THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 1856 R FRANCIS PIGGOTT THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 1856 "LAW OF THE SEA' SERIES OF HISTORICAL AND LEGAL WORKS Vol. I. Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities, 1780-1800. Vols. II., III. Documentary History of the French Wars, 1793-1815. A. 1793 to the Peace of Amiens. B. Peace of Amiens to 1815. Vol. IV. The Declaration of Paris, 1856. A Study. Documented. Vols. V., VI. Principles governing the Relations of Belligerent and Neutral. A. History as the Basis of the Law. B. The Law as derived from History. THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 1856 A STUDY - DOCUMENTED - BY SIR FRANCIS PIGGOTT "Law of the Sea " Series Vol. IV LONDON UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS LTD. 1 8 WARWICK SQUARE, E.G. 4 1919 THE time has come at last when all theories as to the manner in which war ought to be waged are to be revised by the light of experience of war as it is, in fact, waged ; those especially which attempt to control the relations of the belligerents with the neutral merchant. It is essential therefore that the veil which for sixty years has surrounded the Declaration of Paris should be withdrawn, and its story told from Hansard, some few White Books, and documents preserved in the Public Record Office. The task of piecing together the scattered fragments has been made easier by the able assistance and energetic collabora- tion of Miss Sylvia Seeley. In telling the story I have found the need of a moderating influence, and Mr George A. B. Dewar, bringing an open mind to the subject, has supplied it. F. T. P. 14 OLD SQUABE, LINCOLN'S INN TABLE OF CONTENTS P ART I.HISTORICAL 1854 PAGE THE DECLARATIONS OF THE NEUTRALITY OF THE SCANDINAVIAN POWERS ......... 5 II THE GENERAL POSITION, 1853-54 19 A. The Other Neutrals 19 B. The Relations between England and France ... 22 C. Political Opinion in England ..... 24 III DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE AS TO THE PRIN- CIPLES OF MARITIME LAW TO BE ADOPTED DURING THE WAR . . 27 IV THE RIGA DESPATCH 40 V THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE PRIOR TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR 55 VI THE DECLARATIONS TO THE NEUTRALS ..... 73 The Instructions to the Fleets ...... 79 The Answer of the United States : First Marcy Note . 80 VII MR PHILLLMORE'S MOTION, 14th JULY 1854 .... 82 viii The Declaration of Paris 1855 I PAGE THE DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT TRADING WITH THE ENEMY LAND TRANSPORT THROUGH PRUSSIA ... 87 II THE POLITICAL ECONOMISTS' THEORY OF WAR ... 93 III LICENCES TO TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 102 IV THE FACTS AS DESCRIBED BY CONTEMPORARY WRITERS . .110 1856 i THE CONGRESS OF PARIS AND THE TREATY OF PEACE . .115 II THE DECLARATION OF THE CONGRESS . . . . .117 III THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS . . . .124 IV THE POWERS WHICH ADHERED TO THE DECLARATION . .135 INDIRECT ADHERENCES TO THE DECLARATION . . . 140 A. By Treaty with Italy 140 B. By Treaty with France 141 V THE REFUSAL or THE UNITED STATES TO ADHERE . 142 Table of Contents ix 1860-1862 I PAGE THE REPORT OF THE HORSFALL COMMISSION ON MERCHANT SHIPPING, 1860 150 II QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN PARLIAMENT, 1861 . . .153 III THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF PARIS DURING THE CIVIL WAR, 1861 154 IV THE DEBATE OF 1862 . 161 P ART II. COMMENTARY THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION OF PARIS . 173 I THE NATURE OF A DECLARATION : THE TREATY-MAKING PREROGATIVE ........ 174 II THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION EXAMINED . . . . . .179 III THE FORM IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLES ARE STATED . .183 IV THE EFFECT OF WAR ON TREATIES, AND ESPECIALLY ON THIS DECLARATION ........ 189 V THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE DECLARATION THAT " FREE SHIPS MAKE FREE GOODS " 195 x The Declaration of Paris VI PAGE THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO ADHERENCE TO THE DECLARA- TION : INDIVISIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES . .197 VII THE COURTS AND THE DECLARATION 202 VIII THE DECLARATION AND THE LAW OF NATIONS . . . 206 CONCLUSION 214 PART III. DOCUMENTS CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CHIEF HISTORICAL EVENTS CON- NECTED WITH THE RUSSIAN WAR, 1854-1856 . .221 1. DECLARATIONS OF THE NEUTRALITY OF THE SCANDINAVIAN POWERS 223 A. Sweden to the Belligerents ..... 223 Lord Clarendon's Reply ..... 225 B. Denmark to the Belligerents ..... 225 Lord Clarendon's Reply ... .227 C. Denmark to the United States (and other Neutrals) 228 D. Sweden to the United States (and other Neutrals) . 229 E. United States Secretary of State's Reply to Denmark and Sweden 230 2. THE RIGA DESPATCH 230 3. INSTRUCTIONS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MUTUAL PROTECTION OF SUBJECTS AND COMMERCE 231 E. (1) Circular to British Diplomatic and Consular Agents 231 E. (2) Instructions to British Naval Officers . . 233 F. (1) Circular to French Diplomatic and Consular Agents . 234 F. (2) Instructions to French Naval Officers . . 235 Table of Contents xi PAOK 4. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS MARTIN, LEVIN & ADLER AND THE BOARD OF TRADE . . . 237 5. DECLARATIONS TO THE NEUTRALS ..... 240 A. Great Britain 240 B. France. (With Report of M. Drouyn de Lhuys) . 241 6. CREATION OF PRIZE COURTS 243 A. English 243 B. French 247 7. CIRCULAR DESPATCHES ANNOUNCING THE DECLARATION TO THE NEUTRAL POWERS ..... 249 A. British 249 B, C. French 250, 251 8. UNITED STATES DESPATCHES RELATING TO THE DECLARATION TO THE NEUTRALS 252 9. PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDERS IN COUNCIL . . . 268 10. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FLEETS ..... 280 A. English 280 B. French 283 1 1 . CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE RELATIVE TO JOINT CAPTURES, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FLEETS 289 12. BRITISH NOTIFICATIONS OF BLOCKADES .... 298 13. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE BLOCKADES . . 301 14. NEUTRAL LEGISLATION AS TO NAVIGATION DURING THE WAR 305 A. Brazil 305 B. Bremen ........ 305 C. Denmark . . . 307 D. Haiti . . .315 E. Hamburg . . . 316 F. Hanover . . . 318 G. Hawaiian Islands 320 H. Lubeck ... . 320 I. Mecklenburg-Schwerin . 321 J. Naples . 322 K. Portugal . 323 L. Spain 324 M. Sweden 325 xii The Declaration of Paris PACK 15. EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT PIERCE'S MESSAGE TO CON- GRESS, 1854 ....... 329 16. CONVENTIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES AS TO NEUTRALS . . . .331 A. With Russia, 1854 331 B. With the Two Sicilies, 1855 332 C. With Peru, 1856 333 17. PROTOCOLS OF THE CONGRESS OF PARIS, 1856 . . . 335 18. FRENCH PROMULGATION OF THE DECLARATION OF PARIS . 346 19. ADHERENCES TO THE DECLARATION OF PARIS . . . 347 ADHERENCES TO THE MEDIATION CLAUSE . . . 387 20. INDIRECT ADHERENCES ....... 388 A. Guatemala ........ 388 B. Honduras 388 C. Mexico ... .... 389 D. Peru 389 E. Salvador 391 F. Sandwich Islands . . . . . . 392 G. Siam 392 21. UNITED STATES : SECOND MARCY NOTE, 1856 . . . 393 22. UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR A CONVENTION, 1857 . 404 23. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT SHIPPING, 1860. EXTRACT RELATING TO BELLIGERENT RIGHTS AT SEA 408 24. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE DECLARATION OF PARIS : CORRESPONDENCE . . . . . .411 25. OBSERVANCE OF THE DECLARATION ..... 435 BRITISH ORDER IN COUNCIL : APPLICATION OF DECLARATION OF PARIS IN THE EVENT OF WAR BY FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN AGAINST CHINA, 1860 . . 435 26. OBSERVANCE OF PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION . . 437 A. Proclamation by the United States . . . 437 B. Proclamation by Spain ... . 439 ADDENDUM TO CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE BLOCKADES 440 INDEX . . . 442 PART I HISTORICAL * THE immediate cause of the war which broke out in 1853 was a dispute which had arisen between France and Russia upon the custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The real cause was the intention of Russia to hasten the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Nicholas, in a memorable conversation, actually suggested to the British ambassador at St Petersburg that England should receive Egypt and Crete as her own portion of the spoil. This con- versation, which took place in January 1853, was at once reported to the British Government. It undoubtedly prepared the way for future trouble. ... It had the effect of rendering the British Ministry suspicious of his intentions, at a moment when a good under- standing with this country was of the first importance to the Czar of Russia. . . . Almost at the same moment he affronted France by declining to call Napoleon " Monsieur mon frere." . . . Nicholas had the singular indiscretion to render a British Ministry suspicious of him, and a French Emperor angry with him, in the same month. Napoleon could easily avenge the affront. . . . The Greek and Latin Churches both claimed the right of protecting the Holy Places of Palestine. Both appealed to a Mahometan arrangement in support of then* claim : each declined to admit the pretensions of the other. The Latin Church in Palestine was under the protection of France ; the Greek Church was under the protection of Russia ; and France and Russia had constantly supported, one against the other, these rival claims. In the beginning of 1853 France renewed the contro- versy. She even threatened to settle the question by force. The man whom Nicholas would not call " mon frere " was stirring a contro- versy thick with trouble for the Czar of Russia. . . . The dispute about the Holy Places was soon superseded by a general demand of Russia for the adequate protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte. In the summer of 1853 the demand took the shape of an ultimatum ; and when the Turkish Ministers, declined to comply with the Russian demand, a Russian army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities. In six months a miserable quarrel about the custody of the Holy Places had assumed dimensions which were clearly threatening war. At the advice of England the Porte abstained from treating the occupation of the Principalities as an act of war ; and diplomacy consequently secured an interval for arrang- ing peace. The Austrian Government framed a note, which is known as the Vienna Note, as a basis of a settlement. England and the neutral Powers assented to the note ; Russia accepted it ; and it was then presented to the Porte. But Turkey, with the obstinacy which has always characterised its statesmen, declined to accept it. War might even then have been prevented if the British Government had boldly insisted on its acceptance, and had told Turkey that if she modified the conditions she need not count on England's assistance. One of the leading members of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry wished to do this, and declared to the last hour of his life that this course should have been taken. But the course was not taken. Turkey was permitted, or, according to Baron Stockmar, encouraged to modify the Vienna Note ; the modifications were rejected by Russia ; and the Porte, on the 26th of September, delivered an ultimatum, and on the 4th of October 1853 declared war. These events excited a very widespread indignation in this country. The people, indeed, were only imperfectly acquainted with the causes which had produced the quarrel ; many of them were unaware that the complication had been originally introduced by the act of France ; others of them failed* to reflect that the refusal of the Porte to accept a note which the four Great Powers of which England was one had agreed upon was the immediate cause of hostilities. Those who were better informed thought that the note was a mistake, and that the Turk had exercised a wise discretion in rejecting it ; while the whole nation instinctively felt that Russia throughout the negotiations had acted with unnecessary harshness. In October 1853, therefore, the country was almost unanimously in favour of supporting the Turk. The events of the next few weeks turned this feeling into enthusiasm. The Turkish army, under Omar Pasha, proved its mettle by winning one or two victories over the Russian troops. The Turkish fleet at Sinope was suddenly attacked and destroyed. Its destruction was, undoubtedly, an act of war : it was distorted into an act of treachery ; a rupture between England and Russia became thenceforward inevit- able. . . . (Spencer Walpole, Foreign Relations, ch. iiL pp. 99-102.) So early as 28th of January 1853 the French Emperor perceived that his measures had effectually roused the Czar's hostility to the Sultan, and he instantly proposed to England that the two Powers should act together in extinguishing the flames which he himself had just kindled, and so endeavour to come to a joint understanding, with a view to resist the ambition of Russia. Knowing beforehand what the policy of England was, he all at once adopted, and proposed it to our Government in the very terms always used by English states- men. (Kinglake, History of the Crimean War, i. p. 343.) * * * La Russie, souveraine absolue de la Mer Noir, n'ayant qu'a etendre la main pour toucher le Bosphore, plaait la Mediterranee sous la menace des flottes de Sebastopol ; du fond de ses ports in- accessibles, elle atteignait tous les empires et tous les royaumes. Les quatre grandes puissances europeennes s'unirent afin d'em- pecher une guerre qui semblait imminente, et dans le but, tout en sauvegardant 1'amour propre de la Russie de sauvegarder aussi 1'inde- pendance de la Turquie. Toutefois la France et 1'Angleterre devant le developpement de 1'aggression Russe tinrent leurs escadres a portee de secourir effi- cacement le Sultan. Le sort est jete : les dernieres croyances de paix sont evanouies, les relations diplomatiques de la France et de 1'Angleterre ont cesse avec la Russie. Les declarations de guerres sont echangees, on se prepare a combattre. (Bazancourt, U Expedition de Crimee, Intro- duction, xxvi, and t. i. ch. i.) The Declarations of the Neutrality of the Scandinavian Powers.* EARLY in January 1854, the spread of the war begun between Turkey and Russia in the previous October appeared imminent. Lord Palmerston resigned from the Aberdeen Administration in December 1853, because he thought the Government's policy towards Russia was not firm enough. The British fleet was ordered to the Black Sea, and a few days later he resumed office. The coming of the Western nations to the assistance of the Porte then seemed certain ; and the neutrals began to take steps for fostering the commerce which follows in the train of war. The neutrals were the Scandinavian Powers, their people long-established traders in material essential to naval warfare ; the steps were those assertions of rights which had become a tradition among them. The spell of peace which had blessed the nations for forty years was about to be broken ; the supply of materials was fully equal to the heavy demands of the pending war ; the trade prospects were good ; there would certainly be the traditional difficulties in getting cargoes safe to belligerent ports. Turkey's allies were those two countries who in their great wars had wrangled over the rights of neutrals almost as strenuously as they had fought ; divided counsels on such vexed questions were more than probable. There were rumours, too, that a change had been gradually coming over certain sections of British public opinion ; prompt action was therefore advisable. If the rumours were true, 1 This chapter is based almost entirely on despatches preserved in the Public Record Office. These despatches, as well as those referred to in other chapters, are to be found in the official volumes as under : Sweden : F.O. 73 ; Nos. 254, 259, 260, 261. Denmark : F.O. 22 ; Nos. 205, 207, 208. Prussia : F.O. 64 ; Nos. 359, 364, 367, 368, 369. France : F.O. 27 ; Nos. 996, 997, 1005-1012. 5 6 The Declaration of Paris even premature action was not likely to be resented, more especially as the advocates of the new ideas were in power. Moreover, although negotiations were still going on, although the scales which held peace and war had not yet dipped, Russia was taking steps to strengthen her position. The occasion seemed specially favourable for a forward policy. On 2nd January 1854, Sweden and Denmark presented identical despatches containing premature declarations of neutrality x which, in plain language, were polite but firm intima- tions to Britain, France, and Russia of what they might expect from these neutrals in the event of war. It was an ultimatum with the familiar burden, " respect for the neutral flag." The documents are true to the tradition of the Armed Neutralities, of which these two countries had been such prominent members. They were not couched in the old crude terms. There was no appeal to the applause of all Europe. A more sober diplomacy had intervened : but the old point, that the neutral claim was a " right," was expressed in clear and unmistakeable language. The steadfast adherence to "a strict neutrality founded in good faith, impartiality, and an equal respect for the rights of all the Powers," would impose on the Kings of Sweden and Denmark certain obligations, and assure to them certain ad- vantages. The obligations were many to abstain from parti- cipation, direct or indirect ; to admit to their ports the war- ships and merchantmen of the belligerents, with certain re- strictions ; to refuse admittance to privateers ; to accord to belligerent vessels facilities for the supply of stores, not contra- band of war ; to exclude prizes from their ports except in cases of distress. The terms in which these obligations were defined would not, on the face of them, cause any discussion. The time, indeed, appeared specially opportune for a strong line as to privateers. The " advantages " were comprised in a single sentence " To enjoy " in their commercial relations with the countries at war " all security and all facilities " for their " vessels as well as for their cargoes, with the obligation at all times for such vessels to conform to the regulations generally established and recognised for special cases of declared and effec- tive blockade." There was, however, a touch of the old Armed Neutrality spirit in the concluding paragraph of the declarations : " Such are the general principles of the neutrality adopted by His Majesty the King ... in the event of war breaking out in Europe. His Majesty the King flatters himself that they will be acknowledged as in conformity with the Law of Nations." 1 Document No. 1. Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 7 Rumours of concerted action between Sweden and Denmark as neutrals in the event of war had reached London in the autumn of 1853, and Mr Grey, British Minister at Stockholm, was instructed on the 12th November to ascertain what arrangements had already been made. The King declined to give Mr Grey the required information ; but he informed him that it was his intention to make a declaration of policy as soon as a communication had been received from Copenhagen. M. Lobstein, the French Minister, had, however, received im- portant intelligence from the King, which he communicated to Mr Grey. There were to be two chief points in the declaration of neutrality : (1) a specification of ports to be closed to the belligerents ; and (2) " que le pavilion neutre couvre la mar- chandise." With regard to the second point, it had been proposed by Sweden to Denmark, but Mr Grey adds : " I have reason to believe that there is not the same unanimity upon the subject. The King in his conversation with M. Lobstein told him that he took it for granted Russia would recognise the principle laid down in it, but I do not hear that he made any allusion to England." The following extract was enclosed from the Svenska Tidningen of the 18th November : Russia is preparing for a European War, but we pre- pare for a neutrality in keeping with our rank and advan- tageous position not one which may be trampled upon, or the honour of which may be impaired by anyone making use of our peaceable coast for their benefit. On the 19th December Mr Greyreported that Baron Stjerneld, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, had asked him if he knew the views of the British Government with regard to the neutral flag, dwelling on the injustice of refusing to admit that the flag protects the merchandise. Mr Grey thought that doubt as to the course the British Government would take had caused great distrust of England, and was the reason why he could obtain no information as to the forthcoming declaration of neutrality. The French Minister had told him that the matter of the declaration was entirely agreed upon between Sweden and Denmark. In the same despatch Mr Grey informed Lord Clarendon of a statement made to him by Baron Stjerneld, that " if England refused to admit the principle that the neutral flag protects the merchandise, before six months were over she would have a war with the United States." This state- ment might have been based on inferences drawn from the history of the early years of the century ; it might also have been based on information of actual negotiations on the subject 8 The Declaration of Paris between Washington and Copenhagen. Mr Grey evidently had suspicions that such negotiations were in progress, and they were confirmed. He wrote on the llth February 1854, that from conversations he had been led to believe that " the Swedish Government might endeavour to come to some understanding with the United States, in case of difficulties arising between Sweden and England, upon the question of the neutral flag." The declarations of neutrality had, in fact, been notified to the United States by Denmark on the 20th January, 1 and by Sweden on the 28th, 2 as also to the other neutral Powers. The reason for this action was explained in the Danish Note to be that the King, having nothing more at heart than to maintain and cement the relations of friendship and under- standing which so happily reigned between him and all the Governments of Europe, regarded it "as a duty not to leave the allied and friendly Powers in ignorance of the line of policy " which he proposed to follow in the possible contingency of a maritime war. The body of the documents reproduced the Notes which had been sent to the belligerents. The American Secretary of State replied in both cases, on the 14th February, 3 that the views expressed by the two Govern- ments were regarded by the President " with all the interest which the occasion demands." Mr Grey also wrote on the llth February that he had been informed " that Sweden could not count upon the support of America upon this question, and the sympathies of the latter were certainly on the side of England in case of a war with Russia," an intimation which Baron Stjerneld was said to have received with some disappointment. This information was the more important, as our Minister understood that the American Charge d' Affaires had proposed on his own motion " that it might be advisable to send a small squadron to the Baltic in the spring, in the event of a war, for the protection of American commerce." The replies received from the other Powers, especially those from Prussia and Austria, were reported by Mr Grey to be " entirely satisfactory." Even more interesting information as to the attitude of the United States in the event of war came into the possession of the Government in February. The Czar had been endeavour- ing to obtain its consent to the issue of Russian letters of marque to United States citizens. The information had been received by the French Government, and was immediately reported to 1 Document No. 1C. a Document No. ID. ' Document No. 1 E. Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 9 London. M. Drouyn de Lhuys intended to address the United States, saying that the old cordial relations which had existed between the two countries assured him that the proposal would not be countenanced. Lord Cowley was instructed to inform the French Minister of the British Government's sympathetic concurrence with the despatch. Reports tend to show that public opinion in the United States was entirely favourable to the allies, 1 but this question of serving in Russian privateers presented difficulties which stood in the way of its effective prohibition. On the 22nd March, Mr Mason, the United States Minister in Paris, in- formed the Secretary of State that it was the point on which most apprehension was felt. 2 Lord Clarendon in the same month discussed the question of privateering generally with Mr Buchanan, the Minister in London, and the means of suppress- ing it, speaking in highly complimentary terms of the treaties which the United States had concluded with different nations " stipulating that if one of the parties be neutral and the other belligerent, the subjects of the neutral accepting commissions as privateers to cruize against the other from the opposing belligerent, shall be punished as pirates." Mr Buchanan added : 3 " These ideas were doubtless suggested to his mind by the apprehension felt here . . . that our sailors will be employed to cruize against British commerce." The apprehension had not subsided in April, when Mr Marcy referred to it in a despatch to Mr Buchanan. Great Britain and France, he says, would both most readily enter into conventions, but in spite of the provision in existing treaties he did not think that the President " would permit it to be inserted in any new one." I have not come across any record of Americans having accepted Russian letters of marque ; but it will not be un- interesting to record Mr Mason's opinion on this question, and the somewhat ingenious way in which he links it up with the other question of the neutral flag. 1 CONSUL BANCROFT TO LORD CLARENDON. Cincinnati, 5th July 1855. Public opinion in this city and State and the adjacent States, and generally, and I might say universally, throughout the interior, where the true American opinion is best to be gathered, is decidedly favourable to Great Britain in respect to the Russian war. This favourable opinion pervades all classes. I speak only of the interior, as it is my Consular district, leaving those on the seaboard to report according to their in- formation : but I can confidently affirm that the favourable feeling is persistent throughout the whole of the United States. (State Papers, vol. xlvii. p. 360.) * Document No. 8 C. * Document No. 8 D. 10 The Declaration of Paris The point on which most apprehension is felt, is the engagement of citizens and vessels of the United States in privateering under the Russian flag. I have urged that, with every disposition to prevent such unlawful proceed- ings by our people, the Government would find much difficulty in enforcing its laws, unless sustained by public opinion in the United States, and aided by the people, as well as by officers of Government ; that with the vast extent of sea-coast of the United States, the Government could not have information of the preparation of vessels for such enterprizes, in all cases, in time to suppress them, unless the people felt an anxious desire that the laws should be executed ; that if the allies adopted just and liberal measures in regard to neutral rights, it would give profitable returns to a safe business, and the entire mercantile community of the United States would, from a sense of justice and of national duty, as well as of their own interest, be found ready to aid the Government in executing the laws ; that, tempting as might be the offers to engage under the Russian flag, to cruize against the commerce of the allies, the danger of the service, the difficulty of realizing their prizes by adjudication, and, above all, the actual profit of lawful trade, under equitable and fair rules in respect to neutral rights, and the public satisfaction at seeing just principles established among nations, would probably prevent our citizens, however bold and adventurous, from taking part in the assaults on the commerce of the allies. The second question discussed in the preliminary conversa- tions related to the closing of the Baltic ports. It was reported that Russia had demanded, in the event of war, that Swedish ports should remain open to her but closed to England and France. According to another report, Russia's demand was that all the ports of Sweden should be closed to all belligerents, including herself. According to yet another, that she should have permission to carry her prizes into Carlscrona, and also into Slito in case of necessity, the same favour not to be accorded to England and France. These demands, whichever might have been the true one, were refused. Sweden declared that she would only close those ports the entrance to which she could defend ; but the whole question, as Mr Grey's despatch of 30th January pointed out, 1 caused the King great anxiety lest Russia should be tempted to support her demands by force. 1 MB GREY TO LORD CLARENDON. Stockholm, Jan. 30, 1854. After reporting that the arrival of the Russian courier, M. Daschkoff, aroused public curiosity in Stockholm, and that M. Daschkoff had read Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 11 If Russia could persuade Sweden to close all her ports, she would place the allies at a great disadvantage. If some of them remained open it would enable the English and French ships to refit, whereas if all were closed, Russia would suffer no in- convenience, for she had her own Baltic ports to rely on. It was worth a diplomatic discussion to press the assumption of the international lawyers that the conditions of perfect neu- trality require that neutral action must be equal on both sides : what is granted to one belligerent must be granted to the other. So the question was seriously raised by Russia that this condi- tion of equal treatment would not be fulfilled if the allies derived a benefit from the action of Sweden of which she need not avail herself ! Therefore all the ports must be closed. A question of the same nature arose on the other side. The allies pressed for the closing of Copenhagen by Denmark. Her Majesty's Government could not consent to be excluded from to them a despatch to the King of Sweden, expressing the Emperor of Russia's desire that Sweden should close all her ports to all belligerents in the event of war, Mr Grey continues : "This demand was founded upon the disadvantage under which Russia would lie if the English and French fleets were allowed to enter the Swedish ports. The demand was made in temperate and conciliating language, and the King of Sweden's answer will be sent from here to-morrow. That answer is a decided negative, and both Baron Stjerneld and Baron Manderstrom said to me that they were convinced Her Majesty's Government would be satisfied with it. The King had desired that the greatest reserve should be observed with regard to the Corps Diplomatique at Stockholm, in order that it might never be alleged that his answer to Russia had been dictated by foreign influence, for though Sweden was a small Power, she was an independent one. The Swedish Government were, however, bound not to lose sight of the fact that whatever might be the issue of the war, if war there was, Russia would always be the neighbour of Sweden, and that it was therefore doubly important to the latter to avoid giving offence to the former. In the present instance, it could not be denied that the attitude of Sweden would, in the event of a war, be more advantageous for England and France than for Russia, but they could not alter her geographical position, and there was no hesitation on the part of the King, whose refusal to comply with the demands of Russia was most decided. " There appears to me to be a very general dread among the Swedes of a sudden attack being made by Russia upon the Island of Gottland. The Crown Prince has repeatedly expressed to me his alarm with regard to the position of Gottland, and he- lately gave me to understand that the Russian forces were being increased in Finland. I accordingly asked Baron Manderstrom to-day if he had heard of reinforcements being sent to that quarter. He answered, ' Not yet, but they are being sent,' and he, I am bound to say, added that he had no apprehension as regards Gottland, but that he feared the Russians might mean to take possession of a portion of Finnmark, where there were ports which were never closed by ice. He mentioned particularly the Waranger Fiord. Baron Manderstrom is, however, the only person I have seen who has expressed this opinion, and the fact of two regiments being now under orders to march for Gott- land as soon as the weather admits, is a proof that the Government see the necessity of being on their guard in that quarter." 12 The Declaration of Paris those fortified ports in the Baltic which would be convenient to the allies, while the only Danish port which they could not use was to be left open for the use of our enemies. The ques- tion was ultimately settled, and Copenhagen was closed as far as necessary for the safety of the town and arsenal. The Prussian ports were not closed because, not being a naval power, Prussia had no means of enforcing her neutrality. To revert to the Scandinavian declarations, the interest of which centres in the advantage to be assured by their neutrality to the subjects of Sweden and Norway and Denmark. They were " to enjoy all security and all facilities for vessels belonging to them, as well as for their cargoes " : in other words, their " free ships " were to make " free goods." On the receipt of these declarations one of two courses might have been adopted, either of which would have been appropriate to the occasion. A curt reply might have been sent pointing out that as a state of war did not in fact exist, neither did a state of neutrality, and therefore the questions raised were premature ; or a polite intimation might have been given that the declarations had been received and note taken of their contents an accus6 de reception, leaving the consideration of them to a more convenient hour. But from the unpublished despatches it appears that the British and French Governments had been informed in the autumn of 1853 that Sweden and Denmark intended to make a declaration, and that they were particularly anxious to ascer- tain what attitude the allied Governments intended to adopt towards the neutral flag. The allies were themselves anxious to know what would be the attitude of the Scandinavian Powers, and they had a very clear intimation that they intended to press for the recognition of " free ships free goods." Yet another curious point will presently appear. The King of Sweden seems to have been more ready to impart information to the French than the English Minister. M. Lobstein, however, at once passed on all that he had learnt to Mr Grey. And yet the French Government appears to have been in the dark as to Lord Clarendon's intentions. M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote twice to Count Walewski, the French Ambassador in London, on the subject : on the 4th January, instructing him to ascertain what those intentions were ; on the 12th more particularly to try and discover what answer to Sweden and Denmark would be given by Great Britain. He would give much, he said, for Lord Clarendon's answer to be in the same terms as his own. Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 13 M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. 1854, Jan. 4. Tachez de connaitre a cette occasion, quelles sont les dispositions actuelles du gouvernement anglais en ce qui concerne les neutres. C'est une matiere sur laquelle a r^gne jusqu'ici entre PAngleterre et nous une grande dif- ference d'opinions. J'ai d'ailleurs sujet de penser, d'apres un commencement de polemique que j'ai remarque dans les journeaux anglais, que le commerce serait peu favorable a 1'application des anciennes doctrines du gouvernement britannique dans toute leur rigueur. Je vous prie, tout en evitant d'entamer une discussion prematuree sur la question de droit, de recueillir sur ce point des informations aussi exactes que faire se pourra, et de chercher a savoir notamment a quelles obligations le cabinet de Londres croit le Danemarck et la Suede tenus envers lui dans 1'exercice de la neutralite. Lord Clarendon n'ignore pas, sans doute, que la Russie eprouve un vif mecontentement de Pattitude de ces deux puissances, et en particulier de celle de la Suede. C'est une raison de plus pour nous, ce me semble, de croire a la sincerite" des resolutions des cabinets de Copenhague et de Stockholm et de ne pas augmenter, par de trop grandes exigences, les embarras de leur position. 1854, Jan. 12. J'attacherais un grand prix a ce que la reponse de lord Clarendon fut con9ue, autant que possible, dans le meme sens que la notre, et put tranquilliser entierement la Suede et le Danemarck sur 1'exercice de leur neutralite. Je sais que le gouvernement anglais n'est pas prepare a se departir de ses anciennes maximes en matiere de droit maritime ; mais je desire qu'au moins dans la pratique il mette sa conduite d'accord avec la notre, si la guerre vient a eclater. Tout prouve en effet que ce sera le meilleur moyen d'accroitre les sympathies que nous temoignent les deux Cours scandinaves, et a cause de notre bon droit dans la question generate, et a cause des exigences blessantes que le cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg a mises en avant aupres d'elles. La neutralite meme est un acte d'inde- pendance envers la Russie que leurs liens de famille et les ev6nements de ces dernieres annees rendent tres-meritoire et dont leur puissant voisin ne se dissimule pas le caractere peu bienveillant. C'est done une attitude qui peut les rapprocher plus encore de nous dans certaines eventualites, et qu'il faut menager avec soin. Trop de rigueur au con- traire dans la surveillance des relations commerciales que le pavilion marchand de la Suede et du Danemarck tachera d'entretenir avec les ports russes, pourrait refroidir des 14 The Declaration of Paris sentiments qui sont en ce moment tels que nous devons les desirer et amener les discussions d'une nature facheuse. Je sais que la Suede compte avec confiance sur la liberte du commerce sous pavilion neutre. Apparently the English answer was sent without having been communicated to France ; and a despatch from Mr Grey, of the 30th January, shows that the French answer was not so explicit in its acceptance of the principles put forward by Sweden and Denmark, and did not give entire satisfaction. The non-receipt of the English reply is difficult to follow, as Lord Clarendon's despatch was dated the 20th January; it should have been received in Stockholm on the 30th. On the 6th February, however, the King of Sweden wished Mr Grey to report " the satisfaction of the Swedish Government at receiving so friendly a reply to their Declaration." There was another despatch, dated the 23rd February, which will be referred to presently. MR GREY TO LORD CLARENDON. MY LORD Stockholm, 30 Jan. 1854. Mr Lobstein, the French Minister, communicated on the 24th inst. to the Swedish Government the reply of the French Government to the Swedish Declaration of Neu- trality. The Government have expressed themselves as being satisfied with it as far as it goes, but they would have wished it to be more explicit, and I am informed that Count Lowenhielm, the Swedish Minister at Paris, will be instructed to apply for a further communication on the subject. Baron Stjerneld said to me to-day that he was most anxious to receive the reply of Her Majesty's Government, and begged me to write to Your Lordship to that effect. He said that the Swedish merchants were somewhat alarmed on account of the doubt which existed as to the course England would take as regards the privileges of the Neutral flag. 1 1 Doubts as to the sincerity of the allies' promises in their Declarations seem to have been felt in Sweden. The United States Charge d' Affaires forwarded to the Secretary of State from Stockholm on the 10th April a translation of the new Swedish Ordinance [Document No. 14 K] relative to contraband of war. His comments on the Declaration throw a curious light on the gratitude of neutrals for benefits received : "You will best know what reliance may be safely placed upon the equitable promises which have been held out to neutrals by the belligerent Powers ; seemingly triumphs of the enlightened age over historic reminiscences of war. It would ill become me to offer an opinion of the realities to be looked for ; but the forebodings of the more intelligent men of the country weigh upon this community ; and, although unconfessed by Government, they are the real con- trolling influences in the Council of State." [Document No. 8 G.] Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 15 It is difficult to reconcile all these inconsistencies. But the policy of a Government must be judged by its public statements. Even in January some of the problems of maritime law which the war would bring in its train must have been apparent. If war were declared, England and France would be in alliance : it would be in one of its aspects a maritime war : the principles of maritime law recognised by the two countries were not uniform. But, seeing that joint action was inevitable, con- sultation with our ally was essential. It was impossible for Lord Clarendon to take upon himself to assert that he intended to adhere to the traditional British belligerent policy of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships : equally impossible for him to accept the proposition that the principle asserted by the Scandinavian Powers was in conformity with the Law of Nations, or to say without further consideration that in the circumstances it would be acquiesced in. When the views of France had been ascertained, the policy which would be adopted during the war, should it break out, would then be decided. But Lord Clarendon adopted the one course which was in direct opposition to the traditional policy of the country ; and apparently without consulting the French Government. The Note had received the best attention of Her Majesty's Govern- ment, and he was " glad to express the satisfaction with which they have learned the neutral policy " which it was the intention of the Scandinavian Powers " to pursue," and the measures "adopted for giving effect to that policy." Her Majesty's Government did not doubt " that if war should unfortunately occur, the engagements taken will be strictly and honourably fulfilled," and would use their best endeavours " in support of the neutral position" that these Powers proposed "to maintain." The matter was not referred to in Parliament until the 10th February, when the Earl of Ellenborough asked in the House of Lords whether any communication had been received from the Scandinavian Powers "as to their intentions with respect to their utter neutrality, or modified neutrality, in the event of hostilities occurring in the Baltic." Lord Clarendon replied : Yes, they have announced their intention of preserv- ing a strict and perfect neutrality, and given a list of ports and fortified places to which ships of war of the belligerents could not be admitted. Our answer was that we approve the system of policy which they propose to adopt, and the manner in which they intend to carry it out. I may also say that we shall respect that neutrality. In answer to a further question whether " exception had been taken with respect to certain Baltic ports essential to the 16 The Declaration of Paris practical action of our fleet," as "we stood on great inequality with Russia, whose fleet could shelter in her own ports in stress of weather, while we had no refuge at hand," Lord Clarendon said that, " no exception has been taken by us to any part of the communication, and the naval authorities were consulted before our answer was sent." He added that great exception had, however, been taken by Russia. The House being still in the dark as to the nature of the communication, papers were asked for on the 13th February, and there being no objection, the Scandinavian notifications, together with the answers, were issued in a White Paper. 1 The terms used in these despatches are worthy of note. Sweden and Denmark had informed the prospective belligerents that they as neutrals intended to adopt certain principles, asserted to be in conformity with the Law of Nations, which would assure to them certain advantages. Lord Clarendon expressed satisfaction with the policy, and the measures adopted for giving effect to that policy, and stated that the British Government would support the neutral position which these States proposed to maintain, and had taken no exception to any part of the communication. So far as concerned the obliga- tions which neutrality imposes on non-belligerents, the terms used by Sweden and Denmark were justified ; but so far as the advantages which a neutral would derive from it, the last word rests with the belligerents. In Lord Clarendon's opinion, how- ever, it is permissible for neutral Governments to lay down prin- ciples on which belligerents are to conduct the war in so far as the commerce of those neutrals may be affected. And, further, the principle which Sweden and Denmark required the belligerents to adopt was " free ships free goods." It is therefore clear that Lord Clarendon, after full warning of the intention of these Powers to claim the benefit of the principle, and after full con- sideration, had adopted this principle by the middle of January. Lord Clarendon appears to have consulted Lord Cranworth, the Lord Chancellor, whose view was that the attitude of Sweden and Denmark was " one of which we cannot complain." The Queen's Advocate was Sir J. D. Harding. LORD CRANWORTH TO LORD CLARENDON. 40 Upper Brook Street, 16 Jany. 1854. MY DEAR LORD CLARENDON, I send you back the Swedish and Danish Declarations of Neutrality, with the Queen's Advocate's opinion on 1 Document No. 1. Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 17 them. There can be no doubt but that he is right in saying that the course of conduct which Sweden and Denmark prescribe for themselves will be one of perfect neutrality, and one of which we cannot complain. I doubt whether in such circumstances it would be wise to ask these States to modify the regulations which they have proposed for them- selves. But this must depend on the degree of disadvantage which, in a naval and military point of view, we shall be likely to incur from having the ports in question left open to both belligerents. Unless it is very apparent, I should be inclined not to interfere with their own proposals. It would be very desirable to get these States to treat coal as contraband of war. It is not, as I believe, one of the articles so agreed to be treated in the existing conventions, and, if I am right, then it is by treaty an article which is not contraband of war. If they will not agree to add it to the articles now forbidden as contraband, it will be for considera- tion whether the altered state of things since the dates of the existing treaties, does not warrant us in saying we shall, in spite of the treaties, prevent its importation into an enemy's port. But this would be a strong measure, and not to be resorted to until all other measures fail. I think you should ascertain what are the existing treaties with Sweden and Denmark (if any) as to what articles are and what are not contraband. The Queen's Advocate would, I dare say, tell you at once. Very truly Yours, CRANWORTH. I have so far considered the Scandinavian declarations of neutrality solely as an incident which preceded the outbreak of the war with Russia, and from these points of view : their prematurity, their pretensions, and the acceptance of these pretensions by Lord Clarendon. There^ is another and more important aspect their historical relation, already hinted at, to the Armed Neutralities. In the manner of putting forward the claim, in the assumption that these two Kings were the infallible interpreters of the Law of Nations, these documents were so reminiscent of the claims made, and of the manner of the documents issued by the League of the Northern Neutrals, that their inspiration must have been palpable even to the least profound student of history. 1 There was more ; it was the traditional attitude of Sweden towards Great Britain at war. At the outbreak of the war in 1793, in accordance with their plan for isolating revolutionary France, Sweden, with other 1 See vol. i. of this series The Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities ; and vol. v., where the history of the Leagues will be dealt with at length. 2 18 The Declaration of Paris countries, had been invited by Russia and Great Britain to join their alliance. The offer was rejected, the King's intention to preserve the strictest neutrality being conveyed through Holland. But rumours getting abroad in Haarlem and other towns giving an erroneous interpretation of his attitude, an instruction on the subject was issued by the King renewing his intention of observing " la neutralite la plus stricte tant envers les Puissances combinees qu'envers la France." The document l concluded with this sentence : Sa Majeste attend de meme, que le Pavilion Suedois sera duement respecte durant la presente guerre, et en suffrira pas la moindre insulte, mais au contraire eprouvera toute assistance possible, et ne sera point trouble dans ce commerce, auquel un pavilion neutre est autorise. There is no mistaking the meaning of this declaration ; it was an intimation that Sweden expected the belligerents to respect the principle " free ships free goods." The intention expressed by Sweden and Denmark in their convention of 1794 to protect their ships in the exercise of rights based on treaties, or founded in the Droit des Gens Universel, " dont la jouissance ne sauroit etre disputee a des Nations neutres et independantes," 2 was a more circuitous method of saying the same thing. In the earliest stages, therefore, of the story of the Declara- tion of Paris, Lord Clarendon put himself in this dilemma : either he had forgotten the history of our troubles with the neutrals in 1780 and 1800, or he had deliberately ignored it in favour of the new opinions which had begun at this time to gain ground that our policy during those periods was wrong, and the neutral contentions right. It seems probable that the new policy was deliberately adopted. It is not surprising that it was vigorously attacked by those who believed that England's position in the world depended, and rightly depended, on the principles on which her belligerent action was based. 1 Swedish Declaration of Neutrality, 6th March 1793. De Martens, Reciteil, v. p. 237 : (2nd ed.) v. p. 567. 2 Convention, 27th March 1794, art. iv. ; De Martens, Recuett, v. p. 274 : (2nd ed.) v. p. 606. The General Position, 1853-54 19 II The General Position, 1853-54. A. THE OTHER NEUTRALS. The declarations of neutrality issued by the Scandinavian Powers were too much infected with the spirit of the Armed Neutralities for this question not to present itself to other neutral Governments Were they not bound in their own interests to follow the lead ? Indeed, the formation of an armed neutrality by the German States seems at one time to have been considered possible. 1 Yet another unusual question arose. It is the right of nations that are not parties to the quarrel to remain neutral : it is customary for them to make a formal statement of their intentions. But the premature issue of these declarations, stating the conditions which the belligerents were required to observe towards these neutrals, gave them an opportunity to say whether they agreed ; and they did, in fact, answer as if the declarations were in order. But then, almost inevitably, this led to discussion whether the answers received from the belli- gerents were satisfactory. The Russian answer was considered unsatisfactory. The neutrals were thus allowed to take charge. The records are incomplete and do not throw too much light on this curious position ; and the general principles of neutrality are confused with the question already alluded to, the closing of the Baltic ports. The geographical position of the Scandi- navian countries, lying midway between the belligerents in the northern area of the conflict, the proximity of Sweden to Russia, the certainty that there would be fighting in the Baltic, made the question of the neutral ports one of grave concern to both belligerents as well as to the neutral countries. In the absence of any definite guiding principle, a triangular discussion became inevitable between nations who were not yet neutrals and nations who were not yet belligerents ; and it was accentuated by the efforts made by each belligerent to invest the neutrality of the other States of Europe with the appearance of friendliness to its cause. For the allies had persuaded themselves that they were embarking on a holy war ; and, though the invitation to other countries to join them in the crusade was not so formal as that given by England and Russia to join the alliance against re- volutionary France, the hope that their neutrality might at least be benevolent was conveyed par voie diplomatique. M. Drouyn 1 See p. 20. 20 The Declaration of Paris de Lhuys, in a Memoir e l published in 1868, referring to the joint policy which was clearly traced for the allies, says : " Elles devraient done veiller a ce que rien dans leur conduite ne vint blesser les neutralites bienveillantes qu'elles desiraient transformer en concours avoue." On the part of Russia there were counter-efforts to eliminate from it anything in the nature of covert friendliness, and make it " rigorous." Prussia and Austria were the uncertain factors in the situation. Nominally they were linked by the common interests of the Germanic Confederation of which Austria was the leading Power, but the long-standing elements of discord between them affected the discussions. Austria very early in the year had proposed to Prussia that the smaller States of Europe should be invited to associate themselves with the two leading German Powers in a declaration of neutrality, urging the necessity of consolidat- ing the whole of Central Europe into one united body whose combined military force would enable it to withstand an attack from any quarter. Baron Manteuffel seems to have treated this suggestion as referring to political neutrality, and to have ignored any commerical bearing which might have been intended. He replied that "the concert and the union which was most efficacious was that of the four Powers [England, France, Austria, and Prussia] which was at present most com- pletely attained in the Congress at Vienna." Lord Clarendon learned of this answer with much satisfaction. The King of Prussia was wavering : firm while he relied on his Foreign Minister, Baron Manteuffel ; weak when his brother- in-law, the Czar, used his influence over him, which he did without remorse. For the Scandinavian Powers a joint declara- tion of neutrality from Prussia and Austria would evidently be a source of strength. It was the policy of the Czar to separate them. Sir Augustus Loftus reported from Berlin on the 2nd December that the King's rejection of the joint declaration had given rise to the suspicion that he " was about to take an opposite course of action to Austria with regard to the Eastern 1 The Memoire read before the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in April 1868, is entitled " Les Neutres pendant la Guerrd d' Orient." It contained a full account of the negotia- tions between England and France from January to March 1854, relative to the Declaration issued to the neutrals at the outbreak of war, together with copies of his own despatches to Count Walewski, French Ambassador in London. Copies of the pamphlet have entirely disappeared in England ; but I was fortunate enough to obtain a copy from Paris through the exer- tions of my friend Mr J. T. B. Sewell, Solicitor to the British Embassy. Subsequently I discovered that a translation of it had been included in the Appendix to the Report of the Royal Commission on Neutrality, pub- lished in 1868. Mr David Urquhart wrote of it with characteristic vehemence in the Diplomatic Review. The General Position, 1853-54 21 question." For Prussia the success of either side would be the inevitable prelude of the reconstitution of the kingdom of Poland. The British Ambassador had no fear that the King would place himself at the mercy of Russia so long as Baron Manteuffel remained at the head of affairs ; " but the Russian party at Court had lately brought great pressure to bear on the King and others, by describing the danger to which Prussia would be exposed if she did not make common cause with the Emperor Nicholas." At a special interview Baron Budberg pressed the Russian case with so much success that Baron Manteuffel interrupted the conversation, asking the King how Russia would prevent the 1200 Prussian ships which were dispersed over the world from being captured by British cruisers, and how Russia would prevent the destruction that would no doubt instantly fall on the Prussian ports in the Baltic, of which sea the English would soon be masters. He thought that instead of the Emperor coming to the defence of Prussia, he would probably be unable to defend himself, and his capital would not be safe. The Czar wrote privately to the King, " and used arguments almost amounting to menaces if he would not agree to some distinct declaration of neutrality." More astutely he requested the services of some Prussian officers, which were, however, refused. The King had shown great distrust of England, and had caused the British Government to be informed that he could not go against Russia " if England continued in the path which she was now doing " her high- handed demand that Russia should withdraw from the Danubian Principalities. Her Majesty's Government expressed disappoint- ment that Prussia was not prepared to go to war, but hoped she would be influenced by the conduct of Austria. The utmost that Baron Manteuffel could promise was that Prussia might be depended on to strike a decisive blow later. So the King wavered to and fro " a reed shaken by the wind," as the Prince Consort described him to Baron Stockmar as fear of Russia and distrust of England alternately got the upper hand : between alliance with Russia, individual neutrality, joint neutrality. When joint neutrality seemed almost inevit- able, Count Orloff was instructed to endeavour to induce Prussia and Austria " to bind themselves by a declaration that what- ever the consequences of their neutrality might be, nothing should make them take part against Russia." l 1 Ultimately, on the 20th April 1854, Austria and Prussia entered into a treaty mutually guaranteeing each other's territories, and agreeing to give mutual assistance in case of aggression. An invitation was to be issued to all Governments of the German Confederation to accede. In an additional article it was declared that Austria and Prussia regarded 22 The Declaration of Paris The joint neutrality of Austria and Prussia being essential, the King of Sweden, urged by the Crown Prince, and possibly encouraged by Austria, decided to send a message to the Diet " asking for supplies to enable him to take the necessary measures to maintain the declaration of neutrality." Declara- tions of neutrality in theory fell within its province. But Denmark, represented in the Diet in respect of the Elbe Duchies, was uncertain as to the advisability of the step. The Ministry did not see how it would be of service in promoting the object of Austria, and thought that a joint declaration of neutrality on the Eastern question by the Diet would never be obtained ; but it might save Denmark from embarrassment with regard to Holstein. The Diet did, in fact, adhere, on the 24th July 1854, to the treaty of alliance between Austria and Prussia, concluded on the 20th April. 1 The attitude of the Crown Prince of Sweden was entirely favourable to the allies. He suggested that the best way of bringing the King of Prussia's wavering to an end would be to include the Prussian Baltic ports in the blockade ; supported France when she made the definite suggestion, a few days after the declaration of war, that Sweden should throw in her lot with the allies and recover the provinces wrested from her by the House of Holstein. A proclamation of neutrality was, after all, not necessarily permanent. Thus it came about that this premature declaration of neutrality before a state of belligerency existed, though ap- parently intended only to ensure the safety of neutral com- merce, developed into a question of a general European neutrality, stirring all the Chanceries to open up some of the most critical problems in European politics. Smouldering ques- tions, which might or might not have been affected by the terms of the peace, were fanned into a flame before the war began. B. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE. The interest of the question of belligerent and neutral centres in the relations of England and France. For good or evil they were allies. The alliance created two hostile currents of public the occupation of the Lower Danube by Russia as dangerous, but that they understood that the troops would be withdrawn in accordance with concessions made to the Christian subjects of the Porte. By a further separate article Austria was to request Russia to stop her invasion of Turkish territory, and to guarantee the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities. Prussia was to support the request, and should Russia refuse, the article of the treaty providing for mutual assistance in case of aggres- sion was to be put in force. 1 See Table of Historical Events at the commencement of the Documents. The General Position, 1853-54 23 opinion. A strange influence pervaded non-political England in the middle of the nineteenth century, yielding to the glamour, indefinable but very real, of a memory, of a name " Napoleon." The third Napoleon mantled himself with all the virtues of the First ; and the recognition, characteristically English, of the greatness of the great enemy they had at last vanquished, enabled him to manufacture the glamour that surrounded in this country the name he bore. The Emperor of the French and the English Prime Minister were " the idols of the public." But there was also strenuous unbelief in any hereditary virtues having descended to the " Man of December." The views of those who held this opinion find expression in Mr Herbert Paul's bitter statement that " England was not her own mistress, but was tied and bound, not to France, but to the man who had made France his own." l That sardonic historian declared that for the purpose of these negotiations Palmerston was as much Napoleon's Minister as Walewski himself. 1 How far the English Ambassador was under the in- fluence of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs we shall be able to judge when we come to deal with the negotiations between the allies in regard to their attitude towards the neutrals. There is an uncomfortable humility about Lord Cowley's own version of his discussions with M. Drouyn de Lhuys which makes the reading of his despatches most unsatisfactory. But whatever were the undercurrents, French opinion was clear : the world was to be impressed with the solidarity of the alliance. " On se rappelle," writes M. Drouyn in his Memoir e, " le prodigieux elan de ces jours de resolution 6nergique et de cordiale confiance. Les gouvernements, animes du meme esprit qui entrainait les deux nations 1'une vers 1'autre, s'attachaient a faire dis- paraitre, au profit de la civilisation et de Phumanite, les traces de divisions seculaires." And all means which could promote its success were taken. The Consular officers of the two nations, the 'Consuls of their respective colonies, and their naval officers, were to give reciprocal protection to each other's subjects in different parts of the world 2 : " Ainsi, aux yeux des nations trangeres, la France et PAngleterre confondaient leurs dra- peaux." On one point only there seemed to be a possibility of friction. When war should be declared there would be joint action at sea ; but the laws of the two countries differed radically on fundamental points of prize law. England seized enemy property on the sea, but paid great respect to neutral property ; if the enemy property was ships they were seized, and any 1 Herbert Paul, History of Modern England, vol. ii. p. 6. 1 Document No. 3. 24 The Declaration of Paris neutral property on board was restored to its proprietors ; if the enemy property was cargo and the ship neutral, the cargo was confiscated and the ship released with freight. France, on the other hand, since 1778, had paid more regard to the flag than to the property carried under it. If the flag was neutral, the cargo, even if it belonged to the enemy, was allowed to pass ; if the flag was enemy, the cargo, even if it belonged to neutrals, was confiscated. France believed in the virtue of one formula " free ships free goods," but took the benefit of another, " enemy ships enemy goods." England asserted the bare fact she seized enemy property. How were these con- flicting principles to be reconciled, and the two fleets act in harmony ? This is not the moment to discuss the merits of the respective principles ; it was not the moment, in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion, to discuss them on the eve of war : " 1'opposition . . . e"tait tellement radicale, qu'en les dressant les uns en regard des autres, on se condamnait a une contradiction sans issue." 1 A compromise was essential, because the action of fleets acting in concert must be uniform. A compromise, a common de- claration, if only the redaction could be successfully settled, would be more satisfactory to all parties concerned, especially the neutrals. It would redound to the glory of the alliance if they could achieve " une seule declaration . . . qui, en constatant mieux notre parfait accord, frapperait plus forte- ment les esprits." C. POLITICAL OPINION IN ENGLAND. In the letter which M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote, 4th January 1854, to Count Walewski, French Ambassador in London, 2 he said that he had reason to think, " d'apres un commencement de polemique que j'ai remarque dans les journaux anglais," that the commercial world in England was unfavourable to the rigorous application of the ancient doctrines of her maritime law. 3 It would be out of place here to attempt to analyse the various springs from which the different political parties in England drew their inspiration ; but it is material to note how far that inspiration conduced to the acceptance of the Declara- tion of Paris, and there are certain facts, to be developed in due 1 This sentence in the Memoire is quoted in full on p. 28. 1 This letter is set out on p. 13. 8 I have unfortunately been unable to trace the discussion referred to in the file either of The Times or of the Manchester Guardian. The General Position, 1853-54 25 course, which throw light upon the question. The most impor- tant fact to note is that public opinion as a whole did not support it ; it cannot claim to accord with what is called the " trend of political thought." Nor, except in so far as party supports its leaders in accepting the accomplished fact, can it be said to have been treated as a party question. It seems rather to have been the result of the coalition of different sections of thinkers, each acting under the influence of temperament released from the hard pressure of fact. On the merits of the war itself the public supported the policy of the Cabinet, but there was a small section bitterly hostile. As to the method of con- ducting war at sea there was a considerable division of opinion, and it was here that temperament ultimately got the better of sound judgment based on knowledge of the necessities of war. The forty years of peace had influenced men's minds in different ways. Those who called themselves practical men of business espoused the cause of commerce. To the Manchester school successful commerce was the noblest aim of existence, its creed that " the one object of foreign policy was the advance- ment of trade." To that school were allied the pacifists of those days, whose doctrine was parodied by the formula, " All war is wrong, therefore this war is wrong." More accurately, as proclaimed by its greatest exponent, John Bright, it took form in the belief that the blessings of peace being so great, the curses of war so terrible, man, as a reasonable being, when left undisturbed must naturally so yearn for peace that eventu- ally war would become impossible. 1 But there were others with more dangerous views. As the facts receding into the distance became dimmer, they subjected the causes of past wars to cold analysis. Professing to search for right in the abstract, they assumed the semblance of wisdom, and were treated as philosophers. The tendency of such inquiries is towards self-examination, a process which detects flaws in one's own conduct, the conclusion almost inevitably taking the common form " perhaps after all we were wrong." The Philosophical Radicals, as they were curiously called, boldly passed'from their legitimate occupation of bettering the people into the region of foreign relations, for which they were not too well equipped. Disregarding the facts of history, they did not hesitate to give their verdict against England. That which passes as " independence of thought " enabled them to assume an attitude of detachment from the affairs of their country, and this, coupled with an intense conviction in the virtues of 1 See John Blight's speech in the debate of 1862 t " 1862," Chap. IV 26 The Declaration of Paris the age in which they lived, brought them to regard what others called the " glorious past " as an " age of barbarism." The biographies of these learned Radicals leave us in the dark as to the reasons which induced them to espouse the cause of the neutrals. Certainly neither the scientific method nor the historical research on which they prided themselves warranted the conclusions to which they came. It looks as if it were no more than a crude application of the doctrine that the criterion of right and wrong is the promotion of happiness of the greatest number. The neutrals represented the greatest number, their happiness depended on enhanced profits, therefore they were right. No sounder argument is discernible in the speeches of their spokesman, Sir William Molesworth. The Philosophical Radicals based their theories on Bentham. For Bentham war was " mischief on the largest scale " ; it was the greatest curse on the greatest number, and this was prob- ably the connecting link between the two sections of the Radicals. Gibraltar, they thought, was held contrary to " every law of morality and honour " ; and supremacy at sea meant arrogance and the assumption of dictatorial power, and the sooner it became obsolete the better. 1 These ideas prepared their minds for acquiescing in the claims of the neutrals, who also asserted that England was the arrogant dictator of the seas. To these were added those, persistent in political life, who, not in the pride which apes humility, but in humility itself, believed that we were worse, not better, than other men. The Declaration of Paris was the product of temperament. The grave problems which it professed to settle were not argued on their merits in the open ; the two sides of the question were never discussed ; the conclusions were come to in secret. One result of these different currents of thought has already been emphasised. Consciously or unconsciously, the theories which the Armed Neutralities had put forward against England came to be acceptable to English politicians. Another still more curious result was that they accepted the story of the Napoleonic Wars in a humble, apologetic sort of way, and thought it their duty to the world to express contrition for our victory. These men deliberately advocated, though without acknowledging their authorship, as principles of the highest political morality, the very doctrines by which Bonaparte sought to wrest from England the supremacy of the sea, and reduce this presump- tuous little island to its true position of having no part nor lot in the destinies of Europe. 1 The English Radicals, C. B. Boylance Kent, p. 385. Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 27 III Discussion between England and France as to the Prin- ciples of Maritime Law to be adopted during the War. The Scandinavian declarations of neutrality had made one thing perfectly clear : the question of the neutrals, traditionally difficult in our own belligerent relations with them, would be doubly difficult in a war, with France as our ally, on the sea as well as on the land. The two fleets had already operated to- gether. On the 2nd June 1853 Admiral Dundas had been ordered to sail from Malta to Besika Bay to join the French fleet and put himself under the orders of Stratford Canning, British Ambassador at Constantinople. On the 22nd October the two fleets had entered the Dardanelles, and on the 4th January they were in the Black Sea. Joint action at sea against Russia was inevitable should war break out ; it would not be fair to the neutrals if the laws on which their instruc- tions would be respectively based were radically different. The British fleet would stop neutral ships with enemy pro- perty on board, which the French fleet would let go on their courses ; the French fleet would seize neutral cargo on enemy merchantmen, which the British fleet would return to its owners. The neutrals would have a most legitimate grievance. All questions of their asserted rights apart, they were clearly entitled to know with certainty what would happen to them in the event of war. It was obvious that some arrangement must be come to before war was finally decided on. The French Government realised at once the importance of the question. In the two despatches set out in Chapter I. 1 from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London he betrays his anxiety. Count Walewski'is to ascer- tain what are the views of the British Government on the sub- ject. He does not conceal his hope that public opinion in England may be coming round to the French view ; but his policy is uninfluenced by this hope : there should be no discus- sion on the merits of the two systems. As was natural, the question formed the subject of many discussions " des les premiers jours de Janvier " between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley, British Ambassador in Paris, the substance of which were given by him in the Memoire already referred to. 1 See p. 13. 28 The Declaration of Paris M. Drouyn dwelt on the importance of a public manifesta- tion of agreement for the purposes of the war between the two countries on a question of such great moment as their relations with the neutral Powers. In order to achieve this end the enunciation of absolute principles was to be avoided, " car 1'opposition entre ceux que 1'Angleterre maintenait avec une energie traditionelle, et ceux que nous faisions gloire de defendre, etait tellement radicale, qu'en les dressant les uns en regard des autres, on se condamnait a une contradiction sans issue." It was necessary to find some ground of common action ; these particular theories could be reserved, and only considered in case of need. This was only possible on one condition : C'est que chacun renonat au moins pour la dure de la guerre, a user des facultes que 1'un des deux s'estimait permises, mais que proscrivait 1'autre. II est concevable en effet que, sans repudier un droit, sans se departir d'une prevention, 1'on s'abstienne pour un temps de les faire valoir, tandis qu'on ne saurait, sans inconsequence, exercer meme exceptionnellement des actes dont on conteste la legitimite. Ce mode de transaction, laissant intactes les doctrines, ne heurtait aucun principe, ne soulevait aucun embarras. Destine d'ailleurs a etre accueilli avec reconnaissance par les puissances non belligerantes, il etait conforme aux interets comme aux intentions liberates des allies. This would mean the abandonment of certain privileges claimed by the French marine, but it would be in harmony with the national traditions, always favourable to the rights of neutrals and the freedom of the seas. The general situation, M. Drouyn said, encouraged us to take this course. European opinion was for the most part favourable to France and England marching to the assistance of an oppressed ally ; this was in itself an element of strength, which might possibly, in the times to come, be developed into a still more effective assistance. It would enable the alliance to be thrown open to all States which might desire to adhere. The allies were bound, therefore, to do nothing to wound a benevolent neutrality which they desired to transform into an open assistance. The German Courts would have, M. Drouyn thought, a considerable influence on the progress of events, but they had been for too long under the ascendancy of Russia ; great and little States were attached to her by many bonds. Prudence counselled us to be careful in our dealings with Prussian commerce ; it counselled us similarly in regard to the Scandi- navian Powers, owing to their geographical position, which made Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 29 their friendship precious, their hostility disturbing, to both parties. The memories of the Armed Neutralities " ces deux grandes manifestations " were among the principal traditions which bound Stockholm and Copenhagen to Petersburg. If we revived these old pretensions might we not revive the old resistance, and throw into the arms of Russia the nations which in those days had acted on her instigation ? The United States caused us similar preoccupation. Russia had made a bid for its sympathy, and was in agreement with that Government as to the interpretation of the law of the sea, for the Republic of the New World from all time had maintained the rights of the neutral flag. Was it wise to give our enemy an opportunity of rallying the United States to its side and turning her against us ? The reference in the Memoire to these political arguments concludes with this ominous sentence, which contains the key to the policy of secrecy adopted by the Cabinet : L'Angleterre n'etait pas insensible a ces considerations, mais elle les combattait en alleguant 1'impossibilite ou serait son gouvernement d'abandonner, en face du pays, les regies inviolables de son vieux droit maritime. It would appear, however, that Lord Cowley had dwelt particularly on the British Government's fear that the United States would go against us and lend her seamen to Russia. In order to prevent this danger arising, and to conciliate the American Government, the Cabinet had submitted, not only to the States, but to France and to all the maritime Powers, a proposal to enter into an agreement for the suppression of privateers, declaring that in event of war any one furnished with letters of marque would be treated as a pirate. In a letter to Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Clarendon claimed to be the author of this proposal, but the idea seems to have been abandoned. In regard to it M. Drouyn says that while France agreed that privateering ought to be abolished as inconsistent with the customs of civilised nations, she thought nevertheless that it was desirable to ensure at the same time similar progress in other branches of the law of the sea. In his recollections of the conversation M. Drouyn adds this reflection, that the common practice which we proposed that the allies should adopt in this war with Russia seemed to us the best step that could be taken towards bringing about a collective reform on many points which in our opinion were correlative one with the other. The opinion of the French Government is noted at this place, because it had an undoubted bearing on the agree- ment arrived at after the war in 1856. It must be observed, 30 The Declaration of Paris however, that nowhere during the negotiations in 1854 was the point insisted on. On the contrary, M. Drouyn de Lhuys' policy throughout was to keep this opinion in the background. Conversations on such an important question would natur- ally be reported to London by the Ambassador ; as M. Drouyn suggests in one of his despatches, there must have been daily letters. The only document that a thorough search in the Public Record Office has disclosed is a despatch from Lord Cowley to the Foreign Office, dated the 9th February 1854, and the general tenor of it shows unmistakeably that it was the first written record of the impression left on Lord Cowley's mind of what M. Drouyn had said to him, and of his recollection of his own replies. The despatch and Lord Clarendon's reply were as follow : LOED COWLEY TO LORD CLARENDON. 150. Paris, Feb. Qth, 1854. MY LORD, I have had some conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the delicate subject of the rights of neutral Powers. It appears that some of the smaller States, pos- sibly prompted by Russia, who knows the differences of opinion which exist between Great Britain and France on the subject of these rights, have either intimated to the French Government their intention to remain neutral, or have asked advice of the French Government whether they should declare themselves neutral or not. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me with great frankness and friendliness of manner of the language which he had held, and which he had since introduced into a circular sent to the French Missions abroad. He had strongly dissuaded, he said, any of those States from making any declaration of neutral- ity. In the first place they would remain neutral, he ob- served, without declaring themselves to be so. Nine times out of ten a declaration of neutrality implied partiality for, and was intended to be favourable to, one of the belligerents. Secondly, he argued, that it would be a dangerous proceed- ing for the smaller States to put forth declarations, which might provoke counter-declarations on the part of any one of the belligerents. If it was hoped to sow dissensions be- tween France and England by raising questions on which it was known they were not agreed the plotters would be disappointed, for both nations would know how to regulate their conduct in respect of this matter so as not to impede the prosecution of the common object which they had in view. Thirdly, the less the smaller Powers put forward Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 81 their opinions on this subject, the more likely was the war to be confined to the East. If divisions became apparent among the European Powers, if some were tacitly neutral and others declared themselves to be so, if some put forward one doctrine and others another, the revolutionary party would profit by these dissensions to advance their own schemes, and a war would be kindled of which no one could foresee the end, whereas unanimity on the part of the Western States would confine the seat of war to the East. Lastly, it would be impolitic in neutral Powers to make de- clarations, when France, the great champion of the rights of neutrals, could not and would not take part with them. It might be argued, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, that this language had not been held to Sweden and Den- mark, but the case was not the same. England and France now knew that that declaration had been made partly from a desire to escape from the pressure of Russia in a different sense upon those two Governments, and it could not be denied further that if war broke out, it was more than likely that some of the principal operations would be carried on in the Baltic, and consequently in the immediate neighbourhood of those countries. Nothing could be more amicable than the language with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys treated this very delicate question with me, and particularly the points on which he thought I might take umbrage. He said that the two countries must be mutually forbearing, that France would abstain from asserting any principles to which we could not assent, and that he was sure that we would not have recourse to measures calculated to provoke discussion. He had no doubt that Russia counted upon setting the two Governments at variance upon this point, and he had as little doubt that she would be disappointed. I said that I was sure that your Lordship would do full justice to the frank and loyal manner in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had expressed himself, and that every precaution would be taken by Your Lordship's Government to prevent the question of the rights of neutrals becoming a source of entanglement to any future operations under- taken by the Government in common. LORD CLARENDON TO LORD COWLEY. 87. Confidential. ,, T Feb. 14^, 1854. MY LORD, Her Majesty's Government have learnt with extreme satisfaction, from your Lordship's despatch, No. 150, the frank and friendly manner in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys 32 The Declaration of Paris has discussed with you a question upon which so much difference has existed between the two countries, and upon which no doubt in various quarters the hope of future dis- sension is founded ; but nothing will more tend to frus- trate such expectations than the wise and judicious advice given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to those States which have sought the opinion of the French Government respecting their neutrality. Her Majesty's Government approve and confirm the assurances which Your Excellency gave to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who may rely that upon this particular question, as in all others, no effort on the part of Her Majesty's Government will ever be wanting to preserve the perfect harmony that now exists between France and England. It is difficult to believe that Lord Cowley's despatch refers to the same conversation which M. Drouyn has reported, and which is supported by the despatches printed in his Memoire. Its contents seem to indicate that Lord Cowley's memory must have been singularly at fault. The first statement is difficult to follow. Do Governments, either of small States or large, ask the advice of a country on the verge of going to war, much less of one of two countries in alliance, " whether they should declare themselves neutral or not " ? If they had, would a statesman of M. Drouyn's experience have given them the advice attributed to him : that a declaration of neutrality, nine times out of ten, " implied partiality for, and was intended to be favourable to, one of the belligerents " : that it would be dangerous for them " to put forth declarations which might provoke counter-declarations on the part of any one of the belligerents " : and that " the less the smaller Powers put forward their opinions, the more likely was the war to be con- fined to the East " ? Sweden and Denmark had not sought advice ; nor had their declarations provoked counter-declara- tions. They had indeed been singularly successful in obtaining recognition of their own views of neutrality. The rest of the despatch, which relates to the relations between England and France " on the delicate subject of the rights of neutral Powers," is most disconcerting. It is difficult to understand the frame of mind of a British Ambassador who could find it necessary to emphasise the fact that the language used by the French Foreign Secretary was " amicable," that he had expressed himself in a " frank and loyal " manner, particularly in regard to " the points on which he thought I might take umbrage " ; or what grounds he had for adopting without any qualification, or at least reporting without comment M. Drouyn's statement that France was " the great champion Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 33 of the rights of neutrals." These remarks create the impression that Lord Cowley read into M. Drouyn's conversation a homily on the impropriety of England's conduct in the past, and that it found an echo in his own conscience, weighted with a sense of the national guilt. Lord Cowley evidently belonged to that school of thought to which reference has already been made, which held England to have been in the wrong, and the neutrals in the right, in their old disputes, and whose adherents after- wards openly proclaimed their views in Parliament. With regard to the law of France, although " free ships free goods " was incorporated into it in 1778, so long as she maintained " enemy ships enemy goods " she denied the right of free commerce with the enemy, as much as England did, when it tended to the assistance of the enemy. France's historical position will be fully examined in subsequent volumes. It was no more than this, that as a belligerent she found the principles advocated by the neutrals suited her purpose, and she sup- ported them. But that was forty years before these friendly conversations. There is no correspondence on record to show that this question of the neutrals had ever been discussed be- tween France and England after 1815. France might certainly have entered a protest, as a potential neutral, when Canning refused to ratify a treaty negotiated with Brazil which con- tained a " free ships free goods " clause, and with character- istic emphasis asserted our ancient principle. 1 But diplomatists equally matched do not " take umbrage " at what is said when they are discussing wars in which their countries were involved nearly half a century before. It is quite consistent with perfect friendship for each courteously to maintain that his country was right in the past, and to pass on to the more important questions of the present. The most extraordinary thing, however, is that, according to M. Drouyn's version of their conversation, these remarks 1 "The rule of maritime law which Great Britain has always held on this subject is the ancient law and usage of nations ; but it differs from that put forth by France and the Northern Powers of Europe, and that which the United States were constantly endeavouring to establish. England had braved confederacies and sustained wars rather than give up this principle ; and whenever, in despair of getting the British Govern- ment to surrender it by force, recourse had been had to proposals of amicable negotiations for the purpose of defining, limiting, or qualifying the exercise of the right of search, Great Britain had uniformly declined all such overtures from a conviction of the impracticability of qualifying, limiting, or even defining in terms that would be acceptable to the other party the exercise of a right without impairing, if not sacrificing, the right itself." (From Canning's despatch to Sir Charles Stewart: quoted by Lord Derby, 22nd May 1856. Hansard, cxlii. col. 53.) 3 34 The Declaration of Paris were not made. They are inconsistent with the policy which he had decided to adopt, not to raise any question on the respective merits of the two laws, and the subsequent corre- spondence shows that he loyally abided by that decision. But, taking M. Drouyn's own version of the conversations as accurate, there were many historical points on which Lord Cowley could have set M. Drouyn right. He might have reminded him that, so far from the memories of the Armed Neutralities being among the principal traditions which bound Stockholm to Petersburg, Sweden and Russia had been at war soon after the League of 1780 had been dissolved, and each had abandoned the famous principles. He might have reminded him that, so far had the Republic of the New World been from maintaining " from all time " the rights of the neutral flag, the principle of seizing enemy property on neutral ships had been expressly recognised in the Jay Treaty with England in 1796. He might have reminded him too of Jefferson's well-known answer to France : The French complain " that the English take French goods out of American vessels, which is " said to be " against the law of nations, and ought to be prevented by us. On the contrary, we suppose it to have been long an established principle of the law of nations, that the goods of a friend are free in an enemy's vessel, and an enemy's goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend. The inconvenience of this principle . . . has induced several nations latterly to stipulate against it by treaty, and to substitute another in its stead that free bottoms shall make free goods. ... As far as it has been introduced, it depends on the treaties stipulat- ing it, and forms exceptions in special cases to the general operation of the law of nations. We have introduced it in our treaties with France, Holland, and Prussia ; the French goods found by the latter nations in American bottoms are not made prize of. It is our wish to establish it with other nations. But this requires their consent also, as a work of time ; and in the meanwhile they have a right to act on the general principle, without giving to us, or to France, cause of complaint." l There was also the earlier despatch from Secretary of State Pinckney to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 27th January 1789 : According to the law of nations, the goods of an enemy found on board the ship of a friend are liable to capture, 1 Letter from Mr Jefferson to M. Genet, 24th July 1793 ; see Letters of Hiatoricua, p. 79. Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 35 and the goods of a friend found on board the ship of an enemy are safe. The United States and France have con- sented to change this rule as between themselves. They have agreed that the goods of an enemy found on board the vessels of either party shall be safe, and that the goods of either found on board the vessel of an enemy shall be liable to capture. The one part of this rule is in conse- quence of and dependent on the other. The one part cannot on any principle of justice be abandoned while the other is maintained. In the treaty with England the United States retain unchanged the law of nations. The reference of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the proposal made by the British Government to the maritime Powers to abolish privateering is borne out by a letter from Lord Clarendon to Lord Shaftesbury, written on the 2nd March 1854, 1 in which he says : I take exactly your view of Letters of Marque, and I some time ago addressed myself privately to the Govern- ments of France and of the United States saying that, as we had been driven into the brutal and barbarous methods of settling differences, we should at least endeavour to mitigate its horrors, and thus pay homage to the civilisa- tion of the times we live in, and that I could see no reason why a licence should be given for robbery by sea, any more than by land, &c. &c. 2 The proposal has been met in a corresponding spirit, and I hope shortly to settle some change in international law, for that will be necessary ; but the three greatest maritime Powers of the world have a right to effect such a change in the interests of humanity. I am not yet prepared, however, to make any public announcement on the subject, because I wish, at the same time, with the privateering system, to bring our law, or rather practice, respecting neutral flags more in harmony with the practice and expressed wishes of other maritime nations. M. Drouyn himself might have written the last sentence. It expresses his views, as recorded many years afterwards, of 1 Hodder's Life oj Lord Shaftesbury, vol. ii. p. 467. 1 Lord Clarendon would appear to have had several conversations on the subject of abolishing privateering with the United States Minister. Mr Buchanan records one in his despatch already referred to, of the 24th March. The conversation was general, and Lord Clarendon did not propose the conclusion of a treaty for its suppression, though " it was evident that this was his drift." According to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, however, the proposal for a convention had already been made to all the maritime States some months previously. 36 The Declaration of Paris what he had hoped ultimately to achieve, but which he thought it inadvisable to press the British Government to accept, and did not press till the war was over. And here was the British Foreign Secretary ready to accept the new doctrines, but not openly, not " in the face of the people." He is conducting the negotiations " privately," arid he tells M. Drouyn the reason he dare not conduct them openly. This letter throws a flood of light on all the dark places in the story ; the absence of despatches in January ; the non- publication of anything that was ever written on the subject ; all the secrecy and the mystery that have surrounded it from that day to this. But although M. Drouyn knew the secret, he took no advantage of it. It may possibly be put no higher than this : that as an experienced statesman he saw the danger which the British Government were running, was not willing to run the risk of the people in England getting to know what was afoot, and so he took the game out of the hands of the British Ministers, and tried to play it for them in the only way in which there lay any chance of success. But it is a fact that throughout the negotiations he makes believe that the Cabinet is reluctant to accept any modification of the ancient law. Only their perversity, as we shall see, well-nigh baffled him. I find no record in any biography of the men of the period, not even in Lord Clarendon's recently published Life, of his conversion, nor who was responsible for it most probably Mr Milner Gibson and Sir William Molesworth. The secrecy of February was broken on the 27th by what has all the appearance of a ballon d'essai sent up by Mr Milner Gibson. Sir William Wray was anxious to know whether Russian ships chartered by British merchants, laden with corn, would be allowed to pass British and French men-of-war, having been already permitted to pass the Bosphorus by the Sultan's firman. The answer was in the affirmative ; whereupon Mr Milner Gibson irrelevantly asked this further question : " Whether the Government had come to a decision, and whether they will announce that decision, whether free ships are to make free goods and neutral flags to be respected ? " The question could hardly have been so worded unless the questioner had known that the matter was under consideration. Possibly he was impatient at his pupil's dilatoriness, and thought it necessary to force the pace, as he ought by now to be prepared to make a public announcement. Lord John Russell replied that the question was one of the greatest importance and was under consideration, but that an answer would be given before the declaration of war. Immediately the answer was reported to Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 37 Paris, M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote a despatch to Count Walewski. He had put the matter so plainly before the British Govern- ment, the settlement of the question for the duration of the war, whatever might happen afterwards, was so logically simple, that he could not understand the delay in coming to a decision. Lord John Russell's answer seemed to suggest that the question was being considered independently of the French Government. Nothing could have a worse effect than a want of unanimity between the allies. A controversy such as Lord Cowley had indicated as possible was unnecessary if only the course he had suggested were followed. Once more M. Drouyn de Lhuys insisted on the wisdom of it. Time pressed, and he was impatient. M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Mars 1, 1854. Je regretterais vivement que PAngleterre proc6dat a une mesure de cette importance sans se concerter prealable- ment avec nous. II serait du plus mauvais effet, au d^but d'une guerre faite en commun, que les deux pays parussent divises sur des theories, lorsque dans la pratique ils doivent agir ensemble. Veuillez appeler de nouveau 1'attention de lord Clarendon sur cet objet. II me semble que, sans reveiller une controverse qui alarmerait des interets que tout nous conseille de menager avec soin, il serait suffisant de rediger pour les commandants de nos batiments des in- structions strictement calcule'es d'apres les necessites de la guerre actuelle et de nature a rassurer les neutres, particu- lierement ceux que les habitudes de leur commerce portent a navigeur de preference dans la mer Noire ou dans la mer Baltique. De cette facon, 1'Angleterre et la France reser- veraient chacune leur doctrine, et leur action se confondrait dans une meme pratique, que Ton serait tou jours maitre de rendre plus seVere, pendant le cours des hostilites, si les circonstances venaient a Pexiger. An interview with the British Ambassador followed, in which the necessity for concerted action between the allies was again insisted on. M. Drouyn expressed the hope " that no decision might be taken, and, above all, no declaration on the subject published, without previous consultation with the French Govern- ment." The matter was reported by Lord Cowley, with a curious sense of detachment, on the 6th March, as having been " men- tioned a day or two ago." From the rest of this despatch it might be imagined that the proposal for dealing with the rights of neutrals had emanated from the British Government, and that 38 The Declaration of Paris they had omitted to consult their ally. By the light of Lord Clarendon's letter to Lord Shaftesbury the suggestion in the last sentence is disingenuous, that " it will be for your Lordship to consider whether an attempt may not now be made to set this question at rest as far as is in the power of the two Governments for ever." LORD COWLEY TO LORD CLARENDON. 285. Paris, March 6th, 1854. MY LORD, Mons. Drouyn de Lhuys mentioned to me, a day or two ago, that he had heard that Her Majesty's Govern- ment was occupied, at the present moment, in consider- ing the delicate question of the rights of neutrals, and he expressed the hope that no decisions might be taken, and, above all, no declarations on the subject published, without previous consultation with the French Government. I promised M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inform Your Lord- ship of his wishes, and I could not resist remarking how desirable it was that the friendly intercourse so happily subsisting between the two Governments should be further cemented by an understanding upon a question, on' which, until now, they had been unfortunately divided. M. Drouyn de Lhuys responded with much cordiality to this remark, and it will be for Your Lordship to consider whether an attempt may not now be made to set this question at rest, as far as is in the power of the two Governments, for ever. Lord Clarendon replied by the following despatch : LORD CLARENDON TO LORD COWLEY. 170. March 9th, 1854. MY LORD, The subject to which Your Excellency adverts in your despatch, No. 285, of 6th March, relative to the rights of neutral flags in time of war, is under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, but no decision will be taken nor any declaration published without previous communi- cation with the French Government. The facts recorded in the foregoing pages bear out the statement that Lord Clarendon fulfilled his intention of keeping the proposals he was going to make in due course secret. The French Government, though they knew the plan, were in the dark as to how it would be carried out. It is curious, therefore, Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 89 to turn to a small collection of despatches which passed between the United States and the European Powers, both belligerent and neutral, in the early months of 1854, respecting the questions in issue. 1 From this correspondence we find that the United States Government were informed at all stages of the intentions of the Cabinet, though the intimate character of the negotia- tions with France do not seem to have been disclosed. On the 23rd February, that is, three days before Mr Milner Gibson's question in the House, Mr Buchanan, United States Minister in London, informed Mr Marcy that he had asked Lord Clarendon whether the Government had determined on the course they would pursue in the impending war, in regard to neutrals, and whether they would adopt " free ships free goods." It was of the greatest importance that merchants in America should know the decision as speedily as possible. Mr Buchanan was informed that the Cabinet had not yet come to a decision ; but Lord Clarendon had told him that he " should be the very first person to whom he would communicate the result." He then intimated a desire to converse with the American Minister upon the subject " informally and un- officially." Mr Buchanan had no instructions, but, as an individual, he was willing frankly to express his opinions. He would consider it a breach of confidence to report Lord Clarendon's private opinions on a question still pending before the Cabinet, " and on which its members are probably divided." He had, however, no objection to repeat the substance of his own observations. The United States Courts, he said, have recognised the right of capturing enemy property on neutral ships, and the duty to restore neutral property on enemy ships. From a very early period of our history the Government had sought, in favour of neutral commerce, to change the rule by treaties with different nations, and to adopt instead the principle of the flag, the main object being to reduce the occasions on which the right of search would be exercised. He thought that this would be best achieved by adopting " free ships free goods " and " enemy ships enemy goods." The reason why the United States had not recently concluded any treaties on these lines, he presumed, was " that until the strong maritime nations, such as Great Britain, France, and Russia, should "consent to enter into such treaties, it would be but of little avail to con- clude them with the minor Powers." He would not, however, be astonished if the British Government " should yield their 1 Printed in State Papers, vol. xlvi. pp. 821-843 [Document, No. 8]. 40 The Declaration of Paris long-cherished principle " and adopt the rule of the flag. He knew positively that Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Prussia were urging this upon them ; " but what I did not know until the day before yesterday, was that the Government of France was pursuing the same course." He apparently did not know that Great Britain and France were working together as allies to come to some common form for their declaration ; nor that a favourable answer had already been given to Sweden and Denmark. The other despatches in this correspondence will be referred to at the different stages of the negotiations with France to which they are relevant. IV The Riga Despatch. The position of affairs at the beginning of March 1854, is now clear. Lord Clarendon had decided in his own mind " to bring our law, or rather practice, respecting neutral flags more in harmony with the practice and expressed wishes of other maritime nations," not for the purposes of the war only, but permanently. He had confided his wish to his friend Lord Shaftesbury. M. Drouyn de Lhuys also knew his secret. Further, he had talked " informally and unofficially " with the United States Minister, who had drawn his own conclusions. Lord Clarendon did not think, however, that it was necessary to obtain an expression of the wishes of the maritime nation to which he belonged, in the usual way, through Parliament. Being in favour of the greater and permanent change, he must also, " privately," have been in sympathy with the French proposal for the lesser, and temporary, change ; and he cannot fail to have been impressed with the logic of M. Drouyn's argument as to the manner in which that change should be effected. He was still, however, not prepared to make a public announcement, and two despatches to Lord Cowley, set out in the following chapter, are entirely non-committal. Ministers who propose, on their own motion, to make altera- tions in the ancient laws of England are not entirely free agents. They are guardians of their own consciences ; but the Law Officers are guardians of the law, and, when they are consulted, guide the public utterances of the Ministers. Custom has pre- scribed the occasions on which the Law Officers must be con- The Riga Despatch 41 suited. The Attorney-General at the time was Sir Alexander Cockburn. The northern trade of Europe was largely in the hands of British merchants. Subsequent debates dealing with the com- mercial aspects of the war supply us with some interesting facts which are pertinent to the question now to be discussed. Russia's trade with Great Britain was ten times greater than with any other country ; it amounted to thirteen millions annually ; and it was no exaggeration to say that her commodi- ties were produced mainly by the aid of British money. The intimate commercial relations between the two countries was probably a relic of the old days of British factories. It is not difficult to imagine that the business houses established in Riga and the Baltic ports were in direct descent from their commercial ancestors who traded under the protection of the factory system. The trade consisted principally in flax and tallow : Ireland re- ceived large quantities of flax seed for her cotton industry. It was said authoritatively that as a result of the custom of cash payments the Russian interest in consignments did not exceed 15 per cent. What the proper designation of such trade is, whether " enemy " or " British," and how it should be dealt with in war, were serious questions which would inevitably have to be faced by the Government. Russia had assured the mer- chants of her protection ; it is not surprising, therefore, that they should inquire, so soon as war was seen to be inevitable, what protection they would receive from their own country. We learn from Mr Mitchell's speech in the House of Commons on the 4th July, that Lord Clarendon had in December 1853, with " absence of official reserve," informed our merchants that " it would be highly unsafe to make the usual advances to Russia." l 1 The question of subscribing to Russian loans also arose immediately after the war broke out, and the British Consul -General to the Hanse towns was instructed to send the following circular to the Vice-Consuls explaining the law as to contributing to the foreign loan which the Russian Government proposed to contract. The circular was laid before Parliament on July 24, 1854 : "g IE "Hamburgh, June 30, 1854. " Her Majesty's Government having taken the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as regards the nature of the crime, and the degree of penalty which any subject of Her Majesty would render himself liable to in contributing to the foreign loan which the Government of Russia propose to contract, I am therefore informed by the Earl of Clarendon that a British subject contributing to a loan raised on behalf of a sovereign at war with Great Britain, will be guilty of High Treason, as adhering to the Queen's enemies. " I have accordingly to instruct you to give every publicity to this fact within your Vice-consular district. I am, etc. " British Vice-Consul at ... G. LLOYD HODGES." 42 The Declaration of Paris But the question was more formally raised in February by the Board of Trade, and was referred to Lord Clarendon. 1 The result was a despatch sent on the 16th February 2 to the Consul at Riga, for the information of the British merchants, in which, after consultation with the Law Officers, the law as to trading with the enemy was explained. Persons resident and trading in an enemy country are treated as enemies, and their property is liable to seizure on the sea, even if on board a neutral vessel, "whether such persons be by birth neutral, allies, enemies, or fellow-subjects." Clearly then at this point the Attorney- General's opinion on the law overrode any question of policy. This is a harsh doctrine, but it is embedded in our law of war, and it is not necessary to discuss it. I shall confine myself to making one suggestion. The position of a merchant who establishes a business in the ordinary course in a foreign country seems to differ in many respects from that of a merchant who has so established himself with the implied authority of his Government ; to the latter it does not seem necessarily to follow that the same harsh principle of the law should apply. Such an authority would be implied where British merchants had estab- lished themselves in a country where " by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means," the King exer- cises foreign jurisdiction. The modern principle of exterritoriality is based on the old factory system, and, if I am right in my sugges- tion that the British merchants in Russia were lineal descendants of the old factory merchants, it would not have been unreasonable to modify the old principle of the law in their favour. 3 1 Lord Clarendon on the 17th March said that the question was referred to him " about a month ago." But, allowing for the reference to the Law Officers, the consideration of their report, and the drafting of the despatch to Riga, it cannot have been later than the beginning of February. * Document No. 2. 8 The " factory system " was, as pointed out in the text, the forerunner of the modern system of consular jurisdiction which exists in certain Oriental countries, of which the chief remaining example is China. In virtue of the commercial treaties the subjects of other countries enjoy the privilege of exterritoriality, by which, speaking very generally, they remain subject to their own laws, and to the jurisdiction of their own Consuls. The difference between the exterritorial and the factory system is that, under the latter and older system, the whole personnel of the factory, irrespective of nationality, was subject to the Consul's jurisdiction. It was to all intents and purposes a separate colony. Very little is known of the foundation of the system in Russia ; the following article of the Treaty of Commerce of 1787 between Russia and Portugal will therefore be of interest : " V. Les sujets des deux Puissances contractantes pourront dans les Etats respectifs s'assembler avec leur Consul en Corps de Factorie, et faire entr'eux pour 1'interet commun de la Factorie, les arrangemens qui leur conviendront en tant qu'ils n'auront rien de contraire aux loix, statuts et reglemens du pays, ou de Pendroit oMls seront 6tablis." (De Martens, Recueti, iii. 305 : (2nd ed.) iv. 315.) The Riga Despatch 48 It was, however, decided that the law was to be applied. As Lord Clarendon said, one of the Riga merchants had inti- mated his intention of continuing his residence in Russia, and " he had been told the consequences." The consequences were stated with almost brutal frankness : their property was by law " enemy property " ; the old doctrine of seizing enemy property on neutral ships would be adhered to in the impend- ing war : in other words, free ships would not make free goods. Lord Clarendon had now put himself in a curious dilemma. In so far as his own personal views were concerned, or even his intention, as confided to Lord Shaftesbury, to change the law, he was right to maintain the law officially. But within a month of his accceptance of the Scandinavian Powers' intimation that they expected that their free ships were to make free goods, he informed the Riga merchants that their goods, being enemy goods, should not be free on free ships. Yet Riga is a Baltic port, and it was conceivable that the merchants of Riga might charter Danish or Swedish vessels to bring their flax seed and tallow to England. The foundations of a policy of confusion were thus well and truly laid even before war began. The Swedish Government itself appears to have been puzzled, and to have asked for, perhaps received, explanations ; for, on the 23rd February, Mr Grey wrote that he had spoken to Baron Stjerneld on the question of the neutral flag, and had been assured that the Swedish Government was content not to press for any explicit answer on the subject from Her Majesty's Government. The answer of 16th January had not been " explicit " in the fact that Lord Clarendon had not stated, in so many words, that he accepted " free ships free goods." So far as the English law of war was concerned, however, the principle was clear, and seemed to be clearly stated. But a firm of London merchants, Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler, saw difficulties, and put this question to the Board of Trade : whether " Russian goods imported from neutral ports would be considered contraband, or would they be fairly admissible into England ? " The question had little relation to the point referred to in the Riga despatch, and the firm was informed * " that, in the event of war, every indirect attempt to carry on trade with the enemy's country will be illegal ; but, on the other hand, bona-fide trade not subject to the objection above stated, will not become illegal, merely because the articles which form the subject-matter of that trade were originally produced in an 1 See letter by Mr Emerson Tennent, Document No. 4 (4). 44 The Declaration of Paris enemy's country." The letter 1 laid down two further principles of war law : first, that trading with the enemy, indirect as well as direct, is illegal ; secondly, that the produce of an enemy country, commonly called goods " of hostile origin," are not per se tainted either as " enemy property " or as contraband. This point had been formally admitted by Great Britain in the treaty with Russia in 1801, and there had not since then been any question that it was the English view of the general law, quite apart from treaty arrangements. The provision in the treaty with Russia was that goods of hostile origin which had become bond-fide neutral property were exempt from seizure, though, by a supplementary article, colonial produce was excepted. The same principle would obviously apply when such goods had become the property of British subjects. The firm, however, thought they had detected a flaw in the official reasoning. " It appears," they wrote, " that a British subject buying (by his agents) Russian produce in Russia, and importing the same via Germany (a neutral country), will be acting illegally, and goods seized on arrival here ; but that a neutral subject buying Russian goods and consigning them to this country from a neutral port will be considered as carrying on a bond-fide trade, and his merchandise will be admitted for consumption into England. This would give such a decided advantage to the neutral over the British subject, that we cannot believe such to be the intention of the Government." It is possible that the combined results of the two rules might have been as the merchants stated. The rule treating British subjects in certain circumstances as if they were enemies is clearly arbitrary, but it is rendered necessary by the exigencies of war. Its consequences may not be very logical. It may well be that these consequences appear to be hard when compared with the consequences of another rule which is based on sound principle ; they can only be avoided by a rigorous adherence to the spirit as well as to the letter of the law. The Board of Trade could do no more than refer the firm to the general principle stated in the former letter, and repeat " that in the case of articles originally produced in Russia, but since purchased from neutrals at a neutral port, and in the ordi- nary course of trade with such port by British merchants, the fact of their having been originally produced in Russia will be immaterial." To revert to the Riga despatch. It was referred to in the 1 The correspondence with the Board of Trade is printed as Document No. 4. The Riga Despatch 45 House of Commons on the 13th March, when a somewhat irregular discussion arose out of a question put by Mr Mitchell, Member for Bridport. He hoped that the Government would shortly state their intentions with respect to the neutrals, because a statement made on a previous occasion by the Secretary to the Treasury " appeared to be irreconcilable with the document issued by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, said that the Government would make a statement at the earliest possible moment ; whereupon Mr Milner Gibson " took the liberty " of drawing the attention of the House to the fact that a public declaration of policy had already been made in the Riga despatch, and dwelt on the hardship it would cause to British commerce if it were insisted on. He hoped they were not to con- sider the despatch of Lord Clarendon as the rule that was to be adopted in the Baltic, because, " not only would it be calculated to cause collision with friendly Powers, not only would it have no effect in bringing the war to a close, but it would rather, on the contrary, have the effect of prolonging it." Then, taking up the thread of the hints he had dropped on the 27th February, he indicated the policy which he and a section of the House were prepared to urge on the Government. Unless the question of the neutrals " should be dealt with in a different spirit from that which was manifested in former times, it might bring this country into a collision with the United States of America." The principle laid down in the Riga despatch would authorise the boarding and rummaging of every United States ship by British officials " to see if they could find some bale or package in which there might be, directly or indirectly, a Russian interest" which would lead to its condemnation. He was " in hopes that the sounder policy would be adopted, that free ships would make free goods, and that the country would be spared the risk of being brought into collision with the friendly Powers." The Secretary to the Treasury (Mr J. Wilson) then explained his previous statement. The question put to him, he said, had nothing to do with imports to or exports from Russia. It was solely a commercial question which had been decided by the Treasury whether Russian produce imported by a neutral Power in a neutral ship the property of a neutral subject would be held sacred or be liable to seizure ; which was an entirely different question from any which might arise with respect to direct trade with Russia. Apparently the Treasury answer was that such produce would be held " sacred." On the 17th March the question was formally raised in both Houses of Parliament : in the Lords, by the Marquis of Clanri- 46 The Declaration of Paris carde, on a motion for copies of correspondence which had led up to the Riga despatch ; in the Commons, on a motion by Mr Milner Gibson, that instructions be given to British cruisers not to interfere with neutral vessels carrying enemy property not contraband of war. Lord Clanricarde did not question the law laid down in the despatch, but objected to the indistinct and abrupt terms in which it was couched. He was, however, anxious to know whether it was to be taken as " representing the positive decision of the Government " ; and he presumed that it was not in- tended to convey the opinion of the Government in regard to the rights of the neutrals. " So grave a subject as that, and one which had led to so much controversy, ought not to be discussed in that sort of incidental correspondence." Lord Clarendon replied in the Lords. Coming at this time, a speech from the Foreign Secretary must have been looked forward to with anxiety, as well by those who believed that no change ought to be made in our maritime practice as by the British merchants whose trade was in jeopardy. With the war practi- cally certain, all parties would naturally expect that the policy in regard to the neutrals would by this time have been decided. Lord Clarendon had not seen the Emerson Tennent letter. 1 But he justified the Riga despatch, regretting that it should seem to have been expressed with " unnecessary curtness or severity." On receipt of the Board of Trade letter, he said, ** I immediately took advantage of all the means at my command to ascertain what the law really was in reference to it, and having ascertained it, I stated it as clearly and concisely as I could in my despatch. In such despatch I explained to him [the Consul at Riga] that by the law and practice of nations a belli- gerent has a right to consider as enemies all persons who reside in a hostile country, or who maintain commercial establishments therein, whether such persons are by birth neutrals, allies, enemies, or fellow-subjects ; that the property of all such persons exported from such country is res hostium, and, as such, is looked upon as lawful prize of war. Such property, I said, would in fact be condemned as prize, although its owner might be a native-born subject of the captor's country, and although it might be in transitu to that country, and the fact of its being laden on board a neutral ship would not protect it." But the hard case of the Riga merchants had not been over- looked. " It has not been possible hitherto to determine on what principle the dispensing power of the Crown will be exer- 1 See p. 43. The Riga Despatch 47 cised, whether licences or Orders in Council shall be resorted to." Being for the first time engaged with a naval ally in war, " it is our duty," he added, " to be very clear as to the principles we are about to adopt, and the departure which we shall sanction from our former law and practice . . . before we can call on the French Government to adopt those principles, and to protect British commerce and property in a way that the French might not in ordinary circumstances see to be right." He concluded by saying that he had endeavoured to give all the information in his power ; " but your Lordships will under- stand that great caution is necessary in doing so ... not to commit the Government to courses which may involve great responsibility. I think we are nearly in a position to determine the principle on which we shall allow licences." 1 This part of the speech refers entirely to the question of British merchants in Russia, and to the grant of licences to allow them to continue their trade. It is necessary to consider it separately from the second part, because the departure from 1 In a bundle of loose Miscellaneous Papers preserved in the Public Record Office, there are many half sheets which bear witness to the fact that the question of licences was at that time seriously engaging Lord Clarendon's attention. It appears from a memorandum in his own hand- writing, dated the 1st March, that for some time the Government were determined to avoid having recourse to licences, " as calculated to produce fraud and undue favour to individuals." But there is a slip on which a query is written, also in Lord Clarendon's hand, " Whether Russian produce from over the frontier to Prussian ports and shipped from thence by British or Neutral vessels will be subject to seizure and confiscated by H.M. cruisers ? " This is enclosed in an office inquiry dated 20th March : " Lord Clarendon wishes to have the inclosed Query submitted in form to the Q's Ad^t being a query put to Ld. Clarendon by the Deputation to-day. " Ld. Clarendon wishes also to obtain a form of Licence for the free passage of ships laden with Russian produce, etc. He asked me whence such licences were issued. I said I believed from the Council Office. But I apprehend that the Law Officers must be first consulted as to the pro- priety of the wording. They must know at the Admiralty whence such licences are issued how they are worded." It would not be legitimate to reconstruct a policy on such very slender foundations : but some inferences may reasonably be drawn from these fragments. The memorandum of the 1st March has the word " super- seded " written on it in pencil. It would therefore appear that the question of licences was being again considered in connection with the Prussian transit trade ; and it is possible that at the tune Lord Clarendon made the statement given in the text he was hopeful that licences would furnish the remedy for what was going on in Prussia. This memorandum was followed by another in Lord Clarendon's hand, dated 26th March, evidently dealing with an application for a licence : " I think the answer to this sd. be that his case with others of a like kind shall be taken early into consideration. " A Com ee of P.C. and B. of T. will be appointed for granting licences, and to them I apprehend we ought to refer all the cases we have rec d together with the opinion of the Law Officers upon them. M. 26/54. " C." 48 The Declaration of Paris *' our former law and practice " relates only to the system of licences adopted during the Napoleonic Wars, which was as much criticised at home as abroad. The statement of the position is unexceptionable. Being engaged with an ally in war, obviously the principles on which the licences were to be granted needed clear definition, for the French cruisers would be required to recognise British licences, and so to protect British commerce and property ; manifestly the system could only be adopted by mutual agreement, for British cruisers would have in a similar way to protect French commerce and property. The point made in the speech that "the French might not in ordinary circumstances " agree to affording this protection, is not quite intelligible. Napoleon had resorted to licences to as large an extent as the British Government ; he had indeed developed the system into the far more dangerous one known as " neutralisation," by which enemy ships were transferred to the neutral flag. 1 The difficulty that the French Government might not approve the reintroduction of the system in its simple form, which would enable our Own mer- chants to get their cargoes home to England, was probably illusory. Possibly something might depend on whether the resulting benefit would be entirely for the British merchants, or whether the French trade with Russia was sufficiently con- siderable to make it an important factor in the situation ; but this was not a question which should weigh with a loyal ally. As a matter of fact, practically all the Orders in Council and French ordonnances relating to trade with Russia were identical. It is doubtful whether any serious discussion on the question of licences really took place with France. The English des- patches which are extant are not complete enough for any statement to be based on them, but M. Drouyn de Lhuys' Mtmoire does not allude to it. But the moment had apparently at last arrived when Lord Clarendon thought it advisable to make a public statement as to his new opinions in regard to neutral rights. Having dis- posed of the Riga merchants, he proceeded to lift the veil to prepare the country for what was going on. I assume that the " we " in his statement refers to the French and English Governments conjointly. " With respect to the rights of neutrals," he said, " and in respect to letters of marque, I trust we are about to set an example of liberality by which we shall be able to show that, as far as it is in our power, it is our intention to mitigate the 1 The Licence System is more fully explained in Chapter III. of " 1855." The Riga Despatch 49 calamities of war, and to act in a manner that shall be con- sistent with the humanity and civilisation of the age." This statement requires very particular attention, coming, as it does, immediately after the defence of the Riga despatch, and specially because it contains no indication that the con- templated change was to be limited to the duration of the war. It is possible that the cautious reference in the earlier part of the speech to a " departure from our former law and practice " was zeugmatic, and that it was intended to relate as well to the seizure of enemy goods on neutral ships as to the licence system. That, however, may be passed over in view of the much more serious confusion of two very distinct subjects in this short sentence. The " example of liberality " which was about to be set, the " calamities of war " which were about to be mitigated, the action which was a'bout to be taken "consistent with the humanity and civilisation of the age," were referred in- discriminately to the rights of neutrals and to letters of marque. But these epithets are not applicable alike to both these subjects ; none of them indeed are properly applied to the rights of neutrals. To abandon the English practice of seizing enemy property on neutral ships might be described as an act of " liberality " to the enemy ; to the neutral it was a concession to their con- venience and to their importunity, nothing more. The abandon- ment by the French of their practice of confiscating neutral property on enemy ships was a similar concession. The delay, the inconvenience, even the financial loss to neutrals resulting from these practices, could not be described as " calamities of war." And neither the English nor the French practice could by any stretch of language be referred to inhumanity or attributed to want of civilisation. " I do not see," Sir Edward Grey said in a debate in 1908, "that humanity has anything to do with seizing enemy property on neutral ships." On the other hand, to abandon privateering could not by the most imaginative person be described as an " act of liberality." But the excesses to which the system had given rise certainly were a " calamity of war " ; according to the view held in many countries, it was inconsistent " with the humanity and civilisation of the age." There was undoubtedly a very strong feeling in this country against privateering. A petition had been presented from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce praying that British ships should no longer be commissioned as privateers. The privateers were perpetually bringing us trouble, endless trouble, during the Seven Years' War. Sir Julian Corbett 1 says : 1 England and the Seven Years' War, vol. ii. p. 7. 50 The Declaration of Paris What the King's cruisers did might possibly have been borne, but the action of our privateers was outrageous be- yond endurance. Every year it had been growing worse, and it is not to be denied that at this time there was a swarm of smaller privateers in the Narrow Seas who were not to be distinguished from pirates. Pitt was honestly doing his best to check the abuses, but the privateers were incorrigible. What oppressed his mind from the first was a vision of the three Northern Powers uniting to protect their trade. He saw how easily on such a pretence they might gather a powerful combined fleet to escort their convoys down Channel, and then ; having seen them clear, it would be open to them to run into Brest, join hands with the French fleet, and declare war. We should then be unable to keep command of the Channel or the North Sea, and the threatened invasion would become a real danger. The vision does credit to Pitt's long sight and acute perception. It was far from fanciful. France was doing all she could at this time to tempt Sweden into taking a hand in her invasion project, and Denmark was actually approaching Holland as to the possibility of forming a maritime union and taking common action for the assertion of neutral rights. Pitt, who knew how to make concessions as well as to be bold, met the danger by bringing pressure to bear on the Prize Courts to release as many ships as possible, and by restraining the excesses of the privateers by administrative action. . . . By these means the air was cleared. The neutral Powers were pacified, and the special danger passed. There is indeed little doubt that the privateers were at the root of almost all the troubles we ever had with the neutrals. 1 But to apply these high-flown terms to the seizure of enemy property on neutral ships was an abuse of language. What, then, was Lord Clarendon's object in linking together two perfectly distinct subjects by inappropriate epithets ? Was he not quite master of his subject, speaking to men even less well - informed than himself ? It certainly succeeded 1 The following example may be cited : In March 1801 the Danish Minister in London complained of certain " atrocities " deliberately committed by British privateers. Lord Hawkes- bury replied that a searching inquiry had been ordered into the conduct of the persons accused of violence and inhumanity. If the charges were substantiated, their conduct would receive the strongest marks of the Government's disapproval : " attendu que c'est le voeu uniforme de Sa Majeste, que, meme dans les cas d'hostilites ouvertes, toute espece de cruaute ou de severit6 non necessaire soit scrupuleusement evitee par toutes les personnes, employees au service de Sa Majeste." (De Martens, Recueil, Supplement, ii. p. 445.) The Riga Despatch 51 in producing a mystification, which has prevailed even to this day. On the same day, 17th March, in the House of Commons, Mr Milner Gibson developed his previous hints in a long speech in support of his motion that an humble address be forwarded to Her Majesty that she will be graciously pleased to give special instructions to the officers commanding Her Majesty's cruisers, in the event of war, to abstain from interfering with the neutral vessels on account of any goods or property, not contraband of war, that may be contained therein, and praying Her Majesty to direct Her Ministers to consider a policy of entering into treaty stipulations with the United States of America, and any other foreign country willing to entertain the same, on the principle that free ships shall make free goods, and the neutral flag give neutrality to the cargo. Like most of his speeches on the subject, it was singu- larly confused, the good being obscured by vague and useless generalities, such as this : "It must be obvious to everyone that after forty years of peace the usages which might have been adapted to the last war may not be equally adapted now. . . . Opinions have changed, and we all know that that mighty power, steam, has been introduced since the last war, and effected important alterations in maritime communications." One result of the introduction of that mighty power seems to have escaped his attention. It had promoted neutral activities, and suggested important alterations in their methods of getting cargoes to belligerents, as the " broken voyages " at Nassau and Matamoros were soon to demonstrate. The time was hardly opportune to suggest that belligerents should relax their efforts to counteract these activities. But the conclusion to which Mr Milner Gibson had come was that this was " a most favourable moment for entertaining the question whether great changes may not be introduced into the principles of international law," which was the view Lord Clarendon had expressed to Lord Shaftesbury. " We are on terms of the most perfect amity with France and the United States, two of the most important naval and commercial Powers in the world besides ourselves, and therefore we might probably obtain their assent to such an alteration of the international law upon this subject as would be befitting the times in which we live, and as would give liberal scope for commercial trans- actions in time of war. I ask you to consider whether [this] war cannot be carried on without infringing to the same extent as formerly on the rights of commerce and private 52 The Declaration of Paris property." ... He believed that there was " very good ground for considering at the present time the policy of entering into a treaty with the United States and other foreign countries, in order that free ships may make free goods." It is singular that a statesman of the standing of Mr Milner Gibson, who was undertaking to guide the country into a new way of conducting its wars, should have betrayed so little grasp of his subject as to suggest that England might obtain the assent of France and the United States to such a change in the law. A very slight knowledge of the history of the subject would have told him that our assent to such a change was the one thing that those Powers had always been anxious to obtain, and that with- out that assent there was no possibility of the principle being recognised as a part of international law. The point mainly insisted on, however, was that this maxim, the adoption of which would give " liberal scope for commercial transactions in time of war," was more suited to the " times in which we live." No more specific reason was given why the times had changed since Catherine of Russia had put forward the same argument, than the introduction of steam. She had advocated the same doctrine ; she also was anxious to foster " commercial transactions in time of war," and did not hesitate to explain what she meant commercial transactions between neutral and the enemy. She was certain, she wrote to Count Pouschkin, her Minister at Stockholm, that the real reason why England had attacked Holland in 1781 was that the States- General had adhered to the Armed Neutrality, " d'autant plus, que par la elle [la Republique d'Hollande] mettoit parfaitement a couvert la navigation et 1'industrie commer9ante de ses sujets, exerce"e pour la plus part en faveur des ennemis de PAngleterre." 1 Mr Milner Gibson seemed unconscious that he was advocat- ing no new doctrine, only a very old one which had been asserted by the neutrals from 1752 to 1815, and on which at times they had threatened to insist by force of arms. When he had aired his favourite theory Mr Milner Gibson was on more solid ground in dealing with the practical question of the moment. Although it had been pressed as a perma- nent principle suited to the times in which we live, the House must have been surprised to find him continuing in a lower key : " I do not propose to give up any of our maritime rights." He admitted that our practice in war was in accordance with the Law of Nations ; he desired only a modification of the Riga 1 Rescript of the Empress to Count Pouschkin, 1781 : Secret History of the Armed Neutrality, by a German nobleman (Count Goertz), 1792, p. 209. The Riga Despatch 58 despatch ; he considered that " searching neutral ships for enemy goods is totally nugatory for the purposes of this war," because the bulk of Russian produce on the high seas was not Russian property. He asked simply that special instructions should be issued that the right be not exercised during the war ; and he reinforced his arguments by words which might have been, had in fact been, written by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. If such instructions were issued we should " make no surrender of principle we do not deprive ourselves of the power of exercising those extreme rights whenever we think fit." Lord Clarendon had just made an announcement in the other House as to the Government policy. Mr Milner Gibson promised to address the House again should that announcement have fallen short of the principle which he believed to be the only safe one. Mr Horsfall seconded the motion, and " could not conceive how any Government could think otherwise." Lord John Russell said that the Government would " issue in some shape or other " a document which should declare its policy. Mr J. L. Ricardo said that the Riga despatch and the Board of Trade correspondence l were totally at variance. He then started a new point, of which more was to be heard in subsequent debates. Dwelling on the injury to our own manufacturers if we " prevented the imports of Russia coming into this country," he hoped we should not be governed " by old and antiquated notions," but abide by the " sounder and fairer notions " we had adopted in regard to commerce. Mr T. Baring complained, more practically, of the injury to trade caused by the delay in the announcement of the Government decision. John Bright spoke a few words. He hoped the Government would " take a wise course " and change the law. If they did not, our commerce would be overtaken by the United States ; "otherwise war with the United States was inevitable." As for the law, he never could see " any justice in what we called the Law of Nations on this subject." Then, not weighing his words with his customary care, he declared that " The property on board a neutral ship should be as sacred from the intrusion of enemies as the property of a neutral on shore." Lord John Russell requested the forbearance of the House. The question was being considered, and a document was being prepared which required very especial care, as France had to be communicated with. He added the important statement : Though the views of the Government are decided, " it was 1 Document No. 4. 54 The Declaration of Paris necessary to see whether they were agreeable to the Government of France." These two debates of the 17th March taken together, as well as the preliminary discussions on the 13th, are incomprehensible. As we shall see in the next chapter, negotiations had been for some time going on with France as to the policy which the allies were to adopt with regard to the neutrals. They had reached a difficult stage, and the utmost circumspection was necessary. A debate in Parliament is often the least circumspect of dis- cussions. It was eminently undesirable at the moment ; it was obviously premature, as the allied policy had not been definitely decided ; and it might lead to evasive statements by Ministers, which the House of Commons dislikes. But the parliamentary tradition recognises the expediency of caution when delicate negotiations are pending, and the House would certainly have acquiesced in the forbearance which Lord John Russell requested at the end of the debate if he had more boldly asked for it at the beginning. As it was, he made a statement which, if it had been true in fact instead of being very wide of the mark, might have jeopardised the whole of the negotiations : " The views of the Government are decided." They were, most unfortunately, very undecided. The result was a general dis- cussion in Parliament of a policy not yet determined, than which nothing is more likely to bring either parliamentary debate or diplomatic discussion into disrepute. But the debate gave Lord Clarendon the opportunity to lift the veil. On the 16th March he had done something more than lift the veil to the United States Minister. It transpired from a letter of Mr Buchanan to the Secretary of State at Washington that Lord Clarendon had explained to him exactly how the question stood. This important letter will be considered in the next chapter, in connection with the then-pending negotia- tions with the French Government. The remarkable feature about the debate, however, is not so much what was said as what was left unsaid. The merchants were in real alarm at the consequences threatened by the Riga despatch ; they were unreasonably alarmed at the Board of Trade correspondence ; the subject was evidently one of great complexity, which it was difficult to explain in official corre- spondence. But there was not one word said in either House, by speakers on either side, referring to the answer which had been given to the Scandinavian Declarations of Neutrality. The correspondence had been published in a White Paper 1 in 1 Document No. 1. The Riga Despatch 55 February. Had nobody read it ? Or, reading it, had no one understood ? Undoubtedly the law laid down in the Riga despatch was harsh, but it was the law of war. Mr Milner Gibson could have made a strong case for mitigating it if he had reminded the House of the answers given to Sweden and Denmark. His vague allusions to international law would have been unnecessary if he had referred to Government action actually taken, to opinions which seemed to have been actually formed, to promises actually made to the important neutrals of the North, all of which were at variance with the despatch. Yet he did not mention them. Still more extraordinary, those and there must have been many who objected to the concessions made to Sweden and Denmark, who knew that the Riga despatch did accurately state the ancient law of war against trading with the enemy, might have effectively contrasted the two policies, and pointed out the manifest variance between them. Yet they omitted all reference to the documents but lately issued for their information. There is much that is incomprehensible in every stage of the story ; it is perhaps not surprising that this characteristic should show itself thus early in the course of events. The Negotiations between England and France prior to the Declaration of War. Lord John Russell's statement at the close of the debate on the 17th March that a document was being prepared, but that the French Government had to be communicated with did not give a definite idea that negotiations with France had been going on for some time. The further statement that the views of the British Government " were decided " suggested that the Govern- ment had made up its mind, but that the delay in making its views public arose from this necessity of consulting the French Government and persuading it to adopt those views. Lord John wisely, and more accurately, added : " There are other causes for unavoidable delay." During the first week of March, as we have seen, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was urging prompt concerted action between the allies in regard to the neutrals, and dwelling on the bad effect which would be produced if separate and contradictory action were taken. M. Drouyn's anxiety can hardly have been relieved 56 The Declaration of Paris by Lord Clarendon's dilatory reply that the Law Officers were being consulted, but that no declaration would be published without consultation with the French Government. The roles of the two Governments had in some curious way become in- verted. The discussion had been initiated in Paris in the early days of January, the attention of the British Government had been called to the extreme urgency of united action, the simplest and speediest way of arriving at united action had been pointed out but so far in vain. February passed, and nothing had been done ; but at the beginning of March the British Government had apparently taken the matter into its own hands might, for all M. Drouyn knew, be deciding in favour of separate action. Hence his urgent message to Count Walewski. The only con- solation vouchsafed to him was that " no decision will be taken nor any declaration published without previous communication with the French Government": not "without previous consul- tation," but " without previous communication." M. Drouyn, however, interpreted this to mean sans se concerter, and con- tinued to negotiate. His narrative gives us an insight into what the British Government had been doing. Although by no means exhaustive, it is illuminating. A draft for the declaration to the neutrals had been prepared, and on the 14th March Lord Cowley presented it to the French Government, intimating that it had been the subject of much discussion in London, in order to make it conform as far as possible with French doctrines. M. Drouyn gives a summary of the draft and of the im- portant concessions which had been made. Reserving the question of law, the British Government undertook to confine visit on the high sea to the verification of a ship's nationality, and to the steps necessary to establish the absence of contraband of war, and of enemy despatches : it would admit that the neutral flag covered enemy property, and neutral goods under the enemy flag were to be untouched : letters of marque would not be issued, and British subjects accepting them would be treated as pirates. M. Drouyn rejoiced especially at the acquiescence in " free ships free goods." Enlightened as to the political side of the question, the British Government, he says, saw the necessity of reassuring the neutral Powers. Writing in 1868, he cannot resist giving us his version of the age-old dispute ; and after his interviews with Lord Cowley, as recorded by him, it is hard to say he was not justified. Eclaire" sur le cote politique de la question, le gouverne- ment britannique avait senti la ne"cessite de rassurer les puissances neutres, qu'effrayait le souvenir de la violation Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 57 constante de leur pavilion par ses croiseurs pendant les dernieres guerres, et de toutes les vexations qu'avait entrainees Pexercice du droit de visite pousse a outrance. Quand ce droit en effet impliquait la recherche de toutes les marchandises auxquelles pouvait etre attribute une provenance ennemie, il revetait la forme la plus intolerable, et 1'emploi qu'en avait fait la Grande Bretagne etait de nature a repandre 1'effroi parmi les nations non belligerantes. But M. Drouyn was not satisfied. The " right of search," even as restricted in the draft declaration, seemed to him to leave the door open to abuses, and the French Government thought that its exercise should be surrounded with guarantees giving greater protection to the neutrals. Discussions with Lord Cowley on this subject, as well as on several other details, having taken place, the draft was sent back to London, recast in such a form that it was hoped it might be used by both Govern- ments. The date of its despatch is put by M. Drouyn as the 20th March. There is, however, a telegram from Lord Cowley to the Foreign Office, despatched at 11.55 a.m. on the 19th, which gives a different account of the interviews. TELEGRAM FROM LORD COWLEY TO FOREIGN OFFICE. Drouyn stated to me yesterday that I should have a copy of the proposed French declaration in regard to neutrals this evening. I asked him several questions with a view to ascertaining whether there was any hitch. The general impression left upon my mind was that the declaration would be substantially the same as ours, but that it would be accompanied by a Note " to Her Majesty's Government " explaining the French view of certain passages. The words in inverted commas were added by a further telegram sent later on the same day. The reference to " several questions " put " with a view to ascertaining whether there was any hitch " is inconsistent with the idea that the new draft was the result of collaboration, but it is not necessary to unravel this discrepancy. From the first, as we have already seen from his January despatches, Lord Cowley's recollections of his intentions differed radically from those of the French Minister. It will be sufficient to give M. Drouyn's despatch to Count Walewski concerning the draft, in which he makes a very explicit statement as to its joint author- ship. He again emphasised the principle on which the draft rests that the fundamental principles of the two countries were left intact. In this way he hoped to achieve the joint declara- 58 The Declaration of Paris tion, so essential for bringing home to the world the fact of the alliance. FROM M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Mars 20, 1854. Ce projet a ete prepare entre lord Cowley et moi dans des entretiens confidentiels sur cette matiere delicate. Je viens d'en donner communication a M. le Ministre de la Marine en le priant de me faire connaitre son opinion le plus tot possible. Nous avons, ce me semble, a opter entre une declaration commune qui, s'appliquant uniquement a la presente guerre, n'engagerait pas les maximes dei'Angle- terre et dans laquelle nous n'abandonnerions pas les notres, ou deux declarations simultan6es qui, annon$ant les memes intentions quant a la conduite et aux instructions donnees aux commandants des forces navales respectives, rser- veraient egalement la difference de nos doctrines : mais j'inclinerais pour une seule declaration, qui serait plus satisfaisante pour les neutres, et qui, en constatant mieux notre parfait accord, frapperait plus fortement les esprits. On the 24th March, in answer to a question by Sir Fitzroy Kelly, Lord John Russell said that the document, to the exist- ence of which he had referred in the debate of the 17th, would be ready " very shortly." He added that there would probably be an Order in Council or a Declaration, but he was not sure whether it might not be necessary to introduce a Bill into Parliament. It it difficult to make out exactly what Lord John meant by this answer. The draft as recast must have been received in London ; " very shortly " could have no other meaning than that in its new form it had been practically accepted by the Cabinet. The facts, however, were very different. On the 24th, M. Drouyn sent a second and fuller despatch to Count Walewski on the subject of the draft, in which he developed the points already alluded to in the short despatch of the 20th. It seems probable that this second despatch, elaborating the position taken up by the French Government, was prompted by the invertebrate debates in Parliament on the 17th March, the report of which would not have reached him till after the short despatch of the 20th had been posted. With so clear a perception of what the necessities of the case demanded, he must have been in dismay at reading the speeches of Mr Milner Gibson and his friends urging the Government to take a step at once which he, M. Drouyn, knew they had already decided to take in due course of time, and at finding no frank Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 59 statement of the fact made by the Minister : and puzzled to understand the meaning of Lord Clarendon's circumlocutions. It must have appeared to him necessary to bring the Foreign Secretary back to the realities of the position : to remind him that, though he knew his secret desire to change the English practice in regard to the neutrals, though he sympathised with this desire, while regretting the necessity for keeping it secret, there was not then time to bring about the change even by indirect methods. It certainly, at that moment, was not the wish of France to bring that question to the front. Knowing the secret, that Lord Clarendon dared not, he was too astute a diplomatist not to know that, if the ulterior desire were to be- come generally known, it might wreck the temporary arrange- ment he contemplated making for the war. Hence, it seems to me, this second despatch was written : Count Walewski must once more remind Lord Clarendon of the real position taken up by the French Government. It will be well fully to appreciate that position. The point insisted on from the first was again emphasised : whatever course of joint action was decided on, it must preserve intact the fundamental principles, so widely divergent, of the two countries : in this way only a joint declaration would be possible. But if the British Government wished to indicate that it reserved the right to apply such and such principle for the present, thus insisting that that principle was a recognised right, then two declarations would become necessary, similar in principle but different in form. It would be impossible for the French Government to say that it renounced a right the existence of which it had always contested. This was a question of form : the essential thing was that the two Governments should agree as to the principles to be applied. M. Drouyn then dwelt on the fact that his Government was ready to abandon the practice of confiscating neutral property on enemy ships, in spite of the delicate nature of the question. It was to be feared that enemy goods on board enemy ships might escape capture by means of the old trick so familiar to the neutrals in former wars, lending the neutral flag to the enemy's ship, known as " neutralisation " ; * and possibly a law would be required to give effect to this new arrangement, more especially as it would deprive the French marine of a consider- able portion of their prize money. He would, however, consult the Minister of Marine so soon as he knew definitely the pro- posals of the British Cabinet. 1 See the chapter on the " Licences to trade with the Enemy," Chapter III. of " 1855." 60 The Declaration of Paris M. Drouyn thought that the abandonment of this practice would sufficiently counter-balance the abandonment of the British practice of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships. On the face of it, and accepting M. Drouyn's estimate of its value, the bargain seemed to be the only possible one ; it fell within the broad principle of mutual surrender of divergent principles which he had laid down at the commencement of the negotiations, and apparently the British draft had been based upon it. 1 1 FROM M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI Mars 24, 1854. Les observations que lord Cowley m'a presentees sur le pro jet de declaration relatif a la neutrality que j'ai eu Phonneur de vous adresser le 20 de ce mois, donnent lieu, de notre part, a certaines remarques sur lesquelles je crois utile d'appeler votre attention. Pour parvenir a faire une declaration commune, on devait se borner a formuler ce que les deux nations entendaient admettre ou repousser pendant la dur6e de la guerre actuelle. Les theories de la France et de 1'Angleterre 6tant differentes, il etait indispensable d'eviter tout ce qui pouvait ressembler a une sorte de declaration de principes. Le pro jet que je vous ai communique etait une transaction entre les systemes des deux pays ; il ne faisait prevaloir ni 1'une ni 1'autre de ces doctrines. Si le gouvernement anglais desire que sa declaration indique qu'il reserve 1'application de tel ou tel principe ou qu'il renonce, quant a present, a 1'exercice de tel ou tel droit, en indiquant ainsi qu'il considere ce principe comme reconnu, et ce droit comme lui appartenant, il faudra necessaire- ment en venir a faire deux declarations, semblables quant au fond, mais diff&rentes quant a la forme ; car evidemment le gouvernement franais ne peut dire qu'il renonce a 1'exercise d'un droit dont il a toujours conteste 1 'existence, ou qu'il reserve 1'application d'un principe, quand il a sans cesse refus6 de la reconnaitre. Ceci du reste n'est qu'une simple question de forme ; ce qui importe le plus en realit6, c'est que les deux gouverne- ments soient d'accord quant aux regies pratiques qui devront etre appliquees. Je passe a 1'examen de deux points importants et sur lesquels je vous invite a appeler plus specialement 1'attention de lord Clarendon. Le premier est relatif aux marchandise neutres saisies a bord de navires ennemis. Le pro jet que je vous ai envoy6 declarait que la confiscation n'en serait pas prononcee ; c'est la une question tres-grave en elle-meme, tres-delicate surtout pour le gouvernement francais. II est a craindre en effet, que les marchandises ennemis chargees a bord de navires ennemis n'arrivent a naviguer sans danger, au moyen de neutralisations simulees ; et d'autre part, les lois fran9aises, pronon?ant la confiscation des navires ennemis sans admettre d'exception pour les marchandises neutres, il faudra peut-etre une loi nouvelle pour enlever aux marins qui ont des droits a exercer, cette part souvent tres-considerable de leurs prises. C'est une question du reste au sujet de laquelle j'aurai a m'entendre, comme sur toutes les autres, avec M. le Ministre de la Marine. Mais je ne puis le consul ter utilement sur ces divers points que lorsque j'aurai 6t6 officielle- ment et completement inform^ des propositions definitives du cabinet britannique. Le gouvernement anglais parait insister pour que le pro jet de declara- tion d6fende aux neutres de se livrer, pendant la guerre, soit au commerce colonial, soit au cabotage, s'ils sont reserves pendant la paix. Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 61 We learn from this despatch, however, for the first time, that the British Government had raised in their draft a new and highly contentious point, which, curiously enough, was Je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler avec quelle persistance le gouverne- ment frangais, a toutes les 6poques, a soutenu les reclamations nombreuses et vives que 1'adoption de cette regie souleva, des 1'origine, de la part des nations neutres. La France est done Ii6e par ses pr6cedents historiques ; elle 1'est 4galement par des traites faits avec plusieurs Etats, done elle s'est engagee a laisser les navires naviguer librement en temps de guerre, meme entre deux, ports ennemis. Comment pourrions-nous aujourd'hui nous associer a une disposition qui refuserait aux neutres un droit que nous avons toujours revendique pour eux, et que nous avons meme pro- clame solennellement dans nos traites ? Je n'indique qu'en passant 1'interet particulier que cette question presente pour la France, et les consequences diSerentes que 1'adoption de la regie proposee aurait pour les deux pays. L'Angleterre, qui admet en tout temps les pavilions etrangers a prendre part au cabotage et au commerce des colonies, n'a rien a craindre de 1'application qui pourrait lui en etre faite ; la France au contraire, qui reserve encore ces naviga- tions au pavilion national, pourrait avoir eventuellement a souffrir de la regie qu'on 1'invite a proclamer. Je me demande du reste, s'il y a un interet considerable, pour la guerre actuelle, a inserer dans la declaration une disposition semblable. La Russie, il est vrai, reserve en temps de paix le cabotage et le commerce des colonies ; mais, dans la Baltique, le cabotage ne se fait qu' entre un petit nombre de ports, qu'il sera facile aux flottes de fermer completement au moyen d'un blocus effectif. II en est de meme de la mer Noire, sur laquelle les flottes combinees dominent. Quant au commerce de 1' Amerique russe, qui est le monopole d'une compagnie, s'il vient a etre exerce par les vaisseaux des Etats-Unis, il en pourrait resulter, dans un interet minime, des complications graves, que la France a d'autant plus le desir d'eviter sur cette question, que son traite de 1778 avec les Etats-Unis est un de ceux oil le droit des neutres de se livrer, pendant la guerre, aux commerces reserves, a ete formellement stipule. Je me plais a reconnaitre, du reste, tous les efforts que le gouverne- ment anglais a faits pour se rapprocher autant que possible des doctrines de la France, et vous pouvez assurer de nouveau lord Clarendon de notre desir sincere d'entrer dans la voie des transactions mutuelles. Nous en avons donne la preuve sur la question des marchandises neutres a bord des navires ennemis. Mais, en ce qui concerne le droit des neutres de se livrer aux navigations reservees, lord Clarendon reconnaitra, j'en suis certain, que la concession ne saurait venir de notre part. Le gouverne- ment anglais, en effet, qui regarde la prohibition comme fondle sur le droit des gens, peut bien reconcer a s'en prevaloir, tout en reservant son systeme, tandis que la France ne saurait proclamer une regie que, d'apres ses principes, elle ne se croit pas autorisee a appliquer. Telles sont les observations que je vous prie de presenter a lord Clarendon. J'espere qu'elles le determineront a ecarter de la declaration anglaise une regie que la France ne pourrait faire figurer dans la sienne. Jusqu'ici les deux gouvernements ont saisi toutes les occasions de faire ressortir la solidarit6 complete qui unit si heureusement les deux nations ; il importe que cette meme pensee continue de se reveler j usque dans les regies a 6tablir pour les questions secondaires. Si, sur certains points, les deux pays ne peuvent adopter les memes principes, il me parait du moins tres- desirable qu'ils 6vitent, surtout dans une declaration solennelle, d'en proclamer de difterentes. Vous voudrez bien me faire connartre le plus t6t qu'il vous sera possible, le r^sultat de 1'entretien que vous aurez eu avec lord Clarendon . 62 The Declaration of Paris omitted from M. Drouyn's summary of it. A clause had been introduced prohibiting neutrals from participating in the enemy's colonial and coasting trade ; in other words, the British Government proposed to insist on the " Rule of 1756." Against this M. Drouyn de Lhuys vehemently protested. He recalled the persistence with which France had supported the frequent protests of the neutrals against this Rule. France was therefore pledged against it by historical precedents, as well as by her treaties with many States. How was it possible for her now to associate herself with a provision which denied to neutrals a right she had always claimed for them ? Coming to the merits of the question, he pointed out that the provision would result in different consequences to France and England, for England allowed foreign flags to participate in her colonial and coasting trades, while France, according to the old monopoly system, reserved those trades for the national flag. But, he added, after all, was it a practical question ? In the Baltic the coasting trade le cabotage only existed between a few ports, and both in this sea and in the Black Sea a blockade by the joint fleets would be equally efficacious. In regard to Russian trade with its own dependencies in America it was in the hands of a Company, and, if it should be carried on by American vessels, questions might arise with the United States which France would desire to avoid, especially as, in her treaty of 1778, the right of the neutrals to participate in these trades during war had been expressly recognised. M. Drouyn acknowledged the efforts made to bring the views of the Cabinet into harmony with French doctrines, but Lord Clarendon must realise that it was impossible to ask France to make this concession. This despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys has an importance outside the special circumstances in which it was written. It is commonly assumed that the " Rule of 1756 " is a doctrine of the past ; it is certainly true that since the Declaration of Paris we have heard little of it. We now learn, and I believe M. Drouyn's account of these negotiations to be the only docu- ment which contains the information, that the Law Officers in 1854 considered it a very live doctrine. This is not the place to enter into a long examination either of the Rule itself or of the vital principle which underlies it. That will be undertaken in a subsequent volume ; but in view of the fact that its introduction into the English draft came near to wrecking the negotiations between England and France in 1854, a brief explanation of the " Rule " is necessary in order to understand the nature of the discussions which then took Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 68 place in regard to it. It is unfortunate that only one side of them remains. It would have been interesting to have read what Sir Alexander Cockburn had to say on the subject, and why he thought it necessary to revive it as some would say at so critical a time. But only M. Drouyn's comments upon it remain for our enlightenment, and a discussion of them is neces- sary to the understanding of the deadlock which was avoided by so narrow a margin of time. There is another important question which will be considered in due course how far the signing of the Declaration of Paris destroyed a Rule which Was fundamental to the whole system of our maritime law. For the moment it is sufficient to note Mr Hall's comment, written some years after the Declaration was in force : It is not " easy to see that the question has necessarily lost its importance to the degree which is sometimes thought." 1 The " Rule of 1756," as stated and enforced by the Prize Courts, is that a neutral has no right in war to participate in a trade of the enemy which is closed to him in peace. The special applications of the Rule were to the enemy's colonial and coast- ing trades. The examination of the decisions involves the larger question whether this is a complete statement of the Rule, or whether these are not merely two specific applications of a far wider principle. The judgments in the Immannel 2 and the Whilelmina 3 as to the colonial trade, and in the Emanuel 4 as to the coasting trade, seem to indicate very clearly what that principle is : the right of the belligerent to prevent neutral assistance to the enemy. It is sufficient here to refer to a few points which are incon- testable : first, that during the Seven Years' War, and in sub- sequent wars, we seized neutral ships which were participating in the enemy's colonial and coasting trades, establishing thereby the " Rule " as a principle of our belligerent practice ; secondly, that this Rule was one of the principles on which England acted which the Armed Neutralities sought to abrogate by their first contention " Que les vaisseaux neutres puissent naviguer librement de port en port et sur les cotes des nations en guerre " ; 5 thirdly, that the same clause was introduced into several treaties subsequently entered into, among them many to which France was a party ; but fourthly this on the 1 Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 682. a 2 C. Bob., 186. 3 4 C. Rob., App., p. 4. 1 C. Rob., 296. 5 Russia and Denmark, Armed Neutrality Convention, 1780, art. iii. De Martens, Recueil, ii. 103 : (2nd ed.) iii. 189. 64 The Declaration of Paris authority of Mahan that underlying the Rule there was a principle which inspired many of the English Orders in Council and French decrees during the Napoleonic Wars. If, therefore, we accept either of the theories often advanced, that during those wars France was seized by a madness which rendered her not accountable for her actions, but that England, remaining sane, was accountable ; or, that both nations were mad simul- taneously, and that their misdeeds must be regarded as flagrant violations of the Law of Nations ; then so much of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' statement as referred to France being bound to oppose the Rule by her treaties with many States was irreproachable. But with regard to the objection to it " La France est done liee par les precedents historiques " this cannot be put upon the same high plane, for the protests of France against the Rule were those of a belligerent. It is quite true that France with great persistence " a toutes les epoques, a soutenu les reclamations nombreuses et vives que 1'adoption de cette regie souleva, des 1'origine, de la part des nations neutres " ; but reduced to a simpler expression this amounted to no more than that she did her best, by encouraging the neutrals in their protests, to diminish the rigour of British practice at sea which deprived her of their assistance. He was possibly, however, on safer ground when he pointed out that a rigorous blockade of the Baltic ports would render recourse to the Rule un- necessary in this war. We may now continue the narrative of the negotiations. The draft Declaration as recast in Paris was despatched on the 20th March. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had evidently seen the Ambassador after posting his long despatch to Count Walewski on the 24th, and on the 25th Lord Cowley sent the following telegram to the Foreign Office : TELEGRAM FROM LORD COWLEY TO FOREIGN OFFICE. Drouyn presses for a decision on the neutral question. If you agree to adhere to the first draft, he will make his declaration as near to it as possible, leaving out the coasting- trade clause. If you adopt any other, he begs to have it without loss of time, as he is asked questions on all sides, which he avoids answering as yet. Following on the interview, perhaps not quite satisfied with Lord Cowley's share in it, M. Drouyn sent a further short despatch to Count Walewski instructing him to insist once more on the importance of a joint declaration, and begs for a decision. Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 65 M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Mars 26, 1854. Insistez sur les tres-graves inconve"nients d'une d- claration s6par6e qui ferait douter de 1'entente des deux pays, alarmerait les neutres, et ame'nerait d'involontaires et ineVitables conflits entre les commandants. Si lord Clarendon accepte le principe d'une declaration commune, sauf a regler le detail par des instructions separ6es, priez-le de me faire communiquer son projet pour que je puisse m'entendre avec le Ministre de la Marine et arriver a une conclusion. The next day a second and more detailed despatch followed, in which M. Drouyn dwells on the fact that he has had many conferences with Lord Cowley, and that Lord Clarendon must therefore have received almost daily information of his views, and again refers to the counter-project which he had prepared with the British Minister. 1 Again he expresses the hope that 1 M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Mars 27, 1854. Mes entretiens avec lord Cowley ont ete consacres depuis quelques temps, a 1'examen de 1'importante et delicate question des droits des neutres. Lord Clarendon a du etre informe presque journellement de 1'objet de ces discussions, et je sais que M. I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre lui avait deja transmis le projet de declaration dont nous avons pose les bases ensemble. Ce Ministre se trouvait ainsi tout prepar6 a recevoir la communication que je vous chargeais de lui faire par ma depeche du 24 de ce mois, et dont le but etait de 1'amener & emettre une opinion definitive sur des points qu'il a eu le temps d'examiner. Ma depeche telegraphique d'hier vous aura prouve 1'interet que le gouvernement de 1'Empereur attache a sortir d'une indecision qui, aujourd'hui que 1'etat de guerre est proclame, ne saurait so prolonger sans les plus graves inconvenients. J'espere que vos efforts auront determine le principal secretaire d'Etat de S.M. Britannique a renoncer au systeme pour lequel il avait laisse percer ses preferences et qui consisterait dans la publication de deux declarations, non-seulement separees, mais distinctes quant aux principes qui y seraient emis ou reserves. Ce n'est qu'avec le plus vif regret que nous verrions 1'Angleterre adopter une marche qui, des le principe meme d'une guerre faite en commun, accrediterait 1'opinion d'une divergence entre les deux gouvernements et affaiblirait, aux yeux de nos adversaires, 1'effet politique de 1'union intime et complete qui a donne a notre diplomatie la force qu'il est maintenant plus necessaire que jamais de conserver pour nos actes. Si de 1'ensemble nous descendons aux details, les dangers ne sont pas moins grands. Entre la declaration de la France et celle de 1'Angleterre, les neutres feront un choix et nul doute qu'ils ne se rangent plus volontiers autour de la puissance qui, par sa fidelity & des traditions auxquelles ils sont inviolablement attaches, leur apparaitra comme le champion de leur propre cause. Ne serait-il pas preferable de leur montrer leur surete dans 1'union des deux marines et d'eviter avec soin de raviver une vieille querelle qui alarmerait leurs interets, exciterait leurs passions et les reporterait peut-etre moralement dans un autre camp que le ndtre ? D'un autre c6te, et ce n'est pas une des moindres objections a faire 5 66 The Declaration of Paris the idea of separate declarations has been abandoned, dwelling on the advantages which the neutrals would derive from a single document. He has recourse to yet another argument. The United States would assume the role of protector of the neutrals. A treaty of commerce had been proposed to France in which the principles maintained by both Governments would be affirmed. If the allies were now publicly to declare different principles, it would not be possible for France to reject the proposal. But if they came quickly to an agreement, the con- sideration of it might very well be postponed. He suggests one way out of the difficulty : so long as the declarations were uniform, the Instructions to the fleets might deal with the details in a modified way provided they were settled jointly in the event of special doctrines being referred to in them by either country. Without drawing too largely on the imagination, what had happened to call for yet another long despatch, another reitera- tion of the old arguments, is fairly clear. On the 26th or 27th au systeme indique par lord Clarendon, comment concevoir qu'en presence de deux declarations distinctes etablissant une separation theorique entre les gouvernements, leurs amiraux et leurs officiers de mer s'entendent dans la pratique ? II surgira entre eux, je ne veux pas dire des conflits, mais des divergences involontaires et inevitables qui nuiront aux succes de leurs operations. Les fitats-Unis enfin sont prets, je ne saxarais en douter, a revendiquer le role que nous cleclinerions et a se faire les protecteurs des neutres, qui eux-memes recherchent leur appui. Le cabinet de Washington nous propose en ce moment de signer un traite d'amitie, de navigation et de commerce oto il a insere une s6rie d'articles destines a affirmer avec une autorite nouvelle les principes qu'il a tou jours soutenus et qui ne different pas des notres. Le principal secretaire d'Etat de S.M. Britannique com- prendra que nous n'aurions aucun moyen de ne pas repondre favorable- ment & 1'ouverture qui nous est faite, si la France et 1'Angleterre, bien que se trouvant engagees dans une meme entreprise, affichaient publiquement des doctrines opposees. Que les deux gouvernements, au contraire, s'entendent sur les termes d'une declaration commune, et nous pouvons alors ajourner 1'examen des propositions des Etats-Unis. II me parait difficile que ces considerations ne frappent pas 1'esprit de lord Clarendon, et j'espere qu'il se decidera a accepter un projet, qui, se bornant a tenir compte des conditions de la guerre actuelle, laissera de c6te des principes qu'il est d'autant moins opportun de soulever ou de rappeler que leur application serait inutile, et dont les effets, comme dans la question du cabotage sur les cotes des pays ennemis, par example, peuvent etre rem- places par I'emploi de mesures pratiques au sujet desquelles tout le monde est d'accord. Les instructions donnees aux commandants des batiments de guerre des deux pays suppleeraient naturellement a ce qu'il y aurait d'incomplet dans la declaration identique ; il serait toutefois necessaire, meme dans le cas oil ces instructions devraient conserver quelques traces des doctrines particulieres de la France et de 1'Angleterre, qu'elles fussent concertees en commun, et vous donnerez a lord Clarendon 1'assurance que M. le Ministre de la Marine emploierait tous ses soins a se rapprocher autant que possible de I'Amiraut^ dans les directions qu'il transmettrait a noa amiraux. Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 67 March, Count Walewski had received the despatch, dated the 24th, and on that very night in Parliament Lord John Russell had said that the document would be ready " very shortly," and talked vaguely about Orders in Council, or Acts of Parliament. Knowing what was passing in the Minister's mind, Count Walewski probably telegraphed this speech to Paris, and its uncertainty must have impelled M. Drouyn to write once more upon the old theme. We have now reached a point when cross-purposes obtained the upper hand : on the 24th March the Russians crossed the Danube and invaded Turkey, and war had become a question of hours. But, in spite of its imminence, projects and counter- projects from London and Paris crossed one another so fre- quently that it is impossible to maintain a sequence in the narrative of events. The 26th was a Sunday. There must have been an informal meeting of some of the Ministers, for at 11 a.m., in reply to Lord Cowley's of the 25th, the following telegram was sent to Lord Cowley : TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO LORD COWLEY. (11 A.M.). We have endeavoured to meet the views of the French Government as far as possible, and I do not think we can make further changes in the draft sent to you last night. I believe the Declaration will not be published before Thursday ; followed at 9.30 p.m. by a second : TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO LORD COWLEY. (9.30 P.M.). Further alterations have been made in the Declaration which will be satisfactory to France, though we cannot abandon our principle. I will send a messenger with it to-morrow. Meanwhile M. Drouyn had not been idle. After sending his long despatch to Count Walewski, he sent a new draft for the Declaration prepared in conjunction with the Minister of Marine, in which he endeavoured to approximate as much as possible to the English view. This draft has not been preserved, but it appears to have been based on the idea suggested in the despatch of the same day, that the Declaration should contain a statement of principles only, leaving the details to be worked out in the Instructions to the fleets. 68 The Declaration of Paris M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Mars 27, 1854. Cette declaration, que j'ai concertee ddfinitivement avec M. le Ministre de la Marine, ne consacre que les prin- cipes essentiels sur lesquels il importe de constater 1'accord des deux gouvernements ; des instructions separees, qui pourront d'ailleurs etre reciproquement communique'es, regleront 1'application de ces principes suivant la legislation de chacun des deux pays et resoudront, sous ce point de vue speciale, les difficultes sur lesquelles la divergence des doctrines respectives ne permet pas un accord patent, du moins immediat. This counter-project crossed one sent from London which appears to be the draft referred to in the first of the two Sunday telegrams, for M. Drouyn says that it contained a coasting-trade clause ; and that on the 28th Lord Cowley informed him that it had been definitely adopted by the Cabinet. The maintenance of the clause made it impossible for the French Government to accept it. Lord Cowley sent a telegram to London to that effect : TELEGRAM FROM LORD COWLEY TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 28TH MARCH. It is impossible to get an answer respecting the In- structions to naval commanders to-day. Drouyn will say nothing without consulting the Minister of Marine, but that part of them restricting neutrals from the exercise of the coasting trade will, I fear, not be agreed to. The reasons for the French attitude were explained by M. Drouyn to Count Walewski on the 28th. 1 From this despatch 1 M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. 1854, Mars 28. Je regrette, qu'en rappelant dans cet acte des theories qui ne sont pas les notres, et en y insurant Pinterdiction du commerce de cabotage ainsi que le principe de la limitation du commerce des neutres au seul commerce permis en temps de paix, le gouvernement britannique nous place dans la necessite de faire une declaration separee. Cette declara- tion comprendra tous les points indiques dans le projet joint a ma depeche d'hier, sauf le pr6ambule, dont j'ai fait 1'objet d'un rapport a 1'Empereur. J'ai obtenu, ainsi que vous le verrez, 1'assentiment de M. le Ministre de la Marine & la regie qui exempte de la saisie la marchandise neutre a bord d'un navire ennemi. Lord Cowley m'a communiqu6 en meme temps le projet des instructions destinees aux commandants des batiments de guerre anglais, en m'anon- cant qu'il etait sur le point d'etre signe. Des lors il est superflu de relever les questions qu'il tend a resoudre dans un sens oppos6 a nos principes Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 69 it appears that the Instructions to the British Fleet also had been presented with the intimation that they were on the point of being signed. It only remained therefore for independent Instructions to the French Fleet to be prepared, which M. Drouyn hoped would not create great inconvenience. The Times records that a meeting of the Cabinet was held on Monday, the 27th March, at which all the Ministers were present, and that it lasted two hours. M. Drouyn gives the result of it as reported to him : Au dernier moment, le conseil fut assemble de nouveau. Apres une longue discussion, il fut decide que 1'article qui avait provoqu nos objections serait raye de la declaration anglaise. Des lors 1'entente etait complete. Pour arriver a une identite absolue, il nous etait facile de plier notre projet aux formes traditionnelles que doivent revetir les ordres en conseil emis au nom de la reine du Royaume-Uni. En quelques heures, grace au telegraphe, les deux cabinets purent constater leur accord et aviser a la publication immediate de leur declaration commune. Here the story ends, but there is one other source of informa- tion from which some of the innumerable gaps may be filled in the American despatches which have already been referred to. We have seen, from Mr Buchanan's despatch of the 24th February, 1 that Lord Clarendon had taken the United States Minister unofficially into his confidence. He would be the first to whom the decision of the Cabinet would be communicated. On the 16th March 2 Lord Clarendon sent for the Minister and read to him " the declaration which had been prepared for Her Majesty, specifying the course she had determined to pursue towards neutral commerce during the war." A summary was sent to Washington the next day. " Free ships free goods " had been adopted, and neutral cargoes were to be free on enemy ships. The subject of blockades was dealt with in an " entirely et a notre legislation. II ne nous reste qu'a rediger, a notre point de vue, les instructions destinees a nos propres croiseurs. Je viens de prier M. le Ministre de la Marine de preparer ce travail, que j'aurai soin de vous communiquer pour etre porte a la connaissance du gouvernement britannique. J'ai 1'espoir que, dans 1'execution, cette divergence des instructions n'entrainera pas d'inconvenients graves, car nous sommes d'accord sur les points les plus essentiels, et je reconnais particulierement 1'esprit de Iiberalit6 avec lequel le gouvernement anglais s'est rapproche de nos principes en matiere de blocus. Cependant, si quelque dissenti- ment se presentait, je n'aurais qu'a regretter d'autant plus les retards qu'ont eprouves la preparation et la communication des projets sur lesquels une entente prealable aurait ete si desirable. 1 See p. 39. 2 Document No. 8 B. 70 The Declaration of Paris unexceptional " manner, and in conformity with American principles. No letters of marque would be issued. " His Lordship then asked me," continued Mr Buchanan, " how I was pleased with it ; and I stated my approbation of it in strong terms. I said that in one particular it was more liberal towards neutral commerce than I had ventured to hope, and this was in restoring the goods of a friend, though captured on the vessel of an enemy." Lord Clarendon also informed the Minister that he had repeated to the Cabinet the conversation he had had with him, " and this had much influence in inducing them to adopt their present liberal policy towards neutrals." He hoped that this would prove satisfactory to the United States, "and I assured him that I had no doubt it would prove highly gratifying to them." Permission had been given to communicate the substance of the declaration to Washington, which Mr Buchanan interpreted to include the publication of a notice informing the shipping interest of the new practice. One other sentence in this despatch is of great importance. The draft " had not yet undergone the last revision of the Cabinet ; but the principles stated in it had received their final approbation and would not be changed." This throws light on Lord John Russell's statement on the 17th March, that " the views of the Government are decided." x The draft read to the United States Minister must have been the one presented to the French Government by Lord Cowley on the 14th March. Mr Buchanan's summary of it practically coincides with that given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, though he refers to some additional details. Lord Cowley 's telegram of the 19th clearly indicates that the coasting-trade clause was included in the first draft ; and a despatch of the 13th April from the United States Secretary of State also mentions it. So that Mr Buchanan must have over- looked it, or seeing it had approved. Mr Marcy refers to the declaration as " distinct in interdicting to neutrals the coasting and colonial trade with the belligerent, if not enjoyed by them previous to the war " ; and after glancing at the use to which the " Rule of 1756 " was put during the French wars, " which this country held to be in violation of the law of nations," he enters an emphatic protest against its revival by Great Britain. " Should she still adhere to those principles in the coming con- flict in Europe, and have occasion to apply them to our com- merce, they will be seriously controverted by the United States, and may disturb our friendly relations with her and her allied 1 See p. 54. Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 71 belligerents." The liberal spirit, he adds, which she had indi- cated in the other principles with reference to neutral ships and cargoes " gives an implied assurance that she will not attempt again to assert belligerent rights, which are not well sustained by the well-settled principles of international law." Mr Marcy then expressed the opinion that in some respects the law of blockade is " unreasonably rigorous towards the neutrals," and that when they had visited a port " in the common freedom of trade," they ought to be allowed to take in cargo after the blockade is established, and freely depart. He concludes with a brief commentary on the right of search " so freely used, and so much abused, to the injury of our com- merce, that it is regarded as an odious doctrine in this country, and, if exercised against us harshly in the approaching war, will excite deep and widespread indignation." Caution in its exercise by the belligerents would therefore be " a wise procedure." He alludes to the " settled determinations of the English Admiralty," that persistent resistance to a search renders a vessel confiscable : " It would be much to be regretted if any of our vessels should be condemned for this cause, unless under circumstances which compromitted their neutrality." Mr Marcy 's despatch was written (13th April) before the receipt of a copy of the Declaration which was posted by the Minister in London on the 31st March. The difficulty of clearly understanding the whole story is increased by Mr Buchanan's statement in his covering letter, that the Declaration was " substantially the same as that which I informed you it would be in my despatch of the 17th instant." The British Minister at Washington communicated the Declaration to the United States Government officially on the 21st April, intimating the confident hope that it would, " in the spirit of just reciprocity," give orders that Russian privateers should not be equipped or victualled, or admitted with their prizes into United States ports, and that its citizens should rigorously abstain from taking part in armaments of this nature, or in any other measure opposed to the duties of a strict neu- trality. This communication was acknowledged by what is commonly known as the First Marcy Note, of the 28th April. Before we consider the terms of the Declaration itself, we must realise the strange fits of indecision through which, on the eve of war, the Cabinet passed before agreement was come to as to the attitude to be adopted to the neutrals. There was, as I read it, a conflict between Lord Clarendon, supported by such of the Ministers as were in his confidence, and those members of the Cabinet who, having no pronounced 72 The Declaration of Paris views of their own on the subject, were probably influenced by the opinion of Sir Alexander Cockburn. When he was con- sulted, the strict letter of the law maintained the upper hand ; w r hen his opinion was dispensed with, the predilections of Lord Clarendon prevailed. The Riga despatch was, a's Lord Clarendon declared, written on the advice of the Law Officers. The drafts of the proposed Declaration were naturally prepared by them ; the insistence of the " Rule of 1756 " was obviously due to their advice. We may be quite sure that the final decision not to insist on its retention in the draft was come to by the yielding of the Cabinet to the wishes of its " governing member," as Lord Clarendon has been called. But the influence of the Attorney- General is, I think, visible in the two Sunday telegrams. They contain a point of considerable difficulty which I shall not attempt to solve, but it is too important to overlook. In the morning no further changes can be made. In the evening, further alterations have been made" though we cannot abandon our principle." Had these two telegrams stood alone we might reasonably assume that the alteration made was the temporary adoption of " free ships free goods " ; the principle that could not be abandoned, the seizure of enemy property on neutral ships. The reference to " the coasting-trade clause " in Lord Cowley's telegram of the 25th (which the copying clerk turned into " the coaling-trade clause ") would have remained mys- terious. But we now know that this clause was included in the earliest draft, and the meaning of the Sunday evening tele- gram is clear : the practice would be waived during the war, but the " Rule of 1756 " on which it rested could not be per- manently abandoned. The Rule was, as we shall see in Chapter VI., suspended by the Order in Council of the 15th April 1854, which put the Declaration in force. As to the effect of the United States Minister's opinion on the Cabinet when it was reported by Lord Clarendon, the one point which is clear from the correspondence analysed above is, that it may have induced the dissenting members to accept " free ships free goods," but that it did not bring about the suspension of the " Rule of 1756." Mr Marcy's strong protest was not written till the 13th April. Thus far, then, the influence of the Law Officers seems to be unmistakeable. But when Lord Clarendon acted independently of them he gave full rein to his intention ; he had accepted " free ships free goods " directly the Scandinavian Declarations of neutrality gave him the opportunity. It is equally clear that he did not intend to make a public announcement of his new faith until he was compelled, and it was too late for him to The Declarations to the Neutrals 73 be forced by Parliament to draw back. It would not be fair to say that the confusion of his speech on the 17th March was deliberate ; but the only other explanation of it is that he had but the haziest notion of the meaning or of the far-reach- ing effect of the new doctrines he had espoused, and that he was hypnotised by the invocations of humanity and civilisation in which Mr Milner Gibson and the Philosophical Radicals so freely indulged. VI The Declarations to the Neutrals. The Declaration by the Queen to the neutrals was issued on Tuesday, the 28th March, and was followed immediately by the declaration of war. THE DECLARATION TO THE NEUTRALS. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland having been compelled to take up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom she remains at peace. To preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unneces- sary obstruction Her Majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her by the Law of Nations. It is impossible for Her Majesty to forgo the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbours, or coasts. But Her Majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel unless it be contra- band of war. It is not Her Majesty's intention to claim the confisca- tion of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships, and Her Majesty further declares that, being anxious to lessen as much as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly organised forces of the country, it is not her present inten- tion to issue letters of marque for the commissioning of privateers. Westminster, 28th March, 1854. 74 The Declaration of Paris The French Declaration, in identical terms, was approved by the Emperor on the 29th March, and appeared in the Moniteur of the 30th April, accompanied by a Report of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. 1 On the same day M. Drouyn wrote to Count Walewski in terms of great enthusiasm at the successful termination of the negotiations which had so nearly come to an untimely end : M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. 1854. Je me felicite vivement de la preuve eclatante que la France et PAngleterre viennent de donner de leur bon accord dans la question si importante des droits reserves aux neutres pendant la guerre actuelle. L'harmonie qui s'est etablie entre les deux cabinets sur un point ou Ton aurait pu croire qu'il leur serait, malgre leur sincere envie d'y parvenir, extremement difficile de s' entendre, produira partout la meilleure impression et conciliera aux puissances auxquelles appartient 1'initiative de cette genereuse resolu- tion les sympathies des nations commerantes dans le monde entier. Veuillez dire a lord Clarendon que le gouverne- ment de PEmpereur apprecie comme il le doit 1'esprit qui a preside aux deliberations du gouvernement de la reine Victoria sur un sujet qui lui tenait particulierement a cceur, et qu'il en considere le reglement, dans les termes ou il s'est fait, comme un des meilleurs resultats de 1'intime alliance des deux pays. On the 30th a circular despatch was sent to the French diplomatic and consular authorities in neutral countries. 2 It dwelt on the advantages which the solicitude of the allies had conferred upon the neutrals, and took the opportunity of im- pressing upon them the advisability of the neutral Governments taking all necessary steps to prevent their subjects engaging in any enterprise inconsistent with the duties of a rigorous neutrality, this being the condition and the guarantee that the advantages conferred on them would be maintained. The British Government was congratulated on having been animated by the same desires as the Government of the Emperor, and already penetrated with the idea of leaving the neutrals in possession of all the advantages which the indispensable necessities of the war did not make it a duty to restrict. In reciting these advan- tages, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that they were to be enjoyed only during this war ; but he did not fail to note that, when the war should be over, " cette declaration commune 1 Document No. 5 B. z Document No. 7 B. The Declarations to the Neutrals 75 demeurera comme un precedent considerable acquis a 1'histoire de la neutralite." The circular letter was followed on the 5th April by a more formal notification to be addressed by the diplomatic agents to the Governments to which they were accredited. 1 The point was emphasised that in making the concessions to the neutrals the allies had restrained within very narrow limits the exercise of their rights as belligerents. A similar notification was sent to the British agents. 2 Instructions to the fleets followed. 3 From M. Drouyn's account it appears that although the fundamental principles had been settled in common, some difficulties in their applica- tion on secondary points had arisen. He treats these differences as inevitable, and as having their origin in the practice of the two countries which had for so long been opposed. The Instructions, therefore, were intended to minimise the effect of these differences, and appeared to have been the result of a complementary series of amicable explanations between the two Governments. M. Drouyn de Lhuys concludes his survey of the negotiations in exuberant language : Places a 1'abri des violences de la guerre, ils [les neutres] n'avaient plus a craindre d'etre entraines dans la querelle d'autrui, et ils demeuraient libres de poursuivre en paix, au milieu de combats auxquels ils etaient etrangers, leur commerce accoutume, pourvu qu'aucune fraude n'appelat sur eux la severite des belligerantes. Les neutres profiterent largement de toutes les facilite*s qui leur etaient accordees. Ils n'en abuserent point, et pendant toute la duree de la guerre la France et 1'Angle- terre n'eurent pas a regretter leur genereuse initiative. Cette experience, comme on devait s'y attendre, fut con- cluante. Le progres des mceurs secondant la reforme des doctrines, les nouvelles regies, eprouvees par la pratique des deux grandes puissances maritimes, furent universelle- ment acceptees comme un bien pour toutes les nations. En Angleterre comme en France, les classes commer9antes, loin de voir avec jalousie la securite que ce regime liberal donnait a des interets rivaux, se felicitaient du developpe- ment general des transactions qui en etaient les consequences, et sentaient que tous etaient appeles a y trouver egalement leur avantage. L'Exposition universelle de 1855 organisee a Paris pendant que nos armees de terre et de mer com- battaient en Crimee et dans la Baltique, fournit, on s'en souvient, une preuve eclatante de la vigueur et du succes 1 Document No. 7 C. 2 Document No. 7 A. s Documents No. 10 A and B. 76 The Declaration of Paris avec lesquels les travaux de la paix etaient poursuivis au sein meme d'une guerre acharnee. Un tel spectacle etait une gloire pour le siecle ou il se produisait pour la premiere fois, et il devait inspirer une juste confiance dans 1'avenir des ide6s dont il signalait le triomphe. De plus en plus les cruelles necessites de la guerre etaient circonscrites dans un cercle etroitement trace, en dehors duquel 1'humanite pacifique et industrieuse gardait ses droits. How far the actual events justified or falsified his rhapsody ; how far this picture of a commercial Arcadia, where no one thought of the war which the foolish world outside was waging, much less of mixing in the quarrel, where each pursued his own business in peace, is true to fact will be seen in due course. The identical Declarations which resulted from the tedious negotiations between the allied Courts require careful study. In view of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' determined effort to avoid a recognition in the French Declaration of any principle against which France had always protested " evidemment le gouverne- ment franais ne peut dire qu'il renonce a 1'exercice d'un droit dont il a toujours contest^ 1'existence, ou qu'il reserve Fapplica- tion d'un principe quant il a sans cesse refuse de le reconnaitre " he seems, in his anxiety to achieve absolute uniformity, perhaps in the hurry of the final drafting, to have waived the point : " Sa Majeste consent pour le present, a renoncer a une partie des droits qui lui appartiennent comme puissance belligerante en vertu du droit des gens." One of the belligerent rights thus renounced for the purposes of the war was the seizure of enemy property (other than contra- band) on neutral ships. This was a declaration of an absolute principle. The right of the neutrals which it was assumed to infringe, freedom of enemy goods on board their free ships, was one of those " que nous nous faisions gloire de defendre." Yet here was a positive assertion that this was a belligerent right recognised by the Law of Nations ! Similarly, in the Queen's declaration there is a positive assertion that the right to seize neutral goods on enemy ships was a belligerent right recognised by the Law of Nations which was not to be enforced during the war. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this sentence in the Declarations. It annihilated in advance all the declama- tion in Parliament against the English principle of seizure as not warranted by the Law of Nations. The answer which might have been given by anyone who had read the documents carefully was : The French Government has recognised it as a The Declarations to the Neutrals 77 belligerent right which the Law of Nations approves ; has only asked for it to be held in suspense during the war. The point will be elaborated hereafter ; but it is well to note at once that the common ground of belligerent right on which both these principles of seizure rest can only be the prevention of neutral assistance to the enemy. The French practice was aimed at one form of assistance, loading neutral goods on enemy ships, because of the possibilities of fraud which it opened up, by means (as M. Drouyn de Lhuys pointed out) of " neutralisa- tion " ; the English practice was aimed at another but less occult form of assistance, openly carrying the enemy's goods. It is interesting to note in passing that the French Declaration led to a voluminous, and not uninstructive, correspondence between the Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee and the Lord Advocate. 1 His statement that the French law accepted "free ships free goods " was challenged by the chairman, Mr Jacob Ironside, who contended that, in the face of this paragraph in the French Declaration, the statement could not be correct. It was an ingenious but inaccurate contention. The Lord Advocate's replies were not very illuminating ; he supported his statement as to the law of France by reference to an American text-book, Lawrence's edition of Wheaton ! Thus far we have been dealing with theory only ; there was a practical question behind it that question to which Lord John Russell had alluded on the 24th March, how these new principles of maritime law ought to be put into force in England. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was conscious of the same difficulty in regard to the alteration of the maritime law of France. Would it not be necessary to legalise the new regulation as to the non- confiscation of neutral goods on enemy ships, for it would deprive the French sailors of part of their prize money ? The question was really the same in both countries ; but we are specially con- cerned with its solution as it affects England. The English question is indeed more complex, because, though France has adopted in her organic laws the principles of the British Consti- tution, the mere fact of reducing them to a written law elimi- nated all those thousand and one minute details of constitutional principle more especially those relating to the prerogative which, being unwritten in our own case perplex the English statesman. The issue of the Declaration to the neutrals on the 28th 1 " The Part of France and Russia in the Surrender by England of the Right of Search," Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee (London, 1866). 78 The Declaration of Paris March was not the solution of the difficulty propounded by Lord John Russell. The constitutional effect of that Declaration had to be determined. This question arises again in connection with the Declaration of Paris, and the discussion will be more con- venient when we have the whole case before us. In connec- tion with the Declaration of 1854, however, the Government took definite action : an Order in Council was issued on the 15th April. The marginal note to the White Paper describes it as " in furtherance of " the Declaration. It carried the Declaration into effect, and at the same time explained its practical opera- tion. After reciting its terms, it proceeded : Now it is this Day ordered, by and with the Advice of Her Majesty's Privy Council, that all Vessels under a neutral or friendly Flag, being neutral or friendly Property, shall be permitted to import into any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions all Goods and Merchandise whatso- ever, to whomsoever the same may belong ; and to export from any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions to any Port not blockaded any Cargo or Goods, not being Contra- band of War, or not requiring a special Permission, to whom- soever the same may belong. And Her Majesty is further pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby further ordered, that, save and except only as aforesaid, all the Subjects of Her Majesty and the Subjects or Citizens of any neutral or friendly State shall and may, during and notwithstanding the present Hostilities with Russia, freely trade with all Ports and Places wheresoever situate which shall not be in a State of Blockade, save and except that no British Vessel shall under any Circumstances whatsoever, either under or by virtue of this Order or otherwise, be permitted or empowered to enter or communicate with any Port or Place which shall belong to or be in the Possession or Occupation of Her Majesty's Enemies. Eliminating all superfluous words, and inserting some which are of necessity implied, we arrive at the meaning of these very complicated provisions : First. All neutral or friendly vessels may import into the British dominions all goods, whether of enemy origin or enemy property ; and may export from the British dominions to any enemy port not blockaded all goods, not contraband of war, even if they be enemy property. This is a practical expansion of the formula " free ships free goods." The Declarations to the Neutrals 79 Second. Subject to the exception of contraband of war, British subjects and subjects of neutral or friendly States may trade freely with enemy ports which are not blockaded, not- withstanding the war. There is no limitation in respect of the port of departure ; therefore, so far as neutral and friendly vessels are concerned, it includes trading with the colonial or coast ports of the enemy, and is, therefore, a suspension of the " Rule of 1756." But Third. No British vessel may (under any circumstances, either under the Order or otherwise) enter or communicate with an enemy port. This excludes British vessels from the privileges granted to neutral or friendly vessels under the second provision. It also excludes them from the privileges granted to neutral or friendly vessels under the second part of the first provision, but includes them in the privileges granted to such vessels under the first part of that provision so long as it did not involve communi- cating with enemy ports ; in other words, a British vessel was limited to carrying enemy property to the British dominions from any port which was not Russian. To this extent they were " free ships," and enemy property on board became " free goods." French vessels were accorded all the privileges granted to neutral vessels. But although the privileges of British vessels were limited, it would seem that British traders were under no restrictions ; for, quite apart from the somewhat vague terms of the trading privileges in the second provision, the very large terms in which " free ships free goods " had been stated in the first provision, both in regard to import and export, to whomsoever the goods might belong, enabled the neutrals to carry the trade of British merchants. THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FLEETS. There remained one more document to be issued by each Government to its fleets, the Instructions to enable the sailors to carry out the policy of the Government. They had been referred to on many occasions in the correspondence, and at one time M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought that the solution of the difficulty in coming to an agreement might be found by relegating all details to the Instructions, which would not be published to the world at large. He was anxious, however, that the two sets should be uniform. This idea could not be carried out, as the 80 The Declaration of Paris English Instructions were signed simultaneously with the issue of the Declaration. The only article which need be noticed is Art. 7, which provided that neutral ships should not be stopped because they had enemy goods on board, and that enemy goods on neutral ships should not be seized. 1 The French Instructions, 2 issued on the 31st March 1854, are somewhat more detailed, and at one or two points seem to go beyond what the circumstances required. Thus Art. 6 lays down the general principle : " Les neutres etant autorises par le droit des gens a continuer librement leur commerce avec les puis- sances belligerantes. ..." Neutral vessels, therefore, were only to be stopped for breaking blockade, or when carrying contra- band of war to the enemy, or on enemy account, official despatches, or soldiers or sailors. In these cases both the ship and cargo were declared to be confiscable, unless the contraband should be less than three-fourths of the whole cargo, in which case the contraband only was confiscable. There appears to have been no attempt to come to an agree- ment on this point, as under English maritime law the ship is not confiscated on account of her cargo, unless she belongs to the owner of the contraband. It would seem as if the general principle had been expressly asserted, in view of the discussion which had taken place with regard to, and as a direct denial of, the English " Rule of 1756." The other articles dealt with the " effective blockade " and its violation (Art. 7), the definition of contraband (Art. 8), and the recognition of the right of convoy (Art. 14). In none of these cases was there a similarity between French and English practice, nor apparently had there been any attempt to arrive at an agreement. THE ANSWER OF THE UNITED STATES : FIRST MARCY NOTE. On receipt of the Declaration the United States Govern- ment sent, on the 28th April, a formal acknowledgment in what is known as the " First Marcy Note." 3 It expressed the Presi- dent's satisfaction that " free ships make free goods, which the United States has so long and so strenuously contended for as a neutral right, and in which some of the leading Powers of Europe have concurred, is to have a qualified sanction by the practical observance of it in the present war by both Great Britain and France two of the most powerful nations of 1 Document No. 10 A. * Document No. 10 B. ' Document No. 8 J. The Declarations to the Neutrals 81 Europe." The sincere gratification at the Declaration would have been enhanced if Great Britain had announced that she would observe it in every future war. The unconditional sanction of the rule by Great Britain and France " would cause it to be henceforth recognised throughout the civilised world as a general principle of International Law." The same con- sideration which had induced the concession in the present war the desire to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction would, it was presumed, have equal weight in any future war. With the object of settling the question once and for all, so that it should never again be called in question, the United States suggested that the Powers should unite in a declaration that it should be observed hereafter as a rule of international law. The President was also pleased to observe that Great Britain did not intend to bring into question during the war the exemption of neutral goods on enemy ships from seizure. Finally, the United States, while claiming full enjoyment of these rights as a neutral Power, would observe the strictest neutrality towards each and all the belligerents. A similar but shorter note was sent to the French Govern- ment on the 23rd May. As France was already an adherent to the " free ships free goods " principle, a homily on the im- propriety of the opposite practice was not required. The paragraph in the Note to Great Britain referring to the freedom of neutral goods on enemy ships was out of place, for the seizure of such goods had never formed part of her maritime law. For the sake of consistency, a homily on the impropriety of this practice might have been addressed to France. It may also be noted that the statement that the United States had " so long and so strenuously " contended for the freedom of enemy goods on neutral ships " as a neutral right " is not quite consistent with the fact that in the Jay Treaty l the opposite is expressly recognised ; and from the long period of contention for " free ships free goods " must be omitted the time when President Jefferson emphasised, in answer to the complaints of France, the fact that it depended solely on mutual agreement and could in no sense be regarded as a right. 2 1 Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, 19th Nov. 1794, art. xvii. (De Martens, vi. 338: (2nd ed.), v. 642). 2 See p. 34. 82 The Declaration of Paris VII Mr Phillimore's Motion, 4 p . 577. The Form in which the Principles are Stated 183 that such a Declaration need not be submitted to Parliament ; but that it was not in itself an operative document, and, in order to fulfil the Queen's obligations under it, an Order in Council would be necessary to put it in force whenever England went to war. The course adopted in 1854 was also followed in March 1860, when an Order in Council was issued " relative to the observance of the Rules of maritime war under the Declaration of Paris," in the event of war by France and Great Britain against China. 1 The solution of the constitutional question naturally varies in each country according to the provisions of its constitution. The Declaration was promulgated in France, 2 and also, as we have seen, in the Argentine Republic, Switzerland, and Prussia. Ill The Form in which the Principles are Stated. If the constitutional question was dealt with clumsily, the drafting of the principles was still worse. With regard to the 1st principle, the declaration that " privateering is and remains abolished," though untrue as long as there were any dissenting Powers, may pass as a convenient formula to indicate the undertaking of the adherent Powers that they would never issue commissions to privateers. Yet even then, it is by no means clear that there is not a reservation in favour of resorting to them in the event of a war with a non-adherent Power. The 2nd that " the neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war " is incomplete even as a statement of principle. Just as it was necessary to declare that " free ships " could not make contraband of war " free," so it was necessary to declare that they did not make any goods " free " when they were on board a ship condemned for running a blockade. Further, in the case of an embargo, " free ships " have no privileges at all in respect of any goods on board, and neutral owners of cargo may suffer great loss from the delay occasioned by enforced detention in port. The order for an " embargo or stop " to prevent vessels clearing out of our ports for enemy ports specially refers to and includes " all persons and effects " on board such vessels. These omissions bear witness to the 1 Document No. 25. 2 Document No. 18. 184 The Declaration of Paris unnecessary haste with which the principles were sketched out. It is the more surprising in the case of embargo, because special emphasis is always laid by the neutral on the delay occasioned by visit at sea, even if it is not followed by search. The delay caused by an embargo must be ten times as great. Similar criticism is applicable to the 3rd principle that " neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag." An enemy's ship caught running blockade is condemned because she is enemy property. Neutral goods on board are condemned because they are on board a ship running blockade. It was not intended to give to the enemy flag the privilege of " covering " neutral goods in such circumstances ; the principle is, therefore, in- accurately stated. The main defect of the statement of both the 2nd and 3rd principles, however, is that the question, What is contraband of war ? is left in the air. The settlement of a list of contraband goods was of course impossible at the closing meetings of a long Conference. The idea of a list or rather three lists of " absolute contraband," " conditional contraband," and " free " or non-contraband goods, prevailed till the present war. It was presumably intended to preserve this classification in 1856 ; and as the plenipotentiaries were not the persons best suited to frame such lists, their ulti- mate settlement should have been left to experts to be thereafter designated, as was done at Upsal in 1654. From the point of view of other nations it was a dangerous omission ; for it left open, and therefore England free to insist on, the opposite principle that a belligerent has a right to pro- claim his own list of contraband, and to add to it as necessity arises, a necessity of which he is, and must be, the sole judge. It could not have been assumed that there was any agree- ment on the subject unless the Armed Neutralities had been for- gotten. The countries of the League contended that a list of contraband contained in a treaty between two Powers could be extended arbitrarily to a third Power not a party to it, could even be made applicable, at the will of one of the signatory Powers, to a Power with which there was no treaty dealing with the subject. This is not the place to consider the subject of contraband at any length ; but the question of " contraband by treaty " is sufficiently clear to warrant this brief statement, which is based on historical fact. The commercial relations between two countries may be such that when they are settling questions likely to arise in the event of one of them being at war, the The Form in which the Principles are Stated 185 other remaining neutral, some questions may be dealt with specially in such a way as to reduce friction in the circumstances and preserve friendly relations. Contraband is such a question. It must always be the desire of a country likely to remain neutral in war to protect the trade in its staple industry. If the country with which a commercial treaty is in process of negotiation considers that, with due regard to its own safety, it can exempt the produce of that industry from the goods which it will seize on their way from that country to the enemy, it may well do so, taking care to obtain a quid pro quo. But this affords no reason why such goods going from another neutral country to the enemy should also be exempted. This is the simple inference to be drawn from the explanatory con- vention of 4th July 1780 between Great Britain and Denmark. 1 Both the 2nd and 3rd principles are, therefore, ineffective. Even the cardinal principle of contraband, that goods are only liable to be seized as such when they have an enemy destination, was omitted. It is common knowledge that this is fundamental to the idea of contraband, but a very considerable difficulty has always existed in determining what is " enemy destination." It is true that it became acute in respect of broken voyages during the Civil War in 1865 over the Nassau and the Matamoros cases, 2 when what was looked upon, and is even now called, the American extension of the doctrine was adopted. But the controversy dates back to the cases of the Essex and the William, 3 in 1805, and the lawyers were perfectly familiar with it. What, then, was the effect of the new declaration that " free ships make free goods " on the doctrine of " continuous voyage" ? Apparently no one was at pains to inquire. It certainly is very difficult to answer the question. There seem to have been only two alternatives : either that the doctrine of " continuous voyage " should also be left in the air, the understanding being that the new maxim would be interpreted subject to that doctrine by the countries then for the first time adopting it ; or, seeing that the maxim could not annihilate the doctrine altogether, that any extension of the maxim beyond the cases of the most palpable use of a neutral country for transport of contraband to the enemy was assumed to be impossible. I do not pretend to unravel the problem ; my object is only to show at what a loose end the Declaration of Paris, hailed 1 De Martens, Becueil, ii. 102 ; (2nd ed.) iii. 177. 2 See Mountague Bernard's History of the Neutrality of Great Britain in the American Civil War, pp. 299 et seq. 3 5 C. Rob., 385. 186 The Declaration of Paris with such profound joy by the neutrals as putting an end to what they had to endure from England, left some of the most important details of the principles it enunciated. The absence of accurate draftsmanship is specially noticeable in the statement of the 4th principle, that " blockades, in order to be legally binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." It states nothing more than what was in normal circumstances considered to be the law, without explaining the meaning of the term " effective," nor what was the proper method of preventing access to the enemy's coast, which had always given rise to disputes. This serious criticism was forcibly put forward by the United States Government in the Second Marcy Note. 1 The fourth principle . . . can hardly be regarded as one falling within that class with which it was the object of the Congress to interfere ; for this rule has not, for a long time, been regarded as uncertain, or the cause of any " deplorable disputes." If there have been any disputes in regard to blockades, the uncertainty was about the facts but not the law. Those nations which have resorted to what are properly denominated " paper blockades " have rarely, if ever, undertaken afterwards to justify their conduct upon principle, but have generally admitted the illegality of the practice, and indemnified the injured parties. What is to be judged " a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy," has often been a severely- contested question ; and certainly the Declaration, which merely reiterates a general undisputed maxim of maritime law, does nothing towards relieving the subject of blockade from that embarrassment. What force is requisite to con- stitute an effective blockade remains as unsettled and as questionable as it was before the Congress at Paris adopted the Declaration. The real question in dispute was whether the English prin- ciple of blockade fulfilled the condition of effectiveness. That principle was stated by Pitt in his speech of the 25th March 1801 : " Ports ought to be considered in a state of blockade when it is unsafe for vessels to enter them, though the ports are not actually blocked up." 2 This was the principle accepted in the treaty with Russia in 1801 3 : " Que, pour determiner ce qui caracterise un port bloque", on n'accorde cette denomi- 1 Document No. 21. 2 Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. xxxv. col. 1127. 3 De Martens, Sup., ii. 476 ; (2nd ed.) R. 2, vii. 260. The Form in which the Principles are Stated 187 nation qu'a celui ou il y a, par la disposition de la puissance qui 1'attaque avec des vaisseaux arretes ou suffisamment proches, un danger evident d'entrer." Assuming the question of " paper blockades " to have been actually under discussion, the 4th principle may certainly be said to have settled it. But although the absence of all record leaves us in the dark as to what was discussed, there is little doubt that the principle was directed against the English doctrine that blockades could be established bycruisersquadrons, and that Lord Clarendon intended to throw over Pitt's principle and the definition of the Russian treaty. Sir William Harcourt in the Letter of Historicus, which deals with the Law and Practice of Blockade, pointed out the difference between this definition and the doctrine which the Armed Neutrality sought to establish. The blockading vessels were to be " arretes et suffisamment proches " ; in the Russian treaty they were to be " arretes ou suffisamment proches." The principle as drafted did not settle our difference of opinion with the continental jurists. The Courts could, there- fore, still follow the precedents of the French wars in judging the effectiveness of our blockades. The same remark applies to blockades of other nations, which in insurance cases may come before the ordinary Courts. So long as no new interpretation was given to the legal mean- ing of an " effective " blockade, the Common Law Courts would still follow the precedents of the Prize Court. An even more serious defect in the statement of the principle was the application to blockade of the expression " legally binding." The misuse of criminal law terms is characteristic of every branch of the law applicable to belligerent and neutral merchant. If the declaration of an " effective blockade " were in itself effective ; if it did in reality, and not in pretence, create an " offence " for the commission of which there were a real penalty of seizure, then the term would have some meaning. But as " the law " stands, it is just as if robbery were punish- able only if the offender be caught in the act. The adventurous skipper may snap his fingers at the biggest squadron of cruisers if he can get through ; and in a gale of wind the rules of " effectiveness " invite him to make the attempt, by allowing the cruisers to draw off, while the blockade still remains techni- cally " effective." What we call " the law of blockade " is a mere tangle of words. It is not even, as it ought to be, based on the principle " catch as catch can," for it is fettered with this provision, that even though you catch you may only keep 188 The Declaration of Paris if, in the opinion of a committee of experts, you could catch other ships should they give you the chance of trying. If the words " legally binding " mean anything it must be this that a declaration of blockade is a prohibition to neutral ships to pass that way to the relief of the enemy, disobedience being visited with the penalty of condemnation as for a real " offence." But were that so, then, if the ship were found in harbour when the port falls into the hands of the belligerents, she would still be liable to condemnation but she is not. Success purges the " offence," and once in port at anchor, the risk of seizure is over. Or again, breach of blockade may be by getting out as well as by getting in. According to the English view of the law, the risk of seizure continues till the end of the outward voyage. If it were an " offence," and not a mere risk of getting caught, then the vessel would be liable to be captured on her next voyage. But it is clear that when the voyage is over " limitation " has set in. That these and many other peculiarities in the " law " are capable of satisfactory explanation is another matter ; but the discussion of it must be postponed for the present. The point emphasised now is that, granting it was advisable to proclaim the principle, and accepting Lord Clarendon's view that it was politically necessary to abandon Pitt's views of blockade, some attempt should have been made soon afterwards to turn the principle into agreed and coherent rules. But this important work was not attempted till the Congress of London sat in 1908 ; and no greater condemnation could have been pronounced on the inchoateness of the principle laid down by the Declaration of Paris than the statement in Sir Edward Grey's invitation to the Powers, that " the discussions which took place at The Hague during the recent Conference showed that on various questions connected with maritime war divergent views and practices prevailed among the nations of the world." 1 This was specially applicable to blockade, for the principles acted on by England and other countries in regard to it were widely divergent. 1 Correspondence respecting the International Naval Conference in London, 1908-9; Misc. No. 61 (1909). The Effect of War on Treaties 189 IV The Effect of War on Treaties, and especially on this Declaration. As a general proposition it is undisputed that treaties come to an end when war breaks out between the nations which have made them. The question was raised very inadvisedly in con- nection with the Declaration of Paris, in the debate of 1862, by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Secretary of State for War, who seems to have asserted that it would not remain in force if war broke out between any two of the signatory Powers. " By international law," he said, you may make a valid engagement with respect to the principle that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods ; but when you go to war with a nation, war puts an end to all treaties and engagements in the nature of a treaty. If we had a treaty with the United States recognising the principle that belligerents were to recognise one another's mercantile marine, the very act of war would have put an end to that treaty. As to the Declaration of Paris, I deny that it must be binding in the event of war. It is binding in respect of neutrals in time of war. No doubt we are bound in respect of France or Russia if we are at war with the United States ; but it is an absurdity to suppose that if we were at war with France or Russia, it would have any binding effect upon us, except in regard to our honour. All I say is, it is not binding by international law. This very obscure statement naturally aroused great indigna- tion. Sir Stafford Northcote objected to a Minister of the Crown using such language. He cited Kent as an authority for the principle that treaties which are made in anticipation of war remain binding during hostilities. As a general rule, the obligations of treaties are dissi- pated by hostilities ; but if a treaty contains any stipula- tions which contemplate a future state of war and make provision for such an exigency, those stipulations preserve their force and obligation when the rupture takes place. The obligation of keeping faith is so far from ceasing in time of war that its efficacy becomes increased, from the increased necessity for it. 1 1 International Law, Abdy's ed., p. 393. 190 The Declaration of Paris He also mentioned familiar cases in which this principle must be true ; as where the time for belligerent subjects to quit the country, or questions as to exchange of prisoners of war, have been agreed to. Clearly war could not put an end to such provisions. John Bright also cited authorities to uphold the morality of nations and the faith of treaties. From Wheaton There might be treaties of such a nature as to their object and import as that war would necessarily put an end to them ; but where treaties contemplate a permanent arrangement of territory, or other national rights, or in their terms were meant to provide for the event of an in- tervening war, it would be against every principle of just interpretation to hold them extinguished by war. 1 And from Sir Robert Phillimore The general maxim that war abrogates treaties be- tween belligerents must manifestly be subject to limitation in one case namely, in the case of treaties which expressly provide for the contingency of the breaking out of war between the contracting parties. 2 It may be unscientific, but it certainly has a moral weight of some practical value, when we say that to violate a treaty is a breach of the Law of Nations, in spite of the absence of some higher compelling force, something in the shape of a sanction. The international " law " as to the observance of treaties can be put on no more secure ground than that nations are expected to carry out their engagements in the same way as individuals are by law compelled to carry out theirs. The breach of a treaty engagement may lead to a rupture with the other contracting party, and rupture to war, if that other can put sufficient forces in the field, or ships upon the sea ; other States will not interfere unless they too are parties to the engagement. It is no concern of theirs ; but they will obviously be chary of entering into agreements with a State which has once made default in observ- ing its treaties. 3 1 International Law (Dana's edition), pp. 352, 353 n. 2 International Law, iii. p. 662. 8 The meaning of this paragraph may be illustrated by the case of Belgium. Germany's invasion in breach of her guarantee of Belgium's neutrality has generally been spoken of as a "breach of international law," as if the observance of a treaty were the subject of a rule like any other governing the intercourse of nations. But when we say that the violation of a treaty obligation is a breach of the Law of Nations, we mean to imply that that law in dealing with nations is based on the same principle as the law which deals with individuals, and that one of those principles is that it is wrong to break an obligation. The Effect of War on Treaties 191 War does, as a fact, destroy all relations between the belli- gerents ; obviously, therefore, any agreements on which their relations rest must cease to exist on the outbreak of hostilities, do require renovation on their cessation. 1 But seeing that the obligation to observe treaties can be put no higher than that it rests on the national honour (which, however, the majority of States deem the highest ground), it is clear that the case of those treaties which profess to regulate the conduct of the con- tracting States in the event of their falling out " ce qu'a Dieu ne plaise " is summed up accurately by Kent, if we attribute to the word " obligation " its exact international meaning, when he says : " The obligation of keeping faith is so far from ceasing in time of war, that its efficacy becomes increased, from the increased necessity for it." If one State agrees with another State that in the event of war between them certain things shall not happen (as that their traders shall not be disturbed in their business for a certain period), it is a mere chaos of thought to say that when war does break out those things may happen, and, in that instance, the traders be disturbed. It is the necessity for an honourable fulfilment of obligations as to conduct in war, increased tenfold by the fact of obligations undertaken mutually by many States, which is the only sanction for Hague Conventions. Anything more injudicious can hardly be imagined than for Sir George Cornewall Lewis, in the course of a highly contentious debate as to whether the Government had been wise to adopt a maxim limiting belligerent action, to suggest vaguely that in the event of war the maxim would cease to bind us. Even if it were true it was quite unnecessary, and inevitably led some speakers into a side-track, confusing an already sufficiently confused issue. 2 1 For an illustration, see " Declarations d'adhesion des Etats allemands a la remise en vigueur des Traites anterieurs a la Guerre," January-February 1872 (State Papers, vol. Ixii. p. 834). 2 The idea that war abrogates all treaties, including those made in direct contemplation of war, has at times been really considered as dangerous. It is specially referred to, and steps taken to counteract it, in the treaty of 1871 between Italy and the United States (State Papers, vol. Ixi. p. 88). By Art. XXI. provision is made, inter alia, that in case of war between the High Contracting Parties (which may God avert), six months is to be allowed for subjects to return to their own country : " And it is declared that neither the pretence that war dissolves treaties, nor any other what- ever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this article ; but, on the contrary, that the state of war is precisely that for which it is provided, and during which its provisions are to be sacredly observed as the most acknowledged obligations in the law of nations." 192 The Declaration of Paris Sir George was reputed to be the " precisest of reasoners and the most logical of men " ; but in answer to Mr Thomas Baring's criticism, he found no other explanation of his cryptic saying than the following : This is so important a point that I should be sorry if any misunderstanding arose. What I meant to say, and what I believe I did say, was this : that I conceived the Declaration of Paris to be binding as between this country and neutrals during the existence of war, and to be equally binding with a treaty, though it was only a Declaration ; but that if we were at war with any of the parties to that Declaration, then, like other treaties, it would cease to have a binding effect as regards the belligerent. If words, carefully collated with the best authorities, could by any possible means avoid a pernicious doctrine without getting involved in it themselves, this article should have achieved it. But if all treaties, even those which contemplate a state of war and make provision for it, are annihilated by war, then this treaty would equally suffer that fate. The curious point about this treaty is that this provision is not intro- duced into the other articles which contemplate a state of war arising between the two countries, and it might be contended, on the principle indusio unius exclusio alterius, that the other provisions had been left to their fate when war should arise. Thus by Art. XII. the High Contracting Parties agree " that, in the unfortunate event of war between them, the private property of their respective citizens and subjects, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure, on the high seas or else- where, by the armed vessels or by the military forces of either party," but no reference is made to " the pretence that war dissolves treaties " ; nor is it mentioned in Art. XIII., which defines what " ought to constitute a legal blockade." If, however, Sir George Cornewall Lewis did not mean to assert the doctrine broadly, that war does dissolve all treaties, but meant some- thing quite different which he tried to explain, then it really was hardly worth while to try to avoid an imaginary doctrine by such an artificial set of words. In connection with this treaty it is interesting, in reference to what I have said in the text as to the doubtful meaning of " adoption " of this maxim, to turn to Art. XVI., in which the contracting countries accepted it. There is this proviso : " Provided that the stipulations declaring that the flag shall cover the property shall be understood as applying to those Powers only who recognise this principle ; but if either party shall be at war with a third, and the other neutral, the flag of the neutral shall cover the property of enemies whose Governments acknowledge this principle, and not of others." What this means I do not know. Does it apply only to Governments which recognise the principle generally as part of their system of mari- time law, or does it include those who have included it in their treaties with some countries but not with others ? And to which form of " recog- nition " does it relate ? To the reciprocal engagement when the parties are at war with one another ; or to the more usual form, when one of the parties is at war and the other is neutral ? The Effect of War on Treaties 198 This does not clear up what he had said in his speech : "If we had a treaty with the United States recognising the principle that being belligerents we were to recognise one another's mercantile marine, the very act of war would put an end to that treaty." He was referring to the principle, much advocated during the debate, of immunity of private property at sea, and what he said was that, if, accepting this principle, we entered into a treaty with the United States, in the event of war private property at sea would cease to be immune. I am under the im- pression that he was endeavouring to understand and explain Lord Palmerston's statement that " free ships make free goods " deals entirely with the relations between belligerents and neutrals, and that the relations of belligerents with one another are only affected by the " immunity of private pro- perty " principle. But having asserted that were this provision in a treaty it would not bind the parties if they were at war, Sir George Cornewall Lewis went boldly on and applied this very heretical doctrine to the Declaration of Paris : " If we were at war with any of the parties to the Declaration, then, like other treaties, it would cease to have a binding effect as regards that belligerent." Men so wide apart in their habits of thought as Sir Stafford Northcote and John Bright united in condemning such language in the mouth of a Minister of the Crown. Did he mean that in such an event both belligerents might commission privateers, might declare blockades which were not " effective," might seize neutral goods on enemy ships, and enemy goods on neutral ships ? Did he mean that the Declaration of Paris, in spite of all the applause which had been lavished upon it, in spite of all the gratitude with which it had been acclaimed by the neutrals, would be nulle et non avenue ? Clearly he did not mean this, because he " conceived that the Declaration would be binding as between this country and neutrals during the existence of a war " ; and three of its principles affect neutrals. But the abolition of privateering would, according to this view, not operate as regards the belli- gerent ; therefore his ships might be seized by our privateers. In endeavouring to unravel the complicated idea that any principle of the Declaration should, in the event of our being at war, be binding on us in regard to the neutrals, and not binding as regards the other belligerent, I propose to confine my inquiry to the " free ships free goods " principle. What is true of that must also be true of the others. One preliminary point must first be made clear. " Free ships free goods " when introduced into treaties may assume one 13 194 The Declaration of Paris of two distinct forms : in the first and common form the right of free carriage for the enemy of one party would be granted to the other party remaining neutral ; in the second form the right of free carriage by all neutrals was acquired by each party in the event of war. 1 The essential difference between the two forms is that in the first the right of free carriage was given to one potential neutral ; whereas in the second the right would be given to one potential enemy. Complicated questions of construction arise in regard to the question whether the con- verse right enures to the enemy under the first' form, and to all neutrals under the second ; but they need not detain us for the present. Nor need we consider what the resultant rights to enemy and neutrals would be if several independent treaties, containing either of the forms, were entered into by each pair of a group of three or more States. This problem arises under the combined operation of the treaties of Utrecht between England and France, France and Holland, and the treaty of Westminster between England and Holland. It would have been raised in a still more acute form in the case of the inde- pendent conventions proposed in 1862 to be entered into by the United States with each of the adherent Powers to the Declaration of Paris. 2 These subsidiary questions do not arise under the Declaration, which was a multilateral agreement, governing the relations between every adherent State with every other adherent State. It is not debateable that it governed those relations, first, between each belligerent, secondly, be- tween each belligerent and each neutral. This may be tested in the concrete. States A, B, C, D agree that, as between themselves, the neutral flag shall cover enemy goods. This must mean that if A is at war with B, the flags of C and D shall cover A's goods as against B and B's goods as against A. So if B is at war with D, that the flags of A and C shall cover B's goods against D and D's goods as against B. Neither Lord Palmerston's dictum nor Sir George Lewis's explanation will stand the test of this most elementary analysis. But all the Powers did not adhere, and the question of the application as between adherent and non-adherent States is one of great complexity which requires special consideration. 1 I am doubtful whether any example of this form is to be found. It would be worded thus : "In the event of the contracting Parties being at war, then their goods shall be respectively free under neutral flags." This, however, would be the consequence of an adoption of " free ships free goods " generally. See pp. 83, 84. 1 See p. 159. The Effective Operation of the Declaration 195 V The Effective Operation of the Declaration that " Free Ships make Free Goods." We now come to the vital question involved in the Declaration of Paris limiting the inquiry, as before, to the 2nd principle, What was its effective value as an international agreement ? The States of the world came to be divided into adherents and non-adherents sheep and sea-wolves. They did not all and all- at-once assume the sheep's clothing. There was on the part of the majority extreme haste to adhere ; but some made excuses. An examination of the consequences of the Declaration while some States abstained is therefore necessary. It will enable us to test its practical value, to see whether the Congress really did achieve anything worthy of the congratulations which the plenipotentiaries poured out so lavishly upon their work : whether it was practical statesmanship. The adherent Powers were of two categories : those whose general law allowed them to seize enemy goods on neutral ships, and those who, either by express provision of their law or by conventions with other States, recognised, or asserted that they recognised, the freedom of enemy goods on neutral ships. The fact that the first category included at the time only one State, England, makes the inquiry, as it affects the statesmanship of the English plenipotentiaries, all the more interesting and important. For simplicity's sake we may assume that the non-adherent Powers resembled the second category of the adherents in their recognition of the maxim. Now the Declaration contained a provision that "it is not binding except as between those Powers who have adhered to it," or, more plainly, as Lord Palmerston put it in his despatch of the 13th April 1856, " it shall not be applicable to the rela- tions of the Declaring Powers with States which shall not have acceded to the Declaration." The meaning of this provision must be it was clearly Lord Palmerston's meaning that those of the adherent Powers who did not recognise the maxim in their general law (in other words, England) would continue legitimately to enforce their old practice of seizing enemy pro- perty on neutral ships in their relations with any non-adherent Power. During war the relations of any adherent to any non- adherent may be those of belligerency or those of neutrality. Therefore the meaning of this provision in its application to England is, that whether a non-adherent Power be the enemy 196 The Declaration of Paris at war with England, or be neuter when England is at war with another Power, the ancient maritime law of England re- mained in force in regard to it, with the express approval of the other adherent Powers. This being so, it is obviously necessary to do now what ought to have been done ages ago : test the application of this principle to the various cases which might occur. I assume England to be at war, because concrete cases are easier to handle : we ought thus to be able to reach the precise consequences of England's adherence to the Declaration. CASE A. WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND AN ADHERENT POWER. i. Where the Neutral is also an Adherent Power. The maxim here has full play, for both enemy and neutral come within the express scope of the Declaration. * ii. Where the Neutral is a Non-adherent Power. Under the express terms of the Declaration, it is not binding as between England and such a neutral. Therefore that Power ought not to be entitled to the benefit of the maxim. But the adherent enemy is entitled to that benefit. If this neutral were allowed to carry this enemy's goods " free," the express right which England retained would be nullified, and the result would be to make nonsense of the condition of the Declaration. The meaning of the limitation of its operation must therefore be, that an adherent belligerent is not entitled to the benefit of free carriage of his goods by a non-adherent neutral. CASE B. WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND A NON-ADHERENT POWER. i. Where the Neutral is also a Non-adherent Power. The maxim here disappears, for both enemy and neutral are outside the Declaration. ii. Where the Neutral is an Adherent Power. Under the express terms of the Declaration, it is not binding as between England and such a belligerent. Therefore the goods of that Power ought to be liable to seizure. But the adherent neutral is entitled to the benefit of the maxim. If this enemy were allowed to have his goods carried " free " by this neutral, again the express right which England retained would be nullified, and again the result would be to make nonsense of the condition of the Declaration. The meaning of the limitation of its operation must there- fore also be that an adherent neutral is not entitled to carry Conditions attached to Adherence to Declaration 197 " free " the goods of a non-adherent belligerent. But if this be so, then the Declaration has destroyed the historic contentions of the neutrals as to the meaning of the maxim. But in this case the confusion is more extended : for this enemy is neither bound, nor expected, to observe the maxim in regard either to this neutral or to England. Therefore, unless this country's general law, as distinct from treaties, prevents him, he will not be concerned with the fact that both England and the neutral are adherent Powers, but he will seize, under the old maritime law, English goods on these neutral ships. CASE C. WAR BETWEEN TWO NON-ADHERENT POWERS ; ENGLAND, AS WELL AS OTHER ADHERENTS, BEING NEUTRAL. In this case adherent neutrals will take no benefit from their Declaration, for they have expressly excused both belligerents from observance of the maxim. If, therefore, they hope to carry goods for either belligerent, the other will probably seize them, and will certainly pay no regard to assertions of a " right " which he is expressly entitled to disregard. The neutrals' only course would be to form another Armed Neutrality, which, unless the belligerent's Government were affected with the same nervousness as many politicians confessed to in 1854, would probably suffer the same disregard as its predecessors, and the Declaration would result in nothing. Judged thus by its practical results, the Declaration cannot be said to be satisfactory. Yet they could easily have been fore- seen had someone taken the trouble to think out the not very complicated consequences resulting from twice ten or two dozen States entering into a reciprocal engagement to adopt this two- edged maxim. They are not to be avoided by declaring that it has only one edge. VI The Conditions attached to adherence to the Declaration : Indivisibility of the four Principles. The Declaration was agreed to on the 16th April 1856. The statement of its principles was followed by an engagement on the part of the plenipotentiaries to bring it to the knowledge of the States which had not taken part in the Congress, and to invite them to accede to it, doubting not that the gratitude of WS The Declaration of Paris the whole world for the maxims they had proclaimed would lead to their general adoption. The efforts of the Governments would thus be crowned with full success. It was then resolved as a necessary corollary that La prece'dente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qu'y ont ou qui y auront accede. At the last sitting of the Congress, on the 16th April, a further resolution was taken, that the four principles were to be one and indivisible. Adherence was to be " all in all or not at all." This condition would result naturally from adherence to the Declaration. Partial adherence to such a document would be impossible without an express provision recognising it. But in order to assure this impossibility the principle of " indivisibility " was specially emphasised. The signatory Powers pledged themselves, and required adherents to pledge themselves, not to enter into any engagement on the subject of neutral rights which was not based on all four principles. Sur la proposition de M. le Comte Walewski et reconnais- sant qu'il est de 1'interet commun de maintenir 1'indivisi- bilite des quatre principes mentionn^s a la Declaration signee en ce jour MM. les Plenipotentiaires conviennent que les Puissances qui 1'auront signed ou qui y auront accede, ne pourront entrer, a Favenir, sur 1'application du droit des neutres en temps de guerre, en aucun arrangement qui ne repose a la fois sur les quatre principes de la dite Declaration. The Plenipotentiaries thus deliberately interposed the con- dition of the indivisibility of the four principles, not merely before their aspiration to include them in the Law of Nations could be fulfilled, but before any one of them could be asserted to be a principle of that law. The United States Government, in its refusal to adhere, pointed out that the principle of " indivisibility " did not form part of the Declaration, which was perfectly true ; but the claim based on it, that therefore the United States could adhere to some of the principles and not to all, could not be admitted in the absence of express permission. The principle of " indivisibility " carries with it some curious, though latent, consequences. It disposes for good of the asser- tion that " free ships free goods," for example, is, or ever was, of itself and by itself, a " principle " of the Law of Nations. Specially, this could never be asserted by a non-adherent against an adherent Power. It is also conclusive evidence of the opinion of a large number of Powers against the validity of such a Conditions attached to Adherence to Declaration 199 contention made by one non-adherent Power against another non-adherent Power. It reduced the maxim from the lofty position in which it had been placed by Frederick the Great, by Catherine, by Paul, by Bonaparte, of a primitive right included in the code which Nature had devised for the govern- ment of nations, to a principle depending on express consent. Not only that, it was not a principle which could be consented to by itself, but only in connection with three other principles. The pretension that it was, or is, or ever could be again asserted to be a neutral " right," was once and for all destroyed. So much of international thought and writing has centred round the Declaration, much of it of the loosest kind, some of it learned, some of it painfully ignorant, that it is worth while considering briefly the wisdom of this condition. For, assum- ing all the virtues with which each of the four principles has been endowed by enthusiasts, the connection between them, the suggestion that their interdependence was asserted for the " common interest," is not so obvious as not to require some explanation. Indeed it ignored the link of indivisibility, recognised by the common practice of nations in the early treaties, which connected " free ships free goods " with " enemy ships enemy goods." The Armed Neutralities had been so far logical. While they insisted on the freedom of enemy property under the neutral flag, they left untouched the French and Spanish practice of seizing neutral goods under the enemy flag. It is perfectly true that from the standpoint of the pre- tended inviolability of neutral commerce this practice was as bad as seizing enemy goods under the neutral flag. But the linking together of the two maxims under the principle of the flag was based on logic, and they are the only two principles which could be called scientifically " indivisible." The opinion is certainly justified that zeal for the gradual development of international law, for the " progress " which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had in his mind, might well have been contented with the acceptance of one or two of the principles as a commencement of execution of the plan. Seeing that privateering was " un des plus grand fleaux de la guerre," something worthy of the gratitude of the whole world would have been achieved if its abolition had been accomplished. If Lord Clarendon was bent on sacrificing something, seeing that England was quite as bad an offender as any other country in this matter, if not the worst of all, he might have devoted his energies to that. But by tying it on to the acceptance of other doctrines, he ran the risk of jeopardising the complete carrying out of the scheme, as in fact he did. 200 The Declaration of Paris So as to " free ships free goods," which was the favourite maxim of the United States. All that had passed in 1854 in regard to its adoption, and the rejection of " enemy ships enemy goods," showed that unanimity here was probable, and " pro- gress " feasible. In the First Marcy Note, 1 acknowledging the Declaration to the neutrals in 1854, the United States Govern- ment had expressed the hope that " free ships free goods " might become a settled principle, so as " to prevent it from being called again in question from any quarter or under any circumstances." The United States had proposed to the Powers in 1854 that simple conventions should be entered into recog- nising the maxim, as well as the freedom of neutral property on enemy ships. Russia, Peru, and the Two Sicilies accepted the invitation. 2 In order to achieve the universal acceptance of these two principles, there was a stipulation in the Russian Treaty que toutes les nations qui consentiront ou pourront con- sentir a acceder aux regies du premier article de cette convention, par une declaration formelle stipulant qu'elles les observeront, jouiront des droits resultant de cette accession de la meme maniere qu'auront lieu la jouissance et 1'observation par les deux puissances signataires de la pre"sente convention. France was on the point of signing. The United States, in refusing to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, did not hesitate to show irritation that its own project should be superseded by one which made the acceptance of the two principles only possible if they were linked on to two others, one of which was unacceptable, and the other of ques- tionable value. A reply to the Second Marcy Note would have been interesting, not only because it would have answered the objections raised to the abolition of privateering, but also have explained why the principle of " indivisibility " had been insisted on. The opportunity of explaining the reason for the condition passed away, and it has never since been attempted. The Swedish letter of adherence to the Declaration hardly furnishes a satisfactory explanation. If Lord Clarendon had suggested as a bargain that we should accept " free ships free goods," provided that the United States would abandon privateering, it would have been intelligible, resembling the mutual surrender of principle by England and France in 1854. But the strange part of his defence is that Lord Clarendon asserted that we had got the benefit of the abandonment of 1 Document No. 8 J. * Document No. 16. Conditions attached to Adherence to Declaration 201 privateering as a quid pro quo for our acceptance of the maxim, the real fact being that we had abandoned both privateering, and our principle of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships, in return for nothing at all. 1 So as to blockade. No international issue was ever so clear-cut. England was again, in the eyes of " all Europe," vvie great offender. The French wars had shown the extent to which blockading could be carried. The English prin- ciple was well known : Pitt had declared it ; the treaty with Russia in 1801 had accepted it. The Continental Powers, ever since the days of the Armed Neutralities, had insisted that more precision was required, and that ports should be closely blocked by stationary ships. The Council Board was set, full powers to discuss this question, then or at a later date, could have been obtained : here was a brilliant occasion " pour elucider " cette question, " poser certains principes, exprimer des intentions, faire enfin certaines declarations " with regard to this thorny question. But Lord Clarendon would neither struggle to maintain the English principle of blockade, nor yet give it up unless he also gave up our principle of seizure. Yet this was essentially a matter capable of being argued on war principles, as distinct from doctrinaire ideas. The admirals of the Allied fleets had shown what sailors thought of the matter, for they agreed to blockade the Black Sea ports by stationing their squadrons at the entrance of the Bosphorus, to the dismay of the statesmen and lawyers at home. The occasion for sailors and lawyers to discuss and settle their long- standing dispute was at hand ; but it was allowed to pass. 1 From a memorandum in a bundle of " Miscellaneous Papers " in the Public Record Office, discovered since the statement in the text was in type, it would appear that Lord Clarendon had had this idea in his mind for some time. Portugal had received the invitation from the United States to join in the treaty which had been proposed in 1854, and sought Lord Clarendon's advice through our Ambassador, Sir Richard Pakenham. Lord Clarendon wrote : "It must be for the Government in question to determine whether it should bind itself by a treaty engagement to recognise the principle that free ships make free goods, but I strongly advise that the adoption of such an engagement with the United States should be made conditional on the abandonment of the practice of issuing letters of marque. Any maritime Power at war with the United States would find an enormous advantage in the prohibition of a system so attractive to the adventurous spirit and buccaneering habits of American citizens, and to which they would resort with great success and in formidable numbers." 202 The Declaration of Paris VII The Courts and the Declaration. There are certain documents of which the Courts take " judicial notice," that is to say, they interpret and apply ther/> without formal proof of their existence. Their contents form part of the knowledge which reposes in the " judicial bosom." Thus the statutes of the realm may be cited in argument with- out proof that they have been passed. But treaties are not in this category. They are, it is true, part of the law of the land ; but when they are relied on they must be " proved " : brought formally to the notice of the Court. The method of proof has been simplified by Lord Brougham's Evidence Act (No. 2) of 1851 ; but they have not been raised to the dignity of " judicial notice." For some unexplained reason, treaties and other international documents are not communicated to the world at large which includes the Bench of Judges. Their publica- tion in the Gazette is not required ; and Lord Brougham's Act does not go so far as to authorise the admission in evidence of King's printer's copies. Our methods in such matters are slipshod. Even in the case of statutes, we have no formal " promulgation " such as obtains on the Continent. In France it is a fundamental principle that a law does not come into force until it is pro- mulgated, that is, published in the official Gazette. But in England a statute is in force from the moment of the King's assent ; it does not depend even on the issue of the King's printer's copy. The maxim that ignorance does not excuse breaches of the law applies from that moment to all its provisions, how many or various they may be, or intricate their meaning. In the case of a criminal statute, breach of its provisions five minutes after it is passed is an offence punishable by the extreme penalty provided the Judge thinks fit to impose it. This is an old-established rule of our constitution which might, if enforced to the letter, be productive of infinite hard- ship ; but, as Sir George Jessel used to say, " Such is our law." It is possible that the rule as to " judicial notice " may have sprung from the old struggle between Parliament and the King, for the shadow of a constitutional principle is discernible in the distinction which is made between statutes and treaties. The Judges take " notice " of an Act of Parliament, but not of an Act of the King. " King-made law," which includes treaties, proclamations, Orders in Council, and even treaties which by The Courts and the Declaration 203 statute require an Order in Council to bring them into effective operation, must be proved ; though sometimes, as in the case of extradition treaties, they are ordered to be published in the Gazette. 1 This brief outline of a highly technical subject has an important bearing on the question in hand the recognition of the Declaration of Paris by the Courts. It is conceivable that a document of which the Court cannot take " judicial notice " may, by frequent reference, become so well known to the individual Judges that they would be justified in waiving formal proof. But this is " judicial familiarity," and not to be confused with " judicial knowledge." It is no disrespect to the Common Law Judges to say that they have not even judicial familiarity with the language in which the principles of the Declaration of Paris are expressed. How then would it be proved, in order to establish the proposition, in an insurance case springing out of the war, that by English maritime law " free ships make free goods " ? The only official document in which the Declaration is contained is the White Paper " presented to Parliament," in which the protocols of the Congress of Paris are printed in French, with an English translation. It has never officially been put into any other form, nor published independently. The spirit which kept it secret has prevailed to the end. The constitution does not make publication a condition to the efficacy of a treaty ; but neither does the law authorise the Courts to accept the print of a protocol as judicial proof of an international agreement. In the case of executive orders and rules made in virtue of statutes, it is customary to provide that they shall be laid on the tables of the Houses ; and, unless the circumstances are exceptional and require immediate executive action, they become operative as part of the parent statute, as amended by motion, within a prescribed period, usually forty days. But this custom has not been extended to treaties or other acts done in virtue of the prerogative. The result is, therefore, that there has been no publication of the Declaration of Paris which is receivable in evidence. These somewhat vague principles apply to the Prize Court, which is set up by the King to administer the Law of Nations. 1 Before the publication of the Statutory Rules and Orders chaos reigned in regard to obtaining authorised copies of Orders in Council, treaties, and other similar documents. Publication in the Gazette, though not required by law, was assumed to be all-sufficient notice to all whom they might concern, the idea being that it was the duty of all good citizens to be subscribers to that periodical. 204 The Declaration of Paris It has been said that the Court itself sits under the authority of the Law of Nations, is, so to speak, a " Law of Nations Court." In England, the Court of Admiralty is invested with jurisdiction in prize, administering a law which lies outside the great body of the law of England, but, when occasion arises, also administering the municipal law of the country. The Prize Court has gradually assumed to itself the functions of a Court of Law, and the Judge exercises his functions in accordance with the notions fundamental to the administration of justice in England. The principle of " judicial knowledge " probably therefore applies. The provisions of the Declaration of Paris have become, from frequent reference, familiar to the Judge ; but it is doubtful whether there is so radical a difference between a Prize Court as now constituted and a Court of Law as to warrant any further departure from the strict rules of legal procedure. 1 A reference to the French procedure adopted in the case of the Declaration of Paris will throw light on the peculiarity of our own practice. It was promulgated by Imperial decree. 2 This decree fulfilled the legal forms required by the French constitution for making the Delaration operative ; its principles thenceforward became the law of all the Courts, and it is the notice, required by French law, to all the world that France is an adherent Power. This fact might well be in question in a Common Law Court ; it would be proved in the same way as any other question of foreign law. The manner in which a State has adhered to the Declara- tion is therefore important, and is a question which the Courts might have to consider. 1 It is popularly supposed that the Prize Courts in all countries are judicial tribunals. There is not much information available on the subject, but it is certain that in some countries they are administrative Courts. The Decree of Napoleon "portant institution d'un Conseil de Prises" (Document No. 6 B), issued before the Russian War, shows that the con- stitution of the French Prize Courts differs essentially from our own. It is a Conseil, not a Cour de Prises. It is not suggested that such a Conseil does not give its decisions in accordance with international law ; the fact that conclusions are given shows that the Procureur-Oeneral, or some other member of the Parquet, is appointed to the Conseil, and these would naturally be in accordance with international law. During the Russian War M. de Pourtalis, an eminent French lawyer, was the legal member of the Conseil. An example of the form of the decision, in the name of the King, will be found in the State Papers, vol. viii. p. 423. It was given in December 1819, and terminated the long correspondence between the United States and France respecting the burning of two American vessels in 1811 by French frigates after the alleged revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees. 2 Document No. 18. The Courts and the Declaration 205 In the case of Switzerland and a few other countries the adherence was by arrete, a copy of which was included in the " act of adherence." The meaning of the correspondence between England and Germany in 1870, referred to in the chapter on " The Adherence of the Powers " is now clear. At the outbreak of war Lord Granville had asked for a formal notification from the belligerents that they would observe the principles of the Declaration. The Prussian answer was that a law had already been passed, and nothing further was there- fore required. 1 But what would happen in the case of a country which had only adhered by official letter, such as those which have been collected in the State Papers ? There are certain occasions on which the Courts are authorised to apply to a Secretary of State for official information, as in the case of the existence of " foreign jurisdiction." 2 The authority of a statute making this information evidence is, I believe, requisite ; it is doubtful whether there is any recognised principle. Another old rule of procedure arising out of war must be noticed. An alien enemy has no locus standi in the Courts, even in prize proceedings in w^ich he may have a considerable interest. Neutral captains were allowed to claim the immunity of enemy cargoes as well as of their own ships. " In the last war the master was general claimant for himself and everybody concerned " (Jungfre Maria). 3 This appears at first sight to be an evasion of the old practice rule ; but it was probably no more than an application of a legal principle. The cargo was the property of an enemy subject in custody of the ship, and the ship's owner, or his legal representative, the master, wa*s allowed to put the treaty before the Court, not on the enemy owner's behalf, but in his own right as legal custodian. The owner derived the benefit of it. The Lords went even further in the Yong Vrow Adriana,* in 1760. The Vice-Admiralty Court of Gibraltar had restored the ship as belonging to neutrals, but had condemned part of the cargo as enemy property. The owners of the cargo appealed, and the appeal was prosecuted in the name of the master, the original claim having been in his name. The Lords declared " that the captain is not now at liberty to appeal, under privilege of the ship, but that the owners may use him on the appeal as a claimant of this property." 1 See p. 135. 8 Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, s. 4. 3 Hay and Marriott's Rep., p. 283. * Burrell, 178. 206 The Declaration of Paris The question has now been put on a new and entirely satis- factory footing by the decision of the late President, Sir Samuel Evans, in the Schooner Mowe. 1 He recognised the injustice of not allowing an enemy subject to avail himself of a provision in a treaty containing " stipulations which contemplate a future state of war and make provision for such an emergency," and destroyed the old rule that an alien enemy is not persona standi in judicio where such a provision would enure to his benefit. He held that " whenever an alien enemy conceives that he is entitled to any protection, privilege, or relief under any of the Hague Conventions of 1907, he shall be entitled to appear as a claimant, and to argue his claim before the Court." This principle applies to the Declaration of Paris ; an enemy subject therefore may now argue his claim to the privilege of " free ships free goods." Any. doubt as to the binding force of treaties of this kind during war, such as was raised in the House of Commons by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, has been set at rest, and the mists of an archaic prejudice have been dispelled by a common-sense rule, which was at the same time enlightened jurisprudence. VIII The Declaration and the Law of Nations. It is 'generally assumed that the adherence of all nations to such a document as the Declaration would modify international law, and a short cut has been taken to the conclusion that such a modification has, in fact, been effected. Two assumptions are made to this end : first, that the United States is the only non-adherent Power ; secondly, that the state of American maritime law is such that the condition of adherence has been satisfied. So many and such serious consequences follow, that it is necessary to examine these assumptions carefully. M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote exultingly in his Memoire : A cette declaration ont accede toutes les puissances, ex- cepte 1'Espagne, le Mexique, et les Etats-Unis de PAmerique du Nord. Les deux premieres ne firent des reserves que sur le droit d'armer des corsaires, mais elles donn6rent leur 1 Lloyd's Prize Cases, ii. p. 70. The Declaration and the Law of Nations 207 adhesion aux autres articles. Quant aux Etats-Unis, ils auraient accept6 la declaration tout entiere si Ton eut ajoute* une clause relative a Pinviolabilite de la propriety privee sur mer. Sauf ces restrictions, les arrangements conclus en 1854 entre 1'Angleterre et la France sont tombes dans le domaine public et places desormais sous Pautorite du droit des gens. Count Walewski, reporting the adherences of the Powers to the Emperor in 1856, 1 put the consequence on a^lower level. He wrote that the principles of the Declaration " ainsi se trouve consacre dans le droit international de la presque totalite des Etats de 1'Europe et de PAmerique." The late Sir Samuel Evans, in his judgment in the Marie Gldser 2 (September 1914), said that the position at the outbreak of the war was as follows : The Declaration has been adopted by practically all the civilised States of the world except the United States of America. The United States refused to become a party to it, chiefly on the broad ground that they desired a complete exemp- tion from capture at sea of all private property other than contraband. Nevertheless the United States announced at the beginning of the Civil War that they would give effect to its principles during those hostilities ; and again, in 1898, during their war with Spain, the President issued a proclamation on April 26th, 1898, 3 declaring that the policy of the United States Government in the conduct of the war would be to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris therein set forth, one of them being thus expressed : " Neutral goods not contraband of war are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag." Spain also in the same year, while maintaining that she was not bound by the Declaration, gave orders 4 for the observation of the rules that (i) a neutral flag covers the enemy goods, except contraband of war; and (ii) neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag. Spain and Mexico, which had for half a century refrained from acceding to it, have recently formally acceded, the former State on January 18th, 1908, and the latter on February 13th, 1909. Our own country, one of the original parties to it, has steadfastly adhered to it. The Court accordingly ought to, and will, regard the 1 Document No. 19. * Lloyd's Prize Cases, i. p. 66. s Document No. 26 A. Document No. 26 B. 208 The Declaration of Paris Declaration of Paris, not only in the light of rules binding in the conduct of war, but as a recognised and acknowledged part of the Law of Nations, which alone is the law which this Court has to administer. I venture on criticism of recent decisions solely where it is necessary to the elucidation of the discussion. The supreme knowledge of maritime law comes only as a slow growth from continued study and experience. When the war broke out no one had studied it with that profoundness which its administra- tion requires. There is hardly a principle of the books which has not needed overhauling. We had all been brought up under the influence of doctrines introduced in the middle of the nineteenth century for the purpose of modifying the stringency of maritime law as it had been understood by England ; of introducing doctrines, pressed to their utmost limit in the Declaration of London, which, when we were face to face with the realities of a continental war, were found to sap the foun- dations of effective belligerency. Above all, the Declaration of Paris had passed into a kind of gospel ; but it was forgotten that its principles had never been seriously examined. It was taken as accomplished fact. The learned President's state- ment, therefore, expresses an opinion which generally prevailed during the first few months of war. The war has been a great disturber of pre-judgments, and I venture to discuss his statement ; for there is a wide difference both in fact and intention between Sir Samuel Evans' opinion and both M. Drouyn de Lhuys' and Count Walewski's views. They do not rest on a common basis of principle. Further, it is not quite clear what was the meaning of the statement made on the eve of the American Civil War, that the Law Officers had been instructed to advise " as to what are the alterations which are to be made in the Law of Nations in consequence of the Declaration of Paris." 1 Now as to the two traditional assumptions underlying the Marie Gldser judgment. 2 Neither of them is warranted. First, as we have seen, there were, and are still, many non-adherent States. Secondly, in the absence of adherence, will conformity of law suffice ? The Declaration expressly excluded adherence subject to reservations. The reservation made by Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela was as to the abolition of privateering ; that principle was not removed from the Declaration ; the position of these countries in 1868 was, therefore, the same as if they had re- 1 See p. 153. * Lloyd's Prize Cases, i. p. 56. The Declaration and the Law of Nations 209 fused to accept all the four indivisible principles. They were non-adherent Powers. Again, an offer to adhere subject to a condition cannot become effective until the condition has been accepted by the other Powers. The United States offered complete adherence if the principle of the immunity of private property at sea were added. That principle was not added. Therefore in 1868 the United States was a non-adherent Power, and is so now. Further, the proposal actually made by the Government at Washington to Great Britain and France during the Civil War was that it should be by way of separate conventions. 1 Lord John Russell was willing to accept this for the purpose of simplifying matters during the Civil War. Serious complica- tions would have resulted if his offer had been accepted ; but he attached a condition which was rejected, and the negotia- tions came to an infructuous end. Lastly, the acceptance of the principles, even of all four, merely by legislation of a country, cannot be the adherence required by the terms of the Declaration. For laws may be altered, and the pledge which adherence implies would still be wanting. A Power which " accepted " the principles in this way would not be in the same position as the adherent Powers. With regard to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' statement, we must inquire what it was that had fallen " dans le domaine public." * " Domaine public " is a French term for which " public law " is the only, though not the precise, equivalent. He did not say that the principles of the Declaration have passed into the droit des gens, but " sont places desormais sous Pautorite du droit des gens." He could not have intended to assert that principles which these States had refused to accept had become principles of the droit des gens in spite of them ; this would have involved a contradiction in terms. The meaning probably is no more than that the observance of the principles by the adherent Powers had passed within the realm of international law. This does not carry us very far, for the observance of treaties is required by the Law of Nations. Count Walewski's intimate relations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys make it probable that he was accurately expressing his view, that the principles had passed into the international law of the several States which had accepted them by adhering to the Declaration. By " international law " he must have meant " maritime law " ; and his opinion, therefore, was that the 1 See p. 159. 2 The reference to the " arrangement of 1854 " in the statement must have been intended to refer to the principles adopted in 1856. H 210 The Declaration of Paris maritime law enforced by each State is such as its legislature enacts it ; that uniformity in the maritime laws of all States is desirable ; and that when this is achieved, we reach the true droit des gens or international law. With regard to Sir Samuel Evans' opinion, I venture to think that the condition of interdependence attached to the acceptance of the principles makes it impossible for the accept- ance, even by all the non-adherent Powers, of one, or two, or even three of them, to have converted them into principles of international law. But assuming the acceptance of the two principles freedom of enemy property on neutral ships, and freedom of neutral property on enemy ships by all nations to have satisfied the condition of their recognition as principles of international law the non-adherent Powers by legislation ; the adherent Powers by the fact of adherence the Declaration of Paris would be reduced to the subordinate position of evidence in respect of the attitude of some of the Powers. This would altogether destroy the effect which has been ascribed to it by tradition. And yet if we give to the Declaration any larger warrant of authority, in face of the fact that some Powers have not adhered, we should be giving to a conventional agreement a wider scope than its terms imply ; for rights and obligations enacted by a convention rest on nothing but consent. The fallacy that States which are not parties to conventions can be compelled to observe them runs all through the history of the subject ; the climax in fallacy being reached in the Due de Bassano's report to Bonaparte in 1812, that the Treaty of Utrecht that is to say, two of the commercial treaties signed at Utrecht in 1713 had established " a common law " of nations : " Les droits maritimes des neutres ont et regies solennelle- ment par le traite d'Utrecht, devenu la loi commune des nations." x I do not here discuss the wider proposition, that if all States adhere to a convention its provisions are thereafter transmuted into principles of the Law of Nations. It is sufficient to refer once more to Lord Palmerston's despatch of the 13th April 1856, to show that he never contemplated or assented to any radical alteration of the Law of Nations : It would not be correct to say that a declaration of principles such as is now contemplated could alter the Law of Nations. That law rests upon foundations wider 1 Rapport a VEmpereur Napoleon : Reponse par Phileleuthertts : Londres, 1812. The Declaration and the Law of Nations 211 and deeper than the occasional declaration of a few States, and it could not be altered except by some agreement much more general and much more formal than the pro- posed Declaration ; and it would be dangerous for Great Britain to admit that such a Declaration issued by the representatives of a small number of States could alter the Law of Nations. An example thus set and a precedent thus established, by the consent and participation of Great Britain, might hereafter upon other occasions be used for the purpose of establishing doctrines of inter- national law to which Great Britain might have the strongest possible objection and repugnance. It is desirable not only that the Declaration should be communicated to other States, but that the States to which it shall be communicated be invited to accede to it, and it is highly important to record that the principles thus proclaimed shall not be applicable to the relations of the declaring Powers with States which shall not have acceded to the Declaration. The general tenor of this despatch has already been con- sidered. It was highly critical of the draft sent over from Paris for approval of the Cabinet, and important alterations in the proposed preamble were indicated as essential to England's concurrence. These two paragraphs seem to be conceived in the same critical spirit. Lord Clarendon had intimated that, " If the whole Congress were to adopt the proposition of Count Walewski, it should be well understood that it would only be binding in regard to the Powers who may accede to it, and that it could not be appealed to by Governments who may refuse their accession." Lord Palmerston thought that, having accepted the policy, it should be made as far-reaching in its operation as possible, and therefore proposed that States not represented at the Con- gress should be invited to join. But he must not be taken to have agreed that, even if all were to accept the invitation, the " much more general and much more formal " agreement would have been reached by which alone an alteration in the Law of Nations would have been effected ; that the Declaration, even with all the States in the world as adherents, would become one of those wide and deep foundations on which the Law of Nations rests. The despatch is suggestive of the large question which the Declaration had opened up ; it does not profess to solve it. It may be agreed that a multilateral convention to which all nations have adhered is more efficacious to bind than a series of independent conventions entered into between them all, two 212 The Declaration of Paris and two ; but the assumption that its principles thereby pass into the Law of Nations, even if it rested on a sounder basis than it does, is not a practical proposition. But, these questions apart, we are faced with two difficulties. First, if adherence to a convention by all States does make its principles part of international law, it would shut out all pro- gress in the rules of maritime law ; for no alteration, however beneficial and obviously necessary, could be introduced except by way of another general convention ; and, in the premises, the refusal of one State to adhere would prevent its adoption. Secondly, and more important, either a State can never withdraw its assent to such a convention, or, if it may and does, the rule must thereupon drop out of the code. The suggestion lends itself to endless discussion, which would not be very profitable. But one remark may be made. Debates on war principles in peace-time, in spite of Lord Clarendon's view 1 that only then can reason dictate the right way to wage war, can never be very satisfactory. The possibilities of war seem then so remote, so unreal, that the conditions inevitably are more favourable to the latent ulterior motive which plausible diplomatic phrases skilfully employed hide from the wit of even clever pleni- potentiaries. But this is conceivable : that theoretical principles might be adopted which, put into war practice, might mean irretrievable disaster to some consenting Power. Does the doctrine that contracts are eternal and indefeasible, except by consent of all parties, hold then ? In conclusion, I pass from the region of theory and con- jecture to the very practical solution of all difficulties which is suggested by Sir Samuel Evans' later decision in the Schooner Mowe. 2 The result of that decision has been already dealt with. Its indirect consequences are, I think, wider than at first sight appear. An enemy subject may now claim the benefit of one of the principles of the Declaration, and argue his case before the Court, if his Government is an adherent Power, in the same way as the subject of an adherent neutral Power. A multilateral treaty differs in no respect from a simple treaty the subjects of the Parties come within the application of the new rule of practice in both cases. But the subjects of a non-adherent Power could not claim the benefit of the rule. This decision seems to me, with great respect, to do away with the necessity of an inquiry whether the Declaration has 1 See p. 127. 2 Lloyd's Prize Cases, ii. p. 70, see p. 206. The Declaration and the Law of Nations 213 become part of the Law of Nations ; for whether nineteen nations, or all nations, have adhered, in order to entitle the sub- ject of an adherent Power to raise a direct issue under it, it is to the Declaration he must appeal. The position of such a claimant is not strengthened by the assertion that the Declara- tion has become part of the Law of Nations, and the position of subjects of a non-adherent Power is not altered. CONCLUSION MANY strange things conspired to the evolution of the Declara- tion of Paris, and it will be well, in conclusion, to gather together the threads of the story. Having accepted the condition which the Scandinavian Powers attached to their neutrality, that their free ships should make enemy goods free, Lord Clarendon almost immediately informed British merchants that the old law of war against trading with the enemy would be enforced, and that their consignments from the enemy would not be free on neutral ships. Being engaged with France as ally in a naval war, Lord Clarendon recognised that the action of the fleets must rest on identity of principle, and both Governments endeavoured to bring this about. While the negotiations were being dragged out to the last minute before war was declared, and the patience of France was sorely tried, Lord Clarendon submitted the draft Declara- tion as a British project to the United States Minister in London, and was seeking his approval. Finality was promised at a time when nothing was further off than a final decision ; and even then it was finality in the English Cabinet, not in the Allied councils. France was not informed of the part which the United States Government was asked to play in the discussion, still less did she know that the differences of opinion in the Cabinet had disappeared under the pressure of the Minister's opinion. Throughout these parallel discussions the " Rule of 1756 " dances like a firefly. It is here, it is gone, it reappears ; on the morning of the last day it is insisted on, to the im- minent wrecking of the joint declaration ; by the evening it is withdrawn, but not abandoned. Faced with serious criticism in Parliament by those who feared that the policy adopted for this war might become a perpetual principle to be adopted in all wars, the Government spokesmen allayed those fears by what was tantamount to a pledge for the future " To waive is not to surrender." 214 Conclusion 215 Behind this was the fixed intention of Lord Clarendon, confided to Lord Shaftesbury, to alter the ancient law, to abandon the ancient practice, permanently : and the con- fession to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he dared not do it openly, in the face of the people. Between the Government and the people there was built up a screen of false conclusions drawn from half-true statements ; of theories as to how war ought to be waged ; of political economists' predictions of what would happen if only those theories were adopted by whom these doctrines were asserted : that trading with the enemy must be permitted ; that the maxim " free ships free goods " sanctions it ; that ships and cargoes upon the sea are not part of the national commerce, but private property, which should be immune from capture ; that the Bonaparte theories were sound, and that we owed an apology to the world at large for having resisted and defeated them. To the demonstration of these doctrines a year of theoretical talk was devoted, and the most glaring act of unneutral service that could well be devised, short of actual military assistance to the enemy, the scheme of Prussian land-transit to Memel, was but feebly protested against. And afterwards the Declaration of Paris was hung " round our necks " : and no better justification forthcoming than this : " And now, my Lords, let me ask, having once waived these rights, was it possible, or was it prudent, for us to return to them ? " So the full circle was complete : to waive was to surrender, as had always been intended. Thus Lord Clarendon achieved his purpose, and England, through his agency, did what the neutrals had hi vain demanded for a hundred years, under more strenuous Ministers, that she should do. Yet so little importance did LordfClarendon attach to the Declaration, that when, a few months later, Parliament was prorogued, no mention was made of it in the Queen's speech. But of the many strange things, none more strange than Lord Palmerston's varying moods. It is difficult to believe that the author of the despatch to Lord Clarendon on the eve of his signing the Declaration can have made the speeches he did : either in the autumn of 1856 to the electors of Liverpool, or in the House of Commons in 1862 embodying his " second thoughts." These speeches show one thing clearly, that the question is too intricate to be dealt with in the political manner. Theory cannot replace practical experience. The question to be solved is whether, if neutrals are allowed to carry enemy goods free, 216 The Declaration of Paris and " private property " is immune upon the sea, England can successfully wage war ? Only the experts in naval and military matters can answer that question. But the civilian may assist by his researches into historical records. And history reveals three distinct policies hostile to England. First, that of the enemy, who shapes his policy according to his needs for carrying on the war. Without " free ships free goods " France could not have got the assistance which the neutral gave her for building and repairing ships, and would not have been able to carry on the war in aid of the Americans. When the alliance with the Colonists was completed and, after long secret preparation, war had been declared, M. de Sartine, French Secretary of State for the Marine, being informed that England was seizing cargoes of ships timber and naval stores on Dutch ships, wrote fort emu to M. de Vergennes : " Si les Anglais prennent les neutres, nos appro visionnements pour I'anne'e prochaine seront interceptes ; vous jugez du mal que cela nous fera." l Dr Fauchille's book on the Armed Neutrality of 1780 contains frequent allusions to this need of France if she was to carry on the war. In one pregnant passage he says : " C'^tait pour la France 1'unique moyen d'assurer 1'approvisionnement de ses ports et 1'entretien de sa marine, conditions indispensables au soutien d'une guerre navale contre 1'Angleterre. La France ne trouvait pas en elle-meme les materiaux essentiels pour la navigation . . . seule, elle n'aurait pu importer toutes les choses necessaires. ... II fallait done recourir a l'6tranger." 2 Secondly, that of the neutral merchant, whose trade in his staple commodities, ships timber and naval stores, would be carried on without risk of seizure if only " free ships free goods " could be insisted on. Mr Wroughton, British Minister at Stockholm, wrote in February 1780 : "I am constantly assured that we give too great an extent to the appellation of naval stores, which, being the natural and sole production of this country, such an im- pediment to their exportation cannot fail of being a great detriment to its trade and revenues." 3 And Mr Morton Eden, British Minister at Copenhagen, reported about the same time a conversation with Count Berns- torff, with reference to the victualling trade, especially in salted provisions : "It was a point they [the Danes] never could give up, nor would ; it was nearly the only production of the country, 1 De Sartine to de Vergennes, 22nd August 1778 (Fauchille, La Ligue des Neutres, p. 4). 3 Fauchille, ibid, p. 16. 3 F.O., 73, Sweden. Conclusion 217 and the loss of this branch of commerce must be highly detri- mental. Some of the Royal Family engaged in the trade." l Thirdly, that of the neutral shipowner, the profits of whose carrying trade would be magnified past reckoning if " free ships free goods " were admitted as a universal rule. Mallet du Pan records the answer to the Prince of Orange of a Dutch shipper who carried munitions to the Spaniard : " S'il y avait un commerce lucratif avec 1'enfer, je me hasardais d'y bruler mes voiles." 2 There is little difference in principle between this confession and the statement in the speech from the Dutch throne in September 1855 : " Bien que la guerre n'ait pas etc sans exercer une influence assez sensible sur le commerce et la navigation, ces deux branches d'industrie nationale se trouvent neanmoins dans une situation satisfaisante." 3 The principle is to secure the profit from the commerce which is incident to war. So it was always three to one : the interests of the three coinciding to reduce England's power of seizing enemy property to its lowest limits : supporting their claim by assertions that it found its warrant in the Law of Nations. When it is said that in the past England was not afraid to stand alone, the meaning is, that she was undeterred by this combination, and fought at sea according to the principle which she believed to be the foundation of the law of war : to prevent neutral assistance from reaching the enemy. In spite of the bluster of Armed Neutralities she held her own. The fear of offending the United States, working on the latent inclination to adopt humanitarian theories of war, produced the change in English maritime law which was finally embodied in the Declaration of Paris. Mr Marcy prevailed where Catherine had failed. But neither fear of offending the neutrals, nor reckless dis- regard of them, is the principle on which wars can be fought and won. Each by its own way will lead to disaster : fear of offence paralyses the striking force of the country ; reckless disregard destroys the commercial action and reaction on which our own relations with the neutrals depend. The path of safety lies between ; and it is the way which, as I believe, the Law of Nations sanctions. The old question, What is the Law of Nations ?, is once more to be discussed ; on the answer will depend the solution of all 1 F.O., 22, Denmark. 2 Annales politiques, t. i. p. 226. 3 State Papers, vol. xlvi. p. 1040. 218 The Declaration of Paris the disputes between belligerent and neutral merchant. It is to be found in Lord Palmerston's despatch to Lord Clarendon. He modified certain statements in the preamble proposed to the Declaration which prejudiced the verdict of history on Britain's action in past wars, and he definitely established the meaning of the term which had been so greatly misused the " Law of Nations." I know of no statement which so concisely renders all Lord Stowell's teaching that that Law does not rest on principles which Congresses have endeavoured to formulate, but on wide and deep foundations, the search for which has for so long been abandoned. The despatch has lain hidden for many years. It will, I think, serve as an all-sufficient and inspiring guide in the momentous discussions which are now imminent. PART III T>OCUMENTS CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CHIEF HISTORICAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE RUSSIAN WAR, 1854-1856. . Manifesto of the Porte setting forth reasons for the declara- tion of war against Russia. (N.R.Q., 1 xv. p. 547.) . Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia against the declaration of war by the Porte. (N.R.Q. , xv. p. 651.) . Conference at Vienna between Austria, Great Britain, France, and Prussia to smooth away the differences between Russia and the Porte. (N.R.G., xv. p. 533.) . Protocol : Consideration of the Turkish answer. (N.R.G., xv. p. 535.) . Protocol : Consideration of the Russian propositions. (N.R.G., xv. p. 538.) . Russian manifesto suspending diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France. (State Papers, xlvi. p. 363.) . Protocol : Consideration of preliminaries of proposed Treaty between Russia and the Porte. (N.R.G., xv. p. 540.) . Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, France, and the Porte. (N.R.G., xv. p. 566.) . Russia crosses the Danube and invades Turkey. . Declaration of causes of war by Great Britain. (N.R.G., xv. p. 552.) . Protocol : Russia having left unanswered the invitation of the Conference to evacuate the Principalities, it was de- cided that " L'etat de guerre deja declaree entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte existe egalement de fait entre la Russie d'une part, et la France et la Grande Bretagne de 1'autre." (N.R.G., xv. p. 543.) . Convention between Great Britain and France to determine the object of their alliance and the means to be employed in common. (N.R.G., xv. p. 568.) . Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between Austria and Prussia. (N.R.G., xv. p. 572. German text. State Papers, xliv. p. 84.) Additional article, 26th November, with accession of Germanic Confederation, 9th December 1854. Treaty, Austria and Prussia, 20th April 1854 : i. Mutual guarantee of each other's territory, ii. Mutual assistance in case of aggression, iii. Military assistance to be ready in case of need. iv. Invitation to all Governments of the Germanic Con- federation to accede. v. Neither party to conclude a separate alliance detri- mental to this alliance, vi. Ratifications to be exchanged without delay. Additional article. Austria and Prussia regard the occupation of the Lower Danube by Russia as dangerous, but under- stand that her troops will be withdrawn in consequence of concessions now granted to Christian subjects by the Porte. Single article. Austria to request Russia to stop her in- vasion of Turkish territory, and guarantee evacuation of Danubian Principalities. Prussia to support this. In the event of Russia's refusal, art. ii. of the Treaty to be put in force. llth-23rd April 1854 Russian manifesto relating to the war. (State Papers, xlvi. p. 382.) th October 1853 1st November 1853 5th December 1853 13th January 1854 2nd February 1854 8th February 1854 5th March 1854 12th March 1854 21st March 1854 28th March 1854 Qth April 1854 10th April 1854 20th April 1854 De Martens, Nouveau Recueil General 222 The Declaration of Paris 23rd May 1854 Uth June 1854 24th July 1854 Sth August 1854 . September 1854 20th September 1854 October 1854 . October 1854 . 5th November 1854 . 2nd December 1854 . 28tfi December 1854. January 1855 26th January 1855 . Af arc/i 1855 Marc/i 1855 Marcfc 1855 Sth September 1S55 , 21st November 1855 25th February -6th April 1856 March 1856 28<7i 4rtZ 1856 Protocol :-^Communication of Convention concluded on the 20th April between France and England on one side and Austria and Prussia on the other. (N.R.G., xv. p. 544.) Military Convention between Austria and the Porte, Austria agreeing to take all necessary steps to secure the evacua- tion of the Principalities. (N.R.G., xv. p. 594.) Decree of the Diet of the German Confederation adhering to Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Prussia of 20th April 1854. (N.R.G., xv. p. 579.) Notes exchanged at Vienna between Austria, France, and Great Britain, fixing the basis for the establishment of a Peace between Russia and the Porte. (N.B.G., xv. p. 644. ) The allied armies land in the Crimea. Battle of the Alma. The Siege of Sebastopol begins. Battle of Balaclava. Battle of Inkerman. Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, France, and Austria. (N.R.G., xv. p. 600.) Memorandum by Great Britain, France, and Austria to Russia. In order to prevent the revival of recent complications, Great Britain, France, and Austria declare that i. No former Treaties between Turkeyand Russia concern- ing Moldavia,Walachia, and Serbia are to be revived. ii. Free navigation of the Danube. A syndicate to have power to clear away the obstacles at the estuaries. iii. Revision of Treaty of 13th July 1841, to re-establish the existence of the Ottoman Empire, iv. Russia to renounce official protection of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and not to revive the Treaty of Koutchouk Kainardj i,the misinterpretation of which was the cause of the war. (N.R.G., xv. p. 632.) Lord Aberdeen resigns. Lord Palmerston becomes Prime Minister. Supplementary Convention between Great Britain and France accepting the accession of Sardinia to the Conven- tion of 10th April 1854. (N.R.G., xv. p. 606.) Circular of Count Nesselrode to Russian Ministers in neutral countries in regard to Sardinia's joining in the war (N.R.G., xv. p. 555.) Manifesto by Sardinia justifying her declaration of war against Russia. (N.R.G., xv. p. 557.) Protocols of second Conference at Vienna between Great Britain, France, Austria, Turkey, and Russia. (N.R.G., xv. p. 633.) Convention between Sardinia and the Porte, Sardinia ad- hering to the Alliance of Great Britain and France with the Porte of 12th March 1854. (N.R.G., xv. p. 623.) Fall and evacuation of Sebastopol. Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Sweden guaran- teeing territorial integrity of Sweden against Russia. (N.R.G., xv. p. 628.) Capitulation of Kars. Congress of Paris between Great Britain, France, Sardinia, Turkey, Austria, Prussia, and Russia to determine condi- tions of Peace. (State Papers, xlvi. p. 63. N.R.G., xv. p. 700.) Signature of Treaty of Peace at Paris. (State Papers, xlvi. p. 8. N.R.G., xv. p. 770.) Signature of Declaration of Paris. Queen's Proclamation of Peace. (State Papers, xlvi. p. 62.) Declarations of Neutrality, JANUARY 1854. A. SWEDEN TO THE BELLIGERENTS. BARON REHAUSEN TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON. Londres, le 2 Janvier, 1854. Les complications politiques du moment, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de la Porte Ottomane, et Peventualite" possible d'une guerre maritime, ont impost au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norvege Pobligation de vouer une attention serieuse aux effets qui pourraient en resulter. Son desir sincere est de conserver intactes les relations de bonne amitie et de parfaite intelligence qui regnent si heureusement entre les Royaumes Unis et tous les Gouvernements de 1'Europe. N'ayant rien de plus a cceur que de maintenir et de cimenter ces relations, Sa Majest le Roi de Suede et de Norvege regarde comme un devoir de ne point laissez ignorer aux Puissances amies et alliees la marche politique que, pour y parvenir, elle se propose de suivre dans Peventualite ci-dessus mentionne'e. Guidee autant par la franche amitie qui regne entre les Souverains et les peuples des Royaumes Unis et du Danemarc, que par cette communaute' d'interets et de principes politiques qui se soutient et se renforce reciproquement, Sa Majesti le Roi de Suede et de Norvege s'est vue appelee, en premier lieu, a se concerter avec son auguste ami, voisin et allie, Sa Majeste" le Roi de Danemarc, sur les mesures a adopter eventuellement, afin d'etablir une action commune, propre a faciliter par son identite Papplication du systeme convenu. Ces ouvertures ayant trouve" Paccueil favorable, auquel on etait en droit de s'attendre, c'est en conformite des resolutions arretees ar les 2 Souverains, que le Soussigne, Envoye" Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norvege pres Sa Majeste la Reine de la Grande Bretagne et 223 224 The Declaration of Paris d'lrlande, a 10911 Pordre de son auguste Souverain de porter a la connaissance du Ministere de Sa Majeste Britannique les regies generates que Sa Majeste* le Roi de -Suede et de Norvege a cru devoir etablir, afin de fixer la position de ses Etats pour le cas deplorable que des hostilites entre les Puissances amies et alliees du Roi vinssent a eclater. Le systeme-que Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et Norvege entend suivre et appliquer invariablement est celui d'une stricte neutralite, fondee sur la loyaute, Pimpartialit6 et un egal respect pour les droits de toutes les Puissances. Cette neutralite, selon les vues uniformes des 2 Cours, imposerait au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste" le Roi de Suede et de Norvege les obligations et lui assurerait les avantages suivants : 1. De s'abstenir, pendant la lutte qui pourrait s'engager, de toute participation, directe ou indirecte, en faveur d'une des Parties Contendantes au detriment de 1'autre ; 2. D'admettre dans les ports de Suede et de Norvege les batiments de guerre et de commerce des parties belligerantes ; le Gouvernement se reservant toutefois la faculte d'interdire aux premiers I'entr6e des ports de guerre suivants, savoir : celui de Stockholm, en de9a de la forteresse de Waxholm ; de Christiania, en de9a du fort de Kaholm ; le bassin interieur de la station militaire Norvegienne a Horten ; les ports de Carlsten et de Carlskrona, en de9a des fortifications ; et le port de Slito, dans I'lle de Gottland, en de9a des batteries elevees a Encholm. Les reglements sanitaires et de police que les circonstances auraient rendu ou pourraient rendre necessaires, devront naturellement etre observe^ et respectes. Les corsaires ne seront pas admis dans les ports, ni toleres sur les rades des Etats de Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norvege ; 3. D'accorder aux batiments des Puissances belligerantes la facult^ de se pourvoir dans les ports des Royaumes Unis de toutes les denrees et marchandises, dont ils pourraient avoir besoin, a 1'exception des articles reputes contrebande de guerre ; 4. D'exclure des ports de Suede et de Norvege 1'entree les cas de detresse constate"e excepte"s la condamnation et la vente de toute prise ; et enfin, 5. De jouir, dans les relations commerciales des Royaumes Unis avec les pays en guerre, de toute surete et de toutes les facilites pour les navires Suedois et Norvegiens, ainsi que pour leurs cargaisons, avec 1'obligation toutefois pour ces navires de se conformer aux regies generalement etablies et reconnues pour les cas speciaux de blocus declares et effectifs. Tels sont les principes generaux de la neutrality adoptee par Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norvege pour le cas qu'une Declarations of Neutrality 225 guerre en Europe viendrait a eclater. Le Roi se flatte qu'ils seront reconnus conformes aux droits des gens, et que leur loyale et fidele observation mettra Sa Majeste" en 6tat de cultiver avec les Puissances amies et alliees ces relations que, pour le bien de ses peuples, il lui tient a coeur de preserver et toute interruption. En priant Lord Clarendon de vouloir bien porter la presente communication a la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majest6 Britannique, le Soussigne, &c. The Earl of Clarendon. REHAUSEN. THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE HON. W. GREY. Foreign Office, January 20, 1854. SIR, I have to inform you that the note which has been delivered to me by Baron Rehausen, containing the declaration of neu- trality on the part of Sweden and Norway in the event of war, has received the best attention of Her Majesty's Govern- ment ; and I am glad to express the satisfaction with which they have learned the neutral policy which it is the intention of the Swedish and Norwegian Government to pursue, and the measures adopted for giving effect to that policy. Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that if war should unfortunately occur, the engagements now taken by the Swedish and Norwegian Government will be strictly and honourably fulfilled, and Her Majesty's Government will lend their best endeavours in support of the neutral position that Sweden and Norway propose to maintain. I am, &c. The Hon. W. Grey. CLARENDON. B. DENMARK TO THE BELLIGERENTS. COUNT REVENTLOW CRIMINIL TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON. Legation de Danemarc, le 2 Janvier, 1854. Les complications politiques du moment, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de la Porte Ottomane, et Peventualite possible d'une guerre maritime, ont impose au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc 1'obligation de vouer une atten- tion serieuse aux effets qui pourraient en resulter. Son desir sincere est de conserver intactes les relations de bonne amitie et de parfaite intelligence qui regnent si heureusement entre 15 226 The Declaration of Paris le Danemarc et tous les Gouvernements de PEurope. N'ayant rien de plus a cceur que de maintenir et de cimenter ces relations, Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc regarde comme un devoir de ne pas laisser ignorer aux Puissances allie'es et amies la marche politique que, pour y parvenir, elle se propose de suivre dans Peventualite ci-dessus mentionn^e. Guidee autant par la franche amitie 1 qui regne entre les Souverains et les peuples du Danemarc et des Royaumes Unis de Suede et de Norvege, que par cette communaute d'interets et de principes politiques qui se soutient et se renforce recipro- quement, Sa Majest6 le Roi de Danemarc s'est vue appelee, en premier lieu, a se concerter avec son auguste ami, voisin et allie, Sa Majeste" le Roi de Suede et de Norvege, sur les mesures a adopter eventuellement, afin d'etablir une action commune, propre a faciliter, par son identite, 1'application du systeme con- venu. Ces ouvertures ayant trouve 1'accueil favorable, auquel on etait en droit de s'attendre, c'est en conformite des resolutions arret^es par les 2 Souverains, que le Soussign, Charge d'Affaires de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc pres Sa Majeste la Reine de la Grande Bretagne et de 1'Irlande, a reyu 1'ordre de son auguste Souverain de porter a la connaissance du Ministere de Sa Majeste Britannique les regies generates que Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc a cru devoir etablir, afin de fixer la position de ses Etats, pour le cas deplorable que des hostilites entre des Puissances amies et alliees du Roi vinssent a e"clater. Le systeme que Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc entend suivre et appliquer invariablement, est celui d'une stricte neutralite, fondee sur la loyaute, Pimpartialite et un egal respect pour les droits de toutes les Puissances. Cette neutralite, selon les vues uniformes des 2 Cours, imposerait au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc les obligations et lui assurerait les avantages suivants : 1. De s'abstenir, pendant la lutte qui pourrait s'engager, de toute participation, directe ou indirecte, en faveur d'une des parties contendantes au detriment de 1'autre ; 2. D'admettre dans les ports de la Monarchic les batiments de guerre et de commerce des parties belligerantes, le Gouvernement se reservant toutefois la faculte d'interdire aux premiers, ainsi qu'aux navires de transport appartenant aux flottes respectives des Puissances belligerantes, P entree du port de Christianso. Les reglements sanitaires et de police que les circonstances auraient rendu ou pourraient rendre necessaires, devront naturellement etre observes et respectes. Les corsaires ne seront pas admis dans les ports, ni toleres sur les rades des Etats de Sa Majeste Danoise ; Declarations of Neutrality 227 3. D'accorder aux batiments des Puissances bellige'rantes la facult^ de se pourvoir, dans les ports de la Monarchic, de toutes les denre'es et marchandises dont ils pourraient avoir besoin, a 1'exception des articles reputes contrebande de guerre ; 4. D'exclure des ports de la Monarchic 1'entr^e les cas de de"tresse constates excepte"s la condamnation et la vente de toute prise ; et enfin, 5. De jouir, dans les relations commerciales des Etats de Sa Majeste Danoise avec les pays en guerre, de toute surete et de toutes facilites pour les navires Danois, ainsi que pour leurs cargaisons, avec obligation toutefois pour ces navires de se conformer aux regies generalement etablies et reconnues pour les cas speciaux de blocus declares et effectifs. Tels sont les principes generaux de la neutralite adoptee par Sa Majesty le Roi de Danemarc pour le cas qu'une guerre en Europe vint a clater. Le Roi se flatte qu'ils seront reconnus conformes au droit des gens, et que leur loyale et fidele observa- tion mettra Sa Majeste en etat de cultiver avec les Puissances amies et alliees ces relations que, pour le bien de ses peuples, il lui tient tant a cceur de preserver de toute interruption. En priant son Excellence le Comte de Clarendon de vouloir bien porter la presente communication a la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique, le Soussigne 1 , &c. Le Comte de Clarendon. A. REVENTLOW CRIMINIL. THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO MR BUCHANAN. Foreign Office, January 20, 1854. SIR, I have to inform you that the note which has been delivered to me by Count Reventlow Criminil, containing the declaration of neutrality on the part of Denmark in the event of war, has received the best attention of Her Majesty's Government ; and I am glad to express the satisfaction with which they have learned the neutral policy which it is the intention of the Danish Government to pursue, and the measures adopted for giving effect to that policy. Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that if war should unfortunately occur, the engagements now taken by the Danish Government will be strictly and honourably fulfilled, and Her Majesty's Government will lend their best endeavours in support of the neutral position that Denmark proposes to maintain. I am, &c. A. Buchanan, Esq. CLARENDON. 228 The Declaration of Paris C DENMARK TO THE UNITED STATES. THE DANISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. Washington, January 20, 1854. The present political complications consequent upon the declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte, and the possible contingency of a maritime war, have imposed upon the Govern- ment of His Majesty the King of Denmark the obligation of giving an earnest attention to the effects which may be the result. Its sincere desire is to preserve intact the relations of friendship and good understanding which so happily reign between Denmark and all the Governments of Europe. Having nothing more at heart than to maintain and cement those relations, His Majesty the King of Denmark regards it as a duty not to leave the allied and friendly Powers in ignorance of the line of policy which, for the attainment of said object, he proposes to follow in case of the above-mentioned event. Guided as much by the frank friendship which reigns between the Sovereigns and people of Denmark and of the United King- doms of Sweden and Norway, as by that community of interests and political principles which reciprocally sustains and reinforces each other, His Majesty the King of Denmark has found him- self called, in the first place, to concert himself with his august friend, neighbour, and ally, the King of Sweden and Norway, on the measures eventually to be adopted in order to establish a common action proper to facilitate, by its identity, the appli- cation of the system agreed upon. These overtures having met with that favourable reception one had a right to expect, it is in conformity with the resolutions taken by the two Sovereigns that the Undersigned, Charge d' Affaires of His Majesty the King of Denmark, near the Government of the United States of America, has received the order of his august Sovereign to bring to the knowledge of the Government of the United States the general rules which His Majesty the King of Denmark has deemed it proper to establish in order to fix the position of his States in the deplorable event of hostilities breaking out between the friendly and allied Powers of the King. [The remainder of the Note was substantially the same as the Danish Declaration to the Belligerents, No. 1, B.] Declarations of Neutrality 229 D. SWEDISH DECLARATION TO THE UNITED STATES. THE SWEDISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE Washington, January 28, 1854. The present political complications consequent upon the declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte, and the possible contingency of a maritime war, have imposed on the Govern- ment of His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway the obligation of giving an earnest attention to the effects which may be their result. Its sincere desire is to preserve intact the relations of friendship and good understanding which so happily reign between Sweden and Norway and all the Govern- ments of Europe. Having nothing more at heart than to maintain and cement those relations, His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway regards it as a duty not to leave the allied and friendly Powers in ignorance of the line of policy which, for the attainment of the said object, he proposes to follow in case of the above-mentioned event. Guided as much by the frank friendship which reigns be- tween the Sovereigns and people of Sweden and Norway and of the Kingdom of Denmark, as by that community of interests and political principles which reciprocally sustain and reinforce each other, His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway has found himself called, in the first place, to concert himself with his august friend, neighbour, and ally, the King of Denmark, on the measures eventually to be adopted in order to establish a common action proper to facilitate, by its identity, the application of the system agreed upon. These overtures having met with that favourable reception one had a right to expect, it is in conformity with the resolutions taken by the two Sovereigns, that the Undersigned, Charge d' Affaires of His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, near the Government of the United States of America, has received the order of his august Sovereign to bring to the knowledge of the Government of the United States the general rules which His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway has deemed it proper to establish in order to fix the position of his States in the deplorable event of hostilities breaking out between the friendly and allied Powers of the King. [The remainder of the Note was substantially the same as the Swedish Declaration to the Belligerents, No. 1, A.] 280 The Declaration of Paris E. REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES TO DENMARK AND SWEDEN. THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE DANISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON. Washington, February 14, 1854. The Undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Note which the Charge d' Affaires of His Majesty the King of Denmark addressed to this Department on the 28th ulto., bringing to the knowledge of this Government the general rules which it has been deemed proper by His Majesty the King of Denmark, in concert with His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, to establish, in order to fix and define the position of Denmark in the event of hostilities breaking out among the Powers of Europe, in consequence of the existing relations between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. The Undersigned has the honour to inform Mr Torben Bille that, at his request, the views of his Government have been submitted to the President, and that they are regarded by him with all the interest which the occasion demands. Mr Bille may rest assured that the Government and people of this country feel deep solicitude in the events now transpiring in Europe, not only on account of the general anxiety they occasion to those Powers more nearly exposed to the menaced evils, but also as having a most important ulterior bearing upon the United States. The Undersigned, etc. T. Bille, Esq. W. L. MARCY. [The reply to the Swedish Charge* d' Affaires was in identical terms.] The Riga Despatch, 16TH FEBRUARY 1854. The Earl of Clarendon has had under his consideration your despatch requesting to be informed what respect would be paid by British cruisers, in the event of war, to bona-fide British property, the produce of Russia, if shipped on board neutral vessels. T am to acquaint you in reply that property of the Riga Despatch 231 description in question, the produce of Russia, and exported therefrom, by and on account of a British merchant domiciled and trading there, although purchased before the war, and ex- ported to England, would not be respected by Her Majesty's cruisers unless in pursuance of a licence, or of some special instructions from Her Majesty to the officers of the navy. By the law and practice of nations a belligerent has a right to con- sider as enemies all persons who reside in a hostile country, or who maintain commercial establishments therein, whether such persons be by birth neutrals, allies, enemies, or fellow-subjects ; the property of such persons exported from such country is, therefore, res hostium, and, as such, lawful prize of war. Such property will be condemned as prize, although its owner may be a native-born subject of the captor's country, and although it may be in transitu to that country and its being laden on board a neutral ship will not protect the property. You will, there- fore, inform those whom it may concern that in the event of war the property in question will not be protected by the con- sular certificate, or by any other document, but will be liable to capture and condemnation as prize. To the British Consul at Riga, February 16, 1854. Instructions of the British and French Governments for the Mutual Protection of Subjects and Commerce, FEBRUARY 1854. E. (I) CIRCULAR TO BRITISH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS. c Foreign Office, February 23, 1854. oIR, The communication which has recently been made to you of the correspondence on Eastern affairs which has been laid before both Houses of Parliament, will have shown you that there is every probability of an early commencement of hos- tilities between Great Britain and France on one side, and Russia on the other. That correspondence will also have shown you that the British and French Governments, through- out the difficult and complicated negotiations which have pre- 232 The Declaration of Paris ceded the existing state of affairs, have earnestly and cordially acted together, with a view to avert the calamity of war, and that they are equally prepared to act with the same earnestness and cordiality for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, if the Emperor of Russia should still be unwilling to negotiate for peace on fair and reasonable terms. The time has now arrived when it is incumbent on the two Governments to prepare for all the contingencies of war ; and among those contingencies it has been impossible for them to overlook the danger to which their subjects and their com- merce on the high seas may be exposed by the machinations of their enemy, who, though unable from his own resources materially to injure either, may seek to derive means of offence from countries whose Governments take no part in the contest which he has provoked. But it is a necessary consequence of the strict union and alliance which exists between Great Britain and France, that, in the event of war, their conjoint action should be felt by Russia in all parts of the world ; that not only in the Baltic, and in the waters and territory of Turkey, their counsels, their armies, and their fleets, should be united either for offensive or defensive purposes against Russia, but that the same spirit of union should prevail in all quarters of the world, and that whether for offence or defence the civil and military and naval resources of the British and French Empires should be directed to the common objects of protecting the subjects and commerce of England and France from Russian aggression, and of de- priving the Russian Government of the means of inflicting injury on either. For these reasons Her Majesty's Government have agreed with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French to instruct their civil and naval authorities in foreign parts to consider their respective subjects as having an equal claim to protection against Russian hostility ; and for this purpose, either singly or in conjunction with each other, to act indifferently for the support and defence of British and French interests. It may be that, in a given locality, one only of the Powers is represented by a civil functionary, or by a naval force ; but, in such a case, the influence and the power of that one must be exerted as zealously and efficiently for the protection of the subjects and interests of the other as if those subjects and interests were its own. I have accordingly to instruct you, Sir, to act in conformity with this principle. You will consider it your duty to protect, as far as possible, against the consequence of the hostilities British and French Government Instructions 233 in which England and France may shortly be engaged with Russia, the subjects and interests of France equally with those of England ; and you will make known without reserve to the French civil and naval authorities with whom you may have means of communication, any dangers to which the interests of either country may be exposed, or any opportunities with which you may become acquainted of inflicting injury on the common enemy. Instructions to the same effect will be sent by the Govern- ment of France to its civil and naval authorities in foreign parts, and Her Majesty's Government concur with that of France in anticipating the most favourable results from this decided manifestation of the intimate union which prevails between them, and which it is their earnest desire should influence their agents in all parts of the world at a moment when they are about to engage in a contest with the Empire of Russia for an object of such paramount interest to Europe as the maintenance of the Turkish Empire. I am, &c. (Signed) CLARENDON. E. (2) INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH NAVAL OFFICERS. By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The Earl of Clarendon, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having informed us that Her Majesty's Government and that of France have agreed that their civil authorities and naval forces in all parts of the world should co-operate, or if necessary act singly, for the protection of the interests of the subjects and commerce of the two nations, whenever the same may stand in need of assistance, against the hostile machinations of Russia ; and Lord Clarendon having further signified the Queen's commands that an instruction to that effect should be issued for the direction of Her Majesty's naval forces in all parts of the world ; we transmit to you here- with a copy of Lord Clarendon's letter, together with a copy of a circular addressed by his Lordship to Her Majesty's Diplo- matic and Consular Agents abroad ; and we hereby require and direct you to conform yourself in all respects to the views and instructions of Her Majesty's Government as expressed in Lord Clarendon's letter, and in the circular in question. We further acquaint you that a similar instruction has been 284 The Declaration of Paris addressed by the French Government to the naval forces of France. We further require and direct you to take the earliest oppor- tunity, after receipt of this order, of communicating in the most friendly manner with the officer in command of the French naval forces on your station, with the view of giving the fullest and speediest effect to the intentions of Her Majesty's Govern- ment and that of France. Given under our hands the 24th February 1854. (Signed) J. R. G. GRAHAM. HYDE PARKER. F. (I) CIRCULAR TO FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS. ,, Paris, Fevrier 1854. MONSIEUR, Forces d'admettre la possibility d'hostilite's entre eux et la Russie, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste" Imperiale et celui de Sa Majest6 Britannique ont pens6 que Palliance qu'ils ont con- tractee en vue d'un danger commun devait couvrir tous ceux de leurs inte"rets que les consequences de la guerre pourraient atteindre ou menacer. Quelle que soit Petendue des ressources dont ils disposent, notamment sur mer, ils ont a tenir compte de 1'impreVu. II peut, si la guerre e'clate, se produire, dans des parages ou les forces navales de chacun d'eux ne seraient point constamment pre"sentes, des conjonctures ou leurs nationaux et leur pavilion de commerce n'auraient pas, au moment ne"cessaire, tout 1'appui indispensable a leur securite". Les deux Gouvernements n'avaient qu'a s'inspirer de la pensee qui preside & leurs rapports actuels pour trouver un moyen de pourvoir & ces eVentualiteX et ils I'ont vu dans 1'adoption concerted d'un systeme de protection reciproque embrassant ces inte'rets dissmines sous toutes les latitudes. Les Agents diplomatiques et commerciaux, ainsi que les com- mandants des forces navales, de chacun des deux pays, sur tous les points du globe, devront done accorder leur appui aux sujets et au commerce de Pautre, dans toutes les hypotheses ou ils seraient menace's par 1'ennemi commun. En cons6quence, Monsieur, vous conside"rerez, en pareil cas, les batiments et les sujets Anglais, dans votre ressort, comme ayant le meme droit que les batiments et les sujets Francais & toute 1'assistance que comportent vos attributions, et vous donnerez avis de cette prescription aux officiers de Marine de British and French Government Instructions 235 Sa Majeste" Impe'riale qui seraient en position de concourir aux mesures que les circonstances resultant de 1'etat de guerre vous paraitraient commander. Les Agents et les officiers de mer de Sa Majeste Britannique recevront des instructions identiques, et ainsi les sujets et le commerce des deux nations seront autorises a compter sur la protection reciproque des Consuls et de la Marine des deux Puissances. Vous comprendrez, Monsieur, que je ne cherche point a determiner a 1'avance tous les cas qui pourront re"clamer votre intervention. C'est a votre sagacite" de vous diriger dans 1'appli- cation du principe destine a vous servir de regie de conduite. Les deux Gouvernements ont tenu beaucoup moins a preciser les circonstances et les formes dans lesquelles cette protection devra s'exercer qu'a bien marquer le caractere qu'elle doit prendre. Mais, en donnant au monde ce nouveau temoignage de 1'unite de leurs vues et de la since"rit6 de leur alliance, ils sont persuades que, pour assurer a cette mesure commune toute 1'efficacite desirable, leurs Agents n'ont besoin que de se bien pe"netrer de 1'esprit de solidarite qui en a inspire aux deux Cabinets la pensee. Recevez, &c. (Signe) DROUYN DE LHUYS. F. (2) INSTRUCTIONS TO FRENCH NAVAL OFFICERS. Paris, Ftvrier 1854. MESSIEURS, Ma depeche du 18 Fevrier a appele spe"cialement votre atten- tion sur les graves complications qu'a fait naitre en Europe la question d'Orient. Les n^gociations entamees pour denouer pacifiquement le differend qui s'est eleve entre la Russie et la Turquie sont demeurees sans resultat, et tout porte a croire que de nouveaux efforts demeureront impuissants. L'Angleterre et la France ont resolu de prot^ger 1'Empire Ottoman, et de s'opposer, meme par la force, aux projets envahissans de la Russie. Ces deux grandes nations sont intimement unies dans leur politique et se sont mutuellement donne" les gages les plus certains de leur alliance. Leurs escadres croisent de concert dans la Mer Noire ; elles se pretent recipro- quement le plus loyal concours ; les deux Gouvernements, aprs avoir adopte une politique commune, se sont mis egalement d'accord sur tous les moyens d'action. Cette alliance de la France et d'Angleterre ne doit pas se reVeler seulement dans les mers d'Europe. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste" Imperiale et celui de la Reine de la Grande 236 The Declaration of Paris Bretagne desirent que la meme union, le meme accord, regnent sous toutes les latitudes. Les forces navales de PAngleterre et de la France doivent done se preter un mutuel concours dans toutes les regions meme les plus lointaines. Immediatement apres la reception de ces instructions, vous aurez soin de vous mettre e"h relation avec les commandants des stations ou des batiments de la Grande Bretagne. Vous devrez combiner, de concert avec eux, toutes les mesures qui auraient pour objet de proteger les interets, la puissance ou 1'honneur du drapeau des deux nations amies. Vous vous preterez dans ce but une mutuelle assistance, soit que vous deviez attaquer 1'ennemi, quand les hostilites auront commence ou quand la declaration de guerre aura ete faite, soit que vous vous trouviez, des ce moment, dans Pobligation de vous defendre. Vous devrez accorder votre protection aux batiments du commerce de la Grande Bretagne au meme titre que les batiments de guerre de PAngleterre preteront aide et protection aux navires marchands de notre nation. En un mot, les deux Gouvernements de France et d'Angle- terre desirant que leurs forces navales armees agissent comme si elles appartenaient & une seule et meme nation, je compte que, pour ce qui vous concerne, vous ne perdrez jamais de vue cette regie de conduite, et que vous saurez la pratiquer de maniere a cimenter davantage encore, s'il se peut, Pintime union des deux pays. Tant que les hostilites entre la France et PAngleterre d'une part, et la Russie de Pautre, n'auront pas commenc ou que la declaration de guerre n'aura pas ete faite, vous vous dispenserez de prendre Pinitiative des mesures agressives, et vous vous tiendrez sur la defensive. J'aurai soin, aussitot que le moment sera venu, de vous transmettre toutes les instructions necessaires pour Pattaque. Recevez, &c. (Signe") Ducos. Board of Trade Correspondence 237 Correspondence between Messrs Martin, Levin <& Adler and the Board of Trade, FEBRUARY-MARCH 1854. To THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE. 13 Trinity Square, Tower Hill, February 24, 1854. RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR, We shall feel greatly obliged by your informing us whether, in the event of a war between this country and Russia, Russian goods imported from neutral ports would be considered contra- band, or would they be fairly admissible into England ? Being much interested in this question, we solicit the favour of a reply, And remain, with due respect, &c. (Signed) pro MARTIN, LEVIN & ADLER, J. H. HAMBLEN. To THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE. 13 Trinity Square, Tower Hill, March 9, 1854. SIR, On the 24th ultimo, we took the liberty of addressing you a letter, of which the following is a copy : " We shall feel greatly obliged by your informing us whether, in the event of a war with Russia, Russian goods imported from neutral ports would be considered contraband, or would they be fairly ad- missible into England ? Being much interested in this question, we solicit the favour of your reply, and remain with due respect," &c. To this letter we have received no answer of any kind, which makes us fear that ours did not reach its destination. May we respectfully, but urgently, solicit a reply to the present as early as possible ? The question is one of vital interest to us. We have now considerable quantities of Russian goods on the way from that country to England, partly by land via Germany ; this must be our apology for troubling you, 238 The Declaration of Paris and as we cannot tell at what precise time they may arrive here, we do not know until favoured with your answer in what position we stand. We remain, &c. (Signed) MARTIN, LEVIN & ABLER. 3 Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, March 10, 1854. GENTLEMEN, With reference to your letter of yesterday's date, in which you request a reply to the question contained in your letter of the 24th ultimo, as to the treatment of Russian produce in this country, in the event of a war with Russia, I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to inform you, that they are in communication with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and that a reply will be sent to your letter of the 24th ultimo so soon as the decision of Her Majesty's Government as to the course to be adopted in this matter shall enable them to do so. I am, &c. (Signed) J. EMERSON TENNENT. Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler. 4 Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, March 14, 1854. GENTLEMEN, In reply to your letter of the 24th February, requesting to be informed whether, in the event of war between this country and Russia, Russian goods imported from neutral ports would be considered contraband, or would be admissible into England ; I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade to inform you, that in the event of war, every indirect attempt to carry on trade with the enemy's country will be illegal ; but, on the other hand, bond-fide trade not subject to the objection above stated, will not become illegal, merely because the articles which form the subject-matter of that trade were originally produced in an enemy's country. I am, &c. (Signed) J. EMERSON TENNENT. Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler. Board of Trade Correspondence 239 13 Trinity Square, Tower Hill, March 15, 1854. SIR, We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favour of yesterday, in answer to our inquiry relative to Russian produce imported from neutral ports, in the event of war. You therein state, that " every indirect attempt to carry on trade with the enemy's country will be illegal ; but, on the other hand, bond-fide trade not subject to the objection above stated, will not become illegal, merely because the articles which form the subject- matter of that trade were originally produced in an enemy's country." We are very desirous to be informed where the line of dis- tinction is to be drawn between " an indirect attempt to carry on trade," and a " bond-fide trade," as we cannot at present see how, in case of war, any Russian goods could be imported into this country, without such importation coming under the head of an indirect attempt to carry on trade with the enemy's country ; unless the interpretation put upon your letter by several of the merchants with whom we have conferred upon it, be the true one, viz., that a British subject buying (by his agents) Russian produce in Russia, and importing the same, via Germany (a neutral country), will be acting illegally, and his goods would be seized on their arrival here ; but that a neutral subject buying Russian goods and consigning them to this country from a neutral port, will be considered to be carrying on a bond-fide trade, and his merchandise will be admitted for consumption into England. This view of the case would give such a decided advantage to the neutral over the British subject, that we cannot believe such to be the intention of the Government. We therefore feel it necessary to put the present question, trusting we may be favoured with an explicit reply : In the event of war being declared between this country and Russia, will it be allowable to import Russian produce (the property of British or neutral subjects) into this country from neutral ports ? We remain, &c. (Signed) pro MARTIN, LEVIN & ABLER, J. H. HAMBLEN. To the Secretary, Marine Department, Board of Trade. 240 The Declaration of Paris 6 Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall, March 16, 1854. GENTLEMEN, In reply to the inquiry contained in your letter of the 15th instant, whether, in the event of war being declared between this country and Russia, it will be allowable to import Russian produce, the property of British or neutral subjects, from neutral ports, I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to refer you to the general principle laid down in my letter of the 14th, and to repeat, that in the case of articles originally produced in Russia, but since pur- chased from neutrals at a neutral port, and in the ordinary course of trade with such port by British merchants, the fact of their having been originally produced in Russia will be immaterial. I am, &c. (Signed) J. E. TENNENT. Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler. 5 Declarations to the Neutrals, MARCH 1854. A. GREAT BRITAIN. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having been compelled to take up Arms in support of an Ally, is desirous of rendering the War as little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom she remains at Peace. To preserve the Commerce of Neutrals from all unnecessary Obstruction, Her Majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a Part of the belligerent Rights appertaining to Her by the Law of Nations. It is impossible for Her Majesty to forego the Exercise of Her Right of seizing Articles contraband of War, and of preventing Neutrals from bearing the Enemy's Despatches, and She must maintain the Right of a Belligerent to prevent Neutrals from breaking any effective Blockade which may be established with an adequate Force against the Enemy's Forts, Harbours, or Coasts. But Her Majesty will waive the Right of seizing Enemy's Declarations to the Neutrals 241 Property laden on board a neutral Vessel, unless it be contraband of War. It is not Her Majesty's Intention to claim the Confiscation of neutral Property, not being contraband of War, found on board Enemy's Ships ; and Her Majesty further declares, that being anxious to lessen as much as possible the Evils of War, and to restrict its Operations to the regularly organised Forces of the Country, it is not Her present Intention to issue Letters of Marque for the commissioning of Privateers. Westminster, March 28, 1854. B. FRANCE. Paris, le 29 mars 1854. SIRE, A une epoque ou les relations maritimes et les interets com- merciaux occupent une si large place dans 1'existence des peuples, il est du devoir d'une nation qui se trouve contrainte a faire la guerre de prendre les mesures necessaires pour en adoucir autant que possible les effets, en laissant au commerce des peuples neutres toutes les facilites compatibles avec cet etat d'hostilite auquel ils cherchent a demeurer etrangers. Mais il ne suffit pas que les bellig6rants aient la pensee intime de respecter toujours les droits des neutres ; ils doivent de plus s'efforcer de calmer, par avance, ces inquietudes que le commerce est toujours si prompt a concevoir, et ne laissant planer aucun doute sur les principes qu'ils entendent appliquer. Un reglement sur les devoirs des neutres pourrait paraitre une sorte d'atteinte a la souverainete des peuples qui veulent garder la neutralite ; une declaration spontanee des principes auxquels un belligerant promet de conformer sa conduite semble, au contraire, le temoignage le plus formel qu'il puisse donner de son respect pour les droits des autres nations. C'est dans cette pensee qu'apres m'etre concerte avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique, j'ai 1'honneur de sou- mettre a la haute approbation de Votre Majeste la declaration suivante. Je suis avec respect, Sire, de Votre Majeste, le tres-humble et tres-obeissant serviteur et fidele sujet. Signe : DROUYN DE LHUYS. Approuve : Signe : NAPOLEON. 16 242 The Declaration of Paris DECLARATION RELATIVE AUX NEUTRES, AUX LETTRES DE MARQUE, ETC. Sa Majeste 1'empereur des Franyais, ayant etc forcee de prendre les armes pour soutenir un allie, desire rendre la guerre aussi peu onereuse que possible aux puissances avec lesquelles elle demeure en paix. Afin de garantir le commerce des neutres de toute entrave inutile, Sa Majeste consent, pour le present, a renoncer a une partie des droits qui lui appartiennent comme puissance belli- g6rante, en vertu du droit des gens. II est impossible a Sa Majest6 de renoncer a 1'exercice de son droit de saisir les articles de contrebande de guerre et d'empecher les neutres de transporter les depeches de 1'ennemi. Elle doit aussi maintenir intact son droit, comme puissance bellige'rante, d'empecher les neutres de violer tout blocus effectif qui serait mis, a 1'aide d'une force suffisante, devant les ports, les rades ou cotes de 1'ennemi. Mais les vaisseaux de Sa Majeste ne saisiront pas la propriete" de 1'ennemi chargee a bord d'un batiment neutre, a moins que cette propriete ne soit contrebande de guerre. Sa Majeste ne compte pas revendiquer le droit de confisquer la propriete des neutres, autre que la contrebande de guerre, trouvee a bord des batiments ennemis. Sa Majeste declare en outre que, mue par le desir de diminuer autant que possible les maux de la guerre et d'en restreindre les operations aux forces regulierement organisees de 1'fitat, elle n'a pas, pour le moment, 1'intention de delivrer des lettres de marque pour autoriser les armements en course. Creation of Prize Courts 243 6 Creation of Prize Courts. A. ENGLAND. (I) ORDER IN COUNCIL. AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, the 29th Day of March 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. HER MAJESTY having determined to afford active assistance to Her Ally, His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, for the protection of His Dominions against the encroachments and unprovoked aggression of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, Her Majesty therefore is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that General Reprisals be granted against the Ships, Vessels, and Goods of the Emperor of all the Russias, and of His Subjects, or others inhabiting within any of His Countries, Territories, or Dominions, so that Her Majesty's Fleets and Ships shall and may lawfully seize all Ships, Vessels, and Goods belonging to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his Subjects, or others, inhabiting within any of His Countries, Territories, or Dominions, and bring the same to Judgment in such Courts of Admiralty within Her Majesty's Dominions, Possessions or Colonies, as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof. And to that end Her Majesty's Advocate General, with the Advocate of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the Draught of a Commission, and present the same to Her Majesty at this Board, authorizing the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of England, and the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court, his Surrogate or Surrogates, as also the several Courts of Admiralty within Her Majesty's Dominions which shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance of and judicially proceed upon all and all manner of Captures, Seizures, Prizes and Reprisals, of all Ships, Vessels, and Goods that are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine 244 The Declaration of Paris the same, and according to the course of Admiralty, and the Law of Nations, to adjudge and condemn all such Ships, Vessels, and Goods, as shall belong to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his Subjects, or to any others inhabiting within any of his Countries, Territories or Dominions ; And they are likewise to prepare and lay before Her Majesty at this Board, a Draught of such Instructions, as may be proper to be sent to the said several Courts of Admiralty, in Her Majesty's Dominions, Possessions and Colonies, for their guidance herein. FROM the COURT at BUCKINGHAM PALACE this Twenty-ninth day of March One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. CRANWORTH, C. WILLIAM MOLESWORTH. GRANVILLE, P. LANSDOWNE. ARGYLL, C. P. S. J. RUSSELL. BREADALBANE. ABERCORN. CLARENDON. MULGRAVE. NEWCASTLE. ERNEST BRUCE. SIDNEY HERBERT. DRUMLANRIG. STEPHEN LUSHINGTON. I. R. GRAHAM. W. E. GLADSTONE. ABERDEEN. (2) ORDER IN COUNCIL APPROVING DRAFT COMMISSION. WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board the annexed Draught of a Commission authorizing and enjoining the Com- missioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain or any two or more of them to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of England and the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court his Surrogate or Surrogates as also the several Courts of Admiralty within Her Majesty's Dominions Possessions or Colonies which shall be duly commissioned and thereby author- izing and requiring them to take cognizance of and judicially to proceed upon all and all manner of Captures Seizures Prizes and Reprisals, of all Ships and Goods that are or shall be taken and to hear and determine the same and according to the course of Admiralty and the laws of nations to adjudge and condemn all such ships and vessels and goods as shall belong to the Emperor of Russia or to his subjects or to any others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories or dominions unless licensed by Her Majesty or exempted by the operation and effect of an Order of Her Majesty made and dated this 29th day of March l for exempting from capture or detention Russian Vessels under Special circumstances or any future order in this be- half Her Majesty taking the same into Consideration was pleased 1 Document No. 9 (4). Creation of Prize Courts 245 with the advice of Her Privy Council to approve thereof and to Order as it is hereby Ordered that the Rt. Hon-ble Visct Palmer- ston One of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State do cause the said Commission to be prepared for Her Majesty's Royal Signature with a proper warrant for the immediate passing the same under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. COMMISSION. VICTORIA by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen Defender of the Faith and so forth to Our right trusty and wellbeloved Councillor Sir James Robert George Graham Baronet Our trusty and wellbeloved Hyde Parker Esquire Companion of Our Most Hon-ble Order of the Bath Vice Admiral of the Blue Squadron of Our Fleet ; Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley Esq're Companion of Our Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath Rear Admiral of the White Squadron of Our Fleet Richard Saunders Dundas Esquire Companion of Our Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath Rear Admiral of the Blue Squadron of Our Fleet ; Alexander Milne Esq're Captain in Our Navy and William Francis Cowper Esq're Our Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Dominions thereunto belonging and to Our Commissioners for executing that Office for the time being Greeting. Whereas We have determined to afford active assistance to Our Ally His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire for the protec- tion of his Dominions against the encroachments and unprovoked aggression of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias : And whereas by and with the Advice of Our Privy Council we have ordered that General Reprisals be granted against the Ships Vessels and Goods of the Emperor of all the Russias and of his Subjects and others inhabiting within any of his Countries Territories or Dominions so that Our Fleets and Ships shall and may lawfully seize all Ships Vessels and Goods belonging to the Emperor of all the Russias or his Subjects or others inhabiting within any of his Countries Territories or Dominions and bring the same to Judgment in such Courts of Admiralty within Our Dominions Possessions or Colonies as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof These are therefore to authorize and We do hereby authorize and enjoin you Our said Commissioners now and for the time being or any two or more of you to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of England and the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court and his Surrogate and Surrogates and also the several 246 The Declaration of Paris Courts of Admiralty within Our Dominions Possessions or Colonies which shall be duly commissionated and they are hereby authorized and required to take cognizance of and Judicially to proceed upon all and all manner of Captures Seizures Prizes and Reprisals of all Ships Vessels and Goods already seized and taken and which hereafter shall be seized and taken and to hear and determine the same and according to the Course of Admiralty and Law of Nations to adjudge and condemn all such Ships Vessels and Goods as shall belong to the Emperor of All the Russias or to his Subjects or to any others inhabiting within any of his Countries Territories or Dominions. In witness whereof we have caused Our Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to be put and affixed to these Presents. Given at Our Court at St James's the 3rd day of April in the year of Our Lord 1854, and in the 17th year of Our Reign. (3) WARRANT OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY REQUIRING THE HIGH COURT OF AD- MIRALTY TO PROCEED IN PRIZE CAUSES, &c. By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. Her Majesty having been pleased by the Commission under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland bearing date the Third day of April One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four to authorize us to the effect following as by the Commission itself herewith sent you to remain of Record in the Registry of the High Court of Admiralty of England doth more at large appear. These are in Her Majesty's Name and Our's to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of England, and you the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court, and your Surrogate and Surrogates, and you are hereby author- ized and required to take cognizance of, and to judicially proceed upon all and all manner of Captures, Seizures, Prizes and Re- prisals of all Ships Vessels and Goods that are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine the same, and according to the course of Admiralty, and the Law of Nations to adjudge and condemn all such Ships Vessels and <2oods, as shall belong to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his Subjects, or to any others inhabiting within any of his Countries, Territories or Dominions, which shall be brought before you for Trial and Condemnation. And for so doing this shall be your Warrant. Creation of Prize Courts 247 Given under our hands and the Seal of the Office of Admiralty this Fourth day of April One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. HYDE PARKER. / R. S. DUNDAS. To The Right Honourable Stephen Lushington, D.C.L., Judge of the High Court of Admiralty of England. By command of their Lordships. W. A. B. HAMILTON. B. FRANCE. DOCKET PORTANT INSTITUTION D'UN CONSEIL DES PRISES. NAPOLEON, etc. etc. Vu la declaration faite par nos ordres au Senat et au Corps le"gislatif, le 27 mars dernier, relativement a 1'etat de guerre existant avec la Russie ; Vu notre declaration du 29 mars dernier, relative aux neutres, aux lettres de marque, etc. etc. ; Vu la convention conclue le 10 mai dernier entre nous et Sa Majeste la reine du royaume uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, relativement au jugement et au partage des prises ; Notre conseil d'etat entendu, Avons decre'te' et decretons ce qui suit : Art. l er . Un conseil des prises est institue a Paris. Art. 2. Ce conseil statue sur la validite de toutes les prises maritimes faites dans le cours de la presente guerre, et dont le jugement doit appartenir a 1'autorite fra^aise. II statue egalement sur les contestations relatives a la qualite des navires neutres ou ennemis, naufrages ou echoues, et sur les prises maritimes amenees dans les ports de nos colonies. Art. 3. Ce conseil est compose : 1 d'un conseiller d'fitat, president ; 2 de six membres, dont deux pris parmi les maitres de requetes de notre conseil d'fitat ; 3 d'un commissaire du gouvernement qui donne ses conclusions sur chaque affaire. Les membres du conseil des prises sont nommes par dcret imperial, sur la presentation de nos ministres des affaires etran- geres, de la marine et des colonies. Leurs fonctions sont gratuites. Un secre"taire-greffer est attache au conseil. 248 The Declaration of Paris Art. 4. Les stances du conseil des prises ne sont pas pub- liques. Ses decisions ne pourront etre rendues que par cinq membres au moins. Le commissaire du gouvernement est, en cas d'absence ou d'empechement, remplace par 1'un des membres du conseil. Art. 5. Les decisions du conseil des prises ne sont excu- toires que huit jours apres la communication officielle qui en est faite a nos ministres des affaires etrangeres, de la marine et des colonies. Art. 6. Les decisions rendues par le conseil des prises peuvent nous etre deferees en notre conseil d'fitat, soit par le commissaire du gouvernement, soit par les parties interessees. Le recours doit etre exerce par le commissaire du gouvernement dans les trois mois de la decision, et par les parties interessees dans le trois mois de la notification de cette decision. Ce recours n'a pas d'effet suspensif, si ce n'est pour la repartition definitive du produit des prises. Toutefois, le conseil des prises peut ordonner que Pexecution de sa decision n'aura lieu qu'a la charge de fournir caution. Dans tous les cas, il peut etre ordonne en notre conseil d'fitat qu'il sera sursis a Pexecution de la decision centre laquelle un pourvoi est dirige, ou qu'il sera fourni une caution avant cette execution. Art. 7. Les avocats a notre conseil d'etat ont seuls le droit de signer les memoires et requetes qui sont presentes au conseil des prises. Art. 8. Les equipages des batiments de Sa Majeste" la reine du royaume uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande sont represented devant le conseil des prises par le consul de leur nation ou par tout autre agent que designe le gouvernement britannique. Art. 9. Les agents consulaires Strangers peuvent presenter au conseil des prises toutes les observations qu'ils jugent con- venables dans 1'interet de leurs nationaux, mais seulement par 1'intermediaire du commissaire du gouvernement. Art. 10. Les frais de secretariat et autres depenses accessoires occasionnees par le service du conseil des prises forment un chapitre special au budget du ministere de la marine et des colonies. Art. 11. Les dispositions de 1'arrete des consuls du 6 germinal an VIII. et des autres reglements non contraires a notre present dcret sont maintenues. Sont ne'anmoins abrogs les articles 9, 10 et 11 de 1'arrete du 6 germinal an VIII. Art. 12. Nos ministres secretaires d'fitat au departement des affaires etrangeres et au departement de la marine et des Despatches announcing Declaration to Neutrals 249 colonies sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de 1'execu- tion du present decret. Fait au palais de Saint-Cloud, le 18 juillet 1854. NAPOLEON. Par 1'Empereur, Le ministre secretaire d'fitat au departement des affaires etrangeres. Signe : DROUYN DE LHUYS. Le ministre secretaire d'fitat au departement de la marine et des colonies. Sign6 : TH. Ducos. Circular Despatches announcing the Declaration to the Neutral Powers, MARCH, APRIL, 1854. A. BRITISH CIRCULAR DESPATCH CONTAINING DRAFT OF NOTE TO BE ADDRESSED BY AGENTS ABROAD TO FOREIGN COURTS, ACCOMPANYING H.M.'S DECLARATION OF MARCH 28, 1854. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being compelled to take up arms for the purpose of repelling the aggression of H.M. the Emperor of Russia upon the Ottoman Empire, and being desirous to lessen as much as possible the disastrous consequences to commerce resulting from a state of Warfare, their Majesties have resolved for the present not to authorise the issue of letters of marque. In making this resolution known, they think it right to announce at the same time the principles upon which they will be guided during the course of this war with regard to the navigation and commerce of neutrals. H.M. the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has accordingly published the accompanying Declaration, which is identical with that published by H.M. the Emperor of the French. In thus restricting within the narrowest limits the exercise of their rights as belligerents, the Allied Governments confidently trust that the Governments of countries which may remain neutral during this war will sincerely exert every effort to enforce upon their subjects /citizens the necessity of observing 250 The Declaration of Paris the strictest neutrality. Her Britannic Majesty's Government entertains the confident hope that the . . . Government will receive with satisfaction the announcement of the resolutions thus taken in common by the two Allied Governments, and that it will, in the spirit of just reciprocity, give orders that no privateer under Russian colours shall be equipped or vic- tualled or admitted with its prizes in the ports of ... and also that the subjects/citizens of ... shall rigorously abstain from taking part in armaments of this nature or in any other measure opposed to the duties of a strict neutrality. B. FRENCH CIRCULAR DESPATCH TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. Paris, March 30, 1854. MONSIEUR, Le Moniteur de ce jour public la declaration du gouverne- ment fran9ais au sujet des neutres, ainsi que le rapport que j'ai presente a 1'Empereur en la soumettant a sa haute appro- bation. Vous trouverez ci-joint copie de ces deux documents. Le gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique a promulgue", de con cote, la meme declaration. Au moment ou les deux Etats prennent les armes pour la defense commune d'un allie, ils ne pouvaient donner une preuve plus eclatante de la parfaite conformite de leurs sentiments et de 1'esprit de solidarite qui les unit, qu'en adoptant les memes resolutions dans une matiere sur laquelle, jusqu'ici, leurs principes avaient ete si differents. Penetr6 de cette solicitude que la France a tou jours temoignee pour les neutres, le gouvernement de I'Empereur s'etait des longtemps preoccupe des questions graves que la neutrality souleve, pour en preparer la solution dans le sens le plus favor- able aux interets des peuples avec lesquels il demeure en paix. Je m'empresse de reconnaitre qu'il a trouve le gouvernement de Sa Majest6 britannique anim6 des memes desirs, et deja penetre" de la pens^e de laisser les neutres en possession de tous les avantages que les necessites indispensables de la guerre ne feraient point un devoir absolu de restreindre. C'est cette communaute de vues qui a dicte la declaration adoptee par les deux gouvernements ; et, je n'hesite pas a le dire, jamais un document de cette nature n'a ete con9U dans des termes aussi favorables. L'intention de ne point delivrer de lettres de marque y est officiellement annoncee ; La necessite du blocus effectif est admise ; Despatches announcing Declaration to Neutrals 251 Le pavilion neutre couvrira la marchandise, et pourtant la marchandise neutre restera libre sous pavilion ennemi : Tels sont les avantages qui vont etre assures au commerce pendant la guerre ; et meme, lorsqu'elle sera terminee, cette declaration commune demeurera comme un precedent con- side"rable acquis a 1'histoire de la neutralite. Mais si 1'union intime de la France et de 1'Angleterre a permis de consacrer un systeme aussi avantageux pour les nations neutres, il doit en re"sulter pour celles-ci une obligation plus stricte de respecter d'une maniere complete les droits des belli- gerants. Nous avons done raison d'esperer que les gouverne- ments neutres non-seulement ne feront aucun acte qui puisse presenter un caractere hostile, mais qu'ils s'empresseront de prendre toutes les mesures necessaires pour que leurs sujets s'abstiennent de toute entreprise contraire aux devoirs d'une rigoureuse neutralite. Je vous adresserai incessamment un projet de note dont la redaction aura ete concertee avec le gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique, pour notifier la declaration presente au gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredited C. FURTHER FRENCH CIRCULAR DESPATCH TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. Paris, April 5, 1854. MONSIEUR, J'ai 1'honneur de vous transmettre le projet d'une note que vous voudrez bien adresser immediatement au Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, pour lui faire connaitre les principes que la France et la Grande-Bretagne appliqueront aux neutres dans le cours de la guerre actuelle, ainsi que la resolution qu'ont prise les deux gouvernements de ne point delivrer, quant a present, de lettres de marque. Le representant de Sa Majeste britannique recevra 1'ordre d'adresser au gouvernement de . . . une communication analogue. Vous voudrez bien me transmettre la reponse du gouverne- ment de . . . des qu'elle vous sera parvenue, et faire les de- marches necessaires pour qu'elle soit conforme a la juste attente des deux gouvernements. PROJET DE NOTE. Le soussigne a reu 1'ordre de son gouvernement d'adresser a S. Exc. M. ... la communication suivante : S.M. PEmpereur des Franais et S.M. la Reine du Royaume- Uni de la Grande-Bretagne vont se trouver clans la necessit^ 252 The .Declaration of Paris de recourir a la force des armes pour repousser les agressions dont 1'empire ottoman est 1'objet de la part du gouvernement de S.M. 1'Empereur de Russie. Voulant, autant que possible, diminuer pour le commerce les consequences funestes de 1'etat de guerre, Leurs Majestes ont resolu de ne point autoriser la course, quant a prdsent, par la delivrance de lettres de marque, et de faire connaitre, en meme temps que cette resolution, les principes qu'elles entendent appliquer a la navigation et au commerce des neutres dans le cours de cette guerre. C'est dans ce but que S.M. 1'Empereur des Franais a fait publier la declaration ci-jointe, identique a celle que S.M. la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande a fait publier de son cote". En restreignant 1'exercise de leurs droits de bellig6rants dans des limites aussi etroites, les gouvernements allies se croient fondes a compter sur les efforts sinceres des gouvernements qui demeureront neutres dans cette guerre, pour faire observer par leurs sujets (ou nationaux) les obligations de la neutralite la plus absolue. En consequence, le gouvernement de S.M. 1'Empereur des Franais a la confiance que le gouvernement de . . . accueillera avec satisfaction 1'annonce des resolutions prises en commun entre les deux gouvernements allies, et voudra bien, par une juste re'ciprocite, donner des ordres pour qu'aucun corsaire sous pavilion russe ne puisse etre arm6 ni ravitaille, ni admis avec ses prises dans les ports de . . . et pour que les sujets . . . (ou citoyens) . . . s'abstiennent rigoureusement de prendre part a des armements de ce genre ou a toute autre mesure contraire aux devoirs d'une stricte neutralite. 8 United States Despatches relating to the Declaration to the Neutrals. 1 A. THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. /p . . London, February 24, 1854. I then inquired of his Lordship [Lord Clarendon] whether the British Government had yet determined upon the course they would pursue, during the impending war, in regard to neutrals ; whether they would adhere to their old rule of captur- 1 State Papers, vol. xlvi. pp. 821 et seq. U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 253 ing the goods of an enemy on board the vessel of a friend, or adopt the rule of " free ships free goods " ; observing that it was of great importance to my countrymen, engaged in commerce, that they should know the decision on this point as speedily as possible. He said that the question was then under the consideration of the Cabinet, and had not yet been decided, but I should be the very first person to whom he would communicate the result. Intimating a desire to converse with me, informally and un- officially, upon the subject, I informed him that I had no in- structions whatever from my own Government in relation to it, but, as an individual, I was willing frankly to express my opinions. From what passed between us, I should consider it a breach of confidence in me to report his private opinions, on a question still pending before the Cabinet Council, and on which its members are probably divided. I can, however, have no objection to repeat to you the sub- stance of my own observations. I said that the Supreme Court of the United States had adopted, in common with their own Courts, the principle that a belligerent had a right, under the law of nations, to capture the goods of an enemy on board the vessel of a friend, and that he was bound to restore the goods of a friend captured on board the vessel of an enemy. That, from a very early period of our history, we had sought, in favour of neutral commerce, to change this rule by Treaties with different nations, and, instead thereof to adopt the principle that the flag should protect the property under it, with the exception of contraband of war. That the right of search was, at best, an odious right, and ought to be restricted as much as possible. There was always danger, from its exercise, of involving the neutral in serious difficulty with the belligerent. The captain of a British man-of-war or privateer would meet an American vessel upon the ocean and board her for the purpose of ascertaining whether she was the carrier of enemies' property. Such individuals, especially, as their own interest was deeply involved in the question, were not always the most competent persons to conduct an investigation of this character. They were too prone to feel might and forget right. On the other hand, the American captain of a vessel searched would necessarily be indignant at what he might believe to be the unjust and arbitrary conduct of the searching officer. Hence bad blood would be the result, and constant and dangerous reclamations would arise between the two nations. I need not inform his Lordship that our past history had fully justified such apprehensions. On the other hand, if the 254 The Declaration of Paris rule that " free ships shall make free goods " were established, the right of the boarding officer would be confined to the ascertainment of the simple facts, whether the flag was bond- fide American, and whether articles contraband of war were on board. He would have no investigation to make into the owner- ship of the cargo. If, superadded to this rule, the correspond- ing rule was adopted, that " enemy's ships shall make enemy's goods," the belligerent would gain nearly as much by the latter as he had lost by the former, and this would be no hardship to the neutral owner of such goods, because he would place them on board an enemy's vessel with his eyes open, and fully sensible of the risk of capture. I observed that the Government of the United States had not, to my recollection, made any treaties recently on the prin- ciple of " free ships free goods," and the only reason, I pre- sume, was, that until the strong maritime nations, such as Great Britain, France, and Russia, should consent to enter into such treaties, it would be of little avail to conclude them with the minor Powers. This, I believe, is a fair summary of all I said, at different times, in the course of a somewhat protracted conversation, and I hope it may meet your approbation. I shall not be astonished if the British Government should yield their long-cherished principle, and adopt the rule, that the flag shall protect the cargo. I know positively that Sweden and Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Prussia, are urging this upon them ; but what I did not know until the day before yesterday was, that the Government of France was pursuing the same course. In this connection, I think it to be my duty to say that the correspondence of Mr Schroeder, our Charge d' Affaires at Stock- holm, a gentleman with whom I am not personally acquainted, has furnished me the earliest and most accurate information of the proceedings of the northern Powers on questions which may affect the neutral interests of the United States. Lord Clarendon referred to our neutrality law (of April 20th, 1818) * in terms of high commendation, and pronounced it 1 The Act of Congress of the 20th April 1818 provided in sec. 2: " That if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlist or enter himself, or hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign Prince, State, colony, district, or people as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour, and shall be fined not exceeding 1000 dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding three years," etc. U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 255 superior to their own, especially in regard to privateers. They are evidently apprehensive that Russian privateers may be fitted out in the ports of the United States, to cruize against their commerce, though, in words, his Lordship expressed no such apprehension. Would it not be advisable, after the war shall have fairly commenced, for the President to issue his proclama- tion upon the proper official authorities to be vigilant in executing this law ? This could not fail to prove satisfactory to all the belligerents. The Hon. W. L. Marcy. JAMES BUCHANAN. B. THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. London, March 17, 1854. (Extract) Lord Clarendon sent for me yesterday, and, in compliance with his promise, read me the declaration which had been pre- pared for Her Majesty, specifying the course she had determined to pursue towards neutral commerce during the present war. It announces distinctly, not only that the neutral flag shall protect the cargo, except in cases of contraband, but that the goods of neutrals captured on board an enemy's vessel shall be restored to their owners. It fully adopts the principle that " free ships shall make free goods," and also secures from con- fiscation the property of a friend found on board the vessel of an enemy. The declaration on the subject of blockades, so far as I could understand it, from the reading, is entirely unexceptionable and in conformity with the doctrines which have always been maintained by the Government of the United States. Her Majesty also declared that she will issue no commissions to privateers, or letters of marque during the war. His Lordship then asked me how I was pleased with it ; and I stated my approbation of it in strong terms. I said that, in one particular, it was more liberal towards neutral commerce than I had ventured to hope, and this was in restoring the goods of a friend, though captured on the vessel of an enemy. He remarked that they had encountered great difficulties in overcoming their practice for so long a period of years, and their unvarying judicial decisions ; but that modern civilisation required a relaxation in the former severe rules, and that war should be conducted with as little injury to neutrals as was 256 The Declaration of Paris compatible with the interest and safety of belligerents. He also observed that he had repeated the conversation which he had with me on these subjects to the Cabinet Council, and this had much influence in inducing them to adopt their present liberal policy towards neutrals. He then expressed the hope that their course would prove satisfactory to the Government of the United States ; and I assured him that I had no doubt it would prove highly gratifying to them. I asked him if I were at liberty, in anticipation of the publica- tion of Her Majesty's declaration, to communicate its substance to yourself ; and he replied, certainly, I was. It had not yet undergone the last revision of the Cabinet ; but the principles stated in it had received their final approbation, and would not be changed. If our shipping interest in the United States should feel as anxious upon this subject as American owners of vessels in this country, you may deem it advisable to publish a notice of the practice which will be observed by Great Britain and France towards neutrals during the continuance of the present war ; and to this I can perceive no objection. The Hon. W. L. Marcy. JAMES BUCHANAN. C. THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN PARIS TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. Paris, March 22, 1854. (Extract) The allies, too, find themselves under the necessity of pro- viding for future contigencies of a most delicate nature, by instructions to their naval commanders, acting in concert, in respect to neutral rights pending the war. In the past history of the two countries, the principles of France on this subject have been, as you are aware, entirely at variance with those held by England. It is both delicate and difficult to produce harmony in their combined action. The deep interest of the European States, not engaged in this war, in the adoption by the allies, with their absolute naval supremacy over Russia, of measures which will give to the commerce of neutrals the most perfect security, added to the earnest desire of the allies to secure their co-operation, if to be had, and, if not, to avoid their active opposition, has given to the subject the deepest interest, and contributed to prepare the way for a fair and equitable adjustment. I have looked to this subject with deep anxiety, U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 257 and have endeavoured to guard against any possible violation of our rights as a neutral, by the measures of the belligerents, in the prosecution of the war. I have embraced every oppor- tunity, since I have been in Paris, of impressing, by informal conversation, on the Minister, and with the representatives of foreign Powers here, that if those liberal principles which the United States have always maintained were not recognized, my Government could not be satisfied ; that with her vast com- mercial marine, her enormous surplus products, her export and import trade, and her large investments in the fisheries in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, it was impossible that my country could submit to any practical exercise of the rights of war which would subject her citizens, their business, and their vessels to vexatious searches, captures, or detentions ; that except in cases of contraband, her flag must protect the cargo which it covered, and the high seas must be what the God of nature intended it a free highway for all nations. The point on which most apprehension is felt is the engagement of citizens and vessels of the United States in privateering under the Russian flag. I have urged, that, with every disposition to prevent such unlawful proceedings by our people, the Government would find much difficulty in enforcing its laws, unless sustained by public opinion in the United States, and aided by the people, as well as by officers of the Government ; that with the vast extent of seacoast of the United States, the Government could not have information of the preparation of vessels for such enterprizes, in all cases, in time to suppress them, unless the people felt an anxious desire that the laws should be executed ; that if the allies adopted just and liberal measures in regard to neutral rights, it would give profitable returns to a safe business, and the entire mercantile community of the United States would, from a sense of justice and of national duty, as well as of their own interest, be found ready to aid the Government in executing the laws ; that, tempting as might be the offers to engage under the Russian flag to cruize against the commerce of the allies, the danger of the service, the difficulty of realizing their prizes by adjudication, and, above all, the actual profit of lawful trade, under equitable and fair rules in respect to neutral rights, and the public satisfaction at seeing just principles established among nations, would probably prevent citizens, however bold and adventurous, from taking part in the assaults on the commerce of the allies. The combination of circumstances is most auspicious to the establishment of our cherished principles of neutral rights the rights of the weaker Powers against the aggressive pretensions 17 258 The Declaration of Paris of the strong ; and the considerations of policy are too grave, in their favour, to believe that so sagacious a statesman as Mr Drouyn de Lhuys will fail to see them in all their force, nor is there any doubt that he will be sustained by the Emperor. It is fortunate, too, that the present state of things will give to the British Cabinet a disposition to regard with favour the relaxation and liberalization of their ancient views on this subject. The Hon. W. L. Marcy. J. Y. MASON. D. THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. /x , . . v London, March 24, 1854. (Extract) In my last despatch, of the 17th instant, I omitted, for want of time, to refer to the conversation between Lord Clarendon and myself, on the general subject of privateering. He did not propose the conclusion of a Treaty between Great Britain and the United States for its suppression ; but he expressed a strong opinion against it, as inconsistent with modern civilization, and liable to great abuses. He spoke in highly complimentary terms of the Treaties of the United States with different nations, stipulating that if one of the parties be neutral and the other belligerent, the subjects of the neutral accepting commissions as privateers to cruize against the other from the opposing belligerent, shall be punished as pirates. These ideas were, doubtless, suggested to his mind by the apprehension felt here that Americans will, during the existing war, accept commissions from the Emperor of Russia, and that our sailors will be employed to cruize against British commerce. In short, although his Lordship did not propose a Treaty between the 2 Governments for the total suppression of privateer- ing, it was evident that this was his drift. In answer, I admitted that the practice of privateering was subject to great abuses ; but it did not seem to me possible, under existing circumstances, for the United States to agree to its suppression, unless the naval Powers would go one step further, and consent that war against private property should be abolished altogether upon the ocean as it had already been upon the land. There was nothing really different in principle or morality between the act of a regular cruizer and that of a privateer in robbing a merchant vessel upon the ocean, and confiscating the property of private individuals on board for the benefit of the captor. U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 259 But how would the suppression of privateering, without going further, operate upon the United States ? Suppose, for example, we should again unfortunately be engaged in a war with Great Britain, which I earnestly hoped might never be the case ; to what a situation must we be reduced if we should consent to abolish privateering. The navy of Great Britain was vastly superior to that of the United States in the number of vessels-of-war. They could send cruizers into every sea to capture our merchant vessels, whilst the number of our cruizers was comparatively so small as to render anything like equality in this respect impossible. The only means which we would possess to counterbalance in some degree their far greater numerical strength, would be to convert our merchant vessels, cast out of employment by the war, into privateers, and endeavour, by their assistance, to inflict as much injury on British as they would be able to inflict on American commerce. The genuine dictate of Christianity and civilization would be to abolish war against private property upon the ocean altogether, and only employ the navies of the world in public warfare against the enemy, as their armies were now employed ; and to this principle thus extended, it was highly probable the Government of the United States would not object. Here the conversation on this particular subject ended in a good-natured manner ; and I am anxious to learn whether what I have said in relation to it meets your approbation. The Hon. W. L. Marcy. JAMES BUCHANAN. E. THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN PARIS TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. Paris, March 30, 1854. (Extract) In the Moniteur of this morning appeared a report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the declaration of the Emperor of France, on the subject of neutrals, letters of marque, etc., pending the war. I enclose slips of the Moniteur containing these several important documents. I think that you will observe in them satisfactory recognition of liberal principles in regard to the rights of neutrals. The Hon. W. L. Marcy. J. Y. MASON. 260 The Declaration of Paris F. THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. London, March 31, 1854. (Extract) You will perceive that Her Majesty's declaration concerning the commerce of neutrals is substantially the same as that which I informed you it would be in my despatch of the 17th instant. It has given great satisfaction to the diplomatic repre- sentatives of neutral nations in London, and to no one more than myself. Indeed it is far more liberal than I had any reason to expect it would have been, judging from the judicial decisions and past history of the country. The Hon. W. L. Marcy. JAMES BUCHANAN. G. THE UNITED STATES CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT STOCK- HOLM TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. Stockholm, April 10, 1854. SIR, A Swedish Ordinance was published yesterday, defining the rights and obligations of such of the people as are engaged in commerce and navigation. The document is interesting as forming part of the history of the Northern neutrality. For this and other reasons I have translated it entire. 1 The marginal notes which I shall add, will enable you to refer to any clause that may chiefly interest you. You will best know what reliance may be safely placed upon the equitable promises which have been held out to neutrals by the belligerent Powers ; seemingly triumphs of the enlightened age over historic reminiscences of war. It would ill become me to offer an opinion of the realities to be looked for ; but the forebodings of the more intelligent men of the country weigh upon this community ; and, although unconfessed by Govern- ment, they are the real controlling influences in the Council of State. I have, etc., The Hon. W. L. Marcy. F. SCHROEDER. Ordinance is printed in French among the Neutral Legislation issued during the war (Document No. 14 M). U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 261 H. THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON. Washington, April 13, 1854. (Extract) The course indicated to you by Lord Clarendon as that which Great Britain had determined to pursue in the event of a European war in regard to neutral commerce is entirely satis- factory to this Government as to the 2 main points. The proposition submitted to you the same, I presume, which Mr Crampton has confidentially submitted to me are, 1st. That free ships make free goods, except articles contraband of war ; and 2nd. That neutral property, not contraband, found on board enemies' ships is not liable to confiscation. The United States have long favoured the doctrine that the neutral flag should protect the cargo, and endeavoured to have it regarded and acted on as a part of the law of nations. There is now, I believe, a fair prospect of getting this sound and salutary principle incorporated into the international code. There can be, I presume, no doubt that France cheerfully concurs with Great Britain in adopting this principle as a rule of conduct in the pending war. I have just received a despatch from Mr Mason, in which he details conferences he had with the French Ministers on the subject of neutral rights ; it does not appear from the accounts he has given of them that the French Government had intimated to him the course it intended to pursue in regard to neutral ships and neutral property on board enemy's ships. I have no doubt, however, that France has more readily acquiesced in the indicated policy than Great Britain. Both Great Britain and France, as well as Russia, feel much concerned as to the course which our citizens will take in regard to privateering. The two former Powers would at this time most readily enter into conventions, stipulating that the subjects or citizens of the party, being a neutral, who shall accept com- missions or letters of marque, and engage in the privateer ser- vice, the other party being the belligerent, may be treated as pirates. A stipulation to this effect is contained in several of our treaties, but I do not think the President would permit it to be inserted in any new one. His objection to it does not arise from a desire to have our citizens embark in foreign belligerent service, but, on the contrary, he would much regret to see them take such a course. Our laws go as far as those of any nation I think further in laying restraints upon them in regard to going into foreign privateer service. This Government is not 262 The Declaration of Paris prepared to listen to any proposition for a total suppression of privateering. It would not enter into any convention whereby it would preclude itself from resorting to the merchant marine of the country, in case it should become a belligerent party. The declaration which Her Britannic Majesty's Government proposes to issue is distinct in interdicting to neutrals the coast- ing and colonial trade with the belligerent, if not enjoyed by them previous to the war. In regard to this trade, you are aware that Great Britain asserted principles, in the wars result- ing from the French Revolution, before she issued her obnoxious Orders in Council, which this country held to be in violation of the law of nations. Should she still adhere to those principles in the coming conflict in Europe, and have occasion to apply them to our commerce, they will be seriously controverted by the United States, and may disturb our friendly relations with her and her allied belligerents. The liberal spirit she has indi- cated in respect of the cargoes under a neutral flag, and neutral property which may be found on board of enemies' ships, gives an implied assurance that she will not attempt again to assert belligerent rights which are not well sustained by the well- settled principles of international law. In some respects, I think the law of blockade is unreasonably rigorous towards neutrals, and they can fairly claim a relaxation of it. By the decisions of the English Courts of Admiralty and ours have generally followed in their footsteps a neutral vessel which happens to be in a blockaded port is not permitted to depart with a cargo, unless that cargo was on board at the time when the blockade commenced, or was first made known. Having visited the port in the common freedom of trade, a neutral vessel ought to be permitted to depart with a cargo, without regard to the time when it was received on board. The right of search has heretofore been so freely used, and so freely abused, to the injury of our commerce, that it is re- garded as an odious doctrine in this country, and, if exercised against us harshly in the approaching war, will excite deep and widespread indignation. Caution on the part of belligerents in exercising it towards us in cases where sanctioned by usage, would be a wise procedure. As the law has been declared by the decisions of Courts of Admiralty and elementary writers, it allows belligerents to search neutral vessels for articles contra- band of war, and for enemies' goods. If the doctrine is so modified as to exempt from seizure and confiscation enemies' property under a neutral flag, still the right to seize articles contraband of war, on board of neutral vessels, implies the right U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 263 to ascertain the character of the cargo. If used for such a purpose and in a proper manner, it is not probable that serious collisions would occur between neutrals and belligerents. A persistent resistance by a neutral vessel to submit to a search renders it confiscable, according to the settled determina- tion of the English Admiralty. It would be much to be regretted if any of our vessels should be condemned for this cause, unless under circumstances which compromitted their neutrality. J. Buchanan, Esq. W. L. MARCY. I. THE FRENCH MINISTER AT WASHINGTON TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. Washington, April 28, 1854. (Translation) The Undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- potentiary of France, has received orders from his Government to address the following communication to the Honourable Secretary of State. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, are about to find themselves under the necessity of resorting to force of arms in order to repel the aggressions of which the Ottoman Empire is the object, on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. Being desirous to lessen as much as possible, in behalf of commerce, the fatal consequences of a state of war, their Majesties have determined not to authorise privateering, for the present, by issuing letters of marque, and to make known, at the same time, that this determination is communicated, the principles which they intend to apply to the navigation and the commerce of neutrals during this war. It was with this view that His Majesty the Emperor of the French caused the accompanying declaration to be published ; the same being identical with that which Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has caused to be published on her side. In confining the exercise of their rights of belligerents within such narrow bounds, the Allied Governments consider them- selves justified in relying upon the sincere efforts of those Governments which shall remain neutral in this war, to cause their respective citizens and subjects to observe the obligations of strictest neutrality. Consequently, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, trusts that the Government of the United States will receive with satisfaction the announce- 264 The Declaration of Paris ment of the determination taken in common between the two Allied Governments, and that it will, by way of just reciprocity, give orders so that no privateer under the Russian flag shall be allowed to be fitted out or victualled, nor admitted with its prizes, in the ports of the United States, and in order that United States citizens may rigorously abstain from taking part in equip- ments of this kind, or in any other measure contrary to the duties of a strict neutrality. The Undersigned, etc., The Hon. W. L. Marcy. SARTIGES. [A letter was written in similar terms by Mr Crampton, British Minister to the United States, forwarding the Queen's Declaration to the Secretary of State.] J. FIRST MARCY NOTE, APRIL 28, 1854. United States of America, Department of State. The undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, has had the honor to receive the note of Mr Crampton, Her Britannic Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, of the 21st instant, accompanied by the declaration of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in regard to the rule which will for the present be observed towards those Powers with which she is at peace, in the existing war with Russia. The undersigned has submitted those communications to the President, and received his direction to express to Her Majesty's government his satisfaction that the principle that free ships make free goods, which the United States have so long and so strenuously contended for as a neutral right, and in which some of the leading Powers of Europe have concurred, is to have a qualified sanction by the practical observance of it in the present war by both Great Britain and France two of the most powerful nations of Europe. Notwithstanding the sincere gratification which Her Majesty's declaration has given to the President, it would have been en- hanced if the rule alluded to had been announced as one which would be observed not only in the present, but in every future war in which Great Britain shall be a party. The un- conditional sanction of this rule by the British and French governments, together with the practical observance of it in the present war, would cause it to be henceforth recognised throughout the civilised world as a general principle of inter- national law. This government, from its very commencement, U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 265 has labored for its recognition as a neutral right. It has incorporated it in many of its treaties with foreign powers. France, Russia, Prussia, and other nations, have, in various ways, fully concurred with the United States in regarding it as a sound and salutary principle, in all respects proper to be incorporated into the law of nations. The same consideration which has induced Her Britannic Majesty, in concurrence with the Emperor of the French, to present it as a concession in the present war, the desire " to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruc- tion," will, it is presumed, have equal weight with the belli- gerents in any future war, and satisfy them that the claims of the principal maritime Powers, while neutral, to have it recog- nised as a rule of international law, are well founded, and should be no longer contested. To settle the principle that free ships make free goods, except articles contraband of war, and to prevent it from being called again in question from any quarter or under any circumstances, the United States are desirous to unite with other Powers in a declaration that it shall be observed by each, hereafter, as a rule of international law. The exemption of the property of neutrals, not contraband, from seizure and confiscation when laden on board an enemy's vessel, is a right now generally recognised by the law of nations. The President is pleased to perceive, from the declaration of Her Britannic Majesty, that the course to be pursued by her cruisers will not bring it into question in the present war. The undersigned is directed by the President to State to Her Majesty's minister to this government that the United States, while claiming the full enjoyment of their rights as a neutral power, will observe the strictest neutrality towards each and all the belligerents. The laws of this country impose severe restrictions not only upon its own citizens, but upon all persons who may be resident within any of the territories of the United States, against equipping privateers, receiving commissions, or enlisting men therein, for the purpose of taking a part in any foreign war. It is not apprehended that there will be any attempt to violate the laws ; but should the just expectation of the President be disappointed, he will not fail in his duty to use all the power with which he is invested to enforce obedi- ence to them. Considerations of interest and the obligations of duty alike give assurance that the citizens of the United States will in no way compromit the neutrality of their country by participating in the contest in which the principal powers of Europe are now unhappily engaged. 266 The Declaration of Paris The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Mr Cramp ton the assurance of his distinguished consideration. \XT U- A -100 10*4 W. L. MARCY. Washington, April 28, 1854. John F. Crampton, Esq., etc., etc. K. MR MARCY'S NOTE TO FRANCE. 1 (Extrait du Moniteur du 23 Mai 1854.) Paris, 23 Mai 1854. Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis de PAmerique du Nord a repondu, le 28 Avril, a la communication qui lui avait 6te faite par le ministre de France de la declaration des deux grandes puissances maritimes de 1'Europe relativement aux pavilions neutres durant la guerre actuelle. Dans cette reponse, M. L. Marcy exprime, au nom du president de 1'Union, le vceu que les maximes adoptees de concert par la France et PAngleterre deviennent pour 1'avenir la regie de conduite de toutes les nations civilisees. Le secretaire d'Etat declare, en outre, que son gouvernement a la ferme volonte d'observer strictement et de faire observer de meme les devoirs de la neutralite. II rappelle que la legislation du pays interdit severement a tout citoyen ame'ricain, ainsi qu'a toute personne etablie sur le ter- ritoire de 1'Union, les e'quipements de corsaires, les commissions, les enrolements d'hommes en vue de prendre part a la guerre etrangere. M. Marcy ajoute qu'il n'est pas a craindre que quelque tentative ait lieu pour enfreindre ces lois, mais que, dans le cas ou 1'attente du gouvernement de 1'Union a ce sujet serait trompee, le President croirait devoir user du pouvoir dont il est investi pour les faire respecter. L. THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE UNITED STATES MINISTER AT ST PETERSBURGH. Washington, May 9, 1854. You have probably seen the joint declaration of Great Britain and France, referred to in the enclosed copy of a Note to Mr Crampton, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister to this Government. This declaration was communicated to me by Ministers of France and England, accompanied by a Note, to which I replied. The Note to the French Minister is substan- tially the same as that sent to Mr Crampton. 1 The text of the original Note was not available. The extract from the Moniteur is reprinted from Ortolan's Diplomatic de la Mer. U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 267 It is the settled purpose of this Government to pursue such a course, during the present war in Europe, as will give no cause to either belligerent party to complain, and it sincerely hopes neither will give this country any ground for dissatisfaction. The danger of a misunderstanding is much less with Russia than with Great Britain and France. I believe, however, these latter Powers are desirous to pursue a fair and liberal course towards neutrals, and particularly towards the United States. You will observe that there is a suggestion in the enclosed for a Convention among the principal maritime nations to unite in a declaration that free ships should make free goods, except articles contraband of war. This doctrine had heretofore the sanction of Russia, and no reluctance is apprehended on her part to becoming a party to such an arrangement. Great Britain is the only considerable Power which has heretofore made a sturdy opposition to it. Having yielded for the present in the existing war, she thereby recognises the justice and fairness of the principle and would hardly be consistent if she should with- hold her consent to an agreement to have it hereafter regarded as a rule of international law. I have thrown out the suggestion to Great Britain and France to adopt this as a rule to be observed in all future wars. The President may instruct me to make the direct proposition to these and other Powers. Should Russia, Great Britain, and France concur with the United States in declaring this to be the doctrine of the law of nations, I do not doubt that the other nations of the world would at once give their consent and conform their practice to it. If a fair oppor- tunity should occur, the President requests you to ascertain the views of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia on the subject. The decisions of Admiralty Courts in this and other countries have frequently affirmed the doctrine that a belligerent may seize and confiscate enemy's property found on board of a neutral vessel ; the general consent of nations, therefore, is necessary to change it. This seems to be a most favourable time for such a salutary change. From the earliest period of this Government, it has made strenuous efforts to have the rule that free ships make free goods, except contraband articles, adopted as a prin- ciple of international law ; but Great Britain insisted on a dif- ferent rule. These efforts, consequently, proved unavailing ; and now it cannot be recognised, and a strict observance of it secured, without a conventional regulation among the maritime Powers. This Government is desirous to have all nations agree in a declaration that this rule shall hereafter be observed by them respectively, when they shall happen to be involved in any war, and that, as neutrals, they will insist upon it as a 268 The Declaration of Paris neutral right. In this the United States are confident that they will have the cordial consent and co-operation of Russia. I am, etc., T. H. Seymour, Esq. W. L. MAECY. Proclamations and Orders in Council, MARCH-APRIL 1854. (I) FEBRUARY 18. PROCLAMATION PROHIBITING EXPORT OF ARMS, STORES, ETC. BY THE QUEEN A PROCLAMATION. VICTORIA R. Whereas by the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, Section 150, certain Goods may, by Proclamation or Order of Her Majesty in Council, be prohibited either to be exported or carried Coastwise : And whereas We, by and with the Advice of Our Privy Council, deem it expedient and necessary to prohibit the Goods herein-after mentioned either to be exported or carried Coastwise : We, by and with the Advice aforesaid, do hereby Order and Direct, that from and after the Date hereof, all Arms, Ammunition and Gunpowder, Military and Naval Stores, and the following Articles, being Articles which We have judged capable of being converted into, or made useful in increasing the Quantity of, Military or Naval Stores, that is to say, Marine Engines, Screw Propellers, Paddle Wheels, Cylinders, Cranks, Shafts, Boilers, Tubes for Boilers, Boiler Plates, Fire Bars, and every Article, or any other component Part of an Engine or Boiler, or any Article whatsoever, which is, can or may become applicable for the Manufacture of Marine Machinery, shall be and the same are hereby prohibited either to be exported from the United Kingdom or carried Coastwise. Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Eighteenth Day of February, in the Year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, and in the Seventeenth Year of Our Reign. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN. Proclamations and Orders in Council 269 (2) MARCH 9. PROCLAMATION AGAINST FITTING OUT OR EQUIPPING VESSELS FOR WARLIKE PURPOSES. BY THE QUEEN A PROCLAMATION. VICTORIA R. Whereas by an Act of Parliament passed in the Fifty-ninth Year of the Reign of His late Majesty King George the Third, entitled " An Act to prevent the enlisting or Engagement of His Majesty's Subjects to serve in Foreign Service, and the fitting out or equipping in His Majesty's Dominions Vessels for Warlike Purposes, without His Majesty's Licence," it is amongst other things enacted [recital of s. 7 of Foreign Enlistment Act, 1819, 59 G. III. c. 69]. And whereas it has been represented to Us that Ships and Vessels are being built in several Places within the United Kingdom, and are being equipped, furnished, and fitted out especially with Steam Machinery, with Intent that they shall be employed as aforesaid, without Our Royal Leave or Licence for that Purpose first had or obtained or signified as aforesaid ; We have therefore thought fit, by and with the Advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclama- tion, warning all Our Subjects against taking part in such Proceedings, which We are determined to prevent and repress, and which cannot fail to bring upon the Parties engaged in them the Punishments which attend the Violation of the Laws. Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Ninth Day of March in the Year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, and in the Seventeenth Year of Our Reign. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN. On the 28th March Her Majesty issued a Declaration of the causes of war ; and on the same date her Declaration with reference to neutrals and letters of marque [No. 5, A]. On the 29th March, by an Order in Council, general reprisals were granted against Russia. (3) MARCH 29. EMBARGO ON RUSSIAN VESSELS. AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, the 29th Day of March 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. It is this Day ordered by Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, that no Ships or Vessels belonging to any 270 The Declaration of Paris of Her Majesty's Subjects be permitted to enter and clear out for any of the Ports of Russia, until further Order ; and Her Majesty is further pleased to order, that a general Embargo or Stop be made of all Russian Ships and Vessels whatsoever, now within or which shall hereafter come into any of the Ports, Harbours, or Roads within any of Her Majesty's Dominions, together with all Persons and Effects on board the said Ships or Vessels : Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any Ships or Vessels specified or comprised in a certain Order of Her Majesty in Council, dated this Twenty- ninth Day of March, for exempting from Capture or Detention Russian Vessels under special Circumstances ; and Her Majesty is pleased further to order, and it is hereby ordered, that the utmost Care be taken for the Preservation of all and every Part of the Cargoes on board any of the said Ships or Vessels, so that no Damage or Embezzlement whatever be sustained. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Ad- miralty, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports are to give the necessary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. C. C. GREVILLE. (4) MARCH 29. EXEMPTING CERTAIN RUSSIAN VESSELS FROM CAPTURE. AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, the 29th Day of March 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. Her Majesty, being compelled to declare War against His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and being desirous to lessen as much as possible the Evils thereof, is pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that Russian Merchant Vessels, in any Ports or Places within Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be allowed until the Tenth Day of May next, Six Weeks from the Date hereof, for loading their Cargoes and departing from such Ports or Places ; and that such Russian Merchant Vessels, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to con- tinue their Voyage, if on Examination of their Papers it shall appear that their Cargoes were taken on board before the Ex- piration of the above Term : Provided, that nothing herein Proclamations and Orders in Council 271 contained shall extend or be taken to extend to Russian Vessels having on board any Officer in the Military or Naval Service of the Enemy, or any Article prohibited or contraband of War, or any Despatch of or to the Russian Government. And it is hereby further ordered by Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council as aforesaid, that any Russian Merchant Vessel which, prior to the Date of this Order, shall have sailed from any Foreign Port bound for any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be permitted to enter such Port or Place and to discharge her Cargo, and afterwards forth- with to depart without Molestation, and that any such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to continue her Voyage to any Port not blockaded. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, are to give the neces- sary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. C. C. GREVILLE. (5) APRIL 7. EXTENDING ORDER No. 4 TO INDIA AND THE COLONIES. AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, the 7th Day of April 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. Her Majesty being compelled to declare War against His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and being desirous to lessen as much as possible the Evils thereof, is pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that Russian Merchant Vessels which, at the Time of the Publication of this Order, shall be in any Ports or Places in Her Majesty's Indian Territories under the Govern- ment of the East India Company, or within any of Her Majesty's Foreign or Colonial Possessions, shall be allowed Thirty Days from the Time of the Publication of this Order in such Indian Territories, or Foreign or Colonial Possession, for loading their Cargoes and departing from such Ports or Places ; and that such Russian Merchant Vessels, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to continue their Voyage if, on Examina- tion of their Papers, it shall appear that their Cargoes were taken on board before the Expiration of the above Term ; pro- vided that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be taken 272 The Declaration of Paris to extend, to Russian Vessels having on board any Officer in the Military or Naval Service of the Enemy, or any Article pro- hibited or contraband of War, or any Despatch of or to the Russian Government. And it is hereby further ordered by Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council as aforesaid, that any Russian Merchant Vessel which, prior to the Twenty-ninth Day of March now last past, shall have sailed from any Foreign Port, bound for any Port or Place in any of Her Majesty's Indian Territories, or Foreign or Colonial Possessions, shall be permitted to enter such Port or Place, and to discharge her Cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without Molestation ; and that any such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to continue her Voyage to any Port not blockaded. -*1 And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, the Right Honourable the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, and all Governors, Officers, and Authorities whom it may concern, in Her Majesty's East Indian, Foreign, and Colonial Possessions, are to give the necessary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. C. C. GREVILLE. (6) APRIL 7. EMBARGO ON RUSSIAN VESSELS IN CHANNEL ISLANDS AND ISLE OF MAN. AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, the 7th Day of April 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. It is this Day ordered by Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, that no Ships or Vessels belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects be permitted to enter and clear out for any of the Ports of Russia until further Order ; and Her Majesty is further pleased to order, that a general Embargo or Stop be made of all Russian Ships and Vessels whatsoever now within or which shall hereafter come into any of the Ports, Harbours, or Roads, within Her Majesty's Islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and the Isle of Man, together with all Persons and Effects on board the said Ships or Vessels : Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend Proclamations and Orders in Council 273 to any Ships or Vessels specified or comprised in a certain Order of Her Majesty in Council, dated the Twenty-ninth Day of March last, for exempting from Capture or Detention Russian Vessels under special Circumstances ; and Her Majesty is pleased further to order, and it is hereby ordered, that the utmost Care be taken for the Preservation of all and every Part of the Cargoes on board any of the said Ships or Vessels, so that no Damage or Embezzlement whatever be sustained. And the Lieutenant-Governors of Her Majesty's Islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and of the Isle of Man, for the Time being, are to give the necessary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain, and to return an Account of their Proceedings to this Board. C. C. GREVILLE. (7) APRIL 11. PERMITTING EXPORT OF CERTAIN PROHIBITED ARTICLES. AT THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, WHITEHALL, the llth Day of April 1854. BY THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. The Lords of the Council having taken into consideration cer- tain Applications for Leave to export Arms, Ammunition, Military and Naval Stores, &c., being Articles of which the Exportation is prohibited by Her Majesty's Proclamation of February 18th, 1854 : their Lordships are pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that Permission should be granted by the Lords Com- missioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to export the Articles so prohibited, to be carried Coastwise to Ports in the United King- dom, and likewise to all Places in North and South America, except the Russian Possessions in North America ; to the Coast of Africa, West of the Straits of Gibraltar, and round the South and East Coast of Africa ; to the whole Coast of Asia not within the Mediterranean Sea or the Persian Gulf, and not being Part of the Russian Territories ; to the whole of Australia, and to all British Colonies within the Limits aforesaid, upon taking a Bond from the Persons exporting such prohibited Articles that they shall be landed and entered at the Port of Destination ; and that all further Permission to export such Articles to other Parts of the World be only granted upon Application to the Lords of the Council at this Board. C. C. GREVILLE. 18 274 The Declaration of Paris (8) APRIL 15. IN FURTHERANCE OF THE DECLARATION TO THE NEUTRALS. [No. 5 A.] AT THE COURT AT WINDSOR, the 15th Day of April 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. Whereas Her Majesty was graciously pleased, on the Twenty- eighth Day of March last, to issue Her Royal Declaration in the following Terms : Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having been compelled to take up Arms in support of an Ally, is desirous of rendering the War as little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom she remains at Peace. To preserve the Commerce of Neutrals from all un- necessary Obstruction, Her Majesty is willing, for the Present, to waive a Part of the Belligerent Rights apper- taining to Her by the Law of Nations. It is impossible for Her Majesty to forego the Exercise of Her Right of seizing Articles Contraband of War, and of preventing Neutrals from bearing the Enemy's Despatches, and She must maintain the Right of a Belligerent to prevent Neutrals from breaking any effective Blockade which may be established with an adequate Force against the Enemy's Forts, Harbours, or Coasts. But Her Majesty will waive the Right of seizing Enemy's property laden on board a neutral Vessel unless it be Con- traband of War. It is not Her Majesty's Intention to claim the Confisca- tion of neutral Property, not being Contraband of War, found on board Enemy's Ships ; and Her Majesty further declares, that being anxious to lessen as much as possible the Evils of War, and to restrict its Operations to the regularly organised Forces of the Country, it is not Her present Intention to issue Letters of Marque for the com- missioning of Privateers. Now it is this Day ordered, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, that all Vessels under a neutral or friendly Flag, being neutral or friendly Property, shall be permitted to import into any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions all Goods and Merchandise whatsoever, to whomsoever the same may belong ; and to export from any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions to any Port not blockaded any Cargo or Goods, Proclamations and Orders in Council 275 not being Contraband of War, or not requiring a special Per- mission, to whomsoever the same may belong. And Her Majesty is further pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby further ordered, that, save and except only as aforesaid, all the Subjects of Her Majesty and the Subjects or Citizens of any neutral or friendly State shall and may, during and notwithstanding the present Hostilities with Russia, freely trade with all Ports and Places wheresoever situate which shall not be in a State of Blockade, save and except that no British Vessel shall under any Circum- stances whatsoever, either under or by virtue of this Order or otherwise, be permitted or empowered to enter or communicate with any Port or Place which shall belong to or be in the Possession or Occupation of Her Majesty's Enemies. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, and Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, are to give the necessary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. C. C. GREVILLE. (9) APRIL 15. EXTENDING ORDER NO. 4 TO THE 16TH MAY. AT THE COURT AT WINDSOR, the 15th Day of April 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. Whereas by an Order of Her Majesty in Council of the Twenty- ninth of March last, it was amongst other things ordered, " that any Russian Merchant Vessel which prior to the Date of this Order shall have sailed from any Foreign Port, bound for any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be permitted to enter such Port or Place and to discharge her Cargo, and after- wards forthwith to depart without Molestation, and that any such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to continue her Voyage to any Port not blockaded " : And whereas Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her said Council, is now pleased to alter and extend such Part of the said Order : It is hereby ordered, by and with such Advice as aforesaid, as follows ; that is to say, That any Russian Mer- chant Vessel which, prior to the Fifteenth Day of May One 276 The Declaration of Paris thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, shall have sailed from any Port of Russia, situated either in or upon the Shores or Coasts of the Baltic Sea or of the White Sea, bound for any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be permitted to enter such last-mentioned Port or Place, and to discharge her Cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without Molesta- tion ; and that any such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to continue her Voyage to any Port not blockaded. And Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the Advice afore- said, further to order, and it is hereby further ordered, that in all other respects Her Majesty's aforesaid Order in Council, of the Twenty-ninth Day of March last, shall be and remain in full Force, Effect, and Operation. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, are to give the neces- sary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. C. C. GREVILLE. (10) APRIL 15. PROHIBITING EXPORT OF ARMS FROM MALTA AND GIBRALTAR. AT THE COURT AT WINDSOR, the 15th Day of April 1854. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. Whereas it has appeared expedient and necessary to Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, by reason of the Hostilities now subsisting between Herself and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, to prohibit the Goods herein-after mentioned to be exported from the Island of Malta and its Dependencies, except as herein-after provided : Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council aforesaid, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from and after the Publication of this Order in the said Island, all Arms, Ammunition, and Gunpowder, Military and Naval Stores, and the following Articles, being Articles deemed capable of being converted into or made useful in increasing the Quantity of Military or Naval Stores ; that is to say, Marine Engines, Screw Propellers, Paddle Wheels, Cylinders, Cranks, Shafts, Boilers, Tubes for Boilers, Boiler Plates, Fire-bars, and every Article, Proclamations and Orders in Council 277 or any other component Part of an Engine or Boiler, or any Article whatsoever which is, can, or may become applicable for the Manufacture of Marine Machinery, shall be and the same are hereby prohibited to be exported from the said Island of Malta and its Dependencies, except with the Licence of the Governor or other Officer administering the Government thereof for that Purpose first had and obtained. And the Most Noble the Duke of Newcastle, One of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary Directions herein accordingly. C. C. GREVILLE. An Order similar to the above was also issued prohibiting the Exportation of Arms, &c., from the " Town and Garrison of Gibraltar." (II) LIMITING PROCLAMATION OF 18TH FEBRUARY [NO. (1)] TO CERTAIN ARTICLES. AT THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, WHITEHALL, the 24th Day of April 1854. BY THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. The Lords of the Council, having taken into consideration certain Applications for Leave to export various Articles of which the Exportation is prohibited by Her Majesty's Pro- clamation of the 18th February 1854, are pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that the Officers of Her Majesty's Customs do not hereafter prevent the Export of any Articles, except only Gunpowder, Saltpetre, and Brimstone ; Arms and Ammunition ; Marine Engines and Boilers, and the component Parts thereof. And that such last-named Articles be prohibited from Export only when destined to any Place in Europe North of Dunkirk or to any Place in the Mediterranean Sea East of Malta ; and that the Officers of Her Majesty's Customs do permit the Export of the said enumerated Articles to any other Part of the World, upon taking, from the Persons exporting the same, a Bond that they shall be landed and entered at the Port of Destination. Whereof the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, 278 The Declaration of Paris and Officers of Her Majesty's Customs, and all other Persons whom it may concern, are to take Notice, and govern them- selves accordingly. C. C. GREVILLE. (12) November 30, 1854. Prohibiting the export of lead, nitrate of soda, blue lias, Portland cement, and any article used in the manufacture of marine cement. (13) January 2, 1855. Rescinding the Order of Nov. 30 pro- hibiting the export of blue lias, Portland cement, and any article used in marine cement. (14) August 7, 1855. Prohibiting the export of sulphate of potash, muriate of potash. (15) August 7, 1855. Prohibiting the export of rivet iron, angle iron, round bars, rivets, strips of iron, sheet plate iron, low moor plates. (16) August 28, 1855. Granting leave to export certain articles, hitherto prohibited, to places east of Malta, with the exception of gunpowder, saltpetre, brimstone, nitrate of soda, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash, arms and ammunition of every kind, including lead. (17) August 30, 1855. Amending in certain details Order No. 15 relative to the export of iron. (18) August 30, 1855. [Probably in lieu of No. 15 as amended.] Prohibiting the export of rivet iron, angle iron, rivets, strips of iron, low moor and bowling plates, sheet plate iron exceeding J inch, round bars of from f- to f -inch diameter. (19) September 20, 1855. Rescinding Order No. 16, with the exception of gunpowder, saltpetre, brimstone, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash, arms and ammunition. (20) September 20, 1855. Prohibiting the export of chlorate of potash. (21) November 1, 1855. Prohibiting the export, to all foreign countries except British possessions, of saltpetre, nitrate of soda, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash, chlorate of potash. (22) December 27, 1855. Prohibiting the export to Her Majesty's colonies and plantations in North America, including the West Indian Islands and all foreign countries, of saltpetre, nitrate of soda, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash. Proclamations and Orders in Council 279 (23) December 28, 1855. Rescinding the prohibition to export chlorate of potash. (24) April 9, 1856. Revoking Order No. 3. (25) April 9, 1856. Revoking Order No. 6. (26) April 9, 1856. Taking off all prohibitions on the exporta- tion of arms, ammunition, etc. (27 and 28) April 9, 1856. Revoking Order No. 10 (Malta and Gibraltar). (29) FEBRUARY 8, 1855. PROCLAMATION DECLARING AS TRAITORS ALL BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO SHALL ASSIST HER MAJESTY'S ENEMIES. BY THE QUEEN A PROCLAMATION. VICTORIA R. Whereas information has been received that certain acts of a highly treasonable nature have been, or are about to be, done or attempted by certain British subjects adhering to the Queen's enemies, either within Her Majesty's dominions, or in parts beyond the seas ; such as building, or aiding and assist- ing in building, or equipping, ships of war, providing stores, or tackling, arms, and ammunition, for such ships, or manufactur- ing or fitting, or aiding, or assisting in manufacturing or fitting, steam machinery, either for such ships or for other warlike purposes ; or by entering into contracts, engagements, or agree- ments for some of the aforesaid purposes, or otherwise adhering to, aiding, assisting, or abetting, the Queen's enemies in parts beyond the seas, in levying or carrying on war against Her Majesty : now, Her Majesty, by this Her Royal Proclamation, doth warn all such persons engaging in any such treasonable designs or attempts as aforesaid, or otherwise adhering to, assisting, aiding, or abetting the Queen's enemies, that they will be liable to be apprehended and dealt with as traitors, and will be proceeded against with the utmost rigour of the law. Given at our Court at Windsor, this eighth day of February, in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and in the eighteenth year of our reign. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN. (30) April 28, 1856. Proclamation of peace. 280 The Declaration of Paris 10 Instructions to the Fleets. A. ENGLISH. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMMANDERS OF H.M.'S SHIPS AND VESSELS OF WAR AS TO THE DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED VESSELS. I. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall send all Ships, Vessels, and Goods which they shall seize and take, into such Port within Her Majesty's Dominions as shall be most convenient for them, in order to have the same legally adjudged in the High Court of Admiralty of England, or in some other Admiralty Court lawfully authorised to take cognizance of matters of Prize. II. After such Ships, Vessels, and Goods (save as to Ships of War) shall have been taken into any such Port, the Captor or one of his Chief Officers or some other person present at the capture, shall bring or send as soon as possibly may be, three or four of the principal persons belonging to the captured Ship or Vessel (two of whom shall always if possible be either the Master, Supercargo, Mate or Boatswain) before the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty of England, his Surrogate or the Judge of some other Admiralty Court within the British Dominions lawfully authorised, or others commissioned for that purpose as aforesaid, all such Books, Papers, Passes, Sea Briefs, Charter Parties, Bills of Lading, Cockets, Letters, and other Documents and Writings whatsoever as shall be delivered up, or found on board any such Ship or Vessel ; and the Captor or one of his Chief Officers or some other person who was present at the capture, and saw the said Papers and Writings delivered up, or otherwise found on board at the time of the Capture, shall make Oath that the said Papers and Writings are brought and delivered in as they were received and taken without any Fraud, Addition, Subduction, Alteration or Embezzlement what- ever, or otherwise shall account for the same upon Oath to the satisfaction of the Court. III. All Ships, Vessels, Goods, Wares, Merchandises and other Effects (save as to Ships of War) so captured as aforesaid shall immediately upon being brought into Port, be delivered over into the custody of the Marshall or other duly qualified Officer of the High Court of Admiralty of England, or other Court of Instructions to the Fleets 281 Admiralty commissioned as aforesaid, or in the absence of any such Officer into the custody of the Collector, Comptroller, or other principal Officer of the Customs or Navigation Laws, and such Ships, Vessels, Goods, Wares, Merchandise and Effects shall be kept and preserved, and no part thereof shall be sold, spoiled, wasted or diminished, and the bulk thereof shall not be broken (save only in case of urgent necessity or by Decree of the Court,) until final judgement shall have been given in the said Court of Admiralty touching and concerning the same. IV. If any Ships or Vessels belonging to Her Majesty or Her Subjects or to any of Her Allies or their Subjects shall be found in distress by being in Flight, set upon, or Captured by the Enemy, or by reason of any other Accident, the Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall use their best endeavours and give aid and succour, and to the utmost of their power labour to recapture and free the same from the Enemy or such other distress. V. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall not ransom or agree to ransom or quit or set at liberty any Ship or Vessel, Goods or Wares, Merchandises, or other Effects belonging to the Enemy, which shall have been seized and taken by them, save only in case of urgent necessity. VI. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall carry all persons taken on board of any captured Men of War or other Ships or Vessels to Ports at which there are or shall be established Depots for the reception of Prisoners of War, and shall there deliver them over to such persons as shall be duly authorised to receive and take charge of them ; and no such Commander or other Officer shall presume, upon any pretence whatever, to land, release, or deliver over any such persons at any other place to any other person or in any other manner than as aforesaid. VII. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall not until further orders capture, detain or molest any Ship or Vessel belonging to any subject or citizen of any State in amity with Her Majesty solely by reason of Enemy's Goods being laden on board her, nor shall they, until further orders, capture, detain or molest any Goods, Wares, Merchandises, and Effects laden on board the same solely by reason of their belong- ing to the Enemy. VIII. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall seize, detain, and Capture all Ships and Vessels laden wholly or in part with Arms, Ammunition, Naval or Military Stores, Officers, Troops, Seamen, and Despatches, or any other Contraband of War, which is destined for the use 282 The Declaration of Paris of the Enemy, and shall send such Ships or Vessels, and con- traband (except as hereinafter mentioned) into some Port within Her Majesty's Dominions for adjudication before the High Court of Admiralty of England, or some other Court of Admiralty duly authorised to take cognizance thereof; pro- vided, that if any such Ships, Vessels, or Contraband be owned by the Subjects of France, the same shall be taken into some Port of France for adjudication. IX. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall seize all Ships and Vessels and the Goods, Mer- chandise, and Effects laden therein to whomseover belonging, that shall be found attempting to Violate any Blockade of the Ports, Harbours, or Coasts of the Enemy, and shall send them (except as hereinafter excepted) into some Port within Her Majesty's Dominions for adjudication before the High Court of Admiralty duly commissioned to take cognizance thereof ; pro- vided, that if such Ships or Vessels be owned by Subjects of France the same shall be taken into some Port of France for adjudication. X. In case Her Majesty shall declare any Ports, Harbours, or coasts to be in a state of Blockade, the Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War are hereby enjoined to stop all Neutral Vessels, which they shall meet at Sea, destined to the said Ports, Harbours, or coasts, and if they shall appear to be ignorant of the existence of the said Blockade, and have no Contraband of War on board, they shall turn them away, apprising them that the said Ports, Harbours, or Coasts are in a state of Blockade, and shall write a Notice to that effect upon one or more of the Principal Ship's Papers ; and if any neutral Ship or Vessel, which shall appear to have been so warned, or to have been otherwise informed of the existence of the Blockade, or to have sailed from her last Port after it may reasonably be supposed that notification of the Blockade had been made public there, shall yet be found attempting or intending to violate such Blockade, such Vessel shall be seized, and sent into some Port within Her Majesty's Dominions, for legal adjudi- cation before the High Court of Admiralty of England, or some other Court duly authorised to take cognizance thereof; pro- vided, that if such Ship or Vessel be owned by Subjects of France, the same shall be taken into some Port of France for adjudica- tion. And if any neutral Ship or Vessel be found coming out of any blockaded Port which she shall previously have entered in violation of such Blockade, or if she shall have any Goods or Merchandise on board laden after knowledge of the Blockade, such Ships or Vessel, and the Goods, Wares, Merchandises, and Instructions to the Fleets 283 other Effects on board the same shall in like manner be seized and sent in for adjudication ; provided that, if such Ship or Vessel be owned by the Subjects of France, she shall be taken into some Port of France for adjudication. But any neutral Ship or Vessel coming out of any such blockaded Port, in ballast, or having only Goods or Merchandise on board laden before the knowledge of the Blockade, shall be suffered to pass except there be other grounds for detaining her, and a Notice and Warning shall be written upon one or more of the Principal Ship's Papers prohibiting such Vessel from again attempting to enter such Port during the existence of the blockade. B. FRENCH. INSTRUCTIONS ADRESS^ES PAR SON EXCELLENCE LE MIN- ISTRE SECRETAIRE D'fiTAT AU DfiPARTEMENT DE LA MARINE ET DES COLONIES A MM. LES OFFICIERS GfiNfiR- AUX, SUPfiRIEURS ET AUTRES, COMMANDANT LES ES- CADRES ET LES BATIMENTS DE SA MAJESTfi IMPfiRIALE. Paris, le 31 Mars 1854. MESSIEURS, Par une circulaire en date du 28 de ce mois, je vous ai fait connaitre que la Russie s'etait constitute vis-a-vis de la France et de 1'Angleterre dans un etat de guerre dont la responsabilit6 lui appartient tout entiere [No. 3 (F. 2)]. Vous trouverez ci-jointe la declaration faite a ce sujet au S6nat et au Corps legislatif par ordre de 1'Empereur. Je vous notifie aujourd'hui les intentions de Sa Majeste relativement aux devoirs nouveaux qui en decoulent pour vous, independamment du concours que vous aurez a preter aux operations militaires proprement dites, suivant les instructions speciales que je vous adresserai ou qui vous parviendront a ce sujet par la voie hierarchique. Voici done la ligne de conduite que vous aurez a tenir par suite de cette declaration : 1. Des ce moment vous etes requis de courir sus a tous les batimerits de guerre de Sa Majest6 1'empereur de Russie ou a tous corsaires armes sous son pavilion, et a vous en emparer par la force des armes ; vous aurez egalement a courir sus et a capturer tous les bailments de commerce russes, ainsi que leurs cargaisons, que vous rencontrerez en mer ou dans les ports et rades de 1'ennemi, sous les exceptions suivantes : Un delai de six semaines, qui court du 27 de ce mois au 9 mai prochain inclusivement, ayant etc accord^ aux batiments de 284 The Declaration of Paris commerce russes pour sortir des ports francais, soit qu'ils s'y trouvent en ce moment ou qu'ils y entrent ulterieurement, vous n'arreterez aucun de ces batiments pendant ledit delai, et vous laisserez egalement continuer leur navigation a ceux de ces batiments qui etabliraient par leurs papiers de bord qu'etant partis dans les limites du delai accorde, ils se rendent directe- ment a leur port de destination et qu'ils n'ont pu encore y parvenir. Les memes exceptions s'appliqueront aux navires russes sortis des ports de PAngleterre ou qui seraient destines pour ces ports. 2. Vous n'apporterez aucun obstacle a la peche cotiere, meme sur les cotes de 1'ennemi ; mais vous veillerez a ce que cette faveur, dictee par un interet d'humanite 1 , n'entraine aucun abus prejudiciable aux operations militaires et maritimes. Si vous etes employes dans les eaux de la mer Blanche, vous laisserez aussi subsister sans interruption, et sauf repression en cas d'abus, l'6change de poisson frais, de vivres, d'ustensiles et d'agres de peche qui se fait habituellement entre les paysans des cdtes russes de la province d' Archangel et les pecheurs des cdtes du Finnmarken norvegien. 3. Vous n'arreterez pas non plus les batiments russes pourvus d'un sauf-conduit ou licence, soit du gouvernement imperial, soit du gouvernement britannique, ou, enfin, du gouvernement ottoman. Vous trouverez ci- joint un modele de la forme adoptee pour les licences ou sauf-conduits fran9ais. Je vous communiquerai ulterieurement un modele des actes analogues des gouvernements anglais et ottoman. Vous vous assurerez que les actes qui vous seront presentes sont sinceres et que las conditions en ont etc rigoureusement observees ; en cas de soupons sur leur sincerite ou d'inexe- cution de leurs conditions, vous etes autorises a saisir le batiment qui en serait porteur. 4. Vous vous abstiendrez d'exercer aucun acte d'hostilit dans les ports ou dans les eaux territoriales des puissances neutres, et vous considererez les eaux territoriales comme attendant a une portee de canon au dela de la laisse de basse mer ; vous vous abstiendrez egalement de toute capture ou poursuite hostile dans les ports et eaux territoriales des puis- sances alliees, a moins que vous n'en soyez requis ou que vous n'y soyez autorises par Pofficier de la puissance territoriale charge du commandement le plus voisin. 5. L'6tat de guerre interrompant les relations de commerce entre les sujets des puissances belligerantes, vous aurez a arreter non seulement les batiments marchands nationaux, mais encore les batiments marchands des puissances alliees, qui, sans une Instructions to the Fleets 285 permission ou licence speciale, tenteraient d'enfreindre cette interdiction, ou qui, plus coupables encore, chercheraient a violer un blocus ou s'engageraient dans un transport de troupes, de depeches ofncielles ou de contrebande de guerre pour le compte ou a destination de rennemi. 6. Les neutres 6tant autorises par le droit des gens a continuer librement leur commerce avec les puissances belligerantes, vous n'arreterez les batiments neutres que dans les cas suivants : 1 S'ils tentaient de violer un blocus ; 2 S'ils transportaient, pour le compte ou a destination de 1'ennemi, des objets de contrebande de guerre, des depeches officielles ou des troupes de terre ou de mer. Dans ces divers cas, le batiment et la cargaison sont confiscables, sauf lorsque la contrebande de guerre ne forme pas les trois quarts du chargement, auquel cas les objets de contrebande sont seuls sujets a confiscation. 7. Tout blocus, pour etre respecte, devra etre effectif, c'est- a-dire maintenu par des forces suffisantes pour qu'il y ait danger imminent de pen^trer dans les ports investis. La violation du blocus resulte aussi bien de la tentative de penetrer dans le lieu bloque que de la tentative d'en sortir apres la declara- tion du blocus, a moins, dans ce dernier cas, que ce ne soit sur lest ou avec un chargement pris avant le blocus ou dans le delai fixe par le commandant du blocus, delai qui devra tou jours etre suffisant pour proteger la navigation et le commerce de bonne foi. Un blocus n'est d'ailleurs cense 1 connu d'un batiment qui se dirige vers un port bloque qu'apres que la notification speciale en a etc inscrite sur ses registres ou papiers de bord par 1'un des batiments de guerre formant le blocus ; et c'est une formalite* que vous ne devrez point negliger de faire remplir toutes les fois que vous serez engages dans une operation de ce genre. 8. La contrebande de guerre se compose des objets suivants, lorsqu'ils sont destines a 1'ennemi, savoir : Bouches et armes a feu, armes blanches, projectiles, poudre, salpetre, soufre, objets d'equipement, de campement et de harnachement militaires, et tous instruments quelconques fabriques a 1'usage de la guerre. 9. Sauf la verification relative au commerce illicite dont je vous ai indique le caractere, vous n'avez point a examiner la propriete du chargement des navires neutres : le pavilion couvre la marchandise, et des lors la propriety ennemie chargee a bord n'est point confiscable ; toutefois, je crois devoir vous informer que, par une faveur speciale que Sa Majeste a entendu.conceder aux neutres dans le cours de cette guerre, d'accord avec Sa Majeste la reine, son auguste alliee, les proprits des sujets 286 The Declaration of Paris allies ou neutres trouvees & bord des navires ennemis seront exemptes de confiscation. 10. Pour 1'application de ces principes, la nationalite des maisons de commerce doit se determiner d'apres le lieu ou elles sont etablies ; mais la nationalite des batiments ne derive pas seulement de celle de leurs proprietaires, mais encore de leur droit legitime au pavilion qui les couvre. 11. En cas de detresse d'un batiment national ou allie ou en cas de capture par Pennemi, vous devrez lui porter toute aide et assistance ou vous efforcer d'en operer la recousse : 1'intention de Sa Majeste est que ce sauvetage ou cette recousse ne donne lieu a aucun droit sur le batiment secouru ou recous. Dans le cas ou vous reprendriez sur 1'ennemi un batiment neutre, vous etes autorises a considerer ce batiment comme ennemi s'il est reste plus de vingt-quatre heures en la possession de 1'ennemi, a moins de circonstances exceptionnelles dont Sa Majeste se reserve 1'appreciation. Si le batiment n'est pas reste pendant vingt-quatre heures au pouvoir de 1'ennemi, vous le relacherez purement et simplement. 12. Si vous rencontrez un corsaire sous pavilion russe, vous le saisirez et le traiterez comme tout autre batiment marchand ennemi ; mais Sa Majeste ayant, d'accord avec ses augustes allies, renonce quant a present a la delivrance de lettres de marque, est en droit d'attendre que l'armement et la conduite des corsaires ennemis soient renfermes strictement dans les limites les plus restreintes du droit des gens, et vous aurez a verifier avec rigueur s'ils ne rentrent pas dans 1'un des cas prevus par la loi du 10 avril 1825 sur la piraterie, dont vous trouverez ci- joint un extrait, afin que vous puissiez, le cas echeant, en faire 1'application. 13. Pour remplir les devoirs resultant des indications qui precedent, vous" aurez a exercer le droit de visite. Bien que ce droit soit illimite en temps de guerre quant aux par ages, je vous recommande cependant expressement de ne Pexercer que dans les parages et dans les circonstances ou vous auriez des motifs fondes de supposer qu'il peut amener la saisie du bati- ment visit6. Quant a la forme, vous vous tiendrez, autant que possible, hors de la portee de canon. Vous enverrez a bord un canot dont 1'ofncier montera sur le navire a visiter, accompagne de deux ou trois hommes seulement, et se bornera a verifier, d'apres les papiers de bord, la nationalite ainsi que la nature du bati- ment et du chargement, et a reconnaitre si le batiment est engage" dans un commerce illicite. L'examen des papiers de bord est d'autaut plus important Instructions to the Fleets 287 que, d'apres notre legislation, ces papiers peuvent seuls servir au jugement ulterieur sur la validite" ou I'lnvalidite" de la prise. 14. Vous ne visiterez point les batiments qui se trouveront sous le convoi d'un navire de guerre allie" ou neutre, et vous vous bornerez a re'clamer du commandant du convoi une liste des batiments place's sous sa protection avec la declaration e"crite qu'ils n'appartiennent pas a Pennemi et ne sont engages dans aucun commerce illicite. Si cependant vous aviez lieu de soup9onner que la religion du commandant du convoi a 6t6 surprise, vous communiqueriez vos soup9ons a cet officier, qui procederait seul a la visite des batiments suspected. 15. Si la visite ne determine pas la saisie du batiment, Pofficier qui en aura etc charge" devra seulement la constater sur les papiers du bord ; si au contraire elle determine la saisie, 1 'officier visiteur devra : 1 S'emparer de tous les papiers de bord ; 2 Dresser un inventaire ; 8 Mettre a bord un equipage pour la conduite de la prise. 16. En cas de prise d'un corsaire ou d'un pirate, vous pro- ce'derez de la meme maniere ; mais dans le cas de capture d'un batiment de guerre, vous vous bornerez a la constater sur votre journal, et vous pourvoirez a la conduite de la maniere la plus conforme a la securite des equipages auxquels vous la confierez. Les lettres officielles et particulieres trouvees a bord des batiments captures devront m'etre adressees sans delai. 17. Toute prise doit etre juge, et il ne vous est pas permis de consentir a un traite de ran9on, et dans ce cas meme 1'acte de ranyon, redige" conforme'ment aux modeles joint aux pre'sentes instructions, devra etre soumis a la juridiction qui est ou sera charged en France du jugement des prises. 18. II a etc convenu entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Imperiale et celui de Sa Majeste Britannique : 1 Que le produit net des prises faites en commun sera divise en autant de parts qu'il y aura d'hommes embarques sur les batiments engages dans 1'action, sans tenir compte des grades, et que la repartition des sommes revenant aux batiments respectifs sera faite par les soins de chaque gouvernement et d'apres la loi du pays ; 2 Que, quant aux batiments en vue au moment de la capture, et dont la presence pourrait encourager le capteur et intimider 1'ennemi, il leur serait accorde" une part dans la prise. Le mode du jugement des prises n'ayant pas encore etc" regie d6fmitivement entre Sa Majeste 1'Empereur et son auguste alliee, je ne suis point en mesure de vous fixer aujourd'hui d'une maniere positive sur la marche qui devra etre suivie. 288 The Declaration of Paris Cependant les dispositions ci-apres me paraissent devoir etre adoptees : 1 Par exception, le juge competent sera le juge du capture lorsqu'il s'agira de batiments fran9ais qui se seraient mis dans le cas d'etre arretes par des croiseurs anglais, pour violation ou tentative de violation de blocus ou pour transport de contre- bande de guerre, et vice versa lorsqu'il s'agira de batiments anglais qui auraient etc arretes par des croiseurs francais ; 2 Pour les batiments captures autres que ceux des marines fran9aise ou anglaise, la regie que le juge competent de la prise est le juge du capteur reprendra son empire ; 3 Si la capture a lieu par suite d'une action commune et sous un commandement superieur, le pavilion du commandant sup^rieur determinera la nationality du juge ; 4 Si la capture est faite par un croiseur de Tune des deux nations alliees en presence et avec 1'appui materiel ou moral d'un croiseur de 1'autre, le juge de la prise sera celui du capteur. 19. Lorsque le jugement devra appartenir a la juridiction fran9aise, vous conduirez la prise dans le port de France le plus rapproche, le plus accessible et le plus sur, ou dans le port de la possession fra^aise la plus voisine ; mais si des circonstances de force majeure ne vous permettaient pas de conduire la prise en France ou dans une possession fran9aise, vous pourrez la conduire dans un port anglais ou ottoman ou se trouverait un consul de Sa Majeste Imperiale, avec lequel vous vous concerterez sur la destination ulterieure de la prise. Lorsque, au contraire, vous serez dans le cas de remettre a la juridiction anglaise une prise faite ou amenee par vous, vous la conduirez dans le port anglais le plus proche, et vous vous entendrez, soit avec le consul de Sa Majeste Imperiale, soit avec 1'autorite locale, pour vous en dessaisir d'une maniere reguliere. Ces diverses dispositions devront naturellement etre observees par les officiers conducteurs de prises. 20. Vous ne devrez distraire du bord aucun des individus qui montent le batiment capture, s'il s'agit d'un corsaire ou d'un batiment marchand ; mais les femmes, les enfants et toutes les personnes etrangeres au metier des armes ou a la marine ne devront, en aucun cas, etre traites comme prisonniers de guerre, et seront libres de debarquer dans le premier port ou le batiment abordera. S'il s'agit d'un batiment de guerre, et sauf la meme exception, vous pourrez, si vous le jugez utile, transborder une partie de 1'equipage, et vous conduirez les prisonniers soit dans un port militaire de France, soit dans tout autre port qui pourra etre ulterieurement designe" comme lieu de d6p6t pour les prisonniers de guerre. Convention as to Joint Captures 289 21. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander, en terminant, de concerter votre action avec les batiments de Sa Majeste" Britannique ou de la Porte Ottomane toutes les fois que vous en trouverez 1'occasion. Je suis persuade que vous ne perdrez jamais de vue 1'accord complet qui existe entre les trois gouverne- ments, et que vous ne negligerez rien de ce qui pourrait le fortifier et resserrer les liens qui les unissent. Independamment des documents auxquels se referent les presentes instructions, vous trouverez ci-apres divers actes dont les dispositions devront etre observees, sauf, bien entendu, en ce qu'elles auraient de contraire aux regies qui precedent. Recevez, messieurs, 1'assurance de ma consideration tres- distinguee. Le ministre secretaire d'fitat de la marine et des colonies, THEODORE Ducos. 11 Convention between Great Britain and France relative to Joint Captures, with Instructions to the Fleets, MAY 10, 1854. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being desirous to deter- mine the jurisdiction to which the adjudication of joint cap- tures which may be made dur- ing the course of the present war by the naval forces of the two nations shall belong, or of captures which may be made of merchant-vessels belonging to subjects of either of the two countries by the cruizers of the other, and being desirous to regulate at the same time the mode of distribution of the proceeds of joint captures, Sa Majeste la Reine du Roy- aume Uni de la Grande Bre- tagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majeste FEmpereur des Fran- ais, voulant determiner la juridiction a laquelle devra appartenir le jugement des prises qui, dans le cours de la guerre actuelle, pourront etre operees en commun par les forces navales des deux nations, ou des prises qui pourront etre faits sur des navires marchands appartenant aux sujets de 1'un des deux pays par les croiseurs de 1'autre, et voulant regler en meme temps le mode de repar- tition des produits des prises effectuees en commun, out 19 290 The Declaration of Paris have named as their Plenipo- tentiaries for that purpose : 1. When a joint capture shall be made by the naval forces of the two countries, the adjudica- tion thereof shall belong to the jurisdiction of the country whose flag shall have been borne by the officer having the superior command in the action. 2. When a capture shall be made by a cruizer of either of the two allied nations in the presence and in the sight of a cruizer of the other, such cruizer having thus contributed to the intimidation of the enemy and encouragement of the captor, the adjudication thereof shall belong to the juris- diction of the actual captor. 3. In case of the capture of a merchant-vessel of one of the two countries, the adjudication of such capture shall always belong to the jurisdiction of the country of the captured vessel : the cargo shall be dealt with, as to the jurisdiction, in the same manner as the vessel. 4. In case of condemnation under the circumstances de- scribed in the preceding Articles : (1) If the capture shall have been made by vessels of the two nations whilst acting in conjunction, the net proceeds of the prize, after deducting the necessary expenses, shall be divided into as many shares as there were men on board the capturing vessels, without reference to rank, and the nomine 1 pour leurs Plenipoten- tiaires a cet effet : 1. Lorsqu'une prise sera faite en commun par les forces navales des deux pays, le juge- ment en appartiendra a la juri- diction du pays dont le pavilion aura etc 1 porte par 1'officier qui aura eu le commandement supe"rieur dans Faction. 2. Lorsqu'une prise sera faite par un croiseur de 1'une des deux nations alliees en presence et en vue d'un croiseur de 1'autre, qui aura ainsi con- tribue a intimider 1'ennemi et a encourager le capteur, le jugement en appartiendra a la juridiction du capteur effectif. 3. En cas de capture d'un batiment de la marine mar- chande de 1'un des deux pays, le jugement en appartiendra tou jours a la juridiction du pays du batiment capture ; la cargaison suivra, quant a la juridiction, le sort du bati- ment. 4. En cas de condamnation dans les circonstances prevues par les Articles precedents : (1) Si la capture a &t6 faite par des batiments des deux nations agissant en commun, le produit net de la prise, deduc- tion faite des depenses neces- saires, sera divis6 en autant de parts qu'il y aura d'hommes embarques sur les batiments capteurs, sans tenir compte des grades, et les parts revenant Convention as to Joint Captures 291 shares belonging to the men on board the vessels of the Ally shall be paid and delivered to such person as may be duly authorized on behalf of the allied Government to receive the same ; and the distribution of the amount belonging to each vessel shall be made by each Government according to the laws and regulations of the country. (2) If the capture shall have been made by cruizers of either of the two allied nations in the presence and in sight of a cruizer of the other, the divi- sion, the payment, and the distribution of the net proceeds of the prize, after deducting the necessary expenses, shall likewise be made in the manner above mentioned. (3) If a capture, made by a cruizer of one of the two countries, shall have been ad- judicated by the Courts of the other, the net proceeds of the prize, after deducting the neces- sary expenses, shall be made over in the same manner to the Government of the captor, to be distributed according to its laws and regulations. 5. The commanders of the vessels of war of Their Majesties shall, with regard to the send- ing in and delivering up of prizes, conform to the Instruc- tions annexed to the present Convention, and which the two Governments reserve to them- selves to modify by common consent, if it should become necessary. aux hommes embarque's sur les batiments de la nation alli6e seront payees et delivrees a la personne qui sera dument autorisee par le Gouvernement allie a les recevoir ; et la repartition des sommes reve- nant aux batiments respectifs sera faite par les soins de chaque Gouvernement suivant les lois et reglements du pays. (2) Si la prise a t faite par les croiseurs de 1'une des deufc nations alli^es en presence et en vue d'un croiseur de 1'autre, le partage, le paiement, et la repartition du produit net de la prise, deduction faite des depenses necessaires, auront lieu egalement de la maniere indiquee ci-dessus. (3) Si la prise, faite par un croiseur de 1'un des deux pays, a ete jugee par les Tribunaux de 1'autre, le produit net de la prise, deduction faite des d- penses necessaires, seraremis de la meme maniere au Gouverne- ment du capteur, pour etre distribue" conforme'ment a ses lois et reglements. 5. Les commandants des batiments de guerre de Leurs Majests se conformeront, pour la conduite et la remise des prises, aux Instructions jointes a la presente Convention, et que les deux Gouvernements se reservent de modifier, s'il y a lieu, d'un commun accord. 292 The Declaration of Paris 6. When, in execution of the present Convention, the valua- tion of a captured vessel of war shall be in question, the calcu- lation shall be according to the real value of the same ; and the allied Government shall be entitled to delegate one or more competent officers to concur in the valuation. In case of dis- agreement, it shall be decided by lot which officer shall have the casting voice. 7. The crews of the captured vessels shall be dealt with ac- cording to the laws and regula- tions of the country to which the present Convention attri- butes the adjudication of the prize. 8. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the rati- fications shall be exchanged at London within ten days from this date, or sooner if possible. 6. Lorsque, pour 1'execution de la pre"sente Convention, il y aura lieu de proceder a 1'estima- tion d'un batiment de guerre capture", cette estimation por- tera sur sa valeur effective ; et le Gouvernement allie aura la faculte de d61eguer un ou plusieurs officiers competents pour concourir a 1'estimation. En cas de disaccord, le sort decidera quel officier devra avoir la voix preponderante. 7. Les equipages des bati- ments captures seront trace's suivant les lois et reglements du pays auquel la presente Convention attribue le juge- ment de la capture. 8. La presente Convention sera ratifiee, et les ratifications en seront echangees a Londres dans le delai de dix jours, ou plus tot si faire se peut. ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION. ANNEXE A LA CONVENTION. INSTRUCTIONS to the Com- manders of Ships of War belonging to Her Majesty the Queen of the United King- dom of Great Britain and Ireland and to His Majesty the Emperor of the French. You will find inclosed a copy of a Convention which was signed on the 10th instant between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, regulating the jurisdiction to which shall be- INSTRUCTIONS pour les Commandants des Bailments de Guerre de Sa Majeste la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et de Sa Majeste VEmpereur des Frangais. Vous trouverez ci- joint copie d'une Convention single le 10 de ce mois entre Sa Majeste la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et Sa Majeste FEmpereur des Fran9ais, pour regler la juri- diction a laquelle devra appar- tenir le jugement des prises Convention as to Joint Captures 293 long the adjudication of the joint captures made by the allied naval forces, or of the captures of merchant-vessels belonging to the subjects of either of the two countries which shall be made by the cruisers of the other, as likewise the mode of distribution of the proceeds of such joint captures. In order to ensure the execu- tion of this Convention, you will conform yourself to the following Instructions : 1. Whenever, in consequence of a joint action, you are re- quired to draw up the report or proces-verbal of a capture, you will take care to specify exactly the names of the ships of war present during the action, as well as the names of their com- manding officers, and, as far as possible, the number of men embarked on board those ships at the commencement of the action, without distinction of rank. You will deliver a copy of that report or proces-verbal to the officer of the allied Power who shall have had the superior command during the action," and you will conform yourself to the instructions of that officer as far as relates to the measures to be taken for the conduct and the adjudication of the joint captures so made under his command. If the action has been com- manded by an officer of your nation, you will conform your- self to the regulations of your own country, and you will con- operees en commun par les forces navales alliees, ou faites sur des navires marchands ap- partenant aux sujects de 1'un des deux 6tats par les croiseurs de 1'autre, ainsi que le mode de repartition du produit des prises effectuees en commun. Pour assurer Fexecution de cette Convention, vous aurez a vous conformer aux Instruc- tions suivantes : 1. Lorsque, par suite d'une action commune, vous serez dans le cas de rediger le rapport ou le proces-verbal d'une cap- ture, vous aurez soin d'indiquer avec exactitude les noms des batiments de guerre presents a 1'action, ainsi que de leurs commandants, et, autant que possible, le nombre d'hommes embarques a bord de ces bati- ments au commencement de Faction, sans distinction de grades. Vous remettrez une copie de ce rapport ou proces-verbal a 1'officier de la Puissance alliee qui aura eu le commandement superieur dans Faction, et vous vous conformerez aux instruc- tions de cet officier en ce qui concerne les mesures a prendre pour la conduite et le jugement des prises ainsi faites en com- mun sous son commandement. Si Faction a 6te commande'e par un officier de votre nation, vous vous conformerez aux reglements de votre propre pays, et vous vous bornerez a 294 The Declaration of Paris fine yourself to handing over to the highest officer in rank of the allied Power who was present during the action a certified copy of the report or of the proces-verbal which you shall have drawn up. 2. When you shall have effected a capture in presence of, and in sight of, an allied ship of war, you will mention exactly, in the report which you will draw up when the capture is a ship of war, and in the report or proces-verbal of the capture when the prize is a merchant- vessel, the number of men on board your ship at the commencement of the action, without distinction of rank, as well as the name of the allied ship of war which happened to be in sight, and, if possible, the number of men embarked on board that ship, likewise without distinction of rank. You will deliver a certi- fied copy of your report or proces-verbal to the commander of that ship. 3. Whenever, in the case of a violation of a blockade, of the transport of contraband articles, of land or sea troops of the enemy, or of official despatches from or for the enemy, you find yourself under the necessity of stopping and seizing a merchant-vessel of the allied nation, you will take care to : (1) Draw up a report (or proems-verbal), stating the place, the date, and the motive of the arrest, the name of the vessel, remettre a 1'officier le plus eleve en grade de la Puissance allied, present a 1'action, une copie certifiee du rapport ou du proces-verbal que vous aurez redige. 2. Lorsque vous aurez effectu6 une capture en pr6- sence et en vue d'un batiment de guerre allie, vous mention- nerez exactement dans le rap- port que vous redigerez, s'il s'agit d'un batiment de guerre, et dans le proces-verbal de capture, s'il s'agit d'un bati- ment de commerce, le nombre d'hommes que vous aviez a bord au commencement de 1'action, sans distinction de grades, ainsi que le nom du batiment de guerre allie qui se trouvait en vue, et, s'il est possible, le nombre d'hommes embarques a bord, egalement sans distinction de grades. Vous remettrez une copie certi- fied de votre rapport ou proces- verbal au commandant de ce batiment. 3. Lorsqu'en cas de viola- tion de blocus, de transport d'objets de contrabande, de troupes de terre ou de mer ennemies, ou de depeches offi- cielles de ou pour Pennemi, vous serez dans le cas d'arreter et saisir un batiment de la marine marchande du pays allie, vous devrez : ( 1 ) R6diger un proces-verbal , enonyant le lieu, la date, et le motif de 1'arrestation, le nom du batiment, celui du capitaine, Convention as to Joint Captures 295 that of the captain, the number of the crew ; and containing besides an exact description of the state of the vessel, and of her cargo. (2) Collect and place in a sealed packet, after having made an inventory of them, all the ship's papers, such as registers, passports, charter- parties, bills of lading, invoices, and other documents calcu- lated to prove the nature and the ownership of the vessel and of her cargo. (3) Place seals upon the hatches. (4) Place on board an officer, with such number of men as you may deem advisable, to take charge of the vessel, and to ensure its safe conduct. (5) Send the vessel to the nearest port belonging to the Power whose flag it carried. (6) Deliver up the vessel to the authorities of the port to which you shall have taken her, together with a duplicate of the report (or pr aces-verbal), and of the inventory above- mentioned, and with the sealed packet containing the ship's papers. 4. The officer who conducts the captured vessel will procure a receipt proving his having delivered up the vessel, as well as his having delivered the sealed packet, and the dupli- cate of the report (or proces- verbal) and of the inventory above-mentioned. 5. In case of distress, if the captured vessel is not in a fit le nombre des hommes de l'6quipage ; et contenant en outre la description exacte de 1'etat du navire, et de sa cargaison. (2) Reunir en un paquet cachete, apres en avoir fait 1'inventaire, tous les papiers de bord, tels que actes de nationality ou de propriety, passeports, charte-parties, con- naissements, factures, et autres documents propres a constater la nature et la propriete du batiment et de la cargaison. (3) Mettre les scelles sur les e"coutilles. (4) Placer a bord un officier, avec tel nombre d'hommes que vous jugerez convenable, pour prendre le batiment en charge, et en assurer la conduite. (5) Envoyer le batiment au port le plus voisin de la Puis- sance dont il portait le pavilion. (6) Faire remettre le bati- ment aux autorites du port ou vous 1'aurez fait conduire, avec une expedition du proces- verbal et de 1'inventaire ci-dessus men- tionnes, et avec le paquet cachet6 contenant les papiers de bord. 4. L'officier conducteur d'un batiment captur6 se fera de- livrer un re9U constatant la remise qu'il en aura faite, ainsi que la delivrance qu'il aura faite du paquet cachete et de I'exp6dition du proces-verbal et de 1'inventaire ci-dessus mentionne's. 5. En cas de detresse, si le batiment capture est hors 296 The Declaration of Paris state to continue its voyage, the officer charged to conduct to a port of the allied Power a prize made on the merchant service of that Power, may enter a port of his own country or a neutral port ; and he will deliver his prize to the local authority, if he enters a port of his own country, and to the Consul of the allied nation if he enters a neutral port, with- out prejudice to the ulterior measures to be taken for the adjudication of the prize. He will take care, in that case, that the report or proces-verbal, and the inventory which he shall have drawn up, as well as the sealed packet containing the ship's papers, be sent exactly to the proper Court of adjudi- cation. 6. You are not to consider as prisoners of war, and you will give free permission to land, to all women, children, and persons not belonging to the military or maritime pro- fession who shall be found on board the captured vessels. With this exception, and those which your own security may suggest, you will not per- mit any person to be removed from on board the vessel ; and in all cases you will retain the master, supercargo, and others whose evidence may be essen- tial to the adjudication of the prize. You will treat as prisoners of war all persons whatever who may be found on board the enemy's vessels, with the d'etat de continuer sa route, Pofficier charg de conduire dans un port de la Puissance alliee une prise faite sur la marine marchande de cette Puissance, pourra entrer dans un port de son propre pays ou dans un port neutre ; et il remettra sa prise a Pautorite locale, s'il entre dans un port de son pays, et au Consul de la nation allied s'il entre dans un port neutre, sans prejudice des mesures ulterieures a prendre pour le jugement de la prise. II veillera, dans ce cas, a ce que le rapport ou proces-verbal et 1'inventaire qu'il aura rdiges, ainsi que le paquet cachet^ contenant les papiers de bord, soient envoy es exactement a la juridiction chargee du juge- ment. 6. Vous ne considererez point comme prisonniers, et vous laisserez librement de- barquer, les femmes, les enfants, et les personnes Strangers au metier des armes ouala marine, qui se trouveront a bord des batiments arretes. Sauf cette exception et celles que vous suggerera le soin de votre suret6, vous ne distrairez aucun individu du bord ; dans tous les cas, vous conserverez a bord le capitaine, le subre- cargue, et ceux dont le tmoi- gnage serait essentiel pour le jugement de la prise. Vous traiterez comme prison- niers de guerre, sauf 1'excep- tion ci-dessus indiquee au 1, tous les individus quelconques Convention as to Joint Captures 297 exceptions above mentioned trouves a bord des batiments inl. You will place no other re- striction on the liberty of allied or neutral subjects found on board allied or neutral vessels, than such as may be necessary for the security of the vessel. With respect to your own countrymen, you will treat them according to the general instructions you have received, and you will, in no case, deliver them up to a foreign juris- diction. The persons who may have been exceptionally removed from the captured vessels shall afterwards be sent back to their own country, if they belong to the allied nation ; if they are neutrals or enemies, they shall be treated as if they had been found on board vessels captured by you separately. ennenus. Vous n'imposerez a la liberte" des sujets allies ou neutres, trouvs sur les batiments allies ou neutres, d'autre restriction que celle qui pourra etre ne"ces- saire pour la s6curit du bail- ment. Quant a vos nationaux, vous les traiterez conformement aux instructions gnrales dont vous etes muni, et vous n'aurez, en aucun cas, a les remettre a une juridiction trangere. Les hommes distraits excep- tionnellement du bord des bati- ments captures, devront etre ulterieurement renvoy6s dans leur pays, s'ils appartiennent a la nation alliee ; et s'ils sont neutres ou ennemis, ils seront traites comme s'ils se fussent trouves sur des batiments cap- tures par vous isolement. FRENCH DECREE PROMULGATING THE CONVENTION. NAPOLEON, par la grace de Dieu et la volont6 nationale, EMPEREUR DES FRANC.AIS. A tous presents et a venir, SALUT. Sur le rapport de notre ministre secretaire d'etat au de- partement des affaires etrangeres, AVONS DECRETE et DECRETONS CC qui SUlt : ARTICLE PREMIER. Une convention, suivie d'une annexe, ayant et conclue le 10 mai de la pr^sente annee 1854, entre la France et le Royaume- Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, pour regler le mode de jugement et de partage des prises faites dans le cours de la presente guerre ; et les actes de ratification ayant etc" respective- ment echanges le 20 du meme mois, ladite convention, dont la teneur suit, recevra sa pleine et entiere execution. [Here follows the Convention.] 298 The Declaration of Paris 12 British Notifications of Blockades. 1 1854 (1) 12TH MAY 1854. Letter from Senior Officer H.M.S. Amphion, Memel Roads, informing the British Vice Consul that Riga, Libau and Windau are strictly blockaded as from 15th May, sent as enclosure with Senior Officer's Report dated 14th June 1854 to Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier. Summary of Report. In respect of neutral vessels captured in attempting to violate the Baltic blockade, and sent to England for adjudication, three points must be established before they can be condemned as lawful prize : 1. Effective blockade. This has been continually main- tained. 2. Intention to violate blockade. This has been ascertained by the course of the captured vessel in each case. 3. Knowledge of blockade. Regarding the first point, I have the honour to inform you, that since May 9th, when I was first entrusted with the blockade of this coast (at which time I found H.M.S. Conflict and Cruizer on the Station, which vessels had been blockading since April 20th) 2 ships have been ordered to cruize off the entrance of the Gulf of Riga, a passage limited by the shoals to a breadth of 3 miles, this entrance has never been left without one vessel. . . . Under these orders 154 vessels have been warned off since April 20th, though nearly all had passed through the Sound, and only 4 had been detained for attempting to enter blockaded ports. Residents in such ports had been officially notified of the exist- ing blockade through the British Vice Consul at Memel. (2) 13TH JUNE 1854 Notifying despatch from Vice Admiral Dundas commanding H.M.'s naval forces in the Black Sea, dated 1st June, announcing blockade of the Danube by combined British and French naval forces. 1 State Papers, vols. xliv., xlv. British Notifications of Blockades 299 (3) 16TH JUNE 1854. Notifying despatch from Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier commanding H.M.'s naval forces in the Baltic, dated 28th May, announcing that Libau and Windau on the coast of Courland and other ports etc. from Lat. 55 53' N. to as far north as Cape Dager Ort, including Riga, Pernau and all other ports etc. in the Gulf of Riga " were then in a state of blockade by a com- petent force " : that all ports etc. eastward from Cape Dager Ort as far as Helsingfors and Sveaborg on the coast of Finland : continuing westward, ports including the Aland archipelago : from thence northward, Tornea and all intermediate Russian ports etc. in the Gulf of Bothnia " are and were then in a state of strict blockade by a competent force." (4) 12TH JULY 1854. Notifying despatch from Sir Charles Napier commanding H.M.'s naval forces in the Baltic announcing that on and from 26th June " a strict and effective blockade was actually estab- lished by combined British and French naval forces of ports in the Gulf of Finland : that a complete blockade of Cronstadt and St Petersburg had been effected by the combined fleets from the same date : thence, passing westward, the line of blockade included the whole coast of Esthonia and adjacent islands to Ekholm Light." (5) HTH AUGUST 1854. Notifying further particulars of blockades of Russian Baltic ports. " On being joined by the French squadron in the Gulf of Finland on the 13th June the duties of blockading in that Gulf and elsewhere were henceforward conjointly carried into effect." (6) 28TH SEPTEMBER 1854. Notifying strict blockade of all ports in the White Sea including specially Archangel and Onega by a competent force of the allied fleets. (7) 3RD NOVEMBER 1854. Notifying despatch from Sir Charles Napier announcing the raising of the blockade of ports in the Gulf of Bothnia. 300 The Declaration of Paris 1855 (8) 3RD MARCH 1855. Notifying despatch from Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons commanding H.M.'s naval forces in the Black Sea, dated llth February, announcing that the ports in' the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov were strictly blockaded by a competent force of the allied fleets, and that certain ports in the Crimea would remain open and free from blockade. (9) 10TH MARCH 1855. Notifying despatch from Sir Edmund Lyons announcing raising of blockade of the Danube. (10) 27TH APRIL 1855. Notifying despatch from officer commanding H.M.'s squadron, dated 19th April, announcing that Libau on the coast of Cour- land was placed on that date in a state of strict blockade by a competent British force in the name of the allies ; and that on the same day all Russian ports in the Baltic, including the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, were also placed in a state of strict blockade by a competent force. (11) 16TH MAY 1855. Notifying despatch from Rear Admiral Dundas commanding H.M.'s ships in the Baltic, of a strict blockade by an effective force of ports in the Gulf of Finland in the name of the allies. (12) 21ST JUNE 1855. Notifying despatch " with reference to the blockade of the Gulf of Finland already established on 28th April last," announ- cing ports in the Gulf of Finland, especially Cronstadt, were strictly blockaded by a competent force on the 27th May in the name of the allies. (13) 29TH JUNE 1855. Notifying despatch from French and British admirals commanding the allied naval forces announcing that all ports on the coast of Finland were on the 15th June placed in a state of strict blockade by a competent force of the allied fleets. Correspondence Relating to the Blockades 301 (14) I?TH JULY 1855. Notifying despatch from Senior Officer of White Sea Squadron announcing a strict blockade in the name of the allies by a competent force of ports on the White Sea, especially Archangel and Onega. (15) 27TH JULY 1855. Notifying despatch from Rear-Admiral Dundas announcing joint notification of strict blockade of Baltic ports and all Russian ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, by a competent force of the allied fleets. (l6) 29TH NOVEMBER 1855. Notifying despatch from Senior Officer White Sea Squadron raising blockade of the White Sea on 9th October. 1856 BRITISH NOTIFICATION OF THE RAISING OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH BLOCKADES OF RUSSIAN PORTS, PENDING THE RATIFICATIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. Foreign Office, April 8, 1856. Notice is hereby given, that pending the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, an armistice by sea, as well as by land, has been agreed upon between Great Britain and her Allies, on the one part, and Russia on the other ; and that consequently, orders have been given for immediately raising the blockade of Russian ports. 13 Correspondence Relating to the Blockades. A. M. DROUYN DE LHUYS TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Paris, le 19 Avril, 1854. M. LE COMTE, Le blocus devant naturellement etre notifie en meme temps pour les Gouvernements Fran9ais et Anglais je vous prie d'engager Lord Clarendon a me faire parvenir le plus prompte- ment possible par Pintermediare de Lord Cowley les avis 302 The Declaration of Paris relatifs aux blocus effectues par les forces navales Britanniques, afin que la notification en puisse etre inseree le nienie jour dans le Moniteur et dans la Gazette de Londres. De mon cote, j'aurai soin de transmettre a Lord Clarendon par votre inter- mediare 1'avis des blocus effectues par les forces navales Fran9aises. Quelle que soit la marine qui e"tablisse le blocus, je pense qu'il doit tou jours etre sense avoir ete effectue par les forces navales combinees au nom des deux Gouvernements allies ; il me parait essentiel que les termes de la notification soient explicites a cet egard et pour prevenir les difficultes auxquelles pourraient donner lieu les blocus des golfes et des cotes je crois aussi convenable d'inse'rer dans toutes les notifications outre les noms des principaux ports ces termes : " et autres ports, rades, havres, ou criques du Golfe de ou de la cote de depuis le cap ou la pointe jusqu'au cap ou la point e ." II ne peut echapper a Lord Clarendon qu'il y a toujours avantage a eViter une discussion de principes lorsque les doutes peuvent etre preVenus par le simple choix des termes. J'ai soumis cette observation a Lord Cowley qui 1'a trouvee d'autant plus fondee que d'apres la jurisprudence Anglaise il ne lui paraissait pas certain qu'en cas de blocus du Golfe de Finland par exemple sans autre designation, la navigation entre deux ports du golfe put etre considere comme violant le blocus. II est dans nos usages de transmettre les notifications de blocus au corps diplomatique accredite a Paris et je pense que cet usage existe aussi en Angleterre veuillez bien M. le Comte vous en assurer aupres de Lord Clarendon, et, s'il en est ainsi lui proposer d'adopter pour ces sortes de notifications le projet de circulaire ci- joint ou tout autre qu'il jugerait convenable d'y substituer pour que ces sortes de communications aient lieu de la part des deux Gouvernements dans les termes identiques. Le Ministre d' Angleterre a Copenhague a notifie" officielle- ment au Gouvernement Danois Pintention ou se trouve PAmiral Napier de bloquer le Golfe de Finlande. Je pense que cette notification ne saurait remplacer celle qui doit suivre 1'insertion de 1'avis du blocus dans les journaux officiels, et je me crois fonde" a la considerer comme ayant ete faite sans instructions. D'apres une regie qui a prevalu dans le droit des gens moderne et que pour notre part nous avons observee scrupuleusement dans les mesures de represailles que nous avons eu a employer contre le Mexique et Buenos-Ayres, il doit^etre laisse aux batiments neutres, en cas d'etablissement de blocus un delai suffisant pour quitter le port sur lest ou avec leur chargements : cette regie a ete rappelee aux commandants de nos batiments de guerre Correspondence Relating to the Blockades 303 par les instructions generates dont ils ont e"te munis. Je vous prie M. le Comte d'engager Lord Clarendon a faire donner aux commandants Anglais des ordres dans le meme sens si les in- structions generates qui ont du leur etre adressees ne sont pas deja explicates sur ce point. Je vous rappellerai a cette occasion M. le Comte le desir que je vous ai exprime par ma depeche du de ce mois, d'avoir communication des instructions generates des croiseurs Anglais et de connaitre 1'opinion du Cabinet Anglais sur les instructions adresses a nos croiseurs. Je reois encore journelle- ment de la part des Puissances neutres des demandes d'explica- tions sur les principes adoptes par nous en matiere de droit maritime et je ne puis y repondre convenablement qu'apres etre fixe sur les principes admis par le Gouvernement Anglais. Je vous prie M. le Comte de renouveler vos demarches aupres de Lord Clarendon pour etre mis en mesure de me transmettre promptement que j 'attend a cet egard. B. MEMORANDUM BY M. DROUYN DE LHUYS VIEWS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON THE BLOCKADE OF THE BLACK SEA. le 29 Juin, 1854. MM. les Vice Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas pensent que le blocus des ports Russes de la Mer Noire ne peut-etre rendu effectif que par 1'adoption des deux mesures suivants. La premiere que serait prise par le Gouvernement Ottoman aurait pour objet de defendre I'exp^dition (clear out) de tous les na vires neutres de Constantinople pour les possessions Russes de la Mer Noire, et d'empecher tous navires neutres destines pour les possessions Russes de quitter le Bosphore au moyen de deux batiments de guerre Turcs et d'un ou plusiers batiments allies stationes a Pentree de la Mer Noire avec ordre d'inscrire sur les papiers de bord de ces navires la defense de se rendre dans les ports Russes. La seconde mesure consisterait a etablir deux croisieres de batiments-a-vapeur de deux escadres alliees, 1'une devant le golfe occidental entre le Danube et le Cap Chersonese et la seconde devant le golfe oriental entre le Cap Chersonese et la Baie de Gelendjik. Les 19 vaisseaux de ligne des escadres combinees feraient, en outre, de frequentes appari- tions dans les golfes de maniere a rendre le blocus aussi effectif que possible. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres qui avait etc consulte sur la premiere partie de cette proposition par M. le Ministre de la Marine en consequence d'une depeche de M. le 304 The Declaration of Paris Vice Amiral Hamelin a repondu le 26 Juin qu'elle ne lui paraissait pas admissible d'apres les principes proclames par les 2 Gouvernements allies au commencement de la guerre, attendu qu'elle avait evidemment pour objet de remplacer un blocus effectif par une interdiction de commerce que la Porte elle-meme ne pourrait prononcer sans violer ses engagements conventionnels avec les Puissance maritimes. Rapprochee de la 2 me partie de la proposition, qui tend a Petablissement d'un blocus effectif, la premiere partie n' off re plus le caractere absolu qui semblait devoir la faire repousser sans reserve : elle a seulement pour Pobjet d'ajouter a 1'emcacite de blocus, et dans cette mesure elle peut etre adoptee en partie. En effet, si 1'on regarde comme utile de bloquer tous les ports Russes de la Mer Noire, meme ceux qui sont sans importance pour le commerce d'exportation et qui ne sont frequentes que par des caboteurs, et si Ton admet que les croisieres projetees peuvent constituer suivant les termes de nos declarations une force suffisante pour qu'il y ait danger de penetrer dans les ports declares en e"tat de blocus, il est inutile de reclamer de la Porte aucune mesure d'interdiction commerciale ; mais il peut etre avantageux, surtout au point de vue de la jurisprudence Anglaise, de poster des croiseurs Turcs ou allies a 1' entree de la Mer Noire afin de notifier a tous les navires entrant 1'existence du blocus effectif des ports Russes, au moyen d'une inscription sur les papiers de bord. Les batiments qui auront re9u ce l r avertisse- ment ne sauraient s'ils sont rencontres aux environs des ports bloques en reclamer un second et pourront evidemment etre saisis comme ayant cherche a violer un blocus. II va sans dire que MM. les Amiraux devront faire la notification du blocus dans les termes convenus entre les deux Gouvernements, c'est a dire en designant nominativement les ports ainsi que les points nautiques extremes des rades, havres, ou criques compris dans le blocus. [For Lord Clarendon's reply to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' letter of 19th April, see Addendum on p. 440.] Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 305 14 Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during the War. A. BRAZIL. DECREE OF H.M. THE EMPEROR OF BRAZIL CONCERNING PRIVATEERS. Rio de Janeiro, 17 May, 1854. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Imperial Majesty, attentive to the commercial interests of his subjects, and desirous to observe a strict neutrality during the war which unhappily exists between Great Britain and France on the one side and Russia on the other, as far as possible to conform to the principles of international law and the Imperial legislation, has decided to adopt the following resolutions : 1. That no privateer flying the flag of any belligerent Power may be armed, provisioned, or admitted with its prizes into the ports of our empire. 2. That no Brazilian subject shall take part in the arming of privateers nor take any action opposed to the duties of a strict neutrality. I officially inform Your Excellency of the said resolutions and I have to request Your Excellency to send suitable instruc- tions in order that they may be understood and executed by the authorities of the Empire and those that are subordinate to you. Permit me to take the opportunity of repeating to Your Excellency the assurances of my perfect esteem and distinguished consideration. ANTONIO PAULINO LIMPO DE ABREU. To H.E. o Sr. Jose Maria da Silva Paranihos. B. BREMEN. ORDINANCE OF THE SENATE OF BREMEN, DECLARING THE NEUTRALITY OF BREMEN IN THE WAR BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS; AND PROHIBITING THE EXPORTATION OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR. BREMEN, APRIL 12, 1854. As a state of war now exists between several of the Great European Powers, and the commencement of hostilities by sea and land has been declared, the Senate, in order, under existing 20 306 The Declaration of Paris circumstances, to secure Bremen property from loss and damage as much as possible, and to maintain the neutral position of Bremen against all infringement, sees itself called upon to require the attention of all, but particularly of those engaged in commerce, and also of shipowners, so that they, in their commercial transactions to and from places belonging to a belligerent State, be it in a state of blockade or not, in order to avoid their own loss, do abstain from all and every violation of those obligations imposed on them in time of war by the general law of nations and by Bremen State Treaties. Notwithstanding that the Senate feels assured that the reference to their duties towards friendly Powers and their own State will be sufficient to deter the citizens of Bremen in future, as it has done hitherto, from every undertaking opposed to the principles of public law, yet it hereby at the same time, without prejudice to any other measures that may become necessary for the maintenance of the neutrality of the State of Bremen, enjoins the following regulations for general observation : 1. The exportation is prohibited of all articles deemed contraband of war by the law of nations, or by the existing Bremen State Treaties ; and particularly of munitions of war, gunpowder, musket and cannon balls, percussion caps, sulphur, and saltpetre, ordnance and arms of every description, and generally of all articles immediately serving for purposes of war, to the territory of any of the belligerent Powers by land or water, and whether under Bremen or foreign flag. The transgression of this prohibition will be followed, in addition to the confiscation of the articles in question, by fine or imprisonment according to circumstances. 2. On all shipments of goods to the belligerent States the articles are to be correctly specified ; the term "merchandize " or any general designation is inadmissible. 3. No Bremen vessel shall be allowed to carry double sets of ship's papers, or to sail under a foreign flag. 4. The legal obligation previously imposed on the sworn shipbrokers that they shall give notice of the shipment of articles considered as contraband of war, as also in regard to the genuineness of the ship's documents and ship's papers, remain unaltered in validity, and the observance thereof is hereby again expressly enjoined on them. Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 307 ORDINANCE OF THE SENATE OF BREMEN, PROHIBITING THE ADMISSION, FITTING-OUT, AND PROVISIONING OF PRIVA- TEERS IN THE PORTS OF BREMEN, DURING WAR BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS. BREMEN, APRIL 28, 1854. The Governments of Great Britain and France having officially announced to the Senate that they have agreed to make no use, until further notice, of the right possessed by them as belligerent Powers to grant letters of marque during the continuance of the war carried on by them, therefore, the Senate, considering the obligations imposed on neutral States by a just reciprocity, finds itself called upon hereby to ordain, for general observance, as follows : 1. All citizens of the State of Bremen are forbidden, under peril of heavy punishment, in anywise to engage in privateer- ing, either by fitting out privateers themselves, or by affording them indirect aid. 2. The proper authorities are directed not to allow, under any circumstances, the fitting out and provisioning of privateers, be they under whatever flag or letters of marque they may, in any port belonging to the State of Bremen, and not to permit any such privateers, and any prizes which they may have with them, to enter a Bremen port, unless in cases of clearly-proved distress at sea. Resolved in the Assembly of the Senate, Bremen, the 28th of April, and published on the 29th of April, 1854. C. DENMARK. NOTICE OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO THE RENEWED APPLICATION OF THE ORDINANCE OF MAY 4, 1803, AS TO HOW TRADERS AND SEAMEN ARE TO CON- DUCT THEMSELVES IN CASE OF A WAR BETWEEN FOREIGN MARITIME POWERS, ETC. Copenhagen, April 20, 1854. On the llth inst. His Majesty the King graciously appointed the Undersigned Ministers to remind His Majesty's subjects of the laws contained in the Ordinance of the 4th of May 1803 relating to the conduct to be observed by traders and navigators in case of a war between foreign naval Powers ; and likewise to announce that, on account of the impending war, the said Ordinance will come again into operation in all and every part of His Majesty's realm from the day on which this notice is there made known. 308 The Declaration of Paris As it has also been deemed necessary to particularize more especially several regulations in that Ordinance, His Majesty has been pleased to give his subjects some interim instructions to enable them conscientiously to perform their duties ; to observe as well the general conditions of the Treaty, which in the event of the threatened war come into force, as also the Declaration of Neutrality communicated by order of His Majesty to several foreign Powers, especially the belligerents in the annexed translated circular, in the same manner as it will be by His Majesty and his Government. The Undersigned Ministry have, therefore, to announce and enforce the following by Royal Authority : Section 1. In regard to Article I. of the Ordinance of 4th May 1803, it is hereby determined that the Royal Latin sea- passes ordered therein must be procured for all voyages, ex- cepting the inland navigation in the Baltic, Cattegat, and the German Ocean, or between Danish or neutral ports in the Baltic and Cattegat. Although the Royal Latin sea-pass is only valid for one voyage, to wit, from the time of the departure of the vessel for her home port after receipt thereof, until her return (Ordinance, 4th May 1803, Article XII.), it may, nevertheless, be presumed that it will be renewed by indorsement, according to circumstances. Under the designations of Colleges (Boards) made use of in the Ordinance of 4th May 1803, Article IX., the respective Ministries are now to be understood ; so that when Article XIV. names the General Land Economy and Commercial Board, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is meant ; in like manner, the Finance Ministry is to be understood by the West Indian Guinea Revenue and General Board of Customs alluded to in the same paragraph. For the present the Royal Latin sea-pass is furnished by the Minister of Foreign Affairs gratis. Section 2. In addition to the articles specified in the Ordinance of 4th May 1803, all manufactured articles which may be directly converted into articles of warfare, are now deemed contraband of war. Should any change or addition, with respect to contraband of war, be necessary in consequence of any special stipulations between His Majesty the King and foreign Powers, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs reserves to itself the right of giving further particulars after having received His Majesty's instructions. Section 3. In consequence of the conditions of the existing Treaties (Treaty with Great Britain, of llth July 1670, Art. III., Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 309 4 and explanatory Article of July, 1780, and agreeable to the ml contents of the Royal Declaration of Neutrality (Article I.)), it is illegal for His Majesty's subjects to take any kind of service whatever, either by land or in any of the Government ships belonging to the eventual belligerent Powers ; and especially to pilot the vessels of war or transports of those Powers beyond the pilots' districts of the Danish Kingdom. The above is made known for the instruction and guidance of all whom it may or doth concern. BLUHME. ORDINANCE OF THE KING OF DENMARK, RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF TRADERS AND MARINERS WHEN WAR BREAKS OUT BETWEEN FOREIGN MARITIME POWERS. Copenhagen, May 4, 1803. We, Christian the Seventh, by the Grace of God, King of Den- mark and Norway, the Vandals and Goths, Duke of Schleswig- Holstein, Stormarn, Ditmarsh, and Oldenburg. Make known, that although by sundry orders, before pub- lished, we have established the laws and regulations to be observed by our trading and maritime subjects, when war takes place between foreign naval Powers, we, nevertheless, deem it necessary, under existing circumstances, to compile under one Ordinance, and to particularise the details of the above-named orders, which are to serve as a guide to all whom they may concern, in order that, on the one hand, the basis thereof may be generally understood, by which it is at all times our intention to maintain the rights of our trading and maritime subjects ; on the other hand, that no one may be able to exculpate himself on the ground of ignorance of the duties devolving on him as a Danish subject, in the aforesaid case. It is, therefore, our most gracious will that the following Regulations only and alone shall in future be observed and strictly followed by all and every one desirous of participating in the privileges to which the neutrality of our flag entitles them in times of war, in their legal tradings and navigation ; for this purpose we have hereby rescinded and annulled all former regulations made for the guidance of our subjects in this respect ; therefore we direct and command as follows : Art. I. Those of our trading and maritime subjects who are desirous of despatching any ship belonging to them across the seas to any of the foreign places to which, according to the circumstances, the effects of the War may extend, are bound, 310 The Declaration of Paris under due observance of all the instructions and rules, herein- after appointed, to furnish themselves with a royal Latin sea- pass, also the necessary papers and documents for a lawful despatch of the vessel. For this purpose, on the outbreak of hostilities between foreign Powers, it will be further determined and made public for what places it will be deemed necessary for ships to be furnished with our Latin sea-passes. II. The pass cannot be obtained before the owner of the vessel for which it is required has procured the necessary ship's certificate, as evidence of his legal right to the ship. III. No one may obtain a ship's certificate who is not our subject, either born in our kingdom and possessions, or before the commencement of hostilities between any of the Naval Powers of Europe, has been in possession of all the rights of citizenship, either in our own or other neutral States. In all cases the owner of the vessel for which the certificate is required shall be resident in some part of our kingdom or possession. IV. Anyone who, according to the preceding article, is entitled to obtain a ship's certificate, shall, in order to procure the same, present himself before the magistrate or other autho- rity of the place to which the ship belongs, or where the greater part of the owners are resident, and there either the whole, or at least the chief owner, shall make oath, or by a written and signed affidavit, swear that the ship belongs to him or them (all being our subjects), and that the vessel for which the ship's certificate is required has on board no contraband of war destined to any of the belligerent Powers or their subjects. V. No one may, on the breaking out of war, be allowed to command any ship furnished with our royal sea-pass, who shall have been born in the country of any of the Powers which are at war, without he has obtained his rights of citizenship in our kingdom and possession prior to the breaking out of hostilities. VI. Every captain commanding a vessel furnished with our royal sea-pass, must have obtained his citizenship in some part of our kingdom or dominions. He is bound at all times to have his bugerbrief (certificate of citizenship) with him on board. As a surety that he will undertake nothing contrary to the tenor of these, our regulations, he is bound, before his departure from the port where he receives the pass, to make oath that, with his consent, nothing shall be done whereby the pass and docu- ments rendered to him might be misused. This affidavit shall be delivered by the owner with his application for the pass ; but should this, owing to the absence of the captain, not be practicable, it must be announced by the owner, and our Consul or Commercial Agent at the district where the captain then is Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 811 shall be responsible that the captain makes such affidavit on receipt of the pass : VII. No supercargo, factor, clerk, or other ship's officer, being a subject of the belligerent Powers, shall be on board of such ships as shall be furnished with a royal Latin sea-pass. VIII. Of the crew, including the mate, the half shall at all times consist of seamen of our realm. Should it happen that the crew at a foreign port should become incomplete, by deser- tion, death, or sickness, in such a manner that the captain is rendered incapable of fulfilling the commands contained in this Article, it shall be lawful for him to ship as many foreigners, but preferably the subjects of neutral Powers, as may be neces- sary for the continuation of the voyage ; but in no case shall the number of the subjects of the belligerent Powers on board the ship be more than the third of the entire crew. Every change in the crew, and the reasons thereof, shall be noted by the master on his crew-list, and in every case be attested in writing by our respective Consuls and Commissioners of Com- merce, or their representatives, at the port into which the ship enters ; such endorsement serving the master as justification in all cases that may arise. IX. In addition to the ship's documents, which are always to be kept on board, the following also belong, exclusive of the ship's certificate alluded to in Article II., viz., the ship's " biel or bygnings brev " (builder's certificate) ; and in case he who had the vessel built has since had her transferred to another owner, then also " kiobebrevet or skiodet " (the purchase certificate or transfer). These documents are to be sent in to the colleges or authorities by the owner on applying for the pass, together with the certificate to prove the ship's lawful right to the possession of the pass : The royal Latin sea-pass, with the requisite translations. The maale-brev (measure-brief). Equipagerullen or folkelisten (crew-list), duly attested by the proper authorities. Charter-parties and bills of lading of the cargo ; and, lastly, Told and clarerings seddelen (Customs' clearance) from the port where the cargo is shipped. X. The maale-brev (measure-brief) shall be issued by the authorities empowered to measure vessels in our kingdom. Should any of our subjects purchase a vessel in a foreign port, our Consul or Commercial Agent at that place shall be author- ized to effect the ship's measurement, and furnish the master with an interim measure-brief, which shall be deemed valid until the ship arrives at any port of our kingdom, where she shall be 312 The Declaration of Paris properly measured and branded, and a formal measure-brief pre- pared, which shall afterwards always remain on board the ship. XI. All and every one is prohibited, owners as well as captains, to procure or have on board duplicate ship's papers, or to carry a foreign flag, so long as they shall sail with the papers and documents graciously furnished to them by us. XII. Our royal Latin sea-pass is valid only for one voyage ; to wit, from the time the ship, after the reception thereof, leaves the home port, to the time of her arrival back again, provided she shall not have come into the possession of any other person by lawful sale, in which case the new owner shall obtain the necessary passes and papers in his own name. XIII. As according to the generally acknowledged principles, the subjects of neutral Powers are not permitted to have goods on board which may be deemed contraband of war, when des- tined to the belligerent Powers or to their subjects, or which may already belong to them, we hereby distinctly determine what is to be understood as contraband of war, to prevent our flag being misused for covering the carriage of such prohibited goods, and in order that no one may be enabled to exculpate himself on the plea of ignorance. The following articles, there- fore, shall be looked upon and deemed by our subjects to be contraband of war ; to wit, cannon, mortars, all sorts of weapons, pistols, bombs, grenades, ball, guns, flints, matches, gunpowder, saltpetre, brimstone, cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartridge boxes, saddles, and bridles, excepting such a quantity of these articles as may be necessary for the defence of such vessel and crew. Moreover, the positive obligations respecting the convey- ance of prohibited goods and property in ships or vessels belonging to our subjects, entered into by special stipulations with foreign Powers, are to remain in full force in all their parts, for which purpose owners shall be furnished with particular instructions to regulate their actions on this head on receipt of the pass. XIV. Should any ship or vessel destined to a neutral port take on board such goods which, if intended for any port be- longing to the belligerent Powers, would be regarded as con- traband of war, every such shipper and master shall then, in addition to the oath they have respectively to make as owner and captain, before the proper magistrate or other authorities be compelled to make a special declaration, apart from the usual required Customs' clearance, setting forth the description, quantity and value of such goods, in conformity with the invoices and bills of lading, which declaration, signed by the shipper and master, shall be certified by the proper collector or inspector of Customs at the places where the clearance is Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 813 effected. Such attested declaration shall, after clearance of the ship, be forwarded without delay by our Custom-House officers to our West Indian Guinea Revenue and General Board of Customs, to serve for the control of the goods therein mentioned on due arrival at the proper port of destination, unless it can be shown by authenticated proof that they were prevented by cases of distress or violent detention. The control thereof shall be conducted in the following manner : the shipper of such goods shall procure a certificate from our Consul or Commercial Agent at the place to which the ship is destined, or, if no Consul or Commercial Agent, or their representative, reside there, then of the proper functionaries or other persons appointed by public authorities at the place, duly qualified to issue such certificate, which certificate aforesaid shall legally certify the arrival of such ship and discharge of such goods, in conformity with the given declaration. This certificate must be procured, and for- warded to our General Land Economy and Commercial College, as soon as the vessel arrives at her port of destination, or has returned to an inland harbour. Should such certificate not be forthcoming within a proper time necessary for the completion of the voyage, our General Land Economy and Commercial College shall demand of the shipper a declaration, such as he may conscientiously affirm on oath, that he has received no intelligence of the ship and goods in question. Should no proof, however, be obtainable of the arrival of the ship and the dis- charge of the goods in question at a neutral port, or the preven- tion thereof be shown to have been occasioned by accident or forcible detention, the shipper shall pay to the Sea Pass Ex- chequer of our General Land Economy and Commercial College a fine of 20 Rbthlr. for every commerce last of the ship's burthen, and in such cases of transgression the owners and captain shall be liable to prosecution according to law. XV. No captain shall sail to any port blockaded by sea by any of the belligerent Powers, and he shall guide himself in this respect carefully, according to the warnings made known to him by the proper authorities respecting the blockade of any ports. In case that on sailing into any port, of the blockade of which he was before ignorant, he meet any ship, under a man-of-war's flag, belonging to the belligerent Powers, and it then be announced to him by the commander thereof that the port is really under blockade, he shall without delay put back, and in nowise seek to creep in by surreptitious means, so long as such port shall be in state of blockade. XVI. None or our subjects shall serve on board privateers, much less fit out, or have any interest in fitting out of such 314 The Declaration of Paris vessels ; neither shall any owner or master allow his ship to be used for the transport of troops, weapons, or ammunition of war, of what kind or nature soever. In case a master should not be able to prevent his ship, by means of irresistible force, being made use of for the aforesaid purpose, it shall be his duty, fervently, and by a formal deed, to protest against such violent treatment, which it was not in his power to prevent. XVII. Should a merchant vessel, not sailing under an armed protection, be boarded at sea by any ship belonging to the belligerent Powers entitled to examine her ship's papers, the captain shall make no resistance against such search, when undertaken by the commanding officer of the aforesaid armed ship ; but he shall, on the contrary, be bound to produce faith- fully and without reserve all papers and documents relating to ship and cargo. It is, moreover, most stringently prohibited for the captain, his officers, or any of his crew to throw overboard or any manner destroy or conceal any document or paper on board belonging to the ship or cargo, be it either before or during the search. When merchant vessels are allowed the armed protection of our man-of-war flag, every master is compelled to show his ship's papers to the superior officer of the convoy, before he can be received under such convoy, and in all cases implicitly to follow his orders. XVIII. Should any master or owner dare to transgress or otherwise to oppose this our Ordinance, he shall have forfeited his citizenship, and his further right to fit out vessels, and also be subjected to be prosecuted by law, and punished, according to the circumstances, as perjurers, or as wilful transgressors of our royal mandate. On the other hand we will, with parental care, maintain and protect the interest of our beloved subjects' lawful commerce and navigation, when they conduct themselves obediently in accordance to the above rules and instructions ; for which purpose we have instructed and commanded our Ministers, Consuls, and other proper authorities abroad, to pre- vent to the utmost of their power, any annoyance or molestation to our subjects, and in case of such occurring, to protect the sufferer, and endeavour to obtain justice for him and compensa- tion for damages. We shall likewise, at all times, graciously support every well-grounded claim that any of our subjects may at any time humbly lay before us. Given under our hand and seal, at our royal residence, in the city of Copenhagen, the 4th May 1803. Schimmelmann Schestedt. (L.S.) CHRISTIAN R. C. Winther. Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 315 D. HAITI. DECLARATION OF THE EMPEROR OF HAITI, RELATIVE TO THE NEUTRALITY OF HAITI IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE ALLIED POWERS AND RUSSIA; THE NON-ADMIS- SION OF PRIVATEERS INTO HAITIAN PORTS; THE NON- VIOLATION OF BLOCKADES ; AND THE TRADE OF NEUTRALS. NOVEMBER 18, 1854. Sa Majeste PEmpereur, voulant conserver la neutralite dans la guerre qui se poursuit en Europe entre les Puissances alliees et la Russie, a daigne arreter ce qui suit : Les navires armes en course ne seront point admis dans les ports et rades de 1'Empire et en pourront par consequent s'y procurer ni munitions ni instruments quelconques dont ils pourraient avoir besoin. Ne seront pas admis pareillement dans ces ports, les arma- teurs avec leurs prises & moins d'un cas de peril evident. II ne sera pas permis de leur acheter des objets qu'ils pour- raient avoir a vendre quels qu'ils soient. Defense est faite aux sujets de 1'Empire de prendre du service & bord des batiments des armateurs etrangers, et aux batiments sous pavilion haitien de transporter pour aucune des Puissances belligerantes, des objets de contrebande de guerre. Les dits batiments pourront toutefois faire le transport du commerce dans les ports et rades des Puissances belligerantes, et prendre chargements, dans leur qualite de neutres, de mar- chandises appartenant aux sujets des dites Puissances, excepte la contrebande de guerre. Les batiments sous pavilion haitien s'abstiendront d'entrer dans les ports qui seront bloques reelle- ment et effectivement ; c'est - a - dire, lorsque ce blocus est maintenu par des forces suffisantes et lorsqu'il y a declaration formelle du commandant des forces navales. Le Gouvernement de 1'Empire se conforme aux principes proclames par les Puissances belligerantes relativement au commerce des neutres, a savoir : le pavilion couvre la marchan- dise ; la propriete des neutres, meme sur les navires ennemis, est inviolable (excepte, dans le c"as de contrebande de guerre et de blocus effectif ) ; et enfin on declare que des lettres de marque ne seront pas de"livrees. Le present avis est public pour que le commerce haitien s'y conforme. 316 The Declaration of Paris E. HAMBURGH. PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF HAMBURGH, PRO- HIBITING THE EXPORTATION OF ARTICLES CONTRA- BAND OF WAR, AND THE VIOLATION OF BLOCKADES, DURING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS. HAMBURGH, APRIL 10, 1854. During the present state of war between several of the Great European Powers the Senate feels itself called upon to issue the following regulations : The exportation of all contraband of war, considered as such according to the law of nations or Hamburgh State Conven- tions, viz. : Ammunition, guns, gunpowder, saltpetre, sulphur, balls, caps, all kinds of arms, and, generally speaking, all objects which may be used in warfare, is hereby prohibited to the States of the belligerent Powers, whether under Hamburgh or under foreign colours, or by land. Whosoever, as owner or master of a vessel or shipper of such articles, acts in contravention of this ordinance is not only liable to the confiscation of such articles, but will likewise be heavily fined and punished by imprisonment. In order to exercise a proper control over goods to be shipped to belligerent States, those goods are to be distinctly named, and the expression " merchandize," or any other general deno- mination, is inadmissible. No captain or master of a ship under Hamburgh colours is permitted to break a blockade, or, after having been informed thereof, to pass through it clandestinely, nor is he permitted to have double ship's papers, or to carry a foreign flag, as long as he is furnished with a Hamburgh ship's pass. Those who may wish to ascertain further particulars respect- ing the orders and instructions of the belligerent Powers, relating to the navigation and commercial intercourse of neutrals, are to apply to the Board of Trade. PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF HAMBURGH, WARNING HAMBURGH CITIZENS AGAINST PRIVATEERING; AND PRO- HIBITING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATEERS INTO PORTS OF HAMBURGH, DURING WAR. HAMBURGH, APRIL 26, 1854. The Senate, in again most urgently drawing attention to the fact that the duty of every individual citizen of the State of Hamburgh requires him to avoid all that might impair the Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 317 neutral position of the Hamburgh State and its flag, hereby warns all citizens of Hamburgh, under threat of heavy punish- ment, from being in any manner concerned, during the present war, in privateering, or in taking any interest therein, either by fitting out privateers themselves or by indirectly aiding them. At the same time the Senate makes publicly known that no privateer, let it be under whatever flag, or provided with what- ever letters of marque it may, shall, either with or without prizes, be admitted into the ports and roads of Hamburgh, except in cases of clearly-proved distress at sea, and that the proper orders have been given to turn away immediately such privateers and their prizes under any circumstances. PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF HAMBURGH RESPECTING THE EXPORTATION TO NEUTRAL PORTS OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR. HAMBURGH, MAY 22, 1854. It appearing advisable, in order to obviate abuses and in- conveniences on the exportation to neutral ports of articles which, by the Ordinance of the lOfh April, 1 are to be considered as contraband of war, to adopt proper measures in order to prevent such articles being conveyed to other ports than those they are declared for by the shippers, the Senate, with respect to the export of articles contraband of war to neutral ports, the prohibition of such articles to the countries of the belli- gerent Powers remaining in force, has come to the following resolution : Every shipper for neutral ports of articles which, according to the notification of the 10th April, are to be considered as contraband of war, is to engage, on declaring the name of the consignee and their place of destination on his oath, to be bound, under forfeiture of the value of the articles so shipped, to produce to the Custom-House authorities here a certificate from the Hamburgh Consul, or, if there is none, from the competent authority at the place of destination, declaring that the articles have been actually landed and delivered to the declared consignee. The time within which such certificate is to be produced shall be fixed according to the distance of the port of destination. The shippers are liable under this bond until the production of the certificate, and in case they fail to produce it within the time appointed for delivering it in, they shall pay the full value of the articles so exported, unless they can substantiate on oath, on being required so to do, that, owing to accidents on the voyage, 1 See p. 316. 318 The Declaration of Paris or the seizure of the vessel at sea, they have received no account respecting the ship and cargo. The above-named declarations on oath and the bonds are to be handed in to the Custom-House authorities here by the ship-broker previous to his clearing out the vessel, and the ship- brokers must note the same on the manifest of the vessel, on pain of being deprived of their privileges ; they, as ship-brokers, must further be responsible that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, no articles contraband of war are exported in any vessel to neutral ports without delivering in the prescribed declaration. If required, the Custom-House authorities will grant a certi- ficate of the delivery to them of such declarations on oath and forms of obligation for a fee of two marks currency. F. HANOVER. LAW OF HANOVER, RELATIVE TO THE NEUTRALITY OF HANOVER IN THE WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND TURKEY ON THE ONE PART, AND RUSSIA ON THE OTHER PART; PROHIBITING PRIVATEERING; OR THE EXPORT OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR. HANOVER, MAY 5, 1854. George V., by the grace of God King of Hanover, Royal Prince of Great Britain and Ireland, Duke of Cumberland, Duke of Brunswick and Liineburg, etc. On account of the war which has broken out between England, France, and Turkey on the one side, and Russia on the other side, and of the resolutions adopted by the two first-mentioned States for the purpose of preventing, as much as possible, injury to the commerce and shipping of the neutral Powers, We, with the constitutional assent of the General Assembly of the States, issue the following orders, which are to have the force of law until further directions : Art. I. Our subjects are prohibited from accepting or using letters of marque under any form or flag whatever, as well as from every kind of participation in the fitting-out, manning, or management of privateers, and especially from serving on board them. Anyone who acts contrary to this prohibition must not only expect no protection from our Government if he be treated by other States as a pirate, but he shall moreover be tried by the tribunals of this country, according to Article CXXX., No. 2, of the Criminal Code, and the other provisions thereof applicable to the case. Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 319 II. No privateer shall be allowed to enter Hanoverian harbours except in case of distress at sea, and then the vessel must be watched, and forced to leave again as soon as possible. In such cases, moreover, no supply of provisions, except victuals, if necessary, for immediate use, no making up of stores, of arms, or ammunition, must take place from this country on pain of punishment, according to Article I. III. The transport to and from the belligerent States of their troops, arms, or ammunition, as well as other articles serving for hostile purposes, and regarded by the general law of nations as contraband of war, is prohibited in Hanoverian ships. Anyone who transgresses this prohibition must expect no protection from our Government in case of seizure and confisca- tion by the belligerent States, besides which he will be liable to have his Hanoverian sea-pass taken away, and to be refused a new one during the continuance of the war, to be fined to the amount of 500 dollars, or to be imprisoned for six months. IV. The transport of despatches and couriers for the belli- gerent States shall be visited by the same punishment. V. The exportation of the materials mentioned in Article III. from our Kingdom to any one of the belligerent States is forbidden, no matter under what flag it may be intended to take place. Our authorities shall prevent such exportation, with military aid if necessary ; but should any take place notwithstanding, the ship and such part of the cargo as consists of the said articles shall be confiscated, and the delinquent shall moreover be punished, according to the provisions of Article III. VI. Using a foreign flag before the actual change of the nationality of a ship, or carrying double ship's papers for the purpose of evading the above orders, will, in the cases men- tioned in Articles III. to V., be punished moreover as fraud, according to 217 of the Penal Police Law of 25th May 1847. VII. The sentences of fine and imprisonment incurred under this law will be passed by the criminal departments of the Superior Tribunals. VIII. The present law may be wholly or partially repealed by further ordinances. IX. Our Ministries, each in its own department, are charged with the execution of this law, and our Ministry of Finance and Commerce especially is authorized to issue, by way of proclamation, more particular instructions regarding articles that are to come under the designation of contraband of war. 320 The Declaration of Paris G. HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. PROCLAMATION OF THE KING OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, TURKEY AND RUSSIA. HONOLULU, MAY 16, 1854. Be it known to all whom it may concern that We, Kame- hameha III., King of the Hawaiian Islands, hereby proclaim our entire neutrality in the war now pending between the great maritime Powers of Europe ; that our neutrality is to be respected by all belligerents to the full extent of our jurisdiction, which by our fundamental laws is to the distance of one marine league surrounding each of our islands of Hawaii, Maui, Ka- hoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, Oahu, Kauai, and Niihau, commenc- ing at low-water mark on each of the respective coasts of the said islands, and includes all the channels passing between and dividing the said islands from island to island ; that all captures and seizures made within our said jurisdiction are unlawful ; and that the protection and hospitality of our ports, harbours, and roads shall be equally extended to all the belligerents, so long as they respect our neutrality. And be it further known, to all whom it may concern, that we hereby strictly prohibit all our subjects, and all who reside within our jurisdiction, from engaging either directly or indirectly in privateering against the shipping or commerce of any of the belligerents, under the penalty of being treated and punished as pirates. Done at our Palace of Honolulu, this 16th day of May 1854. Keoni Ana. KAMEHAMEHA. H. LtTBECK. ORDINANCE OF THE SENATE OF LUBECK, PROHIBITING THE EXPORT OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR, DURING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND TURKEY AGAINST RUSSIA. Lt) BECK, APRIL 10, 1854. In consequence of the state of war existing between Turkey, France, and Great Britain on the one part, and Russia on the other part, the Senate, in order to protect the trade and naviga- tion of Liibeck, hereby ordains and brings to the general know- ledge of the public that : 1. The exportation of articles contraband of war for the belligerent Powers or their subjects is prohibited. 2. Articles contraband of war are arms, ordnance, firearms, and munitions of war of every description, but particularly Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 321 gunpowder, musket and cannon balls, rockets, percussion caps, and all other articles serving for war purposes, as also saltpetre, sulphur, and lead. 3. The transgression of the present ordinance will be followed by the confiscation of the articles contraband of war, and all those who are guilty thereof, or accomplices therein, shall be severely punished. PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF LUBECK, ANNOUNCING THE NEUTRALITY OF LUBECK IN THE WAR BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS; AND PROHIBITING THE VIOLATION OF BLOCKADES, OR THE OUTFIT OF PRIVA- TEERS FROM, OR THEIR ADMISSION INTO, PORTS OF LUBECK. LUBECK, APRIL 24, 1854. With reference to the official announcement made to us of a blockade of the whole of the Russian Baltic ports to be effected by the British fleet, and in order, in the present war, to maintain the neutral position of Lubeck unimpaired, and also to avert loss and injury from the citizens of this State, the Senate has resolved to make the following regulations for general observance : 1. No master of a Lubeck vessel shall break a blockade, or, after having been informed thereof, endeavour clandestinely to evade it. He must not carry two sets of ship's papers, nor sail under a foreign flag. 2. Privateers shall neither be fitted out nor provisioned in the Free State of Lubeck. The citizens of Lubeck must wholly refrain from participation in such undertakings, which are in- consistent with the principles of a strict neutrality. 3. Privateers, with or without prizes, shall not be admitted into the harbours of Lubeck, except in cases of proved distress at sea. In such a case, however, the privateer and any prizes she may have shall be placed under surveillance, and shall leave the harbour again as soon as may be. I. MECKLENBURGH-SCHWERIN. ORDINANCE OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURGH- SCHWERIN, PROHIBITING THE OUTFIT OF PRIVATEERS FROM PORTS OF MECKLENBURGH-SCHWERIN, OR THEIR ENTRANCE INTO THE SAME, DURING WAR BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS. SCHWERIN, APRIL 26, 1854. We, Frederick Francis, by the grace of God, Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin, in pursuance of our Ordinance of 21 322 The Declaration of Paris the 15th instant, for the purpose of preserving our neutral position in the present war, ordain as follows : 1. Privateers, with or without prizes, are not to be admitted into the harbours of our dominions. If, therefore, an armed privateer should appear before any of our ports, either for the purpose of bringing its prizes into safety, or to seek shelter, or to be supplied with provisions, or to be repaired, or under any other pretext whatever, its entry and remaining in the port is altogether prohibited : it is to be sent away and a notification to be made here immediately. 2. As privateers are neither permitted to be fitted out nor provisioned in our dominions, our subjects are also entirely to abstain, under heavy penalties, from every participation in undertakings so incompatible with the principles of a strict neutrality. J. NAPLES. ORDONNANCE DE S. M. LE ROI DE NAPLES CONCERNANT LES CORSAIRES ET LE COMMERCE NAPOLITAIN PEN- DANT LA GUERRE, 12 APRIL 1854. His Majesty the King of Naples wishing on the one hand to preserve to its fullest extent the neutrality adopted in the present war, and on the other hand to conform to the political principles manifested by the belligerent Powers concerning neutral commerce, has resolved the following : That no ships armed as privateers shall be admitted to the ports of this kingdom, nor provided with arms, military stores, or anything serving thereunto. That no privateer may bring prizes into the ports of this Kingdom except in cases of imminent peril, nor may they remove anything whatsoever out of the said prizes. That the subjects of this Kingdom shall not be allowed to take service on board a privateer of any foreign nation. That no vessels of this Kingdom shall convey any articles whatsoever recognised as contraband of war to any belligerent Power. That the ships of this Kingdom may freely carry on their commerce in the ports and in the harbours of belligerent Powers, and in the capacity of neutrals they may also carry merchandise belonging to the subjects of the said Powers except contraband of war. Finally, that ships of this Kingdom are prohibited from entering into any blockaded port provided that the blockade Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 323 is effective and maintained by a sufficient force, and when it has been formally notified by the Commanding Officer. The rules which the belligerent Powers will follow (seguiranno) concerning neutral commerce are as follows : That the flag covers the merchandise except contraband of war ; that the property of neutrals on enemy ships shall be immune from capture except in the case of contraband of war ; that a blockade in order to be effective must be maintained by a sufficient force and duly announced ; and that, lastly, letters of marque will not be issued. K. PORTUGAL. DECREE OF THE KING-REGENT OF PORTUGAL, DECLARING THE NEUTRALITY OF PORTUGAL IN THE WAR BETWEEN TURKEY, ETC., AND RUSSIA, AND PROHIBITING THE OUTFIT OF PRIVATEERS FROM PORTUGUESE DOMINIONS. LISBON, MAY 5, 1854. Home Department, May 5, 1854. SIRE, War being declared between Powers with whom we are in ancient alliance, which alliance it behoves us to keep intact, and the Crown of Portugal being bound to take all measures in order on its part to preserve the strictest neutrality during the present contest, so that one of the belligerent parties shall not be treated with more or less favour than the other, and keeping in view what has always, under similar circumstances, been practised by the Sovereigns and Governments of these realms, your Majesty's Ministers have agreed upon submitting to your Majesty the following Decree, from the adoption of which will follow, on the part of the Portuguese Government, the observance of the rules of the law of nations, which Neutral Powers are bound to keep and uphold. DUQUE DE SALDANHA. Taking into consideration the Report of the Ministers and Secretaries of State of all the several departments, I am pleased to decree, in the name of the King, as follows : Art. I. The relations of peace, of good friendship, and cordial understanding which subsist between Portugal and all the Governments of Europe ought, on our part, to be preserved intact, and to continue to be religiously observed, by preserving the most strict and absolute neutrality with regard to the Powers which are at present in a state of war. 324 The Declaration of Paris II. In the ports of this kingdom, and in its possessions in any part of the world, it is prohibited to Portuguese subjects, and to foreigners residing in Portugal, to construct or arm vessels to be employed as privateers during the present war ; and letters of marque will be denied to either of the above- mentioned parties. III. The entrance of privateers, and of prizes made by them, or by any vessels of war of the belligerent Powers, into the ports mentioned in the preceding Article, is also prohibited. An exception shall be made to this rule in cases of dis- tress in which, according to the law of nations, it is indispensable to show hospitality, the sale or unloading of prizes thus arriving at the ports of these realms being, however, in no way permitted, neither may such vessels entering there remain any longer time than is necessary for receiving the succour of humanity which, in accordance with the said law of nations and with the pro- visions of the Decrees of the 30th of August 1780, and the 3rd of June 1803, are due to them. The Ministers and Secretaries of State of the several depart- ments shall thus understand, and cause the same to be carried out. KING- REGENT. L. SPAIN. DECREE OF THE QUEEN OF SPAIN, PROHIBITING THE OUTFIT OF PRIVATEERS IN THE SPANISH DOMINIONS DURING WAR BETWEEN TURKEY, ETC., AND RUSSIA. MADRID, APRIL 12, 1854. Ministry of Marine, Madrid, April 12, 1854. MADAM, The war which has unfortunately broken out in the East, might do harm to our navigation and commerce, the prosperity of which so warmly interests your Majesty. Fortunately Great Britain and France, well worthy of the advanced post which they occupy amongst civilized nations, have strenuously endeavoured to diminish the evils which the present struggle must cause to the world, by renouncing for the present the issuing of letters of marque, and by making conjointly other declarations which are highly favourable to neutral Powers. It behoves the commercial interests of Spain to take ad- vantage of a course of policy so highly humane, and to satisfy at the same time your Majesty's feelings towards the nations which are the friends and allies of Spain. Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 825 Therefore, the undersigned Minister, in conformity with the opinion of the Council of Ministers, has the honour to propose to your Majesty the subjoined project of Decree. Madam, at the Royal feet of your Majesty, EL MARQUES DE MOLINS. DOCKET DE SA MAJESTY LA REINE D'ESPAGNE CONCERNANT LES CORSAIRES ET LE COMMERCE ESPAGNOL PENDANT LA GUERRE. In consideration of the proposals I have received from my Minister of Marine, the following articles are decreed with the approval and consent of the Council of Ministers : 1. The equipment, the maintenance, and admission of privateers flying the Russian flag is prohibited in all Spanish ports. 2. It is equally prohibited to owners, masters, and captains of Spanish mercantile ships to accept letters of marque from any Power, or to assist any vessels having the character of privateers, except in virtue of the claims of humanity in the case of fire and shipwerck. 3. The Spanish flag covers the transportation of all articles of commerce except warlike stores, papers, or despatches, but not commerce with ports blockaded by the belligerents. By means of this present decree Her Majesty's Government will not be responsible for any damage which may be incurred by persons trading in violation of this article. M. SWEDEN. ORDONNANCE DE S. M. LE ROI DE SUEDE CONCERNANT LA NAVIGATION DE SES SUJETS PENDANT LA GUERRE, 8 APRIL 1854. Nous, Oscar, par la grace de Dieu, roi de Suede et de Norv^ge, des Goths et des Vandales, savoir faisons : Qu'ayant reconnu la necessity, en vue des collisions qui menacent d'e"clater entre des puissances maritimes etrangeres, que ceux de nos fideles sujets qui exercent le commerce et la navigation observent rigoureusement les obligations et precautions requises pour assurer au pavilion suedois tous les droits et privileges qui lui reviennent en qualite de pavilion neutre, et pour eViter e"gale- ment tout ce qui pourrait en quelque maniere le rendre suspect aux puissances belligerantes et 1'exposer a des insultes ; nous avons juge" a propos, en rapportant ce qui a &t& statue" pre"- 326 The Declaration of Paris cedemment & cet 6gard, d'ordonner que les regies suivantes devront dorenavant etre generalement observees. l er . Pour etre admis a jouir des droits et privileges revenant au pavilion suedois en sa qualite de neutre, tout batiment suedois devra etre muni des documents qui, d'apres les ordon- nances existantes, 1 sont requis pour constater sa nationalite, et ces documents devront tou jours se trouver a bord du batiment, pendant ses voyages. 2. II est severement defendu aux capitaines d'avoir des papiers de bord et des connaissements doubles ou faux, ainsi que de hisser pavilion etranger en quelque occasion ou sous quelque pretexte que ce soit. 3. S'il arrivait que, pendant le sejour d'un batiment suedois a Petranger, P6quipage, soit par desertion, mort, maladie ou autres causes, se trouvat diminue au point de n'etre plus suffisant pour la manoeuvre du navire, et qu'ainsi des matelots Strangers dussent etre engages, ils devront etre choisis de pre"- frence parmi les sujets des puissances neutres ; mais dans aucun cas le nombre des sujets des puissances belligerantes qui se trouveront a bord du navire ne pourra exceder un tiers du total de Pequipage. Tout changement de cette nature dans le personnel du navire, avec les causes qui y ont donne lieu, devra e"tre marque par le capitaine sur le role de Pequipage, et la fide- lite" de cette annotation devra etre certifiee par le consul ou vice-consul suedois competent, ou bien, en cas qu'il ne s'en trouvat point sur les lieux, par la municipality, le notaire public ou quelque autre personne de la meme autorite, suivant les usages des pays respectifs. 4. Les batiment s suedois, en qualit de neutres, pourront naviguer librement vers les ports et sur les cotes des nations en guerre ; toutefois les capitaines devront s'abstenir de toute tentative d'entrer dans un port bloque" des qu'ils auront te formellement prevenus de Petat de ce port par Pofficier qui commande le blocus. Par un port bloque, on entend celui qui est tellement ferm, par un ou plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre ennemis stationnes et suffisamment proches, qu'on ne puisse y entrer sans danger eVident. 5. Toutes marchandises, meme propri6t des sujets des puissances belligerantes, pouiront etre librement mene'es a bord des batiments suedois, en leur qualite 1 de neutres, a la reserve des articles de contrebande de guerre. Par contrebande de guerre il faut entendre les articles suivants : canons, mortiers, 1 Ordonnances royales du l er mars 1841 et 15 aout 1861. Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 327 armes de toute espece, bombes, grenades, boulets, pierres a feu, meches, poudre, salpetre, soufre, cuirasses, piques, ceinturons, gibernes, selles et brides, ainsi que toutes fabrications pouvant servir directement a 1'usage de la guerre, en exceptant toutefois la quantit6 de ces objets qui peut etre n^cessaire pour la defense du navire et de I'^quipage. Pour le cas qu'a regard de la definition des objets de contre- bande de guerre, des changements ou additions devraient etre introduits par suite de conventions avec les puissances etrangeres, il en sera ult^rieurement statue. 1 6. II est interdit a tout capitaine sue"dois de se laisser employer avec le batiment qu'il conduit a transporter pour aucune des puissances bellige"rantes des d6peches, des troupes ou des muni- tions de guerre, sans y etre contraint par une force re"elle ; auquel cas il devra protester formellement contre un tel emploi de la force. 7. Les batiments des puissances belligerantes pourront im- porter dans les ports suedois et en exporter toutes denrees et marchandises, pourvu que, d'apres le tarif general des douanes, elles soient permises a Pimportation ou a 1'exportation, et a la reserve des articles reputes contrebande de guerre. 8. II est defendu a tout sujet suedois d'armer ou d'^quiper des navires pour etre employes en course contre quelqu'une des puissances belligerantes, leurs sujets et propriet^s ; ou de prendre part a Pequipement de navires ayant une pareille destination. II lui est egalement defendu de prendre service a bord de corsaires etrangers. 9. II ne sera permis a aucun corsaire etranger d'entrer dans un port suedois et de sejourner sur nos rades. Des prises ne pourront non plus etre introduites dans les ports suedois, autrement que dans les cas de detresse constatee. II est e"gale- ment interdit a nos sujets d'acheter des corsaires Strangers des effets capture's de quelque espece que ce soit. 10. Lorsqu'un capitaine faisant voile sans escorte est ren- contre" en pleine mer par quelque vaisseau de guerre de 1'une des puissances belligerantes ayant droit de controler ses papiers de bord, il ne doit ne se refuser ni chercher a se soustraire a cette visite ; mais il est tenu de produire ses papiers loyalement et sans detour, ainsi qu'a surveiller que ni depuis que son navire a et he!6, ni pendant la visite, aucun des documents concernant le navire ou son chargement ne soit soustrait ou jete a la mer. 11. Lorsque les batiments marchands font voile sous escorte 1 Par une ordonnance poste"rieure du roi de Suede (13 septembre 1851), le plomb en saumons ou sous toute autre forme doit aussi etre trait6 comme contrebande de guerre. 828 The Declaration of Paris de vaisseaux de guerre, les capitaines devront se regler sur ce qui est prescrit par 1'ordonnance royale du 10 juin 1812. 12. Le capitaine qui observe scrupuleusement tout ce qui lui est prescrit ci-dessus doit jouir, d'apres les traites et le droit des gens, d'une navigation libre et sans gene ; et si, nonobstant, il est moleste, il a droit de s'attendre a 1'appui le plus energique de la part de nos ministres et consuls a Petranger, dans toutes les justes reclamations qu'il pourra faire pour obtenir reparation et de"dommagement ; au lieu que le capitaine qui omet et neglige d'observer ce qui vient de lui etre prescrit pour sa route ne devra s'en prendre qu'a luimeme des desagrements qui pourront resulter d'une pareille negligence, sans avoir a esperer notre appui et protection. 13. Dans le cas qu'un navire suedois fut saisi, le capitaine doit remettre au consul ou vice-consul suedois, s'il s'en trouve dans le port ou son batiment est amene, mais a son defaut, au consul ou vice-consul suedois le plus voisin, un rapport fidele et dument certifie des circonstances de cette prise avec tous ses details. Mandons et ordonnons a tous ceux a qui il appartiendra de se conformer exactement a ce que dessus. En foi de quoi nous avons signe la pre"sente de notre main, et y avons fait apposer notre sceau royal. The following memorandum relating to the above Ordinance was added to the letter of the United States Charge d'Affaires at Stockholm to the Secretary of State, dated 10th April 1854 [Document No. 8 G] : " I have examined the above-cited Ordinance, in hopes to find in it the claim that neutral merchant-vessels under convoy are exempt from actual visit of belligerents, and that an assurance by the commander of the convoying man-of-war in relation to the vessels under his protection must suffice. These things do not appear in the Ordinance referred to, nor in that at present translated ; but I have been officially informed that the Swedish Government claim these principles as international rights, and as expressed in Article XII. of our Treaty with Sweden of 1783, revived in the existing Treaty, Article XVII. " The Swedish Ordinance of 1812, cited above, contains sailing directions for convoys, and national regulations for the com- manders thereof. F. SCHROEDER." President Pierce's Message to Congress 829 15 Extracts from President Pierce's Message to Congress, 4TH DECEMBER 1854. Long experience has shown that, in general, when the prin- cipal Powers of Europe are engaged in war, the rights of neutral nations are endangered. This consideration led in the progress of our War of Independence to the formation of the celebrated confederacy of the Armed Neutrality, a primary object of which was to assert the doctrine that Free Ships make Free Goods, except in the case of articles contraband of War, a doctrine which from the very commencement of our national being has been a cherished idea of the Statesmen of this country. At one period or another every maritime Power has by some solemn Treaty stipulation recognised that principle, and it might have been hoped that it would come to be universally received and respected as a rule of international law. But the refusal of one Power prevented this in the next great war which ensued, that of the French Revolution, and it failed to be respected among the belligerent States of Europe. Notwith- standing this, the principle is generally admitted to be a sound and salutary one ; so much so that at the commencement of the existing war in Europe, Great Britain and France announced their purpose to observe it for the present, not however as a recognised international right, but as a mere concession for the time being. The cooperation, however, of these two powerful maritime nations in the interest of neutral rights appeared to me to afford an occasion justifying and inviting on the part of the United States a renewed effort to make the doctrine in question a principle of International Law by means of special conventions between the several Powers of Europe and America. Accordingly a proposition embracing not only the rule that free ships make free goods, except contraband articles, but also the less contested one that neutral property other than contra- band though on board enemy's ships shall be exempt from confiscation, has been submitted by this Government to those of Europe and America. Russia acted promptly in this matter : a convention was concluded between that country and the United States providing for the observance of the principles announced not only as between themselves but also as between them and all other nations which shall enter into the like stipulation. None of 330 The Declaration of Paris the other Powers have as yet taken final action on the subject. I am not aware, however, that any objection to the proposed stipulations has been made, but on the contrary they are acknowledged to be essential to the security of neutral com- merce, and the only apparent obstacle to their general adoption is in the possibility that it may be encumbered by inadmissible conditions. The King of the Two Sicilies has expressed to our Minister at Naples his readiness to concur in our proposition relative to neutral rights, and to enter into a convention on that subject. The King of Prussia entirely approves of a project to the same effect submitted to him, but proposes an additional article providing for the renunciation of privateering. Such an article for most obvious reasons is much desired by nations having naval establishments large in proportion to their foreign com- merce. If it were adopted as an international rule, the commerce of a nation having comparatively a small naval force would be very much at the mercy of its enemy in case of war with a Power of decided naval authority. The bare statement of the condition in which the United States would be placed after having surrendered the right to resort to privateers in the event of war with a belligerent of naval supremacy will show that this Government could never listen to such a proposition. The navy of the first maritime power in Europe is at least 10 times as large as that of the United States, without resort on our part to our mercantile marine : the means of an enemy to inflict injury upon our commerce would be tenfold greater than ours to retaliate. We could not extricate our country from this unequal condition with such an enemy unless we at once departed from our present peaceful policy and became a great naval power. Nor would this country be better situated in a war with one of the secondary naval Powers. Though the naval disparity would be less, the greater extent and more exposed condition of our widespread commerce would give any of them a like advantage over us. The proposition to enter into engagements to forego resort to privateers in case this country should be forced into war with a great naval Power is not entitled to more favourable consideration than would be a proposition to agree not to accept the services of volunteers on land. When the honour or the rights of our country require it to assume a hostile attitude it confidently relies on the patriotism of its citizens, not ordinarily devoted to the military profession, to augment the army and navy so as to make them fully adequate to the emergency which calls them into action. The proposal to surrender the right United States Conventions as to Neutrals 331 to employ privateers is professedly founded upon the principle that private property of unoffending non-combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war ; but the proposed surrender goes but little way in carrying out that principle, which equally requires that such private property should not be seized or molested by national ships of war. Should the leading Powers of Europe concur in proposing as a rule of international Law to exempt private property upon the ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that broad ground. [From The Times, 18th December 1854.] 16 Conventions between the United States and other Countries as to Neutrals. A. RussiA. 1 22 July 1854. Les Etats-Unis d'Amrique et sa Majeste" PEmpereur de toutes les Russies animes d'un egal desir de maintenir et de preserver de toute atteinte les rapports de bonne intelligence qui ont de tout temps si heureusement subsiste entre eux-memes, comme entre les habitants de leurs Etats respectifs, ont re"solu d'un commun accord de consacrer, par une convention formelle, les principes du droit des neutres sur mer qu'ils reconnaissent pour conditions indispensables de toute liberte de navigation et de commerce maritime. . . . 1. Les deux hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent comme permanent et immuable le principe qui suit, savoir : (1) Que le pavilion couvre la marchandise (that free ships make free goods), c'est a dire, que les effets ou marchandises qui sont la proprie'te des sujets ou citoyens d'une Puissance ou Etat en guerre, sont exempts de capture ou confiscation sur les vaisseaux neutres, a 1'exception des objets contrebande de guerre. (2) Que la proprie'te neutre, a bord d'un navire ennemi, n'est pas sujette a confiscation, a moins qu'elle ne soit contre- bande de guerre. Elles s'engagent a appliquer ces principes au commerce et 1 De Martens, N.R.O., xvi. pt. i. p. 571. 332 The Declaration of Paris a la navigation de toutes Puissances et Etats qui voudront les adopter de leur cote* comme permanents et immuables. 2. Les deux hautes parties contractantes se re'servent de s'entendre ulterieurement selon que les circonstances pourront Pexiger sur Papplication et 1'extension a donner, s'il y a lieu, aux principes convenus a Particle 1. Mais elles declarent des a present qu' elles prendront les stipulations que renferme le dit article 1, pour regie, toutes les fois qu'il s'agira d'aprecier les droits de neutralite. 3. II est convenu entre les hautes parties contractantes que toutes les nations qui voudraient consentir a acc6der aux regies contenues dans Particle 1 de cette convention par une declaration formelle stipulant qu'elles s'engagent a les observer, jouiront des droits resultant de cette accession comme les deux Puissances signataires de cette convention jouiront de ces droits et les observeront. Elles se communiqueront reciproque- ment le resultat des demarches qui seront faites a ce sujet. 4. La present e convention sera approuvee et ratifiee par le President des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, par et avec Pavis et le consentement du Senat des dits Etats, et par sa Majeste" PEmpereur de toutes les Russies, et les ratifications en seront e'changees a Washington dans Pespace de dix mois, a compter de ce jour, ou plus tot, si faire se peut. B. Two SICILIES. 1 13 January 1855. The United States of America and his Majesty the King of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, equally animated with a desire to maintain and preserve from all harm the relations of good understanding which have at all times so happily sub- sisted between themselves, as also between the inhabitants of their respective States, have mutually agreed to perpetuate, by means of a formal convention, the principles of the right of neutrals at sea, which they recognize as indispensable condi- tions of all freedom of navigation and maritime trade. . . . 1. The two High Contracting Parties recognize as perman- ent and immutable the following principles, to wit : 1st. That free ships make free goods ; that is to say, that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a Power or State at war are free from capture and confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles of contra- band of war. 2nd. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation unless the same 1 De Martens, N.JR.G., xvi. pt. i. p. 569. United States Conventions as to Neutrals 333 be contraband of war. They engage to apply these principles to the commerce and navigation of all such Powers and States as shall consent to adopt them on their part as permanent and immutable. 2. The two High Contracting Parties reserve themselves to come to an ulterior understanding as circumstances may re- quire with regard to the application and extension to be given, if there be any cause for it, to the principles laid down in the first article. But they declare from this time that they will take the stipulations contained in the said 1st article as a rule, whenever it shall become a question to judge of the rights of neutrality. 3. It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties that all nations which shall or may consent to accede to the rules of the first article of this convention, by a formal declaration stipulating to observe them, shall enjoy the rights resulting from such accession as they shall be enjoyed and observed by the two Powers signing this convention. They shall mutually communicate to each other the results of the steps which may be taken on the subject. 4. The present convention shall be approved and ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the said States, and by his Majesty the King of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies ; and the ratifications of the same shall be exchanged at Washington within the period of twelve months, counting from this day, or sooner if possible. C. PERU. 1 22 July 1856. The United States of America and the Republic of Peru, in order to render still more intimate their relations of friendship and good understanding, and desiring, for the benefit of their respective commerce and that of other nations, to establish an uniform system of maritime legislation in time of war, in accordance with the present state of civilization, have resolved to declare, by means of a formal convention, the principles which the two republics acknowledge as the basis of the rights of neutrals at sea, and which they recognize and profess as permanent and immutable, considering them as the true and indispensable conditions of all freedom of navigation and maritime commerce and trade. . . . 1. The two High Contracting Parties recognize as permanent and immutable the following principles < 1st. That free ships makes free goods that is to say, that 1 De Martens, N.R.G., xvii. pt. i. p. 191. 334 The Declaration of Paris the effects or merchandize belonging to a power or nation at war, or to its citizens or subjects, are free from capture and confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles contraband of war. 2nd. That the property of neutrals on board of an enemy's vessel is not subject to detention or confiscation, unless the same be contraband of war ; it being also understood that, as far as regards the two contracting parties, warlike articles, destined for the use of either of them, shall not be considered as contraband of war. The two High Contracting Parties engage to apply these prin- ciples to the commerce and navigation of all Powers and States as shall consent to adopt them as permanent and immutable. 2. It is hereby agreed between the two High Contracting Parties, that the provisions contained in article 22 of the treaty concluded between them at Lima, on the 26th day of July, 1851, are hereby annulled and revoked, in so far as they militate against, or are contrary to, the stipulations contained in this convention ; but nothing in the present convention shall, in any manner, affect, or invalidate the stipulations contained in the other articles of the said treaty of the 26th day of July, 1851, which shall remain in their full force and effect. 3. The two High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to come to an ulterior understanding, as circumstances may require, with regard to the application and extension to be given, if there be any cause for it, to the principles laid down in the first article. But they declare, from this time, that they will take the stipulations contained in the said article as a rule, whenever it shall become a question to judge of the rights of neutrality. 4. It is agreed between the two High Contracting Parties that all nations which shall consent to accede to the rules of the first article of this convention by a formal declaration, stipulating to observe them, shall enjoy the rights resulting from such accession as they shall be enjoyed and observed by the two parties signing this convention ; they shall com- municate to each other the result of the steps which may be taken on the subject. 5. The present convention shall be approved and ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of said States, and by the President of the republic of Peru, with the authorization of the legislative body of Peru, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within 18 months from the date of the signature hereof, or sooner, if possible. Protocols of the Congress of Paris 335 17 Protocols of the Congress of Paris, 1856. PROTOCOLS NO. 20. STANCE DU 2 AVRIL 1856. Ainsi qu'il 1'avait decide", le Congres s'occupe de la question de savoir si les blocus peuvent etre leva's avant l'e"change des ratifications du Traite* de Paix. M. le Comte Walewski expose que les prc6dents 6tablissent que, generalement, les blocus n'ont ete leves qu'au moment de 1'echange des ratifications, en vertu du principe que la guerre n'est terminee qu'au moment ou les stipulations qui doivent y mettre fin, ont re9u la consecration des Souverains ; que 1'esprit de liberalit^ qui exerce, de nos jours, une si heureuse influence sur le droit international et sur les relations que les diverses Puissances entretiennent entre elles, permet n^anmoins de deroger a cette regie ; que la France et la Grande Bretagne, qui ont mis les blocus existants, se sont entendues pour donner, dans cette circonstance, une marque de leur sollicitude pour le commerce en general, et qu'il ne reste plus, des lors, qu'a se concerter sur les moyens propres a assurer a 1'Europe ce nouveau bienfait. D'accord avec M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France, M. le Comte de Clarendon propose de conclure une armistice sur mer. Cette mesure, dans son opinion, aurait pour effet la levee immediate des blocus existants. M. le Comte Walewski ajoute que cette combinaison per- mettrait de considerer les prises, faites posterieurement a la signature de la Paix, comme non avenues, et de restituer les navires et les chargements captures ; que le commerce se trou- verait ainsi autorise a reprendre, sans plus de retard, toutes ses transactions, si la Russie, de son cote, levait, des a present, les mesures exceptionnelles qu'elle a prises, durant la guerre, pour interdire, dans ses ports, les operations commerciales qui se faisaient pendant la paix. Adoptant avec empressement les vceux exposes par MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la France et de la Grande Bretagne, MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie repondent que la pro- position soumise au Congres sera vraisemblablement accepted avec une extreme faveur par leur Gouvernement ; qu'ils s'em- pressent, par consequent, d'y adherer par les memes motifs qui 1'ont suggeree aux Plenipotentiaires qui en ont pris 1'initiative ; 336 The Declaration of Paris mais qu'ils se trouvent dans Pobligation de reserver 1'approba- tion de leur Cour. MM. les Plenipotentiaires des autres Puissances de"clarent que cette m esure sera accueillie avec un sentiment de vive reconnais- sance par les Etats neutres. II est, en consequence, decide que si, dans la prochaine stance, ainsi qu'ils le presument, MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie sont autorises a faire savoir que leur Gouvernement a leve les prohibitions imposees, pendant la guerre, au commerce d'importation et d'exportation dans les ports et sur les frontieres de 1'Empire Russe il sera conclu entre la France, la Grande Bretagne, la Sardaigne, et la Turquie, d'une part, et la Russie, de Pautre part, une armistice sur mer qui comptera a dater de la signature de la Paix, et qui aura pour effet de lever tous les blocus. Par consequent, les prises faites posterieurement a la date du 30 Mars passe, seront restituees. Les actes Consulaires et formalites requises des navigateurs et des commercants seront remplis provisoirement par les Agents des Puissances qui ont consenti, pendant la guerre, a prendre soin officieusement des interets des sujets des Etats bellige'rants. (Suivent les signatures.) PROTOCOLE No. 21. SEANCE DU 4 AVRIL 1856. Le Protocole de la prece'dente seance est lu et approuve". MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie annoncent qu'ils sont autoris6s a declarer que les mesures prohibitives prises pendant la guerre pour fermer les ports Russes au commerce d'exportation, vont etre levees. Par suite de cette declaration, et conformement a la resolution qu'il a prise dans sa precdente reunion, le Congres arrete qu'il est conclu un armistice maritime entre la France, la Grande Bretagne, la Sardaigne, et la Turquie, d'une part, et la Russie, de Pautre parte, et que les prises faites postdrieurement a la signature de la Paix seront restitutes. II est convenu, en consequence, que des ordres seront donnas pour la Iev6e immediate des blocus existants, et que les mesures prises en Russie, pendant la guerre, centre 1'exportation des produits Russes, et notamment celles des ce"reales, seront e"gale- ment rapportees sans retard. Protocols of the Congress of Paris 337 PROTOCOLE No. 22. STANCE DU 8 AVBIL 1856. Le Protocole de la precedente seance est lu et approuve". M. le Comte de Clarendon rappelle que, dans la derniere reunion, et attendu que tous les Plenipotentiaires n'e"taient pas encore en mesure d'acceder a d'autres propositions, le Congres s'est borne a convenir de la levee des blocus. II annonce que les Plenipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne sont aujourd'hui autorises a faire savoir que les decisions restrictives imposees, a 1' occasion de la guerre, au commerce et a la navigation, sont a la veille d'etre rapportees. MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie ayant renouvele" la declaration analogue qu'ils ont faite dans la seance du 4 Avril, et tous les autres Plenipotentiaires ayant e'mis un avis favorable, le Congres arrete que toutes les mesures, sans distinction, prises a 1'origine ou en vue de la guerre, et ayant pour objet de suspendre le commerce et la navigation avec PEtat ennemi, sont abrogees, et qu'en tout ce qui concerne soit les transactions commerciales, sans en excepter la contrebande de guerre, soit les expeditions de marchandises et le traitement des batiments de commerce, les choses sont retablies partout a dater de ce jour, sur le pied ou elles se trouvaient avant la guerre. M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France dit ensuite qu'il doit appeler 1'attention du Congres sur un sujet qui, bien que concernant plus particulierement la France, n'en est pas moins d'un grand interet pour toutes les Puissances Europe*ennes ; il croit superflu de dire qu'on imprime chaque jour en Belgique les publications les plus injurieuses, les plus hostiles, centre la France et son Gouvernement ; qu'on y preche ouvertement la revolte et 1'assassinat ; il rappelle que, recemment encore, des journaux Beiges ont ose preconiser la societe dire " La Marianne," dont on sait les tendances et 1' objet ; que toutes ces publications sont autant de machines de guerre dirigees centre le repos et la tranquillite de la France par les ennemis de 1'ordre social, qui, forts de I'impunit6 qu'ils trouvent a 1'abri de la legislation Beige, conservent 1'espoir de parvenir enfin a realiser leurs coupables desseins. M. le Comte Walewski propose au Congres de terminer son ceuvre par une declaration qui constituerait un progres notable dans le droit international, et qui serait accueillie par le monde entier avec un sentiment de vive reconnaissance. Le Congres de Westphalie, ajout-t-il, a consacre la liberte 22 338 The Declaration of Paris de conscience, le Congres de Vienne 1'abolition de la traite des noirs et la liberte de la navigation des fleuves. II serait vraiment digne du Congres de Paris de poser les bases d'un droit maritime uniforme en temps de guerre, en ce qui concerne les neutres. Les quatre principes suivants atten- draient compldtement ce but : 1. Abolition de la course ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, excepte la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, excepte la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable meme sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus ne sont obligatoires qu'autant qu'ils sont effectifs. Ce serait certes la un beau r^sultat auquel aucun de nous ne saurait etre indifferent. Quant aux observations presenters par M. le Comte Walewski sur les exces de la presse Beige, et les dangers qui en resultent pour les pays limitrophes, les Plenipotentiaires de 1'Angleterre en reconnaissent 1'importance ; mais, representants d'un pays ou une presse libre et independante est, pour ainsi dire, une des institutions fondamentales, ils ne sauraient s'associer & des mesures de coercition centre la presse d'un autre Etat. M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne, en d6- plorant la violence a laquelle se livrent certains organes de la presse Beige, n'hesite pas a declarer que les auteurs des execrables doctrines auxquelles faisait allusion M. le Comte Walewski, que les hommes qui prechent 1'assassinat comme moyen d'at- teindre un but politique, sont indignes de la protection qui garantit a la presse sa liberte" et son inde"pendance. En terminant, M. le Comte de Clarendon rappelle qu'ainsi que la France, 1'Angleterre, au commencement de la guerre, a cherche, par tous les moyens, a en atte"nuer les effets, et que, dans ce but, elle a renonce", au profit des neutres, durant la lutte qui vient de cesser, a des principes qu'elle avait jusque la in- variablement maintenus. II ajoute que 1'Angleterre est disposee a y renoncer dfinitivement, pourvu que la course soit e"galement abolie pour tou jours ; que la course n'est autre chose qu'une piraterie organisee et 16gale, et que les corsaires sont un des plus grands fleaux de la guerre, et que notre etat de civilisation et I'humamte' exigent qu'il soit mis fin a un systeme qui n'est plus de notre temps. Si le Congres tout entier se ralliait & la proposition de M. le Comte Walewski, il serait bien entendu qu'elle n'engagerait qu'a 1'egard des Puissances qui y auraient Protocols of the Congress of Paris 339 acced6, et qu'elle ne pourrait etre invoqu6e par les Gouverne- ments qui auraient refus6 de s'y associer. M. le Comte Orloff fait observer que les pouvoirs dont il a e"te muni, ayant pour objet unique le retablissement de la paix, il ne se croit pas autorise a prendre part a une discussion que ses instructions n'ont pas pu preVoir. M. le Comte de Buol se felicite de voir les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre disposes a mettre fin aussi promptement que possible a 1'occupation de la Grece. L'Autriche, assure-t-il, forme les vo3ux les plus sinceres pour la prosp^rite" de ce Royaume, et elle desire egalement, comme la France, que tous les pays de PEurope jouissent, sous la protection du droit public, de leur indpendance politique et d'une complete prosprite\ II ne doute pas qu'une des condition essentielles d'un etat de choses aussi desirable ne reside dans la sagesse d'une legislation combined de maniere a prevenir ou a reprimer les exces de la presse, que M. le Comte Walewski a blames avec tant de raison en parlant d'un Etat voisin, et dont la repression doit etre conside"ree comme un besoin Europeen. II espere que dans tous les Etats continentaux ou la presse offre les memes dangers, les Gouverne- ments sauront trouver, dans leur legislation, les moyens de la contenir dans de justes limites, et qu'ils parviendront ainsi mettre la paix a 1'abri de nouvelles complications internationales. En ce qui concerne les principes de droit maritime dont M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France a propose" 1'adoption, M. le Comte de Buol declare qu'il en apprecie 1'esprit et la portee, mais que n'etant pas autorise par ses instructions a donner un avis sur une matiere aussi importante, il doit se borner, pour le moment, a annoncer au Congres qu'il est pret a solliciter les ordres de son Souverain. Mais ici, dit-il, sa tache doit finir. II lui serait impossible, en effet, de s'entretenir de la situation interieure d'Etats inde- pendants qui ne se trouvent pas representes au Congres. Les Plenipotentiaires n'ont reu d'autre mission que celle de s'occuper des affaires du Levant, et n'ont pas ete convoque"s pour faire connaitre a des Souverains ind^pendants des vceux relatifs a 1'organisation interieure de leurs pays : les pleins-pouvoirs deposes aux Actes du Congres en font foi. . . . M. le Baron de Manteuffel declare connaitre assez les inten- tions du Roi son auguste Maitre, pour ne pas hesiter & exprimer son opinion, quoiqu'il n'ait pas d'instructions a ce sujet, sur les questions dont le Congres a ete saisi. Les principes maritimes, dit M. le premier Plenipotentiaire 840 The Declaration of Paris de la Prusse, que le Congres est invite a s'approprier, ont tou jours etc professes par la Prusse, qui s'est constamment appliquee a les faire prevaloir ; et il se considere comme autorise a prendre part a la signature de tout Acte ay ant pour objet de les faire admettre definitivement dans le droit public European. II exprime la conviction que son Souverain ne refuserait pas son approbation a 1'accord qui s'etablirait dans ce sens entre les Plenipotentiaires. MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie ajoutent qu'ils pren- dront les ordres de la Cour sur la proposition soumise au Congres relativement au droit maritime. M. le Comte Walewski se felicite d'avoir engage les Pleni- potentiaires a echanger leurs idees sur les questions qui ont etc discutees. II avait pense qu'on aurait pu, utilement peut- etre, se prononcer d'une maniere plus complete sur quelques- uns des sujets qui ont fixe 1'attention du Congres. " Mais, tel quel," dit-il, " Pechange d'idees qui a eu lieu n'est pas sans utilite." M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France etablit qu'il en ressort, en effet : 1. Que personne n'a contest^ la n6cessite de se pre"occuper murement d'ameliorer la situation dp la Grece, et que les trois Cours Protectrices ont reconnu 1'importance de s'entendre entre elles a cet gard. 2. Que les Plenipotentiaires de 1'Autriche se sont associes au voeu exprim6 par les Plenipotentiaires de la France de voir les Etats Pontificaux eVacues par les troupes Franaises et Autrichiennes aussitot que faire se pourra sans inconvenient pour la tra'nquillite du pays et pour la consolidation de 1'autorite du Saint Siege. 3. Que la plupart des Plenipotentiaires n'ont pas contest^ 1'efficacite qu'auraient des mesures de clemence prises d'une maniere opportune par les Gouvernements de la Peninsule Italienne, et surtout par celui des Deux Siciles. 4. Que tous les Plenipotentiaires, et meme ceux qui ont cru devoir reserver le principe de la liberte de la presse, n'ont pas hesit6 & fletrir hautement les exces auxquels les journaux Beiges se livrent impunement, en reconnaissant la necessite de rem6dier aux inconv6nients reels qui resultent de la licence effrende dont il est fait un si grand abus en Belgique. Qu'enfin 1'accueil fait, par tous les Plnipotentiaires, a Pide de clore leurs travaux par une declaration de principes en matiere de droit maritime, doit faire esperer qu'a la prochaine seance, ils auront recu de leurs Gouvernements respectifs 1'autorisation Protocols of the Congress of Paris 841 d'adh^rer a un Acte qui, en couronnant 1'ceuvre du Congres de Paris, realiserait un progres digne de notre epoque. (Suivent les signatures.) PEOTOCOLE No. 23. STANCE DU 14 AVRIL 1856. Le Protocole de la seance prece"dente et son Annexe sont lus et approuves. M. le Comte Walewski rappelle qu'il reste au Congres a se prononcer sur le projet de Declaration dont il a indique les bases dans la derniere reunion, et demande aux Ple"nipotentiaires qui s'6taient reserv6 de prendre les ordres de leurs Cours respectives, a cet egard, s'ils sont autorises a y donner leur assentiment. M. le Comte de Buol declare que 1'Autriche se felicite de pouvoir concourir a un Acte dont elle reconnait la salutaire influence, et qu'il a ete muni des pouvoirs necessaires pour y adherer. M. le Comte Orloff s'exprime dans le meme sens ; il ajoute, toutefois, qu'en adoptant la proposition faite par M. le premier Pldnipotentiaire de la France, sa Cour ne saurait s'engager a maintenir le principe de 1'abolition de la course et a le defendre, centre des Puissances qui ne croiraient pas devoir y acceder. MM. les Plenipotentiaries de la Prusse, de la Sardaigne, et de la Turquie, ayant egalement donne leur assentiment, le Congres adopt e le projet de redaction annexe au present Proto- cole, et en renvoie la signature a la prochaine reunion. M. le Comte de Clarendon, ayant demande" la permission de presenter au Congres une proposition qui lui semble devoir etre favorablement accueillie, dit que les calamite's de la guerre sont encore trop presentes a tous les esprits pour qu'il n'y ait pas lieu de rechercher tous les moyens qui seraient de nature a en preVenir le retour ; qu'il a et6 insere a 1'Article VII du Traite de Paix une stipulation qui recommande de recourir a 1'action me'diatrice d'un Etat ami avant d'en appeler a la force, en cas de dissentiment entre la Porte et 1'une ou plusieurs des autres Puissances signataires. M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne pense que cette heureuse innovation pourrait recevoir une application plus gdnerale et devenir ainsi une barriere opposee a des conflits qui, sou vent, n'eclatent que parcequ'il n'est pas tou jours possible de s'expliquer et de s'entendre. II propose done de se concerter sur une resolution propre & assurer, dans 1'avenir, au maintien de la paix cette chance de 342 The Declaration of Paris duree, sans, toutefois, porter atteinte a 1'inde'pendance des Gouvernements. M. le Comte Walewski se declare autorise a appuyer l'ide"e ^mise par M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne ; il assure que les Plenipotentiaires de la France sont tout disposes a s'associer a 1'insertion au Protocole d'un voeu qui, en re"pondant pleinement aux tendances de notre epoque, n'entraverait, d'aucune faon, la liberte d'action des Gouvernements. M. le Comte de Buol n'hesiterait pas a se joindre a 1'avis des Plenipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne et de la France, si la resolution du Congres doit avoir la forme indiquee par M. le Comte Walewski ; mais il ne saurait prendre, au nom de sa Cour, un engagement absolu et de nature a limiter 1'independance du Cabinet Autrichien. M. le Comte de Clarendon repond que chaque Puissance est et sera seule juge des exigences de son honneur et de ses inte"rets ; qu'il n'entend nullement circonscrire 1'autorite des Gouverne- ments, mais seulement leur fournir 1'occasion de ne pas recourir aux armes, toutes les fois que les dissentiments pourront etre aplanis par d'autres voies. M. le Baron de Manteuffel assure que le Roi, son auguste Maitre, partage completement les idees exposees par M. le Comte de Clarendon ; qu'il se croit done autorise a y adherer et a leur donner tout le deVeloppement qu'elles comportent. M. le Comte Orloif, tout en reconnaissant la sagesse de la proposition faite au Congres, croit devoir en referer a sa Cour avant d'exprimer 1'opinion des P16nipotentiaires de la Russie. M. le Comte de Cavour desire savoir, avant de donner son opinion, si dans 1'intention de 1'auteur de la proposition, le voeu qui serait exprime par le Congres s'etendrait aux interventions militaires dirig^es centre des Gouvernements de fait, et cite, comme exemple, 1'intervention de PAutriche dans le Royaume de Naples en 1821. Lord Clarendon repond que le voeu du Congres devrait admettre 1'application la plus generate ; il fait remarquer que, si les bons offices d'une autre Puissance avaient determine le Gouvernement Grec a respecter les lois de la neutralite, la France et 1'Angleterre se seraient tres probablement abstenues de faire occuper le Pirde par leurs troupes. II rappelle les efforts faits par le Cabinet de la Grande Bretagne, en 1823, pour preVenir 1'intervention arme'e qui cut lieu, a cette 6poque, en Espagne. M. le Comte Walewski ajoute qu'il ne s'agit ni de stipuler un droit, ni de prendre un engagement ; que le voeu exprime^ par le Congres ne saurait, en aucun cas, opposer des limites a la liberte" d'appre"ciation qu'aucune Puissance ne peut aligner Protocols of the Congress of Paris 343 dans les questions qui touchent a sa dignite ; qu'il n'y a done aucun inconvenient a ge'ne'raliser Pidee dont s'est inspire" M. le Comte de Clarendon, et a lui donner la portee la plus etendue. M. le Comte de Buol dit que M. le Comte de Cavour, en parlant, dans une autre seance, de 1'occupation des Legations par des troupes Autrichiennes, a oublie que d'autres troupes etrangeres ont etc" appelees sur le sol des Etats Remains. Aujourd'hui, en parlant de 1'occupation par 1'Autriche du Royaume de Naples en 1821, il oublie que cette occupation a te le r^sultat d'une entente entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances re"unies au Congres de Laybach. Dans les deux cas, il attribue a PAutriche la me'rite d'une initiative et d'une spontaneite que les Plenipotentiaries Autrichiens sont loin de revendiquer pour elle. L'intervention, rappele par le Ple*nipotentiaire de la Sar- daigne, a eu lieu, ajoute-t-il, a la suite des pourparlers du Congres de Laybach ; elle rentre done dans 1'ordre d'idees 6nonce par Lord Clarendon. Des cas semblables pourraient encore se reproduire, et M. le Comte de Buol n'admet pas qu'une inter- vention effectuee par suite d'un accord etabli entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances, puisse devenir 1'objet des reclamations d'un Etat de second ordre. M. le Comte de Buol applaudit a la proposition, telle que Lord Clarendon 1'a presentee, dans un but d'humanite ; mais il ne pourrait y adherer, si on voulait lui donner une trop grande Etendue, ou en d^duiredes consequences favorables auxGouverne- ments de fait, et a des doctrines qu'il ne saurait admettre. II desire, au reste, que le Congres, au moment meme de ter- miner ses travaux, ne se voie pas oblige de traiter des questions irritantes et de nature a troubler la parfaite harmonic qui n'a cesse" de re"gner parmi les Plenipotentiaires. M. le Comte de Cavour declare qu'il est pleinement satisfait des explications qu'il a provoquees, et qu'il donne son adhesion a la proposition soumise au Congres. Apres quoi MM. les Plenipotentiaires n'hesitent pas a ex- primer, au nom de leurs Gouvernements, le vceu que les Etats entre lesquels s'eleverait un dissentiment serieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circon- stances Padmettraient, aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie. MM. les Pl^nipotentiaires esperent que les Gouvernements non repre"sentes au Congres s'associeront a la pensee qui a inspir6 le voeu consign^ au present Protocole. (Suivent les signatures.) 844 The Declaration of Paris ANNEXE AU PROTOCOLS No. 23. DECLARATION. Les Ple"nipotentiaires qui ont signe le Traite de Paris du trente Mars, mil huit cent cinquante-six, reunis en Conference, Conside"rant : Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a 6t pendant longtemps Pobjet de contestations regrettables ; Que 1'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille matiere, donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a des divergences d'opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes serieuses et meme des conflits ; Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, a etablir une doctrine uniforme sur un point aussi important ; Que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congres de Paris ne sauraient mieux repondre aux intentions dont leurs Gouverne- ments sont animes, qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les rapports internationaux des principes fixes a cet egard ; Dument autorises, les susdits Plenipotentiaires sont convenus de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but ; et etant tombes d'accord ont arrete la Declaration solennelle ci-apres : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire re'ellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi. Les Gouvernements des Plenipotentiaires soussigns s'enga- gent a porter cette Declaration a la connaissance des Etats qui n'ont pas etc" appeles a participer au Congres de Paris, et a les inviter a y acceder. Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer ne sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde entier, les Plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas que les efforts de leurs Gouvernements pour en generaliser Padoption ne soient couronnds d'un plein succes. La pr^sente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede. Fait a Paris, le seize Avril, mil huit cent cinquante-six. (Suivent les signatures.) Protocols of the Congress of Paris 345 PROTOCOLS No. 24. STANCE DU 16 AVRIL 1856. Le Protocole de la precedente stance est lu et approuve. M. le Comte Orloff annonce qu'il est en mesure, en vertu des instructions de sa Cour, d'adherer d^finitivement au voeu con- signe" a 1'avant dernier paragraphe du Protoeole No. 23. II est donne" lecture du projet de Declaration annexe au Protocole de la derniere reunion, apres quoi, et ainsi qu'ils 1'avaient decide, MM. les Plenipotentiaries precedent a la signa- ture de cet Acte. Sur la proposition de M. le Comte Walewski, et reconnaissant qu'il est de 1'interet commun de maintenir Pindivisibilit6 des quatre principes mentionnes a la Declaration signee en ce jour, MM. les Plenipotentiaries conviennent que les Puissances qui 1'auront signed ou qui y auront acc6d, ne pourront entrer, a Pavenir, sur 1'application du droit des neutres en temps de guerre, en aucun arrangement qui ne repose a la fois sur les quatre principes objet de la dite Declaration. Sur une observation faite par MM. les Plenipotentiaries de la Russie, le Congres reconnait que la presente resolution, ne pouvant avoir d'effet retroactif, ne saurait invalider les Con- ventions anterieures. M. le Comte Orloff propose a MM. les Plenipotentiaries d'offrir, avant de se separer, a M. le Comte Walewski tous les remerciements du Congres pour la maniere dont il a conduit ses travaux : " M. le Comte Walewski formait," dit-il, " a 1'ouver- ture de notre premiere reunion, le vceu de voir nos deliberations aboutir a une heureuse issue ; ce vceu se trouve realise, et assur6- ment 1'esprit de conciliation avec lequel notre President a dirig nos discussions, a exerce une influence que nous ne saurions trop reconnaitre, et je suis convaincu de repondre aux sentiments de tous les Plenipotentiaries en priant M. le Comte Walewski d'agrer 1'expression de la gratitude du Congres." M. le Comte de Clarendon appuie cette proposition, qui est accueillie avec un empressement unanime par tous les Pleni- potentiaries, lesquels decident d'en farie une mention spciale au Protocole. M. le Comte Walewski repond qu'il est extremement sensible au temoignage bienveillant dont il vient d'etre 1'objet ; et de son c6t, il s'empresse d'exprimer a MM. les Plenipotentiaries sa reconnaissance pour 1'indulgence dont il n'a cesse de recueillir les preuves pendant la dure des Conferences. II se felicite avec eux d'avoir si heureusement et si completement atteint le but propos^ a leurs efforts. Le present Protocole est lu et approuv. (Suivent les signatures.) 346 The Declaration of Paris 18 French Promulgation of the Declaration of Paris, 1856. DOCKET IMPERIAL PORTANT PROMULGATION DE LA D^CLA- RATION DU 16 AVRIL 1856, QUI REGLE DIVERS POINTS DE DROIT MARITIME. NAPOLEON, Par la grace de Dieu et la volonte Rationale, Empereur des Francais, A tous presents et a venir, salut : Ayant vu et examine la declaration conclue, le seize avril mil huit cent cinquante-six, par les plenipotentiaires qui ont signe le traite de paix de Paris du trente mars de la meme annee, Declaration dont la teneur suit : DECLARATION. Les plenipotentiaires qui ont signe" le traite de Paris du trente mars mil huit cent cinquante-six, reunis en conference, ConsideVant : Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a 6t6 pendant longtemps 1'objet de contestations regrettables ; Que 1'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille matiere donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a des divergences d'opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes s^rieuses et meme des conflits ; Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, a etablir une doctrine uniforme sur un point aussi important ; Que les plenipotentiaires assembles au congres de Paris ne sauraient mieux rpondre aux intentions dont leurs gouverne- ments sont animus, qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les rapports internationaux des principes fixes a cet egard ; Dument autorises, les susdits plenipotentiaires sont convenus de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but, et, etant tombs d'accord, ont arret la declaration solennelle ci-apres : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 8. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 347 c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire rellement Faeces du littoral de Pennemi. Les gouvernements des plenipotentiaires soussignes s'engagent a porter cette declaration a la connaissance des fitats qui n'ont pas etc appelds a participer au congres de Paris, et a les inviter a y acc6der. Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer ne sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde entier, les plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas que les efforts de leurs gouvernements pour en generaliser 1'adoption ne soient couronnes d'un plein succes. La presente declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront acced6. Fait a Paris, le seize avril mil huit cent cinquante-six. (Suivent les signatures.) Sur le rapport de notre ministre et secretaire d'etat au departement des affaires etrangeres, Nous avons decrete et decretons ce qui suit : Art. l er . La susdite declaration est approuvee et recevra sa pleine et entiere execution. Art. 2. Notre ministre et secretaire d'fitat au departement des affaires Etrangeres est chargE de Pexecution du present decret. Fait a Paris, le vingt-huit avril mil huit cent cinquante-six. NAPOLEON. 19 Adherences to the Declaration of Paris. RAPPORT A L'EMPEREUR DES FRANgAIS SUR LA PUBLICA- TION DES NOTES OFFICIELLES PORTANT ACCESSION A LA DECLARATION DU CONGRES DE PARIS, DU 16 AVRIL 1856, RELATIVE AU DROIT MARITIME EN TEMPS DE GUERRE. PARIS, LE 12 JUIN 1856. Departement des Affaires Etrangeres. SIRE, Votre Majest6 daignera se rappeler que les Puissances signa- taires de la Declaration du 16 Avril 1856, s'etaient engagees a faire des demarches pour en gen6raliser 1'adoption. Je me suis 348 The Declaration of Paris empress^ en consequence de communiquer cette Declaration a tous les Gouvernements qui n'etaient pas representes au Congres de Paris en les invitant a y acceder et je viens rendre compte a 1'Empereur de 1'accueil favorable que cette com- munication a re9u de la plupart de ceux auxquels elle a et6 transmise. Adoptee et consacree par les Plenipotentiaires de 1'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, de la Prusse, de la Russie, de la Sardaigne, et de la Turquie, la Declaration du 16 Avril a obtenu Pentiere adhesion des Etats done les noms suivent savoir : Bade, La Baviere, la Belgique, Breme, le Bresil, le Duche" de Brunswick, le Chili, la Confederation Argentine, la Confedera- tion Germanique, le Danemark, les Deux-Siciles, la Republique de 1'Equateur, les Etats-Romains, Francfort, la Grece, Guate- mala, Haiti, Hambourg, le Hanovre, les deux Hesses, Lubeck, Mecklembourg-Schwerin, Mecklembourg-Strelitz, Nassau, Olden- bourg, Parme, les Pays-Bas, le Perou, le Portugal, la Saxe, Saxe-Altenbourg, Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe- Weimar, la Suede et la Norvege, la Toscane, le Wurtemberg. 1 Les Etats reconnaissent done avec la France et les autres Puissances signataires du Traite de Paris, 1. Que la course est et demeure abolie, 2. Que le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre. 3. Que la marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contre- bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Enfin, que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement Pacces du littoral de 1'ennemi. Le Gouvernement de Y Uruguay a donne egalement son entier assentiment a ces quatres principes sauf ratification du pouvoir legislatif. L'Espagne, sans acceder a la Declaration du 16 Avril, a cause du 1 point, qui concerne Pabolition de la course a repondu qu'elle s'appropriait les trois autres. Le Mexique a fait la meme reponse. Les Etats-Unis seraient prets de leur cote a accorder leur adhesion, s'il etait ajout6 a Penonce de Pabolition de la course que la propriete prive des sujets ou citoyens des nations belligerents serait exempte de saisie sur mer de la part des marines militaires respectives. Sauf ces exceptions, tous les cabinets ont adher6 sans reserve aux quatre principes qui 1 The adherences now printed have been, as far as possible, brought up to date. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 349 constituent la Declaration du Congres de Paris, et ainsi se trouve consacre dans le droit international de la presque totalite" des Etats de 1'Europe et de l'Am6rique un progres auquel le Gouvernement de Votre Majest6 continuant Tune des plus honorables traditions de la politique Fra^aise peut se feliciter d'avoir puissamment contribue. Afin de constater ces adhesions je propose a PEmpereur d'autoriser 1'insertion au Bulletin des lois des notes officielles dans lesquelles elles se trouvent con- signees et si votre Majest agree cette proposition, je ferai publier de la meme maniere les accessions qui pourront me parvenir ulterieurement. Je suis, &c. A. WALEWSKI. ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION. DECLARATION DU PRESIDENT DE LA CONFEDERATION ARGENTINE. Parana, le 1 Octobre, 1856. (Traduction) Nous Justo-Jose de Urquiza, President Constitutionnel de la Confederation Argentine ; Considerant que leurs Excellences MM. les Ministres Plenipo- tentiaires de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Franais et de Sa Majeste Britannique, au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ont invite separement le Gouvernement National de la Confederation Argentine a adherer aux principes sur le droit maritime arretes dans le Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril de la presente annee, dont la teneur suit : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi ; La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront acce"de\ En consequence, et faisant usage de Pautorisation du Congres Souverain par la loi en date du 15 Septembre dernier, Declarons : Que le Gouvernement National Argentin adhere aux principes ci-dessus exprimes, se considerant comme oblige a regler, d'apres eux, ses rapports avec les Gouvernements qui les ont ou qui les 350 The Declaration of Paris auront accepts. Le Ministre des relations exterieures communi- quera et fera circular la presente Declaration, qui sera inscrite aii registre national. Donne dans la maison du Gouvernement dans la ville de Parana, capitale provisoire de la Confederation Argentine, le ler Octobre de Tan 1856. JusTO-JosE DE URQUIZA. BADEN. LE MINISTRE DE BADE A PARIS AU MINSTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE L'EMPEREUR. Paris, le 30 Juillet, 1856. M. LE MINISTRE, Le Cabinet de Paris, ainsi que ceux de Vienne, de Londres, de Berlin et de Saint-Petersbourg, ont bien voulu communiquer dans le temps an Gouvernement Badois la Declaration que les Plenipotentiaires r&inis au Congres de Paris ont signee et annexee au Protocole du 16 Avril dernier, No. 24, dans le but d'etablir une legislation uniforme du droit maritime des neutres en temps de guerre. Afin d'atteindre pleinement Pobjet qu'il s'etait propose, le Congres a juge convenable que sa Declaration fut portee a la connaissance des Gouvernements qui n'avaient pas pris part a ses travaux et pour les engager a y adherer, invitation qui a ete egalement adressee au Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale le Prince-Regent, mon auguste Souverain. En consequence, le Soussigne, Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Pienipotentiaire de Bade, conformement aux ordres qu'il a recus, a 1'honneur de faire a son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Frangais la communication suivante : Le Gouvernement Badois ne saurait meconnaitre les grands bienfaits resultant de 1'Acte en question pour le bien-etre et la securite du commerce universel. L'on devra au principe consacre par ladite declaration, en ce qui touche 1'abolition de 1'armement en course, d'avoir rassure des interets dont le de- veloppement prend chaque jour de plus grandes proportions, et d'avoir pose une legislation sur le droit des neutres propre a rendre desormais impossibles les complications et les conflits regrettables, amenes tant de fois dans le passe par 1'incertitude des interpretations en pareille matiere. Bien que les Etats maritimes soient plus specialement interesses dans la question, ce ne sont pas eux seuls qui recueilleront les heureux effets Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 351 des quatre points convenus au Congres de Paris ; les fruits en riviendront a tous les pays que Pindustrie et le commerce, ces liens puissants des nations, rattachent e'troitement entre eux. Le Gouvernement Badois n'he'site done pas a se rendre a 1'appel qui lui a e*te fait ; c'est avec une vive satisfaction qu'il donne sa pleine adhesion a des principes si conformes a 1'esprit et a la civilisation de notre siecle. En informant Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres que le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale le Prince-Regent de Bade adhere sans restriction a la Declaration signee a Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, le Soussigne a Phonneur de prier son Excellence de vouloir bien lui accuser reception de la pre"sente. H saisit, &c. BARON DE SCHWEIZER. BAVARIA. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE BAVIERE AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE BAVIERE A PARIS. Munich, le 4 Juillet, 1856. M. LE COMTE, M. le Comte de Massignac, Charge d' Affaires de France prs cette Cour, m'a communique, en vertu des ordres de son Gouvernement et en invitant le Gouvernement Bavarois a y adherer, une Declaration signee le 16 Avril dernier, par MM. les Plenipotentiaires des Puissances represented au Congrs de Paris et dans laquelle sont pose's, en matiere de droit maritime, les principes suivants : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire re'ellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi. Le Gouvernement du Roi, M. le Comte, constate avec une vive satisfaction, due a Pinitiative du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste" PEmpereur des Franais, le grand progres qui vient de s'accomplir dans cette branche importante du droit international. La nouvelle doctrine, en effet, est fonde'e sur les principes de Pequite" la plus eVidente ; elle est, en outre, en tous points conforme a Pesprit pacifique et civilisateur dont se glorifie a juste titre Pepoque actuelle, et elle mettra heureusement fin a 352 The Declaration of Paris des divergences d'opinion qui souvent ont etc la source de difficultes serieuses et de conflits. Ce document ayant etc place sous les yeux du Roi, notre auguste Souverain, qui en a reconnu la haute importance en payant en meme temps un juste tribut de reconnaissance aux Hautes Puissances represent ees au Congres de Paris, je viens d'etre autorise a porter a votre connaissance, M. le Comte, que le Gouvernement Bavarois adhere pleinement et avec em- pressement aux principes de droit maritime proclames dans la seance du 16 Avril, qu'il les accepte et entend les appliquer dans leiir ensemble, et qu'il s'engage a n'entrer a 1'avenir dans aucun engagement sur 1'application du droit maritime en temps de guerre sans stipuler 1'observation des quatre points susenonces. Vous voudrez bien, M. le Comte, donner lecture et laisser copie de la presente depeche a M. le Comte Walewski. Recevez, &c. VON DER PFORDTEN. BELGIUM. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE BELGIQUE AU MINISTRE PLENIPOTENTIAIRE DE FRANCE A BRUXELLES. Bruxelles, le 6 Juin, 1856. M. LE MINISTRE, Votre Excellence a ete chargee d'inviter le Gouvernement du Roi a acceder a la Declaration souscrite, le 16 Avril dernier, par les Puissances qui ont participe au Congres de Paris, declaration qui a pour objet de consacrer les principes de droit maritime, savoir : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire re'ellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi. Apres avoir pris les ordres du Roi, mon auguste Souverain, j'ai 1'honneur de donner acte a votre Excellence de la pleine et entiere adhesion de la Belgique a la Declaration susmentionnee et aux principes qu'elle renferme. J'ajouterai, M. le Ministre, que Sa Majeste en a hautement appr&ie' le caractere eleve : elle se fe"licite de Pinfluence salutaire que cette nouvelle base Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 353 du droit public maritime doit exercer dans 1'avenir, et m'a charge d'etre ici Pinterprete de ses sentiments de satisfaction. VlCOMTE VlLAIN XIIII. BRAZIL. LE MINISTRE DBS AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DU BRESIL AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Rio Janeiro, le 18 Mars, 1858. (Traduction) Le Soussigne du Conseil de Sa Majeste PEmpereur, Ministre Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangeres, a porte a la connais- sance du Gouvernement Imperial 1'invitation qui lui a et faite par M. le Chevalier de Saint-Georges, Envoye" Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire, au nom de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, relativement aux principes generaux de droit international proclame's par le Congres de Paris. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur ne pouvait que faire le plus bienveillant accueil a la Declaration par laquelle les Plenipotentiaries du Traite Europeen du 30 Mars, 1856, ont termine leur glorieuse mission. Le droit conventionnel de PEmpire, comme ne Pignore pas M. de Saint-Georges, a tou jours ete inspire par les memes sentiments libe'raux et pacifiques qui consacrent la doctrine la plus generalement suivie jusqu'a ce jour. Ces dispositions amicales du Gouvernement Imperial n'ont 6te que confirmees par Pexamen reflechi de Pimportant objet auquel se refere Pinvitation du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste PEmpereur des Frangais, et le soussigne a la satisfaction, d'apres les ordres de PEmpereur, son auguste Souverain, de faire savoir a M. de Saint-Georges que le Gouvernement Imperial adhere entierement aux principes de droit maritime etablis par les Conferences de Paris, a savoir : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi. Le Gouvernement Imperial, en s'associant dans cette forme, quant a Padoption de maximes si moderees et si justes, aux Gouvernements qui en ont pris Pinitiative, espere que la politique 23 354 The Declaration of Paris sage et ge"nereuse qui les a inspires en re"glera egalement la vraie pratique, evitant, autant qu'il sera possible, les disaccords et les conflits qui, de tout temps, ont apporte des restrictions aux principes 6nonce"s aux paragraphes 2 et 3 a 1'egard du droit de visite et de la qualification de marchandise hostile, et aussi quant au principe enonce au paragraphe 4, en ce qui determinera sa condition essentielle et les cas de violation effective de la part des neutres. L'humanite et la justice doivent certainement au Congres de Paris une grande amelioration apportee a la loi commune des nations ; mais, au nom des memes principes, on peut encore demander aux Puissances signataires du Traite du 30 Mars, 1856, comme complement de son ceuvre de justice et de civil- isation, la consequence salutaire que renferment les maximes qu'elles ont proclame'es. Cette consequence est que, toute propri^te particuliere inoffensive, sans exception, des navires marchands, doit.etre placee sous la protection du droit maritime a 1'abri des attaques des croiseurs de guerre. Le Gouvernement Imperial adhere en cela a 1'invitation des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et, dans 1'espoir que la modification proposed par cette Puissance au premier des principes proclames par le Congres de Paris se r^alisera, se declare des a present dispose" a 1'admettre comme la complete expression de la nouvelle juridiction internationale. Le Soussigne", en adressant a M. de Saint-Georges cette agre"able communication, saisit cette occasion pour lui renou- veler les expressions de sa parfaite estime et de sa considra- tion distingue. J. M. DA SILVA PARANHAS. BREMEN. LE SYNDIC CHARGfi DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE LA VILLE DE BREME AU MINISTRE RESIDENT DES VILLES LIBRES A PARIS. Br&me, le 11 Juin, 1856. M. LE MINISTRE, M. 1'Envoye" de France s'est acquitt6 aupres de moi de la communication dont il avait etc charge" par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste" Impe"riale, au sujet de la Declaration du Congres de Paris concernant les principes de droit maritime en temps de guerre. Cette communication a e"te" accueillie par le Se"nat avec la satisfaction que devait lui faire eprouver 1'adoption de principes si favorables aux intdrets des neutres et si conformes aux progres de notre temps." Le Se"nat ne saurait done, Monsieur, Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 355 que s'empresser d'adhe"rer a la Declaration signe"e par les membres du Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, convaincu que I'adh^sion a donner a 1'acte dont il s'agit ne devra produire tout 1'effet desirable qu'autant qu'elle embrassera dans son ensemble les quatre principes poses par les Puissances signataires. C'est dans cette mesure qu'il n'hesite pas a la formuler, en considerant comme e"tant lies d'une maniere indivisible les quatre points resolus par la Declaration precitee. Je vous invite, en consequence, Monsieur, a porter cette adhesion pleine et sans reserve a la connaissance de M. le Comte Walewski, a qui vous voudrez bien laisser copie de la presente depeche. Je ne doute pas qu'elle ne reponde completement aux vceux du Gouvernement de 1'Empereur et au but de la communication que M. Edouard Cintrat avait etc charge de nous faire. Vous profiterez en meme temps de cette occasion, Monsieur, pour reiterer a M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 1'expression de la sincere reconnaissance du Senat pour tous les genereux principes de droit public qui, sur 1'initiative de PEmpereur, inspire de la politique traditionnelle de la France, ont etc consacres par le Congres, dans le noble but d'empecher, dore- navant, autant que cela est possible, les guerres, ou d'en dimi- nuer les tristes consequences. Recevez, &c. SMIDT. BRUNSWICK. LE MINISTRE D'ETAT DU DUG DE BRUNSWICK AU CHARGfi D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. Brunswick, le 7 Dtcembre, 1857. M. de Charge d' Affaires, le Soussigne Ministre d'Etat Ducal a eu 1'honneur de recevoir la copie d'une depeche de M. le Comte Walewski, avec la copie y jointe de la Declaration des Plenipo- tentiaires au Congres de Paris, relatives aux nouveaux principes du droit maritime arrete"s dans la seance du 16 Avril, 1856, lesquelles pieces vous avez bien voulu lui transmettre par votre note du 4 courant, et il se hate, M. le Charge d'Affaires, de vous en presenter Pexpression de toutes ses obligations. Le Gouverne- ment de Son Altesse le Due sait parfaitement apprecier le progrs sur le domaine du droit des gens, se manifestant dans les principes de cette declaration, ainsi que les bienfaits pour le commerce et les rapports internationaux, qui ne tarderont pas a en decouler, et il ne saurait que s'en feliciter. Comme la Diete Fe"derale a, dans sa seance du 10 Juillet dernier, unanimement declare son adhesion aux principes en 356 The Declaration of Paris question, et que les repre"sentants de la France, de la Grande - Bretagne et de la Russie a Francfort ont ete informe's de cette conclusion, il sera permis au Soussigne Ministre d'Etat de s'y referer. Le Soussigne, &c. GEYSO. CHILI. LE MINISTRE DBS RELATIONS EXTfiRIEURES DU CHILI AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. (Traduction) Santiago, le 13 Aout, 1856. MONSIEUR, J'ai eu 1'honneur de recevoir votre note en date du 24 du mois dernier, par laquelle vous invitez mon Gouvernement, au nom de celui de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur, a s'associer a la Declaration signe*e par les Plenipotentiaires du Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, et ayant pour objet de fixer des bases uniformes de droit maritime a regard des neutres. J'ai re9U en meme temps une copie de la note que M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de France vous a adresse*e a ce sujet, et de la Declaration sus- mentionnee du 16 Avril. Les quatre principes sanctionne"s et promulgues dans cette declaration ont deja ete en partie 1'objet de stipulations formelles dans les Traites que la Re'publique a conclus avec des Puissances de 1'Europe et de PAme'rique. Les regies proclame'es sur cette matiere par le Congres de Paris sont done en tout conformes a la politique de mon Gouverne- ment, et aucune difficulte ne s'oppose a la signature d'engage- ments propres a les sanctionner et a les y generaliser. Si votre Gouvernement est anime du meme desir, le mien sera heureux de concourir, pour sa part, a la generalisation de principes aussi conformes aux interets generaux du commerce du monde et qui sont en harmonic si parfaite avec la civilisation de notre e"poque. Je saisis, &c. A. VARGAS. DENMARK. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE DANEMARC AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Copenhague, le 25 Juin, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemark, a eu 1'honneur de recevoir la note que M. Dot6zac, Envoye* Extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"nipotentiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Fran9ais, a bien voulu lui adresser, en date du 2 du courant, en lui remettant, par ordre de son Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 357 Gouvernement, la Declaration que le Congres de Paris a, sur la proposition du premier Plinipotentiaire de Sa Majeste" PEmpereur Napoleon, adopted dans la seance du 16 Avril dernier, touchant certains principes du droit maritime en temps de guerre, dont les Puissances signataires du Traite de Paix du 30 Mars de la presente annee sont convenues de faire entre elles la regie invariable de leur conduite. A cette note etait egalement jointe une depeche de Son Excellence M. le Comte Walewski, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Franais, en date du 15 Mai, par laquelle M. Dotezac a etc charge d'inviter le Gouverne- ment de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemark a acceder a la Decla- ration susmentionnee. Le Soussigne s'est fait un devoir de remettre cette Decla- ration au Roi, son auguste Souverain, en portant 1'attention de Sa Majeste sur les considerations qui en ont motive la signa- ture et qui justifient pour 1'avenir, sans restriction et dans leur ensemble, les principes qui en font 1'objet. La Declaration porte : 1. Que la course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Que le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. Que la marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contre- bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement Pacces du littoral ennemi. Enfin il est stipule dans la Declaration qu'elle n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede. La justice des principes enonces est si evidente et les principes memes sont si conformes a Pesprit de la legislation Danoise en matiere de droit maritime, que Pinvitation qui vient d'etre ainsi adressee au Gouvernement du Roi a ete doublement agre"able a Sa Majeste. En consequence, le Soussigne se trouve autorise a declarer, par la presente, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemark accede a la Declaration signee, le 16 Avril de Pannee courante, par les Plenipotentiaries reunis au Congres de Paris, et qu'il adopte, sans restriction et dans leur ensemble, les principes consacres par cet acte, en en reconnaissant Pindivisi- bilite pour 1'avenir. En priant M. Dotezac de vouloir bien porter la presente note a la connaissance du Gouvernement Imperial, le Sous- signe, &c. DE SCHEELE. 858 The Declaration of Paris ECUADOR. DfiCRET DU SfiNAT ET DE LA CHAMBRE DES REPRfiSENTANTS DE L'EQUATEUR REUNIS EN CONGRES. Quito, le 6 Decembre, 1856. (Traduction) Le Senat et la Chambre des representants de 1'Equateur, reunis en Congres, Considerant que la Declaration adoptee au Congres de Paris, en date du 16 Avril de la presente annee 1856, par les Plenipotentiaires de plusieurs Etats de FEurope, est conforme aux principes que la Republique a professes jusqu'a ce jour et stipules avec plusieurs nations de 1'Amerique, DECRETENT : Art. 1. La Republique de 1'Equateur adhere a la Declaration signee a Paris, le 16 Avril de la presente annee, par les Plenipo- tentiaires de PEurope, declaration qui comprend les resolutions suivantes : 1. La course est abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Le blocus, pour etre obligatoire, doit etre effectif, c'est- a-dire doit etre maintenu par une force suffisante pour interdire 1'acces du littoral de 1'ennemi. 2. A 1'egard des Etats qui ont adhere ou qui adhereront, la Republique de 1'Equateur s' engage, en consequence, a observer tous et chacun des points exprimes dans PArticle precedent. Soit communique au Pouvoir Executif pour etre public et mis en vigueur. Donne a Quito, capitale de la Republique, le 29 Novembre, 1856, 1'an XII de la Liberte. Le President du Senat, MANUEL BUSTAMENTE. Le President de la Chambre des Representants, PAUL GUEVARA. Le Secretaire du Senat, MODESTE ESPINOSA. Le Secretaire de la Chambre des Representants, PAUL BUSTAMENTE. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 359 Palais du Gouvernement, a Quito, le 6 Decembre, 1856, an XII de la Liberte. Pour etre mis a execution. MARCOS SPRIEL. ANTONIO MATA. FRANKFORT. LE PREMIER BOURGMESTRE DE FRANCFORT AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Francfort-sur-le-Mein, le 17 Juin, 1856. Le soussigne, Premier Bourgmestre de la Ville Libre de Franc- fort, s'est empresse de porter a la connaissance du haut Senat la communication officielle que M. le Comte de Monttessuy, Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste PEmpereur des Fran9ais, a bien voulu lui faire au sujet de la Declaration a 1'egard du droit maritime arretee a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856, au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, par les Plenipotentiaries qui ont signe le Traite de Paris du 30 Mars, 1856. Le Senat, appreciant dans toute leur etendue la haute portee des dispositions de la Declaration en question, disposi- tion qui reglent le droit maritime en temps de guerre d'une maniere analogue aux interets du commerce et de la civilisa- tion, et propres a prevenir et a resoudre les difficultes et les conflits dus a 1'incertitude de la loi internationale en pareille matiere, a charge le soussigne de repondre a la communication qui lui a ete faite par la declaration officielle : Que le Senat de cette Ville Libre accede sans restriction au contenu de la Declaration sur le droit maritime du 16 Avril, 1856, ainsi qu'a 1'engagement de n'entrer, a 1'avenir, dans aucun arrangement sur 1'application du droit maritime en temps de guerre sans stipuler la stricte observation des 4 points resolus par la Declaration. Le Senat ne doute pas que tous les Etats qui n'ont pas ete appeles a participer au Congres de Paris repondront avec gratitude a 1'invitation d'acceder a un Acte qui, a juste titre, est considere comme un des progres qui font la gloire de notre temps et comme le veritable couronnement de 1'ceuvre de pacification conclue a Paris. Le soussigne a I'honneur de prier M. le Comte de Monttessuy de vouloir bien porter la declaration du Senat a la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur, et saisit, &c. Dr NEUBURG. 360 The Declaration of Paris GERMANIC CONFEDERATION. LE PRESIDENT DE LA DIETE GERMANIQUE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Francfort, le 10 Juillet, 1856 (Traduction) Le Soussign a 1'honneur de preVenir son Excellence M. le Comte de Monttessuy, Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"ni- potentiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Franais, que la Haute-Diete a pris connaissance avec le plus vif interet de la communication que son Excellence a bien voulu lui faire relativement a la Declaration signee a Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, concernant 1'interpretation et 1'application du droit maritime en temps de guerre. Conformement a 1'invitation qui y est exprimee ainsi qu'aux propositions faites conjointement par les Gouvernements de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur d'Autriche et de Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse, et aux communications faites de la part des legations de Sa Majeste Britannique et de Sa Majeste" 1'Empereur de Russie, la Haute-Diete a pris, dans sa seance d'aujourd'hui, la decision dont le Soussigne a 1'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe une copie. II saisit, &c. RECHBERG. RESOLUTION DE LA DIETE GERMANIQUE, DU 10 JUILLET, 1856. (Traduction) La Diete Germanique a decide : En appreciant et en reconnaissant pleinement le contenu et les fins de la Declaration concernant 1'interpretation et 1'appli- cation du droit maritime en temps de guerre, que les Ple"ni- potentiaires reunis au Congres de paix de Paris ont signee comme annexe du Protocol XXIV des Conferences, et par laquelle a et6 arrete ce qui suit : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1' exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement I'acces du littoral de 1'ennemi. De se rendre a 1'invitation qui lui a iti faite de la part de 1'Autriche et de la Prusse, ainsi que des Cours de France, de la Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 361 Grande-Bretagne et de Russie, d'adhe*rer a cette Declaration et par consequent d'y acce*der au nom de la Confederation Germanique. GREECE. LE MINISTBE DES AFFAIRES F.TRANGERES DE GR$CE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Athenes, le -$ Juin, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre de la Maison Royale et des Relations Exte'rieures de Sa Majeste Helle*nique, a 1'honneur d'accuser reception a M. rEnvoye" Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipo- tentiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Frangais, de la note, en date du 6 Juin, par laquelle il a bien voulu lui communiquer la Declaration sur les droits des neutres en temps de guerre maritime, signe*e a Paris le T V Avril, 1856, et dont la teneur suit : DECLARATION. Les Plenipotentiaries qui ont signe* le Traite* de Paris du 30 Mars, 1856, re"unis en Conference, Considerant : Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a etc, pendant longtemps, 1'objet de contestations regrettables ; Que 1'incertitude du droit et des devoirs, en pareille matiere, donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a des divergences d'opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes se"rieuses et meme des conflits ; Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, a e*tablir une doctrine uniforme sur un point aussi important ; Que les Plenipotentiaries assembles au Congres de Paris ne sauraient mieux repondre aux intentions dont leurs Gouverne- ments sont animus, qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les rapports internationaux des principes fixes a cet egard ; Dument autorises, les Plenipotentiaries sont convenus de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but, et, etant tombes d'accord, ont arrete la Declaration solennelle ci-apres : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement 1'acces du littoral de 1'ennemi. 362 The Declaration of Paris Les Gouvernements des Plenipotentiaires soussignes s'en- gagent a porter cette Declaration a la connaissance des Etats qui n'ont pas e"te appeles a participer au Congres de Paris, et a les inviter a y acceder. Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer ne sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde entier, les Plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas que les efforts de leurs Gouvernements, pour en generaliser Padoption, ne soient couronnes d'un plein succes. La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede. Fait a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856. BUOL SCHAUENSTEIN. HUBNER. A. WALEWSKI. BOURQUENEY. CLARENDON. COWLEY. MANTEUFFEL. HATZFELDT. ORLOFF. BRUNOW. C. CAVOUR. DE VILLAMARINA. AALI. MEHEMMED DJEMIL. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste se felicite sincerement d'avoir a donner son accession a un acte qui est une veritable conquete de la justice et de la science du droit sur des maximes differemment cogues et plus differemment encore appliqu6es jusqu'a present par les diverses nations. Les grandes Puissances signataires du Traite" de Paix de Paris peuvent se glorifier a juste titre d'avoir ajoute a leur grande ceuvre de pacification un bienfait aussi important que celui dont elles viennent de doter le monde entier. Le Soussigne, apres avoir pris les ordres du Roi, son auguste Souverain, s'empresse done de declarer a M. PEnvoye Extraordi- naire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de France, que le Gouverne- ment Grec adhere a toutes et & chacune des quatre clauses contenues dans la susdite Declaration, et promet de s'y con- former exactement, le cas e"cheant. Toutefois, comme la Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede, le Soussigne prie M. Mercier de faire prendre a son Gouverne- ment les dispositions convenables pour informer le Gouverne- ment Grec quelles sont les Puissances qui ont deja exprime ou exprimeront, dans la suite, leur adhesion a la Declaration. A. R. RANGABE. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 363 GUATEMALA. LE MINISTRE DBS RELATIONS EXTfiRIEURES DE GUATE- MALA AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. (Traduction) Guatemala, le 30 Aout, 1856. M. LE VICOMTE, J'ai eu 1'honneur de recevoir, avec la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 18 de ce mois, une copie de la depeche de son Excellence M. le Comte Walewski, par laquelle ce Ministre vous charge d'engager le Gouvernement de Guatemala a adherer aux principes de droit maritime adoptes par les Plenipoten- tiaires reunis dernierement a Paris, et qui sont constates par la Declaration signee, le 16 Avril dernier, dont vous avez bien voulu m'envoyer egalement une copie. En reponse a cette note, j'ai 1'honneur de vous informer, Monsieur, que le President de la Republique est d'avis que les principes etablis dans cette Declaration sont non-seulement d'une justice rigoureuse, mais qu'ils peuvent etre en meme temps une garantie pour les nations faibles ; en consequence, son Excellence, avec 1'assentiment unanime de son Cabinet d'Etat, donne avec satisfaction son adhesion formelle aux principes importants contenus dans la Declaration faite, le 16 Avril dernier, par le Congres de Paris. Je saisis, &c. P. DE AYCINENA. HAITI. LE MINISTRE DBS RELATIONS EXTfiRIEURES D'HAlTI AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. Cayes, le 17 Septembre, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre des Relations Exterieures de Sa Majeste* 1'Empereur d'Haiti, a eu 1'honneur de recevoir la note de M. le Vice-Consul, charge* de la Legation et du Consulat general de France a Port-au-Prince, par laquelle il a officiellement signifie au Gouvernement Haitien la Declaration du 16 Avril dernier des Plenipotentiaires Europeens du Congres de Paris, et demande au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Imperiale son adhesion aux principes du droit maritime international proclames dans le Congres precite. Le Ministre des Relations Exterieures d'Haiti est charge d'annoncer au Vice-Consul de France la pleine et entiere ad- hesion du Gouvernement Imperial et ajoute que cette adhesion, 364 The Declaration of Paris ainsi que la Declaration qui y a donne lieu, seront rendues publiques par le journal officiel du Gouvernement. Le Ministre des Relations Exterieures d'Haiti prie M. le Vice-Consul d'agreer, &c. L. DUFRENE. HAMBURG. LE SYNDIC CHARGE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE HAM- BOURG AU MINISTRE RESIDENT DES VILLES LIBRES A PARIS. Hambourg, le 27 Juin, 1856. MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE, M. 1'Envoye de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Franais m'a communique le 3 de ce mois, en m'en laissant copie, une depeche que le Ministre des Affaires lEtrangeres, M. le Comte Walewski, lui avait adressee, en date du 19 Mai, au sujet des principes de droit maritime en temps de guerre adoptes par les Puissances signataires du Traite de Paris, et par 1'adoption desquels les signataires, et surtout la France, par la genereuse proposition de laquelle cette resolution a etc" prise, se sont acquis des titres durables a la profonde reconnaissance de toutes les nations maritimes. Une communication analogue m'a ete faite le meme jour par les Ministres d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie. Sur le rapport que je lui en avais fait, le Senat vous autorise, conformement au desir que M. le Comte Walewski en avait exprime dans sa depeche du 19 Mai, a declarer a Son Excellence, au nom du Se"nat, que le Senat adhere pleinement et sans restriction quelconque aux 4 points contenus dans la Declara- tion sur le droit maritime en temps de guerre, que M. Cintrat a bien voulu nous transmettre, et que le Senat s'engage en meme temps a n'entrer a 1'avenir, sur 1'application du droit maritime en temps de guerre, dans aucun arrangement sans stipuler la stricte observation des 4 points resolus par cette Declaration. Vous profiterez en meme temps de cette occasion, Monsieur, pour r&terer a M. le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres 1'expres- sion de la sincere reconnaissance du Senat pour tous les genereux principes de droit public qui, sur 1'initiative de 1'Empereur, inspire de la politique traditionnelle de la France, ont ete consacres par le Congres, dans le noble but d'empecher dore- navant, autant que cela est possible, les guerres, ou d'en diminuer les tristes consequences. Vous voudrez bien donner lecture et laisser copie de cette de"pche a M. le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres. Agreez, &c. MERCK. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 365 HANOVER. LE MINISTRE DBS AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE HANOVRE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Hanovre, le 31 Mai, 1856. Le Soussigne", Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangeres, a re9u la note du 28 de ce mois, que M. le Comte de Reculot, Envoy6 Extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"mpotentiaire de Sa Majeste* 1'Empereur des Fran9ais, au nom de son Gouverne- ment, a bien voulu lui adresser pour inviter le Gouvernement Hanovrien a adherer a la Declaration des Ple*nipotentiaires au Congres de Paris relative aux nouveaux principes du droit maritime arrete"s dans la seance du 16 Avril dernier. Appreciant dans toute leur valeur la genereuse initiative prise a cette occasion et les motifs eleves qui 1'ont dicte"e, le Gouvernement Hanovrien reconnait avec une vive satisfaction, dans les principes appeles desormais a servir de regie au droit maritime international, Peclatant temoignage d'un grand progrs accompli, constatant, a la veritable gloire de ceux qui 1'ont realise, le sentiment profond du droit et de requite", et qui restera dans 1'histoire comme Tun des plus beaux monuments de la civilisation moderne. Organe de la plus vive reconnaissance de Gouvernement Hanovrien envers les Hautes Puissances representees au Congres de Paris, le soussigne Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangeres, autorise" a cet effet par le Roi, son auguste Maitre, a 1'honneur de porter a la connaissance de M. le Comte de Reculot, que le Gouvernement Hanovrien adhere avec empressement a la De- claration des Plenipotentiaires au Congres de Paris relative aux nouveaux principes du droit maritime arretes dans la seance du 16 Avril dernier, qu'il en accepte 1'application pleine et entiere, et qu'il s'engage nommement a n'entrer, a 1'avenir, en aucun arrangement sur 1'application du droit maritime en temps de guerre sans stipuler la stricte observation des quatre points re"solus par ladite Declaration. Le Soussigne", &c. PLATEN HALLERMUND. HESSE-CASSEL. LE MINISTRE D'fiTAT DE HESSE-CASSEL AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. ,, Cassel, le 4 Juin, 1856. MONSIEUR, Ayant reu par 1'interme'diaire de M. de Montherot, Envoye* Extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"nipotentiaire de Sa Majeste* 1'Empereur des Fran9ais pr6s la Cour Electorale de Hesse, les 366 The Declaration of Paris copies d'une depeche de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur, ainsi que d'une Declaration en date du 16 Avril dernier, toutes deux ayant trait aux nouveaux principes du droit maritime en temps de guerre adoptes par les Plenipotentiaries au Congres de Paris, j'ai 1'honneur de vous preVenir, Monsieur, que je me suis fait un devoir d'en porter le contenu a la connaissance de 1'Electeur, mon auguste Maitre, et que Son Altesse Royale a accueilli cette communication avec un int^ret particulier, daignant en meme temps exprimer son adhesion aux principes enonce"s. Veuillez, &c. DE MEYER. HESSE-DARMSTADT. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE HESSE - DARMSTADT AU MINISTRE PLfiNIPOTENTIAIRE DE SON ALTESSE ROYALE LE GRAND-DUG A PARIS. ,, . Darmstadt, le 15 Juin, 1856. M. LE BARON, J'ai 1'honneur de vous transmettre sous ce pli copie de deux pieces importantes que M. le Vicomte Roederer a .bien voulu me communiquer, il y a quelque temps, savoir, d'une depeche de M. le Comte Walewski, en date du 15 du mois passe, et d'une Declaration des Plenipotentiaries qui ont signe le Traite de Paris du 30 Mars dernier, destined a fixer les principes du droit maritime en temps de guerre. Le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal, tres-sensible a 1'invitation que le Cabinet des Tuileries lui a fait adresser, par 1'organe de la Legation ImpeYiale a Darmstadt, d'acceder a la Declaration du Congres de Paris sur cette importante matiere, ne saurait qu'applaudir a une doctrine si favorable a la securite* et au deVeloppement des rapports internationaux. Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Due m'a, en consequence, donne 1'ordre de vous charger, Monsieur le Baron, de faire con- naitre au Gouvernement Imperial combien celui du Grand- Duche" de Hesse se rejouit des heureux resultats des demarches que, par ordre de Sa Ma jeste 1 1'Empereur, M. le Comte Walewski a faites au Congres de Paris dans un but d'utilite si reelle et si universelle. Vous ajouterez que le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal adhere avec empressement, sans reserve ni restriction quelconque, a cette Declaration comme etablissant des principes indivisibles. Vous voudrez bien, d'ailleurs, donner lecture et laisser copie de la pr6sente d6peche a son Excellence M. le Comte Walewski. Agre"ez, &c. BARON DE DALWIGK. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 367 HOLLAND. LE MINISTRE DBS AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DES PAYS-BAS AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. La Haye, le 7 Juin, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangeres, a eu Fhonneur de recevoir de M. le Baron d'Andr, Envoye Extra- ordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Fran9ais, en date du 2 de ce mois, communication de la Declaration faite en Conference a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856, au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, par les Plenipotentiaires qui ont signe le Trait6 du 30 Mars de la meme annee, et relative au droit maritime en temps de guerre. Pareille communication a e"te faite au Soussign par les autres legations des Puissances signataires du Traite du 30 Mars, accrditees a la Haye. A cette communication e"tait jointe 1'invitation d'acceder a la Declaration precite"e. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi des Pays-Bas a re9U cette communication avec une satisfaction proportionnee a l'ceuvre de haute civilisation qui, par 1'adoption unanime des maximes contenues dans la Declaration, a ete accomplie dans la Conference de Paris. A ces maximes, du reste, les Pays-Bas ont tou jours rendu hommage. C'est, en consequence, avec empressement que le Soussign, d'apres les ordres du Roi son auguste Maitre, et en son nom, declare acceder a ladite Declaration du 16 Avril, en exprimant 1'espoir que 1'adoption des principes qui y sont etablis sera generate et que leur maintien ne souffrira jamais d' interruption. Le Soussign6 a fait parvenir une note identique a MM. les autres Representants des Puissances signataires. II prie M. le Baron d'Andre de vouloir bien lui accuser la reception de la pr^sente et d'agr^er, &c. VAN HALL. JAPAN. FRENCH NOTIFICATION OF THE ACCESSION OF JAPAN TO THE DECLARATION OF PARIS OF APRIL 16, 1856, RESPECTING MARITIME LAW. PARIS, DECEMBER 24, 1886. Sa Majeste 1'Empereur du Japon ayant accede a la Declara- tion signee le 16 Avril, 1856, au Congres de Paris, pour re"gler divers points de droit maritime, par 1'Acte d'Accession deiivre" 368 The Declaration of Paris par son Excellence M. Inouye Kaoru, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres muni de pleins pouvoirs en bonne et due forme ; acte d'acceptation dont la teneur suit ici mot pour mot : " Le Soussigne", Ministre des Affaires iStrangeres de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur du Japon, a 1'honneur de faire savoir a M. Sienkiewicz, Ministre de France a T6ki6, que le Gouverne- ment du Mikado, appreciant la haute justice des principes proclames dans le Declaration dressee le 16 Avril 1856, par le Congres de Paris, et dont le texte est ci- joint, donne son adhesion entiere definitive aux quatre clauses contenues dans cette De- claration, et s'engage a s'y conformer exactement. " Le Soussigne" attacherait du prix a ce que son Gouverne- ment fut informe.des adhesions qui se sont deja produites et de celles qui pourront avoir lieu dans la suite. II saisit, &c. " (L.S.) INOUYE KAORU, " Ministre des Affaires fitr anger es. " Ministere des Affaires ^trangeres, T6ki6, le 30 jour du 10 mois de la 19 anne"e de Meiji (30 Octobre, 1886)." Nous, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres de la Republique Franaise, dument autorise a cet effet, acceptons formellement la dite accession tant au nom du Gouvernement de la Re*publique qu'au nom des Hautes Puissances Signataires de la De*clara- tion du 16 Avril, 1856 ; et nous nous engageons a accomplir les obligations contenues dans la dite Declaration qui pourront concerner Sa Majeste 1'Empereur du Japon. En foi de quoi nous avons signe le present Acte d'Accepta- tion d' Accession et y avons appose" notre cachet. Fait a Paris, le 24 Decembre, 1886. (L.S.) FLOURENS. LUBECK. LE SYNDIC CHARGE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE LA VILLE DE LUBECK AU MINISTRE RESIDENT DES VILLES LIBRES A PARIS. Lubeck, le 20 Juin, 1856. M. LE MINISTRE, Monsieur 1'Envoye" Extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"nipoten- tiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Fran9ais accredit^ aupres de la ville libre et ans^atique de Lubeck, par une note du ler courant a fait communication de la Declaration des Ministres signataires de la paix de Paris, du 30 Mars dernier, au sujet des principes de droit maritime en temps de guerre. Cette communication et 1'invitation y ajoutee d'adherer a ladite Declaration ont ete accueillies par le Senat avec toute la satis- Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 369 faction due a 1'adoption de principes si favorables aux intents des neutres et si conformes aux vues e* dairies du siecle. Le Se"nat, Monsieur, apres avoir fait pr^c6der des communications inte"rieures, s'empresse d'adh^rer, au nom de Lubeck, a cette meme Declaration, telle qu'elle est signde par les membres du Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, acte qui produira tout Peffet desire* par 1'ensemble des quatre points y contenus et ins6parablement lie's. En consequence, Monsieur, je viens d'etre charge par le Snat de vous inviter a porter cette adhesion pleine et entiere a la connaissance de son Excellence Monsieur le Comte Walewski, en lui laissant copie de la pre"sente d^peche. CUETIUS, Syndic. MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE MECKLEM- BOURG-SCHWfiRIN AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Schw6rin, le 22 Juillet, 1856. Le Soussigne", Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Due de Mecklembourg-Schwe'rin, a re9U la note dont son Excellence M. de Cintrat, Envoye" Extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"nipotentiaire de Sa Majeste" 1'Empereur des Frangais a Hambourg, 1'a honore", en date du ler Juin dernier, et qui a pour objet d'inviter le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal a acce"der a la Declaration signee, le 16 Avril dernier, par les Puissances qui ont participe" au Congres de Paris, sur les principes du droit maritime en temps de guerre. Apres avoir pris les ordres du Grand-Due, son auguste Souverain, le Soussigne est charge" d'etre 1'interprete de la vive satisfaction dont Son Altesse Royale a ete penetre'e en voyant etablie, par la consecration de ces principes, une nouvelle base du droit public maritime, propre a att6nuer les calamites de la guerre et a mettre un terme a 1'etat d'incertitude auquel a donne lieu jusqu'a present 1'application de la loi internationale en pareille matiere. Plus Son Altesse Royale sait appre"cier le caractere eleve d'un tel acte, plus elle s'est empressee de prononcer sa pleine et entiere adhesion a la Declaration susmentionnee et aux prin- cipes qu'elle renferme. Ayant 1'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe a M. de Cintrat la copie de la patente qui, en consequence, vient d'etre publiee par 1'organe officiel du Gouvernement Grand-Ducal, le Soussigne, &c. COMTE DE BULOW. 24 870 The Declaration of Paris PUBLICATION RELATIVE A L' ADHESION DU GBAND-DUCHE DE MECKLEMBOURG-SCHWfiRIN A LA DECLARATION SUR LES DROITS DES NEUTRES, EN TEMPS DE GUERRE, SIGNfiE A PARIS, LE 16 AVRIL, 1856. Schw&rin, le 22 Juillet, 1856. (Traduction) Nous, Fr6deric-Fran9ois, par la grace de Dieu, Grand-Due de Mecklembourg, &c., savoir faisons que les Plenipotentiaires des Puissances represente'es au Congres de Paris ayant signe, le 16 Avril dernier, la Declaration sur les droits des neutres en temps de guerre, dont le texte original et la traduction sont imprimis ci-apres dans le supplement A, et lesdits Plenipoten- tiaires etant, en outre, convenus que les Puissances qui ont signe cette Declaration, ou qui pourraient y acceder encore, seraient tenues de ne passer desormais aucune transaction sur le droit des neutres en temps de guerre qui ne reposat sur les quatre principes dans leur ensemble pose's dans ladite Declaration, avons, sur 1'invitation faite a notre Gouvernement, appreciant pleinement les motifs qui ont dirig6 les signataires de la De- claration du 16 Avril dernier, et etant parfaitement d'accord avec le contenu d'icelle, completement accede, avec notre Grand- Duche, non-seulement a cette Declaration, mais aussi a la con- dition relative & 1'indivisibilite des quatre principes poses, et avons ordonne de publier notre accession par le present acte. Donne en notre Ministere d'Etat, Schwerin, le 22 Juillet, 1856. FREDERIC FRANgois. Comte Bulow de Schrceter de Brock. MECKLENBURG-STRELITZ. LE MINISTRE D'fiTAT DE MECKLEMBOURG- STRfiLITZ AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Neu-Strelitz, le 25 Aout, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat de Son Altesse Royale le Grand- Due de Mecklembourg-Strelitz, a 1'honneur de faire part a Son Excellence M. 1'Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipoten- tiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Frangais, en reponse a sa note du 1 Juin, 1856, que la Confederation Germanique, en appr^ciant hautement et a I'unanimit6 le contenu et le but de la Declaration arretee par les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congres de Paris sur 1'interpretation et Papplication du droit maritime en temps de guerre et signee, le 16 Avril de cette Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 371 anne"e, comme annexe du Protocole de la vingt-quatrieme con- fe"rence, ayant accede 1 a cette declaration, Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Due a prononce son adhesion a cette meme Declara- tion par un arrete" du 14 de ce mois. Le Soussigne prie Son Excellence M. Cintrat de vouloir bien en informer son Gouvernement, et profite, &c. BERNSTORFF. MEXICO. ACCESSION OF MEXICO TO THE DECLARATION RESPECTING MARITIME LAW SIGNED AT PARIS, APRIL 16, 1856- FEBRUARY 13, 1909. THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO SIR EDWARD GREY. Ambassade de France, Londres, le 9 Avril, 1909. M. LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT, Le Ministre du Mexique a Paris vient d'informer le Gouverne- ment de la Republique de 1'accession de son Gouvernement a la Declaration de Paris du 16 avril, 1856, sur le droit maritime. Je suis charge par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de porter cette information a la connaissance de votre Excellence en lui remettant copie de 1'acte par lequel le Gouvernement francais a accepte, tant en son nom qu'au nom des Puissances signataires de la Declaration de 1856, I'adh6sion du Gouverne- ment mexicain. Veuillez, &c., E. DAESCHNER. (Inclosure.) ACTE D'ACCEPTATION D'ACCESSION. Le Gouvernement des fitats-Unis mexicains ayant accede" a la Declaration signee le 16 avril, 1856, au Congres de Paris, pour regler divers points de droit maritime, par 1'Acte d'Accession delivre par M. S. B. de Mier, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre plenipotentiaire du Mexique a Paris, Acte d'Accession dont la teneur suit : Le Soussigne, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre Ple"ni- potentiaire des fitats-Unis du Mexique pres le President de la Republique fransaise, a 1'honneur de faire savoir a M. S. Pichon, Senateur, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres de la Republique fran9aise, que le Gouvernement des fitats-Unis mexicains, appreciant la haute justice des principes proclames dans la Declaration dressee le 16 avril, 1856, par le Congres de Paris, donne son adhesion entiere et definitive aux quatre clauses 372 The Declaration of Paris contenues dans cette Declaration et s'engage a s'y conformer enticement. Paris, le 13 fevrier, 1909. (L.S.) S. B. DE MIER. Nous, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres de la Republique franaise, dument autorise a cet effet, acceptons formellement ladite accession, tant au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique qu'au nom des Hautes Puissances signataires de la Declaration du 16 avril, 1856. En foi de quoi nous avons signe le present Acte d' Accepta- tion d' Accession et y avons fait apposer notre cachet. Fait a Paris, le 13 fevrier, 1909. (L.S.) S. PICHON. SIR EDWARD GREY TO THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. Foreign Office, April 21s/, 1909. SIR, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 9th instant, in which you inform me of the accession of the United States of Mexico to the Declaration respecting maritime law, signed at Paris on the 16th April, 1856, and inclose a copy of the Act by which the Government of the French Republic has accepted such accession. In thanking you for this communication, of which I have taken due note, I have, &c. E. GREY. NASSAU. LE MINISTRE D'ETAT DE NASSAU AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. Wiesbaden, le 18 Juin, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat de Son Altesse le Due de Nassau, a eu 1'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de son auguste Souverain la copie de la depeche de M. le Comte Walewski que M. le Vicomte Roederer, Charge d'Affaires de France, a bien voulu lui remettre. Son Altesse le Due, convaincu de la justesse ainsi que de la salutaire influence des quatre principes du droit maritime international consigned dans la Declaration que les P16nipoten- tiaires des Puissances reprsentees au Congres de Paris ont formellement e*mise, le 16 Avril dernier, n'hesite point a y adherer sans restriction. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 373 En priant M. le Vicomte Rcederer de vouloir bien porter cette haute resolution a la connaissance de son Gouvernement, le Soussigne, &c. PRINCE DE WITTGENSTEIN. NORWAY. See SWEDEN AND NORWAY. OLDENBURG. LE MINISTRE DBS AFFAIRES ETRANGERES D'OLDENBOURG AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Oldenbourg, le 9 Juin, 1856. Le Soussigne a eu Phonneur de recevoir la note, en date du 1 du courant, par laquelle Son Excellence M. Cintrat, Envoy e Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste PEmpereur des Fran9ais, a bien voulu lui communiquer la Declaration signee a Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, par les Membres du Congres, dans le but de fixer les bases d'un droit maritime uniforme en temps de guerre. Le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal a partage la vive satisfaction avec laquelle Petablissement d'une legislation uniforme en fait de droits de guerre navale a etc generalement accueilli ; il se felicite d'etre invite par les Hautes Puissances contractantes a acceder a un arrangement qui repond tant a Pesprit de notre epoque et qui promet tant d'avantages pour les interets du commerce et de la navigation. En consequence, le Soussigne est autorise a declarer que le Gouvernment de Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Due d'Olden- bourg adhere aux principes poses dans les quatre Articles du Protocole mentionne du 16 Avril dernier, et qu'il reconnait Pindivisibilite de ces principes. En priant Son Excellence M. Cintrat de vouloir bien lui accuser reception de Padhesion de son Gouvernement, le Sous- signe, &c. DE ROSSING. PAPAL STATES. SON EMINENCE LE CARDINAL SECRETAIRE D'ETAT A L'AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE. Du Vatican, le 2 Juin, 1856. (Traduction) Le Soussigne, Cardinal Secretaire d'Etat, s'est empresse de placer sous les yeux du Saint Pere, non-seulement le texte de la deliberation du Congres de Paris relative aux principes de droit maritime applicables en temps de guerre, mais aussi la depeche 874 The Declaration of Paris de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste PEm- pereur, votre auguste Maitre, laquelle en etait le commentaire. Votre Excellence avait eu la bonte" de me transmettre copie de ces documents par la note qu'elle m'a fait 1'honneur de m'adresser le 27 du mois dernier. A cette occasion, votre Excel- lence annon9ait qu'elle avait etc charged par le Gouvernement Imperial d'inviter celui du Saint Siege a donner son adhesion a cette resolution du Congres, attendu les avantages qui resultent pour les neutres de dispositions positives conformes a 1'esprit de la civilisation moderne. Sa Saintete, apres avoir porte son attention sur les considera- tions diverses qui ont engage les Plenipotentiaires signataires du Traite de Paix a discuter et resoudre un point d'une aussi grande importance, ne pouvait manquer d'apprecier les principes qui les ont guides. II lui a semble qu'ils repondaient parfaite- ment a la necessite de proteger les interets commerciaux et les nombreuses transactions qui en sont la consequence, et qui, dans les circonstances actuelles, out pris un si grand developpe- ment chez toutes les nations. En reconnaissant que 1'on a eu en vue d'eviter que, durant une lutte entre Puissances belli- gerantes, la propriete des sujets d'un Gouvernement neutre cut a souffrir de la divergence des opinions, Sa Saintete" a vu avec satisfaction que les Articles de la resolution combinee par les Plenipotentiaires donnaient pleine garantie centre une pareille eventualite. En consequence de ces observations, Sa Saintete, s'etant determinee a accueillir 1'invitation qui lui &tait faite, a charge le Soussigne de faire connaitre, en son nom, que, de la part du Saint Sige, entiere adhesion etait donnee a 1'acte susmentionne concernant le droit maritime international. Le Soussigne, en accomplissant avec plaisir une mission si honorable, prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien en rendre compte a son Gouvernement et d'agreer, &c. ANTONELLI. PARMA. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE PARME AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Parme, le 20 Aout, 1856. Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat pour le Departement des Affaires Etrangeres de Son Altesse Royale Madame la Duchesse- Regente de Parme, a eu 1'honneur de recevoir la depeche de Son Excellence M. le Prince de Latour-d'Auvergne, Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste 1'Empereur des Franyais pres les Cours de Parme et de Toscane, en date du 30 Juin dernier, par Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 375 laquelle le Gouvernement de Parme a re$u du Gouvernement Fran9ais communication de la Declaration signed par les P16ni- potentiaires r6unis au Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856, ayant pour objet de faire reconnaitre des principes determines de droit maritime en temps de guerre, et pour 1'inviter a adherer a ladite Declaration. Le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale est trop dispose a applaudir et a s'associer a tout ce qui peut faciliter aux peuples le progres dans les voies de la civilisation pour ne pas accueillir une telle invitation. C'est pourquoi le Soussigne se felicite de pouvoir declarer, d'apres les ordres re9us de Madame la Duchesse-Regente des Etats de Parme, au nom du Due Robert I, que Son Altesse donne son entiere adhesion aux quatre principes enonces dans la Declaration du 16 Avril, 1856, des Plenipotentiaries au Congres de Paris, ainsi con9us : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous le pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi. Le Soussigne, &c. PALLAVICINI. PERU. LE MINISTRE RESIDENT DU PfiROU A PARIS AU MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE L'EMPEREUR. Paris, le 23 Novembre. 1857. M. LE COMTE, Son Excellence D. D. Manuel Ortiz de Zeballos, Ministre des Relations Exterieures du Perou, m'annonce, par le dernier courrier, que la Convention nationale et le Gouvernement Supreme ont adopte avec plaisir les principes reconnus comme base du droit maritime par le Congres de la Paix, dans sa De- claration faite a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856. Ces principes sont : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemie ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 376 The Declaration of Paris c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement 1'acces du littoral de 1'ennemi. J'ai 1'honneur, en portant ces faits a la connaissance de votre Excellence, selon 1'ordre que j'en ai re9u de mon Gouverne- ment, de la prier de vouloir bien me permettre de saisir cette occasion, &c. Luiz MESONES. PORTUGAL. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE PORTUGAL AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. (Traduction) Palais, le 28 Juillet, 1856. EXCELLENCE, Par ordre de son Gouvernement, votre Excellence a etc chargee, de concert avec les autres Representants des Puissances signataires du Traite de Paix du 30 Mars de cette annee, d'inviter le Gouvernement de Sa Majest6 a adherer a la Declaration du 16 Avril dernier, signee par les Plenipotentiaires qui ont pris part au Congres de Paris et contenant les quatre principes suivants de droit maritime, a savoir : 1. La course est t demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a Pexception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement 1'acces du littoral de 1'ennemi. Sa Majeste, a qui j'ai rendu compte, conme c'etait mon devoir, de la susdite invitation, appreciant pleinement les grands avantages qui doivent re"sulter, pour les interets generaux du commerce et de la navigation, de 1'adoption des quatre principes etablis, m'a ordonne de demander imme'diatement aux Cortes Pautorisation necessaire, qu'elles ont accorded par la loi du 25 courant. J'ai alors reyu de Sa Majeste 1'ordre de repondre a votre Excellence que son Gouvernement adhere avec plaisir, pleinement et entierement, a la susdite Declaration, d'autant plus que les principes enonces dans les Articles II., III. et IV. sont les memes que ceux que le Portugal a deja admis, en 1782, dans un Traite avec la Russie, et recemment dans le Traite de Commerce et de Navigation qu'il a conclu avec la Confederation Argentine. D'autre part, Sa Majeste a daign m'autoriser a declarer a Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 377 votre Excellence, que le Gouvernement Portugais adhere e"gale- ment au principe enonce dans PArticle VIII. du Traite de Paris, et auquel se rapporte le Protocole XXIII. du 14 Avril dernier, portant que : " Les Etats entre lesquels s'eleverait un dis- sentiment serieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, auraient recours, en tant que les circonstances 1'admettraient, aux bons offices d'une tierce Puissance," sans toutefois que cette adhesion de la part du Gouvernement du Roi affecte en rien son inde- pendance et sa liberte d'action. Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter la presente declaration a la haute connaissance de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, et je profite, &c. MARQUIS DE LOULE. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE PORTUGAL AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. (Traduction) Palais, le 28 Juillet, 1856. EXCELLENCE, Pour satisfaire aux desirs que votre Excellence m'a exprimes par ordre de son Gouvernement, en ce qui concerne la restriction contenue dans le Protocole XXIV. du 16 Avril, 1856, j'ai 1'honneur de 1'informer que les termes dans lesquels le Gouverne- ment de Sa Majeste a cru devoir donner son adhesion a la Declaration du 16 de ce mois, ne pouvant etre que ceux qu'ont autorise"s les Cortes et qui sont identiques aux termes adoptes par les Gouvernements de Belgique et de Suede, le Gouverne- ment Portugais se trouve, par consequent, en ce qui concerne ladite restriction, dans le meme cas que ces deux nations et que les autres qui auraient adhere ou qui viendraient a le faire dans des termes semblables a ceux de la Declaration dont il est question. Je profite, &c. MARQUIS DE LOULE. SAXE-ALTENBURG. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE SAXE- ALTENBOURG AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Altenbourg, le 9 Juin, 1856. Le Soussigne a eu 1'honneur de recevoir la note de Son Ex- cellence M. le Vicomte des Me"loizes, Ministre de France, du 5 Mai dernier, avec les copies des depeches de son Excellence M. le Comte Walewski, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de 378 The Declaration of Paris France, et n'a pas manqu6 de prendre les ordres de Son Altesse Royale le Due, son auguste Souverain, qui 1'a charge de faire a son Excellence la presente communication : Le Gouvernement du Due recommit parfaitement la justesse du voeu des Puissances represented au Congres de Paris, qui a ete exprime dans le Protocole No. XXIII., de la seance du 14 Avril dernier, savoir ; " que les Etats entre lesquels s'eleverait un dissentiment serieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances Padmettraient, aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie." Le Gouvernement du Due hesite d'autant moins a s'associer a ce principe, que celui-ci ne porte aucun prejudice ni a la souverainet6 des Etats in- dividuels, ni aux relations et aux devoirs particuliers reposant sur la solidarite des Etats Allemands. Les principes concernant le commerce maritime en temps de guerre, sur lesquels le Congres de paix est tombe d'accord, et qui se trouvent poses et resolus dans la Declaration du 16 Avril, 1856, n'ont pu que faire eprouver au Gouvernement du Due la plus grande satisfaction, de sorte qu'il ne tarde point a r^pondre a 1'invitation qu'il a reue et a acce"der a ladite Declaration dans toute sa teneur. Le Soussigne prie Son Excellence de vouloir bien porter les declarations ci-dessus a la connaissance de son Gouvernement, et profite de cette occasion, &c. LARISCH. SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE SAXE- COBOURG-GOTHA AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Gotha, le 22 Juin, 1856. M. LE VICOMTE, En vous accusant la reception de vos lettres du 20 Mai avec les annexes relatives aux principes adoptes par les P16ni- potentiaires signataires du Traite de Paris du 30 Mars, sur les droits des pays neutres, en temps de guerre, et le recours a prendre aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie, avant d'en appeler aux armes, j'ai 1'honneur de remercier votre Excellence de cette communication. En meme temps je me felicite de pouvoir vous assurer que le Gouvernement du Duche" de Co- bourg-Gotha, en tous points d'accord avec les sentiments du Congres, y accede pleinement, sauf les engagements qu'il a pris envers la Confederation Germanique. Veuillez, &c. SEEBACH. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 379 SAXE-WEIMAR. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES DE SAXE- WEIMAR AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. ,, Weimar, le 22 Juin, 1856. M. LE VICOMTE, Apres mon retour de la campagne, on m'a fait part de deux offices du 20 Mai, par lesquels votre Excellence, au nom du Gouvernement Imperial, a bien voulu inviter la Cour Grand- Ducale a acceder a la pens^e de haute mediation internationale introduite dans 1'Article VIII. du Traite du 30 Mars et aux principes proclames par la Declaration du 16 Avril concernant le commerce maritime en temps de guerre. Je me suis hate" de transmettre ces communications interes- santes a Monseigneur le Grand-Due, mon auguste Maitre, et Son Altesse Royale, convaincue des effets bienfaisants de pareils principes adoptes au concert des Etats Europeens, m'a charge d'exprimer ses remerciments de la communication susdite et de declarer a votre Excellence qu'elle accedait aux principes en question d'autant plus sans aucune hesitation, que Son Altesse Royale a appris qu'on ne peut pas douter que la meme accession aura lieu de la part de la Confederation Germanique. En priant votre Excellence de bien vouloir faire part de cette declaration au Gouvernement Imperial, je profite de cette occasion, &c. WATZDORF. SAXONY. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES FjTRANGERES DE SAKE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Dresde, le 16 Juin, 1856. M. LE BARON, C'est avec un vif interet que le Gouvernement de Saxe a re9u la communication que vous avez ete charge de lui faire de la Declaration arretee, le 16 Avril dernier, entre les Puissances reunies au Congres de Paris, pour poser les bases d'un nouveau droit maritime en temps de guerre, et qui est conue en ces termes : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. La pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a F exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire re'ellement Pacces du littoral de Pennemi. 380 The Declaration of Paris Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste TEmpereur des Francais, en nous donnant connaissance de cet accord, ayant bien voulu y joindre 1'invitation d'y acceder, je m'empresse, d'apres les ordres de Sa Majeste le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, de con- stater ici : L'adhesion pleine et entiere du Royaume de Saxe a la De- claration mentionnee ci-dessus et aux principes qu'elle renferme, comme etablissant entre les neutres et les belligerants un droit international qui ne saurait avoir que de bien salutaires effets ; Ainsi que 1'intention de n'entrer, a 1'avenir, sur 1'application du droit des neutres en temps de guerre, en aucun engagement qui ne repose a la fois sur les quatre principes objets de ladite Declaration. En vous priant, M. le Baron, de bien vouloir porter cet acte d'adhesion a la connaissance de votre Gouvernement, je saisis, &c. BEUST. SPAIN. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS RESPECTING THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN ON JANUARY 18, 1908, TO THE DECLARATION RESPECT- ING MARITIME LAW SIGNED AT PARIS, APRIL 16, 1856. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO SIR EDWARD GREY. Ambassade de France, Londres, le I5fevrier, 1908. M. LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT, L'Ambassadeur d'Espagne a Paris vient de notifier a M. le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres que son Gouvernement adherait a la Declaration du 16 avril, 1856, sur le droit maritime. Je suis charge de transmettre a votre Excellence une copie de 1'Acte par lequel le Gouvernement de la republique a accepte 1'accession de 1'Espagne, tant en son nom qu'en celui des Puissances signataires de la Declaration precitee. Veuillez agreer, &c. PAUL CAMBON. (Inclosure.) ACTE D'ACCEPTATION D'ACCESSION. Sa Majeste le Roi d'Espagne ayant accede a la Declaration signee le 16 avril, 1856, au Congres de Paris, pour regler divers points de droit maritime, par 1'Acte d'Accession delivre par son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire a Paris, son Excellence M. de Leon y Castillo, Marquis del Munis, Acte d'Accession dont la teneur suit : Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 381 Le soussigne Ambassadeur extraordinaire et Pienipoten- tiaire de Sa Majeste le Roi d'Espagne pres le President de la Republique franyaise, a 1'honneur de faire savoir a M. S. Pichon, se'nateur, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres de la Republique fran9aise, que le Gouvernement espagnol, appr^ciant la haute justice des principes proclames dans la Declaration, dressee le 16 avril, 1856, par le Congres de Paris, donne son adhesion entiere et definitive aux quatre clauses contenues dans cette Declaration, et s'engage a s'y conformer exactement. Paris, le 18 Janvier, 1908. (L.S.) F. DE Ls6N Y CASTILLO. Nous, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres de la Republique fran9aise, dument autorise a cet effet, acceptons formellement ladite accession, tant au nom du Gouvernement de la republique qu'au nom des Hautes Puissance signataires de la Declaration du 16 avril, 1856. En foi de quoi nous avons signe le present Acte d' Accepta- tion d'Accession et y avons fait apposer notre cachet. Fait a Paris, le 18 Janvier, 1908. (L.S.) S. PICHON. SIR EDWARD GREY TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. You* EXCELLENCY, Forei * n ^ ce ' f *** 18 ' 1908 ' I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 15th instant, in which you inform me of the accession of Spain to the Declaration respecting maritime law, signed at Paris on the 16th April, 1856, and inclose a copy of the Act by which the Government of the French Republic has accepted such accession. In thanking your Excellency for this communication, of which I have taken due note, I have, &c. E. GREY. SWEDEN AND NORWAY. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE SUEDE ET DE NORVEGE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. T., Stockholm, le 13 Juin, 1856. MONSIEUR, Par votre office du 27 du mois passe, vous m'avez fait 1'honneur de me communiquer, d'ordre de votre Cour, la De- claration que MM. les Pienipotentiaires au Congres de Paris ont adoptee, le 16 Avril dernier, ayant pour but d'etablir une doctrine uniforme sur le droit maritime en temps de guerre, 382 The Declaration of Paris Declaration qui a etc* ported a la connaissance des Etats non represented au Congres, avec 1'invitation d'y acceder. Cette Declaration porte, 1. Que la course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Que le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. Que la marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contre- bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; Et 4. Que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour faire interdire reellement I'acces du littoral de 1'ennemi. Les principes enonces dans les Articles II. et III. de la sus- dite Declaration, par 1'adoption desquels Papplication du droit maritime se trouverait fixee pour 1'avenir, ayant de tout temps ete reconnus et defendus par la Suede, qui, dans mainte occa- sion, s'est efforcee a les faire triompher, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norwege ne saurait hesiter a en reconnaitre la justice et 1'utilite. II s'estime done heureux d'y adherer et de declarer en meme temps qu'appreciant les raisons p6remptoires qui ont motive 1'adoption des premier et quatrieme points de la Declaration susmentionnee, il les accepte egale- ment et sans restriction quelconque, en reconnaissant Pindi- visibilite des principes qui s'y trouvent consignes. En exprimant toute la satisfaction qu'eprouve le Roi mon auguste Souverain de voir ainsi reglee, par un acte solennel qui exercera une si grande influence sur 1'avenir du commerce Europeen, une question mena9ante pour ses interets les plus chers, je vous prie, Monsieur, de vouloir bien porter a la con- naissance de votre auguste Cour la pre"sente declaration et d'agreer, &c. STIERNELD. On the 16th November 1905, after the separation of Norway from Sweden, the following official statement was made with regard to the treaty obligations of the two Powers under existing Treaties : ... Si ces Conventions et Arrangements pouvaient etre jusqu'ici conside*res comme entrainant pour la Norvege et pour la Suede une responsabilite commune vis a vis des obligations qui en re"sultent pour chacun d'entre eux, le Gouvernement Norvegien se tient done des a present responsable seulement des obligations des dits Conventions et Arrangements communs qui concernent la Norvege. II en est de meme re"lativement aux Conventions Interna- tionales auxquellcs la Norvege et la Suede ont adhere" en commun. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 383 SWISS CONFEDERATION. LE CONSEIL FEDERAL SUISSE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Berne, le 28 Juillet, 1858. Son Excellence M. le Ministre de France a bien voulu com- muniquer, au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste PEmpereur, a M. le President de la Confederation, une Declaration en quatre articles emanant des Hautes Puissances repr6sentees au Congres de la Paix a Paris, sur les principes du droit maritime a observer dorenavant en temps de guerre, le 16 Avril dernier, en invitant en meme temps la Confederation Suisse a adherer a cette declaration. Le Conseil Federal a vou6 une srieuse attention a cette ouverture et, aimant a reconnaitre dans les bases de cette Declaration un progres important dans les voies de 1'humanite et de la civilisation, ainsi que les grands avantages qui en re- sulteront pour le commerce et la navigation en temps de guerre, il n'a pu hesiter a y donner suite. A cet effet, il a soumis cette affaire avec recommandation a PAssemblee Federale Suisse, et 1'adhesion de la Confederation Suisse a la susdite Declaration a etc prononcee par decret du f du mois courant. En ayant 1'honneur d'adresser ci-incluse a Son Excellence une expedition vidimee de ce^decret, rendu par la Haute Assemblee Federale, le Conseil Federal prie M. le Comte de Salignac- Feneion de bien vouloir le faire parvenir au Haut Gouvernement Franais, et saisit, &c. Au nom du Conseil Federal Suisse, Le President de la Confederation, STAEMPFLI. Le Chancelier de la Confederation, SCHIESS. ARRETfi FEDERAL CONCERNANT L' ADHESION DE LA SUISSE AU DROIT MARITIME EN TEMPS DE GUERRE. Berne, le 16 Juillet, 1856. L'Assembiee Federale de la Confederation Suisse, conside- rant les grands avantages resultant de la Declaration collective arretee dans le Congres de Paris, sur le droit maritime pour la navigation et le commerce en temps de guerre ; Vu la proposition du Conseil Federal, Arrete : La Confederation Suisse adhere a la Declaration des Puis- sances representees au Congres de Paris, sur le droit maritime en temps de guerre, du 16 Avril, 1856. 384 The Declaration of Paris Ainsi arrete" par le Conseil des Etats Suisses. Berne, le 11 Juillet, 1856. Au nom du Conseil des Etats Suisses. Le Secretaire, J. KERN GERMANN. Le President, F. DUBS. Ainsi arrete par le Conseil National Suisse. Au nom du Conseil National Suisse. Berne, le 28 Juillet, 1856. Le Secretaire, SCHIESS. Le President, JULES MARTIN. L'expe*dition conforme a 1'original. Le Chancelier de la Confederation, SCHIESS. TUSCANY. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES F.TRANGERES DE TOSCANE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Florence, le 5 Juin, 1856. MON PRINCE, La communication que Votre Excellence m'a fait 1'honneur de m'adresser, le 30 du mois passe, a Pe'gard des nouveaux principes de droit maritime proclames par le Congres de Paris, a tout de suite occupe* la plus se'rieuse attention de la part du Gouvernement Grand-Ducal. Ces principes constituent un progres de civilisation trop notable et sont dictes par un esprit trop genereux d'humanite et de tolerance, pour que leur Declaration ne soit pas accueillie par le monde entier avec la plus vive reconnaissance. La Toscane, appelee par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste PEmpereur des Fran9ais, aussi bien que par ceux de Sa Majeste" la Reine de la Grande-Bretagne et de Sa Majeste* Imperiale et Royale Apostolique, a s'associer a cette Declaration et a donner son adhesion aux principes qui en forment le sujet, a de tout temps professe* des sentiments si conformes a ceux qui ont anim6 les magnanimes resolutions du Congres de Paris, elle a toujours, et d'une maniere tellement constante, regie sa con- duite sur ces nobles maximes, que sa reponse ne saurait etre douteuse. Consequemment, mon Prince, ayant invoque les ordres de mon auguste Souverain, j'ai 1'honneur de vous signifier que le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal adhere purement, simplement et indivisiblement, aux quatre points de droit maritime re"solus par le Congres de Paris dans sa stance du 8 Avril de cette anne*e ; qu'il les regardera, a Pavenir, comme faisant partie de son droit international, et s'engage a n'entrer avec qui que ce soit en Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 385 aucun arrangement sur 1'application du droit maritime en temps de guerre, sans stipuler leur fidele observation. Je suis bien aise d'avoir a constater une pareille conformity de vues entre le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Impriale et Royale le Grand-Due mon Maitre et celui de Sa Majest6 I'Empereur des Fran9ais, et je saisis cette occasion pour avoir 1'honneur de r&terer a Votre Excellence les temoignages de ma haute consideration. BALDASSERONI. THE TWO SICILIES. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DES DEUX SICILES AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. Naples, le 31 Mai, 1856. (Traduction) Le Soussigne, charge du Portefeuille du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, a re$u la note que son Excellence M. le Baron Brenier, Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Franais lui a fait 1'honneur de lui adresser, en date du 25 du mois passe, pour inviter le Gouverne- ment de Sa Majeste Sicilienne a adherer aux principes contenus dans la Declaration adoptee par les Plenipotentiaires reunis au Congres de Paris, relativement au commerce et a la navigation des neutres en temps de guerre. Le Soussign6 se fait un plaisir de faire connaitre a son Ex- cellence que le Gouvernement du Roi accueille bien volontiers 1'invitation du Gouvernement Imperial de se conformer aux susdites maximes adoptees par la France et par les autres Puis- sances qui ont pris part aux Conferences de Paris, maximes propres a maintenir la reciprocite de leurs bonnes relations Internationales, d'autant plus que ce sont celles qui, depuis un temps eloigne, sont professees par le Gouvernement royal lui-meme. Le Soussigne ne doit pas cependant negliger, dans cette circonstance, de manifester combien a ete agreable la convic- tion exprimee par son Excellence dans la susdite note, que le Gouvernement Royal ne ferait pas de difficult^ d'adopter des principes inspires par la plus sage politique et par la vraie civilisation, et a 1'occasion desquels le Gouvernement du Roi se plait a declarer qu'une semblable proposition est, par sa nature, de celles qui ont tou jours trouve en France le plus fort appui, et dont le resultat est a 1'honneur du Gouvernement Imperial. Le Soussigne, &c. CARAFA. 25 386 The Declaration of Paris URUGUAY. [See Count Walewski's Report to the Emperor, p. 348.] WURTEMBERG. LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE WURTEMBERG AU MINISTRE DE WURTEMBERG A PARIS. Stuttgard, le 25 Juin, 1856. M. LE BARON, J'ai 1'honneur de vous informer qu'une communication m'a ete faite par les Ministres d'Autriche, de Prusse, de Russie, de France et d'Angleterre, accredited pres cette cour, ayant pour objet de me faire savoir que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congres de Paris ont pris une decision relative a plusieurs ques- tions du droit maritime, jusqu'a present douteuses, decision qui a ete immediatement adopt6e, comme regie invariable, par les Puissances representees au Congres. En meme temps, lesdits Ministres m'ont remis une copie de 1'acte re"dige sous forme de Declaration solennelle, dans lequel les Plenipotentiaires ont enonce les considerations qui ont servi de base a cet arrangement, ainsi que les principes qui ont e"te etablis en consequence, en exprimant le de*sir de voir le Gouvernement du Roi donner son adhesion aux principes du droit des gens consacres par cette Declaration. En vous transmettant une copie de la declaration dont il s'agit, j'ai 1'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement du Roi approuve completement les considerations sur lesquelles repose 1'arrangement en question, attendu qu'il lui parait non- seulement desirable, mais meme indispensable, d'apres Petat actuel des relations Internationales, de rsoudre, autant que possible, tous les doutes qui ont subsiste jusqu'a present a Pegard d'une partie aussi essentielle du droit des gens, et de prevenir desormais des conflits qui peuvent resulter de Pin- certitude sur des principes legaux. Le Gouvernement du Roi reconnait egalement que les principes etablis dans la Declara- tion dont il s'agit repondent au but qui vient d'etre indique" ; et il ne peut qu'applaudir au progres notable que ces principes consacrent dans la voie d'un deVeloppement du droit des gens ge"n6ral, conforme aux ides et aux besoins de notre epoque. Je vous prie, en consequence, M. le Baron, de vouloir bien, en donnant lecture de la presente de"peche au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste PEmpereur des Fra^ais, Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 387 M. le Comte Walewski, et, en lui en laissant une copie, notifier en meme temps a son Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi, notre auguste Maitre, accede completement et sans restriction aux quatre principes relatifs au futur droit maritime en temps de guerre, qui sont 6tablis dans la Declara- tion susmentionnee. Vous voudrez bien en meme temps exprimer a M. le Comte Walewski que le Gouvernement du Roi a vu, par la depeche adressee par son Excellence a M. le Marquis de Ferriere, et dont celui-ci m'a laisse une copie, que la conclusion de cet arrangement, qui est d'un si haut interet pour les relations commerciales internationales, lesquelles ont acquis de nos jours une si grande importance, doit etre attribute principalement aux efforts du Cabinet Franais, qui s'est acquis ainsi un nouveau titre aux sentiments de reconnaissance du Gouvernement du Roi. En attendant 1'avis de la prompte execution du mandat qui vous est confie, je saisis cette occasion, &c. HUGEL. Adherences to the Mediation Proposal x included in the Declaration [contained in 23rd Protocol of April 14.] Anhalt Dessau Coethen. Modena. Argentine Confederation. Nassau. Baden. New Grenada. Brazil. Oldenburg^ Bremen." Parma. Chili. Portugal. Denmark. Saxe-Altenburg. Frankfort. Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Germanic Confederation. Saxe-Meiningen. Greece. Saxe-Weimar. Hamburgh. Saxony. Hanover. Two Sicilies. Hesse- Cassel. Sweden and Norway. Hesse-Darmstadt. Tuscany. Lubeck. Wurtemberg. Mecklenburg- Schwerin. 1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1284. 388 The Declaration of Paris 20 Indirect Adherences to the Declaration of Paris. A. GUATEMALA. [By Treaty with Italy, 1868. 1 ] Art. XII. As a complement of the principles of maritime law established by the declaration of the Congress of Paris on the 16th April 1856, which are accepted without reservation by the two parties in their mutual relations, the two Powers agree that, in case of the misfortune of a war between them, private property of any kind belonging to citizens of one shall be respected by the other, the same as property of neutrals, and this both at sea and on land, on the high seas as well as in the territorial seas, and in any other place whatever, and under whatsoever flag the vessels and the goods are navigating, without any other restrictions than the case of breaking blockade and the case of contraband of war. Nevertheless, the right is maintained of preventing during the war all trade and communication between all or any parts of the shores of their own territory and merchant ships navi- gating under a hostile flag, as well as of applying confiscation and other penalties to the transgressors of the interdiction, pro- vided that the prohibition and the penalty be determined by a suitable manifesto previously published. B. HONDURAS. [By Treaty with Italy, 1868. 2 ] XII. As a complement to the principles of maritime law established by the Declaration of the Congress of Paris on the 16th of April 1856, which are accepted without reservation by the two parties in their mutual relations, the two Powers agree that, in ease of the misfortune of a war between them, private property of any kind belonging to citizens of one shall be respected by the other, the same as property of neutrals, 1 State Papers, vol. Ix. p. 759. * Ibid., vol. Ixi. p. 1049. Indirect Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 389 and this both at sea and on land, on the high seas as well as the territorial seas, and in any other place whatever, and under whatsoever flag the vessels and the goods are navigating, without any other restrictions than the case of breaking blockade and the case of contraband of war. Nevertheless, the right is maintained of preventing during the war all trade and communication between all or any parts of the shores of their own territory and merchant ships navi- gating under a hostile flag, as well as of applying confiscation and other penalties to the transgressors of the interdiction, provided that the prohibition and the penalty be determined by a suitable manifesto previously published. XIII. The blockade to be obligatory must be effective and declared. The blockade shall not be considered effective unless it be maintained by forces sufficient for the real prevention of any access to the coasts or the ports blockaded. C MEXICO. [By Treaty with Italy, 1870. 1 ] XX. The contracting States, if either of them should be at war with another country, will recognise and observe the principle that the neutral flag covers the enemy's merchandize, that is, that the effects or goods belong to citizens of a country at war are exempt from capture and from confiscation when found on board neutral vessels, with the exception, however, of contraband of war, and that the property of neutrals found on board a vessel belonging to the enemy shall not be liable to capture and confiscation, unless it be contraband of war. XXII. If one of the contracting States should be at war with a third Power the citizens of the other may continue their navigation and trade with the belligerents, saving contraband of war, and excepting those places which may be blockaded or besieged by sea or by land. D. PERU. [By Treaty with France, 1861. 2 ] XIX. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes adoptent dans leurs relations mutuelles les 4 principes de droit maritime 1 State Papers, vol. Ix. p. 1016. 2 Ibid, vol. lii. p. 122. 890 The Declaration of Paris proclames dans la declaration de 16 Avril, 1856, par les Pleni- potentiaries de 1'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de la Prusse, de la Russie, de la Sardaigne, et de la Turquie, reunis au Congres de Paris, et reconnus 6galement par le Gouvernement du Perou, aux terms de la resolution legislative du 3 Octobre, 1857, 1 savoir : 1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la propriete ennemie, a 1'excep- tion de la contrebande de guerre ; 3 C . La propriete neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas sujete a confiscation sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante, capable d'interdire reellement tout acces a la cote de 1'ennemi. XX. Comme consequence des principes qui precedent les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent les points suivant : 1. Les na vires de celui des deux Etats qui demeurera neutre pourront naviguer librement d'un port ou d'un territoire neutre a un autre neutre, d'un port ou d'un territoire neutre a un autre ennemi, et d'un port ou territoire ennemi a un autre egalement ennemi, a 1'exception, bien entendu, des endroits ou des ports en etat de blocus, et, dans tons les cas, la marchandise charge'e a bord de ces navires, quel qu'en soit le proprietaire, sera libre, a 1'exception, de la contrebande de guerre. Sera egale- ment libre tout individu embarque a bord du batiment neutre, lors meme qu'il serait sujet ou citoyen de PEtat ennemi, pourvu qu'il ne soit pas actuellement au service de 1'ennemi ou en destination pour y entrer. 2. Les propriete"s et les sujets ou citoyens de celle des deux Parties Contractantes qui demeurera neutre, tandis que 1'autre sera engagee dans une guerre seront a Pabri de toute confiscation et arrestation, meme a bord d'un navire ennemi, a moins qu'il ne s'agisse de contrebande de guerre ou de contrebande de guerre ou de personnes actuellement au service de 1'ennemi ou a destination pour y entrer. 1 See Adherence of Peru, p. 375. Indirect Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 391 E. SALVADOR. [By Treaty with France, 1858. 1 ] XIX. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes adoptent dans leurs relations mutuelles les principes suivants : 1, La course est et demeure abolie ; 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 3. La marchandise neutre, a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire r^ellement Pacces du territoire de 1'ennemi. II est d'ailleurs convenu que la liberte" du pavilion assure aussi celle des personnes, et que les individus appartenant a une Puissance ennemie qui seraient trouves a bord d'un bati- ment neutre ne pourront pas etre faits prisonniers & moins qu'ils ne soient militaires et pour le moment engages au service de 1'ennemi . Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes n'appliqueront ces principes, en ce qui concerne les autres Puissances, qu'a celles qui les reconnaitront e'galement. [By Treaty with Italy, I860. 2 ] XIX. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes adoptent dans leurs relations mutuelles les principes suivants : 1. La course est et demeure abolie, 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie a 1'ex- ception de la contrebande de guerre. 3. La marchandise neutre a 1'exception de la contrebande de guerre n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi. 4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire re'ellement Faeces du littoral de 1'ennemi. II reste en outre convenu que la liberte du pavilion garantit aussi celles des personnes et que les individus appartenant a une Puissance ennemie qui seraient rencontres a bord d'un batiment neutre, ne pourront etre faits prisonnier, a moins que ce ne soient des militaires et qu'ils ne soient en ce moment 1 State Papers, vol. 1. p. 389. 2 Ibid., vol. Ixi. p. 1037. 392 The Declaration of Paris au service de 1'ennemi. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes n'appliqueront ces principes qu'aux Puissances qui les re- connaissent egalement. R SANDWICH ISLANDS. [By Treaty with Italy, 1863. 1 ] ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO THE TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, JULY 22, 1863. The two High Contracting Parties, moreover, agree that they will conform to the principles sanctioned by the Congress of Paris, and enunciated in the Declaration of April 16, 1856, relative to privateering, the rights of neutrals, and blockade, in the following terms, that is : " 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. "2. The neutral flag covers the merchandise of the enemy, with the exception of contraband of war. " 3. Neutral merchandise, excepting contraband of war, can- not be sequestrated under hostile flag. " 4. Blockades, to be obligatory, must be effective ; that is, maintained by a sufficient force really to prevent access to the shores of the enemy." G. SIAM. [By Treaty with Italy, 1868. 2 ] XVI. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing the prin- ciples of maritime law established by the Paris Congress of 1856, agree that if a war should take place between them, private property, of whatever kind, belonging to citizens of the one, shall be respected by the other, in the same manner as the property of neutrals. This shall be observed on land, at sea, on the high seas, in the territorial waters, and every- where else, and whatever may be the flag under which the vessels navigate or the goods are carried, without any limita- tions, except the case of breaking blockade and the case of contraband of war. The right is maintained, however, of preventing, during the war, all commerce and communications between all or any points of the coast of their own territory, and merchant ships under hostile flags, and also to visit transgressors of the pro- 1 State Papers, vol. Ix. p. 404. 2 Ibid., vol. Ix. p. 777. Second Marcy Note, 1856 393 hibition with confiscation and other penalties, provided the prohibition and the penalties be made known by a suitable manifesto published previously. XVII. If Siam should be at war with another nation, this circumstance shall not cause any impediment to the free trade of Italy with Siam or with the hostile nation. Italian ships may always, save in the case of effective blockade, proceed from the ports of one to the ports of the other belligerent nation, transact the usual business there, and import or export all kinds of goods not prohibited. 21 Second Marcy Note, 1856. MR MARCY TO COUNT SARTIGES. Department of State, Washington July 28, 1856. The Undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, has laid before the President " The Declaration concerning Maritime Law," adopted by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, at Paris, on the 16th of April 1856, which the Count de Sartiges, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of France, has presented on behalf of the Emperor of the French to the Government of the United States, for the purpose of obtaining its adhesion to the principles therein contained. Nearly two years since the President submitted, not only to the Powers represented in the late Congress at Paris, but to all other maritime nations, the second and third propositions contained in that Declaration, and asked their assent to them as permanent principles of international law. The propositions thus submitted by the President were : "1. That free ships make free goods that is to say, that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a Power or State at war are free from capture and confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles contraband of war. " 2. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's 394 The Declaration of Paris vessel is not subject to confiscation unless the same be contraband of war." It will be perceived that these propositions are substantially the same as the second and third in the Declaration of the Congress at Paris. Four of the Governments with which negotiations were opened on the subject by the United States have signified their acceptance of the foregoing propositions. 1 Others were inclined to defer acting on them until the return of peace should furnish a more auspicious time for considering such international questions. The proceeding of the Congress of the Plenipo- tentiaries at Paris will, as a necessary consequence, defeat the pending negotiations with the United States, if the two following propositions, contained in Protocol No. 24, are acceded to : 1st, that the four principles shall be indivisible ; and 2nd, that the Powers which have signed or may accede to the Declaration shall not enter into any arrangement in regard to the application of the right of neutrals in time of war which does not at the same time rest on the four principles which are the object of said Declaration. As the indivisibility of the four principles, and the limitation upon the sovereign attribute of negotiating with other Powers, are not a part of the Declaration, any nation is at liberty to reject either, or both, and to act upon the Declaration without restriction, acceding to it in whole or in part. In deliberating on this important subject, it behoves all Powers to consider, and, if they think proper, to act upon this distinction. All the Powers which may accede to that Declaration, and the subsequent restrictions contained in the 24th Protocol, will assume an obligation which takes from them the liberty of assenting to the propositions submitted to them by the United States, unless they at the same time surrender a principle of maritime law which has never been contested the right to employ privateers in time of war. The second and third principles set forth in the Declaration, being those submitted to other maritime Powers for adoption by this Government, it is most anxious to see incorporated, by general consent, into the code of maritime law, and thus placed beyond future controversy or question. Such a result, securing so many advantages to the commerce of neutral nations, might have been reasonably expected, but for the proceedings of the Congress at Paris, which require them to be purchased by a too costly sacrifice the surrender of a right which may well be con- sidered as essential to the freedom of the seas. 1 For the treaties with three of these Governments, see Group 16, p. 331 ; see also p. 148. It is uncertain which is the fourth Government. Second Marcy Note, 1856 395 The fourth principle contained in the Declaration, namely, " Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective ; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy," can hardly be regarded as one falling within that class with which it was the object of the Congress to interfere ; for this rule has not, for a long time, been regarded as uncertain, or the cause of any " deplorable disputes." If there have been any disputes in regard to blockades, the uncertainty was about the facts, but not the law. Those nations which have resorted to what are properly denominated " paper blockades " have rarely, if ever, under- taken afterwards to justify their conduct upon principle, but have generally admitted the illegality of the practice, and indemnified the injured parties. What is to be judged " a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy," has often been a severely contested question ; and certainly the Declaration, which merely reiterates a general undisputed maxim of maritime law, does nothing towards relieving the subject of blockade from that embarrassment. What force is requisite to constitute an effective blockade remains as unsettled and as questionable as it was before the Congress at Paris adopted the Declaration. In regard to the right to employ privateers, which is declared to be abolished by the first principle put forth in the Declara- tion, there was, if possible, less uncertainty. The right to resort to privateers is as clear as the right to use public armed ships, and as incontestable as any other right appertaining to belligerents. The policy of that law has been occasionally questioned, not, however, by the best authorities ; but the law itself has been universally admitted, and most nations have not hesitated to avail themselves of it ; it is as well sus- tained by practice and public opinion as any other to be found in the Maritime Code. There is scarcely any rule of international law which particular nations in their Treaties have not occasionally suspended or modified in regard to its application to themselves. Two Treaties only can be found in which the Contracting Parties have agreed to abstain from the employment of privateers in case of war between them. The first was a Treaty between the King of Sweden and the States-General of the United Provinces, in 1675. Shortly after it was concluded the parties were involved in war, and the stipulation concerning privateers was entirely disregarded by both. The second was the Treaty of 1785, between the United States and the King of Prussia. When this Treaty was renewed in 1799, the clause stipulating 396 The Declaration of Paris not to resort to privateering was omitted. For the last half century there has been no arrangement, by Treaty or otherwise, to abolish the right, until the recent proceedings of the Plenipotentiaries at Paris. By taking the subject of privateering into consideration, that Congress has gone beyond its professed object, which was, as it declared, to remove the uncertainty on points of maritime law, and thereby prevent " differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents, and consequently serious difficulties and even conflicts." So far as the principle in regard to privateering is concerned, the proceedings of the Congress are in the nature of an act of legislation, and seek to change a well-settled principle of international law. The interest of commerce is deeply concerned in the estab- lishment of the two principles which the United States had submitted to all maritime Powers ; and it is much to be regretted that the Powers represented in the Congress at Paris, fully approving them, should have endangered their adoption by uniting them to another inadmissible principle, and making the failure of all the necessary consequence of the rejection of any one. To three of the four principles contained in the Declaration there would not probably be a serious objection from any quarter, but to the other a vigorous resistance must have been anticipated. The policy of the law which allows a resort to privateers has been questioned for reasons which do not command the assent of this Government. Without entering into a full dis- cussion on this point, the Undersigned will confront the ordinary and chief objection to that policy, by an authority which will be regarded with profound respect, particularly in France. In a commentary on the French Ordonnance of 1681, Valin says : " However lawful and time-honoured this mode of warfare may be, it is, nevertheless, disapproved of by some pretended philosophers. According to their notions, such is not the way in which the State and the Sovereign are to be served : whilst the profits which individuals may derive from the pursuit are illicit, or at least disgraceful. But this is the language of bad citizens, who, under the stately mask of a spurious wisdom, and of a crafty, sensitive conscience, seek to mislead the judg- ment by a concealment of the secret motive which gives birth to their indifference for the welfare and advantage of the State. Such as are worthy of blame as are those entitled to praise who generously expose their property and their lives to the dangers of privateering." Second Marcy Note, 1856 397 In a work of much repute published in France almost simultaneously with the proceedings of the Congress at Paris, it is declared that " The issuing of letters of marque, therefore, is a constantly customary belligerent act. Privateers are bond- fide war-vessels, manned by volunteers, to whom, by way of reward, the Sovereign resigns such prizes as they make, in the same manner as he sometimes assigns to the land forces a portion of the war contributions levied on the conquered enemy " (Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises Maritimes). It is not denied that annoyances to neutral commerce, and even abuses, have occasionally resulted from the practice of privateering ; such was the case formerly more than in recent times : but when it is a question of changing a law, the inci- dental evils are to be considered in connexion with its benefits and advantages. If these benefits and advantages can be obtained in any other way, without injury to other rights, these occasional abuses may then justify the change, however ancient or firmly established may be the law. ' The reasons which induced the Congress of Paris to declare privateering abolished are not stated, but they are presumed to be only such as are usually urged against the exercise of that belligerent right. The prevalence of Christianity and the progress of civilization have greatly mitigated the severity of the ancient mode of prosecuting hostilities. War is now an affair of Governments. "It is the public authority which makes and carries on war ; individuals are not permitted to take part in it, unless authorized to do so by their Government." It is a generally received rule of modern warfare, so far at least as operations upon land are concerned, that the persons and effects of non-combatants are to be respected. The wanton pillage or uncompensated appropriation of individual property by an army, even in possession of an enemy's country, is against the usage of modern times. Such a mode of proceeding at this day would be con- demned by the enlightened judgment of the world, unless warranted by special circumstances. Every consideration which upholds this sentiment in regard to the conduct of a war on land favours the application of the same rule to the persons and property of citizens of the belligerents found upon the ocean. It is fair to presume that the strong desire to ameliorate the severe usages of war by exempting private property upon the ocean from hostile seizure, to the extent it is usually exempted on land, was the chief inducement, which led to " the declaration " by the Congress at Paris, that " privateering is and remains abolished." 398 The Declaration of Paris The Undersigned is directed by the President to say, that to this principle of exempting private property upon the ocean, as well as upon the land, applied without restriction, he yields a most ready and willing assent. The Undersigned cannot better express the President's views upon the subject than by quoting the language of his annual Message to Congress, of December 4, 1854 : " The proposition to enter into engagements to forego a resort to privateers, in case this country should be forced into a war with a great naval Power, is not entitled to more favourable consideration than would be a proposition to agree not to accept the services of volunteers for operations on land. When the honour or rights of our country require it to assume a hostile attitude, it confidently relies upon the patriotism of its citizens, not ordinarily devoted to the military profession, to augment the army and navy, so as to make them fully adequate to the emergency which calls them into action. The proposal to surrender the right to employ privateers is professedly founded upon the principle that private property of unoffending non- combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war ; but the proposed surrender goes but little way in carrying out that principle, which equally requires that such private property should not be seized or molested by national ships of war. Should the leading Powers of Europe concur in proposing, as a rule of international law, to exempt private property, upon the ocean, from seizure by public armed cruizers as well as by privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that broad ground." The reasons in favour of the doctrine that private property should be exempted from seizure in the operations of war are considered in this enlightened age so controlling as to have secured its partial adoption by all civilized nations ; but it would be difficult to find any substantial reasons for the dis- tinction now recognized in its application to such property on land, and not to that which is found upon the ocean. If it be the object of the Declaration adopted at Paris to abolish this distinction, and to give the same security from the ravages of war to the property of belligerent subjects on the ocean as is now accorded to such property on the land, the Congress at Paris has fallen short of the proposed result, by not placing individual effects of belligerents beyond the reach of public armed ships as well as privateers. If such property is to remain exposed to seizure by ships belonging to the navy of the adverse party, it is extremely difficult to perceive why it should not, in like manner, be exposed to seizure by privateers, Second Marcy Note, 1856 399 which are, in fact, but another branch of the public force of the nation commissioning them. If the principle of capturing private property on the ocean and condemning it as prize of war be given up, that property would, and of right ought to be, as secure from molestation by public armed vessels as by privateers ; but if that principle be adhered to, it would be worse than useless to attempt to confine the exercise of the right of capture to any particular description of the public force of the belligerents. There is no sound principle by which such a distinction can be sustained ; no capacity which could trace a definite line of separation pro- posed to be made ; and no proper tribunal to which a disputed question on that subject could be referred for adjustment. The pretence that the distinction may be supported upon the ground that ships not belonging permanently to a regular navy are more likely to disregard the rights of neutrals than those which do belong to such a navy is not well sustained by modern experience. If it be* urged that a participation in the prizes is calculated to stimulate cupidity, that, as a peculiar objection, is removed by the fact that the same passion is addressed by the distribution of prize-money among the officers and crews of ships of a regular navy. Every nation which authorizes privateers is as responsible for their conduct as it is for that of its navy, and will, as a matter of prudence, take proper precaution and security against abuses. But if such a distinction were to be attempted, it would be very difficult, if not impracticable, to define the particular class of the public maritime force which should be regarded as privateers. " Deplorable disputes," more in number and more difficult of adjustment, would arise from an attempt to discriminate between privateers and public armed ships. If such a discrimination were attempted, every nation would have an undoubted right to declare what vessels should consti- tute its navy, and what should be requisite to give them the character of public armed ships. These are matters which could not be safely or prudently left to the determination or super- vision of any foreign Power, yet the decision of such contro- versies would naturally fall into the hands of predominant naval Powers, which would have the ability to enforce their judgments. It cannot be offensive to urge weaker Powers to avoid as far as possible such an arbitrament, and to maintain with firmness every existing barrier against encroachments from such a quarter. No nation which has a due sense of self-respect will allow any other, belligerent or neutral, to determine the character 400 The Declaration of Paris of the force which it may deem proper to use in prosecuting hostilities ; nor will it act wisely if it voluntarily surrenders the right to resort to any means, sanctioned by international law, which, under any circumstances, may be advantageously used for defence or aggression. The United States consider powerful navies and large stand- ing armies, as permanent establishments, to be detrimental to national prosperity and dangerous to civil liberty. The expense of keeping them up is burdensome to the people ; they are, in the opinion of this Government, in some degree a menace to peace among nations. A large force, ever ready to be devoted to the purposes of war, is a temptation to rush into it. The policy of the United States has ever been, and never more than now, adverse to such establishments ; and they can never be brought to acquiesce in any change in international law which may render it necessary for them to maintain a powerful navy or large regular army in time of peace. If forced to vindicate their rights by arms, they are content, in the present aspect of international relations, to rely, in military operations on land, mainly upon volunteer troops, and for the protection of their commerce in no inconsiderable degree upon their mercantile marine. If this country were deprived of these resources, it would be obliged to change its policy, and assume a military attitude before the world. In resisting an attempt to change the existing maritime law that may produce such a result, it looks beyond its own interest, and embraces in its view the interest of all such nations as are not likely to be dominant naval Powers. Their situation in this respect is similar to that of the United States, and to them the protection of commerce, and the maintenance of international relations of peace, appeal as strongly as to this country, to withstand the proposed change in the settled Law of Nations. To such nations, the surrender of the right to resort to privateers would be attended with consequences most adverse to their com- mercial prosperity, without any compensating advantages. Most certainly no better reasons can be given for such a surrender than for foregoing the right to receive the services of volunteers ; and the proposition to abandon the former is entitled, in the judgment of the President, to no more favour than a similar proposition in relation to the latter. This opinion of the im- portance of privateers to the community of nations, excepting only those of great naval strength, is not only vindicated by history, but sustained by high authority. The following passage in the Treatise on maritime prizes to which I have before referred, deserves particular attention : Second Marcy Note, 1856 401 " Privateers are especially useful to those Powers whose navy is inferior to that of their enemies. Belligerents, with powerful and extensive naval armaments, may cruize upon the seas with their national navies ; but should those States whose naval forces are of less power and extent be left to their own resources, they could not hold out in a maritime war ; whilst by the equipment of privateers they may succeed in inflicting upon the enemy an injury equivalent to that which they themselves sustain. Hence Governments have frequently been known, by every possible appliance, to favour privateering armaments. It has even occurred that Sovereigns, not merely satisfied with issuing letters of marque, have also taken, as it were, an interest in the armament. Thus did Louis XIV. fre- quently lend out his ships, and sometimes reserve for himself a share in the prizes." It certainly ought not to excite the least surprise that strong naval Powers should be willing to forego the practice, com- paratively useless to them, of employing privateers, upon condition that weaker Powers agree to part with their most effective means of defending their maritime rights. It is, in the opinion of this Government, to be seriously apprehended that if the use of privateers be abandoned, the dominion over the seas will be surrendered to those Powers which adopt the policy and have the means of keeping up large navies. The one which has a decided naval superiority would be potentially the mistress of the ocean, and by the abolition of privateering that domination would be more firmly secured. Such a Pqwer engaged in war with a nation inferior in naval strength would have nothing to do for the security and protection of its commerce but to look after the ships of the regular navy of its enemy. These might be held in check by one-half, or less, of its naval force, and the other might sweep the commerce of its enemy from the ocean. Nor would the injurious effects of a vast naval superiority to weaker States be much diminished if that superiority was shared among three or four great Powers. It is unquestionably the interest of such weaker States to discountenance and resist a measure which fosters the growth of regular naval establishments. In discussing the effect of the proposed measure the aboli- tion of privateering a reference to the existing condition of nations is almost unavoidable. An instance will at once present itself in regard to two nations where the commerce of each is about equal, and about equally wide-spread over the world. As commercial Powers they approach to an equality, but as naval Powers there is great disparity between them. 26 402 The Declaration of Paris The regular navy of one vastly exceeds that of the other. In case of a war between them, only an inconsiderable part of the navy of the one would be required to prevent that of the other from being used for defence or aggression, while the remainder would be devoted to the unembarrassed employment of destroy- ing the commerce of the weaker in naval strength. The fatal consequences of this great inequality of naval force between two such belligerents would be in part remedied by the use of privateers ; in that case, while either might assail the commerce of the other in every sea, they would be obliged to distribute and employ their respective navies in the work of protection. . This statement only illustrates what would be the case, with some modification, in every war where there may be consider- able disparity in the naval strength of the belligerents. History throws much light upon this question. France, at an early period, was without a navy, and in her wars with Great Britain and Spain, both then naval Powers, she resorted with signal good effect to privateering, not only for protection, but successful aggression. She obtained many privateers from Holland, and, by this force, gained decided advantages on the ocean over her enemy. Whilst in that condition, France could hardly have been expected to originate or concur in a proposition to abolish privateering. The condition of many of the smaller States of the world is now, in relation to naval Powers, not much unlike that of France in the middle of the sixteenth century. At a later period, during the reign of Louis XIV., several expeditions were fitted out by him, composed wholly *of privateers, which were most effectively employed in prosecut- ing hostilities with naval Powers. Those who may have at any time a control on the ocean will be strongly tempted to regulate its use in a manner to subserve their own interests and ambitious projects. The ocean is the common property of all nations, and instead of yielding to a measure which will be likely to secure to a few possibly to one an ascendancy over it, each should perti- naciously retain all the means it possesses to defend the common heritage. A predominant Power upon the ocean is more menacing to the well-being of others than such a Power on land, and all are alike interested in resisting a measure calculated to facilitate the permanent establishment of such domination, whether to be wielded by one Power or shared among a few others. The injuries likely to result from surrendering the dominion of the seas to one or a few nations which have powerful navies arise mainly from the practice of subjecting private property Second Marcy Note, 1856 403 on the ocean to seizure by belligerents. Justice and humanity demand that this practice should be abandoned, and that the rule in relation to such property on land should be extended to it when found upon the high seas. The President, therefore, proposes to add to the first pro- position in the Declaration of the Congress at Paris the following words : " And that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband." Thus amended, the Government of the United States will adopt it, together with the other three .principles contained in that Declaration. I am directed to communicate the approval of the President to the second, third, and fourth propositions, independently of the first, should the amendment be unacceptable. The amend- ment is commended by so many powerful considerations, and the principle which calls for it has so long had the emphatic sanction of all enlightened nations in military operations on land, that the President is reluctant to believe it will meet with any serious opposition. Without the proposed modification of the first principle, he cannot convince himself that it would be wise or safe to change the existing law in regard to the right of privateering. If the amendment should not be adopted, it will be proper for the United States to have some understanding in regard to the treatment of their privateers when they shall have occasion to visit the ports of those Powers which are, or may become, parties to the Declaration of the Congress at Paris. The United States will, upon the ground of right and comity, claim for them the same consideration to which they are entitled, and which was extended to them, under the Law of Nations, before the attempted modification of it by that Congress. As connected with the subject herein discussed, it is not inappropriate to remark, that a due regard to the fair claims of neutrals would seem to require some modification, if not an abandonment, of the doctrine in relation to contraband trade. Nations which preserve the relations of peace should not be injuriously affected in their commercial intercourse by those which choose to involve themselves in war, provided the citizens of such peaceful nations do not compromise their character as neutrals by a direct interference with the military operations of the belligerents. The laws of siege and blockade, it is believed, afford all the remedies against neutrals that the parties to the war can justly claim. Those laws interdict all 404 The Declaration of Paris trade with the besieged or blockaded places. A further interference with the ordinary pursuits of neutrals in nowise to blame for an existing state of hostilities is contrary to the obvious dictates of justice. If this view of the subject could be adopted, and practically observed by all civilized nations, the right of search, which has been the source of so much annoyance, and of so many injuries to neutral commerce, would be restricted to such cases only as justified a suspicion of an attempt to trade with places actually in a state of siege or blockade. Humanity and justice demand that the calamities incident to war should be strictly limited to the belligerents themselves, and to those who voluntarily take part with them ; but neutrals, abstaining in good faith from such complicity, ought to be left to pursue their ordinary trade with either belligerent, without restrictions in respect to the articles entering into it. Though the United States do not propose to embarrass the other pending negotiations, relative to the rights of neutrals, by pressing this change in the law of contraband, they will be ready to give it their sanction whenever there is a prospect of its favourable reception by other maritime Powers. The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) W. L. MARCY. 22 United States Proposals for a Convention, 1857. (l) MR DALLAS TO THE EAEL OF CLARENDON. Legation of the United States, London, February 24, 1857. With reference to the interview at the Foreign Office on the 20th instant, the Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, has now the honour to submit to the Earl of Clarendon, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the accom- panying draft of a Convention, declaratory of certain principles of maritime law, to the adoption of which he has been specially instructed to invite Her Majesty's Government. The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, United States Proposals for a Convention, 1857 405 Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, while assembled in Congress at Paris on the 16th of April 1856, having taken into consideration the subject of maritime law in time of war, agreed to a Declaration containing the following four " maxims " : 1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective ; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. The Plenipotentiaries also engaged that their respective Governments should bring this Declaration to the knowledge of the States which had not taken part in the Congress of Paris, and invite them to accede to it ; and added, that it was not and should not be binding, except between those Powers who have acceded, or shall accede, to it. To the United States the above-mentioned Declaration has been formally made known by several of the Governments whose Plenipotentiaries subscribed it (though not by Her, Majesty's Government), and their adhesion invited. These four principles of international relation have long en- gaged the consideration of the American Government. About two years prior to the meeting of the Congress at Paris, negotia- tions had been originated, and were in train, with the maritime nations, for the adoption of the second and third propositions, substantially as enunciated in the Declaration. The fourth of those principles, respecting blockades, had, it is believed, long since become a fixed rule of the law of war. And, in relation to the first of those principles, contemplating, in deference to the higher civilization and purer philanthropy of the age, a general relinquishment of a right undoubtedly possessed by every nation that of employing private armed vessels against an enemy the President of the United States had publicly, in his Message to Congress at the opening of the session in December 1854, expressed the policy and sentiment of the American Government and people. To all of the propositions of the Declaration made by the Plenipotentiaries at Paris, the Government of the United States has been, therefore, for some time, and still is, prepared cordially to accede, excepting only with such an addition to the first as has always seemed to the President indispensable to the attain- ment of its true and humane purpose that of diminishing the calamities of war. 406 The Declaration of Paris The Undersigned forbears, in this communication, to press upon the Earl of Clarendon the reasons which brought the Government of the United States to the conviction that the enlargement of the first proposition in the Declaration of the Plenipotentiaries at Paris, as made in the accompanying draft of a Convention, is necessary before that proposition can justly claim its assent. Those reasons have been distinctly and fully stated in various Executive and international Papers, which have doubtless heretofore reached his Lordship's notice. They arise, indeed, naturally, in any deliberative mind, by which the re- linquishment of the right to employ privateers is considered in its bearing upon the Constitutional structure, the economical policy, the commercial activity, and the defensive means of the United States. It is undoubtedly true that some incongruity may be detected in comparing the second and third propositions with the first of the furnished draft ; but it has been thought most prudent to abstain from any effort to improve the form of the Convention by changing the phraseology employed by the Plenipotentiaries at Paris, or by the American Executive. The respective pro- positions, thus worded, have been addressed to and reflected upon by maritime nations generally, and much delay and inconvenience would necessarily be consequent upon moulding them anew. If Her Majesty's Government be disposed to concur in the principles themselves, it is not presumed that an objec- tion will be suggested by the mere form in which they are embodied. The Undersigned is directed to invite Her Majesty's Govern- ment to conclude the proposed Convention ; and he has the honour to apprise the Earl of Clarendon that the President of the United States has transmitted him a full power to negotiate and sign it whenever agreed upon. The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) G. M. DALLAS. Inclosure. A TREATY, &c. The United States of America and animated by a common desire to render more intimate the rela- tions of friendship and good understanding now so happily subsisting between them, and more especially to establish these relations in accordance with the present state and progress of civilization, have mutually resolved to declare, by means of a United States Proposals for a Convention, 1857 407 formal Convention, the principles of Maritime Law which the High Contracting Parties acknowledge as the basis of neutral and belligerent rights at sea, and which they agree to recognize as permanent and immutable, and to observe between them- selves and with other Powers which shall recognize and observe the same towards the Parties to this Convention. For this purpose, the President of the United States has conferred full powers on and has conferred like powers on and said Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have concluded and signed the following Articles : ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Parties do hereby agree to observe the following principles as immutable rules of Maritime Law : First. That privateering is, and shall remain, abolished, and the private property of subjects or citizens of a belligerent, on the high seas, shall be exempted from seizure by the public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband. Second. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. Third. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. Fourth. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective ; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Parties do hereby declare that, hence- forward, in judging of the rights of citizens and subjects of neutral nations, they will observe the principles contained in the foregoing Articles, and be guided by them, and that all nations which shall stipulate by Treaty to accede to the afore- said principles, and observe the same, shall enjoy the rights secured thereby as fully as the two Powers signing this Con- vention. This Convention shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof and by , and the 408 The Declaration of Paris ratifications shall be exchanged at within fifteen months, to be counted from the date of the signature hereof, or sooner, if possible. (2) MR DALLAS TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON. Legation of the United States, London, April 25, 1857. The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- potentiary of the United States, referring to his letter of the 24th February 1857, relating to a modification of the rules of mari- time law which were proposed by the Conference at Paris, has the honour to inform the Earl of Clarendon, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he has recently been specially instructed by his Government to suspend negotiations upon that subject until he shall have received further instructions. The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) G. M. DALLAS. 23 Report of the Select Committee on Merchant Shipping, AUGUST 28, 1860. EXTRACT FROM REPORT RELATING TO BELLIGERENT RIGHTS AT SEA. The question of belligerent rights at sea, with reference to merchant shipping, affects alike the British shipowner in the prosecution of his business, and the general interests of Great Britain, and, therefore, the evidence given on the subject has received from Your Committee that attention which its gravity demands. Great Britain formerly asserted principles of the law of nations, with reference to the rights of belligerents and neutrals, though other nations defended maxims in some points differing from our own. But in the war with Russia in 1854, England having formed an alliance with France, both nations waived their rights to Report of Select Committee on Merchant Shipping 409 confiscate enemy's goods on board neutral ships, as also neutral goods, in either case not contraband of war, found on board an enemy's ship. This mutual but provisional waiver of belligerent rights placed the allies in harmonious action, and practically countenanced the principle that " free ships make free goods." Upon the return of peace, the Declaration of Paris of April 1856, signed by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, gave a formal sanction to this principle. Privateering was also abolished. America was invited to be a party to this general inter- national agreement, but demurred, and coupled at first her assent to the abolition of privateering with the condition that private property at sea should no longer be subject to capture. Finally, she refused to be a party to a convention whereby she would be precluded from resorting to her merchant marine for privateering purposes in case she became a belligerent. But this is not surprising, for the United States has obtained a recognition of the rights of neutrals for which she contended throughout a former period of hostilities ; and Great Britain has surrendered her rights without any equivalent from the United States. Our shipowners will thereby be placed at an immense disadvantage in the event of a war breaking out with any important European Power. In fact, should the Declara- tion of Paris remain in force, during a period of hostilities, the whole of our carrying trade would be inevitably transferred to American and other neutral bottoms. From the evidence given by various witnesses, it appears that at a recent period, upon a mere rumour of war in Europe, in which it was apprehended that Great Britain might be in- volved, American and other neutral ships received a decided preference in being selected to carry produce from distant ports of the world to ports in Europe, whereby even in a period of peace British shipowners were seriously prejudiced. It seems, therefore, that the state of international law, with reference to belligerent rights affecting merchant shipping, cannot remain in its present state ; for whilst England may be involved in any great European war, the United States is almost certain to be neutral ; and thus our great maritime rival would supplant us in the carrying trade. We must therefore either secure the general consent of all nations to establish the immunity of merchant ships and their cargoes from the depredations of both privateers and armed national cruisers during hostilities ; or we must revert to the maintenance of our ancient rights, whereby, relying upon our maritime superiority, we may not merely hope to guard un- 410 The Declaration of Paris molested our merchant shipping in the prosecution of their business, but may capture enemies' goods in neutral ships, and thus prevent other nations from seizing the carrying trade of the kingdom during a state of hostilities. Your Committee consider it their duty to call the attention of Your Honourable House to the great importance of this question, which, if not solved during a period of peace, may cause incalculable embarrassment at the outbreak of a war. It is doubtless the Prerogative of the Crown to initiate proper measures to maintain the honour and guard the interests of the country in this respect. Your Committee, however, cannot but express their opinion that a compact, like the Declaration of Paris, to which a great maritime Power has refused to be a party, may, in the event of hostilities, produce complications highly dis- astrous to British interests. As matters stand, England is under all the disadvantages of the want of reciprocal pledges on the part of the United States to refrain from privateering, or from the attempt to break a blockade, which, as heretofore, a sense of self-preservation might compel Great Britain to establish ; while Powers so unpledged, urged by every motive of self-interest, would be in a position to inflict the deepest injury upon British interests, under the same unjustifiable pretences as were put forth during the war at the commencement of the present century. Your Committee have thought it their duty thus briefly to point out to Your Honourable House the present unsatisfactory position of this question as it immediately affects British merchant shipping. They have done so in the confidence that the whole subject will receive due attention in that quarter where the responsibility rests of taking such measures, in con- currence with foreign Powers, as may place the present inter- national regulations on a better footing. Your Committee are aware that grave objections have been urged by high authorities against any further step in advance ; but they cannot close this brief comment on so important a question without expressing a hope that Your Honourable House will agree with them in the opinion that, in the progress of civilisation and in the cause of humanity, the time has arrived when all private property, not contraband of war, should be exempt from capture at sea. Your Committee are of opinion that Great Britain is deeply interested in the adoption of this course. This country has at all times a much larger amount of property afloat than any other nation, and consequently requires a very large naval force to protect her merchant shipping, perhaps at a time when the whole of our ships of war may be urgently wanted to defend our shores. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 411 24 The American Civil War and the Declaration of Paris. CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE OVERTURES AD- DRESSED TO THE CONTENDING PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH A VIEW TO THEIR ADHESION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW AS LAID DOWN BY THE CONGRESS OF PARIS IN 1856. [SELECTED EXTRACTS. 1 ] No. 1. LORD J. RUSSELL TO EARL COWLEY. Foreign Office, May 6, 1861. MY LORD, Although Her Majesty's Government have received no despatches from Lord Lyons by the mail which has just arrived, the communication between Washington and New York being interrupted, yet the accounts which have reached them from some of Her Majesty's Consuls, coupled with what has appeared in the public prints, are sufficient to show that a civil war has broken out among the States which lately composed the American Union. Other nations have, therefore, to consider the light in which, with reference to that war, they are to regard the Confederacy into which the Southern States have united themselves ; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that, looking at all the circumstances of the case, they cannot hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and, as such, invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent. I have stated this to Lord Lyons in the despatch of which I enclose a copy for your Excellency's information. In making known to M. Thouvenel the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on this point, your Excellency will add that you are instructed to call the attention of the French Government to the bearing which this unfortunate contest threatens to have on the rights and interests of neutral nations. On the one hand, President Lincoln, in behalf of the Northern portion of the late United States, has issued a Proclamation declaratory of an intention to subject the ports of the Southern 1 The numbering of the despatches corresponds with that of the White Paper (North America, No. 3, 1862) in which the correspondence was published The Declaration of Paris portion of the late Union to a rigorous blockade ; on the other hand, President Davis, on behalf of the Southern portion of the late Union, has issued a Proclamation declaratory of an intention to grant letters of marque for cruizers to be employed against the commerce of the North. In this state of things it appears to Her Majesty's Govern- ment to be well deserving of the immediate consideration of all maritime Powers, but more especially of France and England, whether they should not take some steps to invite the con- tending Parties to act upon the principles laid down in the 2nd and 3rd Articles of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which relates to the security of neutral property on the high seas. The United States, as an entire Government, have not acceded to that Declaration ; but in practice they have, in their Conventions with other Powers, adopted the 2nd Article, although admitting that without some such Convention the rule was not one of universal application. As regards the 3rd Article, in recent Treaties concluded by the United States with South American Republics, the principle adopted has been at variance with that laid down in the Declaration of Paris. Your Excellency will remember that, when it was proposed to the Government of the United States, in 1856, to adopt the whole of the Declaration of Paris, they in the first instance agreed to the second, third, and fourth Proposals, but made a condition as to the first that the other Powers should assent to extending the Declaration so as to exempt all private property whatever from capture on the high seas ; but before any final decision was taken on this proposal, the Government of President Buchanan, which in the interval had come into power, withdrew the proposition altogether. It seems to Her Majesty's Government to be deserving of consideration whether a joint endeavour should not now be made to obtain from each of the belligerents a formal recogni- tion of both principles as laid down in the Declaration of Paris, so that such principles shall be admitted by both, as they have been admitted by the Powers who made or acceded to the Declaration of Paris, henceforth to form part of the general law of nations. Her Majesty's Government would be glad to be made ac- quainted with the views of the Imperial Government on this matter with as little delay as possible. (Signed) J. RUSSELL. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 413 No. 3. EARL COWLEY TO LORD J. RUSSELL. Paris, May 9, 1861. MY LORD,- I called this afternoon on M. Thouvenel for the purpose of obtaining his answer to the proposals contained in your Lord- ship's despatch of the 6th instant, relative to the measures which should be pursued by the Maritime Powers of Europe for the protection of neutral property in presence of the events which are passing in the American States. M. Thouvenel said the Imperial Government concurred entirely in the views of Her Majesty's Government, and would be prepared to join Her Majesty's Government in endeavour- ing to obtain of the belligerents a formal recognition of the 2nd and 3rd Articles of the Declaration of Paris. M. de Flahault would receive instructions to make this known officially to your Lordship. With regard to the manner in which this endeavour should be made, M. Thouvenel said that he thought a communication should be addressed to both parties in as nearly as possible the same language, the Consuls being made the organs of communi- cation with the Southern States ; that the language employed should be that of goodwill and friendship ; that the present state of things should be deplored, and a declaration made that the Governments of Great Britain and France intended to abstain from all interference, but that the commercial interests of the two countries demanded that they should be assured that the principles with respect to neutral property laid down by the Congress of Paris would be adhered to an assurance which the two Governments did not doubt they should obtain, as the principles in question were in strict accordance with those that had been always advocated by the United States. M. Thouvenel observed that as France and the United States had been always agreed on these maritime questions, it would be difficult for either party in America to refuse their assent to the principles now invoked. His Excellency said further that, in looking for precedents, it had been discovered that Great Britain, although treating at the commencement of the American war letters of marque as piracy, had, after a time, recognized the belligerent rights of the States in rebellion against her. (Signed) COWLEY. 414 The Declaration of Paris No. 7. LORD J. RUSSELL TO LORD LYONS. Foreign Office, May 18, 1861. MY LORD, Her Majesty's Government deeply lament the outbreak of hostilities in North America, and they would gladly lend their aid to the restoration of peace. You are instructed, therefore, in case you should be asked to employ your good offices, either singly or in conjunction with the Representatives of other Powers, to give your assistance in promoting the work of reconciliation. But as it is most probable, especially after a recent letter of Mr Seward, that foreign advice is not likely to be accepted, you will refrain from offering it unasked. Such being the case, and supposing the contest not to be at once ended by signal success on one side, or by the return of friendly feeling between the two contending parties, Her Majesty's Government have to consider what will be the position of Great Britain as a neutral between the two belligerents. So far as the position of Great Britain in this respect towards the European Powers is concerned, that position has been greatly modified by the Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856. [Here follows a reference to the terms of the Declaration.] Mr Secretary Marcy, in acknowledging on the 28th July, 1856, the communication of the Declaration of Paris made to the Government of the United States by the Count de Sartiges, 1 proposed to add to Article 1 thereof the following words : " and that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belli- gerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband " : and Mr Marcy expressed the willingness of the Government of the United States to adopt the clause so amended, together with the other three principles contained in the Declaration. Mr Marcy also stated that he was directed to communicate the approval of the President of the second, third, and fourth propositions, independently of the first, should the proposed amendment of Article 1 be unacceptable. The United States Minister in London, on the 24th of February, 1857, renewed the proposal in regard to Article 1, and submitted a draft of Convention 2 in which the Article so 1 Document No. 21. 2 Document No. 22. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 415 amended would be embodied with the other three Articles. But before any decision was taken on this proposal, a change took place in the American Government, by the election of a new President of the United States, and Mr Dallas announced on the 25th of April, 1857, that he was directed to suspend negotiations on the subject. Up to the present time those negotiations have not been renewed. The consequence is, that the United States remaining outside the provisions of the Declaration of Paris, the uncertainty of the law and of international duties with regard to such matters may give rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties and even conflicts. It is with a view to remove beforehand such " difficulties " and to prevent such " conflicts " that I now address you. For this purpose, I proceed to remark on the four Articles, beginning not with the first, but with the last. In a letter to the Earl of Clarendon of the 24th of February, 1857, Mr Dallas, the Minister of the United States, while submit- ting the draft of a new Convention, explains the views of the Government of the United States on the four Articles. In reference to the last Article he says : " The fourth of those principles respecting blockades had, it is believed, long since become a fixed rule of the law of war." There can be no difference of opinion, therefore, with regard to Article 4. With respect to the 3rd Article, the principle laid down in it has long been recognised as law, both in Great Britain and in the United States. Indeed, this part of the law is stated by Chancellor Kent to be uniform in the two countries. With respect to the 2nd Article, Mr Dallas says, in the letter before quoted : " About two years prior to the meeting of the Congress at Paris, negotiations had been originated, and were in train with the maritime nations, for the adoption of the second and third propositions substantially as enumerated in the Declaration." The United States, therefore, have no objection, in principle, to the second proposition. Indeed, Her Majesty's Govern- ment have to remark that this principle is adopted in the Treaties between the United States and Russia of the 22nd of July, 1854, 1 and was sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period 1 Document No. 16. A sentence has apparently dropped out of the despatch, as the word " Treaties " indicates an intention to refer to the treaties concluded by the United States with other Powers. 416 The Declaration of Paris of the history of their independence by their accession to the armed neutrality. 1 With Great Britain the case has been different ; she formerly contended for the opposite principle as the established rule of the Law of Nations, but having in 1856, upon full consideration, determined to depart from that rule, she means to adhere to the principle she then adopted. The United States, who have always desired this change, can, it may be presumed, have no difficulty in assenting to the principle set forth in Article 2 of the Declaration of Paris. There remains only to be considered Article 1, namely, that relating to privateering, from which the Government of the United States withheld their assent. Under these circum- stances it is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be borne in rnind that privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no question, however, but that the Commander and crew of a ship bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing under such letters of marque. In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new principle. You will urge these points upon Mr Seward. The proposals of Her Majesty's Government are made with a view to limit and restrain that destruction of property, and that interruption of trade, which must in a greater or less degree be the inevitable consequences of the present hostilities. Her Majesty's Government expect that these proposals will be received by the United States' Government in a friendly spirit. If such shall be the case, you will endeavour (in concert with M. Mercier) to come to an agreement on the subject, binding France, Great Britain, and the United States. If these pro- posals, should, however, be rejected, Her Majesty's Government 1 This is a mistake. The United States did not adhere to the Armed Neutrality Convention. They expressed their desire to do so, but being belligerents it was not acceded to. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 41? will consider what other steps should be taken with a view to protect from wrong and injury the trade and the property and persons of British subjects. (Signed) J. RUSSELL. No. 8. LORD J. RUSSELL TO LORD LYONS. Foreign Office, May 18, 1861. (Extract) I think it right to acquaint your Lordship that my instruction to you of the 6th instant, in which I stated to you the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government had thought it incumbent on them to admit the belligerent rights of the Confederate States of America, as well as my instruction to you of this day, have severally been communicated to the French Government, and that, as I learn from Lord Cowley and the French Am- bassador, the Imperial Government concur in those instructions, and have sent corresponding instructions to M. Mercier. Your Lordship may therefore be prepared to find your French colleague ready to take the same line with yourself in his communications with the Government of the United States. I need not tell your Lordship that Her Majesty's Govern- ment would very gladly see a practice, which is calculated to lead to great irregularities, and to increase the calamities of war, renounced by both the contending parties in America as it has been renounced by almost every other nation of the world ; and therefore you will not err in encouraging the Government to which you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which they may evince to recognize the Declara- tion of Paris in regard to privateering, as Her Majesty's Govern- ment do not doubt that they will, without hesitation, recognize the remaining Articles of the Declaration, to which you are now instructed to call their attention. You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Govern- ment cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the Government of the United States if coupled with the condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from them such letters of marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of the law of nations. You will take such means as you shall judge most expedient 27 418 The Declaration of Paris to transmit to Her Majesty's Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of my previous despatch to you of this day's date, to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled Confederate States. No. 10. LORD J. RUSSELL TO MR GREY. Foreign Office, June 12, 1861. SIR, The Ambassador of France came to me yesterday, and in- formed me that the Minister of the United States at Paris had made to M. Thouvenel two propositions. The first was that France should agree to add to the 1st Article of the Declaration of Paris the plan of protecting private property on the sea from capture in time of war. The second proposition was, that privateering being abolished by the adoption of the 1st Article of the Declaration of Paris, amended as proposed, the privateers sent out by the so-styled Southern Confederacy should be considered as pirates. M. Thouvenel wishes to learn the opinions of Her Majesty's Government upon these propositions. Her Majesty's Govern- ment decidedly object to the first proposition. It seems to them that it would reduce the power in time of war of all States having a military as well as a commercial marine. It is hardly necessary to point out that in practice it would be almost impossible to distinguish between bond-fide ships carrying merchandize, and ships fraudulently fitted out with means of war under the guise of merchant vessels. With regard to the second point, Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to depart from the neutral character which Her Majesty, as well as the Emperor of the French, has assumed. You will read this despatch to M. Thouvenel. (Signed) J. RUSSELL. No. 11. MR GREY TO LORD J. RUSSELL. Paris, June 14, 1861. MY LORD, In obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I, yesterday, read to M. Thouvenel your despatch of the 12th instant, relating to the propositions made by the Minister of the United States to his Excellency. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 419 M. Thouvenel expressed great satisfaction on finding how completely your Lordship's views coincided with his own. His Excellency said he was already aware that your Lordship enter- tained the same opinion as he himself did on this subject, but he had not yet heard it so decidedly expressed, and he desired me to convey his thanks to your Lordship for the communication. His Excellency proceeded to say that the first proposition had not been made by Mr Dayton until he had asked that Minister to address him an official note on the subject. His answer to it was that the Imperial Government would be glad if that of the United States acceded " purely and simply " to the Declaration of Paris, but that it was out of the question to accept the condition which it was proposed to add to that Declaration, for the effect would be, as your Lordship observes, greatly to reduce the power in time of war of all States having a military as well as a commercial marine. With regard to the second proposition, his Excellency said it was made by the United States with the evident object of leading the French Government to take a decided part against the Southern Confederacy, but this attempt had failed, and there was no intention on the part of the French Government to depart from their neutral character. M. Thouvenel also informed me that he has not yet received any further communication from Mr Dayton. (Signed) W. G. GREY. No. 12. LORD LYONS TO LORD J. RUSSELL. (Received June 17.) Washington, June 4, 1861. (Extract) M. Mercier and I had a conversation respecting these in- structions [as recited] a few hours after the despatches con- taining them reached us. On one point we both entirely agreed. We were both con- vinced that the best hope of attaining the object of our instruc- tions, and of preventing an inconvenient outbreak from this Government, lay in making the course of Great Britain and France as nearly as possible identical. It is probable that Mr Adams may, before this despatch reaches your Lordship, have offered, on the part of this Govern- ment, to adhere to Article 1 of the Declaration of Paris, as well as to the others, and thus to declare privateering to be abolished. There is no doubt that this adherence will be offered in the 420 The Declaration of Paris expectation that it will bind the Governments accepting it to treat the privateers of the Southern Confederacy as pirates. Had this Government offered its adherence immediately upon the appearance of the notice by the Southern Confederacy of its intention to issue letters of marque, it would probably have not been very difficult for Great Britain and France to have exercised an influence at Montgomery which would have pre- vented the letters from being actually issued. At the present moment, however, the privateers are in full activity, and have met with considerable success. It is not, therefore, to be ex- pected that the Southern Confederacy will relinquish the em- ployment of them, otherwise than on compulsion or in return for some great concession from France and England. It seems to be far from certain that the United States' Congress would ratify the abolition of privateering ; nor do I suppose that the Cabinet will abide by its proposal when it finds that it will gain nothing towards the suppression of the Southern privateering by doing so. No. 13. LORD J. RUSSELL TO LORD LYONS. Foreign Office, June 21, 1861. (Extract) The United States Minister at Paris has made propositions to the Imperial Government, founded on the answer of Mr Marcy to the request formerly made to him, to adopt, on the part of his Government, the Declaration of Paris. The Government of the Emperor entirely concur with Her Majesty's Government in the opinion that these propositions ought to be rejected. When I asked Mr Adams whether he had similar propositions to make to Her Majesty's Government, he informed me that he had no instructions to do so. No. 14. LORD LYONS TO LORD J. RUSSELL. (Received June 80.) [Reporting a visit with M. Mercier to Mr Seward.] Washington, June 17, 1861. (Extract) Mr Seward said at once that he could not receive from us a communication founded on the assumption that the Southern The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 421 rebels were to be regarded as belligerents ; that this was a deter- mination to which the Cabinet had come deliberately ; that he could not admit that recent events had in any respect altered the relations between foreign Powers and the Southern States ; that he would not discuss the question with us, but that he should give instructions to the United States' Ministers - in London and Paris, who would be thus enabled to state the reasons for the course taken by their Government to your Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you should be desirous to hear them. Mr Seward proceeded, in a friendly and less formal tone, to say that he did not relish the identity of the course pursued by Great Britain and France ; that he did not think that two European Powers ought to consult together upon the course to be pursued towards a great nation like the United States, and announce that they were acting in concert on the subject. M. Mercier and I endeavoured to make it clear to Mr Seward that this was a susceptibility which was not indulged in by the Great Powers of Europe in their relations with each other. Nothing, we said, was more common than for two or more Powers to come to an agreement upon the policy to be pursued on a matter in which they had a common interest, and to unite their efforts in order to give effect to that policy. Such a course was never considered offensive or disrespectful. Certainly on the present occasion Great Britain and France had none but the most friendly feelings towards the United States. Mr Seward replied that he could not but notice this point, although he did not mean to make it the subject of a formal complaint. As to what the British and French Governments practically asked, he was, he said, perfectly ready to agree to all, and more than all, that was desired. The United States had always held, and held still, that the flag covered the cargo, and that the property of a friend was not liable to seizure under an enemy's flag. The Government admitted fully that it would be re- sponsible for the acts of any privateer to whom it should issue letters of marque. He regarded these principles to be quite as applicable to measures of coercion adopted against rebels as to the operations of a regular war. This being the case, Great Britain and France would, Mr Seward said, obtain all they wanted, and there was no need that any question should be raised by those two Powers with the United States, as to whether the Southern rebels were or were not invested with belligerent rights. France had made no public announcement on the subject;' Great Britain had, 422 The Declaration of Paris indeed, issued a Proclamation, and some of Her Majesty's Ministers had made declarations in Parliament. After all, however, the Proclamation was addressed only to Her Majesty's subjects ; Americans, too, understood and respected, as much as Englishmen, the freedom of Parliamentary debate. He should not take official cognizance of the recognition of the belligerent rights of Southern rebels by Great Britain and France, unless he should be forced to do so by an official communication addressed to the Government of the United States itself. Mr Seward's language and demeanour throughout the inter- view were calm, friendly, and good-humoured. No. 15. LORD LYONS TO LORD J. RUSSELL. (Received June 30.) ,-p, . .. Washington, June 17, 1861. In the course of the conversation which Mr Seward held with M. Mercier and me yesterday, it appeared that he conceived that the communication which we were discussing with him was a matter entirely distinct from his proposal to adhere to the Declaration of Paris. He seemed to have concluded, from a despatch which he had received from Mr Adams, that your Lordship had authorized me to enter into a separate negotiation on that subject. I have this morning explained to Mr Seward how the matter really stands. He said, in reply, that he thought he had reason to complain that the Governments of Europe had taken no notice of the offer he had made to them long ago, to adhere, without reserve, to the Declaration of Paris. He had announced that he preferred the proposal of Mr Marcy, but if that was not acceptable he was ready to agree to the Declaration as it stood. He should now desire Mr Adams to inform your Lord- ship that he was willing that the negotiation should be carried on either here or in London, without further delay. No. 16. MR ADAMS TO LORD J. RUSSELL. (Received July 12.) Legation of the United States, London, ,, T July 11, 1861. MY LORD, I am directed once more to renew the proposition here, and to say that, if agreeable to your Lordship, I am prepared The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 423 to present to your consideration a project of a Convention at any moment which it may be convenient to you to appoint. (Signed) CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. No. 18. Draft of Convention between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, upon the subject of the Rights of Belligerents and Neutrals in time of War. (Communicated to Lord J. Russell by Mr Adams, July 13.) The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland being equally animated by a desire to define with more precision the rights of belligerents and neutrals in time of war, have for that purpose conferred full powers, the President of the United States upon Charles F. Adams, accredited as their Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her said Majesty, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland upon And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, have concluded the following Articles : ARTICLE I. 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. ARTICLE II. The present Convention shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland ; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within the space of six months from the signature, or sooner if possible. In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate, and have thereto affixed their seals. Done at London, the day of , in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one. 424 The Declaration of Paris No. 19. LORD J. RUSSELL TO MR ADAMS. Foreign Office, July 18, 1861. 9IB) Upon considering your propositions of Saturday last, I have two remarks to make : First. The course hitherto followed has been a simple notification of adherence to the Declaration of Paris by those States which were not originally parties to it. Secondly. The Declaration of Paris was one embracing various Powers, with a view to general concurrence upon questions of Maritime Law, and not an insulated engage- ment between two Powers only. Her Majesty's Government are willing to waive entirely any objection on the first of these heads, and to accept the form which the Government of the United States prefers. With regard to the second, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that they should be assured that the United States are ready to enter into a similar engagement with France, and with other maritime Powers who are parties to the Declara- tion of Paris, and do not propose to make singly and separately a Convention with Great Britain only. But as much time might be required for separate communi- cations between the Government of the United States and all the Maritime Powers who were parties to, or have acceded to, the Declaration of Paris, Her Majesty's Government would deem themselves authorized to advise the Queen to conclude a Convention on this subject with the President of the United States, so soon as they shall have been informed that a similar Convention has been agreed upon, and is ready for signature, between the President of the United States and the Emperor of the French, so that the two Conventions might be signed simultaneously, and on the same day. (Signed) J. RUSSELL. No. 21. [A covering letter containing the following copy letter as inclosure.] LORD LYONS TO CONSUL BUNCH. g Washington, July 5, 1861. The course of events having invested the States assuming the title of the Confederate States of America with the character of belligerents, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 425 Government to obtain from the existing Government in those States securities concerning the proper treatment of neutrals. I am authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the nego- tiation on this matter to you ; and I have great satisfaction in doing so. In order to make you acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government, I transmit to you a duplicate of a despatch to me in which they are fully stated. 1 It is essential, under present circumstances, that you should act with great caution, in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the new Confederation by Great Britain. On this account, I think it unadvisable that you should go to Richmond, or place yourself in direct communication with the Central Authority which is established there. The most convenient course will, probably, be for you to take advantage of the intercourse which you naturally hold with Mr Pickens, the Governor of the State of South Carolina. I cannot doubt that if you explain, verbally, to Mr Pickens the views of Her Majesty's Government, he will have no diffi- culty in inducing the Government at Richmond to recognize, by an official act, the rights secured to neutrals by the second and third Articles of the Declaration of Paris, and to admit its own responsibility for the acts of privateers sailing under its letters of marque. The most perfect accord on this question exists between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French ; and instructions corresponding to these are sent to-day by the Emperor's Minister here to the French Consul at Charleston. You will accordingly enter into the frankest communication with your French colleague on the subject, and will be careful to act in strict concert with him. (Signed) LYONS. No. 24. MR ADAMS TO LORD J. RUSSELL. Legation of the United States, ,.. T London, July 29, 1861. MY LORD, I have the honour now to inform your Lordship that in consonance with the intention expressed in my note of the 19th instant, I have written to Mr Dayton at Paris touching the extent of his powers to negotiate, upon the same basis proposed by me to you, with the Government of France to which he is accredited. I have also to say that since the date of my writing I have 1 Despatch No. 7. 426 The Declaration of Paris had the pleasure to converse personally with him, as well as to receive a letter from him in answer to my inquiry. Mr Dayton informs me that some time since he made a proposal to the French Government to adopt the Declaration of the Congress at Paris in 1856, with an addition to the first clause, in substance the same with that heretofore proposed by his predecessor Mr Mason, under instructions given by Mr Marcy, then the Secretary of State of the United States ; to that proposal he received an answer from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declining to consider the proposition, not for any objection entertained against it, but because it was a variation from the terms of the original agreement, requiring a prior reference of it to the other parties to that Convention. This answer does not in his opinion make the ultimate acceptance of his addition impossible, and he does not feel as if he ought to abandon the support of what he considers as so beneficent an amendment to the original plan, until he has reason to despair of success ; he has therefore requested to know of me whether I have reason to believe perseverance in this direction to be fruitless. For my part I entirely concur in the view entertained by Mr Dayton of the value of this amendment ; I also know so well the interest that my Government takes in its adoption as to be sure that it would refuse to justify a further procedure on our part which was not based upon a reasonable certainty that success is not attainable, at least, at the present moment. I have therefore ventured to state to Mr Dayton my belief that I have that certainty ; I have therefore mentioned to him what I have likewise communicated to the proper Depart- ment of the Government of the United States the fact that in the last Conference I had the honour to hold with your Lordship, allusion having been made to the amendment of Mr Dayton, I said that that amendment was undoubtedly the first wish of my Government, and that I had instructions to press it if there was the smallest probability of success ; but that I supposed this matter to have been already definitely acted upon : to which I understood your Lordship to signify your assent, and to add that I might consider the proposition as inadmissible. If I have made no mistake in reporting the substance of what passed between us, Mr Dayton tells me he is satisfied, and expresses his readiness to proceed on the basis proposed by me to your Lordship, with the French Government. But in order to remove all possibility of misconception between him and myself, I have taken the liberty of recalling your Lordship's attention to the matter before it may be too late. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 427 Should there have been any essential error of fact on the main point, I trust your Lordship will do me the favour to set me right. Should it happen, on the contrary, that I am correct, I believe it will not be necessary to interpose any delay in the negotiation for further reference to the Government of the United States. Mr Dayton will take the necessary steps to apprize the Govern- ment of the Emperor of the French of his intention to accede to the Declaration of Paris pure and simple, and the negotia- tions may be carried on simultaneously in both countries, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be perfected on the respective sides. However my Government may regret that it has not been able to expand the application of the principles of the Declaration of Paris to the extent which it deems desirable, it is too well convinced of the great value of the recognition actually given to those principles by the Great Powers of Europe in that act, longer to hesitate in giving in its cordial adhesion. But it ardently cherishes the hope that time and the favouring progress of correct opinion may before long bring about opportunities for additional developments of the system they initiate, through the co-operation of all the maritime nations of the earth, and most especially of one so enlightened and philanthropic as Great Britain. (Signed) CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. No. 28. EARL RUSSELL TO MR ADAMS. c Foreign Office, August 19, 1861. oIR, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a Declaration which I propose to make, upon signing the Convention of which you gave me a draft, embodying the Articles of the Declaration of Paris. I propose to make the Declaration in question in a written form, and to furnish you with a copy of it. You will observe that it is intended to prevent any mis- conception as to the nature of the engagement to be taken by Her Majesty. If you have no objection to name a day in the course of this week for the signature of this Convention, Mr Dayton can on that day and at the same time sign with M. Thouvenel a Conven- tion identical with that which you propose to sign with me. (Signed) RUSSELL. 428 The Declaration of Paris Inclosure in No. 28. Draft of Declaration. In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day be- tween Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States. No. 30. EARL COWLEY TO EARL RUSSELL. Paris, August 20, 1861. (Extract) Knowing that M. Thouvenel was to see Mr Dayton this morn- ing, I sent his Excellency a copy of your Lordship's note and declaration to Mr Adams with reference to the Convention respecting maritime law, as soon as they reached my hands. I have just seen M. Thouvenel, who informed me that he had apprized Mr Dayton that it was the intention of the Imperial Government to make a similar declaration to him ; Mr Dayton had thereupon said that he did not think that either he or Mr Adams could receive such a Declaration without reference to their Government. Mr Dayton hardly concealed from M. Thouvenel that the object of his Government in agreeing to sign the Convention was to force the Western Powers to treat the Southern privateers as pirates, arguing that as the Government of Washington was the only Government recog- nized by foreign Powers, the Southern States must, as far as foreign Powers were concerned, be subject to the consequences of the acts of that Government. No. 31. A long letter from Mr Adams to Earl Russell, dated 23rd August 1861, reviewing the negotiations, replied to at length by Earl Russell on 28th August, No. 32. No. 33. EARL COWLEY TO EARL RUSSELL. M j Paris, August 27, 1861. I have informed M. Thouvenel that Mr Adams declines to sign the Convention respecting Maritime Law without further The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 429 orders. His Excellency has heard nothing more from Mr Dayton. (Signed) COWLEY. No. 37. EARL COWLEY TO EARL RUSSELL. Paris, September 10, 1861. MY LORD, Mr Dayton has addressed to M. Thouvenel a note couched in much the same terms as that addressed by Mr Adams to your Lordship, declining to proceed with the Treaty sanctioning the Declaration of Paris without further orders from his Government. M. Thouvenel's reply is to the same purport as your Lord- ship's. (Signed) COWLEY. No. 38. LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL. (Received September 13.) Washington) August 30, 1861. (Extract) I have received, just in time to have the inclosed copy made for your Lordship, a despatch from Mr Consul Bunch, reporting the proceedings taken by him, in conjunction with his French colleague, M. de Belligny, to obtain the adherence of the so- called Confederate States to the last three Articles of the Declaration of Paris. Inclosure 1 in No. 38. CONSUL BUNCH TO LORD LYONS. [Reporting interview, in company with M. de Belligny, with Mr Davis, President of the Confederate States.] Charleston, August 16, 1861. (Extract) Mr Davis expressed no unwillingness to entertain the matter, although he signified his regret that it should not have been more formally brought before him, as it seemed to him that if the Declaration which it was sought to obtain from the Government of the Confederate States was of sufficient importance to require the overture now made to him, it was 430 The Declaration of Paris of equal consequence that it should be made in a more regular manner. ... It was soon determined that Congress should be invited to issue a series of Resolutions, by which the second, third, and fourth Articles of the Declaration of the Treaty of Paris should be accepted by the Confederate States. These Resolutions were passed on the 13th instant, approved on the same day by the President. . . . Your Lordship will observe that, by these Resolutions, the Confederate States accept the second, third, and fourth Articles of the Declaration of Paris, but by their Resolution declare, with reference to the first Article, that they " maintain the right of privateering as it has been long-established by the practice and recognized by the Law of Nations." With respect to this Resolution, I beg to remark that the wishes of Her Majesty's Government would seem to have been fully met, for as no proposal was made that the Confederate Government should abolish privateering, it could not be expected that they would do so of their own accord, particularly as it is the arm upon which they most rely for the injury of the extended commerce of their enemy. But the Secretary of State has placed in the hands of Mr , for communication to us, the inclosed copy of the instructions issued for the guidance of privateers, and appeals to them, as well as to the character of the Government, for a proof of their determination that the privateers shall conform themselves to the ordinary practices sanctioned by the Law of Nations. We think that we may rely on the assur- ances thus given, supported, as they are, by the language of the Resolution. The fact is, that the President and the Government are a good deal annoyed at the refusal of France, England, and other nations to allow prizes to be condemned in their ports, which they consider as somewhat of a departure from a strict neutrality, and which they still hope may be reconsidered as the contest advances. They also confidently expect that the same anxiety for the mitigation of the evil consequences of the present war, which has rendered the accession of the Confederate States to the Declaration of Paris a matter of interest to France and England, will induce other nations to insist upon the rigorous fulfilment by the United States of the principle contained in the fourth Article, viz., the effectiveness of the blockade instituted by that Power. The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 431 Inclosure 2 in No. 38. Resolution touching certain Points of Maritime Law, and defining the position of the Confederate States in respect thereto. Whereas the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, in a conference held at Paris on the 16th of April, 1856, made certain declara- tions concerning maritime law, to serve as uniform rules for their guidance in all cases arising out of the principles thus proclaimed ; And whereas, it being desirable not only to attain certainty and uniformity, as far as may be practicable, in maritime law, but also to maintain whatever is just and proper in the estab- lished usages of nations, the Confederate States of America deem it important to declare the principles by which they will be governed in their intercourse with the rest of mankind : Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America : 1st. That we maintain the right of privateering, as it has been long established by the practice, and recognized by the Law of Nations. 2nd. That the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3rd. That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4th. That blockades, in order to be binding, must be effectual ; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. Signed by the President of Congress, on the 13th August, and approved same day by the President of the Confederate States of America. Inclosure 3 in No. 38. Instructions issued by the President of the Confederate States to Private Armed Vessels. 1. The tenor of your commission, under the Act of Congress entitled " An Act recognizing the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States and concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods," a copy of which is herein annexed, will be kept constantly in your view. The high seas referred to in your commission, you will understand 432 The Declaration of Paris generally to refer to the low- water mark ; but with the ex- ception of the space within one league, or three miles, from the shore of countries at peace with the United States and the Confederate States. You will, nevertheless, execute your commission within the distance of the shore of the nation at war within the United States, and even on the waters within the jurisdiction of such nation, if permitted to do so. 2. You are to pay the strictest regard to the rights of neutral Powers, and the usages of civilized nations, and in all your proceedings towards neutral vessels you are to give them as little molestation or interruption as will consist with the right of ascertaining their neutral character, and of detaining and bringing them in for regular adjudication in the proper cases. You are particularly to avoid even the appearance of using force or seduction, with the view to deprive such vessels of their crews or the passengers, other than persons in the military service of the enemy. 3. Towards enemy's vessels and their crews you are to proceed in exercising the rights of war, with all the justice and humanity which characterizes this Government and its citizens. 4. The master and one or more of the principal persons belonging to the captured vessels are to be sent, as soon after the capture as may be, to the Judge or Judges of the proper Court in the Confederate States, to be examined on oath touching the interest or property of the captured vessel and her lading ; and at the same time are to be delivered to the Judge or Judges all papers, charter-parties, bills of lading, letters and other documents and writings found on board ; and the said papers to be proved by the affidavit of the com- mander of the captured vessel, or some other person present at the capture, to be produced as they were received, without fratid, addition, subtraction, or embezzlement. 5. Property, even of the enemy, is exempt from seizure on neutral vessels, unless it be contraband of war. If goods contraband of war are found on any neutral vessel, and the commander thereof shall offer to deliver them up, the offer shall be 'accepted, and the vessel left at liberty to pursue its voyage, unless the quantity of contraband goods shall be greater than can be conveniently received on board your vessel, in which case the neutral vessel may be carried into port for the delivery of the contraband goods. The following articles are declared by this Government contraband of war, as well as all others that are so declared by the laws of nations, viz. : All arms and implements serving for the purpose of war The American Civil War and Declaration of Paris 433 by land or sea, such as cannons, mortars, guns, muskets, rifles, pistols, petards, bombs, grenades, balls, shot, shell, pikes, swords, bayonets, javelins, lances, horse furniture, holsters, belts, and generally all other implements of war. Also, timber for building, pitch, tar, resin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp, cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels, wrought iron and planks only excepted. Neutral vessels conveying enemies' despatches, or military persons in the service of the enemy, forfeit their neutral char- acter, and are liable to capture and condemnation. But this rule does not apply to neutral vessels bearing despatches from the public Ministers or Ambassadors of the enemy residing in neutral countries. By the command of the President of the Confederate States. (Signed) ROBERT TOOMBS, Secretary of State. No. 40. LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL. (Received September 23.) Washington, September 10, 1861. MY LORD, Mr Seward read to me very rapidly, this morning, the draft of a long despatch which he has written to Mr Adams on the subject of the Declaration which your Lordship proposes to make upon signing the Convention by which the United States would adhere to the principles of maritime law laid down by the Congress of Paris. The despatch would, he said, be communicated to your Lordship by Mr Adams. I was not able to follow Mr Seward very exactly as he read it, but so far as I could judge, the language appeared to be suitable and friendly. Mr Adams is, however, directed to break off the negotiation altogether if your Lordship insists upon making the Declaration. Hopes are expressed that it may be resumed at a more favourable moment. A similar despatch will be addressed to Mr Dayton, to be communicated to the French Government. In speaking to me, Mr Seward appeared to consider the negotiation to be completely at an end for the present. (Signed) LYONS. 28 434 The Declaration of Paris No. 42. EARL RUSSELL TO LORD LYONS. Foreign Office, December 24, 1861. MY LORD, I omitted at the proper time to mention to you that the refusal of Mr Adams to sign a Convention respecting the Declaration of Paris, with my Declaration attached to it, was approved by his Government. I felt no doubt it would be so ; but the communication of Mr Adams not being in writing, I omitted to state the fact. (Signed) RUSSELL. No. 43. LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL. (Received December 25.) Washington. December 6, 1861. (Extract) I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the Papers relating to Foreign Affairs which were laid before Congress with the President's Message. A great deal of the space devoted to England and France is occupied by the negotiations concerning the adherence of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, Mr Adams writes frequently and at great length concerning his misapprehension of your Lordship's intentions as to transferring the negotiation to Washington. The simple explanation of this misapprehen- sion is, that Mr Seward refused to receive the despatch 1 in which your Lordship's proposals were made. 2 Your Lordship will recollect that Mr Seward, having been permitted by M. Mercier and me to read and consider in private that despatch, and a despatch of a similar tenour from the Government of France, refused to receive the formal copies we were instructed to place in his hands, or to take any official notice of their contents. The English despatch was, however, subsequently communi- cated officially by your Lordship to Mr Adams. From several of the papers now published it appears that it was only an act of common prudence on the part of the Govern- ments of Great Britain and France not to accept the accession of this country to the Declaration of Paris without stating distinctly what obligations they intended, by doing so, to assume with regard to Seceded States. Little doubt can remain after reading the papers that the accession was offered solely with a 1 No. 7. 2 See No. 14. Observance of the Declaration of Paris 435 view to the effect it would have on the privateering operations of the Southern States ; and that a refusal on the part of England and France, after having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers as pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if not a ground of quarrel. 25 Observance of the Declaration of Paris. BRITISH ORDER IN COUNCIL, RELATIVE TO THE OBSERVANCE OF THE RULES OF MARITIME LAW, UNDER THE DECLARA- TION OF THE CONGRESS OF PARIS, 1856, TOWARDS VESSELS AND GOODS OF THE ENEMY AND OF NEUTRAL POWERS, IN THE EVENT OF WAR BY FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN AGAINST CHINA, MARCH 7, 1860. AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, the 7th Day of March 1860. PRESENT, THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. Whereas, in the event of hostilities commencing between Her Majesty and her august Ally the Emperor of the French on the one hand, and the Emperor of China on the other hand, it is the intention and desire of Her Majesty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to act during such hostilities in strict conformity with the Declaration respecting Maritime Law, signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, assembled in Congress at Paris, and dated April 16, 1856 ; and whereas Her Majesty is willing to extend the benefits of the said Declara- tion of Paris to all Powers which may be neutral in the said hostilities : Now Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that so far as regards the ships of any neutral Power, the flag of any such Power shall cover the enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war ; so that no goods of enemies found on board any ship belonging to the subjects of such neutral Power, or to 436 The Declaration of Paris those inhabiting within dominions of any such Power, and duly entitled to use the flag of such Power, shall be subject to capture or condemnation by reason only of such goods being enemies' goods ; all other liabilities to capture and condemnation, respectively, of enemies' goods and neutral ships being reserved and remaining in all respects as before the Declaration of the said Congress at Paris, of the 16th of April, 1856. And it is hereby further ordered that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, shall not be liable to capture under the enemy's flag, by reason only of said goods being under the enemy's flag ; all other liabilities to capture and condemna- tion of neutral goods being reserved, and remaining in all respects as before the Declaration of the said Congress at Paris, of the 16th of April, 1856 : Provided always, and it is hereby ordered, that nothing herein contained shall be applicable to, or shall be construed, deemed, or taken, so as to operate or apply to, or in favour of any person, ship, or goods whatso- ever, which may be captured for breaking or attempting to break, or which may be lawfully adjudged to have broken or attempted to break, any blockade maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy ; but that all such persons, ships, and goods may be duly taken cognizance of, proceeded upon, adjudicated, dealt with, and treated, in all respects and to all purposes according to the course of Admiralty and the Law of Nations, as if this Order had never been made, anything hereinbefore to the contrary in anywise notwith- standing. And it is further ordered that, notwithstanding the existence of hostilities between Her Majesty and her august Ally on the one hand, and the Emperor of China on the other hand, and during the continuance thereof, all and every the subjects of Her Majesty and of Her august Ally the Emperor of the French, shall and may, during such hostilities, freely trade at and with all parts and places wheresoever situate in the dominions of China, and also with all persons whomsoever, as well subjects of the Emperor of China as others residing or trading within any part of the dominions of the said Emperor. And it is further ordered and declared that, if any Chinese ship or vessel shall be captured or taken by any of Her Majesty's vessels or forces, having on board any merchandize or goods being the bond-fide property of any subjects of Her Majesty or of her august Ally the Emperor of the French, such merchandize or goods shall not be subject or liable to be condemned as prize, but shall, on the proof of such property, as aforesaid, be restored to the owner or owners thereof : Provided always, and it is Observance of Principles of the Declaration of Paris 437 hereby ordered, that this Order shall not apply, to be construed, deemed, or taken to operate to, or apply to or in favour of contraband of war, or to trading in, supply of, or dealing with, any articles or things which it may be declared by Her Majesty and her august Ally shall be deemed and taken as contraband of war, or to any trading or attempt to trade with places subject to effective blockade by the ships or fleets of Her Majesty and her august Ally, or either of them ; and it is further ordered that Her Majesty's officers and subjects, and especially Her Majesty's Courts and officers exercising any prize jurisdiction, do take notice hereof, and govern themselves accordingly. WM. L. BATHURST. 26 Observance of the Principles of the Declaration of Paris : War between United States and Spain. A. PROCLAMATION BY THE UNITED STATES. Foreign Office, 3 May 1898. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received the following note from the American Ambassador at this Court : American Embassy, London, 23 April 1898. MY LORD, I have the honour to acquaint you that I have been informed of the intention of the Government of the United States in the event of hostilities between the Government of Spain, not to resort to privateering but to adhere to the following recognised Rules of international law : 1. The neutral flag covers the enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war. 2. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag ; and 3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective. To the Marquess of Salisbury. 438 The Declaration of Paris Foreign Office, May 9, 1898. Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has this day received, through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washing- ton, the following Proclamation, which has been issued by the President of the United States of America : (EXISTENCE or WAR. SPAIN.) BY THE PRESIDENT or THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. A PROCLAMATION. Whereas by an Act of Congress approved the 25th April, 1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A.D. 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain ; and Whereas it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations, and sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of this Government will not be to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the Rules of the Declaration of Paris : Now, therefore, I, William M'Kinley, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim : 1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the ex- ception of contraband of war. 2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag. 3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective. 4. Spanish merchant-vessels, in any ports or places within the United States, shall be allowed till the 21st May 1898, inclu- sive, for loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places ; and such Spanish merchant-vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of the above term ; Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Government. 5. Any Spanish merchant-vessel which, prior to the 21st Observance of Principles of the Declaration of Paris 439 May 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molestation ; and any such vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded. 6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard to the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail-steamers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, on the 26th day of April in the year of our Lord 1898, and of the Independence of the United States the 122nd. (L.S.) WILLIAM M'KINLEY. By the President, Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State. B. PROCLAMATION BY SPAIN. Foreign Office, May 3rd, 1898. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received through His Majesty's Embassy at Madrid the following trans- lation of a Decree issued by the Spanish Government on 23rd April 1898 : Article III. Notwithstanding that Spain is not bound by the Declaration signed at Paris on the 16th April 1856, as she expressly stated her wish not to adhere to it, my Government, guided by the principles of international law, intends to observe, and hereby orders that the following Regulations for maritime law be observed : (a) A neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, except contra- band of war. (b) Neutral goods^ except contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag. (c) A blockade to be binding must be effective, that is to say, maintained with a sufficient force to actually prevent access to the enemy's coast. Article IV. The Spanish Government, while maintaining their right to issue letters of marque which they expressly 440 The Declaration of Paris reserved in their note of 16th May 1857 in reply to the request of France for the adhesion of Spain to the Declaration of Paris relative to maritime law, will organise for the present a service of auxiliary cruisers of the navy composed of ships of the Spanish mercantile navy which will co-operate with the latter for the purposes of cruising and which will be subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the navy. ADDENDUM To Correspondence relating to the Blockades : Document No. 13. [Lord Clarendon's answer to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' letter of 19th April 1854 (p. 301) was not discovered in time to print with the other correspondence.] LORD CLARENDON TO COUNT WALEWSKI. Foreign Office, 1 May 1854. M. L'AMBASSADEUR, Her Majesty's Government have duly considered the sugges- tions made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the despatch to Your Excellency dated 19th inst. which you were so good as to communicate relative to blockade, and I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government concur with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the notification of blockade should be made jointly and in the name of the two Governments, although such notification is not essential to the validity of the blockade, which may be duly constituted de facto without any public or formal notification, by a sufficient force of either nation on the spot. Her Majesty's Government consider that, when practicable, the names of each port blockaded should be inserted in the notification, and that the addition suggested by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, pointing out the territorial limits of the blockade, is strictly proper if not absolutely necessary. With respect to the form and manner of conveying information to neutral Governments for the establishment of blockade, Her Majesty's Government have no objection to the form of the circular proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to be addressed to the Minister of each neutral Government at London and Paris, Addendum 441 and will adopt that form as well as notify blockades in the London Gazette. It should, however, be distinctly understood that the validity of a blockade depends mainly upon the efficiency of a competent force on the spot, and that it will not be affected by the want of notification. The only effect of notification is to prevent the necessity of a warning in each particular instance. Vice- Admiral Sir Charles Napier's announcement of his inten- tion to blockade will not dispense with a formal notification, as an announcement of a mere intention has no legal effect. With regard to the rule stated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to have been established by the modern Law of Nations, of granting sufficient delay to neutral vessels to leave blockaded ports, either in ballast or laden, I have to state to Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are unable entirely to admit the rule to be as thus stated. The English prize-law and practice has, indeed, permitted egress to neutral ships in ballast, but it has only allowed egress to cargoes when such cargoes had either been taken into the port before the blockade, or had been bond fide purchased and laden on board before the com- mencement of the blockade. Primd facie all laden ships coming out of a blockaded port are liable to capture, and it is for those interested to obtain restoration from the Prize Court when they shall have proved that neither the ships nor the cargoes were justly liable to condemnation. I have, &c., (Signed) CLARENDON. INDEX [The word " Declaration " refers to the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Where the Declaration of 1854 is intended, the words " declaration to the neutrals " are used.] PAGE ADHERENCE TO THE DECLARATION the Powers which adhered . . 135 countries subject to foreign jurisdic- tion did not adhere . . 138 no provision for new States adhering 138 ,, for countries which have separated . . . 138 indirect : by treaty with Italy . 140 ,, by treaty with France . 141 consequences of, considered . . 207 ALBEMAELE, EABL OF moves for greater restrictions on Russian trade ... 88 as to trading with the enemy in violation of the common law . 90 on substitutes for Russian raw material ..... 96 ARCHANGEL return of exports from, to England moved for .... 88 ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION constitutional adherence to Declara- tion 135 ARMED NEUTRALITY Sweden and Denmark follow tradi- tion of 6 relation of Scandinavian declara- tion of neutrality to 17 theories of, adopted by Philosophical Radicals 26 abandonment of principles by signa- tory Powers .... 34 Holland's adherence to . . .52 said by Sir William Molesworth to have attained its object . . 85 Lord Derby's statement as to Eng- land's attitude during . . 133 defied by the Earl of Chatham and William Pitt . . . .169 allowed " enemy ships enemy goods" without protest . . . 199 ASHLEY, MR EVELYN on Napoleon's desire for peace . 115 justifies Lord Clarendon's action in regard to Declaration . .116 vindicates policy of Declaration 116, 129 AUSTRIA reply to Scandinavian neutrality . 8 proposal as to neutrality of smaller States . . . .20 alliance with Prussia ... 22 Azov, SEA OF blockade of 87 BALKAN STATES no adherence to Declaration by . 139 BALTIC blockade of 87 nullified by action of Prussia 87, 88 BALTIC PORTS discussion as to closing of, 10-12, 15, 16, 19 blockade of, France contends would render " Rule of 1756 " un- necessary during the war . 64 BARING, MR THOMAS advocates freedom of enemy ships . 164 BASSANO, Due DE report to Bonaparte on Treaty of Utrecht 210 BELLIGERENT RIGHT exercise of, may be modified or abandoned . . . .180 BELLIGERENT RIGHTS AT SEA report of Horsfall Commission on . 150 BENTHAM opinion of, on war .... 26 BERNERS, LORD question by, as to British trade with Russia ..... 88 BEUST, COUNT (PRUSSIAN PLENIPOTEN- TIARY) comment on Peace of Paris . .115 BLACK SEA British fleet ordered to . . . 5 entry of allied fleets ... 27 blockade unsatisfactory ... 87 action of the admirals : ordered to blockade ports separately . 87 final notification of . .87 Lord Granville on ineffectiveness of 90 BLOCKADE American view as to unreasonable interference with trade . . 71 United States criticism of form in which principle stated in De- claration .... 143, 186 of commercial ports, United States objects to 153 of Confederate States ports by Lincoln .... 153, 162 constitutional aspect of principle of Declaration dealing with . .179 a high act of sovereignty . .179 enemy ship breaking, condemned as enemy property . . . 184 Pitt's definition of ._ . . 186,201 definition of, in Russian treaty 186, 201 meaning of " effective " . . . 187 meaning of " legally binding " . 188 risk of seizure continues till end of outward voyage . . .188 BOARD OF TRADE inquiry to, as to Russian trade, from Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler 43 statement concerning articles pro- duced in Russia ... 44 442 Index BONAPARTE, NAPOLEON doctrines of, adopted by Philoso- phical Radicals ... 26 adopted in Second Marcy Note . 147 adopted by Horsfall Commission . 151 licences used by, in French wars . 48 clothes French army with British cloth in 1807 ... 98 claims " free ships free goods " as a right 199 Due de Bassano's report to, on Treaty of Utrecht, 1812 . . 210 BOSPHORUS blockade of entrance, doubts as to legality of .... 87 BOURQUENEY, BARON (FRENCH PLENI- POTENTIARY) comment on Peace of Paris . .115 BOURRIENNE (BONAPARTE'S SECRETARY) purchases British cloth for French Army 98 BRAZIL comments in adherence to Declaration 135 BRIGHT, JOHN exponent of Manchester school, views on war . . . . .25 advocates extension of immunity of neutral flag to enemy flag . 100, 164 speech on the Declaration . 164 et seq. criticism of Lord Palmerston's speech in 1856 . . . 165 on effect of war on treaties . 190, 193 BRITISH MERCHANTS trade of Russia in the hands of . 41 position of, in Russia ... 42 BROUGHAM, MR criticism of the Orders in Council of 1807 99, 106 BUCHANAN, MR (UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON) confers with Lord Clarendon on privateering . . . . 35 re. asks Lord Clarendon if English pol- icy regarding " free ships free goods " has been determined . 39 statement of United States' views on " free ships free goods " and " enemy ships enemy goods " . 39 British policy regarding neutrals ex- plained to, by Lord Clarendon . 54 Lord Clarendon communicates declaration to neutrals to . 69 approves British draft of declara- tion to neutrals : conversation with Lord Clarendon reported to the Cabinet : communicates summary to Washington . 70 BUD BERG, BARON (RUSSIAN AMBASSA- DOR TO BERLIN) interview with King of Prussia as to neutrality during the war . 21 BUOL, COUNT (AUSTRIAN PLENIPOTEN- TIARY) accepts the Declaration . . .119 CABINET approves declaration to neutrals . 69 Mr Buchanan's opinion reported to 70 ,, reports division in . 39 CAMPBELL, LORD (LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND) letter as to submitting Declaration to Parliament. . . . .177 PAOK CANNING refusal to ratify Brazilian Treaty, 1827 131 CANNING, STRATFORD (BRITISH AMBAS- SADOR AT CONSTANTINOPLE) British fleet put under the orders of . 27 CARDWELL, MR despondent as to stopping British trade with Russia ... 94 reference to licences ... 94 on obtaining raw material from the enemy 96 declares, in 1854, that to waive rights is not to surrender them . .116 CARLSCRONA Russia desires to carry prizes into . 10 CARNARVON, EARL OF criticises Lord Clarendon's defence of Declaration . . . 130 CASES REFERRED TO Emanuel ..... 63 Essex . . . 91, 92, 93 n., 185 Goede Hoop 107 Hoop 99 Immanuel ..... 63 Jungfre Maria .... 205 Maria ...... 91 Marie Glaser .... 207 208 Potts v. Bell 99 R. v. Wilson 176 Schooner Mowe . . . 206, 212 Trent 168 Whilelmina 63 William ... 92, 93, 185 Yong Vrow Adriana . . . 205 CATHERINE, EMPRESS OF RUSSIA fosters commerce between neutral and the enemy ... 52 maritime code of . . .173 claim to "free ships free goods" as a right 199 CERTIFICATES OF ORIGIN rejected as a means to check British trade with Russia ... 94 CHATHAM, LORD endeavour to suppress privateers . 147 defiance of Armed Neutralities . 169 CHINA Order in Council as to observance of Declaration in the event of war against .... 183 CLANHICARDE, MARQUIS OF asks for correspondence leading to Riga despatch ... 46 CLARENDON, LORD (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) discussion with American Minister on privateering . . 9, 35 n. on ' free ships free goods " 39 policy regarding Scandinavian neu- trality 15-18 Lord Cranworth's letter to . . 16 letter to Lord Shaftesbury on priva- teering, and alteration of mari- time law . . 29, 35, 85, 124 confides to M. Drouyn that he dare not make changes in English maritime law en face du pays 29, 36 influenced by Philosophical Radicals 36 444 The Declaration of Paris CLARENDON, LOED continued. justifies the Riga despatch . 40, 46 advises merchants not to make usual advances to Russia . 41 states position of British merchants in Russia .... 42 proposes issue of licences to British merchants in Russia . . 47 n. discloses policy as to neutral rights 48 confuses objections to privateering with claims of neutrals . . 50 submits declaration to the neutrals to Mr Buchanan . . 54, 69 reports conversation with Mr Buchanan to the Cabinet . 70 promises joint-action to French Government as to declaration to the neutrals ... 55 " governing member " of the Cabinet 72 attitude of, at Congress of Paris 116 et seq. despatch to, from Lord Palmerston, criticising terms of the De- claration .... 122 original proposal for surrender . 123 defence of the Declaration in the House of Lords . . 124 et seq. criticises Consolato del Mare . 126 criticises Grotius .... 127 condemns privateering . . 128 approves early contentions of neutrals 128 considers surrender inevitable after the declaration to neu- trals of 1854 . . . .129 unfavourable to immunity of private property at sea . . 153 asserts Declaration need not be sub- mitted to Parliament . .177 suggests adoption of " free ships free goods " a bargain for the abolition of privateering . 200, 201 n. abandons Pitt's principle of blockade . . . .201 proposes the Declaration to be binding only on consenting Powers 211 letters and telegrams to Lord Cowley : satisfaction at Lord Cowley's interview with M. Drouyn . 31 independent action not to be taken by England regarding neutrals 38 alteration in declaration to neu- trals impossible ... 67 alteration in declaration to neu- trals adopted .... 67 letters and telegrams from Lord Cowley reporting interview with M. Drouyn regarding neu- 30 trals .... M. Drouyn's anxiety for concerted action . . 38 M. Drouyn pressing for decision on neutral 64 question French objection to coasting-trade clause . 68 COASTING TRADE in the Baltic, insignificance of . 62 M. Drouyn de Lhuys' objection to introducing " Rule of 1756 " in order to stop ... 62 clause included in Lord Cowley's first draft . . . . 70, 72 COBDEN. MR seconds Mr Horsfall's motion as to maritime law . . . .161 COCKBUBN, SIR ALEXANDER (ATTORNEY- GENERAL) revives " Rule of 1756 " 63 influence of opinion on members of the Cabinet .... 72 COLCHESTER, LORD moves resolution regretting De- claration ..... 124 COLLIER, Ms- suggests enforcement of " Rule of 1756" 88 COMMERCIAL TREATIES ancient custom of Parliament to advise the Crown on . .182 COMMON STOCK principle established by Prize Courts 92 evaded by United States mer- chants 92 CONFEDERATE STATES recognition of, as belligerents . 154, 155 attitude towards Declaration . . 160 CONGRESS OF PARIS meeting of . . . .115 conclusion of Treaty of Peace . .115 CONSEIL DE PRISES constitution of .... 204 CONSOLATO DEL MARE settlement by, of principles of mari- time law 126 CONSULAR JURISDICTION based on factory system . . 42 CONTINENTAL SYSTEM development of, by Bonaparte . 106 CONTINUOUS VOYAGE doctrine of, affected by Prussian land-transit system . . 88 reinforced by common-stock prin- ciple 92 effect of " free ships free goods " on 185 CONTRABAND OF WAR sent to the enemy by Prussian tran- sit trade 89 not defined in the Declaration . 184 contention of Armed Neutralities as to 184 effect of treaty definition of . . 184 CORBETT, SIR JULIAN as to privateers ... 50, 147 COSTA RICA principle of the flag adopted in treaty with Italy . . . 140 and in treaty with France . .142 COWLEY, LORD (BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN PARIS) fear of American privateers for Russia . 29 Index 445 J LORD continued. interviews with M. Drouyn as to declaration to the neutrals . 37, 56 presents draft of declaration to neutrals to French Government 56 informs M. Drouyn of adoption by Cabinet of coasting-trade clause 68 letters and telegrams to Lord Clarendon : reporting interview with M. Drouyn on neutral question . 30 on French declaration to neutrals 57 reporting Drouyn's anxiety to settle neutral question 64 French objection to coasting-trade clause . 70 letters and telegrams from Lord Clarendon. see LOHD CLARENDON. CEAMPTON, MB (BRITISH MINISTER AT WASHINGTON) communicates declaration to neu- trals to United States Govern- ment 71 CRANWOETH, LORD letter to Lord Clarendon as to Scandinavian neutrality . . 16 CUSTOMS LAW as to manufactured articles . . 95 CZAE, THE policy to separate Prussia and Austria ..... 20 influence on King of Prussia . . 21 DANTJBIAN PEINCEPALITIES England's demand of Russia's with- drawal from 21 DARDANELLES entry of allied fleets ... 27 DAVIS, JEFFERSON (PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA) proclamation by, inviting applica- tions for letters of marque . 153 DECLARATION nature of ..... 174 how far equivalent to a treaty . 174 et seq. DECLARATION TO THE NEUTRALS, 1854 communicated by Lord Clarendon to Mr Buchanan .... 69 publication of, by England . . 73 publication of, by France . . 74 carried out by Order in Council . 78 Edinburgh Review on . . .101 DECLARATION OF PARIS the product of temperament . . 26 effect on Rule of 1756 ... 63 no blue-book published as to . . 116 discussion in the Congress as to 1 18 et seq. text of 120 discussed in the House of Lords . 124 not submitted to Parliament . 125, 175 not mentioned in Queen's speech . 134 Powers which adhered to . . 135 et seq. Powers which did not adhere . . 138 indirect adherences to . . 140 et seq. refusal of the United States . to adhere .... 142 et seq. affects relations of belligerent and belligerent as well as neutral and belligerent . . . 152 DECLABATION OF PAPIS continued. attitude of United States to, during Civil War . . . .154 Mr Marcy's criticism of . . .70 meaning and effect of ... 173 constitutional questions involved in, examined . . . .176 effect of war on ... 189 et seq. its effective value as an international agreement .... 195 " judicial knowledge "of . . 202 no official publication of . . 203 proof of, in Courts . . . 204 French promulgation of . . 204 proof of foreign adherences . . 205 enemy subject may claim benefit of 206 its position in the Law of Nations 206 et seq. original draft of preamble . .211 DENMARK (see also SCANDINAVIAN POWERS) urges the adoption of the principle of the flag .... 40 DERBY, EARL OF as to necessity for checking Russian trade 95 criticism of the Declaration . .116 on Lord Clarendon's defence of the Declaration . . 125 et seq. DISRAELI, MR on the Declaration . . . 168-169 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC principle of the flag adopted in treaty with France . . .141 DHOUYN DE LHUYS, M. (FRENCH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) as to United States citizens accept- ing letters of marque . . 9 discussions with Lord Cowley as to neutrals . . .23, 27, 28, 37 as to privateering . . 32, 35 informed that no change in British maritime law can be made en face du pays .... 36 urges prompt allied action as to neutrals ..... 56 satisfaction as to English adoption of " free ships free goods " . 56 requires greater restrictions on right of search .... 57 sympathy with Lord Clarendon's de- sire to change English policy . 59 opposition to inclusion of Rule of 1756 in declaration to neutrals 62, 63 endeavour to approximate French declaration to English views . 67 explains advantages of French practice, " enemy ships enemy goods " 77 opinion as to effect of the Declara- tion 209 despatches to Count Walewski as to English policy towards Scandinavian Declaration of neutrality .... 13 as to joint declaration to neutrals 58-62 inconvenience of separate declara- tions 65 as to rights of neutrals . . 65, 66 sending counter-project . . 68 regrets introduction of coasting- trade clause .... 68 congratulations on successful negotiations .... 74 446 The Declaration of Paris DROUYN DE LHUYS, M. continued. Memoirs description of . . .20 n. as to England's acquiescence in " free ships free goods " . .56 describing result of final Cabinet meeting on declaration to the neutrals 69 differences between allies to be minimised by instructions to the fleets .... 75 description of result of negotiations 75 declaration to the neutrals re- serves power to revert to ancient practice . . . 134 threat to revive treaty negotia- tions with the United States . 148 as to adherence of nearly all the Powers to the Declaration . 206 ECUADOR constitutional adherence to Declara- tion 135 principle of the flag adopted in treaty with France . . 142 " EDINBURGH REVIEW " article on the Orders in Council of 1854 100 ELLENBOEOUGH, EARL OF question as to Scandinavian neutral- ity . . . . . .15 EMBARGO neutral ships have no privilege under 184 EMERSON TENNENT, MB Board of Trade letter to Messrs Martin & Co 46 ENEMY PRODUCE not tainted as enemy property . 44 ENEMY PROPERTY. See " FREE SHIPS FREE GOODS." ENEMY SHIPS ENEMY GOODS Mr Buchanan anticipates adoption of, by England ... 39 almost invariably accompanied by " free ships free goods " . 85, 199 not recognised by English law . 179 ENEMY SUBJECT may claim benefit of treaty under new practice .... 206 ENEMY, TRADE WITH facilitated by Prussian transit trade 90 ENGLAND relations with France before the war 22 endeavours to mitigate effect of war on neutrals . . .118 abandonment of principles of mari- time law 123 EVANS, SIR SAMUEL judgment in the Marie Glaser 207, 208, 210, 212 in the Schooner Mowe . 206, 212 EXPOSITION DBS MOTIFS Law Officers' reply to . .131 FACTORY SYSTEM British merchants in Russia under the protection of . .40 principle of exterritoriality based on 42 explanation of . . . 42 n. FAUCHER, M. LEON article referred to by Lord Granville . 1 10 quotation from . . . .112 FAUCHILLE, DR PAUL La Ligue des Neutres : on need of France for ships' timber . . 216 FLAG principle of 85 FLEETS instructions to (English) . . 79 (French) ... 80 FRANCE relations with England before the war 22 respect of, for neutral flag . . 24 declaration to neutrals, 1854 . . 74 adoption by, of "free ships free goods " in Treaty of Utrecht . 84 indirect adherences by treaty with . 141 FREDERICK THE GREAT claims " free ships free goods " as a right 199 FREE SHIPS FREE GOODS demand for, in Scandinavian Declaration of Neutrality . 12 French belief in . . .24 Mr Buchanan urges adoption of, by England 39 acknowledgment of, in declaration to neutrals .... 56 meaning of adoption of . 69, 83 acceptance of, by Lord Clarendon . 72 put in force by Order in Council 78, 79 United States' satisfaction at allied observance of . . . .80 President Jefferson's views as to . 81 included in certain treaties with Great Britain ... 83 usual treaty form of principle . 84 acceptance by England in considera- tion of alliance . . 84 almost invariably accompanied with " enemy ships enemy goods " 85, 199 Lord Clarendon on ... 125 Lord Clarendon's analysis of treaties containing .... 127 first adopted by Prussians in 1746 . 131 views of Horsfall Commission on .151 connection with immunity of private property at sea . . 167, 168 constitutional aspect of principle establishing . . . . 180 objections to form in which principle stated in Declaration . . 183 two forms of, in treaties . . 193, 194 examination of its effect in specific cases ..... 196-197 not a principle of the Law of Nations 198 favoured by United States . . 200 FRENCH LAW Reglement of July 1778 . . . 84 GERMAN EMPIRE no formal adherence to Declaration by 138 GERMAN STATES formation of armed neutrality by, considered .... 19 GIBSON, MB MILKER asks if free ships are to make free goods during the war . . 36 Index 447 GIBSON, MB MILNEB continued. responsibility of ,for Lord Clarendon's views ..... 36 refers to hardships involved by the Riga despatch : danger of colli- sion with United States . . 45 motion in favour of " free ships free goods " 51 GRANVILLE, LORD as to transit trade and Prussian assurances .... 89 as to Black Sea blockade . . 90 on the effect of Berlin and Milan Decrees ..... 99 asks that belligerents in Franco- Prussian War shall notify observance of Declaration . 205 GREAT BRITAIN " free ships free goods " included in certain treaties ... 83 GREY, SIR EDWARD on humanity and seizure of enemy property in neutral ships 49, 169 draws attention to change in Lord Palmerston's views . . . 169 GREY, LORD . advocates limitation of trade restric- tions for injuring the enemy . 97 GREY, MR (BRITISH MINISTER AT STOCKHOLM) correspondence concerning Scandi- navian neutrality . . 7, 8, 14 conversation with Baron Stjerneld on the neutral flag ... 43 GHOTIUS recognition of principles of Consolato, by 127 GUATEMALA principle of the flag adopted in treaty with France . . . 142 HALL, MR comment on " Rule of 1756 " . 63 on recognition of rebels as belli- gerents 154 HARDWICKE, EARL OF (LORD PRIVY SEAL) misapprehension as to scope of the Declaration .... 130 HISTORICUS, LETTERS OF as to Jefferson's letter to M. Genet . 34 n. on recognition of rebels as belli- gerents 154 on definition of blockade in Russian treaty 187 HOLLAND adherence to Armed Neutrality alleged cause of England's attack in 1781 . . .52 " free ships free goods " included in treaty with Great Britain . 83 HONDURAS indirect adherence to Declaration in treaty with Italy . . . 140 principle of the flag adopted in treaty with France . . .141 HORSFALL, MR Chairman of Committee on Merchant Shipping 150 motion as to unsatisfactory state of maritime law . . . .161 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA advocated in Second Marcy Note . 144 Lord Clarendon appears unfavour- able to 153 its connection with " free ships free goods" .... 168 INSTRUCTIONS. See FLEETS. INTERNATIONAL LAW. See LAW OF NATIONS. ITALY no formal adherence to Declaration by 139 indirect adherences by treaty with . 140 JAPAN adherence to the Declaration . . 138 JAY TREATY. See TREATIES. JEFFERSON (PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES) denies " free ships free goods " to be aright " . . . 34, 81 KENT on licences 99 on effect of war on treaties . 189, 191 KING (see also PREROGATIVE) party to all proceedings in prize . 180 prize lies in grant from . . .181 KONIGSBERG Prussian trade in . . . .110 LANSDOWNE, LORD condemns effect of licences on our commerce during French wars . 106 LAW OF NATIONS Scandinavian Powers contend their Declaration of neutrality to be in accordance with . . 16-17 English principle of seizure said to be not warranted by . .76 principles of, not affected by agree- ments between States . . 103 Lord Clarendon's wish to modify . 124 Lord Palmerston on its wide and deep foundations . . 137, 212 how affected by the Declaration 153,154 Prize Court administers . . . 204 LETTERS OF MARQUE (see also PRIVA- TEERS) Russian attempt to issue to American citizens ..... 8 issue of, by Jefferson Davis . . 153 issued by the King . . .179 LEWIS, Sir GEORGE CORNEWALL opinion that the Declaration is not binding in war . . 163, 189 et seq. as to immunity of private property at sea 193 LICENCES Government's declaration as to . 47 adopted in Napoleonic Wars . . 48 not resorted to in Russian War . 94 considered generally. . 102 et seq. LICENCE SYSTEM origin of 105 account of 106 justified by Sir William Scott . . 109 LINCOLN (PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES) proclaims blockade of Southern ports, 1861 . . . .153 448 The Declaration of Paris LINEN INDUSTRY importance to, of Russian trade in flax seed 96 LOANS contributing to enemy loan high treason . . . . 41 n. LOBSTEIN, M. (FRENCH MINISTEE AT STOCKHOLM) communications concerning Scan- dinavian neutrality . . . 7 King of Sweden discusses neutrality with 12 LOFTUS, SIB AUGUSTUS (BBITISH MINISTER IN BERLIN) report as to King of Prussia's neutrality .... 20 LYONS, LORD (BRITISH MINISTER IN WASHINGTON) despatches to and from, during American Civil War . 157 et seq. MAHAN, ADMIRAL Orders in Council and French decrees of 1807, based on Rule of 1756 64 on licences ..... 104 MALLET pu PAN quotation from, on England's great- ness 133 MANCHESTER SCHOOL its commercial creed . . 25, 163 MANTEUFFEL, BARON (PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF STATE)- views as to neutrality of German States 20 influence over King of Prussia favourable to neutrality . . 21 joins in the Declaration . . .119 MAHCY, MR (UNITED STATES SECRE- TARY OF STATE) despatch to Mr Buchanan on priva- teering ..... 9 protests against revival of Rule of 1756 . . . . 70, 72 warning that caution must be exer- cised by belligerents . . 71 note on declaration to the neutrals (First Marcy Note) ... 80 memorandum containing United States refusal to adhere to the Declaration (Second Marcy Note) . . . . 142 et seq. MARINE, FRENCH MINISTRY OF consulted as to abolition of " enemy ships enemy goods " . . .59 assists in preparing second French draft of declaration to the neu- trals .69 MARTIN, LEVIN & ADLER, MESSRS correspondence with Board of Trade as to importation of Russian goods from neutral ports . 43 MASON, MR (UNITED STATES MINISTER IN PARIS) aa to grant of Russian letters of marque to U.S. citizens . . 9 MASTER OF SHIP claimant for owners of cargo under old practice .... 205 MEMEL railway to, from Russian frontier . 88 Prussian trade in . . .110 MEXICO declines to accept abolition of privateering .... 138 ultimate adherence to Declaration . 138 principle of the flag adopted in treaty with Italy . . . 141 MILNER, THE REV. THOMAS quotation from The Baltic : its Shores, Gates, and Cities . .110 MITCHELL, MR quotes Lord Clarendon's advice to merchants engaged in Russian trade 41 MOLESWORTH, SlB WlLLIAM leader of the Philosophical Radicals 26 responsibility of , for Lord Clarendon's views .... 36. 127 defends Government action ; en- deavours to prove England's adoption of " free ships free goods " 82 argument in favour of " free ships free goods " . . . 84, 86 considers that Armed Neutrality attained its object ... 85 " to waive is not to surrender " 85, 116 NAPOLEON III. popularity of, in England . . 23 influence of, over Lord Palmerston . 23 NAVAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON discussion as to principles of inter- national law .... 136 NEUTRALS agreements with as to rationing, necessity for .... 102 NEUTRAL GOODS on enemy ships, constitutional aspect of principle exempting from seizure . . . .179 objection to form of principle in Declaration .... 184 N EUTBALIS ATION development of Bonaparte's system of licences into ... 48 enemy ships escape capture by use of neutral flag . . .59, 105 possilibities of fraud ... 77 NEUTRALITY, BREACH OF by use of State railways . . 89 by Prussian transit trade . . 93 NEW GRANADA principle of the flag adopted in treaty with France . . . 141 NORTH AMERICA ACT ships trading with rebel colonies to be seized as enemy's . . 155 NORTHCOTE, SIR STAFFORD on effect of war on treaties . 189, 193 NORWAY adherence to Declaration after sepa- ration from Sweden . . 138 Index 449 OPPBNHEIM, MB as to meaning of " declaration " 174-176 ORDERS IN COUNCIL OF 1807 based on Rule of 1756 . . .64 OHDEH IN COUNCIL, 15TH APRIL 1854 suspends Rule of 1756 . . .88 facilitates trade with the enemy . 91 Edinburgh Review on ... 100 issued " in furtherance " of Declara- tion 182 OBDEB IN COUNCIL, MARCH I860 as to observance of Declaration in event of war against China . 183 QBLOFF, COUNT (RUSSIAN PLENIPO- TENTIARY) accepts the Declaration . . .119 adheres to mediation clause . .121 PALMER, SIB ROUNDELL - opinion of the Declaration 163 PALMEBSTON, LOBD resigns from the Aberdeen Ministry 5 despatch to Lord Clarendon, 13th April 1856, criticising terms of Declaration . . . .122 refers to the wide and deep foundations of the Law of Nations . . 137, 210, 215, 218 the Queen signifies her approval of the Declaration to . . . 123 Liverpool speech : exemption of private property at sea ; adop- tion would amount to political suicide ..... 165 John Bright's criticism of . . 165 his own defence of . . .169 as to powers not adhering to the Declaration . . . .195 PAPEB BLOCKADE made illegal by the Declaration . 187 PARLIAMENT Declaration not submitted to .175 constitutional question examined . 181 PAUL, MB HERBERT opinion of Napoleon III. ... 23 PEACE OF PARIS commented on by Count Beust, Baron Bourqueney, Lord Derby 1 15 PEBU indirect adherence to the Declara- tion 141 treaty with United States . 148, 200 PHILLIMOBE, MB J. G. motion against adoption of " free ships free goods " . . .82 PHILLIMOBE, MB ROBEBT speech on declaration to neutrals . 86 as to effect of war on treaties . . 190 PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS views of, hostile to England . . 25 theories of, based on Bentham . 26 doctrines of . . . .73 desire to abandon seizure of enemy goods 82 PINCKNEY, MB (UNITED STATES SBCBETABY OF STATE) despatch to French Government as to "free ships free goods," 1789 34 PITT upholds English maritime law . 131 declares English principles of blockade . . . .201 POLITICAL ECONOMISTS theories of war . . . 93 et seq. on necessity of obtaining raw material from the enemy . 96 extreme opinions of ... 104 POBTUGAL - " free ships free goods " included in treaty with Great Britain . 83 PBACTICE claims under treaty by enemy subjects .... 205 PREROGATIVE nature of treaty-making . 174 et seq. exemplified in extradition treaties 1 76 exemplified in cession of Heligo- land to Germany . . .177 exemplified by abolition of slave trade 178 grant of commissions to privateers . 179 PBIVATEEBS proposed suppression of 29 petition against, by Liverpool Chamber of Commerce . . 49 cause of trouble during Seven Years War 50, 147 PBIVATEEBING confused by Lord Clarendon with concessions to neutrals . . 130 regarded by United States as essen- tial to the freedom of the sea . 143 United States wish to treat Southern privateers as pirates . . 158 constitutional aspect of principle abolishing . . . .179 objection to form in which prin- ciple stated in Declaration . 183 Lord Clarendon's statement that he accepted " free ships free goods " in return for abolition of 201 reservation as to, by Spain, Mexico, United States, and Venezuela . 208 PBIZE accrues to King in office of Admir- alty 180 awarded to captors as royal bounty . 180 PBIZE COUBT constitution of French . . . 204 English (documents) 243 PBOTECTORATES, BRITISH no adherence to Declaration by . 139 PRUSSIA ports not closed .... 12 neutrality of . . . .20 vacillation of King . . . 20, 21 Czar's influence over ... 87 alliance with Austria ... 22 abolishes land import duties, transit system nullifies Baltic blockade 88 assurances to remedy complaints against . . . .89 29 450 The Declaration of Paris RAILWAYS Neutral State, use of, a breach of neutrality .... 89 RAW MATERIAL methods suggested for introducing into England from enemy country 95 REGLEMENT OF 1778 (FBENCH) adoption of " free ships free goods " 84 "REVUE DBS DEUX MONDES" article on the blockade in, by M. Leon Faucher . . . 110, 112 reply by M. Tegoborski . 110, 113 RICARDO, MB J. L. on variance between Riga despatch and Board of Trade correspon- dence 53 English interest in Prussian transit trade 94 opposes certificates of origin . . 94 on uselessness of blockade . . 97 advocates trading with the enemy in raw material ... 97 pamphlet on " War Policy of Com- merce " . . . " . 110, 111 RIGA British business houses long estab- lished in .... 41 RIGA DESPATCH based on Law Officers' opinion as to trading with the enemy . 42, 43 debate on, in House of Commons . 45 divergence of policy from . 82, 94 RIGHT OF SEARCH M. Drouyn desires more restrictions on, in draft declaration . . 57 Mr Marcy's disapproval of . .71 RULE OF 1756 English insistence on, in declara- tion to neutrals . . .62, 72 explanation of .... 63 opposition of France to . . .64 revival of, protested against by Mr Marcy 70 suspended by Order in Council 79, 88 denial of, by French Instructions . 80 Mr Collier suggests enforcement of 88 RUSSELL, LORD JOHN says that " free ships free goods " is under consideration . . 36 promises announcement of Govern- ment policy towards neutrals . 53 statement of, as to negotiations with France 55 opinion of the Declaration . .116 RUSSIA endeavours to issue letters of marque to U.S. citizens ... 8 demands as to closing Swedish ports . . . . 10, 11 answer to neutrals .... 19 trade chiefly with Great Britain . 41 provision in treaty with Great Britain, 1801, as to goods of " hostile origin " . . .44 RUSSIA continued. transit system of goods through Prussia ..... 87 treaty with United States recognis- ing principle of the flag . 148, 200 ST GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, TREATY OF. See TREATIES. 84 SALVADOR indirect adherence to the Declara- tion ..... 140, 141 SANDWICH ISLANDS indirect adherence to the Declara- tion ..... 140 SCANDINAVIAN POWERS (see also SWEDEN and DENMARK) declaration of neutrality . . 6, 12 notifications of neutrality to neutral Powers ..... 8 interest of, in joint neutrality of Prussia and Austria . . 20 SEVEN YEARS WAR Rule of 1756 established in .63 activity of privateers during . . 147 SHAFTESBURY, LORD letter from Lord Clarendon to, on letters of marque . . 35, 124 Lord Clarendon's views on maritime law confided to . .40, 43, 51 SHEFFIELD FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE correspondence with the Lord Advocate .... 77 SIAM indirect adherence to the Declaration 140 SLITO Russia desires to carry prizes into . 10 SMITH, MR F. E. motion as to immunity of private property at sea . . . 169 SOUTHERN STATES ports of, blockaded in Civil War . 153 SPAIN " free ships free goods " included in treaty with Great Britain . 83 declines to accept abolition of privateering . . . 138, 207 ultimate acceptance of Declara- tion ...... 138 STANLEY OF ALDERLEY, LORD (PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE) " to waive is not to surrender " . 129 regrets decision as to privateering . 147 STATUTE 25 Edw. III., Trading with the enemy. .... 90 STEPHEN, JAMES War in Disguise referred to 92 STJERNELD, BARON (SWEDISH MINISTER FOB FOREIGN AFFAIRS) correspondence with Mr Grey . 7, 8 conversation on neutral flag with Mr Grey ..... 43 STOWELL, LORD Sir William Molesworth's views not in accordance with . 86 Index 451 SWEDEN discussion as to closing ports of . 10 urges the adoption of the principle of the flag .... 40 asks for explanation of the Riga despatch .... 43 adherence to the Declaration . . 135 provision for adherence after separa- tion from Norway . . . 138 SWEDEN, CHOWN PHINCE OF favourable to allies ... 22 SWEDEN, KING OF attitude of, in regard to neutrality . 12 satisfaction of, with English answer to neutrality declaration . 14 SWITZERLAND adherence to Declaration . . 135 form of . 205 TRANSIT SYSTEM Russian goods pass through Prussia to England .... 87 breach of neutrality ... 93 methods for counteracting . . 94 TREATIES effect of war on . . . .189 1654. Great Britain and Holland (Westminster) : "free ships free goods " . 194 1675. Sweden and Holland : abstention from privateer- ing .... 144 1677. Great Britain and France (St Germain-en-Laye) : form of " free ships free goods " clause in . 84, 194 1713. Great Britain and France (Utrecht) : form of " free ships free goods " clause in, renewal of Treaty of 1677 . . 84 said to have established common law of nations . 210 1713. France and Holland (Utrecht): " free ships free goods " . 196 1780. 4th July, Great Britain and Denmark : supplementary to Treaty of 1670 . . 184 1780. Russia and Denmark (Armed Neutrality Convention) : free navigation on enemy coasts .... 63 1785. United States and France : abstention from privateer- ing .... 144 1787. Russia and Portugal : provision as to the factory system . . . . 43 n. 1794. Great Britain and the United States. (Jay Treaty) : recognition of right to seize enemy property on neutral ships . 34, 81, 103 n. 1801. Great Britain and Russia : enemy produce not treated as enemy property . 44, 201 definition of blockade in . 186 TREATIES -continued. 1871. Italy and the United States : war not to abrogate . 191 n. immunity of private pro- perty at sea . . 192 n. " free ships free goods " 192 n. TBENT, AFFAIB OF Earl Russell's despatch stating British case . . . .168 Two SICILIES Treaty with United States recog- nising principle of the flag . 148, 200 UNITED STATES - reply to Scandinavian neutrality . 8 public opinion in, favourable to the allies .... 9 British Government fear that United States would allow privateering for Russia . . 29 Mr Milner Gibson's fear of collision with ..... 45 proposes commercial treaty to France 66 opposition to Rule of 1756 . . 70 acknowledgment of declaration to neutrals (First Marcy Note) . 80 declines to accept abolition of privateering .... 138 refusal to adhere to the Declara- tion 142-149 conflict with its own treaty pro- ject 143 criticism of blockade principle . 143 importance of privateering . . 143 exemption of private property from seizure supported . . . 144 abandonment of contraband sug- gested .... 146, 148 proposal to France to adopt im- munity of private property at sea 148 outbreak of Civil War . . .153 attitude towards Declaration during the Civil War . . .154 proposal for separate conventions . 159 Lord John Russell's stipulation . 160 conventions with adherent Powers proposed .... 194 refusal to adhere to the Declara- tion 200 unless with insertion of immunity of private property at sea . 209 URUGUAY treaty with Italy, commerce with enemy to continue in war . 141 UTRECHT, TREATY OF. See TREATIES. renewal of provisions in Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye . . 85 VALIN justification of privateering relied on by United States 144 VENEZUELA principle of the flag adopted in treaty with Italy ... 140 and in treaty with France . 142 declines to accept the abolition of privateering .... 208 452 The Declaration of Paris PAGE DE VEHGENNES motives of French assistance to the United Colonies in . . 133 n. VICTORIA, QUEEN signifies her approval of the Declara- tion 123 VIENNA, CONGRESS OF secures abolition of the slave trade 118, 175, 177 WALEWSKI, COUNT (FBENCH AMBAS- SADOR IN LONDON) correspondence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys with. See DHOUYN DE LHUYS. President of the Congress . .117 proposes the Declaration . . .118 proposes indivisibility of the prin- ciples of the Declaration . .121 WALEWSKI, COUNT continued. reports adherences of the Powers . 207 view as to the principles of Declara- tion becoming international law 209 WAR effect of, on treaties . . 189 et seq. on the Declaration . . 189 et seq. WARD, ROBERT views of, differ from Sir William Molesworth's conclusions . . 83 treatise on maritime law . . . 147 WESTPHALIA, CONGRESS OP secures liberty of conscience . .118 WHEATON on licences 99, 107 effect of war on treaties . . 190 WHAT, SIR WILLIAM question by, concerning Russian corn-ships .... 36 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH. THE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. 50m-3,'C8(H9'242s8)94a2