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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
 
 Congressional Control of Foreign 
 
 Relations During the American 
 
 Revolution 1774-1789 
 
 BY 
 
 GEORGE C. WOOD 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
 IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOB 
 THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 AT 
 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY. 
 
 H. RAY HAAS & CO. 
 
 Printers and Publishers 
 
 Allentown, Pa. 
 
 1919 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1919 
 
 BY 
 GEORGE C. WOOD 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Genesis and Development of the Chief Factors of Con 
 trol in the First Continental Congress of 1774. 
 
 The core of the question, 1 The folk -mote and its significance, 1 The 
 Plymouth and Massachusetts colonies contrasted, 2 Early demands for 
 full representative government, 2 Evolution of the town-meeting, 3 Adap 
 tation to new conditions, 3 Significance of the growth of towns, 4 Devel 
 opment of the decentralization of power, 4 Causes of passage of Naviga 
 tion Acts, 4 Struggles with Royal prerogatives, 5 The problem an economic 
 one, 5 Basis of protests raised to higher grounds, 6 The significance of 
 the colonial agent, 7 Growth of his executive powers, 8 Origin of the com 
 mittees of correspondence, 9 Their growth and development, 10 Their 
 originator, 1] Their purpose, 12 Their significance and their results, 14 
 Chapter Summary, 15. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Formation of Parties in Congress as a Result of Con 
 flict between Factors of Control and Their Perpetuation through 
 Committees. 
 
 The task of the Massachusetts delegates, 17 Formation of committees, 
 17 Opposition to Independence, 18 Work accomplished, 18 Leadership 
 of Galloway and Samuel Adams, 18 Plan of Union, 19 Adoption of Res 
 olutions, 19 Similarity to Massachusetts resolutions, 20 Assumption of 
 new powers by Congress, 20 Crystallization of opinion in colonies, 20 
 Drawing of party lines in Second Congress, 21 Compromise between Vir 
 ginia and New England, 21 The working majority, 22 Increased power 
 of the "Radicals," 22 Growth of idea of Independence, 23 Declaration 
 of Independence, 23 Chapter Summary, 24. 
 
IV TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Rise and Significance of the Committee System in Con 
 gress. 
 
 Kelation of the committees of correspondence to Congressional commit 
 tees, 26 Reasons for the adoption of the committee system, 27 Nature 
 and distribution of early committees, 29 Special committees of 1776, 1777, 
 1778, 30 Special committees of 1779, 30 The "letter" committees of 
 1780, 30 Growing inefficiency in Congress, 31 Distribution of member 
 ship of committees of 1775, 33 Political combination of the Lees and 
 Adams s, 33 Distribution of membership of the committees of 1776, 34 
 Significance of this distribution, 35 Distribution of membership of the 
 committees of 1777, 34 Increasing control of the committee system by the 
 Eadicals, 34 Distribution of membership of the committees of 1778, 35 
 Distribution of membership of the committees of 1779, 36 Absolute control 
 of Congress by a minority of the colonies through control of the committee 
 system, 37 Distribution of committee membership in 1780, 37 Decline in 
 the power of Virginia, 38 Beginning of the development of executive 
 power in Congress, 38 Distribution of committee membership in 1781, 38 
 The steering committees, 39 Rapid decline of the committee system of 
 control, 40 Chapter Summary, 40. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Immediate Effects of the Committee System upon the 
 Conduct of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 First foreign affairs committee, 42 Congressional restrictions, 42 
 Work of the committee, 43 Not considered a diplomatic committee, 43 
 Opposition of Samuel Adams and the Radicals, 45 Beginning of the mil 
 itia" policy in the conduct of foreign relations, 45 Democratization of all 
 diplomatic activities, 46 Establishment of a Committee of Foreign Af 
 fairs, 47 An attempt to place executive powers in the hands of the Com 
 mittee of Secret Correspondence, 47- -Attempt of Radicals to control for 
 eign relations through the selection of special committees, 48 Struggle be 
 tween the Radicals and the Constructionists over the membership of the 
 Committee of Foreign Affairs, 49 Struggle over censure and recall of the 
 American Commissioners in France, 50 Constructionists control the Com 
 mittee of Foreign Affairs, 52 Decline in the importance of the Committee 
 of Foreign Affairs, 52 Enumeration of special committees functioning as 
 Committees of Foreign Affairs, 53 Political principles of Samuel Adams, 
 56 The committees overworked, 57 Poor selection of committees, 58 
 Changes in personnel, 59 Development of States Rights, 59 State consti- 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS V 
 
 tutions adopted, 60 Decentralization of power in the states the result, 
 60 Chapter Summary, 61. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Crucial Period in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs as a 
 Result of the Weakness and Indecision of Congress Working 
 through Its Committee System. 
 
 Perilous situation of foreign affairs in 1777, 63 Party animosities, 
 63 Election of envoys to France in 1776, 64 Details of their instructions, 
 64 Evidence of Radical influences, 65 Difficulties of Silas Deane, 65 Lack 
 of instructions and communications, 66 Deane assumes executive powers. 
 66 Condemnation of his activities, 67 The work of M. Beaumarchais, 67 
 Misunderstandings and suspicions, 67 Troubles between Deane, Franklin 
 and Arthur Lee, 68 Activities of the English ministry, 69 Franklin s 
 difficult position, 70 His diplomatic policy contrasted with that of Deane, 
 70 Inefficiency of the Committee of Correspondence at home, 71 Envoys 
 ignorant as to whom they are responsible, 70 Adams s complaints, 73 
 Committee of Foreign Affairs practically non-existent, 74 Intrigues of the 
 English ministry in France and America, 74 The envoys in France in des 
 perate straits, 75 Appeals to Franklin by English ministry, 76 Proposed 
 reconciliation, 76 Beaumarchais and Vergennes turn tide to America, 76 
 The Treaty of Alliance signed, 76 Imminence of diplomatic disaster, 
 77 Chapter Summary, 77. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 The Influence of France in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Early French influence in America, 79 Gerard sent as first minister 
 to America, 80 His purposes, 80 His instructions, 80 His observations on 
 America, 81 Problems which he was obliged to solve, 81 His relations 
 with Congress, 82 His increasing influence in Congress, 82 Chevalier de 
 la Luzerne is sent to America as minister from France, 83 Attacks on 
 Franklin in Congress, 83 Luzerne s influence in his behalf, 83 Selection 
 of peace envoy, 84 Luzerne s active part in drawing up instructions, 84 
 Adams s attitude to French ministry, 85 The paper money resolution in 
 Congress, 85 Increasing dislike of Adams by French Court, 85 His rebuff 
 by Vergennes, 86 Franklin s delicate position, 87 Bribery used by Lu 
 zerne to influence selection of peace envoys, 87 Opposition of the Radicals 
 to Luzerne s influence, 88 Luzerne checks cabals against Washington and 
 Franklin, 88 Luzerne seeks the appointment of a committee to act in pros 
 ecuting the war, 89 Luzerne seeks to establish a Department of Foreign 
 
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Affairs, 90 He seeks to appoint Robert Livingston as Secretary of Foreign 
 Affairs, 90 French ultimatum to Congress, 91 Congress stirred to action 
 by the French ministry, 91 Chapter Summary, 92. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Beginning of the Centralization of Power in the Con 
 duct of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Importance of the recall of Deane, Lee and Adams, 94 Attempts of 
 Congress to send envoys to all Courts in Europe, 94 Results, 95 Franklin 
 given new powers, 95 His instructions and limitations placed upon him, 
 95 His gradual assumption of executive powers, 96 Adams s attitude as 
 peace envoy, 96 Chafes under limitation of his powers, 97 Increase of 
 Franklin s executive powers, 97 Jay s instructions, 98 He disobeys his 
 instructions, 99 Causes and results, 99 Chapter Summary, 100. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Establishment of a Definite Policy in the Conduct of 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Beginnings of the development of executive power in Congress, 102 Es 
 tablishment of Departments, 103 Establishment of a Department of For 
 eign Affairs, 103 Duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 104 The 
 Secretary limited in power, 104 Congress appoints special committees to 
 conduct foreign relations activities, 105 Livingston resigns as Secretary 
 of Foreign Affairs, 105 Commendation of Livingston, 107 Development 
 of executive powers in the Department of Foreign Affairs, 107 Enlarge 
 ment of the powers of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 108 John Jay 
 elected Secretary of the United States for the Department of Foreign Af 
 fairs, 100 Chapter Summary, 109. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Election of a Secretary of the United States of America 
 for the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Formation of a 
 Department of State. 
 
 John Jay a new type of Secretary for the Department of Foreign Af 
 fairs, 111 His policies, 112 Seconded by the leaders of "strong govern 
 ment" in Congress, 112 Struggle between Jay and the Radicals over the 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS VII 
 
 appointment of envoys to France, 113 Sectional jealousies and the devel 
 opment of States Rights in connection with the proposed treaties, 113 In 
 creased power delegated to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 114 Complete 
 downfall of the committee system of control in Congress, 114 Adams s 
 failure as Minister to England, 115 Jay empowered to treat with Spain on 
 the boundary and Mississippi river questions, 115 Increased prestige of 
 the Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs, 116 More powers 
 delegated to Jay, 116 Jay refuses to assume full responsibility in con 
 cluding a treaty with Spain, 117 His suggested compromise, 117 Oppo 
 sition to plan and struggle between states, 118 Congress fears Jay s powers 
 and seeks to limit him, 118 Jay pleads for a definite and fixed policy by 
 Congress in the conduct of the negotiations with Spain, 119 Jay multiplies 
 his recommendations to Congress, 120 Congress defers action on Jay s re 
 commendations, 120 The new constitution provides for executive depart 
 ments by implication, 121 Hamilton s plan for executive departments, 
 122 Pinckney s plan, 122 Powers of the President, 122 Madison s plan, 
 123 Establishment of a new Department of Foreign Affairs, 124 Duties 
 and powers of the Secretary, 124 Establishment of a Department of State, 
 125 Election of Thomas Jefferson as the first Secretary of State, 126 
 Chapter Summary, 126. GENERAL SUMMARY, 128. 
 
 Bibliographical Index p. 131. 
 Topical Index p. 133. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The history of any nation is ordinarily divided into periods 
 or epochs. This arbitrary division is made, partly for the con 
 venience of the reader or student of history ; partly because some 
 event or series of events seem to have given a new direction to 
 the current or continuity of history, resulting in a marked ex 
 pansion or diminution of control or power in national life. Such 
 periods are commonly observed in the treatment of American 
 history. 
 
 However, beneath the records of events, there is always a 
 strong current of motives, of causes and of effects, which is or 
 dinarily obscure to the casual reader of history. 
 
 If this idea is kept constantly in mind, it is not an easy 
 task to properly divide American history into periods. This diffi 
 culty obtains for two important reasons. (1) Causes are often 
 slow in producing results; (2) Causes are often complex. In 
 any field of research, it is, therefore, evident that changes take 
 place very gradually, especially in the social and industrial 
 fabric. Sudden changes may take place in the political life of a 
 nation, but the ordinary man, unless such changes are catastro 
 phic, is left unaltered in his daily life. 
 
 Granted that changes in the political life of a people may 
 be slow as well as in other lines of institutional growth, it fol 
 lows that the tracing of the causes and effects of the events and 
 movement cited as a basis of discussion in this thesis, will be 
 somewhat difficult. To determine how Congress, from 1774 to 
 1789, controlled our foreign relations, is to take for granted at 
 once, that the dates mentioned are selected merely for the sake 
 of convenience. The trend of events between these dates had 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
 their beginning long before the year 1774 and their final outcome 
 is not yet seen. 
 
 Men who lived in 1790, lived in about the same way as the 
 men of 1730, in spite of the fact that the sovereignty of the coun 
 try had radically changed during the intervening period. The 
 fact is, the governmental changes had come so gradually 
 that the common citizen was little affected by them. This fact 
 illustrates in a marked way, the essential unity and continuity of 
 history. 
 
 However, in America, momentous changes did occur. It is 
 the problem of this thesis to show, if possible, how and why 
 these changes occurred in the conduct of foreign affairs. This 
 thesis appears to admit of but one valid method of treatment. 
 That method is the tracing out through the careful study of con 
 gressional committees, the causes and growth of those activ 
 ities favorable to or opposed to the formation of a definite policy 
 in the conduct of foreign relations during the American revolu 
 tion. 
 
 The attempt is here made to show the gradual evolution of a 
 Department of State, having its inception in a Committee of 
 Secret Correspondence. Based primarily upon private commun 
 ications, secret memoirs, facsimiles and a study of the composi 
 tion of the Congressional committees, a thread of continuity has 
 been found running through all of them, gradually developing 
 from a condition of chaos, through one of uncertainty and vacil 
 lation, to a final definite policy and assumption of power by In 
 dividuals and departments, having executive functions of wide 
 application in a strong centralized government. In short, it is 
 hoped that it will have been shown how the foreign policy of the 
 American colonies, as regards its initiation, activity, method of 
 control, degree of control and results of that control, was de 
 veloped by Congress from 1774 to 1789. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OP CON 
 TROL IN THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS OP 1774. 
 
 The causes of the American revolution were many and 
 varied. The problem here presented is not that of discovering 
 these causes, except in so far as they coincide with the factors of 
 control in Congress from 1774 to the adoption of the constitution 
 in 1789. With the problem limited, the core of the question is 
 What were the factors that caused the development of methods of 
 control and how did these methods work to control resolves and 
 the policy of Congress, especially with respect to the conduct of 
 foreign relations? 
 
 I. THE FOLK-MOTE. 
 
 The early and successful struggles for individual freedom in 
 England were only possible through the existence of the insti 
 tution known as the folk-mote. This was a form of local self- 
 government possessing an enormous importance in the polity of 
 even the primeval Teutons. It was a fixed, frequent, accessible 
 meeting of the individual freemen for the purpose of discussing 
 and deciding upon public matters. This same folk-mote, modi 
 fied in large measure, conditioned the events which culminated in 
 the American revolution. The folk-mote, therefore, may be said 
 to be, biologically, at least, the primordial cell of every Anglo- 
 Saxon body politic. l 
 
 This primordial institution was evolved and developed into 
 a somewhat complex organism in England, but it was reborn in 
 
 1 Freeman: Growth of the English Constitution, p. 17. 
 
2 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 New England with a greater vitality in two, at least, of the 
 original colonies and expressed itself finally in the New England 
 town-meeting. 
 
 The people of the Plymouth colony were primarily re 
 ligious refugees. But they possessed a keen political sense, 
 nevertheless. This political acumen expressed itself in a remark 
 ably homogeneous social and political system. The Plymouth 
 compact, signed on board ship, was a democratic frame of gov 
 ernment. - Though tinged with theocracy, the little company had 
 hardly set foot upon the new continent before it began to con 
 duct its affairs in a thorough-going democratic manner. 3 
 
 In contrast to the Plymouth colony, the Massachusetts Bay 
 colony of ten years later, was in reality a commercial enterprise. 
 However, soon after the colony was settled, a clean-cut, consti 
 tutional system was evolved, based upon its charter. 4 This sys 
 tem was composed of a governor, deputy-governor, assistants and 
 others, clothed with power to make and execute laws. 5 
 
 Opposition to the manner of conducting this form of govern 
 ment soon arose, however. It was charged that the primary prin 
 ciple of the folk-mote was being gradually violated. In 1631, 
 the freemen of Massachusetts Bay demanded that the whole body 
 of freemen choose the body of assistants and that the executive 
 officers be then chosen by these assistants. 6 The demand was 
 reluctantly granted. In 1634, a representative body, composed 
 of delegates elected by the freemen, formed an assembly which 
 acted with the assistants, forming a General Court. 7 
 
 The people thus controlled the selection of the governor 
 
 2 MacDonald: Documentary Source Book of American History, p. 19. 
 
 3 Bradford: History of Plymouth Plantation, p. 110. 
 
 * MacDonald : Documentary Source Book of American History, p. 23-26. 
 6 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 25. 
 6 Ibid. p. 29. 
 T Ibid. p. 30. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL o 
 
 through their power of selecting the assistants. Thus was the 
 governor made, in large measure, responsible to the people. 
 
 The steps from 1631 down to the demand by the people for 
 complete independence of legislative power are many and intri 
 cate. But this much stands out clearly. The people continu 
 ously claimed all power necessary for the conduct of a separate 
 government, except that they recognized their dependence upon 
 the Crown and passed no laws contrary to those in existence in 
 England. 8 Massachusetts, in particular, asserted its liberties 
 because composed of Englishmen. Upon this ground, and this 
 alone, the people claimed the political power of self-govern 
 ment. 9 
 
 The point to be emphasized here is most important. The 
 original folk-mote was brought bodily to the North American 
 continent, modified and embodied in a colonial government 
 scheme, called a town-meeting, yet its essence always remained 
 the same. Every freeman had an equal liberty of delivering his 
 opinion, without fear or favor. Moreover, he gave or withheld 
 his vote upon any question as he saw fit and every vote weighed 
 equally. 10 In a word the folk-mote was the central hereditary 
 institution of the colonial governments of New England. It 
 gave by its very nature, homogeneity to the successive periods of 
 New England political life. It was the foundation of the spirit 
 of true democracy. 
 
 II. 
 
 GROWTH AND DIFFERENTIATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE 
 ASSEMBLIES. 
 
 There is evidence that environment and opportunity were 
 important factors in developing the new colonies. Rapid differ- 
 
 8 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 42. 
 
 Ibid. p. 42. 
 
 10 Ibid. pp. 25, 26. 
 
4 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 entiation occurred in the industrial, educational, religious and 
 social life of the people. Political changes were also inevitable. 
 New towns were founded in the immediate vicinity of Boston. As 
 time passed, others were founded far removed from the mother 
 colony. Such were Portsmouth, Newport, Providence, Hartford, 
 Windsor and others. Each developed in accordance with its own 
 needs. Each venture was an objective illustration of an innate 
 desire for independence in thought and action. The ultimate 
 result was a marked modification of the original town meeting. 
 Representation was only possible through the selection of dele 
 gates, properly instructed in their respective town-meetings as 
 to what they should do and say at the General Court. J1 The pur 
 pose of this procedure was to effectively check the possible in 
 crease of central authority. These men were Englishmen 
 jealous of their liberties. They considered that the power of 
 government still resided in the individual freeman living in the 
 most remote cabin in the wilderness. Hereditary characteristics 
 were more powerful here than environmental factors. The im 
 mediate effect was the rise of a true representative system to 
 gether with a marked decentralization of power. 
 
 III. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 The rapid differentiation in political and, above all, in in 
 dustrial life resulted in the passage by the British Parliament 
 of a series of Navigation Acts in order to control the laws of 
 trade. With the passing of the Molasses Act in 1733, a colonial 
 policy was rapidly formulated in England. Its most important 
 features were the following : 
 
 (1) The enforcement of the Navigation Acts. 
 
 (2) The enforcement of uniformity in the colonial govern 
 ments. 
 
 " Fundamental Orders of New Haven Colony (MacDonald), p. 36. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL 
 
 (3) The increase of Parliamentary control over colonial in 
 ternal affairs. 
 
 The Navigation Acts were said to be examples of " external 
 policies, but their influence soon became * internal. The royal 
 governor in Massachusetts Bay attempted to enforce his royal 
 prerogatives in the assembly. Opposed by the assembly, he re 
 fused to sign their bills. The assembly retaliated by holding up 
 the governor s salary. This method of procedure soon became 
 common in most of the colonies. In every colony the principle 
 was the same. In every colony leaders of the opposition were 
 being developed. These leaders opposed the will of the proprie 
 tor, the arbitrary actions of the royal governors or unjust trade 
 restrictions. In all colonies the control of the revenues by the 
 assemblies effectively blocked royal aggression. The crux of the 
 whole situation was fast becoming an economic one. 
 
 The passing of the Sugar Act of April 5, 1764, caused the 
 calling of the Boston Town-meeting on May 25, 1764, at which 
 a committee of five men was appointed to prepare instructions 
 to its newly elected delegates in the provincial assembly. Samuel 
 Adams drew up the instructions and made it very plain that the 
 delegates were limited in their actions. 12 Furthermore, the dele 
 gates were enjoined to use "their influence in maintaining the 
 inalienable rights and privileges of the province" and "to pre 
 serve that independence in the house of representatives which 
 
 characterize a free people " " Our trade has for a long time 
 
 labored under great discouragement and it is with the greatest 
 concern that we see such further difficulties coming upon it, as 
 will reduce it to the lowest ebb, if not totally obstruct and ruin 
 it." 13 
 
 In addition, the assembly was rebuked for not having taken 
 
 12 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 157. 
 
 18 Hutchinson : History of Massachusetts Bay, III, pp. 106, 107. 
 
6 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 earlier action in view of the intention of the ministry to burden 
 us with new taxes." Here was a protest based ostensibly upon 
 the desire for a redress of grievances resulting from an arbitrary 
 policy in the control of the colonial assembly, but actually 
 founded in a deep resentment at the restriction of trade. The 
 problem was an economic one, when seen in its true light. 
 
 James Otis, in the colonial assembly, was quick to pick up 
 the thread of the argument and deliver a speech on the Rights ol 
 the British colonies. "If our trade may be taxed," he said, 
 
 "why not our lands? This annihilates our charter rights to 
 
 govern and tax ourselves It strikes at our British privileges 
 
 If taxes are laid upon us in any shape without our having 
 
 a legal representation where they are laid, are we not reduced 
 from the character of free subjects to the miserable state of 
 
 tributory slaves? As His Majesty s other northern American 
 
 colonies are embarked with us in this most important bottom (a 
 sheer assumption) we further desire you to use your endeavors, 
 that their might may be added to that of this province ; that by 
 the united application of all who are aggrieved, all may happily 
 obtain redress. 14 
 
 Based originally upon trade restrictions, this speech at once 
 raised the issue to higher grounds. It included three principles 
 destined to be of great importance. (1) It asserted the doctrine 
 of no taxation without representation. (2) It claimed for the 
 colonists the full rights of Englishmen. (3) It suggested a 
 united protest of the colonies. Evidence seems to point to Sam 
 uel Adams as the author of the fundamentals, especially the last 
 one named. 
 
 Two great questions, then, confronted the colonists : 
 
 (1) Should the English imperial policy extend to America 
 or should America rule herself and still be united to England? 
 
 14 Otis: Rights of British Colonies, pp. 100-105. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL 7 
 
 (2) Should the English idea of representation be allowed or 
 obstinately opposed? 
 
 The first question was an economic one ; the second political. 
 The first situation conflicted with American property and pros 
 perity; the second conflicted with American independence of 
 thought and action as expressed in the folk-mote and subsequent 
 town-meeting. 
 
 IV. THE COLONIAL AGENT. 
 
 A factor which largely contributed to the development of 
 concerted action by the colonies against the prerogatives of the 
 crown was the colonial agent. The practical negation of a true 
 representative form of government through the excessive use of 
 the veto power by the royal governors, developed a most serious 
 situation. While the colonial assemblies could and did check in 
 large measure the coercive plans of the governors by refusing 
 to pay them their salaries, yet they could not, on the other hand, 
 secure the passage of measures benefiting the colonists. 
 
 The obvious temporary solution of the problem was the ap 
 pointment of a representative of the colonies who could go to 
 England and lay before Parliament and the king, the needs and 
 grievances of the various sections of the country. The plan was 
 an attempt to follow the line of least resistance in obtaining 
 certain ends which could not be secured in the colonial assem 
 blies. 
 
 The colonial agent became the embodiment of the represen 
 tative system, modified by existing circumstances. He was a com 
 mittee system reduced to its lowest terms. 
 
 As early as 1764 Franklin represented Pennsylvania in 
 England. He petitioned the crown to relieve the colony of the 
 burden of excessive taxation. Successful in this, he remained in 
 England as the leading representative of the colonies. It was 
 
8 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 through his influence that the Stamp Act was repealed. That 
 he did not always reflect the true spirit of the colonies up to the 
 year 1775 is indicated by the fact that he urged the payment of 
 the tea tax by the colonists, in a letter to Thomas Gushing, Feb. 
 5, 1771. 15 
 
 Massachusetts had been represented in England by Dennys 
 De Berdt from 1765 to the time of his death in 1770. 16 Franklin 
 was at once appointed in his place, but only after strong oppo 
 sition from Samuel Adams, who suspected him of lukewarmnesb 
 towards the idea of independence. 17 Adams succeeded in ob 
 taining the appointment of Arthur Lee as his associate and for 
 warded to Franklin a long and very explicit set of instructions 
 to guide him in his activities as colonial agent. 
 
 In 1775, Franklin having returned to America, Lee became 
 the sole agent of Massachusetts in England. The next step was 
 his selection as secret agent of the Committee of Secret Corre 
 spondence of the Continental Congress in 1775. 
 
 That the leaders in the colonies kept the colonial agents well 
 informed of the trend of events in America after 1765 is shown 
 by the numerous letters of Adams directed to De Berdt and Lee. 
 These letters go into details of events, circumstances, policies 
 and instructions. Especially illuminating are the accounts of 
 the growth of the committees of correspondence in the towns of 
 the colony of Massachusetts. 18 This function of the colonial 
 agent changed and became more important from 1770 to 1775 
 due primarily to the rapid development of differences between 
 the governors and the assemblies and the consequent growth of 
 intercolonial committees. In fact, the colonial agent became in 
 large measure an executive in function and it was but a slight 
 
 u Franklin: Works, VII, p. 505. 
 
 16 Samuel Adams s Writings, I, p. 61. 
 
 " Ibid. II, p. 46. 
 
 18 Samuel Adams s Writings, I, II, III. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL 
 
 transition from the office of the colonial agent to that of a con 
 gressional envoy after the Declaration of Independence had made 
 the appointment of such a person necessary. 
 
 V. ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE COMMITTEES OF CORRRESPOND- 
 ENCE AS ORGANS OF RESISTANCE TO ROYAL POWER. 
 
 A study of the history of Massachusetts Bay colony gives 
 unmistakable evidence that from 1764 until the meeting of the 
 first Continental Congress in 1774, the successful resistance to 
 the colonial policy of England was instituted and maintained by 
 a well organized committee system. This system may have had 
 its origin in the standing committees of the English Parliament, 
 but it was certainly modified and adapted to new conditions in 
 America under the stress of coercion. It became necessary early 
 in the disputes between governor and assembly to appoint com 
 mittees which could hold over the intervals between sessions, in 
 order to keep at white heat the one idea of a redress of griev 
 ances. As soon as the assembly met, differences inevitably de 
 veloped. Foreseeing prorogation, it appointed a committee to 
 work until such time as it could present its report on the pro 
 gress of its task. In June, 1764, the House of Representatives 
 chose a committee to write to the other colonies informing them 
 of the measures adopted in Massachusetts. 19 The House was at 
 once prorogued and met again in October. At once a large com 
 mittee was appointed to prepare a memorial to the king, assert 
 ing the rights of the colonists as Englishmen. In January, 1765, 
 Governor Bernard recommended moderation and submission to 
 the law of Parliament, as expressed in the Stamp Act. In reply, 
 the assembly chose a committee to consider the state of the prov 
 ince, which proposed the Stamp Act Congress at New York. 
 
 " Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), pp. 159-60. 
 
10 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 From 1765 to the time of the revolution, the governor kept 
 the General Court in session as little as possible. 20 Often, on 
 calling the assembly, he suddenly dismissed it, on the discovery 
 that it was deliberating upon resistance to his power. In 1767, 
 the town of Boston requested the governor to call the assembly, 
 but he declined. 21 At a meeting of the citizens of that town, 
 a committee was chosen to obtain subscribers to an agreement 
 to refuse to use British goods. The subscribers were numerous 
 and many other towns adopted measures and similar resolutions 
 through the action of committees. 22 
 
 So marked was this movement, that the amount of goods 
 imported from England in 1767 was 165,000 pounds less than 
 in 1764. In 1768 a large ship was sent back without unload 
 ing, 23 The General Court of 1768, chose a large committee to 
 consider the state of the province. Prominent members of this 
 committee were Gushing, Samuel Adams, James Otis and John 
 Hancock. This committee prepared three circular letters 
 through its secretary, Samuel Adams. 24 One was sent to the 
 colonial agent in England, one to the English ministry and one 
 to the king. In addition, a letter was sent to each House of 
 Representatives on the continent with a final expression as fol 
 lows: "The House is fully satisfied that your assembly is too 
 generous and enlarged in sentiment to believe that this letter 
 proceeds from an ambition of taking the lead or dictating to the 
 other assemblies. They freely submit their opinion to the judg 
 ment of others and shall take it kind in your House to point out 
 to them anything further it may be thought necessary. 25 
 
 20 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 178. 
 
 21 Ibid. p. 189. 
 * Ibid. p. 190. 
 M Ibid. p. 181. 
 14 Ibid. p. 190. 
 
 24 Bradford: History of Masscahusetts (1620-1820), p. 190. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL 11 
 
 This Communication was couched in the most reserved terms, 
 but it aimed to influence the other assemblies, nevertheless, and 
 the adroitness of the wording had just the desired effect. Digni 
 fied by the seal of approval of the Massachusetts assembly in the 
 writing of Samuel Adams, it was a clarion call to action. 
 
 The General Court was at once requested to rescind the let 
 ters. It refused to do so and was at once dissolved by Bernard, 
 the governor, but not before a committee drew up charges against 
 him, accompanied by a petition for his early recall. 26 
 
 It had long been suspected that the real instigator of these 
 radical moves in the Massachusetts assembly was Samuel Adams. 
 Plans were set on foot by Royalists to suppress him or take him 
 to England for trial as an incendiary. 27 Hutchinson wrote, "A 
 man Adams is rather considered as the opposer of government 
 and a sort of Wilkes in New England." 28 Adams plan of ac 
 tion seemed to be to provoke Hutchinson into making hostile and 
 arrogant answers to the resolutions of the assembly. In this he 
 admirably succeeded. To one of these resolutions Hutchinson 
 replied, "That the charter reserved to the governor the full 
 power, from time to time, to adjourn, prorogue or dissolve the 
 
 assembly To yield to them (assembly) this prerogative 
 
 there would be danger of encouraging the inhabitants of 
 
 other towns in the province to similar procedure which the 
 
 law had not made the business of town-meetings. 29 
 
 This reply accomplished two things which Adams had fore 
 seen. It provoked the assembly to greater opposition and it de 
 veloped co-operation among the towns of the province. Hutch 
 inson s communication was repeatedly read in the assembly and 
 scattered broadcast. At the psychological moment Adams pro- 
 
 58 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 184. 
 
 27 Hutchinson s Letters, I, p. 183. 
 
 28 Ibid. I, p. 167. 
 
 n Hutchinson: History of Massachusetts Bay, III, p. 363. 
 
12 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 posed "that a Committee of Correspondence be appointed to 
 consist of twenty-one persons, to state the rights of the colonists 
 and of this province in particular, as men and Christians and 
 as subjects and to communicate the same to the several towns 
 and to the world as the sense of this town, with the infringe 
 ments and violations thereof, that have been, or from time to 
 time, may be made. 30 
 
 The size of this committee as proposed by Adams was sig 
 nificant. He was evidently fearful of the possibility of the lodg 
 ing of too much power in the hands of a few men. Yet when 
 the committee met on November 3, 1772, and took up its work, 
 it at once delegated the work of preparing a statement to three 
 men. To Adams was assigned the task of stating the rights of 
 the colonists; the enumeration of infringements was delegated 
 to Joseph Warren, while the letter to be sent to the neighboring 
 towns was to be drawn up by Benjamin Church. 
 
 The results of the work of this committee were instantan 
 eous. Several towns (Marblehead, Koxbury, Cambridge, Ply 
 mouth) planned to adopt similar resolutions and appoint simi 
 lar committees. 31 By June, 1773, Hutchinson reported that 
 eighty towns had appointed such committees. 
 
 The ostensible purpose of these committees was to forward 
 information of all kinds from one town to another. Such was 
 the import of the letter of the Committee of Correspondence of 
 Boston to Cambridge, Dec. 29, 1772, 32 to Plymouth on the same 
 day and to Worcester, Sept. 11, 1773. The emphasis soon 
 changed, however, and we find the most important principle de 
 veloped in subsequent letters to be the independence of the judi 
 ciary. 33 A letter to Marblehead from Boston dated Nov. 24, 
 
 30 Hutchinson : History of Massachusetts Bay, III, p. 368. 
 
 81 Ibid. Ill, p. 369. 
 
 82 Writings of Samuel Adams, II, p. 392. 
 Ibid. Ill, p. 50. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL 13 
 
 1774, proposed a Continental Post. 34 A letter to Franklin as 
 agent, Mar. 31, 1774, emphasized the same principle, and de 
 veloped at length the wonderful effects of the Committees of 
 Correspondence. Adams informed Franklin that the people are 
 
 wonderfully enlightened and aroused They are united in 
 
 sentiment and their opposition to unconstitutional measures of 
 
 the government is become systematic colony communicates 
 
 fully with colony There is a common affection All 
 
 colonies are become one, because united in sentiment and opposi 
 tion to tyranny. 35 
 
 In a letter to Arthur Lee, as colonial agent, dated April 4, 
 1774, Adams indicates the final result to be, "the entire separa 
 tion and independence of the colonies. 36 On May 12. 1774, the 
 Committee of Correspondence of Boston wrote to a like committee 
 at Portsmouth asking aid in opposition to the Boston Port Bill. 37 
 On May 13, 1774, a letter was forwarded to the Committee of 
 Correspondence of Philadelphia on the same matter, 38 and to 
 Silas Deane on May 18, 1774, suggesting that the towns of Con 
 necticut voluntarily and at once, refuse to purchase British goods 
 and further suggested the formation of a conference of Commit 
 tees of Correspondence of the neighboring colonies. 39 
 
 The original Committees of Correspondence as proposed by 
 Adams had developed a basis for local confederation. Closely 
 associated through the colonial agent with other colonies having 
 the same or similar grievances, it was but a matter of time, be 
 fore these committees began to take on an inter-colonial char 
 acter and function, resulting in a definite, organized, continental 
 
 84 Writings of Samuel Adams, III, p. 80. 
 35 Ibid. Ill, pp. 85-92. 
 
 86 Ibid. Ill, pp. 97-100. 
 
 87 Ibid. Ill, p. 106. 
 
 88 Ibid. Ill, p. 109. 
 
 89 Ibid. Ill, p. 114. 
 
14 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 resistance. Indeed, this united movement began as early as the 
 year 1770, when the Massachusetts assembly appointed a com 
 mittee to correspond with the agent in England and with com 
 mittees in other colonies on the state of public affairs. 40 Early 
 in 1773 another large committee was chosen to correspond with 
 the committees of other colonies on political subjects. 41 It but 
 needed a concerted action of two colonies to lead the movement. 
 Virginia furnished the link by also proposing in 1770, a corre 
 spondence with Masachusetts concerning their grievances with 
 a view to union . On March 12, the House of Burgesses passed 
 a resolution for ascertaining the views of the other colonies. 42 
 
 On June 12, Samuel Cooper wrote to Franklin, "Virginia 
 has led the way by proposing correspondence between all the 
 
 colonies so that New England is now united with Virginia, 
 
 etc." 43 The Massachusetts House at once voted to correspond 
 with all the colonies. 44 
 
 This concerted action by these two colonies led at once to a 
 better understanding among all the colonies and hastened, with 
 out doubt, the calling of the First Continental Congress at Phila 
 delphia in September, 1774. 
 
 That Hutchinson realized the full importance of the work 
 of the committees is evidenced by his characterizing their letters 
 as "highly improper, and a glaring attempt to alter the con 
 stitution of the colonies that it was a procedure which 
 
 should have been considered an avowal of independence and 
 could be justified only on the principle of independence. 45 
 
 The result of this committee work was foreseen by Adams, 
 
 40 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 232. 
 
 41 Ibid. p. 232. 
 
 43 Virginia State Papers, VIII, p. 1. 
 
 43 Franklin: Works, VIII, pp. 49-50. 
 
 44 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 232. 
 
 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 233. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS OP THE CHIEF FACTORS OF CONTROL 15 
 
 Hutchinson and all other discriminating leaders. On June 17, 
 1774, at Salem, a series of resolves were presented providing for 
 the election of seven delegates to meet with delegates from other 
 colonies on September 1, 1774, at Philadelphia or other place to 
 be determined upon. 46 John Adams and Samuel Adams were 
 members of this delegation. Notice was at once sent to all other 
 colonies informing them of the action of the Massachusetts assem 
 bly. Almost immediately similar action was taken by them all 
 and the Congress was assured. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The folk-mote was primarily a form of local government 
 functioning as a committee of the whole. Transplanted to Amer 
 ica, it became a town-meeting, modified into a representative 
 form of government, due to the rapid growth of towns. The 
 people, always jealous of their rights as Englishmen, still con 
 trolled governmental action through their committees of dele 
 gates, who were definitely and uniformly instructed as to their 
 actions. 
 
 Increased economic restrictions caused a rapid crystalliza 
 tion of public sentiment and a revulsion of feeling against the 
 English ministry. This resentment was reflected in the assem 
 blies through the appointment of commttees, with power to in 
 struct delegates or to draw up resolutions relative to the state of 
 affairs. 
 
 Opposed and obstructed by the royal governors, these as 
 sembly committees sought partial relief through the appointment 
 of the colonial agent, who was in fact a committee of one with 
 delegated powers carefully limited by instructions. He, in a 
 
 * Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 240. 
 
16 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 limited way, performed some of the duties which the colonists 
 believed the royal governor should have executed in their behalf. 
 
 The next movement was a lateral one. Samuel Adams pro 
 posed the selection of a committee of correspondence in the Bos 
 ton town-meeting. The idea was at once accepted and followed 
 by many towns. By this method the whole public was kept con 
 stantly informed of the political conditions and public opinion 
 was thereby rapidly crystallized. 
 
 The next step was the formation of inter-colonial committees 
 of correspondence. The work of these committees was constantly 
 enlarged, but it was always limited by definite instructions. The 
 result of this inter-colonial co-operation was the development of 
 a continental spirit of resistance to coercion and a simultaneous 
 demand for a redress of grievances. 
 
 The final step in the propaganda, instigated and kept alive 
 by the Committees of Correspondence, was the determination of 
 the leaders in Massachusetts to secure complete independence. 
 
 The chief factors of control which originated in the colonial 
 towns and assembly and were carried to the First Continental 
 Congress, there to profoundly influence that body, were, there 
 fore : 
 
 (1) A deep seated resentment towards the English minis 
 try, especially by the Massachusetts and Virginia delegates. 
 
 (2) The fixed determination of the Massachusetts delegates 
 to secure independence as the only means of escaping economic 
 ruin and political slavery. 
 
 (3) The gradual adoption of the committee system as a 
 natural and effective means of securing this independence through 
 the control of the legislative and executive functions of Con 
 gress. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE FORMATION OF PARTIES IN CONGRESS AS A RESULT OP CON 
 FLICT BETWEEN FACTORS OF CONTROL AND THEIR PER 
 PETUATION THROUGH COMMITTEES. 
 
 1. 
 
 The delegates from Massachusetts proceeded to Philadelphia 
 irrevocably committed to a program of complete independence. 
 For this reason a large majority of the delegates from the other 
 colonies regarded them with deep suspicion. Met at Frankfort 
 by Dr. Rush, Mr. Mifflin, Mr. Bayard and others, they were 
 informed that they were regarded as four desperate adventurers. 
 They were advised against assuming the lead in Congress, since 
 this privilege had been reserved for Virginia as the leader of 
 the southern colonies. "This was plain speaking," said Johi* 
 Adams, "but it made a deep impression. That conversation has 
 given a coloring to the whole policy of the United States down 
 to this day. * 
 
 The supreme task of Massachusetts was to persuade the other 
 colonies to approve her extreme stand against England. She 
 had gone too far to retrace her steps. She must obtain aid or 
 perish. To attempt to withstand the military power of England 
 alone was unthinkable. 
 
 Committees were, therefore, organized through the influence 
 of Samuel Adams, with a nice regard for the susceptibilities of 
 the various delegates. But the work of these committees was so 
 slow that all delegations were soon dissatisfied. It soon developed 
 
 1 Hosmer: Samuel Adams, pp. 313-314. 
 
18 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 that the delegates from the Middle colonies were utterly opposed 
 to any move which favored independence. In this matter they 
 took their stand beside Virginia. This in itself, is evidence that 
 the Virginia delegates were lukewarm to the idea of independ 
 ence in spite of the fact that the House of Burgesses had taken 
 a decided stand in this matter some time before. John Adams 
 wrote relative to the Congress of 1774 as follows, "There was not 
 one member, except Patrick Henry, who appeared sensible of the 
 precipice, or rather the pinnacle, on which we stood, and had 
 courage and candor enough to acknowledge it. " 2 
 
 After two weeks of constant shifting, practically nothing 
 was accomplished. Finally on Sept. 17, the revolutionary re 
 solves of the Suffolk convention were placed before Congress. 
 Samuel Adams had guided them through the provincial assembly 
 under the immediate supervision of Joseph Warren. These re 
 solves declared that "no obedience is due from this province 
 (Massachusetts) to either or any part of the acts of Parlia 
 ment." 3 They further advised the meeting of a provincial con 
 gress ; directed the tax collectors to pay no money into the royal 
 treasury unless the constitution should be restored and finally 
 virtually threatened armed resistance. r 
 
 The direct object of introducing these resolves into Con 
 gress, can have been no other than to precipitate discussion or 
 action or approval of the radical stand of Massachusetts, thus 
 placing upon Congress the responsibility of accepting for the 
 whole country the attitude of the New England colonies. 
 
 This motive was at once suspected and caused the rapid 
 formation of opposing factions. Joseph Galloway placed him 
 self at the head of the party of conciliation in opposition to the 
 party of independence, which was fast forming about the New 
 
 3 John Adams: Works, X, p. 78. 
 8 Journals of Congress, I, pp. 9-14. 
 
THE FORMATION OF PARTIES IN CONGRESS 19 
 
 England delegates as a nucleus. The leader of the independence 
 party can be assumed to have been Samuel Adams. Galloway 
 refers to Adams as, "by no means remarkable for brilliant abili 
 ties, yet he (Adams) is equal to most men in popular intrigue 
 
 and the management of factions it was this man, who by 
 
 his superior application, managed the factions in Congress at 
 Philadelphia and the factions in New England. 4 
 
 Galloway s Plan of Union, presented as an offset to the 
 Suffolk resolves on Sept. 28, 1774, was defeated by a majority 
 of only one vote. 5 This close contest conclusively showed the 
 complexion of Congress. Even Franklin approved the plan, ably 
 seconded by Duane and Jay of New York. This vote produced 
 a marked effect upon the New England delegates. They learned 
 in a decisive manner, that they could not force their measures 
 through Congress. They determined, therefore, to attempt to 
 control measures by working indirectly through others and thus, 
 if possible, effect their plans. 
 
 The marshalling of forces slowly, but inevitably took place 
 The leaders were Galloway and Samuel Adams. Reconciliation 
 was cherished by a surprisingly large number of the delegates. 
 All felt union to be essential. All felt that the cause of Massa 
 chusetts involved the liberties of every colony. Yet all did not 
 see the urgency of engaging in active measures for her support. 
 
 After seven weeks of debate Congress accomplished three 
 important things. (1) It approved the Suffolk resolves, which 
 were in essence a declaration of war against England. (2) It 
 drew up a Declaration of Rights and (3) adopted the outlines 
 of an Association of the Colonies. 6 This, of course, was the re 
 sult of much compromise. 
 
 4 Galloway: Historical and Political Reflections, p. 67. 
 6 Journals of Congress, I, pp. 43, 44ff. 
 Ibid. I, pp. 19-22. 
 
20 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Two remarkable facts are revealed in these resolutions. 
 (1) The Declaration was almost identical in its wording with the 
 non-importation resolutions passed in the Boston town-meeting 
 in 1772. Furthermore it is remarkably similar to the Suffolk 
 resolves. The connection is obvious. The fact that these simi 
 larities were known at the time, shows the steady growth of a 
 strong independence party in Congress. (2) There is an as 
 sumption by Congress of legislative powers. Congress was os 
 tensibly a mere convention a debating club. Yet it adroitly 
 developed signs of nationality and union. Furthermore it was 
 clearly assuming executive powers of a most momentous na 
 ture. By the adoption of the Declaration of Rights urged by 
 John Adams, the thirteen colonies were nationalized. T 
 
 2. 
 
 The second Continental Congress was to meet on May 10, 
 1775. During the interval, matters rapidly crystallized in the 
 different colonies, especially in Massachusetts. A new assembly 
 resolved itself in October at Salem into a provincial Congress 
 and drafted resolutions which had all the effect of law through 
 out the colony. 8 Meeting again in November, the delegates to 
 the First Continental Congress made their report, which was 
 approved. The same delegates (with the exception of Bowdoin) 
 were returned with the addition of John Hancock. 9 The peo 
 ple were exhorted "to consider the danger and to be prepared 
 to meet and avert it, by their love of liberty and of their coun 
 try, by respect for the memories of their ancestors and by regard 
 for posterity; and to remember that they must stand or fall 
 
 T Chamberlain: John Adams and the Kevolution, p. 90. 
 
 Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 247. 
 
 Ibid. p. 247. 
 
THE FORMATION OF PARTIES IN CONGRESS 21 
 
 with the liberties of America, " 10 In February, 1775, a third 
 provincial Congress met. The committee of safety was con 
 tinued and its powers enlarged. General officers were appoint 
 ed and military stores were deposited at Concord and Wor 
 cester. 
 
 But there was a far different feeling in some of the other 
 colonies. In Georgia, the independence faction could not gain 
 acceptance of the Declaration of Rights. " A motion of approval 
 was also defeated in New York. 12 In a letter to Richard Henry 
 Lee, Patrick Henry says, Perhaps I am mistaken, but I fear 
 too great a bias to aristocracy prevails among the opulent. I 
 am myself a democrat on the plan of your admired friend (Sam 
 uel Adams). 13 
 
 It would be reasonable to suppose that the delegates to the 
 Second Continental Congress would be very definitely instructed 
 as to their powers and actions relative to independence. It was 
 evident that the most that could be expected of most of them 
 was an acquiescence to a decided protest to the English ministry. 
 
 From the moment the delegates assembled in Philadelphia 
 in May, 1775, party lines were sharply drawn. The Massachu 
 setts delegates were under greater suspicion than ever, because 
 of the recent violent trend of events in New England. The first 
 move of the New England delegates was to persuade Congress 
 to adopt the army before Boston. It was plain to the independ 
 ence leaders, however, that the only hope of success in this move 
 was in a combination with the Southern colonies, of which Vir 
 ginia was the recognized leader. Approached upon this matter, 
 the southern delegates agreed to vote for the adoption of the 
 army, if they, in turn, could name the commander-in-chief. To 
 
 " Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 248. 
 11 Candler: Revolutionary Records of Georgia, I, pp. 250-251. 
 u Lincoln: Constitutional History of New York, I, pp. 473-477. 
 " Tyler: Patrick Henry, p. 181. 
 
22 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 this the New England delegates acquiesced and Washington s 
 appointment to the position was generally understood by him 
 and the delegates to be conditioned upon political bargaining. 
 
 The union of New England and Virginia developed a work 
 ing majority in Congress. The power of this majority was 
 greatly extended by enlarging the scope of the work of the 
 Committee of Correspondence, which, as we have seen, had its 
 origin in Massachusetts and was one of the most important fac 
 tors in the development of a spirit of union and independence. 
 Resolutions were also presented to fire the patriot mind. To 
 encourage the Radicals in the hesitating colonies, Congress, on 
 June 10, 1775, cut the Gordian knot by urging the colonies to 
 set up their own independent governments. 14 
 
 In October, 1775, the Rhode Island delegates presented a 
 resolution to arm a fleet at the expense of the government. 15 A 
 committee was appointed consisting of New England delegates 
 who reported that each New England colony be requested to 
 furnish two ships to be placed under the command of Washing 
 ton. The Southern and Middle colonies opposed the plan, but it 
 was finally passed. 
 
 This vote was a blow to the moderates. The Independence 
 party was gaining strength. On October 26, the New Hampshire 
 delegation asked the advice of Congress as to its regulation of civil 
 power in the absence of a government. The subject was referred 
 to a committee composed of men favorable to the cause of inde 
 pendence. This committee reported that New Hampshire should 
 set up its own government. 16 
 
 The leader of the opposition to all measures indicating a 
 trend toward independence was John Dickinson. To him has 
 
 14 Journals of Congress, II, p. 84. 
 u Ibid. Ill, p. 274. 
 " Ibid. Ill, p. 298. 
 
THE FORMATION OF PARTIES IN CONGRESS 23 
 
 been ascribed the predominant politico-literary influence in 
 America from 1765 to 1775. But the radicals had now gone too 
 far for him. His consent to a concession of Parliamentary con 
 trol over America in matters of legislation was now roughly 
 discarded. His substitute, that an allegiance to the Crown was 
 the only just stand for the colonies to take was poison to the 
 Independence party. Rutledge, who in June, 1776, agreed with 
 Dickinson in his opposition to independence, at last expressed 
 impatience with his intellectual fastidiousness and nicety, declar 
 ing that the vice of all his productions was the "vice of refining 
 too much. 17 
 
 On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, moved 
 in Congress, "that these united colonies are and of right ought 
 to be free and independent states. 18 John Adams seconded 
 the motion. At once Dickinson opposed the measure because 
 of his well known views upon independence and because he had 
 been instructed to vote against it by his colony, should it be pre 
 sented. "Let us form our government," he said, "and agree 
 to terms of a confederation before assuming sovereignty. Settle 
 the existing disputes between the colonies and make firm our na 
 tion, then let America advance with majestic steps and as 
 sume her station among the sovereigns of the world. 19 
 
 But Dickinson s protest fell upon deaf ears. The opposition 
 to his principles was now too strong to be deterred from the 
 execution of its plans. The resolution was referred to a com 
 mittee consisting of John Adams, Franklin, Roger Sherman and 
 R. R. Livingston, and resulted in the promulgation of the Decla 
 ration of Independence, on July 4, 1776. 
 
 On July 3, John Adams wrote, "Yesterday, the greatest 
 
 1T John Jay: Correspondence and Public Papers, p. 67. 
 
 18 Journals of Congress, V, p. 425. 
 
 19 Stille: Life and Writings of John Dickinson, I, p. 1373. 
 
24 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 question was decided which ever was debated in America and a 
 
 greater, perhaps, never was or will be decided among men 
 
 When I look back to the year 1761 and recollect the arguments 
 
 concerning the Writs of Assistance which I have hitherto 
 
 considered as the commencement of the controversy between 
 Great Britain and America I am surprised at the sudden 
 ness as well as greatness of the Revolution. 20 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The Massachusetts delegates went to Philadelphia with a 
 fixed idea of influencing congressional action. Their situation 
 was desperate and demanded heroic measures. By persuasion 
 and pressure, they were able to induce Congress to adopt the 
 Suffolk resolves, thus committing it to decisive action. The 
 immediate result was the formation of opposing factions. Sam 
 uel Adams as leader of the independent faction, was able to con 
 trol most of the minor factions through his powers of persuasion. 
 Measures were passed in favor of the independence faction, but 
 always with a small majority. Meanwhile, Congress unconscious 
 ly assumed legislative and executive powers. The appointment 
 of committees followed as a means of controlling measures. This 
 method of conducting congressional business served two distinct 
 purposes. (1) It put an effective check upon any tendency to 
 arbitrary or irresponsible action, so much feared by the New 
 England delegates. (2) It was by the use of this method that 
 Adams was able to get through Congress the measures he felt, 
 necessary to assist Massachusetts and to accomplish independ 
 ence. As a consummate politician he used his powers of persua 
 sion on the floor of Congress to effect the selection of committee 
 members to his liking. He then instructed these members how 
 to act in the committee meetings. 
 
 30 John Adams: Familiar Letters to His Wife, p. 191. 
 
THE FORMATION OP PARTIES IN CONGRESS 25 
 
 Checked in this work by the decided opposition of Galloway 
 and others, Adams concluded a combination with the southern 
 colonies and thereby secured a working majority which could 
 control action even on the floor of Congress. The work of the 
 Committee of Correspondence was at once enlarged. It began 
 to instruct the colonial assemblies as to the proper procedure in 
 setting up independent governments. The impetus for inde 
 pendence gained in the colonial assemblies by the work of this 
 committee soon had its reflected effect upon the congressional 
 delegates. The sentiment for independence in Congress rapidly 
 crystallized and overcoming a fast dwindling opposition, result 
 ed in the Declaration of July 4, 1776. 
 
 The greatest factor in the accomplishment of this result 
 was, without doubt, the elaborate committee system, which had 
 its origin in the Massachusetts towns and colonial assembly un 
 der the inspiration of Samuel Adams. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM IN 
 
 CONGRESS. 
 
 On November 2, 1772, the Committee of Correspondence 
 began its life as a local institution of the Revolution. * On that 
 date a committee was also appointed to report on "The Rights 
 of the Province as men, as Christians, as subjects of the British 
 Empire. 2 Samuel Adams, a member of this committee, drew 
 up a set of resolutions. He expressly developed the first funda 
 mental positive law of all commonwealths or states to be the 
 establishment of the legislative power and the first fundamental 
 natural law which is to govern the legislative power itself is the 
 preservation of society. Therefore, the legislative power cannot 
 justly assume to itself a power to rule by extempore, arbitrary 
 decrees, but it is bound to see that justice is dispensed and that 
 the rights of the subjects be decided by promulgated standing 
 and known laws and by authorized independent judges. 3 
 
 This exposition seems, on the face of it, extremely theoreti 
 cal. To include it in the same resolution providing for the for 
 mation of a Committee of Correspondence seems incongruous, 
 but it seemed to be the exact thing needed at the time. It ap 
 pealed to the keenest and most dignified personages in the colony. 
 It placed the basis for redress of grievances upon a high plane 
 of political thought. It gave impetus to action once it had been 
 expressed in correspondence. 
 
 1 Collins: Composition of Committees of the American Revolution, 
 Amer. Hist. Association Report, 1901, V, p. 247. 
 
 * Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), p. 225. 
 8 Old South Leaflets, VII, p. 419ff. 
 
THE RISE OP THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 27 
 
 The importance of the Committee of Correspondence can 
 not be overestimated as a piece of revolutionary machinery. It 
 was not merely a channel through which public opinion might 
 flow. It created public opinion and played upon it to fashion 
 events. It was the mother of committees and these subsequent 
 committees, local and inter-colonial, worked up the war. It in 
 cluded measures in its scope of work and its activities compre 
 hended executive, legislative and judicial functions. It formed 
 the germ of government. 4 
 
 After the organization of the Second Continental Congress 
 in May, 1775, it was, therefore, natural that the appointing of 
 committees should be the first plan adopted for the carrying on 
 of the business of Congress. There were several very good rea 
 sons why this method of procedure should have been followed. 
 
 (1) In Massachusetts and to some extent in Virginia, this 
 had been the accepted method of accomplishing business of im 
 portance. This method had been the development of years. It 
 had fitted in with the circumstances. It had been, in many in 
 stances, a sheer necessity as a means of successfully combating 
 the arbitrary actions of the royal governors. The system was a 
 direct product of the times. 
 
 (2) In several of the colonies the plan had been successful 
 in accomplishing decisive results. Successive committees based 
 their resolutions upon the arguments and findings of previous 
 committees. Ground had thus been gradually won and this 
 ground was never surrendered again. The non-importation agree 
 ments, the Stamp Act Congress, the Committee of Correspond 
 ence were all results of a system of opportunism. The First Con 
 tinental Congress, itself, was the best evidence of its success. 
 
 (3) It was fitting that as many of the colonies as possible 
 
 4 Collins: Composition of Committees of the American Revolution, 
 Amer. Hist. Association Report, 1901, V, 1, p. 247. 
 
28 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 be represented in the conduct of the important affairs of Con 
 gress. This procedure would work out for a greater unity of 
 purpose. It was more democratic. It would silence criticism 
 and prevent the formation of factions and oppositions. 
 
 (4) It was, furthermore, a politic move on the part of the 
 New England delegates to strive to have the power in commit 
 tees divided among the several delegates, so as to eliminate, as 
 far as possible, the well founded suspicions of the Middle and 
 some of the Southern colonies that the New England delegates 
 were determined upon independence. 
 
 (5) In the interval between the First and Second Conti 
 nental Congress, public opinion had crystallized among the peo 
 ple of the colonies. This opinion was, of course, reflected in the 
 colonial assemblies. These assemblies, in turn, instructed their 
 new delegates as to what they should do or say in the new Con 
 gress. It would be necessary, therefore, to throw matters of im 
 portance into committees in order to prevent constant deadlocks 
 upon the floor of Congress. 
 
 (6) Deadly afraid of an executive in Congress, with pow 
 ers of control, the very absence of such a leader made it neces 
 sary that some assumption of executive power should take place. 
 This could best be done, with the least amount of friction, 
 through committees. 
 
 During the First Continental Congress, the Journals reveal 
 but 10 committees. All of these had to do with the Associa 
 tion; the statement of the rights of the colonies; the address to 
 the king; to the people of Great Britain; the non-importation 
 agreements, etc. 
 
 The membership of these committees was evenly distribut 
 ed among the colonies. On the first committee two members were 
 contributed by each colony. Both John and Samuel Adams 
 represented Massachusetts. 5 The second committee was com- 
 
 6 Journals of Congress, I, p. 28. 
 
THE RISE OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 29 
 
 posed of one representative from each colony. Patrick Henry 
 represented Virginia. 6 On the eight succeeding committees, 
 the different colonies were represented as follows : Massachusetts 
 6 ; New Hampshire 1 ; Connecticut ; Rhode Island ; New York 
 3 ; Delaware 1 ; Pennsylvania 4 ; Maryland 2 ; Virginia 9 ; New 
 Jersey 1 ; North Carolina 1 ; South Carolina 2, while Georgia 
 was not then represented in Congress. 
 
 There is evidence here that the Massachusetts delegates profit 
 ed by the advice given them on the way to Philadelphia. The 
 deference shown to Virginia by Massachusetts in the selection 
 of these delegates was not lost upon her. The combined com 
 mittee membership of the two colonies upon the eight committees, 
 was 18 against 11 for the Middle colonies, which, as we have 
 seen, were moderate in their stand on independence. 
 
 The serious selection of committees began after the organi 
 zation of the Second Continental Congress. During the re 
 mainder of the year 1775, 102 special committees were counted. 
 Most of these committees range from 3 to 13 members. Of 51 
 committees taken at random during this period, the average 
 membership of each committee was five and a fraction. 
 
 The objects for which these committees were appointed were 
 as varied and as numerous as their number. There were, besides, 
 some dozen standing committees, all composed of a large number 
 of men. The work of these committees, in general, seems ex 
 tremely trivial, in view of the importance of the work confront 
 ing Congress at the time. 
 
 It is plain that the work could and should have been sepa 
 rated and grouped into well defined departments having more 
 or less executive powers. But nowhere is there any indication 
 that such a course was even contemplated during the years 1775, 
 1776 or 1777. 
 
 8 Journals of Congress, I, p. 29. 
 
30 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 During the year 1776, 169 special committees were appoint 
 ed or elected, besides those which held over from 1775. There 
 were also 14 standing committees. Of 35 committees taken 
 chronologically during 1776, one consisted of 13 members, 14 
 of three members, while the average number of members in each 
 committee was four and a fraction. 
 
 During 1777, 95 special committees were appointed or elect 
 ed. There were, besides, 17 standing committees. Of 19 com 
 mittees taken in a chronological order during this year, the 
 largest number of members on any committee was 5 and the 
 lowest 3, while the average number of members in each com 
 mittee was three and a fraction. 
 
 During 1778, 210 special committees were appointed or elect 
 ed. Of these, 151 were noted as to their nature and purpose. 89 
 were selected to consider personal or public communications sent 
 to Congress by individuals, committees or colonies. It would be 
 difficult to classify all these communications as to their nature 
 and requirements, but it is plain that they all might have 
 been properly turned over to one committee as a clearing house, 
 which could, in turn, have distributed them to the proper stand 
 ing committees or to departments, had such departments been 
 in existence. Instead, these communications were placed in the 
 hands of 89 separate committees. With the existence of proper 
 departments, but six would have been necessary, with the pos 
 sible addition of six standing committees. 
 
 During 1779, but 104 special committees were appointed or 
 elected. Of 64 of these committees observed, 39 were selected to 
 consider communications alone. 
 
 This sudden reduction in the number of committees was due 
 to the fact that many letters were, during this year, referred to 
 other previously appointed "letter" committees. However, 
 there was no change in the idea or method of conducting the work 
 
THE RISE OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 31 
 
 of Congress. During this year, of the 104 committees noted, but 
 10 consisted of 5 members, 2 of 4 members, 1 of 6 members, 1 of 2 
 members and 1 of 13 members, while the average number of mem 
 bers in each committee was about three. 
 
 During this year, there was a marked change in the person 
 nel of the committees. It was constantly changing, either through 
 absences which forced the appointment of new members to fill 
 vacancies ; through the transfer of men from one committee to an 
 other or through other reasons not easy to determine. 
 
 During 1780, 193 special committees were elected. There 
 were, besides, 8 standing committees. Of these 193 committees, 
 just 100 were selected to consider special communications in the 
 form of letters. The marked reduction in the number of stand 
 ing committees was due to the formation of some ill-defined de 
 partments, such as War, Treasury, Commerce, etc. The nature 
 of the special committees outside of the " letter" committees still 
 varied greatly. Of the 193 committees observed during this year, 
 131 were noted as to their membership. Two committees con 
 sisted of 6 members each : 17 of 5 members each ; 6 of 4 members ; 
 104 of 3 members ; 2 of 2 members, while the average number of 
 members in each committee was 3.2. 
 
 The result of the adoption of the committee system in con 
 ducting the business of Congress soon became apparent. Ineffi 
 ciency of an extreme nature inevitably followed. It was an ex 
 cellent example of the effect of the decentralization of power so 
 often exemplified by the town-meeting and advocated by Samuel 
 Adams and others as the essence of democracy. 
 
 Even when Boards were elected to perform the work which 
 would naturally be delegated to them, special committees were 
 elected to do such work. Centralization of power and responsi 
 bility was bitterly opposed, even though its admitted corollary 
 was efficiency and the dispatch of a vast amount of work. 
 
32 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 During the years 1775 to 1780, the committee system, while 
 showing improvement in some minor respects, was still the most 
 important factor in the conduct of business. The result was an 
 almost total inability to get things done and this weakness was 
 reflected in all the departments of the Congress. 
 
 The distribution of the membership on these special com 
 mittees among the colonies and their personnel may well claim 
 our attention and may throw some light upon the persistence of 
 the committee system through so many years, in spite of its ineffi 
 ciency. In the year 1775, of 10 committees selected because of 
 their importance, the representation of the different colonies on 
 these committees was as follows : Massachusetts 6 ; Connecticut 3, 
 making 9 in all from New England. Pennsylvania had 7, New 
 York 11 and Maryland 2, making 20 in all from the Middle colo 
 nies. Virginia had 10, North Carolina 2, and South Carolina 4, 
 making 16 in all from the Southern colonies. The percentage of 
 representation of each group of colonies on these 10 committees 
 was as follows : New England 20% ; Middle colonies 45% ; South 
 ern colonies 35%. 
 
 If a second period in the same year is selected beginning 
 June 25, a study of the committees in a chronological order re 
 veals a marked change in proportionate representation among th 
 colonies. 
 
 The distribution among the colonies was now as follows : 
 Massachusetts 7, Connecticut 6, Rhode Island 3, New Hampshire 
 3, making 19 in all from New England. Delaware was repre 
 sented by 2 members, New York by 8, Pennsylvania by 8, Mary 
 land by 6, and New Jersey by 2, making 26 in all from the Middle 
 colonies. Virginia was represented by 6 members, South Caro 
 lina by 6, and Georgia by 3, making 15 in all from the Southern 
 colonies. These figures would show that the representation was 
 very evenly distributed among the colonies. 
 
THE RISE OP THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 33 
 
 It has been intimated, however, that the New England and 
 Southern colonies, if combined, would always have a balance of 
 power in Congress, even if all the delegates from these two groups 
 of colonies did not follow the majority of their fellows in acting 
 together. The following statement gives some light on the possi 
 bility of such a combination. "The Adams s of Massachusetts 
 and the Lees of Virginia were the dangerous minority, who had 
 all along aimed at independency but whose purposes had never 
 been so openly exposed as now. Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Jay and Mr. 
 Deane were the exponents of the majority. During the month of 
 September, 1775, the committees, if nothing else, show with tol 
 erable clearness, the temper prevailing in the body. " 7 John 
 Adams himself said, Mr. Samuel Adams and myself were very 
 intimate with Richard Henry Lee and he agreed with us per 
 fectly in the great system of our policies and by this means we 
 kept a majority of the delegates of Virginia with us. Harrison, 
 Pendleton and some others showed jealousy of this intimacy at 
 times. Harrison courted Hancock and others of our colleagues, 
 but we had a majority and gave ourselves no trouble about their 
 little intrigues. 8 
 
 These statements are significant. They appear to be a clear 
 indication of the trend of events and they clearly show that an 
 attempt was being made to control, absolutely, the actions of 
 Congress through the committee system. 
 
 In the beginning of 1776, a chronological list of ten commit 
 tees was noted. Either Samuel or John Adams are found on 
 every one of them. Five of these committees had to do with the 
 army, with General Washington or with the regulation of trade 
 or foreign affairs. The distribution of the colonies upon these 
 committees was as follows : Massachusetts was represented by 19 
 
 1 Charles Francis Adams: Life of John Adams, I, p. 183. 
 * John Adams: Works, III, p. 32. 
 
34 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 members ; Rhode Island by 3 ; Connecticut by 5 ; New York by 4 ; 
 New Jersey by 2 ; Pennsylvania by 1 ; Delaware by 1 ; Maryland 
 by 1 ; Virginia by 7 ; North Carolina by 1 ; South Carolina by 4. 
 The New England colonies alone controlled 19 of the total mem 
 bership of 40 members on these 10 committees; the Southern 
 colonies controlled 12, while the Middle colonies controlled 9. 
 The combined membership of the New England and Southern 
 colonies was 31 out of a total membership of 40. 
 
 During the latter part of 1776, the distribution and per 
 sonnel of 10 committees taken in a chronological order were 
 noted. John Adams or Samuel Adams or Richard Henry Lee 
 were found on every one of them. Lee, alone, served on 7 of thest 
 committees. Nine of these committees had to do with executive 
 functions. In these 10 committees the colonies were represented 
 as follows: Massachusetts was represented by 10 members; New 
 York by 2 ; New Jersey by 2 ; Maryland by 1 ; Virginia by 10 and 
 South Carolina by 1. The total for New England was 10 mem 
 bers; for the Middle colonies 5 and for the Southern colonies 11. 
 Combined, the New England and Southern colonies controlled 21 
 out of a total membership of 26. 
 
 Three things of marked significance are here revealed. (1) 
 The number of members on these special committees had been ap 
 preciably reduced. (2) The number of colonies represented on 
 these committees had been reduced, on. the average, by half. (3) 
 There is evidence of a centralization of power in the hands of a 
 few men with increased executive functions. 
 
 The ulterior functions of the committee system now begin to 
 be revealed. By this system, and this system alone, could the 
 destinies of the united colonies be controlled by the Radical or 
 Liberty party in Congress. The work of Congress was placed in 
 the hands of committees, consisting of a membership whose ma 
 jority was unalterably opposed to any centralization of power 
 
THE RISE OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 35 
 
 whatsoever. Yet, these men, under the leadership of the Adams s 
 and the Lees, were actually attempting to accomplish centraliza 
 tion of power under the very eyes of Congress. Opposition to 
 this procedure was another factor which aided in producing in 
 efficiency and chaos in Congress. 
 
 During 1776, there were 169 special and 14 standing com 
 mittees. Samuel Adams served upon 22 special and 4 standing 
 committees. John Adams served upon 13 special and 2 standing 
 committees. Of a total of 43 committees taken chronologically 
 from June 17, 1776 to Dec. 28, 1776, all of which had to do with 
 important national affairs, Massachusetts, alone, controlled 14 
 of them, while in a combination with the Southern colonies, she 
 controlled 32 of the total of 43 committees. Of these 32 commit 
 tees, 11 had to do with the control of the army and instructions 
 to Washington and 8 with the conduct of foreign affairs. Samuel 
 Adams served on 7 and John Adams served on 4 of the army com 
 mittees, while each served on 4 of the 8 committees relative to 
 foreign affairs. 
 
 Of the 95 special committees elected during 1777, besides the 
 17 standing committees, Samuel Adams served on 16 special and 
 
 I standing committee (Board of War) ; John Adams served on 
 
 II special committees and one standing committee, while Richard 
 Henry Lee served on 18 special committees. Most of these spe 
 cial committees were those upon which the Adams s were not 
 serving, so that if the two colonies of Massachusetts and Virginia 
 did not actually control every committee, they used their pow 
 erful influence in almost every special committee. They, with 
 out doubt, actually controlled 45 of the 95 special committees and 
 knew exactly what was going on in all the rest of them. 
 
 Of 158 of the 210 special committees elected in 1778, which 
 have been observed in detail, 66 were elected to consider letters. 
 Of the remaining 92 committees, it was found that the represen- 
 
36 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 tation of the different colonies on the more important committees, 
 such as those elected to prepare instructions to the American 
 Commissioners in France or to Washington ; to act upon the mat 
 ter of foreign relations, etc., or to receive communications from 
 the French minister, was as follows: Massachusetts had 14 
 members ; Connecticut 27 ; Rhode Island 4 ; Virginia, 24 and 
 South Carolina 15. From the Middle Colonies the membership 
 was as follows : New York 18 ; New Jersey 13 ; Pennsylvania 3 ; 
 Delaware 3 and Maryland 8. The total membership of the New 
 England and Southern colonies was 84 as compared to 45 from 
 the Middle colonies. This would seem natural, since two groups 
 would necessarily more than outvote a third group. But the sig 
 nificant fact is that five colonies of the first two groups had near 
 ly double the representation of the third group of five colonies. 
 Thus Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia and South Carolina 
 dominated practically every committee. On the other hand, a 
 majority of the memberships of the unimportant committees, 
 such as those relative to seals, petitions, celebrations, accounts, 
 letters, etc., went to the Middle colonies. 
 
 During 1779, 26 different men were represented 244 times 
 on the total of 104 special committees elected. Of these 26 dif 
 ferent men, 4 were from Massachusetts, 5 from Connecticut, 1 
 from Rhode Island, 2 from New York, 1 from Delaware, 4 from 
 New Jersey, 2 from Pennsylvania, 4 from Maryland, 2 from 
 Virginia and 1 from South Carolina. It should be noted that the 
 New England colonies furnished 10 of the 26 men; the Middle 
 colonies furnished 13, while only 3 came from the Southern colo 
 nies. Now a most remarkable fact is discovered, when it is con 
 sidered in the light of what has been said concerning committee 
 control. The three men of the Southern colonies served on 51 
 of the 104 committees ; the 13 from the Middle colonies served on 
 35, while the 10 men from the New England colonies served on 
 
THE RISE OP THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 37 
 
 81. The New England and Southern colonies thus had a com 
 bined membership of 132 as compared to 36 from the Middle 
 colonies and these 132 memberships were contributed by only 
 one-half of all the men represented on the 104 committees. Here 
 is clear proof of the increasing determination and power to con 
 trol national affairs by a very few colonies represented by men 
 who entertained very definite views concerning the proper invest 
 ment of power in the hands of a few men. 
 
 The committees on military and foreign affairs were dis 
 tributed as follows: New England colonies, 28 members repre 
 sented by S men ; the Middle colonies, 20 members represented by 
 7 men, while the Southern colonies had 17 members represented 
 by 2 men. The New England and Southern colonies had together 
 45 members represented by 10 men, while the Middle colonies had 
 20 members represented by 7 men. The tendency here, relative 
 to the control of executive functions in the more important af 
 fairs of the colonies, is plain. 
 
 During 1780, of the 131 committees noted in a chronological 
 order, the membership was limited to 48 men. The distribution 
 of these men among the colonies was as follows: Massachusetts 
 68, Connecticut 60, Rhode Island 28, New Hampshire 2, making 
 158 in all. New York contributed 73, New Jersey 27, Delaware 
 28, Pennsylvania 21 and Maryland 25, making 174 in all, while 
 Virginia contributed 11, South Carolina 15, North Carolina 38 
 and Georgia 2, making 66 in all. Here is shown for the first time, 
 the growing power of the Middle colonies. This means that the 
 conservative, constructive policy of men like Morris, Franklin, 
 the Livingstons and others was gaining strength. Furthermore, 
 there is evidence of the beginning of a coalition between Massa 
 chusetts and the Middle colonies. Witherspoon of New Jersey, 
 for example, was an able aid of Samuel Adams during the years 
 1779, 1780 and 1781. There is also noted a distinct falling off 
 
38 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 in the power and influence of Virignia and the other Southern 
 colonies. The ways had begun to part and Richard Henry Lee 
 was practically the only member from Virginia who openly sup 
 ported what may with propriety be called the * militia" policy 
 of the New England or Liberty party. 
 
 Coincident with this change, there appears a gradual de 
 velopment of executive power in spite of the large number of 
 committees still appointed. Much work was now being done by 
 the Boards of War, Admiralty, Commerce, and even a Committee 
 of Foreign Affairs was given some work to do in connection with 
 the conduct of foreign affairs. 
 
 It is further noticeable that letters from Washington are 
 now referred to committees representing in their membership no 
 one colony or group of colonies. Even the Committee of For 
 eign Affairs was not now under the control of the New England 
 delegates. Above all there is a remarkable falling off in the 
 original membership of Congress, only Sherman, McKean, Sam 
 uel Adams, Dana and Bland having retained their membership 
 in Congress from 1775 to 1780. 
 
 During 1781, 261 special committees were elected. Of these 
 127 were formed for the purpose of considering communications. 
 But 45 of these seemed to have as their function the consideration 
 of important and constructive work. This seems to point to the 
 fact that, in spite of the increased number of special committees, 
 the important work of Congress was being gradually concentrated 
 in the hands of Boards or standing committees. Aside from the 
 committees elected to consider the reports of the different Boards 
 and standing committees, the membership of the remaining com 
 mittees was very much scattered, no colony or set of colonies hav 
 ing any decided advantage. But one of all these special com 
 mittees was elected to consider matters relative to foreign rela 
 tions and this committee was to make proper arrangements to 
 receive the French minister. 
 
THE RISE OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 39 
 
 On May 15, 1781, a new feature in the election of committees 
 was developed. The weakening of the control of the special com 
 mittees by the New England and Southern colonies has been 
 noted. Coincident with this we note a marked increase in the 
 number of special committees during 1781. In desperation, the 
 constructive elements in Congress proposed a weekly committee, 
 whose functions should be the distribution of all business to the 
 proper channels for consideration and action. This committee 
 was, in reality, a steering committee. 
 
 Here seemed to be another chance for the New England 
 leaders to gain control of the conduct of Congressional actions. 
 By controlling the selection of the steering committees each week, 
 they could check, promote or divert measures to their liking. 
 Observation shows that some such attempt was made. In the 34 
 committees of this kind, elected from the 15th of May to the end 
 of the year 1781, the New England colonies contributed 28 mem 
 bers; the Southern colonies 31 members, while the Middle colo 
 nies contributed 34 members. The New England and Southern 
 colonies had, combined, 59 members as compared to 34 from the 
 Middle colonies. While the combination between the New Eng 
 land and the Southern colonies did not mean so much in 1781 as 
 in 1778, yet the totals show that the power of the Radicals in 
 Congress was still formidable. Of these 34 committees, New 
 England and the Southern colonies absolutely controlled 7 by 
 having every member on them from these colonies. They con 
 trolled two of the three members of the committee in 16 of the 34 
 weeks, leaving 11 weekly committees exclusively controlled by the 
 members from the Middle colonies. During the last six weeks of 
 the year, the Middle colonies seem to have obtained control of the 
 majority of the membership in this weekly committee. But this 
 was apparently of little consequence, for according to the rec 
 ords, not one special committee was appointed, outside of the 
 
40 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 steering committees, from the 31st of October to the last day of 
 the year. 
 
 The reason for such an omission of committees is not appar 
 ent. The committee system, as a scheme of Congressional con 
 trol, was fast running its course. The war had been concluded. 
 The specific aims of the Radicals had been accomplished, but 
 the amount of time and the number of opportunities lost which 
 might have been used to shorten the war through solidifying the 
 efforts and powers of an efficient government were beyond com 
 putation. 
 
 The nature and personnel of Congressional committees, 
 leaves no room for doubt concerning the purpose of the commit 
 tee system and its inevitable tendencies. Whether the leaders 
 perceived the final results of such a policy is beside the question. 
 The system worked for a relatively long period and the system 
 was the necessary cause of inefficiency and the forerunner of ex 
 ecutive powers in responsible governmental departments. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The committee sj stem had its origin in Massachusetts under 
 the guidance of Samuel Adams. This system was at once adopted 
 by Congress as a means of conducting business, because it had 
 been eminently successful in accomplishing results in the colo 
 nies. It was also a democratic method of carrying out the func 
 tions of government and effectually prevented the centralization 
 of power. It was an elaboration of the town-meeting. 
 
 It was soon found by the Radicals, however, that the com 
 mittee system was the only method by which their ideas of inde 
 pendence could hope to prevail. The next step was a political 
 combination between the New England and Southern colonies in 
 order that the committee system might be absolutely controlled 
 and used for the ends in view. 
 
THE RISE OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 41 
 
 A study of the committee system from 1775 to 1781 shows 
 how this process of control was gradually evolved. The imme 
 diate effect was the decentralization of power and inefficiency in 
 Congress in the conduct of business, but marked centralization 
 of power in the hands of the Radicals for furthering their own 
 ideas and principles. This centralization was actually accom 
 plished by reducing the size of committees, by a reduction in the 
 number of colonies represented on the various committees and by 
 an increase in the number of representatives from particular col 
 onies having definite principles to promulgate. 
 
 Beginning in the year 1780, the power of the Radicals in 
 Congress began to weaken. The Constructionists, largely repre 
 senting the Middle colonies, were able to break the selfish hold 
 of the Liberty party. Executive power began to develop and ex 
 pressed itself in well defined Boards and Departments. By 1781, 
 the committee system as a scheme of control of Congressional 
 actions had almost completely lost its power. This break-up was 
 hastened by a change in old party alignments, which had been so 
 effective in accomplishing results in the early years, and the equal 
 distribution of representatives from the different colonies on most 
 of the important committees or in the executive departments. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM UPON THE 
 CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
 The first committee having anything to do with the conduct 
 of foreign affairs was elected on November 29, 1775. On this 
 date, it was resolved "that a committee of five be appointed for 
 the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great 
 Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world, and that they lay 
 their correspondence before Congress when directed." The 
 members of this committee were Benjamin Harrison of Vir 
 ginia ; Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania ; Thomas Johnson of 
 Maryland; John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and John Jay of 
 New York. The Middle colonies were here well represented, 
 having four of the five members. * 
 
 Some interesting observations may be made concerning this 
 committee. (1) Congress resolved. This was, as we have ob 
 served, its accustomed way of doing business. (2) A committee 
 of five was elected. This number was characteristic of most of 
 the committees formed. They ranged from three to thirteen, 
 and thus centralization of power was prevented. (3) The com 
 mittee was appointed for the sole purpose, etc. Its powers were 
 clearly defined and limited. (4) Its correspondence was to be 
 laid before Congress ivhen desired by that body. Thus Con 
 gress was to have absolute and continuous control of its ap 
 pointed committee. 
 
 Party politics were at once in evidence in the appointment 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, I, p. 192. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 43 
 
 and control of this committee. The Liberty* faction was not 
 strong enough to control the personnel of this committee, but 
 did manage to limit and define its powers. 
 
 That this committee was not considered a diplomatic one is 
 shown by the fact that on December 2, 1775, Congress resolved 
 that the Committee of Correspondence be directed to use their 
 endeavors to find out and engage in the service of the United 
 colonies, skillful engineers, not exceeding four, to be paid equally 
 to what they received in former services. 2 On May 10, 1776, 
 it was resolved that the Committee of Secret Correspondence be 
 directed to lay their proceedings before Congress on the follow 
 ing Monday, withholding names of persons they have employed 
 or with whom they have corresponded. 3 There is no apparent 
 evidence to show just how the committee came to assume the new 
 name now used by it. There is a possibility that the name was 
 transferred by common consent or usage from that of the Secret 
 Committee, which had been previously appointed to purchase 
 supplies for the army. At any rate, there is little reference to 
 the Secret Committee, as such, after this time and increased ref 
 erence to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. The latter 
 did all the work of the first committee, together with much cor 
 respondence. At the same time the Committee of Secret Corre 
 spondence was beginning to take on some of the functions of a 
 diplomatic committee, yet it was not considered as a foreign 
 affairs committee, judging from the attitude of Congress to it. 
 
 This observation is borne out by the fact that on May 9, 
 
 *Note: The terms Independence party, Liberty faction and Radicals all 
 refer to the same body of men in Congress. The differences between them 
 were due to differences in the stage of their development, rather than to dif 
 ferences in principles. The Independnce party men soon became Liberty 
 men and the Liberty men in turn became Radicals in order that they might 
 insure the acceptance of Liberty principles. 
 
 * Secret Journals of Congress, I, p. 66. 
 
 * Journals of Congress, IV, p. 345. 
 
44 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 1776, it was resolved that an order for $10,000 be drawn on the 
 treasurer in favor of the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 for the purchase of two vessels, they to be accountable. * That 
 this committee was performing the functions of a Board of War 
 is here evident. 
 
 In September, 1776, Congress, again, in a committee of the 
 whole, worked out a set of instructions for Franklin, giving de 
 tailed instructions concerning the presenting and handling of a 
 treaty with France, indicating in the minutest details what ar 
 ticles to insist upon, what to surrender at once and what to use 
 as "pawns" in the game. 5 On September 26, 1776, a commit 
 tee of four was appointed to prepare a draft of instructions to 
 Franklin and his two colleagues (Deane and Jefferson). 6 On 
 September 28, Congress accepted the draft of instructions drawn 
 up by this Committee. It was also resolved on this date that the 
 Committee of Secret Correspondence be directed to export pro 
 duce or remit bills equal to 1,000 Ibs. sterling, subject to the or 
 der of the Commissioners in France for their support. 7 
 
 Here we have conclusive evidence of the unimportant for 
 eign relations functions of the Committee of Secret Correspond 
 ence. All such relations and functions were given into the hands 
 of a special committee. But this is just what should be ex 
 pected, in view of what is known concerning the fear of too 
 much concentration of power in the hands of a few. The Com 
 mittee of Secret Correspondence possessed no power of its own 
 to decide or to act upon any war measures whatsoever, and prac 
 tically had no power to act upon measures coming within its 
 own jurisdiction. 
 
 On December 24, 1776, Congress resolved that a committee 
 
 4 Journals of Congress, V, p. 529. 
 
 Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 27, 28, 29. 
 
 Ibid. II, p. 31. 
 
 Ibid. II, pp. 33, 34. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 45 
 
 of five be appointed to prepare and report on a plan for ob 
 taining foreign assistance. 8 The men elected to this committee 
 were Gerry of Massachusetts ; Witherspoon of New Jersey ; Rich 
 ard Henry Lee of Virginia; Clark of New Jersey and Samuel 
 Adams of Massachusetts. 
 
 The name of Samuel Adams is here found upon a foreign 
 affairs committee for the first time. This clearly indicates the 
 increased influence of the Radicals. Unable to control the per 
 sonnel of the original Committee of Correspondence, they were 
 able to limit its powers, and defeat its functioning as a foreign 
 relations committee. Here we find a special committee having 
 for its definite work the conduct of foreign relations and it is con 
 trolled almost completely by the Radicals, four of the five mem 
 bers coming from that faction, since it was known that Wither 
 spoon was in sympathy with the Radical policies and it is entirely 
 possible that he might have influenced Clark, the fifth member 
 of the committee. 
 
 Even before this, on September 26, 1776, a committee of 
 four had been elected to draft letters of credence to the Commis 
 sioners in France, another piece of work which should have gone 
 to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. 9 The members of 
 this committee were Morris of New York ; R. H. Lee of Virginia ; 
 Wythe of Virginia and John Adams of Massachusetts. Here 
 again the Radicals controlled three of the four votes on this com 
 mittee. 
 
 The very presence of Samuel Adams, John Adams and R. H. 
 Lee on such committees presages the beginning of a so-called 
 "militia" policy in the conduct of foreign affairs. In the in 
 structions to William Lee as Commissioner to Vienna, this Radi 
 cal committee directed him as follows : t You will seize the first 
 favorable moment to solicit, with decent firmness and respect, an 
 
 * Journals of Congress, II, p. 36. 
 
 Journals of Congress, V, p. 827. 
 
46 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 acknowledgement of the independence of these states and the 
 public reception of their commissioners as the representatives 
 of a sovereign state. 10 The instructions to Ralph Izard, Com 
 missioner to Tuscany, were identical in language. Here was the 
 launching of a policy which was destined to cause a perilous 
 situation in the conduct of American foreign relations. 
 
 These men of the Radical section or faction in Congress, 
 sought to democratize all efforts to secure international co-opera 
 tion in the conduct of foreign affairs. They feared the centrali 
 zation of power even in the hands of envoys and they were 
 afraid of the power residing in the crowned heads of Europe. 
 Despising all accepted methods of diplomacy, they were deter 
 mined that whatever work of a foreign nature must be done, 
 should be controlled by men of a set and determined purpose, 
 who would make aggressive demands upon foreign powers 
 worthy of recognition. It is worth considering whether these 
 men saw the impending danger of this line of procedure. They, 
 apparently, did not see the defects of an elaborate committee 
 system. It cannot be assumed that they were alive to the out 
 come of the committee system projected into the conduct of for 
 eign affairs. 
 
 On December 27, 1776, Congress directed the Committee of 
 Secret Correspondence to direct the Commissioners in France to 
 procure 100,000 stand of arms. " This is the first instance where 
 this committee had anything to do with the men in France over 
 whom it might be assumed to have had full control. Its diplo 
 matic character was here, for the first time, feebly recognized. 
 It is safe to conclude, however, that the work of the committee 
 consisted mainly in the securing of money, munitions and sup 
 plies, while the real work of foreign relations was conducted by 
 the special committee elected three days before. 
 
 w Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 350. 
 u Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 36, 37. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 47 
 
 On April 17, 1777, Congress resolved that the Committee 
 of Secret Correspondence be altered and that for the future, it 
 be styled the Committee for Foreign Affairs. 12 It was further 
 resolved that a secretary be appointed or elected to said com 
 mittee with a salary of $70 per month. The secretary was to 
 take an oath of secrecy. After some debate Thomas Paine was 
 elected secretary of the committee. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the motion to change the name 
 of the Committee of Secret Correspondence was made by its 
 friends. These friends, however, were not the Kadicals. It was 
 thought by the Constructionists that if the committee were 
 recognized by name as having some functions of a diplomatic 
 nature, the work of the committee along this line might eventu 
 ally become of more importance. It will be interesting to note if 
 the change in name did bring to it more work of a diplomatic 
 nature than before. 
 
 Almost immediately, the Radicals tried to control this com 
 mittee. On April 17, 1777, the same day upon which the change 
 in the name of the Committee of Secret Correspondence had 
 been effected, it was moved that two members be added to the 
 Committee for Foreign Affairs. 13 The men proposed were 
 Lovell of Massachusetts and Heyward of South Carolina. This 
 recommendation as to the personnel of the enlarged committee 
 was, however, scratched out of the journals. On May 26, 1777, 
 the same names were again proposed and this time they were 
 elected to the committee. 14 Fearing that the change in name 
 actually did mean a change in the nature of the work of the 
 original Committee of Secret Correspondence, the Radicals at 
 tempted to change the personnel of the Committee for Foreign 
 Affairs entirely, and in this they largely succeeded, though pre- 
 
 " Journals of Congress, VII, p. 274. 
 " Ibid. VII, p. 276. 
 14 Ibid. VIII, p. 385. 
 
48 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 viously the committee had been, under the leadership of Robert 
 Morris of New York, overwhelmingly conservative and construc 
 tive in its policy. 
 
 The addition of these two Radicals to the Committee for 
 Foreign Affairs did not give the Radicals complete control of the 
 committee, however. It was great enough, nevertheless, to limit 
 to a large degree, the power of the Committee for Foreign Af 
 fairs and thus minimize its importance. The Radicals then had 
 recourse to the election of special committees again as some of the 
 following will show: 
 
 (1) On May 1, 1778, a committee of three (R. H. Lee, Gov 
 ern eur Morris, Roger Sherman) was elected to draw up proper 
 instructions to the Commissioners to foreign courts. 15 Here is a 
 clear case of a special committee assuming the functions of the 
 Committee for Foreign Affairs. Two of the three men composing 
 the committee were Radicals, fully pledged to the " militia" pol 
 icy in the conduct of foreign affairs. (2) On May 4, 1778, a 
 committee of three (R. H. Lee, Dana, Drayton) was elected to 
 prepare a form of ratification of treaties already suggested. lfl 
 All three of these men were Radicals. (3) On September 14, 
 1778, a committee of five (Morris, Chase, Drayton, R. H. Lee, 
 Samuel Adams) was elected to prepare a letter of credence to 
 Louis XVI, notifying him of the appointment of Franklin as 
 minister plenipotentiary to the court of France. 17 The Radi 
 cals controlled three of the five members of this committee also. 
 Previous to this, in October, 1777, R. H. Lee, Witherspoon and 
 Hooper had been added to the Committee for Foreign Affairs in 
 the hope of completely controlling it. By this new addition the 
 Radicals now had a majority of one in a total membership of 
 eleven. 
 
 u Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 488. 
 19 Ibid. II, p. 490. 
 " Ibid. II, p. 504. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 49 
 
 On June 1, 1778, the instructions to the Commissioners in 
 France having been reported out, they were found to be unsat 
 isfactory on account of their extreme aggressiveness and they 
 were ordered recommitted. 18 At the same time three more mem 
 bers were added to the Committee for Foreign Affairs. These 
 men were Drayton of South Carolina : Duer of New York and J. 
 Smith of Pennsylvania. Two of these three men were Conserva 
 tives,* thus destroying the precarious majority of the Radicals in 
 the committee. 
 
 This see-saw work in Congress relative to the conduct of for 
 eign affairs now began to produce its evil results. On August 13, 
 1778, it was resolved "that Congress take into consideration on 
 the following Saturday the state of foreign affairs and that Mr. 
 Silas Deane be required to attend Congress on that day and give 
 them information respecting the general state of those affairs 
 and a particular statement of the funds and commercial trans 
 actions in Europe and especially with Monsieur Beaumarchais. " lg 
 It was further ordered "that the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
 lay before Congress all letters and other public papers which 
 they have received from the commissioners, agents or other per 
 sons, who have transacted business for the United States in 
 Europe from the appointment of the Committee of Secret Corre 
 spondence to this day. 20 
 
 The leaven of inefficiency due to party politics had begun 
 to work. Previous to this order, on August 1, 1777, a committee 
 of three had been elected to examine the letters which had passed 
 between the then Committee of Secret Correspondence and Mr. 
 
 *Note: The term Conservative is here used to indicate all men who 
 opposed the Radical program. The Construct] onists on this issue were in 
 cluded among the Conservatives. 
 
 18 Journals of Congress, X, p. 559. 
 
 " Ibid. XI, p. 787. 
 
 28 Ibid. XI, p. 788. 
 
50 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Silas Deane and report thereon to Congress. 21 This committee 
 was composed of Samuel Adams, J. Wilson and Henry Laurens. 
 The Radicals again controlled this committee. By January 20, 
 1779, matters had become so indefinite and embarrassing, that 
 it was resolved that a committee consisting of one member from 
 each state, be appointed to take into consideration the foreign af 
 fairs of these United States and also the conduct of the late and 
 present commissioners of the States in Europe and report 
 thereon. 22 
 
 After a long and heated discussion in committee, it was 
 finally decided upon the floor of Congress after at least six votes 
 had been taken upon the matter, that " suspicions and animosi 
 ties have arisen among the late and present commissioners, name 
 ly Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, Ralph Izard 
 and William Lee, highly prejudicial to the honor and interests 
 of these United States. 23 It apparently did not occur to the 
 members of Congress that the direct cause of the suspicions and 
 animosities was the undecided and inefficient methods of con 
 ducting important business through the committee system con 
 trolled by the Radicals. 
 
 On April 30, 1779, Paca and Drayton, as a special commit 
 tee on the question, "Shall Arthur Lee, commissioner of the 
 United States at the court of Madrid, be recalled?" laid upon 
 the table a report, which was only accepted after the President 
 had appealed to the House, due to the strenuous objections of 
 Samuel Adams to the report as being out of order. 24 This re 
 port was in substance as follows: Whereas, by intelligence com 
 municated to the committee by the minister of France Mr. 
 
 Arthur Lee has not the confidence of either the courts of Ver- 
 
 n Journals of Congress, VIII, p. 596. 
 
 M Ibid. VIII, p. 93. 
 
 M Ibid. XIII, pp. 479-487. 
 
 14 Ibid. XIV, pp. 534-537. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 51 
 
 sallies or Madrid that his appointment as plenipotentiary 
 
 to the court of Madrid would be disgusting to that court 
 
 that the conduct of Arthur Lee was disgraceful to those courts 
 and prejudicial to the honor and interests of the United States 
 
 that the committee was astonished to hear an assertion 
 
 made in Congress on the 15th inst. by an Honorable Member 
 from Massachusetts (Samuel Adams) as from the highest au 
 thority in America that the said commissioner had the confidence 
 of the Court of Versailles and since another assertion by the 
 Honorable Member from the same state, that the said member is 
 the most proper person to represent the said state at the court of 
 Madrid, assertions which being made in debate upon foreign af 
 fairs, were made to influence Congress to continue the said 
 
 Arthur Lee as the public minister at the Court of Madrid 
 
 that the committee has been compelled to apply to the Minister 
 of France residing near Congress as the highest source of infor 
 mation in America and that he produced an original let 
 ter to him from Vergennes, in which was said, I confess to you, 
 
 that I fear Mr. Lee and those about him that he disgusted 
 
 the Court of France and that this information was laid be 
 fore Congress to the end that they may not be misled to con 
 tinue said commissioner at the Court of Madrid that if this 
 
 advice is disregarded, the committee discharges its duty and will 
 not be responsible for the consequences, ruinous to finances and 
 an impediment to peace. 
 
 On May 3, 1779, a vote was taken on the recall of Arthur 
 Lee. 25 The states voted as follows : Massachusetts gave three of 
 her four votes against recall as might have been expected ; Rhode 
 Island was divided; Connecticut voted No; New York voted 
 Yes ; New Jersey, controlled by Witherspoon, voted No ; Pennsyl 
 vania was divided; Delaware voted No; Maryland voted Yes; 
 
 85 Journals of Congress, XIV, p. 542. 
 
52 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Virginia, Yes ; North Carolina, Yes ; South Carolina was divided. 
 A divided vote was given on the whole question and no decision 
 was reached. The vote showed, however, an unmistakable divis 
 ion between old forces formerly standing strongly and firmly to 
 gether, namely, the New England and Southern colonies. The 
 explanation is to be found in the extreme aggressiveness of the 
 methods of the Radical party and the beginning of a new prob 
 lem in Congress soon to be known as States Rights. 
 
 On June 10, 1779, a second vote was taken in Congress on 
 the recall of Lee. 2G There was not a dissenting vote on the 
 question. Two days before, on June 8th, a vote had been taken 
 on the recall of Ralph Izard. 27 Here the vote was almost unani 
 mous, only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and 
 South Carolina voting No. This vote showed how fast the senti 
 ment in Congress was turning against the tactics of the Radical 
 party. The vote on Lee was conclusive. 
 
 On November 29th, 1779, two more members were added to 
 the Committee for Foreign Affairs Houston of New Jersey and 
 Robert Livingston of New York. 28 This action threw the balance 
 of power still more into the hands of the Conservatives, in so far 
 as the conduct of foreign relations was concerned. 
 
 From this time on until June, 1781, very little is heard of 
 the Committee for Foreign Affairs. There are two explanations 
 for this: (1) Much of the real work of the committee was car 
 ried on by Franklin in France. (2) The Radicals seeing their 
 power in the Committee for Foreign Affairs fast disappearing, 
 went back again to the old system of electing special committees, 
 thereby hoping to control the actual work of the committee. 
 
 Previous to June, 1781, the following special committees 
 were elected to act upon foreign relations: 
 
 18 Journals of Congress, XIV, p. 714. 
 
 27 Ibid. XIV, p. 700. 
 
 28 Ibid. XV, p. 1302. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 53 
 
 (1) On Februa^ 24, 1779, papers relative to negotiations 
 with the Barbary states were ordered referred to a committee of 
 three (Carmichael, Nelson and Burke). 29 All three of these 
 men represented the Radical party. 
 
 (2) On April 15, 1779, a committee of thirteen (already 
 mentioned) was elected to consider the report on the Commis 
 sioners abroad. 30 
 
 (3) On October 9, 1779, a committee was elected to prepare 
 a commission for the secretaries to the minister plenipotentiary 
 to France. 31 
 
 (4) On October 13, 1779, John Jay asked Congress for in 
 formation as to the source of moneys he needed to carry on his 
 diplomatic work in Europe. The matter was referred to a new 
 special committee consisting of Henry Laurens, Jenifer and 
 Langdon, two of whom were Radicals. " 
 
 (5) On the same day, it was moved that Mr. Witherspoon 
 and Mr. Lovell (both Radicals) be added to the above commit 
 tee. As both these men were also members of the Committee for 
 Foreign Affairs, the motion is significant. " 
 
 (6) On November 8, 1779, a committee was elected to nego 
 tiate a loan from the United Provinces and to prepare a letter 
 to the Courts of Versailles and Madrid, informing them of the 
 appointment of Mr. Jay as the negotiator of a loan in the Low 
 Countries and to solicit their aid to that end. 34 Here is a plain 
 example of the workings of the "militia" system. The one 
 thing that France and Spain did not want the United States to 
 do was to attempt the negotiation of loans among neutrals. 
 
 (7) On November 12, 1779, a committee of three (Morris, 
 
 M Secret Journals of Congress, IT, p. 520. 
 
 30 Ibid. II, pp. 525-544. 
 
 " Ibid. II, p. 273. 
 
 32 Ibid. II, p. 275. 
 
 38 Ibid. II, p. 276. 
 
 * Ibid. II, p. 295. 
 
54 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Houston, Dickinson) was elected to consider the draft of a speech 
 to be delivered before Congress by the Chevalier de la Luzerne. 35 
 The Conservatives completely controlled this committee, but it 
 was of no importance. 
 
 (8) But on January 25, 1780, when the memorial of the 
 French minister was referred to a committee of seven members 
 (Mathews, Livingston, Ellsworth, Gerry, Griffin, Burke, Mc- 
 Kean), the Radicals controlled five of them. 36 The work on this 
 speech was in just that proportion deemed to be important from 
 the standpoint of foreign affairs. 
 
 (9) On October 18, 1780, a committee of four (Hawley, 
 VanDyke, Ingersoll, Henry) were elected to draft a memorial 
 to Versailles for procuring aids and supplies for a vigorous pros 
 ecution of the war. 37 The Radicals controlled this committee. 
 
 (10) On the same day, another special committee was ap 
 pointed to receive and report on letters from John Adams and 
 was directed to instruct Adams not to make a truce with Eng 
 land. 88 This work ought assuredly to have been placed in the 
 hands of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 (11) On December 11, 1780, a committee of three (Sulli 
 van, Madison, Mathews) was elected to prepare a draft of a 
 commission and instructions to Henry Laurens. 39 All three of 
 these members were Radicals. 
 
 (12) On December 15, 1780, a committee of three (Duane, 
 Witherspoon, Madison) was elected to draw up a commission 
 and instructions to the minister to Russia. 40 Two of the three 
 members of this committee were Radicals. 
 
 (13) On December 22, 1780, a committee of three (Mathews, 
 
 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 296. 
 
 Ibid. II, pp. 299-311. 
 
 Ibid. II, p. 326. 
 
 Ibid. II, p. 339. 
 
 Ibid. II, p. 357. 
 
 Ibid. II, p. 357. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 55 
 
 Madison, Duane) was elected to confer with Mr. Laurens on the 
 subject of his mission. 41 Two of the members of this committee 
 were Radicals. 
 
 (14) On December 26, 1780, a committee was elected to pre 
 pare additional instructions to Franklin. 42 The Conservatives, 
 for the first time, controlled this committee. 
 
 (15) On December 26, 1780, a committee was elected, com 
 posed of five members (Witherspoon, Sullivan, Duane, Mathews, 
 Madison) to confer with the French minister on the matter of Mr. 
 Laurens mission. 4S Here, again, the Radicals were in control. 
 
 The mere enumeration of the above fifteen committees pro 
 duces an accumulative effect upon the investigator, inasmuch 
 as every one of them was elected to perform specifically the 
 duties of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. It is clear that the 
 Committee of Secret Correspondence was never considered as a 
 Committee for Foreign Affairs during its early existence. 
 Changed in name on April 17, 1777, to that of the Committee for 
 Foreign Affairs, it began to function as a foreign relations com 
 mittee. Immediately the Radicals sought representation on this 
 committee. Failing in this as far as complete control was con 
 cerned, they had recourse to the election of many special com 
 mittees, some of which have just been mentioned. The result 
 must necessarily have been extreme chaos in the conduct of for 
 eign relations by so many committees working at cross purposes. 
 This, we will find, was reflected in the conduct of foreign rela 
 tions abroad and nearly caused the complete break-down of all 
 negotiations for money, loans, supplies, munitions, treaties and 
 alliances. 
 
 The difficulties of the situation were further complicated by 
 differences in individual beliefs, antagonisms resulting from 
 
 41 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 373. 
 41 Ibid. II, p. 373. 
 * Ibid. II, p. 373. 
 
56 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 these differences and a growing importance of the affairs of the 
 individual states. 
 
 (1) Samuel Adams believed devoutly in the liberty of the 
 individual and the absolute overthrow of despotism. He was 
 able, in Massachusetts, to control political power through the 
 elections, because he choose men of his own stamp to aid him and 
 because his austere character forestalled all opposition. He went 
 to Philadelphia with the firm conviction that Congress was a 
 town-meeting. Beyond this conviction he would not and did not 
 go during his active period in Congress. Here we see how one of 
 the controlling factors developed in a previous chapter influ 
 enced Congressional action for nearly six years. The point that 
 Adams could not see was that a homogeneous party in Massachu 
 setts was far different from a heterogeneous, multi-partied group 
 of men from different colonies, having different ideals and ex 
 periences. His ideas were the real obstacles to the working out 
 of his schemes of pure democracy, paradoxical as that may seem. 
 The explanation of this is found in the fact that parties out of 
 power become theoretical. The Liberty party in Massachusetts, 
 always out of power, stood as a party of opposition to the func 
 tioning of executive power. Experience in leadership was lim 
 ited to controlling the opposition factions, rather than in amelio 
 rating and solving political problems of expediency and govern 
 mental control. 44 The type of Puritanism which subjects public 
 conscience to private conscience was in the ascendency and rep 
 resented by men who were heroes of revolt, but weaklings in 
 organization and reconstruction. 45 
 
 Samuel Adams was opposed to the scientific principles of 
 war, of finance and of diplomacy. Thus, he fought all execu 
 tive power and trusted to the committee system as permanent 
 
 44 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Rerolution, 
 I, p. 253. 
 
 < Ibid. I, p. 253. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 57 
 
 in itself. He never considered the scaffolding of the stronger 
 government to follow, as did Washington, Franklin, Jay, and 
 others, but at all times attempted to subordinate Boards and De 
 partments to the men who sympathized with his views or by po 
 litical moves, tried to control all committees by choosing their 
 members. 48 Associated with Samuel Adams in these convic 
 tions were John Adams and R. H. Lee. All three chafed at the 
 Fabian policy of Washington in the conduct of military af 
 fairs ; 47 all three, on the other hand, opposed regulars for the 
 militia, declaring that a standing army was a horrid evil, even 
 against invasion. 4i 
 
 Gerard, the French minister to the colonies, said, Two men 
 led in maintaining the balance of power so that they could profit 
 by it in case of capitulation to England Witherspoon and 
 Samuel Adams were those men. 49 This statement is borne out 
 in our observation of committees. 
 
 (2) All the committees, regardless of their political com 
 plexion, were greatly overworked. By this means their efficiency 
 was partly destroyed. John Adams said that he was incessantly 
 at work from four in the morning till ten at night and that he 
 served on ninety separate committees (though I can find no evi 
 dence that he served on that number of committees at one 
 time). 50 If he served on half that number of committees, it is 
 safe to say that he could not have possibly attended the meetings 
 of even a majority of them, on account of unavoidable conflicts 
 and the necessity of spending much of his time on the floor of 
 Congress, as well as the executing of the business of these com 
 mittees. 
 
 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, I, pp. 262, 263. 
 
 Ibid. I, p. 263. 
 
 Bancroft: History of the Constitution, p. 537. 
 
 Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, pp. 165-106. 
 
 Morse: John Adams, p. 144. 
 
58 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 (3) No time was spent in selecting men for any committee 
 because of special fitness for the work of that committee. Most 
 men in Congress, said Gerard, owe their positions to zeal and 
 patriotism. Little attention is paid to talent. If one member 
 happens to be more conspicuous, private jealousy and the antic 
 ipation of personal ascendency throws him in the background. 
 Competent merchants, therefore, are placed on the Committee 
 for Foreign Affairs. Many colonels and generals are in Con 
 gress, but none of them are on the Board of War. 51 
 
 (4) Every delegate in Congress was closely watched by the 
 colony that sent him. The states did not concede to Congress 
 the power formerly allowed to Great Britain. Congress did not, 
 itself, pretend to have sovereign powers. It merely acted as the 
 mouth piece of the Patriot party in the colonies. It resolved 
 and recommended measures, but it could not, or at least did not 
 assume to enforce these resolves. It depended upon the states to 
 approve its actions. 52 Everything from the plan of a hospital 
 to the plan of a seal had to be made in committees. 5S War, it 
 self, was carried on by a debating society. 
 
 (5) The personnel of the committees was constantly chang 
 ing. Strong men who were unwilling to sacrifice all for the good 
 of the country at large, were attracted by desirable work in their 
 own states. Pendleton and Hancock, both of whom became gov 
 ernors of their own states, illustrate this feature. All of the thir 
 teen members of the original Committee on Confederation (ex 
 cept Samuel Adams) had left Congress before debate upon the 
 matter had even begun. 
 
 (6) After 1779, a new alignment in Congress became appar 
 ent. This division was between the advocates of a strong cen 
 tralized government (Constructionists) and the States Rights 
 
 " Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, pp. 174-175. 
 
 Journals of Congress, III, p. 458. 
 
 w Index of Committees, Journals of Congress. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 59 
 
 or Liberty party. The former was developed as a protest against 
 the inefficiency brought about by the Liberty party through the 
 use of the committee system. Said Gerard, "There are two 
 parties in Congress States Rights and National. Debates be 
 tween them are acrimonious and the effect of this is a certain 
 paralysis of both the diplomatic and military genius of the coun 
 try. The National party is composed of Washington, Jefferson, 
 Franklin, Harrison, Robert Morris, Madison, the two Living 
 stons and the Virginia statesmen generally. The States Rights 
 
 party consists of the Adams s, R. H. Lee and Arthur Lee 
 
 These are strong^ anti-French, because the French believe in 
 the collective power of the states. 54 
 
 When in the First Continental Congress, Patrick Henry as 
 serted that distinctions between Virginia, Pennsylvania, New 
 York and New England were no more, men shook their heads 
 and shrugged their shoulders. 5D The small states were afraid of 
 the large ones. Most of them considered the union but a tem 
 porary one. This idea is expressed in the Constitutions of North 
 Carolina and Pennsj^lvania in providing for their delegates to 
 the Continental Congress, "as long as such representation shall 
 be necessary. 56 Connecticut in adopting her old charter as a 
 new constitution stated, "This republic is and shall forever re 
 main a free sovereign and independent state." 57 On July 2, 
 1776, New Jersey issued a constitution, "to be inviolable" in 
 case of no reconciliation; "temporary and provisional," if the 
 reverse. 58 In January, 1779, Massachusetts drew up the first 
 draft of a constitution, but it was rejected in the town-meetings, 
 
 * Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, p. 194. 
 95 John Adams: Works, II, p. 367. 
 66 Ibid. II, p. 366. 
 
 87 Rhode Island Calender Records, VII, pp. 448-449. 
 " Minutes of the Provincial Congress and Council of Safetj of the State 
 of New Jersey, p. 558. 
 
60 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 because it did not secure equality of representation and con 
 tained no bill of rights. A committee of three, including the two 
 Adams s, was elected to make a new draft. This was sent to the 
 town-meetings and after more than a thousand suggested 
 changes had been received, digested and in part incorporated, a 
 constitution was finally adopted in 1780 by the assembly. 59 
 
 The power in most states was placed wholly in the hands of 
 the people. Many included in their constitutions a bill of rights. 
 Every error of the British government was to be entirely elim 
 inated. In October, 1776, Virginia did away with the entailment 
 of estates. 60 Jefferson was optimistic concerning the growth ot 
 republicanism, but Jay wrote to Rutledge, "We have a govern 
 ment, you know, to form, and God only knows what it will re 
 semble." 81 
 
 The governors were checked and limited in devious ways. 
 The colonies had had experiences with governors. There was 
 universal fear of a one-man power. Consequently short terms in 
 office were popular. In eight states the governor was elected for 
 one year. In eleven states he had no veto power. Others had a 
 council of state to advise him. 
 
 By 1777, all states, with the exception of Massachusetts, had 
 adopted definite governmental plans. The fact that this state 
 was the last to do so, is worthy of note. First in demanding in 
 dependence through her delegates in Congress, she was the last 
 to build for herself a constitution. Most zealous of her position 
 as a colony, she hazarded all in a conflict of arms. Most zealous 
 of her democratic liberties, she developed a remarkable and lofty 
 idea of state sovereignty. 
 
 In the light of the difficulties enumerated above, together 
 with the peculiar growth of state governments and the ideals of 
 
 M Bradford: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820), pp. 277, 293, 291. 
 
 "Morse: Jefferson, p. 39. 
 
 81 VanTyne: American Revolution, p. 157. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 61 
 
 States Rights, the actions and beliefs of the Radical leaders in 
 Congress from 1775 to 1780 can now readily be explained. Ex 
 pressed in the ponderous and inefficient committee system, it is 
 remarkable that airything of moment was accomplished in the 
 way of diplomacy during those years. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The Committees of Correspondence began life as local insti 
 tutions in 1772. When Congress met in 1774, the election of com 
 mittees to do business was a natural procedure. Committee work 
 really began with the second Congress. In 1775, we find 102 spe 
 cial committees elected to do work which should have been done 
 by regularly established departments. The number of special 
 committees steadily increased until 1778. In this year the so- 
 called * letter committees predominated in number. 
 
 In 1779 and 1780, the "letter" committees still led in num 
 ber. There was also much change in the personnel of all com 
 mittees. Nothing of any moment was referred to Boards or 
 standing committees, although such now existed. The direct 
 result was a marked inefficiency and decentralization of power. 
 This was at first a natural result. But by 1778, it had come to be 
 premeditated, in order to control the work of Congress. 
 
 In the beginning, the personnel of committees shows New 
 England delegates in the minority. This minority gradually in 
 creased during the latter part of 1775 and by the middle of 1776, 
 the Radicals, with the help of Virginia, were able to control Con 
 gressional actions on all important issues. By the latter part of 
 1776, Massachusetts and Virginia largely controlled the special 
 committees on foreign affairs. By 1777, the Adams s and Lees 
 controlled absolutely the majority of committees on foreign af 
 fairs. During 1778, their power was still increased and by 1779 
 their power was overwhelming. This climax of power coincides 
 
62 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 with the rash i militia policy of the envoys in France and other 
 countries at this time. 
 
 During 1780, the power of the Radicals temporarily de 
 creased. More work of importance was referred to Boards and 
 the Committee for Foreign Affairs. This was, primarily, the re 
 sult of the disclosures of animosities among the envoys abroad. 
 The Constructionists realized the cause of these troubles to be 
 the committee system, and were now attempting to find means 
 to check it. 
 
 Not until April 17, 1777, was the Committee of Secret Cor 
 respondence recognized as having foreign relations powers. At 
 once the Radicals attempted to control this committee. Failing 
 in this, they sought to nullify its actions by securing the election 
 of many special committees to do its work. During 1778 and 
 1779, the Radicals were able, for a short time, to control the Com 
 mittee for Foreign Affairs, but with disastrous results. 
 
 During 1779 a new alignment of forces began. State jeal 
 ousies and States Rights doctrines appeared and greatly inter 
 fered with the proper functioning of the work of all committees. 
 Not much is heard of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, there 
 fore, until 1781. Meanwhile, much of its work had been done by 
 Franklin in Europe. 
 
 Other factors appeared to weaken the committee system, as 
 well as the conduct of foreign affairs, at this time, so that the 
 power of the Radicals rapidly waned. At this juncture, the 
 Middle states were given an opportunity to assume control of af 
 fairs under the leadership of constructive statesmen, aided by the 
 wiser men of the Southern colonies. This change in control 
 checked the inefficiency and chaos resulting from the committee 
 system, and prevented the loss of French aid in the time of great 
 est need and assured the success of the American colonies in ob 
 taining and retaining independence. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD IN THE CONDUCT OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS A 
 
 RESULT OF THE WEAKNESS AND INDECISION OF 
 
 CONGRESS WORKING THROUGH ITS COMMITTEE 
 
 SYSTEM. 
 
 We have seen that the committee system was a natural and 
 inevitable result of the times. It is possible that nothing better 
 could have been devised to check aristocratic tendencies and 
 effect complete decentralization of power. A form of democracy 
 was built up in Congress, but it soon gave evidence of a lack ol 
 the democratic spirit. Sectional jealousies and suspicions de 
 veloped and the final outcome was most uncertain. 
 
 In such a situation, the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
 found itself in an extremely perilous position by the latter part 
 of 1777. The colonies were desperately in need of money and 
 supplies in order to prosecute the war. The Radicals claimed 
 that anything beyond this in the way of help meant ultimate 
 subservience to a foreign power. This belief of the Radicals was 
 the chief basis for the development of the "militia" policy of 
 demanding direct and efficient aid from France. To make af 
 fairs more difficult, Congress was hopelessly divided by party 
 animosities. According to de Fleury, these parties were sub 
 divided into infinity, but generally, there was an alignment into 
 two wings, the Eastern party comprising Pennsylvania, New 
 Jersey and South Carolina, led by Gates and Lee ; the Southern 
 party comprising Virginia, Maryland, New York, North Caro 
 lina and Delaware. The Eastern party was ably seconded by 
 New England on the platform that no man of influence should 
 have power over all the forces of the state. This party, there- 
 
64 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 fore, upheld Gates against Washington and all others desiring a 
 strong, centralized government. * The New England faction 
 moreover, formed the "militia" wing of the Patriot or Liberty 
 party, standing for decentralization of power and a demand 
 upon Prance for immediate aid to be given by her as a privilege 
 and duty. 
 
 On September 26, 1776, Congress elected three commission 
 ers to the Court of France (Franklin, Deane and Jefferson). 
 Jefferson declining, Arthur Lee was elected in his place. 2 Their 
 work in France was to be the procuring of funds and ammuni 
 tion and the signing of a treaty of alliance. 
 
 Deane had been sent as a special agent to France as early 
 as 1775. Lee came on from London, where he had been acting 
 as a special agent for New England, appointed through the in 
 fluence of Samuel Adams. They all gathered in France, De 
 cember 15, 1776, where they found conditions far from favor 
 able, due to the previous work of Deane. He had been instructed 
 to gain an audience with Vergennes, Minister of Affairs, when 
 he was to discuss the purchase of arms and to intimate that 
 France had been selected as a source of help, because her friend 
 ship would be fittest to obtain and cultivate, in the event of a 
 separation from England ; that mutual commercial advantages 
 would result from such a friendship, but that arms and clothing 
 were needed then and would be paid for as soon as navigation 
 could be protected by America and her friends. 3 
 
 Three things are plain in this suggested line of action. 
 (a) A demand was practically made upon France for aid; (b) 
 Supplies were to be paid for at some future date; (c) Payment 
 depended upon free navigation which was to be controlled and 
 
 1 Stevens: Facsimiles of the American Revolution, XVII, No. 1616. 
 * Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 31. 
 
 a Sparks: Diplomatic Correspondence, I, pp. 5-8; Deane Papers, I. 
 p. 123. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 65 
 
 protected by France, the creditor. Such extreme assumptions 
 are explained by the fact that the New England party was, for 
 the time, in control of the committee which drafted these in 
 structions. It is a clear demonstration of the spirit of that 
 faction. 
 
 Deane was further instructed to play slowly with Vergen- 
 nes; to look for opportunities for announcing that the American 
 colonies were anxious to know if France would acknowledge, in 
 the event of separation, these colonies as independent, receive 
 their ambassadors, and enter into treaties or alliances with them, 
 and if so, under what conditions. 4 
 
 That this line of action was the direct result of committee 
 rather than Congressional deliberation is proved by the fact 
 that as late as September, 1777, when John Adams, one of the 
 leaders of the movement to demand aid from France, proposed 
 such procedure upon the floor of Congress, it was rejected. "It 
 was too much for the nerves of Congress," said Adams, "The 
 grimaces and the convulsions were very great. 5 Franklin al 
 ways thought, "a virgin state should preserve its virtue and 
 character and not go abroad suitoring for alliances. 6 
 
 This conflict in Congress on the question of alliances, added 
 to the growing inefficiency of the committee system, had its im 
 mediate effect upon the labors of Deane. In several letters to 
 Congress, he indicates his distress in not receiving word from 
 America. 7 He is finally informed by the Committee of Corre 
 spondence that a change has been made in the personnel of the 
 Committee and that Lee and Franklin have been appointed as 
 commissioners to aid him. 8 On October 25, he complains of the 
 
 4 Sparks: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Eevolution, 
 I, p. 8. 
 
 6 Clark: Silas Deane, p. 41. 
 
 8 Foster: A Century of American Diplomacy, p. 9. 
 
 7 Deane Papers, I, pp. 287-288; 325-326. 
 
 8 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 162. 
 
66 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 silence of Congress. 9 He makes the same complaint on Novem 
 ber 9, 1776, 10 and again on November 28, 1776. n On Novem 
 ber 28, Deane received notice of the Declaration of Independ 
 ence. The letter was dated August 7, 1776, though the Declara 
 tion was consummated on the 7th of July preceding. Deane 
 complains bitterly that the announcement was not made in a 
 more formal way and in the form of a document of some import 
 ance, instead of a three or four line letter from a committee ol 
 Congress. 12 In another letter he complains with some show of 
 resentment, that he gets no instructions from Congress and that 
 the delay in issuing the Declaration is absolutely destroying 
 American prestige in Europe. 13 Even Lee became disgusted with 
 the dilatory methods of Congress and writes to that body in these 
 words, * For Heaven s sakes, if you mean to have any connexion 
 with this kingdom, be more assiduous in getting your letters 
 here. I know not where the blame lies, but must lie somewhere, 
 when vessels sail from Philadelphia down to the middle of Au 
 gust without a single line (instructions)." 14 As late as March, 
 1777, Deane writes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 that he has received just three letters since he arrived in France 
 a year before. 15 It should be kept in mind, however, that Con 
 gress was just then relying upon committees in the conduct of 
 foreign relations and with these committees under the control of 
 Samuel Adams, nothing else could have been expected. 
 
 In desperation, Deane assumed powers and prerogatives 
 which Congress had never granted him. He proceeded to hire 
 
 Deane Papers, I, pp. 337-338. 
 
 10 Ibid. I, p. 351. 
 
 11 Ibid. I, pp. 371-372. 
 
 12 Sparks: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, V, 
 p. 51. 
 
 13 Ibid. V, pp. 40-45. 
 
 14 Ibid. V, p. 33. 
 
 18 Deane Papers: II, p. 18. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 67 
 
 many officers in Europe, granting them commissions of high rank 
 in the American army. This action seriously embarrassed Wash 
 ington and in September, 1777, Congress, upon a report of the 
 Committee for Foreign Affairs, condemned such action as with 
 out authority by Congress. 16 
 
 Meanwhile, a personage, destined to have much to do with 
 American history, now appeared and had a conference with 
 Deane. This man was Beaumarchais. It is known that he went 
 to London to confer with Arthur Lee. It is further known that 
 Lee sent a statement to Virginia soon after this conference, in 
 forming that colony that France would furnish five million 
 livres worth of arms and ammunition. ir Beaumarchais, on his 
 return to France at once endeavored to secure funds from the 
 French government, but without success. He then formed an in 
 dependent company and finally succeeded, through the instiga 
 tion of Lee and an agreement with Deane, in shipping supplies 
 in large quantities to America with explanatory letters and bills 
 signed by Rodriguez, Hortalez and Company. 18 
 
 Congress, however, relying completely upon Lee s statement 
 to Virginia, accepted the supplies with grace and bothered little 
 concerning the bills, in spite of the fact that Deane had rend 
 ered to Congress statements as to the exact nature of the goods 
 shipped and the amount of America s indebtedness for them. 
 
 The results of this misunderstanding were immediate. Both 
 Deane and the French king fell under suspicion. Here is clear 
 evidence of the fruits of the committee system. Deane had re 
 ceived no instructions. He knew nothing of the temper or de 
 sires of Congress. The whole situation is traceable to the ina 
 bility of Congress to adopt a definite policy in the conduct of 
 foreign relations and adhere to it. 
 
 u Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 481. 
 
 17 Clark : Silas Deane, p. 55. 
 
 18 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 276. 
 
68 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 France was, during this time, maintaining strict neutrality. 
 Ships were prevented from clearing loaded with munitions for 
 America and officers whom Deane had hired were arrested on 
 board ship and imprisoned. The situation becoming desperate, 
 Deane began to hold the French government responsible for his 
 difficulties. 
 
 At this juncture, the new commissioners, who were ap 
 pointed to aid Deane, arrived in France. At once, trouble of an 
 other form developed, due to the fact that Lee regarded himself 
 as the leader of the commission. He took issue with Beaumar- 
 chais because he treated with Deane; with Deane because he con 
 sidered that Deane had robbed him of much honor ; with Frank 
 lin because of his great welcome in France ; with France because 
 she did not move with more alacrity. 19 But he received no sat 
 isfaction in any of his tirades and becoming disgruntled, went 
 to Spain with promises to that Court that America would con 
 quer Pensacola in return for Spanish aid. But the Spanish 
 Court, on advice from Franklin, kept Lee at Vittoria. Franklin 
 strenuously objected to Lee s method of procedure. "A virgin 
 state," he said, "should wait with decent dignity for the appli 
 cations of others while we are asking, it is necessary to 
 
 comply with the humors of those we apply to. 20 
 
 The leader, then, of the "militia" policy abroad was Arthur 
 Lee. Both he and Samuel Adams were unalterably opposed to 
 the two fundamental ideas of diplomacy of that day, namely, 
 that ambassadors should not be forced upon foreign courts and 
 that delicacy was to be always used even between politically 
 equal countries. Lee, true to his ideas of the efficacy of the 
 "militia" policy, conveyed to Samuel Adams and to Congress 
 
 19 Hale: Franklin in France, pp. 42-43. 
 
 20 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence of American Revolution, II. 
 p. 298. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 69 
 
 the idea that Vienna, Madrid, the Courts of Prussia, Russia and 
 Tuscany would be pleased to have America send envoys. 21 
 
 Deane, also, thought himself largely superseded by Frank 
 lin, and began to carry on negotiations with the French Court on 
 his own account. In a letter to Vergennes, April 8, 1777, he an 
 nounced that the people and Congress of America expected as 
 sistance from France and urged the necessity of not disappoint 
 ing them. 2i 
 
 The English ministry was not slow to suspect that all was 
 not going well with the American envoys. Suspecting a luke- 
 warmness on the part of Deane to the idea of complete independ 
 ence, it sent secret agents to influence him. On December 12, 
 1777, Paul Wentworth wrote to Deane asking for a secret inter 
 view. 23 Deane replied arranging for such a meeting. 2 * Went 
 worth came to this meeting on December 15, bringing memo 
 randa which included general headings for the preliminaries to 
 an accommodation and perpetual union between Great Britain 
 and the American colonies. 25 It must be said to the credit ol 
 Deane, however, that the English ministry was soon convinced 
 that he was absolutely opposed to peace. It was then planned 
 to compromise him by implicating him in the trial of "John the 
 Painter. Failing in this scheme, it was next planned to carry 
 him by force from France to England, there to intern him until 
 peace could be accomplished. 26 
 
 Deane had, by this time, done enough to satisfy Congress of 
 his lack of reliability. Accordingly, it was resolved on November 
 21, 1777, to recall him and the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
 was directed to take measures to put this resolve into effect. 27 
 
 21 Lee: Life of Arthur Lee, II, p. 113. 
 
 22 Stevens: Facsimiles, VI, No. 680. 
 
 23 Stevens: Facsimiles, VI, No. 719 (1). 
 
 24 Ibid. VI, No. 719 (2). 
 26 Ibid. VI, No. 719 (3). 
 
 26 Ibid. XV, No. 1489. 
 
 27 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 481. 
 
70 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Franklin, upon taking up his duties in France, found him 
 self the minority member of the commission in all matters of 
 diplomacy. He refused to press matters in connection with sup 
 plies and ammunition. In January, 1777, he was prevailed upon, 
 however, to make an actual demand upon the French king for 
 ships of war. The commission intimated that such demand was 
 agreeable to our instructions. 28 This last phrase is evidence 
 that Franklin did not intend to assume the responsibility for the 
 "militia" policy. He would not take a high-handed course of 
 action. "It is my purpose," he said, "to procure, while I stay 
 here, what advantage I can for our country, by endeavoring to 
 please this court. a9 
 
 Franklin s stand upon the method of the conduct of diplo 
 matic relations had its effect upon the French Court. This may 
 be gathered from a question put to each of the Commissioners by 
 the French ministry, as follows: "What, in the opinion of the 
 American Commissioners, is necessary to be done to engage them 
 not to listen to any propositions from England for a new connec 
 tion with that country?" 
 
 Franklin answered as follows: "The Commissioners feel 
 that the immediate conclusion of a treaty of commerce and amity 
 
 will remove uncertainty and give such a reliance on the 
 
 friendship of France as to reject firmly all propositions made 
 to them by England, which have not for their basis the entire 
 freedom and Independence of America, both in matters of gov 
 ernment and commerce. 30 
 
 Deane answered as follows: "There must be a guarantee 
 by France of the present American possessions with others to be 
 acquired and to enter into war with England, or furnish Con- 
 
 88 Stevens: Facsimiles, VI, No. 614. 
 
 29 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Bcvolution, 
 II, p. 245. 
 
 " Stevens: Facsimiles, VIII, No. 774. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 71 
 
 gress with money to carry on the war, until peace or the con 
 quering of all English possessions in America. 31 
 
 The contrast between these two answers is striking. One il 
 lustrated the essence of the Constructionist party which Frank 
 lin represented. The other was the core of the "militia" policy 
 which Samuel Adams fathered in America. 
 
 During the whole of the year 1777, the Committee for For 
 eign Affairs did nothing but correspond with the Commissioners 
 in France. Robert Morris, a member of the committee, informed 
 them, "that the conduct of Congress is discouraging and that as 
 long as that body persists in executing as well as deliberating on 
 their business, it will not be done right. This has been urged 
 many times, but some do not want to part with power (Radi 
 cals) or pay others to do what they cannot do themselves." 32 
 He adds that he was not placed on the committee to correspond, 
 but to carry out the conveyances, but he has done nothing but 
 write letters. 
 
 It must have been encouraging to the envoys in France to 
 receive a letter from the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 that through an accident in removing from Philadelphia to Bal 
 timore, the Secretary of Congress had lost the instructions to the 
 Commission, by which it was empowered to negotiate with the 
 Courts of other neutral nations. 33 
 
 Henry Laurens, as President of Congress, informs John 
 Adams on November 28, 1777, that he has been elected Commis 
 sioner to France and asks pardon for the omission of his com 
 mission on account of lack of instructions and a knowledge of 
 precedents in such matters. 34 Laurens was a follower of Sam- 
 
 81 Stevens Facsimiles, VIII, No. 776. 
 
 32 Sparks: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, I, 
 p. 179. 
 
 33 Ibid. I, p. 181. 
 
 34 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, 
 II, p. 432. 
 
72 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 uel Adams, who gloried in the fact that he knew nothing of 
 diplomatic procedure and did not care to know. 
 
 That Congress acted often on diplomatic matters as a com 
 mittee of the whole, is shown by a letter from Laurens to John 
 Adams, January 1, 1778, in which he says that he had received 
 his (Adams s) letters and had read them to Congress. 35 Near 
 ly a year after this (December 8, 1778) James Lovell wrote to 
 Franklin (for the Committee for Foreign Affairs) that he en 
 closed plans of operations, but that his letter had been delayed 
 for alterations to be made by Congress. 36 
 
 This indefiniteness in Congress relative to diplomatic af 
 fairs, was reflected in the work and correspondence of the en 
 voys in France. They knew not to whom they were responsible 
 or to whom they were to address their complaints, memorials or 
 reports. On July 1, 1777, William Lee received his instructions 
 as Commissioner to Berlin from John Hancock, President of 
 Congress. 37 Lee, replied, acknowledging the receipt of his com 
 mission, but directed his letter to Charles Thomson, Secretary of 
 Congress. 38 In many of Lee s letters he says he "is pleased to 
 inform Congress, etc." From January 22, 1778 to September, 
 1778, he directs his letters to the President of Congress. After 
 this interval, he directs them to the Committee for Foreign Af 
 fairs. Ralph Izard, as Commissioner, directs his letters from 
 July 1, 1777 to April 1, 1778, to the Committee for Foreign At- 
 fairs. After this interval, he directs them to Henry Laurens, 
 President of Congress. 
 
 This state of affairs simply affirms the fact that the Ameri 
 can Commissioners were working in the dark through a lack of 
 
 * WLarton: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 475. 
 
 * Sparks: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Eevolutiou, 
 V, p. 147. 
 
 " Ibid. I, p. 591. 
 M Ibid. I, p. 595. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 73 
 
 a definite policy in conducting foreign affairs by Congress. The 
 Commissioners as a body wrote to Congress, March 12, 1777, and 
 said, "It is more than four months since Mr. Franklin s depar 
 ture from Philadelphia and not a single line from thence writ 
 ten since that time has reached your Commissioners in Europe. 
 We have no information of what passes in America, but through 
 
 England Our total ignorance of the Truth or Falsehood of 
 
 Facts, when Questions are asked of us concerning them makes 
 us appear small in the eyes of the people here and is prejudicial 
 to our negotiations. 89 
 
 Even John Adams wrote from Passy, May 24, 1778, to the 
 Commerce Committee of Congress, complaining of many agents 
 claiming authority from many different sources. He intimated 
 that this was a waste of energy and money and that all orders 
 should come to these persons from one person. 40 In a letter 
 dated July 9, 1778, and addressed to James Lovell, John Adams 
 said that he had heard but once from Congress since his arrival 
 in France. 41 On February 27, 1779, he wrote to John Jay, then 
 President of Congress, saying that he believed that but one am 
 bassador was necessary in France and since he had heard noth 
 ing from Congress, and understands that Franklin had been ap 
 pointed as such, he was coming home. " 
 
 These statements from a man who had always been zealous 
 in his support of the committee system and the "militia" pol 
 icy of the conduct of foreign affairs, is somewhat startling. It Is 
 excellent proof that he began to see the futility of both systems. 
 
 But the climax of the whole matter of inefficiency of the 
 committee system as a means of conducting foreign affairs came 
 in 1779, when James Lovell on August 6th of that year, wrote to 
 
 " Stevens: Facsimiles, XIV, No. 1448. 
 
 49 Wharton : Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 595. 
 
 41 Ibid. II, p. 642. 
 
 Ibid. Ill, p. 69. 
 
74 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Arthur Lee as follows : * There is really no such thing as a Com- 
 inittee for Foreign Affairs existing. No Secretary or clerk 
 further than I, presumes to be one or the other. The books and 
 papers of that extraordinary body lay yet on the table of Con 
 gress, or rather are locked up in the Secretary s private box. 43 
 It should be noted that this statement was made fully two years 
 after the Committee for Foreign Affairs had been elected to exe 
 cute diplomatic work. It is now plain why nothing of import 
 ance is recorded concerning the work of this committee after the 
 year 1778. 
 
 The English ministry by the latter part of 1777, began to 
 suspect that Franklin was the chief obstacle in the way of ef 
 fecting a compromise between England and the American colo 
 nies. Strenuous endeavors were made to discredit him in 
 France. 44 Commissioners were also sent to America with a 
 plan for reconciliation. On June 9, 1778, these commissioners 
 wrote to Henry Laurens as President of Congress intimating 
 that they note with concern the insidious interposition of a power 
 (France) which has always had a most evil intention and mo 
 tives. 45 Laurens, under orders of Congress, roundly rebuked 
 the Commissioners on June 17, 1777. 46 The Commissioners then 
 replied, questioning the power of Congress to conclude treaties 
 without the delegation of power from the states. 47 They next 
 declared that Congress could not conclude treaties without first 
 referring them to the individual states. 48 
 
 This procedure of the English .Commissioners had a most 
 subtle bearing on the whole relation between France and Amer 
 ica. It first made a direct appeal to the States Rights Party, 
 
 a Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, III, p. 288. 
 44 Stevens: Facsimiles, XIV, No. 1402. 
 
 48 Ibid. XI, No. 1104. 
 
 49 Ibid. XI, No. 1110. 
 Ibid. XI, No. 1119. 
 48 Ibid. XI, No. 1133. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 75 
 
 headed by Samuel Adams and others. It was an attempt to di 
 vide the union of the colonies. It caused great anxiety in France 
 because the French ministry could not decide whether they were 
 to deal with a union of the states in America or with independent 
 republics. In short, it could not be determined where sovereign 
 ty resided. 
 
 Vergennes, Beaumarchais and others were now thoroughly 
 aroused to the seriousness of the situation and made frequent 
 appeals to the king to hasten aid and recognition to America. 
 They had reason to believe that the American envoys were be 
 coming thoroughly discouraged. In a letter dated October 1, 
 1777, Lord Stormont, the English ambassador in France, in 
 formed Weymouth that the American Commissioners (excepting 
 Franklin) openly declare that American privateers will make no 
 distinction between English and French ships hereafter. 49 Ver 
 gennes, in a letter to Marquis D Ossun said that he knew that 
 the American Commissioners were discouraged and that they 
 would accept England s terms if not efficiently aided. He added 
 that the existing conditions were brought about by their own in 
 discretions, however, because they took too much for granted or 
 tried to involve France and thus gain advantages to them 
 selves. 50 
 
 Beaumarchais wrote to the French ministry in the early part 
 of 1778 commending three lines of action, namely, to remain 
 passive; to conclude a treaty with America or to recognize her 
 independence. 51 Vergennes was active in the same cause, how 
 ever. In a letter to de Montmoren, January 8, 1778, he empha 
 sizes the necessity of immediate action. 52 
 
 The English ministry, having obtained knowledge of the 
 
 * Stevens: Facsimiles, XIX, No. 1709. 
 80 Ibid. XVIII, No. 1712. 
 
 61 Ibid. XXI, No. 1814. 
 
 62 Ibid. XXI, No. 1827. 
 
76 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 probable action of the French ministry were desperate, and final 
 ly brought pressure upon Franklin himself. On June 16, 1778, 
 Franklin received in a peculiar fashion, a letter signed with the 
 name of Charles de Weissenstein, which he declared to be ac 
 tually in the hand writing of George III. The letter made a 
 profound plea for reconciliation. 53 A second was received on 
 the same day containing plans for allaying the present ferment 
 in America. Secret measures were proposed; Franklin was of 
 fered a pension, as well as John Adams, John Hancock and Gen 
 eral Washington. A treaty of eighteen articles was proposed, 
 the first six of which were to be secret and the people were never 
 to know of their existence. 54 A third letter from the same 
 source outlined a plan of government after the event of recon 
 ciliation. 55 But to all of these brilliant offers Franklin made ab 
 solutely no reply. 
 
 The success of Vergennes in keeping the English ministry in 
 the dark concerning the relations between France and America 
 is fully shown in a study of the correspondence of the time be 
 tween members of the English ministry. While keeping up this 
 play, Vergennes and Beaumarchais, together turned the tide to 
 America by means of a famous letter to the king under date of 
 December 7, 1777. 56 On February 6, 1778, a treaty of amity 
 and commerce was signed by the American Commissioners at the 
 Court of France, brought to America *by Gerard and presented 
 to the American Congress on May 4, 1778. 57 On February 6, 
 1778, a treaty of alliance, eventual and defensive was signed in 
 Paris, together with an attached secret treaty. 58 
 
 " Stevens: Facsimiles, VIII, No. 835. 
 
 84 Ibid. VIII, No. 836. 
 
 " Ibid. VIII, No. 837. 
 
 M Clark: Silas Deane, p. 58. 
 
 " Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 57-79. 
 
 M Ibid, II, pp. 81-89. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 77 
 
 The year 1778 brought to a partial close the long series of in- 
 trigues and misunderstandings begun in 1775. Their existence 
 meant imminent disaster to the American cause. The constancy 
 of Franklin ; the confidence of the French ministry in him ; the 
 aid of the French agents in America and the bungling diplomacy 
 of the English ministry, were the chief factors which prevented 
 the loss of the American conflict. The committee system of 
 conducting diplomatic affairs, together with the ridiculous 
 "militia" policy of the Radicals, were the opposing factors. The 
 result was a very slender margin in favor of success for the Am 
 erican colonies. There is no doubt that the war would have been 
 appreciably shortened had there been responsible bodies or de 
 partments in Congress clothed with full executive powers to 
 rapidly prosecute the war and hasten the growth of friendly 
 relations with France under the wise guidance of men of the type 
 of Franklin. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The growing prominence of the Radical elements in Con 
 gress gave courage to the Radical envoys abroad. The demands 
 upon France were constant and insistent. Their immediate ac 
 ceptance would have assuredly resulted in a general European 
 conflagration. 
 
 This method of seeking aid from foreign powers was com 
 bated in Congress, but the Radicals prevailed through their con 
 trol of committees. An attempt to block this control by the Con- 
 structionists resulted in an almost total lack of instructions to 
 the Commissioners abroad. Deane, consequently assumed powers 
 which he was never authorized to use. The Beaumarchais affair 
 naturally followed with its suspicions and animosities. In this 
 state of affairs, Arthur Lee assumed the leadership as the cham 
 pion of a real "militia" diplomacy. Differences among the 
 
78 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 American envoys developed on this issue. Dissensions followed 
 and individual secret negotiations began. This gave the English 
 ministry an opportunity to widen these differences by the use 
 of threats, bribes and slander. The result was the recall of 
 Deane and the censure and subsequent recall of all the commis 
 sioners except Franklin. 
 
 This envoy was next attacked by the English ministry. They 
 attempted to discredit him in France, but he held his prestige 
 by moderation, political astuteness and skill. He was, moreover, 
 sadly handicapped by party struggles in Congress, resulting in 
 the practical non-existence of a Committee for Foreign Affairs. 
 This weakness invited the instigation of an English propaganda 
 in America by an appeal to the States Rights party. Bribes were 
 next extended to Franklin, but without success. A treaty of 
 amity and commerce was signed on February 6, 1778, through 
 the direct work of Franklin and in spite of the inefficiency at 
 home and abroad, directly due to a most dangerous attempt to 
 bring about a complete decentralization of power under the con 
 trol of an unwieldy committee system. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE INFLUENCE OF FRANCE IN THE CONDUCT OF 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
 The French ministry early saw the trend of affairs in Ameri 
 ca and among the American envoys in France. While implicit 
 confidence was placed in Franklin s universal spirit and mature 
 judgment, nevertheless, it wisely refrained from committing it 
 self in negotiations with men who could not act in unison and 
 who could not secure proper instructions from Congress. There 
 fore, as early as 1775, at the time of Deane s appointment to act 
 as agent to France, the French ministry sent a secret committee 
 to America. This committee w r as led by Bonvouloir and forward 
 ed information to France concerning conditions arid influenced, 
 as far as possible, public opinion in America. 
 
 This committee strongly advised "that great care be used 
 in the treatment of the American envoys, especially those from 
 New England, (Deane and Arthur Lee) for this part of the coun 
 try, if slighted, will capture and hold all French possessions un 
 til aid by France is given. * 
 
 On September 11, 1776. Hopkins, a brigadier general in the 
 pay of the French army and a member of the committee, wrote 
 de Sartine, asking that the Grand Order of Military Merit be 
 conferred upon him so that he might prove to Americans that 
 the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes would not affect Protest 
 ants living in France or in French possessions. 2 The basis of 
 this request was obvious. It was an attempt to allay fears in 
 
 1 Stevens: Facsimiles, XVI, No. 1336. 
 3 Ibid. XII, No. 1355. 
 
80 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 America over the prospect of an alliance with a Catholic country 
 and to offset the attempts of the English to stir up prejudice 
 against France among the members of Congress. 
 
 In the early part of the year 1778, Gerard de Rayneval was 
 sent by France as minister to America. He lived, on account of 
 much illness, within sixty paces of the door of Congress and was 
 soon constantly consulted by the members. 3 The coming of Ger 
 ard to America served two purposes. (1) It tended to increase 
 the friendship between the two countries and (2) it kept France 
 in close touch with the vagaries of the Radical party and with 
 its "militia" policy as reflected in France. This was necessary 
 in view of the fact that these factors might compromise France 
 with England at any moment without her being properly pre 
 pared to meet the issues involved. 
 
 The instructions to Gerard were direct and simple. He was 
 to guard against the making of a separate peace with Britain by 
 Congress; to assure Congress that the French king would make 
 no terms with England short of independence ; to dissuade Con 
 gress from any plan of peace which would include Florida or 
 Canada ; to refuse to extend America any further pecuniary aid ; 
 to make it plain to Congress that the king would not prolong the 
 war one day to aid America to make or keep any conquests in 
 the West. 4 This was a program big with possibilities. It indi 
 cated that France clearly realized the extent of the inter-state 
 jealousies and the ramifications of the States Rights ideas as 
 early as 1778. 
 
 Gerard reported to Vergennes as early as July, 1778, that 
 strong party feeling existed in Congress, through diversity of 
 principles and ambitions. 5 He further reported * that a selfish 
 
 8 Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, p. 164. 
 
 4 Doniol: Participation de la France a retablishment Etats-Unif 
 d Amerique, III, p. 153. 
 
 5 Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, pp. 165-166. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 81 
 
 and calculating spirit prevails in America. Mercantile cupid 
 ity exists, especially in the northern people and it will undoubt 
 edly exercise an important influence on the future destiny of the 
 republic. " 6 He still further reports a woeful lack of efficiency 
 in Congress through the placing of wrong men on committees. 7 
 
 Several questions soon arose which the French minister was 
 obliged to consider and to influence, if possible, their decision. 
 Among such questions were the following: (1) The fisheries 
 question which the New England delegates to Congress thought, 
 the most important of all, since this was the basis of New Eng 
 land s prosperity. In fact, it was one of the most important 
 causes of the war. Other states thought this question of slight 
 importance and nine of them outside of the New England group 
 indicated that they would not continue the war for this advan 
 tage to a particular section. (2) The New England delegates 
 laid increasing stress upon the immediate invasion of Canada, 
 until the plan was emphatically vetoed by Washington on the 
 advice of Gerard. (3) Several delegates were desirous of bring 
 ing Spain into the war, but this plan meant the raising of com 
 plicated boundary questions. After some difficulty it was silenced 
 by Gerard. (4) A cabal against Washington and Franklin was 
 in full sway, but both schemes were rendered abortive through 
 the diplomatic skill of Gerard and Vergennes. 8 Gerard was also 
 obliged to counteract the strong representations of the British 
 ministry in an attempt to win over certain influential parties in 
 Congress. R. H. Lee asserted in Congress that the United States 
 had a right to deal independently with England, but members of 
 Congress instantly assured Gerard, however, that Lee s asser 
 tion was received with contempt and indignation. "All the dele 
 gates affirmed to me," said Gerard, "that not two men in Con- 
 
 8 Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, p. 176. 
 
 7 Ibid. pp. 174-175. 
 
 8 Ibid. pp. 194-196. 
 
82 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 gress were capable of listening to Temple s (one of the British 
 commissioners) proposals, but the conduct of the delegates of 
 Massachusetts still hampered their action. 9 The implications 
 concerning Samuel Adams are patent and Gerard reported that 
 Congress was fast becoming weary and ashamed of the ascend 
 ency enjoyed by the party headed by R. H. Lee and Samuel 
 Adams. 10 
 
 Five members of Congress drew up an answer to a question 
 by Gerard concerning Lee s doctrines. Four members sent in 
 a secret second answer. The fifth member, Samuel Adams, re 
 fused to agree to it, and tried to persuade others that an explicit 
 answer was not required. Gerard reported that he was fortify 
 ing his colleagues against fallacious arguments. 1J The use of 
 the word colleagues is interesting as showing how intimate the 
 French minister had become with the political conditions in 
 America and with some of the members of Congress. 
 
 On March 10, 1779, Gerard reported, "Our friends in Con- 
 firess began to attack their opponents yesterday. They brought 
 forward the principle of treating with France in perfect confi 
 dence. The Lee faction was hard pressed. Samuel Adams said, 
 Why must our interests be so closely united with those of 
 France? Here is the spot where our independence must be estab 
 lished. " 12 
 
 This conflict in Congress culminated in the appointment of a 
 committee of thirteen to investigate the condition of foreign 
 affairs of the United States and also the conduct of the Commis 
 sioners in France and report thereon. This committee brought 
 in a report in March, 1779, based upon evidence furnished by 
 the French minister, and resulted in the censure of all and the 
 
 * Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, p. 197. 
 
 10 Ibid. p. 196. 
 
 11 Ibid. p. 199. 
 " Ibid. p. 200. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS 83 
 
 recall of most of them. From this time until 1781, practically 
 nothing is heard of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. There 
 is evidence that the American foreign relations were largely car 
 ried on by the French minister working through friends and 
 committees in Congress. 
 
 On July 18, 1779, the Chevalier de la Luzerne assumed his 
 duties as minister to America. He at once came into contact 
 with a scheme of the Radicals to displace Franklin in France. 
 Arthur Lee and Ralph Izard were the leaders in this movement. 
 "If," said Lee, "the total disorder and neglect which prevails 
 in the public affairs committed to him (Franklin) will not satisfy 
 gentlemen that the continuation of him in office is incompatible 
 with the public honor and interest, there is no use of my making 
 further charges. 13 Luzerne reported these charges to Vergennes, 
 who replied, "His (Frankln s) conduct leaves nothing for Con 
 gress to desire. It is as zealous and patriotic as it is wise and 
 circumspect . . . The method he pursues is much more efficacious 
 than if he were to assume a tone of importunity in multiplying 
 his demands, and especially if these were enforced by threats 
 to which we would attach neuter value or importance and which 
 would serve to render him personally disagreeable. 14 
 
 The question naturally arises, Who saved Franklin s po 
 litical head ? It is, without doubt, safe to assume that it was Lu 
 zerne s untiring efforts in Franklin s behalf, coupled with the 
 sympathy and work of the level headed men in Congress, which 
 prevented diplomatic disaster. 
 
 In 1779, Vergennes suggested to Congress through the 
 French minister that it would be well for it to select an envoy 
 empowered to treat for peace, as that was now a possibility. The 
 selection was at once made the basis for a campaign of state in 
 trigue. The choice lay between John Adams and John Jay. 
 
 " Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, IV, p. 184. 
 
 14 Durand: Documents of the American Eevolution, pp. 247-248. 
 
84 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Franklin, already in France was the logical candidate and the 
 one man most acceptable to Vergennes. Jay had the support of 
 New York and practically all of the Southern states, because of 
 his known views upon the navigation of the Mississippi river. 
 Adams was supported by New England and some of the Middle 
 states because of his views on the fisheries. Here was the split 
 in the old alignment noted in committee control in Chapter IV, 
 and which began to assume importance about 1780. The Radi 
 cals won in the selection of Adams for the post in France, while 
 Jay was sent to Madrid. 15 
 
 Next came the instructions to these men. Luzerne here took 
 active part. He controlled factions and made it plain that he 
 desired nothing done in the way of demands outside of independ 
 ence. He further stipulated that Spain must be considered. 
 This action by Luzerne at once placed France in a position of 
 embarrassment and suspicion and the Radicals were not slow in 
 making the most of the situation. 16 This suspicion was increased 
 by evidence that Vergennes did not care to see America emerge 
 from the war too strong and he was, therefore, inclined to use his 
 influence in securing some of Spain s demands, relative to 
 Florida and the Mississippi. He even suggested to Congress the 
 value of placating Spain by allowing her western territory and 
 warned Congress that France would not prolong the war a single 
 day to help America in western conquests. 17 
 
 Suspicious of France, John Adams, on arriving in Paris, 
 assumed at once, an attitude of antagonism. He disliked all par 
 ties and men. For this reason he fought Franklin and reviled 
 Vergennes. He informed Vergennes that the colonies were un 
 der no distressing burden of obligation to France, for without 
 
 " Doniol: Participation de la France, etc., Ill, p. 293. 
 16 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 310. 
 
 " Ibid. II, pp. 244, 249; Doniol: Participation de la France, etc., Ill, 
 p. 153. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 85 
 
 America, the Bourbons would be defeated by England. 18 Frank 
 lin at once wrote the President of Congress, "I think an expres 
 sion of gratitude is not only our duty, but our interest Mr. 
 
 Adams, who means our welfare and our interest as much as I 
 do or any man can do, seems to think a little stoutness and a 
 greater use of independence and boldness in our demands will 
 secure us ample assistance. It is for the Congress to judge and 
 regulate their affairs accordingly." 19 
 
 But this suspicious attitude to France began to permeate 
 Congress. That body, in 1780, repudiated paper money and rec 
 ommended that it be redeemed at 40 to 1. t Adams informed 
 Vergennes of this action of Congress, which much incensed him. 
 "In giving this information," said Adams, "I flatter myself, 
 that I am so much the master of the principles, as to demonstrate 
 that the plan of Congress is not only wise, but just. $ Vergennes 
 at once wrote to Luzerne, asking him to have Congress modify 
 the resolutions as far as France was concerned, since it spelled 
 ruin for French financial interests. 
 
 This financial muddle came at the most critical period of the 
 whole revolution. On August 7, 1780, Vergennes informed Lu 
 zerne of the paper money conference with Adams and added, * I 
 give you these details in order that you may confidentially con 
 fer with the President and principal members of Congress and 
 thus enable them to judge whether if Mr. Adams is such as to 
 qualify him for the important task confided to him by Congress. 
 As far as I am concerned, I foresee that the Plenipotentiary will 
 do nothing but raise difficulties and cause vexations on account of 
 a stubborness, a pedantry, a self-sufficiency and a self-conceit, 
 which render him incapable of handling political questions 
 
 18 Durand: Documents of American Revolution, p. 226. 
 
 19 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, IV, p. 23. 
 t Journals of Congress, XVI, p. 264. 
 
 t John Adams: Works, VII, p. 193. 
 
86 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 if really attached to independence, which I cannot verify 
 
 he seems to be feebly attached to the alliance, so that it would 
 cost him nothing to take steps which would imply the ingratitude 
 of the United States, whilst the opposite sentiment forms the 
 basis of his instructions. 20 Meanwhile, Vergennes took the mat 
 ter to Franklin, 21 who agreed to lay the whole matter before 
 Congress. 22 Luzerne wrote Vergennes on January 2, 1781, stat 
 ing that Adams s letters had been laid before Congress and that 
 this body regarded Adams s views of his instructions and mis 
 sion as absurd. 23 On January 28, 1781, Luzerne informed Ver 
 gennes that Congress disapproved generally of Adams s manage 
 ment of his mission and regretted that negotiations for peace 
 should be in the hands of one so capable of being mistaken in its 
 real object. 24 . 
 
 Adams, however, was not to be swerved from his course by 
 the opinions of Congress. Writing to Vergennes regarding the 
 instructions to Rochambeau, he implied that France did not mean 
 to give any effective aid to America. He further added, after 
 criticizing Vergennes, " I am determined to omit no opportunity 
 of communicating my sentiments to your excellency upon every 
 thing that appears to me of importance to the common cause, in 
 which I can do it with any propriety. 25 
 
 Vergennes at once replied that, "his Majesty did not re 
 quire Mr. Adams s solicitations in order to interest him in the 
 welfare of the United States. 2G Adams had, at last, become 
 so distasteful to Vergennes that he wrote to Luzerne on Febru- 
 
 20 Durand: Documents of the American Kevolution, pp. 233-234. 
 
 21 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, III, p. 827. 
 
 22 Ibid. Ill, p. 844. 
 
 23 Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, p. 233. 
 
 24 Ibid. p. 234. 
 
 25 Doniol: Participation de la France, etc., IV, p. 422; John Adams: 
 Works, VII, p. 241. 
 
 28 Doniol: Participation de la France, etc., IV, p. 423. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 87 
 
 ary 18, 1781, and indicated that he hoped that Congress would 
 not appoint Adams as an aid to Franklin again, but he directed 
 Luzerne to refrain from trying to procure his recall, but rather 
 to get Congress to give him instructions which will keep him from 
 doing mischief. 27 
 
 The situation was now the more delicate, because Franklin 
 had allowed himself to be used by Vergennes as a channel of 
 communication with Congress concerning his troubles with 
 Adams. This materially injured Franklin and created a large 
 support for Adams. 28 Nevertheless, through Luzerne s sugges 
 tions, Congress decided to strengthen Adams by the selection of 
 joint commissioners from widely scattered states. To accomplish 
 this plan, Luzerne employed means which cannot be count 
 enanced, though it seemed justified at the time on account of the 
 rabid opposition of the Radicals to Franklin and his work. It 
 was found possible to elect Franklin as one of these Commission 
 ers, by the manipulation of Sullivan of New Hampshire. Thomas 
 Paine was also bribed to aid in carrying out the plan. This is 
 proved by Luzerne s letter to Vergennes in which he says, "He 
 informed me that he would accept this task with pleasure. I 
 promised him $1,000 a year." 29 The same kind of an induce 
 ment was, it may be inferred, extended to Sullivan, for Luzerne 
 says concerning him, "This delegate has shown in this affair 
 equal patriotism and attachment to the alliance. 30 With the 
 aid of these two men and others, instructions suitable to Ver 
 gennes were agreed upon and John Jay, Franklin, Henry Lau- 
 rens and Thomas Jefferson were chosen to aid John Adams in 
 Europe. 31 Adams, on hearing of this affair was furious, Con 
 gress," he said, "surrendered their own sovereignty into the 
 
 27 Durand: Documents of the American ^Revolution, pp. 235-237. 
 
 28 Bancroft : History of the United States, X, p. 443. 
 2 * Doniol: Participation de la France, etc., IV, p. 60. 
 80 Ibid. IV, p. 608. 
 
 11 Bancroft: History of the United States, X, p. 238. 
 
88 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 hands of the French minister. Blush, Blush, ye guilty record 
 Blush and perish." 32 
 
 The success of Luzerne in selecting envoys and writing in 
 structions for them, did not effectually check the Kadical oppo 
 sition, however. It actually made it more rabid. The Massa 
 chusetts delegates held their seats in Congress in spite of a reg 
 ulation of Congress that no delegate should hold his seat for 
 more than three consecutive years. Samuel Adams was returned 
 to Congress year after year. That Luzerne fought against the 
 pernicious influence of this man by means which would not al 
 ways bear the light, is shown by a report to Vergennes in which 
 he says that the actions of the Massachusetts delegates "has led 
 me into several proceedings of which I have not complained, be 
 cause I have prevented their effects by other means. 33 
 
 In May, 1779, Samuel Adams had nominated Arthur Lee for 
 a post in Europe as special envoy in place of Franklin, in spite 
 of all the charges against him. Luzerne reported that Adams did 
 all that he could through intrigue and friendship to accomplish 
 this selection, but Luzerne put a stop to the plan by refusing to 
 transact business through him (Lee), if he were selected. 34 
 Adams then attempted to nominate General Gates, but Washing 
 ton and Luzerne checked this plan by announcing that Gates 
 could not enter upon diplomatic duties until cleared of military 
 charges. 35 
 
 By December, 1780, Congress was filled by cabals and 
 schemes to discredit both Washington and Franklin. The num 
 ber of special committees suddenly increased. Their work wa f 
 so bungling that an attempt was made to reduce their number 
 and size, but Samuel Adams blocked every move of this kind. So 
 
 M Doniol: Participation de la France, etc., IV, p. 608. 
 88 Durand: Documents of the American Revolution, p. 249. 
 84 Ibid. p. 241. 
 88 Ibid. p. 242. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 89 
 
 great was the committee evil, that Washington was obliged to 
 keep his plans of campaigns secret from Congress. D Estaing 
 and Luzerne were the only two men in America to whom they 
 could be entrusted. Things came to such a serious state by the 
 middle of 1780, that Livingston of New York was bent upon 
 forming a separate confederation with New England left out. 
 But Luzerne counseled delay and an attempt to win back Penn 
 sylvania and Delaware, both of which had been won over to the 
 New England side. By this means Luzerne hoped that the Mid 
 dle states would hold the balance of power. Lafayette, in a let 
 ter to Vergennes dated May 20, 1780, indicated that Luzerne was 
 convinced that Congress could never act with discretion and 
 promptitude on any diplomatic matters and had accordingly 
 asked Congress to name a committee to confer with him, with 
 power to set in motion all the resources of America. 36 This let 
 ter is evidence that Luzerne was satisfied that disaster could only 
 be averted by clothing Washington with extraordinary powers 
 and allowing Franklin to use his best judgment in an executive 
 control of foreign relations. Consequently, the French minister 
 adopted the plan of bombarding Congress with memorials and 
 securing the selection of the committee named above. 
 
 This committee was selected on December 26, 1780. It con 
 sisted of Witherspoon, Sullivan, Duane, Madison and Mathews. 37 
 Witherspoon was the only member of the committee, who as a 
 confessed Radical, stood out for New England. Madison be 
 lieved in the concentration of powder for efficiency up to a certain 
 limit and Mathews was much interested in the Mississippi ques 
 tion. The complexion of the committee gives evidence of the 
 influence of Luzerne in its selection. 
 
 The Radicals and Constructionists for the first time were 
 able to agree upon a new plan for the conduct of foreign affairs 
 
 36 Stevens: Facsimiles, XVII, No. 1625. 
 
 37 Ibid. XV, No. 1193. 
 
90 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 about the middle of 1780, but for far different reasons. The 
 Radicals saw the growing control of diplomatic relations by Lu 
 zerne and wished to check it; the Constructionists hoped that 
 such control would arouse the leaders of Congress to a realization 
 of the necessity of a Department of Foreign Affairs, having a 
 definite policy of action. 
 
 On May 15, 1780, a motion was made to select a committee 
 of three to consider and report upon proper arrangements for 
 the establishment of a Department of Foreign Affairs. 38 The 
 members of this committee were Lovell, Houston and Duane, two 
 of whom were followers of Samuel Adams. This, alone, assured 
 the defeat of the plan. It was felt by the Radicals that this com 
 mittee would make uncertain the plans of Luzerne and check his 
 control of diplomatic affairs. It was not until December 17, 1780, 
 however, that Congress was privileged to consider the report of 
 this committee. 39 Nothing again was heard of the plan until 
 January 10, 1781, when the original committee reported on a 
 plan for a Department of Foreign Affairs. 40 
 
 On May 29, 1781, the French minister conferred with a com 
 mittee which had been appointed to consider two memorials sent 
 by him to Congress concerning the conditions of affairs in 
 France. 41 During 1781, Luzerne still continued to forward me 
 morials to Congress upon many subjects, the majority of them 
 having a direct bearing upon the appointment and control of 
 consuls ; 42 plans of conventions for discussion of peace ; 4S 
 reports on treaties ; 44 and communications from abroad. 45 
 
 M Journals of Congress, XVI, p. 428. 
 
 89 Ibid. XVII, p. 505. 
 
 40 Ibid. XIX, pp. 43-44. 
 
 41 Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 372-373. 
 
 42 Ibid. Ill, p. 10. 
 48 Ibid. Ill, p. 20. 
 44 Ibid. II, p. 267. 
 46 Ibid. Ill, p. 26. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 91 
 
 On August 11, 1781, Luzerne reported to Vergennes that he 
 had used his influence to procure the appointment of Living 
 ston as Secretary of State, but that his opponents declare that 
 the endorsement of the French minister is a guarantee of the 
 defeat of any candidate. Luzerne praised Livingston, but ad 
 mitted him to be somewhat indolent and a lover of quiet. 48 
 
 Meanwhile, the committee which had been appointed to con 
 fer with Luzerne, was enlarged at his request, because it could 
 not apparently accomplish the work outlined for it to do. Ver 
 gennes informed this committee through Luzerne, that the war 
 could not be further prosecuted by France unless Congress indi 
 cated greater activity at once. 47 He also directed Luzerne to 
 inform Congress that it would be necessary for that body to draw 
 a line of conduct for John Adams, of which he might not be al 
 lowed to lose sight and accused Adams of a wrong use of his 
 powers in treating with England. 48 
 
 Luzerne at once made a strong representation to Congress, 
 asking for the immediate appointment of a committee with which 
 he could treat. 49 Luzerne indicated to this committee the dan 
 gers of delay and the possibility of the loss of the war. 50 
 
 Stirred to action at last, this committee reported out letters 
 which were forwarded by Congress to the French king on Octo 
 ber 18, 1781, assuring him of redoubled efforts by Congress to 
 bring the war to a speedy conclusion. 51 On October 24, 1781, 
 Washington reported to Congress the surrender of Cornwallis 
 and this event was ordered communicated to the French min 
 ister through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 52 
 
 48 Durand: Documents of the American Eevolution, p. 238. 
 4T Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 22. 
 
 48 Journals of Congress, XX, p. 563. 
 
 49 Ibid. XX, p. 561. 
 
 60 Secret Journals of Congress, III, pp. 36-37. 
 
 61 Ibid. Ill, p. 40. 
 
 62 Ibid. Ill, p. 47. 
 
92 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 As early as 1775, the French ministry sent secret envoys to 
 America to study conditions and to influence public opinion in 
 favor of France. After the signing of the treaty of 1778, a min 
 ister was sent to America to further influence public opinion 
 and to control, as far as possible, the actions of Congress in the 
 conduct of foreign affairs. 
 
 Gerard early realized the pernicious influence of the Radi 
 cals and the inefficiency of the committee system of Congressional 
 control. Under these conditions, he boldly endeavored to control 
 domestic affairs and so far succeeded as to be directly instru 
 mental in effecting the recall of some of the American envoys 
 to France. 
 
 Luzerne, upon his arrival in America, used his influence in 
 checking the inefficient control of the army and the attempt to 
 replace Franklin. He took part in the framing of instructions 
 to John Adams as peace envoy; he was instrumental in procur 
 ing the modification of the paper money tangle; he induced 
 Congress to bring Adams to account for failure to follow the 
 letter of his instructions ; he was probably concerned in the word 
 ing of new instructions to Adams ; he secured the appointment of 
 other Commissioners to aid Adams ; he frustrated an attempt by 
 Samuel Adams to secure the election of Arthur Lee again to a 
 post in Europe; he prevented an attempt of the Middle and 
 Southern colonies to secede from New England, thus maintaining 
 a balance of power. 
 
 Finally he asked Congress to appoint a committee to confer 
 with him on the marshalling of America s entire resources; he 
 worked through this committee to secure the clothing of Wash 
 ington with dictatorial and Franklin with plenary powers in 
 their respective fields of labor. In this work, he largely assumed 
 the functions of the original Committee of Foreign Affairs. 
 
FRANCE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 93 
 
 He suggested the establishment of a Department of Foreign 
 Affairs and probably aided in drawing up the report of the 
 committee on the Department. He used his influence in securing 
 the election of Livingston as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He 
 urged Congress to redouble its efforts in the prosecution of the 
 war and discouraged Congress from laying claim to western 
 territory. He constantly kept in mind the best interests of 
 France as well as those of America. 
 
 Luzerne s services to America cannot be estimated. He 
 finally succeeded in arousing Congress to a supreme effort in 
 winning the war and events conclusively proved that his influ 
 ence was effective. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER IN THE 
 CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
 The recall of Arthur Lee and John Adams as special envoys 
 to France in October, 1778, and the election of Benjamin Frank 
 lin as minister plenipotentiary to that country on October 26, 
 1778, were milestones in the development of the executive powers 
 of government in the United States. 
 
 The work of the Commission in France had been almost 
 fruitless, if we except the treaty of 1778, owing to the "animosi 
 ties and disputes detrimental to the interests and honor of the 
 United States. Complete disgust at the chaotic turn of events, 
 had forced the leaders in Congress to demand the censuring of 
 all the Commissioners ; the recall of two of them and the confer 
 ring of plenary powers upon Franklin. 
 
 On December 28, 1776, a committee was appointed in Con 
 gress to prepare plans for obtaining foreign assistance. It re 
 ported and its plans were referred to a committee of the whole. * 
 On December 30, 1776, the report of the committee was read and 
 considered. 2 The direct result of this report was the sending 
 of Izard to Tuscany; Dana to Russia; Arthur Lee to Prussia; 
 William Lee to Vienna and Laurens to the Netherlands. But in 
 every instance, they were either never received or allowed to 
 wander harmlessly about without recognition or accomplishment. 
 This was a typical result of the "militia" policj^. Furthermore, 
 it kept six ministers in Europe, when one would have been suffi- 
 
 1 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 37. 
 a Ibid. II, pp. 38-39; 40, 41. 
 
THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER 95 
 
 i 
 
 cient. It harassed the work of Franklin ; it was a matter of great 
 expense. It had a bad effect upon the French negotiations. It 
 nearly broke up the work of the Commissioners during 1777 and 
 1778. 
 
 It was the accumulated results of all these embarrassing 
 situations, that caused Congress to accept the report of the Com 
 mittee of Secret Correspondence on January 2, 1777, in the form 
 of a commission for Franklin. 3 But this report was, as usual, 
 referred to a committee of three (Chase, Wilson, Samuel Adams). 
 The appearance of Adams on the committee was a guarantee 
 that Franklin would be limited in his powers. The report of the 
 committee was adopted by Congress and gave Franklin new pow 
 ers beyond those he first enjoyed as Commissioner to France. 
 This was, without doubt, a concession to Wilson, who was a Con- 
 structionist and a member of this committee. 4 
 
 Franklin s instructions were grouped under eleven heads. 
 Most of the items appeared to be compromises between the oppos 
 ing parties in Congress. The last item, however, definitely stated 
 that he was to make no engagements without the consent of Con 
 gress having previously been obtained. 5 This was the one point 
 which shows the power of the advocates of the decentralization 
 of power. Yet in this very point, there was a great advance in 
 the conduct of foreign affairs, because the entire work was placed 
 in the hands of one man. This would, in the end, work out for 
 increased executive powers of foreign ministers. 
 
 Necessity had been the cause of many of the executive as 
 sumptions of Franklin during all the years from 1776 to 1782. 
 This assumption of power had been a gradual growth and when 
 in 1778, he was given special powers, he was not at a loss 
 as to how they should be used. Lacking instructions from Con 
 
 8 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 42. 
 
 4 Ibid. II, pp. 42, 43. 
 
 * Ibid. II, pp. 107-111; Journals of Congress, XII, pp. 1038-1042. 
 
96 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 gress, he soon found himself acting as Secretary of the Treasury 
 in negotiations for loans and in the disbursing of money. 6 He 
 was a deputy Secretary of War, in that he bought and forwarded 
 military supplies and in part, gave suggestions and views to the 
 Frencn Court on the conduct of campaigns and the movement 
 of troops. He acted as deputy Secretary of the Navy in fitting 
 out cruisers and planning naval campaigns. 7 He acted as Sec 
 retary of State in conducting various diplomatic matters. All 
 these functions implied the delegation of power by Congress, but 
 such power it did not delegate, as we have had occasion to ob 
 serve. Such powers were tacitly assumed, however, with the en 
 couragement of the French Court and the Constructionists at 
 home. Here was the first real executive work, which was the 
 antecedent of the subsequent development of power of an execu 
 tive nature in the American scheme of government after 1789. 
 That this early power of Franklin was not abused was due to 
 his stability and integrity. In the hands of Arthur Lee or John 
 Adams it might have been fatal. 
 
 After the recall of the envoys, Franklin was free to use his 
 new powers in the most efficient way and with a wide interpre 
 tation. But his respite was short. The enemies of Franklin in 
 Congress attempted to replace him with John Adams. Failing 
 in this, they were able to secure the selection of Adams as peace 
 envoy, and he arrived in France in this capacity early in 1780. 
 
 Immediately, Adams began his old tactics of berating Frank 
 lin and especially the French ministry. In October, 1780, Frank 
 lin advised him to assume a different attitude to Vergennes but 
 to no avail. 8 On July 12, 1781, Adams commission as an envoy 
 to close a commercial treaty with France was revoked by Con- 
 
 6 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p. 291. 
 
 7 Ibid. II, pp. 224-245. 
 1 Ibid. IV, p. 87, 
 
THE CENTRALIZATION OP POWER 97 
 
 gress. 9 On May 29, 1782, Livingston, then Secretary of For 
 eign Affairs, scored Adams for not replying to a letter from the 
 Department of Foreign Affairs and warns him against signing a 
 separate peace. 10 On October 31, 1782, Adams wrote to Living 
 ston, lamenting that he is bound by instructions. X1 On November 
 18, 1782, he wrote again to Livingston arguing against the limita 
 tions placed upon him by his instructions and adds, "There is 
 nothing that humbles and depresses; nothing that shackles and 
 confines; in short nothing that renders totally useless all your 
 ministers in Europe so much as these positive instructions to con 
 sult and communicate with the French ministry upon all occa 
 sions and follow their advice. 12 
 
 This is certainly a marked change in the attitude of this 
 leader of Radicals and believer in the utmost decentralization of 
 power. He then feared the use of power. Now it was a far dif 
 ferent matter. Cold reason compelled Adams to gradually as 
 sume a national view, though it was diametrically opposed to his 
 state interests and affections, which made him at heart provin 
 cial. In this mental state, Adams was not of great value to 
 America in France. The French ministry turned naturally to 
 Franklin with the hope that he could assume enough power to 
 conclude peace with satisfaction to all concerned. 
 
 Franklin s executive powers rapidly increased from this 
 time. Two factors, among many, seem of great importance in 
 hastening this increase of powers. (1) The committee system in 
 Congress completely broke down about 1781. In spite of the 
 appointment of 261 committees during this year, nothing of im 
 portance was accomplished. The direct result was the establish 
 ment of the Department of Foreign Affairs with Livingston, a 
 
 Journals of Congress, XX, p. 746. 
 
 10 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, V, pp. 226-227. 
 
 11 Ibid. VI, pp. 53, 54. 
 
 12 Ibid. VI, pp. 52-53. 
 
98 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 staunch friend of Franklin, as its first Secretary. He at once 
 placed in Franklin s hands all the powers he, as Secretary, could 
 give him and kept, to the best of his ability, the Radical element 
 in the dark concerning Franklin s plans. 
 
 (2) The other important factor was the surrender by the 
 Southern states of their claims to the Floridas and the instruct 
 ing of Jay to agree to give up the free navigation of the Missis 
 sippi below the 31st parallel of latitude. 13 But Jay never re 
 vealed these instructions as Spain did not enter the French and 
 American alliance and as a result, the French- American treaty 
 was modified to the advantage of the United States. 
 
 Here was a clear case of the assumption of executive power. 
 It was good evidence that the conduct of foreign affairs was not 
 in the hands of Congress or even in the hands of the Secretary 
 of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 In 1782, Franklin called Jay to France from Spain with 
 this comment, "Spain has taken four years to consider whether 
 she would treat with us or not. Give her forty years and let us 
 mind our own business. 14 With Jay in France, negotiations for 
 peace began between Oswald, the English representative, and 
 Franklin in the spring of 1782. Jay, as a commissioner, refused 
 to treat with Oswald whatsoever, on the basis of the American 
 colonies and plantations, but only upon the basis of a sovereign 
 power entitled the United States of America. 
 
 Franklin and Vergennes both urged Jay to assume a con 
 ciliatory attitude. This aroused Jay s suspicions. 15 They were 
 increased by a letter of Marbois to Vergennes in which reference 
 was made to the United States in such a way as to cause Jay to 
 think that the French ministry was distinctly unfriendly. Jay 
 was convinced that France would oppose the extension of Ameri- 
 
 18 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 99. 
 
 14 Jay: Correspondence and Public Papers, II, p. 193. 
 
 15 Ibid. II, p. 372. 
 
THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER 99 
 
 ca to the west, limit the Newfoundland fisheries, aid Spain in 
 securing her claims to the Mississippi and support the English 
 claim to all the territory above the 31st degree latitude. 16 
 
 He was determined that France should not sacrifice the in 
 terests of the United States to satisfy Spain and the Family 
 Compact. He, therefore, determined to act without instructions, 
 even without the sanction of Franklin. He urged, without in 
 forming the French ministry, (which according to his instruc 
 tions he was bound to do) the dispatch of an envoy to England 
 to show the English ministry the immediate necessity of cutting 
 the cords binding France to America. 17 
 
 Jay was partly right and partly wrong in his suspicions. 
 France was well within her rights in demanding knowledge and 
 aid from America in negotiating terms of peace. On the other 
 hand, had France and Spain known all the details of the nego 
 tiations between America and England, the treaty of peace, 
 which was ultimately signed, would not, in all probability, have 
 been as advantageous to the United States. This action by Jay 
 was a clear case of the assumption of executive powers in such a 
 way as to save a most vital and delicate situation. 
 
 Jay s stand all through the negotiations was opposed to 
 that of Franklin. It is true that Franklin was a Construetionist 
 as well as Jay, but he was an opportunist Constructionist. Jay s 
 stand in the whole matter was extremely technical, but extremely 
 useful. He, no doubt, suspected and feared too much, but these 
 fears and suspicions were of immense value to the United States. 
 He knew before he left America, that France did not believe that 
 the United States would make the possession of the fisheries the 
 absolute and irreducible basis of peace. 18 The persistence of 
 Adams on this point, however, came very near wrecking the 
 
 16 Jay: Correspondence and Public Papers, II, p. 398. 
 
 17 Ibid. II, pp. 405-407. 
 
 18 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, V, p. 241. 
 
100 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 whole negotiations. For this reason the conferences dragged on 
 until the latter part of 1782. But Adams and Jay, together, 
 finally gained all the disputed points, pleasing both Northern and 
 Southern states. The boundary question, the fishery question, 
 the treatment of the Loyalists and the settlement of the Ameri 
 can debts were all settled and the articles of the provisional 
 treaty signed on November 30, 1782. 
 
 Thus the transfer of the executive functions of government 
 to France and their assumption by three American envoys, made 
 possible the advantageous provisions of the articles of peace. 
 What advantages, if any, would have been attained, had the 
 American Congress controlled foreign affairs to the end, can 
 never be known. That the war would never have ended success 
 fully with it in power, working through its inefficient committee 
 system, is probable. That the terms of peace would not have 
 been satisfactorily completed and with advantage to America 
 under a true Congressional regime is almost certain. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 New England demanded that the fisheries question should 
 be settled in her favor at the outcome of the war, regardless ol 
 its effect upon the rest of the country. This was always the 
 spirit of the militia" policy. This kind of diplomacy was 
 sectional. Franklin s policy was national. 
 
 Since the Radicals could not remove Franklin, they sought 
 to limit his powers. His instructions were made very definite. 
 But the fact that the work in France was placed in the hands 
 of one man was a great step in advance in the use of executive 
 power. The committee system had miserably failed and the 
 Committee for Foreign Affairs was inactive. The only solution 
 of the problem was the one attempted the virtual transfer of 
 the conduct of foreign affairs to Europe. 
 
THE CENTRALIZATION OP POWER 101 
 
 Franklin, in France, assumed varied executive powers. He 
 was driven to do this by the necessities of the case. This was. 
 the first real development of executive power in connection with 
 the American government. That it was wisely used was due 
 to the man using it. He was most acceptable to the French 
 Court. This very position of confidence stirred up suspicions 
 against him. When Jay arrived in France, he was soon able to 
 follow Franklin s lead. With the consent of Franklin, he broke 
 his instructions in 1782 and the treaty of peace was signed with 
 England without the knowledge of France and contrary to the 
 instructions of Congress. 
 
 This action of the American envoys was hastened by party 
 strife in Congress. The assumption of executive power could 
 alone save the situation. Its results were acceptable. The end 
 seemed to justify the means. This was all accomplished by the 
 concentration of executive power in the hands of men able to 
 properly use it. That it was assumed is evidence that Congress 
 did not have the power to give it, or possessing it, would not dele 
 gate it to the envoys abroad. Their successful work in France 
 was the beginning of the rapid growth of the executive functions 
 of government. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT OP A DEFINITE POLICY IN THE 
 CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
 The actions of the peace envoys in France is proof that the 
 executive power of the government, through its representatives, 
 developed more rapidly than it was delegated by Congress. 
 
 It is interesting to note, however, that the growth of execu 
 tive power began early in the life of Congress. As early as Jan- 
 / uary 24, 1776, a committee was appointed to consider the estab 
 lishment of a War Office. a After June 25, 1776, many questions 
 which had formerly been referred to special committees for ac 
 tion, were now turned over to this Board. 2 During 1776, a com 
 mittee was appointed to consider the establishment of a Post 
 Office. 3 On April 17, 1777, the Committee of Secret Correspond 
 ence was changed to the Committee for Foreign Affairs. 4 Dur 
 ing this year, Samuel Adams was elected a member of the Board 
 of War. 5 It is at once noticeable that fewer special committees 
 were appointed to consider letters from Washington, since most 
 of them were referred to this Board. 
 
 The first marked delegation of power appears on May 16, 
 1778, when it was resolved that such alterations in or additions 
 to the instructions given to the Commissioners at the Courts of 
 Berlin, Vienna and Tuscany may be made by the Committee for 
 Foreign Affairs as they may think expedient. 6 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, IV, p. 85. 
 
 2 Journals of Congress, IV, p. 85ff. 
 
 3 Ibid. IV, p. 107. 
 
 4 Ibid. VII, p. 274. 
 6 Ibid. VII, p. 32. 
 
 6 Journals of Congress, XI, p. 505. 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFINITE POLICY 103 
 
 On May 15, 1780, a committee of three was appointed to 
 
 consider a plan for the establishment of a Department of ^ 
 
 eign Affairs. 7 Six months later, on December 17, 1780, this 
 special committee brought in its plan. 8 Here was good evidence 
 of the inability of Congress to do efficient work. On Jan. 10, 
 1781, the report of the committee was seriously considered by 
 Congress. 9 
 
 Meanwhile a concentration of executive power had begun 
 in other lines of governmental work. On January 10, 1780, a 
 committee of four had been appointed to consider the establish 
 ment of a Court of Appeals. 10 On August 21, 1780, a committee 
 had been appointed to consider a plan for an executive depart 
 ment. During this period much work was being assigned to the 
 Boards of War, Marine, Commerce and Treasury, but very little 
 to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, as we have observed. 
 
 On January 10, 1781, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
 was established, with recommendations for the selection of a 
 Secretary. ^ On January 17, 1781, Arthur Lee and Livingston 
 were placed in nomination by the Radicals and Constructionists 
 respectively, but no action was then taken. 12 It was voted that 
 the ballots be cast on these names on February 9, 1781. 13 No 
 action was taken, however, until June 13, 1781, and it was then 
 voted to postpone action until the following week. 14 There 
 seems to be no record as to the exact date when the Secretary 
 was elected, but it may be assumed from the records of events 
 that Livingston was elected as Secretary sometime in August, 
 
 7 Journals of Congress, XVI, p. 428. 
 
 8 Ibid. XVII, p. 1156. 
 
 9 Ibid. XIX, p. 42. 
 
 10 Ibid. XVI, p. 32. 
 
 11 Ibid. XIX, p. 42. 
 " Ibid. XIX, p. 65. 
 18 Ibid. XIX, p. 133. 
 14 Ibid. XXI, p. 637. 
 
104 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 1781. 15 On January 16, 1781, the salary had been fixed at 
 $4,000 per year. 16 
 
 The duties of the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs were in 
 substance as follows: (1) To hold office during the pleasure of 
 Congress; (2) To have custody of all books, papers, etc., belong 
 ing to the Department; (3) To conduct all correspondence; 
 (4) To correspond with governors; (5) To receive the applica 
 tions of foreigners; (6) To secure the redress of private in 
 juries in foreign lands; (7) To attend Congress and report on 
 all cases referred to him by Congress; (8) To give Congress in 
 formation concerning his department; (9) To have access to all 
 state papers; (10) To control foreign ambassadors. 17 
 
 It had taken a long time to come to this position in the con 
 trol of foreign affairs and it is evidence that the leaven of execu 
 tive control had begun to work in Congress. Yet it is surprising 
 how much Congress hampered the new Secretary in the conduct 
 of his department. Able man as Livingston was, he was never 
 allowed to initiate any diplomatic activities of any consequence. 
 That he had a definite foreign policy which he desired to carry 
 out was early manifest, but he was handicapped by constitu 
 tional limitations. 18 Furthermore, Congress continually in 
 fringed upon his delegated powers as Secretary. 
 
 On November 23, 1781, Congress ordered the Secretary to 
 inform its Ministers in France to confer with Lafayette and to 
 employ him in accelerating supplies and fulfilling plans for the 
 assistance of America. 19 On January 2, 1782, the Secretary was 
 ordered to lay before Congress an estimate of the expenses to be 
 incurred by the Ministers abroad. 20 On May 1, 1782, the Secre- 
 
 " Journals of Congress, XXI, p. 855. 
 
 16 Ibid. XIX, p. 64. 
 
 17 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, V, pp. 199-201. 
 
 18 Ibid. I, pp. 663-664-665. 
 
 19 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 49. 
 
 20 Ibid. Ill, p. 52. 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFINITE POLICY 105 
 
 tary lays before Congress a letter from the French minister. 21 
 On May 14, 1782, he is directed to state the condition of com 
 merce and outline plans for its protection. 22 Committees be 
 gan to be appointed to do the work originally assigned to the Sec 
 retary. One committee was selected to revise the instructions to 
 Adams. 23 Another committee was appointed to draft a com 
 mission and instructions for a minister to Sweden. 24 A third 
 was elected to receive communications from the French minis 
 ter. 25 On September 24, 1782, a committee of three was elected 
 to confer with the French minister relative to England s at 
 titude to peace. 26 On October 4, 1782, the same committee re 
 ported on dispatches from Jay and Lafayette. 27 On October 
 22, 1782, a committee of three reported on a letter from Jay and 
 recommended that he be ordered to at once conclude a treaty 
 with the United Provinces. 28 On November 25, 1782, on re 
 ceiving the report of a committee of three, Congress ordered the 
 Secretary to send all information possible to Congress and to 
 Ministers to European Courts, except secret materials. 29 On 
 December 3, 1782, Livingston resigned as Secretary of Foreign 
 Affairs. 30 On December 25, 1782, Livingston, on the request of 
 Congress to remain in office until spring, consented to perform 
 the duties of the office until that time, but this consent was given 
 with great reluctance. 31 
 
 It was natural that Livingston should have resigned. At 
 first, Congress saw to it that he was kept strictly within his 
 
 21 Secret Journals of Congress, III, pp. 93-100. 
 
 22 Ibid. Ill, p. 109. 
 
 23 Ibid. Ill, p. 142. 
 34 Ibid. Ill, p. 215. 
 
 25 Ibid. Ill, p. 217. 
 
 26 Ibid. Ill, pp. 218-226. 
 
 27 Ibid. Ill, pp. 248-250. 
 
 28 Ibid. Ill, p. 251. 
 
 29 Ibid. Ill, p. 254. 
 
 30 Ibid. Ill, p. 255. 
 81 Ibid. Ill, p. 265. 
 
106 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 duties as outlined in the original plan. The Radicals were, 
 moreover, particular that a very strict construction should be 
 placed upon his powers. A little later, the Radicals took up 
 their old plan of securing the appointment of special committees 
 to control the work and functions of the Secretary. He became 
 a mere " rubber stamp." Self respect required him to resign. 
 That Livingston had a real policy and planned to use it, had he 
 been allowed to do so, is shown by several instances. 
 
 After a report by the Secretary with recommendations, on 
 February 5, 1782, it was voted by Congress, "that Franklin be 
 authorized to enter into such engagements in France or with 
 any state or province or with any man or body of men whatso 
 ever, when necessary, for binding the United States to discharge 
 said loans with interest and the United States pledges their faith 
 to conform to what he executes. 32 
 
 The above stands out, however, as the only clear case where 
 the recommendations of the Secretary resulted in any clearly 
 denned action on the part of Congress relative to the enlarge 
 ment of the powers of the Ministers abroad. 
 
 There were several other reasons why Livingston was com 
 pelled to resign. (1) The work of the Department was very ar 
 duous owing to the large amount of correspondence. (2) He 
 found that as soon as he had incorporated the sentiments of Con 
 gress in communications to his Ministers, the sentiments of Con 
 gress had again changed, so that his instructions meant nothing. 
 (3) He desired to give instructions to his ministers of a secret 
 nature, in many instances, but he dared not send them without 
 the advice and consent of Congress. (4) He was seldom able to 
 gain information of value to him in his work by listening to the 
 debates in Congress and he was never encouraged to ask ques 
 tions. 
 
 82 Journals of Congress, XXII, p. 66. 
 88 Ibid. XXII, p. 370. 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFINITE POLICY 107 
 
 That Livingston faithfully fulfilled the duties of the office 
 during his term as Secretary is proved by the fact that on July 
 2, 1782, a committee of five, most of whom were Radicals, be 
 gan an investigation of the Department. 33 On September 18, 
 1782, the committee reported on the number and nature of the 
 books, papers, etc., in the archives of the Department. It re 
 ported that the Secretary had shown much industry, attention 
 and ability in his work; that whatever errors were discovered 
 were too trivial to be reported to Congress, and that some sug 
 gestions were made to the Secretary, which no doubt would be 
 acted upon. 34 
 
 It would seem that Livingston s incumbency as Secretary 
 of Foreign Affairs was a distinct period of transition from 
 utter chaos to the beginning of executive control and he was 
 the particular victim of a natural reaction against such change. 
 Had he remained a year longer as Secretary, he would, without 
 doubt, have begun to reap the good results of the transition. 
 
 Two factors changed conditions very materially during 
 1782, so that by 1783 and 1784, the Department of Foreign Af 
 fairs really began to function as such. (1) The Committee 
 system completely broke down during 1781 and 1782 as a means 
 of control of Congressional action. Whereas, in the early part 
 of 1781, many special committees were elected to consider mat 
 ters which most certainly belonged to the several Departments; 
 by 1782, most of the committees elected had as their function 
 the consideration of matters presented to Congress by these De 
 partments. The positions of Congress and Departments, as far 
 as functions and actions were concerned, were now exactly re 
 versed. The result was a most remarkable growth of execu 
 tive power in the several Departments of government. (2) On 
 November 21, 1782, James Madison offered a resolution in Con- 
 
 34 Journals of Congress, XXIII, pp. 586-589. 
 
108 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 gress to the effect that the powers of the Secretary of Foreign 
 Affairs be enlarged. 35 Previous to this, his powers had been 
 somewhat enlarged, but now a committee of five was appointed 
 to consider the matter of further enlarging them. Their report 
 was wordy and grandiloquent, but when reduced to its lowest 
 terms was not much of an improvement. The appointment of 
 the committee was no doubt a concession to the Construction- 
 ists, especially Madison, but the Radicals saw to it that the 
 teeth of the measure should be effectually drawn. The work 
 of the Department, as outlined by this committee, ended with 
 the provision that all letters to United States Ministers or for 
 eign powers must receive the approval of Congress before sent. 
 The suggestion that the Secretary be given a seat in Congress 
 was struck out. He was to reduce all communications to proper 
 form in his office, which were to be resubmitted to Congress, 
 then countersigned by the Secretary and then delivered to the 
 proper destination. 86 
 
 This plan gave the Secretary more work than before, but 
 no more real power. The new Department of Foreign Affairs 
 was accepted with the repeal of the law establishing the first 
 one. 37 But the new Department did not then receive any more 
 work of importance to do. Some committees were still elected 
 to do this work. On February 14, 1783, a committee reported 
 on a letter from Jefferson and Congress at once acted on his 
 proposed mission as a special envoy to Europe. 38 On April 1, 
 1783, a committee of five reported that Laurens be allowed to 
 return home. 39 On June 4, 1783, Livingston flatly refused to 
 serve longer as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and it was ordered 
 that the Secretary of Congress receive the papers of the De- 
 
 30 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 254. 
 
 38 Journals of Congress, XXII, p. 87. 
 
 3T Ibid. XXII, p. 92. 
 
 88 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 318. 
 
 Ibid. Ill, p. 320. 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFINITE POLICY 109 
 
 partment of Foreign Affairs until a successor was elected. 40 
 Congress at this time accepted Livingston s resignation with re 
 luctance, extended to him its thanks and praised his zeal, fidel 
 ity and ability in the work of the Department. 41 Without a 
 Secretary, the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs was 
 again conducted by special committees. This plan had been the 
 customary one up to 1780, as we have seen. Yet its shortcom 
 ings were at once manifest. The leaders in Congress saw at 
 once that the government had outgrown the old ways of con 
 ducting Congressional business and demanded a responsible 
 Secretary for the conduct of diplomatic relations. After a short 
 delay and with no postponement, John Jay was elected Secre 
 tary of the United States of America for Foreign Affairs on 
 May 7, 1784, at a salary of $3,000 per year. 42 The Department 
 now advanced to a new position of importance and usefulness. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 From the year 1776, there were scattered attempts to 
 place executive power in the hands of standing committees. 
 Some executive work of a domestic nature was beginning to be 
 referred to various Boards, but no serious attempt had been 
 made to establish an executive Department of Foreign Affairs. 
 On January 10, 1781, such a Department was, however, estab 
 lished, but it required seven months more to select a Secretary. 
 
 New powers were granted the Secretary, yet he was not 
 allowed to initiate any important measures or follow a well 
 defined policy. He was strictly limited in his powers. Em 
 barrassments and slights followed and the office of Secretary 
 fell into disrepute. Livingston, the Secretary, unable longer 
 to withstand the existing conditions, resigned. 
 
 40 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 363. 
 
 41 Ibid. Ill, p. 363. 
 
110 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Livingston was a victim of a period of transmission. The 
 committee system was collapsing and Franklin was assuming 
 enlarged powers abroad. The committee system again took 
 charge of the Department, but it was soon found inadequate. 
 In 1783 more powers were given to the Secretary, but this did 
 not suffice. Finally in 1784, Jay was elected as Secretary for 
 the United States of America and the Department assumed new 
 life. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE ELECTION OF A SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
 
 AMERICA FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
 
 THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
 
 1. 
 
 The election of John Jay as Secretary of the United States 
 of America for the Department of Foreign Affairs marked an 
 epoch in the history of the control of foreign relations. In Jay, 
 the Department possessed a far different type of man from Liv 
 ingston. Experienced in the conduct of peace negotiations with 
 England while in France, he brought to the new office the same 
 aggressiveness which he had shown abroad. Jay also possessed 
 initiative and the will power to persevere until his policies were 
 wrought out. His one supreme purpose was to make the power 
 of the United States felt abroad, but he knew that this could not 
 be accomplished until there was a far stronger government at 
 home. His experiences in France and Spain had given him con 
 clusive proof of its weakness. It was because of this weakness, 
 that he felt justified in assuming unauthorized powers as a spe 
 cial envoy. 
 
 Jay met strong obstacles in carrying out his plans, however. 
 The enemies of strong government fought him at every point. 
 In a letter to Washington on June 27, 1786, two years after he 
 became Secretary, he complained of the dire condition of affairs 
 and outlines the absolute necessity of a strong government ably 
 administered. * On August 18, 1786, he wrote to Jefferson and 
 
 1 John Jay: Correspondence and Public Papers, III, p. 203. 
 
112 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 deplored the lack of energy in the state and federal govern 
 ments. 2 In a second letter to Jefferson, dated October 27, 1786, 
 he indicated that the inefficiency of the government became daily 
 more apparent. 3 In a letter to Mr. Carmichael, January 4, 
 1787, he indicated that business of importance had not been done 
 since November 3, 1786, owing to the lack of a quorum in Con 
 gress. 4 On February 9, 1787, he wrote Jefferson, indicating that 
 the executive, judicial and legislative work of the government 
 must be arranged in separate departments. 5 
 
 Jay was not alone in this opinion. Both Jefferson and Mad 
 ison stood with him. Jefferson as a revolutionist, possessed keen 
 constructive powers and a clear appreciation of the need of the 
 adaptation of the government to the needs of the people. 6 As 
 chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, he drafted in 
 structions for the concluding of commercial treaties on the basis 
 of reciprocity. In this he was in full accord with Franklin. He 
 supported the establishment of a Department of Foreign Affairs 
 against the Radicals. He supported Madison against R. H. Lee 
 in sustaining measures in the Virginia legislature giving power 
 to Congress to impose impost duties. 7 
 
 As early as March, 1785, Madison wrote concerning the De 
 partment of Foreign Affairs, If the office of Foreign Affairs be 
 a proper one and properly filled, a reference to it of all foreign 
 dispatches is so obvious a course, that any other disposition of 
 them by Congress condemns their own establishment and affronts 
 the minister in office and puts on him a label of caution and 
 against respect and confidence of the ministers of foreign powers, 
 
 2 John Jay: Correspondence and Public Papers, III, p. 210. 
 
 8 Ibid. Ill, p. 212. 
 
 4 Ibid. Ill, p. 225. 
 
 8 Ibid. Ill, p. 231. 
 
 8 Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p. 257. 
 
 T Ibid. I, p. 258. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 113 
 
 essential to his usefulness. 8 He added that while Congress 
 might reject the opinions of the Secretary, it should not renounce 
 the opportunity of using them. In the light of the citations above, 
 it is interesting to note the gradual development of power on the 
 part of Jay as Secretary. 
 
 On June 23, 1784, Jay took office. On May 5, 1784, the Rad 
 icals made their last attempt to carry out the States Rights policy 
 in connection with the conduct of foreign affairs. It was re 
 solved that two Commissioners be appointed in addition to Mr. 
 Adams, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Jay (then in Europe) to be chosen 
 in such manner that the commercial interests of the different 
 parts of the country might be equally attended to. 9 This motion 
 was lost, after a prolonged debate, on the ground that the inter 
 ests of the United States did not require more than three min 
 isters plenipotentiary in Europe at the same time. There was 
 little doubt that the strong government" advocates defeated 
 this plan, since they had observed in so many instances how the 
 multiplication of envoys in Europe had disrupted the policies of 
 the best statesmen in America. 
 
 To counteract this abortive attempt of the Radicals, on May 
 10, 1784, a motion was made to give Adams, Franklin and Jef 
 ferson (who had been elected to take Jay s place) power to make 
 and receive propositions for a treaty of commerce and amity and 
 to negotiate -and sign the same, transmitting it to Congress for 
 its final ratification. 10 
 
 The Southern states now made their demands known by caus 
 ing it to be resolved on June 3, 1784, that the Ministers should 
 not enter into any compact with Spain by which any rights of 
 the citizens of the United States to a free navigation of the Mis 
 sissippi river from its source to the ocean should be given up. " 
 
 8 Madison: Writings, I, p. 141. 
 
 9 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 469. 
 
 10 Ibid. Ill, p. 489. 
 u Ibid. Ill, p. 511. 
 
114 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 The boundary and navigation questions were fast becoming 
 national issues. In such an approaching crisis, it was seen that 
 divided responsibility would be ruinous to the Spanish-American 
 controversy. Accordingly, on February 11, 1785, it was resolved, 
 on the basis of the report of a committee of five, to whom had 
 been referred letters from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that 
 all communications, as well to as from the United States in Con 
 gress assembled, on the subject of foreign affairs, be made 
 through the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs 
 and that all letters, memorials or other papers on the subject of 
 foreign affairs, be addressed to him. Also, it was further re 
 solved that all papers written in a foreign language, which in 
 future shall be sent to Congress from the Secretary of the De 
 partment of Foreign Affairs, be accompanied with a translation 
 in English and that a proper interpreter be engaged to do this 
 work. 12 
 
 On May 14, 1785, the Secretary reported out the form of a 
 commission for John Adams as minister to England. 13 This was 
 the first instance where the Secretary had been allowed to do this 
 important work, though it had always been one of his functions. 
 On the next day the Secretary was ordered to make out a letter 
 of credence to Adams, taking care not to make any reference to 
 former disputes. 14 
 
 A marked change had now taken place in the conduct of 
 foreign affairs, yet the committee system of control had not en 
 tirely disappeared, even at this date. A committee was, for in 
 stance, appointed to take into consideration letters from the min 
 isters of the United States at foreign Courts. 15 But the system 
 as such, was practically dead. The "militia" idea of diplomacy 
 
 12 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 527. 
 
 13 Ibid. Ill, p. 546. 
 
 14 Ibid. Ill, p. 547. 
 
 15 Ibid. Ill, p. 550. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 115 
 
 was still active, however. Adams was elected as Minister on 
 February 24, 1785. 16 He at once left for England. Blunt and 
 proud of his country, he demanded, on his arrival, rewards for 
 America, In this spirit, he worked for three years and returned 
 empty handed. This failure was due primarily to the attitude 
 of Adams, but a second large factor was the fact that England 
 could not ascertain with whom to conclude a treaty, because she 
 did not know whether Congress or the individual states held 
 the sovereign power of the United States. It was for this reason 
 that no Minister was sent to America by England until 1791. 17 
 
 On July 2, 1785, the Secretary introduced the Spanish min 
 ister, don Diego Gardoqui to Congress. Here was assumed an 
 other function formerly always delegated to special committees 
 of selected membership. Gardoqui announced that he was em 
 powered to treat on adjustment of points of difference between 
 Spain and America. 18 On July 20, 1785, it was resolved "that 
 the Honorable John Jay, Secretary to the United States of Am 
 erica for the Department of Foreign Affairs be and he hereby is 
 invested with full powers in behalf of the United States of Amer 
 ica to treat, adjust, conclude and sign with don Diego de Gar 
 doqui whatever articles, compacts and conventions may be neces 
 sary for establishing and fixing the boundaries between the ter 
 ritories of the said United States and those of His Catholic Maj 
 esty, etc. 19 Congress added, however, that the general plan of 
 each article be submitted to Congress previous to making it a 
 proposition to the Spanish Minister. 
 
 Here is seen for the first time, the power to conclude 
 treaties placed in the hands of the Secretary to the United 
 States. 
 
 18 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 533. 
 
 17 Wharton : Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p. 574. 
 
 18 Secret Journals of Congress, III, pp. 562-566. 
 
 19 Ibid. Ill, p. 568. 
 
116 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 The seat of the control of affairs of a diplomatic nature 
 was now being brought back from Europe and placed in the 
 hands of the Secretary to the United States, where it had always 
 legally belonged, but owing to party struggles and the inefficien 
 cy of the committee system, had never been allowed to remain. 
 
 The first reference to Jay as the Secretary to the United 
 States of America for the Department of Foreign Affairs, was 
 made in the Journals of Congress on July 13, 1785, over a year 
 after he had been elected to that office. 20 While plainly be 
 lated, it was proof that Congress had begun to regard Jay and 
 his office seriously. On July 20, 1785, the same day that Jay re 
 ceived his new powers as a negotiator of treaties, we find the first 
 instance of a special committee having been elected to receive 
 communications from the Secretary. This committee was in 
 structed to report back to Congress on a suggested method of 
 procedure with regards all such communications. 21 
 
 Here, for the first time, the positions of the Secretary and a 
 special committee, are exactly reversed as compared to their posi 
 tions in 1780 and 1781. At that time, the committees were ap 
 pointed to conduct the work of the Department of Foreign Af 
 fairs and the Secretary was either ignored or directly ordered to 
 carry out the wishes of the committees. 
 
 On July 21, 1785, -a special commission was issued to Jay, 
 closing as follows : * and we hereby promise in good faith to ap 
 prove, ratify and fulfill and cause to be observed and fulfilled 
 whatsoever shall by him, our plenipotentiary, be stipu 
 lated and signed, etc. 22 
 
 On August 25, 1785, however, the clause, requiring him 
 (Jay) to refer all plans of propositions to Congress before ac 
 tion upon them, was repealed. He was ordered to stipulate the 
 
 20 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 566. 
 
 21 Ibid. Ill, p. 568. 
 23 Ibid. Ill, p. 571. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 117 
 
 rights of the United States as to their territorial boundaries and 
 the free navigation of the Mississippi river from its source to the 
 ocean, as established in the treaty with Great Britain and he was 
 not to conclude any treaty until he had submitted it to Con 
 gress. 23 
 
 The truth of the matter was that the Spanish minister knew 
 the proverbial weakness of Congress. He was playing a deep 
 game. Congress became suspicious of this and changed front 
 to meet the issue. The remarkable fact concerning this action 
 is that Congress had become so solidified in aims and purposes 
 that it could adopt at once a certain line of action and follow it. 
 This shows a great advance in united action and centralization of 
 power. 
 
 On May 31, 1786, Jay, having been actually threatened by 
 the Spanish minister, asked Congress to appoint a committee to 
 instruct and direct him on every point and subject relative to 
 the proposed treaty with Spain. He also recommended that such 
 committee be a secret one. 24 This seems to be proof that enough 
 power had been given to the Secretary by Congress, that he now 
 found it undesirable to assume the full responsibility in the use 
 of that power. Called before Congress relative to his request, 
 he informed Congress on August 3rd, that he considered a treaty 
 with Spain of the greatest importance. He stated that France 
 would not remain neutral in a struggle with Spain ; that the two 
 great obstacles in the negotiations were the boundaries and the 
 navigation of the Mississippi, and that the Spanish minister had 
 informed him that the Spanish king would never compromise on 
 these points. Jay suggested a compromies by negotiating a 
 treaty for twenty-five years and no use of the river below the 
 southern boundary of the United States. * 5 
 
 28 Secret Journals of Congress, III, p. 586. 
 24 Ibid. IV, p. 43. 
 28 Ibid. IV, p. 44ff. 
 
118 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 This suggestion at once stirred up a heated debate in Con 
 gress. States Rights statesmen came at once to the front. The 
 Southern states stood solid against Jay s plan. The Northern 
 states wanted Jay relieved from directions demanding the nav 
 igation of the Mississippi. Patrick Henry said that he would 
 rather part with the confederation than relinquish the naviga 
 tion of that river. a6 
 
 On August 10, 1786, Jay was asked by Congress to lay be 
 fore it all information which he possessed concerning the atti 
 tude of France to the Mississippi river question. 27 Jay re 
 ported to Congress on the matter the same day, and informed 
 that body that the Court of France in his opinion, would not 
 admit the claims of America. 28 He indicated that Gerard and 
 Luzerne both talked against the American position, while repre 
 senting France in America. 
 
 After deliberating upon the matter for two weeks, Congress, 
 on August 28, 1786, repealed the act of August 25, 1785, and re 
 solved to give Jay very definite instructions upon the boundary 
 and navigation questions, particularly as to the relinquishing of 
 rights below the southern boundaries. 29 Congress was evidently 
 apprehensive that Jay might decide to disobey instructions again 
 as he had done in France, and it was determined to take no 
 chances. On the same day, therefore, Jay s commission was re 
 pealed. 30 Congress then revised the whole plan of negotiations. 
 In a conference with the Secretary, it was indicated that the ne 
 gotiations must proceed in accordance with his views (a tacit 
 admission of his increased powers) or through a conviction of 
 their impropriety, Congress must adopt some other plan. To 
 
 !a Lee: Arthur Lee, II, p. 321. 
 
 27 Secret Jornals of Congress, IV, p. 63. 
 
 28 Ibid. IV, pp. 63-71. 
 
 29 Ibid. IV, p. 81. 
 80 Ibid. IV, p. 85. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 119 
 
 accept Jay s plan confused the treaty of commerce and amity 
 and also the boundary question. 31 
 
 On August 30, 1786, the Secretary was instructed not to 
 conclude any treaty of commerce with Spain unless and until 
 the boundary question was settled satisfactorily. 32 
 
 Nothing of importance was heard of the Spanish- American 
 question during the remainder of 1786. Beginning with the year 
 1787, the Secretary generally formally reported to Congress in 
 writing on all letters and communications sent to him. He al 
 most invariably accompanied these communications with recom 
 mendations as to what Congress should do. Sixteen different sets 
 of such communications were noted in the Secret Journals of 
 Congress from February 3, 1787 to July 28, 1788. 33 
 
 On April 4, 1787, the Secretary was asked by Congress to 
 report on the state of the negotiations with the Spanish minis 
 ter. 34 On April 13, 1787, Jay gave the complete correspondence 
 in the matter to Congress. He indicated that much had been 
 done by indirection, but little could be forced upon the Spanish 
 minister. He showed that it had been partially agreed that both 
 Spain and the United States were to use the Mississippi down 
 to the United States southern boundary. He strongly advised 
 that the United States adopt some fixed and stable plan or policy 
 towards Spain. 35 On April 20, 1787, Jay was asked to prepare 
 a commission to a special envoy to Spain to conclude the whole 
 matter. Jay strenuously opposed this action, but added, that if 
 Congress insisted, he should propose Jefferson as the envoy. 36 
 
 On September 24, 1787, the Secretary, fully cognizant of the 
 fruitlessness of Adams s mission to England as Minister, still 
 
 31 Secret Journals of Congress, IV, p. 91ff. 
 
 32 Ibid. IV, p. 92ff. 
 
 33 Ibid. IV, pp. 285-438. 
 84 Ibid. IV, p. 297. 
 
 35 Ibid. IV, pp. 299-300. 
 38 Ibid. IV, pp. 339-341. 
 
120 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 deplored the fact that England had not sent a Minister to the 
 United States. He indicated a desire to retaliate, but recom 
 mended caution until "affairs justify a more nervous style of 
 conduct and language this neglect will cease the mo 
 ment the American government and the administration of it 
 shall be such as to impress other nations with a degree of respect 
 
 which deny Congress the means of inspiring at 
 
 present. 37 
 
 On October 5, 1787, Jay recommended the appointment of 
 a Minister to succeed Adams, who was coming home at his own 
 request. 38 On October 13, 1787, the Secretary recommended the 
 repeal of state laws favoring certain nations through treaties of 
 the states. 39 The frequency of these recommendations indi 
 cates plainly that a new era had begun in the Department of 
 Foreign Affairs. The Secretary, through his personality, had 
 developed new powers relative to the initiation of policies and 
 the bringing of them to a successful conclusion. 
 
 On September 16, 1787, Congress, fearful that a report that 
 they were disposed to surrender to Spain in the matter of claims 
 to the navigation of the Mississippi river, would nullify all ef 
 forts in coming to an understanding with that country, resolved, 
 "that the free navigation of the Mississippi river is a clear and 
 essential right of the United States and that the same ought to be 
 considered and reported as such. " 40 It was at the same time 
 resolved, that no further progress be made in the negotiations 
 with Spain by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but that the 
 subject be reopened by the federal government which is to as 
 semble in March next. 41 
 
 It is evident that Congress had taken into serious consider- 
 
 87 Secret Journals of Congress, IV, pp. 388-389. 
 
 88 Ibid. IV, p. 401. 
 
 89 Ibid. IV, pp. 411-413. 
 
 40 Ibid. IV, p. 453. 
 
 41 Ibid. IV, p. 454. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 121 
 
 ation the recommendation of the Secretary that a more stable 
 government be organized in order that an impression might be 
 made upon the powers of Europe in the matter of diplomatic 
 negotiations. 
 
 This was the last action on matters pertaining to the De 
 partment of Foreign Affairs under the Confederation. 
 
 2. 
 
 The steps in the development of a definite Department of 
 Foreign Affairs had been gradual from 1776 to 1788. First came 
 the Committee of Secret Correspondence, which soon functioned 
 as a Committee of Foreign Affairs. Then followed a long contest 
 over the establishment of a Department of Foreign Affairs. 
 With the formation of this Department, we saw how the Radi 
 cals attempted to keep real power away from it, but, in spite of 
 this movement, necessity gave the Department power and under 
 Livingston and Jay, it became a real power in the control of 
 diplomatic relations. The decided work of Jay made the forma 
 tion of a Department of State relatively easy. 
 
 The Constitution, when adopted in 1789, did not provide, in 
 so many words, for the creation of executive departments of 
 government. It referred to them, however, as things which 
 would, as a matter of course be adopted or established. Article 
 II, Section 2, in treating of the powers of the President, said, 
 "He may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Of 
 ficer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject re 
 lating to the duties of their respective offices but the Con 
 gress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, 
 as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of 
 law, or in the heads of departments." 
 
 Under the Confederation, there were Departments of Fi 
 nance, War, Marine, Post Office and Foreign Affairs, but, of 
 
122 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 course, no Department of State. Laws, Ordinances, proclama 
 tions, etc., were promulgated from the office of the Secretary of 
 Congress, signed by the President and countersigned by the Sec 
 retary, who kept the great seal after 1782. 
 
 Alexander Hamilton at once proposed a plan of government 
 which contemplated a supreme executive, "to have sole appoint 
 ment of the heads or chief officers of the Departments of Finance, 
 War and Foreign Affairs. 42 An executive council was also 
 proposed, composed of the President of the Senate, the Chief 
 Justice and Ministers who might be appointed for the Depart 
 ments of Foreign and Domestic Affairs, War, Finance, Marine, 
 etc., who shall advise, but not conclude the President. 43 
 
 Pinckney proposed a second plan including the following: 
 A Council of State, composed of the following officers, Chief 
 Justice, Secretary of Domestic Affairs, Secretary of Commerce, 
 Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of War, and Secretary of 
 Marine, who shall be appointed by the President during his 
 pleasure. The duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall 
 be to correspond with all foreign Ministers, prepare plans of 
 treaties and consider such as may be transmitted from abroad 
 and generally to attend to the interests of the United States in 
 their connection with foreign powers. 44 
 
 The three outstanding facts concerning these proposed 
 plans of government were: (1) The placing of the supreme au 
 thority in the hands of a strong central executive power vested 
 in one person the President. (2) The separation of the func 
 tions of government into an executive, judicial and legislative 
 tripartite form. (3) The more definite placing of executive 
 functions in the control of Departments as aids to the President. 
 But it is a fact to be noted that all three of these features were 
 
 42 Madison: Writings (Hunt), III, p. 195. 
 48 Ibid. IV, p. 234. 
 Ibid. IV, p. 242. 
 
THE FORMATION OP A DEPARTMENT OP STATE 123 
 
 built upon the lines already developed in a limited way from 
 1776 to 1788, omitting in a large measure the weaknesses and 
 adopting the good points they possessed. 
 
 A marked innovation, however, was the suggestion that the 
 President shall appoint a Secretary of State to hold office during 
 his pleasure, who shall be a Secretary to the Council of State and 
 also the public Secretary of the President. It was to be his duty 
 to prepare Public dispatches from the President, which he shall 
 countersign. 45 
 
 The scheme for the Council of State, after due consideration 
 was rejected, but its importance was recognized in Section 2 of 
 Article II of the Constitution. It pointed unmistakably towards 
 executive Departments of government. After the fiasco of the 
 preceding twelve years in the conduct of governmental functions, 
 it is little wonder that the "strong government" advocates in 
 sisted that something better should now be attempted. 
 
 Congress met April 6, 1789. Washington was inaugurated 
 as President of the United States of America on April 30, 1789, 
 but not until the 19th of May was the establishment of executive 
 Departments taken up in earnest. After much discussion on this 
 matter, James Madison offered a substitute for all the former 
 propositions as follows: "That there should be established an 
 Executive Department to be denominated the Department of 
 Foreign Affairs at the head of which there shall be an officer, to 
 be called the Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
 appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
 of the Senate and such person to be removable by the Presi 
 dent." 46 The idea at once gained credence that Madison s mo 
 tion assumed that this Department would be at the head of all 
 the other Departments and for this reason, the plan was strenu 
 ously opposed. Yet, in the end, Madison s idea prevailed. The 
 
 46 Hunt: Department of State, p. 55. 
 Ibid. p. 59. 
 
124 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 "strong government" leaders insisted that had the Confeder 
 ation possessed a strong Department of Foreign Affairs during 
 the war period, much trouble would have been avoided and the 
 war probably appreciably shortened. 
 
 Finally on June 2, 1789, a committee reported to Congress 
 two bills, each purporting to establish a Department: (1) A 
 Department of War and (2) a Department of Foreign Affairs. 
 There had been much heated discussion concerning the power of 
 the President to remove the head of Departments, so the bills 
 were amended so as to give the President an implied power of 
 removal. In this form the bills were passed by the House on 
 June 24, 1789, by a vote of 29 to 22. 47 The vote indicated that 
 the "strong government" men did not completely control the 
 situation, but this condition was natural. There was still fear 
 of delegating too much power to one man or Department. The 
 bills passed the Senate, however, on July 18, 1789, and were 
 signed by the President on July 27, 1789. 48 The act provided in 
 Section 1, that (1) There shall be an Executive Department to be 
 denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs; (2) That this 
 Department shall be headed by a principal officer to be called 
 the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs; (3) That 
 the duties entrusted to him by the President shall be relative to 
 correspondence, commissions, instructions, etc., to or with public 
 Ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or other 
 applications from foreign public Ministers or other foreigners or 
 such other matters as the President shall assign. 
 
 Here is seen the establishing of a new Department with the 
 usual duties and asignments of the old and preceding one. In 
 Section 2, it is provided that there shall be an inferior officer 
 called a chief clerk who will take the place of the principal (Sec 
 retary) when said principal shall for any cause, be removed by 
 
 41 Hunt: Department of State, p. 66. 
 48 Annals of Congress, I, p. 659. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 125 
 
 the President, or in any other case of vacancy, he shall have 
 charge of all records, books, papers, etc. 
 
 In Section 3, each of the officers of the Department is re 
 quired to take an oath to fulfill with fidelity the duties of their 
 respective offices. Here again was an old idea applied to new 
 conditions. 
 
 In Section 4, it is provided that the Secretary shall have 
 charge of all records, books, papers, etc., in the office of the Secre 
 tary for the Department of Foreign Affairs, heretofore estab 
 lished by the United States in Congress assembled. 49 This plan 
 had been adopted back in 1781. 
 
 A Home Department was proposed on July 23, 1789, to bs 
 headed by a Secretary of the United States, who was to corre 
 spond with the states, keep the great seal and file copies of public 
 proceedings, etc. This plan met with little favor, it being urged 
 that too much correspondence had already been carried 011 with 
 the states. 60 
 
 On August 27, 1789, a bill was passed by the House and on 
 September 7, 1789, the Senate concurred. It was signed by the 
 President on September 16, 1789. This act provided that the 
 Executive Department denominated the Department of Foreign 
 Affairs, hereafter be called the Department of State and that 
 the principal officer shall be called the Secretary of State. His 
 duties shall be to review and print bills, orders, resolutions or 
 votes of the Senate and House. The Secretary shall also keep the 
 great seal and shall have the custody of all books, papers, etc., as 
 before. Here is seen the simple combining of the duties of the 
 Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and that of the 
 Secretary of Congress. Both sets of duties had been fully de 
 veloped years before. 
 
 For some time John Jay continued to act as Secretary for 
 
 * Heney: Statutes at Large, p. 28. 
 * Annals of Congress, I, p. 666. 
 
126 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 Foreign Affairs, even though the Department had been greatly 
 changed. He even acted as the new Secretary of State for fifty 
 days. On September 26, 1789, however, Thomas Jefferson was 
 commissioned as the regular Secretary of State and in February, 
 1790, he took up his duties in that office as provided by the bill 
 passed on September 15, of the previous year. 51 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 The election of John Jay as Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
 marked a second great epoch in the development of the control of 
 diplomatic relations by Departments. Jay had a policy of aggres 
 siveness which he proposed to follow. In this he was seconded by 
 the ablest leaders in Congress, though the Radicals unsuccessfully 
 tried to limit his powers and those of his Ministers abroad. By 
 the passing of resolutions on February 11, 1785, it was decided 
 that all communications, which had to do in any way with the 
 conduct of foreign affairs, must pass through the hands of the 
 Secretary. 
 
 This put an effectual stop to the special committee control 
 of the Secretary, who began at once to issue commissions and 
 recommendations. The "militia" idea of diplomacy still per 
 sisted, however. This is well shown by Adams s actions in Eng 
 land and the uselessness of his work. His failure was due partly 
 to his methods of working and largely to the inefficiency of Con 
 gress. No foreign power knew whether the United States was 
 one nation or thirteen. 
 
 On July 20, 1785, Jay was given full power to treat with 
 Spain upon the boundary and navigation questions. Here was 
 the first instance of power being given to a Secretary of Foreign 
 Affairs to conclude a treaty. Jay s strong stand upon the duties 
 of his Department, caused Congress to attempt to limit him, 
 
 81 Jay: Correspondence and Public Papers, III, p. 381. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 127 
 
 however, in his conduct of the negotiations. This showed plainly 
 the increased power of the Secretary and his Department. 
 
 The increase in the dissensions between the States Rights 
 and National parties now threatened the welfare of the country. 
 Jay was early aware of this and pleaded for a stronger govern 
 ment. He opposed the sending of a special envoy to Spain to 
 conclude the treaty, claiming that this action would show weak 
 ness on the part of America. He opposed the sending of more 
 Ministers to Europe, claiming that a few would do far better 
 work than many. During 1786 and 1787, Jay sent many recom 
 mendations to Congress, many of which were favorably received. 
 
 The increased weakness of the foreign relations position of 
 Congress, owing to its indefinite federal policy, brought the 
 majority of the leaders to see the absolute need of a strong cen 
 tralized government. Even John and Samuel Adams were 
 finally convinced of this. After the adoption of the Constitution, 
 Madison and Hamilton made proposals for the establishment of 
 strong executive departments. All these proposals were based 
 upon previous workable schemes. They were the results of an 
 evolutionary force, gradually adapting itself to new conditions. 
 Along with this adaptation, however, there was seen the neces 
 sity of much greater powers of government. This was in the 
 minds of the promoters of the founding of Departments. 
 
 A Secretary of State was consequently proposed, but with 
 no ready response. A strong Department of Foreign Affairs 
 was then established in July, 1789. A Home Department was 
 proposed on July 23, 1789, but rejected. On August 27, 1789, a 
 compromise plan was proposed, namely, that the Department of 
 Foreign Affairs be called the Department of State and that the 
 principal officer be called the Secretary of State, whose duties 
 should include those of the Secretary of the proposed Home De 
 partment. This was finally passed and Jefferson became the first 
 Secretary of State of the United States of America on Septem- 
 
128 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OP FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 ber 26, 1789, with greatly increased powers of a distinctively 
 executive nature. 
 
 GENERAL SUMMARY. 
 
 This thesis has attempted to show that hereditary qualities 
 and environment and the development of special organizations 
 as a result of these influences, had a marked effect upon the be 
 liefs and convictions of the several delegates (especially those 
 from Massachusetts) to the First Continental Congress and that 
 this resulted in the rapid development of controlling factors 
 which first began to be important and to struggle for supremacy 
 in the Second Continental Congress. (Chapters I and II). 
 
 This difference in beliefs among the delegates caused the 
 formation of parties and the division of the whole country into 
 two or three fairly well defined areas or sections. The work of 
 the Congress was at first naturally carried on largely by com 
 mittees, but when party lines began to be drawn, the committee 
 system began to be used as a means of controlling the political 
 situation in Congress. Both Liberative and Constructionist ele 
 ments struggled for the mastery of this democratic, but markedly 
 inefficient system. (Chapter III). 
 
 During the years 1776/1777, 1778 and 1779, the committee 
 system prevailed. All executive power was expressed through 
 the passing of resolutions and carried out through the hands of 
 special committees. This procedure resulted in the marked de 
 centralization of power and the effectual defeat of all measures 
 aiming to conduct the affairs of government in an efficient and 
 successful manner. The most marked effect of this weakness in 
 governmental action was the inability of Congress to conduct 
 foreign relations in a proper way. The results were most dis 
 astrous both at home and abroad. Little or nothing was done in 
 a diplomatic way until the year 1778. Imminent disaster caused 
 the rapid growth of the Constructionist party, which desired a 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE 129 
 
 strong government with the centralization of power in the hands 
 of executive departments. (Chapter IV). 
 
 The growing of this party was shown in its demand for the 
 control of the envoys to Prance and their final recall, and the 
 placing of larger powers in the hands of Franklin in France. 
 This struggle between parties over governmental powers, with 
 out doubt, prolonged the war. During this period of chaos, the 
 negotiations with France were periodically in danger of breaking 
 down and it was only through giving a free hand to Franklin 
 that French aid was finally secured. (Chapter V). 
 
 During this period of chaos the conduct of foreign affairs in 
 America was practically in the hands of the French minister to 
 the United States. It was largely through the policies of the 
 French Minister that dictatorial powers were lodged in the hands 
 of Washington, the cabals against Franklin and Washington 
 largely defeated and the negotiations with France prevented 
 from reaching the breaking point. (Chapter VI). 
 
 The assumption or granting of these powers was the begin 
 ning of the executive functioning of government through the 
 work of individuals, both at home and abroad. Through this 
 policy the treaty of 1778 with France was signed ; it was by the 
 disobeying of instructions that the peace with England was con 
 summated. Meantime, the Department of Foreign Affairs was 
 established in Congress. The process was necessarily slow, be 
 cause it was continually fought by the Radicals. But the com 
 mittee system was now breaking down and by 1783, its control 
 ling power was destroyed. (Chapter VII). 
 
 The executive impetus could now never be destroyed. It 
 had been shown to have been successful. The centralization of 
 power in departments began in earnest. The prolonged nego 
 tiations with Spain over the boundary and navigation questions 
 proved beyond a doubt, the absolute necessity of a stronger and 
 more efficient government than had hitherto existed. 
 
130 CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1774-1789 
 
 The Constitution was accordingly adopted in 1789 and pro 
 vided for the immediate establishment of strong executive de 
 partments. The Department of Foreign Affairs with a Secre 
 tary was formed with greatly enlarged powers. But this De 
 partment almost immediately resolved itself into a Department 
 of State with a Secretary of State. (Chapters VIII and IX). 
 
 The whole process of development had been slow and irreg 
 ular. But its outcome was sure, since the very existence of the 
 United States of America depended upon it, and because there 
 were enough wise leaders in America who could see the meaning 
 of the problem and possessed the sagacity and courage to fight 
 it through to a successful issue. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
 No attempt has been made to list all the material consulted in the 
 preparation of this thesis. The works given below include, therefore, only 
 those found most valuable and to which reference has been made in foot 
 notes throughout the body of the work. 
 
 Adams, C. F. : Life of John Adams. 
 
 Adams, John : Familiar Letters to His Wife. 
 
 Adams, John : Works. 
 
 Adams, Samuel : Writings. 
 
 American Historical Association Reports, 1901, etc. 
 
 Annals of Congress. 
 
 Bancroft: History of the United States. 
 
 Bradford, Alden: History of Massachusetts (1620-1820). 
 
 Bradford, William : History of Plymouth Plantation. 
 
 Candler : Revolutionary Records of Georgia. 
 
 Chamberlain : John Adams and the Revolution. 
 
 Clark : Silas Deane. 
 
 Collins : Composition of Committees of the American Revolution 
 
 Deane: Papers. 
 
 Doniol: Participation de la France a T etablishment Etats- 
 
 Unis d Amerique. 
 
 Durand : Documents of the American Revolution. 
 Foster : A Century of American Diplomacy. 
 Franklin: Works. 
 
 Freeman: Growth of the English Constitution. 
 Galloway, Joseph : Historical and Political Reflections. 
 Hale: Franklin in France. 
 Heney : Statutes at Large. 
 Hosmer : Samuel Adams. 
 
132 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
 Hunt : The Department of State. 
 
 Hutchinson : History of Massachusetts Bay. 
 
 Hutchinson: Letters. 
 
 Jay, John : Correspondence and Public Papers. 
 
 Journals of Congress. 
 
 Lee : Arthur Lee. 
 
 Lincoln: Constitutional History of New York. 
 
 MacDonald: Documentary Source Book of the American Revo 
 lution. 
 
 MacDonald : Fundamental Orders of New Haven Colony. 
 
 Madison: Writings. 
 
 Minutes of the Provincial Congress and Council of Safety of the 
 State of New Jersey. 
 
 Morris: John Adams. 
 
 Otis, James : Rights of British Colonies. 
 
 Old South Leaflets. 
 
 Rhode Island Calender Records. 
 
 Secret Journals of Congress. 
 
 Sparks : Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution. 
 
 Stevens : Facsimiles of the American Revolution. 
 
 Tyler : Patrick Henry. 
 
 Van Tyne : The American Revolution. 
 
 Virginia State Papers. 
 
 Wharton : Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolu 
 tion. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Accounts, 36. 
 
 Adams, John, as Colonial delegate, 
 
 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 28, 33, 34, 
 35, 45, 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65; 
 as envoy to France, 71, 72, 73 ; 
 76; as peace envoy, 83, 84, 
 85, 86, 87, 92, 94, 96, 97, 100, 
 101, 105, 113; as Minister to 
 England, 114, 115, 119, 120, 
 126, 127. 
 
 Adams, Samuel, as leader of oppo 
 sition in Massachusetts, 5, 6, 
 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 
 18, 19, 21; as leader in Con 
 gress, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 33, 
 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 45, 48, 50, 
 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 
 66, 68, 71, 72, 75, 82, 88, 90, 
 95, 102, 127. 
 
 Admiralty, Board of, 38. 
 
 Affairs, Minister of, 64. 
 
 Agent. Colonial, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 
 15; French, 77; Special, 64, 
 69, 73, 79. 
 
 Agreement, Non-Importation, 27, 
 28. 
 
 Alliance, 56, 64, 65, 80, 86, 87, 97, 
 98; treaty of, 76. 
 
 Ambassadors, 65, 68, 73, 104; Eng 
 lish, 75. 
 
 Amity. 70, 76, 78, 113. 
 
 Ammunition, 64, 67, 70. 
 
 Appeals, Court of, 103. 
 
 Aristocracy, 21. 
 
 Army, 21, 25, 43, 67; French, 92. 
 
 Assembly, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 
 
 16, 25, 28, 60. 
 Assistance, Writs of, 23. 
 
 Assistants, 2, 3. 
 
 Association, of Colonies, 19, 28. 
 
 Baltimore, 71. 
 
 Barbary States, 53. 
 
 Bayard, James, delegate from Del 
 aware, 17. 
 
 Beaumarchais, M., 49, 67, 68, 75, 
 76, 77. 
 
 Berlin, 72; Court of, 102. 
 
 Bernard, Governor, 9, 11. 
 
 Bills, 67, 125. 
 
 Bill of Eights, 60. 
 
 Bland, Eichard, delegate from Vir 
 ginia, 38. 
 
 Boards, 41, 57, 61, 62, 109; of 
 War, 102, 103; of Marine, 
 103; of Commerce, 103; of 
 Treasury, 103. 
 
 Bowdoin, James, delegate from 
 Massachusetts, 20. 
 
 Boston, 4, 10, 12, 13, 21; town- 
 meeting, 5, 20. 
 
 Bonvouloir, Count, 79. 
 
 Bourbons, 85. 
 
 Burgesses, House of, 14, 18. 
 
 Burke, James, delegate from Mas 
 sachusetts, 53, 54. 
 
 Cabals, 88, 129. 
 
 Canada, 80, 81. 
 
 Cambridge, 12. 
 
 Carmichael, William, delegate 
 
 from Maryland, 53, 112. 
 Celebration, 36. 
 Charter, 2, 11, 59. 
 Chase, Samuel, delegate from 
 
 Maryland, 48, 95. 
 
134 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Chief Justice, 122. 
 
 Christians, 12, 26. 
 
 Church, Benjamin, leader in Mas 
 sachusetts, 12. 
 
 Clark, Abraham, delegate from 
 New Jersey, 45. 
 
 Clerk, 74, 124. 
 
 Colonels, 58. 
 
 Colonies, British, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, 27, 
 28, 29, 33, 36, 40, 41, 56, 57, 
 59, 60, 61: American, 65, 69, 
 72, 75, 77, 98: New England,, 
 18, 32, 34, 36, 39, 46, 52; 
 Middle, 18, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 
 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 92; South 
 ern, 21, 22, 25, 28, 33, 34. 35, 
 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 63, 92. 
 
 Commerce, 70, 76, 78; Committee 
 of, 173; Department of, 31, 
 38. 
 
 Commission, Special, 94. 
 
 Commission, 70, 71, 72, 95, 96, 
 115, 119, 124, 126. 
 
 Commissions, 53, 54. 
 
 Commissioners, American, 36, 44, 
 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 64, 65, 
 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
 77, 78, 82, 87, 92, 95, 98, 102, 
 113; English, 74. 
 
 Compact, 115; Family, 98; Ply 
 mouth, 2. 
 
 Committee of Foreign Affairs, 47, 
 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 62, 63, 
 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 83, 
 92, 100, 102, 103, 106, 112. 
 121; of Correspondence, 12, 
 13, 16, 22, 25, 26, 27, 43, 45, 
 61, 65, 126; of Secret Corre 
 spondence, 8, 43, 44, 45, 46, 
 47, 49, 55, 62, 66, 71, 95, 102, 
 121; of Congress, 40; "let 
 ter," 9, 30, 31, 61; special, 35, 
 38, 39, 45, 52, 53, 55, 61, 88, 
 102, 106, 109, 115, 116, 126, 
 128; confederation, 58; stand 
 
 ing, 30, 31, 35, 38, 61, 109; 
 "steering," 39, 40; weekly, 
 39; of safety, 21. 
 
 Communications, 30, 31, 36, 38, 90, 
 105, 108, 114, 116, 126. 
 
 Commonwealth, 26. 
 
 Concord, 20. 
 
 Confederation, 13, 23, 89, 118, 121, 
 124. 
 
 Connecticut, 13, 29, 33, 34, 36, 37, 
 51, 59. 
 
 Congress, First Continental, 9, 34. 
 16, 28; provincial, 18, 20, 21; 
 Second Continental, 20, 21, 
 29 ; Stamp Act, 9, 27. 
 
 Conservatives, 49, 52, 54, 55. 
 
 Constructionists, 41, 47, 58, 62, 77, 
 88, 90, 95, 96, 100, 103, 108, 
 126. 
 
 Constitution, 14, 18, 59, 60, 61, 121, 
 123, 127, 130. 
 
 Control, Congressional, 40, 56, 67, 
 92, 103; of foreign relations, 
 111; of consuls, 90. 
 
 Cooper, Samuel, friend of Frank 
 lin, 14. 
 
 Cornwallis, Lord, 91. 
 
 Convention, 115. 
 
 Crown, 3, 7, 8, 23. 
 
 Council of State, 60, 121. 
 
 Court, French, 70, 118; foreign, 
 114; European, 105; Prus 
 sian, 69; Eussian, 69; Span 
 ish, 68, 69; of Tuscany, 69. 
 
 Cushing, Thomas, delegate from 
 Massachusetts, 8, 10. 
 
 Dana, Francis, delegate from Mas 
 sachusetts, 38, 48, 94. 
 
 Deane, Silas, delegate from Con 
 necticut and envoy to France, 
 13, 33, 44, 49, 50, 64, 65, 66, 
 67, 68, 69, 70, 77, 78, 79. 
 
 Debts, American, 100. 
 
 de Berdt, Denys, colonial agent, 8. 
 
INDEX 
 
 135 
 
 Declaration of Independence, 9, 
 23. 25, 66; of Rights, 19, 20. 
 21. 
 
 de Fleury, M., French statesman, 
 63. 
 
 Delegates, 2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 18, 19, 
 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 38, 
 58, 60, 61, 81, 82, 88, 126. 
 
 Delegation, 15, 17, 22. 
 
 Delaware, 29, 32, 34, 37, 51, 63, 89. 
 
 Democracy, 3, 31, 56, 63. 
 
 Democrat, 21. 
 
 de Montmarin, Count, 75. 
 
 Departments, 41, 57, 61, 107, 112, 
 122, 127, 129; of Domestic 
 Affairs, 122; executive, 102, 
 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 
 130; heads of, 121, Foreign 
 Affairs, 90, 93, 97. 103, 106, 
 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 
 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 
 125, 126, 127, 129. 130; Home, 
 125, 127; of State, 121, 122, 
 125, 127, 130 ; of Finance, 121, 
 122; of Marine, 121; of Post 
 Office, 121; of Treasury, 31; 
 of War, 121, 122, 124. 
 
 D Estaing. Admiral, 89. 
 
 de Sartine. French statesman, 79. 
 
 Dickinson, John, delegate from 
 Pennsylvania, 22, 27, 33, 42, 
 54. 
 
 Diplomacy, 46, 50, 61, 68, 70, 77. 
 100; "militia," 77, 114. 
 
 D Ossun. Marquis. French states 
 man, 75. 
 
 Drayton, William, delegate from 
 Georgia, 48, 49, 50. 
 
 Duane, James, delegate from New 
 York, 19, 54, 55, 89, 90. 
 
 Duer. William, delegate from Ne\\ 
 York, 49. 
 
 Edict of Nantes, 79. 
 Ellsworth, Oliver, delegate from 
 Connecticut, 54. 
 
 Empire, British, 26. 
 
 Engineers, 43. 
 
 Englishman, 3, 4, 15. 
 
 Envoys, 46, 62, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77, 
 78, 79, 83, 88, 92, 94, 96, 99, 
 100, 101; peace, 102, 108, 119, 
 127; special, 113, 129. 
 
 Executive, 8, 28, 122 ; council, 122. 
 
 Fabian policy, 57. 
 
 Factions, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28, 43, 46, 
 
 56, 64, 65, 77, 84. 
 Finance, 56. 
 
 Fisheries, 84, 100; Newfoundland. 
 99. 
 
 Florida, 80, 84, 98. 
 
 Folk-mote, 1, 2, 3, 7, 15. 
 
 Foreign Affairs, 34, 35, 36, 37. 38, 
 42, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 54, 61, 
 73, 77, 82, 89, 92, 95, 98, 100, 
 104, 113, 115, 126, 129; rela 
 tions, 38, 45, 46, 62, 67, 83, 
 89, 109, 111, 125, 128. 
 
 French minister, 36, 38, 50, 51, 54, 
 55, 57, 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 
 91, 96, 104. 
 
 Frankfort, 17. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, as colonial 
 agent, 7, 8, 13, 14, 19; as com- 
 mitteeman, 23, 38, 42, 44, 48; 
 as envoy to France, 50, 52, 55, 
 
 57, 59, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 
 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 
 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89. 92. 
 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 
 106, 110, 112, 113, 129. 
 
 Galloway, Joseph, delegate from 
 Pennsylvania, 18, 19, 25. 
 
 Gardoqui, don Diego, Spanish 
 minister to America, 115. 
 
 General Court, 2, 4, 10, 11. 
 
 Gates, General, -63, 64, 88. 
 
 Generals, 58; brigadier, 79. 
 
 George III, King of England, 76. 
 
 Georgia, 21, 29, 32, 38. 
 
136 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Gerard, Rayneval, French minister 
 to America, 57, 58, 59, 76, 80, 
 81, 82, 91, 118. 
 
 Gerry, Stephen, delegate from 
 Massachusetts, 45, 54. 
 
 Government, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 15, 22, 
 23, 27, 40, 57, 58, 60, 64, 67, 
 68, 70, 76, 94, 96, 101, 102, 
 111, 112, 120, 122, 127; fed 
 eral, 112; state, 60, 112; plan 
 of, 122, 129. 
 
 Governor, 2, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 60, 
 104. 
 
 Grand Order of Military Merit, 79. 
 
 Griffin, Cyrus, delegate from Vir 
 ginia, 54. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, 122, 127. 
 
 Hancock, John, delegate from Mas 
 sachusetts, 10, 20, 33, 58, 72, 
 76. 
 
 Harrison, Benjamin, delegate from 
 A 7 irginia, 33, 42, 59. 
 
 Hawley, Joseph, delegate from 
 Massachusetts, 54. 
 
 Henry, Patrick, delegate from 
 Virginia, 18, 21, 29, 54, 59, 
 118. 
 
 Heyward, Thomas, delegate from 
 South Carolina, 47. 
 
 Home Department, 125, 127. 
 
 Hooper, William, delegate from 
 North Carolina, 48. 
 
 Hopkins, General, 79. 
 
 House, Massachusetts, 14; of Rep 
 resentatives, 125. 
 
 Hospitals, 58. 
 
 Houston, William, delegate from 
 Georgia, 52, 54, 90. 
 
 Hutchinson, Thomas, governor of 
 Massachusetts, 12, 14, 15. 
 
 Independence, 4, 5 n 7, 8, 13, 14, 16 
 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 
 40, 46, 60, 62, 69, 70, 75, 82, 
 84, 85, 86. 
 
 Instructions, 8, 35, 36, 54, 55, 65, 
 
 66, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 86, 87, 
 88, 92, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 
 105, 106, 124, 129. 
 
 Ingersoll, James, delegate from 
 
 Pennsylvania, 54. 
 Izard, Ralph, envoy to Tuscany. 
 
 46, 50, 52, 72, 83, 94. 
 
 Jay, John, delegate from New 
 York, 19, 33, 42, 53, 57; as 
 President of Congress, 73; as 
 envoy to France, 83, 84, 87, 
 98, 99, 100, 101, 105; as Sec 
 retary of Foreign Affairs, 
 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 
 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 
 126. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, as delegate 
 from Virginia, 44, 59, 60, 64; 
 as peace envoy, 87, 108, 111, 
 112, 117, 119; as Chairman 
 Committee of Foreign Affairs, 
 112; as Secretary of State, 
 126, 127. 
 
 Jenifer, Daniel, delegate from 
 Maryland, 53. 
 
 "John, the Painter," 69. 
 
 Johnson, Thomas, delegate from 
 Maryland, 42. 
 
 Journals of Congress, 28, 116; Se 
 cret, 119. 
 
 Judges, 26. 
 
 Judiciary, 13. 
 
 King, British, 7, 9, 10, 28 ; French, 
 
 67, 70, 76, 80, 91; Spanish, 
 117. 
 
 Kingdom, 66. 
 
 Lafayette, General, 89, 104, 105. 
 Langdon, John, delegate from 
 
 New Hampshire, 53. 
 Laurens, Henry, delegate from 
 
 South Carolina, 55; envoy to 
 
 France, 50, 54, 55, 71, 72, 74, 
 
 87, 94, 108. 
 
INDEX 
 
 137 
 
 Lee, Arthur, as colonial agent, 8, 
 13; as envoy to France, 33, 
 35, 50, 51. 52, 59, 61, 64, 65, 
 67, 68, 69, 77, 79, 83, 85, 88, 
 92, 94, 96, 102. 
 
 Lee, Richard, Henry, delegate from 
 Virginia, 21, 23, 33, 34, 35, 
 38, 46, 48, 57, 59, 61, 63, 81, 
 82, 112. 
 
 Lee, William, delegate from Vir 
 ginia, 45, 50, 72, 94. 
 
 Legislation, 23. 
 
 Legislature, Virginia, 112. 
 
 Letters, 10, 11, 14, 31, 35, 36, 49, 
 51, 54, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 89, 
 
 91, 97, 105, 108, 112; of cre 
 dence, 114. 
 
 Liberty Party, 38, 41, 43, 56, 64, 
 128. 
 
 Livingston, B. R., delegate from 
 New York, 23, 37, 59, 89. 
 
 Livingston, Robert, delegate from 
 New York, 37, 52, 54, 59; as 
 Secretary of Department of 
 Foreign Affairs, 91, 92, 97, 
 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 
 110, 111, 121. 
 
 Loans, 35, 53, 96, 106. 
 
 London, 64, 67. 
 
 Lovell, James, delegate from Mas 
 sachusetts, 47, 53 ; as Secre 
 tary of Department of For 
 eign Affairs, 72, 73; as mem 
 ber of special committee, 90. 
 
 Louis XVI, King of France, 48. 
 
 Low Countries, 53. 
 
 Loyalists, 100. 
 
 Luzerne, Chevalier, de la, French 
 minister to America, 54, 83, 
 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 
 
 92, 93, 118. 
 
 McKean, Thomas, delegate from 
 
 Delaware, 38, 54. 
 Madison, James, delegate from 
 
 Virginia, 54, 55, 59, 84, 89, 
 
 107, 108, 110, 123, 127. 
 Madrid, 50, 51, 53, 69, 84. 
 Marblehead, 12. 
 
 Maryland, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 
 
 51, 63. 
 Marbois, Count, French statesman, 
 
 98. 
 Mathews, John, delegate from 
 
 South Carolina, 54, 55, 89. 
 Memoranda, 69, 72, 89. 
 Massachusetts, 3, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 
 
 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 
 
 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 
 
 45, 47, 51, 52, 56, 59, 60, 61, 
 
 82, 128; Bay, 2, 5, 9. 
 Memorials, 9, 54, 90, 114, 124. 
 Merchants, 58. 
 Mifflin, Thomas, delegate from 
 
 South Carolina, 17. 
 Militia, 57. 
 "Militia" policy, 38, 45, 53, 63, 
 
 68, 70, 73, 77, 80, 94, 100, 
 
 126. 
 
 Military Affairs, 57. 
 Ministers, American, 95, 104, 106. 
 
 108, 113, 114, 115, 119, 126, 
 127; French, 80, 81, 82, 83, 
 89, 90, 91; foreign, 122, 124. 
 
 Minister, plenipotentiary, 48, 53, 
 
 85, 94, 113. 
 Ministry, English, 6, 10, 15, 16, 
 
 21, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81 / 
 
 97; French, 75, 76, 77, 79^ 
 
 91, 97, 98, 99. 
 Mission, 55, 86. 
 Mississippi River, 84, 89, 98, 99, 
 
 113, 117, 118, 119, 120. 
 Money, 53, 55, 63, 73, 96; paper, 
 
 85, 92. 
 
 Molasses Act, 4. 
 Morris, Governeur, delegate from 
 
 New York, 38, 45, 48. 
 Morris, Robert, delegate from New 
 
 York, 48, 53, 59, 71. 
 Munitions, 55, 68. 
 
138 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nation, 23, 71, 126. 
 National Party, 59. 
 Navigation Acts, 4, 5. 
 Negotiations, 53, 55, 69, 73, 78, 
 
 96, 98, 100, 101, 108, 117, 120; 
 
 French, 95 ; diplomatic, 79 ; 
 
 peace, 86, 111. 
 Nelson, Thomas, delegate from 
 
 Virginia, 53. 
 Neutrality, 68. 
 New Hampshire, 22, 29, 32, 37, 
 
 52, 53, 87. 
 New Jersey, 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, 
 
 45, 51, 52, 59, 63. 
 Netherlands, 94. 
 Newport, 4. 
 North Carolina, 29, 32, 34, 37, 52. 
 
 59, 63. 
 New York, 9, 19, 21, 29, 32, 34, 
 
 36, 37, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 59, 
 
 63, 84, 88, 89. 
 
 Ordinances, 122. 
 
 Officers, 67, 68. 
 
 Otis, James, leader in Massachu 
 setts, 6, 10. 
 
 Oswald, , English peace com 
 missioner, 98. 
 
 Paine, Thomas, 47, 87. 
 
 Paca, William, delegate from 
 Maryland, 50. 
 
 Paris, 76, 84. 
 
 Parliament, English, 4, 7, 9, 18. 
 
 Patriot Party, 58, 64. 
 
 Party, Constructionist, 128; Eas 
 tern, 63; Independence, 19, 
 20, 22, 23; National, 59; New 
 England, 65; Patriot, 58, 64; 
 Radical, 34, 80; Southern, 63; 
 State Rights, 74, 78, 127. 
 
 Passy, 73. 
 
 Peace, 69, 71, 80, 83, 90, 97, 100, 
 105, 129. 
 
 Pendleton, Edmund, delegate from 
 Virginia, 33, 58. 
 
 Pennsylvania, 7, 29, 32, 34, 36, 
 43, 49, 51, 52, 59, 63, 89. 
 
 Pensacola, 68. 
 
 Petition, 11, 36. 
 
 Philadelphia, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 
 21, 24, 29, 56, 66, 71, 73. 
 
 Pinckney, Charles, delegate from 
 South Carolina, 122. 
 
 Plymouth, 12; colony, 2; compact, 
 3. 
 
 Policy, 6, 7, 9, 33, 45, 46, 73, 90, 
 104, 109, 113, 129; federal, 
 120, 127. 
 
 Port Bill, Boston, 13. 
 
 Portsmouth, 4, 13. 
 
 Post, Continental, 13. 
 
 Post Office, 102. 
 
 President of Congress, 50, 71, 73, 
 74, 85, 122; of the United 
 States, 122, 123, 124, 125; of 
 the Senate, 122. 
 
 Protestants, 79. 
 
 Providence, 4. 
 
 Province, 6, 9, 10, 11. 
 
 Prussia, 67, 94. 
 
 Puritanism, 56. 
 
 Radicals, 22, 23, 39, 40, 41, 45, 47, 
 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 
 62, 63, 71, 77, 83, 84, 87, 89, 
 90, 92, 97, 98, 103, 106, 107, 
 108, 112, 113, 121, 126, 129. 
 
 Reciprocity, 112. 
 
 Reconciliation, 19, 59, 74, 76. 
 
 Regulars, 57. 
 
 Republic, 59, 75, 81. 
 
 Republicanism, 60. 
 
 Representation, 4, 6, 7, 36, 59, 60. 
 
 Representatives, 41, 46, 98; Euro 
 pean, 102. 
 
 Resolutions, 10, 12, 14, 15, 20, 22, 
 23, 26, 27, 85, 125, 126, 128. 
 
 Resolves, 15, 58; Suffolk, 18, 19, 
 20, 24. 
 
 Revolution, American, 10, 23, 26. 
 
 Rights, 9, 12, 28. 
 
INDEX 
 
 139 
 
 Rochambeau, Admiral, 86. 
 
 Ehode Island, 22, 29, 32, 34, 30, 
 
 37. 51. 
 
 Royalists, 11. 
 Rodrigwez, Hortalez & Company, 
 
 67. 
 
 Roxbury, 12. 
 Rush, Dr. Benjamin, delegate from 
 
 Massachusetts, 17. 
 Rutledge, Edward, delegate from 
 
 Scuth Carolina, 23, 60. 
 
 Salary, Governor, 5, 7. 
 
 Salem, 15, 20. 
 
 Seal, 36, 58, 125. 
 
 Secretary of Commerce, 122; of 
 Congress, 71, 72, 108, 117, 
 122, 125; of Domestic Affairs, 
 122; of Home Department, 
 125; of Foreign Affairs, 47. 
 74. 91, 93, 98, 103, 104, 105, 
 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 114, 
 115, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 
 127; of Marine, 122; of the 
 Navy. 96; of the Treasury, 
 96; of State, 91, 96, 123, 125, 
 126, 127, 130; to the Presi 
 dent, 123; of the United 
 States of America, 109, 110, 
 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 
 125; of War, 96; to plenipo 
 tentiary, 53. 
 
 Senate, 123, 124, 125. 
 
 Sherman, Roger, delegate from 
 Connecticut, 23, 38, 48. 
 
 Slavery, 16. 
 
 Smith, J., delegate from Pennsyl 
 vania, 49. 
 
 South Carolina, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 
 47, 49, 52, 63. 
 
 Sovereigns, 23. 
 
 Sovereignty, 23, 60. 
 
 Stamp Act, 8, 9; Congress, 9, 27. 
 
 States, 23, 26, 46, 50, 51, 56, 58. 
 65, 68, 74, 75, 80, 84, 87, 120, 
 125 ; Council of, 60, 123 ; Mid 
 
 dle, 62, 84, 89; Northern, 100, 
 118; Southern, 98, 100, 113, 
 1]8; foreign, 124. 
 
 Statesmen, 57, 62, 113, 118. 
 
 States Rights, 52, 58, 59, 61, 62, 
 
 80, 113, 118; Party, 74, 78, 
 127. 
 
 Stormont, Lord, English minister 
 
 to France, 75. 
 
 "Steering" Committees, 39. 
 Sugar Act, 5. 
 
 Suffolk, Resolves, 18, 19, 20, 24. 
 Sullivan, John, delegate from New 
 
 Hampshire, 54, 55, 87, 89. 
 Summary, 15, 24, 40, 61, 79, 92, 
 
 100, 109; General, 128. 
 
 Taxation, 6, 7. 
 
 Taxes, 6; tea, 8. 
 
 Temple, Lord, English Commis 
 sioner to America, 82. 
 
 Territory, Western, 93. 
 
 Teutons, 1. 
 
 Thomson, Charles, Secretary of 
 Congress, 72. 
 
 Towns 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 
 25. 
 
 Town-meetings, 2, 3, 4, 7, 15, 16, 
 20, 31, 40, 56, 59, 60; Boston, 
 5, 20. 
 
 Trade, 6. 
 
 Treaties, 48, 55, 64, 65, 70, 74, 75, 
 76, 77, 78, 90, 92, 96, 98, 100, 
 
 101, 105; of commerce and 
 amity, 113, 115, 116, 117, 119, 
 122, 126, 127, 129. 
 
 Treasury Department, 31. 
 Truce, 54. 
 
 Tuscany, 46, 69, 94; Court of, 102. 
 Tyranny, 13. 
 
 United Provinces, 53, 105. 
 
 United States, J7, 49, 50, 51, 53, 
 
 81, 82, 86, 94, 98, 99, 100, 
 106, 109, 111, 113, 114, 115 ; 
 117, 119, 120, 122, 125, 126; 
 
140 
 
 INDEX 
 
 of America, 98, 123, 127, 129, 
 130. 
 Union, 59, 69, 75. 
 
 Van Dyke, Nicholas, delegate from 
 New Jersey, 54. 
 
 Vergennes, Charles Gravier, French 
 foreign minister, 51, 54, 64. 
 65, 69, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 84, 
 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 96, 98. 
 
 Versailles, 50, 51, 53, 54. 
 
 Veto, 60. 
 
 Vienna, 45, 69, 94; Court of, 102. 
 
 Virginia, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 
 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 
 43, 44, 52, 59, 60, 61, 67. 
 
 Vittoria, 68. 
 
 Vote, 3, 19, 50, 52, 125. 
 
 War, 19, 56, 58, 63, 71, 77, 80, 84, 
 91, 93, 100; Office, 102, 129; 
 
 Board of, 35, 38, 44, 58; De 
 partment of, 121, 122, 124. 
 
 Warren, Joseph, leader from Mas 
 sachusetts, 12, 18. 
 
 Washington, George, 22, 33, 35, 36, 
 38, 57, 59, 64, 67, 76, 81, 88, 
 89, 91, 92, 102, 111, 123, 129. 
 
 Wentworth, Paul, English secret 
 agent, 69. 
 
 Weissenstein, Charles de, 76. 
 
 Weymouth, Lord, English states 
 man, 75. 
 
 Wilkes - ,11. 
 
 Wilson, James, delegate from 
 Pennsylvania, 50, 95. 
 
 Windsor, 4. 
 
 Witherspoon, John, delegate from 
 New Jersey, 37, 45, 48, 51, 53, 
 54, 55, 57, 89. 
 
 Worcester, 12, 21. 
 
 Wythe, George, delegate from 
 Georgia, 45. 
 
 i 
 
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