J s UC-NRLF ^B Sfl3 SSS LIBRARY OF THK University of California. GIFT OF .Ur./V%/»*^ f^......j/J n /yvA-^ L.\ ^J..^.t<^V\A*vy7.. Class MAYOR VS. COUNCIL Should a system of municipal government, concentrating all cxccu*' tive and administrative powers in the mayor, be adopted in cities of the United States? THE TWENTY<.SEVENTH ANNUAL JOINT DEBATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN #% %# SINGLE COPY, POSTPAID, FIFTY CENTS CEO. B. NELSON 703 STATE ST., MADISON, WtS. <^JS^R^S OFTHE UNIVERS OF ITY UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN VIEWS MAYOR VS. COUNCIL Should a system of municipal government, concentrating all execu/' tive and administrative powers in the mayor, be adopted in cities of the United States? THE TWENTY^SEVENTH ANNUAL JOINT DEBATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SINGLE COPY, POSTPAID, .FIFTY CENTS CEO. B. NELSON 703 STATE ST., MADISON, WIS. ^€- Copyright, 1897 By Theo. W. Brazeau. Tracy, Gibbs & Co., Printers, Madison, Wis. c^ f^ tlwenty^Seventh Unnual Joint Debate PRESIDENT OF THE EVENING, PROF. D. B. FRANKENBURGER DEBATE Question — Should a system of municipal government concen= trating all executive and administrative powers in the Mayor be adopted in cities of the United States of over forty thousand inhabit tants? INTERPRETATION "Executive and administrative powers" to include the sole power to appoint and to remove all heads of departments and chief City Officers (except the Treasurer and Comptroller. The Comptroller to have only the powers of an accounting officer.) All subordinates shall be appointed by the head of their respective department, under Civil Service rules, and may be removed by the same for cause other than political. The Mayor, the heads of the departments and the city officers in their respective capacities shall have the power: to make all contracts; to purchase all materials and supplies; to have charge of Ihe construction, improvement, extension and management of all public streets, works and property; to grant all licenses and franchises, subject to confirmation by the common council; to make all estimates for the following fiscal year, said estimates not to be increased by the council. Conceded that the system is valid under the laws and constitutions of the States and of the United States. AFFIRMATiVE-ATHEN>e NEGATIVE-PHILOMATHIA Julius Gilbertson Frank E. Compton J. W. Page .George B. Nelson Otto Bosshard Theodore W. Brazeau Judges: Rev. E. G. Updike Mr. Reuben Gold TAwaitej Judge Romanzo Bunn DECISION FOR THE NEGATIVE PREFACE The literary societies of the University of Wisconsin submit this, the Twenty-Seventh Annual Joint Debate, with the hope that it will be as favorably received by the public, as those of previous years. Since the first joint debate between the literary societies of the University in 1867, the debate has taken place almost regularly each year and is to-day one of the most important college events. The investigation for each successive debate has become •< broader and closer, until now the contestants spend a whole year in careful preparation. For a number of years the debates have been published and have been received with favorable comment by the most eminent authorities. The growth and success of the Joint Debate has been partly due to a peculiar and admirable organization of debating societies which has existed in the University of Wisconsin for years, but more largely due to the head of department of rhetoric and oratory. Prof. D. B. Frankenburger, who has done everything to defend and strengthen the debating socie- ties and to encourage scientific argumentation. In the preparation of this debate, the contestants visited all the cities under the centralized system and made a per- sonal investigation of its practical workings. It is hoped that the results of their work, which is briefly summarized in the following pages, will add something of value to this im- portant subject. THEO. W. BRAZEAU, Publisher. UNIVhKSII Y OF INTRODUCTION The Opinions of the Six Debaters on the Proper Organization of a City Qovernment. JULIUS GILBERTSON I regard the * 'mayor system" the best form of government under existing conditions. The true principles of democracy are opposed to all tendencies towards centralization. But in spite of this fact, the system, which concentrates large pow- ers in the hands of one man, is the only system which can bring home to the average American voter, any realization of his civic responsibility. The reformation of our cities will be the result of evolution. The presence of large aggregation of foreign-born people, not yet familiar with our institution, together with the sa- loon, tramp and semi-criminal vote, is the great obstacle in the way of reform. Our large cities are conglomerations of nationalities and classes. Under such conditions there can be no sense of social unity or civic responsibility, without which responsible self-government will surely fail. The ref- ormation, I believe, will be brought about through independ- ent political movements. The average voter is the slave of his party and until this state of affairs is changed, but little improvement can be expected. Every party will be ruled by a certain set of men called the "machine." Under existing laws and circumstances the chances are nine out of ten, that the machine is corrupt. Reformation will come by the edu- cation of the rising generations to^ a conception of municipal patriotism, independence and civic responsibility. Caucus and election laws must then be passed which will give effect to these new forces, and prevent selfish and corrupt men from controlling party organizations. There can be no doubt but that a large majority of the peo- pie desire good government. We have not reached the stage where they will rise up in their might and demand it. May the time soon come when they will. F. E. COMPTON I believe in the "council system" as the ultimate and best system of government for all American cities. I believe in giving the council practically all power, as it has in English cities. The organization should be as follows. A council of a single chamber composed of members chosen from large dis- tricts or at large. A double chamber is a useless complica- tion and a decided step backward in municipal organization. A mayor chosen by the council and responsible to that body. Single heads of departments chosen by the council. The American plan of meeting every abuse of power by the crea- tion of a board or commission, each member of which is to act as a check on the others, is illogical, inefficient, and a complete and undeniable failure in practice. There must be single heads for each department no matter what form of government is adopted. To complete the plan all subordin- ates should be chosen under civil service rules. While the extremely centralized system may work well in some cities, and for a time bring relief, the system is no guarantee of good citj' government. The adoption of such a system means practically the abolition of the representative body, the com- mon council, and the adoption of a system of ''one man power," to which the American people are heartily opposed. It can never be a permanent system. If we are to have better municipal government there must come, together with the better organization of our system, a great change in social and political conditions. First of all voters must cease to divide on party lines, and vote for the best candidate presented for the office; greater interest must be taken in the primaries so that better men will be nomi- nated. This may be possible only after some legal regulation of the primaries is brought about. Better men must be will- ing to sacrifice a little time in the service of the municipality — at least the time necessary to vote. These changes will come through education brought about by unceasing agita- tion. ' J, W. PAGE Any view of municipal affairs that fails to consider the su- perior opportunities for men of ability in private life to those offered in public service, that forgets that the first interest of our people is commercial not governmental, that neglects the influence of the heterogeneous and transitory character of our urban population and the ease with which unassimilated classes are controlled by political bosses, is inadequate to a true un- derstanding of our municipal failures. Our cities are passing through a transitory state, and at least while this condition lasts, large and almost despotic powers must be lodged in the mayor. However, the council is the weak department of city government, and ultimate reform, it seems to me, must come from an improvement of that body. Meanwhile the govern- ment should be made as simple as possible, to the end that busy citizens may, with a limited expenditure of time and effort, gain an adequate knowledge of the city affairs. The city reports, now often a mass of unintelligible and unimpor- tant details, should be simplified and by statute made uniform throughout each state, that cities may gain by the experience of others in municipal undertakings and by comparison of expenditures. The tendency toward less legislative interference and more responsibility in the cities seems to be a movement in the right direction, but restrictions on the taxing and debt crea- ting powers must be maintained. The general adoption of civil service laws will be a valuable improvement. The may- or's cabinet, as tried in Boston, has been successful, and state boards of municipal control have elements of strength for the reform of our municipalities. Q. B. NELSON A year's study of municipal charters, together with quite a complete investigation into the practical workings of the va- rious systems, ought to have given me settled convictions on the question of municipal organization, yet this is not quite the case. When I contrast the present loosely organized and irresponsible system, with a system which concentrates all ex- ecutive and administrative power in the mayor, I have no doubt as to which is the better system. In such a compari- son I think the concentrated system vastly preferable. But when I compare the mayor system with a system organized with the aim of giving large powers to the city council, I find myself uncertain as to which one to choose. I have not studied the mayor system without becoming a thorough admirer of many of its features, but at the same time I have not failed to recognize some of the dangers and evil tendencies of such a system. The mayor should undoubtedly have large powers and should be held correspondingly responsible, and in nearly all cases there should be single heads of departments in the ad- ministration of city affairs, but I cannot sanction a system which practically makes the mayor the entire city govern- ment. Such a system may be partially justified from a stand- point of^present conditions. Perhaps no system will arouse the people to a realization of their civic duty quite so well, but it seems to me to represent the temporary and not the permanent system. Under the mayor system the council has a tendency to remain bad, if not to become actually worse. When the people fix the greater part of their attention upon the election of mayor, the council must suffer. Little im- provement in its character can be hoped for. The mayor can never be all of the city government, for a strong council is indispensable to a city government. At the present time I believe the great problem in our cities is to improve the coun- cils. We can never have good city government as a perma- nent thing until the councils are improved. I would there- fore favor a system with a council of a single chamber, chosen at large and with power to choose the mayor. The mayor thus chosen, should have absolute power to appoint and re- move his heads of departments. This would make the elec- tion of a council the all important thing. It would give us located responsibility and unity, a good council and a power- ful mayor, and a system eminently republican. OTTO BOSSHARD Under existing conditions, I believe the ''federal plan," as outlined in the question discussed, the system best adapted to the government of American cities. First, because the system is simple, thus giving opportunity for more efficient and economical administration than is possible under the complex and cumbersome "council" or "commission" sys- tems. Second, because under this system responsibility is definitely located, thereby lessening the opportunity for cor- ruption, which under the present system with division of responsibility can flourish without fear of detection or punish- ment. There is of course much truth in the statement that "any system will work well if administered by honest and capable officials." But the very difficulty with our present systems has been in securing such men. It is a well known fact in politics that the less important the office the less care exercised by the electors in filling it. This has been especially true in the selection of aldermen in the larger cities. Consequently our city councils contain a large per cent, of incapable and dishonest men, and when the administration of municipal affairs is in their hands it suffers. On the other hand, even now, when the mayor has little real power, political parties generally present a candidate for that office with far greater ability for municipal service than the average alderman. Charges of corruption or incompe- tency are not as often brought against the mayor as against 10 the council. This being true, it is but natural to conclude that the * 'federal system" where the dignity and importance of the office will be much greater than at present, even better men will be chosen mayor, thus insuring more satisfactory administration. Were it not for the difficulty of obtaining honest and capa- ble aldermen in our larger cities, the council system would be preferable, for it is more democratic, i. e. , it gives the citizens a larger and more direct share in the actual adminis- tration of the city. But as long as conditions remain as at present, the federal plan, insuring as it does the selection of a better mayor seems preferable to a system which would concentrate all power in the council. THEO. W. BRAZEAU The typical American municipal organization, with its boards, commissions, and other complications, though not the sole or even greatest cause of poor city government, is no doubt an evil, which must be removed before the best results can be obtained. Between a system of checks and balances such as we have at present, and a system which concentrates all executive and administrative power in the mayor and sin- gle heads of departments, the latter is without a question far better. ^ Under the conditions which prevail in many cities at present it is perhaps the only form of organization which would give good results. Between the ''mayor system," however, as a permanent system, and a system which vests great power in the council, I am convinced that the "council system" must be the final and permanent organization; not because European cities have had good government under such a system, but because it is the simplest and most con- sistent organization. As long as the people elect an independent executive, it will be found difficult, if not impossible to concentrate the proper attention on the election of a strong council, and that branch of the city government will be neglected, no matter II how important its duties. If the council is stripped of its powers, it will become only a clog upon our municipal machin- ery. A strong mayor and strong council cannot exist to- gether unless the mayor is chosen by the council. No one would think of vesting all power, both legislative and execu- tive in the mayor alone, or of abolishing the council, nor would such a system secure the best results. Neither would one propose to have the council, in this country, conduct all executive and administrative as well as legislative work. The system which seems best adapted to our conditions is to have a mayor the executive and* administrative head of the city, elected by the council; to have each department under a sin- gle head appointed by the mayor; and to have a council of a single chamber, the councilmen to be elected from large dis- tricts. Under such a system it would be absolutely neces- sary for the people to elect a good council before they could have good government, but their whole attention would be centered on the election of aldermen, and not divided as at present. Such a system would also secure perfect responsi- bility. Of course no change of organization will bring good gov- ernment. It will make good government easier ta obtain and that is all. Good men must be chosen to run the machinery and to choose good men the people must sacrifice time, party prejudice, and personal gain. JULIUS QILBERTSON, ATHEN>E The great forces that have revolutionized our industrial life are rapidly making our cities the controlling factor in modern civilization. The educational and social influences of city life likewise irresistibly attract our rural population. The in- evitable result is that city life is destined to be the lot of an ever increasing proportion of manjcind. CHART I.— INCREASE OF URBAN POPULATION. Year. Population. No. of Cities Urban Population. Per ct. Urban Per cent. Increase of Populat'n. Increase of Urban Popul'n. 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 i860 1870 1880 1890 1895 3.929.214 5.308,483 7,229,881 9,633,822 12,866,020 17.069,433 23, 191,876 31.443.321 38,558,371 50,155.783 62,622,250 72,000,000 6 6 II 13 26 44 85 144 226 286 443 131,472 210,873 356,920 475.135 864,501 I . 435 . 994 2,897,586 5,072,256 8,071,875 11,318,547 18,284,385 25,000,000 2.3 3.0 4.9 4.9 6.7 8.5 12.5 16. 1 20,9 22.5 29.0 34.7 35.10 36.39 33 .07 33.55 32.67 35.87 35.58 22.63 30.08 24.86 20.00 62 59 75 55 60 43 57 61 70 60 70 From 1 880-1 890, as shown by this chart, (chart No. i) the population of the United States increased about 25 percent., while in the same period the urban population increased 66 per cent. At this rate the number of people in our cities at the present time must be over 25,000,000, or more than one- third of the whole population. Out of each $100 contributed by the taxpayers of the cities, about 80 per cent, goes to the city, while the entire burden of the county, state and national taxation amounts to only 20 per cent. The city debt is so great that the share of each cit- izen is nearly ten times as great as his share of the state and national debts. 13 With these facts before us, we can better appreciate the great importance of the subject we are to discuss this even- ing. The condition of municipal governments, in America to- day, justifies the most serious alarm. Investigations made during the past few years have revealed a degree of corrup- tion far beyond the wildest imaginings of the most pessimistic reformer; franchises worth millions of dollars are voted to cor- porations without a cent of compensation to the public; enor- mous and unnecessary debts are contracted; the unbusiness- like organization of the different departments results in the greatest inefficiency and waste; and the word ''alderman" has become a synonym for corruption. The common knowledge and observation of every citizen makes it unnecessary for me to here refer to specific cases of maladministration, and yet the hundreds of cases of extrava- gance and corruption in city administration brought to the attention of the public during the past few years are as noth- ing compared to the evils not brought to light, but which the public nevertheless is forced to endure. Says Pres. Smart, of the Purdue University: "It is a notorious fact that a dol- lar in the hands of a municipal government has no greater purchasing power than a half dollar in the hands of a private citizen." Bryce declares our cities to be: "The oneconspicious failure of American institutions." Says Andrew D. White: "Without the slightest exaggeration we may assert that with but a few exceptions the city governments of the United States are the worst in Christendom, the most inefficient, the most expensive, the most corrupt." This also was the con- clusion of the Citizen's Association of Chicago in 1891, after an extensive investigation of the condition of over 100 cities. That there is an evil to be remedied, no student of city gov- ernment will deny. Now let us find where the evil lies, its cause and remedy. A good city government depends on two factors; (i) the efficiency of the machinery of government, and (2) the man- 14 ner and spirit in which that machinery is administered. It is true that the most perfect governmental machinery is no guar- antee of good government unless the motives of the officials are good, yet it is likewise true that cumbersome and compli- cated methods of administration, such as exist in most of our cities and such as the negative defend here to-night, are sure to bring unsatisfactory results. They prevent ef^cient ad- ministration and by dividing responsibility foster wastefulness and corruption. The administrative organization of our cities is therefore of the utmost importance. A city is, above all things, a business corporation. The questions of streets, water, sanitation, safety, etc., are questions of business and not of politics. Even now under the present system, no mat- ter how bitter may have been the strife at the election, when once the administration is organized there is no longer a struggle between democrats and republicans, but a struggle between extravagance and economy, between expenditure and retrenchment. These facts being true, it follows that in order to secure the best results in administration the city should be organized on business principles. Organized so as to secure harmonious, unified and responsible administration. This is the test by which a system of city government must be judged. The chief merit of our system is that it is a bus- iness system. The chief fault of the prevailing system is that by being unbusinesslike it leads to wastefulness, mismanage- ment and corruption. Among the English speaking people there are three more or less distinct types of city administration. In the first the common council is the all important body; it not only passes laws and ordinances, but carries on the administrative and executive work of the city by means of its committees and appointees. This is the English system. The second type is the board or commission system. Legislative and execu- tive functions are distributed among numerous boards, com- missions and individuals. Once in office these boards are practically independent of one another and responsible to no 15 one. This, in a hundred varied forms, is the prevailing type of city government in the United States to-day. The third type separates the legislative and executive functions and makes the mayor the responsible head. This is called the federal plan, and is the system we advocate. The three great defects in the system of city government now prevalent are: (i.) The consolidation of legislative and executive functions in the same bodies, for example, in com- mittees of the council. (2.) The distribution of the execu- tive power among boards and individuals, so that the people are unable to locate responsibility for misgovernment and mis- management. (3.) The employment of subordinates not on account of their experience and training, but on account of personal and political favoritism. The granting of executive powers to the alderman, thus over-burdening that body with the minor details of the city administration, has probably been the most important factor in the deterioration of the common councils. In nearly all the large cities the duties of an alderman are so exacting, that if properly performed they consume his entire time. In America, having no leisure class, the result has been that the ofifice of alderman instead of being filled by men of intelli- gence and business ability, is occupied by men of a very low standard. Says the Pennsylvania commission: "The consol- idation of executive and legislative functions in the commit- tees of the council is the chief cause of our municipal evils." The distribution of the executive functions of the city gov- ernment among separate and independent boards, has been due principally to two facts: (i) the distrust of the common council, and (2) the delegation by an over burdened council of certain powers to committees which finally become perma- nent. There is no uniformity in the manner of appointment of these boards. Some are appointed by the mayor; some by the council; some are elected by the people; while still others are appointed by the governor of the state. These boards, possessed of both legislative and executive functions, inevitably clash, and the defect of the system becomes ap- i6 parent in the impossibility of locating responsibility. For example, in the city of Chicago there are fifteen independent governing bodies, besides the ordinary departments of the city government; and six of these have the power of levying taxes and making appropriations. In the city of New York, says Andrew H. Green: "There are eighty boards and indi- viduals which create debt independent of one another." Says Lispenard Steward, a member of the Fassett Committee: "The most disastrous results in New York city government have been caused by a division of responsibility." This com- plicated division of responsibility is found in nearly every city. For example, Denver has ten boards, Milwaukee ten, Baltimore eight, Detroit ten. Denver, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Boston, and many other cities have their police boards ap- pointed by the governor of the state. In Detroit, the Board of Health is appointed by the governor. In Omaha the park commissioners are appointed by the district judges. Then too the length of the term of office varies greatly. In the city of Milwaukee, the head of the board of health holds office for four years, the city engineer for three, the members of board of public works for three, park commissioners for four years. The mayor holds office for but two years. It is therefore utterly impossible for him to control men who serve for a longer term. When Mayor Strong entered upon his duties as mayor of New York city, he found twenty-one heads of departments, whom he could not remove. And had they not been legis- lated out of office by the New York legislature, it would have taken three successive victories by the reform element, before the city could have got rid of the corrupt Tammany officials. Says Prof. Thomas, in his history of Baltimore: "The divis- ion of city administration among boards is contrary to correct principles of administration as well as to good rules of busi- ness management. The reason is obvious. ^ ^ ^s- The investigator who wishes to locate any piece of blameworthi- ness, when government is carried on by a complicated system 17 of commissions, will wander through the devious mazes of administrative irresponsibility, and wander in vain." Says Albert Shaw: **City government in the United States de- feats its own ends by its checks and balances, its partition of duty and responsibility, and its grand opportunity for the game of hide and seek." Thus we see the chaotic character of our city governments. The mayor, the aldermen, the committees oi the council, joint standing committees, boards for the government of charities and health, commissioners of streets, fire, police, w^ater, etc., the old town governments, which still survive in some of our largest cities, like Chicago, all of these in some sense executive, all operating within the same limits often impeding one another, rarely consulting one another, each jealous of any interference by another, all with- out common direction or common responsibility. City gov- ernments are primarily business corporations. What busi- ness man would divide the management of his business among a score of conflicting and irresponsible bodies.? In place of this system, or rather lack of system, we pre- sent a plan which makes the mayor the real head of the city. There is definite responsibility on the part of the officers. The departments are as few and as well concentrated as is consistent with the duties to be performed, and so related to one another through the mayor that unified, harmonious, eco- nomical and responsible administration can be secured. This plan consolidates the numerous governing bodies into a suf- ficent number of departments, and separates the executive and legislative functions. The mayor, who is elected by the people, is given the sole power of appointment and removal of the heads of departments, and is thereby made responsible for all the administrative and executive departments. This in brief, is the federal plan, and the system we advocate to- night. Its two main characteristics you will notice are: (i) It separates the legislative from the executive functions; and (2) By giving the mayor the power of appointment and re- moval of the head of departments, it makes him directly re- 2 — J.D. sponsible to the people for the proper administration of the city. This system is the logical outcome of positive tendencies that have pervaded American municipal life for the past fifty years. It is the system toward which our cities are rapidly moving-. It is not an untried system. Our plan does not in- volve a rigid, iron-clad form of government for every city in the country. The number of departments will depend on the size of the city and kind of work that the city undertakes. We hold to the two vital principles of government, namely, the concentration of responsibility in a definite head, and the complete separation of the legislative and the executive branches of the city. Our plan does not reduce the council to a nonenity, but under it that body is to have legislative powers only. Like Congress, and the state legislature, it is to direct, not execute. The idea of a strong executive is in line with our munici- pal development. The committee system, as it existed in England in the 17th century, became the model of our origi- nal municipality. Local administration was centered in the council. The mayor was a mere figurehead. Since then the development has been, (i) toward the concentration of power and responsibility in the mayor and the executive officers. In Philadelphia, for example, from 1701-1789 the mayor was chosen by the council, and had not even the power of veto. He remained a component part of the council until 1796. In 1854 he was given the power of appointment. Gradually more power was granted until in 1887 the mayor was made the responsible head of the city administration. Boston received its charter in 1822. This gave the mayor only the powers of a police magistrate. From 1 829-1 885 all the executive work was directed by the committees of the council. In 1854 the mayor was given the power of veto, and the right to remove appointive officers. The charter of 1885 transferred all the executive powers of the city to the mayor and prohibited the council from interfering in any way in the conduct of the executive business. In 1882, Brooklyn adopted the federal plan of city government, Cleveland in 1891, In- dianapolis 1893, Fort Wayne in 1893, Evansville in 1893. The following cities have, during the past year, adopted practically the federal plan: Columbus, Holyoke, Elmira, Springfield, Ohio, Bridgeport, Buffalo, Binghampton, Port- land, Ore. We have examined the charter of every city coming within the limits of this debate, and nearly all show a tendency to give the mayor more power. This fact is also substantiated by letters we have received from public officials of those cities. We thus see that the whole tendency of our municipal development is in the direction of a strong execu- tive. That this tendency is recognized and approved is shown by the position of students and authorities on the subject of municipal government. The Fassett committee appointed by the New York legislature in 1891, which gave the most •comprehensive report ever published on municipal govern- ment in the United States, on page 95 of its report says: "There is no reason why the same principles of marked di- vision between the legislative and executive functions should not be applied to the city as well as the state." Says Grover Cleveland: "If the chief executive is to be held respon- sible for order and good government, he should not be per- mitted to find in divided responsibility, excuse for any neglect of the best interest of the people." Writes Theodore Roose- velt: "I heartily favor your side. Speaking with a practical knowledge of the subject, I want to emphasize the need of centralizing responsibility." Says Judge Dillon in his work on municipal corporations: "Experience has demonstrated with us the necessity of granting more power and responsi- bility to the executive head of our municipal institutions." The principles of our plan have been advocated by the fol- lowing commissions: The Pennsylvania commission of 1876, Fassett commission, Greater New York commission, commis- sions for the second and third class cities of the state of New York, New Haven, Lowell, and many others. Committees 20 have been appointed during the past year to revise the char- ters of the cities of Omaha, Denver, Toledo, San Francisco, Springfield, Mass., Portland, Me., Lawrence and Worcester; each and every one have prepared charters making the mayor the responsible head of the city. The charter recommended by the National Association of Good Government Clubs, em- bodies the principle of a strong executive, and the separa- tion of the legislative and executive functions. Out of 125 letters sent to the boards of trade and civic organizations, we have received 104 replies. All of these, with the exception of two comparatively small cities, answered that the federal plan is best suited for the government of their respective cities. Not a single one favored the granting of more pow- ers to the common council. Students and authorities on the subject of municipal government in this country, are practi- cally unanimous in favor of the principles on which our plan is based. Among the many authorities we may mention Pres. Seth Low of Columbia college, Simon Sterne, Judge Dillon, Wm. Evarts, Prof. E. J. James, Franklin MacVeagh, James C. Carter, Fred Grant and Prof. H. C. Adams, Theodore Roose- velt, Grover Cleveland and David Dudley Field. That great evils exist in our municipal institutions, must be admitted; these evils cannot be attributed to any censurable characteristic of our people, but must be attributed to the ir- responsible, the complicated, and unbusinesslike system un- der which our cities have operated. We have attempted to govern our large and rapidly developing cities by an anti- quated form of government. Our cities are to-day in a transi- tory stage, and are going through the same process of evolu- tion as the early state. The early state was at first governed by the town meeting or the common council plan of govern- ment. As wealth and population multiplied, this plan became inadequate, and the democratic states almost universally adopted the principle of the separation of the legislative and ex- ecutive functions. Villages and small cities of the past cen- tury could be well governed by the archaic plan. But now 21 we have reached the stage where the city is of such great importance, that it represents more wealth and population than many states of the past century. With this growth, the same necessities which confronted the early state, now con- fronts our cities. And moreover, so far as our cities have gone they have solved the problem in the same way as the early state. Bitter experience has forced them to seek the same remedy. The fact that every important change in American charters, has been in the direction of a strong ex- ecutive, and the further fact that students and authorities, who are best able to judge, are practically unanimous in fa- vor of this tendency, prove conclusively that the city of the future will be governed by^ mayor and a council, the first having executive powers, the second having legislative pow- ers. These are the vital principles for which we contend. F. E. COMPTON, PHILOMATHIA The government of the larger cities of the United States has not been entirely satisfactory. This fact has led some of the less hopeful reformers to declare that representative government in our municipalities is a failure, but this con- clusion is not warranted and follows from a superficial view. If we look carefully we see that the representaj:ive system in our cities is not a failure, but rather deserves much praise. The system has had to contend with a host of evil conditions and tendencies and still in spite of them all has worked fairly well. As President Seth Low, of Columbia College, says: "The marvel would seem to be not so much that American cities are criticisable for many defects but rather that results so great have been achieved in so short a time." The evils of our municipal government spring from many complex causes. Chief among these causes is the marvelous growth of our cities. "The problem in America," says Pres- ident Low, "has been to make a great city in a few years out of nothing." From mere villages fifty years ago New York, Chicago, Brooklyn and Philadelphia have each come to number nearly two million inhabitants, while other cities have grown at nearly the same rate. This rapid growth ne- cessitated extensive public improvements. In a few years miles upon miles of new streets were paved, street railway franchises were granted, sewer, gas and water systems estab- lished, parks laid out and improved and great public build- ings erected. This hasty extension of public works was nat- urally wasteful. Here was laid the foundation of the present municipal debt, and here was the opportunity for corrupt poli- ticians to fill their pockets at the public treasury. Then too, this rapid growth made it impossible to forecast the future; great public buildings were scarcely finished before they were remodeled and enlarged, sewer, gas and water systems were [22] 23 constantly extended; everywhere there was reconstruction and expansion to meet the demands of our ever increasing population. This rapid growth, the prime cause of ineffi- cient government, was itself the result of a large foreign im- migration. Much of this immigration was undesirable and brought many serious evils to the nation. It crowded our cities with a heterogeneous population, ignorant of our insti- tutions, indifferent to the public welfare. • From this unde- sirable immigration has come our slums, our class vote. It made ring rule possible. Its evil effects were multiplied by a reckless granting of the right of suffrage. Foreigners with- out property, without knowledge of our municipal affairs, cast their ballots in every city election. These causes, the rapid growth of our cities, and an unde- sirable immigration, in themselves show why our municipal government has been inefficient. But we must add to these, the transitory character of our population. Population in America has moved steadily from east to west, Philadelphia, Chicago and St. Louis have been mere stopping places in this western migration. Foreigners make up a large part of the population of our cities, and their brief residence of a year or so, cannat but result in lack of interest in the cities' welfare. Another powerful cause of poor city government is the in- fluence of the saloon and municipal monopolies. The saloon has a great deal to lose under good city government through the enforcement of laws regulating the sale of intoxicants. The liquor power has everywhere been active in the control of municipal affairs. "Of the one thousand and seven pri- maries held in New York City in 1884, 633 were held in liq- uor saloons." Municipal monopolies too have much to gain by poor administration and so take an active part in poli- tics. These causes are rendered more efficient for evil by the fact that the American people have little administrative knowl- edge. The city must deal with intricate problems, political and economic; such as taxation, regulation of natural monop- 24 dies and charities. Ten years ago these subjects were hardly even taught in our colleges. People were ignorant of the principals of municipal government, incapable of distinguish- ing good administration from bad. To-day every body is studying municipal questions in colleges and clubs and the next decade will witness a mighty change in municipal affairs whatever the form of government may be. Again, our city government has been poor because of the evil union of national and municipal politics. ' Party bosses owe their power to partisan politics. "Four-fifths of the electors," says Mr. Bryce, ''give little thought to per- sonal qualifications and vote the straight out ticket." The great New York commission of 1877, on municipal govern- ment in its report says: "The political division of good citi- izens paralyzes all ordinary effort for good municipal govern- ment." Says James C. Carter, President of the National Muni- cipal League: "If national politics could be excluded from municipal affairs and officers elected on merit the municipal question would be solved." Gentlemen, the rapid growth of our cities, undesirable im- migration, broad suffrage, transitory character of our popula- tion, intrusion of national politics, these are more than ade- quate causes to account for poor city government. But there is still another, the interference of state legisla- ture in city affairs. Selfish politicians in the legislatures have encouraged municipal extravagance which the people were powerless to prevent because the legislature was beyond the reach of the city voter. Besides this, not a session of any state legislature goes by without a change in the charters of our large cities. The New York commission in 1877 gave state interference as the main cause of poor city government. The report of the Fassett Senate committee in 1890, the most scholarly and complete report ever made on city government, says: "Your committee cannot too strongly condemn this interference as one of the chief causes of the miscarriage of the local administration." State interference takes the <:j-ov- 25 ernment out of the hands of the people and places it in the lobby of the legislature. City officers have been appointed and removed, new offices created, streets paved, public build- ings erected and the city burdened with debt to gratify the desire of state politicians. In fact: ''Frequent legislation has destroyed all local self-government." Said James W. Pryor, secretary of the City Club of New York, in an interview: "If we could have for ten years in this country a single free city of a million inhabitants we should hear very little more about the hopeless problem of municipal government." There is still another cause of poor city government that must be mentioned, the apathy and indifference of the best citizens to municipal government. On account of the bad elements in city politics, the absorbing commercial interests and isolation of the individual in cities, a large number of peo- ple take no interest in the government of our municipalities. In a democracy the government depends upon the people and the problem is a problem of arousing the people's interest. Said Prof. Edmund J. James in a personal interview: "We have never had a form of government in our American cities which has been so bad that if every citizen would do his duty we could not have obtained good results." The concentration of power has not aroused the peoples' interest, and has failed as a measure of reform. The way to arouse civic pride is not by a change of charters but by edu- cation, education through reform associations and the study of municipal government. Thus far I have shown that the evils of our cities lie not in our form of government but in social and moral conditions, quite apart from the form, which conditions must be changed before better government can be hoped for. Yet the affirma- tive ignore these fundamental causes when they ask you to adopt a radical change in our municipal system and thus de- clare representative government in our cities a failure. They propose to give to one man not only all executive and ad- ministrative but many legislative powers. In fact, they ask 26 you to take a step backward in the evolution of government and in place of our representative system establish a system of municipal Caesarism. A system that at most can only be advocated as a temporary measure, a war measure, but even as a war measure the system cannot remove the fundamental evils of our city government; but in many respects indeed would aggravate them. Then to advocate such a scheme as a permanent system is absurd. We, on the other hand, gentlemen, advocate measures of reform that will remove these fundamental causes that I have mentioned. To prevent the evil union of national and municipal poli- tics we advocate the entire separation of municipal from state and national elections. To prevent legislative interference and charter tinkering we advocate local self-government for all cities, so that th^ voters of the cities can control municipal affairs. We advocate the strict enforcement of our naturalization laws and the improvement of our primaries, so that they will attract and not repel our best citizens. To remove the evils of the spoils system we advocate the appointment of subordinate officers under civil service rules, enforced by a board of non-partisan civil service commis- sioners. These measures of reform are exactly the measures pro- posed by the national municipal league, by all the good gov- ernment clubs in the United States, advocated by every stu- dent of municipal government and have brought most beneficial results wherever they have been in operation. We recognize that such causes as the indifference of citizens, and lack of administrative knowledge can only be remedied by education and agitation. These two forces have already greatly im- proved our city government. We recognize that other causes, as rapid growth, immigration and transitory population, are gradually passing away and the condition of our cities is steadily improving. 27 So with the enforcement of the reforms I have mentioned no reason can be urged for a change of our municipal system, but even were a change of system desirable the radical scheme advocated by the affirmative can not remedy but will only in- crease our municipal ills. The system of the affirmative throws immense power into the hands of the mayor by giving him control of the municipal patronage. But the affirmative argue that this patronage will be removed by the appointment of subordinates under civil service rules. The temptation under their system, how- ever, for one man to gain control of all appointments has been so great, that without a single exception, the rules of the charter have been completely disregarded in every city where their system has been tried. In a personal interview with Prof. Edmund J. James, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, he said: "In Philadelphia subordinates are appointed and removed in the same manner as provided in your question, but this power has been greatly abused, the spoils system is as bad or worse to-day than before the rules were adopted." In New York city, under a system similar to the affirmative, the rules have been disregarded in the same manner. The senate committee reports as follows: "In New York city the officers are still almost without ex- ception from the highest to the lowest the prizes of political life and the rewards of party service." In Brooklyn where the system of concentration has had a most thorough trial the results have been the same. Under eight years of sue- sive administrations, the civil service rules were entirely ignored, and the spoils system reigned supreme. In Indian- apolis the civil service rules would, if enforced, exclude all political reasons for appointment in the city service. But every mayor since the adoption of the centralized charter has utterly disregarded these rules. The city charter was so recklessly violated that a special commission was appointed to examine the civil service of Indianapolis, and reported as follows: "Large numbers of employees have been removed 28 and others appointed without the slightest regard either to the rules or the charter." "The best interests of the city are being disregarded for the benefit of personal and partisan consideration." This, under a system exactly like the affirm- ative in the city of churches and homes, where conditions are almost ideal for the perfect operation of these rules. This, gentlemen, is the practical working of the affirma- tive's theories. It is easy to see why civil service rules should break down under their system when we observe that subordinates are appointed by the heads of departments who are dependent upon the mayor for their position. These heads of departments then, being subservient to the mayor would be strongly tempted to use these rules for partisan purposes. So we see that civil service rules under a concentrated sys- tem cannot prevent the mayor from building up a strong po- litical machine. Let us now pass to the point of locating responsibility. The affirmative urge that under their system they will have responsibility located in the mayor. But, gentlemen, they still retain the council and give this council joint powers with the mayor, so, in accord with their own theory, divide the re- sponsibility in government. While the idea of located respon- sibility may sound well in theory, in practice it has proven most unsatisfactory. Located responsibility goes for nothing if it does not move the people to action. It means nothing if it does not remove corruption from municipal government. And, gentlemen, here the system of the affirmative has ig- nominiously failed. We have just seen how located respon- sibility has failed to prevent the greatest abuse of the civil service rules. In addition to this, experience teaches that so- called located responsibility has not prevented the most cor- rupt mayors from being elected, has not prevented these same men from being re-elected, or from being succeeded by mayors equally as bad or even worse. In an interview with Hon. A. K. McClure, editor-in-chief of the Philadelphia Times, 29 he said: "The theory of responsibility may be sound, but the practice is decidedly weak. Our present system has proved a great power for harm. We have not been able to elect a good mayor since the centralized charter of 1887 was adopted." If located responsibility means anything why was it that under the afilirmative system in Brooklyn the people re-elected Mayor Chapin after one of the most corrupt and extravagant administrations in the history of the city.? Lo- cated responsibility goes for nothing if the people turn down one corrupt mayor and elect a worse one in his place. Yet this has been the experience in Brooklyn, New York and In- dianapolis, where the system of the affirmative is in opera- tion. Our poor city government is not due to a lack of located responsibility, but to the indifference of the people. In every city it is known that the mayor is responsible for the enforce- ment of all city ordinances, such as the regulation of the sa- loon and gambling houses, yet the people do not hold the mayor responsible. There is hardly a city in the country where the mayor is doing his duty in regard to the enforce- ment of these laws. When brought to the test of experience their system has failed in the very respect where it seems theoretically perfect. Not only has the system failed in the United States but the idea of concentrating power in the hands of one man has never found acceptance in any of the European cities. In England, Germany, France, Scotland, Canada and other foreign coun- tries the council has been given full power in municipal gov- ernment and these countries have achieved wonderful success in the control of their cities. While there are slight differ- ences in conditions between foreign countries and the United States, we must remember that the work of cities the world over is the same. As Ex-Mayor Mathews, of Boston, an ad- verse witness in our case, says: "It must be conceded that the common argument that most of the city's work should be vested in an executive officer, is refuted by the experience of 30 foreign cities." Even the affirmative must admit that if there is any inherent weakness in the council system it would have shown itself in the many foreign countries where it has not been in practical operation. Especially as it has operated in many different countries under entirely different conditions. Eng- land has a set of conditions different from those in France, Germany from those in Scotland and Scotland from those in Canada. Yet the council has been eminentl)^ successful in all of them. In spite of this fact the affirmative claim that our poor city government is due to our system of government by the council. To maintain this proposition they must disregard the fundamental causes that I have mentioned, and they must explain why city government in the United States has shown such a marked improvement wherever these causes have been removed. When they have done this they must show why the council has worked so successfully not only in all foreign cit- ies, but in many cities in the United States. In Minneapo- lis, Atlanta, Nashville, Springfield, Mass., and many other cities they have the council with large powers and the people are well satisfied with the government. Says Hon. Robert Pratt, of Minneapolis: "The system under which we are chartered is known as council government. I prefer it in many respects to the one you are discussing." Says Julian Ralph, a student of municipal government: "The govern- ment t)f Minneapolis is certainly a success." Said A. S. Col- lier, in an article on Nashville: "The business of the city is as well conducted as a bank." Says Mr. Kennedy, of Memphis: "The system of government of Memphis is excellent." Hon. W. W. Mershon, of Saginaw, in an article "in Municipality and County," said: "We think we have a model city charter." Writes Hon. Mark Hubble, of Buffalo: "Our city govern- ment is most satisfactory." Said A. H. Davis, of Atlanta, at the recent good government conference at Baltimore: "Our charter works well. It seems admirably adapted to our local needs. Under our present charter for twenty-two years the city has never lost by "misappropriation or embez- 31 zlement of its funds." Said Geo. A. Denison at the same conference: "Springfield has never been ruled by a ring. When departure from the path of municipal rectitude has oc- curred the people have been swift to rebuke them and to turn the careless servants out of office." In other cities with the same system good government has not been as satisfactory, which shows conclusively that char- ter is not the cause of poor city government. We must conclude, gentlemen, that the evils of our city government are due to social and political conditions such as rapid growth of our cities, foreign immigration, broad suf- frage, transitory character of our population, confusion of na- tional and local politics, poor primaries, the spoils system, interference of state legislatures, and the apathy and indiffer- ence of the better classes in our cities. We must conclude that the only remedy for corrupt city government is the removal of these fundamental causes. We must conclude that the concentration of power in one man does not strike at the root of the evil, and is there'fore superficial and ineffective. We must conclude that such a system would lead a corrupt man to abuse the civil service and charter, through his ambi- tion to gain political power, as the experience of Indianapolis and Brooklyn has shown. We have seen that located responsibility in practice has utterly refuted the theoretical claims for such a scheme. We must conclude that when the spoils system has been removed from our cities by civil service reform, when we have better primaries, when voters divide on the line of good or bad city government, instead of tariff or currency, and when there is an enlightened civic interest, such a radical change will be unnecessary. Until many of these changes occur such a radical change would be ineffective if not vicious. We have every reason to be encouraged from the stride municipal reform has made the last few years. Municipal re- 32 form movements have centered the people's interest on the necessity of good city government. We have certainly passed the period of great municipal in- efficiency, and the tendency in all, cities is steadily toward improvement. J. W. PAGE, ATHENyE Our opponents have admitted the evils of our municipal governments, but they have sought to attribute them to causes that cannot be changed by the form of government, to the saloon, immigration, state interference, etc. How would they remedy the evils they admit? Does the present plan of dealing with the saloon in Milwaukee, where each alderman practically has the -granting of the licenses, suit them better than the plan we propose? Their plan makes it necessary for the saloons to control the alderman. The evils they have pointed out are evils indeed but what remedies have they proposed? A single city cannot prohibit immigration, nor even legislative interference. The remedies they propose are not practical, they are extensive not inten- sive. How can the reforms they hint at be accomplished? On the other hand our plan is tried and practical and in every city where it has been adopted we will show you that a marked improvement has taken place. The reforms the neg- ative have mentioned, impossible of accomplishment, are de- , signed to conceal the evils which the negative admit exist. Gentlemen, our opponents have admitted our cause of action and to win this debate must propose a better plan than we advocate. This is the only logical conclusion from their ad- missions but we apprehend from the tenor of the gentlemen's debate that by a general admission of poor city government, and a denial of specific charges they, in the face of astound- ing instances of misgovernment and corruption will take the position that present conditions do not warrant a change. In taking this position they place themselves in opposition to every student of the question and every investigating com- mittee, and I ask your indulgence while I mention a few of the hundreds of cases of corruption that have led such men as James C. Carter to declare that, "Our city governments il- 3-JD. [33] 34 lustrate every form of public disgrace." I need not recall the notorious Broadway scandal in New York in which a street railway franchise was corruptly passed over the mayor's veto, investigation of which showed that all but two of the twenty- four aldermen were implicated in the corrupt deal. Nor rveed I mention the infamous Gas Ring, which for more than thirty years controlled the patronage and elections in Phil- adelphia, and robbed the city of millions of dollars annually. Only last year the Tennessee Bar Association reported that property in the cities of that state was being abandoned be- cause of the deplorable condition of the city governments. And this state contains one of the cities whose government they have spoken of so highly. During the past thirty years the debts of lOO of our larg- est cities have increased $400,000,000, and there is abso- lutely nothing to show where more fhan half this outlay has gone. Take for example the city of New York where the debt increased $41,000,000 between 1890 and 1895, o^ Eliza- beth City where the indebtedness all accumulated during the last few years, for street improvements at exorbitant rates,, equals one-fourth of the valuation of all property in the city. Still the gentlemen tell us our cities are not badly adminis- tered. Two years ago a law was passed in Missouri compelling the sate of franchises. The day before the law went into effect, the Kansas City common council in forty-five minutes granted to private companies thirteen franchises valued at over $6,500,000, and for which the city did not receive a cent. The council of Omaha last year attempted to grant an exclusive franchise for fifty years to supply the city with water and gas at exorbitant rates; the mayor by his veta secured concessions worth more than a million dollars. In 1895 eleven of the thirty-three New Orleans aldermen were indicted and three sent to prison for corrupt franchise deals. I might give hundreds of instances but no one doubts the part played by corruption and bribery in the granting of 35 franchises. An investigation by the Toledo Board of Trade showed that the city had been robbed of more than $i,ooo, - ooo. Cincinnati is to-day so completely under the control of one independent and irresponsible boss, that no ordinance is passed or officer elected without his approval. Without a visible income this man has built a palatial home. Last August in the city of Memphis an alderman was sent to prison for soliciting bribes. In the city of Lowell another boodle alderman was convicted in November. To-night in Des Moines boodle money belonging to a gas company is held in a bank. If more instances of corruption are necessary the record of a single week last month is as conclusive as it is disgraceful. In New York, Mayor Strong by his veto of a corrupt fran- chise ordinance saved the city $10,000,000. In Omaha the city engineer's department was being investigated because of inefficiency and corruption. In Chicago, John M. Harlan, son of Justice Harlan of the supreme court, in a public meet- ing declared that every committee of the city council is con- trolled by aldermen whose votes are for sale; that the Calu- met franchise cost the company $100,000 corruption money. William Giles estimates that more than $4,000,000 has been paid to the council directly during the past eight years. In that city, Martin B. Madden, an irresponsible alderman, has been for six years the acknowledged boss of the council, dic- tating its policy, having charge of all contracts and control- ling the expenditure of over $15,000,000 per annum. Nor is this all, during the same week the investigations of a grand jury in Minneapolis revealed the fact that a majority of the aldermen have been systematicall}/ robbing that city. They have demanded and received a regular percentage on the contracts which they have let, amounting it is believed to ten per cent, of the city's total expenditures. They have levied assessments on every man whom they have appointed to a city position, and from this source received $30,000 a year. The grand jury is still in session, and what their in- vestigation will reveal is not known, but already some indict- 36 ments have been returned, and enough is now known to con- demn Minneapolis as one of the most corruptly governed cities in the country. This kind of municipal corruption, not unusual in our cities, is attracting widespread attention because Minneapolis has been constantly pointed to as the model city by those who advocate the council form of government. Such is the record for a single week of the system defended by the negative, and the instances that I have given are only a few of the thousands of known cases of corruption, and there are doubtless thousands that have not been discovered. The gentleman has referred to Springfield as a well governed city. Does he not know that the mayor in his last message condemned Springfield's system of committee government, and said that economy of administration could not be secured under it.? Nor do these facts indicate the full extent of the evils in our city affairs. In addition to the amounts taken directly from the city, far greater sums are annually raised by assess- ments on employees, saloons, gambling houses, large corpora- tions and business concerns. It is estimated that $3,000,000 are thus raised annually in the city of New York. Many of these facts were revealed by the Lexow investigating com- mittee, and what has been proven of conditions in New York is known to exist in almost every city in the country in one form or another. In Chicago, for example, by taking bribes for low assessments it is known that each assessor derives as large an income from his position as the salary of the presi- dent of the United States. The money raised by these black- mailing schemes keeps the ward heeler in line, enables the boss to rule our cities, and elects corrupt men to the council. My time is too limited to permit the mention of more spe- cific cases of corruption, but the instances I have mentioned are typical. Surely the gentlemen will not longer attempt to maintain that we have no cause for action, that the condition of our city governments does not warrant a change. This deplorable condition of our cities my colleague has shown you is due to the failure to separate legislative and ex- 37 ecutive functions and to the division of executive and adminis- trative powers among numerous independent boards, commit- tees and individuals. It is evident that some change must be made in the form of government of our cities. The plan we ad- vocate brings system out of this chaos. It separates the legis- lative and executive departments and confines each within its clearly defined sphere. It abolishes the numerous administra- tive and executive boards and places all the executive power in an executive department, which consists of the mayor and the heads of departments, who are appointed by him and re- sponsible to him. Under these heads of departments are the great body of subordinates all of whom are appointed in ac- cordance with civil service rules and responsible to the head of their respective department. This plan gives each officer his work to do and for which he alone is responsible. The work of each department is clearly defined. The mayor is made the controlling and responsible head of the whole ad- ministration. He can call to account any careless or corrupt ofiicial and the people will hold the mayor personally respon- sible if he fails to correct any abuses in the government of the city. Our cities are concerned to a much greater degree than our national and state governments with business ques- tions. The functions of the executive department are purely those of business. The erection of buildings, the cleaning and paving of streets, the disposal of sewage, the manage- ment of water and lighting plants, the making of contracts, all are questions of business, and to be managed successfully must be conducted in accordance with the principles that are essential to the successful management of any private enter- prise. The problems arising from the rapid growth of our urban population as well as the constant tendency to extend the sphere of municipal activity by assuming the ownership and control of natural monopolies, make the application of busi- ness principles to the management of the business affairs of our cities an absolute necessity. 38 The first essential for the successful management of any -corporation, public or private, is a strong, efficient, and re- sponsible head, who has the power to carry out a continuous and consistent policy. This is especially true where the business is so varied and complicated as is that of our modern cities. One president is better than three receivers, one capable and responsible head better than any committee of the council. With the heads of departments that are inde- pendent or only responsible to the council, which like all bodies composed of many members, must be vacillating- and hesitating, there can be no common purpose, no continuous policy, no unity of administration. For these are qualities which can only be secured when as under our system there is a single executive head, with full power to act under strict re- sponsibility. How long would a private corporation keep from bankruptcy if its business was parcelled out to committees of the stockholders, each independent of the other and with no common policy and no responsible head.? Yet this is the condition of affairs which must exist in our cities as long as executive and administrative powers are parcelled out among numerous independent boards and committees. A policy more certain to bring about extravagance and mis-govern- ment in city affairs could not be devised. As has been shown our plan strikes at the very root of the abuses in city government, by separating legislative and ex- ecutive functions and by fixing responsibility. To the coun- cil we give all legislative powers, to the executive all the administrative and executive work. The executive de- partment has absolute charge of tne constructson of improve- ments, the management of city property and the making of contracts. There are, however, certain quasi-con- tracts like the granting of licenses and franchises which involve questions of public policy and should be submitted to the council, in order that the executive department shall not encroach upon the functions of that body. One of the disastrous results of the system of government 39 under which most of our cities are suffering is that so few offices are filled by the better class of citizens. The average alderman is a man of low moral character, lit- tle education and no business training. The members of the executive boards and commissions are but little better. It is the opinion of boards of trade and civic organizations with whom we have corresponded that from 50 to 75 per cent, of the alderman in cities coming within the limits of this debate are unfit for office. Yet many of the gravest problems that confront the American people are connected with our cities. The reason why to-day they do not secure able men as offi- cers is that there is little in city office to attract good men, for they find themselves handicapped at every turn by the complicated system of divided powers and responsibility. On the other hand this system attracts venal and inefficient men by offering every opportunity to conceal mismanagement and corruption. To secure efficient city officials the system of city government must be so changed that city offices will be such positions of power and honor, that they will not only offer opportunity for men of ability to exercise their talents but that they will appeal to all that is best in such men. Wherever these changes have been effected there has been a most marked improvement in the character of the city offi- cials. When Brooklyn adopted our system, Pres. Seth Low was glad to accept the office of mayor of that city. When New York made the offices of police and of street cleaning commissioners places of power and responsibility, Theodore Roosevelt resigned his position as member of the national civil service commission to become police commissioner, and the city secured Col. Waring, the foremost sanitary engineer in America, for street cleaning commissioner. Thus when our system is in general operation it will be that everywhere men of character and ability will find in city offices a field for the exercise of their talents and the very best men will seek these positions. The fact that the mayor's office is made one of great im- 40 portance is not the only assurance that we will secure efficient mayors. The people, knowing that the success of the city administration will depend on securing an honest and able man for mayor, will take greater interest in elections and de- vote more attention to city affairs. At the present time the responsibility for the city administration is distributed among a large number of offices and it is utterly impossible for the voters to inform themselves of the character and records of the numerous, comparatively obscure candidates for these po- sitions. Moreover, the power of the ballot is so diffused that no thorough and permanent reform can be obtained. It is therefore no wonder that interest in municipal elections has been constantly decreasing until now in many of our cities from 25 to 40 per cent, of the voters fail to vote. And it is well known that the voters who stay away from the polls are the better class of our people. This condition alone would justify a change. The adoption of our plan which concen- trates the interest of the voters an the choice of one man and enables the people to accomplish their purpose at a single election, has been followed in every instance by increased in- terest in city primaries and elections. The results are strik- ingly shown by these charts. The line in each chart shows the time our plan was adopted. The number of votes cast for mayor is shown and compared with the population and the vote cast for governor wherever reliable figures can be obtained. In each case showing that under our plan the votes cast for mayor increased much faster than either the population or the vote for governor. The comparison with the vote cast for president is not given for that but illustrates in a greater degree, the principle of the federal plan that where interest is centered in the election of one man more people do their duty at the polls. Chart no. 2 — FoRiSii^YNg;:^ Population. Vote for Mayor. ' ^^^ . ~ ^ ^ sented by a vote. 1890 35,393 6,247 1892 37>78Q 5>45i 6.9 1894 45,679 8,546 1896 48,750 8,977 5-4 1892- 1896. — Increase in population 29 per cent. 1 892-1 896. — Increase in votes for mayor 64 per cent. In Fort Wayne prior to the adoption of our plan each vote represented 6.9 people now each vote represents only 5.4 or in other words while the population has increased 29 per cent. the number of votes cast for mayor has increased 64 per cent. Chart no. 3 — Indianapolis. Population. Vote for Mayor. .. ? , ^ ^ ^ sented by a vote. ^^^7 97,332 20,700 1889 119,346 20,873 5.7 1891 1.33,020 22,568 1893 144,000 28,715 1895 149,355 31,751 4-7 1889-1895. — Increase in population 25 per cent. 1889-1895. — Increase in votes for mayor 52 per cent. In Indianapolis the same improvement is shown, the num- ber of people represented by each vote has decreased from 5.7 to 4.7. This city now showing the greatest proportion of actual voters to the population of any city in the country. While the population has increased 25 per cent, since the change in the form of government the votes cast for mayor have increased more than 50 per cent. • Chart No. 4. — Cleveland. Popula- Governor Mayor No. of persons rep- tion. Vote. Vote. resented by a vote. 1887 239,229 30,397 25,298 1889 261,708 39,345 31,333 8.3 1991 299,475 48,429 34,190 1893 322,932 44,122 37,7^7 1895 352,629 43,712 45,909 7'^ 42 1889-1895- — Increase in population, 34 per cent. 1889-1895. — Increase in votes for governor, 8 per cent. 1 889-1 895. — Increase in votes for mayor, 43 per cent. The same improvement is shown in Cleveland. The num- ber of persons represented by each vote the last year under the old system was 8.3, in 1895 the number was but ^.6. From 1889 to 1895 the population increased 34 per cent., and while the vote for governor only increased 8 per cent., the vote for mayor increased 43 per cent. Chart No. 5. — Brooklyn Governor Vote. Mayor Vote. 1881 1882.. 1883 1885 1887 1888 1889 1891 1893 1894 1895 1 880-1890. — Increase in population, 42 per cent. 1881-1891. — Increase in vote for mayor, 68 per cent. 1881-1895. — Increase in vote for mayor, 95 per cent. In Brooklyn the vote cast for mayor at the last election ex- ceeded the highest vote ever cast for governor by more than 8,000 votes. We have not been able to secure the popula- tion for each year, but while the population increased 42 per cent, between 1 880-1890 the vote for mayor between 1881 and 1 891 increased 68 percent, or 95 percent, between 1881 and 1895. 86,721 U^, «jv^3 98,562 100,302 100,560 118,450 116,328 124,951 147,920 146,304 166,717 162,897 170,992 1872 1873 1875 1877 1878 i88i 1882 1884 1886 UIMIVtKSn Y OF £lLIFORHy^ 43 Chart No. 6 — Philadelphia. Governor Vote. 118, 119 113,889 127,219 146,950 153,955 Mayor Vote. 94,237 109,261 121,413 150,643 149,669 1887 152,663 1890 191,952 1 891 179,628 1894 192,464 1895 214,742 1 886-1 894 — Increase in vote for governor 25 per cent. 1 887-1 895 — Increase in vote for mayor 39 per cent. Likewise in Philadelphia the vote cast for mayor at the last election exceeded the largest vote ever cast for governor by more than 22,000 votes, and while the vote cast for gov- ernor increased 25 per cent, between 1886 and 1894, the vote for mayor between 1887 and 1895, an equal period, in- creased more than 39 per cent. Chart No. 7. — Boston. Total number of votes cast. Nov. Election Dec. Election Larger number for Governor. for Mayor. of Votes for 1875.. . . 27,380 27,116 Gov. 1876.. • 43,795 30,663 Gov. 1877.. •. 34,213 47,988 Mayor. 1878.. . . 47, 890 38,141 Gov. 1879.. ■• 43,437 35,555 Gov. 1880.. . 53,396 41,654 Gov. 1881.. . 29,219 40,170 Mayor. 1882.. • 47,734 41,288 Gov. 1883.. . 58,443 53,444 Gov. 1884.. . 58,748 51,662 Gov. 44 44,682 Mayor. 45,66; Mayor. 5i,820 Mayor. 63.548 Gov. 56,877 Mayor. 54,254 Mayor. 55,018 Gov. 66,667 Gov. 68,228 Gov. 68,588 Mayor. 76,721 Mayor. 1885.... 41,683 1886. . . . 45,467 1887.... 49,423 1888.. .. 64,923 R. and Pr. year 1889.... 52,478 R. 1890.... 54,088 R. 1891 60,986 R. 1892 .... 73,616 R. and Pr. year 1893.... 70,715 R. 1894. ... 66,214 R. 1895 • • • • 66,916 Number of persons represented by one vote: 1885—8.7 1880-1885— 8.7 1895 — 6.4 1890-1895 — 7.2 Turning now to the chart on Boston where the elections for governor are held in November and the municipal elec- tions are held one month later and where on this account you would expect to find a small vote cast for municipal officers we see that while during the ten years prior to the adoption of our plan the vote for governor exceeded the vote for mayor in all but two years, that in the eleven years since the condi- tions have been reversed and the mayor's vote has exceeded the vote for governor in all but four years, two of these being years in which presidential election took place and all occur- ring during the years when Wm. E. Russell, the idol of the people, of Massachusetts, as candidate for governor, was ask- ing for their votes. Moreover since the adoption of our plan the number of people represented by each vote has been re- duced from 8.7 in 1885 to 6.4 in 1895, or taking five year periods 1880 to 1885 and 1 890 to 1895 the reduction has been from 8.7 to 7.2 showing a remarkable increase of interest in city elections. Students of municipal government everywhere are united in declaring that the first essential to a reform of city govern- ment is a more active interest of the people in city elections. They declare that if the people will only attend the primaries and elections the problem of city government will be solved. These charts show that, without exception, wherever our plan 45 has been adopted the tendency to neglect municipal affairs has not only been stayed but that an ever increasing number of people now attend the primaries and the polls, thus insur- ing a higher grade of officials and better municipal govern- ment. Still another reason why our plan secures better men is that the incentive for corrupt men to seek office is removed. Responsibility for every act is fixed and the detection and punishment of the careless or criminal exercise of official powers is made certain. Under such conditions a public po- sition has no attractions for men whose only object in seek- ing office is to dishonestly enrich themselves. Any man, when responsibility is fastened upon him, fears public criti- cism and respects public opinion. Thus we see that by mak- ing it unprofitable for corrupt men to seek office, by increas- ing the interest of the people in city affairs, and by making the office of mayor a position of honor and responsibility, we insure the election of able men of character as mayors. The negative will argue that our system will allow the mayor to build up a political machine. No political machine can be established without having a large number of offices at the disposal of the boss. Our plan by placing all the subor- dinate positions under strict civil service rules, making ability and experience the criterion for oflfice, removes the very basis upon which a political machine is built. Ward heelers and politicians have no interest in a man who cannot reward them.^ The seven or eight offices at the disposal of the mayor would be a source of weakness rather than of strength if he should attempt to build 'up a machine; for the number of enemies made by these appointments would be far greater than the number of friends gained. Moreover, under our plan the mayor is held directly responsible and it is to his personal in- terest to administer the government efficiently and economi- cally thereby securing the good will of the public. Any at- tempt to abuse the powers of his official position will surely bring upon him the condemnation of the people. The ex- A 46 perience of those cities that have adopted the principles of our plan but which do not choose their subordinates under civil service rules, shows that even in those cities, every at- tempt of the mayor to maintain himself in office through the power of a political machine has met with disastrous defeat. By placing subordinates under civil service rules and by fix- ing responsibility for the administration directly on the mayor, the plan we advocate, eliminates all danger of a political ma- chine. I have shown how under our plan by increasing the powers of the mayor we obtain men of good character and ability for that position. Good mayors will secure able heads of depart- ments. Under the present system, where many officers are elected, the tickets are made up by compromises between the different factions and classes. Under these conditions, says Judge Story: "The nominations have little to do with the fitness of the candidates." When the appointments are made by the mayor and con- firmed by the council the result is no better, for all responsi- sibility for the character of the men appointed is destroyed. The aldermen say they confirmed the best man the mayor would appoint, the mayor replies that he appointed the best man the council would confirm. In nearly every city the aldermen have abused the power of confirmation. They have cfippled the executive force for months by'refusing to confirm the mayor's appointments and have often compelled the appointment of men totally unfit for office. Under our system the mayor cannot escape the responsibility for the character of his appointees. Moreover it is to the mayor's personal advantage to appoint able and experienced men; for the success of his administration depends, in large measure, upon the character of his appointments. Heads of depart- ments are places of importance and honor and their salaries are sufficient to attract men of ability. Men of good business reputation will accept a position from the mayor when they would refuse to run the risk of being rejected by the council. 47 or defeated at the polls. By giving the mayor the absolute power of appointment and removal we secure the best possi- ble men for heads of departments, harmony between the de- partments and unity of administration. Our plan provides all necessary safeguards to protect the city. The executive department can not expend any money nor make a single contract until an appropriation is made by the council. The council can raise money and direct its ex- penditure, but can not pay out a single cent. The treasurer and comptroller who have charge of the city funds are wholly independent of the mayor. These officers, though not con- trolled by the mayor, can not in any way obstruct the admin- istration of the city affairs, but their independence enables them to prevent the squandering of the public money by pre- venting the falsification of the accounts. This, gentlemen, is the business-like organization of the business departments of the city government for which we ask your approval to-night. Under our system the common council may or may not be organized as it is to-day. In this discussion we are not con- cerned with the legislative functions of the city; for the ques- tion expressly limits the range of our inquiry to the proper drsposal of the administrative and executive functions. But in closing let me call your attention to the fact that one of the first results of relieving the council of the executive work with its mass of details, is an improvement in the character of the council and of the manner in which it performs its duties. The time required of an alderman is greatly short- ened, and busy men can serve in the council. As I have already shown the opportunity for corruption is taken away. Relieved of the stigma now attached to the word ''alderman," better men will enter the council. The council having only important legislative questions to decide, is able to consider each matter carefully and perform its duties more efficiently. Being deprived of the power to spend money, and at the same time being held responsible by the people for the rate of taxation, the council naturally becomes a conservative part 48 of the city government. Our plan, therefore, not only im- proves the executive department, but likewise the legislative department of the city. Gentlemen of the Jury: I have presented the theory upon which the federal plan of city government is based. Its two main characteristics are that it separates the functions of gov- ernment and fixes responsibility for every act. In place of the present heterogeneous, chaotic and unbusinesslike systems, which have made our city governments a disgrace to the country, we have presented a system characterized by sim- plicity, harmony and unity; a system adapted to our Ameri- can conditions and modeled after our national government. This system by giving the mayor full control of the executive department makes the position one of power and dignity, at- tractive to our best men. The people know that the admin- istration depends upon the character of the mayor and being able to use their power directly and efficiently are aroused to greater interest in city affairs and city elections. This in- sures the selection of prominent, able and honest men as mayors. The mayor knowing that he is held responsible for the administration; that his reputation will largely depend upon the character of his appointees, will be careful to choose only able and experienced men as heads of departments. Our plan therefore insures honest and efficient mayors, capable heads of departments, trained and experienced subordinates, thus securing the highest degree of administrative efficiency. In short, our system intensifies interest in city affairs, secures good officials, gives them power to act and fixes responsi- bility. GEO. B. NELSON, PHILOMATHIA The gentlemen of the affirmative have repeatedly asserted that a city is simply a large business corporation. Upon this assumption, they would introduce their system, claiming the while that the system which they propose is an exact model of a business corporation. Now, gentlemen, attractive as is such a comparison it is nevertheless a great and popular fal- lacy. In the first place a city is not a business corporation but a body politic. The many court decisions affirm the truth of this statement. In the second place the functions, aims, and objects of a city differ widely from those of a busi- ness corporation. The one exists to provide for the health, safety, comfort, education and pleasure of its people, while the other exists primarily to declare as large dividends as possible for its stockholders. The one exists to spend money the other to make money. But even granting that a city is a business corporation, the system proposed by the affirmative does not give us a system whose practical workings are analogous to those of a business corporation. Instead of being elected by the whole mass of the people, in the heat of a campaign, the head of a business corporation is chosen by interested and enlightened stock- holders in the quiet of a committee room. Instead of being elected for a short term of years, the president of a business corporation holds his position for life, while his heads of de- partments hold their positions because of special merit and never because they are friends or political supporters of the president. Instead of owing allegiance to any ring or politi- cal party, the head of a corporation is directly responsible to a board of directors. If the affirmative demand a business organization, they must return to a strong council, and have the mayor chosen by this council. It is no wonder the af- firmative's unbusinesslike system has not given good results. 4— J.D. [49] so The gentlemen further claim that both charter commissions, which were appointed by the governor of the state of New York, to formulate general charters for the second and third class cities, have reported in favor of concentrated systems. This is true, but gentlemen they have not brought forth a single statement from any of these commissioners, to show that they favored the system proposed here to-night. On the other hand we of the negative have corresponded with sever- al of these commissioners and have received replies which jus- tify our position here to-night. Hon. Robert Earl, chairman of the commission for second class cities, writes of the affirma- tive's scheme — "It is too broad. All executive and adminis- trative power should not be concentrated in the mayor." Arthur L. Andrews, another member of this same commis- sion, writes: * * ^ "In my humble judgment, the affirm- ative of the question and interpretation is not the best sys- tem for any city. * * * i think there are grave dangers attending the increase of power of a mayor, and I think there is a reaction of sentiment among municipal reformers on this question." From members on the third class commission we have re- ceived similar replies. F. W. Holls, of New York city, in an- swer to the question — Is the affirmative the best permanent system for cities, writes: "Decidedly no!" Hannibal Smith, a second member, upholds our general position when he says: "The proposition in your letter grants too great powers to the mayor." Gentlemen, can our opponents still claim that these com- missioners unanimously advocate their system.'* In spite of the numerous self-evident causes of poor city government which my colleague cited, in spite of the fact that many cities enjoy good government under charters which are entirely different, the affirmative still maintain that char- ter is all-important in municipal government. But, gentle- men, even granting for the moment that they have shown municipal government in the United States unsatisfactory, 51 and that the charter is the cause of poor city government, even then, they have but taken the first step in the proof of their proposition. They must yet show that a system of ex- treme concentration is the remedy. They ask you to-night to adopt a system which rests fund- amentally upon two great assumptions — first, that our coun- cils are to-day hopelessly corrupt, incapable of improvement; and, second, that under existing moral and political conditions the people of our large municipalities will always elect an honest and capable mayor. The weakness and inconsistency of any argument based upon such assumptions must be at once apparent. Because both mayor and council are the pro- duct of the same conditions, both are elected by the same electors, and both are responsible to the same constituency. Could they prove that under present conditions the people would invariably elect an honest and capable mayor, they would overcome the first great obstacle to the adoption of their system. But the election of a capable mayor would be most diffi- cult. It would be almost impossible to find a man who could rigidly enforce the laws, efficiently supervise the various de- partments, examine the terms of all contracts, and could then have sufficient time to consider private rights and public needs in the granting of franchises and the making of innum- erable estimates. I say, to find such a man would be indeed most difficult, if not impossible. Says Dr. Ely: "The suc- cessful mayor under such a system must understand adminis- tration, finance, sanitation, education, etc., etc., in order to properly guide the different branches of municipal govern- rnent, and this kind of a, mayor will rarely be found." But granted that there are men capable of efficiently exer- cising all these powers, will such men really be recognizable among the vast throng of office seekers.? Will they accept the position.? If so, will they be nominated and elected.? Experience with such a system answers No! In the first place, honorable jurors, our ablest and best men are not to- 52 day available for positions in city governments, exposed to hostile partisan criticism, uncertain as to election and still more uncertain as to tenure of office; lured by the equally honorable and much more lucrative positions in the great cor- porations, the able man, the man of great executive capacity, is reluctant to have his name go before apolitical convention. But the affirmative say that this system of great powers and responsibilities will attract the superior men. I answer that such powers will likewise attract political bosses. They will move heaven and earth to control such positions, for the con- trol of them means the control of the city government. Writes Edmund Kelly, an active reformer of New York city: ''The plan proposed is one grateful to politicians, be- cause under this plan, all the machine has to do is to concen- trate its energies upon the election of mayor — a thing which it does with uniform success, except under conditions of un- usual excitement." But, gentlemen, this prize would be sought not only by machine politicians, but the saloon power would make every endeavor to elect a man obedient to its will. Worthy jurors, you must concede that the election of a poor mayor is possible, nay, extremely probable. Unor- ganized for municipal welfare, divided along partisan lines, good citizens in the heat of a campaign may easily make a mistake, and such mistakes have been unfortunately too com- mon in practice. But the success of this system depends upon the election of a good man. For although several mis- takes may be made in the election of aldermen and the con- trol of the council still be left in good hands, yet one mistake in the selection of the mayor is fatal to the mayor govern- ment. But, gentlemen, grant that a well meaning man is elected mayor. What happens.^* No sooner is he inaugurated than he is literally besieged by office seekers, by contract and fran- chise jobbers. Not only this, he is visited by the local boss and party managers, who demand the adoption of certain policies or certain measures for the party good. True, the mayor can resist if he will. But to quote the words of Her- 53 bert Welch, in a personal interview: "The pressure brought to bear upon an honest and well meaning man is simply enormous and very few are strong enough to withstand the demands of the boss." Such was the case with mayors Whit- ney, Chapin and Boody in Brooklyn — all under the affirmative system. Gentlemen, if the mayor is a politician he will surely not resist, because he has been elected by a certain party, and to disregard the demands of that party is to be ungrateful to those who elected him. If he is weak or inca- pable he will soon be dominated by the boss, and the worst type of city government will follow. Such a system is not government. It is dictatorship in municipal affairs. It is a system which makes a clean sweep for good government possible, but gives no assurance of its continuance, nor does it prevent an entire overthrow of set- tled policies, nor a return to the worst of governments that moment the people fail to elect a faithful, honest and capable mayor. You can hold your mayor responsible and dismiss a bad mayor at the end of his term of office, but you have not solved the problem of good government, until you have made certain, that his successor will not possess the same qualities that caused his dismissal. But though the election of a good mayor is assured, this system even then, has an inherent weakness — successive ad- ministrations are not continuous, but revolutionary. Not only is the, mayor changed frequently, but with him the en- tire corps of heads of departments. This has been the in- variable rule in Cleveland, Philadelphia and also in Brooklyn, except during the period when that city was dominated by the famous Whitney, Chapin, Boody regime. Under this system no continuity of policy is possible, and waste, ineffi- ciency and extravagance must result from such a practice. But, worthy jurors, the important question is — how has such a system worked in practice.^ Brooklyn's experience gives ample evidence to support every charge we have made against this system. In 1881 the people of Brooklyn elected 54 their first mayor under the new charter. They fortunately struck upon Mr. Low — an ideal man for the position — edu- cated and intelligent, strong in character, firm of purpose, he gave to the people of Brooklyn a clean administration. But he was not appreciated and was barely elected for a second term. At the end of his term of ofifice, concentration was pronounced a success, but the people did not stop to think that it was Mr. Low, and not the new city charter that made the city government. They did not stop to think that they could not elect a Low every time. Mr. Whitney, the successor of Mr. Low, in his letter ac- cepting the nomination, sneered at the principles of civil ser- vice reform, and thus at once conclusively proved his unfit- ness for the position. Unheard of as a candidate, he came forth as boss McLaughlin's nominee and was elected. Said E. L. Godkin shortly after his election: "The dummy was elected and his administration is already justifying the ma- chine's confidence in him." All the heads of departments who had been so wisely selected by Mr. Low were replaced by men noted more for partisan activity than for business qualifications. The civil service rules were evaded and cor- ruption was everywhere rampant. "In short," says E. L. Godkin, "the object of the new administration in Brooklyn is to break down so far as possible, the system of conducting municipal affairs upon business principles." Finally the peo- ple demanded an investigation and the famous Bacon legis- lative investigation followed. Senator Bacon himself calls Brooklyn "the paradise of gamblers and the home of the sa- loon." This investigation revealed much corruption and con- demned Mayor Whitney in these words: "It is impossible to exonerate Mayor Whitney from a personal responsibility for these abuses." The administration of Whitney went down in disgrace, under legislative condemnation and grand jury presentments. Thus was given the first great blow to concentration. Poor, government was not only possible, but it was evident that the change from good to bad government was rapid and complete. 55 But so thoroughly had the party intrenched itself that at the next election boss McLaughlin's candidate — Mr. Chapin — was elected. It was too evident that lovers of good gov- ernment could hope for but little from this man. He re- tained the worst elements of Whitney's administration. Says the editor of the New York Tribune, "Chapin has swallowed his pledges to the city and meekly and submissively takes his orders from McLaughlin." Although this continued through- out his administration, he was nevertheless elected for a sec- ond term. The government now went from bad to worse. Heavy expenditures continued, needless public works were undertaken and finally the corruption culminated in the fa- mous water works scandal by which the city of Brooklyn would ha\e been defrauded of over a million dollars had not the schemers been stopped by injunction. This attempted steal did not prevent boss McLaughlin from electing Mayor Boody under the pretense of putting in a reform man. Mayor Boody was a man of education, of eloquence and pecuniary competence. Not only this, he was for years a reformer, condemning the boss and the politics of spoils, but he too, was from the first, the willing tool of the bosses, and he gave modern Brooklyn the worst govern- ment in its history. When he was inaugurated the people demanded a clean sweep, yet he retained nearly every one of Chapin's heads of departments, thus maintainmg the same old type of corrupt city government. Says Edward M. Shep- herd, in '93: "It is not too much to say that the reputation for evil brought upon Brooklyn by the last two years of Mr. Chapin's mayoralty, and that of Mr. Boody, has seriously diminished the attractiveness of the city for residence or busi- ness in the opinion of its own citizens and still more of strangers." Gentlemen, when Mr. Boody was elected mayor he had every possible motive to give a business administra- tion, but he failed miserably. Even Edward M. Shepherd, an adverse authority, says: "Mr. Boody himself hardly tries to conceal that his will has been completely effaced by that 56 of boss McLaughlin, that he is no longer a free agent, but is a mere agent or attorney of the boss." Such is the record of four successive administrations — eight years of continuous decline under the system of the affirmative. Finally, in 1893, inspired by the work of Dr. Parkhurst, the people of Brooklyn rose in their might and elected Mayor Schieren — a man who gave Brooklyn a fairly good administra- tion. Yet he was able to do this only with great difficulty, for the city had been under control of Corrupt men so long. Says A. R. Conkling — a writer on municipal government — "The political revolution in Brooklyn in 1893, has disclosed an alarming condition of municipal affairs." The commis- sioner of city works found fifty sinecures in his department which he abolished at a saving to the city of $50,000, while the park commissioner found seventy-five idlers in that de- partment. Says Mayor Schieren himself, in August, '94: "We found the city's financial condition embarrassing as there were outstanding contracts, certified and uncertified, for sev- eral millions of dollars, which we had to recognize." Even following this civic awakening Brooklyn does not en- joy good government to-day. Says C. A. Haviland, a prom- inent lawyer of Brooklyn: "The present administration is condemned on ever}^ hand. Extravagance and recklessness and catering to corporate influence now dominates in Brook- lyn." The civil service commission has had constant trouble with the present mayor. Many temporary appointments have been made, new offices created and all schemes adopted to evade the civil service rules. So flagrantly has he abused these rules that Mayor Wurster has actually been brought be- fore the courts. Says Editor McAneny, secretary of the Na- tional Civil Service Reform League: "Ultimately Mr. Wur- ster will be compelled by the courts and by public opinion to obey the law and the constitution. Meanwhile he is strength- ening the growing conviction that he will not hesitate to use his high office to advance his political fortunes, and that in trusting to his promises of a business administration, a large 57 number of people who voted for him were sadly fooled." Gentlemen, without well enforced civil service rules this sys- tem is the worst form of a political machine, and it seems thus far that civil service rules applied under such a system have generally failed to accomplish their purpose. This is the experience of Brooklyn. I now wish to quote from a few prominent authorities, capa- ble judges of municipal government, who have had every opportunity to observe the workings of the affirmative sys- tem in Brooklyn and New York. James C. Carter — presi- dent of the American Municipal Reform Associations, and a prominent lawyer of New York city — writes: '*I do not be- lieve in concentrating in the office of mayor the unlimited power of appointment and removal of heads of departments." Writes Simon Sterne — a recognized authority on city govern- ment — **The system of practically abolishing the legislative power and influence of local common councils and concen- trating the power in the hands of the mayor of the city of New York has on the whole disappointed the advocates of the con- centration of municipal authority in the hands of one official." C. A. Haviland — a leading lawyer of Brooklyn, writes: "It has become a serious question as to whether in trusting su- preme control to the mayor is wise." William M. Ivins, an active reformer and a member of a chart;er commission of 'jj , writes: "I am very heartily opposed to the system of con- centrated executive and administrative power in the mayor. My own experience has been that it does not work well." Edmund Kelly, a prominent member of the City Club of New York city, writes: ''I have no hesitation in saying that the experience of New York and Brooklyn demonstrates that the system proposed is a thoroughly bad one." Frank J. Good- now, of Columbia College, professor of administrative law, and an unimpeachable authority on municipal government, writes: "I do not think that the history of Brooklyn under the new charter that was adopted in 1888, and which vests so much power in the mayor, would show that better municipal 58 government can be expected under it, than under a scheme which recognizes greater powers as existing in the council. Certainly since 1888 the government (in Brooklyn) has been oftener bad than good." Lastly, the greatest practical re- former of the 19th century. Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst, writes us: "I do not believe that it is wise that all executive and administrative power in municipal power should be concen- trated in the mayor." Worthy jurors, can the affirmative in the light of these facts and contrary to these authorities ask you to adopt their system of municipal government? Generalizing from insufficient data, they ask you to adopt a system which strips the council of its most important pow- ers, which leaves it indeed with little positive power for good, while capable of doing much harm. They can urge this step for one reason only, that these powers have been abused by our councils. Now worthy jurors, that certain councils have abused their powers, we admit, but gentlemen, I ask you is their position a logical one.'' There is not a single power pos- sessed by the mayor which has not been as often abused as any powder possessed by any American council. In this light there can be no just reason why the mayor should be made a dictator, or why this war measure should be adopted. Not recognizing the true solution of the problem, the election of better councilmen, the friends of this new scheme jump to the conclusion that these powers should be lodged with the mayor. It needs no study to see what effect this change must have upon the councils. There can be but one result — a speedy deterioration in the character of our councilmen. Stripped of administrative as well as important legislative powers, the position of councilman loses its dignity and will be relegated to the lowest elements of our population. Prof. Leo S. Rowe of the University of Pennsylvania, in a per- sonal interview says: 'T believe that every one must concede that if we strip the council of jts powers the character of its members must deteriorate." James W. Pryor, secretary of the City Club of New York, says in a personal interview: 'T 59 have every reason to think that the adoption of such a sys- tem would lead to a further decline in the councils. I cer- tainly believe that true municipal reform must tend in an op- posite direction." Examine the New York council as it was before the first concentrated charter was adopted — a body possessing- most serious powers and performing most import- ant functions, while the office itself was held in credit and esteem. Examine it as it is to-day — a mere historical sur- vival. Worthy jurors, from the day that Boss Tweed put his concentrated charter through the legislature the council has steadily declined. This same decline is apparent in Brooklyn. Says Hon. St. Clair McKelway, editor-in-chief of the Brook- lyn Daily Eagle : "By concentrating all notice on the mayor- alty the republicans generally name a poor lot of aldermen." Regarding the condition in Boston, Sam'l B. Capen, president of the Boston Municipal League, writes: '*We are well aware that our council under our present city charter has much less power than in former years, and this is the reason why so many of our best citizens now refuse to allow their names to be considered in connection with it." Gentlemen, it was in 1887 that the concentrated charter of Philadelphia was adopted. From a municipal report pub- lished in 1895 we note this quotation: "It is since 1887 that the decline in the tone and spirit of councils has been most marked." It seems self evident that the adoption of this scheme closes the way for improvement in the character of our coun- cils. Now what does this mean.? It means just that which has become too evident in Philadelphia, New York and Brooklyn, that as long as the councils are retained, perma- nent improvement in the city government cannot be hoped for without improving them. It means just what all students of municipal government fully realize, that permanent reform can never come by degrading the council, reformation is a process of elevation, not of degradation. Hence, to reform a council by degrading its functions is clearly an inconsistent, an illogi- cal, a vicious effort. 6o It is admitted by all reformers that with better councils almost any kind of a charter will work well. Without them the best charter in the world will not improve city govern- ment. But gentlemen, the council can never be raised in standard by robbing it of those attractions which make it inviting to the man ambitious to serve his city honestly. I repeat, a strong council cannot long exist under a concen- trated system. Now, worthy jurors, if we can improve the councils by removing the fundamental causes of poor city government, why take these powers from them.? Why introduce a tempo- rary, spasmodic scheme which does not strike at the real root of the evil, but makes our councils worse instead of better.? If the affirmative assume that we cannot elect better councils, why do they still leave the councils certain joint powers with the mayor.? To show their system logical, it devolves upon them to improve the council, else we must conclude that even with a perfect mayor, municipal government under their system would he a continuous jangle. If one man power means good municipal government, why do not the affirma- tive give to the mayor these few remaining powers rather than leave them only to hamper him.? Already a reaction has set in against this novel scheme, for the simple reason that its advocates have witnessed too many cases where it would have been a grand blessing to have had a mayor restricted by a good council. Because they know that a poor mayor in league with a bad council makes poor city government; because they know that a good council can- not exist under such a system, and that one man, however good he may be while hampered with a poor council cannot alone make good city government. Not only this, but this system is not representative. In the words of Charles Francis Adams: "Such a system is nothing but a municipal Caesarism. The remedy will not be found by working in that direction, for America is essentially republican, and a vigorous, healthy, representative body, is the essence of republicanism. Without that it cannot flourish. 6 1 If therefore, for any cause, the legislature is weak, it must be strengthened. If it is corrupt, it must be purified. It must be retained' and it must be made powerful." One man can neither represent the different localities, nor the various in- terests, parties or factions of the community. Such a sys- tem is not the ultimate. It is a system which prevents pub- licity and discussion and renders an opposing faction impossi- ble. It is a system which removes the government farther and farther from the people, and stands in strong contrast to the movements for proportional representation and the refer- endum in municipal affairs. Such a system is not the ideal. A system with a strong council, composed of men of charac- ter, possessing large powers, exercising a strong supervisory control over the departments, representing all sections and all classes, presents a government continuous, consistent, Ameri- can. The charter commsssion of 1877 faces the concentrated idea squarely in these words: "We have no confidence in such a system. It finds no support in the established princi- ples of representative governments." In 1890, after eight years of experience with the concentrated system in Brook- lyn, after several years of similar experience in New York city, the Fassett Senate Commission made a report compris- ing five large volumes, and it is by far the most complete of its kind. The commission meets the question of concentra- tion in this strong statement. '*We do not believe in mak- ing the mayor an autocrat, or in the recent tendency of leg- islation towards the abolition of government by council. * ^ ^ For this is our American theory of government, and we do not believe the time h:^s yet come to abandon it." OTTO BOSSHARD, ATHENE The negative have admitted the existence of great evils in American municipal government. They therefore concede our cause for action. On this point, then, we meet them on an equal footing. The only difference in the two sides in this" debate lies in the remedies proposed for the evils. The negative have proposed merely superficial remedies. They have argued that a stricter enforcement of our naturalization and election laws and the adoption of civil service rules in all cities is practically sufificient to cure the evils. These reforms are beneficial we admit, but they are inadequate. They do not strike at the root of the evil. Civil service rules will merely do away with minor abuses of city government, such as loose book-keeping or careless auditing. These are not the vital defects of our present system. The great evils, as my colleagues have shown, are complicated machinery, the consolidation of legislative and executive functions in one body and the division of responsibility. Civil service rules will not remedy these evils. Municipal corruption, extrava- gance and inefficiency will continue so long as our cities operate under a system of divided responsibility and complex mechantsm. Our system provides for civil service. It does all that the system of the negative does. But it goes further. It strikes at the root of present evils. It simplifies the ma- chinery of government, separates the legislative and execu- tive functions and locates responsibility. Civil service and like schemes of reform fail to do this. The gentlemen have selected several cities at random, each operating under the council system and have shown that at present and in years past these cities have enjoyed exceptionr ally good government. They have also shown that in some particulars the administration of those cities operating under our system, has been less commendable than that of the cities [62] 63 which they cited, — in this way endeavoring to establish the superiority of the present system over the system we advo- cate here to-night. Such a comparison, gentlemen, amounts to absolutely nothing in this discussion. Difference of loca- tion, of social or of economic conditions, might of themselves sufficiently explain any advantageous showing in favor of one city or another. But aside from this, we maintain that the only just and proper method of judging the merits of our sys- tem of municipal government is to take any city which has adopted it and compare that city's condition for the same number of years before and after its adoption of our system. If by such a comparison, the administration and general con- dition of that city since the adoption of the new charter has been shown to be worse than prior to its adoption, then, gentlemen, you are justified in condemning that system. But if on the other hand, as I will endeavor to prove in the course of my debate the general administration of the city has under- gone a marked improvement, I then claim that the federal system is preferable to the present cou^ncil system. They have also called attention to European council-gov- erned cities. Again I need not remind you that such a com- parison is worthless, for with European conditions so radically different from conditions in this country, I fail to see the bearing of such examples on this discussion. Indeed, the very fact that the gentlemen are obliged to go to Europe for successful instances of their system shows that in this country such instances are exceedingly rare. It is charged that our system is nothing less than ' 'Munic- pal Caesarism." They endeavor to exaggerate the power that a mayor will wield under our system. We are creating no new functions of government. We are not investing the mayor with any powers that do not properly belong to him, neither are we depriving the council of any that it ought to exercise. We simply vest in the mayor and his appointees — the executive department of city government, — we vest in them all executive and administrative duties. We leave the 64 . • council full legislative powers. The one man power, which they claim is to be avoided, is nothing new in municipal gov- ernment. We have it now under our council system. There is scarcely a city but what has i.ts boss whose power is infi- nitely greater than that of a mayor's under our system. Not only that, but the boss is irresponsible for his acts, while re- sponsibility is centered directly upon our mayor. Power with- out responsibility is dangerous, but power exercised under definite and fixed responsibility is not dangerous. It means good government. They quote certain individual members of each of the Great New York Commissions as being opposed to our system. The gentlemen are correct in so far as they have gone. But the thing of- importance in the matter is the majority report of these commissions. The majority report in every instance is in favor of the system we uphold here to-night. They point to the city of New York as an example of the failure of our system. Yet Mayor Strong on page 12 of his message of January 7,^1896, says: "The actual administra- tion of municipal affairs in this city is in the hands of com- missioners and not in the hands of the mayor," in other words New York is governed by the commission system, a system of divided responsibility. Hence when they speak of corrup- tion and inefficiency in the government of New York city, they simply condemn their own system. Their whole argument against our system has been based on individual statements and broad generalization. They have adduced no specific facts to substantiate their arguments. Thus far we have established two propositions, (i.) That existing municipal government, administered by the board and commission system, is exceedingly corrupt; that the abuse is universal and that no relief can be hoped for under the prevailing system. (2.) In answer to the crying demand for relief from these evils we have submitted a system which was conceived in reason and common sense and we have shown that its operation would be characterized by simplicity and efificiency. 65 But our system is neither new nor unique. It has been tried and proven eminently successful in cities formerly reek- ing with corruption and extravagance. Uniformly it has cre- ated order and purity in the city's affairs. The vicious classes in j!)olitics have desperately opposed it. Yet its essential features have triumphed in Brooklyn, Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Indian.apolis, Evansville, Fort Wayne and else- where. Brooklyn was the pioneer city to adopt, in 1881, a reform charter identical in its essential features with the system we propose to-night. Prior to this, Brooklyn, equally with New York, had been preyed upon by the Tweed Ring, until wrote Governor Cornell: "The council is corrupt and irresponsible. Useless offices are created. Political bosses prey like vul- tures on exhorbitant tax -levies. The mayor is helpless." In 1882 after a bitter fight with the corrupt element the new charter was established. Says William DeWitt: "Our emancipation was magical." To-day Brooklyn's public works department is a recognized model; her streets are unexcelled; her fire and police departments are unequalled. Yet the econ- omy of the new system has materially reduced the tax-rate, the average rate since 1881 being a decrease of 15 per cent, as compared with the average of the ten years preceding. The mayors have been uniformly capable men. They are jealously watched and the importance of the office is mani- fested by the fact that the vote for mayor often exceeds the city vote for governor. Previous to 1881 says Col. Morton, a member of the New York Constitutional Convention: "We could not fix responsibility for mismanagement. But to-day if wrongs are committed, the mayor must correct them or fall beneath the weapon of public suffrage." Mayor Boody was elected in 1891 by a majority of 7,500. Failing to remedy abuses he suffered, in 1893, a defeat by a majority of over 31,000. Yet this mayor was guilty of inactivity merely — nothing worse — there was no charge of corruption. But the greater efficiency of other mayors, like Low and Chapin, 5-J-D. 66 has been rewarded by a second term of office, for the people under our system know where to locate responsibility for the city's government. The second city was Boston, which, in 1885, adopted what is practically the federal system. Up to this time a vicious system of council committees and some forty-five independent boards, administered the affairs of the city. ''Many of these boards," reported the Citizens' Association of that city in 1884, "have sunk to such a level of incompetence and cor- ruption, that public opinion has cpmpelled a reform." The new charter brought about an increased public interest in city elections and a greater economy and efficiency of administration. The average annual tax-rate for the ten years preceding the adoption of the new charter was $13.03 per $1,000 of assessed valuation. But in the ten years since that time the tax-rate has averaged only $11.53, a reduction of over 11 per cent, in spite of the fact that the city's population has increased 28 per cent. ; and in spite of the further fact that an immense system of public improvements was carried out, aggregating upwards of $36,000,000 in value. Philadelphia was the third city to adopt the federal sys- tem. Her new charter, called the Bullit law, was adopted in 1887. Six years of continuous fighting by an organized com- mittee of 100 citizens was necessary to defeat the ring oppo- sition. The vilest crimes in municipal corruption had marked Philadelphia's previous history. In 1885 a monster memorial to the legislature of Pennsylvania read as follows: "The rate of taxation is excessively high, yet Philadelphia is recognized as the worst paved and filthiest city in the civilized world. The water is unwholesome and offensive — the sewers are nau- seating. Our public buildings are wretched and not repaired. " The memorial ends thus: "The real cause is not in poor men in office but it is to be found in the system of irresponsible government." The new charter abolished the twenty-three irresponsible boards and substituted eight departments. The mayors have 67 since been uniformly strong nrien and are a restraint on cor- ruption. Says John . C. Bullit: '*The minimum saving to our people is $3,000,000 per annum, due primarily to the abolition of fifteen extravagant boards." This economy has enabled the city under the new charter to construct an ideal sewage system; to thoroughly pave her streets and perfect her fire and police departments and her general administration, at the same time paying off $47,000,000 of the city debt, re- ducing it from $62,000,000 in 1887 to $15,000,000 in 1896, — and more remarkable still, her rate of taxation has not in- creased. Says Penrose in his history of Philadelphia: "His- torians will date the beginning of scientific government in Philadelphia from the passage of the Bullit bill." The fourth city to adopt the federal system was Cleveland. After struggling for a number of years with constantly in- creasing taxes, debts and corruption, the people rebelled and, in 1 887, the Cleveland board of trade headed an agitation, which after a prolonged struggle with the infamous Cleveland boodle ring, gave them, in 1891, a new charter almost identical with that of Brooklyn. Previous to this says Judge Blandin: -"There was discord and strife between the independent boards. A crushing burden of taxation was levied only to serve as a spoils fund. The city's most valuable franchises were the private stock in trade of vicious demagogues, and there was no remedy for the people were unable to fix respon- sibility." The maze of complicated boards and committees were organized into six distinct departments, all responsible to the mayor. The first year under the new charter, 1 891, showed a de- crease in departmental expenses of over $129,000, and this in face of the fact that 27 per cent, more paving, and 33 per cent, more sewers were laid in 1891 than in 1890. Says Comptroller Rositer: "The city saves by the new charter 20 per cent, on all its purchases; in the expenses of adminis- tration, $26,000, and in di.scounts received by prompt pay- ments, $70,000." This, he adds, "would be impossible under the old board system." The city's funds are invested 6S at an average rate of 4.31 per cent., which formerly brought less that 2 per cent. This nets the city more than $100,000 per annum. The tax-rate still further shows the economy resulting from* the new system. During the five years preceding the new charter the tax-rate rose 17 per cent. In the five years after it fell 1 1 per cent. Again, the total amount of taxes have increased only 17 per cent, while population has increased 34 per cent. Yet with 1 1 per cent, decreased burden of taxes, $8,620,000 worth of permanent improvements have been added at an increase of only $1,360,000 in the city debt, thus showing an actual saving to the city of $7,200,000. Writes the mayor: "The success of the charter is so great that the people jealously refuse to assent to changesin it, even though they be desirable." The next city to adopt the federal plan was Indianapolis, in 1891. Previous to this time, according to Hon. Lucius B. Swift, the streets were almost impassable, there being but two miles of improved roadway. No adequate system of sewer- age had been provided, neither was there a serviceable sys- tem of street lighting, in short, the city suffered all the evils of a corrupt and incompetent government. To-day they have fifty-two miles of improved streets. In 1891 they had but twenty-three miles of sewers, while to-day they haue over seventy-seven. Before 1891 the city used only antiquated gas lighting; now they have 821 electric lights. While the public debt has increased but $400,000, the value of permanent improvements has increased by over $5,000,- 000, and the tax-rate has actually declined. This remark- able change, says the board of public works in its last annual report: "We believe to be due primarily to the improved methods in the management of the city's affairs under the new charter." Writes G. L. Payne, editor of the Indianapolis News: "Jobbery and corruption under the new charter have been unknown." "The great increase of interest in city affairs is shown by 69 the extraordinarily large vote at municipal elections." ''It may be safely asserted that this city has profited to an unusual degree by the new charter." Fort Wayne, Indiana, is the next city whose charter, adopted in 1893, is an exact model of our system. During the first year of its operation the department of streets, ex- pended 45 per cent, less than it did the previous year, not- withstanding the fact that more miles of streets were im- proved than ever before. In less than two years a $15,000 deficit was transformed into a $15,000 surplus, while at the end of the next year this surplus was increased to $73,000, and the problem now, says the mayor, in his last annual mes- sage, is how to get rid of the surplus. A special fund has al- ready been set aside to be applied to the building of a mu- nicipal lighting plant. The tax rate has also greatly declined, being $1.05 per $100 assessed valuation during the first year and $.95 per $100 each succeeding year since the adoption of the new charter, — while during the coming year — estimates the comptroller, a rate of $.75 per $100 will be sufificient for all purposes. The city debt has also been reduced by $8,000 during the same period. Writes the mayor in his last annual message: "A new era of progress and prosperity has dawned upon the city." Says Chas. McCulloch, president of the first national bank of Fort Wayne: "The improvement under the new charter has been most marked. The standard of ofificers is higher, and the people take greater interest in the elections." The next city to adopt the federal plan was Evansville, Ind., in 1893. Prior to the new charter the bonded debt of the city was over $2,000,000 with little or nothing to show for it. Ten years before the city had repudiated its debt and its credit was gone. With the adoption of the new charter there was a remarkable decline in the annual operating ex- penses. The average yearly expenditures under the new charter were but $360,000, while in the same period before its adoption, the average was $403,000, a saving of $43,000 or 70 II per cent, a year, — although the city's population had in- creased 20 per cent, since 1890. As further proof we cite the tax-rate, which notwithstanding the fact that the assessed valuation has remained practically the same since 1891, still shows a rapid decrease. The average rate for the period prior to the operation of our charter was $1.52^ per $100 assessed valuation, while since its adoption it has been but $1.27 per $iOO, — a decrease of 16 per cent. In spite of all this saving, says the mayor in his last annual message: "All public buildings have been kept in excellent repair. New streets have been paved and sidewalks laid; our parks have been greatly improved." We have now presented to you seven concrete examples. All have been in practical operation sufficiently long to have hadadistinctand determining influence on the city's condition. Their charters differ somewhat in detail, but in their gen- eral principles they coincide with our system. Uniformly the result has been a marvelous improvement. None of these cities would now revert to the old system. In addition to these seven, the following have during the past two years practically adopted the federal plan: Columbus, Holyoke, Elmira, Springfield, O., Binghampton, Bridgeport, and Buf- falo. Every change in charters has been in the direction of giving the mayor greater power and corresponding responsi- bility. ~*The recently proposed charter of greater New York is the embodiment of our system. SUMMARY. What was it that suggested this subject for discussion.-^ It was not a mere desire for debate; it was not the product of fanciful theory. Our plan suggests no radical or revolution- ary changes in our institutions. Universally it is known that municipal government in this country is a conspicuous failure. Few cities, outside of those that have adopted our system, can boast of an honest and businesslike government. Immense municipal debts are mul- tiplying year by year. Taxes are high and oppressive. Cur- n rent expenditures are enormous, and yet the money spent brings small returns in the shape of municipal service. Streets are uncleaned; sewers unrepaired; public works neglected; wastefulness and utter incompetency everywhere. Yet there are other evils of a more alarming nature, — the evils of mu- nicipal corruption and rottenness. Franchises of immense value are granted for almost nothing. Their passage through the council is affected by means of wholesale and barefaced bribery. Lavish appropriations are squandered. Measures of blackmail are regularly introduced. Aldermanic votes are as purchasable as ordinary merchandise, — as the recent instances in New York and Minneapolis bear witness. The American people desire good government. Why then, is it that corruption and rottenness in the administration of mu- nicipal affairs is ever present.^* It is due to one all-important fact. It is due to the division of responsibility in city government. We find the administrative work of the city divided among numerous boards, committees, individuals and commissions, the duties of one body overlapping and clashing with those of another. There is no definite head, no source of common direction or common responsibility. All is chaos and confu- sion! Divided responsibility is no responsibility. It fosters corruption and shields the guilty. It attracts to public office the ignorant and vicious. It repulses the able and conscien- tious. It is the division of responsibility, due to the pres- ent complicated system, that shields the boodler from detec- tion and punishment, and has filled our city councils with the most disreputable of political scum. These evils are not temporary or transient. They are the inevitable consequence of any system that divides responsi- bility. We, of the affirmative, have presented for your considera- tion a remedy that strikes at the very root of these evils. A remedy that is reasonable, simple, effective and practical. Our remedy is reasonable. It involves no radical or revo- lutionary change. It is not necessary that every city should 72 abolish its present and adopt our proposed charter. Most of our cities have already taken steps in that direction. All that is necessary would be a few simple amendments to the present charter,- — as in the case of Boston and other cities that have adopted our plan. Our remedy is simple. It does not propose any elaborate or complicated system, but simply organizes the city govern- ment on a business basis. Its chief characteristics are: that it makes a sharp divisioi) between the legislative and execu- tive departments of government; that it abolishes the existing conglomeration of irresponsible boards and consolidates them into a sufficient number of responsible single-headed depart- ments; that it systematizes and simplifies our present admin- istrative machinery; in a word, that it brings order out of chaos and converts complex inefficiency into businesslike sim- plicity. Not only is our system reasonable and simple, — it is also effective. It cures the evil by removing its cause. By mak- ing the office of mayor one of power and responsibility better men will seek the position. By narrowing the issue and in- creasing the public interest at elections, the people can in- vestigate the qualifications of the candidate, and see that only the best men are chosen to office; while only a single election is required to turn out an inefficient administration. There will be HO inducements for corrupt men to seek city office, because the responsibility will be so located that the public can lay its finger upon the offender. And the city adminis- tration will be more efficient, because organized on a business basis. That our system has proven successful in practical opera- tion I have already shown. Our remedy then, is reasonable, simple, effective and prac- tical. But it is more than that. In view of the present de- plorable condition of our cities, — the recent instances of cor- ruption, — our system is absohitely necessary. As opposed to this what have the negative to offer.^ They 73 tell you that the one-man power is dangerous. We reply, that by making the mayor the head of the city, responsibility will be centralized; that divided responsibility has been the source of our municipal evils. They attack our system as undemocratic, in so doing they attack the very principles upon which our national govern- ment has been run for over a hundred years. They tell you that the evils of the present system are only temporary, not inherent; that civil service rules will afford a complete remedy. For answer we point to our city and na- tional governments^ Both have suffered from the spoils sys- tem, yet one is a failure, the other a success. If the differ- ence of system is not the cause, what is.? Our system provides for civil service regulations. But it goes further. It strikes at the root of the evil. They point to European cities under the council system, and wisely, for American experience under that system can give them little encouragement. They speak of the burden of proof. Yet how insignificant is the burden we bear compared to the burden resting upon the negative. We seek no new system. All we ask is to apply to our cities those same principles that have made our national government so conspicuous a success, — to extend a system already operating in over a dozen cities. Reform is not radicalism. Indeed it becomes conservatism when it is in response to a crying demand for relief from present evils. How shall the negative answer this.? Upon them, then, rests the great burden of vindicating the present deplorable conditions. They must defend the present unbusinesslike system, which places executive powers in legislative hands. They must prove that divided responsibility is a sound and safe principle in our republican form of government. They must justify a system that gives rise to every phase of municipal corruption; a system unsuited to American conditions, at variance with modern tendencies, and contrary to every principle of busi- ness management. 74 On the other hand, — they oppose a system which strikes at the root of these evils; a system which separates legisla- tive from executive functions; which locates responsibility and organizes the city on a business basis. They oppose a system advocated by every investigating committee and supported by such men as Theodore Roosevelt, President Cleveland, and David Dudley Field. And, finally, they oppose that consummation of lOO years of municipal progress, — the recent charter of greater New York, — drawn by the most distinguished committee that ever considered municipal questions, — Judge Dillon, Simon Sterne, Ben. F. Tracy, William DeWitt and Seth Low, — a charter that in every important feature is the exact embodiment of the system we propose to-night. Gentlemen of the jury, your decision if it be for the nega- tive must embody an explanation of the admitted and utter failure of the present system; must oppose the separation of legislative from executive functions; must antagonize the prin- ciples of our national government; must defend the division of responsibility in city administration; must oppose the in- troduction of business methods in city affairs; must hold that the unanimous decision of authorities and investigating com- mittees is wrong; must oppose all reform and run counter to the tendencies of the time. Your decision, if it be for the affirmative, will be simply a vindication of that progressive conservatism, which supports our system as the only practical, businesslike remedy for present evils. THEO. W. BRAZEAU, PHILOHATHIA The affirmative propose, as a remedy for municipal ills, an organic change in city government. They propose to take from the legislative branch its positive strength, and to vest in one man all executive and administrative as well as the most important legislative powers. They have attempted to justify this step by claiming that their system was a strict division of executive and adminis- trative from legislative function. The supreme court of Massachusetts decided (142 Mass. 201) that the initiation of public improvements was not an executive or administrative power. Neither is the affirmative system a division such as exists in the United States government, for congress has power to make any appropriation it desires, while under the affirmative system the legislative branch has not. The system of the affirmative gives the mayor power to make all estimates for the following fiscal year. The coun- cil has no power to increase these estimates, but is left only the negative power of decreasing them. The power to make "all estimates," in its practical workings, gives the mayor power to make all appropriations, and therefore the power to initiate all public improvements and public work. Construct- ing and extending sewer, water and lighting systems, crea- ting and enlarging parks, building bridges, opening, extend- ing, and improving streets, and constructing public buildings, are all in the hands of the executive. Not only is the mayor given the power of executing public works but he is also given the power to determine whether they shall or shall not be done. The initiation of public improvements and the dicision of as to the amount and purpose of public expenditure, are clearly discretionary powers and belong to the legislative branch. To take the control of the purse from the legislative [75] 7(> body, is a confession of the failure of the representative idea that few American citizens are willing to make. Municipal government would not be improved by transfer- ing powers of the council to the mayor anymore than the na- tional government would be improved by transfering congres- sional powers to the presidents. If our councils are poor the people must face the problem squarely and improve them. The affirmative recognize that the council must be retained. They also give it important negative powers in granting fran- chises and licenses, and decreasing the estimates of the mayor. With a poor council these powers must only hamper the mayor as the experience of Brooklyn has shown, with a' good council it is difficult to see why all legislative power should not be entrusted to that body. The union of powers in one man, such as proposed in this question, is contrary to the representative theory of govern- ment and is a decided step backward. The affirmative claim, however, that the concentration of power in one man will awaken responsibility in the people. To prove this they have given figures which they claim show a larger vote under the centralized system than under other systems. Let us examine the value of those figures. In the first place he did not use the same standard of. comparison throughout his tables. In some cases he used population, in others vote for governor. I have used the same standard in each comparison. Second, the increase for mayor should not be compared with the increase for governor, but the vote for mayor under the centralized system compared with the vote for mayor under the council system in the same city. Third, the standard of comparison he took was not a good one. The vote for governor, is not an index to the possible number of votes, because it is almost as light as the vote for mayor, and also because the city vote is increased so largely each year by the annexation of suburbs, while this does not affect the vote for governor. The mistake of comparing vote with population is still greater. Population gives us little idea of the number of possible votes because the foreign popula- tion differs so in different places. Our comparisons have been with the presidential vote, be- cause the vote for president gives the best index to the pos- sible number of votes. A large number are called out by the excitement of a presidential campaign, and every one who votes for president can vote for mayor. We have compared the same city under both systems, except Brooklyn and In- dianapolis, for which we were unable to get the votes under a council system. Of course the comparison in these two cities do not show anything either way. Chart No. S^Brooklyn. Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor to Presidential Vote. 1880 107,319 1881 1883 1884 1885 1887 1888 86,895 98,562 20,424 89 119,496 20,934 82 100,560 118,450 157,685 39,238 75 1889 1891 1892 1893 1895 1896 124,951 146,709 177,655 30,946 "" 82 166,717 170,982 190,947 19.965 89 78 Chart No. 9. — Philadelphia. Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor to Presidential Vote. ^ 6 1880 I88I 1884 173,889 174.747 I'" 150.643 149,669 23.246 25.078 86 85 1887 1888 ,891 1892 1895 1896 152,663 S 204,520 51.857 74 M 179,628 -c;? 203,103 23,475 88 >, 214,925* ^ 244,892 29,967 86 *In some cases the figures used in these charts differ slightly from those used by the affirmative. This difference is due to the authorities used. Some in- clude the vote for all minor candidates while others do not. Chart No. io. — Cleveland. Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor TO Presidential Vote. 1880 I88I 1883 1884 1885 1887 1888 1889 29,091 ■B 19,624 24.443 9.467 67 S ^ ' 37.864 13,421 64 28,099 25.298 31,333 74 41,178 15,880 76 . ... 189 I 1892 1893 1895 1896 34. 190 s 46,666 12,476 73 t-r (A 37.767 45.909 80 ^^' S 69.735 23.058 65 79 Chart No. ii. — Indianapolis. Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor to Presidential Vote. 1891 22,568 1892 1893 1895 1896 34,949 8.794 64 28,715 31.751 38,787 7.036 81 Chart No. 12.- —Cincinnati. Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor to Presidential Vote. S 1884 1885 1887 2888 1889 > 57.856 « 51,745 47,167 6,111 89 -= >> C/5 a 64. 193 3 50,803 14,390 72 ^ e 189I 1892 1893 1894 51,556 12.843 80 0} 64.399 t*^ >•(/) m 54.574 9,825 82 ^ Chart No. 13.— Boston. Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor TO Presidential Vote. e 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 189I 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 41,654 40, 167 41,292 53,449 51.673 53.335 11,681 78 tn SC/) U 58,368 6.695 88 44.697 45.709 51.825 63.552 56,881 54.254 55.019 66,667 68,228 68,588 76,721 S 65,169 1,617 97 >, C/5 05 74,683 8,016 89 ^ '■** 82,307 5.586 93 8o Chart No. 14. — Milwaukee, (Council City.) Year. Mayor Vote. Presidential Vote. Difference. Per cent, of Mayor to Presidential Vote. 1882 16,866 20,422 26,578 31.975 31.033 38,885 46,451 42,414 1884 1886 28,899 8,477 70 1888 1890 1892 1894 1896 37.121 5.146 86 45.011 6,126 86 63,432 21,018 67 As far as these election statistics show anything they show no general increase of vote under the concentrated system, such as to warrant the conclusion that there is a greater inter- est under that system than under other systems. Boston is the only city that shows a greater per cent, of votes since the adoption of a concentrated system, and it only shows it for the particular years used. For all other years it shows no greater vote than under the old system. Indianapolis and Brooklyn under concentrated systems show no greater per cent, of votes than Milwaukee under a council system. The vote for mayor under a ''mayor system" tells the same sad and significant story of civic indifference as the vote un- der other systems. (See chart.) Brooklyn has as high as 39,000 stay away voters in one election. Philadelphia, where the indifference is very great, had as many as 5 1 , 000 voters stay at home while corruption ran riot in the city hall. Cleveland had, in 1895, 27,058 indifferent voters, Indianapolis 7,000 out of 38,000, Cincinnati 9, 825, and Boston 8,000. I think I am warranted in saying that there is no greater interest under a system of concentration than under any other system. At least no greater interest is shown by the votes cast * city elections. Since, then, the concentration of pbwer in the mayor fails to arouse greater interest in municipal affairs, we should ex- pect to find the same evils under that system as under other systems. 8i Let us look at the practical operation of concentration in the United States. Brooklyn, N. Y., Quincy, Mass., Indianapolis, Cleveland, Boston, Cincinnati, Philadelphia and a few minor cities have adopted a system similar to that proposed by the affirmative. Here we should expect to find all the benefits claimed for con- centration. My colleague has shown beyond a doubt that the affirma- tive system in Brooklyn has failed to accomplish its aim. Since 1882 they have had Whitney, Boody and two terms of Chapin, all subservient tools of "Boss McLaughin," and at present they are enduring the reign of Frederick W, Wur- ster. Ex-Mayor Schieren of Brooklyn, writes us, and also testi- fies in an interview in the New York Evening Post of August 4, 1894, that the administrations of Mayors Boody, Whitney and Chapin were corrupt. Frank J. Goodnow, professor of administrative law in Co- lumbia college, writes us: "I do not think that the history of Brooklyn under the new charter that was adopted in 1888, and which vests so much power in the mayor, would show that better municipal government can be expected under it than under a scheme which recognizes greater powers as ex- isting in the council. Certainly since 1888 the government has been oftener bad than good." James McKeen, a prominent attorney of Brooklyn, and member of the civil service league, C. Augustus Haviland, an attorney interested in municipal reform, Geo. F. Peabody of the Brooklyn civil service league, Edward M. Shepard re- form candidate for mayor against Wurster, Elmer E. Johnson of the Brooklyn civil service league, and many others whose names I am requested not to publish, all testify independently to the same fact, that Boody, Chapin, Whitney and Wurster have given Brooklyn poor government. Good Government, the civil service league organ, is now attacking Wurster for the abuse of his power. To summar- 6 — ^J.D. 82 ize the results in Brooklyn we can say that they have elected four corrupt mayors out of six. The affirmative claimed that Mayor Chapin paid only $400,- 000 for the suburban water plant my colleague spoke of. The fact is Mayor Chapin signed the contract for the purchase of this plant for over one million dollars, but its execution was stopped by injunction, and the case is now pending in the United States supreme court. New York's corruption under an extreme concentrated sys- tem, is too well known to need mention. Grant and Gilroy gave New York the most corrupt government in the world. In 1889, Quincy, Mass., adopted a charter concentrating power in the mayor. In its practical workings, the charter has been such a dis- mal failure, that its author, Mr. Bradford, in 1893, said: "It must be admitted upon evidence of leading citizens of Quincy, that the charter has thus far failed to accomplish its purpose; that extravagance of expenditure, local jobbing and caucus politics, are as rampant as in any other city in the state." In 1 89 1 Indianapolis adopted a charter exactly like the one proposed by the affirmative. Indianapolis has a population largely American; it is the capital of the state and is known as a city of churches. When the concentrated scheme was adopted, the citi- zens organized a reform association of nearly 1,000 members. With the new charter, a number of reforms were also adopted which aimed at the root of municipal evils, such as civil rules, and separation of national and city elections. The Indianap- olis charter of 1891, therefore, started under ideal condi- tions. Under the new charter three mayors have been chosen, Sullivan, Denny, and Taggart, all morally weak, and nar- rowly partisan, who shamefully abused the power intrusted to them. The charter provides for appointments under civil service rules, "which no honorable officer would for a moment think of disregarding." Yet Sullivan entirely ignored these rules 83 and filled the offices for personal and partisan gain. Before election he employed three times the needed number in city labor, and let gambling houses and saloons run in open viola- tion of law. Mayor Denny followed the course of his predecessor. He utterly disregarded the civil service provision of the charter, run the city in the interests of his party, and consequently gave a corrupt and inefficient administration. So inefficient in fact that the department of public works was investigated by a committee of the council, revealing gross inefficiency and corruption in the granting of contracts and execution of public work. A committe of the board of trade found the same inefficiency in the fire department. Mayor Taggart, the present mayor, is the climax of the weak mayors of Indianapolis. He is much worse than his predecessors. Under his administration the civil service sunk so low that an investigation by the Indiana civil service commission resulted. The report of the commission does not generalize upon the corruption but bristles with numerous specific cases. The charter provides that officers shall be removed only for cause; yet the investigating committee found a wholesale removal of officers for "inefficiency," who were in every case replaced by Taggart partisans. The committee summed up the result of its investigation in these words, the foregoing facts *'show to your committee that the best interests of the city are being disregarded for personal and party considerations." Good city government demands experienced heads of departments, yet Indianapolis, like Brooklyn, has suffered from continual change of the higher administrative officers. Says the editor of the Indianapolis News : "We have never had a competent city engineer and the blundering work this incompetence has cost u<: is to be estimated by tens of thou- sands of dollars." The experience with the affirmative system in Indianapolis proves conclusively that mere change of system cannot rem- edy our municipal ills. 84 "Boston's charter," says Ex-Mayor Matthews, "is a more consistent application of the theory of executive responsibil- ity than can be found in any organic law cf any other large city in this country." Yet the people have elected mayor after mayor, under this charter, who have disappointed every hope of the reformers. The first four years under the cen- tralized system, it cost Boston $5,000,000 more to conduct the business of the city than for the four years previous under a council system, yet the debt increased as rapidly, and less was expended for public improvements. City employes were hired at more than the market rate and the greatest frauds in executive contracts perpetrated. Hon. L. B. Tuckerman of Cleveland says: "I was strongly in favor of the federal plan until we had it, and now I am inclined to regard it as bad as the old system in its actual workings." An investigation in Cleveland lately, revealed the same defects there as are found in other places. Says the committee of investigation: "Even the federal plan has not brought about the application of strict business methods in the conduct of city affairs." Cincinnati has been still worse. Speaking of the charter of that city before the conference for good city government, Mr. Wilby said: "It is claimed that the law was a step for- ward because it reposed greater power in the mayor, but we have the same sort of mayor now that we habitually had be- fore the law was passed." Boss Cox still reigns in Cincinnati. Philadelphia, since the adoption of its concentrated system in 1887, has been as corrupt as any city in America. In re- gard to the Philadelphia charter, Hon. Herbert Welsh, of that city, says. "We have had the most complete failure in practical results. The city has been under the control of cor- rupt politicians, administration has been wasteful and extrav- agant, and the civil service rules have, in the hands of officers who did not care to enforce them, been practically a dead letter." 85 The affirmative stated that Philadelphia has good city gov- ernment, but, gentlemen, I have no hesitation in saying that Philadelphia is the worst governed city in America. Writes D. G. Fanno, managing editor of the Philadelphia Tunes: "The practical working of the new law has not been satisfactory. This would probably be an ideal form of gov- ernment for cities if the people would elect an ideal mayor; but unfortunately our elections are controlled by a corrupt machine, who by controlling the nominations at the primary elections always place their own creatures in power. This has been the experience in Philadelphia and under the new system we have had the most corrupt and most extravagant government ever known in our history." Before the senatorial investigating commissioners, Geo. McAneny, secretary of the New York Civil Service Reform Association, said Philadelphia was the worst place in the country from a reformer's standpoint. The affirmative claimed the government of Philadelphia economical. Ex. -Gov. Patteson says: **The expenditures of the government of Philadelphia for the year 1894 were $32, 190,000 an average per capita for each voter of $150. For the year 1887, the first year under the new charter they were $17,638,304. For this enormous increase it is venturing nothing to say no adequate return has been received. Prom- ises of better and cheaper gas, of purer and more abundant water, of splendid street improvements and other public ben- efactions, have been clamorously kept to the ear and have been persistently broken to the hope. Improvrdent contracts have wasted the substance of the people. Lavish salaries have rewarded placemen, holding sinecures, while 20,000 school children are to-day denied fit accommodations. The various departments of the city government and their armies of employes have injuriously interfered to control the politics of the city. Municipal officers have betrayed their trust to the great shame of the city and to the loss of millions of the public moneys. Profligacy has quickly succeeded extrava- 86 gance and the revenues of the people have beconie the spoils of the unscrupulous." There is no interest in municipal affairs in Philadelphia. From Bryce American Commonwealth, vol. I, p. 102, I take this quotation: "A trustworthy correspondent writes to me from Philadelphia (1894), 'There is probably an average of 150 republican voters to an election district. The average attendance at primaries is said to be about twelve, which is approximately the number of party servants necessary to man- age the meeting under party rules." Yet the republican party rules Philadelphia! I have here the citizens municipal asso- ciation reports of Philadelphia, which are nothing but records of corruption in that city. They have just finished the Queen Lane Reservoir at a cost of $1,500,000, and yet the authori- ties do not dare to fill it with water. It won't hold water. Yet the affirmative do not admit evils under their system. You will observe, Hon. Judges, that the cities in the United States, which have the poorest government — Boston, New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Indianapolis and Cincinnati — have a mayor with extensive powers, while many cities where the council is powerful, as Minneapolis, St. Louis, Buffalo and Atlanta, are having good city government. You will observe, also, Hon. Jurors, that the mayor has abused the power placed in his hands, to as great, if not greater extent, than the councils have abused their power. According to the affirmative logic, power should be taken from the mayor and given to the council. In considering a change of charters in our larger cities, we should not overlook the fact that city government in all parts of the United States the last ten years has .been constantly improving. Prof. Bryce says: "No one who has studied municipal gov- ernment in the United States the last twenty-five years will doubt that there is a decided improvement." Hon. Seth Low says: "There is substantial reason for thinking that the gen- eral tendency even in larger cities is toward improvement." 87 Says Dr. Albert Shaw: "The worst things in American mu- nicipal government are undoubtedly behind." This improvement is apparent from the great number of re- form associations which are educating the people to a better understanding of municipal problems. We have better elec- tion laws than we had, schools are better, population more stable, and more intelligent men are giving a portion of their time to the welfare of the city. This improvement is noticable in all parts of the United States under all kinds of charters. It has been no greater in cities under the affirmative sys- tem than under other systems. The system supported by the affirmative is not a logical application of concentration. The theory of concentration is to vest power in a single person, so that responsibility maybe undivided, but the affirmative system leaves the council joint powers with the executive. The affirmative assume it impos- sible to choose a good council, yet leave with the council power to veto all licenses and franchises, and power to de- crease the estimates made by the executive — enough powers to destroy the theory of executive responsibility which concen- tration aims to secure. The affirmative system is also a tendency in the wrong di- rection. The father of that system. Hon. Seth Low, says: "No one will contend that this (concentration of power) is the ultimate or ideal condition of affairs." If it is not the "ultimate or ideal condition," then we say that a change to such a system must be only temporary, and would place us years behind in the development of our municipal govern- ment. England, Scotland, and Canada, countries that have solved the question of municipal government, all have worked in the opposite direction. Says H. W. Williams: "A city exists to protect the health, life, property, and persons of its citizens, to furnish them with light, water, and transportation, to maintain streets, 88 alleys, and public parks. Some corporate body must deter- mine how and at what cost these various ends are to be attained. To bestow this power on the mayor, to have him not only execute but enact the laws, is not only contrary to the spirit of our institutions but would be absurd." The remedy proposed by the afifirmative is superficial. It was the first impulse of certain reformers, but it does not go at the root of the evil. When these reformers began to look for a remedy for municipal ills, they saw a council with large powers. They jumped at the conclusion that if the powers were taken from the council it would improve the govern- ment. They did not see that a poor council was an effect and not a cause; they did not see that if the mayor had pos- sessed the power, the evils would have been found in the ex- ecutive department; they did not profit by the experience of every civilized country on the globe in trusting the council with large powers; and they did not take into consideration the ideals of the American people. The concentration of power in one man was the first im- pulse, but the sober second thought has brought a reaction. The great New York commission in 1890, which made the most thorough investigation ever made into municipal gov- ernment, reported against concentration. The greatest municipal reformers oppose the change. Dr. Albert Shaw, Dr. Richard T. Ely, James C. Carter, presi- dent of the National Municipal League, Dr. Parkhurst — the greatest authorities on this subject in the United States — are opposed to such a system. They oppose it because in theory it is superficial, in practice a failure. To summarize: we have shown that the evils of city gov- ernment in the United States cannot be remedied simply by legislation; that they are due to causes more fundamental; causes such as crowding of cities by a marvelous growth, un- desirable immigration, abuse of suffrage and naturalization; to the confusion of national and city politics, the influence of ^corrupt money power, the constant interference of the state 89 in local affairs, the lack of administrative knowledge; and finally to the apathy and indifference of our best citizens to the welfare of our municipalities. We have pointed out the common error of constantly de- pending upon legislation for reform. We have shown the difificulty under present conditions of securing a mayor, morally and intellectually great enough to fulfil the demands of their system, and that such difficulty has been found in practice. We have shown the dangerous power this system throws into the hands of a corrupt man. We have shown that under this ''one man system," the council must degenerate into a mere rudimentary body, and the most useful and democratic part of our city government become a clog upon our municipal machinery. Further, we have shown that the council is more in touch with the people than one man can hope to be; that through its discussion and recorded vote the council secures publicity and corresponding responsibility, which the secret and speedy action of one man cannot secure; that the council represents all parties, all factions, and all shades of opinion in the ad- ministration of public affairs; that it furnishes a place for a large and growing number of educated men in the municipal service. We have shown that the proposed system is, at best, a temporary measure, is inconsistent, and a tendency in the wrong direction. We have shown that concentration has failed to arouse civic pride and failed to give good govern- ment. We have shown that it has not proven a remedy in Brook- lyn, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, Quincy and Indianapolis. In brief, we have proven that nothing is to be gained by the change. Finally we have shown that the remedy for our municipal ills lies in the separation of national and local politics, a pure civil service, home rule for cities, and the education of the people to higher ideals of city gov- 90 ernment. We have shown that many of the conditions which prevent these reforms are passing away. The affirmative propose to vest in one man, all executive and administrative power of our cities, the control of appro- priations and the initiation of all public works — they propose to make one man the city government. A great burden rested upon them to prove beyond a doubt that such a radical change should be made. To have maintained their proposi- tion they should have shown: first, good reason why the ninety-five cities included should change the charters under which they are now operating; second, they should have shown that the change should go as far as the system they advocate. To have proven the first proposition, — to have shown why a change should be made in all cities in the United States from forty thousand to three million inhabitants — they should have shown serious evils in the government of these cities. But the greatest evils of city government are found in the larger cities, which have to a great extent concentrated sys- tems. Moreover these evils are only temporary and accord- ing to Dr. Albert Shaw, Hon. Seth Low, and Prof. Bryce, are rapidly passing away. Even should they have proven cities above 40,000 inhabi- tants poorly governed, before they could have concluded that these cities should change their form of government, they should have traced the evils directly to the charter. This they have failed to do; for we have shown that there are at least ten fundamental causes to which poor city gov- ernment is due; second because we have shown that cities all over the United States are well or poorly governed regardless of the form of their charters. And third, because they could not explain the improvement of city government the last ten years regardless of the charters under which cities are oper- ating. Have they, then, n,ot failed to prove their first propo- sition.^ 91 Suppose, however, they should have proven that cities over 40,000 inhabitants have poor government, and that this poor government is due to the charter under which they are operating, they still had left the greatest step in their proof — to have shown their system the remedy. To have proven this proposition they should have shown: first, that the present system, with the reforms we have sug- gested, is not -capable of remedying the evils they have pointed out. But we have gone beyond our mere duty, analyzed the causes of poor city government, and given affirmative argu- ments showing how the evils can be overcome with these re- forms. The precedent of every civilized country refutes the idea that there is any inherent weakness in government by councils. Second, to have proven their system the remedy, they should have shown it a permanent system, capable of adapt- ing itself to democratic conditions, and not as we have pointed out, a temporary measure of relief. Third, and most import- ant, to have proven their system the remedy, they should have shown that in practice it has been able to stem the tide of municipal corruption. Have they not failed to prove this important point and thus failed to establish their second prop- osition.? Have they explained Mayors Whitney, Boody, Chapin and Wurster under the Brooklyn charter, and the fail- ure in Quincy, Cleveland, Boston, Philadelphia and Cincin- nati.? Have they explained the corrupt government of Indian- apolis, and Tammany's hold upon New York.? Has their sys- tem not shown the same evils as the system they condemn.? But conditions in every one of the cities should have greatly improved, for conditions in all cities have greatly improved. They should have shown that the improvement in cities with a concentrated system has been greater than in cities under other systems. In showing this they should not have confused what the charters have done, and what has been done by great reforms quite independent of the charter. Have they considered these elements? 92 Even should they have shown it a success in one of the cities where it has been tried, would it prove anything for different cities under different conditions? If we have succeeded in overthrowing any one of the ar- guments that go to establish their conclusion, we are entitled to your verdict. The legitimate duty of the affirmative was to prove their system not equal to, but better than the nega- tive system, and to prove this beyond a doubt. In conclusion: the affirmative should have shown strong cause for action, because of evils of our cities, due to the charters; and they should have shown that a change as radi- cal as they propose is the remedy. Gentlemen, in the face of the evidence we have produced, have they established these two propositions.'* OTTO BOSSHARD THREE niNUTE REBUTTAL Worthy jurors, once more I wish to call your attention to the character of their argument. They have based it from beginning to end on general statements. We have substan- tiated every proposition with specific facts from official rec- ords and reports. They have quoted individuals. We have quoted commissions. Now in regard to the city of Brooklyn, concerning whose government they have found so much to deplore. I simply want to ask you gentlemen does it seem plausible, that if the government of Brooklyn through all these years has been in the wretched condition which the negative claim it has been, and if this condition is a result of the workings of our char- ter, — I ask you, does it stand to reason that men who now compose the Greater New York Commission, men who have lived in New York and Brooklyn all their lives and who ought to know the true condition of that city, I ask you, does it stand to reason that these same men, should insist in propos- ing a charter for Greater New York nearly identical with that of Brooklyn, if as the negative claim, it has worked so un- successfully, there.? No, gentlemen, the very fact that the charter of Greater New York was modelled after that of Brooklyn is the strongest possible argument in behalf of our system. The last speaker with his charts on elections attempted to disprove the argument of my colleague, regarding the added interest in elections following the adoption of our system. He took the difference in the number of votes cast for presi- dent and in the number of those cast for mayor in the various cities. He showed that this difference was just as large in our cities as it was in cities governed by the council system. In some of our cities he showed that this difference in votes [93] 94 was increasing, thereby leaving you to infer that the number of ''stay at home voters" increases, or in other words, that in- terest in municipal elections, under the federal system ac- tually declines. Again I maintain that the only just method of comparison is by comparing the size of the vote cast for mayor, before and after the adoption of the new system as was done by my colleague. But even accepting the gentleman's own figures as he has presented them, they simply emphasize more strongly the truth of my colleague's argument. I have only time to call your attention to two of his charts but they all illustrate the same point. If you will observe his chart of election statistics for the cities of Boston and Milwaukee you will find that the number of "stay at home voters" in the mu- nicipal elections of Milwaukee is never less than 21,000 while in Boston, this number has never exceeded 8,000. This shows the contrast between the two systems. Boston with double the population has on the average only one- third as many ''stay at home voters" as has Milwaukee. Yet Milwaukee is governed by the council, while Boston is governed by the federal system. Need there he any further argument to con- vince you that the people manifest greater interest in city af- fairs under our system than under the present,? Remember, gentlemen, our cities must operate under some system of government. The question is, — shall they be gov- erned by the present chaotic, complex and unbusinesslike system, — a system responsible for the deplorable condition of our cities, — or shall they be governed by the federal plan — a system based on sound principles of government, and one which has worked an improvement wherever tried. BIBLIOGRAPHY The ''Bibliography of Municipal Administration and City Affairs," published by the Reform Club of New York last month, is so complete, and so well arranged that another bibliography on the general subject of municipal government is wholly unnecessary at this time. There is nothing bearing solely and definitely upon the question discussed in the preceding pages. What has been written on the subject is scattered through books, magazine articles, pamphlets, and reports, on other subjects. In the following bibliography we shall mention the literature which will aid the student most in obtaining a knowledge of the ques- tion. A system of concentration more or less resembling the one proposed in the question discussed is found in Brooklyn, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indi- anapolis, Fort Wayne, Ind., Evansville, Ind., and Quincy, Mass. City reports, correspondence, newspapers, and mu- nicipal league reports are the sources of information concern- ing the success of the system. The most valuable of these are the reports of the various reform associations. A brief biolography is given on each of these cities. For the benefit of those desiring information on other phases of the municipal question, we have given references to the various bibliographies on municipal government which have lately appeared. Only the principal works on the gen- eral subject of municipal government are included in the re- mainder of the bibliography. BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON nUNICIPAL GOVERNnENT A Bibliography of Municipal Administration and City Condition. By Rob- ert C. Brooks. Paper, i2mo., pp. 233, New York: Reform Club, 52 William Street. 50 cents. This is the most complete bibliography that has ever been compiled and cov- ers all the works included in others, bringing the references down to March, [95] 96 i897- It contains about 6,000 entries, covering foreign literature as well' as American. The literature on every municipal problem is included. Bibliography of Municipal Reform. Thomas E. Will, Arena, 10:555. (1894). Bibliography of Political Corruption. Thomas E. Will, Arena, 10: 845. (1894). Bibliography of Parks and Play Grounds. Thomas E. Will, Arena, 10: 274. (1894). Bibliography on Public Baths: A Study on Public Baths, New York Associa- tion for Improvement of the Condition of the Poor. 1895. Reference Lists of Works Relating to Municipal Government. Frank E. Wood- ward, Maiden, 1887. pp. 4. Bibliography of Municipal Government and Municipal Reform. Proceedings of the First National Conference for Good City Government. 1894. Bibliography of Municipal Government in the United States. Prof. Frank A. Hodder, Kansas University Quarterly, i: 179-96. 1893. Same in Cor- nell University Library Bulletin Vol. IL 1888. City Government. Syllabus of six lectures, John R. Commons, J. Beckett,. Greencastle, Ind. CONCENTRATION OF POWER— THEORY Adams, Charles Francis: Municipal Government. Lessons from the Experience of Quincy, Mass. Forum, 14: 282. (1892). Quincy, Mass. "The Centennial Milestone." Cambridge, Mass. John Wilson & Sons. 1892. Avery, Elroy M. : "Federal Plan of Municipal Government as Illustrated by the City of Cleveland." South Bethlehem, Pa. 1892. 15 pp. Same in Lehigh Quarterly, June, 1892, Vol. 2, No. 3. Bradford, Gamaliel: "Our Failure in Municipal Government." Scribner's M., 2: 485. 1887. Our Failure in Municipal Government. Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 3: 691. 1883. Bryce, James: American Commonwealth, 3rd Ed. 1895. N. Y., Macmillan & Co., Chap. 50, 51 and 52. BuLLiT, John C. : "Form of Government for Philadelphia," Address before Philadelphia Social Science Association January, 1882. Philadelphia. Allen, Lane & Scott. 1882. 42 pp. CooLEY, E. A. : Democracy and City Government. Cosmopolitan, 14:737. 1893. (Against concentration.) Field, David Dudley: Reforms Needed in Municipal Government. Albany Law Journal, 48; 355. 1883. 97 FisK, John: Civil Government in the United States. Boston. 1890. Chapter V. Gardner, Rathbone: "Municipal Reform Projects." Advance Club Publications. Providence, R. I. 1891. Gladden, Washington: "The Government of Cities." Century, 49: 155. November, 1894. GoDKiN, E. L. : Municipal Caesarism. Nation, 13: 205. 1871. Aldermen and their Appointments. Nation, 38: 158. 1884. Problems of City Government. Ann. American Academy Political Sci- ence, 4: 857. 1894. GooDNOw, Frank J. : Comparative Administrative Law. New York. Putnam's, 1893. 2 vols. Vol. I, p. 193. Municipal Problems. McMillan & Co., 1897. Low, Seth: Chapter 52, Bryce American Commonwealth. "American View of Munici- pal Government in the United States." Problems of Municipal Government. Address at Cornell University, March, 1887. Printed by University. Obstacles to Good City Government. Forum, 5: 260. 1888. The Problem of City Government in the United States. Outlook, 53: 624. April 4, 1896. Mr. Low is a strong advocate of concentration, and his presentation of the case is the best. Mac Veagh, Franklin: A Program of Municipal Reform. Am. Jour. Sociology, March, 1896. Shepard, H. N. : The Mayor and the City. Atlantic, 74: 85. 1894. Simpson, D. F. : Municipal Government of Minneapolis. Proceedings Second National Conference for Good City Government, p. 93. Philadelphia. 1895. (Against concentration.) WiLLLiAMS, Henry W. : "Reform of Our Municipal Councils," p. 236. Third National Confer- ence for Good City Government. The question of concentration of power in the mayor is discussed incidentally in the papers on the municipal conditions of various cities, read before the Philadelphia, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and Baltimore Conferences for Good City Government. The proceedings of all of the conferences have been pub- lished by the National Municipal League. Address 514 Walnut street. Other articles on the question of concentration, with special reference to practice, are found below, under the different cities under that system. 7— J.D. CONCENTRATION IN PRACTICE. BROOKLYN. "Brooklyn and Philadelphia." E. L. Godkin. Nation, 42: 140. 1886. "The Brooklyn Idea of City Government." Edward M. Shepard. Forum, 16: 38. 1893. "City Government of Brooklyn." City Gov't, i: 77. 1896. "Municipal Government of Brooklyn." W. G. Low. First Nat. Conf. Good City Gov't, p. 72. "Organized Misgovernment." Sidney Reid. Harper's Weekly, 38: 326. 1894. "Report of the Affairs of the City of Brooklyn and County of Kings, Prelim- inary." N. Y. Assembly Docs., 82, 1887. 10 pp. "Report of the Commission to Revise all Laws Affecting the City of Brooklyn." N. Y. Assembly Docs., 77, 1887. 206 pp. "Report in the matter of the Brooklyn Investigation." N. Y. Assembly Doc, no, 1887. 80 pp. Minority Report Doc. , m, 1887. 20 pp. New York Evening Post, Aug. 4, 1894. Interview with Mayor Schieren. Good Government. Official Journal of the National Civil Service Reform League: 54 Williams St. BOSTON. City Government of Boston. J. M. Bugbee. J. H. U. Studies, vol. V, 3. 1887. Municipal League of Boston. Samuel B. Capen. Am. Journal of Politics, 5: I. 1894. Cost and Methods of Street Cleaning in Boston. J. Assoc. Eng, Soc. p. 433. Aug.. 1892. Home Rule for American Cities. Ellis P. Oberhaltzer. Ann. Am. Acad., 3: 736. Report of Committee of City Charter. City Doc's 120, 146, 147. 1884. Annual Reports of Citizen's Association. 1889-1893. Printed by Association. The City Government of Boston. Nathan. Matthews, Jr., mayor of Boston, 1891-5. pp. 288. Boston: Rockwell & Churchill. 1895. (A valuable contribution to the literature on municipal government.) Publication Municipal League of Boston. Moorfield Story, p. 61. First National Conference for Good City Govern- ment. CINCINNATI. There has been scarcely anything published on Cincinnati. The only pos- sible information is through personal investigation or correspondence. "Municipal Conditions of Cincinnati" by Chas. B. Wilby. p. 313 proceedings of the Second Nat'l Conf. for Good City Gov't. Plain Municipal Lessons from Cincinnati Chaut. 12: 383. 1891. CLEVELAND. Annual Report of the Chamber of Commerce for 1896. "The Business Man- agement of a Great City.' by Win. L. Strong of New York, p. 132. "Civic Pride" by Mayor Robert S. McKisson of Cleveland. 99 Cleveland's Plan of Government. Julian Ralph. Harper's W'k'ly 39: 829. Federal Plan as Illustrated by the City of Cleveland. Elroy M. Avery. (See under General.) Chapter on the History of Cleveland. C. M. Burton, Detroit. Burton. pp. 31. 1895. Cleveland's Municipal Service. Cleveland Leader, Jan. 22. 1896. INDIANAPOLIS. Municipal Conditions of Indianapolis. Lucius B. Swift, p. 374, Proceedings of 2nd Nat. Conf. for Good City Gov't. The Civil Service Chronicle. Edited by Lucius B, Swift, Indianapolis, Ind. 1891-96. Especially Nov;, 1895. Annual Reports of the Commercial Club of Indianapolis. NEW YORK. New Aldermen. E. S. Nadal, Forum, 2:49. 1886. Comparison as to Cost of Administration in New York and Berlin Real Estate Record and Guide Nov. 10. 1884. p. 673. Citizens and Oflficials of N. Y. City, "Their Rights and Duties According to Law, together with a Popular Description of all Departments of the City Gov- ernment." Brooklyn Leader Pub. House, 1895. 109 PP-. 25c. ^'Consolidation Act, The N. Y. City." Mark Ash, Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co., 1890, (contains all the old Eng. charters of N. Y., and the present charter and ordinances). On Municipal Corruption in New York. Dr. Chas. H. Parkhurst, Our Day, 9: 451. (1892). Criminal Degradation of N. Y. Citizenship. John B. Leavitt, Forum, 17: 659. (1894). "Franchises of New York, A Chapter of Municipal Folly." A. C. Bernheim, Century, 50: 149. 1895, Municipal Government of New York. Edmund Kelly, p. 103 First Nat'l. Conf. for Good City Gov't. "Why New York is Not Well Governed." J. B. Bishop, Nation 50: 216. 1890. Machine Politics in New York City. Theo. Roosevelt, Century, 33: 74. Municipal Reform in New York. E. L. Godkin, Nation, 13: 84. 1871. A Putrid Police. Soc. Econ. 7: 9. 1894. Lexow Investigation. "Report of the committee appointed by the Senate to in- vestigate the Police Department of the city of N, Y " Jan. 18, 1895. 65 pp. Lexow Investigation: "Report and Proceedings of the Senate Investigating Committee on the Police Department of the City of New York." 5 vols. Albany, 1895. "Investigation of the Department of Public Works. Report of Committee." Theodore Roosevelt. New York Assembly Docs. 125, 153, 172, Sess. 1884. Preliminary Report of the Senate Committee on Cities. (Fassett Comm.) Sen. Doc, 1889, No. 57. lOO Testimony taken before the Senate Committee on Cities. N. Y. Senate Docs., 1891. No. 80. 4 vols. "Our Fight with Tammany." Dr. Chas. H. Parkhurst. New York. Scrib- ner's, 1895. 296 pp. $1.25. "Tammany Ring." Chapter 88. Bryce's Amer. Commonwealth. Vol.11. City Vigilance. A monthly issued by the City Vigilance League from January, 1894. Greater New York Charter and Report of the Commission. Submitted to the Legislature of New York February 20, 1897. QUINCY, MASS. A New Departure, E. L. Godkin. Nation, 55: 197. 1892. Mr. Adams' Quincy Address. G. Bradford. Nation, 55: 221. 1892. "Lessons from Quincy, Mass " C. F. Adams. Forum, 14: 282. 1892. "The Centennial Milestone of Quincy, Mass." C. F. Adams. Cambridge. John Wilson & Sons, 1892. (Same as Forum, 14; 282.) "Our Failure in Municipal Government." G. Bradford. Annals Amer. Acad. 3: 691. 1893. CITIES UNDER OTHER SYSTEMS. 'Municipal Conditions of." Hon. John Boyd Thacher. p. 137. Proc. 3d ' Nat. Conf. for Good City Gov't. Annual Reports of Citizens Association. 1 881- 1893. BALTIMORE. "City Government of Baltimore." F. C. Latrobe. Taxpayers Ass'n Address. 1889. P. 148. "City Government of Baltimore." Chas. J.Bonaparte, p. 87. First Nat'l Conference for Good City Gov't. Rule of X)riminal Classes in Baltimore. H. White. Nation, 44; 159. 1887. City of Buffalo. F. J. Shepard. New Eng. Mo., 14: 237. 1893. Well Governed Buffalo. Julian Ralph. Harpers Wkly., 39: 812. 1895. Municipal Conditions of. Frank M. Loomis. Second Natl. Conf. for Good City Gov't, p. 344. CHICAGO. City Government of. Franklin MacVeagh. p. 80, proceedings First Nat'l Conf. for Good City Gov't. How to Govern, by a Practical Reformer. Chicago. Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1x8 pp. 25c. Since the Adoption of Civil Service Reform. Merritt Star, p, 162 3rd Nat. Conf. for Good City Gov't. Municipal Government in Chicago. Rev. O. P. Gifford. Our Day, 11: 59. 1893. Administration of Chicago I. Municipal History. II. Organization. S. E. Sparling, Univ. of Wis. lOl MINNEAPOLIS. Citizens Law Enforcement League of Minneapolis. Rev. S. L. Speare. Our Day. 9: 315. 1892. Municipal Government of Minneapolis. D. F. Simpson. 2nd Nat'l Conf. Good City Gov't, p. 93. NASHVILLE. "Appointment of a Receiver in Nashville in 1S69." Dr. Louis S. Merriam. Am. Law Rev., 25: 393. 1891. Municipal Conditions of Nashville. A. V. S. Lindsley. p. 102, 3rd Nat'l Conf. for GQod City Gov't. Municipal Gov't of Nashville. John L. Kennedy. City Government, i: 108. 1896. Experiments in Municipal Government. A. S. Colyar. Southern Bivouac, vol. II, No. 5: 306. NEW HAVEN, CONN. The Republic of New Haven. Chas. H. Baltimore. J. H., Univ. Press, 1886. $2.00. Town and City Government of New Haven. Chas. H. Levermore. J. H. U, Studies, IV: 10. 1886. NEW ORLEANS. Municipal Conditions. Walter B. Spencer. 2nd Nat'l Conf. Good City Gov't, p. 407. Municipal History of. W. W. Howe. J. H. U. Studies, VII: 4. (1889.) 25c. PROVIDENCE, R. I. Publications of Advance Club. Providence. Government of Providence, Town and City, 1636-1889. Geo. G. Wilson. Providence, Preston & Rounds, 1889. $1.00. ST. LOUIS. City Government of St. Louis. Prof. Marshall Snow. J. H. U. Studies, V: 4. 1887. Notes on City Government of St. Louis. Albert Shaw. Cent., 52: 253. 1896. Government of St. Paul. H. J. Gorden and Irwin Beaumont. City Gov't, i: 13. 1896. St. Paul. W. H. Lightner. Second Nat'l Conference for Good City Gov't. p. 105. ^ SAN FRANCISCO. Establishment of City Government in San Francisco. B. Moses. J. H. Univ. Studies VII: 2 and 3. 1889. Civic Awakening in. A. Knapp. Arena 12: 241. 1895. Civil Service Reform in. Good Gov't 15: 119. 1896. Municipal Conditions of. Isaac T. Milliken. Second Nat'l Conf. for Good City Gov't, p. 449- I02 Reforms in. Outlook, 54: 53. 1896. * Municipal Conditions and the New Charter. J. D. Phalen. Overland Mo. 28: 104. 1896. Municipal Government of. J. H. Stallard. Overland, Mo. Feb. '97. Single articles on other cities will be found in the Report of the Nat'l Mu- nicipal Conferences. BEST BOOKS ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. GooDNOw, Frank J. "Comparative Administrative Law." N. Y., Putnams. 1893. 2 vols. $500- Covers the general field of administration. Vol. I, Bk. Ill deals with Local Administration. GooDNOw, Frank J, "Municipal Home Rule; a Study in Administration." N, Y., Macmillan. 1895. pp. 283. $1.50. Very good discussion of the legal relations of the state to the city and the abuses arising from this relation. GooDNow, Frank J. "Municipal Problems." N. Y,, Macmillan. 1897, The best, in fact the only work in book form covering the problems of mu- nicipal government. Conkling, a. R. "City Government in the United States." N. Y., Appletons. 1894. pp. 227. $1.00. Analyzes the organization of a typical American city. Matthews, Nathan, Jr. "City Government of Boston," Mayor of Boston, 1891-5. pp. 288. Bos- ton, Rockwell & Churchill. 1895. (See Boston.) Shaw, Dr. Albert: "Municipal Government in Great Britain." N. Y. Century Co. 1895. 385 pp., $2.00. Shaw, Dr. Albert: "Municipal Government in Continental Europe." N. Y. Century Co. 1895. 500 pp., $2.00. From these two works a very satisfactory knowledge of all the European city governments can be obtained. Outside of scattered magazine articles they are the only source of information accessible. The author has collected a store of interesting and instructive material which he has arranged in systematic form. The two works together with those of Goodnow should be the first to find a place in a library on municipal government. CURRENT LITERATURE DEVOTED TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. A number of papers and periodicals have appeared the last few years devoted solely to municipal government and municipal reform. The leading ones are given below. 103 Good Government. Official Journal of the Nat. Civil Service Reform League. Pub. monthly, New York. $i.oo per year. City and State. Pub. weekly. Philadelphia, 1305 Arch St. Herbert Welsh, editor. $1.00 per year. Municipality and County. Monthly, 202 Main St., Buffalo, N. Y. J. Henry Wood, editor. $2.00 per year. Municipal Affairs. Quarterly, 52 Williams St., New York. Pub. by New York Reform Club. First number issued March, 1897. Municipal Year Book. J. Henry W^ood, Buffalo, 1897. A book that fills a long felt want by summarizing information of all kinds on municipal gov- ernment in the United States. "THE HEATHEN CHINEE" WEEPS at sight of the high-class laundry work we tur7i out. He may pretend to save you a few cents 071 your week' s washings but the diff^erence in quality of work, saving on wear and tear of clothing, and general satisfac- tio7i prompts your patronage of a first-class establishmeyit, sicch as the • Alford Bro's Laundry 113=115 North Carroll St. OLSON & OSTIN Xtailors Everything pertaining to Tailoring done at Reasonable Rates -^ PHONE 662 .332 STATE STREET, CORNER GORHAM.. Sdwin Sumner t Son 15 Soutb plnchneg an& 502 State Sts. ^^^^l!SaA\Vi% M\i, E. R. GURTISS iDbotoarapber VILAS BLOCK Cbe Capital Cft)) tvvM Store ^^^ CARRIES THE BEST LINE OF FUNKE'S ChocolatesandConfectiooery We manufacture our own Candies. Sell goods cheaper than elsewhere JOHN J. LOEHRER Corner State and Johnson M.S.KLAUBER&CO. Clotbfnd and jfurnisbind Ooods ifine daflorlng ^T^ ^^ ^^ MADISON, WIS. I LOEHRER&ANDERSON LIVERY BICYCLES! NAPOLEONS ROYAL BLUE 5EE THEM-«« »»-TRY THEM CRESCENTS YOU ALL KNOW THEM Call and see the '97 models at The Larson Jewelry Store THE EYES OF BEAUTY Brighten at the sight of our new Cycle and Qolf Suits, Sweaters, Caps, Belts, Hose, etc. Young man, As you Hope to Win Do not miss this chance. We '11 make the prices easy. Cassius B. Nelson The Clothier and Hatter BARLOW S. OTT COMPLETE LINE AND ORRECT PRICES Drugs and Druggist Sundries 21 NORTH PINCKNEY STREET t urcell... Dentist 30 ynifflin St. GROVES' PIANO WAREROOMS ...KEEP EVERYTHING IN MUSIC... PIANOS SOLD ON MONTHLY PAYMENTS PRICES AWAY DOWN Latest Popular Sheet Music ALWAYS ON HAND J. W. & A. E. GROVES A. G. NIELSON Ipboto^rapber 23 SOUTH PINCKNEY STREET MADISON, WIS. FRANK 8. WARREN ANDREW S. BROWN TELEPHONE 53 WARREN & BROWN (Hess & Schmitz' Old Stand) Ciuery^Boardipi^ STABLE CORNER STATE AND OILMAN STREETS yiRadison, His. Funeral and Party Carriages a Specialty (balace of Sweets XIalF? ot tbe Uown Those delicious Ice Cream Sodas, Crushed Fruit — Strawberry, Raspberry, Peach, Pineapple. Ice Cream and Ices. A box of Bitter Sweets for the opera. 109 State St. ART ROOMS,,,, 13 WEST MAIN ST, Stew=dents=a=ten=shun Besf (;abit\Gfpl7otes $2.50 per Dozeo WARRANTED N. P. JONKS WHEN YOU NEED MUSIC, STRINGS, PIANO TUNED, ETC., DON'T SHUN "27" -WARNER'S MUSIC STORE, "27" West riain Street (that's us) "CITY AND STATE" An 8 page independent journal. Published Weekly. HERBERT WELSH, Managing Editor. The object of City and State is the advancement of good government in Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania, and in the country at large. This paper aims to represent truly the mass of the people, and to convey to them such facts and considerations about public affairs as most seriously concern them, which are now extremely difficult, if ngt wholly impossible, to arrive at. CiTY AND STATE represents no party, faction or clique, and is the organ of no so- ciety, league or committee. It will always endeavor, however, to keep itself in kindly touch and in the broadest sympathy with every project and movement of honest men and women looking to the well-being of society. It aims to give the exact truth on all mat- ters relating to the welfare of the city and State. Free from bias or improper influence of any kind. WHAT IS THOUGHT OF IT "We consider City and State the ablest and bravest municipal reform paper pub- lished. Very few, indeed, of our exchanges are read with so much interest or profit. We should be glad to give what help we can in widening your audience." — The Outlook. "City and State \% z.vs\osXxQixe&\\\xx% illustration of the service which journalism can render to promote the highest civism. Such a paper is a witness for municipal righteousness, and a teacher, as it seems to me, of incomparable value. I wish it most heartily success." — Rt. Rev. Henry C. Potter, D. D. "City and State is one of the few newspapers whose editorials I read. It seems to me one of the sanest, most virile, most courageous newspapers in the country." — Rev. Washington Gladden, D. D. "I am a regular reader of City and State. The spirit in which it is written is es- pecially needed in these times. I hope the paper will be as prosperous as it is useful." — Hon. Carl Schurz. "City and State" is published every Thursday. Publication office ijoj Arch Street, Philadelphia. Terms: One dollar a year. Write for sample COpieS. U. S . WH EEL: W. A. TAYLOR F. H. BERG TAYLOR & BERG Expert Bicycle Repairmen Dealers in BICYCLES AND BICYCLE SUNDRIES Corner State, Henry and Johnson Streets MADISON, WIS. PHONE 6SO C. B. WELTON W. H. WILT C. B. WELTON & CO. THE CASH Clothiers, Hatters and ..Furnishers.. CORRECT STYLES AND PERFECT FITTING GARMENTS A SPECIALTY Lowest Prices Always Guaranteed 15 West Main Street MADISON, WIS. JOHN DAMM , DEALER IN Fine Cigars and Fancy Smoking . . . Tobacco . . . 226 STATE ST. GEM RESTAURANT 114 KING STREET Under new management. Meals and Short Orders at all hours. R W. CURTISS Ipbotoarapber IF YOU WANT To Buy a Wheel A) To Rent a Wheel A) To See a Good Wheel A: To Have a Wheel Repaired JSC Call at the A: State Street Cyclery Phone 586 (**roS°') n. n. QERLflCH ARTIST IN Manufacturing ^ Repairing ...Musical Instruments... Dealer in Trimmings for Instruments. Piano Tuning, Fine Repairing and Refinishing of Pianos and Organs Skillfully Executed Corner State and Henry Streets MADISON, WI5. Telephone 650 ARE YOU IN NEED of anything in this line? BREAD ROLLS PIES CAKES MACAROONS LADY FINGERS CREAM PUFFS ANGEL FOOD If so, call at the West Baking Co., 421 state St. "The Municipal Year Book OF THE UNITED STATES" is under course of preparation and will be published by J. Henry Wood, 31 Church street, Buffalo, N. Y. All phases of municipal management in the 200 largest cities will receive minute and complete attention. The data will be tabulated in easily compara- ble form. There will be a directory of municipal officials, showing titles and names of all principal officials, salaries, terms of office, etc., etc. Each department will be treated at length and in detail. Subscription price $5 per copy. When subscription edition is exhausted the price will be $10. MUNICIPALITY and COUNTY Published at 31 Church street, Buffalo, New York. Price $1 per annum. A National Monthly Magazine, giving condensed information concerning municipal government and municipal reform. Established 1894. Your Friend the.. % ■r\ Kenwood Blc)fck . iA Wheel You Can v# W ' Depend Upon. For Lightness, Swiftness and Strength it is Unsurpassed, You can learn all about it by addressing Hamilton Kenwood Cycle Co. 203-20S>2or SXanal St., Qiicas:o. I TRACY, GIBBS L CO. | % ll^nnters /fS College morft a Spectalti? UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY This is the date on which this book was charged out. i^iZ [30m-6,'ll]