UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY THE LAW OF T REAL PROPERTY AND OTHHK INTHRHSTS I\ LAND BY HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY Author of "The Law of Landlord and Tenant." ENLARGED EDITION IX THREE VOLUMES VOLUME II cni(:.\(;c) CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY 1920 T T4473rant, or attempted grant, of an ease- ment. It h;is in one state been decided tliat wlicn a license to make a particular use of one's land is merely in- ferred from acquiescence in such use,"*- the making of 50. Thompson v. Normanden, in spite of expenditures. Brower 134 Iowa, 720, 112 N. W. 188; v. Wakeman. 88 Conn. 8, 89 Atl. Laughery Turnpike Co. v. .Mc- 913. Creary, 147 Ind. 526, 46 N. E. 51. St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards 906; Kentucky Distilleries Ware- Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 111. house Co. V. Warwick Co.. 166 384, 54 Am. Rep. 243: Baynard v. Ky. 651. 179 S. W. 611; Wood Every Evening Printing Co., 9 V. Edes, 2 Allen (Mass.) 578; Del. Ch. 127, 77 Atl. 885; Adams Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, 10 v. Weir & Flagg (Tex. Civ. App.), S. W. 661; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 99 S. W. 726. Vt. 150. So if it is for one y;e^r 52. Ante, this section, note 27. only, it is revocable thereafter 2. R. ?.— 2 1214 Keal Peoperty. [§ 349 improvements hj tlie Jicensee did not render the license irrevocable.^'' Such a view appears reasonable. There is evidently no attempted grant of an easement, and nothing on which the licensee can properly base an as- sumption that he has a permanent interest in the land, so as to justify his expenditure for improvements. There are occasional decisions or dicta that after a license has become irrevocable by reason of the •making of improvements thereunder or, as we would prefer to express it, after an attempted oral grant of an easement has been validated by such making of im- provements, the license privilege remains irrevocable, or the easement endures, only so long as the improve- ments originally made continue available for the pur- pose of its exercise.^'" This view appears to involve a failure to recognize the connection between the case referred to and the doctrine of part performance or equitable estoppel. There is no more reason that the privilege should in such case be restricted to the life of the improvements than that a decree specifically en- forcing a contract for the sale of land, based on the part performance involved in the making of improve- ments, should call for a conveyance of an estate to en- dure only as long as the improvements endure. Occasionally the courts have suggested or asserted that, in case the licensee has made improvements on the faith of the license, it can be revoked, but only if the licensee is placed in statu quo by reimbursement of the cost of such improvements.^* The propriety of this 53. Shaw V. Prof itt. 57 Ore. 192, Clark v. Glidden, 60 Vt. 702, 15 Ann. Cas. 1913A, 63, 109 Pac. 584, Atl. 358. 110 Pac. 1092; Ewing v. Rhea, 37 54. Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. Ore. 583, 82 Am. St. Rep. 783, 23, 68 Am. Dec. 190; Flick v. 52 L. R. A. 140, 62 Pac. 790. Bell, 110 Cal. xvii 42 Pac. 813; Compare Boynton v. Hunt, 88 Vt. Southwestern R. Co. v. Mitchell, 187; 92 Atl. 153. 69 Ga. 114; Dlllion v. Crook, 11 53a. Ameriscoggin Bridge v. Bush (Ky.) 321; Ferguson v. Bragg, 11 N. H. 102; Phillips v. Spencer 127 Ind. 66, 25 N. E. Cutler, 89 Vt. 233, 95 Atl. 487; 1035; Shipley v. Fink, 102 Md. ^ 349] Easements. 1215 form of relief in favor of the person making the im- provements, like that of the absolute negation of the right to revoke, appears properly to be a question of the construction of "the language used in according permis- sion to make use of the land, as to whether it is a license or the attempted grant of an easement. If the latter, it is for the court, in its discretion, it would seem, to determine whether the landowner should be given an opportunity, by reimbursing the expenditures made on the faith of the invalid grant, to relieve his land of the easement to which it would otherwise be sub- ject on the theory of equitable estoppel. License coupled with an interest. A license which is coupled with a grant or interest cannot, it is agreed, be revoked. ^^ What this means is that if one has an interest, acquired by grant or otherwise, in some thing or things upon the land, for the purpose of re- moving which a license to enter on the land is expressly given or necessarily implied, such removal cannot be prevented • on the theory that a license is revocable. The doctrine that a license coupled with an interest is irrevocable has been applied in the case of chattels 219, 62 Atl. 316; Dawson v. West- 330, 351; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 ern Md. R. Co., 107 Md. 70, 14 Mees. & W. 838; Miller v. State, L. R. A. N. S. 809, 126 Am. St. 39 Ind. 267; Long v. Buchanan, 27 Rep. 337, 15 A & E. Ann. Cas. Md. 502, 92 Am. Dec. 653; Ster- 678, 68 Atl. 301; Johnson v. Bart- ling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 217, 12 ron, 23 N. D. 629, 44L. R. A. (N. S.) Am. Rep. 80; Williamston etc. 557, 137 N. W. 1092. See com- R. Co. v. Battle, 66 N. C. 540; pilation of cases in 44 L. R. A. Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 513, 31 N. S. 557. Am. St. Rep. 122, 27 Pac. 900, Applying such a theory, it has 31 Pac. 407. been held that if the licensee is Occasionally the courts have allowed to recover from the mistakenly referred to what is licensor the value of his improve- properly a valid grant of a right ments, he cannot thereafter assert of profit, as a license coupled that the license is irrevocable. with an interest. Funk v. Halde- Oster V. Broe, 161 Ind. 131, 64 man, 53 Pa. 229; McLeod v. Dial, N. E. 918. 63 Ark. 10, 37 S. W. 306. 55. Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan 1216 Real Property. [§ 349 sold while lying- upon the vendor's premises, ^'^ and also in the case of chattels placed upon another's land by the latter 's permission.^'^ So, as has been judicially stated,^^ while a license by A to hunt in his park, whether given by deed or parol, is revocable, as merely rendering lawful the act of hunting, which would other- wise be unlawful, on the other hand, if the license be, not only to hunt, but also to take away the deer killed to his own use, this is a grant of the deer, with a license annexed to come on the land, and sup])osing the grant of the deer to be good, the license is irrevocable. The doctrine might also be applied in connection with a valid conveyance or sale of growing trees, or of min- erals or fixtures in or on the land, which while legally a part of the land, are capable of becoming ])ersonalty by severance,^^ but in such a case the inability of the landoVkTier to deprive the transferee of the privilge of entering on the land for the purpose of removing the things granted may perhaps be more satisfactorily based on the theory that the grantee of those things, trees, minerals or fixtures, as the case may be, acquires not a license merely, but an easement, a right of way by necessity,^ "^ which will endure so long as the necessity ex- ists. A license is obviously not coupled with a grant or interest in the sense referred to, so as to be irrevocable, 56. Wood V. Manley, 11 Ad. & & W. 483: Giles v. Simonds, 15 El. 34; Walker Furniture Co. v. Gray (Mass.) 441, 77 Am. Dec. Dyson, 32 Dist. Col. A.pp. 90, 19 373; Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. L. R. A. N. S. 606; Parker v. H. 217, 12 Am. Rep. 80; White Barlow, 93 Ga. 700, 21 S. E. 213; v. Elwell, 48 Me. 360, 77 Am. Dec. Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 49 231. Am. Rep. 152; Giles v. Simonds, 58. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 15 Gray (Mass.) 441, 77 Am. Dec. Mees. & W. 828. 373; Heath v. Randall, 4 Cush. 59. See dewberry v. Chicago (Mass.) 195; Lambert v. Robin- Lumbering Co., 154 Mich. 84, 117 son, 162 Mass. 34, 44 Am. St. Rep. N. W. 592; and infra, this section 326, 37 N. E. 753. section, note 63. 57. Patrick v. Colerick, 3 Mees. 60. Post, § 363(c). § 349] Easements. 1217 if the licensee lias failed to secure any interest by reason of the invalidity of the attempted grant of the interest.'^ ^ So it has been frequently decided that, an oral sale of growing trees being insufficient to pass them as such/^^ the vendee has merely a revocable license to cut the trees, while, after they are cut, the sale is regarded as taking effect on them, as intended, in their chattel character, and then the vendee, having an interest in the trees, has an irrevocable license to enter on the land to remove them.''-^ And a like doctrine has been applied in connection with a sale of minerals in or fixtures upon the land which, as being oral merely, is not effective as a transfer thereof.^* If what was originally a license has become, by the application of the doctrine of part performance or equitable estoppel, in effect an easement, it no doubt remains a burden upon the land in the hands of a subse- quent purchaser of the land, except when he is a pur- chaser for value and without notice.^^ And a subse- 61. Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 159, 29 Atl. 840; Polk v. Carney. East, 602; Wood v. Leadbitter, 17 S. D. 436. 97 .N W. 360; 13 Mees & W. 838; Long v. Buch- Welever v. Advance Sningle Co., anan, 27 Md. 502, 92 Am. Dec. 653. 34 Wash. 331, 75 Pac. 863; Bru. 62. Ante, § 261, note 82. ley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. 625, 48 63. Colby Hinkley Co. v. Jor- L. R. A. 839, 81 N. W. 1038. dan, 146 Ala. 634, 41 So. 962; In Cool v. Peters Box Co., 87 Jenkins v. Lykes, 19 Fla. 148, 45 Ind. 531, it was considered that Am. Rep. 19; Cool v. Peters Box even if the trees were cut by & Lumber Co., 87 Ind. 531; Gar- a stranger, the contract of sale ner v. Mahoney, 115 Iowa, 356, operated to vest title thereto in 88 N. W. 828; Martin v. Johnson, the original vendee, who was con- 105 Me. 156, 73 Atl. 963; Giles sequently entitled to sue the stran- V. Simonds, 15 Gray (Mass.) 441, ger for their conversion. 77 Am. Dec. 373; United Soc. v. 64. MtCullagh v. Rains, 7.") Brooks, 145 Mass. 410, 14 N. E. Kan. 4.58, 89 Pac. 1041; Wetospsky 622: White v. King, 87 Mich. 107, v. New Haven Gas Light Co., 88 49 N. W. 518; Walton v. Lowrey, Conn. 1, 90 Atl. 30; Whitaker v. 74 Miss. 484, 21 So. 243; Pierre- Cawthorne, 14 N. Car. 389. pont v. Barnard, 6 N. Y. 279; 65. That an innocent purchaser Fish v. Capwell, 18 R. I. 667, 49 for value is protected, see Prince Am. St. Rep. 807, 25 L. R. A. v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 27 Am. Dec. 1218 Real. Property. § 349 qiient purcliaser with notice has no more right than has his vendor to revoke the license, so called.^*^ The li- censee has an equity against the licensor, the right to enforce which as against a purchaser from the licensor is determined by the ordinary rule for determining priorities in equity.*^ ^ (e) Mode of revocation. A license may be re- voked either by express words to that effect, or by an act on the part of the licensor indicating an intention to revoke it,^^ as when he makes its exercise impossible.'^" It is likewise revoked by a conveyance of the land to a third person,*^*^ or by the death of the 675; Clark v. Close, 43 Iowa, 92; Wilkins v. Irvine, 33 Ohio St. 138; Wheation v. Cutler, 84 Vt. 476, 79 Atl. 1091. 66. Russell v. Hubbard, 59 111. 335; Arterburn v. Beard, 86 Neb. 733, 126 N. W. 379; Joseph v. Wild, 146 Ind. 249, 45 N. E. 467; Portman v. Topliff, 138 Iowa, 19, 115 N. W. 508; Carrolton Tele- phone Exchange Co. v. Spicer, 177 Ky. 340, 197 S. W. 827; Shaw v. Profitt, 57 Ore. 192, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 63, 109 Pac. 584, 110 Pac. 1092. 67. See Ewart, Elstoppel, 199 and post, § 566. 68. Wood V. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 838; Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 27 Am. Dec. 675; Fluker v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 81 Ga. 461, 12 Am. St. Rep. 328, 2 L. R. A. 843, 8 S. E. 529; Forbes v. Balenseifer, 74 111. 183; Fischer v. Johnson, 106 Iowa, 181, 76 N. W. 658; Hodg- kins V. Farrington, 150 Mass. 19, 5 L. R. A. 209, 15 Am. St. Rep. 168, 22 N. E. 73; Pitzman, v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387, 33 Am. St. Rep. 336; Carleton v. Redinglon 21 N. H. 291.311. But it has been held that the institution of an action of eject- ment by the licensor against the licensee does not effect a revo- cation for the purpose of that action. Somers v. Somers, 83 Conn. 156, 76 Atl. 45. 69. Hyde v. Graham, 1 Hurlst. & C. 593; Forbes v. Balenseifer, 74 111. 183; Fowler v. Hyland, 48 Mich. 179, 12 N. W. 26; Pitzman V. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387, 33 Am. St. Rep. 536, 19 S. W. 1104; Quimby V. Straw, 71 N. H. 160, 51 Atl. 656; West V. Shaw, 61 Wash. 227, 112 Pac. 243; Hazelton v. Putnam, 3 Pin. (Wis.) 107, 54 Am. Dec. 158. 70. Wallis V. Harrison, 4 Mees. & W. 538; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Co., 133 Ala. 411, 91 Am. St. Rep. 38, 57 L. R. A. 720, 31 So. 947; Wetospsky v. New Haven Gas Light Co., 88 Conn. 1, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 968, 90 Atl. 30; Jen- kins V. Lykes, 19 Fla. 148, 45 Am. Rep. 19; High v. Jasper Mfg. Co., 57 Fla. 437, 49 So. 156; Kamp- § 349] Easements. 1219 licensor/^ since a license cannot justify a trespass on land as against the licensor's grantee, heir or devisee."^ - (f) Termination otherwise than by revocation. A license may, as above indicated, cease to be opera- tive by reason of its revocation, that is, by reason of the landowner's indication of an intention to that effect,*^-^ or by reason of the land having passed into the hands of a person other than the licensor/^ It may also cease to ■ be operative by force of the terms of the license itself, as when it permits only one act by the licensee, and that act has been done, or the license is limited as to time,'^^ or it is subject to a house V. Gaffner, 73 111. 453; Mc- Intyre v. Harty, 236 111. 629, 86 N. E. 581 ; Seidensparger v. Spear, 17 Me. 123, 35 Am. Dec. 234; Drake v. Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.) 141; Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Marble, 112 Mich. 4, 70 N. W. 319; Minneapolis Western Ry. Co. V. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 128, 59 N. W. 983; Houx V. Seat, 26 Mo. 178, 72 Am. Dec. 202 (but see Bracht v. Johnson, 187 Mo. App. 220, 173 S. W. 692); Eckerson v. Crippen, 110 N. Y. 585, 1 L. R. A. 487, 18 N. E. 443; VoUmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 118; Price etc. Co. v Madison, 17 S. D. 247, 95 N. W. 9;{3; U. S. Coal & Oil Co. V. Harrison, 71 W. Va. 217, 47 L. R. A. N. S.) 870, 76 S. E. 346; Coleman v. Foster, 1 Hurlst. & N. 27 (lease). So it is revoked by the con- veyance of a right of user in the land the exercise of which is inconsistent with the enjoy- ment of the license. Salinger v. North American Woolen Mills Co., 70 W. Va. 151, 73 S. B. 312; Archer v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 41 Mont. 56, 137 Am. St. Rep. 692, 108 Pac. 571. 71. DeHaro v. United States, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 599, 18 L. Ed. 681; Jensen v. Hunter, 108 Cal. xvii, 41 Pac. 14; Lambe v. Manning, 171 111. 612. 49 N. E. 509; Spacy V. Evans, 152 Ind. 431, 52 N. E. 605; Hodgkins v. Farrington, 150 Mass. 19, 5 L. R. A. 209, 15 Am. St. Rep. 168, 22 N. E. 73; Estelle V. Peacock, 48 Mich. 469, 12 N. W. 659; East Jersey Iron Co. v. Wright, 32 N. J. Eq. 248; Eggles- ton v. New York & H. R. Co.. 35 Barb (N. Y.) 162; Chavez v. Tor- lina, 15 N. Mex. 53, 99 Pac. 690; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N. C. 492; Caledonian etc. School v. Kent, 86 Vt. 151. 84 Atl. 26; Hazelton v. Putnam, .3 Chand. (Wis.) 117, 3 Pin. 107, 54 Am. Dec. 158. 72. See note in 14 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 73. 73. Ante, this section, notes 68, 69. 74. Ante, this section, notes 70, 7]. 75. Reed v. Merrefield. 10 Mete. 155; Gilmore v. Wilson, 53 Pa. 1220 Real Peoperty. [§ 349 condition which has been violated. "^^ It may also come to an end by reason of the expiration of a reasonable time for acting thereunder/^ or by reason of its aban- donment by the licensee.''^ And a license being personal to the licensee, it becomes inoperative upon his death.'''* A license not being assignable, an attempted as- signment by the licensee of his rights thereunder has been regarded as bringing the license to an end,'^ the courts following in this regard the analog\' of a tenancy at will. It hag also been regarded as terminated by a sale of the land, even prior to a conveyance in pursuance thereof, the purchaser being let into posses- sion,^" and also by the setting off of the land under execution against the owner.^^ (g) Effect of termination. The termination of a license, by revocation or othei'wise, while it pre- cludes any subsequent acts on the authority of the license, does not affect the validity of acts previously done thereunder.''- If the licensee, in the course of the 194; Oesting v. New Bedford. 210 41 Am. Rep. 720, 11 N. W. 265; Mass. 396, 96 N. E. 1095; Glynn Chandlery. Spear. 22 Vt. 388. V George, 20 N. H. 114. 79. Bates v. Duncan, 64 Ark. 76 Pratt v. Ogden, 34 N. Y. 339, 62 Am. St. Rep. 190 42 S. 20. W. 410; Fischer v. Johnson, 106 77. Atite, § :M9(c), note 36. Iowa, 181, 76 N. W. 658; Blals- 78. East Jersey Iron Co. v. dell v. Portsmouth etc. R. Co., 51 Wright, 32 N. J. Eq. 248; Lake N. H. 483; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Erie R. Co. v. Michener, 117 Ind. Pa. 164, 93 Am. Dec. 732; Polk v. 465, 20 N. E. 254. Carney, 17 S. Dak. 436, 97 N. W. 78a. Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 360. 375, 27 Am. Dec. 675; Ruggles v. 80. Bruley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. Lesure, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 187; Page 625, 48 L. R. A. 839, 81 N. W. V. Gaskill, 84 N. J. L. 615, 87 1038. Atl. 460; Hazelton v. Putnam, 3 81. Taylor v. Gerrish, 59 N. H. Chand. (Wis.) 117. 3 Pin. 107, 54 5C9. Am. Dec. 158. 82. Foot v. New Haven etc. Co., As to the effect, in case of a 23 Conn. 214; Owens v. Lewis, 46 license given to two or more per- Ind. 488, 15 Am. Rep. 295; Stevens sons jointly, of the death of one, v. Stevens, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 251, see Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 45 Am. Dec. '203; Blaisdell v. <^ 349] Easements. 1221 exercise of his rights under the license, has placed anything on the land, he is entitled, upon revocation of the license, to a reasonable time within which to remove it.^^ There is no obligation upon the licensee, on revoca- tion of the license, to restore the land to the condition in which it was before he made changes therein or placed structures thereon, under authoritv of the license.-^ The question of the right to revoke a license is entirely distinct from the question whether, in revoking it, the licensor violates a contract on his part, express or implied, not to revoke it. Though the revocation is perfectly valid and effective, the licensor may be liable in damages for having revoked it.'*'^ (h) Assignment of license. A license creates a privilege personal to the licensee, wliich cannot ordinarily be transferred by him to another.''" If the Portsmouth etc. R. Co., 51 N. H. 400; Cornish v. Stubbs, L. R. 5 C. 483; Freeman v. Hadley, 32 N. J. P. 334. See Wilson v. Tavener L. 225; Great FaUs Waterworks (1901) 1 Ch. 578; Hodgkins v. Co. V. Great Northern Rwy. Co., 21 Farrington, 150 I\Iass. 19, 15 Am. Mont. 487, 54 Pac. 963; Pratt v. St. Rep. 168, 5 L. R. A. 209, 22 Ogden, 34 N. Y. 20; Pursell v. N. E. 73. Stover, 110 Pa. 43, 20 Atl. 403; 84. Liggins v. Inge. 7 Bing. Merri weather V. Dixon, 28 Tex. 15; 682; Hodgkins v. Farrington, 150 Lockhart v. Geir, 54 Wis. 133, 11 Mass. 19, 15 Am. St. Rep. 168, N. W. 245; Winter v. Broekwell, 58 L. R. A. 209, 22 N. E. 73. 8 East 308. 85. Kerrison v. Smith, (1897) 83. Brower v. Wakeman, 88 2 Q. B. 445; McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Conn. 8, 89 Atl. 913; Shipley v. Gray (Mass.) 211; Goldman v. Fink, 102 Md. 219, 62 Atl. 316; Beach Front Realty Co., 83 N. J. Ingalls V. St. Paul, M. & M. R. L- 97, 83 Atl. 777; Pollock. Torts. Co., 39 Minn. 479, 12 Am. St. Rep. (6th Ed.) .'iG3. 476, 40 N. W. 524, Great Falls 86. Wickham v. Hawker. 7 Waterworks Co. v. Great Northern Mees. & W. 63; Ackroyd v. Smith, R. Co., 21 Mont. 487, 54 Pac. 963; 10 C. B. 188; Prince v. Case, 10 Putnam v. State, 132 N. Y. 344, Conn. 375, 27 Am. Dec. 675; .Ten- 30 N. E. 743; Wright v. Brown, kins v. Lykes, 19 Fla. 148. 45 163 Mo. App. 117, 145 S. W. 518; Am. Rep. 19; Dawson v. Western Mellor V. Watkins, L. R. 9 Q. B. Md. R. Co., 107 Md. 70. 14 L. R. 1222 Real Property. [§349 license is coupled with an interest,'^*''' however, it en- ures to the benefit of one to whom the interest is as- signed,^^ that is, as the original grantee of things upon or in the land may enter to remove them, so any person acquiring title to them from him may do so. And a license, so called, which is irrevocable by reason of expenditures by tlie licensee ©n the strength thereof,®* is presumably assignal)le, in the sense that the privilege of making the particular use of another's land passes as incident to the transfer of land of the licensee for the benefit of which the license was given,®^ that is, as an appurtenant easement. In one case it was held that the benefit of a license, contained in an instrument of lease, enabling the lessor to enter for a certain purpose, passed to his transferee and was enforcible against an assigTiee of the lessee, the instrument expressly providing that the stipulations should extend to and be binding on the assignees of the respective parties,*^^ and in another case it was held to pass to the lessor's transferee without any mention of assigns.^*''' Such a stipulation, in terms giving the lessor a right to enter on the land, if re- garded as a contract to the effect that the lessor or his transferee should be allowed to enter, may well pass on A. (N. S.) 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. Mees. & W. 63; Heflin v. Bingham, 337, 15 Ann. Cas. 678, 68 Atl. 56 Ala. 566, 28 Am. Rep. 776; 301; Ward v. Rapp, 79 Mich. 469, Ely v. Cavanaugh, 82 Conn. 681. 44 N. W. 934: Fuhr v. Dean. 26 74 Atl. 1122; Sawyer v. Wilson, 61 Mo. 116, 69 Am. Dec. 484; Cowles Me. 529; Wiseman v. Eastman. 21 V. Kidder, 24 N. H. 364. 57 Am. Wash. 163, 57 Pac. 398. Dec. 287; Blaisdell v. Portsmouth. 88. Ante, § 349(d), notes 44-51. G. F. & C. R. R., 51 N. H. 483: 89. See Russell v. Hubbard. 59 Mendenhall v. Klinck, 51 N. Y. 111. 335. 246. But St. John v. Sinclair, 89a. Marks v. Gartside, 16 111. 108 Minn. 274, 122 N. W. 164 App. 177. appears to be contra. 89b. Brewster v. Gracey. 65 86a. Ante, § 349(h), notes 55- Kan. 137, 69 Pac. 199. And see 60. Stebbins v. Demorest, 138 Mich. 87. Bassett v. Maynard, Cro. 297, 101 N. W. 528. Eliz. 819; Wickham v. Hawker, 7 ^ 350] Easements. 1'--3 a transfer of the. reversion, and be enforcible against an assignee of the leasehold, as a covenant running with the land, so as to justify a recovery of damages for a breach thereof, and presumably a court of equity would in such case regard what is in terms merely a permission to enter as a contract for an easement of entry to endure for the life of the lease, and as such capable of specific enforcement by means of an in- junction to prevent any interference with the exercise of the right of entry by the lessee or his assignee. § 350. Easements in gross and appurtenant. An easement ordinarily exists for the benefit of the owner of some particular land, it belonging to him as an in- cident of his ownership of the land. In other words, there is not only a ''servient" tenement, subject to the easement, but also a "dominant" tenem.ent, in favor of which the easement exists. And the easement, to be thus "appurtenant" to a dominant tenement, must be such that it conduces to the beneficial use of such tenement.^^ For instance, one cannot have a right of way over another's land, appurtenant to one's own land, except as it is available for going to or from the latter land. In England it has been judicially asserted that an easement is always appurtenant, that is, that one can- not have an easement which belongs to him personal- ly, apart from his ownership of particular land.^^ 90. Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 C. B. conveyance by the owner of the 164; Hill V. Tupper, 2 Hurl. & C. easement. 121; Linthicum v. Ray, 9 Wall. It Is immaterial that the ease- (U. S.) 241; Moore v. Crose, 43 ment incidentally benefits land Ind. 30; Wh'aley v. Stevens, 21 S. other than the tenement to which C. 221, 27 S. C. 549, 4 S. E. 145. it is appurtenant. Simpson v. God- But in Perry v. Pennsylvania R. manchester, L. R. (1897) App. Cas. Co., 55 N. J. Law 178. 26 Atl. 696. See 10 Columbia Law Rev. 829, it is held that an easement at p. 74. may be made appurtenant merely 91. Rangeley v. Midland Ry. by language to that effect in a Co., 3 Ch. App. 306; Ackroyd v. V224: Eeal. Property. [§ 350 It appears, however, that ovoii there one niay have a riglit analogous to an easement, a personal right as to the nser of i^articular laud, not revocable at the pleasure of the land owner, ^- and whether this is called an ease- ment in gross, a right analogous to an easement, or a right of user, appears to be entirely immaterial. In this country the possibility of the existence of a person- al privilege in the nature of an easement or, as It is us- ually termed, of an "easement in gross," has been freely recognized ^^. The dominant tenement. Tliere is no necessity that the dominant tenement, to which the easement is appurtenant, should adjoin the servient tenement, Smith, 10 C. B. 164: Hawkins v. Rutter. 61 L. J. Q. B. 146. 92. Mounsey v. Ismay. 3 Hurlst. & C. 498 ; Shuttleworth v. Le Flem- ing. 19 C. B. N. S. 695; Great Western Rwy. Co. v. Swindon etc. Rwy. Co., 22 Ch. Div. at pp. 706, 707. Ways in gross are referred to in the earliest English law dic- tionary. Termes de la Ley (1629) under chimin: Doddridge, J., in W. Jones 127; by Chief Baron Gilbert in his work on Uses at p. 281. These references are from an article by Charles Sweet, Esq., in 24 Law Quart. Rev. at p. 260. A way in gross was assumed to have a legal existence In Sen- house V. Christian. 1 Term. Rep. 5t".0. 93. Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. Ill, 99 Am. Dec. 354; Willoughby V. Lawren-e, 116 111. 1, 56 Am. Rep. 758. 4 N. E. 356; Engel v. Ayer. 86 Me. 448. 27 Atl. 352: Good- rich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 459; A?nidon V. Harris. 113 Mass. 59 ; Wilder v. Wheeler, 60 X. H. 351 ; Shreve v. Mathis. 63 N. J. Eq. 170, 52 Atl. 234; Goldman v. Beach Front Realty Co., 83 N. J. 97, 83 Atl. 777; Mayor, etc.. of the City of New York v. Law, 125 N. Y. 380, 26 N. E. 471; Poull v. Mockley, 33 Wis. 482. That an easement of diverting water from or across another's land may be in gross, see Ring V. Walker. 87 Me. 550, 33 Atl. 174; Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.'k 459: Hail v. Ionia, 38 Mich. 423; Wentworth v. Philpot, 60 X. H. 193; Talbit v. Joseph. 79 Or 309, 155 Pac. 184; Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Elec. St. Rwy.. 43 S. C. 154. 20 S. E. 1002. In Myers v. Berven. 166 Cal. 484, 137 Pac. 260, a right of way. not apparently created for the benefit of any particular land, was re- garded as assignable because, be- ing "distinctly of an easement over the soil upon a defined route," it was an easement, not in gross, but appurtenant. The opinion does not explain how an § 350] Easements. 1225 which is siihject to the easeniont,^^ though obviously the two tenements ordinarily do adjoin. There are, how- ever, statements to be f ound,^'"' and at least one decision,*^" that a risht of way cannot be appurtenant to land unless it has one of its termini upon the land to which it is claimed to be appurtenant, a view which is ap- parently not in harmony with the statement that the dominant and servient tenements need not adjoin. Why one terminus of a way must be upon the domi- nant tenemient, is not explained. It has been asserted that a way, in order to be ap- purtenant to land, must be ''essentially necessary" to the enjoyment of the land.**® If this statement means an}'- thing more tlian that the way must conduce to the ad- vantage of such land, it is, it is conceived, erroneous. It is a question whether an easement can be appur- tenant to an incorporeal hereditament, whether for in- stance, a right of way over the land of A can exist as appurtenant to, and for the purpose of exercising. easement can be appurtenant in the absence of a dominant tene- ment. 94. Guthrie v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 27 Ont. App. 64; Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn, 130, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 983, 112 Am. St. Rep. 93, 61 Atl. 98; GoodwiUie Co. v. Com- monwealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272; Jobling v. Tiittle, 75 Kan. 351. 9 L. R. A. X. S. 960, 89 Pac. 699; Witt v. Jeffer- son, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 746, 18 S. W. 229; Cady v. Springfield Water- works Co., ]:!4 N. Y. 118, 31 N. E. 245; Rieffler v. Wayne Storage Water Power Co., 232 Pa. 282, 81 !A.tl. 300; Perrin v. Oarfiel'l, 37 Vt. 304. 95. Washburn, Easements (4th Ed.) 257 {Hcmhle); Garrison v. Rudd, 19 111. 558; Sanxay v. Hun- ger, 42 Ind. 44. See Lathrop v. Eisner, 93 -Mich. 599, 53 N. W. 791; Kershaw v. Burns, 91 S. Car. 129, 74 S. E. 378. 96. Whaley v. Stevens. 21 S. Car. 223. 97. That it need not, see Gra- ham V. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 112 Am. St. Rep. 93, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 983, 61 Atl. 98; GoodwiUie Co. V. Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272; Witt v. Jefferson, 13 Ky. L Rep. 746, 18 S. W. 229; Case of Private Road, 1 Aslini. (Pa.) 417. 98. Washburn, P^asements, (4th Ed.) 257; Moore v. Crose, 4.'! Ind. 30; Whaley v. Stevens, 27 S. Car. 549, 4 S. E, 145; Fish?r v. Fair, 34 S. Car. 203, 14 L. R. A. 33;!, 13 S. E. 470. 1226 EeAL. PKOPEilTy. [§ 350 a privilege in gross of fishing or taking minerals on the land of B. There is in England a dictum in favor of the view that an easement may thus appertain to an incor- poreal hereditament,^ ^'^ and also a dictum to the con- trary.^^'^ Transferability of easement. An easement in gross has occasionally been regarded as susceptible of voluntary transfer,*^^ and as passing by descent,^ pro- vided as least the language used in its creation shows an intention to that effect,^ But more frequently such an easement has been regarded as so purely personal to the original grantee as to be incapable of voluntary or involuntarv transfer.^ Considerations in favor of 98a. Hanbury v. Jenkins, L. R. 2 Ch. 401. There is an assumption to this effect by Sharswood, J., in Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21, 100 Am. Dec. 597. 98b. Atty. Gen. v. Copeland, L. R. (1901) 2 K. B. 101. See Gale, Easements (8th Ed.) 12; Goddard, Easements (6th Ed.) 12. 99. Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 459, 90 Am. Dec. 161; French v. Morris, 101 Mass. 68; Amidon v. Harris, 113 Mass. 59; Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301, 51 N. W. 550; Poull v. Mock- ley, 33 Wis. 482; Percival v. Wil- liams, 82 Vt. 531, 74 Atl. 321. See Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, 72 N. J. Eq. 492, 66 Atl. 427. In Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448, 27 Atl. 352, such a right was regarded as transferable, apparently on the theory that, because it involved a possibility, in the particular case, of monopolizing a large part of the servient tenement and was pe- cuniarily profitable, it was equiv- alent to a profit a prendre. This view is adopted from Washburn, Easements (4th Ed.) 13. The same view is asserted, apparently, by Walworth Ch., in Post v. Pear- sail, 22 Wend. 425; Sharswood J., in Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. at p. 40. 1. Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 459, 90 Am. Dec. 161 ; Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 33 Atl. 174; Percival v. Williams, 82 Vt. 531, 74 Atl. 321. 2. In Field v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148, 114 S. W. 2061 Wilder v. Wheel- er, 60 N. H. 351, it was held that it was not transferrable because the language used in its creation did not show an intention to that effect. And in Lynch v. White. 85 Conn. 545. 84 Atl. 326, it was held that, there being no words of limitation extending it to heirs, and no facts showing such an intention, it endured only for the life of the person in favor of whom it was created. 3. Freed v. Morris, 88 Ark. 148, 114 S. W. 206; Wagner v. Hanna. 38 Cal. Ill, 99 Am. Dec. :'.54; Hall V. Armstrong, 53 Conn. 554, 4 Atl. ^ 350] Easements. 1227 the latter view have been suggested as follows: "If such right be an inheritable estate, how will the heirs take? In severalty, in joint tenancy, coparcenary, or as tenants in common? If not in severalty, how can their interests be severed! If it be assignable, what limit can be placed on the power of alienation? To whom and to how many may it be transferred?"^ Never- theless it is somewhat difficult to see why, if, as appears to be the case,^ a profit in gross is capable of passing by voluntaiy transfer and by descent, an easement in gross should not be so capable. The courts could ef- fectually protect the owner of the servient tenement against an assigimient to such a number of persons as unduly to increase the burden thereon, and the heirs might w^ell be regarded as holding in that fonn of cotenancy w^hich exists in case of the descent of land itself. An appurtenant easement is regarded as so closely annexed to the dominant tenement that it passes prima facie upon a conveyance of such tenement with- out express mention,''^ and regardless of whether the 113 (dictum); Louisville etc. 6. Lide v. Hadley, 36 Ala. 627. R. Co. V. Koelle, 104 111. 455; 76 Am. Dec. 338; Quiiilan v. Noble, Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malott, 130 75 Cal. 250, 17 Pac. 69; Goodwin Ind. 121, 29 N. E. 412, {dictum); v. Bragaw, 87 Conn. 31, 86 Atl. Winston v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 398, 6G8; Taylor v. Dyches, 69 Ga. 455; 45 N. W. 958 (dictum); Tinicum Tinker v. Forbes, 136 111. 221, 26 Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, N. E. 503; Moore v. Grose, 43 Ind. 100 Am. Dec. 597; Comm. v. Zim- 30; Cassens v. Meyer, 154 Iowa, merman, 56 Pa. Suiper Ct. 311; 187, 134 N. W. 543 (warranty Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, deed) ; Wendell v. Heim, 87 Kan. 14 L. R. A. 300, 23 Atl. 20; Fisher 136, 123 Pac. 869; Hammond v. V. Fair, 34 S. Car. 203, 13 S. B. Eads, 146 Ky. 162, 142 S. W. 379; 470; Kershaw V. Burns, 91 S. Car. Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me. 381, 129, 74 S. E. 378; Salem Capital 6 Atl. 6; Douglass v. Riggin, 123 Flour Mills V. Stayton Water Ditch Md. 18, 90 Atl. 1000; Barnes v. & Canal Co. (C. C.) 33 Fed. 14G. Lloyd, 112 Mass. 224; Willets v. 4. Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio Langhaar, 212 Mass. 573, 99 N. St. 614, per Mcllvaine, J. E. 466; Dulce Realty Co. v. Stead 5. Post, § 382, note 19. Realty Co., 245 Mo. 417, 151 S. 1228 Keal Peoperty. [§ 350 conveyance refers to ''appurtenances."' Likewise a re- covery in ejectment of the dominant tenement involves a recovery of an easement appurtenant thereto/^ Since an easement appurtenant is intended to be exercised only for the benefit of and in connection with the dominant tenement, it cannot be separated there- from by its transfer to a person other than the owner of such tenement.^ Such a separation would involve its conversion into an easement in gross. Duration of easement. An appurtenant ease- ment usually exists in favor of one having an estate in fee simple in the dominant tenement, but in so far as the easement is intended to endure so long only as the purpose of its creation can be regarded as still existent,^*^ the possible duration of the easement cor- responds to that of an estate in fee determinable rather than to that of an estate in fee simple. And occas- sionally the language of the grant creating an ease- ment expressly provides that it is to endure only W. 415; Sweetland v. Olseii, 11 & Aid. 661. Mont. 27, 27 Pac. 339; Spaulding 9. Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 C. B. V. Abbott, 55 N. H. 423; Voorhees 164; Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 30; V. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 58; Shields Baker v. Kenney, 145 Iowa, 638. V. Titus, 46 Ohio St. 528, 22 N. E. 139 Am. St. Rep. 456, 12 N. W. II'I; Jackson v. Trullinger, 9 Ore. 901; Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 393; Ruhnke v. Aubert, 58 Ore. 6, 33 Atl. 175; Wilson v. Ford, 209 113 Pac. 38; Rhea v. Forsyth, 37 N. Y. 186, 102 N. E. 614; Wood Pa. St. 503, 78 Am. Dec. 441; v. Woodley, 160 N. C. 17, 41 L. R. Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. A. (N. S.) Ii:i7, 75 L. E lU: Cumberland Valley R. Co., 240 Pa. Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. St. 519, 87 Atl. 968; Re Barhous- 614; Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. en, 142 Wis. 292, 124 N. W. 649. I. 495, 14 L. R. A. 300. 23 Atl. 7. Shelby v. Chicago & E. I. R. 20; Reise v. Enos. 76 Wis. 634, 8 Co. 143 111. 385, 32 N. E. 438; L. R. A. 617, 45 N W. 414. Agnew V. Pawnee City, 79 Neb. That the attempted transfer of 603, 113 N. W,. 236; Smith v. the easement apart from the dom- Garbe, 86 Neb. 94, 124 N. W. 921. inant tenement does not extinguish 8. Callaway v. Forest Park the easement, see a suggestive Highlands Co., 113 Md. 1, 77 Atl. note in 20 Harv. Law Rev. 136. 141; Crocker v. Fothergill, 2 Barn. 10. Post, § 372. ^ 350] Easements. 1229 until a certain event occurs.^ ^ An appurtenant ease- ment may also, as well as an easement in gross, be for life, as having been intended to endure only so long as the grantee's life estate in the dominant tene- ment endures,^- or as having been created by one having only a life estate in the land in which it is created. The easement may be for years only.^^ Determination of class. Whether, in any par- ticular case, an easement created by grant is an easement appurtenant or an easement in gross, is to be determined by the language of the grant as construed in the light of tiie surrounding circumstances.^"'' That the easement is of value to particular land owned by the grantee of the easement,^* or that it is valueless except as exercised for the benefit of such land,^^ tends to 11. See e. g. Arbaugh v. Alex- ander, 164 Iowa, 635, 146 N. W. 747; Wooding v. Michael, 89 Conn. 704, 96 Atl. 170. 12. See Hoffman v. Savage, 15 Mass. 130; Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 671; Pym v. Harrison, 33 Law Times, 796. 13. Davis V. Morgan, 8 B. & C. 8. See Booth v. Alcock, L. R. 8 Ch. 663; Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 N. J. Eq. 619, 27 Am. St. Rep. 455, 23 Atl. 265. 13a. Hopper v. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636, 45 Pac. 874; Durkee v. Jones, 27 Colo. 159, 60 Pac. 618; Blan- chard v. Maxson, 84 Conn. 429, 80 206; Cassens v. Meyer, 154 Iowa, 187, 134 N. W. 543; Hammond v. Eads, 146 Ky. 162, 142 S. W. 379; Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591; Kent Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Long, 111 Mich. 383, 69 N. W. 657; Liederding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 77 Am. St. Rep. 677, 80 N. W. 360; Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 94, 124 N. W. 921; Ruhnke v. Aiibert, 2 R. P.— i 53 Ore. 6, 113 Pac. 38; Cadwal- ader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 23 Atl. 20. 14. Webb V. Jones, 163 Ala. 637, 50 S. 887; Durkee v. Jones, 27 Colo. 159, 60 Pac. 618; Blancliard V. Maxson, 84 Conn. 429, 80 Atl. 206; Cherokee Mills v. Standard Cotton Mills, 138 Ga. 856, 76 S. E. 373; Goodwillie Co. v. Com- monwealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272; Cassens v. Meyer, 154 Iowa, 181, 134 N. W. 543; Smith v. Ladd, 41 Me. 314; Green- wood Lake & P. J. R. Co., v. New York & G. L. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 435, 31 N. E. 874; Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 91, 136 Am. St. Rep. 674, 20 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1209, 124 N. W. 921 ; Ruffin v. Seaboard Air Line Rwy.. 151 N. Car. 330, 66 S. E. 317; Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 8 L. R. A. 617, 45 N. W. 414; Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 532, 91 S. E. 391. 15. Hopper v. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636, 45 Pac. 874; Schmidt v. 1230 Real. Pboperty. "§ 350 sliow that it is appurtenant to such land. The fact tnat, after the creation of the easement, it was exercised oxrhisively in connection with particular property be- Ionising to tlie grantee of the easement would seem also to tend to indicate that it is appurtenant thereto.^® That the grant of an easement is in terms in favor of one, liis heirs and assigns, does not tend to show that it is personal rather than appurtenant,^' nor, on the other hand, does the omission of such words ordinarily have such an effect. ^^ That it is granted to one for life or during his occupation of particular land has been r(»oai-c]ed as showing an intention to create a mere per- sonal right. ^'^'^ The courts tend to regard an easement as ap- purtenant rather than as in gross,*" and accordingly, in Brown, 226 111. 590, 80 N. E. 1071; Cassens v. Meyer, 154 Iowa, 187. 134 N. W. 543; Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591; Lathrop v. Elsnor. 93 Mich. 593, 53 N. W. 791; Lid- gerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 77 Am. St. Rep. 677, 80 N. W. 360; Cadwalder v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 14 L. R. A. 300, 23 Atl. 20. 16. Ruhnke v. Aubert, 58 Ore. 6, 113 Pac. 38; Wesley v. M. N. Cartier & Sons Co., 30 R. I. 40:'.. 75 At. 626; L-dgerding v. Zigneg"^, 77 Minn. 421, 77 Am. St. Rep. 677, 80 N. W. 360. And see Winston V. Johnson, 42 Minn. 398, 45 N. W. 958. But see Wentworth v. Philpot, 60 X. H. 193. 17. Callaway v. Forest Park Highlands Co., 113 Md. 1. 77 Atl. 141; Parsons v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co., 216 Mass. 269, 103 N. E. 693; Mitchell v. D'Olier, 68 N. J. L. 375, 59 L. R. A. 949, 53 Atl. 467. Rather does such lan- guage indicate an intention that the easement shall be appurtenant. Hopper V. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636, 45 Pac. 874; Moll v. McCauley, 83 Iowa, 677, 50 N. W. 216: French V. Williams, 82 Va. 462, 4 S. E. 591. 18. Dennis v. Wilson. 107 Mass. 591; Teachout v. Capital Lodge etc., 128 Iowa, 384, 104 N. W. 440; Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Rwy. Co. V. Griswold, 51 Ind. App. 497, 97 N. E. 1030; United States Pipe Line Co. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 254. 42 L. R. A. 572. 41 Atl. 759: Contra Comm. V. Zimmerman, 56 Pa. Super. 311; Wilder v. Wheeler. 60 N. H. 351. Compare Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421. 77 Am. St. Rep. 677, SO N. W. 360. 18a. Estabrooks v. Estabrooks, 91 Vt. 515, 101 Atl. 584. 19. McMahan v. Williams. 79 Ala. 288; Gardner v. San Gabriel Valley Bank, 7 Cal. App. 106. 9;^ Pac. 900; Blanchard v. Maxson, 84 Conn. 489, 80 Atl. 206; Chero- § 350] Easements. 1231 the ordinary case, a reservation of an easement on a conveyance of part of one's land will be regarded as of an easement appurtenant to the land retained/^'"' while an easement in the land retained, created by the in- strument by which land is conveyed, will ordinarily be appurtenant to the land conveyed.^^'^ But a different view has been indicated in one case, to the eifect that if the grant of an easement is by a clause entirely separate from that by which the land is conveyed, though by the same instrument, it is to be regarded as in gVoss.^^'' In one case the fact that the grant of the easement was on the sarnie day on which land had been granted was regarded as showing that it was appurte- nant to such land/^*^ The fact that one to whom there was granted the privilege of taking water from another's land had a life estate only in neighboring land has been regarded as tending to show that the privilege was not ap- kee Mills v. Standard Cotton Mills. 138 Ga. 856, 76 S. E. 373; Whit- aker v. Harding. 256 111. 148, 99 N. E. 945; Lucas v. Rhodes, 48 Ind. App. 211, 94 N. E. 914; Pres- byterian Church of Osceola v. Har- ken, 177 Iowa, 195, 158 N. W. 692; Hammond v. Eads. 146 Ky. 162, 142 S. W. 379; Willets v. Langhaar, 212 :\Iass. 573, 99 N. E. 466; Lidgerding v. Zign go, 77 Minn. 421. 77 Am. St. Rep. 677, 80 N. W. 3G0: Ruhnke v. Aubert, 58 Ore. 6, 113 Pac. 38; Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 94, 124 N. W. 921; WSlson V. Ford, 209 N. Y. 186, 102 N. E. 614; Ruhnke v. Aubert, 58 Ore. 6, 113 Pac. 38; Calwalader V. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 14 L. R. A. 300, 23 Atl. 20; French v. Wil- liams, 82 Va. 462, 4 S. E. 591; Spensley v. Valentine, 34 Wis. 154. But see Wilder v. Wheelor, 60 N. H. 351; Comm v. Zimmerman, 56 Pa. Super. 311. 19a. Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Smith v. Ladd, 41 Me. 316; Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132; Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591; Lathrop v. Eisner, 93 Mich. 599; Winston v. .Johnson, 4? Minn. 398, 45 N. W. 958; Pres- byterian Church of Osceola v. Harken, 177 Iowa, 195, 158 N. W. 692. 19b. Kuecken v. Voltz, 110 111. 264; Stearns v. Mullen. 4 Gray (Mass.) 151; Blood v. Millard, 172 Mass. 65, 51 N. E. 527; Gunson V. Healy, 100 Pa. 42; Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 8 h. R. A. 617, 45 X. W. 414. 19c. Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N. J. Eq. 170. 52 Atl. 234. 19d. Moll V. McCauley, 83 Iowa. 677. 50 N. W. 216. 1232 Eeal Pkoperty. [§ 350 pnrtenaiit to such land.^^^ In tlie same state it has been said that the fact that the gift of a right of way to one who owned land in fee was expressed to be for life only might indicate that the way was in gross and not appurtenant to his land.^'^^ If the language of the grant or reservation of an easement is such as itself to show that the easement was created solely for ex- ercise in connection with particular land, as in the case of a right of way specified to be to and from such land, it is appurtenant. ^^^ The fact that the instrument by which a right of way is created fails to refer in any way to neighboring, land owned by the beneficiary of the grant has occasion- ally been regarded as showing that the right is not intended to be appurtenant to such land, but is in gross. ^^'^ But there are a greater number of decisions which assert, expressly or by implication; a contrary view, to the effect that the dominant tenement need not be expressly referred to.^** In the case of an easement by prescription, whether the easement is appurtenant or in gross is to be determined by the consideration whether the user of the servient tenement throughout the prescriptive period was for the benefit of, and in connection A\'ith, 19e. Amidon v. Harris, 113 4 S. E. 591; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, Mass. 59. L. R. 8 Ch. 650. 19f. Dennis v. Wilson, 107 19h. Wag'ner v. Hanna. .38 Cal. Mass. 591. See Lidgerding v. Zig- ill, 99 Am. Dec. 354; Metzger v. nego, 77 Minn. 421, 77 Am. St. Holwick, 17 Oliio Circ. Ct. 605. Rep. 677, 80 N. W. 360; Mc- 20. Hopper v. Barnes, 113 Cal. Daniel v. Walker, 46 S. C. 43, 636, 45 Pac. 874; Durkee v. Jones, 24 S. E. 378. 27 Col. 159, 60 Pac. 618; Gold- 19g. Lide v. Hadley, ?S Ala. stein v. Raskin, 271, 111. 249, 111 627, 76 Am. Dec. 338; MendeU v. N. E. 91 (distinguishing Garrison Delano, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 176; v. Rudd, 19 HI. 558, as having George v. Cox, 114 Mass. 382; Val- been at law); Dennis v. Wilson, entine v. Schreiber, 3 N. Y. App. 107 Mass. 591; Salem Capital Div. 235, 38 N. Y. Supp. 417; Flour Mills v. Stayton Water Ditch Gunson v. Healy, 100 Pa. St. 42; & Canal Co., 33 Fed. 146. French v. Williams, 82 Va. 462, § 351] Easements. 123o one particular piece of land, and also of the consider- ation of its utility in connection wdth sucli land or its lack of utility apart therefrom.^i A right of user, given to one of the parties to a partition of land, over the portion allotted to another of such parties, has been regarded as appurtenant to the portion allotted to the former.- - There are occasional decisions to the effect that one may acquire, by grant or reservation, an easement to be exercised in connection with and for the benefit of par- ticular land which he does not own, in which case, it seems, the easement is in gross until he acquires such land, and if and when he acquires it, the easement be- comes appurtenant to the land.^^* § 351. Light and air. As before stated, the owner of land has no "natural right" to light or air, and can- not complain that either has been cut off by the erection of buildings on adjoining land.-"' An owner of land may, however, acquire, by grant or its equivalent, a right to have light and air enter a particular window or other aperture, free from interruption by the owner of ad- jacent land, and such a right constitutes an easement in his favor.-^ 21. Schmidt v. Brown, 226 111. note 29. 590, 80 N. E. 1071. 24. Turner v. Thompson. 58 Ga. 22. KarmuUer v. Krotz, 18 268, 24 Am. Rep. 497; Keating v. Iowa, 352; Davenport v. Lamson, Springer, 146 111. 481, 22 L. R. A. 21 Pick. (Mass.) 72; Bowen v 544, 37 Am. St. Rep. 175, 34 N. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132. See E. 805; White v. Bradley. 66 Me. Hopper V. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636, 254; Janes v. .lenkins, 34 Md. 1, 45 Pac. 874. 6 Am. Rep. 300; Story v. Odin. 22a. North British Railway Co. 12 Mass. 157, 7 Am. Dec. 46; V. Park Yard Co. (1898) App. Cas. Brooks v. Reynolds, 106 Mass. 31; 643; Amidon v. Harris. 113 Mass. Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N. J. Eq. 59; Percival v. Williams, 82 Vt. 270, 33 Atl. 794; Lattimer v. Liv- 531, 74 Atl. 321; Kalmowski v. ermore, 72 N. Y. 174; Weig- Jacobowski, 52 Wash. 359, 100 Paf. mann v. Jones, 163 Pa. St. 330, 852. 30 Atl. 198. As to air, see Chas- 23. Ante, § 336, note 4d, § 338, tey v. Ackland (1895) 2 Ch. 389, 123-1: Ee.\l Peoperty. [§ 352 While the owner of land is entitled to have the air diffused over his land free from pollution by any use made of neighboring land, this being a natural right, an infringement of which constitutes a nuisance,-^ the OAvner of the neighboring land may acquire, by grant or prescription, an easement consisting of the right to make such injurious use of his land, or, as it is sometimes said, he may acquire a right to maintain a nuisance involving the pollution of air.^^ § 352. Waters and watercourses. The mutual rights of adjoining or neighboring owners in regard to water have been previously considered.^^* These rights may, however, be suspended or modified in favor of the owner of one piece of land as against another by the creation of an easement. So, the owner of land upon a natural stream may acquire from the owner of land lower down on the same stream, by grant or prescription, the privilege of polluting the stream, or of appropriating what would otherwise be an unreasonable amount of water,^^ or he may acquire the privilege of obstructing the flow of the stream so as to flood the land of an (1897) App. Cas. 155; PoHock, v. Bessey, 49 Me. 539. 77 Am. Dec. Torts (6th Ed.) 399, note. 271; Warner v. Cushman, 82 Me. 25. See anfe, § 338. 168, 19 AtU 159; Washburn & 26. Goddard, Easements, 265; 2 Moen Mfg. Co. v. Salisbury, 152 Wood, Nuisances, § 704 et seq. Mass. 346, 25 N. E. 724; Smith v. Sturges V. Bridgman, 11 Ch. Div. City of Sedalia. 152 Mo. 283, 48 852; Dana v. Valentine, 5 Mete. L. R. A. 711, 53 S. W. 907; Lov- (Mass.) 8; Matthews v. Stillwater erin v. Walker, 44 N. H. 489; Gas etc. Co., 63 Minn. 493, 65 N. Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleach- W. 947. ing Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335, 346; 26a. Ante, § 339. Provost v. Calder, 2 Wend. (N. 27. Stockport Waterworks Co. Y.) 517; Winchester v. Osborne, 61 V. Potter, 3 Hurl. & C. 300; Wood N. Y. 555; Geer v. Durham Water V. Waud, 3 Exch. 748; Tyler v. Co., 127 N. C. 349, 37 S. E. 474; Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, Fed. Cas. Talbot v Joseph. 78 Ore. 308, 155 No. 14312; Village of Dwight v. Pac. 184; McCallum v. German- Hayes, 150 111. 273, 41 Am. St. town Water Co., 54 Pa. St. 40; Rep. 367, 37 N. E. 218; Crosby Messinger's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. ^ 352] Easements. 1235 upper proprietor.2^ So, land may be subject to an ease- ment precluding- the owner thereof from cutting off percolating water, to the detriment of a neighboring owner, though otherwise he has the privilege of doing so f^ or an easement may exist modifying the rights of adjoining owners as to the discharge or flow of sur- face waters.''*' Right to take water from spring. Not infre- quently the owaier of land on which there is a spring or well grants to a neighboring land owner the privilege of 285, 4 Atl. 162; Olney v. Fenner, 2 R. I. 211, 57 Am. Dec. 711; Rood V. Johnson, 26 Vt. 64. A privilege in a riparian owner to divert or pollute the water of the stream is not strictly an ease- ment in the land of the owner who suffers by such diversion or pollution, it has been said, since it involves no use of the latter's land, or restriction of its use. Cockburn, C. J., in Mason v. Shrewsbury & H. Ry Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 578; Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N. C. 349; 37 S. E. 474. It does, however, involve the privilege of doing an act to the detriment of such land, that is, of dspleting the water flowing thereby, and the statement refer- red to would seen unduly to nar- row the definition of an easement. See article by Professor Wesley N. Hohfield, 27 Yale Law Journ. 66. 28. Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & S. 190; Central Georgia Power Co. V. Cornwell, 141 Ga. 843, 82 S. E. 24;'.; Ballard v. Struckman, 123 m. 636, 14 N. E. 682; Brook- ville & M. Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134; Williams v. Nelson, 2:? Pick. (Mass.) 141, 34 Am. Dec. 45; Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray (Mass.) 870: Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 128, 15 Am. St. Rep. 243, 38 N. W. 890; Cornwell Mfg Co. v. Swift, 89 Mich. 503, 50 N. W. 1001; Swan V. Munch, 65 Minn. 500, 35 L. R. A. 743, 60 Am. St. Rep. 491, 67 N. W. 1022; Winnipiseo- gee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420; Tabor v. Bradley, 18 N. Y. 113, 72 Am. Dec. 498; State v. Suttle, 115 N. C. 784, 20 S. E. 725; Bobo v. Wolf, 18 Ohio St. 463; Campbell v. McCoy, 31 Pa. St. 263; Weed v. Keenan, 60 Vt. 74, 6 Am. St. Rep. 93, 13 Atl. 804. 29. Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 2 Gray's Cas. 12; Whitehead v. Parks, 2 Hurl. & N. 870; Johnstown Cheese Mfg. Co. V. Veghte, 69 N. Y. 16, 25 Am. Rep. 125; Davis v. Spaulding, 157 Mass. 431, 19 L. R. A. 102, 32 N. E. 650. 30. Wright v. Willams, 1 Mees. & W. 77; Gregory v. Bush, 64 Mich. 37, 8 Am. St. Rep. 797, 31 N. W. 90; Phinizy v. City Council of Augusta, 47 Ga. 260; Ross V. Mackeney, 46 N. J. Eq. 140, 18 Atl. 685; Louisville & N. Ry. Co. V. Mossman, 90 Tenn. 157, 25 Am. St. Rep. 670, IG S. W. 64. 1236 Real Property. [§ 353 taking water therefrom, usually by means of a pipe or concluit.^°^ In such a case, if the water can be regarded as belonging to the owner of the land, the grantor, there is, it appears, the grant of a profit a prendre,^^^ while if the water is pi(hlici juris, that is, belongs to no one, the grant is merely of the privilege of taking it across the grantor's land, of an easement merely. § 353. Artificial water courses and drains. One may, for the purpose of procuring water from a stream or other source of supply, have the privilege of having water flow to his land over intervening land belonging to another, in an aqueduct or other artificial channel, and such a privilege constitutes an easement in the intervening land.^^ Likewise one may have an easement consisting (primarily) of the privilege of discharging surface or waste water, or sewage, through or on an- other's land.22 In case the privilege of having water thus pass to or from one's own land over or through another's land 30a. See e. g. Bissell v. Grant, Va. 474. 35 Conn. 288; Rollins v. Blackden, 30b. Post, § 381. 112 Me. 459, 92 Atl. 521; Good- 31. Taylor v. Corporation of St. rich V. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) Helens. 6 Ch. Div. 264; Prescott v. 459; Johnson v. Knapp, 146 Mass. White, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 341; Legg 70, 15 N. E. 134; Howard v. Brit- v. Horn, 45 Conn. 409; Cole v. ton, 67 N. H. 484, 41 Atl. 269; Bradbury, 86 Me. 380, 29 Atl. 1097; Toothe V. Bryce, 50 N. J. Eq. Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360, 40 589, 25 Atl. 182; Paine v. Chand- Am. Dec. 156; Cannon v. Atlantic ler, 134 N. Y. 385, 19 L. R. A. Coast Line R. Co., 97 S. C. 233, 99, 32 N. E. 18; Woodring v. Hoi- 81 S. E. 476. lenbach, 202 Pa. St. 65, 51 Atl. 318; 32. Wood v. Saunders, 10 Ch. Chase v. Cram, 39 R. I. 83, 97 Atl. App. 582; Humphries v. Cousins, 481; Vermont Central R. Co., v. 2 C. P. Div. 239; Brown v. Honey- Hills, 23 Vt. 681; Corevo v. Hoi- field, 139 Iowa, 414, 116 N. W. man, 82 Vt. 34, 71 Atl. 718; 731; White v. Chapin, 12 Allen Wheelock v. Jacobs, 70 Vt. 162, 67 (Mass.) 516; Larsen v. Peterson. Am. St. Rep. 659, 43 L. R. A. 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094; 105, 40 Atl. 41; Diffendal v. Vir- Treadwell v. Inslee, 120 N. Y. 458, ginia M. Ry. Co., 86 Va. 459, 10 24 N. E. 651; Sanderlin v. Baxter, S. E. 536; Warren v. Syme, 7 W. 76 Va. 299, 44 Am. Rep. 165. <^ 353] Easements. 1-37 exists in connection with a supply of water of a tempo- rary character merely, the watercourse thus formed must necessarily be regarded as artificial rather than natural. When how^ever the source of supply is per- manent in character the question as to whether the water course is to be regarded as natural or artificial is by no means a simple one. As before remarked,^^^ if water flows from a permanent source of supply it might well be regarded as a natural watercourse through the entire extent of its flow, although it flows in part through an artificial channel, provided such channel is of a per- manent character. For instance, when the water of a natural watercourse is permanently diverted in ])art by the construction of a mill race or ''cut off," the flow of water in this new channel might well be regarded as part of a natural watercourse. The cases however tend to regard such flow as constituting, originally at least, an E^rtificial, rather than a natural watercourse^^-* Any rights or privileges as to the use of the water of an artificial watercourse in favor of the owners of land thereon or thereunder, even though bearing a super- ficial resemblance to the "natural rights" of riparian land owners, are in the nature of easements,"^ and there have been a number of decisions in connection with the question of the existence of such easements. As before stated, in some cases owners of land abutting on an artificial watercourse have been regarded as ac- quiring, by reason of the passage of time, on the tlieory, it seems, of acquiescence or estoppel, rights as to the water of the watercourse similar to the natural rights of riparian owmers on a natural watercourse.-"^ In other cases the existence of such easements similar to natural ri gilts has been based on a presumption of grants to that effect, as stated in the next following paragraph. or> Ante, § 3:]9, note 33a. v. Koonj Behari Pattuk, 4 App. 34. Ante, § 3:'-9. note 33c. Cas. 121; Baily & Co. v. Clark. 35. Woodv. Waudv3Exch.748; Son & Morland (1902) 1 Ch. 649. Rameshur Pershad Narain Singh 36. Ante, § 339, note 33c. 1238 Eeai. Property. [§ 353 When a watercourse is constructed over the lands of several persons, for utilization by all of them, it may properly be presumed, it has been held, in the absence of evidence to tlie contrary'', that the intention was that they should enjoy the same rights among themselves as if they were riparian owners on a natural stream,^''' that, in other words, there were mutual grants by them of easements to that extent. And there are English cases in which such a presumption has been applied in connection with a watercourse flowing in an ancient channel, of unkno^\^l date, but evidently of artificial creation, and apparently intended for the benefit of the various owners of the land through which it passes.^'' In the case of an artificial watercourse or drain over the land of one person, which had its inception ex- clusively in the needs of another person, as when one persoji acquires by grant a privilege to have water flow in a stream either to or away from his land over the land of another, or causes such flow over another's land without any privilege of so doing, the person whose land is thus burdened would have, in the first place, no right to insist on a continuance of the burden; that is, he would have no easement to have the flow of water so continued for his benefit, nor would he, not Jiaving the right to have it continued, have any right as to the water itself."" In other words, he would not have the rights, as to the water, of a riparian proprietor on a natural stream. Whether, after the flow has continued for the prescriptive period, he could claim an easement by pre- scription as to the flow of water, would seem largely to 37. Burrows v. Lang (1901) 2 Vt. 109. 11 L. R. A. N. S. 693, Ch. 502; Whitmores (Edenbridge), 66 Atl. 1039. Ltd. V. Stanford (1909) 1 Ch. 427; 38. Roberts v. Richards. 50 L. Townsend v. McDonald, 12 N. Y. J. Ch. 297. Baily & Co. v. Clark, 381; Cottel v. Berry, 42 Ore. 593, Son & Morland (1902) 1 Ch. 649. 72 Pac. 584; Harrington v. De- 39. Burrows v. Lang (1901) 2 Maris, 46 Ore. Ill, 1 L. R. A. N. Ch. 502; Whitmores (Edenbridge), S. 756, 77 Pac. 603, 82 Pac. 14; Ltd. v. Stanford (1909) 1 Ch. 427. Cloyes V. Middlebury Elec. Co., 80 § 353] Easements. 1239 depend on the acceptance of the doctrine of reciprocal easements by prescription elsewhere referred to.^^ A somewhat analogous question has arisen, in connection with natural watercourses, whether after the channel has been changed and has so remained for a nmnber of years, the stream can be restored to its former channel as against persons wlio liave improved and utilized their land upon the assumption that the change would be permanent.^ ^ In England it is stated that if a watercourse is created for a merely temporary purpose, there is no room for the presumption of a grant, in favor of a person whose land alaits thereon, of a right as to the use of the water,^- but ' ' temporary purpose ' ' appears to include every purpose for which an individual would be likely to create or divert a watercourse,^^ and the result of the English cases seems to be, at least approximately, that if a watercourse is created by one for his own purposes, a grant by him of a right as to the water will not be presumed, while if created by several persons for their mutual benefit, across their own lands, 'mutual grants of rights as to the use of the water will be presumed.^^ Grants of water power. Though a riparian owner on a natural water course has, by the weight of authority, no power to confer upon another the privilege of appropriating water from the stream, to be consumed elsewhere than upon riparian land,^^ he may confer upon one who is not a riparian owner the privilege of using the water merely for temporary purposes, the water so used being returned to the stream in such a condition, and with such a degree of promptitude, as not to affect 40. Post. § 532. Ltd. v. Stanford (1909) 1 Ch. 427. 41. Ante, § 339(h). 43. See cases in next preceding 42. Arkwright v. Gell, 5 Mees. note. & W. 203; Wood v. Waud, 3 Exch. 44. Ante, this section, note 37. 748; Burrows v. Lang (1901) 2 Ch. 45. Ante, § 339(b), note 54. 502; Whitmores (Edenbridge), 1240 Real, Peoperty. [§ 353 the lower proprietors.^*' This is frequently done for the purpose of furnishing power to a mill or other in- dustrial enterprise away from the stream, the riparian owner causing or allowing sufficient water to supply the power to pass to the desired locality through a flume or other conduit. Such an arrangement is usually re- ferred to as involving the grant of a water right or privilege, or of water power. What is, legally speaking, the specific subject of the grant in such a case is a matter as to which the courts give us no information, and that being the case, the writer ventures to express the opinion that when the riparian owner thus gives to a non ripa- rian owner the privilege of using the water of the stream for the furnishing of power, he grants no right in the water itself, but merely grants a right to conduct, or to have the water flow, over or through his riparian land, in order that it may reach the land where it is sought to be utilized for the creation of power. So far as concerns the utilization of the water in such a way, which does not involve any substantial diminution of the amount of water passing to the lower proprietors, or cause it to pass to them in a deteriorated condition, such lower proprietors cannot object, whether the utilization is by an upper riparian proprietor himself, or by another person. Since then such other person has, as against the lower proprietors, the privilege of so utilizing the water, it is necessary, in order that he actually do so, only that he get access to the water, and this he acquires from the upper riparian proprietor by means of a grant from the latter of the easement of conducting the water, or of having it flow to a named amount, over such upper proprietor's land. Frequently the water is conducted across the riparian land by the riparian proprietor himself, who consequently in effect furnishes the water to the other person at the boundary of the latter 's land, but even in such a case, it is conceived, the latter has 46. Ante, § 339(c). § 353] Easements. 1241 merely the privilege of an unobstructed flow of the water over or through the riparian land, an easement in the land and not a right in the water. Indeed the riparian owner has himself no proprietary right in the water, hut merely a right to have it flow past his land as it has been accustomed to flow,^ ' and having no proprietary right in the water, he cannot create such a right in an- other. It may, and no doubt frequently does, occur that the riparian owner merely contracts to furnish water power to a certain extent, or to furnish a certain amount of water for the creation of power, and in such a case there appears to be no transfer whatsoever of a pro- prietary right, no ''grant" in any sense of the term, but merely a personal obligation upon such owner to see that the water is available for use by his neiglibor, at the proper height, and to the agreed extent, for the creation of power. The employment of the expression "water power" in this connection is in itself calculated to produce some confusion of ideas.^^ The expression properly means the energy to be produced, or capable of production, by the fall of water, and such potential energy would hardly appear to be a proper subject of grant. A riparian owner does not, strictly speaking, o\\ai water powder, but he owns the privilege of controlling the water at that particular point, so that he can allow it to fall in 47. Ante, § 339(a), note 34. so developed to be considered in 48. The expression appears to determining the taxable value of have occa.sioned some perplexity in non riparian land. See Blackstone connection with questions of tax- Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Black- ation. The more satisfactory view stone, 200 Mass. 82, 18 L. R. A. in this regard is that the water (N. S.) 755, 85 N. E. 880; Union power is not a distinct subject Water Co. v. Auburn, 90 Me. 60, for assessment, but that the pos- 37 L. R. A. 651, 60 Am. St. Rep. sibility of utilizing the water for 40, 37 Atl. 331; Saco Water Power the development of power is to Co. v. Buxton, 98 Me. 295, 56 Atl. be considered in determining the 914; Penobscot Chemical Fibre Co. taxable value of the riparian land, v. Bradley, 99 Me. 263, 59 Atl. 83; as is the possibility of obtaining Cocheco Co. v. Strafford, 51 N. H. the whole or a part of the power 455; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Con- 1242 Real Property. [§ 35-1: such a manner, and in connection with snch appliances, that it will produce power capable of industrial ap- ])lication, and, as above indicated, in making it possible for another person to control the water for the same ]nirposes, by means of a grant of the privilege of having the water flow over his land or otherwdse, he effects what is ordinarily referred to as a grant of water power. In case, as frequently occurs, the riparian owner w^ho grants the use of the water to a non riparian owner, owns a dam upon the stream which serves to keep the water at the desired level, the grant of the use of the water would involve the grant not only of an easement to have the water pass over the riparian land, but also, presumably, of an easement to utilize the dam for the purpose of making the water available for his use.^^ § 354. Support of land. As before explained, the owner of land has a natural right to support for his land from neighboring land, as has the owner of the surface of land from subjacent soil or minerals.^" Such a natural right may be extended or diminished by the creation of an easement in favor of one landowner by the other. The owner of land may accordingly grant to the owner of adjacent land the privilege of with- drawing support from the former's land,^^ and the owner of the surface of land may grant to the owner of sub- jacent soil or minerals the privilege of withdrawing support from the surface.''" But the intention to grant cord, 66 N. H. 562, 32 L. R. A. 73 Conn. 294, 47 Atl. 328; Moline 621, 34 Atl. 241; BeHows Falls Water Power Co. v. Cox, 252 111. Canal Co. v. Rockingham, 37 Vt. 348, 96 N. E. 1044) is not readily 622. The propriety of referring to apparent. water power, that is, the privilege 49. See Trudeau v. Field, 69 of controlling the fall of water by Vt. 446, 38 Atl. 162. reason of the location of one's 50. Ante, §§ 345, 346. land, as having a distinct situs for 51. Ryckman v. Gillis, 57 N. Y. the purpose of taxation (as in 68. Quinnebaug Reservoir Co. v. Union 52. Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. ^ 355] Easements. 1243 .(or reserve) an easement of this character nnist clearly appear, and it cannot be inferred from general langnage, contained in the conveyance by which the ownership of the minerals is severed from that of the surface, although by that language a right to extract all the mnierals is apparently recognized.^^ § 355. Support of buildings. The owner of land may acquire from the owner of adjoining land an ease- ment consisting of a right to support for buildings on his land from such adjoining land,^* or from adjoining buildings,^^ neither of wliich exists as a natural right. L. Cas. 362 ; Aspden v. Seddon, 10 Ch. App. 394; Wilms v. Jess, 94 lU. 464, 34 Am. Rep. 242; Scranton V. PhUlips, 94 Pa. St. 15; Miles V. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. St. 449, 10 Ann. Cas. 871, 66 Atl. 764; Kirwin v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 249 Pa. 98, 94 Atl. 468. That such a privilege of removing surface support is properly re- garded as an easement, see Pro- fessor Hohfield's luminous article, 27 Yale Law Journ. 66. 53. Dixon v. White, 8 App. Cas. 883; Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Sampson, 158 Ala. 590, 48 So. 493; Wilms V. Jess, 94 111. 464,34 Am. Dec. 242; Lloyd V. Cat- linCoalCo., 210 111. 460, 71 N. E. 335; Paull v. Island Coal Co.. 44 Ind! App. 218, 88 N. E. 959; Collins V. Gleason Coal Co , 140 Iowa, 114, 18 L. R. A. N. S. 736, 115 N. W. 479; Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310, 50 L. R. A. N. S. 686, 137 Pac. 941 ; Piedmont etc. Coal Co. V. Kearney, 114 Md. 49(;, 79 At. 1013; Erickson v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. 161; Burgner v. Humph- reys, 41 Ohio St. 340; Robertson V. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 566, 33 Atl. 706; Wea- ver V. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195, 65 Ala. 545; Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 220 Pa. 651, 16 L. R. A. X. S. 851, 60 Atl. 329; Stongap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S. E. 305; Catron v. Smith Buller Min. Co.. 181 Fed. 941, 104 C. C. A. But see Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 1115, 5;; S E. 24; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 179 Fed. 191, 102 C. C A. 457. 54. Rigby v. Bennett, 21 Ch. Div. 559; TunstaU v. Christian, 80 Va. 1, 56 Am. Rep. 581; Lasala V. Holbrook, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 173. 55. Angus V. Dalton, 4 Q. B. Div. 162; Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740; Murchie v. Black, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 190; Richards v. Rose. 9 Exrh. 218; Lemaitre v. Davis, 19 Ch. Div. 281; City of Quincy v. Jones. 76 111. 231. 20 Am. Rep. 243; Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Mass. 374, 12 Am. Rep. 716; Partrid.s;p V. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632. 1244: Real Pkoperty. [§ 356 In cases in whicli separate floors of a building belong" to different persons, tliere is a right of support for the upper floor or floors from the lower part of the building, and this right the o^\^ler of the latter can in no way impair, there being an implied grant to this effect in the conveyance of such upper floor or floors. ^*^ § 356. Party walls. A^'j^arty wall" is a division wall between two buildings belonging to different persons, in which each of such persons has certain rights of use or ownership, or both. The term, as stated in a modem English case,^"^ has been used in connection with division walls in four different senses. It may refer to (1) a division wall of which, with the land beneath. it, the owners of the. two adjoining buildings are tenants in common ;^^ (2) a wall divided longitudinally into two strips, each of the adjoining owners owning the strip on his side, and having a right to use that strip only;^^ (3) a wall located entirely upon the land of one of the adjoining owners, and belonging entirely to him, but subject to an easement in the other to have it maintained as a division wall between the two properties and to use it for purposes of support ;^^ or (4) a wall divided 56. McConnel v. Kibbe, 33 111. 1 Ch. 508; Wiltshire v. Sidford, 1 175, 85 Am. Dec. 265; Rhodes v. Man. & R. 404; Montgomery v. McCorm.ack, 4 Iowa, 375; Graves Trustees of Masonic Hall. 70 Ga. V. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 501; Harris 38. See Eherred v. Cisco, 4 Sandf. V. Ryding, 5 Mees. & W. 60. (N. Y.) 480. But the owner of the upper 59. Matts v. Hawkins, 5 Taunt, floor has, it seems, no right to de- 20; Murly v. McDermott, 8 Adol. mand that the owner of the lower & E. 138. keei) it in repair for the purpose 60. Tate v. Fratt. 112 Cal. 613, of supporting the former. See 44 pac. 1061; Price v. McConnell. l)ost. § 370. note 55. 27 111. 255; Molony v. Dixon. 65 57. Watson v. Gray. 14 Ch. Div. Iowa. 1.36, 54 Am. Rep. 1, 21 N. 192, 2;er Fry, J. W. 488; Henry v. Kock, 80 Ky. 58. It is used in this sense in 391. 44 Am. Rep. 484; Dorsey v. the following cases; Cubitt v. Habersack, 84 Md. 117, 35 Atl. Porter. 8 Barn. & C. 257; Mayfair 96; Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 50 N. Property Co. v. Johnston (1894) y. 646; Nash v. Kemp, 49 How. § 356] Easements. 1245 longitudinally in to two strips, each of tlic adjoining owners owning the strip on his side only, but having an easement in the other strip for the purposes of the support of his building.*'^ In England, a division wall is presumed to belong to the first of the above clases.^- In -this country, no such presumption has ever been recognized, and a party wall almost invariably belongs to the fourth class mentioned above, except in the few cases in which it belongs to the third class as having been built entirely on the land of one proprietor. For this reason, it seems proper to consider the subject of party walls as a part of the law of easements, though a party wall of the first or second class involves no application of that law. A wall may be a party wall for part of its height, and, as to the balance, a wall belonging entirely to one of the two adjoining ow^ners, without any easement of support in favor of the other.*'^ If one of two adjoining owners, in building a wall, places it in part upon the land of the adjoining owner, whether Avith or without the assent of the latter, the Pr, (N. Y.) 522; Western Bank's Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639, 10 Am. Rep. Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 171; Bright 545; Odd Fellows' Hall Ass'n of V. Allan, 203 Pa. St. 394, 93 Am. Portland v. Hegele, 24 Ore. 16, St. Rep. 769, 53 Atl. 251; Duns- 32 Pac. 679; Sanders v. Martin, comb V. Randolph, 107 Tenn. 89, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 213, 31 Am. Rep. 89 Am. St. Rep. 915, 64 S. W. 598; Davenhauer v. Devine, 51 21. Tex. 480, 32 Am. Rep. 627; And- 61. Graves v Smith, 87 Ala. rae v. Haseltine, 58 Wis. 395, 46 450, 13 Am. St. Rep. 60, 5 L. R. Am. Rep. 635, 17 N. W. 18. A. 298, 6 So. 308; Ingals v. Pla- 62. Cubitt v. Porter, 8 Barn. & mondon, 75 Hi. 118; Block v. C. 257; Watson v. Gray, 14 Ch. Isham, 28 Ind. 37, 92 Am. Dec. Div. 192. 287; Hoffman v. Kuhn, 57 Miss. 63. Weston v. Arnold, L .R. 8 746, 34 Am. Rep. 491; Shiverich Ch. 1084; Price v. McConnell, 27 V. R. .1. Gunning Co., 58 Neb. 29, 111. 255; Ringgold Lodge v. De 78 N. W. 460; Partridge v. Gil- Kalb Lodge, 157 Ky. 203, 162 S. W. bert, 15 N. Y. 601, 69 Am. Vec. 1111; Barry v. Kdlavitch, 84 Md. 632; Hendricks v. Stark, 37 N. Y. 95, 33 L. R. A. 294, 35 Atl. 170. 106, 93 Am. Dec. 549; Brocks v. 2 R..P.— 4 1246 Real Peopeety. [§ 356 courts will not ordinarily recognize any liability on the part of the latter, by reason of his subsequent user of the wall, to the builder.*'^ A promise by him to pay for such use as lie may make of the wall may, however, it has been decided, be inferred from the fact of his acquiescence in its construction by the other in part on his land, with knowledge that the latter expects payment for its use,*^^ and there are occasional decisions and suggestions to be found that, without reference to the circumstances under which the wall was erected, the non lAiilder is bound to contribute to the cost of its erection upon making use thereof/''" There is frequently an ex- 64. Antimarchi v. Russell, 63 Ala. 356, 35 Am. Rep. 40; Prelss V. Parker, 67 Ala. 500; Orman v. r>ay, 5 Fla. 385; Huck v. Flentye, 80 111. 258; Long v. Smyre, 87 Kan. 182, 123 Pac. 765; Wiikins V. Jewett, 139 Mass. 29, 29 N. E. 214; Allen v. Evans, 161 Mass. 485, 37 N. E. 571; Sherred v. Cisco, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 480; Grif- fin V. Sansom, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 72 S. W. 864; List v. Horn- brook, 2 W. Va. 340. See 21 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 222. 65. Huck V. Flentye. 80 111. 2.3S; Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa, 253, 74 Am. Dec. 348; Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513, 20 Am. Rep. 347; Griffin v. Sansum, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 72 S. W. 864. See Bank of Escondido v. Thomas, — Cal. — , 41 Pac. 462; Zeinin- ger V. Schnitzler, 48 Kan. 63. 28 Pac. 1007. It has been decided that the fact that the wall, though built on A's land, projected over B's land, precluded A from obtain- ing an injunction against the use of the wall by B. Guttenberger V. Woods. 51 Cal. 523. On the other hand it was held that the fact that the foundation of ths wall extended under ground into B's land, all the wall above the ground being on A's land, gave B no right to use the wall with- out making compensation. Tru- lock V. Parse. 83 Ark. 149, 11 L. R. A. X. S. 924, 103 S. W. 166. 66. Zugenbuhler v. Gilliam, 3 Iowa, 371 ; Spaulding v. Grundy, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 951, 104 S. W. 293; Howze v. Whitehead. 93 Miss. 578, 46 So. 401; Reid v. King, 158 N. C. 85, 73 S. E. 168; Sanders v. Martin, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 213. The mere fact that one. In contructing a building extending to the edge of hits land,, con- structs no wall along such edge, utilizing the wall of his neigh- bor for protection on that side. without however in any way cut- ting or breaking into it, does not give the neighbor a right of action. Nolan V. Mendere. 77 Tex. 565, 19 Am. St. Rep. 801, 14 S. W. 167. See Bisquay v. Jennelot, 10 Ala. § 357] Easements. 1247 press agTeement to this effect,''" and occasionally a statute imposes a pecuniary liability upon one making use of a wall placed partly on his land.^"'' § 357. Partition fences. There is generally, at common law, no obligation upon a landowTier to maintain a partition fence between his land and the land ad- joining.''^ But there may be an easement, created by grant or prescription, in favor of one piece of land, by which the owner of land adjacent thereto is compellable to maintain a partition fence between them."^ Such an easement is sometimes referred to as a "spurious" easement, since a true easement, it is considered, cannot involve a duty of active performance on the part of the owner of the land subject to the easement, the servient tenement. An easement involving a right to the maintenance of a partition fence is to be distinguish- ed from a right to have it maintained by reason of a contract to that effect.'^ ^ In many states there are statutes providing for the construction of a partition fence between adjoining- pieces of land at the joint expense of the owners or occupants thereof.'^ By these statutes, each adjoining owner or occupant is required not only to join in the 245, 44 Am. Dec. 483. But he Castner v. Riegel, 54 N. J. Law, cannot cut or break into the waU, 498, 24 Atl. 4S4; Adams v. Van it not being a party wall. Sim- Alstyne, 25 N. Y. 232. onds V. Shields, 72 Conn. 141 44 70. D'Arcy v. Miller, 86 111. 102, Atl. 29. 29 Am. Rep. 11; Bruner v. Pal- 67. Post, § 361, notes 37-52, § mer, 108 Ind. 397; Lawton v. 393. Fitchburg R. Co., 8 Cush. (Mass.) 67a. Post, § 365, notes 11-21. 230, 45 Am. Dec. 753; O'Riley v. 68. Star v. Rookesby, 1 Salk. Diss, 41 Mo. App. 184; Harrlman 323; Moore v. Levert, 24 Ala. 310; v. Park, 55 N. H. 471; Scott v. Rust V. Low, 6 Mass. 90. And Grover, 56 Vt. 499, 48 Am. Rep. see ante, § 298. 814. 69. Star v. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 71. 1 Stimson's Am. St. law, 335; Lawrence v. Jenkins, L. R. § 2182; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 8 Q. B. 274; Bronson v. Coffin, 1050 et scq.. Ante, § 298. 108 Mass. 175, 118 Mass. 15C; 1248 Eeal Property. [§ 357 construction of the fence, but also in its maintenance and repair,"^ and neither can, without the consent of the other, remove any part of the fence, except, in some states, at certain periods of the year, or after a prescribed notice to the other proprietor.'" When one owner of land desires to compel con- tribution by an adjacent owner of part of the cost of a partition fence under the statute, and the latter re- fuses to make contribution, the former is usually ex- pressly authorized to apply to local officers, called "fence viewers," for a determination of the proportions to be built and maintained b}?- each, or, in case the fence is already erected, for an allowance of the amount to be contributed by the party in default.^^ These statutes usually authorize one thus to compel his neighbor to join in the erection and maintenance of the fence only in case the latter 's land is improved,'^ ^ or occupied,^*^ or inclosed,'^^ and sometimes only when the land is used or occujDied "otherwise than in common," this meaning land, it is said, which is segregated from other land by inclosure, or by use of an exclusive nature.'^^ An owner of land who is bound, by grant or pre- scription, or by reason of proceedings under the 72. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § Y.) 320; Shriver v. Stephen.3, 20 2185; Guyer v. Stratton, 29 Conn. Pa. St. 1.38; Farr v. Spain, 67 421; Rhodes v. Mummery, 48 Ind. Wis. 631, 31 N. W. 21. 216; Barrett v. Dolan, 71 Iowa. 75. Wiggin v. Baptist Soc, 43 94, 32 N. W. 189; Stephens v. N. H. 260. Shriver, 25 Pa. St. 78; Carpenter 76. Maudlin v. Hauscombe, 12 V. Cook, 67 Vt. 102, 30 Atl. 998. Colo. 204, 20 Pac. 619; Rust v. Low 73. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 6 Mass. 90. 2184. 77. Kent v. Lix, 47 Mo. App. 74. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 567; Boyd v. Lammert, 18 111. App. 2182; Gonzales v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 632; Boenig v. Hornberg, 24 Minn. 295; Thompson v. Bulson, 78 111. 307. 277; Farmer v. Young, 86 Iowa. 78. Hewit v. Jewell, 59 Iowa, 382, 53 N. W. 279; Briggs v. 87, 12 N. W. 738 ; Jones v. Perry, Haynes, 68 Me. 535; Burr v. Kam- 50 N. H. 134. See Perkins v. Per- er, 12 Neb. 483, 11 N. W. 741; kins, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 134. Bronk v. Becker, 17 Wend. (N. § 358] Easements. 1249 statute, to maintain a partition fence, or a part thereof, is liable to the adjoining proprietor for any damage that may occur owing to his failure properly to main- tain it, there being usually an express provision to this etfect in statutes providing for partition fences."^ He has no right to recover against the adjoining pro- prietor for a trespass by the latter 's cattle which re- sults from his own failure to comply with his ol^ligation to fence;'*'' but his obligation is to his adjoining owner only, and to those lawfully using the latter 's land, and he may recover against others whose cattle trespass on the adjacent land, and pass therefrom onto his land, although they do so owing to his own failure to fence. ^^ § 358. Rights of way. A right of way is primarily a privilege to pass over another's land. Such a right never exists as a natural right, but must always be created by a grant or its equivalent. A right of way may be either public or private, — that is, it may be a right of passage of which every individual may avail himself, or it may exist for the benefit of one individual or class of individuals. Public rights of way are not, properly speaking, easements, though they are frequently re- ferred to as such, and they will be more particularly discussed in another connection.**- Private rights of way, which constitute one of the most important classes of easements, will be hereafter discussed in connection 79. Powell V. Salisbury, 2 239; Rangier v. McCreight, 27 Pa. Younge & J. .'591; Gate v. Gate, 50 St. 95 Roach v. Lawrence, 56 Wis. N. H. 144, 9 Am. Rep. 179; Saxton 478, 14 N. W. 595. V. Bacon, 31 Vt. 540; 1 Stimson's 81. Lord v. Wormwood, 29 Me. Am. St. Law, § 2189 (B). 282, 50 Am. Dec. 586; Rust v. Low, 80. D'Arcy v. Miller, 86 111. 102, 6 Mass. 90; Lyons v. Merrick, 105 29 Am. Rep. 11; Baynes v. Chas- Mass. 71; Lawrence v. Gombs, 37 tain, 68 Ind. 376"; Barrett v. N. H. :'.31, 72 Am. Dec. 3;i2; Chapin Dolan, 71 Iowa, 94, 32 N. W. 189. v. Sullivan R. Go., 39 N. H. 53, 75 Tonawanda R. Co. v. Monger, 5 Am. Dec. 207. Denio (N. Y.) 255, 49 Am. Dec. 82. Post, § 417. 1250 Real, Property. [§ 359 with the acquisition, user, and extinguishment of ease- ments. ""'^ A railroad right of way, so called, is frequently more than a mere right of way, it being a strip of land aetnally owned by the railroad company, on which the tracks are located. In so far as the railroad company has merely an easement of a right of way, that is, the privilege of having its trains pass over another's land, it is necessaril}" an easement in gross and not an ease- ment appurtenant. ^^^ Frequently a right of way exists, not directly over the soil of another's land, but over a hallway, passage way or stairway in a building on another's land.^^" Such a right of way frequently exists by reason of the leasing of individual rooms or suites in a building, the owner of the building retaining control of the hallways and stairways, subject, however, to a right of way over such hallways and stairways, in favor of each lessee of a room or suite. ^^*^ § 359. Pews and burial rights. The character of the rights enjoyed by the holder of a church pew has been the subject of numerous decisions in this country', which are, how^ever, not entirely harmonious in charac- ter, and are frequently unsatisfactory iu their discus- sion of the principles involved.^^^ In England, there may be an easement, consisting of the privilege of oc- cupying a particular pew in the parish church, an- nexed to a particular house or messuage, this apparent- ly not differing in nature from any other easement, the house or messuage constituting the dominant tenement, 83. Post, §§ 3S1-380. Mich. 578, 147 N. W. 481. 83a. See 2 Lewis, Em. Domain, 83c. Ante, § 51 (d), note 97. §§ 451, 468; Elliott, Railroads, § 83d. See Article by Carl Zoll- 938. man, Esq., "Pew Rights in Amer- 83b. See e. g. Bale v. Todd, 123 ican Law," 25 Yale Law Journ. Ga. 99, 50 S. E. 990; Teachout v. 467, incorporated in "American Capital Lodge, 128 Iowa, 380, 104 Civil Church Government, ch. 15, N. W. 440; Gates v. Sebald, 180 by that author. § 360] Easements. 1251 and the cliiircli the servient tenement. ^^ In this country it is generally recognized that a "pew holder" is not, as such, a part owner of the church edifice, or of the land on which it stands, these belonging usually to the ecclesiastical authorities, the church corporation, or trustees.**^ He is sometimes said to have an easement or "incorporeal, hereditament,"^^ but if he has an easement, it is an easement in gross, since in this country a pew is never appurtenant to a particular house or messuage. Pews have also been said to be "real estate, "^^ but this can be so only when one's in- terest is, as regards its possible duration, equivalent to an estate of freehold. If one's interest in a pew is 84. Hinde v. Chorlton, L. R. 2 C. P. 104; Brumfitt v. Roberts, L. R. 5 C. P. 224; PhiUips v. Halliday [1891] App. Cas. 228. 85. First Baptist Soc. in Leeds V. Grant, 95 Me. 245; Re New South Meeting House in Boston, 1.3 Allen (Mass.) 497; Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1; Jones V. Towne, 58 N. H. 462, 42 Am. Rep. 602; Presbyterian Church in Newark v. Andruss 21 N. J. Law, 325; Freligh v. Piatt, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 494; Trustees of Ithaca First Baptist Church v. Bigelow, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 28; Wheaton v. Gates, 18 N. Y. 404; First Baptist Church in Hartford V. Witherell, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 226, 24 Am. Dec. 223; Kincaid's Ap- peal, 66 Pa. St. 411, 5 Am. Rep. 377; Howe v. Stevens, 47 Vt. 262. 86. First Baptist Soc. in Leeds V. Grant, 59 Me. 245; Presbyterian Church In Newark v. Andruss, 21 N. J. Law, 325; Gamble's Succes- sion, 23 La. Ann. 9. See Wash- burn, Easements, 682. It has been occasionally stated. rather ambiguously, that the "owners of pews have an exclusive right to their possession and oc- cupation for the purposes of public worship, not as an easement, but by virtue of their individual right of property therein, de- rived, perhaps, in theory at least, from the corporation represented by the trustees who are seised and possessed of the temporalities of the church." Shaw v. Bever- idge, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 26, 38 Am. Dec. 616; O'Hear v. De Goes- briand, 33 Vt. 606, 80 Am. Dec. 652. 87. Price v. Lyon, 14 Conn. 280; Attorney General v. Proprietors of Federal St. Meeting House, 3 Gray (Mass.) 1; Kimball v. Sec- ond Congregational Parish in Rowley, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 347; Trustees of Ithaca First Baptist Church V. Bigelow. 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 28; Viele v. Osgood, 8 Barb. (N. Y.)130; Howe v. Stevens, 47 Vt. 262; Barnard v. Whipple, 2a Vt. 401, 70 Am. Dec. 422, 1252 Real, Pboperty. [§ 359 limited to a term of years, or is "from year to year," it would seem to be at most personal property- merely.*** Frequently, if not ordinarily, at tlie present day, es- pecially in cburcli edifices of recent construction, a pew holder, so called, would appear to be in the position merely of a licensee, he paying so much periodically for the privilege of occupying the pew. As to the rights of the person entitled to use a pew, upon the destruction of the church edifice or the sale thereof, the cases are not in entire accord. The view more generally adopted is that the church cor- poration or trustees are liable to him for the value of his right if the building is destroyed or sold without an absolute necessity for such action, while there is no such liability in case such necessity exists. ^'^ There are occasional suggestions that the pew owner would have a right to be allotted a pew in a new edifice substituted for the old.'''^ Burial rights. The privilege of interring bodies in a burial ground belonging to a corpora- tion or association,^'-'' has been referred to as an 88. See McNabb v. Pond, 4 Gates, 18 N. Y. 395; Cooper v. Bradf. (N. Y.) 7; Johnson v. Cor- Trustees of First Presbyterian bett, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 265, 276; Church, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 222; Inhabitants of First Parish v. Mayor v. Temple Beth El, 52 N. Spear, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 144; Y. St. Rep. 638, 23 N. Y. Supp. Trustees of the Third Presbyter- 1013; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. ian Congregation v. Andruss, 21 411, 422; Kellogg v. Dickinson, 18 N. J. Law, 325. In Pennsylvania, Vt. 266. the right to a pew is considered 90. Daniel v. Wood, 1 Pick, to be personal property. Church (Mass.) 102; Mayor v. Temple V. Wells' Ex'rs, 24 Pa. St. 249. Beth El, 52 N. Y. St. Rep. 638, 23 And so by statute in Massachu- N. Y. Supp. 1013. setts. Rev. Laws 1902, c. 36, § 90a. As to the nature of a 38; and New Hampshire Pub. right of interment in land be- Stat. 1901 eh. 220, § 14. longing to an individual, see 89. Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. Woolridge v. Smith, 243 Mo. 190, (Mass.) 508; Sohier v. Trinity 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 752, 147 S. W. Church, 109 Mass. 1; Wlieaton v 1019; Hines v. State, 126 Tenn. § 359] Easements. 1253 easement,^^ as a usufructuary right,"- and as a license.''^ The question of the nature of the interest of a lot holder, as he is frequently termed, is dt-pendent primarily upon the intention manifested by the instrument by which it is created or evidenced, and the nature of such in- strument. It may occur that a lot is conveyed outriglit to one for burial purposes, he acquiring an estate there- in to endure so long as it is used, or capable of use, for burial purposes.^^ This, however, is unusual. A privilege of interring bodies in a cemetery lot has been regarded as passing by descent.'^-'* Whether it could ordinarily be devised or transferred inter vivos to persons outside the family would appear to depend on the provisions of the instrument under which it is held and the regulations of the cemetery corporation or association.^*^ 1, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1138, 149 S. W. 1058. See also as to private burying grounds within tlie con- fines of another's land. Brown v. Anderson, 88 Ky. 577, 11 S. W. C07; Mitchell v. Thorne, 134 N. Y. 536, 30 Am. St. Rep. 699, 32 N. E. 10. 91. Hook V. Joyce, 94 Ky. 450, 21 L. R. A. 96, 22 S. W. 651; Jacobs V. Congregation Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 73 Am. St. Rep. 141, 33 S. E. 853; Richards V. Northwest Protestant Dutch Church, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 42, 20 How. Pr. 317. 92. Buffalo City Cemetery v. City of Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 503; Windt V. German Reformed Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 471; Price V. Methodist Church, 4 Ohio 415. 93. Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 14 N. E. 903; Partridge v. First Independent Church, 39 Md. 631; Rayner v. Nugent, 60 Md. 515; Gowen v. Bessey, 94 Me. 114, 46 Atl. 792; Page v. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17, 56 Am. Rep. 481; McGuire v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 54 Hun (N. Y.) 207; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 420, 5 Am. Rep. 377. 94. Lakin v. Ames, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 198; Silverwood v. Lat- robe, 68 Md. 620, 13 Atl. 161; New York Bay Cemetery Co. v. Buckmaster, 49 N. J. Law 449, 9 Atl. 591; Matter of Brick Presby- terian Church, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 155. 95. Jacobus v. Congregation Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518. 73 Am. St. Rep. 141, 33 S. E. 853; Matter of Brick Presb. Church, 3 Edw. (N. Y.) 155; Gardner v. Swan Point Cemetery, 20 R. I. 646, 78 Am. St. Rep. 807, 40 Atl. 871. 96. See Pearson v. Hartman, 1254 Real, Peopekty. [§ 360 Tlie corporation or society controlling the cemetery may make regulations as to the mode and limits of the use of lots therein for burial,'^" but such regulations must not be unreasonable or arbitrary.^* All rights in the persons entitled to use the burial ground are terminated by the necessary abandonment of the use of the land for burial purposes.^^ In so far as the person to whom the privilege of burial is granted, has no more than an easement or usufructuaiy right, he does not have the possession of the burial lot.^ Somewhat strangely, however, it has been decided or assumed, in several cases, that he may maintain trespass qimre clansum fregit against one interfering with his right.^ § 360. Miscellaneous easements. In addition to easements of the classes above referred to, numerous 100 Pa. 84; Dickens v. Cave HiU Cemetery Co., 93 Ky. 385, 20 S. W. 282. That interments have been actually made has been re- garded as precluding a sale of the lot. Thompson v. Hickey, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 159, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 434; Schroeder v. Wanzor, 36 Hun. (N. Y.) 423. 97. Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 14 N. E. 903; Farelly v. Metairie Cemetery Ass'n, 44 La. Ann. 28, 10 So. 386. 98. Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Hopkinson, 114 111. 209, 29 N. E. 685; Mount Moriah Cemetery Ass'n V. Com., 81 Pa. St. 235, 22 Am. Rep. 743; Silverwood v. Lat- robe, 68 Md. 620, 13 Atl. 161. 99. Partridge v. First Inde- pendent Church, 39 Md. 631; Page V. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17, 56 Am. Rep. 481; Richards v. North West Dutch Church, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 42; Went v. Methodist Protestant Church, 80 Hun. 266, 150 N. Y. 577, 44 N. E. 1129; Price v. Metho- dist Episcopal Church, 4 Ohio 515; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411, 5 Am. Rep. 377; Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42, 32 Am. Rep. 417. 1. That he cannot maintain ejectment, see Hancock v. Mc- Avoy, 151 Pa. 460, 31 Am. St. Rep. 774, 18 L. R. A. 781, 25 Atl. 47; Stewart v. Garrett, 119 Ga. 386, 64 L. R. A. 99, 100 Am. St. Rep. 179, 46 S. E. 427. 2. Bessemer Land, etc., Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala. 135, 56 Am. St. Rep. 26, 18 So. 565; Pulsifer v. Douglass, 94 Me. 556, 53 L. R. A. 238, 48 Atl. 118; Smith v. Thomp- son, 55 Md. 5, 39 Am. Rep. 409; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. Dec. 759; Thirkfield v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, § 360] Easements. 1255 other easements liave been judicially recognized. Among sucli may be mentioned the privilege of maintaining upon another's land a stairway,^ a reser^'oir/ a sign- board,^ of utilizing another's dock," of placing a sign on a building," of placing clothes lines^'*' on or over an- other's land, of having one's building overhang another's land,'^ of s^\'ingin2' shutters thereover,^^ and even of extending one's building or porch upon another's land.^- Also a privilege of placing logs and lumber,^^ or mer- 12 Utah, 76, 41 Pac. 564; HoU- man v. Platteville, 101 Wis. 94, 70 Am. St. Rep. 899, 76 N. W. 1119. 3. Moon V. Mills, 119 Mich. 298, 75 Am. St. Rep. 390, 77 N. W. 926. 4. Riefler & Sons v. Wayne Storage Water Power Co., 232 Pa. 282, 81 Atl. 300. 5. Rex V. St. Pancras Assess- ment Committee, 2 Q. B. D. 581, 586; Borough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy, 144 N. Y. App. Div. 784, 129 N. Y. Supp. 740. 6. Sargent v. Ballard, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 251; Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 42, 93 Am. Dec. 132. Or an easement of utilizing a canal basin. International Pottery Co. V. Richardson, 63 N. J. L. 248, 43 Atl. 692. 7. Moody V. Steggles, 12 Ch. D. 261; Levy v. Louisville Gun- ning System, 121 Ky. 510, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359, 89 S. W. 528. 8-9. Drewell v. Towler, 3 Barn. & Ad. 735; Steiner v. Peter- man, 71 N. J. Eq. 101, 63 Atl. 1102. 10. Ingals V. Plamondon, 75 111. 118; Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 79 Atl. 433; First Bap- tist Society v. Wetherell, 34 R. 1. 155, 82 Atl. 1061. 11. Richardson v. Pond, 15 Gray (Mass.) 387. 12. Ensign v. Colt, 75 Conn. Ill, 52 Atl. 829, 946; Wilson v. Riggs, 27 App. D. C. 550; Jeffrey v. Winter, 190 Mass. 90, 76 N. E. 282; Smith v. Lockwood, 100 Minn. 221, 110 N. W. 980; Taylor V. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 99 Atl. 433; Ruffin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 151 N. C. 330, 66 S. E. 317. So an easement of planning and maintaining a monument on an individuals land was recognized in Wilson V. Board of Chosen Free- holders of Gloucester County, 83 N. J. Eq. 545, 90 Atl. 1021. Compare Littlefield v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 134; Cortelyou v. Van Brundt, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 357, to the effect that any right invol- ing exclusive occupancy is neces- sarily more than an easement. And see references to English authorities to this effect, P"^t, § 361, note 34. 13. Pollard v. Barnes, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 191; Gurney v. Ford, 2 Allen (Mass.) 576; Lacy v. Green. 84 Pa. 514. 1256 Real Property. [§ 360 chaiidise,^-' on another's land, of tieing horses/^ mixing manure/^ and storing rolling chairs for hire^"^ thereon, of placing appliances to control the flow of water,^^ or to catch fish.^*^ In a few states the statutes name certain ease- ments which may be imposed upon land in favor of other land, and also certain easements which may be so imposed without making them appurtenant to other land.-°'-^ These provisions do not appear to have had [.ny substantial effect as regards the law of easements in those states. There are to be found occasional judicial expres- sions to the effect that new species of easements will not be recognized,^^ that, in other words, "incidents of a novel kind cannot be attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner. "^^ And this view re- ceived practical application in one case in which the court refused to recognize an easement consisting of an exclusive right to float boats on another's canal .^^ It cannot be said, however, that the courts have ordinarily shown any disposition thus to restrict the power of the owner of land to subject it to an easement in favor 14. Richardson v. Pond, 15 Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 5330, 5331; Gray. (Mass.) 387. Oklahoma Rev. Laws 1910, §§ 15. Trauger v. Sassaman, 14 6623, 6624; South Dakota Civil Pa. 514; Benham v. Minor, 38 Code 1910, §§ 267, 268. Conn. 252. 22. See Eckert v. Peters, 55 16. Pye V. Mumford, 11 Q. B. N. J. Eq. 379, 36 Atl. 491. 666. 23. This is in effect the state- 17. Goldman v. Beach Front ment of Brougham L. C. in Kep- Realty Co., 83 N. J. L. 97, 83 pel v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. p. 535, Atl. 777. made in connection with the 18. Wood V. Hewett, 8 Q. B. right to enforce an affirmative 913. covenant as against a transferee 19. Rolle V. Whyte, L. R. 3 Q. of the covenantor. It is quoted B. 286; Leconfeld v. Lonsdale, L. with approval in Ackroyd v. R. 5 a P. 657. Smith, 10 C. B. 164, and Hill v. 20-21. See California Civ. Code, Tupper, 2 Hurlst. & C. 121. §§ 801, 802; Montana Rev. Codes, 24. Hill v. Tupper, 2 Hurlst. & 1907, §§ 4507, 4508; North Dakota C. 121. ^ 361] Easements. 1257 of another, and, as a matter of fact, as appears from the preceding paragraph, they have quite freeh^ allowed incidents of a novel kind to be attached to property in the foi-m of easements, as they have in the form of covenants. II. The Creation of Easements. § 361. Express grant. The various classes of vesti- tive facts bv means of which an easement can be created may be enumerated as follows: (1) Express grant; (2)^ Reservation or exception in a conveyance of land; (3) Implied grant or reservation; (4) Prescription; (5) A statutory proceeding, usually under the power of eminent domain; (6) Estoppel. The first of these will be considered in this section, and the others in the sections following. Easements, involving as they do no possession or seisin of the land, were never capable of creation by livery of seisin, and an owner of land desirous of creating an easement in favor of another could do so only by grant, that is, by a written instrument under seal. The necessity for this purpose of an instrument under seal still exists,^^ except in so far as seals may, in the particular jurisdiction, have been abolished or have lost their efficacy. In equity, however, it appears that an instrument, not under seal, by which it is sought to create an easement or right of profit, if based 25. Wood V. Leadbitter, 13 land, 2 Gray (Mass.) 302; Fuhr Mees. & W. 842; Somerset v. Fog- v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116, 69 Am. Dec. well, 5 Barn. & C. 875; Bird v. 484; Blaisdell v. Portsmouth, G. Hlgginson, 2 Adol. & E. 696, 6 F. & C. R. Co., 51 N. H. 483; Adol. & E. 824; Hewlins v. Ship- Veghte v. Raritan Water Power pam, 5 Barn. & C. 221; Shipley Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 142; Thompson V. Fink, 102 Md. 219, 2 L. R. A. v. Gregory, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 81, 4 (N. S.) 1002, 62 Atl. 360; Dyer Am. Dec. 255; Wilkins v. Irvine, V. Sanford, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 395, 33 Ohio St. 138; Huff v. McCauley, 43 Am. Dec. 399; Morse v. Cope- 53 Pa. St. 206, 91 Am. Dec. 203. 1258 Real Peopekty. [§ 361 on a valuable consideration, will be given effect as a contract to create an easement.-^^ Even apart from the common-law requirement that the grant of an easement shall be by writing under seal, a wanting is necessary, under the Statute of Frauds, and an attempted oral grant of an easement is no more than a license.2*^ In courts exercising equitable powers, however, as before stated,^" if the intended gi^antee makes expenditures on the faith of the attempted oral grant, the intending grantor is estopped to deny the validity of the grant, or as it might be otherwise ex- })ressed, the attempted oral grant is given effect on the theory of part performance. What is in form a covenant merely — that is, an agreement under seal — may operate as the grant of an easement, when this is clearly the intention of the parties. ^^ For instance, a covenant by A that B shall 25a. Frogley v. Lovelace, Johns 333; Jones v. TankerviUe (1909) 2 Ch. 440; Ashelford v. Wills, 194 111. 492, 62 X. E. 817. 26. Profile Cotton Mills v. Cal- houn Water Co., 189 Ala. 181, 66 So. 50; Davis v. Tway, 16 Ariz. 566, L. R. A. 1915E, 604, 147 Pac. 750; Empire Inv.^stment Co. v. Mort, 169 Cal. 732, 147 Pac. 960; Workman v. Stephenson, 26 Colo. App. 339, 144 Pac. 1126; McReynolds v. Har- rigfeld, 26 Idaho, 26, 140 Pac. 1096; Wilmington Water-Power Co. v. Evans, 166 111. 548. 46 N. E. 1083; Bonelli v. Blakemore, 66 :Miss. 136, 14 Am. St. Rep. 550, 5 So. 228; Banghart v. Flummer- felt, 43 N. J. Law 28; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 206, 91 Am. Dec. 203; Harris v. Miller, Meigs (Tenn.) 158, 33 Am. Dec. 138; Maple Orchard Grove & Vine- yard Co. V. Marshall, 27 Utah, 215, 75 Pac. 369; Rice v. Roberts, 24 Wis. 461, 1 Am. Rep. 195. 27. Ante^ § 349(d), notes 44- 49. 28. Hiolms V. Seller, 3 Lev. 305; Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. Cas. 348, 362; McCarthy v. Nic- rcsi, 72 Ala. 332, 47 Am. Rep. 418; Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 111. 11, 56 Am. Rep. 758. 4 N. E. 356; Harris v. Dozler, 72 111. App. 542; Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253; Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481, 24 X. E. 858; Kettle River R. Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 472, 6 L. R. A. Ill, 43 X. W. 469; Barr v Lamaster. 48 Xeb. 114, 32 L. R. A. 451, 66 X. W. 1110; First Xat. Bank v. Ports- mouth Sav. Bank, 71 N. H. 547, 53 Atl. 1017; Wetmore v. Bruce, 118 N. Y. 319, 23 N. E. 303: Xor- fleet V. Cromwell, 64 X. C. 1; :\Iorton V. Thompson, 69 Vt. 432. § 361] Easements. 1259 have a riglit of wav over his, A's land, may be regarded as in effect a grant of a right of way by A, m favor of Tlie grant of an easement may properly provide for a future extension of the user of the servient tenement to correspond with future requirements in that re- gard.^^^ It has been the subject of learned discussion m England,-^ whether, in a grant of an easement, m order to confer an interest for longer than the grantee's life, words of inheritance must be used.^*^ In this country it has occasionally been assumed that they are necessaiy for this purpose,^ ^ in the absence of any statutorv provision making a conveyance effective to create an estate in fee simple without the use of such words,22 g^^ch as has been before referred to.^'^ Whether an instrument is a grant of an easement in particular land,^'^^^ or a transfer of the ownership of 38 Atl. 88; Kalinowski v. Jacob- owoski, 52 Wash. 359, 100 Pac. 852; Warren v. Syme, 7 W. Va. 475; In re Barhausen, 142 Wis. 292,' 124 N. W. 649, 125 N. W. 680. Likewise what is in form a release may, under the particular circumstances of the case, be con- strued as the grant of an ease- ment. Walterman v. Norwalk, 145 Wis. 663, 130 N. W. 479. 28a. Patterson v. Chambers Power Co., 81 Ore. 328, 159 Pac. 568, and cases there cited. And see post. § 369. 29. See articles in 24 Law Quart. Rev. at pp. 199, 259, 264. 30. ITiere is a (.UcUim to the effect that such words are neces- sary in Hewlins v. Shippam, h B. & C. 221, 228. They are in practice invariably inserted. 31. Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 229, 3 N. E. 206; Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253. And see cases cited /'o.v/, § 362, note 65. But even in a state in which such words are regarded as neces- sary in the case of the grant of an easement, they are not neces- sary in order to give an easement by partition decree. Bornstein v. Doherty, 204 Mass. 280, 90 N. E. 531. 32. See Stovall v. Coggins Granite Co., 116 Ga. 376, 42 S. E. 723; GoodwiUie Co. v. Common- wealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272; Hagerty v. Lee, 54 X. J. L. 580, 20 L. R. A. 631, 25 Atl. 319; Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa, 352; Whitney v. Richardson, 59 Hun. (N. Y.) 601; Borst v. Empire, 5 N. Y. 33 (semble). 33. Avtv, § 21(a). 33a. As in Pellissier v. Corker, 1260 Real Property. [§ 361 such land, with a specification of the user which is ex- pected to be made of the land,"* is obviously a question of construction of the language used. That the con- veyance is in terms of land does not necessarily pre- vent a construction thereof as creating only an ease- ment in the land.^'*'' One can obviously not create an easement upon land belonging to another, and for this reason one who has an undivided interest only in the land cannot create an easement therein."^ There are, however, occasional 103 Cal. 516. 37 Pac. 465; Cin- cinnati, I. St. L. & C. Ry. Co., V. Geisel, 119 Ind. 77, 21 N. E. 470; Nichols V. New England Furniture Co., 100 Mich. 230, 59 N. W. 155; Maxwell v. McCall, 145 Iowa, 687, 124 N. W. 760; Samples v. Smythe, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 187, 105 S. W. 415; Callaway v. Forest Park High- lands Co., 113 Md. 1, 77 Atl. 141; Beasley v. Aberdeen & Rocktish R. Co., 145 N. Car. 272, 59 S. E. 60; Wason v. Pilz, 31 Ore. 9, 48 Pac. 701; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522; Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 357, 38 Pac. 1126. 34. As in Weihe v. Lorenz, 254 111. 195, 98 N. B. 268; Low v. Streeter, 66 N. H. 36, 9 L. R. A. 271, 20 Atl. 247; Blauvelt v. Pas- saic Water Co.. 75 N. J. Eq. 351, 72 Atl. 1091; Kilmer v. Wilson, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 86; AumiUer v. Dash, 51 Wash. 520, 99 Pac. 583; Mitchell V. Prepont, 68 Vt. 613, 35 Atl. 496. See Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 114 Am. St. Rep. 509, 1 L. R. A. N. S. 806, 6 Ann. Cas. 239, 81 Pac. 208. That there is given a right of exclusive user of a part of the land, either on the surface, or in a stratum below the surface, ap- pears, according to the English cases, to indicate conclusively that something more than an easement is transferred, that thfi ownership of the land is to that extent conveyed. See article by Charles Sweet, Esq., on "The 'Easement' of Tunnelling," 32 Law Quart. Rev. 70; Taylor v. Corporation of St. Helens, 6 Ch. D. 264; Reilly v. Booth, 44 Ch. D. 12. To the same effect appear to be the American cases, Little- field V. Maxwell, 31 Me. 134; Cortelyou v. Van Brunt, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 357. Compare cases cited ante, § 360, note 12. 34a. Overton v. Moseley, 135 Ala. 599, 33 So. 696; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522; Biles v. Tacoma R. Co., 5 Wash. 509, 32 Pac. 211. 35. Pfeiffer v. University of California, 74 Cal. 156, 10 Pac. 622; Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 423; Marshall v. Peck, 28 Conn. 183; Clark v. Parker, 106 Mass. 554; Crippen v. Morse, 49 N. Y. 63; Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N. Y. § 361] Easements. 1261' decisions to the effect that if a cotenant does grant an easement, the grantee can demand a partition in order that the easement may be established upon that part of the hind allotted to his grantor.^^ The creation of an easement by devise, which oc- curs but infrequently, may be considered as one phase of the creation of easements by grant.-^''^ It occurs when the testator, in devising land, provides that tlie de^^isee shall have an easement over other land belong- ing to him.'"^ And the acquisition of an easement by condemnation,^"^ or, by what may be regarded as closely analogous thereto, the payment of a judgment for damages as on account of the maintenance of a permanent nuisance,^^*^ are also substantially varieties of acquisition of an easement by grant, as is the ac- quisition of an easement by force of a decree in parti- tion proceedings.^^® Party wall rights. Occasionally the ownei of land grants to an adjoining owner the privilege of utilizing a wall already constructed on the former's land as a party wall, that is, as a division wall and for purposes of support. More usually, however, a wall 139, 55 Am. St. Rep. 653, 44 N. McKenney v. McKenney, 216 Mass. E. 966. It follows that he cannot 248, 103 N. E. 631; Wiley v. BaU, create it in favor of land owned 72 W. Va. 685, 79 S. E. 659. by him in severalty. Palmer v. 36c. Post. § 561. Palmer, 150 X. Y. 139, 55 Am. St. 36d. See editorial note, 7 Co- Rep. 653, 44 N. E. 966; City Club umbia Law Rev. at p. 277; Sedg- V. McGeer, 198 N. Y. 160, 91 N. wick. Damages, §§ 93, 95, 924, E. 539. 924a; LeAvis, Eminent Domain, §5 36. Charleston, C. & C. R. Co. 937, 948. V. Leech, 33 So. Car. 175, 26 Am. 36e. See e. g.. Mount Hope Iron St. Rep. 6fi7, 11 S. E. 631; Mc- Co. v. Dearden, 140 Mass. 430, 4 Elroy V. McLeay, 71 Vt. 396, 45 N. E. 803; Bornstein v. Doherty, Atl. 898. 204 Mass. 280., 90 N. E. 531; Bean 36a. See Goddard, Easements, v. Coleman, 44 N. H. 539; RicU- (6th Ed.) 125. ardson v. Arraington, 10 R. I. 36b. See e. g., Lide v. Hadley, ii^. .?6 Ala. 627, 76 Am. Dec. 338; 2 R. P.— 5 1262 Eeal Property. [§ 361 acquires the characteristics of a party wall by reason of what is known as a party wall agreement, executed before the erection of the wall. For instance, if A and B own adjoining lots, and A contemplates the erection of a building on his lot, they may enter into an agree- ment by which A acquires from B the privilege of placing one wall of the building, to the extent of half its thickness, upon B's land, with a stipulation that B may use the wall for the purpose of such building as he may desire to erect, upon payment by him of one- half, or other proportioned part, of the cost of the wall. Or it may be that, without specifying which is to erect the wall, it is provided that the one erecting it may place one-half upon the other's land, and that the other may utilize the wall upon paying part of the cost. Assuming that A is the one who is to erect the wall, it would seem that B's agTeement that he may erect it in part on B's land involves the grant to A of an easement in B's land, while A's agreement that B ma}^ utilize the wall on the pajTuent of part of the cost of construction involves the grant of an easement in A's land as regards the part of the wall to be placed thereon. And likewise if it is not specified which o^vner is to erect the wall, there are, it appears, mutual grants of easements between the parties. As to the ownership of that part of the wall erected by A upon B 's land, the cases are to the effect that it belongs to A until B makes use of it,"^ or pays a part of its cost for the purpose of utilizing it,^^ whereupon it passes into the ownership of B. It appears somewhat singular that no question has ever been judicially suggested as to whether a party 37. Maine v. Cumston, 98 Mass. 111. 437, 104 N. E. 5; Nat. Life 317; Berry v. Godfrey, 198 Mass. Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Lee, 75 228, 84 N. E. 304; Hill v. Huron, Minn. 157, 77 N. W. 794; Glover 33 S. Dak. 324, 145 N. W. 570. v. Mersman, 4 Mo. App. 90; 38. Mickel v. York, 175 111. 62, Masson's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 26. 51 N. E. 848; Kuh v. O'Reilly, 261 <^ 361] Easements. 1263 wall agreement of the character referred to is not in- valid under the Eule against Perpetuities. If the agree- ment in effect provides that the o^\^lership of part of the wall is to change at an indefinite time in the future, as stated in the cases last referred to, it is difficult to see why such provision is not within the rule. And even apart from such a provision for a change in the ownership of the wall, if the right of the non builder, or of his successor in interest, to use the wall, is dependent on the pajinent by him of part of the cost, a construction of the agreement which is sometimes adopted,^^ such an attempt to create an easement to arise at some indefinite time in the future would seem to be within the rule.^° Conflict with the rule could be entirely avoided, it is conceived, by considering the part of the wall erected on the non builder 's land as con- tinuing to be the property of the builder even after user and payment therefor by the former, or as being from the first the property of the person on whose land it stands, and by furthermore considering the agreement as immediately creating cross easements in the land of each proprietor, with a contractual liability on the part of the non builder as regards part of the cost of the wall. It has occasionally l)een suggested that such an agreement creates the relation of vendor and purchaser as regards that part of the wall placed on the non builder's land,^^ that it, in other words, creates an option in the non builder -to purchase that part of the wall. Such a construction of the agreement would not protect it from the operation of the Rule against Perpe- 39. As apparently in Masson's 40. Gray, Perpetuities, § 316. Appeal, 70 Pa. 26; Conner v. Joy, 41. See Gibson v. Holrlen, llf) — Tex. Civ. App. — , 150 S. W. III. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 146, 3 N. E. 485. But not in Matthews v. 282; McChesney v. Davis, 86 111. Dixey, 149 Mass. 595, 5 L. R. A. App. 380; 8 Columbia Law Rev. 102, 22 N. E. 61; Hill v. Huron, at p. 121. 33 S. Dak. 324, 145 X. W. 570. 1264 Eeal Property. [§ 361 tiiities,^^ and it does not appear to be adopted in prac- tice, a conveyance of that part of the wall not being ex- ecuted upon payment by the non builder of part of the cost, as we might expect to be done if such payment in- volved the consummation of a purchase. Furthermore, while such an option would involve in effect a con- tract or covenant by the builder to convey to the non builder the part of the wall on the latter 's land, when ever the latter may desire to use the wall, upon pay- ment by the latter of the stipulated part of the cost, yet the possible existence of such a contract or covenant on the part of the builder is ignored in the numerous cases discussing whether the benefit or burden of the agreement to pay for the land ^\^11 pass to successors in title.^'^ In view of this omission to refer to any such contract or covenant in this connection, in which it would most properly be referred to, it seems reason- able to conclude that the theory that the parties stand in the relation of vendor and purchaser as regards the wall has not been generally adopted. A party wall agreement of the character referred to, involving as it does the creation of easements in land, is invalid if merely oral.** If, however, the wall is erected in accordance with the agreement, the parties are, it appears, in the same position as if the agreement had been originally valid. The agreement involves an attempted oral grant by one proprietor to the other of an easement to place the wall in part on the former's land, which is, on the theon^ of part performance or es- toppel,*'"* validated by the subsequent construction of the wall on the faith thereof.**' Such grant can, how- 42. Gray, Perpetuities, §§ 330- Mass. 19, 5 L. R. A. 209, 15 Am. 3S0c. St. Rep. 168, 22 N. E. 73. 43. I'ost, §§ 393, 45. Ante, § 349(d), notes 44- 44. Tillis V. Treadwen, 117 49. Ala. 445, 22 So. 983; Rice v. Rob- 46. Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19; erts, 24 Wis. 461, 1 Am. Rep. Russell v. Hubbard, 59 111. 335; 195; Hodgkins v. Farrington, 150 Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa, 253. § 361] Easements. 1265 ever, be recognized and enforced only subject to the con- ditions and stipulations to which it was originally sub- ject, including the right of the grantor to make use of the wall upon the payment by him of part of the cost thereof. So far as concerns the personal liability of such grantor under his contract to pay a portion of the cost of the wall in case of its use by him, conceding that such contract is within the Statute of Frauds, which appears somewhat questionable, it is validated, it seems, by reason of the part performance involved in the building of the wall,^^ and apart from the doc- trine of i)art performance, the user of the wall, since this belongs to the builder thereof, would involve a liability in tort or upon the theory of quasi con- tract. That a contract to pay a certain sum in case one makes a particular use of another's property is invalid under the statute can not enable him to make such use of the property without incurring any liability. If the proprietor who, by the terms of the agree- ment, is to construct the partition wall on the division line between the two properties, fails to extend it the full length of that line, the other, it has been held, has the privilege of so extending it.^^ What constitutes a user of the wall by B which will render him liable under his covenant to A, who constructed the wall, for part of the cost thereof, is 74 Am. Dec. 348; Horr v. Hollis, not build it has been regarded 20 Wash. 424, 55 Pac. 565; Miller as a performance which takes V. Brown, 33 Ohio St. 547. his contract to pay a part of the 47. See Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. cost out of the statute. Walker 19; Rindge v. Baker, 57 N. Y. v. Shackelford, 49 Ark. 503, 4 Am. 209; Stuht v. Sweesy, 48 Neb. St. Rep. 61, 5 S. W. 887; Pireaux 767, 67 N. W. 748; Swift v. Cal- v. Simon, 79 Wis. 392, 48 N. W. nan, 102 Iowa, 206, 37 L. R. A. G74. 462, 63 Am. St. Rep. 443, 71 N. 48. Matthews v. Dixey. 149 W. 233; Rice v. Roberts, 24 Wis. Mass. 595, 22 N. E. 61; Negus v. 461, 1 Am. Rep. 195. Becker, 72 Hun (N. Y.) 479, 25 Occasionally the user of the N. Y. Supp. 640. wall by the proprietor who did 1266 Real, Peoperty. [§ 362 l^rimarily a matter of the constiniction of the covenant. A user of the wall in the course of the reconstruction of an existing building, as distinguished from its use in the erection of a new building, has, in particular cases, been regarded as insufficient to impose a liabil- ity.^^ And a like view has been taken of the erection by B of another wall impinging upon the wall built by A, although the existence of this latter wall enables B to make his wall of lighter construction.^" In one case a covenant to pay part of the cost of the wall when the covenantor used it was construed to involve an obliga- tion upon his part to use the wall in a reasonable time,^^ and in two cases the court appears to have con- strued such a covenant as involving a liability upon the covenantor if he conveyed his land and so put it out of his power to use the wall.^^ § 362. Express reservation or exception. By the law of England, an ''exception" in a conveyance merely withdraws from the operation of the conveyance a pan of the thing conveyed as a whole, and a "reservation" merely provides for the rendition to the grantor of something, such as a rent or service, which is regarded as issuing from the thing granted.^^"^^ An easement 49. Shaw V. Hitclicock, 119 not to include one half the cost Mass. 254; Fox v. Mission Free of additions made by a purchaser School, 120 Mo. 349, 25 S. W. 172. from the buil:^er, on his own land, 50. Kingsland v. Tucker, 115 N. for the purpose of strengthening Y. 574, 22 N. E. 268; Sheldon the wall for his own purposes. Bank v. Royce, 84 Iowa, 288, 50 Walker v. Stetson, 162 Mass. 86, N. W. 986. 44 Am. St. Rep. 350, 38 N. E. IS. That the builder of the Avail 51. Sherley v. Burns, 22 Ky. L. failed to extend it over a small Rep. 788, 58 S. W. 69. portion of the division line as he 52. Rawson v Bell, 46 Ga. 19; agreed to do was held not to Nalle v. Paggi, 81 Tex. 201, 13 prevent recovery upon the other's L. R. A. 50, 16 S. W. 932. Compare covenant. Keith v. Ridge, 146 Mo. Hurford v. Smith, 24 Okla. 448, 90, 47 S. W. 904. 103 Pac. 851. And cases cited The covenant to pay one-half post, § 393(b), note 74. of the cost of the wall was held 53-57. See post, § 436. § 362] Easements. 1267 in the land conveyed is regarded as neither a part of the land nor as issuing therefrom, and consequently, in that country, if, upon the conveyance of land, there is in terms a reservation or exception, in favor of the grantor, of an easement in the land, these words are construed as in eft'ect a re-grant of the easement by the grantee of the land to the grantor, which can take effect only if the instrument is executed by such grantee.^^ In this country, however, the view of the common law as to the restricted functions of an ex- ception and a reservation is not usually adopted,^^ and it is held that an easement in the land conveyed may be created by a reservation,*^^ and in some states even by an exception,*'^ and consequently, the fact that the instrument is not executed by the grantee of the land as well as by the grantor is immaterial. Occasionally it has been decided that an easement may properly be created by a reservation but not by an except'ion,^- and, having 58. Durham & S. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 2 Q. B. 940; Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Mees. & W. 63; Corpo- ration of London v. Riggs, 13 Ch. Div. 798. 59. See post, § 436. 60. Chai>pell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 62 Conn. 195, 17 L. R. A. 420, 24 Atl. 997; Kuecken v. Voltz, 110 111. 264; Morrison v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 117 Iowa, 587, 91 N. W. 793; Wendell V. Helm, 87 Kan. 136, 123 Pac. 869; Inhabitants of WMnthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 .Me. 307; Damron v. Justice, 162 Ky. 101, 172 S. W. 120; Kent v. Waite, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 138; Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132; Claflin v. Bos- ton & A. R. Co., 157 Mass. 480, 20 L. R. A. 638, 32 N. E. 659; Haggerty v. Lee, 54 N. J. Law 580, 50 N. J. Eq. 464, 20 L. R. A. 631, 25 Atl. 319; Borst v. Empie, 1 Seld. N. Y. 33; Rose v. Bunn, 21 N. Y. 275; Grafton v. ;\Ioir, 130 N. Y. 465, 27 Am. St. Rep. 533, 29 N. E. 974; Richardson v. Clements, 89 Pa. St. 503, 33 Am. Rep. 784; Kister v. Reeser, 98 Pa. St. 1, 42 Am. Rep. 608; Fischer v. Laack, 76 Wis. 313, 45 N. W. 104. 61. Inhabitants of Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 33 Atl. 174; Claflin V. Boston & A. R. Co., 157 Mass. 489, 20 L. R. A. 638, 32 N. E. 659; Bridser v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601; Lcavitt v. Towle, 8 N. H. 96. 62. City Club of Auburn v. .Mc- Geer, 198 N. Y. 160, 91 N. E. 539, 92 N. E. 105; Gill v. Fletcher. 74 Ohio St. 295, 113 Am. St. Rep. 962, 78 N. E. 433; Kister v. Reeser, 1268 Eeal Property. [§ 362 regard to the nature of a reservation and of an exception at common law, sucli a view appears to be a reasonable one. The assumption that an easement may be created by exception as well as by reservation has resulted in much confusion in particular cases/'^ In some states it is considered that words of in- heritance must be used in the reservation of an ease- ment in order that the grantor may acquire an ease- ment to endure longer than his own life,^^ In other states such words are regarded as unnecessary by reason of the general statutory provisions dispensing with the necessity of such words in order to create an estate in fee simiDle.*'*' In a few states the use of such words has been regarded as unnecessary on the theory that, the reservation being evidently intended to be for the benefit of neighboring land retained by the grantor, his easement is to be regarded as unlimited in point of duration."*" This latter view harmonizes with 98 Pa. 1; Riefler & Sons v. Wayne Storage Water Power Co., 232 Pa. 282, 81 Atl. 300. 64. Post, § 436. 65. Koelle v. Knecht, 99 I'.l. 396; Dawson v. Western Md. R. Co., 107 Md. 70, 14 L. R. A. (X. S.) 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. 337, 15 Ann. Cas. 678, 68 Atl. 301; Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 229; Childs v. Boston & M. R. R., 213 Mass. 91, 99 N. E. 957; Hornbeck v. West- brook, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 73; Kister V. Rieser, 98 Pa. 1. And so it has been said that the word "heirs ' is necessary in the case of a res- ervation of oil and gas, but not in the case of an exception of oil and gas. Mandle v. Gharing, 256 Pa. 121, 100 Atl. 535. 66. Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637, 50 So. 887; Presbyterian Church of Osceola v. Harken, 177 Iowa, 195, 158 N. W. 692; Bein- lem V. Johns. 102 Ky. 570, 44 S. W. 128; Ruffin v. Seaboard Air Line Rwy., 151 N. Car. 330, 66 S. E. 317; Rubnke v. Aubert, 58 Ore. 6, 113 Pac. 38; Forde v. Libby, 22 Wyo. 464, 143 Pac. 1190. 67. Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637, 50 So. 887 (dictum); Chap- pell V. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 62 Conn. 195, 17 L. R. A. 420, 24 Atl. 997; Teachout v. Capital Lodge I. 0. O. P., 128 Iowa, 380, 104 X. W. 440; Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 33 Atl. 174; Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448, 27 Atl. 352; Lathrop v. Eisner, 93 Mich. 599, 53 N. W. 791; Smith v. Furbish, 68 N. H. 123, 47 L. R. A. 226. 44 Atl. 398. But as to Maine see Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Dana v. Smith, 114 Me. 262, 95 At. 1034. «^ 362] Easements. 1269 the common law rule that the reservation of rent upon a lease by one having a fee simple estate, without the mention of heirs, gives the lessor an interest in the rent which passes upon his death to his lieirs, as partaking of the character of the reversion to which it appertains. ^^ In so far as it may be considered that an easement may be created by an exception, it is generally agreed tliat words of inheritance are unnecessary, in order to give to the grantor of the land an interest in the ease- ment to endure beyond his life.*^^ An easement in gross is ordinarily regarded, as above stated, as being purely personal to the person in favor of whom it is created,'*^ and consequently a reservation of such an easement would usually create an easement for the grantor's life only, in the ab- sence at least of language indicative of a contrary intention. That an easement cannot be created by reservation in favor of a person other than the grantor in the conveyance has been frequently asserted,'^ but there are to be found cases which are not in accord with such a view.'- The important consideration in that regard would appear to be whether the language of reservation in the particular case in favor of a third 68. Co. Litt. 47a; 2 Piatt, H. & H. R. Co., *62 Conn. 195, 17 Leases, 88; Gilbert, Rents, 64; L. R. A. 420, 24 Atl. 997; Win- Jaques v. Gould, 4 Cush. (Mass.) throp v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; 384. Mclntire v. Lauckner, 108 Me. 443, In Smith's Ex'cr v. Jones, 86 SI Atl. 784; Foster v. Smith, 211 Vt. 258, 84 Atl. 866. that the ease- Mass. 411, 98 N. E. 693; Lipsky ment was appurtenant appears to v. Heller, 199 Mass. 310, 85 N. E. have been regarded as a reason 453; Smith's Ex'cr v. Jones, 86 for construing the language as Vt. 258, 84 Atl. 866; Ruffin v. an exception, in order that, al- Seaboard Air Line, 151 N. Car. though without words of inheri- 330, 66 S. E. 317. tance, it might endure after the 70. Aiilr, § 350, note 3. grantor's life. 71. Post, § 436. 69. Chappell v. New York, N. 72. Post, § 436. 1270 Eeal Property. [§ 363 person can be construed as the grant of an easement to such person. As words of covenant may operate as a grant of an easement,^^ they may operate as a reservation, as when one accepts a conveyance of land to him, which contains an agreement on his part that the grantor of the land may use such land in a certain way, or that he, the grantee, shall allow it to be used in a certain way.'^"^^ §363. "Implied" grant or reservation. (a) General considerations. Frequently, although there is no grant of an easement in express terms, an easement is regarded as arising in connection with a conveyance of land, either for the benefit of the land conveyed as against land retained by the grantor, or for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as against the land con- veyed, the former being referred to as a case of the "implied grant" of an easement, and the latter being referred to as a case of the "implied reservation" of an easement. This doctrine of implied grant and implied reserva- tion finds its practical application in connection with the question whether, upon a severance of ownership of land, an easement is created corresponding to a pre- existing "quasi easement,"^- and also in connection with the question of the existence of an "easement of necessity."*^ Theory of implied grant. In the case of an easement arising in favor of the grantee of land as corresponding to a preexisting quasi easement, as well as in the case of an easement of necessity, the 73. Ante, § 361, note 28. 680. 74-81. Weller v. Brown, 160 82. Post, this section, notes 85- Cal. 515, 117 Pac. 517; Hathaway 50. V. Hathaway, 159 Mass. 584, 35 83. Post, this section, notes 51- X. E. 85; Re Barkhausen, 142 3b. Wis. 292, 124 X. W. 649, 125 N. W. § 363] Easements. 1271 easement is res^arded as existing on the theory that the grantor and grantee of the land intend that it shall exist, and the courts merely declare in effect that the particular circumstances of the transaction raise a pre- sumption of such an intention. Since the easement thus arises as the result of an intention imputed to the parties that it shall arise, it exists, properly speaking, by reason of an express rather than an implied grant. This being so, a question suggests itself as to how, in view of the Statute of Frauds, and the recognized necessity, at common law, of a grant under seal in order to create an easement, a grantee of land can be regarded as acquiring, as ap- purtenant to the land, an easement in other land, not previously existing, and not referred to in the con- veyance. The explanation is, apparently, that the easement is to be regarded, for the purpose of the par- ticular case, as included in the description of the land conveyed. Evidence is always admissible to aid in the interpretation of the language of a written instrument, and so evidence is admissible to show the surrounding circumstances to be such as to raise a presumption that the property conveyed was, not a mere piece of land, but a piece of land with a particular easement appurtenant thereto.^* The rules declared by the courts as to the creation of easements corresponding to preexisting quasi easements, and of easements of necessity, con- stitute in reality merely rules of construction for the pur- pose of determining the scope of the conveyance. And the grant of the easement is implied only in the sense that the easement passes by the conveyance although not expressly mentioned, just as an easement previously cre- ated passes upon a conveyance of the land to which it is appurtenant without any express mention of the 84. As said by Justice Story, privilege at the time of the grant, somewhat too sweepingly: "What- passes as parcel of it." Hazard ever is actually enjoyed w^ith the v. Robinson, 3 Mason, 272. thing granted, as a beneficial 1272 Eeal Property. [§ 363 easement. It is immaterial, from a legal point of view, whether the easement passes because the instru- ment expressly says that it shall pass, or because the circumstances are such as to call for a construction of the language used as so saying. So in the case of the so called implied reservation of an easement upon a conveyance of land, the description of the land is, by reason of the surrounding circumstances, construed to refer, not to the land free from any easement, but to the land subject to an easement corresponding to the previous mode of utilizing the land or to the necessities of the case, and there is thus, properly speaking, an express reserv^ation, in the sense that it is intended, or rather presumed to be intended, and the reservation is implied only in the sense that, instead of being explicitly stated, it is left to be inferred from the language used when construed with reference to the surrounding cir- cumstances. (b) Of easement corresponding to pre-existent quasi easement. One cannot have an easement over one's own land, but one may make use of one part of his land for the benefit of another part, just as, if they were separately owmed, the owner of the latter might make use of the former by reason of the existence of an easement in his favor. When one thus utilizes part of his land for the benefit of another part, it is frequent- ly said that a quasi easement exists, the part of the land which is benefitted being referred to as the ''quasi dom- inant tenement," and the part which is utilized for the benefit of the other part being referred to as the ^' quasi servient tenement." The so called qtmsi easement is evidently not a legal relation in any sense, but the expression is a convenient one to describe the particular mode in which the owner utilizes one part of the land for the benefit of the other, as bearing on the question now to be discussed, whether, when the two parts subse- quently become the property of different persons, an actual easement is to be regarded as existing, which ^ a63] Easements. 1273 corresponds to the use wliich was previously made of the land by the owner of both parts. The latter ques- tion is frequently, perhaps more usually, the subject of discussion and adjudication without the employment of the expression quasi easement, which is here employed merely because, in the view of the writer, the explana- tion and discussion of the matter will be thereby somewhat facilitated. If the owner of land, one part of which is sub- ject to a quasi easement in favor of another part, conveys the quasi dominant tenement, an easement cor- responding to such quasi easement is ordinarily re- garded as thereby vested in the grantee of the land, pro- vided, it is said, the quasi easement is of an apparent continuous and necessary character. It is perhaps unfortunate that the courts, in de- termining whether, in a particular case, an easement corresponding to a preexisting quasi easement has passed with the land, have usually failed to recognize that the question is primarily one of construction, and have instead undertaken to lay down absolute rules as to what characteristics the particular easement or quasi easement must have, implying that, if it has these char- acteristics, the easement will pass as a matter of law. The characteristics ordinarily referred to in tliis con- nection are, as above indicated, that the user be ap- parent, that it be continous, and that it be necessary, each of which will be hereaftei- discussed in turn. But it does not seem that the presence or absence of any or all of these characteristics should be conclusive. Taking the case of a quasi easement which is not apparent, which is not continuous and which is not necessary, nevertheless a conveyance in terms of the quasi domi- nant tenement should, it is conceived, be construed as a conveyance of the lands with an easement appurtenant thereto corresponding to the pre existing quasi ease- ment, if this accords with the probable intention of the parties. On the other liand, even though the quasi ease- 1274 Eeal Property. [§ 363 ment has all the three characteristics named, an ease- ment corresj)oncling thereto evidently does not pass with the land if the language of the conveyance shows clearly an intention otherwise,^^ or if the circumstances are such as to exclude a construction of the language of the conveyance as inclusive of the easement. So it has been decided that an easement does not pass when the grantee of the land knows that the grantor has no intention that it shall pass.^*^ Applications of doctrine. The doctrine of an implied grant of an easement corresponding to a pre- existing quasi easement has been applied in various connections, of which the following may be mentioned. It has been held that where the owner of two pieces of land maintains on one of them a drain for the bene- fit of the other, a person to whom he conveys the latter is entitled to an easement of maintaining the drain as it was before maintained.^' And so if one lays pipes for the supply of water from one part of his land to 85. Webber v. Vogel, 159 Pa. tale of property under order of 235, 28 Atl. 226; Hardy v. Mc- court there was no implication Cullough, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 251; of the grant of an easement if Bloom V. Koch, 63 N. J. Eq. 10, the evident intention of the court 50 Atl. 621 (dictum) ; Greer v. was otherwise. Van Meter, 54 N. J. Eq. 270, 33 87. Thayer v. Payne, 2 Gush. Atl. 798 Ulictinn); United States Mass. 327; Lampman v. Milks, 21 V. Appleton, 1 Sumn. 492. N. Y. 505; Denton v. Leddell, 23 86. Birmingham, Dudley & Dis- N. J. Eq. 64; Shaw v. Etheridge, trict Banking Co. v. Ross, L. R. 3 Jones L. (48 N. C«ir.) 300; 38 Ch. Div. 295; McPherson v. Siiarpe v. Scheible, 162 Pa. 341, Acker, McArth. & M. 150, 48 Am. 42 Am. St. Rep. 838, 29 Atl. 736; Rep. 749; Curtis v. Ayrault, 47 Elliott v. Rhett, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) N. Y. 473; Lebus v. Boston, 21 40S, 57 Am. Dec. 750; Sarnderlin Ky. X.aw Rep. 411, 47 L. R. A. 79, v. Baxter, 76 Va. 299; McElroy 51 S. W. 609; Kemp v. Pennsyl- v. McLeay, 71 Vt. 396, 45 Atl. vania R. R., 156 Pa. 430, 26 Atl. 898. But see Allers v. Bach, 130 1074. Md. 499, 100 Atl. 781, where the In Assets Investment Co. v. implied grant of an easement of HoUingshead, C. C. A. 200 Fed. drainage was negatived, apparent- 551, it was decided that upon a ly as not being necessary. § 363] Easements. 1275 another part, a grantee of the part so benefitted may have the privilege of obtaining a water supply in the same manner as it was previously obtained by his grantor.^^ The doctrine has also been applied in connec- tion with the question of the right to utilize water power,^'^ to flood land,*^® to demand support for a building from another building,^ ^ or from a wall,^- to 88. Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121; Watts v. Kelson, L. R. 6 Ch. 166; Franciscioni v. Soledad Land & Water Co., 170 Cal. 221, 149 Pac. 161; Quinlan V. Noble, 75 Cal. 250, 17 Pac. 69; Adams v. Gordon, 265 111. 87, 106 X. E. 517; Johnson v. Knapp, 146 Mass. 70, 15 N. E. 134; Toothe V. Bryce. 50 N. J. Eq. 589, 25 Atl. iS2;Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094; Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385, 19 L. R. A. 99, 32 N. E. 18; Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 N. Y. 390, 45 N. E. 865; Coolidge v Hager, 43 Vt. 9, 5 Am. Rep. 256. In Nicholas v. Chamberlain. Cro. Jac. 121, there is a dictum by Popham, C. J., that no such ease- ment to have the water pass to one's land is created if the pipes were laid by a lessee of the grant- or or by a disseisor, and they were not in any way adopted by the grantor as a part of the premises before making the con- veyance. This dictum was ap- plied in Cogswell v. Cogswell, 81 Wash. 315, 142 Pac. 655. 89. Jarvis v. Seele Mill Co., 173 111. 192, 64 Am. St. Rep. 107, 50 N. E. 1044; Smith v. Dressel- house, 152 Mich. 451, 116 N. W. 387; Richardson v. Bigelow, 15 Gray (Mass.) 154; Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557. 90. Preble v. Reed, 17 Me. 169; Baker v. McGuire, 53 Ga. 245, 57 Ga. 109; Burr v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 290; Znamanacek v. Jelinek, 69 Neb. 110, 111 Am. St. Rep. 533, 95 N. W. 28; Latta v. Catawba Electric & Power Co., 146 N. Car. 285, 59 S. E. 1028. 91. Jordan v. Otis, 38 Ms. 429; Tunstall v. Christian. 80 Va. 1. 56 Am. Rep. 581; Richards v. Rose, 9 Exch. 217. But see Grif- fiths V. Morrison, 106 N. Y. 165, 12 N. E. 580; Whyte v. Builders' League, 164 N. Y. 429, 58 N. E. 517. 92. Kahn v. Cherry, 131 Ark. 49, 198 S. W. 266; Nippert v. Warneke, 128 Cal. 501. 61 Pac. 96, 270; Goldschmid v. Starring, 5 Mackey (D. C.) 582; Ringgold Lodge V. De Kalb Lodge, 157 Ky. 203, 16 S. W. 1111; Carlton v. Blake, 152 Mass. 176, 23 Am. St. Rep. 818, 25 N. E. 83; Cherry v. Brizzolura, 89 Ark. 309, 116 S. W. 668; Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632; Eno V. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer. (N. Y. — ) 53, 6 Duer. 17; Henry v. Koch, 80 Ky. 391, 44 Am. Rep. 484; Doyle v. Ritter, 6 Phila. 577; Schwalm v. Beardsley, 106 Va. 407, 56 S. E. 135. 1276 Eeal Property. [§ 363 utilize a stairway on adjoining property ,^-^ and to liave a building encroach on another's land,^^ and even to have water in an adjoining pond kept at a fixed level.®*^ Easement of light. In England and one or two states, it is the ordinary rule that, if one conveys land on which there is a building which is lighted by windows opening on land retained by the grantor, the grantee is entitled to an easement of light over such land, and the grantor cannot obstruct his light by building on his land.^"^ Generally, in this country, however, it has been held that no such grant of an easement of light will be implied, it being calculated unduly to burden land, and to interfere with its alienation and proper improve- ment;^*' or that it will be implied only in case the light 93. Stephens v. Boyd, 157 Iowa, 570, 138 N. W. 389; National Ex- change Bank v. Cunningham, 46 Ohio St. 575, 22 N. E. 924; HoweU V. Estes, 71 Tex. 690, 12 S. W. 62; Geible v. Smith, 146 Pa. 276, 28 Am. St. Rep. 796, 23 Atl. 437. 94. Lead City Miner's Union v. Moyer, 235 Fed. 376; Wilson v. Riggs, 27 App. D. C. 550; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E. 188; Smith v. Lockwood, 100 Minn. 221, 110 N. W. 980; Carrig v. Mechanics' Bank, 136 Iowa, 261, 111 N. W. 329; Katz v. Kaiser, 154 N. Y. 294, 48 N. E. 532; Grace M. E. Church V. Dobbins, 153 Pa. 294, 34 Am. St. Rep. 706, 25 Atl. 1120. 94a. Marshall Ice Co. v. La Plant, 136 Iowa, 621, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073, 111 N. W. 1016. 95. Swansborough v. Coventry, 9 Bing. 305; Broomfield v. Wil- liams (1897), 1 Ch. 602; Greer V. Van Meter, 54 N. J. Eq. 270, 33 Atl. 794; Sutphen v. Therkel- son, 38 N. J. Eq. 318; Fowler v. Wick. 74 N. J. Eq. 603, 70 Atl. 682; Liedtke v. Lipman, (N. J. Ch.) 76 Atl. 463; Janes v. Jenk- ins, 34 Md. 1, 6 Am. Rep. 300. See Wood v. Grayson, 22 Dist. Col. App. 432. 96. Kenn3dy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 40 L. R. A. 476, 52 Pac. 843; Keating v. Springer, 146 111. 481, 22 L. R. A. 544, 37 Am. St. Rep. 175, 34 N. E. 805; Anderson V. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 168 Pac. 900, 901; Ray v. Sweeney, 14 Bush (Ky.) 1, 29 Am. Rep. 388; Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316; Keats V. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 15 Am. Rep. 80; Mullen v. Strieker, 19 Ohio St. 135, 2 Am. Rep. 379; Bailey v. Gray, 53 S. C. 503, 31 S. E. 354; Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 Pac. 1031, 136 Pac. 1146. See Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa, 35, 92 Am. Dec. 444; White V. Bradley, 66 Me. 254 § 363] Easements. 1277 entering the grantee's building over the grantor's land is actually necessaiy to the use of such building.'*^ The same rule as that ordinarily applied in con- nection with a conveyance in fee simple has also been asserted in connection \\dth a lease, it being held that the lessor, or one claiming under him, may erect a building on land adjoining the premises leased, al- though he thereby obstructs the passage of light to the latter premises.''^ Some courts have, however, indi- cated a disposition to protect a tenant under a lease to a greater extent in this regard than a grantee in fee simple, having in view perhaps that the burden on the adjoining land will endure only for the life of the lease, and that the tenant is not in a position to change the construction of the building in order to procure light otherwise. Thus it has in one state been decided that the lease of a room ' ' with appurtenances ' ' passes an ease- ment in the yard attached to the building, for the pro- curement of light and air,*^^^ and in another that one who leases front rooms in his building cannot construct an addition to the building on an unenclosed space in front thereof so as to cut off the light and air from the 97. Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Palmer v. Wetmore. 4 N. Y. Super. Conn. 365, 29 L. R. A. 582, 32 Ct. (2 Sandf.) 316; Myers v. Gem- Atl. 939; Turner v. Thompson, mel, 10 Barb, (N. Y.) 537; Lindsey 58 Ga. 268, 24 Am. Rep. 497; Dar- v. First Nat. Bank, 115 N. C. 553, r.ell V. Columbus Show Case Co., 20 S. E. 621. 129 Ga. 62, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 333, 98a. Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 58 S. E. 631; Case v. Minot, 158 432, 21 Am. Rep. 629. The opin- Mass. 577, 22 L. R. A. 536, 33 N. ion is apparently to the effect E. 700; Lipsky v. Heller, 199 that if "appurtenances" had not Mass. 310, 85 N. E. 453; Renny- been mentioned, no easement son's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 147, 39 would have passed, but it also Am. Rep. 577; Powell v. Sims, 5 distinguishes the cases deciding W. Va. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 629. that no easement of light is cre- 98. Keating v. Springer, 146 ated by implication on the ground 111. 481, 34 N. E. 805, 22 L. R. A. that in this particular case the 544, 37 Am. St. Rep. 175 (in this yard had been appropriated to case, however, there was an ex- the use of the building and was press covenant on the subject) ; a part of the same lot. 2 R, P.— G 1278 Reu\l Peoperty. [§ 363 rooms and cover the lessee's signs.^^** A like view has been asserted as to the obstruction of the light passing to that part of the building- which is leased, by reason of an alteration of the building itself, it having been de- cided that the lessor, or one standing in his place, can- not alter the building so as to prevent light and air from passing through a ''well" as it did at the time of the lease.'^^'' And it has likewise been decided that the tenant of an upper floor cannot obstruct the passage of light to a lower floor through a grating'' ^'^ or skylight.^ ^'^ In the various cases referred to, the light in question was presumably necessary' for any proper enjoyment of the premises, and they may perhaps be regarded as coming within the exception to the general rule, some- times asserted,^^^ that a grant of a right to light will be implied so far as it is absolutely necessary.''**^ User must be apparent. That an easement may thus be created because corresponding to a pre- existing quasi easement, the quasi easement, that is, the user of one tenement for the benefit of the other by their common owner, must, it is said, have been appar- ent,''^'^ and it was apparent, it has been stated, if its 98b. Brande v. Grace, 154 easement in such light and air as Mass. 210, 31 N. E. 633. was "essential to the beneficial en- 98c. Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. joyment of the leased tenement." 577, 22 L. R. A. 536, 33 N. E. which he could assert against 700. one subsequently taking a lease 88d. Spies v. Damm, 54 How. of adjoining land from the same Pr. (N. Y.) 293. lessor. And in Stevens v. Salo- 98e. O'Neill v. Breese. 3 Misc. mon, 39 Misc. 159, 79 N. Y. Supp. 219. 23 N. Y. Supp. 526. See 136, that the lessor could not Morgan v. Smith. 5 Hun (N. Y.) cut off light "essential to the 220. beneficial use." 9Sf. Ante, § this section, note 98h. Whiting v. Gaylord. 66 97. Conn. 337, 50 Am. St. Rep. 87, 34 98g. In Darnell v. Columbus Atl. 85; Hyde Park Thompson Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S. Houston Light Co. v. Brown, 172 E. 631, 13 L. R. A. N. S. 333, it 111. 329, 50 N. E. 327; Powers v. was held that the lessee had an Heffernan, 233 111. 597, 84 N. E. § 363] Easements. 1279 existence was indicated by signs which must necessarily have been seen, or which might be seen or known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant with the subject.'^'' Accordingly, the question whether the user of land for a drain or aqueduct which is under ground or covered by buildings is apparent for the purpose of the rule depends, it seems, on whether there is any object in sight from the land purchased, as being thereon or near thereto, such as a pump or a sink, which indicate the presence of the aqueduct or drain. ^ The user of land for purposes of {passage is appar- ent, it seems, so as to give to the transferee of the quasi dominant tenement a right of way over the land re- tained, if there is a well marked road or path, either constructed for the purpose,^ or as a result of con- l>61; Fetters v. Humphreys, 18 N. J. Eq. 260, 19 N. J. Eq. 471; Lamp- man V. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505; Butter- worth V. Crawford. 46 N. Y. 349, 7 Am. Rep. 352; Phillips v. Phil- lips, 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577; Providence Tool Co. v. Cor- liss Steam Engine Co., 9 R. I. 564; Sanderlin v. Baxter, 76 Va 299, 44 Am. Rep. 165. 99. Gale, Easements (8th Ed.) 116; Pyer v. Carter, 1 Hurlst. & N. 916. See to this effect, Ingalls V. Plamondon, 75 111. 118; Taylor V. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 79 Atl. 433; Butterworth v. Craw- ford, 46 N. Y. 349, 7 Am. Rep. 352; Rollo v. Nelson, 34 Utah, 116, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315, 96 Pac. 263. In Brown v. Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 75 Atl. 382, it is said that the easement must be "indicated by objects which are necessarily seen or would be ordinarly ob- servable by persons familiar with the premises." 1. For cases in which a quasi easement involving the use of land for a drain or aqueduct was 'held to be apparent, see Pyer v. Carter, l Hurlst. & N. 916; Schwann v. Cotton (1916), 2 Ch. 120; McPherson v. Acker, :MacArthur & M. (D. C.) 150, 48 Am. Rep. 749; Tooth v. Bryce. 50 N. J. Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182; Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094; Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W. Va. 645, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 929, 91 S. E. 536. For cases in which it was held not to be ap- parent, see Robinson v. Hillman, 36 Dist. Col. App. 241; Carbrey V. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.) 364, 83 Am. Dec. 688; Covell v. Bright, 157 Mich. 419, 122 N. W. 101; Butterworth v. Crawford, 46 N. Y. 349, 7 Am. Rep. 352; Scott v. Beutel, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 1. 2. Robinson v. Hillman, 36 Dist. Col. App. 241; Teachout v. 1280 Real Property. [§ 363 stant or prolonged user.^ There are however ocasional judicial expressions to the effect that a way is never to be regarded as apparent for this purpose.'^* The requirement that the user of the land have been apparent is perhaps based on the consideration that if the user was not apparent, the one to whom the quasi dominant tenement is conveyed cannot be pre- sumed to have had any knowledge thereof, or to have an- ticipated that he would enjoy a like right of user. But this consideration appears to be of uniform impor- tance only on the assumption that every conveyance is a bilateral transaction, that, in other words, it is effec- tive because representing an agreement between the parties. A conveyance is, no doubt, in the ordinary case, the result of a prior agi^eement, and the require- ment of the ''acceptance" of a conveyance, so fre- quently asserted in this country,"^** involves the idea that the conveyance, to be effective, must also be agreed to by the grantee after its execution. Nevertheless a con- veyance may well be made which is not the result of agreement, and which is valid in spite of the inability of the grantee to accept. Suppose a conveyance of the quasi dominant tenement is made by wav of gift to a child one year old. Why should the fact that the user of the quasi servient tenement is apparent or not apparent affect the question whether the conveyance Duffus, 141 Iowa, 466, 119 N W. N. J. Eq. 471; Michelet v. Cole, 983; Keokuk Electric Ry. & Power 20 N. Mex. 357, 149 Pac. 310. In Co. V. Weisman, 146 Iowa, 679. Duvall v. Ridout, 124 Md. 193, 126 N. W. 60; Hankins v. Hen- L. R. A. 1915C, 345, 92 Atl. 209. Hendricks, 247 111. 517, 93 N. E. it is said that there is no implied 428; Scott v. Moore, 98 Va. 66S. grant of a way, though well de- 71 Am. St. Rep. 749, 37 S. E. fined, unless it is enclosed or im- 342; Hammond v. Ryman, 120 Va. proved, or is actually necessary. 131, 90, S. E. 613. And Allers v. Beach, 130 Md. 499, 3. Stone v. Burkhead, 160 Ky. 100 Atl. 781, is adverse to the 47, 169 S. W. 489 (semble) ; Liquid "implied" grant of a right of w.ay Carbonic Co. v. Wallace, 219 Pa. in any case, if not a way of neces- 457, 68 Atl. 1021. sity. 3a. Fetters v. Humphreys, 19 3b. Post, § 463. § 363] Easements. 1281 creates an easement in favor of the infant? And the same difficulty suggests itself in connection with a devise of the quasi dominant tenement,'* in which case the devisee may be ordinarily supposed to be ignorant of the devise until after the testator's death. If the testator has habitually made use of one part of his land for the benefit of another, why should not a devise of this latter part be presumed to be intended to include the right of user to the same extent when the user is not apparent as wlien it is apparent? And even in the case of a conveyance of the quasi dominant tenement by way of sale, the fact that the user is not apparent might well be disregarded if the grantee knows other- wise of such user by the grantor.^ User must be continuous. In order that an easement may thus be created as corresponding to a pre existing quasi easement, the previous user must also, it is ordinarily stated, have been continuous." In some 4. Post, note 30. 5. The statement that the user must be apparent, like the state- ment that it must be continuous a;ppears to have originated in Gale and Whatley on Easements, published in 1839, these authors adopting the expressions "appar- ent" and "continuous" from the French Civil Code. See Lord Blackburn's remarks in L. R. o App. Cas. at p. 821. There were quite a number of cases prior to the date named, an 3 indeed sub- sequent thereto, in which the doc- trine of the grant of an easement as corresponding to a pre-exist- ing quasi easement was recog- nized, but in which there was no suggestion of any necessity that the prior user have been appar- ent or continuous. See cases re- ferred to, Gale, Easements (8th Ed.) 117 et seq. The requirement of the French Code in this re- spect appears to have been based upon certain of the customary laws, and upon the decisions of the courts, of old France. See the references in a suggestive note in 65 University of Penna. Law Rev. at p. 77. In Brissaud, French Private Law (Continental Legal History Series) p. 424, it is said that in the old law the doctrine of implied grant based on pre- vious usage, ordinarily referred to as "destination du pere de famine'' seems to have applied only to visible servitudes, but that there is not a very clear distinction made between their being visible and being continuous. 6. Worthington v. Gimson, 2 El. & El. 618; Wheeldon v. Bor- rows, 12 Ch. Div. 31; Walker v. 1282 Real Peoperty. [§ 36^ cases the view is taken that the user is continuous if no further act of man is necessary to its continuous exercise," while in other cases the question is said to be whether there is a permanent adaptation of the tw^o tenements to the exercise of the user.^ Givins: the former signification to the expression, it is difficult to see any propriety in the requirement of. continuousness. Giving the latter signification thereto, the requirement appears to be, not that the user be continuous, but that there be such an adaption of the two tenements for the purpose of such user as to indicate an intention that the user shall be permanent or approximately perma- nent, and there are cases in which this view is ex- pressed.^ Clifford, 128 Ala. 67, 86 Am. St. Rep. 74, 29 So. 588; Whiting v. Gaylord, 66 Conn. 337, 50 Am. St. Rep. 87, 34 Atl. 85; Powers v. Heffernan, 233 111. 597, 84 N. E. 661; Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094; Lampman Milks, 21 N. Y. 505; Longendyke V. Anderson, 101 N. Y. 625, 4 N. E. 625; Sanderlin v. Baxter, 76 Va. 299, 44 Am. Rep. 165. 7. Bonelli v. Blakemore, 66 Miss. 136, 14 Am. St. Rep. 550. 5 So. 228; Providence Tool Co. v, Corliss Steam Engine Co., 9 R. I. 564; Morgan v. Meuth, 60 Mich. 238, 27 N. W. 509. This is the meaning given to the expression by the French law. Code Napoleon Art. 688. See editorial note, 65 University Penna. Law Rev. 77. 8. Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N. J. Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182; Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88. 30 Atl. 1094; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E. 188; Paine v. Chandler. 134 N. Y. 385, 19 L. R. A. 99, 32 N. E. 18; Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 N. Y. 390, 45 N. E. 865. 9. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Patterson, 103 Ind 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E 188; Starrett v. Baudler, — Iowa. — , 165 N. W. 216; Carmon v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305, 87 S. E. 224; Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St. 463, 47 N. E. 653; German Sav- ings & Loan Society v. Gordon. 54 Ore. 147, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331., 102 Plac. 736; -Phillips v. Phillips. 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577; Scott v. Moore, 98 Va. 668, 81 Am. St. Rep. 749, 37 S. E. 342 (semble). In occasional New Jersey deci- sions continuous and apparent appear to be regarded as con- vertible terms. Fetters v. Humph- reys, 18 N. J. Eq. 260; Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 79 Atl. 433. And see as to the lack of distinction in this regard, in the old French law, oiite, this sec- tion note 5, ad fin. § 363] Easements. 1283 The maintenance of a drain or aqueduct has been regarded as involving a continuous user/'' while, on the other hand, the going on land to obtain water has been regarded as not continuous.^ ^ Whether the user of land for purposes of passage is continuous within the meaning of this asserted re- quirement is a matter on which there has been con- siderable difference of opinion, and while some cases seem to regard is as necessarily discontinuous, because not constantly exercised,^- other cases regard it as continuous if there is a clearly-defined road over the servient tenement, evidently intended for the use of the dominant tenement.'^ 10. Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094; Paine v. Chandler. 134 N. Y. 385. 19 L. R. A. 99. 32 X. E. 18; Sanderlin v. Baxter, 76 Va. 299; Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W. Va. 233, 34 L. R. A. (X. S.) 632, 71 S. E. 198; Dodd V. Burchell. 1 Hurlst. & Colt 113; Schwann v. Cotton (1916), 2 Ch. 120. 11. Polden V. Bastard. L. R. 1 Q. B. 156; O'Rorke v. Smith, 11 R. I. 259, 23 Am. Rep. 440. Con- tra. Eliason v. Grove, 85 Md. 215, 36 Atl. 844, in which case, how- ever, there was a continuous adaptation of the premises, in the shape of a gate near the v.ell. 12. Worthington v. Gimson, Z El. & El. 618; Brett v. Clowser, 5 C. P. Div. 376; Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301; Bentley v. Mills, 174 Mass. 469, 54 N. E. 885 (semble) : Morgan v. Meuth. 60 Mich. 238, 27 N. W. 509; Bonelli v. Blakemore, 66 Miss. 136, 14 Am. St. Rep. 550, 5 So. 228; Fetters v. Humphreys, 18 N. J. Eq. 260, 19 X. J. Eq. 471: Kelly v. Dunning, 43 X. J. Eq. 62, 10 Atl. 276; Parsons v. John- son. 68 X. Y. 62, 23 Am. Rep. 149; Carmon v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305, 87 S. E. 224; Providence Tool Co. v. Corliss Steam Engine Co., 9 R. I. 504: O'Rorke v. Smith, 11 R. I. 259; Standiford v. Goudy. 6 W. Va. 364. 13. Brown v. Alabaster, 37 Ch. Div. 490; Thomas v. Owen, 20 Q. B. Div. 225; Watts v. Kelson, 6 Ch. App. 166; Ellis v. Bassett, 128 Ind. 118, 25 Am. St. Rep. 421, 27 N. E. 344; Stone v. Burkhead, 160 Ky. 47, 169 S. W. 489; Elia- son V. Grove, 85 Md. 215, 36 Atl. 844; Gorton Pew Fisheries Co. V. Tolman, 210 Mass. 412, 97 N. E. 54; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577; Zell v. Universalist Society, 119 Pa. St. 390, 4 Am. St. Rep. 654, 13 Atl. 447; Com. v. Burford, 225 Pa. 93, 73 Atl. 1064; Hammond v. Ryman, 120 Va. 131, 90 S. E. 613; And see Martin v. Murphy, 221 111. 632, 77 N. E. 1126; Feitler v. Dobbins, 263 111. 78, 104 X. E 1284 Eeal Property. [§ 363 Occasionally it lias been said to be of primary im- portance that the user, or the mode of exercising the user, have been in its nature permanent or approxi- mately permanent/^ and certainly the mere fact that the grantor is, at the time of the conveyance, making a temporary use of the land retained for the benefit of of the land conveyed, without any permanent adaptation of the land to the exercise of the user, is not calculated to induce the belief that the parties intend that the grantee shall be entitled to continue or repeat such user. Suppose for instance the grantor is piling on the land retained hay taken from the land conveyed, such temporary user of the land retained for the bene- fit of the land conveyed is an insufficient basis on which to support a construction of the conveyance as including a right in subsequent years so to pile the hay from the land conveyed. It is in this sense only, as involving a requirement of permanency in the mode of user that, as above indicated, the requirement of con- tinuousness seems to be appropriate in this connection. User must be necessary. In this countr^^ the cases usually say that an easement is not thus created in favor of the transferee of land, as corresponding to a preexisting qiiasi easement, unless the easement, or the particular user involved therein, is "necessary," qualifying this expression, however, by other words indicating that this requirement of necessity means little if any more than highly desirable. ^^ Thus it has been said that the easement must be necessary to the 1088. Stephens v. Boyd, 157 Iowa, 570, It has been said that the re- 138 N. W. 389. And cases cited quirement of continuousness does (nite^ this subsection, note 9. not apply to the case of a way. 15. The English cases do not Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W. Va. ordinarily refer to such a require- 233, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 632, 71 S. ment, but occasionally they do E. 198. so. Wheeldon v. Burrows, 12 Ch. 14. See Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Div. 31; Suffield v. Brown, 9 Jur. Wallace, 219 Pa. 457, 68 Atl. 1021; (N. S.) 1001; Watts v. Kelson, § 363] Easements. 1285 proper enjoyment of the land,^*^ or to its reasonable/^ or convenient, ^^ or beneficial^*' enjoyment, or "reason- ably necessary" to its enjoyment or use,-° or to its convenient nse,^^ or "clearly necessary to its beneficial use. "22 6 Ch. App. 166; Ewart v. Coch- rane, 4 Macq. 117. 16. Evans v. Dana, 7 R. I. 306; Whiting V. Gaylord, 66 Conn. 337. 50 Am. St. Rep. 87, 34 Atl. 85. 17. Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 N. Y. 390, 45 N. E. 865; Cave v. Crafts, 53 Cal. 135; Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 29 L. R. A. 582, 32 Atl. 939; Eliason v. Grove, 85 Md. 215, 36 Atl. 844; Powers v. Heffernan, 233 111. 597, 84 N. E. 661. 18. Kane v. Templin, 158 Iowa, 24 138 N. W. 901; Hankins v. Hendricks, 247 111. 517, 93 N. E. 428 (highly convenient and beneficial) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577; McElroy v. McLeay, 71 Vt. 396. 19. Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 22 L. R. A. 536, 33 N. E. 700; Sandford v. Boss. 76 N. H. 476, 84 Atl. 936; Carmon v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305, 87 S. E. 224. 20. Gaynor v. Bauer, 144 Ala. 448, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1082, 39 So. 749; Wilson v. Riggs, 27 App. Cas. (D. C.) 550; Robinson v. Hillman, 36 App. Cas. (D. C.) 241; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582. 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E. 188; Teachout v. Duffus, 141 Iowa, 466, 119 N. W. 983; Irvine v. Mc- Creary, 108 Ky. 495, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 169, 49 L. R. A. 417, 56 S. W. 966; Dolliff v. Boston & M. R. Co., 68 Me. 173 (clearly neces- sary to beneficial enjoyment) ; Dinneen v. Corporation for Relief of Widows & Children of the Clergy of Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Mary- land, 114 Md. 589, 79 Atl. 1021; Johnson v. Knapp, 146 Mass. 70, 15 N. E. 134, 150 Mass. 267, 23 N. E. 40 ; Bussmeyer v. Jablonsky, 241 Mo. 681, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 549, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1104. 145 S. W. 772; Sanford v. Boss, 76 N. H. 476, 84 Atl. 936 (to beneficial enjoyment) ; Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 79 Atl. 433 (ditto) ; Fowler v. Wick, 74 N. J. Eq. 603, 70 Atl. 682; Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385, 19 L. R. A. 99, 32 N. E. 18; Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St. 463, 47 N. E. 653; Rightsell V. Hale, 90 Tenn. 556, 18 S. W. 245; Rollo v. Nelson, 34 Utah, 116, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315, 96 Fac. 263 (for use and convenient enjoyment) ; Goodal v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 671; San- derlin v. Baxter, 76 Va. 299, 44 Am. Rep. 165; Hammond v. Ry- man, 120 Va. 131, 90 S. E. 613 (reasonably essential to its use); Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W. Va. 645, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 929, 91 S. E. 536. 21. New Ipswich W. L. Fac- tory v. Batchelder, 3 N. H. 190; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E. 188 (reasonably necessary to fair enjoyment). 22. Stevens v. Orr, 69 Me. 323. 1286 Real Property. [§ It is impossible to deduce from the cases any general rule by which to determine the existence of this "neces- sity," so called, and such a rule is, perhaps, in the na- ture of things, impossible of formulation. That the necessity need not be absolute, in the sense that there can be no enjoyment whatsoever of the land without the exercise of the easement, is apparent from all the decisions.-^ In a few states it has been said that the question of necessity is determined by the consideration whether a substitute for the easement can be procured by ''reasonable" trouble and expense.^^ 23. See McPherson v. Acker, MacArthur & M. (D. C.) 150. 48 Am. Rep. 749; Cihak v. Klekr, 117 111. 643, 7 N. E. Ill; John Han- cock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pat- terson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. f50, 2 N. E. 188; Dolliff v. Boston & M. R. Co., 68 Me. 173; Gorton Pew Fisheries Co. v. Tolman, 210 Mass. 412, 97 N. E. 54; Bonelli \. Blakemore, 66 Miss. 136, 14 Am. Si. Rsp. 550, 5 So. 228; Kelly V. Duncomb, 43 N. J. Eq. 62, 10 Atl. 276; Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505; Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385, 19 L. R. A. 99, 32 N. E. 18; Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 N. Y. 390, 45 N. E. 865; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577; Providence Tool Co. v. Corliss Steam Engine Co., 9 R. I. 564; Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 671. It has been said, in two states, that the grant of an easement will be implied in cases of "strict necessity" only. Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276; Stillwell v. Foster, 80 Me. 333, 14 Atl. 731; Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287. And see Malsch V. Waggoner, 62 Wash. 470. 114 Pac. 446; Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 136 Pac. 1146, 135 Pac. 1031. But in view of other decisions in these states it is evident that it is not meant by this that the easement must be necessary for the purpose of any enjoyment whatsoever of the land. See cases previously cited in this note, and Stevens v. Orr, 69 Me. 233; Johnson v. Knapp, 146 Mass. 70, 15 N. E. 134; Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 22 L. R. A. 536, 33 N. E. 700. Occasionally it has been said to be sufficient that the easement be highly convenient and beneficial. See Adams v. Gordon, 265 111. 87, 106 N. E. 517. 24. Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276; Dolliff v. Boston & M. R. Co., 68 Me. 173; Johnson v. Jor- dan, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 234; Thayer V. Payne, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 327; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.) 364, 83 Am. Del. 688; Randall v. M'Laughlin, 10 Allen (Mass.) 366; Smith V. Blanpied, 62 N. H. 652; Scott V. Beutel, 23 Graft. (Va.) 1, § 363] Easements. 1287 The fact tbat the easement is necessary for the pur- pose of a full enjoyment of the land conveyed is no doubt a consideration tending to show that the grantee of the land expects to have such an easement, correspond- ing to the preexisting quasi easement, as appurtenant to the land conveyed, and that the grantor expects him to have it. In other words the great desirability of the easement is a consideration, of greater or less weight, in favor of the assumption that the conveyance of the land is intended to be, not of the land alone, but of the land with the easement appurtenant thereto. Conversely, the fact that the easement is not highly desirable for the enjoyment of the land conveyed is a consideration adverse to the view that the grantor intends the grantee to acquire, or that the grantee expects to acquire, such easement. The courts tend in terms to base this requirement of neces- sity, so called, upon the impolicy of imphdng a grant in excess of the express words of the conveyance, and the desirability of making such implication only in case of necessity, but the meaning of this appears to be merely that the language of the conveyance is not to be extended by construction so as to include an case- ment not expressly referred to, and not before existing, unless this easement is so desirable for the full enjoy- ment of the land conveyed that a conveyance of the land without the easement is unlikely to have been within the contemplation of the parties. Actuality of user. Tlie mere fact that the land retained is capable of user in a particular way for the benefit of the land conveyed is obviously in itself no reason for regarding an easement of that character as passing by the conveyancCj^** and tlie fact that such 25. See the excellent opinion of 26. Haverhill Sav. Bank v. Dodge, J., in Miller v. Hoeschler. Griffen, 184 Mass. 419, 68 N. E. 126 Wis. 263, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 839; Latta v. Catawba Elec. Co., £27, 10.5 N. W. 790. 146 N. C. 285, 59 S. E. 1028; 1288 Eeal Property. r§ 363 user has taken place in the past, during the common own- ership of the two properties, is immaterial if it was abandoned before the conveyance was made.^" That there has been a temporary cessation of the user at that time is not however, it seems, conclusive against the construction of the conveyance as passing the land with the easement as appurtenant thereto.^^ Character of conveyance. An easement has been regarded as thus passing because corresponding to a preexisting quasi easement, not only when the grantor retains the land which is sought to be subjected to the easement, but also when he disposes of this latter land by a contemporaneous conveyance.^** And it has been regarded as so passing upon a devise of land as well as of a conveyance,^^ and upon a lease as well as upon a conveyance in fee simple. ^^ Likewise a mortgage « Brown v. Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 75 Atl. 382; Belser v. Moore, 73 Ark. 296, 84 S. W. 219. 27. Gorton Pew Fisheries Co. V. Tolman, 210 Mass. 412, 97 N. E. 54; Bauer & Co. v. Chamber- lain, 159 Iowa, 12, 138 N. W. 903; Van Rossum v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co., 129 Mich. 530, 89 N. W. 370; McHart v. McMiiUin. 30 Can. Sup. Ct. 245. 28. Elliott V. Rhett, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 405, 57 Am. Dec. 750; Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557. 29. Allen v. Taylor, 16 Ch. D. 355; Phillips v. Low (1892), 1 Ch. 47; Henry v. Koch, 80 Ky. 391, 44 Am. Rep. 484; Stephens v. Boyd, 157 Iowa, 570, 138 N. W. S89; Larsen v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094; Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St. 463, 47 N. E. 653; Cannon v. Boyd, 73 Pa. St. 179. Compare Whyte v. Build- ers' League of New York, 164 N. Y. 429, 58 N. E. 517. As in the case of conveyances made by sev- eral cotenants for purposes of partition. O'Daniel v. Baxter, 112 Ky. 334, 65 S. W. 805; Robinson V. Hillman, 36 App. Cas. (D. C.) 241; Johnson v. Gould, 60 W. Va. 84, 53 S. E. 798; Clark v. De- baugh, 67 Md. 430, 10 Atl. 241. 30. Jones v. Sanders, 138 Cal. 405; Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 158 Pac. 1025; Stephens v. Boyd, 157 Iowa, 570, 138 N. W. 389; Gorton Pew Fisheries Co. V. Tolman, 210 Mass. 402, 38 L R. A. (N. S.) 882, 97 N. E. 54; iViuse V. Gish, 114 Va. 90, 75 S. K. 764; Pearson v. Spencer, 3 B. & S. 761; Phillips v. Low, L. R (1892) 1 Ch. 47; Schwann v. Cotton (1916) 2 Ch. 120. 31. See Snow v. Pulitzer 142 ^ 363] Easements. 1289 of the quasi dominant tenement may have a similar op- eration in this regard, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale thereof thus acquiring an easement corresponding to the quasi easement existing at the time of the mort- gage.^- And the same doctrine has been applied in favor of one acquiring title to the quasi dominant tenement by a judicial sale,^^ or a sale under execution,^^ and a conveyance in accordance therewith, and also in favor of one acquiring title from commissioners or other officials appointed to make partition.^^ Ownership of servient tenement. Since a per- son cannot create an easement in another's land, a N. Y. 263, 36 N. E. 1059; Thropp V. Field, 26 N. J. Eq. (11 C. E. Green) 82; Miller v. Fitzgerald Dry Goods Co., 62 Neb. 270, Si5 N. W. 1078; Comm. v. Burford, 225 Pa. 52, 73 Atl. 1064; and other citations in. 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. § 128. 32. Pendola v. Ramm, 138 Cal. 517, 71 Pac. 624; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E. 188; Carrig v. Mechanics Bank, 136 Iowa, 261, 111 N. W. 329; Havens v. Klein, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 82; Pennsylvania R. Co. V. Jones, 50 Pa. St. 417. In Harlow v. Wlhitcher, 136 Mass. 553, it was held that the fact that the mortgagee of land released a part thereof from tae mortgage did not impose an eas:- ment on the other part, as against the mortgagee, corre- sponding to a user then made by the mortgagor of the other part for the benefit of the part re- leased. In Cannon v. Boyd, 73 Pa. St. 179, it was held, ai)parently, that an easement passed to a pur- chaser at a sale under the mort- gage although the quasi ease- ment did not exist until after the making of the mortgage. 33. Zell V. Universalist Society, 119 Pa. St. 390, 4 Am. St. Rep. 654, 13 Atl. 447; Manbeck v. Jones, 190 Pa. St. 171, 42 Atl. 536. 34. Kieffer v. Imh.off, 26 Pa. St. 438; Building Association v. Getty, 11 Phila. 305. 35. Kilgour v. Ascham, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 82; Muir v. Cox, 110 Ky. 560, 62 S. W. 73; Ellis v. Bassett, 128 Ind. 118, 25 Am. St. Rep. 421, 27 N. E. 344; Brakely V. Sharp, 9 N. J. Eq. 9, 10 Id. 206; Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 671; Burwell v. Hobson, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 322, 65 Am. Dec. 247; Powell v. Riley, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 153; Gentry v. Piercy, 175 Ky. 174, 193 S. W. 1017. It has been applied in con- nection with the assignment of dower. Morrison v. King, 62 II!. 30. Compare Smilh v. Smith, 62 N. li. 652. 1290 Real Property. [§ 363 conveyance of land for the benefit of which other land, not belonging to the grantor, is used without right or merely under a license, does not have the effect of vesting in the grantee an easement corresponding to such prior use/^*' There are however decisions to the eff'ect that if, in such case, the grantor subsequently ac- quires the other land, such an easement will then arise in favor of the grantee on the principle of estoppel. ^^ The difficulty with this view would seem to be that there is nothing on which to base an estoppel. The original conveyance did not in terms purport to create an easement in favor of the grantee, and the user of another's land at the time does not, it seems, as does the user of his ovni land, seem a sufficient reason for construing it, as against the grantor, as an attempted conveyance of the land with an easement appurtenant thereto in such other's land."*^ Since one who has an undivided interest in particu- lar land cannot burden such land with an easement,^^ tliere can be no implication of a grant as corresponding to a preexisting qtiasi easement if there is an out- standing undivided interest in the property silbjected to the user.^*^ 36. Trump v. McDonnell. 120 Latta v. Catawba Elec. Co., 146 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353; Green v. N. C. 285, 59 S. E. 1028; .rarnigan Collins, 86 N. Y. 246. v. Mairs, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 473. It has been decided that the 38. See Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 fact that the owner of the land N. Y. 390, 45 N. E. 865. so used for the benefit of another's 39. Ante, § 361, note 35. land joins in a conveyance of the 40. Farley v. Howard, 60 X. latter, being the husband of the Y. App. Div. 173, 70 N. Y. Supp. owner thereof, does not impose an 51, 172 X. Y. 628, 65 N. E. IIIC; easement on his land. Farley v. Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139, Howard, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 193, 55 Am. St. Rep. 653, 44 N. E. 172 N. Y. Supp. 28. 966. But See McElroy v. Mc- 37. Swedish-American Nat. Leay, 71 Vt. 396, 45 Atl. 898, to Bank of Minneapolis v. Connec- the effect that in such case the ticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 83 Minn. grantee would have a right to 377, 86 N. W. 420; McElroy v. call for partition. McLeay, 71 Vt. 396, 45 Atl. 898; § 363] Easements. 1291 Conveyance with ** appurtenances." The de- cisions are ordinarily to the effect that the fact that a conveyance of the quasi dominant tenement is ex- pressed to be "with the appurtenances" or with certain rights '^appertaining and belonging" or that similar general terms are nsed, does not in itself operate to create an easement in the grantee equivalent to the pre-existing quasi easement.^ ^ According to the English cases, however, a conveyance of land with the easements or rights "used and enjoyed therewith" will create in favor of the grantee an easement cor- responding to a quasi easement previously existing in favor of the land conveved.^- 41. Worthington v. Gimson, 2 Ell. & El. 618; Baring v. Abing- don (1892), 2 Ch. 374, 389; May V Smith, 3 Mackey (D. C.) 55; Kentucky Distilleries & Ware- house Co. V. Warwick Co., 166 Ky. 651, 179 S. W. 611; Stevens V. Orr, 69 Me. 323; Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301; Duvall v. Ridout, 124 Md. 193, L. R. A. 1915C, 345, 92 Atl. 209; Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. 443, 9 Am. Dec. 161; Mor~ gt.n V. Meuth, 60 Mich. 238, 27 N. W. 509; Bonelli v. Blakemore, 66 Miss. 136, 14 Am. St. Rep. 550, 5 So. 228; Spaulding v. Abbott, 55 N. H. 423; Stuyvesant v. Wood- ruff, 21 N. J. L. 133; Georke v. Wadsworth, 73 N. J. Eq. 448, 68 Atl. 71; Michelet v. Cole, 20 N. Mex. 357, 149 Pac. 310; Parsonr, V. Johnson, 68 N. Y. 62, 23 Am. Rep. 149; Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah, 243, 161 Pac. 1127; Swazey V. Brooks, 34 Vt. 451; Standiford v. Goudy, 6 W. Va. 364. Occasionally, however, the use of the word "appurtenances" has been regarded as effective for this purpose. Thomas v. Owen, 20 Q. B. Div. 225; Wood v. Gray- son, 22 App. Cas. (D. C.) 432; Ihoma.s v. Wiggers, 41 111. 470; Doyle V. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 659; Elliott v. Bailee, 14 Ohio St. 10; Miller v. Lapham, 44 Vt. 416 (with privileges) ; Tayter v. North, 30 Utah, 156, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 410, 83 Pac. 762. See Atkins v. Boardman, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 457, 37 Am. Dec. 100. 42. Kay v. Oxley, L. R. 10 Q. B. 360; Watts v. Kelson, 6 Ch. App. 166; Barkshire v. Grubb, 18 Ch. Div. 616, Bayley v. Great Western Ry. Co., 26 Ch. Div. 434. So, where the owner of two ad- joining tracts has used one (the fjudsi servient tenement) for the purpose of passing to the other (the quasi dominant tenement), while ,a conveyance of the lat- ter tenement "with appurte- nances" will not pass a right of way, the conveyance, if with the rights and easements "used and enjoyed therewith," will have that effect. Formerly it was held 1292 Eeal Pkoeerty. [§ 363 Implied reservation. In some of the English cases, and likewise in some decisions in this country, it was held that, upon the transfer of the quasi servient tenement by the owner, there was an implied reservation of an easement corresponding to the quasi easement l)efore existing, that is, the same doctrine was applied in favor of the grantor of the land as in favor of the grantee.^^ The later English cases, however, are to the ^effect that there no such reservation of an easement as corresponding to a preexisting quasi easement is to be implied, this view being based mainly on the theory that the assertion of such an easement by the grantor is in derogation of his own grant.^^ There are likewise in several states decisions or dicta somewhat adverse to the recognition of any such easement in favor of the grantor as corresponding to a preexisting that this principle applied only in case the quasi easement had, at a former time, when the gw^tsi dorhinant and servient tenements belonged to different persons, ex- isted as an actual easement. Thomson v. Waterlow, L. R. 6 Eq. 36; Langley v. Hammond, L. R. 3 Exch. 168. This distinction is, however, no longer recog- nized. 43. Pyer v. Carter, 1 Hurl. & N. 916; Thomas v. Owen, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 225; Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 158 Pac. 1025; Cihak v. Klekr, 117 111. 643, 7 N. E. Ill; I'owers V. Heffernan, 233 111. 597, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523, 122 Am. St. Rep. 199, 84 N. E. 661; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 53 Am. Rep. 550, 2 N. E. 188; Lebus v. Boston, 21 Ky. Rep. 411, 47 L. R. A. 79, 51 S. W. 609; Irvine v. Mc- Creary, 108 Ky. 495, 49 L. R. A. 417, 56 S. W. 966; Znamaneck v. Jelinek, 69 Neb. 110, 11 Am. St. Rep. 533, 95 N. W. 28; Dunklee V. Wilton R. Co., 24 N. H. 489; Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 79 Atl. 433; Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N. J. Eq. 270, 33 Atl. 794; Carmon v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305, 87 S. E. 224; Seibert v. Levan, 8 Pa. St. 383, 49 Am. Dec. 525; Geible v. Smith, 146 Pa. St. 276, 28 Am. St. Rep. 796, 23 Atl. 437; Grace M. E. Church v. Dob- bins, 153 Pa. St. 294, 34 Am. St. Rep. 706, 25 Atl. 1120; Rightsell V. Hale, 90 Tenn. 556, 18 S. W. 245; Harwood v. Benton, 32 Vt. 724; Bennett v. Booth, 70 W. Va. 264, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 618, 73 S. E. 909. 44. White v. Bass, 7 Hurl. & N. 722; Suffield v. Brown, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 185; Wheeldon v. Burrows, 12 Ch. Div. 31; Ray v. Hazeldene (1904), 2 Ch. 17. •^ 363] Easements. 1293 quasi easement, it being sometimes stated that an ease- ment will be implied in favor of the grantor only when it is strictly necessary^^ or strictly necessaiy for the en- joyment of the land retained/^ that is, when it can be implied as an easement of necessity. In some the fact that the conveyance contains a warranty or covenant against encumbrances is referred to as one considera- tion adverse to recogiiition of such an easement in favor of the grantor, a view which appears to he open to considerable question, the purpose of a covenant in a conveyance not being to determine the construction of the instrument as regards the rights conveyed.'*^ The distinction asserted in the later English cases between the implication of a grant, and of a reservation, 45. €herry v. Brizzolara, 89 Ark. 309, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, 116 S. W. 668; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276; Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.) 364, S3 Am. Dec. 688; Bass v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287; O'Brien v. Murphy, 189 Mass. 353, 75 N. E. 700; Brown V. Fuller, 165 Mich. 162, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 853, 130 N. W. 621; Dabney v. Child, 95 Miss. 585, 48 So. 897; Meredith v. Frank, 56 Ohio St. 479, 47 N. E. 656; Sellers v. Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 81 Tex. 458, 13 L. R. A. 657, 17 S. W. 32; Scott V. Eeutel, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 1; (so that substitute cannot be pro- cured at reasonable expense); Shaver v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 502, 37 S. E. 664. To this effect is Attrill V. Piatt, 10 Can. Sup. Ct. 425. In Crosland v. Rogers, 32 S. C. 130, 10 S. E. 874, it is said that the necessity must be im- perious. 46. Walker v. Clifford, 128 Ala. 2 R. l>.—1 67, 86 Am. St. Rep. 74, 29 So. 588; Wells v. Garbutt, 132 N. Y. -1-30, 30 X. E. 978. In Starrett v. Baudler, — ■ Iowa, — , 165 N. W. 216 it is said that there must be no other reasonable mode of en- joying the dominant tenement without the easement. 47. Cherry v. Brizzolara, 89 Ark. 309, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, 116 S. W. 668; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.) 364, 83 Am. Dee. 088; McSweeney v. Comm. 185 Mass. 371, 70 N. E. 429; Brown V. Fuller, 165 Mich. 162, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459, Ann. Cas. 1912C. 853. 130 N. W. 621; Dabney v. Child, 95 Miss. 585, 48 So. 897; Denman v. Mentz, 63 N. J. Eq. 613, 52 Atl. 1117; Howley v. Chaf- fee, 88 Vt. 468, 93 Atl. 120. Th;it the presence of such a oovenant in the conveyance is immaterial, see Bennett v. Booth, 70 W. Va. 264, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 618. 73 S. E. 909; Harwood v. Benton, 32 Vt. 724. 1294 Eeal, Property. [§ 363 of an easement corresponding to a preexisting quasi easement, has been decided not to apply in connection with what have been termed ''reciprocal" easements, the only instance of which, given in the cases, is that of the support of buildings, the rule in regard to them l)eing that, when buildings are erected together by the same owner in such a way as obviously to require mutual support, and he thereafter conveys one of them, the grantee is regarded as impliedly giving the grantor a right of support for the house retained by him in consideration of the right of support impliedly granted for the house sold.^^ Likewise, in this country, it appears to be considered that, if one builds houses separated by a partition wall, and the houses are after- wards conveyed to different persons, with the division line running longitudinally through the wall, each house is ordinarily entitled to an easement of support in the part of the wall on the other's land, irrespective of whether it was conveyed by the builder before or after the conveyance of the other, that is, upon the severance of ownership the partition wall becomes a party wall.^^ It may be questioned, however, whether the easement of support in favor of the grantor in such cases might not rather be regarded as an easement of necessity. In order that an easement maj^ thus be recognized in favor of the grantor, by way of implied reservation, as corresponding to a preexisting quasi easement, the 48. Richards v. Rose, 9 Exch. App. Cas. (D. C.) 427; Ingalls 218; Suffield v. Brown, 4 De G2X. v. Plamondon, 75 111. 118; Everett J. & S. 185; Wheeldon v. Bur- v. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588. 5 L. rows, 12 Ch. Div. 31. See Steven- R. A. 110, 14 Am. St. Rep. 462. son V. Wallace, 27 Grat. (Va.) 77; 22 N. E. 52; Carlton v. Blake, 152 Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1, Alass. 176, 23 Am. St. Rep. 818, 56 Am. Rep. 581; Adams v. Mar- 25 N. E. 83; Partridge v. Gilbert, shall, 138 Mass. 228. Compare 15 N. Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632; Clemens v. Speed, 93 Ky. 284, Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 50 X. Y 19 L. R. A. 240, 19 S. W. 660. 646; Heartt v. Kruger, 121 N. Y. 49. Bartley v. Spaulding n 386, 9 L. R. A. 135, 18 Am. St. § 363] Easements. 1295 user of the land conveyed for the benefit of that retained must, it is said, be apparent.^" And presumably any other requirement that may in the particular juris- diction be regarded as essential to the implication of an easement in favor of the grantee of land, such as continuousness and necessity, will be regarded as es- sential to such an implication in favor of the grantor. (c) Of easement of necessity. An easement of necessity, so called, is an easement which arises upon a conveyance of land, in favor of either the grantor or grantee of the land, by reason of a construction placed upon the language of the convey- ance in accordance with what appears to be the neces- sity of the case, in order that the land conveyed, or sometimes, the land retained, may be properly avail- able for use. The purpose for which a conveyance of land is made may call for a construction of the conveyance as vesting in the grantee an easement as appurtenant to the land, such an easement being necessary in order that the land may be used as intended. Thus one who conveys land to be used for a factory has been regarded as granting such an easement, as regards tlie pollution of air or water, as is evidently necessary to enable the land to be used for that business,^ ^ and if he conveys it Rep. 829, 24 N. E. 841; Schaefer 96 Wash. 529, 165 Pac. 385. V. Blumenthal, 169 N. Y. 221, 62 50. Biddison v. Aaron, 102 Md. N. E. 175. 156, 62 Atl. 523; Jobling v. Tut- But see Cherry v. Brizzolara, 89 tie, 75 Kan. 351, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) Ark. 309, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, 960, 89 Pac. 699; Scott v. Beutel, 116 S. W. 668, to the effect that 23 Gratt. (Va.) 1; Sellers v. Tex- this is so only if another wall as Cent. Ry. Co., 81 Tex. 458, 13 cannot be built at a reasonable L. R. A. 657, 17 S. W. 32. As to expense. And as perhaps oppos- this requirement, see ante, this ed to the implication of an ease- subsection, notes 1-5. ment of support in such case see 51. Gale, Easements (8th Ed.) Clemens v. Speed, 93 Ky. 284, 19 113, note f; Goddard, Easements, L. R. A. 240, 19 S. W. 660; Wil- (6th Ed.) 205; Hall v. Lund, 1 liamson Inv. Co. v. Williamson, Hurl. & C. 676; Huntington & K. 1296 IIkai. Property. [§ 363 for tlie purpose of erecting a building, he may well be regarded as granting such rights of support as are necessary for the building.^^ So, if one conveys land for railroad purposes, the conveyance involves in effect a grant of the right to construct and operate the rail- road in a proper manner, even in derogation of the grantor's natural rights as regards land retained by him,^^ and such an easement is like\\ise vested in the railroad when the land is taken under condemnation proceedings,^^ If one conveys 'minerals beneath his land, the grantee may be entitled, on the same theory of necessity, to the privilege of building air shafts and water storage facilities, of erecting machinery in or on the grantor's land, and of dumping waste thereon. ^^^ And in some states, while an easement of light is not recognized merely because of a 'preexisting quasi ease- ment of light, such an easement will, it seems, be recognized, when the access of light to the land granted over the land retained can be regarded as actually necessary.^^^ Likewise when buildings on adjoining Land Devel. Co. v. Phoenix Pow- Ry., 10 H. L. Cas. 333; Manning der Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 711, 21 S. v. New Jersey Short Line R. Co., E. 1037. 80 N. J. L. 349, 32 L. R. A. (N. And if he sells and conveys S.) 155, 78 Atl. 200. land adjoining his pond for an 54a. Williams v. Gibson, 84 ice business he in effect grants a Ala. 228, 5 Am. St. Rep. 368, 4 privilege to demand that the pond So. 350; Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo. be not drained. See 'Marshall 600, 117 S. W. 1163; Gordon v. Ice Co. V. LaPlant, 136 Iowa, 621, Million, 248 Mo. 155, 154 S. W. 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073, 111 N. 99; Marvin v. Brewster Co., 55 W. 1016. X. Y. 538; Fowler v. Delaplain, 52. Caledonian Ry. Co. v. 79 Ohio St. 279, 21 L. R. A. (N. Spr,ot, 2 Macq. H. L. Cas. 453; S.) 100, 87 N. E. 260; Turner v. Rigby V. Bennett, 21 Ch. Div. 559; Reynolds, 23 Pa. St. 199; Potter Siddons v. Short, 2 C. P. Div. 572; v. Rend, 201 Pa. 318, 50 AtL 821; Freeholders of Hudson County v. Dewey v. Great Lakes Coal Co., Woodcliff Land Co., 74 N. J. L. 236 Pa. 498, 84 Atl. 913; Arm- 355, 65 Atl. 844. strong v. :Maryland Coal Co., 67 53. See Lewis, Eminent Do- W. Va. 589, 69 S. E. 195; Dand main, § 474. v. Kingscote, 6 Mees. & W. 174. 54. Elliot V Northeastern 54b. Ante, § 363(a), note 97. § 363 J Easemknts. 1297 lots belonging to a single person are dependent on one another for support, and lie conveys one of the lots, retaining the other, it may be considered that an ease- ment of support *'By necessity" exists in each lot and building in favor of the other ;^^° and even when there is a building upon but one of the lots, it would seem reasonable to recognize an easement of support, by way of necessity, for the land of such lot with the added weight of the building.^^^ Ways of necessity. By far the most usual instance of an easement of necessity is a way of neces- sity. Such an easement ordinarily arises when one conveys to another land entirely surrounded by his, the grantor's, land,^^ or which is accessible only across either the grantor's land or the land of a stranger.^^ In such a case, unless the conveyance is regarded as giving, as appurtenant to the land conveyed, a right of way over the land retained by the grantor, the grantee can make but a limited use, if any, of the land 54c. Ante, § 363b, notes, 48, 56. Gilfoy v. RandaU, 274 lU. 49. 128, 113 N. E. 88; Thomas v. Mc- 54d. See Sterrett v. Baudler, Coy, 48 Ind. App. 403, 96 N. E. — Iowa, — , 165 N. W. 216. 14; Fairchild v. Stewart, 117 55. Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Iowa, 734, 89 N. W. 1075; Adams Saund. 323, note 6; Pinnington v. v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361, 84 Atl. Galland, 9 Exch. 1; Tayloi* v. 530; Zimmerman v. Cockey, 118 V/arnaky, 55 Cal. 350; Collins v. Md. 491, 84 Atl. 743; Pleas v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 38 Am. Dec. Thomas, 75 Miss. 495, 22 So. 820* 61; Mead v. Anderson, 40 Kan. Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic 203, 19 Pac. 708; Leonard v. Leon- City Elec. Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 434, ard, 2 Allen (Mass.), 543; Powers 79 Atl. 326; Palmer v. Palmer, V. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 51 Am. 150 N. Y. 139, 55 Am. Rep. 653, Rep. 154, 19 N. W. 257; Board of 4t N. E. 966; Wooldridge v. Cough- Sup'rs of Lamar County v. Elliott. lin, 46 W. Va. 345, 33 S. E. 233; 107 Miss. 841, 6G So. 203; Kim- Proudfoot v. Saffle, 62 W. Va. 51, ball V. Cochecho R. Co., 27 N. 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 482, 57 S. E. H. 448, 59 Am. Dec. 387; Holmes 256. V. Seely, 19 Wend. (.N. Y.) 507; "The deed of the grantor as Bond V. Willis, 84 Va. 7{)»5, 6 S. much creates the way of necessity E. 136. as it does the way by grant. The 1298 Eeaxi Peoperty. [§ 363 conveyed to liim, and the courts, in pursuance of con- siderations of public policy favorable to the full utiliza- tion of the land, and in accordance with the presumable intention of the parties that the land shall not be with- out any means of access thereto, have established this rule of construction that, in the absence of indications of a contrary intention, the conveyance of the land shall in such case be regarded as vesting in the grantee a right of way across the grantor's land.-^^ Xot only may a way of necessity arise in favor of the grantee of land, but it may also arise in favor of the grantor, when one conveys land which is so situated as to render land retained by him inaccessible except over the land conveyed or the land of a stranger.^* only difference between the two is, that one is granted in express words and the other only by im- plication." Nichols V. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302, per Morton, J. 57. "Although it is called a way of necessity, yet in strict- ness, the necessity does not create the way, but merely fur- nishes evidence as to the real intention of the parties. For the law will not presume, that it was the intention of the parties, that one should convey land to the other, in such manner that the grantee could derive no bene- fit from the conveyance; nor that he should so convey a portion as to deprive himself of the enjoy- ment of the remainler. The law, under such circumstances, will give effect to the grant according to the presumed intent of the parties." Waite J., in Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 38 Am. Dec. 61. 58. Clark v. Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170; Pinnington v. Galland, 9 Exch. 1; Corporation of London V. Riggs, 13 Ch. Div. 789; Collins V. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 38 Am. Dec. 61; Stamper v. McXabb, 172 Ky. 253, 189 S. W. 216; White- house V. Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 23 Am. St. Rep. 756, 21 Atl. 743; Jay V. Michael, 92 Md. 198, 48 Atl. 61; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Board of Railroad Com'rs, 162 Mass. 81, 38 N. E. 27; Pleas v. Thomas, 75 Miss. 495, 22 So. 820; Herrin v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 Pac. 323; Pingree v. McDuffie, 56 N. H. 306; Shoemaker v. Shoe- maker, 11 Abb N. Cas. (N. Y.) 80; Meredith v. Frank, 56 Ohio St. 479, 47 N. E. 656; Willey v. Thwing, 68 Vt. 128, 34 Atl. 428; Koffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W. Va. 233, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 632, 71 S. E. 198. § 363] Easements. 1299 In such a case the conveyance is construed as passing, not land free from any easement, but land subject to an easement of a right of way in favor of the land re- tained. Such an implied reservation of an easement to a certain extent involves a violation of tlie rule which precludes one from derogating from his own grant, but it is recognized and upheld by the courts from the con- siderations of public policy above mentioned/"^^ The fact that the conveyance contains a warranty or other covenant of title has been regarded as insufficient to exclude such an implication,*'" though it might no doubt be excluded by language in the conveyance or, it seems, by evidence of surrounding circumstances, calling for a different construction.*''^'^ Since a reservation as w^ell as a grant of a right of way may thus be implied on the ground of necessity, it is iimnaterial, for the purpose of establishing a way on this ground, whether the asserted dominant tene- ment was disposed of by the common owner before or after the asserted servient tenement. In case the owner of land conveys to another timber growing thereon, the conveyance is to a great extent nugatory unless the grantee has the privilege of going on the land in order to cut the timber, and con- sequently the instrument would ordinarily be con- strued as granting such privilege or, in other words, he has a w^ay of necessity.*'^ And so a convej'^ance of minerals in the soil is ordinarily regarded as giving the privilege of passing over the grantor's land in 59. See Packer v. Welsted, 2 York etc. R. C. v. Board of Rail- Sid. 39, 111; Button v. Tayler, 2 road Com'rs, 162 Mass. 81, 38 N. Lutw. 1487; Pinnington v. Gal- E. 27; Jay v. Michael, 92 Md. land, 9 Exch. 1. 198, 48 Atl. 61. 60. Meredith v. Frank, 56 Ohio 60a. Post, this section, notes St. 479, 47 N. E. 656; McEwan 70-75. V. Baker, 98 111. App. 271; Powers 61. Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. V. Heffernan, 233 111. 597, 84 N. McKinley, 83 Minn. 419, 86 N. VV. E. 661; Brig-ham v. Smith, 4 Gray 414; Worthen v. Garno, 182 Mas.s. (Mass.) 297, 64 Am. Dec. 76; New 243, 65 N. E. 243. 1300 Eeal Property. [§ 363 order to extract the minerals, and of constructing roads, tram and railway tracks to such an extent as may be necessary for this purpose,*^- and such a conveyance, moreover, in order that it may be effective, ordinarily involves of necessity the privilege of sinking shafts through the surface of the land for the purpose of ex- tracting the minerals.^2^ What is in effect a way of necessity may also exist in connection with the grant of an easement, in so far as this involves the necessity of passing over the grantor's land in order to exercise the easement.^^ A way of necessity does not, as is sometimes sup- posed, exist merely by reason of the fact that otherwise one has no access to his land.'^^ As above stated, it 62. Dand v. Kingscote, 6 M. & W. 174; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Savitz, 57 111. App. 659; Marvin V. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 X. Y. 538, 14 Am. Rep. 322. Baker V. Pittsburg C. & W. R. Co., 219 Pa. 398, 68 Atl. 1014; Pearne v. Coal Creek M. & M. Co., 90 Tenn. 619, 18 S. W. 402; Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 65 W. Va. 636, 64 S. E. 853; 1 Barringer & Adams, Mines & Mining, 576, 2 Id. 598. 62a. Cardigan v. Armitage, 2 Barn. & C. 197; Hooper v. Dora Coal Min. Co., 95 Ala. 235, 10 So. 652; Ewing v. Sandoval C. & M. Co., 110 111. 290; Ingle v. Bot- toms, 160 Ind. 73, 66 N. E. 160; Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N. Y. 538; Baker v. Pitts- burg C. & W. R. Co., 219 Pa. 398, 68 Atl. 1014; 3 Lindley, Mines, § 813. In Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286, 18 L. R. A. 702, 34 Am. St. Rep. 645, 25 Atl. 597, the owner of land having conveyed to another the strata of coal beneath the surface and subsequently discovering the pres- ence of oil beneath the coal, as- serted the right to bore wells through the coal, and his claim was sustained. It was recognized however that it could not well be sustained on the theory of a way by necessity, without a con- siderable modification of that doc- trine, and the view was asserted that the right of access in such case should be sustained as a natural right. See editorial note 17 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 47. And on the authority of this case it was held that there was a natural right to sink an artesian well through the strata of coal. Penn- sylvania Cent. Brew. Co. v. Le- high Valley Coal Co.. 250 Pa. 300, 95 Atl. 47. 63. Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 in, 11, 56 Am. Rep. 758, 4 N. E. 356; R. J. Gunning v. Cusack, 50 111. App. 290. 64. Bullard v. Harrison, 4 Maule & S. 387; Banks v. School <^ 363] Easements. 1301 arises in connection with a conveyance of land by one who retains adjoining land, and consequently it is necessary, in order to establish such a way, to show that at some time in the past the land for the benefit of which the way is claimed and that in which it is claimed belonged to the same person.''^ Provided this unity of o\^Tlership is shown to have existed, its remote- ness either in point of time or by reason of intervening conveyances appears to be immaterial.*^'^ Whether the previous ownership by the state or federal government of both pieces of land, with a sub- sequent grant or sale by it of one or both of them, is sufficient to justify a finding of a way of necessity, appears to b-e open to question. In one case^^ it was Directors of Dist. No. 1 of Mc- Lean County, 194 III. 247, 62 N. E. 604; Whitehouse v. Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 23 Am. St. Rep. 756, 21 Atl. 743; Brice v. Randall, 7 Gill & J. (Md.)« 349; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302; Roper Lumber Co. V. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N. Car. 161, 73 S. E. 902; Ellis V. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, 6!) N. H. 385, 42 L. R. A. 570. 41 Atl. 856; Carmon v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305, 87 S. E. 224; McKinnev V. Duncan, 121 Tenn. 265, 118 S. W. 683; Tracy v. Atherton. 35 Vt. 52, 82 Am. Dec. 621; Schu- lenbarger v. Johnstone, 46 Wash. 202, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941, 116 Pac. 843. 65. Thrump v. :M€Donnell, 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353; Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331; Ellis v. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, 69 N. H. 385, 42 L. R. A. 570, 41 Atl. 856; Dudley v. Meggs, 54 Okla. 65, 153 Pac. 1122; McBurney v. Glenmary Coal & Coke Co., 121 Tenn. 275, 118 S. W. 694 (semble) ; Tracy v. Atherton, 35 Vt. 52, 82 Am. Dec. 621; Crotty v. New River etc. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233. 66. See Taylor v. Warnaky, 55 Cal. 350; Logan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 8 L. R. A. 58, 24 N. E. 135; Conley v. Fairchild 142 Ky. 271, 134 S. W. 142; Feoffees of Grammar School in Ipswich v. Jeffrey's Neck Pasture, 174 Mass. 572, 55 N. E. 462; Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E 233. 67. Herrin v. Siebern, 46 Mont. 226, 127 Pac. 323, vi^here it was held that on a grant by the United States of odd numbered sections of land, there was implied res- ervation of a way of necessity in favor of the United States for the benefit of private persons de- siring to settle on the land re- tair,?d, or to go thereon for propei'- purposes, as to search for min- erals or graze cattle. 1302 Eeal Property. [§ 363 held that a right of way of necessity was to he regarded as reserved upon a grant hy the federal government, hut there are two cases to the effect that the doctrine of ways of necessity has no application in connection with such a grant.^^ And it has also been decided that such a right does not exist in favor of a grantee of the state over land retained by the state.*^^ It is not entirely clear why a conveyance by the government should be subject to a different rule in this respect from a conveyance by a private individual. The same intention may well be imputed to it as to an individual, not itself to hold or to vest in another land which cannot be utilized for lack of a means of approach, and the same considerations of public policy in favor of the utilization of the land apply in both cases. Since the grant or reservation of a way of neces- sity is implied merely to accord with the presumed intention of the parties, such an implication may be excluded by particular language in the conveyance.'*' So the fact that there was an express 'provision for some particular mode of access has been regarded as preventing the recognition of a way of necessity.'^ ^ And a like effect has been given to a reference in the conveyance to adjoining land, which extended to the highway, as belonging to the grantee, the grantee claiming under such conveyance being precluded from denying the correctness of such reference and con- sequently from denying that he has this other means of access to the highway.'^^ It might also be excluded, it seems, by evidence of extrinsic facts."^ An intention 68. Bully Hill Copper Min. & 71. Georke Co. v. Wadsworth. Smelting Co. v. Bruson, 4 Cal. 73 N. J. Eq. 448, 68 Atl. 71; Bas- App. 180, 87 Pac. 237; United com v. Cannon, 158 Pa. 225, 27 States V. Rindge, 208 Fed. 611. Atl. 968. 69. Pearne v. Coal Creek M. & 72. Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. M. Co., 90 Tenn. 619, 18 S. W. 351, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1075, 78 402. Atl. 456. 70. Seely v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 73. See Mead v. Anderson, 40 128. Kan. 203, 19 Pac. 708; Seeley v. § 363] Easements. 1303 to grant or reserve such an easement, for instance, could not well be presumed in ease there was an oral agree- ment that no right of way should existJ* And so if land is conveyed with an explicit understanding that it is to be covered by a building, it could not well be con- tended tliat the grantor had a right of way of necessity throuah the building. If, in a conveyance of land, a way is provided, it has been said, which gives access for ordinary purposes to the lot granted, no way of necessity will arise, al- though that way is not sufficient for all purposes,^^ or, to exjDress it more in accordance \\'ith principle, the existence of a way for ordinary purposes is sufficient to exclude any presumption of an intention that a way for all purposes shall exist. An easement of necessity, like any other easement, cannot be imposed upon land not owned by the gran- tor,"^^ or in which he has an undivided interest only."^ Since a way of necessity exists by reason of a con- struction of the conveyance, based on the necessity of such way to the user of the land conveyed or retained, it is the necessity which exists at the time of the conveyance which determines the existence of the way, and not a necessity which may subsequently arise by reason of a change of circurastances.'^^'^' A conveyance is to be Bishop, 19 Conn. 128. wood v. West, 171 Ala. 463, 54 74. Lebus v. Boston, 21 Ky. So. 694. Law Rep. 411, 47 L. R. A. 79, 92 77. Woodworth v. Raymond, 51 Am. St. Rep. 333, 51 S. W. 607. Conn. 70; Marshall v. Trumbull, See Ewert v. Burtis (N. J. Ch.) 28 Conn. 183. But if the various 12 Atl. 893. owners of the land make deeds 75. Haskell v. Wright, 23 N. J. for the purpose of partition Eq. 389. one who acquires a tract not 76. Consequently there is no otherwise accessible would have grant of a right of way by neces- a way of necessity. Palmer v. sity when the land granted and Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139, 55 Am. St. that retained meet only at a Rep. 653, 44 N. E. 966. mathematical point, that is, when 77a. Kentucky Distilleries & merely a corner of one touches Warehouse Co. v. Warwick Co., a corner of the other. Green- 1C6 Ky. 651, 179 S. W. Oil; Cor- 1304 Eeal Property. [§ 363 construed with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of its execution and not those subsequently arising. The grant of a way of necessity is implied in order to enable one to utilize his own land and not to enable him to utilize other land, and consequently one has no such right over another's land merely because of his in- ability otherwise to reach public land where he desires to pasture his cattle.'^'^^ While the implication of a way of necessity is almost invariably for the purpose of access to the hind from the highway, occasionally a way of necessity has been recognized, apparently without reference to the question of its necessity for the purpose of access from the highway, but merely to give access to other land belonging to the same person, when he has conveyed an intervening strip for a railroad right of way.'^^ Upon a subsequent transfer of the dominant tene- ment a way of necessity appurtenant thereto, like any other easement, passes without any mention thereof.'^ And the burden passes upon the conveyance of the ser- nell Andrews Smelting Co. v. conveyed a strip of land to a Boston & P. R. Co., Corp., 202- railroad company for a right of Mass. 585, 89 N. E. 118. Post, this way was, upon the Subsequent section, notes 97-99. discovery of natural gas, re- 77b. Mcllquhain v. Anthony garded as entitled to a way by Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 18 Wyo. necessity thereover for a pipe 53, 104 Pac. 20. line to conduct gas to his dwell- 78. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. ing. Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co., Smith, 177 Ind. 524, 97 N. E. 164; 47 W. Va. 59, 34 S. E. 934. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Rwy. Co. 79. Taylor v. Warnaky, 55 Cal. V. Kearns, 58 Ind. App. 694, 108 SbO; Conley v. Fairchild, 142 Ky. N. E. 873; Vandalia R. Co. v. 271, 134 S. W. 142; Bean v. Furnas, 182 Ind. 306, 106 N. E. Bean, 163 Mich. 379, 128 N. W. 401; New York, etc., R. Co. v. 413; Pleas v. Thomas, 75 Miss. Railroad Commissioners, 162 495. 22 So. 820; Wcoldridge v. Mass. 81, 38 N. E.-27. In one case Coughlin, 46 W\ Va. 345, 33 S. E. the owner of land who had 223. ^ 363] Easements. 1305 vient tenement except as against a purchaser for value without notice.^" Character of conveyance. A way of necessity may arise r?pon a conveyance of land although at the same time the grantor conveys away the balance of his land to another,^^ and so it may arise upon a devise.^- It may also arise by force of a lease.^^' It has been regarded as arising on a conveyance by a trustee,^* and also by an executor.^^ A way of necessity has been regarded as arising not only when the severance of the ownership of the two pieces of land occurs as a result of voluntary transfer, but also when it occurs as a result of legal proceedings,^*^ as when one piece is sold under a lien,^^ or under execution,^^ or is taken under condemnation proceedings.'^^ And likewise when the severance of the 80. Logau V. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 8 L. R. A. 58, 24 N. E. 135; Jay v. Michael, 92 Md. 198; Fairchild v. Stewart, 117 Iowa, 734, 89 N. W. 1075; Thomas v. McCoy, 48 Ind. App. 403, 96 N. E. 14; Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 434, 79 Atl. 326. 81. Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139, 55 Am. St. Rep. 653, 44 N. E. 966; Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Ind. 251. 82. Mclntire v. Lauchner, 108 Me. 443, 81 Atl. 784; Conover v. Cade, 184 Ind. 604, 112 N. E. 7. In Mancuso v. Riddlemoser, 117 Md. 53, 82 Atl. 1051, it was held that when the control of a door in the cellar of a building was "strictly necessary" for purposes of ventilation and the manage- ment of the heating apparatus, the right to control it would be implied in favor of the owner of the building as against one to whom he had leased a part of the building including the cellar S3. Tutwiler Coal, Coke &-. Iron Co. V. Tuvin, 158 Ala. 657. 48 So. 79; Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 51 Am. Rep. 154, 19 N. W. 257. 84. Howton v. Frearson, 8 Term Rep. 50. 85. Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 38 Am. Dec. 61. 86. See Bean v. Bean, 163 Mich. 379, 128 N. W. 413. 87. San Joaquin Valley Bank v. Dodge, 125 Cal. 77, 57 Pac. 687; Proudfoot v. Saffle, 62 W. Va. 51, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 482, 57 S. E. 256. 88. Damron v. Damron, 119 Ky. 806, 84 S. W. 747. 89. Clcvchmd, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Smith, 177 Ind. 524, 97 N. E. 164. 1306 Real Peoperty. [§ 36^ ownership occurs as a result of partition proceedings. ^"^ It has also been regarded as arising when land is set off by appraisement under an execution, in such a way that either the land retained by the debtor or that set off is otherwise inaccessible.^^ In all these cases in which a way of necessity is regarded as arising in favor of one who acquires land by legal jDroceedings, the ''implied grant" of the way is, it seems, properly to be regarded as based on a construction of the language of the official conveyance, or of the decree, as intended to include the right of way. Degree of necessity. A way of necessity will not ordinarily be recognized if there is another mode of access to the land, though much less convenient, that is, as has been sometimes said, a way of convenience is not a way of necessity.^^ ^j^^j g^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^|-^^^ ^1^^ 90. Blum V. Weston, 102 Cal. 362, 36 Pac. 778, 41 Am. St. Rep. 188; Mesmer v. Uharriet, 174 Cal. 110, 162 Pac. 104; Ritchey v. Welsh, 149 Ind. 214, 48 N. E. 1031, 40 L. R. A. 105; Goodal v. God- frey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 671. 91. Pernam v. Wead, 2 Mass. 203, 3 Am. Dec. 43; Taylor v. Townsend, 8 Mass. 411, 5 Am. Dec. 107; Russell v. Jackson, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 574; Schmidt v. Quinn, 136 Mass. 575. 92. Dodd V. Burchell, 1 Hurl. & C. 113; Corea v. Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1019, 95 Pac. 882; Sterricker v. Mc- Bride, 157 111. 70; Ward v. Robert- son, 77 Iowa, 159, 41 N. W. 603; Hall V. McLeod, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 98, 74 Am. Dec. 400; Whitehouse V. Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 23 Am. St. Rep. 756, 21 Atl. 743; Mitchell V. Seipel, 53 Md. 251; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102; Dab- ney v. Child, 95 Miss. 585, 48 So. 897; Field v. Mark, 125 Mo. 502. 28 S. W. 1004; Roper Lumber Co. V. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N. C. 161, 73 S. E. 902; Meredith V. Frank, 56 Ohio St. 479, 47 N. E. 656; Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268; Valley Falls Co. V. Dolan, 9 R. I. 489; Bailey V. Gray, 53 S. C. 503, 31 S. E. 354; Alley v. Carleton, 29 Tex. 74; Dee v. King, 73 Vt. 375, 50 Atl. 1109; Malsch v. Waggoner, 62 Wash. 470, 114 Pac. 446 iseyn- ble) ; Mcllquahain v. Anthony Wil- kinson Live Stock Co., IS Wyo. 53, 104 Pac. 20. As to whether the use of a staircase on adjoining property could, under the circumstances, be regarded as necessary and not merely convenient, see Galloway V. Bonesteel, 65 Wis. 79, 56 Am. Rep. 616, 26 N. W. 262; Stillwell § 363] Easements. 130' existing- wav is steep or narrow,^^ or can be made available onlv bv the expenditure of money or labor,"'' has been held not to justify a finding of a way of necessity. On the other hand there are decisions to the effect that if the cost of the construction of a road over one's own land, as a means of access to any particular portion thereof, would involve very great expeuse, out of proportion to the value of the land itself, there is such a necessity for a way over another's land as to justify the recognition of a way of necessity.^^ Whether the fact that the land is otherwise accessible only by water is a justification for assuming the existence of a way of necessity across the land is a matter as to which the cases are not entirely clear."'^ V. Foster, 80 Me. 333, 14 Atl. 731; Quimby v. Shaw, 71 N. H. 160, 51 Atl. 656. 93. Kripp V Curtis, 71 Cal. 62, 11 Pac. 879; Gaines v. Lunsford, 120 Ga. 370, 47 S. E. 967, 102 Am. St. Rep. 109; Dudgeon v. Bron- pon, 159 Ind. 562, 95 Am. St. Rep. 815; Turnbull v. Rivers, 3 Mc- Cord (S. C.) 131, 15 Am. Dec. 622; United States v. Rindge, 208 Fed. 611. 94. Carey v. Rae, 58 Cal. 159; Gaines v. Lunsford, 120 Ga. 370, 102 Am. St. Rep. 109, 47 S. E. 967; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (.Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302; Dee V. King, 73 Vt. 375, 50 Atl. 1109; Shaver v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 502, 37 S. E. 664; Fitchett v. Mellow, 29 Ont. Rep. 6. See Mes- mer v. Uharriet, 174 Cal. 110, 162 Pac. 104. 95. Smith V. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 905; Watson v. French, 112 Me. 371, L. R. A. 1915C, 355, 92 Atl. 290; Pettin- gill V. Porter, 8 Allen (Mass.) 1, 85 Am. Dec. 671; Foeffees of Grammar School in Ipswich v. Proprietors of Jeffrey's Neck Pas- ture, 174 Mass. 572; O'Rorke v. Smith, 11 R. I. 259, 23 Am. Rep. 440; Crotty v. New River & Poca- hontas Consol. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 230. See as to the citerion of disproportionate expense, U. S. v. Rindge, 208 Fed. eii. 96. In Feoffees of Grammar School in Ipswich v. Proprietors of .Jeffrey's Neck Pasture, 174 Mass. 572, it was decided that a way of necessity existed, although there was access by water, if the latter mode of access was not available for general purposes to meet the requirements of the uses to which the property would naturally he put. And in Jay v. Michael, 92 Md. 198. it is assum- ed that the fact of access by water is immaterial. But in Kings- ley V. Gouldsboroug'h Land Im- provement Co., 86 Me. 280; Ilil- dreth v. Googins, 91 Me. 227; 1308 Real Peopeety. [§ 363 Since the recognition of a way -of necessity is based on the intention imputed to the parties at the time of the severance of the ownership, it follows that the existence of the privilege, and also its extent, is to be determined with reference to what is necessary for the use of the premises in the manner contemplated by the parties at the time of such severance.^ '^ So if the parties contemplate a use of the land for a par- ticular business, there is a right of way of necessity sufiScient for the purposes of the business, if no other way sufficient for that purpose exists,^^ and if the parties contemplate a use of the land for a residence, there is a way of necessity sufficient for that purpose, if no other way so sufficient exists.^** The fact that a particular use of the land is being made at the time of the severance of ownership does not of itself show that the parties do not contemi:)late the possibility of another use of the land, and hence does not pre- clude the recognition of a way of necessity, upon a sub- sequent change of use, in accord with the requirements of the latter rather than of the former use.^ And the view has been taken that the parties are to be pre- sumed, in the absence of any evidence on the subject, to have in mind any lawful use of the land.^ Lawton V. Rivers, 2 McCord (S. Riggs, L R. 13 Ch. D. 798. See C.) 445; Turnbull v. Rivers, 3 Mc- Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251. Cord (S. C.) 131; Fitchett v. 98. Gaylord y. Mtoffat, L. R. 4 Mellow, 29 OM. Rep. 6,— it was Ch. App. 133. decided that no such right of way 99. Camp v. Whitman, 51 N. existed, when there was access J. Eq. 467 26 Atl. 917. by water, it being left, in the i. in Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn, second of the cases cited, to the 71 it was decided that although jury to say whether the access thre was an express grant of a by water was "available". See right of way for carting wood also Staples v. Cornwall 114 App. from the land, a residence hav- Div. 596, 99 N Y Supp. 1009. ing subsequently been erected 97. Wlhittier v. Winkley, 62 N. thereon, there was a way of ne- H. 338; Camp v. Whitman, 51 cessity thereto for general i>ur- N. J. Eq. 467, 26 Atl. 917, discuss- poses, ing Corporation of London v. 2. Whittier v. Winkley, 62 N. § 364] Easements. 1309 The grantor or grantee of land obvionsly cannot, by the subsequent erection of obstacles to access to the land, create a necessity for this purpose which did not exist at the time of the severance of ownership,^ nor can he create such a necessity by such subdivision of his property as he may subsequently make on the sale thereof.^^ That the grantee of land, being a municipality or subdivision of a state, has the right to obtain land for a road b}^ condemnation proceedings does not pre- clude it from claiming a way of necessity.^*^ § 364. Prescription. An easement may be acquired by the adverse user of another's land for a certain period, usually the same as that required to give title to land itself by disseisin or adverse possession. The acquisition of an easement in this manner is termed ''prescription," and is based on tlie theory that if one makes use of another's land, not by permission, and the owner fails to interfere to prevent such use, such acquiescence is, in order to prevent litigation, and also to obviate the difficulty of yiroving title after lapse of time, to be considered as conclusive evidence that the user is rightful. The subject of prescription will l)e considered in another part of this work.* H. 338, disapproving Gorpoiation of access was available for gen- of London v. Riggs, 13 Ch. Div. eral purposes to meet the requiro- 798; Grotty v. New River & Poca- ments of the uses to which the hontas Consol. Coal Co.. 72 W. plaintiff's property would natural- Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233. Compare ly be put. Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic 3. Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. Electric Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 434, 71) 251. Atl. 326. 3a. Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 In Foeffees of Grammar School Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268; U. S. v. in Ipswich v. Proprietors of Jef- Rindge, 208 Fed. 611. frey's Neck Pasture, 174 Mass. 3b. Board of Sup'rs of Lamar 572, it was said that the exist- County v. Elliott, 107 Miss. 368. ence of a way of necessity was f!6 So. 203. to be determined by the consid- 4. Post, §§-514-533. eration whether any other mode 2 R. P.— 8 1310 Real Pkoperty. [§ 365 § 365. Acquisition under statute. An easement may, by force of a particnlar statute, be acquired in the land of anotlier for a public use, by proceedings under the power of eminent domain, and payment of adequate compensation. The most prominent instances of easements so acquired are the right of way privilege acquired by a railroad company through the land of an individual,^ and the privilege of the owner of land on a watercourse, under what are known as the ''Mill Acts," of flooding the land of another by the erection of a dam for manufacturing or milling purposes.® In some states the statute provides for the acquisition, by a company formed for irrigation purposes, of the privilege of constructing canals, aqueducts, or reservoirs on the land of individuals,'^ and a somewhat similar pri\dlege is frequentlj^ given by statute to local associations formed to construct canals and ditches for the drainage and reclamation of marshy districts.^ Another instance of an easement created by statute is the obligation, im- posed by statute in some states, to contribute to the erection and maintenance of a partition fence.*^'^*^ As to party walls. In the absence of a statu- tory provision in this regard, or of the grant of an 5. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, it is decided that a landowner's §§ 263, 449, 584; 3 Elliott, Rail- right to have cattleguards main- roads, § 950 ct scq. tained by a railway company is 6. Gould, Waters, §§ 253, 579 a "statutory easement," and that et seq.; anfe § 339e. consequently a release thereof by. 7. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, him is binding on his successor § 308; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. in title. Such a view would prob- V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; Oury ably not be accepted by all V. Goodwin (Ariz.) 26 Pac. 376; courts. In re Madera Irrigation Dist., 92 8. Lindsay Irrigation Co. v. Cal. 309, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106; Mehrtens, 97 Cal. 676; NefE v. Paxton & H. Irrigating Canal & Reed, 98 Ind. 341; Norfleet v. Land Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Cromwell, 70 N. C. 634, 16 Am. Irrigation & Land Co., 45 Neb. 884, Rep. 787; Tidewater Co. v. Coster, 50 Am. St. Rep. 585. 18 N. J. Eq. 518. In Gulf & S. I. R. Co. V. Chap- 9-10. See ante, § 357. man, 102 Miss. 778, 59 So. 889, § 3G5] Easements. 1311 easement to tliat effect, one of two adjoining owners cannot place a wall wholly or in part on the other's land. In several states, however, there are statutes in this regard, usually to the effect that one owner may place a wall to a certain extent upon the adjoining owner's land, which wall the other will have the right to use upon payment of half the cost.^^ A wall is not such as is contemplated by the statute, it has been decided, unless it is susceptible of user as a party wall,^- and it has on this theory been decided that the wall cannot have openings, such as windows, therein. ^^ That is, though the wall belongs, when built, to the projorietor who builds it, until the other pays his proportion of the costs, ^^ he has no right, under the statute, to build in part on the other's land any but a solid wall. A wall erected by one proprietor has been regarded as a party wall for the purpose of the statute, so as to give the adjoining owner certain rights therein, if its foundation is jDartly on the latter 's land, even though 11. A statute providing that C. 480; Robinson v. Hillman, 36 one may erect a wall in part up- App. D. C. 576. on the land of an adjoining 13. Smoot v. Heyl, 34 App. D. owner, to be used by both as a C. 480; Kiefer v. Dickson, 41 Ind. party wall, has been held to be App. 543, 84 N. E. 523; Traute unconstitutional in Massachusetts. v. White, 46 N. J. Eq. 437, 19 Wilkins v. Jewett, 139 Mass. 29. Atl. 196; Sullivan v. Graffort, 35 And there are dictia to that ef- Iowa, 531; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 feet in New Jersey. Traute v. Pa. 118. Contra, Jeannin v. De White, 46 N. J. Eq. 437, 19 Atl. Blance, 11 La. Ana. 465; Pierce v. 196; Schmidt v. Lewis, 63 N. J. Lemon, 2 Houst. (Del.) 519. Eq. 565, 52 Atl. 707. That such a The Iowa statute authorizes statute is valid, see Swift v. Cal- openings to be made upon taking nan, 102 Iowa, 206, 37 L. R. A. measures to protect the other 462, 63 Am St. Rep. 443, 71 N. W. proprietor. See Shoemaker v. 233; Evans v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34; Wallace, 154 Iowa, 236, 134 N. Heron v. Houston, 217 Pa. 1, 118 W. 740. Am. St. Rep. 898, 66 Atl. 108; 14. Jeannin v. De Blance, 11 Hunt V. Ambuston, 17 N. J. Eq. La. Ann. 465; Cordill v. Israel, 208. 130 La. 138, 57 So. 778; Bertram 12. Smoot V. Heyl, 34 App. D. v. Curtis, 31 Iowa, 46. 1312 Real Peoperty. [§ 365 the part of the wall above the ground is wholly within the limits of the land belonging to the builder.^ ^ When, however, the wall was not intended to encroach upon the other's land, but did so by accident and to but a slight extent, and there was nothing to indicate that it was intended to be used as a party wall, such other was considered to have no rights therein, though he could insist that the encroaching part should be re- moved.''' Even a wall erected entirely on one's ovni land may, it appears, under the Pennsylvania statute, be a party wall for the purposes of the adjoining owner if it was so intended by the one erecting it.^" The privilege, under the statute, of erecting a wall partly on the adjoining land for the use of both pro- prietors has been held to override the privilege of the adjoining owner of erecting a wall on his own land for his exclusive use, and a wall of the latter character may be destroyed if this is necessary for the purpose of erecting a wall of the former character.^^ There has been held to be a user by one pro- prietor of a wall erected by the other, so as to make the former liable under the statute for part of the cost, when he utilized the wall as one side of a permanent frame building erected by him, though he did not use the wall for purposes of support, ^'^ while the erection of a merely temporary shed against the wall was held 15. Lukens v. Lasher, 202 Pa. University of Pennsylvania, 220 327, 51 Atl. 887; Banner v. Cas- Pa. 328, 89 Atl. 861. satt, 236 Pa. 248, 84 Atl. 780. It 18. Western National Bank's is immaterial that the wall is Appeal, 102 Pa. 171; Mercantile on the adjoining land to the ex- Library Co. v. University of Penn- tent of less than one half its sylvania, 220 Pa. 328, 89 Atl. 861; thickness. Western National Heron v. Houston, 217 Pa. 1, IIS Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171; Kos- Am. St. Rep. 898. ack v. Johnson, 38 App. D. C. 19. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Weir- 62. Shugart Co., 91 Iowa, 422, 59 N. 16. Pile V. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296, W. 255 ; Pier v. Salot (Iowa) 107 46 Am. St. Rep. 677, 31 Atl. 646. N. W. 420. 17. Mercantile Library Co. .v § 366] Easements. 1313 not to be such a user.-^ The erection of an inferior wall by the side of the other wall has also been de- cided not to involve a user of the latter.-^ § 366. Estoppel. (a) By reference to non ex- istent way. If one, in conveying land, describes it as bounded on a street (or other highway) which is in fact nonexistent, he is, as against his grantee, it is said, estopped to deny the existence of such street, the result being that he in effect grants, in so far as he owns the land covered by the supposed street, a right of way along the route thereof for the purpose of access to the land conveyed,-^ and also easements of light and air such as the grantee would have had were the street actually existent.^^ Likewise if land conveved is de- 20. Beggs V. Duling, 102 Iowa, 13. 70 N. W. 732. As to what constitutes a new use of a new wall erected in place of an old one, so as to impose liability under the statute, see Hoffstott V. Voigt, 146 Pa. 632, 23 Atl. 351; German Nat. Bank v. Mellor, 238 Pa. 415, 86 Atl. 415. 21. Sheldon Bank v. Royce, 84 Iowa, 288, 50 N. W. 986. 22. Teasley v. Stanton, 136 Ala. 641, 96 Am. St. Rep. 88, 33 So. 823; Rogers v. Ballinger, 59 Ark. 12, 26 S. W. 12; Petitpierre V. Maguire, 155 Cal. 242, 100 Pac. 690; Billings v. Mckenzie, 87 Conn. 617, 89 Atl. 344; Poole v. Greer, 6 Del. 220, 65 Atl. 767; Schreck v. Blum, 131 Ga. 489, 62 S. E. 705; Young v. Braman, 105 Me. 494, 75 Atl. 120; O'Linda v. Lathrop, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 292; Driscoll V. Smith, 184 Mass. 221, 68 N. E. 210; Dawson v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 15 Minn. 136, 2 Am. Rep. 109; Plumer v. John- ston, 63 Mich. 65, 29 N. W. 687; Crosby v. Greenville, — Mich. — , 150 N. W. 246; Moses v. St. Louis Sectional Dock Co., 84 Mo. 242; Lindsay v. Jones, 21 Nev. 72; White V. Tidewater Oil Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 1; Imperial Realty Co. v. West Jersey & S. . R. Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 110, 77 Atl. 1041; United N. J. Railway & Canal Co. v. Cru- cible Steel Co., 86 N. J. Eq. 258, 98 Atl. 1087, affirming 85 N. J. Eq. 7, 95 Atl. 243; White's Bank V. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 65; Niagara Falls V. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 168 N. Y. 610, 61 N. E. 185; Weeks v. New York W. & B. Ry. Co., 207 N. Y. 190, 100 N. E. 719; Ott V. Kreiter, 110 Pa. St. 370, 1 Atl. 724; Shelter v. Welzel, 242 Pa. 355, 89 Atl. 455; Gish v. Roanoke, 119 Va. 519, 89 S. E. 970; Espley v. Wilkes, L. R. 7 Exch. 298. 23. Trowbridge v. Ehrich, 191 1314 Eeal Property. [§ 366 scribed as bounded, not by a street or other highway, but by a j^rivate alley or passageway, the grantor is said to be estopped, as against the grantee, to deny that such an alley or passageway exists, that is, he grants to that extent a right of way appurtenant to the land conveyed.-^ And it has been decided that if the con- veyance bounds the land on a way which is actually laid out, the grantee acquires a right of passage for the whole length of such way, so far as it is upon the grantor's land, and not merely for the length of the boundary of the land conveyed.-^ While a reference to a non existing street or way as a boundary has thus ordinarily been regarded as involving the grant of a right of way, a different view N. Y. 361, 84 N. E. 297; Dill v. Board of Education of City of Camden, 47 N. J. Eq. 421, 10 L. R. A. 276, 20 Atl. 739; Fitzgerald V. Barbour, 55 Fed. 440, 5 C. C. A. 180. 24. Garstang v. Davenport, 90 Iowa, 359, 57 N. W. 876; Riley v. Stein, 50 Kan. 591, 32 Pac. 947; Reccus V. Weber, 142 Ky. 157, 134 S. W. 145; Young v. Braman, 105 Me. 494, 75 Atl. 120; Fox v. Union Sugar Refinery, 109 Mass. 292; McKenzie v. Gleason, 184 Mass. 452, 100 Am. St. Rep. 566, 69 N. E. 1076; Gould v. Wagner, 196 Mass. 276, 82 N. E. 10; Flagg v. Phillips, 201 Mass. 216, 87 N. B. 598; Carlin V. Paul, 11 Mo. 32, 47 Am. Dec. 139; Cox V. James, 45 N. Y. 557; Hennessy v. Murdoch, 137 N. Y. 317, 33 N. B. 330; Rhoads v. Walter, 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 43. But see Milliken v. Denny, 135 N. C. 19, 47 S. E. 132. The fact that land is bounded by a privatQ passageway does not, it has been decided, give any rights of light and air as regards the space occupied by such way, except in so far as required for the purposes of pas- sage. Bitello V. Lipson, 80 Conn. 497, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 193, 125 Am. St. Rep. 126, 69 Atl. 21. And a description of the land con- veyed as bounded on an "open court" was held to give no ease- ments of light and air which would prevent the erection of a building on the court. Lipsky v. Heller, 199 Mass. 310, 85 N. B. 453. 25. Thomas v. Poole, 7 Gray. (Mass.) 83; Rodgers v. Parker, 9 Gray (Mass.) 445; Ralph v. Clifford, 224 Mass. 58, 112 N. E. 482; Tobey v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 404; McConnell v. Rathbun, 46 Mich. 303, 9 N. W. 426; Schreck v. Blun, 131 Ga. 489, 62 S. E. 705. Compare Langmaid v. Hig- gins, 129 Mass. 353. § 366] Easements. 1315 has been adopted when the land was in terms bounded on the side line of the street or way,-*^ when the street or way was referred to merely for the purpose of loca- ting the starting point of the description, and the land was described by courses and distances, although one of the courses happened to correspond with the side line of such street or way,-' and when the land was bounded on a "continuation" of a supposed street.^*^ And gen- eralh^ the particular language used, or the circumstances of the case, may be referred to for the purpose of show- ing that there was no intention, in bounding the land on a non-existent street or way, to give any easement in the land retained.-^ One thus acquiring an easement by a grant to liim of land as bounded by a street which is nonexistent has the right to have the supposed street kept open to its full width, as indicated on a plat referred to or otherwise.^'' In so far as one who has conveyed land as bounded on a street or way which is in fact nonexistent is pre- 26. McKenzie v. Gleason, 184 58 N. Y. Supp. 163; Neely v. Mass. 452, 100 Am. St. Rep. 566, Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 551, 61 Atl. 69 N. E. 1076. 1096. 27. Lankiu v. Terwilliger, 22 30. Fitzgerald v. Barbour, 55 Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268; Talbert v. Fed. 440, 5 C. C. A. 180; White Mason, 136 Iowa, 373, 113 N. W. v. Tidewater Oil Co., 50 N. J. 918 {dictum); Pierpoint v. Har- Eq. 1, 25 Atl. 199; Livingston v. risville, 9 W. Va. 215 {semhle). New York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 22 And see Neely v. Philadelphia. Am. Dec. 622. 212 Pa. 551, 61 Atl. 1096. That a conveyance of land 28. Atwood V. O'Brien, 80 Me. bounds it on a non existent street 447, 15 Atl. 44. But see Teasley does not impose any obligation V. Stanton, 136 Ala. 641, 96 Am. on the grantor to make a streei St. Rep. 88, 33 So. 823. or way accordingly, which will 29. Pitts V. Baltimore, 73 Md. be fit for travel. Loring v. 326, 21 Atl. 52; Bushman v. Gib- Otis, 7 Gray (Mass.) 563; Hen- son, 15 Neb. 676, 20 N. W. 106, nessey v. Old Colony & N. R. Co., 289; Hopkinson v. McKnight, 31 101 Mass. 540, 100 Am. Dec. 127; N. J. Law 422; King v. New Durkin v. Cobleigh, 156 Mass. 108, York, 102 N. Y. 171. 6 N. E. 395; 17 L. R. A. 270, 32 Am. St. Rep. Re Brook Ave., 40 App. Div. 519. 436, 30 N. E. 474. 1316 Eeal Property. [§ 366 chicled from denying the existence of an easement in favor of his grantee on the land retained by him, one to whom he subsequently conveys the latter land is also so precluded,^^ but not one claiming under title paramount, as for instance at a sale under a prior mortgage.^^ One can obviously not create an easement by de- scribing the land conveyed as bounded by a street or wa}', if he does not own the land on w^hicli the street or way is supposed to be located, that is, he cannot thus create a right of way over another's land.^^ And it has been decided that such a reference to a nonexistent street or way does not, merely because it cannot operate as creating a way, take effect as a covenant as to the existence of the street or way, for breach of which dam- ages may be claimed.^* The statement not infrequently found in the cases,^^^ that the reference to a street in- volves an ''implied covenant" on the part of the gran- tor that there is such a street, appears ordinarily to 31. Fitzgerald v. Barbour, 55 Fed. 440, 5 C. C. A. 180; Thomas V. Poole, 7 Gray (Mass.) 83; Rogers v. Ballinger, 59 Ark. 12, 26 S. W. 12; Cox v. James, 45 N. Y. 557; Sbetter v. Welzel, 242 Pa. 355, 89 Atl. 455. Contra Briz- zalaro v. Senour, 82 Ky. 353. 32. See Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah, 501, 126 Pac. 959. That a subsequent grantee ot part of the land, away from the asserted street, cannot assert the existence of the way, see Dawson V. S. Paul Fire & Marine Insur. Co., 15 Minn. 136, 2 Am. Rep. 139. 33. Dorman v. Bates Manuf'g Co., 82 Me. 438, 19 Atl. 915; Cole \. Hadley, 162 Mass. 579, 39 N. E. 279. 34. Wimpey v. Smart, 137 Ga. 325, 73 S. E. 586; Howe v. Alger, 4 Allen (Mass.) 206; Fulmar v. Bates, 118 Tenn. 731, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 964, 121 Am. St. Rep. 1059, 102 S. W. 900. Contra, Trutt v. Spott, 87 Pa., 339;. Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa. 373, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 878, 113 N. W. 918 (semble). 34a. See e. g. Rogers v. Bel- linger, 59 Ark. 12, 26 S. W. 12; Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38. White V. Flannigan, 1 Md. 525, 54 Am. Dec. 668; Tufts v. Charles- town, 2 Gray (Mass.) 272; Mosi?s V. St. Louis Sectional Dock Co., 84 Mo. 242: Greenwood v. Wilton R. R., 23 N. H. 261; Bellinger v. Union Burial Ground Soc, 10 Pa. 135. ^ 366] Easements. 1317 mean merely that he is precluded from denying the existence of the street. There are quite occasional decisions and dicta to the effect that if one conveys land as abutting on a legally existent highway, the fee of "hieh he owns, and the highway is subsequently discontinued, the grantee still has a right of passage where the highway previously existed, which cannot be obstructed by the grantor or one claiming under him.-'^ This view involves the as- sumption that the description in a conveyance of land as abutting on a highway has the effect of creating a private right of way, irrespective of whether the high- way does or does not exist. While the courts, as above stated, in deciding that the grantee of land may acquire an easement in the grantor's adjoining land by reason of the fact that the conveyance bounds the land on a nonexistent street or way, base this in terms on the ground of estoppel, they give practically no satisfaction as reg^ards the character and theoretical basis of the estoppel. If they regard it as a case of estoppel by deed, that is, if they mean that the grantor having, in a formal conveyance, referred to a street as existing on his land in a particular lo- cation, he is estopped to deny that it does so exist,"'" the fact that the grantee knows that the street does not exist would presumably be immaterial, as would the fact that the conveyance is by way of gift."'^ The courts, 35. Bayard v. Hargrove, 45 Ga. County, 36 Utah, 127, 104 Pac. 342; Leffler v. Burlington., 18 "Wlash. 691, 1^. R. A. 1917A, 1120, Iowa, 361. Parker v. Farminghani, 159 Pac. 891; Central Trust Co. 1047; Dobson v. Hohenadel, v. Ifennen, 90 Fed. 593, 33 C. C. 148 Pa. St. 367, 23 Atl. 1128. A. 189. Rut see Kimball v. Ken- Shetter v. Welzel, 242 Pa St. 355, osha, 4 Wis. 321. 111. Van Buren v. Trumbull, 92 36. It is reforrei to as a case 8 Mete. (Mass.) 260; Plumer v. of estoppel by deed in Billings v. Johnston, 63 Mich. 165, 29 N. W. McKenzie, 87 Conn. 617, 89 Atl. 687; White's Bank v. Nichols, 64 344; Shetter v. Welzel, 242 Pa. N. Y. 65; Holloway v. Southmayd, 355, 89 Atl. 455; Bigelow, Estnp- 139 N. Y. 390, 34 N. E. pel (6th Ed.) 403. 89 Atl. 455; Sowadski v. Salt Lake 37. That the fact that the con- 1318 Real Peopertt. [§ 366 however, occasionally refer to the probability that the supposed existence of the street constituted part of the consideration which induced the purchase, and from this point of view the estoppel is not by deed, but is by representation, and the fact that the purchaser was aware of the facts and was consequently not misled, or that the conveyance was by way of gift, would pre- vent the estoppel taking eifect.-^^ If the grantee's acquisition of the easement is by reason merely of the fact that the conveyance purported to bound the land by a street, without reference to whether the grantee was induced to suppose that a street actually exists, the rule might as well be stated, it seems, without reference to the doctrine of estoppel. So considered, the rule appears to be merely one of construction, that a conveyance of land as bounding on a nonexistent street is presumed, if no such street exists, to be intended to vest in the grantee, as appurte- nant to such land, easements of passage and of light and air, similar to those which he would have acquired had the street actually existed.^^* If on the other hand the purchaser's acquisition of the easement is by reason of his having been induced to believe that a street exists, without reference to whether the grantor intended to create such an easement in his favor, the rule is, it seems, properly expressed in terms of estoppel, and the language of the conveyance in reference to the street would appear to be material only as raising a presump- tion that similar language was used by the vendor in the negotiations which preceded the conveyance. So far as estoppel by representation is concerned, the fact veyance is by way of gift is im- material in Kenyou v. Hookway, m.atenal see Flersheim v. City of 17 N. Y. Misc. 452, 41 N. Y. Supp. Baltimore, 85 Md. 489, 36 Atl. 230. A contrary view is taken iu 1098. Bushman v. Gibson, 15 Neb. 676, 38. That the grantor had pre- 20 N. W. 106, 289. viously told the grantee that he 38a. Post, this section, note did not intend to give him such 54a. an easement was regarded as im- § 366] Easements. 1319 that the conveyance bounds the land by a street is immaterial if the purchaser has been expressly told, or has reason to believe, that no such street exists. The same considerations apply in the case of a reference to a private passage way as a boundary. If the language of the instrument operates to create an easement in the grantee, irrespective of whether the grantee was induced to believe in the existence of the passage way, the easement is created by the lang-uage of the conveyance, and the introduction of the doctrine of estoppel is un- necessary, while if the instrument creates an easement in the grantee merely because it indieatos that the grantee was induced to purchased in the belief that the passage way existed, the easement is properly said to be created by estoppel. (b) By reference to plat. It is frequently stated that if one sells land, or conveys it, with refer- ence to a plat, on .which plat appear streets, squares, quays, or the like, the plat is in effect made a part of the transaction of sale or conveyance, with the result that the vendee or grantee acquires a right to insist that, in so far as the property belongs to the vendor or grantor, the parts designated on the plat as streets, squares, quays or the like, shall continue to be de- voted to such public use free from interference by tli(> grantor or one claiming under him.^^ The cases ordi- 39. Danielson v. Sykes, 157 Cal 311, 37 N. E. 850; Fisher v. Beard, 689, 109 Pac. 87, 28 L. R. A. 32 Iowa, 346; Cleaver v. Man- (N. S.) 1024; Pierce v. Roberts, hanke, 120 I-owa, 77, 94 N. W. 57 Conn. 31, 17 Atl. 275; Fisk v. 279; Rowan's Excrs. v. Portland, Ley, 76 Conn. 295, 56 Atl. 559; 8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.) 232; Mem- East Atlanta Land Co. v. Mower, phis & St. L. Packet Co. v. Grey, 138 Ga. 380, 75 S. E. 418; May- 9 Bush (72 Ky.) 13; Bartlett v. wood Co. V. Village of Maywood, City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460; Burn- 118 111. 61, 6 N. E. 866; Swedish ham v. Mahoney, 222 Mass. 524, Evangelist Lutheran Church v. Ill N. E. 396. Ilorton v. Williams, Jackson, 229 111. 506, 82 N. E. 99 Mich. 423; Lennig v. Ocean City 348; Field v. Barling, 149 111. 556, Ass'n 41 N. J. Eq. 606. 56 Am. 24 L. R. A. 406, 41 Am. St. Rep. Rep. 16, 7 All. 491; Dill v. Board 1320 Keal Pkoperty. [§ 366 narily refer to this as arising from a sale according to a plat rather than from a conveyance according to a plat, but when the sale is according to a plat the conveyance by which the sale is consummated is usually according to the same plat, and it may be questioned whether, when the courts refer to a sale according to a plat, they do not usually have in mind such a sale followed by a simi- lar conveyance. As is subsequently indicated,^° whether a sale according to a plat, that is, a reference to a plat in connection with the negotiations for a sale, will have the same effect in this regard as such a reference in- corporated in the instrument of conveyance of the land, has been questioned. In some cases,"* ^ in giving this effect to a conveyance according to a plat, language is used by the court indi- cative of the view that this result is attained by an ap- plication of the same principle which operates to pre- clude one who conveys land as bounded on a street or way from denying the existence of the street or way, and that the cases are exceedingly analogous appears not to be open to question. In some cases the view is asserted that the reference to the plat operates to vest an ease- ment in the grantee as inducing him to believe that the streets or other public places exist as indicated on the plat,^2 thus in etfect applying the doctrine of estoppel of Education of City of Camden, (bridge). Wilson v. Acree, 97 47 N. J. Eq. 421, 10 L. R. A. 276, Tenn. 378, 37 S. W. 90; Tuttle 20 Atl. 739. Bissell v. Railroad v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah, 501, 126 Co., 23 N. Y. 61; Hennessy v. Pac. 959. Mnrdock, 137 N. Y. 317, 40. /Vs/, § 366(c), note 54. 33 N. E. 330; Buffalo L. 41. See Booraem v. North Hud- & R. Co., V. Hoyer, 214 N. Y. son R. Co., 40 X J. Eq. 557, 5 236, 108 N. E. 455; Chapin v. Atl. 106. Dodge v. Pennsylvania Brown, 15 R. I. 579, 10 Atl. 639; R. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 351, 45 N. J. Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Eq. 366; Wyman v. New York, 11 Cumberland Valley R. Co., 240 Pa. Wend. (N. Y.) 486; Bissell v. 519, 87 Atl. 968; Oney v. West N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61; Buena Vista Land Co., 104 Va. McCall v. Davis, 15 R. I. 579. 580, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 832. 113 42. Presoott v. Edwards, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1066, 52 S. E. 343 Cal 298, 59 Am. St. Rep. 186; May- § 366] Easements. 1321 by representation. Frequently the courts refer in this connection to the fact that, as appears to be agreed in this country,^^ a sale of lots with reference to a plat involves a dedication to public use by the vendor of those parts indicated on the plat as intended to be so used,'** apparently regarding this as the basis for recog- nizing a right of way in the vendee. But this, it is con- ceived, involves a misapplication of the doctrine of dedication. The existence of a right of way in the vendee by reason of a sale to him by reference to a plat is entirely independent of whether any right exists in the public.*^ For instance, although the public authori- ties refuse to accept the dedication, or vacate a street appearing on a plat, so that the dedication of the street is practically a nullity, nevertheless the vendee's rights remain the same as if the authorities had not taken such action. That the right of the A^endee or grantee in such case is not dependent on the doctrine of dedication is apparent upon consideration of the analogous case of a private right of way appearing on the plat with ref- erence to which the sale or conveyance is made. The doctrine of dedication is absolutely inapplicable in connection with a private way, and yet the vendee or wood Co. V. Village of May wood, 110 Mo. 618, 19 S. W. 735; Hawley 118 111. 61, 186, 49 Pac. 178; Clark v. Baltimore, 33 Md. 270; Carter V. Elizabeth, 40 N. .J. L. 172; Mc- v. Portland, 4 Ore. 339; Dobson v. Farland v. Linderkugel, 107 Wis. Hohenaiel, 148 Pa. 367, 23 Atl. 474, 83 i\. W. 757. McCall v. Davis, 1128. 15 R. I. 579; Van Buren v. Trum- 45. See Prescott v. PJd wards, bull, 92 Wash. 691, L. R. A. 1917 A, 117 Cal. 298, 59 Am. St. Rep. 186; 1120, 159 Pac. 891. 49 Pac. 178; Danielson v. Sykes, 43. Post, § 482. 157 Cal. 686, 109 Pac. 87, 28 L. 44. Highland Realty Co. v. R- A. (N. S.) 1024; Overland Avondale Land Co., 174 Ala. 325, Machinery Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 56 So. 716; Harrison v. Augusta, Colo. 163, 69 Pac. 574; White v. Factory, 73 Ga. 447; I^gansport Tidewater Can.il Co., 50 N. J. Eq. V. Dunn, 8 Ind. 38; Schneider v. 1, 25 Atl. 199; Lennig v. Ocean Jacob, 86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350; City Ass'n, 41 N. J. Eq. 606, .'it; Morton v. Williams, 99 Mich. 423, Am. Rep. 16, 7 Atl. 491; Carroll 58 N. W. 369. Heitz v. St. Louis, v. Asbury, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 354; 1322 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 36G grantee in such case ordinarily acquires a right of way.^^ The authorities are not entirely harmonious as to whether one receiving a conveyance of land described with reference to a plat acquires a right of way over, or rather, corresponding to, every street which, though nonexistent, appears upon the plat. Some cases are to the effect that, while the grantee is not restricted to such supposed streets as are actually adjacent to his land, he acquires rights only in such as are reasonably necessary for convenient access to and exit from the land conveyed, and that the grantor is not, as against him, estopped to deny the actual existence of streets ap- pearing on the plat which he would not ordinarily have occasion to use for such purpose,'*'^ while some recognize rights in the grantee along the routes of all the streets designated on the plat.^^ Tn one or two states the rights Wolf V. Brass, 72 Tex. 133, 12 S. W. 159. 46. Smith v. Young, 160 111. 1C3, 43 N. E. 486; Marshall v. Lynch, 256 111. 522, 100 N. E. 289; Kaatz V. Curtis, 215 Mass. 311, 102 X. E. 424; Lowenberg v. Brown, 79 N. Y. App. Div. 414, 79 N. Y. Supp. lOGO (semble). 47. Pearson v. .Allen 151 Mass. 79, 21 Am. St. Rep. 426, 23 N. E. 731; DoAvney v. Hood, 203 Mass. 4, 89 N. E. 24; Bell v. Todd, 51 Mich. 21, 16 N. W. 304; State V. Hamilton, 109 Tenn. 276, 70 S. W. 619. Occasionally the view has been taken that while the grantee may have a legal right as to all strips designated as streets on the plat, he has a right to an injunction only as to those which are more or less neces- sary for his purposes. Daniel- son V. Sykes, 157 Cal. 686, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024, 109 Pac. 87; Thorpe v. Clanton, 9 Ariz. 351, 85 Pac. 1061; Chapin v. Brown, 15 R. I. 579, 10 Atl. 639. 48. Price v. Stratton, 45 Fla. 535, 33 So. 644 (semble) ; Indian- apolis V. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200. 51 Am. Rep. 749; Nagel v. Dean, 94 Minn. 25, 101 N. W. 954 (sem- ble) ; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460; Collins v. Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 83 Am. St. Rep. 720, 39 S..E. 21; Jessop v. Kittaning Borough, 225 Pa. 583, 74 Atl. 553; Thaxter v. Turner, 17 R. I. 799, 24 Atl. 829; Sipe v. Alley, 117 Va. 819, 86 S. E. 122; Cook v. Totten, 49 W. Va. 177, 87 Am. St. Rep. 792, 38 S. E. 491; Edwards V. Moundsville Land Co., 56 W. Va. 43, 48 S. E. 754. § 366] Easements. 1323 of the grantee are said to be limited to the street on which his land purports to abut, so far as is necessary in order to reach a cross street in either direction.^'' In so far as the vendee thus acquires an easement in the strips designated as streets on the plat he has, it ap- pears, the right to have them kept open to the full width indicated on the plat.^^ It has occasionally been stated that, when land is sold or conveyed according to a plat, the grantee ac- quires the right, not only to use the " streets appearing on the plat, but also the right to have the public use them,^^ the theory being that, having purchased with this expectation, he should not be disappointed therein. Such a ^'iew is not entirely satisfactory. Assuming that there is a dedication by the sale or conveyance, the public obviously acquires a right to use the streets, or strips designated as streets, because in that case they are streets. But this is a riglit in the public, not in the individual grantee, and the conception of an easement, appurtenant to land, to have the members of the public use the property in the neighborhood along certain de- signated routes, not for the purpose of access to such land, but for tlieir own individual x^urposes, is a dif- ficult one. Such an easement in one's favor would mean, it seems, that though all those desiring to go to or from his land, including himself, were allowed to use these designated streets, he could maintain an action because other persons were not allowed to do so. Even when the streets are actually existent, it does not seem that an abutting owner on one street could com- l)lain because tlie public generally are not allowed to 49. Reis v. City of New York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 22 Am. Dec. 188 N. Y. .58, 80 N. E. 573; Haw- 622. ley V. Baltimore, 33 Md. 270. 51. Highland Realty Co. v. 50. Molitor v. Sheldon, 37 Kan. Avondale Land Co., 174 Ala. 32<), 246, 15 Pac. 231; White v. Tide- 56 So. 716; Earll v. City of Chi- water Oil Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 1, 25 cago, 136 111. 277, 26 N. E. 370; All. 199; Livingston v. New York. xllden Coal Co. v. Chulli.s, 200 111. 1324 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 366 use other streets in the neighborhood, this being for the individual members of the public, or the muncipal authorities, to do, and his rights can not well be greater when the streets are nonexistent. The failure of the decisions clearly to explain the true nature of the estoppel operating to give to the grantee of land an easement corresponding to a street or way, which though actually nonexistent, is referred to as a boundary, or of that operating to give to him an easement corresponding to a street or other public place appearing on a plat referred to in the conveyance, as well as the difficulties involved in the question whether a sale according to a plat, as distinct from a conveyance according to a plat, operates to preclude the grantor from denying the existence of the easement, appear to emphasize the desirability of treating the matter, for the most part at least, as one of the construction of the instrument of conversance rather than as one of estoppel. The question then in each case becomes one of the meaning of the language used as regards the property conveyed, whether, that is, it means tlie land alone, or the land with an easement annexed thereto? While a conveyance of land as bounded on a street or way is ordinarily presumed, in case the street or way is non- existent, to mean the land with a private easement annexed thereto, this presumption has no operation in case a different intention apj^ears from the particular language used.^- And it would seem, as evidence is always admissible to aid in the construction of an in- strument, this presumption may be rebutted by refer- ence to the surrounding circumstances at the time of the transaction. So the fact that the grantee knew that 222, 65 N. E. 665; Rowan v. Port- v. Grenet. 22 Tex. 94; City of land, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 232; Heitz Corsicana v. Zorn, 97 Tex. 317. V. City of St. Louis, 110 Mo. 618, 78 S. W. 924; Lins v. Seefeld, 126 19 S. W. 735; Quicksall v. Phila- Wis. 610, 611, 105 N. W. 917. uelphia, 177 Pa. 301; Clark v. 52. Ante, this section, note 38a. Providence, 10 R. I. 437; Oswald <§. 366] Easements. 1325 no street or way existed would be a mate.rial considera- tion, not only as showing that he was not misled by the reference to the street or way, but also as showing that the reference to the street or way was not to be con- sidered for the purpose of ascertaining whether an easement passed by the conveyance. So a conveyance of land by reference to a plat on which streets and squares or the like appear, is presumed, in case the streets or squares do not actually exist, to mean the land with corresponding private easements annexed thereto, but presumably evidence that the words used meant the land without any easements appurtenant thereto would be admissible. In case the conveyance makes no reference to any street or way, or to a plat, but the grantor, previous to making the conveyance, states to the gTantee that there is a street or way, such statement may be referred to for the purpose of determining whether the language of the conveyance meant the land with an easement appurtenant thereto of the character referred to, or the land without such an easement. And the same may be said as regards the exhibition by the vendor of a plat on which streets or squares appear, which plat is not referred to in the conveyance. Such act on his part is, it is conceived, to be considered because it serves to explain the meaning of the language used in the conveyance as applying, not to the land alone, but to the land with easements appur- tenant thereto corresponding to the public easements depicted on the plat. Just as in the case of what is ordinarily referred to as the implied grant of an ease- ment, the basic principle is that a conveyance of land in general terras may be shown, by reference to ex- trinsic facts, to be intended as a conveyance of land with an easement annexed, so in this case a conveyance of land may be shown, by reference to an extrinsic fact, to be intended as a conveyance of land witli an oasomont or easements annexed. The application of tlie doctrine of estoppel might well be confined to those cases fn 2 R. p.— 9 1326 Real Property. [^ 366 which there is an actual misrepresentation by the ven- dor, on which the purchaser relies, as indicated in the following subsection. (c) By representation or acquiescence. If, in order to effect a sale of land, the intending vendor states that there is a street or way adjacent to or near the land, or an easement appurtenant thereto, and on the faith of such statement the purchase is made, the vendor is ordinarily estopped to deny the existence of the way, street or other easement,^^ and the same effect has occasionally been given to the exhibition by the ven- dor to the vendee, before the sale, of a plat showing a particular street or way as existing in connection with the property.^^ The doctrine of estoppel by representation, by means of conduct of a particular character, has occasionally 53. Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 304, 59 Am. St. Rep. 156, 49 Pac. 178; Kirkpatrick v. Brown, 59 Ga. 450; Mattes v. Frankel, 157 N. Y. 603, 52 N. E. 585, 68 Am. St. Rep. 804; Cleaver v. Manhanke, 120 Iowa, 77, 94 N. W. 279; Kixmiller v. Bait. & 0. S, W. R. Co., 60 Ind. App. 686, 111 N. E. 401. So it was held that purchaser ot lots to whom the vendor had stated that there were appurte- nant thereto rights as to sewers and a water system could not be deprived by the vendor of the right to make use of such sewer and water systems as existed. Biggs V. Sea Gate Ass'n, 211 N. Y. 482, 105 N. E. 664. The purchase must obviously be made in reliance on the state- ment by the vendor in order that the latter be estopped. Poronto V. Sinnott, 89 Vt. 479, 95 Atl. 647. 54. Ford v. Harris, 95 Ga. 97, 22 S. E. 144; Cihak v. Klekr, 117 111. 643, 7 N. E. Ill; Dubuque V. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450, 74 Am. Dec. 358; Babcock v. Heenan, 193 Mich. 229, 159 N. W. 494; In re Edgewater Road, 13 N. Y. App. Div. 203, affirmed 199 N. Y. 560; In re Sedgwick Ave., 162 N. Y. App. Div. 236, 147 N. Y. Supp. 661. In Pyper v. Whitman, 32 R. I. 510, 80 Atl. 6, such an effect was denied to the exhibition of a plat, apparently on the theory that it would involve a violation of the "parol evidence" rule. In Dawson v. St. Paul Fire & Ma- rine Ins. Co., 15 Minn. 36, 2 Am. Rep. 139, it was questioned whether the exhibition of a plat should have this effect. 54d. Ante, § 339(h). § 366] Easements. 1327 been applied or asserted for the purpose of establisliing an easement when the one clai'ming the easement has made improvements, or otherwise adopted a particuhir course of action on the assumption that a changed con- dition already existing in connection with a stream or body of water would be allowed to continue, with the result that the o^vner of the land on which such con- dition existed was precluded from changing back to the original condition,^"'^*^ and one might be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by his conduct in inducing another to make improvements for the purpose of utilizing the supposed easement.^^^ In case there is an attempted oral grant of an easement, and the intended grantee makes improve- ments for the purpose of exercising the easement, equity will recognize and enforce the easement on the theory of what is ordinarily referred to as that of part perfor- mance^*^ but which is essentially the theory of estoppel. 54e. See MiUer & Lux v. En- v. Lewis, 13 Conn. 303, 33 Am. terprise Canal & Land Co., 169 Dec. 405; Penn American Plate Cal. 415, 147 Pac. 567; Morris Glass Co. v. Schwinn, 177 Ind. Canal & Banking Co. v. Diamond 645, 98 N. E. 715; Townsend v. Mills Paper Co., 71 N. J. Eq. 481, Epstein, 93 Md. 537, 52 L. R. A. 64 Atl. 746, 73 N. J. Eq. 414, 75 409, 86 Am. St. Rep. 441, 49 Atl. All. 1101; Smith v. Row- 629; Morrill v. St. Anthony Falls land, 243 Pa. 306, 90 Atl. 183. See Water Power Co., 26 Minn. 222, cases cited, note to L. R. A. (N. 37 Am. Rep. 399, 2 N. W. 842; S.) 1916C, at p. 940 et seq. Laird v. Atlantic Coast Sanitary Ordinarily, however, one's mere Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 49, 67 Atl. 387; acquiescence in the making of New York Rubber Co. v. Rothery, improvements by another for the 107 N. Y. 310, 1 Am. St. Rep. purpose of making a use of the 822, 14 N. E. 269; Lavery v. latter's land which involves a vio- Arnold, 36 Ore. 84, 57 Pac. 908, lation of a»iiatural right appertain- 58 Pac. 524; Silver Spring Bleach- ing to the former's land involves no ing & Dyeing Co. v. Wanskuck, estoppel to deny the existence of 13 R. I. 611. an easement in diminution of such 54f. Ante, § 349(r]), notes 44- catural right. See Lux v. Haggin, 49. 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674; Johnson 1328 Kb-\l Property. [§ 367 III. Eights of Usee. § 367. Easements created by grant. The mode io which an easement may be exercised, that is, the charac- ter and extent of the rights and privileges involved therein, is, in the case of an easement created by grant, determined by construction of the langniage of the grant.^^ So it is a question of construction whether the easement is restricted by the use made of the dominant tenement at the time of the grant, or whether the burden of the easement may be increased with any increase or change in the use of the dominant tenement.^^ Since the language used in the grant of an ease- ment is ordinarily of a general character, containing no mention of specific rights and pri\ileges, the proc- ess of construction involves not only the ascertainment of the actual intention from the language used, but also the establishment of a presumed, a fictitious, inten- tion, in regard to matters as to which, so far as appears, there was no actual intention,'^' and for this purpose the courts have established certain rules of construction to be applied in connection with such a grant. Frequently these rules are stated as positive rules of law and not of construction, but they are, in their last analysis, merely rules of construction, since they are controlled by any expression of intention in the grant. For in- stance, when it is said that the owner of the dominant tenement may make such changes on the servient tene- ment as are necessary for the proper exercise of the 55. Whitehead v. Parks, 2 271; Kinney v. Hooker, 65 Vt. Hurl. &X. 370; Williams v. James, .333. 36 Am. St. Rep. 864, 26 Atl. L. R. 2 C. P., 577; Field v. Leiter, 690; Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v. 118 111. 17, 6 N. E. 877; Moore v. Richmond F. & P. R. Co., 116 Fletcher, 16 Me. 63, 33 Am. Dec. Va. 211, 81 S. E. 93. 633; French v. Marstin, 24 N. H. 56. PoRt, § 369. 440, 57 Am. Dec. 294; Abbott v. 57. See Salmoiul, Jurispru- Butler, 59 N. H. 317; Wells v. dence (4th Bd.) 141, note. Tolman, 156 N. Y. 636, 51 N. E. ^, 367] Easements. 1329 easement,^^ this properly means that the grant of an easement is lorima facie to be construed as intended to confer such a privilege. This practice of stating a rule of construction in the form of a rule of law is of such obvious convenience in this connection that it will be adopted to some extent in the following pages, in spite of the technical inaccuracy involved therein. As in the case of other written instruments, the circumstances under which the grant was made are to be considered as aids in its construction.^^ In case of doubt the grant of an easement is construed, as are conveyances generally, in favor of the grantee rather than the grantor.*^^ While a reservation of an ease- ment is, it seems, to be construed in favor of the grantee of the land.*'^ The mode in which the grantee of the easement, wtih the grantor's acquiescence, exercised the easement after its acquisition, that is, the practical construction of the grant by the parties, may be referred to in order to aid in ascertaining its meaning,^^ }q^\^ \\^q f^^^ n^^X 58. Post § 370. 235 Pa. 5, 83 Atl. 592; Smith v. 59. Wood V. Saunders, 44 Law Duncan, 35 Utah, 203, 99 Pac. J. Ch. 514; Currier v Howes, 103 673. Cal. 431, 37 Pac. 521; Peck v. 60. Sweeney v. Landers, Frary Mackowsky, 85 Conn. 190, 82 Atl. & Clark, 80 Conn. 575, 69 Atl. 566; 199; Baker v. Frick, 45 Md. 337, Frisbie v. Bigham Masonic Lod?e 24 Am. Rep. 506; Mendell v. De- No. 256, 133 Ky. 588, 118 S. W. lane, 7 Mete, (ilass.) 176; Row- 359; Atkins v. Bordman, 2 Mete. ell V. Doggett, 143 Mass. 483, 10 (Mass.) 457; Duross v. Singer, N. E. 182; McConnell v. Rathbun, 224 Pa. 573, 73 Atl. 951; First 46 Mich. 303, 9 N. W. 426; White Baptist Soc. v. Wetherall, 34 R. V. Eagle & Phen.ix Hotel Co., 68 L 155, 82 Atl. 1061; Stephen Put- N. H. 38, 34 Atl. 672; Cheswell ney Shoe Co. v. Richmond F. & V. Chapman, 38 N. H. 14, 75 Am. p. R. Co., 116 Va. 211, 81 S. E. Dec. 158; Cooper v. Louanstein, 93. 37 N. J. Eq. 284; Herman •/. 61. Mitchell v. Reid, 192 N. Y. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 37, 7 L. R. \. 255, 85 N. E. 65; Redemptorists 226, 16 Am. St. Rep. 800, 23 N. v. Wenig, 79 Md. 348, 29 Atl. 667. E. 442; Hotchkiss v. Young, 42 See Reese Hiowell Oo. v. Brown, Ore. 446, 71 Pac. 324; Mercantilo 48 Utah, 142, 158 Pac. 684. Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 1330 Real Property. [§ 367 the grantee inade for a considerable time a more limited use of the land than that justified by the grant cannot affect the construction of a grant which is in terms unambiguous.*'^ It has been said in one state that the owner of an easement in the land of another need not use it in the particular manner prescribed by the instrument which creates it, and may use it in a different manner, pro- vided he does not increase the servitude or change it to the injury of the servient tenement.^^ The exact mean- ing of this statement does not clearly appear. It can hardly mean that one having an easement of a certain character can substitute an easement of a different character, provided this does not operate to the preju- dice of the servient tenement.^^ The statement was made on the authority of decisions that in the case of an easement to flow land or to have water pass to one's 62. Fox V. Millar, 150 Fed. 320; Winslow v. City of Vallejo, 148 Cal. 723, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 851, 113 Am. St. Rep. 349, 84 Pac. 191; Drummond v. Foster, 107 Me. 401, 78 Atl. 470; Blais v. Clare, 207 Mass. 67, 92 N. E. 1009; Onthank v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 194; Bernero v. McFarland Real Estate Co., 134 Mo. App. 290, 114 S. W. 531; Mer- cantile Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 235 Pa. 5, 83 Atl. 592; Cram v. Chase, 35 R. I. 98, 43 L. R. A. N. S. 824, 85 Atl. 642; Sked V Pennington. Spring Water Co., 72 N. J. 599, 65 Atl. 713. So when one having an ease- ment of light availed himself of such easement by maintaining windows in a wall for many years, this was regarded as lix- ing the character and extent of the easement. Kesseler v. Bow- ditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N. E. 887. 63. Bowers v. Myers, 237 Pa. 533, 85 Atl. 860; Hammond v. Hammond, 250 Pa. 51, 101 Atl. 855. This, even though the per- son having the easement con- sented to an erection which pre- vented it full exercise. Cotting V. Murray, 209 Mass. 133, 95 N. E. 212. 64. Tallon v. City of Hoboken, 60 N. J. L. 212, 37 Atl. 895, it being there decided that if one dedicating land for a street re- served the right to lay tracks for horse cars and steam cars he could lay tracks and string wires for electric cars. 65. See United States Pipe Line Co. V. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 254. 42 L. R. A. 572. § 367] Easements. 1331 land, the use to which the water is put is immaterial.^® These decisions do not appear to support the statement. If the owTier of an easement enters on the servient tenement for a purpose not included in the rightful exercise of the easement, he is liable as a trespasser to the same extent as if he had no easement."^ Rights of way. A right of way appurtenant to a particular tenement, as being intended for the pur- pose of access to and egress from such tenement, can- not be utilized by the owner of such tenement for the purpose of reaching other land.^^ He may, however, after going to the dominant tenement by the right of way, pass to a place beyond, if he did not have this in mind when going to the dominant tenement, the ques- tion being of his bona fides in making use of the way.''^ 66. Luttrell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. S7; Sanders v. Norman, 1 B. & Aid. 258; Johnston v. Hyde, 33 N. J. Eq. 632; Angell, Water- courses, §§ 228-230. 67. Kaler v. Beaman, 49 Me. £07; Appleton v. FuUerton, 1 Gray (Mass.) 186; Ganley v. Looney, 14 Allen (Mass.) 40; El- liott V. Rhett, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 405, 57 Am. Dec. 750. 68. Howell V. King, 1 Mod. 190; Colchester v. Roberts, 4 Mees. & W. 769; West v. Louis- ville & N. R. Co., 137 Ala. 568, r.4 So. 852; Anderson v. Sweeney, 82 Conn. 694, 75 Atl. 76; Good- willie Co. V. Commonwealth Elec- tric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272; Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malott, 130 Ind. 21, 29 N. E. 412; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. V. Malott, 135 Ind. 113, 34 N. E. 709; Albert v. Thomas, 73 Md. 1, 20 Atl. 912; Davenport v. Lamson, 21 Pick. Ulass.) 72; Greene v. Canny, 137 Mass. 64; Randall v. Grant, 210 Mass. 302, 96 N. E. 672; French V. Marstin, 32 N. H. 316; Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 Atl. 606; Hales v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 172 N. C. 104, 90 S. E. 11; Shroder V. Brenneman, 23 Pa. St. 348; Springer v. Mclntyre, 9 W. Va. 196; Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 8 L. R. A. 617, 45 N. W. 414. So it was held that one could not bring materials to the dom- inant tenement by a right of way appertaining thereto, and after leaving them there a short time, carry them to a point beyond, to be used in the construction of buildings. Skull v. Glenister. 16 C. B. (N. S.) 81. 69. Williams v. James, L. R. 2 C. P. 577; French v. Marstin, 32 N. H. 316. The use of a right of way for access to a highway stands on a different basis, and the owner of the dominant tene- 1332 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 367 A right of way may be general, as capable of use for all purposes, or may be limited to use by foot passengers only, or horses only, or particular species of vehicles, or for the transportation of certain classes of articles.'^^ So one may have a right of way for carriages, without the right of driving cattle along the way, or of using it for the transportation of farm products ;'^^ or he may have a w^ay for agricultural purposes, without any right to transport other classes of articles, such as coal taken from the dominant tene- ment.'^- A grant in general terms will ordinarily be con- strued as creating a general right of way cai>able of use for all reasonable purposes,'^ but the circum- stances may demand a different construction,^^ as for instance when the physical condition of the servient tenement is such that a general user of the way would involve an injury to such tenement,'^ and the named ment may go therefrom to the highway, though he intends there- after to go from the highway to a point beyond, since this is the obvious purpose of a right of way to a highway. Colchsster v. Roberts, 4 Mees. & W. 769. 70. As a privilege of trans- porting wood (Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71), stone (Hoosier Stone Co. V. Malott, 130 Ind. 21, 29 N. E. 412; Shoemaker v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. & N. W. R. Co., 45 Minn. 366, 48 N. W. 191), or coal (Webber v. Vogel, 159 Pa. 235, 28 Atl. 226). 71. Ballard v. Dyson, 1 Taunt. 2'i9; Herman v. Boberts, 119 N. Y. 37, 16 Am. St. Rep. 800; Perry V. Snow, 165 Mass. 23; Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71. 72. Cowling v. Higginson, 4 Mees. & W. 245. That an automobile was a car- riage within a grant of a right of way for carriages, see Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 Atl. 606. 73. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Mann, 160 111. App. 649; Frost V. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 1, 90 N. E. 357; Randall v. Grant, 210 Mass. 302, 96 N. E. 672; Abbott v. But- jer, 59 N. H. 317; Shreve v. Math- is, 63 N. J. Eq. 170, 52 Atl. 234; Arnold v. Fee, 148 N. Y. 214, 238, 42 N. E. 588; Bowers v. Myers, 237 Pa. 533, 85 Atl. 860; Central Christian Chui-ch v. Lennon, 59 Wash. 425, 109 Pac. 1027; United Land Co. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 10 Ch. App. 586. 74. See Cannon v. Villars, 8 Ch. Div. 420. 75. Rov/ell v. Daggett, 143 Mass. 483, 10 N. E. 182. ^ 367] Easements. 133: width of the way may be such as to render it apparent that a foot way only is intended."^^ A right of way may, by the terms of the grant, be limited to certain seasons" or persons,^ « or even to a particular time of day.'^ It may also be subject to interruption by reason of a particular use that may be made by the owner of the servient tenement.^'^ In the absence of express restrictions in that re- gard in the grant, it seems that all persons who can be regarded as having peraiission, express or implied, to enter on the dominant tenement, may use a way for the purpose of access to such tenement and of egress therefrom.^^ Consequently members of the family of the dominant owner,^^ i^[^ servants and employees,^=^ his guests,^^ and tradesmen and other persons with whom he does business,^^ may do so. Such persons are 76. Perry v. Snow, 165 Mass. 13, 42 N. E. 117. 77. Wells V. Tolman, 156 N. Y. 636, 51 N. E. 392. 78. Hollins v. Verney, 13 Q. B. D. 304. 79. Collins v. Slade, 23 Week- ly Rep. 199. 80. Wells V. Tolman 156 N. Y. 636, 51 N. E. 392; Mercer v. Woodgate. L. R. 5 Q. B. 26. 81. Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N. J. Eq. 170, 52 Atl. 234; Gunson v. Healy, 100 Pa. 42. 82. Griffith v. Rigg, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 463, 37 S. W. 58; Bax- endale v. North Lambeth Liberal, etc., Club (1902) 2 Ch. 427. 83. Metcalfe v. Westaway, 34 T^. .1. C. P. 113; Cleaves v. Bra- man, 103 Me. 154, 68 Atl. 857; Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N. J. Etj. 170, 52 Atl. 234. 84. Baxendale v. North Lam- beth Liberal Club (1902) 2 Ch. 427. 85. Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N. J. Eq. 170, 52 Atl. 234; Common- wealth V. Burford, 225 Pa. 93, 73 Atl. 1064. In Tutwiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co. V. Tuvin, 158 Ala. 657, 48 So. 79, it was apparently held that a person was not justified in using a way to go to a residence to collect a furniture bill unless circumstances appeared showing an invitation to such person on the part of the person entitled to the way, to use the way, or his consent to such use. It would seem that the purchase of the furniture might have been re- garded as justifying the inference that the purchaser consented to have the vendor send to collect the bill. The court emphasises the fact that the way was one of necessity, but it is difficult to see the materialty of this consider- ation. 1334 Real Property. [§ 367 not guilty of trespass in using the way, and the owner of the easement would, it seems, have a right of action in case there was an interference with the use of the way by a member of one of these classes. The owner of the right of way may have, in some cases, in addition to the privilege of passage, and as in- cidental thereto, the privilege of placing goods tempo- rarily on that part of the servient tenement on which the w^ay is located,^*^"^^ of letting horses and carriages stand thereon,®^ or of swinging a gate thereover.^^ The grant of a right of way in general terms has been construed as not enabling the grantee to lay a pipe for the transpor- tation of gas or oil,^*^ to string electric light wires,^^ to fence off the way,^- or to take ice,^^ or herbage.^'' One to whom was granted a right of way across a creek was regarded as entitled to build a bridge although for twenty years after the grant there was merely a ford.*'"*'* The person entitled to use a private way cannot deviate therefrom on the land outside of the way be- cause the way is impassable, unless, perhaps, there is an obligation upon the servient owner to repair the 86-87. Appleton v. FuUerton, 1 A. 512, 33 Am. St. Rep. 55, 52 Gray (Mass.) 186. Compare Kaler N. W. 590; Contra, Murray v. V. Beanaii, 49 Me. 207. Murray v. Dickson, 57 Tex. Civ. 88. Van O'Linda v. Lathrop, 21 620, 123 S. W. 179, where there Pick. (AFass.) 292, 32 Am. Dec. were circumstances to show that 261. it was contemplated that the way 89. Ditto. was to be used for driving cattle, 90. United States Pipe Line and Harvey v. Crane, 85 Mich. Co. V. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 316, 12 L. R. A. 601, 48 N. W. 62 N. J. L. 254, 42 L. R. A. 572, 582, where the right of way was 41 Atl. 759; Allen v. Scheib, 257 not created by grant but was laid Pa. 6, 101 Atl. 102. off under the statute. 91. Carpenter v. Capital Elec- 93. Julian v. Woodsmall,' 82 trie Co., 178 111. 29, 43 L. R. A. Ind. 568. 645, 69 Am. St. Rep. 286, 52 N. E. 94. Emans v. Turnbull, 2 973. Johns. (N. Y.) 313, 3 Am. Dec. 92. Moffitt V. Lytle, 165 Pa. 427. 173, 30 Atl. 922; Wiley v. Ball, 94a. Hammond v Hammond, 72 W. Va. 683, 79 S. E. 659; Sizer 258 Pa. 51, 101 Atl. 855. V Quinlan, 82 Wis. 390, 16 L. R. § 367] Easements. 1335 way,^^ or unless tlie latter has caused the obstruction of the way."*' Location. If the location and limits of the right of way are not defined in the grant, a reasonably convenient and suitable way is presumed to be in- tended, and the right cannot be exercised over the whole of the land."^ Subject to the requirement of reasonable convenience and suitability, the owmer of the servient tenement may ordinaril}'-, in such case, fix the location, and it has been considered that if he fails to do so, the owner of the easement is entitled to fix it."* And this is the case as regards a way of necessity to the same extent as any other way created by grant."^ 95. Taylor v. Whitehead, 2 Dou?. 7^5; Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah, 205, 97 Pac. 33. 96. Selby v. Nettlefold, 9 Ch. App. Ill; Farnum v. Piatt, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 339; Bass v. Ed- wards, 126 I\Iass. 445; Kent v. Judkins, 53 Me. 162; Rockland Water Co. v. Tillson, 75 Me. 170; Haley v. Colcord, 59 N. H. 7, 47 Am. Rep. 176; Jarsdadt v. Smith, 51 Wis. 96. Contra, Williams v. Safford, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 309. See Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 507. 97. Long V. Gill, 80 Ala. 408; Johnson v. Kinnicutt. 2 Cush. (Mass.) 153; Gardner v. Webster, 64 N. H. 520, 15 Atl. 144; Grafton V. Moir, 130 N. Y. 465, 27 Am. St. Rep. 533, 29 N. E. 974 (reser- vation). 98. Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 110 Pac. 118. Shedd v. Amer- ica Maize Products Co., 60 Ind. App. 146, 108 N. E. 610; Bangs v. Parker, 71 Me. 458; MoKenney McKenney, 216 Mass. 248, 103 N. E. 631; Bunch v. Wheeler, 210 Mo. 622, 109 S. W. 654; Callen v Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 97 N. W. 973; Smith v. Wiggin, 52 N. H. 112; Peduzzi v. Restelli, 79 Vt. 349, 64 Atl. 1128; Stephens v. Gor- don, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 61. In Mo- Kell V. Collins Colliery Co., 46 W. Va. 625, 33 S. E. 765, it is said that the owner of the way may locate it. The opinion refers to Hart V. Connor, 25 Conn. 331, but there the right to locate the way was expressly reserved 99. Gale, Easements [8th ed.] 1982; Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 62, n Pac. 879; Ritchey v. Welsh. 149 Ind. 214, 40 L. R. A. 105, 4S N. E. 1031; Russell v. .Tackson, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 574; Bass v. Edwards, 126 Mass. 445; Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 51 Am. Rep. 154; Herrin v. Siebern, 46 Mont. 226, 127 Pac. 323; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 507; Capers v. Wil- son. .3 McCord, (S. C.) 170; McMil- 1336 Real Property. [§ 867 In case tliere has been, up to tlie time of the grant and at the time thereof, a user of the land for purposes of passage along a certain line, this will, it has been said, be presumed to be the location intended.^ Frequently, the location of the way is determined by subsequent agreement, ^^ or by the exercise of the right of way in a particular line with the acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement,^ the parties to the grant thus placing their own construction thereon in this regard. The power of a court of equity to fix the location has been recognized in a number of cases,'' apparently len V. McKee, 129 Tenn. 39, 164 S. W. 1197; Jenne v. Piper, 69 Vt. 497, 38 Atl. 147. But not, it has been said, when the way of necessity resulted from a partition proceeding between several persons, so that the re- cognition of an option to locate in one of them would involve a power to discriminate between the others. Mesmer v. Uharriet, 174 Cal. 110, 162 Pac. 104. 1. Karnmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa, 352; Cotting v. Murray, 209 Mass. 133, 95 N. E. 212; Thompson V. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 131 Mich. 95, 90 N. W. 1037; Crocker v. Crocker, 5 Hun, (N. Y.) 587; Kraut's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 64; Kinney v. Hooker, 65 Vt. 333, 36 Am. St. Rep. 864. la. Gerrish v. Shattuck, 128 Mass. 571; Eureka Land Co. v. Watts, 119 Va. 506, 89 S. E. 968; See Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah, 243, 161 Pac. 1127. 2. Roberts v. Stevens, 40 111. App. 138; Dickenson v. Crowell, 120 Iowa, 254, 94 N. W. 495; Roland V. O'Neal, (Ky.) 122 S. W. 827, (way of necessity) ; Bannon v. An- gier, 2 Allen (Mass.) 128; O'Brien V. Goodrich, 177 Mass. 32, 58 N. E 151; Board of Sup'i^ of Lamar County V. Elliott, 107 Miss. 841, 66 So. 203; Davis v. Watson, 89 Mo. App. 15; Wynkoop v. Burger, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 222; Crocker v. Crocker, 5 Hun, (N. Y.) 587; Warner v. Columbus, etc., R. Co. 39 Ohio St. 70; Eureka Land Co. v. Watts, 119 Va. 506, 89 S. E. 968; Fritsche v. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 266, 45 N. W. 1088; Kalinowski v. Jacobowski, 52 Wash. 359, 100 Pac. 852. But it was held that the acqui- escence by the servient owner in the passage by the dominant owner over a particular line did not show a location of the way in this line if the condition of the servient tenement was such that it was immaterial where the other passed. Smith v. Wiggin, 52 N. H. 112. And see Colt v. Redfield, 59 Conn. 427, 22 Atl. 426. 3. Lide v. Hadley, 36 Ala. 627, 76 Am. Dec. 338; Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 110 Pac. 118; David- son V. Ellis, 9 Cal. App. 145, 98 Pac. 254; McKenney v. McKen- § 367] Easements. 1337 on the ground that a multiplicity of suits is thereby avoided. Width of way. As regards the width of the way, a specific statement in the grant obviously gov- erns,^ and such a statement is not controlled by con- siderations as to what is reasonable or necessary.^ A specification of the way as being of a certain width has been regarded as not entitling the grantee to utilize more than that width in order to be able to make a road of that width.*^ If the Avidth is not fixed by the terms of the grant, the grantee is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width as is sufficient to afford reasonable access and egress.'^ And if the way is granted for a particular purpose, what is reasonably necessary for that purpose is to be considered.^ That the grantee used a particular width with the acquiescence of the grantor has been regarded as controlling in this regard as a x>i'actical location of the way.^ And the particular grant may call for a ney, 216 Mass. 248, 103 N. E. a way three feet wide, the alley 6731; Burnham v. Mahoney, 222 being clearly defined by per- Mass. 524, 111 N. E. 396; Higbee manent structures as an alley less Fishing Club v. Atlantic City than three feet wide. The refer- Electric Co., 78 N. J. Es. ence to width was obviously not a 434, 79 Atl. 326 (way of statement of the width of the way necessity) ; Gardner v. Webster, 64 to be exercised, but merely an in- N- H. 520, 15 Atl. 144; McMillan accurate description of the place V. MfKee, 129 Tenn. 39, 164 S W. where it was to be exercised. 1197 (way of necessity). 7. Bright v. Allan, 203 Pa. 386; 4. See Stetson v. Curtis, 119 Lipsky v. Heller, 199 Mass. 310, 85 Mass. 266; Gray v. Kelley, 194 N. E. 453; Walker v. Pierce, 38 Vt. Mass. 533, 80 N. E. 651. 94; Wiley v. Ball, 72 W. Va. 685, 5. Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 79 S. E. 659. 673, 110 Pac. 118. 8. Drummond v. Foster, 107 6. Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. Me. 401, 78 Atl. 470; O'Brien v. 673, 110 Pac. 118; Dewire v. Han- Murphy, 189 Mass. 353, 75 N. E. ley, 79 Conn. 454, Atl. 573. ''^'Il- ^ ^ _,„ V o* o* *r,T^t.., 9- George V. Cox, 1 14 Mass. 382. In Stevenson v. Stewart, 7 Phila. iq. Salisbury v. Andrews, 19 29.3, it was considered that a grant pick. (Mass.) 250; Gerrish v. of a right to use an alley three Shattuck. 128 Mass. 571; Steven- feet wide did not give a right to son v. Stewart, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 293. 1338 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 367 construction as intending a way as already existent and defined by use or paving or the like.^<^ A grant or reser- vation of a right of passage over a space of a named width has been construed as giving a right of way, not of that width, but of merely a convenient width, to be located upon that space. ^^ Change of location. After the point or place at which, or line along which, an easement is to be ex- ercised has once been fixed, whether by the express terms of the grant, or by agreement or acquiescence, one of the parties cannot change such location without the consent of the other.^^ There are in this country, how- ever, several cases to the effect that the location of a way may be changed by oral agreement of the parties, or agreement inferred from conduct. ^^ These But a grant of a right of way over an existing road does not necessarily involve a right of way as to the whole width of the road, so as to preclude the erection of an obstruction on the road not interfering with the reasonable exercise of the ease- ment. Grafton v. Moir, 130 N. Y 465, 29 N. E. 974, 27 Am. St. Rep. 533; Abney v. Twombley, 39 R. I. 304, 97 Atl. 806; Clifford v. Hoare, L. R. 9 C. P. 362. "See Gimble v. Wehr, 165 Wis. 1, 160 N. W. 1080. 11. Johnson v. Kinnicut, 2 Gush. (Mass.) 153; Short v. De- vine, 146 Mass. 119, 15 N. E. 148. In Cleaves v. Braman, 103 Me. 154, 68 Atl. 857, it was held that the grant of a way over "a piece of land forty feet wide in every part" did not entitle the grantee to use the whole forty feet if not needed. Compare Tudor Ice Co. v. Cunningham, 8 Allen (Mass.) 139. 12. Richey v. Welsh, 149 Ind. 214, 40 L. R. A. 105, 48 N. E. 1031; Jenuison v. Walker, 11 Gray, (Mass.) 423 (aqueduct) ; Kesseler V. Bowditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N. E. 887 (windows) ; Galloway V. Wilder, 26 Mich. 97; Jaqui v. Johnson, 27 N. J. Eq. 526; Man- ning V. Port Reading R. Co., 54 N. J. Eq. 46, 33 Atl. 802; John- son V. Hahne, 61 N. J. Eq. 438, 49 Atl. 5 (easement of light) ; Onthank v. Lake Shore R. Co., 71 N. Y. 174 (aqueduct) ; Moore- Lead V. Snyder, 31 Pa. 514 (tail race) ; Garraty v. Duffy, 7 R. I. 476; Eureka Land Co. v. Watts, 119 Va. 506, 89 S. E. 968 (way); Rhoades v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 145, 102 Pac. 884 (right to take water from stream). 13. Durkee v. Jones, 27 Colo. 159, 60 Pac. 618; Peck v. Lloyd, 38 Conn. 566; Wynkoop v. Burger, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 222; Hamilton § 367] Easements. 1339 cases do not explain how, since an easement can be created only by grant or its equivalent, one can ac- quire, by oral agreement, an easement not previously existing, even though he does, in exchange therefor, relinquish a similar easement which he has in the same land. A right of wa}^ along line A is not the same ease- ment as a right of way along line B, even though the dominant and servient tenements are identical in the two cases. There are cases in this country,^* as in England, ^^ in which the view is indicated that the substituted way is to be regarded as temporary only, so that if such way is withdrawn by the owner of the servient tenement, the other has a right to use the old way. If, however, there is an intention permanently to change the route, it might well be found, it would seem, that the way over the old route is extinguished by abandonment.^*' And in ease the owner of the ease- ment makes expenditures on the servient tenement on the faith of the oral agreement, he might be regarded as acquiring an easement in accordance therewith by estoppel. '' The court would no doubt endeavor to avoid a finding that the easement over the original route was abandoned unless it could recognize a valid easement over the new route. V White, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 60; gerald, 70 Vt. 468, 41 Atl. 504 Smith V. Barnes, 101 Mass. 275; Tee Mary Helen Coal Co. v. Hat- Chenault v. Gravitt, 27 Ky. L. field, 75 W. Va. 148, 83 S. E. Rep. 403, 85 S. W. 184; Berkey & 292. Gay Furniture Co. v. Valley City 14. Wright v. Willis, 23 Ky. Milling Co., 194 Mich. 234, 160 Law Rep. 556, 63 S. W. 991; N. W. 648; Rumill v. Robbins, 77 Hamilton v. White, 5 N. Y. 9. Me. 193 (way of necessity) ; Tar- 15. Lovell v. Smith, 3 C. B. N. butt V. Grant, 94 Me. 371, 47 Atl. S. 120. 899; Smith v. Lee, 14 Gray 16. Crounse v. Wemple, 29 N. (Mass.) 473; Gage v. Pitts, 8 Y. 540; Pope v. Devereux, 5 Gray Allen (Mass.) 531; Davidson v. iMass.) 409. Nichols v. Peck, 70 Kretz, 127 Minn. 313, 149 N. W. Conn. 439, 40 L. R. A. 81, 66 Am. 652; Lawton v. Tison, 12 Rich. St. Rep. 122, 39 Atl. 830. (S. C.) 88; Stockwell v. Fit/.- 17. Ante, § 366(c). 1340 Real. Peoperty. [§ 367 Party walls. The grant of an easement to use a wall for party wall purposes prima facie involves the privilege of increasing the height of the wall in order to erect a higher building, if this does not unduly burden the wall, or in any way operate to the detri- ment of the adjoining proprietor,^^ and subject to any express restriction in the grant as to the height to which the easement mav extend. ^^ 18. Graves v. Smith. 87 Ala. 450, 13 Am. St. Rep. 60, 6 So. 304; Tate v. Fratt, 112 Cal. 613, 44 Pac. 1061; Bright v. Bacon & Sons, 131 Ky. 848, 116 S. W. 386, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 386; Field v. Leiter, 118 111. 17, 6 N. E. 877; Everett v. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588, 5 L. R. A. 110, 14 Am. St. Rep. 462, 22 N. E. 52; Dauen- hauer v. Devine, 51 Tex. 480, 32 Am. Rep. 627. That he can raise the wall to the extent that it is on his own land, see Andrae v. Haseltine, 58 Wis. 395, 46 Am. Rep. 635. That he may raise a party wall al- though it is entirely on the land of the adjacent owner, see Tata V. Fratt, 112 Cal. 613, 44 Pac. 1061; Dorsey v. Habersack, 84 Md. 117, 35 Atl. 96. It has been held, in at least one case, that, upon using the addition to the wall, the other proprietor is bound to contribute tart of the cost. Sanders v. Martin, 2 Lea. (Tenn.) 213, 31 Am. Rep. 598, And Citizens Fire Ins. Co. V. Lockridge & Ridge- way, 132 Ky. 1, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, 116 S. W. 303, contains a dictum to that effect. Contra, Allen V. Evans, 161 Mass. 485. The assumption in Walker v. Stetson, 162 Mass. 86, that he is so bound, appears to be based on the language of the original agreement under which the wall was constructed. The statute oc- casionally provides that he shall be so liable. Howell v. Goss, 128 Iowa, 569, 105 N W. 61; Younker v. McCatchcn, 177 Iowa, 634, L. R. A. 1917B, 949, 159 N. W. 441. The grant of a right to insert girders in a wall or to build against the wall does not con- fer party wall rights, so as to entitle the grantee to raise the wall. Moore v. Rayner, 58 Md. 411; Miller v. Stuart, 107 Md. 23, 68 Atl. 273. 19. Frowenfelf v. Casey, 139 CaL 421, 73 Pac. 152; Henne v. Lankershim, 146 Cal. 70, 79 Pac. 853; Calmelet v. Sichl, 48 Neb. 505, 67 N. W. 467, 58 Am. St. Rep. 700; Fidelity Lodge v. Bond, 147 Ind. 437, 45 X. E. 338, 46 N. B. 825. It appears to be the rule in England that if the a'jjoining owners are tenants in common or' the wall, one of them cannot raise the wall without the others consent. Watson v. Gray, 12 Ch. Div. 192. A contrary view is as- § 367] Easements. 1341 « All additiou thus made to tlio wall by virtue of one's right to use the wall as a party wall partakes of the character of the ori2inal wall, as regards the right of user thereof.^*^^ And the requirement which exists in the case of the original wall, when placed on the division line, that it contain no openings, such as windows, ^^'^ applies as well to the addition placed upon the wall.2o It has been decided in one case that when a party wall is erected one-half on each of the two adjoining properties, one proprietor can extend his beams into the waU only so far as the limits of his own land,-^ and there are occasional intimations to this effect in other cases.2- There cannot well be, however, any absolute rule to this effect. A could no doubt grant to B in express terms the privilege of extending his beams entirely through the wall, and in any case the extent to which beams can be inserted is a question of the con- struction of the "party wall agreement," that is, of the grant of the easement, in each particular case, the usage of builders in that community being a weighty consideration in this connection. If the wall is en- tirely on the land of one proprietor, the adjoining pro- prietor, having a party wall easement therein, has al- most necessarily the i)rivilege of extending lieams in the serted in Wallis v. First Nat. Iowa, 634, L. R. A. 1917B, 949. Bank of Racine, 155 Wis. 305, 159 N. W. 441 (statute). 143 N. W. 670. 19b. I'o.^t, this section, note 19a. Graves v. Smith, 87 Ala.. 31. 450, 13 Am. St. Rep. 60; Allen v. 20. Graves v. Smith. 87 Ala. Evans. 161 Mass. 485. See Field 450, 13 Am. St. Rep, 60, 6 So. V Leiter, 118 111. 17. 304; Dauenhauer v. Devine, 51 For cases construing a contract Tex. 480, 32 Am. Rep. 627. as requiring contribution to the 21. Lederer & Strauss v. Col- cost of such an addition only for onial Investment Co.. 130 Iowa. £. building subsequently erected, 157, 8 Ann. Cas. 317. lOfi X. W. see Shaw v. Hitchcock, 119 Mass. 357. 254; Fox v. Mission Free School. 22. McMinn v. Karter, 116 Ala. 120 Mo. 349, 25 S. W. 172. And 390, 22 So. 17: Walker v. Stetson, see Tounker v. McCutchen, 177 162 Mass. 86, 38 N. E. IS. 2 R. P.— 10 1342 Real Peopeety. [§ 367 wall beyond the limits of his own land, and there is no legal objection to his having that privilege when the wall is ])artially on his own land. One of the two adjoining owners cannot ordinarily remove or impair the party wall,^^ except as such re- moval or impairment is merely temporary and for the 'purpose of strengthening the wall or substituting there- for another wall more suitable for his purposes.^^ Even in the latter case he is liable for any damage caused to the other by his failure properly to support and protect the latter 's property during the operation,^^ or, if it is left to the other to protect his property, the latter is entitled to be indemnified the necessary ex- penses of such protection.^^ It does not seem that one altering a party wall by raising it or otherwise is ab- solutely liable for any injury which may result to the other in the course of the work. He is merely bound to use diligence to prevent such injury.^^ 23. Nippert v. Warneke, 125 Cal. 501. 61 Pac. 270; Montgomery v. Trustees of Ma- sonic Han, 70 Ga. 38; Schile v. Brokhahus. 80 N. Y. 619; Briggs V. Klosse, 5 Ind. App. 129, 51 Am. St. Rep. 238, 31 N. E. 208; Baugh- er V. Wilkins, 16 Md. 35, 77 Am. Dec. 279. But see Hieatt v. Mor- ris. 10 Ohio St. 523, 78 Am. Dec. 280. Clemens v. Speed, 93 Ky. 284, 19 L. R. A. 240, 19 S. W. 660; WiUiamson Inv. Co. v. Wil- liamson. 96 \\Tash. 529, 165 Pac. 385. 24. Eno V Del Vecchio, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 53, 6 Duer, 17; Putzel V. Drovers & M. Nat. Bank, 78 Md. 349, 44 Am. St. Rep. 298, 22 L. R. A. 632, 28 Atl. 276; Lex- ington Lodge V. Beal, 94 Miss. 521, 49 So. 833; Mann v. Riegler, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 774, 111 S. W. 300; Bellenot v. Laube, 104 Va. 842, 52 S. E. 698. That he cannot sub- stitute another wall, see Partridge V. Lyon, 67 Hun, 29, 21 N. Y. Supp. 848. In some states the statute authorizes him to make alter- ations in the wall for his own purposes. Fowler v Saks, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 570, 7 L. R. A. 649; Haine v. ;Merrick, 41 La. Ann. 194. Evans v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34. 25. Eno V. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 53, 6 Duer. 17. 26. Putzel V. Drovers & M. Nat. Bank, 78 M'd. 349, 44 Am. St. Rep. 298, 22 L. R. A. 632, 28 Atl. 276. 27. Negus V. Becker, 143 N. \^ 303, 25 L. R. A. 667, 42 Am. St. Rep. 68, 38 N. E. 290, explaining Brooks V. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639, § 3G7] Easements. 1343 If the wall is in a ruinous or unsafe condition, one proprietor may repair it or replace it by a new wall, and he is not liable for the cost of protecting the ad- joining property during the prosecution of the work, or for any loss necessarily incident thereto, as of business or rent,-^ though he is liable for any injury caused by negligence in the doing of the work.-^ There is at least one. decision to the effect that, if the party wall becomes unsafe or ruinous, it may be re- built by one of the adjoining owners, and the other will be compelled to pay part of the cost,-^^ A grant of the privilege of placing on the grantor's land a wall to be used as a party wall does not ordinarily enable the grantee to place thereon a wall with openings, such as windows, therein, the expression party wall meaning prima facie a solid wall.^^ A right to have openings in the wall may, however, be in- cluded in the grant,^^ or rather, as the owner of the land may grant the privilege of placing or maintaining 10 Am. Rep. 545; Lexington. Lodge 401; Bellenot v. Laube's Ex'r, 104 V. Beal, 94 Miss. 521, 49 So. 833. Va. 842, 52 S. E. 698; Sanders See Putzel v. Drovers & M. Nat. v. Martin, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 213. Bank, 78 Md. 349, 44 Am. St. Rep. 31. Bartley v. Spaulding, 21 298, 22 L. R. A. 632, 28 Atl. 275, Dist. Col. 47; Kuh v. O'Reilly, 261 and Heine v. Merrick, 41 La. Ann. 111. 437, 104 N. E. 5; Bonney v. 194, 5 So. 760, 6 So. 637. Compare Greenwood, 96 Me. 335, 52 Atl. Fleming v. Cohen, 186 Mass. 323, 786; Coggins & Owens v. Carey, 104 Am. St. Rep. 572, 71 N. E. 106 Md. 204, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 563. 1191, 124 Am. St. Rep. 468, 66 28. Partridge V. Gilbert, 15 N. Atl. 673; Norraille v. Gill, 159 Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632; Maypole Mass. 427, 38 Am. St. Rep. 441, V. Forsyth, 44 111. App. 494; Craw- 34 N. E. 94; Harber v. Evans, 101 Shaw V. Sumner, 56 Mo. 517; Hoff- Mo. 661, 10 L. R. A. 41, 20 Am. man v. Kuhn, 57 Miss. 746, 34 Am. St. Rep. 646, 14 S. W. 750; De Rep. 491. Baun v. Moore, 167 N. Y. 598, 60 29. Negus V. Becker, 143 N. Y N. E. 1110; Cutting v. Stokes, 72 303; Crawshaw v. Sumner, 56 Mo. Hun. (N. Y.) 376, 25 N. Y. Supp. 517. 365; Holden v. Tidwell, 37 OkU. 30. Campbell v. Mesnr, 4 553, 133 Pac. 54. Dauenhauer v. Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334. See How/e Devine, 51 Tex. 480, 32 Am. Rep. v. Whitehead, 93 Miss. 578, 46 So. 627. 1344 Eeal Pkoperty. [§ 368 a solid wall on Ms land, so be may grant the privilege of placing or maintaining thereon a wall with open- ings.^^ It has been said that the right to have openings in a partition wall may be acquired by prescription,^^ but this appears to be questionable.^^ The grant of the j)rivilege of jjlacing or maintain- ing a wall in part on one's land may expressly include a right to have flues therein.^^ Or there may be an implied grant of such a right based on the existence of the flues before the severance of ownership of the two properties."' Whether the grant of the privilege of erecting a wall, or of utilizing it, for party wall pur- poses, involves a right to maintain flues therein, is a question of construction, in the solution of which the practice of builders in that community as regards the placing of flues in party walls is entitled to considera- tion.^^ § 368. Easements created by prescription. In the case of prescriptive easements, the mode and extent of user of the servient tenement permissible are determined, generally speaking, by the mode and extent 32. Grimley v. Davidson, 13?> 37. Ingals v. Plamandon, 75 111. 116, 24 N. E. 439; Weigmann 111. 118; De Baun v. Moore, 167 V. Jones, 163 Pa. 330, 30 Atl. 198; X. Y. 598, 60 N. E. 1110. Reynolds v. Union Sav. Bank, 155 In Koolbeck v. Baaighn, 126 Iowa, 519, 136 N. W. 529. Iowa, 194, it was held that in. 33. Lengyel v. Meyer, 70 N. J. view of a statutory provision that Eq. 501, 62 Atl. 548; Dunscomb the builder of the wall shall V. Randolph, 107 Tenn. 89, 89 Am. insert flues at the request of St. Rep. 915, 64 S. W. 21; Stein v. the other, such other, having failed Bernsforj, 108 Minn. 177, 121 N. to make such request, cannot W. 879. Hammann v. Jordan, 129 utilize flues placed in the wall by N. Y. 61, 29 N. E. 294. the buil'der, though they extend 34. Graves v. Smith, 87 Ala. over the limits of his lot. 450, 5 L. R. A. 298, 13 Am. St. 38. See Hammann v. Jordan, Rep. 60, 6 So. 308. 129 N. Y. 61, 29 N. E. 294; De 35. Post § 517. Baun v. Moore, 167 N. Y. 598, 60 36. Pier v. Salot, — (Iowa), N. E. 1110. — , 107 N. W. 420. § 369] Easements. 1345 of the user during the prescriptive periocl.^*^ Accord- ingly a prescriptive right to divert or pollute water enables one to divert or pollute it to the extent to which the diversion or pollution extended during such peri- od,^ ^ and one having a prescriptive right to overflow another's land can overflow it to the extent to w^hich he was accustomed to overflow it during the prescriptive period.^"* But a question of very considerable difficulty may arise by reason of the assertion, by the person entitled to the easement, of a right of user of the same general character and extent as the prescriptive user, but varying in some degree therefrom. This matter is considered elsewhere in connection with the subject of prescription.*"'^ § 369. Effect of change in dominant tenement. The fact that, after the making of a grant of an easement, there is a change in the mode in which the dominant tenement is utilized, so that as a result thereof the easement is more constantly exercised, has usually been regarded as not aifecting the existence of the easement.*^ Occasionally, however, a different view 39. Wright v. Moore, 38 Ala. lisle v. Cooper, 21 N. J. Eq. 576; 593, 82 Am. Dec. 731; Postle- Gilford v. WMnnipiseogee Lake thwaite v. Payne, 8 Ind. 104; Bar- Co., 52 N. H. 262; Tucker v. ry V. Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95, 33 L. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 13 Ore. R. A. 294, 35 Atl. 170; Prentice v. 28, 7 Pa-o. 53. Sabine v. Johnson, Geiger, 74 N. Y. 341; Lewis v. 35 Wis. 185. New York etc. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 40b. Post, § 531. 202, 56 N. B. 540. Elliott v. Rhett, 41. Greist v. Amrhyn, 80 Conn. 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 405, 57 Am. 280, 68 Atl. 521 (sr'm?>Zf) ; Randall Dec. 750; Arbuckle v. Ward, 29 v. Grant, 210 Mass. 302, 96 N. E. Vt. 43. 672; Parsons v. New York N. H. & 40. Crossley v. Lightowler, 2 H. R. Co., 216 Mass. 269. 103 N. Ch. App. 478; McCallum v. Ger- E. 693; Abbott v. Butler, 59 N. H. mantown Water Co., 54 Pa. St. 317; Kretz v. Fireproof Storage 40, 93 Am. Dec. 656; Middlesex Co., 127 Minn. 304, 149 N. W. 648: Co. V. City of Lowell, 149 Mass. Gillespie v. Weinberg, 148 N. Y. 509, 21 N. E. 872. 238, 42 N. E. 676, P'lint v. Bacon, 40a. Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 13 Hun. (N. Y.) 454; Benner v. 128, 15 Am. St. Rep. 243; Car- Junker, 190 Pa. 423, 43 Atl. 72; 1346 Eeal Pkoperty, [§ 369 was adopted in the particular case,^^ It is, properly speaking, a question of the construction of the grant, tliat is, of whether the parties thereto intended that the easement should ]>e exercised irrespective of a change in the user of the dominant tenement, and, by the weight of authority, the presumption appears to be, as above indicated, that such was the intention. The increase of the burden on the servient tenement is, it would seem, immaterial, except as it may render it less probable that such a change of user was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the grant. In accordance with the view ordinarily taken, that a change in the mode of utilizing the dominant tene- ment does not affect the existence of the easement, is the view generally adopted, that upon the subsequent subdivision of the original dominant tenement, a right of way is appurtenant to each and every part.^^ And Frazier v. Berry, 4 R. I. 440; United Land Company v. Great Eastern. Railway Co., L. R. 10 C'n. 586; Newcomen v. Coulson, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 133; Finch v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 5 Ex. D. 254; White v. Grand Hotel, Eiast- bourne, Limited (1913) 1 Ch. 113. 42. It was held that, where there was a grant of a way to a loft, and the space or opening under the loft then used as a wood house, the way no longer existed after the open space hari been built over and changed into a dwelling house. Allan v. Gom- me, 11 Adol. & E. 759. This de- cision was, however, questioned by Parke, B., in Henning v. Bur- net, 8 Exch. 187. In Wood V. Saunders, 10 Ch. App. 582, it was held that one to whom was granted a right of drainage through adjacent land for the benefit of land on which was a private residence at the time of the grant could not ex- ercise the right for the benefit of large additions made to the house for the purpose of changing it into a sanitarium. See also Great Western Railway v. Talbot (1902) 2 Ch. 759. In Goodwillie v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 X. E. 272, it was held that the grant of a right to use a switch track, in favor of owners of a lumber yard, did not justify the use of the track for carrying coal to an electric plant thereafter con- structed on the site of the lumber yard. 43. Currier v. Howes, 103 Cal. 431, 37 Pac. 521; Sweeney v. Lan- ders Frary & Clark, 80 Conn. 575, 69 Atl. 566; Durkee v. Jones, 27 Colo. 159, 60 Paa 618; Brossart ^ 369] Easements. 1347 the same rule has been applied in connection with an easement of another character.^^ An easement of necessity has been regarded as not limited, as regards its utilization, by the mode in which the dominant tenement was used at the time of the creation of the right, but as available for any use incident to a change in the use of such tenement.^ ^ And accordingly a way of necessity has been regarded as available to each one of various grantees of a part of the tenement to which the way was originally ap- purtenant.^^ In the case of a prescriptive easement, the question whether a change in the dominant tenement atfects the right to exercise the easement depends, in a general way, upon whether the effect of the change is materially to increase the burden upon the ser^dent tenement or alter the character of the user thereof.'*''^ V. Corlett, 27 Iowa, 288; Garrison V. Ru'^d, 19 111. 559; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Dur- kin V. Cobleigh, 156 Mass. 108, 17 L. R. A. 270, 32 Am. St. Rep. 436, 30 N. E. 474; Forbes v. Com- monwealth, 172 Mass. 289, 52 N. E. 511. Moore v. White, 159 Mich. 460, 124 N. W. 62; Dawson v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 15 Minn. 136. (Gil 102), 2 Am. Rep. 109; Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 Atl. 606 ; Lansing V. Wiswwall, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 213. Gunson v. Healy, 100 Pa. 42; Ehret v. Gunn, 166 Pa. 384, 31 Atl. 200; Dee v. King, 77 Vt. 230, 68 L. R. A. 860. 59 Atl. 839; Linkenhofer v. Grayhill, 80 Va. 835; Newcomen v. Coulson, L. R. f. Ch. Div. 141. A different rule "would force every person who has a right of way to preserve his property entire, in order to preserve his passage." Tilgh- man, C. J., in Watson v. Bioren, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 227, 7 Am. Dec. 617. 44. Harris v. Drewe, 2 B. & Ad. 164 (church pew) ; Blood V. Millard, 172 Mass. 65, 51 N. E. 527 (right to take water from spring) ; Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 254, 24 Am. ,Dec. 218 (right to have strip of land left vacant). 45. Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71; Whitticr v. Winkley, 62 N. H. 3^8; Crotty v. New River & Poca- hontas Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233; Contra. Corporation of London v. Riggs, L. B. 13, Ch. Div. 798. 46. Erie R. Co. v. S. H. Klein- man Realty Co., 92 Ohio St. 96, 110 N. E. 527. 46a. Post, § 531. 1M8 Real Peopeety. [§ 370 § 370. Alterations and repairs. Tlie owner of the easement may enter on the servient tenement and make such changes therein as are necessary for the proper exercise of the easement.^'^ Thus, one having a right of way may prepare the land for its exercise, according to the nature of the way, that is, according as it may be a foot way, a horseway, or a way for all teams and carriages.^^ And he may subsequently make alterations in the servient tenement in so far as this may be neces- sitated by a change of conditions for which he is not responsible.^^ He cannot, however, make alterations in the servient tenement, which are not necessary for the exercise of the easement, even though they conduce to tlie convenience of its exercise, if such alterations will injuriously affect the servient tenement.^^ The o^\Tier of the easement may likewise enter on the servient tenement in order to make any repairs necessary to the exercise of the easement, and may make use of the servient tenement for this purpose to a reasonable extent ;^^ and he may even prevent the con- 47. Newcomen v. Coulson, 5 Y. 37, 7 L. R. A. 226, 16 Am. St. Ch. Div. 133; Burris v. People's Rep. 800, 23 N. E. 442. Ditch Co., 104 Cal. 248, 37 Pac. 49. Nichols v. Peck, 70 Conn. 922; White v. Eagle & Phenix 439, 40 L. R. A. 81, 66 Am. St. Hotel Co., 68 N. H. 38, 34 Atl. Rep. 122, 39 Atl. 493; Pinlinson €72; Freeman v. Sayre, 48 N. J. v. Porter, L. R. 10 Q. B. 188. Law, 37; Herman v. Roberts, 119 50. Capers v. McKee, 1 Strob. N. Y. 37, 7 L. R. A. 226, 16 Am. L. (S. Car.) 164; McMillen v. St. Rep ;^00, 23 N. E. 442; Ham- Crouin, 13 Hun (N. Y.) 68; Knud- mond V. Hammond, 258 Pa. 51, ion v. Frost, 56 Colo. 530, 139 ■:01 Atl 855; Wallis v. First Nat. Pac. 533; Hotchkiss v. Young, 42 Bank of Racine, 155 Wis. 306, 143 Ore. 446, '71 Pac. 324; Redemp- N. W. (570. torists v. Wenig, 79 Md. 348, 29 48. fjenhouse v. Christian, 1 Atl. 667; Draper v. Varnerin, 220 Tei-m. Rep. 560; Newcomen v. Mass. 67, 107 N. E. 350. Coulsen, 5 Ch. Div. 133; Knudson 51. Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Wms. V. Frost, 56 Colo. 530, 139 Pac. Saund. 323, note 6; Pico v. Coli- 533; White v. Eagle & Phenix nas, 32 Cal. 578; Lamott v. Hotel Co., 68 N. H. 38, 34 Atl. Ewers, 106 Ind. 310, 55 Am. St. 672; Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Rep. 746, 6 N. E. 636; Hammond § 370] Easements. 1349 struction of a building necessary to the beneficial use of the land, if the building would prevent the making of repairs.^^ In the absence of an express stipulation or prescrip- tive obligation to that effect, there is no requirement that the owner of the servient tenement put or keep it in proper condition for the exercise of the easement, though he must not actively obstruct its exercise.^'' So the fact that the owner of a building has a right of support from an adjoining building does not entitle him to demand that the owner of the latter keep it in repair so as to furnish sufficient support,^^ nor can the owner of an upper floor compel the repair of the lower floor bv the owner thereof.^^ V. Woodman, 41 Me. 177, 66 Am. Dec. 219; Prescott v. White, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 341 ; Brown v. Stone, 10 Gray (Mass.) 61, 69 Am. Dec. 303; McMillan v. Cronin, 75 N. Y. 474; Thompson v. Uglow, 4 Ore. 369; Walker v. Pierce, 38 Vt. 94. In Kepler v. Border, 179 Iowa, 218, 161 N. W. 302, where sev- eral different persons had the right to use a private road, the court made an order apportioning the cost of repairs as between them. 52. Goodhart v. Kyeit, 25 Ch. Dlv. 182. 53. Nichols v. Peck, 70 Conn. 439, 40 L. R. A. 81, 66 Am. St. Rep. 122, 39 Atl. 493; Hastings V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 148 Iowa, 390, 126 N. W. 786; Brid- v.'ell V. Neltner, 173 Ky. 847, 191 S. W. 633; Gillis v. Nelson, 16 La. Ann. 275; Ballard v. Butler, 30 Me. 94; Rowe v. Nally, 81 Md. 367, 32 Atl. 198; Doane v. Bad- ger, 12 Mass. 65; Harvey v. Crane, 85 Mich. 316, 12 L. R. A. 601, 48 N. W. 582; Wynkoop v. Burger, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 222: Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 371: 7 L. R. A. 226, 16 Am. St. Rep. SCO, 23 N. E. 442. So he is under no obligation to fence off a way to which his land is subject. Brill v. Brill, 108 N. Y. 511, 15 N. E. 538; Wiley v. Ball, 72 W. Va. 685, 79 S. E. 659, and in the case of a ditch for the supply of drinking water, it is not prima facie for the owner of the servient tenement to fence off the ditch so that the water will not be polluted by his cattle. Bellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho, 545, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 992, 94 Pac. 103^. And see Mc- Coy V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 176 Iowa, 139, 155 N. W. 995. 54. Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Mass. 374, 12 Am. Rep. 716. 55. Tenant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 360, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089; Colebeck v. Girdlers Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 234; 1350 Real Property. [§ 370 That one has party wall rights in a wall or a part of a wall imposes no obligation on him, or on the owner of the wall, to reconstruct it when destroyed by fire or other accidental cause. "^^^ And it would seem question- able, on principle, whether one person entitled to use a party wall should have contribution from the other on account of expenditures for repairs, additions or reconstruction, undertaken by the former for his own benefit, though enuring to the benefit of the latter.^-^'' The question of the liability for damage caused by the failure to repair or j^roperly to construct an appliance or structure on the servient tenement, the purpose of which is to make the exercise of the easement feasible or convenient, would seem ordinarily to de- pend on who is in control thereof. If the owner of the dominant tenement, for instance, constructs a con- duit or ditch on the servient tenement of which he retains control, he is liable, it would seem, if, by reason of failure to keep it in repair, the servient tenement isi flooded,^*^ and so it has been held that he is liable if damage accrues to cattle belonging to the owner of the servient tenement by reason of failure to protect them from the danger of falling into a ''washout" oc- curring in a ditch constructed by him.^^ On the other Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Mass. 374, 12 55b. But that there is a right Am. Rep. 716; Jackson v. Bruns, of contribution. Howze v. White- 129 Iowa, 616, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) head, 93 Miss. 578, 46 So. 401; 510, 106 N. W. 1; Gale, Ease- Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. ments (9th Ed.) 479. But see 334; Sanders v. Martin, 2 Lea dictum in Graves v, Berdan. 26 (Tenn.) 213. Contreing in a general way similar to that between a license and an easement.^ ^ It is as a result, it seems, 13c. Ante, § 339(a). umbia Law Rev. 251, 30 Harv. 13d. Ante, § 349(d). Law Rev. 297. 13e. Samuel C. Wiel, Esq., 14. See cases cited inle, this article 22 Harv. Law Rev. at p. section, note 11. 213. See editorial notes, 13 Col- 15. ^nte, § 349(a). 1392 Eeal Pkoperty. [§382 of the absence of any duty on the part of the landowner to refrain from interference with the exercise of the license privilege that the license is revocable at the pleasure of the licensor. Not infrequently a landowner licenses another to sever from the land some particular subject of profit, with the intention that the license, on effecting such severance, shall become the owner of the thing severed, as for instance, when the landowner orally licenses another to cut timber or remove minerals. In such a case there is both a license to sever the wood or minerals and an oral gift or sale of them, the gift or sale taking effect, for the purpose of transferring the owmership to the licensee, so soon as they become chattels by reason of their severance. ^"^ § 382. Rights in gross and appurtenant. Eights to take profits from another's land may exist in gross, — that is, they may be held by one independently of his ownership of other land, the rule in this respect differing in England from that usually regarded as applying to easements, unattended with a right of profit.^" They may, however, be appurtenant to other land, the land to which the right ap])ertains being then the "dominant tenement," and the land from which the profits are taken being the ''servient 'tenement.'"^ 16. Ante, § 261. 18. PhiHips v. Rhodes, 7 Mete. 17. Welcome v. Upton, 6 Mees. (Mass.) 322; Goodrich v. Bur- & W. 536; Shuttleworth v. Le bank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 459, 90 Fleming, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 687; Am. Dec. 161; Huntington v. Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Y. 419, Asher, 96 N. Y. 604; Bingham v. 26 Am. Rep. 612; Tinicum Fish- Salene, 15 Ore. 208, 14 Pac. 523, ing Co. V. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21. 3 Am. St. Rep. 152; Grubb v. 100 Am. Dec. 597; Youghiogheny Grubb, 74 Pa. St. 25; Hall v. Law- River Coal Co. V. Pierce, 153 Pa. rence, 2 R. I. 218, 57 Am. Dec. St. 74, 25 Atl. 1026; Cadwalader 715; Chase v. Cram, 39 R. I. 83, V. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 14 L. R. 97 Atl. 481, 802. And see cases A. 300, 23 Atl. 20. Williams, Rights in notes following. of Common, 184, 195, 203, 207. § 382] Profits a Peendbe. 1393 A profit a prendre in gross is ordinarily regarded as freely transferable and inheritable.^^ A profit a pren- dre appurtenant passes prima facie upon a transfer of the dominant tenement.^"'' A right of profit, in order that it may be appur- tenant to other land, and pass therewith, must be in some way connected with the enjoyment of the right of property in the dominant tenement, and must be lim- ited by the needs of the latter.^^" Consequently one cannot claim as appurtenant to land owaied by him a right to take all the wood which may grow on other land, and dispose of it as he pleases,^*' or a right to take turf or seaw^eed from other land, without regard to the requirements of his own tenement.^ ^ Since a right of profit appurtenant is limited and admeasured by the uses of the dominant tenement, it follows that such profit cannot be separated from the latter by a grant thereof to a third person without the tenement.^^ 19. Welcome v. Upton, 6 Mees. & W. 536; Muskett v. Hill, 5 Eing. N. C. 694; Grubb v. Bayard, 2 Wall. Jr. 81; Gaston v. Plum, 14 Conn. 344; New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn. 168, 58 Atl. 753; Baker v. Kenney, 145 Iowa, 638, 139 Am. St. Rep. 456, 124 N. W. 901; Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 36 Mich. 105; Negaunee Iron Co. V. Iron Cliffs Co., 134 Mich. 264, 96 N. W. 468; Boat- man V. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. 614; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21, 100 Am. Dec. 597; Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 498, 14 L. R. A. 300, 23 Atl. 20. 19a. Warrick v. Queen's Col- lege, 6 Ch. App. 716; Hopper v. Herring, 75 N. J. L. 212, 67 Atl. 714; Huff V. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 209, 21 Am. Dec. 203; Grubb v. Grubb, 74 Pa. St. 25. 19b. Chesterfield v. Harris (1908), 2 Ch. 397; Hopper v. Her- ring, 75 N. J. L. 212, 67 Atl. 714; Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Y. 419, 26 Am. Rep. 612. 20. Bailey v. Stephens, 12 C. B. N. S. 91. 21. Valentine v. Penny, Noy, 145; Hall v. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 218. In Huntington v. Asher, 96 N. Y. 604, 48 Am. Rep. 652, it was held that a right to cut ice on land, and to store it in an ice house on other land, might be appurtenant to the land on which the ice house was situated. 22. Drury v. Kent, Cro. Jac. M; Hall v. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 218, 57 Am. Dec. 715; Baker v. Ken- 1394 Real Property. [§§ 383, 384 § 383. Righis of common. The term ''common" is frequently applied in England, especially by the older writers, to a right of profit, as when they speak of common of pasture, of estovers, of turbary, of piscary (fishing), or of digging for coals, minerals, and the like.^^ The word "common," applied in this connec- tion, refers to the fact that the interest in the profits is ''common," as between the person entitled to take profits and either the owner of the land, or other owners of like rights of profit in the same land.^^ Con- sequently, the word is properly applied to any profit a prendre which is not exclusive of like rights in either the owner of the land or in a third person. A right of profit, on the other hand, which is ex- clusive of any rights in either the landowner or in a third person to take similar profits from that particular land, is usually referred to in the English books as a "several" right, as in the case of a several right of fishery or of pasture.^^ Common of turbary involves the right in common with others, of digging turf on another's land, and common of piscary the right of fishing on the land of another, or, rather, in water on his land.^^ Common of estovers involves the right of taking necessary wood from another's land for use as firewood, or in repairs on a house or farm.^^ § 384. Rights of pasture. The most imjDortant profit a prendre, historically considered, is that of pas- turing cattle on another's land, usually referred to as "common of pasture." Under the feudal system, the ney, 145 Iowa, 638, 139 Am. St. Leake, Prop, in Land, 332. Kep. 456, 124 N. W. 90L 25. Co. Litt. 122a; Williams, 23. Co. Litt. 122a; 2 Blackst. Rights of Common, 12, 18-30, 259- Comm. 32, 34; Williams, Rights '^^^65. of Common, passim. 26. Co. Litt. 122a; 2 Bl. Comm. 24. Co. Litt. 122a; 2 Pollock & 34; Smith v. Kemp. 2 Salk. 637. Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 144; 27. 2 Bl. Comm. 35; Van Rens- § 384] Profits a Peendke. 1395 right existed in favor of the tenants of the manor as re- gards the waste land of the manor, — that is, the land not allotted to tenants or reserved by the lord as de- mesne land.^^ Common of pasture involves the placing of the cattle on the land to eat the herbage, in this differing from a right to take herbage from another's land by cutting and transporting it.-^ Common of pasture might, at common law, be '^ ap- pendant," ' 'appurtenant," "in gross," or "because of vicinage." Common appendant existed, as before sug- gested, in favor of each holder of arable land in a manor, as appertaining to such land, and involved the right to pasture, on the waste land of the manor, his '' commonable" cattle. It could not be created after the statute of Quia Eyiiptores, since a grant by the lord of the manor thereafter took the land granted out of the manor as regards tenure,"^'^ and cannot, of course, exist selaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 639. The right to take fstovers from another's land must be distinguished from the exclu- sive right of a tenant for life or years to take them from his own land, which has been pre- viously considered. See, onle, § 283, and 2 Blackst. Comm. 35, Chitty's note. 28. This right in the tenants of the manor to take profits from the waste land probably ex- isted, before the introduction of feudalism into England, as a right in the inhabitants of the town or "vill" to utilize the lands v.hich belonged to the community i:s a whole. After the introduc- tion of feudalism and of the man- orial idea, these community lands came to be regarded as bslonging to the lord, and consequently the right to take profits therefrom was regarded as a right to profits a prendre in another's land. The community lands of the town or vill were themselves a survival of the "mark" system, which ex- isted in all Aryan communities. Digby, Hist. Real Prop. (5th Ed.) 192; Williams, Rights of Com- mon, 37 et seq.: INIaine, Village Communities, passim; 4 Kent, Comm. 441, note by Hon. 0. W. Holmes. In this country, traces of the mark system are to be found in the system of "com- mons" or "common lands" which existed in New Englanfl and also in the Spanish and French settle- ments. See post, § 418. 29. De la Warr v. Miles, 17 Ch. Div. 535; Potter v. North, 1 Saund. 353a, note; Williams, Rights of Common, 21. 30. Leake, Piop. in Land, 337, citing 2 Co. Inst. 85. 1396 Real Peopeety. [§ 385 in this country. Common "because of vicinage" was a local custom of intercommoning, — that is, for cattle to stray from one common to another adjacent com- mon, without creating any liability for trespass.''^ It was based on custom, and has never existed in this country."^^ Common of pasture "appurtenant" and "in gross" are rights of pasture annexed to a dominant tenement, or belonging to a person and his heirs, the terms being applied as in other cases of profits a prendre,^^ and these may exist in this country. § 385. Mineral rights. A person may have a right to take minerals from another's land in the nature of a profit a prendre?"^ Such right to take minerals from another's land must be carefully distinguished from an estate in the minerals themselves which, as pre- viously stated, may be separated, for purposes of ownership, from the surface of the ground.^^ A grant of the right to take minerals from another's land is not 31. Co. Litt. 122a; 2 Blackst. Comm. 33. Comm. 33. 34. Doe d. Hanley v. Wood, 2 S2. A right of common, some- Barn. & Aid. 738; Muskett v. HiU, times, perhaps, termed "common 5 Bing. N. C. 694; Rutland Marble of vicinage," has been occasional- Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. (U. S.) ly asserted in jurisdictions where 339, 19 L. Ed. 955; Smith v. the owner of cattle is not bound Cooley, 65 Cal. 46, 2 Pac. 880; to prevent them from trespassing Baker v. Hart, 123 N. Y. 470, 12 on unfenced land belonging to L. R. A. 60, 25 N. E. 948; Clem- others (see Davis v. Gurley, 44 ent v. Youngman, 40 Pa. St. Ga. 582), but the right to allow 'iAl; Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. one's cattle to roam over un- Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286, 18 L. R. fenced lands belongs, in those A. 702, 34 Am. St. Rep. 645, 25 jurisdictions, to everybody, and, Atl. 597. as clearly decided, constitutes in 35. Wilkinson v. Proud, 11 no sense a right of common of Mees. & W^. 33; Caldwell v. Ful- pasture (Harrell v. Hannum, 50 ton, 31 Pa. St. 475; Baker v. Ga. 508). See Smith v. Floyd, 18 Hart, 123 N. Y. 470, 12 L. R. A. Barb. (N. Y.) 522; Thomas v. 60, 25 N. E. 948; Smith v. Cooley. Marshfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 240. 65 Cal. 46, 2 Pac. 880. See ante, § 33. Co. Litt. 122a; 2 Blackst. 253. § 386] Pkofits a Pkendee. 1397 exclusive of the right of the owner of the land also to take them, unless it is so expressed."" A right to take oil or gas from land in which the person so entitled has no right of ownership is likewise, though not always expressly so stated, a right of profit a prendre.^'^ Fre- quently what is properly a profit a prendre as regards minerals in land, that is, a power of a more or less permanent character to take as one's own minerals in the land, is referred to as a mining license,"^ the im- portant distinction, before referred to, between a profit a prendre and a license,^'' being thus ignored. § 386. The creation of rights. A profit a prendre may, like an easement, be acquired by either grant or prescription. Since the grant of such a right involves a transfer of an interest in land, it must be created by writing, and a seal is necessary to the validity of the grant at common law.^° An attempted grant of a profit a prendre, if invalid as being merely oral, or, it would seem, as wanting a seal, creates a license merely, which may be revoked at any time,^^ but by reason of 36. Stockbrldge Iron Co. v. 57 Pa. St. 446; Boone v. Stover, Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290; 06 Mo. 430; Silsby v. Trotter, 29 Massot V. Moses, 3 Rich. (S. C.) N. J. Eq. 228; East Jersey Iron 168; Harlow v. Lake Superior Co. v. Wright, 32 N. J. Eq. 248; Iron Co., 36 Mich. 105; Silsby v. Painbridge, Mines (5th Ed.) 280 Trotter, 29 N. J. Eq. 228; Grubb t'^ seq.; MacSwinney, Mines, c. 12. V. Bayard, 2 Wall. Jr. 81, Fed. and authorities cited, onte, § 254. Cas. No. 5,849; Funk v. Halde- 39. Ante, § 381, notes 14-16. man, 53 Pa. St. 229; Mountjoy's 40. Hopkins v. Robinson, 2 Case, Co. Litt. 164b. Lev. 2; Somerset v. Fogwell, 5 37. See Brown v. Spilman, 155 Barn. & C. 875; Holford v. Bailey, U. S. 665, 39 L. Ed. 304; Union 13 Q. B. 426; Taylor v. Millard, Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petro- 118 N. Y. 244, 6 L. R. A. 667. 23 Icum Co., 72 Pa. St. 173; Duffield N. E. 367; Karaphou&e \. Gaffner, V. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. St. 520, 2;: 73 111. 453; Boone v. Stover, 66 Atl. 4. Mo. 430; McBee v. Loftis, 1 Strob. 38. See Stockbridge Iron Co. Eq. (S. C.) 90. V. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 41. Williams v. Morrison (C. 290, 322; Kamphouse v. Gaffner, C.) 32 Fed. 177; Wheeler v. West, 73 111. 453; Neumoyer v. Andreas, 71 Cal. 126, 11 Pac. 871; Kamp- 1398 Real Property. [§ 387 tlie making of improvements by the intended grantee on the faith thereof the intending grantor may be estop- ped to deny the validity of the grant,^- as in the case of an invalid grant of an easement.'^^ A profit a prendre may also, like an easement, be created by words of exception or reservation,^^*^ A right of profit may be acquired by prescription, provided the taking during the prescriptive period was limited to the requirements of a particular dominant tenement.^^ But there can be no prescriptive right of profit in the public."*^ § 387. AppofTtionment and extinction. A profit a prendre in gross cannot be assigned in portions to different persons, so that each of the assignees may exercise it separately, but all the assignees must exer- cise it in common; this being on the theory that other- wise the land would b« injured as a result of the taking of profits therefrom by numerous persons.^® Some rights of common appurtenant, such as those of esto- vers, are not apportionable on the severance of the dominant tenement by the conveyance of a part thereof, since this would increase the amount of profits to be house V. Gaffner, 73 IH. 453; Des- P. Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100 N. E. lege V. Pearce, 38 Md. 588; Huff 434; Tuscorara Club of Mil- V. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 206. brook v. Brown, 215 N. Y. 543, 42. Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73 109 N. E. 597. III. 453; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. 44. Dowglas v. Kendall, Cro. St. 206. Jac. 256; Cowlan v. Slack, 15 43. Ante, § 349(d), notes 44- East, 108; Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 49. C. B. 164; Bailey v. Stephens, 12 43a. Stockbridge Iron Co. v. C. B. N. S. 91; Harris v. Chester- Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290; field (1911), App. Cas. 623; Hill Warden v. Watson, 93 Md. 107, 5 v. Lord, 48 Me. 83; Morse v. Mar- S. W. 605; Alden's Appeal, 93 Pa. shall, 97 Mass. 519; Perley v. St. 182; Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Langley, 7 N. H. 233. Y. 419. 45. Post, § 419. That a reservation is ineffec- 46. Mountjoy's Case, Co. Lift, tual to create a proiit a prendre 164b; Chetham v. Williamson, 4 in favor of a third person, see East, 469; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Beardslee v. New Berlin, L. & Pa. St. 229, 244; Harlow v. Lake § 387] Profits a Peendee. 1399 taken, and, consequently, as neither of the persons between whom the land is divided is entitled to the l-irofits, the right thereto is entirely extinguished by such a conveyance.*' But where a right of common is admeasurable according to the area of the dominant tenement, the common may be apportioned to the several parts of the dominant tenement upon its severance, the burden on the servient tenement not being increased thereby. Such is the case where there is a right to pasture such cattle as may be kept on the dominant tenement, or to take such herb- age as may be used thereon, and the alienee of a part of the dominant tenement is entitled to a right of common proportioned to the extent of his grant.^^ A profit a prendre is extinguished by a release thereof to the owner of the servient tenement.*^ If the titles to the dominant and servient tenements become united in one person, he having an equal estate in both, the right of common or profit is extinguished, since a man cannot have a right of profit in his o^vn land.^*^ And the same result no doubt follows if the owner of a right of profit in gross acquires a fee-simple estate in the servient tenement. Even though a right of profit or common is appor- tionable, if separate parts of the land subject thereto are held by different tenants, the right is extinguished in case the owner of the dominant tenement releases a Superior Iron Co., 36 Mich. 105, rence, 2 R. I. 218, 57 Am. Dec. 121. 715; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 47-. Van Rensselaer v. Rad- 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 639. cliffe, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 639, 2r) 49. Litt. § 480; Co. Litt. 280a; Am. Dec. 582; Livingston v. 2 Leake, 355. Ketchum, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 592; 50. Tyrringham's Case, 4 Coke, Hall V. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 218, 57 38a; Bradshaw v. Eyre, Cro. Eliz. Am. Dec. 715; Bell v. Ohio & P. 570; Rex v. Inhabitants of Her- R. Co., 25 Pa. St. 161, 64 Am. mitage, Carth. 239; Saundeys v. Dec. 687. Oliff, Moore, 467; Hall v. Law- 48. Co. Litt. 122a; Tyrring- rence, 2 R. I. 218, 57 Am. Dec. ham's Cas, 4 Coke, 37a; Wild's 715. Case, 8 Coke, 78b; Hall v. Law- 1400 Real. Property. [§ 387 ])art of such land from the burden of the profit,^^ or if the dominant tenement and a part of the servient land become the property of one man;''- since, otherwise, the burden upon the other parts would be increased. 51. Rotherham v. Green, Cro. I.eon. 43; Livingston v. Te* Eliz. 593; Hall v. Lawrence, 2 R. L 218, 57 Am. Dec. 715; John- son V. Barnes, L. R. 7 C. P. 592, 600. 52. Kimpton v. Bellamyes, 1 Broeck, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 14, 8 Am. Dec. 287; Hall v. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 218, 57 Am. Dec. 715; BeU V. Ohio & P. R. Co., 25 Pa. St. 161, 64 Am. Dec. 687. CHAPTER XIV. COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND. § 388. General considerations. 389. Tlie running of benefits. 390. The runnings of burdens. 391. Privity of estate. 392. The nature of the covenant. 393. Party wall agreements. § 388. General considerations. Covenants with the owner of hind, which are calculated to render its enjoyment more beneficial, may in some, if not all, cases, be enforced by a subsequent owner of the land; and, on the other hand, covenants made by the o^^^ler of land, restricting in some mode the freedom of its enjoyment, may, by some authorities, be enforced against a subsequent owner of the land. Covenants the benefit or burden of which may thus pass to subsequent own- ers of the land are said to "run with the land." Rights created by such covenants in favor of or against transferees of the land are strictly in personam, and not in rem; but as incidents of the land, following it into the hands of subsequent owners, they are some- what similar in effect to proprietary rights in another's land such as have been previously discussed, and ac- cordingly call for consideration in this connection. That covenants in connection with leases run in favor of or against the owner of an estate for life or for years created by the lease, or of the reversion expectant on such estate, is determined, or at least confirmed, by the provisions of the statute of 32 Hen, VIII. *c. 34. The terms and effect of this statute having been already cons^^dered,' the running of cove- nants made by or with the owner of land in fee simple not in connection with a lease, will alone be here dis- cussed. (1401) 1402 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 388 These questions of the assignment of contractual benefits and liabilities by the transfer of the land in con- nection with which the contract was made have usually been considered in connection with "covenants," strict- ly so called, that is, contracts under seal. In England, owing to the general practice of sealing formal legal in- struments affecting land, the question of the running of a contract not under seal appears not to have been the subject of judicial determination, so far as appears ; and the fact that the running of covenants in leases was, by the statute of 32 Hen. 8, expressly confined to covenants in indentures of lease may well have tended to confirm the view that in no case can an agreement not under seal run with the land. In this country there are one or two decisions that a contract not under seal will not run with the land- and at least one case indicative of a contrary view.^ In any state in which private seals have been abolished or their efficacy destroyed, the fact that a contract is or is not under seal is obviously immaterial upon the ques- tion whether it runs with the land. In the case of a deed poll,— that is, an instrument sealed by one only of the parties thereto, — a stipula- tion therein on the part of the person not sealing it is, by the weight of authoritj^ regarded as the covenant of such person by reason of his acceptance of the conveyance,* though there are well-considered opinions 1. Ante, § 56(a). 114 N. E. 692. 2. Martin v. Drinaii, 128 Mass. 4. Co. Litt. 230b, Butler's 515; Kennedy v. Owen, 136 Mass. note; Sheppard's Touchstone, 199; Poage v. Wabash, St. L. & 177; Georgia Southern R. Co. v. P. Ry. Co., 24 Mo. App. 199. Reeves, 64 Ga. 492; Sanitary Dis- 3. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 4S N. trict of Chicago v. Chicago Title H. 475. That an oral contract & Trust Co., 278 111. 529, 116 N. will not run, see St. Louis, A. & E. 161; Midland Ry. Co. v. Fisher, T. H. R. Co., V. Todd, 36 111. 409; 125 Ind. 19, 8 L. R. A. 694, 21 Am. Guilfoos V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 69 St. Rep. 189, 24 N. E. 758; Sex- Hun (N. Y.) 593, 23 N. Y. Supp. auer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa, 357, 14 925; Bartlett v. State, — Ind. — , L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, 15 A. & E. § 389] Covenants Running With Land. 1403 to the contrary.^ In order to create a covenant, neither the word "covenant," nor any other particular word, is necessary,^ and words of condition are frequently, as before stated, construed as words of covenant/ Moreover, words of covenant have been sometimes construed as creating, not a covenant, but an ease- ment,^ or a charge on the land in the nature of a lien.9 § 389. The running of benefits. That the right to sue upon a covenant relating to land may pass to a subsequent owner of the land, claiming under the covenantee, by reason merely of the conveyance of the land, is generally conceded.^*' Such a covenant is usually Ann. Cas. 54, 113 N. W. 941; Ken- tucky Cent. R. Co. v. Kenney, 82 Ky. 154 (semble) ■ Poage v. Wa- bash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 24 Mo. App. 199; Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475, 97 Am. Dec. 633; Finley v. Simpson, 22 N. J. L. 311, 53 Am. Dec. 252; Hagerty V. Lee, 54 N. J. L. 580, 20 L. R. A. C31, 25 Atl. 319; Atlantic Dock Co. V. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35, 13 Am. Rep. 556; Bowen v. Beck, 94 N. Y. 86, 46 Am. Rep. 124; May- nairl v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158 {sem- ble) ; Riug V. Mayberry, 168 N. C. 563, 84 S. E. 846; Hickey v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 51 Ohio St. 40, 23 L. R. A. 396, 46 Am. St. Rep. 543, 36 N. E. 72; Doty V. Chattanooga Union Ry. Co, 103 Tenn. 564, 53 S. W. 944, 48 L. R. A. 160, 6 L. R. A. (X. S.) 436. 5. Piatt, Covenants, 10; Hins dale V. Humphrey, 15 Conn. 431; Stabler v. Cowman, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 284; Western Md. R. Co. V. Orendirff, 37 Md. 335; Newell V. Hill, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 180; Martin v. Drinan, 128 Mass. 515; Kennady v. Owen, 136 Mass. 199; Maule V. Weaver. 7 Pa. St. 329; First Congregational Meeting House Soc. V. Town of Rochestei , 66 Vt. 501, 29 Atl. 810. 6. Piatt, Covenants. 28; Har- tung V. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 18 N. W. 175; Midgett v. Brooks, 34 N. C. 145, 55 Am. Dec. 405; Taylor V. Preston. 79 Pa. St. 436; Trull v. Eastman, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 121; Electric City Land & Improve- ment Co. V. West Ridge Coal Co., 187 Pa. St. 500, 41 Atl. 458. 7. Ante, § 79. 8. Ante, § 361. 9. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. V. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. Rep. 112, 22 Pac. 53; Howard Mfg. Co. V. Water Lot Co., 53 Ga. 689; Martin v. Martin. 44 Kan. iP5, 24 Pac. 418; Goudy v. Goudy, Wright (Ohio), 410. 10. Pollock, Contracts (Willis- ton's Ed.), 300; Sims, Covenants Running with Land, 136; Fergu- 1404 Real Property. [^ 389 made by the grantor or grantee of land as an incident of the conveyance, that is, by one who has some relation to the title. The question has, however, occasionally arisen whether one who is neither a grantor nor grantee of the land may make a covenant with the owner thereof, the benefit of which will pass to a subsequent owner of the land, that is, whether the benefit of a covenant may run, though there is lacking what is ordinarily referred to as *' privity of estate" between the covenantor and covenantee. The authorities are about equally divided upon the ques- tion. ^^ Apart, however, from any question of cove- nants running wdth the land, the transfer of the land might be construed as intended to pass the right of action for subsequent breaches of the covenant, that son V. Omaha & S. W. R. Co., 227 Fed. 513, 142 C. C. A. 145; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. O'Baugh, 49 Ark. 418, 5 S. W. 711; Sterling Hydraulic Co. v. Williams, 66 111. 393; Peden v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa, 328, 5 Am. St. Rep. 680, 35 N. W. 424; Gaines' Adm'x v. Poor, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 503, 79 Am. Dec. 559; Leader v. La Flamme, 111 Me. 242, 88 Atl. 859; Maryland Coal Co. V. Cumberland & Penn- sylvania R. Co., 41 Md. 343; Na- tional Union Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N. J. L. 173; Vjntnor Investment Co. v. Record Devel. Co. (N. J. Ch.), 80 Atl. 952; Raby V. Reeves, 112 N. C. 688, 16 S. E. 760; Ford v. Oregon Electric R. Co., 60 Ore. 278, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 358, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 280, 117 Pac. 809. 11. That the benefit will pass with the land in such case, see Pollock, Contracts (7th Ed.) 237, note; Holmes, The Common Law, 405; 1 Smith's Leading Cases (8th u\m. Ed.) at p. 176; Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N. W. 874; Dickinson v. Hoomes' Adm'r, 8 Grat. (Va.) 353 (dic- tum) ; Gaines' Adm'x v. Poor, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 503, 79 Am. Dec. 559; Rawle, Covenants, § 203, note. The contrary view is taken in Sims, Covenants Running with the Land, 196; Sugden, Vendors (14th Ed.) 584 et seq,; Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N .Y. 212, 11 L. R. A. 646, 26 N. E. 611, 147 N. Y. 456, 42 N. E. 17; Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474; Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 459 {dictum) Pack- enham's Case, Y. B. 42 Edw. Hi. 3, pi. 14 (translated in Rawle, Covenants, § 203, note), is cited on both sides of the discussion, — a not unnatural result of the ob- scurity of the report. § 390] Covenants Running With Land. 1405 is, as involving an assignment of a cliose in action, within the modern statutes and rules in that regard.^^"^ § 390, The running of burdens. In England it is apparently the law that the burden of a covenant by the owner of land in fee simple, made with one other than his lessee, will not run so as to be enforceable against a transferee of the land.^^ In this country, on the other hand, there are a number of decisions to the effect that covenants by the owner of land will bind transferees of the land,^-^ though in a few lla. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. p. 885. That transfer of the land after breach does not transfer the right of action for such breach, see Gulf Coast & Coke Co. V. Musgrove, 195 Ala. 219, 70 So. 179. 12. Pollock, Contracts (7th Ed.) 237; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. (10th Ed.) 75-85. See Brewster V. KidgUl, 12 Mod. 166; Brew- .ster V. Kitchin, 1 Ld. Raym. 317; Keppel V. Bailey, 2 Mylue & K. 517; Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham, 29 Ch. Div. 750. 13. Robbins v. Webo, 68 Ala. 393; Gilmer v. Mobile, & M. R. Co., 79 Ala. 569; Alderson v. Cut- ting, 163 Cal. 503, 126 Pac. 157 (semble) ; Hottell v. Farmers' Protective Ass'n, 25 Colo. 67, 71 Am. St. Rep. 109, 53 Pac. 327; Georgia Southern R. Co. v. Reeves, 64 Ga. 492; Dorsey v. St. Louis A., &.T. H. R. Co., 58 111. 65.; Fitch v. Johnson, 104 111. Ill; Hazlett V. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488, 40 Am. Rep. 254; Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa, 357, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, 15 A. 2 R. P.— 14 & E. Ann. Cas. 54, 113 X. W. 941; Ranney v. Childs, 96 Kan. 483, 152 Pac. 621; Sutton v. Head, 86 Ky. 156, 9 Am. St. Rep. 274, 5 S. W. 410; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. V. May, 157 Ky. 708, 163 S. W. 1112. De Logny's Heirs v. Mercer, 43 La. Ann. 205 (semble); Leader v. La Flamme, 111 Me. 242, 88 Atl. 859; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Con- tinental Ins. Co., 87 N. Y. 400 (dictum); Dexter v. Beard, 130 X. Y. 549, 29 X. E. 983; Denman V Prince, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 213; Dey V. Prentice, 90 Hun (X. Y.) 27, 35 X. Y. Supp. 563; Easter v. Little Miami R. Co., 14 Ohio St. 48 (dictum) ; Huston v. Cincin- nati, & Z. R. Co., 21 Ohio St. 236; Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. Bosworth, 46 Ohio St. 81, 2 L. R. A. 199, 18 X. E. 533 (dictum); Hickey v. Lake Shore, & M. S. Ry. Co., 51 Ohio St. 40, 2.3. L. R. A. 396, 46 Am. St. Rep. 545, 36 N. E. 672 (dictum) St. Andrews' Church Appeals, 67 Pa. St. 512; Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. St. 327, 34 L. R A. 227, 34 Atl. 663; Electric City Land & Im- provement Co. V. West Ridge Coal 1406 Real Property. [§ 390 states the English view appears to have been adopted/'* Occasionally a covenant of an affirmative character appears to have been regarded as enforcible in equity, on the same theoiy on which negative or restrictive Co., 187 Pa. St. 500, 41 Atl. 458; Wooliscroft V. Norton, 15 Wis. 198. Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 9 L. R. A. 561, 46 N. W. 545. 14. West Virginia Transpor- tation Co. y Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600; Brewer v. MarshaH, 18 N. J. Eq. 337, 19 N. J. Eq. 537 (dictum) ; Tardy V. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 59 Am. Rep. 676; Costigan v Pennsylvania R. Co., 54 N. J. L. 233, 23 Atl. 810; Lynn v. Mount Savage Iron Co., 34 Md. 603 (semble). It has been said quite recently, by the New York Court of Ap- peals, that the burden of a cov- enant will not ordinarily run with the land, two or three covenants being however referred to as ex- ceptions to this rule. Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1115. Compare IMorehouse v. Woodruif, 218 N. Y. 494, 113 N. E. 512. In Massachusetts, apart from the cases of landlord and tenant, the burden of a covenant will not run with the land, as a general rule, it has been said, unless "the (covenant either creates a ser- vitude or a restriction in the nature of a servitude in favor of a neighboring parcel, or else is in some way incident to and inseparable from such a servi- tude; or, if attached to the dom- inant estate, appears to be the quid pro quo for the easement enjoyed." Holmes, S. J., in Lin- coln V. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378, 52 L. R. A. 110, 59 N. E. 67;. Com- pare Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946. Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 449, and Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 118 Mass. 156, 11 Am. Rep. 335, which seem to favor the running of the bur- den. The later decisions in this state upon this subject, especially those in which the opinion of the court was delivered by Holmes, C. J., are in accord with the views expounded by him in his work "The Common Law," pp. 392-406. 14. Gilmer v. Mobile, & M. Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 569, 58 Am. Rep. 623; Bartlett v. State, — Ind. — , 114 N. E. 692; Louisville H. & St. L. Rwy Co. V. Baskett, — (Ky.) — , 121 3. W. 957; Kneale V. Price, 29 Mo. App. 227; Bur- bank V. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475; Pittsburg C, & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bosworth, 46 Ohio St. 81, 2 L. R. A. 199, 18 N. E. 533. In Carnegie Realty Co. v. Caro- lina C, & 0. Ry. Co., 136 Tenn. 300, 189 S. W. 371, it was held that a transfer did not impose the burden of the covenant on the transferee if the latter did not make any claim under the trans- fer and did not take possession. This does not accord with the view ordinarily asserted in con- nection with the running of cov- enants in leases. See 1 Tiffany. I^andlord & Ten., p. 975. <^ 391] CovEXANTs RuxNixG WiTH Land. 1407 covenants are so regarded, as against a purchaser with notice of the covenant. ^^'^ The fact that the burden of a covenant passes to the transferee is not, it would seem, sufficient in itself to relieve the original covenantor from liability thereon, the same principle being applicable as in the case of landlord and tenant.^^ In several cases, however, the covenantor has been regarded as immune from liability for violations occurring after he has parted with title, on a construction of the language to this effect, as being in accord with the presumable intention of the parties to the covenant.^** While ordinarily the cases do not assert any re- quirement that the transferee of land have notice of a covenant made by a previous o^^^ler, in order that he may be bound thereby, they occasionall}' do so ;^*^^ and the courts, it is conceived, would be reluctant to impose liability upon one under a covenant of which he had neither actual or constructive notice. Usually the transferee of land would be chargeable with notice of the covenant by reason of the fact that it occurs in a conveyance in the chain of title, or in a conveyance of adjoining land made by a previous owner whose name appears in the chain of title. § 391. Privity of estate. In order that the burden of a covenant run with the land, there must be, it is generally stated, a "i)rivity of estate" between the covenantor and covenantee. ^'^ This expression, as used 14a. Post, § 395, note 17. 124 N. Y. 120, 21 Am. St. Rep. 15. See cnte, § 54(d). 652, 26 N. E. 275; BoUes v. Pecos 16. Carr v. Lowry's Adm'x, 27 Irrig. Co., — N. Mex. — , 167 Pac. Pa. St. 257; Rickey v. Lake Shore 280. & M. S. Ry. Co., 51 Ohio St. 40, 16a. See cases cited Post, § 23 L. R. A. 396, 46 Am. St. Rep. 393, note 76. 545, 36 N. E. 672; Sexauer v. Wil- 17. Spence v. Mobile, & M. Ry. son, 136 Iowa, 357, 14 L. R. A. Co., 79 Ala. 576; Hiazlett v. Sin- (N. S.) 185, 15 A. & E. Ann. Cas. clair, 76 Ind. 488, 40 Am. Rep. 54, 113 N. W. 941; Clark v. Devoe, 254; Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474; 1408 Real Peoperty. H 391 in connection with covenants, other than in leases, running with estates in fee simple, refers apparently to the relation between the grantor and grantee of such an estate at the time of the conveyance. In other words, in order that there be such privity of estate that the burden of a covenant may run, the covenant must be entered into at the time of the making of a con- veyance by the covenantee to the covenantor, or vice versa^^ Accordingly, except perhaps in two or three states,^^ the requisite privity exists in the case of a covenant by a grantor to do or not to do something on land retained by him, adjoining that conveyed, so that one to whom the former is subsequently conveyed by him may be bound by the covenant;-^ and it also exists Hurd V. Curtis, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 459; Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 449; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 118 Mass. 156, 11 Am. Rep. 254; Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498; Wheeler v Schad, 7 Nev. 204; Cole v. Hughes, 54 N. Y. 444; Nye v. Hoyle, 120 N. Y. 195, 24 N. E. 1; Easter v. Little Miami R. Co., 14 Ohio St. 48. Town of Middletown v. Newport Hospital, 16 R. I. 319, 15 Atl. 800; Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence etc., Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 97 Am. St. Rep. 954, 44 S. E. 520. 18. Gilmer v. .Mobile, & M. R. Co., 79 Ala. 569; Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. Rep. 112, 22 Pac. 53; Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Nulte, 126 Ind. 373, 26 N. E. 72; Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. Baskett, — Ky. — . 121 S. W. 957; Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64; Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475; Harsha v. Reid, 45 N. Y. 415; Lawrence v. Whitney, 115 N. Y. 410, 5 L. R. A. 417, 22 N. E. 174; Louisville & N. R Co V Webster, 106 Tenn. 586. 61 S. W. 1018. 19. /'o.vf, this section, note 28. 20. Fitch V. Johnson, 104 111. Ill; Scott V. Burton, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 324; Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 9 L. R. A. 561, 46 N. W. 545; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 11 Am. Rep. 335; Haz- lett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488, 40 Am. Rep. 254; Easter v. Little Miami R. Co., 14 Ohio St. 48.— the last three cases, however, in- volving covenants by the grantor to fence, which might be regarded as involving the grant of an ease- ment. See ante, § 357. It is to be observed that the burden of the covenant does not necessarily pass with the land in connection with which the privity arises; that is, in the case re- ferred to in the text, the privity arises in connection with the land first conveyed, while the burden of the covenant runs with that <^ 391] Covenants Running With Land. 1409 in the more ordinary case of a covenant by the grantee of land as to something to be done or not to be done by him on the land conveyed, so that his subsequent transferee may be bound thereby. On the other hand, an agreement by various mill owners as to the use of ■water will not bind their assigns, since there is no privity between them.-^ And a covenant made after a conveyance, though between the parties thereto, has been held not to be supported by such privity of estate that the burden will run.^^ The exact basis of this requirement that the parties to the covenant stand in the relation of grantor and grantee in order that the covenant may run, does not clearly appear.--'' As before indicated, by some authorities, such a requirement exists in order that even the benefit of a covenant may run.^^ In the case of a covenant in a lease, the running of the covenant is ordinarily, as we have before seen, closely associated with the existence of a privity of estate between the interested parties,^^ and this may have last conveyed. See Brewer v. Cal. 476, with which, however, Marshall, 18 N. J. Eq. 337, 19 N. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. J. Eq. 537; Waterbury v. Head, Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 361; Clark v. Rep. 112, 22 Pac. 53, does not Devoe, 124 N. Y. 120, 21 Am. St. appear to be in accord. Rep. 652, 26 N. E. 275, as ex- 22. Inhabitants of Plymouth v. plained in Dexter v. Beard, 130 Carver, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 183; N Y. 549, 29 N. E. 983. Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64. Wheel- 21. Kurd V. Curtis, 19 Pick. er v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204. But if (Mass.) 459; Lawrence v. Whit- the covenant and conveyance are ney, 115 N. Y. 410, 5 L. R. A. parts of the same transaction, the 417, 22 N. E. 174. In Pennsyl- fact that they are in separate vania it is held that the require- instruments is immaterial. Sims ment of privity is subject to ex- Covenants, 198; Hills v. Miller, ceptions, and that, without any 3 Paige (N. Y.) 254; Robbins v. such privity, covenants by owners Webb, 68 Ala. 393 (semble.) of separate tracts of riparian land 22a. See a suggestive editorial as to the use of the water power note in 15 Columbia Law Rev. will bind their assignees. Horn v. at p. 55. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 9 L. R. A. 23 See ante, § 389, note 11. 810, 20 Atl. 706. To the same 24. Ante, § 56. effect, see Weill v. Baldwin, 64 1410 Real Property. [§ 391 operated to suggest that in no case can tlie burden of a covenant run in tlie absence of such privity.^-^ Privity of estate, however, as between a grantor and grantee in fee simple has a meaning different from that which it has as between lessor and lessee, and their suc- cessors in interest. In the latter case, privity of estate means the simultaneous ownership by both parties of estates in the land, while in the former case it can mean merely succession in ownership. It was occasionally used in the latter sense by Coke,^" and perhaps other early authorities,-' particularly in con- nection with the law of warranty, and conceding the necessity'' of privity of estate in order that the burden of a covenant, not contained in a lease, may run with the land, it was reasonable to regard this requirement as satisfied by the succession in ownership which was included under this designation by the earlier writers. In at least two states the conveyance of an estate in the land, as distinguished from the grant of an ease- ment therein,^^ has been held not to furnish the privity of estate necessary to the creation of a covenant which will run with the land,-^ the theory being, apparently, that a mere succession in interest is not sufficient for 25. In Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. 27. See the opinion of Holmes, 459, in which the necessity of such C. J., in Norcross v. James, 140 privity is asserted in reference Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946, and Holmes, to a covenant by a fee simple "The Common Law," 395-400. owner, not in a lease, the court re- 28. Post, this section, note 30. fers to Webb v. Russell, 3 Term. 29. Los Angeles Terminal Land Rep. 402, which involved a coven- Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 Pac. ant in a lease. 308; Berryman v. Hotel Savoy 26. Co. Litt. 271a, 272b, 273, Co., 160 Cal. 559, 37 L. R. A. (N. 352a, 385a. In Whittingham's S.) 5, 117 Pac. 677; Norcross v. Case, 8 Co. Rep. 84, it is said James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. "there are three manner of privi- 946. In the latter case it is said ties, soil, privity in blood, privi- by Holmes, J., in delivering the ty in estate, and privity in law. opinion of the court, that the * * * Privities in estate are, as statement that there must be joint tenants, husband and wife, "privity of estate between the donor and donee, lessor and covenantor and the covenantee, lessee." only means that the covenant § 391] Covenants Kunning With Land. 1411 this purpose, but that the simultaneous existence of two distinct interests in the land, in the covenantor and covenantee respectively, is necessary.^^* Grant of easement. The requirement of privity of estate is satisfied if the covenant accompanies a grant by the owner of land of a mere easement therein, he retaining the land."'^ Accordingly, it has been held that the burden of a covenant made upon the grant of a water privilege,^ ^ or upon the grant of a railroad must impose such a burden on the land of the covenantor as to be in substance, or to carry with it, a grant of an easement or quasi easement, or must be in aid of such a grant." This statement accords with the view of the sub- ject elsewhere presented by this learned jurist, (see "The Com- mon Law," at p. 388 et seq.), but does not accord with the ordinary judicial view. With this state- ment may be compared a state- ment emanating from the same court at a much earlier period. "The stipulations in the indenture cannot be construed as grants and covenants at the same time. If they were grants, then an action of covenant is not the proper remedy for the violation of them; and if covenants, the assignee is not bound for want of privity of estate between the parties." Per Wilde, J., in Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 459. 29a. In Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 449, above cited, in which the running of a covenant created in connection with the grant of an easement, was ap- parently first recognized, the de- cision appears to be based on the analogy of a lease, it being said that "privity exists between the grantor and grantee, where a grant is made of any subor- dinate interest in land; the re- version or residue of the estate being reserved by the grantor, all covenants in support of the grant or in relation to the beneficial enjoyment of it, are real cove- nants and will bind the assignee." 30. Gilmer v. Mobile & M. Ry. Co. 79 Ala. 569; Sterling Hydrau- lic Co. V. Williams, 66 111. 393; Fitch V. Johnson, 104 111. Ill; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 156, 11 Am. Rep. 335; Lincoln v. Bur- rage, 177 Mass. 378, 52 L. R. A. 110, 59 N. E. 67; Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 9 L. R. A. 561, 46 N. W. 545. A covenant created in connection with an casement was held to run, even though not entered into till after the grant of the easement. Morse V. Aldrich, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 449. Contra, Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64; Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204. ::04. 31. Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hamp- shire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467, 92 Pac. 290 (semble) ; Fitch v. Johnson. 104 111. 111. Nye v. 1412 Eeal Property. [§ 392 right of way,"^- will bind a subsequent transferee of tbe land or of the easement."" And the grant of an ease- ment as regards the construction and utilization of a party wall will support the running of a covenant as to compensation for the use of the wall.^^ § 392. The nature of the covenajit. We have, in connection with the discussion of covenants in leases which run with the land,''' referred to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of framing a rule for the determina- tion of whether a covenant is such as to touch and concern the land so as to run therewith. ' Ordinarily, however, a covenant is regarded as touching and con- cerning the land if it is of value to the covenantee by Hoyle, 120 N. Y. 195, 24 N. E. 1; IMorchouse v. Woodruff, 218 N. Y. 494, 113 N. E. 512; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1; Noonan v. Orton, 4 Wis. 335; Wooliscroft V. Norton, 15 Wis. 198. But see Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114; Barringer v. Virginia Trust Co., 132 N. C. 409, 43 S. E. 910. So a covenant which was made in connection with a gas and oil lease, a grant apparently of a profit a prendre, was held to run. Indiana, etc., Oil Co. v. Hinton, 159 Ind. 398, 64 N. E. 224; Har- bert V. Hope Natural Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 207, 84 S. E. 770. And see Munro v. Syracuse, L. & N R. Co., 200 N. Y. 224, 93 N. E. P16, and comment thereon in 11 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 384. 32. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. V. O'Baugh, 49 Ark. 418, 5 S. W. 711; Dorsey v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 58 111. 65; Mid- land Ry. Co. V. Fisher, 125 Ind. 19, 8 L. R. A. 604, 21 Am. St. Rep. 189, 24 N. E. 756; Peden v. Chi- cago. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa. 328, 5 Am. St. Rep. 6S0, 35 N. W. 424; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Kenney, 82 Ky. 154; Ford v. Ore- gon Elec. R. Co., 60 Ore. 278, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 358, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 243, 117 Pac. 809; Lydick V. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 427. 33. Dorsey v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 58 111. 65; Fitch v. Johnson, 104 111. Ill; Midland Ry. Co. V. Fisher, 125 Ind. 19, 8 L. R. A. 604, 21 Am. St. Rep. 189, 24 N. E. 756; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. V. Kenney. 82 Ky. 154; Ly- Gick V. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 427. So the benefit may pass with a subsequent grant of the water power. Sterling Hy- draulic Co. V. Wniiams, 66 111. 34. Post, § 393. 35. See ante, § 56(b). § 392] Covenants Running With Laxd. 141^ reason of his oc<3upation of the land or by reason of an easement which he has in the land, or if it is a burden on the covenantor by reason of his occupation of the land. It has ))een held that a covenant to give free transportation to the covenantee,"" or to pay an incumbrance on the land,^^ is of such a personal nature as not to run. And the same view has been taken by some courts as to a covenant the purpose of which is to prevent competition in trade.^^ Among the covenants which have been most fre- quently considered as passing with the grant of a 36. Morse v. Garner, 1 Strob, (S. C.) 514, 47 Am. Dec. 565; Dickey v. Kansas City & I. R. T. Ry. Co., 122 Mo. 223, 26 S. W. 685; Ruddick v. St. Louis, K. & N. W. Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 25, 22 S. W. 499, 38 Am. St. Rep. 570; Eddy v. Hinnant, 82 Tex. 354, 18 S. W. 562. So, in the case of a cove- nant by the grantee of an ease- ment to give its transportation business to the grantor, a ferry company, it was held that the covenant would not run, since it did not affect the enjoyment of the easement, or of the land in which the easement was granted, but was purely for the benefit of the owner of the ferry. Wig- gins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co., 94 111. 83. Compare Munro \. Syracuse, L. S. & N. R. Co., 200 N. Y. 224, 93 N. E. 516. 37. Glinn v. Canby, 24 Md. 127; Scholten v. Barber, 217 111. 148, 75 X. E. 460; Graber v. Dun- can, 79 Ind. 565. The same view was taken of a covenant to pay to the covenantee a percentage of the net earnings of mining property, against the transferee of which it was sought to as- sert the covenant. Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinch- man, 212 Fed. 803, 129 C. C. A. 267. 38. Taylor v. Owen, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 301; Kettle River R. Co. V. Eastern Ry. Co. of Minnesota. 41 Minn. 461, 6 L. R. A. Ill, 43 N. W. 469; Sjoblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193, 114 N. W. 746; Tardy V. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 59 Am. Rep. 676; Thomas v. Hay ward, L. R. 4 Exch. 311. Contra, Bobbins v. '•.Vebb, 68 Ala. 393; National Union Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N. J. Law 173; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 136. 1414 Real Property. [§ 392 fee-simple estate are those to repair a dam or canal,'^^ and to fence or to repair a fence.^° A covenant to maintain a station^ ^ or to stop trains^^ ^t a particular point has been held to rnn, as has a covenant to supply water^^ or gas*^ and to pay taxes.* ^ As previously stated/''' a covenant, contained in an instrument of lease, as to a thing not in esse, has been 39. Howard Mfg. Co. v. Water Lot Co., 53 Ga. 689; Sterling Hy- draulic Co. V. Williams, 66 111 393; Batavia Mfg Co. v. Newton Wagon Co., 91 111. 230; Maxon V. Lane, 102 Ind. 364, 1 N. E. 796; Fowler v. Kent, 71 N. H. 388, 52 Atl. 554; Nye v. Hoyle, 120 N. Y. 195, 24 N. E. 1; Den- man V, Prince, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 213; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1; Carr v. Lowry's Adm'x, 27 Fa. St. 257; Wooliscroft v. Nor- ton, 15 Wis. 198. 40. Dorsey v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 58 111. 65; Midland Ry. Co. V. Fisher, 125 Ind. 19, 8 L. R. A. 604, 21 Am. St. Rep. 189, 24 N. E. 756; Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. V. Priest, 131 Ind. 413, 31 N. E. 77; Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa, 357, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, 15 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 54, 113 N. W. 357; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. V. Kenney, 82 Ky. 154; Chicago, M. & G. R. Co. V. Dodds & John- son, 167 Ky. ?24, 181 S. W. 666; Bronson v. Coffin, 188 Mass. 175, 11 Am. Rep. 335, 118 Mass. 156; Countryman v. Deck, 13 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 110; Dey v. Prentice, 90 Hun (N. Y.) 27, 35 N. Y. Supp. 563; Huston v. Cincinnati & Z. R. Co., 21 Ohio St. 236; Hickey v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 51 Ohio St 40, 23 L. R. A. 396, 46 Am. St. Rep. 545, 36 N. E. 672; Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276, 27 Am. Dec. 550. 41. Georgia Southern Railroad V. Reeves, 64 Ga. 492; Reidsville, & S. E. R Co. V. Baxter, 13 Ga. App. 357, 79 S. E. 187; LouisviUe, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baskett. — (Ky.) — , 121 S. W. 957; Par- rott V. Atlantic, & N. C. R. R., 165 N. C. 295, Ann. Cas. 1915D. 165, 81 S. E. 348; Carnegie Realty Co. V. Carolina, Clinchfield, & Ohio Ry. Co., 136 Tenn. 300, 189 S. W. 371. 42. Gilmer v. R. Co., 79 Ala. 569; Ford v. Oregon Elec. R. Co., 60 Ore. 278, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 358, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 280, 117 Pac. 809. 43. Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 436, 110 Am. St. Rep. 215, 53 S. E. 701; Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467, 92 Pac. 290. 44. Indiana Natural Gas Co. v. Hinton, 159 Ind. 398, 64 N. E. 224. 45. Barron v. Whiteside, 89 Md. 448, 43 Atl. 825; West Virginia, C. & P. R. Co. v. Mclntire, 44 W. Va. 210, 28 S. E. 696. 46. Ante, § 56(b). See 1 Tif- fany, Landlord & Ten., p. 892; § 392] Covenants Running With Land. 1415 frequently considered not to run unless ''assigns" are mentioned. Occasionally the same rule lias been as- serted in connection with such a covenant not contained in an instrument of lease.^^ The intention of the parties to the covenant that it shall run with the land is occasionally referred to as a consideration of importance in determining whether it' does run,^^ but in the great majority of cases no reference is made to this matter, the question whether the covenant runs being regarded as one to be determined by the consideration whether it touches and concerns the land. The correct rule appears to be that the parties to the covenant may, by indicating an intention to that effect, prevent the covenant from running, although it is such that othei-wise it would run,*^ wdiile if the covenant is one w^hich does not touch and concern the land, the parties cannot make it run by indicating an intention or desire that it shall run.^" Looked at from this point of view, the rule of Spencer's case, that a covenant in reference to a thing not in esse does not run unless assigns are mentioned, in so far editorial note, 15 Mich. Law Rev. ' thing not in esse, did not run, at p. 79. in the absence of the word 47. Md. & Pa. R. Co., V. Silver, "assigns." 110 Md. 510, 73 Atl. 297; Whalen 48. Milliken v. Hunter, 180 Ind. V. Baltimore, & 0. R. Co., 108 149, 100 N. E. 1041; Sexauer v. Md. 11, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 130, Wilson, 136 Iowa, 357, 14 L. R. A. 129 Am. St. Rep. 423, 69 Atl. 390; (N. S.) 185, 15 Ann. Cas. 54, 113 Duester v. Alvin, 74 Ore. 544, 145 N. W. 357; Brown v. Southern Pac. 660; Carnegie Realty Co. v. Pac. Co., 36 Ore. 128, 47 L. R. A. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. Co., 136 409, 78 Am. St. Rep. 761, 58 Pac. Tenn. 300, 189 S. W. 371. But see 1104. Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa, 357, 49. Maryland Coal Co. v. Cum- 14 L. R. A. (X. S.) 185, 15 A. berland, etc. R. Co., 41 Md. 343; & E. Ann. Cas. 54, 13 N. W. 941. Masury v. Southworlh, 9 Ohio St. Purvis V. Shuman, 273 111. 286, 348; Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 App. 112 N. E. 679. So in Hartung v. Div. 412, 45 N. Y. Supp. 32. Witte, 59 "Wis. 285, and Gulf, C. 50. Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 Com. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 72 Tex. B. 164; Fresno Canal & Irr. Co. 122; Brown v. Southern Pac. Co., v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 22 Pac. 36 Ore. 128, 47 L. R. A. 409, 78 275. Gibson v. Holden, 115 111. Am. St. Rep. 761, 58 Pac. 1104, 199, 56 Am. Rep. 149, 3 N. E. It was held that a covenant to 282; Kettle River R. Co. v. East- build a fence, as concerning a ern R. Co. of Minnesota, 41 Minn. 141G Real, Property. [§ 393 as it is adopted in any state,^^ may be regarded as involving merely a rule of construction that a covenant of that character is to be regarded as intended to be personal, unless a contrary intention is shown by the mention of assigns. § 393. Party wall agreements. Whether the stipu- lation, in a party wall agreement,-"'- that one of the two adjoining owners, parties thereto, upon using a wall built by the other upon the division line, shall pay to the latter part of the cost of the wall, is a covenant which runs w4th the land, has been the sub- ject of frequent discussion and adjudication.^" As before stated, the grant of an easement at the time of the making of a covenant is regarded as fur- nishing the "privity of estate" necessary to enable a covenant to run with the land, and such a grant of an easement appears to occur in the case of a party wall agreement. If the wall is regarded as belonging to both the land owners immediately upon its construction, the agreement in effect involves a grant, to take effect upon the construction of the wall, by the non builder to the builder, of an easement to use the former's half of the wall for purposes of support, and also a grant, to take effect subsequently, by the builder to the non builder, of an easement to use the former's half of the wall for purposes of support; in other words, it involves the grant of cross easements of support.^^ If the wall is regarded as belonging to 461, 6 L. R. A. Ill, 43 N. W. 469; 53. The authorities on the Glenn v. Canby, 24 Md. 127; Brew- subject, previous to 1903, are con- er V. Marshall, 18 N. J. Eq. 337, veniently grouped in a note in 66 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. L. R. A. at p. 673. The subject 679; Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 N. Is discussed, in a most discrim- Y. App. Div. 45 X. Y. S. 32; Mas- inating manner, with references ury V. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 348; to the cases by Professor Ralph Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Webster, W. Aigler, in 10 Mich. Law Rev. 106 Tenn. 586, 61 S. W. 1018. at p. 186. 51. Ante, this section, notes 46, 54. Roche v. Ullman, 104 111. 47. 1; King v. Wight, 155 Mass. 444. 52. Ante, § 356. 29 N. E. 644; Kimm v. Griffin, 67 § 393] Covenants Running With Land. 1417 the landowner who builds it, until the other pays to him part of the cost thereof, there is a grant of cross easements of support, to take effect when such payment is made, and title to part of the wall ac- cordingly vests in the non builder, and there is also a grant, by the non builder to the builder, of an ease- ment to maintain the wall in part on the former's land.^^ Running* of benefit. The right to compensation under the agreement for the use of the wall is by some cases considered to appertain to the land, and to pass to a transferee of the proprietor who built the wall,^*' while by others it is regarded as personal to such proprietor, so as not to pass to his transferee.^" Minn. 25, 64 Am. St. Rep. 385, 69 N. W. 634. 55. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166; King v. Wight, 155 Mass. 444, 29 X. E. 644. 56. Rugg V. Lemley, 78 Ark. 65, 115 Am. St. Rep. 17, 93 S. W. 570; Eberly v. Behrend, 20 D. C. 215; Ferguson v. Worrall, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 219, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1261, 101 S. W. 966; Savage V. Mason, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 500; King V. Wight, 155 Mass. 444, 29 N. E. 644; Kimm v. Griffin, 67 Minn. 25, 64 Am. St. Rep. 385, 69 N. W. 634; Piatt v. Eggleston, 20 Ohio St. 414. See the remarks by Holmes, C. J., in Lincoln v. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378,, 52 L. R. A. 110, 59 N. E. 67, adverse to the view that, while the burden of such a covenant runs with the land, the benefit thereof can be regarded as "in gross" or per- sonal to the covenantee. In order that the transfe'Tee of the builder be able to recover upon the contract to pay part of the cost of the wall upon using it. the party wall agreement must, it has been held in Massachusetts, be under the seal of the other party, as otherwise the builder acquires, not an easement, but a mere license to build on the other land, and no privity exists to support the running of the covenant. Joy v. Boston Penny Sav. Bank, 115 Mass. 60. Even if the agreement is not under seal, the transferee of one tract, by accepting a conveyance bind- ing him to pay a part of the cost of the wall, becomes liable ac- cordingly. Maine v. Cumston, 98 Mass. 317. 57. Kenny v. Mackenzie, 12 Ont. App. 346; Crater v. McCor- mick, 4 Colo. 197; Conduitt v. Ross. 102 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Mayer v. Martin, 83 Miss. 322, 35 So. 218 (dictum) ; Cole v. Hughes. 54 N. Y. 444; Lea's Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 504; Todd v. Stokes, 10 Pa. St. 155; Parsons v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 44 W. Va. 335, 67 Am. St. Rep. 769, 29 S. E. 999. 1418 Real Property. [§ 393 The right to compensation has occasionally been con- sidered to be personal to the builder, not passing with the land, if the ownership of half the wall, by the express terms of the agreement, vests immediately on its construction, contrary to the general rule, in the owner of the other land, though he cannot use it till he pays his share,^^ the theory being that, in such case, the promise of the non builder is merely to reimburse the builder in part for his expenditure, the performance of which promise has no effect on the land. In at least one case, in which the title to no part of the wall was regarded as vesting in the non builder until payment was made by him, the right of the trans- feree of the builder to receive the payment was based on the theorv% not that the benefit of the covenant ran with the land, but rather that he was the vendor of part of the wall.°^ The fact that an intention appears in the agree- ment that the covenant shall run with the land, as when it is so stated,^" or even when the agreement is in terms made binding on assigns,^ ^ has occasionally been In New York, it seems, how- 18 111. App. 439. Pillsbury v. Mor- ever, that the right to compensa- ris, 54 Minn. 492, 56 N. W. 170. tion passes with the land if the And Professor Aigler's discussion, covenant is general in terms, re- 10 Mich. Law Rev. at p. 195. ferring to the possible construe- 59. Gibson v. Holden, 115 111. tion of the wall by either party. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 133, 3 N. E. Mott V. Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 272. See Rugg v. Lemley, 78 312, 17 L. R. A. 409, 31 N. E. Ark. 65, 115 Am. St. Rep. 17, 93 1097; Sebald v. Mulholland, 155 S. W. 570; Piatt v. Eggleston, 20 N Y. 455, 50 N. E. 260; Craw- Ohio St. 414. ford v. Krollpfeiffer, 195 N. Y. 60. Jebeles etc. Confectionery 185, 133 Am. St. Rep. 783, 88 Co. v. Brown, 147 Ala. 593, 11 Ann. N. E. 29. Cas. 525, 41 So. 626; Adams v. 58. Gibson v. Holden, 115 111. Noble, 120 Mich. 545, 79 N. W. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 133, 3 N. E. 810; Loyal Mystic Legion v. Jones, 272; McChesney v. Davis, 86 111. 73 Neb. 342, 102 N. W. 621. App. 380; Bloch v. Isham, 28 Ind. 61. Southworth v. Perring, 71 37. See Mickel v. York, 175 111. Kan. 755, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 62, 51 N. E. 848; Tomblin v. Fish, 114 Am. St. Rep. 527, 81 Pac. § 393] Covenants Running With Land. 1419 referred to in support of a decision that in the par- ticular case the benefit passed, while conversely the absence of any such showing of intention has been referred to in support of a contrary decision.'^- E" /en though the benefit of the covenant would otherwise pass, the party building the wall may, it has been held, upon the grant of his parcel, reserve the right to compensation on account of the use which may be subsequently made of the wall by the adjoining proprietor.'"-^ Occasionally the benefit of the stipulation for pajTBent of part of the cost of the wall has been re- garded as passing to a grantee of the builder of the wall, not on the theory that it is a covenant running with the land, but because the instrument by which the land was conveyed also transferred in terms the benefit of the stipulation,^'^ or on the theory, apparently, that a transfer in terms of the land is to be construed as also intended to transfer the benefit of the stipula- tion, as if it were so stated.^ In one or two cases the grantee of the builder appears to be regarded as entitled to recover part of the cost of the wall on the theory, not of contract, but rather of quasi contract, that is, that the person making use of another's wall is under an implied 481, 82 Pac. 785; King v. Wight, 63. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 155 Mass. 444, 29 X. E. 644; Hoff- 166, 26 X. E. 198; Pillsbury v. man v. Dickson, 47 Wash. 431, Morris, 54 Minn. 432, 56 X. W. 125 Am. St. Rep. 907, 15 Ann. 170. Cas. 173, 92 Pac. 272, 93 Pac. 523. 64. Keating v. Korfhage, 88 Sandberg v. Rowland, 51 Wash. Mo. 524; Parsons v. Baltimore 7, 97 Pac. 1087. See Loyal Mystic Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 44 W. Va. 335. Legion v. Jones, 73 Xeb. 342, 102 29 S. E. 999, 67 Am. St. Rep. 769; X. W. 621; Weyman v. Ringold, 1 Ellinsburg Lodge Xo. 20 v. Col- Bradf. (X. Y. Surr.) 40. lins, 68 Wash. 94, 122 Pac. 602. 62. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 65. See Roche v. Ullman, 104 166, 26 X. E. 198; Behrens v. 111. 11; Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. Hoxie, 26 111. App. 417. See Mott 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433. Mott v. V. Oppenhiemer, 135 N. Y. 312, Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312, 17 17 L. R. A. 409, 31 X. E. 1097. L. R. A. 409, 31 N. E. 1097. 1420 Real Property. [§ 393 assumpsit to make compensation to the owner of the wall.^^ The statutes in regard to party walls"' have ordinarily been construed as entitling the grantee of the builder of the wall to enforce the statutory liability for a portion of the cost of the wall/'^ But the user of the wall by the adjoining lot o^\^ler matures the ob- ligation, so that the right to compensation does not pass by a subsequent conveyance of the land.*'^ Running of the burden. Agreements between owners of adjoining pieces of land that, in case of the erection by either of them of a party wall upon the division line, a part on each tract, the other will, if he subsequently uses such wall, pay his share of the cost, have usually been held to bind a subsequent transferee of either owner for a part of the cost upon his user of such wall previously erected by the owner of the other property,'*^ though there are states in which such liability on the part of the transferee is denied."^ The fact that the party wall agreement 66. Post, § 393, note 77. 115 III. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 146, 3 67. Ante, § 365. N. E. 282; Conduitt v. Ross, 102 68. Pfrommer v. Taylor, 27 Ind. 166, 26 N. E. 198; Ferguson Del. 113, 86 Atl. 212; Halpine v. WorraU, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 219, 9 V. Barr, 21 Dist. Col. 331; Thorn- L. R. A (X. S.) 1261, 101 S. W. son V. Curtis, 28 Iowa, 229; Irwin 966; Savage v. Mason, 3 Cush. V. Peterson, 25 La. Ann. 300; (Alass.) 500; Standish v. Law- Hunt V. Ambruster, 17 N. J. Eq. rence, 111 Mass. Ill; Richardson 208; Knight v. Beenken, 30 Pa. v. Tobey, 121 Mass. 457; King v. 372; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. 118; Wight, 155 Mass. 444, 29 N. E. Contra under an earlier Pennsyl- 644; National Life Ins. Co. of vania statute, Dannaker v. Riley, ]\Iontpelier v. Lee, 75 Minn. 157, 14 Pa. 435. 77 N. W. 794; Burr v. Lamaster, 69. Eberly v. Behrend, 9 30 Neb. 688, 9 L. R. A. 637, 27 Am. Mackey (20 D. C.) 215; Lea v. St. Rep. 428, 46 N. W. 1015; Gar- Jones, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 587, 209 mire v. Willy, 36 Neb. 340, 54 N. Pa. 22, 57 Atl. 1113. W. 562; Hall v. Geyer, 14 Ohio 70. Roche v. UUman, 104 111. Cir. Ct. R. 229, 7 Ohio Dec. 436. 11; Mackin v. Haven, 187 111. 480, 71. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 58 N. E. 448; Tomblin v. Fish, 498; Nalle v. Paggi, — (Tex ) — , 18 HI. App. 439; Gibson v. Holden, 9 S. W. 205. In Nalle v. Paggi, § 398] Co\'EXANTS RrxxiXG With Laxd. 1421 is ill terms binding on the assigns of the i)arties has been referred to as making the burden of the covenant run with the land'- and a statement that the covenant is to run with the land would no doubt have quite as great an effect.'" Such an agreement is, it seems, prima facie, con- strued as providing for reimbursement by the person alone who uses the wall for the construction of a building; and consequently the original covenantor, if he does not use the wall, is not liable on his covenant,'^ nor is one to whom the land is transferred after it has been built on by his grantor ordinarily so liable.'" SI Tex. 201, 1 L. R. A. 33, 16 S. W. 932, it was held that the non builder, party to the agreement, having contracted to pay half the value of the wall when he used it, became personally liable for half the value immediately on trans- ferring his land to another, and thus becoming incapable of using the wall. In New York it is held that the covenant to pay part of the cost runs with the land, if the agree- ment is general in terms, con- templating the possible construc- tion of the wall by either party in the future, without reference to any present intention of building a wall, while it does not run when it involves a specific agree- ment that, if the party named build the wall, the other party shall pay part of the cost thereof upon using it. Sebald v. Mulhol- land, 155 X. Y. 455, 50 X. E. 260; Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer, 195 X. Y. 185, 88 N. E. 29. 72. Roche v. Ulman, 104 111. 11; South worth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755, 81 Pac. 481, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 114 Am. St. Rep. 527, 82 Pac. 785; King v. Wright, 155 2 R. P.— 15 -Mass. 444, 29 X. E. 644; Kimm v. Griffin, 67 .Minn. 25, 64 Am. St. Rep. 385, 69 X. W. 634; Hoffman v. Dickson, 47 Wash. 431, 125 Am. St. Rep. 907, 15 Ann. Cas. 173. 92 Pac. 272, 93 Pac. 523. 73. Jebeles h Colias Confec- tionery Co. V. Brown, 147 Ala. 593, 11 Ann. Cas. 525, 41 So. 626; Roche V. Ulman, 104 111. 11; Rein- hardt v. Holmes, 143 Mo. App. 212, 127 S. W. 611; Adams v. Xoble. 120 -Mich. 545, 79 X. W. 810. There is one decision to the effect that although the covenant was not previously one the bur- den of which would run with the land, its character in this regard is changed if a subsequent con- veyance by the covenant is in terms subject to the party wall agreement. Ellinsburg Lodge Xo. 20, I. 0. F. C. V. Collins, 68 Wash. 94, 122 Pac. 602. 74. Standish v. Lawrence, 111 Mass. Ill; Jordan v. Kraft, 33 Xeb. 844; Percival v. Colonial In v., Co., 140 Iowa, 275, 24 L. R. A. (X. S.) 293, 115 X. W. 941. 75. Pfeiffer v. .Matthews, 161 .Mass. 487, 42 Am. St. Rep. 435. 37 1422 Eeal Peoperty. [^ 393 Occasionally reference is made in the decisions to the existence in the particular case- of notice of the party wall agreement on the part of the person sought to be charged, as if lack of notice might prevent the running of the covenant as against him.'^'' And it may be assumed that the courts would hesitate to impose such liability on one who purchased the land without notice, actual or constructive, of the agree- ment. Occasionally the court, without reference to the doc- trine of covenants running with the land, appears to have implied an assumpsit, on the part of a subsequent grantee, taking with notice of his grantor's agreement that part of the cost of the wall shall be paid upon its user, to make payment accordingly, such assumpsit being implied in favor of the person, whether the original builder or his grantee, who owns the wall at the time of its user by the owner of the other prop- erty.'^'^ This implied assumpsit involves a liability, N. E. 571; First Nat. Bank v. 104 N. W. 607, it was held that Security Bank, 61 Minn. 25, 63 X. the grantee was not affected with W. 264. But in Iowa a grantee notice of the agreement by rea- who purchases with notice that son of the presence of the wall his grantor, who used the wall, on his land. This was however has not paid for it as agreed is a proceeding for an injunction, perhaps liable. Pew v. Buchanan, and the decision in favor of de- 72 Iowa, 637, 34 N. W. 453. Per- fendant may presumably be re- cival V. Colonial Inv. Co., 140 garded as based on the theory Iowa, 275, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) that the agreement created an 293, 115 N. W. 941. equitable charge (Post, note 80) 76. Lorenzi v. Starmarket, 19 which was effective as against Idaho, 614, 115 Pac. 490. See purchasers with notice only. Roche V. Ullman, 104 111. 11; Har- 77. Standish v. Lawrence, 111 ris V. Dozier, 72 111. App. 542; Mass. Ill; Richardson v. Tobey, McChesney v. Davis, 86 111. App. 121 Mass. 457, 23 Am. Rep. 283; 380; Richardson v. Tobey, 121 Brown v. Pentz, 1 Abb. App. Dec. Mass. 457, 23 Am. Rep. 283; Gar- 227, per McCouu, J., Burlock v. mire v. Willy, 36 Neb. 340, 54 N. Peck, 2 Duer 90; and see Piatt v. W. 562. Eggleston, 20 Ohio St. 414; Na- In Scottish American Mortgage tional Life Ins. Co. v. Lee, 75 Co. V. Russell, 20 S. Dak. 310, Minn. 157, 77 N. W. 794. § 393] Covenants Kuxning With Land. 1423 not in contract, }3ut in quasi contract. But ordinarily, as before stated,'^^ no liability is imposed upon one using a wall placed in part on his land by another, in the absence of an agreement on his part, or on the part of his predecessor in title, to make compensation in the case of its use by him. The theory of implied as- sumpsit, above referred to, appears to be that adopted in England, in order to impose liability on a sub- sequent grantee of the covenantor.'''* In a few cases it has been said that an agreement of the character referred to has the effect of creating an equitable charge,^*' or lien,^^ so that a grantee claiming under the non builder, if he takes with notice, express or implied, of the agreement to pay for the use of the w^all, takes subject thereto. And occasionally such an agreement has apparently been regarded as creating an equitable easement as regards the pay- ment of part of the cost of the wall.^- The view that by such an agreement an equitable lien or charge is created involves the proposition merely that, in case the wall built by the owner of one tract is used by the owner of the other, the liability for the stipulated portion of the cost of the wall may 78. Ante, § 356 ment for lien) ; Parsons v. Bal- 79. Christie v. Mitchison, 36 timore Building & L. Ass'n, 44 W. Law Times N. S. 621; Irving v. Va. 335, 67 Am. St. Rep. 769, 29 Turnbull (1900), 2 Q. B. 129. The N. E. 999. latter case is criticized in edi- In one state a grantee has been torial notes, 14 Harv. Law Rev. at regarded, by force of the statute p. 297, and 1 Columbia Law Rev. as to party walls, as taking tha at p. 257. land subject to a lien for a por- 80. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. tion of the cost of the wall, if 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433; Keating v. it was used by his grantor. Pew Korfhage, 88 Mo. 254; Stehr v. v. Buchanan, 72 Iowa, 637, 34 Raben, 33 Neb. 437, 50 N. W. 327. N. W. 453. 81. Nelson v. McEwen, 35 111. 82. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 -Mo. App. 100; First Nat. Bank v. Se- 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433; Keating v. curity Bank, 61 Minn. 25, 63 N. W. Korfhage, 88 Mo. 254; Stehr v. 264. Arnold v. Chamberlain, 14 Raben, 33 Neb. 437, 50 N. W. 327. Tex. Civ. App. 634 (express agree- 1424 Real Property. [§ 393 be enforced against the land by foreclosure sale But whether such a lien should be recognized in the absence of any language showing an intention to cre- ate it may well be questioned. And the theory of equitable charge or lien furnishes no ground for im- posing a personal liability upon a subsequent grantee of the land,*'^ though it is not, it seems, inconsistent with the existence of such liability.*^ That is, a grantee may in some jurisdictions be personally liable as upon a covenant running with the land, and the covenantee at the same time have an equitable lien upon his land for part of the cost of the wall. The view that by such an agreement an equitable easement is created appears to involve the proposition that as one who takes with notice of an agreement by his predecessor in title that the land shall not be used in a certain way may be restrained from making such use,^^*" so one who takes with notice of an agreement that the land shall not be used without the making of a certain payment, may be restrained from making such use without making the payment. ^-^ In so far as the theory of equitable easement, however, may involve the assumption that the right to use the wall is conditional upon payment of part of the cost thereof, it does not accord with the construction sometimes, perhaps usually, placed upon a party wall agreement, that the right to use the wall is not dependent upon payment of the stipulated part of the cost.***^ 83. See Keating v. Korfhage, 88 Garmire v. Willy, 36 Xeb. 340, Mo. 524; Parsons v. Baltimore .54 N. W. 562. Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 44 W. Va. 335, 84a. Po.^t, § 394. 67 Am. St. Rep. 769, 29 N. E. 999. 85. See Gibson v. Holden, 115 84. First Nat. Bank v. Security 111. 199, 56 Am. Rep. 146, 3 X. E. Bank, 61 Minn. 25, 63 N. W. 624; 282. Roche V. unman, 104 111. 11; Har- 86. Ante, § 361, note 39. ris V. Dozier, 72 111. App. 542. CHAPTER XV. RESTRICI'IONS ENFORCEABLE IN EQUITY. § 394. General considerations. 394. Character of agreement. 396. Theory of enforcement. 397. Persons subject to restriction. 398. Notice. 399. Persons entitled to enforce restriction. 400. Existence of general plan. 401. Defenses to enforcement. § 394. General considerations. Even in jurisdic- tions where, as in England, the burden of a covenant does not run with the land, an agreement as to the use of land may, under certain circumstances, affect a subsequent purchaser of the land who takes with notice of the agreement, equity in such case enjoining a use of the land in violation of such agreement.^ As stated in the leading case on the subject, ^'"^ "the ques- tion is not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be pennitted to use the land 1. See, on the subject of this Heights Co. of Baltimore, 70 Md. chapter, an excellent article by 493, 3 L. R. A. 579, 17 Atl. 372; Professor George L. Clark, in IG Feabody Heights Co. of Baltimore Mich. Law Rev. at p. 90. City v. Willson, 82 Md. 186, 36 la. Tulk V. Moxhay, 2 Phillips, L. R. A. 393, 32 Atl. 386, 1077; 774. See, to the same effect, De Whitney v. Union Ry. Co., 11 Gray Mattes V. Gibson, 4 De G. & J. (Mass.) 359, 71 Am. Dec. 715; 276; Luker v. Dennis, 7 Ch. Div. Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 227; McMahon v. Williams, 79 58 Am. St. Rep. 363, 24 N. W. Ala. 288; Bryant v. Grosse, 155 104; Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 99; Frye v. H. 475, 97 Am. Dec. 633; Kirk- Partridge, 82 111. 267; Hutchin- Patrick v. Peshine, 24 N. J. Eq. sun V. Ulrich, 145 111. 336, 21 L. 206; Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. R. A. 391, 34 N. E. 556; Wieg- Eq. 386, 19 Atl. 190; Hayes v. man v. Kusel. 270 HI. 520, 110 Waverly & P. Ry. Co., 51 N. J. N. E. 886; Newbold v. Peabody Eq. 345; Cotton v. Cresse, 80 N. (14:^:,) 142G Real Property. [§ 394 in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he pur- chased." The person thus affected by the agreement as to the use of the land may be a purchaser, a lessee,^ or a mere occupant of the land under license.^ Such an agreement may occur in connection with a con- veyance of land, restricting the grantor, or the sub- sequent transferees of the grantor, as regards the use of land retained by him,^ or restricting the grantee as regards the use of the land conveyed.^ Or it may be independent of any conveyance of land, being merely an agreement between adjoining owners as regards the use of their land.'' J. Eq. 540, 85 Atl. 600; Wootton V. Seltzer, 84 N. J. Eq. 207, 93 Atl. 1087; Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, 1 Am. St. Rep. 816, 17 N. E. 335; Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 254, 24 Am. Dec. 218; Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N. E. 322; St. Andrew's Luth- eran Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 512; Town of Middletown v. New- port Hospital, 16 R. I. 319, 15 Atl. 800; Ball v. Milliken, 31 R. I. 36, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1334, 76 Atl. 789. 2. Wilson V. Hart, 1 Ch. App. 463; Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 12; Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.) 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632. 3. Mander v. Falcke [1891] 2 Ch. 554. 4. See e. g., Halle v. Newbold, 69 Md. 265; Bridgewater v. Ocean City R. Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 798, 52 Atl. 1130; Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N. E. 322; Water- town V. Cowen, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 510, 27 Am. Dec. 80; Nicoll v. Fenning, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 258. 5. See e. g., Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 69 So. 438; Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 Pac. 310; Judd v. Rob- inson, 41 Colo. 222, 124 Am. St. Rep. 128, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1018, 92 Pac. 724; Hays v. St. Paul M. E. Church, 196 111. 633, 63 N. E. 1040; Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546; Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 58 Am. Rep. 363, 24 N. W. 104; Coughlin v. Barker, 46 Mo. App. 54; Condert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386, 10 Atl. 190; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N. Y. 400; Smith v. Graham, 217 N. Y. 655, 112 N. E. 1076; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289. 6. Bryan v. Grosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 499; Codman v. Brad- ley, 201 Mass. 361, 87 N. E. 591, Ericksen v. Tapert, 172 Mich. 457, 138 N. W. 330; Supplee v. Cohen, 81 N. J. Eq. 500, 86 Atl. 366; Cotton V. Cresse, 80 N. J. Eq. 540, § 394] Equitable Restrictions. 1427 That the grantor of land is expressly given a right of forfeiture in case of the breach by the grantee of a provision restrictive of the use to be made of the land does not of itself j^reclude the enforcement of such a provision by injunction."^ The courts do not favor restrictions upon the utiliza- tion of land, and that a particular mode of utilization is excluded by agreement must clearly appear.'" If this does appear, the fact that the person seeking relief can- not show that such user of the land will cause him actual damage is usually immaterial,^'' though it may happen that the particular violation of the agreement sought to be restrained is so unimportant that equity will not inter- vene.'^^ The court will give relief when necessary by a mandatory as well as by a prohibitory injunction.'^ ^ 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357, 85 Atl. 600; Trustees of Columbia Col- lege V. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Lewis V. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227, 26 Am. St. Rep. 516, 29 N. E. 81. 7. Weil V. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 69 So. 438; Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 58 Am. Rep. 363, 24 N. W. 104; Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 38 N. E. 1122; Wilson V. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 188 Mass. 565, 75 N. E. 128; Hayes v, W^verly & P. R. Co., 51 N. J. Eq. 345, 27 Atl. 648; Ball v. Milliken, 31 R. I. 36, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, 76 Atl. 789; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289; Duester v. Alvin, 74 Ore. 544, 145 Pac. 660. 7a. Gerling v. Lain, 269 111. 337, 109 N. E. 972; Brandenburg V. Lager, 272 111. 622, 112 N. E. 321; Van Duyn v. H. S. Chase & Co., 149 Iowa, 222, 128 N. W. 300; Melson v. Ormsby, 169 Iowa, 522, 151 N. W. 817; Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 Mich. 333, 154 N. W. 151; Godley v. Weisman, 133 Minn. 1, L. R. A. 1917A, 333, 157 N. W. 711, 158 N. W. 333; Scharer V. Pantler, 127 Mo. App. 433, 105 S. W. 668; Fortesque v. Carroll. 76 N. J. Eq. 583, 75 Atl. 923; Goater v. Ely, 80 N. J. Eq. 40, 82 Atl. 611; Hunt v. Held, — Ohio — , 107 N. E. 765; McCloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa. 319, 90 Atl. 73. 7b. Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167, 100 N. E. 500; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J. Eq. 612, 61 Atl. 369; Supplee v. Cohen, 80 i\. J. Eq. 83, 83 Atl. 373; Spilling V. Hutcheson, 111 Va. 179, 68 S. E. 250. See Doherty v. Allman, 3 App. Cds. at p. 720, per Lord Cairns. 7c. Barton v. iSlifer, 72 N. J. Eq. 812, 66 Atl. 899; Smith v. Spencer, 81 N. J. Eq. 389, 87 Atl. 158; Forsee v. Jackson, 192 Mo. App. 408, 182 S. W. 783. 7d. Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167, 100 N. E. 500; Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361, 87 N. E. 591; Stewart v. Finkclstone, 206 Mass. 28, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634, 1428 Real Peopeety. [§ 395 It has been decided in one state that a covenant restrictive of the use of land constitutes a property right in the land restricted, so as to entitle the bene- ficiaries under the covenant to compensation if such land is devoted to a public use which involves a vio lation of the covenant,^ and in another state the interest of one entitled to enforce such a covenant has been regarded as a right of which he cannot be deprived by legislation without compensation.^ Elsewhere, how- ever, such a covenant has been regarded as a nullity as against the state or a state agency seeking to utilize the land for a public or quasi public purpose, with the result that a neighboring property owner cannot assert any claim for damages in such case, though the public use is of a character which is in terms excluded by the covenant/'" § 395. Character of agreement. In England, an agreement will thus be enforced in equity against a subsequent purchaser or occupant only when it is restrictive of the use of the land, and not when it calls for the performance of some positive act by the occu- pant thereof.^^ And in the great majority of the 138 Am. St. Rep. 370, 92 N. E. Co., 92 Ohio St. 471, 112 N. E. 37; AHen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 507; U. S. v. Certain Lands, 112 36, 99 N. E. 575; Compton Hill Fed. 622; Wharton v. United Imp. Co. V. Strauch, 162 Mo. App. States, 153 Fed. 876. 76, 141 S. W. 1159; Maine v. Mul- 10. Havwood v. Brunswick liken, 176 Mich. 443, 142 N. W. Permanent Benefit Building Soc. 782; Spilling v. Hutcheson, 111 8 J. B. Div. 403; Austerberry v. Va. 179, 68 S. E. 250. Corporation of Oldham, 29 Ch. 8. Flynn v. New York, W. & Div. 750; London & S. W. Ry. B. R. Co., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562. See 913. De Gray \:. Monmouth Beach Club 9. Riverbank Improvement Co. House Co., 50 X. J. Eq. 329. That V. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 only a restrictive agreement will N. E. 244. thus be enforced, see also Miller 9a. Doan v. Cleveland Short v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 X. Line Ry. Co., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 E. 1114 {semble). N. E. 505; Ward v. Cleveland Ry. § 395] Equitable Restrictioxs. 1429 cases in this country the agreement enforced has been restrictive. Thus, agreements not to use specified limd for building/^ or for a particular business/^ or for other than residence purposes/^ have been thus en- forced, as have agreements not to build within a cer- tain distance of the street/"* or to erect no building of less than a certain cost/^ or of a style of construc- tion other than that named. ^*^ In some cases/" how- ever, an affirmative agreement in connection with the land has been regarded as within the doctrine, with the effect that a purchaser from the promisor with notice of such an agreement, though he may not be personally liable for its non performance, takes the land subject to the possibility that a court of equity will enforce its performance, or reparation for its non performance, by a decree in reference to the land. So an agreement by which, if one uses a wall constructed by his adjoining owner, he is to pay a 11. Tulk V. Moxhay, 2 Phillips, 774. Wood V. Cooper (1894) 3 Ch. 671; Herriok v. Marshall, 66 :\le. 435; Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546; Lad;l v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481, 24 N. E. 858; Phoe- nix Ins. Co. V. Continental Ins. Co., 87. X. Y. 400; Hennen v. De- veny, 71 W. Va. 629, L. R. A. 1917A, 524, 77 S. E. 142. 12. McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288; Collins Mfg. Co.v. Marcy. 25 Conn. 242; Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 58 Am. Rep. 363, 24 X. W. 104; Post v. Weil, 115 .\. Y. 361; 5 L R. A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 800, 22 X. E. 145; Stines V. Dorman. 25 Ohio St. 580. 13. German v. Chapman, 7 Ch. Div. 271; Parker v. .Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.) 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632. Trustees of Columbia Col- lege V. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440. 14. Manners v. Johnson, 1 Ch. Div. 673; Coles v. Sims, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 1; Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512; Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387; Ogontz Land & Im- provement Co. V. Johnson, 168 Pa. St. 178, .31 Atl. 1008; Branden- burg V. Lager, 272 111. 622. 112 N. E. 321. 15. Bowes V. Law, L. R. 9 Eq. 636. Page v. Murray, 46 X. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. 11; Blakemore v. Stan- ley, 159 Mass. 6, 33 N. E. 689. 16. Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 404; Landell v. Hamilton, 177 Pa. St. 23, 35 Atl. 242; Clark V. Martin, 49 Pa. St. 289. 17. Flege v. Covington & C. Elevated R. & Transfer & Bridge Co., 122 Ky. 348, 121 Am. St. Rep. 463, 91 S. W. 738; Bailey v. Aga- wam Nat Bank, 190 Mass. 20, 3 L. R. A. (X. S.) 98, 112 Am. St. Rep. 296, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1430 Real Peopekty. [§ 395 certain amount named, has occasionally been regarded as enforcible against the land in the hands of a pur- chaser with notice as an equitable rather than a legal claim. ^^ The adoption of this view, that even an affirmative agreement may be enforced as against a purchaser with notice, involves merely a necessity of regarding such an agreement, if for the payment of money by the promisor to the jDromisee, as cre- ating an equitable lien or charge on the lands, ^^ and if for the doing of another character of act, as justif}"- ing a decree for the- specific performance of the agreement. If the agreement neither calls for the payment of money nor is of such a character that specific perfonnance would otherwise be decreed, it would appear to be enforceable in equity as against such a subsequent purchaser to no greater extent than it is enforcible at law. Subject to such considerations, there would appear to be no objection to the applica- tion of the doctrine which we are now discussing to the case of an affirmative agreement, except as the particular court may regard it as impolitic thus to increase the burdens capable of imposition on land,^° According to a few decisions, the agreement, even though restrictive, in order to be thus enforced in equity against a subsequent purchaser, must ''touch and concern" land belonging to the person in favor of whom the agreement is made, by tending to the* phys- ical advantage of such land, it being insufficient that 553, 76 N. E. 449; Childs v. Boston 18. Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. & M. R., 213 Mass. 91, 99 N. E. 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433; Burr v. 957. Carson v. Percy, 57 Miss. 97; Lamaster, 30 Neb. 688, 9 L. R. A. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 637, 27 Am. St. Rep. 428, 46 N. W. 475; Gould v. Partridge, 52 N. Y. 1015. See ante. § 393, notes 82-85. App. Div. 40, 64 N. Y. Supp. 870 19. Post, § 661. (semble) ; Hlnchman v. Consol. 20. See article by Charles I. Arizona Smelting Co., 198 Fed. Giddings, Esq., In 5 Harv. Law ^07 (semble). As adverse to the Rev. at p. 279; editorial note in enforcement of such an affirma- 18 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 214; 3 tive covenant, see Miller v. Clary, Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 1295. 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114. § 395] Equitable Eestkictions. 1431 it increases its value indirectly by preventing the use of the adjoining property for a competing business.^ ^ That such an agreement preventive of competition may be enforced against a subsequent purchaser with notice is however recognized or assumed in a number of cases.-- And admitting that the agreement is valid between the original parties thereto, the fact that its chief operation is to restrain competition appears to be hardly a sufficient reason for permitting a subse- quent purchaser with notice of the agreement to use the land in contravention thereof.^ ^ Statute of Frauds. The right thus to enforce an agreement in equity against a subsequent pur- chaser is, at least in some jurisdictions, independent of the mode or incidents of its execution. It need not be a covenant, that is, an agreement under seal, and it has usually been regarded as sufficient although oral merely, or merely inferred from the acceptance of a conveyance containing such a stipulation, or from re- presentations made upon the sale of land.^^ It is to 21. Taylor v. Owen, 2 Blackf. ridge, 82 111. 267; Watrous v. (Ind.) 301 (semble); Norcross v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 58 Am. Rep. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946; 363, 24 X. W. 104; Hodge v. Sloan, Brewer v. Marshall, 18 X. J. Eq. 107 N. Y. 244, 1 Am. St. Rep. 816, 337, 19 N. J. Eq. 557; Kettle River 17 N. E. 335 (two judges dissent- R. Co. V. Eastern Ry. Co. of Minne- ing) ; Stines v. Dorman, 25 Ohio sota; 41 Minn. 461, 6 L. St. 580; Middletown, Town of, v. R. A. Ill, 43 X. W. 469; Tardy v. Newport Hospital, 16 R. I. 319, Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (two judges 333, 1 L. R. A. 191, 15 Atl. 800 dissenting); West Virginia Rwy. (semble). See Sutton v. Head, V. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 86 Ky. 156, 9 Am. St. Rep. 274, W. Va. 600. See Burdell v. Gran- 5 S. W. 410. di, 152 Cal. 376, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 23. See 17 Harv. Law Rev. at 909, 125 Am. St. Rep. 61, 92 Pac. P 183. article by Prof J. B. Ames. 1022. 24. Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. 22. Catt v. Tourle, 4 Ch. App. Cas. 12; Renals v. Colishaw, 9 Ch. 654; Holloway v. Hill (1902), 2 Div. 125, 11 Ch. Div. 866; Mac- Ch. 612; Robinson v. Webb, 68 Ala. kenzie v. Childers, 43 Ch. Div. 397, 77 Ala. 176; McMahon v. Wil- 265; Nottingham Patent Brick & Hams, 79 Ala. 288; Frye v. Part- Tile Co. v. Butler, 15 Q. B. Div. 1432 Real Property. [§ 395 be regretted that the judicial expressions to this effect have not been accompanied by any explanation of why the agTeenient is not within the operation of the Statute of Frauds, a question as to which there ap- l)ears to be considerable room for discussion. In two or three states the view has been asserted that an agreement such as we are now considering involves the creation of an interest in land, within the local equivalent of the first section of the English statute.^" But in view of the fact that that statute contains a separate provision in reference to proof of the creation of an express trust, it might perhaps be questioned whether the first section was intended to apply to the creation of any equitable interest, and a like view might perhaps be taken of similar lan- guage occurring in a state statute. There is one ex- Illicit decision that an agreement restrictive of the use of land is not an agreement for the sale of an interest in land within the fourth section of the stat- ute,^^ and this seems a rational view, but a contrary view is asserted in another state. -^ There are two decisions denying that an agreement that land shall not be utilized in a particular way is one not to be performed within one year from the making thereof 261, 16 Q. B. Div. 778; Wliitney 25. Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sandf. V, Union Railway Co., 11 Gra\ C^i. (N. Y.) 72; Rice v. Roberts, (Mass.) 359, 71 Am. Dec. 715; 24 Wis. 461; McCusker v. Goode, Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples. 185 Mass. 607, 71 N. E. 76; 164 Mass. 319; Allen v. City of Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 36 L. R. 380, 100 N. E. 622. And see Tib- A. (N. S.) 890, 133 N. W. 317; betts v. Tibbetts, 66 N. H. 360, Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 20 Atl. 979. 26 N. Y. 105; Lewis v. Gollner, 26. Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn. 129 N. Y. 227, 26 Am. St. Rep. 476, 29 Am. St. Rep. 218, 23 Atl. 516, 29 N. E. 81; Equitable Life 876. Ass'n Soc. of United States v. 27. Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661, 43 N. 5. Mass. 380, 4 L. R. A. 962, 100 N. 173; Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, E. 622; Clanton v. Scruggs, 95 41 N. J. Eq. 606, 56 Am. Rep. Ala. 279, 10 So. 757. 16, 7 Atl. 491. <§ 395] Equitable REsxRirTioxs, 1433 Avitliiu the statute, one decision bein^- based on the theory that it may be performed within a year,-*^ and the other upon the theory that the provision does not apply to a negative contract.-'^ It is, however, difficult to see how such a contract not limited in time, is capable of performance in a year, nor is it clearly apparent that a negative contract does not call for performance to the same extent as a positive contract, for the purpose of this provision. In those jurisdic- tions, however, in which this provision as to agreements not to be performed within a year has been held not to apply to a contract based on an executed considera- tion, or to one which is to be entirely performed by one party within the year, an agreement incidental to the sale or conveyance of land would ordinarily not fall within its operation.'^"- Conceding that otherwise the agreement in refer- ence to the land would be within the Statute of Frauds, it has been suggested that a restrictive agreement, although oral, might on occasion be enforced on the theory of part performance,"^^ on that of fraud-*- or on that of estoppel."'" It would seem, however, somewhat difficult to bring every case of an oral restrictive agreement within the operation of either one of these doctrines. In case, for instance, one conveying land to another orally agrees, at the time of executing the conveyance, not to make a particular use of land re- tained by him, there would appear to be no room for the application of the doctrine of ])art performance, nor any sufficient basis for a finding of either estoppel 28. Hall V. Solomon, 61 Conn. ing Co., 15.5 Cal. 402, 101 Pac. 476, 29 Am. St. Rep. 218, 23 Atl. 297. 876. 31. Williams, Vendor & Pur- 29. Leinau v. Smart. 11 chaser (2nd Ed.) 494. Humph. (Tenn.) 308. 32. Hubbell v. Warren, 8 A'.len 30. That a verbal agreement (Mass.) 173. not to use land for a certain 33. Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, purpose is within this provision, 41 X. J. Eq. 606, 56 Am. Rep. 16, see Long V. Cramer Meat & Pack- 7 Atl. 491; Woods v. Lowrance, 1434 Real Property. [§ 396 or frand.^^ The fact that one purchasing land mis- takenly supposes that an incidental stipulation entered into by the vendor is legally enforcible, should hardly operate to estop the vendor from asserting the con- trary, even though it appears that the former would not have made the purchase had he been correctly informed.^^ § 396. Theory of enforcement. While the right to enforce in equity an agreement or covenant of a restric- tive character as against a subsequent purchaser with notice thereof is generally recognized, the judicial ex- pressions as to the principle underlying such enforce- ment are singularly inharmonious. In some cases, the doctrine appears to be regarded as merely an equitable application of a legal rule that the burden as well as the benefit of a covenant which touches and concerns the land will run with the land, a view which is necessarily restricted to such states as have adopted the rule that the burden of a covenant runs with the land at law.^" In a considerable number of cases the right of enforce- ment appears to be based on the theory that, in the view of a court of equity, an easement in the land is created by an agreement of this character.^^'^ 49 Tex. Civ. App. 542, 109 S. W. Me. 242, 88 Atl. 859; Dawson v 418. Western M. R. Co., 107 Md. 70, 34. See Sprague v. Kimball, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 809, 126 Am. 213 Mass. 380, 100 N. E. 622. St. Rep. 337, 15 Ann. Cas. 678, 68 35. See Clanton v. Scruggs, 95 Atl. 301; Hogan v. Barry, i43 Ala. 279, 10 So. 757. Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253; Ladd v. 36. Ante, § 390. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 21 37. McMahon v. Williams, 79 Am. St. Rep. 481, 24 N. E. 858; Ala. 288; Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. Chase v. Walker, 167 Mass. 293, 407, 69 So. 438; Tinker v. Forbes, 45 N. E. 916; Brown v. O'Brien, 136 111. 221, 26 N. E. 503; Hutch- 168 Mass. 484, 47 N. E. 195; inson v. Ulrich, 145 111. 336, 21 L. Riverbank Improvement Co. v R. A. 391, 34 N. E. 556; Clark Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. V. McGee, 159 111. 518, 42 N. E. E. 244; Allen v. City of Detroit, 965; Herrick v. Marshall, 66 Me. 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 317, 36 435; Leader v. La Flamme, 111 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890; Bowen v. § 396] Equitable Restrictions. 1435 This latter theory has been adopted by the later English cases,^^ and has been there applied to the extent of holding that, as a legal easement requires a dominant as well as a servient tenement,^^ so an *' equi- table easement," requires a dominant tenement, that is, such an easement can be created by a restrictive cove- nant only if the covenantee has an interest in the land sought to be benefitted, with the result that if the covenantee has not such an interest, a purchaser from the covenantor, although taking with notice of the covenant, is not atfected thereby.^*^ The theory referred to, that a restrictive agree- ment operates to create an easement for the i^urposes of a court of equity, though favored by the later English cases, and frequently referred to with ap- proval by most respectable American courts, is by no means entirely satisfactory.^'^ ^ If what is in form a Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675; Trustees of Columbia Col- lege V. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Muz- zarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. St. 643, 30 Atl. 291; Green v. Creigh- ton, 7 R. I. 9. 38. The adoption of this view by the English courts dates from the dictum, entirely uncalled for, of Jessel, M. R., in London & Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, that "the doctrine of Tulk V. Moxliay, 2 Phil. 774, rightly considered, appears to me to be either an extension in equity of the doctrine of Spen- cer's case to another line of cases, or else an extension in equity of the doctrine of negative easements." See, in support of this view, editcrial notes in^ 2S Harv. Law Rev. at p. 201, 31 Id. at p. S76. 39. Ante, § 348. 40. Formby v. Barker (1903), 2 Ch. 539; :\lillbourn v. Lyons (1914), 1 Ch. 34; Lon:^on County Council v. Allen (1914), 3 K. B. 642. In the latter case two of the three judges indicate dissatisfac- tion with the theory which com- pelled such a decision. Likewise, on the analogy of easements, it has, in Massachu- setts, been decided that the benefit of a restrictive agreement by the grantee of land would not pass on a subsequent conveyance of neighboring land in which the promisee had merely an undivid- ed interest, since a contrary view would involve in effect a reser- vation of an easement in favor of a person not of a party to the con- veyance, that is, the owner of the other undivided interest. Hazen v. Mathews, 184 Mass. 388, 68 N. E. 838. 40a. The covenants thus en- forced against an assignee of the l-tSO Eeal Property. [§ 396 contract not to use tlie land in a particular manner creates an easement as to the use of the land, it should, one would suppose, create it for the purposes of a court of law as well as of a court of equity. It is difficult to understand how language which, when under consideration in a court of equity, is regarded as cre- ating an easement can, when under consideration in a court of law, be regarded as creating a contract only.^^ It is no doubt true that an easement can be created by what are in form words of covenant,"'^ but that is by reason of the construction placed upon these words as being in effect words of grant, for the pur- liose of a court of law as well as of equity. It is somewhat noticeal)le that even courts which empha- size the theory of "equitable easement" for the pur- pose of making effective a restrictive covenant as against a subsequent purchaser of the land, ordinarily regard words of covenant restrictive of the use of land as creating, for other purposes, merely a cove- nant.^"^ That is, the courts ignore the possible operation of such words as creating an equitable easement rather than a covenant, except when it is convenient to regard them as creating such an easement for the pur- ])ose of making them effective against a subsequent purchaser. The more satisfactory theory, it is conceived, in regard to the enforceability in equity of restrictive covenantor are, as hereafter stat-- case of a deviation of a few inches ed, usually restrictions upon the from a building line, or a re- character or location of the build- striction as to the use to be made ing to be erected, or business to of the land, or the cost of the be maintained, on the land, and building thereon, such covenants are, in some of the 41. See the remarks of Wilde, cases last cited, said to create J., in Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick, easements of light, air, and pros- (Mass.) 459, quoted ante, § 391, pect. They are, however enforced note 29. even when their violation could 42. Ante, § 361. not involve any interference with 43. See 1 Tilfany, Landlord & light, air, or prospect, as in the Tenant, § 123. <^ 396] Equitable Eestbictioxs. 1437 agreements against purchasers with notice is that equi- ty regards such an agreement as vesting in tlie prom- isee a right to specific enforcement by means of an injunction or otherwise, not only as against the origi- nal promisor, but also as against a subsequent holder of the property, if not a purchaser for value without notice.^^ If the right to equitable relief could not thus be asserted as against a subse([uent holder of the property, the result would be that the promisee could be deprived of such right, in practically every case, by a collusive transfer on the i)art of the promisor. The doctrine, properly regarded, appears to be closely analagous to that by which the equitable right to spe- cific performance of a contract is enforced as against a subsequent holder of the property, not a bona fide purchaser for value, by a decree requiring him to make a conveyance in conformity to the contract, as well as to the doctrine that a trust may be enforced as against a purchaser from the trustee under like circumstances. Sucn a right as to the use of land, created by contract and capable of enforcement as against a subsequent holder of the land, resembles likewise an equitable lien created by a contract subjecting the land to a pecuniaiy claim l)y way of security for the claim. It has in England been decided that one who ac- quires the land by adverse possession takes it subject to a restrictive agreement to which it was subject in the hands of the rightful owner.^"^ This decision appears, 44. See the discussion in Sug- at p. 119, 17 Harv. Law Rev. at den, Vendors & Purchasers (14th p. 415, 21 Id. 139; De Gray v. Ed.) 802 et seq. Maitland, Equity Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 165; articles by Prof. J. B. Ames 50 X. J. Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388; in 17 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 174, Cotton v. Cress3, 80 N. J. Eq. Lectures on Legal History, 381; 540, 85 Atl. 600. 49 L. R. A. (X. S.) by T. Cyprian Williams, Esq., in 357. 51 Solicitors' Journal 141; by Pro- 45. Re Xisbet & Potts' Con- fesor Harlan F. Stone, in 18 Co- tract (1905), 1 Ch. 391, (1906) 1 lumbia Law Rev. at p. 291; edi- ch. 386. torial notes in 4 Law Quart. Rev. 2 R. P.— 16 1438 Ebal Pkoperty. [§ 397 to some extent at least, to be based on tbe theory, re- ferred to in the preceding paragraph, that the right created by such an agreement is in the nature of an easement. Attention has been called by an able writer^'' to the difficulty of harmonizing this decision, which in effect regards an equitable claimant as unaffected by the fact that the holder of the legal title is barred under the statute of limitation, with the rule*' that a cestui que trust is barred when the holder of the legal title is barred, and suggestions have been made that in view of this decision, the rule that a cestui que trust is barred when the holder of the legal title is barred must be regarded as having been superseded as a result of the language used in the Statute of Limita- tions now in force in that country.*^ § 397. Persons subject to restriction. So far as the agreement which is sought to be enforced against a subsequent holder of the land concerns, as is almost in- variably the case, the use to be made of the land, it is a question of primary importance whether the agree- ment concerns the use to be made thereof by the prom- isor only, or the use to be made thereof by others as well. A use by a subsequent purchase cannot well be restrained if the agreement was intended to prevent the promisor only from making such use.*'' What the intention was in this regard is a question of construc- tion, but since it is ordinarily immaterial to the promisee who may make any particular use of the property, the presumption would seem to be, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, that such a use by any person whomsoever is intended,^'' and 46. T. Cyprian Williams, Esq., 49. Kemp v. Bird,' 5 Ch. Div. in 51 Solicitors' Journal at pp. 974; Re Fawcett v. Holmes, 42 141, 155. Ch. Div. 150; Brigg v. Thornton 47. Ante. § 103, note 4. (1904), 1 Ch. 386; Pythian Castle 48. Lightwood, Time Limits of Ass'n of Sacramento v. Daroux, Actions, 80; article by Charles 172 Cal. 510, 157 Pac. 594. Sweet, 19 Juridicial Review, 67. 50. See HoJge v. Sloan, 107 N. § 398] Equitable Eestrictions. 1439 an intention to this effect would appear to be clearlT indicated by the fact that the agreement in terms binds the promisor's as;?igns,^^ or that the agreement is in an impersonal form, that the land shall not be used in a particular way. § 398. Notice. As above stated, a restrictive agree- ment is enforced in equity against a subsequent pur- chaser only when he takes with notice thereof.^- Such notice may be either actual or constructive,^^ and the purchaser is, in accordance with the general rule as to notice,-^^ charged with notice of anything showing or imposing such a restriction which may be con- tained in a conveyance in the chain of title under which he claims,"" and whether such a conveyance is recorded is necessarily immaterial in this regard.^^ Y. 244, 1 Am. St. Rep. 816, 17 N. E. 335; Fuller v. Arms, 45 Vt. 400. 51. Holloway Brothers v. Hill (1902), 2 Ch. 618. See Hartz v. Kales Realty Co., 178 Mich. 560, 146 N. W. 160; Pavkovich v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 150 Cal. 39, 87 Pac. 1097. In Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. V. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 Pac. 308, it appears to be considered that if the restriction does not in terms purport to bind assigns or grantees, it cannct be enforced against them. And see Pythian Castle Ass'n of Sacramento v. Daroux, 172 Cal. 510, 157 Pac. 594; Wood V. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 86 Atl. 128. 52. Carter v. Williams, L. R. 9 Eq. 678; Nottingham Co. v. Butler, 16 Q. B. Div. 778, 787; Rowell v. Satchell (1903) 2 Ch. 212; Judd V. Robinson, 41 Colo. 222, 124 Am. St. Rep. 128, 14 Ann. Cas. 1018, 92 Pac. 724; Washburn v. Miller, 117 Mass. 376; Moller v. Presby- terian Hospital, 65 N. Y. App. Div. 134. 53. Wilson v. Hart, 1 Ch. App. 463; Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 12; Patman v. Harland, 17 Ch. Div. 353. 54. Post, § 572, 55. Patman v. Harland, 17 Ch. Div. 353; W^iegman v. Kusel, 270 111. 520, 110 N. E. 884; Duncan v. Central Passenger Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 525, 4 S. W. 228; Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546; Oliver v. Kalick, 223 Mass. 252, 111 N. E. 879; Zoller V. Goldberg, 183 Mich. 197, 149 N. W. 089; Wabash, St. L. & ■P. Ry. Co., 24 Mo. App. 199; Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537; Smith v. Graham, 217 N. Y. G55, 112 N. E. 1076*. See Norfleet V. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1. 56. Occasional statements that the purchaser is, in the particular .jcase, charged with notice of the agreement because the convey- 1440 Eeal Property. [§ 398 If, however, the agreement is contained in a conveyance which is not in the chain of title, but which was made by a prior owner of neighboring land, the question of its record may be material for the purpose of charging a purchaser with notice of the agreement, and such may also be the case when the agreement is not contained in a conveyance of land, but is incorporated in an independent instrument. The former case, that of an agreement contained in a conveyance not in the chain of title of the person against whom it is sought to en- force it, is elsewhere discussed,^' and the question of the record of an independent restrictive agreement will here alone be referred to. Whether such an agree- ment is entitled to be recorded, so that its record will affect the purchaser wnth constructive notice thereof is obviously a question to be determined by the lan- guage of the state recording law.'''* In accordance with the general equitable rule that a purchaser with notice from a ])urcliaser without notice takes free of the equity,-'^ the etfect of the ac- quisition of the property by one having no notice of the restrictive agreement is to put an end to the enforceability of the agreement as against the land.'"'^ There are in England occasional dicta^^ that a bona fide ])urcliaser for value of an e(|uitable, as dis- tinguished from a legal, estate, takes subject to the burden of a restrictive agreement, the element of notice ance in his chain of title in which Sjoblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193. it is contained is of record. 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1129, 114 N. (Schadt V. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, W. 746. 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 139 N. 59. Post. § 575. W. 878; :\Iiller v. Klein, 177 Mo. 60. Roak v. Davis, 194 Mass. App. 557, 160 S. W. 562; Bowen v. 481, 80 N. E. 690; Wilkes v. Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. Spooner [1911] 2 K. B. 473. 675) appear to be beside the mark. 61. London & S. W. Rwy. Co. 57. Post, § 567(d). v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562; Rogers 58. That it is entitled to record v. Hosegood [1900], 2 Ch. 388, see Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. Y. 405; Osborne v. Bradley [1903], 291, 33 N. E. 279; Boyden v. Rob- 2 Ch. 446, 451. erts, 131 Wis. 659, 111 N. W. 701; § 399] Equitable Restrictions. 1441 being thus niaterijil only Avheii the agTeement is as- serted as against a purchaser of the legal estate. This accords with the rule generally stated, that the doc- trine of bona fide purchase for value does not operate to protect the purchaser of a merely equitable interest, but the soundness of the rule from the standpoint of principle may be doubted''- and, as has been remarked, it is difficult to see the justice of exempting the bona fde purchaser of a legal fee simple from the burden of a restrictive covenant while not exempting such a pur- chaser of an equitable fee simple.**^ § 399. Persons entitled to enforce restriction. The person with whom the agreement was made, owning land in the neighborhood which might be benefitted by reason of the restriction, may no doubt proceed in equity for its enforcement. If on the other hand he has no land to be benefitted by the enforcement of the restriction, he cannot, by the weight of authority,^"* 62. See article by Professor Law Rev. at p. 58, 27 Harv. Law J. B. Ames, in 1 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 493, 16 Mich. Law Rev. at at p. 8, et seq., Lectures on Legal p. 97. In Massachusetts it has History p. 263, et seq. heen decided that the original 63. See article by Professor vendor, who has disposed of all Ames in 17 Harv. Law Rev. at his land, may properly join in p. 178, note. Lectures on Legal a suit by one of his vendaes History at p. 385. against another to enforce a rt- 64. Forman v. Safe Deposit & striction. Riverbank Improve- Trust Co., 114 Md. 574, 80 Atl. ment Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. i98; Genung v. Harvey, 79 N. J. 217, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 730, 95 Eq. 57, 80 Atl. 955; St. Stephens X. E. 216. That the heirs of a Church V. Church of Transfigura- promisee who disposed of all his tion, 201 N. Y. 1; Los Angeles land cannot enforce the restric- University v. Swarth, 107 Fed. lion, see Graves v. Deterling, 120 798, 54 L. R. A. 262, 46 C. C. A. N. Y. 447, 24 N. E. 655. 047. See Trustees v. Lynch, 70 In England the fact that the N. Y. 440; Dana v. Wentworth, promisee had parted with all his 111 Mass. 191. property was considered not to A contrary view is adopted in preclude him from enforcing tlio Van Sant v. Rose, 260 III. 401, restriction when its violation 103 N. E. 194, criticized in 9 111. subjected him to a possible lia- 1442 Eeal Property. [§ 399 obtain such relief, a view which accords with the general practice of courts of equity, to give relief only in favor of one who shows an interest in the subject matter of the suit. As regards the right of one claiming under the person with whom the agreement was made, to enforce the agreement, the cases are usually to the effect that, provided the agreement was intended to benefit par- ticular land belonging to the promisee, rather than the promisee personally, and not otherwise, any pur- chaser of the whole or of part of that land is entitled to enforce the agreement to the same extent as the promisee himself could have enforced it.*^^ In such case the benefit of the agreement passes as incident to the land which the agreement was intended to benefit, in the same manner as the benefit of a covenant runs with the land at law.^^ The question ordinarily arises in connection with a restrictive agreement entered into by the grantee of land with his grantor, who subse- quently transfers adjoining land, in whole or in part, to another, who undertakes to assert the agreement as against the original grantee or one claiming under such grantee. In some cases the fact that the person with whom the agreement was made had at the time neigh- boring land which might be benefitted by compliance with the restriction appears to be regarded as sufficient to show that the agreement was intended to benefit the bility for breach of covenant of Mass. 381; Skinner v. Shepard, title. Spencer v. Bailey, 69 Law 130 Mass. 180; Beals v. Case, 138 Times. 179. Mass. 138; Clapp v. Wilder, 176 65. Keates v. Lyon, 4 Ch. App. Mass. 332, 50 L. R. A. 120, 51 N. 218; Renals v. Colishaw, 9 Ch. E. 692; De Gray v. Monmouth Div. 125, 11 Ch. Div. 866; Leek Beach Club House Co., 50 N. J. V. Meeks, — Ala. — , 74 So. 31; Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388; Equitable Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 160 Cal. 559, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) v. Brennin, 148 N. Y. 661, 43 N. 5, 17 Pac. 677; Hay v. St. Paul E. 173; Duester v. Alvin, 74 Ore. M. E. Church, 196 111. 633, 63 N. 544, 145 Pac. 660. E. 1040; Sharp v. Ropes, 110 66. Ante, § 389. § 399] Equitable Eestbictions. 1443 land, so that it would enure to a subsequent purchaser of a part or the whole thereof.''" In other cases a contrary view is taken, that the person claiming the right to enforce the restrictive agreement as transferee of land which belonged to the promisee has the burden of showing that the agreement was intended to benefit the promisee's land rather than the promisee per- sonally.^^ Adopting the latter view, it is not entirely clear how this intention may be shown. In England and in two or three states the rule appears to be that, unless the restriction is in aid of some common plan or general scheme of development,^^ it must be shown by the language of the instrument itself in which the agreement appears,^*^ construed with reference to the 67. McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288. Leek v. Meeks, — Ala. — , 74 So. 31; Roberts v. Porter, 100 Ky. 130, 37 S. W. 485; Herriek V. Marshall, 66 Me. 435; Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (semble) ; Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 58 Am. Rep. 363, 24 N. W. 104; Hartwig v. Grace Hospital, 198 Mich. 725, 165 N. W. 827; Post V. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361, 5 L. R. A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 809, 22 N. E. 145; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289; Muzzarelli v. Holshizer, 163 Pa. 643, 30 Atl. 291; Ball v. Mul- liken, 31 R. L 36, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 30, 76 Atl. 789. 68. Keates v. Lyon, L. R. 4 Ch. 218; Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 117 Pac. 677, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5; Loomis v. Collins, 272 111. 221 111 N. E. 999; Sharp V. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381; Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 181; Lowell Institute for Savings v. Lowell, 153 Mass. 530, 27 N. E 518; Hobart v. Weston, 223 Mass. 161, 111 N. E. 779; Coughlin v. Barker, 46 Mo. App. 54. Helm- eley v. Marlborough House Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 Atl. 14; Mc- Nichol V. Towsend, 73 N. J. Eq. 276, 67 Atl. 938, 73 N. J. Eq. 276, 70 Atl. 965. 69. Post, § 400. 70. Renals v. Colishaw, 9 Ch. Div. 125; Reid v. Bickerstaff (1909), 2 Ch. 305. Judd v. Robin- son, 41 Colo. 222, 124 Am. St. Rep. 128, 92 Pac. 724, 14 Ann. Cas. 1018; Helmsley v. Marl- borough Hotel Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 63 N. J. Eq. 804; Sailer v. Padolski, 82 N. J. Eq. 459, 88 Atl. 967; Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180; St. Patricks Religious etc., Ass'n v. Hale, 227 Mass. 175, 116 N. E. 407. See Beetem v. Garrison, 129 Md. 664, 99 Atl. 897 ; Equitable Life Ass'n. Soc. of United States v. Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661. 43 N. E. 173. In Kiley v. Hall, 96 Ohio, 374, 117 N. E. 359, it was considered necessary, in order to enable the 1444 Real Property. [§ 399 surrounding circumstances,"' but occasionally the view has been indicated that such an intention may be in- ferred from the surrounding circumstances alone, with- out reference to whether the instrument contains any indication of intention in this regard.'^ Conceding that the intention to benefit the land must appear from the instrument itself in which the agreement occurs, the fact that the agreement is in terms with the promisee and his assigns would seem to be sufficient for this purpose"'^ and that the agreement was with the i^romisee and his heirs has been given this effects* In England the view has obtained that, although the agreement was not originally intended to benefit the land, the promisee may, upon the subsequent sale by him of the land, make the agreement enure to the l)enefit of the purchaser by the indication of an inten- tion to that effect, that is, he may, as it were, annex the agreement to the land by making it a part of the subject of the sale.''^ Whether this power in the prom- grantee of a lot to enforce a re- ■ Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 114 Md. s^triction inserted in the convey- 574, 80 Atl. 298; Badger v. Board- ance of a neighboring lot from man, 16 Gray (Mass.) 559; JewelJ the common grantor, that the v. Lee, 14 Allen (Mass.) 145, 92 latter grantee had reason to know Am. Rep. 744; Beals v. Case, 138 either that the restriction in the Mass. 138; Lowell Institute for deed to him was intended for Savings v. Lowell, 153 Mass. 530, the benefit of the owners of other 27 N. E. 518; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. lots, as well as of the grantor Continental Ins. Co., 87 N. Y. 400; or that there was a common plan Ball v. Mulliken, 31 R. I. 36, 76 of improvement. Atl. 789. 37 L. R. A. N. S. 623; Hennen v. Deveny, 71 W. Va 629, 71. See Hays v. St. Paul M. E. Church, 196 111. 633, 63 N. E. 1040; Coughlin v. Barker, 46 Mo. App. 54; Clapp v. Wilder, 176 Mass. 332, 57 N. E. 692, 50 L. R. L. R. A. 1917A, 524, 77 S. E. 142. 73. Mann v. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377; Nlcoll v Flenning, 19 Ch. D. 258; Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361, 87 N. E. 591. See McMahon A. 120; Hennen v. Deveny, 71 W. ^ Williams, 79 Ala. 288. Va. 629. L. R. A. 1917A. 524, 77 ,^ iHelmsley v. Marlborough ^- ^- ^^'^- Hotel Co.. 68 X. J. Eq. 596, 61 Atl. 72. Peabody Heights Co. v. 455. Wilson, 82 Md. 186, 36 L. R. A. 75. Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. 393, 32 Atl. 386, 1077; Forman v. Div. 125, 11 Ch. Div. 866. Cas. § 399] Equitable Eesteictioxs. 1445 isee to annex the agreement to the land is to be regarded as based on an intention in the promisor to confer on him such power, or is entirely independent of the intention of the promisor, does not clearly ap- \)em', and recognition of any such a power ai)pears to be unnecessary and confusing. As has been remarked b}^ a writer of great discrimination: ''The instances must be rare in which a promisor, willing to give the promisee the power of transferring the benefit of the agreement, would care whether the power were exer- cised by a double assignment of land and agreement or by the mere assignment of the land. Xor is it easy to see why this distinction should be of value to the promisee. For if the agreement be interpreted in the wider sense, as intended to give the benefit to the promisee and any assignee of the land as sucli, a promisee, washing under exceptional circumstances to convey the land without the benefit, could easily re- lease the restriction to the land about to be con- veyed."''' This doctrine does not appear to have been adopted in this country. There are occasional dicta to the elTect that, even in the absence of a general plan,''^'' a restrictive agree- ment may be enforced by one who is neither the orig- inal promisee, nor a. successor in interest of the latter, provided he owned neighboring land at the time of the agreement, and it was the intention that he should en- joy the benefit thereof.'''** If the agreement was for the benefit of particular land, not only a subse(iuent grantee in fee of such land, but a lessee thereof for years, is entitled to assei-t the agreement."" 489; Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. 76a. J'omi^ § 400. Cas. 12; Rogers v. Hosegood 76b. Hays v. St. Paul M. E. (900), 2 Ch. 388, 408; Nalder etc. Church, 196 IH. 63.'i, 63 N. E. 1040; Brewery Co. v. Harraan, 82 Law Doerr v. Cobbs, 146 Mo. App. 342. Times 594. 123 S. W. 547. See editorial not'i, 76. Professor J. B. Ames, in 12 Columbia Law Rev. 158, and 17 Harv. Law Rev. 174, Lectures Post, § 400, note 83. on Legal History, 381. 77. Taite v. Gosling, 11 Ch. D. 1446 Real Peopebty. [§ 400 The right of a subsequent grantee of the land for the benefit of which the agreement was made to assert the agreement is, it has been decided, independent of whether he knew of its existence at the time of the conveyance to himJ^ An agreement restricting the use of a particular tract of land is prima facie not to be construed as in- tended to restrict the use of one part of the tract in favor of another part thereof. For instance, an agreement by the grantee of land with his grantor that he will not make a particular use of the land con- veyed cannot ordinarily be asserted by a subsequent purchaser of a part of that land as against the owner of another part.'^^ § 400. Existence of general plan. The question of who may enforce a restrictive agreement as to the use of land has arisen most frequently in connection with agreements entered into in furtherance of some general plan or scheme of improvement devised by the owner of land upon its division into building lots, it being intended that the purchasers of lots shall, for the common benefit of all, utilize the lots only in accord- ance with such plan. The cases are to the effect that when such a general plan exists, any purchaser of a lot with knowledge of such plan may assert the restrictions involved therein as against any other pur- chaser.^*^ In spite of the unanimity with which the 273; Johnson v. Robertson, 156 1, 127 Am. St. Rep. 925, 85 N. E. Iowa, 64, 135 N. W. 585. 687; Lewis v. Ely, 100 N. Y. App. 78. Rogers v. Hosegood (1900), Div. 252; Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99 2 Ch. 388, 407; Child v. Douglas. Neb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060; Contra Kay 560, 571. Winfield v. Henning, 21 N. J. Eq. 79. King V. Dickson, 40 Ch. D. 188; Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 596; Graham v. Hite, 93 Ky. 474, 659, 111 N. W. 701 (two judges 20 S. W. 506; Jewell v. Lee, 14 dissenting). Allen (Mass.) 145, 92 Am. Dec. 80. Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. 744; Dana v. Wentworth, 111 Cas. 12; Mackenzie v. Childers, 43 Mass. 291; Korn v. Campbell, 192 Ch. Div. 265. Alderson v. Cutting, N. Y. 490, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 163 Cal. 503, 126 Pac. 157; Mc- § 4()0] Equitable Kestrictioiss. 1447 courts, when the matter has been presented, have ac- cepted this doctrine, there is a singular and disap- pointing lack of explanation of the principle on which it is to be regarded as based. As between two pur- chasers of different lots at different times, the right of the later purchaser to enforce the agreement of the earlier purchaser is readily explicable on the theory that the existence of the general plan shows an intention that such agreement shall enure to the bene- fit of all the lots not then disposed of by the common vendor, so that, upon the subsequent sale of one of these latter lots, the purchaser thereof will, in ac- cordance with the rule before stated, ^^ be entitled to enforce the agreement. But this does not explain how an earlier purchaser is enabled to enforce a restrictive agreement entered into at a later date by a later pur- chaser. An agreement cannot well pass on a transfer of land unless there is an agreement then in existence to pass.^- In some of the states the right of the prior Neil V. Gary, 40 App. D. C. 397, v. Lottman, — Tex. Civ. — , 171, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1113; Parlter 171 S W. 27; Boyden v. Roberts, V. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.) 131 Wis. 659, 111 N. W. 701. 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632; Evans v. It has been held that if one Foss, 194 Mass. 513, 9 L. R. A. includes in a common plan not (N. S.) 1039, 80 N. E. 587; Allen only his own land, but adjoining v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, 30 Ann. land which he does not own, and Cas. 820, 99 N. E. 575; Allen v. he subsequently acquires this Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 36 L. R. A. land, a purchaser of lots therein (N. S.) 890, 133 N. W. 317; Reed from him takes it subject to the V. Hazard, 187 Mo. App. 547, 174 plan. Schmidt v. Palisade Supply S. W. Ill; Winfield v. Henning 21 Co., — N. J. Ch. — , 84 Atl. 807. N. J. Eq. 133; De Gray v. Mon^ The equitable obligation in effect mouth Beach Club House Co., 50 attaches to the land when it is N. J. Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388, 67 N. .acquired by him. See 13 Colum- J. Eq. 731, 63 Atl. 1118; Mulligan bia Law Rev. at p. 77. V. Jordan, 50 N. J. Eq. 363, 24 Atl. 81. Ante, § 399. 543; Hyman v. Tash — (N. J. Eq.) 82. Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. — , 71 Atl. 742; Tallmadge v. East 474, 45 Atl. 19, 48 L. R. A. 54, 78 River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Barron Am. St. Rep. 446; Mulligan v. Jor- V. Richard, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 105; dan, 50 N. J. Eq. 363. 24 Atl. 543; Wallace v. Clifton Land Co., 92 Helnisley v. Marlboro Hotel Co.. Ohio St. 349, 110 N. E. 94; Hooper 62 N. .1. Eq. 164. 63 N. J. Eq. 1448 Real Pkopekty. [§ 4U0 purchaser to enforce the subset|uent agreement of another purchaser might he supported on the ground that the beneficiary of a contract, although not a party thereto, can maintain suit thereon. ^^ In jurisdictions which do not concede such a right to the beneficiary of a contract, the view might perhaps be adopted that what the prior purchaser in such case is allowed to enforce is, not the agreement entered into by the subsequent purchaser, but an agreement to the same elTect, entered into by the common vendor, either expressed, or inferred from the existence of a common plan of improvement. That is, if diiferent persons purchase lots from A and there is a common plan of improvement brought by A to the knowledge of each purchaser, this evidences an agreement by A with each purchaser that the lots subsequently to be sold by him shall not be utilized in violation of such plan, and this agreement can be enforced as against any subsequent purchaser (with notice thereof) from A, without regard to the agree- ment in this regard between such subsequent pur- chaser and A. It must be conceded, however, that such a theory has but rarely been judicially asserted,^"* and the courts, in adjudicating the right of purchasers S04, 52 Atl. 1132; Leaver v. Gor- plained upon established prin- man, 73 N. J. Eq. 129, 67 Atl. ciples, but must be accepted as 111; McNichol v. Townsend, 73 a further extension of equity jur- N. J. Eq. 276, 70 Atl. 965; Dosrr isprudence, whereby in a limited V. Cobbs, 146 Mo. App. 342, 123 S. class of cases the interests of W. 547; Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99 beneficiaries of a contract are Xeb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060. recognized and protected." 83. See Pollock, Contracts. 8^- It is more or less clearly (Williston's Edition) at p. 237 et indicated in Talmadge v. East ggq_ Eivei- Bank, 26 X. Y. 105; Equi- In a discriminative note in 12 table Life Insurance Coc. v. Bren- Columbia Law Rev. at p. 160, this nan, 148 N. Y. 661, 43 N. E. 173 ; theory is adopted to explain the Lawrence v. Woods, 54 Tex. Civ. reciprocal rights of the purchas- App. 233, 118 S. W. 551; Spicer ers under a general plan, it being v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 2. See said that the results reached by 5 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 283, article the courts "cannot be entirely ex- by Charles I. Giddings. Esq. § 4(J(Jj EQUITABLE IlESTlilCTIOXS. 144*J under a comiiioii plan to enforce restrictions as be- tween themselves, base this right in terms not upon the implication of an agreement by the common vendor, but upon the express agreements entered into by the purchasers themselves. Furthermore the Statute of Frauds might possibly operate to deprive of legal ef- fectiveness an agreement so implied from oral state- ments as to a general plan. Another explanation which has been given of the rights of enforcement as between various purchasers is that the equity "springs from the presumption that each purchaser has paid an enhanced price for his property, relying on the general plan, by which all the property is to be sub- jected to the restricted use, being carried out, and that while he is bound by and observes the covenant, it would be inequitable to him to allow any other owners of lands, subject to the same restrictions, to violate it."^^ And it has also been said that in such case the covenant is enforceable by any grantee against any other upon the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration which binds each, and gives to each the appropriate remedy.^''' The question of the existence of a general plan is one of fact, to be determined with reference to the particulars and conditions of the laying out and sale of the lots, as indicated either verbally or in writing.^^ That the vendor retains adjoining property without himself 85. De Gray v. Monmouth necessarily requires and imports Beach Club House Co., 50 N. J. reciprocity of obligation. Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388, per Green, 87. See Hano v. Bigelow, 155 V. C. Ma.ss. 341, 29 N. E. 628; Allen v. 86. Korn v. Campbell, 192 N. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, 99 N. E. Y. 490, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 85 r.75; Sprague v. Kimball. 213 N. E.. 689, per Werner, J. And Mass. 380, 100 N. E. 622; Barton see Parker v. Nightingale, 6 y. Slifer, 72 N. J. Eq. 812, 66 Atl. AJlen (Mass.) 241. ^99; Foreman v. Sadler, 114 Md. So in Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. 574, 80 Atl. 298; Be Birmingham Cas. 12, Lord Macnaghten says & District Land Co., (1893), 1 Cli. that the community of interest 342. 1450 Real. Peopekty. [§ 400 entering into any agreement similar to that which he exacts from purchasers has been regarded as tending to show the absence of a general plan enuring to the benefit of all the purchasers.«« That similar agree- ments were exacted of a considerable portion of the purchasers does not of itself show the existence of a general plan.^** On the other hand the fact that agree- ments are not exacted of a portion of the purchasers has been decided not to show the non existence of a general plan.^° The fact that a like agreement was exacted from all of the various purchasers has been regarded as showing the existence of a general plan,^i 88. Keates v. Lyon, 4 Ch. at p. 225; Osborne v. Bradley (1903), 2 Ch. at p. 454; Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381. Compare Se Bir- mingham & District Land Co., (1893), 1 Ch. 342. 89. Leaver v. Gorman, 73 N. J. Eq. 129, 67 Atl. Ill; McNichol V. Townsend, 73 N. J. Eq. 276, 67 Atl. 938; McNeil v. Gary, 40 App. D. C. 397, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1113; Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. 474, 48 L. R. A. 54, 78 Am. St. Rep. 446. 45 Atl. 19; Coughlin v. Barker, 46 Mo. App. 54. 90. Leader v. La Flamme, 11 Me. 242. 88 Atl. 859; Velie v. Richardson, 126 Minn. 334, 148 N. W. 286; Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341, 29 N. E. 628; Bacon V. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 X. E. 936; Sargent v. Leonardi. 223 Mass. 556, 112 N. E. 633; Allen V. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 133 N. W. 317; Chopin V. Dougherty, 165 111. App. 426. The exaction of different agree- ments from the various pur- chasers does not tend to show a common plan. Webber v. Landrigan, 215 Mass. 221, 102 N. PJ. 460; Clark v. McGee, 159 111. 518, 42 N. E. 965; Helmsley v. Marlborough Hotel Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 Atl. 14. That in some conveyances there are restrictions additional to those which occur in all the conveyances does not show the non existence of a general plan. Evans v. Foss, 194 Mass. 513, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039, 11 Ann. Cas. 171, 80 N. E. 587; Allen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 820, 99 N. E. 575. Nor is this shown by lack of exact uni- formity in the restrictions in the different conveyances. Hart v. Ruter, 223 Mass. 207, 111 N. E. 1; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J. Eq. 612, 61 Atl. 369; Coates V. Cullingford, 147 App. Div. 39, 131 N. Y. S. 700; Hooper v. Lott- man, — Tex. Civ. — , 171 S. W. 270. 91. Fete v. Foerstel, 159 Mo. App. 75, 139 S. W. 820; Alderson V. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 126 Pac. 157 {semble); Hano v. Bigelow, <^ 400] Equitable Restrictions. 1451 but a contrary view has also been asserted.^^ A com- mon plan cannot be shown, as against one who pur- chased without knowledge of any restriction, by evi- dence that after his purchase the neighboring lots were sold by the common vendor subject to a particular restriction.*^"' That a building line appeared on a recorded ])lat of property has been referred to as indicating that there was a general plan in this regard, subject to which each purchaser of a lot acquired title. ^^ On the other hand the appearance of such a line on a plat has been regarded as insufficient to show a general plan.^° Restrictions imposed in accordance with a general plan, like other restrictions,*^*' are enforceable only as against purchasers with notice thereof,*^' and a pur- chaser with notice from a purchaser without notice takes free therefrom.^* A purchaser is, it has been decided, not charged with notice of a general plan by the uniformity of construction of buildings on other lots sold by the same vendor.-'^ A purchaser can ob- viously not be charged with notice of a general plan, or affected thereby, if his purchase was prior to the establishment of such plan,^ 155 Mass. 341, 29 N. E. 638 (sem- 319, 90 Atl. 73. ble); McNeil v. Gary, 40 App. 93. Ante, § 398. Dist. Col. 397, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97. Roak v. Davis, 194 Mass. 1113; Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99 481, 80 N. E. 690; Hyman v. Neb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060. Tash (N. J. Eq.), 71 Atl. 742. 92. MuUigan v. Jordan. 50 N. 98. McCuster v. Goode, 185 J. Eq. 363, 24 Atl. 543; Roberts Mass. 607. 71 N. E. 76. V. Lombard, 78 Ore. 100, 152 Pac. 99. Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. 499. Y. 291, 33 N. E. 1079, overruling 93. Lambrecht v. Gramlich, 187 dictum in Tallmadge v. East Mich. 251, 153 N. W. 834. River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105, 111; 94. Loomis v. Collins, 272 111. Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 Mich. 221, 111 N. E. 999. See Oliver £33, 154 N. W. 151. V. Kalick, 223 Mass. 252, 111 N. 1. Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 E. 879. Mich. 333, 154 N. W. 151. 95. McCloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa. 1452 Eeal Property. [§ 401 In England the doctrine of a general plan has been applied in connection with leases of flats in an apartment building, with the result that the lessee of a flat, whose written and printed lease shows that the whole building was used or intended to be used for residential flats, and imposes certain regulations upon the lessee in accordance with this intended use, is en- titled to an injunction against the lessor, seeking to utilize the balance of the building for other than resi- dential purposes.^ § 401. Defenses to enforcement. The right to enforce a restrictive agreement may be lost by laches or acquiescence,-^ especially when this results in the mak- ing of expenditures by defendant.^ And if the promisee or his successor in title, by his conduct, in any way induces a violation of the agreement, he cannot ordi- narily complain thereof.'^ That the agreement has but a limited time to run has, in connection with other circumstances,^ been regarded as a consideration ad- verse to its enforcement. 2. Hudson v. Cripps (18D6), 1 143 Pa. 487, 22 Atl. 832, 24 Am. Ch. 265; Alexander v. Mansions St. Rep. 567. Proprietary, 16 Times Law Rep. 4. Bridgewater v. Ocean City 431; Gedge v. Bartlett, 17 Times Ass'n, 85 N. J. Eq. 379, 96 Atl. Law Eep. 43; Jaegei v. Mansions, 905; Smith v. Spencer, 81 N. J. Limited, 87 Law Times, 690. Eq. 389, 87 Atl. 158; Whitney v. 3. Leaver v. Gorman, 73 N. J. Union Railway Co., 11 Gray Eq. 129, 67 Atl. Ill; Sayers v. (Mass.) 359, 367; Kelsey v. Dodd. Collyer, 28 Ch. Div. 103. o2 L. J. Ch. 34. A delay of ten weeks before 5. Stott v. Avery, 156 Mich, consulting an attorney was re- 674, 121 N. W. 825; Union Trust garded as not necessarily pre- "S: Realty Co. v. Best, 160 Cal. 263, eluding relief, no prejudice re- ^16 Pac. 737. De Gama v. suiting to defendant. Stewart v. r)'Aquila, — X. J. Ch. — , 101 Atl. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N. 1028. E. 37. And see Woodbine Land 6. Loud v. Prendergast, 206 & Improvement Co. v. Riener, — Mass. 122, 92 N. E. 40; Page v. N. J. Eq. — , 85 Atl. 1004; Star Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. Brewery v. Primas, 163 111. 652, 11; McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. 45 N. E. 145; Orne v. Fridenburg, Y. 36, 5 Ann. Cas. 45, 75 N. E. § 401] Equitable Restrictions. 1453 In the case of restrictions imposed in pursuance of a general plan, that the originator of the plan, the common grantor, acquiesces in, that is, fails to take legal action to prevent, substantial infringements of the plan by some of his grantees, has been regarded as showing an abandonment by him of the plan, pre- cluding him from subsequently enforcing the restriction as against others.' And one to whom he conveys a lot subject to such a common plan of restriction has occasionally been regarded as precluded from enjoining the violation of the restriction if he acquiesced in a violation thereof by another which substantially af- fected his property,^ though his failure to object to a violation by the owner of one lot does not affect his right to object to a violation by another, if the former violation, by reason of the distance of the lot, or for some other reason, did not affect the enjoyment of his lot.^ In one or two states the acquiescence by one 961; Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. 11. 7. Scharer v. Pantler. 127 Mo. App. 433, 105 S. W. 668; Chelsea Land & Improvement Co. v. Adams, 71 N. J. Eq. 771, 66 AtL 180, 14 Ann. Cas. 758 ; Ocean City Land Co. v. Weber, 83 N. J. 476. 91 Atl. 600; Roper v. Williams, Turn. & E. 18. Peck v. Matthews, L. R. 3 Eq. 515; Sobey v. Sains- bury (1913), 2 Ch. 513. But his acquiescence in viola- tions of a like covenant in deed.s of neighboring lots has been hel'l not to prevent his enforcement of the covenant, if these viola- tions occurred before the covenant was made. Sherrard v. Murphy, 193 Mich. 352, 159 N. W. 524. 8. Curtis V. Ruben, 244 111. 88, 91 N. E. 84; Ewertsen v. Gersten- berg, 186 111. 344, 57 N. E. 1051, 21 L. R. A. 310; Helmsley v. Marl- 2 R. P.— 17 borough Hotel Co , 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 Atl. 14, 63 N. J. Eq. 804, 52 Atl. 1132; Meany v. Stork, 81 N. J. Eq. 210, 86 Atl. 398; Ocean City Ass'n V. Chalfant, 65 N. J. Eq. 156, 55 Atl. 801, 1 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 601. 9. Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 126 Pac. 157; Johnson v. Robertson. 156 Iowa. 64, 135 N. W. 585; Barton v. Slifer, 72 N. J. Eq. 812. 66 Atl. 899. Bowen v. Smith, 76 X. .1. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675; Row- land v. Miller, 139 X. Y. 93, 22 L. R, A. 22, 34 X. E. 765; McGuire v. Caskey, 62 Ohio St. 419, 57 X. E. 53; Payson v. Burnham, 141 Mass. 547. 6 X. E. 708; Sayles v. Hall, 210 Mass. 281, 96 X. E. 712; Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647. 139 X. W. 878. 45 L. R. A. (X. S.) 726; Stewart v. Stork, 181 Mich. 408, 148 N. W. 393 (srmble). 1454 Real Propekty. [§ 401 grantee in the violation of the common restriction by another, even though such violation be substantial, does not, it seems, preclude the former from sub- sequently asserting the restriction as against a third ,i»rantee,^" wliile in England the view has been adopted that, in order tliat acquiescence in other vio- lations shall preclude equitable relief, such violations must have been of a character which would prevent the attainment of the purpose which it was sought to attain by the execution of the agreement, that is, uni- formity in the improvement of the various lots, or the preservation of the general character of the property considered as a whole. ^^ Acquiescence in a breach of a minor character would not, in any state, it seems probable, constitute grounds for denying relief against a breach of a much more serious character,^- and likewise former breaches and acquiescence therein have been regarded as insufficient grounds for withholding relief when they resulted from a mistaken construction of the agreement.^^ One cannot obtain relief in equity against the violation of a restrictive agreement entered into in pursuance of a general plan if he himself is guilty of 10. Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 ing Ocean City Ass'n v. Chalfant, Mass. 396. 60 N. E. 936. Codnian v. 65 N. J. Eq. 156, 1 Ann. Cas. 601, Bradley, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N. E. 55 Atl 801. 936; Andre v. Donovan, 198 Mich. 12. See Richards v. Revitt, 7 256, 164 N. W. 543; O'Gallagher v. Ch. Div. 224; Meredith v. Wilson, Lockhart, 263 111. 489, 105 N. E. 69 Law Times 336. Seawright v. 295, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1044. And Blount, 139 Ga. 323, 77 S. E. 152; see Misch v. Lehman. 178 Mich. Newberry v. Barkalow, 75 N. J. 225, 144 N. W. 556; Lattimer v. Eq. 128, 71 Atl. 752. And see Ball Livermore, 72 N. Y. 174; Yeomans v. Milliken, 31 R. I. 36, 37 L. R. V. Herrick, 178 Mo. App. 274, 165 A. (N. S.) 623. Ann. Cas. 1912B, S. W. 1112. 30, 76 Atl. 789. 11. German v. Chapman, 7 Ch. 13. Right v. Winters, 68 N. J. Div. 271; Knight v. Simmonds Eq. 252, 59 Atl. 770; Brigham v. (1896), 2 Ch. 295. See note in 17 Mulock Co.. 74 N. J. Eq. 287, 70 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 138 criticiz- Atl. 185. And see Stewart v. § 401] Equitable Kestkictions. 1455 a substantial breach of tlie same restriction.^'* But the fact that the plaintiff has himself committed a minor breach of the agreement will not disentitle him to an injunction against a breach by another of considerable magnitude. ^''^ While the original promisee may release the re- stricted land from the burden of the restriction, so long as he is the only one interested in the observance thereof, he cannot so do to the detriment of one claiming under him, who shares with him the right to assert the restriction.^^ If, by reason of the course of action pursued by the complainant, or of his predecessor in title, the character of the neighborhood has been so altered as to render impossible the attainment of the purjDose which originally dictated the making of the restrictive agreement, equity will not enforce the agreement.^'' Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634, 138 Am. St. Rep. 370, 92 N. E. 37. 14. Curtis V. Rubin, 244 III. 88, 91 X. E. 84; Kneip v. Schroe- der, 255 111. 621, 99 N. E. 617; Compton Hill Improvement Co. V. Tower, 158 Mo. 282, 59 S. W. 239; Loud v. Pendergast, 206 Mass. 122, 92 N. E. 40; Olcott v. Sheppard K. & Co., 96 N. Y. App. Div. 281, 89 N. Y. Supp. 201. Sut- clifEe V. Eisele, 62 X. J. Eq. 222, 50 Atl. Rep. 69; Smith v. Spencer, 81 N. J. Eq. 389, 87 Atl. 158. 15. Western v. MacDermott, L. R. 2 Ch. 72; Meredith v. Wilson, 69 Law Times 336; Hooper v. Bromet, 89 Law Times 37; Bacon V. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 X. E. 936; Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634, ]38 Am. St. Rep. 370, 92 N. E. 37; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J. Eq. 612, 61 Atl. 369. Hy- man v. Tash (N. J. Eq.), 71 Atl. 742; McGuire v. Caskey, 62 Ohio St. 419, 57 N. E. 53; Adams v. Howell, 58 Misc. 435, 108 N. Y. Supp. 945; Tripp v. O'Brien, 57 111. App. 407. 16. Mackenzie v. Childers, 43 Ch. D. 265; Johnson v. Robertson, 156 Iowa, 64, 135 N. W. 585; Spahr V. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114, 122 S. W. 379; Coudert v. Sayre, 46 X. .7. Eq. 386. Bowen v. Smith, 76 X. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675; Duester V. Alvin, 74 Ore. 544, 145 Pac. 660. And see Landell v. Hamil- ton, 177 Pa. 23, 35 Atl. 242. 17. Bedford v. British Museum, 2 Myl. & K. 552; Star Brewery V. Primas, 163 111. 652, 45 X. E. 145; Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 111. 344, 51 L. R. A. 310, 57 X. E. 1051; Page v. Murray, 46 X. J. Eq. 32.5, 19 Atl. 11. Compare Hen- nen v. Deveny, 71 W. Va. 629, L. R. A. 1917A, 524. 77 S. E. 142. 1456 Real Propeety. [§ 401 Thus in a leading English case it was decided that one who had, for the protection of the outlook from his mansion house, required one to whom he sold neigh- boring property to enter into an agreement as to the mode of improving the property sold, could not, after having torn down his mansion house, obtain an in- junction against a breach of the agreement.^^ And it is apparently on this theory that a restrictive agreement has occasionally been regarded as un- enforcible after the promisee had sold neighboring property free from any such restriction, it being con- sidered that by the making of such sales he in effect made the agreement useless for the purpose of pre- serving the character of the neighborhood.^'* Such is apparently the extent to which, in England, a change in the character of the neighborhood, subsequent to the making of the agreement, is regarded as operating to prevent the enforcement of the agreement, that is, the change in the neighborhood has this effect if, and only if, it is a result of the course of action pursued by the complainant or his predecessor in interest.^" In this country, on the contrary, a cliange of condition has not infrequently been regarded as precluding the enforcement of the restrictive agreement even though the change was not the result of the course of action pursued by the complainant or his predecessor in title. In one case, frequently referred to,-^ it was decided 18. Bedford v. British Museum, senger Rwy. Co., 85 Ky. 525, 4 2 Myl. & K. 552. S. W. 228; Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 So it was held that, if the owne. Mich. 110, 22 L. R. A. 863, 39 Am. of a lot had, by building a wall, St. Rep. 522, 56 X. W. 1105. rendered a restriction upon the 20. Sayers v. Collyer, L. R. 28 height of buildings on the next Ch. D. 103; Osborne v. Bradley lot partially valueless to his lot, (1903), 2 Ch. 446. Craig v. Green he could not enforce the restric- (1899), 1 Ir. Ch. 258. But see tion so as to prevent the con- dicta in Sobey v. Sainsbury (1913), struction of buildings no higher 2 Ch. 513; German v. Chapman, than the wall. Landell v. Haniil- 7 Ch. D. 279; Knight v. Simmonds ton, 177 Pa. St. 23, 35 Atl. 242. (1896), 2 Ch. 297. 19. Duncan v. Central Pas- 21. Columbia College y. Thach- § 401] Equitable Restrictions. 1457 that a change of conditions which could not have been foreseen at the time of the making of the agreement, the construction of an elevated railway in front of the restricted property, was a sufficient defense to the enforcement of a restriction, imposed for the purpose of fitting the property for high class residences; and in a number of cases even an alteration in the char- acter of the neighborhood which could have been fore- seen, such as the encroachment of business upon a residence neighborhood, has been regarded as justify- ing the refusal of equitable relief,^^ especially when the enforcement of the restriction would materially injure the defendant without benefitting the complain- ant.^^ Such a change in the character of the neighbor- hood has however been decided not to be a defense to the suit to enforce the restriction, if the restriction continued to be of value to the property sought to be benefitted.^^ It would seem probable that the courts, in regarding an alteration in the neighborhood, whicli might have been foreseen, as ground for refusing er, 87 N. Y. 311, 41 Am. Rep. 365. Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. ^ 22. Los Angeles Terminal 496, 31 N. E. 691, 32 Am. St. Rep. Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 476; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. Pac. 308; Kneip v. Schroeder, 255 93, 22 L. R. A. 182, 34 N. E. 765; III., 621, 29 Ann. Cas. 426, 99 N. E. McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. G17; McArthur v. Hood Rubber 36, 5 Ann. Cas. 45, 75 N. E. 961; Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162; Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N. Y. Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 243, 104 N. E. 629; Page v. Murray, 355, 28 Am. St. Rep. 584, 30 N. 46 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. 11. E. 741; McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 24. Codman v. Bradley, 201 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961, 5 Ann. Cas. Mass. 361, 87 N. E. 591; Zipp v. 45. Misch V. Lehman, 178 Mich. Barker, 40 App. Div. 1, 57 N. Y. 225, 144 N. W. 556. But not the Supp. 569, 166 N. Y. 621. as ex- mere anticipation of such a plained in Batchelor v. Hinkle, change. Evans v. Foss, 194 .Mass. 210 N. Y. 243, 104 N. E. 629; 513, 80 N. E. 587, 9 L. R. A. N. S. Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183*, 1039, 11 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 171; 88 N E. 322; Landell v. Hamilton, Spahr V. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114, 175 Pa. 327, 34 L. R. A. 227, 34 122 S. W. 379. Atl. 663. See Witherspoon v. 23. Star Brewery Co. v. Pri- Hurst, 88 S. C. 561, 71 S. E. 232. mas, 163 111. 652, 45 N. E. 145; 1458 Real Peopebty. [§ 401 equitable relief, have been moved by the consideration that otherwise such restrictions might operate to hamper municipal development.^^ 25. See 14 Columbia Law Rev. is suggested that the view refer- at p. 438, and the full discussion red to may be supported on the of the various New York decisions theory of a presumed intention in 6 Bench & Bar 56, 96, by to that effect in the creation of Adolph Sieker, Esq. In a note the restriction, in 31 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 877, it CHAPTER XVI. RENT. § 402. The nature oi rent. 40S. What may be reserved as rent. 404. Classes of renis. 405. Payments which are not rent. 406. The reservation of rent. 407. Transfer of rights and liabilities. 408. Death of person entitled. 409. Time at which rent is due. 410. Apportionment as to time. 411. Amount of the rent. 412. Apportionment as to amount. 413. Extinction or suspension of rent. 414. Actions for rent. 415. Distress for rent. 416. Lien for rent. § 402. The nature of rent. Rent may be defined, in a general way, as a tribute or return of a certain amount, which is regarded as issuing out of the land, as part of its actual or possible profits, and is payable by one having an estate in the land, as compensation for his use possession and enjoyment of the land, or occasionally, as a charge on the land. The word "rent" is derived from "render," and the name thus em- phasizes the distinction betw^een rent, which is actually rendered or paid by the tenant, and a j^rofit a prendre, which is taken by the person entith^d thereto, without the active intervention of the tenant.^ The word is used in the law in at least four distinct senses, which it is desirable clearly to distinguish. It is in the first place used in a general sense, to describe any and every tribute which may be payable by one on account of an estate in the land, as when we say that rent 1. Co. Litt. 142a; Leake, Prop, in Land, 373. 1460 Real Peopeety. [§ 403 is usually payable in money, or rent is collectible by distress, or rent must be certain in amount, and, thus used, it applies either to one payment of tribute to be made, one "installment of rent," or to a succession of such payments. The word, when used in this sense, is, ordinarily at least, not accompanied by any article. In the second place, the word is used specifically, to describe a particular payment of tribute^ to be made by a tenant of particular land, or a succession of such payments. For instance, we may say that the rent due by a tenant of certain land is over due, meaning thereby that one installment of the rent is overdue or that a number of installments are overdue. And so we speak of an action having been brought for "the rent," meaning thereby an action for one installment or several installments. The word rent when used in this sense is ordinarily preceded by the definite article. In the third place, the word is used specifically to describe the right which a particular person or persons may have to a succession of payments by the tenant or tenants of a particular piece of land, as when we refer to a man as having a rent or a ground rent, or say that the rent upon (issuing from) a certain piece of land belongs to a named individual. The word "rent," when used in this sense, is used with either the definite or indefinite article. In the fourth place, the word is used to designate sums paid as rent, the proceeds, that is, of the payment of one or more of the periodic in- stallments, as when one speaks of applying the rent in a certain manner, meaning thereby what is re- ceived on account of rent. The word is frequently used in this sense in the phrase "rents and profits." Allien so used, the word is ordinarily preceded by the definite article. § 403. What may be reserved as rent. It is said by Coke that rent is reserved out of the profits of the land,2 and by Blackstone that rent is a profit issuing 2. Co. Litt. 141b. § 403] Eent. 1461 out of tlie laiid.-^ The use of the term ''profit" in this connection has reference to the connnon law theory of rent, that it is part of the actual or possible profits of the land, a theory which was closely connected with another theory, that rent, like any other feudal service, was something issuing from and owed by the land itself.* The chief consequences of the theory that rent is payable out of the profits of the land are that if the tenant is deprived of the opportunity to take the profits, as by eviction, the landlord's right to rent ceases or is suspended,^ and that the rent is not re- garded as an actual debt until the profits have been received by the tenant, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary.^ The statement that rent is a profit, or a part of the profits, issuing out of the land,. does not mean that part of the actual products of the soil must he delivered as rent. Tient is, in fact, usually reser^^ed or made payable in money, but the tribute to be rendered may, by the terms of the reservation, take almost any form, as, for instance, the delivery of a horse," or of a certain amount of grain or cotton,* the furnishing of board or 3. 2 Blackst. Comm. 41. Houghton, 1 Lowell, 554, Fed. 4. See 2 Pollock & Maitland, Cas. No. 6,725; Wilson v. Penn- Hist. Eng. Law, 126, 129. sylvania Trust Co., 114 Fed. 742. 5. See Clun's Case, 10 Co. 126b But that rent to become due con- and post, § 413, notes 93 et seq. stitutes a present debt, see Ro- 6. Litt., § 513; Co. Litt. 292b; well v .Felker, 54 Vt. 526. And Bordman v. Osborn, 23 Pick. gge also Brown v. Cairns, 107 (Mass.) 295; Thorp v. Preston, ^^.^^,3^ 277, 77 N. W. 478. 42 Mich. 511, 4 N. W. 227; Ord- ^ Co. Litt 142a way V. Remington, 12 R. I. .nO, ^_ ^^[ ^itt.' 142a; Townsend v. Isf!nborger, 45 Iowa, 670; Boyd V. McCombs, 4 Pa. St. 146; Mc- Dougal V. Sanders, 75 Ga. 140. 34 Am. Rep. 646; Haffey v. Miller 6 Gratt. (Va.) 454. Consequently a claim for rent subsequently to accrue cannot bo r^..„„.r,f^,i oc „ ,i,.;.v, „„..;v,..f Frequcntly, in this country, rent presented as a claim against a 1 ." bankrupt's estate. Atkins v. consists of a named portion of Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595; Ex parte the crop raised. See (oUr, § 265. 1462 Real Peopeety. [§ 404 support,** or the performance of manual services on or off the land.^« It is said hy Coke that "a, man upon his feoifment or conveyance cannot reserve to him parcel of the annual profits themselves, as to reserve the vesture or herbage of the land or the like. For a reservation ought not to be a reservation of the profits themselves, since these are granted, but of a new return out of the profits ;"^^ and his statement in this regard has been followed by other English writers.^- A like view has been strongly asserted in a New Hampshire decision.^^ And so it has been said that when the grantor or lessor undertakes to reserve as rent a share of the ore which may be removed from the land, this constitutes prop- erly, not a reservation of rent, but an exception of a part of the property gTanted or leased.^^ But what- ever the rule may be in this regard in England, it is not open to question, in most parts of this country, that a reservation as rent of part of the crops to be produced on the land is perfectly valid. § 404. Classes of rents. The classification of rents at common law was based primarily upon the dis- tinction between a rent which was reserved upon the conveyance or lease of land, as a compensation to the 9. Baker v. Adams, 5 Cush. Ga. App. 46, 60 S. E. 800. (Mass.) 99; Shouse v. Krusor, 24 11. Co. Litt. 142a. Mo. App. 279; In re Williams' 12. Sheppard's Touchstone, SO: Estate, 1 N. Y. Misc. 35, 22 N. Y. 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. 28, c. 1, § 3; Supp. 906. Comyn, Landlord & Ten., 95. In Munroe v. Syracuse, Lake 13. Moulton v. Robinson, 27 X. Shore & Northern R. Co., 200 N. H. .550. Y. 224, a stipulation for the is- 14. See Gowan v. Christie, L. sue of an annual railroad pass R. 2 H. L. Sc. 273, 284, per Lord was regarded as in the nature Cairns; Coltness Iron Co. v. cf one for rent. Black, 6 App. Cas. 315, 335, per 10. Co. Litt. 96a, 96b; Doe d. Lord Blackburn; Greville-Nugent Edney v. Benham, 7 Q. B. 976; v. Mackenzie (1900), App. Cas. Van Renssalaer v. Jewett, 2 N. h3, per Lord Halsbury; Fairchild Y. 141; Price v. Thompson. 4 v. FairchUd (Pa.) 9 Atl. 255. § 404] Ebnt. 1463 grantor or lessor, and a rent whicli was granted by the owner of land to another person, without any transfer of the land, being merely a right to a periodical pay- ment secured on the land. In the former case, before the Statute of Quia Emptores, since the conveyance of the land created a relation of tenure, even in the case of the conveyance of an estate in fee simple, the payment of the rent re- served was regarded as one of the services incident to that relation. ^^ Accordingly, 'a rent reserved upon the making of a feoffment, whereby the relation of tenure was created, was known as a ''rent service."^*' Upon a failure to perform this feudal service of paying rent, the lord was, as in the case of default in any other of the feudal services, entitled to enforce its performance by the seizure of chattels upon the land, this being known as the remedy of "distress."^" This right of distress was a distinctive feature of the particular class of rents known as "rents service." The right of distress was an incident of the right of lordship, the ''seignory," or, when the tenure was for an estate less than a fee simple, of the reversion remaining in the lord, and consequently, if the lord granted the seignory or reversion while retaining the rent, or granted the rent while retaining the seignory or reversion, the rent could no longer be enforced by distress, and was accordingly thereafter termed a "rent seek" or "dry rent."*^ In the case of a rent created by the grant of a rent by the owner of land, of which he retained the ownership, no relation of tenure was created, and con- sequently there was no remedy by way of distress for the enforcement of the obligation, A rent so created was accordingly another form of "rent seek." A 15. Ante, § 6. § 415. 16. Litt., § 122; Gilbert, 18. Litt. §§ 218, 225-228; Deu Rents, 9. d. Farley v. Craig, 15 N. J. L. 17. Litt., §§ 213, 216. See /"«<, If 2. 1464 Real Property. [§ 404 right of distress might, however, be expressly given in the grant, in which case the rent was known as a ''rent charge."^'' Rents charge, thus created hy a grant of a rent by the owner of land, he retaining the entire interest in the land, are quite common in England, they being sometimes granted by the purchaser of land as part of the consideration therefor, and also being util- ized as a mode of providing for younger sons and others in family settlements. In this country, however, they are very infrequent. They are in effect merely annuities secured on land, and in some cases equity will enforce their payment by a sale of the land, as in the case of a mortgage or other lien. After the Statute Quia Emptores, a conveyance of land in fee simple no longer had the effect of creating a relation of tenure between the feoffor and feoffee, but the feoffee merely became substituted in place of the feoffer. Consequently, a reservation of rent on such a conveyance thereafter made could not be regarded as a rent service, and was a rent seek, without the right of distress, unless this right was expressly given, so as to render it a rent charge.^*^' Since, however, this statute did not apply in the case of a conveyance of an estate less than a fee, a rent service is, even at the present day, created by the reservation of rent upon the conveyance or lease by a tenant in fee of a less estate, either an estate tail, an estate for life, or one for years ; and likewise when a tenant of an estate less than a fee conveys or leases for a period less than his own estate, so as to leave a reversion in him. Consequently, the 19. Litt. §§ 218, 219; Co. Litt. In Pennsylvania, a rent created 150b; 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. by a reservation upon the con- Eng. Law, 129. veyance of land in fee simple 20. Litt. §§ 215-217; Co. Litt. is a rent service, but this is 143b, Hargrave's note; Bradbury owing to the fact that the statute V. Wright, 2 Doug. 624; Van Quia Emptores is not in force Rensselaer v. Chadwick, 22 N. Y. there. Ingersoll v. Sargeant, 1 32. Whart. (Pa.) 336. § 405] Eent. 14G5 rent reserved on the ordinary lease for years is i>rox> erly a rent service.-^ It is stated by Coke tliat rent service is so called ''because it hath some corporal service incident to it, which at least is fealty,"-^ and upon the strength of this statement, as transmitted by Blackstone,-^ it has been asserted, in two states,^^ that in view of the fact that fealty is not there recognized, rent service is non ex- istent. In the time of Coke, since rent service was essentially tenurial in character, and fealty was an in- cident of tenure,-^ it followed that rent service was accompanied by fealty, but the reason that rent service was so called appears really to have been that it was in itself a service. The expression rent service was in use nearly three hundred years before Coke,^^ and the writers of that earlier time, as well as the judges, speak of rent as one class of service.^' § 405. Payments which are not properly rent. Rent can, by the common law authorities, be reserved only out of land or things constituting in law a part of the land, to which the landlord may have recourse to dis- train, and camiot be reserved out of incorjjoreal things.^'' Whether the statement that rent must be reserved out of things to which the landlord may have recourse to 21. Litt. §§ 214, 215; Ehrman Maitland, Hist. Eiig. Law, 128 V. Mayer, 57 Md. 621; Ingersoll note. V. Sergeant, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 337; 27. See Bracton, bk. 2, c. 16, Den d. Farley v. Craig. 15 N. J. fol. 35a; Britton (Nichol's Ed.) L. 192. tk. 1, c. 28, § 16, bk. 2, c. 10, § 1; 22. Co. Litt. 142a. Y. B. 33-35 Edw. 1, p. 208; Y. B. 23. 2 Blackst. Comm. 42. 1 & 2, Edw. 2 (Selden Soc.) p. 24. Herr v. Join, son, 11 Colo. 119, pi. 36; Y. B. 2 & 3, Edw. 2. 393, 18 Pac. 342; Penny v. Little, p. 140, pi. 58. 4 111. 30L £8. Co. Litt. 47, 142a; Gilbert. 25. Litt. §§ 91, 132; Co. Litt. Rents, 120; 2 Blackst. Comm. 41; ft7b, 93a. Buszard v. Cupel, 8 Barn. & Cr. 26. See Y. B. 33-35 Edw. 1, p. 141. £52, referred to in 2 Pollock & 146G Real Property. [-§> 4i)5 distrain is to be regarded as a statement of the reason for the rule precluding the reservation of rent out of incorporeal things, or a statement of the result of the rule, does not clearly appear. In favor of the former view reference may be made to statements to be found that the king may resei-ve rent upon a lease of in- corporeal things for the reason that, by virtue of his jDrerogative, he can distrain on all lands of his lessee,^'' and that rent may be reserved on a demise of the vesture or herbage of land for the reason that the lessor may distrain the cattle on the land."" If the common law rule precluding the reservation of rent upon a lease of an incorporeal thing is to be regarded as based on the inability to distrain thereon, the ques- tion might arise whether the rule remains the same in any jurisdiction in which, as is the case in most of the states, the right of distress no longer exists.^ ^ A differentiation originating in the existence or non exis- tence of a right of distress might well be ignored after the right of distress has been entirely abolished. But whether or not the sum named upon a lease of an incorporeal thing, to be paid by the lessee, is to be regarded as rent, it is recoverable by the lessor in an action of contract against the lessee.^^ Rent cannot be reserved out of chattels, and con- sequently sums to be paid by a bailee of chattels, as compensation for their use and enjoyment, are not properly referred to as rent.^^ In the case of a lease of 29. Co. Litt. 47a, Hargrave's 32. Co. Litt. 47a; Dean & Chap- note, ler of Windsor v. Gover. 2 Wms. 30. Co. Litt. 47a. Sauud. 302; Raby v. Reeves, 112 31. In Raby v: Reeves, 112 N. N. C. 688, 16 S. E. 760. C. 688, 16 S. E. 760, sums so re- 33. Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 17a; served were regarded as not con- Sutliff v. Atwood, 15 Ohio St. &tituting rent, while a contrary 186. In Mickle v. Miles, 31 Pa. view was adopted, without dis- iSt. 20, and Vetter's Appeal, 99 cussion, in Jordan v. Indianapolis Pa. St. 52, it was said that rent Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N. E. may issue, not only from lands 680. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & and tenements, but also from the Ten. p. 1119. personal property necessary for § 405] Kent. 1467 land together with chattels, as for instance of a farm with the stock thereon, or of a house with the furni- ture therein, the whole rent has been regarded as issu- ing from the land alone, so as to authorize a distress on the land for the entire amount. ^^ So, upon an eviction from the land, the liability for rent has been regarded as entirely suspended, without reference to the fact that the lessee continues to enjoy the use of the chattels included in the lease.''' And a declaration in an action for the rent was not regarded as defective because it averred a demise of land alone, although chattels also were included.''*^ On the same principle, that the rent issues entirely out of the land, it has been decided in one state that the executor of the lessor, though entitled to the chattels at the end of the lease, has no right to any portion of the rent reserved on a lease of land and chattels."'' There are other cases, however, which refuse or fail to apply this theory when calculated to produce unjust results. For in- stance, it has been decided that the grantee of' the reversion in the land, without any interest in the chat- tels, is not entitled to the whole rent as against the grantor retaining the chattels,''^ and there are two cases their enjoyment, but by this the 36. Farewell v. Dickenson, 6 court evidently meant merely that Barn. & C. 251. rent does not cease to be rent 37. Armstrong v. Cummings. because reserved upon a lease 58 How. Pr. 332; Fay v. Holloran, of land which also includes chat- 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 295. tels. 38. Buffum v. Deane, 4 Gray 34. Newman v. Anderton, 2 (Mass.) 385. In Newton v. Speare Bos. & P. (N. R.) 224; Selby v. Laundering Co., 19 R. I. 546, 37 Greaves, L. R. 3 C. P. 594; Lath- Atl. 11, it is decided that the rop V. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282: Stein transferee of the land in such v. Stely, — (Tex. Civ. App.) — , case is entitled only to the value 32 S. W. 782. of the use anrj occupation of the 35. Gilbert, Rents, 175; Y. B. land. 12 Hen. 8, 11, pi. 5. Emott v. The decision in Jones v. Smith, Cole, Cro. Eliz. 255; Read v. 14 Ohio, 606, that when chattels Lawnse, 2 Dyer 212 b; Contra are included in the lease, the Bro. Abr. Apportionment, pi. 24. covenant to pay rent does not 1468 Real Propeety. [§ 405 in which it is decided that if the chattels leased with the land are lost or destroyed, the rent should be ap- portioned, that is, diminished proportionally.^^ These cases, however, appear hardly to accord with the ordi- nary rule, hereafter stated,^'^ that no apportionment of rent occurs on the destruction of the buildings on the land leased, and in one of these cases the decision is apparently regarded as involving a repudiation of that rule. All payments which a lessee agrees with the lessor to make, are not necessarily rent. For instance, sums which the lessee agrees to pay to the lessor on account of good will,*^ of improvements made by the latter,*^ or of existing indebtedness,^^ are not rent, the pay- ments not being made by way of compensation for the use and enjoyment of the property. And this appears to be so regardless of w^hether the parties refer to such payments as rent, since what constitutes rent is a (iuestion of law and not of intention. Likewise, in spite of several decisions to the effect that an agree- ment by the lessee with the lessor to pay the taxes is in effect one to pay rent,'*^ the proper view is, it is sub- mitted, that sums thus to be paid to a third person, not a representative of the lessor, do not constitute rent.^^ pass upon a transfer of the rent So. 546; Miners' Bank of Potts- alone appears questionable. ville v. Heilner, 47 Pa. 452. 39. Newton v. Wilson, 3 Hen. 44. Gedge v. Shoenberger, 83 & M. (Va.) 470; Whitaker v. Haw- Ky. 91; Roberts v. Sims, 64 Miss, ley, 25 Kan. 674, 37 Am. Rep. 277. 597, 2 So. 72; Neagle v. Kelly, 146 The same view is favored by Le 111. 460, 34 N. E. 947; Knight v. Taverner's Case, 1 Dyer 56a. Orchard, 92 Mo. App. 466; Mc- 40. Post, § 413, notes 81-85. Cann v. Evans, 185 Fed. 93, 107 41. Smith V. Mapleback, 1 C. C. A. 313. Term. Rep. 441. 45. That a stipulation to pay 42. Hoby v. Roebuck, 7 Taunt. taxes is not a stipulation to pay 157; Donellan v. Read, 3 Barn. & rent, see Hodgkins v. Price, 137 Adol. 899. Mass. 13; Evans v .Lincoln County, 43. First Nat. Bank v. Flynn, 204 Pa. 448, 54 Atl. 321 ("water 117 Iowa, 493, 91 N. W. 784. Pax- rents") ; People v. Swayze, 15 Abb. ton V. Kennedy, 70 :Miss. 865, 12 Pr. (N. Y.) 432. §§ 406, 407] Eent. 1469 It has been well said in this connection that ''rent has a fixed legal meaning, and to consider all payments which, by the terms of the lease, a tenant is bonnd to make, as coming within its definition, would lead to a confusion of ideas without necessity or advantage."^" § 406. The reservation of rent. In technical lan- guage, the rent which is provided for by the lease is "reserved," as distinguished from a part of the land, which may be "excepted."^' Xo particular language is necessary, it being sufficient if it indicates an inten- tion that the rent named shall be paid or rendered to the lessor.^^ It is a well recognized rule of the common law that rent must be reserved in favor of the lessor or grantor himself, and not in favor of a stranger, since it is paid by way of retribution for the land and should consequently go to him from whom the land passes.^^ In several states, however, the courts have referred to money which the lessee agrees to pay to a stranger as rent, without apparently any suspicion that this is not in accordance with the common law.""' As a rent may be reserved on a conveyance in fee, so it may be reserved upon the transfer of the whole interest of a tenant for life or for 3^ears, a reversion in the transferor being unnecessary.^'^ § 407. Transfer of rights and liabilities. V]iou the conveyance of a reversion to which rent is incident, 46. Garner v. Hannah, 13 N. Rolle, Abr. 447; Gilbert, Rents, Y. Super, Ct. (6 Duer) 262, per 54; Ryerson v. Quackenbush, 26 Slosson, J. X. J. L. 232. 47. Co. Litt. 47a; Doe d. Doug- .50. Toan v. Pline, 60 Mich. 385, las V. Lock, 2 Ad. & El. 705, 743. 27 X. W. 557; Brett v. Sayle, 60 See post, § 436. Miss. 192; Schneider v. White, 12 48. Harrington v. Wise, Cro. Ore. 503, 8 Pac. 652; Broddie v. Eliz. 486; Attoe v. Hemmings, 2 .Johnson, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 464. Bulstr, 281; Doe d. Rains v. Knel- And cases cited <'>itr, this section, ler, 4 Car. & P. 3. note 44. 49. Litt. § 346; Co. Litt. 143b. 5]. Newcomb v. Harvey, Carth. 2 R. P.— 18 UTO Real Peoperty. [§ 407 the rent also j)asses unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;'^- but the reversion may be conveyed without the rent, or the rent may be assigned without the reversion, the rent and the reversion being thereby separated.^ ^ The right to rent which has already become due does not pass upon a transfer of the reversion unless there is an express provision that it shall pass.^^ An assignment of rent already due is an assignment of a mere chose in action, while an assignment of the rent, that is, of the right to the instalments as they come due in the future, is properly not an assignment of a chose in action, but is a transfer of an interest in land.^^'' Were rent a chose in action, and not an in- terest in land, it would not have been transferable at common law. The liability for rent reserved on a lease for years passes to an assignee of the leasehold by reason of the ''privity of estate" existing between him and the owner of the reversion, and a transferee of the reversion has also, on the same theory, a right to recover the rent. This question of the rights and liabilities of the* trans- 161; Williams v. Hayward, 1 El. 126; Gates v. Max, 125 N. C. 139, & El. 1040; McMurphy v. Minot, 34 S. E. 266; Co. Litt. 143a, 151 4 N. iH. 251. b; 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. § 52. Walker's Case, 3 Coke 22; 180c. Butt V. Ellett, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 54. Flight v. Bentley, 7 Sim. 544, 22 L. Ed. 183; Steed v. Hin- 149; Thornton v. Strauss, 79 Ala. son, 76 Ala. 298; Dixon V. Niccolls, 164; Damren v. American Light 39 111. 372, 89 Am. Dec. 312; Out- & Power Co., 91 Me. 334, 40 Atl. toun T. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 Atl. 63; Wise v. PfafE, 98 Md. 576. 56 134; Patten v. Deshon, 1 Gray Atl. 815; Burden v. Thayer, 3 (Mass.) 325. Mete. (Mass.) 76, 37 Am. Dec. 53. Crosby v. Loop, 13 111. 625; 117; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank Watson Y. Hunkins, 13 Iowa, 547; v. Ege, 9 Watts (Pa.) 436, 36 Am. Damren v. American Light & Dec. 130; Dobbs v. Atlas Elevator Power Co., 91 Me. 334; Beal v. Co., 25 S. Dak. 177, 126 N. W. 250; Boston Car Spring Co., 125 Mass. Kneeland Investment Co. v. Ald- 157, 28 Am. Rep. 216; Brownson rich, 63 Wash. 609, 116 Pac. 264. V. Roy, 133 Mich. 617. 95 N. W. 54a. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & 710; Moffatt v. Smith, 4 N. Y. Ten. § 180c. § 407] Kent. 1471 ferees by reason of their privity of estate will be more conveniently considered in connection with the subject of the common-law action of "debt" as a remedy for nonpayment of rent.^^ Covenants to pay rent. An instrument of lease usually contains a covenant on the part of the lessee to pay rent. Both the benefit and the burden of a covenant to i)ay rent, upon a demise leaving a rever- sion in the lessor, run with the land,''" and consequently an action thereon may be brought by the transferee of the reversion,-^" and against an assignee of the lessee.^ ^ The liabilit}^ of the original lessee upon his cove- nant to pay rent, being of a purely contractual nature, is not affected by his assignment of the leasehold, even though the assignment is assented to by the landlord.^^ 55. i'ost, § 414, notes 18-29. 56. See I'ntr, § 56. 57. Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 240, 1 Lev. 259; Midgleys v. Love- lace, 12 Mod. 45; Baldwin v. Wal- ker, 21 Conn. 168; Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. 160; Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536; Main v. Feathers, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 646; Maden v. Woodman, 205 Mass. 4, 91 N. E. 206. 58. Palmer v. Edwards, 1 Doug. 187, note; Steward v. Wolveridge, 9 Bing. 60; Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. 225, 5 Pac. 104; Webster V. Nichols, 104 111. 160; Carley v. Lewis, 24 Ind. 73; Donelson v. Polk, 64 Md. 504, 2 Atl. 824; Lee v. Payne, 4 Mich. 106, 119; Edwards v. Spalding, 20 Mont. 54, 49 Pac. 443; Hogg v. Reynolds, 61 Neb. 758, 87 Am. St. Rep. 522, i^ iijl W. 479; Stewart v. Long Tsiand R. Co., 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200, 55 Am. Rep. 844; Tyler Commercial College v. Stapleton, 33 Okla. 305, 125 Pac. 443; Moline V. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Ore. 532, 144 Pac. 572; Hannen v. Ewalt. 18 Pa. 9; Bowdre v. Hamp- ton, 6 Rich. Law (S. C.) 208; Pingry V Watkins, 17 Vt. 379. 59. Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 237, 1 Lev. 259; Mills v. Auriol, 1 H. Bl. 433; Randall v. Rigby, 4 Mees. & W. 134; Evans v. Mc- Clure. 108 Ark. 531, 158 S. W. 487; Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223. 27 Pac. 612, 14 L. R. A. 151: Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 830, 146 Pac. 638; Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 111. 634, 37 Am. St. Rep. 248, 35 N. E. 820; .Johnstone v. Stone, 215 Mass. 219, 102 N. E. 366; Latta v. Weiss, 131 Mo. 230, 32 S. W. 1005; Creveling v. De Hart, 54 N. J. Law, 338, 23 Atl. 611; Taylor v. De Bus, 31 Ohio St. 468; Pittsburg Consol. Coal Co. V. Greenlee, 164 Pa. 549, 30 Atl. 589; Almy v. Greene, 13 R. 1472 Real Property. [§ m Occasional statements that, in the particular case, the lessor's acquiescence in the assignment, or failure to assert any claim for rent as against the lessee, had the effect of relieving him from liability,'^'^" can be sup- ported only on the theory that such action on the part of the lessor constituted, under the circumstances of the case, a new lease to the assignee, thus causing a surrender by operation of law.^'''' And the same may be said of occasional statements, ^^"^ that the acceptance of rent by the landlord from the assignee relieves the lessee from liability.'*''^ Such acceptance of rent can have this effect only if it can be regarded as evidencing a new lease by the landlord to such assignee. An assignee of the leasehold is in a position differ- ent from that of the lessee, in that he can relieve him- self from further liability for rent by making an as- signment to another.^^'^ I. 350, 43 Am. Rep. 32; Granite Building Corp. v. Rubin, 40 R. I. 208, L. R. A. 1917D, 100 Atl. 310; Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Colve Co. V. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 968, Ann. Cas. 1916E. 786, 80 S. E. 781. 59a. Fry v. Partridge, 73 111. 51; Colton v. Garham, 72 Iowa, 324, 33 N. W. 76; Brayton v. Boom- er, 131 Iowa, 28, 107 N. W. 1099: Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112; Patton V. Deshon. 1 Gray (Mass.) 325; Hutclieson v. Jones, 79 Mo. 496; Jamison v. Reilly, 92 Wash. 538, 59 Pac. 699. 59b. Post, § 431, note 89. 59c. Fry v. Partridge, 73 111. 51; Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112; "Hutcheson v. Jones, 79 Mo. 496. Jamison v. Reilly, 92 Wash. 538, 159 Pac. 699 {semble). 59d. That acceptance of rent from the assignee does not have that effect, see Copeland v. Watts. 1 Starkie 95; Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 382, 24 L. Ed. 173; Schehr V. Berkey, 166 Cal. 157, 135 Pac. 41; Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 111. 634, 7 Am. St. Rep. 248, 35 N. E. 820; Powell v. Jones, 50 Ind. App. 493, 98 N. E. 646; Harris v. Heackman, 62 Iowa, 411; Johnson v. Stone, 215 Mass. 219, 102 N. E. 366; Hunt v. Gard- ner, 39 N. J. Law 530; Decker V Hartshorn, 60 X. J. L. 548, 38 Atl. 678; McFarland v. May, — Okla. — , 162 Pac. 753; Hooks v. Bailey, 5 Ga. App. 211, 62 S. E. 1054; Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. V Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 968, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 786, 80 S. E. 781. And cases cited i^ost, 8 431, note 94. 60. Paul V. Nurse, 8 Barn. & Cres. 486. Johnson v. Sherman, 15 Cal. 287, 76 Am. Dec. 481; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 111. 361, 38 L R .A. 624, 46 § 407] Eent. 1473 It has been decided in this country that, even npon the assignment of rent, reserved on a lease for years, apart from the reversion, the benefit of the lessee's covenant runs with the rent, so as to authorize suit by the assignee thereon/'^ In case of the transfer of the reversion in a part only of the land by the lessor, he and his transferee are each entitled to recover, on the lessee's covenant to pay rent, a proportional part of the rent/'- The liability on the covenant to pay rent has been regarded as apportionable to such an extent as to ren- der an assignee of the leasehold interest in part of the land subject to a proportional part thereof, and no more.^^ Covenant to p?y rent in fee. The benefit of a covenant to pay rent reserved or granted in fee will, according to the English cases, it seems, not run with the rent, so as to be available to subsequent owners thereof, the theory being that a covenant will never N. E. 1105; Trabue v. McAdams, Wineman v. Hughson, 44 111. App. 8 Bush. (Ky.) 74; Consumers Ice 22. Contra, Allen v. Wooley, 1 Co. V. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 35 Atl. Blackf. (Ind.) 148. 1086; Bell v. American Protective 62. City of Swansea v. Thomas, League, 163 Mass. 558, 28 L. R. A. 10 Q. B. Div. 48. Dreyfus v. Hirt, 452, 47 Am. St. Rep. 481, 40 N. 82 Cal. 621, 23 Pac. 193; Crosby E. 857; Cohen v. Todd, 130 Minn. v. Loop, 13 111. 625; Worthington 227, L. R. A. 1915E, 846, 153 X. v Cooke, 56 Md. 51; Linton v. W. 531; Meyer v. Alliance In v. Hart, 25 Pa. St. 193, 64 Am. Dec. Co., 86 N. J. L. 694, 92 At. 1086, 691; Pelton v.. Place, 71 Vt. 430, affirming 84 N. J. L. 450, 87 At. 76 Am. St. Rep. 782, 46 Atl. 63. 476; Durand v. Curtis, 57 N. Y. 63. Babcock v. Scoville, 56 111. 7, 15 Am. Rep. 453; Washington 461; Cox v. Penwick, 4 Bibb. (Ky.) Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 538; Daniels v. Richardson, 22 Pa. 576, 10 Am. St. Rep. 553, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 565; Harris v. At. 799; Harvard Inv. Co. V. Smith, Frank, 52 Miss. 155; St. Louis 66 Wash. 429, 119 Pac. 864. Public Schools v. Boatmen's Ins. 61. Willard v. Tillman, 2 Hill & Trust Co., 5 Mo. App. 91 (aem- (N. Y.) 274; Demarect v. Willard, hie); Hogg v. Reynolds, 61 Neb. 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 206; Patten v. 758, 87 Am. St. Rep. 522, 86 N. W. Deshon, 1 Gray (Mass.) 325. See 479; Van Rensselaer v. Bradley, 1474 Eeal Property, [§ 408 run with an incorporeal thing.*'* In this country, on the other hand, it has been usually held that the benefit of the covenant will run with the rent,''^ this being in accord with the view held here that a covenant will run with an incorporeal thing.^*' In this country, likewise, the burden of a covenant to pay rent reserved or granted in fee is regarded as passing with the land, so as to render the grantee of the land personally liable thereon.^^ In England, it would seem, in view of the expressions adverse to the running of the burden of covenants on conveyances in fee,*'^ that the grantee of the land would not be liable on the covenant.^^ § 408. Death of person entitled. A rent charge granted by the owner of land is real or personal prop- erty, according as the grantee is given a freehold es- tate therein, or an estate less than freehold.'^*^ A rent 3 Denia (N. Y.) 135, 45 Am. Dec. 451; Van Rensselaer v. Gifford, 24 Barb. N. Ry. 349. 64. Milnes v. Branch, 5 Maule & S. 411; Randall v. Rigby, 4 Mees. & W. 130, 135. 65. Scott V. Lunt's Adm'r, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 596, 8 L. Ed. 584: Streaper v. Fislier, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 155, 18 Am. Dec. 604; Trustees of St. Mary's Church v. Miles, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 229; Cook v. Bright- ly, 46 Pa. St. 439; Van Rensselaer V. Read, 26 N. Y. 558, distinguish- ing Devisees of Van Rensselaer v. Executors of Plainer, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 24. But see Irish v. Johnston, 11 Pa. St. 488, and the discussion of the question in American notes to Spencer's Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 193. 66. See onte,^ § 391, notes 30- 34. 67. Streaper v. Fisher, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 155; Herbaugh v. Zentmyer, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 159; Hannen v. Ewalt, 18 Pa. St. 9; Van Rensse- laer V. Read, 26 N. Y. 558; Van Rensselaer v. Dennison, 35 N. Y. 393; Carley v. Lewis, 24 Ind. 123. On the same principle, the burden of a covenant to pay rent reserved upon the transfer of a life interest in land will bind a subsequent transferee of such interest. McMurphy v. Minot, 4 N. H. 251. 68. See ante, § 390. 69. Holt, C. J., in Brewster v Kidgill, 12 Mod. 166; Copinger & Munro's Law of Rents, 473-476. But that the burden does run, see Sugden, Vendor & Purchaser (13th Ed) 483; Harrison, Chief Rents, 102. 70. Knolle's Case, 1 Dyer, 5b; § 409] Rent. 1475 reserved upon tlie grant of a fee-simple estate in land is real property passing to the heir or devisee.'^ A rent incident to a reversion partakes of the nature of the reversion, and passes therewith on the death of the reversioner. Accordingly, it more usually passes to the heir, as being reserved by a tenant in fee simple making a lease for years, though it is person- alty belonging to the executor or administrator, if re- served on a sublease by a tenant for years. '^- If, however, a rent reserved on a lease for years by a ten- ant in fee simple becomes separated from the rever- sion,"^ it is equivalent to an estate for years merely in a rent charge, and passes to the personal representative of the owner, and not to the heir or devisee.'^^ Rent which has become due is personal property, and consequently, upon the death of the person entitled thereto, though still unpaid, it goes to his personal representative, and not to his heir or devisee.'^ § 409. Time at which rent is due. A lease of land ordinarily states either the periods with reference to w^hich the installments of rent are to be computed, as by providing for a "weekly," ''monthly," ''quarterly" or "annual" rent, or it specifies the exact days on Butt's Case, 7 Coke. 23a; 1 Woer- 87 Am. Dec. 324; Stinson v. Stin- ner, Administration, § 297. son, 38 :Me. 593. Towle v. Swasey, 71. Cobb V. Biddle, 14 Pa. St. 106 Mass. 100; Woodhurn's Estate, 444; In re White's Estate, 167 Pa. 138 Pa. St. 606, 21 Am. St. Rep. St. 206, 31 Atl. 569. As to the 932, 21 Atl. 16; Huff v. Latimer, particular mode of descent of a 33 S. C. 253, 11 S. E. 758. rent charge created by the res- 73. See cute, § 407, note 53. ervation of a rent on a grant in 74. Knolle's Case, Dyer, 5b; fee, see Co. Litt. 12b, 3 Preston, Williams, Executors (9th Ed.) 727. Abstracts, 54; Van Rensselaer v. 75. 1 Woerner, Administra- Hays, 19 N. Y. 68. tion, § 300; Mills v. Merryman, 72. 1 Woerner, Administration, 49 Me. 65; Haslage v. Krugh, 25 § 300; Sacheverell v. Froggatt, 2 Pa. St. 97. Bealey v. Blake's Adm'r, Saund, 367a, notes; Dixon v. Nic- 70 Mo. App. 229; Ball v. First Nat. colls, 39 111. 372, 89 Am. Dec. 312; Bank of Covington, 80 Ky. 501. Rubottom V. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202, 1-476 Eeal Peopekty. [§ 409 which rent is to be paid. In the latter case the ques- tion as to the time for payment of the successive in- stallments of rent is merely one of construction of the language used. In the former case the rent for the particular period named, whether it be a week, a month, a quarter, or a year, does not become due until the end of such period,^*'' in the absence of a stipula- tion,"^^ or, it seems, a custom,''^ to the contrary, the theory being that, since rent is a part of the profits of the land, it is not payable until it has been earned by the tenant's enjojTiient of the premises. In determin- ing what is the last day of the rent period, whether a year, a quarter, a month, or a week, for this purpose, the same method of comimtation is employed, it seems, as in determining the length of the tenn,'^^ that is, the last day of each period, on which day the rent becomes due, is not that corresponding to the first day, but the day previous thereto. For instance, if the term begins on the second day of January, and rent is in terms pay- able monthly, it becomes due on the first and not the second day of each of the following months, and if payable yearly, it becomes due on the first day of each of the following years. ^*^ Not infrequently there is an express provision for the paymient of the rent, not at the end of the period 76. Coomber v. Howard. 1 C, 78. Tignor v. Bradley, 32 Ark. B. 440; Parker v. Gortatowsky, 781; McParlane v. Williams, 107 129 Ga. 623, 59 S. E. 286; Castle- m. 33; Watson v. Penn, 108 Ind. man v. Du Val, 89 Md. 657, 43 Atl. 21, 58 Am. Rep. 262, 8 N. E. 636; 821; Hilsendegen v. Scheich, 55 Calhoun v. Atchison, 4 Bush. (Ky.) Mich. 468, 21 N. W. 894; Kistler 261, 96 Am. Dec. 299; Buckley v. V. McBride, 65 N. J. L. 553, 48 Atl. Taylor, 2 Term. Rep. 600. 558. Ridgley v. Stillwell, 27 Mo. 79. 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. 128; Holt V. Nixon, 73 C. C. A. p. 63. 268, 141 Fed. 952. 80. So if the term begins Jan- 77. Menough's Appeal, 5 Watts uary 10th, and the rent is pay- & S. (Pa.) 432; Hilsendegen v. able quarterly, the rent falls due Scheich, 55 Mich. 468, 21 N. W. on April 9th, July 9th, October 894; Gibbs v. Ross, 2 Head. 9th, and January 9th, and not on fTenn.) 437. the tenth day of each of these § 409] Een-t. 1477 during wliicli it is earned, but at the commencement of such period, that is, the rent is made payable "in advance," as it is usually expressed. Time of day for payment. Rent may be paid at any hour of the day on which it becomes due,*^ but there is no obligation to pay it until midnight of tliat day, and the tenant is consequently not in default until the next day.^^ Applying this doctrine, it has been held that if the landlord, by his action, the tenancy being at will, terminates the tenancy during the day on which the rent is payable, the tenant is relieved from liability, ^^ and that an eviction on that day under par- amount title has a like effect.^'* On the same theory it has been decided that if a tenant in fee simple, after making a lease, dies on the rent day, the installment of rent falling due on that day belongs, not to his per- sonal representative, but to his heir or devisee, as having become due after his death,®-^ And it seems that, in case the reversion is transferred on that day, the transferee is entitled to the installment then falling due.^^ The English courts refused, however, to apply such a theory in the case of a life tenant who, after leasing, not under a i)ower, died on a rent day, and they regarded the rent in such a case as belonging to the personal representative of the life tenant,^" being moved, presumably, to this determination, by the fact months. Donaldson v. Smith, 1 83. Hammond v. Thompson. Ashm. (Pa.) 197. 168 Mass. 531, 47 N. E. 137. 81. Clun's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 84. Smith v. Shepard, 15 Pick. 127b; Dibble v. Bowater, 2 El. & (Mass.) 147, 25 Am. Dec. 432. Bl. 564; Comyn. landlord & Ten- 85. Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Wms. ant, 219. Saund. 287; Rockingham v. Pen- •82. Duppa V. Mayo, 1 Wms. rice, 1 P. Wms. 177. Saund. 287 and note (17); Cut- 86. See Hammond v. Thomp- ting V .Derby, 2 W. Bl. 1077. Left- son, 168 Mass. 531, 47 X. E. 137. ley V. Mills, 4 Term Rep. 170; 87. Rockingham v. Penrice, 1 Wolf V. Rauck, 150 Iowa, 87, Ann. p. Wms. 177; Southern v. Bellasis, Gas. 1912D, 386, 129 N. W. 319; 1 P. Wms. 179, note. Strafford Sherlock v Thayer, 4 Mich. 355, v. Wentworth, Prec. Ch. 555. 66 Am. Dec. 539. 1478 Real Property. [§ 410 that otherwise the tenant under the lease would have escaped liability for the entire rent period.^^ Acceleration of rent. Occasionally the lease provides that the rent for the whole term shall im- mediately become payable upon a named contingency, as for instance, upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of the tenant,^^"" the removal of his personal property from the premises,^^'* or his failure to pay an install- ment of rent when due.^^'^ Occasionally the courts ap- pear to have applied the doctrine of "anticipatory breach," which has been the subject of considerable dis- cussion in connection with the law of contracts,^^*^ to a case in which the liability for rent was repudiated, this being regarded as immediately giving the landlord a right of action against the tenant for damages, esti- mated on the theory that the latter would make no further pajmients of rent as stipulated. ^^"^ § 410. Apportionment as to time. At common law, rent is not regarded as accruing from day to day, like interest, but it is only upon the day fixed for pay- ment that any part of it becomes due.^^ The result of this principle is that, ordinarily, the person who is on that day the owner of the reversion is entitled to the entire installment of rent due on that day, though he may have been the owner of the reversion or rent but a part of the time which has elapsed since the last 88. See PoH, § 410. 162 Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797; Minne- 88a. Piatt v. Johnson, 168 Pa. apolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 47, 47 Am. St. Rep. 877, 31 Atl. 74 Minn. 98, 76 N. W. 1024; Brown 935. V. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 Pac. 88b. Goodwin v. Sharkey, SO 89. Pa. St. 149. 89. Clun's Case, 10 Coke 126b; 88c. Johns v. Winters, 251 Pa. Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. 169, 96 Atl. 130; Hart v. Wynne, 23 Am. Rep. 261; Anderson v. — (Tex. Civ.) — , 40 S. W. 848. Robbins, 82 Me. 422, 9 L. R. A. 88d. See Wald's Pollock, Con- 568, 19 Atl. 910; Marshall v. Mose- tracts (Williston's Ed.) p. 355 et ley, 21 N. Y. 280; Bank of Penn- seg sylvania y Wise, 3 Watts (Pa.) 88e. Bradbury v. Higgenson, 394. <§ 410] Eent. 1479 rent day. Conversely, one who has been the owner of the reversion or rent during a part of that period can claim no portion of the installment unless he is such owner at the time at which the installment is payable by the terms of the lease. The general rule in this regard is ordinarily expressed by the statement that rent cannot be apportioned as to time. Applications of this rule occur as follows: If a tenant in fee simple, having made a lease, dies between two rent days, the entire installment of rent falling due belongs to his heir or devisee, as being the owmer of the reversion at the time the installment falls due, and the executor or administrator can assert a claim to no portion thereof.'^'' And when the landlord makes a conveyance of the reversion, the grantee is entitled, in the absence of a contrary stipulation, to all the rent which falls due at the next rent day, and the grantor can claim no part thereof,^ ^ So in case the tenant is evicted by title paramount between rent days, the landlord cannot claim any portion of the installment next falling due,''- and this is a fortiori the case if the landlord himself evicts the tenant. The case is the same if the landlord terminates the tenancy, either by force of an express option so to do,^^"^^ or in accord- ance with the nature of the tenancy, as being one at 90. Clun's Case, 10 Coke, 127a; 92. Emglisli v. Key, 39 Ala. Duppa V. Mayo, 1 Wms. Saund. 113; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368, 287; Anderson v. Robbins, 82 Me. 61 Am. Dec. 364; Adams v. Bige- 422, 8 L. R. A. 588, 19 Atl. 910. low, 128 Mass. 365; Russell v. Eloodworth v. Stevens, 51 Miss. Fabyan, 28 N. H. 543, 61 Am. 475; Dorsett v. Gray, 98 Ind. 237; Dec. 629. Allen V. Van Houton, 19 N. J. 93-94. Zule v. Zule, 24 Wend. Law (4 Harr.) 47. (N. Y.) 76, 35 Am. Dec. 600: 91. English V. Key, 39 Ala. 113; Nicholson v. Munigle, 6 Allen (88 Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368, 61 Mass.) 215. But see dictum in Am. Dec. 364; Hull v. Stevenson, Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343, 38 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 135, note. Am. Dec. 493, to the effect that Bank of Pennsylvania v. Wise, a lease providing for the termin- 3 Watts (Pa.) 394; Hearne v. ation on a contingency should be Lewis, 78 Tex. 276, 14 S. W^ 572. construed as providing for ap- portionment. 1480 Real Property. [§ 411 will/'^ or for breach of a condition subsequent.^^ By force of this rule, at common law, if a tenant for his own or another's life makes a lease for years, and the lease comes to an end by reason of his death or that of the cestui que vie, the lessee entirely escapes liabil- ity for the installment of rent next falling due.®'^ The lessor or his executor cannot recover the whole install- ment, since the life interest has ceased before the installment falls due, and he cannot, under the rule against apportionment, recover a portion calculated up to the time of the cessation of his interest. Nor can the remainderman recover any portion of the rent, since the lease by which the rent was reserved is no longer opera- tive, and also because he is a stranger to the lease. The rule forbidding the apportionment of rent, so far as concerns a rent reserved on a lease by a tenant for his own life, was changed in England, by Stat. II Geo. 2, c. 19, § 15, providing that if any tenant for life should die before the day for the payment of rent reserved on a lease which terminated on such death, his executors or administrators might recover from the under tenant a proper proportion of the rent, ac- cording to the length of time between the last rent day and the death of the tenant for life. And a similar statute has been enacted in a number of states. By later legislation in England the right of apportionment has been gVeatly extended, and in a few states there is legislation of a like tendency.^ ^ § 411. Amount of the rent. The amount of tlie rent to be jjaid must be certain or- capable of reduction 95. Leighton v. Thee;], 2 SaUc. HI. 365, 55 Am. Rep 424; Watson 413; Robinson v. Deering, 56 Me. v. Penn, 108 Ind. 21, 8 N. E. 636, 357; Hammond v. Thompson, 168 58 Am. Rep. 26. Gee v. Gee, 22 Mass. 531, 47 N. E. 137. N. C. (2 Dev. & B. Eq.) 103. 96. HaH r. Joseph Middleby, 98. See Tiffmy, Landlord & 197 Mass. 485, 83 N. E. 1114. Ten. pp. 1076-1079; Wilson v. 97. Clun's Case, 10 Coke 127a; Hagey, 251 111. 452, 96 N. E. 277; ex parte Smyth, 1 Swanst. 337, Smlthvvick v. Oliver. 94 Ark. 451, and notes; Hogland v. Crum, 113 127 S. W. 706. § 411] Rent. 1481 to a certainty,"^ but it is sufficient that the amount can be ascertained before the time for payment.^ As an example of rent which is thus ascertainable at the time for its payment, though not at the time of the demise, may be mentioned rent consisting of a certain portion of the crop which may be raised upon the land, or computed with reference to the amount of minerals extracted from the land. So it may be made to fluctuate with the price of wheat,^^with the income which the tenant may derive from the use of the premises,^ or with the particular use which the tenant may make of the land."* Not infrequently the amount of the rent is reduced by an agreement entered into between the landlord and tenant after the making of the lease. That such an agreement must be supported by a valid consideration has been recognized in a numl:er of cases,^ and there are several decisions upon the sufficiency of the considera- tion in the particular case.^ In spite of these decisions, there is, it is submitted, room for question whether, applying common law standards, a consideration should be regarded as necessary. At common law, one entitled 99. Co. Litt. 142a; Gilbert, Iowa, 86, 12 X. W. 767; Bow- Rents, 9. ditch V. Chickering, 139 Mass. 1. Co. Litt. 96a; Selby v. 283, 30 N. E. 92; Wharton v. An- Greaves, L. R. 3 C. P. 594; Walsh derson, 28 Minn. 301, 9 N. W. V. Lonsdale, 21 Ch. Div. 9; Mc- 860; Hazeltine v. Ausherman, 87 Farlane v. Williams, 107 111. 33; Mo. 410; Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. Butcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584. 141, 28 Am. Rep. 120. 2. Kendall v. Baker, 11 C. B. 6. Doherty v. Doe, 18 Colo. 842. 456, 33 Pac. 165; Raymond v. 3. Hardy v. Briggs, 14 Allen Krauskopf, 87 Iowa, 602, 54 N. (Mass.) 473; Long v. Fitzsimmons, W. 432; Lamb v. Rathburn, 118 1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 530. Mich. 666, 77 N. W. 268; Ten Eyck 4. Roulston V. Clark, 2 H. Bl. v. Sleeper, 65 Minn. 413, 67 N. 563; Bowers v. .\ixon, 12 Q. B. W. 1076; Bowman v. Wright, 65 558. Neb. 661, 91 N. W. 580, 92 N. W. 5. Goldsborough v. Gable, 140 580; Holmquist v. Bavarian Star 111. 269, 15 L. R. A. 294, 29 N. Brew. Co., 1 App. Div. 347, 72 N. E. 722. Id. 152 111. 594, 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 443, 37 N .Y. Supp. E. 1025; Wheeler v. Baker, 59 :',80. 1482 Keal Property. [§ 412 to rent can extin.^uish it by executing a release in favor of the person whose estate was charged therewith/ and an agreement to reduce the rent is, it is conceived, in effect merely a partial release of the rent, that is, a pro fauto transfer of the rent by way of release, w^hich is perfectly valid at common law, without any consideration.^ The common law release, however, re- quired a seal, and in so far as a seal may still be necessary to the validity of a release, an agreement, not under seal, for the partial or total extinguishment of rent, might well be regarded as a contract to execute a release, to which the court would give elfect only if supported by a consideration. An agreement, made after the making of the lease, in terms to increase the rent, does not, strictly speaking, increase the rent. The additional sum agreed to be paid is not rent, since it is not reserved upon the mak- ing of a lease or other conveyance.^ The only theory on which it could be regarded as rent would be by considering the agreement as a new demise, effecting a surrender by operation of law of the original lease,^" but this would give to the agreement a force ordinarily not contemplated by the parties. ^^ § 412, Apportionment as to amount. Eent may be apportioned as regards the amount thereof, that is, a person may become entitled to, or liable for, a portion only of the rent originally reserved.^^ Either one of three different cases of such apportionment may arise, that is: (1) a right to a distinct portion of the rent, and to such portion onh', may be vested in each of two or more persons; (2) a liability for a 7. Post, § 413, note 39-41. 32 N. Y. Super. Ct. (2 Sweeny) 8. See Pollock, Contracts (Wil- 74. liston's Ed.) 813. 10. Post, § 431. 9. Donellan v. Read, 3 Barn. 11. See Doe d. Monck v. Geekie, 6 Adol. 899; Hoby v. Roebuck, 5 Q. B. 841. 7 Taunt. 157; Coit v. Braunsdorf, 12. As to apportionment of <^ 412] • Eent. 1483 distinct portion of the rent, and for sucli portion only, may be imposed on one person, another being' liable for the balance; or (8) the rent may be extin- guished as to a joortion, and a ])ortion only. An apportionment of the character first referi'ed to, resulting from the vesting of the right to a distinct ])ortion of the rent in each of two or more persons, oc- curs when the landlord grants the reversion in part of the land, retaining the balance, ^^ and also when he transfers the reversion in different parts of the land to different persons, not retaining any part thereof.^^ And the case is the same when he severs the reversion by devise. ^^ An apportionment also takes place if the reversion is severed by act of the law, as when, on the death of the landlord, it passes to two or more heirs, ^" or when it passes to the heir, and, as to one-third, to the widow.^" In the case of such a severance of the reversion, the tenant is entitled to demand that the jury determine, in an action for the rent, the respective values of the different portions of the land, and the con- sequent extent of his obligation to each owner of a part of the reversion. ^^ Not only may the rent be apportioned by a sever- ance of the reversion, but it may also be apportioned rent on lease of land and chat- 22 Pa. 144. tels, see wife, § 405, notes 34-40. 15 Ewer v. .Aloyle, Cro. Eliz. 13. Co. Litt. 148a; 2 Co. Inst. 771; Hare v. Prou:foot. 6 U. C. 504; West v. Lassells, Cro. Eliz. Q. B. (0. S.) 617. 851; Bliss v. Collins, 5 Barn. & 16. Leitch v. Boyington, 84 111. Aid. 876; Worth ington v. Cooke, i79, 25 Am. Rep. 442; Cole v. Pat- 56 Md. 51; Biddler v. Hussman, terson, 25 Wend. (X. Y.) 456; 23 Mo. 597; Grubbie v. Toms, 70 Bank of Pennsylvania v. Wise, N. J. Law 522, 57 Atl. 144, Id. 3 Watts (Pa.) 404. 71 .\. J. Law, 338, 59 Atl. 1117; 17. 1 Rolle Abr. 237, pi. 5. Linton v. Hart, 25 Pa. 193. 64 18. Bac. Abr. Rent (.M. 3) ; Am. Dec. 691. Fish v. Campion, 1 Rolle, Abr. 14. Gilbert, Rents. 173; Ehr- 237, pi. 1; Bliss v. Collins, 5 Barn, man v. Mayer, 57 Md. 612, 40 Am. & Aid. 876; Hare v. Proudloot, 6 Rep. 448; Crosby v. Loop, 13 111. U. C. Q. B. (0. S.) 617; Diddle 625, 14 111. 320; Reed v. Ward, v. Huss, 23 Mo. 597. 1484 Eeal Property. . [§ 412 by the landlord without reference to the reversion, this being either retained by him or transferred to another, as when one who has demised land for a term of years, reserving rent, grants to each of several i^ersons, or to one person, a portion of the rent.^^ So tenants in com- mon of land, after making a lease thereof, reserving one entire rent, m-iy, without partitioning the reversion, apportion the rent between them.^'^ On severance of leasehold. In case the lease- hold interest in different parts of the premises becomes vested in different persons, each part, or the owner of each part, is ordinarily liable only for a proportioned part of the rent.-^ And the original lessee remains liable to the landlord for the whole rent, under his covenant to pay rent.^^ A tenant cannot, without the consent of the owner of the rent, by any disposition of the land or of a part thereof, apportion the rent so as to affect the right of such owner to collect the whole rent which may at any time fall due, by means of a proceeding against the land. Accordingly, if the tenant of part of the leased premises is in default, the landlord may distrain upon another part,-^ and he may presumably enforce a con- dition of forfeiture against such other part as well as against that part which belongs to the tenant in default. Partial extinction or suspension of rent. Cases of the apportionment of the rent by reason of the ex- tinction or suspension of a portion of the rent occur 19. Ards V. Watkins, Cro. Eliz. ardsou, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 565; 651; Bliss v. Collins, 5 Barn. & Hogg v. Reynolds, 61 Neb. 758, Aid. 876, 882; Rivis v. Watson, 5 87 Am. St. Rep. 522, 86 N. W. Mees. & W. 255. 479; Van Rennselaer v. Bradley, 20. Powis V. Smith, 5 Barn. & 3 Denio (N. Y.) 135, 45 Am. Dec. Aid. 850; Woolsey v. Lasher. 3? 451. App. Div. 108, 54 N. Y. Supp. 737. 22. Aute, § 407, note 59. 21. Babcock v. Seoville, 56 111. 23. Curtis v. Spitty, 1 Bing. 461; St. Louis Public Schools v. N. Cas. 756; Jackson v. Wychoff, Boatmen's Insurance & Trust Co., 5 Wend. (X. Y.) 53. 5 Mo. App. 91; Daniels v. Rich- § 412] Eent. 1485 upon the termination of the tenant's estate as regards a part of the jDremises. Thus, if the tenant of the whole premises leased surrenders his leasehold interest in a part thereof, or his leasehold is otherwise in part merged in the reversion, the rent is apportioned, it be- ing extinguished in an amount proi)ortioned to tlie value of the portion as to which the lease is no longer outstanding, while still existent as regards the lial- ance.-"* The rent is also apportioned in case the land- lord re-enters upon a part only of the land for breach of a condition of the lease,-^ and in case the tenant is evicted from part of the land by title paramount, the landlord being thereafter entitled to such portion only of the rent as is proportioned to the part of the leased premises which the tenant still holds under him.-*^ Occasionally the rent is apportioned by reason of the lessee's inability to obtain possession of the whole of the demised premises.^' In laction on covenant for rent. There is a dictum in an English case,-** that "in covenant as be- tween lessor and lessee, where the action is personal, and upon a mere privity of contract, and on that account transitory as any other personal contract is, the rent is not apportionable." This dictum, it seems clear, 24. Litt. § 222; Co. Litt. 148a; 470, 74 Am. Dec. 108; Fillebrown Smith V. Mallngs, Cro. Jac. 160; v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580; Cheairs Higgins V. California Petroleum & v Coats, 77 Miss. 846, 50 L. R. Asphalt Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac. A. Ill, 78 Am. St. Rep. 546, 28 1087; Leitch v. Boyington, 84 111. So. 728; Lawrence v. French, 25 179, 34 L. R. A. 55, 57 Am. St. Wend. (N. Y.) 445; Christopher v. Rep. 396; Ehrman v. Mayer, 57 Austin, 11 N. Y. 216; Poston v. Md. 612, 40 Am. Rep. 448; Nellis Jones, 37 X. Car. (2 Ired. Eq.) V. Lathrop, 22 Wend. (X. Y.) 121, 350; Tunis v. Grandy, 22 Gratt. 34 Am. Dec. 285; Van Rensse- (Va.) 109, Co. Litt. 148b. laer v. Gifford, 24 Barb. (X. Y.) 27. Ante, § 413, notes 43-59. 349. 28. Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 25. Walker's Case, 3 Coke 22; East 575, per Lord EHenborough, Collins V. Harding, 13 Coke 58. C. J. 26. Halligan v. Wade, 21 111. 2 R. P.— 19 1486 Eeal Pkoperty. [§ 412 is not correct as applied to an action upon the covenant for rent, by a lessor who has disposed of the reversion in part of the leased premises, he being entitled to recover a proportionate part of the rent and no more.^^ Whether it is correct as applied to a case in which the rent is in part extinguished or suspended, as upon a surrender or eviction by title paramount, it is difficult to say. The covenant might frequently be construed as one to pay the rent that may become due, rather than to pay the amount reserved, in which case the liability under the covenant would be the same as in an action of debt for rent, and a loss of the possession of part of the premises would be a ground for a pro tanto reduction of liability in an action on the covenant, as in an action of debt.^*^ In so far as the covenant is not 'susceptible of this construction, it is somewhat difficult to find a satisfactory ground on which to base a partial reduction of liability in case of the partial loss of pos- session by the tenant.'^ ^ The courts might possibly apply the somewhat indefinite doctrine of failure of consideration in this connection. Of rent charge. A rent charge is not appor- tionable to the same extent as a. rent service. Rent charges were never favored by the courts as were rents service, which were regarded as a part of the feudal con- stitution of the realm.^- Consequently, if the owner of the rent acquires a part of the land from which it issues, by 29. Swansea v. Thomas, 10 Q. Poston v. Jones, 37 N. C. (2 Ired. B. Div. 48; Worthington v. Cooke, Eq.) 350, 38 Am. Dec. 683, it is at 56 Md. 51; Linton v. Hart, 25 least suggested that in such case p. 193, 64 Am. Dec. 691. a court of equity would inter- 30. See Baynton v. Morgan, 22 vene in order to compel an ap- Q. B. Div. 81, per Fry, J. portionment. 31. In Shuttleworth v. Shaw, 6 32. See Gilbert, Rents, 152. A Upper Can. Q. B. 539, it was de- rent seek, likewise, has been re- cided that in an action of coven- garded as not apportionable by ant for rent there could be no the act of a party. Vin. Abr., apportionment on account of the Apportionment (A) 2; Id., Rent partial eviction of the tenant. In (Ga.) 12. -§ 41b'] Eent. 1487 voluntary conveyance, no apportionment occurs, and the whole rent is extinguished.^^ It is apportioned, how- ever, if the owner of the rent releases a part thereof,"* or if he acquires a part of the land by descent.^^ And even on a voluntary conveyance to him of part of the land an apportionment occurs if it is so agreed be- tween the parties to the conveyance, this in effect creating a new rent charge,"^^ Upon a transfer of a portion of the rent to another an apportionment oc- curs.^''' § 413. Extinction or suspension of rent^ By release. The right to rent ceases upon the making of a release of the rent by the owner thereof in favor of the owner of the land.^^ If the release is in terms of a portion only of the rent, the balance remains existent as a charge on the whole land.'''' A release, as under- stood at common law, is an instrument under seal, and such an instrument is valid though without any con- sideration.^'^ An agreement not to claim any rent, if not under seal, and not supported by a consideration, is, like any other such agreement, invalid.*^ The fact that no rent has been demanded, or that no rent has been paid, for a very considerable period, even twenty years or more, does not raise a pre- sumption that the rent has been released, thougli it may, by reason of the statute of limitations, prevent a re- 33. Litt. § 222; Co. Litt. 147b, 38. Litt. § 479; Co. Litt. 280a; 148a. Howell v. Lewis, 7 C. & P. 566. 34. Co. Litt. 148a; Bac. Abr., 39. Co. Litt. 148a; 2 Leake Rent (m) 1. 407; Ingersoll v. Sargeant, 1 35. Litt. § 224; Co. Litt. 194b; Whart. (Pa.) 337. Cruger v. McLaury, 41 N. Y. 219. 40. Co. Litt. 264b; Bac. Abr., 36. Co. Litt. 147b, and note; Release (A.); Wald's Pollock. Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick, 22 Contracts (Williston's Ed.) 812. N. Y. 32. 41. See Haseltine v. Ausher- 37. Co. Litt. 148a; Gilbert, man, 87 Mo. 410; Kaven v. Rents, 163; Farley v. Craig. 11 N. Chrystie, 84 N. Y. Supp. 470; J. Law (<; Halst.) 262. Donaldson v. Wberry. 29 Out. 1488- Real Pboperty. [§ 4].-? covery of particular installments of rent overdue.^- Withholding of possession. It has ordinarily been held that the lessee is not liable for rent in case the lessor prevents him from taking possession under the lease.*^ By some decisions, even though the lessee takes possession of part of the leased premises, he is, if excluded from the balance, not liable for any part of the rent or on a quantum meruit,*'^ but in other cases a different view is taken.*^ The exclusion of the tenant by the landlord from part of the leased premises ap- pears so analogous to that of an eviction of the tenant by the landlord from part,^^ that it might well, it seems, be regarded as having a similar effect in suspending the entire rent.^'^ That the lessee, without being prevented from tak- ing possession, fails to take possession, is obviously no defense to a claim for rent.^^ One cannot thus rid himself of an obligation assumed by him, merely be- cause he finds it convenient to withdraw from his bar- gain. 552. But in Hill v. Williams, 41 S. C. 134, 9 S. E. 290, the con- trary appears to be assumed. 42. Ehrman v. Meyer, 57 Md. 612, 40 Am. Rep. 448; Jackson V. Davis, 5 Cow. 130, 15 Am. Dec. 451; Lyon v. Odell, 65 N. Y. 28; St. Mary's Church Trustees v. Miles, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 229. 43. Reed v. Reynolds, 37 Conn. 469; Moore v. Guardian Trust Co., 173 Mo. 218, 73 S. W. 143; Penny v. Fellner, 6 Okla. 386, 50 Pac. 123; McClurg v. Price, 59 Pa. 420, 98 Am. Dec. 356; MerriU V. Gordon, 15 Ariz. 521, 140 Pac. 496. See ante, § 50. 44. Moore v. Mansfield, 182 Mass. 302, 65 N. E. 398, 94 Am. St. Rep. 657; AlcClurg v. Price 59 Pa. 420, 98 Am. Dec. 356; Penny V. Fellner, 6 Okla. 386, 50 Pac. 123. See McLeod v. Russell, 59 Wash. 676, 110 Pac. 626. 45. See Knox v. Hexter, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. (10 Jones & iS.) 8; Eldred v. Leahy, 31 Wis. 541, 11 Am. Rep. 613. 46. Ante, § 58. 47. Post, this section, note 95. 48. Levi v. Lewis, 6 C. B. N. S. 766; Douglass v. Branch Bank, 19 Ala. 659, 54 Am. Dec. 207; Little V. Hudgins, 117 Ark. 272. 174 S. W. 520; Marix v. Stevens, 10 Colo. 261, 15 Pac. 350; Union Pac. R. Co. V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 164 111. 88, 45 N. E. 488; Brown v. Cairns, 107 Iowa, 727, 77 N. W. 478; Becar v. Flues, § '^I'S] Kent. 1489 Exclusion by paramount owner. Tliat tlie lessee is niialjle to obtain possession owing to the pos- session of one having paramount title^ is a good defense to a claim for the rent,^^ and this has been held to be so even though the exclusion from possession extends to but a part of the premises.^" It has been decided, however, that if the lessee takes possession of the part from which he is not excluded, he is liable in an action of use and occupation accordingly. -"^^ It would seem that the partial exclusion of the lessee from possession by one having paramount title might well be assimilated, so far as concerns its effect on his liability for rent, to his partial eviction by such person, so as to call for an apportionment of the rent,^- and there are occasional decisions to that effect.^^ One holding under a previous unexpired lease by the same lessor holds by paramount title, for this purpose,^^ as for others.'^^-^^ It has been asserted in England and Canada,^'^ that possession of part of the leased premises, by a third person holding under an unexpired prior lease 64 N. Y. 518; McGlynn v. Brock, S';5 (semble). Ill Mass. 219. 52. Post, this section, note I>. 49. Brandt v. PhiUppi, 82 Cal. 53. McLoughlin v. Craig, 7 Ir. 640, 23 Pac. 122, 7 L. R. A. 224; C. L. 117; Seabrook v. Moyer, 88 Duncan v. Moloney, 115 111. App. Pa. 417. 522; Andrews v. Woodcock, 14 54. See Neale v. McKenzie, 1 Iowa, 397; Posten v. Jones, 37 Mees. & W. 746; Dengler v. i\. C. (2 Ired, Eq.) 350, 38 Am. Michelssen, 76 Cal. 125, 18 Pac. Dec. 683; Maverick v. Lewis, 3 138; Lawrence v. French, 25 McCord (S. C.) 211; State Uni- Wend. (N. Y.) 443, 7 Hill, 519; versity v. Joslyn, 21 Vt. 52. See Tunis v. Grandy, 22 Gratt. (Va.) entc, § 50. 519. 50. Neale v. McKenzie, 1 Mees. 55-56. Ante, § 58(a), notes 43- & W. 746; Dengler v. Michelssen, 46. 76 Cal. 125, 18 Pac. 138. 57. Neale v. McKenzie, 1 Mees. 51. Lawrence v. French, 25 & W. 747; Ecclesiastical Com'rs Wend. (N. Y.) 443, 7 Hill, 519; of Ireland v. O'Connor, 9 Ir. C. Tunis V. Grandy, 22 Gratt. (Va.) L 242; Holland v. Vanstone, 27 109; Wtitson v. Wand, 8 Exch. U. C. Q. B. 15. 1490 Real Pkopekty. [§ 413 made by the same lessor, will not constitute even a partial defense to an action for rent under the second lease, if this latter is under seal, the theory being that it then cgerates as a lease in possession of that part of the land of which the lessor has possession, and a lease of the reversion (concurrent lease^^) of that part held by the prior lessee. Such a view, that the second lease will, so far as possible be regarded as a concurrent lease, is not suggested in any of the cases decided in this country as to the liability for rent when a part or the whole of the premises is in the possession of a prior lessee.'^ In any case, it would seem, the question whether the second lease may be so regarded for the purpose of imposing liability for rent, would be one of the construction of the language used. Exclusion by stranger without right. There are several cases to the effect that the lessee's inability to obtain possession of the premises owing to the pres- ence of a third person wrongfully in possession, such as a tenant holding over his term, is no defense to an action for rent.*'° This view accords with the recog^ nized rule in the analogous case of the eviction of the tenant by a wrongdoer.^ ^ There are, however, to be found occasional dicta "^^ and decisions ^^ to the con- trary. Merger and surrender. If the leasehold in- terest and the immediate reversion thereon become vested in the same person or persons, either by the acquisition of the former interest by the landlord, or 58. Ante, § 53(c). 52. And see Field v. Herrick, 101 59. Ante, this section, note 54. 111. 110. 60. Mechanics' & Traders' Fire 61. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Insurance Co. v. Schott, 2 Hilt. Ten. p. 1301. (N. Y.) 550; Ward v. Edesheimer, 62. Rieger v. Welles, 110 Mo. 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 138, 17 N. Y. App. 166. 84 S. W. 1136; Smart Supp. 173; Cozens v. Stevenson. v. Allegaert, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 179. 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 421; Univer- 63. Kean v. Kolkschneider. 21 sity of Vermont v. Joslyn, 21 Vt. Mo. App. 538; Hatfield v. Fuller- § 413:] Rent, 1491 by tlie acquisition of the latter interest "by the tenant, or by the simultaneous acquisition of both interests by the same person or persons, the tenant's interest is merged in the reversion,^^ and the rent reserved upon the creation of the lesser estate is extinguished.*''' When merger occurs as a result of the acquisition of the tenant's interest by the landlord, the termination of the tenancy and extinguishment of the rent are or- dinarily said to be the result, not of merger, but of surrender,***' that is, of the yielding up of the particular estate to the landlord.**' If the merger or surrender takes place as to a part of the leased premises only, the rent is proportionately extinguished.^^ The merger or surrender obviously does not atfect the liability for rent which has previously accrued.*''' ton, 24 in. 278; Goldman v. Dieves, 159 Was. 47, 149 N. W. 713. 64. Ante, § 59(e). 65. Otis V. California Petroi- cum & Asphalt Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac. 1087; Otis v. McMillan, 70 Ala. 46; Erving v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 171 Cal. 559, 153 Pac. 945; Liebschutz v. Moore, 70 Ind. 142, 36 Am. Rep. 182; Casey v. Gregory, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 505, 56 Am. Dec. 581; Matter of Eddy, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 396; Nellis v. Lathrop, 22 Wend. (X. Y.) 121, 34 Am. Dec. 285; Mixon v. Coffield, 24 N. Car. (2 Ired Law) 301; Sutliff v. At- wood, 15 Ohio St. 186; Alvord v, Banfield, 85 Ore. 49, 166 Pac. 549. 66. American Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Inv. Co. (C. C. A.), 150 Fed. 17, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 557; Terstegge v. First German Mut. Benevolent Soc, 92 Ind. 82, 47 Am. Rop. 135; Dills v. Stobie, 81 111. 202; Armour Packing Co. v. Des Moines Pork Co., 116 Iowa, 723, 93 Am. St. Rep. 270, 89 N. W. 196; Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351, 19 Am. Rep. 416; Kiernan v. Germain, 61 Miss. 498; Underbill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576; Everett v. Wil- liamson, 107 N. C. 204, 12 S. E. 187, 22 Am. St. Rep. 870; Minne- apolis Co-Operative Co. v. Wil- liamson, 51 Minn. 53, 38 Am. St. Rep. 473, 52 N. W. 98; Frankel V. Steman, 92 Ohio St. 197, 110 N. E. 747; Pratt v. H. M. Richards Jewelry Co., 69 Pa. 53, 8 Am. Rep. 212; West Concord Mill Co. v. Hosmer, 129 Wis. 8, 116 Am. St. Rep. 931, 107 N. W. 12. 67. Post, § 431. 68. Ante, § 412, note 24. 69. Kastner v. Campbell, 6 Ariz. 145, 53 Pac. 586; Sperry v. Miller, 8 N. Y. 336, 16 N. Y. 407; Nicol V. Young, 68 Mo. App. 448; Johnson v. Muzzy, 42 Vt. 708, 1 Am. Rep. 365; Attorney General V. Cox, 3 H. L. Cas. 340. 1492 Real Pkopebty. [§ 413 By the English decisions,^^^ if the reversion on a sublease is merged in the original reversion, the sub- lessee's liability for rent is terminated, the same prin- ciple applying as in the case of surrender of the. sub- reversion. How far this doctrine would be applied in this country is doubtful/'-'^ AbandoP-ment by tenant. Tliat the tenant abandons the premises does not affect his liability for rent,*'^^ unless the landlord, by assuming control of the 69a. Thre'r v. Barton, Moore, 94; Webb v. Russell, 3 Term Rep. 393. 69b. The doctrine was refer- red to as an existing doctrine in Bailey v. Richardson, 66 Cal. 416, 5 Pac. 910; Buttner v. Kasser, 19 Cal. App. 755, 127 Pac. 811; Kri- der V. Ramsay, 79 N. C. 354; Mc- Donald V May, 96 Mo. App. 236, 69 S. W. 1059. See Williams v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 133 Mich. 448, 103 Am. St. Rep. 458, 95 N. W. 708. That the sublessor can- not recover rent after his sur- render of his leasehold interest is decided in Grundin v. Carter, 99 Mass. 15; Pratt v. Richards Jewelry Co., 69 Pa. 53; and as- sumed in Buttner v. Kasser, 19 Cal. App. 755, 127 Pac. 811. But as opposed to the sublessee's im- munity from rent on the theory of the merger of the subreversion, see Hessel v. Johnson, 129 Pa. 173, 5 L.. R A. 851, 15 Am. St. Rep. 716, 18 Atl. 754. See a ju- dicious criticism of the doctrine in an editorial note in 13 Colum- bia Law Rev 245. 69c. Wolffe V. Wolff, 69 Ala. 549, 44 Am. Rep. 526; Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464, 26 Pac. 967, 23 Am. St. Rep. 488; Miller v. Ben- ton, 55 Conn. 540, 13 Atl. 678; Stobie V. Dills, 62 111. 432; Mar- tin V. Stearns, 52 Iowa, 345, 35 Am. Rep. 278, 3 N. W. 92; Bick- ford V. Kirwin, 30 Mont. 1, 75 Pac. 518; Prucha v. Coufal, 91 Neb. 724, 136 N. W. 1019; Under- bill V. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576; Tyler Commercial Col- lege V. Stapleton, 33 Okla. 305, 125 Pac. 443; Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Or. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430; Reeves v. Comesky, 168 Pa. St. 571, 32 Atl. 96; Bar- low V. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88, 53 Am. Dec. 79. In Clinton Amusement etc. Co. V, Dranow, 88 N. J. L. 701, 96 Atl. 893, the highest court of the state says that there was an abandon- ment, not a surrender, by the tenant. This refusal to recognize that a surrender by operation of law may result from an aban- donment is caused apparently by a failure to distinguish the tech- nichal term "surrender," as ap- plied to an estate, from its or- dinary use as applied to a re- linquishment of possession. The common law does not recognize abandonment as a method of transferring or terminating estates in land, and the statement <^ 413] Eent. 1493 premises, or otherwise, can be regarded as in effect accepting the possession at the hands of the tenant, so as to effect a surrender by operation of law, as else- where explained.^^*^ The landlord is, in such case, under no obligation to lease the premises to another, but may allow them to lie vacant, and yet recover the installments of rent as they accrue.*^^^ The fact that the landlord, upon the abandonment by the tenant, makes a lease to another will, under some circumstances and in some jurisdictions, effect a surrender, so as to relieve the tenant from liability for rent thereafter accruing,*^*' ^ but in so far as it does not do this, the new letting is regarded as on behalf of the former tenant, so as to relieve him from the rent under the original lease to the extent of the renf received under the new lease, and no further.«9s Forfeiture of leasehold. Upon the assertion of a forfeiture by the landlord for breach of condition,'" while he is entitled to rent which has already become referred to seems unfortunate Broyles, — Tex. Civ. ^, 141 S. The lower court was, it is sub- W. 283; Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash, mitted, correct in using the ex- 300, 159 Pac. 89. See editorial pression surrender. note 13 Columbia Law Rev. 79. 69d. Post, § 431, note 96 et 69f. Post, § 431, note 8. seq. 69g. Meyer & Co. v Smith, 33 69e. Bradbury V. Higgenson, Ark. 627; Marshall v. Grosse 162 Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797; Board- Clothing Co., 184 111. 421, 75 Am. man Realty Co. v. Carlin, 82 Conn. St. Rep. 181, 56 N. E. 807; Brown 413, 74 Atl. 682; Rau v. Baker, v. Cairns, 107 Iowa, 727, 77 N. W. 118 111. App. 150; Patterson v. 478; Oldewurtel v. Wiesenfeld, 97 Emerich, 21 Ind App. 614, 52 N. Md. 165, 99 Am. St. Rep. 427, 54 E. 1012; Leavitt v. Maykel, 210 Atl. 969; Alsup v Banks, 68 Miss. Mass 55, 96 N. E. 51; Merrill v. 664, L. R. A. 598, 24 Am. St. Rep. Willis. 51 Neb. 162, 70 N. W. 914; 294, 9 So. 895, 13; Conner v. War- Whitcomb v. Brant, 90 N. J. L. ner, 52 Okla. 630, 152 Pac. 1116; 245, 100 Atl. 175; Underbill v. Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Collins, 132 N. Y. 269. 30 x\. E. Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430; 576; Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hahn, 33 Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370, 44 Am. Okla. 516, 126 Pac. 554; Milling v. Rep. 114. Becker, 96 Pa. 182: Goldman v. 70. iiite, §§ 74-89. 1494 Real Peopertt. [§ 413 due,"^^ he cannot recover rent subsequently to become due, or rather, there is no rent subsequently to become dueJ- Though there is no liability for rent falling due after the enforcement of a forfeiture, a provision of the instrument of lease continuing the liability of the lessee in such case is usually regarded as effective. Thus it has been decided that the parties may validly stipulate that, upon the termination of the tenancy by re-entry or equivalent action on the part of the landlord, he may re-let to another at the risk of the tenant, the latter remaining liable for any deficiency in the amount so obtained as compared with that reserved by the original lease. '^•'' And likewise, a provision that the lessee shall remain liable for rent in spite of the forfeiture of his term will enable the landlord to claim from the former tenant any such deficiency in the amount obtained from the new tenant.'^ To obtain the benefit of such a pro- vision, the landlord must exercise reasonable diligence to make a new^ lease at the best possible rent.'^ In the case 71. Hartshorne v. Watson. 4 107 Mich. 389, 65 N. W. 234; Bing. N. Cas. 178; Mackubin v. Sharon v. American Fidelity Co., Whetcroft, 4 Har. & McH. (Md.) 172 Mo. App. 309, 157 S. W. 972; 135; Hinsdale v. White, 6 Hill. Hackett v. Richards, 13 N. Y. (N. Y.) 507; McCready v. Linden- 138. born. 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208; 73. Way v. Reed, 6 Allen Rubicum v. Williams, 1 Ashm. (Mass.) 364; Woodbury v. Spar- (Pa.) 235; Galbraith v. Wood, 124 rell Print, 187 Mass. 426, 73 N. Minn. 210, 144 N .W. 945; Youngs E. 547; Hall v. Gould, 13 N. Y. Mining Co. v. Courtney, 219 Fed. 138; Baldwin v. Thibadeau, 28 868, 135 C. C. A. 538. Abb. N. Cases 14, 17 N. Y. Supp. 72. Oldershaw v. Holt, 12 532; Yuan Suey v. Fleshman, 65 Adol. & E. 590; Watson v. Mer- Ore. 606, 133 Pac. 803. rill, 69 C. C. A. 185, 136 Fed. 359; 74. Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Coburn v. Goodall, 72 Cal. 498, 1 Co., 147 111. 634, 37 Am. St. Rep. Am. St. Rep. 75, 14 Pac. 190; 248, 35 N. E. 820. But in Pusey Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., v. Sipps, 56 Pa. Super. Ct. 121, H7 111. 634, 37 Am. St. Rep. 248, such a provision appears to be 35 N. E. 820; Hall v. Joseph regarded as nugatory. Middleby, Jr., 197 Mass. 485, 83 75. International Trust Co. v. N. E. 1114; Wreford v. Kenrick, Weeks, 203 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. •^ 413:] Eent. 1495 of a stipulation of this character, continuiTig the lessee's liability for the amoniit of the rent reserved in the lease, or for any excess of that amount over that obtainable on a new lease, the continuing liability is not, properly speaking, for rent, since the tenancy to which the rent appertained has ceased to exist. It is merely a contrac- tual liability to the extent named." ^ As to whether, when rent is payable in advance, the landlord is entitled to the full installment of rent in spite of his re entry during the rent period, the cases are not in accord. On principle, he having become entitled to the installment on the rent day, his right thereto w^ould properly seem to be unaffected by his subsequent enforcement of a forfeiture.'^^^ Taking land for public use. Upon the taking of the whole of the leased land for public use under the power of eminent domain, the ownership of the land thereby passing to the state or other public agency, the liability for rent, it is usually agreed, comes to an end."^^ Upon the taking of a part of the premises, ac- 224; Edmands v. Rust & Richard- ham v. Phillips, 1 E. D. Smith son Drug Co., 191 Mass. 123, 77 (N. Y.) 416. See editorial note. N. E. 713; Woodbury v. Sparrell 14 Columbia Law Rev. 354. Con- Print, 198 Mass. 1, 84 N. E. 441. tra, Sutton v. Goodman, 194 76. See Hall v. Gould, 13 N. Y. Mass. 389, 80 N. E. 608; Hall v. 127; Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Middeby, 197 Mass. 485, 83 N. E. Co., 147 111. 634, 37 Am. St. Rep. m^; Wreford v. Kenrick, 107 248, 35 N. E. 820; Woodbury v. Mich. 389, 65 N. W. 234. Sparrell Print, 187 Mass. 426, 73 77. Corrigan v. Chicago, 144 N. E. 547; Stott Realty Co. v. 111. 537, 21 L. R. A. 212, 33, N. E. United Amusement Co., 195 Mich. 746; O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass. 684, 162 N. W. 283. 28, 20 Am. Rep. 299; Lodge v. 76a. That he is entitled to the Martin, 31 App. Div. 13, 52 N. full installment, see Ellis v. Y. Supp. 385; Barclay v. Pickler, Rowbotham (1900), 1 Q. B. 740; 38 Mo. 143; Dyer v. Wightman, Hepp Wall Paper Co. v. Deahl, 66 Pa. 425; McCardell v. Miller, 53 Colo. 274, 125 Pac. 491; Gal- 22 R. I. 96, 46 Atl. 184. Contra, braith v. Wood, 124 Minn. 210, Foote v. City of Cincinnati. 11 144 N. W. 945; Healy v. McManus, Ohio, 408, 38 Am. Dec. 737; Foltz 23 How. Pr. (N. Y.) ; Cunning- v. Huntley, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 210. 1496 Keal Peopeety. [§413 cording to some decisions, the liability for rent contin- ues as before.'^^ But there are other decisions to the effect that in such a case the rent is apportioned, the tenant being thereafter liable only for an amount pro- portioned to the value of the part of the premises not taken. "^^ These latter decisions are, it is conceived en- tirely in harmony with principle, and they unquestion- abl}^ arrive at an equitable result. Under such a view, the tenant is, in the condemnation proceeding, awarded merely the amount, if any, by which the value of his leasehold interest, tliat is, the excess in the rental value over the rent reserved, is diminished owing to the taking. Under the opposite view, the tenant is award- ed the diminution in the rental value caused by the taking, on the theory that lie will ultimately pay it over to the landlord in the form of rent, which, as a matter of fact, he may or may not do. It would seem that when the ownership of either a part or the whole of the leased premises, the "fee" as it is usually referred to, is taken under the power of eminent domain, the liability for rent is proportion- ally reduced or extinguished, for the reason that the leasehold interest in the land taken has come to an end by reason of its merger in the reversion. When the reversion and the leasehold are voluntarily transferred to a single person by their respective owners, a merger results, and the same thing occurs when they are so transferred involuntarily, as by condemnation, the fact that the transferee is the state or some other pub- lic agency being immaterial. On the other hand, in 78. Stubbings v. Village of 597; Board of Levee Commission- Evanston, 136 111. 37, 11 L. R. A. ers v. Johnson, 66 Miss. 248, 6 839, 29 Am. St. Rep. 300, 26 N. So.' 199; Cuthbert v. Kuhn, 3 E. 577; Parks v. City of Boston, Whart. (Pa.) 357, 31 Am. Dec. 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198; Olson Land 513; Uhler v. Cowen, 192 Pa. 443, Co. V. Alki Park Co., 63 Wash. 44 Atl. 42 (semble). See Dyer 521, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 365, 115 v. Wightman, 66 Pa. 427; City of Pac. 1083. Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 79. Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 621, 61 Atl. 203. § 413] Bent. 1497 the case of the taking of, not the ownership or "fee," bnt merely an easement in the leased premises, the question of the continuing liability for rent may be most satisfactorily solved upon the theory that the dispossession of the tenant by the public agency, for the purpose of enjoying the easement, after the latter 's acquisition thereof, constitutes an evic- tion under paramount title. ^^ Such dispossession is not, indeed, under a paramount title if by paramount title we mean only a legal title outstanding at the time of the lease, but there is no reason for so confining its meaning. An eviction by one claiming by force of the foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the lease is no doubt an eviction under paramount title, regardless of "whether the mortgagee had the legal title, and so an eviction by one claiming by force of the assertion of the paramount power of the state may well be re- garded as an eviction under paramount title, or at least so analogous thereto as to be governed by the same principles. Destruction of buildings. The well established rule of the common law is that the liability of the tenant for the rent called for by the lease is in no way affected by the fact that buildings or improvements on the land leased are wholly or partially destroyed by some unforeseen casualty, however much this may decrease the utility of the premises to the tenant. This rule finds its most frequent application in the case of a total or partial destruction by fire of buildings on the leased premises, ^^ but it has also been applied when buildings 80. See Emmes v. Feeley, 132 81. Baker v. Holtzapffel, 4 Mass. 346; Devine v. Lord, 175 Taunt. 45; Cowell v. Lumley, 39 Mass. 384, 78 Am. St. Rep. 502, Cal. 151, 2 Am. Rep. 430; Buck- 56 N. E. 570; Rhode Island Hos- horn Plaster Co. v. Consolidated pital Trust Co. v. Hayden, 20 R. Plaster Co., 47 Colo. 516, 108 Pac. I. 544, 42 L. R. A. 107, 40 Atl. 27; Hunniston, Keeling & Co. v. 421. Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 67 Am. St. 1498 Real Pbopekty. [§ 413 or other improvements on the premises were destroyed by a flood,^^ a tempest,^^ a hostile army,^^ or a mob.^^ Occasionally the common law rule has been disapproved, as bearing with undue hardship on the tenant.^*' In case of the destruction, even though total, of the bruildings on the leased land, there is not a total destruction of the subject matter of the lease, and there remains something out of which, in theory, the rent can issue, however small may be the value of the land as compared with the buildings destroyed. In the case, on the other hand, of the lease of a building alone, without the land,^" or of merely certain rooms in or parts of a building,^^ if the building, or the part thereof which is the subject of the lease, is destroyed, it 'has Rep. 232, 51 N. E. 893; Fowler V. Mott, 6 Mass. 63; Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 73 N. E. 523; Bowen v. Clemens, 161 Mich. 493, 137 Am. St. Rep. 521, 126 N. W. 639: Lincoln Trust Co. V. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S. W. 1007; Fowler v. Payne, 49 Miss. "2; Felix v. Griffiths, 56 Ohio St. 39, 45 N. E. 1092; Harrington v. Watson, 11 Ore. 143, 50 Am. Rep. 465, 3 Pac. 173; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Heikens, 112 Tenn. 378, 65 L. R. A. 298, 79 S. W. 1038; Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 52 W. Va. 476, 61 L. R. A. 957, 44 S. E. 149. 82. Smith v. Ankrim, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 39. 83. Peterson v. Edmonson, 5 Har. (Del.) 378. 84. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26; Robinson v. L'Engle, 13 Fla. 482; Pollard v. Shaffer, 1 Ball. (Pa.) 210. 85. Wagner v. White, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 564. 86. See Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 37 Am. Rep. 277; Wattles v'. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 36 L. R. A. 424, 61 Am. St. Rep 554, 69 N. W. 785; Coogan v. Parker, 2 S. C. 255, 16 Am. Rep. 659. The question of the equity of the rule is discussed in 1 Tiffany, Land- lord & Ten., § 182 m (1). 87. Ainsworth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89, 99 Am. Dec. 352; Schmidt v. Pettit, 8 Dist. Col. (1 Mc Arth) 179. 88. McMillan v Solomon, 42 Ala. 356, 94 Am. Dec. 654; Wo- mack V. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103, 92 Am. Dec. 306; Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 448, 45 Am. Dec. 222; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498; Moving Picture Co. v. Scottish etc. Ins. Co , 244 Pa. 358, 90 Atl. 642; Paxson & Comfort Co. v Potter, 30 Pa. Super Ct. 615; Porter v. Tull. 6 Wash. 408, 22 L. R. A. 613, 36 Am. St. Rep. 172, 33 Pac. 965. § 413] Eent. 1490 been nsiially held in this country that nothing- remains from which the rent can issue, and that consequently the liability therefor immediately ceases. In England the same rule applies when the lease is of an apartment in a building as when it is of the land itself,^^ and the explanation would seem to be that there the lease of an apartment is construed as including an interest in the soil, from which the rent may be regarded as issuing even after the destruction of the apartment. The operation of the rule that the liability for rent continues in spite of the partial or total destruction of the buildings on the leased premises may be, and frequently is, excluded by an express provision to the contrary in the instrument of lease. Provisions of this character have quite frequently been the subject of judicial construction.^'^ In a number of jurisdictions statutes have been adopted which have the effect of partly or wholly re- lieving the tenant from rent in case of the destruction of the buildings, or any part thereof, during the term. For instance the Xew York statute'*^ provides that "where any building which is leased or occupied is destroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause, as to be untenantable and unfit for occupancy, and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises; and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner rent for the time subsequent to the sur- render." These statutes have frequently been before the courts for construction.^^ 89. Izon V. Gorton, 5 Bing N. changing the language of the Cas. 501; MarshaU v. Schofield, original act of 1860. 52 L. J. Q. B 58. See Selby v. 92. See cases cited 1 Tiffany, Greaves, U R. 3 C. P. 954. Landlord & Tenant, § 182 m (8), 90. See 1 Tiffany. Landlord & and Harvey v. Weisbaum, 159 Cal. Tenant, § 182 ni (6). 265, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540, Ann.. 91. Real Property Law, § 197, Cas. 1912B, 1115, 113 Pac. 656; 1500 Real Property. [§ 413 Eviction by landlord. An eviction of the ten- ant by the landlord, tlie nature of wliicli is elsewhere discussed,^^ has the effect of suspending the tenant's liability for rent thereafter to become due,^^ even though the eviction is as to merely a part of the premises, the tenant retaining possession of the bal- ance.*^^ Though the courts frequently refer to an eviction by the landlord as absolutely terminating the liability for rent, this is not quite correct. It merely suspends the liability for such time as the tenant re- mains out of possession of the whole or a part of the premises as a result of the eviction.^*' The tenant is free from liability for the rent becoming due between Spear v. Baker, 117 Md. 570, 84 Atl. 62; Fink v. Weinholzer, 109 Minn. 381, 123 N. W. 931; Lin- 'deke v. McArthur's Inc., 125 Minn. 1, Ann. Cas 1915C, 600, 145 N. W 399; Carley v. Liberty Hat Mfg. Co., 81 N. J. L. 502, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545. 79 Atl. 447; Sayre v. Roseville Motor Co., 85 N. J. L. 10, 91 Atl. 596; Colonial Land Co v. Asmus, 82 N. J. L. 521, 81 Atl. 827; Acme Ground Rent Co. v. Werner, 151 Wis. 417, 139 N. W. 314. 93. A life, § 58(b). • 94. Upton V. Townend, 17 C. B. 30; Engstrom v. Tyler, 46 Kan. 317, 26 Pac. 735; Royce v. Gug- genheim, 106 Mass. 201, 8 Am. Rep. 322; Osmers v. Furey, 32 Mont. 581, 81 Pac. 345; Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 339; Poston V. Jones, 37 N. C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 350, 38 Am. Dec. 683; Wolf v. Eppenstein, 71 Ore. 1, 140 Pac. 751. 95. Co. Litt. 148b; Gilbert, Rents, 173; Skaggs v. Emerson, 50 Cal. 3; Frepons v. Grostein, 12 Idaho, 671, 87 Pac. 1004; Smith V. Wise, 58 111. 141; Smith v. McEnany,. 170 Mass. 26, 64 Am. St. R3p. 272, 48 N. E. 781; Kus- chinsky v. Flanigan, 170 Mich. 245, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 430, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1228, 136 N. W. 362; Christopher v. Austin, 11 N. Y. 216; Galleher v. O'Grady, — N. H. — , 100 Atl. 549; Morris v. Kettle, 57 N. J. L. 218, 30 Atl. 879; Linton v. Hart, 25 Pa. 193, 64 Am. Dec. 691; Edmison v. Lowry, 3 S. D. 77, 17 L. R. A. 275, 44 Am. St. Rep. 774, 52 N. W. 583; Briggs v. Hall, 4 Leigh (Va.) 484, 26 Am. Dec. 326.. New York Dry Goods Store v. Pabst Brewing Co., 50 C. C. A. 295, 112 Fed. 381; Contra in Alabama, Warren V. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188, 51 Am. Rep. 446; Anderson v. Winton, 136 Ala. 422, 34 So. 962. 96. Co. Litt. 319a; Maekubin v. Whetcraft, 4 Har. & McH. (Md.) 135; Smith v. McEnany, 170 Mass. 26, 64 Am. St. Rep. 272, 48 N. E. 781; Day v. Watson, 8 Mich. 535; Tiley v. Moyers, 43 Pa. 404. § 41:^:] Eent. 1501 the time of the eviction of the tenant and his restoration to possession, even though the landlord does not him- self retain the possession.^" As to the effect of an eviction during a rent period, when the rent is payable in advance for that period, the cases are not agreed, some being to the effect that the tenant is,^^ and others to the effect that he is not,^^ relieved in such case. It is somewhat difficult to comprehend how, after the tenant has, by the terms of the lease, become absolutely liable for an instalment of rent, he can be relieved from such liability by a subsequent occurrence. The fact of such advance pay- ment could, however, it seems, be considered in as- sessing damages on account of the eviction, whether the claim for damages is asserted by way of set otf or in a separate action.^ A mere trespass or entry by the landlord, not amounting to an eviction,- does not affect the liability for rent.'^ Eviction under paramount title. The liability for the rent comes to an end upon the eviction of the tenant from the entire premises by one having para- mount title.* Even though this eviction is merely con- 97. Cibel v. Hill, 1 Leon. 110; 2. Ante, § 58(b). Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 3. Roper v. Lloyd, T. Jones 339. 148; Hunt v. Cape, 1 Cowp. 242; 98. The Richmond v. Cake, 1 Lawrence v. French, 25 Wend. App. Dist. Col. 447: Hall v. Joseph (N. Y.) 443; Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Middleby, 197 Mass. 485, 83 N. E. Rawle (Pa ) 339. 1114; Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 4. Cuthbertson v. Irving, 4 109, 24 Am. Rep. 117 (semhle). Hurlst. & X. 742; Wheelock v. See Hyman v. Jockey Club etc. Warschauer, 34 Cal. 265; Stub- Co., 9 Colo. App. 299, 48 Pac. 671. bings v. Evanstown, 136 111. 37, 11 99. Ryerse v. Lyons, 22 Up. L R. A. 839, 26 N. E. 577; George Can. Q. B. 12; Giles v. Comstock, v. Putney, 58 Mass. (4 Cash.) 351, 4 N. Y. 270, 53 Am. Dec. 374; 50 Am. Dec. 788; Home Life Ins. Hunter v. Reiley, 43 N. J. L. 480; Co. v. Sherman, 46 N. Y. 370; Gugel V. Isaacs, 21 N. Y. App. Friend v. Oil Well Supply Co., 165 Div. 503, 48 N. Y. Supp. 594. Pa. 652, 30 Atl. 1134; Maxwell v. 1. Schienle v. Eckels, 227 Pa. Urban, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 55 305, 76 Atl. 15. S. W 1124. 2 R. P.~2U 1502 Eeal Property. [^ 413 structive,^ and tlie tenant assumes, by attornment or otherwise, the relation of tenant to the paramount owner and as such becomes liable for rent, this liability is under a different demise, and the rent is a different rent, even though similar in amount. An eviction under paramount title, like an eviction by the landlord, does not affect the tenant's liability for rent w^hich became due before the eviction oc- curred, since this rent was fully earned.*^""^ This would seem properly to be the case even though the rent is payable in advance, and the eviction occurs before the end of the period for which it is payable.^ If the eviction under paramount title is partial merely, that is, from a part only of the leased premises, the rent is apportioned and the tenant is relieved from liability only for an amount proportioned to the value of that part,^ the rule being different in this regard when the partial eviction is under paramount title from that which controls when it is by the landlord. Untenantable condition of premises. Since, as before stated, the landlord is under no obligation to the tenant as regards the condition of the premises, and their fitness for the latter 's use and occupation, either at the time of the lease or subsequently thereto,^" it would seem that the tenant should not be relieved 5. Ante, § 58(a). v. Coats, 77 Miss. 846, 50 L. R. 6-7. 2 Rolle, Abr., Rent (0.); A. Ill, 78 Am. St. Rep. 546, 28 Grobham v. Thornborough, Hob. So. 728; Christopher v. Austin. 82; Pepper v. Rowley, 73 111. 262; 11 n. Y. 216; Fifth Avenue Build- Fitchburg Cotton Manufactory ing Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. Corp. V. Melven, 15 Mass. 268; 370, 117 N. E. 579; Poston v, Giles V. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270, 53 Jones, 37 S. C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 350, Am. Dec. 374. 38 Am. Dec. 683; Tunis v. 8. Giles V. Comstock, 4 N. Y. Grandy, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 109: 270, 53 Am. Dec. 374. But see Mayor of Swansea v. Thomas, 10 ante, this section, note 98. Q. B. Div. 48. But see Wilson 9. Halligan v. Wade, 21 111. v. Sale, 41 Pa. Super. 566. 470, 74 Am. Dec. 108; Fillebrown 10. Ante, § 51. V. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580; Cheairs § 413:] Rent. 1503 from liabilit}' for rent in the absence of an express stipulation or a statutory provision in that regard, bj' reason of defects in the premises. And that this is so is attested by the numerous decisions at common law to the effect that even the destruction of the buildings on the leased premises will not have that etfect.^^ In New York, however, the tenant has been regarded as relieved from liability by reason of the "untenantable" condition of the premises, the statute before referred to, providing that the tenant shall be relieved from rent if the building is destroyed or so injured by the elements as to be untenantable and unfit for occupancy, being apparently extended to cases in which the building becomes untenantable without being destroy- ed or injured.^2 In Michigan the tenant has been relieved from liability for rent on account of an untenantable condition existing at the time of his entry under the lease, apparently without reference to any statutes. ^^ Occasionally, particularly in New York, the existence of an untenantable condition, which the landlord might have removed by making repairs on the premises, but which he fails to remove, has been referred to as relieving the tenant from liability for rent, on the theory that it constitutes an eviction by him,^"* and there is a distinct tendency on the part of the courts, because eviction, by the conmion law precedents, re- lieves the tenant from rent, to apply the term to any condition which is regarded as sufficient to relieve the 11. Ante, this section, notes 81- 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten., § 85. 182n(2). 12. Meserole v. Hoyt, 161 N. 13. Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 Y. 59, 55 N. E. 274; Vann v. Mich. 577, 41 N. W. 695; Petz v. Rouse, 94 N. Y. 401. So in Voight Brewery Co., 116 Mich. Minnesota under a substantially "^18, 72 Am. St. Rep. 531, 74 N. similar statute. Bass v. Rollins, 63 W. 651. Minn. 226, 65 N. W. 348; Dam- 14. Tallman v. Murphy, 120 N. kroger v. Pearson, 74 Minn. 77, 76 Y. 345, 24 N. E. 716; Sully v. N. W. 960; Kafka V. Davidson, 135 Schmitt, 147 N. Y. 248, 49 Am. St. Minn. 389, 160 N. W. 1021. See Rep. 659, 41 N. E. 514. 1504 Real Peoperty. [<§ 413 tenant in this respect. ^'^'^ So an eviction has been said to occur in the case of the landlord's failure to furnish heat to the apartment leased, not only when the lease contained a stipulation requiring the lessor to furnish heat/*'' but also even in the absence of such stipulation, when the landlord's control of the heating apparatus and the custom of the community led the tenant to anticipate that heat would be furnished.^"*^ The ap- plication of the term, however, to the case of such a mere omission on the part of the landlord is, it is conceived, to be deprecated. Even conceding the de- sirability of relieving the tenant from liability for rent whenever the premises become untenantable, it is undesirable to confuse the law of eviction for the sake of a merelj^ nominal compliance with the prece- dents of the common law.^^'' Breach of covenant. The question whether the breach of a particular covenant or stipulation by the landlord is a defense to the claim for rent, is properly a question merely whether the stipulation for the pay- ment of rent and that by the landlord are in the particu- lar case to be construed as dependent or independent. The question has more frequently arisen in connection 14a. So, in a recent case it Iowa, 742, 100 N. W. 851; Har- was held that a refusal to al- mony Co. v. Ranch. 64 111. App. low the tenant to obtain water, 386; McSorley v. Allen, 36 Pa. in an emergency, from a neigh- Super. Ct. 271; Buchanan v. boring building, constitUjted an Orange, 118 Va. 511, 88 S. E. 52. eviction relieving him from rent. 14c. Tallman v. Murphy, 120 Boston Veterinary Hospital v. N. Y. 345, 24 N. E. 716; Jackson Kiley, 219 Mass. 533, 107 N. E. v. Paterno, 58 Misc. 201, 108 N. 426. Y. Supp. 1073, 128 N. Y. App. 14b. Bass V. Rollins, 63 Minn. Div. 474, 112 N. Y. Supp. 924; 226, 65 N. W. 348; Minneapolis Pakas v. Rawle, 152 N. Y. Supp. Co-operative Co. v. Williamson, 965; O'Hanlon v. Grubb, 38 App. 51 Minn. 53, 38 Am. St. Rep. 473, D. C. 1213, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 52 N. W. 986; Riley v. Pettis 1213. Compare Martens v. Sloane. County, 96 Mo. 318, 9 S. W. 906; 132 N. Y. App. Div. 114, 116 N. Y. Lawrence v. Burrell, 17 Abb. N. Supp. 512. Cas. 312; Filkins v. Steele, 124 14d. Ante, § 58(b). § 41^] Eent. 1505 with a stipulation for the making of repairs or improve- ments by the landlord, and in the majority of cases the stipulations have been regarded as independent.^^ But there are a number of decisions in which, without any discussion of the matter on principle, the land- lord's failure to comply with a stipulation for the making of repairs or improvements during the tenancy has been assumed to justify the tenant in abandoning the premises and refusing to pay rent.^'^' Likewise it Jias occasionally been decided that the landlord's failure to comply with his contract to furnish heat or power excuses the tenant from paying rent.'" Illegality of business. If a lease is knowingly made for the purpose of carrying on an illegal busi- ness on the premises, such as prostitution, gambling. 15. Surplice v. Farnsworth, 7 Man. & G. 576; Central Appa- lachian Co. V. Buchanan, 73 Fed. 1006; Young v. Berman, 96 Ark. 78, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977, 131 S. W. 62; Lewis & Co. v. Chis- holm, 68 Ga. 40; Arnold v. Krig- baum, 169 Cal. 143, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 370, 146 Pac. 423; Rubens V. Hill, 213 111. 523, 72 N. E. 1127; Long V. Gieret, 57 Minn. 278, 59 N. W. 194; Warren v. Hodges, 137 Minn. 389, 163 N. W. 739; Meredith Mechanic Ass'n v. American Twist Drill Co., 67 N. H. 450, 39 Ati. 330; Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N. J. L. 648, L. R. A. 1915C, 649, 92 Atl. 392; Watters V. Smaw, 32 N. C. (10 Ind. Law) 292; Partridge v. Dykins, 28 Okla. 54, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 984, 113 Pac. 928; Prescott v. Otter- statter, 85 Pa. 534; Smith v. Wiley, 60 Tenn. (1 Baxt.) 418; Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 52 W. Va. 470, 61 L. R. A. 9r>7, 44 S. E. 149. In Wise v. Sparks, — Ala. — , 73 So. 394, whether a contract to pay rent and one to make re- pairs were dependent was re- garded as a question for the jury. 16. Bissell V. Lloyd, 100 111. 214; Marks v. Chapman, 135 Iowa, 320, 112 N. W. 817; Hart- hill V. Cooke's Ex'r, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1524, 43 S. W. 705; Pierce V. Joldersma, 91 Mich. 463, 51 N. W. 1116; Nelson v. Eichoff, — Okla. — , 158 Pac. 370 (semble) ; Auer V. Vahl, 129 Wis. 635, 109 N. W. 529. See Taylor v. Finne- gan ,189 Mass. 568, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973, 76 N. E. 203; Tif- fany, Landlord & Ten. § 182r. 17. Bass V. Rollins, 63 Minn. 226, 65 N. W. 348; Filkins v. Steele, 124 Iowa, 742, 100 N. W. 851; Rogers v. Babcock, 139 Mich. 94, 102 N. W. 636; Har- mony Co. V. Raucli, 04 111. App. 1506 Keal Property. [§ 4i; or the sale of liquor in violation of law, there can be no recovery of rent.^'*^ Not infrequently, in recent years, a question has arisen as to the effect, upon the liability for rent, of the fact that the lease was made to enable the lessee to use the property for the sale of intoxicating liquors, and such use became invalid, after the making of the lease, by reason of the adoption of a pro- hibitory law. The cases are ordinarily to the effect that legislation of the character referred to did not terminate the tenancy or relieve from liability for the full amount of the stipulated rent,^'^'* the decision in a number of these cases being based on the theory that there w^as in the instrument of lease no reference to the liquor business which called for construction as excluding the sale on the premises of articles other than liquors, and that consequently the lessee could still utilize the premises. ^'*^ In a few cases a contrary 386; McSorley v. Allen, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 271. See ante, this section, note 14a. 17a. Mitchell v. Campbell, 111 Miss. 806, 72 So. 231; Sherman V. Wilder, 106 Mass. 537; Berni V. Boyer, 90 Minn. 469, 97 N. W. 121. And cases cited, 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. § 40; editorial note 26 Harv. Law Rev. 181. 17b. Lawrence v. White, 131 G-a. 840, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966, 6:j S. E. 631; Goodrum Tobacco Co. V. Potts-Thompsou Liquor Co., 133 Ga. 776, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 498, 66 S. E. 1081; Barghman v. Port- man, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 342, 14 8. W. 342; Kerley v. Mayer, 10 Misc Rep. 718, 31 N. Y. Supp. 818, judgment aff'd., 155 N. Y. 636, 49 N. E. 1099; Houston Ice & Brew- ing Co. V. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79, 88 S. W. 197; Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., 19 Wyo. 18, 113 Pae. 788, 117 Pac. 132, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 773, A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1913E, 258. See the excellent note on the sub- ject, by Professor R. W. Aigler, in 16 Mich. Law Rev. 534. 17c. O 'Byrne v. Henley, 161 Ala. 620, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496, 50 So. 83; Harper v. Young, 123 Ark. 162, 184 S. W. 447; Shreve- port Ice & Brew. Co. v. Mandel, 128 La. 314, 54 -So. 831 ; San Anto- nio Co. V. Brents, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 443, 88 S. W. 368; Warm Springs Co. v. Salt Lake City, — Utah, — , 165 Pac. 788; Hayton v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 66 Wash. 248, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 432, 119 Pac. 739. So the premises being still available for other purposes, the fact that an ordinance rendered them practically unavailable for the purpose of a garage, for which the lease was taken, was regarded § 414] Rent. 1507 view, that the change in the law relieved the lessee from liability for rent, was asserted, ^"*^ this view being? sometimes based, however, on the fact that by the terms of the lease the tenant was precluded from mak- ing any use of the premises except for the sale of intoxicants. ^'^^ In so far as these latter cases assume that a statement in the lease that the premises are to be used for a particular purjiose precludes their use for another purpose, they in effect regard such a statement, presumably, as a covenant or condition against such user, since otherwise the statement as to user would seem to be inoperative. The inability to obtain or renew a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors has been regarded as no defense to the claim for rent, although the lease was taken for the purpose of conducting that particular business on the premises. ^''^ § 414. Actions for rent. When the person to whom rent was payable had a freehold interest in the rent, as no defense to the claim for " fibn theatre" supplies, a change rent. Barnett v. Clark, 225 Mass. in the law prohibiting such busi- 185, 114 N. E. 317. ness relieved from liability for 17(1. Heart v. East Tennessee rent. Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 19 L. 17c. Greil Bros. v. Mabson, 179 R. A. (N. S.) 964, 130 Am. St. Ala. 444, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 664, Rep. 7.5.3, 113 S. W. 364; The 60, So. 876; Kahn v. Wilhelm. US Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing Ark. 239, 177 S. W'. 403; Briins- & Malting Co., 94 Wash. 125, L. wick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle. R. A. 1917C, 431, 162 Pac. 31; Brewing & Malting Co., 98 Wash. In Koen v. Fairmont Brewing Co., 12, 167 Pac. 58. 69 W. Va. 94, 70 .9. E. 1098, it 17f. Standard Brewing Co. v. was decided, that even if the adop- Weil, 129 Md. 487, 99 Atl. 661; tion of prohibition was otherwise Gaston v. Gordon, 208 Mass. 265, g^c^lnd for relief from rent, it was 94 N. E. 307; Teller v. Boyle, 132 not ground therefor if the tenant Pa. 56, 18 Atl. 1069; Miller v. Mc- continued in possession. Guire, 18 R. I. 770, 30 Atl. 966; In McCullongh Realty Co. v. Burgett v. Loeb, 43 Ind App. 657, Laemmle Film Service, — Iowa, 88 N. E. 346. — , 165 N. W. 33, it was held that A like view was adopted when when there was a lease for the pur- the city was made "dry" by an poKfi of carrying on a business in election held after the making of 150S Eeal Propebty. [^ 414 the nonpayment thereof on demand was considered, at common law, a disseisin of the rent, and conse- quently the real action of novel disseisin was the proper form of proceeding by which to recover itJ^ By statute, however, an exception to this rule was made in favor of the executors and administrators of tenants in fee of rents, who were authorized to sue in debt for arrears of rent due to their decedents. ^^ Since the abolition of real actions, it has, in Eng- land, been decided that an action of debt,^^ or its equivalent, will lie in favor of the owmer of a rent charge in fee, on the theory that such an action did not lie at common law owing merely to the fact that the higher remedy by real action existed during the continuance of the freehold.-^ the lease, the local option law un- der which the election was held be- ing in fca-ce at the time of its making. Houston Ice & Brewing Co. V. Keenan; 99 Tex. 79, 88 S. W. 197. 18. Litt. §§ 233-240. 19. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 37 (A. D. 1540); Co. Litt. 162a; Harrison, Chief Eents, 180. A tenant of land in fee simple Avho has leased for years has been held not to be a tenant in fee of the rent reserved on the lease for years, so that the stat- ute will authorize an action of debt for the rent by his execu- tors. Prescott V. Boucher, 3 Barn. & Adol. 849. 20. Though the distinct forms of action known as " debt, ' ' "covenant," and "assumpsit" no longer exist in many states, they represent, as connected with the recovery of rent, distinctions of a substantive character in regard to the right and basis of recovery, and consequently, even in ' ' code ' ' states, a knowledge of the particu- lar circumstances appropriate to the bringing of one rather than the other of these actions is most de- sirable. 21. Thomas v. Sylvester, L. K. 8 Q. B. 368, 2 Gray's Cas. 704; Christie v. Barker, 53 Law J. Q. B. 537; Searle v. Cooke, 43 Ch. Div. 519. See In re Herbage Kents [1896] 2 Ch. 811. The cor- rectness of these decisions has, however, been questioned, on the ground that the duty of paying rent was, at common law, imposed on the land alone, — a ' ' real obliga- tion," — and hence the mere aboli- tion of real actions could not make it a personal obligation. See the learned review of the subject by T. Cyprian Williams, Esq., 13 Law Quart. Rev. 288, and the references therem to Ognel's Case, 4 Coke, 48b. § 414] Rent. 1509 In the case of a rent for life, whether rent reserved on a lease for life. or a rent charge granted for life, the tenant of the land was regarded as personally liable for the rent, and, while this personal liability could not be enforced during the existence of the life interest in the rent, because temporarily superseded by the existence of the ''real" obligation on the part of the land, upon the termination of such real obligation hy the termination of the life interest, the tenant's per- sonal obligation became enforceable by the owner of the rent, or his personal representatives.^^ The right of one leasing for years to sue for arrears of rent reserved in an action of debt was recognized at an early date in the history of that action,-^ and that the action is available for this pur- pose has never been questioned.-^ The action w^ll also lie for rent reserved upon a tenancy at wilL"^ Since the common-law action of debt is not founded upon a contract, but is rather a remedy for the re- covery of a specific sum in the possession of the defendant belonging to the plaintitf,-*^ the tenant, in order to be liable therein, need not have contracted to pay the rent, but he is made liable as having taken 22. Ognel's Case, 4 Coke, 49a. 23. 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Gilbert, Eents, 98; Co. Litt. 162a, Eng. Law, 209. Hargrave's note; 13 Law Quart. 24. Litt. §§ 58, 72; Co. Litt. Re^- 291. 47b; Gilbert, Eents, 93; Trapnall By statute (8 Anne, c. 14, y. Merrick, 21 Ark. 503; Rowland § 4, A. D. 1709), the right y. Coffin, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 52; was given to bring an action of j^^ 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 125; Out- debt for the recovery of rent serv- ^^^^ ^ jy^y^^^ ^o ^d. 536, 20 Atl ice reserved upon a lease for life, j.^. ^^^^^^^ ^, Whitney, 3 even during the lease, but it an- -r, . .^„ ,r ,, ,. , . u xu 1 Demo, 452; McEwen v. Joy, 7 plied in no ease where the rela- "^ .• ^* i„ 11 1 1 i. 4. T 1 Rich. Law (S. Car.) 33; Elder v. tion of landlord and tenant did v ^ > not exist. Webb v. Jiggs, 4 H^'^''^' ^^ ^enn. (2 Sneed) 81. Maule & S. 113. There are similar ^5. Litt. § 72. statutes in several states. See 1 26. Ames, Lectures o-n Legal Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. p. 1819, History, 88. note 7. 1510 Real Property. [§ 414 the profits due by the land, and, consequently, mere privity of estate, as distinct from privity of contract, is sufficient to sustain the action. Accordingly, a transferee of the land, or of the particular estate therein which owes the rent, is liable in debt to the person entitled to the rent;-'^ and a transferee of the reversion may recover therein against the lessee or an assignee of the lessee,^^ as may a transferee of the rent without the reversion.-'' Debt will, moreover, lie against the original lessee, although the latter has assigned his lease, since the lessee cannot substitute another in his place without the landlord's assent. If, however, the landlord accept the lessee's assignee as tenant, he cannot thereafter bring debt against the original lessee.^'' If the lessee's interest in a part of the premises is assigned to another person, or in different parts to different persons, each of such assignees is liable in debt, by reason of privity of estate, for a proportional part of the rent.^^ The assignee of the reversion cannot bring debt against the original lessee after the latter 's assignment of the term, since there is, in such case, neither privity of contract nor of estate."^ 27. Walker's Case, 3 Coke, 22a; rest v. Willard, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 237, 206; Kendall v. Garland, 5 Cush. note (1) ; Howland v. Coffin, 9 (Mass.) 74. Pick. (Mass.) 52, 12 Pick. 125, 30. Walker's Case, 3 Coke, 22a; McKeon v. Whitney, 3 Denio (N. Marsh v. Brace, Cro. Jac. 334; Y.) 452. Mills V. Auriol, 1 H. Bl. 433, 440; 28. Walker's Case, 3 Coke, 22a; Wadham v. Marlowe, 8 East, 314, Thnrsby v. Plant, 1 Saimd. 237, 1 note. Lev. 259; Howland v. Coffin, 12 31. Gamon v. Vernon, 2 Lev. Pick. (Maps.) 125; Patten v. 231; Curtis v. Spitty, 1 Bing. N. Deshon, 1 Gray (Mass.) 325; Out- C 760; Harris v. Frank, 52 Miss, toun V. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 Atl. 155; St. Louis Public Schools v. 134. . Boatmen's Ins. & Trust Co., 5 Mo. 29. Williams v. Hayward, 1 El. App. 91. Compare Daraainville v. & El. 1040; Allen v. Bryan, 5 Mann, 32 N. Y. 197. Barn. & C. 512; Eyerson v. Quack- 32. Humble v. Glover, Cro. Eliz. enbush, 26 N. J. Law, 236; Dema- 328; Walker's Case, 3 Coke. 22a. § 414] Kent. 1511. An action of debt, if brought by or against one not a party to the original lease, as in the case of an action by the assignee of the lessor or against the assignee of the lessee, being based on privity of estate, has always been regarded as a ''local" action, which must be brought in the county where the land lies;^' while, if brought against the original lessee by the lessor, being based on contract, it is "transitory," and may be brought where the lessee may be found, or where the contract was made.^* Action of covenaiit. On the lessee's covenant to pay the rent, usually contained in the instrument of lease, an action of covenant may be brought at common law,^^ and, in jurisdictions where such form of action is abolished, an equivalent action to enforce the tenant's liability on his covenant will lie. To support the common law action of covenant there must be a technical covenant by the lessee, that is, the instrument must be sealed by him^^ since the proper action on a written agreement to pay rent, not under seal, is assumpsit. An action by the lessor against the lessee on the covenant to pay rent has been regarded as transitory, as being based purely on contract,^" and the weight 33. Bord v. Cudmore, Cio. Car. Wall. (U. S.) 479, 20 L. Ed. 721; 183; Pine v, Leicester, Hob. 37; Greenleaf v. Allen, 127 Mass. 248; Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 East, 575; Union Pac. Ey. Co. v. Chicago, R. Whitaker v. Forbes, L. E. 10 C. L & P. Ey. Co., 164 111. 88. Eus- P. 583; Bracket v. Alvord, 5 Cow. sell v. Fabyan, 28 N. H. 543, 61 (N. Y.) 18. Am. Dee. 629; Taylor v. I>e Bus, 34. Wey v. Tally, 6 Mod. 194; 31 Ohio St. 468. Thursby v. Plant, 1 Wms. Saund. 36. Johnson v. Muzzy, 45 Vt. (Ed. 1871) 306-308; Bracket v. Al- 419, 12 Am. Rep. 214; Him dale vord, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 18; Hen- v. Humphrey, 15 Conn. 433; wood V. Cheeseman, 3 Serg. & E. Trustees of Hocking County v. (Pa.) 502; Chitty, Pleading (7th Spencer, 7 Ohio (2nd pt.) 143. K<1.) 282. 37. Bulwcr's Case, 7 Coke, 3a; 35. Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. Wey v. Yally, 6 Mod. 194; 1 237, 1 Lev. 259, 2 Gray's Cas. Chitty, Pleading (7th Ed.) 283. 671; Cross v. United Sitates, 14 1512 Real Pkopeety. [§ 414 of authority is to the same effect as regards an action by the transferee of the reversion against the original lessee, on the theory that the privity of contract is transferred by the Statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34.2« On the other hand, an action, whether by the original lessor or his transferee, against the assignee of the lessee, has been regarded as local, as being based on privity of estate.^^ Assumpsit. An action of special assumpsit may be maintained upon the lessee's express promise to pay a certain sum as rent, provided such promise is not under seal.^° Under the code procedure. In a large number of jurisdictions, the common law forms of action having been abolished, the statements made above as to the appropriate forms of action for the recover}- of rent, and their distinguishing characteristics in this regard, have no longer any practical application, though an understanding thereof is desirable for a full compre- hension of the common law view of rent. Likewise, in most states, the common law distinctions, above re- ferred to, betw-een local and transitory actions, have been superseded by statutes directing where suit shall be brought, as, for instance, by provisions that suit 38. Thiirsby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 40. .See eases cited in article hy 237 1 Lev. 259, and notes in 1 Prof. J. B. Ames, on Assumpsit Wms. Saund. (Ed. 1871) 278, 307; for Use and Occupation, in 2 1 Cliitty, Pleading (7tli Ed.) 283. Harv. Law Rev. at pp. 378, 379. 39. Barker v. Darner, Garth. 182 ; Lectures on Legal History, pp. Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 East, 575, 168, 169. And see, also, Hins- 2 Gray's Case. 679; Thursby v. dale v. Humphrey, 35 Conn. 443; Plant, 1 Saund. 237; Bowdre v. Rubens v. Hill, 213 111. 523, 72 Hampton, 6 Rich. Law (S. C.) 208. N. E. 1127; Trustees of Hocking See Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. County v. Spencer, 7 Ohio (2nd 22.3, 5 Pac. 104. Bonetti v. Treat, part) 149; Burnham v. Best, 49 91 Cal. 223, 14 L. R. A. 151, 27 Ky. (10 B. Men.) 227; Swem v. Pa«. 612; Hiutze v. Thomas, 7 Sharretts, 48 Md. 408; Johnson v. Md. 346, to the effect that the Muzzy, 45 Vt. 419. 12 Am. Rep. action is based on privity of es- 214. tate. § 414] Kent. 1513 shall be brought in the county of the defendant's resi- dence, or where he may be served with process, and so if the rent is payable in a certain county, the venue may be determined by a provision that an action on a contract shall be brought at the place of performance. Remedy in equity. Equity will occasionally take jurisdiction of a proceeding by the landlord for the recovery of rent on the ground that the remedy at law is inadequate. One case in which equity thus takes jurisdiction is where the tenant has made a sublease, and the tenant is insolvent, in which case the court will direct the subtenant to pay the rent to the chief landlord, on the theory that the rent should be discharged out of the profits of the land.^^ This theory, that the profits of the land are properly ap- plicable to the pa^anent of rent, and that equity alone can enforce such application, w^ould seem to be the grounds on which the jurisdiction of equity should be sought and sustained. It cannot, however, be said that this reason for the assumption of jurisdiction by equity clearly apjoears from the cases, such jurisdiction having' ordinarily been sustained on the ground that the remedy by distress was for some reason not available in the par- ticular case.'*- That the amount of rent due and pay- able by defendant is uncertain, either because he is tenant of liut a part of the land subject to the lease*^ or for otlier reasons,^^ has also been regarded as ground for the interposition of equity. 41. Goddaid v. Keate, 1 Vein. 598; Leeds v. Powell^ 1 Ves. Sr. 87; Haley v. Boston Belting Co., 171. See article by Prof. C. C. 140 Mass. 73, 2 N. E. 785; For- Langdell, 10 Harv. Law Rev. 93. rest V. Durnell, 86 Tex. 647, 26 43. Swedesborough Church v. S. W. 481; Otis v. Couway, 114 N. Shivers, 16 N. J. Eq. (1 C. E. Y. 13, 20 N. E. 628; Kemp v. Sail Green) 453. Antonio Catering Co., 118 Mo'. App. 44. Livingston v. Livingston, 4 134, 93 S. W. 342. .Johns Ch. (N. Y.) 287, 8 Am. Dec. 42. Collet v. Jacciiios, 1 Cli. Cuf. .^62; Van Rensselaer v. Layman, 39 120; Cocks V. Foley, 1 Vern. 359; Ilarv. Pr. (N, Y.) 9. See 2 Tif- North V. Strafford, 3 P. Wras. iany. Landlord & Ten. § 292. 148; Benson v. Baldwin, 1 Atk. 1514 Real Peoperty. [^ 414 Action for use and occupation. At common law, as above stated, assumpsit would lie upon a con- tract not under seal for the payment of rent.^-^ And it would also lie upon a contract to pay a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of land, pro- vided no certain rent was reserved.^^ The statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 14, authorised a landlord, provided the demise is not by deed, that is, is not under seal, to recover a reasonable satisfaction in an action on the case for the use and occupation of the land, even though a certain rent is reser^-ed and there is no proof of an express promise. A statute of a similar character has been enacted in a number of states,^" while in several, upon w^hat appears to be a somewhat questionable reading of the earlier English decisions, it has been decided that a landlord may recover in such an action apart from a statute bearing on the subject.^ ^ In this action, the technical name of which is indebitatus assumpsit for use and occupation, rent as such is not recovered, but merely a reasonable satis- faction for the use of the premises; and the recovery is based on the theory that a contract to pay such reasonable satisfaction is to be inferred from the circumstances in conformity with the intention of the parties. If one person permits another to take and retain possession of his land, it is, in the ordinary case, a reasonable inference that the former expects the latter to pay the reasonable value of such pos- 45. Ante, this ?ection, note 40. Marsh) 255, 23 Am. Dec. 404; 46. Ames, Assumpsit for Use Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566, 64 and Occupation, 2 Harv. Law Eev. Am. Dec. 105; Heidelbach v. Slad- 379, Lectures on Legal History, er, 1 Handy (Ohio) 457; Eppes 169. V. Cole, 4 Hen. & M. (Va.) 161, 47. .See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & 4 Am. Dee. 512. That it does not Ten. p. 1856. lie apart from statute, see Bell v. 48. Gunn v. Seovil, 4 Day Ellis' Heirs, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) (Conn.) 228, 4 Am. Dec. 208; 294; Byrd v. Chase, 10 Ark. 602; Crouch V. Briles, 30 Ky. (7 J. J. Long v. Bonner, 33 N. C. 27. § 414] Rent. 1515 session or occupation, and that the latter expects to pay, and the law recognizes the reasonableness of such inference and enforces a contract so inferred. It is in this sense only that, as is frequently stated, "the law implies an obligation" to pay the value of the use and occupation, the obligation not being im))lied by law witliout reference to the presumed intentions of the parties, as in the case of quasi contract. To sustain an action for use and occupation the relation of landlord and tenant nmst, ordinarily at least, exist between the parties.^^ And consequently it will not lie in favor of the owner of land against a person who has entered thereon as a trespasser.^'' Occasionally a state statute has been construed as authorizing such an action against a trespasser,^^ and in several states, where the line between the different forms of action has been obscured by statutory enact- ments, a trespasser may, it seems, be made liable for the rental value of land under allegations of use and occupation by him.^- Such an action cannot however 49. Carpenter v. Uuited States, 84 U. S. (17 Wall) 489, 21 L. Ed. 680; Hamby v. Wall, 48 Ark. 135, 3, Am. St. Rep. 218, 2 S. W. 705; Emergon v. Weeks, 58 Cal. 4.39; Cambridge Lodge v. Routh, 163 Ind. 1, 71 N. E. 148; Jones v. Donelly, 221 Mass. 21.3, 108 N. E. 106.3; Hogsott v. Ellis, 17 Midi. 351; McFar'an v. Watson, 3 N. Y. 286; Aull Say. Bank v. AuU's Adm'r, 80 Mo. 199; Rosenberg v. Sprecher, 74 Neb. 176, 103 N. W. 1045; Clark v. Clark's Estate, 58 Vt. 527, 3 Atl. 508. 50. Pico V. Pheliin, 77 Cal. 86, 19 Pac. 186; Latlirop v. Standard Oil Co.., 83 Ga. 307, 9 S. E. 1041; Carrigg v. Meehanics' Bank of Providence, 136 Iowa, 261, 111 N. W. 329; Stockett v. Watkins' Adm'rs, 2 Gill. & J. (Md.) 326, 20 Am. Dec. 438; Emery v. Emery, 87 Me. 281, 32 Atl. 900; Inman V. Morris, 63 Miss. 347; Brolasky V. Feiguson, 48 Pa. 434; Galves- ton Wharf Co. v. Gulf C. & .S. F. R. Co., 72 Tex. 454, 10 S. W. 537. 51. Dell V. Gardner, 25 Ark. 134; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Atchi- son, 43 Kan. 529, 23 Pac. 610; Newberg v. Cowan, 62 Miss. 570; Earl V. Tyler, 36 Okla. 179, 128 Pac. 269. 52. Sec Lindt v. Lindcr, 117 Iowa, 110, 90 N. W. 596; Hidden V. Jordan, 57 Cal. 184; Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26; Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Martin, 11 Okla. 192, 66 Pac. 328; Olson v. Huntamer, 6 S. Dak. 364, 55 Am. St. Rep. 844, 61 N. W. 479. 1516 Real Property. [^ 415 be regarded as the equivalent of assumpsit for use and occupation, but is more properly an action of trespass, for mesne profits, according to the common law nomenclature. Forfeiture of leasehold. The landlord is, by tlie express terms of the lease, frequently given the right to re enter on the land, and thereby terminate the tenant's interest, in case of nonpayment of rent, such a stipulation rendering the tenant's estate one on condition.^^ In a number of states, apart from any such provision in the lease, the landlord is authorized to resume possession upon the tenant's failure to pay rent, such a provision being most frequently intro- duced as a part of a statute authorizing summary proceedings, and the non payment of rent being named as one of the grounds for such a proceeding, while in a few states the non payment of rent is made a ground of forfeiture, without any reference to the mode of proceeding by which the forfeiture may be enforced.^^ § 415. Distress for rent. As before stated, the remedy by distress existed at common law in the case of a rent service, unless the rent and the seignory or reversion became separated, and also in the case of a rent charge. -^^ In England the right of distress has been given by statute in the case of all rents, and consequently rents seek no longer exist there as a distinct class. ^"^ The question whether this statute is in force in any particular state has been seldom passed upon,^''' this being a natural result of the in- frequency of rents other than rents service reserved on leases for years. 53. Ante, §§ 74-89. 57. In Illinois the English sta- 54. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. tute was, in a quite early deci- §§ 193a, 274d, e. sion, recognized as in force (Penny 55. Ante, § 404. v. Little, 4 111. 301), while a dif- 56. 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, § 5 (A. D. ferent view was taken in New 1731). § 415] Eent. 1517 The remedy by distress lias not been favored in this country, it being often regarded as affording opportunity for injustice and oppression, and as unfairly dis- criminating in favor of a particular class of creditors. In some states it has been abolished by statute,^^ and in some the courts have refused to recognize it as an existing part of the law.^'' The remedy, under its common-law name, still exists in a number of states; but even in those states it is quite frequently modified by statutory provisions, the general tendency of which is more or less to withdraw the control of the pro- ceedings from the ■ landlord and to vest it in public officials, thus assimilating it to the process of attach- ment.^^ ^ In New England the remedy of attachment on mesne process has superseded that of distress. Originally, the remedy by distress merely enabled the landlord to seize the chattels on the land, and hold them as a pledge for the payment of rent ;^° but by stat- ute the landlord was authorized to sell the goods levied upon, and to apply the proceeds on the rent,*^^ the proceeding being thus changed from one to secure the rent to one to collect it. Furthermore, the seizure of the goods was formerly made by the landlord himself; but at the present day, in most jurisdictions, the actual levy is made by an officer of the law.'''^ It has been quite frequently stated that to sup- port a distress the rent reserved must be certain or York (Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cow. 59a. See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & ^52). Ten. §§ 325-346. The gist of the 58. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ton. statutory provisions in the various § 325. states are conveniently presented 59. Folmar v. Copeland, 57 Ala. in a note in 2 Cornell Law Quart. 588; Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. Kev. at p. 357, by D. R. Perry, 393, 18 Pac. 342; Crocker v. Mann. Esq. 3 Mo. 472, 26 Am. Dec. 684; Bohni 60. Co. Litt. 47; :; P.hu-kst. V. Dunphy, 1 Mont. 333; Deaver Comm. 614. V. Rice, 20 N. Car. (4 Dev. & B. 61 2 Wm. & Mary c, 5 (A. D. Law) 567, 34 Am. Dec. 69; Smith 1690). V. Wheeler, 4 Okla. J38, 44 Pac. 62. 2 Tiffany, Landlnrd & Ten. 203. § 336. 2 R. P.— 21 1518 Real Property. ["§> 415 capable of reduction to a certaiiity,^^ and occasionally reasons have been stated for this requirement, con- nected with the method of proceeding at common law.®^ But, it is conceived, the true and sufficient ground for the requirement of a certain rent as a basis for distress is that, as before stated,*^^ there is no such thing as a rent which is not certain or capable of re- duction to a certainty. The statement of this require- ment has occasionally been made as a justification for a holding that there was no right of distress although there was a right of recovery for use and occupation."® The reasonable value of the use and occupation, though recoverable by action, is not rent, and it is for this reason, rather than because the amount is uncertain, that it cannot be recovered by distress. Who may distrain. Since the right of distress is based upon the relation of tenure, a distress for rent reserved on a lease can be made only by one having the reversion, that is, the landlord.*^' Consequently, at common law, a lessor who has disposed of the re- version, retaining the rent, cannot distrain,*^^ though he may do so, it seems, in some states, by force of a statutory provision giving the right of distress to persons entitled to rent, as he might in any state in which the English statute,^ ^^ giving the right in the ease of a rent seek, may be regarded as in force. 63. Eegnart v. Porter, 7 Bing. Fla. 611; Tiflft v. Verden, 19 Miss. 451; United States v. Williams, 2 (11 Smedes & M.) 153; Valentine Cranch. C. C. 438, Fed. Cas. No. v. Jackson, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 302; 16,710; Smoot v. Strauss, 21 Fla. Wells v. Hornish, 3 Pen. & W. 611; Marr v. Eay, 151 111. 799, (Pa.) 31. 26 L. K. A. 799, 37 N. E. 1029; 67. Sims v. Price, 123 Ga. 97, Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 556; 50 S. E. 961; Marr v. Eay, 151 Smith V. Fyler, 2 Hill. (N. Y.) 111. 340, 26 L. R. A. 799, 37 N. E. G48; Jocks v. Smith, 1 Bay, (S. 1029; Patty v. Bogle, 59 Miss. Car.) 315. 491; Grier v. McAlarney, 148 Pa. 64. .See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & 587, 24 Atl. 119; McKenzie v. Ten. § 327d. Eoper, 2 Strob (S. Car) 306. 65. Ante, § 411, note 99. 68. Litt. § 226. 66. Stayton v. Morris, 4 Har. 68a. Ante, this section, note 56. (Dol.) 224; Smoot v. Strauss,' 21 § 415] Eent. 1519 At common law the executor or administrator of a deceased owner of a rent had no right to distrain for rent which belonged to him as having accrued in the lifetime of such owner, but by St. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 37, § 1, the right of distress was given to the executors and administrators of tenants in fee, fee tail, or for term of life.*'^ This statute has, however, been held to give no right of distraint to the executor of a tenant of land in fee who demised the land for years, re- serving a rent,'^ and, on this construction of the statute, an executor or administrator has, in jurisdictions where there is no statute to the contrary, no right to collect by distress rent due by a tenant of his decedent under a lease for years. There are in a few states statutes expressly giving the right of distress to the executors or administrators of a deceased landlord, or giving them the same remedies for the collection of rent as the decedent had. Chattels subject to distress. All chattels on the demised premises are, generally speaking, liable to be distrained upon, and the fact that they belong to a person other than a party to the lease is immaterial.'^ ^ In some states, however, by statute, a stranger's prop- erty is exempt from distress.^^ Things which are part of the freehold, as fixtures, cannot be destrained upon."-' Things which are liable to be injured by keeping,"^ and also, it seems, things not readily capable of 69. Co. Litt. lG2a. hanc, 4 ni. App. (4 Bradw.) 460; 70. Prescott v. Boucher, .3 Barn. Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) & Adol. 849; Jones v. .Tones, ?, 323. In Furbush v. Chappell, 105 Barn. & Adol. 967. Pa. St. 187, it is deciued that fix 71. Gilbert, Distresses, 3;{; tures removable by a tenant are Bradley, Distresses, 73; 3 Blackst. distrainable, a view which ac- Comm. 8. eords with the rule existing in that 72. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. state that removable fixtures arc § 32Sa(9). personalty. See ante, § 272(d). 73. Co. Litt. 47b; Gilbert, Dis- 74. 2 Blackst. Conim. 101; Mor- tresses, 42; Turner v. Cameron, L. ley v. T'inchcomlio, 2 F.ych. lOl. R. 5, Q. B. .30; Kassing v. Keo- 1520 Eeal Property. [^ 415 identification, such as loose pieces of money/ ^ are not subject to distress. Things in a person's actual use or possession, such as a horse which he is riding, or a machine at wliich he is working, are also exempt, in order that a breach of the peace may not be caused by an attempt to distrain thereon.'^ Implements or uten- sils of one's trade or profession, such as the axe of a carpenter or the books of a scholar, are exempt, if there be other things on the premises sufficient in amount to satisfy the distress; and beasts used for working a farm, and sheep thereon, are in the same way conditionally exempt."^^ Goods which are in the custody of the law,' ^ as when they have been levied upon under execution,'^^ or attachment,^'^ are not distrainable. The rigor of this rule is, however, considerably alleviated, in Eng- land and in some states, by reason of statutes securing to the landlord, as against an execution levy, arrears of rent to the amount of one year's rent.^^ The most important class of exemptions from dis- tress consists of those in favor of trade or commerce, being generally of those things belonging to a third person which are temporarily on the leased premises 75. 1 Rolle's Abr. 667; Bac. 79. Herron v. Gill, 112 111. 247; Abr., Distress (B). Craddock v. Riddlesbarger, 32 Ky. 76. Co. Litt. 47a; Simpson v. (2 Dana) 205; Van Horn -v. Hartopp, Willes, 512; Beall v. Goken, 41 N. J. L. 499; SuUivau Beck, 3 Cranch C. C. 666, Fed. v. Ellison, 20 S. C. 481. Gas. No. 1,161; Couch v. Craw- 80. Thomson v. Baltimore & ford, 10 Up. Can. C. P. 491. Susquehenna Steam Co., 33 Md. 77. Co. Litt. 47b; 3 Blackst. 312; Pierce v. Scott, 4 Watts & Comm. 9; Jenner v. Yolland, 6 S. (Pa.) 344; Ayres v. Depras, Price 3. - Speers Law (S. Car.) 367; Meyer 78. Co. Litt. 47b; Eaton v. v. Oliver, 61 Tex. 584. Southby, Willes, 131; Bowser v. 81. The English statute is that Scott, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 86; Mul- of 8 Anne c. 14, § 1. The various herin v. Porter, 1 Ga. App. 153, decisions upon this and the more or 58 S. E. 60; Karns v. McKinney, less similar state statutes are dis- 78 Pa. 387; Cooley v. Perry, 34 cussed in 1 Tiffany, Landlord & S. C. 554, 13 S. E. 853; Meyer Ten. § 183. V. Oliver, fil Tex. 584. <^ 415J Kent. 1521 for the purposes of the business there conducted, as in the case of raw material left there to be worked up,^^ or goods placed there for purposes of sale*-* or for safe keeping. ^^ For a similar reason, it seems, the property of a guest at an inn are exempt.^^ Things not on the premises. Apart from stat- ute,^^ only goods upon the demised premises can be distrained for the rent therof, or, as it is frequently expressed, the distress must be made upon the prem- ises. ^^ In at least three states the law in this regard has been changed by statutes allowing the goods of the tenant to be distrained upon wherever located.^^ There are also, in a number of states, ^^ as in Eng- 82. Co. Litt. 47a; Bead v. Bnr- ley, Cro. Eliz. 596; Knowles v. Pierce, 5 Houst. (Del.) 178; Hos- kins V. Paul, 9 N. J. L. 110, 17 Am. Dec. 455. 83. MeCreery v. Claflin, 37 Md 435, 11 Am. Rep. 542; Connali v Hale, 23 WemL (N. Y.) 46 Brown v. Stackhouse, 155 Pa. 582 35 Am. St. Eep. 908, 26 Atl. 669 Walker v. Johnson, 4 McCord (S Car.) 552. 84. Miles v. Furber, L. E. 8, Q. B. 77; Beall v. Beck, 3 Cranch. C. C. 666, Fed. Cas. No. 1,161; Owen V. Boyle, 22 Me. 47; Brown V. Sims, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 138. 85. 3 Blackst. Comm. 8; Brad- ley, Distresses, 144; Gorton v. Falk- ner, 4 Term Rep. 567; Lyons v. Elliott, 1 Q. B. Div. 210; Beall v. Beck, 3 Cranch C. C. 666, Fed. Cas. No. 1,161 ; Karns v. McKiu- ney, 74 Pa. 389; Kellogg News- paper Co. V. Peterson, 162 111. 158, 53 Am. St. Rep. 300, 44 N. K. 411; Elford v. Clark, 3 Brev. (S. Car.) 88. Ill owe jurisdiction tilings lie- longing to a permnnent boardor at an inn or boarding house have been regarded as exempt. Riddle V. Welden, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 9. Contra, Trieber v. Knabe, 12 Md. 491, 71 Am. Dec. 607. 86. Except in the case of cattle driven off the premises in the sight of the landlord or his agent when about to distrain. Co. Litt. 161a; 2 Co. Inst. 132; Bradby, Distresses, 94. Or when there is an express stipulation allowing dis- tress on things belonging to the lessee ofP the premises. In re Roundwood Colliery Co. [1897] 1 Ch. 373; Dinger v. McAndrews, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 221. 87. Co. Litt. 161a; White v. Hoeninghaus, 74 Md. 127, 21 Atl. 700; Crocker v. Mann, 3 Mo. 472, 26 Am. Dec. 684; Weiss v. John, 37 N. J. L. 93; Pemberton v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 307; Clifford V. Beems, 3 Watts. "(Pa.) 246; Mosby v. Leeds, 3 Call (Va.) 439. 88. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten- ant, § 3281(4). 89. Id, § 3281(3). 1522 Real Property. [§ 416 land,^" statutes authorizing a distress on the tenant's goods and chattels if removed by him from the premises in order to prevent a distress thereon. And in several states the same end of realizing from chattels re- moved from the premises, or liable to be removed, is secured by statutory provisions for attachment for rent.91 § 416. Lien for rent. In quite a number of states there are statutes subjecting chattels or crops upon the demised premises to a lien in favor of the landlord for rent. Such a statutory lien on crops is not ordinarily restricted to the crops of the tenant, but the crops of a subtenant are subject thereto, while a lien given by statute on things other than crops is usually restricted to things belonging to the tenant himself. The statute ordinarily names the method of enforcing the lien, as, for instance, by attachment, or by statutory distress. But even when the statute named another method of enforcing the lien, a right to foreclose it by a proceeding in equity has not infrequently been upheld.^^ Occasionally a lien is created upon crops or other personal property upon the leased premises by ex- press stipulation in the instrument of lease. A lien so created resembles, more or less, a chattel mortgage, and the courts are inclined to determine the rights of the lessor thereunder from this point of view. It is usually enforced by the decree of a court of equity for the sale of the property subject to the lien.^^ 90. St. 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 1. 92. See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & 91. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten- Tenant, § 321. aut, §§ 347-351. 93. Id., § 322. CHAPTER XVTI. PUBLIC RIGHTS. § 417. Highways. 418. Parks, squares, and commons. 419. Customary rights. 420. Rights of fishing. 421. Rights of navigation. § 417. Highways. We have before referred to rights as to the use of the land of an individual for a public or quasi public purpose, such as a right of way for a railroad, for a drain, or for irrigation purposes.^ These, however, though they involve a public use of the land, do not usually give a right of user to each member of the public, while the rights which we will now consider may ordinarily be exercised by any indi- vidual member of the })ublic, or of that part of the public resident in a particular locality. The most usual instance of a right, in each member of the public, thus to make use of another's land, exists in the case of a ''highway" over private land; this being, in effect, a right of way in gross, in favor of each member of the public. Though the existence of a highway does not, at common law, affect the ownership of the soil, which remains in the original owner, subject to use by tiie public for highway i)urposes, under some state statutes bearing upon the creation of highways, not only the right of user but the ownership, or "fee," as it is gener- ally termed, of the land, is in the public, or in the state or municipality in trust for the public, in which case the rights of user in the public are not rights as to the 1. See ante, § 365. (1523) .1524 Real Peopekty. [§ 417 user of another's land, but rather rio'hts incident to ownership.^ Creation. A hi.a:hway mav be created either (1) by "dedication" of the land by the owner to use as a highway; (2) by prescription, — that is, user of the land by the public for highway purposes for the prescriptive period; or (3) by statutory proceedings, involving, if necessary, the taking of the land upon the payment of compensation under the power of eminent domain. Statutory proceedings are usually, in the case of suburban highways, instituted by owners of land in- terested in procuring the establishment of the highway; and in cities, by the municipal authorities. All per- sons interested in the land over or through which the highway is to run are made parties to the proceeding; and it is the ordinary practice, in one proceeding, to determine the damages to be paid to the owaiers of the land utilized for the highway, and to apportion among the owners of the land to be benefitted thereby the cost of the undertaking. The preliminary question whether the proposed highway is necessary for the public wel- fare may be determined by the legislature, or delegated to the local authorities, or left to be adjudicated by the tribunal which determines the question of damages. The question whether, by proceedings of this char- acter, the ownership or *'fee" of the land is vested in the public, or merely a right of user, is to be determined by the terms of the statute ; and unless this plainly con- templates that the *'fee" shall be appropriated, it is generally held that the public acquires a right of user only.2 2. The use of the word "fee" tive of the Guration of a right, in this connection to designate rather than of its character, and the ownership, as distinct from its use erroneously implies that the mere right of user, of the a mere right of user is necessarily land, though sanctioned by almost less in duration than a fee. universal practice, is unfortunate, 3. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, since the word is properly descrip- § 449; Elliott, Roads & Streets, § -tl7] Public Rights. 1525 The dedication of land to the i)ub]ic for nse as a highway, and the creation of highways by prescription, will be considered in another part of this work.^ Rights of owner of land. When the pul)lic have a right of passage merely, the owner of the land or "fee" therein may use it in any way not interfering with its use by the public for passage.^ He is, in the ordinary case, alone entitled to cut and appropriate the trees,^ or herbage,''^ within the highway limits, and to remove the soil or minerals under the highway.^ The municipal authorities may, however, remove trees, earth or stone for the purpose of opening or improving the highway, and by some decisions they may utilize materials so obtained for the purpose of repairing other parts of the highway.^ The owner of the land may bring ejectment against one unlawfully inclosing or encroaching within the § 254; 2 Dillon, Municipal Corpo- rations, § 589. 4. See jwst, §§ 479, 514. 5. Elliott, Roads & Streets, §§ 259, 876; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2nd Ed.) 416; Cloverdale Homes V. Town of Cloverdale. 182 Ala. 419, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607, 62 So. 712: Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454. 4 Am. Dec. 159; Glen- coe V. Reed, 93 Minn. 518, 67 L. R. A. 901, 101 N. W. 956; Daily V. State, 51 Ohio St. 348, 46 Am. St. Rep. 578; Lynch v. Town of Northview, 73 W. Va. 609, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038, 81 S. E. 83;i. 6. City of Atlanta v. Holliday. 96 Ga. 546, 23 S. E. 509; Crisraon V. Deck, 84 Iowa, 344, 51 N. W. 55; Bigelow V. Whitcomb, 72 N. H. 473, 65 L. R. A. 676, 57 Atl. 680; Weller v. McCormick, 52 N. J. L. 470, 8 L. R. A. 798, 19 Atl. 1101; Dailey v. State, 51 Ohio St. 348. 24 L. R. A. 724, 46 Am. St. Rep. 578, 37 N. E. 710; Sanderson v. Haverstick, 8 Pa. St. 294; Tucker V. Eldred, 6 R. I. 404. 7. Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass. 33, 8 Am. Dec. 121; Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49, 8 Am. Rep. 363; People V. Foss, 80 Mich. 559, 45 N. W. 480, 20 Am. St. Rep. 532; Wood- ruff V. Neal, 28 Conn. 165; 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, S 853. 8. Town of Suffield v. Hatha- way, 44 Conn. 521, 26 Am. Rep. 4S3; Aurora v. Fox, 78 Ind. 1; Deaton v. Polk County, 9 Iowa, 594; West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush (Ky.) 121; Glencoe v. Reed, 93 Minn. 518, 67 L. R. A. 901, 10 N. W. 956; Higgins v. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151. 9. See Dillon, Mun. Corp.. § 1149; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd Ed.) 417, 418. 1526 Real. Pkopeety, [§ 417 limits of the Mghway,^'^ or trespass against one ^ho uses the land for a purpose not within the scope of its use as a highway/*^-^ or who injures trees or herbage thereon.^ ^ A city street is a highway, but a distinction is fre- quently asserted between such a highway and an ordi- nary rural highway, it being said that, while in the latter case the public have merely a right of passage, in the case of a city street there exists, besides this right of passage in individual members of the public, power in the municipal authorities to change the surface, to cut down trees, place sewers and pipes beneath the bed of the street, and in effect to exclude the owner of the land from any use thereof other than that of passage common to all individuals.^- The cases, how- ever, which assert such a distinction do not usually de- cide that a use can be made of a city street which 10. Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Bur- row, 133; Perry v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413, 28 Am. Rep. 740; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Eaton, 170 111. 513, 39 L. R. A. 722, 62 Am. St. Rep. 390, 49 N. E. 365; Louisvnie, St. L. & T. Ry. Co. V. Liebfried. 92 Ky. 407, 17 S. W. 870; Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River v. Nashua & L. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1; Thomas v. Hunt, 134 Mo. 392, 32 L. R. A. 857, 35 S. W. 581; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 447, 8 Am. Dec. 263; Becker v. Lebanon & M. St. Ry. Co., 195 Pa. 502, 46 Atl. 1096; Contra, Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431, 8 L. Ed. 452; Becker V. Lebanon & M. St. Ry. Co., 195 Pa. 502, 46 Atl. 1096. See the suggestive discussion of the last cited case in an editorial note in 14 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 291. 10a. Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange 1004; Burr v. Stevens, 90 Me. 500, 38 AtL 547; Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 52 Am. Rep. 513; Lewis v. Jones, 1 Pa. St. 336, 44 Am. Dec. 138. 11. Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 498, 8 L. Ed. 477; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165; Blis V. Hall, 99 Mass. 597; Bolen- der V. Southern Michigan Tel. Co., 182 Mich. 646, 148 N. W. 697; Gambel v Pettijohn. 116 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 783; Andrews v. You- mans, 78 Wis. 56. 47 N. W. 304. 12. See Western Railway of Alabama v. Alabama Grand Trunk R. Co., 96 Ala. 272, 17 L. R. A. 474, 11 So. 483; Montgomery v. Santa Ana Westminster Ry. Co. 104 Cal. 186, 25 L. R. A. 654, 43 Am. St. Rep. 89, 37 Pac. 786; Kincaid v. Indianapolis, etc.. Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577, 8 L. R. A. 602. 19 Am. St. Rep. 113, 24 N. E. 1066; Chesapeake & Pot. Telephone § 417] Public Rights. 1527 cannot be made of a suburban highway ;^^ and the sounder view seems to be that a suburban highway, like a city street, is subject to all highway uses and im- provements which may be necessary, among which are to be included its use for the supply of water, light, or drainage, when these are rendered necessary by the density of population, and that the fact that the high- way is within the limits of a city is immaterial, except as this is usually coincident with the necessity for such uso.^^ Additional servitude. When the ownership of the land is not acquired by the public, but merely a right of passage, if the land within the highway limits is afterwards used for a purpose, even though of a public nature, which is not within the scope of the high- way use for which the land was dedicated or appropri- ated, it is considered that the land is subjected to an additional burden or *' servitude," entitling the owner to compensation as for a new taking of x>roperty. So it has been held that the use of the highway for a steam Co. V. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36, 28 14. See Floyd County v. Rome Am. St. Rep. 219, 21 Atl. 690; Van St. R. Co., 77 Ga. 614, 3 S. E. 3; Brunt V. Town of Flatbush, 128 De Kalb Co. Telephone Co. v. Dut- N. Y. 50, 27 N. E. 973; McDevitt to^n, 228 111. 178, 10 L. R. A. (N. V. Peoples' Nat. Gas Co., 160 Pa. S.) 1057, 81 N. E. 838; Lake St. 367, 28 Atl. 948; Duquesne Shore M. S. R. Co. v. Whiting, Light Co. V. Duff, 251 Pa. 607, 161 Ind. 76, 67 N. E. 933; Cater 97 Atl. 82; Elliott, Roads & v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Streets, § 482 et seq. Minn. 539, 28 L. R. A. 310, 51 Am. 13, "The only court in which it St. Rep. 543, 63 N. W. Ill; Eels has been unequivocally adjudicated v. American Telephone & Tele- that a certain use was legitimate graph Co., 143 N. Y. 133, 25 L. R. in the case of city streets, anQ not A. 640, 38 N. E. 202; Palmer v. legitimate in the case of country Larchmont Electric Co., 158 N. Y. highways, is that of Pennsylvania, 231, 43 L. R. A. 672, 52 N. E. in which it has been held that an 1092; Callen v. Columbus Edison electric passenger railway is a legi- Elec. Light Co. 66 Ohio St. 16(i, OS timate use of a city or village L. R. A. 782, 64 N. E. 141; Hu 424] Teansfer by Government. 1557 the ground, and in some states, by local requirements, by posting notice of the claim, and recording a certifi- cate of the location.^^ The extent of the claim is, in the c-ase of a lode or vein, limited by the United States statute to fifteen hundred feet in the direction in which the lode or vein runs, and three hundred feet on each side of the vein ; the boundaries running in the direction of the vein being known as "side" lines, and those run- ning across the vein as "end" lines. The locator is entitled to any ore within the space marked by these surface lines extended downward vertically, and may follow the vein across his side lines, even though, in so doing, he takes ore from beneath the surface claim of another, but he cannot follow the vein across his end lines. A placer claim or location is limited to one hundred and sixty acres in case the location is made by an asso- ciation of not less than eight bona fide locators, and to twenty acres in the case of a location by an individual. In order that one who has located a claim may con- tinue to hold it, he must do work or make improvements thereon to the value of at least one hundred dollars in each year, and, in case of his failure so to do, the claim is forfeited, and open to location by another person.'" § 424. Grants by the states. Of tlie lands witliin the original thirteen colonies, the larger part had, at the time of the American Revolution, been granted to individuals or to associations, to hold in private owner- ship, and their rights, except in so far as the lands were confiscated for disloyalty, were not affected by the transfer of the sovereignty to the state. Those lands, however, which had not been granted away by the crown^ passed to the respective state governments as successors to the crown, and as representatives of the 18. Barringer & AdamH, Mines ringer & Adams, Mines & Min- & Mining, c. 7. ing c. 9. 19. Rev. St. U. S. § 2324; Bar- 1558 Eeal Pbopebty. [<^ 424 public. Such lands, the title to which was thus vested ill any of the original states, have been disposed of either by special legislative grants, or in accordance with a regular statutory system, established for the purpose, providing for their survey and sale to persons making formal application to the state authorities. The territory ceded by certain states to the general government was, to some extent, incumbered by grants previously made to indniduals by the ceding state, and these grants were usually, by the agreement for cession, recognized by the United States. Of the lands of which the title thus became vested in the states, the most im- portant were those under tidal and navigable waters, over which the state governments have always exercised control, and which they have, as a general rule, not granted away to individuals, the policy of the states, however, differing among themselves in this regard.^" Within the territory ceded to the United States by foreign governments, the states formed therefrom have no rights to vacant lands except as these may have been granted to them by the United States government. Such grants have, however, as above stated, been made to a very considerable extent, and the lands so granted to the states they have disposed of to individuals and corporations in various ways. The land under navigable waters within the limits of the territory ceded to the United States, either by one of the states or by a foreign country, passed to the United States for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for the several states to be ultimately created out of such territory, and, upon the admission of any part of such territory as a state, such lands pass ipso facto to the state government, subject, however, to any grants of rights therein which may have been made for appropriate purposes by the United States government 20. Martin v. WaddeU's Lessee, 38 L. Ed. 331. 16 Pet. (U. S.) 367, 10 L. Ed. 997; See ante, §§ 300, 301. Shiveley v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, § 424] Transfer by Government. 1559 while holding the country as a territory. Consequently, the new states admitted into the Union since the adop- tion of the constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions, and they may accordingly grant rights therein to individuals, as it may seem most expedient, subject only to the paramount rights of navigation and commerce.^^ The vacant lands which belonged to the state" of Texas, lying within its limits, never became part of the public domain of the United States, there being an express provision to that effect in the resolutions passed by congress for its admission as a state.-^ These lands have been gradually disposed of, usually by locations under ''land certificates," these certificates having been issued for various purposes, as to encourage settlement, to reward participants in the War of Independence, or their heirs, and to promote the construction of rail- roads.^^ The systems and regulations adopted by the various states in disposing of their public lands have been of the most diverse character. Usually, however, a war- rant is issued, either to one entitled as a beneficiary by some legislative act, or in consideration of the payment of a sum fixed by law, this warrant authorizing him to "locate" or "enter" a certain number of acres in the public domain. The holder of the warrant then selects his land, and files witli a desiunatod official a description of the land, this being kno%vn as the "entry." The lan^ so applied for is then usually surveyed by the ]mblic surveyoi', and, after such survey, and his com- pliance witli all the other requirements of the statute, the applicant is entitled to a "patent" or grant from the state.'-^"* 21. Shiveley v. Bowlby, 152 U. Texas lands is clearly stated in S. 1, :',8 L. Ed. 331. 1 Dembitz, Land Titles, 5G1 et seq. 22. 5 U. S. Stat. 797. 24. See 2 Minor. Institutes. 23. The mode of dispo.sul of 898; 1 Dembitz, Land Titles, 500; 1560 Keal Propebty. [§ 425 § 425. Spanish and Mexican Grants. Witliin the territory ceded to the United States by France, Spain, and Mexico, there existed, at the time of the cession, private rights based upon grants previously made by the nation having dominion therein, and tliese grants the United States government was, either by express stipulation in the treaty to that effect, or by provisions preserving rights of property, required to recognize. Though the Louisiana territory was purchased from France, most of the grants made therein before its ces- sion to the United States' were made by the Spanish, and not by the French, government, the territory having passed from the former to the latter but a short time previously. The grants made within the limits of the Florida purchase previous to the treaty of cession were expressly recognized in that treaty. Before the cession of territory by Mexico to the United States, numerous grants had been made by that government from the time of its acquisition of in- dependence from Spain, early in the nineteenth century. Grants made before that period w^ere by the Spanish crowai, acting through the governor or viceroy. In the performance of its treaty obligations to recog- nize these prior existing grants of land in the ceded territory, this government has adopted the policy of requiring all persons claiming under grants made previous to the particular cession in question to submit their claims to examination either by commissioners named for the purpose, or by the federal courts, and the claims thus submitted have been the subject of many adjudications, frequently of an adverse character. Lands comprised within the limits of the present state of Texas have been, iii succession, the subject of grant by the Spanish government, the Mexican government, the Mexican state of Coahuila and Texas, the republic of Texas, and the present state of Texas.^^ 23 Am, & Eng. Encyc. Law (1st 25. See Republic of Texas v. Ed.) 53 et seq. Thorn, 3 Tex. 505; Norton v. § 426] Transfer by Government. 1561 Grants made by the previous sovereignties have always been recognized by the present state of Texas. § 426. Patents. A patent is a document issued by the government to one to whom it has. transferred or agreed to transfer land, in order to vest in the trans- feree the complete legal title, or to furnish evidence of the transfer. Patents are regularly issued by the United States government, and also by the state govern- ments, to persons who have, by the proper proceedings, established their right to the ownership of land previ- ously belonging to the United States or the state. The patent is, in form, a conveyance of the land, and must, when issued by the United States, be signed in the name of the president, and sealed with the seal of the general land office, and countersigned by the recorder.-*^ A state patent must usually be signed by the governor, and sealed with the state seal.-'^ A patent is necessary to pass a perfect title to public land in all cases except when the legislative branch of the government has made a grant taking- effect in praesentiP Consequently, when no such pre- vious grant has been made, the patent constitutes, and is necessary for, the transfer of the legal title.-^ When, on the other hand, there has been a previous grant taking effect in praesenti, the purpose of the issue of the patent is not to transfer the title, but to furnish evidence of the transfer, or to show compliance with Mitchell, 13 Tex. 51; Jones v. ter 'v. Ruddy, 166 U. S. 495, 41 Muisbach, 26 Tex. 237. L. Ed. 1091. 26. McGarrahan v. New Idria 29. McGarrahan v. New Idria Min. Co., 96 U. S. 316, 24 L. Ed. Min. Co., 96 U. S. 316, 24 L. Ed. 630. See Rev. St. U. S. § 450. 630; Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 27. See State v. Morgan, 52 u. S. 74, 31 L. Ed. 344; City of Ark. 150, 12 S. W. 243; Exum v. Brownsville v. Basse, 36 Tex. 500; Brister, 35 Miss. 391; Hulick v. Roads v. Symmes, 1 Ohio, 281, Scovil, 9 111. 159; Jarrett v. 13 Am. Dec. 621; Carter v. Ruddy, Stevens, 36 W. Va. 445, 15 S. E. Kit; u. S. 495, 41 L. Ed. 1091; 445. Wood V. Plttman, 113 Ala. 212, 28. Wilcox V. Jackson, 13 Pet. 20 So. 972. (U. S.) 498, 10 L. Ed. 264; Car- 1562 Real Pbopeety. [§ 426 the conditions thereof, obviating, in any legal contro- versy, the necessity of other proof of title.^° Even when there has been no legislative grant of the land, the government, upon the payment of the pur- chase price of land by an individual, and other com- pliance with the statutory requirements, thereafter holds the legal title, as any other vendor of land who has received the purchase money, in trust for the ven- dee.^ ^ But this mere equitable title will not support an action of ejectment at common law, and for that puriDoso the legal title must be acquired by the issue of a patent.^2 In many of the states, however, it is pro- vided by statute that certificates issued b}^ the United States land office, showing the making of final proof and pajanent, and so entitling the holder to a patent, shall be prima facie, evidence of title sufficient to support an action of ejectment.^^ But a distinction is made in this respect between receipts issued by the land office after final proof, and receipts issued merely to show that an application or ''filing" has been made, and the latter will not, even under these statutes, support ejectment,^* When there has been a grant taking effect in praesenti, 30. Morrow v. Whitney, 95 U. v. Sherwood, 124 U. S. 74, 41 L. S. 551, 24 L. Ed. 456; Wright v. Ed. 1091; Seward's Lessee v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 30 L. Hicks, 1 Har. & McH. (Md.) 22. Ed. 1039; Deseret Salt Co. v. Tar- 33. See Balsz v. Liebenow pey, 142 U. S. 241, 35 L. Ed. 999; (Ariz.) 36 Pac. 209; Surginer v. Kernan v. Griffith, 27 Cal. 89; Paddock, 31 Ark. 528; Case v. Lee V. Summers, 2 Ore. 267. Edgeworth, 87 Ala. 203; Whit- 31. Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. taker v. Pendola, 78 Cal. 296. 20 (U. S.) 441, 11 L. Ed. 671; Pac. 680; Davis v. Freeland's Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. Lessee, 32 Miss. 645; Pierce v. (U. S.) 210. 18 L. Ed. 339; Frace, 2 Wash. St. 81, 26 Pac. Hussman v. Durham, 165 U. S. 192, 807; McLane v. Bovee, 35 144, 41 L. Ed. 664; Brill v. Stiles, Wis. 27. 35 HI. 305, 85 Am. Dec. 364; 34. Balsz v. Liebenow (Ariz.) Arnold v. Grimes, 2 Iowa, 1. 36 Pac. 209; Hemphill v. Davis, 38 32. Hooper v. Scheimer, 23 Cal. 577; Dale v. Hunneman, 12 How. (U. S.) 235, 16 L. Ed. 452; Neb. 221, 10 N. W. 711; Adams v. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. (U. Couch, 1 Okl. 17. S.) 92, 20 L. Ed. 534; Langdon § 426] Transfer by Government. 1563 the grantee may, even without the aid of any statute, bring ejectment, as having the legal title, though a patent has not been issued to him.^^ A patent is, as evidence of title, conclusive in a court of law as against collateral attack, unless it is invalid on its face for insufficiency of language or execution, or unless it is void for want of power to issue it, as when the land had been previously granted, or was reserved from sale.^'^' In equity, however, a patent, valid on its face, can, as against others than bona fide purchasers of the land for value, be attacked, for fraud in its procurement or mistake in its issuance, either by the government or by a person otherwise entitled to the land;''' and if the patent has been issued to one other than tlie person entitled thereto, he may procure a decree establishing a constructive trust in his favor, and requiring the patentee to make a convevanee to 35. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241, 35 L. Ed. 999; Nothern Pac. R. Co. v. Cannon fC. C.) 46 Fed. 224; Southern Pac. Co. V. Burr, 86 Gal. 279, 24 Pac. 1032; Northern Pac. R. Co. V. Majors, 5 Mont. 111. 2 Pac. 322. 36. Field v. Seahury, 19 How. (U. S.) 323. 15 L. Ed. 650; Sher- man V. Buick, 93 U. S. 209. 23 L. Ed. 849: Steel v. St. Louis Smelt- ing & Refining Co.. 106 U. S. 447, 27 L. Ed. 226; Wright v. Rose- berry, 121 U. S. 488, 30 L. Ed. 1039; Davis' Adm'r v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. Ed. 2:i8; State V. Morgan, 52 Ark. 150, 12 S. W. 243; Moore v. Wilkinson, 13 Cal. 488; Laneenoiir v. Shanklin, 57 Cal. 70: Bledsoe's Devisees v. Wells, 4 Bibb. (Ky.) 329; State v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 7 Nel'. 357; Jackson v. Hart, 12 .Johns. (N. Y.) 77, 7 Am. Dec. 280; Web- ster V. Clear, 49 Ohio St. 392, 31 N. E. 744; Norvell v. Camm, 6 Munf. (Va.) 233. 8 Am. Dec. 742; Jarrett v. Stevens, 36 W. Va. 445, 15 S. E. 177. 37. St. Louis Smelting & Re- fining Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875; Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408. 29 L. Ed. 428; Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U. S. 642, 35 L. Ed. 290; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. Ed. 747; United States V. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 141 U. S. 358. 35 L. Ed. 766: United States V. Marshall Silver Min. Co., 129 U. S. 579, 32 L. Ed. 734; Colo- rado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307, 31 L. Ed. 182; Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 23, 6 Am. Dec. 311; Ro- niain v. Lewis, 39 Mich. 233,; Norvell v. Camm, 6 Munf. (Va.) 1564 Real Property. [§ 426 him."^ The issuance of a patent, however, raises the presumption that it was validly issued, and one seeking to set it aside must sustain his averments in that regard by clear proof.^'' A patent, when issued, dates back, as against in- tervening claimants, to the time when the equitable title vested in the patentee by payments of the purchase price, or otherwise.^® 238. 8 Am. Dec. 742; State v. Bachelder, 5 Minn. 223 Gil. 178), 80 Am. Dec. 410. 38. Stark V. Starrs, 6 WaU. (U. S.) 412, 18 L. Ed. 928; Widdi- combe v. Childers, 124 U. S. 400, 31 L. Ed. 427; Cornelius v. Kes- sel, 128 U. S. 456, 32 L. Ed. 482: Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S. 242, 37 L. Ed. 152. 39. Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 30 L. Ed. 949; Schnee v. Schnee, 23 Wis. 377, 99 Am. Dec. 183; City of Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Port. (Ala.) 577; 33 Am. Dec. 325. 40. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 92, 20 L. Ed. 5-34; Hussman v. Durham, 165 IT. S. 144, 41 L. Ed. 664; Waters v. Bush, 42 Iowa, 255; Reynolds v. Ply- mouth County, 55 Iowa, 90; Waterman v. Smith, 13 Gal. 419. See post, § 377, note 76. CHAPTER XIX. VOLUNI'ARY TRANSFER INTER VIVOS. I. Classes of Conveyances. I 427. Conveyances at common law. 428. Conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses. 429. Conveyances employed in the United States. 430. Quitclaim deeds. 431. Surrender. 432. Conveyances failing to take effect in the manner intended. II. FoBM AND Essentials of a Conveyance. 433. General considerations. 434. Designation of parties. 435. Words of conveyance. 436. Exceptions and reservations. 437. Rules of construction. 438. Consideration. 439. Reality of consent. 440. Effect of alterations. III. Description of the Land. § 441. General considerations. 442. Description by government survey. 443. Reference to plat. 444. Monuments, courses and distances. 445. Boundaries on water. 446. Boundaries on ways. 447. Sufficiency of description. 448. Appurtenances. IV. Covenants ior Title. § 449. General considerations. 450. Covenant for seisin. 451. Covenant for right to convey. 452. Covenant against incumbrances. 453. Covenants for quiet enjoyment and of warranty. 454. Covenant for further assurance. 455. The measure of damages. 456. Covenants running with the land. V. ExEcuTio.N OF The Conveyance. § 457. Signing. (1565) 2 R. P.— 24 ' 1566 Real Fkoperty. [§ 427 458. Sealing. 459. Witnesses. 460. Acknowledgment. 461. Delivery. 462. Conditional delivery. 463. Acceptance. 464. Execution by agent. 465. Effect of execution — Return or cancellation. § 427. Conveyances at common law — Feoffment. The transfer of land by ''livery of seisin," which has already been briefly described/ was ordinarily known as a "feoffment," and the terms were, it seems, used interchangeably.- The person making the transfer was known as the "feoffor," and the transferee as the feoffee." The livery was ordinarily accompanied by a "charter of feoffment," declaring the limitations of the estate or estates vested in the feoffee, but the livery of seisin was alone necessary until the passage of the Statute of Frauds, which in effect declared that all estates created by livery of seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making and creating the same, or their agents, should be estates at will merely.^ This mode of transfer was available only in the case of estates accompanied by sei- sin, that is, estates of freehold in possession, and was not available for the transfer of rights in incorporeal things.* Since a feoffment operated on the possession alone, any person having possession of land, even though, as in the case of a tenant for years, not legally seised, could, by feoffment to a stranger, create in the latter an estate of any quantum; and so one having seisin as of an estate for life could create in another a greater estate. Since the effect of such a transfer of seisin was 1. Ante, § 14. Challis, Real Prop. 370. ; 2. Challis, Real Prop. (.3rd Ed.) 4. Sheppard's Touchstone, 228; 362. Williams, Real Prop. 31; 2 3. 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 1. See Co. Blackst. Comm. 314. See ante, Litt. 48; 2 Blackst. Comm. 313; § 16. <^ 427] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1567 to operate wrongfully upon the interest of tlie owner of the reversion or remainder, it was termed a "tort- ious ' ' conveyance.^ Transfer by feoffment is now in effect obsolete, though occasionally the theory of such a transfer may be resorted to for the purpose of upholding a con- veyance otherwise invalid or ineffective to carry out the evident purpose of the parties.*' In many states the statutes expressly dispense with the necessity of livery of seisin for the conveyance of real property. ''^ Fines and recoveries. Fines and recoveries were collusive actions brought for the purpose of ef- fecting a transfer of interests in land not otherwise transferable. They have been abolished by statute in England, and in no state of this country are they, it is believed, in practical use.^ They were for many years utilized for the purpose of barring estates tail, and thereby . evading the statute De Bonis Conditionalibus,^ but they were appropriate and necessary for other purposes, the most important of which was the transfer ■ of land by a married woman, she not being competent to make an ordinary conveyance. Grant. A grant was, at common law, made use of for the transfer of such interests in land as, from their nature, were incapable of transfer by feoffment, that is, of which there tonld be no seisin, including all rights in another's land, or other incorporeal things real, and also estates in remainder or reversion upon a free hold estate.^^ A grant always, involved a "deed," 5. Co. Litt. § 611, and Butler's St. 460. note; Co. Litt. 251a, 3.30b; Challis, 7. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § Real Prop. 371. 1470. 6. Witham v. Brooner, 63 111. 8. These proceedings are ex- .■'.44; Ware v. Richardson, '.', Md. plained in 2 Blackst. Comm. 348. 505; Rogers v. Sisters of Charity 9. Ante, § 28. 97 Md. 556; Hunt V. Hunt, 14 10. Co. Litt. 9b, 49a, 172a; 2 Pick. (Mass.) 374; Carr v. Rich- Blackst. Comm. 317; 2 Sanders, ardson, 157 Mass. 576, 32 N. E. Uses & Trusts (5th Ed.) 29. 958; Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Pa. See ante, § 16. 1568 Real Propeety. [^ 427 that is, a writing under seal, since no other form of writing had, at common law, any legal effect. ^^ At conmion law the lord's right to the services of the tenant, the ''seignory," could not be transferred to another without "attornment" by the tenant, that is, acceptance of the new lord. The same principle applied in the case of the grant of a reversion, it not being valid unless the tenant attorned to the grantee.^- The necessity of attornment was, as before stated, abolished in England by 4 Anno, c. 16 § 9, and is no longer recog- nized in this country. ^^ Lease. A lease is a conveyance of an estate for life, for years, or at will, by one who has a greater estate. At common law, if the estate conveyed was for life, livery of seisin was required,^^ but if for years or at will merely, an oral lease without livery was sufficient. ^^ By the Statute of Frauds, a writing was rendered necessary for the creation of an estate for years, excepting certain leases not exceeding three years from the making thereof. ^"^ But, even at common law, a lease for years of an incorporeal thing was in- valid unless in writing and under seal, since such a thing lay in grant for all purposes, and no other method of transfer thereof was recognized.^^ The form and re quisites of a lease have been previously considered, in connection with the subject of estates for years. ^'^^ Release. A conveyance by release is a con- veyance of an estate or interest in land to one who has possession of the land or a vested estate therein. It 11. Co. Litt. 172a; Slieppard's 2 Piatt, Leases, 1. Touchstone, 229; 1 Hayes, Convey- 16. 29 Car. II. c. 3, §"§ 1, 2 ancing (5th Ed.) 25; 2 Sanders, 17. Co. Litt. 85a; Tottel v Uses & Trusts (5th Ed.) 41. Howell, Noy, 54; 14 Vin. Abr. tit 12. Litt .§§ 551, 567, 568; Co. "Grant" (Ga.); Sheppard's Touch Litt. 309a, Butler's note. stone, 26T; Somerset v. Fogwell 13. See ante, §§ 53 (a). 5 Barn. & C. 875; Bird v. Hig 14. 2 Blackst. Comm. 318. ginson, 2 Adol. & E. 696. 15. Sheppard's Touchstone, 267; 17a. Ante, i 42. § 427] Tbansfer Intee Vivos. 1569 was utilized, at. common law, in cases in which the per- son to whom the conveyance was to be made was already in jDossession, so that no livery of seisin could be given unless he should first quit possession, which w^ould have involved an idle multiplication of cere- monies.^^ A release may be made to the tenant of a life estate by the owner of the reversion or remainder thereon, whether the life estate be one created by act of the parties, ^^ or one created by act of the law, such as as estate of dower or curtesy,^*^ the life estate being en- larged by the release to a fee simple or fee tail. A release may also be made by the owner of the reversion to the tenant of an estate for years or at will,-^ but not to a tenant at sufferance.-- Eeleases thus made by a reversioner or remainderman to the particular tenants are said by the common law writers to enure by way of enlargement of the estate {enlarger V estate). ^^ A mere interesse termini, that is, the right of a lessee who has not yet entered under his lease, does not entitle him to take a release by way of enlargement,-^ it being necessaiy that the lessee be in actual possession, or in legal possession by force of the Statute of Uses.^^ A release, in order to enlarge the particular estate to one of inheritance, must, at common law, contain the word "heirs," as in the case of a conveyance between strangers.^" A release mav also be made, not by way of en- largement of an estate, but by way of passing an estate {mitter Vest ate), as when one joint tenant or coparcener releases his estate to his cotenant. In this case, words of inheritance have never been required, since the per- son to whom the release is made is regarded as already seised of the freehold, and the release is merely a 18. 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. 22. Co. Litt. 270b. Eng. Law. 90. 23. Litt. § 465; Challis, Real 19. Co. Litt. 273b. Prop. 409. 20. 2 Sanders, Uses & Trusts 24. Litt. § 459; Co. Litt. 270a. (5th Ed.) 73. 25. See ante, § 100. 21. Litt §§ 460, 46.-.. 20. Litt. § 465; Co. Litt. 273b. 1570 Eeal Pkopekty. [§ 427 discharge from the claim of another seised under the same title.-' A release was never regarded as suf- ficient to pass the interest of one tenant in common to another, since they are regarded as having distinct freeholds.^* A third mode of operation of a release is by way of "extinguishment" of an interest in another's land, as when the owner of a rent, a right of profit, or an easement, releases his rights to the owner of the land subject thereto.-^ The only other modes of opera- tion of release at common law occurred in the case of a release, by one disseised, of all his right or claim in favor of the disseisor, or of his heir or feoffee, this being known as a "release by way of passing the right" {mitter le droit). ^^ A release must, at common law, be by deed, that is, by writing under seal.^^ Strictly speaking, at the present day, as at com- mon law, a release cannot be made to one having neither possession of the land nor a vested estate there- in,^^ but a conveyance purporting to be a release will almost invariably be upheld as a conveyance by bar- gain and sale or grant.^^ Assignment and surrender. The term ' ' assign- ment" in connection with the law of land, is commonly applied to the transfer of a chattel interest.^^ At com* 27. Co. Litt. 273b, and Butler's M. (Miss.) 130. note. 33. Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 28. 4 Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c 6, § 475, Fed. Cas. No. 787; Conn's 25; 2 Preston, Abstracts, 77. Heirs v. Manifee, 2 A. K. Marsh 29. Litt. § 480; Co. Litt. 280a. (Ky.) 396, 12 Am. Dec. 417; Pray 30. Litt. § 466; 4 Cruise, Dig. v. Pierce, 7 Mass. 381, 5 Am. Dec. tit. 32, c. 6, § 26. 59; Havens v. Sea Shore Land 31. Co. Litt. 264b; 2 PoUock & Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 365, 20 Atl. 497; Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 91. Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; 32. Runyon v. Smith, (C. C.) Hall's Lessee v. Ashby, 9 Ohio 18 Fed. 579; Branham v. City of 96, 34 Am. Dec. 424. See Ely v. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585; Warren v. Stannard, 44 Conn. 528. Childs, 11 Ma^. 222. Compare 34. 2 Blackst. Comm. 326; 4 Sessions v. Reynolds, 7 Smedes & Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 6 § 15. § 427] Teansfee Inter Vivos. 1571 moil law, an assignment of such an interest in land, as distinguished from an interest in an incorporeal thing, might be made without writing,"'' but by the Statute of Frauds^^' a writing signed by the assignor, or by his agent authorized in writing, is required. The question of the right of a tenant to make an assignment of his leasehold interest, and that of when a transfer by him constitutes an assigTiment and when a sublease, have been previously considered.'^' That class of conveyance known as surrender, in- volving the transfer of a particular estate to the re- versioner or remainderman, though recognized at common law, is frequently the subject of adjudication at the present day, and will be most conveniently dis- cussed in a subsequent section apart from the other common law conveyances.^* Exchange. An excliange is a mutual convey- ance of equal. interests in distinct pieces of land. At common law, if both pieces of land lay in the same county, the exchange might be oral, while, if situated in different counties, a deed was required.'*'^ But, by the Statute of Frauds, a writing is necessary on the exchange of freeholds or of terms for years other than certain terms for three years or less.^^^ No livery of seisin was necessary at common law, but each party to the exchange was required to enter while both were alive.^^ A common-law exchange could not be effected unless the estates of the respective parties were of the same legal quantum; — that is, an estate in fee simple could be 35.- 4 Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 6, 39. Litt. §§ 62, 63; Co. Litt. § 20. .50a. 36. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, S 3. As to 40. 29 Car. II. c. 3, §§ 1-3; the various state statutes bear- Co. Litt. 50a, Butler's note. See ing on the form of an assignment. Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. see 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. § 478; Cass v. Thompson, 1 N. H. 154. 65, 8 Am. Dec. 36; Rice v. Peet, 37. Ante, §§ 54, 55. 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 503. 38. Post, § 431. 41. Co. Litt. 50b. 1572 Real Property. [§ 428 exchanged only for an estate of the same character, an estate for twenty years only for an estate for twenty years, and so on.^^ xiie word ''exchange" was required to be used, and no other expression would supply its place.*^ A common-law exchange, answering to the foregoing requirements, probably never occurs in modern practice. § 428. Conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses. The Statute of Uses, as has been previously ex- ])lained, gave rise to two entirely new methods of trans- ferring legal estates in land, to-wit, the conveyance by ''bargain and sale," and that by "covenant to stand seised;" the former being based upon a use raised in the intended transferee by the payment of a pecuniary consideration, usually merely nominal, and the latter being based on the declaration of a use in favor of one related by blood or marriage, the statute executing the use in both cases.^* One effect of this statute was to enable the owner of land, by a mere contract of sale and the payment to him of a pecuniary consideration, to vest the legal title in another, without any writing or ceremony whatever, and with absolute secrecy, and to prevent such secret conveyances by bargain and sale a statute was passed in the same year, called the "Statute of Enrollments,"^^ requiring all bargains and sales of freehold interests, in order to be valid, to be made by deed, that is, writing under seal, enrolled in couii; or with certain officials. The statute did not apply to conveyances by covenant to stand seised. 42. Litt. §§ 64, 65; Co. Litt. 36; Dean v. Shelly, 57 Pa. St. 51a; 2 Blackst. Comm. 323: Anony- 426, 98 Am. Dec. 235; Windsor mous, 3 Salk. 157; Windsor v. v. Collinson, 32 Or. 297. Collinson, 32 Ore. 297; Long v. 44. See ante, § 100. Fuller, 21 Wis. 121. 45. 27 Hen. VIIL c. 16 (A. D. 43. Co. Litt. 51b; 2 Blackst. 1535). See 2 Sanders, Uses & Comm. 323; Eton College v. Win- Trusts (5th Ed.) 64; Digby, Hist. Chester, 3 Wils. 468; Cass v. Law Real Prop. (4th Ed.) 364. Thompson, 1 N. H. 65, 8 Am. Dec. § 428] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1573 This statute is probably not in force in any state.^^ Clandestine conveyances by bargain and sale being thus prevented by the Statute of Enrollments, conveyancers, soon after the statute, devised the conveyance by '* lease and release," taldng advantage of the fact that the statute required the enrollment of bargains and sales of ' 'freehold" interests only. This conveyance, as before explained, consisted of a bargain and sale of a leasehold interest to the intended grantee, which vested him with the legal possession, and this was followed by a deed of release of the reversion remaining in the former owner.^" A conveyance by covenant to stand seised is usually said to be based upon the consideration of blood or marriage.'*''''^ But in such case the word con- sideration is used, not in its technical sense of the equivalent for a promise, but in the sense of motive or inducement for the agreement to stand seised. "The exception in favor of those related by blood or marriage had in truth nothing to do with the doctrine of con- sideration and was established in the interest of the 46. See Givan v. Tout, 7 Blackf. Gray, Peripetuities, § 57. The (Ind.) 210; Marshall v. Fisk, 6 same view is adopted in Jackson Mass. 24, 4 Am. Dec. 76; Chandler v. Dunsbaugh, 1 Johns. Gas. 92. It V. Chandler, 55 Cal. 267; Givan v. is asserted in support of this Doe, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 210; opinion view that previous to the stat- of Justices, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 595. ute of enrollments a covenant to Compare Underwood v. Campbell, stand seised could be supported 14 N. H. 393. by a pecuniary consideration, and 47. 1 Hayes, Conveyancing, that after that statute the con- (5th Ed.) 76. See ante. § 100. trary view was adopted merely to 47a. That a consideration of prevent the statute being nulli- blood or marriage is necessary, fied by regarding conveyances see post, this section, notes 49- which were in their nature deeds 51, 63. In Massachusetts the view of bargain and sale as covenants has been asserted that a covenant to stand seised. But covenants to stand seised may be supported to stand seised apipear not to by a pecuniary consideration. have been recognized previous to Trafton v. Hawes, 102 Mass. 533, the Statute of Enrollments. Pro- 3 Am. Rep. 494; Ricker v. Brown, fessor Ames says that Sharington 183 Mass. 424, 67 N. E. 3.53. See v. Strotton, Plowd. 298 (anno ].574 Real Property. [§ 428 great English families. "^^ What degree of relationship is sufficient to support a conveyance of this character appears to have been but little discussed, and no restriction in this regard has been asserted, a covenant to stand seised in favor of a nephew or cousin being- regarded as valid,^^ as is no doubt one in favor of a grandchild.^*^ As regards connection by marriage, it would seem to be necessary that the beneficiary be the wife, or perhaps the husband, of one wdio is within the necessary degree of blood relationship, so that such a conveyance by A to his daughter-in-law or to his cousin's wife would be valid, but not such a conveyance by one of the latter to A.^^ This is by reason of the fact that this form of conveyance was upheld merely to enable one to perpetuate and make provision for his or her own family, and while a conveyance to the wife of one's relative might conduce to this end, a con- veyance to a relative of one's wife could not so operate. The valuable consideration necessary to support a conveyance by bargain and sale is either money or money's worth.^- It involves ordinarily the idea of a benefit to the grantor, but presumably a mere detri- ment to the grantee would be sufficient for this pur- pose as it is to support an executory contract. A mere promise on the part of the grantee, as to pay money^^ or to support the grantor^* is sufficient, and a 1565) "was the first case of this covenant to stand seised in favor kind." See 21 Harv. Law Rev. at of a son in law or daughter in p. 269, Lectures on Legal History. law is valid see also, Gale v. p. 241. Coburn, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 397; 48. Prof. J. B. Ames in 21 Bell v. Scammon. 15 N. H. 381, Harv. Law Rev, at p. 269, Lee- 41 Am. Dec. 706; Contra, Corwin tures on Legal History, p. 241. v. Corwin, 9 Barb. 219 6 N. Y. 49. Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, 342. 93; Sheppard's Touchstone, 511. 52. 2 Preston, Conveyancing, 50. See Hansom v. Buckner, 4 373; Jackson v. Pike, 9 Cow. (N. Dana (Ky.) 251; Stovall v. Bar- Y-.) 69; Redmond v. Cass, 226 111. nett, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 207. 120. 51. See the full discussion by 53. 2 Sanders, Uses & Trusts White, J., in Thompson v. Thomp- (5th Ed.) 56. son, 17 Ohio St. 649. That a § 429] Tbansfer Inter Vivos. 1575 mere condition subsequent in the conveyance, calling for the performance of some act by the grantee, has apparently been so regarded,^^ as has a reservation of a rent, of either substantial or nominal value.^^ Mar- riage is also a valuable consideration, in the sense that a bargain and sale to one in consideration of his intended marriage with one of the grantor's family is valid.^^ § 429. Conveyances employed in the United States. In most of the states of this country there are statutory provisions authorizing the transfer of land by simple forms of conveyance,^* which, in their operation, much resemble the common-law "grant," except that they are not confined to incorporeal things. The same pur- pose of simplification of conveyancing has in England been attained by a statute providing that all corporeal tenements and hereditaments shall, as regards the con- veyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant, as well as in livery.^^ Conveyances b}' way of bargain and sale have, however, been in fre- quent use in this country,*"^ and, even in states where there are statutory provisions of the character referred to, the words "bargain and sell" are ordinarily used in a conveyance. In such states, in fact, it is difficult, and for most, if not all, purposes, unimportant, to say 54. Young V. Ringo, 1 T. B. the thorough discussion of the Men. (Ky.) 30; Spalding v. Hal- local law of the different states lenbeck, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 292. in this regard by Professor John 55. Stonley y. Bracebridge, 1 R. Rood, in 4 Mich. Law Rev. 109. Leon. 6; Exum v. Canty, 34 Miss. 59. "Real-Property Act," St. 8 533; Castleton v. Langdon, 19 Vt. & 9 Vict. c. 106, § 2 (A. D. 1845), 210. 60. See Pascault V. Cochran (C. 56. Barker v. Keate, 2 Mod. C.) 34 Fed. 358; Givan v. Tout, 7 253. Black'f. (Ind.) 210; Nelson v. 57. Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, Davis, 35 Ind. 474; Chiles v. Con- 91; Arnold v. Estis, 92 N. C. 162; 'ey's Heirs, 2 Dana (Ky.) 21; Thompson v. Thompson, 17 Ohio Sanders v. Hartzog, 6 Rich. (S. C.) St. 649. '*'^^; Holland v. Rogers, 33 Ark. r.8. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, S ^51; Stewart v. Stewart. 171 Ala. 1480-H82. And see particularly 485, 54 So. 604; Bronston's Adm'r 1576 Reax, Property. [§ 430 whether a particular conveyances operates by force of the Statute of Uses or under the local statute. In order, however, that a conveyance be regarded as taking effect by way of bargain and sale, it must, as was be- fore stated, be supported by a valuable consideration, either actual or expressed.^^ Conveyances by way of covenant to stand seised have been recognized in this country ,'^2 but, since a con- sideration of blood or marriage is necessary,^^ there is but little opportunity for their employment. Even when the proper consideration does exist, a conveyance in form under the local statute, or by way of bargain and sale, with a recital of a pecuniary consideration, would usually be employed. Conveyances by lease and release have never been employed to any extent in this country, since the Statute of Enrollments, which constituted the reason for their use in England, is not in force here. § 430. Quitclaim deeds. There is, in this country, a well-recognized class of conveyances, known as **quit- V. Bronston's Heirs, 141 Ky. 639, (N. Y.) 85; Ward v. Wooten. 75 133 S. W. 584. N. C. 413; Sprague v. Woods, 4 61. Corwin v. Corwin, 6 N. Y. Watts & S. (Pa.) 192; Fisher v. 342, 57 Am. Dec. 453; Wood v. Strickler, 10 Pa. St. 348, 51 Am. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509, 67 Am. Dec. Dec. 488; Watson v. Watson, 24 62; Lambert v. Smith, 9 Ore. 185; S. C. 228. 58 Am. Rep. 247; Barry Den d. Jackson v. Hampton, 30 v. Shelby, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 229. N. C. 457; Gault v. Hall, 26 Me. 63. Rollins v. Riley, 44 N. H. 561; Boardman v. Dean, .^.4 Pa. 9; Jackson v. Caldwell, 1 Cow. (N. St. 252. Y.) 622; Gault v. Hall, 26 Me. That the recital of the consider- 561; Thompson v. Thompson, 17 ations is conclusive for the pur- Ohio St. 649; Doe d. Cobb v. Hines, pose of supiporting the conveyance 44 N. C. 343. 59 Am. Dec. 559; as a bargain and sale, see post, § Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Pa. St. 438, note 75. 460; 2 Sanders, Uses & Trusts 5th 62. Murray v. Kerney, 115 Md. Ed. 98; Contra in Massachusetts. 514, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 937, See ante, this section, note 47a. 81 Atl. 6; Merrill v. Publishers' 64. See, as to the early use of Paper Co., 77 N. H. 285, 90 Atl. the word "quitclaim," 2 Pollock 786; .Tackson v. Swart, 20 Johns. & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law. 91. § 430] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1577 claim deeds," which are to some extent a development of the common-law release, and which have acquired their name from one of the words ordinaril}^ used in the latter instrument.^^ Such a conveyance purports merely to convey whatever title to the particular land the grantor may have, and its use excludes any implica- tion that he has a good title, or any title at all/'' Accordingly, as a general rule, it contains no covenants for title, and its employment is, in some states, re- garded as in itself notice to the purchaser of possible defects in the title, so that he cannot claim to occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser.*'^ Such a con- veyance, moreover, is not regarded as transferring an after acquired title on the principle of estoppel/'''' A quitclaim deed, how^ever, is sufficient in itself to pass the grantor's existing title to the same extent as a deed of grant or bargain and sale,^^ and its validity is not, like the common-law release, dependent upon the existence of an estate or interest in the grantee/^ The question w^hether a conveyance is a mere quitclaim is determined by a construction of the instrument as a whole, with reference to the circumstances under 65. City & County of San Fran- Dutton, 79 111. 466; Callahan v. Cisco V. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465, 79 Davis, 90 Mo. 78, 2 S. W, 216; Am. Dec. 187; Kerr v. Freeman, Landes v. Brant, 10 How. (U. S.) 33 Miss. 292; Emmel v. Headlee 372, 13 L. Ed. 460; French's (Mo.) 7 S. W. 22; Coe v. Persons Lessee v. Spencer, 21 How. (U. S.) Unknown. 43 Me. 432; Garrett v. 228, 16 L. Ed. 97. Christopher, 74 Tex. 4.'"j3, 15 Am. 68. Bradbury v. Davis, 5 Colo. St. Rep. 850, 12 S. W. 67. 265; Kyle v. Kavanaugh, 103 Mass. 66. See j)OHt. S 5r.7(m). :;56; Grant v. Bennett, 96 111. 513; 67. Post, § 545(b). Wilson v. Albert, 89 Mo. 537, 1 Since a government patent, S. W. 20fi; Mclnerney v. Beck, 10 when issued, relates back to the Wash. 515, 39 Pac. 130. So by date of the entry, it enures to the statute in some states. See Hoff- benefit of one to whom the man v. Harrington, 28 Mich. 90; patentee has, since the entry, con- Kerr v. Freeman, 33 Miss. 292. veyed the land, even though by a 69. Spaulding v. Bradley. 79 "quitclaim" purporting to convey Cal. 449, 22 Pan. 47; Kerr v. Free- merely such title as he has. Crane man, 33 Miss. 292. v. Salmon, n Cal. 63; Welch v. 1578 Real Property. [§ 431 which it was given.'*' It may be said, however, that the cases do not appear to be entirely consistent as to the criteria controlling in the matter.'^ § 431. Surrender. That character of conveyance known as ''surrender" was fully recognized at common law and might accordingly have been properly dis- cussed in the previous section dealing with conveyances at common law. In view however of the practical im- portance of the law of surrender it has appeared to be expedient to devote a separate section thereto. "Surrender" has been defined as a yielding up of an estate for life or years to him that hath an im- mediate estate in reversion or remainder, wherein the estate for life or years may drowTi by mutual agree- ment between them."'^^ Unfortunately, this technical meaning of the word, as referring to the transfer of an estate, has been somew^hat obscured by its frequent use in an untechnical sense, as referring to the re- linquishment or yielding up, not of an estate, but of the physical possession of the premises, as when the lessee covenants to "surrender" the premises in good con- dition at the end of the term, and the courts frequently fail clearly to distinguish between such a surrender of possession and a surrender, properly so called, of an estate for life or j^ears. Quite frequently, in using 70. See United States v. Call- Cummings v. Dearborn, 56 Vt. fornia & Oregon Land Co., 148 U. 441. S. 31, 37 L. Ed. 354; Derrick 71. See post, § 567(m). V. Brown, 66 Ala. 162 Reynolds That the word "quitclaim" is V. Shaver, 59 Ark. 299; Morrison used does not in itself show that V. Wilson, 30 Cal. 344; Wightman the conveyance is legally a quit- V. Spofford; 56 Iowa, 145; Taylor claim deed. Hitt v. Caney Fork V. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 26 Am. Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 93, 139 Rep. 304; Nichols v. Schmitton, S. W. 693; Garrett v. Christopher, 107 Tex. 54, 174 S. W. 283; Cook 74 Tex. 453, 15 Am. St. Rep. 850, v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 S. 12 S. W. 67. W. 1094; Baldwin v. Drew, — - 72. Co. Litt. 337b. See 2 Piatt, (Tex. Civ.) --, ISO S. W. 614; Leases, 499; Comyn, Landl. & Ten. 336. § 431] Teansfeb Inter Vivos. 1579 the term even in its technical sense, a surrender "of the lease" is spoken of, but this must be understood as merely an elliptical expression signifying a surrender of the estate created by the lease. The courts occasionally refer to the "rescission" or '' cancellation" of the lease by the parties to the tenancy, without apparently recognizing that a termina- tion of the tenancy as a result of an agreement of tlie parties, made subsequently to its creation, necessarily involves the divesting of a leasehold estate out of the lessee, or his assignee, and a revesting thereof in the landlord.''^^ After an estate, whether in fee simple or for life or for years, has been conveyed, the grantor and grantee in the conveyance cannot effect a reconveyance of the estate to the former by undertaking to "rescind" or "cancel" the original conveyance.^"* The parties to a contract can rescind or cancel the contract, that is, they can make a new contract by which each agrees to forego his rights under the previous contract, but the mere making of a new contract can never transfer property rights even to a person in whom they were formerly vested. Any rescission or -cancellation, so called, of a lease, by the parties thereto, must con- sequently, in order to terminate the tenancy, constitute in legal effect a surrender, and must satisfy the re- quirements existing with reference to such a mode of convey ance.'^^* In order that a surrender may be effected, the estate surrendered must be no greater in quantum that the estate of the surrenderee, since otherwise it cannot merge therein.''' And furthermore it must 73. See Silva v. Bair, 141 Cal. 94 N. W. 431; Snyder v. Ilard- 599, 75 Pac. 162; Alschuler v. ing, 34 Wash. 286, 75 Fac. 812. Schiff, 164 in. 298, 45 N. E. 74. Post, § 465. 424; Evans v. McKanna, 89 Iowa 74a. Post, this section, note 362, 8 Am. St. Rep. 390, 56 80. N. W. 527; Andre v. Graebner, 75. 3 Preston, Conveyancing, 126 Mich. 116, 85 N. W. 464; 166 et seq. Geddis v. Folliett, 16 S. D. 610, 1580 Real Property. [§ 431 immediately precede the latter estate as regards the right of possession, with no vested estate intervening.'^'^ Consequently if A leases to B for years and B leases to C, the subtenant C cannot surrender to A, and if property is devised to A for life, with remainder to B for life, with remainder to C in fee, A cannot, though B can, surrender to C. Express surrender. Surrender may be either ''express" or "by operation of law." At common law an express surrender, in the ordinary case, could be made orally,''^ but this was changed by the provision of the English Statute of Frauds that a surrender, if not by act and operation of law, must be in writing, signed by the surrenderor or his agent, and there are in most of the states statutes to a similar effect.'^* Before the Statute of Frauds the cancellation of an instrument of lease was regarded as equivalent to an oral surrender, and valid as such,'^^ but this is no longer the case.*"' As elsewhere stated,^^ the cancella- tion of an instrument of conveyance, after its delivery, does not have the effect of revesting in the maker the estate conveyed thereby, and this is as true of a con- veyance by way of lease for a terra of years as of a conveyance in fee simple. While the words "surrender, grant and yield up" are ordinarilj^ used in a formal instrument intended to take effect as a surrender, no particular words are necessary, it being sufficient that an intention to trans- fer the leasehold interest to the reversioner clearly appears.^- Accordingly, an instrument in form a lease 76. Except when an estate for Gilb. Eq. Cas. 235. years is interposed between two 80. Roe d. Berkley v. Arch- freeliold estates. Id. 107, and bishop of York, 6 East 86; Doe ante, § 34. d. Courtail v. Thomas, 9 Barn. 77. Co. Litt. 338a; Sheppard's & C. 288; Rowan v. Lytle, 11 Touchstone 300. Wend. (N. Y.) 616. 78. See 2 Tiffany, Landlord 81. Post, § 465. & Ten., § 189a. 82. Farmer v. Rogers, 2 Wils. 79. Magennis v. Mac Cullogh, 26; Shepard v. Spaulding, 4 § 431] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1581 of the premises by the tenant to the landlord has been regarded as sufficient as a surrender,'*" as has what was in terms an "agreement" for the relin- quishment of tlie leasehold, it being intended to take effect as a surrender,^"* Apparently, in England, where a mortgage transfers the legal estate to tlie mortgagee, a mortgage of the leasehold by the tenant to his land- lord would take effect as a surrender ,'"•'• l3ut such a result could not follow in any juiisdiction where a mortgage does not transfer the legal title."*' Surrender by operation cf law. A surrender by "act and oi)eration of law," which is expressly ex- cepted from the Statute of Frauds, is a surrender which the law infers from certain acts by the parties as being inconsistent with the continued distinct px- istenee of the two former estates. Occasionall}^ the theory appears to be asserted that surrender by opera- tion of law takes place because the acts of the parties show an intention or agreement that the leasehold estate shall be surrendered;^" but it is somewhat difficult to regard a surrender as taking place by operation of law when it results from the agreement or intention Mete. (Mass.) 416; Greider's Ap- ing Ass'n, 106 111. 221, 46 N. E. peal, 5 Pa. St. 422, 47 Am. Dec. 752; Talbot v. Whipple, 14 Allen 413. (Mass.) 177; Tobener v. Miller, 83. Loyd v. Langford, 2 Mod. 68 Mo. App. 569; Meeker v. 174; Smith v. Mapleback, 1 Spalsbury, 66 N. J. Law 60, Term R. 441; Shepard v. Spauld- 48 Atl. 1026; Home Coupon fix- ing, 45 Mass. (4 Mete.) 416. change Co. v. Goldfarb, (N. J. 84. Harris v. Hancock, 91 N. Eq.) 74 At. 14.!; O'Neill v. Y. 340; Allen v. .laquish, 21 Pear.se, 88 N. J. L. 733. 96 Atl. "Wend. (N. Y.) 628. 1102, affirming 87 N. J. L. 382, 85. See Cottee v. Richardson, 94 Atl. 312; Bedford v. Ter- 7 Exeh. 143. hune, 30 N. Y. 453, 86 Atl. 394; 80. See Breeae v. Bange, 2 Hart v. Pratt, 19 Wa.sh. 560, 53 E. D. Smith N. Y.) 474. Pae. 711. 87. See e. g. Beall v. White, And see cases cited this sec- 94 U. S. 382, 24 L. Ed. 173; tion. post note 93. Brewer v. National Union Build- R. P.— 25 1582 Real Propee,ty. [§ 431 of tlie parties, even tlioiigh this is shown by acts rather than by words. ^^ A surrender by operation of law occurs when the tenant accepts from the reversioner a new lease, to be- gin immediately, or at any time during the existence of the previous lease; this result being based on the theory that, by such acceptance, the tenant is estopped to deny the validity of such new lease, which neverthe- less cannot be valid unless the first lease is terminated.*^ The new lease must, it seems, be sufficient to pass an in- terest according to the intention and contract of the pav- ties,^*^ but the fact that the new lease is oral is imma- terial if an oral lease is sufficient to create the interest intended to be created.^^ Since the surrender in such case is by operation of law, it might be considered as takings place even contrary to the intention of the parties.^- 88. So in Felker v. Richard- son, 67 N. H. 509, 32 Atl. 830, it is said, per Carpenter, J., "A surrender by agreement, whether express or implied, is the act, not of the law, but of the parties. To constitute a surrender by opera- tion of law, overt acts of both parties inconsistent with the con- tinuance of the term are essen- tial." But see Professor Aigler's note in 15 Mich. Law Rev. 659, and the article there referred to in 5 Irish Jurist, 117, also Editor- ial note 28 Harv. Law Rev. 313. 89. Lyon v. Reed, 13 Mees. & W. 285; Otis v. McMillan, 70 Ala. 46; Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507. 27 Pac. 369; Flagg v. Dow, 99 Mass. 18; Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 661. 91 N. W. 580; Schief- felin V. Carpenter, 15 Wend (N. Y.) 400; Edwards v. Hale, 37 W. Va. 193, 16 S. E. 487. Acceptance by the tenant from the landlord of an interest other than an estate for years, if in- consistent with the former ten- ancy, has likewise been regarded as effecting a surrender by oper- ation of law, as when "a lessee for years accepts a grant of a rent, common, estovers, herbage, or the like, for life or years, out of the same lands." Bac. Abr., Leases (S.) 2, 1. See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. § 190 b (2). 90. Doe d. Biddulph v. Poole, 11 Q. B. 713; Zick v. London United Tramways Ltd., (1908) 2 K. B. 126; Schiefflin v. Car- penter. 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 400; Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. 141. 28 Am. Rep. 120. 91. Comyn's Dig. "Surrender," (Tl); Fenner v. Blake, (1900), 1 Q. B. 426; Evans v. McKanna, 89 Iowa, 362, 48 Am. St. Rep. 390, 56 N. W. 527; Schiefflin v. Car- penter. -5 Wend. (N. Y.) 400; Coe V. Hobby. 72 N. Y. 141, 28 Am. Rep. 120. 92. See Lyon v. Reed, 13 Mees. & W. 285; Brown v. Cairns, 107 -§431] Tkansfer Intek Vivos. 158o Occasionally, however, a different view has l>een taken, that the new lease merely raises a presumption of surrender, capable of rebuttal by evidence that the intention was otherwise.^^ The question has occasionally arisen whether an assignee of the lessee, by reason of his recognition by the landlord as tenant of the premises, can be regarded as holding under a new lease, so as to effect a sur- render of the estate created by the original lease, and consequently to put an end to the liability of the original lessee on account of rent. The cases are generally to the effect that the mere acceptance of rent from the assignee does not involve a new lease, so as to effect a surrender,^* and it is difficult to see how any other view could be adopted. The assignee is bound to pay the rent, an'd the acceptance of payment from him involves merely the recognition of a liability already existing.^^ A second mode of surrender by operation of law, and one which frequently occurs, results from the re- lowa, 727, 77 N. W. 478; Enyeart (Mass.) 337; Detroit Pharmacal V. Davis, 17 Neb. 228, 22 N. W. Co. v. Burt. 124 Mich. 220, 82 449. N. W. 893; Rees v. Lowry, 57 93. Flagg V. Dow, 99 Mass. 18 Minn. 381, 59 N. W. 310; Ed- (semble) ; Thomas v. Zumbalen. wards v. Spalding, 20 Mont. 54, 43 Mo. 471; Brown v. Linn 49 Pac. 443; Bouscaren v. Brown, Woolen Co., 114 Me. 266, 95 Atl. 40 Neb. 722, 42 Am. St. Rep. 692, 1037; Smith v. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 59 N. W. 385; Creveling v. De 31, 2 Am. St. Rep. 362, 15 N. E. Hart, 54 N. J. Law 338. 23 At. 70. See Editorial note 22 Harv. 611: Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Law Rev. 55. Y. 205; Frank v. McGuire, 42 Pa. 94. Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 77; Adams v. Burke, 21 R. L 233, 13 L. R. A. 418. 27 Pac. 612; 126, 42 At. 515; Granite BIdg. Triest & Co. v. Goldstone, 173 Cal Corp. v. Rubin, 40 R. I. 208, 100 240, 159 Pac. 715; Cuesta v. Gold- Atl. 310; Johnson v. Norman, 98 smith, 1 Ga. App. 48, 57 S. E. Wash. 331, 167 Pac. 923. And 983; Grommes v. St. Paul Trust cases cited ante, § 407, note 59c. Co., 147 111. 634, 35 N. E. 820, 95 There are cases however 7 Am. St. Rep. 248; Harris v. which regard the original lessee Heachman, 62 Iowa, 411, 17 N. as relieved from liability in such W. 592; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 f'nsh. case. See ante, § 407, note 59d. 1584 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 431 linquishment of possession by the tenant and the re- sumption of possession by the landlord.''*' The theory of such surrender would seem to be that the revesting of possession in the landlord to the exclusion of the tenant, by the action of both parties, being inconsistent with the continuance of an outstanding leasehold in the tenant, both are estopped to assert that the relation of landlord and tenant still exists. It is immaterial whether such change of possession is the result of agreement. The tenant may relinquish, possession to the landlord in accordance with an agreement to that ef- fect,''" but more frequently the change of possession oc- curs as a result of the abandonment of the premises by the tenant and the subsequent resumption of the pos- session thereof by the landlord. The question frequenth' arises whether there has been such a resumption of possession by the landlord, upon the abandonment of the premises by the tenant, as to give rise to a surrender by operation of law, relieving the tenant from liability under the lease. This appears to depend, in each case, on whether the land- lord has taken possession with the intention of oc- cupying and controlling the premises as his own, to 96. Grimman v Legge, 8 Barn. ises and the tenant accedes to & C. 324; Dodd v. Acklom, 6 such demand. See e. g. Kean Man. & G. 672; Shahan v. v. Rogers, 146 Iowa, 559, 123 N. Herzberg, 73 Ala. 59; WiUiams W. 978: Conkling v. Tuttle. 52 V. Jones, 1 Bush (Ky.) 621; Mich. 630, 18 N. W. 391; Smith Lamar v. McNamee, 10 Gill & J. v. Pendergast. 26 Minn. 318, 3 N. (Md.) 116, 32 Am. Dec. 152; W. 978; Frankel v. Sternau, 92 Talbot V. Whipple, 14 Allen, Ohio St. 197, 110 N. E. 747; (Mass.) 177; Prior v. Klso, 81 Patchin's Ex'r v. Dickerman, 31 Mo. 2^1; Elgutter v. Drishaus, 44 Vt. 666; Eimerman v. Nathan, Neb. 378, 63 N. W. 19; Dennis v. 116 Wis. 124, 92 N. W. 550 Miller, 68 N. J. Law 320, 53 Atl. {semhle) ; Boyd v. Gore, 143 Wis. 394; Elliott v. Aiken, 45 N. H. 5,31, 128 N. W. 68; Compare 30; Hart v. Pratt, 19 Wash. 560, Whittaker v. Barker, 1 Cromp & 53 Pac. 711. M. 113; Lamar v. McNamee, 10 97. There is such an agree- Gill & J. (Md.) 116, 32 Am. Dec. ment, it appears, if the landlord ]52; Felker v. Richardson, 67 N. demands possession of the prem- H. 509, 32 Atl. 830. § 431J Transfek Inter Vivus. 1585 the exclusion of the tenant in case the latter desires to return,"^ and this is ordinarily a question of fact.''''* That the landlord, after the tenant's abandonment, entered and cared for the premises,^ or that he made repairs,- has been regarded as not in itself involving such a resumption of possession. When the tenant, upon abandoning the premises, sends the key to the landlord or leaves it at his residence or place of business, the fact that the landlord fails to return it to the tenant does not necessarily show a resumption of exclusive pos- session of the jDremises for this purpose,-^ though the 98. Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 369, 25 Am. St. Rep. 145; Duffy v. Day, 42 Mo. App. 638; Meeker v. Spalsbury, 66 N. J. Law 60, 48 Atl. 1026; Har- grove V. Bourne, 47 Okla. 484, 150 Pac. 121. 99. Hays v. Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 72 S. W. 563; Carson v. Arvantes, 10 Colo. App. 582, 50 Pac. 1080; Okie v. Pearson, 23 App. D. C. 170; Brewer v. Nation- al Bldg. Ass'n, 166 111. 221, 46 N. E. 752; Armour Packing Co. v. Des Moines Park Co.. 116 Iowa, 723, 93 Am. St. Rep. 270, 89 N. W. 196; Sander v. Holstein Com- mission Co., 118 Mo. App. 29, 121 Mo. App. 293; Hargrove v. Bourne, 47 Okla. 484, 150 Pac. 121; White v. Berry, 24 R. I. 74. 52 Atl. 682; Kneeland v. Schmidt. 78 Wis. :545. 11 L. R. A. 498, 47 N. W. 438. 1. .Joslin v. McLean, 99 Mich. 480, 58 N. W. 467; Duffy v. Day, 42 Mo. App. 638; Rucker v. Mason,— Okla.,— 161 Pac. 195; Milling V. Becker, 96 Pa. 182. 2. Cook V. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99, 4 So. 713; Brewer v. National Union Bldg. Ass'n 166 111. 221, 46 N. E. 752; Sessinghaus v. Knocke, 127 Mo. App. 300, 105 S. W. 283; Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, 16 L. R. A. 183, 28 Am. St. Rep. 636, 31 N. E. 94; Breuckman v. Twibill, 89 Pa. 58; Smith v. Hunt, 32 R. I. 326, 79 Atl. 826. 3. Oaster v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. Div. 575; Fehringer v. Wagner, Stockbridge Trading Co., 61 Colo. 359, 157 Pac. 1071; Ledsinger v. Burke, 113 Ga., 74, 38 S. E. 313; ToUe V. Orth, 75 Ind. 298, 39 Am. Rep. 147; Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa, 345, 35 Am. Rep. 278, 3 N. W. 92; Withers v. Larrabee. 48 Me. 570 Joslin v. McLean, 99 Mich. 480, 58 N. W. 467; Lucy v. Wilkins, 33 Minn. 441, 23 N. W. 861; Landt v. Schneider, 31 Mont. 15. 77 Pac. 307; Underbill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576; Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio .■!44, L. R. A. 1918B, 96, 116 N. E. 797; Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370, 44 Am. Rep. 114; John B. Webster Co. V. Grossman. 33 S .D. 383, 146 N. W. 565, (acceptance of Key by Janitor); C'liandler v. Hinds, 135 Wis. 43, 115 N. W. :!39. That the landlord, for the pur- 1586 Real Peopejrty. [§ 431 acceptance and retention of tlie key, combined with other circumstances, may have this effect.'^ The attempt of the landlord to lease the premises to a third person,^ or even his actual making of such a lease, to take effect immediately in possession, does not, in a number of jurisdictions, show such an assumption of control over the premises as to give rise to a surrender, re- lieving the former tenant from further liability under the previous lease,^ especially in case the landlord, before making the second lease, notifies the former tenant that he is about to make such a lease on the latter 's account, that is, that his purpose is to reduce, but not necessarily to extinguish, the latter 's liability for rent.'^ By other cases it is held that such reletting pose of making repairs, obtained the key from the tenant, was held not to relieve the tenant, he having been notified that he would still be held liable. Smith V. Hunt, 32 R. I. 326, 79 Atl. 823. 4. Phene v. Popplewell, 12 C. B. N. S. 334; Brewer v. National Union Bldg. Ass'n 166 111. 221, 46 N. E. 752; Hesseltine v. Seavey, 16 Me. 212; Buckingham Apart- ment House Co. V. Dafoe, 78 Minn. 268, 80 N. W. 974; Fink V. Browe Co., (N. J. Ch.) 99 Atl. 926; Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430. 5. Walls V. Atcheson, 3 Bing. 462; Joslin v. McLean, 99 Mich. 48, 58 N. W. 467; Blake v. Dick, 15 Mont. 236, 48 Am. St. Rep. 671, 38 Pac. 1072; O'Neil v. Pearse. 88 N. J. L. 733, 96 Atl. 1102 aff'g 87 N. J. L. 382, 94 Atl. 312; Haynes V. Aldrich. 133 N. Y. 287, 16 L. R. A. 183, 28 Am. St. Rep. 636, 31 N. E. 94; Lane v. Nelson. 167 Pa. 602, 31 Atl. 864. In Meagher V. Eilers Music House, S4 Ore. 33, 164 Pac. 373, the decision to this effect was to some extent based on the fact that the second lease expressly reserved a right in the original tenant to resume possession. 6. Humiston, Keeling & Co. v. Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 51 N. E. 893; Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa, 345, 3 N. W. 92; H. S. Chase & Co. v. Evans, 178 Iowa, 885, 160 N. W. 346; Scheelky v. Koch, 119 N. C. 80, 25 S. E. 713; Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio, 344, L. R. A. 1918B, 96, 116 N. E. 797; Bowen V. Clarke, 22 Ore. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 625, 30 Pac. 430; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370, 44 Am. Rep. 114; Auer v. Hoffmann. 132 Wis. 620, 112 N. W. 1090. 7. See Williamson v. Crossett, 62 Ark. 393: Renard v. Renard, — Cal.— 165 Pac. 694; Rehkopf v. Wirz, 31 Cal. App. 695, 161 Pac. 285; Brown v. Cairns, 107 Iowa, 727. 77 N. W. 478; Kean v. Rogers, 146 Iowa. 559, 123 N. W. 754; Oldewurtel v. Wiesenfeld, 97 Md. 165. 54 Atl. 969; Alsup v. § 431] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1587 necessarily brings to an end the tenancy previously existing,^ and in favor of this view is the fact that the contrary view appears to involve a right of possession in two distinct persons under two distinct leases at one and the same time.** A third mode of surrender by operation of law oc- curs in the case of a new lease by the landlord to a third person, accompanied by the former tenant's re- linquishment of possession in favor of such person. ^*^ And it is apparently on this principle, or on a prin- ciple akin thereto, that a surrender by operation of law has occasionally been regarded as taking place when the landlord accepted as his tenant a sublessee of the original tenant.^^ Banks, 68 Miss. 664, 13 L. R. A. 598, 24 Am. St. Rep. 294, 9 So. 895; McGinn v. B. H. Gladding Dry Goods Co., 40 R. I. 348, 101 Atl. 129. 8. Oastler v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. Div. 575: Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 25 Am. St. Rep. 145, 27 Pac. 380: Rice v. Dudley, 65 Ala. 68; Haycock v. Johnston, 97 Minn. 289, 114 Am. St. Rep. 715. 106 N. W. 304; Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 49 L. R. A. 580, 76 Am. St. Rep. 327, 56 N. E. 903; Pelton V. Place 71 Vt. 430, 46 Atl. 63. 9. See 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. p. 1340, 14 Mich. Law Rev. 82; 15 Id. 559. In Whitcomb v. Brant. 100 Atl. 175, it Mas held by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Ap- peals that a lessor making a new lease, upon abandonment by the first lessee, at a higher rent than that reserved in the first lease, was not liable for the ex- cess to the first lessee, although he had refused to consent to a surrender. The case is criticized. 30 Harv. Law Rev. 766. 10. Nickells v. Atherstone, 10 Q. B. 944; Morgan v. McCollister, 110 Ala. 319, 20 So. 54; Triest & Co. V. Goldstone, 173 Cal. 240, 159 Pac. 715; Williams v. Vander- bilt, 145 111. 238, 21 L. R. A. 489, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486, 34 N. E. 476; Rogers v. Dockstader, 90 Kan. 189, 13S Pac. 717; Kins^y v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112; Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351, 19 Am. Rep. 416; Gallop v. Murphy, 160 Mo. App. 1, 141 S. W. 438; Washoe Coui.ty Bank v. Cai ipbell, 41 Nev. 153, 67 Pac. 643; In re Sherwoods, 210 Fed. 754. As to the effect of the invalidity of the new lease, see editorial note 28 Harv. Law Rev. 313, Commenting on Johnson v. North- ern Trust Co., 265 111. 263, 106 N. E. 814. Compare 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. p. 1347. 11. Dills v. Stobie, 81 lU. 202 (srmble); Stimmel v. Waters, 2 Bush (Ky.) 282; Amory v. Kan- offsky, 117 Mass. 351, 19 Am. Rep. 1588 Real, Property. [§§ 431, 432 Effect of surrender. A surrender by a par- ticular tenant has the effect of extinguishing his es- tate/^ and if he is a tenant under a lease it terminates all future liability under the covenants/'' the most ordinary application of this principle occurring in the case of a covenant to pay rent, which ceases to be effective after a surrender.^* A surrender does not, however, operate to the prejudice of a third person.^"* For instance, the interest of a subtenant is not affected by the surrender of the estate of the head tenant,^'' nor is a lien on the estate surrendered affected by the surrender.^^ § 432. Conveyances failing to take effect in the manner intended. A conveyance which is intended to take effect as a certain class of conveyance, if not valid for that purpose, will, if possible, be construed as a conveyance of another character, in order that it may 416; Snyder v. Parker, 75 Mo. App. 529; Thomas v. Cook, 2 Barn & Aid. 119. See 2 Tiffany. Landlord & Ten. § 154. 12. Co. Litt 338b; Terstegge v. First German Mut. Benev. Soc. 92 Ind. 82, 47 Am. Rep. 135; Deane v. Caldwell, 127 Mass. 242; Harris v. Hiscock, 91 N. Y. 340; Appeal of Greider, 5 Pa. 422, 47 Am. Dec. 413. 13. Piatt, Covenants, 585; American Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Inv. Co., 150 Fed. 17, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 557: Deane v. CaldweU, 127 Mass. 242; Snowhill v. Reed, 49 N. J. L. 292, 60 Am. Rep. 615, 10 Atl. 737. 14. Ante, § 413, note 66. 15 Co. Litt 338b. 16. Mellor v. Watkins, L. R. 9 Q. B. 400: Mitchell v. Young, 80 Ark. 411, 7 L. R. A. (N .S.), 221, 17 Am. St. Rep. 89, 97 S. W. 454: Buttner v. Kasser. 19 Cal. App. 755, 127 Pac. 811: McKenzie V. Lexington. 4 Dana (Ky.) 129; Eten V. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 252; Krider v. Ramsay, 79 N. C. 354: Hessel v. .Johnson, 129 Pa. 173. 5 L. R. A. 851, 15 Am. St. Rep. 716, 18 Atl. 754; Cuschner v. Westlake. 43 Wash. 690, 86 Pac. 948. So it has been held that al- though the surrender of the es- tate of the head tenant prevents the recovery from the subtenant of rent afterwards accruing (ante § 413, note G9a) the surrenderee is still bound by a covenant entered into by the original les- sor. Bailey v. Richardson, 66 Cal. 416, 5 Pac. 910; Standard Oil Co. v. Slye, 164 Cal. 435, 129 Pac. 589. 17. Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 12 Am. St. Rep. 174. 21 Pac. <§ 433'] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1589 take effect.^** This important rule has been applied in numerous connections. For instance, a conveyance in- tended to take etifect as a bargain and sale, but which is void as such for want of a pecuniar}^ consideration, will take etfect as a covenant to stand seised, if a con- sideration of blood or marriage exists;^'' and, as be- fore stated, a conveyance in words of release, void as such for want of an estate or possession in the releasee, will be supported as a conveyance by bargain and sale, or otherwise.-" This principle has also been adopted to support limitations of future estates w-hich could not fee supported unless the conveyance were regarded as operating under the Statute of Uses.-^ II. Form and Essentials of a Conveyance. § 433. General considerations. All conveyances of freehold or leasehold interests in lands, other than certain leases for three years or less, must, by the Statute of Frauds, be in writing.-^ In most, if not all, the states of this country there are statutes to the same general effect.^" These statutes, however, as be- before stated, do not interfere with surrenders by operation of law,-^ And even in the case of an at- 955; Dobschuetz v. HoUiday, 82 United States v. Housman, 6 111. 371; Firth v. Rowe, 53 N. J. Paige (N. Y.) 526; Eckmaii v. Eq. 520, ;;2 Atl. 1064; Allen v. Eckman, 68 Pa. St. 460. Brown. 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 39. 20. See ante, note ZW. 18. Norton Deeds, 46, citing 21. Roe d. Wilkinson v. Tran- the numerous English cases. mer, 2 Wils. 75, Willes, 682; Goodtitle v. Bailey, Cowp. 600; Ward v. Wooten, 75 N. C. 413; Roe d. Wilkinson v. Traniner, Wall v. Wall , 30 Miss. 91, 64 Willes, 682; Foster's Lessee v. Am. Dec. 147; Merrill v. Pub- Dennison. 9 Ohio, 121; Hunt v. lishers Paper Co., 77 N. H. 285, Hunt, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 374; 90 Atl. 786; Rembert v. Vetoe, Lambert v. Smith, 9 Ore. 185, 191. 89 S. C. 198, 71 S. E. 959. See Gray. Perpetuities § 65. 22. 29 Car. II c. 3, p. 1-3. 19. Crossing v. Scudamore, 2 23. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Lev. 9. 1 Mod. 175; Morton v. S§ 1560. 4143. Sledge. 29 Ala. 478; Bank of 24. See ante, § 431. 1590 Keal Property. [^ 433 tempted oral conveyance, the intended grantee, by making improvements upon the property, may create an equity in himself entitling him to a valid written conveyance.^^ At common law, all written conveyances of land, as well as most other written instruments, were in the form of deeds, that is, of instruments under seal, and a deed was either a ''deed of indenture" or a "deed poll." A deed of indenture was a deed made between two or more persons, while a deed poll was made by one person only.-'^ These terms are thus used in England at the present day, and they are occasionally so' used in this country. A carefully drawn conveyance usually consists of the following parts : At the commencement the names of the parties are stated,^" and the date is sometimes here given, though it is frequently placed at the end. Next come the recitals, if there are any, these being statements of fact, explanatoiy of the transaction. A statement of the consideration and of its payment and receipt then follow,^^ and, after this, the operative words of conveyance,-'' with a description of the land conveyed,^^ and any exception therefrom."^^ The parts thus far eimme rated constitute what is known as "the premises," The premises are followed by the "haben- dum" which limits the estate to be taken by the grantee, and is usually introduced by the words "to 25. Post, § 547. queutly, conveyancers adopted the 26. Co. Litt. 229a. The word practice, which still, it seems, , 'indenture" originated in the fact prevails in England, of cutting that two copies of the deed were all deeds between two or more usually written on the same parties in a waving line at the piece of parchment, with some top. 2 Blackst. Comm. 296; Wil- word or letters written between Hams, Real Prop. (18th Ed.) 150. them, through which the parch- 27 .Post, § 434. ment was cut in an indented or 28 Post, § 438. waiving line. The words "deed 29. Post, § 435. poll" refer to a deed "polled" 30. Post, §§ 441-448. or shaven at the top. Subse- 31. Post, § 436. § 434] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1591 have and to hold. "^- Any declaration of trust which is sought to be made is here inserted. The "redden- dum" or reservation'' then follows, after that the statement of any condition or power affecting the grant, and then the covenant or covenants of title.-^^ The conclusion usually consists of a formal reference to the execution, and the signatures and seals of the parties are then placed by them at the foot of the instrument.^^ There is also, almost invariably, a certi- ficate by an officer that the conveyance was acknow- ledged by the grantors. ^*^ Though a well drawn conveyance usually contains all or most of these parts above referred to, a convey- ance containing merely the names of the parties and words of conveyance, with a description of the land, if duly executed, is sufficient to vest at least an estate for life in the grantee.^^ § 434. Designation of the parties. A conveyance should designate with certainty the name of the grantor, and this should regularly be done at the commence- ment. It is sufficient, however, if the name as given is sufficient to enable the grantor to be identified, and the fact that his name as it appears in the instrument differs from his actual name, or from the name signed thereto, does not invalidate the conveyance.^^ A con- veyance in terms by the "heirs" of a person deceased is sufficient, since they are capable of identification. '^'-^ 32. Post, § 437. 361, 8 Am. St. Rep. 671, 37 N. 33. Post, § 4;}6. W. 788; Houx v. Batteen, 68 Mo. 34. Post, §§ 449-456. 64; Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 35. Post, §§ 457, 458. 587, 17 L. R. A. 824, 53 N. W. 36. Post, § 460. 598; David v. Williamsburg City 37. Co. Litt. 7a; 4 Kent's Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 265, 38 Comm. 461. Am. Rep. 418; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 38. Comyn's Dig. "Fait" (E 148 Pa. St. 216, 23 Atl. 985; Chap- 3); Erskine v. Davis, 25 lU. 251; man y. Tyson, 39 Wash. 523, 81 Nicodemus v. Young, 90 Iowa, Pac. 1066. 423, 57 N. W. 906; Bierer v. 39. Blaisdell v. Morse, 75 Me. Fretz, 32 Kan. 329, 4 Pac. 284; 542. Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn. 1592 Real. Propebty. [§ 434 It lias generally been held that, when two or more persons join in the execution of a conveyance, only such as are named in the body of the instrument will be regarded as parties thereto. This rule has usually been applied in the cases of conveyances by a husband, the joinder in the execution of which by the wife has been regarded as insufficient to release her dower, or otherwise divest her rights ;^^' but the rule has also been a23plied in the case of another person joining in the execution of a conveyance which does not name him as a party."* ^ In a number of jurisdictions, however, the rule referred to has been repudiated, more usually,*- but not exclusively,'*-^ in connection with the question 40. Agricultural Bank of Miss- issippi V. Rice, 4 How. (U. S.) 22.5, 11 L. Ed. 949; Batchelor v. Brereton, 112 U. S. 396, 28 L. Ed. 748; Harrison v. Simons, 55 Ala. 510; Cordano v. Wright. 159 Cal. 610, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1044, 115 Pac. 227; Cox v. Wells, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 410, 43 Am. Dec. 98; Prather v. McDowell, 8 Bush (Ky.) 46; Beverly v. Wal- ler, 115 Ky. 600, 103 Am. St. Rep. 342, 74 S. W. 264; Payne v. Parker, 10 Me., 178, 25 Am. Dec. 221; Stevens v. Owen, 25 Me., 94; Lothrop V. Foster, 51 Me. 367; Catlin V. Ware, 9 Mass. 218, 6 Am. Dec. 56; Leavitt v. Lamprey. 13 Pick. (Mass.) 382, 23 Am. Dec. 685; Greenough v. Turner. 11 Gray (Mass.) 334 Merrill v. Nelson, 18 Minn. 366; Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49, 47 Am. St. Rep. 65, 26 S. W. 1068; Laugh- lin V. Fream. 14 W. Va. 322. 41. Harrison v. Simons, 55 Ala. 510; Parsons v. Justice, 163 Ky. 737, 174 S.-W. 725; (Compare Hargis v. Ditmore. 8fi Ky. 653, 7 S. W. 141); Peabody v. Hewitt. 52 Me. 33, 83 Am. Dec. 486; Marx & Sons v. Jordan, 84 Miss. 334, 105 Am. St. Rep. 457, 36 So. 386; See Batchelor v. Brereton, 112 U. S. 396. 28 L. Ed. 748; Stone V. Sledge. 87 Tex. 49, 47 Am. St. Rep. 65, 26 S. W. 1068. 42. Ingoldsby v. Juan, 12 Cal. 564; Johnson v. Montgomery, 51 111. 185; Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss. 275; Elliot v. Sleeper, 2 N. H. 525; Burge v. Smith, 27 N H. 332; Woodward v Leaver. 38 N. H. 29. And see Isler v. Isler, 110 Miss. 419, 70 So. 455. A husband's authentication of his wife's deed by his joinder in the execution, has occasionally been regarded as suflBcient under the statute, though he was not named in the instrument. Dentzel V. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138; Pease v. Bridge, 49 Conn. 58. 43. Sterling v. Park, 129 Ga. 309, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298, 121 Am. St. Rep. 224, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 201, 58 S. E. 828; Hrouska v. Janke, 66 Wis. 252, 28 N. W. 166. See Hargis v. Ditmore, 86 Ky. 653, 7 S. W. 141. § 434] Transfer Inter Vivos. 15D.3 of the release of dower, it being considered that the signature alone serves not only to identify the signer as a grantor in the conveyance, but also to indicate an intention to join therein for the i)urpose of passing his or her interest. The requirement that the grantor's name be inserted appears, as is suggested in some of the cases last cited, to have been based on the necessity of having some means for his identification,^^'' at a time when but few people wrote, and a writing was ordinarily authenticated by sealing alone. The grantee or grantees must be named in the conveyance, or means for their identification furnished thereby.^^ It does not affect the validity of the con- veyance that the name of the grantee, as inserted there- in, is not that ordinarily borne by him, but one given to or assumed by him for the occasion is sufficient.'*^ A conveyance however to an absolutely fictitious per- son is a nullity.^^ A conveyance to a person deceased is a nullity,'* "'^ and a conveyance to the "estate" of one deceased has 43a. Perkins, Conveyancing. § 77 Am. Dec. 640; Chapman v. 36; Sheppard's Touchstone, 233. Tyson, 39 Wash. 523, 81 Pac. 44. Wood V. Boyd, 28 Ark. 75; 1066; Staak v. Sigelkow, 12 Wis. Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 234. But in Barr v. Schroeder, 613.. McGrew v. Lamb, 60 Colo, 32 Cal. 609 it appears to be as- 462, 154 Pac. 91; Simmons v. sumed that a mistake in the Spratt, 20 Fla., 495; Chase v. grantee's name invalidated the Palmer, 29 111. 306; Clarke v. conveyance. Butts, 73 Minn. 361, 76 N. W. 46. David v. Williamsburg Fire 199; Henniges v. Paschke, 9 N. Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 265, 38 Am. D. 489, 81 Am. St. Rep. 588, 84 Rep. 418; Muskingum Valley N. W. 350; Hardin v. Hardin, Turnpike Co. v. Ward, 13 Ohio 32 S. C. 599, 11 S. E. 102; Lund 120, 42 Am. Dec. 191; Weihl v. v. Thackery, 18 S. Dak. 113, 99 Robertson, 97 Tenn. 458, 37 S. N. W. 856; Wright v. Lancaster, W. 274. 48 Tex. 250. 47. Lewis v. McGee 1 H. K. 45. Wilson v. White, 84 Cal. Marsh. (Ky.) 199; Hunter v. 239, 24 Pac. 114; Scanlan v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 73 Am. Dec. Grimmer, 71 Minn. 351, 70 Am. 543; Morgan v. Hazlehurst Lodge, St. Rep. 326, 74 N. W. 146; 53 Miss. G65; Neal v. Nelson, 117 Thomas v. Wyatt, 31 Mo. 188, N. C. 393, 53 Am. St. Rep. 590. 1594 Real Property. [§ 43-1 likewise been so regarded,^ ^ A conveyance to the "heirs" of one deceased is valid, since their identity is capable of immediate establishment.^^ It is immaterial in what part of the conveyance the grantee's name or identity is made to appear,^^^ but if a person is named as grantee in the premises, another person not named therein, but named in the habendum, cannot take an estate under the conveyance otherwise than by way of remainder.^! Uncertain grantee. Occasionally a conveyance is made in terms to the heirs of a particular person, which person is still alive. There is obviously no room for objection to the validity of such a conveyance 23 S. E. 428. But when a con- sideration is paid, an equity has occasionally been recognized as existing in favor of the heirs. Hutto V. Hutto, 66 Fla. 504, 63 So.; Johnson v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 168 N. C. 226, 84 S. E. 289. In City Bank v. Plank, 141 Wis. 653, it was held that a con- veyance in terms to a person de- ceased was valid, on the theory that by the use of the name of deceased it was intended to designate his executor, the in- ference being very strong that when the parties to a transaction know that a person named is dead, they intend, in using his name, to designate a living per- son.. 48. Simmons v. Spratt, 20 Fla. 495, 8 So. 123; Mclnerney v. Beck, 10 Wash. 515, 39 Pac. 130, But see Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W. Va. 296, 73 S. E. 930, where a bequest to the "estate" of one deceased was regarded as passing the property to the personal representative. 49. Shaw V. Loud, 12 MasS. 447; Hoover v. Malen, 83 Ind. 195; Boone v. Moore, 14 Mo. 421; Gearheart v. Tharp, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 31. 50. Spyve v. Topham, 3 East 115; Richey v. Sinclair, 167 111. 184, 47 N. E. 364; Berry v. Bil- lings, 44 Me. 416, 69 Am. Dec. 107; Bay v. Posner, 78 Md. 42; Irwin V. Longworth, 20 Ohio, 581; Henniges v. Paschke, 9 N. Dak. 489, 81 Am. St. Rep. 588; Co. Litt. 7a; Sheppard's Touchstone, 75; 2 Preston, Conveyancing, 435. 51. Norton, Deeds, 287; Shep- pard's Touchstone (Preston's Ed.) 237; Samme's Case, 13 Coke, 54; Hiisted V. Rollins, Iowa, 137 N. W. 462, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379: Blair v. Osborne, 84 N. C. 417; Moore v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 206; Adams v. Dunklee, 19 Vt. 382; Cox v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 175; Weekly v. Weekly, W. Va. 83, S. E. 1005. Contra, to the effect that one not named in premises may take otherwise than by way of remainder, see Mc- Leod V. Tarrant, 39 S. C. 271, 17 § 434] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1595 if the word ''heirs" is in the particular case intended as a designation of ascertained persons, the living children, for instance, of the person named. ^- But it has been decided in a number of cases that if the word "heirs" is in such case used in its technical sense, and the attempted conveyance to the heirs is not by way of remainder, it is invalid for lack of any ascertained grantee.^^ And it has been decided that, for the same reason, a conveyance, not by way of remainder, to unborn children of a particular person, is invalid.^* The validity of such a conveyance when by w^ay of contingent remainder, has on the other hand been freely recognized.^-^ At common law, that is, before the Statute of Uses, such a conveyance to persons not ascertained or not in being was valid only if by way of contingent remainder, since otherwise there was no person to whom the livery of seisin could be made,^*' and this distinction between a conveyance by way of remainder and not by way of remainder was applied even in the S. E. 773 (Mclver, C. J. dissent- Ga. 210, 84 Am. St. Rep. 233, ing). 38 S. E. 827; Faloon v. Sim- 52. Tharp v. Yarbrough. 79 Ga. shauser, 130 111. 649, 22 N. E. 382, 11 Am. St. Rep. 439; Sey- 835; Morris v. Caudle, 178 111. mour V. Bowles, 172 111. 520. 50 9, 44 L. R. A. 489, 69 Am. St. N. E. 122; Tinder v. Tinder, 131 Rep. 282, 52 N. E. 1036; Miller Ind. 381, 30 N. E. 1077; Heath v. McAlister, 197 111. 72 64 N. V. Hewitt, 127 N. Y. 166; 13 L. E. 254; Dupree v. Dupree, 45 N. R. A. 46, 24 Am. St. Rep. 438; C. 164, 59 Am. Dec. 590; Newsom Huss V. Stephens, 51 Pa. St. 282; v. Thompson, 2 Ired. L. (24 N. Robertson v. Wampler, 104 Va. Car.) 277; Lillard v. Ruckers, 9 380, 51 S. E. 835. Yerg. (Tenn.) 64. 53. Duffield v. Duffield 268 111. 55. Co. Litt, 378a; Norton. 29, 108 N. E. 673; Tinder v. Tin- Deeds, 319; Boraston's Case, 3 der, 131 Ind. 381, 30 N. E. 1077; Co. Rep. 20a; Sharman v. Jack- Booker V. Tarwater, 138 Ind. .'!85, son, 30 Ga. 224; Mudge v. Ham- 37 N. E. 979; Hall v. Leonard. 1 mill, 21 R. I. 283, 79 Am. St. Rep. Pick. (Mass.) 27; Morris v. Ste- 802, 43 Atl. 544. See cases cited phens, 46 Pa. St. 200. But see mite, § 136 (b). Bailey v. Willis. 56 Tex. 212. 56. Ante, § 156. 54. Davis v. Hollingsworth, 113 1596 Eeal Propeety. [§ 434 case of a conveyance by grant,"*^ in analogy, presumably, to the case of a conveyance by livery, since there was nothing in the nature of a common4a,w grant to sug- gest such a distinction. Consequently the modern de- cisions, in recognizing this distinction, are supported by the common law authorities. It is somewhat dif- ficult, however, to see why the validity of a conveyance in favor of the heirs or unborn children of A should, at the present day, be dependent on whether, by the same instrument, a particular estate is created in favor of B ; and such a conveyance might, it is submitted, well be sustained, without any particular estate, as creating an executory interest, valid by force of the Statute of Uses, or local state statute,^^ to mature into an estate upon the ascertainment or coming into exis- tence of the grantees named. A devise to unascertained or non existent persons, if not offending the Rule against Perpetuities, is perfectly valid,^'-^ and there would appear to be no sufficient reason for applying a different rule in this regard to a conveyance inter vivos. The language of some of the cases, above cited, would seem to suggest that the asserted invalidity of a conveyance to unascertained or non existent persons is based on the theory that a conveyance by deed is necessarily a bilateral transaction, and that conse- quently the grantee must be in existence at the time of the delivery of the instrument in order that there be an acceptance thereof.'"' Even the courts, however, which i)rofess to recognize the necessity of the ac- ceptance of a conveyance, in etfect admit that a con- veyance is perfectly valid although the grantee is an infant, mentally and legally incapable of acceptance,*''^ and if the impossibility of acceptance dispenses mth its necessity when such impossibility arises from per- 57. Perkins, §§ 52, 53; Shep- 59. Atife, § 160. pard's Touchstone, 235; Bacon's 60. Post. § 463. Abridgment, Grant (C). 61. Post, § 463, note 18. 58. Ante, §§ 156-158. § 434] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1597 soiial incapacity, such impossibility might well have the same effect when arising from the uncertainty or non existence of the person whose acceptance is other- wise required. A conveyance to a corporation not yet formed has been regarded as invalid for lack of an existent and ascertained gTantee.*^^ But, it is submitted, such a conveyance might, apart from the Rule against Per- petuities, be supported as creating an executory in- terest, to become vested upon the formation of the corporation. In so far, however, as the conveyance might be intended to operate in favor of a corporation to be formed at a future time, however remote, it would be invalid under the Eule against Perpetuities. A conveyance to the inhabitants of a certain dis- trict or municipal division has been regarded as in- valid, on the ground that there is a lack of reasonable certainty in the grantee,*^^ and a like view has been taken of a conveyance to the owners of the building adjoining the land conveyed on the west side thereof."^ Neme of grantee left blank. At the common law, a deed, that is, an instrument under seal, if de- livered with a blank therein as to an essential part, is void, although this blank be afterwards tilled by one having parol authority from the maker of the deed so to do; this conclusion being ordinarily based on the theory tliat an authority to execute and deliver an instrument under seal must itself be under seal.''^ Applying the rule referred to, it has been held, in several states, tliat a conveyance under seal, which is 62. Phelan v. San Francisco, 52 Atl. 1042; Co. Litt. 3a. 6 Cal. 531; Harriman v. Southam, 64. Schaidt v. Blaul, 66 Md. 16 Ind. 190; Douthitt v. Stinson, 141, 6 Atl. 669. 63 Mo. 268; Utah Optical Co. v. 65. Sheppard's Touchstone, 54; Keith, 18 Utah, 464; RusseH v. Comyn's Dig. "Fait" (A 1); Hib- Topping 5 McLean, 194, Fed. blewhite v. McMorine, 6 Mee.s. Cas. 12163. & W. 200, 63. Hunt V. Tolles, 75 Vt. 48, R. P.— 26. 1598 Real Property. [^ 434 sought to be delivered with the name of the grantee left blank, is invalid, although the blank is afterwards filled up by another person acting under authority from the gTantor, if that authority was not under seal.^^ In other states, it has been held, without reference to the question of a seal, that an authority subsequently to insert the grantee's name must be in writing.'^" In still other states there are decisions to the effect that the name of the grantee, if left blank, may be inserted under an oral authority, or an authority merely in- ferred from the circumstances of the case,^* these de- 66. Ingram v. Little, 14 Ga. 173, 58 Am. Dec. 549; Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen (Mass.) 305; Macurda v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 341, 114 N. E. 366; Davemport v. Sleight, 19 N. C. 381; Rollins v. Ebbs, 137 N. C. 355, 2 Ann. Cas. 327, 49 S. E. 341; Preston v. Hull, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 600. 67. Adamson v. Hartman, 40 Ark. 58; Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85, 10 Am. Rep. 266; Whitaker V. Miller, 83 111. 381; Mickey v. Barten, 194 111. 446, 62 N. E. 802; Ayres v. Probasco, 14 Kan. 175; Lund v. Thackery, 18 S. D. 113, 99 N. W. 856. See Lind- sley V. Lamb, 34 Mich. 509. 68. Swartz v. Ballou, 47 Iowa, 188, 29 Am. Rep. 470; Hall v. Kary, 133 Iowa 465, 119 Am. St. Rep. 639, 110 N. W. 930; Bank V. Fleming, 63 Kan. 139, 65 Pac. 213; Guthrie v. Field, 85 Kan. 58, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326, 116 Pac. 217 (dictum) ; Inhabitants of South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 90; Board of Education of Minneapolis v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637, 136 N. W. 1095; Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534, 14 Am. Rep. 435; Thum- mel V. Holden, 149 Mo. 677, 51 S. W. 404; Hemmenway v. Mu- lock, 56 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 38; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Ore 211, 28 Am. St. Rep. 746, 27 Pac. 1046; Threadgill v. Butler, 60 Tex. 599; Clemmons v. McGeer, 63 Wash. 446, 115 Pac. 1081; Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 783, 26 S. E. 262; Schintz v. McManamy, 33 Wis. 299; Friend v. Yahr, 126 Wis. 291 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891, 110 Am. St. Rep. 924, 104 N. W. 997 The tendency is to presume authority for this purpose in the person to whom the instru- ment is handed by the grantor. Creveling v. Banta, 138 Iowa. 47. 115 N. W. 598; Barras v. Barras, 191 Mich. 473, 158 N. W. 192; Board of Education v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637, 136 N. W. 1095; Mont- gomery V. Dresher, 90 Neb. 632, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423, 134 N. W. 251; Lamar v. Simpson, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 71, 42 Am. Dec. 345; Clemmons v. McGeer, 63 Wash. 446, 115 Pac. 1081; Friend v. Yahr 126 WMs. 291, 104 N. W. 997, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891, 110 Am. St. Rep. 924, 104 N. W. 997. 434] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1599 cisions ordinarih^ referring to the common law re- quirement of an authority under seal as technical and unreasonable. These decisions do not howev.er meet the difficulty presented by the statutes in force in a number of states requiring a conveyance to be signed by the grantor or by an agent "authorized in writing." In the presence of such a statute it is difficult to under- stand how such an essential part of the conveyance as the designation of the grantee can be the act of an agent without written authority. And especially is this the case when the oral authority is one to insert, not the particular name which was inserted, but any name w^hich it might thereafter become desirable to insert. Nor do these decisions appear to meet the difficulty, hereafter referred to,^^ arising from the requirement of delivery. In case one to whom the instrument is entrusted, with authority to insert the name of the grantee, in- serts such name and then hands the completed instru- ment to the grantee named, the question arises, when, if ever, is the instrument to be regarded as having been delivered. Was delivery effected by the action of the grantor in handing the instrument to the agent, or was it effected by the action of the agent in handling When the instrument must be Simms v. Hervey, 19 Iowa, 273, executed by the grantor, and 297, if this rule were adopted cannot be executed through an has transpired, and deeds or agent, as in some states is the mortgages to land are now "float- case In a conveyance by a mar- ed" almost as readily as com- ried woman, blanks in the con- mercial paper, and the name of veyance cannot be filled by a the grantee Inserted when it (s'ic) third person acting under oral, finds an owner who concluding or even sealed, authority. Drury to retain the land elects to In- V. Foster, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 24 17 sert his name as grantee. The L. Ed. 780. practice, while not conserving a 69. Post, § 461, note 57. single laudable purpose, has prov- In Creveling v. Banta, 138 Iowa en an efficient help in the per- 47, 115 N. W. 598, Ladd, C. J. petration of fraud and the con- remarked as follows: "What was cealment of property from the evidently feared by Dillon J., in pursuit of creditors." 1600 Real Propeety. [§ 434 the instrument to the grantee. The former view ap- pears to be excluded by the difficulty of conceiving of the legal delivery as a conveyance of an instrument which lacks the name of a grantee. Such an instru- ment is necessarily incapable of legal operation, and to assert that such an instrument has been delivered, that is, that an intention has been indicated that it shall immediately be legally operative/" appears to involve an al^solute incompatibility of ideas. In accord with this lat- ter view are the occasional decisions or judicial statements that the grantee's name must be inserted by the agent l^efore he "delivers" the instrument, or before he de- livers it to the grantee,"^ ^ this evidently involving the view that it is the physical transfer by the agent, and not the transfer to the agent, which operates as de- livery. On the other hand there are decisions that an agent to whom the instrument is handed, with authority to insert such name as he may choose as that of the grantee, may insert his own name, and thereby render the instrument operative in his favor,"^ and these do not accord with the view that the instrument can- not be delivered until the grantee's name is inserted, 70. Post. § 461. ual transfer of the instrument 71. Allen v. Withrow, 110 L. to the agent involves in effect S. 119, 28 L. Ed. 90; Osby v. a delivery conditioned upon the Reynolds, 260 111. 576, 103 N. E. filling of the blank (see post, § 556; Carr v. McColgan, 100 Md. 462), so that the instrument is 462, 476, 60 Atl. 606; Derry v. to be regarded, so soon as the Fielder, 216 Mo. 176, 115 S. W. blank is filled, as having been 412; Chauncey v. Arnold, 24 N. delivered at the time of such Y. 330; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Ore. transfer. This does not, how- 211, 28 Am. St. Rep. 746, 27 Pac. ever, obviate the difficulty in- 1046; Telschow v. Quiggle. 74 volved in the idea of even the Ore. 105, 145 Pac. 11; Duncan v. conditional delivery of a con- Hodges, 4 McCord (S. C.) 239, 17 veyance lacking a grantee. Am. Dec. 734. See Lockwood v. 72. Burk v. Johnson, 146 Fed. Bassett, 49 Mich. 546, 14 N. W. 209; Augustine v. Schmitz, 145 492. Iowa 591, 124 N. W. 607; Ein- In Halvorsen v Mullin, 179 stein v. Holladay-Koltz Land & Iowa 293. 156 N W. 289, the. Lumber Co., 132 Mo. App. 82, 111 view is expressed that the man- S. W. 859 . § 434] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1 601 or with the view that the delivery is to be regarded as made by the agent on behalf of the grantor. The con- ception of a conveyance becoming operative by reason of a delivery made by the grantee as agent of the grantor is an almost impossible one. Furthermore, if the one who is given authority to fill the blank is also the grantor's agent for the purpose of making delivery of the instrument when completed, he should, it is submitted, have formal written authority for this purpose, a power of attorney, as it is ordinarily termed, the delivery being a part of the execution of the instrument.''''^ Even though a merely oral authority to insert the name of the grantee, and to make delivery of the instrument when thus completed, be regarded as in- sufficient, a view which, though not in accord with the weight of authority in this country, is conceived to be the sounder on principle, nevertheless an instrument completed and delivered under such an insufficient authority might in some cases be supported on the theory of estoppel, in favor eitlier of the person whose name is inserted in the instrument,'^^ or in favor of a bona fide purchaser from him for value. '^^ One claim- ing under a conveyance has frequently no means of determining whether the grantee's name was inserted before or after its execution, and unless he is to be protected on the principle of estoppel, there is little safety in purchasing property in any jurisdiction where the validity of an oral authority to insei't the gi-antee's name is denied. 73. Post, § 461, notes 53-58. v. Wells, 15 Neb. 298, 18 N. W. 74. Quinn v. Brown, 71 Iowa 132. See El Dorado Exchange 376, 34 N. W. 13; McCleery v. Nat. Bank v. Fleming, 63 Kan. Wakefield, 76 Iowa, 529, 2 L. R. 139, 65 Pac. 213, and jwst, this A. 529, 41 N. W. 210; State v. section, note 77. Matthews, 44 Kan. 596, 10 L. R. 75. Swartz v. Ballou, 47 Iowa. A. 308, 25 Pac. 36; Phelps v. Hall v. Kary, 133 Iowa, 468, 119 Sullivan, 140 Mass. 36, 54 Am. Am. St. Rep. 639, 110 N. W. 930; Rep. 442, 2 N. E. 121; Pence v. Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex. Arbuckle, 22 Minn. 417; Garland 379. 1602 Real Pboperty. [§ 434 In case a blank as to the name of the grantee is filled by a person who has no authority for the purpose, either oral or in writing, or it is filled in a manner contrary to the directions of the grantor, the con- veyance is, it is agreed, invalid as regards a person who is aware of the circumstances of the transaction.''' As regards an innocent grantee or purchaser, on the other hand, it might frequently be valid, on the ground of estoppel'^^ provided at least he pays value.'^^ If the grantor chooses to place in the hands of another person an instrument duly signed and sealed by him, but which is otherwise in an incomplete state, and such other ex- ceeds his authority in making the instrument apparently complete, the grantor, and not an innocent purchaser, should be the one to suffer on account thereof. The grantor should be estopped, in such case, to deny that the instrument is his act and deed."^^ When the grantor, instead of handing the blank instrument to another, retains it, and it later leaves his custody without his consent, the question whether it is effective in the hands of a bona fide purchaser would seem to depend primarily upon whether the con- 76. Ayers v. Probasco, 14 Kan. So. 425; Vica VaUey & C. R. v. 175; Arguello v. Bours, 67 Cal. Mansfield, 84 Cal. 560, 24 Pac. 447, 8 Pac. 49; Lund v. Thackery, 145; Whitaker v. MiUer, 83 111. 18 S.. D. 113, 99 N. W. 856; 381; Thummel v. Holden, 149 Mo. Schintz V. McMenamy, 33 Wis. 677, 51 S. W. 404; Westlake v. 299. Dunn, 184 Mass. 260, 100 Am. St. 77. Creveling v. Banta, 138 Rep. 557, 68 N. E. 212; Tel- Iowa, 47, 115 N. W. 598; Augus- schow v. Quiggle, 74 Ore. 105, tine V. Schmitz, 145 Iowa, 591, 145 Pac. 11; Swan v. N. B. 124 N. W. 617; State v. Matthews, Australian Co., 2 Hurlst. & Colt. 44 Kan. 596, 10 L. R, A. 308, 25 175. Pac. 36; Guthrie v. Field, 85 78. In Van Dyke y. Van Dyke, Kan. 58, 116 Pac. 217, 37 L. R. 119 Ga. 47 S. E. 192, 830, in which A. (N. S.) 326; Pence v. Ar- the conveyance was regarded as buckle, 22 Minn. 417; Garland v. invalid there appears to have Wells, 15 Neb. 298, 18 N. W. 132; been no consideration paid. Clemmons v. McGeer, 63 Wash. 79. See the admirable discus- 446, 115 Pac. 1081. But see sion In Ewart, Estoppel, 449, et Barden v. Grace, 167 Ala. 453, 52 seq. But the cases referred to § 434] Transfer Intee Vivos. 1603 duct of the grantor was, in the particular case, lacking in reasonable care.^° Substitution of other grantee. The question of the validity of a conveyance, the name of the grantee in which was inserted after it left the grantor's hands, in a space left blank for this purpose, was discussed above. ^^ A question of a somewhat analogous nature concerns the validity of a conveyance, when the name of the grantee was inserted after delivery, not in a space originally left blank for the purpose, but by way of substitution for another name which appeared in the instrument at the time of delivery. Occasionally a purchaser of land, with a view to the saving of expense and trouble, upon reselling the land to another, merely erases his own name and inserts that of the purchaser, so that, when the instrument is re- corded, the title appears to have passed direct from his vendor to the last purchaser. Such an alteration, even if made with the consent of both the grantor and grantee, and in the presence of both, cannot operate, it would seem, to divest the title vested by the delivery in the original grantee,^^ and the fact that the grantor purports to make a second delivery after the alteration cannot well change the result. To divest one's title to land something more is necessary tlian a conveyance by his grantor to a third person. It has been said that if the original grantee himself procures the change to be made he cannot thereafter claim title in hiniself,^^ but this is in the latter portion of note 77 471, 9 Ann. Cas. 481, 77 N. E. st^pra are opposed to any such 942; Carr v. F'rye, 225 Mass. 531, notion of estoppel. 114 N. E. 745. 80. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence, 83. Abbott v. Abbott, 189 111. § 2419; Van Amringe v. Morton 488, 82 Am. St. Rep. 472, 59 N. 4 Whart. (Pa.) 382; Telschow v. E. 958. The statement appears QHiiggle, 74 Ore. 105, 145 Par. 11. to have been uncalled for, as 81. Ante, this section, notes the court found that the change 65-80. w^as made before delivery. 82. Gibbs v. Potter, 166 Ind. 1G04: Real. Property. [§ 435 so, it is submitted, only in so far as the elements of an estoppel are present.^* The substitution of another name as that of the grantee, without the grantor's consent, can obviously not operate to vest title in the person whose name is so substituted.'*'' One conveying to A cannot, without his consent, be made to convey to B. And likewise the substitution of another name as that of the grantee, without the consent of the original grantee, cannot have such an effect, of divesting the title of the origi- nal grantee.^" § 435. Words of conveyance. Though particular words are appropriate to particular classes of con- veyances, it is not necessary that these particular words be used, and the conveyance is valid, provided it contains any words signifying an intention to trans- fer the land or the grantor's interest therein.^" The phrase "give, grant, bargain, and sell" is frequently employed, and is no doubt sufficient for any class of conveyance, in view of the rule before referred to, that a conveyance will be upheld if possible, though it can- not operate as intended. It is necessary, however, that 84. See Goodwin v. Norton, 87. Shove v. Pincke, 5 Term. 92 Me. 532, 43 Atl. 111. R. 124; Peters v. McLaren, 218 85. HoUis V. Harris, 96 Ala. Fed. 410, 134 C. C. A. 198; San 288; Wagle v. Iowa State Bank, Francisco & 0. R. Co. v. City Iowa 156 N. W. 991; Wilds v. of Oakland, 43 CaL 502; Yeager Bogan, 55 Ind. 331 (senible) ; v. Farnsworth, 163 Iowa, 537; Perry v. Hackney, 142 N. C. 368, 145 N. W. 87; Howe v. Warnack. 115 Am. St. Rep. 741, 9 Ann. 4 Bibb. (Ky.) 234; Gordon v. Cas. 244, 55 S. E. 289; Goodwin Haywood, 2 N. H. 402; Hutchins V. Norton, 92 Me. 532. 43 Atl. v. Carleton, 19 N. H. 487; Jack- Ill son V. Root, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 60; 86. John V. Hatfield, 84 Ind. Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; 75 (semble); HiU v. Nisbet, 58 Folk v. Varn, 9 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) Ga. 586 (semble); Clark v. Cress- 303; Evenson v. Webster, 3 S. well, 112 Md. 339, 21 Ann. Cas. D. 382, 44 Am. St. Rep. 802, 53 338, 76 Atl. 579; Simpkins v. N. W. 747; Hanks v. Folsom, 11 Windsor, 21 Ore. 382, 28 Pac. Lea (Tenn.) 555. 72 (semMe). § 436] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1605 the conveyance contain words showing an intention to transfer the grantor's interest,®* and the words "sign over"*^ and ''warrant and defend" have been held to be insnfficient,'"^ as have the words "does wilL""^ **- § 436. Exceptions and reservaticns. The purpose and effect of an exception in a conveyance is to except or exclude from the operation of the conveyance some part of the thing- or things covered by the general words of description therein, as when one conveys a piece of land, excepting a certain part thereof, or the houses thereon, it being properly always a thing actually existent.*^^ A reservation in a conveyance, as defined by the common-law writers, is a clause by which the grantor of the land creates, in favor of himself, some new thing "issuing out of" the land, and not previously in existence, such as a rent, or some other service of a feudal or quasi feudal character.^"' The expressions "reserve" and "reservation" have been applied, in a somewhat untechnical sense, in connec- tion with a clause in a conveyance by which the 88. Webb v. MuUins, 78 Ala. R. Co., 132 Iowa, 129, 109 N. W. Ill; BeU V. McDuffie, 71 Ga. 264; 453; Brown v. Anderson, 88 Ky. Davis V. Davis, 43 Ind. 561; 577, 11 S. W. 607: Snoddy v. Brown v. Manter, 21 N. H. 528, Bolen, 122 Mo. 479, 24 L. R. A. 53 Am. Dec. 223; Weinrich v. 507, 24 S. W. 142 ; 25 S. W. 932; Wolf, 24 W. Va. 299; Freuden- Edwards v. Brusha, 18 Okla. 234. berger Oil Co. v. Simmons, 75 W. 90 Pac. 727. See Truett v. Va. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918A 873, 83 Adams, 66 Cal. 218, 5 Pac. 96; S. E. 995. Brown v. Allen, 43 Me. 590; King 89. McKinney v. Settles, ;;1 v. Wells, 94 N. C. 344; Woodcock Mo. 541. V. Estey, 43 Vt. 515. 90. Hummelman v. Mounts. 87 An exception in a covenant of Ind. 178. title is not necessarily an excep- 91-92. Caldwell v. Caldwell, tion or reservation for the pur- 140 Ga. 736 ,79 S. E. 853. poses of the conveyance. Wen- 93. Co. Litt, 21a; Sheppard's dall v. FLsher. 187 Mass. 81, 72 Touchstone, 77 et seq.; Washing- N. E. 322; Towns v. Brown, (Ky.) ton Mills Emery Mfg. Co. v. Com- 114 S. W. 773. mercial Fire Ins. Co. (C. C), 94. Co. Litt. 47a; Sheppard's 13 Fed. 646; Spencer v. Wabash Touchstone, 8(); Doe d. Douglas 1606 Real Property. [§ 436 grantor retains a power of disposition over the land conveyed,^^ by which he is given a right to repurchase the property j^*^ by which he retains the right to re- cover damages for jiast injuries to the property con- veyed,^" and by which he retains a limited estate in the land,^^ and perhaps in other cases of stipulations in behalf of the grantor. Such cases evidently do not fall within the common-law definition of a reservation, but the use of the expression in these comiections is highly convenient, and appears, in the ordinary case, to be free from objection. As creating easement. The nature of an exception and of a reservation being, at common law, such as above described, neither was strictly appropriate for the creation, on the conveyance of land, of an easement or right of profit in the land in favor of the grantor, and, accordingly, the English courts have de- cided that such an attempted exception or reservation must be construed as a grant back of an easement by the grantee of the land.'^'' In this country, however, a different view has been taken, and such a right has almost invariably been regarded as the proper sub- ject of a reservation,^ and sometimes even of an ex- V. Lock, 3 Adol. & El. 743; Dur- 436 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 116, 149 N. ham & S. Ry. Co. v. Walker, W. 613; Vessey v. Dwyer, 116 2 Q. B. 940. Minn. 245, 133 N. W. 613; Mer- 95. See Varner v. Rice, 44 rill v. Publishers' Paper Co. 77 Ark. 236; Bouton v. Doty, 69 N. H. 285; 90 Atl. 786; In re Conn. 531, 37 Atl. 1064; Horn v. Dixon, 156 N. C. 26, 72 S. E. 71; Broyles, (Tenn. Ch.) 62 S. W. Rembert v. Vetoe, 89 S. C. 198, 297; Van Ohlen's Appeal, 70 Pa. 71 S. E. 959. 57. 99. Durham & S. Ry. Co. v. 96. Saddler v. Taylor, 49 W. Walker, 2 Q. B. 940; Wickham Va. 104, 38 S. E. 583. v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63; 97. Richardson v. Palmer, 38 Corporation of London v. Riggs. N. H. 212; Shepard v. Man- 13 Ch. Div. 798. hattan Ry. Co. 169 N. Y. 160, 1. Chappell v. New York, N. 62 N. E. 151; Maurer v. F^ied- H. & H. R. Co., 62 Conn. 195. man, 197 N. Y. 248, 90 N. E. 814. 17 L. R. A. 420, 24 Atl. 997; 98. Wood V. Logue, 167 Iowa Haggerty v. Lee, 50 N. J. Eq. <§ 436] Transfer Inter ^''Ivus. 16<^7 ceptioii.- The view that a right of use or profit may be created by reservation seems to involve but a slight extension of the common law conception of a reserva- tion, and it is more or less justified by the fact that in this country the conveyance is usually executed by the grantor alone, so that the effect of regarding a stipula- tion for such a right in favor of the grantor as a grant back, as is done in England, would usually result in rendering it invalid. But to describe such a stipu- lation as an exception involves a complete departure from the common law view of tht nature of an ex- ception, as being in etfect merely a part of the descrip- tion of what is conveyed. In so far as the courts, thus recognize the pos- sibility of utilizing an exception as well as a reserva- tion for the purpose of creating an easement, it being conceded that the particular expression used, w^hether '' except" or "reserve" has little weight in this con- nection,^ it was to be anticipated that the determination, in any particular case, whether there is the reservation of an easement, or the exception of an easement, would be attended ^\^th considerable difficulty. In some de- cisions, upon the assumption that the word *' heirs" is necessary for the creation of an easement in perpetuity, if it is by means of a reservation. Mobile not necessary if it is by means of an exception,^ the absence of such word has been regarded as showing that the language used in the particular case was intended to operate as an exception and not a reservation,^ a view which 464, 26 Atl. 537; Claflin v. Boston Clafiin v. Boston & A. R. Co., & A. R, Co., 157 Mass. 489, 20 157 Mass. 489, 20 L. R. A. 63S, L. R. A. 638, 32 N. E. 659; Graf- 32 N. E. 659; Bridger v. Pierson, ton V. Moir, 130 N. Y. 465, 27 Am. 45 N. Y. 601. See ante, § 362. St. Rep. 533, 29 N. E. 974; 3. Post, this section, note 8. Kister v. Reeser, 98 Pa. St. 1, 4. Ante, § 362. 42 Am. Rep. 608. See cases cited 5. Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 post, this section, notes 5-8. Me. 307; Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 2. Inhabitants of Winthrop v. 389, 76 Atl. 705; White v. N. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Ring v. Y. & N. E. R. Co., 156 Mass. 181. Walker. 87 Me. 550, 33 Atl. 174; .",0 N. E. 612; Hamlin v. Kail- 1608 Real Propeety. [§ 436 involves an imputation of intention to the person using the words which is seldom, if ever, in accord with his actual intention. Some courts, on the other hand, regard as an exception a clause undertaking to create in favor of the grantor of the land an easement cor- responding to a preexisting qi{asi easement, on the theory that in that case there is a retention by the grantor of a thing actually existent, while if the ease- ment sought to be created does not correspond to a preexisting quasi easement, the clause is to be regarded as a reservation, as undertaking the creation of a thing not before existent/' This latter distinction, though ingenious and readily capable of practical ap- plication, appears to ba without any foundation in principle. As heretofore explained,^ a quasi easement is said to exist when the owner of land uses part of his land for the benefit of another part, but this is merely a form of expression, and a quasi easement is not in itself a right recognized by the law. One uses part of his land for the benefit of another part by right of ownership, and not by reason of the existence of a quasi easement. Consequently an "exception" of an easement corresponding to a preexisting quasi ease- ment involves the creation of a new and distinct legal right to the same extent as a "reservation" of an easement not corresponding to a use previously made of the land conveyed. As above stated, in construing language creating, or attempting to create, rights in the land granted in favor of the grantor, the courts ignore the terms used, such as "except" and "reserve," and ordinarily consider it to constitute an exception or a reservation, according to the nature of the rights sought to be cre- road Co., 160 Mass. 459, 36 N. 76 Atl. 705 (semble) ; Claflin v. E. 200; Lipsky v. Heller, 199 Boston & M. R. R., 157 Mass. Mass. 310, 85 N. E. 453; Smith's 401; Foster v. Smith, 211 Mass. Ex'cr V. Jones, 86 Vt. 258. 84 411, 98 N. E. 693; Smith's Execu- Atl. 866 (sem-ble). v. Jones, 86 Vt. 258, 84 Atl. 866. 6. Hall V. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 7. Ante. § 363 (b). § 436J Transfer Inter Vivos. 1609 ated.^ Accordingly, applying what seems the proper distinction between an exception and a reservation, language which seeks to create rights in favor of the grantor in a certain jDart of the land will be regarded as constituting a reservation or an exception, according- ly as an easement in such part is created, or the owner- ship of such part is retained.^ And in case the con- veyance provides that the grantor shall have rights as to timber on the land, the court will consider merely whether the intention is that the grantor shall retain the ownership of the timber, or shall have only a right to come on the land to take timber, and will regard the provision as an exception or a reservation accordingly.^" And a stipulation as to minerals may be either a res- er^^ation of a right to take minerals, or an exception of the minerals in place. ^^ 8. Webb V. Jones, 163 Ala. 637, 50 So. 887; Van Slyke v. Arrowhead Reservoir & Power Co., 155 Cal. 675, 102 Pac. 816; Zimmerman v. Kirchner, 151 Iowa 483, 131 N. W. 756; IVTc- Intire v. Lauckner. 108 Me. 443, 81 Atl. 784; Claflin v. B. & A. R. R Co, 157 Mass. 489, 20 L. R. A. 639, 32 N. E. 659; Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich. 267, 60 N. W. 679; Smith v. Furbush, 68 N. H. 123, 47 L. R. A. 226, 44 Atl. 398; Hagerty v. Lee, 54 N. J. L. 580, 20 L. R. A. 631, 25 Atl. 319; Gill V. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 113 Am. St. Rep. 962. 78 N. E. 433; Riefler & Sons v. Wayne Storage Water Power Co.. 232 Pa. 282, 81 Atl. 300; Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Heck, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 497; Watkins v. Tucker, 84 Texj 428, 19 S. W. 570; Bradley v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., lis Va. 233, 87 S. E. 721: Stndebaker v. Beek, 83 Wash. 260, 145 Pac. 225; Jones v. Hoff- man, 149 Wis. 30 134 N. W. 1046. 9. Barnes v. Burt, 38 Conn. 541; Wellman v. Churchill, 92 Me. 193. 42 Atl. 352; Winston V. Johnson, 42 Minn. 398, 45 N. W. 958; Jones v. De Lassus, 84 Mo. 541; Langdon v. New York, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 314, 93 N. Y. 129; Towne v. Salentine. 92 Wis. 404, 66 N. W. 395; Prichard V. Lewis, 125 Wis. 604, 1 L. R. A, (N. S.) 565, 110 Am. St. Rep. 873, 104 N. W. 989. 10. Van Slyke v. Arrowhead Reservoir & Power Co) 155 Cal. 675, 102 Pac. 816; Knotts v. Hydrick, 12 Rich. L. (S. C.) 317; Rich V. Zeilsdorff, 22 Wis. 544, 99 Am. Dec. 81. 11. Gill V. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 113 Am. St. Rep. 962, 78 N. E. 433: Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo. 479, 24 L. R. A. 507. 24 S. W. 142, 25 S. W. 932; Barrett v. Kansas & Texas Coal IGIO IIeaLi Pkoperty. [§ ^'iO Reservation in favor of third person. At com- mon law a reservation of rent cannot, by the use of particular language, be made to operate in favor of a person other than the lessor or grantor.^^ This rule has been said to be based on the consideration that, since the rent reserved is a return or comi^ensation for the land granted, the one who grants the land is the only person entitled to the benefit of the reservation, and it was also said that a reservation of rent in favor of a stranger would involve the danger of mainte- nance.^^ A like view, that a reservation must be in favor of the grantor, has been asserted in connection with the reservation of an easement or right of prof- it,^ ^ but there are to be found occasional dicta or decisions to the effect that an easement may be re- served in favor of a person other than the g'rantor.^^ Co., 70 Kan. 649, 79 Pac. 150; Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236; Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. St. 197. 12. Litt. § 346; Co. Litt. 143b, 213b. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten., § 170. 13. Gilbert, Rents 54. 14. Washburn, Easements 34; Jackson v. Snodgrass, 140 Ala. 365, 37 So. 246; Illinois Central R. Co., V. Indiana Cent. R. Co. 85 111. 211; Stone v. Stone, 141 Iowa 438, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 18 Ann. Cas. 799, 119 N. W. 712; Beinlein v. Johns. 102 Ky. 570, 44 S. W. 128; Herbert v. Pue, 72 Md. 307, 20 Atl. 182; Murphy v. Lee, 144 Mass. 371, 11 N. E. 550; Haverhill Sav. Bank v. Griffin, 184 Mass. 419, 68 N. E. 839; Borst v. Empie, 5 N. Y. 33; Beardslee v. New Berlin L. & P. Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100 N. E. 434; Edwards v. Brusha, 18 Okla. 234, 90 Pac. 727; Young's Petition, 11 R. I. 636; Brace v. Van Eps, 21 S. D. 65, 109 N. W. 147; Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis. 52. 15. Lynch v. White, 85 Conn. 545, 84 Atl. 326 (semile) ; White- law V. Rodney, 212 Mo. 540, 111 S. W. 560; Litchfield v. Boogher, 238 Mo. 472, 142 S. W. 302; City Club of Auburn v. McGeer, 198 N. Y. 160, 91 N. E. 539 (semble) ; Gibbons v. Ebding, 70 Ohio St. 298, 101 Am. St. Rep. 900, 71 N. E. 720; Duross v. Singer, 224 Pa. 573, 73 Atl 951. See Bark- hausen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 142 Wis. 292, 124 N. W. 649, 125 N. W. 680. And a reservation of highway rights in favor of the public in no way a party to the convey- ance, has been assumed to be valid. Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 111. 199. 40 N. E. 482; Edwards v. Brusha, 18 Okla. 234, 90 Pac. 727; Tuttle v. Walker, 46 Me. <^ 436] Transfer Inter Vwos. 1611 If one conveying laud to A undertakes by the same instrument to create an easement in the land in favor of B, there is, it would appear, not a reservation of an easement in favor of B but a grant thereof to him, that is, by one and the same instrument, the grantor undertakes to convoy land to one person and an ease- ment in the land to another. To this there would seem to be no objection on principle, provided the execution by him of the instrument is such as is required for the purpose of the grant of an easement, and provided further the courts can regard the words of reservation, as they do words of covenant, '"^ as equivalent to words of grant for this purpose, which, it would seem, in order to effectuate the intention of the parties, they may well do.^' It can liardly be questioned that a testator might create an easement in favor of one devisee over land devised to another by words of reservation, as well as by words of grant. ^^ There are several cases to the effect that an at- tempted reservation in favor of a third person may indirectly operate in his favor by excluding a part of the land from the operation of the conveyance, and so preventing the transferee from asserting any rights therein as against such person, ^^ to the effect, in other words, that if the grantor undertakes to reserve an easement in favor of a third person in a particular part of the land, that part of the land is excepted from the conveyance, and the grantee can consequently not as- 280. See Elliot v. Small, 35 Walker, 2 Q. B. 940. Ante, this Minn. 396, 59 Am. Rep. 329, 29 section, note 99. N. W. 158. 18. There was no question 16. Ante, § 361. suggested as to the validity of 17. As in England words of such a reservation in Wiley v. reservation of an easement are Ball, 72 W. Va. 685, 79 S. E. construed as operating by way 659. of re-grant from the transferee 19. Bridger v. Pierson, 45 N. of the land. See Doe v. Lock, Y. 601; Bessom v. Freto, 13 Mek. 2 Ad. & El. 743; Wickham v. (Mass.) 523; Hodge v. Boothby. Hawker 7 Mees. & W. 63; Dur- 48 Me. 68; Martin v. Cook, 102 ham & Sunderland Ry. Co. v. Mich. 267, 60 N. W. 679. 1612 Real Property. [§ 436 sert any claim thereto as against such third person, or any other person, who may happen to be utilizing the land. It is, nevertheless, difficult to see how an at- tempted reservation of an easement can thus take effect as an exception, how, for instance, a reservation of a right of way thirty feet wide in favor of a third person can be regarded as an exception of a strip of land thirty feet wide.^- Regarding it merely as a matter of construction, such a view would seem to violate the recognized rule^^ that words of exception or reservation are to be construed in favor of the grantee rather than of the grantor. Apparently op- posed to the cases referred to are several decisions that the fact that the grantor in a conveyance of land undertakes to reserve a strip of the land in favor of the public for use as a highway does not prevent the ''fee" in such strip, that is, the ownership thereof, from passing under the conveyance,-^'* When there is in terms an exception or reservation of an easement in favor of a third person, which easement is already existent, the exception or reservation, so called, is not effective as such, since the rights of such person are independent of whether the owner of the land refers to such rights in his conveyance of the land. Con- sequently the statement, occasionally found, that the reservation of an existing easement in favor of a 20. In Young Petitioner, 11 Brown,— Ky.) — 114 S. W. 773; R. I. 636, it was held that a Massey v. Warren, 52 N. C. clause undertaking to vest in 143; Klaer v. Ridgway, 86 Pa. a third person a right to take St. 529. timber could not be upheld as 21a. Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 111. an exception, and was void. 199, 40 N. E. 482; Edwards v. 21. Wiley v. Sirdorus, 41 Brusha, 18 Okla. 234, 90 Pac. Iowa 224; Wellman v. Churchill, 727; Cincinnati v. Newell. 7 92 Me. 193, 42 Atl. 352; Derby Ohio St. 37; Bolio v. Marvin, 130 v. Hall, 2 Gray (Mass.) 236; Mich. 82, 89 N. W. 563; Elliot Bolio v. Marvin. 130 Mich. 82, v. Small, 35 Minn. 396, 59 Am. 89 N. W. 563; Duryea v. New Rep. 329, 29 N. W. 158; Tuttle York, 62 N. Y. 592; Towns v. v. Walker, 46 Me. 280. § 436] Transfer Ixter Vivos. 1613 third person constitutes an exception-- is, it is sub- mitted, somewhat lacking in accuracy. In so far as the language of the conveyance may be construed as ex- cepting a part of the land, when there was previously merely an easement in a third person in such part,^^ the language does operate as an exception, but it does not operate in favor of such third person, since he merely retains the easement which he previously had. Likewise the langiiage operates as an exception in favor of the grantor when it in terms excepts an as- certained part, and erroneously states that such part has been sold or conveyed to another.-^ As above stated,-*'^ the language of reservation is not infrequently employed for the purpose of creating in the grantor a less estate than that conveyed, as when one conveys an estate- in fee simple "reserving" an estate for his life. Such a clause is not a reservation, according to the common-law conception of the term, but it has occasionally been referred to as such for the purpose of the general rule that a reservation can operate only in favor of the grantor, with the result that in a conveyance in fee simple, for instance, an at- tempted "reservation" of a life estate in favor of a member of the grantor's family other than himself has been regarded as invalid.-^'' It may be questioned, 22. Stockwell v. Coullard, 129 way) ; Contra. Derby v. HaU, 2 Mass. 231; Wood v. Boyd, 145 Gray (Mass.) 236; Gould v. Mass. 176, 13 N. E. 476; State Howe, 131 111. 490, 23 N. E. V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Richardson 602; Richardson v. Palmer, 38 V. Palmer, 38 N. H. 212; Brid- N. H. 212. See note 20 Harv. Law ger V. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601; Rev. at p. 574. Beardsley v. New Berlin Light 24. Arabs v. Chicago, St. P., & Power Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100 M. & O. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266, N. E. 434; Bartlett v. Barrows, 46 N. W. 321; Roberts v. Robert- 22 R. I. 642, 49 Atl. 31. son, 53 Vt. 690. See Stone v. 23. Reynolds v. Gaertner, 117 Stone, 141 Iowa 438, 119 N. W. Mich. 532; HaU v. Wabash R. 712, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 18 Co., 133 Iowa 714, 110 N. W. Ann. Cas. 797. 1039; Munn v. Worrall, 53 N. 24a. Ante, this section, note Y. 44; Urascheid v. Scholz, 84 98. Tex. 265. 16 S. W. 1065 (high- 24b. White v. City of .Marion, 2 R. P.— 27 1614 Real, Property. [§ 436 however, Avhether such words of reservation might not occasionally be construed as words of grant, vesting in the third person named a life estate, with remainder in fee simple. The tendency has been to regard such an attempted reservation of a limited estate in favor of a third person as what the courts denominate an "excejition" of the estate named in favor of the grantor himself.-'*^ Sufficiency of exception. An exception must be of part of the thing granted,-^ and must not be as extensive as such thing, so as to be repugnant thereto.^^ Nor is it valid if the subject thereof was previously specifically granted, as when, after granting twenty houses, one of such houses is sought to be excepted.-' There may be an exception, as before indicated, not only of a particular piece of land measured horizon- tally, but also of houses or other fixtures on the land conveyed,-^ or of timber growing thereon,^^ or of minerals therein,-''" 139 Iowa, 479, 117 N. W. 254; Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich. 267, 60 N. W. 679; Burchaid v. Walther, 58 Neb. 539, 78 N. W. 1061; hi re Dixon, 156 N. C. 26, 72 S. E. 71. 24c. See the first three cases cited in last preceding note. 25. Sheppard's Touchstone, 78; HaU V. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 76 Atl. 705; Moore v. Lord, 50 Miss. 229; Cornell v. Todd, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 130. 26. Dorrell v. Collins Cro. Eliz. 6; Shoenberger v. Lyon, 7 Watts & S. C. (Pa.) 184; Young's Petition, 11 R. I. 636; Puckett v. McDaniell. 96 Tex. 94, 70 S. W. 739. See Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 18 Am. St. Rep. 404, 43 N. W, 984; Foster v. Runk, 109 Pa. St. 291, 58 Am. Rep. 720, 2 Atl. 25; Koenigheim v. Miles, 67 Tex. 113, 2 S. W. 81; Adams v. Warner, 23 Vt. 395. 27. Sheppard's Touchstone 78; 4 Kent's Comm. 468; Sprague v. Snow, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 54. 28. Marshall v. Niles, 8 Conn. 369; Washington Mills Emery Mfg. Co. V. Commercial Fire Ins. Co. (C. C.) 13 Fed. Sep. 646; San- born V. Hoyt, 24 Me. 118 Ante § 273. It has been said however that an exception of a house will prima facie include not only the house but the land under it. Webster v. Potter, 105 Mass. 414. 29. Sheppard's Touchstone, 78; Heflin v. Bingham, 56 Ala. 566, 28 Am. Rep. 776; Howard v. Lincoln, 13 Me. 122; Putnam v. Tuttle, 10 Gray (Mass.) 48. See ante, § 261. 30. Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo. § 43G] Tbansfer Inter Vivos. 1615 The part or thing excepted, it is said, must be described with such certainty that it may be identified, and an exception has not infrequently been held to be void for lack of such certainty.'^ ^ But this requirement of certainty is, by a number of cases, subject to an important qualification, to the effect that there is suffi- cient certainty if the exact location of the excepted part is left to the election of the grantor,^- or, it seems, is capable of subsequent ascertainment otherwise.^ '^ The effect of the invalidity of an exception out of the land conveyed, by reason of its indefiniteness, is that the whole tract passes by the conveyance as if no exception had been attempted.^^ 479, 24 S. W. 142, 25 S. W. 932; Sloan V. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29 Ohio St. 568; Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. St. 197. See ante § 253, note 19. 31. Bromberg v. Smee, 130 Ala. 601, 30 So. 483; Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640; Nunnery V. Ford, 92 Miss. 263, 45 Co. 722: Andrews v. Todd, 50 N. H. 565; Den d. Waugh v. Richardson, 30 N. C. 470; Stambaugh v. Holla- baugh, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 357; Butcher v. Creel's Heirs, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 201; Harding v. Jennings 68 W. Va. 354, 70 S. E. 1. 32. Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422, 62 Pac. 596; Thruston v. Masterson, 9 Dana (Ky.) 228; Smith V. Furbush. 68 N. H. 12.^1, 47 L. R. A. 226, 44 Atl. 398; Dygert v. Matthews, 11 Wend. (N Y.) 35; DeRoach v. Clardy, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 233, 113 S. W. 22; Benn v. Hetcher, 81 Va. 25, 59 Am. Rep. 645. Compare Chap- man V. Mill Creek Coal and Coke Co., 54 W. Va. 193. 46 S. E. 262. Until the land excepted is as- certained by the election of the grantor, the parties are in the position of tenants in common, it has been said. Smith v. Fur- bush, 68 N. H. 123, 47 L. R. A. 226, 44 Atl. 398. It has been decided in England that an exception, thus to be subsequently ascertained by elec- tion, involved an attempt to create an estate in futuro, and might consequently be invalid, under the Rule against Per- petuities, or otherwise. Savill Bros., Ltd. V. Bethell (1902) 2 Ch. 523. 33. Melton v. Monday, 64 N. Car. 295 (subsequent survey) ; Ex parte Branch 72 N. Car. 106; (homestead to be set off) ; Lang- don V. New York, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 314, 93 N. Y. 129 (street to be laid out); Consolidated Ice Co. v. New York, 166 N. Y. 92, 59 N. E. 713 (street to be laid out). 34. Bromberg v. Smee. 130 Ala. 601, 30 So. 483; Swindall v. Ford, 184 Ala. 137, 63 So. 651 Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640 Baldwin v. WMnslow, 2 Minn. 213 McAllister v. Honea. 71 Miss 1616 Real Property. [^ 436 Since an exception is in effect merely a part of the description of the thing granted, the subject of the exception remains in the grantor, as before the con- veyance, and no words of inheritance or other words of limitation are necessary in order that the grantor may retain the same estate in the thing excepted as he had before.^^ An excexDtion, in its very nature, cannot operate in favor of a person other than the grantor.^^ But we frequently find in a conveyance language undertaking to except a part or parts of the land as being the prop- erty of another, or as having been previously sold or conveyed to another/" In such cases it is obvious that the rights of such other in the part excepted are not properly based on the exception, but exist prior there- to, and the effect of the words of exception is merely 256, 14 So. 264; Den d. Waugh V. Richardson, 30 N. C. 470. 35. Smith v. Ladd, 41 Me. 314; Lipsky V. Heller, 199 Mass. 310, 85 N. E. 453; Negaunee Iron Co. V. Iron Cliffs Co., 134 Mich. 264, 96 N. W. 468; Emerson v. Mooney, 50 N. H. 318; Whitaker V. Brown, 46 Pa. St. 197; Mandle V. Gharing, 256 Pa. 121, 100 Atl. 535; Wheeler v. Wood, 30 Vt. 242. And see cases cited ante §. 362. The occasional Massachusetts decisions to the contrary (Curtis V. Gardner, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 457; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.) 170; are evidently no longer law. See Wood V. Boyd, 145 Mass. 176, 13 N. E. 476; Claflin v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 157 Mass. 489, 20 L. R. A. 638, 32 N. E. 659. The decision in Knotts v. Hydrick. 12 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 314 is based on a passage in gheppards' Touchstone at p. 100, which is corrected in Preston's edition of the work. 36. Parsons v. Miller, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 561; Beardsley v. New Berlin Light & Power Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100 N. E. 434; Redding V. Vogt, 140 N. C. 562, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 312, 53 S. E. 337. Any suggestion contra in Stone v. Stone. 141 Iowa, 438, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 18 Ann. Cas. 797, 119 N. W. 712, cannot be accepted. But an exception in terms of a part of the land in favor of a third person may operate in favor of the grantor, to exclude that part from the conveyance. Corning v. Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 209. 37. Lloyd v. Gates, 143 Ala. 231, 111 Am. St. Rep. 39, 38 So. 1022; Adams v. Hopkins. 144 Cal. 19, 77 Pac. 712; Mayberry v. Beck, 71 Kan. 609, 81 Pac. 191; Sanford v. Stillwell. 101 Me. 466, § 436] Transfer Inter Vivcjs, 1617 to charge the grantee, and persons claiming under him, with notice of the rights of such other person. So an exception, so called, of an outstanding dower interest,^^ does not confer on the widow a dower interest not pre- viously existent, but merely recognizes the existence of such interest. Sufficiency of reservation. Upon the question whether words of inheritance are necessary in a reservation, in order to confer an interest greater than for life, the cases are not in accord. It would seem, on principle, that such words would be necessary, in the creation of an easement or right of profit by reservation, when they would be necessary in the crea- tion of such a right by grant, and not otherwise. The cases, however, ordinarily discuss the question w^ithout reference to the consideration of the necessity of such words in a grant. It has occasionally been decided, or asserted, that such words are necessary in order to reserve an easement to the grantor and his heirs,^" and this view has been adopted in at least one state in which a conveyance of the land itself in fee simple may be made without the use of such words.^^ In tlie greater number of states the courts have refused to ap- ply the requirement of words of inheritance to the case of a resei^v^ation of an easement, this view being some- times based on the statute dispensing with words of 64 Atl. 843; Midget v. Wharton, E. R. Co, 156 Mass. 181, 30 N. 102 N. C. 144, 8 S. E. 778; In re E. 612; Claflin v. Boston & A. Stokeley's Estate, 19 Pa. 476; Bell R. Co., 157 Mass. 489, 20 L. R. A. V. Gardner & Lacey Lumber Co., 638, 32 N. E. 659; Simpson v. 85 S. C. 182, 67 S. E. 151; Har- Boston & M. R. R., 176 Mass. man v. Stearns, 95 Va. 58, 27 359, 57 N. E. 674; Hornbeck v. S. E. 601. Westbrook, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 73; 38. Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray Kister v. Rieser. 98 Pa. 1. (Mass.) 373; Meserve v. Meserve, 40. Dawson v. Western M. R. 19 N. H. 240; Crosby v. Mont- Co., 107 Md. 70, 14 L. R. A. (N. gomery, 38 Vt. 238; Swick V. S.) 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. 337. 15 Sears 1 Hill (N. Y.) 17. Ann. Ca.s. 678, 68 Atl. 301. See 39. Knelle v. Knecht, 99 111. Negaunee Iron Co. v. Iron Cliffs 396; White v. New York & N. Co., 134 Mich. 264, 96 N. W. 468. 1618 Real Property. [^ 437 inheritance for the purpose of creating an estate in fee simj^le, and sometimes on the theory that the ease- ment must be presumed to be of a quantum correspond- ing to the estate of the neighboring land retained by him, to which the easement is appurtenant.^^ § 437. Rules of construction. The courts, in con- nection with the construction of written conveyances, as of other instruments, have asserted some general rules of construction, to aid in ascertaining the intention of the parties thereto. In case of doubt, it is said, the conveyance is to be construed most strongly as against the grantor, or in favor of the grantee, on the theory, it seems, that the words used are to be regarded as the words of the grantor rather than of the grantee.^^ Applying this rule, an exception or reservation in a conveyance is construed in favor of the grantee rather than of the grantor.^ ^ 41. Ante § 362. 42. Co. Litt. 48a, 183a; Neill V. Devonshire, 8 App. Cas. 135; Dickson v. Van Hoose, 157 Ala. 459, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 717, 47 So. 718; Jenkins v. Ellis, 111 Ark. 220, 163 S. W. 524; Younger V. Moore, 155 Cal. 767, 103 Pac. 221; Brown v. State, 5 Colo. 496; Sweeney v. Landers, 80 Conn. 575, 69 Atl. 566; Peoria & P. Union Ry. Co. v. Tamplin, 156 111. 285, 40 N. E. 960; Robertson V. Lieber, 56 Ind. App. 152, 105 N. E. 66; Weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iowa 10, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 706, 134 N. W. 103; Chapman v. Hamblet, 100 Me. 454, 62 Atl. 215; Second Universalist Soc. v. Du- dan, 65 Md. 460; Soria v. Harrison County, 96 Miss. 109, 50 So. 443; Grooms v. Morrison, 249 Mo. 544, 155 S. W. 430; Crane v. McMurtrie, 77 N. J. Eq. 545, 78 Atl. 170; Outlaw V. Gray, 163 N. C. 325, 79 S. E. 676; CoUison v. Phila- delphia Co. 233 Pa. 350, 82 Atl. 474; Huntley v. Hough- ton. 85 Vt. 200, 81 Atl. 452; South & Western R. Co. v. Mann. 108 Va. 557, 62 S. E. 354; Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351, 98 Pac. 756; Dear Creek Lumber Co. v. Sheets, 75 W. Va. 21, 83 S. E. 81; Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Hewett, 55 Wis. 96, 12 N. W. 382. 43. Cardigan v. Armitage, 2 B. & C. 197; Jacobs v. Roach, 161 Ala. 201, 49 So. 576; Wiley v. Sirdorus, 41 Iowa, 224; Towns v. Brown, (Ky.) 114 S. W. 773; Wellman v. Churchill, 92 Me. 193, 42 Atl. 352; Billings v. Beggs, 114 Me. 67, 95 Atl. 354; § 437] Tbansfer Inteb Vrv^os. 1619 The rule has been applied in the case of a lease, in favor of the lessee/^ and in the ease of a mortgage, in favor of tlie mortgagee.'*^ The rule has been occasion- all.v referred to as one of last resort,^" and as one of questionable utility or propriety.'*' There are occasion- al suggestions to be found that the rule, while applicable in the case of a deed poll, does not apply in the case of an indenture, the language of which is to be regarded as that of both parties.*** In case of a clear repugnancy between two clauses of the conveyance, the earlier clause should, it is said, prevail over the later clause.^^ This rule likewise has been referred to as one of last resort,^*^ and of question- able utilitv.^^ Derby v. Hall, 2 Gray (Mass.) 236; Bolio v. Marvin, 130 Mich. 82, 89 N. W. 563; Cocheco Mfg. Co. V. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305; Duryea v. New York, 62 N. Y. 592; Beardslee v. Light etc. Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100 N. E. 434; Klaer v. Ridgeway, 86 Pa. 329; Sheffield Water Co. v. Elk Tan- ning Co., 225 Pa. 614, 74 Atl. 742; Bradley v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 118 Va. 233 87 S. E. 721. 44. Doe V. Dixon, 9 East 15; Dann v. Spurrier, 3 Bos. & P. 399. 45. Stuart v. Worden, 42 Mich. 154, 3 N. W. 876; United States Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 111. 483. 46. Patterson v. Gage, 11 Colo. 50; Swan v. Morehouse, 6 Dist. Col. 225; Falley v. Giles, 29 Ind. 114; Carroll v. Granite Mfg. Co., 11 Md. 411; Biddle v. Vande- venter, 26 Mo. 500; Flagg v. Eames, 40 Vt. 16, 94 Am. Dec. 363. 47. Taylor v. St. Helens Corp., 6 Ch. D. 264, per .lessel M. R.; Swan V. Morehouse, 6 Dist. Col. 225; Biddle v. Vanderventer, 26 Mo. 500. 48. Sheppard's Touchstone 87, 2 Blackst. Coram. 380; Browning V. Beston, Plowd 131; Palmer V. Evangelical Baptist Benevolent & Missionary Soc. 166 Mass. 143, 43 N. E. 1028; Union Water Power Co. v. Lewiston, 101 Me. 564, 65 Atl. 67. 49. Sheppard's Touchstone, 88; Norton Deeds, 80; Robertson v. Robertson, 191 Ala. 297, 68 So. 52; Tubbs v .Gatewood, 26 Ark. 128; Havens v. Dale, 18 Cal. 359; Lewman v. Owens, 132 Ga. 484; Marden v. Leimbach, 115 Md. 206, 80 Atl. 958; Blackwell v. Blackwell, 124 N. C. 269, 32 S. E. 676. 50. Bush V. Watkins, 14 Beav. 425; Berners v. Real Estate Co., 134 Mo. App. 290, 114 S. W. 131; Waterman v. Andrews, 14 R. I. 589. 51. McWilliams v. Ramsay, »'?3 Ala., 813; Pike v. Munroe, 36 Me. 309, 58 Am. Dec. 751. 1620 Real. Property. [§ 437 Language of premises as controlling. It was a well established rule of the common law that, in the case of a clear repugnancy between the premises and the haheudmn, the premises would prevail to the ex- tent that an estate specifically limited in the gTantini>' clause could not be cut down to a less estate or in- validated by the language of the h€rhaps, the mere assertion of the right to exercise it,'^^ has been regarded as involving a breach of the covenant. In a few cases, where the conveyance of land was regarded, by reason of the use of the expression ''appurte- nances," or otherwise, as intended to include an ease- ment in the adjoining land, a failure of title to such easement has been held to involve a breach of the covenant."^ In one state it has been said that an eviction is unnecessarv if the covenantor is insolvent or a non 349, 55 Pac. 443, 56 Pac. 72. In Sel- don V. Dudley E. Jones Co., 74 Ark. 348, 85 S. W. 778, it is even asserted that in the case of wild a,nd unimproved land, the mere existence of a paramount title in- volves a breach. 76. Occasionally it has been decided, apparently, that the existence of an easement does not involve a breach of the covenant. Diseker v. Eau Claire Land & Imp. Co., 86 S. C. 281, 68 S. E. 529; Cummings v. Hamrick, 74 W. Va. 406, 82 S. E. 44. 77. Flynn v. White Breast Coal & Min. Co., 72 Iowa, 738, 32 N. W. 471; Lamb v. Danforth, 59 Me. 324, 8 Am. Rep. 426; Harring- ton V. Bean, 89 Me. 470, 36 Atl. 986; Smith v. Richards, 155 Mass. 79, 28 N. E. 1132; Scriver V. Smith, 100 N. Y. 471, 53 Am. Rep. 224, 3 N. E. 675; Rea v. Minkler, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 196: Wilson V. Cochran, 46 Pa. 229. The case of Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 497, in which it was decided that the exercise of a right to divert water from a stream on the land did not in- volve a breach of the covenant, has been criticized. See Wilson V. Cochran, 46 Pa. 233; Rawle, Covenants, § 152 note. 78. Helton v. Asher, 135 Ky. 751, 123 S. W. 285; Kramer v. Carter, 136 Mass. 504. The successful assertion of the easement by suit has been re- garded as Involving a breach of the covenant. Ailing v. Bur- lock, 46 Conn. 504; Ensign v. Colt, 75 Conn. 111. 52 Atl. 829. 946; Butt v. Riffe, 78 Ky. 352: Hymes v. Estey, 116 N. Y. 501, 15 Am. St. Rep. 421, 22 N. E. 1087. 79. Downs v. Nally, 161 Ky. 432, 170 S. W. 1193; Richstein v. Welch, 197 Mass. 224, 83 N. E. 417; Scheible v. Slagle. 89 Ind. 323; Bowling v. Burton, 101 N. C. 176, 2 L. R. A. 285, 7 S. E. 701; Peters v. Grubb, 21 Pa. 455; Adams v. Conover, 87 N. Y. 422. § 453:] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1701 resident^*^ or is about to remove his property from the state. ^^ An eviction is obviously not necessary in any state in which the covenant of warranty is re- garded as including that against incumbrances. ^^ To constitute an actual eviction under paramount title the dispossession need not be under legal proc- ess,*^ nor need there be any judicial decision in favor of the holder of the paramount title, ^^ it being suf- ficient that the claim is actually asserted,*^ that it is 80. Walker v. Robinson, 163 Ky. 618, 174 S. VW. 503. 81. , Knight's Adm'r v. Schroad- er, 148 Ky. 610. 147 S. W. 378. 82. Moore v. Lanham. 3 Hill (S. C.) 304; Jeter V. Glenn, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 374; Van Wagner v. Van Nostrand, 19 Iowa, 422; Bullard V. Hopkins, 128 Iowa, 703. 105 N. W. 197 (semble) ; Taylor v. Allen, 60 Pa. Super Ct. 503. 83. Rawle, Covenants. § 132: Foster v. Pierson, 4 Term R. 617: McGary v. Hastings, 39 Cal. 360, 2 Am. Rep 456; Green v. Irv- ing, 54 Miss. 450. 28 Am. Rep. 360; Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 645; Hodges v. Latham, 98 N. C. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 333, 3 S. E. 495. 84. Dugger v. Oglesby, 99 111. 405; Mason v. Cooksey, 51 Ind. 519; Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 350, 3 Am. Dec. 222. 85. There can be no eviction under paramount title unless such title is actually asserted, and consequently, at least In the ordinary case, no breach of the covenant occurs if the covenantee yields possession to the holder of a paramount title, who has not asserted his title. Hester v. Hunnicutt, 104 Ala. 282, 16 So. 162; Moore v. Vail, 17 111. 185; Axtel V. Chase, 83 Ind. 546; Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450, 28 Am. Rep. 360; Ogden v. Ball, 40 Minn. 94. 41 N. W. 453; Mor- gan V. Hannibal R. Co., 63 Mo. 129; Githens v. Barnhlll,— (Mo. App.)— 184 S. W. 145; McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. St. 115, 30 Atl. 265, 268; Leddy v. Enos, 6 Wash. 247, 33 Pac. 508, 34 Pac. 665. To the rule requiring an as- sertion of the adverse claim an exception has been recognized when the paramount title was in the United States. Dillahunty v. Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co., 59 Ark. 629, 27 S. W. 1002, 28 S. W. 657; Crawford County Bank V. Baker, 95 Ark. 438, 130 S. W. 556; McGary v. Hastings, 39 Cal. 367, 2 Am. Rep. 456; Harrington V. Clark, 56 Kan. 644, 44 Pac. 624; Pevey v. Jones, 71 Miss. 627, 42 Am. St. Rep. 486, 16 So. 252. The cancellation of an entry or patent by the land office has been regarded as a sufficient as- sertion of the government title. Butler V. Watts, 13 La. Ann. 390; Efta V. Swanson, 115 Minn. 373, 132 N. W. 335, Giddings v. Hot- ter, 19 Mont. 263, 48 Pac. 8; Jennings v. Kiernan, 35 Ore. 349. 55 Pac. 443, 56 Pac. 72 (suit 1702 Real, Peoperty. [§ 453 valid,^^ and that the covenantee yields thereto.^"^ A constructive eviction, as distin^ished from an actual one, involving a breach of the covenant, occurs when, upon the assertion of a paramount title, the covenantee, instead of yielding possession to the hos- tile claimant, buys in such title, or takes a lease from the holder thereof.*^ The covenantee is, however, under no obligation to the covenantor thus to arrive at a settlement with the paramount owner.^'^ Somewhat similar to the case of a purchase of the paramount to annul patent). And dealing with the land as state land has been regarded as sufficient asser- tion of a paramount title in the state. Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450; Brown v. Allen, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 219, 10 N. Y. Supp. 714. 86. See Rawle, Covenants § 136, and cases cited ante, this section, note 60. 87. Gunter v. Williams, 40 Ala. 561; Clements v. Collins, 59 Ga. 124; Axtel v. Chase, 83 Ind. 546; Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 350, 3 Am. Dec. 222; Kramer v. Carter, 136 Mass. 504; AUis v. Nininger, 25 Minn. 525; Green V. Irving, 54 Miss. 450, 28 Am. Rep. 337; Lambert v. Estes, 99 Mo. 604, 13 S. W. 284; Cheney V. Straube, 35 Neb. 521, 53 N. W. 479; Cornish v. Capron, 136 N. Y. 232, 32 N. E. 773; Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N. Y. 223, 33 N. E. 376; Brown v. Corson, 16 Ore. 388, 19 Pac. 66, 21 Pac. 47; Wilson V. Cochran, 46 Pa. St. 229; Hebert v. Handy, 29 R. I. 543, 72 Atl. 1102. 88. Dillahunty v. Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co., 59 Ark. 699, 27 S. W. 1002, 28 S. W. 657; McGary V. Hastings, 39 Cal. 360, 2 Am. Rep. 456; Hayden v. Patter.son, 39 Colo. 15, 88 Pac. 437; Joyner V. Smith, 132 Ga. 779, 65 S. E. 68; McConnell v. Downs, 48 111. 271; Beasley v. Phillips, 20 Ind. App. 182; Smith v. Keeley, 146 Iowa, 660, 125 N. W. 669; Sprague V. Baker, 17 Mass. 590; Brooks V. Mohl, 104 Minn. 404, 116 N. W. 931; Loomis v. Bedel, 11 N. H. 74; Hodges v. Latham, 98 N. C. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 333, 3 S. E. 495; Pee Dee Naval Stores Co. V. Hamer, 92 S. C. 423, 75 S. E. 695; Morrow v. Baird, 114 Tenn. 552, 86 S. W. 1079; Clark V. Mumford, 62 Tex. 531; Morgan V. Haley, 107 Va. 331, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 122 Am. St. Rep. 846, 13 Ann. Cas. 204, 58 S. E. 564; See Tucker v. Cooney, 34 Hun. (N. Y.) 227, 100 N. Y. 719; Stewart v. Drake, 9 N. J. L. 139. In one or two states a . different view has been taken. Huff V. Cumberland Valley Land Co. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 213, 30 S. W. 660; Dyer v. Britton, 53 Miss. 270. Compare Swinney v. Cock- rell, 86 Miss. 318, 38 So. 353. 89. Brawley v. Copelin. 106 Ark. 256, 153 S. W. 101; Miller v. Halsey, 14 N. J. L. 48; Olmstead V. Rawson, 188 N. Y. 517, 81 N. E. 456; Parker v. Crainton, 143 § 453r] Transfer Inter Vivos. title by the covenantee is that of the extinguishment by him of a paramount lien,^^ or the purchase by him of the property upon a sale under such lien.^^ Occasionally a mere adjudication that another's title is superior to that of the covenantee has been regarded as involving a breach of the covenant of warranty, without reference to whether the covenantee still retains the possession.^^ Such a view appears to involve, to some extent, a departure from the require- ment of eviction in order to effect a breach of the covenant,^^ and might well, perhaps, be confined to cases in which the land, at the time of the adjudication, is vacant and unoccupied.^^ Occasionally there has been considered to be a breach of the covenant by reason of an outstanding legal title when the cove- Ga. 421, 85 S. E. 338; Rawle. Covenants §, 181. 90. Bemis v. Smith, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 194; Estabrook v. Smith, 6 Gray (Mass.) 572, 66 Am. Dec. 443; Jackson v. Hanna, 8 Jones Law, (53 N. C.) 188; Welsh v. Kibler, 5 S. C. 405; Kenney v. Norton, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 384; McCrillis v. Thomas 110 Mo. App. 699, 85 S. W. 673. 91. Talbott V. Donaldson, 71 Kan. 483, 80 Pac. 981; Whitney V. Dinsmore, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 124; Hill V. Bacon, 110 Mass. 387; Cowdrey v. Colt, 44 N. Y. 382, 4 Am. Rep. 690; Brown v. Dins- more. 12 Pa. 372. It has been held that the cove- nantee may pay the taxes on the property when due, and assert a breach of the covenant. Swinney V. Cockrell. 86 Miss. 318, 38 So. 353. But this is open to question so long as there has been no claim made against the property on account of the taxes. Leddy V. Enos, 6 Wash. 247, 33 Pac 508, 34 Pac. 665. 92. Cox V. Bradford, 101 Ark. 302, 142 S. W. 172; Hayden v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15, 88 Pac. 437; Wilber v. Buchanan, 85 Ind. 42; Wright v. Nipple, 92 Ind. 310; Sarrls v. Beckman, 55 Ind. App. 638, 104 N. E. 598; Waggener v. Howsley's Adm'r, 64 Ky. 113, 175 S. W. 4; Hubbard v. Stanaford, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1044, 100 S. W. 232; Boyd v. Bartlett, 36 Vt. 9; Black V. Barto, 65 Wash. 502, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 846, 118 Pac. Pac. 623. 93. That a mere adjudication is not sufficient, see Wagner v. Finnegan, 54 Minn. 251, 55 N. W. 1129; Hoy v. Taliaferro, 8 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 727; Real v. Hollister, 20 Neb. 112, 29 N. W. 189; Kerr v. Shaw, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 2."?6; Ravenel v. Ingram, 131 N. C. 549. 42 S. E. 967; Paul v. Witman, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 407. 94. See Wagner v. Finnegan, 54 Minn. 25. 55 N. W. 1129; St. .John v. Palmer, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 1704 Keal. Pkoperty. [§ 453 iiantee has obtained a decree in equity cancelling such title in his favor.^^ Proof of paramount title. One alleging a breach of the covenant by reason of an eviction or as- sertion of claim by a third person has the burden of showing that such person had a paramount title. ^" But ''it has come to be well settled in most if not all of the United States that, in general, upon suit being brought upon a paramount claim against one who is entitled to the benefit of any of the covenants for title, and more particularly it would seem of the covenant of warranty, he can, by giving proper notice of the action to the party bound by the covenants and requiring him to defend it, relieve himself from the burden of being obliged afterward to prove, in the action on the cove- nants, the validity of the title of the adverse claim- ant, "^"^ and occasionally a judgment thus recognizing 599, and ante, this section, note 75. 95. Smith v. Keeley, 146 Iowa, 660, 136 N. W. 669; Mackenzie v. Clement,— (Mo. App)— 129 S. W. 730; Lane v. Fury, 31 Ohio St. 574. 96. Copeland v. McAdory, 100 Ala. 553, 13 So. 545; Tuggle v. Hamilton, 100 Ga. 292, 27 S. E. 987; Moore v. Vail, 17 111. 190; Crance v. Collenbaugh, 47 Ind. 256; George v. Putney, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 355, 50 Am. Dec. 788; Lambert v. Estes, 99 Mo. 604, 13 S. W. 284; Snyder v. Jennings, 15 Neb. 372, 19 N. W. 501; Stone V. Hooker, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 157; Cobb v. Klosterman, 58 Ore. 211, 114 Pac. 96; Callis v. Cogbill, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 137; West- rope V. Chambers, 51 Tex. 178; McKillop V. Post, 82 Vt. 403, 74 Atl. 78. The burden of showing the validity of the asserted para- mount title Is upon the cove- nantee who yields thereto. Ever- sole V. Early, 80 Iowa, 601, 44 N. W. 897; Rawle Covenants §, 136; Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant p. 1299. 97. Rawle, Covenants § 117. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 88 Ark. 169, 113 S. W. 1032; Mc- Cormick v. Marcy, 165 Cal. 386, 132 Pac. 449; Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416, 62 S. E. 291; Harding V. Sucher, 261 111. 284, 103 N. E. 1019; Olmstead v. Rawson, 188 N. Y. 517, 81 N. E. 456;Stone- braker v. Ault,— Okla.— 158 Pac. 570; Samson v. Zimmerman, 73 Kan. 654, 85 Pac. 757; Elliott v. Saufley, 89 Ky. 52, 11 S. W. 200; Parnsworth v. Kimball, 112 Me. 238, 91 Atl. 954; Boyle v. Ed- wards, 114 Mass. 375; Cummings V. Harrison, 57 Miss. 275; Sachse V. Loeb, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 536, § 453:] Transfer Inter Vwos. 1705 the supremacy of another's title has been regarded as conclusive upon the covenantor when rendered in a suit brought not by such other against the covenantee, but by the covenantee against such other, the covenan- tor being notified to appear and prosecute the suit.^^ The notice need not, it seems, be in writing.^^ It has sometimes been regarded as necessary that the notice include or be accompanied by a request that the covenantor defend the action,^ but such a requirement has not always been recognized.^ Obviously the notice must be given with sufficient promptitude to enable the covenantor to prepare his defense.^ If no notice of the action is given to the covenantor, a judgment therein against him is not even prhna facie evidence of the paramount character of the title of the party in favor of whom it was rendered,^ but apart from any question 101 S. W. 450; Farwell v. Bean, 82 Vt. 172, 72 Atl. 731. So in the case of notice to the cove- nantor's heir, afterwards sued on the covenant. Farnsworth v. Kimball, 112 Me. 238, 91 Atl. 954. 98. Gragg v. Richardson, 25 Ga. 570, 71 Am. Dec. 190; Sarrls V. Beckman, 55 Ind. App. 638, 104 N. E. 598; Hubbard v. Stanaford, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1044, 100 S. W. 232; Dalton v. Bowker, 8 Nev. 191; White v. wniiams, 13 Tex. 258; Pitkin v. Leavitt, 13 Vt. 379. 99. Sarrls v. Beckman, 55 Ind. App. 638. 104 N. E. 598; Rich- stein V Welch, 197 Mass. 224, 83 N. E. 417; Cummings v. Harrison. 57 Miss. 275; Walton v. Camp- bell, 51 Neb. 788, 71 N. W. 737; Miner v. Clark, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 426. Contra, Mason v. Kellogg, 38 Mich. 132, approved in Rawle. Covenants, § 119. 1. Pence v. Rhonemus, 58 Ind. App. 268, 108 N. E. 129; Wheelock V. Overshiner, 110 Mo. 100, 19 S. W. 640; Paul v. Witman, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 409; Clark v. Mum- ford, 62 Tex. 532; Anderson v. Bigelow, 16 Wash. 198, 47 Pac. 426. That the convenautor must be "tendered the opportunity to take upon himself the defense" is asserted in Richstein v. Welch, 197 Mass. 224, 83 N. E. 417. 2. Cummings v. Harrison, 57 Miss. 275; Jones v. Balsley, 154 N. Car. 61, 69 S. E. 827; Morgan V. Haley, 107 Va. 331, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732. 122 Am. St. Rep. 846, 13 Ann. Cas. 204, 58 S. E. 564. 3. Fassler v. Streit, 100 Neb. 722, 161 N. W. 172; Morette v. Bostwick, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 701, 111 N. Y. Su'pp. 1021; Middle- ton v. Thompson, 1 Speers L. (S. Car.) 67; Somers v. Schmidt, 24 Wis. 421, 1 Am. Rep. 191. 4. Rawle, Covenants §, 123 and cases cited. Osburn v. Prltch- ard, 104 Ga. 145, 30 S. E. 656; 17()() Real, Propeety. [§<§ 454, 455 kof notice the covenantor is bound by the judgment it he is a party thereto.^ § 454. Covenant for further assurance. The cov- enant by the grantor to make such other assurances as may be necessary to perfect the title is less ex- tensively used in the United States than any of the other covenants for title, though its importance to the pur- chaser, it has been said, ' ' can hardly be overrated. ' '^ Un- der this covenant, the convenantor may be required to do such further acts as may be necessary on his part to perfect the title which the conveyance purports to pass, but the covenantee cannot demand that he do acts which are unnecessary, or which it is impossible for him to do. The remedy under this covenant is more often by a suit for specific performance than by an action of damages, as in the case of the other covenants.'^ § 455. The measure of damages — Covenant for sei- sin. In an action for breach of the covenant for seisin, the measure of damages is ordinarily the amount of the consideration paid by the grantee, usually with interest, such consideration being presumably the value Council Imp. Co. v. Pacific & 757; Elliott v. Saufley, 89 Ky. Idaho Northern Land & Improve- 52, 11 S. W. 200; Eaker v. Har- ment Co., 29 Idaho 113, 57 Pac. vey, 192 Mo. App. 697, 179 S. W. 258; Sisk v. Woodruff, 15 111. 985; Smith v. Dixon, 27 Ohio St. 15; Dalton v. Bowker, 8 Nev. 477; Jennings v. Kiernan, 35 Ore. 190; Baumgartner v. Chipman, 30 349, 55 Pac. 443, 56 Pac. 72. Utah, 466, 86 Pac. 411; Anderson 6. Rawle, Covenants for Title, V. Blgelow, 16 Wash. 198, 47 Pac. § 98. See Cochran v. Pascault, 426; Wallace v. Pereles, 109 Wis. 54 Md. 1. 316, 53 L. R. A. 644, 83 Am. St. 7. Rawle, Covenants. §§ 99-109. Rep. 898, 85 N. W. 371. See The fact that this covenant may Kapiolani Estate v. Atcherley, 238 be enforce^d by specific perform- U. S. 119, 59 L. Ed. 1229. ance, while the other covenants 5. Seyfried v. Knoblauch. 44 for title cannot, is the reason, Colo. 86, 96 Pac. 993; Samson v. as stated by Mr. Rawle, of its Zimmerman, 73 Kan. 654, 85 Pac. great value to the purchaser. § 455] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1707 of the land at the time of the sale, with a view to which the covenant w^as made.^ Adopting this measure of damages in case the breach is as to part of the premises only, the recovery is a part of the consideration, proportioned to the vahie of snch part.'-^ And if the estate which passes is less than that purported to be conveyed, the amount recoverable is the consideration paid less the value of the estate which actually passes. ^'^ Occasionally the view has been asserted that the covenantee can recover only nominal damages on ac- count of a breach of the covenant for seisin, if he has in no way been disturbed in his possession of the land.^^ In the great majority of cases, however, the fact that the grantee is or is not still in possession is not re- 8. Mather v. Stokely, 218 Fed. 764, 134 C. C. A. 442; Logan v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313, 33 Am. Dec. 338; Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 516, 10 Am. Dec. 169; King v. Gilson's Adm'x, 32 lU. 348, 83 Am. Dec. 269; Shorthill v. Fer- guson, 44 Iowa, 249; Cummins v. Kennedy, 3 Litt (Ky.) 118, 14 Am. Dec. 45; Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433, 3 Am. Dec. 61; Nichols V. Walter, 8 Mass. 243; Willson V. Willson, 25 N. H. 229, 57 Am. Dec. 320; Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 1; Crowell V. Jones, 67 N. C. 386, 83 S. E. 551; Backus' Admr's v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211, 17 Am. Dec. 585; Conklin v. Hancock, 67 Ohio St. 455, 66 N. E. 518; Bender v. Fromberger, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 442; Park V. Cheek, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) 20; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Mundy, 110 Va. 422, 66 S. E. 61. 9. Bibb V. Freeman, 59 Ala. 612; Seyfried v. Knoblauch, 44 Colo. 86, 96 Pac. 993; Hubbard v. Norton, 10 Conn. 422; Lloyd v. Sandusky, 20:'. 111. 621, 68 N. E. 154; Wright v. Nipple, 92 Ind. 310; Scantlin v. Allison, 12 Kan. 85; Cushman v. Blanchard, 2 Me. 266, 11 Am. Dec. 76; Cornell v. Jackson, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 506; Dubay v. Kelly, 137 Mich. 345, 100 N. W. 677; Adkins v. Tom- linson, 121 Mo. 487, 26 S. W. 573; Staats V. Ten. Eyck's Ex'rs, 3 Caines (N. Y.) Ill, 2 Am. Dec. 254; Campbell v. Shaw, 170 N. Car. 186, 86 S. E. 1035; Beaup- lan,d V. McKeen, 28 Pa. St. 124, 70 Am. Dec. 115. 10. Gray v. Biscoe, Noy, 142; Hartford etc. Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112; Kimball v. Bryant, 25 Minn. 496; Tanner v. Living- ston, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 83; Curtis V. Brannon, 98 Tenn. 153, 69 L. R. A. 760, 38 S. W. 1073; Bowne V. Walcott, 1 N. Dak. 415. 11. Hacker v. Blake, 17 Ind. 97; Hencke v. Johnson, 62 Iowa, 555; Sable v. Brockmeier, 45 Minn. 248, 47 N. W. 794; Conklin V. Hannibal etc., R. Co. 65 Mo. 533; Bowne v. Wolcott, 1 N. Dak. 415, 48 N. W. 336; Kinzie 1708 Real Property. [§ 455 ferred to in connection with the question of the amount of damages recoverable, and in a few cases the view referred to is clearly repudiated.^- But since, if the covenantee is allowed to recover what he paid for the land, he should not be allowed to retain the land, the courts, in giving him substantial damages in such case, have occasionally taken measures to pro- tect the covenantor in this regard, either by reciuiring the tender of a reconveyance as a prerequisite to the recovery of a judgment,^^ or ,by regarding the judg- ment for damages as in itself revesting the title in the covenantors^ or, it might be that the court will require a reconveyance as a prerequisite to the issue of exe- cution on the judgment.s^ Although the covenant is broken by reason of lack of title in the grantor at the time of the convey- ance, only nominal damages can be recovered if, before suit on the covenant, the lapse of the limitation period has perfected the title of the grantee,^^ or if the grantee's title is perfected by the grantor's acquisi- tion of the paramount title, which enures to the benefit of the grantee on the theory of estoppel. ^'^ In case the grantee buys in a paramount title, he can recover the amount paid therefor, provided this V. Riely's Ex'r, 100 Va. 709, 42 188; Kincaid v. Brittain, 5 Sneed S. E. 872; Smith v. Hughes, 50 (Tenn.) 123; CampbeU v. Mar- Wis. 620, 7 N. W. 653. tin, 89 Vt. 214, 95 Atl. 494 (on 12. Bolinger v. Brake, 57 Kan. satisfaction of judgment) ; Noon- 663, 47 Pac. 537; Parkinson v. an v. Ilsey, 21 Wis. 148. Woulds, 125 Mich. 325, 84 N. W. 15. See Rawie, Covenants, § 292; Kincaid v. Brittain, 5 Sneed 185; Catlin v. Hurlburt, 3 Vt. (Tenn.) 119; Blake v. Burnham, 403; Ives v. Niles, 5 Watts (Pa.) 29 Vt. 437. 323; Campbell v. Martin, 89 Vt. 13. Shorthill v. Ferguson, 44 214, 95 Atl. 494. Iowa, 249, 47 Iowa, 284; Frazer 16. Wilson v. Forbes. 2 Dev. V. Supervisors of Peoria, 74 III. (N. Car.) 30; Kincaid v. Britain, 111. 282; Flint v. Steadman, 36 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 123; Garfield Vt. 210. v. Williams, 2 Vt. 328. 14. Stinson v. Sumner, 9 Mass. 17. Ante, § 449, notes 73-76. 150; Parifer v. Brown, 15 N. H. § 455] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1709 was a fair and reasoiia])le price, and no more.^^ The covenant for right to convey beins; the equiva- lent of the covenant of seisin, it follows that the mea- sure of damages for breach is the same, that is, ordinarily the amount of the consideration paid.^'' Covenant for quiet enjoyment and v/arranty. Tlie measure of damages for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment or of warranty is, by the weight of authority, the same as that for breach of the covenant for seisin or of right to convey, that is, in the ordinary case, the value of the land at the time of the convey- ance, as measured by the consideration paid, without reference to any increase in value arising from the development of the neighborhood or the improvement of the land itself.-*^ In some of the New England states, 18. Anderson v. Knox, 20 Ala. 156: Pate v. MarshaU, 23 Ark. 591; Weber v. Anderson, 73 lU. 439; Bolinger v. Brake, 57 Kan. 663, 47 Pac. 537; Spring v. Chase, 22 Me. 505, 39 Am. Dec. 500; KimbaU v. Bryant, 25 Minn. 496; Hall V. Bray, 51 Mo. 288; Werner V. Wheeler, 142 App. Div. 358, 127 N. Y. Supp. 158; Price v. Deal, 90 N. Car. 290; Eames v. Armstrong, 146 N. Car. 1, 125 Am. St. Rep. 436, 59 S. E. 165; Cobb v. Klosterman. 58 Ore. 211, 114 Pac. 96. 19. Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 516, 10 Am. Dec. 109; Willson v. Wlllson, 25 N. II. 233, 57 Am. Dec. 320; Hodges v. Thayer. 110 Mass. 286; Kinzie v. Riely's Ex'r, 100 Va. 709, 42 S. E. 872 (nominal damages) ; Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, 10 N. W. 6. 20. Allinder v. Bessemer Coal, Iron & Land Co., 164 Ala. 275, 51 So. 234; Weber v. Anderson, 73 Til. 439; Burton v. Reeds, 20 Tnd. R. P.— 33 87; Swafford v. Whipple, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 261, 54 Am. Dec. 498; Efta v. Swanson, 115 Minn. 373, 132 N. W. 335; Winnipiseogee Paper Co. v. Eaton, 65 N. H. 13, 18 Atl. 171; Bennett v. Jenkins, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 50; Hunt v. Hay, 214 N. Y. 578, 108 N. E. 851; Clark V. Parr, 14 Ohio, 118, 45 Am. Dec. 529; Brown v. Dicker- son, 12 Pa. St. 372; Elliott v. Thompson, 4 Humph. Tenn.) 99, 40 Am. Dec. 630; Lewis v. Ross, 95 Tex. 358, 67 S. W. 405; Far- well V. Bean, 82 Vt. 172, 72 Atl. 731; Conrad v. Effinger, 87 Va. 59, 24 Am. St. Rep. 646, 12 S. E. 2; West Coast Mfg. & Inv. Co. V. West Coast Imp. Co., 31 Wash. 610, 72 Pac. 455. The amount of the considera- tion paid by the covenantee, rath- er than that received by the covenantor, determines the dam- ages. Hunt V. Hay, 214 N. Y. .578, 108 N. E. 851. 1710 Eeal Pkopebty. [§ 455 however, the covenants for quiet enjoyment and of warranty are regarded as intended to indemnify the covenantee for any loss suffered by him, and as con- sequently entitling him to damages to the extent of the value of the land at the time of the eviction.-^ Such a rule may involve a very great burden upon one who sells land his title to which is defective, though he believes it to be good, he being thereby made liable for the cost of all improvements, however great, made by his grantee, as well as for any increase in value arising from growth of population and the like causes.^^ Upon a breach of the covenant as regards a part of the land only, the grantee is . entitled to recover a proportioned part of what he could have recovered on a total breach.23 In case the grantee is not actually dispossessed, but buys in the outstanding title, he is ordinarily en- titled, in an action on the covenant of warranty or for quiet enjoyment, to recover only the amount paid by him therefor.24 jj^ gQ f ^j. ^s there may be a breach by 21. Horsford v. Wright, Kirby 92 Tex. 44, 45 S. W. 562; West (Conn.) 3, 1 Am. Dec. 8; Gore v. Coast Mfg. & Inv. Co. v. West Brazier, 3 Mass. 523, 3 Am. Dec. Coast Imp. Co., 31 Wash. 610, 72 182; Cecconi v. Rodden, 147 Mass. Pac. 455; Butcher v. Peterson, 26 64, 16 N. E. 749; Park v. Bates, W. Va. 447, 53 Am. Rep. 89. 12 Vt. 381, 36 Am. Dec. 347; 24. Brawley v. Copelin, 106 Williamson v. Williamson, 71 Ark. 256, 153 S. W. 101; Clay- Me. 442. comb v. Munger, 51 111. 373; 22. See Rawle, Covenants, §§ Beasley v. Phillips, 20 Ind. App. 165-171. 182, 50 N. E. 488; Sullivan v. 23. Hoffman v. Kirby, 136 Cal. Hill, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 962, 112 S. 26, 68 Pac. 321; PhiUips v. W. 564; LefBngwell v. Elliott. Reichert, 17 Ind, 120, 79 Am. 8 Pick. (Mass.) 455; Brooks v. Dec. 463; McNally v. White, 154 Mohl, 104 Minn. 404, 116 N. W. Ind. 63, 54 N. E. 794, 56 N. E. 931; Halloway v. Miller, 84 Miss. 214; James v. Louisville Public 776, 36 So. 531; Cheney v. Warehouse Co., 23 Ky. Law Rep. Straube, 35 Neb. 521, 53 N. W. 1216, 64 S. W. 966; Boyle v. Ed- 479; Lemby v. Ellis, 146 N. Car. wards, 114 Mass. 373; AUen v. 221, 59 S. E. 683; Arrigoni v. Miller, 99 Miss. 75, 54 So. 731; Johnson, 6 Oreg. 167; Cox v. Mengel v. Williamson, 50 Pa. Henry, 32 Pa. St. 18; Mengel v. Super. Ct. 100; Hynes v. Packard, Williamson, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 100; § 455J Transfer Inter Vivos. 1711 reason of an easement outstanding in a third person,^^ he can, it seems, recover only the amount of the conse- quent decrease in the value of the land.-*' In so far as damages for breach of a covenant for title may be measured by the consideration paid, the recital in that regard in the conveyance is not conclusive as to the amount.^ '^ Covenant against incumbrances. TLe covenant against incumbrances is considered as one for indemnity only, and the covenantee can recover no more than what he may have been compelled to pay in order to extinguish the outstanding incumbrance,^^ or, in case he can not so extinguish it, the amount of injury which he may be considered to have suffered from its exis- tence, ordinarily measured by the resulting diminution in the value of the land.^^ But though no loss has been Brown v. Thompson, 81 S. C. 380. 62 S. E. 440; McClelland v. Moore, 48 Tex. 355; Cameron v. Burke, 61 Wash. 203, 112 Pac. 252. But see Nolan v. Feltman, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 119. 25. Ante, § 453, notes 76-78. 26. Harrington v. Bean. 89 Me. 470, 36 Atl. 986; Schwartz v. Black, 131 Tenn. 360, Ann. Cas. 1916C 1195, 174 S. W. 1146. 27. Bass V. Starnes, 108 Ark. 357. 158 S. W. 136; Rook v. Rook, 111 111. App. 398; Cook v. Curtis. 68 Mich. 611, 36 N. W. 692; Holmes v. Seaman, 72 Neb. 300, 100 N. W. 417, 101 N. W. 1030; Mayer v. Wooten. 46 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 102 N. W. 423. 28. Fraser v. Bentel, 161 Cal. 390, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1062, 119 Pac. 509; Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 495, 10 Am. Dec. 169; Amos V. Cosby, 74 Ga. 793; McDowell V. Milroy, 69 111. 498; Boice v. Coffeen, 158 Iowa, 705, 138 N. W. 857; Reed v. Pierce, 36 Me. 455, 58 Am. Dec. 761; Johnson v. Collins, 116 Mass. 392; Kellogg V. Malin, 62 Mo. 429; Hartshorn V. Cleveland, 52 N. .1. Law 473, 19 Atl. 974; Corbett v Wren, 25 Oreg. 305, 35 Pac. 658; Myers v. Brodbeek, 110 Pa. St. 198, 5 Atl. 662; Pritchard v. Rebori, 135 Tenn. 328, 186 S. W. 121; George A. Lowe Co. v. Simmons Ware- house Co., 39 Utah, 395, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 246, 117 Pac. 874; Eaton V. Lyman, 30 Wis. 429. 29. Rawle, Covenants, §§ 190, 191; Fraser v. Bentel, 161 Cal. 390, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1062, 119 Pac. 509; Mitchell v. Stanley, 44 Conn. 312; Morgan v. Smith, 11 111. 194; Kostendader v. Pierce, 37 Iowa, 645; Harrington v. Bean, 89 Me. 470, 36 Atl. 986; Wether- bee V. Bennett, 2 Allen (Mass.) 428; Bailey v. Agawam Nat. Bank. 190 Mass. 20. 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98, 112 Am. St. Rep. 1712 Ukal. Pkopekty. [§ 455 sustained at the time of bringing suit, he may recover nominal damages, since the covenant is regarded as broken as soon as made, when there is any outstanding incumbrance.'^ ° In those states in which the recovery on a covenant for quiet enjoj^nent or of warranty is limited to the amount of the consideration paid, the recovery for breach of the covenant against incumbrances is likewise so limited, no matter what exj^enditure or loss the cove- nantee may have incurred on account of the incum- brance.''^ 296, 76 N. E. 449; Mackey v. Harmon, 34 Minn. 168, 24 N. W. 702; KeUofeg v. Malin, 62 Mo. 429; WiUson v. Willson, 25 N. H. 229, 57 Am. Dec. 320; Wil- liams V. Hewitt, 57 Wash. 62, 135 Am. St. Rep. 971, 106 Pac. 496; Smith v. White, 71 W. Va. 639, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, 78 S. E. 378; Gadow v. Hunholtz, 160 Wis. 293, 151 N. W. 810. See McGuckin v. Milbank, 152 N. Y. 297, 46 N. E. 490. When the breach arises from the existence of an outstanding term of years, the value of tho use of the land for such term has been regarded as the meas- ure of damages. Barker v. Den- ning. 91 Kan. 485, 138 Pac. 573; Malsbury v. Jacobus, 88 Neb. 751, 130 N. W. 424; Porter v. Bradley, 7 R. I. 542. 30. Tuskegee Land & Security Co. V. Birmingham Realty Co., 161 Ala. 542, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 992, 49 So. 378; Ensign v. Colt, 75 Conn. Ill, 52 Atl. 829. 946; WiUetts v. Burgess, 34 111. 494; Thompson v. Richmond, 102 Me. 335, 66 Atl. 649; Wilcox v. Musche, 39 Mich. 101; Walker's Adm'r v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664; Smith V. Jefts, 44 N. H. 482; Hasselbuch v. Mohmking, 76 N. J. L. 691, 73 Atl. 961; McGucken V. Milbank, 152 N. Y. 297, 46 N. E. 490; Fishel v. Browning, 145 N. C. 71, 58 S. E. 759; Funk v. Voneida, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 109, 14 Am. Dec. 617; International Development Co. v. Clemans, 59 Wash. 398. 109 Pac. 1034; In re Hanlin's Estate, 133 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411; Rawle, Covenants, §§ 188, 189. That the grantee could have recovered nominal damages on a covenant against incumbrances by reason of an outstanding mort- gage does not prevent a recovery on the covenant of warranty upon his eviction after foreclosure of the mortgage. Smith v. Wahl, 88 N. J. L. 623, 97 Atl. 261. 31. Rawle, Covenants, § 193; Collier v. Cowger, 52 Ark. 322, 6 L. R. A. 107, 12 S. W. 702; Guth- rie V. Russell, 46 Iowa, 269, 26 Am. Rep. 135; Dimmick v. Lock- wood, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 142; Foote V. Burnet, 10 Ohio, 317, 36 Am. Dec. 90; George A. Lowe Co. V. Simmons Warehouse Co., § 455] Transfer Inter Vivos. 173 3 Interest. Interest from the time of plaintiff's eviction is })resumaMy always recoverable by him,^^ since from that time he is deprived of the use of his money and also of the use of the land. For a like reason a covenantee who, by reason of an outstanding title, fails to acquire the possession of the land under the conversance to him, is entitled to interest on the purchase price paid by him from the time of its pay- ment. ^^ Whether, when the covenantee did acquire the pos- session under his conveyance, he is entitled to interest on the purchase price for the period previous to his eviction by the paramount owner, has ordinarily been regarded as dependent on the question of his liability to the latter for mesne profits."^ ^ Except for this liabil- ity, he might well be regarded as compensated, by his enjoyment of the land, for his deprivation of the use of the money, and so not entitled to interest. But the courts usually assume that if he has not already been made liable for such profits, he will be made so liable, and consequently do not regard his enjoj^nent of the land as in itself sufficient to deprive him of interest. In so far, however, as his non liability for mesne profits can be regarded as established, by adjudication or otherwise, he is not entitled to interest,"'-^ and, so if, by 39 Utah, 395, 117 Pac. 874, Ann. Tex. 37, 16 S. W. 623. Gas. 1913E, 246; Eaton v. Lyman, 34. In Virginia the recovery 30 Wis. 41. of interest is restricted to that 32. Collier v. Cowger, 52 Ark. which accrues after eviction. 322, 6 L. R. A. 107, 12 S. W. 702; Threlkeld v. Fitzhugh, 2 Leigh, Spring V Chase, 22 Me 505, 39 451; Abernathy v. Phillips, 82 Am. Dec. 595; Hutchins v. Round- Va. 769, 1 S. E. ll;i. tree, 77 Mo. 500; Henning v. 35. Harding v. Larkin, 41 111. Withers, 3 Brev. (S. C) 458, 6 413; White v. Tucker, 52 Miss. Am. Dec". 589; Conrad v. Effinger, 145; Withers v. Bank of Com- 87 Va. 59, 24 Am. St. Rep. 649. merce & Trust Co., 104 Miss. 3^. Graham v. Dyer, 16 Ky. 681, 61 So. 690; McGuffey v. L. Rep. 541, 29 S. W. 'MG; Hutch- Humes. 85 Tenn. 26. 1 S. W. ins V. Roundtree. 77 Mo. 500; 506; Mann v. Mathews, 82 Tex. Hunt V. Nolen, 46 S. C. 551, 24 98, 17 S. W. 927; Flint v. Stead- S. E. 543; Johns v. Hardin, 81 man, 36 Vt. 210. Contra, Rhea 171-t Eeal. Property. [§ 455 reason of the statute of limitations, or for some other reason, he is liable for mesne profits for only a limited number of years back, his right to recover interest is limited to those years.''*' Occasionally the immunity of the covenantee from liability for mesne profits has been regarded as precluding his recovery of interest only in so far as the land was capable of beneficial use,^^ but the correctness of such a view is open to question.^^ Expenses of litigation. Since the covenantee. if he relinquishes possession on the demand of one asserting a paramount title, has the burden of showing that the claimant's title is paramount,''** it appears just and equitable that he should have the privilege of defending against the adverse claim without incurring loss by so doing. This has been generally recognized by the courts to the extent of giving him, as an element of damages in an action on the covenant, the costs in an action against him by the paramount claimant, which action he, in good faith but unsuccessfully, un- dertook to defend.*^ In some states the covenantee is V. Swain, 122 Ind. 272, 22 N. E. 37. Wood v. Kingston Coal Co., 1000, 23 N. E. 776. 48 IH. 356, 95 Am. Dec. 554; 36. Fernander v. Dunn, 19 Ga. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Ban- 497, 65 Am. Dec. 607; Harding v. ister, 89 Miss. 808, 42 So. 345. Larkin, 41 111. 413; Spring v. 38. See Spring v. Chase, 22 Chase, 22 Me. 505, 39 Am. Dec. Me. 505, 39 Am. Dec. 595. 595; Stebbins v. Wolf, 33 Kan. 39. Ante, § 453, note 96. 765, 7 Pac. 542; Thompson v. 40. Kingsbury v. Milner, 69 Jones, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 365; Ala. 502; Beach v. Nordman, 90 Hutchins v. Roundtree, 77 Mo. Ark. 59, 117 S. W. 785; Mc- 500; Morris v. Rowan, 17 N. J. Cormick v. Marcy, 165 Cal. 449, L. 304; Poster v. Thompson, 41 132 Pac. 449; Harding v. Larkin. N. H. 373; Staats v. Ten Eyck, 41 111. 413; Stebbins v. Wolf, 33 3 Caines, 111, 2 Am. Dec. 256; Kan. 765, 7 Pac. 542; Robertson Caulkins v. Harris, 9 Johns, 324; v. Lemon, 2 Bush (Ky.) 302; Bennett v. Jenkins, 13 Johns. Dubay v. Kelly, 137 Mich. 345, (N. Y.) 50; Clark v. Parr, 14 100 N. W. 677; Brooks v. Mohl, Ohio, 118, 45 Am. Dec. 529; Cox 104 Minn. 404, 116 N. W. 931; V. Henry, 32 Pa. 18; Mengel Box Brooks v. Black, 68 Miss. 161, Co. V. Ferguson, 124 Tenn. 433, 11 L. R. A. 176, 24 Am. St. Rep. 137 S. W. 101. 259, 8 So. 332; Hazelett v. Wood- § 455] Transfer Inter Vrv'os. 1715 also allowed the reasonable amount of fees paid his attorney in such action,^ ^ while in others his right to attorney's fees is denied.^ ^ Not infrequently the cove- nantee has been caid to be entitled to recover the ex- pense or cost of such previous litigation, an expression presumably broad enough to include attorney's fees as well as taxed costs.^^ ruff. 150 Mo. 534, 51 S. W. 1048; Taylor v. Holier, 1 Mont. 688; Jones V. Balsley, 154 N. C. 61, 69 S. E. 827; Pitcher v. Living- ston, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 4 Am. Dec. 229; McAlpin v. Woodruff, 11 Ohio St. 120; Welsh v. Kiliber, 5 S. C. 405; Mengel Box Co. v. Ferguson, 124 Tenn. 433, 137 S. W. 101; Morgan v. Haley, 107 Va. 331, 13 L. R. A. N. S. 732, 12 Am. St. Rep. 846, 13 Ann. Cas. 204, 58 S. E. 564. Contra, Taylor V. Allen, 131 Ga. 416, 62 S. E. 291; Terry's Ex'r v. Drabenstadt, 48 Pa. 400; Clark v. Mumford, 62 Tex. 531. See Shook v. Lanfer, (Tex. Civ. App.) 100 S. W. 1042. The covenantee is obviously not entitled to the costs of defending an action in which he is suc- cessful, since this would impose liability under the covenant for the act of a third person not having paramount title. Hoffman V. Dickson, 65 Wash. 556, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 67, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 869, 118 Pac. 737; Smith v. Par- sons, .-.S W. Va. 644, 11 S. E. 68. 41. Beach v. Nordman, 90 Ark. 59, 117 S. W. 785; McCormick v. Marcy, 165 Cal. 449, 132 Pac. 449; Harding v. Larkin, 41 111. 413; Meservey v. Snell, 94 Iowa, 222, 58 Am. St. Rep. 391, 62 N. W. 767; Burchfield v. Brinkman, 92 Kan. 377, 140 Pac. 894; Robert- son v. Lemon, 2 Bush (Ky.) 302; Ryerson v. Chapman, 66 Me. 557; Brooks v. Mohl, 104 Minn. 404, 116 N. W. 931; Hazelett v. Woodruff, 150 Mo. 534, 51 S. W. 1048; Taylor v. Holter, 1 Mont. 688; Walton v. Campbell, 51 Neb. 788, 71 N. W. 737; Rickert v. Snyder, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 416; Lane v. Fury, 31 Ohio St. 574; Keeler v. Wood, 30 Vt. 242. 42. Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416, 62 S. E. 291; Reggio v. Braggiotti, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 166; Brooks V. Black, 68 Miss. 161, 11 L. R. A. 17G, 24 Am. St. Rep. 259, 8 So. 332; Holmes v. Sin- nickson, 15 N. J. L. 313; Terry V. Drabenstadt, 68 Pa. 400; Jeter V. Glenn, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 374; Mengel Box Co. v. Ferguson, 124 Tenn. 433, 137 S. W. 101; Turner v. Miller, 42 Tex. 418; Morgan v. Haley, 107 Va. 331, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 122 Am. St. Rep. 846, 13 Ann. Cas. 204, 58 S. E. 564. 43. Beach v. Nordman, 90 Ark. 59, 117 S. W. 785; Butler v. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399, 24 Atl. 328; Meservey v. Snell, 94 Iowa, 222, 58 Am. St. Rep. 391, 62 N. W. 767; Stebbins v. Wolf, 33 Kan. 7G5, 7 Pac. 542; Quick v. Walker, 125 Mo. App. 257, 102 S. W. 33; Williamson v. Williamson, 1716 Real, Peoperty. [§ 455 The view has occasionally been asserted or sug- gested that the costs of the previous action,^^ or the amount of attorneys' fees therein,* ^^*^ should be al- lowed only in case the covenantee notified the covenantor of the litigation in time to enable the latter to deter- mine the advisability of contesting the adverse claim, the covenantee being in that case entitled to recover such expenditures unless the covenantor requested him not to make the contest. The allowance to the covenantee of the cost of pre- vious litigation between him and the paramount claim- ant has not been confined to the case of an action against him by such claimant, but has been extended to the case of a proceeding by him against such claimant 71 Me. 442; Cheney v. Straube, 35 Neb. 521, 53 N. W. 479; Ryerson v. Chapman, 66 Me. 557; Richmond v. Ames, 164 Mass. 467, 41 N. E. 671; Brooks v. Mohl, 104 Minn. 404. 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195, 116 N. W. 931; Taylor V. Holter, 1 Mont. 688; Drew v. Towle, 30 N. H. 531 {semble); Winnepiseogee P. Co. v. Eaton, 65 N. H. 13, 18 Atl. 171 (semble) ; Lane v. Fury, 31 Ohio St. 574; Point St. Iron Works v. Turner, 14 R. I. 122, 51 Am, Rep. 364; Keeler v. Wood, 30 Vt. 242; Tar- bell V. Tarbell, 60 Vt. 486, 15 Atl. ]04. 44. De Jarnette v. Dreyfus, 166 Ala. 138. 51 So. 932; Butler V. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399, 24 Atl. 328; Teague v. Whaley, 20 Ind. App. 26, 50 N. E. 41; Walsh v. Dunn, 34 111. App. 146; Mercantile Trust Co. V. South Park Resi- dence Co.. 94 Ky. 271, 22 S. W. 314; Hutchins v. Roimdtree, 77 Mo. 500; Mengel Box Co. v. Fer- guson, 124 Tenn. 433, 137 S. W. 101. But that no notice is neces- sary, see Ryerson v. Chapman, 66 Me. 557; Morris y. Rowan, 17 N. J. L. 304; Tarbell v. Tar- bell, 60 Vt. 486, 15 Atl. 104. See Matheny v. Stewart, 108 Mo. 73, 17 S. W. 1014. 45-46. Garner v. Morris, 187 Ala. 658, 65 So. 1000; Teague v. Whaley, 20 Ind. App. 26, 50 N. E. 41; Meservey v. Snell, 94 Iowa, 222, 58 Am. St. Rep. 391, 62 N. W. 767; Mercantile Trust Co. v. South Park Residence Co., 94 Ky. 271, 22 S. W. 314; Crisfield v. Storr, 36 Md. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 480; Richmond v. Ames, 164 Mass. 467, 41 N. E. 671; Macken- zie V. Clement, 144 Mo. App. 114, 129 S. W. 730; Jeffords v. Dreis- bach, 168 Mo. App. 577, 153 S. W. 274; Balte v. Bademilfer, 37 Ore. 27, 82 Am. St. Rep. 737, 60 Pac. 601; Ellis v. Abbott, 69 Ore. 234, 138 Pac. 488; Point St. Iron Works v. Turner, 14 R. I. 122, 51 Am. Rep. 364. § 455] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1717 involving the validity of the claim, and which re- sulted in favor of the latter.^ ^ Action against remote grantor. Upon the question of the measure of damages in an action upon a covenant of warrant}^ brought, not by the original covenantee, but by a remote grantee entitled to the benefit of the covenant as one running with the land,^^ the cases are not in accord. Some courts have adopted the view that the jnirchase price paid by the original covenantee is the measure of recovery,^^ while others regard the recovery as limited by what the plaintiff himself paid for the land,^'^ without, however, recog- nizing any right to recover more than the price paid by the original covenantee, if this was less than that paid by the plaintiff.^^ These latter cases thus in effect regard the covenant as one for limited indemnity. 47. Chestnut v. Tyson, 105 Ala. 149, 16 So. 723, 53 Am. St. Rep. 101; Gragg v. Richardson, 25 Ga. 566, 71 Am. Dec. 190 (semJyle); Walsh V. Dunn, 34 111. App. 146; Yokum V. ThomaF, 15 Iowa, 67; Barnett v. Montgomery, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 331; Kyle v. Faunt- leroy, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 622; Ryer- son V. Chapman, 66 Me. 557; Haynes v. Stevens, 11 N. H. 28.. Andrews v. Davison, 17 N. H. 413, 43 Am. Dec. 606; Lane v. Fury, 31 Ohio St. 574; Pitkin v. Leavitt, 13 Vt. 379. 48. Post. § 456. 49. Mischke v. Baughn. 52 Iowa, 528, 3 N. W. 543: Dough- erty V. Duvall, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 57; Cook v. Curtis, 68 Mich. 611. 36 N. W. 692; Brooks v. Black, 68 Miss. 161, 8 So. 332, 11 L. R. A. 176, 24 Am. St. Rep. 259; Low- ranee v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8; Lewis v. Ross, 95 Tex. 358, 67 S. W. 405; Hollingsworfh v. Mexia, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 37 S. W. 455; Rogers v. Golson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 31 S. W. 200. 50. Barnett v. Hughey, 54 Ark. 195, 15 S. W. 464; Taylor v. Wal- lace, 20 Colo. 211, 46 Am. St. Rep. 285, 37 Pac. 963; Crisfield V. Storr. 36 Md. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 480; Moore v. Frankenfield, 25 Minn. 540; Dickson v. Desire, 2A Mo. 166; Williams v. Beeman, 2 Dev. L. (13 N. C.) 483; Mette V. Dow, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 93; Whitz- man v. Hirsh, 87 Tenn. 513, 11 S. W. 421; Eaton v. Lyman, 26 Wis. 61, 7 Am. Rep. 39. 51. Barnett v. Hughey, 54 Ark. 195, 15 S. W. 464; Taylor v. Wallace, 20 Colo. 211, 46 Am. St. Rep. 285, 37 Pac. 963; Cris- field v. Storr, 36 Md. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 480; Moore v. Frankenfield, 25 Minn. 540; Dickson v. Desire, 23 Mo. 166; Williams v. Beeman, 2 Dev. L. (S. C.) 483; Whitz- man v. Hirsh, 87 Tenn. 513, U 1718 Real Propeety. [§ 456 § 456. Covenants running with the land. The benefit of a covenant for title until breach runs with the Iand.^'2 Upon breach, the covenant is changed into a mere personal right of action, to be enforced by the i:)erson entitled to the benefit of the covenant at the time of the breach, or, in case of his death, his personal representative, and not passing with the land to his heir, or to his grantee, unless there is an express as- signment of the right of action.-"^^ Since covenants for quiet enjoyment and of war- ranty are not broken until an interference with the use and enjojTiient occurs, such a covenant may be enforced by any person to whom, after the making of the cove- nant and before such interference, the land may have passed, whether a grantee of the covenantee, his heir, or his devisee,^^ while one to whom the land passes af- ter such interference has no right of action by reason S. W. 421; Eaton v. Lyman, 26 Wis. 61, 7 Am. Rep. 39. 52. Rawle, Covenants, § 205. 53. Lewis v. Ridge, Cro. Eliz. 863; Lucy v. Levington, 2 Lev. 26; Peters v. Bowman, 98 U. S. 56, 25 L. Ed. 91; Pinckard v. American Freehold Land Mort- gage Co., 143 Ala. 568, 39 So. 350; Davis v. Lyman, 6 Conn. 249; Ladd v. Noyes, 137 Mass. 151; Davidson v. Cox, 10 Neb. 150 4 N. W. 1035; Adams v. Conover, 87 N. Y. 422; Geiszler V. De Graaf, 166 N. Y. 339, 82 Am. St. Rep. 659, 59 N. E. 993; Wesco V. Kern, 36 Ore. 433, 59 Pac. 548, 60 Pac. 563; Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fiss, 147 Pa. St. 232, 23 Atl. 5G0; Clement v Bank of Rutland, 61 Vt. 298, 4 L. R. A. 425, 17 Atl. 717; Mc- Conaughey v. Bennett's Ex'rs, 50 W. Va. 172, 40 S. E. 540. 54. Deason v. Findley, 145 Ala. 407, 40 So. 220: Gibbons v. Moore, 98 Ark. 501. 136 S. W. 937; Redwine v. Brown, 10 Ga. 311; Claycomb v. Munger, 51 111. 373; Pence v. Rhonemus, 58 Ind. App. 268, 108 N. E. 129; Wyman V. Ballard, 12 Mass. 304; Libby v. Hutchinson, 72 N. H. 190, 55 Atl. 547; Suydam v. Jones, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 180, 25 Am. Dec. 552; Keyes & Marshall Bros. Realty Co. v. Trustees of Canton Christian College, 205 N. Y. 593, 98 N. E. 1105; King v. Kerr's Adm'rs, 5 Ohio, 154, 22 Am. Dec. 777; Arnold v. Joines, 50 Okla. 4, 150 Pac. 130; Lawrence v. Senter, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 52; Til- lotson V. Prichard, 60 Vt. 94, 6 Am. St. Rep. 95; McConaughey V. Bennett's Ex'rs, 50 W. Va. 172, 40 S. E. 540; Patterson v. Cappon, 125 Wis. 198, 10? N. W. 1083; Rawle, Covenants, § 213 et seq. § 456] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1719 of his ownership of the laiid.^^ It appears to be the rule, however, in a number of states, that the benefit of the covenant w^ll not pass unless the covenantor,^^ or the covenantee,^''' was in possession of the land at the time of his transfer thereof, such possession being regarded as involving an interest in the land,^^ to which the covenant can be regarded as adhering, while in the absence of such possession the attempted convey- ance by the covenantee, with a paramount title outstand- ing, transfers no interest whatsoever with which the covenant can run. The covenants of seisin and of right to convey,-^^ 55. Gulf Coal & Coke Co. v. ATusgrove, 195 Ala. 219, 70 So. 179; De Long v. Spring Lal^e Beach Imp. Co., 74 N. J. L. 250, 66 Atl. 591; Thompson v. Richmond, 102 Me. 33.5, 66 Atl. 649; Smith v. Richards, 155 Masn. 79, 28 N. E. 1132; Moore v. Mer- rill, 17 N. H. 75, 43 Am. Dec. 593. 56. Wilson v. Widenham, 51 Me. 566; Slater v. Rawson, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 450, 6 Id. 439; Allen V. Kennedy, 91 Mo. 324, 2 S. W. 142; Iowa Loan & Trust Co. V. FuUen, 114 Mo. App. 633, 91 S. W. 58; Mygatt v. Coe, 152 N. Y. 457, 46 N. E. 949, 57 Am. St. Rep. 521; Bull v. Beiseker, 16 N. Dak. 290, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514, 113 N. W. 870; H. T. & C. Co. V. Whitehouse, 47 Utah, 323, 154 Pac. 950; Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 353, 399; McDonald v. Rothgeb, 112 Va. 749, 72 S. E. 692; Wallace v. Pere- les, 109 Wis. 316, 53 L. R. A. 644, 83 Am. St. Rep. 898, 85 N. W. 371. See Solberg v. Robinson, 34 S. Dak. 55, 147 N. W. 87. 57. Wead v. Larkin, 54 111. 489, 5 Am. Rep. 149; Tillotson v. Prichard, 60 Vt. 94, 6 Am. St. Rep. 95, 14 Atl. 302. 58. The idea, though not so expressed by the courts, appears to be closely analogous to that of the tortious fee acquired by a disseisor. See a7ite, § 15. 59. Prestwood v. McGowin, 128 Ala. 267, 86 Am. St. Rep. 136; ILawrenoe v. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 188; Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 498; Bethell v. Bethell, 54 Ind. 428, 23 Am. Rep. 650; Thompson v. Richmond, 102 Me. 335, 66 Atl. 649; Sears v. Broady, 66 Neb. 207, 92 N. W. 214; Chapman v. Holmes' Ex'rs, 10 N. J. L. 20; Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 3 Am. Dec. 379; Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N. Y. 212, 11 L. R. A. 646, 26 N. E. 611; Eames v. Armstrong, 142 N. Car. 506, 55 S. E. 405; Brady V. Bank of Commerce of Coweta, 41 Okla. 473, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1019, 138 Pac. 1020; Solberg v. Robinson, 34 S. Dak. 55, 147 N. W. 87; Clement v. Bank of Rut- land, 61 Vt. 298, 4 L. R. A. 425, 17 Atl. 717. 1720 Real. Property. [§ 456 and also the covenant against inenmbrances,*'" have, in the majority of the states, been regarded as not run- ning with the land, the theory being that they involve stipulations that a certain state of things exists at the time of the conveyance, and that the nonexistence there- of involves an immediate breach. In some states, however, a different view has been adopted as to these covenants,''^ it being considered that, 'even though a technical breach be regarded as occurring at the time of the conveyance, this does not prevent the covenant from running until a breach occurs which involves sub- stantial damage, and this view, which accords in result with that adopted in E-ngland,*'^ has been favored by the text book writers, as conducing to the efficiency of the covenants and presumably harmionizing with the purpose of their introduction, that of affording indem- nity to persons claiming under the covenantee as well as to the covenantee himself.''''^ In some states a similar 60. Turner v. Lal/son, 144 Ala. 432, 39 So. 755; Logan v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313, 33 Am. Dec. 338; McPike V. Heaton, 131 Cal. 109, 82 Am. St. Rep. 335; Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 498; Thompson V. Richmond, 102 Me. 335, 66 Atl. 649; Clark v. Swift, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 390; Simonds v. Dia- mond Match Co., 159 Mich. 241, 123 N. W. 1132; Blondeau v. Sheridan, 81 Mo. 545; Bryant v. Mosher, 96 Neb. 555, 148 N. W. 329: Moore v. Merrill, 17 N. H. 75. 43 Am. Dec. 593; Carter v. Denman's Ex'rs, 23 N. J. L. 260; Marbury v. Thornton, 82 Va. 702, 1 S. E. 909. 61. Covenants of seisin and right to convey. Martin v. Bak- er, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 232; De- hority v. Wright, 101 Ind. 382; Schofield V. Iowa Homestead Co., 32 Iowa, 318, 7 Am. Rep. 197; Sturgis V. Slocum, 140 Iowa, 25, 116 N. W. 128; Devore v. Sunder- land, 17 Ohio, 52, 49 Am. Dec. 442; Mecklem v. Blake, 22 Wis. 495; Covenants against incum- brances. Richard v. Bent, 59 111. 38, 14 Am. Rep. 1; Hunt v. Marsh, 80 Mo. 396; Foote v. Burnet, 10 Ohio, *317; Cole v. Kimball, 52 Vt. 639; In re Ham- lin's Estate, 133 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411. See Post v. Compau, 42 Mich. 90. 62. Kingdon v. Nottle, 1 Maule & S. 355; King v. Jones, 5 Taunt. 418, Kingdon v. Nottle, 4 Maule & S. 53. 63. See Rawle, Covenants. §§ 208, 212; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, Amer. notes, p. 221; 4 Kent, Comm. 472; editorial note 15 Harv. Law Rev. 150. Com- pare note 6 Mich. Law Rev. 254. § 45G] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1721 result has been attained on the theory that the right of action for the breach which immediately occurs is transferred by the covenantee's subse(juent convey- ance, unless a contrary intention appears, so as to enable the transferee to bring suit on the covenant, either in his own name,''"' or in that of the covenantee.*^* Occasionally a statute specifically provides for the run- ning of such covenants.^*^' A covenant for further assurance is not regarded as broken until damage has been caused by refusal to furnish the assurance, and there is consequently a right of action on such covenant in favor of one to whom the land passes before such refusal,'^'" The right of a remote grantee to sue upon a cove- nant of title as running with the land is not affected by the fact that he also has a right of action on a covenant made directly with himself by his immediate grantor.*'^ In order to avoid the possibility of two or more judgments against the covenantor on account of the same breach in favor of successive owners of the land, the rule has been laid down and generally adopted that neither the covenantee nor a subsequent owner, after parting with the land, can recover on the covenant until he has himself been compelled to pay damages on 64. Tucker v. McArtliur, 103 suit on a covenant against In- Ga. 409, 30 S. E. 283; Security cumbrances in the name of the Bank of Minnesota v. Holmes, assignor, and the difficulties of 65 Minn. 531, 60 Am. St. Rep. pleading therein, see Rawle, Cov- 495, 68 N. W. 113; Kimball v. enants, § 227. Bryant, 25 Minn. 496; Coleman v. 66. Rawle, Covenants, § 211. Lucksinger, 224 Mo. 1, 123 S. W. 67. Rawle, Covenants, § 230; 441; Geiszler v. De Graaf, 166 Bennett v. Waller, 23 111. 97; N. Y. 339, 82 Am. St. Rep. 659, Collier v. Gamble, 10 Mo. 467; 59 N. E. 993; Hall v. Paine, 14 Colby v. Osgood, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) Ohio St. 417. See Arnold v. 339. Joines, 50 Okla. 4, 150 Pac. 130. 68. Withy v. Mumford, 5 Cow. 65. Rawle, Covenants, § 226. (N. W.) 137, 607; Markland v. See Peters v. Bowman, 98 U. S. Crump, 18 N. C. 101, 27 Am. Dec. 59, 25 L. Ed. 91; Newman v. 101, 27 Am. Dec. 230; Rawle, Sevier, 134 111. App. 544; Cole Covenants, § 215. v. Kimball, 52 Vt. 643. As to a 1722 Real, Property. [§ 457 his own covenant, in favor of one claiming under him, this being regarded as tantamount to an eviction."^ The covenantee or other owner of the land cannot, unless in special cases, after having conveyed the land, release the covenant, so as to affect the right of his grantee to sue thereon,'^^ and it has been suggested that such a release by the covenantee, even though made by him while owner of the land, does not affect the right of action in favor of a subsequent transferee of the land who takes without notice, actual or constructive, of the release. '^^ V. ExECUTIOISr OF THE CONVEYANCE. § 457. Signing. At common law, a written trans- fer of land was always sealed, but not signed. In England, the better oinnion is that the requirement in the Statute of Frauds that the writing be signed does not apply to a sealed instrument.''^ In this country. 69. Booth V. Starr, 1 Conn. 244, 6 Am. Dec. 233, Redwine V. Brown, 10 Ga. 311; Thompson V. Richmond, 102 Me. 335, 66 Atl. 649; Wheeler v. Sohier, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 222; Simonds v. Diamond Match Co., 159 Mich. 241, 123 N. W. 1132; AUis v. Foley, 126 Minn. 14, 147 N. W. 670; Chase v. Weston, 12 N. H. 413; Withy v. Mumford, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 137; Markland v. Crump, 18 N. C. 94, 27 Am. Dec. 230; Clement v. Bank of Rutland, 61 Vt. 298, 4 L. R. A. 425, 17 Atl. 717. 70. Abby v. Goodrich, 3 Day (Conn.) 433; Claycomb v. Mon- ger, 51 111. 373; Crooker v. Jewell, 29 Me. 527; Chase v. Weston, 12 N. H. 413. 71. See Claycomb v. Munger, 51 111. 373; Susquehanna & Wyo- ming Valley Railroad & Coal Co. V. Quick, 61 Pa. St. 339; Field V. Suell, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 504. Contra, see Littlefield v. Getchell, 32 Me. 392. 72. Cherry v. Heming, 4 Exch. 631; Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580, 597; Aveline v. Whisson, 4 Man. & G. 801; 3 Preston, Ab- stracts, 61; Challis, Real Prop. (3rd ed.) 404. The statute in terms (29 Car. II. c. 3, § 1) provides that all leases, estates, interests of freehold, terms of years, etc., "made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing, and signed by the parties so mak- ing or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully author- ized by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only." § 457] Traistsfer Inter Vivos. 1723 however, a state statute requiring a signed writing for tlie transfer of an interest in land has been construed as requiring the writing to be signed, although it be sealed/'' In the absence of a statutory requirement that the instrument be "subscribed" by the grantor, the signature may, it has been held, be in any part thereof."^ The signing may be by mark, although the person so signing is able to write,' ^ or may be by the hand of another person in the grantor's presence. '^'^ Even a signature by another, made out of the grantor's pres- ence,"^^ is sufficient if adopted by the grantor, as when he subsequently acknowledges or delivers the instru- ment as his act and deed. When the conveyance purports to be by more than one grantor, but all the grantors do not sign, the sig- natures of those that do, followed by delivery by them, 73. Goodman v. Randall, 44 Conn. 321; Shlllock v. Gilbert, 23 Minn. 386; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. V. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq. 193; Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230; Adams v. Med- sker, 25 W. Va. 127. 74. McConnell v. Brillhart. 17 111. 354, 65 Am. Dec. 661; Smith V. Howell, 11 N. J. Eq. 349; Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 L. R. A. 205, 12 S. E. 902; Saunders v. Hackney, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 194; Newton v. Emerson, 66 Tex. 142. 75. Meazels v. Martin, 93 Ky. 50, 18 S. W. 1028; Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 L. R. A. 205; Truman v. Lore's Lessee, 14 Ohio St. 144; Mackay V. Easton, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 619, 22 L. Ed. 211. 76. Lewis v. . Watson, 98 Ala. 497, 22 L. R. A. 297, 39 Am. St. Rep. 82, 13 So. 570; Jansen v. McCahlll, 22 Cal. 563, 83 Am. Dec. 84; Middlesboro Waterworks v. Neal, 105 Ky. 586, 49 S. W. 428; Bird V. Decker,^64 Me. 550; Gard- ner V. Gardner, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 483, 52 Am. Dec. 740; McMurtry V. Brown, 6 Neb. 368; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq. 193; Lee v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217; Hays V. Hays, 6 Pa. St. 368. 77. McClendon v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 122 Ala. 384. 122 So. 30; O'Neal v. Judsonia State Bank, 111 Ark. 589. 164 S. W. 295; Chivington v. Colorado Springs Co., 9 Colo. 597; Ford v. Ford, 27 App. D. C. 401; Reinhart V. Miller, 22 Ga. 402, 68 Am. Dec. 506: Hailey First Nat. Bank v. Glenn. 10 Idaho, 224. 109 Am. St. Rep. 204; Kerr v. Russell. Nye V. Lowry, 82 Ind. 316; 69 111. 666, 18 Am. Rep. 634; Clough V. Clough, 73 Me. 487, 40 Am. Rep. 386; Bartlett v. Drake, 100 Mass. 174, 97 Am. Dec. 92; 1724 Eeal Propeety. [§ 458 will be sufficient to divest their interest, '^^ unless their delivery was conditional upon signature by the others."^ § 458. Sealing — Necessity. At common law, the only recognized mode of authenticating a written in- strument was by sealing, and consequently any con- veyance in use at the present day which takes effect by the common law, such as a grant of a right in another's land, or a release, must be under seal, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary.^*' In a number of the states, by express provision of statute, seals are no longer necessary, and the presence of a seal on a conveyance does not affect the acquisi- tion of rights thereunder.^^ In other states there is an express requirement that a transfer of an interest in land shall be under seal.^- Since, after the passage of the Statute of Uses, a conveyance by bargain and sale might be oral, the mere paj^ment of a consideration being sufficient to raise a use, which the statute would execute,^^ and since moreover, the Statute of Enrollments, passed in recog- nition of this fact, and requiring a bargain and sale to be by writing under seal and enrolled, has been Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276; Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116, 69 Am. Pierce v. Hakes, 23 Pa. St. 231; Dec. 484; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Newton v. Emerson, 66 Tex. 142; Pa. St. 206, 91 Am. Dec. 203; 78. Colton V. Leavey, 22 Cal. Cagle v. Parker, 97 N. C. 271, 2 496; Jackson v. Sanford, 19 Ga. S. E. 76. 14; Scott V. Whipple, 5 Me. 336; 81. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Harrelson v. Sarvis, 39 S. C. 14, § 1564 (B). See Wisdom v. 17 S. E. 368. Reeves, 110 Ala. 418, 18 So. 13; 79. Johnson v. Brook, 31 Miss. Pierson v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa. 17; Arthur v. Anderson, 9 Rich. 283, 63 Am. Dec. 440; Jerome v. (S. C.) 234; Haskins v. Lombard, Ortman, 66 Mich. 668; Gibbs v. 16 Me. 140, 33 Am. Dec. 645. McGuire, 70 Miss. 646, 12 So. See Post, § 462. 829. 80. Somerset v. Fogwell, 5 82. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Barn. & C. 875; Wood v. Lead- § 1564 (A). bitter, 13 Mees. & W. 838; Hew- 83. Challis, Real Prop. 419, lins V. Shippam, 5 Barn. & C. 420; Williams, Real Prop. (18th 229; Arnold v. Stevens, 24 Pick. Ed.) 196; 1 Hayes, Conveyancing (Mass.) 109, 35 Am. Dec. 305; (5th Ed.) 76. See ante, § 428. § 458] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1725 generally regarded as not in force in this country, it would seem that a seal is unnecessary, in the absence of a state statute to the contrary, in the case of a con- veyance taking effect under the Statute of Uses or un- der a state statute. In a number of the states, ho^vever, it has been decided or assumed that, even in the absence of a local statutory requirement, a seal is necessary, this view being sometimes based upon the assumption that a conveyance of land is necessarily a **dced," which, since a deed means a sealed instrument, assumes the very point in question.^* Even when a seal is necessary to convey the legal title, an unsealed conveyance will be etfective in equity, it being there regarded as a contract for a conveyance, specifically enforcible.*^ Sufficiency. At common law, an instrument was sealed, usually, at least, by impressing some device upon wax, which was made to adhere to the paper ;S^ but at the present day an impression made by stamping upon the paper on which the instrument is written,''^ or 84. Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. Nat. Bank of North Bend v. Gage, 286, 58 Am. Dec. 374; Barrett v. 71 Ore, .373, 142 Pac. 539; Brink- Hinckley, 270 111. 298, 110 N. E. ley v. Bethel, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 359; Osby v. Reynolds, 260 111. 786; Frost v. Wolf, 77 Tex. 455, 576, 103 N. E. 556; Switzer v. 19 Am. St. Rep. 761; Garten v. Knapps, 10 Iowa, 72. 74 Am. Dec. Layton, 76 W. Va. 63, 84 S. E. 375; McLaughlin v. Randall. 66 1058. Me. 226; Colvin v. Warford, 20 86. 3 Co. Inst. 169. Md. 357; Robinson v. Noel, 49 87. Sugden, Powers (8th Ed.) Mi.ss. 253; Jackson v. Hart, 12 232; Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. Johns. (N. Y.) 77. In Under- (U. S.) 472; Pillow v. Roberts, wood V. Campbell, 14 N. H. 393, 12 Ark. 822; Hendee v. Pinkerton, it seems to be considered that 14 Allen (Mass.) 381; Allen v. the Statute of Enrollments is in Sullivan R. Co., 32 N. H. 446; force in New Hampshire. Corrigan v. Trenton Delaware 85. Switzer v. Knapps, 10 Falls Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 52. Contra. Iowa, 72, 74 Am. Dec. 375; Jewell, Bank of Rochester v. Gray, 2 Hill V. Harding. 72 Me. 124; McCarley (N. Y.) 227; Warren v. Lynch. 5 V. Tippah County Sup'rs, 58 Johns. (N .Y.) 239. See 1 Am. Miss. 483; Wadsworth v. Wendell, Law Rev. at p. 638. 5 Johns. Ch. fN. Y.) 224; First R. P.— 34 1726 Real Property. [§ 458 even a paper wafer or piece of paper gummed on the face of the instrument,^^ is usually regarded as sufficient. By statute in many states, a mere scroll or any other de- vice marked on the paper on which the conveyance is written is sufficient,^^ and in other states a similar view iias been taken, in the absence of any exjjress statute.^"^ So, the writing of the word "Seal" in connection with the signature has been regarded as a sufficient sealing.^^ A recital in the instrument that it is sealed is not necessary in order to make the sealing effective, if there is actually a seal.^- In a few decisions, however, a different view has been taken w^hen the alleged seal consisted of merely a scroll or other device which did not of itself show that it was affixed as a seal.^^ A statement in the instrument that it is sealed will not be sufficient as a substitute for a seal.^^ 88. Tasker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 359; Turner v. Field, 44 Mo. 382; Corrigan v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 52. 89. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 1565. 90. Trasher v. Everhart. 3 Gill. & J. (Md.) 246: Hudson v. Poindexter, 42 Miss. 304; Hack- er's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 192; Jones V. Logwood, 1 Wash. (Va.) 42. Contra, McLaughlin v. Ran- dall, 66 Me. 226; Bates v. Boston & N. Y. C. R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 251; Douglas v. Oldham, 6 N. H. 150; Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 239. 91. Cochran v. Stewart, 57 Minn. 499, 59 N. M. 543; White- ley V. Davis' Lessee, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 333. The word "Seal" within a scroll has been decided to be sufficient in some cases. Hastings v. Vaughn. 5 Cal. 315; Miller v. Binder, 28 Pa. St. 489; English V. Helms, 4 Tex. 228. Contra. Beardsley v. Knight, 4 Vt. 471. 92. Wing V. Chase, 35 Me. 260; Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134. 12 L. R. A. 205, 12 S. E. 902; Proprietors of Mill Dam Foundry Co. v. Hovey, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 417, 428; Taylor V. Glaser, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 502; Comyns, Dig. "Fait" (A 2). 93. Bohannon v. Hough, 1 Miss. 461; Cromwell v. Tate's Ex'r, 7 Leigh (Va.) 301, 30 Am. Dec. 506; Corlies v. Vannote, 16 N. J. L. 324; Carter v. Penn, 4 Ala. 140. And see Buckingham v. Orr, 6 Colo. 587. Compare Ash- well V. Ayres, 4 Grat. (Va.) 283. 94. Armstrong v. Pearce, 5 Harr. (Del.) 551; Deming v. Bul- litt, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 241; Mc- Pherson v. Reese, 58 Miss. 749; Patterson v. Galliher, 122 N. C. 511. 29 S. E. 773; Taylor v. Glaser, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 502; § 459] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1727 The seal need not, and in fact usually is not, affixed at the same time as or after the signing of the instru- ment, it being sufficient that the party adopts, expressly or impliedly, the seal already placed on the paper.^^ So, each of the parties executing the instrument need not have a separate seal, one seal being sufficient if adopted by all the j^arties signing.**^ § 459. Witnesses. In some states witnesses, usual- ly two in number, are necessarj'' in order to make a conveyance valid as between the parties thereto. In other states, no witnesses are required, while in some, though witnesses are not necessary to render the con- veyance valid as between the parties, they are necessary for the purpose of proving the deed for record, in the absence of an acknowledgment by the grantor.^"^ The witness need not be present at the actual signing of the instrument by the grantor, provided the latter acknowledges to him that it is his act, and ex- l^ressly or impliedly requests him to attest the instru- ment.*^^ The witnesses must sign the instrument, their signatures being usually placed under a clause, "Signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of" or some other expression which serves to show the purpose of their signature being used.**^ Mitchell V. Parham, Harp. (S. C.) 521; Bowman v. Robb, Pa. St. 3; Davis v. Judd, 6 Wis. 85; 302; Lambden v. Sharp, 9 Humph. Burnette v. Young, 107 Va. 184, (Tenn.) 224; Yale v. Zanders, 4 95. Sheppard's Touchstone, 54, Wis. 96. 57; Reg. v. Inhabitants of St. 97. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Paul, 7 Q. B. 232; Ball v. Dun- § 1566. sterville, 4 Term R. 313; Ash well 98. Jackson v. Phillips, 9 Cow. V. Ayres, 4 Grat. (Va.) 283. (N. Y.) 94. 113; Tate v. Law- 96. Carter V. Chandron, 21 Ala. rence, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503: 88; Davis v. Burton, 4 111. 41, 36 Clements v. Pearce, 63 Ala. 284; Am. Dec. 511: Bradford v. Ran- Mulloy v. Ingalls, 4 Neb. 115. dall, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 496; Luns- See Little v. White, 29 S. C. ford V. La Motte Lead Co., 54 170; Poole v. Jackson, 66 Tex. Mo. 426; Northumberland v. Cob- 380, 1 S. W. 75; 1 Stimson's Am. leigh, 59 N. H. 250; Pickens v. St. Law, § 1567. Rymer, 90 N. C. 283, 47 Am. Rep. 99. The signature of the wit- 1728 Real Peopbbty. [§ 460 The statutes liaA^e usually been construed as re- quiring that the witness be competent, at the time of his attestation of the conveyance, to testify in regard to its execution in ease of litigation between the parties, with the result that his attestation is of no effect for the purpose of validating the conveyance, if he is not so competent. ^'2 § 460. Acknowledgment. In some states the stat- ute requires a conveyance to be acknowledged by the grantor before an official in order to make it effective even as betw^een the parties," and in a number of states an acknowledgment is necessary to the validity of a conveyance by a married woman. More usually, how- ever, the requirement of acknowledgment is imposed only as a preliminary to the record of a conveyance, for the purpose of charging a subsequent purchaser with notice thereof,^ Avith the result that the record of a ness, it has been decided, may be by mark. Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich. 215; Devereux v. Mc- Mahon, 102 N. C. 284, 9 S. E. 635. 1-2. So it has been held that one having a pecuniary interest in the conveyance is disqualified. Winsted Sav. Bank & Building Ass'n v. Spencer, 26 Conn. 195; Child V. Baker, 24 Neb. 1'88. And a grantor cannot witness the execution of the instrument by his co-grantor. Townsend v. Downer, 27 Vt. 119. A wife or husband of a grant- or has also been regarded as disqualified. Third Nat. Bank of Chattanooga v. O'Brien, 94 Tenn. 38, 28 S. W. 293; Johnston v. Slater, 11 Grat. (Va.) 321; Cor- bett V. Norcross, 35 N. H. 99. But in some cases it has been held that the witness need not be competent to testify at the time of its execution, provided he can testify when called to prove the execution in court. Frink V. Pond, 46 N. H. 125; Doe d. Johnson v. Turner, 7 Ohio, 216, pt. 2. 3. See Lewis v. Herrera, 10 Ariz. 74, 85 Pac. 245; Parrott v. Kumpf, 102 111. 423; Hout v. Hout, 20 Ohio St. 119. 4. 1 Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, § 1570. 5. See e g.; Green v. Abra- ham, 43 Ark. 420; Lee v. Mur- phy, 119 Cal. 364, 51 Pac. 549; Edwards v. Thorn, 25 Fla. 222, 5 So. 707; New England Mort- gage Security Co. v. Ober, 84 Ga. 294, 10 S. E. 625; Harris v. Reed, 21 Idaho, 364, 121 Pac. 780; Graves v. Graves, 6 Gray (Mass.) 391; Thompson v. Scheid, 39 Minn. 102, 12 Am. St. Rep. 619, 38 N. W. 801; Ligon v. Barton, § 460] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1729 conveyance not properly acknowledged will have no such effect."' The acknowledgment has, moreover, in a number of states, the effect of rendering the conveyance admissible in evidence without further proof of its execution.^ Qualifications cf officer. The statute ordinarily requires the acknowledgment to be made, if within the state, before a judge, clerk of court, justice of the peace, or notary public. The provisions of the statutes as to acknowledgment in another state sometimes provide that it may be taken by named classes of officials of the latter state, sometimes by commissioners of deeds ap- pointed for such state, and sometimes by any officials of the other state authorized by the statutes of such state to take acknowledgments. The statutes also contain, almost invariably, specifie provisions as to the officials who may take acknowledgments in foreigTi countries for use in the state in which the statute is passed. It is generally agreed that an officer who is benefi- cially interested in the transaction cannot take an acknowledgment.'^ Consequently the grantee cannot take the grantor's acknowledgment,^ nor can either the 88 Miss. 135, 40 So. 555; Finley There is authority for the view V. Babb, 173 Mo. 257, 73 S. W. that interest does not disqualify 180; Brown v. Manter, 22 N. H. if there is no other officer who 468; Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. can take the acknowledgment. Y. 291, 33 N. E. 1079; Geneseo Stevenson v. Brasher, 90 Ky. 23. First Nat. Bank v. National Live 13 S. W. 242; Lewis v. Curry, 74 Stock Bank, 13 Okla. 719, 76 Pac. Mo. 49. Contra, semhle, Hammers 130; Watts v. Whetstone, 79 v. Dole, 61 111. 307. S. C. 357, 60 S. E. 703. 8. Lee v. Murphy, 119 Cal. 6. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 364, 51 Pac. 549; Brereton v. § 1572; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § Bennett, 15 Colo. 254; Hogans 1676. V. Carruth, 18 Fla. 587; Florida 7. But in Tennessee, apparent Savings Bank & Real Estate ly, interest does not disqualify Exchange v. Rivers, 36 Fla. 575, one to take an acknowledgment. 18 So. 850; Hammers v. Dole, Cooper V. Hamilton Perpetual 61 111. 307; West v. Krebaum, 88 Bldg. etc. Ass'n, 97 Tenn, 285, 33 111. 263; Wilson v. Traer, 20 L. R. A. 338, 56 Am. St. Rep. Iowa, 231; Greenlee v. Smith, 4 795, 37 S. W. 12. Kan. App. 733, 46 Pac. 543; 1730 Real Property. [§ 460 trustee in,^ or a beneficiary under/*' a deed of trust take the acknowledgment of the grantor therein. Whether one grantor can take the acknowledgment of his cograntor appears to be uncertain.^ ^ By the weight of authority an officer is disqualified to take an ac- knowledgment in which a corporation is beneficially in- terested if he is a stockholder therein, ^^ but not if Beaman v. Whitney, 20 Me. 413; Laprad v. Sherwood, 79 Mich. 520, 44 N. W. 943; W^asson v. Connor, 54 Miss. 351; Hainey V. Alberry, 73 Mo. 427; Amick v. Woodworth, 58 Ohio St. 86, 50 N. E. 437; Hunton v. Wood, 100 Va. 54, 43 S. E. 186. But in Murray v. Tulare Irri- gation Co., 120 Cal. 311, 49 Pac. 463, 52 Pac. 586, it was held that an acknowledgment taken by one of several grantees, each of whom took "a separate and defined interest" was good as to all the grantees except that one. And in Darst v. Gale, 83 111. 136, a substantially similar view was taken as to an acknowl- edgment before one of several trustees to whom a mortgage was made. 9. Muense v. Harper, 70 Ark. 309, 67 S. W. 869; Darst v. Dale, 83 111. 136; Holden v. Brimage, 72 Miss. 228, 18 So. 383; German American Bank v. Carondelet Real Estate Co., 150 Mo. 570, 51 S. W. 691; Lance v. Tainter, 137 N. C. 249, 49 S. E. 211; Rothschild v. Daugher, 85 Tex. 332, 16 L. R. A. 719, 34 Am. St. Rep. 811, 20 S. W. 142; Bow- den v. Parrish, 86 Va. 67, 19 Am. St. Rep. 873, 9 S. E. 616; Hunton v. Wood, 101 Va. 54. 43 S. E. 186. Contra, Weidman V. Templeton, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 61 S. W. 102. 10. Wasson v. Connor, 54 Miss. 351; Long v. Crews, 113 N. Car. 256, 18 S. E. 499; Baxter v. Howell, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 198, 26 S. W. 453. 11. That he can do so, see Greve v. Echo Oil Co., 8 Cal. App. 275, 96 Pac. 904. Contra, People V. Railroad Comm'rs, 105 N. Y. App. Div. 273, 93 N. Y. Supp. 584 (certificate of incor- poration). 12. Hayes v. Southern Home Bldg, etc., Ass'n, 124 Ala. 663, 82 Am. St. Rep. 216, 26 So. 527; Ogden Bld'g, etc., Ass'n v. Mensch, 196 111. 554, 63 N. E. 1049; Steger v. Travelling Men's Bldg etc., Ass'n, 208 111. 236, 100 Am. St. Rep. 225, 70 N. E. 236; Kothe v. Krag Reynolds. 20 Ind. App. 293, 50 N. E. 594; Smith v. Clark, 100 Iowa, 605, 69 N. W. 1011; Wilson v. Griess, 64 Neb. 792, 90 N. W. 866; Bexar Bldg. etc., Ass'n v. Heady, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 154, 50 S. W. 1079, 57 S. W. 583; Boswell v. Laramie First Nat. Bank, 16 Wyo. 161, 92 Pac. 624. That a stockholder Is not dis- qualified to take the acknowl- edgment of a mortgage to the corporation, see Read v. Toledo Loan Co., 68 Ohio St. 280, 62 § 460] Transfer Ixter Vivos. 1731 he is a corporate officer and not a stockholder. ^"^ One is not disqualified merely because he is the attorney/^ or the agent or employee, of an interested party.^^ Nor is one disqualified to take an acknowledgment by the fact that he is related to an interested party/^ and even the husband of the grantee, it has been decided, may take the grantor's acknowledgment.^" Duties of officer. The officer, in taking the acknowledgment, must comply with all the requirements of the statute. The statute invariably requires him to satisfy himself as to the identity of the person making the acknowledgment, and occasionally provides the man- ner in which he shall so satisfy himself, as by sworn witnesses. In the absence of any prescribed method of satisfying himself of the grantor's identity, the suffi- ciency of the acknowledgment cannot be questioned be- cause the officer acts merely on an introduction bv a L. R. A. 338, 56 Am. St. Rep. 663, 67 N. E. 29. And this though the stockholder was also an officer of the corporation Keene Guaranty Sav. Bank v. Lawrence, 32 Wash. 572; Cooper V. Hamilton Perpetual Building & Loan Ass'n, 97 Tenn. 285, 33 L. R. A. 338, 56 Am. St. Rep. 795, 37 S. W. 12. 13. Woodland Bank v. Ober- haus, 125 Cal. 320, 57 Pac. 1070; Florida Sav. Bank v. Rivers, 36 Fla. 577. 18 So. 850; Horbach V. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 514, 37 L. R. A. 434, 67 N. W. 485; Ogden Bldg & Loan Ass'n v. Mensch, 196 111. 554, 89 Am. St. Rep. 330, 63 N. E. 1049; Bardsley V. German American Bank, 113 Iowa, 216, 84 N. W. 1041; Keene Guaranty Sav. Bank v. Lawrence, 32 Wash. 572, 73 Pac. 680. 14. Brown v. Parker, 97 Fed 446. 38 C. C. A. 261; Bierer v. Fretz, 32 Kan. 329, 4 Pac. 284; Helena First Nat. Bank v. Rob- erts, 9 Mont. 323, 23 Pac. 718; Havemeyer v. Dahn, 48 Neb. 536, 33 L. R. A. 332, 58 Am. St. Rep. 706, 67 N. W. 489. 15. Castetter v. Stewart, 70 Neb. 815, 98 N. W. 34; Wachovia Nat. Bank v. Ireland, 122 N. C. 571, 29 S. E. 835; Penn v. Gar- vin, 56 Ark, 511, 20 S. W. 410. 16. Helena First Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 9 Mont. 323, 23 Pac. 718; Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; McAllister v. Purcell, 124 N. C. 262, 32 S. E. 715. 17. Remington Paper Co. v. O'Dougherty, 81 N. Y. 474; Nixon V. Post, 13 Wash. 181, 43 Pac. 23; Kimball v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 674 (mortgage). But the con- trary has also been decided, in cases in which the grantor whose acknowledgment was taken was a married woman. Jones v. 1732 Real Property. [§ 460 third person,^'' however this may affect the question of liis liability for a false certificate in this regard.^^ If the person making the acknowledgment speaks only a foreign language, the officer should employ an interpre- ter.2o Certificate, The stakite almost invariably re- quires the officer M-ho takes the acknowledgment to write upon, or attach to, the instrument, a certificate of acknowledgment, that is, a statement, under his hand, and ordinarily under his seal, showing that the acknowledgment was made. The certificate must, it is generally recognized, show a compliance with the statu- tory requirements, and if the statute contains specific provisions as to what the certificate must show, an omission to comply therewith renders it invalid. It must, in most jurisdictions, show the official character of the officer, that the acknowledgment was in fact made before him by the party w^ho executed the instrument, and that such person was personally known to him, or that he was satisfied or informed as to the identity of such person. But the certificate is to be construed with reference to the instrument to which it is appended, and consequently omissions or errors therein, not per- taining to the fact of acknowledgment itself, may usual- ly be corrected by reference to the language of the conveyance.- 1 And, generally speaking, a substantial Porter, 59 Miss. 628; Silcock v. Cal. 486: Waltee v. Weaver, 57 Baker, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 508, Tex. 569. 61 S. W. 939. But in Micliigan an acknowl- 18. Nippel V. Hammond, 4 edgment tlirough an Interpreter Col. 211; Wood v. Bach, 54 Barb. has been held to be insufficient. (N. y.) 1.34. See Lindley v. Dewey v. Campau, 4 Mich. 565 Lindley, 92 Tex. 446, 49 S. W. Harrison v. Oakman, 56 Mich. 573. 390, 23 N. W. 164. 19. See Barnard v. Schuler, 100 21. Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Minn. 289, 110 N. W. 966; Hat- Wall. (U. S.) 513; Frederick v. ton v. Holmes, 97 Cal. 208, 31 Wilcox, 119 Ala. 355, 72 Am. St. Pac. 1131. Rep. 925, 24 So. 582: Summer v. 20. Norton v. Meader, 4 Sawy. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179, 14 L. R. A. 603; De Arnaz v. Escandon, 59 815, 30 Am. St. Rep. 106, 10 So. § 460] Transfer Inter Vivos. 173:;^ comiDliance with the statutory requirement is sufficient, an adherence to the actual language of the statute be- ing regarded as unnecessary.-^ Oral evidence, how- ever, is not admissible in order to prove an essential fact which was by mistake omitted from the certificate.-^ In some states, by statute, the certificate is merely prima facie evidence of the facts which it recites, and its falsity may be shown by extraneous evidence.^"* In the absence of such a statutory provision, a certificate of acknowledgment is usually regarded as conclusive in regard to the matters as to which the officer is re- 562; Milner v. Nelson, 86 Iowa. 452, 53 N. W. 405; Kelly v. Rosenstock, 45 Md. 389; Bruns- ■wick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Brackett, 37 Minn. 58, 33 N. W. 214; Owen v. Baker, 101 Mo. 407. 20 Am. St. Rep. 618; Claflin v. Smith, 15 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 241; Fuhrman v. London. 13 Serg & R. (Pa.) 386, 15 Am. Dec. 608. 22. Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U. S. 710, 24 L. Ed. 544; Frederick V. Wilcox, 119 Ala. 355, 72 Am. St. Rep. 925; Jacoway v. Gaiilt, 20 Ark. 190; Goode v. Smith, 8 Cal. 581; Wilson v. Russsii. 4 Dak. 376, 31 N. W. 645; De- launey v. Burnett, 9 111. 454; Martin v. Davidson, 3 Bush (Ky.) 572; Bennett v. Knowles, 66 Minn. 4, 68 N. W. Ill; Gross V. Watts, 206 Mo. 373, 121 Am. St. Rep. 662, 104 S. W. 30; Torrey V. Thayer, 37 N. J. L. 339; Ab- rams v. Rhoner, 44 Hun 511; Etheridge v. Ferebee, 31 N. C. 312; Garton v. Hudson-Kimberly Pub. Co., 8 Okla. 631; Jamison V. Jamison, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 457. 31 Am. Dec. 536: Timber v. Desparois, 18 S. D. 587, 101 N. W. 879: Hughes v. Powers. 99 Tenn. 480, 15 Lea, 683; Wilson V. Simpson, 80 Tex. 279. 16 S. W. 40: Welles v. Cole, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 645; Bensimer v. Fell, 35 W. Va. 15, 29 Am. St. Rep. 774. 12 S. E. 1078. 23. Elliott V. Piersol's Lessee. 1 Pet. (U. S.) 328; Cox v. Hol- comb, 87 Ala. 589. 13 Am. St. Rep. 79; Ennor v. Thompson, 46 111. 214; Barnett v. Shankleford, 6 J. J. Marsh (Ky.) 532, 22 Am. Dec. 100; Willis v. Gattman, 53 Miss. 721; Salt v. Anderson, 71 Neb. 826, 99 N. W. 678; Wynne V. Small, 102 N. C. 133, 8 S. E. 912; Harty v. Ladd, 3 Ore. 353; Looney v. Adamson, 48 Tex. 619; Harrisonburg First Nat. Bank v. Paul, 75 Va. 594, 40 Am. Rep. 740. 24. See Moore v. Hopkins, 83 Cal. 270, 17 Am. St. Rep. 248; Tuten V. Gazan, 18 Fla. 751; Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497; Peoples Gas Co. v. Fletcher, 81 Kan. 76, 41 L. R. A. N. S. 1161. 105 Pac. 34; Ronier v. Conter. 53 Minn. 171, 54 N. VS^. 1052; Pierce V. Georger, 103 Mo. 540, 15 S. W. 848; McKay v. Lasher, 121 N. Y. 477, 24 N. E. 711. 1734 Eeal, Propekty. [§ 460 quired to certify,^^ but the fact that there was no ac- knowledgixieiit whatever may be shown in contradiction of the certificate.^^ As between the parties, moreover, evi- dence is always admissible to show that the acknowledg- ment was obtained by fraud or imposition, in which the grantee participated, or of which he knew,^'^ but this can- not be shown as against a person ignorant of the f raud,^^ 25. Grider v. American Free- hold Land Mortg. Co., 99 Ala. 281, 42 Am. St. R&p. 58; Petty V. Grlsard, 45 Ark. 117; Ford v. Ford, 27 App. D. C. 401, 6 L. K. A. (N. S.) 442; Graham v. Anderson, 42 111. 515, 92 Am. Dec. 89; Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. .333, 24 Am. Rep. 699; Pereau v. Frederick, 17 Neb. 117, 22 N. 235; Mutual T.tfe Ins. Co. v. Corey, 135 N. Y. 326, 31 N. E. 1095; Moore v. Fuller, 6 Ore. 275, 25 Am. Rep. 524; Heilman v. Kroh, 155 Pa. St. 1, 25 Atl. 751; Ronner v. Welcker, 99 Tenn. 623, 42 S. W. 439; Wheelock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 679, 66 Am. St. Rep. 920. So it has been held that the certificate cannot be impeached by a showing that the acknowl- edgment was taken by telephone. Banning v. Banning, 80 Cal. 271, 13 Am. St. Rep. 156. 26. Grider v. American Free- hold Land Mortg. Co., 99 Ala. 281, 42 Am. St. Rep. 58; Meyer V. Gossett, 38 Ark. 377; Le Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 533, 40 Am. St. Rep. 81; Smith V. Ward, 2 Root (Conn.) 374, 1 Am. Dec. 80; Lewis v. McGrath, 191 in. 401, N. E. 61 N. E. 135; Morris v. Sargent, 18 Iowa, 90; O'Neil V. Webster, 150 Mass. 572, 23 N. E. 2.S5; Spivey v. Rose, 120 N. C. 163, 26 S. E. 701; Williams v. Carskadden, 36 Ohio St. 664; Michener v. Cavender, 38 Pa. St. 334, 80 Am. Dec. 486; Wheelock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 679, 66 Am. St. Rep. 920. 27. Grider v. American Free- hold Land Mortg. Co., 99 Ala. 281, 42 Am. St. Rep. 58; Chiving- ton V. Colorado Springs Co., 9 Colo. 597; Eyster v Hatheway, 50 111. 521, 99 Am. Dec. 537: Aultman-Taylor Co. v. Erasure, 95 Ky. 429, 26 S. W. 5; Central Bank of Frederick v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305, 81 Am. Dec. 597. O'Neil V. Webster, 150 Mass. 572, 23 N. E. 275; Allen v. Lenoir, 53 Miss. 32] : Williamson v. Car- skadden, 36 Ohio St. 664; Cover V. Manaway, 115 Pa. St. 338, 2 Am. St. Rep. 552; Pierce v. Fort, 60 Tex. 464. 28. De Arnaz v. Escandon, 59 Cal. 486; Ladew v. Paine, 82 111. 221; Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. 331, 24 Am. Rep. 699; Moore v. Fuller, 6 Ore. 272. 25 Am. Rep. 524; Londen v. Blythe, 27 Pa. St. 22, 67 Am. Dec. 142: Pennsylvania Trust Co., v Kline. 192 Pa. St. 1, 43 Atl. 401; Campbell v. Harris Lithia Springs Co., 74 S. C. 282, 114 Am. St. Rep. 1001; Cason v. Cason, 116 Tenn. 173, 93 S. W. 89; Pierce v. Fort, 60 Tex. 464; § 460] Transfer Inter Vivos. 17o5 at least if a purchaser for value.^^ It has been quite frequently decided that, as against a purchaser for value and without notice, if the certifi- cate is regular on its face, it cannot be showTi that there was no valid acknowledgment by reason of lack of authority in the officer, as when he was beneficially interested, or that he undertook to act outside of his jurisdiction. The tendency of the later authorities is to regard the instrument as duly acknowledged, for the purpose of making its record effective as construc- tive notice, in favor of an innocent purchaser, in spite of the existence of such a defect, not apparent on the record or the face of the certificate."^*^ In a consider- able number of decisions, however, any such qualifica- tion upon the right to question the validity of the ac- knowledgment is ignored.^^ By married woman. In some states, a con- veyance in which a married woman joins, whether for the purpose of conveying her own property, or in order to release her rights in her husband's property, must, in order to be etfective as against her, be acknowledged 29. Lewars v. Weaver, 121 Pa. 92 Pac. 624, 93 Pac. 661; National St. 268, 15 Atl. 514; Edwards v. Bank of Fredericksburg, 1 Boyd, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 204. Hughes (U. S.) .'57 per Waite, C. 30. Ogden Bldg., etc., Ass'n v. J. Mensch, 196 lU. 554, 89 Am. St. 31. See Edinburgh American Rep. 330, 63 N. E. 1049; Bank of Land Mortg. Co. v. Peoples, 102 Benson v. Hove, 45 Minn. 40, 47 Ala. 241, 14 So. 656; Leonhard N. W. 449; Stevens v. Hampton, v. Flood, 68 Ark. 162, 56 S. W. 46 Mo. 404; Morrow v. Cole, 58 781; Kothe v. Krag-Reynolds Co., N. J. Eq. 203. 42 Atl. 673; Heil- 20 Ind. App. 293, 50 N. E. 594; brun V. Hammond, 13 Hun 474; Wilson v. Traer, 20 Iowa, 231; Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C. 418, Farmers, etc., Bank v. Stockdale, 35 S. E. 1035; Ardmore National 121 Iowa, 748, 96 N. W. 732; Bank v. Briggs, 20 Okla. 427, 23 Smith v. Clark, 100 Iowa, 605. L. R. A. (N. S.) 1074, 94 Pac. 533; 69 N. W. 1011; Groesbeck v. Peterson v. Lowry, 48 Tex. 408; Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Davis v. Corey v. Moore, 86 Va. 721. 11 Beazley, 75 Va. 491; Hunton v. S. E. 114; BosweU v. First Nat. Wood, 101 Va. 54. 43 S. E. 186. Bank of Laramie, 16 Wyo. 161, 1736 Keal Pkoperty. [§ 461 by her before the officer after a private examination by liim to ascertain that she executes it voluntarily and without compulsion from her husband, and the certiti- cate of the officer must state that he so examined her, and that she acknowledged the instrument to be her free and voluntary act. In some of the other states, while a private examination is not necessary, the certi- ficate must contain such a statement as to the free and voluntary nature of her act.^^ The officer is also occa- sionally required by the statute to ascertain, before taking the acknowledgment, that she understands the nature of the instrument."'^ The number of states in which an acknowledgment is thus necessary to the validltv of a conveyance by a married w^oman is, how- ever, steadily diminishing, the tendency of recent legis- lation being to enable ner to dispose of her property as if a feme sole. Proof in place of acknowledgment. In many states the statute authorizes, as an alternative to ac- knowledgment, and as preliminary to record, proof of the authenticity of the instrument, ordinarily by the evidence of the attesting witnesses. In some states such proof is authorized only when the grantor refuses to make acknowledgment, or dies before making it. In some it is authorized when the acknowdedginent or certifi- cate thereof is defective. ^^ § 461. Delivery. A written instrument, regarded as a constitutive or dispositive act, becomes legally operative by reason either (1) of the mutual action of two or more persons, parties in interest thereto, or (2) of the action of one person, from whom the writing 32. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, v. Reese. 1G5 Pa. St. 158, 30 Atl. § 6501. 722; Mettler v. Miller, 129 111. 33. See Norton v. Davis, 83 630, 22 N. E. 529. Tex. 32, 18 S. W. 4^5; Drew v. 34. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Arnold, 85 Mo. 128; Tavenner v. §§ 1590-16ii6. Barrett, 21 W. Va. 656; Spencer § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 17117 may be regarded as issuing. The mutual action of two or more persons is required in the case of what are known as simple contracts, while all other instruments, by the theory of the English common law,"^ become legally operative by the action of one party only. Of such other instruments, some are said to take eifect by delivery, this term serving to designate the final act by which one who has previously signed the instrument, or both signed and sealed it, signifies his intention that the instrument shall have a legal operation, and so realizes his intention in fact. Conveyances of land, in- cluding leases, contracts under seal, mortgages of land and of chattels, deeds of gift, insurance policies, and promissory notes, take effect by delivery. Of the in- struments which, while becoming operative by the action of one person alone, are not said to take effect by delivery, the most important class, perhaps the only class, consists of testamentary instruments, wills. But though, in the case of a will, there is no requirement of delivery under that name, nevertheless an instrument ordinarily becomes operative as a will only by virtue of a final expression of intention by the maker to that effect, such expression usually taking the form, by force of statute, of a declaration in the presence of witnesses of an intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, or of a request addressed to witnesses to attest the signature thereto, ])rovided they accede to the request."*^ Such final expression of intention in the case of a will is the equivalent of the final expression of in- tention by means of delivery in the case of an instru- ment inter vivos. The expression "delivery," as applied to a written instrument, had its inception, it appears,''^ in connection with written conveyances of lands, the manual transfer 35. Post, § 463, note 7. Series) §§ 298, 302, 313; 2 Pollock 36. Post, § 469. & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 85, 37. Brissaud, French Private 86. h'dvf, (Continental Legal History 1738 liEAL Pkopekty, [*^ 461 or "deliver}^" of which was, in early times, upon parts of the continent of Europe, regarded as in effect a symbolical transfer of the land itself, analogous to livery of seisin. And not only was the notion of physi- cal delivery of the instrument applied in connection with the transfer of land, hut it was applied also in con- nection with written evidences of contract, the physical transfer of the document being necessary to make it legally operative, and being effective to that end.^^ The view that a transfer of land could be effected by means of the manual transfer of a writing was originally adopted in England to but a limited extent, but in so far as the courts recognized the effectiveness of a writ- ten instrument for the purpose of transfer or of con- tract, they adopted the continental conception of a physical change of possession thereof as a prerequisite to its legal operation, and accordingly the necessity of delivery became established in connection with various classes of written instruments as they came to be recog- nized by the courts, particularly deeds of grant, con- tracts under seal, the only class of contract recognized in the earlier history of our law, and promissory notes.^® ^^Hiile, as before stated, the necessity of delivery in connection with the instruments last named, and others of an analogous character, is stiU fully recog- nized, the crude conception of a manual transfer of the instrument as the only means of making it legally effective, which gave birth to the expression ^'delivery" as used in this connection, has been superseded by the more enlightened view that whether an instrument has been delivered is a question of intention merely, there being a sufficient delivery if an intention appears that it shall be legally operative,^" however this intention 38. Brissaud. op. cit. § 370; 2 Law Quart. Rev. at p. 17. Pollock & Maitland, 190. 40. Fitzpatrick v. Briginan, 39. As to promissory notes, 130 Ala. 450, 30 So. 500; Russell see article by Professor W. S. v. May, 77 Ark. 89, 90 S. W. 617; Holdsworth, "The Early History Follmer v. Rohrer, 158 Cal. 755, of Negotiable Instruments," 31 112 Pac. 544; Flynn v. Flynn, 17 § 461] Transfer Inter Vn^os. 173:9 may bo indicated.^^ Accordingly, it is generally agreed that delivery does not necessarily involve any manual transfer of the instrument,^ ^ ^^^^ provided an intention is indicated that the deed shall take effect, the fact that the grantor retains possession of the instrument is im- Idaho, 147, 104 Pac. 1030; Bowers V. Cottrell, 15 Idaho, 221, 96 Pac. 936; Riegel v. Riegel, 243 111. 626, 90 N. E. 1108; Burkholder V. Casad, 47 lud. 418; Sheldon V. Crane, 146 Iowa, 461, 125 N. W. 238; Doty v. Barker, 78 Kan. 636, 97 Pac. 964; Burk v. Sproat, 96 Mich. 404, 55 N. W. 985; Inger- soU V. Odendab.i, 136 Minn. 428. 162 N. W. 525; Coulson v. Coul- son, 180 Mo. 709, 79 S. W. 473; Martin v. Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 32 Pac. 187, 19 L. R. A. 242, 40 Am. St. Rep. 415; Flannery v. Flannery, 99 Neb. 557, 156 N. W. 1065; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. Eq. 56, 21 Atl. 627; Fisher v. Hall, 42 N. Y. 416; Lee v. Parker 171 N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217; Mitchell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Johnson v. Craig, 37 Okla. 378, 130 Pac. 581; Sapping- field V. King,— Ore.— 8 L. R. A. N. S. 106; Hannah v. Swarnet, 8 Watts (Pa.) 11; McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359, 55 S. W. 310; Matson v. Johnson, 48 Wash. 256, 125 Am. St. Rep. 924, 93 Pac. 324; Glade Coal Min. Co. v. Harris. 65 W. Va. 152, 63 S. E. 873. In Cox v. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 156 Pac. 509, it is in effect said that though the grantor In- tends, in handing the instrument to the grantor, to make it oper- ative as a conveyance, there is no delivery if it is procured by fraud. This is, it is submitted, erroneous. The intention exists, and hence there is a delivery, though the intention is based on a misconception wrongfully induced. There are almost num- berless decisions recognizing that the legal title passes in such case. 41. Delivery, being a question of intention, is one of fact, for the jury. Murray v. Stair, 2 Barn. & C. 82; Fitzpatrick v. Brigman, 133 Ala. 242, 31 So. 940; Donahue v. Sweeny, 171 Cal. 388, 153 Pac. 708; Emmons v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154, 1 Ann. Cas. 864, 70 N. E. 142; Brann v. Monroe, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 324; Bishop V. Burke, 207 Mass. 133, '^3 N. E. 254; O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 130 Minn. 292, 153 N. W. 607; Hurlburt v. Wheeler, 40 N. H. 73; Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Crain v. Wright, 36 Hun, 74, 114 N. Y. 307; Ar- f'hambeau v. Edmunson, 87 Ore. 476, 171 Pac. 186; Fisher v. Kean, 1 Watts (Pa.) 278; Kana- well V. Miller, — Pa.— 104 Atl. 861; McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359, 55 S. W. 310; Dwinell V. Bliss, 58 Vt. 353. 5 Atl. 317; Holly St. Land Co. v. Beyer, 48 Wash. 422, 93 Pac. 1065; Garrett V. Goff, 61 W. Va. 221, 56 S. E. 351; Kittoe v. Willey, 121 Wis. 548, 99 N. W. 337. 42. Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Crenshaw. 169 Ala. 606. 53 So. 812; Faulkner v. Feazel. 113 Ark. 289, 168 S. W. 568; Smith v. 1740 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 461 material.^^ So, while it is frequently said, both by the older and later authorities, that delivery may be made to a third person for the benefit of the grantee,^* mean- May, 3 Penn. (Del.) 233, 50 Atl. 59; Benneson v. Aiken, 102 111. 28-1, 40 Am. Rep. 592; Hoyt v. Northup, 256 in. 604, 100 N. E. 164; Prince v. Prince, 258 111. 304, 101 N. E. 608; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28; Newton v. Bealer. 41 Iowa, 334; Pentico v. Hays, 75 Kan. 76, 88 Pac. 738, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224; Kirby v. Hulette, 174 Ky. 257, 192 S. W. 63; Byers v. McClanahan, 6 Gill. & J. (Md.) 250; Creeden v. Ma- honey, 193 Mass. 402, 79 N. E. 776; Thatcher v. St. Andrews Church, 37 Mich. 264; Chastek V. Souba, 93 Minn. 418, 101 N. W. 618; Young v. Elgin — (Miss.) —27 So. 595; Lee v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144, 88 S. E. 217; Dukes V. Spangler, 35 Ohio St. 119; Kanawell v. Miller,— Pa. — 104 Atl. 861; Farrar v. Bridges, 5 Hump. (Tenn.) 411; Watson v. Johnson, 48 Wash. 256, 125 Am. St. Rep. 924, 93 Pac. 324. 43. Doe d. Garnons v. Kmght, 5 Barn. & C. 671; Xenos v. Wick- ham, L. R. 2 H. L. 296; Austin V. Fendall, 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 362; Otis v. Spencer, 102 HI. 622, 40 Am. Rep. 617; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; Bunnell v. BunneH, 111 Ky. 566, 64 S. W. 420. 65 S. W. 607; Moore v. Hazelton, 9 Allen (Mass.) 102; Stevens v. Hatch, 6 Minn. 64; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147; Ruck- man V. Ruckman, 32 N. J. Eq. 259; Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 545, 30 Am. Dec. 75; Mitchell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Ledgerwood v. Gault, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 643; Thatch- er V. Capeca, 75 Wash. 249, 134 Pac. 923. So the fact that the grantor still has access to the instru ment does not conclusively nega tive delivery. Strickland v Griswold, 149 Ala. 325, 43 So 105; Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark 104, 85 S. W. 244; Kenniff v Caulfield. 140 Cal. 34, 73 Pac 803; Munro v. Bowles, 187 111 346, 54 L. R. A. 864; Terry v Glover, 235 Mo. 544, 139 S. W 337; Payne v. Hallgarth, 33 Ore 430, 54 Pac. 162; Wilson v. Wil son, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac. 643. 44. Sheppard's Touchstone, 57, 4 Kent. Comm. 455; Doe d. Garnons v. Knight, 5 Barn. & C. 671; Xenos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 312: Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Crenshaw, 169 Ala. 606. 53 So. 812; Watson v. Hill, 123 Ark. 601, 186 S. W. 68; Crozer v. White— (Cal.)— 100 Pac. 130: Clark V. Clark, 183 111. 448. 75 Am. St. Rep. 115; Gomel v. Mc- Daniels, 269 111. 362, 109 N. E. 996; Matheson v. Matheson. 139 Iowa, 511, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167. 117 N. W. 755: Harmon v. Bower. 78 Kan. 135, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502, 16 Ann. Cas. 121, 98 Pac. 51: Beatty v. Beatty, 151 Ky. 547, 152 S. W. 540; Clark V. Creswell, 112 Md. 339. 21 Ann. Cas. 338, 76 Atl. 579; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 412: Cooper v. Cooper, 162 Mich. 304. § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 174J ing thereby that the conveyance may take effect by reason of physical transfer of the instrument to a third person, this would seem to result, not from any particu- lar virtue in the transfer, but from the fact that the transfer may show an intention to make the instrument legally operative. A declaration to such third person of an intention that the deed shall take effect would seem to be quite as effective as a manual transfer to him, if satisfactoril}^ proven,^^ and would indeed, as affording indubitable evidence of the grantor's inten- tion, have a conclusiveness that may be lacking in the case of a mere manual transfer. Such a transfer to a third person, if not made with the intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, does not con- 127 N. W. 266: Barnard v. Thur- ston. 86 Minn. 343, 90 N. W. 574; Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104 Mo. 201. 24 Am. St. Rep. 326; Jones V. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279: Church V. Oilman, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 656: Robblns v. Roscoe, 120 N. C. 79. 38 L. R. A. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774: Meeks v. StUl- well, 54 Ohio St. 541; Belcher v. La Grande Nat. Bk. 87 Ore. t)65, 171 Pac. 410; Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. St. 285; Eckman v. Eck- man, 55 Pa. St. 269; Kanner v. Startz,— Tex Civ. App.— , 203 S. W. 603. Statements, occasionally found, to the effect that the instrument must be handed to the third person with the intention that h<» pass it on, so to speak, to the grantee named (See e. g. Osborne v. Eslinger, 155 Ind. 351, 80 Am. St. Rep. 240, 58 N. E. 439) or that he must so pass it on (Furenes v. Eide, 109 Iowa, 511, 77 Am. St. Rep. 545. 80 N. W. 539; Jackson v. Phlpps, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 418) are, it is 2 R. P.— 35 submitted, absolutely incorrect. The intention of the grantor as to whether the instrument shall take effect as a conveyance is the subject for ascertainment, not his intention, if he happens to have any, as to the ultimate custody of the writing. In one state it appears to have been decided that a manual transfer to a third person cannot involve delivery unless such per- son is a duly authorized agent of the grantee. Jameson v. Goodwin, — Okla. — 170 Pac. 241, Such a view is, it is submitted, entirely out of harmony with the authorities generally. 45. 3 Preston, Abstracts, 63; Doe d. Garnons v. Knight, 5 Barn. & C. 671; Xenos v. Wlck- ham, L. R. 2 H. L. 312; Linton V. Brown's Adm'rs (C. C.) 20 Fed. 455; Rushin v. Shields, 11 Ga. 636, 56 Am. Dec. 436; Moore V. Hazelton, 9 Allen (Mass.) 102; Regan v. Howe, 121 Mass. 424; Kane v. Mackln, 9 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 387; Vought v. Vought, 1742 Real Propeety. [§ 461 stitute a delivery;**' nor does such a transfer to the grantee himself, if the transfer is not with such inten- tion, but is for another purpose as, for instance, to en- able him to examine the instrument.*"^ In spite, however, of these numerous decisions recognizing the minor imjiortance of the matter of actual transfer of the instrument in connection with the question of delivery, the courts not infrequently speak as if such transfer were an essential in delivery. The occasional mention, moreover, of delivery "to" the grantee, suggests the idea of a physical transfer to 50 N. J. Eq. 177, 27 Atl. 489; Scrugham v. W^ood, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 54,5; Diehl v. Emig, tJ5 Pa. St. 320; Contra, Moore v. Conins, 15 N. C. 384. 46. Co. Litt. 36a; Sheppard's Touchstone 57; Culver v. Carroll, 175 Ala. 469, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 103, 57 So. 767; Baker v. Baker. — (Cal.)— , 100 Pac. 892; Merrills V. Swift, 18 Conn. 257; Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568, 13 L. R. A. 64, 21 Am. St. Rep. 131, 22 Atl. 299; Lange v. Cullinan 205 111. 365, 68 N. E. 934; Connor V. Buhl, 115 Mich. 531, 73 N. W. 821; Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316; Jackson v. Phlpps, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; MltcheH's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Sears v. Scranton Trust Co., 228 Pa. 226, 20 Ann. Cas. 1145, 77 Atl. 423; Leftwich v. Early. 115 Va. 323, 79 S. E. 384; Showalter V. Spangler, 93 Wash. 326, 160 Pac. 1042. A statement of an intention that the conveyance shall be immediately operative has been regarded as effective as a de- livery, although the instrument had been previously placed in another's custody to hold It in behalf of the grantor. Moore V. Trott, 162 Cal. 268. 122 Pac. 462; Elliott v. Hoffhine, 97 Kan. 26, 154 Pac. 225. 47. Bray v. Bray, 132 Ark. 438, 201 S. W. 281; Kenney v. Parks, 137 Cal. 527, 70 Pac. 556; Cox V. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371. 156 Pac. 509; Oswald v. Caldwell. 225 111. 224, 80 N. E. 131: Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 260 111. 179, 103 N. E. 65; Witt v. Witt, 174 Iowa. 173. 156 N. W. 321; Ball v. Sandlin, 176 Ky. 537, 175 S. W. 1089; Tewkesbury v. Tewkesbury, 222 Mass. 595. Ill N. E. 394; Comer v. Baldwin, Its Minn. 172; Braman v. Bingham. 26 N. Y. 483; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222. 63 S. E. 1028; Clark V. Clark. 56 Ore. 218. 107 Pac. 23; In re Nicholl's Petition. 190 Pa. 308, 42 Atl. 692: Gordon V. White, 33 S. D. 234. 145 N. W. 439; Dwinell v. Bliss. 58 Vt. 353, 5 Atl. 317: Zoerb v. Paetz, 137 Wis. 59, 117 N. W. 793. 1^ 4G1 1 Tkansfer Inter Vivos. 17415 him. The delivery of a conveyance or other instrument involves in its essence no delivery ''to" any one, since it means merely the expression, by word or act, of an intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, and the fact that in many cases such intention is indi- cated by the making of a physical transfer does not show that such transfer is necessary. The partial survival of the primitive formalism, as it has been well termed,^^ which attached some peculiar efficacy to the physical transfer of the instrument, as involving a symbolical transfer of the property described therein, is presumably to be attributed to the fact that in other connections the words ''deliver" and "delivery," as applied to inanimate things, ordinarily have reference to a physical transfer. It being conceded that even a voluntary transfer of the instrument by the grantor to the grantee does not in- volve a delivery if not with the intention that the in- strument shall be legally operative, it necessarily fol- lows that the instrument cannot be regarded as having been delivered merely because the grantee has ac- quired possession thereof without the grantor's con- sent.^^ And it has been decided that the fact of non delivery in such case may be asserted even as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, who purchased in re- liance on the grantee's possession of the instrument.-"'" 48. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § v. Ayer, 2G Ore. 589, 39 Pac. 1; 2405. King v. Diffey— Tex. Civ. App.— 49. Bender v. Barton, 166 Ala. 192 S. W. 262. 337, 52 So. 26; Bowers v. Cottrell, 50. Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532. 15 Idaho, 221, 96 Pac. 936; Lundy 32 Pac. 576, 33 Pac. 323: Henry v. Mason, 174 111. 505. 51 N. E. v. Carson, 96 Ind. 412; Ogden v. 614; Schaefer v. Purvlance. 160 Ogden, 4 Ohio St. 458; Burns v. Ind. 63, 66 N. E. 154;. Hintz v. Kennedy, 49 Ore. 588, 90 Pac. Hintz, 175 Iowa, 392, 156 N. W. 1102; Van Amrlnge v. Morton, 4 878; White v. Holder— (Ky.)— Whart. (Pa.) 382; Steffian v. 118 S. W. 995; Westlake v. Dunn, Milmo Nat. Bank, 69 Tex. 513. 6 184 Mass. 260, 100 Am. St. Rep. S. W. 823; Tyler Building & 557; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 134 Loan Ass'n v. Baird & Scales. — Mich. 90, 95 N. W. 973; Allen Tex. Civ. App.—. 16.') S. W. 5J2. 174-4: Eeal Property. [§ 461 There arc, however, dicta to the effect that the grantor may, by reason of his lack of care in the custody of the instrument, be estopped, in favor of a bona fide pur- chaser, to deny its delivery.^ ^ Apart from any question of houa fide purchase, there are a number of" decisions to the effect that an in- strument of conveyance, the possession of which has been improperly acquired by the grantee named therein, may be subsequently made operative by the grantor's recognition of the title as being in such grantee.^^ In connection with these decisions the courts ordinarily speak of such recognition as involving a ''ratification" of the deed or of the delivery, but what actually, occurs is, it is conceived, a delivery by the grantor, that is, an expression of an intention by him, not previously expressed, that the instrument, which has already passed into the grantee's hands, shall take effect as a transfer of title. An instrument which is inoperative as a conveyance for lack of legal delivery cannot be made operative by ratification, there being indeed, in such case, nothing to ratify. And likewise a j^hysical transfer of the instrument, which lacks all legal sig- nificance because not made by one authorized to make delivery, cannot thereafter, by ratification, be trans- formed into a legal delivery, that is, an expression of intention that the instrument shall be legally operative. 51. Gould V. Wise, 97 Cal. 532. Co., 13 C. C. A. 1, 65 Fed. 441. 32 Pac. 576, 33 Pac. 323; Alex- See post. § 462, note 42. ander v. Welcker. 141 Cal. 302, 74 52. Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Pac. 845; Allen v. Ayer, 26 Ore Idaho, 633, 69 L. R. A. 572, 80 589, 39 Pac. 1; Merck v. Merck, 83 Pac. 1117; Phelps v. Pratt, 225 S. Car. 329, 137 Am. St. Rep. 815, 111. 85, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945, 65 S. E. 347; Steffian v. Mllmo 80 N. E. 69: Harkness v. Cleaves, Nat) Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 6 S. W. 113 Iowa, 140, 84 N. W. 1033; 823; Garner v. Risinger, 35 Tex. McNulty v. McNulty, 47 Kan. Civ. App. 378, 81 S. W. 343; 208, 27 Pac. 819; Pannell v. Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55, Askew,— Tex. Civ. App. — , 143 S. 11 Am. Rep. 546; Laughlin v. W. 364. Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dock § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. J 745 Delivery by agent. The delivery of an instru- ment is a part of the execution thereof,'^^ and in so far as a written or sealed authority may be necessary to enable one to sign or seal an instrument as an agent acting in behalf of the grantor, such an authority is, it is conceived, necessary to enable one to deliver the instrument as such agent. ^^ It would be strange if the final expression of intention, which makes the instru- ment legally operative, could be given by one acting under an oral authority, while the merely preliminary acts of signing and sealing can be performed by an agent only when acting under authority in wiiting. There are, however, to be found occasional judicial statements that a deed may be delivered by one acting under oral authority,^^ and that this may be done is not infrequently assumed by the courts.^^ That an oral authority is sufficient for this purpose appears to be involved in the decisions, rendered in a number of states,^^ that a conveyance which, at the time it leaves 53. See Goodlet v. Goodman Coal & Coke Co., 192 Fed. 775, 113 C. C. A. 61; Clark v. Child, 66 Cal. 87, 4 Pac. 1058; Bowers V. Cottrell, 15 Idaho, 221, 96 Pac. 936; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; McAndrew V. Sewell, 100 Kan. 47, 163 Pac. 653; Tucker v. Helgien, 102 Minn. 382, 113 N. W. 912; and other cases cited in "Words & Phrases" under "Execute." 54. That an agent cannot de- liver a deed without authority under seal is explicitly decided in Hibblewhlte v. M'Morine, 6 Mees. & W. 200; Powell v. London & Provincial Bank (1893), 2 Ch. 555. So it is said In Sheppard's Touchstone at p. 57, that "where one person delivers an instru- ment as the act of another per- son, who is present, no deed con- ferring an authority is requisite. But a person cannot, unless au- thorized by deed, execute an in- strument as the act of a person who is absent." 55. White v. Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 437; Macurda v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 341, 114 N. E. 366; Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 783, 26 S. E. 262. See Huff- cut, Agency (2nd Ed.) p. 38. 56. Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, 116 111. 340, 6 N. E. 428; Furenes V. Eide, 109 Iowa, 511, 77 Am. St. Rep. 545, 80 N. W. 539; Con- way V. Rock, 139 Iowa, 162, 117 N. W. 273; Santaquin Min. Co. v. High Roller Min. Co., 25 Utah 282, 71 Pac. 77; Spring Garden Bank v. Ilulings Lumber Co., 32 W. Va. 357, 3 L. R. A. 583. 57. Ante, § 434. note t;8. 1746 Real Property. [§ 461 the hands of the grantor, hicks the name of a grantee, becomes valid if the name is subsequently inserted by an agent acting under oral authority from the grantor, these decisions apparently- involving the assumption that the delivery of the deed is made by such agent, since delivery could not be made so long as the instru- ment, lacking the name of the grantee, was a legal nullity, and there is no act by the grantor, after the in- sertion of such name, which can be referred to as indicative of an intention to deliver. The view indicated in the decisions referred to, that an agent acting under oral authority may make delivery, is presumably based on the misconception, previously referred to, that delivery of a deed means merely the manual transfer of the instrument. That an agent in possession of the instrument in behalf of the grantor is in a position to hand it to the grantee, whether his agency is based on a written or an oral authority, is sufficiently obvious, and because he is in a position to do this it is assumed that he has the power and authority to make delivery of the instrument on behalf of the grantor. But delivery of the instru- ment involves more than a manual transfer thereof, and the fact that the agent is in a position to make such a transfer is no reason for assuming that he has legal authority to express, by word or act, an intention on the part of the grantor that the instrument shall be- come legally operative. It no doubt frequently occurs that the grantor hands the completed instrument to an agent, with oral instructions to hand it to the grantee upon some subsequent event, ordinarily the payment of the purchase money. In such case, however, the de- livery, it is conceived, is properly to be regarded as a conditional delivery made by the grantor himself, a delivery made by him, that is, at the time of handing the instrument to his agent, conditioned however upon the subsequent payment of the purchase money or occurrence of the other event named, on which the agent was to hand the instrument to the grantee. Upon § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1747 the satisfaction of the condition the delivery by the grantor becomes effective, as in the case of any other conditional delivery,"^ and the mere act of the agent in handing the instrument to the grantee is not technically speaking, a delivery thereof, it having already been delivered. Since the delivery must be made by the grantor, or by the grantor's agent, in order to be eft'ective, there can be no delivery after the grantor's death. A deceased grantor can obviously not make delivery, and the agent's authority necessarily comes to an end upon the death of the principal.^'' Retention of control. It is not infrequently said that there is no delivery if the grantor still re- tains control or dominion over the deed.*'*' Such a state- ment is somewhat ambiguous. The mere fact that the grantor retains possession of the instrument is, as above 58. Post, § 462. 59. Mortgage Trust Co. of Pennsylvania v. Moore, 150 Ind. 465, 50 N. E. 72; Schaeffer v. Anchor Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 11.3 Iowa, 652, 85 N. W. 985; Colyer V. Hyden, 94 Ky. 180, 21 S. W. 868; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 60 Am. Rep. 291; Givens v. Ott. 222 Mo. 395, 121 S. W. 23; Meikle V. Cloquet, 44 Wash. 513, 87 Pac. 841. 60. See e. g. Tarwater v. Going, 140 Ala. 273, 37 So. 330; Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568, 13 L. R. A. 64, 21 Am. St. Rep. 131, 22 Atl. 299; Rutledge V. Montgomery, 30 Ga. 899; Cal- lerand v. Plot, 241 111. 120, 89 N. E. 266: Pethel v. Pethel, 45 Ind. App. 664, 90 N. E. 102; Kirby v. Hulette, 174 Ky. 257, 192 S. W. 63; Renehan v. Mc- Avoy, 116 Md. 356, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941, 81 Atl. 586; .Toslin V. Goddard, 187 Mass. 165. 72 N. E. 948; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 60 Am. Rep. 291; Ingersoll V. Odendahl. 136 Minn. 428, 162 N. W. 525: Hall v. Waddill, 78 Miss. 16, 27 So. 936, 28 So. 831;- Peters v. Berkemeier, 184 Mo. 393, 83 S. W. 747; Baker v. Haskell, 47 N. H. 479, 93 Am. Dec. 455; Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028; Arne- gaard v Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 41 L. R. A. 258; Ball v. Fore- man, 37 Ohio St. l:{9; Eckman v. Eckman, 55 Pa. St. 269; Johnson V. John.son, 24 R. I. 571, 54 Atl. 378; Merck v. Merck, 83 S. C. 329, 137 Am. St. Rep. 815, 65 S. E. 347; Cassidy v. Holland, 27 S. D. 287, 130 N. W. 771; Gaines V. Keener, 48 W. Va. 56, 35 S. E. 856; Butts v. Richards, 152 Wis. 318, 140 N. W. 1. 1748 Real Property. [§ 461 indicated,*'^ not incompatible with delivery, and yet it can hardly be said that, having possession of the deed, he has no dominion or control thereover. The state- ment may mean that the fact that the grantor has a right to demand the physical possession of the insti'n- ment, or to refuse to relinquish such possession, conclu- sively shows that the instrument has not been delivered since, after delivery, the grantee, and not the grantor, is entitled to control the possession of the instrument, it being his muniment of title. Or it may mean that the fact that the grantor has a right to determine whether the instrument shall have a legal operation shows that it has not been delivered, since after delivery he has no such right. But since the question whether the grantor has the right of control as regards either pos- session of the instrument or its legal operation depends on whether there has been a delivery, the statement re- ferred to amounts to little more than a statement that, so long as the instrument is subject to the grantor's control by reason of lack of delivery, the instrument has not been delivered. The statement is unquestion- ably correct, but appears to be of questionable utility, and its frequent repetition is calculated to obscure, rather than to clarify, the nature of delivery. Presumptions as to delivery. In connection with the question of the delivery of a deed, various rules of presumption have been judicially asserted, that is, particular states of fact have been regarded as show- ing prima facie, that the instrument has or has not l)een delivered. It has been said that the fact that the instrument remains in the possession of the grantor raises a pre- sumption that it has not been delivered.''- This appears 61, Ante, this section, note 43. 133 Iowa, 320, 107 N. W. 310, 62. Donahue v. Sweeny, 171 110 N. W. 582; Dunbar v. Mea- Cal. 388, 153 Pac. 708; Kavan- dows, 165 Ky. 275, 176 S. W. augh V. Kavanaugh, 260 III. 79, 1167; Dudley v. Niclierson, 107 103 N. E. 65; Shetler v. Stewart, Me. 25, 78 Atl. 100; Kanawell v. § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 17-1-9 to be merely another way of saying that delivery is an affirmative fact, the burden of proving which is upon the person alleging it. If he cannot support this burden by evidence of a change of possession of the instru- ment, he must support it by other evidence."^ While a presumption of non delivery is said ordi- arily to arise from the grantor's possession of the instrument, no such presumption arises, it is said, if the grantor, by the terms of the instrument, reserves a life estate in the property, for the reason that there is no object in such a reservation unless the instrument is to operate before the grantor's death.''^ That such a reservation shows that the instrument was i)rei)ared with the intention that its operation should not be postponed till the grantor's death may be conceded, but it is difficult to see what bearing this has on the question of delivery, since the form of the instrument, even without .the reservation, shows that it was pre- pared with this intention. It might as well be said that any instrument in the form of a conveyance inter vivos as disting-uished from a will, though still in the possession of the grantor, is to be presumed to have been delivered, since it would not have l;een prepared in that form had it not been intended to operate be- fore the grantor's death. Delivery is, as above indi- Miller, —Pa.— 104 Atl. 861; Cas- W. Va. 56, ;{5 S. E. 856; Butts v. sidy V. Holland, 27 S. D. 287, Richards, 152 Wis. 318. 44 L. R. 130 N. W. 771; Butts v. Richards, A. (N. S.) 528, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 152 Wis. 318, 140 N. W. 1. 854, 140 N. W. 1. 63. See Jenkins v. Southern 64. Hill v. Kreiger, 250 111. R. Co., 109 Ga. 35, 34 S. E. 355; 408, 95 N. E. 468; Buck v. Garber. Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 1: 261 111. 378, 103 N. E. 1059; Powers V. RusseU, 13 Pick. Collins v. Smith, 144 Iowa. 200. (Ma:!S.) 69: Bisard v. Sparks, 122 N. W. 839; Sneathen v. 133 Mich. 587, 95 N. W. 728; Sneathen, 104 Mo. 201, 24 Am. Ligon V. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, St. Rep. 326, 16 S. W. 497; Wil- 40 So. 555; Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. liams v. Latham, 113 Mo. 165, 313, 27 Am. St. Rep. 338; At- 20 S. W. 99; Ball v. Foreman, wood V. Atwood, 15 Wash. 285, 37 Ohio St. 132. 46 Pac. 240; Gaines v. Keener, 48 1750 Eeal Peopbrty. [^ 461 cated, the final expression, subsequent to the signing and sealing, of an intention that the instrument shall he legally operative, and, whatever the form of the instrument, it cannot well constitute the basis for an inference that, subsequent to the signing and sealing, such intention was expressed.^^ It has furthermore been said that the grantor's retention of the instrument does not give rise to a presumption of non-delivery if he retains an interest in the property and it is consequently to his advantage that the instrument be preserved.*'^ It is, however, dif- ficult to see that, in the ordinary case, it is to his advantage that the instrument be preserved, if its effect is to divest him of either the whole interest or a partial interest in the property. He would in either case be better off if the instrument were no longer available for the purpose of asserting his grantee's rights thereunder. That the instrument is in the possession of the grantee named therein is usually referred to as raising a presumption that it has been delivered,''" based, it would seem, on the probability that the grantor gave him possession of the instrument, and the improbability that the grantor would vest him w^ith such a muniment of title unless he intended that the title should pass. 65. See Colyer v. Hyden, 94 E. 204; Inmau v. Swearingen, Ky. 180, 21 S. W. 868; Whitney 198 III. 437, 64 N. E. 1112; V. Dewey, 10 Idaho, 6H3, 69 L. R. Hathaway v. Cook, 258 111. 92, A. 572, 80 Pac. 1117. 101 N. E. 227; Hild v. Hild, 129 66. Blakemore v. Byenside, 7 Iowa, 649, 113 Am. St. Rep. Ark. 504; Cribbs v. Walker, 74 500; Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. Ark. 104, 85 S. W. 244; Scrug- 237, 116 Pac. 898; Ball v. Sandlin, ham V. Wood, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 176 Ky. 537, 195 S. W. 1089; 545. Valentine v. Wheeler, 116 Mass. 67. Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 478; Barras v. Barras, 192 Mich. (U. S.) 322, 10 L. Ed. 476; 584, 159 N. W. 147; Wilson v. Simmons v. Simmons, 78 Ala. Wilson, 85 Neb. 167, 122 N. W. 365; Thompson v. McKenna, 22 856; Plerson v. Fisher, 48 Ore. Cal. App. 129, 133 Pac. 512; Hill 223, 85 Pac. 621; Painter v. V. Merritt, 146 Ga. 307, 91 S. Campbell, 207 Pa. 189, 56 Atl. § 461] Transfee Inter Vivos. 1751 In England and Massachusetts there are decisions to the effect that the signing and sealing of the instru- ment in the presence of an attesting witness raises a presumption of delivery,''^ the effect of which presump- tion would be to justify a finding of delivery, although the instrument is still in the grantor's possession, upon evidence that it was signed and sealed by him. Such a presumption does not appear to have been rec- ognized elsewhere, and it may perhaps be regarded as based on a recognized practice, in the jurisdictions named, of making delivery of the instrument by a dec- laration to that effect in the presence of witnesses at the time of signing and sealing. The propriety of such an inference of delivery from the mere fact of signing and sealing might indeed depend on the particular cir- cumstances of the case, for instance on the presence or absence of the grantee. That the grantor signs and seals the instrument in the presence of the grantee may justify an inference of delivery, while his doing so in the grantee's absence may not.*'^ That the attestation clause, under which the wit- nesses write their names, recites the delivery of the in- strument, has occasionally been regarded as creating a presumption of delivery,"" while a contrary view has 409; Jackson v. Lamar, 58 Wasti. Eliz 7; Levister v. Hilliard, 57 383, 108 Pac. 946. N. C. 12. "If both parties be That the presumption is not present, and the usual formalities overthrown by the fact that the of execution take place, and the possession is not affirmatively contract is to all appearances shown to have originated prior consummated without any condi- lo the grantor's death, see Blair tions or qualifications annexed, v. Howell, 68 Iowa, G19, 28 N. W. it is a complete and valid deed, 199; Melaney v. Cameron, 98 Kan. notwithstanding it be left in the 620, 159 Pac. 19. c\istody of the grantor." 4 Kent's 68. Hall v. Bainbridge, 12 Q. Comm. 455, quoted and applied B. 699; Hope v. Harman, 16 Q. in Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend. B. 751 note; Burling v. Paterson, (N. Y.) 545; Wallace v. Berdell. 9 Car. & P. 570; Moore v. Hazel- 97 N. Y. 13. ton, 9 Allen (Mass.) 102; Howe 70. Xenos v. Wickham, L. R. V. Howe, 99 Mass. 88. 2 H. L. 296; Evans v. Grey. 9 L. 69. See Shelton's Case, Cro. R. Jr. 539; Clark v. Akers, 16 1752 Real Property. [§ 4G1 also been expressed/^ Such a fact might properly, it would seem, be regarded as evidence sufficient to sup- port a finding of delivery, but whether it should bo regarded as creating a presumption of delivery, in the sense of requiring a finding of delivery in the absence of countervailing evidence, appears questionable^^ Upon the question whether the fact that an instru- ment is acknowledged raises a presumption of delivery the cases are few and unsatisfactory. That it does not has occasionally been decided,'^'^ but there are a greater number of decisions to an opposite effect.'^* The fact that the instrument is acknowledged in the presence of the grantee might operate to create an inference in this regard which an acknowledgment out of his presence would not create."^^ Some weight might also be im- Kan. 166 (semble) ; Hall v. Sears, 210 Mass. 185, 96 N. E. 141; Diehl v. Emig, G5 Pa. St. 320; Currie v. Donald, 2 Wash. (Va.) 58. 71. Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Rushin v. Shield, 11 Ga. 636; Hill v. McNichoI, 80 Me. 209, 13 Atl. 883. 72. The presence of such a clause has been referred to as some evidence of delivery. Den- nis V. Dennis, 119 Mich. 380, 78 N. W. 333. And see, apparently to this effect. Hill v. Merritt, 146 Ga. 307, 91 S. E. 204. 73. Braun v. Monroe, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 324; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 279; Kille v. Ege, 79 Pa. St. 35. In Alexander v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345, It was decided that acknowledgment did not create a presumption of delivery for the reason that the concurrence of the grantee is needed. This is however another question, that of the necessity of acceptance. See post, § 463. 74. Boyd v. Playback, 63 Cal. 493; New Haven Trust Co. v. Camp, 81 Conn. 539, 71 Atl. 788; Baker v. Updike, 155 111. 54, 39 N. E. 587; Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 17; Govin v. De Miranda, 76 Hun (N. Y.) 414, 27 N. Y. Supp 1019; Tarlton v. Griggs, 131 N. C. 216, 233, 42 S. E. 591; Humphrey v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 35. Occasionally the fact that the Instrument was both acknowledg- ed and recorded is referred to as raising a presumption of de- livery. Sulzby v. Palmer, 194 Ala. 524, 70 So. 1; Stephens v. Stephens, 108 Ark. 53, 156 S. W. 837: Felker v. Rice, 110 Ark. 70, 161 S. W. 162. 75. See Delaplain v .Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612, 67 Am. St. Rep. 788, 30 S. E. 201; Adams v. Baker, 50 W. Va. 249, 40 S. E. 356; Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 545. <^ 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1753 puted to the language of tlie certificate of acknowledg- ment, an acknowledgment in express terms that the gran- tor delivered the instrument being perhaps entitled to more weight than an acknowledgment merely that he executed it.'*^ The usage of the community as to the time and manner of making acknowledgments might also have a hearing in this regard.'" It would seem on the whole desirable that the courts refrain from the as- sertion of a presumption of delivery from acknowl- edgment, but rather leave it to the jury to determine w^hether the circumstances of the particular case show an intention on the part of the grantor that the instru- ment shall be legally operative.'* In several cases it is in effect decided that a finding of delivery cannot be based on the fact of acknowledgment alone. '^'^ The question may arise in this connection of the effect of a statute, such as exists in a number of states, making an instrument, if duly acknowledged, admissible without further proof of execution. In one state such a statute has been regarded as placing on the op- posite party the burden of show^ing non-delivery,*'^ but this does not appear to accord with decisions in other jurisdictions that the authentication of a docu- ment sufficient to render it admissible in evidence does not necessarily create a presumption of its execution.^^ 76. See Blight v. Sclieuck, 10 W. Va. 561, 20 S. E. 591; Hutch- Pa. 285; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. ison v. Rust, 2 Gratt. (Va.) L. 279; Hawes v. Hawes, 177 HI. 394. 409, 53 N. E. 78. 79. Humphrey v. Hartford Fire 77. In Brann v. Monroe, 11 Ins. Co., 15 Dlatchf. (U. S.) 35; Ky. L. Rep. 324 it is said that Wiggins v. Lusk, 12 III. 132; the acknowledgment raises a pre- Baker v. Updike, 155 111. 54, 39 sumption of delivery because the N. E. 587; Btirton v. Boyd, 7 instrument ought to be delivered Kan. 17; Covin v. De Miranda, before acknowledgment. This can 7G Hun. 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1019; not well be said in all commu- 80. Tucker v. Helgren, 102 nities. Minn. 382, 113 N. W. 912. 78. That the acknowledgment 81. Anderson v. Cuthbert, i03 Is merely evidence bearing uu Ga. 767, 30 S. E. 244; Scott v. the question appears to be recog- Delany, 87 111. 146; Ross v. nlzed in Furguson v. Bond, 39 Gould, 5 Me. 204; Bogle v. Sul- 1754 Real Propeety. [§ 461 That the grantor has the instrument recorded, or leaves it with the proper official for record, has been frequently referred to as raising a presumption of de- livery.*^- This amounts in effect to a statement that such action on the part of the grantor shows, primu facie, an intention on his part that the instrument shall be legally operative. It is in the ordinary case dif- ficult to see any object in leaving the instrument for record, unless it is intended that it shall operate as a conveyance, and the rule of presumption referred to ap- pears to be founded in reason. In a few states only does this view appear to have been actually repudiated, and it is not always clear, in these states, why such an effect is denied to the grantor's conduct in this regard.^" In a very considerable number of cases it is said that the action of the grantor in having the instrument re- corded does not show delivery if this was without the knowledge or consent of the grantee,^'* but this intro- livant, 1 Call. (Va.) 561; Sieg- fried V. Levan, 6 Serg. & R. 308. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2135. 82. Lewis v. Watson, 98 Ala. 479, 39 Am. St. Rep. 82; Lee Hardware Co. v. Johnson, 132 Ark. 462, 201 S. W. 289; Ellis v. Clark, 39 Fla. 714, 23 So. 410; Creighton v. Roe, 218 111. 619, 109 Am. St. Reip. 310; Blacken- ship V. Hall, 233 111. 116, 122 Am. St. Rep. 149, 84 N. E. 192; Colee V. Colee, 122 Ind. 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345, 23 N. E. 687; Hut- ton V. Smith, 88 Iowa, 238, 55 N. W. 326; Lay v. Lay,— (Ky.) — 66 S. W. 371; Holmes v. Mc- Donald, 119 Mich. 563, 75 Am. St. Rep. 430; Griffin v. Howey, 179 Mich. 104, 146 N. W. 210; Ingersoll v. Odendahl, 136 Minn. 428, 162 N. W. 525; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262, 137 Am. St. Rep. 567, 127 S. W. 86; Mitch- ell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Robbins v. Rascoe, 120 N. C. 79, 38 L. R. A. 238, 56 Am. St. Rep. 774; Thompson v. Jones, 1 Head (Tenn.) 574; Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147, 18 S. W. 113; Newton v. Emerson, 66 Tox. 142; Bjmerland v. Ely, 15 Wash. 101. 83. See Egan v. Horrigan, 96 Me. 46. In McManus v. Commow, 10 N. D. 340, 87 N. W. 8, the decision to this effect is based on an ill-advised statute under- taking to state what constitutes delivery. In Massachusetts this position appears to be in part the result of the view (post, § 463) that there must be knowl- edge of or assent to the convey- ance on the part of the grantee. (See Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456; Samson v. Thornton, 3 Mete. 275), and in part of the § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1755 duces another question, that of the necessity of ac- ceptance of a conveyance, which properly calls for separate discussion,^^ and these cases cannot generally be regarded as involving a repudiation of the view that the action of the grantor in having the instrument re- corded shows, prima facie, an intention that it shall take effect as a conveyance. The presumption of de- livery, based on the action of the grantor in having the instrument recorded, is recognized as being subject to rebuttal by evidence that he did not intend the instru- ment to operate as a conveyance.^-' In several cases the fact that the purpose of the conveyance was merely to prevent the assertion or collection of a claim by a third person against the gran- notion that delivery of a deed means the physical transfer of the instrument. Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560, 7 Am. St. Rep, 554; Barnes v. Barnes, 161 Mass. 381, 37 N. E. 379. The legisla- ture has now intervened by mak- ing the record of a conveyance concllisive evidence of delivery in favor of a bona fide purchaser. See Rev. Laws, c. 127, § 5. 84. Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. (U. S. 636, 18 L. Ed. 262; Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 81, 718 I.. Ed. 542; Knox v. Clark, 15 Colo. App. 356, 62 Pac. 334; Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 111. 199, 40 N. E. 482; Wilenou v. Handlon, 207 111. 104, 69 N. E. 892; Vaughan v. Godman. 94 Ind. 191; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 100 Iowa, 476, 69 N. W. 676; Alexander v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345; Oxnard v. Blake, 45 Me. 602; Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456, 6 Am. Dec. 146; Sam- son V. Thornton 3 Mete. (Mass.) 275, 37 Am. Dec. 135; Bullitt v. Taylor, 34 Miss. 708, 69 Am. Dec. 412; Cravens v. Rossiter, 116 Mo. 338, 38 Am. St. Rep. 606; Derry Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 264; Jackson v. Phipps, 12 .lohns. (N. Y.) 418; King v. Antrim Lumber Co.,— Okla.— 172 Pac. 958; Bogard v. Barhan, 56 Ore. 269, 108 Pac. 214. 85. Post, § 463. 86. Humiston v. Preston, 66 Conn. 579. 31 Atl. 544; Jones v. Bush, 4 Harr. (Del.) 1; Ellis v. Clark, ;59 Fla. 714, 23 So. 410; Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 111. 199, 40 N. E. 482; Vaughan v. Vaughan, 94 Ind. 19; Hutton v. Smith, 8» Iowa, 238, 55 N. W. 326; Hoga- done V. Grange Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 133 Mich. 339, 94 N. W 1045; Barras v. Barras. 192 Mich. 584, 159 N. W. 147; Babbitt v. Bennett, 68 Minn. 260, 71 N. W. 22; Metcalfe v. Brandon, 60 Mi.ss. 685; Boardman v. Dana. 34 Pa. St. 252; Thompson v. Jones, 1 Head (Tenn.) 576; Walsh v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 54 Vt. 351. 1756 Eeal Property. [§ 461 tor and not to vest a beneficial interest in the grantee, has been regarded as prechiding, or at least as tending to preclude, any inference of delivery from the grantor 's action in recording the instrument.^^ Such a view ap- pears, however, to be open to question. The instrument cannot operate in any degree for his protection unless it operates as a conveyance, and the fact that he de- sires protection would seem to be rather an additional reason for regarding the instrument as having become operative by delivery.^^ Even conceding that his pur- pose to avoid payment of claims would show that there was no delivery, it might be questioned whether he, or one claiming in his right, should be allowed to assert that the ordinary inference from his use of the record- ing system should not be drawn, because he made such use for purposes of deception. That the grantor, after having the instrument re- corded, himself obtains it from the recording officer, instead of leaving it with the latter to be called for by the grantee, does not appear to have any proper bearing upon the question of the grantor's intention in having it recorded.^*^ Even though there were the 87. Coulson v. Scott, 167 Ala. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262, 137 Am. 606, 52 So. 436; Union Mut. Life St. Rep. 567, 127 S W. 86; Ins. Co. V. Campbell, 95 111. Decker v Stansberry, 249 111. 267, 35 Am. Rep. 166; Weber v. 487, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 227, 94 Christen, 121 111. 91, 2 Am. St. N. E. 940. Rep. 68, 11 N. E. 898; Vaughan 89. See Lewis v. Watson, 98 V. Godman, 94 Ind. 19; Davis v. Ala. 480, 22 L. R. A. 297; Rus- Davis, 92 Iowa, 147, 60 N. W. sell v. May, 77 Ark. 89, 90 S. 507; Egan v. Horrigan, 96 Me. W. 617; Moore v. Giles, 49 Conn. 46, 51 Atl. 246; Hogadone v. 570; Allen v. Hughes, 106 Ga. Grange Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 133 775. 32 S. E. 927; Colee v. Colee, Mich. 339, 94 N. W. 1045; Hoop- 122 Ind. 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. er V. Vanstrum, 92 Minn. 406, 345. 23 N. E. 687; Collins v. 100 N. W. 229; Koppelmann v. Smith, 144 Iowa, 200, 122 N. W. Koppelmann, 94 Tex. 40, 57 S. 839; Lay v. Lay, (Ky.), 66 S. W. W. 570; Elmore v. Marks, 39 371; Mitchell's Lessee v. Ryan, Vt. 538. 3 Ohio St. 377; Thompson v. 88. See Corley v. Corley, 2 Jones, 1 Head. (Tenn.) 576. Cold, (Tenn.) 520; Chambers v. But Weber v. Christen, 121 111. § 461] Transfer Ixtee Vivos. 1757 fullest intention on the part of tlie grantor that the instrument should become legally effective, he might well desire to have it returned to him to hold tempo- rarily. The fact, however, that the grantor not only obtains the instrument after its record, but retains it in his possession, has been regarded as showing that it has not been delivered.^ *^ Conceding that the record of the instrument by the grantor is sufficient in itself to make a prima facie showing of delivery, it is not entirely clear why his subsequent retention of the instrument should be regarded as showing a different intention. That the grantor has the instrument recorded might properly, it is submitted, overcome any inference of non-delivery from his subsequent possession of the in- strument, since, as before remarked, it is difficult to conceive of any object in having it recorded other than that it should be legally operative. It being conceded that a manual transfer of the instrument by the grantor directly to the recording officer shows, prima facie, an intention that it shall operate as a conveyance, it would seem that his manual transfer of the instrument to another, to be by the latter handed to the recording officer, might likewise show such an intention, and there are decisions to this effect.^^ 91, 2 Am. St. Rep. 68, 11 N. Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 125 E. 893, is apparently contra. Ala. 538, 28 So. 38; Zeigler v. 90. Weber v. Christen, 121 Daniel. 128 Ark. 40:{, 194 S. 111. 91, 2 Am. St. Rep. 68, 11 N. W. 246; Valter v. Blavka, 195 E. 893; Hutton v. Smith, 88 111. 610, 63 N. E. 499; In re Iowa, 238, 55 N. W. 326; Jourdan Bell's Estate, 1^0 Iowa, 725, V. Patterson, 102 Mich. 602, 61 130 N. W. 798; Tngersoll v. N. W. 64; Babbitt v. Bennett, Odendahl, 136 Minn. 428, 162 N. 68 Minn. 260, 71 N. W. 22; El- W. 325; Bobbins v. Rascoe, 120 more v. Marks, 39 Vt. 538; Fair N. Car. 79, 38 L. R. A. 238, 58 Haven Marble & Marbleized Slate Am. St. Rep. 774; Thompson v. Co. V. Owens, 69 Vt. 246, 37 Atl. .lones, 1 Head (Tcnn.) 576; 749. See King v. Antrim Lumber Bates v. Winters, 138 Wis. 073, Co., — Okla.— , 172 Pac. 958. 120 N. W. 498. 91. Tennessee Coal, Iron & 2 R. P.— 36 1758 Real Peopebty. [§ 461 It has been frequently asserted that the mere fact that the instrument is of record raises a presumption of delivery, without any reference being made to the identity of the person who had it recorded.-*- The cases do not ordinarily indicate the basis of this presump- tion, but occasionally**-^ it has been regarded as based, to some extent at least, upon the statutory provisions, existent in most of the states,^^ making an instrument, duly acknowledged (or proved), and recorded, or a copy thereof, admissible without further proof. But this latter view does not appear to accord with the authorities, before referred to,^^ that the authentica- tion of an instrument sufficient to justify its admission in evidence does not create a presumption of its due execution, A more satisfactory reason for inferring delivery from the fact that the instrument is of rec- ord w^ould seem to be the probability that it was placed on record either by the grantor, thus indicating an intention on his part to make it operative,^'^ or by the grantee, thus indicating that it was in his possession, this itself raising a presumption of delivery.^'^ Any presumption arising from the mere fact of record might be overthrown by evidence that the instrument was 92. Estes V. German Nat. 24; Whiting v. Hoglund, 127 Wis. Bank, 62 Ark. 7, 34 S. W. 85; 135, 7 Ann. Cas. 224, 106 N. Parker v. Salmons, 101 Ga. 160, W. 391; Laughlin v. Calumet 65 Am. St. Rep. 291; Spencer & Chicago Canal & Dock Co., V. Razor, 251 111. 278, 96 N. E. 13 C. C. A. 1, 65 Fed. 441. 300; Witt V. Witt, 174 Iowa, 173, 93. See Napier v. Elliott. 177 156 N. W. 321; Maynard v. Ala. 113, 58 So. 435; MitcheU's Maynard, 145 Ky. 197, 140 S. W. Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; 156; Balin v. Osoba, 76 Kan. Jackson v. Perkins, 2 Wend. (N. 234, 91 Pac. 57; Patrick v. Y.) 317; Goodlett v. Goodman Howard, 47 Mich. 40, 10 N. W. Coal & Coke Co., 192 Fed. 775, 71; Sweetland v. Buell, 164 N, 113 C. C. A. 61. Y. 541, 79 Am. St. Rep. 676; 94. These statutes are sum- Stephenson v. Van Blokland, 60 marized in 3 Wigmore, Evidence, Ore. 247, 118 Pac. 1026; Mc- §§ 1651, 1676. Daniel v. Anderson, 19 S. C. 211; 95. Ante, this section, note 81. Morgan v. Morgan, 82 Vt. 243, 96. Ante, this section, note 82. 137 Am. St. Rep. 1006, 73 Atl. 97. Ante, this section, note 67. § 461] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1759 not placed on record by the authority of either the grantor or grantee,^^ or by other evidence to the eifect that there was no delivery,'^'^ That the parties to the instrument acted as if the title to the property had passed to the grantee named has been regarded as showing or tending to show delivery.^ In regard to this it may be conceded that the fact that the grantor named acts as if the title had passed to the grantee named would certainly appear to be strong evidence of his intention that the instrument should operate to pass the title.^ That the grantee named so acts would appear to be strong evidence of his acceptance of the conveyance, so far as an accep- tance may be regarded as necessary in the particular jurisdiction," but it does not seem to have any par- ticular relevancy to the question whether the grantor has delivered the instrument, assuming that, as is believed to be the case, the cjuestion of acceptance is entirely distinct from that of delivery. Voluntary settlement. It was said by Chancel- lor Kent in a quite early New York case,"-'' that a voluntary settlement is valid, even though the grantor 98. Bouvier-Iaeger Coal Land 10 N. W. 71. Co. V. Sypher, 186 Fed. 644. 2. See Corley v. Corley, 2 99. Equitable Mtge. Co. v. Poldw. (Tenn.) 520; Donahue Brown, 105 Ga. 474, 30 S. E. 687: v. Sweeny, 171 Cal. 388, 153 Pac. McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 708; Tweedale v. Barnett, 172 Cal. 306, 102 S. W. 997; Hathaway v. 271, 156 Pac. 483; Tupper v. Cook, 258 111. 92, 101 N. E. 227. Foulkes, 9 C. B. N. S. 797. That 1. Gould V. Day, 94 U. S. the grantor treats the land as 405, 24 L. Ed. 232; In re Jackson his own, after having signed Brick & Tile Co., 189 Fed. 636; a conveyance thereof, has been re- Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104, garded as tending to show that 85 S. W. 244; Bruner v. Hart, the conveyance was not delivered. 59 Fla. 171, 51 So. 593; Rode- Little v. Eaton, 267 111. 62;i, 108 meier v. Brown, 109 111. 347, 61 N. E. 727. Am. St. Rep. 176, 48 N. E. 468; 3. Post, § 463. Bunnell v. Bunnell, 111 Ky. 566, 3a. Souverbye v. Ardcii, 1 64 S. W. 420, 65 S. W. 607; .Tohns. Ch. 240. Patrick v. Howard. 47 Mich. 40, 1760 Real Property. [§ 461 retains possession of the instrument, in the absence of other circumstances to show that it is not intended to he ahsohite. In view of the fact, w^ell recognized at the present day if not at that time, that not only a volun- tary settlement, but any conveyance, may be effective al- though the physical possession of the instrument re- mains in the grantor,^ the statement referred to with reference to voluntary settlements appears to have no l^articular significance. It has however been quoted from time to time,^ and it appears to be responsible for the view, asserted in two or three states, that in the case of a voluntary settlement, especially when made in favor of an infant, the law will make stronger pre- sumptions in favor of delivery than in other cases.'* In one state it has been said that in the case of such a settlement the burden of proof is on the grantor to show that there was no delivery/ Why there should be a relaxation of the requirements of proof of delivery in the case of such a settlement is not entirely clear. It has been said that ''the same degree of formality is never required, on account of the great degree of confidence which the parties are presumed to have in each other, and the inability of the grantee, frequently, to take care of his own interests."^ As a matter of fact, however, no formality is necessary in any case for the delivery of a conveyance, and conceding the necessity 4. Ante, this section, note 43. v. Schooler 258 Mo. 83, 167 S. 5. See WaUace v. Berdell, 97 W. 444. N. Y. 13; Bryan v. Wash, 7 7. Bryan v. Wash, 7 lU. 557; 111. 557; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 103. Winterbottom v. Pattison, 152 6. Miller v. Meers, 155 111. . 111. 334, 38 N. E. 1050; Abbott 284, 40 N. E. 577; Ln tinier v. v. Abbott, 189 111. 488, 82 Am. Latimer, 174 111. 418, 51 N. E. St. Rep. 472. But in Hawes v. 548; Abbott v. Abbott, 189 111. Hawes, 177 111. 409, 53 N. E. 78, 488, 82 Am. St. Rep 472; Baker the necessity of a showing of V Hall, 214 111. 364, 73 N. E. delivery even in the case of a 351; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind voluntary settlement is clearly 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345, 23 N. recognized. E. 687; Crowder v. Searoy. 103 8. Bryan v. Wash, 7 111. 557. Mo. 97, 15 S. W. 346; Schooler § 461] Traxsfer Inter Vivos. 1701 of delivery, the reasons suggested for dispensing with the ordinary proof thereof in this particular case ap- pear somewhat inadequate. Indeed the fact that the settlement is voluntary, a gift merely, might well be regarded as requiring the strictest proof of delivery.^ Date of delivery. Since an instrument of conveyance operates to transfer the title to the property only upon delivery, the ascertainment of the date of delivery is frequently a matter of importance. There is a rebuttable presumption that the instrument was delivered on the day on which it is dated,^*^ provided, at least, it is not acknowledged, or is not acknow- ledged on a different date. When the date of the in- strument differs from the date of acknowledgment, the delivery is by some courts presumed to have taken place on the former date,^^ and by some on the 9. See Jamison v. Craven, 4 Del. Ch. 311; Hooper v. Van- strum, 92 Minn. 406, 100 N. W. 229. 10. Williams v. Armstrong, 130 Ala. 389, 30 So. 553; Gordon V. City of San Diego, 108 Cal. 264, 41 Pac. 301 (statute); Kim- ball V. Chicago. 253 111. 105, 97 N. E. 257; Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 446; Schweigel v. L. A. Shakman Co., 78 Minn. 142, 80 N. W. 871, 81 N. W. 529; Blair State Bank v. Bunn, 61 Neb. 464, 85 N. W. 527; Crossen v. Oliver, 37 Ore. 514, 61 Pac. 885; State V. Dana, 59 Wash. 30, 109 Pac. 191; Douthat v. Roberts, 73 W. Va. 358, 80 S. E. 819; Wheeler v. Single, 62 Wis. 380, 22 N. W. 569. 11. Smith V. Scarbrough, 61 Ark. 104, 32 S. W. 382; Smiley V. Fries, 104 111. 416; Lake Erie etc. R. Co. V Whitham, 155 III. 514, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 28 L. R. A. 612; Scobey v. Walker, 114 Ind.. 254, 15 N. E. 674; Crabtree v. Crabtree, 136 Iowa, 630, 113 N. W. 923, 15 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 149: McConnell v. Brown, 6 Lltt. (Ky.) 459; Ford V. Gregory, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 175; Smith v. Porter, 10 Gray. (Mass.) 66; Conley v. Finn, 171 Mass. 70, 68 Am. St. Rep. 399. But see Mighill v. Town of Row- ley, 224 Mass. 586, 113 N. E. 569; People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397; Harriman Land Co. v. Hil- ton, 121 Tenn. 308, 120 S. W. 162; Kirby v. Cartwright, 48 Tex.. Civ. App. 8, 106 S. W. 742; Beall v. Chatham, (Tex. Civ App.), 117 S. W. 492; Har- man v. Oberdorfer, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 497. In Calligan v. Cal- ligan, 259 111. 52, 102 N. E. 247. it is decided that the deed in presumed to have been delivered on the day of its date, thongli not acknowledged till a later 17()2 Real PROPERTir. [^ 462 latter.^- This diiference of view as to whether the date of acknowledgment should control, in the absence of other evidence, appears to be the result, to a very considerable extent, at least, of a difference of view as to the probability of delivery before acknowledgment,^-" and the usage of different communities in this regard might well differ. § 462. Conditional delivery. The delivery of a conveyance, or of any other instrument which takes effect by delivery, may be conditioned upon the per- formance of some act or the occurrence of some event. A conditional delivery is usually referred to as a delivery "in escrow," or it is said that an instrument conditionally delivered is delivered as an "escrow." These forms of expression have the sanction of cen- turies of usage, and yet it may be questioned whether they are not calculated to give a wrong impression as to such a delivery. The word "escrow" meant origi- nally, it appears, a piece or roll of parchment or paper, and its use in this connection doubtless has reference to the fact that an instrument conditionally delivered is not immediately operative. But an instrument in the form of a deed, which is conditionally delivered, is delivered as a deed, an instrument capable of legal operation, and not as a mere piece of paper. Other- wise it could not become legally operative upon the satisfaction of the condition. In the case of a con- ditional delivery, a delivery in escrow, the maker of the instrument in effect says : "I now deliver this as my date, if the acknowledgment waa 336, 122 N. W. 780; Fontaine v. not necessary to the passing of Boatmen's Sav. Inst., 57 Mo. 552; title, and only then. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Field, 12. Kitchener v. Jehlik, 85 174 Mo. App. 11, 161 S. W. 364; Kan. 684, 118 Pac. 1058; Loomis Bolaskey v. Furey, 12 Phila. V. Pingree, 43 Me. 299 {semble) ; (Pa.) 428 (semble); Kent v. Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md. Cecil, (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. 352 (semble); Blanchard v. Ty- W. 715. ler, 12 Mich. 339, 86 Am. Dec. 12a. Atite, this section, note 57; Miller v. Peter, 158 Mich. 77. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1763 act and deed, provided such a condition is satisfied," and not '*I now deliver this as a mere piece of paper, provided such a condition is satisfied." The use of the word ''escrow" in this connection is, however, so thoroughly established that any question as to its propriety is necessarily futile, and the expressions ''conditional delivery" and "delivery in escrow" will here be used for the most part interchangeably. Physical transfer. Tlie conception of a con- ditional delivery, a delivery in escrow, as ordinarily presented in the older English books, is of a transfer of the possession of the instrument to a third jierson, as custodian or depositary, with directions to him to hand it to the grantee or obligee named upon the satis- faction of the condition,'"' and so in this country the cases have tended to emphasize the matter of the phys- ical transfer of the instrument. If, however, the de- livery of a deed is, as appears to be generally agreed, merely the expression, either by word or act, of an intention that the instrument shall have a legal opera- tion, conditional delivery would seem properly to be merely an expression of an intention that the instru- ment sliall have a legal operation provided a certain condition is satisfied, and adopting such a view, the physical transfer or custody of the instrument be- comes of minor importance. An absolute delivery can be made without a iihysical transfer of the instrument,'^ and it is difficult to see why a conditional deliverv cannot be so made. There are in England judicial ex- pressions to the effect that it can.''""' The contrary view is a relic of the primitive formalism whicli at- taches some peculiar efficacy to the physical transfer of the instrument, as involving a symbolical transfer of the property described therein. 13. Perkins, Conveyancing, §§ 15-16. See Gudgen v. Bessett. 142-144; Sheppard's Touchstone, 6 EH. & Bl. 986; Xenos v. Wlck- 59; 2 Bl. Comm. 307. ham, L. R. 2 H. L. 29(1. 14. Antr, § 461, notes 42, 43. 17()4: Real Property. [§ 462 The manual transfer of the instrument, which is ordinarily assumed to be essential to a conditional delivery, must, according to the authorities in this country, be to a person other than the grantee, it being held that if the grantor, intending to make a conditional delivery, hands the instrument to the grantee, there is necessarily an absolute delivery.^^ In England the older authorities are generally to the same effect,^^ but there are occasional modern dicta to the contrary.^'' That the mere physical transfer of the instrument should, in any jurisdiction, be allowed to override the grantor's explicit declaration of intention that the in- strument shall not be immediately operative, is a striking illustration of the persistence of the primitive formalism before referred to.-^ An instrument mav be 17. Alabama Coal & Coke Co. V. Gulf Coal & Coke Co., 165 Ala. 304, 51 So. 570; Campbell V. Jones, 52 Ark. 493, 6 L. R. A. 783; Mowry y. Heney, 86 Cal. 471, 25 Pac. 17; Larsb v. Boyle, 36 Colo. 18, 86 Pac. 1000; Walker V. Warner, 31 Dist. Colo. App. 76; Duncan v. Pope, 47 Ga. 445; Mays V. Shields, 117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68; Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho, 633; 69 L. R. A. 572; McCann v. Atherton, 106 111. 31; Potter V. Barringer, 236 111. 224, 86 N. E. 233; Robinson, Norton & Co. V. Randall. 147 Ky. 45, 143 S. W. 769; Hubbard v. Greeley, 84 Me. 340, 17 L. R. A. 511, 24 Atl. 799; Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 518; Arnold v. Patrick, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 310; Worrall v. Winn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330: Gaston v. City of Portland, 16 Ore. 255. 19 Pac. 127; Keenan & Wade V. City of Trenton, 130 Tenn. 71, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 519, 168 S. W. 1053; Miller v. Fletcher, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 403, 21 Am. St. Rep. 356; Richmond V. Morford, 4 Wash. 337, 30 Pac. 241, 31 Pac. 513; Gaffney v. Stowers, 73 W. V». 420, 80 S. E. 501. But see Wilson v. Wil- son, 158 567, 49 Am. St. Rep. 176, 41 N. E. 1007; Stanley v. White, 160 111. 605, 43 N. E. 729. 18. They are cited in 13 Vin. Abr. Fait (O.); Norton, Deeds, 17; 10 Halsbury's Laws of Eng- land, p. 388. See Co. Litt. 36a; Sheppard's Touchstone, 59. 19. Watkins v. Nash, L. R. 20 Eq. 262; London Freehold and Leasehold Property Co. v. Suffield, L. R. 2 Ch. 608, at p. 621; Hudson v. Pevett, 5 Bing. 368; Bower v. Burdekin, 11 M. & W. 128, 146. 20. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2405, 2408. This writer re- marks in reference to the case of Hawksland v. Gatchel Cro. Eliz. 835, which clearly decided that delivery was conditional, if so intended, although the instru- ment was handed to the obligee, § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 17G5 handed to the grantee or obligee without effecting any delivery whatsoever,^! and it is difficult to see why it cannot be so handed without effecting more than a conditional delivery. So far as the danger of misleading an innocent third person is concerned, the danger is as great when there is no delivery as when the delivery is conditional only. The view referred to has, by a number of courts, been, repudiated in connection with bills and notes, with the effect of upholding a condi- tional delivery thereof in spite of a manual transfer to the payee,^^ and the same considerations in favor of its repudiation would seem to apply in the case of deeds of conveyance. A tendency to break in upon such a rule is indicated by decisions that it does not ai)})ly if the instrument shows on its face an intention that others than those who have executed it shall join in its execution before it shall become operative,^' as well as by decisions that the grantor can hand the instru- ment to the grantee, to be in turn handed by the latter to a third person to hold it in escrow, without thereby rendering it immediately operative.^^ Occasional decisions to the effect that an instrument cannot be regarded as conditionally delivered if it is handed to the grantee's agent-''' are based upon the "the authority and vogue of North American Fire Ins. Co., 23 Coke's and Sheppard's writing.s Wend. (N. Y.) 43, 35 Am. Dec. obscured and suppressed prema- 543; Brown v. Reynolds, 5 Sneed, •turely this progressive concep- (Tenn.) 639. But see Bramau tion." V. Bingham, 26 N. Y. 491, for a 21. Ante, § 461, note 47. (lictum contra. 22. 1 Daniel, Negotiable In- 25. Duncan v. Pope, 47 Ga. struments (6th ed.), § 68a; Nor- 445; Stewart v. Anderson, 59 ton. Bins & Notes (3rd ed.) 71. Ind. 375; Hubbard v. Greeley, 23. Shelby v. Tardy, 84 Ala. 84 Me. 340, 17 L. R. A. 511; 327, 4 So. 276; Ward v. Churn, Wier v. Batdorf, 24 Neb. 83, :i8 18 Gratt. (Va.) 80, 98 Am. Dec. N. W. 22; Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. 749; Wedlinger v. Smith, 75 Va. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330; Ordinary 309, 40 Am. Rep. 727. v. Thatcher, 41 N. J. L. 403 32 24. Cherry v. Herring, 83 Ala. Am. Rep. 225; Bond v. Wilson, 458, 3 So. 667; Fairbanks v. Met- 129 N. C. 325, 40 S. R. 179. calf, 8 Mass. 230; Gilbert v. 1766 Keal Property. [§ 462 assumption that such a manual transfer to the grantee's agent is in effect a transfer to the grantee himself. Such an assumption is justified, however, only when the transfer is to the grantee's agent as such; that is, the mere fact that for other purposes one is the grantee's agent does not render him such agent for the purpose of holding possession of the instrument, and it has ac- cordingly been decided in a number of cases that there was a valid conditional delivery although the person to whom the instrument was handed, to hold until satis- faction of the condition, was for some purposes the agent of the grantee.^*^ Occasional statements to the effect that an instru- ment which has been handed to the grantor's agent cannot be regarded as having been delivered condi- tionally^'^ appear to be open to question. They are, no doubt, an outgrowth of the view that there can be no conditional delivery if the grantor retains possession of the instrument, it being considered that possession by the grantor's agent is in effect possession by the grantor himself. Conceding that there can be no conditional delivery so long as the grantor retains possession of the instrument, a view which, as we have seen, appears somewhat difficult to sustain on principle, it does not seem that there is the equivalent of such a retention of possession when the grantor hands the instrument to another, merely because such other is his agent. That is to say, the fact that the person to whom he hands the , instrument is the agent of the grantor for other pur- 26. Ashford v. Prewitt 102 762, 50 S. E. 262; Watkins v. Ala. 264, 48 Am. St. Rep. 37; Nash, L. R., 20 Eq. 262. Dixon V. Bristol Sav. Bank, 102 27. Day v. Lacasse, 85 Me. Ga. 461, 66 Am. St. Rep. 193; 242, 27 Atl. 124; Van Valken- Price V. Home Ins. Co., 54 Mo. burg v. Allen, 111 Minn. 333, App. 119; Cincinnati. R. Co. v. 137 Am. St. Rep. 561, 126 N. W. Iliff, 13 Ohio St. 235; Fertig v. 1092; Wier v. Batdorf, 24 Neb. Bucher, 3 Pa. St. 308; Merchants' 83, 38 N. W. 22. Contra. Smith Ins. Co. of New York v. Nowlin, v. Smith, 173 Cal. 725, 161 Pac. (Tex. Civ. App.), 56 S. W. 198; 495; McLaughlin v. Wheeler, 1 Blair v. Security Bank, 103 Va. S. D. 497, 47 N. W. 816. § 4G2] Transfer Inter Vivos. 17G7 poses does not show that he is his agent as regards the custody of the document. The practical incon- venience of the view that there is in such case no con- ditional delivery would seem to be considerable. Sup- pose, for instance, the owner of land, having sold it, signs and seals a conveyance and hands it to his legal adviser, or other agent, with directions to hand it to ihe purchaser upon payment of the purchase money. If this is regarded as an absolute delivery by the vendor, the legal title passes, contrary to his intention, even be- fore the payment of the purchase money, while if it is not regarded as a delivery, the conveyance would not pass title to the purchaser even on his payment of tlie price and the physical transfer of the instrument to him by the agent, unless we adopt the view, which is believed to be unsound on principle,-'^ that an agent acting under oral authority may make delivery. The proper view, it is submitted, of a transaction of the character referred to, is that a conditional delivery takes place when the instrument is handed to the agent, the condition being the payment of the purchase money, upon the satisfaction of which condition the ownership passes. Retention of control. The question whether, when the instrument has been handed by the grantor to a third person, it is to be regarded as having been conditionally delivered, is to be determined with refer- "ence to the language used by him, construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, as showing the grantor's intention.^'-* That is, as absolute delivery is 28. Ante, § 461, notes 53-58. N. E. 800; Jackson v. Sheldon, 29. Murray v. Stair, 2 B. & 22 Me. 569; Andrews v. Farnham, C. 82; Bowker v. Burdekin, 11 29 Minn. 246, 13 N. W. 161; Clark M. & W. 128; Seeley v. Curts, v. Gifford, 10 Wend. (N. Y.> (Ala.), 61 So. 807; In re Cor- 310; Gaston v. City of Portland, nelius' Estate, 151 Cal. 550, 91 16 Ore. 255, 19 Pac. 127; Bronx Pac. 329; White v. Bailey, 14 Inv. Co. v. National Bank of Conn. 271; Shults v. Shults, 159 Commerce of Seattle, 47 Wash. 111. 654, 50 Am. St. Rep. 188, 43 566, 92 Pac. 380. 1758 iiEAL Pkoperty. [§ 4()2 a question of the grantor's intention/^'' so conditional delivery is a question of his intention. Such a manual transfer of the instrument to a third person is com- patible with either an absolute delivery, a conditional delivery, or no delivery whatsoever; that is, the grantor may hand the instrument to a third person with the intention that it become immediately operative, that it become operative in case a certain condition is satis- fied, or with no intention as to its becoming operative. A conditional delivery differs from an absolute delivery merely in the fact that it is subject to a condition, and it is in its nature as final as an absolute delivery.^ ^'^s For this reason it is difficult to yield our assent to oc- casional decisions and dicta'* that the grantor may, when handing the instrument to third person by way of conditional delivery, retain a right of revocation, so called, by an express statement that the instrument is not to become operative even on satisfaction of the condition if he, the grantor, in the meantime indicates a desire to the contrary. It is recognized that, after making a conditional delivery without expressly re- taining any such right of control, the grantor cannot prevent the instrument from becoming operative upon 30. Ante, § 461, note 40. Conn. 90, 87 Atl. 35; or for other 31-33. Consequently there is porposes, so long as he retains no conditional delivery, or any the right to regard it as nullity. delivery vi^hatsoever, if the grant- Miller v. Sears, 91 Cal. 282, 25 or hands the instrument to a Am. St. Rep. 176, 27 Pac. 589; third person with a statement Holland v. McCarty, 173 Cal. 597, that it is not to become opera- 160 Pac. 1069; Hoig v. Adrian tive until he indicates a desire College, 83 111. 267; Kirby v. to that effect. Masters v. Clark, Hulette, 174 Ky. 27, 192 S. W. 89 Ark. 191, 116 S. W. 186; 63. Miller v. Sears, 91 Cal. 282, 25 34. Soward v. Moss, 59 Neb. Am. St. Rep. 176; Loubat v. Kipp, 71, 80 N. W. 268; Ruggles v. 9 Fla. 60; James v. Vanderhey- Lawson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 285, den, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 385. Or if 7 Am. Dec. 375; Wilkins v. he hands it to a third person Somerville, 80 Vt. 48, 11 L. R. A. merely for safe keeping. Dudley (N. S.) 1183, 130 Am. St. Rep. V. Dodley, 126 Ark. 182, 189 S. 906, 66 Atl. 893. W. 838; Shelinsky v. Foster, 87 § 4(Jl'J Transfer Inter Vivos. 17Gi) the satisfaction of tlie condition,^^ and there is no reason why he should be allowed to retain a right of control by an express statement to that effect while making delivery.^^ A delivery which the grantor can, at his option, treat as not a delivery, is incomprehensible, and in so far as the conveyance may still be subject to the grantor's control, in the sense that he may treat it as a legal nullity, it must be considered that there has been no delivery, conditional or unconditional, and that he has merely handed the instrument to the de- pository to hold as his agent. "Second delivery." One notion as to delivery in escrow which, though erroneous on principle, and generally repudiated,^" receives occasional expression,^^ is that such a delivery does not become operative by 35. Tharaldson v. Everts, 87 Minn. 168, 91 N. W. 467; Seibel V. Higham, 216 Mo. 121, 129 Am. St. Rep. 502, 115 S. W. 987; James v. Vanderheyden, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 385; Stanton v. MUler, 58 N. Y. 192. But see Brown v. Allbright 110 Ark. 394, 161 S. W. 1036, for a dictum contra. 36. That there is no delivery whatsoever if such right of rev- ocation is retained, see Moore V. Moye, 122 Ark. 548, 184 S. W. 63; Roe v. Lovick, 8 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 88; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 6'44, 11 Am. Rep. 592; and cases in note 31-33 supra. See also cases to the same effect in connection with a delivery to take effect on the grantor's death, post, note 93. That there is no delivery in so far as a right of control stilt exists in the grantor see ante. § 461, note 60. 37. White Star Line Steam- boat Co. v. Moragne, 01 Ala. 610, 8 So. 867; Cannon v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133, 13 Pac. 315; Couch V. Meeker, 2 Conn. 302; Davis V. Clark, 58 Kan. 100, 48 Pac. 563; Francis v. Francis, 143 Mich. 300, 106 N. W. 864; Naylor V. Stene, 96 Minn. 57, 104 N. W. 685; State Bank v. Evans, 15 N. J. L. 155, 28 Am. Dec. 400; Craddock v. Barnes, 142 N. C. 89, 54 S. E. 1003; Shirley v. Ayres, 14 Ohio St. 307; Ketter- son V. Inscho, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 150, 118 S. W. 626; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644. 38. See Fuller v. HoUis, 57 Ala. 435; Fitch v. Bunch, 30 Cal. 208, 212; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 412; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 60 Am. Rep. 291; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26; Stephens v. Rine- hart, 72 Pa. St. 434; 4 Kent's Comm. 454; 3 Wai-hburn, Real Prop.. § 2179; 16 Cyclopedia Law & Proc. 561 n 3. 1770 Real PiiOPERXY. [^, 462 reason of the satisfaction of the condition, unless this is followed by a manual transfer of the instrument by its custodian to the grantee named therein, a "second delivery" as it is sometimes called. It might, of course, happen that such a transfer is a part of the condition on which the delivery is made, but that it is not ordinarily the grantor's intention that the operation of the instrument shall depend on the custodian's caprice or convenience in handing or not handing the instru- ment to the grantee is sufficiently obvious. The fact that, as is frequently the case, the grantor requests or directs the custodian to hand the instrument to the grantee upon the occurrence of the event specified, or even that the grantor is under the mistaken impression that such a manual transfer is necessary in order to render the instrument operative, is no reason for infer- ring an intention that the instrument shall not be operative unless such a transfer is made. The neces- sity of such a physical transfer of the instrument by its custodian cannot be regarded as involved in the oc- casional decisions that the grantee may, upon satis- faction of the condition, recover possession of the instru- ment from the custodian by suit.^'^ The grantee is en- titled to its possession because it is a muniment of his title, and not because its possession by him is necessary to render it legally operative. This notion of the necessity of a second delivery is evidently based on the primitive idea, before referred to, which still so fre- quently emerges, that the operation of a deed is de- pendent on the physical transfer of the instrument to the grantee or obligee. 39. Tombler v. Sumpter, 97 Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 58. 65, 4 Atl. Ark. 480, 134 S. W. 967; Hardin 461; Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 V. Neal Loan & Banking Co., Utah, 421, 64 Pac. 958 (semble) ; 125 Ga. 820, 54 S. E. 755; Guild Bronx Inv. Co. v. National Bank V. Althouse, 71 Kan. 604, 81 Pac. of Commerce, 47 Wash. 566, 92 172; Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. Y. Pac. 380; Schmidt v. Deegan, 69 192, 202, 65 Barb. 58; BaXim's Wis. 300, 34 N. W. 83. § 462] Transfer Inter V IVOS. 1771 Closely connected in its nature and origin with this notion of the necessity of a second delivery is the con- tention, occasionally made, that if the custodian of the instrument hands it to the grantee before the satisfac- tion of the condition, the instrument becomes immedi- ately operative. This contention has met with no favor, tliere being a considerable number of decisions that an instrument delivered in escrow does not thus be- come innnediately operative by reason of such a trans- fer to the grantee of the possession of the i^strumont.^*' And this has been held to be so even as against a subsequent innocent purchaser for value from the grantee,^ ^ unless the grantor, in giving the grantee pos- session of the land in addition to relinquishing control of the instrument, was guilty of such negligence as to be precluded from asserting that the instrument was delivered merely in escrow.^^ The grantor may, how- 40. Calhoun County v. Ameri- can Emigrant Co., 93 U. S. 124, 127, 23 L. Ed. 826; Ober v. Pendleton, 30 Ark. 61; Heney V. Pesoli, 109 Cal. 53, 41 Pac. 819; Stanley v. Valentine, 79 111. 544; Jackson v. Rowley, 88 Iowa, 184, 55 N. W. 339; Dag- gett V. Daggett, 143 Mass. 516, 10 N. E. 311; Black v Shreve, 13 N. J. Eq. 455, 4JB; Hinman V. Booth, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; Thornhill v. Olson, 31 N. D. 81, L. R. A. 1916A, 493, Ann Cas. 1917E, 427, 153 N. W. 442; Powers V. Rude, 14 Okla. 381; Bradford v. Durham, 54 Ore. 1, l.-^S Am. St. Rep. 807, 101 Pac. 897; Sharp v. Kilborn, G4 Ore. 371, 130 Pac. 735; Etheredge v. Aetna Ins. Co., 102 S. C. 313, 86 S. E. 687; Schmidt v. Mus- son, 20 S. D. 389, 107 N. W. 367; Morris v. Blunt, 35 Utah, 194, 99 Pac. 686. 41. Dixon V. Bristol Sav. Bank, 102 Ga. 461, 31 S. E. 96, 66 Am. St. Rep. 193; Forcum v. Brown, 251 111. 301, 96 N. E. 259; Jackson v. Lynn, 94 Towa, 151, 58 Am. St. Rep. 386, 62 N. W. 704; Seibel v. Higham, 216 Mo. 121, 129 Am. St. Rep. 502, 115 S. W. 987 (semhle) ; Harkreader V. Clayton, 56 Miss. 383, 31 Am. Rep. 369; Wood v. French. 39 Okla. 685, 136 Pac. 734; Boswell V. Pannell, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 146 S. W. 233; Smith v. South Royalton Bank, 32 Vt 341; Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343, 65 Am. Dec. 314, 6 Wis, 453; Frank- lin V. Killilea, 126 Wis. 88, 104 N. W. 993; Cobban v. Conklin, 125 C. C. A. 451, 208 Fed. 231; United States v. Payette Lum- ber & Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 88. See ante, § 461, note 50. 42. Bailey v. Crim, 9 Biss. (U. S.) 95; Mays v. Shields, 117 1772 Eeal Peopkbty. [§ -t62 ever, it is said, waive the condition, as by recognizing the instrument as operative although the condition has not been satisfied,^^ and even his mere failure, for an unreasonable time, to take measures to cancel or other- wise nullify the instrument after it has passed into the grantee's control may preclude him from thereafter as- serting, as against an innocent purchaser, that his de- livery thereof was conditional.^^ A distinction in this regard is asserted in some of the books between an instrument delivered as an escrow, not to take eifect as the grantor's deed until the satis- faction of a condition, and an instrument handed to a third person, as the grantor's deed, to be "delivered" to the grantee upon the satisfaction of a condition; it being said that, in the latter case, as distinguished from the former, the instrument is the grantor's "deed presently," and if the grantee obtains possession thereof even before the satisfaction of the condition it becomes Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68; Quick v. Milligan, 108 Ind. 419, 58 Am. Rep. 49; Hubbard v. Greeley, 84 Me. 340, 17 L. R. A. 511, 24 Atl. 799; Schurtz v. Colvin, 55 Ohio St. 274, 45 N. E. 527; Wood v. French, 39 Okla. 685, 136 Pac. 734; Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. St. 285, 51 Am. Dec. 478; Spotts V. Whitaker, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 157 S. W. 422; King v. Diffey, —Tex. Civ. App.—, 192 S. W. 262. And that the grantor may be estopped by reason of his failure to 'act promptly against the grantee after the wrongful acqui- sition of the instrument by the latter, see Allen v. Powell, (Ind. App,), 115 N. E. 96; Baillarge V. Clarke, 145 Cal. 589, 104 Am. St. Rep. 75, 79 Pac. 268; Leonard v. Shale, 266 Mo. 123, 181 S. W. 16. See i)Ost, § 462, note 44. 43. Jackson v. Badham, 162 Ala. 484, 50 So. 131; Mays v. Shields, 117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68; Eggleston v. Pollock, 38 Neb. 188, 56 N. W. 805; Oland v. Malson, 39 Okla. 456, 135 Pac. 1055; Truman v. McCollum, 20 Wis. 70. As well suggested in Mr. Ewart's admirable work "Waiver Distributed," at p. 130, in such a case of waiver, so called, of the condition on which delivery is made, the condition is to be re- garded as being subject, in its creation, to the grantor's option, that is, the grantor has the privilege of having it regarded as conditional or not conditional. 44. Mays v. Shields, 117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68; Haven v. Kra- mer, 41 Iowa, 382; Johnson v. Erlandson, 14 N. D. 518, 105 N. W\ 722; Connell v. Connell, 32 § 462] Tbansfek Inter Vivos. 1773 immediately operative.^ ^ This distinction is strongly asserted in one case in this country,-*^ and in a few others it is referred to in terms of approval.*" In others it has been repudiated*^ or referred to as ques- tionable.*^ The old books in which this distinction is asserted make it hinge upon the language used by the grantor or obligor in handing the instrument to the intended custodian, that is, upon whether the grantor handed it as his deed or as an escrow, it being re- garded as his "deed presently" if referred to by him as his deed.^*' At the present day it is ejitirely im- material whether the grantor refers to the instrument as an escrow or as his deed, and the fact that the grantor directs the person to whom he hands the instru- ment to hand or "deliver" it to the grantee only upon the satisfaction of a condition would ordinarily be re- W. Va. 319, 9 S. E. 252. See ante, § 461, note 51. That the grantor may have the instrument cancelled If prematurely handed by its custodian to the grantee, see Anderson v. Goodwin, 125 Ga. 663, 54 S. E. 679; Bales v. Roberts, 189 Mo. 49, 87 S. W. 914. That he may have its record enjoined, see Matteson v. Smith, 61 Neb. 761, 86 N. W. 472. 45. Comyn's Dig. Fait, A 3; Perkins, Conveyancing, §§ 143, 144; Sheppard's Touchstone, 59; Bushell V. Pasmore, 6 Mod. 217. The distinction is recognized in Murray v. Stair, 2 B. & C. 82, but apparently repudiated in Johnson v. Baker, 2 B. & Aid. 440. 46. Wheelwright v. Wheel- wl"ight, 2 Mass. 447, 3 Am. Dec. 66. 47. Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N. Y. 92; Martin v. Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 40 Am. St. Rep. 415; 2 R. P.— 37 Ball V. Foreman, 37 Ohio St. 132; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592; Wells v. Wells, 132 Wis. 73, 111 N. W. 1111. 48. State Bank at Trenton v. Evans, 15 N. J. L. 155, 28 Am. Dec. 400; Hall v. Harris, 5 Ired. Eq. 303. 49. See Jackson v. Sheldon, 22 Me. 569; Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267, 63 Am. Dec. 235. "The distinction on this point is quite subtle, and almost too evanescent to be relied on." 4 Kent's Comm. 455, n. 50. In Murray v. Stair, 2 B. & C. 82, it is said that the word "escrow" need not be used to make a delivery in escrow, but no criterion for the application of the asserted distinction Is in- dicated. See the judicious re- marks of Hornblower, C. J., In State Bank at Trenton v. Evans, 15 N. J. L. 158, 28 Am. Dec. 400. 1774 Real Propeety. [§ 462 garded as showing that the original delivery of the in- strument was conditional only. There is, it is sub- mitted, absolutely no distinction between an instrument conditionally delivered as an escrow and one con- ditionally delivered as a deed, and neither can take effect until the condition is satisfied. There is, it is true, a dictum of Chief Justice Shaw^ to the apparent effect that an instrument can be regarded as an escrow only when the delivery is conditioned upon the per- formance of some act by the grantee or obligee, while it is the grantor's "deed presently" if conditioned upon the occurrence of some other character of *event,^^ but as he cites no authority and states no reason in sup- port of the dictum, it may, it is submitted, be disre- garded, in view especially of the fact that there are quite a number of cases'^- in which it is assumed with- out question that an instrument conditionally delivered is an escrow, although the condition does not involve the voluntary performance of any act by the grantee or obligee. Necessity of contract. It has been asserted in a number of cases that there can be no delivery in escrow unless it takes place as the result of an actual contract of sale between the parties to the instrument, 51. Foster V. Mansfield, 3 Mete. Am. St. Rep. 785, 14 Pac. 580; (Mass.) 412, 37 Am. Dec. 154. McDonald v. Huff, 77 Cal. 279, 19 The dictum is quoted with ap- Pac. 499; Raymond" v. Smith, 5 proval in Fine v. Lasater, 110 Conn. 555; Stone v. Duvall, 77 Ark. 425, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 385, 111. 475; Shults v. Shults, 159 161 S. W. 1147; Grilley v. At- 111. 654, 50 Am. St. Rep. 188, kins, 78 Conn. 380, 4 L. R. A. 43 N. E. 800; Fitzgerald v. Allen, (N. S.) 816, 112 Am. St. Rep. 240 111. 80, 88 N. E. 240; Millett 152, 62 Atl. 337; Taft v. Taft, 59 v. Parker, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 608; Mich. 185, 60 Am. Rep. 291; Hoagland v. Beckley, 158 Mich. Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa. St. 565, 123 N. W. 12; Price v. Home 434; Landon v. Brown, 160 Pa. Ins. Co., 54 Mo. App. 119; Gil- St. 538, 28 Atl. 921. bert v. North American Fire Ins. 52. See e. g.; Prewitt v. Ash- Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 44, 35 ford, 90 Ala. 294, 70 So. 831; Am. Dec. 543; Tooley v. Dibble, Conneau v. Geis, 73 Cal. 176, 2 2 Hill. (N. Y.) 641; Payne v. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1775 as, for instance, when the delivery is conditioned upon the payment by the grantee of an agreed price for the land. This view appears to have been first asserted in a California case,^^ which, without naming any authority, stated this as one possible ground of its decision, and this was the only authority cited in a subsequent case in Wisconsin, ^^ which explicitly decided that in the absence of a valid and enforceable contract between the parties for the sale of the land, there could be no delivery in escrow. On the authority of this latter case and of one of the text books hereafter referred to, the same view^ was adopted, without discussion, by the Supreme Court of Utah,'^^ and it was likewises adopted in Oregon"'''^ upon the authority of text book statements alone. There are occasional decisions to the same effect in other States,^^ and various text books, on the authority of one or more of the cases above referred to, state this as settled law."''' The idea at the basis of this asserted requirement of an auxiliary contract in con- nection with conditional delivery appears to be that, in the absence of such a contract, the grantor can control the operation of the instrument, that, in other words, Smith, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 104; Clarke v. Eureka County Bank, 123 Fed. 922. 53. Fitch V. Bunch, 30 Cal. 208, approved in Miller v. Sears, 91 Cal. 282, 25 Am. St. Rep. 176; Holland v. McCarthy, 173 Cal. 597, 160 Pac. 1069. Professor R. W. Aigler considers that this case first cited merely asserted, in effect, that the absence of a contract of sale is conclusive, or approximately conclusive, that no delivery has been made, that, in other words, the depositary holds it subject to the grantor's con- trol. See article 16 Mich. Law Rev. 569. 54. Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, 24 Am. Rep. 427. 55. Clark v. Campbell, 23 Utah, 569, 54 L. R. A. 508, 90 Am. St. Rep. 716, 65 Pac. 496. 56. Davis v. Brigham, 56 Ore. 41. 107 Pac. 961, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1340, followed in Foulkes v. Seng- stacken, 83 Ore. US, 163 Pac. 311. 57. Main v. Pratt, 276 111. 218, 114 N. E. 576; McLain v. Healy, 98 Wash. 489, 168 Pac. 1; Freeland v. Charnley, 80 Ind. 132. See Seibert v. Lanz, 29 N. D. 139, 150 N. W. 568. 58. 16 Cyclopedia Law & Proc. 562; 11 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.), 335; 1 Devlin, Deeds, 31.']. 1776 Eeal Property. [§ 462 he may revoke the delivery.^^ Such an idea is, it is conceived, absolutely erroneous,^*^ and involves an en- tire misapprehension of the nature of conditional de- livery. After the delivery of the instrimaent of con- veyance, whether absolutely or conditional, the parties stand in the relation, not of vendor and purchaser under a contract but of grantor and grantee under a convey- ance, and consequently the question of the existence of a valid contract of sale, is immaterial.'^ ^ There is no more reason for regarding the conditional delivery of a conveyance as invalid in the absence of an enforciblo contract of sale than for so regarding an absolute de- livery. The view referred to, that a contract is necessary to a conditional delivery, has no considerations of policy or convenience in its favor, and its necessary result is considerably to detract from the practical utility of the doctrine of conditional delivery. Apart from the fact that it involves a misapprehension of the nature of conditional delivery, the following additional objections thereto may be suggested. In the first place, the doc- trine of conditional delivery is not peculiar to convey- ances of land, but is recognized also in connection with contracts under seal and also bills and notes. If there can be no conditional delivery of a conveyance in the absence of a contract of sale, that is, a contract to execute a conveyance, it would seem a reasonable infer- ence that there can be no conditional delivery of a contract under seal or a promissory note unless there is a contract to execute such an instruipent. There is no more reason for requiring an auxiliary contract in the one case than in the others. Yet it has never been suggested, so far as the writer is informed, that there 59. See particularly Campbell 61. This is well stated in an V. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, 24 Am. editorial note in 15 Mich. Law Rep. 427, for an assertion to this Rev. 579, by Professor R. W. effect. Aigler. See also article by the 60. Ante, this section, note 35. same writer, 16 Id. 569. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1777 can be a conditional delivery of a contract under seal or a promissory note, only when there is a legally valid contract to execute the contract or note. Furthermore, a valid conditional delivery may occur in connection with transactions not involving a sale, in the case of a gift, for instance. There can obviously be no contract of sale in such case to support the validity of the delivery,^^ ye^ if a contract of sale is necessary to support a con- ditional delivery in the one case, how can such a delivery be valid without a contract of sale in the other? Another consideration adverse to the view referred to lies in the fact that, while the doctrine of delivery in escrow was recognized in the common-law courts at least as early as the tirst half of the fifteenth century ,•'•'• a purely executory contract, not under seal, was not there enforceable at that time.^^ That being the case, the requirement of an extraneous contract in order to make the delivery in escrow effective w^ould, in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, have necessitated a con- tract under seal, and it seems hardly probable that such a delivery of an obligation or conveyance under seal was ahvays accompanied by another obligation under seal calling for its execution. The subject of delivery in escrow is treated with considerable fullness in at least two of the earlier books,^^ and there is not the slightest suggestion in either as to the necessity of such an auxiliary contract. It is, to say the least, some- what extraordinary that an integral element in a doctrine dating from the commencement of the fifteenth 62. This is recognized in Hoi- 6, 25. land V. McCarthy, 173 Cal. 597, 64. Ames, History of Assump- 160 Pac. 1069, where it is ac- sit, 2 Harv. Law Rev. 1, 5.i, re- cordingly stated that though a printed in Lectures on Legal contract is necessary in other History, 129, 149; 3 Holdsworth, cases of conditional delivery, it Hist. Eng. Law 336-349; Pollock, is not necessary when it is made Contracts (8th Ed.) 148. in pursuance of a gift. 65. Perkins. Conveyanring. §§ 63. See Y. B. 13 Hen. 4. 8; 138. 144; Sheppard's Touchstone. Y. B. 8 Hen. 6. 26; Y. B. 10 Hen. 58, 59. 1778 Keal Peoperty. [§ 462 centurj^ should have remained to be discovered by a California court in the latter half of the nineteenth. In addition to the cases above referred to which assert that existence of a contract of sale is necessary in order that a conveyance may be delivered in escrow, there are to be found judicial suggestions to the effect that the ''deposit in escrow," that is, the physical transfer of the instrument by the grantor or obligor to a third person, to hold until satisfaction of the con- dition, must be in pursuance of a contract between the parties.^^ Thus it has been said in one case that the making of a deed in escrow presupposes a contract pursuant to which the deposit is made,*^^ and in another that there must be a contract which prevents the grantor from recalling the deed.''^ The idea that, in the ab- sence of a contract, the grantor can recall the deed is, as before remarked, without any support in principle, and there is, it is submitted, no more necessity of a contract in regard to its custody when the delivery is conditional than when it is unconditional. Satisfaction of condition. Properly considered, conditional delivery, or delivery in escrow, is the same as any other delivery, except that it is subject to the satisfaction of a condition. After the condition has been satisfied, there is an operative conveyance^'^ which is to be regarded as having been delivered at the time of its conditional delivery, for the obvious reason that it was then, and then only, that it was delivered, though 66. See Fitch v. Bunch, 30 of which three cases supports the Cal. 208; Wellborn v. Weaver, statement in the slightest degree. 17 Ga. 267. 69. If the condition is satis- 67. Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. fied, the operation of. the con- Y. 192. veyance is obviously not prevent- 68. Anderson v. Messenger (C. ed by the fact that the grantor C. A.) 158 Fed. 250, citing James reacquires possession of the in- V. Vanderheyden (N. Y.) 1 Paige, strument. Wymark's Case, 5 Co, 385; Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. Rep. 74; Regan v. Howe, 121 460; and Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Mass. 424; Bauni's Appeal, 113 Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592, none Pa. St. 58, 4 Att. 461. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1779 the ownership cannot be regarded as having passed until it actually did pass, that is, until the satisfaction of the condition. The grantor in effect says, at the time of handing the instrument to the intended custodian, "I now deliver this as my deed provided such a thing is done or occurs." That the delivery of the instru- ment and the passing of the ownership thus occur at dif- ferent times is, it is conceived, the solution of the some- what vague statements in the books, that, on the satis- faction of the condition, the deed will relate back to the time of delivery in order to uphold the deed, or to do justice, or to carry out the intention of the parties,'^'^ and it will serve to explain most of the decisions in this regard. The analogy may be suggested of an exec- utory limitation contained in a conveyance inter vivos, which does not vest an estate until satisfaction of the con- dition precedent, but which, when the condition is satis- fied, takes effect regardless of events or transactions which may have taken place since the time of the de- livery of the conveyance. Accordingly, the fact that the grantor dies,'^^ or becomes incapitated,'^- between the 70. Price v. Pitsburg, Ft. W. ^9, 72. & C. R. Co., 34 in. 13; Hoyt v. 71. Davis v. Clark, 58 Kan. McLagan, 87 Iowa, 746, 55 N. W. 100, 48 Pac. 563; Cook's Adm'r 18; Mohr v. Joslin, 162 Iowa, 34, v. Hendricks, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 142 N. W. 981; Baker v. Snave- 500; Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, ley, 84 Kan. 179, 114 Pac. 370; 2 Mass. 447, 3 Am. Dec. 66; Taft V. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 60 Tharaldson v. Everts, 87 Minn. Am. Rep. 291; Simpson v. Mc- 168, 91 N. W. 4G7; Schooler v. Glathery, 52 Miss. 723; Frost v. Schooler, 258 Mo. 83, 167 S. W. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 288; 444; Webster v. Kings County Craddock v. Barnes, l42 N. C. Trust Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. 89, 54 S. E. 1003; Shirley v. E. 964; Jackson v. Jackson, 67 Ayres, 14 Ohio, 307, 45 Am Dec. Ore. 44, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 373, 546; May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 135 Pac. 201; Gammon v. Bun- 262, 16 Ann. Cas. 1129, 96 Pac. nell, 22 Utah, 421, 64 Pac. 958; 454, 1065; Landon v. Brown, 160 Bronx Inv. Co. v. National Bank Pa. 538, 28 Atl. 921; Foxley v. of Commerce, 47 Wash. 566, 92 Rich, 35 Utah, 162, 99 Pac. 666; Pac. 380; Perryman's Case, 5 Spring Garden Bank v. Hulings Co. Rep. 84. Lumber Co., 32 W. Va. 357, 3 L. 72. Perkins, Conveyancing. §§ R. A. 58;{; Sheppard's Touchstone, 10, 140; Jennings v. Bragg, Cro. 1780 Real Property. [§ 462 time of the delivery of the instrument and the satis- faction of the condition, does not affect the validity of the instrument as a conveyance. And likewise, if the grantee dies during such interval of time, the possibility of ownership vests in his heir.'^^ So the instrument is to be regarded as having been delivered at the time of the conditional delivery, as against an intermediate purchaser from the grantor, and is entitled to priority, unless such purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value, and as such protected against a conveyance prior in time.'''^ And as against a creditor of the grantor in favor of whom a lien accrues by attachment or judgment intermediate the delivery and the satisfaction of the condition, the grantee takes priority,'^^ unless such creditor is, by the recording law of the particular juris- diction, entitled to the protection accorded a bona fide. purchaser.'^'' On the other hand, since the title does not Eliz. 447; Butler's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25; Davis v. Clark, 58 Kan. 100, 48 Pac. 563; Wheelwright V. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 447, 3 Am. Dec. 66; Simpson v. Mc- Glathery, 52 Miss. 723. 73. Ferryman's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 84; Prewitt v. Ashford, 90 Ala. 294, 7 So. 831; Stone v. Duvall, 77 111. 475; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26; Webster v. Kings County Trust Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. E. 964; Perry v. Perry, 170 App. Div. 525, 155 N. Y. Supp. 954. 74. McDonald v. Huff, 77 Cal. 279, 19 Pac. 499; Whitmer v. Schenck, 11 Idaho. 702, 83 Pac. 775; Leiter v. Pike, 127 111. 287; 20 N. E. 23; Wright v. Astoria Co., 45 Ore. 224, 77 Pac. 599; Wil- kins V. Somerville, 80 Vt. 48, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1183, 130 Am, St. Rep. 906, 66 Atl. 893. As against equities accruing before the con- ditional delivery, the grantee in the deed conditionally delivered, like any other grantee, cannot claim as a bona fide purchaser for value unless he paid value before receiving notice. See Baker v. Suavely, 84 Kan. 179, 114 Pac. 370. 75. Whitfield . v. Harris, 48 Miss. 710; Simpson v. McGlath- ery, 52 Miss. 723; Hall v. Harris, (N. C), 5 Ired. Eq. 303; see Dettmer v. Behrens, 106 la. 585, 68 Am. St. Rep. 326, 76 N. W. 853; Shirley's Lessee v. Ayres, 14 Ohio, 307. Contra, Jackson v. Rowland, (N. Y.), 6 Wend. 66; Wolcott V. Johns, 7 Col. App. 360, 44 Pac. 675 {dictum); Taft V. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 60 Am. Rep. 291. 76. See May v. Emerson 52 Ore. 262, 16 Ann. Cas. 1129, 96 Pac. 454; Riddle v. Miller, 19 Ore. 468, 23 Pac. 807. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1781 pass as of the time of the conditional delivery, a dis- tress levied by the grantor before the satisfaction of the condition is valid." And the grantor is entitled to the rents and profits of the land until the condition is satisfied,'^ except when, owing to the pajTnent by the grantee of interest on the purchase price, the court, in the equitable adjustment of the rights of the parties, gives the rents and profits to the grantee."^ And the grantor has been properly considered the owmer of the land for the purpose of signing a petition for the organ- ization of a drainage district,^^ as well as for the pur- pose of imposing upon him a liability for taxes.^^ Decisions to the effect that, upon the satisfaction of the condition, the grantee's title, that is, his ownership, relates back to the time of the delivery, for the puri)ose of validating an intermediate quit-claim conveyance by the grantee,^2 appear to be questionable, as are, it is submitted, decisions that, while a conveyance to a non-existent corporation is ordinarily invalid, sucli a conveyance is valid if its delivery is conditional upon the formation of the corporation named, and such a corporation is subsequently formed.^^ / As the death of the grantor before the satisfaction of the condition does not affect the validity of the 77. Oliver v. Mowat, 34 Up. the time of the delivery, so call- Can. Q. B. 472. ed, involved in the manual trans- 78. Perkins, Conveyancing, § fer of the instrument by the 10. depository to the grantee, ap- 79. Price v. Pittsburg R. Co., pears questionable. 34 111. 13; Scott v. Stone, 72 Kan. 82. Beekman v. Frost (N. Y.) 545, 84 Pac. 117. 18 Johns. 544, 9 Am. Dec. 246; 80. Hull V. Sangamon River Tooley v. Dibble (N. Y.) 2 Hill, Drainage District, 219 111. 454, 641. That It does not relate back 76 N. E. 701. for this purpose, see 2 W^illianis, 81. Mohr V. Joslin, 142 N. W. Vendor & Purchaser (2d Ed.) 981. 1251, note (d), referred to in The decision in McMurtrey v. 10 Halsbury's Laws of England. Bridges, 41 Okla. 264, 137 Pac. 390, note (m). 721, that a warranty against 83. Spring Garden Bank v. taxes at the "time of delivery" Hulings Lumber Co., 32 W. Va. of the conveyance meant taxes at 357, 3 L. R. A. 583; Santaquin 1782 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 462 delivery made by him, so one may make delivery sub- ject to a condition which cannot, by its terms, be satis- fied until after his death. A judicial statement to the effect that if the condition cannot be satisfied until after the grantor's death, the instrument is neces- sarily testamentary in character,^^ appears to be based on the mistaken view that such a condition makes the transfer revocable so long as the grantor lives. Since so long as the condition is not satisfied, the title does not pass, it results that when it becomes as- sured that the condition will never be satisfied, the instrument loses all possible efficacy. In such case the grantor will ordinarily desire to have the instrument returned to him, to preclude the possibility^ of its after- wards being utilized to his detriment, but the deposi- tary may properly retain the instrument so long as there is the slightest uncertainty as to the ultimate satis- faction of the condition. Occasional expressions*^ to the effect that the action of the depositary in retain- ing the instrument or returning it to the grantor has in itself some effect on the rights of the grantor and gran- tee are, it is submitted, erroneous. If the condition can never be satisfied, the instrument can never be operative, regardless of who has the possession, and if the condition is satisfied, that the instrument has in some way passed into the possession of the grantor does not prevent its operation.*'^ Min. Co. V. High Roller Min. Co., Cas. 1915C, 373, 135 Pac. 201; 25 Utah, 282, 71 Pac. 77. In Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah, these two cases a significance is 421, 64 Pac. 958. imputed to the "second delivery" 85. Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, to which it is not entitled. 60 Am. Rep. 291, approved in 84. Dettmer v. Behrens, 106 Culy v. Upham, 135 Mich. 131, Iowa, 585, 68 Am. St. Rep. 32?; 106, Am. St. Rep. 388. Nolan V. Otney, 75 Kan. 311, 9 86. Brown v. Allbright, 110 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317, 89 Pac. Ark. 394, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 692, 690; Stockwell v. Shalit, 204 161 S. W. 1036; Hall v. Yaryan, Mass. 270, 90 N. B. 570; Jack- 25 Idaho, 470, 138 Pac. 339. son v. Jackson, 67 Ore. 44, Ann. 87. Ante, this section, note 69. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1783 The cases upon the question of the burden of proof in connection with a conditional delivery are few and not entirely satisfactory. In view of the ordinary presumption of delivery from the grantee's possession of the instrument,*"^ it would seem that, if the grantee has such possession, it is for the grantor to show that though the instrument was delivered, the delivery was conditional,'^'*'' and for the grantee to show that the condition was satisfied.-^'' Delivery conditioned on death. Not infre- quently the grantor hands the instrument to a third per- son with a request or direction that he hand it to the grantee named upon the grantor's death, or otherwise indicates his intention that it shall become fully opera- tive only upon his death. Such action has usually been regarded as involving a delivery of a conditional or quasi-conditional character, in that an instrument so delivered does not operate in exactly the same manner in which it would have operated had there been no refer- ence to the grantor's death. There is, however, ati obvious distinction betw^een such a delivery and an ordinary conditional delivery. In the latter case the condition may never be satisfied, while in the former the condition, that of death, must necessarily be satis- fied. A delivery conditioned upon a condition whicli cannot fail to be satisfied is strictly speakinsi', not a conditiv)nal delivery. The courts might have taken this view, that such a delivery is not properly subject; to any condition, and that consequently the instrument operates exactly as if there had been no reference to the grantor's death, l)ut this they have not done. Tliey 88. Ante, § 461, note 67. Kavanaugh, 260 111. 179, 11)3, N. 88a. Evans v. Gibbs, 6 Humph. E. 65. (Tenn.) 405; Union Bank v. 88b. Black v. Shreve. 13 N. Ridgely, 1 Harr. & G. (Md.) J. Eq. 455; Kavanaugh v. Kava- 324; Black v. Shreve, 13 N. J. naugh, 260 111. 179, 103 N. E. Eq. 455. But see Kavanaugh v. 65. Contra, Swain v. McMillan, 30 Mont. 433, 76 Pac. 94.1. 1784 Real Property. [§ 462 have regarded the reference to death in such case, in connection with the delivery, as in some way aifect- ing the operation of the conveyance, without, however, any entirely satisfactory elucidation of the matter. The courts have not infrequently said that, upon such a delivery, the title passes immediately, subject to a life estate in the grantor,^^ or with the right of possession postponed.^" If this means that a con- veyance so delivered creates two estates, a particular estate for life in the grantor and an estate in the nature of a remainder or reversion in the grantee, the propriety of the statement appears to be somewhat open to question. Thus to give to a conveyance in terms creating only an estate in fee simple, the additional effect of creating an estate for life in the grantor, does considerable violence to its language, and furthermore it gives to the matter of delivery an operation to which it is not entitled. The function of delivery is to determine whether the instrument shall be operative, not the estate or estates which the instrument shall create when it does become operative. Another theory which may be suggested as to such a delivery with reference to the grantor's death is that, by reason of the language used at the time of handing the instrument to its custodian, the conveyance, though in terms creating a vested estate in fee simple in the grantee, creates merely a prospect of an estate, which 89. Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 797; Maxwell v. Jlarper, 51 446, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, 33 Pac. Wash. 351, 98 Pac. 756. 338; Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 90. Kirkwood v. Smith, 212 205, 162 Pac. 639; GrlUey v. At- III. 395, 72 N. E. 427; Owen v. kins, 78 Conn. 380, 4 L. R. A. Williams, 114 Ind. 179, 15 N. E. (N. S.) 816, 112 Am. St. Rep. 678; Gideon v. Gideon, 99 Kan. 152, 62 Atl. 337; Wheeler v. 332, 161 Pac. 595; Meech v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 562, 99 N. Wilder, 130 Mich. 29, 89 N. W. E. 502; Rowley v. Bowyer, 75 556; Dickson v. Miller, 124 Minn. N. J. Eq. 80, 71 Atl. 398; 346, 145 N. W. 112; Shaffer v. Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. Smith, 53 Okla. 352, 156 Pac. 475, 41 L. R. A. 258, 75 N. W. 1158. § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1785 will ripen into a vested estate only on the death of the grantor, as if a springing nse had been created, the fee simple remaining in the meanwhile in the grantor. Such a result may be attained by regarding a delivery with reference to the grantor's death as but one case of conditional delivery, ignoring the fact that the condi- tion named, that of death, is certain to be satisfied. This involves a fiction, it is true, but it is a beneficial fiction, conducive to simnlicity and harmony, as bringing into a single categoiT all the cases of qualified delivery. Applying this latter theory, in accordance with the views previously indicated, while the delivery is to be regarded as occurring at the time at which it actually does occur, the title does not pass, that is, the grantee does not acquire any estate, until the death of the gran- tor. The delivery is etTective as against subsequent donees, grantees and attaching and judgment creditors, except in so far as they stand in the position of innocent purchasers for value.^^ And so the death of the grantee after the delivery and before the grantor's death does not atfect the validity of the delivery and, upon the grantor's death, an estate becomes vested in the gran- tee's heir.^2 q^^ tj-^g other hand, no estate vests in the grantee or grantee's heir until the grantor's death, until, that is, the condition named is satisfied. That the grantor, in handing the instrument to the depositary, retains a right to control its operation, a 91. To this effect appear to mell v. Shirley, 69 Ohio St. 187, be Wittenbrock v. Cass, 110 Cal. persons who gave credit to the 1, 42 Pac. 300; Grilley v. Atkins, grantor in ignorance of the con- 78 Conn. 380, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) veyance so delivered were given 816, 112 Am. St. Rep. 152, 62 Atl. priority, and in Ladd v. Ladd, 14 337; Nowakowski v. Sobeziak, 270 Vt. 185, the widow by a marriage 111. 622, 110 N. E. 809; Smiley v. subsequent to such delivery was Smiley, 114 Ind. 258, 16 N. E. regarded as entitled to dower. 585; Owen v. Williams, 114 Ind. 92. Stone v. Duvall. 77 111. 179, 15 N. E. 678; Brown v. 475. And compare Stonehill v. Austen (N. Y.) 35 Barb. 341; Ran- Hastings. 202 N. Y. 115, 91 N. ken V. Donovan, 166 N. Y. 626, E. 1068. 46 App. Div. 225. But in Rath- 178G Real Property. [§ 462 right, for instance, to withdraw and cancel it, precludes the physical transfer to the depositary from operating as a delivery, in the case of an instrument which is to take effect on the grantor's death,'*'^ as in the case of an instrument which is to take effect on the satisfaction of any other condition.'^* As before remarked, a delivery which the grantor can, at his option, treat as not a deliver}^ is incomprehensible, and cases which recognize a delivery in spite of such retention of control,-*^ cannot he supported on principle. If, however, no such power of control is retained, the mere fact that the depositary allows the grantor to resume possession of the instru- ment,'''^ or that he would do so if requested,''''^ does not affect the fact of deliverv. 93. Seeley v. Curts, 180 Ala. 445, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 381, 61 So. 807; Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, 33 Pac. 338; Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 703, 151 Pac. 1; Wilson v. Wilson, 158 111. 567, 49 Am. St. Rep. 176; Kunkel v. Johnson, 268 111. 422, 109 N. E. 279; Osborne v. Eslinger, 155 Ind. 351, 80 Am. St. Rep. 240; Brown v. Brown, 66 Me. 316; Burk V. Sproat, 96 Mich. 404, 55 N. W. 985; Dickson v. Miller, 124 Minn. 346, 145 N. W. 112; Cook V. Brown, 34 N. H. 460; Saltzsieder v. Saltzsieder, 219 N. Y. 523, 114 N. E. 856; Hud- dleston v. Hardy, 164 N. C. 210, 80 S. E. 158; Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 41 L. R. A. 258, 75 N. W. 797; Williams V. Schatz, 42 Ohio St. 47; Thrush V. Thrush, 63 Ore. 143, 125 Pac. 267, 126 Pac. 994; Johnson v. Johnson, 24 R. I. 57; Showalter V. Spangler, 93 Wash. 43, 160 Pac. 1042; Williams v. Daubner, 103 Wis. 521, 74 Am. St. Rep. 902. 94. Ante, this section, notes 29-35. 95. Woodward v. Camp, 22 Conn. 457 (but see Grilley v. Atkins, 78 Conn. 380, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816, 112 Am. St. Rep. 154, 62 Atl. 337) ; Lippold v. Lippold, 112 Iowa, 134, 84 Am. St. Rep. 331; Daggett v. Simonds, 173 Mass. 340, 46 L. R. A. 332; Ruggles V. Lawson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 285, 7 Am. Dec. 375; Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S. W. 533. 96. Tweedale v. Barnett, 172 Cal. 271, 156 Pac. 483; Foreman V. Archer, 130 Iowa, 49; Peterson V. Bisbee, 191 Mich. 439, 158 N. W. 134; Thrush v. Thrush, 63 Ore. 143, 125 Pac. 267', 126 Pac. 994. But this has been referred to as evidence that there was originally no valid delivery. Tweedale v. Barnett, 172 Cal. 271, 156 Pac. 483; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 19 N. D. 713, 125 N. W. 307. 97. Loomis v. Loomis, 178 § 462] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1787 Decisions to the effect that there is no valid de- livery if it is conditioned on the grantor's death within a period named,''^ or on his death before the death of the grantee,"^ appear to be decidedly questionable. They are based on the assumption, erroneous, it is sub- mitted, that in such case the grantor retains control of the operation of the instrument. It would hardly be contended that in the analogous case of a delivery con- ditioned on the payment of the purchase money within a time named, the grantor retains such control, and that there is consequently no valid delivery. That the grantor expressly retains the privilege of cancelling the instrument in case the grantee fails to support her for the balance of her life involves no such retention of control as to affect the validity of the delivery, it in- volving merely a right to terminate the estate created, in case the named contingency occurs.^ It is sometimes said of such a delivery witli refer- ence to the grantor's death, that the deed becomes op- erative upon its 'Vlelivery" by the custodian to the gran- tee after the grantor's death,- but, it is conceived, any such reference to a "second delivery," so called, mean- ing thereby a manual transfer by the custodian of the instrument to the grantee, introduces an entirely er- roneous conception. Assuming, as is no doubt ordinarily the case, that the grantor intends the instrument to be fully effective upon his death even though the custodian does not hand the instrument to the grantee, such i)liysi- Mich. 221, 144 N. W. 552; White Mullis, 167 N. C. 405, 83 S. E. V. Watts, 118 Iowa, 549, 92 N. 582.- W. 660; Maxwell v. Harper, 51 2. Owen v. Williams, 114 Iiul Wash. 351, 98 Pac. 756. 179, 15 N. E. 678; Haeg v. 98. Long V. Ryan, 166 Cal. Haeg, 53 Minn. 33, 55 N. W. 442, 137 Pac. 29. 1114; Dickson v. Miller, 124 99. Kenney v. Parks, 125 Cal. Minn. 346, 145 N. W. 112; Wil- 146, 57 Pac. 772; Dunlap v. Hams v. Latham, 113 Mo. 165, 20 Marnell, 95 Neb. 535, 145 N. W. S. W. 99; Tooley v. Dibble, 2 1017. Hill. (N. Y.) 641 : Rosseaii v. 1. Malley v. Quinn, 132 Minn. Bleau, 131 N. Y. 177, 27 Am. St. 254, 15G N. W. 263; Phifer v. Rep. 578, 30 N. E. 52; Stonehlll 1788 Real Property. [§ 463 cal transfer to the grantee is absolutely immaterial, and the instrument becomes operative upon his death by reason of *'the first and only delivery. "^ If the grantor intends such a manual transfer to be a part of the condition of the delivery, it must of course be made in order to render the instrument operative, but the manual transfer would not constitute the delivery of the conveyance, in the technical sense. This has already taken place, and moreover a deed of conveyance cannot be delivered after the death of the grantor.^ § 463. Acceptance. In many of the states, perhaps a majority, an acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee named therein has been stated to be essential to its validity.^ And it has accordingly been decided in a number of cases that the conveyance is not effective as against the claim of a third person which accrued, by reason of attachment, recovery of a judgment, or purchase for value, between the time of delivery of the instrument and the grantee's subsequent assent thereto.^ V. Hastings, 202 N. Y. 115, 94 v. Houlton, 119 Md. 180, 86 Atl. N. E. 1068; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 514; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. Ohio St. 610; Stephens v. Rine- 217, 52 N. E. 75; Watson v. hart, 72 Pa. St. 434; Wilson y. Hillman, 57 Mich. 607, 24 N. W. Wilson, 32 Utah, 169, 89 Pac. 663; Miller v. McCaleb, 208 Mo. 643; Ladd v. Ladd, 14 Vt. 185. 562, 106 S. W. 655; Rennebaum 3. Per Hosmer, C. J., in Stew- v. Rennebaum, 78 N. J. Eq. 507, art V. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317. '79 Atl. 309, 79 N. J. Eq. 654, 4. Ante, § 461, note 59. 83 Atl. 1118; Arnegaard v. 5. Russell V. May, 77 Ark. 89, Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 41 L. 90 S. W. 617; Hibberd v. Smith, R. A. 258, 75 N. W. 797; 67 Cal. 547, 56 Am. Rep. 726; Couch v. Addy, 35 . Okla. 355, Knox V. Clark, 15 Colo. App. 356, 129 Pac. 709; Larisey v. Larisey, 62 Pac. 334; Stallings v. Newton, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129; Reid 110 Ga. 875, 36 S. E. 227; Hulick v. Gorman, 37 S. D. 314, 158 V. Scovil, 9 111. 159; Abernathie N. W. 780; Kempner v. Rosen- V. Rich, 256 111. 166, 99 N. E. thai, 81 Tex. 12, 16 S. W. 639; 883; Woodbury v. Fisher, 20 Ind. Welsh v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243. 387, 83 Am. Dec. 325; Kyle v. 6. Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Kyle, 175 Iowa, 734, 157 N. W. Wall. (U. S.) 81; Hibberd v. 248; Alexander v. De Kermely, Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 56 Am. Rep. 81 Ky. 345; Gates v. Gates, 152 726; Knox v. Clark, 15 Colo. App. Ky. 47, 153 S. W. 10; Houlton 356, 62 Pac. 334; Evans v. Cole- § 463:] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1789 A conveyance was effective at common law although the transferee did not assent thereto or even know there- of, he always having, however,' the right to ''disclaim," that is, to repudiate the conveyance and thereby revest the title in the grantor.' Such is the rule in England at the present day.® And in spite of the constant assertion and reassertion by the courts in this country of the necessity of acceptance, it is difficult to avoid the con- clusion that in a number of states the rule in this regard is the same as in England, that no acceptance of the conveyance is necessary, though the grantee may, if he choose, dissent and disclaim.^'* That no acceptance is necessary appears to be involved in the statement, made with great frequency^ that, provided the conveyance can be regarded as beneficial in character, and as not in- volving any burden on the grantee, his acceptance will be presumed in the absence of any showing of dissent,'' man, 101 Ga. 152, 28 S. E. 645; Partridge v. Chapman, 81 111. 137; Woodbury v. Fisher, 20 Ind. 387, 83 Am. Dec. 325 (but see Emmons v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154, 1 Ann. Cas. 864, 70 N. E. 142); Day v. Griffith, 15 Iowa, 104; Bell v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, 11 Bush (Ky.) 34, 21 Am. Rep. 205; Simpson v. Yocum, 172 Ky. 449, 189 S. W. 439; Field v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 606, 32 N. E. 838; Kuh v. Gar- vin, 125 Mo. 547, 28 S. W. 847; Fischer Leaf Co. v. Whipple, 51 Mo. App. 181; Rogers v. Heads Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. 52, 37 L. R. A. 433; Derry Bank v. Web- ster, 44 N. H. 264; Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. 12, 16 S. W. 639; Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243. 7. Litt. §§ 684, 685; Butler & Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 260; Thompson v. Leach, 2 Vent. 198; 2 R. P.— 38 Sheppard's Touchstone, 284. See Skipwith's Ex'r v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh (Va.) 272. 8. Siggers v. Evans, 2 El. & Bl. 367; Standing v. Bowring, 31 Ch. D. 286; Mallott v. Wilson (1903), 2 Ch. 494. See article on the nature of disclaimer by F. E. Farrer, Esq., in 32 Law Quart. Rev. 83. 8a. See editorial note, 19 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 612; Harrl- man, Contracts, (2d Ed.) §§ 82, 83. 9. Arrington v. Arrlngton, 122 Ala. 510, 26 So. 152; Graham v. Suddeth, 97 Ark. 283, 133 S. W. 1033; De Levillian v. Edwards. 39 Cal. 120; Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257, 46 Am. Dec. 315: Moore V. Giles, 49 Conn. 570; Baker v. Hall, 214 111. 364, 73 N. E. 351; Bremmerman v. Jennings, 101 Ind. 253; Emmons v. Harding. 162 Ind. 154, 70 N. E. 142; Pod- 1790 Real Property. [§ 463 and this though he is in entire ignorance of the con- veyance.^^ Such a statement represents a tendency, which appears to be open to criticism,^ ^ to express rules of substantive law in the form of rules of presumption, a mode of expression which is particularly objectionable w^hen, as in this case, the thing presumed to exist is a thing which concededly does not exist. If there is no acceptance, no rule of law, whether or not designated a presumption, can create an acceptance. And the only conclusion, it is submitted, to be drawn from the deci- sions upholding a beneficial conveyance even in the ab- hajsky's Estate, 137 Iowa, 745, 115 N. W. 596; Gideon v. Gideon, 99 Kan. 322, 161 Pac. 595; Jeffer- son County Building Ass'n v. Heil, 81 Ky. 513; Houlton v. Houlton, 119 Md. 180, 86 Atl. 514; IngersoU V. Odendahl, 136 Minn. 428, 162 N. W. 525; Metcalfe v. Brandon, 60 Miss. 685; Ensworth v. King. 50 Mo. 477; Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Rennebaum v. Rennebaum, 78 N. J. Eq. 427, 79 Atl. 309. 79 N. J. Eq. 654, 83 Atl. 1118; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406. 6 Am. Rep. 112; Ten Eyck. V. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 50 N. E. 963; Lynch v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 611, 89 S. E. 61; Arne- gaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. Dak. 475, 41 L. R. A. 258, 75 N. W. 797; Shaffer v. Smith, 53 Okla. 352, 156 Pac. 1188 (voluntary deed); In re Braley's Estate, 85 Vt. 351, 82 Atl. 5; Guggenheimer V. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 457, 19 S. E. 874. In Ward v. Ritten- house Coal Co., 152 Ky. 228, 153 S. W. 217, it is said that ac- ceptance is not to be implied or presumed if the grantee is com- petent and is present in person. 10. Elsberry v. Boykin, 65 Ala. 336; Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Crenshaw, 169 Ala. 606, 53 So. 812; Russell v. May, 77 Ark. 89, 90 S. W. 617; Tibballs v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 428; Graham v. Suddeth, 97 Ark. 283, 133 S. W. 1033; Burch V. Nicholson, 157 Iowa, 502, 137 N. W. 1066; Wuester v. Folin, 60 Kan. 334, 56 Pac. 490; Clark v. Creswell, 112 Md. 339, 21 Ann. Cas. 338, 76 Atl. 579; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. Eq. 56, 21 Atl. 627; Everett v. Everett, 48 N. Y. 218; Munoz v. WUson, 111 N. Y. 295, 18 N. E. 855; Robbins V. Roscoe, 120 N. C. 79, 38 L. R. A. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774; Mit- chell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377. So acceptance has been said to be presumed in the case of a de- livery on condition or to take effect on the grantor's death. Kyle V. Kyle, 175 Iowa, 734, 157 N. W. 248. And the grantee's ignorance of the conveyance is immaterial. Roepke v. Nutz- mann, 95 Neb. 589, 146 N. W. 939; Saltzsieder v. Saltzsieder, 219 N. Y. 523, 114 N. E. 856. 11. See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 326, § 463'J Transfer Inter Vivos. 1791 seiice of acceptance, is that acceptance is not necessary in the case of such a conveyance. The adoption of the double fiction, that acceptance is necessary, and that it exists although confessedly it does not exist, has, it is conceived, no reason whatsoever of policy or conveni- ence in its favor. The assertion of a presumption of acceptance, as it appears in the cases referred to, is objectionable, it is submitted, not only as involving the introduction of confusing and unnecessary fictions, but also because it in effect ditferentiates, as regards the necessity of ac- ceptance, between conveyances which are and are not beneficial. Since the grantee, so long as he has not ac- tually accepted the transfer, can disclaim, and so oycbide any possibility of prejudice to him by reason of the con- veyance, it is not readily perceived why the courts should undertake to discriminate in this regard. AVheth- er the conveyance shall be eventually availed of by the grantee is a matter for him to decide, and it does not appear to be the province of the court to indulge in sup- positions as to his probable action in this respect. If acceptance is otherwise not necessary, why should the non beneficial character of the conveyance render it necessary? If it is otherwise necessary, why should the beneficial character of the conveyance render it unneces- sary? Such a distinction, based on the beneficial or onerous character of the conveyance, has been re- pudiated in England,^- but has been applied in several cases in this countrv,^^ with the effect of invalidatinfr a 335, 351; 2 Chamberlayne, Evi- courts should be asked in each dence, §§ 1087, 1145, 114(;, 1160 particular instance if the deed et seq. may not be considered onerous." 12. "Almost every conveyance, Campbell, C. J., in Siggers v. in truth, entails some charge or Evans, 5 El. & Bl. 367. obligation vv^hich may be onerous 13. Occasionally a conveyance in the way of covenant or lia- has been regarded as not bene- billty; and we think It much ficial because It was made in the safer that one general rule performance of a contract of sale, should prevail, than that the which Imposed an obligation for 1792 Real Peopeety. [§ 463 conveyance not actually accepted, because not regarded by the court as beneficial in character, although, in these same jurisdictions, a ''beneficial" conveyance would have been upheld without any acceptance. If an actual assent or acceptance, it may be remarked, is to be re- garded as necessary whenever any burden or obligation is imposed on the grantee, it is somewhat difficult to un- derstand the decisions, hereafter referred to^^ which up- hold the validity of a conveyance in trust, although the trustee has not assented thereto. The view that assent or acceptance on the part of the grantee is necessary appears to have had its origin, for the most part, in the notion that a conveyance is a contract, and that consequently there must be a meeting of minds. ^^ But a conveyance is not a contract,^^ and there is no intrinsic difficulty in regarding a conveyance as effective to vest property in the grantee even before the latter has consented to receive it. In the case of a the (purchase money upon the purchaser. Derry Bank v. Web- ster, 44 N. H. 268; Boardman v. Dean, 34 Pa. 252; Wood v. Mont- pelier, (Vt.) 82 Atl. 671. And a mortgage or conveyance to secure several creditors has been regard- ed as not beneficial for the rea- son that its acceptance by any one of the creditors might result la precluding his recovery of the whole of his claim. Johnson v. Farley, 45 N. H. 505. A convey- ance made to one merely as a conduit of title has been regarded as not beneficial for this purpose. Little V. Eaton, 267 111. 263, 108 N. E. 727. Compare Ferrell v. Childress, 172 Ky. 160, 189 S. W. 1149. where a conveyance so made was regarded as properly accepted by the person beneficial- ly interested in its execution. 14. Post, this section, notes 19, 20. 15. See Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243; Rogers v. Heads Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. 52, 37 L. R. A. 433. 16. Anson, Contracts (13th Ed.) 3, 4; Pollock, Contracts, Ap- pendix A; Hammon, Contracts, §§ 6, 7, note 11; Clark Contracts, IL Nor does a contract necessarily Involve a meeting of the minds of the parties. "The contractual obligations which the common law recognized were enforced, and are still enforced, not be- cause those obligations are the result of agreement, but because certain forms of procedure af- forded remedies for certain wrongs." Harriman, Contracts. 2d Ed.) § 61L § 463'] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1793 devise, as well as in that of a transfer by operation of law, the ownership passes without reference to whether the transferee has consented to take the property, and the same might well occur in the case of a voluntary transfer inter vivos, provided only the transferee has the privilege of subsequently refusing the transfer.^^ In support of this view reference may be made to the case of conveyances to infants, and persons non compos mentis, and to that of conveyances in trust, discussed in the two following paragraphs. In the case of a conveyance to an infant, or to a person non compos mentis the courts, even those which assert most positively the necessity, in the ordinary case, of an actual acceptance, undertake to avoid the difficulty of requiring acceptance on the part of one in- capable of giving it, by asserting that in such case the assent of the grantee will be conclusively presumed, pro- vided at least the conveyance is beneficial in character.^^ But, as before remarked, the conceded lack of acceptance cannot well be supplied by a presumption that the 17. If a father should die les- Thurman, C. J., in Mitchell's tate, devising an estate to his Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377. daughter, and the latter should 18. Staggers v. White, 121 Ark. afterwards die without a knowl- 328, 181 S. W. 139; Turner v. edge of the will, it would hardly Turner 173 Cal. 782, 161 Pac. 980; be contended that the devise be- Miller v. Meers, 155 111. 284, 40 N. came void for want of acceptance, E. 577; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 and that the heirs of the devisee Ind. 191; Tansel v. Smith, 49 Ind. must lose the estate. Neither App. 263, 93 N. E. 548, 94 N. E. win it be denied that equitable 890; Fitzgerald v. Tvedt, 142 estates are every day thrust upon Iowa, 40, 120 N. "W. 465; Combs people by deeds, or assignments, v. Ison, 168 Ky. Ky. 728, 182 S. made in trust for their benefit. W. 953; Campbell v. Kuhn, 45 nor win It be said that such Mich. 513, 40 Am. Rep. 479; Fen- beneficlarles take nothing until ton v. Fenton, 261 Mo. 202, 168 they assent. Add to these the S. W. 1152; Chambers v. Cham- estates that are thrust upon bers, 227 Mo. 262, 137 Am. St. people by the statute of descent. Rep. 567, 127 S. W. 86; Davis v. and we begin to ' estimate the Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147, 18 S. W. value of the argument, that a 113; Bjmerland v. Eley, 15 Wash, man shall not be made a prop- 101, 45 Pac. 730. erty holder against his will. 1794 Real Peopeety. [§ 463 grantee would, if he had an opportunity, accept the conveyance, and moreover, even supposing this could be done, the presumed acceptance, in the case of a con- veyance to an infant, or to a person non compos mentis, would be an acceptance by a person lacking in legal capacity, and therefore a nullity. In the case of a conveyance in trust, the legal 'itle is usually regarded as vesting in the trustee without any acceptance by him, or even any knowledge on his part of the conveyance,^^ this result being not infre- quently attained on the theory of a presumption of assent.^*^ Even though he subsequently dissents, and refuses to accept, the conveyance does not become nuga- tory, but equity will appoint another trustee. ^^ The equitable interest under a deed of trust likewise vests in the beneficiary named without any acceptance thereof 19. Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 185, 22 L. Ed. 504; Devol V. Dye, 123 Ind. 321, 1 L. R. A. 439; Mlnot v. Tilton, 64 N. H. 371, 10 Atl. 682; Gulick v. Gullck, 39 N. J. Eq. 401; Myrover v. French, 73 N. C. 609; Read v. Robinson, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 329; First Bank v. Holmes. 85 Pa. 231; Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221, 78 Atl. 535; Cloud v. Calhoun, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 358; Fur- man V. Fisher, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 210; Fletcher V. Fletcher, 4 Hare 67; Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.) 229. But statements are occasionally found to the effect that no title vests in the trustee until he ex- pressly or by implication accepts the trust. 1 Perry, Trusts, § 259, Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 138; Oxley Stave Co. V. Butler County, 121 Mo. 614, 26 S. W. 367; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 111. 281, 86 N. E. 139. 20. Kennedy v. Winn, 80 Ala. 165; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321, 7 L. R. A. 439; Howry v. Gard- ner, 41 Ohio St. 642; McKinney V. Rhoads, 5 Watts (Pa.) 343; Eyrick v. Hetrick, 13 Pa. 488; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.) 67; Bowden v. Parrish, 86 Va. 67, 19 Am. St. Rep. 873. 21. Irvine v. Dunham, 111 U. S. 327, 28 L. Ed. 444; Smith v. Davis, 90 Cal. 25, 25 Am. St. Rep. 92, 27 Pac. 26; Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 14 L. R. A. 69, 22 Atl. 945; Braswell v. Downs, 11 Fla. 62; French v. Northern Trust Co., 197 111. 30, 64 N. E. 105; Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 41 Am. St. Rep. 673; King v. Donelly, 5 Paige (N Y.) 46; Roseman v. Roseman, 127 N. C. 494, 37 S. E. 518; Talbot V. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221, 78 Atl. 535; Cloud § 463:] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1795 by him, or even any knowledge by him of the trust.^^ It is sometimes said, in this connection, that one is pre- sumed to accept the benefit of a trust.^' The courts, in referring to the necessity of accep- tance, do not always clearly indicate whether it is to be regarded as an element of delivery, or as something additional to, and separate from, delivery. Perhaps they more frequently suggest the former view,-^ and this they apparently do in effect when they state that the grant- or's record of the instrument does not create any pre- sumption of delivery if without the knowledge or assent V. Calhoun, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 358; Ames, Cases on Trusts, 230. 22. Brooks v. Marbury, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 78; Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Farrady, 9 Del. Ch. 306, 82 Atl. 24; Koch V. Streuter, 232 111. 594, 83 N. E. 1072; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 44 L. R. A. 205, 43 Atl. 43; Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. 190, 87 N. E. 634; Mar- quette V. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 414, 43 L. R. A. 840, 78 N. W. 474; Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. Bq. 401; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134. 31 Am. Rep. 446; Moloney V. Tilton, 22 N. Y. Misc. 682, 51 N. Y. Supp. 682; Breedlove v. Stump, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257; Connecticut River Sav. Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571, 33 Am. St. Rep. 944, 25 Atl. 487; Skip- with's Ex'r v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh (Va.) 272; Fleenor v. Hensley, 121 Va. 367, 93 S. E. 582; See McEwen v. Bamberger, 3 Lea, (Tenn.) 576. 23. Brunson v. Henry, 140 Ind. 455, 39 N. E. 256; Emporia First Nat. Bank v. Ridenour, 46 Kan. 718, 26 Am. St. Rep. 167; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N. M. 82, 167 Pac. 436; Stone v. King, 7 R. I. 358, 84 Am. Dec. 557; Cloud v. Calhoun, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 358; Furman v. Fisher, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 557. 24. Stallings v. Newton, 110 Ga. 875, 36 S. E. 227; Byers v. Spencer, 101 111. 429, 40 Am. Rep. 212; Bremmerman v. Jennings, 101 Ind. 253; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 100 Iowa, 476, 69 N. W. 076; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 179 Ky. 686, 201 S. W. 24; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N. E. 75; Miller v. McCaleb, 208 Mo. 562, 106 S. W. 655; Jaskson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406, 6 Am. Rep. 112. Occasionally it has been said that delivery and acceptance must be simultaneous. Church v. Gil- man, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 656, 30 Am. Dec. 82; Hulick v. Scovll, 9 111. 159. Contra, Sullivan v. Sul- livan, 179 Ky. G86, 201 S. W. 24 Regan v. Howe, 121 Mass. 424 Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 And see Stone v. New England Box Co.. 216 Mass. 8, 102 N. K. 949. 1796 Eeal Peopekty. [§ 463 of the grantee.-'^ There would seem, however, to be some difficulties in the way of regarding the grantor's indication of intentioii as constituting delivery only when accompanied or immediately followed hy ac- ceptance. Adopting such a view, the grantor would, after having indicated his intention that the conveyance should operate, have the right until acceptance to change his intention, and to dispose otherwise of the property, and yet the cases regard his indication of intention, in the case both of conditionaP^ and unconditional deliv- ery,^'^ as concluding him in this regard. It is more satisfactory, it is submitted, conceding that acceptance is necessary, to regard it as something outside of de- livery, as, in etfect, an indication of the grantee's inten- tion, as delivery is an indication of the grantor's in- tention.-^ The contrary vew, above referred to, is ap- parently to some extent the outcome of the mistaken tendency to regard delivery as involving a manual transfer of the instrument, such a transfer being ordi- naril}'^ impossible without the assent of the person to whom the transfer is made. The acceptance may, it has been said, be given by another person acting on behalf of the grantee, such ac- ceptance being sufficient if afterwards ratified by the grantee.^^ Such a statement is somewhat ambiguous. If it means that, provided an unauthorized person ac- 25. Ante, § 461, note 84. 29. Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 26. Ante, § 462, notes 31-36. 217, 52 N. E. 75; Couch v. Addy, 27. Ante, § 461, note 60. 35 Okla. 355, 129 Pac. 709. 28. Such a view is involved in In Blackwell v. Blackwell, 196 the occasional statements that the Mass. 186, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. acceptance may be given by the 1070, it was decided that there grantee even after the grantor's may be a valid acceptance by the death. Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. grantor in behalf of the grantee, Crenshaw, 169 Ala. 606, 53 So. whose general agent he was. The 812; Cates v. Cates, 152 Ky. 47, cases cited in support of the deci- 153 S. W. 10; Burkey v. Burkey, — sion merely involved the princi- Mo. — 175 S. W. 623; Taylor v. pie that no manual transfer of Sanford, 108 Tex.- 340, 193 S. W. the instrument is necessary. 661. § 464] Transfer Inter Vrv'os. 1797 cepts oil behalf of tlie grantee, title immediately vests in the latter, subject to an option on liis part as to whether he will ratify the acceptance, this appears to be the equivalent of a statement that, although there is no valid acceptance, title immediately passes to the grantee subject to an option in him subsequently to repudiate the transfer, this being the common law and present English rule. It may, however, mean that an unauthorized acceptance being invalid, title does not pass until the grantee, by indicating his adoption of the acceptance, in effect himself accepts the conveyance, this in effect recognizing the asserted American rule, that the grantee's acceptance is necessary. Whichever meaning is given to the statement, it does not appear that the unauthorized acceptance has any legal signifi- cance, the grantee's ratification of such accoiDtance, so called, being merely his acceptance of the transfer, of which there had previously been no valid acceptance. § 464. Execution by agent. The owner of land may transfer it, not only by himself executing the in- strument of transfer, but also by empowering another so to do in his absence. The execution of a convey- ance by the agent of the grantor, in the grantor's ab- sence, by virtue of the authority given the agent for this purpose, is to be distinguished from the case, before referred to,"^^ in which the signing of an instru- ment by the hand of another is adopted by the grantor as his own act, this being for all purposes his own sig- nature. A written instrument by which one is authorized to act as the agent of another, in connection with the transfer of land, as in otlier connections, is frequently, indeed ordinarily, referred to as a power of attorney. The common law rule that authority to execute an instrument under seal must itself be under seal appears to be still recognized in a considerable number of 30. Ante, § 457. notes 76, 77. 1798 Real Property. [§ 464 states,^^^ and, in so far as a seal may, in a particular jurisdiction, be necessary to the legal validity of a con- veyance, an authority to one as agent to execute a con- veyance must be under seal.^^ But without reference to such a common law requirement of a seal, which ob- viously involves a requirement of a written instrument, the statutes of most of the states expressly require such an authority to be in writing, and some require it to be under seal.^^ Since delivery is part of the execution of the in- strument, it would seem that, in so far as a written or sealed authority may be necessary to enable an agent to sign or seal a conveyance of land, such an authority is also necessary to enable him to deliver the instrument, •The question has been previously discussed.^^ It is a technical rule of the common law that only those are bound by a sealed instrument who purport to be parties thereto and in whose names it is signed and sealed,^^ and, applying this rule it has occasionally been decided that a conveyance executed by an agent was insufficient because it purported to be the deed, not of the intended grantor, but of the agent himself, even though the body of the instrument indicated that the person who signed and sealed it was acting merely as agent,^^ or even though a statement of his agency was appended to his signature.^'' In other cases, however, 30a. Huffcut, Agency, § 26; 35. Taylor v. Agricultural & Mechem, Agency, § 212. Mechanical Ass'n, 68 Ala. 229; 31. Tilton V. Cofield, 2 Colo. Stinchfield v. Little, 1 Me. 231, 10 392; Watson v. Sherman, 84 111. Am. Dec. 65; Elwell v. Shaw, 16 263; Montgomery v. Dorion, 6 N. Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126; Stone H. 250; Heath v. Nutter, 50 Me. v. Wood, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 453, 17 378; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69; Am. Dec. 529; Bellas v. Hays, 5 Blood V. Goodrich, 9 Wend. (N. Serg. & R. 427, 9 Am. Dec. 385. Y.) 68, 24 Am. Dec. 121; Cadell 36. Echols v. Cheney, 28 Cal. V. Allen, 99 N. C. 542. 157; Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 32. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 337; Harper v. Hampton, 1 Harr. 1670. J. 622; Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. 33. Ante, § 461, notes 53-58. 337, 48 Am. Dec. 689; Town- 34. HufEcut, Agency (2d Ed.) send v. Corning, 23 Wend. 442; § 188; Mechem Agency, § 1093. Farmers v. Respass, 5 T. B. Mon. § 464] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1799 such strictness of view is not adopted, it being regarded as sufficient that it appears, either from the signature or from the body of the instrument, that it is intended to be the deed, not of the agent, but of the principal,-"*^ and in some states there is a statutory provision to this general effect.^ ^ The question whether an intention appears from the face of the instrument that it shall take effect as the deed of the principal is, in its nature, a question of the construction of the language used, as to which no absolute rule can be laid down.^^ Such an intention does not ordinarily appear to be inferred from the fact that the person who executes the instrument is de- scribed therein as the agent of the principal, or that he professes to be acting under authority from the latter,^^^ though in some cases this appears to be re- garded as sufficient for the purpose.^^ That the convey- (Ky.) 562; Crawford v. Crawford, 77 S. C. 205. 37. Carter v, Chaudron, 21 Ala. 72; Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. 464a; Doe d. Tenant v. Roe, 27 Ga. 418; Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N. E. 123, 52 Am. Rep. 680; Nobleboro v. Clark, 68 Me. 87; Herbert v. Pue, 72 Md. 307; Hutchins v. Byrnes, 9 Gray, 367; Murphy v. Welch, 128 Mass. 489; Bigelow V. Livingston, 28 Minn. 57; McClure v. Herring, 70 Mo. 18; Hubbard v. Swafford etc. Co., 209 Mo. 495, 123 Am. St. Rep. 488, 108 S. W. 15; Hale v. Woods, 10 N. H. 471; Donovan v. Welch, 11 N. D. 113, 90 N. W. 262; Heffer- nan v. Addams, 7 Watts (Pa.) 116; Rogers v. Bracken's Adm'r, 15 Tex. 564; Shanks v. Lancaster, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 110, 50 Am. Dec. 108. 38. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 1675; 1 Mechem, Agency, § 1096, note 22. 39. See Haven v. Adams, 4 Allen (Mass.) 80; Nobleboro v. Clark, 68 Maine 87. 40. Jones V. Morris, 61 Ala. 518; Sheridan v. Pease, 93 111. App. 219; Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14; First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196, 77 N. E. 778; Kiersted v. Orange & A. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 343, 25 Am. Rep. 199; Cadell v. Allen, 99 N. C. 542, 6 S. E. 399; Norris v. Dains, 52 Ohio St. 215, 39 N. E. 660, 49 Am. St. Rep. 716; Quigley v. De Haas, 82 Pa. St. 267; North V. Henneberry, 44 Wis. 306; See Hill V. Conrad, 91 Tex. 341, 43 S. W. 789. 41. Donovan v. Welch, 11 N. Dak. 113, 90 N. W. 262; Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N. E. 423, 52 Am. Rep. 680; Maglll v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. 464a, 16 Am. Dec. 70; Hubbard v. Swafford etc. Co.. 209 Mo. 495, 123 Am. St. Rep. 488. 1800 Keal Property. [§ 46-1 aiice is made by the agent as if in his own right, without any reference to the fact of agency, and without any mention of his principal by name, would obviously pre- clude the conveyance from operating to divest the prin- cipal's rights.^ ^ That the instrument is signed in the name of A the principal "by" B the agent, is, it seems, sufficient to make the instrument effective as the deed of A, although it reads as the deed of B,^^ while a sig- nature B "for" A would be sufficient to make it A's deed if the instrument itself reads as the deed of A, and not otherwise.^^ The fact that the name of the principal is signed by the agent without any addition to the signature showing that the signing was by an agent has been held not to affect the validity of the signature.^ ^ It has been suggested that it must appear somewhere upon the face of the instrument that it was executed, not by the grantor, but by an agent of the grantor,"*^ but it may be questioned whether this is essential, how- ever desirable. ^'^ A conveyance which fails at law, because its execu- tion is by the agent in his own name, instead of in that of his principal, will be sustained in equity as an agree- ment to convey, and, as such, will be effective, not only 42. Bassett v. Hawk, 114 Pa. 34 Am. Dec. 176; Cadell v. Allen, St. 502, 8 Atl. 18. 99 N. C. 542, 6 S. E. 399; Donovan 43. See Northwestern Distill- v. Welch, 12 N. D. 113; Norris v. ing Co. V. Brant, 69 IH. 658, 18 Dains,— Ohio— 39 N. E. 660, 49 Am. Rep. 631; Shanks v. Lan- Am. St. Rep 716; McDaniels v. caster, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 110, 50 Am. Flower Brook Mfg. Co., 22 Vt. Dec. 108; McClure v. Herring, 70 274. Mo. 18, 35 Am. Rep. 404. 45. Forsyth v. Day, 41 Me. 382; 44. Smith v. Morse, 9 Wall. (U. Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287; S.) 76, 19 L. Ed. 597; Carter v. Devinney v. Reynolds, 1 Watts Chaudron, 21 Ala. 72; Hancock v. & S. (Pa.) 328. Younker, 83 111. 208; Hunter's 46. Wood v. Goodridge, 6 Cush. Adm'rs v. Miller's Adm'rs, 6 B. (Mass.) 117, 52 Am. Dec. 771. Mon. (Ky.) 612; Nobleboro v. 47. See Forsyth v. Day, 41 Clark, 68 Me. 87; Mussey v. Scott, Me. 382; Hunter v. Giddings, 96 7 Cush. (Mass.) 215, 54 Am. Dec. Mass. 41, 93 Am. Dec. 54. 719; Hale v. Woods, 10 N. H. 470, § 46-4] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1801 between the parties, but as against subsequent pur- chasers with notice.^^ A married woman has power to transfer her rights in land only in the mode named by statute, and con- sequently, in the absence of express statutory authority, or a declaration that she may transfer her separate es- tate as if she were sole, she cannot execute the convey- ance by an agent or attorney, and, if so executed, it will, as against her, be void both at law and in equity."*^ The validity of the execution of a conveyance in behalf of a corporation by an officer thereof is to be determined by the same considerations as determine the validity of a conveyance executed by any other agent of the intended grantor. The instrument should prop- erly name the corporation rather than the officer as the gTantor, and should be signed with the corporate name and sealed with the corporate seal.^*^ If, however, the fact that the conveyance is intended to be the deed of the corporation clearly appears from the language of the instrument, the fact that it is signed in the name of the officer does not aifect its validity as a conveyance by the corporation.^^ And in such case the seal affixed to the signature, though a mere scroll, will be presumed to 48. Taylor v. Agricultural & Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138; Mechanical Ass'n, 68 Ala. 229; Wilkinson v. Getty, 13 Iowa, 157: Love V. Sierra Nevada Lake Earle's Adm'rs. v. Earle, 20 N. Water & Min. Co., 32 Cal. 639, J. L. 347. 91 Am. Dec. 602; Robbins v. 50. See Cook, Corporations, § Butler, 24 111. 387; Wilkinson 722. V. Getty, 13 Iowa, 157, 81 Am. 51. Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Dec. 428; McCaleb v. Pradat, 25 Conn. 464a, 16 Am. Dec. 70; Miss. 257; Kearney v. Vaughan, Purinton v. Security etc. Co., 72 50 Mo. 284; Ramage v. Ramage, Me. 22; Haven v. Adams, 4 Allen 27 S. C. 39, 2 S. E. 834. See (Mass.) 80, distinguishing Brinley Stark V. Starr, 94 U. S. 477, 24 v. Mann, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 337; L. Ed. 276. Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59: 49. Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Wall. (U. S.) 137; Mexia v. Co., 4.T N. H. 343; McDanlels v. Oliver, 148 U. S. 664; Waddell Flower Brook Mfg. Co., 22 Vt. V. Weaver's Adm'rs, 42 Ala. 293; 274. Holland v. Moon, 39 Ark. 120; 1802 Keal Pkoperty. [§ 464 be the seal of the corporation, for this particular occa- sion at least.^^ Aiid even though the instrument pur- ports to be merely the deed of the officer, the fact that it is signed and sealed in the name of the corporation will, it seems, render it effective as the deed of the corpora- tion.^^ If it does not appear from the language of the instrument or from the signature that it is the deed of the corporation, it would not usually be regarded as such, even though the officer is referred to by his official name.^^ Acknowledgment by agent. An acknowledg- ment may, in the absence of an express statutory pro- vision to the contrary, be made by the agent or attorney in fact of the grantor. The cases do not indicate what formality of authorization is necessary, but there would seem to be little question that the same formality is necessary to enable an agent to acknowledge as to sign or seal the instrument, that, for instance, a writ- ten power of attorney is necessary for the one purpose if it is necessary for either of the others. An authority in terms to '^execute" the instrument is no doubt suffi- cient to authorize its acknowledgment,^^ though, strictly speaking, an acknowledgment can not be regarded as a part of the execution, except in jurisdictions where it is necessary in order to transfer the title. The certificate of acknowledgment should show that the agent of the grantor made the acknowledgment in behalf of his principal, and not in his own behalf,^^ but the courts ordinarily appear disposed to disregard 52. See cases cited Cook, Cor- Md. 376; Bigelow v. Livingston, porations, § 721, 1 Clark & 28 Minn. 57, 9 N. W. 31; Rich- MarshaU, Corporations, § 192c. mond v. Voorhees, 10 Wash. 316, 53. See Northwestern Distill- 38 Pac. 1014. ing Co. V. Brant, 69 111. 658, 18 56. Pfeiffer v. Cressey, 85 III. Am. Rep. 631; Shaffer v. Hahn, App. 11; Campbell v. Hough, 73 11] N. Car. 1, 15 S. E. 1033. N. J. Eq. 601, 68 Atl. 759; Peters 54. Ante, this section, note 42. v. Condron, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 55. Robinson v. Mauldin, 11 80. Ala. 977; Basshor v. Stewart, 54 § 464] Transfer Inter Vr-os. 1803 any such requirement, or to construe the language used with the utmost liberality in this regard/^" The mode of acknowledgment on behalf of a cor- poration is frequently prescribed by statute. In the absence of any statutory designation of the person who is to make the acknowledgment on behalf of the corporation, it may ordinarily be made by any officer who has authority to affix the corporate seal.^** The certificate should show that the officer taking the acknowledgment was satisfied that the person making the acknowledgment was actually the corporate officer which he purported to be,^» and that he acknowledged the instrument as the act and deed of the corporation.**® But a recital that he acknowledged it as his own act and deed has usually been regarded as sufficient, it be- ing inferrable from the context and the instrument it- self that the acknowledgment was in liehalf of the corporation."^ 57. Robinson v. Mauldin, 11 Ala. 977; Talbert v. Stewart, 39 Cal. 602; Sowden v. Craig, 26 Iowa, 156, 96 Am. Dec. 125; Munger v. Baldridge, 41 Kan. 236, 13 Am. St. Rep. 273; Bige- low V. Livingston, 28 Minn. 57, 9 N. W. 31; McAdow v. Black, 6 Mont. 601; Moses v. Dibrell, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 457, 21 S. W. 414; Ferguson v. Ricketts, — (Tex. Civ. App.)— 57 S. W. 19; Rich- mond V. Voorhees, 10 Wash. 316; 58. See Gray v. Waldron, 101 Mich. 612, 60 N. W. 288; Morris V. Keil, 20 Minn. 531; Bowers V. Hechtman, 45 Minn. 238, 47 N. W. 792; Hoopes v. Auburn Water Works Co., 37 Hun. (N. Y.) 568; Sheehan v. Davis, 17 Ohio St. 571. Compare Johnson V. Bush, 3 Barb. Ch. 207. 59. Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U. S. 710, 24 L. Ed. 544; Klemme v. McLay, 68 Iowa, 158, 26 N. W. 533; Bennett v. Knowles, 66 Minn. 4, 68 N. W. Ill; Hopper v. Love- joy, 47 N. J. Eq. 573, 12 L. R. A. 588, 21 Atl. 298; Withrell v. Murphy, 154 N. C. 82, 69 S. E. 748; Holt v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 11 S. D. 456, 78 N. W. 947. 60. See Chicago First Nat. Bank v. Baker, 62 111. App. 154; Gessner v. Minneapolis etc. R. Co., 15 N. D. 560. 61. Copper Belle Min. Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334, 95 Pao. 94; Chicago etc. R. Co, v. Lewis, 53 Iowa, 101, 4 N. W. 842; Frost- burg Mut. Bldg. Ass'n v. Brace, 51 Md. 508; Eppwright v. Nicker- son, 78 Mo. 482; Descombes v. Wood, 91 Mo. 196, 60 Am. Rep. 239; Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Muller V. Boone, 63 Tex. 91; McDaniels V. Flower Brook Mfg. Co., 22 Vt. 1804 Real Property. [§ 465 § 465. Effect of execution — Return or cancellation. After the instrument has been delivered, and the title has consequently passed to the grantee named, it cannot, it has usually been held, be revested in the grantor by the mere physical transfer to him of the instrument, or by the cancellation of the instrument, although this is by agreement. In order to reconvey to his grantor, as to any other person, the grantee must execute a conveyance to him.^'^ In a few states, however, the view has been adopted that the grantee in an unrecorded conveyance, after returning the instrument to the grantor, with the intention of revesting the title in him, or after cancel- ling the instrument with this intention, cannot intro- duce secondary evidence of the instrument, the practical effect of this being to divest him of the title in favor of the original grantor.^^ And in other jurisdictions it is recognized that, under particular circumstances, the grantee may, by reason of such return or cancellation of the instrument, be estopped to assert title in him- 274; Banner v. Rosser, 96 Va. St. 550, 35 Atl. 214; Wilke v. 238, 31 S. E. 67. Wilke, 28 Wis. 296; Furguson v. 62. Gimon v. Davis, 36 Ala. Bond, 39 W. Va. 561, 20 S. E. 589; White v. Moffett, 108 Ark. 591; Slaughter v. Bernards, 97 490, 158 S. W. 505; Cranmer v. Wis. 184, 72 N. W. 977; Bolton Porter, 41 Cal. 462; Weygant v. v. Carlisle, 2 H. Bl. 263; Ward Bartlett, 102 Cal. 224, 36 Pac. v. ^ Lumley, 5 Hurlst. N. 87. 417; Botsford v. Morehouse, 4 And see cases cited ante, § 440 Conn. 550; Metropolitan Trust note 29. & Sav. Bk. V. Perry, 259 111. 183, 63. Thompson v. Thompson, 9 102 N. E. 218; Gibbs v. Potter, ind. 323, 68 Am. Dec. 638; Far- 166 Ind. 471, 77 N. E. 942; Hatch rar v. Farrar, 4 N. H. 191; Mus- V. Hatch, 9 Mass. 311, 6 Am. Dec. sey v. Holt, 24 N. H. 248; 67; Tabor v. Tabor, 136 Mich. Emery v. Dana, 76 N. H. 48?| 84 255, 99 N. W. 4; Green v. Hayes, Atl. 976; Gugins v. Van Gorder, 120 Minn. 201, 139 N. W. 139; 10 Mich. 523, Potter v. Adams, McAllister v. Mitchner, 68 Miss. 125 Mo. 118, 28 S. W. 490; Arring- 672, 9 So. 829; Potter v. Adams, ton v. Arrington, 114 N. C. 115, 125 Mo. 118, 28 S. W. 490; Raynor 19 S. E. 145; Simpkins v. Wind- V. Wilson, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 469; sor, 21 Ore. 382, (semhle); Parshall v. Shirts, 54 Barb. (N. Howard v. Huffman, 3 Head Y.) 99; Jeffers v. Philo, 35 Ohio (Tenn.) 562; Wilke v. Wilke, 28 St. 173; Tate v. Clement, 176 Pa. Wis. 296, and cases cited ante, § § 465] Transfer Inter Vivos. 1805 self .^^ 111 one or two states the return of the instrument to the grantor, or its destruction, with the intention of revesting the ownership in him, has been regarded as divesting the grantee of the equitable though not of the legal title,^^ and in two states, apparently, of the legal title as well.*^*^ In all these cases, how^ever, in which the return or cancellation of the instrument has been regarded as effective, directly or indirectly, in favor of the grantor, the instrument was at the time unrecorded, and the return or cancellation of an in- strument previously recorded would, in every jurisdic- tion, presumably, be absolute nugatory.^''' 440, note 34. But that it does not so operate as against a third person, see Thompson v. Thomp- son, 9 Ind. 323, 68 Am. Dec. 638; Wilke V. Wilke, 28 Wis. 296. Compare Pollock, Contracts (Williston's Edition) p. 849. 64. Whisenant v. Gordon, 101 Ala. 256, 13 So. 914 (semble) ; Brown v. Brown, 142 Iowa, 125, 120 N. W. 724; Rowe v. Epling, 163 Ky. 381, 173 S. W. 801; Patterson v. Yeaton, 47 Me. 308; Comm. V. Dudley, 10 Mass. 403; Trull V. Skinner, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 213; Howe v. Wilder, 11 Gray (Mass.) 267; McAllister V. Mitchner, 68 Miss. 672, 9 So. 829; Dukes v. Spangler, 35 Ohio St. 119; Stanley v. Epperson, 45 Tex. 645. 65. Reavis v. Reavis, 50 Ala. 60; Sanford v. Finkle, 112 111. 146; Happ v. Happ, 156 111. 183, 41 N. E. 39; Cossman v. Keister, 223 111. 69, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 698, 114 Am. St. Rep. 305, 79 N. E. 58; Matheson v. Matheson, 139 Iowa, 511, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167, 117 N. W. 755; Russell v. Meyer, 7 N. D. 335, 75 N. W. 262. A like view was applied when the instru- ment was not returned or can- celled, but, having been lost, it was regarded by the parties as having been returned and cancell- ed. Hays V. Dean, — Iowa, — 164 N. W. 770. 66. Huffman v. Huffman, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 491; Peterson v. Carson,— (Tenn.)— 48 S. W. 383; Respass v. Jones, 102 N. Car. 5, 8 S. E. 770. The making of a second con- vej^ance of the same property, by the same grantor to the same grantee, but excepting a part of that previously conveyed, has been held to render the first conveyance nugatory. Wardman V. Harper, 156 Iowa, 453, 136 N. W. 893; Hall v. Wright. 137 Ky. 39, 127 S. W. 16. 67. See Pollock, Contracts. (Williston's Ed.) 850; Thomp- son V. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323, 68 Am. Dec. 6.38; Rifeiner v. Bow- man, 53 Pa. St. 313; Wheeler v. Single. 62 Wi.s. 380, 22 N. W. 569. 2 R. P. CHAPTER XX TRANSFER BY WILL. § 466. General considerations. 467. Will and conveyance distinguished. 468. Signing by testator. 469. Acknowledgment and publication. 470. Competency of witnesses. 471. Attestation and subscription. 472. Holographic and nuncupative wills. 473. Undue influence. 474. Lapsed and void devises. 475. The revocation of a will. 476. Children or issue omitted from will, 477. Revival of will. 478. Republication. § 466. General considerations. While, before the Norman Conquest, and for a century thereafter, per- sons were allowed to make post obit gifts of land, to take effect in possession after the death of the donor, the rule was established by the king's court, late in the twelfth century, in favor of the heir, that a transfer of a freehold interest in land, though to take effect only after the death of the transferor, must be by livery of seisin, and so any transfer of such an interest, answer- ing to our modern will or devise, became impossible, ex- cept in the case of certain lands devisable by local custom.^ Eventually the invention of uses enabled one to devise his land by making a feoffment to uses to be declared by his last will, in which case chancery would enforce the use so declared.^ The power of thus making a will by the declaration of a use was, however, put an end to by the Statute of Uses, this being in fact one of 1. 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. (5th Ed.) 64; Williams, Real Eng. Law, 324-329. Prop. (21st Ed.) 168. See ante, § 2. 1 Sanders, Uses & Trusts 96. (1806) § 466] Transfer by Will. 1807 tlie purposes of its passage, as recited in the preamble. But the inconvenience of this prohibition of testamen- tary disposition was so greatly felt that, five years later, the Statute of Wills^ was passed, by which statute tenants in fee simple were empowered to dispose by will of all their lands held in socage tenure, and two-thirds of those held by knight service, and, after the change of all tenures into socage tenures,* all lands came within the operation of this statute, and were devisable. '^ A will of real property was in early times, and likewise after the Statute of Wills, regarded as a species of conveyance, to take effect at a future time, that is, on the death of the testator.** This theory had important results upon the law of wills of real property, as dis- tinct from wills of personalty. One most important result of this theory was that, since one could convey only such land as he owned, a will could operate u]ion such real property only as the testator owned at the time of making the will.'' And for this reason, if one, after having made a will, aliened property covered by the will, such property did not pass under the will, even though he subsequently reacquired it,^ The rule that after-acquired real property does not pass under a will has been changed by statute in most, if not all, jurisdictions. In England the Wills Act ^ provided that a testator might dispose of all real and personal estate to which he might be entitled at the time of his death, and that every will should, in the absence of indications of a contrary intention, be con- strued to take effect, with reference to the real and personal estate comprised in it, as if executed imme- diately before the death of testator. The effect of these 3. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1 (A. D. 7. Harwood v. Goodright. 1 1540). Cowp. 87; Brydges v. Chandos. 2 4. An,te, § 12. Ves. Jr. 417, 427; Williams, Real 5. Digby, Hist. Real Prop. c. 8. Prop. 250. 6. Pollock & Maitland, Hist. 8. Post, § 475. Eng. Law, 313; Williams, Real 9. 7 Wm. IV. and 1 VUt. c. Prop. (21st Ed.) 250. 20 §§ 3, 24 (A. D. 18:57). 1808 Eeal Property. [^ 466 provisions is that a gift in general terms, such as ''all my real estate," or "all my property," or "all my land," passes after-acquired interests, unless a contrary intention appears, and that a "residuary devise," that is, a devise of all one's proj)erty not otherwise disposed of, has the same effect.^" In some of the states there are statutes substantially similar to those in England,^^ and having a similar op- eration.^- In other states the statute provides that after-acquired real property shall pass by the wiU only when it appears from the will that such was the testa- tor's intention. ^^ Another effect of the theory that a devise was a conversance was that a residuary devise was regarded as a specific devise of such land as the testator owned at the time of making the mil, and did not othermse dis- pose of therein, a matter which will be considered here- after more particularly in connection with "lapsed and void devises."^* A further result of the theory that a disposition of real property by Avill was in effect a conveyance ap- peared in the fact that a devise of real property, unlike a legacy of personalty, was regarded as passing the land directly to the devisee, without the intervention of the executor or administrator. This rule still prevails in the majority of jurisdictions, though it has been changed by recent statutes in England and some states.^' The king's courts, in the twelfth century, having es- tablished the principle that there could be no testamen- 10. 1 Jarman, Wills, 291, 612. Briggs, 69 Iowa, 617, 29 N. W. 11. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 632; Paine v. Forsaith, 84 Me. 66, §§ 2806, 2809. 24 Atl. 590; Woman's Union Mis- 12. See Webb v. Archibald, 128 sionary Soc. of America v. Mead. Mo. 299, 34 S. W. 54; Jacobs' Es- 131 111. 33, 23 N. E. 603; Kimball tate, 140 Pa. St. 268, 11 L. R. A. v. Ellison, 128 Mass. 41. 767, 23 Am. St. Rep. 230, 21 Atl. 14. See iwst, § 474. 318. 15. 2 Woerner, Administration, 13. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § § 337; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 2809 (C). See Church v. Warren (2d Ed.) 1037 et seq. Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 539; Briggs v. "^ 467] Transfee by Will. 1809 tary gift of land, relinquished the jurisdiction of the personal property of decedents to the ecclesiastical courts, and thereafter the law of succession to personal property, including chattels real, was developed by these latter courts. ^^ As a result, the civil-law conception of a will, not as a conversance, but as a secret and revoca- ble instrument, which was to take effect at the death of testator only, has always been applied in the case of personalty ;^'^ and likewise the position of an executor or administrator as the personal representative of the deceased, to whom all his personal property passes on his death, including that disposed of by will, became established at an early date.^^ § 467. Will and conveyance distinguished. The question frequently arises whether a particular instru- ment is to be regarded as a conveyance inter vivos or as an instrument of a testamentary character, that is, a will. The distinction would seem to be clear, liowever difficult of application. If the instrument is intended to be immediately operative, it cannot be regarded as a will, and conversely, if it is intended to be operative only upon the death of the maker, it cannot be regarded as a conveyance inter vivos.'^^ The question is, in the last 16. 2 Pollock & Maltland, Hist. 144; Sapplngford v. King, 49 Ore. Eng. Law, 329, 331. 102, 8 L. R. A. N. S. 1006, 89 Pac. 17. Holds-worth & Vickers, Lav/ 142, 90 Pac. 150; Trumbauer v. of Succession, 31; Maine, Anc. Rust, 36 S. D. 301, 154 N. W. 801; Law (4th Ed.) 173 et seg.; Har- In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wash, wood V. Goodright, Cowp. 87. 391, 134 Pac. 1041; and cases cited 18. 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. in note to Phillips v. Phillips, Eng. Law, 334, 345; Digby, Hist. A. & E. Ann. Gas. 1916D, 996) is Real Prep. (5th Ed.) 380. in a sense correct, but it is open 19. The statement frequently to criticism as suggesting that made that whether an instrument the distinction depends on the is a deed or a will depends upon character of the interest which whether it passes a "present in- passes rather than on the time terest (See e. g. Ransom v. at which it is to pass. Until the Pottawattamie County, 168 Iowa, testator's death, nothing passes by 570, 150 N. W. G57; Glover v. a will. Fillmore, 88 Kan. 545, 129 Pac. 1810 Real Peoperty. [§467 analysis, merely whether the maker of the instrument intended, by its execution, immediately to transfer an interest to another, or whether he intended merely to declare in whom an interest should vest upon his death, in case he did not subsequently indicate a different in- tention. The difficulty in the practical application of the distinction lies in the difficulty of ascertaining the intention of the maker of the instrument in this regard. That no estate in favor of the person named is to com- mence until the death of the maker of the instrument does not show that the instrument is testamentary in character,-'' since an estate to commence at his death can, as previously stated,-^ be created by a conveyance inter vivos. And the fact that the maker expressly reserves a life estate,^^ or the possession and control of the property during his life,^^ is perfectly compatible with the operation of the instrument as a conveyance inter vivos. Nor is the instrument necessarily a will because the beneficiary named has merely a possibility, and no assured prospect, of an estate, to commence upon the testator's death. For instance a conveyance may be made inter vivos of a life estate to commence in 20. West V. Wright, 115 Ga. St, Rep. 334, 59 Pac. 1059; Deck- 277, 41 S. E. 602; Kytle v. Kytle, enbach v. Deckenbach, 65 Ore. 160, 128 Ga. 387, 57 S. E. 748; Bowler 130 Pac. 729; Muntz v. Whitcomb, V. Bowler, 176 111. 541, 52 N. E. 40 Pa. Super Ct. 553. 4.37; Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 23. Adair v. Craig, 135 Ala. 48 L. R. A. 257, 59 Pac. 1059; 332, 33 So. 902; Guthrie v. O'Day V. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588, Guthrie, 105 Ga. 86, 31 S. E. 40; 112 Am. St. Rep. 542, 92 S. W. Spencer v. Razor, 251 111. 278, 96 637; Fellbush v. Fellbush, 216 Pa. N. E. 300; Tansel v. Smith, 49 141, 65 Atl. 28. Ind. App. 263, 93 N. E. 548, 94 N. 21. Ante, § 159. E. 890; Saunders v. Saunders, 115 22. Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. Iowa, 275, 88 N. W. 329; Dozier 396, 61 So. 75; Sharpe v. Mat- v. Toalson, 180 Mo. 546, 102 Am. thews, 123 Ga. 794, 51 S. E. 706; St. Rep. 586, 79 S. W. 420; Ran- Timmons v. Timmons, 49 Ind. ken v. Donovan, 166 N. Y. 626, 60 App. 21, 96 N. E. 622; Lefebure N. E. 119; Cook v. Cooper, 59 S. V. Lefebure, 143 Iowa, 293, 121 C. 560. 38 S. E. 218; Jones v N. W. 1025; Love v. Blauw, 61 Caird, 153 Wis. 384, 141 N. W. Kan. 496, 48 L. R. A. 257, 78 Am. 228. § 467] Transfer by Will. 1811 interest upon the grantor's death, in which case the beneficiary has, previous to the grantor's death, merely a possibility of an estate, dependent on his survival of the grantor.2^ And one may, by a conveyance inter vivos, limit an estate to conmience on the death of the maker of the instrument provided a particular con- tingency occurs, provided, for instance the transferee named survives the maker.^^ In such a case the gi-antee would have merely a possibility of an estate, but the possibility becomes his immediately upon the delivery of the conveyance, and he cannot be deprived of the possibility by any act on the part of the maker. While a will is in its nature revocable and a convey- ance inter vivos is in its nature not revocable, the fact that the instrument contains an express power of revoca- tion does not show it to be a will.-*^ The right to revoke a will, which is based on the fact that the will does not be- come operative until the testator's death, is in effect a right to render the instrument absolutely nugatory, while an express powder of revocation contained in a convey- ance inter vivos does not involve a right to render the in- strument absolutely nugatory, but merely empowers the grantor to divest an estate or interest which is created by the conveyance. Occasionally, language is used by the courts suggesting that the absence of an express power of revocation tends to show that the instrument 24. See e. g. Lindemann v. as deciding the contrary, they Dobossy, — (Tex. Civ. App.) — 107 cannot, it is submitted, be up- S. W. Ill; West v. West, 155 held. Mass. 317, 29 N. E. 582. 26. Mays v. Burleson, 180 Ala. 25. See e. g., Thomas v. Wil- 396, 61 So. 75; Cribbs v. Walker, Hams, 105 Minn. 88, 117 N. 74 Ark. 104, 85 S. W. 244; W. 155; Phifer v. Mullis, 167 Tennant v. John Tennant Mem- N. C. 405, 83 S. E. 582. If orial, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 212; Kenney v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146, 57 Brady v. Fuller, 78 Kan. 448, 96 Pac. 772; Dunlap v. Marnell, 95 Pac. 854; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. Neb. 535, 145 N. W. 1017; In re 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147; Stamper v. EdwaH's Estate, 75 Wash. 391, Venable, 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S. W. 134 Pac. 1041, are to be regarded 812; 1 Jarman, Wills, 22. 1812 Real Peopekty. [§ 467 was intended as a conveyance inter vivos^'^ but the prop- erty of such an inference seems most questionable. The absence of an express power of revocation might quite as well be regarded as tending to show that the in- strument was intended as a will, since a will is always I'e vocable, and there is no possible object in inserting sucli an express power therein. That an instrument has been expressly delivered as a conveyance would seem to be conclusive that it is not intended to operate as a will, unless it is susceptible of division into two instruments, one a will and the other a conveyance. Usually, however, even though the circumstances are such as to create a presumption of delivery, so as to validate the in- strument if regarded as a conveyance, they are not such as to show conclusively that the instrument was intended to operate as a conveyance. If, for instance, the maker hands the instrument to the transferee named, though this creates a presumption of delivery in case the instrument is to be regarded as a convey- ance,^^ and may tend to show that the instrument was intended as a conveyance,-^ it is perfectly possible that the instrument was put in such transferee's care as a will, and that it was not intended to operate as a con- veyance.'*" On the other hand, the fact that there is no evidence of delivery of the instriunent, such as is necessary to support it as a conveyance inter vivos, that 27. See e. g. Abney v. Moore, coll, 143 Cal. 528, 77 Pac. 471; 106 Ala. 131, 18 So. 60; Harper Youngblood v. Youngblood, 74 Ga. V. Reaves, 132 Ala. 625, 32 So. 614; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 111. 721; Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 92, 101 N. E. 227; Fellbush v. 179, 27 L. R. A. 523, 39 N. B. Fellbush, 216 Pa. 141, 65 Atl. 864; Lacy v. Comstock, 39 Kan. 28; Billings v. Warren, 21 Tex. 86, 39 Pac. 1024; Kelleher v. Civ. App. 77, 50 S. W. 625. Kernan, 60 Md. 440; Ellis v. 30. See Fellbush v. Fellbush, Pearson, 104 Tenn. 591, 58 S. 216 Pa. 141, 65 Atl. 28; Griffin W. 318. V. Mcintosh, 176 Mo. 392, 75 S 28. Ante, § 463, note 67. W. 677; Tewkesbury v. Tewkes- 29. AUney v. Moore, 106 Ala. bury, 222 Mass. 595, 111 N. E. 131, 18 So. 60; DriscoII v. Dris- 394. § 467] Teansfkr by Will. 1813 is, no evidence of an expression, by word or act', of an intention that it shall operate as such, won Id seem to afford some room for an inference that it was intended to operate only at the maker's death,^^ though an in- strument which is in form clearly a conveyance inter vivos cannot, it would seem evident, be regarded as a will merely because it has not been delivered as a con- veyance."^ In so far as a lack of delivery can be inferred from the maker's retention of possession of the instrunient,^'^ and in so far as testamentary intention can be inferred from a lack of delivery ,^^ such intention can be inferred from the retention of possession. But the retention of possession is not conclusive of a lack of delivery,^^ and it is certainly not conclusive of an in- tention that the instrument shall operate as a will rather than as a conveyance. The fact that an instrument of doubtful character is invalid if regarded as a conveyance while valid if regarded as a will, has been referred to as a ground for regarding it as a ^^all,'*^ and conversely, the fact that an instrument is invalid if regarded as a will while valid if regarded as a conveyance has been considered a ground for regarding it as a conveyance.''^ This view is based partly upon the policy of the courts to give 31. Sharp v. HaH, 86 Ala. 110, 35. Ante, § 461, uole 43. 11 Am. St. Rep. 28; Rice v. 36. Heaston v. Kreig, 167 Ind. Carey, 170 Cal. 748, 151 Pac. 101, 119 Am. St. Rep. 475, 77 N. 135; Nichols v. Chandler, 55 Ga. E. 805; Symes v. Arnold, 10 Ggi. 369; Nichols v. Huddleson, 13 B'. 506; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110. Men. (Ky.) 299; Bromley v. 11 Am. St. Rep. 28; Trumbauer Mitchell, 155 Mass. 509, 30 N. v. Rust, 36 S. D. 301. 154 N. W. E. 83; Edwards v. Smith, 35 801; 1 Jarman, Wills, 22. And Miss. 197; Miller v. Holt, 68 Mo. see ante, this section, note 31. 584; Kresecker's Estate, 170 Pa. 37. Jacoby v. Nichols, 23 Ky. St. 476; RouDtree v. Rountree, L. Rep. 205, 62 S. W. 734; 85 S. C. 383, 67 S. E. 471. Thomas v. Williams, 105 Minn. 32. See Dexter v. Witte, 138 88, 117 N. W. 155; Abney v. Wis. 74, 119 N. W. 891. Moore, 106 Ala. 131, 18 So. 60; 33. Ante, § 4G1, note 62. Wynn v. Wynn, 112 Ga. 214, 37 34. Ante, this section, note 31. S. E. 378. 1814 Kbal Propeety. [§ 467 to an instrument a legal operation wherever possible, and partly upon the consideration that the maker of the instrument must have intended it to operate in the mode in which he rendered it capable of operating. The fact, however, that an instrument which is clearly intended to operate as a will is not executed with the formalities required in the case of a will is not sufficient, it would seem, to give it validity as a conveyance inter vivos, but it is totally inoperative."^ The maker's in- tention that the instrument shall not be operative until his death excludes an intention that it shall be im- mediately operative, which latter intention is necessary to constitute delivery.^^ With this intention lacking, the fact that the maker hands the instrument to the trans- feree named therein could not make the instrument effective as a conveyance inter vivos.'*'^ That an instrument otherwise in the form of a conveyance inter vivos contains a clause to the effect that it is not to take effect until the maker's death has in some cases been regarded as showing a testamentary intent,^ ^ while in others this has been regarded as not inconsistent with the operation of the instrument as a conveyance imter vivos, and as merely postponing the 38. See Murray v. Cazier, 23 102, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066, 89 Ind. App. 600, 53 N. E. 476; Pac. 142, 90 Pac. 150; Turner Priester v. Hohloch, 70 N. Y. v. Scott, 51 Pa. 26; Coulter v. App. Div. 256, 75 N. Y. Supp. Shelmadine, 204 Pa. 120, 53 Atl. 405; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa, 638; Fellbush v. Fellbush, 216 331, 90 N. W. 66; Larson v. Pa. 141, 65 Atl. 28. Lund, 109 Minn. 372, 123 N. W. 41. Seay v. Huggins, 194 Ala. 1070. 496, 70 So. 113; Donald v. Nes- 39. Ante, § 461, notes 40-47. bit, 89 Ga. 290, 15 S. E. 367; 40. See Griffin v. Mclntosli, 176 Ransom v. Pottawattamie Coun- Mo. 392, 75 S. W. 677. And see ty, 168 Iowa, 570, 150 N. W. cases cited, ante, § 461, note 47; 657; In re Bybee's Estate, 179 Murphy v. Gabbert, 166 Mo. 596, Iowa, 1089, 160 N. W. 900; 89 Am. St. Rep. 733, 66 S. W. Leonard v. Leonard, 145 Mich. 536; Terry v. Glover, 235 Mo. 563, 108 N. W. 985; Moody v. 544, 139 S. W. 3S7; Pinkham v. Macomber, 159 Mich. C57, 124 Pinkham, 55 Neb. 729, 76 N. W. N. W. 549; Simpson v. Mc- 411; Sappingfield v. King, 49 Ore. Gee, 112 Miss. 344, 73 So. 55. § 467] Teansfer by Will. 1815 transferee's right of enjoyment.'' ^ Such language would seem, prima facie, to indicate a testamentary intention, but when read in connection with the context and the surrounding circumstances, it may no doubt be suscep- tible of a different construction. The decisions which regard such a clause as merely postiDoning the right of enjoyment are to a considerable extent, it appears, based on the consideration that otherwise the instrument would be a nullity because not executed as a will. It does not seem that any absolute rule that such a clause shows, or that it does not show, a testamentary intention, should properly be aserted, it being a ques- tion merely of the construction of the language used. One may, of he chooses, by conveyance inter vivos, create in another an estate to commence upon his, the grantor's, death,^2a ^^^ ^^^ j^^^ ^^^^ -^^ ^j^^ particular instrument he indicates an intention to create such an estate is certainly not conclusive that the instrument is a will and not a conveyance. That an instrument undertakes to dispose only of such property as the maker may have at the time of his death has been regarded as strong, if not conclusive, evidence of an intention that the instrument shall op- erate as a will and not as a conveyance.^^ 42. Abney v. Moore, 106 Ala. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 68 L. R. A. 131, 18 So. 60; Phillips v. 180, 82 S. W. 998; Abbott v. Phillips, 186 Ala. 545, 65 So. Holway, 72 Me. 298; Vessey v. 89; Burch v. Nicks, 50 Ark. Dwyer, 133 N. W. 613; Rogers 367, 7 S. W. 563; West v. v. Rogers (Miss.) 43 So. 946; Wright, 115 Ga. 277, 41 S. E. Wimpey v. Ledford (Mo.) 177 602; Griffith v. Douglas, 120 S. W. 302; Merck v. Merck, 83 Ga. 582, 48 S. E. 129; Harsh- S. C. 329, 65 S. E. 347; Truni- barger v. Carroll, 163 111. 636, bauer v. Rust, 36 S. D. 301, 154 45 N. E. 565; Hathaway v. N. W. 801; Garrison v. Mc- Cook, 258 ni. 92, 101 N. E. 227; Lain. (Tex. Civ. App.) 112 S. Kelly V. Shimer, 152 Ind. 290, W. 773; Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. 53 N. E. 233; Rust v. Ruth- Va. 25, 31 S. E. 986. erford, 95 Kan. 152, 147 Pac. 42a. Ante, § 159. 805; Phillips v. Lumber Co., 43, Nichols v. Nichols, 108 Cal. 94 Ky. 445, 42 Am. St. Rep. 444, 143 Pac. 712; Robinson v. 367, 22 S. W. 652; Hunt v. Schley, 6 Ga. 515; Brewer v. 1816 Keal Property. [§ 467 That an instrument, in form a conveyance inter vivos, is handed to a person other than the grantee, with instructions to retain it until the grantor's death, is not, by reason of the reference to the grantor's death, testamentary in character, is generally recognized,^* such a physical transfer being regarded as involving delivery, of a quasi conditional character, of the instru- ment as a conveyance.*-^ If, however, the grantor, at the time of handing the instrument to a third person,*^ or to the grantee himself,* '^ indicates an intention that the instrument shall have no operation whatsoever until the grantor's death, and that in the meanwhile he may revoke or cancel it, or treat it as not legally existent, the instrument cannot be regarded as having been de- livered as a conveyance, and it must be regarded, either as an instrument of conveyance which is nugatory for lack of delivery, or as a testamentary instrument which is valid only if executed as such.*'^^ Baxter, 41 Ga. 512, 5 Am. Rep. 530; Roth v. Michalis, 125 111. 325, 17 N. E. 809; Heaston v. Kreig, 167 Ind. 301, 119 Am. St. Rep. 475, 77 N. E. 805; Poore V. Poore, 55 Kan. 687, 41 Pac. 973; Watkins v. Dean, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 321, 31 Am. Dec. 583; See Kyle v. Perdue, 87 Ala. 423. 6 So. 296; Roth v. Michaelis, 125 111. 325, 17 N. E. 809; Gage v. Gage, 12 N. H. 371. 44. Griswold v. Griswold, 148 Ala. 239, 121 Am. St. Rep. 64, 42 So. 554; Fine v. Lasater, 110 Ark. 425, 161 S. W. 1147; Hunt V. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 162 Pac. 639; Thurston v. Tubbs, 257 111. 465, 100 N. E. 947; American Nat Bank of Lincoln v. Martin, 277 111. 629, 115 N. E. 721; Wheel- er V. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N. E. 502; Schniinger v. Bawek, 135 Iowa, 131, 112 N. W. 210; Hoagland v. Beckley, 158 Mich. 565, 123 N. W. 12; Peter- son V. Bisbee, 191 Mich. 439, 158 N. W. 134; Dickson v. Miller, 124 Minn. 346, 145 N. W. 112; Saltz- sieder v. Saltzsieder, 219 N. Y. 523, 114 N. E. 856; Shaffer V. Smith, 53 Okla. 352, 156 Pac. 1188. 45. A7ite, § 462. 46. Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 703, 151 Pac. 1; Shipley v. Shipley, 274 111. 506, 113 N. E. 906; Tewkes- bury V. Tewkesbury, 222 Mass. 595, 111 N. E. 394; Felt v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237, 118 N .W. 953. 47. Benner v. Bailey, 234 IH. 79, 84 N. E. 638; Felt v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237, 118 N. W. 953; Watson V. Magill, 85 N. J. Eq. 592, 97 Atl. 43. 47a. Cox V. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 156 Pac. 509. § 467] Transfer by Will. 1817 Extrinsic facts and circumstances may usually be considered in order to ascertain whether a particular instrument was or was not intended to operate as a will."^^ That is, the avimus testandi, if not apparent from the face of the instrument, may be shown other- wise, and consequently, although the phrasinr^ of an instrument is strongly suggestive of a conveyance inter vivos, or even of a contract, it may operate as a will.^^ Conversely, although the instrument contains phrases suggestive of a will, it may be shown that it was in- tended to operate, not as a will but as a conveyance inter vivos.^^ There are several decisions, however, that if an instrument contains no language suggestive of a testamentary intent, such intent cannot be shown by proof of extrinsic circumstances.^^ And there are also decisions that if the language of the instrument clearly shows a testamentary intent, it cannot be shown to have been intended to take effect as a conveyance.^- 48. Nichols v. Nichols, 2 Phillim. 183; Lister v. Smith, 3 Swab. & Tris. 282; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110, 11 Am. St. Rep. 28; Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 595; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa, 331, 90 N. W. 66 (semble) ; Wareham v. Sellers, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 98; McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566; Prather v. Prath- er, 97 Miss. 311, 52 So. 449; Outlaw V. Hurdle, 46 N. C. 150; Tozer v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373, 30 Atl. 400; White v. Helmes, 1 McCord (S. C.) 430; Ferguson V. Ferguson, 27 Tex. 339; Bel- garde V. Carter, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 146 S. W. 964; Smith v. Smith, 112 Va. 205, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1018, 70 S. E. 491. 49. Gomez v. Higgins, 130 Ala. 493, 30 So. 417; Wellborn V. Weaver. 17 Ga. 267, 63 Am. Dec. 235; Blackman v. Preston, 123 111. 381, 15 N. E. 42; Ison V. Halcomb, 136 Ky. 523, 124 S. W. 813; Moody v. Macomber, 159 Mich. 657, 124 N. W. 549; Sartor v. Sartor, 39 Miss. 760; In re Belcher, 66 N. C. 51; Kiesecker's Estate, 190 Pa. St. 476, 42 Atl. 886; Ingram v. Porter, 4 McCord (S. C.) 198. 50. Ward v. Ward. 104 Ky. 857, 48 S. W. 411: Clayton v. Liverman, 29 N. C. 92; Tozar v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373; Faulk v. Fa-ulk, 23 Tex. 653. 51. Clay V. Layton, 134 Mich. 317, 96 N. W. 458; Dodson v. Dodson, 142 Mich. 586, 105 N. W. 1110; Elliott V. Cheney, 183 Mich. 561, 150 N. W. 163; Noble v. Fickes, 230 111. 594, 82 N. E.' 950, 13 L. R. A. N. S. 1203. And see Fellbush v. Fellbuali, 216 Pa. 141, 65 Atl. 28. 52. Goodale v. Evans, 263 Mo. 1S18 Eeal Property. [§ 468 Upon the question whether an instrument which purports on its face to be a will, and is duly executed as such, can be shown to have been executed without any intention that it have a legal effect, whether it can be shown, for instance, that it was executed merely as a memorandum, or to illustrate how a will should be made, or to obtain immunity from the solicitation of a person named therein, the cases are not entirely in accord. The tendency of the authorities in this country is rather adverse to the introduction of evidence for this purpose, the solemnity of the execution of the instrument in the statutory mode being regarded as sufficient to exclude the jDOSsibility of thus asserting a lack of testamentary intent.^^ The English authorities are to the effect that a lack of such intent rnay be shown.^* § 468. Signing by testator. In all states the statute requires, as did the English Statute of Frauds, that a will shall be signed by the testator, or, in the majority of states, by some other person, by the testa- tor's express direction, and in his presence.^^ The testator's owm signature may be by means of a mark, even though he is able to write, provided the mark is intended as a signature ;^*^ and so, in signing, he may use 219, 172 S. W. 370; Phifer v. 52 Am. Dec. at p. 167. Mullis, 167 N. C. 405, 83 S. E. 54. Nicholls v. Nicholls, 2 582. Phniim. 183; Lister v. Smith, 3 53. BarnewaU v. Murrell, 108 Swab. & Tr. 282; 1 Jarman, Wills, Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; In re Ken- 23. And such is the rule in nedy, 159 Mich. 548, 28 L. R. A. Massachusetts. Fleming v. Mor- (N. S.) 417, 134 Am. St. Rep. rison, 187 Mass. 120, 105 Am. St. 743, 18 A. & E. Ann. 892; Heas- Rep. 386, 72 N. E. 499. ton V. Krieg, 167 Ind. 101, 119 55. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Am. St. Rep. 475, 77 N. E. 805; § 2640. Brown v. Avery, 63 Fla. 376, 56. In re Clark's Estate, 170 Ann. Cas. 1914A, 90. 58 So. 34. Cal. 418, 149 Pac. 828; Robinson And see Sewell v. Slingluff, 57 v. Brewster, 140 111. 649, 33 Am. Md. 537. As to the admissibility St. Rep. 265; Bevelot v. Lestrade, of the maker's declarations upon 153 111. 625, 38 N. E. 1056; Rook this question, see 3 Wigmore, v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24, 51 Am. St. Evidence, § 1736, and note in Rep. 163; Ahnert v. Ahnert, 98 § 468] Transfee by Will. 1819 only his initials, or his Christian name, or even adopt another name than his own.'" When the signature is by a person other than the testator, the requirements that it be by his direction and in his presence must be strictly comi^lied with.^^ Even in the absence of lan- guage in the statute expressly authorizing the signature to be made by another than the testator, by the latter 's direction and in his presence, such a signature would, it seems, ordinarily be upheld as being in effect the signa- ture of the testator himself, in the absence of language in the statute clearly sho^\dng a contrary intention.^" This would be in accord with the rule which prevails in the case of a conveyance inter vivos, ^^ as well as in other connections,''^ and a different construction of the statute would have the unfortunate effect of dis- abling any person, incapacitated by physical disability to make a mark, from making a will. There appears no reason why a signature by another in one's own pre- sence, properly proven, should not be as effective for the purpose of a will as for other purposes. In regard to the position of the signature, the niles in the different states are not in accord. Under statutes which follow the English Statute of Frauds in merely Kan. 768, 160 Pac. 201; Nickerson Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. V. Buck, 12 Gush. (Mass.) 332; St. 489. See Pool v. Buffum, 3 Plate's Estate, 148 Pa. St. 55, 33 Ore. 438, 443. Am. St. Rep. 805; In re Hers- 59. In re McElwaine, 18 N. perger's Estate, 24B Pa. 569, 91 J. Eq. 499, the statute was con- st. 942; Wilson v. Craig, 86 strued as requiring the physical Wash. 465, 150 Pac. 1179. act of signature to be the act 57. 1 Jarman, Wills, 79; In of the testator, and Robins v. re Savory, 15 Jur. 1042; Knox's Coryell, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 559 Estate, 131 Pa. 220, 6 L. R. A. contains a dictum that such 353, 17 Am. St. Rep. 798, 18 would be the case in the absence Atl. 1021. of words in the statute indica- 58. Page, Wills, §§ 175, 176; tive of a contrary intention. Waite V. Frisbie, 45 Minn. 361, 60. Ante, § 457. 47 N. W. 1069; Murry v. Hen- 61. See authorities cited 25 nessey, 48 Neb. 608, 67 N. W. Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd 470; Armstrong's Ex'r v. Arm- Ed.), 1066. strong's Heirs, 29 Ala. 538; 1S20 Eeal Peopekty. [§ 468 requiring that tlie will be signed, it has been decided that the place of the signature, whether by the testator him- self, or by another for him, is immaterial, and that it may be made in the margin, in the body of the will, or elsewhere. Accordingly, the writing of the testator's name in the body of the will, as when he commences it, ''I, John B.," is sufficient, under such statutes, as a. signature, provided, it seems, it is so intended, or at least another signature is not intended to be added.'^^ The statutes of a number of states, however, require the testator to "subscribe" the will, or contain some other express requirement that the signature appear at the end of the will,*^^ and there are a number of decisions upon the question of whether the signature to a parti- cular will was at the end thereof, so as to comply wdth the statute.*^* The solution of this question involves the consideration, not only of whether some particular lan- guage is to be regarded as following the signature,"^ but also of whether this language is of such a disposi- tive character as properly to constitute a part of the will, so that its occurrence after the signature can be regarded as conclusive that this is not at the end of the will.*^*^ It has, moreover, occasionally been con- 62. lieraayne v. Stanley, 3 ject up to 1907 are collected in Lev. 1; Armstrong's Ex'r v. Arm- a note in 17 L. R. A. N. S. at strong's Heirs, 29 Ala. 538; Miles', p. ;>53. See also editorial note, Will, 4 Dana. (Ky.) 1; Arm- 12 Columbia Law Rev. 380. strong V. Walton, 105 Miss. 337, 65. See e. g. Irwin v. Jac- 62 So. 173; Catlett v. Catlett, ques, 71 Ohio St. 395, 69 L. R. 55 Mo. 330; Peace v. Edwards, A. 422, 73 N. E. 683; In re 170 N. C. 64, Ann. Cas. 1918A, Swire, 225 Pa. St. 188, 73 Atl. 778, 86 S. E. '"807; Lawson v. 1110. Dawson. 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 66. See Baker v. Baker, 51 53 S. W. 64. See In re Phelan's Ohio St. 217; In re Andrews, 162 Estate, 82 N. J. 316, 87 Atl. N. Y. 1, 48 L. R. A. 662, 76 625; In re Booth, 127 N. Y. 109, Am! St. Rep. 294; Wineland's Ap- 24 Am. St. Rep. 429. peal, 118 Pa. St. 37, 4 Am. St. 63. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Rep. 37. § 2640; 1 Woerner, Administra- That a clause appointing an tion, § 39. executor is part of the will, so 64. The cases upon the sub- that if the signature precedes ^ 469] Transfer by Will. 1821 tended that the wiU is not signed at the end thereof by reason of the fact that a very considerable blank space exists between the last clause of the will and the signature.*'^ The signature may be either before or after the *' attestation" clause,^^ the nature of which is ex- plained in another section.*^'' If writing is added below the signature subsequently to the execution and publica- tion of the will, it is merely an attempted codicil, not affecting the validity of the will as expressed in the writing before the signature/*^ § 469. Acknowledgment and publication. The statute sometimes requires the testator's signature to be acknowledged by him before witnesses, usually as an alternative to his actual signature of the will in their presence,"^ No particular words of acknowledgment are necessary, it being sufficient that he indicates to the witnesses, either by words or acts, that the signature is his and the instrument his act."- In at least three states, on a construction of the statute, it has been regarded as necessary that the witness see the signa- snch clause, the signature is not 70. In (re Jacobson. 6 Dem. at the end of the win, see Sur. (N. Y.) 298; Chaplin, Wills, Sisters of Charity of St. Vin- 229. cent de Paul v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 71. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 409. Contra. Ward v. Putnam, § 2642. See Limbach v. Bolin 119 Ky. 889, 85 S. W. 179. 169 Ky. 204, L. R. A. 1916D, 67. In re Seaman, 146 Cal. 1059, 183 S. W. 495; Ludlow v. 455, 106 Am St. Rep. 53, 80 Ludlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597; Sisters Pac. 700; Morrow's Estate, 204 of Charity of St. Vincent de Pa. St. 479, 54 Atl. 313. See Paul v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409. Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 104, 72. Thompson v. Karme, 268 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353, 11 A. 111. 168, 108 N. E. 101; Turner & E. Ann. Cas. 1008. v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; Smith v. 68. Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Holden, 58 Kan. 535, 50 Pac. 447; Y. 535, 46 Am. Rep. 156; In re Nickerson v. Buck, 12 Cush. Young's Will, 153 Wis. 337, 141 (Mass.) 332; In re Landy, 148 N. W. 226; Hallowell v. Hallo- N. Y. 403; In re Herring, 152 well, 88 Ind. 251; Page, Wills, N. C. 258, 67 S. E. 570; In re § 183. Claflin, 73 Vt. 129, 87 Am. St. 69. Post, § 471. Rep. 693. R. P.— 40 1S2: Eeal Pbopbrty. [§ 469 ture which the testator acknowledges to be his,^^ while in others this is regarded as unnecessary, it being suffi- cient that the witness is told by the testator that the instrument has been. signed by him, or that he otherwise indicates to the witness that such is the case.'^^'^' There is also, in some states, a requirement that the testator acknowledge, in the presence of witnesses, that the instrument is his last will and testament, this con- stituting what is known as the ''publication" of the will.''^'' The publication, however, like the acknowledg- ment of the signature, need not be by express declara- tion, the testator's mere assent to a statement by an- other, or incidental reference to the instrument as his will, being sufficient, if it plainly informs the witnesses that the instrument is his will."^' In the absence of a statutory requirement, it is unnecessary that the testa- tor inform the witnesses that the instrument is his willJ^ 73. In re Mackay's Will, 110 N. Y. 611, 1 L. R. A. 491, 6 Am. St. Rep. 409, 18 N. E. 433; KTunn v. Ehlert, 218 Mass. 471, 196 N. E. 163; Pope v. Rogers, 92 Conn. 248, 102 Atl. 583. See editorial notes, 28 Harv. Law Rev., 217; 27 Yale Law Journ., 847. 74-75. White v. Trustees of British Museum, 6 Bing. 310; Hobart v. Hobart, 154 111. 610, 45 Am. St. Rep. 151; Gould v. Chicago Theological Seminary, 189 111. 282, 59 N. E. 536; Dougherty v. Crandall, 168 Mich. 281, 134 N. W. 24. 76. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 2642; Bigelow, Wills, 47. 77. In re CuUberg's Estate, (Cal.), 146 Pac. 888; Harp v. Parr, 168 111. 459, 48 N. E. 113; Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1, 80 Am. St. Rep. 604; In re Williams' Will, 50 Mont. 142, 145 Pac. 957; In re Ayers' Es- tate, 84 Neb. 16, 120 N. W. 491; Hildreth v. Marshall, 51 N. J. Eq. 241, 27 Atl. 465; Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125; In re Meurer, 44 Wis. ;?92, 28 Am. Rep.*59L 78. White v. Trustees of British Museum, 6 Bing. 310; Moodie v. Reid, 7 Taunt. 355; Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366. 18 So. 831; Canada's Appeal from Probate, 47 Conn. 450; In re Barry's Will, 219 111. 391, 76 N. E. 219; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; Scott v. Hawks, 107 Iowa, 723, 70 Am. St. Rep. 228; Osburn v. Cook, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 532, 59 Am. Dec. 155; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; In re Skinner, 40 Ore. 571, 67 Pac. 951; Dauphin County His- torical Soc. V. Kelker, 226 Pa. St. 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010; Long V. Michler, 133 Tenn. 51. 179 S. W. 477; In re Claflin's § 470] Transfer by Will. 1823 § 470. Competency of witnesses. The state stat- utes, with few, if any, exceptions, require the signature, or acknowledgment thereof, to be in the presence of two and sometimes three witnesses,"^ and also, as just stated, publication of the will as such in the presence of witnesses is frequently required. If there be less than the statutory number of competent witnesses, the will is void.^"^ The statute usually requires the witness to be ''competent" or " credible, "^^ and the term "credible" is construed as meaning the same as "com- petent."^- It is sufficient that the competency exists at the date of the will; and the fact that the witness becomes subsequently incompetent to testify does not in- validate the will, though it may necessitate that the will be proven by secondary evidence.**^ In other words, the statutory requirement as to the witnesses necessary to attest the execution of a will is entirely distinct from the question as to how the will shall be proved after the testator's death, though such proof is by means of the attesting witnesses, if they are then competent to testify, and are accessible.^^ Will, 75 Vt. 19, 58 L. R. A. 261, v. Fellowes, 5 Mass. 219; Combs' 52 Atl. 1053. Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 158: Brown 79. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, v. Pridgen, 56 Tex. 124. § 2644. 83. Brograve v. Winder, 2 Ves. 80. See Cureton v. Taylor, 89 Jr. 636; Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. Ga. 490, 15 S. E. 643; Poore v. 1, 30 L. R. A. 143, 51 Am. St. Poore, 55 Kan. 687; Johnson v. Rep. 121, 23 S. E. 107; Fishpr Delome Land & Planting Co., v. Spence, 150 111. 253, 41 Am. 77 Miss. 15, 26 So. 360; Simmons St. Rep. 360; Warren v. Baxter. V. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 30 Am. 48 Me. 193; Higgins v. Carltou.. St. Rep. 875. 28 Md. 115, 92 Am. Dec. 666; 81. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Sears v. Dillingham. 12 Mass § 2646. 358; In re Holts' Will, 56 Minn. 82. Hudson v. Flood, 5 Del. 33. 45 Am. St. Rep. 434; Stewart 450, 94 Atl. 760; Gillis v. Gillis, v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25, 22 Am. 96 Ga. 1, 30 L. R.. A. 143, 51 Rep. 408; Hoff v. State, 72 Tex. Am. St. Rep. 121, 23 S. E. 107; 281. The statute so provides in In re Noble's Will, 124 HI. 266, a number of states. 1 Stim- 15 N. E. 850; Clark's Appeal, son's Am. St. Law, § 2647. 114 Me. 105, 95 Atl. 517; Amory 84. Cheatham v. Hatcher, 30 1824 Eeal Property. [§ 470 The competency of an attesting witness is, as a general rule, determined by the consideration whether the witness is a person competent to testify in a court of justice in regard to the will, and questions have fre- quently arisen as to the competency of particular per- sons at common law, and under modern statutory pro- visions. At common law, a ' beneficiary under the will was not a competent witness, because, by the rules pre- vailing in courts of justice, one interested in litigation could not testify therein.^^ Since this rule had the effect of frequently invalidating a will merely because a witness had a small interest thereunder, it was pro- vided by statute that the testamentary provision in favor of the witness should be void, and that he should be regarded as a competent witness. ^'^ In this countrj^ there are statutes of a more or less similar character in most of the states, it being usually declared, as in Eng- land, that the devise or bequest to the witness shall be void, but frequently with a provision giving such wit- ness what he would have taken, in the absence of the will, by descent or distribution, to the extent that this does not exceed the devise or bequest.^^ A mere charge upon land in favor of a witness for the payment of debts due him will not, however, in most states, affect his competency.^^ And the statute also, in effect, frequent- ly provides that the witness shall not lose the benefit of such a provision if there are enough witnesses without him.^ In a few states a mtness to a will is no longer regarded as disqualified by reason of his beneficial in- terest thereunder, since the adoption of statutes allow- ing even interested parties to testify in judicial pro- Grat. (Va.) 56, 32 Am. Rep. and 1 Vict. c. 26, § 14. 650; Trustees of Theological Sem- 87. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, inary of Auburn v. Calhoun, 25 §§ 2650, 2651. N. Y. 422; Carlton v. Carlton, 88. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 40 N. H. 14. § 2648. 85. 1 Jarman, Wills, 69; Hold- 89. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, fast V. Dowsing, 2 Strange, 1253. § 2650; 1 Woerner, Administra- 86. 25 Geo. II. c. 6; 7 Wm. IV. tion, § 41. § 470] Transfer by Will. 1825 ceedings.^" An executor named in the will is not usually regarded as so interested, by reason of his right to com- missions, as to be disqualified as a witness thereto.^ ^ In two or three states, however, a different view ob- tains.^2 At common law, a husband or wife is incompetent as a W'itness in regard to any matter in which the other has a pecuniary interest,®^ and it has accordingly been decided that the husband or wife of a devisee or a lega- tee is not a competent witness to the will.^^ Modern statutes, however, removmg the disability of the hus- band and wife of a party in interest to testify, have in some states been construed as removing the incom- petency as an attesting witness to a will,^^ and the same effect has in one state at least been given to a statute 90. See White v. Bower, 56 Colo. 575 136 Pac. 1053; Leitch V. Leitch 114 Md. 336 79 Atl. 600; In re Wiese's Estate 98 Neb. 463, 153 N. W. 556, L. R. A. 1915E, 832. 91. Comstock v. Hadlyme Ec- clesiastical Sec, 8 Conn. 254, 20 Am. Dec. 100; Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292, 68 Am. Dec. 41; Davenport v. Davenport, 116 La. 1009, 114 Am. St. Rep. 575, 41 So. 240; Wyman v. Symmes, 10 Allen (Mass.) 153; Sears v. Dil- lingham, 12 Mass. 358; Geraghty V. Kilroy, 103 Minn. 286, 114 N. W. 838; Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25, 22 Am. Rep. 408; Children's Aid Soc. v. Loveridge, 70 N. Y. 387; Snyder v. Bull, 17 Pa. St. 54; Coalter v. Byan, 1 Gratt. (Va.) 18; Richardson v. Richardson, 35 Vt. 298. 92. Tucker v. Tucker, 27 N. C. 161, (as regards personal prop- erty) ; Jones v. Grieser, 238 111. 183, 15 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 787 & note, 87 N. E. 295. And the dis- qualification has been held to ex- tend to the wife of an executor. Fearn v. Postlethwaite, 240 111. 626, 88 N. E. 1054; Huie v. Mc- Connell, 47 N. C. 455. 93. See the discussion and criticism of this rule in 1 Wig- more, Evidence, § 600 et seq. 94. Windham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burrows, 414, 424; Sloan's Estate. 184 111. 579, 56 N. E. 952; Sul- livan V. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474; Rucker v. Lambdin, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 230; Hodgman v. Kittredge, 67 N. H. 254, 68 Am. St. Rep. 66i, 32 Atl. 158; Gid- dings V. Turgeon, 58 Vt. 106, 4 Atl. 711. 95. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 54 Iowa, 443, 6 N. W. 699; Iji re Holt's Will, 56 Minn. 33, 22 L. R. A. 481, 45 Am. St. Rep. 434. 57 N. W. 219; Lippincott v. Wikoff, 54 N. J. Eq. 107, 33 Atl. 305. 1826 Real Pbopehty. [§ 471 modifying the common law doctrine of unity of interest of husband and wife.^^ A statute invalidating a provision in favor of a witness in order to render the witness competent has occasionally been construed to apply to a provision in favor of the husband of a witness.^ ^ Such a statute has not, however, usually been given such a construction.^^ In a number of states a devise or legacy to the husband or wife of a subscribing witness is expressly made void by the statute.^^ § 471. Attestation and subscription. The witnesses as to the execution or publication of a will are required, usually, not only to witness the performance of these acts by testator, but also to sign their names upon the instrument "in the presence of" testator, and sometimes '4n the presence of" each other.^ The question of what constitutes "presence," within this requirement, has been the subject of numerous decisions, of a some- what conflicting character.^ The testator and the wit- nesses need not, it has been held, be in the same room, in order to render the signatures of the latter "in the presence of" the former, it being sufficient that he sees them, as through a door or window;^ and though the testator does not actually see the witnesses sign, this is 96. Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Tex. Rep. 360, 37 N. E. 314. 643, 30 S. W. 861. 99. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law 97. Winslow v. Kimball, 25 § 2650. Me. 493; Jackson v. Durland, 2 1. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 314; Moore § 2644. V. McWilliams, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. 2. The cases are collected in C.) 10. note in 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. at 98. White v. Bower, 56 Colo. p. 414. See also editorial ^.note, 575, 136 Pac. 1053; Fisher v. 14 Columbia Law Rev. 180. Spence, 150 111. 253, 37 N. E. 314, 3. Shires v. Glascock, 2 Salk. 41 Am. St. Rep. 314; In re Holt's 688; Casson v. Dade, 1 Brown. Will, 56 Minn. 33, 45 Am. St. Ch. 99; Ambre v. Weishaar, 74 Rep. 434, 22 L. R. A. 481; Hodg- 111. 109; Riggs v. Riggs, 135 man v. Kittredge, 67 N. H. 254, Mass. 238, 46 Am. Rep. 464; In 68 Am. St. Rep. 661; Giddings v. re Meurer, 44 Wis. 392 28 Am. Turgeon, 58 Vt. 106, 41 Am. St. Rep. 591. § 471] Transfer by Will. 1827 usually regarded as taking place in his presence, if he is physically able, by shifting his gaze, to see the act of signing, provided at least he can do this without pain or danger to life.^ He must know what the witnesses are doing,^ and the signing is not in his presence if he is in such a state mentally as not to have such knowledge." When the will is signed in the room in which testator is, there is, it seems, a presumption that the requirement is satisfied.''' The statutory requirement is not usually regarded as satisfied by an acknowledgment by the witness, in the testator's presence, of a signature pre- viously affixed by him out of the testator's presence.^ The statute occasionally provides in express terms that the witnesses shall attest the will at the request of the testator, and even though the statute makes no reference to a request, it has been held that there must 4. 1 Jarman, Wills, 89 et seq; Bigelow, Wills, 55; Schouler, Wills, §§ 340-342. See Gordon V. Gilmer, 141 Ga. 347, 80 S. E. 1007; Drury v. Connell, 177 111. 43, 52 N. E. 368; Raymond v. Wagner, 178 Mass. 315, 59 N. E. 811; Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Jones v. ' Turk. 48 N. C. 202. Compare McKee v. McKee's Ex'r, 155 Ky. 738, 160 S. W. 261; Cunningham v. Cunning- ham, 80 Minn. 180, 81 Am. St. Rep. 256, 51 L. R. A. 642; Healey V. Bartlett, 73 N. H. 110, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 413. 5. 1 Jarman, Wills, 89; Orn- dorff V. Hummer, 12 B. Men. (Ky.) 619; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 81 Va. 405. But if testator is blind, he may take cognizance through his other senses of the signing by a witness. Riggs v. Rlggs, 135 Mass. 238, 46 Am. Rep. 464; In re Allred's Will, 170 N. C. 153, 86 S. E. 1047; Ray v. Hill, 3 Strobh. (S. C.) 297. 6. Right V. Price, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 241; Chappel v. Trent, 90 Va. 849, 19 S. E. 314. 7. In re Howard, 51 B. Mon. (Ky.) 199, 17 Am. Dec. 40; Watson V. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Stewart v. Stewart, 56 N. J. Eq. 761, 57 N. J. Eq. 664; Neil V. Neil, 1 Leigh. (Va.) 6; Bald- win V. Baldwin, 81 Va. 405. 8. Calkins v. Calkins, 216 111. 458, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 393 and note, 108 Am. St. Rep. 233; Men- dell V. Dunbar, 169 Mass. 74 61 Am. St. Rep. 277; Den v. Milton, 12 N. J. L. 70; Ragland V. Huntingdon, 23 N. Car. 561; Pawtucket v. Ballou, 15 R. I. 58, 2 Am. St. Rep. 868. But see contra, Cook v. Winchester, 81 Mich. 581, 8 L. R. A. 822 and note; Sturdivant v. Birchett, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 67, 11 Gratt. 220. 1828 Eeal Property. [§ 471 be a request.*^ But the request need not be in express terms, ^'^ and it appears to be sufficient that the circum- stances are such as to show that, in attesting the will, the witnesses are acting in accordance with the testa- tor's wish at the time,^^ as when the request is made by a third person in the testator's presence and the latter 's conduct indicates an acquiescence in such re- quest.^- There is evidently no such assent on the part of testator if he is not in a condition to know what is being done.^^ An '^attestation clause," which consists of a recital, signed by the witnesses, of a compliance with the necessary requirements in execution of the will, should always be appended to the will, since it furnishes prima facie evidence of its due execution, and may serve to refresh the memory of the witnesses as to the circumstances of the execution. Such a clause is not however, necessary to the validity of the will, the stat- utes merely requiring the witnesses to sign their names upon the document, or, in some states, upon the docu- ment at the end or foot of the will itself. ^^ 9. Gross V. Burneston, 91 Md. Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 383, 46 Atl. 993; Burney v. Al- S. E. 668. len, 125 N. C. 314, 74 Am. St. 12. HufE v. Huff, 41 Ga. 696; Rep. 637; Savage v. Bowen, 103 Harp v. Parr, 168 HI. 459, 48 Va. 540, 49 S. E. 668; Skinner N. E. 113; Conway v. Vizzard, v. American Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 122 Ind. 266, 23 N. E. 771; Iii re 209, 65 N. W. 1037. HuU's WiU, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 10. Rogers v. Diamond, 13 N. W. 979; Martin v. Bowdern, Ark. 474; Schierbaum v. Schem- 158 Mo. 379, 59 S. W. 227; me, 157 AIo. 1, 80 Am. St. Rep. Matter of Nelson, 141 N. Y. 152, 604; Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 9, 36 N. E. 3; Burney v. Allen, 125 80 Am. Dec. 235; Savage v. N. Car. 314, 74 Am. St. Rep. 637, Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 S. E. G68; 34 S. E. 500; In re Skinner, 40 Skinner v. American Bible Soc. Ore. 571. 63 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037. 951. 11. In re MuUin's Estate, 110 13. McMechen v. McMechen, 17 Gal. 252, 42 Pac. 645; Higgins v. W. Va. 683, 41 Am. Rep. 682. Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 92 Am. Dec. 14. 1 Jarman, WiUs, (Bige- 666; Gross v. Burneston, 91 Md. low's Ed.), 123; Schouler, Wills, 383, 46 Atl. 993; In re Voorhis, § 346. 125 N. Y. 765, 26 N. E. 935; <§§ 472, 473] Transfer BY Will. 1829 § 472. HologTaphic and nuncupative wills. By statute in a number of states, "holographic" wills, that is, wills entirely written by testator himself, are valid, • though not executed in accordance with the ordinary statutory requirements, if signed by him, and if, in two states at least, found among the valuable papers and effects of deceased, or entrusted by him to another for safe keeping.^^ "Noncui)ative" wills, that is, wills consisting of merely oral declarations by testator in the presence of witnesses, were allowed before the passage of the Statute of Frauds, but by that statute the right to make them was much restricted, the amount of property which could be so disposed of being greatly limited, and it also being provided that they could be made only in the last sickness of deceased, before three witnesses, and usually in his own habitation. In this country there are usually statutory provisions of a somewhat similar character, providing especially, however, for the making of such wills by soldiers in actual military service, and by mari- ners at sea. The law of nuncupative wills never applied in England to real property, in the absence of a local custom to the contrary, since, before the Statute of Wills, such property could not be devised, and since, by the terms of that statute, as well as by the Statute of Frauds, a will of lands was required to be ' * in writing. ' ' The statutes on the subject in this country usually re- strict such wills to personal property.^® § 473. Undue influence. The question whether a certain testamentary disposition was the result of the exercise of "undue influence" upon the testator is the subject of frequent litigation. The courts have not been very successful in defining what constitutes uiulue 15. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 16. Bigelow, Wills, 03 et sci].; § 2645. See Page, Wills, §§ 229- Page, Wills, §§ 232-240; 1 Stim- 231; Schouler, Wilts (5th Ed.), son's Am. St. Law, §§ 2700-2705; §"255. Schouler, Wills, § 359, et scq. 1830 Real Peopebty. [§ 473 influence sufificient to defeat a testamentary provision, but it is stated, in a general way, that it must be such persuasion or importunity as to overpower the will of the testator, without convincing his judgment,^'^ that is, it involves a substitution of another person's will for that of testator.^^ But the mere fact that one per- suades the testator to make a will in his favor, or in- duces him to do so by argument or flattery, does not, of itself, show undue influence, ^^ and so ''appeals to the affections or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of gratitude for past services, or pity for future destitution, or the like," are legitimate, and do not affect the validity of the will.20 The question of undue influence is entirely distinct from that of the mental capacity of the testator to make a will, which will hereafter be considered i^i but the fact that, though mentally capable of making a will, he is wanting in physical and mental vigor, is usually an 17. Hall V. Hall, L. R. 1 Prob. & Dlv. 481; Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala. 641, 24 So. 459; In re Clark's Estate, (Cal.), 149 Pac. 828; Wiley v. Gordan, 181 Ind. 252, 104 N. B. 500; Kennedy v. Kennedy. 124 Md. 38, 91 Ail. 759; Gay v. GiUilan, 92 Mo. 250, 1 Am. St. Rep. 712; In re Tuni- son's Will, (N. J.), 93 Atl. 1087; In re Diggins' Estate, 76 Ore. 341, 149 Pac. 73; Herster v. Her- ster 122 Pa. 239, 9 Am. St. Rep. 95; Scott V. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S. W. 1138. 18. Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 Prob. Div. 81; Phillips v. Gaither, 191 Ala. 87, 67 So. 1001; May- nard v, Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, 60 Am. Rep. 276; Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451, 50 N. W. 598; Riley v. Sherwood, 144 Mo. 354, 45 S. W. 1077; Wadding- ton V. Buzby, 45 N. J. Eq. 173, 14 Am. St. Rep. 706; In re Mueller's Will, 170 N. C. 28, 83 S. E. 719; Cook v. Bolduc, 24 Wyo. 281, 157 Pac. 580, 158 Pac. 266. 19. 1 Woerner, Administration, § 31; McDaniel, v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533; Yoe v. McCord, 74 111. S3; Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393, 12 S. W. 762; In re Mclntyre's Estate, 193 Mich. 257, 159 N. W. 517; Hughes v. Murtha, 32 N. J. Eq. 288; Trost v. Dingier, 118 Pa. St. 259, 4 Am. St. Rep. 593. 20. HaU V. Hall, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 481; Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 111. 625, 38 N. E. 1056; Gay V. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 1 Am. St. Rep. 712; In re Mondorf's Will, 110 N. Y. 450, 18 N. E. 256; In re Craven's Will, 169 N. C. 561, 86 S. E. 587. 21. See post, § 595. § 474] Transfer by Will. 1831 important consideration in determining the question of undue influence.-^ The fact that a beneficiary under the will sustains a confidential relation towards testator, such as that of attorney or guardian, does not of itself, according to some authorities, raise a presumption of undue in- fluence sufficient to overthrow the will, though, under such circumstances, much slighter evidence of improper acts on the part of the beneficiary will be required than ordinarily.^^ By some decisions, however, the mere existence of the confidential relation raises a presump- tion that the will is invalid.^^ That a beneficiary who is not a near relative himself prejDared the instrument is usually regarded as tending to show undue influence.-^ § 474. Lapsed and void devises. As a consequence of the "ambulatory" nature of a will, which prevents its 22. Griffith v, DifEenderffer, 50 Md. 466; Sullivan v. Foley, 112 Mich. 1, 70 N. W. 322; Shailer V. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112; Wad- dington v. Buzby, 45 N. J. Eq. 173, 14 Am. St. Rep. 706, 16 AtL 690; Turner v. Butler, 253 Mo. 202, 161 S. W. 765. 23. Parfiitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 462; Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279, 24 Am. St. Rep. 904, 8 So. 286; Lockridge v. Brown, 184 Ala. 106, 63 So. 524; Carter v. Dixon, 69 Ga. 82; Pil- strand v. Swedish Methodist Church, 275 111. 46, 113 N. E. 958; Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa, 425, 59 N. W. 69; In re Smith's Will, 95 N. Y. 516; Bigelow, Wills, 89. 24. Connor v. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556, 1 Am. St. Rep. 84; Kirby's Appeal, 91 Conn. 40, 98 Atl. 349; Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, Wendling v. Bowden, 252 Mo. 647, 161 S. W. 774; Carroll V. Hause, 48 N. J. . Eq. 269, 27 Am. St. Rep. 469; Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 572, 41 Atl. 277; Hartman v. Strickler, 82 Va. 225; 1 Woerner, Administration, § 32. 25. Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curt. Ecc. 637; Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala. 641, 24 So. 459; Richmond's Appeal, 59 Conn. 226, 21 Am. St. Rep. 85; Bush v. Delano, 113 Mich. 321. 71 N. W. 628; Yardley V. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. St. ;?95, 56 Am. Rep. 218; In re Barney's Will, 70 Vt. 352, 40 Atl. 1027; Montague v. Allan's Ex'r, 78 Va. 592, 49 Am. Rep. 384; Bigelow, Wills 87, 89, 26. 1 Jarman, Wills, 307; 2 Woerner, Administration, § 434. 27. Page, Wills, § 740; Merrill V. Hayden, 80 Me. 133, 29 Atl. 949; Crum v. Blis.s, 47 Conn.. 592. 1832 Real Property. [§ 474 operation until the death of the testator, the death of a devisee or legatee during the testator's lifetime will, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, render the gift absolutely void.^^ And so a devise or legacy to a cor- poration may lapse or become void by the dissolution of the corporation before testator's death.^" The testator may, however, make a substitutionary gift of that partic- ular property in case the other gift fails, owing to the death of the beneficiary or for other reasons, and this will be carried out by the courts.-* The fact that the gift is in terms to one "and his heirs" does not, of it- self, show any intention to make a substitutionary gift to the heirs, since this is a word merely of limitation, and not of purchase.-^ In some cases, however, the use of the words "and heirs" has been construed as con- stituting a substitutional gift to the heirs,^° and this is the effect usually given to a provision for one "or his heirs. "^^ In most of the states there is at the present day a statutory provision naming a class of persons who may take in case of the death of the beneficiary during the lifetime of the testator. In many states it is pro- vided that a devise or bequest to a child or other des- cendant of the testator shall, in case of the death of the devisee or legatee before the testator, pass to the issue or occasionally the heirs of such devisee or lega- 28. 1 Jarman, Wills, 308; Mass. 382; Hand v. Marcy, 28 Page, Wills, § 741; Wilde v. Bell, N. J. Eq. 59. 86 Conn. 610, 87 Atl. 8; Gilmor's 30. Gilmor's Estate, 154 Pa. Estate, 154 Pa. St. 523, 35 Am. St. St. 523, 35 Am. St. Rep. 855, 26 Rep. 855, 26 Atl. 614; Rivers v. Atl. 614; Gittings v. McDermott, Rivers, 36 S. C. 302, 15 S. E. 2 Mylne & K. 69, 73; 2 Woerner, 137. See ante, § 26. Administration, § 434. 29. Gibbons v. Ward, 115 Ark. 31. 2 Woerner, Administra- 184, 171 S. W. 90; Maxwell v. tion, §§ 417, 434; Hand v. Marcy, Featherston, 83 Ind. 339; In re 28 N. J. Eq. 59; O'Rourke v. Wells, 113 N. Y. 396, 10 Am. St. Beard, 151 Mass. 9, 23 N. E. Rep. 137; Kimball v. Story, 108 576. See Keniston v. Adams, 80 Me. 290, 14 Atl. 203. § 474] Transfer by Will. 1833 tee.^- In some, the same provision is made in favor of the issue of any devisee or legatee who is a relation of the testator, while, in others, the issue of any devisee or legatee dying before the testator takes the gift, unless a contrary intention appears.^^ In the case of a devise of land to two or more in- dividuals, to take as tenants in common and not as joint tenants,^* if one of them dies before testator, the devise will, at common law, lapse as to his share, in the absence of controlling language to the contrary, while the other donee or donees will take the same interest as if such death had not occurred.^^^ On the other hand, in the case of a devise to members of a class, such as children or nephews, if one who would other- wise be a member of the class dies before the testator, his share does not lapse, even at common law, but the property is divided between the members of the class, as ascertained at the time of testator's death, or at such later date as may be indicated in the will.^*^ And even 32. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 36. In re Warner's Appeal, 39 § 2823(A). Conn. 253; Lancaster v. Lan- 33. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, caster, 187 lU. 540, 79 Am. St. § 2823(B), (C). See Page, Wills, Rep. 234, 58 N. E. 462; In re §§ 742, 743; 2 Woerner, Admin- Nicholson's Will, 115 Iowa, 493, istration, § 435. 91 Am. St. Rep. 175, 88 N. W. 34. If the gift is to them as 1064; Stetson v. Eastman, 84 joint tenants, those of them who Me. 366, 24 Atl. 868; Shots v. survive the testator will take Poe, 47 Md. 513, 28 Am. Rep. all. See ante, § 191. 485; Dove v. Johnson 141 Mass. 35. Bill V. Payne, 62 Conn. 287, 5 N. E. 520; In re Wood- 140, 25 Atl. 354; Magnuson v. ward's Estate, 84 Minn. 161, Magnuson, 197 111. 496; Morse v. 86 N. W. 1004; Carter v. Long, Hayden, 82 Me. 227, 19 Atl. 443; 181 Mo. 701, 81 S. W. 162; Camp- Best V. Berry, 189 Mass. 510, bell v. Clark, 64 N. H. 328, 10 109 Am. St. Rep. 651; Moffett v. Atl. 702; Campbell v. Rawdon, Elmendorff, 152 N. Y. 475. 57 Am. 18 N. Y. 412; Pimel v. Betjemann, St. Rep. 529, 46 N. E. 845; 183 N. Y. 194, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) Twitty V. Martin, 90 N. C. 643; 580, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 289; Strong V. Ready, 9 Humphr. Robinson v. McDIarmId, 87 N. (Tenn.) 168; In re Sharpless' C. 643. Estate, 214 Pa. 335, 63 Atl. 884. 1834r Keal. Property. [§ 474 tliough tlie class is to be ascertained as of a date prior to testator's death, if a member of the class, as- certained as of that date, subsequently dies before the testator, his share, it seems, does not lapse, but the survivors take the whole.^'^ In the case of such a gift to a class, the survivors take the whole, by reason of a construction of the language used in the will as indicating an intention that the beneficiaries of the devise shall be those members of the class who survive the testator, and it is accordingly somewhat difficult to see the applicability to such a case of a statute intended to prevent lapse. It has accordingly been decided, in several states, that the statutory provisions above re- ferred to, enabling the issue of a deceased devisee or legatee to take in the latter 's place, do not apply to a devise or legacy to a class,^^ but in a greater number these statutes have been held to apply to such a case, in the absence of a showing of a diiferent intention, with the result that the share which w^ould have gone to the deceased member of the class passes to his issue."'^ These decisions appear ordinarily to be based on a presumption that the testator, in drafting the will, had in mind the statute in question and intended by the naming of a class, to include issue of a deceased mem- ber thereof. It is also to be observed that in the states in which this view has been adopted, the statute ordi- 37. See 1 Jarman, Wills 312. 415, 29 N. E. 631; Strong v. 38. Davie v. Wynn, 80 Ga. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N. W. 673, 6 S. E. 183; Craycroft v. 183; Jamison's Executors v. Hay, Craycroft, 6 Harr. & J. (Md.) 54; 46 Mo. 546; Wooley v. Paxson, Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit 46 Ohio St. 307; In re Bradley's Co. V. Sibbitts, 62 N. J. Eq. 131, Estate, 166 Pa. 300, 31 Atl. 96; 49 Atl. 530; Olney v. Bates, 3 Moore v. Dimond, 5 R. I. 121; Drew, 319. Missionary Society v. Pell, 14 R. 39. Rudolph V. Rudolph, 207 I. 456; Jones v. Hunt, 96 Tenn. HI. 266, 99 Am. St. Rep. 211; 369. In re Nicholson, 115 Iowa, 493, 40. Billingsley v. Tongue, 9 91 Am. St. Rep. 175; Moses v. Md. 575; Twitty v. Martin, 90 N. Allen, 81 Me. 268, 17 Atl. 66; C. 643; Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex. Moore v. Weaver, 16 Gray (Mass.) 426. 305; Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. § 474] Transfer by Will. 1835 narily does not provide that no lapse shall result by reason of the death of a devise or legatee, nor refer to the matter of lapse, but merely declares that in case of such death, the issue of the deceased devisee or legatee shall take in his place. A devise or legacy to one who is dead at the time of the execution of the will is absolutely void,^^ except in so far as the rule in this regard may have been changed by statute. Such a devise or legacy is some- times referred to as lapsing,*^ but the expression ''lapse" would seem to be more properly confined to the case of a devise or legacy which fails by reason of some occurrence subsequent to the execution of the will. Statutes which provide who shall take in case the devisee or legatee dies before the testa- tor have more usually been applied regardless of whether such death occurred before or after the execu- tion of the will,^^ though occasionally a ditferent con- struction has been adopted.*'^ In the case of a devise to a class of persons, the question is, not of the con- struction of the statute, but rather of the construction of the language of the testator as showing his intention^ and the adoption of a statute obviating the failure of a devise by reason of the death of the devisee is no reason for assuming that the testator meant to include within the class named the issue or heirs of a person who, had he been living would have been a member of the class, but who died before the execution of the will. This view 41. Baybank v. Brooks, 1 Bro. N. Y. 194, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) Ch. 84; Dildiue v. Dildine, 32 580, 5 Ann. Cas. 239; Mintner's N. J. Eq. 78. Appeal, 40 Pa. St. 11; Wildberger 42. Cheney v. Selman, 71 Ga. v. Cheek's Ex'rs, 94 Va. 517, 27 384; Chenault v. Chenault, 10 Ky. S. E. 441. L. Rep. 840, 9 S. W. 775, 88 Ky. 43. BiUingsley v. Tongue, 9 83; Nutter v. Vickery, 64 Me. Md. 575; Lindsay v. Pleasants, 39 490; Bray v. Pullen, 84 Me. 185, N. C. 320; Alniy v. Jones, 17 R. 24 Atl. 811; Guitar v. Gordon, 17 I. 265, 12 L. R. A. 414; Suber v. Mo. 408; Jamison v. Hay, 46 Nash. 84 S. C. 12, 65 S. E. 947; Mo. 546; Pimel v. Betjemann, 183 1836 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 474 has been adopted in the majority of the jurisdictions in which the question has arisen, including some in which the applicability of the statute to the case of an in- dividual donee who is dead at the time of the execution of the will is fully recognized.^^ Effect of residuary clause. One result of the theory that a devise of land was a present conveyance of the land, and of the rule that a will did not pass after- acquired land,*^^ was that a residuary devise of land, however general in its terms, was in its nature specific, as operating only on such land as the testator owned at the time of executing the will and did not devise to another person, and was equivalent to a devise of such land by name or specific description. Consequently, although a devisee of specific land in the will died before testator, causing a ''lapse" of the devise, the land could not pass under the residuary devise, but descended to the heir,^^ A ditferent view has, in one or two cases, been taken as to a devise which was originally void, as distinguished from one which lapsed, it being held that the property included therein would pass under a residuary clause, on the theory that the devise being a nullity from the beginning, the property must be re- garded as part of the residuum.*® 44. Davie V. Wynn, 80 Ga. 673, 1 Jarman, Wills 609; Johnson v. 6 S. E. 183; In sequent writing only when such writing is executed as a will.'^^ Such revocation may result either from the language of the later instrument revoking the earlier will, or the later will may make a disposition of testa- tor's property, or part thereof, inconsistent with the earlier disposition."^^ If the second will neither in terms 71. Winsor v. Pratt, 2 Brod. & words written upon another part B. 650; Wolf v. Bollinger, G2 111. of the paper, to the effect that 368; Doane v. Hadlock, 42 Me. the will is ^evoked or. "cancell- 72; Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 Miss, ed," though signed by the testa- 205; Gardner v. Gardiner, 65 N. tor, do not revoke the will, H. 230, 8 L. R. A. 383, 19 Atl. unless witnessed as required in 651; In re Penniman's Will, 20 the case of a will. Howard v. Minn. 245 (Gil. 220), 18 Am. Rep. Hunter, 115 Ga. 357, 90 Am. St. 368. Rep. 121, 41 S. E. 638; Matter of 72. Powell V. Powell, L. R. 1 Akers, 74 N. Y. App. Div. 461, Prob. & Div. 209. 77 N. Y. Supp. 643, 173 N. Y. 620, 73. Olmstead's Estate, 122 Cal. 06 N. E. HOP.; Lewis v. Lewis, 2 224, 54 Pac. 745; Mclntyre v. Watts & S. (Pa.) 455; Ladd's Mclntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 102 Am. St. Will, 60 Wis. 187; Matter of Gos- Rep. 71, 1 A. & E. Ann. Cas. ling, 11 Prob. & Div. 79. But see 606; Townsheni v. Howard, 86 Evans' Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 238; Me. 285, 29 Atl. 1077; Semmes v. Billington v. Jones, 108 Tenn. 234, Semmes, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 388; 56 L. R. A. 654, 91 Am. St. Rep. Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 751; Warner v. Warner, 37 Vt. (Mass.) 388; Banks v. Banks, 65 356. Mo. 432. 75. 1 Jarman, Wills, 139; Bige- 74. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § low, Wills. 136. 2673. So it has been held that § 475] Tkansfee by Will. 184J revokes the previous will nor is inconsistent therewith, then both are in force, the later being- in effect a codicil to the former instrument,'^« and, if the later will is only partially inconsistent with the earlier will, the latter remains in force in other respects.'^ The subsequent will may contain no provision other than that revokin.x^ the earlier will,'^ and it has the effect of revocation if it so provides, although the attempted disposition there- in of the testator's property is for some reason invalid.'^^ The contents of a lost will may be shown for the purpose of establishing the revocation of a previous will.^^ But the mere fact of the execution of a later will without evidence as to its contents, is not sufficient to show a revocation.^^ A revocation by a will or codicil of a previous dis- position of property is invalid if expressly made upon an assumption of fact which turns out to be mistaken.^^ But the fact that the revocation was the result of mis- 76. 1 Jarman, Wills, 139; In re Dunabaugh, 130 Iowa, 692, 107 • N. W. 925; Deppen's Trustee v. Deppen, 132 Ky. 755, 117 S. W. 352; Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591, 44 Atl. 393; Smith V. McChesney, 15 N. J. Eq. 359; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; In re Venable's Will, 127 N. C. 344, 37 S. E. 465; Gordon V. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723, 24 S. E. 342. 77. Freeman v. Freeman, 5 De Gex. M. & G. 704; Lemage v. Goodban, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 57; Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; In re DeLavea- ga's Estate, 119 Cal. 651; Wil- liams V. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 110 Am. St. Rep. 431, 62 L. R. A. 383, 4 A. & E. Am. Caa. 306; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; Price V. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23. 78. Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332; Bayley v. Bailey, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 245. 79. Ex parte Ilchester, 7 Ves. 348, 373; Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 45; Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83 N. W. 97, 86 N. W. 959; In re Scott, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N. W. 109: Hairston V. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276; Morey V. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507. 56 Am. Rep. 538, 3 Atl. 636; In re Mel- ville's Estate. 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679. 80. Caeman v. Van Harke, 33 Kan. 333, 6 Pac. 620; Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510. 81. Hitchins v. Basset. 2 Salk. 592; Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E. 1004; In re Sternberg's Estate, 94 Iowa, 305. 62 N. W. 734; Williams v. Miles. 68 Neb. 463. 94 N. W. 705. 96 N. W. 151; Lane v. Hill. 68 N. II. 275, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591, 1844 Real Property. [§ 475 take cannot be shown by evidence extrinsic to the will,^^ and it has been held that even a mistake apparent in the will does not defeat the revocation if it is not based on information received from others, but the matter is within the personal knowledge of testator.'^^ A revocation, moreover, which is stated to be based upon certain advice given testator, has been supported, though the advice was mistaken, since it was the advice on which testator acted, and as to his receipt of the advice there was no mistake.*'^ Marriage and birth of issue. The common law rule was that the will of a man is not revoked by his marriage alone, ^^ and this rule still controls in some states. In others the statutes changing the com- mon-law rights of a married woman as regards her in- terest in her husband's estate on his death without issue have been regarded as changing the rule, so as to give to his marriage the effect of revoking his will,^''^"** and oc- casionally there is a statutory provision expressly to that effect.89 82. CampbeU v. French, 3 Ves. bell's Ex'r, 19 Grat. (Va.) 758. 321, where the revocation of a 86. 1 Jarman, Wills, 111. provision in favor of certain per- 87-88. Brown v. Scherrer, 5 sons, "they being all dead," was Colo. App. 255, 21 Colo. 481; Mor- held to be inoperative, they being gan v. Ireland, 1 Idaho, 786; alive. See also Doe d. Evans, 10 Tyler v. Tyler, 19 111. 151; Ameri- Adol. & El. 228; Mordecai v. can Board of Com'rs for Foreign Boylan, 59 N. C. 365; and a sug- Missions v. Nelson, 72 111. 564; gestive editorial note in 22 Harv. In re Teopfer, 12 N. Mex. 372, 67 Law Rev. at p. 374. L. R. A. 315. Contra, Goodsell's 83. Dunham v. Averill, 45 Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Atl. 557; Conn. 61, 29 Am. Rep. 642; Hayes Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 34 V. Hayes, 45 N. J. Eg. 461, 17 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419; Atl. 634; Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R. Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 56 L 99; Skipwith v. Cabell's Ex'r, Am. Rep. 530, 3 Atl. 604. 19 Gratt. (Va.) 758. 89. See In re Anderson's Es- 84. Mendinhall's Appeal, 124 tate, 14 Ariz. 502, 131 Pac. 975; Pa. St. 387, 10 Am. St. Rep. 590. In re Cutting's Estate, 172 Cal. 85. Attorney General v. Lloyd, 191, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1171, 155 1 Ves. Sr. 32; Newton v. Newton, Pac. 1002; In re Roton's Will, 95 12 Ir. Ch. 118; Skipwith v. Ca- S. C. 118, 78 S. E. 711; Koontz v. § 475] Tkansfee by Will. 1845 At coniinoii law, the marriage of a woman revokes her will, for the reason, it is said, that, since the mar- riage destroys her right to make or revoke a will, if marriage did not in itself cause a revocation, the will would stand as a permanent disposition of her prop- gP^y 90 rpj^-g ^.^^|g -g ^ positive rule of law, and evidence is not admissible to show a contrary intention on the part of testatrix.*^ ^ In several states it has been held that this rule does not apply when the common-law re- striction upon the right of a married woman to make a will no longer exists.^^ An express statutory provision in accordance with the common-law rule has, however, been held not to be impliedly repealed by a statute giv- ing testamentary capacity to married women f^ and the common-law rule has been regarded as confirmed by a provision, in the statute regarding the revocation of wills, that nothing therein contained shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator.^* By the common-law rule, generally recognized as in force in this country, in the absence of a statutory change, the marriage of a man, if followed by the birth of a child, revokes his will previously made/'^ This rule Koontz, 83 Wash. 180, 145 Pac. 173, 54 Am. Rep. 329; Kelly v. 201. Stevenson, 85 Minn. 247, 56 L. R. 90. 1 .Tarman, Wills, 110; A. 754, 89 Am. St. Rep. 545: Hodsden v. Lloyd, 2 Brown Ch. Fellows v. Allen, 60 N. H. 439, 49 534; Garrett v. Dabney, 27 Miss. Am. Rep. 329; Webb v. Jones, 335. So by statute in a number 36 N. J. Eq. 163; Morton v. Onion, of states. 1 Stimson's Am. St. 45 Vt. 145; In re Lyons, 96 Wis. Law, § 2676(A). 339, 65 Am. St. Rep. 52; Contra. 91. Nutt V. Norton, 142 Mass. Swan v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 45. 242, 7 N. E. 720; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 93. Brown v. Clark. 77 N. Y. 63 N. H. 475, 56 Am. Rep. 530, 3 369; In re Kaufman's Will, 131 Atl. 604. N. Y. 620. 92. In ire Tuller's Will, 79 111. 94. Shorten v. .ludd, 60 Kan. 99, 22 Am. Rep. 164; In re Emery, 73, 57 Pac. 938; Swan v. Ham- 81 Me. 275, 17 Atl. 68; Roane v. mond, 138 Mass. 45; In re Booth's Hollingshead, 76 Md. ;!69, 35 Am. Will, 40 Ore. 154, 61 Pac. Ii;t5. 66 St. Rep. 438, 17 L. R. A. 592; Pac. 710. Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich. 95. 1 Jarman, Wills, 110; 1846 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 475 is based, it is said, upon a tacit condition, annexed to the will, that, in case of snch a total change in testator's circumstances, the will shall be void,''''' and consequently evidence of a contrary intention on the part of the testa- tor is, by the weightiest decisions, not admissible.'*'^ The rule that marriage and birth of issue revokes the will does not, however, apply if the future wife and the issue of the marriage are provided for by the will,''^ and occasionally, by statute, a provision for the issue alone is sufficient to prevent its application.'*'' The birth of a child does not, apart from statute, affect a man's previous disposition of his property by will.i There are in most of the s rates express statutory provisions as to the effect of marriage or birth of issue in revoking a will. In some states a will is revoked by marriage and birth of issue, unless provision for such issue is made in the w^ill or by settlement, or they are in such way mentioned in the will as to show an intention not to provide for them. In several states the marriage alone of the testator revokes the will, subject, in some Christopher v. Christopher, 2 v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 56 Am. Dickens, 445. Rep. 530, 3 Atl. 604. Contra, In New Hampshire it lias been Wheeler v. Wheeler, 1 R. I. 364. held that the marriage and birth 98. Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 of Issue no longer effect a revo- East, 530; Marston v. Roe, 8 cation, in view of the statute Adol. & E. 14; Warner v. Beach, which gives to a widow and child 4 Gray (Mass.) 162; Baldwin v. not provided for in the will the Spriggs, 65 Md. 373, 5 Atl. 295. same share as if decedent had 99. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, died intestate. Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 § 2G76(C). N. H. 498. 1. Doe d. White v. Barford, 4 96. Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 East, Maule & S. 10; GoodseU's Appeal 530; Baldwin v. Spriggs, 65 Md. from Probate, 55 Conn. 171, 373, 5 Atl. 295. 10 Atl. 557; Swan v. Hammond, 97. Marston v. Roe, 8 Adol. & 138 Mass. 45; Brush v. Wilkins, E. 14; Chicago, B & Q. R. Co. v. 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 506. Con- Wasserman (C. C.) 22 Fed. 872; tra, McCullum v. McKenzie, 26 Baldwin v. Spriggs, 65 Md. 37."^, Iowa, 510; Negus v. N°~us 46 5 Atl. 295. See Nutt v. Norton, lowa, 487, 26 Am. Rep. 157. 142 Mass. 242, 7 N. E. 720; Hoitt § 475] Transfer by Will. 1847 states, to tlie condition that lie leaves a widow for whom he does not provide by marriage settlement or in the will, or does not so mention her in the will as to show an intention not to provide for her. And in some states a will made before the birth of issue, which makes no mention of possible issue, is in etfect revoked if the testator leaves a cliild.^ Aliengtion of land. The conveyance by the testator of land, which would otherwise pass under a will previously made, necessarily withdraws such land from the operation of the will.^ When there is merely a contract to convey, the vendor is, as before stated,^ a trustee for the purchaser, and the legal title alone passes under his previous devise of the land, the right to the purchase money passing, in the absence of stat- ute, to the personal representative."^ In some states, however, the statute provides that, on the death of the vendor of land, the unpaid purchase money shall pass under the devise of the land, in place, as it were, of the land.^ So far as the common-law rule that the will operates only on land owned by testator at the time of its execu- tion may still remain in force in any jurisdiction, the reconveyance to testator of land conveyed by him after the making of the will cannot render the will operative as to such land.'^ And, apart from any change in the law brought about by the modern statutes, a conveyance by the testator after the making of his will, otherwise 2. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § Atl. 295, 296; Skinner v. New- 2676; 1 Woerner, Administration, berry, 51 111. 203; Bruck v. Tuck- § 55. See Shackelford v. Wash- er, .32 Cal. 426. See ante, § 127. burn, 180 Ala. 168, 60 So. 318, 6. 1 Woerner, Administration. 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195. § 53. 3. 1 Jarman, Wills, 129. 7. 1 Jarman, Wills (4th Ed.) 4. Ante, § 125. 147; Philippe v. Clevenger, 239 5. 1 Jarman, WiUs, 129, Wal- 111. 117, 16 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 207, ton V. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. 87 N. E. 858; Morey v. Sohler, Y.) 258 11 Am. Dec. 456; Bender 63 N. H. 507, 56 Am. Rep. V. Luckenbach 1G2 Pa. St. 18, 29 538. 1848 Eeai. Property. [§ 475 than by waj^ of mortgage, ^ if it transfers the legal or equitable title in fee simple, is effective as a revocation, even though, by the same instrument, the title is im- mediately revested in him.^ Under the statutory rule which now prevails in England, and in most, if not all, of the states, that the will operates on such land as the testator has at the time of his death, a conversance by testator after making his will cannot prevent the opera- tion of the will upon the land conveyed, if it is recon- veyed or title is in any way revested in the testator before his death ; and in many jurisdictions there is an express provision that a conveyance shall not prevent the operation of the will with respect to such an estate as testator has at the time of his death, unless, in some states, the intention to revoke is expressed in the con- veyance.^" A conveyance by a testator was held in England, as the law formerly stood, to effect a revocation of a de- vise of the land conveyed, although the conveyance was void, either for want of capacity in the grantee, or for want of the proper formalities, on the theory, it seems that such an attempted conveyance shows an intention that the devise shall never be operative. ^^ This rule is no longer in force in England, for the reason, it is said, that, as a valid conveyance no longer effects a revocation if the title becomes revested in testator, one which is invalid can have no greater effect.^^ In this country there seems to be no explicit decision that an 8. Jackson v. Parker, Ambl. 2 Whart. (Pa.) 103; See Ballard 687; Baxter v. Dyer, 5 Ves. Jr. v. Carter, 5 Pick." (Mass.) 112, 16 656; McTaggart v. Thompson, 14 Am. Dec. 377. Pa. St. 149. This is by reason 10. Wills Act, 7 Wm. IV. and of the fact that a mortgage is in 1 Vict. c. 26, § 23; 1 Stimson's equity merely a security or lien. Am. St. Law, § 2810. 9. Cave v. Holford, 3 Ves. 650; 11. 1 Jarman, Wills (4th Ed.) Brydges v. Chandos, 2 Ves. Jr. 165; Mountague v. Jecifereys 417; Krieg v. McComas, 126 Md. Moore, 429; Hick v. Mors, Amb. 377, 95 Atl. 68; Walton v. Walton, 215; Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 258, 11 Ch. (N. Y.) 258, 11 Am. Dec. 456. Am. Dec. 456; Jones v. Hartley, 12. 1 Jarman, Wills, 133. §§ 476, 477] Transfer by Will. 1849 invalid conveyance could in an}' case effect a revocation, but there are dicta to such an effect.^-^ And on such theory, or one analogous thereto, a revocation has been regarded as effected by a conveyance delivered on a condition which was never satisfied.^* A conveyance which is voidable because procured by fraud has in two states been decided not to cause a revocation.^ ^' § 476. Children or issue omitted from will. In most states there is a statutory provision that, if a child living at the testator's death, or who has died prior to such death leaving issue, was born after the execution of the will, such child or issue shall take the share to which he or they would have been entitled if testator had died intestate. In a number of the states, such a provision applies only in case the child or issue were not provided for otherwise by testator, or were not intentionally omitted.^*' In a number of states, statutes of this character, entitling an omitted child to the share which he would have had if deceased had died intestate, are not restricted in their ap})lication to children born after the execution of the will, but ap]ily in the case of any child, usuall}- whether that child was omitted intentionally or unintentionally.^'^ § 477. Revival of will. In the case of a will which is revoked by an express statement to that effect in a subsequent will, or by inconsistent provisions therein, the question has frequently arisen as to tlie etfcct of a 13. Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. W. 697; Smithwick v. Jordan, 15 Ch. (N. Y.) 258; Graham v. Mass. 113. Contra in England Burch, 47 Minn. 171, 28 Am. St. Simpson v. Walker, 5 Sim. 1. See Rep. 339, 49 N. W. 697; Bigelow, Redfield, Wills (4th Ed.) 344. Wills, 134. But see Bennett v. 10. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Gaddis, 79 Ind. 347. § 2843. 14. In re Gensemore's Estate, 17. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 246 Pa. 216, 92 Atl. 134. 2842. See Page, Wills, § 291; 1 15. Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn. Woeruer, Administration, § 55. 171, 28 Am. St. Rep. 339, 49 N. 1850 Eeal Property. [§ 477 subsequent revocation of the revoking will. In England it was held by the couunon-law courts that the effect was to ''revive" or put in force again the pro^^sions of the earlier will, if this had not been destroyed, on the theory that, as the second will had no operation until testator's death, if it was revoked it could not operate as a revocation of the earlier will.^^ The ecclesiastical courts, however, held that the question of revival was one of intention purely, to be decided according to the fact and circumstances of the particular case.^^ This question is there set at rest by the Wills Act,^" which provides ''that no will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof, or by a codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, and showing an intention to revive the same," it being held thereunder that the cancellation or destruction of the revoking will cannot revive the previous will.^^ In this country the view of the English ecclesiasti- cal courts, that the question of revival is one purely of intention, has occasionally been adopted,^- with the burden, it seems, of showing revival upon the party asserting it.-' In some jurisdictions, on the other hand, the view^ is taken that the revocation of the sub- sequent will ipso facto revives the earlier one,^^ pro- is. Goodright v. Glazier, 4 431, 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 306 Burrows, 2512, 4 Gray's Cas. 434; and note, 96 N. W. 151; Lane v. 1 Jarman, Wills (4th Ed.) 136. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 73 Am. St. 19. Moore v. Moore, 1 Phillim. Rep. 591; McClure v. McClure, 86 357; Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Tenn. 173, 6 S. W. 44; In re Addams, 116. Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. 20. 7 Wm. IV. and Vict. C. 1082; See Bohannon v. Walcot, 1 26, § 22. How. (Miss.) .-566; Randall v. 21. 1 Jarman, Wills 126; 1 Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643. Williams, Executors (9tli Ed.) 23. Pickens v. Davis, 134 16:5. Mass. 252; Lane v. Hill, 68 N. 22. Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 H. 275, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591. See Iowa, 344, 133 N. W. 901; Pick- editorial note, 15 Harv. Law Rev. ens V. Davis, 134 Mass. 252; 142. Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 24. Stetson v. Stetson, 200 111. 62 L. R. A. 383, 110 Am. St. Rep. GOl, 61 L. R. A. 258, 66 N. E. § 478] Transfer by Will. 1851 vided, accordingly to some courts, there was uo express revocation of the first will, but merely an inconsistency between the first and second wills, on the theory that while an express revocation operates inmiediately, a revocation by an inconsistent provision is ambulatory until death.-^ In a few states the rule of the English statute has been adopted in the absence of local legislation on the subject.-'' There are, in many states, statutory provisions on this subject, it being sometimes provided, as in England, that a will once revoked can be revived only by a re- execution thereof, or by a codicil duly executed, while in others the canceling, destruction, or revocation of the second will does not revive the first will, unless such intent appears in the terms of the revocation, or the first will is duly republished.-*^* § 478. Republication. A will may be republished so as to give the words of the will the same effect as if the will had been originally executed at the time of such republication, that is, so as to make it "speak" as of that time.-' Under the law as it formerly existed 262; Moore v. Rowlett, 269 HL 315; Danley v. Jeftersou, 150 88, 109 N. E. 682; Flintham v. Mich. 590, 121 Am. St. Rep. 640, Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82; Bates v. 13 Ann. Cas. 242, 114 N. W. Hacking, 29 R. I. 1, 14 L. R. A. 470; In re Noon's Will, 115 Wis. (N. S.) 937, 68 Atl. 622; Taylor 299, 95 Am. St. Rep. 944, 91 N. V. Taylor, 2 Nott & McC (S. C.) W. 670. See editorial note, 12 482. Columbia Law Rev. 353. 25. James v. Marvin. 3 Conn. 26a. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 576; Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. §§ 2678, 2679. 357; Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, The destruction of a codicil re- 7 N. W. 799; Cheever v. North, viving a former revoked will has 106 Mich. 390, 37 L. R. A. 561, been decided not to have the 58 Am. St. Rep. 499, 64 N. W. effect of rendering the revival in- 455. See Peck's Appeal from Pro- operative, if there was no inten- bate, 50 Conn. 562; Fitzpatrick's tion that it should have that Appeal, 87 Conn. 579. 89 Atl. 92; effect. James v. Shrimpton. 1 Hawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481, Prob. Div. 431. 2 L. R. A. 863, 10 S. W. 558. 27. 1 Jarman, Wills, 159; Wil- 26. Harvell v. Lively, 30 Ga. liams. Executors (9th Ed.) 170. 1852 Keal Property. [§ 478 in England, restricting the operation of a devise of lands to such lands as were owned by the testator at the time of execution of the will, and in those states in this country where the same rule still prevails, the effect of a republication is important, as it brings lands ac- quired between the date of execution and of republi- cation within the operation of a general devise.^* But since the general change of the law in this respect, the doctrine of republication has lost much of its importance and it calls for consideration now chiefly in connection with the possibility of giving effect to a will orginally invalid,^^ or w^hich has been revoked,^" but not de- stroyed. The republication may consist of a re-execution of the instrument with the same formalities as are neces- sary in the case of an absolutely new will. Accordingly, while, previous to the Statute of Frauds, it might be by means of an oral declaration even in the case of land,^^ since that time the same formalities have been required in the republication, as in the making, of a will of land.^^ The making and execution of a codicil to a will has likewise the effect, in the absence of any ap- pearance of a contrary intention, of a republication of the will, and it is immaterial whether the codicil 28. Beckford v. Parnecott Cro. Atl. 426; Skinner v. American Eliz. 493; Barnes v. Crow, "4 Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 209, .65 N. W. Brown Ch. 2; Luce v. Dimock. 1 1037. Root (Conn.) 82; Jack v. Shoen- 30. In re Cutting's Estate, 172 berger, 22 Pa. St. 416. Cal. 191, 155 Pac, 1002, Ann. 29. Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. Cas. 1917D, 1171; Brown v. 568; Brown v. Riggin, 94 111. 560, Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; Burge v. Manship v. Stewart, 181 Ind. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568; Wickoff's 299, 104 N. E. 505; Barnes v. Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 281, 53 Am. Phillips, 184 Ind. 415, 111 N. E. Dec. 597. 419; Beall v. Cunningham, 3 B. 31. Beckford v. Parnecott, Cro. Mon. (Ky.) 390, 39 Am. Dec. 120; Eliz. 493. McCurdy v. Neall, 42 N. J. Eq. 32. Jackson v. Potter, 9 Johns. 333, 7 Atl. 566; Smith v. Runkle, (N. Y.) 312; Love v. Johnston, — (N. J.)— 97 Atl. 296; Stevens v. 34 N. C. 355, 1 Woerner, Admin- Myers, 62 Ore. 372, 121 Pac. 434; istration § 56. Walton's Estate. 194 Pa. 528, 45 § 478] Transfer by "Will. 1853 expressly so provides, or whether it is actually annexed to the will.''^ In the absence of an expression of a contrary intention, the republication of a will, whether by re-execution, or by the making of a codicil, is of the will as changed by any pre-existing codicils, they being in effect a part of the will.^* The mere fact that the will is referred to by its original date does not take the case out of the rule.^^ 33. 1 Williams, Executors (9tli Ed.) 164; Barnes v. Crow, 4 Brown Ch. 2; Freeman v. Hart, 61 Colo. 455, 158 Pac. 305; Pope V. Pope, 95 Ga. 87, 22 S. E. 245; Hobart x. Hobart, 154 111. 610, 45 Am. St. Rep. 151; Manship v. Stewart, 181 Ind. 299, 104 N. W. 505; In re Murfield's Will, 74 Iowa, 479; Brimmer v. Sohier, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 118; McCurdy v. Neall, 42 N. J, Eq. 333, 7 Atl. 566; Van Alstyne v. Van Alstyne, 28 N. Y. 375; Stevens v. Myers, 62 Ore. 372, 121 Pac. 434; Lin- nard's Appeal, 93 Pa. 313, 39 Am. Rep. 753; Skinner v. American Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037. 34. 1 Williams, Executors (9th Ed.) 171; Crosbie v. MacDoual, 4 A''es. 610. 35. Green v. Tribe, 9 Ch. Div. 231. 2 R. P.— 42 CHAPTER XXI. DEDICATION. § 479. Purposes for which dedication may be made. 480. No particular beneficiary or baneficiaries. 481. Who may effect dedication. 482. Intention to dedicate. 483.. Acceptance. 484. Dedication distinguished from estoppel. 485. Qualified and conditional dedication. 486. Effect of dedication. § 479. Purposes for which dedication may be made. Land may be "dedicated" to a public use by means of a declaration by its owner, either by word or act, of his intention that the land shall be devoted to such use.^ The doctrine of dedication appears in its in- ception to have been confined to the case of a dedica- tion of land, or of a bridge erected thereon, to high- way uses,^'' but the scope of the doctrine has been very greatly extended. It has, for instance, been decided that land may be dedicated for use by the public as a park, common or public square,^ as a wharf or landing 1. Angell. Highways. § 1H2 2 Ed. 4, 9; 8 Ed. 4, 9; 8 Hen. 7, et seq: Elliott, Roads & Streets, 5; 2 Co. Inst. 705). For it is c, 5. presumed by the law, that the la. While Lade v. Shepherd, proprietor of such land adjoin- 2 Strange, 1004 (anno 1735) ap- ing gave up to the public for pears to be the first reported passage at some former period all case in which the doctrine is the land between his enclosure specifically referred to, it is rea- and the middle of the road" sonable to suppose that it existed, (citing Doe d. v. Pearsey, 7 B. in theory at least, from a much & C. 306). See also the discus- earlier period. In Woolrych, sion and quotations Cn the opin- Ways, p. 5, appears the following ion of Collin, J., in Appleton v. language: 'It is laid down in the New York, 219 N. Y. 250, 114 N. old books, that in a highway the E. 73. king has nothing except the pas- 2. Baker v. Johnston, 6 Pet. sage for himself and his people, (U. S.) 431; San Leandro v. Le but that the freehold, and all the Breton, 72 Cal. 170, 13 Pac. 405; profits, as trees, etc., appertain to Gordon County v. Calhoun, 128 the lord of the soil (citing Y. B. Ga. 781, 58 S. E. 360; Rhodes v. (1854) § 479] Dedication. 1855 place,3 as a cemetery,-' foi- school })nrposes,^ and for the erection of public buildings." The analogy between the dedication of land for a park or common and its dedication for a liighway is reasonably close, since in both cases there results a riaht of user in each and every member of the public. The Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N. E. 942; Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283, 95 Am. Dec. 729; Northport Wesleyan Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Andrews, 104 Me. 342, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976, 71 Atl. 1027; Higgenson v. Slat- tery, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523; Trustees of M. E. Church, Hoboken v. Council of Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13, 97 Am. Dec. 696; Porter v. International Bridge Co., 200 N. Y. 234, 93 N. E. 716; Le- Clercq v. Gallipolis, 9 Ohio, 217, 28 Am. Dec. 641; Carter v. Port- land, 4 Ore. 339; Com. v. Rush, 14 Pa. St. 186; State v. Travis County, 85 Tex. 435, 21 S. W. 1029; State v. Trask, 6 Vt. 355, 27 Am. Dec. 554; Sturmer v. Ran- dolph County Court, 42 W. Va. 724, 36 L. R. A. 300, 26 S. E. 532; Thorndike v. Milwaukee Au- ditorium Co.. 143 Wis. 1, 126 N. W. 881. 3. City of Napa v. Rowland, 87 Cal. 84, 25 Pac. 247; Alton v. Illinois Transportation Co., 12 111. 38, 52 Am. Dec. 479; Village of Mankato v. Willard, 13 Minn. 13, 97 Am. Dec. 208; Child v. Chap- peU, 9 N. Y. 246; Portland & W. V. R. Co. V. Portland, 14 Ore. 188, 58 Am. Rep. 299, 12 Pac. 205; City of Pittsburg v. Epping Car- penter Co., 194 Pa. St. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Gardner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 153, 60 Am. Dec. 407. 4. Wormley v. Wormley, 207 111. 411, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481, 69 N. E. 865; Redwood Cemetery Ass'n V. Bandy, 93 Ind. 246; Hagaman v. Dittmar, 24 Kan. 42; Tracy v. Bittle, 213 Mo. 302, 112 S. W. 45; First Nat. Bank of Pawnee City v. Hazels, 63 Neb. 844, 56 L. R. A. 765, 89 N. W. 378; Stockton v. Newark, 42 N. J. Eq. 531, 9 Atl. 203; Hunter v. TruiBtees of Sandy Hill, 6 Hni (N. Y.) 407; Pott v. Pottsville, 42 Pa. 132; Mowry v. City of Provi- dence, 10 R. I. 52; Pierce v. Spafford, 53 Vt. 394; Roundtree V. Hutchinson, 57 Wash. 414, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 875, 107 Pac. 345; 5. Carpenteria School Dist. v. Heath, 56 Cal. 478; Chapman v. Floyd, 68 Ga. 455; Board of Regents for Normal School Dist. No. 3 V. Painter, 102 Mo. 464, 10 L. R. A. 493, 14 S. W. 938; Board of Education of Incorporated Vil- lage of Van Wert v. Edson, 18 Ohio St. 221; Pott v. Pottsville. 42 Pa. 132; School Dist. No. 2 of Johnson County v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 563, 27 Pac. 919. 29 Pac. 741. P. Spires v. Los Angeles, 150 Cal. 64. 87 Pac. 1026; Campbell County Court v. Newport, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 538; State v. Travis County, 85 Tex.[ 435, 21 S. W. 1029; Board Sup'r.s Frederick County v. City of Winchester, 84 Va. 467, 4 S. E. 844. 1856 Eeal Property. [§ 479 same may be said of a dedication of land, covered by- water, for use by the individual members of the public, for purposes of navigation, i)assage or recreation,"^ and of a dedication of land immediately surrounding a well or spring, to enable the public to obtain water there- from.^ Likewise, a decision that land may be dedicated to the use of the public for the purpose of keeping the view of the sea unobstructed appears to involve merely a recognition of the fact that there may, in such a case, be a use of the land by any member of the public who may chose to look at the sea over that land. But the position that land may be dedicated for school purposes, or for use by the public authorities as a cemetery, involves a very considerable departure from the original conception of dedication, since such a use is necessarily restricted to but a small part of the public. A school building into which any^ and every person shall have the right of entry, or a cemetery in which any and every person shall have the right of burial, is not readily conceivable. And likewise, when land is devoted to the purposes of the particular municipality, as, for instance, to the erection of a municipal building, the beneficiaries of the use are not the public generally, but that class of the public who reside within the municipal limits. As regards the dedication of land for a wharf or landing place, such a use of land appears to be analogous to its use for highway purposes, in so far as the former use 7. See Shaw v. Crawford, 10 v. McPherson, — Ky. — 124 S. W. Johns. 236; Compton v. Waco 272. Bridge Co., 62 Tex. 715; Gillean 9. Atty Gen. v. Vineyard Grove V. Frost, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 371, Co., 181 Mass. 507, 64 N. E. 75; 61 S. W. 345; Trenton Water See Atlantic City v. Associated Power Co. v. Donelly, 77 N. J. Realties Corp., 73 N. J. Eq. 721, L. 659, 73 Atl. 597. 17 Ann. Cas. 743, 70 Atl. 345; 8. Smith v. Cornelius, 41 W. Berrien Springs v. Ferguson, 154 Va. 59, 30 L. R. A. 747, 23 S. E. Mich. 472, 118 N. W. 262; Poole 599; McConnell v. Lexington, 12 v. Commissioners of Rehoboth, 9 Wheat, 582; Raleigh County v. Del. Ch. 192, 80 Atl. 683. Ellison, 8 W. Va. 308; Thompson <§> 479] Dedication. 1857 involves merely a right, in any member of the public, to pass to or from boats over that land, but in so far as this may involve the temporary storage or piling of goods on the land by any member of the public, to the possible exclusion of any use whatsoever of the land by the owner of the land or by other members of the public, the applicability thereto of the doctrine of dedication appears, on principle, to be open to question, and there are judicial expressions to this effect.^^ The greatest extension which the doctrine of dedi- cation has received is that involved in decisions that land may be dedicated for the use of a particular religious sect or denomination, or a particular church society, as a place for worship,^^ as a cemetery/^ or as a parsonage.^^ These decisions appear, ordinarily, to have been dictated by a desire to uphold a gift which would otherwise fail for lack of a sufficient conveyance, and they are usually sought to be justified on the theory that such a use is a public use. It is difficult to con- cede, however, that a use of land by a sect or society for religious or cemetery purposes is a public use. The doctrine of dedication has never, apparently, been applied in the case of land devoted to a merely philan- thropic use, such as an almshouse or hospital, not under the control of the public authorities,^^ and yet the pub- lic is ordinarily quite as mueli interested in such a use 10. Pearsall v. Post, 20 Wend. S.) 566, 7 L. Ed. 212; Boyce v. (N. Y.) Ill; Post V. Pearsall, 22 Kalbaugh, 47 Md. 334, 28 Am. Wend. N. Y.) 425. Rep. 464. 11. Com'rs of Wyandotte Co. v. 13. McKinney v. Griggs, 5 Presbyterian Church, 30 Kan. 620, Bush (Ky.) 401, 96 Am. Dec. 360. 1 Pac. 109; Griffey v. Briars, 7 14. In Cincinnati v. White's Bush. (Ky.) 471; Hannibal v. Lessee, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431. it is Draper, 15 Mo. 634; Cooper v. said that " it was admitted at the Sandy Hill First Presbyterian bar that dedications for charitable Church, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 222; and religious purpo.ses, and for Williams v. First Presbyterian public highways, were valid." The Society, 1 Ohio St. 478; Atkinson admission appears to have been V. Bell, 18 Tex. 474. unjustified as regards dedications 12. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. (U. for charitable purposes. 1858 Real Peopeety. [^ 480 as in the use of land for worship under the auspices of some particular church. And it has been explicitly decided that land cannot be dedicated for use for a raihvay,^-^ a use in which all classes of the community are more or less interested. The decisions that land may be dedicated for the use of a particular religious sect or society, appear to be based, directly or in- directly, upon a false analogy suggested in an early case in the federal Supreme Court,^^ between the doc- trine of dedication, and a doctrine, applied in that case, that a grant for the establishment of a church will be upheld even though at the time of the grant there is no grantee in existence." The suggestion thus made, that land may be dedicated for religious purposes, was subsequently applied by that court as validating an oral gift of land to an unincor[3orated religious body for use as a cemetery.^^ And these cases are ordinarily referred to as conclusive of the validity of a dedication for the benefit of a religious society. § 480. No particular beneficiary or beneficiaries. It is well recognized that a dedication of land does not involve any necessity of a particular grantee or bene- ficiary.^^ The purpose and effect of a common-law dedi- 15. Elyton Land Co. v. South purposes. Morgan v. Railroad & North Alabama Co., 95 Ala. 631, Co., 96 U. S. 716, 24 L. Ed. 743; 10 So. 270; Pittsburgh, C, C. & Kansas City & N. Connecting R. St. L. Ry. Co. V. Warrum, 42 Co. v. Baker, 183 Mo. 312, 82 S. Ind. App. 179, 82 N. E. 934, 84 W. 85; Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. N. E. 356 (dictum); Louisville Homan, 151 Iowa, 404, 131 N. W. etc. R. Co. V. Stephens, 96 Ky. 878. 401, 49 Am. St. Rep. 303, 28 S. W. 16. Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 14; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. U. S. 292, 3 L. Ed. 735. Whitham, 155 111. 514, 28 L. R. A. 17. See editorial note 16 Harv. 612, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 40 N. Law Rev. 128. E. 1014; Todd v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. 18. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. (U. & C. R. Co., 19 Ohio St. 514; Wat- S.) 566, 7 L. Ed. 521. son v. Chicago M & St. P. R. 19. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. Co., 46 Minn. 321, 48 N. W. 1129. 566, 7 L. Ed. 521; Doe v. Jones, But by force of statute land 11 Ala. 63; Warren v. Jackson- may be dedicated for railway vllle, 15 111. 236, 58 Am. Dec. § 480] Dedicatiox. 1859 cation is to create a riglit of user in the public, or at least in some particular class of the public, and not in some particular person or persons, natural or legal. And for this reason, not only is a particular grantee or beneficiary unnecessary, but there is, it seems, no dedication when there is a particular grantee or bene- ficiary. As there cannot be a dedication in favor of a par- ticular person, so there cannot be a dedication in favor of a limited number of persons.-" It must be in favor of the public, and not of a part of the public. Consequently an attempted dedication in favor of a municipality, or the inhabitants of a municipality, has no legal validity, unless construed as a dedication in favor of the whole public,^! and this although the numi- cipality may represent the public for tbe purpose of ac- 610; Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, 118 lU. 61, 6 N. E. 866; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170, 13 Pac. 405; State V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Bryant's Lessee v. McCandless, 7 Ohio Pt. 2, 135; Atkinson v. Bell, 18 Tex. 874; Meeker v. Puyallup, 5 Wash. 759, 32 Pac. 727. 20. Hill V. W^ng, 193 Ala. 312, 69 So. 445; Illinois Ins. Co. v. Littlefield, 67 111. 368; City of Chicago V. Borden, 190 111. 430, 60 N. E. 915; Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 52 Am. Rep. 513; Witter V. Harvey, 1 McCord L. 67, 10 Am. Dec. 650; Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah, 257, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 86, 102 Pac. 740; Talbott v. Richmond & D. R. R. Co., 31 Graft. (Va.) 685; Tupper V. Huson, 46 Wis. 646, 1 N. W. 332. 21. Poole V. Huskinson, 11 M. & W. 827; Miller v. City of Indianapolis, 123 Ind. 196, 24 N. 228; Atty Gen. v. Tarr, 148 Mass. 309, 2 L. R. A. 87, 19 N. E. 358; Trerice v. Barteau, 54 Wis. 99, 11 N. W. 244. In connection with the state- ment that it is immaterial to the validity of a dedication that there is no municipal corporation existent at the time to assume control of the land dedicated on behalf of the public, it is oc- casionally suggested that the lack in this respect is remedied by the subsequent creation of such a corporation. Riverside v. .Mac- Lain, 210 III. 308, 66 L. R. A. 288. 102 Am. St. Rep. 164, 71 N. E. 408; Buffalo L. & R. Ry. Co. v. Hoyer. 214 N. Y. 236. 108 N. E. 455; Kniss v. Duquesne Borough, 255 Pa. 417, 100 Atl. 132; Gillian v. Frost. 25 Tex. Civ. App. 371. 61 S. W. 345. This is, it is con- ceived, misleading. The dedica- tion is valid regar(U«^ss of wiietlier 1860 Real Property. [§ 481 cepting the dedication,-- and controlling the user of the land dedicated. . The case of a gift of land to a municipal corporation, effected by a written conveyance to the corporation, for a purpose involving a use of the land by or for the benefit of the inhabitants, is occasionally referred to as a dedication,^'^ but it is not properly such. In such a case the municipality is in the position of a grantee, while in the case of a dedication there is, as above stated, no grantee. And conceding that a valid dedication may be made in favor of a religious as- sociation by an oral declaration of an intention to that effect,^'* a view which, as before suggested, is difficult to harmonize with the requirement that dedication be in favor of the public and not of part of the public, the term dedication is not properly applicable when there is a valid conveyance in writing to such associa- tion or in trust therefor. In such case the title passes, not by dedication, but by grant. § 481. Who may effect dedication. No one other than the owner of land, or one acting under authority from him, can effect a dedication,^^ and an attempted such a corporation is subsequent- R. I. 56, 19 L. R. A. 262, 25 Atl. ly created. 692; Spokane v. Security Savings 22. Post, § 483. Soc, 82 Wash. 91, 143 Pac. 435. 23. Gaynor v. Bauer, 144 Ala. 24. Anie, § 479 notes 11-13. 448, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 1082, 39 So. 25. Johnson v. Dadeville, 127 749; Cordano v. Wright, 159 Cal. Ala. 244, 28 So. 700; California 610, A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1912C, Nav. & Improvement Co. v. Union 1044, 115 Pac. 227; H. A. Hillmer Transportation Co., 126 Cal. 433, Co. V. Behr, 264 111. 568, 106 N. 46 L. R. A. 825, 58 Pac. 936; E. 481; In re Wellington, 16 Shedd v. Alexander, 270 111. 117, Pick. (Mass.) 87, 26 Am. Dec. 110 N. E. 327; Edenville v. R. R. 631; Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. Co., 77 Iowa, 69, 41 N. W. 568; 846, 40 L. R. A. 402, 65 Am. St. Allen v. Meuwenberg, 108 Mich. Rep. 625, 23 So. 307; Normal 629, 66 N. W. 571; Stillman v. School Dist. No. 30 v. Painter, 102 Olean, 210 N. Y. 168, 104 N. E. Mo. 464, 10 L. R. A. 493, 14 S. 128. W. 938; Greene v. O'Connor, 18 ^ 481] Dedication. 1861 dedication by one not the owner is not valididated by his subsequent acquisition of title, unless he thereafter in some way recognizes the dedication.-*^ One having a }iartial or limited interest in land can- not be affected by a dedication in which he does not participate. For instance, an existing easement in the land,^^ or lien, by way of mortgage,-^ or otherwise,-^ is not affected by a dedication made by the owner of an estate in fee simple in the land, and a dedication by one cotenant is a nullity as regards the other cotenants.-'*^ Likewise a reversioner or remainderman cannot be af- fected by a dedication made by the particular tenant alone.^^ A municipal corporation, it has been held, may dedi- cate land owned by it to a particular public use,"- and 26. Boerner v. McKillip, 52 Kan. 508, 35 Pac. 5; Kansas City Mining Co. v. Riley, 133 Mo. 574, 34 S. W. 835; Camden v. Mc- Andrew & Forbes Co., 85 N. J. L. 260, 88 Atl. 1034; Chase v. Oregon City, 72 Ore. 527, 143 Pac. 1111; liushnell v. Scott, 21 Wis. 451, 24 Am. Dec. 555. 27. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Olyphant Borough, 224 Pa. 387, 73 Atl. 458; State v. Steamship Co., Ill La. 120, 35 So. 482; De- troit V. Detroit & M. R. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Sarcoxie v. Wild, 64 Mo. App. 403. See South Berwick V. York County, 98 Me. 108, 56 Atl. 623. 28. Hoole V. Atty. Gen. 22 Ala. 190; Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Luckie, 143 Ga. 457, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1105, 85 S. E. 332; H. A. Hillmer Co. v. Behr, 264 111. 568, 106 N. E. 481; Granite Bituminous Pav. Co. V. McManus, 244 Mo. 184, 148 S. W. 621; Gate City v. Rich- mond, 97 Va. 337. 33 S. E. 615. 29. Hays v. Perkins, 109 Mo. 102, 18 S. W. 1127; Morning v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 364, 140 N. W. 638. 30. South Baltimore Harbor & Imp. Co. V. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 37 Atl. 27; St. Louis v. Laclede. 96 Mo. 197, 9 Am. St. Rep. 334, 9 S. W. 581; Thomason v. Dayton, 40 Ohio St. 63; Daniels v. Almy, 18 R. I. 244. 27 Atl. 330; Scott V. State, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 629. 31. Wood V. Veal, 5 Barn. & Aid. 454; City of Durham v. Southern R. Co., 121 Fed. 894; Rives V. Dudley. 56 N. C. 126, 67 Am. Dec. 231; Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. 29. 78 Am. Dec. 359; McKinney v. Duncan. 121 Tenn. 265. 118 S. W. 683; See editorial note. 21 Harv. Law Rev. 151. 32. Boston v. Lecraw. 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 426; San Francisco V. Calderwood, .'.1 Cal. 585; Holladay v. City and County of San Francisco, 124 Cal. 352, 57 1862 Real Peoperty. [§ 482 a dedication by the United States government, by- means of an Act of Congress, has been recognized^^ as lias a dedication by a state. ^^ § 482. Intention to dedicate. A dedication need not be by any formal act or declaration, and it is sufficient if in any way the owner of the land indicates an intention to devote the land to the public use.^** The act of dedication is affirmative in character, and the intention to dedicate must be clearly shown.^^ It, however, the acts of the owmer of the land are such as unequivocally to indicate an intention to dedicate, the fact that he had no such intention is immaterial.^^ In case his acts are equivocal in character, he may, ac- Pac. 146; Attorney General v. Tarr, 148 Mass. 309, 2 L. R. A. 87, 19 N. E. 358; State v. Wood- ward, 23 Vt. 92. 33. United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 154 U. S. 225, 237, 38 L. Ed. 971; Cook v. Burling- ton, 30 Iowa, 94, 6 Am. Rep. 649; Wells V. Pennington County, 2 S. D. 1, 39 Am. St. Rep. 758, 48 N. W. 305. 34. Snowden v. Loree, 122 Fed. 493; Zinc Co. v. City of La Salle, 117 111. 411, 2 N. E. 406, 8 N. E. 81; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Scott, 74 Ind. 29; Reilly v. City of Racine, 51 Wis. 526, 8 N. W. 417. 34a. Hill V. Houk, 155 Ala. 448, 46 So. 562; Quinn v. Ander- son, 70 Cal. 454, 11 Pac. 746; Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 IH. 29, 52 Am. Dec. 476; Williams V. Wiley, 16 Ind. 362; HaU v. McLeod, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 98, 74 Am. Dec. 400; Wright v. Tukey, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 290; Buntin v. Danville. 93 Va. 200, 24 S. E. 30. 35. Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 66, 19 So. 901; Monterey v. Malarin, 99 Cal. 290, 33 Pac. 840; Denver v. Jacobson, 17 Colo. 497, 30 Pac. 246; City of Hart- ford V. New York & N. E. R. Co., 59 Con. 250, 22 Atl. 37; Swift V. Lithonia, 101 Ga. 706, 29 S. E. 12; Bethel v. Pruett, 215 111. 162, 74 N. E. Ill; State v. Green, 41 Iowa, 693; O'Malley v. Dillenbeck Lumber Co., 141 Iowa, 186, 119 N. W. 601; Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 346; State v. Nudd, 23 N. H. 327; Heiple v. East Portland, 13 Ore. 97; Cin- cinnati & M. V. R. Co., V. Rose- ville, 76 Ohio St. 108, 81 N. E. 178; Harris v. Commonwealth, 20 Graft. (Va.) 833; Atlas Lum- ber Co. V. Quirk, 28 S. Dak. 643, 135 N. W. 172; Provident Trust Co. V. City of Spokane, 63 Wash. 92, 114 Pac. 1030; Lynch- burg Traction & Light Co. v. Guill, 107 Va. 86, 57 S. E. 644. 36. Town of Holly Grove v. Smith, 63 Ark. 5, 37 S. W. 956; Frauenthal v. Slaten, 91 Ark. 350, 121 S. W. 395; Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 484; Hanson v. § 482] Dedication. 1863 cording to some decisions, testify as to his actual inten- tion.^^ The existence or non existence of the intent to dedicate in any particular case is a question of fact rather than of law.^^ Public user as evidence. There are numerous decisions to the effect that the mere fact that land is used by the public for a greater or less time does not in itself show a dedication thereof by the owner,^* Proffer, 23 Idaho 705, 132 Pac. 573; Seidschlag v. Antioch, 207 in. 280, 69 N. E. 949; Miller v. Indianapolis, 123 Ind. 196, 24 N. E. 228; Tise v. Whitaker Harvey Co., 146 N. C. 374, 59 S. E. 1012; Cole V. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 17 N. Dak. 409, 17 Ann. Cas. 304, 117 N. W. 354; Kuck v. Wakefield, 58 Ore. 549, 115 Pac. 428; Lamar County v. Clemenis, 49 Tex. 347; Champ v. Nicholas County Court, 72 W. Va. 475, 78 S. E. 36L 37. Bidinger v. Bishop, 76 Ind. 244; Goodfellow v. Riggs, 88 Iowa, 540, 55 N. W. 319; City of Chicago V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 152 111. 561, 38 N. E. 768; Helm V. McClure, 107 Cal. 199, 40 Pac. 437. Contra, Perkins v. Fielding, 119 Mo. 149, 24 S. W. 444, 27 S. W. 1100. 38. City of Hartford v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 59 Conn. 250, 22 Atl. 37; Harmony v. Clark, 250 111. 57, 95 N. E. 47; Owensboro v. Muster, 111 Ky. 856. C4 S. W. 840; Cushwa v. Williamsport, 117 Md. 306, 83 Atl. 389; Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich. 278, 18 Am. St. Rep. 441, 44 N. W. 270; Morse v. Zeize, 34 Minn. 35, 24 N. W. 287; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Moye, 39 Miss. 374; Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 118 S'. W. 418; Wood v. Kurd, 34 N. J. L. 87; Waters v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. St. 189, 57 Atl. 523; Folsom V. Town of Underhill, 36 Vt. 580. The facts on which a find- ing of dedication vel non, in a large number of cases, was based, are stated and considered in a note to Benton v. St. Louis, 129 Am. St. Rep. 582 et seq. 39. Folkstone Corp. v. Brock- man (1914) App. Cas. 338; Irwin V. Dixion, 19 How. (U. S.) 10 13 L. Ed. 25; McKey v. Village of Hyde Park, 134 U. S. 84, 33 L. Ed. 860; Steele v. Sullivan, 70 Ala. 589; San Francisco & Grote, 120 Cal. 59, 41 L. R. A. 335, 65 Am. St. Rep. 155, 52 Pac. 127; Healey v. Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736, 54 S. E. 749; Palmer v. Chicago, 248 111. 201, 93 N. E. 765; Johnson V. Robertson, 156 Iowa, 64. 135 N. W. 585; Cyr v. Madore, 73 Me. 53; Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 340; £tacey v. Miller, 14 Mo. 478; Nelson v. Reick, 96 Neb. 486, 148 N. W. 331 ; Lewis v. City of Portland, 25 Ore. 133, 42 Am. St. Rep. 772; Weiss v. Borough of South Bethlehem. 136 Pa. 294. 20 1864 Real Property. [§ 482 but the owner's acquiescence in such user of the land is a fact to be considered in connection with other facts bearing on the question of dedication,^^ the weight to be attributed to such acquiescence depending, it would seem, on the length and character of the user, the nature of the place in w^hich it occurs, the ability of the owner to prevent such user by the public without inter- fering with his own user of the land, as well as other circumstances.^^ The theory is that if the public user has been openly as of right, and for so long a time that Atl. 801; Worthington v. Wade, 82 Tex. 26, 17 S. W. 520; Bacon V. Boston & M. R. Co., 83 Vt. 421, 76 Atl. 128; Lynchburg Traction & Light Co. V. Guill, 107 Va. 86, 57 S. E. 644; Cunningham v. Hendricks, 89 Wis. 632, 62 N. W. 410. But in Kentucky the con- tinuous public user of a pass- way for fifteen years without let or hindrance from the owner has been regarded as raising a con- clusive presumption of dedication. Bloomfield v. Allen, 146 Ky. 34. 141 S. W. 400. 40. Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 Pac. 448; Atlanta Railway & Power Co. V. Atlanta Rapid Transit Co., 113 Ga. 481, 39 S. E. 12; City of Chicago v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 152 111. 561, 38 N. E. 768; State v. Birmingham, 74 Iowa, 407, 38 N. W. 121; Southern Railway v. Coplinger's Adm'r, 151 Ky. 749, 152 S. W. 947; Neal v. Hopkins, 87 Md. 19, 39 Atl. 322; Klenk v. Town of Walnut Lake. 51 Minn. 381, 53 N. W. 703; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Moye, 39 Miss. 374; Penquite v. Lawrence, 11 Ohio St. 274; Weiss V. South Bethlehem Borough, 136 Pa. St. 294, 20 Atl. 801; Water- town V. Troeh,— S. Dak.—, 125 N. W. 501; Bennington County v. Manchester, 87 Vt. 555, 90 Atl. 502; Christianson v. Caldwell, 152 Wis. 135, 139 N. W. 751; Sturmer V. Randolph County Court, 42 W. Va. 724, 36 L. R. A. 300, 26 S. E. 532. But that acquiescence in public user for less than the pre- scriptive period is insuflBcient to evidence dedication, see Jones v. Peterson, 178 Iowa, 1389, 161 N. W. 181. In a considerable number of Jurisdictions the public user of one's land under claim of right, if continued for the prescriptive period, is regarded as giving rise to a conclusive presumption of the legal creation of rights of user in public, analogous to the conclusive presumption of a gi'ant on which the doctrine of prescription for private rights has ordinarily been based. This matter we consider in connection with the doctrine of prescription. Post, § 533. 41. That the question whether acquiescence in the user is such as to evidence an intention to dedicate is purely one of fact, see Folkstone Corporation v. Brock- man App. Cas. (1914) 338. *§> 482 J Dedication. ]865 it must have come to the knowledge of the owner of the land, the owner's acquiescence therein may justify the inference that he intended that it be devoted to such use.^2 jf ti^g usej. is ^q^ ^^g ^f pig^t, but is based upon a license or permission given to individuals or to a class of individuals, the owner's acquiescence therein can obviously not support an inference of dedication.-*"' When the owner of land leaves it open in whole or in part as a means of access to his own premises, the fact that he allows the public generally to use it for purposes of passage is but slight, if any, evidence of an intention to dedicate, since he could not con- veniently leave it open to those persons coming to his own premises and close it as against all others.'*'* And the owner's mere acquiescence in the use of land by the public for purposes of travel or recreation can furnish but slight evidence of dedication when such land is un- enclosed land, not in use for purposes of cultivation or otherwise.^"'^ That, on the other hand, one whose land is 42. See per Blackburn J. in 25 Ore. 133, 22 L. R. A. 736, 42 Greenwich Board of Works v. Am. St. Rep. 772; Columbia & P. Maudslay, L. R. 5 Q. B. 404. S. R. Co. v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 513, 43. Barraclough v. Johnson, 8 74 Pac. 670. Ad. & El. 99; Wooster v. Fiske, 45. Tutwiler v. Kendall, 113- 115 Me. 161, 98 Atl. 378; Carpen- Ala. 664, 21 So. 332; Latham v. ter V. City of St. Joseph, 263 Mo. Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 514, 25 Pac. 705, 174 S. W. 53. 673; Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83, 44. Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 10 Atl. 499; Savannah v. Standard (U. S.) 10, 13 L. Ed. 25; Loomis Fuel Supply Co., 140 Ga. 353, 78 V. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., S. E. 906; Kyle v. Logan, 87 111. 78 Conn. 156, 61 Atl. 539; Georgia 64; Hansen v. Green, 275 111. 221. R. R. & Banking Co. v. Atlanta. 113 N. E. 982; State v. Kansas 118 Ga. 486, 45 S. E. 256; Chicago City etc. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 139; V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 152 Tucker v. Conrad, 103 Ind. 349, 111. 561, 38 N. E. 768; Pennsylvania 2 N. E. 803; Rathinan v. Noren- Co. V. Plotz, 125 Ind. 26, 24 N. E. berg, 21 Neb. 467, 32 N. W. 305; 343; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa, Hutto v. Tiildall. 6 Rich. L. (S. 686, 149 N. W. 925; Durgin v. C.) 396; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.) 398; Rail- Montgomery, 85 Tex. 6f. 19 R. W. road V. Roseville, 76 Ohio St. 108, 1015. 81 N. E. 178; Lewis v. Portland, 186G Keal Peopeety. [§ 482 for the most part enclosed, leaves outside his fence a strip suitable for passage, not apparently for his own convenience, and acquiesces in the public use of that strip, may frequently justify the inference of an inten- tion on his i)art to dedicate such strip to the public use.^*' In some jurisdictions it has been asserted that if the owner of land acquiesces in the public use thereof for such a length of time that the public accommodation and private rights might be materiall}^ affected by an interruption of the enjoyment, an intention to dedicate may be presumed.^^ This statement, borrowed, directly or indirectly, from a dictum in an early case in' the Supreme Court of the United States,^'^ appears to be somewhat opposed to the cases above referred to, in which it is decided that the fact of user alone is not sufficient of itself to show a dedication,^^ and it is dif- ficult to see how the possibility of detriment to public or private interests by reason of the interruption of the use can have a bearing upon the question whether there has been a dedication, a question of the land- owner's intention.^" 46. See McCracken v. Joliet, Marion v. Skinman, 127 Ind. 130, 271 111. 270, 111 N. E. 131; Carl- 11 L. L. A. 55, 26 N. E. 676; son V. Allen, 90 Kan. 457, 135 Cromer v. State, 21 Ind. App. 502, Pac. 669; Neal v. Hopkins, 87 52 N. E. 239; State v. Wilson, 42 Md. 19, 39 Atl. 322; Boonville Me. 9; Case v. Favier, 12 Minn. Special Road Dist. v. Fuser, 184 89; Parrish v. Stephens, 1 Ore. Mo. App. 634, 171 S. W. 962; 59; Hughes v. Providence etc. R. Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, Co., 2 R. I. 493; Johnson City v. 118 S. W. 418, 129 Am. St. Rep. Wolfe, 103 Tenn. 277. 52 S. W. 561; Robison v. Gebauer, 98 Neb. 991; Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 196, 152 N. W. 329; Johnson City Utah, 240, 51 Pac. 980; Richmond V. Wolfe, 103 Tenn. 277, 52 S. W. v. Stokes, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 713; 991; Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah, Roundtree v. Hutchinson, 57 305, 64 Pac. 955; Humphrey v. Wash. 414, 27 L. R A.. (N. S.) Krutz, 77 Wash. 152, 137 Pac. 875, 107 Pac. 345. 806. 48. Cincinatti v. White, 6 Pet. 47. Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 431 239; Chicago v. Wright, 69 111. 49. Ante, this section, note 39. 318; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 50. See Hayden v. Stone, 112 101 Ind. 200, 51 Am. Rep. 749; Mass. 346. § 482] Dedication. 186< That the public user has been aceomiianied by ex- penditures on the part of the municipal authorities, to adapt the land to such user, and that the land owner knew of such expenditures, and acquiesced therein, would appear to be a consideration indicative of an intention on his part to dedicate, or perhaps operative to preclude him from denying such intontion.^i That the owner of land continues to pay taxes thereon,"^- or that he makes a conveyance of thQ land,^^ may tend to rebut any inference that he has dedicated it to public use. That he has maintained a gate or bars across the land, thus interfering more or less with any public user thereof, is evidence in rebuttal of any rights in the public,'^^ though not conclusive in this regard.^^ 51. See Eldridge v. Collins, 75 Neb. 65, 105 N. W. 1085; Harris V. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 833; McKenzie v. Gilmore, — (Cal.) — , 33 Pac. 262; State v. Birming- ham, 74 Iowa, 411, 38 N. W. 121; Raymond v. Wichita, 70 Kan. 523, 79 Pac. 323; Rex v. thomas, 7 El. & Bl. 39&. 52. Mansur v. State, 60 Ind. 357; City of Topeka v. Cowee, 48 Kan. 345, 29 Pac. 560; Case v. Favier, 12 Minn. 89 (Gil. 48); Bauman v. Boeckeler, 119 Mo. 189, 24 S. W. 207; Eugene v. Lowell, 72 Ore. 237, 143 Pac. 903. But payment of taxes is but slight evidence against a dedication. See Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood!, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N. E. 942; Getchell V. Benedict, 57 Iowa, 121, 10 N. W. 321; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170, 13 Pac. 405; City of Ottawa v. Gentzer, 160 111. 509, 43 N. E. 601. 53. Hall V. City of Baltimore. 56 Md. 187; Case v. Favier, 13 Minn. 89 (Gil. 48). 54. Rugby Charity Trustees v. Merry weather, 11 East 375 note; Jones V. Phillips, 59 Ark. 35, 26 S. W. 386; Cook v. Sudden, 94 Cal. 443, 29 Pac. 949; Bidinger v. Bishop, 76 Ind. 244; Gray v. Haas, 98 Iowa, 502, 67 N. W. 394; State V. Adkins, 42 Kan, 203, 21 Pac. 1069; Cyr v. Madore, 73 Me. 53; Com. v. Newbury, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 51; Field v. Mark, 125 Mo. 502, 28 S. W. 1004; Carpenter V. Gwynn, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 395;- Lewis v. Portland, 25 Ore. 133, 42 Am. St. Rep. 772, 22 L. R. A. 736, 35 Pac. 256; Wickre v. In- dependence, 31 S. D. 623, 141 N. W. 973. 55. People v. Eel River etc. R. Co., 98 Cal. 665. 33 Pac. 728; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ini. 200, 51 Am. Rep. 749; Brad- ford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa, 686, 149 N. W. 925; Eldridge v. Collins. 75 Neb. 65, 105 N. W. 1085. But that the maintenance of gates and bars, in four different places within a distance of half u mile 1868 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 482 Sales with reference to plat. As a general rule, if the owner of land lays it off into lots, with streets and alleys intersecting the same, and thereafter sells lots with reference to such streets and alleys, or with reference to a plat on which they appear, he is regarded as having dedicated to the public the land covered by such street and alleys,^*' and a like result has been held to follow if he sells lots with reference to a plat made by another.^ ^ But that the owner of conclusively excluded an infer- ence of dedication, see Jones v. Davis, 35 Wis. 376. 56. Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. (U. S.) 10, 31, 13 L. R. A. 25; South & N. A. R. Co. V. Davis, 185 Ala. 193, 64 So. 606; Balmat V. Argenta, 123 Ark. 175, 184 S. W. 445; Porter v. Carpenter, 39 Fla. 14, 21 So. 788; Fossion V. Landry, 123 Ind. 136, 24 N. E. 96; Schick v. West Davenport Imp. Co., 167 Iowa, 294, 145 N. W. 689, 149 N. W. 451; Bartlett V. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460; Mayor & City Council of Balti- more V. Frick, 82 Md. 77, 33 Atl. 435; Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 423; Harrington v. Man- chester, 76 N. H. 347, 82 Atl. 716; Ridgefield Park v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 278, 89 Atl. 773; In re Hunter, 163 N. Y. 542, 57 N. E. 735; Sexton v. Elizabeth City, 169 N. C. 385, 86 S. E. 344; Meier v. Portland Cable Ry. Co., 16 Ore. 500, 1 L. R. A. 856, 19 Pac. 610; Quicksall v. City of Philadelphia, 177 Pa. 301, 35 Atl. 609; Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R. Co., 240 Pa. 519, 87 Atl. 698; Brown v. Curran,— (R. I.) — 83 Atl. 515; City of Elkins v. Dono- hoe. 74 W. Va. 335, 81 S. E. 1130. Likewise a part or square shown on a plat with reference to which lots have been sold has been regarded as dedicated. Frauenthal v. Slaten, 91 Ark. 350, 121 S. W. 395; Davidow v. Gris- wold, 23 Cal. App. 188. 137 Pac. 619; East Atlanta Land Co. V. Mower, 138 Ga. 380, 75 S. E. 418; New Orleans v. Carrolton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695; Northport Grove Camp meeting Ass'n v. Andrews, 104 Me. 342, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976, 71 Atl. 1027; Cush- wa V. Williamsport, 117 Md. 306. 83 Atl. 389; Atty. Gen. v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 13 L. R. A. 251, 28 N. E. 346; Pondler v. Minnea- polis, 103 Minn. 479, 115 N. W. 274; Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N. D. 504, L. R. A. 1916B, 1160, 154 N. W. 195; Lueders v. Town of Tenino, 49 Wash. 521, 95 Pac. 1089; as has a wharf, under like circumstances. City of Pittsburg V. Epping — Carpenter Co., 194 Pa. 318, 45 Atl. 129. But see Palen V. Ocean City, 64 N. J. L. 669, 46 Atl. 774. 57. Hall" V. Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494, 70 N. E. 883; Thomas v. Metz, 236 111. 86, 86 N. E. 184; Longworth v. Sedevic, 165 Mo. 221, 65 S. W. 260; Clark v. Eliza- § 482] Dedication. 1869 land makes a plat thereof, without making any sales in accordance therewith, has been usually regarded as not involving a dedication,^^ in the absence of a statutory provision for dedication by the filing of a plat.^^ That a dedication may result from sales with reference to a plat it is unnecessary, it has been decided, that the spaces asserted to be dedicated be marked on the plat as streets alleys or squares, it appearing from a con- sideration of the plat as a whole, with reference to the surrounding circumstances, that the spaces were intended to be devoted to a public use.^**^ In a considerable number of the cases in which this doctrine of dedication by sales with reference to a plat has been asserted, the rights of individual pur- chasers of lots only were in question, but their rights, as against their vendor, to have the streets and other public places kept open, in accordance with the plat on the strength of which they made their purchases, is to beth, 40 N. J. L. 172; Wyman v. Mayor of New York, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 486; Oregon City v. Oregon & C. R. Co., 44 Ore. 165, 74 Pac. 924; City of Pittsburg v. Epping Carpenter Co., 194 Pa. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Deadwood v. Whittaker, 12 S. Dak. 515, 81 N. W. 908; Corsi- cana v. Zorn, 97 Tex. 317, 78 S. W. 924. 58. United States v. Chicago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185, 12 L. R. A. 660; Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116, 21 L. R. A. 62, 13 So. 289; Town of Holly Grove v. Smith, 63 Ark. 5, 37 S. W. 956; People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 15 Am. St. Rep. 22, 22 Pac. 474; Baltimore & Ohio S. W. Ry. Co. v. Seymour, 154 Ind. 17, 55 N. E. 953 (sem ble) ; Bennett v. Seibert, 10 Ind. App. 369, 35 N. E. 35; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 232; Quirk V. Miller, 129 La. 1071, 57 2 R. P.— 43 So. 521; Whitworth v. Berry, 69 Miss. 882, 12 So. 146; New York & L. B. R. Co. V. Borough of South Amboy, 57 N. J. L. 252, 30 Atl. 628; Nodine v. Union, 42 Ore. 613, 72 Pac. 582; Patterson V. Peoples Natural Gas. Co., 172 Pa. St. 554, 33 Atl. 575. 59. Post, notes fi3a-66. 59a. East Birmingham Realty Co. V. Birmingham Machine & Foundry Co., 160 Ala. 461, 49 So^ 448; Los Angeles v. McCollum, 156 Cal. 148, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387, 103 Pac. 914; Kimball v. Chicago, 253 111. 105, 97 N. E. 257; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200, 51 Am. Rep. 749; Hanson v. Eastman, 21 Minn. 509; Bu.schmann v. City of St. Louis, 121 Mo. 523, 26 S. W. 687; Weger V. Delran, 61 N. J. L. 224, 39 Atl. 730. 1870 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 482 be sustained upon a different theory,"^ and it is unnecessary, in such a case, to introduce any reference to tlie doctrine of dedication. Many of the cases, how- ever, which assert this doctrine of dedication by sales with reference to a plat, involve the rights of the public generally, or of the municipality as representa- tive of the public, and that such sales do usually in- volve a dedication in accordance with the plat may be regarded as settled in most, if not all, of the states. It is to be regretted that, of the great number of cases in which a dedication by sales in accordance with a plat is asserted, none, so far as the writer has ob- served, undertake to explain why such sales should operate as effecting a dedication, why, for instance, the fact tliat the owner of land has sold two or three lots with reference to a plat, and has thereby subjected him- self to obligations in favor of the purchasers as re- gards the streets depicted on the plat, is to be re- garded as showing an intention to create rights in such streets in favor of the public generally. The doctrine had its origin, it may be suspected, in a failure to distinguish between the rights of the individual pur- chasers and of the public, as when the courts said, as they have not infrequently said, that the sale of lots with reference to a plat involves a dedication of the lots in favor of the purchasers, thus ignoring the well settled principle that land cannot be dedicated for the benefit of particular members of the public.*'^ The ex- pression "dedication" having thus been introduced to express the result of such sales in favor of individuals, it was to be expected that, as time went on, such sales should come to be regarded as effecting a dedication for all purposes.^2 60. Ante, § 366(b). 62. That such sales effect a 61. See the remarks in People dedication appears to be negativ- V. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 15 Am. St. ed in Washington. See Smith v. Rep. 22, 22 Pac. 474; Prescott v. King County, 80 Wash. 273, 141 Edwards, 117 Cal. 298, 59 Am. St. Pac. 695. Rep. 186, 49 Pac. 178. § 482] Dedication. 1871 Description with reference to street. That in selUng or conveying land, it is described by reference to a suppositious street, or extension of a street, which has not actually been opened, does not, it seems, neces- sarily involve a dedication of land for such street,<52a though it would no doubt ordinarily give the pur- chaser a right of way in the land so referred to as a street, if the vendor is the owner thereof.''^ Statutory dedication. In the statutes author- izing the record of a plat of a subdivision of land made by the owner thereof,*^'^'' there is usually a provision that the strips or pieces of land which the owner, as indicated on the plat, intends shall be used by the public for streets, parks, and the like, shall be regarded as dedicated to the public. These statutes usually contain minute requirements in regard to the form and authenti- cation of the plat, and, if these requirements are not complied with, the plat does not constitute a statutory dedication, though it may, in connection with sales of land with reference thereto, or other acts, constitute evidence of a common-law dedication."* A statutory dedication by the recording of a plat differs from a common-lsiw dedication in that it in- volves a direct conveyance of the legal title, the owner- ship of the land, to that extent, to the municipality, while in the case of a common-law dedication the legal ownership is not affected, there being vested in the 62a. Hoole v. Atty. Gen., 22 238 Pa. 504, 86 Atl. 278; Felin Ala. 190; Mobile v. Fowler, 147 v. Philadelphia, 241 Pa. 164, 88 Ala. 403, 41 So. 468 (semble) ; Atl. 421; Rathmun v. Halfman, 58 Cerf V. Pfleging, 94 Cal. 131, 29 Tex. 551. Contra, Flershelm v. Pac. 417; Owensboro v. Muster, Baltimore, 85 Md. 489. ;J6 Atl. Ill Ky. 856, 64 S. W. 840; City of 1098; Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Omaha v. Hawver, 49 Neb. 1, 67 Co. v. Baltimore, 124 Md. 635, 93 N. W. 891; Atlantic City v. Groff, Atl. 146; Whyte v. City of St. 68 N. J. L. 670, 54 Atl. 800; In re l^ouis, 153 Mo. 80, 54 S. W. 478. Eleventh Avenue, 81 N. Y. 436; 63. Ante, § 366(a). Jones V. Teller, 65 Ore. 328, 133 63a. Ante, § 443. Pac. 354: Tesson v. Porter Co., 1872 Keal Peopebty. b) 483 public merely a privilege of iiser.^'^ In case there is no municipality in existence at the time of a statutory dedication, the fee, it has been said, is in abeyance until a municipality is created.^^ § 483. Acceptance. In order that a dedication, or rather, an offer of dedication, may be effective for the purpose of imposing burdens and liabilities upon the public authorities as regards the condition and re- pair of the property, it is ordinarily necessary that it be accepted by the public,^'^ and, by numerous decisions, an acceptance is also necessary in order to render the offer of dedication irrevocable by the dedicator,^^ and in order to give to the municipality rights of control as regards the property.''^ In one state it has been de- 64. See Marsh v. Village of Fairbury, 163 111. 401, 45 N. E. 236; Ruddlman v. Taylor, 95 Mich. 547, 55 N. W. 376; Hatton V. St. Louis, 264 Mo. 634, 175 S. W. 888; Kaufman v. Butte, 48 Mont. 400, 138 Pac. 770; Pills- bury V. Alexander, 40 Neb. 242, 58 N. W. 859; Incorporated Vil- lage of Fulton's Lessee v. Mehren- feld, 8 Ohio St. 440; Kee v. Satterfield, 46 Okla. 208. 149 Pac. 243; McCoy v. Thompson, 84 Ore. 141, 164 Pac. 589; Thorndike v. Milwaukee Auditorium Co., 143 Wis. 1, 126 N. W. 881. 65. Post, § 486. 66. Winthrop Harbor v. Gur- des, 257 111. 596, 101 N. E. 199. 67. City & County of San Fran- cisco V. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585, 91 Am. Dec. 545; City of Denver V. Denver & S. F. Ry. Co., 17 Colo. 583, 31 Pac. 338; Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N. E. 942; Maine v. Brad- bury, 40 Me. 154; Ogle v. City of Cumberland, 90 Md. 59, 44 Atl. 1015; Downend v. Kansas City, 156 Mo. 60, 56 S. W. 902; State v. Atherton, 16 N .H. 203; Atlantic & S. R. Co. V. State Board of Assessors of New Jersey, 80 N. J. L. 83, 77 Atl. 609. 68. City of Los Angeles v. Mc- Collum, 156 Cal. 148, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 103 Pac. 914; Riley .V. Hammel, 38 Conn. 574; H. A. Hillmer Co. v. Behr, 264 111. 568, 106 N. E. 481; Town of Kenwood Park V. Leonard, 177 Iowa, 337. 158 N. W. 655; Whittington v. Comm'rs of Crisfield, 121 Md. 387, 88 Atl. 232; Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 346; MighiU v. Town of Rowley, 224 Mass. 586, 113 N. E. 569; Price v. Town of Brecken- ridge, 92 Mo. 378, 5 S. W. 20; Buffalo V. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513; Simmons v. Cornell, 1 R. I. 519; Spokane v. Security Sav. Soc, 82 Wash. 91, 143 Pac. 435; Univer- sity of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart v. City of Watertown, 150 Wis. 505, 137 N. W. 754. 69. Schmidt v. Spaeth, 82 N. J. L. 83 Atl. 242; Pope v. Clarke, § 483] Dedication. 1873 cided that the death of the dedicator before acceptance milhfies the dedication.'^ Some of the statutes providing for a dedication by the record of a plat have been construed as not in- volving any necessity of an acceptance.-^i And ac- cording to some decisions there is a presumption of acceptance of a dedication which is beneficial in char- acter,'-^ a view which in effect dispenses with the neces- sity of an acceptance in such a case. Furthermore bv the weight of authority, a dedication effected by sales with reference to a plat'^ cannot be revoked even though there has been no indication of acceptance, "^^ a 122 Md. 1, 89 Atl. 387; Moore v. Fowler, 58 Ore. 292, 114 Pac. 472; Baltimore v. Broumel, 86 Md. 153, 37 Atl. 648; Phillips v. Stamford, 81 Conn. 408. 71 Atl. 361; Gilder v. City of Breuham, 67 Tex. 345, 3 S. W. 309. 70. People v. Johnson, 237 111. 237, 86 N. E. 676; Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. V. Chicago, 264 111. 24, 105 N. E. 702. 71. Town of Lake View v. Le Bahn, 120 111. 92, 9 N. E. 260; Osage City v. Larkin, 40 Kan. 206, 2 L. R. A. 56, 10 Am. St. Rep. 186, 19 Pac. 658; Keyes v. Excelsior, 126 Minn. 456, 148 N. W. 501; Town of Otterville v. Bente, 240 Mo. 291, 144 S. W. 822; Weep- ing Water v. Reed, 21 Neb. 261, 31 N. W. 797; Carter v. City of Portland, 4 Ore. 339; Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah, 127, 104 Pac. Ill; Meachem v. City of Seattle, 45 Wash. 380, 88 Pac. 628. 72. Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal. 43, 16 L. R. A. 145, 28 Pac. 839; Guthrie v. Town of New Haven, ?,1 Conn. 308; Poole v. Commissioners of Rehoboth, 9 Del. Ch. 192, 80 Atl. 683; Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 58 Am. Rep. 143, 10 N. E. 325; Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N. H. 347, 82 Atl. 716. See Phillips V. Stamford, 81 Conn. 408, 71 Atl 361. Such a presumption cannot, it has been suggested exist in the case of a highway, there being liabilities to repair in connection therewith. Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 58 Am. Rep. 143, 10 N. E. 325; Wayne County V. Miller, 31 Mich. 447. But It might, it would seem, even then exist for purposes other than of Imposing a liability upon the public. See Henderson v. Yea- man, 169 Ky. 503, 184 S. W. 878; Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N. H. 347, 82 Atl. 716. 73. Ante, § 482, note 56. 74. Rulolph V. Birmingham 188 Ala. 620, 65 So. 1006; Brook- feld V. Block, 123 Ark. 153. 184 S. W. 449; Davidow v. Griswold, 23 Cal. App. 188, 137 Pac. 619; Boise City v. Hon. 14 Idaho, 272, 94 Pac. 167; HusfpII v. Lincoln. 200 III. 511, 65 N. E. 1088; Louis- 1874 Real Pkoperty. [§ 483 view which is ordinarily asserted without any attemjot to state a reason for such an exception to the ordinary requirement of acceptance, but which is occasionally based on the somewhat unsatisfactory theory that the individual purchasers, by making the purchases, ac- cept in behalf of the public the dedication made by the sales to themJ^ It would rather seem that it is be- cause of the creation of rights in the individual pur- chasers, which rights are not subject to subsequent con- trol by the vendor, and of the association which ap- parently exists between the creation of such individual rights and the asserted dedication in favor of the pub- lic,'''^^ that the vendor has been regarded as unable to revoke the dedication thus made. The acceptance of the dedication may be by formal action on the part of the state or municipality, as repre- senting the public,"^^ but this is not usually necessary. ville V. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 147 Ky. 141, 738, 143 S. W. 782, 145 S. W. 389; Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460; Baltimore v. Frick, 82 Md. 77, 33 Atl. 435; Harrison County Supervisors v. Seal, 66 Miss. 129, 3 L. R. A. 659, 14 Am. St. Rep. 545, 5 So. 622; Shearer V. City of Reno, 36 Nev. 443, 136 Pac. 705; Darling v. Jersey City, 73 N. J. Eq. 318, 67 Atl. 709; Revard v. Hunt, 29 Okla. 835, 119 Pac. 589; Baker City Mut. Irr. Co. V. Baker City, 58 Ore. 306, 110 Pac. 392, 113 Pac. 9; City of Pitts"- burg V. Epping Carpenter Co., 194 Pa. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Martinez v. City of Dallas, 102 Tex. 54, 109 S. W. 287, 113 S. W. 1167. Contra, Gathright v. State, 129 Ark. 339, 195 S. W. 1069; Prescott v. Ed- wards, 117 Cal. 298, 59 Am. St. Rep. 186, 49 Pac. 178; Eltinge v. Santos, 171 Cal. 278. 152 Pac. 915; Kimball v. Chicago, 253 111. 105, 97 N. E. 257; Rose v. Elizabeth- town, 275 111. 167, 114 N. E. 14; Steinauer v. Tell City, 146 Ind. 490, 45 N. E. 1056; Clendenin v. Maryland Construction Co. 86 Md. 80, 37 Atl. 709; Canton Co. v. Baltimore, 106 Md. 69, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 129, 66 Atl. 681; Vil- lage of Grandville v. Jenison, 84 Mich. 54, 47 N. W. 600; State v. Hamilton, 109 Tenn. 276, 70 S. W. 619. 75. Sanford v. Meridian, 52 Miss. 383; Christian v. Eugene, 49 Ore. 170, 89 Pac. 419; Highland Realty Co. v. Avondale Land Co., 174 Ala. 326, 56 So. 716. 75a. Ante, § 482 notes 61, 62. 76. Little Rock v. Wright, 58 Ark. 142, 23 S. W. 876; City of Eureka v. Armstrong, 83 Cal. 623, 22 Pac. 928, 23 Pac. 1085; White V. Smith, 37 Mich. 291; State v. Atherton, 16 N. H. 203; State v. City of Elizabeth, 35 N. J. L. 359; § 483] Dedication. 1875 Any action on the part of the municipality showing that it has assumed control of the land dedicated is suf- ficient evidence of acceptance.'" Eepairs or improve- ments made by, or under the authority of, officers who have general charge of highways, and power to lay them out, may show' an acceptance of the dedication of a highway,"^^^ though repairs made by a merely subordi- nate officer would not have such an effect."^ A mere user by the public is sufficient, according to the weight of authority, to justify a finding that there w^as an ac- ceptance for most purposes,^*^ though not, according to some cases, for the purpose of imposing any burden or Bellenot v. Richmond, 108 Va. 314, 61 S. E. 785. In Virginia there must, it appears, be an ac- ceptance of record. Terry v. Mc- Clung, 104 Va. 599, 52 S. E. 355. 77. Brewer v. City of Pine Bluff, 80 Ark. 489, 97 S. W. 1034; Penick v. Morgan County, 131 Ga. 385, 62 S. E. 300; People v. John- son, 237 111. 237, 86 N. E. 676; Burroughs v. City of Cherokee, 134 Iowa, 429, 109 N. W. 876; Mulligan v. McGregor, 165 Ky. 222, 176 S. W. 1129; Lyons v. Mullen, 78 Neb. 151, 110 N. W. 743; In re Hunter, 163 N. Y. 542, 57 N. E. 735; Palmer v. East River Gas Co., 115 N. Y. App. Div. 677, 101 N. Y. Supp. 347; Jeffress v. Town of Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919; Cincinnati & L. Ry Co. V. Carthage, 36 Ohio St. 631; Herrington v. Booth & Flinn, 252 Pa. 70, 97 Atl. 178; Doyle V. City of Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433, 4 N. C. C. A. 167, 161 S. W. 997; Spencer v. Arlington, 49 Wash. 121, 94 Pac. 904. 78. Town of Lake View v. Le Bahn, 120 111. 92, 9 N. E. 269; Town of Fowler v. Linguist, 138 Ind. 566, 37 N. E. 133; Wright V. Tukey, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 290; Kaime v. Harty, 73 Mo. 316; Du Bois Cemetery Co. v. Griffin, 165 Pa. St. 81, 30 Atl. 840; Folsoni v. Town of Underbill, 36 Vt. 580. 79. State v. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154; White v. Bradley, 66 Me. 254. 80. Stewart v. Conley, 122 Ala. 179, 27 So. 303; Tranmell v. Brad- ford— (Ala.)— 73 So. 894; Hall v. Kauffman, 106 Cal. 451, 39 Pac. 756; City of Denver v. Denver & S. F. Ry. Co., 17 Colo. 583, 31 Pac. 338; Phillips v. City of Stamford, 81 Conn. 408, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1114, 71 Atl. 361; Parsons v. Trustees of Atlanta University, 44 Ga. 529; Consumers' Co. v. Chica-. go, 268 111. 113, 108 N. E. 1017; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. Ry. Co. V. Warrum, 42 Ind. App. 217, 82 N. E. 9:54, 84 N. E. 356; Raymond V. Wichita, 70 Kan. 523, 79 Pac 323; Riley v. Buchanan, 116 Ky. 625, 63 L. R. A. 642. 3 Ann. Cas. 788. 76 S. W. 527; Cnahwa v. Williamsport. 117 Md. 306. 83 Atl. 389; Atty. Gen. v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 13 L. R. A. 251. 28 N. lcS76 Eeal, Property. [§ m liability on the municipality.^'^ Occasionally the view has been asserted that, in order that acceptance may be inferred from user, for any purpose whatsoever, the user must have continued for the prescriptive period.^^ And in some cases the question of the suf- ficiency of user for this purpose has been said to be to a great extent dependent on whether the public con- venience would suffer bv a cessation of the user.^^ E. 346; Minium v. Sole!,— (Mo.) — 183 S. W. 1037; Cassidy v. Sulli- van, 75 Neb. 847, 106 N. W. 1027; Schmidt v. Spaeth, 82 N. J. L. 575, 83 Atl. 242; Montgomery v. Somers, 50 Ore. 259, 90 Pac. 674; Com. V. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, 4 Am. St. Rep. 599, 12 Atl. 424; Watertown v. Troeh, 25 S. D. 21, 125 N. W. 501; Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah, 243, 161 Pac. 1127; Seattle v. Hinckley, 67 Wash. 273, 121 Pac. 444. In some states, however, ptiblic user is not regarded as sufficient evidence of acceptance, for any purpose. Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139, 55 Am. St. Rep. 653, 44 N. E. 966; Smith v. Smythe, 197 N. Y. 457, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524, 90 N. E. 1121; Cincinnati & M. V. R. Co. V. Roseville, 76 Ohio St. 108, 81 N. E. 178; Lynchburg Traction & Light Co. v. Guill, 107 Va. 86, 57 S. E. 644 (semble); Chapman v. Sault Ste. Marie, 146 Mich. 23, 109 N. W. 53. 81. Pennick v. Morgan County, 131 Ga. 385, 62 S. E. 300; People V. Commissioners, 52 111. 498; Cochran v. Town of Shepherds- ville,— (Ky.)— 43 S. W. 250; May- berry V. Standish, 56 Me. 342; Kennedy v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 65 Md. 514, 57 Am. Rep. 346, 9 Atl. 234; Ogle V. City of Cumberland, 90 Md. 59, 62, 44 Atl. 1015; Downend V. Kansas City, 156 Mo. 60, 51 L. R. A. 170, 56 S. W. 902; Gilder V. City of Brenham, 67 Tex. 345, 3 S. W. 309; Tower v. Rutland, 56 Vt. 28; Clarendon v. Rutland R. Co., 75 Vt. 6, 52 Atl. 1057; Hast V. Piedmont & C. R. Co., 52 W. Va. 396, 44 S. E. 155; See Stevens V. Nashua, 46 N. H. 192. Contra, Ivey V. City of Birmingham, 190 Ala. 196, 67 So. 506; Guthrie v. New Haven, 31 Conn. 308; Phillips V. Stamford, 81 Conn. 408, 71 Atl. 361 (dictum); Benton V. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 129 Am-. St. Rep. 560, 118 S. W. 418; Ack- erman v. Williamsport, 227 Pa. 591, 76 Atl. 421; Kniss v. Du- quesne Borough, 255 Pa. 417, 100 Atl. 132; Caston v. City of Rock Hill, 107 S. C. 124, 92 S. E. 191; Doyle V. Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S. W. 997 ((licttim). 82. People v. Johnson, 237 111. 237, 86 N E. 676; Whittington v. Comm'rs of Crisfield, 121 Md. 387, 88 Atl. 232. 83. Ivey v. City of Birming- ham, 190 Ala. 196, 67 So. 506; San Francisco v. Carnavan, 42 Cal. 541; Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 129 Am. St. Rep. 561, 118 S. W. 418; Pence v. Bryant, 54 W. Va. 263, 46 S. E. 275. § 483] Dedicatiox. 18; The question whether there has been an acceptance IS, like that of the offer of dedication, ordinarily one of fact.s^ It is not infrequently said that the acceptance of a dedication must take place within a reasonable time, or that the public has a reasonable time for acceptance.*^ "What is a reasonable time appears to be a question of fact in each particular case^'^ and is to be determined, to some extent at least, by the necessity or desirability of the public use of the land dedicated, the public beino- under no obligation to accept the dedication before con^ ditions are ripe for its utilization of the land.^' The delay of acceptance, to render it nugatory, nmst, it has been said, be for such a length of time and under such 84. City of Hartford v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 59 Conn. 250, 22 Atl. 37; Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 92; Flack v. Village of Green Island, 122 N. Y. 107, 25 N. 267; Downend v. Kansas City, 71 Mo. App. 529; Folsom v. Town of Underhill, 36 Vt. 580. 85. People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 91 Am. Dec. 542, 22 Pac. 474; Rose V. Elizabethtown, 275 III. 167, 114 N. E. 14; Town of Ken- wood Park V. Leonard, 177 Iowa, 337, 158 N. W. 655; Field v. Manchester, 32 Mich. 279; Briel V. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 433; Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N. D. 504, L. R. A. 1916B, 1160, 154 N. W. 195. 86. H. A. Hillmer Co. v. Behr. 264 111. 568, 106 N. E. 481; Ken- wood Park V. Leonard, 177 Iowa, 377, 158 N. W. 655; Chafee v. City of Aiken, 57 S. C. 507, 35 S. E. 800. So it is said that the acceptance of the dedication need not be within any particular time. Henderson v. Yeaman, 169 Ky. 603, 184 S. W. 878; Beale v. Takoma Park, 130 Md. 297, 100 Atl. 379. In Christopherson v. Incorpo- rated Town of Forest City, 178 Iowa, 893, 160 N. W. 691, it was held that an acceptance thirty years after the dedication and twenty years after the fencing in of the property was too late. And in People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 91 Am. Dec. 542, 22 Pac. 474, a like view was taken of an ac- ceptance twenty-one years after the dedication. And in Kelley V. Jones, 110 Me. 360, 86 Atl. 252, of an acceptance eighty years after the dedication. 87. Lee v. Harris, 206 111. 128. 97 Am. St. Rep. 176, 69 N. E. 230; McClenehan v. Town of Jesup, 144 Iowa, 352, 120 N. W. 74; City of Meridian v. Poole. 88 Miss. 108, 40 So. 548; Meier v. Portland Cable Ry. Co.. 16 Ore. 500, 1 L. R. A. 856, 19 Pac. 610; City of Ashland v. Chicago & * N. W. Ry. Co., 105 Wis. 398, SO N. W. 1101. 1878 Real Peoperty. [§ 483 circumstances as clearly to indicate an abandonment of any intention to accept the offer of dedication.^'^ Since a municipality has authority, in the ordinary case, to accept a dedication in behalf of the public, the question whether, when the dedication is made by the municipality, an acceptance, by public user or other- wise, is necessary to complete the dedication, is one of some difficulty.^^^ And the same question may arise in coruiection with a dedication by the United States or a state.^^ No clear and harmonious rule appears to exist in this regard. The question whether the dedication of a highway has been accepted as regards its entire breadth or length by reason of repairs on part only of its breadth or length, or of public user of such part only, would seem to be a question of fact, to be determined with reference to the circumstances of the case, with a pre- sumption perhaps, by the weight of authority, in favor of the acceptance of the whole way as dedicated.^*' 88. Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N. D. by the United States appears to 504, L. R. A. 1916B, 1160, 154 N. be assumed in WeUs v, Penning- W. 195. And see 129 Am. St. ton County, 2 S. D. 1, 39 Am. St. Rep. at p. 619, note to Benton v. Rep. 758, 48 N. W. 3C5; Hatch City of St. Louis. Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 88a. That acceptance is neces- 165 Pac. 518. So in the case of sary in such a case, see San a dedication by the state. Reilly Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. v. City of Racine, 51 Wis. 526. 585, 91 Am. Dec. 542; Curtis v. 8 N. W. 417. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154, 48 Am. Dec. 90. People v. Langenoir, — Cal. 149; Board of Trustees of Phil- App.,— 142 Pac. 888; Ellis v. adelphia INIuseums v. Trustees of City of Hazlehurst, 138 Ga. 181, the University of Pennsylvania, 75 S. E. 99; McDonald v. Stark, 251 Pa. 125, 96 Atl. 126. Contra, 176 111. 456, 52 N. E. 37; Sullivan Attorney Gen. v. Tarr, 148 Mass. v. Tichenor, 179 lU. 97, 53 N. E. 309, 2 L. R. A. 87, 19 N. B. 561; Village of Augusta v. Tyner, 358.' In Knox v. Roehl, 153 Wis. 197 lU. 242, 64 N. E. 378; Hall 239, 140 N. W. 1121, it is said v. Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494, 70 that only slight proof of accept- N. E. 883; Kuehl v. Town of ance is necessary in such case. Bettendorf, 179 Iowa, 1, 161 N. 89. That acceptance is neces- W. 28; Crosby v. City of Green- sary in the case of a dedication ville, 183 Mich. 452, 150 N. W. § 483:] Dedication?. 1879 In the case of a dedication for streets by the re- cord of a plat, or the sale of lots with reference to a jjlat, the acceptance of one or more of the streets has occasionally been regarded as involving an acceptance of all, in the absence of a showing of a contrary inten- tion.^ ^ It has in one state been stated that the ac- ceptance of one street does not show acceptance of all,^2 and that the acceptance of those streets in one part of the land platted does not show acceptance of those in another part,''^ but that the acceptance of the most important streets,^^ or of most of the streets,^^ justifies an inference that all have been accepted. 246; Kennedy v. Le Van, 23 Minn. 513; Triplett Twp. v. Mc- Phearson, 172 Mo. App. 369, 157 S. W. 857; City of Pittsburg v. Epping-Carpenter Co., 194 Pa. St. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Chaffee v. Aiken, 57 S. C. 507, 35 S. E. 800. In Borough of South Amboy v. New York & L. B. R. Co., 66 N. J. L. 623, 50 Atl. 368, it is said that the dedication must be ac- cepted in whole, if accepted at all. On the other hand it has been quite occasionally decided that, in the particular case, an ac- ceptance as to the whole did not result from repairs on, or user of, a part of the land dedicated. Mobile V. Fowler, 147 Ala. 403, 41 So. 468; Hall v. Meriden, 48 Conn. 416; Kelsoe v. Oglethorpe, 120 Ga. 951, 102 Am. St. Rep. 138, 48 S. E. 366; Theissen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho, 505, 144 Pac. 548; Bell v. City of Burlington, 68 Iowa, 296, 27 N. W. 245; Wayne County v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447; Commonwealth v. Royce, 152 Pa. St. 88, 25 Atl. 162; Ashland v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 105 Wis. 398, 80 N. W. 1101. 91. Village of Lee v. Harris, 206 111. 428, 99 Am. St. Rep. 176, 69 N. E. 230; Parriott v. Hampton, 134 Iowa, 157. Ill N. W. 440; Heitz v. City of St. Louis, 110 Mo. 618, 19 S. W. 735; Derby V. Ailing, 40 Conn. 410; City of Jackson v. Laird, 99 Miss. 476, 55 So. 41. But see Kelsoe v. Oglethorpe, 120 Ga. 951, 102 Am. St. Rep. 138, 48 S. E. 366; Wolf- skill V. Los Angeles County, SC> Cal. 405, 24 Pac. 1094; Kennedy V. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 65 Md. 514, 57 Am. Rep. 346, 9 Atl. 234. 92. Rose V. Elizabethtown, 275 111. 167, 114 N. E. 14; Casey v. Chicago, 263 111. 147, 104 N. E. 1025. 93. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.. 264 111. 24, 105 N. E. 702. 94. Kimball v. Chicago, 253 111. 105, 97 N. K. 257; Dewey v. Chicago, 274 111. 268, 113 N. E. 599. 95. Consumers' Co. v. Chicago, 268 in. 113, 108 N. E. 1017. 1880 Eeal Property. [§ 484 § 484. Dedicaticn distinguished from estoppel. It is frequently asserted that the doctrine of dedication is based upon the theory of estoppel in pais, but this would seem to be incorrect.^^ The doctrine of dedica- tion was recognized earlier than the doctrine of esto^j- pel in pais,^' and the former doctrine is perfectly com- prehensible without reference to the latter. One who indicates, by his course of conduct, an intention to de- vote his property to j)ublic use, thereby effects a dedica- tion, just as one who, by executing an instrument of conveyance in favor of an individual, indicates an in- tention to transfer to him an estate in land, effects such transfer. In neither case can it properly be said that, because the expression of intention in accordance with legal requirements results in effecting the intention, an estoppel in pais is involved. So when it is said, as it occasionally is said, that one whose acts are such as to show an intention to dedicate, is estopped to deny such intention, the introduction of the theory of estop- pel appears entirely unnecessary. Such a case in- volves merely an application of a general rule that, for legal purposes, one's intention is such as his acts would lead a reasonable man to believe to be his intention. ^^ The only case, it is submitted, in which it is at all appropriate to refer to the theory of estoppel in this connection is that, above referred to,^^ of a dedication by sales with reference to a plat, in which case the dedi- cation appears to be, in some way not explained, a 96. As is well stated In An- 2; Ewart, Estoppel, p. 7. As gell, Highways, § 156. before remarked <^ante, § 479, 97. The doctrine of dedication note la), the doctrine of was recognized in express terms dedication presumably was recog- in Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange nized in principle, if not by name, 1004, an action of trespass, decid- early in the history of English ed anno 1735. Estoppel in pais, law. or equitable estoppel, received its 98. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence, first explicit recognition in courts § 2413. of law in the nineteenth century. 99. Ante, § 482, note 56. See Bigelow, Estoppel, ch. 18, § § 485] Dedication. 1881 result of the vendor's asserted estoppel, as against the purchasers, to deny the existence of ways and spaces as indicated on the plat. Although, as just stated, the doctrine of dedication is properly independent of that of estoppel, the fact that the public have been allowed to utilize the land as if it has been dedicated to public use may, under particular circumstances, operate to prevent or estop the owner from interrupting such use. In such a case the court is quite as likely to state that the user of the land by the public for the particular puri>ose shows a dedication for that purpose, as to say that the land- owner is estopped to prevent the continuance of such user. For instance, in the ca&e of land which has been used, without dissent by the owner, for the purpose of a cemetery, a finding of dedication is no doubt usually based, to a considerable extent at least, upon considera- tions which appertain properly to the doctrine of es- toppel rather than to that of dedication. A dedication is found to have been made by reason of circumstances which would properly estop the owner to deny that it was made. For the purpose of the particular case the confusion of the two doctrines is immaterial, but for the purpose of scientific discussion it is much to be deprecated.^ § 485. Qualified and conditional dedication. A dedication may be made subject to reservations in favor of the dedicator or to restrictions upon the freedom of use of the land by the public. Thus it has been held that a highway may be dedicated, to be used only at certain seasons,^ or subject to a right in the dedicator oi- in others to use the land for certain ])urp()ses, or at cer- tain times.^ And the dedication of a liighway may be 1. See the admirable discus- Y. 347, 17 L. R. A. 454. T2 N. sion in the editorial note in 16 E. 78. Harv. Law Rev. at p. 128. 3. Mercer v. Woodgate. I.. R. 2. Hughes V. Bingham, 135 N. 5 Q. B. 26; Arnold v. Blaker, I-. 1882 Ekal Property. [§ 485 made, not for general highway purposes, but for use by pedestrians only, or for a certain class of vehicles.* But there may be a restriction imposed by the dedicator upon the control or user of the land by the public so far reaching in its nature as to be inconsistent with the very nature and purpose of a dedication. In cases in which land was dedicated for a highway, a reservation, in favor of the dedicator, of a right to locate and maintain, or to enable others to locate and maintain, railway tracks in the highway, has ordinarily been regarded as valid,^ while on the other hand a general reservation of the control of public utilities in connection with the highway has not been upheld.^ A stipulation that the j)ublic user of the highway shall be subject to certain specific restrictions on the power to remove trees or grass from parts of the land has been supjDorted.'^ A jDrovision, in connection with the dedication, that the municipality shall make certain improvements has been given effect as a condition R. 6 Q. B. 433; City of Nobles- Ayres v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 ville V. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., N. J. L. 44, 57 Am. Rep. 538, 130 Ind. 1, 29 N. E. 484; City of 3 Atl. 885; 52 N. J. L. 405, 20 Dubuque v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248; Atl. 54; Tallon v. Hoboken, 59 Atlantic City v. Associated Real- N. J. L. 383, 60 N. J. L. 212, 37 ties Corp. 73 N. J. Eq. 721, 17 Ann. Atl. 895; Oklahoma City & T. Cas. 743, 70 Atl. 345; City of R. Co. v. Dunham, 39 Tex. Civ. Cohoes V. President, etc., Dela- 575, 88 S. W. 849. And so, ap- ware & H. Canal Co., 134 N. Y. parently, a reservation of a right 397, 31 N. E. 887. to place a canal in the highway 4. Stafford v. Coyney, 7 Barn. may be valid. City of Cohoes v. & C. 257; Home Laundry Co. President, etc. Delaware & H. V. Louisville, 168 Ky. 479, 182 Canal Co., 134 N. Y. 397, 31 N. S. W. 645; Hemphill v. Boston, E. 887. 8 Cush. (Mass.) 195; Tyler v. 6. Jones v. Carter, 45 Tex. Sturdy, 108 Mass. 196; Trustees Civ. App. 450, 101 S. W. 514; of Methodist Episcopal Church of Bradley v. Spokane & I. E. R. Hoboken v. City of Hoboken, 33 Co., 79 Wash. 455, 140 Pac. 688. N. J. L. 13, 97 Am. Dec. 696. 7. Avis v. Borough of Vine- 5. Noblesville v. Lake Erie & land, 56 N. J. L. 474, 23 L. R. A. W. Ry. Co., 130 Ind. 1, 29 N. E. 685, 28 Atl. 1039; Young v. 484; Arn v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., Landis, 73 N. J. L. 266, 62 Atl. 171 Ky. 157, 188 S. W. 340; 1133. § 485] Dedication. 1883 precedent to the vesting- of rights iu the puhlic,^ as has a provision that otlier owners of land shall dedicate for the same public purpose.^ A stipulation relieving the dedicator from liability for aii}^ part of the cost of adapting the land to the public use has been upheld.^'' That a stipulation in favor of the dedicator, made at the time of dedication, is invalid, does not ordinarily invalidate the dedication.^ ^ But a stipulation for a right to revoke the dedication has been regarded as showing an intention not to dedicate.^- And there is. evidently no dedication when the owner of the land retains the power to determine in the future what part of the land shall be devoted to the public use.^-' Although, by a statutory dedication, the ownership of the land dedicated would otherwise be vested in the municipality,^^ the dedicator may, it has been decided, by an express provision on the plat, retain the owner- ship, a right of user merely being vested in the public,' ^'^ and he may, likewise, it seems, expressly retain the minerals in the land dedicated,^^ the ownership of which would otherwise be vested in the municipality.^" 8. People V. WiUiams, 64 Cal. of Charlestown, 4:5 W. Va. 796, 498. 2 Pac. 393; Jenkins County 28 S. E. 831; State v. Spokane V. Dickey, 139 Ga. 91, 76 S. E. St. Ry. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 41 L. 856. R. A. 515, 67 Am. St. Rep. 739, 9. Peoples' Gas Light & Coke 53 Pac. 719. Co. V. Chicago, 255 111. 612, 99 N. 12. San Francisco v. Canavan, E. 703; St. Louis v. Meier, 77 Mo. 42 Cal. 541. 13; Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. 13. Niagara Falls Suspension Luckie. 143 Ga. 457, 85 S. E. 332. Bridge v. Bachman, 66 N. V. 261. 10. Perth Amboy Trust Co. v. 14. Ante. § 482, note 64. Perth Amboy, 75 N. J. L. 291, 15. Dubuque v. Benson, 23 68 Atl. 84. See the comments on Iowa, 248. this case in 21 Harv. Law Rev. 16. Brown v. City of Cartilage, at p. 357. Compare Richards v. 128 Mo. 10, 30 S. W. 312; Dubu- Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 506. que v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248. 11. City of Noblesville v. Lake 17. Des Moines v. Hall. 24 Erie & W. R. Co., 130 Ind. 1, 29 Iowa, 234; Zinc Co. v. City of N. E. 484; Des Moines v. Hall, 24 La Salle, 117 111. 411, 2 N. K. Iowa, 234; Richards v. Cincinnati, 406, 8 N. E. 81; Hawesvllle v. 31 Ohio St. 506; Riddle v. Town Iliiwes' Heirs. 6 Bush. (Ky.) ]884 Eeal Pkoperty. [§ 486 § 486. Effect of dedication. A common law dedi- cation for highway purposes/^ or even for a park, common, or sqnare,^^ does not affect the ownership of tlie land, but merely gives to the public a right of nser therein. When, however, land is dedicated for a pur- pose which excludes the idea of its use by any and every individual, as in the case of a dedication for a school, church, or cemetery, the corporation or association which carries out the purpose of the dedication must have an exclusive control of the land which is practi- cally equivalent to possession thereof.^" In some states the view has been taken that in the case of land dedi- cated for a park,^^ or even for a highway ,^^ the munici- pal corporation which controls the land so dedicated in behalf of the public has a right of possession therein which entitles it to maintain ejectment against an in- truder thereon, a view which is not entirely satis- 232. But see Leadville v. Bohii Mining Co., 37 Colo. 248, 8 L- R- A. (N. S.) 422, 11 Ann. Cas. 443, 86 Pac. 1038. 18. Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange 1004; City of San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585. 91 Am. Dec. 542; Robbins v. White, 52 Fla. 613, 42 So. 841; Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. V. Hartley, 67 III. 439; Farwell v. Chicago, 247 HI. 235, 93 N. E. 168; Wilder v. City of St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192; Charleston Rice Milling Co. v. Bennett, 18 S. C. 254. 19. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431, 8 L. R. A. 452; At- torney General v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 13 L. R. A. 251, 28 N. E. 346; Porter v. International Bridge Co., 200 N. Y. 234, 93 N. E. 716; Pome- roy V. Mills, 3 Vt. 279, 23 Am. Dec. 207; Raleigh County Sup'rs v. Ellison, 8 W. Va. 308. 20. It has accordingly been decided that one who has dedicat- ed land for a cemetery has there- after no such right to possession of the land as to be entitled to maintain ejectment. Campbell v. City of Kansas, 102 Mo. 326, 10 L. R. A. 593, 13 S. W. 897; Hunter v. Trustees of Sandy Hill, 6 Hill. (N. Y.) 407. 21. Methodist Episcopal Church V. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13, 97 Am. Dec. 696; Price v. Plain- field, 40 N. J. L. 608. 22. Visalia v. Jacob, 65 Cal. 434, 52 Am. Rep. 303, 4 Pac. 433; City and County of San Fran- cisco V. Grote, 120 Cal. 59, 41 L. R. A. 335, 65 Am. St. Rep. 155, 52 Pac. 127; Lee v. Harris, 205 111. 428, 99 Am. St. Rep. 176, 69 N. E. 230; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. v. Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. 540; Ocean Grove § ^^^^ Dedication. 1885 factory from the standpoint of principle.-^ It is some- what difficult to see how a mere right of user in the public can confer on the municipality a right of possession, sufficient to sustain ejectment, it being con- ceded that a private individual having a mere right of user, that is, an easement, can have no such right ol possession. Even though the public right of user is of such character and extent as entirely to preclude any user of the land by the dedicator, or by his suc- cessor in interest, it seems desirable, for the purpose of legal theory, to deny the element of possession to a mere right of using the land. The statutes in regard to dedication by the re- cording of a plat frquently provide that the owner- ship of the land, and not a mere right of user, shall be vested in the municipality in trust for the public.-* Under such a statute the title to the land is properly to be regarded as passing by way of grant or conveyance, rather than by way of dedication, as the term was understood at common law. The statute makes the plat in eifect a conveyance of the land which purports to be devoted to j)ublic use. AVhether the ownership or merely a right of user is vested in the public, the land cannot be aliened by Camp Meeting Ass'n v. BerthaH, 481, 50 Am. Rep. 119, 21 N. W. 63 N. J. L. 312, 43 Atl. 887. 520. 23. For contrary decisions, see 24. See Leadville v. Bohn SUn. Savannah v. Steamboat Co., R. Co., 37 Colo. 248, 86 Pac. 1038: M. Charlt. (Ga.) 342; Covington Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 lU. 301; V. Freking, 8 Bush. (Ky.) 121; City of Pella v. Scholte, 21 Bay County v. Bradley, 39 Midi. Iowa, 463; Hutchinson v. Danley, 133, 33 Am. Rep. 367; Canton Co. 88 Kan. 437, 129 Pac. 163; VII- V. City of Baltimore, 106 Md. lage of Grandville v. Jenson, 84 69, 66 Atl. 679, 11 L. R. A. (N. Mich. 54, 47 N. W. COO; City o? S.) 129, 67 Atl. 274; South- Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; ampton v. Betts, 163 N. Y. 454, Carroll v. Elmwood. 88 Neb. 352. 57 N. E. 762; Street Comm'rs v. 129 N. W. 537; Incorporated Vil- Taylor, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 129; lage of Fulton's Lessee v. Mehren- Racine v. Crotsenberg, 61 Wis. feld. 8 Ohio St. 440. 1886 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 486 the public authorities to individuals,-'^ nor used for purposes other than those for which it was dedicated.^® A use of the land by the public authorities for l)urposes other than those contemplated in the dedica- tion will be restrained upon the application of owners of other land injured by such change of use^"^ and a suit for this purpose may be maintained by the dedi- cator, it seems, in case the ownership of the land is still in him,-^ but not if, under the statute, the owmer- 25. Douglass v. City Council of Montgomery, 118 Ala. 599, 43 L. R. A. 376, 24 So. 745; Rudolph Herman Co. v. City and C.ounly of San Francisco, 154 Cal. 688, 99 Pac. 169; City of Alton v. Illinois Transp. Co., 12 111 38, 52 Am. Dec. 479; Trustees of August V. Perkins, 3 B. ^^oil. (Ky.) 437; Cummings v. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259, 2 S. W. 130; Haberly v. Treadgcld, 67 Ore. 425, 136 Pac. 334; Corpora- tion of Seguin v. Ireland, 58 Tex. 183. 26. Western Railway of Ala. v. Alabama G. T. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272, 17 L. R. A. 474, 11 So. 483; Arkansas River Packet Co. v. Sorrels, 50 Ark. 466, 8 S. W. 683; Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 160 Cal. 699, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, 117 Fac. 906; Lutterloh v. Town of Cedar Keys, 15 Fla. 306; Ward v. Field Mu- seum, 241 in. 496, 89 N. E. 731; East Chicago Co. v. East Chi- cago, 171 Ind. 654, 87 N. E. 17; Hopkinsville v. Jarrett, 156 Ky. 777, 162 S. W. 85; Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177; Board of Regents for Normal School-Dist. No 3 v. Painter, 102 Mo. 464, 10 L. R. A. 493, 14 S. W. 938; Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church of Hoboken v. City of Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13, 97 Am. Dec. 696; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cin- cinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N. E. 983; Church v. Portland, 18 Ore. 73, 6 L. R. A. 259. 27. Douglass v. City Council of Montgomery, 118 Ala. 599, 43 L. R. A. 376, 24 So. 745; Lutter- loh v. City of Cedar Keys, 15 Fla. 306; Strange v. Hill & West Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 54 Iowa, 669, 7 N. W. 115; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363; Dodge v. North End Improvement Ass'n, 189 Mich. 16, Ann Cas. 1918E, 485, 155 N. W. 438; Row- zee V. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 40 L. R. A. 402, 65 Am. St. Rep. 625, 23 So. 307; Huber v. Gazley, 18 Ohio, 18, 3 Ohio St. 399; Church v. City of Portland, 18 Ore. 73; Morrow v. Highland Grove Traction Co., 219 Pa. 619, 123 Am. St. Rep. 677, 69 Atl. 41; Clement v. City of Paris, 107 Tex. 200, 175 S. W. 672. 28. Hardy v. City of Memphis, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 127; Rowzee V. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 40 L. R. A. 402, 65 Am. St. Rep. 625, 23 So. 307. But see Thorndike V. Milwaukee Auditorium Co., 143 Wis. 1, 126 N. W. 881. § 486] Dbdioatioit, 1887 ship of the land is in the public.-^ In case a right of user only is vested in the public, an abandonment of the right has the effect of leaving the land free from the burden thereof, in the original dedicator or those claiming under him.^° And even when, under the statute, the ownership is vested in the public, if the authorities entirely relinquish the use of the land, or the use for which the land was dedicated becomes impossible, the land has been held to revert to the original dedicator, or to persons claiming under him.^^ A mere failure on the part of the pulilic to exercise the right of user, or the cessation of such exercise, does not show an abandonment,'^^ nor is an improper 29. United States v. Illiuois C. R. Co., 154 U. S. 225, 38 L. Ed. 971; Thorndike v. Mil- waukee Auditorium Co., 143 Wis. 1, 126 N. W. 881. Contra, War- ren V. City of Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351. 30. Mahoning County Comr's V. Young, 8 C. C. A. 27, 59 Fed. 96; Matthews v. Bloodworth, 111 Ark. 545, 165 S. W. 263; Olin V. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 25 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454; Benham V. Potter, 52 Conn. 248; Robbins V. White, 52 Fla. 613, 42 So. 841; Bayard v. Hargrove, 45 Ga. 342; Thomsen v. McCormick, 136 111. 135, 26 N. E. 373; Town of Freedom v. Norris, 128 Ind. 377, 27 N. E. 869; Kitzman v. Green- halgh, 164 Iowa, 166, 145 N. W. 505; Baltimore & O. K. Co. v. Gould, 67 Md. 60, 8 Atl. 754; Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 423; Tracy v. Bittle, 213 Mo. 302, 112 S. W. 45; Porter v. International Bridge Co., 200 N. Y. 234. 9:5 N. E. 716; Rowe v. James, 71 Wash. 267, 128 Pac. 539. 31. Hill V. Kimball, 269 111. 398, 110 N. E. 18; Board of Sup'rs of Kent County v. City of Grand Rapids, 61 Mich. 144, 27 N. W. 888; Gaskins v. Wil- liams, 235 Mo. 563, 139 S. W. 117; City of Newark v. Waison, 56 N. J. L. 667, 24 L. R. A. 843, 29 Atl. 487; Heard v. City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 242; Board of Education of the Incorporated Village of Van Wert v. Inhabi- tants of Van Wert, 18 Ohio St. 221, 98 Am. Dec. 114; Haberly v. Treadgold, 67 Ore. 425, 136 Pac. 334; State v. Travis County, 85 Tex. 435, 21 So. 1029: Sow- adzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah, 127, 104 Pac. 111. 32. Santa Ana v. Santa Ana Valley Irr. Co., 163 Cal. 211. 124 Pac. 847; Chicago R. 1. & P. Ry. V. Council Bluffs. 109 Iowa, 425, 80 N. W. 564; Gardarl V. Humboldt. 87 Kan. 41. 123 Pac. 764; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 232; Uriel v. Natchez, 48 Miss. 423; Smith v. State, 23 N. J. L. 712; Spencer Eeal Pkopeety. [§ 486 use of the land by the public authorities sufficient in itself to terminate the riglits of the public therein."'^ V. Peterson, 41 Ore. 257, 68 Pac. 519; Pittsburg v. Epping-Carpen- ter Co., 194 Pa. St. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Hogan v. Jamestown, 32 R. I. 528, 80 Atl. 271; Basic City V. Bell, 114 Va. 157, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1031, 76 S. E. 336; Olson Land Co. v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 142, 136 Pac. 118; Lins V. Seefield, 126 Wis. 610, 105 N. W. 917. 33. Barclay v. Howell, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 498, 8 L. R. A. 478; McAlpine v. Chicago Great West- ern R. Co., 68 Kan. 207, 64 L. R. A. 85, 1 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 452, 75 Pac. 73; Parker v. City of St. Paul, 47 Minn. 317, 50 N. W. 347; Goode v. City of St. Louis, 113 Mo. 257, 20 S. W. 1048; Williams v. First Presby- terian Soc. in Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 478; Hardy v. City of Mem- phis, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 127; Thorndike v. Milwaukee Audi- torium Co., 143 Wis. 1, 126 N. W. 881. CHAPTER XXII. INTESTATE SUCCESSION, § 487. General considerations. 488. Descent to issue. 489. Surviving consort as lieir. 490. Parent as lieir. 491. Descent to collateral kindred. 492. Kindred of the half blood. 493. Representation. 494. Ancestral lands. 495. Illegitimate children. 496. Unborn children. 497. Adopted children. 498. Advancements. 499. Disinheritance. § 487. General considerations. At common law, the real property belonging to decedents j^assed, in the absence of a valid will/ to persons standing in a position of blood relationship to them, according to certain established rules or ''canons" of descent.- Personal property, on the other hand, including chattels real, passed to the administrator, appointed by the ecclesi- astical court from among the intestate's next of kin, who usually, whether rightly or wrongly, appropriated to his own use all the surplus after payment of debts,^ until by statute it was provided that such sur])lus should be distributed, in a certain manner, to the widow and children, or, in default of children, to the next of kin.* In this country, the common-law distinction between real and personal property in this regard is still re- 1. But a will was valid, ex- 208 et scq. cept by particular custom, only ?>. Blackst. Comni. 515; Holds- after the Statute of Wills. See worth & Vickers Law of Suf- ante, § 466. cession, 132. 2. Litt. §§ 2-8; 2 Bl. Comm. 4. 22 & 2ri Car. II. c. 10. (1889) 1890 Eeal Property. [§ 487 tained in perhaps a majority of states, though in some the executor is empowered, upon receiving authority from the court, to sell real property for the payment of debts. ^ In some states the statute provides that real property shall pass to the personal representative, to be administered by him in the same manner as personal property,*^ and there is a growing tendency to obliterate the distinctions between the two classes of property as regards the powers of the executor or admin'strator in redarg thereto. Generally, moreover. In this country, the persons to whom the real property passes upon the death of the owner intestate are approximately the same as those entitled to the personal property when dis- tributed by the personal representative. The original rule at common law was that the right of succession was determined by relationship to the ''first purchaser," as he was termed, meaning thereby the person who in theory, at least, brought the land into the family, but who might as well have been termed the last purchaser, as being the person who last acquired the land otherwise than by descent. In course of time, when land had been in the same family for several generations, it frequently became difficult satisfactorily to identify such purchaser, and the courts came to regard relationship to the person last seised in deed of the land as sufficient for this purjjose, on a presumption apparently to the effect that a person re- lated to the person last seised was ordinarily likewise related, in the same line of descent, to the first pur- chaser.'^ And so it is usually said that, at common law^, 5. Post, § 552. The common-law rule that seis- 6. Woerner, Administration, in in deed makes the root of §§ 276, 337; 1 Dembitz, Land descent, in connection with the Titles, § 28; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. rule that persons of the half Law, 1037 et seq. blood could not inherit, received 7. Watkins, Descents {4th what was regarded as its typical ed.) 11, 2 Blackst. Comm. 228, exemplification in the following and Chitty's note to same on p. case: If, on the death of a 209; Leake, Prop, in Land, 60. father seised in fee simple, leav- § 487 Intestate Successiox. 1891 the person claiming land by descent must have shown that he was heir to the person who was last actually seised of the land. Xevertheless, if one acquired land by purchase, although he did not acquire the actual seisin, as for instance a devisee w^ho failed to enter, his heir could take by descent to the exclusion of the heir of the person last actuahy seised.^ The present English statute provides that descent shall always be traced from the last purchaser^* while in this country, in most, if not all, the states, descent is traced from the person last entitled to the land, regardless of whether he was seised, or whether he ac- quired the land by purchase or by descent.*^ At common law, as in England at the present day, the male issue inherits before the female, and, when there are two or more males of equal degree, the elder alone inherits, while females inherit all together. These rules, in so far as they give priority to the male issue, and to the eldest of such issue, have been changed in all the states of this country, and all those in the same degree of relationship, w^hether male or female, share equally in the inheritance, the legislation in this country having followed in this respect, as it has frequently done in other respects, the provisions of the English statute as to the distribution of personal property.^" ing a son and a daughter by a referred to as the doctrine of first marriage, and a son by a "possessio fratis.'' See Litt. § second marriage, the elder son, 8; WiHlams, Seisin, 55; Challis, the heir, entered and obtained Real Prop. 241. seisin, and then died without is- 8. Watkins, Descents (4th ed.) sue, his half brother could not 29, 32; Hubback, Succession, 114. inherit, but the land passed to 8a. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. lOG. the sister, while, if he did not "The Inheritance Act." enter, the land would pass to 9. 4 Kent's Comm. itSS; the half brother. Hence the Greenleaf's Cruise's Dig. tit. 29. maxim, "Possessio fratris de feodo ch. 3; Dembitz, Land Titles, simplici facit sororem esse haer- § 30. edem," and the rule that seisin 10. 4 Kent's Comm. 379; 1 in deed is necessary to make the Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 3101. root of descent was frequently Occasionally a naked legal title ]S92 Real Property. [§ 487 Reversions and remainders. Since at common law descent was traced either from the person last actually seised, or from the last purchaser, it followed that if a reversion or remainder subject to a particular estate of freehold was cast upon an heir, such heir did not, unless he did acts changing the course of descent, constitute a root of descent, in case of his death while the particular estate was still outstanding, but the per- son claiming as heir upon his death was required to trace his descent from the original reversioner or re- mainderman, as being the last purchaser, and it was the person who was the heir of the latter at the time of the termination of the particular estate who was then enti- tled to possession. ^1 A like rule applied in the case of an executory devise, that person being entitled who could show himself the hoar of the original devisee at the time of the vesting. ^2 The common-law rule in this regard was recognized and applied in a number of states,^^ but even in those states, as in others, it has, for the most part, been super- seded, owing to the statutory changes in the law of descent, with the result that a reversion or remainder, which passes to one by descent, subsequently passes, on still descends as at common law. Scoggin, 92 N. Car. 99, 53 Am. As to estates tail, see cmfe, § Rep. 410. 30. In Barnitz v. Casey, 7 Cranch 11. Watkins, Law of Descents 456, and Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. (14th Ed.) 130; Cruise, Digest. 75, 47 Am. St. Rep. 363, 28 Atl. tit. 29, ch. 4, § 1 e< seq. 1062, it is said that he is en- 12. Goodright v. Searle, 2 Wils. titled who makes himself heir at 29; Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & the time when the contingency Pull. 643; Watkins, Law of De- happens. That is so in the scents, 132; Fearne, Cont. Rem. case of an executory interest, as 561. in the first of the above cited 13. Buck V. Lantz, 49 Md. cases, because it is then that 439; Conner v. Waring, 52 Md. the interest falls into possession, 724; Jenkins v. Bonsai, 116 Md. but it would not seem to be so 629, 82 Atl. 229; Payne v. Rosser, in the case of a contingent re- 53 Ga. 662; Jackson v. Hilton, mainder, unless the vesting and 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 96; Lawrence the termination of the particular V, Pitt. 46 N. Car. 344; King v. estate occur at the same time. § 48 / ] Intestate Succession. 1893 his d?atli intestate, to his heirs, without regard to the ancestor from whom he inherited. ^^ Devise to heir. In case one undertakes to devise to his heir exactly the same interest in par- ticular land as the latter would take by descent, he is regarded as taking by descent and not by the devise, descent being regarded as the worthier title.^-' So if one having an estate in fee simple undertakes to de- vise an estate for life to one person with remainder in fee simple thereon to his, the testator's, heir at lav\', the latter, instead of taking an estate in remainder under the devise, takes an estate in reversion by descent.^*^ That the devise is subject to a charge of some sort does not affect the application of the rule.^*^" But if the devise undertakes to give to the heir an estate in a larger or smaller share of the land than would have passed to him by descent, he takes under the devise."''' In case the property w'ould, apart from the devise, pass by descent to two or more persons to hold jointly, as in the second of the above son v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398; cited cases. At common law the Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia general doctrine applied to a Trust Co. 158 Ky. 280, 164 S. vested as well as to a contin- W. 939; Medley v. Williams, 7 genty remainder. G. & J. (Md.) 70; Ellfs v. Page, 14. Kean v. Hoffecker, 2 Harr. 7 Cush. (Mass.) 161; Felton v. (Del.) 103, 29 Am. Dec. 336; Billups, 2 Dev. & B. (19 N. Oliver v. Powell, 114 Ga. 592, Car.) 308; Seabrook's Excrs. v. 40 S. E. 826; North v. Graham, Seabrook, 1 McMul. Eq. (S. 235 111. 178, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) C.) 201; Hoover's Lessee y. 624, 126 Am. St. Rep. 189, 85 Gregory, 10 Yerg. 444. N. E. 267; Miller v. Miller, 10 16. Watkins, Law of Descents Mete. (Mass.) 393; Cook v. Ham- (4th Ed.) 221; Barr v. Gardner, mond, 4 Mason, 467; Moore v.- 259 111. 256, 102 N. E. 287; Stel- Rake, 26 N. J. L. 574; Barber v. well v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558, 35 Brundage, 165 N. Y. 368, 62 N. Am. Rep. 240; Donelly v. Turner, E. 417; Early v. Early, 134 N. 60 Md. 81; Whitney v. Whitney, C. 258, 46 S. E. 503; Hicks v. 14 Mass. 88. Pegues, 4 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 413. 16a. Clark v. Smith, 1 Salk. 15. Watkins, Law of Descents 241; Ellis v. Page, 7 Cusli. (4th Ed.) 229; Co. Litt. 12b, (Mass.) 161; Kinney v. Glasgow, Hargrave's note; .Tost v. Jost, 1 53 Pa. 141. Mackey (Dist. Col.) 487; David- 1894 Real Peoperty. [§ 488 the question whether a devise of the property to those persons would be operative depends primarily on wheth- er, in that particular jurisdiction, joint heirs take as coparceners or as tenants in common.^^^ If joint heirs take as coparceners, such persons named as joint devisees take under the devise and not by descent, since the devise creates a tenancy in common or joint tenancy, and cannot create a holding in coparcenery,^^*^ while if joint heirs take as tenants in common, a devise to them jointly, if not in such form as to create a joint tenancy, is nugatory as creating the same interest in each of them as he would acquire by descent. ^"^ § 488. Descent to issue. In all the states, realty descends to all the legitimate children of deceased living at his death, and to the descendants of deceased children, these latter taking per stirpes, and not per capita, that is, the descendants of each child taking what their an- cestor would have taken had he been alive, without reference to their number, ^^ In case all the children of the intestate are dead, the grandchildren and issue of deceased grandchildren inherit in their jjlace. Such descendants take per stirpes if they are not all in the same degree of relationship to the intestate, as when some are grandchildren and some are great-grand- children, while, if they are all in the same degree of relationship, they take in some states per capita, though in other states per stirpes}^ 16b. Landic v. Simmous, 1 300, 12 S. E. 753; McAfee v. App. D. C. 507; McDaniel v. Al- Gilmore, 4 N. H. 391'. leu, 64 Miss. 417, 1 So. 356; Mc- * 17. See Trustees of University Kay V. Hendon, 7 N. C. 209. v. Holstead, 4 N. Car. 289. 16c. Ante, § 193. 18. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 16d. Watkins, Law of Descent § 3101. (4th Ed.) 233; Anon. Cro. Eliz. 19. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 431, pi. 6; Gilpin v. HoUings- §§ 3103, 3137; 1 Dembitz, Land worth, 13 Md. 190, 56 Am. Dec. Titles, § 33, 737; Biedler v, Biedler, 87 Va. § 481)] Intestate Suocessiox. 1895 § 489. Surviving consort as heir. At common law, the surviving husband was entitled to an estate by curtesy in his wife's real property,^" while he took an absolute interest in her personal property, including chattels real.-^ Apart from his estate by curtesy, her real property did not pass to him, even though other- wise it escheated for failure of heirs. In this country, at the present day, the surviving husband is frequently given a fee-simple interest in his wife's real property. In some, he is, if the wife leaves no issue, given a fee- simple interest in all her realty, while in some he is given one-half or two-thirds of her realty in such case. In a number of states, although there are children, he takes a share by descent, which is greater or less, according to the number of children who are to share in the intestate's property. In some states, moreover, he takes all tlie realty, if the wife leaves no issue, parent, or brother or sister, and in most, if not in all, the states, he takes it if she leaves no kindred.^^ The surviving wife had, at common law, her right of dower only out of his realty, while, by the English statute of distribution, she was given one-third of his personalty, unless he left no issue, in which case she had one-half.^^ In this country the widow is frequently, by statute, given a fee-simple interest in a portion of her husband's realty in certain contingencies, as when he leaves no issue, or no issue, parent, or brother or sis- ter, or when he leaves no kindred, her rights correspond- ing, in a general way, to those of a surviving husband.^-* In a number of states, moreover, she is given a third or a half in fee simple, even though her husband loaves 20. Ante, §§ 237-245. Dembitz, Land Titles, § 32. 21. Co. Litt. 351; 2 Blackst. 23. 2 Blackst. Comm. 515. Comm. 434. 24. 1 Stinison's Am. St. Law, 22. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, §§ 3109, 311.5, 3119. 3123; 1 §§ 3105, 3109, 3115, 3119, 3123; 1 Woerner, Administration. § 67; Woerner, Administration, § 66; 1 1 Dembitz, Land Titles, § !52. 189G Real Propebty. [§§490,491 issue,^^ and this she is frequently allowed to take in lieu of any provisions made for her in his will.^^ § 490. Parent as heir. At common law, land could never lineally ascend, that is, it could not pass to the father or grandfather of the decedent upon the latter 's death, though it could pass to his uncle, the brother of his father, and might from him pass to the father.^ ^ This rule has been entirely changed in this country, and the statute frequently provides that the decedent's prop- erty shall pass to his father or mother in certain cases. Thus, in some states it is provided that, if the intestate leave no descendants, his property shall pass to his father, or to the father or mother, or to the mother, together with brothers and sisters, though in some states the brothers and sisters of deceased are preferred to either of his parents.^^ § 491. Descent to collateral kindred. In case the intestate leaves no issue surviving, and the realty does not pass entirely to the surviving consort, or to one or bott of the parents, under the statutes referred to above, it descends among the collateral kindred of the intestate, that is, to persons not lineally related to him, but related by reason of the fact that they are descended from the same ancestor. Among such collateral kindred the brothers and sisters and their descendants hold the first place, and are sometimes, by the terms of the stat- ute, preferred to the parents of deceased.^^ Generally, as between collateral kindred not ijartio- ularly specified in the statute of descent, those standing 25. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Law, 287 et seq.; Holdsworth § 3105. & Vickers, Law of Succession, 26. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 152. § 3262; see a^ite, § 236. 28. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 27. Litt. § 3. Different ex- §§ 3107, 3111, 3117; 1 Woerner, planations of the origin of this Administration, § 68. rule have been given. See 2 29. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Blackst. Coram. 211 et seq.: §§ 3107, 3111, 3113, 3121. 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. § 49J] Intestate Successio:n-. 1897 in an equal degree of relationship to the intestate share the inheritance to the exclusion of those in a more dis- tant degree. In the majority of the states, the statute provides that the degrees of kinship shall be computed according to the rule of the civil law, though a few have adopted that of the canon law, sometimes referred to as that of the common law.'*^ The preference shown for the civil law is in accord with the general tendency to follow the English statute of distributions, which was construed with reference to the civil law rule."^^ The difference between the two rules is as follows. The canon law regarded the intestate and a particular claim- ant as in the degree of relationship to one another which corresponded to the number of degrees between their common ancestor and the one of his two descendants who was most distant from him, so that if the claimant and intestate were both grandchildren of the common an- cestor, they were related to one another in the second degree, while, if one was a grandchild and the other a great-grandchild, they were related in the third degree. By the civil-law method of computing relationship, on the other hand, the degrees between the common ances- tor and the intestate were added to those between the former and the claimant, in order to ascertain the degree of relationship; and so two grandchildren of a common ancestor were related in the fourth degree, and a grandchild and a great-grandchild in the fifth degree.^- The canon law rule was utilized by the ecclesiastical courts for the purpose of determining the validity of marriage between blood relatives, but does not appear ever to have been recognized in England l)y the common law courts.-^"^ It has never in that country been applied for the purpose of determining rights of inheritance, 30. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Ed.) 355. §§ 3121, 3139; 1 Woerner, Admin- 32. 2 Blackst. Comm. 206 ct istration, § 72. srq. 31. Lloyd V. Tench, 2 Ves. Sr. 33. See Christian's note to 2 212; 1 Williams, Executors (9th Blackst. Comm. 207. 1898 Real Property. [§ 492 for the reason that these have always been ascertained, as between collateral kindred, upon the princi]3le of representation, according to which the lineal descend- ants of any person deceased stand in the place in which such person would have stood if he had been living.^* § 492. Kindred of the half blood. At common law, in order that one might inherit as a collateral kinsman of the intestate, it was necessary that they both be descended not only from the same person, but from the same marriage of that person, that is, the claimant must have been a kinsman of the whole, and not of the half, blood. So, one could not inherit from his half brother, even though the land had descended from their common parent to such half brother, and though other- wise the land would escheat for want of heirs.^^ This rule has been changed by statute in most, if not all, the states, but the statutory provisions on the subject are very divergent. In a few states, kindred of the half blood are given the same rights of succession as those of the whole blood; and in some they inherit half shares only as against the whole shares passing to those of the whole blood. In a number of states, while the dis- tinction between the whole and half blood no longer ex- ists in connection with land purchased by the intestate, it does exist as to ancestral land, so as to exclude from any share therein collateral kin not of the blood of the ancestor from whom the land was derived.^^* In a few states kindred of the half blood do not take except in default of kindred of the whole blood in the same de- gree of relationship.^*^ In the absence of any reference to the matter of whole or half blood, the statute has al- 34. Post, § 493. tion, § 70; 1 Dembitz, Land 35. Litt. §§ 6-8; 2 Blackst. Titles, § 37. The cases on the Comm. 227. subject are collected in editorial 35a. Post, § 494. notes 29 L. R. A. 552, 26 L. 36. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, R. A. N. S. 603, L. R. A. 1916C, § 3133; 1 Woerner, Administra- 923. § 493] Intestate Sucoesstox. 1899 most invariably been construed to apply without refer- ence to such a distinction.^"^ § 493. Representation. The common law doctrine was that the lineal descendants of a person deceased represent the latter, that is, stand in the place, for pur- poses of inheritance from another, in which the deceased person would have stood had he survived."^ ^ In this country, since the statutes expressly give the right of inheritance to the direct descendants of the intestate, and declare whether they are to take per stirpes or per capita, the application of the doctrine of representation is not usually called for in their favor. As regards col- lateral kindred, there is in some states a general pro- vision that the descendants of any person deceased shall inherit the estate which such person would have inherit- ed had he survived the intestate, but more usually the right of representation is in terms restricted to descend- ants of a deceased brother or sister. Thus, if the in- testate left surviving a brother and the children of a deceased sister, though such children could not otherwise assert any right to share the intestate's property with the surviving brother, since he stands in a closer degree of relationship to the intestate, they can do so by reason of their right of representation of the intestate.^^ In either case, descendants of a deceased brother or sister of the intestate stand in the place of such brother or sister as 37. In re Lynch's Estate, 132 453, 61 Am. Dec. 632; Beebee Cal. 214, 64 Pac. 284; Ector v. v. Griffing, 14 N. Y. 235; Stock- Grant, 112 Ga. 557, 53 L. R. A. ton v. Frazier, 81 Ohio St. 227, 723, 37 S. E. 984; Aldridge v. 90 N. E. 168; Edwards v. Barks- Montgomery, 9 Ind. 302; Ander- dale, 2 Hill Eq. 416; Baker v. son V. Bell, 140 Ind. 375, 29 L. Chalfant, 5 Whart. 477; Lynch's R. A. 541, 39 N. E. 7:T5; Neely v. Appeal, 132 Pa. St. 422, 19 Atl. Wise, 44 Iowa, 544; Clay v. 281; Marlow v. King, 17 Tex. 177. Cousins, 1 T. B. Men. (Ky.) 75 38. 2 Blackst. Comm. 217. Sheffield v. Lovering, 12 Mass. 39. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 489; Rowley v. Stray, 32 Mich. § 3138. 70: Prescott v. Carr, 29 N. H. 1900 Eeal Pkoperty. [§ 493 regards the right to share with any surviving brothers and sisters of the intestate or descendants of other deceased brothers and sisters. In some states the right of representation is not conceded to all descendants of a deceased brother or sister, but is restricted to the children of such brother or sister, the result of which would be, in the case stated above, that the surviving brother would take all the intestate's property, to the exclusion of the gi'andchildren of the deceased sister, though the children of the deceased sister would have been entitled had they survived.^^* A statute providing that no representation shall be allowed beyond the degree of brothers' and sisters' children precludes all persons not so closely related from taking by representation. Under such a statute, for instance, uncles and aunts take to the exclusion of the children of deceased uncles and aunts.^*^ But a statute thus limiting representation within certain degrees of kindred does not limit inheri- tance within those degrees, that is, persons beyond those degrees, if all in the same degree of kindred to the in- testate, may take as heirs without reference to the doc- trine of representation.^^ Ordinarily, if the statute expressly provides that certain classes of relatives shall take by representation, that doctrine cannot apply in favor of others.^- And a provision that the property shall, in a certain con- 39a. 1 Wocruer, Administra- 42. Curry's Estate, 39 Cal. tion, § 71; 1 Dembitz, Land 529; Quinby v. Higgins. 14 Me. Titles, § 35. 309; Bigelow v. Morong, 103 40. Porter v. Askew, 11 Gill. Mass. 287; In re Chapoton's Es- & J. 346; Clary v. Watkins, 64 tate, 104 Mich. 11, 53 Am. St. Neb. 386, 89 N. W. 1042; John- Rep. 454, 61 N. W. 892; Douglas ston V. Chesson, 6 Jones Eq. (59 v. Cameron, 47 Neb. 358, 66 N. N. C.) 146. And first cousins W. 430; Clayton v. Drake, 17 to the exclusion of children of Ohio St. 367; Brennemans Ap- first cousins. Adee v. Campbell, peal, 40 Pa. St. 115; North v. 79 N. Y. 52; In re Clendaniel's Valk, Dud. Eq. (S. C.) 212; In re Estate, 12 Phila. 54. Robert's Estate, 84 Wash. 163, 41. Hoffman v. Watson, 109 146 Pac. 398. Md. 532, 72 Atl. 479. § 493] Intestate Succession. 1901 tingency, descend to the next of kin "in equal degree," has ordinarily been construed as excluding any right, in those who are not next of kin, to share, by way of representation, with those who are next of kin.^^"* The doctrine of representation, as applied when there are claimants in different degrees of relationship to the intestate serves, so far as it may be available un- der the statute, to prevent the exclusion of the claimants of the more remote degree from all share in the in- testate's property. When all the claimants are in the same degree, they are all equally the intestate's next of kin, and consequently they may all share in the in- testate 's property without reference to the doctrine of representation. Whether, in such case, they take by way of representation or purely in their own right may however be important for the purpose of determining whether they take per stirpes or per capita.*^ If, for instance, the nephews and nieces of the intestate are to be regarded as taking by way of representation, the children of each brother or sister take together their parents share, that is, they take per stirpes, while if they do not take as representing their parent, they take per capita. The statutes fixing the course of descent have more usually been construed as calling for the application of the doctrine of representation only when the claimants are of unequal degree, and not when they are all of the same degree, the result of such construc- tion being that, in the latter case, they take per capita 43. In re Nigro's Estate, 172 Ark. 52. 9 S. W. 435; Houston Cal. 474, 156 Pac. 1019; Van v. Davidson, 45 Ga. 574; Cox v. Cleve V. Van Fossen, 73 Mich. Cox, 44 Ind. 368; Doane v. Free- 342, 41 N. W. 258; Conant v. man, 45 Me. 113; McComas v. Kent, 130 Mass. 178; Douglas v. Amos, 29 Md. 132; Balch v. Cameron, 47 Neb. 358, 60 N. W. Stone, 149 Mass. 39. 20 N. E. 430; Schenck v. Vail, 24 N. .1. 322; Ernst v. Freeman's Estate. Eq. 538; In re Sullivan's Estate, 129 Mich. 271, 88 N. W. 636: 48 Wash. 631, 94 Pac. 48.'], 95 Jones v. Barnett, 30 Tex. 637; Pac. 71. 2 Blackst. Coram. 417. 44. See Garrett v. Bean, 51 2 R. P.— 45 1902 Keal Propeety. [§ 494 and not per stirpes y^* A different construction has, how- ever, occasional!}^ been i^laced on a particular statute.^** In some states there is a specific provision that when all those entitled are of the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take per capita.*'^ § 494. Ancestral lands. At common law, in case of failure of lineal descendants of the person last seised, the land passed to his collateral relations only when they were of the blood of the first purchaser, by whom the land was brought into the family.^* This rule of the common law survives to some extent in the statutory pro- visions, found in a number of states, to the effect that, if the land came to the intestate either by descent, or by gift or devise from an ancestor, or sometimes, ''on the part of" or ''from" his father or mother, it shall pass to such kindred as are of the blood of the ancestor from whom it was derived by him.^^ The statutes of this 45. Byrd v. Lipscomb, 20 Ark. 19; Houston v. Davidson, 45 Ga. 574; In re Nigro's Estate, 172 Cal. 474, 156 Pac. 1019; Baker v. Bourne, 127 Ind. 466, 26 N. E. 1078; Snow v. Snow, 111 Mass. 389; Nichols v. Shep- ard, 63 N. H. 391; Staubitz v. Lambert, 71 Minn. 11, 73 N. W. 511; Eshleman's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 42; Fisk v. Fisk, 60 N. J. Eq. 195, 46 Atl. 538; Wagner v. Sharp, 33 N. J. Eq. 520; Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. St. 387; Stent v. McLeod, 2 McCord Eq. (S. C.) 354; Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. (Va.) 355; Ball v. Ball, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 325. 46. McComas v. Amos, 29 Md. 132; Odam v. Caruthers, 6 Ga. 39; Crump v. Faucett, 70 N. C. 345; Jackson v. Thurman, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 322. The English statute of Distri- bution has been construed as giving the property to the direct descendants of the intestate, when in equal degree, per stirpes, and to the collateral relatives, when in equal degree, per capita. Lloyd V. Tench, 2 Ves. Sen. 213; Re Ross's Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq 286; In re Natt, 37 Ch. Div. 517. 47. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 3137. See Ellis v. Harrison, 140 N. C. 444, 53 S. E. 299; Witherspoon v. Jernigan, 97 Tex. 98, 76 S. W. 445; Moore v. Conner— (Va.)—, 20 S. E. 936. 48. Litt. § 4; 2 Blackst. Coram. 220. See ante. § 487. Thus, if A purchased land and it de- scended to his son B, wbo was seised, and B died without issue, the land descended to such col- lateral relatives of B only as were of the blood of A. 49. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 494] Intestate SuccKSiiioN. 1903 general character differ to so great an extent in their phraseology that any general statements with reference thereto are difficult, if not impossible, to niake.-'^'' In some the exclusion of collateral kindred not of the blood of the ancestor from whom the property was derived applies only as between kindred in equal degree, and in some only in case there is a relative of the blood of that ancestor within a certain degree named, and in some it excludes the kindred not of the ancestor's blood in favor of any existing kindred of his blood, though not ordinarily, by the terms of the statute, to the extent of allowing the property to escheat for failure of heirs.'*'^ The statutes have ordinarily been construed as restricting the right of inheritance to the blood of the ancestor from whom the land passed directly to the in- testate, and not to the blood of the ancestor who first brought the property into the family, as at common law.^^ When the statute speaks of a gift or devise from an ancestor, the expression ''ancestor" might reason- ably, it would seem, be construed as referring to a person from whom the donee or devisee did actually inherit, or would have inlierited had the gift or devise not been made, rather than as referring to one from whom he § 3101; 1 Dembitz, Land Titles, v. Shailer, 46 Conn. 119; Smith § 36. V. Groom, 7 Fla. 81; Murpliy v. 49a. The cases construing the Henry, 35 Ind. 442; Cutter v. statutes in this regard are most Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206; Den v. conveniently collected in note Jones, 8 N. J. L. 340; Wheeler to L. R. A. 1916C, 902 et seq. v. Clutterbuck, 52 N. Y. 67; See also editorial note 15 Col- Hyatt v. Pugsley, 33 Barb. (N. umbia Law Rev. 526. Y.) 373; Clayton v. Drake, 17 50. That the property does not Ohio St. 367; White v. White, escheat, see State University v. 19 Ohio St. 531; Morris v. Pot- Brown, 1 Ired. L., 23 N. Car. ter, 10 R. L 58; Arnold v. O'Con- 387; Dowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa. nor, 397 R. L 557, L. R. A. 1916C, St. 41; Parr v. Bankhart, 22 898, 94 Atl. 145. Contra, Lewis Pa. St. 291. V. Gorman, 5 Pa. St. 164; Wil- 51. Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. kerson v. Bracken, 2 Ired L. (U. S.) 58, 7 L. Ed. 347; Clark (24 N. C.) 315. 190J: Ee.\l property. [§ 49^ might have inherited had some other heir not inter- vened.^- For instance, the fact that the person who de- vised the land to the intestate was his micle or his cousin, so that, had the latter not left a brother surviv- ing, the property would have come to the intestate by descent, would not seem to make such testator the ancestor of the intestate within the meaning of the statute. A brother or sister may be an ancestor within such a provision.^^ That the statute provides for the descent of property, in a certain contingency, from husband to wife, or from wife to husband, has in at least one state been regarded as not making the one consort the ancestor of the other, for the purpose of the statutes referred to.^^ In case the legal and equitable titles to the land in question came to the intestate from ditferent sources, it is the source of the legal title, rather than of the equit- able, which determines whether it is to be regarded as coming from a particular ancestor.^'* But the fact that the ancestor paid for the land, or that it was paid for from his estate, has been regarded as making it a gift to the intestate from the ancestor, though it was con- veyed by the vendor directly to the intestate.^® 52. Such construction was 699. adopted in Burgwyn v. Devereux. 55. Goodright v. WeUs, Dougl. 1 Ired. Law (23 N. C.) 583; 771; Selby v. Alston, 3 Ves. Jr. Osborne v. Widenhouse, 3 Jones 339; Hill v. Heard, 104 Ark. 23, Eq. (56 N. C.) 238. But in 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 446, Ann. Greenlee v. Davis, 19 Ind. 60, Cas. 1914C, 403, 148 S. W. 254; the word "ancestor" was con- Wells v. Head, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) strued as equivalent to "kindred." 166; Nicholson v. Halsey, 1 And to that effect is Hostetler Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 417; Higgins V. Peters, 94 Ohio 17, 113 N. E. v. Higgins, 57 Ohio St. 239, 48 656. N. E. 943; Russell v. Bruer, 64 53. Benedict v. Brewster, 14 Ohio St. 1; Shepard v. Taylor, Ohio, 368; Cutter v. Waddingham, 15 R. I. 204, 3 Atl. 382, 16 R. I. 22 Mo. 206. 166, 13 Atl. 105. 54. Brower v. Hunt, 18 Ohio 56. Galloway v. Robinson, 19 St. 311; Stembel v. Martin, 50 Ark. 396; Cotton v. Citizens' Ohio St. 495. Contra. Cornett Rank. 97 Ark. 568. 135 S. W. V. Hough, 136 Ind. 387, 35 N. E. 346; Prick Coke Co. v. Longhead, § 49-1:] Intestate Succession. 1905 Generally speaking, land acquired by means of an- cestral land, as by purchase with the proceeds of the sale of the latter, ^^^ or by exchange,^^ is not ancestral. But ancestral land would not ordinarily lose its charac- ter as such because a partition thereof between the heirs is elTected.'^'-^ If one who owns land which came to him from an ancestor conveys it to another and takes a re- conveyance back, the land will ordinarily lose its ances- tral character and pass, on his death intestate, as having been newly acquired by him.'^'^ Of somewhat the same nature as the statutory pro- visions above referred to, as making the course of de- scent dependent upon the source of the intestate's title, are the provisions found in a number of states to the effect that, upon the death of a minor unmarried, leav- ing property which came from either parent, by descent or, in some states, by gift or devise, it shall descend to the other children of the same parent, or to the issue of such children.*'^ The effect of a statute of this character has in several cases been said to be to make the property pass to the surviving children as by de- scent, not from the deceased child, but from the parent, 203 Pa. 168, 52 Atl. 172. Contra, ante, § 203. Pattersnn v. Lamson, 45 Ohio 60. Co. Litt. 12b; Watkin«?, St. 77. Conipare Carter v. Day, Law of Descents (4th Ed.) 241 59 Ohio St. 96, 69 Am. St. Rep. et seq; Holme v. Shinn, 62 N. 757, 51 N. E. 967. J. Eq. 1, 49 Atl. 151; Kihlken v. 57. Watson v. Thompson. 12 Kihlken, 59 Ohio St. lOG, 69 Am. R. I. 466; Martin V.Martin, 98 Ark. St. Rep. 757. 51 N. E. 967; 93, 135 S. W. 348. See Adams v. Nesbitt v. Trindle, 64 Ind. 183. Anderson, 23 Miss. 705; Cornett But see Dudrow v. King, 117 V. Hough, 136 Ind. 387. Md. 182, 83 Atl. 34, and the edi- 58. Armington v. Armington, torial note thereon, 12 Columbia 28 Ind. 74; Brower v. Hunt, 18 Law Rev. 625. Ohio St. 311. 61. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law. 59. Martin v. Martin, 98 Ark. § 3101; 1 Dembitz. Land Titles, 93, 135 S. W. 348; Conkling v. § 36. See In re Van Orsdol's Brown, 8 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Estate. 94 Neb. 98. 142 N. W. Y.) 345; Lawson v. Townlev, 686; and editorial note, L. R. 90 Ohio, 67. 106 N. E. 780. Sae A. 1916C, at p. 926. 1906 IJeal Property. [§ 495 as if such cliild had died in the parent's lifetime.''- But nevertheless it has been occasionally decided that prop- erty which came, by force of the statute, to the deceased minor child upon the death of another deceased minor child, did not come from the deceased parent, so as to be within the operation of the statute.*'^ The statute does not apply when the property came from a grand parent and not from a parent,''^ and when it in terms applies only to property acquired by descent, it does not ap- ply to property acquired by devise.^^ § 495. Illegitimate children. At common law, a child born out of wedlock was regarded as filiiis nullius, and as consequently bearing no relationship to any persons other than his own offspring. Consequently he could be the heir neither of his own father or mother, nor of any other person, and no persons could inherit from him except the heirs of his body.^*' This rule has been changed generally in this country by various statu- tory provisions. In the first place, the state statute frequently provides that the intermarriage of the parents after the birth of the child, or such intermar- riage when accompanied by the father's acknowledgment of the child, shall render the child legitimate, and in some states the acknowledgment by the father without inter- marriage has this effect, subject to the proviso, usually, that an acknowledgment of the child shall not enable the child to inherit from the kindred of the father.^'^ 62. In re North's Estate, 48 64. Walden v. Phillips, 86 Ky. Conn. 583; Nash v. Cutler, 16 302, 5 S. W. 757; Sedgwick v. Pick. (Mass.) 491; Crowell v. Minot, 6 Allen (Mass.) 171; Clough, 23 N. H. 207; Perkins Whitten v. Davis, 18 N. H, 88. V. Simons, 28 Wis. 90; In re 65. Donahue's Estate, 36 Cal. Fort's Estate, 14 Wash 10, 44 329; Nash v. Cutler, 16 Pick. Pac. 104. (Mass.) 491; BurTte v. Burke, 63. Driskell v. Hanks, 18 B. 34 Mich. 451. Mon. (Ky.) 855; Goodrich v. 66. 1 Blackst. Comm. 459; 2 Adams, 138 Mass. 552; Walkers v. Kent's Comm. 212. Boaz, 2 Rob. (Va.) 485. Contra, 67. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Perkins v. Simons, 28 Wis. 90. §§ 6631, 6632. There is an ex- § 496] Intestate Succession. 1907 In most states, by statute, the illegitimate children in- herit from the mother equally with the legitimate chil- dren, and in some states they inherit also from her kindred, though in a majority of the states, while inherit- ing from the mother, they do not inherit from her kin- dred. In a few states they inherit from the mother only in case of default of lawful issue."^' The property of an illegitimate child will descend to the sur\'iving husband or wife, or to the children, as in the case of any other person dying intestate. In default of such others en- titled to inherit, the decedent's property goes usually, under the statute, to the mother and the latter 's kin- dred.«9 § 496. Unborn children. At common law, a cliild en ventre sa mere at the time of the death of the intes- tate, if subsequently born alive, is regarded as living at the time of such death, for the purpose of taking from him by descentj^ this according with a general rule that such a child is to be regarded as living when it is to its interest so to regard it.'^^ The common law rule has been applied in a number of decisions in this coun- try,'^^ occasionally subject to the qualification that not only must the child be born alive, but the period of its ceUent summary of the statutes, 71. See Doe d. Clarke v. vith references to some of the Clarke, 2 H. El. 399; Gray decisions thereon. In 1 Dembitz. Perpetuities, § 220; Williams, Land Titles, §§ 39, 40. See also Real Prop. (21st Ed.) 3G3. See 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd for a general discussion of the Ed.) 327. status of such a child, editorial 68. 1 Stimson's Am. Law, § note 26 Harv. Law Rev. 638. 3151; 1 Woerner, Administration, 72. Morrow v. Scott. 7 Ga. § 75. 5.15; Barr v. Gardner, 259 111. 69. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 256, 102 N. E. 2S7; Massie v. § 3154; 1 Woerner, Administra- Hiatt's Adm'r. 82 Ky. 314; tion, § 75. Aubuchon v. Render, 44 Mo. 560; 70. Watkins, Law of Descents, Giles v. Solomon, 10 Abb. Prac. ch. 4; Challis, Real Prop. (3rd (N. S.) 97; Hill v. Moore. 1 Ed.) 139. Murph. (5 N. C.) 23:5; Pear.son V. Carlton, 18 S. C. 47. 1908 Eeal Peopekty. [§ 496 foetal existence must have been such that its contin- uance in life may be reasonably anticipated,''^" and in a number of states the common law rule has been confirmed by statute.'^'* In many states, however, the statute in terms provides for inheritance by posthumous children only who are the children of the intestate, or, in some, who are descended from him.'^' A statute thus ex- cluding posthumous children other than children of the intestate has been construed to exclude only those born after the death of the intestate, and not to exclude a relative previously born merely because he happened to have been born after the death of his own father/^ A child which was en ventre sa mere at the time of the intestate's death, and entitled to take by descent from him, cannot be divested of his interest, it has been held, by a proceeding to which he was not a party, even though the decree therein was rendered before his birth.'^ The case of descent to a child en ventre sa mere at the time of the intestate's death prosents one case of what has been referred to as the doctrine of shifting inheritances, by which, as it was recognized at common law, the estate of the person wlio was next in the line of descent at the time of the intestate 's death was liable to be divested in favor of one subsequently born who was nearer in the line of descent.'^^ In so far as descent to a child en ventre sa mere at the time of the intestate's death is recognized, the inheritance necessarily shifts, 73. Nelson v. Iverson, 24 Ala. 278, 4 Atl. 679. 9, 60 Am. Dec. 442;; Harper v. 77. Botsford v. O'Conner, 57 Archer, 4 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 99, 111. 72; Massie v. Hiatt, 82 Ky. 43 Am. Dec. 472; Marsellis v. 314; Giles v. Solomon, 10 Abb. Thalhimer, 2 Paige 35, 21 Am. Pr. N. S. 97; Deal v. Sexton, Dec. 66. 144 N. C. 157, 119 Am. St. Rep. 74. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law 943, 56 S. E. 691. § 3136. 78. 2 Blaekst. Comm. 208; 3 75. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Cruise's Dig. tit. 29 ch. 3, § 11; §§ 2844, 3135, 3136; 1 Woerner, Watkins, Law of Descents, 169, Administration, § 74. 185. 76. Shriver v. State, 65 Md. § 497] Intestate Succession. 1909 either partially or wholly, npon his subsequent birth. But in several eases in this country the doctrine of shift- ing inheritances has been repudiated, in so far as it was asserted in favor of a person born after the intestate 's death who was not at the time of such death en voitre. sa mere/^ Occasionally the statute provides that no child born after the intestate's death shall take bv descent unless born within ten months thereafter.**^ § 497. Adopted children. The statutes authorizing the adoption of children quite frequently contain express provisions as to inheritance both by and from an adopted child.^^ Apart from any such express provision, the effect of the adoption is ordinarily to entitle the child to inlierit from the adoptive parent as if he were the latter 's own child, ^^ and to entitle the child of the adopted child to inherit from the adoptive parent.'^'^ But the statutes do not ordinarily operate to give to thb adopted child a right to inherit from the kindred of the adoptive parent,** they frequently containiuij an ex- 79. Bates v. Brown, 5 Wall. Me. 578, 55 Atl. 520; Ross v. (U. S.) 710, 18 L. Ed. 535; Cox Ross, 129 Mass. 24.3, 37 Am. Rep. V. Matthews, 17 Ind. 367; Drake 321; Morrison v. Estate of Ses- V. Rogers, 13 Ohio St. 21; Melton sion's, 70 Mich. 297, 14 Am. St. V. Davidson, 86 Tenn. 129, 5 S. Rep. 500, 38 N. W. 249; Rowans W. 530. The doctrine was for- Estate, 132 Pa. 299, 19 Atl. 82. merly recognized in North Car- See editorial note 5 Virginia Law olina. Ciitlar v. Cutlar, 2 Rev. 349. Hawkes (9 N. C.) 324, but was 83. In re Darling's Estate. 173 superseded by the act of 1823. Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606; Pace v. Rutherford v. Gregn, 2 Ired. Eq. Klink, 51 Ga. 220; Gray v. (37 N. C.) 121. Holmes, 57 Kan. 217, 33 L. R. A. 80. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 207, 45 Pac. 596: Power v. § 3136. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671. 4 S. W. 683; 81. 1 stimson's Am. St. Law, Herrick's Estate, 124 Minn. 85, § 6647. 144 N. W. 455; Bernero v. Good- 82. Re Newman, 75 Cal. 213, 7 win, 267 Mo. 427. 184 S. W. 74; Am. St. Rep. 146, 16 Pac. 887; Batchelder v. Walworth,— (Vt.) — Barnes v. Allen, 25 lad. 222; 82 Atl. 7; See In re Webb's Eh- Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 133, tate, 250 Pa. 179. 95 Atl. 419. 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) V.id, 136 S. 84. Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 W. 133; Virgin v. Marwlck, 97 ill. 536, 2.S L. R. A. 665. 39 Am. 1910 Eeal Property. [§ 497 plicit provision to this effect. The adopted child may, it has been held, inherit from his natural parent as he would have done had he never been adopted.^^ But there are decisions to the effect that one cannot inherit from the adoptive parent both as an adopted child and as a blood relative of such parent.^^ St. Rep. 196, 36 N. E. 628; Wallace v. Noland, 246 111. 535, 138 Am. St. Rep. 247, 92 N. E. 535; Barnhizel v. Ferrell, 47 Ind. 335; Sunderland h Estate, 60 Iowa, 732, 13 N. W. 655; Merritt V. Morton, 143 Ky. 133, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 139, 136 S. W. 133; Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146, 66 L. R. A. 437, 109 Am. St. Rep. 669, 100 N. W. 278, 4 Ann. Cas. 879; Hockaday V. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775, 98 S. W. 585; Meader v. Archer, 65 N. H. 214; Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N. E. 445, 69 Am. St. Rep. 753; Burnett's Estate, 210 Pa. 599, 69 Atl. 74; Batchel- ler-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R. I. 45, 97 Atl. 378; Helms v. EUiott, 89 Tenn. 446, 10 L. R. A. 635, 14 S. W. 930: Moore v. Moore, 35 Vt. 98. "The ancestors of the adopter are presumed to know their relatives by hlood, and to have them in mind in the distribution of their estates, either by will or descent, but they cannot be expected to keep informed as to adoption proceed- ings in the probate court of the coXinties of this state; and to allow an adopted child to inherit from the ancestors of the adop- ter would often put property into the hands of unheard-of adopted children, contrary to the wishes and expectations of such ances- tors." Burket, J., in Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, C9 Am. St. Rep. 753. 85. Barnhizel v. Farrell, 47 Ind. 335; Wagner v. Warner, 50 Iowa, 532; Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 39 L. R. A. 748, 65 Am. St. Rep. 635, 44 S. W. 761; Upson V. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655; Compare dicta in Re Jobson's Estate, 164 Cal. 312, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, 128 Pac. 938; Re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378. That the adopted son may inherit from his natural grandfather, see In re Darling's Estate, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606. In Indiana it has been d«eided that a child adopted by a hus- band during his former marriage was a child "by a previous wife" within a statute giving a share in his estate to such a child. Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 17 L. R. A. 806, 31 N. E. 1047; Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993. An adopted child of a deceased devisee has been regarded as "an heir in a descending line" of such devisee within a statutory provision substituting such heir in place of the deceased devisee, so as to prevent a lapse. Clark v. Clark, 76 N. H. 551, 85 Atl. 758; Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 17 L. R. A. 435. 30 Am. St. 497] Intestate Succession", 19]1 As regards inheritance from the adopted child, it is occasionally provided by the statute that property ac- quired by him by gift, devise or descent from the adopt- ive parent shall pass, upon his death intestate and with- out issue, to such parent, and in some states that prop- erty otherwise acquired by him shall so pass.«" There is at least one decision to the effect that, even in the absence of any statutory provision in this regard, all property of the child, in such case, passes to the adoptive parent, to the exclusion of his blood relatives.^"* There are, on the other hand, decisions that all his prop- erty passes to his own kindred to the exclusion of the adoptive parent,^'-* such a view being occasionally based on the fact that the statute, providing in te?-ms that the adopted child should be heir of the adoptive parent, and being silent as to any right of inheritance by the lat- ter, impliedly excluded any such rights.*'" In some states Rep. 370, 24 Atl. 948. And in Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524 it was held that the adopted child of a deceased child of decedent was "living issue" of such deceased child within a statute providing for descent to living issue of a deceased child. 86. Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81, 62 Atl. 253; Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N. E. 177; De- lano V. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619, 2 L. R. A. 698, 20 N. E. 308; Contra, Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa, 532. As regards the effect of a second adoption by another person upon the child's right to inherit from him who first adopted him, see editorial notes, 31 Harv. Law Rev. 488; 16 Mich. Law Rev. 119; 5 Virginia Law Rev. 349, commenting on In re Klapp's Estate, 107 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381, in which it was decided that the right to inherit under the first adoption was de- stroyed. Contra, Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993. 87. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 6649. 88. In re Jobson's Estate, 164 Cal. 312. 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, 128 Pac. 938. 89. White v. Dotter, 73 Ark. 130, 83 S. W. 1052; Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 Pac. 693; In tre Namaun, 3 Hawaii. 484; Baker v. Clowser, 158 Iowa, 156, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056, 138 N. W. 837; Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729, Ann. Cas. 19170, 466, 66 So. 132; Reinders v. Koppelman. 68 Mo. 482, 494; Edwards v. Ycarby. 168 N. C. 663. L. R. A. 1!»1.'-)E. 462, 85 S. E. 19; Upson v. Noble. 35 Ohio St. 655; nolo v. Rol)l)ln.s. 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617. 90. Corn v. Powell. Ml W N. ]912 Keal Pkopekty. [§ 498 it is the law that an adoptive parent or his kindred shall take such proi:)erty as passed to the child from the adoptive parent, while the blood relatives take property which he acquired otherwise. ^^ The right of inheritance, acquired by a child's adoption in one state will, it has been held, be recognized in another state, in so far as this right is not inconsis- tent with the laws and policy of the latter state.^^ § 498. Advancements. An advancement is a giv- ing, by anticipation, to a child or other relative, of a part or the whole of what the donee would receive on the death of the donor intestate, with the result, general- ly speaking, that the amount thereof is deducted in determining the share of such donee after the donee's death. A substantially similar doctrine was recognized at common law, in the case of land given to one of several co-heiresses to hold in frank marriage, she being excluded from any share in the ancestor's land unless she brought the land given her into a common fund for equal distribution, this being known as ''hotchpot.'"^" C. (Pa.) 297; Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617. 91. See Swick v. Coleman, 2l8 m. 33, 75 N. E. 807; Lanferman V. Van Zile, 150 Ky. 751, 150 S. W. 1008; Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N. W. 617; Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274. In Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788, Paul V. Davis, 100 Ind. 422, overruling Barnhizel v. Ferrell, 47 Ind. 335, it was decided that property which descended to the adopted child from the adoptive parent descended to the latter's kindred, the question of the descent of property otherwise acquired being expressly left undecided. 92. Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn 152, 70 Atl. 453; Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 IH. 536, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196. 36 N. E. G28; Schick v. Howe, 137 Iowa, 249, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 980, 114 N. W. 916; Gray v. Holmes, 57 Kan. 217, 33 L. R. A. 207, 45 Pac. 596; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 466, 66 So. 132; Anderson v. French, 77 N. H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042, L. R. A. 1916 A, 660; Finley v. Brown, 122 Tenn. 316, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1285, 123 S. W. 359. See Calhoun V. Bryant, 28 S. Dak. 266, 133 N. W. 266. Contra, Brown v. Fin- ley, 157 Ala. 424, 21 L. R. A. N. S. 679, 131 Am. St. Rep. 68, 47 So. 577. 93. 2 Blackst. Comm. 190. As § 498] Intestate Succession. 1913 Frank-marriage was, however, practically obsolete even in Blackstone 's time,^^ and the modern law of advance- ments is based exclusively on statutes, which differ some- what in different states."^ In most states the statute applies in terms to a gift to any descendant of the intestate, but a statute apply- ing in terms to a gift to a child only has been construed as extending to a gift to another descendant.'**^ The statutes^f many states provide that if the per- son to whom the advancement was made dies before the intestate, his representives shall stand in his place as regards the advancement, that is, will take subject to the deduction thereof as the ancestor would have done.®^ But even apart from an express provision to that effect, it seems, persons taking by right of representation the share of him to whom the advancement was made, take subject to such deduction.^^ Persons, on the other hand, who take in their own right and not by right of represen- tation, take free from any claim on account of advance- ments made to their parent.^^ to local customs of charging ad- 114 111. 603, 2 N. E. 603, 4 N. E. vancements in connection with 137, 7 N. E. 287; Bramford v. the distribution of personalty, Crawford, 51 Ga. 20; Coffman v. see 2.Blackst. Comm. 517; Holt Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8, 23 S. E. V. Frederick, 2 P. Wms. 356. 523. 94. 2 Blackst. Comm. 115. 98. Simpson v. Simpson, 114 95. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 111. 603, 2 N. E. 603; Barber v. §§ 31G0-31G8; 2 Woerner, Admin- Taylor, 9 Dana (Ky.) 84; Smith istration, § 559. v. Smith, 59 Me. 214; Williams' 96. In re Williams. 62 Mo. Estate, 62 Mo. App. 339; Headen App. 339; Johnson v. Antriken, v. Headen, 42 N. C. 159; Quarlcs 205 Mo. 244, 103 S. W. 936; v. Quarles. 4 Mass. 680; Parsons Storey's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 89; v. Parsons, 52 Ohio St. 470; Per- A gift to a grandchild made son's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 121; Mr- while the grandchild's parent was Lure v. Steel, 14 Rich. Eq. 105. alive has been regarded as not 99. Brown v. Taylor, 62 Ind. constituting an advancement to 295; Skinner v. Wynne, 2 Jones the parent. Stevenson v. Martin, Eq. 41; Calhoun v. ('osgrove. 33 11 Bush (Ky.) 485. La. Ann. 1001; Person's Apeal, 97. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 74 Pa. St. 121. § 3164. See Simpson v. Simpson, 1914 Real Property. [§ 498 The question whether a gift to a possible heir or distributee is to be regarded as an advancement is a question as to the intention of the donor, and, apart from statute, a gift to an adult child, if of substantial value, is usually presumed to be an advancement.^ In a num- ber of states there are statutory provisions to the effect that the gift, in order to constitute an advancement, must be acknowledged in writing as an advancement by the donee, or must be expressed in the g^ft or grant to be made as such, or must be so charged by the donor in writing.- In some states it is provided that maintaining, educating, or giving money to a minor child, without any view to a portion or settlement for life, is not an ad- vancement.^ The statute in most states declares that, if the amount of the advancement exceeds the share to which the donee would be entitled on the death of the donor in- testate, though he need refund no part of what he has received, he can receive nothing further from the intes- tate 's estate. In case the advancement is not equal to the share to which he is entitled, the donee, iti a num- ber of states, is given so much of the intestate's prop- erty as will make all the shares equal ; and in some states it is provided that the advancement is to be charged against the share to which the donee is entitled in either the real or the personal property, according as the advancement may have been the one or the other, and that, if the advancement should exceed the amount to which he may be entitled out of either class of ]3roperty, his share in the other class shall be proportionally re- duced. In some states it is provided in terms that the donee must, in order to obtain his proper share in the 1. 2 Woerner, Administration, 2. 1 Stimson Am. St. Law, § § 555; Boyer v. Boyer, 62 Ind. 3162. App. 73, 111 N. E. 952; Calhoun 3. 1 Stimson, Am. St. Law, § V. Taylor, 178 Iowa, 56, 159 N. 3161. This appears to be so apart W. 600; Lynch v. Culver, 260 Mo. from such an express provision. 495, 168 S. W. 1138. 2 Woerner, Administration, § 555. § 499] Intestate Succession. 1915 intestate's proi)erty, bring the amount of tlie advance- ment into ''hotch pot," that is, he must eontiibute to the common fund the amount of his advancement, and shall then receive therefrom the same amount as if the advancement had not been made.^ The statutes in regard to advancements have no ap- plication, as a general rule, in the case of a partial in- testacy, since it is presumed that the will would have mentioned any gifts which it was intended should be regarded as advancements.^ § 499. Disinheritance. It is generally recognized that one who would otherwise take, as heir or distributee, the w^liole or a part of decedent's property, cannot be deprived of his right in this regard by a mere expres- sion of an intention to that effect in decedent's will, without a testamentary disposition of the property in favor of another or others. For instance, a statement in testator's will that his eldest son is not to share in his estate will not preclude the son from so sharing, unless all tlie estate is etfectuallv disposed of bv tlie will.« Even though all of decedent's property is otherwise disposed of by the will, this is not necessarily effective, in many states, to deprive a child of decedent, or tlie issue of a deceased child, of a right to share thereiu, it 4. 1 Stirason's Am. St. Law, § Anderson, 69 N. H. 561, 44 All. :>]63. 103; Nagle v. Conard, 79 N. J. 5. 2 Woerner, Administration, Eq. 124, 81 Ail. 841, 80 N. J. Eq. § 553; 1 Dembitz, Land Titles, § 253, 86 Atl. 1103; Gallagher v. 248. Crooks, 132 N. Y. :]?>S. 30 N. K. 6. Denn v. Gaskin, Cowp. 657; 746; In re Trimble's Will, 199 N. Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. Jr. Y. 454, 92 N. E. 1073; Atkins 492; Campbell-Kan nanakoa v. v. Kron, 2 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 58; Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 92 Pac. Vaughn v. Lanford, 81 S. C. 282. 184; Lane v. Patterson, 138 Ga. 62 S. E. 316; Bois.seau v. Al- 710, 76 S. B. 47 (semble); Tea dridges, 5 Leigh (Tenn.) 222; V. Millen, 257 111. 624, 101 N. E. Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 209; Doe v. Lanius, 3 Ind. 441. 8 S. E. 072. 56 Am. Dec. 518 & note; Wells v. 1916 Real Peoperty. [§ 499 being frequently provided by statute that a child, or the issue of a deceased child, not provided for in the will, shall, subject to varying limitations, take the share which he would have received in case decedent had died intestate, and in many states there is such a provision, confined in its operation, however, to the case of a child who was born after the execution of the wdllJ 7. See 1 Stimson's Am. St. Administration, § 55. Law, §§ 2842, 2843, 1 Woerner, CHAPTEE XXIII ADVERSE POSSESSION OF LAND. § 500. General considerations. 501. Actual and visible possession. 502. Exclusiveness of possession. . 503. Hostility of possession. 504. Necessity of claim of title. 505. Mistake in locating boundary. 506. Necessity of right of action. 507. Interruption of running of statute. 508. Tacking. 509. Personal disabilities. 510. Exception in faTor of the sovereign. 511. Effect as vesting and divesting title. 512. Extent of possession. 513. Particular relations. (a) Landlord and tenant. (b) Trustee and cestui que trust. (c) Licensor and licensee. (d) Principal and agent. (e) Grantor and grantee. (f) Vendor and vendee. (g) Life tenant and remainderman, (h) Cotenants. (i) Mortgagor and mortgagee. (j) Mortgagor and foreclosure purchaser. (k) Surviving spouse and heirs. (1) Parent and child. (m) Husband and wife. § 500. General considerations. There were, even in early times, numerous statutes adopted in England limiting the time within which an action could be brouglit on account of a disseisin of land, but these differed from the statutes of the present day in that, instead of naming a certain number of years before the institution of the action beyond which no disseisin could be alleged, they named a certain j^ear back of which the pleader could Z R. P.-46 (191') 1918 Real Property. [§ 500 not go.^ The last statute whicli adopted this method of tixing the period of limitation was St. Westminster I. e. o9,- which forbade the seisin of an ancestor to be alleged in a writ of right prior to the beginning of the reign of Richard I. (A. D. 1189), and for other writs fixed the year 1217. Thus, under this statute, at the time of its passage, the period of limitation for some writs was fifty-eight years, and this period was lengthen- ed, as time went on without any change in the law, so that it exceeded three hundred years when, by 3^2 Hen. VIII. c. 2,^ a change was made, and the modern method was adopted of tixing a certain number of years Avithin which the action must be brought. This last statute, how- ever, applied only to the old real actions, and, the action of ejectment having to a great extent taken their place, St. 21 Jac. I. c. IG,"* was passed, which provided that no person should thereafter make any entry into any lands, tenements, or hereditaments but within twenty years next after his or their right or title shall have accrued. This statute, while not in terms applying to the action of ejectment, did so in effect by barring the right of entry on which the action depended. In this country the statutes of the different states, as regards the limitation of actions to recover land, exhibit very considerable diversity, but the courts, in appMng them, have recognized certain general princi- ples as governing the subject, with but little regard, for the most part, to the language of the particular statute. The period of twenty years, named in tlie statute of James, has been adopted in the legislation of a number 1. Thus the earliest date at Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. which the seisin of an ancestor Law, 51, 81, 141. could be alleged in a writ of 2. 3 Edw. I. (A. D. 1275). right was the beginning of the 3. A. D. 1540. The disadvan- reign of Henry 1. (A. D. 1100) un- tages of the long period of limita- til this was changed by the tion was, however, to a great ex- Statute of Merton to the begin- tent avoided by the system of ning of the reign of Henry II. levying fines. See Lightwood, (A. D. 1154). Other dates were Possession of Land. 15C. fixed for other writs. See 2 4. A. D. 1623. ^ ^^)] Adverse Posslssjox. 1919 of the states, while in a few the lapse of a greater period is required to har the right of action, and in some a much less period. In a number of the states there are statutory provisions for what are known as "short limitations," in effect considerably r ' ' _ the ordinary- period in cases when the adverse p :i is by one claiming under "color of title," that is, by one who has, in taking possession, acted on the strength of a conveyance or judicial decree purporting to vest the title in him, but which, for some reason, fails to do so. In some states, such a provision exists in favor of one occupying under a particular class of conveyance or de- cree, as when it is provided that a junior patent from the state under which one occupies cannot be attacked after a certain number of years, and such a provision is fre- quently found in favor of a purchaser at certain classes of judicial sales, or at tax sales. The possession under such a •'short limitation" act is usually required to be accompanied by the payment of taxes on the land by the person in possession.^ The doctrine of adverse possession, as now estab- lished, may be expected to diminish in importance with the further extension and utilization of the system of registration of titles ordinarily referred to as the Torrens System,^' by reason of the fact that the legisla- tion establishing this system quite frequently provides that title shall not be acquired by adverse possession as against the registered owner of the land.^ 5. The short limitation acts of registered land." Ii has been said, the several states are ■well sam- in this connection that "if the marized in 2 Dembitz. Land Titles. § 186. 5a. Post. I 580. 5b. But the English Commis- sioners on Land Transfer recom- mend a change in this regard In the English act, to the effect that "the statutes of limitation shall article by James Edward Hoge. operate in the same manner with Esq.. 28 Yale Law Joum. at pp. regard to registered as to un- 54, 58, wherein is faTOied the policy of the V^: ■ acts is (as has always 1 so'Jnd, what adec -a there be for r€ . to ni»- registered lanu. .Article by Arthur UnderhJlL Elsq. in 27 Law Quart- Rev. at p. 178. See 1920 Eeal Pboperty. [§ 500 Theory of the legislation. The desirability of fixing, by law, a definite period within which claims to land must be asserted has been generally recognized, among the practical considerations in favor of such a policy being the prevention of the making of illegal claims after the evidence necessary to defeat them has been lost, and the interest which the community as a whole has in the securit}^ of title. The moral justification of the policy lies in the consideration that one who has reason to know that land belonging to him is in the possession of another, and neglects, for a considerable period of time, to assert his right thereto, may properly be penalized by his preclusion from there- after asserting such right. It is, apparently, by reason of the demerit of the true owner, rather than any sup- posed merit in the person who has acquired wrongful possession of the land, that this possession, if continued for the statutory period, operates to debar the former owner of all right to recover the land.® Presumption of conveyance distinguished. The doctrine, occasionally asserted, that the long continued possession of land by one claiming as owner gives rise to the presumption of a valid conveyance to him or to the person under whom he claims, though ordinarily similar in its practical results to the statutes of limitation, is entirely independent thereof. It involves a presumption of the rightfulness of one's possession, while the stat- applicatiou of the limitation stat- Haralson, J., in Lecroix v. Malone, utes to land registered under the 157 Ala. 434, 47 So. 725; Depue, system, the limitation period to J., in Foulke v. Bond, 41 N. J. L. begin to run, however, only after 527. A different view is indicated registration. in Mclver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat, 25, 6. See Ames, Disseisin of approved in Craven v. Craven, Chattels, 3 Harv. Law Rev. 318, 181 Ind. 553, 103 N. E. 333, 105 Lectures on Legal History 197; N. E. 41. See the discussion of Editorial note, 10 Columbia L. the policy of the statutes by Rev. 761; Pollock & Wright, Pos- Professor Henry W. Ballantine, 32 session, 96; Gibson, C. J., in Harv. Law Rev. 135, Sailor v. Hertzogg, 2 Pa. St. 182; § 500] Adverse Possessiox. 1921 utes of limitation are by their terms applicable only when tlie possession is, apart from such statutes, wrong- ful. As regards the doctrine referred to, of the pre- sumption of a conveyance based on long continued possession, it has been said, by the United States Supreme Court, that in order to presume a conveyance it is not necessary for the jury to believe that a conveyance was in fact executed, but it is sufficient if the evidence leads to the conclusion that the conveyance might hav^e been executed, and that its existence would be a solution of the difficulties arising from its non execution.' Such a view has also been indicated by some of the state courts,^ while others merely recognize that long con- tinued possession is a fact, to be considered along with other facts, tending to show that a convej^ance was ex- ecuted, without being in any way conclusive in that regard.^ The cases do not ordinarily specify the length of the period of possession w^hich will be sufficient to justi- fy the presumption of a grant. It would appear, how- ever, that in so far as the presumption is regarded as a rule of law^, calling for the finding of a grant without 7. Field, J., in Fletcher v. Ful- Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick, ler, 120 U. S. 534, 30 L. Ed. 759. (Mass.) 85, 33 Am. Dec. 715; 8. Kidd V. Browne, — Ala. — , 70 .lenkins v. McMichael, 21 Pa. So. 65; Reed v. Money, 115 Ark. Super. Ct. 161; Taylor v. Wat- 1. 170 S. W. 478; Casey's Lessee kins, 26 Tex. 688; Herndon v. V. Inloes, 1 Gill (Md.) 430, 503, Vick, 89 Tex. 469, 35 S. W. 141; 39 Am. Dec. 658; Melvin v. Wad- Townsend v. Downer's Adm'r, 32 dell, 75 N. C. 357; Davis v. Me- Vt. 183. Arthur, 78 N. C. 357; Williams v. Regarded as a mere matter of Donnell, 2 Head (Tenn.) 695;i inference, a grant may be in- Dunn V. Eaton, 92 Tenn. 743, 23 ferred or presumed from other S. W. 163; Matthews v. Burton, facts, even though the person aa- 17 Gratt. (Va.) 312. serting the grant had never been 9. Nelson v. Weekly, 1!)5 Ala. in possession. Le Blanc v. Jack- 1, 70 So. C61; Carter v. Good- son.— Tex Civ. App.— , 161 S. W. son, 114 Ark. 359, 169 S. W. 806; CO. Sumner v. Child, 2 Conn. C07; ]922 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 500 regard to the actual belief of the jury therein/'^ it must be supported by a possession of at least the period of the statute of limitations, and ordinarily its application has been based on a possession for a longer period.^^ When the presumption, so called, involves merely an inference of the making of a conveyance from the fact of possession, taken in connection with other circum- stances, it seems that a period of possession less than the limitation period might properly be considered in aid of the inference. ^- A conveyance from the state may be presumed,^^ although the statute of limitations will not ordinarily run against the state. ^^ A conveyance will not be pre- sumed, it seems, on the part of one who was incapaci- tated to make a conveyance. ^^ Character of possession. Ordinarily at least, the statutes of limitation with reference to land in terms impose no requirement upon the person in wrongful possession as to the character of his possession neces- 10. Ante, this section, notes 65 So. 170; Tracy v. Norwich etc. 7, 8. R. Co., 39 Conn. 382; Jarboe v. 11. Waggener v. Waggener, 3 McAtee, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 279; T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 542; Hunt v. State v. Dickinson, 129 Mich. 221, Hunt, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 175, 88 N. W. 621; Caruth v. Gillispie, 57 Am. Dec. 130; Kellum v. Corr, 109 Miss. 679, 68 So. 927; Jackson 209 N. Y. 486, 103 N. E. 701; v. McCall, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 377; Stockdale v. Young, 3 Strob. L. Reed v. Earnhart, 10 Ired. (N. S. C.) 501; Coleman v. Coleman, C.) 516; Davis v. McArthur, 78 71 S. C. 521, 51 S. E. 250; Scales N. C. 357. See Editorial note, 29 V. Cockrill, 3 Head (Tenn.) 432; Harv. Law Rev. 88. Cannon v. Phillips, 2 Sneed 14. Post, § 510. (Tenn.) 211. 15. Hunt v. Hunt, 3 Mete. 12. Barclay v. Howell, 6 Pet. (Mass.) 175, 37 Am. Dec. 130; (U. S.) 498, 8 L. Ed. 477; RicarJ Spears v. Oakes, 4 Rich. L. (S. V. Williams, 7 Wheat, 59, 5 L. C.) 347; Habersham v. Hopkins, Ed. 398; Courcier v. Graham, 1 4 Strob. L. (S. C.) 238, 53 Am. Ohio, 330 Stockdale v. Young, 3 Dec. 676 (deed in breach of Strob. L. (S. C.) 501. trust); Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 13. United States v. Chaves, S. C. 28; Martin v. State, 10 159 U. S. 452, 40 L. Ed. 215; Humph. (Tenn.) 157; Drewery v. Carter v. Walker, 186 Ala. 140, Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S. W. § 500] Adverse Possession". 1923 sary to make the bar effective, and it is merely by reason of the endeavor of the courts adequately to protect the interests of the rightful owner that certain requirements in this regard have become established. The most im- portant of these requirements is that to the effect that the possession must be hostile or ''adverse" to the true owner, and so generally has this requirement been recog- nized, and so important has it been regarded, that the expression "adverse possession" has come to be general- ly applied to describe that branch of the law which has to do with the construction and application of the stat- utes of limitation in reference to land. The emphasis thus laid upon the character of the wrongful possession has the unfortunate effect of obscuring the theory on which, as above stated, these statutes appear properly to operate, that is, that, like other statutes of limitation, they bar the remedy of the person rightfully entitled not by reason of any merit in the wrongdoer, but by reason of the demerit of the person who, having a remedy, fails to exercise it within the time named in the statute. It is occasionally said that the adverse possession which is sufficient to cause the statute of limitations to run is synonymous with disseisin, as recognized at com- mon law, but this is not entirely correct. Disseisin is, properly, "where a man enters into any lands or tene- ments where his entry is not congeable (i. e. ])ermissi- ble), and ousted him which has the freehold."'" Dis- seisin then, as the expression was used in the old l)()oks, means a wrongful dispossession of one who has a free hold estate in the land. And it was carefully distinguish- ed from a mere trespass, which did not involve any dispossession of the freeholder.*"^ Since then disseisin, generally speaking, meant tlie wrongful dispo.^sessioii of one person by another, and the statute of limitations 946; Ferguson v. Prince, 136 17. Co. l.itt. 181a, 2 Preston Tenn. 543, 190 S. W. 548. Abstracts, 287. 16. Litt. § 279. 1924 Real Peopeety. [§501 I'lms by reason of such wrongful dispossession,' it would ordinaril}^ be correct to say that the statute runs in favor of a disseisor as against the disseisee. But it also runs under circumstances which did not involve a dis- seisin at common law, as for instance, when a tenant pur auter vie holds over after the death of cestui que vie,^^ or a tenant for years disclaims the title of his landlord.^^ On the other hand the statute may not run under circumstances which at common law involved a disseisin. "If a man entereth into land of his own wrong, and take the profits, his words to hold it at the will of the owner cannot qualify his wrong, but he is a disseisor. "-° But the statute of limitations would not run in favor of one so entering and claiming to be tenant at will of the rightful owner, for the reason that his possession lacks the element of adverseness or hostility, which is necessary to the running of the statute. Furthermore the expression "disseisin," like * ' dispossession, ' ' has reference to a change of occupancy, while the expression "adverse possession " involves the idea of a continuous occupancy without change. § 501. Actual and visible possession. In order that the statute of limitations shall run against the right to recover land, it is necessary, not only that the person rightfully entitled be out of the actual possession, but also that there be an entry upon the land by another. The statute does not run as against the true owner in favor of one who, while having what purports to be a conveyance of the land, or other paper title, has never entered on the land.^^ Nor is an entry upon the land sutKcient in itself, but it must be followed by such acts IS. Post, § 513(g). 72 Ala. 151; Christy v. Spring 19. Post, § 513(a). VaUey Water Works, 97 Cal. 21, 20. Co. Litt. 271a. 31 Pac. 1110; Walker v. Hughes, 21. White V. Burnley, 20 How. 90 Ga. 52, 15 S. E. 912; Thayer v. (U. S.) 235, 15 L. Ed. 886; Ward McClellan, 23 Me. 417; Word v. V. Cochran, 150 U. S. 597, 37 L. Box, 66 Tex. 596, 3 S. W. 93. Ed. 1195; Lipscomb v. McClellan, § 501] Adverse Possession. 1925 of dominion over the land as will constitute what the law regards as actual possession of the land.-- This re- quirement of actual possession by another appears to find sufficient justification in the consideration that un- less some other person is in possession there is no one against whom the rightful owner can enforce his riglit of action or entrj-, and so no one in favor of whom the statute can operate, and also in the consideration that if no person is in possession there is nothing to sug- gest to the rightful owner the desirability or propriety of asserting his rishts in the land. What is sufficient to constitute actual possession of the land depends upon the character of the land and all the circumstances of the case.^^ It involves, as a general rule, the doing of acts of dominion on the land, sufficient- ly pronounced and continuous in character to charge the owner with notice that an adverse claim to the land is asserted. Continued residence on the land is no doubt sufficient to show actual possession f^ and cultivation or otherwise improving the land has been regarded as suffi- cient in particular cases,^^ and the erection and main- tenance of a fence around the land may, in connection 22. The payment of taxes is road & Coal Co. v. Quick, 68 Pa. not a substitute for possession. St. 189; Alabama State Land Co. Franklin v. Snuw, 195 Ala. 569, v. Kyle, 99 Ala. 474-, 13 So. 43. 71 So. 93; Mitchell v. Chicago B. Under some of the "short limi- & Q. R. Co., 265 III. 300, 106 N. tation" statutes, actual residence E. 833; Frazier v. Ison, 161 Ky. is necessary. Stumpf v. Oster- 379, 170 S. W. 977; Millett v. hage, 94 111. 115; Chiles v. Jones. Mullen, 95 Me. 400, 49 Atl. 871, 4 Dana (Ky.) 479. Whitman v. Shaw, 166 Mas.. 451, 25. Butler v. Drake, 62 Minn. 44 N. E. 333; Young v. Grieb, i>5 229, 64 N. W. 559; Susquehanna Minn. 396, 104 N. W. 131; Leaven- & W. V. Railroad & Coal Co. v. worth V. Reeves, 106 Miss. 722, Quick. 68 Pa. 189; Congdon v. 64 So. 660; Hays v. Pumphrey, Morgan, 14 S. C. 587; Crapo v. 226 Mo. 119, 125 S. W. 1109. Cameron, 61 Iowa. 477. 16 N. W. 23. The matter is well discuss- 523; Finn v. Wisconsin River ed in 2 Dembitz Land Titles, § Land Co., 72 Wis. 546. 40 N. W. 181. 209; Johns v. McKibben, 156 111. 24. Susquehanna & W. V. Rail- 71, 40 N. E. 449. 1926 Real Peopeety. [§ 501 with other circumstances, be sufficient.^*^ On the other hand, a merely occasional and sporadic use of the land, an occasional entry to cut timber or grass, or to ap- propriate other products or profits of the land, does not usually constitute actual possession.^'^ The question whether, in any particular case, there was an actual pos- session of the land, is ordinarily one of fact for the jury under the instructions of the court.^^ In a number of states ther£ are statutory provisions as to what shall constitute possession for this purpose, 26. Perry v. Lawson, 112 Ala. 480, 20 So. 611; Carpenter v. Smith, 76 Ark. 447, 88 S. W. 976; Brumagim v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24, 50; Ritzman v. Aspel- meier, 89 Iowa, 179, 56 N. W. 421; Lamereaux v. Creveling, 103 Mich. 501, 61 N. W. 783; Barker V. Publisher's Paper Co., — N. H. — , 97 Atl. 749; Moore v. Curtis, 169 N. C. 74, 85 S. E. 132; Am- brose V. Huntington, 34 Ore. 484, 56 Pac. 513; Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 84 N. W. 855, 85 N. W. 402, 83 Am. St. Rep. 905. 27. Chastang v. Chastang, 141 Ala. 451, 109 Am. St. Rep. 45, 37 So. 799; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Ga. 182, 71 Am. Dec. 198; White V. Harris, 206 111. 584, 69 N. E. 519; Smith v. Chapman, 160 Ky. 400, 169 S. W. 834; Lacroix v. Crane, 133 La. 227, 62 So. 657; Malone v. Long, 128 Md. 377, 97 Atl. 643; Parker v. Parker, 1 Allen (Mass.) 245; Leavenworth V. Reeves, 106 Miss. 722, 64 So. 666; Herbst v. Merrifield, 133 Mo. 267, 34 S. W. 571; Cornelius v. Giberson, 25 N. J. L. 1; Wheeler V. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377; Camp- bell V. Miller, 165 N. C. 51, 80 S. E. 974; Wheeler v. Taylor, 32 Ore. 421, 67 Am. St. Rep. 540, 52 Pac. 183; Wheeler v. Winn, 53 Pa. 122, 91 Am. Dec. 186; Stevens V. Pendregon, 106 Tex. 576, 173 S. W. 210; Wilson v. Blake, 53 Vt. 305. 1 Compare McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 Atl. 1025; D. W. Alderman & Sons Co. V. McKnight, 95 S. C. 245, 78 S. E. 982; Chase v. Eddy, 88 Vt. 235, 92 Atl. 99. So it has been decided that the mere pasturing of cattle ' on land did not, in view of the character of the land and the custom of the community, involve an actual possession; Bergere v. United States, 168 U. S. 66, 42 L. Ed. 383; McCloskey v. Hayden, 169 111. 297, 48 N. E. 432; Fuentes V. McDonald, 85 Tex. 132, 20 S. W. 43; Chilton v. White, 72 W. Va. 545, 78 S. E. 1048. 28. Anderson v. Bock, 15 How. (U. S.) 323, 14 L. Ed. 714; Trues- dale V. Ford, 37 111. 210; Arm- strong V. Risteau, 5 Md. 256, 59 Am. Dec. 115; Pendill v. Mar- quette County Agricultural Soc, 95 111. 210; Martin v. Rector, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 138; O'Hara v. Richardson, 46 Pa. St. 385. § 501] Adverse Possessiox. ]92; a usual one being that land shall be regarded as possess- ed by one when it has been protected by him by means of a substantial enclosure, or when it has been "usually cultivated and improved,"-^ this latter phrase being construed as equivalent to cultivated and improved as land of a similar character is usually cultivated and improved.^*' The possession need not be by the adverse claimant himself, he being regarded as in actual possession for this purpose if one holding under him as his tenant or agent is in possession.^^ The possession must, it is said, be ''visible" and "notorious," so that the owner may have an opportunity to learn of the adverse claim, and to protect his rights.'^- Actual knowledge of the possession on the part of the true owner is not, however, necessary, it being suffi- cient that he could have learned thereof bv the exercise 29. Wood, Limitations (4th Ed.) § 255. 30. See Mattes v. Hall,— (Cal.) —132 Pac. 295; Trask v. Success Mining Co., 28 Idaho, 483, 155 Pac. 288; Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362, 110 N. E. 772. 31. Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S. 278; Elliott v. Dycke, 78 Ala. 1; Beckett v. Petaluma, 171 Cal. 309, 153 Pac. 20; Kepley v. Scully, 185 111. 52, 57 N. E. 187; Atty. Gen. v. Ellis, 198 Mass. 91, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1120, 84 N. E. 430; Ramsey v. Glenny, 45 Minn. 401, 22 Am. St. Rep. 736, 48 N. W. 322; Lindenmayer v. Gunst, 70 Miss. 693, 35 Am. St. Rep. 685, 13 So. 252; Alexander V. Gibbon, 118 N. C. 796, 54 Am. St. Rep. 757, 24 S. E. 748; Strom V. Hancock Land Co., 70 Ore. 101, 140 Pac. 458; Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 1; Chamberlain v. Pybas, 81 Tex. 511, 17 S. W. 50. Such possession by one person by the hands of another has been conveniently designated as "medi- ate posession" as distinct from the "immediate possession' of the person who is actually in the possession of the land. Salmond's Jurisprudence, § 101. 32. Lawrence v. Doe, 144 Ala. 524, 41 So. 612; De Frieze v. Quint, 94 Cal. 653, 28 Am. St. Rep. 151, 30 Pac. 1 ; Grimes v. Ragiand, 28 Ga. 123; McCIeUan V. Kellogg. 17 111. 498; Haas v. Wilson, 97 Kan. 176, 154 Pac. 1018; Frazier v. Ison, 161 Ky. 379, 170 S. W. 977; Reatty v. Mason, 30 Md. 409; Fugate v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441; Little v. Down- ing, 37 N. H. 355; King v. Wells. 94 N. C. 344; Wade v. Crouch. 14 Okla. 593; Bowman v. Bow- man. 35 Ore. 279; Daniel v. Day- ton Coal & Iron Co., 132 Tenn., 1928 Real Pkoperty. [§ 502 of proper diligence."^ And since the requisites of ''actual" possession are usually defined with reference to the sufficiency of such acts to affect the owner with notice of the adverse claim, it would seem somewhat questionable whether there can be any ''actual" posses- sion which is not at the same time "visible" and "no- torious." There are, however, statements to be found that notoriety of possession is not necessary in case the possession is actually known to the rightful owner,^^ statements which suggest, by implication, that there might be a possession sufficient to satisfy the require- ment of actual i^ossession, but not sufficient to satisfy that of visible and notorious jDOSsession. § 502. Exclusiveness of possession. In order that one may acquire rights in land by possession for the statutory period, the possession must, it is frequently 501, 178 S. W. 1187; Mhoon v. Cain, 77 Tex. 416; Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah, 186, 72 Pac. 936. 33. Bynum v. Hewlett, 137 Ala. 333, 34 Sj. 391; School Dist. No. 8 of Tliompson v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 336; St. Louis A. & T. H. R. Co. V. Nugent, 152 111 119, 39 N. E. 263; Alden v. Gilmorp. 13 Me. 178; Saumels v. Borrow- scale, 104 Mass. 207; Merritt v. Westerman, 180 Mich. 449, 1-17 N. W. 483; Village of Glencoe v. Wadsworth, 48 Minn. 402, 51 N. W. ;;77; Spicer v. Spicer, 249 Mo. 51^2, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 238, 155 S. W. 832. See Editorial note, 11 Columbia Law Rev. 673; Carney v. Hennessey, 74 Conn. 107. 53 L. R. A. 699, 92 Am. St. Rep. 199, 49 Atl. 910; St. Louis etc. R. Co. V. Nugent, 152 111. 119, 39 N. E. 263; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Ga. 182. 34. Brown v. Cockrell, 33 Ala. 47; Trotter v. Neal, 50 Ark. 340, 7 S. W. 384; Clarke v. Gilbert, 39 Conn. 94; Cook v. Babcock, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 206; McCaughn v. Young, 85 Miss. 277, 37 So. 839; Norton v. Kowazek, — (Mo.) — 193 S. W. 556; Dausch v. Crane, 109 Mo. 323, 19 S. W. 61; Pease v. Whitney,— N. H.— , 98 Atl. 62; Sheaffer v. Eakman, 56 Pa. St. 144; McAuliff v. Parker, 10 Wash. 141, 38 Pac. 744. 35. Ward v. Cochran, 150 U. S. 597, 37 L. Ed. 1195; Goodson v. Brothers, 111 Ala. 589, 20 So. 443; Towle v. Quante, 246 111. 568, 92 N. E. 967; Stump v. Henry, 6 Md. 201, 61 Am. Dec. 301; Bailey v. Carlton, 12 N. H. 9, 37 Am. Dec. 190; Cahill v. Palmer, 45 N. Y. 478; CoUins V. Lynch, 167 Pa. St. 635, 31 Atl. 921. § 50l>] ADviiESE Possession. 1929 said, be exclusive.''^ It must be exclusive of the true owner and also of third persons. If the true owner is on the laud as o^^^ler, the possession is, in the eye of the law, in such o^^^ler,^^ and another person who is on the land has, not only no adverse possession, but no pos- session whatsoever. He is on the land either as a licensee or a trespasser.^'^ If, however, the true owner is sho^vn to be on the land merely as a licensee, not asserting, by word or act, any right of o^vnership or possession, his presence on the land does not amount to an actual possession, and the possession may properly be attri- buted to him who is on the land exercising or claiming exclusive control thereof.^* As regards the requirement that the possession be exclusive of third persons, this appears to follow from the very nature of legal possession. If two or more persons are on land, neither having title thereto, and each claiming possession independently of the other, neither can be regarded as in legal possession of 36. Reading v. Royston, Salk. 423; Gafford v. Strauss, 89 Ala. 282, 7 L. R. A. 568, 18 Am. St. Rep. Ill, 7 So. 248; Inskup v. Shields, 4 Harr. (Del.) 345; Spencer Christian Church's Trus- tees V. Thomas, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 250, 84 S. W. 750; Royer v. Ben- low, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 303; Illinois Steel Co. v. Tamms, 154 Wis. 340, 141 N. W. 1011; Litt. S 701; Lightwood, Possession of Land, 36. 37. See Gafford v. Strauss, 89 Ala. 282, 7 L. R. A. 568, 18 Am. St. Rep. Ill, 7 So. 248; Hoyt v. Zumwalt, 149 Cal. 381, 86 Pao. 600; Brumback v. Brumback, 198 III. 66, 64 N. E. 741; Bellis v. Bellis, 122 Mass. 414; Smith v. Hitchcock, 38 Neb. 104, 56 N. W. 791; O'Hara v. Richardson, 46 Pa. 385; Lloyd v. Rawl, 63 S C 219, 41 S. E. 312; Larwell v. Stevens. (C. C.) 12 Fed. 559. The true owner has been re- garded as being in possession of land over which the eaves of his house extended, so as to prevent the assertion of adverse posses- sion by another who made use of the land under the eaves. Lins V. Seefeld, 126 Wis. 610. 105 N. W. 917, approved 24 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 232. Contra, Randall V. Sanderson, 111 Mass. 114; Rooney v. Retry, 22 Ont. L. llo\^. 101. 38. Feliz v. Feiiz, 105 Cal. 1. 38 Pac. 521; Owsley v. Owsley. 117 Ky. 47, 77 S. W. 397; First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Har- per. 191 Mhs'^ 106 77 y F. 778. 1930 EE.VL Pkoperty. [§ 503 the land. Legal possession is in nature exclusive."^ There is, however, one case in which the possession of an individual is not exclusive, and that is in the case of co-ownership. In that case, however, the possessions of the co-o\\mers are not separate possessions, but rather a single possession, that is, as stated by Black- stone, a unity of possession exists.^^ In the case of persons thus claiming as co-owners the possession of each or, it seems, of one alone,* ^ will operate in favor of all.''^ One may be in possession, for the purpose of acquiring land under the statutes of limitation, al- though he permits the public to pass over the land,*^ nor is the existence of an easement thereover in favor of another individual,*"* or of the public,*^ inconsistent with his acquisition of title. § 503. Hostility of possession. In order that the statute of limitations may bar one of his right to recover land it is necessary, not only that the land be in possession of another, but that such possession be "adverse" or "hostile" to the true o^\Tier. It is some- what surprising, in view of the frequency with which the courts have recognized this requirement, that they have so seldom ventured to explain what they mean by an adverse or hostile possession as distinguished from one which is not adverse or hostile. A possession, it 39. Lightwood, Possession of 44. Randall v. Sanderson, 111 Land, 14; Pollor'k & Wright, Pos- Mass. 114; Barker v. Publishers' session 21. Paper Co.— N. H.— 97 Atl. 749; 40. 2 Blackst. Comm. 180, 191. Sowles v. Butler, 71 Vt. 271, 44 41. Woodruff V. Roysden, 105 Atl. 355. Tenn. 491, 80 Am. St. Rep. 905, 45. Webber v. Clark, 74 Cal. 58 S. W. 1066. 11, 15 Pac. 431; Cady v. Fitz- 42. Hutchinson v. Chicago etc. simmons, 50 Conn. 209; Rupley v. R. Co., 41 Wis. 541; Beedy v. Fraser, 132 Minn. 311, 156 N. Dine, 31 Pa. 13; Ward v. Ward, W. 350; Woodruff v. Paddock, 130 L. R. 6 Ch. 789. N. Y. 618, 29 N. E. 1021; Cocke 43. Bendorff v. Uihlein, 1.''.2 v. Texas etc. R. Co.. 46 Tex. Civ. Tenn. 193, 177 S. W. 481;. App. 363, 103 S. W. 407. § 503] Adveese Possession. 1931 appears, is adverse to the tiiie owner when it is iiiiac- companied by any recognition, express or inferrible from circumstances, of the right in the latter. It does not involve the necessity of an express denial of the title of the true o^vner, and, it is evident, in the majority of cases there is no such denial. The requirement that the possession be adverse has its logical justification in the consideration that the rec- ognition by the person in possession of the title of the true owner is calculated to lull the latter into a false sense of security and so to induce him to refrain from asserting his right by entry or action. And in accord with this consideration are the decisions,"**^ very con- siderable in number, that if the possession w^as originally not adverse to the true owner, the statute cannot be set in motion against him until the possessor has changed the character of the possession by a denial of the title of such owner, and such change has been brought to the knowledge of the latter. 46. Trufant v. White, 99 Ala. 536; Cotton v. White, 131 Ark. 273, 199 S. W. 116; Kerns v. Dean, 77 Cal. 555; Millett v. Lagomarsino, 107 Cal. 102, 38 Pac. 308: Harrall v. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 47 Am. Rep. 608; Trask V. Success Mining Co., 28 Idaho, 483, 155 Pac. 288; Thompson v. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. 271 111. 11, 110 N. E. 901; Kirby v. Kirby, 236 111. 255, 86 N. E. 259; Mc- Clenahan v. Stevenson, 118 Iowa, 106, 91 N. W. 925; Frazier v. Morris, 161 Ky. 72, 170 S. W. 496; Lancey v. Parks, 102 Me. 135. 66 Atl. 311; Hall v. Stevens, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 418; Compau v. Lafferty, 50 Mich. 114, 15 N. W. 40; Collins v. Colleran. 86 Minn. 199, 90 N. W. 3o4; Stevenson v. Black, 168 Mo. 549, 68 S. W. 909; McCune v. Coodwillie, 204 Mo. 306, 102 S. W. 997; Smith v. Hitchcock, 38 Neb. 104, 56 N. W. 791; Lewis v. New York & H. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 202, 56 N. E. 540; Acton v. Culbertson, 38 Okla. 280, 132 Pac. 81,2; Coqullle Mill & Mercantile Co. v. Johnson, 52 Ore. 547, 1:52 Am. St. Rep. 716, 98 Pac. 132; Bannon v. Bran- don, 34 Pa. St 263, 75 Am. Dec. 655; Johns v. Johns, 244 Pa. 48, 90 Atl. 535; McCutchen v. Mc- Cutchen, 77 S. C. 129, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140, 57 S. E. 678; Duke V. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Ilulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 192, 23 S. R. 233; Graydon v. liurd, 55 Fed. 724, 5 C. C. A. 258. But it has been decided that, if one pur- chases land in the possession of one other than his vendor, he is charired wilh noticf Hint 1932 Real Property. [§ 503 It is sometimes said that the possession must be adverse, not only to the rightful owner, but to the whole world.^^ Such a requirement corresponds, apjjarently, in some degree to the requirement, so frequently as- serted, that the possession be under claim of title, which is the subject of discussion in the following section. The basis of the asserted requirement that possession be adverse to the whole world is not readily percejitible. If the possession is adverse to the rightful owner, it is for the latter to assert his rights, regardless of whether the person in possession mistakenly assumes that the title is in a third person."*"^ Question of fact. The question whether the possession was adverse is ordinarily a question of fact.^8 That the possession was adverse may be shown by evidence that possession was taken under color of title,^^ the possession, though original- ly subservient to the vendor's title, had become hostile. How- att V. Green, 139 Mich. 289, 102 N. W. 734. 47. Ashford v. Ashford, 136 Ala. 632, 96 Am. S't. Rep. 82 34 So. 10 (dictum) ; Ballard v. Hansen, 33 Neb. 861, 51 N. W. 295; Bracken v. Union Pac. R. Co., 75 Fed. 347, 21 C. C. A. 387 (Nebraska); Altschul v. O'Neill, 35 Ore. 202, 58 Pac. 95; McNaught-Collins Imp. Co. v. May, 52 Wash. 632, 101 Pac. 237. 47a. That the possession need not be adverse to the whole world, see Skipwith v. Martin, 50 Ark. 141, 6 S. W. 514; Hayes V. Martin, 45 Cal. 559; McManus V. O'Sullivan, 48 Cal. 485; Adams v. Guerard, 29 Ga. 651, 76 Am. Dec. 624; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121, 17 S. W. 755; Smith v. Badura, 70 Ore. 58, 139 Pac. 107; Smith v. Jones, 103 Tex. 632, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, 132 S. W. 469. See note in 14 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 374, criticizing Bond v. O'Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 83 Am. St. Rep. 265, 58 N. E. 189. 48. Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. S. 773, 24 L. Ed. 317; Snow v. Bray, Ala., 73 So. 542; Stevens, V. Velde. 138 Minn. 59, 163 N. W. 796; Page v. Gaskill, 84 N. J. L. 615, 87 Atl. 460; Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362, 110 N. E. 772; Stokes V. Murray. 95 S. C. 120, 78 S. E. 741. 49. Pillow V. Roberts, 13 How. (U. S.) 472, 14 L. Ed. 228; Oglesby V. Hollistel", 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Taylor v. Danbury Public Hall Co., 35 Conn. 4.30; Ken- drick V. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 6 § 503] Adverse Possespiox, 19.^", as well as by evidence of the declarations of the person in possession accompanying his possession.^'' It may also be shown by evidence of acts by the person in pos- session of such a character as would not be done by him if he conceded the other's title."' ^ The payment by him of taxes upon the land has been regarded as evi- dence that the possession is adverse. ''- Burden of proof. Since the element of liostil- ity or "adverseness" involves merely the absence of a course of action of an affirmative character, that is, of So. 871; Godfrej' v. Dixon Power etc. Co., 228 lU. 487, 81 N. E. 1089; Brady v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 506, 101 Atl. 142 isemble); Cha- bert V. Russell, 109 Mich. 571, 67 N. W. 902; Brown v. Peaslee, 69 N. H. 436, 45 Atl. 234; Warne V. Greenbaum— (N. J.)— 101 Atl. 568; Myers v. Folkman, 89 N. J. L. 390, 99 Atl. 97; La Frani- bois V. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589, 18 Am. Dec. 463; Steinwand v. Brown, 38 N. D. 602, KiG N. W. 129; Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 Pa. St. 210, 47 Am. Dec. 455. 50. Gibson v. Gaines, — Ala. — , 73 So. 929; Stockton Sav. Bank v. Staples, 98 Cal. 189, 32 Pac. 936; Knight v. Knight, 178 Til. 553, 53 N. E. 306; Rand V. Huff, 59 Kan. 777, 53 Pac. 483; Swope v. Ward, 185 Mo. 316, 84 S. W. 895; Harnage v. Berry, 43 Tex. 567. The admis- sibility of such evidence is dis- cussed with references to cases, in '■'> Wigmore, Evidence, § 1778. 51. Grim v. Murphy, 110 111. 271; Rennert v. Shirk, 163 Ind. 542, 72 N. E. 546; Dyer v. Eld- ridge, 136 Ind. 654, .'36 N. E. 522; Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N. W. 1060; Whitaker v. Erie 2 R. P.— 47 Shooting Club, 102 Mich. 454; 60 N. W. 983; Davis v. Bowman, 55 Miss. 671; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 228, 50 S. W. 824; Brock v. Bear, 100 Va. 562, 42 S. E. 307; Pioneer Wood Pulp Co. v. Chan- dos, 78 Wis. 526, 47 N. W. 661. 52. Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S. 278, 42 L. Ed. 466; Chas- tang V. Chastang, 141 Ala. 451, 109 Am. St. Rep. 45, 'M So. 799; Gee V. Hatley, 114 Ark. 376, 170 S. W. 72; Frick v. Sinon, 75 Cal. 337, 7 Am. St. Rep. 177, 17 Pac. 439; Wren v. Parker. 57 Conn. 529, 6 L. R. A. 80, 14 Am. St. Rep. 127. 18 Atl. 790; Wilbur v. Cedar Rapids & M. R. R. Co., 116 Iowa, 65, 89 N. W. 101; Carter v. Clark, 92 Me. 225. 42 At. 398; Whitman v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 451, 44 N. E. 333; Sauers V. Giddings, 90 Mich. 50, 51 N. W. 265: Mattso.»i v. Warner. 115 Minn. 520, 132 N. W. 1127: Draper v. Shoot, 25 Mo. 197. 69 Am. Dec. 262; Minimelberger- Harrison Lumber Co. v. Craig, 248 Mo. 319, 154 S. W. 73; Rover v. Benlow. 10 Serg. u R. 30.!; Hunter v. Malone, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 116, 108 S. W. 709. 1934 Eeal Property. [§ 503 the recognition of the other's title, it would seem that the lack of hostility, rather than the presence thereof, is an affirmative fact to he proven, in the ahsence of cir- cumstances which are recognized as legally sufficient to create a presumption that the possession is not hostile, and this accords witli the reason of the matter. Know- ing, or having reason to know, that his land is in the possession of another, the true owner should he barred by reason of his laches in asserting his own right of pos- session, unless he can show that he was induced so to do by the possessor's recognition and admission of his rights. In some cases this view has been adopted, that the possession will, in the absence of countervailing evidence, be presumed to be hostile,^^ and this view would seem to be more or less involved in the numerous decisions ""^ that, by reason of a particular relation, such as that of landlord and tenant or that of trustee and cestui que trust, the posses- sion is prima facie not hostile or adverse, this appar- ently implying that, in the absence of such a relation, the possession is prima facie hostile, or at least that it is not prima facie lacking in hostility. It has, however, frequently been asserted that the person claiming by force of the statute of limitations has the burden of 53. Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 53 S. C. 126, 121 S. E. 3; Toltec 177, 223; Alexander v. Wheeler, Ranch Co. v. Babcock, 24 Utah, 69 Ala. 332; Hammond v. Crosby. 183, 606 Pac. 876; Morse v. 68 Ga. 767; Craven v. Craven, Churchill, 41 Vt. 649; Illinois 181 Ind. 553, 103 N. E. 333, 105 Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. N. E. 806; Frazier v. Morris, 499, 48 L. R. A. 830, 80 Am. 161 Ky. 72, 170 S. W. 496; St. Rep. 54; 81 N. W. 1027, 82 Zabriska's Succession, 119 La. N. W. 534. 1076, 44 So. 893; Greene v. That the user of another's Anglemire, 77 Mich. 168, 43 N. land is presumed to be adverse, W. 772; Davis v. Bowmar, 55 for the purpose of the creation Miss. 742; Monnot v. Murphy, of a prescriptive right In the 207 N. Y. 240, 100 N. E. 742; nature of an easement, see post, Bryan v. Spivey, 109 N. C. 57, § 519, note 73. 13 S. E. 766; Neel v. McElhenny. 54. Post, § 513. 69 Pa. St. 300; Satcher v. Grice, § 503] Adverse Possession. 1935 showing that his possession was hostile or adverse.^'' It is presumably true that such wrongful possessor has the burden of proof in the sense of risk of non persuasion of the jury, but in so far as we mean by burden of proof the duty of producing evidence,^** the burden as to the hostility of the possession properly shifts, it is sub- mitted, to the person having documentary title, so soon as the other has introduced evidence of his possession for the statutory period. When it is said, as it fre- quently is said,'^'''^ that the burden of showing adverse possession is upon the party asserting it, this jirosum- ably refers to the burden of persuading the jury, and 55. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 121 (semble) ; Davis v. Caldwell, 107 Ala. 526, 18 So. 103; Beasley v. Howell, 117 Ala. 499, 22 So. 989; Love v. Cowger, 130 Ark. 445, 197 S. W. 853; Janke v. McMahon, Cal. App., 133 Pac. 21; Russell v. Davis, 38 Conn. 562; Barrs v. Brace, 38 Fla. 265, 20 So. 991; Mc- Cullough V. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co., 97 Ga. 373, 23 S. E. 838; Thompson v. Toledo, St. Louis & W. R. Co., 271 111. 11, 110 N. E. 901; Benedict v. Bush- nell, — Ind. App.—, 117 N. E. 267; McClenahan v. Stevenson, 118 Iowa, 106, 91 N. W. 925; Edwards v. Fleming, 83 Kan. 653, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923, 112 Pac. 836; Mounts v. Mounts, 155 Ky. 363, 159 S. W. 819; McCune V. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. .306, 102 S. W. 891; Smith v. Sedalia. 152 Mo. 283, 48 L. R. A. 711, 53 S. W. 907; Weeping Water v. Reed, 21 Neb. 261, 31 N. W. 797; Johnson V. Atlantic R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 767, 64 Atl. 1061; Licari v. Carr, 84 N. .L L. 345. 86 Atl. 421; Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 299, 48 N. E. 527; Rathbunville Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Betson, 208 N. Y. 364, 101 N. E. 892; Monk v. Wilmington, 137 N. C. 322, 49 S. E. 345; Johns v. Johns, 244 Pa. 48, 90 Atl. 535; Smith v. Estill, 87 Tex. 264, 28 S. W. 801. 56. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2485-2490. 56a. See e. g. Jones v. Temple, 117 Ark. 579, 176 S. W. 143; Tippenhauer v. Tippenhauer, 158 Ky. 639, 166 S. W. 225: Spicer v. Spicer, (Mo.), 155 S. W. 832; Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 172 N. C. 809, L. R. A. 1917C 143, 94 S. E. 703; Stokes v. Murray, 95 S. C. 120, 78 S. E. 741; Village Mills Co. V. Houston Oil Co., — (Tex.)— 186 S. W. 785; People's Savings Bank v. Bufford, 90 Wash. 204. 155 Pac. 1068. Oc- casionally the statute In terms places the burden of proof on the party asserting adverse pos- session. Blue llidgo Land Co. V. Floyd, 167 N. C. 6S6, 83 S. E. 687, 88 S. E. 862; Slipppi-'k v. Sheppick, 44 T'tah. 131. 13S Pac. 1169. 193G Real Property. [§ 504 such is probably the sense in wliicli the expression ''burden of proof" is used in some of the cases, above cited, in which it is stated that the person claiming by force of the statute of limitations has the burden of showing that his possession was hostile or adverse. When possession was taken under circumstances which ordinarily give rise to a presumption that it is not adverse, the burden is obviously upon the possessor of showing that,- by reason of the course of action adopted by him, such as denial of the title of the rightful owner, his possession has become adverse.^"^ § 504. Necessity of claim of title. It has been asserted, by perhaps most of the courts in this country, that in order that the statute of limitations may run in favor of one in possession of land, the possession must be under claim of right or title. ^^ There would seem reason to doubt, however, whether, in asserting this re- quirement, the courts ordinarily have in mind anything more than a restatement of the requirement of hostility of possession. ^'^ They do not, so far as the writer has 57. Zeller v. Eckert 4 How. v. Wright, .38 Nev. 25, 143 Pac. (U. S.) 295; McClenahan v. 1184; Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 Stevenson, 118 Iowa, 106, 91 N. N. C. 11, 94 S. E. 703; Thomas W. 925; McCune v. GoodwiUie, v. Spencer, 66 Ore. 359, 133 204 Mo. 306, 102 S. W. 997; Pac. 822; Vermont Marble Co. v. Collins V. Colleran, 86 Minn. 199, Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 Atl. 90 N. W. 364; Hall v. Stevens, 151; Skanski v. Novak, 84 Wash. 9 Mete. (Mass.) 418. See aiite. 39, 146 Pac. 160; Custer v. Hall, this section, note 46. 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183. 58. See e. g. McLester Bldg. 59. See, for instance, occas- Co. V. Upchurch, 18 Ala. 23, 60 sional statements that the pes- So. 173; Janke v. McMahon, 21 session "must be adverse, that is, Cal. App. 781, 133 Pac. 21; under a claim of right." Sar- Stowell V. Lynch, 269 111. 437, gent v. Ballard, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 110 N. E. 49; Goulding v. 251; Colvin v. Burnet, 17 Wend. Shonquist, 159 Iowa, 647, 141 N. (N. Y.) 565; State v. Heaphy, W. 24; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 88 Vt. 428, 92 Atl. 813. And see V. Rosskamp, 179 Ky. 175, 200 S. O'DonneU v. McCool. 89 Wash. W. 496; Erickson v. Crosby, 100 537, 154 Pac. 1090. Neb. 372, 160 N. W. 94: Howard § 504] Adverse Possession. 193^ observed, undertake to explain why a claim of title on the part of the possessor is necessary, and it appears that the rightful owner is quite sufficiently protected by the requirement of adverseness or hostility of posses- sion.*' ° Did this requirement of the making of a claim of title really mean what it appears on its face to mean, that the person in possession must state that the land belongs to him, the effect would be, approximately, to limit the operation of the statute of limitations to the case of possession by one who believes himself to have title, since one who knows that he has no title is not apt to claim title until his title is questioned. The notion of the necessity of a claim of title may possibly have originated in the following manner. One is not in adverse possession in case he makes acknowledg- ment to the rightful owner of the latter 's title, that is, 60. TRat claim of right or title is unnecessary, see Johnson V. Gorham, 38 Conn. 513; Car- ney V. Hennessey, 74 Conn. 107, 53 L. R. A. 699, 92 Am. St. Rep. 199, 49 Atl. 910; Campau v. Dubois, 39 Mich. 274; CarroU V. Mays, 8 Dana. (Ky.) 178 (semble) ; Rupley v. Fraser, 132 Minn. 311. 156 N. W. 350; Rude V. Marshall, 54 Mont. 27, 166 Pac. 298; Parker v. Southwick, 6 Watts (Pa.) 377, per Gibson, C. J.; Cox V. Sherman Hotel Co., (Tex. Civ. App.), 47 S. W. 808. Claim of title is not referred to as one of the necessary ele- ments of adverse possession by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Holtzman v. Doug- las, 168 U. S. 278, 42 L. Ed. 466. "The whole inquiry is reduced to the fact of entering and the intention to usurp possession." Per Johnson, J., in Bradstreet V. Huntington. T, Pet. 402, 439. In Texas the statute defines adverse possession as an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a "claim of right incon- sistent with and hostile to the claim of another," but the ex- pression claim of right in the statute has been decided to mean merely that "the entry of the limitation claimant must be with the intent to claim the land as his own, to hold it for himself." and that "such must continue to be the nature of his posses- sion." Houston Oil Co. of Texas V. Jones, —Tex.-. 198 S. W. 290. See Brown v. Fisher. — Tex. Civ.—, 193 S. W. 357. And in Wisconsin a statutory require- ment that the land be held under "claim of title" was regardpd as satisfied if there was an entry hostile to the whole worli. and an Intention on the part of (he possessor "lo Imld llie land as 1938 Eeal Propekty. [§ 504 in case he disclaims title in himself,^^ and there is au- thority for the view that his possession is not adverse if he acknowledges the title of the rightful owner b}^ a communication to a third person.*^^ It being conceded that the statute does not run if there is a disclaimer of title by the person in possession, it was perhaps as- sumed as a corollary that a claim of title by such per- son was necessary to the running of the statute. This explanation of the origin of the requirement is, how- ever, purely conjectural, and occasionally a different theory in this regard is indicated by expressions to the effect that the statute of limitations runs only when there is a technical disseisin, as recognized at common law, and that such a disseisin involves the necessity of a claim of title. In reference to such a theory, it may be said in the first place, as before explained, that ad- verse possession and disseisin are not absolutely the same.^^ In the second place, claim of title, that is, of right, appears never to have been regarded as neces- sary to effectuate a disseisin. The old digests make no mention of such a requirement, and that it did not exist is sufficiently apparent from the fact that there might be disseisin by one person for the use of another, which operated as a disseisin by the former alone until agreed to by the latter, and after such agreement made them both disseisors.^* Indeed the repeated statements that one who wrongfully dispossesses another, though he claims merely as tenant for years or by statute, or even as tenant at will, is a disseisor, for the reason that he cannot qualify his own wrong,^^ would seem to show that claim of title by him was immaterial."'^ his own." Chicago & N. W. Rwy. Co. Litt. 180b. Co. V. Groh, 85 Wis. 641, 55 N. 65. 1 Rolle's Abr. Disseisin W. 714. (I); Vin. Abr. Disseisin (I); 61. Post. § 507, note 37. Com. Dig. Seisin, (Fl); Co. Litt. 62. Post, § 507, note 38. 271. See post, 511, notes 16-18. 63. Ante, § 500. notes 18-20. 66. As to the asserted neces- 64. See Vin. Abr. Disseisin sity, that to constitute a dis- (B); Bac. Abr. Disseisin (A); seisin, there must be an inten- § 504] Adverse Possession. 193i) It has been said that by claim of right or title, in connection with the doctrine of adverse possession, is meant merely "an intention to appropriate and hold the land as owner, and to the exclusion, rightfully or wrons- fully, of every one else."*^' It is most unfortunate, if this is the idea which the courts intend to convey, that they use language which on its face means something entirely different. The presence of such an intention to appropriate is no doubt necessary for the purpose of adverse possession, but this is, it is submitted, not be- cause without it the possession would not be adverse, but because without it there would be no possession.*^^ It was recognized at common law that, in determin- ing whether one was a disseisor or a trespasser merely, his intention, as indicated by his acts, was to be con- sidered,^^ and so at the present day, in determining whether one person has taken possession of property previously in the possession of another, his acts must be such as to show his intention to exercise exclusive control, at least for the time being."^ And this, it is conceived, must be the meaning of the occasional judicial statements that, in order to acquire title by adverse tion to claim a fee, see post, § hoc fecerit, language which is 511, note 19. again quoted in Towle v. Ayer, 67. Sedgwick & Wait, Trial of 8 N. H. 57; Bond v. O'Gara, 177 Title to Land (2d Ed.), § 756, Mass. 139, 83 Am. St. Rep. 265, quoted, apparently with approval, 58 N. E. 275. by Holmes, C. J., in Bond v. 70. So in Pollock v. Wright. O'Gara 177 Mass. 139, 83 Am. Possession, § 14, it is said that St. Rep. 265, 58 N. E. 275. See "to constitute a dispossession also, to the same effect. Fear there must in every case be V. Barwise, 93 Kan. 131, 143 Par. positive acts which can be rc- 505; Rupley v. Eraser. 132 ^linn. ferred only to the intention of 311, 156 N. W. 350; Morrison acquiring exclusive control." And V. Linn, 50 Mont. 396, 147 Pac. as to the necessity of the ele- 166 (construing statute). ment of intention in posses-slon 68. Ante, § 14. see Lightwood, Possession of 69. Co. Lift. 15.3b, quoting Land, p. 21; Holmes, The Com- the statement of Bracton quae- mon Law, 206 et scq.; Salmond, rendum est a judice, quo anirno Jurisprudence, § 97. 1940 Real Property. [§ 504 possession, there must be an intention to claim title. "^ That is, there must be an intention to assert dominion over the property to the exclusion of others. But the requirement of an intention to exercise exclusive con- trol over the property, involved in the asserted necessity of "an intention to claim title," in order that the right- ful owner may be regarded as dispossessed, is to be dis- tinguished from the asserted requirement of a "claim of title," in order to make the statute of limitations elTective as against the dispossessed owner. As tending to negative any requirement of claim of risht or title as necessary to put the statute of limita- tions in motion, reference may be made to the general acceptance of the view that, in the absence of an ex- press statutory requirement to that effect, the statute will run regardless of whether the wrongful possession was taken under a bona fide claim of right. '^- There 71. Brown v. Cockerall, 33 Ala. 38; Wilson v. Hunter, 59 Ark. 626, 43 Am. St. Rep. 63, 28 S. W. 419; Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Pla. 261, 39 Am. St. Rep. 139, 14 So. 805; Riley v. Griffin, 16 Ga. 141; Winn v. Abeles 35 Kan. 85, 57 Am. Rep. 138, 10 Pac. 443; Worcester v. Lord, 56 Me. 265, 96 Am. Dec. 456; Ford V. Wilson, 35 Miss. 490, 72 Am. Del. 137; Pharis v. Jones, 122 Mo. 125, 26 S. W. 1032; Simmons V. Nahant 3 Alien (Mass.) 316; Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781, 42 S. E. 916. 72. Newsome v. Snow, 91 Ala. 641, 24 Am. St. Rep. 934, 8 So. 377; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 49 Am. Rep. 100; Montgom- ery & Mullen Lumber Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250, 128 Pac. 402; French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 443, 21 Am. Dec. 480; May v. Dobbins, 166 Ind. 331, 77 N. E. 353; Rutter v. Small, 68 Md. 133, 6 Am. St. Rep. 434, 11 Atl. 698; Warren v. Bowdran, 156 Mass. 280, • 31 N. E. 300; Dawson v. Falls City Boat Club, 136 Mich. 259 112 Am. St. Rep. 363, 99 N. W. 17; Wilkerson v. Eilers, 114 Mo. 245, 21 S. W. 514; Omaha & F. Land & Trust Co. v. Han- sen, 32 Neb. 449, 49 N. W. 456; Foulke V. Bond, 41 N. J. L. 527; Humbert v. Trinity Church 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 587; Morrison v. Holliday, 27 Ore. 175, 39 Pac. 1100; Reeves v. Dougherty, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 222, 27 Am. Dec. 496; Kinney v. Vinson, 32 Tex. 135; Lampman v. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis. 417, 69 N. W. 171; Ovig V. Morrison 142 Wis. 243, 125 N. W. 449. In Iowa good faith is neces- sary; Litchfield v. Sewel, 97 Iowa, 247, 66 N. W. 104; Clark V. Sexton, 122 Iowa, 310, 98 N. § 5011 Adverse Possessiox. 1941 would seem to bo a certain inconsistency between such a view and the view that the statute will not run unless the wrongful possessor, after obtaining possession, as- serts a claim of right. '^ To re(iuire one, in order to enjoy the benefit of the statute, to assert a claim of right, even though he knows it to be false, involves the placing of a premium upon dishonesty, in contravention of the ordinary judicial policy.'^ Evidence. Conceding the necessity of a show- ing by the person in possession of a claim of right or title on his part, such claim may no doubt be shown by evidence, of declarations by the possessor,'"' but ordi- narily, it appears, it is to be inferred from the fact that the possessor's entry was under color of title,'^" or from the doing of acts by the possessor during his posses- W. 127; Goulding v. Shonquist, 159 Iowa, 647, 141 N. W. 24. And such seems to be the view of the court in Jaspersoh v. Scharnikow, 150 Fed. 571; Skan- ski V. Novak, 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160. 73. "The expressions claim of title, or right, or ownership are, in connection with a naked ad- verse possession, inaccurate, for they imply a belief in the valid- ity of the claim, or good faith on the part of the claimant." Sedgwick & Wait, Trial of Title to Land, § 756. But it has been said in a recent New York case that claim of right, though neces- sary, need not be bona fide; Ram- apo Mfg. Co. V. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362, 110 N. E. 772. 74. In Iowa it has been said that one's knowledge of a de- fect in his title is not incom- patible with good faith on his part. Hughes v. Wyati, 146 Iowa, 392, 125 N. W. .'U; Collins v. Reimers, 181 Iowa, 1143, 165 N. W. 373. 75. Henry v. Brown. 143 Ala. 446, 39 So. 325. And see the following cases, in which asser- tions of title by the wrongful possessor were admitted to show the adverse character of the possession. Stockton Sav. Bank V. Staples, 98 Cal. 189; St. Peters Church \. Beach, 26 Conn. 355; Burr v. Smith, 152 Ind. 469, 53 N. E. 4; Cottle v. Howerton, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 121, .15 S. W. 552; Jacobs v. Callaghan, 57 Mich. 11, 23 N. W. 454; Brown v. Kohoul, 61 Minn. 113, 63 N. W. 248; Westenfelder v. Creen, 24 Ore. 448, 34 Pac. i23; Texas & N. O. R. Co. V. Broom, 5:^ Tex. Civ. App. 78. 114 S. W. 655. 76. Goodson v. Brotliers. Ill Ala. 589, 20 So. 453; Shlpwith V. Martin, 50 Ark. 141, 6 S. W. 514; Wiggins v. Brewster, 1:11 Ga. 162. 62 S. E. 40; HadJock V. Leary 148 N. C 37S. 62 S. 194: Eeal Property. [§ 504 sioii such as ordinarily only an owner would do,"'^ such as the making of improvements,^^ or the payment of taxesJ'' In other words the claim of title is to be estab- lished by evidence of the same character as is ordinarily relied on to establish the hostile or adverse character of the possession,^*^ a consideration which harmonizes with the view above suggested, that in asserting the necessity of a claim of title, the courts ordinarily in- tend merely to restate the requirement of hostility or adverseness of possession. Recognition of title in third person. Apart from the fact that, as involving an affirmative fact, it is calculated to place upon the person in possession the burden of proof, and from the consideration that the presentation of this additional issue is calculated to con- fuse the jury, it does not seem that the assertion of the E. 426; Power v. Kitching, 10 N. D. 254, 88 Am. St. Rep. 691, 86 N. W. 737. 77. Kidd V. Browne, — Ala. — , 76 So. 65; Lyons v. Stroud, 257 111. 350, 100 N. E. 973; Rennert V. Shirk, 163 Ind. 542, 72 N. E. 546; Craven v. Craven, 181 Ind.' 553, 103 N. E. 333; Woodcock v. Crosby's Unknown Heirs, 92 Neb. 723, 139 N. W. 646; Smith v. Badura, 70 Ore. 58, 139 Pac. 107. In New York the statute re- quires possession under claim of title, but it is said that the ac- tual possession and improvement of the premises, as owners are accustomed to possess and Im- prove their estates, without any payment of rent or recognition of title in another will, unless rebutted by other evidence, estab- lish the fact of a claim of title. Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34, 22 N. E. 441; Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240, 100 N. E. 742. 78. Normant v. Eureka Co., 98 Ala. 181, 39 Am. St. Rep. 45, 12 So. 454; Lick v. Diaz, 44 Cal. 479; Grim v. Murphy, 110 111. 271; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Houghton, 126 111. 233, 1 L. R. A. 213, 9 Am. St. Rep. 581; Ren- neot V. Shirk, 163 Ind. 542, 72 N. E. 546; Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N. W. 1060; Barnes V. Light, 116 N. Y. 34; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Ore. 515. 32 Par. 402; La Frambois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 603. 79. Prick v. Sinon, 75 Cal. 337, 7 Am. St. Rep. 177. 17 Pac. 439; Beecher v. Ferris, 117 Mich. 108, 75 N. W. 294; Murphy v. Doyle, 37 Minn. 113, 33 N. W. 220; Allen V. Mansfield, 108 Mo. 343, 18 S. W. 901; Dredla v. Patz, 78 Neb. 506, 111 N. W. 136; Thompson v. Burhans, 79 N. Y. 93; Paine v. Hutchins, 49 Vt. 314. 80. Ayite, § 503, notes 49-52. § 504] Adverse. Possession. 1943 requii'ement of claim of title rather than mere adverse- ness or hostility of possession will, in the ordinary case, affect the result. That is, if the jury can find that the possession is adverse, it mil probably, from a consid- eration of the same evidence, find that it is under claim of title. In one case, however, the assertion of this re- quirement might become of primary importance, that is, when the wrongful possession was taken under the mistaken impression that the title is in a third person, and with full recognition of the supposed rights of such person. If possession adverse to the whole world ^^ is necessary to make the statutory bar effective as against the true owner, the possession in the case supposed is insufficient, although it be clearly adverse to the right- ful owner. What is in substance this state of facts has been presented in a number of cases in which one took and held possession of vacant lands belonging to an- other, under the impression that it belonged to the government. In the majority of these cases it has been decided that the statute of limitations runs under such circumstances,^- while in others the contrary view has been adopted, on the ground that there is no claim of title by the person in possession, or, as otherwise ex- pressed, his possession is not adverse to the whole world.^'^ If claim of title is necessary to enable the stat- 81. Ante, § 503, note 47. Civ. App. 60, 77 S. W. 41G; True- 82. Page v. Fowler, 28 Cal. heart v. Graham, — Tex. Civ. 611; Hayes v. Martin, 45 Cal. App. — , 141 S. W. 281; Francoeur 559; Blumer v. Ohio Land Co., v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236; North- 129 Iowa, 32, 105 N. W. 342; ern Pac. R. Co. v. Kranich, r^2 Rathbone v. Boyd, 30 Kan. 485, Fed. 911. See editorial notes, 2 Pac. 664; Maas v. Burdetzke, 9 Columbia Law Rev. 640; 12 Id. 93 Minn. 295, 106 Am. St. Rep. 364; 10 Mich. Law Uev. 406. 436, 101 N. W. 182; Boe v. Arn- 83. Hunnewell v. Burchelt. old, 54 Ore. 52, 20 Ann. Cas. 152 Mo. 611. 54 S. W. 487; Alt- 533, 102 Pac. 290; Sharpe v. .schul v. O'Neill, 35 Ore. 202. 58 Catron, 67 Ore. 368, 136 Pac. 20; Pac. 95; Schleicher v. Gatlin. Smith V. Jones, 103 Tex. 632, 85 Tex. 270, 20 S. W. 120; Mc- 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, 132 S. Naught-Collins Imp. Co. v. May, W. 469; Price v. Eardley, 34 Tex. 52 Wash. 632, 101 Pac, 237; 1944 Real Property. [§ 504 ute to run, it is difficult to see how it can run when the ])ossessor admits the title to be in the government, even though such admission is based on a mistake. The stat- ute does run in such case, it is submitted, for the reason that the possession is adverse to the rightful owner, and the latter is not excused from asserting his rights within the limitation period by the fact that the adverse pos- session is accompanied by an assertion of title in a third person. That such a view is incompatible with the as- serted requirement of claim of title by the possessor would seem to be merely an additional reason for ques- tioning w^hether claim of title is properly necessary in order that the statute may run. The necessity that the possession be under claim of title has been referred to as ground for holding that the possession of a "mere squatter" is insufficient to give title under the statute of limitations.-^ The ex- pression "squatter" is somewhat lacking in certainty, but it ordinarily means one who, while in possession of another's land, admits that the title is in another per- son, even though without knowledge of such person's identity. There is in such case no claim of title by the person in possession, but even apart from that con- sideration, the possession would seem, by reason of the Skanski v. Novak, 84 Wash. 39, session acknowledged that he had 146 Pac. 160. See editorial no title to the land was held notes 5 Columbia Law Rev. 605; not to prevent the running of 18 Harv. Law Rev. 180. the statute in his favor, he hav- 84. Gay v. Mitchell, 35 Ga. 139, ing "entered to hold the land as 89 Am. Dec. 278; Bell v. Fry, long as he could." 5 Dana (Ky.) 341; Blake v Shiver, 27 Wash. 593, 68 Pac 330; Jasperson v. Scharnikow 150 Fed. 571; Parkersburg In dustrial Co. v. Schultz, 43 W. Va 470, 27 S. E. 255. See Baber v Henderson, 156 Mo. 566, 79 Am in Patterson v. Reigler, 4 Pa St. 201, that the person in pos- In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Concannon, 75 Wash. 591, 135 Pac. 652, the fact that the one in possession made valuable im- provements on the land was re- garded as showing that he was something more than a mere St. Rep. 540, 57 S. W. 719. But squatter, for the purpose of the statute of limitations. § 504] Advf.ese Possf.sstox. 1945 recognition of another's title, to he deprived of the ele- ment of hostility or adverseness, concedino;, that is, that an acknowledgment of another's title will operate to deprive possession of the element of adverseness, al- though such acknowledgment is not made directly to such other.'"'' Claim of easement. The statement occasionally made that possession under a claim to a mere ease- ment does not, although continued for the statutory period, confer title to the fee,*^" involves the miscon- ception that one merely exercising, or undertaking to exercise, "an easement in land, has i)Ossession, or may have possession, of the land. He does not acquire title to the land by adverse possession, for the reason that he never had possession, adverse or nonadverse.'^' Claim of fee simple. Ap])lying and extending the asserted requirement of claim of title, it has occa- sionally been said that the statute runs in favor of the person in possession only if he claims title in fee.-""* In so far as this may mean that the statute does not run against the rightful owner, if the possessor recognizes 85. Post, § 507, note 38. Atl. 97; BedeU v. Shaw. 59 N. 86. Dothard v. Denson, 75 Ala. Y. 46. 482; Indianapolis R. Co. v. Ross, In New York the statute, which 47 Ind. 25. See O'Banion v. asserts the necessity of claim of Cunningham, 168 Ky. 322, Ann. title in order that the possession Cas. 1917A, 1017, 182 S. W. 185, may be adverse, has been regard- Roe V. Strong, 107 N. Y. 350, ed as requiring a claim of title 14 N. E. 294. ill fee, so that if the person 87. But in Long Island Rail- in possession claims merely an way Co. y. Mulry, 212 N. Y. 108, estate for years, the statu!*; does 105 N. E. 806, it seems to be held not run in his favor. I^e-Joll v. that a railroad company is in Shaw, 59 N. Y. 46. But a claini possession though asserting an by a railroad company to a rlKlU easement merely, of way merely has been regard- 88. Harden v. Watson, 104 ed a? so closely eriuivalent to a Ark. 641, 148 S. W. 506; lona claim of title in fee as to enable V. Uu, 16 Hawaii, 432; Laport v. the statute to run. Lour l.sland Todd, 32 N. J. L. 131; Myers K. Co. v. Mulry. 211! N. V. lo8. V. Folkman, 89 N. J. L. 3-90, 99 105 N. E. 80G. 1946 Real Property. [§ 505 tlie fee simple as being in such owner, there can be no question as to the correctness of the statement. But in so far as it may mean more than this, it would appear to be open to question, even conceding that some claim of title is necessary. Opposed to such a view are the cases, hereafter referred to,^^** in which a conveyance or devise having been made to a person for life with re- mainder to another, entry and- possession by the former were held to enure to the benefit of the latter, so as to vest in him a fee simple estate. And the possession of one holding under a lease for years, though this involves no claim on his part to the fee simple, is sufficient as against the rightful owner.^*^ § 505. Mistake in locating boundary. The ques- tion has frequently arisen whether, when an owner of land, by mistake as to the boundary line of his land, takes possession of another's land, and holds it for the statu- tory period, he thereby acquires the title as against the real owner. In some states, in such a case, the posses- sion has been regarded as adverse, without reference to the fact that it is based on mistake, it being sufficient that there is an actual and visible possession without any recognition of the other's title. ^"^ In other states 88a. Post, § 511, notes 30-33b. Velde, 138 Minn. 59, 163 N. W. 89. Ante, § 501, note 31. 796; Crowder v. Neal, 100 Miss. 90. Lucas V. Provinen, 130 730, 57 So. 1; Rude v. Marshall, Cal. 270, 62 Pac. 509; French v. 54 Mont. 27, 166 Pac. 298; Baty Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 21 "Am. Dec. v. Elrod, 66 Neb. 735, 92 N. W. 680; Krause v. Nolte, 217 111. 1032, 97 N. W. 343; Zweimer v. 298, 3 Ann. Cas. 1061, 75 N. E. Vest, 96 Neb. 399, 147 N. W. 362 (semble); Daily v. Boudreau, 1129; Crary v. Goodman, 22 N. 231 111. 228, 83 N. E. 218 (sem- Y. 170; Yetzer v. Thoman, 17i ble); Rennert v. Shirk, 163 Ind. Ohio St. 130, 91 Am. Dec. 122; 542, 72 N. E. 546; Dowell v. Dil- Parker v. Wolf, 69 Ore. 446, 138 Ion, 178 Ky. 531, 199 S. W. 6; Pac. 463; Miles v. Pennsylvania Jordon v. Riley, 178 Mass. 524, Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 All. 211; 60 N. E. 7; Greene v. Angle- Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 4 mire, 77 Mich. 168, 43 N. W. L. R. A. 641, 11 S. W. 794; Wil- 772; Weeks v. Upton, 99 Minn. liams v. Hewitt, 128 Tenn. 689, 410, 109 N. W. 828; Stevens v. 164 S. W. 1198; Burnell v. Ma- '^ 505] Adverse Possessiox. 1947 the fact that, in such case, the possession of the other's land is under mistake, has been regarded as frequently material, and a distinction is asserted to the effect that, if such possession up to the boundary as located is with the intention of claiming title to that extent, even though the boundary be incorrect, the possession is adverse, while, if it is with the intention of claiming title to that extent only if the boundary is correct, the possession is not adverse.-'^ The decisions of a particular court in this regard are not infrequently lacking in entire con- sistency, one with another, and occasionally the judicial discussion of the subject is such as to leave us somewhat in the dark as to the exact position of the court on the question. Though the courts which assert the possible mate- riality of mistake as to the boundary line, ordinarily state that w^hether an intention to claim title to the boundary as located in spite of any mistake therein is the im- portant consideration, they fail to tell us what they mean by such an intention, and in the actual discussion loney, 39 Vt. 579, 94 Am. Dec. 106, 165 S. W. 684; Preble v. 358; Wissinger v. Reed, 69 Wash. Maine Cent. R. Co., 85 Me. 260, 684, 125 Pac. 1030; Mielke v. 21 L. R. A. 829. 35 Am. St. Rep.' Dodge, 135 Wis. 388, 115 N. W. 366, 27 Atl. 149; Borneman v. 1099; Ovig v. Morrison, 142 Wis. Milliken, 116 Me. 76, 100 Atl. 243, 125 N. W. 449. See editorial 5; Mulligan v. Fritts. 226 Mo. notes 9 Harv. Law Rev. at pp. 189, 125 S. W. 1101; Vanderbilt 289, 467; 10 Columbia Law Rev. v. Chapman, 175 N. C. 11. !H at p. 665; 11 Mich. Law Rev. 57. S. E. 70;j; Dunnigan v. Wood, 91. Smith V. Bachus, 195 Ala. 58 Ore. 119, 112 Pac. 531; Chance 8, 70 So. 261; Couch v. Adams, v. Branch, 58 Tex. 490; Davis 111 Ark. 604, 164 S. W. 728: v. Owen, 107 Va. 283, 13 L. R. Bossom v. Gillman, 70 Fla. 310, A. (N. S.) 728, 58 S. E. 581; 70 So. 364; Grube v. W^ells, 34 Christian v. Bulbeck, 120 Va. 74. Iowa, 148; Keller v. Harrison, 90 S. E. 661; Shanski v. Novak. 151 Iowa, 320, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160; Mc- 30, 128 N. W. 851, 131 N. W. Cormick v. Sorenson, 58 Wash. 53; Edwards v. Fleming, 83 Kan. 107, 137 Am. St. Rop. 1047. 107 653, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923. Pac. 1055; Snell v. Steiling, 83 112 Pac. 836; Turner v. Morgan, Wash. 248, 145 Pac. 466. 158 Ky. 511, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) ]948 Eeal Peoperty. [§ 505 of the particular case they not infrequently shift the in- quiry from one as to the existence of an intention to claim title in the contingency of mistake to one as to whether a claim of title was actually made or indicated during the period of possession. An intention to claim title in spite of a mistake in the location of the bound- ary might mean an intention to retain possession until legally ejected, even though convinced of the mistake, or it might mean merely an intention to assert a right to the possession although relinquishing possession by rea- son of proof of mistake. Probably what the courts have in view in asserting this distinction is that the posses- sion is not adverse as regards land erroneously in- cluded in one's possession by reason of a mistake in the boundary line, provided he concedes that if there is any such land he has a mere permissive possession, that he holds possession, in other words, in subordination to any right therein on the part of the adjoining owner, while his possession is adverse if he does not concede the possibility of mistake, and thus fails to recognize any possibility of right in the other. So regarded, it may be questioned whether the position of the courts as- serting the possible materiality of mistake in this re- gard is so entirely out of harmony with that of the courts which assert its immateriality as is frequently assumed. Even the latter courts would hardly regard one's possession of land enclosed by mistake as ad- verse, if the possessor explicitly acknowledges to the rightful owner that any such land is held by him in subordination to any right in the latter and their as- sertion of the immateriality of mistake in this regard appears to mean no more than that the fact of mistake is not a basis for inferring such an acknowledgment on the part of the possessor that he holds in subordination to any possible rights in the true owner. But this ap- l)ears to involve the same position as that held by the courts which assert the possible materiality of the mis- § 505] Adverse Possession. 1949 take, in so far as they recognize"- a presuniiition of in- tention to claim title regardless of the mistake, that is, a presumption that, in spite of the mistake, the posses- sion is adverse. Adopting this view, it is only in so far as the courts, which assert the possible materiality of the mistake, recognize a contrary presumption,"^ of an intention on the part of the wrongful possessor not to claim title if he is mistaken as to the boundary, tliat the assertion of the materiality of mistake as to bound- ary becomes of substantial importance. That the pre- sumption is properly in favor of the adverse or hostile character of the possession rather than against it has been previously argued,"^ but whatever presumi)tion in this regard may be recognized, the introduction of the element of mistake in the discussion of the question of adverse possession is, it is submitted, unnecessary and undesirable. In no case except in that of a mistake as to boundary has the element of mistake been regarded as having any significance,^^ and there is no reason foi' 92. As in Huffman v. White, 90 Ala. 354, 7 So. 816; Couch v. Adams, 111 Ark. 604, 164 S. W. 728; Heath v. Kirkpatrick, 48 Iowa, 78; Zimmerman v. Ginter, 69 Kan. 331, 63 Pac. 657; Patter- son V. Hollis, 90 Kan. 655, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 725, 136 Pac. 258: Turner v. Morgan, 158 Ky. 511, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 106, 165 S. W. 684 (semble) ; Goltermann v. Schiermeyer, 111 Mo. 404. 19 S. W. 484. 20 S. W. 161; Mangold V. Phillips, — Mo.— , 186 S. W. 988: Nichols V. Tallman, Mo., 189 S. W. 1184; Pearson v. Dryden. 28 Or. 350, 43 Paf. 166. See ante, § 295. 93. As in Lecroix v. Malone, 157 Ala. 434, 47 So. 725; Jahnke V. Seydel, 178 Iowa, 363, 159 N. W. 986; Shanline v. Wiltsie. 70 Kan. 177, 3 Ann. Cas. 140. 7S 2 R. P.— 48 Pac. 436; Davis v. Alexander, —Mo.—, 183 S. W. 563; Ware v. Cheek, Mo., 201 S. W. 847; Chris- tian V. Bulbeck, 120 Va. 74. 90 S. E. 661. See Hornsby v. Tucker. 180 Ala. 418. 61 So. 928. 94. Ante. § 503, note 54. 95. "If possession through mis- take were held not to be adverse, very little room would be left for the statute of limitation, for al most every man who buys land under a bad title labors under the mistaken idea that his dee^l is good and effectual." 2 Deni- bitz. Land Titles, 1397. "Adopt the rule that an entry and pos- session under a claim of right, if through misiakf. does not con- stitute an adverse possession. * ♦ * the in(|uiry no longer is whether visible possession, with the intent to posseess, under 1950 Eeal Pbopebty. [§ 506 attributing greater weight thereto when the mistake is as to the proper location of a boundary than when it is a mistake as to the title to all the land wrongfully possessed. And to introduce the element of mistake, and then limit its significance by an inquiry as to the intention which the possessor may have as to his course of action in case there should be a mistake, an intention which has ordinarily no existence whatsoever, is cal- culated only to cause confusion in the minds of the jury, without, it is conceived, any compensating advantage. In case a temporary boundary line is located by agreement between the adjoining owners, with the un- derstanding that they shall occupy with reference there- to until the proper Hue is ascertained, the possession of one beyond the proper line, in accordance with such temporary location, has been regarded as not adverse to the other.'^" His possession in such case is in effect permissive, and involves a recognition of the other's title to the extent of that title. § 506. Necessity of right of action. The purpose of the statutes of limitation is to debar one of his right to assert his claim when, having the powder to assert such claim, he has failed to do so for the period named. Consequently the statutes do not commence to run as against a particular person until a right of entry or action accrues to him. So, as against one who has a remainder upon an estate for life, the statute does not a claim of right, and to use and v. Moreland, 26 Iowa, 96; Mur- enjoy as one's own, is a disseisin, phy v. Comm., 187 Mass. 361, 73 but from this plain and easy N. E. 524; Bunce v. Bidwell, 43 standard of iproof we are to de- Mich. 542, 5 N. W. 1023; Majors part, and the invisible motives v. Rice, 57 Mo. 384; Jackson v. of the mind are to be explored." Vermilyea, 6 Cow. 677; Bryson French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, v. Slagle, 44 N. C. 449; Massen- per Hosmer, C. J. gill v. Boyles, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 96. Smith v. Keyser, 115 Ala. 112; Texas Land Co. v. Williams, 455, 22 So. 149; Peters v. Gracia, 51 Tex. 51; BurneU v. Maloney, 110 Cal. 89, 42 Pac. 455; Hassett 39 Vt. 579, 94 Am. Dec. 358. V. Ridgely, 49 111. 197; McNamee § 506] Adverse Possession. 1951 ordinarily begin to run in favor of a third person, who takes wrongful possession during the life tenancy, until the termination of the estate for life,*^^ and, presumably, as against one who has a reversion upon an estate for years, the statute does not begin to run, in favor of one who takes possession during the existence of the estate for years, until the termination of such estate.^** Nor, it seems, does the fact that the reversioner or re- mainderman has a right of entry for a forfeiture be- fore the normal expiration of the particular estate cause the statute to run as against him before such ex- piration.^'' In one or two states, however, the fact that the remainderman is by statute enabled to maintain a suit to quiet title even before the death of the life tenant is regarded as causing the statute to run as against him in favor of a wrongful possessor, immediately upon his acquisition of knowledge of such wrongful possession.^ If the i^articular estate for life or for years is vol- untarily created after the statute has begun to run, it 97. Angell, Limitations, § 371, Childers v. Bumgarner, 53 N. C. et seq.; Rosenau v. Childress, 297; Davis v. Dickson, 92 Pa. St. Ill Ala. 214, 20 So. 95; Ogden 365; Moseley v. Hankinson, 25 S. V. Ogden, 60 Ark. 70, 46 Am. St. C. 519; Carver v. Maxwell, 110 Rep. 151, 28 S. W. 796; Ander- Tenn. 75, 71 S. W. 752; Mansfield son V. Northrop, 30 Fla. 612, 12 v. Neff, 43 Utah, 258, 134 Pac. So. 318; Bagley v. Kennedy, 81 1160. Ga. 721, 8 S. E. 742; Orthwein 98. Potrero Nuevo Land Co. v. Thomas, 127 111. 554, 11 Am. v. All Persons, 29 Cal. App. 743. St. Rep. 159, 4 L. R. A. 434, 13 156 Pac. 876; Orrell v. Madox. N. E. 564, 21 N. E. 430; Mettler :J Cruise, Dig. tit. 31, ch. 2, § V. Miller, 129 lU. 630, 22 N. E. 30. That the statute begins to 529; Williams v. McClanahaa, 3 run immediately on expiration of Mete. (Ky.) 420; Pratt v. Church- the lease, though it is renewed, ill, 42 Me. 471; Wallingford v. see Gartlan v. C. H. Hooper & Hearl, 15 Mass. 471; Lindley v. Co., —Cal.—, 170 Pac. 1115. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26; 99. Doe v. Danvers. 7 East Watkins v. Green, 101 Mich. 493, 299; Gwynn v. .Tones, 2 Gill. & 60 N. W. 44; Reed v. Lowe, 163 J. (Md.) 173. Mo. 519, 85 Am. St. Rep. 578, 63 1. Marray v. Quigley. 11«« S. W. 687; Pinckney v. Burrage. Iowa. 6. 97 Am. St. Uep. 276. 92 31 N. J. L. 21; Jackson v. .John- N. W. 869; Crl.swell v. ^risweli. son, 5 Cow. 74, 15 Am. Dec. 433; 101 Neb. 349, 163 N. W. 303. 1952 Eeal Property. [§ 506 will continue to run, as against the reversioner or re- mainderman as well as against the particular tenant.- That is, an owner in fee against whom the statute has commenced to run cannot interrupt its running by creat- ing a particular estate, either with or wdthoat a re- mainder thereon. Applying the principle that the statute does not run against one who has no right of entry or action, it has been decided that if, after the adverse possession has begun, the rightful owner, a married woman, dies, and her husband has then an estate for life, the statute does not run as against the woman's heirs during the existence of the life estate.-^ In states in which an estate in fee tail is still recog- nized, since the reversioner or remainderman on the estate in fee tail has no right of entry or action until the failure of the designated heirs of the body, the stat- ute of limitations cannot, in theory, run as against him until then. The English statute of limitations now in force provides in effect that after the statute shall have run as against the tenant in tail, it shall be regarded as having also run against alb persons whom he might have barred by conveyance or otherwise, but before this stat- ute was passed, it was recognized that ''while posses- sion adverse to a tenant in tail told against the issue in tail, who claimed in right of the same estate,^ such pos- session, though protracted for centuries, went for no- 2. Hubbard v. Swofford Bros. 616, 62 L. R. A. 562, 44 S. E. Dry Goods Co., 209 Mo. 495, 123 508. A contrary view is asserted Am. St. Rep. 488 ,108 S. W. 15; in Beattie v. Stewart, 154 111. Sutton V. Clark, 59 S. C. 440, 82 273, 40 N. E. 340. See also Am. St. Rep. 848, 38 S. E. 150; Henry v. Carson, 59 Pa. St. 207. Stackpoole v. Stackpoole, 4 Dr. 4. That it bars such issue & War. at p. 347; 1 Hayes, Con- see Tolson v. Kaye, 3 Brod. & veyancing, 257. Bing. 217; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 3. Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cowen Wall. (U. S.) 268, 18 L. Ed. 572; (N. Y.) 74, 15 Am. Dec. 434, Inman v. Barnes, 2 GaU. 315, 13 followed in Jackson v. Mancius, Fed. Cas. No. 7048; Martindale 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 369; McNeely v. Troup, 3 Harr. & McH. 244; V. South Penn. Oil, 52 W. Va. Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 307, § 506] Adverse Possession. 1953 thing as against the remainderman or reversioner, who had a substantive right, which did not accrue until fail- ure of the issue in tail."^ The matter is of little practical importance in this country, by reason not only of the small number of states in which estates in fee tail are recognized, and the rarity of their occurrence even in such states, but also of the fact that the reversioner or remainderman would ordinarily be bjirred by a convey- ance by the first tenant in tail. In so far as the government may be by statute lia- ble to suit,''' or as the rightful owner can, by legal pro- ceedings against the agents of the government, assei-t his right of pos.session,'^ the statutory bar may run in favor of the government, while, it would seem, it cannot run in absence of such a right of action in his favor. Therie are several cases in which the right of the state to acquire title under the statute of limitations is rec- ognized, without any reference being made to the ques- tion of the ability of the rightful possessor to enforce his claim,^ and these must, it seems, ordinarily be up- held on the theory that there was a right of action against the agents of the state in possession. Bar of cestui que trust. There is one case in which a person may be barred by the adverse jiosses- sion of another although he has no riglit of action or 56 Atl. 1017; Baldridge v. Mc- 454. See editorial note 17 Harv. Farland, 26 Pa. 338 (semble); Law Rev. 55. Dow V. Warren, 6 Mass. 328. 7. Stanley v. Schwalby. 147 V. 5. 1 Hayes, Conveyancing (5th S. 508, 37 L. Ed. 2ri9; E]! Paso Ed.), 258. See Angell, Limita- v. Ft. Dearborn Nat. Bank. 96 lions, § 361, quoting 3 Cruise's Tex. 496, 74 S. W. 21. Dig. tit. 31, ch. 2, § 13. The 8. Atty. Gen. v. Ellis. 198 case of Bassett v. Hawk, 118 Pa. Mass. 91, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94, 11 Atl. 802, to the effect 1120, 84 N. E. 430; Eldridge v. that the reversioner or remain- Binghamptou, 120 N. Y. 309, 24 derman is barred, is based on the N. E. 262; Birdsell v. ("ary, 66 express provision of the act of How. Pr. 358; Parker v. Soiith- 1859. wirk, 6 Watts (Pa.) 377. 6. Baxter v. State, 10 Wis. 1954 Keal Peoperty. [§ 506 entry, that of a cestui que trust. If the possession is adverse to the trustee, so as to bar his right to recover possession after the statutory period, the cestui que trust is also barred.'' This rule, that the cestui que trust must suffer for the negligence of the trustee in failing to sue, has been in terms based on the consideration that were the rule otherwise, the cestui, having no right of action, would never be barred by the statute. ^^ In further justification of the rule reference has been made to the theory^^ that the cestui que trust has, properly speaking, merely a right in personam against the trustee and not an actual estate in the land, and that as he is not liable personally, as is a legal owner, upon an obligation at- taching to the land, such as that on a covenant running therewith, so he is not entitled to protection as is a legal owner.^2 The bar of the statute being based on the existence of a right of action in favor of the trustee, the fact that the cestui que trust is under disability, such as infancy 9. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 of the trust did not accept or Wheat. 152, 6 L. Ed. 360; Cruse qualify, and hence there was no V. Kidd, 195 Ala. 22, 70 So. 166; person to bring suit. The deci- East Rome Town Co. v. Cothran, sion has been criticized on the 81 Ga. 359, 8 S. E. 737; Hall v. theory that the heir or personal Waterman, 220 111. 569, 77 N. representative of the creator of E. 142, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 776; the trust held the legal title and Barclay v. Goodloe, 83 Ky. 493; could have brought suit on be- Stoll V. Smith, 129 Md. 164, 98 half of the cestui. See editorial Atl. 530; Walton v. Ketchum, note, 17 Columbia Law Rev. 568. 147 Mo. 209, 48 S. W. 924; Ben- 10. See the language of Lord nett V. Garlock, 79 N. Y. 302, 35 Hardwicke in Llewellyn v. Mack- Am. Rep. 517; Cameron v. Hicks, worth, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 579, Barn. 141 N. Car. 21, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445, quoted 2 Perry, Trusts, § 407, 53 S. E. 728; Williams v. 858. Otey, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 563, 47 11. Ante, § 103(b). Am. Dec. 632; Collins v. McCarty, 12. "If a man wants complete 68 Tex. 150, 2 Am. St. Rep. 475, legal protection, let him acquire 3 S. W. 730. In Ayer v. Chap- a true proprietary right, with man, 145 Ga. 608, 91 S. E. 548, its incident liabilities, for him- it was held that the statute did self." T. Cyprian Williams, Esq. not run against the cestui when in 51 Solictor's Journal, at p. the trustee named in ihe creation 156. § 507] Adverse Possession. 1955 or coverture, is immaterial,^^ as is the fact that the cestui que trust has an equitable estate in remainder only, the legal title in fee being in the trustee.^* § 507. Interruption of running of statute. It not infrequently occurs that, after the statute of limitations has begun to run against the right to recover land, and before it has run for the period named therein, it, for some reason, ceases to run. Since it runs by reason of the failure to assert one's right to the land as against one in possession thereof whose possession is adverse to the rightful owner, one would expect it to cease to run either upon the owner's assertion of the riglit to the land, upon the cessation of the possession, or upon the cessation of the hostile character of the possession. We will consider, in the above order, the operation in this regard of these various classes of circumstances. By entry or action. One whose land is in tlie wrongful possession of another may assert his right to the land either by entry or by action. It is well recog- nized that the running of the statute is interrupted })y the owner's entry on the land, if, and only if, this is made openly and under claim of right, with a clearly 13. Molton V. Henderson, 62 Rabon. 142 Ga. 1B3, 82 S. E. Ala. 426; Patchett v. Pac. Coast 544; Waterman v. Waterman Ry., 100 Cal. 505, 35 Pac. 73; Hall, 220 111. 569; Edwards v. Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. 178, 12 Woolfolk, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 376; Am. St. Rep. 249, 4 S. E. 391; Ewing v. Shanahan, 113 Mo. 18S, Barclay v. Goodloe, 83 Ky. 493; 20 S. W. 1065; King v. Rhew. Crook V. Glenn, 30 Md. 71; Ewing 108 N. C. 696, 23 Am. St. Rop. V. Shanahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. 76, 13 S. E. 174; Watkins v. W. 1065; Thompson v. Carrai- Specht, 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 585. chael, 122 Pa. St. 478, 15 Atl. 867; Obviously, if the trustee has Williams v. Otey, 8 Humph. only a life estate, the statute (Tenn.) 563, 47 Am. Dec. 632; does not run against the legal Collins V. McCarty, 68 Tex. 150, remainderman. East Rome Town 2 Am. St. Rep. 475, 3 S. W. 730. Co. v. Cothran, 81 Ga. 359, S 14. Cushman v. Coleman, 92 S. E. 737; Ewin v. Llndsey, Ga. 772, 19 S. E. 46; McLain v. (Tenn.) 58 S. W. 388. 1956 Eeal Property. [§ 507 indicated purpose of taking ijossession.^^^ In several states, however, such an effect has been denied to a forcible entry, at least when not followed by continuous possession,^'' and in some states there is a statutory pro- vision restricting the operation of an entry as an inter- ruption of the adverse possession, as by requiring it to be followed by possession for a certain time, or by an action of ejectment, and occasionally the statute ex- pressly deprives the entry of any such effect.^' The bringing of an action by the true owner to re- cover the possession, if followed both by a judgment in his favor and the recovery of possession thereunder, interrupts the running of the statute,^^ and such inter- 15. Doe V. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391, 2 So. 24; Burrows v. Gal- lup, 32 Conn. 493, 87 Am. Dec. 186; Brett v. Farr, 66 Iowa, 684, 24 N. W. 275; Batchelder v. Rob- bins, 93 Me. 579, 45 Atl. 837; Wickes V. Wlckes, 98 Md. 307, 56 Atl. 1017; Boweu v. Guild, 130 Mass. 121; Musser-Sauntry Land, Logging & Mfg. Co. v. T'ozer, 56 Minn. 443, 57 N. W. 1072; Camp- bell V. Wallace. 12 N. H. 362. 37 Am. Dec. 219;^ Landon v. Town- shend, 129 N. V. 166, 29 N. E. 71; Altemus v. Campbell, 9 Watts (Pa.) 28, 34 Am. Dec. 494; Evitts V. Roth, 61 Tex. 81; Illinois Steel Co. V. Budzisz, 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019. The owner may enter by an agent as well as in person. Batchelder v., Robbins, 93 Me. 579, 45 Atl. 837; Johnson v. Fitz- george,- 50 N. J. L. 470, 14 Atl. 762; Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 Pa. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536; Camp v. Camp, 88 Vt. 119, 92 Atl. 12; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019. 16. Gould V. Carr. 33 Fla. 523, 24 L. R. A. 130, 15 So. 259; Bella V. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283; Men- denhall v. Price, 88 Iowa, 203, 55 N. W. 321 (semble); Fergu- son V. Bartholomew, 67 Mo. 212; Norvell v. Gray, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 96. Contra, San Francisco v. Fulde, 37 Cal. 349, 99 Am. Dec. 278. In Illinois an entry has been regarded as forcible for this purpose if against the will of the person in possession. Bug- ner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 280 111. 620, 117 N. E. 711. 17. See Place v. Place, l;59 Mich. 509, 102 N. W. 996; Doug- las V. Irvine, 126 Pa. 643, 17 Atl. 802; Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 122 Am. St. Rep. 609, 86 S. W. 746, 87 S. W. 1148. . 18. Moore v. Greene, 19 How. f!U. S.) 69. 15 L. Ed. 533; Bishop V. Truett, 85 Ala. 376; McGrath V. Wallace, 85 Cal. 622; Smith v. Hornback, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 232, 14 Am. Dec. 122; Barrell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 27 Ore. 77, 39 Pac. 992; Potts v. Wright, 82 Pa. 498. § 507] Adverse Possession. lii.")' ruption occurs, it has been decided, at the time of the bringing of the action. ^'^ The bringing of an action, however, which results unsuccessfully to plaintiff, does not interrupt it.^*^ There are a number of decisions to the effect that even though a judgment is rendered for plaintiff in such action, the statute does not cease to run unless there is a change of possession in accordance with the judgment,-^ while tliere are other decisions to the contrary. 2^ In some of the earlier cases,- • the asserted ineffec- tiveness in this regard of a judgment, not followed by a change of possession in accordance therewith, was based upon the consideration that a judgment in eject- ment decided only that the plaintiff' was entitled to pos- session during the term named in the fictitious demise, 19. Butler v. Secrist, 92 Neb. 506, 138 N. W. 749; Barrell v. Title Guarantee Co., 27 Ore. 77, 39 Pac. 992; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. V. Jenkins, 103 111. 588; Dunn V. Miller, 75 Mo. 260; Breon V. Robrecht, 118 Cal. 469, 62 Am. St. Rep. 247, 50 Pac. 689, 51 Pac. 33; Ball v. Lively, 1 Dana (Ky.) 60; Beard v. Ryan, 78 Ala. 37. 20. Moore v. Greene, 19 How. (N. Y.) 71; Langford v. Poppe, 56 Cal. 73; Workman v. Guthrie, 29 Pa. St. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 654; Snell V. Harrison, 131 Mo. 495, 52 Am. St. Rep. 642, 32 S. W. :M; Nelson v. Triplett, 99 Va. 421, ."^g S. E. 150. 21. Bradford v. Wilson, 140 Ala. 633, 37 So. 295; Carpenter V. Natoma, etc., Water Co., 63 Cal. 616; Gould v. Carr, 33 Fla. 523, 24 L. R. A. 130, 15 So. 259; O'Neal V. Boone, 53 111. 35; Forbes v. Caldwell, 39 Kan. 14, 17 Pac. 478; Smith v. Trabue, 1 Mc- Lean (U. S.) 87. 22. Snen v. Harrison, 131 Mo. 495, 52 Am. St. Rep. 642, 32 S. W. 37, overruling Mabary v. Dollarhide, 98 Mo. 204, 14 Am. St. Rep. 639, 11 S. W. 611; Rogers v. Johnson, 259 Mo. 17.!. 168 S. W. 613; Perry v. Eagle Coal Co., 170 Ky. 824, 186 S. W. 875, apparently overruling Mar- tin V. Hall,. 152 Ky. 677, 153 S. W. 997; Brolaskey v. McClain, 61 Pa. St. 166; Wade v. Mc- Dougle, 59 W. Va. 113, 52 S. E. 1026. A like view has been taken as to the effect of a decree for a conveyance (Gower v. Quinlan. 40 Mich. 572) and a decree «iiiiet- ing title (Hintrager v. Smith, 89 Iowa. 270, 56 N. W. 456; 01)erein V. Wells, 163 111. 101. 45 N. E. 294). 23. Kennedy v. Reynolds. 27 Ala. 364; Smith v. llornljuck. 4 Litt. 233; Jackson v. Ilavilaml. 13 Johns. 229. 1958 Real Peoperty. [§ 507 and was consequently not conclusive as to the title gen- erally,^^ but this consideration has ceased to be effective Avith the change in the nature of the action. And the view that a change of possession is necessary can be based only on the theory that, in the absence of a change of possession, the running of the statute is not inter- rupted unless tlie possession loses its hostile character, and that it does not lose such character merely as a result of the rendition of a judgment in favor of the rightful owner. It is said on the other hand, that the judgment does have the effect of depriving the posses- sion of its adverse character, for the reason that it estops the defendant therein from asserting that he holds under claim of title.^" But conceding that a hold- ing under claim of title is necessary to put the statute in motion,^*' it is by no means clear that a judoment in ejectment against the wrongful possessor should prop- erly estop him from the assertion of such a holding. It estops him from asserting title in subsequent litigation, but he is at liberty, it would seem, after the rendition of the judgment, as before, to assert in conversation or otherwise, that he claims title to the property, and hav- ing made such assertion, to show, in subsequent litiga- tion, that he did so. The bringing of an action by the true owner to assert his rights, followed by the recovery of a judgment by him, without any actual change of pos- session, might, it is submitted, be regarded as effective to stop the running of the statute against him, for the reason that in that way he has asserted, in the most conclusive manner possible, his rights in the land. While his failure to assert his rights by either action or entry involves laches on his part, it does not seem that he should be regarded as guilty of laches, and made to suffer accordingly, because, after asserting his rights by an action brought to a successful conclusion, he fails 24. See an excellent editorial 25. 9 Columbia Law Rev. 351. note in 9 Columbia Law Rev. 26. Ante, § 504. at p. 351. § 507] Adverse Possession. 1959 to follow tJais up by an entry on the land. He has a right to assume, after judgment in his favor, and in the abs(?nce of anything to show the contrary, that defend- ant, in retaining possession, is doing so in his behalf, that is, in accord with the adjudication.-'^ By cessation of possession. Since the statute runs against the rightful owner only if there is an actual possession of the land by another, it ceases to run upon a cessation of such actual possession, an interruption of the continuity of possession, as it is frequently termed. If such an interruption occurs, and possession is there- after resumed, the limitation period commences to run only from the time of such resumption. ^^ Interruption of continuity of possession may result from the cessa- tion by the person in possession of his exercise of acts of possession or ownership over the land,-^ but the mere fact that the acts of possession are not continuous, or that the owner does not continue in actual occupancy, does not necessarily show an interruption of the posses- sion, this depending on the character of the acts neces- sary to constitute actual possession, the intention of the possessor, and the other circumstances of the case."" Nor is the continuity of possession interrn))tod 27. See Sanford v. Herron, 161 83 Tex. 580. 19 S. W. 136; Illinois Mo. 176, 84 Am. St. Rep. 703, Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 115 Wis. 68, 61 S. W. 839. 90 N. W. 1019. 28. Ross V. Goodwin, 88 Ala. 29. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. 390, 6 So. 682; Brown v. Hanauer, Philyaw, 88 Ala. 264, 6 So. 837; 48 Ark. 277, 3 S. W. 27; Town- Sharp v. Johnson, 22 Ark. 79; send V. Edwards, 25 Fla. 582. 6 Clark v. White, 120 Ga. 957, 48 So. 212; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. S. E. 357; Downing v. Mays. 153 Keegan, 185 111. 70, 56 N. E. 1088; 111. 33, 46 Am. St. Rep. 896. 3S Steeple v. Downing. 60 Ind. 478; N. E. 620; Nixon v. Porter. 38 Logan V. Williams, 159 Ky. 412, Miss. 401; Barrell v. Title Guar- 167 S. W. 124; Armstrong v. antee & Trust Co. 2.7 Ore. 77, Risteau's Lessee, 5 Ind. 256, 59 39 Pac. 997; Stephens v. Leach, Am. Dec. 115; Old South Soc. 19 Pa. St 262; Fitch v Beyer, V. Walnwright, 156 Mass. 115, 51 Tex. 336. 30 N. E. 476; Bliss v. Johnson, 30. Beasloy v. Ilowoll. 117 Ala. 94 N. Y. 235; Philipson v. Flynn, 499. 22 So. 989; Aldrirh Mining ![)()() Real Peoperty. [§ 507 by the entry of a third person upon the land, not effect- ing an ouster of the person previously in possession, such an entry constituting merely a trespass upon such person's possession.^^ That the interruption of continuity of possession is the result of overwhelming necessity, such as the sub- mersion of the property ,^^ sickness,''^ or military con- ditions,^^ appears' to be immaterial in this regard, but when the cessation of occupation is temporary merely, the fact that it is obviously the result of such necessity is a consideration tending to show that the legal posses- sion is nevertheless continuing.'^ '^ By cessation of hostility. Since the statute runs against the true owner in favor of one in posses- sion only when such possession is hostile or adverse, it follows that if the possession, although otherwise con- tinuous, ceases to be hostile or adverse, by reason of Co. V. Pearce, 192 Ala. 195, 68 So. 900; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431, 83 Pac. 1008; Downing V. Mayes, 153 111. 330, 46 Am. St. Rep. 896, 38 N. E. 620; Butt v. Houser — (Ky.)— 188 S. W. 628; McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 Atl. 1025; Ford v. Wil- son, 35 Miss. 490; Hunter v. Finnell, 193 Mo. 142, 91 S. W. 472; Pease v. Whitney, — N. H. — , 98 Atl. 62; Cross v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 172 N. C. 119, 90 S. E. 14; Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Pa. St. 297; Cathcart v. Mat- thews, 105 S. C. 329, 89 S. E. 1021; Langdon v. Templeton, 66 Vt. 173, 28 Atl. 866; Chase v. Eddy, 88 Vt 235, 92 Atl. 99. 31. Chastang v. Chastang, 141 Ala. 451, 109 Am. St. Rep. 45, 37 So. 799; Prouty v. Tilden, 164, 111. 163, 45 N. E. 445; Martin v. Hall, 152 Ky. 077, L. R. A. 1918A, 1041, 153 S. W. 997; Batch- elder V. Robbins, 95 Me. 59, 49 Atl. 210; Ballard v. Hansen, 33 Neb. 861, 51 N. W. 295; Clark v. Potter, 32 Ohio St. 49; Workman V. Guthrie, 29 Pa. 495, 62 Am. Dec. 382; Love v. Turner, 78 S. C. 513, 59 S. E. 529; Glover v. Pfeuffer, —Tex. Civ.—, 163 S. W. 984; Zeller v. Martin, 157 Wis. 341, 147 N. W. 371. 32. Western v. Flanagan, 120 Mo. 61, 25 S. W. 531. S§e 2 Columbia Law Rev. 562; 16 Har- vard Law Rev. 224. 33. Taylor v. Dunn, 108 Tex. 337, 193 S. W. 663. 34. See Holliday v. Cromwell, 37 Tex. 437. 35. See McColgan v. Langford, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 108, 116; Robin- son V. Nordman, 75 Ark. 593, 88 S. W. 592; Thomas v. Spencer, 66 Ore. 359, 133 Pac. 822, § 507 Adverse Possession. 1961 the possessor's recognition of the title of the rightful owner, the statute thereupon ceases to run.^^' The pos- session also ceases to be hostile when the possessor ac- quires the right of possession, by a conveyance or lease/*" In other words, if after the statute has commenced to run, the person in possession acquires the title to the land, and subsequently disposes thereof, retaining pos- session, the statutory period must be figured from the time of such separation of the title and the possession. There are occasional decisions or dicta to the effect that the possessor's recognition of the title of the rightful owner is effective for the purpose of negativing the ele- ment of hostility although it is communicated, not to the rightful owner himself, but to some third person or persons,"^ but the soundness of such a view is, it is sub- mitted, open to question. One who takes possession of another's land without permission from the owner is guilty of a tort regardless of the fact that he concedes 36. Russell v. Erwin, 38 Ala. 44; Trufant v. White, 99 Ala. 526, 13 So. 83; Vittitow v. Bur- nett, 112 Ark. 277, 165 S. W. 625; Lovell v. Frost, 44 Cal. 471; McMahill v. Torrence, 163 111. 277, 45 N. E. 269; Litchfield v. Sewell, 97 Iowa, 247, 66 N. W. 104; Pratt v. Ard, 63 Kan. 182, 65 Pac. 255; Ray v. Barker's Heirs, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 364; Vaughan v. Bacon, 15 Me. 455; Warren v. Bowdran, 156 Mass. 280, 31 N. E. 300; City of St. Paul V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 34 L. R. A. 184, 63 N. W. 267, 65 N. W. 649, 68 N. W. 458; Tomlinson v. Lynch, 32 Mo. 160; Stone v. Kansas City & W. B. R. Co., 261 Mo. 61, 169 S. W. 88; Nebraska Ry. Co. V. Culver, 35 Neb. 14:5, 52 N. W. 886; Keneda v. Gardner, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 464; Williams v. Scott, 122 N. C. 545, 29 S. E. 877; IngersoU v. Lewis, 11 Pa. St. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536; Erskine V. North, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 60. Contra, McAllister v. Hartzell, 60 Ohio St. 69. That the person in possession instituted a suit for specific per- formance against the rightful owner was held to involve an ad- mission of the latter's title. Cen- tral Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tari)ey.— Utah—. 168 Pac. 554. 37. Patton v. Smith. 171 Mo. 231, 71 S. W. 187; Joy v. I'ale- thorpe. 77 Ore. 552. 152 Pac. 230. 38. Chirago etc. R. Co. v. Kee- gan. 185 111. 70. 56 N. E. 1088; Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201; Whitaker v. Thayer, 38 Tex. Civ. 537, R6 S. W. 364; City of Clovo- liind V. Clevflund, <".. C. & Sf. L. Ry. Co., 93 Fed. 113; An 507] Adverse Possession. 1963 chase from the rightful owner, should not, it is con- ceived, any more than should his offer to purchase, bo considered conclusive of his recognition of the latter 's title, but there are occasional decisions in which it has been apparently so regarded.^ ^ The lanouage of the contract may of course show such recognition.^- If the person in wrongful possession actually takes a conveyance from the true owner, he will oidinarily base his claim upon such conveyance rather than upon the statute of limitations, but it may occur that the con- veyance is invalid, or that it covers only part of the property. The language of the conveyance may no doubt be such as to show a recognition of the grantor's title,*^ but apart from this, it seems that the wrongful possessor's acceptance of a conveyance, while it may be evidence of his recognition of the grantor's title,^'* is not conclusive thereof."*^ Effect of taking lease. The taking of a lease from the true owner would almost necessarily, it seems, involve a recognition of the latter 's title, since the lease cannot well be regarded as acquired merely to i)rotect 41. Olson V. Burk, 94 Minn. Meyer v. Hope, 101 Wis. 123, 77 456, 103 N. W. 335; Cluss v. N. W. 720; Elder v. McClaskey, Hackett, 127 Minn. 397, 149 N. W. 70 Fed. 529, 17 C. C. A. 251. But 647; Texas, N. 0. R. Co. v. that it necessarily interrupts tbe Speights, 94 Tex. 350, 60 S. W. running of the statute, see Jack- 659. son V. Sears, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 42. Cahuac v. Cochrane, 41 Up. 435. Can. Q. B. 437. That the acquistion of a tax 43. As in Ingersoll v. Lewis, title does not interrupt the run- 11 Pa. St. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536. ning of the statute, see Hayes v. 44. Price v. Greer, 89 Ark. 300, Martin, 45 (^al. 559; Mather v. 116 S. W. 676, 118 S. W. 1009. Walsh. 107 Mo. 121, 17 S. W. 755; 45. Ripley v. Miller, 165 Mich. Griffith v. Smith, 27 Neb. 47. 42 47, 52, 130 N. W. 345, Ann. Cas. N. W. 749; Zweibel v. Myers. 69 1912C, 952; Bryani v. Prewitt, Nen). 294, 95 N. W. 597; Bannon 132 Ky. 799, 117 S. W. 343; .John v. Brandon, 34 Pa. 263, 75 Am. L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Doc. 655; Silverstone v. Hanley. Cedar Works, 168 N. C. 344, Ann. 55 Wash. 458. 104 Pac. 767. Cas. 1917B, 992, 84 S. B. 523; 1964 Real Pkopeety. [§ 507 the lessee from an unfounded claim by the owner.*^ That it does interrupt the running of the statute has been decided in a number of cases.^'^ A mere offer to take a lease would seem also to be strong evidence of recognition of the other's title, even if not conclusive in that regard.^*'* But the taking of a lease of a tract adjoining the land of which the lessee is in wrongful possession cannot be regarded as involving a recogni- tion of the lessor's title to the latter land, merely be- cause he is the owner of both tracts."'^ Recognition of title in third person. Whether the recognition or admission by the person in posses- sion, that the title is in a third j^erson, operates to inter- rupt the running of the statute as against the true owner, appears to depend on whether it is to be con- ceded that a claim of title, or as otherwise expressed, possession hostile to the whole world, is necessary to the running of the statute. It is, it is submitted, not necessary,^" and consequently such recognition does not interrupt the running of the statute. Such recognition may, however, if it goes to the extent of an attornment to 46. But see Bidwell v. Evans, ment of the lessor's title. It 156 Pa. 30, 26 Atl. 817. would rather seem, h6wever, that 47. Abbey Homestead Ass'n v. the invalidity of the lease would Willard, 48 Cal. 614; Chicago ordinarily be immaterial in this etc. R. Co. V. Keegan, 185 111. 70, regard. 56 N. E. 1088; Boling v. Ewing, 48. Risher v. Madsen, 94 Neb. 9 Dana (Ky.) 76; Campau v. 72, 142 N. W. 700; Horton v. LalTerty, 43 Mich. 429. 50 Mich. Davidson, 135 Pa. 186, 19 Atl. 934. 114, 5 N. W. 648, 15 N. W. 40; 49. O'Flaherty v. Mann, 196 Olson V. Burk, 94 Minn. 456, 103 111. 304, 63 N. E. 727; Rabberman N. W. 335; Hermann v. Mclver. v. Carroll, 207 111. 253, 69 N. E. 51 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 111 S. W. 759; Tex v. Pflug, 24 Neb. 66, 8 766; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Am. St Rep. 231, 39 N. W. 839; George, 51 Wash. 303, 98 Pac. Levy v. Yerga, 25 Neb. 764, 13 1126. In Broad v. Beatty, 73 Ark. Am. St. Rep. 525, 41 N. W. 773; 106, 83 S. W. 339, it is decided Dixon v. Baty, L. R. 1 Exch. 259. that the acceptance of a void 50. Ante, § 503, note 47a. In lease raises merely a rebuttable Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Keegan, presumption of an acknowledg- 185 111. 70, 56 N. E. 1088, it § 507] Adveese Possession. 1965 such third person as tenant, or an agreement to hokl as agent of such person, have the result of making the possession thereafter enure to the benefit of such person rather than of the actual possessor."^^ That the person in wrongful possession purchases, or offers to purchase, the claim of a third person to the land, has been decided not to affect the running of the statute as against the true owner.^- These decisions might be based upon the theory, either that the pur- chase did not involve any recognition of the title of the third person, or that the recognition of the title of a third person does not interrupt the running of the stat- ute against the rightful owner. If two persons have distinct interests in property which is in the adverse possession of another person, the fact that the latter purchases or otherwise acquires the interest of one of such two jDersons does not affect the running of the statute as against the other of such per- sons.^^ Accordingly the fact that the wrongful posses- sor purchases the interest of one tenant in common does not preclude him from asserting the statute as against the other tenants in common. ^^ Even were it conceded appears to be decided that if one Mass. 280, 31 N. E. 300; Dean v. in adverse poss^ession makes a con- Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N. W. veyance of the land to another, 1060; Wiese v. Union Pac. R. Co. 77 without however relinquishing Neb. 40, 108 N. W. 175; Northrop possession, the continuity of the v. Wright, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 476; adverse possession is broken. West v. Edwards, 41 Oreg. 609, 09 This would seem to be upon the Pac. 992; Bannon v. Brandon, theory that recognition of the title 34 Pa. St. 363, 75 Am. Dec. 655: as being in a third person inter- Alsworth v. Richmond, Cedar rupts the ninning of the statute. Works, 172 N. C. 17, 89 S. K. 51. See Robinson v. Bazoon. 1008. 79 Tex. 524, 15 S. W. 585, and 53, See City of St. Paul v. ante, § 501, note 31. Chicago M. & SI. P. H. Co.. 45 52. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Stock- Minn. 387, 48 N. W. 17. man, 36 Cal. 535, 95 Am. Dec. 54. Elder v. McClaskey, 70 205; Clark v. Peckenpaugh. 4»; Fed. 529, 17 C. C. A. 251; Winter- Ill. 11; Medlock v. Suter, 80 Ky. burn v. Chambers. 91 Cal. 170, 101; Bean v. Bachelder, 74 Me. 27 Pac. 658; Richardson v. Watta, 202; Warren v. Bowdran, 156 94 Me. 476, 48 Atl. 180; Cook v. 2 R. P.— 49 1966 Real Peopeety. [^ 507 that the recognition of a title, which is really in A, as being in B would interrupt the running of the statute aganst A, the recognition of the title to one interest as being in B would not interrupt the running of the stat- ute against A as to an entirely distinct interest. Effect of tenant's acknowledgment. If one is in wrongful possession by his tenant,"^^ a question may arise as to whether the tenant's acknowledgment of the true owner's title deprives the possession of the ele- ment of hostility, so as to interrupt the running of the statute. There are a number of decisions to the effect that such acknowledgment does not interrupt the run- ning of the statute,^*^ while it has occasionally been as- serted that it does cause such interruption.^'^ And in a few cases it has been decided that it causes such inter- ruption if the rightful owner does not know of the rela- tion of tenancy.^* These latter cases would seem to in- dicate the proper distinction in this regard. If the rightful owner has no reason to suspect that the person wrongfully in possession of his land is so in possession, not in his own behalf but in behalf of another, he is justified in assuming that the person in possession has full power to characterize his possession, as being hostile or the reverse, and if such person acknowledges the true Clinton, 64 Mich. 309, 8 Am. St. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 122 Am. Rep. 816, 31 N. W. 317: St. Paul St. Rep. 609, 86 S. W. 746, 87 S. V. Chicago etc. R. Co., 45 Minn. W. 1148; Pickens v. Stout, 67 W. 387, 48 N. W. 17; Jackson v. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354. Smith, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 406; 57. Russell v. Irwin, 38 Ala. Northrop v. Wright, 7 Hill. (N. 44; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budsisz, Y.) 476; Coakley v. Perry, 3 Ohio 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019; St. 344. Western Union Beef Co. v. Thur- 55. Ante, § 501. note 31- man, 70 Fed. 960, 17 C. C. A. 532. 56. Elliott V. Dycke, 78 Ala. 58. Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. St. 150; Mills V. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. 203; Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. (Ky.) 248; Middlesboro Water- 508; Louisiana & Texas Lumber works V. Neal, 105 Ky. 58, 49 S. Co. v. Alexander, — Tex. Civ. App. W. 428; Warren v. Frederichs, 76 — , 154 S. W. 233. Tex. 647, 13 S. W. 643; Cobb v. >^ 507] Adverse Possession. 1967 owner's title, tlie latter is not guilty of laches in failing to take legal proceedings. On the other hand, if the rightful owner has reason to know that the person in possession is in possession merely in behalf of another, he has no right to assume that such person has authority to acknowledge his title, or, by reason of such acknowl- edgment, to refrain from legal proceedings. In at least one state-^^ it has been said that the fact that tlie land- lord is unaware of the acknowledgment by his tenant of the true owner's title is a reason for not regarding such acknowledgment as effecting an interruption."'^ This view is apparently based on the theory that if the land- lord is aware of the acknowledgment by the tenant, he may be regarded as having previously authorized it, or as being in a position to repudiate it and to recover pos- session from the tenant. Occasionally the asserted inability of the tenant to interrupt the running of the statute by taking a lease from the true owner is in tenns based" ^ on the rule that a tenant in possession cannot attorn to a third person not having the reversion."- But whether the acknowledg- ment of title takes the form of an attornment, that is, the acceptance of a lease, is immaterial. The tenant cannot usually interrupt the running of the statute in favor of his landlord, hj acknowledging title in the tnie owner, for the reason that he has no authority to make such an acknowledgment. He represents his landlord 59. Haynes v. Boardman, 119 takes such measures was regarded Mass. 414. And see Rankin v. as showing that the running of Tenbrook, 5 Watts (Pa.) 383. the statute was interrupted. 60. In Coyle v. Franklin, 54 61. See Elliott v. Dycke. 78 Fed. 644, 4 C. C. A. r,38, it is Ala. 150; Ellsworth v. Ksliok, 91 decided that the acknowledgment Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973; Cobb v. by the tenant does not interTui)t Robfrtson, 99 Tex. 138. 122 Am. the running of the statute if the St. Rep. 609, 8(i S. W. 74n, S7 S. landlord immediately takes meas- W. 1148; Rankin v. Tenbrook. Ti ures to recover the possession as Watts (Pa.), 386. having been forfeited by the ten- 62. See 1 Tiffany, liandlord & ant. In Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. Tenant, § 19. 119, 76 S. E. 183, a failure to l'J68 Eeal Property. [§ 508 for the purpose of holding possession against third per- sons, bnt not for the purpose of acknowledging the title of third persons. § 508. Tacking. The question has frequently arisen whether the running of the statute against the true owner is affected by the fact that during the statu- tory period, although the possession was continuously hostile to the true owner, it was the possession, not of one person alone, but of two or more persons in succes- sion. This question is ordinarily discussed with refer- ence to the relation between themselves of the succes- sive possessors, and it is said that successive possessions by different persons may be "tacked," so as to defeat the claim of the rightful owner, if such persons are in privity one with another, the expression ''privity" serv- ing to indicate the relationship which exists between two or more persons, one of whom claims under the other or others, as representing the same persona or estate.®^ That an heir is entitled to tack his ancestor's pos- session to his own is generally conceded,*'^ and, by the very great weight of authority, one to whom another, having adverse possession of the land, voluntarily trans- fers the possession, can tack to his own possession the possession of the latter,*'^ even though the transfer of 63. Holmes, The Common Law, 42 S. E. 426; CivH v. Toomey, 368. 103 S. C. 460, 88 S. E. 261; East 64. Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. (Mass.) 241; Fugate v. Pierce, Broyles, 95 Tenn. 613, 32 S. W. 49 Mo. 441; Montague v. Marunda, 761. 71 Neb. 805, 99 N. W. 653; Alex- 65. Frost v. Courtis, 172 Mass. ander v. Gibbon, 118 N. C. 796, 54 401, 52 N. E. 515; Gage v. Gage, Am. St. Rep. 757, 24 S. E. 748; 30 N. H. 421; McNeely v. Langan, Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N. C. 547, 22 Ohio St. 32; Overfield v. 42 L. R. A. N. S. 403, 69 S. E. Christie, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173. 614; McNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio And see cases cited in next note. St. 32; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Contra, King v. Smith, Rice (S. Or. 515, 32 Pac. 402; Overfleld v. C.) 10; Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 Christie, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173: S. C. 28. Epperson v. Stansill, 64 S. C. 485. § 508] Adverse Possessiojs", 1969 possession is accompanied merely by an oral agreement of transfer of title or by an invalid written convey- ance.^^ Consequently, in spite of decisions that, if the land in dispute is not included in the description in a particular conveyance, the possessions of the grantor and grantee cannot be tacked,''^ it seems that even in such case the possessions can be tacked if there was an oral transfer of the possession by the former to the latter, in addition to the making of the written conve}'- ance.^® A devisee can tack to his possession that of his devisor,''^^ and even in the case of a sale under judicial process or decree, the purchaser has been held entitled 66. Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 111. 649, 22 N. E. 835; Shedd v. Alexander, 270 111. 117, 110 N. E. 327; Comm. v. Gibson, 85 Ky. 666; Wishart v. McKnight, 178 Mass. 356, 86 Am. St. Rep. 486, 59 N. E. 1028; Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152, 30 N. W. 551; Crispen V. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536: Davock V. Nealon, 58 N. J. Law 21, 32 Atl. 675; McNeely v. Longan, 22 Ohio St. 32; Parker v. Wolf, 69 Or. 446, 138 Pac. 463; Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Pa. St. 297; Illinois Steel Co. V. Budsisz, 106 Wis. 499, 48 L. R. A. 830, 80 Am. St. Rep. 54, 81 N. W. 1027, 82 N. W. 534; Ram- bert V. Edmondson, 99 Tenn. 15, 63 Am. St. Rep. 819, 41 S. W. 935; Moran v. Moseley — Tex. Civ. App. — , 164 S. W. 1093. But see Sheldon v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 161, Mich. 503, 126 N. W. 1056, criticized 10 Columbia Law Rev. 763. 67. Southern Iron & Steel Co. V. Stowers, 189 Ala. .^14, 66 So. 677; Messer v. Hibernia Sav. etf. Soc. 149 Cal. 122, 84 Pac. 835; Rich V. Naffziger, 255 111. 98, 99 N. E. 341; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry Co. V. Sterling, 189 Mich. 36t;, 155 N. W. 383; Jennings v. White, 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799: Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543. 190 S. W. 548; Allis v. Field, 89 Wis. 327, 62 N. W. 85. 68. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. V. Mulkey, 100 Ark. 71, Ann. Cas. 1913C. 1339, l.'^9 S. W. 643; Rich V. Naffziger, 255 111. 98, 99 N. E. 341; Helmick v. Davenport. R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 174 Iowa, 558, 156 N. W. 736; Vandall v. St. Martin, 42 Minn. 163, 44 N. W. 525; Crowder v. N'eal, lOn Miss. 730, 57 So. 1; West v. Edwards. 41 Or. 609. 69 Pac. 992: Nah?r v. Farmer, 60 Wash. 600, 111 Pac. 768; Mielke v. Dodge, 135 Wis. 388. 115 N. W. 1099: Clithcro v. Fenner, 122 Wis. 3r,6. 99 N. W. 1027, 106 Am. St. Rep. 978. 68a. Shaw v. Nicholay. 30 .Mo. 99; Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152. 36 N. W. 551; Dunbar v. Aldrich, 79 Miss. 698, 31 So. 341; Hart V. Wllllania, 1S9 Pa. 31. 41 All. 983. Contra. Burnett v. Craw- ford. 50 S. Car. ir.l. 27 S. E. 645. 1970 Real Peopeety. [§ 508 to tack to his possession the possession of tlie person or persons whose title the sale was intended to divest.^^ It has been held that one claiming as remainderman under a will may tack to his own possession the posses- sion of the testator and the life tenant under the will, since the possession of each is under the same titleJ" If the personal representative of decedent, without statutory or testamentary authority, takes possession, his possession is in effect that of a wrongdoer, and it cannot be tacked to the possession of decedent.'^^ The rule is different, however, if he has authority to take possession.'^- Wlien, upon the death of a tenant in fee simple," his widow remains in possession claiming by reason of a statute giving to a widow the right of possession, there would seem to be such. a ''privity" between the deceased and his widow as to entitle her to tack his possession to her own,"^^ the case being somewhat analogous to that of tacking by the heir. And in such a case the temporary possession of the widow may, it seems, be tacked to that of the husband's heirs, in order to give the latter title 69. Riggs V. Fuller, 54 Ala. Co. v. Ferguson,— Tenn Ch. — , 35 141; Memphis L. R. R. Co. v. S. W. 900. Organ, 67 Ark. 84, 55 S. W. 952; 72. Cannon v. Prude, 181 Ala. Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 629, 62 So. 24; Vanderbilt v. 6 So. 871; Dunbar v. Aldrich, 79 Chapman, 172 N. C. 809, 90 S. E. Miss. 698, 31 So. 341; Miller v. 993; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Ore. Bumgardner, 109 N. C. 412, 13 S. 515, 32 Pac. 402. See Ricker v. E. 935; Clark v. Bundy, 29 Ore. Butler, 45 Minn. 545, 48 N. W. 190, 44 Pac. 282; Cooper v. Great 407. Falls Cotton Mills Co., 94 Tenn. 73. To that effect see McEntire 588, 30 S. W. 353; Hall v. Hall, 27 v. Brown, 28 Ind. 347; Mills' W. Va. 468. Heirs v. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. 70. Haynes v. Boardman, 119 (Ky.) 248; Atwell v. Shook, 133 Mass. 414; Hart v. Williams, 189 N. Car. 387, 45 S. E. 777; John- Pa. 31, 41 Atl. 983. Contra, son v. Johnson, 106 Ark. 9, 152 Austin V. Rutland R. Co., 45 Vt. S. W. 1017; Mielke v. Dodge, 135 215. See Hickman v. Link, 97 Wis. 388, 115 N. W. 1099. Contra, Mo. 482, 10 S. W. 600. semble, Robinson v. AUison, 124 71. Bullen v. Arnold, 31 Me. Ala. 325, 27 So. 461. 583; East Tennessee Iron & Coal § 508] Adveesb Possession. 1971 by adverse possession.'^ When the widow has no right of possession immediately on the husband's death, but merely a right to have dower assigned to her, the pos- session of the widow can, it has been held, not be tacked to the possession of the husband."^ This view has, how- ever, been questioned, it being asserted that the posses- sion of the widow in such case, not being adverse to the heirs,'^*' should be regarded as in their behalf and con- sequently subject to be tacked to the possession of the decedent to the same extent as that of the heirs. '^^ If one who is in adverse possession leases in turn to different persons, the possession of each of these lessees is, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, the possession of the lessor,"^^ and the possessions of the lessees may be tacked together, and may also be tacked to that of the lessor.'^'' And if one in adverse posses- sion in his own right attorns to a third person, or agrees to hold as the latter 's agent, his possession in his own right may, it would seem, be tacked to his pos- session in behalf of such third person, for the purpose of barring the claim of the true owner.^^^ It has been asserted, in quite a number of cases, that one w^ho disseises another whose own possession 74. Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. See editorial note 17 Harv. Law 482, 10 S. W. 600; AtweU v. Rev. at p. 277. Shook, 133 N. Car. 387, 45 S. E. 78. Aiite. § 501. note 31. 777; Jacobs v. WiUiams, 173 N. 79. Ramsey v. Glenny, 45 C. 276, 91 S. E. 951; Mills' Heirs Minn. 401, 22 Am. St. Rep. 736. V. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 48 N. W. 322; Landon v. Town- 248. shend, 129 N. V. 166, 29 N. E. 71; 75. McEntire v. Brown, 28 Ind. Alexander v. Gibbon, 118 N. C. 347; Sawyer & Kendall. 10 Gush. 796, 54 Am. St. Rep. 757, 24 S. E. (Mass.) 241; Marr v. Gilliam, 1 748; Weaver v. Love, 146 N. C. Coldw. (Tenn.) 488; Baker v. 414, 59 S. E. 1041; Thompson v. Hale, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 46; Doe v. Kauffelt, 110 Pa. St. 209, 1 Atl. Barnard, 13 Q. B. 945. 267; Sims v. Eastland, 3 Head 3i;S; 76. Post, § 513 (k), note 60. Hanks v. Houston Oil Co. of 77. Atwell V. Shook, 133 N. C. Texas,— Tex Civ.—, 173 S. W. 635. 387, 45 S. E. 777; Mill's Heirs v. 80. But Robinson v. Bazoon, 19 Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 248. Tex. 524, 15 S. W. 585, is contra, 1972 Real Pbopeety. [§ 509 was that of a disseisor, and so adverse to the record owner, cannot tack the adverse possession of such other to his own adverse possession, in order to make up the statutory period.*^ There are a few cases of a con- trary tendency, ^2 and the view first referred to has heen criticized on the ground that the statute of limitations should be applied as against one who allows himself to remain out of possession for the statutory period, with- out reference to who may happen to be seised of the land during that period.^^ There can be no tacking if the possession of one person does not immediately follow upon that of the other, since in that case the element of continuity of possession is absent.^^ § 509. Personal disabilities. The statute of limita- tions invariably extends the period for bringing an ac- 81. Little V. Vice,— Ala.— , 76 So. 942; Lucy v. Tennessee & C. R. Co., 92 Ala. 246, 8 So. 806; City & County of San Francisco V. Fulde, 37 Cal. 349, 99 Am. Dec. 278; Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 531; McEntire v. Brown, 28 Ind. 347; Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241; Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152, 30 N. W. 551; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536; Locke V. Whitney, 63 N. H. 597, 3 Atl. 920; Low v. Schaffer, 24 Ore. 239, 33 Pac. 678; Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 75, 4 L. R. A. 641, 11 S. W. 794; Heflin v. Burns, 70 Tex. 347, 8 S. W. 48; Jarrett v. Stevens, 36 W. Va. 445, 15 S. E. 177. 82. Fanning v. Willcox, 3 Day 258; Shannon v. Kinny, 1 A. K. Marsh 3; Hord v. Walton, 2 A. K. Marsh 620; Candler v. Lunsford, 4 Dev. & B. 407; Davis v. Mc- Arthur, 78 N. C. 357; Scales v. Cockrill, 3 Head, 432. And see Wishart v. McKnight, 178 Mass. 356, 86 Am. St. Rep. 486, 59 N. E. 1028. 83. 3 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 324, article by Professor J. B. Ames, reprinted. Lectures on Legal History, at p. 205. See also 1 Harvard Law Rev. 248. 10 Columbia Law Rev. 761. The merits of the prevailing view are excellently presented by Professor Henry W. Ballantine, 32 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 147 et seg. 84. Louisville N. R. Co. v. Philyaw, 88 Ala. 264, 6 So. 837; Kilburn v. Adams, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218, 27 Am. Rep. 226; Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. 156; Jackson v. Leonard. 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 653; Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa., 355; Warren v. Fredericks, 76 Tex. 647, 13 S. W. 643; Winslow v. Newell, 19 Vt. § 509] Adverse Possession. 1973 tion to recover land in case tlie plaintiff was under dis- ability at the time the right of action accrued. The Statute of James I. contained such provision in favor of (1) persons under twenty-one years, (2) femes covert, (3) persons uon compos mentis, (4) persons imprisoned, and (5) persons *' beyond the seas." The saving clause in favor of infants is retained in most, if not all, of the state statutes, though the time at which infancy ceases differs in different states. Tlie saving in favor of married women also still exists in the majority of states, though in some it has been expressly abolished, in view of legislation enal)ling a married wo- man to sue alone. The saving in favor of persons uoi compos mentis is usually retained, and those in favor of persons imprisoned and of persons "beyond the seas," or, what is regarded as equivalent, "absent from the United States," are also frequently to be found. In some states, moreover, there are exceptions in favor of alien enemies. The statutes differ greatly as to the ex- tent of time after the removal of the disability within which an action may be brought, some naming the full period of limitation, and others naming a much shorter period.^^ These exceptions in statutes limiting tlie time for the recovery of land, as in those applical)le to personal ac- tions only, are usually construed as api)licabl(' only to a disability existing at the time of the accrual of the right of action, and the fact that a disability in llu' owner to sue arises after such accrual does not aft'ect the running of the statute.^*' Accordingly, if the right of action has once existed in favor of a person, the fact 164; Jarrett v. Stevens, 36 W. Va. Ga. 267. 63 Am. Dec. 235; Currier 445, 15 S. E. 177. v. Gale, 3 Allen (Mass.) 328; 85. The statutory provisions as Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns, to disabilities are summarized In Ch. (N. V.) 129, 8 Am. Dec. 476; Wood, Limitations (3d Ed.) § Holmes v. Carr. 172 N. C. 213, 90 237. Dembitz, Land Titles § 177. S. E. 152; Milton v. Pace, 85 S. 86. Doe d. Caldwell v. Thorp, 8 C. 373, 67 S. E. 458. Ala. 253; Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 1974 Real. Propeety. [§ 509 that it passes from him by descent to one under the dis- ability of infancy does not extend the time for bringing suit.*^ And if a disability existing at the time of the disseisin or other accrual of the cause of action is once removed, the fact that a subsequent disability inter- venes, as when a female infant, after arriving at age, marries, such subsequent disability does not operate in her favor.^^ If the owner of the land is under two or more disa- bilities at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, he may take advantage of both, or, rather, of the one which endures the longest;*^ but if only one disability exists at that time, he can take advantage of that alone, and the fact that, before such disability terminates, an- other intervenes, as when an infant feme sole marries, does not extend the time for the recovery of the land, or, as it is frequently stated, disabilities cannot be '' tacked. "^*^ Likewise, the disabilities of different per- 87. Harris v. McGuvern, 99 U. S., 61 affirming 2 Sawy. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 6125; Gates v. Beck- worth, 112 Ala. 356, 20 So. 399; Castro V. Geil, 110 Cal. 292, 52 Am. St. Rep. 84, 42 Pac. 804; Doyle V. Wade, 23 Fla. 90, 11 Am. St. Rep. 334, 1 So. 516; Hale's Heirs v. Ritchie, 142 Ky. 424, 134 S. W. 474; Ray v. Thur- man's Ex'r, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 3, 15 S. W. 1116; Burdett v. May. 100 Mo. 13, 12 S. W. 1056; Lyons V. Carr, 77 Neb. 883, 110 N. W. 705; Jackson v. Moore, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 513, 7 Am. Dec. 398; Campbell v. Dick,— Okla.— , 157 Pac. 1062; Lynch v. Cox, 23 Pa. 265; Fore v. Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706; Pickens v. Stout, 67 W. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354. Contra, Everett's Ex'rs v. Whitfield's Adm'rs, 27 Ga. 133. That the disability of a devisee is not avail- able, if the statute had begun to run in favor of testator, see De Hatre v. Edmunds, 200 Mo. 246, 98 S. W. 744. 88. Gherson v. Brooks, — (Ark.) — , 5 S. W. 329; Keil v. Healey, 84 111. 104, 25 Am. Rep. 434; Priddy v. Boice, 201 Mo. 309, 99 S. W. 1055, 119 Am. St. Rep. 762, 9 Ann. Cas. 874, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 718. 89. Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow, (N. Y.) 74, 15 Am. Dec. 433; Butler V. Howe, 13 Me. 397; North V. James, 61 Miss. 761; Keeton's Heirs v Keeton's Adm'r, 20 Mo. 530; Blake v. Hollands- worth, 71 W. Va. 387, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 714, 76 S. E. 814. 90. Bunce v, Wolcott, 2 Conn. 27; White v. Clawson, 79 Ind. 188; Duckett v. Crider, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 188; Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 307, 56 Atl. 1017; § 510] Advebse Possession. 1975 sons canuot be tacked, in order to make up tlie statutory period; and so, if the owner is under a disability from the time of the accrual of the right of action till his death, his infant heir cannot tack his own disability to that of his ancestor, in order to extend the statutory period.^' § 510. Exception in favor of the sovereign. Ac- cording to the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi, the adverse possession of land belonging to the state cannot, unless the statute otherwise provides, divest the govern- ment title.*^- Nor can the state authorities, even by an express provision to that effect, make the statute of limitations effective as against the United States.^-^ The statutory limitation begins, however, to run in favor of one in hostile possession of public land so soon as its ownership passes to a grantee of the government. In determining the time at which the private ownership be- gins for this purpose, the decisions are not in accord, some holding that it does not begin until the issue of the patent,^^ while others consider it as beginning so Herndon v. Yates — (Mo.)—, 194 Central Pac. R. Co., 24 Cal. 245; S. W. 46; Nutter v. De Roche- Twining v. City of Burlington, mont, 46 N. H. 80; Demarest v. 68 Iowa, 284, 27 N. W. 243; Hall Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) v. viittings* Lessee, 2 Har. & 129, 9 Am. Dec. 476; Cozzens v. J. (Md.) 112; Munshower v. Farnan, 30 Ohio St. 491, 27 Am. Patton, 10 Serg & R. (Pa.) 334. Rep. 470; Thompson v. Smith, 7 13 Am. Dec. 678; Hall v. Webb, Serg. & R. (Pa.) 209; McFarland 21 W. Va. 318. See, as to stat- V. Stone, 17 Vt. 165, 44 Am. Dec. utes on the subject, 2 Dembitz, 325; Contra, Miller v. Bumgard- Land Titles. § 179. ner, 109 N. C. 412, 13 S. E. 935. 93. Gibson v. Chouteau. 13 91. Dowell V. Tucker. 46 Ark. Wall. ( U. S.) 92. 20 L. Ed. 534: 438; Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. Redfield v. Parks. 132 U. S. 239. 227; Pim v. City of St. Louis, 122 33 L. Ed. 327. Mo. 654, 27 S. W. 525; Henry v. 94. RedHeld v. Parks, 132 U. Carson, 59 Pa. St. 297; Jackson S. 239, 33 L. 9d. 327; String- V. Houston, 84 Tex. 622, 19 S. fellow v. Tennessee Coal. Iron & W. 799. R- R. Co., 117 Ala. 250, 22 S. 92. Wagnon v. Fairbanks, 105 E. 997; Mathews v. Ferrca, 45 Ala. 528, 17 So. 20; Doran v. Cal. 51; Chiles v. Calk. 4 Bibb 1976 Real Peopeety. [§ 510 soon as, by payment for the land, the individnal has be- come entitled to a patent.''^ The question of the extent to which the statute of limitations runs against a municipal or quasi municipal corporation, as regards land belonging to it, has been the subject of much discussion, and the decisions are not in accord on the question. In the majority of the states, land owned by a municipality, and devoted to uses of a purely public character, as when the "fee" of a street or park is vested in the mmiicipality, or land is conveyed to the municipality for a public building, hospital, or the like, the municipality is regarded as merely the agent of the state, and its rights cannot be affected by the statute of limitations,'"'' though in a (Ky.) 554; Smith v. McCorkle, 105 Mo. 135, 16 S. W. 602; King V. Thomas, 6 Mont. 409, 12 Pac. 865; South End Min. Co. v. Tinney, 22 Nev. 221, 38 Pac. 402; La Frombois v. Jackson, 8 Cow 589, 18 Am. Dec. 463; Clark V. Southard, 16 Ohio St. 408; Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah, 64, 24 Pac. 755. 95. Hibben v. Malone, 85 Ark. 584, 109 S. W. 1008; Bauman v. Grubbs, 26 Ind. 419; Dolen v. Black. 48 Neb. 688, 67 N. W. 760; Ambrose v. Huntington 34 Ore. 484, 56 Pac. 513; Patten v. Scott, 118 Pa. St. 115, 12 Atl. 292, 4 Am. St. Rep. 576; Udell v. Peak. 70 Tex. 547, 7 S. W. 786; Dutton V. Thompson, 85 Tex. 115, 19 S. W. 1026. 96. Mobile Traii»;portation Co. v. Mobile, 128 Ala. 3.35, 30 So. 645, 86 Am. St. Rep. 143, 64 L. R. A. 333; Board of Education of City & County of San Francisco v. Martin, 92 Cal. 209, 28 Pac. 799; Norrell v. Augusta R. & Electric Co., 116 Ga. 313, 59 L. R. A. 101, 42 S. E. 466; City of SuHivan V. Tichenor, 179 111. 97, 53 N. E. 561; Close v. Chicago, 257 111. 47, 100 N. E. 215; Cheek v. City of Aurora, 92 Ind. 107; Kuehl V. Town of Bettendorf, 179 Iowa, 1, 161 N. W. 28; Inhab- itants of Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works, 82 Me. 391, 8 L. R. A. 828, 19 Atl. 902; Brady v. City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 506, 101 Atl. 142; St. Vincent Female Orphan Asylum v. Troy, 76 N. Y. 108, 32 Am. Rep. 286; Heddle- ston V. Hendricks, 52 Ohio St. 460, 40 N. E. 408; Comm. v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, 4 Am. St. Rep. 559, 12 Atl. 424; McKee V. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 255 Pa. 560, 100 At. 454; Almy v. Church, 18 R. I. 182, 26 Atl. 58; Norfolk & W. R. Co. V. Supervisors of Carroll County, 110 Va. 95. 65 S. E. 531; Gustaveson v. Dwyer, 83 Wash. 303. 145 Pac. 458; Ralston v. Town of Weston. 46 W. Va. 544, 76 Am. St. Rep. 834, 33 S. E. 326. But the city may, by some au- § 510] Adverse Possession. 19; number of states a different view obtains."" But even in the former class of states there is a tendency to distin- guish between land devoted to ]mh\ic use and that which is held by the municipality in a "private capacity," and over which it has the power of alienation, the latter be- ing rei>:arded as subject to the bar of the statute.^^ While there are authorities to the effect that land held by a railroad com])any for right of way purposes is so devoted to a public use as not to be the sub- ject of adverse possession,»» such land is. by the weight i)f authority, so subject.* tliorities, be estopped, by reason of Its acquiescence in improve- ments made on its land, to claim title to the land; Christopherson V. Incorporated Town Forest City, 178 Iowa, 893, 160 N VV. 691; Barton v. City of Portland. 74 Ore. 75. 144 Pac. 114(1; Wall v. Salt Lake City,— Utah— . 168 Puc. 766; See Dillon, Mun. Corp., §§ 1187, 1191, 1194. 97. Fort Smith v. McKibbln, 41 Ark. 45, 48 Am. Rep. 19; Axmear v. Richards, 112 Iowa, 657. 84 N. W. 686; Covington v. McNickles's Heirs, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 262; Pastnrino v. City of Detroit, 182 Mich. 5, 148 N. W. 231; Wayzata v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 50 Minn. 438, 52 N. W. 913; St. Charles County v. Powell, 22 Mo. 525. 66 Am. Dec. 637; Meyer v. City of Lincoln, 33 Neb. 566, 18 L. R. A. 146, 29 Am. St. Rep. 500, 50 N. W. 763; Oxford Township v. Columbia, 3S Ohio St. 87; Ostrom v. City of San Antonio, 77 Tex. 345, 14 S. W. 66. 98. Simplot V. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 16 Fed. 350; Ames v. City of San Diego, 101 Cal. 390, 35 Pac. 1005; Robinson v. Lemp, 29 Idaho. 661. 161 Pac. 1024; City of Chicago V. MIddlebrooke, 143 111. 265, 32 N. E. 457; City of Bedford v. Willarcl. 133 Ind. 562, 36 Am. St. Rep. 563, 33 N. E. 368; City of New Orle;m5! v. Salmen Brick & LumLer Co., 135 La. 828. 66 So. 237; In re Willard Parker Hos- pital, 217 N. Y. 1, 111 N. E. 256; Turner v. Hillsboro, 127 N. C. 153, 37 S. E. 191; Board of Super- visors of Tazewell County v. Nor- folk & W. R. Co., 119 Va. 763, 91 S. E. 124; GJ3tai''?son v. Dwyer, 83 Wash. 303, 145 Pac. 458, 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (5th Fa\.). 5 1188 et seq. 99. Southern Pac. Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 240, 54 L. R. A. 522, 64 Paarticular estate. In order, however, that the estopiDel operate in any case in favor of the person named as remainderman, it would seem to be necessary, as a recent writer has well pointed out,^^^ that the grantor or testator have been himself in possession, since if he was not in possession, there was nothing which could be regarded as passing by the conveyance or devise, so as to create a piivity in the remainderman named. As between husband and wife. In case both husband and wife are upon the land belonging to a third person, and the wife alone has color of title, the statute, it appears, will run in her favor rather than in favor of the husband, that is, the possession will be presumed to accord with the color of title.^^ As against bona fide purchaser. One who acquires title by adverse possession for the statu- tory period may, it has been decided, assert such title as against a bona fide purchaser of the record title, although such adverse possessor had relinquished possession previous to the sale.^^ The recording acts protect a bona fide purchaser only as against a prior 33b, Article by Professor 117 Wis. 428, 94 N. W. 332. Henry Winthrop Ballantine, 28 And See Collins v. Lynch, 157 Yale Law Journ. at pp. 224-235. Pa. St. 246, 37 Am. St. Rep. 723, This appears to be recognized 27 Atl. 721. by Jessel, M. R. in Re Stringer's 35. Faloon v. Simhauser, 130 Estate, 6 Ch. D. 1. 111. 649, 22 N. E. 835; Schall 34. McLeod v. Bishop, 110 Ala. v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 640, 20 So. 130; Clark v. Gilbert, St. 191; MacGregor v. Thompson, 39 Conn. .96; Meraman v. Cald- 7 Tex. Civ. App. 32, 26 S. W. 649; ■well, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 32; Potter East Texas Land etc. Co. v. V. Adams, 125 Mo. 118, 46 Am. Shelby, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 685, St. Rep. 478, 28 S. W. 490; Tem- 41 S. W. 542; Winters v. Powell, pleton V. Twitty, 88 Tenn. 595, 14 180 Ala. 425, 61 So. 96 isemble). S. W. 435; Holton v. Whitney, See Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 30 Vt. 405; Hatch v. Lusignan, 444. § 512] Adverse Possessiox. 1987 instrument which might have been, but was not, re- corcled,^*" and there is no obligation upon one Nvho has acquired title by adverse possession to retain the pos- session in order to charge a subsequent purchaser with notice of his rights. But if one in wrongful possession of land, before the end of the limitation period, obtains a conveyance from the true owner, his possession should thereafter, it seems, be regarded as based on the con veyance, so that, if he fails to record it, a subsequent hona fide purchaser will acquire a superior title al- though, if the person in possession had not received the conveyance from the true owner, he would, by tlie running of the statute of limitations, have acquired a title superior to that of the subsequent hona fide \mv- chaser.^' Having obtained a deed from the rightful owner, his possession ceases to be wrongful, and the statute runs only in favor of a wrongful possession. § 512. Extent of possession. As a general rule, one can acquire by adverse possession so great an extent of land only as is covered by his acts of actual posses,sion, continued through the statutory period.^^** It is, however, a well-recognized doctrine in this country that one having "color of title" that is, claiming under what purports to be a valid muniment of title, al- though he actually occupies a part only of the tract covered by his muniment of title, is to be regarded as in possession of the whole tract for the purpose of barring the entry of the owner after the lapse of 1 1n- statutory period, *' constructive possession," ns it is usually termed, of the part not actually occupied hv 36. Post § 567. 915; Garrison v. Sampson, 15 37. See editorial note, 26 Harv. Cal. 93; Mattes v. Hall, 21 Cal. Law Rev. 762, criticizing Winters App. 552, 132 Pac. 295; Roberts V. Powell, 180 Ala. 425, 61 So. T. Merwin, 80 Conn. 347, 6S 96. Atl." 377; Tillman v. Bomar, 1.34 38. Bowles v. Lowery, 181 Ala. Ga. 660, 68 S. E. 504; Bristol. 603, 62 So. 107; Langhorst v. v. Carroll County. 95 111. 84: Rogers, 88 Ark. 318, 114 S. W. Meade v. Ratliff. 133 Ky. 411. i:t4 1988 Real Peopekty. [§ 512 him. As a result of this doctrine, the owner of land who fails to assert his rights within the statutory period as against one in adverse possession of part may be deprived of the whole of the tract, although he had no reason to suppose that the adverse possession was under color of title. The doctrine referred to applies not only when pos- session is taken under a conveyance which is invalid, either for want of title or capacity in the grantor, or for w^ant of proper formalities in the execution of the instrument,"'^ but also when it is taken under a void or voidable decree of court,^'' and generally when there is what is known as a ''paper title." There is, how- ever, considerable question as to whether a conveyance void on its face constitutes "color of title" for this purpose, or for the purpose of the short limitation acts.^^ A conveyance which does not contain anv suf- Am. St. Rep. 467, 118 S. W. 271; Proprietors of Kennebeck Pur- chase V. Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Barber v. Robinson, 78 Minn. 193, 80 N. W. 968; Allen v. Mans- field, 108 Mo. 343, 18 S. W. 901; Anderson v. Meadows, 162 N. C. 400, 78 S. E. 279; Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 395; Lars V. Smith, 63 Ore. 206, 127 Pac. 26: Ege v. Medlar, 82 Pa. St. 86; Langdon v. Templeton, 66 Vt. 173, 28 Atl. 866. 39. Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. (U. S.) 50, 15 L. Ed. 280; Carter v. Chevalier, 108 Ala. 563, 19 So. 798; Noyes v. Dyer, 25 Me. 468; Hecock v. Van Dusen, 80 Mich. 359, 45 N. W. 343; Miesen v. Canfleld, 64 Minn. 513, 67 N. W. 632; Fugate v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 447; Ellington v. Elling- .ton, 103 N. C. 54, 9 S. E. 208; Swift V. Mulkey, 17 Ore. 532, 21 Pac. 871; Stull v. Rich Patch Iron Co., 92 Va. 253, 23 S. E. 293. 40. Reedy v. Camfield, 159 111. 254, 42 N. E. 833, Jones v Thomas, 124 Mo. 586, 24 S. W. 76; Bynum v. Thompson, 25 N. C. 578. See Brind v. Gregory, 120 Cal. 640, 53 Pac. 25; Salter V. Salter, 80 Ga. 178, 12 Am. St. Rep. 249, 4 S. E. 391; Wright V. Stice, 172 111. 571, 51 N. E. 71. 41. That a conveyance void on its face does not give color of title, see Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239, 33 L. Ed. 327; Larkin V. Wilson, 28 Kan. 513; Frique V. Hopkins, 8 Mart. (La.) 110; Fitschen v. Olsen, 155 Mich. 320, 119 N. W. 3; Wafford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36, 76 Am. Dec. 53; Matthews v. Blake, 16 Wyo. 116, 27 L. R. A. 339, 92 Pac. 242. Contra. Reddick v. Long, 124 Ala. 260, 27 So. 402; Wilson v. Atkinson, 77 Cal. 485, 11 Am. St. § 512] Adverse Possession. 1989 ficient description of the land sought to be conveyed is necessarily insufficient as color of title for the' pur- pose of constructive possession.^- According to some decisions this doctrine of con- structive possession is not applicable unless the person seeking to avail himself thereof acquired the color of title in the honest belief that the instrument was ef- fective for the purpose of passing title-*-' and further- more fraud on his part in its acquisition has been re- garded as depriving him of the right to assert the doctrine.^* It is not clearly apparent why the effect of the instrument as showing a constructive possession greater than the actual possession should be regarded as dependent on the existence of a belief in its validitv or a lack of fraud in its acquisition.''^ Rep. 299, 20 Pac. 66; Barger v. Hobbs, 67 111. 592; Miesen v. Canfield, 64 Minn. 513, 67 N. W. 632; Power v. Kitching, 10 N. D. 254, 88 Am. St. Rep. 729, 86 N. W. 737. The view is sometimes taken that a conveyance defective on its face will be sufficient as color of title provided only the defect is such that a person un- learned in the law would have reason to consider the instru- ment valid. Bloom v. Strauss, 70 Ark. 483, 69 S. W. 548, 72 S. W. 563; De Foresta v. Cast, 20 Cal. 307, 38 Pac. 244; Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 443. 54 Am. Deo. 351; Ipock V. Gaskins, 161 N. C. 673, 77 S. E. 843; Burns v. Stewart, 162 N. C. 360, 78 S. E. 321. 42. Reddick v. Long. 124 Ala. 260; 27 So. 402; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. V. Barker, 125 111. 303, 17 N. E. 797; Bellows v. Jewell. 60 N. H. 420; Jackson v. Woodruff, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 276, 13 Am. Dec. 525; Davis v. Stroud, 104 N. C. 484, 10 S. E. 666; Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 395; Ege v. Medlar, 82 Pa. St. 86; Garvin v. Garvin, 40 S. C. 435, 19 S. E. 74; Bassett v. Martin, 83 Tex. 339, 18 S. W. 587; Blakey v. Morris, 89 Va. 717, 17 S. E. 126. 43. Walsh V. Hill, 38 Cal. 481; Reay v. Butler, 95 Cal. 206, 30 Pac. 208; Lee v. O'Quin. 103 Ga. 355, 30 S. E. 356; Godfrey v. Dixon Power & Lighting Co., 228 111. 487. 81 N. E. 1089; Smith V. Young, 89 Iowa, 338, 56 N. W. 506; Foil Ike v. Bond, 41 N. J. L. 527; Ege v. Medlar, 82 Pa. St. 86; Texas Land Co. v. WHliams. 51 Tex. 51; Gregg v. Sayre, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 244, 25;{, 8 L. Ed. 932. 44. Miller v. Rich, 204 III. 444, 68 N. E. 4S8. 45. See editorial note 23 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 57. 1990 Real Peopeety. [§ 512 In order that this doctrine, giving one constructive possession beyond the limits of his actual occupancy, may apply, the part of the land not actually occupied by him, and the part occupied, must belong to the same person, and the owner of land is not affected with notice as of a constructive possession of his land by the fact that it is included in a conveyance with other land not belonging to him, if such other land alone is occupied by the claimant.^^ Were the rule otherwise, the owner of land might be deprived thereof by force of the statute of limitations, although no part was in the pos- session of another, and there was consequently no reason for asserting his title. The fact that the true owner is in actual possession of part of his land prevents the application, in favor of another, of the doctrine of constructive possession by color of title as to the land not occupied by either.^^ In such case the constructive possession of the true owner takes precedence over the constructive possession 46. Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. Coal Creek Min. Co. v. Heck, 446, 39 So. 325; Hurdie v. In- 15 Lea (Tenn.) 497; Daniel v. , vestment Guaranty etc. Co., 81 Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 132 Tenn. Ark. 141, 98 S. W. 701; KimbaU 501, 178 S. W. 1187; Word v. Box, V. Stormer, 65 Cal. 116, 3 Pac. 66 Tex. 596, 3 S. W. 93; Green v. 408; Wheatley v. San Pedro, L. Pennington, 105 Va. 801, 54 S. E. A. & S. L. R. Co., 169 Cal. 505, 877; Robinson v. Lowe, 66 W. Va. 147 Pac. 135; Tennis Coal Co. v. 665, 66 S. E. 1001. Sackett, 172 Ky. 729, Ann. Cas. 47. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 1917E, 629, 190 S. W. 130; Walsh U. S. 333, 26 L. Ed. 113; Semple V. Wheelwright, 96 Me. 174, 52 v. Cook, 50 Cal. 26; Wilkins v. Atl. 649; Turner v. Stephenson, Pensacola City Co., 36 Fla. 36, 72 Mich. 409, 2 L. R. A. 277, 40 18 So. 20; Harriss v. Howard, N. W. 735; Leavenworth v. 126 Ga. 325, 55 S. E. 59; Peoria Reeves, 106 Miss. 722, 64 So. 660; etc. R. Co. v. Tamplin, 156 111. Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N. H. 9, 285, 40 N. E. 960; Hopson v. 37 Am. Dec. 190; Schmitt v. Cunningham, 161 Ky. 160, 170 S. Traphagen, 73 N. J. Eq. 399, 133 W. 522; Stearns Coal & Lumber Am. St. Rep. 739, 69 Atl. 189; Co. v. Boyatt, 168 Ky. Ill, 181 Lewis V. Covington, 130 N. C. 541, S. W. 962; Schlossnagle v. Kolb, 41 S. E. 677; Hicklin v. McClear, 97 Md. 285, 54 Atl. 1006: Bellis 18 Ore. 126, 22 Pac. 1057; Hole v. Bellis, 122 Mass. 414; Bradley v. Rittenhouse, 25 Pa. St. 491; v. West, 60 Mo. 33; Benne v. § 512 J Adverse Possession, 1991 of the trespasser.^^ And, in spite of occasional state- ments to the contrary,^^ this would seem to be so, regard- less of whether the constructive possession of the tresjDasser commenced before or after the constructive possession of the true owner.^*^ The land in actual possession must adjoin that of which Qonstructive possession is claimed,^^ and they must, according to some decisions, be included within one description in the instrument under which the claim is made, and, if they are described or referred to as separate tracts or lots, it is immaterial that they are both included in one conveyance. ^^ Occasionallv the Miller, 149 Mo. 228, 50 S. W. 824; Schmitt V. Traphagen, 73 N. J. Eq. 399, 133 Am. St. Rep. 739, 69 Atl. 189; Hall v. Powel, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 456, 8 Am. Dec. 722; Eenneker v. Warren, 17 S. C. 139; Sequatchie & South Pitts- burg Coal & Iron Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & RaUroad Co., 131 Tenn. 221, 174 S. W. 1122; Jones V. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S. W. 991; Claiborne v. Elkins, 79 Tex. 380, 15 S. W. 395; Langdon v. Temple- ton, 66 Vt. 173, 28 Atl. 866; Fry V. Stowers, 98 Va. 417, 36 S. E. 482. 48. But in North Carolina the constructive possession of the true owner is denied this effect. McLean v. Smith, 106 N. C. 172, 11 S. E. 184; Currie v. Gil- christ, 147 N. C. 648, 61 S. E. 146; Simmons v. Defrance Fox Co., 153 N. C. 261, 69 S. E. 146 49. Fox V. Hinton, 4 Bibb. (Ky.) 55; Kentucky Land & Im- migration Co. V. Reynolds, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1389. 60 S. W. 635: Richie v. Owsley, 143 Ky. 1, 135 S. W. 439; Miniard v. Napier. 167 Ky. 208, 180 S. W. .363; Stull v. Rich Patch Iron Co., 92 Va. 253, 23 S. E. 293; Garrett v. Ramsey. 26 W. Va. 345, 360 idictu7n). 50. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, 26 L. Ed. 113; Semple V. Cook, 50 Cal. 26; Altemus v. Long, 4 Pa. St. 254, 45 Am. Dec. 688; Ament v. Wolf, 33 Pa. St. 331; Creech v. Jones, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 631; Evitts v. Roth, 61 Tex. 81; Combes v. Stringer, 106 Tex. 427, 167 S. W. 217. See note 6 Columbia Law Rev. 583. 51. Brown v. Bocquin, 57 Ark. 97, 20 S. W. 813; Georgia Pine Inv. & Mfg. Co. V. Holton, 94 Ga. 551, 20 S. E. 434; Stephenson v. Doe, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 508. 46 .4m. Dec. 489; Louisville Property Co. V. Lawson, 156 Ky. 288. 160 S. W. 1034; Farrar v. Eastman, 10 Me. 191; Herbst v. Merrifield. 133 Mo. 267. 34 S. W. 571; Wilson v. McEwan, 7 Ore. 85. Lands have been held to he contiguous within this requirement wlion inoroly a corner of one coincides with a corner of the other. Parsons v. Dlls, 172 Ky. 774. Ann. Cas. 191SE. 796. 189 S. W. 1158. 52. Grimes v. Ragland. 28 Ga. 123; Rnwe v. TTenderson Navnl 1992 Real Property. [§ 512 criteriou in this regard has been stated to be whether the instrument shows that the two pieces adjoin one another.^^ In some states there is a restriction upon the ap- plication of the rule of constructive possession, to the effect that it will apply only when the land claimed by reason of constructive possession is such, in char- acter and extent, that its use in connection with the land actually occupied would be in accord with the cus- tom of the country.'^^ In other states no such restriction upon the application of the rule is recognized, it being only necessary that the actual possession be of a visible character, however small it may he in extent in com- parison with the land claimed.^^ stores Co., 143 Ga. 756, 85 S. E. 917; Hornblower v. Banton, 103 Me. 375, 125 Am. St. Rep. 300, 69 Atl. 568; Morris v. McClary, 43 Minn. 346, 46 N. W. 238; Den d. Carson v. Mills, 18 N. C. 546, 30 Am. Dec. 143; Doe d. Laflin v. Cobb, 46 N. C. 406, 62 Am. Dec. 173; Willamette Real Estate Co. v. Hendrix, 28 Ore. 485, 52 Am. St. Rep. 800, 42 Pac. 514; Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, Ann Cas. 1915C, 145, 160 S. W. 844; Montgomery v. Gunther, 81 Tex. 320, 16 S. W. 1073. Contra, Johnson v. Simerly, 90 Ga. 612, 16 S. E. 951; Dills v. Hubbard, 21 111. 328; Parsons v. Dills, 159 Ky. 471, 167 S. W. 415, 172 Ky. 774, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 796, 189 S. W. 1158; Broiigher v. Stone, 72 Miss. 647, 17 So. 509; Roller v. Armentrout, 118 Va. 173, 86 S. E. 906; Webb v. Richardson, 42 Vt. 465. 53. Griffin v. Lee, 90 Ga. 224, 15 S. E. 810; Den d. Carson v. Mills, 18 N. C. 546, 30 Am. Dec. 143. 54. Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Gulf of Mexico Land etc. Co., 82 Miss. 188, 33 So. 845, 100 Am. St. Rep. 627; Jackson v. Woodruff, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 276; Simpson v. Downing, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 316; Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 52; Paine v. Hutchins, 49 Vt. 314; Pepper v. O'Dowd, 39 Wis. 538 (statute). See Zirngibl v. Calumet & C. Canal & Dock Co., 157 111. 430, 42 N. E, 431; Turner V. Stephenson, 72 Mich. 409, 2 L. R. A. 277, 40 N. W. 735; Murphy V. Doyle, 37 Minn. 113, 33 N. W. 220; Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388. 55. Marietta Fertilizer Co. v. Blair, 173 Ala. 524, 56 So. 131; Hicks V. Coleman, 25 Cal. 122, 85 Am. Dec. 103; Furgerson v. Bagley, 95 Ga. 516, 20 S. E. 241; Taliaferro v. Butler, 77 Tex. 578, 14 S. W. 191. See 6 Columbia Law Rev. 5S3, for a criticism of the New York rule. See also Doe d. Lenoir v. South, 32 N. Car. 237. § 512] Adverse Possession. 1993 AVlien a person having color of title to a tract of land conveys a part of such tract to another, who takes possession of that part and no more, such possession of a part by the grantee is not equivalent to possession by the grantor, for the purpose of giving the latter constructive possession of the balance. ^"^ But if the person having color of title to a tract makes a lease of part of the tract, and the lessee takes possession of that part, the possession of the lessee in behalf of the lessor \vill, by the weight of authority, be regarded as extending to the whole tract.^''' Minerals in the land. The question has quite frequently arisen, under what circumstances does the statute of limitations run as regards rights in minerals beneath the surface of land. There exists in this con- nection a primary distinction between the case in which the ownershij) of the surface of the land is not already separated from that of the minerals, and that in Avhicli it is so separated. If one person owns both the surface of the land and the minerals thereunder, and another takes wrong- ful possession of the surface, his actual possession of the surface is ordinarily extended by construction to 56. Trotter v. Cassaday, 3 A. 1066); Knorr v. Raymond, 73 Ga. K. Marsh, 365, 13 Am. Dec. 183; 749; Williams v. Ballance, 23 111. Cochran v. Linville Imp. Co., 127 193, 74 Am. Dec. 187; Murphy v. N. Car. 386, 37 S. E. 496; Jones Comm. 187 Mass. 361, 73 N. E. 524 V. Chiles, 2 Dana (Ky.) 25; Wil- (semble) ; Heinemann v. Bennett, lamette Real Estate Co. v. Hen- 144 Mo. 113, 45 S. W. 1092; Ruf- drix, 28 Ore. 485, 42 Pac. 514, fin v. Overby, 105 N. C. 78, 11 S. 52 Am. St. Rep. 800; Chandler E. 251; Cochran v. Linville Imp. Rushing, 38 Tex. 591; Sharpe v. Co., 127 N. C. 386, 37 N. E. 496; Shenandoah Furnace Co., 100 Bowles v. Brlce, 66 Tex. 724. 2 Va. 27, 40 S. E. 103. S. W. 729. Contra, MaasenKill 57. Zundel v. Baldwin, 114 Ala. v. Bayles, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 328, 21 So. 420; Wheeler v. Foote, lU; Texas Land Co. v. Williams. 80 Ark. 485, 97 S. W. 447 (dis- 51 Tex. 61; Walker v. Knox, tinguished in .Tohnson & Burr v. -Tex. Civ. App.— , 191 S. W. Elder, 92 Ark. :'.n, I'/l S. W. 730. 1994 Real Propeety. [^ 512 the minerals beneath the surface, ^^ and if the statute runs against the rightful owner as regards the surface it also runs as regards the minerals. ^^ It has been decided that the running of the statute in such case as regards the minerals is not aifected by the fact that the wrongful possessor undertakes to convey the miner- als alone to another, who does not take possession, the continued possession of the surface by the grantor in such case being regarded as extending to the minerals in behalf of the grantee.^*^ And conversely it was held in the same state that if one who had taken wrongful possession of the land conveyed the surface, retaining the minerals, the subsequent possession of the surface by the grantee extended to the minerals in behalf of the grantor.^^*^ But the wrongful possession of the surface does not extend by construction to the minerals, if the possession was originally taken under color of a conveyance which expressly excepted the minerals.^ ^ And it has been decided that, when a company was min- ing part of the minerals contained in a tract belonging to it, but not that part of the minerals beneath the portion of the surface of which defendant had wrongful possession, defendant, by the lapse of the statutory period, although he acquired title to the portion of the surface of which he had possession, did not acquire title to the minerals beneath such portion of the sur- face, he having been fully informed as to the operations 58. See Armstrong v. Caldwell, however, overruled by Northcut 53 N. Y. 284; editorial note 10 v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S. Columbia Law Rev. 70. W. 220. 59. Baker v. Clark, 128 Cal. 60a. Moore v. Empire Land 181, 60 Pac. 677; Davis v. Shep- Co., Ala., 61 So. 940. See editor- herd, 31 Colo. 141, 72 Pac. 57; ial notes 24 Harv. Law Rev. 582, Bradley v. Johnson. 11 Idaho. 689, 27 Id. 173. 83 Pac. 927. 61. Louisville v. Nashville R. 60. Black Warrior Coal Co. v. Co., 136 Ala. 156, 96 Am. St. Rep. West, 170 Ala. 346, 54 So. 200; 17, 33 So. 896. See editorial note McBurney v. Glenmary Coal & 10 Columbia Law Rev. 70, and Coke Co., 121 Tenn. 275, 118 S. cases cited, post, note 64. W. 220. The latter case was. § 512] Adverse Possession". 1995 of the company, and that, by such operations, the com- pany had in effect made a severance of the minerals from the surface, analogous to the severance or separa- tion of ownership referred to in the next parag-raph.'"'- This theory of severance by the working of the mineral deposits is somewhat obscure, and the same result might, it is submitted, have been attained on the theory, above referred to, that actual possession is not ex- tended by construction as against the rightful owner in possession of part of his land. If the ownership of the minerals becomes separated from that of the surface, the subsequent^^ possession of the surface owner is not regarded as extending to the minerals, so as to give him title thereto under the statute, even though the owner of the minerals makes no attempt to remove the minerals.^^ The two properties are entirely distinct and there is no more reai^on that the owner of one property should be regarded as in wrongful possession of the other than if the ])lane by which they are separated was vertical instead of horizontal. And in order that the surface owner may be regarded as in possession of the minerals, so that the statute may run in his favor with I'eference thereto, he must conduct mining operations with such 62. Delaware & Hudson Canal 167 Pac. 1025; Crowe Coal & Miu- Co. V. Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 38 L. ing Co. v. Atkinson, 85 Kan. 357, R. A. 826, 38 Atl. 568, 63 Am. Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1196, 116 Pac. St. Rep. 743. 499; Marvin v. Brewster Iron 63. If the separation of own- Mining Co., 55 N. Y. 538; Gill v. ership does not occur until after Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 113 Am. the taking of wrongful possess- St. 295, 113 Am. St. Rep. 962, 78 ion of the surface, it does not, N. E. 433; Kingsley v. Hillside it has been decided, prevent the Coal & Iron Co., 144 Pa. 613, 23 running of the statute as to the Atl. 250; Armstrong v. Caldwell, minerals as well as the surface. 53 Pa. St. 284; Murray v. Allred, Finnegan v. Stineman, 5 Pa. Sup- 100 Tenn. 100. 66 Am. St. Rep. er, Ct. 124. 740, 39 L. R. A. 249. 43 S. W. 355; 64. Birmingham Fuel Co. v. Northoutt v. Cliurch. 135 Tenn. Boshell, 190 Ala. 597, 67 So. 403; 541, 188 S. W. 220, Ann Cus. Crandall v. Goss. 30 Idaho, 661, 1918B, 545; Morlson v. American 1996 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 513 a degree of continuity as accords with the nature of the business, and in such a way as will indicate his intention of exclusive appropriation.^^ If, after the o\vnership of the minerals has be- come separated from that of the surface, a third per- son takes possession of the minerals, the statute will run in his favor as regards the minerals,^^' if his possession is not only adverse, but also visible and notorious.''" But if, after the ownership of the miner- als has become separated from that of the surface, a third person takes wrongful possession of the sur- face, his possession does not extend to the minerals, so as to enable him, by the running of the statutory period, to acquire title thereto.*'^ § 513. Particular relations — (a) Landlord and ten- ant. Possession for the statutorj^ period by the tenant under a lease is, it is agreed, not ordinarily suflBcient to confer title upon him as against his landlord.''^ Ass'n, 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469; 69. Alabama State Land Co. Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., v. Kyle, 99 Ala. 474, 13 So. 43; 58 W. Va. 449, 6 Ann. Cas. 140, 52 Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336; Pilaris S. E. 485. V. Jones, 122 Mo. 125, 26 S. W. 65. Hooper v. Bankhead, 171 1032; Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee, 2 Ala. 626, 54 So. 549; Gordon v. Gill & J. 173; Lyebrook v. Hall, Park, 219 Mo. 600, 117 S. W. 1163, V3 Miss. 509, 19 So. 348; Carson 119 Am. St. Rep. 802; Armstrong v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 73 Am. V. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284. See St. Rep. 691, 77 N. W. 80; Le- edltorial notes, 11 Columbia Law port v. Todd, 32 N. J. L. 124; Rev. 673, 26 Harv. Law Rev. 555. Jackson v. Cams, 20 Johns. (N. 66. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, V.) 301; Whiting v. Edmunds, 176 111. 275, 52 N. E. 144. 9i N. Y. 309; Doherty v. Matsell, 67. Pierce v. Barney, 209 Pa. 119 N. Y. 646, 23 N. E. 994; Tay- 132, 58 Atl. 152; Huss v. Jacobs, lor v. Kelly, 56 N. C. (3 Jones 210 Pa. 145, 59 Atl. 1904. See Eq.) 240; SchuylkiU & D. Imp. French v. Lansing, 73 N. Y. Misc. & R. Co., 58 Pa. 304; Nessley v. 80, 132 N. Y. Supp. 523. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904 68. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, Duke v. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 180 111. 398, 72 Am. St. Rep. 216, 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Flanagan 54 N. E. 214; Morelaud v. H. v. Pearson, 61 Tex. 302; Sherman C. Frick Coke Co., 170 Pa. St. v. Champlain Transportation Co., 33. 32 Atl. 634. 31 Vt. 162; Emerick v. Tavenner, § 513] Advebsb Possession. 1997 The tenant's possession, taken under the lease, in- volves a recognition of the landlord's title in rever- sion, and is consequently not adverse or hostile to the latter. If, however, one becomes tenant of another without being aware of the fact, there is no recogni- tion by him of the other's title, and his possession is consequently adverse, so as to cause the statute to run in his favor, provided only the landlord has no reason to suppose the possession to be otherwise. If, for instance, one takes possession by virtue of an invalid conveyance in fee simple, even an oral gift, under the impression that it is a valid conveyance, he is prima facie a tenant at will under his grantor or donor,'^*' but his possession is nevertheless, in the ordi- nary case, adverse to the latter."^ And if one takes possession under a conveyance which he supposes to give him a fee simple estate, but by reason of lack of form gives him a life estate merely, the possession is to be regarded as adverse to his grantor, so that the statute will ordinarily commence to run in favor of those claiming under him, so soon as, by reason of the expiration of the life estate, the landlord has a right of action to recover possession. '- Even though the landlord has a right to enforce a forfeiture for breach of an express condition, he is under no obligation so to do, and the statute does not commence to run by reason of the occurrence of a cause of forfeiture. '^^ Since the statute does not rim even afer the term has come to an ond,'^ it could hardly run merely by reason of a right to bring tlie term to an end. 9 Gratt. (Va.) 220, 58 Am. Dec. 449, 40 So. 865. In New Haven 217; Swann v. Young, 36 W. Va. Trust Company v. Camp, 8l Conn. 57. 539, 71 Atl. 788, it appears to be 70. Ante, § 61(a). held that the statute begins to 71. Post, § 513(e). run even before the life estate 72. Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. Is out of the way. (N. Y.) 323, 17 Am. Dec. 517; 73. Doe v. Danvers, 7 East Henley v. Wilson, 77 N. Car. 216. 299; Gwynn v. .Tones, 2 Gill & J. See Breland v. O'Neal, 88 Miss. (.Md.) 173. 2 R. P.— 51 1998 Eeal Pbopeety. [§ 5L' It has been frequently asserted that, although the tenant's possession is prima facie not adverse to the landlord, it may become adverse by reason of his open repudiation of the tenancy, and notice thereof brought home to the landolrd.''^^ The repudiation of the tenancy nmst, it has been said be "clear, positive, and con- tinued,"'^" and the landlord is not affected by the repudiation of the tenancy, even though this takes the form of an attornment to another,'" unless and until notice thereof is brought home to him."'^ Express notice is not necessary, it being sufficient that he in 74. Post, this subsection, note 90. 75. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43; Ponder v. Cheeves, 104 Ala. 307, 16 So. 145; Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336, 46 Am. Dec. 462; Austin V. Wilson, 46 Iowa, 362; Patter- son V. Hansel, 4 Bush (Ky.) 654; Sanscrainte v. Torongo, 87 Mich. 69, 49 N. W. 497; Meridian Land & Industrial Co. v. Ball, 68 Miss. 135, 8 So. 316; Doherty V. Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646, 23 N. E. 944; Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904; McGinnis v. Porter, 20 Pa. 80; Duke v. Har- per, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 226, 21 S. E. 347; Swann V. Thayer, 36 W. Va. 46, 14 S. E. 423. 76. Morris v. Wheat, H App. Dist. Col. 201; Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336, 46 Am. Dec. 462; Wilkins V. Pensacola City Co., 36 Fla. 36, 18 So. 20; Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904. 77. Doe V. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391. 2 So. 24; De Jarnette v. McDan- lell, 93 Ala. 215, 9 So. 570; Camden Orphan Soc. v. Lockhart, 2 Mull. Law (S. C.) 84. Contra, semble, Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S. 278, 42 L. Ed. 466. Occasionally it appears to be asserted that the tenant's attorn- ment to another cannot start the running of the statute as against the landlord. Dausch v. Crane, 109 Mo. 323, 19 S. W. 61; Fowler V. Simpson, 79 Tex. 611, 23 Am. St. Rep. 370, 15 S. W. 682. This does not accord with the decisions that the tenant's possession be- comes adverse if he repudiates the tenancy and so informs the landlord. 78. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 43; Le Croix v. Malone, 157 Ala. 434, 47 So. 725; Wilkins V. Pensacola City Co., 36 Fla. 36. 18 So. 20; Farrow's Heirs v. Ed- mundson, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 605, 41 Am. Dec. 250; Leport v. Todd, 32 N. .1. L. 124; Campbell v. Shipley, 41 Md. 81; Holman v. Bonner, 63 Miss. 131; Greenwood V. Moore, 79 Miss. 201, 30 So. 609; Hamilton v. Boggess, 63 Mo. 233; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90, 84 N. E. 610; Nesley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904; McGinnis v. Porter, 20 Pa. 80; Whaley v. Whaley, 1 Speer Law '^ 513] Adverse Possessiox. 1991) some way acquires knowledge of the tenant's action."'' And according to some decisions lie is chargeable witli notice by reason of the open and notorious character of the repudiation of the tenancy.^*^ Since the statute of limitations cannot commence to run until there is a right of action in favor of the rightful owner, it follows that the doctrine above re- ferred to, that the repudiation of the tenancy starts the running of the statute, necessarily involves tlie assumption that such repudiation gives a right to the landlord to assert a forfeiture of the tenant's estate, and there are ciuite a number of decisions that it does give such right,* ^ In a few jurisdictions, however, it appears that a mere oral disclaimer of the tenancy does not give any right of action to the laiidlord,"^- and in any such jurisdisdiction adopting that view, the repudiation of the tenancy could not start the statute in favor of the tenant, until after the expiration of the term for which the tenancy was created. (S. C.) 225, 40 Am. Dec. 594; 80. Wells v. Sheerer. 78 Ala. Bryce v. Cayce, 62 S. C. 546, 4ft 142; Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336, 4C S. E. 948; Duke v. Harper, 6 Am. Dec. 462; Farrow v. Edmund- Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. son, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 605, 41 Am. 462; Udell v. Peak. 70 Tex. 547, Dec. 250; Myers v. Sill jacks, ?8 7 S. W. 786; Stacy v. Bostwick, Md. 319; McClanahan v. McClana- 48 Vt. 192; Allen v. Paul, 24 han, 258 Mo. 579. 167 S. W. 991. Gratt. (Va.) 332; Voss v. King, 81 These decisions are cited 2 33 W. Va. 236, 10 S. E. 402. Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant. § 192. 79. Wells V. Sheerer, 78 Ala. 82. See Jackson v. Kissoll)rack, 142; Cotton v. White, 131 Ark. 10 Johns. (N. Y.) :536. 6 Am. Dec. 273, 199 S. W. 116; Morton v. 341; De Lancey v. Ganong, 9 N. Lawson, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 45; Y. 9; Bedlow v. N. V. Floating Catlin V. Decker, 38 Conn. 262: Dry Dock Co. 112 N. Y. 263. 287, Brandon v. Bannon, 38 Pa. 63; 2 I.. R. A. 629, 19 N. E. 800; Cosgrove v. Franklin, 35 R. I. Rosseel v. Jarvis, 15 Wis. 571, 527, 87 Atl. 544; Floyd v. Mintsey, 82 Am. Dec. 298; Gale v. Oil Hun 7 Rich. Law (S. Car.) 181; Udell Petroleum Co., 6 W. Va. 200 > V. Peak, 70 Tex. 547, 7 S. W. 786; Doe d. Graves v. Wells. 10 Adol. Rensens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 226, & El. 427; Doe d. Daniels t. 21 S. E. 347; Swann v. Thayer, Weese, 5 Up. Can. Q. B. 5S9. 36 W. Va. 46. 14 S. K. 423. 2000 Eeal Property. [§ 513 Occasionally it has been asserted that, in order that the tenant may start the statute running in his favor, he must not only repudiate the teancy, but must also relinquish the possession acquired under the lease and then reenter.^'' This view appears to be based on the theory that by reason of the doctrine that a tenant is estopped or precluded to deny his landlord's title,^^ he cannot make his possession adverse by such a denial, but that such doctrine ceases to apply after the tenant has relinquished possession. The doctrine of the estoppel of the tenant to deny the landlord's title has, it is submitted, no bearing whatsoever upon the question. That doctrine precludes the tenant from denying, in certain classes of action, that the lessor had a valid title at the time of the lease, but it does not, and in fact it cannot, preclude him from making such a denial out of court, and there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent him from subsequently showing, in the course of a legal proceeding, that he did make such denial, and that as a result of such denial the title of the lessor was extinguished by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, if this doctrine of estoppel did apply for this purpose, it is most questionable whether it should cease to apply merely because the tenant relinquishes possession,^^ unless such relinquish- ment is accepted by the landlord, so as to etfect a sur- render by operation of law,^*^ in which case the former tenant's subsequent entry might well be adverse. There are occasional decisions to the effect that if one holding under a lease assumes to transfer a fee simple estate in the property, and the transferee takes possession in ignorance of the fact that his transferor 83. Millett V. Lagomarsino, 107 Hightower, 97 Ga. 592, 25 S. E. Cal. 102, 40 Pac. 25; Alderson v. 371. See 2 Columbia Law Rev. Marshall, 7 Mont. 288, 16 Pac. 52, 9 Id. 451. 576; Whiting v. Edmunds, 94 N. 84. Ante, § 57. Y. 309; Dasher v. Ellis, 102 Ga. 85. Ante, § 57 (d). 830, 30 S. E. 544; Flannery v. 86. Ante, § 431. *§> 513] Adveese Possession. 2001 had merely a leasehold interest to transfer, the pos- session of the transferee is adverse to the original landlord, although the latter has no notice to that effect.^" Such decisions do not appear to accord with the well settled rule that the statute does not com- mence to run by reason of the repudiation of the tenancy unless and until notice of such repudiation is brought home to the landlord. The landlord has a right to assume, until notified of the contrary, that one in possession under a transfer from the lessee is in possession as tenant merely, and while the fact that the transferee is ignorant of the lease shows that there is no recognition by him of the landlord's title, this is no reason for applying as against the landlord a doctrine which has properly no application in the absence of laches on the part of the latter.^** And so, it one holding as tenant at will dies, and his widow succeeds him in the possession, her possession is pre- sumed, in the absence of any repudiation by her of the tenancy, to be subordinate to the title of the true owner.^^^ If the tenant under a lease holds over witliout the consent of the reversioner, that is, without riglit, he is not, properly speaking, a tenant of the person whom he wrongfully excludes from possession,*^'' but never- theless his possession is, prima facie, not regarded as adverse to the latter.^*' 87. Macdougall v. Reedy, 71 Philips v. Rothwell, 4 Bibb. (Ky.) Ga. 750; Dikeman v. Parrish, tJ 33; Millett v. Lagonia(rsino, 107 Pa. 225, 47 Am. Dec. 455; Town- Cal. 102, 38 Pac. 308; Gee v. send V. Boyd, 217 Pa. 386, 12 L. Hatley, 114 Ark. 376, 170 S. W. R. A. N. S. 1148, 66 Atl. 1099; 72; editorial notes 9 Columbia Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 139 Law Rev. 451. 22 Harvard Law Wis. 281, 119 N. W. 935, 121 N. Rev. 604; 7 Mich Law Rev. 592. W. 362. 88a. Frazer v. Naylor, 1 Mete 88. See Luce v. Carley, 24 (Ky.) 593; Neilson v. (;^i^;IU)Il, Wend. (N. Y.) 451, 35 Am. Dec. 85 Wis. 550, 55 N. W. 890. 637; Bedlow v. New York Float- 89. Ante, § 68. ing Dry Dock Co., 112 N. Y. 263, 90. Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee, 2 287, 2 L. R. A. 629, 19 N. E. 800; Gill. & J. (Md.) 173; Lyebrook 2002 Real Peopeety. [§ 513 (b) Trustee and cestui que trust, Tlie posses- sion of the trustee under an express trust is ordinarily not adverse to the cestui que trust,^'^ But although the possession of the trustee is originally not adverse, it becomes so in case he repudiates the trust by un- equivocal words or acts, and such repudiation is brought to the notice of the cestui que trust.^^ In the case of a constructive trust, which is rec- ognized by a court of equity for the purpose of relief against fraud,'''^ the possession of the holder of the legal title is ordinarily adverse to the person who V. Hall, 73 Miss. 509, 19 So. 348; Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 71 Am. St. Rep. 691, 77 N. W. 80; Jackson v. Cams, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 301; Taylor v. Kelly, 3 Jones Eq. (56 N. Car.) 240; Leport v. Todd, 32 N. J. L. 124; Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904; Whaley v. Whaley, 1 Speer Law (S. C.) 225. 40 Am. Dec. 594; Brandon v. Bannon, 38 Pa. 63; Uiike V. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Flannagan V. Pearson, 61 Tex. 302; Fahey v. Kaies,— Tex. Civ.—, 181 S. W. 782; Sherman v. Champlain Transportation Co., 31 Vt. 162; Emerick v. Tavener, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 220, 58 Am. Dec. 217; Swann v. Young, 36 W. Va. 57, 14 S. E. 426. In New York the statute pro- vides that the holding of a tenant shall not be adverse till twenty years after the expiration of the term. See Whiting v. Edmunds, 94 N. Y. 309. 91. Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 202. 19 L. Ed. 306; Cruse v. Kidd, 195 Ala. 22, 70 So. 166; Watson V. Sutro, 86 Cal. 500, 24 Pac. 172, 25 Pac. 64; Meacham V. Bunting, 156 111. 586, 47 Am. St. Rep. 239, 28 L. R. A. 618; Dunn V. Wheeler, 86 Me. 238, 29 Atl. 985; Hatt v. Green, 180 Mich. 383, 147 N. W. 593; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 125; Mil- ler V. Bingham, 36 N. C. 423, 36 Am. Dec. 58; Williams v. First Presbyterian Soc. in Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 478; Smith v. McElyea, 68 Tex. 70, 3 S. W. 258; Reuford V. Clarke, 100 Va. 115, 40 S. E. 630. 92. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 42, 52; Schlessinger v. Mallard, 70 Cal. 326, 11 Pac. 728; Terry V. Davenport, 185 Ind. 561, 112 N. E. 998; McGuire v. Nugent, 103 Mo. 161, 15 S. W. 551; Stanton V. Helm, 87 Miss. 287, ?9 So. 457; Lamberton v. Youmans, 84 Minn. 109. 86 N. W. 894; Con- gregational Soc. etc. v. Newing- ton, 53 N. H. 595; Boydstun v. Jacobs. 38 Nev. 175, 147 Pac. 447; Williams v. Cincinnati First Presby. Church, 1 Ohio St. 478; Long v. Cason, 4 Rich. Eq. 60; Fennell v. League, 107 Tenn. 239, 63 S. W. 1121. 93. Ante, § 108(a). § 513] Adverse Possession. 20U3 is asserting the fraud.''* That is, the statutory period within which one must seek to be relieved against another's fraud is not extended by reason of the fact that such fraud has resulted in placing the legal title to land in the wrongdoer, and that the court, in re- lieving against the fraud, does so by declaring him to hold in trust for the person defrauded. But if the fraud arises from the repudiation of a promise or undertaking to hold the land for the benefit of another, the statute does not begin to run until the repudiation actually occurs, and knowledge thereof is brought home to the person entitled to assert the fraud. '^^^ And the view, adopted in many states, that the statute of limitations does not run against a right of action based on fraud, until the fraud is discovered, would frequently operate to extend the time for the assertion of a constructive trust.^^ To what extent, in the case of a resulting trust, that is, a trust implied in accordance with presumed intention,'''^ the possession of the trustee is to be re- garded as adverse or not adverse to the person bene- ficially entitled, the cases are not entirely clear. It has been decided in a number of cases that, when the trust resulted from the payment of a consideration by one person for property conveyed to another, the possession of the latter was not adverse to the person making the payment mitil there was an exj)licit re- pudiation of the trust, reference being made, however, in some of these cases, to the fact that the circum- stances showed an acknowledgment by the former of 94. Lewis V. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 95. Odell v. Moss, 130 Cal. 352, 119; Hunter v. Dennis, 112 HI. 62 Pac. 555; Carr v. Craig, 138 568, Terry v. Davenport, 185 Ind. Iowa, 526, 116 N. W. 720; Newia 561, 112 N. E. 998; Kennedy v. v. Topfer, 121 Iowa. 433. 96 N. Kennedy, 25 Kan. 151; Edwards W. 905. V. University, 21 N. C. 325. 30 96. Markley v. Canulon Safe Am. Dec. 170; Church v. Winton, Deposit & Trust Co., 74 N. .T. Eg. 196 Pa. St. 107, 46 Atl. 363. 279. 69 Atl. 1100. 97. Ante, § 107. 2004 Real Property. [§ 513 the existence of a trust.^^ When the title is taken in the other's name with a fraudulent intention on the part of such other, the trust is to be regarded as a constructive rather than a resulting trust, and the statute would run at least from the time of the dis- covery of the fraud.''^ In case the trustee under an express trust trans- fers the legal title to a third person, who takes with notice of the trust, or who pays no consideration, the cestui que trust may assert the trust as against such transferee.^ The possession of such transferee for the statutory period has been regarded as sufficient to bar the rights of the cestui que trust, in some cases on the ground that his possession is adverse to the original trustee,- applying the rule that the cestui que trust is barred when the trustee is barred,^ while in other cases the cestui cjue trust has been regarded as barred on the theory that the possession of the transferee of the legal title is that of a constructive trustee, and is con- sequently adverse to the person equitably entitled.^ In 98. Long V. King, 117 Ala. 78 Neb. 584, 111 N. W. 368; 423, 23 So. 534; Haney v. Legg, Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N. H. 241, 129 Ala. 619, 87 Am. St. Rep. 81, 56 Atl. 190; Fawcett v. Fawcett, 30 So. 34; Plass v. Plass, 122 85 Wis. 332, 39 Am. St. Rep. Cal. 3, 15; Norton v. Bassett, 154 844, 55 N. W. 405. Cal. 411, 129 Am. St. Rep. 162, 99. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 25 87 Pac. 894; Corr's Appeal from Kan. 151; Cox v. Menzing, Com'rs, 62 Conn. 403, 26 Atl. 478;' —(Miss.)— 30 So. 41; Reed v. Warren v. Adams, 19 Colo. 515, Painter, 145 Mo. 341, 46 S. W. 36 Pac. 604; Reynolds v. Sumner, 1089. 126 111. 58, 1 L. R. A. 327, 9 Am. 1. Ante, § 114. St. Rep. 523; Zunkel v. Colson, 2. Merriam v. Hassam, 14 109 Iowa, 695, 81 N. W. 175; In re Allen (Mass.) 516, 92 Am. Dec. Mahin's Estate, 161 Iowa, 459, 795; Smilie v. Piffle, 2 Pa. St. 143 N. W. 420; Smith v. Smith, 52, 44 Am. Dec. 156; McCrary v. 132 Iowa, 700, 119 Am. St. Rep. Clements, 95 Ga. 778, 22 S. E. 581, 109 N. W. 194; Lufkin v. 675. Jakeman, 188 Mass. 528, 74 N. 3. Ante. § 506, note 9. E. 933; Condit v. Maxwell, 142 4. Robinson v. Pierce, 118 Mo. 266, 44 S. W. 467, (but see Ala. 273, 45 L. R. A. 66, 72 Am. Reed v. Painter, 145 Mo. 341, 46 St. Rep. 160, 24 So. 984; Smith S. W. 1089); Hanson v. Hanson, v. Dallas Compress Co., 195 Ala. *§ 513] Adveesb Possession. 2005 at least one case the conclusion that the beneficiary is barred is based upon the theory that the transfer of the legal title by the original trustee involves a re- pudiation of the trust by him, which starts the run- ning of the statute in favor of him and of any person claiming under him.^ It has occasionally been decided that the possession of the transferee is adverse as against the beneficiary of the trust even though the latter is not siii juris^' and that it is adverse even as against one equitably entitled in remainder only/ de- cisions which are evidently based on the theory, above referred to, that the beneficiary is barred ))y reason of the bar of the original trustee. To regard, however, an innocent beneficiary as barred by his trustee's failure to take legal action to set aside a wrongful transaction in which the latter knowingly participated does not seem entirely in accord with equitable princi- ples. And the rule that the cestui is barred of relief as against the transferee of the trustee merely be- cause the statute has run as against the trustee him- self has been occasionally asserted to be inapplicable in favor of one who thus colluded with the trustee in a breach of trust. ^ The bar of the cestui que trust may, 534, 70 So. 662; Nougues v. 512; Williams v. First Presby- Newlands, 118 Cal. 102, 50 Pac. terian Soo. 1 Ohio St. 478. 386; StillweU v. Leavy, 84 Ky. 6. McCrary v. Clements, 95 379, 1 S. W. 590 (semble); Ga. 778, 22 S. E. 675; Wilson Cummings v. Stovall, 6 Lea v. Louisville Trust Co., 102 Ky. (Tenn.) 679; Bedford v. Clarke, 522, 44 S. W. 121; Ewing v. 100 Va. 115, 40 S. E. 630. See Shannahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. Newman v. Newman, 60 W. Va. W. 1065. 371, 7 L. R. A. N. S. 370. In 7. Robinson v. Pierce, 118 Norton v. Bassett, 154 Cal. 411, Ala. 273 45 L. R. A. 66. 72 Am. 129 Am. St. Rep. 162, 97 Pac. St. Rep. 160. 24 So. 984. 894, it was decided that if the 8. Chase v. Cartright, 53 Ark. legal title passes by descent on 358, 22 Am. St. Rep. 207, 14 S. the death of the trustee, the W. 90; Parker v. Hall, 2 Head, heirs taking possession are con- (Tenn.) 641; Elliott v. Landls structive trustees merely, in Mach. Co., 236 Mo. 546, 139 favor of whom the statute runs. S. W. 356, distinguishing Ewing 5. Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, v. Shannahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 2QP6 Beal Property. [§ 513 it is submitted, be most satisfactorily based upon the theory that the transfer by the the original trustee in- volves a repudiation of the trust, which sets the statute in motion as against him and those claiming under him, so soon, and not until, it becomes known to the cestui que trust. The possession of the cestui cpte trust under an express trust is prima facie not hostile to the trustee, though it may become so by the assertion by him of a claim in his own right.^'^ The possession of one whose beneficial interest exists by reason of a resulting trust implied from his payment of the purchase price has been regarded as adverse to the person to whom he had the legal title conveyed.^ ^ (c) Licensor and licensee. One who goes on land as a licensee merely has no possession of the land,^2 and consequently the statute does not begin to run in his favor unless and until he in effect takes possession by denying that he is in the position of a licensee. ^^ (d) Principal and agent. Whether one who is upon another's property in the capacity of agent has, strictly speaking, possession of the property S. W. 1065 on the ground that Stevenson, 118 Iowa, 106, 91 N. in the earlier case the purchase W. 925; Matthews v. Ward, 10 was not directly from the trustee. G. & J. (Md.) 443; Whiting v. See also Deans v. Gay, 132 N. Whiting, 4 Gray (Mass.) 236; Car. 227, 43 S. E. 643. Newmarket v. Smart, 45 N. H. 9. As to the necessity of 103; Marr's Heirs v. Gilliam, 1 knowledge on the part of the Cold. (Tenn.) 488. beneficiary, see Marshall's Estate, 11. Ripley v. Bates, 110 Mass. 138 Pa. St. 285, 22 Atl. 24; Jones 161. V. Godwin, 10 Rich. Eq. 226; 12. Ante. § 349(a). Neal V. Bleckley, 51 S. C. 506, 13. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago 29 S. E. 249; editorial note 11 v. Allen, 178 lU. 330, 53 N. E. Columbia Law Rev. 686. 109; Blaisdell v. Portsmouth, 10. Burrows v. Holt, 20 Conn. G. F. & C. R. Co., 51 N. H. 483; 464; Winn v. StriclVaid, 34 Fla. Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. (N. 610, 16 So. 606; McClenahan v. Y.) 451, 35 Am. Dec. 637; Curtis § 513] Advebse Possession. 2007 appears to be open to doubt.'"" But assuming that ho oan be regarded as having possession, his possession is prima facie not adverse to the owner, liis principal.'* Hie may, liowever, acquire an adverse possession as against tlie latter by a repudiation of the relation of agency, or assertion of a claim to the property in his own right, so soon as the principal is affected with knowledge thereof.'^ (e) Grantor land grantee. If one who has made a conveyance of land retains possession of the land, his possession is regarded as prima facie in sub- ordination to the title of his grantee, and as conse- quently not adverse, unless and until he in some wa}' indicates to the latter that he holds in his own behalf.'*' V. La Graude Hydraulic Water Co., 20 Ore. 34; Kittaning Acad- emy V. Brown, 41 Pa. St. 269; Raleigh v. Wells, 29 Utah, 217, 110 Am. St. Rep. 689, 81 Pac. 908. In Cameron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 100, 61 N. W. 814, it was held that the fact that the licensee undertook to transfer the land to another, who took possession, did not start the running of the statute in favor of such other, since it might be assumed that the own- er, in not objecting to the lat- ter's presence on the land, in effect regarded him as a licensee. The decision seems open to ques- tion, since it does not appear that the transferee in possession regarded himself as a licensee. But see Bond v. O'Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 83 Am. St. Rep. 265; 58 N. E. 275, criticized 14 Harv. Law Rev. 374. 13a. See Pollock & Wright, Possession 17; Lightwood, Pos- session of Land, 22; Holmes, The Common Law, 227. 14. Baucum v. George, 65 Ala. 259; Hoskins v. Byler, 53 Ark. 532, 14 S. W. 864; Peabody v. Tarbell, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 226; Combs V. Goldsworthy, 109 Mo. 151, 18 S. W. 1130; Leigh v. Howard, 87 N. J. L. 113, ?3 Atl. 680; Martin v. Jackson, 27 Pa. St. 504, 67 Am. Dec. 489; Pea- body v. Leach, 18 Wis. 657. 15. Carney v. Hennessey, 77 Conn. 577, 60 Atl. 129; Whiting's Heirs v. Taylor's Heirs, 8 Dana (Ky.) 403; Martin v. Jackson, 27 Pa. St. 504, 67 Am. Dec. 489; Williams v. Pott, L. R. 12 Eq. 149. As to adverse possession by an agent, holding by one to whom he has leased the land for his principal, see note in 14 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 266. 16. Daniels v. Williams, 177 Ala. 140, 58 So. 419; Stuttgart V. John, 85 Ark. 520, 109 S. W. 541; Gernon v. Sisson, — (Cal.) — l.'.l Pac. 85; Jay v. Whelchel. 2008 Real Property. [§ 513 The cases do not clearly explain why the possession of the grantor is thus presumed not to be in his own behalf.^'^ Obviously, if the grantor retains possession by reason of permission to that effect from the grantee, his possession is not adverse, it being in effect that of a tenant, ordinarily a tenant at will, of the latter,^^ but the desirability of regarding the grantor as a tenant of the grantee, or as otherwise holding in behalf of the 78 Ga. 786; Trask v. Success Mining Co., 28 Idaho, 483, 155 Pac. 288; Rowe v. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154, 95 Am. Dec. 676; Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Homan, 151 Iowa, 404, 131 N. W. 878; Sellers v. Crossan, 52 Kan. 570, 35 Pac. 205; Nugent v. Peterman, 137 Mich. 646, 100 N. W. 895; Col- lins V. Colleran, 86 Minn, li'9, 90 N. W. 364; Robmson v. Rey- nolds,— (Mo.)— , 176 S. W. 3; Cohn V. Plass, 85 N. J. Eq. 153, 95 Atl. 1011; Jackson v. Burton, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 341; Flesher v. Callahan, 32 Okla. 283, 122 Pac. 489; Gardner v. Wright, 49 Ore. 609, 91 Pac. 286; Pierce v. Bar- ney, 209 Pa. 132, 58 Atl. 152; Lowe V. Turner, 78 S. C. 513, 59 S. E. 529; Virginia Midland R. Co. V. Barbour, 97 Va. 118, 33 S. E. 554; Spaulding v. Collins, 51 Wash. 488, 99 Pac. 306; Schwall- back V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 69 Wis. 292, 2 Am. St. Rep. 740, 34 N. W. 128. 17. It is occasionally said that the grantor's possession is not adverse, because he is to be re- garded as tenant at sufferance of the grantee. See e. g. Daniels V. Williams, 177 Ala. 140, 58 So. 419; Building & Loan Ass'n v. Warren, 101 Ark. 163, 141 S. W. 765; McNeil v. Jordan, 28 Kan. 7; Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. 395. A tenant at suf- ferance is a wrongful possessor, and he is not properly a. tenant of the person whom he deprives of possession. And consequently that one is tenant at sufferance does not appear to be conclusive that his possession is not ad- verse. In other words, the fact, if it be a fact, that the grantor retaining possession is tenant at sufferance (See 1 Tiffany, Land- lord & Ten., § 44) does not in itself show that his possession is not adverse. For instance, if a tenant per autre vie retains (possession after the death of the cestiu que vie, his possession is usually regarded as adverse to the remainderman [see post § 513(g)], although he is a tenant at sufferance. 18. See Prichard v. Tabor, 104 Ga. 64, 30 S. E. 415; Butler V. Nelson, 72 Iowa, 732, 32 N. W. 399; Hunt v. Comstock, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 665; Preston v. Hawley, 101 N. Y. 586, 5 N. E. 770, Id., 139 N. Y. 296, 34 N. E. 90G; Cadwallader v. Lovece, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 29 S. W. 666, 917; Hodges v. Gates. 9 Vt. 178. § 513] Adverse Possession. 2009 latter, in the absence of any evidence to that effect, appears to be open to question.^^ One who goes into possession of land under a transfer of the land from the owner, whether by way of gift or otherwise, which is invalid because oral mere- ly, may usually assert the bar of the statute against the owner if his possession continues for the statutory period, since his possession is presumed to be adverse to any right in the o^vner.^o And generally a grantee's possession is regarded as adverse to the rights of the grantor, whatever be the character of the defects in the grant.2^ 19. See, in this connection, Knight V. Knight, 178 111. 553, 53 N. E. 306; Waltemeyer v. Baughman, 63 Md. 200; Smith V. Montes, 11 Tex. 24; Brinkman V. Jones, 44 Wis. 498, 524. In Arkansas it is said that when the grantor's possession continues unexplained for an un- reasonable length of time, the presumption that it is in sub- ordination to the grantee's title is gradually overcome. Tegarden V. Hurst, 123 Ark. 354, 185 S. W. 463. It does not appear whether, if the presumption is thus overcome, the limitation period is to be regarded as be- ginning to run from the date of the grant or when the pre- sumption is overcome. 20. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 149 Ala. 184, 43 So. 12; Trotter v. Neal, 50 Ark. 340, 7 S. W. 384; New Haven Trust Co. v. Camp, 81 Conn. 539. 71 Atl. 788; Studstill v. Wilcox, 94 Ga. 690, 20 S. E. 120; Stewart v. Duffy, 116 111. 47. 6 N. E. 424; Albright V. Albright, 153 Iowa, .'597, 133 N. W. 737; Tippenhauer v. Tlippen- hauer,— (Ky.)— , 166 S. W. 225; Sumner v. Stevens, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 337; Schafer v. Hauser, 111 Mich. 622, 35 L. R. A. 835, 66 Am. St. Rep. 403, 70 N. W. 136; Sinclair v. Matter, 125 Minn. 484, 147 N. W. 655; Ran- nels V. Ranuels, 52 Mo. 109; Davidge v. Talbot, 98 Neb. 816, 154 N. W. 543; Parker v. Kelsey, 82 Ore. 334, 161 Pac. 694; Nulton V. Nulton, 247 Pa. 572, 93 Atl. 630; Bartlett v. Secor, 56 Wis. 520, 14 N. W. 714. It has been said that unless the donee's entry into possession is under the honest belief that the land was given him, he Is presumed to be holding under a license, and the possession not to be adverse. Johns v. Johns, 244 Pa. 48, 90 At. 535; O'Boyle v. Kelley, 249 Pa. 13, 94 Atl. 448. The idea apparently is that if the person so entering knows that the land was not legally given him, he is presumed to regard his possession as per- missive merely until a valid gift is actually made. 21. Robinson v. Thornton, 102 2010 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 5i: (f ) Vendor and vendee. The possession of the vendee of land under an executory contract of sale is presumed to be in subordination to the rights of his vendor so long as the purchase price has not been paid or the contract is otherwise unperformed on his part,-^ while, by the weight of authority, so soon as he has completely performed his part of the contract, his possession becomes adverse to the vendor,^^ as it does, even before performance by him, if he explicitly repudiates holding under the vendor.-^ Cal. 675, 34 Pac. 120; Carmody V. Chicago & A. R. Co., Ill 111. 69; Big Sandy Co. v. Ramey, 162 Ky. 236, 172 S. W. 508; Melvin V. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 15, 38 Am. Dec. 384; Case V. Green, 53 Mich. 615, 19 N. W. 554; Mattison v. Ausmuss, 60 Mo. 551; Nowlin v. Adams, 25 Gratt (Va.) 137; Parkersburg Nat. Bank v. Neal, 28 W. Va. 744. 22. Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wall 119; Sample v. Reeder, 107 Ala. 227, 18 So. 214; Perry v. Arka- delphia Lumber Co., 83 Ark. 374, 103 S. W. 724; Woodward v. Hennegan, 128 Cal. 293, 60 Pac. 769; Spratt v. Livingston, 32 Fla. 507, 22 L. R. A. 453; Moore V. Mobley, 123 Ga. 424, 51 S. E. 351; Peabody v. Hewett, 52 Me. 33, 83 Am. Dec. 486; Brown v. King, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 173; Burke V. Douglass, 115 Mich. 197, 73 N. W. 133; Moring v. Abies, 62 Miss. 263, 52 Am. Rep. 186; In re De- partment of Public Parks, 73 N. Y. 560; Worth v. Wrenn, 144 N. C. 656, 57 S. E. 388; West v. Edwards, 41 Ore. 609, 69 Pac. 992; Moo-e v. Kelly, 57 Okla. 348, 157 Pac. 81; McCulloch v. Nicholsou,^Tex. Civ. App — , 162 S. W. 432; William James Sons Co. V. Hutchinson, 79 W. Va. 389, 90 S. E. 1047. The possession of the vendee has been regarded as becoming adverse in case the vendor repudiates the contract, as by conveying to another person. Pearson v. Boyd, 62 Tex. 541. 23. Alabama State Land Co. V. Matthews, 168 Ala. 200, 53 So. 174; Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. .385, 104 S. W. 148; New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. Gaffney Oil Co., 134 Ky. 792, 121 S. W. 699; Grigsby v. Smith, 174 Ky. 819, 192 S. W. 856; Brown v. King, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 173; Moring v. Abies, 62 Miss. 263, 52 Am. Rep. 186; Ogle v. Hignet, 161 Mo. 47, 61 S. W. 596; Lanham v. Bowlby, 86 Neb. 148, 125 N. W. 149; An- derson v. McCormick, 18 Ore. 301, 22 Pac. 1062; Watts v. Witt, 39 S. C. 356, 17 S. E. 822; Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tarpey,— Utah— , 168 Pac. 554; Adams v. Fullam, 43 Vt. 592; Furlong v. Garrett. 44 Wis. Ill; See Endicott v. Haviland, 220 Mass. 48, 107 N. E. 394. 24. Zeller v. Eckert, 4 How. 295: Sample v. Reeder, 107 Ala. 227, 18 So. 214; Pope v. Brass- § 513] Adverse Possessiox. 2U11 It is not entirely clear why the performance of the vendee's part of the contract should b<^ regarded as ipso facto giving to his possession an adverse character, but it is perhaps based on the view that the vendee is then entitled to possession,-*' and that con- sequently, while previously his possession could be explained only on the theory tliat he was the tenant of the vendor,-'^ such tenancy might be regarded as automatic- ally ended by reason of complete performance of the contract by him. There are decisions, however, that even in the case of such complete performance by the vendee, a repudiation of the vendor's title is nec- essary to start the running of the statute.-" And in support of this view it may be suggested that, what- ever change in the relations of the parties may be made by the vendee's performance, in the view of a court of equity, it does not change their relations at law. Where the vendee under an executory contract of sale transfers his interest to another, who takes pos- session, the possession of the latter is ordinarily, like- that of the original vendee, not adverse to the vendor,-^ provided at least he has notice that his vendor, the field, 110 Ky. 128, 61 S. W. 161; man v. Chapman, 91 Va. 397, 50 Burke v. Douglass, 115 Mich. 197, Am. St. Rep. 846, 21 S. E. 813; 73 N. W. 133; Lanham v. Bowlby Core v. Faupel, 24 W. Va. 238. 86 Neb. 148, 125 N. W. 149; Cook In Briggs v. Prosser, 14 Wend. V. Knott, 28 Tex. 85; Chapman 227, whether the possession after V. Chapman, 91 Va. 397, 50 Am. performance is adverse, was re- st. Rep. 846, 21 S. E. 813. garded as a question to be deter- 25. See cases cited, 19 Am. & mined with reference to the Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) 704; facts. 39 Cyclopedia Law & Proc. 1621. 28. Lewis v. Hawkins. 23 26. See 1 Tiffany, Landl'd & Wall. 119; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. Ten. § 43a. v. Miller, 115 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 27. Pope V. Brassfield, 110 Ky. 915; Jackson v. Bard, 4 Johns. 128, 61 S. W. 5; Roxbury v. (N. Y.) 230, 4 Am. Dec. 267: Hutson, 37 Me. 42 (seni'ble) ; Gillison v. Savannah, etc.. R. Co., Rodgers v. Beckel, 172 Mich. 544, 7 S. C. 173. Compare ilunter 138 N. W. 202 isemble); Chap- v. Parsons, 2 Bailey ( S. C) 59. 2012 Real Property. [§ 513 original vendee, claims under an executory contract.^'' It lias been decided, however, that if the original vendee make a conveyance to another, who takes with- out notice that his grantor is holding merely under an executory contract of sale, the possession of the grantee is adverse to the original vendor.^*^ And there are occasional decisions that the mere fact that a purchaser from the original vendee has made full payment to the latter suffices in itself to make such purchaser's possession adverse to the original vendor.-^^ In any case, the possession of one claiming under the original vendee, like that of the original vendee him- self, may become adverse by reason of his repudiation of the claim of the vendor.^- (g) Life tenant and remainderman. The statute of limitation does not operate in favor of a tenant for his owm or another's life, so long as the life endures, as against the remainderman or rever- sioner.'''" The life tenant is rightfully in possession ana the theory of adverse possession operates only wiien there is a wrongful possession,^* and it is consequently 29. Little Rock etc. R. Co. v. A. 618, 47 Am. St. Rep. 239, 41 Rankin, 107 Ark. 487, 156 S. W. N. E. 175; Haskett v. Maxey, 134 431 (grantee by quitclaim charg- Ind. 182, 19 L. R. A. 379; Mixter ed with notice). Brown v. v. Woodcock, 154 Mass. 535, 28 Huey, 103 Ga. 448, 30 S. E. 429; N. E. 907; Stevens v. Winship, 1 Keys V. Mason, 44 Tex. 144. Pick. 318, 11 Am. Dec. 178; Lum- 30. Wingfield v. Davis, 53 Ga. ley v. Haggerty, 110 Mich. 552, 64 655; Ripley v. Miller, 165 Mich. Am. St. Rep. 364, 68 N. W. 243; 470, 130 N. W. 345 Ann. Gas. Pincknay v. Burrage, 31 N. J. L. 1912C 952; Snow v. Rich, 22 21; Clute v. New York Cent. & H. Utah 123, 61 Pac. 336. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 267, 24 N. E. 31. Tayloe v. Dugger, 66 Ala. 317; Ladd v. Byrd, 113 N. 444; Beard v. Ryan, 78 Ala. 37. Car. 466, 18 S. E. 666; McCorry 32. Robertson v. Wood, 15 v. King, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 267, Tex. 1, 65 Am. Dec. 140. 39 Am. Dec. 165; Hannon v. 33. Washington v. Norwood, Hounihan, 85 Va. 429, 12 S. E. 128 Ala. 391, 30 So. 405; Ogden 157; Titchenell v. TitcheneU, 74 v. Ogden, 60 Ark. 70, 46 Am. St. W. Va. 237, 81 S. E. 978. Rep. 151, 28 S. W. 796; Meacham 34. See Pickett v. Doe, 74 V. Bunting, 156 111. 586, 28 L. R. Ala. 131; Hanson v. Ingwaldson, § 513] Adveese Possessioiq-. 2013 immaterial that the life tenant asserts a claim to the fee, since this gives the remainderman no right of entry or action.^^ Even though the remainderman might, if he chose, assert a forfeiture of the life estate by reason of wrongful acts upon the part of the life tenant, he is, it seems, under no obligation so to do, in order to prevent the running of the statute."''" In one or two states, however, it has been decided that, in view of a statute giving to a reversioner or remainderman the right to institute a proceeding to quiet title, it is in- cumbent upon the remainderman so to do in case a tenant in life makes a conveyance in fee, and that the statute runs against the remainderman from the time of such conveyance."' One to whom a tenant for life transfers his estate, whether the conveyance purports to convey a life estate or a fee simple estate, acquires the estate of his grantor, with a like right of possession, and conse- quently the statute does not run in his favor as against the remainderman, until after the termination of tlie life.38 77 Minn. 533, 77 Am. St. Rep. 692. 80 N. W. 702. 35. Keith v. Keith, 80 Mo. 125. 125. 36. Wallingford v. Hearl, 15 Mass. 471; Mixter v. Woodcock, 154 Mass. 535, 28 N. E. 907; Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. 260, 72 Am. Dec. 629; But in Green v. Horn, 207 N. Y. 489, 101 N. E. 430 it is intimated that a "positive act of disclaimer" might render the life tenant's possession adverse. 37. Murray v. Quigley, 119 Iowa, 6, 97 Am. St. Rep. 276, 92 N. W. 869; Garrett v. Olford, 152 Iowa, 265, 132 N. W. 379; Maurer v. Reifschneider, 89 Neb. 673, Ann. Gas. 1912C, 643. 132 N. W. 197; Criswell v. Criswell, 2 R. P.— 52 101 Neb. 349, 163 N. W. 197; Contra, Armor v. Frey, 253 Mo. 447, 161 S. W. 829: Dallas Com- press Co. v. Smith, 190 Ala. 423, 67 So. 289. 38. Winters v. Powell, 180 Ala. 425, 61 So. 96; Edwards v. Bender, 121 Ala. 77, 25 So. 1010; Moore v. Childress, 58 Ark. 510, 25 S. W. 833; Luquire v. Lee, 121 Ga. 624, 49 S. E. 834; Howard v. Henderson, 142 Ga. 1. 82 S. E. 292; Maring v. Meeker, 263 111. 136, 105 N. E. 31; Schroeder v. Bozarth, 224 111. 310, 79 N. E. 583: Gates v. Colfax Northern Ry. Co., 177 Iowa. 690, 159 N. W. 456; Carpenter v. Moorelock, 151 Ky. 506, 152 S. W. 575; Mixter v. Woodcock, 154 Mass. 535, 28 N. E. 201-1: Real Peoperty. [§ 513 If a tenant pur autre vie retains possession after the death of the cestui que vie, his possession is usually regarded as adverse to the remainderman from that time."^ as would be, it seems, the possession of the representatives of a tenant for life who hold over after the death of the latter. (h) Cotenants. As between cotenants, the fact that A is in possession,^*^ or takes all the rents and profits,*^ while B is not in possession and receives none 907; Hauser v. Murray, 256 Mo. 58, 165 S. W. 376; Westmeyer v. Gallenkamp, 154 Mo. 28, 77 Am. St. Rep. 747, 55 S. W. 2.31; Green v. Horn, 207 N. Y. 489, 101 N. E. 430; Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, 28 x^J. E. 627; Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. 0. 314, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 172, 51 S. E. 889; Cooley v. Lee, 170 N. C. 18, 86 N. E. 720; Carpenter v. Denoon, 29 Ohio St. 379; Rawls V. Johns. 54 S. C. 394, 32 S. E. 451; Chambers v. Chattanooga Union R. Co., 130 Tenn. 459, 171 S. W. 84; Davis v. Tebbs, 81 Va. 600; McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 224, 130 Pac. 350. 39. Mann v. Mann, 141 Cal. 326, 74 Pac. 995; Jones v. John- son, 81 Ga. 293, 6 S. E. 181; Tur- ner V. Hause, 199 m. 464, 65 N. E. 445; Miller v. Ewing, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 34; HaU v. French, 165 Mo. 430; Barrett v. Stradl. 73 Wis. ?.85, 9 Am. St. Rep. 795, 41 N. W. 439. In Day v. Cochran. 24 Miss. 261 the possession of a tenant pur antre vie holding over is stated not to be adverse. Occasionally the cases suggest a distinction between the holding over of one who had never as- serted a claim to more than a life estate, and that of one who entered under a conveyance from a life tenant which purported to give him a fee simple estate, the former possession not being regarded as adverse. See Irvine V. Silbetts, 26 Pa. 477; Bannon V. Brandon, 34 Pa. St. 263, 75 Am. Dec. 655; Gernet v. Lynn, 31 Pa. St. 94; Barrett v. Stradl, 73 Wis. 385. 9 Am. St. Rep. 795, 41 N. W. 439. That if one has a life estate merely by reason of the omission of words of inheritance, the pos- session of one to whom he under- takes to convey in fee is adverse to the reversioner after the life tenant's death, see Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 323, 17 Am. Dec. 517; Henley v. Wilson, 77 N. Car. 216. 40. McClung v. Ross, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 116; Wheat v. Wheat, 190 Ala. 461, 67 So. 417; Ashley v. Rector, 20 Ark. 375; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Russell v. Stickney, 62 Fla. 569, 56 So. 691; Blackaby v. Blackaby, 185 111. 94, 56 N. E. 1053; Stowell v. Lynch, 269 111. 437, 110 N. E. 51; Pedin Y. Cavins, 134 Ind. 494, 39 Am. St. Rep. 276, 34 N. E. 7; Bader V. Dyer, 106 Iowa, 715, 68 Am. St. Rep. 332, 77 N. W. 469; John- 513] Ad^-ebse Possession. 2015 of the rents and profits, is not of itself sufficient to start the running of the statute in favor of A. B has a right to assume that A hokls j)Ossession, or other- wise utilizes the property, with a full recognition of the right of B to do the same if he so chooses, and B is guilty of no laches in failing to assert his rights. But though the exclusive possession of one cotenant, or his exclusive receipt of the profits, does not of itself serve to show that his possession is adverse to the other or, as it is frequently expressed, that there is an ouster by him of such other, it has been quite occasion- ally asserted that the sole and uninterrupted possession and receipt of profits by one cotenant, continued for a long series of years, ^\^thout any interruption or claim on the part of the cotenant, wall justify a jury in inferring an actual ouster and adverse pos- session.^- The distinction appears to be in effect, that son V. Myer, 168 Ky. 430, 182 S. W. 190; Mansfield v. McGinnis, 86 Me. 118, 41 Am. St. Rep. 532, 29 Atl. 956; Donohue v. Vosper, 189 Mich. 78, 155 N. W. 407; Also- brook V. Eggleston, 69 Miss. 833, 13 So. 850; Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272, 77 Am. Dec. 614; Collier v. Gault, 234 Mo. 457, 137 S. W. 884; Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 71 Am. St. Rep. 691, 77 N. W. 80; Jackson v. Tibbitts, 9 Cow, (N. Y.) 241; Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Ohio St. 232; Tulloch V. Worrall, 49 Pa. St. 133; Odom V. Weathersbee, 26 S. C. 244, T S. E. 890; Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 279; Gilkey v. Peeler, 22 Tex. 663; Ilolley V. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525; Clark V. Beard, 59 W. Va. 669, 53 S. E. 597: Lagorio v. Dozier, 91 Va. 492, 22 S. E. 239. 41. McKneely v. Terry, 61 Ark. 527, 33 S. W. 95:!; Hill v. Cher- okee Const. Co., 99 Ark. 84, 137 S. W. 553; Morgan v. Mitchell. 104 Ga. 596, 30 S. E. 792; Todd V. Todd, 117 111. 92, 7 N. E.'583; Hudson V. Coe, 79 Me. 83, 1 Am. St. Rep. 288, 8 Atl. 249; Warfield V. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272, 77 Am. Dec. 121 idictum) ; Rodney v. McLaughlin, 97 Mo. 426, 9 S. W. 726; Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa. St. 327. 42. Johnson v. Toulmin, 18 Ala. 50; Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, Ann. Cas. 191.5C. 1226, 61 So. 100; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. l;i6, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177. 18 Pac. 146; Burns v. Byrne, 45 Iowa, 287; Chambers v. Pleak, 6 Dana (Ky.) 432; Harrington v. Wil- liams, 173 Ky. 575, 191 S. W. 273 (senihle) ; Parker v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 91, 37 Am. Dec. 121; Lefavour v. Homan, :5 Allen (Mass ) ?.',a- .Joyce v. Dyer, 2016 Real Property. [§ 513 while the exclusive possession of one cotenant does not in- volve an ouster of the other, so as to start the running of the statute, the fact that one cotenant is in sole pos- session for twenty, thirty, or forty years, without any claim being made by the other, justifies a finding that an ouster had taken place, ''because men do not ordi- narily sleep on their rights for so long a period, and a strong presumption arises that actual proof of the original ouster has become lost by lapse of time."*^ While the sole possession of one cotenant is prima facie not adverse to the other, it may, as has been above indicated, become adverse to him, and whether it has so become adverse is ordinarily a question of fact.^* The cotenant in possession may deny the right of the other either by express statement,^^ or by im- 189 Mass. 64, 109 Am. St. Rep. 603, 75 N. E. 81; Warfleld v. Lin- dell, 38 Mo. 561, 90 Am. Dec. 443; Lund V. Nelson, 89 Neb. 449, 131 N. W. 919; Jackson v. Whitbeck, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 632, 16 Am. Dec. 454; Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141 N. Car. 210, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, 115 Am. St. Rep. 682, 53 S. E. 870; Bolton v. Hamilton, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 294, 37 Am. Dec. 509; Rider v. Maul, 46 Pa. St. 376 (semUe) ; Rohrbach v. Sanders, 212 Pa. 636, 62 Atl. 27; Hubbard V. Wood, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 279; Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S. W. 946; Baber v. Baber, 121 Va. 740, 94 S. E. 209; Doe v. Prosser, Cowp. 217; See Sagen & Nelson v. Gudmanson, 164 Iowa, 440, 145 N. W. 954. 43. Lefavour v. Homan, 3 Allen (Mass.) 354. 44. Carpentier v. Mendenhall, 28 Cal. 484, 87 Am. Dec. 135; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Gill V. Fauntleroy, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 177; La Fountain v. Dee, 110 Mich. 347, 68 N. W. 220; Harmon v. James, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) Ill, 45 Am. Dec. 296; Warfleld v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 581, 90 Am. Dec. 443; Golden v. Tyer, 180 Mo. 196, 79 S. W. 143; Beall V. McMenemy, 63 Neb. 70, 93 Am. St. Rep. 427, 88 N. W. 134; Clark V. Crego, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 599; Bolton V. Hamilton, 2 Walls & S. (Pa.) 294, 37 Am. Dec. 509; Keyser v. Evans, 30 Pa. St. 509; Workman v. Guthrie, 29 Pa. St. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 654; PurceU v. Wilson, 4 Gratt. (Va.) 16. 45. Brady v. Huff, 75 Ala. 80; Ashley v. Rector, 20 Ark. 359; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Coogler V. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853, 7 So. 391; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20, 43 Am. St. Rep. 303, 35 N. E. 509; Gill v. Fauntleroy, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 177; Fenton v. Miller, 108 Mich. 246, 65 N. W. 966. Thornton v. York Bank, 45 Me. 158. Phillips v. Gregg, 10 § 513] Adverse Possession. 201: plication, as, for instance, by liis actual exclusion of the otlier,^^^ or by utilizing all or part of the property in such a way as to show an intention to make a per- manent appropriation thereof to his o^\ti use.*^ But the statute does not begin to run in his favor unless the other acquires actual notice of the adverse char- acter of his possession, or unless his assertion of an exclusive claim, however made, is so open and notori- ous that the otlier, exercising reasonable diligence, would necessarily learn thereof.'** Watts, (Pa.) 158, 36 Am. Dec. 158; Hubbard v. Wood, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 279; Church v. Waggon- er, 78 Tex. 200, 14 S. W. 581. 46. Carpenter v. Webster, 27 Cal. 524; Norris v. Sullivan, 47 Conn. 474; Goodwin v. Bragaw, 87 Conn. 31, 86 Atl. 668; Hudson V. Coe, 79 Me. 83, 1 Am. St. Rep. 288, 8 Atl. 249; Jordan v. Surgh- nor, 107 Mo. 520, 17 S. W. 1009; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 587; Forward v. Deetz, 32 Pa. St. 69; Jefcoat v. Knotts, 13 Rich. L. (S. C.) 50. Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 279. 47. Roumillot v. Gardner, 113 Ga. 60, 53 L. R. A. 729, 38 S. E. 365; Laraway v. Larue, 63 Iowa, 407, 19 S. W. 242; Bennett v. Clemence, 6 Allen (Mass.) 10; Capen v. Leach, 182 Mass. 175, 65 N. E. 63; Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 561, 90 Am. Dec. 443; Dunlap V. Griffith. 146 Mo. 283, 47 S. W. 917; Childs v. Kansas City. St. J. & C. B. R. Co.— (Mo.)— , 17 S. W. 954; Zapf v. Carter, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 395, 75 N. Y. Supp. 197; An- nely v. De Saussure, 26 S. C. 497. 40 Am. St. Rep. 725. 2 S. E. 490. Cox V. Tompkinson. 39 Wash. 70, 80 Pac. 1005; Cochran v. Cochran, 55 W. Va. 178, 46 S. E. 924. 48. Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 4 L. Ed. 553; McClung V. Ross, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 116, 5 L. Ed. 46; Packard v. Johnson, 57 Cal. 180; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 49 Am. Rep. 100; Stokely V. Conner, 69 Fla. 412, 68 So. 452; Christopher v. Mungen, 71 Fla. 545, 71 So. 625; Grand Tower Min., Mfg. & Transp. Co. v. Gill, 111 111. 541; Stowell v. Lynch, 269 111. 437, 110 N. E. 51; Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272, 77 Am. Dec. 614, 38 Mo. 581, 90 Am. Dec. 443. Hynds v. Hynds, 253 Mo. 20, 161 S. W. 812; Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 348; Lodge v. Patterson, 3 Watts (Pa.) 74, 27 Am. Dec. 335; Saunders v. Terry, 116 Va. 495, 82 S. E. 68; Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman. 91 Vt. 425, 101 Atl. 151. That actual notice to the coten- ant not in possession is unneces- sary, see Van Gunden v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co.. 52 Fed. 838. 3 C. C. A. 294; Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed. 529, 17 C. C. A. 251; Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1226, 61 So. 100; Unger V. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 49 Am. Rep. 100; Oglesby v. Hollister, 76 2018 Real Peoperty. [§ 513 The cotenant out of possession is not charged with notice that the possession of the other is adverse to him, so that the statute will run in favor of such other, by the mere fact that the other has taken from a third person a conveyance which purports to transfer the whole j^roperty.^^ And, accepting the view which is usually approved, that the purpose of the recording acts is merely to afford protection to subsequent pur- chasers,^*^ the record of such a conveyance to one co- tenant is not sufficient to charge the other with notice of the former's adverse claim. But while there are at least two decisions to this etfect,^^ there are others which give to such record the effect of charging with Cal. 136, 9 Am. St. Rep. 177, 18 Pac. 146; Roberts v. Cox, 259 111. 322, 102 N. E. 204; Knowles v. Brown, 69 Iowa, 11, 28 N. W. 409; Wilson v. Hoover, 154 Ky. 1, 156 S. W. 880; Greenhill v- Biggs, 85 Ky. 155, 7 Am. St. Rep. 579, 2 S. W. 774; Fuller v. Swensberg, 106 Mich. 305, 58 Am. St. Rep. 481, 64 N. W. 463; Peck V. Lockridge, 97 Mo. 549, 11 S. W. 246; Dunlap v. Griffith, 146 Mo. 283, 47 S. W. 917; Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 348; Zapf v. Carter, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 395. 75 N. Y. Supp. 197; Lodge v. Patter- son, 3 Watts (Pa.) 74, 27 Am. Dec. 335 Miller v. Cramer, 48 S. C. 282, 26 S. E. 657; Humphreys V. Edwards, 89 Tex. 512, 36 S. W. 333, 434; Mathews v. Baker, 47 Utah, 532, 155 Pac. 427; Baber v Baber, 121 Va. 740, 94 S. E. 209; Cox V. Tomnkinson, 39 W^sh. 70, 80. Pac. 1005; Clark v. Beard, 59 W. Va. 669, 53 S. E. 597; Roberts V. Decker, 120 Wis. 102 (semble). Compare Gracy v. Fielding, 71 Fla. 1, 70 So. 625: Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1226, 61 So. 100; Custer V. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. B. 183. It has been decided in a recent case that if cotenants in posses- sion have no knowledge of the fact that there are other coten- ants, their possession is to be regarded as adverse to the latter apart from any question of notice, actual or constructive. Bourne v. Wiele, 159 Wis. 340, 150 N. W. 420. 49. Inglis v. Webb, 117 Ala. 387, 23 So. 125; Donason v. Bar- bero, 230 111. 138, 82 N. E. ff20. Craig V. Cox, 255 111. 564, 99 N. E. 647; Hignite v. Hignite, 65 Miss. 447, 4 So. 345; Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 348; Barrett v. McCarty, 20 S. D. 75, 104 N. W. 907; Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 532, 94 Am. Dec. 350. 50. Post § 567(a). 51. Cocks V. Simmons, 55 Ark. 104, 29 Am. St. Rep. 28, 17 S. W. 594: Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525. § 513] Adveese Possession". 2019 notice thereof the tenant out of possession.''- Under these latter decisions, a cotenant who refrains from taking possession is bound to inspect the records in order to ascertain whether the possession of the other has become adverse to him. If a cotenant makes a conveyance which purports to convey not merely his undivided interest in the land, but the entire interest therein, or in a part there- of, and the grantee in the conveyance takes possession accordingly, without any recognition of the rights of the other cotenant, out of possession, the possession of the grantee is regarded as adverse to the latter, and the latter is charged with notice to this effect. He is charged with notice of the fact that a person other than his original cotenant is in possession of the land, and he is also charged with notice of the char- acter of the claim of such person. ' and cannot assume that it is other than such as is indicated by the con- veyance under which he holds."'-'' If, liowever, the 52. Ames v. Howes, 13 Idaho, 756, 93 Pac. 35; Puckett v. Mc- Daniel, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 630, 28 S. W. 360; Morgan v. White, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 318, 110 S. W. 491; Craven v. Craven, 68 Neb. 459, 94 N. W. 604; McCann v. Welch, 106 Wis. 142. 81 N. W. 996. 53. Jackson v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402, 8 L. Ed. 170; Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed. 529, 17 C. C. A. 251. Fielder v. Childs, 73 Ala. 567; Brown v. Bocquin, 57 Ark. 97, 20 S. W. 813; Winterburn v. Chambers, 91 Cal. 170, 27 Pac. 658; McDowell v. Sutlive, 78 Ga. 142, 2 S. E. 937; Bowman v. Owens, 133 Ga. 49, 65 S. E. 156; Waterman Hall v. Waterman, 220 in. 569. 77 N. E. 142; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20, 43 Am. St. Rep. 303, 35 N. E. 509; Blank- enhorn v. Lenox, 123 Iowa, 67, 98 N. W. 556; Clarke v. Dirks, 178 Iowa, 335, 160 N. W. 31; Rose v. Ware, 115 Ky. 420, 74 S. W. 188; Segelbohm v. Waldnef, 101 Kan. 156, 165 Pac. 049. Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 98 Me. 268, 99 Am. St. Rep. 397, 56 Atl. 908; Merryman v. Cumberland Paper Co., 98 Md. 223, 56 Atl. 364; Parker v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 91, 37 Am. Dec. 121; Joyce v. Dyer, 189 Mass. 64, 109 Am. St. Rep. 603, 75 N. E. 81; Phipps V. Crowell, 224 Mass. 342, 112 N. E. 648: Fuller v. Swensberg, 106 Mich. 305, 58 Am. St. Rep. 481, 64 N. W. 463; Brig- ham V. Reau, 139 Mich. 256, 102 N. W. 845; Hanson v. Ingwald- son. 77 Minn. 533. 77 Am. St. Rep. 692, 80 N. W. 702; Sanford v. 2020 Real Property. [§ 513 conveyance purports to be, not of the entire interest in the property, but of the interest of the grantor merely, the possession of the grantee is prima facie like that of his grantor, that of a cotenant only, and not adverse to the other cotenant, and the latter is justified in as- suming this to be the case.^^ (i) Mortgagor and mortgagee. Even in those states in which the mortgagee is regarded as having the legal title, so that there might otherwise be room for the application of the doctrine of adverse pos- session as between the mortgagor and mortgagee. Safford, 99 Minn. 380, 109 N. W. 819; Eastman v. Hinton, 86 Miss. 604, 109 Am. St. Rep. 726, 38 So. 779; Foulke v. Bond, 41 N. J. L. 527; Baker v. Trujillo De Armijo, 17 N. M. 383, 128 Pac. 73; Sweet- land V. Buell, 164 N. Y. 541, 79 Am. St. Rep. 676, 58 N. E. 663; Wheeler v. Taylor, 32 Ore. 421, 67 Am. St. Rep. 540, 52 Pac. 183; Culler V. Motzer, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 356, 15 Am. Dec. 604; Sud- duth V. Sumeral, 61 S. C. 276, 85 Am. St. Rep. 83, 39 S. E. 534: Weisinger v. Murphy, 2 Head (Tenn.) 679; Virginia Coal & Iron Co. V. Hylton, 115 Va. 418, Ann. Cas. 1915A 741. 79 S. E. 337; Church v. State, 65 Wash. 50, 117 Pac. 711; Roberts v. Decker, 120 Wis. 102, 97 N. W. 519. In North Carolina a differ- ent view has apparently been taken. Hardee v. Weathington, 130 N. C. 91, 40 S. E. 855; Bullin V. Hancock, 138 N. C. 198, 50 S. E. 621; Roscoe v. Roper Lumber Co., 124 N. C. 42, 32 S. E. 389. If there is no change of posses- sion after the conveyance, as when the person who held as tenant under the grantor con- tinues to hold under the grantee, the other cotenant is not charge- able with notice that the posses- sions has become adverse. Pick- ens V. Stout, 67 W. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354; Long v. Morrison, 251 III. 143, 95 N. E. 1075. And so when a cotenant makes a con- veyance of the whole, even though this be recorded, but he retains the exclusive possession. Brasher V. Taylor, 109 Ark. 281, 159 S. W. 1120. 54. Bath V. Valdez, 70 Cal. 350, 7 Pac. 487; Gracy v. Fielding, 71 Fla. 1, 70 So. 625; Grand Tower Min., Mfg. & Transp. Co. v. Gill, 111 111. 541; Stevens v. Wait, 112 111. 544; Moore v. Antill, 53 Iowa, 612, 6 N. W. 14; Curtis v. Barber, 131 Iowa, 400, 117 Am. St. Rep. 425, 108 N. W. 755; Lefavour v. Haman, 3 Allen (Mass.) 356; See McQuiddy v. Ware, 67 Mo. 74; Woods V. Banks, 14 N. H. Ill; Foulke V. Bond, 41 N. J. L. 547; Sharp V. Brandow, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 597; Edwards v. Bishop, 4 N. Y. 64. So in the case of a con- veyance in terms of an undivided interest. Wilson v. Storthz, 177 Ark. 418, 175 S. W. 45. § 513] Adverse Possession. 2021 it is recognized that the possession of the mortgagor is not adverse to the mortgagee unless he denies the latter 's rights in an open and notorious manner,^^ and the possession of the mortgagor's transferee is likewise not adverse to the mortgagee. The possession of the mortgagee before default is regarded as in behalf of the mortgagor, to whom he must account for the rents and profits;"'*^ and is con- sequently not adverse, in the absence of a denial of the mortgagor's rights.^" But if the mortgagee takes i:)os- session after condition broken, for the purpose of realizing his security, his possession is presmned to be adverse, or, as it is ordinarily expressed in jurisdic- tions where the legal title is in the mortgagee, a court of equity will, in such case, apply the analogy of the statute of limitations as against the right of tlie mort- gagor to redeem, in the absence of any recognition by him of the mortgagor's title. ^^ 55. Gafford v. Strauss, 89 Ala. 282, 7 L. R. A. 568, 18 Am. St. Rep. Ill, 7 So. 248. Whittington V. Flint, 43 Ark. 504, 51 Am. Rep. 572; Norrls v. He, 152 111. 190, 43 Am. St. Rep. 233, 38 N. E. 762; Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co., 150 Mass. 535, 6 L. R. A. 283, 23 N. E. 305; Chouteau v. Riddle, 110 Mo. 366, 19 S. W. 814; Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439; Colton v. Depew, 60 N. J. Eq. 454, 83 Am. St. Rep. 650, 46 Atl. 728; Martin V. Jackson, 27 Pa. St. 504, 67 Am. Dec. 489; Creigh's Heirs v. Hen- son, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 231; Flynn V. Lee, 31 W. Va. 487, 7 S. E. 430. 56. See post § C13(c). 57. Warder v. Enslen, 73 Cal. 291, 14 Pac. 874; Jones v. Foster, 175 III. 459, 51 N. E. 862, Green v. Turner, 38 Iowa, 112; McPherson v. Hayward, 81 Me. 329, 17 Atl. 164; Holmes v. Tur- ner's Falls Co., 150 Mass. 535, 6 L. R. A. 283, 23 N. E. 305; Anding V. Davis, 38 Miss. 574, 77 Am. Dec. 658; Kip v. Hirsh, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 1; Robinson v. Fife, 3 Ohio St. 551; West v. Middlessex Bank- ing Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598. 58. Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat (U. S.) 489, 6 L. Ed. 142; Byrd v. McDaniel, • 33 Ala. 18; Tibbs V. Reed, 105 Ky. 331, 49 S. W. 6, (semble) ; Munro v. Barton, 98 Me. 250, 56 Atl. 844: Ayres v. Waite, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 72; Stephens v. Dedham Institu- tion, 129 Mass. 547; Nelson v. Ratliff, 72 Miss. 656, 18 So. 487: Essex V. Smith, 97 Neb. 649, 150 N. W. 1022; Hall v. Hooper, 47 Neb. Ill, 66 N. W. 33. Clark v. Clough, 65 N. H. 43, 23 Atl. 521; Hubbell V. Sibley, 50 N. Y. 468; Knowlton v. Walker, 13 Wis. 295. 2022 Real Peoperty. [§ 513 (j) Mortg^agor and foreclosure purchaser. There are decisions that the possession of tho mort- gagor is not adverse as against the purchaser at fore- closure sale,^^ a view which appears to harmonize with the like view which has lieen taken with reference to the possession of a judgment debtor after sale under execution on the judgment.'^*' The possession of the purchaser under an in- valid foreclosure sale being in effect that of an assignee of the mortgage,**^ the right of redemption as against him will also ordinarily be barred after the statutory- period.*'^ (k) Surviving spouse and heirs. If, upon the death of a tenant in fee simple, his widow has, by the law of that jurisdiction, the right to hold possession of the land until the assignment of her dower, the statute of limitations cannot run in her favor as against the heirs or devisees, since they have no right of entry or action,''"^ and it is immaterial tliat they might, if they 59. Bosley v. Stewart, 140 Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598. Iowa, 101, 117 N. W. 1103; Els- 63. Robinson v. Allison, 124 worth V. Eslick, 91 Kan. 287, 137 Ala. 325, 27 So. 461; Padgett v. Pac. 973; Cook v. Travis, 20 N. Y. Norman, 44 Ark. 490; Jarrett v. 400; Neilson v. Grignon, 85 Wis. Jarrett, 113 Ark. 134, 167 S. W. 550, 55 N. W. 890. Contra, Garren 482; Riggs v. Girard, 133 111. 619. V. Fields, 131 Ala. 304, 30 So. 775. 24 N. E. 1031; Renter v. Stuck- 60. Bradford v. Russell, 79 Ind. art, 181 111. 529, 54 N. E. 1014; 64; Jones v._ Lickliter, 154 Ky. Westmeyer v. Gallenkamp, 154 848, 159 S. W. 652; Snowden v. Mo. 28, 55 S. W. 231, 77 Am. St. McKinney, 7 B. Mon. 258; Jackson Rep. 747; Meddis v. Kenney, V. Sternbergh, 1 Johns. Cas. 153; 176 Mo. 200, 98 Am. St. Rep. 496; Swift V. Agnes, 33 Wis. 228. Wofford v. Martin,— Mo.— , 183 S. 61. Post § 654. W. 603; Larson v. Anderson, 62. Chickering v. Failes, 26 74 Neb. 361, 104 N. W. 925; Reed in. 507; Jellison v. Halloran, 44 v. Hackney, 69 N. J. L. 27, 54 Minn. 199, 46 N. W. 332; Miner Atl. 229: Perkins v. Perkins,— V. Beekman, 50 N. Y. 337; Hamm Tex. Civ. App.— , 166 S. W. 915: V. McKenny, 73 Ore. 347, 144 Pac. Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 182, 23 435; Houts v. Hoyne, 14 S. Dak. S. E. 233. See editorial note 14 176; West v. Middlesex Banking Harvard Law Review, 149. § 513] Adverse PossEvSstox. 2023 choose, have her dower assigned.^-' And the case is the same after dower is assigned. She is in the position of a life tenant, and the statute cannot run during her life as against the reversioners or remain- derman.*'^ Even though the widow's possession is otherwise without right, it is, apparently, regarded prima facie as by permission of, or in behalf of, the heirs, and so not adverse to them,''" but it may become adverse by reason of her repudiation of the rights of the heirs."'^ If a widow marries again, and the second husband lives with her on the land of her first husbtaid, the possession, even if conceded to be in the second husband, is prima facie not adverse to the children of the first marriage, so as to cause the statute of limi- tations to run in his favor.*'^ He may, however, it has been decided, so assert a right of possession, under particular circumstances, that the statute will so run.'^^ 64. See Foy v. Wellborn, 112 Givens v. Ott, 222 Mo. 395, 121 S. Ala. 160, 20 So. 604. W. 23. 65. Neely v. Martin, 126 Ark. 67. Hays v. Lemoine, 156 Ala. 1, 189 S. W. 182; Green v. Ellis. 465, 47 So. 97; Brinkley v. Taylor, 145 Ga. 241, 88 S. E. 976; Swear- 111 Ark. 305, 163 S. W. 521; engln v. Stafford, — Mo. — , 188 S. Hogan v. Kurtz, 1 MacArth. W. 97; Graves v. Causey, 170 N. C.)135; Williams v. Thomas, 65 C. 175, 86 S. E. 1030; Cockrell v. Iowa, 183, 21 N. W. 509; Munroe Curtis, 83 Tex. 105, 18 S. W. 436. v. Wilson, 68 N. H. 580, 41 Atl. 66. Brinkley v. Taylor, 111 240; Colgan v. Pellens, 48 N. J. Ark. 305, 163 S. W. 521; Sloss- L. 27, 2 Atl. 633; Davis v. Dick- Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Mc- son, 92 Pa. St. 365; Humphreys Cullough, 177 Ala. 272, 59 So. 658; v. Edwards, 89 Tex. 512, 36 S. VV. Frazer v. Frazer, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 333. 593; Moore v. Gulley, 30 Ky. L. 68. Johnson v. Oldham, 126 Rep. 442, 98 S. W. 1011. (See Ala. 309, 28 So. 487, 85 Am. St. Bush v. Fitzgeralds,— Ky.— 125 S. Rep. 30; Dewitt v. Shea, 20.! 111. W. 716); Shoultz v. Lee, 260 Mo. 923, 67 N. E. 761, 96 Am. St. Rep. 719, 168 S. W. 1146; Reed v. 311; Livingston v. Pendergast, Hackney, 69 N. .1. L. 27, 54 Atl. 34 N. H. 544. 229; Larson v. Anderson, 74 Neb. 69. Munroe v. Wilson, 68 N. H. 361, 104 N. W. 92.-); Hall v. Ma- 580, 41 Atl. 240. thias, 4 Watts & S. 331. Contra, 2024 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 513 If, upon the death of a tenant in fee simple, her surviving husband has a life estate in the land, the statute cannot run in his favor as against the .heirs or devisees, since they have no right of entry or actionJ^ If the surviving husband has no estate in the land, whether the statute of limitations will run in his favor depends on whether his possession is to be re- garded as adverse to the heirs. There are decisions to the effect that it is prima facie adverse,'''^ and also decisions to the contrary.'^^ (1) Parent and child. A child who is upon the land of his parent may be there, and frequently is there, as a licensee merely, in which case he is not in possession.'''^ And if he is in possession his jDosses- sion is apt to be permissive merely, the possession of a tenant, and so not adverse to the parent.'^* The child may, however, be in possession purely in his own right, and not as the licensee or tenant of the parent,'''^ as for instance when he holds under an oral gift,"^^ and in such case the statute will ordinarily run in his favor. It has been judicially stated that the relationship of parent and child raises a presumption that the parent's possession of land belonging to the child is 70. Ante, § 506. Hunt v. Hunt, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 71. Pattison v. Dryer, 98 Mich. 175, 37 Am. Dec. 130; O'Bryan v. 564, 57 N. W. 814; Norwood v. Allen, 108 Mo. 227, 32 Am. St. Totten, 166 N. C. 648, 82 S. E. Rep. 595, 18 S. W. 892; Haggard 951. V. Martin, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 34 72. Marshall v. Pierce, 12 N. H. S. W. 660. 127; Jackson v. Cairns, 20 Johns. 75. Lane v. Copley, 1 Root (N. Y.) 301. (Conn.) 68; New Haven Trust 73. See Butler v. Butler, 133 Co. v. Camp, 81 Conn. 539, 71 Ala. 377, 32 So. 579; Wyatt v. Atl. 788; Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Elam, 23 Ga. 201; Hume v. Hop- McCord L. (S. C.) 268, 13 Am. kins, 140 Mo. 65, 41 S. W. 784. Dec. 721. 74. See Ellsworth v. Hale, 33 76. Wilson v. Campbell, 119 Ark. 633; Brettman v. Fischer, Ind. 286, 21 N. E. 893. Cyrus v. 216 111. 142, 74 N. E. 777: Wells Holbrook, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 466, 106 v. Head. 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 170; S. W. 300; Malone v. Malone. 88 § 513] Adverse Possession. 2025 not adverse to the latter."" But it may be questioned whether there is properly any such presumption. The relationship is merely one of the considerations tend- ing to show that the possession is permissive, and the weight to be imputed to this consideration would vary with the age of the child and the other circumstances of the case.'^^ The courts, however, while recognizing that the parent's possession may be adverse to the children,'^'' have occasionally tended to give considerable weight to the relationship as showing the contrary.^*' And they ordinarily hold that the statute does not run in favor of a surviving parent as against liis children, some or all of whom are minors at the time of his entry, he being in such case regarded as upon the land in the capacity of natural guardian or bailiff.^^ (m) Husband and wife. At common law, as be- tween husband and wife, even though one were in the Minn. 418, 93 N. W. 605; Grimes V. Bryan, 149 N. C. 248, 63 S. E. 106. Contra, Boykin v. Smith, 65 Ala. 294. 77. O'Boyle v. McHugh, 66 Minn. 390, 69 N. W. 37; CoUins V. Colleran, 86 Minn. 199, 90 N. W. 390; Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Mc- Cord L. (S. Car.) 268, 13 Am. Dec. 721. 78. See Silva v. Winpenny, 136 Mass. 253; Gifford v. Gifford, 100 Mich. 258, 58 N. W. 1000; AHen V. Allen, 58 Wis. 202. 210, 16 N. W. 610; Dunham v. Townshend, 118 N. Y. 281, 23 N. E. 367; 10 Harv. Law Rev. 376; 24 Harv. Law Rev. 495. 79. McCarty v. Colton, 134 Iowa. 658, 108 N. W. 217; Fox v. Windes, 127 Mo. 502, 48 Am. St. Rep. 648, 30 S. W. 323; Clark V. Lane, 2 N. J. L. 417; Livings- ton V. Pendergast, 34 N. H. 544; Scarboro v. Scarboro, 122 N. C. 234, 29 S. E. 352; Douglas v. Irvine, 126 Pa. 643, 17 Atl. 802. 80. White v. White, 52 Ark. 188, 12 S. W. 201; Reed v. Smith, 125 Cal. 491, 58 Pac. 139; TuUy V. Tully, 137 Oal. 60, 69 Pac. 700; Parker v. Salmons, 101 Ga. 160, 65 Am. St. Rep. 29L 28 S. E. 681; Horn V. Metzger, 234 111. 240, 84 N. E. 893; Kirby v. Kirby, 236 111. 255, 86 N. E. 259; Nugent v. Peterman, 137 Mich. 646, 100 N. W. 895; Allen v. Allen, 58 Wis. 202, 16 N. W. 610. 81. McQueen v. Fletcher, 77 Ga. 444; Wilson v. Sutton,— Ky. — , 154 S. W. 394; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 126 Mich. 217, 85 N. W. 576; Livingston v. Pendergast, 34 N. H. 544; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 14 Ore. 77, 12 Pac. 307; Cook v. Nicholas, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 331; Hall & Mathias, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 331; Clark v. Trindle, 52 Pa. St. 492; Searle v. Laraway, 2U26 Eeal Pkoperty, [§ 513 exclusive occupation of the other's land, the statute could not run, since they were regarded as constituting but one person.^- But in so far as this common-law doc- trine has been altered by modern legislation, there seems to be no reason why the statute should not run in favor of one as against the other, provided the former is in exclusive possession of the other's land, and his possession is hostile or adverse to the other.^^ And there is obviously, after a divorce has taken place, no such identity of persons as can prevent the run- ning of the statute. ^^ When the husband and wife live together on land belonging to the one or the other of them, the pos- session is ordinarily in the one who has the legal title, and the other is in the position of a licensee, and the statute will consequently not run in favor of the latter as against the former.^^ But there are oc- 27 R. I. 557, 65 Atl. 269; Thomas V. Thomas, 2 Kay & J. 79; How- ard V. Shrewsbury, L. R. 17 Eq. 397; In re Hobbs, 36 Ch. Div. 553. 82. See Bell v. Bell, 37 Ala. 536; Skinner v. Hale. 76 Conn. 223; McArthur v. Egleson, 3 Ont. Appr 577. In Cervantes v. Cer- vantes, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 76 S. W. 790, it was decided that the wife's possession was, under the community system there in force, the possession of the husband, so that she could not acquire his property -by adverse possession, even though deserted by him. 83. See Trammel v. Craddock. 93 Ala. 450, 9 So. 815; Lide v. Park, 135 Ala. 131, 93 Am. St. Rep. 17, 33 So. 175; Evans v. Russ. 131 Ark. 335, 198 S. W. 518; Union Oil Co. v. Stewart, 158 Cal. 149. 110 Pac. 313; Warr v. Honeck, 8 Utah, 61, 29 Pac. 1117. 84. Ross v. McCann, 145 Mo. 271, 46 S. W. 955; Ferring v. Fleischman— (Tenn.)— , 39 S. W. 19; Kelly v. Kelly. — Tenn. — , 58 S. W. 870. See House v. Wil- liams, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 122, 40 S. W. 414. 85. Gafford v. Strauss, 89 Ala. 283 7, L. R A. 568, 18 Am. St. Rep. Ill, 7 So. 248; Stiff v. Cobb, 126 Ala. 381, 85 Am. St. Rep. 38, 28 So. 402; Tumlin v. Tumlin, 195 Ala. 457, 70 So. 254; Mauldin V. Cox, 67 Cal. 387, 391, 7 Pac. 264; Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 387, 145 Pac. 516; Green v. Jones, 169 Ky. 146, 183 S. "W. 488; Claughton V. Claughton, 70 Miss. 384, 12 So. 340; Boynton v. Miller, 144 Mo. 681, 46 S. W. 754; Hovorka v. Havlik. 68 Neb. 14, 110 Am. St. Rep. 387, 93 N. W. 990; Springer V. Young, 14 Ore. 280, 12 Pac. 400; Reagle v. Reagle. 179 Pa. St. 89, 36 Atl. 191; Berry v. Wied- § 51o] Advek^e Possession. 2027 casio'nal decisions to the apparent effect that if the wife has color of title to the land, the statute will run in her favor as against the husband, he not asserting his title.^'^ In so far as the legal identit\* of husband and wife is still recognized, it does not seem that the mere fact of the husband's wrongful abandonment of the ^^'ife should enable the wife to acquire title to his land by the statute of limitations,"'" but there are occasional suggestions, judicial and extra judicial, that the fact of desertion may have an effect in this regard,^** apart from that of giving to the wife the possession which, before the departure of the husband, was pre- sumably in him as having the legal title. man, 40 W. Va. 36, 52 Am. St. 87. See McArthur v. Egleson, Rep. 866, 20 S. E. 817. 3 Ont. App. 577; Cervantes v. 86. Hartman v. Nettles, 64 Cervantes — (.Tex. Civ. App.) — , 76 Miss. 495, 8 So. 234; Massey v. S. W. 790. Rimmer, 69 Miss. 667, 13 So. 88. Union Oil Co. v. Stewart, 832; Mcpherson v. McPherson, 75 158 Cal. 149, 110 Pac. 313; Warr Neb. 830, 121 Am. St. Rep. 835, v. Honeck, 8 Utah, 61, 29 Pac. 106 N. W. 991; Potter v. Adams, 1117, (invalid divorce). Editorial 125 Mo. 118, 46 Am. St. Rep. 478, notes, 10 Columbia Law Rev. 28 S. W. 490 isemble). See Mattes 775; 24 Harvard Law Rev. 316. V. Hall, 21 Cal. 352, 132 Pac. 295. CHAPTER XXIV. PRESCRIPTION FOR INCORPOREAL THINGS. § 514. General considerations. 51.5. Restrictions on application of the doctrine. 516. Who may acquire right by prescription. 517. AVhat rights may be acquired by prescription. 518. Actual user necessary. 519. Adverse character of user. 520. Necessity of claim of right. 521. Necessity of notice to landowner. 522. Necessity of exclusive user. 523. Necessity of peaceable user. 524. Necessity of right of action. 525. Continuity of user. 526. Cessation of adverse character. 527. Interruption by landowner. 528. Protests and interference by landowner. 529. Tacking. 530. Personal disabilities. 531. Nature and extent of prescriptive right. 532. Reciprocal prescriptive rights. 533. Prescription for highways. (a) General considerations. (b) User by public necessary. (c) Adverseness of user. (d) Necessity of claim of right. (e) Necessity of notice of user. (f) Continuity of user. (g) Width of highway. § 514. General considerations. Though the Statute of Westminster I., establishing a date back of which the pleader could not go/ applied to actions for the recovery of the land only, and not to those for the recovery of incorporeal tilings, "the judges, with that assumption of legislative authority which has at times 1. Ante, § 500. (2028) <§ 514] Peescription. 2029 characterized our judicature, proceeded to apply the rule as to prescription established b}' the statute to in- corporeal hereditaments, and, among others, to ease- ments. "^ Subsequently, when, by the Statute of 82 Hen. VIII. c. 2, and 21 Jac. I. c. 16, the time for bring- ing a writ of right or a possessory action to recover land was reduced to sixty and twenty years, respec- tiveh% it might have been expected that the judges would as in the case of the earlier act, apply the anal- og}' of these acts to incorporeal things. This, however, it seems, they did not do,"^ but they effected the same end by the adoption of the fiction that a grant of the right would be presumed if it had been exercised for a period of twenty years , this doctrine of a lost grant being in reality prescription, under another name, shortened in analogy to the period of limitation fixed by the Statute of James.* In the case of prescrii)tion, as it existed by analogy to the early statute, the exercise of the right from the date named conferred an unim- peachable title. Whether this presumption of a lost grant, on the other hand, had a like effect, that is, whether it was a conclusive presumption, or could be rebutted by evidence that there was no such grant, is a question on which there was great doubt. In prac- tice it seems to have been the custom for the court to instruct the jury to find the existence of such a grant, even though there was evidence to show that it did not exist. Eventually the Statute of 2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 71 (A. D. 18o2), termed the ''Prescription Act," was 2. Cockburn, C. J., in Angus determining the period of "im- V. Dalton, 3 Q. B. Div. So, 104. memorial user" for the purpose 3. Gale, Easements (8th Ed.), of prescription, see Yard v. P'ord, 191, citing statements to that 2 Wms. Saund. 175, note; Gale, effect in Angus v. Dalton, 4 Q. B. Easements, 190; Coolidge v. Div. at pages 170, 199, per Learned, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 504. Thesiger and Brett, L. J., and in 4. Gale, Easements, 192. See 6 Aipp. Gas. at page 788, per Fry, Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. J. But that the periods fixed (Mass.) 504. by these statutes was applied in 2 R. P.— 53 2030 Real Property. [§ 514 passed, "with the view," it is said, "of putting an end to the scandal on the administration of justice which arose from thus forcing the consciences of juries."^ In this country the courts have usually followed the analogy of the statute of limitations applicable to actions for the recovery of land, with the effect that one who has exercised as of right a user in another's land for the statutory period, is regarded as having a right of user to that extent.^ And while, quite fre- quently, it is said that from such user a grant will be presumed, the presumption is in effect a positive rule of law, and evidence that no grant was made would be immaterial/ In other words, it is conclusively pre- sumed from the landowner's acquiescence for the statu tory period in the other's user of his land, he having the right and power to stop such user, that the user is a rightful user.^ 5. Cockburn, C. J., in Angus V. Dalton, 3 Q. B. 105. And see Bright V. Walker, 1 Cromp. Mees. & Ros. 211, per Parke, B., and editorial note 29 Harv. Law Rev. 88. 6. Legg V. Horn, 45 Conn. 409; Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 504; Melvin v. Whiting, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 295; Mueller v. Fruen, 3 Minn. 273; Carlisle v. Cooper, 19 N. J. Eq. 256; Cobb V. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369; Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 531; Nicholls v. Wentworth, 100 N. Y. 455, 3 N. E. 482; Krier's Private Road, 73 Pa. St. 109. 7. Smith V. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 42 Pac. 453; Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 504; Wallace v. Fletcher, 30 N. H. 434; L6hig;h Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. L. 605; Ward v. Warren, 82 N. Y. 265; Pavey V. Vance, 56 Ohio St. 162, 46 N, E. 898; Okeson v. Patterson, 29 Pa. St. 22; Carter v. Tinicum Fishing Co. 77 Pa. St. 310;; Lewis V. San Antonio, 7 Tex. 288; Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503; Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, Fed Cas. No. 14312. There are suggestions to the contrary in Lanier v. Booth, 50 Miss. 410; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309. 8. See Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 863; Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740, 773, 803, 823; Warren v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 236; Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49, 7 Am. Dec. 188; Cobb V. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369; Wallace v. Fletcher, 30 N. H. 434; Jones v. Crow, 32 Pa. St. 398; Lamb v. Crosland, 4 Rich. Law (S. C.) 536; Dodge v. Stacy, 39 Vt. 559. § 515] Pkescription. 2031 § 515. Restrictions on application of the doctrine. It is generally recognized that no right can be ac- quired by prescription to maintain a public nuisance.^ So it has been decided that there can be no prescriptive right to maintain an obstruction in the highwaj^^" or to poUute a stream to the detriment of the public." In a number of cases, however, it has been decided that one may acquire by prescription a right to use another's land although such use is incidental to the maintenance of a public nuisance.^2 For instance, a prescriptive right to overflow land has been recognized, although the overflow was effected by the maintenance of a dam in 9. Kissel V. Lewis, 156 Ind. 233, 59 N. E. 478; Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 446, 35 Am. Dec. 576; North Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 16 Utah, 246, 40 L. R. A. 851, 67 Am. St. Rep. 607, 52 Pac. 168. See cases cited in note to Leahane v. Cochrane. 53 L. R. A. 891. 10. Pierson v. Elgar, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 454; Harn v. Common Council of Dadeville, 100 Ala. 199, 14 So. 9; Blackman v. Mauldin, 164 Ala. 337, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 670, 51 So. 23 (navi- gable stream); Fresno v. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co., 98 Cal. 179, 32 Pac. 943; Wolfe v. Town of Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331, 32 N. E. 1017; Lewiston v. Booth, 3 Idaho, 692, 34 Pac. 809; Hynea V. Brewer, 194 Mass. 435, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598, 80 N. E. 503; Veazie v. Dwinel, 50 Me. 479 (floatable stream) ; Morton v. Moore, 15 Gray (Mass.) 573; New Salem v. Eagle Mill Co., 138 Mass. 8; Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57; Dead wood v. Hursh, 30 S. D. 450, 138 N. W. 1122. Contra, semble. Moon v. Mills, 119 Mich. 298, 75 Am. St. Rep. 390, 77 N. W. 926; Chase v. Mid- dleton, 123 Mich. 647, 82 N. W. 612. 11. Bowen v. Wendt, 103 Cal 236, 37 Pac. 149; Piatt Bros. v. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 48 L. R. A. 691, 77 Am. St. Rep. 335, 45 Atl. 154; Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1, 40 Am. Rep. 419; Mar- tin V. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183, 29 N. E. 664; Attorney General V. Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 473, Ann. Cas. 1915A 968, 141 N. W. 890; Shelby v. Cleveland Mill & Power Co., 155 N. C. 196, 71 S. E. 218; Owens V. Lancaster, 182 Pa. 257, 37 Atl. 858; North Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S. L. Canal, 16 Utah, 246, 40 L. R. A. 851, 67 Am. St. Rep. 607, 52 Pac. 168. 12. See Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 105 Pac. 748; Felton v. Wedthoff, 185 Mich. 72, 151 N. W. 727; Charnley v. Shawano Water Power & River Improve- ment Co., 109 Wis. 563. G:i L. R. A. 895, 85 N. W. 507. 2032 Eeal Property. [§ 515 a highway, a public nuisance/^ and even though the collection of such a body of stagnant water constituted a public nuisance by reason of exhalations therefrom.^^ But in so far as the owner of the land suffers a special damage in such case from the condition which gives to the structure the character of a public nuisance, he does not, by lapse of time, lose his right to immunity from the nuisance. So while the owner of the flooded land may, by lapse of time, lose the right to object to the flooding of the land, he does not lose the right, as one of the jDublic, to object to the unhealthy exhala- tions caused thereby.^^ If what would otherwise be a public nuisance is legalized by the public authorities it loses its character of a public nuisance, and conse- quently prescription might, it would seem, run as against an individual as regards its maintenance, to the same extent as in the case of any private nuisance.^" In accordance with the maxim nullum tempus oc- currit regi, a right of user cannot be acquired by prescription in land belonging to the United States, ^^ in the absence at least of an act of Congress establish- ing a limitation period as against the government. That a right of user may be acquired by prescription against the state, if the statute of limitation is ex- 13. Borden v. Vincent, 24 Pick. Wis. 417, 122 N. W. 1062. See (Mass.) 301; Lawrence v. In- Comm. v. Upton, 6 Gray (Mass.) habitants of Fairhaven, 5 Gray 473. (Mass.) 110; Inhabitants of New 15. See cases last cited. Salem v. Eagle Mill Co., 138 Mass. 16. See editorial note 9 Col- 8; Perley v. Hilton, 55 N. H. 444; umbia Law Rev. 183; Tiewis v. Charnley v. Shawano Water Pow- New York & H. R. Co., 162 N. er & River Improvement Co. 109 Y. 202 at 223, 56 N. E. 540. Wis. 563, 53 L. R. A. 895, 85 N. 17. Union Mill & Milling Co. W. 507. V. Ferris, Fed Cas. No. 14371, 2 14, Mills V. Hall, 9 Wend. (N. Sawy. 176; Smith v. Hawkins, tlO Y.) 315, 24 Am. Dec. 160; Rhodes Cal. 122, 42 Pac. 453; Lanique v. V. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 84 Am. Morrison, 29 Oal. App. 136, 154 Dec. 631; Green Bay &. Mississippi Pac. 881. Co. V. Teluah Paper Co., 140 "^ 516] Peescription. 2033 pressly made operative as against the state, has been occasionally recogiiized.^^ Since the doctrine of prescription is based in theory upon the presumption of a grant, it can apply only when an actual grant would have been valid.^^ Consequently, it has been held, a right to lateral support from the bed of a street cannot be acquired by prescription, since the municipality has no power to grant such a right,^^ and a right to appropriate water from a canal cannot be based on prescription when it could not have been the subject of a grant.^^ § 516. Who may acquire right by prescription. The common law rule is that a prescriptive right appur- tenant to land can be asserted only in favor of one who has an estate in fee simple in the land, for the benefit of which the user is made, and that if a tenant for life or years undertakes to assert such a right, he must assert it as having been acquired by the ten- ant in fee simple, under whom he claims.-- The right is appurtenant to the land rather than to any particular estate in the land. An easement in gross acquired by prescription, on the other hand, belongs to the per- is. Nichols V. Boston, 98 Miss. Rogue River Packing Co., 51 Ore. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 732; Attorney 237, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 396. 131 General v. Revere Copper Co., Am. St. Rep. 732, 83 Pac. 391, 92 152 Mass. 444, 9 L. R. A. 510. Pac. 1065, 96 Pac. 865; Goodman 25 N. E. 605; People v. Page. 39 v. Saltash Corp. 7 App. Cas. 633; N. Y. App. Div. 110, 56 N. Y. Neaverson v. Peterborough Rural Supp. 834, 58 N. Y. Supp. 239 Council (1902) 1 Ch. 557. (semble). Compare Kirschner v. 20. Quincy v. Jones, 7(1 111. Western & A. R. Co., 67 Ga. 760. 231, 20 Am. Rep. 243. 19. Woodworth v. Raymond, 51 21. Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. Conn. 70; Attorney General v. 57; Rockdale Canal Co. v. Rad- Revere Copper Co., 152 Mass. 444, cliffe, 18 Q. B. 287. 9 L. R. A. 510, 25 N. K. 005; 22. 2 Blackst. Comm. 2*15; God- Brookline v. Mackintosh, 133 dard, Easements (6th Ed.) 218; Mass. 215, 225 (pollution of Perley v. Hilton, 55 N. II. 444; stream); Felton v. Simpson, 11 Smith v. Kinard, 2 Hill L. (S. Tred L. (33 N. C.) 84; Hume v. C.) 642. note. See Wheaton v. 2034: Real 'Peopekty. [§ 517 son who exercised the user during the prescriptive period, and is ordinarily purely personal to him.-^^ That a municipality may acquire by prescription the right to use the land of an individual for a munic- ipal purpose has been recognized,^^ but the user of the land for the prescriptive period by individual in- habitants of the municipality is insufficient to create an easement in favor of the municipality.^* The public cannot, strictly speaking, acquire rights by prescription. Since a grant cannot be made to the public, there is no room for the presumption of a grant in such case. The analogy of prescription has however been freely applied in the case of highways, on the theory that an adverse user of private land by the public for the prescriptive period gives rise to a pre- sumption that the land was dedicated for a highway, and the term prescription is almost invariably used in that connection. The matter of the establishment of a highway by reason of adverse user on the part of the public is discussed at the end of this chapter. § 517. What rights may be acquired by prescrip- tion. A right of way over another's land may be ac- quired by prescription,-^ and the doctrine is perhaps more frequently applied in this connection than in any other. That there were, during the prescriptive period, gates across the way, does not preclude the acquisition Maple & Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 48, Pick. (Mass.) 191; Green v. 63; Ivimey v. Stocker, L. R. 1 Chelsea, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Ch. App. 396; Fear v. Morgan, Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83. (1906) 2 Ch. 406. 25. See, e. g. Cheney v. C'Bri- 22a. Ante, § 350. en, 69 Cal. 199, 10 Pac. 479; 23. Gordon v. Taunton, 126 Everedge v. Alexander, 75 Ga. Mass. 349; Deerfield v. Con- 858; Talbott v. Thorn, 91 Ky. 417, necticut R. R., 144 Mass. 325, 11 16 S. W. 88; Jones v. Percival. N. E. 105; Smith v. Sedalia, 152 5 Pick. (Mass.) 485, 16 Am. Dec. Mo. 283, 48 L. R. A. 711, 53 S. 415; Garnett v. Slater. 56 Mo. ^^ 907. App. 207; Arnold v. Cornman, 50 24. Coram v. Newbury. 2 Pick. Pa. St. 361. (Mass.) 59; Sale v. Pratt, 19 § 517] Pkescription. 2035 of the right,-*' though it may be regarded as tending to show that the user was permissive.^' The right to appropriate the water of a stream in excess of one's natural right may be acquired by pre- scription as against lower riparian proprietors -* The right to dam or obstruct the water of a stream so as to flood the land of another may also be thus acquired,^^ as may the right to pollute the water,"^" or to control or change the flow.^^ One may also acquire by pre- scription the right to maintain an aqueduct,-^- or a 26. Johnson v. Stayton, 5 Harr. (Del.) 448; Smith v. Roath, 238 111. 247, 87 N. E. 414; Moll v. Hagerbaumer, 98 Neb. 555, 153 N. W. 560; Demuth v. Amweg, 90 Pa. St. 181. 27. Post, § 519, note 80. 28. TVler v. Wilkinson, 4 Ma- son, 397, Fed., Cas. No. 14312; Coonradt v. HiU, 79 Cal. 587, 21 Pac. 1099; Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. V. Baldwin, 155 Cal. 280, 100 Pac. 874: Kuhlman v. Hechl, 77 111. 570; Fankboner ". Coid^r 127 Ind. 164, 26 N. E. 766; Barnes V. Haynes, 13 Gray (Mass.) 188, 74 Am. Dec. 629; Whitney v. Wheeler Cotton-Mills, 151 Mas* 396, 7 L. R. A. 613, 24 N. E. 774; Smith v. Putnam, 62 N. H. 369; Shreve v. Voorhees, 3 N. J. Eq. 25; Krier's Private Road, 73 Pa. St. 109; Horn v. MiUer, 142 Pa. St. 557, 21 Atl. 994; Olney v. Fenner, 2 R. I. 211, 57 Am. Dec. 711; Ferrell v. Ferrell, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 329; Boyd v. Woolwine, 40 W. Va. 282. 21 S. E. 1020. 29. Atlanta & B. Air Line Ry V. Wood, 160 Ala. 657. 49 So. 426; Vail v. Mix. 74 111. 127; Wallace v. Winfield, 96 Kan. A5, 149 Pac. 693; Williams v Nel'-on, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 141; Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 128, 15 Am. St. Rep. 243, 38 N. W. 890; Mueller V. Fruen, 36 Minn. 273, 30 N. W. 886; Alcorn v. Sadler, 71 Miss. 634, 42 Am. St. Rep. 484, 14 So. 444; Hammond v. Zehner, 21 N. Y. 118; Emery v. Raleigh & G. R. Co., 102 N. C. 209, 11 Am. St. Rep. 727, 9 S. E. 139; McGeorge V Hoffman, 133 Pa. St. 381, 19 Atl. 413; Shearer v. Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde, 28 S. D. 509, 134 N. W. 63; Haas v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588; Perrin v. Garfield, 37 Vt. 304. 30. Crossley v. Lightowler. 2 Ch. App. 478; Crosby v. Bessey, 49 Me. 539; Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335; Gladfelter v. Walker, 40 Md. 1; Jones v. Crow, 32 Pa. St. 398. 31. Brace v. Yale, 10 Allen (Mass.) 441; Dyer v. Cranston Print Works Co., 22 R. I. 506, 48 Atl. 791. 32. Churchill v Louie. 1X5 Cal. 608, 67 Pac. 1052; Frederick v. Dickey, 91 Cal. 358, 27 Pac. 742; Watkins v. Peck. 13 N. H. 370; Coventon v. Seufert, 23 Ore. 548, 32 Pac. 508; French Hoek v. Hugo, L. R. 10 App. Cas. 336. 2036 Eeal Property. [§ 517 drain,^^ over another's land and likewise the right to discharge drainage thereon.^'* One may, it has been held, acquire by prescription a right to take seaweed from another's land,^^ or a right to fish thereon.^^ Likewise a prescriptive right to take water,^"^ or ice,^* from another's land has been recognized. A profit a prendre can, however, it has been said, be acquired by prescription only as appur- tenant to a dominant tenement or, as it is technically expressed, the party must prescribe in a que estate.-^" Among other prescriptive rights which have been judicially recognized are the right to have a division fence maintained by the owner of adjoining land,^'' the 33. Alderman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 137, 18 L. R. A. (N. S) 74, 70 Atl. 626; Earl v. De Hart, 12 N. J. Eq. 280, 72 Am. Dec. 395; Beasley v. Engstrom, 31 Idaho, 14, 168 Pac. 1145; Pyott V. State, 170 Ind. 118, 83 N. E. 737; Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa, 121, 152 N. W. 26; White v. Chapin, 12 Allen (Mass.) 516; Shaughnessey v. Leary, 162 Mass. 108, 38 N. E. 197; McCracken v. MacNeal, 169 Mich. 414, 135 N. W. 461; Ramsdale v. Foote, 55 Wis. 557, 13 N. W. 557; Wilkins V. Nicolai, 99 Wis. 178, 74 N. W. 103. 34. Cotton V. Pocasset Mfg. Co., 13 Mete. (Mass.) 429; Chapel V. Smith. 80 Mich. 100, 45 N. W. 69; Seigmund v. Tyner, 52 Ind. App. 581, 101 N. E. 20; Peacock v. Stinchcomb, 189 Mich. 301, 155 N. W. 349. 35. HiH V. Lord, 48 Me. 83. 36. Turner v. Hebron, 61 Conn. 175, 14 L. R. A. 386, 22 Atl. 951; Melvin v. Whiting, 10 Pick-. (Mass.) 295, 20 Am. Dec. 524, IS Pick. (Mass.) 188; McFarlin v. Essex Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 304; Cobb V. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369. Compare Tinicum Fishing Co. V. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21. 37. Rollins v. Blackden, 112 Me. 459, Ann. Cas. 1917A 875, 92 Atl. 521; Kennedy v. Niles Water Supply Co., 173 Mich. 474, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836, 139 N. W. 241; Fraser v. Nerney, 89 Vt. 257, 95 Atl. 501; Mason v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1158, 108 Pac. 608. There may be a prescriptive right to take water from another's aqueduct. Cole v. Bradbury, 86 Me. 380, 29 Atl. 1097; Kearney v. Westchester, 199 Pa. 392, 49 Atl. 227. 38. Hoag V. Place, 93 Mich. 450, 18 L. R. A. 39, 53 N. W. 617; Hinckel v. Stevens, 35 N. Y. App. Div. 5, 54 N. Y. Supp. 457. 39. Grimstead v. Marlowe, 4 Term Rep. 717; Merwin v. Wheel- er, 41 Conn. 14; Beach v. Morgan, 67 N. H. 529, 68 Am. St. Rep. 692. 41 Atl. 349; Washburn, Ease- ments (4th Ed.) 18. 40. Castner v. Riegel, 54 N- § 517] Pkescription. 2037 right to conduct on one's land a business which pollutes the atmosphere, to the injury of the land adjoining/ ^ the right to extend eaves of a roof, or a cornice, or other part of a building, over another's land."- the right to maintain gates or other structures on a private way,*3 the right to stand horses and carriages on an- other's land,^^ the right to turn one's horses on an- other's land in ploughing,^^ the right to attach a sign to another's building,^« the right to maintain an air shaft through another's property,"'" the right to use another's property for a ferry landing.*^ There are, on the other hand, some easements which cannot be acquired by prescription, owing to the fact that the owmer of the land is not in a position to prevent the exercise of the user claimed, or to sue on account thereof, and consequently the fact that he does not do so is no evidence of acquiescence on his part. On this principle it has been decided that the appropria- tion of an excessive quantity of water from a water- J. L. 498, 24 Atl. 484; Bronson has been decided, can give no V. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 11 Am. right to have branches of trees Rep. 335; Adams v. Van Alstyne, overhang adjoining land, in view 25 N. Y. 232. of the constant change incident 41. Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 to growth. Lemmon v. Webb, Ch. Div. 852; Dana v. Valentine, (1894) 3 Ch. 1. 5 Mete. (Mass.) 8. 43. Goodwin v. Bragaw, 87 42. Norwalk Heating & Light- Conn. 31, 86 Atl. 668; Moon v. ing Co. V. Vernam, 75 Conn. 662, MiUs, 119 Mich. 298, 75 Am. St. 96 Am. St. Rep. 246, 55 Atl. 168; Rep. 390, 77 N. W. 926; Ailes v. Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1; Mat- Hallam, 69 W. Va. 305, 71 S. E. thys V. First Swedish Baptist 273. Church of Boston, 223 Mass. 544, 44. Trauger v. Sassnian, 14 Pa. 112 N. E. 228; Grace Methodist St. 514. Episcopal Church v. Dobbins, 153 45. .Tones v. Percival, 5 Pick. Pa. St. 294, 34 Am. St. Rep (Mass.) 485, 16 Am. Dec. 415. 706, 25 Atl. 1120; Sorkin v. Sent- 46. Moody V. Steggles, 12 Ch. man, 162 Pa. St. 543. 29 Atl. Div. 261. 722. So there may be a presrrip- 47. Bass v. Gregory, 25 Q. B. tive right to have vessels overlap d. 481. another's wharf. Wellington v. 48. Clark v. White, 5 Pi:sl5, Cambridge, 220 Mas-i. 312, 107 353; Bird v. Smith. 8 Watts (Pa.) N. E. 976. But prescription, ;t 434, 34 Am. Dec. 488. 2038 Real Peopeety, [§ 517 course for the statutory period by a lower riparian proprietor does not give him any right to continue such appropriation as against an upper proprietor who may thereafter desire to use water therefrom, since the lat- ter had no means of preventing such excessive appro- priation other than appropriating the water himself.'*^ One cannot acquire by prescription a right to water percolating from other land to his land, since the owner of the land from which it percolates is not in a position to prevent its percolation.'^*^ Nor can the owner of a lower tenement acquire by length of user, as against the upper tenement, a right to the flow of surface water.^^ So, the owner of the upper tenement, who has no natural right to have surface water flow from his land on the lower tenement, cannot acquire such right by the fact that the owner of the latter does not prevent such flow until the prescriptive period has elapsed, since such flow gives no right of action.'^ 49. Sampson v. Hoddinott, 1 C. B. N. S. 590; Stockport Water- works Co. V. Potter, 3 Hurl & C. 300; Walker v. Lillingston, 137 Cal. 401, 70 Pac. 282; Miller & Lux V. Enterprise Canal & Land Co., 169 Cal. 415, 147 Pac. 567; Parker v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn o21; Thurber v. Martin, 2 Gray (Mass.) 394; Pratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen (Mass.) 275, 288; Crawford V. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 60 L. R. A. 889, 108 Am. St. Rep. 647, 93 N. W. 781; Davis v. Chamber- lain, 51 Ore. 304, 98 Pac. 154; Mud Greek Irr. Agr. & Mfg. Co. V. Vivian, 74 Tex. 170, 11 S. W. 1078; Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 104 Am. St. Rep. 927, 56 Atl. 1106. See note to 93 Am. St. Rep. at p. 717. But one's ability to acquire a prescriptive ''ght to divert water from a stream at a certain point is not affected by the fact that he owns riparian land lower down on the stream. Dontanello v. Gust, 86 Wash. 268, 150 Pac. 420. 50. Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349; Hanson v. Mc- Cue, 42 Cal. 303, 10 Am. Rep. 299; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 52 Am. Dec. 352; Elster v. Francis, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117; Village of Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 316; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294; Elster V. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82, 30 N. E. 274; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528, 64 Am. Dec. 721; Wheelock v. Jacobs, 70 Vt. 162, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 105, 67 Am. St. Rep. 626, 40 Atl. 51. 51. Wood V. Waud, 3 Exch. 748; Greatrex v. Hay ward, 8 Exch. 291; Broadbent v. Rams- botham, 11 Exch. 602. 52. Parks v. City of Newbury- § 517] Prescription. 2039 Where the civil-law rule, giving the proprietor of the upper tenement a natural right to have his surface water flow off on the lower tenement, controls, he may lose this right by submitting to the obstruction of such flow for the prescriptive period/"*'^ In case tho owner of the upper tenement causes the water to flow on the lower tenement in a particular channel, the lower pro- prietor can prevent such action, and consequently his failure so to do may be regarded as acquiescence there- in, which confers the right if continued for the statutory period.^* One cannot, in this country, by the maintenance of windows in one's building overlooking adjacent land for the statutory period, acquire an easement of light and air in such land, since this involves no injury to the land, or diminution of the value of the beneficial interest therein, and consequently gives no right of action to the landowner.^^ Likewise, the right of sup- port for a building by another building or by adjacent land cannot, by the weight of authority in this country, be acquired by prescription, since not only is the exercise of the right not one which causes injury to the port, 10 Gray (Mass.) 28; White 55. Western Granite & Marble V. Chapin, 12 Allen (Mass.) 516; Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. Swett V. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 9 111, 37 Pac. 192; Guest v. Rey- Am. Rep. 276. Compare Ross v. nolds, 68 111. 478, 18 Am. Rep. Mackeney, 46 N. J. Eq. 140, 18 570; Lahere v. Luckey, 23 Kan. Atl. 685. 534; Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 53. Zerban v. Erdman, 258 111. 436, 46 Am. Dec. 573; Keats v, 486, 101 N. E. 925; Tootle v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 15 Am. Rep. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247, 10 Am. 80; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. Rep. 732; Louisville & N. Ry. Co. (N. Y.) 309; Mullen v. Strieker, V. Mossman, 90 Tenn. 157, 25 Am. 19 Ohio St. 135, 2 Am. Rep. 379; St. Rep. 670, 16 S. W. 64. Plaverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. St. 54. Moody v. Fremd, 177 Ky. 368; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. 5, 197 S. W. 433; White v. Law (S. C.) 311; Hubbard v. Chapin, 12 Allen (Mass.) 516; Town, 33 Vt. 295; Powell v. Sinia. Schnitzius v. Bailey, 48 N. J. 5 W. Va. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 629. Eq. 409, 22 Atl. 732; Glenn v. Contra, Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Line, 155 Mich. 608, 119 N. W. Del. Ch. 643. 1097. 2040 Eeal Pkopebty. [§ 518 supporting land or building, but the dependence of a building on such support is a fact which is in most cases not discoverable until the support is withdrawn."'^ In England, on the other hand, the right of support may be thus acquired.^''^ There are several decisions in this country that a right in the use of a party wall may be acquired by prescription,^^ but this view, while clearly correct when it involves the placing of beams or other parts of a building in or on a wall upon adjoining land,^'' is, it seems, in other cases, not involving any occupation of the space above such land, not reconcilable with the principle that the user, to be adverse, must be action- able,^" nor with the decisions above referred to, that a right of support for buildings from adjoining land or buildings cannot be acquired by prescription. § 518. Actual user necessary. In order that the doctrine of prescription may operate in one's favor he must have actually used the land of another and the mere assertion of a right to use it is insufficient.®^ 56. Richart v. Scott, 7 Watts 614; Weadock v. Champe, 193 (Pa.) 460; MitcheU v. City of Mich. 553, Ann. Cas. 1918C 874, Rome, 49 Ga. 19, 15 Am. Rep. 160 N. W. 564; McVey v. Durkin, 669; Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 136 Pa. St. 418, 20 Atl. 541; 1, 56 Am. Rep. 581; Handlan v. First Nat. Bank of Wichita FaUs McManus, 42 Mo. App. 551; Sul- v. Zundelowitz, — Tex. Civ. App. livan V. Zeiner, 98 Cal. 346. See — , 168 S. W. 40. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 59. As in Barry v. Edlavitch, 199, 207. But see City of Quincy 84 Md. 95, 33 L. R. A. 294, 35 V. Jones, 76 111. 231, 20 Am. Rep. Atl. 170; McLaughlin v. Cecconi, 243; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige 141 Mass. 252, 5 N. E. 261. (N. Y.) 169, 25 Am. Dec. 524. 60. See Whiting v. Gaylord, 57. Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. 66 Conn. 337, 50 Am. St. Rep. Cas. 740; Lemaitre v. Davis, 19 87. 34 Atl. 85. Ch. Div. 281. 61. Peterson v. McCullough, 50 58. Bright' v. J. Bacon & Sons, Incl. 35; Gibson v. Fischer, 68 131 Ky. 848. 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) Iowa, 29, 25 N. W. 914; Fox 386, 116 S. W. 268 (dictum) Dowling V. Hennings, 20 Md. 179 Brown v. Werner, 40 Md. 15 Schile V. Brokhahus, 80 N. Y, River Flour & Paper Co. v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 287, 35 N. W. 744, § 519] Prescription. 2041 It has occasionally been asserted that no right of user can be acquired by prescription unless the user was, during the prescriptive period, actually beneficial to the person exercising it."- In some of these cases the question was as to the acquisition of the right to divert water from a stream, and the assertion of the requirement of beneficial user involved merely the application to the case of prescription of a require- ment recognized in those jurisdictions in connection with the law of prior appropriation.'"''^ "Since a right of appropriation cannot be held without beneficial use, one pretending to be an app'ropriator has no color of title w^ithout beneficial use."*^^ However, the pro- priety of such a requirement of beneficial use as an element of prescription even in those states has been questioned.*^^ And, generally speaking rhe in- troduction of any additional requirements as to the characteristics of the user necessary for the purpose of prescripfion is to be deprecated, as adding to the existing complexity of the subject. § 519. Adverse character of user. In order that a right to use another's land be acquired by (lie user thereof for the statutory period, the user must be hos- tile or adverse to the owner of the land."*' 62. LouisviUe & N. R. Co. v. 64. Wiel, Water Rights in the Hays, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 382, 47 Am. Western States (2nd Ed.), § 247. Rep. 291; Simons v. Munch, 115 65. 93 Am. St. Rep. note to Minn. 360, 132 N. W. 321, and Oregon etc. Co. v. Allen, at cases cited in next note. p. 720; Wiel, Water Rights, § 63. Senior v. Anderson, 115 247. Cal. 496, 47 Pac. 454; 130 Cal. 66. Humphreys v. Blasingame. 290, 62 Pac. 563; California Pas- 104 Cal. 40, 37 Pac. 804; Dexter toral & Agricultural Co. v. Medera v. Tree, 117 111. 532, b N. K. Canal & Irrigation Co., 167 Cal. 506; Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 74; 78, 138 Pac. 718; Lavery v. Arn- Chollar Potosi Min. Co. v. Ken- old, 36 Ore. 84, 57 Pac. 907; nedy, 3 Nev. 361, 93 Am. Dec. Oregon, etc. Co. v. Allen, 41 Ore. 409; Pavey v. Vance, 56 Ohio St. 209, 93 Am. St. Rep. 701, 69 Pac. 162, 46 N. E. 898; Pierre v. 455; Cleary v. Daniels, —Utah, Cloud, 42 Pa. St. 102, 82 Am. Dec. — , 167 Pac. 820. 496; Kearney y. Borough of West 2042 Real Pkopeety. [§ 519 The courts usually refrain from an explicit state- ment of what they mean by adverse user in this con- nection, but it appears reasonably safe to say that a user is adverse if not accompanied by any recognition, in express terms or by implication, of a right in the landowner to stop such user now or at some time in the future. The recognition of the landowner's right to put an end to the user precludes any presumption, from his failure to assert such right, that no such right exists. That the user of the land is under permission or license from the owner of the land shows, it is generally recognized, that the user is not adverse.^'^ Such a user evidently involves a recognition of the land- owner's right to stop it now^ or in the future, and in view of such recognition, no inference can be drawn from his failure actually to stop it. But a user which Chester, 199 Pa. St. 392, 49 Atl. 227. 67. Stewart v. White, 128 Ala. 202, 55 L. R. A. 211, 30 So. 526; Medlock v. Owen, 105 Ark. 460, 151 S. W. 995; Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 12 Pac. 491; Cassin v. Cole, 153 Cal. 677, 96 Pac. 277; Lamhe v. Man- ning, 171 111. 612, 49 N. E. 509; Anchor v. Stewart, 270 111. 57, 110 N. E. 385; Conner v. Wood- fill, 126 Ind. 85, 22 Am. St. Rep. 568, 25 N. E. 876; Sexton v. Holt, 91 Kan. 26, 136 Pac. 934; Dris- coll V. Morehead, 147 Ky. 107, 143 S. W. 758; Morse v. Williams, 62 Me. 445; Kilburn v. Adams, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; Moore v. Bulgreen, 153 Mich. 261, 116 N. W. 1005; Lanier v. Booth, 50 Miss. 410; Dulce Realty Co. V. Staed Realty Co., 245 Mo. 417, 151 S. W. 415; Crawford V. Minnesota & M. Land & Im- provement Co., 15 Mont. 153, 38 Pac. 713; Bone v. James, 82 Neb. 442, 118 N. W. 83; Howard V. Wright, 38 Nev. 25, 143 Pac. 1184; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; Wiseman v. Luck- singer, 84 N. Y. 31, 38 Am. Rep. 479; Lincoln v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 26 N. D. 504, 144 N. W. 713; Wimer v. Simmons, 27 Ore. 1, 50 Am. St. Rep. 685; Zerbey V. Allan, 215 Pa. 383. 64 Atl. 587; Turnbull v. Rivers, 3 McCord L. (S. C.) 131, 15 Am. Dec. 622; Turner v. South & West Improve- ment Co., 118 Va. 720, 88 S. E. 85; Whaley v. Jarrett, 69 Wis. 613, 2 Am. St. Rep. 764, 34 N. W. 727. But Frederic v. Mayers, 89 Miss. 127, 43 So. 677 appears to assert, in an obscure way, that a revocable license becomes ir- revocable after the prescriptive period has passed. It has been decided that the § 519] Pbesckiption. 2043 is permissive in its inception may become adverse by the action of the person exercising the user in denying the right of the landowner to interfere with the user, provided notice of such denial is brought home to the landowner,*^^ When the owner undertakes to confer upon another a perpetual right of user in the land, but fails to do so in a valid manner, as when he makes an oral grant of an easement, the user of the land by such other in ac- cordance with the terms of the invalid grant cannot be regarded as permissive and in subordination to the rights of the lando^vner, but is in effect adverse to such rights.^^ Such a case is analogous to that of the possession of land under an invalid conveyance user is not adverse if it was under permission, although the person giving permission was a tenant who had no authority to give permission. Williamson v. Abbott, 107 S. C. 397, 93 S. E. 15. This appears to be entirely reasonable. That payment to the land owner of an annual sum in connection with the user justifies an inference that it is permis- sive, see Gardner v. Hodgson's Kingston Breweries Co. (1903) App. Cas. 229; O'Brien's Appeal, 11 Wkly Notes Cas. (Pa.) 229. 68. Barbour v. Pierce, 42 Cal. 657; Hill v. Hagaman, 84 ind. 287; McAllister v. Pickup, 84 Iowa, 65, 50 N. W. 556; Patterson V. Griffith,— (Ky.)—, 62 S. W. 884; Pitzman v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387, 33 Am. St. Rep. 536, 19 S. W. 1104; Hurst v. Adams, 86 Mo. App. 73; Taylor v. Gerrish, 59 N. H. 569; Eckerson v. Crippen, 110 N. Y. 585, 1 L. R. A. 487. IS N. E. 443; Huston v. Bybee. 17 Ore. 140, 2 L. R. A. 568. 20 Pac. 51; Thoemke v. Fiedler, 91 Wis. 386, 64 N. W. 1030; Weidensteiner V. Mally, 55 Wash. 79, 104 Pac. 143. 69. Oneto v. Restano. 78 Cal. 374, 20 Pac. 743; Myers v. Berven. 166 Cal. 484, 137 Pac. 260; Gyra v. Winler, 40 Colo. 366, 13 Ann. Cas. 841, 91 Pac. 36; Legg v. Horn, 45 Conn. 415; Alderman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 337, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 74, 70 Atl. 626; McKenzie v. Elliott, 134 HI. 156. 24 N. E. 965; Schmidt v. Brown, 226 111. 590, 80 N. E. 1071; Parish V. Kaspare, 109 Ind. 586, 10 N. E. 109; Shimanek v. Chicago. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. —(Iowa),— 152 N. W. 574; Talbott v. Thorn, 91 Ky. 417, 16 S. W. 88; Oak Grove Missionary Baptist Church v. Rice, 162 Ky. 525. 172 S. W. 927; Jewett v. Hussey, 70 Me. 433; Stearns v. Janes, 12 Allen (Mass.) 582; Sanford v. Kern, 223 Mo. 616, 122 S. W. 1051; Wells v. Parker, 74 N. H. 193, 66 Atl. 121. Hearrl v Bowcn.- Tex Civ Apr. — , 184 S. W. 234; Holm v. 2044 Beal Peoperty. [§ 519 thereof, which is ordinarily adverse to the grantor.'^ The user of the land under such circumstances in- volves no recognition of any right as remaining in the grantor. The user of one piece of land for the benefit of another piece cannot be adverse so long as both are in the possession of the same person, since in such case whatever user is made of either by the person in possession is to be imputed to the fact of possession."*^" A tenant under a lease cannot, it has been decided, acquire by prescription a right in land, near the de- mised premises, which also belongs to the landlord, whether this neighboring land is or is not in the pos- session of a tenant under a lease. '''^ Since the right Davis, 41 Utah, 200, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 89, 125 Pac. 403; J-e-hman V. Mills, 46 Wash. 624, 13 L,. R A. (N. S.) 990, 13 Ann. Cas. 923, 91 Pac. 11. Contra, semhle, Wise- man V. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31, 38, Am. Rep. 479; Long v. May- berry, 96 Tenn. 378, 36 S. W. 1040. 70. Ante § 513(e), note 20. 70a. Battishill v. Read, 18 C. B. 696; Onley v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 496; Damper v. Bassett (1901) 2 Ch. 350; Outram v. Maude, 17 Ch. Div. 391, 405; Barker v. Mobile Elec. Co., 173 Ala. 28, 55 So. 364; Hickox v. Parmelee, 21 Conn. 86; Broom v. Gizzard, 136 Ga. 297, 71 S. E. 430; Williams v. Deskins, 179 Ky. 61, 200 S. W. 1; Pierce v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436. 46 Am. Dec. 573; Murphy v. Welch, 128 Mass, 489; Vossen v. Dautel, 116 Mo. 379, 22 S. W. 734; Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 21 N. J. L. 133, 47 Am. Dec. 156; Stevens v. Den- nett, 51 N. H. 324; Wells v. Parker, 74 N H. 193, 66 Atl. 121; Phillips v. PhiUips, 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577; Payne v. WiUiams, 2 Spears L. (S. C.) 15; Crosland v. Rogers, 32 S. C. 130; Sasman v. Collins,— (Tex. Civ. App.), 115 S. W. 337; Mable V. Matteson, 17 Wis. 1; In Franz V. Mendonca, 131 Cal. 205, 63 Pac. 361, it is said that the user continues to be adverse although the same person is in possession under leases of both properties. This is, it is submitted, erro- neous. See also Gerstner v, Payne,— (Mo. App.)—, 142 S. W. 794, and Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844, 139 S_. W. 1098, criticized in editorial note, 10 Mich. Law Rev. 236. 71. Gayford v. Moffatt, 4 Ch. App. 133; Kilgour v. Gaddes, (1904) 1 K. B. 457; Kuhlmau V. Hecht, 77 111. 570; Brown v. Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 75 Atl. 382; Vossen v. Dautel, 116 Mo. 379, 22 S. W. 734; Stevens v. Dennett, 51 N. H. 324; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. St. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577. § 519] Presckiption. 2045 would be acquired by the tenant as appurtenant to the land itself, and so for the benefit of his landlord,'^ it would result that the landlord would acquire a right of user against himself, an easement in his own land, a legal impossibility. And moreover the fact that the user of land is made in connection with other land which he holds under a lease from the peroon who owns both pieces of land is sufficient in itself to show that the user is permissive merely. Since it is the recognition of a riaht in the land- owner to put an end to the user which deprives the user of the element of adverseness, and such recogni- tion is in its nature an affirmative fact, the burden of proof in reference thereto is properly on the landowner, that is, in the absence of e^ddence to the contrary, the user of another's land is ordinarily presumed to be adverse. ''■^ If evidence to the contrary is introduced, the question of the character of the user is obviously one of fact,'^^ and the burden of proof, in the sense of 72. Ante, § 516, note 22. 73. Polly V. McCali, 37 Ala. 20; Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 28, 87 Pac. 908; Cheda v. South- ern Pac. Co.,— (Cal.)— , 134 Pac. 717; Mitchell v. Bain 142 Ind. 604, 42 N. E. 230; Smith v. Ponsford, 184 Ind. 53, 13 N. E. 194; Stewart v. Brumley, — (Ky.) — , 119 S. W. 798; Bordes v. Leece, 179 Ky. 655, 201 S. W. 4; Cox V. Forrest, 60 Md. 74; Barnes v. Haynes, 13 Gray (Mass.) 188; White v. Chapin, 12 Allen (Mass.) 516; Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Valley City Milling Co., 194 Mich. 234, 160 N. W. 648; Novinger v. Shoop, — Mo. — , 201 S. W. 64; Moll V. Hagerbaumer, 98 Neb. 555, 153 N. W. 560; Smith v. Putnam, 62 N. H. 369; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N. J. L. 675, 48 Atl. 567; Ham- mond V. Zehner, 21 N. Y. 118; American Bank-Note Co. v. New York El. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 252, 29 N. E. 302; Pavey v. Vance, 56 Ohio St. 162, 46 N. E. 898; Gardner v Wright, 49 Ore. 609. 91 Pac. 286; Steffey v. Carpenter, 37 Pa. 41; Slater v. Price, 96 S. C. 245, 80 S. E. 372; Dodge v. Stacy, 39 Vt. 558; Muncy v. Up- dyke, 119 Va. 6.'{6, 89 S. E. 884: Lechman v. Mills, 46 Wash. 624, 91 Pac. 11, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 990, 13 Am: Cas. 923; Hawkins V. Conner, 75 W. Va. 220, 83 S. E. 982; Carmody v. Mulrooney, 87 Wis. 552, 58 N. W. 1109. 74. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 12 Pac. 491; Humphreys V. Blasingame, 104 Cal. 40, 37 Pac. 804; Hill v. Crosby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 466, 13 Am. Dec. 448; Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Wiggln, 209 2 R. P. 2046 Real Propeety. [§ 519 risk of lion persuasion of the jury,^^ is, as regards the adverse character of the user as well as the other elements of prescription, upon the person asserting the prescriptive right. '** While ordinarily, as ahove stated, the user of another's land is presumed to he adverse, such a presumption does not exist, it seems, in the case of unenclosed land or, as it may be otherwise expressed, evidence that the land is unenclosed is sufficient to rebut the presumption."' And it has been decided that when one throws his land open to the use of the public, or of his neighbors generally, a user thereof by a neighboring landowner, however frequent, will be presumed to be permissive and not adverse, in the ab- sence of any attendant circumstances indicative of the contrary."^^ And it has been said that if the proprie- Mass. 542, 95 N. E. 938; Burn- ham V. McQuesten, 48 N. H. 446; Iselin V. Starin, 144 N. Y. 453, 39 N. E. 488; Bennett v. Biddle, 140 Pa. 396, 21 Atl. 363. 75. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2485. 76. District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 45 L. Ed. 440; Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 66 Pac. 10; Barlow v. Frink, 171 Cal. 165, 152 Pac. 290; Shea V. Gavitt, 89 Conn. 359, L. R. A. 1916 A, 689, 94 Atl. 360; Rollins V. Blackden, 112 Me. 459, 92 Atl. 521; Smith v. Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 48 L. R. A. 711, 53 S. W. 907; Barber v. Bailey, 86 Vt. 219, 84 Atl. 608, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98; St. Martin v. Skamania Boom Co.. 79 Wash. 393, 140 Pac. 355; Crosier v. Brown, 66 W. Va. 273, 25 L. R. A. N. S. 174, 66 S. E. 326. 77. Card v. Cunningham, — Ala.—, 74 So. 335; Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 66 Pac. 10; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Stewart, 265 111. 35, 106 N. E. 512 (unen- closed and unoccupied); Bowman V. Wickliffe, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 84; Conyers v. Scott, 94 Ky. 123, 21 S. W. 530, (But see Hansford v. Berry, 95 Ky. 56, 23 S. W. 665); Winlock V. Miller, 167 Ky. 717, 181 S. W. 330 (unenclosed wood- land); Downing v. Benedict, 147 Ky. 8, 143 S. W. 756; Donnell v. Clark, 19 Me. 174; Davidson v. Nantz, 177 Ky. 50, 197 S. W. 520; Gibson v. Durham, 3 Rich. L. 85; Hutto V. Tindall, 6 Rich. L. 396; Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 Pac. 843, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941. Contra, in Pennsylvania and West Virginia Worrall v. Rhoads, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 427; Walton v. Knight, 62 W. Va. 223, 58 S. E. 1025. The Pannsylvania act of 1850 provides, however, that no right of way shall be acquired by prescription over unenclosed woodland. 78. Kilburn v. Adams, 7 Met. (Mass.) 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; ^ 519] Prescription, 2047 tors of churches, school houses and other qu(i After a right of way has been established along a certain line on the basis of prescriptive user of the servient tenement along that line, it cannot be changed by the person entitled thereto to another lino,^'^'' though such person may, it has been decided, deviate from the original line, in case of an obstruction by the land- owner.^'^'' In the case of a right of way appurtenant to certain land by prescription, as in that of one by grant, the way cannot be used for the purpose of going to or from other land beyond.^*'^ In the case of an easement to use a wall on an- other's land as a party wall, based on prescription, it being limited by the extent of the use during the pre- scriptive period, the one entitled to the easement has no privilege of raising the wall,*'''^ or, if it is raised by its owner, of using the additional part.^^® It would seem that when two adjoining owners acquire by pre- scription mutual party wall rights as regards a wall erected on the division line, the same rule would apply, so that neither could raise the wall as a whole with- out the other's consent. 362; Williams v. James, L. R. 80d. Welford v. Gerard, 108 2 C. P. 577; Atwater v. Bod- Ky. 322, 56 S. W. 416; Bright v. fish, 11 Gray 150. J. Bacon & Sons, 131 Ky. 848. 80. Baldwin v. Boston & M. 116 S. W. 268, 20 L. R. A. (N. R. R. 181 Mass. 166, 63 N. E. S.) 386; McLaughlin v. Cecconi 428. 141 Mass. 252, 5 N. E. 261; 80a. Nichols v. Peck, 70 Conn. Bright v. Allan, 203 Pa. 294, 93 439, 66 Am. St. Rep. 122, 40 L. Am St. Rep. 769, 53 Atl. 251. R. A. 81, 39 Atl. 803; Vance v. 80e. Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Adams (Ky.) 112 S. W. 927. Md. 95, 35 Atl. 170; Bright v. 80b. Haley v. Concord, 59 N. Morgan, 218 Pa. 178, 11 Ann. H. 9, 47 Am. Rep. 176. Gas. 708, 67 Atl. 210; Brown & 80c. Williams v. James, L. R. Hamilton Co. v. Johnson, 251 Pa. 2 C. P. 577. See ante § 350. 378, 96 Atl. 823. 2074 Real, Property. [§ 531 A right which was regularly, during the prescrip- tive period, exercised only during a certain season of the year, can, after such period, be exercised only at that season.*^^ A prescriptive riglit to divert water from a stream has been regarded as independent of the use to which the water may be put after diversion,^^ ]yy^i ^ g^b- stantial increase in the amount diverted would ordi- narily not be permissible.^^ A prescriptive right to maintain an aqueduct through another's land has been regarded as limited to the amount of water conducted 81. Cowell V. Thayer, 5 Mete (Mass.) 253, 38 Am. Dec. 400 Griffin v. Bartlett, 55 N. H. 119 Davis V. Brigham, 29 Me. 391 Swan V. Munch, 65 Minn. 500, 67 N. W. 1022, 35 L. R. A. 743; Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N. J. Eq. 576; Hall v. Augsbury, 46 N. Y. 622; Gardner v. Wright, 49 Ore. 609, 91 Pac. 286; Cleary v. Daniels,— Utah— , 167 Pac. 820. 82. Luttrel's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 86; Gallaher v. Montecito Valley Water Co., 101 Cal. 242, 35 Pac. 770; Walton Cranberry Co. v. Seamon, 171 Mich. 98, 137 N. W. 147. Compare Mastenbrook v. Alger, 110 Mich. 414, 68 N. W. 213; Scranton Gas & Water Co. V. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 240 Pa. 604, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 710, 88 Atl. 24. 83. S. O. & C. Co. V. Ansonia Water Co., 83 Conn. 611, 78 Atl. 432; Stock v. Hillsdale, 155 Mich. 375, 119 N. W. 435; Irv- ing V. Borough of Media, 194 Pa. 648, 45 Atl. 482. In Michigan while it was de- cided that a prescriptive right to take water from a lake was lim- ited to the amount diverted dur- ing the prescriptive period (Stock V. Hillsdale, 155 Mich. 375, 119 N. W. 435) it was later decided by a majority of four judges to three, that the extent of such a right was to be measured not by the amount taken, but the level resulting from the taking, and that consequently the pipe could not be lowered as the level became lower. (Kennedy V Niles Water Supply Co., 173 Mich. 474, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836, 149 N. W. 241. In Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342, it was decided that a non riparian owner who diverted one third of the total flow of the stream dur- ing the prescriptive period, had no right to claim, upon a diminu- tion of the total flow, a right to more than one third, that is, a right to the same number of cubic feet per second as he en- joyed during the prescriptive period. In Tinker v. Bessel, 213 Mass. 74, 99 N. E. 946, it appears to be held that a prescriptive right ^^o take water from a spring is to be measured by the user which was apparent to the landowner. It has been said, as regards § 532] Pkesckiption. 2075 through it during the prescriptive period.^"* And it has been decided that one who has, during the pre- scriptive period, conducted water through an open ditch on another's land, does not thereby acquire the n, 46. Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 80 C. C. A. 606, Cohen v. United 228, 50 S. W. 824, quoted and States, 162 Fed. 364; Eisenbach applied in Bellefontaine Improve- v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 250, 26 Pac. ment Co. v. Niedrlnghaus, 181 539. The cases of Taylor v. 111. 426, 72 Am. St. Rep 2oj, Underhill, 40 Cal. 471; Chicago, 55N. E. 184; Chicago & N. W. Ry. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 72 Co. V. Groh, 85 Wis. 641, 55 N. Iowa, 426, 34 N. W. 286, occa- W. 714. sionally cited to this effect, do not 47. Compare note in 22 Harv. support the statement. Law Rev. at p. 610. 2 R. P.— 58 2110 Real Pkopekty. [§ 542 sumably correct as regards his right to have conditions remain such that accretions may form in the f^^ture in front of his land/^ but it appears questionable as re- gards his right to such accretions as do form.^" For in- stance, if the state grants land bounded by the shore, and it is clearly the intention that the grant sliall ex- tend to the shore regardless of any change that may take place in the location thereof, the state cannot, it is conceived, make such intention nugatory by enacting that no accretion shall accrue to the benefit of any litoral owner. And in the case of land bounded by the edge of a river, it would hardly be permissible for the legislature to deprive the grantee of such land of the right to future accretions, and to give them to his grantor, by establishing a conclusive presumption that in such a case the boundary line is intended to remain in the same location in spite of any change in the edge of the stream as a result of accretions to the land. § 542. Accretions to island. In the case of an island, the same rule applies as in the case of land bounded by water on one side only, that is, the bound- aries are presumed to vary with any gradual change in the line between the land and the water or, e.s it is otherwise expressed, the owner of an island is entitled to land added thereto by accretion to the same extent as the owner of land on the bank or shore of the main- 49. In Freeland v. Pennsyl- with the utility of land actually vania R. Co., 197 Pa. 529, 58 L. owned by him. R. A. 206, 80 Am. St. Rep. 850. 50. There are dicta to the ef- 47 Atl. 745, it was decided that feet that one has a vested right a riparian owner could recover to future accretions, in County of damages for the loss of futufe St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wa'l. alluvium by reason of the erec- (U. S.) 46, 23 L. Ed. 59; Hohl tion of a ra'ilway embankment v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 162 Iowa, higher up the stream, but there 66, 143 N. W. 850; Municipaiity the alluvium was accustomed to No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, form, not horizontally adjacent 18 La. 122, 36 Am. Dec. 624; to plaintiff's land, but I'pon it. Meyers v. Mathis, 42 La. Ann. That is, tnere was an inte-ierence 471, 21 Am. St. Rep. 385, 7 § 542] Accretion. 2111 land.^^ In case accretions to the island and to the mainland eventually meet, the owner of each, it is said, owns the accretions to the line of contact,''"^ or, as we would prefer to express it, the boundary of an island, as that of the mainland, changes as its edge or shore line changes, and when there is no longer any island, owing to the growth of the accretions, he to whom the island belonged owns to where its edge or shore line was last visible. The question may arise, in this connection, whether a formation of land which appears in the stream is of sufficient size, importance and permanence, to be re- garded as an island. It has been said in this connection that not everything which rises above highwater mark can be called an island, that there may be reefs and rocks and other accumulations that are not such in any essential sense, and it may be a question of fact whether sand heaps and bars, separated from tlie mainland only by narrow channels or sloughs, are islands. ^^ So. 605. See Linthicum v. Coan, 590, 184 S. W. 891; Naylor v. 64 Ind. 439, 54 Am. Rep. 775, 2 Cox, 114 Mo. 232, 21 S. W. 589. Atl. 826; Webber v. Axtell, 94 52. BeUefontaine Imp. Co. v. Minn. 375, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) Niedringhaus, 181 111. 426, Tj 194, 102 N. W. 915. That after Am. St. Rep. 269, 55 N. E. 184; the federal government granted Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 85 land as bordering on a lake, Pac. 763, 117 Am. St. Rep. 534, it could not deprive the grantee 6 L. R A. (N. S.) 162; Bigelow of land formed by accretion v. Hoover, 85 Iowa, 161, 19 Am. is decided in Knudsen v. Oman- St. Rep. 296, 52 N. W. 124; son, 10 Utah, 124, 37 Pac. 250. Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 33, 51. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. 21 L. R. A. 300, 33 S. W. 100; S. 226, 34 L. Ed. 941; Fillmore Hahn v. Dawson, 134 Mo. 581, 36 v. Jennings, 78 Cal. 634, 21 Pac. S. W. 233; Moore v. Farmer. 156 536; Glassell v. Hansen, 135 Cal. Mo. 33, 79 Am. St. Rep. 504, 547, 67 Pac. 964; Griffin v. John- 56 S. W. 493. See People v. son, 161 in. 377, 44 N. E. 206; Warner, 116 Mich. 228, 74 N. Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa, 714, W. 705. 58 L. R. A. 673, 84 Am. St. Rep. 53. Peters, C. J., in Babson v. 367, 84 N. W. 950; Stark v. Meri- Tainter, 79 Me. 368. 10 Atl. 368. wether, 98 Kan. 10, Ann. Cas. It has been decided by the same 1918E, 993, 157 Pac. 438; Perks court that an elevation of muscle & Higgins V. McCracken, 169 Ky. bed, occasionally covered by the 2112 Real Property, [§ 543 § 543. Apportionment of accretions. In making the division between adjoining litoral or riparian own- ers of the land formed by accretion, the courts have usually adopted the rule of the civil law, by wbich the new water front is divided between them in the same proportions as the old water front, the side boundary lines being- run in a straight course from the points of division on the old frontage to the points of division on the new.^^ It is generally conceded, however, even by the decisions which adopt this rule of division in the ordinary case, that it is subject to modification under particular circumstances,^^ and that especially in fixing the extent of the frontage the ''general available line" thereof should be taken rather than the actual lino as extended by deep indentations or sharp projections. In at least one case the lines were extended from the points of division on the old water front to pro]»ortion- water, is not an island. Thorn- ton V. Foss, 26 Me. 402. 54. Johnston v. Jones, 1 Black. (U. S.) 210, 17 L. Ed. 117; Malone v. Mobbs, 102 Ark. 542, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 479, 145 S. W. 193, 146 S. W. 143; Kehr v. Snyder, 114 111. 313, 55 Am. Rep. 866, 2 N. E. 68; Hammond v. Shepard, 186 111. 235, 78 Am. St. Rep. 274, 57 N. E. 867; Berry V. Hoogendoorn, 133 Iowa, 437, 108 N. W. 333; Newell v. Leath- ers, 50 La. Ann. 162, 69 Am. St. Rep. 395, 23 So. 243; Deerfield V. Arms, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 41, 28 Am. Dec. 276; Blodgett & D. Lumber Co. v. Peters, 87 Mich. 498, 49 N. W. 917, 24 Am. St Rep. 175; Smith v. Leavenworth, 101 Miss. 238, 57 So. 803; De Lassus V. Faherty, 164 Mo. 361, 58 L. R. A. 193, 64 S. W. 183; Batchelder v. Kenniston, 51 N. H. 496, 12 Am. Rep. 143; O'Don- nell V. Kelsey, 10 N. Y. 415; Northern Pine Land Co. v. Bige- low, 84 Wis. 157, 21 L. R. A. 776, 54 N. W. 496; Hathaway v. City of Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 249, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778, 122 Am. St. Rep. 975, 112 N. W. 455. 55. Malone v. Mobbs, 102 Ark. 542, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 479, 145 S. W. 193, 146 S. W. 143; Kehr v. Snyder, 114 111. 313, 55 Am. Rep. 866, 2 N. E. 68; City of Peoria V. Central Nat. Bank, 224 111. 43, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 687, 79 N. E. 296; Stark v. Meriwether, 98 Kan. 10, Ann. Cas. 1913E. 993, 157 Pac. 438; Blodgett & Davis Lumber Co. v. Peters, 87 Mich. 498, 24 Am. St. Rep. 175, 49 N. W. 917; Smith v. Leavenworth. 101 Miss. 238, 57 So. 803; Batch- elder v. Keniston, 51 N. H. 496, 12 Am. Rep. 143; Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. I. 477, 14 Am. Rep. 701; Hubbard v. Man well, 60 § 513] AccEETioi^. 2113 ate i^oints of division, not on the new front, but on the thread of the stream.^*' Occasionally the new land formed in a stream has been divided by drawing straight lines from the division points on the old front at right angles to the general course of the stream,°^ and sometimes the division has been made by continuing the side lines of the properties in exactly the same direction through the newly formed land.^^ This latter method of api^ortion- ment would seem best to accord with the theory of ac- cretion, above advocated,^^ that one acquires title tc the newly formed land merely because the muniment of title is construed as making the water the boundary regard- less of change in the location of the water. P^or in- stance, if a conveyance describes the side boundary as running in a certain course to the water, it should run in that course regardless of any change in t]ie loca- tion of the water. But the courts have not looked at the subject from this point of view, and have occasion- ally repudiated in express terms the method of appor- tionment referred to.^'^ They have a]i])arently had in mind chiefly the securing a fair division of the new frontage, a consideration which, it would seem, is of much greater importance in the case of navigable waters than in the ca§e of those not navigable. This matter of the apportionment of accretions has been occasionally discussed with referenr>^ to the analogous case of the apportionment of the ''flats" or the shore among the owners of the uplands, in cases in which the state has relinquished the ownership of the Vt. 235, G Am. St. Rep. 110, 14 App. 479, 2 Pac. 86; Gorton v. Atl. 693. Rice, 153 Mo. 676, 55 S. W. 241; 56. Kehr v. Snyder, 114 111. Hubbard v. Manwell, 60 Vt. 235. 313, 55 Am. Rep. 886, 2 N. E. 68. 6 Am. St. Rep. 110, 14 Atl. 693, 57. Gorton v. Rice, 153 Mo. 59. Ante, § 535. 076, 55 S. W. 241; Miller v. Hep- 60. Kehr v. Snyder. 114 III. burn, 8 Bush (Ky.) 326. 313, 55 Am. Rep. 866, 2 N. E. 58. Stockley v. Cissna, 119 68; Berry v. Hoogendoorn, 133 Fed. 812, 56 C. C. A. 324 (sem- Iowa, 437. 108 N. W. 923; Cran- ble); McCamon v. Stagg, 2 Kan. dall v. Allen, 118 Mo. 403, 22 2114 'Real. Peoprrty. [§ 543 flats,*^^ and like considerations have been recognized as applicable in the two cases, as they have, in determining the rights of riparian or litoral owners, as against each other, to construct improvenients in front of their laud.^- In all these cases the difficulty of arriving at a just mode of apportionment is partic- ularly emphasized when the lands belonging to the various proprietors are located on a bay or cove, and varying rules have been suggested as to the most desir- able method of apportionment in such a case, the under- lying idea of all of which, however, is to give to eacli proprietor the same proportionate access to the water as he previously had.®^ When a lake, the bed of which originally belonged to the state, becomes dry, the question as to the owner- ship of the bed is a difficult one. It appears to de- pend in the first place upon the direction or directions in which the recession of the water occurred^ each owner of abutting land being entitled by ''accretion" to land left dry as the water receded from his shore. Frequently, however, it would be impossible to ascertain the direction of the recession of the water, and in such a case the court would presumably have to proceed on the theory that the whole bed of the lake became dry at one time, and fix the lines of division, as between individual proprietors, as if the ownership had not originally been in the state.^^* In case it appears that, in the course of the gradual disappearance of the water, islands formed or appeared, these would be- L. R. A. 591, 24 S. W. 172; 62. See Blodgett & Davis Lum- Manchester v. Point Street Iron ber Co. v. Peters, 87 Mich. 498, Works, 13 R. I. 355. 24 Am. St. Rep. 175, 49 N. W. 61. See Comm. v. City of Rox- 917; Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. bury, 9 Gray (Mass.) 451; Won- I. 477, 14 Am. Rep. 701, son V. Wonson, 14 Allen (Mass.) 63. See editorial notes, 122 85; Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. I. Am. St. Rep. 986. 21 L. R. A. 477, 14 Am. Rep. 701; Lowndes 776, 25 L R. A. (N. S.) 257. v. Wickes, 69 Conn. 15, 36 Atl. 63a. Ante, § 445. 1072. § 544] AccBETiox. 2115 long to the state,^^^ and so the state would be entitled to any extensions of such islands caused by the further recession of the water away therefrom.®^*^ § 544. Formatioii of new islands. An island, when formed in a stream or body of water by the deposit of alluvial matter therein, belongs to the owner of the land beneath the water, on which the island is formed, whether such owner be the stat€ or an individual.^^^ So, if the island is on both sides of a line dividing the lands of different owners, the island belongs to both owners,^* This is evidently not so much by force of a doctrine of accretion as by reason of the fact that the island is within the limits of the ownership of the particular proprietor. A new formation on bis land belongs to him just as much as the old formation. If an island which first forms opposite the land of one riparian proprietor gradually extends by accretion opposite the land of another proprietor, the island be- longs, not exclusively to the fonner, but in part to the former and in part to the latter.^-^ An island which is formed, not by the deposit or increase of alluvial matter, but by a change in the course of a river, operating to cut off from the mainland a ix)rtion of land previously constituting a pa^T of the 63b. Post. § 544. 53 Am. Rep. 206. 212, 3 X. E. 63c. See Hammond v. Shepard. 581; McCullough v. Wall. 4 Rich. 186 111. 235, 78 Am. St. Rep. 274, (S. C.) 6S. 53 Am. Dec. 715; 57 N. E. 876. Menominee River Lumber Co. v. 63d. St. Louis t. Rutz, 138 U. Seidl, 149 Wis. 316, 136 N W. S. 226, 34 L. Ed. 941; Glassell 854. V. Hansen, 135 Cal. 547, 67 Pac 64. Trustees of Hopkins k^&d- 964; Middleton v. Pritxihard, 4 emy v. Dickinson. 9 Cush (Mass.) 111. 510, 38 Am. Dec. 112; East 548: Wiggenhorn r. Kountz, 23 Omaha Land Co. v. Hansen. 117 Xeb. 690. 8 Am. St. Rep. 150, 37 Iowa. 96, 90 N. W. 705; Wilson X. W. 603; State v. Muncie Pulp V. Watson. 144 Ky. 352, Ann. Cas. Co., 119 Tenn. 47, 104 S. W 1913 A 774, 138 S. W. 283; Cox v. 43"; 3 Kent's Comm. 428. Arnold. 129 Mo. 337. 50 Am. St. 65. Archer t. Southern Ry. Co., Rep. 450, 31 S. W. 592; Muliy 114 Miss. 403, 75 So. 251. V. Norton. 100 X. Y. 424. 4-:d. 2116 Real Property. [§ 544 mainland, continues in the same ownership as before.^® provided at least the change in the course of the stream can be regarded as sudden.^^ 66. Trustees of Hopkins Acad- 64 S. W. 183; Grady v. Royar, emy v. Dickinson, 9 Cush. (Mo) 181 S. W. 428; Bonewitz (Mass.) 544; De Lassus v. Faher- v. Wygant, 75 Ind, 41. ty, 164 Mo. 361, 58 L. R. A. 193, 67 Se& ante, § 537. CHAPTER XXVI. ESTOPPEL. § 545. Assertion of after acquired title. (a) General considerations. (b) Character of conveyance. (c) Necessity and character of covenants. (d) Cases to which doctrine inapplicable. (e) Persons bound by the estoppel. 546. Estoppel by representation. 547. Improvements by oral grantee. § 545. Assertion of after acquired title — (a) Gen- eral considerations. At common law, a transfer of land by feoffment, fine, or common recovery operated to transfer any estate or interest which might be sub- sequently acquired by the transferor, in case he did not, at the time of making the assurance, have such an estate as he purported to transfer.^ A lease by in- denture had a partially similar effect, in thai", if the lessor did not have any interest in the land at the time of making the lease, an interest subsequently acquired by him became subject thereto, though this was not al- ways the case if the lessor had some interest at the date of the lease.^ Conveyances other than those named had no such effect of passing an after acquired interest or title at common law, nor have they in England at the present day.' 1. Bigelow, Estoppel (6th Ed.) Doe d. Strode v. Seaton, 2 419, 450-456; Rawle, Covenants Cromp., M. & R. 728; Trevivan for Title (5th Ed.) § 243; Doe v. Lawrence, 1 Salk. 276. d. Christmas v. Oliver, 10 Barn. 3. Williams, Real Prop. (21st & C. 181; Sturgeon v. Wingfield, Ed.) 507; Rawle, Covenants for 15 Mees. & W. 224. Title (5th Ed.) §§ 244, 246, 262: 2. Co. Litt. 47b; Williams, Bigelow, Estoppel, 459 et seq; 2 Real Prop. (21st Ed.) 507; Tiff- Smith, Lead. Cas. Amer. notes any, Landlord & Tenant, § 76; 839; Right v. Bucknell, 2 Barn. (2117) 2118 Eeal Property. [§ 545 It has been recognized in England,* as it has in numerous jurisdictions in this country,^ that if a con- veyance purports to transfer a certain estate, whether this appears from recitals, covenants, or any other part of the instrument, the grantor is estopped thereafter to assert that, by reason of lack of title in him at the time, such an estate did not pass by the conveyance, to assert, in other words, that he acquired title after and not before the conveyance. This latter view is ordinarily referred to as involving merely an applica- tion of the common law doctrine of estoppel by deed, precluding a party to a deed from contradicting or disproving any declaration or averment therein. Fre- quently, however, it might as well be regarded as in- volving an application of the modern doctrine of es- toppel by misrepresentation, the grantor, that is, hav- ing induced a change of position on the part of the grantee, the pajnnent of purchase money, by his repre- sentation that he has an estate of a certain character, & Adol. 278; General Finance, 157 N. W. 734; Fitzhugh v. Mortgage & Discount Co. v. Liber- Tyler, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 561;* ator Permanent Benefit Bldg. Cornelius v. Kinnard, 157 Ky. 50, Soc. 10 Ch. Div. 15. 162 S. W. 524 (semble) ; Wells 4. See Right v. Bucknell, 2 B. v. Blackman, 121 La. 324, 46 So. & Ad. 278; Heath v. Crealock, 437 (semble); Pendill v. Mar- L. R. 10 Ch. 30; Bensley v. quette County Agricultural Soc, Burden, 2 Sim. & S. 524, 8 L. 95 Mich. 491, 55 N. W. 384; Mc- J. Ch. 85; General Finance, etc., Innes v. Pickett, 65 Miss. 354, Co. V. Liberator, etc., Society, 10 3 So. 660; Hagensick v Castor, Ch. Div. 15; Poulton v. Moore 53 Neb. 495, 73 N. W. 932; Han- (1915), 1 K. B. 400. non v. Christopher, 34 N. J. Eq. 5. Van Rennsselaer v. Kear- 465; Northrup v. Ackerman, 84 ney, 11 How. (U. S.) 297, 13 L. N. J. Eq. 117, 92 Atl. 802, 309; Ed. 703; Diaz v. Sanchez, 226 Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C. U. S. 234, 57 L. Ed. 201 (sem- 947, 44 S. E. 655; Keady v. ble); Molina v. Ramirez, 15 Martin, 69 Ore. 299, Ann. Cas. Ariz. 249, 138 Pac. 17; Clark v. 1916A, 796, 137 Pac. 856; Root Baker, 14 Cal. 629, 76 Am. Dec. v. Crock, 7 Pa. 378; Lindsay v. 449; Doe dem Potts v. Dowdali, Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 263, 18 S. 3 Houst. (Del.) 369; Habig v. w. 727; Breen v. Morehead, 104 Dodge, 127 Ind. 31, 25 N. E. 182; Tex. 254, 126 S. W. 650; Bring v. Swarm, 176 Iowa, 153, Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 3 § 545] Estoppel. 2119 is thereafter estopped to deny that he had snch an estate at the time of the payment. Whichever theory be adopted, there is no necessity of regarding the after acquired title as actually passing to the grantee. In this country, however, there are decisions and numer- ous dicta to the effect, not only that the grantor in a conveyance is estopped to deny that it passed tlie es- tate which it purported to pass, but also that the conveyance actually passes, by way of estoppel, any estate or title which the grantor may thereafter acquire in the land, if this is within its apparent scope, and especially if it contains certain covenants of title.*^ There are, moreover, in a number of states, statutory provisions to this etfeetJ For most purposes, the question whether there is merely an estoppel on the grantor to assert the after- acquired title, or whether such title actually passes under the conveyance, is immaterial. The distinction between the two views is, however, important in that, as between the grantor and grantee, the effect of the application of the rule, without exception, that a con- veyance containing a covenant of title operates to pass an after-acquired estate, would be that the grantee would be compelled to take such an estate, and would not have the option of refusing so to do, and of recover- ing full damages on the covenant. Eecognizing the injustice of such a result, it has occasionally been held that the grantee has such an option, and is not com- pelled to accept the after-acquired estate in partial or total satisfaction of the covenant.® S. E. 710, 5 Am. St. Rep. 317; 1454; Rawle, Covenants for Title Summerfield v. White, 54 W. Va. (5th Ed.) § 249. 311, 46 S. E. 154. 8. Burton v. Reeds, 20 Ind. 6, Rawle, Covenants for Title 87; Blanchard v. Ellis. 1 Gray (5th Ed.) § 248, and the numer- (Mass.) 193; Resser v. Carney, ous oases there cited; Biselow 52 Minn. 397, 54 N. W. 89; Estoppel, 465; 2 Smith, Lead. Tucker v. Clark. 2 Sandf. Ch. Cas. Amer. notes 838; 11 Am. & (N. Y.) 96; Woods v. North, (i Eng. Enc. Law, 418. Humph. (Tenn.) 309; Mclnnis 7. 1 Stimson, Am. St. Law, § v. Lyman, 62 Wis. 191, 22 N. W. 2120 Eeal Property. [§ 545 The view that the conveyance operates to transfer the after-acquired title is frequently based on the theory that circuity of action is thereby avoided, the title being given to the grantee instead of compelling him to sue on the grantor's covenant for the damage caused by the want of such title. But, as before indicated, so far as the estoppel of the grantor is concerned, the presence of a covenant for title is immaterial, it being sufficient if the intention to convey a certain estate appears from any part of the conveyance,'^"^^ and as shown by an able writer, even when there are such covenants, the estoppel frequently operates although there is no right of action on a covenant.^^ The theory referred to, of avoidance of circuity of action, however satisfactory it may be in many cases, does not serve to explain the decisions as a whole, and as stated by the same author- ity,^2 the only satisfactory theory in this connection is that the courts have merely applied, under common law forms, the equitable principle that, where one having no title or an imperfect title, purports to convey 405. Contra, King v. Gilson, 32 liable on the covenant; (3) when 111. 355; Baxter v. Bradbury, 20 the state is held to be estopped, Me. 260; Reese v. Smith, 12 Mo. though not liable on the cov©- 344; Farmers' Bank v. Glenn, 68 nant; (4) when the grantor is N. C. 35; Knowles v. Kennedy, estopped, though exempt from 82 Pa. 445; Boulter v. Hamil- liability on the covenant owing ton, 15 U. C. C. P. 125. to a discharge in bankruptcy; and 9-10. Ante, § 545(a), notes 4, 5. (5) when he is estopped, thoilgh 11. Rawle, Covenants for Title the claim on the covenant is (5th Ed.) § 251, where the fol- barred by limitations. See the lowing cases in which the es- cases there cited, and also cita- toppel has been held to operate tions in 11 Am. & E. Encyc. in the absence of any liability Law (2d Ed.) 413. But that on the covenants are enumer- there is no estoppel in case ated; (1) When the estoppel is there is no liability upon the sought to be enforced against covenants for title see Smiley v. a purchaser of the subsequently- Fries 104 111. 416; Webber v. acquired title, and not against Webber, 6 Me. 127; Goodel v. the grantor himself; (2) when Bennett 22 Wis. 565. a married woman is estopped 12. Rawle Covenants for Title (in some states) to claim after- (5th Ed.) § 264. acquired property, though not § 545] Estoppel. 2121 a good title to another, and afterwards acquires the land under another title, he may be compelled to con- vey to such other the title so acquired. That is, if an attempted conveyance of a certain estate or interest in land is ineffective by reason of the fact that the grantor has not title to the land at the time of the conveyance, equity will regard the attempted conveyance as a con- tract to convey, and will compel specific performance thereof upon his subsequent acquisition of title. ^^ And the courts of this countrj^ in so far as they regard the after acquired title as actually passing to the grantee, have merely taken the further step of regarding as done what equity would compel to be done. (b) Character of conveyance. Since the es- toppel of the grantor to assert the after acquired title is based upon the consideration that by his conveyance he purported to convey some certain estate or interest, there can be no such estoppel when the conveyance undertakes to transfer merely such an estate or interest as the grantor has,^^ and the fact that such a convey- 13. Taylor v. Debar 1 Ch. 123 S. W. 350. See Judge Hare's Cas. 274; Noel v. Bewley, 3 note, 2 Smith's Leading Cas. (8th Simons, 103; Smith v. Baker, 1 Am. Ed.) at p. 850. Y. & Col. C. C. 223; Jones v. 14. Vary v. Smith, 162 Ala. Kearney, 1 Dru. & W. 134, 159; 457, 50 So. 187; Quivey v. Baker, In re Bridgewater's Settlement 37 Cal. 465; Dailey v. Spring- (1910), 2 Ch. 342; Holyrood v. field, 144 Ga. 395, 87 S. E. 479; Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191, 211 Benneson v. Aiken, 102 111. 284. per Lord Westbury; Wright v. 40 Am. Rep. 592; Harriman v. Shumway, 1 Biss. 23; Goodson Gray, 49 Me. 537; Fay v. Wood, V. Beacham, 24 Ga. 150; Miss- 65 Mich. 390, 32 N. W. 614; issippi Sawmill Co. v. Douglas, Gibson v. Chouteau, 39 Mo. 536; 107 Miss. 678, 65 So. 885; Lewis Perrin v. Perrin, 62 Tex. 477; V. Baird, Fed. Cas. No. 8,316, 3 Jourdain v. Fox, 90 Wis. 99, 62 McLean, 80; Hannon v. Chris- N. W. 936. But in South Caro- topher, 34 N. J. Eq. 459; Buck- lina a conveyance of "all my ingham v. Hanna, 2 Ohio St. right title and interest" in cer- 551, 558; Chew v. Barnet, 11 tain land has been regarded as Serg. & R. 389; Jordan v. Cham- creating the estoppel, on the bers, 226 Pa. 573, 75 Atl. 956; theory, apparently, that such a Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 30.T, conveyance is a quitclaim deed, 2122 Real Property. [§ 545 ance contains covenants for title does not change its character in this respect. ^^ Likewise, if the conveyance purports to pass a limited or partial interest only, the estoppel extends only to such interest, even though the grantor subse- quently acquires a greater interest.^^ And, if a con- veyance is in terms subject to a mortgage, the subse- quent acquisition by the grantor of the mortgagee's interest does not enure to the grantee's beneiit^ pro- vided the covenant for title expressly excepts the mort- gage, ^'^ and, it would seem, even though there is no such express exception, since the covenant may well be regarded as restricted by the character of the interest which the conveyance purports to convey.^^ And so if a married woman joins in her husband's conveyance and a quitclaim deed is effectual as a conveyance. Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 33> See post, this section, notes 20-24. 15. Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156, 175, 30 L. Ed. 396; Kim- ball V. Semple, 25 Cal. 440; Hol- brook V. Debo, 99 111. 372; Stephenson v. Boody, 139 Ind. 60, 38 N. E. 331; Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 457, 38 Atl. 372; Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 47; Bogy v. Shoab, 13 Mo. 365; Bell v. Twilight, 26 N. H. 401; Coble v. Barringer, 171 N. C. 448, L. R. A. 1916E, 901, 88 S. E. 518; White v. Brocaw, 14 Ohio St. 339; Rawle, Cove- nants for Title, § 250. But the presence of a cove- nant for title may affect the construction of the instrument as showing an intention not lo convey merely such estate or Interest as the grantor has. Mills V. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98; Jones v. King, 25 111. 383; Baker v. Aus- tin, 174 N. C. 433, 93 S. E. 949; Bayley v. McCoy, 8 Ore. 259; Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233. Compare, as to the North Carolina law. Coble V. Barringer, 171 N. C. 448, L. R. A. 1916E, 901, 88 S. E. 518; and see Rawle, Cove- nants for Title, §§ 298, 299. 16. Wheeler v. Aycock, 109 Ala. 146, 19 So. 497; Gill v. Grand Tower Min. Co.. 92 111. 249; Stoepler v. Silberberg, 220 Mo. 258, 119 S. W. 418; Mclnnis V. Pickett, 65 Miss. 354, 3 So. 660; Kent v. Watson, 22 W. Va. 561; Simanek v. Nemetz, 120 Wis. 42, 97 N. W. 508; Gillen v. Powe, 219 Fed. 553, 135 C. C. A. 321. 17. Huzzey v. Heffernan, 143 Mass. 232, 9 N. E. 570. 18. Jaclfson v. Hoffman, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 271; Bricker v. Bricker, 11 Ohio St. 240. Con- tra, Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177; discussed and § 545] Estoppel. 212rl merely to release her dower, a title subsequently ac- quired by her will not enure to the benefit of the grantee in the conveyance. ^^ Not infrequently it is said that the grantor in a quitclaim deed is not estopped to assert an after- acquired title, -^' but unfortunately the courts do not al- ways clearly indicate what they mean by a quitclaim deed. Occasionally they use the expression in this con- nection to describe a conveyance which purtDorts in teniis to transfer merelv such interest as the i^rantor criticized in 7 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 429. And see Rawle, Cove- nants for Title, § 298. That an exception of a mort- gage in a covenant against in- cumbrances does not extend to the covenant of warranty in the same instrument, so as to exclude an estoppel, see Sand- wich Mfg. Co. V. Zellmer, 48 Minn. 408; Rooney v. Koenig, 80, Minn. 483, 83 N. W. 399. See, as to this last case, 14 Harv. Law Rev. 233. 19. Sanford v. Kane, 133 111. 199, 8 L. R. A. 724, 23 Am. St. Rep. 602, 24 N. E. 414; Miller V. Miller, 140 Ind. 174, 39 N. E. 547; O'Neill v. Vanderburg, 25 Iowa, 104; Raymond v. Holden, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 270; Griffin v. Sheffield, 38 Miss. 359. 20. Quivey v. Baker, 37 Cal. 465; Habig v. Dodge, 127 Ind. 31. 25 N. E. 182; Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 19 L. R. A. 379, 33 N. E. 358; French v. Bartel & Miller, 164 Iowa, 677, 146 N. W. 754; Fisher v. Hal- lock, 50 Mich. 465, 15 N. W. 552; People V. Miller, 79 Mich. 93, 44 N. W. 172; Ernst v. Ernst, 178 Mich. 100. 144 N. W. 513. 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317; Jackson V. Winslow, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 18; Harden v. Collins, 8 Nev. 4^; Perrin v. Perrin, 62 Tex. 477. In Illinois it is so provided by statute. Wells v. Glos, 277 111. 516, 115 N. E. 658. In Hagensick v. Castor, 53 Neb. 495, 73 N. W. 932, it was held that although an instru- ment was in the ordinary form of a quitclaim deed, yet since the grantors described them- selves as the heirs of A, wrong- ly believing A to be dead, they in effect purported to convey an estate of inheritance vested in them as heirs at law of A, and could not, on A's actual death, assert the title which then passed to them as A's heirs. It has been said that the excep- tion to the general rule in the case of a quitclaim deed does not apply when the title subse- (juently acquired by the grantor is "merely an evidence and forti- fication of the title" which ho previously had. Ford v. Axel- son, 74 Neb. 92, 103 N. W. 1039; Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ky. 701, 191 S. W. 672. This might mean merely that the effect of tho quitclaim as passing what tho grantor has at the time of its 2124 Real Propbety. [§ 545 may have,^^ a form of conveyance which, as before stated,^^ gives no room for an estoppel. Occasionally the courts apparently regard an instrument as a quit- claim deed for this purpose if the words ''release" or ''quitclaim," or both, appear as operative words there- in,-^ presumably on the theory that the use of such words precludes a construction of the instrument as purporting to pass any certain estate or interest. Oc- casionally the language used suggests that the court regards as a quitclaim deed any conveyance in which there are no covenants for title.-^ The doctrine of estoppel to assert an after acquired title has been applied in the case of a mortgage as well execution is not affected by the fact that he subsequently ob- tains a deed purporting to con- vey what he already has, but the statement has also been applied to a case in which the grantor had an equitable title merely at the time of the execu- tion of the quitclaim deed, and thereafter obtained the legal title. Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ky. 701, 191 S. W. 672. 21. As in Anderson v. Yoak- um, 94 Cal. 227, 28 Am. St. Rep. 121, 29 Pac. 500; Frink V. Darst, 14 111. 308, 58 Am. Dec. 575; Benneson v. Aiken, 102 111. 289; Irish v. Steeves, 154 Iowa, 286, 134 N. W. 634, 157 N. W. 734; Pring v. Swarm, 176 Iowa, 153; Nicholson v. Caress, 45 Ind. 479; Carter v. Hosier, 84 Kan. 361, 114 Pac. 226; Manson v. Peaks, 103 Me. 430, 69 Atl. 690; Butcher v. Rogers, 60 Mo. 138; Brawford v. Wolfe, 103 Mo. 391, 15 S. W. 426; Taft v. Stevens, 3 Gray (Mass.) 504; Bell v. Twi- light, 26 N. H. 401; Dorris v. Smith. 7 Ore. 267; Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S. W. 727; Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 Pac. 434. 22. Ante, this section, notes 14, 15. 23. As in Avery v. Akins, 74 Ind. 283; Bruce v. Luke, 9 Kan. 201; Wholey v. Cavanaugh, 88 Cal. 132, 25 Pac. 1112; Frost v. Missionary Society, 56 Mich. 62, 22 N. W. ,189. Contra, Ford v. Axelson, 74 Neb. 92, 103 N. W. 1039. This is presumably the character of instrument intended by the Mississippi statute, which provides that a conveyance of quitclaim and release shall estop the grantor from asserting a subsequently acquired title. It could hardly mean a conveyance of such interest as the grantor may have. See Bramlett v. Rob- erts, 68 Miss. 325, 10 So. 56. 24. Bohon v. Bohon. 78 Ky. 408; Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 256; Tillotson V. Kennedy, 5 Ala. 413, 39 Am. Dec. 330; Cramer v. Benton, 64 Barb. (N. Y.) 522; Jackson v. Hubble, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 613. § 545] Estoppel. 2125 as in that of an absolute conveyance, more particularly when the mortgage instrument contains a covenant of warranty or other covenant.^ ^ And it has been so a.pplied not only in jurisdictions in which the legal title passes to the mortgagee,-'^ but in other jurisdictions likewise.-" There appears to be no difference, as re- gards the doctrine of estoppel, between the principles applicable to a mortgage and to an absolute convey- ance, and the statements here made in reference to the latter will ordinarily apply as well to the former.^''^ If a conveyance is for any reason absolutely in- valid, there is no estoppel upon the grantor as to an after-acquired title.-^ But that the conveyance is in- 25. Jones v. Wilson, 57 Ala. 122; Curren v. Driver, 33 Ind. 480; West Michigan Park Ass'n V. Pere Marquette R. Co., 172 Mich. 179, 137 N. W. 799; Hagen- sick V. Castor, 53 Neb. 495, 73 N. W. 932; Smith v. De Russy, 29 N. J. Eq. 407; Jackson v. Littell, 56 N. Y. 108; Donovan V. Twist, 85 N. Y. App. Div. 130, 83 N. Y. Supp. 76; Jarvis v. Aikens, 25 Vt. 635; DosweU v. Buchanan, 3 Leigh (Va.) 365, 23 Am. Dec. 280. 26. Howze v. Dew, 90 Ala. 178, 24 Am. St. Rep. 783, 7 So. 239; Hoyt v. Dimon, 5 Day (Conn.) 479; Gochenour v. Mow- ry. 33 III. 331; Dagger v. Mu- tual Union Loan & Building Ass'n, 146 111. 283, 33 N. E. 946; Parsons v. Little, 66 N. H. 339, 20 Atl. 958; White v. Patten, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 324; Cockrill v. Bane, 94 Mo. 444, 7 S. W. 480; Northrup v. Ackerman, 84 N. J. Eq. 117, 92 Atl. 909; Rauch v. Dech, 116 Pa. St. 157, 2 Am. ftt. Rep. 598, 9 Atl. 180. 27. Clark v. Boyreau, 14 Cal. 636; Yerkes v. Hadley, 5 Dak. 2 R. P.— 59 324, 2 L. R. A. 363, 40 N. W. 340; Hill v. O'Bryan, 104 Ga. 137, 30 S. E. 996; Rice v. Kelso, 57 Iowa, 115, 7 N. W. 3, 10 N. W. 335; Whitley v. Johnson, 135 Iowa, 620, 113 N. W. 550; Thalls V. Smith, 139 Ind. 496, 39 N. E. 154; Watkins v. Houck, 44 Kan. 502, 24 Pac. 361; Gray v. Franks, 86 Mich. 382, 49 N. W. 130; Caple V. Switzer, 122 Mich. 636, 81 N. W. 560; Osborn v. Scottish American Co., 22 Wash. 83, 60 Pac. 49. 27a. If one who has no title to land undertakes to mortgage the land to one who has a perfect title, and subsequently acquiries the land by descent from the latter, he is not estopped, it has been held, to assert such title as against the latter's repre- sentative. "Neither the mort- gagee nor her representative can deny that her own title was good, because she had taken a conveyance from one having no title." Harding v. Springer, 14 Me. 407, 31 Am. Dec. 61. 28. Kercheval v. Triplett, 1 A. K. Marsh (Ky.) 493; Patter- 2126 Real Propeety. [§ 545 valid as to one grantor obviously does not affect the estoppel upon another grantor. ^^ (c) Necessity and character of covenants. Applying the view, above referred to, that a conveyance is given the effect of transferring an after- acquired title as a means of avoiding the necessity of suing on the covenant for title, it has frequently been asserted that the presence of such a covenant is necessary in or- der that an after-acquired title may pass."" And the cases occasionally distinguish between the different classes of covenants as regards their efficacy in this respect. Thus a covenant of warranty has been referred to in many cases as effective for this purpose,^ ^ frequently as the result of a mistaken application of the doctrine of war- ranty at common law,^^ and the same effect has been given to a covenant for quiet enjoyment,^^ while it has, in sOme states, been denied to a covenant for seisin son V. Pease, 5 Ohio, 191; Kemery V Zeigler, 176 Ind. 660, 96 N. E. 850. 29. Blakeslee v. Mobile Life Ins. Co., 57 Ala. 265; Chapman V Abrahams, 61 Ala. 108; Well- born V. Finley, 7 Jones L. (N. C.) 228. 30. See cases cited 11 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2nd Ed.) 409. 31. Schuman v. George, 110 Ark. 486, 161 S. W. 1038; Doe d. Potts V. Roe, 3 Houst, (Del.) 369, 11 Am. Rep. 757; Oliver v. Holt, 141 Ga. 126, 80 S. E. 630; Walton V. Follansbee, 131 III. 147, 23 N. E. 332; Childs v. Mc- Chesney, 20 Iowa, 431, 89 Am. Dec. 545; Creekmore v. Bryant, 158 Ky. 166, 164 S. W. 337; Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 457, 38 Atl. 372; Knight v. Thayer, 125 Mass. 25; Morris v. Jansen, 99 Mich. 436, 58 N. W. 365; De- merse v. Mitchell, 187 Mich. 683, 164 N. W. 97; Barron v. H. D. Williams Cooperage Co., 185 Mo. App. 625, 171 S. W. 683; Moore V. Rake, 26 N. J. L. 574; Ford V. McBrayer, 171 N. C. 420, 88 S E. 736; Broadwell v. Phillips. 30 Ohio St. 255; Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233; Johnson v. Branch, 9 S. D. 116, 62 Am. St. Rep. 857, 68 N. W. 173; Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S. W. 548; Raines V. Walker, 77 Va. 95. 32. 2 Smith's Leading Cases, Judge Hare's note (8th Am. Ed.) 841 et seq; Rawle, Covenants for Title, §§ 252, 254; Bigelow, Es- toppel (6th Ed.) pp. 453, 463. 33. Smith v. Williams, 44 Mich. 240, 6 N. W. 662; Long Island R. Co. v. Conkiin, 29 N. Y. 572; Tully v. Taylor, 84 N. J. Eq. 459, L. R. A. 1918B, 731, 94 Atl. 572. See Taggart v. Risley, 4 Ore. 235. § 545] Estoppel. 2127 or for good right to convey.'^^ On the other hand there are numerous decisions and judicial dicta that if the conveyance purports to transfer some certain estate, the grantor is estopped, irrespective of the presence of covenants therein, to assert that such an estate did not •pass thereby.^ ^ "When the conversance does not purport to convey such interest only as the grantor has, or a limited in- terest only, the fact that a covenant therein is special, that is, against the acts of the grantor and those claim- ing under him only, does not appear to aifect its opera- tion by way of estoppel.^^ (d) Cases to which doctrine inapplicable. The doctrine that a grantor is estopped to assert an after-acquired title applies only when such assertion would involve a denial that the conveyance passed the interest or estate which it purported to pass. Conse- quently the grantor may freely assert a title subse- quently acquired by him from the grantee either by voluntary conveyance,^ '^ judicial or execution sale,^^ 34. Allen v. Sayward, 5 Me. Short, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 151 227, 17 Am. Dec. 221; Doane v. S. W. 633. Willcutt, 5 Gray (Mass.) 333, 66 35. Ante, this section, note 5, Am. Dec. 369; Chauvin v. Wag- 36. Kimball v. Blaisdell, 5 N. ner, 18 Mo. 531. Contra, Wight- H. 533; Gibbs v. Thayer, 6 Cush. man v. Reynolds, 24 Miss. 675. (Mass.) 30; Coal Creek IMin. & And see Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 12 Lea (Tenn.) (U. S.) 617, 19 L. Ed. 800; Van- 1. Compare, Bennett v. Davis, derheyden v. Crandall, 2 Den. 90 Me. 457, 38 Atl. 372. (N. Y.) 9. 37. Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N. It has been held that the J. Eq. 504, 54 Atl. 160. covenant against incumbrances 38. Erwin v. Morris, 26 Kan. which, by a state statute, is im- 664; Rauch v. Dech, 116 Pa. 157, plied from the use of the word 2 Am. St. Rep. 598, 9 Atl. 180; "grant" or "convey" was suflfi- Goode v. Bryant, 118 Va. 314, 87 clent for this purpose. Morris v.S. E. 588. 2128 Eeal Property. [§ 545 adverse possession,^® tax sale,^" or otherwise.*^ In such a case the grantor asserts, not that the conveyance failed to pass the interest which it purported to pass, but merely that, after such interest had, by the convey- ance, become vested in the grantee, it was divei-;ted out of him and vested in the grantor. Nor is the grantor estopped to assert that, under the circumstances of the case, while the legal title was by the conveyance vested in the grantee, the beneficial interest was vested in another.*^ If one who has conveyed land in his own right subsequently acquires a title thereto, not in his own right but as trustee for another, the doctrine her^^ under discussion does not apply. One cannot thus alfect the interest of another by purporting to convey more than he has.^^ But one may, it seems, by a conveyance in an official or representative capacity, by which he pur- ports to convey a certain interest or estate, be estopped to assert a title subsequently acquired by him in his 39. Abbett v. Page. 92 Ala. 571, Hannah v. Collins, 94 Ind. 201; 9 So. 332; Doolittle v. Robert- Porter v. Lafferty, 33 Iowa, 254; son, 109 Ala. 412, 19 So. 851; Gardner v. Gerrish, 23 Me. 46 Garibaldi v. Shattuck, 70 Cal. Frank v. Caruthers, 108 Mo. 569, 511, 11 Pac. 778; Berthelemy v. 18 S. W. 927. Johnson, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 90, 38 41. Thielen v. Richardson, 35 Am. Dec. 179; Hines v. Robin- Minn. 509, 29 N. W. 677. son, 57 Me. 324, 99 Am. Dec. 42. Harrold v. Morgan, 66 772; Stearns v. Hendersass, 9 Ga. 398; Condit v. Bigalow, 64 Gush. (Mass.) 497, 57 Am. Dec. N. J. Eq. 504, 54 Atl. 160. 65; Horbach v. Boyd, 64 Neb. 43. Dewhurst v. Wright, 29 129, 89 N. W. 644; Tilton v. Fla. 223, 10 So. 682; Phillippi Emery, 17 N. H. 536; Sherman v. v. Leet, 19 Colo. 246, 35 Pac. Kane, 86 N. Y. 57; Johnson \. 540; Kelley v. Jenness, 50 Me. Farlow, 13 Ired, L. (35 N. C.) 455, 79 Am. Dec. 623; Harlan 84; Chatham v. Lonsford, 149 N. v. Jordan, 104 Me. 49, 70 Atl. C. 363, 63 S. E. 81; Harn v. 1066; Runlet v. Otis, 2 N. H. Smith, 79 Tex. 310, 23 Am. St. 167: Wark v. Willard, 13 N. H. Rep. 340, 15 S. W. 240. 389; Jackson v. Mills, 13 Johns. 40. Erwin v. Morris, 26 Kan. (N. Y.) 463; Buckingham v. 664; Foster v. Johnson, 89 Tex. Hanua. 2 Ohio St. 551; Burchard 640, 36 S. W. 67. But only if v. Hubbard, 11 Ohio, 316; Fre- the sale was for taxes which telliere v. Hindes, 57 Tex. 392; came due after the conveyance. Newton v. Easterwood, Tex. Civ. § 545] Estoppel. 2129 own right/^ particularly if the instrument contains a personal covenant by him for title,^^ it being recognized that he may by such a conveyance be estopped to assert a title which he actually has at the time thereof.'*^ In the case of a purchase money mortgage, the mortgage is properly to be construed as purporting to convey or charge such interest only as the mortgagor acquired by the conveyance from the mortgagee, and consequently, if he acquired no title or an imperfect title thereby, the mortgagee cannot claim the benefit of a title subsequently acquired by the mortgagor, the purchaser.^'^ And so, it would seem, when cotenants claiming under a single title make voluntary partition, the mutual conveyances executed by them to carry the partition into effect may properly be regarded as purporting to convey only such title as they all have, and if one subsequently acquires a paramount title, he should not be estopped to assert it as against the others,*® a result which might also be attained on the theory*^ that the purpose and effect of such convey- ances is not to transfer interests in land but merely to designate the share of each of the parties. ^^ App. — , 154 S. W. 646; Gregory liams, 85 Tex. 499, 22 S. W. V. Peoples, 80 Va. 355. 399; Carbee v. Hopkins, 41 Vt. 44. Molina v. Ramirez, 15 250. Ariz. 249, 138 Pac. 17; Mountain 47. Randall v. Lower, 98 Ind. Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 255: Brown v. Phillips, 40 Mich. 30 Idaho, 559, 166 Pac. 271. 264. And see Butterfield v. Lane. 45. Prouty v. Mather, 49 Vt. 114 Me. 333, 96 Atl. 233. Contra, 425; See Morris v. Wheat, 8 Hitchcock v. Fortier, 65 111. 239. App. D. C. 379; Hitchcock v. The latter case is disapproved Southern Iron & Timber Co., in Rawle, Covenants for Title, — Tenn.— , 38 S. W. 588; Ver- § 267; Bigelow, Estoppel (6th meule v. Vermeule, 113 Me. 74, Ed.) 448. 93 Atl. 37. 48. See Rector v. Waugh. 17 46. Rannels v. Howe, 145 Fed. Mo. 26; Pendill v. Marquette 296, 74 C. C. A. 376; Poor v. County Agric. Soc. 95 Mich. 491, Robinson, 10 Mass. 131; WeUs v. 55 N. W. 384; Carson v. Carson. Steckelberg. 52 Neb. 597, 66 Am. 122 N. C. 645, 30 S. E. 4; Doane St. Rep. 529, 72 N. W. 865; v. Willicutt. 5 Gray (Mass.) 328. Kellerman v. Miller, 5 Pa. Super. 49. Ante, § 203. Ct. 443; Corzine's Heirs v. Wil- 50. See Harrison v. Ray. 108 2130 Real Propbety. [§ 545 (e) Persons bound by the estoppel. If, after executing the conveyance, the grantor acquires an estate in the land and then dies, his heir is precluded, to the same extent as was the grantor himself, from asserting that such after-acquired title did not enure to the benefit of the grantee.^^ But while the heir is estopped to assert a title subsequently acquired by the grantor, the heir is not estopped to assert a title subse- quently acquired by him from a source other than his ancestor, the grantor.^^ The question whether one to whom the grantor, after his subsequent acquisition of title, undertakes to make a conveyance, is estopped, as was the grantor, to assert such subsequently acquired title, is one of considerable difficulty. It has been frequently said that an estoppel by deed binds not only parties but also privies,^^ and a like statement is ordinarily made in regard to estoppel by misrepresentation.^^ Strictl}^ applying such a rule, the estoppel would operate against a subsequent grantee although he is a pur- chaser for value without notice of the prior conveyance by his grantor. And there are a considerable number of cases which appear to adopt such a view, that the subsequent grantee is estopped to assert the after- N. Car. 215, 11 L. R. A. 722, 23 K. A. 162, 25 N. E. 1013; Galladay Am. St. Rep. 57, 12 S. E. 993; v. Knock, 235 111. 412, 85 N. E. Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 649; Wilson v. Godfrey, 145 S. W. 520. Iowa, 696, 124 N. W. 875; Russ 51. French v. Spencer, 21 How. v. Alpaugh, 118 Mass. 369, 19 Am. (U. S.) 228, 16 L. Ed. 97; Perry Rep. 464; Gorton v. Roach, 46 V. Kline, 12 Gush. (Mass.) 118; Mich. 294, 9 N. W. 422; Wm. D. Russ V. Alpaugh, 118 Mass. 369, Cleveland & Sons v. Smith, — Tex. 19 Am. Rep. 464; Wark v. Wil- Civ. App.— , 113 S. W. 547. See lard, 13 N. H. 389; Tefft v. Mun- editorial note, 10 Columbia Law son, 57 N. Y. 97; Du Rose v. Kell, Rev. 483. 90 S. C. 196, 71 S. E. 371. See 53. See cases cited 16 Cyclo- Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 pedia Law & Proc. 715; Bigelow, S. W. 520. Estoppel (6th Ed.) 372. 52. Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. 54. See 16 Cyclopedia Law & Wilson, 147 Ala. 275, 40 So. 515; Proc. 778; Bigelow, Estoppel, 629. Ebey v. Adams, 135 111. 80, 10 L. § 545] Estoppel. 2151 acquired title of his grantor, as against a prior grantee of the latter, without reference to whether sucli subse- quent grantee has or has not notice of the iDrior con- veyance.^^ In some cases, however, a contrarj^ view is asserted, expressly or by implication, that the subse- quent grantee is not bound by the estoppel unless he had notice of the prior conveyance by his grantor.^^*^ In several of these latter cases the question chiefly discussed is whether the subsequent grantee is f^harged with notice by the record of the prior conveyance, this occurring before his grantor acquired title. This ques- tion has ordinarily been answered in the negative, that is, the purchaser was regarded as under no obliga- tion to search the records for conveyances b}^ his 55. Letson v. Roach, 5 Kau. App. 57, 47 Pac. 321; Morrison V. CaldweU, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 426, 17 Am. Dec. 84; Powers v. Patten, 71 Me. 583; White v. Patten, 24 Pick (Mass.) 324; Knight V. Thayer, 125 Mass. 25; Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177; Philly v. Sanders, 11 Ohio St. 490, 78 Am. Dec. 316; McCusker v. McEvey, 9 R. I. 528, 10 R; I. 606, 11 Am. Rep. 295; Jarvis v. Aikens, 25 Vt. 635. See Owen v. Brookfort, 208 111. 35, 69 N. E. 952; Colonial & rj. S. Mtge. Co. V. Li°. 95 Ark. 253, 129 S. W. 84; Organ v. Bunnell— Mo.— , 184 S. W. 102. A like doctrine has been In one case applied, as against a purchaser of land to which an casement appertained, in favor of one to whom the servient tene- ment had previously been con veyed, with a covenant of war- ranty, it being held that the grantor of the servient tene- ment was estopped to assscrt the easement against his grantee, upon acquiring the dominant tene- ment, and that one to whom he conveyed the latter was also estopped. Hodges v. Goodspeed, 20 R. I. 537, 40 Atl. 373. See 12 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 219. 56. Rozell V. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 76 Ark. 525, 89 S. W. 469; Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 55 Atl. 670; Way v. Arnold, 18 Ga. 181; Donahue v. Vosper, 189 Mich. 78, 155 N. W. 407; Ford v. Unity Church Soc, 120 Mo. 498, 23 L. R. A. 561. 41 Am. St. Rep. 711, 25 S. W. 394; Greai Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N. H. 452 (dictum): Bing- ham V. Kirkland, 34 N J. Eq. 221; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. V Maltby, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 361; Doyle V. Petroleum Co., 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 240 (se7nble); Calder V Chapman, 52 Pa. St. 359. 91 Am. Dec. 163; Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Co., 93 S. C. 254, 75 S. E. 371; Bernardy V. Colonial, etc., Mortgage Co., 17 S. D. 637, 98 N. W. 166; Green 2132 Real Property. [§ 545 grantor executed and recorded before the grantor had any title to convey, it being sufficient that he searches the records under his grantor in order to discover any conveyance made by the latter after acquiring title. ^'^'^ A contrary view would impose on every purchaser the very serious burden of searching the records for con- veyances made not only by his vendor, but also by his vendor's predecessors in title, for an indefinite time back of the date of his or their acquisition of title." The decisions above referred to, that a purchaser without notice of the previous conveyance by his grantor is not estopped to assert the title acquired by his arantor after the previous conveyance, appear ordi- narily to be based upon the theory that a contrary view would to that extent defeat the purpose and spirit of the recording laws, in giving priority to a conveyance which, though first executed, was not recorded under such circumstances as to satisfy the statutory requirement of record. Another view which has been suggested in this regard is that, since the claim of a grantee as V. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 136 Mich. 274; Schoch v. Birdsall, 48 S. W. 1047, Ann. Cas. 1914A, Minn. 441, 51 N. W. 382; Boyd 1285; See Doswell v. Buchanan, v. Mundorf, 30 N. J. Eq. 545. 3 Leigh (Va.) 365; Higgins v. 57. See 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. § Dennis, 104 Iowa, 605, 74 N. W. 9. 658, p. 1134 note; Rawle, Cove- But a purchaser Is charged nants for Title. §§ 259-261; note with notice of a conveyance made in 17 Harv. Law Rev. at 482. by his vendor before the latter'* But that the record of the acquisition of title, if such con- earlier conveyance does in such veyance was recorded after such case affect the subsequent pur- acquisition. Semon v. Terhune, chaser with notice was decided 40 N. J. Eq. 364, 2 Atl. 18. in Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97; 56a. The impropriety of re- (distinguished in Oliphant v. quiring a search previous to the Burns, 146 N. Y. 218, 40 N. E. mortgagor's acquisition of title 980); Bernardy v. Colonial & U. has in several cases been given S. Mortg. Co., 17 S. D. 637, 108 as a reason for according prior- Am. St. Rep. 791, 98 N. W. 166; Ity to a purchase money mort- Hale v. Hollon, 14 Tex. Civ. App. gage as against a mortgage given 96, 35 S. W. 843, 36 S. W. 288; previously by the same party. Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 Ely v. Pingrey, 56 Kan. 17, 42 Pac. 434. Pac. 330; Heffron v. Flanigan, 37 § 545] Estoppel. 2133 to the subsequently acquired title of his grantor is, properly regarded, equitable in its nature,^^ it may, like other equitable claims, not be asserted as against sub- sequent purchasers for value without notice. As against a subsequent purchaser from the. same grantor who took with notice of the conveyance made by the latter before he acquired title,^^" or wijO was not a purchaser for value,^^^ the prior granteo can no doubt assert the estoppel to the same extent as he could have asserted it against the grantee himself. As regards the question whether the claim of the person to whom the conveyance is made before the grantor's acquisition of title takes priority over the claim under a judgment against the grantor, the cases are few in number and not entirely in harmony. Tak- ing first the case of a judgment rendered before the making of the conveyance, it has been held in one state that, upon the acquisition of title by the grantor; the land becomes subject to the lien of the judgment, in priority to the grantee's claim by way of es'oppel,^" and there is also a decision to the contrary.'^ ^ It does not seem that, by reason of the grantor's lack of title at the time of his conveyance, the grantee should profit at the expense of the judgment creditor, and the former decision appears to be preferable. In the case of a judgment rendered against the grantor after the making of the conveyance and before his acquis'tion of the title, it has been held that the grantee takes free of the lien of the judgment, on the theory, apparently, that the grantor, in view of his conveyance, acquires at 58. Ante, § 545(a), note 13. Circle, 60 Mo. 258; Wark v. 59. See Editorial note, 22 Willard, 13 N. H. 389; Mann v. Harv. Law Rev. 136; also the dis- Young, 1 Wash. Terr. 454. cussion by Mr. Ewart as to the 59b. Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 somewhat analogous question Tex. 259, 18 S. W. 727; Mann v. of the incidence of the burden of Young, 1 Wash. Terr. 454. an estoppel by misrepresentation. 60. Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. Ewart, Estoppel, 199 et seq. 467. 96 Pac. 945. 59a. Edwards v. Hillier, 70 61. Watkins v. Wassell, 15 .Miss. 803, 13 So. 692; Barker v. Ark. 73. 2134 Real Propeety. [§ 546 most merely a legal title, the beneficial interest vesting immediately in the grantee.*'^ In the case of a judg- ment rendered against the grantor not only after his conveyance, but also after his acquisition of the title,, the judgment creditor can, it would seem, for a like reason, have no lien upon the property, excej>t as he may, in some states, be protected as a bona fide pur- chaser for value.^^ § 546. Estoppel by representation. In connection with the law of land there is frequent occasion for the application of the familiar principle that one who, by his words or actions, represents a certain state of facts to be true, and thereby induces another to act to his detri- ment, is precluded from thereafter denying the exist- ence of such a state of facts. So it has frequently been decided that if one, having title to land, as he knows or has reason to know, disclaims any rights therein,^^ or fails to assert his rights,^^ and thereby 62. Lamprey v. Pike, 28 Fed. Schneider, 281 111. 557, 118 N. E. 30; Brown v. Barker, 35 Okla. 41; Webb v. Hardaway — (Ky.) — , 498, 130 Pac. 155. See also Wat- 121 S. W. 669; Blodgett ▼. Mc- kins V. Wassell, 15 Ark. 73. Com- Murtry, 34 Neb. 782, 52 N. W. pare Leslie v. Harrison Nat. 706; Mayer v. Ramsey, 46 Tex. Bank, 97 Kan. 22, 154 Pac. 209. 371. 63. In Pennsylvania a judg- 65. Bryan v. Ramirez, 8 Cal. ment creditor is so protected as 461, 68 Am. Dec. 340; Baillarge against a mortgage made by the v. Clark, 145 Cal. 589, 79 Pac. debtor before acquiring title. 268; Coram v. Palmer. 63 Fla. Calder v. Chapman, 52 Pa. 559, 116, 58 So. 721; Loughran v. 91 Am. Dec. 163; Gallagher v. Gorman, 256 111. 46, 99 N. E. 886; Stern, 250 Pa. 292, 95 At. 518. Simpson v. Yocum, 172 Ky. 449, The latter case is criticized in 189 S. W. 439; Hatch v. Kimball, an editorial note in 29 Harv. Law 16 Me. 146; Brown v. Union Rev. 457 on the ground that the Depot St. Ry. & Transfer Co., judgment creditor was chargeable 65 Minn. 508, 68 N. W. 107; with notice. Pabst v. Berch, 126 Minn. 58, 147 64. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 N. W. 714; Guffey v. O'Reilly, U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618; Burle- 88 Mo. 418, 57 Am. Rep. 424; son V. Mays, 189 Ala. 107, 66 So. Thompson v. Sanborn, 11 N. H. 36; Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 201, 35 Am. Dec. 490; Wendell v. 853, 7 So. 391; Whalen v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. § 546] Estoppel. 2135 causes one, excusably ignorant of the true state of the title, to purchase the land from a third person, he can- not thereafter assert any claim to the land. Like^vdse, the true owner of land who stands by and sees another, under the belief that he has the unincumbered title to the land, make expenditures for improvements thereon, may be under such a duty to inform the person in pos- session of the true state of the title as to be there- after estopped from asserting any rights in the land."" The mere failure to assert one's title, without any active misrepresentation in regard thereto, will not ordinarily have the effect of an estoppel, if his title appears of record, since one purchasing or improving the land is in such case charged with notice of the true state of the title,*''^ And the result appears to be Y.) 344; Heckman v. Davis, 56 Okla. 483, 155 Pac. 1170; Gaddes V. Pawtucket Inst, for Savings, 33 R. I. 177, Ann. Cas. 1912B. 407, 80 Atl. 415; Marines v. Goblet, 31 S. C. 153, 17 Am. St. Rep. 22; Grigsby v. Verch, 34 S. D. 39, 146 N. W. 1075. 66. Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68, 26 L. Ed. 79; Hendrix v. Southern Ry. Co., 130 Ala. 205, 80 Am. St. Rep. 27, 30 So. 596; Gibson v. Herriott, 55 Ark. 85, 29 Am. St. Rep.. 17; Beardsley V. Clem, 137 Cal. 328, 70 Pac. 175; Holmes v. Brooks, 84 Conn. 512. 80 Atl. 773; Coram v. Palmer, 63 Fla. 116, 58 So. 721; Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. V. Strickland, 80 Ga. 776, 12 Am. St. Rep. 232, b S. E. 27; Crumley v. Laurens Banking Co., 141 Ga. 603, 81 3. fi. 871; Hoi comb v. Independent School Dist, 67 Minn. 321, ^^9 N. W. 1067; Thomas v. Pull is, 56 Mo. 211; Deilett v. Kemh!^, r^ N. J Eq. 58; Marvin v. Tusch. 86 Ohio St. 49, 98 N. E. 860; ^rusha v Board of Education of Gklahcraa City 41 Okla. 595, 139 Pac. 298, L R. A. 1916C, 233; McDroom v. Thompson, 25 Ore. 559, 42 Am. St. Rep. 806, 37 Pac. 57; 7/arapol v. Kountz, 14 S. D. 334, 86 Am. St. Rep. 765. 85 N. W. 595; Danielson v. Gustafson, 33 S. D. 440, 146 N. W. 562; Clark v. Kirby, 18 Utah, 258, 55 Pac. 372. 67. Wiser v. Lawler, 189 U. S. 260, 271; Porter v. Wheeler, 105 Ala. 451, 47 L. Ed. 802; Wo.its v Moore, 89 Ark. 19, 115 S. W. 931; Neal v. Gregory, 19 Fla. 356; Bell v. Nye, 255 111. 283, 99 N. E. 610; Farm Land Mfg. & De- benture Co. V. Hopkins, 63 Kan. 678, 66 Pac. 1015; Mason v. Philbrook, 69 Me. 57; Oberheim V. Reeside, 116 Md. 265, 81 Atl. 590; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186; Boston & A. R. R. v. Rear- don, 226 Mass. 286, 115 N. E. 408; Staton V. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261: Blodgett V. Perry, 97 Mo. 203, 10 Am. St. Rep. 307, 10 S. W. 891: Clark V. Parsons, 69 N. H. 147, 70 2136 Real Property. [§ 546 the same when the true owner is in possession of the land.^^ An estoppel of this character, since it is based on a representation that one has not title to land, and not that he has title, has obviously no effect upon a title afterwards acquired by the person making the repre- sentation.^^ This class of estoppel, though frequently spoken if as ''equitable" estoppel, is ordinarily rocognized and enforced in courts of law as well as in equity. But though the principles governing in this class of cases were not clearly recognized and formulated under that name until well into tho nineteenth century,"" before this there existed in equity a doctrine which was equiv- alent to the modern doctrine of estoppel by representa- tion, to the effect that one who knowingly makes a false representation to one who acts on it is bound to make that representation good;'^' and a similar princi- ple was also involved in the equitable rule that the fraudulent failure of one to make known his title to a person about to purchase the land from another would have the effect of changing the ordinary rule of priori- Am. St. Rep. 157, 39 Atl. 898; velopment Co., 52 Tex. Civ. App. Chambers v. Bessent, 17 N. M. 205, 114 S. W. 857. So it is 487, 134 Pac. 237; Fisher v. Moss- said that the person asserting the man, 11 Ohio St. 42; Knouff v. estoppel must have been without Thompson, 16 Pa. 357; Sullivan a convenient means of ascertain- V. Moore, 84 S. C. 426, 65 S. E. ing the truth. Crary v. Dye, 108; Crabtree v. Winchester Bank, 208 U. S. 515, L. Ed.; Stonecipher 108 Tenn. 483, 67 S. W. 797; v. Kear, 131 Ga. 688, 63 S. E. Bigelow v. Tapliff, 25 Vt. 273; 215; State v. Mutual Life Ins. Kingman v. Graham, 51 Wis. 232, Co.,— (Ind.)— , 93 N. E. 213. 8 N. W. 181. Contra, Farr v. 69. Gluckauf v. Reed, 22 Cal. Semmler, 24 S. D. 290, 123 N. 468; Davidson v. Dwyer, 62 Iowa, W. 835. 332, 17 N. W. 575; Donaldson v. 68. Maeomter v. Kinney, 114 Hibner, 55 Mo. 492. Minn. 146, 128 N. W. 1001, 130 70. Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & N. W. 851; Bliss v. Waterbury, E. 469 (A. D. 1837). 27 S. D. 429, 131 N. W. 731 (sevi- 71. Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. ble); Pierce v. Texas Rice De- 174; Bigelow, Estoppel, 603. § 546] Estoppel. 213:7 ties, and of postponing his claim to that of the jnir- chaser."- There has been considerable difference of ojjinion as to whether a misrepresentation, whether by condnct . or b}^ express statement, must be fraudulent in order to give rise to an estoppel of this character. I'he de- cided weight of authority is to the effect that it need not be such;'^^ but apart from the question of the existence of such a requirement in other case.'=!, it is by some authorities asserted that, in order that one may, by reason of misrepresentations, be estopped to assert his title to land, he must have been guJlty of fraud, on the theory that the application of the doctrine of estoppel by representation in such a ease involves in effect a transfer of land, and that is, by the Stat- ute of Frauds, required to be in writing.'^'' More- over, while, as a general rule, an estoppel by represen- tation is as available at law as in equity, it is, by the decisions of some states, not available at law when the title to land is involved, on the ground that at law the Statute of Frauds must control, and that in equity only can the case be regarded as taken out of the statute by the fraud, actual or constructive, involved in tlie mis- representation."^^ The view is, however, taken in most 72. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ 310; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 307. 686, 731; Ewart, Estoppel, 257. Contra, McDowell v. McDowell, 73. Bigelow, Estoppel, 685 note. HI Iowa, 286, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ 805, 806, 176, 133 Am. St. Rep. 170, 119 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d N. W. 702. Ed.) 431; Ewart, Estoppel, 88 ct 75. Stodenmeyer v. Hart, 155 seg. But fraud is necessary lo Ala. 243, 46 So. 488; Mattoon v. the existence of a misrepresenta- Elliott, 259 111. 72, 102 N. E. 251; tion, on which to base the es- Hayes v. Livington, 34 Mich. 384, toppel, in the case of a mere 22 Am. Rep. 533; Johnson v. failure to assert one's rights. Hogan, 158 Mich. 635, 123 N. W. Ewart, Estoppel 92. Editorial 891; Petit v. Flint & P. M. R. Co.. note, 24 Harv. Law Rev. 494. ng Mich. 492, 75 Am. St. Rep. 74. Trenton Banking Co. v. 417, 78 N. W. 554; Suttle v. Duncan, 86 N. Y. 221; Huyck v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co., 76 Va. Bailey, 100 Mich. 223, 58 N. W. 284. 1002; May v. Hanks. 62 N. C. 2138 Real Propekty. [§ 546 jurisdictions,'^'' that such an estoppel may be asserted at law as well as in equity. So far as concerns the ap- l)licability of the Statute of Frauds in such a ease, it may be remarked that though, in the ordinary case, the practical result of the estoppel is equivalent to that of a transfer of the land, it does not actually involve a transfer, and even were it a transfer, it would be a transfer by operation of law, and consequently not with- in the statute. In equity the person in favor of whom the owner is estopped to claim the land is entitled to a convey- ance of the land by the owner, that is, the owner may be compelled to make good his representations;'^'^ this, as before stated, being a recognized equitable doctrine before the legal development of the law of estoppel under that name.'^^ In determining, therefore, the rights of the person to assert the estoppel as against persons other than the person who was originally guilty of the misrepresentation, the former should, it seems, be regarded as standing in the position of any other person having an equity to a conveyance. Con- sequently, the estoppel should be enforceable as against any subsequent owner of the land, as would any other equity, until the land passes to a bona fide purchaser for value. '^'^ This view has usually been applied,^'^ though 76. Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. v. Slaveus, 218 Mo. 598, 117 S S. 68, 26 L. Ed. 79; Davis v. W. 1104. Davis, 26 Cal. 23; Levy v. Cox, 78. Ante, note 71. 22 Fla. 546, Bigelow v. Foss, 59 79. See Ewart, Estoppel, 196. Me. 164; Macomber v. Kinney, on which the view here presented 114 Minn, 146, 128 N. W. 1001, is based. 130 N. W. 851; Brown v. Bowen. 80. Ions v. Harbison, 112 Cal. 30 N. Y. 519; Beaupland v. Mc- 260, 44 Pac. 572; Ramboz v. Keen, 28 Pa. St. 124; Sh-' Stowell, 103 Cal. 588, 37 Pac. Beebe, 35 Vt. 204; Bigelow, Estop- 519; Thornton v. Ferguson, 133 pel (6th Ed.) 781. Ga. 825, 134 Am. St. Rep. 226, 77. Citizens' Bank of Louisi- 67 S. E. 97; Rutz v. Kehn, 143 ana v. First Nat. Bank of New m. 558, 29 N. E. 553; Maxon r. Orleans, L. R. 6 H. L. 360; Beatty Lane, 124 Ind. 592, 24 N. E. V Sweeney, 26 Mich. 217; Favill 683; Webb v. Hardaway, — Ky. v. Roberts. 50 N. Y. 222; Hubbard L. Rep.—, 121 S. W. 669; Brian <^ 546] Estoppel. 2139 frequently tlie subject has been confused by uiider- taking to determine whether the subsequent owner of the land is a ''privy" of the person originally estopped, a question which, by reason of the ambiguity of the terms "privy" and ''privity" is difficult of solution. An important application of the principle of estop- pel by representation is seen in the decisions by which one who allows the record title of land belonging to him to stand in the name of another, who is m pos- session or apparent possession, is precluded from as- serting his ownership as against creditors of the record owner who gave credit on the assumption . that the record showed the true state of the title. ^"'' These decisions are, to a great extent, cases in which the record title being in the husband, the wife was held to be estopped to assert her beneficial interest as against the husband's creditors,^^"' but the same view has been ap- plied when the relation of husband and wife was non existent. Another important application,, and at times ex- tension, of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is to be found in the decisions, not inconsiderable in number, that if an individual, by reason of a mistaken assump- tion as to the extent or limits of a street, encroaches upon the street by the erection of buildings or the construction of other improvements, and the munic- ipality makes no objection to such action on his part, the municipality may be estopped subsecpiently to assert the rights of the public as against sucli encroachment. **' V. Bonvillain, 52 La. Ann. 1794, Rif^hts and Remedies, § 206 ct 28 So. 261; Stinchfield v. Emer- seq; Editorial note, 28 Yale Law son, 52 Me. 465, 8.'', Am. Dec. Journ. f)85. 524; Southard v. Sutton, 68 Me. 80b. The cases in this regard 575; Thistle v. Buford, 50 Mo. are collected in A. & E. Ann. 278; Smith & Richer v. Hill Cas. 1914C, 1066. note to Goldberg Bros., 17 N. M. 415, 134 Pac. 243; v. Parker. Hodges V. Eddy, 41 Vt. 485, 98 81. See 3 Dillon, Municipal Am. Dec. 612. Corporations (5th Ed.) §§ 1191, 80a. The subject is excellent- 1194. ly discussed in Glenn, Creditors 2140 Real Property. [§ 547 The chief difficulty in these cases appears to be in the fact that ordinarily the abutting owner is in a position to ascertain the existence and limits of the street, and i& consequently hardly justified in asserting that he was misled by the failure of the municipality to object to the encroachments.^- § 547. Improvements by oral grantee. The cases are generally to the effect that an oral gift of land, if followed by the making of substantial improvements by the donee on the strength thereof, will be recog- nized and enforced by a court of equity.^' In some of these cases it appears that the court construed the lan- 82. See notes in 8 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 273, 21 Id. at p. 292, 30 Id. 769. 83. Neale v. Neale, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 590; Burris v. J.anders, 114 Cal. 310, 46 Pac. 162; Kinsell v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 683, 124 Pac. 220; Hunt v. Hayt, 10 Colo. 278, 15 Pac. 410; Howell V. Ellsberry, 79 Ga. 475, 5 S. E. 96; Garbutt v. Mayo, 128 Ga. 269, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 58. 57 S. E. 495; Drum v. Stevens, 94 Ind. 181 (but see Winslow v. Winslow, 52 Ind. 8) ; Bevington v. Bevington, 133 Iowa, 351, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508. 12 Ann. Cas. 490. 110 N. W. 840; Dyer v. School Dist. No. Ill of Sedgwick County, 76 Kan. 889, 92 Pac. 1122; Bige- low V. Bigelow, 93 Me. 439, 45 Atl. 513, 95 Me., 17, 49 Atl. 49; Polk v. Clark, 92 Md. 372, 48 Atl. 67; Whitaker v. McDaniel, 113 Md 388, 78 Atl. 1; Trebesch V. Trebesch, 130 Minn. 368, 153 N. W. 754; Maas v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co. of Cincinnati, 148 Mich. 432, 111 N. W. 1044; Dozier v. Matson, 94 Mo. 328, 4 Am. St. Rep. 388, 7 S. W. 268; Story v. Black, 5 Mont. 26, 51 Am. Rep. 37, 1 Pac. 1; Merriman v. Merrl- man, 75 Neb. 222, 166 N. W. 174; Seavey v. Drake, 62 N. H. 393; Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34, 3 Am. Rep. 657; Messiah Home V. Rogers, 212 N. Y. 315, 106 N. E. 59; Thayer v .Thayer, 69 Ore. 138, 138 Pac. 478; Syler's Lessee v. Eckert, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 378; Burns v. Suther- land, 7 Pa. 103; Cook v. Cook, 24 S. D. 223, 123 N. W. 693; Wool- ridge V. Hancock, 70 Tex. 18, 6 S. W. 818; Cooke v. Young, 2 Utah, 254; Burkholder v. Ludlan, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 255, 32 Am. R.jp. 668; Halsey v. Peters, 79 Va. 60; Coleman v. Larson, 49 Wash. 321, 95 Pac. 262; Crim v. England, 46 W. Va. 480, 76 Am. St. Rep. 826. 33 S. E 310; Dillwyn v. Llewellyn, 4 De G. F. & J. 517 (semble); See 1 White & Tudor's Ldg. Cas. in Eq. (4th Am. Ed.) p. 1047; Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies, § 828; Editorial notes, 15 Harv. Rev. at p. 659; 13 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 151; 26 Yale Law § 547] Estoppel. 2141 guage used by the donor as in effect an offer to convey the land to the so-called donee on condition that he would make improvements, which offer was a.^-cepted by the making of improvements, giving rise to a con- tract to convey the land,^^ but more usually the de- cision is based upon the theory that, after the owner of land has induced another to make substantial ex- penditures thereon by purporting to give him the land, a withdrawal of such gift would, although no contract is created, in effect operate as a fraud upon the donee, which equity will interfere to prevent by requiring the execution of a conveyance in accordance with the in tended gift. In applying this doctrine the courts per- haps ordinarily refer to it as a case of specific per- formance, stating that the making of improvements con- stitutes a jDart performance sufficient to take the trans- action out of the Statute of Frauds. The expressions ''part performance" and "specific performance, how- ever, appear to be particularly inappropriate as applied to an attempted conveyance, as distinguished from a contract, and the doctrine may, it is conceived, be more satisfactorily regarded as involving an application, or perhaps extension, of the principle of estoppel tn pais. Journ. 592; article by Professor 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 446; Ridley v. Roscoe Pound, 13 Illinois Law McNain, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 174. Rev. at p. 672. 84. Gwynn v. McCauley, 32 In occasional comparatively Ark. 97; Gaines v. Kendall, 176 early decisions the oral donee 111. 228, 52 L. R. A. 277, 58 N. was restricted to a right to re- E. 598; Harlan v. Harlan, 273 cover the value of his improve- 111. 155, 112 N. E. 452; Haines ments. Evans v. Battle, 19 Ala. v. Haines, 6 Md. 435; Seavey v. 398; Runker v. Abele, 8 B. Mon. Drake, 62 N. H. 393; Young v. (Ky.) 566. See also Tolleson Overbaugh, 145 N. Y. 158, 39 N V Blackstock, 95 Ala. 510, 11 So. E. 712; Greenwood v. School Dis- 284. Relief to the oral donee trict, 126 Mich. 81, 85 N. W. 241. was denied In Adamson v. Lamb 2 R. P.— 60 CHAPTER XXVII. ESCHEAT AND FORFEITURE. § 548. Escheat. 549. Forfeiture. § 548. Escheat. At common law, as before stated, an escheat of land occurred in favor of the feudal lord in case the tenure terminated by reason of the failure of inheritable blood, such failure arising from the corruption of the blood of the tenant by attainder of felony, as well as from the death of the tenant ^;ith- out any ascertainable heir.^ In this country, in those states in which tenure is to be regarded as nonexistent,^ the feudal conception of escheat cannot obtain, though even there the right of the state to land the owner of which dies intestate without heirs would no doubt be sustained as an attribute of sovereignty. Any question upon the subject, however, is avoided in most, if not all, the states by statutory provisions that, upon the failure of other heirs, the land shall pass to the state or to some state agency.'' This right of the state to land in default of heirs is ordinarily spoken of as ''escheat."^ An ''escheat" of this character may occur in states where aliens are forbidden to hold lands, as a result of the absence of all heirs other than aliens, and l- kewi.se owing to the inability of one, otherwise entitled to in- herit, to trace his descent except through an alien.*" 1. 8 Blackst. Comm. 244 et laws of the state" within the in- seq; ante, § 9. heritance tax law, see 29 Harv. 2. Ante, § 13. Law Rev. 455, discussing and ap- 3. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, §§ proving People v. Richardson, 111. 400, 1151-1154, 3125. 103 N. E. 1033, in favor of the 4. As to whether a county ac- liability to the state, quiring land, under the state 4a. Post, § 595. statute, took "by the intestate (2142) § 549] Escheat and Forfeiture. 2143 But the term *' escheat" is not, it seems applicable to the forcible acquisition by the state of land which an alien has, in violation of law, undertaken to acquire bj^ purchase, though the term is frequently so used, this being in the nature of the enforcement of a forfeiture by the state, rather than an escheat.^ § 549. Forfeiture To state. At common law, upon his attainder of high treason, one forfeited to the crown all his freehold estates, and, in case of petit treason and felony, his freehold estates for life, and his chattel interests absolutely.*' In this country the effect of a conviction of crime is rarely to forfeit all the land of the wrongdoer, the statutes of most states providing explicitly that no conviction of crime shall work for- feiture of estate or corruption of blood, though in two or three there may, it seems, be a forfeiture during the life of the offender.'^ If an alien undertakes to acquire land in violation of the law of the particular state, he may, unle^^s pro- tected by the terms of a treaty with his government, be deprived of such land, and a forfeiture to the state be compelled.^ During the American Revolution, many of the co- lonial governments confiscated the lands of persons sup- porting the royal cause,^ and, during the Civil War, acts confiscating the property of persons aiding the Confederate cause were passed by congress, the confis- cation, however, in the case of land, being limited to the term of the offender's natural life,^^ The confis- cation of enemies' property is, at the present day, not generally approved by writers on international law.^^ 5. See 2 Blackst. Coram. 274, can Revolution, 75 et seq. 293; 2 Kent's Comm. 61; Read v. 10. Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. Read, 5 Call (Va.) 207. S. 546, 36 L. Ed. 812. 6. 4 Blackst. Comm, 381-383. 11. Lawrence's Wheaton, In- 7. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, ternat. Law, 596 et seq. Law- §§ 143, 1162. rence, Internat. Law, § 178; Tay- 8. Post, § 597. lor, Internat. Law, § 540. 9. Sabine, Loyalists of Ameri- 2144 Real Peopeety. [§ 549 Occasionally the statute, in restricting the power ot a corporation to acquire land, provides, expressly or impliedly, that land acquired by the corporation in violation of law shall be forfeited to the state. ^^ In the absence of such a provision for forfeiture, though the state may annul the transfer or dissolve the corpora- tion, it does not have any right to the land which the corporation thus wrongfully acquired. ^-^ Land used for purposes which violate the internal revenue laws in certain ways become subject to for- feiture, by express provision of statute, to the United States government.^* At common law, the proceedings on the part of the state to enforce a forfeiture as well as an escheat was by ''office found" or "inquest of office," this being a proceeding, by the aid of a jury, which was made use of in any cases in which the crown asserted a claim to lands or goods. ^^ There is, in some states, a statutory proceeding for the enforcement of such rights, but an inquest of office as at common law, or, it seems, an action of ejectment, would be sufficient to try the rights of the state to the land in any such case. To individual. A tenant of a particular estate usually holds it subject to certain implied conditions. At common law, a life tenant held the land subject to an implied condition that he should not make a feoff- ment thereof in fee simple, since this divested the whole fee-simple title, and by so doing he forfeited his 12. See Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 v. Licking Valley Land & Min- Serg. & R. (Pa.) 313; Com. v. ing Co., 15 Ky. L. Rep. 211, New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 132 22 S. W. 881; Com. v. New York, Pa. St. 591, 7 L. R. A. 634, 19 L. E. & W. R. Co., 132 Pa. St. Atl. 291, 139 Pa. St. 457, 21 Atl. 591, 7 L. R. A. 634, 19 Atl. 291, 528; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. 139 Pa. St. 457, 21 Atl. 528; Com., 151 Ky. 325, 151 S. W. 934, Fayette Land Co. v. Louisville & 151 Ky. 774, 152 S. W. 976. N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274, 24 S. E. 13. Union Nat. Bank v. Mat- 1016. thews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. Ed. 14. Rev. St. U. S. § 3400. 188; National Bank of Commerce 15. 3 Blackst. Comm. 358. § 549] Escheat and Foefeiture. 2145 estate. This ground of forfeiture is now obsolete, since a modern conveyance passes onl}- such interest as the grantor has/*^ A life tenant may, however, at the present day, forfeit his interest by the commission of acts of waste, the statute frequently containing a provision to this effect.^" A tenant under a lease may also forfeit his tenancy by his disclaimer of his land- lord's title, and, in some states, by the use of the premises for an illegal purpose.^* The subject of the forfeiture of an estate in land for breach of an express condition subsequent lias been before considered. ^^ 16. Ante, § 33. 18. 2 Tiffany, Landrd & Ten. 17. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, §§ 192, 193. See ante, § 77. § 1332. 19. Ante, §§ 82-88. CHAPTER XXVIII. TRANSFER UNDER JUDICIAL PROCESS OR DECREE. § 550. Sales and transfers under execution. 551. Sales in equity at the instance of creditors. 552. Sales of decedent's lands. 553. Sales of lands of infants and insane persons. 554. Sales and transfers for purpose of partition. 555. Decrees transferring title. &b6. Adjudications of bankruptcy. § 550. Sales and transfers under execution. The land of a debtor was first made subject to the claims of creditors by an early statute/ which provided that one who had recovered a judgment might elect to have the sheriff deliver to him the chattels of the dentor and one-half his land, the writ under which this was done being termed a "writ of elegit/' because it recited that the creditor had elected (elegit) to pursue that remedy. Formerly the creditor had merely the right to retain the land taken under this writ until the rejits and profits sufficed to pay the judgment, he being knowm as a tenant by elegit; but now, by statute in England, the creditor may not only take all the debtor's land under the writ, but he may obtain an order for the sale of the land, the proceeds being distributed ara')ng all the creditors.^ The writ of elegit has been made use of in but few- states, and is at the present daj-, it seems, obsolete in every state but Delaware.^ In most of the states the same method is authorized for the realization of debts from the land of the judgment debtor as from his chat- tels, that is, a seizure and sale by the sheriff, and ap- 1. 13 Edw. I c. 18 (St. West- Ed.) § 370. minster II.). 3. Freeman, Executions (3d 2. WiUiams, Real Prop. (21st Ed.) 271. (2146) § 550] Judicial Peocess or Decree. 2147 plication of the proceeds to the payment of the .judg- ment. In the New England states, however, the satis- faction of a judgment out of the debtor's land is usually obtained, not by a sale of the land, but by a delivery of the land, or a part thereof, at a value fixed by ap- praisers, to the judgment creditor, this being known as a levy ''by extent," and the land being said to be ''extended." The statutory provisions as to the method of making the extent are full and precise, and the}'' must be strictly followed. A certain period, usually six months or a year, is allowed to the debtor in which he may pay the judgment and recover the extended lands, but, if this is not done, the creditor acquires the whole estate and interest of the debtor absolutely.^ The satis- faction of a pecuniary judgment, whether by a sale under the writ or an extent, is known as an "execution" of the judgment. As a general rule, all legal interests in land are subject to sale under execution.^ But a bare legal title, that is, a legal title not associated with any beneficial interest whatsoever, is not so subject.*' The interest of a tenant at will is not so subject,''' since he has no interest capable of transfer.* Whether the possibility of an estate created by the limitation of an estate subject to a condition precedent, such as a contingent remainder or an executory devise, is subject to sale under execution would seem ordinarily to depend on whether it is an interest which is capable of transfer,^ 4. 3 Freeman, Executions, § McCann, 24 How. (U. S.) o98, 16 372 et seq.; 2 Dembitz, Land L. Ed. 714. Titles, § 173. 7. Colvin v. Baker, 2 Barb. 5. 2 Freeman, Executions, § (N. Y.) 206; Bigelow v. Finch, 172. 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 498; Waggoner 6. Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 v. Speck, 3 Ohio, 292. in. 103, 58 Am. Dec. 600; Mor- 8. Ante, § 62(d). rison v. Herrington, 120 Mo. 9. So it would ordinarily not 665, 25 S. W. 568; Mallory v. be so liable if in favor of un- Clark, 9 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 358; certain persons. Taylor v. Tay- Bostick V. Keizer, 4 J. J. Marsh. lor, 118 Iowa, 407, 92 N. W. 71 597, 20 Am. Dec. 237; Smith v. while it might be liable if in 2148 Real Propeety. [§ 550 provided the langauge of the statute authorizing execu- tion sales is sufficiently broad to apply to such a case.^" At common law there was no method by which equitable interests could be reached by execution, but, by the Statute of Frauds/^ it was enacted that the execution might be levied on lands of which saiy other person or persons were seised or possessed of in trust for the execution defendant. This provision has been adojDted or re-enacted in a number of the states, but it has usually been construed as applicable only in cases in which the execution defendant has, under an express declaration of trust, the exclusive enjoyment of a bene- ficial interest in property, the legal title to wliich is in another, and neither it not its American counterparts have had the effect of making all equitable interests subject to execution. In some states, however, more liberal statutes have been adopted, subjecting equitable interests generally to execution, while in others the common-law rule which prevailed previous to the Stat- ute of Frauds still controls. ^^ Equitable interests which cannot be sold under- execution may usually be reached by a proceeding in equity, known as a "creditor's bill," or ''creditors' suit. "^^ A sale by a sheriff under a writ of execution is by force of a statutory power,^* and is effective, if legally favor of a certain person, the 474. execution defendant. De Haas v. 10. In New York it is said Bunn, 2 Pa. 335, 44 Am. Dec. that a contingent remainder is 201 (executory devise) ; White v. not within the terms of the exe- McPheeters, 75 Mo. 286; In re cution statute. Jackson v. Mid- Packer's Estate, 246 Pa. 116, 92 dleton. 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; Atl. 70 isemhle). Sheridan v. House, 4 Abb. Dec. Occasionally however it appears 218. to be assumed that no contingent 11. 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 10. remainder is liable to sale under 12. 2 Freeman, Executions, §§ execution. Watson v. Dodd, 68 187, 189; 11 Am. & Eng. Bnc. N. C. 528; Howard v. Peavy, 128 Law (2d Ed.) 632. 111. 430, 15 Am. St. Rep. 120, 21 13. 3 Freeman, Executions, § N. E. 503; Hill v. Hill, 264 lU. 424 et seq.; 5 Enc. PL & Pr. 393. 219, 106 N. E. 262; Roundtree v. See post, § 551. Roundtree, 26 S. C. 450, 2 S. E. 14. See ante, § 312. § 550] Judicial Process ok Decree. 2149 made, and followed by a conveyance to the purchaser, to divest the title of the judgment debtor, and to vest it in the vendee. In order that the sale may have this effect, it must be made under a judgincnt rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subj'J-ct- matter and of the parties.^^ If the judgment is valid, an innocent pur- chaser at the sale is not usually affected by irregulari- ties in the j^roceedings leading up to the sale, though, if the judgment creditor is the purchaser, the rule is different, and he is regarded as chargeable with notice of any irregularities.^^ The statutes of a number of states give the judg-ment debtor a certain period after the execution sale within which he may redeem therefrom, hi the absence of statute, there is no right of redemption.^" The sheriff is required, by the statutes of most, if not all, the states, to make a conveyance of the land to the purchaser at the sale, and this is usually regarded as necessary to vest the legal title in the purchaser. This conveyance should recite the recovery of the judg- ment, the issue of the writ, and the sale thereunder, but any requirements in this regard are regarded as directory merely. The conveyance must usually be executed like other conveyances, and an acknowledg- ment is, in most states, though not in all, necessary only for the purpose of record. If the conveyance is in- valid, the purchaser is ordinarily entitled to have a valid one executed in its place. ^* In the case of a sale under execution, the sale is made bv the sheriff as a ministerial officer, acting under the writ, and the court has no control over his actions, and, except in a few states, no confirmation of the sale by the court is necessary in order to validate the sale. An execution sale is accordingly to be distinguished 15. Freeman, Executions, §§ 17. 3 Freeman, Executions, § 19, 20; Kleber, Void Judicial 314. Sales, §§ 262-267, 294. 18. 3 Freeman, Executions, § 16. 3 Freeman, Executions, § 324 ct seq. 339 et seq. 2150 Eeal Peoperty. [§§ 551, 552 from the sales hereafter referred to in this chapter, which are made in conformity with the order of a court, and must be confirmed by it, and which are accordingly I'egarded as the act of the court, though a commissioner or other officer is necessarily employed by the court as an instrument in making the sale. An execution sale is accordingly not, properly speaking, a judicial sale.'^ § 551. Sales in equity at the instance of creditors. The various liens to which land may be subject in behalf of a person other than the owners are enumerated in another part of this work.^^ These liens are almost in- variably enforced by a sale of the land under the de- cree of a court of equity for the purpose of paying the amount of the lien from the proceeds. Likewise, equity may decree a sale in a creditors' suit brought to ob- tain a discovery of assets, to prevent waste and spolia- tion thereof, or to reach property which is not subject to execution because of its equitable character, or be- cause transferred by a conveyance fraudulent as to creditors.2^ § 552. Sales of decedent's lands. At common law, an unsecured debt could not be enforced, as against the real property of the debtor, after the latter 's decease, unless it was due on a contract under seal, which ex- pressly bound the debtor's heirs, and then it could be enforced against the heir to the extent of any land in fee simple descended to him.^- Under this condition of the law there was no remedy available to even the specialty creditor in case the decedent had devised the land, or the heir had aliened it, and, accordingly, it was provided by statute^^ that a devisee should be liable to the same extent as the heir, and that no alien- ation by either the heir or the devisee should affect his 19. Kleber, Void Judicial Sales. 1413-1415. §i 15-20. 22. 2 Blackst. Comm. 244, Wil- 20. Post, Part VI. liams, Real Prop. (21st Ed.) 280. 21. 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ 23. 3 Wm. & M. c. 14 (A. D. § 552] Judicial Process or Decree. 2151 liability for the debt. These statutes imposed on the heir and devisee a personal liability for the debt to the extent of the value of land descended or devised to him, and this was restricted to debts under seal. Later it was provided-'* that all interests in land should be assets for the payment of debts, whether created by simple contract or by contract under seal, and that the heir or devisee might be sued in equity accordingh' by any creditor of the deceased. In this country there is probably in every state a statute making the realty of a decedent liable for his debts as against his heirs and devisees.^^ Under the English statute making the lands of a decedent liable in equity for his debts, the proceeding to subject the land was by a "creditors' bill" in equity and this mode of proceeding for the purpose is recog- nized in a number of the states.-^ In most of the states, however, the probate court has full jurisdiction to order the sale of land for the payment of debts, and likewise, frequently, for other purposes, such as the payment of legacies, or in order to make distribution, and the statutes usually provide that such sales shall be ordered on the application of the executor or administrator.^''' The length of time after the decedent's death within which a sale of lands for this purpose can be applied for by the personal representatives or the creditors of deceased is in some states fixed by statute. ^^ In the ab- sence of statute, it is said that the application must be made within a reasonable time,^^ and occasionally 1691; 6 & 7 Win. Ill c. 14 (A. D. tion, § 463; 11 Am. & Ens. Enc. 1695), 1 Wm. IV c. 47 (A. D. Law, 1072. 1830). 27. 2 Woerner, Administration, 24. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 104 (A. §§ 463, 464. D. 1833). 28. 2 Woerner, Administration, 25. 2 Dembitz, Land Titles. § § 465. 150; 2 Woerner, Administration, 29. Liddel v. MrVickar, 11 N. §§ 463, 490; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. J Law, 44; Rosenthal v. Renick, Law (2d Ed.) 838. 44 111. 202; Killough v. Hinton, 26. 3 Pomeroy, Eq. .lur. §§ 54 Ark. 65; State v. Probate Court 1152-1154; 2 Woerner, Admiuistra- 2152 Real Pkopekty. [§ 552 this has been determined with reference to the statutory period in which an action to recover lands is barred.*^*' A sale of real estate to pay debts is ordinarily authorized only when the personal estate is insufficient for the purpose, and that such is the case must appear from the bill or petition for sale in order to give the court jurisdiction. In some states proceedings for sale by an executor or administrator are regarded as adversary to the heirs or devisees, so that a failure to give notice to the latter as required by statute renders the sale void. In other states they are regarded as proceedings in rem, and so valid, though no notice is given.^^ In a number of states the failure of the execu- tor or administrator to give bond before making sale as required by the statute is regarded as absolutely in- validating the sale, and sometimes such effect is given to a failure to make the proper oath.^- The sale must comply not only with the require- ments of the statute, but also with the terms of the or- der for sale. The sale, when made by the executor or administrator, must, in most states, be confirmed by the court in order to have any effect whatsoever in passing title, since the personal representative, not ex- pressly empowered to sell by the terms of the will, is regarded as the instrument of the court, and the sale, to be valid, must be adopted by the court as its own act.^^ After the sale is confirmed, the executor or administrator, still acting as the instrument of the court, is usually required to make a conveyance of the ol Ramsey County, 40 Minn. 296; Sumner v. Child, 2 Conn. 607. Ferguson v. Scott, 49 Miss. 500. 31. 2 Woerner, Administration, See Bindley's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. § 466; Kleber, Void Judicial 295. Sales, §§ 72, 156. 30. Ricard v. Williams, 7 32. 2 Woerner, Administration, Wheat. (U. S.) 59, 55 L. Ed. 398; § 472; Kleber, Void Judicial Sales, Wingerter v. Wlngerter, 71 Cal. _ §§ 253, 254, 316, 317. 105, 11 Pac. 853; Rosenthal v. ' 33. Kleber, Void Judicial Sales, Renick, 44 111. 202; Bozeman v. §§ 1-4, 381. Bozeman, 82 Ala. 389, 2 So. 732; §§ 553, 554] Judicial Process or Decree. 2153 land to the purchaser, and, until such conveyance is executed, the purchaser has an equitable title inerely.^^ § 553. Sales of lands of infants and insane persons. The extent to which a court of . equity has inherent power to sell the land of an infant for his benefit is involved in considerable doubt; but the question has, to a considerable extent, lost its importance, owing to the passage of acts, in most, if not all, of the states, authorizing such sales by courts either of etiuity or probate jurisdiction.^^ These sales are usually con ducted by the guardian of the infant, under the direction of the court, the proceedings being generally similar to those in the case of sales of decedents' lands. The ap- plication for the sale is ordinarily required to h(^ made by the guardian, but in some states the statute author- izes it to be made by parents or other persons inter- ested in the infant 's welf are.^*^ The lands of persons non compos mentis may like- wise be sold under the direction of a court by force of statute to that effect in all or in most of the states, and occasionally such power has been asserted by courts of equity apart from statute. The sale is usually made by the committee or guardian of the lunatic acting as an instrument of the court."^^ § 554. Sales and transfers for purpose of partition. Proceedings by one interested in land as co-owner with others, to obtain a partition or sale of the land, have previously been discussed.''"^ In this country the juris- diction of proceedings for partition is usually deter- 34. 2 Woerner, Administration, 36. W^oerner, Guardianship, §§ § 480. 08-78; 2 Dembitz, Land Titles, § 35. And the question of the 151; 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 1309; inherent power of a court of Kleber, Void Judicial Sales, §§ equity may well arise by reason 93, 157, 234-2.'',6. of a failure to comply with the 37. Woerner, Guardianship, § statutory requirements. See edi- 148; 2 Dembitz, Land Title.s, § torial note, 23 Harv. Law Rev. 152. 473. 38. Ante. § 204. 2154 Real Property. [§ 555 mined by the statute, and there are in many states special provisions for the partition of land belonging to a decedent in the probate court, or for a sale for the purpose of partition.^*^ As before stated, a partition proceeding is avail- able only when there is a unity of possession in two or more persons, and consequently cannot be employed in order to apportion the land, or to procure a sale, when the persons interested in the land have successive rights of possession, as when thej^ are tenants for life and in remainder, or one is tenant in fee simple, subject to an executory limitation in favor of the other. In. a few- states there is a provision for a sale in such case under the direction of a court of equity.^'' § 555. Decrees transferring title. The court of chancery in England always acted in personam, and not in rem, and consequently, in adjudicating rights of the different parties to a proceeding concerning land, it did not, by its decree, undertake to transfer the title from one to the other of such parties, but gave relief by ordering one party to make a conveyance, cancel an instrument, or do other acts so as to establish and per- fect the rights of the respective parties as adjudicated. This principle of action on the part of courts of equity has, however, been changed by statute in many states of this country, so that, instead of requiring the parties to carry out the decree, the court itself does so, acting through a commissioner or other officer, and, under some statutes, the decree alone, without any further action, is sufficient to transfer the title."* ^ As regards land out- side the jurisdiction, however, the court must still act in personam}^ 39. Freeman, Cotenancy, §§ 42. Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ 134, 550-564. 135, 170, 1317. See Arndt v. 40. 2 Dembitz, Land Titles, § Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 33 L. Ed. 156. 918; Lindley v. O'ReiUy, 50 N. 41. Huston, Decrees in Equity, .J. L. 636, 1 L. R. A. 79, 7 Am. Ch. 2. St. Rep. 802, 15 Atl. 379. § 556] Judicial Process or Decree. 2155 While a judgment in an action concerning land of a strictly legal character, such as ejectment, or the old real actions, or the statutory ''trespass to try title," is usually decisive of the rights of the parties thereto in regard to the ownership of the land, as betweon them- selves, it cannot be regarded as transferring t!)e title in any sense, but merely decides what effect is to be given to previous transfers. § 556. Adjudications of bankruptcy. The present bankrupt act^" provides that the trustee of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, shall be vested b}^ operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, to all proj^erty which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by any means have transferred, or which might hav^e been levied upon and sold under judicial process agaiiist him. The title to the bankrupt's land, therefore, as well as other property, passes, as it were, by force of Ihe ad- judication of bankruptcy, to the trustee subsequently appointed. Previous bankrupt acts, as well as the in- solvency statutes of the various states, have contained similar provisions transferring the property of the bankrupt or insolvent to the trustee, for. the purpose of distribution among creditors."*^ 43. Act July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 44. 16 ' A. & E. Encyc. Law 565, § 70a). 721. CHAPTER XXIX. TRANSFER FOR NONPAYMENT OF TAXES, § 557. Character of title acquired. 558. Judgment for taxes. 559. Forfeiture to state. 560. Remedial legislation. § 557. Character of title acquired. The payment of taxes on land is in this country usually enforced by a summary sale of the land, conducted by the tax col lector or some other ministerial officer. The power to sell lands for nonpayment of taxes is a purely statutory power, and it has always been held that the statutory requirements as to the mode of mak- ing sale must be strictly complied with, and that, more- over, since the power to sell exists only in case there are valid taxes, which are unpaid, no title will pass un- less the tax was levied and assessed in accordance with law. Tax sales have accordingly been held to be in- valid in particular cases for want of a valid assessment or valuation of the property, duly verified by the proper officers, and approved by the legal reviewing authority or "board of equalization," defects in the levy of the tax, defects in the warrant issued to the collector for the collection of the tax, failure to return the list of deliquent taxes, noncompliance with the various re- quirements as to the mode of advertising the sale, failure to comply with the statute, and also with the advertisement, as to the conduct of the sale, failure to sell all the land, though a part brings enough to pay the taxes. Furthermore, the statutory requirements as to the return of the sale by the officer must be complied with, and he must make a conveyance to the purci'aser in strict conformity to the statute. The sale is 'ilso in- (2156) § 557] NOXPAYMENT OF Taxes. 2157 valid if the tax was unconstitutional, or not pro})erly levied by the legislature or the municipal authorities or if the land was exempt, or the taxes liad been paid before the sale. In vievv^ of these many possible de- fects in the proceedings, as well as others which, might be mentioned, it is not strange that titles based on tax sales are usually regarded as of most questionable soundness, and, though this condition of things has been to some extent removed by legislation of a char- acter hereafter referred to, the possibilities of failure of title through defects in the proceedings are stdl such that land, when sold for taxes, rarelj^, if ever, brings its actual value, and its purchase is ordinarily for pur- poses of speculation, rather than for actual occu])ation/ By the statutes of many states, the sale is of an estate in fee simple in the land, free from any incum- brances, and without reference to the estate or interest belonging to the particular person against whom the tax was assessed, that is, the proceeding for sale is in eifect against the land, and not against any particular owner thereof ; and if one interested in the land, tliougii not bound to pa}'' the taxes as against the person in pos- session, desires to protect his interest, he must pay the taxes, or redeem from the tax sale. So, a remainderman or lienor may, by the failure of the owner in possession to pay the taxes, be divested of all interest in the land. In some states, however, or under particular acts, the taxes are not enforceable against the entire interest in the land, but against the interest onh' of tho person against whom the taxes are assessed, in which case th/.' interests of other owners or of lienors are not divested by the sale. 1. An admirable sketch of the are those by Henry C. Black, uncertainties involved in a tax Esq. and by Robert S. Blackwell, title is contained in 2 Dembitz, the fifth edition of which is Land Titles, p., 1323 et seq. Tlie well edited by Frank Parsons, standard works upon the very Esq. extensive subject of tax sales 2 R. P.— 61 2158 Real Property. [§ 558 The statute usually, if not always, names a certain period, varying from six months to three years, within which the owner of the laud may redeem from the sale by the pa^Tuent to the purchaser of the purchase money, interest, and costs, in addition to which he is ordinarily required to pay a penalty, calculated in interest at n high. rate. The purchaser has, until the execution ot a con- veyance or ''deed" by the officer making the sale, neither a legal nor equitable title to the land, but rather a lien thereon for the amount of the purchase money, interest, costs, and penalty. He is usually entitled to the deed upon the expiration of the time for redemption, and not before, and the statutes frequently imprse cer- tain formalities as conditions precedent to his obtaining the deed. The requirements of the statute as to the form of the deed, which are frequently most detaileil and precise in character, and often include full recitals of the antecedent proceedings, must be strictly followed, and the deed must be executed in strict compliance wnith the statute in order to vest the title in the purchaser, § 558. Judgment for taxes. In some states the leg- islator has provided that the sale of land for taxes shall be preceded by the rendition of a judgment deter- mining the amount of the taxes due. The proceeding to obtain such a judgment is in the nature of a proceed- ing in rem against the land, rather than in personam against the owner of the land, and, consequently, personal service of notice of the proceeding is not regarded as a prerequisite to the judgment, construc- tive service by publication being authorized. Any ob- jections to the validity of the tax or to the assessment must be made by way of defense to the application for judgment, and the judgment is. until reversed, re- garded as conclusive of the right to make the sale, according to numerous decisions, even though the taxes were actually paid. ^§ 551>, 560] XoxPAYMEXT OF Taxes. 2151) § 559. Forfeiture to state. The statute occasiou- ally provides tliat, upon noiipaymeut of taxes due the state, the laud, instead of being sold, shall be for- feited to the state. To what extent such a forfeiture is valid if not preceded by a judicial finding that a default in the payment of taxes exists is a question as t>. which there has been considerable difference of opinion. - § 560. Remedial legislation. The legislatures of the various states have, particularly in more recent years, frequently passed curative statutes for the pur- pose of validating tax sales previously made, as well as those thereafter to be made. These acts are re- garded as valid in so far as they undertake to validate the proceedings in respect to a particuhir step therein with which the legislature could have dis})ensed in the first place, but no furtlier. The same end of curing defective proceedings has frequently been at- tained by the passage of acts providing that the deed to the purchaser shall be prima facie evidence of th" regularity of the proceedings, and it has sometimes been made even conclusive evidence in this respect, this latter legislation being valid, however, as are other curative acts, in regard only to matters which conld have been previously dispensed with. Another mode in which the legislatures have under- taken to add to the security of the purchaser at a tax sale is by "short" statutes of limitation in connection with tax titles, requiring the original owner to proceed to recover the land from the jnirchaser within a certain number of years, less than that within which actions for land must ordinarily be brought. These statutes have usually, like the other statutes having the same purpose- in view, been regarded as applicable only wli^ii tlie jurisdictional requirements of a valid sale were present, and as insufficient to validate a sale wliich is void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the officials to make the sale. 2. Cooley. Taxalitm (:!rd V.(\.) S5S ct scfj. CHAPTER XXX. APPROPRIATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN. § 561. TTie power to appropriate. 562. Rights subject to appropriation. 563. Mode of appropriation. 564. Time of passing of title. 565. Cessation of public use. § 561. The power to appropriate. The power of the state to approjDriate profjerty for public nse. upon payment of just compensation, may be exercised direct- ly by the state itself, or the state may, in the exercise of the power, select particular agencies, either natural persons or corporations, on whom it confers the right to take private projDerty for joublic use. Thus, the legislature may, and ordinarily does, authorize munici- pal corporations to appropriate or "condemn" land for street and other municipal purposes, and s(; it may authorize a railroad or irrigation company, or other private corporation, to appropriate property for its use, upon jDayment of just compensation, provided only the use for which it is appropriated is of a public character. This grant by the legislature of the right to exercise the power is frequently by means of a general statute operating in favor of the corporations of a particular class which may desire to exercise the right. ^ The result of the exercise of the power in connection .with land is to transfer to the state, or to the corporate bod}^ to which the power is delegated by the state, aJl or some of the rights in particular land previously vested in a particular individual, or in a number of individuals. 1. Randolph, Eminent Domain, main (3rd Ed.) § 367 et seq. §S 102-106; Lewis, Eminent Do- (2160) § f)62] Eminent Domain. 2161 § 562. Rights subject to appropriation. There may be an a]3i3ropriation of the rights of owner j^"hip in a particular piece of land, the entire interest of the former owner thus passing to the appropriator, or a j-ight merely to use the land for the particular ]3ublic purpose may be acquired. Whether there is an appro- priation of the ownership of the land is u-i^ally a question of the construction of the statute und'.-r which the land is condemned, in connection with any con- stitutional restrictions upon the power. There i< usual- ly a presumption that the ownership, or, as it is ordi- narily expressed, the ''fee," does not pass, and, unless the statute explicitly authorizes the taking of a fee, or this is necessary for the particular use, it is ordinarily considered that a right of user only is taken by even a municipal corporation.- So a railroad company ordi- narily acquires by condemnation merely an easement in the land, and, in the case of land taken for bighway purposes, the public frequently acquires merely the right to use the land for such purposes. The rights of the owner of land may be iisfi'inged, 7iot by the actual taking of the land for a particular public purpose, but by the fact that the utilization of neighboring land for such a purpose results in the fore • ing of water upon the former land, or the casting thereon of stone, earth, or sewerage, thus interfering with the owner's rights of user in the land, and to that extent appropriating his rights in the land.*^ The taking for ])ublic use may also involve, not a physical invasion of the land itself, but merely the divesting of some of the natural rig'hts incident to the owneishi)) of land. 80, one may be divested of rights as to the flow of a natural watercourse, of access to water, or of rights with respect to percolating and surface water. Like- 2. Randolph, Eminent Domain, (U. S.) ICG, 20 L. Ed. 557; Eaton § 205; 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain, v. Boston, C. & M. R. Co., 51 N. §§ 449-451. H. 504. See editorial notes. 19 .''.. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & llarv. Law Rev. 127, 12 Columbia Mississippi Canal Co., 13 Wall. Law Rev. 1C5. 2162 Real I^rofekty. [§ 5(i2 wise, one maj' be deprived of his natural right to free- dom from dust, smoke, noise, and the like. The cases are in very considerable conflict as to the right to compensation for consequential injuries to land, arising from the invasion of the natural rights of freedom from dust, noise, or noxious odors.* One may be entitled to compensation as having been deprived, by the physical appropriation of another per- son's land, of an easement which he enjoyed in such land.^ And it has been decided that if land is subject to an agreement restricting its use, the person for whose benefit such restriction exists is entitled to compensa- tion when the land is appropriated under the power of eminent domain for a purpose which involves a violation of the agreement.^ 4. Randolph, Eminent Domain, § 152; 1 Lewis, Eminent Do- main, § 235. See notes, 19 Harv. Law Rev. 127; 10 Columbia Law Rev. 245, 12 Id. 165. 5. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, § 223; Strickler v. City of Colo- rado Springs. 16 Colo. 61, 25 Am. St. Rep. 245. 26 Pac. 313; Indian- apolis & C. G. R. Co. V. Belt Ry. Co., 110 Ind. 5, 13, 10 N. E. 923; Ladd V. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481, 24 N. E. 858; Detroit Leather Specialty Co. V. Michigan Cent. R Co., 149 Mich. 588, 113 N. W. 14; Arnold V Hudson River R. Co., 55 N. Y. 661; Willey v. Norfolk S. R. Co., 96 N. C. 408. 1 S. E. 446; Neff v Pennsylvania R. Co., 202 Pa. 371, 51 Atl. 1038. 6. Long Eaton Reci-eation Grounds Co. v. Midland Railway (1902) 2 K. B. 574; Flynn v. New York, W. & B. R. Co., 218 N. Y. 140. Ann. Cas. 1918B. 588. 112 N. E. 913. See Allen v. De- troit, 167 Midi. 464. 133 N. W. 317, 36 L. R. A. N. S. 890, and editorial note 21 Harv. Law Rev. 139. In Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 21 Am. St. Rep. 585, 24 N. E. 858, a like result was obtained by regarding the re- strictive agreement as creating a legal easement. See also, to the same general effect Riverbank Imp. Co. V. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244. That there is no right of com- pensation in such a case wa.s decided in Doan v. Cleveland Short Line R. Co., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505, on the ground that if the person en- titled to the benefit of the re- striction is allowed damages in such case, "only a mere device of conveyancing is necessary to defeat entirely the rule that de- preciation of property incidental to a public use does not con- stitute a taking," quoting United States V. Certain Lands in Town of Jamestown, R. I., 112 Fed. 622. See also Wharton v. United § 563] Eminent Domain. 2163 The fact that one's h\iid abuts on a highway or street is quite generally considered to give him certain rights of light, air, and access, interference with which entitles him to compensation as for the taking of prop- erty. Eights of this character, as the subject of com- pensation, have been before referred to, as has the ques- tion of the extent to which the previous appro ja'iation or dedication of land for a highway authorizes its use, without further compensation, for particular purposes, on the ground that such purposes are of a ''highway" character.'^ § 563. Mode of appropriation. The statutes usually contain explicit provisions as to the constitution of the tribunals which are to decide the amount of compensa- tion to be paid for the property taken. Such a tribunal may, in the absence of any constitutional requirement to the contrary, be composed of a jury of less than twelve men, or of a board of commissioners. The petition for the condemnation should fJiow the public character of the use, and the necessity of taking the particular land, and this latter must be accurately described. Notice to the owner is necessary before the compensation is assessed, but constructive notice by publication is usually regarded as sufficient. The action of the tribunal in fixing the amount of the compensation is frequently subject to review by appeal or certiorari, but is not so in the absence of a statutory provision. In the case of an attempted taking of private j.ro|)ei-ty under color of the right of eminent domain, vrlnch is, however, unauthorized, on account either of the private nature of the use, the lack of necessity for the appro- priation, or lack of legislative authority, the owner may usually obtain an injunction against the wrongful entry on the land, or may sue in ejectment or trespass, and sometimes other remedies are available. states, 153 Fed. 876, 88 C. C. A. 7. Ante, § 417. 58, to the same effect. 2164 Real Peopertv, [§ 504 The constitutions of some states provide tlist cora- poni^ation shall be made before the land is taken, but in others, where there is no such provision, the leai-'^latuie sometimes authorizes a taking of property, and leaves the onus upon the landowner of instituting proceedings to ascertain the compensation to be paid, and to enforce its pa^anent. Such legislation has usually been siipport- ed in the case of a taking by the state or a municipal corporation, but in a number of states it has !)een held that, in the case of the actual occupation of land by a private corporation, the payment of the comitensation must be in some way secured to the owner of the land before he can thus be deprived of his property. WheTi the taking of property does not involve the direct oc- cupation of the land of the person claiming compensa- tion, but merely consequential injuries thereto, the actual payment of the compensation is naturally subs.e- quentto the acts which constitute the taking, since th-^ ])roper amount thereof was not previously ascertaina- ble.« § 564. Time of passing of title. The statute is usually construed as divesting the title of the owner of the land taken only upon payment of the compensation aw'arded,^ and this is necessarily the case wdien the con- stitution provides that the compensation shall be paid 8. Randolph, Eminent Domain, Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 57 §§ 231, 291, 362; 2 Lewis, Emi- Mo. 256; Flynn v. Beaverhead nent Domain, §§ 678-681, 872. County, 49 Mont. 347, 141 Pac. 9. New Orleans & S. R. Co. v. 673; Manchester & K. R. Co. v. Jones, 68 Ala. 48; Fox v. West- Keene, 62 N. H. 81; Erie County ern Pac. R. Co., 31 Cal. 538; v Fridenberg, 221 N. Y. 389, 117 Village of Depue v. Bansbach, N. E. 611; Levering v. Phila- 273 111. 574, 113 N. E. 156; Per- delphia, G. & N. R. Co., 8 Watts, kins V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 72 & S. (Pa.) 459; Stacey v. Ver- Me. 95: Mnllan v. Belbin. 130 mont Cent. R. Co. 27 Vt. 39; Md. 313, 100 Atl. 384; Williams Jones v. Miller.— Va.—, 23 S. E. V. New Orleans. M. & T. R. Co., ?5; Port of Seattle v. Yesler CO Miss. 689; Horton v. Grand Estate, 83 Wash. 166, 145 Pac: Rapids & T. Ry. Co., 199 Mich. 209. 472, 165 N. W. 653; Provote v. § 564] Eminent Domain. 2165 previous to the taking. ^"^ Iii the absence of such a constitutional provision, the statute may authorize the taking of the land before payment. Such a statutory provision has occasionally been construed as not trans- ferring the title before payment of the award, but as merely giving a right of entry and occupation of the land as a preliminary to acquiring title by condemna- tion.^ ^ But, in the absence of such a constitutional* jn-o- vision as that referred to, the fact that the cons*'tution requires a just or reasonable compensation to ho paid has not usually been regarded as prohibiting a statute authorizing the passing of the title before payment of the compensation, provided there is adequate provision for the ascertainment and collection of the comuensa- tion.i- By a number of decisions it is held that the owner of the land has a lien for the amount of the unpaid compensation, either by force of the specific statutory provisions, or by analogy to a vendor's lien for the pur- chase price. ^" Such decisions seem necessarily to imp]v 10. Southern Railway Co. v. Lake City Water & Electrical Birmingham. S. & N. O. Ry. Co., Power Co. v. Salt Lake City, 24 130 Ala. 660, 31 So. 509; Stein- Utah. 282, 07 Pac. 791. hart V. Superior Court of Men- 12. Sweet v. Rechel. 159 U. docino County, 137 Cal. 575, 59 S 380; Haverhill Bridge Pro- L. R. A. 404, 92 Am. St. Rep. prietors v. Essex County, 103 183, 70 Pac. 629; Asher v. Louis- Mass. 120; Appleton v. City of ville & N. R. Co., 87 Ky. 39L Newton, 178 Mass. 59 N. E. 648; 8 S. W. 854; Redman v. Phila- Ballon v. Ballou, 78 N. Y. .325; delphia, M. & M. R. Co., 3;^ N. Brewster v. Rogers Co., 169 N. J. Eq. 165; Martin v. Tyler, 4 Y 73, 58 L. R. A. 495; City of N. Dak. 278, 25 L. R. A. 838, 60 Pittsburg, v. Scott. 1 Pa. 309. N. W. 392; Brown v. Seattle, 5 13. Organ v. Memphis & L. Wash. 35. See 10 Columbia Law R. R. Co., 51 Ark. 235. 11 S. W. Rev. at p. 245. 96; New Bedford R. Co. v. Old 11'. Kennedy v. Indianapolis, Colony R. Co., 120 Mass. 397: 103 U. S. 599, 103 L. Ed. 550; Drury v. Midland R. Co., 127 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Mass. 571; Provolt v. Chicago, Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, R. I. & P. R. Co., 69 Mo. 6:^3; 34 L. Ed. 295; Fox v. Western Frelinehuysen v. Central R. Co. Pac. R. Co., 31 Cal. 538; Cush- of New Jersey, 28 N. J. Eq. 388; man v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Salt Jn re New York, W. S. & B. Ry. 2166 Eeal Pkopebty. [§ 565 that the ownership of the land passes by the condemna- tion proceeding even before payment of the compensa- tion, since one cannot usually have a lien on his own land. § 565. Cessation of public use. When merely a right of user for the benefit of the public is take'U, and subsequently such user ceases, the owner of the land has it free from the public burden.^* Logically, in such a case, the corporation, which acquired the right of user for one public purpose, having abandoned that mode of user, could not utilize the land, or authorize it to be utilized, for a different public purpose, without payment of the value of the right of user for this lat- ter purpose. ^^ There appears, however, to be a disposi- tion occasionally to allow such change of user subject to the payment to the owner of the land of the amount by which the burden of the new user exceeds that of the original user.^''' If not merely a right of user, but the "fee," as it is expressed, is taken, that is, if the ownership of the land is acquired for a public purpose, under the power of eminent domain, the fact that it ceases to be used for that purpose does not ordinarily affect the title, and the corporation which acquired the property may utilize it for other purposes, or may dis pose of it, as may be most to its advantage. ^'^ Tt may Co., 94 N. Y. 287: Lycoming Gas Malone v. Toledo, 28 Ohio St. & Water Co. v. Moyer. 99 Pa. 643; Lucas v. Ashland Light, St. 615; Gillison v. Savannah & Mill & Power Co., 92 Neb. 550, C. R. Co., 7 Rich. (S. C.) 173; 138 N. W. 761. Kittell V. Missisquoi R. Co., 56 17. Frank v. Evansville, & I. Vt. 96; 2 Lewis, Eminent Do- R. Co., Ill Ind. 132, 12 N. E. main, § 885. 105; Sweet v. Buffalo, N. Y. & 14. See Heard v. Brooklyn, 60 P. Ry. Co., 79 N. Y. 293; Eld- N. Y. 242; Pittsburgh & Lake ridge v. City of Binghamton, Erie R. Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa. 120 N. Y. 309, 24 N. E. 462; 23. Currie v. New York Transit Co., 15. See editorial note 22 Harv. 66 N. J. Eq. 313, 58 Atl. 308; Law Rev. 439. Malone v. Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 16. See Hatch v. Cincinnati & 643; State v. Griftner, 61 Ohio Indiana R. Co., 18 Ohio St. 92; St. 201. 55 N. E. 612; Wyoming § 565] Eminent Domain 2167 conceivably occur, Jiowever, that by force of the statute under which the land is taken for public use, a deter- minable fee only is acquired by tlie corporation v^xercis- ing the right of condemnation, limited in effect to .^ndure only so long as the land is utilized for the ^articular purpose. ^^ Coal & Transport Co. v. Price. 81 Pa. St. 1.56; Chamberlain v. Northeastern R. Co., 41 S. C. 399, 44 Am. St. Rep. 717. 25 L. R. A. 139, 19 S. E. 743, 996; Seattle Land & Imp. Co. v. Seat- tle, 37 Wash. 274, 79 Pac. 780; Hays V. Walnut Creek Oil Co.. 75 W. Va. 263, Ann. Cas. 1918A. 802, 83 S. E. 900. 18. Lithgow V. Pearson, 28 Colo. App. 70, 135 Pac. 759; Ben- ham V. Potter, 52 Conn. 248: Chambers v. Great Northern Power Co., 100 Minn. 214. 110 N. W. 1128; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. V. Clapp, 201 111. 418, 66 N. E. 223: MeCombs v. Stewart, 40 Ohio St. 647; Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. St. 128, 61 Atl. 815; Canadian River R. Co. v. Wichita Falls & N. W. Ry. Co., — Okla. — , 166 Pac. 163. CHAPTEK XXXI. PRIORITIES, NOTICE AND RECORDING. § 566. Priorities apart from recording acts. (a) As between legal interests. (b) As between legal and equitable interests. (c) As between equitable interests. § 567. The recording acts. (a) General considerations. (b) Instruments capable of record. (c) Unauthorized record of instrument. (d) Instruments not in chain of title. (e) Instrumsnts executed prior to acquisition of title, (f) Instruments executed after apparently parting with title, (g) Instruments recorded after parting with title, (h) What constitutes recording, (i) Time allowed for recording, (j) Mistakes by recording officer. (k) Index to records. (1) Persons affected with notice by record, (m) Persons entitled to assert failure to record. § 568. Notice as substitute, for recording. 569. Information putting on inquiry. 570. Notice to agent. 571. Notice from possession. (a) General considerations. (b) Character of the possession. (c) Possession consistent with record title. (d) Cotenant in possession. (e) Joint possession or occupation. (f) Possession by tenant under lease. (g) Continued possession by grantor. § 571. Notice from statements in instruments of title. 573. Actual and constructive notice. 574. Purchasers for value. (a) Valuable consideration, (b) Pre-existing debt. (2168) § 566] Priorities and Eecording. 2169 (c) Adequacy of consideration. (d) Notice before payment. (e) Notice after part payment. (f) Payment by note. (g) Payment without acquiring legal title. § 575. Purchasers with notice from purcliasers without notice. 576. Purchasers without notice from purchasers with notice. 577. Purchasers at execution sales. 578. Burden of proof. 579. Lis pendens. § 586. Priorities apart from recording acts (a) As between legal interests. "At common law, the title of a purchaser ordinarily depends, first, upon the titlL' of his vendor, secondly, upon whether the vendor has transferred his title to the purchaser. If the vendor had no title, or if his title was defective, it is not material that the purchaser paid the full value of the property, and supposed he was acquiring a jierfeot title. "^ Were the rule otherwise, it is evideht, any owner of property could be divested of his rignts by a nominal sale of the property to an innocent purchaser by one having no rights therein. Applying this rule, it follows that if B claiming under a purported conveyance from A, has no title be- cause the signature on such conveyance was forged, one claiming under a conveyance from B can assert no title, even though he paid value under the supposi- tion that he was acquiring title by B 's conveyance ■ 1. Langdell, E«]uity Pleading, sada, 54 Ga. 74: John v. Hat- § 139. To the same effect, see field, 84 Ind. 75 •, Vanhoose v. Bispham, Equity, § 261; 2 White Fairchild, 145 Ky. 700, 141 S. W. 6 Tudor's Leading Cas. in Eq. 75; Plattsmouth First Nat. Bank (4th Am. Ed.) Judges' Hares v. Gibson, GO Neb. 767, 84 N. W. notes, at p. 46; Vattier v. Hinde, 259; McGregor v. Putney, 75 N. 7 Pet. (U. S.) 252, 8 L. Ed. 675; H. 113, 71 Atl. 226; Smith v. Iowa Land & Trust Co. v. U. Markland, 223 Pa. 605, 72 Atl. S. 217 Fed. 11, 133 C. C. A. 1: 1047; Jarman v. Farley. 7 Lea United States v. Southern Co., 18 (Tenn.) 141; Mortimer v. J.u-k- Fed. 273; Winters v. Powell. 180 son, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 155 S. Ala. 425, 61 So. 96; Bird v. Jones, W. 341. 37 Ark. 195; Comptcni v. Cas- 2. Sampeyreae v. United States, 2170 - Real Property. [§ 566 Likewise, since a conveyance which has not been de- livered is a nullity, one claiming under the grantee therein, though a purchaser for value without notice, cannot, apart from estoppel, assert any title as against the original grantor named," ^ and the same principle has been applied in connection with a conveyance de- livered in escrow, which was handed by the depositary to the grantee before the satisfaction of the condition.-^ Since, as just indicated, one who has no title can- not transfer title to another, one who has transferred his legal estate to one person cannot thereafter detract from the effectiveness of such transfer by undertaking to transfer it to another. And it is immaterial that the later grantee paj^s value under the supposition that ho is acquiring the property, that is, that he is a 'bona fide purchaser for value." And as one who has divested himself of his title cannot convey that title to another, so one claiming under him cannot do so. In other words, apart from statute, transfers of the legal title to land rank, between themselves, according to priority in time. The very considerable departure from this rule, resulting from the statutory provisions for the record- ing of conveyances, will be subsequently discussed (b) As between legal and equitable interests. As between a legal and an equitable interest in the same property, courts of equity have favored the former, and have in effect regarded the holder of the legal title as the actual owner, against whom an equitable in- terest can be asserted only under particular conditions.^ 7 Pet. (U. S.) 222, 8 L. Ed. 665; 3-4. Ante, § 461. And see I-co Bird V. Jones, 37 Ark. 195; Mc- v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144, 88 S. Ginn v. Tobey, 62 Mich. 252, 4 E. 217. Am. St. Rep. 848, 28 N. W. 818; 5. Ante, § 462. Gross V. Watts, 206 Mo. 373, 121 6. The clearest elementary Am. St. Rep. 662, 104 S. W. 30: treatment of this subject is per- Lee V. Parker, 171 N. C. 144, 88 haps to be found in Prof. Mait- S. E. 217; Smith v. Markland, land's Lectures in Equity, p. 120 223 Pa. 605, 132 Am. St. Rep. ci scg. 747, 72 Atl. 1047. § 566] Pkiorities axd Recording. 2171 As between a legal title to property aud an equit- able interest therein or claim thereto, the legal title, if earlier in point of time, takes priority, that is, as one who has transferred his legal title cannct affect his grantee by subsequently attempting to transfer the legal title to another, so he cannot affect his grantee by subsequently attempting to create an equitable interest in another, even though such other pays value without notice of the prior transfer of the legal title." If the equitable interest or claim is first created, the question whether one who subsequently acquires the legal title takes free from the equitable interest or claiui, will ordinarily depend on whether he is a purchaser for value without notice thereof, courts of equity refusing to enforce the prior equity as against such a purchaser.* 7. That the defense of bona fide purchase for value is not available against a prior legal title see Williams v. Lambe, 3 Bro. C. C. 264; Finch v. Shaw, 5 H. L. Cas. 905; Collins v. Archer, l.Russ. & My. 284; Duncan Town- site Co. V. Lane, 245 U. S. 308, 62 L. Ed. 309; Hurst v. McNeil, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 70; Curts v. Cisna. 7 Biss. (U. S.) 260; United States V. Southern Co., 18 Fed. 273; Hooper v. Savannah & M. R. Co., 69 Ala. 529; Daniel v. Hollingshead, 16 Ga. 190; Jenkins v. Bodley, Smedes & M. Ch. (Miss.) 338; Jones v. Zollicoffer, 4 N. C. 645, N. C. Term R. 212. 7 Am. Dec. 708; Elstner v. Fife. 32 Ohio St. 358; Blake v. Hey- ward. Bail Eq. (S. C.) 220; Brown v. Wood, 6 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 155. The defense of bona fide pur- chaser for value was, however, available, under the former chancery practice, as against a prior legal title, when the plain- tiff was invoking the auxiliary, as distinct from the concurrent or exclusive, jurisdiction of a court of equity. Langdell, Equity Pleading, § 144; White & Tudor's Leading Cas. in Eq. (8th Ed.) 168, 172; 13 Halsbury's Laws of England, 77. 8. See, e. g.. Lea v. Polk County Copper Co.. 21 How. (U. S.) 493, 16 L. Ed. 203; Dean v. Roberts, 182 Ala. 221, 62 So. 44; Turner v. Wilkinson, 72 Ala. 367; Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484, 137 Pac. 260; Mays v. Red- man, 134 Ga. 870, 68 S. E. 738; Pitts V. Cable, 44 111. 103: Walker V. Cameron, 78 Iowa. 315. 43 N. W. 199; Winlock v. Munday, 156 Ky. 806, 162 S. W. 76; Haas v. Fontenot, 1.12 La. 812. 61 So. 831: Beidler v. City Bank of Battle Creek, 172 Mich. 381, 137 N. W. 717; Conn v. Boutwell, 101 Miss. 353. 58 So. 105: Har- rington v. Erie Cotinty Sav Bank. 101 N. Y. 2r.7. 4 N. E. 346; Fles- ner v. Cooper, — Okla. — , 134 Pac. 2172 Real Peoperty. [§ 566 This principle, that equitable relief will be denied as against a purchaser for value and without notice, who has acquired the legal title, is fundamental, the court in effect refusing to deprive him of his right f)f prop- erty in such case because it is not unconscientious for him to retain it. On the other hand eciuity regards as unconscientious the retention of the right of property, as against a prior equity, by one who acquired it witli notice of the equity, or without paying value, and will give relief against him accordingly/^ The rule that a purchaser for value without notice will be protected against a prior equity, and its com- plementary rule, that a purchaser with notice or not for value will not be protected, applies regardless of the character of the equity, whether, for instance, it be an express trust, an implied trust, a right to set aside a conveyance, a right to call for a conveyance, a right to reform a conveyance, an equity of redemption, or an equitable lien. 379; Elwert v. Reid, 70 Ore. 318, 139 Pac. 918, 141 Pac. 540; Bigley ■V. Jones, 114 Pa. St. 510, 7 Atl. 54; High v. Batte, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 335; Hennessy v. Blair, 107 Tex. 39. 173 S. W. 871; Ver- mont Marble Co. v. Mead, 85 Vt. 20, 80 Atl. 852; Croup v. De Moss, 78 Wash. 128, 138 Pac. fi71; Cresap v. Brown, 69 W. Va. 658, 72 S. E. 751. 9. See e. g.. Gilley v. Denman, 185 Ala. 561, 64 So. 97; Gilbert V. Sleeper, 71 Cal. 290, 12 Pac. 172;' New York, New Haven & H R. Co. V. Russell, 83 Conn. 581, 78 Atl. 324; Gamble v. Hamil- ton, 31 Fla. 401, 12 So. 229; Finch V. Beal, 68 Ga. 594; Mason v. Mullahy, 145 111. 383, 34 N. E. 36; Walte-r v. Cox, 25 Ind. 271; Burt Zaiser Co v. Fin- negan, 161 loAva, 631, 143 N. W. 486; Price v. Bassett, 163 Mass. 598, 47 N. E. 243; Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 109, .90 Am. Dec. 230; Marshall v. Hill, 246 Mo. 1, 151 S. W. 131; Veith v. McMurtry, 26 Neb. 341, 42 Si. W 6; Brinton v. Scull, 55 N. J. Eq. 747, 35 Atl. 843; Bellamy v. Andrews, 151 N. C. 256, 65 S. E. 963; Horgan v. Russell, 24 N. D. 490, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1150, 140 N. W. 99; Taylor v. Taylor, 69 Ore. 541, 139 Pac. 852; Duff V. McDonough, 155 Pa. St. 10, 25 Atl. 608; Bristow v. Rosen- burg, 45 S. C. 614, 23 S. E. 957; Sautelle v. Carlisle, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 391; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah, 249, 26 Pac. 300; Curtis V. Lunn, 6 Munf. (Va.) 42; Crowley v. Byrne, 71 Wash. 444, 129 Pac. 113; Parker v. Brast, 45 W. Va. 339, 32 S. E. 269. § 566] Priorities and Eecoedixg. 21(3 Claimant under quitclaim deed. The question whether one chiiming under a quitehdiii deed may hold as a bona fide purchaser for value as agai^ist prioi* equities, not based on the recording act, has occacionally been adjudicated adversely to such claimant. •'''' SucJi a question is for the most part analogous to the question hereafter discussed,^"^ as to the rights of such claimant as against an unrecorded conveyance, but when only prior equities are outstanding it is somewhat difficulty to construe the conveyance, even though in ih<^ form of a quitclaim deed, as intended to convey the legal title subject to such outstanding equities.''^ Consequently, there might be stronger reason for protecting the grantee under such a deed as against a prior equity; than as against a prior unrecorded deed. Subsequent acquisition of legal title. Occa- sionally it happens that a purchaser for value does not acquire the legal title at the time of his purcliase, that is, at the time of his payment of the consideration, but acquires it at a later time. He is in such ca^o in the position of the holder of an equity acquiring the legal title. If such subsequent acquisition of the legal title is effected by him without notice on his part of a 9a. Derrick v. Brown, 66 Ala. recording acts, he cannot tlius 162; Hannan v. Seidentopf, 113 claim as against an equity which Iowa, 658, 86 N. W. 44; Gibson could not be made the subject V Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. of record, such as a right to 00, 140 Pac. 76; Hudman v. set aside the deed to his grantor Henderson, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 358, for fraud. Hendricks v. Callo- 124 S. W. 186. way, 211 Mo. 536, 111 S. W. 60; 9b. Post, S 567(m), notes 14- Starr v. Bartz, 219 Mo. 47, 117 23. S. W. 1125. If he is to be re- 9c. See editorial note, 10 Co- garded, however, as an innocent lumbia Law Rev. at p. 371. purchaser for the purpose of pro- In Missouri the vie\y has been tection against a prior unre- adopted that, while a purchaser corded conveyance, he should holding under a quitclaim deed properly, it would seem, be so may claim as against a prior regarded for tl}e purpose of pro- unrecorded deed as being within tection against prior e'luitics. the protection afforded by Die under the general rule. 2 R. P.— (JL! 2174 Real Pkopebty. [^ 566 prior equity in favor of another, it operates to protect him as against such equity.^'' Indeed, by perhaps the weight of authority, the holder of a later equity, if a bona fide purchaser thereof for value, may protect him- self as against an earlier equity by acquiring the legal title, even though he does so after he has notice of the earlier equity, and merely for the purpose of securing priority.^ 1 So it is well settled in England that a third mortgagee, who has only an equitable title subsequent to that of the second mortgagee, may, by acquiring the legal title of the first mortgagee, secure priority over 10. 13 Halsbury's Laws of England 83; Bailey v. Barnes (1894) 1 Ch. 25; Taylor v. Rus- sell (1892) App. Cas. 244; Flagg V. Mann, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 486; United States v. Detroit Timber 6 Lumber Co., 131 Fed. 668; People V. Swift, 96 Cal. 165, 31 Pac. 16; Carlisle v. Jumper, 81 Ky. 282; Flynt v. Hubbard, 57 Miss. 471; Newton v. McLean, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 285; Wilson v. Western North Carolina Land Co., 77 N. C. 445; Oviatt v. Brown, 14 Ohio 285, 45 Am. Dec. 539; Perkins v. Hays, 3 Tenn. 163, 5 Am. Dec. 680; Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610. 11. Blackwood v. London Char- tered Bank of Australia, L. R. 5 Prlv. Coun. App. Ill; Bailey V. Barnes (1898) 1 Ch. 25; Taylor v. Russell (1892) App. Cas. 244; Fitzsimmons v. Ogden, 7 Cranch. (U. S.) 2, 3 L. Ed. 249; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 46, 5 L. Ed. 393; United States V. Detroit Timber & Lum- ber Co., 131 Fed. 668 {dictum); Wheaton v. Dyer, 15 Conn. 307; McNary v. Southworth, 58 111. 473; Campbell v. Brackenridge, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 471; Weston v. Dunlap, 50 Iowa, 185; Carroll v. Johnston, 55 N. C. 120; Gibler V. Trimble, 14 Ohio, 323; Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Dough- erty, 62 Ohio St. 589, 57 " N. E. 455; ZoUmau v. Moore, 21 Graft. (Va.) 313; Hoult v. Donahue, 21 W. Va. 294. See Smith Paper Co. V. Servin, 130 Mass. 511. But that the holder of the later equity cannot thus protect himself after notice of the earlier equity, see Fash v. Ravesies,' 32 Ala. 451; LouisviUe & N. R. Co. V. Boykin, 76 Ala. 560; Paul v. McPherrin, 48 Colo. 522, 21 Ann. Cas. 460. Ill Pac. 59 (dictum); Corn V. Sims, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 391; Cline V. Osborn, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 511, 68 S. W. 1083; Wing v. Mc- Dowell, Walk. Ch. (Mich.) 175; Kilcrease v. Lum, 36 Miss. 569; Doe V. Doe. 37 N. H. 268; Dean V. Anderson. .14 N. J. Eq. 496; Grimstone v. Carter. 3 Paige (N. Y.) 421, 24 Am. Dec. 230; Golds- borough y. Turner, 67 N. C. 412; Bush V. Bush, 3 Strobh. Eq. (S. C.) 131, 51 Am. Dec. 675; Pillow V. Shannon, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 508 (semble) ; Hoover v. Donally, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 316 (semble). § 566] Peiorities and Recording. 2175 the second mortgagee/^'' The riglit of a bona fide pui- chaser thus to protect himself by the subsequent acquisi- tion of the legal title is, however, subject to a qualifica- tion, to the effect that such acquisition must not iiivolve a breach of trust, as regards the holder of the prior equity, upon the part of the person from whom the legal title is acquired.^^ AVhether the trust mast be an express trust, and whether the trustee or the purchaser must have notice of the trust, appears not to be definite- ly settled.!'' ■ (c) As between equitable interests. As be- tween interests or claims of a purely equitable character, that is, enforceable in equity alone, the rule, as generally stated, is that between equal equities priority of time will prevail, that is, they will rank according to their time of accrual.!'* And the fact that the later ecjuity is acquired without notice of the earlier equity i? ordi- narilv immaterial in this connection. ^"^ For instance. lla. Post, § 639. 12. Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271; Pilclier v. Rawlins, L. R. 7 Ch. 259; Bates v. Johnson, Johns. (N. Y.) 304; Taylor v. London & County Bank (1901) 2 Ch. 231; Mumford v. Stohwasser, L. R. 18 Eq. 56.5; Central Trust Co. V. West India Improvement Co. 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387. 13. See the discussion of the English cases bearing on the sub- ject in White & Tudor's Leading Cases, (8th Ed.) vol. 2, at p. 128. 14. Snell, Equity (16th Ed.) 10; 2 Pomeroy, Eq Jur. §§ 683, 718; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Boykin, 76 Ala. .560; Carlisle v. Jumper, 81 Ky. 282; Wailes v. Coopor, 24 Miss. 208; Dedeaux v. Cuevas, 107 Miss. 7, 64 So. 844; Boskowitz v. Davis, 12 Nev. 466; Wilkes v. Harper, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 338; Wil- liams V. Lewis, 158 N. C. 571, 74 S. E. 17; Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. V. Dougherty, 62 Ohio St. 589, 57 N. E. 455; Henry v. Black, 213 Pa. 620, ^3 Atl. 250; 454; Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 97 Am. St. Rep. 1027, 44 S. E. 433. Briscoe v. Ashby, 24 Gratt. (Va.) "Every equitable title is in- complete on its face. It is in truth nothing more than a title to go into chancery to have the legal estate conveyed, and there- fore every purchaser of a mere equity takes it subject to every clog that may lie on it, whether he has had notice of it or not." Chew V. Barnett, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 389, per Gibson, J. 15. hi re Vernon Ewens & Co., 33 Ch. Div. 402; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 177, 9 L. Ed. 388; Curts v. Cisna, 7 Biss. 2176 Keal Peopeety, [btained, to the effect that the purchaser may entirely ignore the record in such case."'" (d) Instruments not in chain of title. Tlie recording acts have been construed as charging a pur- under which the grantor or mortgagor claims, that as having been executed by a person in the chain of title is, if there is another and independent chain of title aifecting the land, but of those only which appear there theory that, if he exercised proper diligence, he would, chaser with notice of a recorded instrument on the is no clue calling his attention to such instrumenrs. t'or by searching the records, discover the existence and terms of such instrument, and he has, on the same upon the records, a purchaser is not affected with mortgagee is ordinarily regarded as charged wilh notice, notice of the instruments contained therein, since there not of all the instruments which appear on the record as theory, been held not to be charged with notice when his failure to discover the recorded instrument Vv^is not owing to lack of diligence. Accordingly, a grantee or instance, A purchasing from B is not affected with notice of a conveyance, previouslj^ recorded, from C to D, unless B's title appears on the record to be derived through C.^^ And, if a conveyance is not recorded, the 32 S. D. 4.38, 143 N. W. 373, Pac. 489; Harris v. Reed, 21 Gilbert v. Jess, 31 Wis. 110. Idaho, 364, 121 Pac. 780; City of And so where an instrument Chicago v. Witt, 75 lU. 211; Sin- was recorded in the wrong coun- clair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. ty, but the subsequent purchaser 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376; saw it on record. Perrin v. Gardner v. Jaques, 42 Iowa, 577; Reed, 35 Vt. 2. Ora v. Bane, 92 Kan. 567, 141 53. Nordman v. Rau, 86 Kan. Pac. 303; John T. Moore Plant- 19, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400, iug Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1068, 119 Pac. T. R. & S. S. Co., 126 La. 840, 351; Kerns v. Swope, 2 Watts 53 So. 22; Roberts v. Bourne, 23 (Pa.) 75. Me. 165, 39 Am. Dec. 614; Baker 54. Abbott V. Parker, lO.''. Ark. v. Griffin, 50 Miss. 158; Page 425, 147 S. W. 70; Standard Oil v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 463: Blake Co. V. Slye, 164 Cal. 435, 129 v. Graham, 6 Ohio St. 580, 67 ^ 567] Priorities and Eecordixg. 2187 fact that a conveyance or mortgage by the grantee therein is recorded will not affect with notice a person who subsequently obtains a conveyance from the same grantor.^-^ And the fact that there is of record a inort- gage from B to A does not charge a subsequent pur- chaser from A with notice of a prior conveyance by A to B which was not recorded.^"*'"^ Likewise, the record of the conveyance of an equitable title from one who has such title only, while notice to a subsequent pur- chaser of the same title from the same grantor, is not notice to one who purchases from the holder of the legal title,-^*' provided at least he has no notice, actual Am. Dec. 360; Perkins v. Cissell, 32 Okla. 827, 124 Pac. 7; Ad- vance Thresher Co. v. Esteb, 41 Ore. 469, 69 Pac. 447; Hethering- ton V. Clark, 30 Pa. St. 393; Smyly v. Colleton Cypress Co., 95 S. C. 347, 78 S. E. 1026; White V. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 71 Am. St. Rep. 875, 50 S. W. 564; Webb V. Ritter, 60 W. Va. 193, 54 S. E. 484. In Fullerton Lum- ber Co. V. Tinker, 22 S. D. 427, 18 Ann. Cas. 11, 118 N. W. 700, the decision to the contrary is based on the fact that the regis- ter of deeds was required to keep an index, which would show in one place all the conveyances which might be made of any particular piece of property. 55. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Gardner 131 Ala 599, 32 So. 622; Rowe v. Hender son Naval Stores Co., 139 Ga 318, 77 S. E. 17; Booker v. Book er, 208 111. 529, 100 Am. St. Rep 250, 70 N. E. 709; Roberts v Bourne, 23 Me. 165, 39 Am Dec. 614; Board of Education of Minneapolis v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404. 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) n37. 136 N. W. 1095; Hart v. Gardner, 81 Miss. 650, 33 So. 442; Page V. Waring, 76 N. Y. 463; Hether- ington V. Clark, 30 Pa. St. 393; Sayward v. Thompson, 11 Wash. 706, 40 Pac. 379. It has been said that a pur- chaser from one in possession can not assert ignorance of a prior recorded conveyance by his vendor, merely because no con- veyance to his vendor appears of record, and that he is chargeable with notice of any recorded con- veyance made by his vendor in possession. Eversole v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 122 Ky. 649, 92 S. W. 593. But he would be chargeable with notice of a previous recorded conveyance by his vendor even if his vendor is not in possession. 55a. Sternberger v. Ragland, 57 Ohio St. 148, 48 N. E. 811; Pyles V. Brown, 189 Pa. St. 164, 69 Am. St. Rep. 794, 42 Atl. 11; Veazie v. Parker, 23 Me. 170; Pierce v. Taylor, 23 Me. 246. 56. Pearce v. Smith, 126 Ala. 116, 28 So. 37; Ora v. Bane, 92 Kan. 567, 141 Pac. 303; Becker 2188 Eeal Propekty. [§ 567 or constructive, of the equitable title-^^"" This general rule, restricting the operation of the record as notice to subsequent purchasers, is obviously based upon the prevailing method of indexing the records by the names of the grantors and grantees, and it is readily conceiv- able that the introduction, in any particular community, of a method of indexing the records with reference to the property atfected, might be regarded by the courts as ground for abrogating the rule."*" If two or more persons join as grantors or mortga- gors, the grantee or mortgagee, or one claiming under him, is chargea])le with notice of recorded instruments executed by each of them, or by persons in the chain of title under which each of them claims.^^ And tUe case is the same when two or more persons, as asserting conflicting claims to land, or as having merely undivided interests 'therein, make separate conveyances thereof to one person.^^ Conveyance of neighboring la,nd. A purchaser is, it appears, ordinarily charged with notice of an incumbrance upon the property created by an instru- ment which is of record, although the primary purpose of such instrument is, not the creation of such ineum- Ijrance, but the conveyance of neighboring proiierty. For instance, if one owning two adjoining city lots V Stroeher, 167 Mo. 306, 66 S. Law Rev. at p. 324, upon the V\^. 1083; Tarbell v. West, 86 N. effect of a mortgage by one claim- Y. 280; Sands v. Beardsley, 32 ing under a contract of sale. W. Va. 594, 9 S. E. 925. 57. See FuUerton Lumber Co. 56a. Davis & Son v. Milligan, v. Tinker, 22 S. D. 427, 18 Ann. 88 Ala. 523, 6 So. 908 (semMe) ; Cas. 11. 118 N. W. 700; Harris v. Alden v. Garver, 32 in. 32; Reed, 21 Idaho, 364, 121 Pac. .Tones V. Lapham, 15 Kan. 540; 780; Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wj'O. 17. Balen v. Mercier, 75 Mich. 42, 42 59 Pac. 434. N. W. 666; Crane v. Turner, 7 58. Gimon v. Davis, 36 Ala. Hun (N. Y.) 357, aff'd 67 N. Y. 589; Creel v. Keith, 148 Ala. 233, 437. See Edwards v. McKernau, 41 So. 780. 55 Mich. 520, 22 N .W. 20. These 59. Brannan v. Marshall, 1S4 citations are in part from an Ala. 375, 63 So. 1007. editorial note in .17 Columbia § 567] Priorities and Recording. 2189 conveys one of them, the instrument of conveyance ex- pressly granting an easement as against the lot retained in favor of that conveyed, the record of such conveyance will, it seems, affect a subsequent purchaser of the former lot with notice of such easement and he will take subject thereto. In such a case, at common law, the purchaser would take subject to the easement previous- ly^ created, as being a legal interest, irrespective of whether he has notice thereof,*'^ and the rule in this respect could not well be regarded as changed by the adoption of the recording law, as applied to a case in which the grant of the easement does appear of record, though in connection with the conveyance of other land, to which the easement is made appurtenant.^' And when, as may occur,"^ the acceptance of a convey- ance of land, or of a grant of an easement in particular land, involves the creation of an easement upon other land, belonging to the grantee, in favor of land belong- ing to the grantor, by reason of words of contract or reservation inserted in the instrument, a subc^^equent purchaser of such other land from the grantee would, it seems, be charged with notice of the easement, by reason of the record of the conveyance or grant, althou2:h the primary purpose thereof was to convey an interest in 60. See ante, § 566(a), 11 chargeable with notice, by the Halsbury's Laws of England, 247; record of the conveyance to A, Leech v. Schweder, 9 Ch. App. that not only did she, A, have the 463, 474. part described, but also that an 61. See Hammonds v. Eads, 146 easement was granted by that Ky. 162, 142 S. W. 379, Glorieux conveyance to A over the balance V. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. 199, Ann. of the tract. Cas. 1917E, 484, 96 Atl. 94; Bow- 62. See Dyer v. Sanford, 9 man v. Holland, 116 Va. 805, 83 Meto. (Mass.) 404; Case v. S E. 393. In Mitchell v. D'Olier, Haight, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 632; 68 N. J. L. 375, 59 L. R. A. 949, referred to in 6 Harv. Law Rev. 53 Atl. 467, it was held that 311, article by H. W. Chaplin, where a conveyance to B of a Esq. In the first cited case, tract of land contained an ex- Shaw, C. J., says: "We think a ception of a certain part specif- grant may be so made as to ically described, as having been create a right in the grantee's previously conveyed to A., B was land in favor of the grantor. For 2 R. P.— 63 2190 Real Property. [§ 567 different land. And if, in conveying lot A, tlie grantor enters into a restrictive agreement as to the improve ment of lot B, retained by him, a subsequent purchaser of lot B would ordinarily be charged with notice of the agreement, by reason of its record as a part of the conveyance of lot A. Were he not so charged, the re- strictive agreement might be to a considerable extent nugatory.^'"^ And, as will appear later,^'^ where one mortgage covers two or more lots or tracts, the pur- chaser of one lot or tract is, by the record of a previous conveyance or mortgage of the other tract, increasing the proportion of the mortgage debt to be borne by the former lot or tract, charged with notice thereof. (e) Instruments executed prior to acquisition of title. The question whether a jjurchaser is charged with notice by the record of a conveyance, executed by a f)erson in his grantor's chain of title before such per- son's acquisition of the title, has been considered in connection with our discussion of the doctrine of the grantor's estoppel to assert an after acquired title,'^^"*^'' it being only by reason of that doctrine that such a con- veyance by one without title can in any case be effective. instance; suppose A. has close C3. King v. St. Louis Union No. 2, lying between two closes. Trust Co., 226 Mo. 351, 126 S. W. Nos. 1 & 3, of B; and A grants 415; Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. to B the right to lay and main- 678, 93 Atl. 216; Whistler v. Cole, tain a drain 'from close No. 1, 81 N. Y. Misc. 519, 143 N. Y. across his close No. 2, thence to Supp. 478, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1118; be continued through his own Holt v. Fleischman, 75 N. Y. App. close, No. 3, to its outlet; and A, Div. 593, 78 N. Y. Supp. 647. in his grant to B, should reserve But a contrary view was adopted the right to enter his drain, for in Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. the benefit of his intermediate L. 199, Ann. Cas. 1917E 484, 96 close, with the right and privilege Atl. 94, on the ground that the of having the waste water there- statute, in making the record from pass off freely through the notice to subsequent purchasers, grantee's close, No. 3, forever. meant purchasers of the same In effect, this, if accepted, would land as that previously conveyed, secure to the grantor a right in 64. Post. § 625. the grantee's land." 65-67. Ante, § 545(e). § 567] Pkioeities and Kecobding. 2191 The cases are not in harmony as to whether a purchaser, finding the record of a conveyance by A to B for in- stance, and a subsequent conveyance by B to the vendor, must examine the records to see whether B, before the conveyance by A to him, had made a conveyance to some other person, which, upon B 's acquisition of title, vested the title in such person. (f ) Instruments executed after apparently parting with title. It is generally agreed that a pur- chaser is not charged with notice of a conveyance by a person in the grantor's chain of title, by reason of the record thereof, if such conveyance was executed after the grantor therein appears, by a recorded conveyance, to have parted with the title.^^ For instance, if A first conveys to B, and then conveys to C, a purchaser from B, is not, by reason of the record of the conveyance to C, charged with notice of its existence, so as to be put on inquiry as to the validity of the conveyance by A to B. He has the right to assume that A, having conveyed to B, would have made no further conveyance, and he is consequently under no obligation to search for such a conveyance. Whether, in case the purchaser from B had actual notice of the subsequent conveyance to C, he would be put on inquiry thereby as to the validity of the conveyance to B, is another question, which would probably call for an affirmative answer. (g) Instrument recorded after parting with title. When a purchaser who receives his conveyance before the record of a prior conveyance by the same grantor to another, nevertheless takes subject to such prior conveyance, as having actual notice thereof, on.^ who purchases from him, but after the record of such prior conveyance, has usually been regarded as taking 68. Goodkind v. Bartlett, 153 Hooker v. Pierce, 2 Hill (N. Y.) HI. 419, 38 N. E. 1045; Tydings 650; White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. V. Pitcher, 82 Mo. 379; Chowen v. 556. 71 Am. St. Rep. 875, 50 S. Phelps, 26 Mont. 524, C9 Pac. 54; W. 564. 2192 Real Property. [§ 567 subject thereto. Such last purchaser cannot claim priority as a purchaser from an innocent purchaser,*^' since his vendor took with notice, and he cannot him- self claim to be an innocent purchaser, because he is charged with notice by the record of the prior convey- ance before his purchase.'^'' In states in which a sub- sequent purchaser, in order to be protected as against an unrecorded conveyance of which he has no notice, must first record his conveyance, '^^ it seems that the last purchaser might, under such circumstances, bo post- poned, even though he purchased before the record of such first conveyance, unless he records his conveyance before the first conveyance is recorded,'^^ Under the doctrine stated in the preceding para- graph, an intending purchaser, although he finds by the index of grantors in the record office, that a particular person in the chain of title executed a conveyance of the land, must nevertheless continue the examination of the records under the name of such person, in order to see whether there was subsequently recorded a i^moc conveyance by such person, though, as before stated'^^ he is under no such duty for the purpose of seeing w^hether there was subsequently recorded a suhsequent conveyance by such person. If, however, he perform his duty in searching for any prior conveyance, he would usually discover any subsequent conveyance of record, and for this reason there seems a certain incon- sistency in making the question of his constriK^tive no- tice of a conveyance subsequently recorded depend upon 69. Post. § 575. 280; Parrish v. Mahany, 10 S. D. 70. Mahoney v. Middleton, 41 276, 66 Am. St. Rep. 715, 73 N. W. Cal. 41; Bayles v. Young ,51 111. 97; White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 127; Van Aken v. Kleason, 34 556, 71 Am. St. Rep. 875, 50 S. Mich. 477; Cook v. French, 96 W. 564, (dictum); Erwin v. Mich. 525, 56 N. W. 101; Woods Lewis, 32 Wis. 276. V. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 71. Post, § 567(1), note 11. 390; Jackson v. Post, 9 Cow. (N. 72. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. Y.) 120, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 588; 443. Van Rensselaer v. Clark, 17 73. Ante, § 5G7(f). Wend. (N. Y.) 25, 31 Am. Dec. § 567] Priorities and Recording. 2193 the date of the conveyance. In one state any distinction in this regard is obviated by decisions to the effect that an intending purchaser, having found on the lecords a conveyance by a particular person in the chain of title, is under no obligation to ''run down" such person further in the index of grantors for the purpose of dis- covering any prior conveyance by him subsequently re- corded/^ (h) What constitutes recording. By the con- struction usually placed on the recording acts, and fre- quently by the express language thereof, it is the time of the filing or deposit of an instrument for record, and not the time of its actual record by the official recorder, that determines the rights of the claimant thereunder as against a subsequent purchaser.'^^ That after the instrument has been recorded, the record is in some way destroyed, as by tire, has b'?en re- garded as not affecting the validity of the act of record, for the purpose of protecting the claimant thereunder as against a subsequent purchaser. '^^"'^^ 74. Morse v. Curtis, 140 Mass. Cas. 559, 38 So. 797; Lewis v. 11, 54 Am. Rep. 456, 2 N. E. Hinman, 56 Conn. 55, 13 Atl. 929. In Day v. Clark, 25 Vt. 143; Greenfield v. Stout, 122 Ga. Vt. 397, the same result is attain- 303, 50 S. E. Ill; Tucker v. Shaw, ed on the theory that, as a subse- 158 111. 326. 41 N. E. 914; Sinclair quent purchaser with notice from v. Slawson, 44 Mich. 123, 38 Am. a purchaser without notice takes Rep. 235, 6 N. W. 207; Deming free from any adverse claim, the v. Miles, 35 Neb. 739, 37 Am. St. last purchaser is, in this case, to Rep. 464, 53 N. W. 665: Davis v. be preferred, because he does not Whitaker, 114 N. C. 279, 41 Am. know that his grantor had actual St. Rep. 793, 19 S. E. 699; Fara- notice of the unrecorded convey- bee v. McKerihan, 172 Pa. 234, 51 ance. Such a view, that a pur- Am. St. Rep. 734, 33 Atl. 583; chaser is protected unless he Throckmorton v. Price. 28 Tex. knows that his vendor had notice 605, 91 Am. Dec. 334. And see of an adverse claim, appears to authorities cited post, § 567 (i), find no support elsewhere. See note 78. also Bowman v. Holland, 116 Va. 76-77. Paxson v. Brown, 10 C. 805, 83 N. E. 393. C. A. 135, 61 Fed. 874; Houston 75. See Chapman & Co. v. Oil Co. of Texas v. Wilhelm, 104 Johnson, 142 Ala. 633, 4 Ann. C. C. A. 618, 182 Fed. 474; Alvis -l9-t Eeal Property. [§ 567 (i) Time allowed for recording. The statute occasionally provides that the instrument shall be re- corded or filed for record within a certain period after its delivery, or expressly allows such a period for re- cording. A requirement that the instrument shall be recorded w^ithin a specified time would ordinarily be satisfied by the filing of it for record within that time, the grantee not being in a position to control the time of actual recording by the official recorder.'** This would seem to be a reasonable construction to place upon such a provision, and usually the statute contains an express declaration that the instrument shall be regarded as re- corded from the time at which it is filed or ''lodged" for record, 'or that it shall be effe.ctive as against sub- sequent purchasers from that time, thus indicating that the time of filing and not the time of actual recording is the important consideration. A provision thus specifying the time within which the instrument must be recorded in order to make it etfective as against subsequent purchasers has ordina- rily been construed as making the record of the instru- ment at any time within the period named e»^iui\'alent to its record at the time of its delivery, so as to give it priority over a subsequent conveyance made lo a bona fide purchaser within that period, even though this be first recorded. ^^ The record of an instrument offer the V. Morrison, 63 IH. 181, 14 Am. Gibbons, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 632. Rep. 117; Shannon v. Hall, 72 111. 78. 'McGregor v. HaH, 3 Stew. 354, 22 Am. Rep. 146; Hyatt v. & P. 397; Dubose v. Young. 10 Cochran, 69 Ind. 436; Thomas v. Ala. 365; Gill v. Fauntleroy's Hanson, 59 Minn. 274; Myers v. Heirs, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 177; Buchanan, 46 Miss. 397; Geer v. Harrold v. Simonds & Bailey, 9 Missouri Lumber Min. Co., 134 Mo. 326; Hughes v. Powers, 99 Mo. 85, 34 S. W. 1099, 56 Am. St. Tenn. 480, 4 S. W. 1. And see Rep. 489; Deming v. Miles, 35 authorities cited ante. § 567(h) Neb. 739, 37 Am. St. Rep. 464, 53 note 75. But see Benson v. Green, N. W. 665; Cooper v. Flesner, 24 80 Ga. 230, 4 S. E. 851; Moore v. Okla. 47, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) Collins, 15 N. C. 384. 1180, 20 Ann. Cas. 29, 103 Pac. 79. Betz v. Mullin, 62 Ala. 365; 1016; Houston v. Blythe, 71 Tex. White v. Interstate Bldg. Ass'n., 719, 10 S. W. 520; Armentrout v. 106 Ga. 146, 32 S. E. 26; Mc- § 567] Priorities and Recording. 2195 statutory period can obviously not have sucli an effect of making the record relate back to the time of de- livery,^^ but for other purposes it is as effective as rec- ord within the period, that is, it operates as construc- tive notice to one purchasing after such record.**^ As between two instruments, neither of which is re- corded within the statutory time, the matter of priority would ordinarily be determined, it seems, as if there were no provision in the statute as to time.^^ As betw^een two instruments, of which the one first re- corded was not recorded within the statutory time, and the other was recorded within such time, it was held, on a construction of the statute, that the one first re- corded was entitled to jDriority.*'^ In the absence of a statutory provision as to the time of recording, the record of an instrument cannot relate back to the time of its delivery, so as to take priority over an intervening conveyance oi" incum- brance.^* If the record did so relate back, without any limitation as to the extent of the interval between the delivery and record of the conveyance, a subsequent Carthy v. Seisler, 130 Ind. 63, Bush (Ky.) 225; Claiborne v. 29 N. E. 407; Finley v. Spratt, 14 Holmes, 51 Miss. 146; Sanborn v. Bush (Ky.) 225 Claiborne v. Adair, 29 N. J. Eq. 338; North- Holmes, 51 Miss. 146; Fries v. rup v. Bremer, 8 Ohio, 392; Null, 154 Pa. 573, 26 Atl. 554 Pleschner v Sumpter, 12 Ore. 161, (dictum); Steele v.' Mansell, 6 6 Pac. 506; Fries v. Null, 154 Pa. Rich. L. (S. C.) 543; Camp Mfg. 573. 26 Atl. 554; CoUins v. Co. V. Carpenter, 112 Va. 79, 70 Aaron, 162 Pa. 539, 29 Atl. S. E. 497. 724; Levi v. Gardner, 53 S. C. 24, 80. Maddox v. Wilson, 91 Ga. 30 S. E. 617; Turner v. Cochran, 39, 16 S. E. 213; Pollard v. 94 Tex. 480, 61 S. W. 923. Cocke, 19 Ala. 188; Schmidt v. 82. McGuire v. Barker, 61 Ga. Zahrndt, 148 Ind. 447, 47 N. E. 339; Fleschner v. Sumpter, 12 335; Littlefield v. Prince, 96 Me. Ore. 161, 6 Pac. 506; Souder v. 499, 52 Atl. 1010; Harding v. Morrow, 33 Pa. 83; Collins v. Allen, 70 Md. 395, 17 Atl. 377; Aaron, 162 Pa. 539, 29 Atl. 724. Leger v. Doyle, 11 Rich. L. (S. 83. Fries v. Null, 154 Pa. 573, C.) 109, 70 Am. Dec. 240. 26 Atl. 554, 158 Pa. 15, 27 Atl. 81. Adair v. Davis, 71 Ga. 769; 867. McVay v. English, 30 Kan. 368, 84. See Sigourney v. Lamed, 1 Pac. 795; Finley v. Spratt, 14 lo Pick. (Mass.) 72. 2196 Real Property. [§ 567 purchaser would never be protected against a prior un- recorded conveyance. In one state, however, it has been held that, although there is no statutory provision as to the time of record, the record will relate back to the time of delivery if the recording occurs within a ''rea- sonable" time.^^ In one state it has been decided that, although the statute in terms invalidates an unrecorded conveyance only as against a subsequent purchaser whose conveyance shall first be duly recorded, a delay in recording an instrument may operate by way of estoppel to prevent the beneficiary thereunder from as serting it as against a subsequent purchaser whose con- veyance is not first recorded.^^ This view appears not to have been asserted elsewhere, though there are numei'- ous decisions to the effect that the failure to record may operate by way of estoppel in favor of creditors of the grantor who give credit to him on the assump- tion that he is still the owner of the land.^''^^ The question of the effect of a delay in recording presents obvious difficulties from a practical point of view. A statute which allows a grantee, by recording his conveyance at any time within a certain period, thereby to obtain priority over an intervening pur- chaser who took in ignorance of the prior conveyance and had no means of discovering its existence, must frequently work hardship, and prevents a purchaser from relying with any sense of absolute security upon the title as it appears of record. On the other hand, if a grantee is allowed no time within which he may re- 85. Goodsell v. Sullivan, 40 Kappes v. Rutherford Park Ass'n, Conn. 83; Hartford Building & 60 N. J. Eq. 129. See also Long- Loan Ass'n V. Goldreyer, 71 Conn. worth v. Chase, 1 McLean, (U. 95, 41 Atl. 659. S.) 282. And compare Mintz v. 86. Marling v. Nommensen, 127 Russ, 161 N. C. 538, 77 S. E. 851 Wis. 363, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 412, That a delay of several years in 115 Am. St. Rep. 1017. 7 Ann. Cas. recording does not Involve an 364, 106 N. W. 844. See, as to "abandonment" of one's title, see the effect of a failure for twenty- Bond v. Wilson, 129 N. C. 325, 40 two years to record or to make S. E. 179. claim as constituting laches, 86a. Ante, § 546. § 567] Priorities and Kecording. 2197 cord the instrument, being in effect liable to be post- poned to a subsequent conveyance to another executed immediately after his own conveyance, during the inter- val of time, perhaps, necessary for the transmission of his own instrument to the record office, such grantee is evidently not fully protected. The statutory provisions as to the time for record- ing, construed, as they have been, as allowing the grantee to postpone recording for a certain period with- out thereby endangering his right of priority, seem to be of questionable expediency. A greater dtgree of justice is likely to be attained by the statutes which, not naming any time for recording, afford protection as against a subsequent purchase only if the prior con- veyance is recorded before the subsequent purchase oc- curs. Under such a statute no doubt a purchaser wiio exercises the greatest possible promptitude in record- ing his conveyance may occasionally be postponed by reason of the immediately previous record of a con- veyance to another, but this is not apt to occur, and if it does occur, he is in a position immediately to learn thereof and to take measures accordingly, while when a certain period is allowed for recording, a purcliaser although he has recorded his conveyance, must wait until the statutory period has expired before he can rest assured that he has obtained the title w^hich he under- took to purchase. ^'^ (j) Mistakes by recording officer. The couiis of the different states are divided upon the (question as to who must suffer the loss occasioned by an error made by the officer in recording a conveyance deposited with him for record. Some courts liold that a grantee, by lodging the instrument with the proper officer for rec- ord, acquits himself of all responsibility as to the actual recording, and that from that time it is notice to sub- sequent purchasers of what it contains, and not of what 87. See Webb, Record of Title, § 7. 2198 Real Pkopeety. [^, 567 the rocording officer may make it show on the rec- Qj,(j S8S9 rpi^jg view is usually based upon the language of the recording statute of the particular state, provid- ing in effect that a conveyance shall be operative as a record, or as against a subsequent purchaser, from tlic time that it is filed or deposited for record. Other courts hold that subsequent purchasers are bound only by what the records show, and that the grantee in a conveyance, in order absolutely to guard against mis- takes by the recorder, and to insure the preservation of his rights as against subsequent purchasor^■, must ascertain that the recordino^ is correctlv done."'' This latter view is usually based on the theor}^ that che re- cording officer is to be regarded, in respect to the record of any particular instrument, as the agent of the bene- ficiary under the instrument, and that the latter is in a position, by the exercise of a considerable degree of dili- gence, to ascertain whether the officer has correctly per- formed his duty, which a subsequent purchaser, even by the exercise of the greatest diligence, could not possibly 88-89. Minis v. Mims, 35 Ala. McKerrihan, 172 Pa. 234, 51 Am. 23; Chapman & Co. v. Johnson, St. Rep. 734, 33 Atl. 583; Parrish 142 Ala. 633, 4 Ann. Cas. 559, 38 v. Mahany, 10 S. D. 276, 66 Am. SO. 797; Carter v. Tennessee Coal St. Rep. 715. & Iron & Ry. Co., 180 Ala. 367, 90. Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 61 So. 65 (deed lost in record 552, 82 Am. St. Rep. 391, 63 Pac. office); Case v. Hargadine, 43 844; Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13 Ark 144; Lewis v. Hinman, 56 Ga. 443, 58 Am. Dec. 523; Gil- Conn. 55, 13 Atl. 143; Merrick v. christ v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576, 30 Wallace, 19 111. 486; Tucker v. Am. Rep. 250; Miller v. Bradford, Shaw, 158 111. 326, 41 N. E. 914; 12 Iowa, 14; Hall v. Wright, 137 Zeiner v. Edgar Zinc Co., 79 Kan. Ky. 39, 127 S. W. 516; Hill v. Mc- 406, 99 Pac. 614; Gillespie v. Nichol, 76 Me. 314; Brydon v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 610, 16 N. E. Campbell, 40 Md. 331; Grand 711; Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. Rapids Nat. Bank v. Ford, 143 593, 48 Am. Rep. 84; Sinclair v. Mich. 402, 114 Am. St. Rep. 668, Slawson, 44 Mich. 123, 38 Am. 8 Ann. Cas. 102, 107 N. W. 76; Rep. 235; Deming v. Miles, 35 Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. Neb. 739, 37 Am. St. Rep. 464, 53 (N. Y.) 288; Beekman v. Frost, N. W. 665; Davis v. Whitaker, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 544; New 114 N. C. 279, 41 Am. St. Rep. York Life Ins. Co. v. White, 17 793, 19 S. E. 699; Ferabee v. n. Y. 469; Jennings' Lessee v. § 567] Peiorities and Recording. 2199 do. This view has occasionally been adopted even when the statute in terms provided that the instrument shall operate as notice from the time of its filing for record.'-^^ Accordingly as the one or the other of tije two views referred to is adopted, it is, in some states, im- material to the grantee in a conveyance that the in- strument is recorded in the wrong book, it nevertheless operating as constructive notice to subsequent pur- chasers,''- while in other states the contrary is true.^^ The rule before referred to^^ that it is the time of the filing or deposit of an instrument of record, and not the time of its actual record by the official recorder, that determines the rights of the claimant thereunder as against a subsequent purchaser, is recognized even in Wood, 20 Ohio 261; Prouty v. Marshan, 225 Pa. 570, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211, 74 Atl. 550; Sawyer V. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, 30 Am. Dec. 459; Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 12 L. R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155, 25 Pac. 341; Pringle V. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772. 91. Miner v. Bradford, 12 Iowa, 14; Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376 (semble). 92. Lignoski v. Croiker, 86 Tex. 324, 24 S. W. 278, 788; Swenson v. Bank, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 723. In Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738, it was held that since the statute did not contain any requirement as to recording in a particular book, the fact that the instrument was recorded in a book other than the one in which it might be expected to be found was immaterial. In Pennsylvania, although, ac- cording to the latest decision, a purchaser is bound only by what the records show, nevertheless ho Is bound by a mortgage recorded and indexed, not in the mort- gage book and index, but in the deed book and index, since it would be discovered by any per- son examining the title. Seo Prouty V. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211, 74 Atl. 550; distinguishing Farabee v. Mc- Kerrihan, 172 Pa. 234, 51 Am. St. Rep. 734, 33 Atl. 583. 93. Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 82 Am. St. Rep. 391, 63 Pac. 844; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 197 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376; Grand Rapids, etc.. Bank V. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 114 Am. St. Rep. 668, 8 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 102, 107 N. W. 76; Gillig v. Maass, 28 N. Y. 191; Parsons v. Lent, PA N. J. Eq. 67; Drake v. Rep- gel, 10 Utah. 376, 37 Par. 583; Sawyer v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172; Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1051, 108 Pac. 439. 94. Ante, § 567(h). 2200 Real Property. [<§ 567 tliose states in which a grantee is not protected as against subsequent purchasers by the mere tiling of the instrument for record, but must see that the re- cording is correctly done. In this class of states it is considered that, while the filing or deposit of the instrument for record is in itself nugatory, yet if it is thereafter properly recorded, the recording dates back to the time of tiling, for the purpose of determin- ing priorities.^^ (k) Index to records. An index of the gran- tors and grantees as named in the recorded convey- ances is ordinarily kept in the record office, and the statute frequently so requires. And occasionally the statute requires that this index also indicate the property conveyed, and perhaps other details of the conveyance. A subsequent purchaser has been regarded as chargeable with notice of statements in the index, even after the conveyance is actually recorded, in so far as such statements may serve to correct errors or supply omissions in the record itself.^'' An entry in the index is sufficient if it serves to put a purchaser on inquiry ,^'^ and, in so far as it undertakes to describe the land, points thereto with reasonable certainty.'''^ An omission, from the entry in the index, of all descrip- tion of the land, although there is a blank space for such 95. Anderson v. Dugas, 29 Ga. Mich. 123, 38 Am. Rep. 235, 6 N. 440; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, W. 207; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772. But a sub- E. 376; Terrell v. Andrew County, sequent purchaser has been held 44 Mo. 309; Leger v. Doyle, 11 not chargeable with notice of Rich. (S. C.) 109, 70 Am. Dec. statements in the index as to 240; Bigelaw v. Topliff, 25 Vt. matters not required to be stated. 282. In Whalley v. Small, 25 Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576, 30 Iowa, 184, while this principle Am. Rep. 250. was conceded, it was decided to 97. Jones v. Berkshire, 15 be inapplicable when there was Iowa, 248, 83 Am. Dec. 412. a delay of twenty-five years in 98. Barney v. Little, 15 Iowa, the actual recording. 527; Malbon v. Grow, 15 Wash. 96. Sinclair v. Slawson, 44 301, 46 Pac. 330. § 567] Prioeities and Eecoeding. 2201 descrijotion, and it is ordinarily inserted, has been held not to affect the effectiveness of the entry, the index referring to the place of record of the conveyance.^" In so far as the recording statute of the particular state is construed as charging a subsequent purchaser with notice of an instrument by reason merely of the filing thereof, without reference to mistakes or omih;- sions of the recorder,^ a subsequent purchaser can not assent that he was misled by errors or omissions in the index, he being chargeable with notice of the prior in- strument without reference to the index.^ In jurisdic- tions in which a subsequent purchaser is chargeable with notice of a prior conveyance by reason of the rec- ord thereof only if the record is correct,^ the question w^hether a subsequent purchaser is bound by r prior conveyance not properly indexed has usually been de- termined by the consideration whether its inclusion in the index is to be regarded, under the statute, as an essential part of its record, the subsequent purchaser not being chargeable with notice of the conveyance if such inclusion is an essential part of its record,^ while he is so chargeable otherwise.^ 99. Oconto V. Jerrad, 46 Wis. 155, 25 Pac. 341;" Lombard v. 317, 50 N. W. 591; St. Croix Land Culbertson, 59 Wis. 433, 18 N. W. & Lumber Co. v. Ritchie, 73 Wis. 399. 409, 41 N. W. 345, 1064. 5. Chatham v. Bradford, 50 Ga. 1. Ante, § 566 (j) note 88. 327, 15 Am. Rep. 692; Agurs v. 2. See Amos v. Givens, 179 Ala. Belcher & CresweU, 111 La. 378, 605, 60 So. 829; Davis v. Whit- 100 Am. St. Rep. 485, 35 So. 607; aker, 114 N. C. 279, 41 Am. St. Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472, 2 Rep. 793, 19 S. E. 699; Herndon Am. Rep. 533; Mutual Life Ins V Ogg, 119 Ky. 814, 84 S. W. 754. Co. of New York v. Dake, 87 N. 3. Ante, § 566(j), note 90. Y. 257; Green v. Garrington, 16 4. Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa, Ohio St. 548, 91 Am. Dec. 103; 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427; Koch v. Stockwell v. McHenry, 107 Pa. St. West, 118 Iowa, 468, 96 Am. St. 237, 52 Am. Rep. 475; Armstrong Rep. 394, 92 N. W. 663; Prouty v. Austin, 45 S. C. 69, 29 L. R. V. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 25 L. A. 772, 22 S. E. 763; Curtis v. R. A. (N. S.) 1211, 74 Atl- 550; Lyman, 24 Vt. 338, 58 Am. Dec. Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 176. 12 L. R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 2202 Real Property. [^ 567 (1) Persons affected with notice by record. The recording acts usually in terms require the record of an instrument for the benefit of a subsequent pur- chaser or incumbrancer only. Consequently, one who has previously acquired an interest in the land, or who is a party to the instrument itself, is not charged with notice of any facts by the record.*' For instance^ the record of a conveyance does not charge the grantor therein with notice that the grantee, after its execution, fraudulently inserted an additional provision therein,'^ nor does it charge the rightful owner of the property with notice of an adverse claim thereto on the part of the grantor and grantee.^ And it appears to be well recognized that one having a debt secured by mortgage on land is not, by the record of a subsequent convey- ance or mortgage of part of the mortgaged land, charged with notice thereof, so as to be precluded from releasing another part of the land to the detriment of the subsequent grantee or mortgagee.^ The purchaser of an equitable title, it seems evi- dent, cannot be in a better position as regards a prior instrument than if he acquired a legal title, and con- sequently he takes subject to a prior conveyance or in 6. Karns v. Olney, 80 Cal. 90, 525, 94 Am. Dec. 350; Bradtl v. 13 Am. St. Rep. 101, 22 Pac. 57; Sharkey, 58 Ore. 153, 113 Pac. Lowden v. Wilson, 233 111. 340, 84 653. N. E. 245; Annan v. Hays, 85 Md. 9. Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark. 591; 505, 37 Atl. 20; Corey v. Smalley, Woodward v. Brown, 119 Cal. 283, 106 Mich. 257, 58 Am. St. Rep. 51 Pac. 2, 542, 63 Am. St. Rep. 474, 64 N. W. 13; Lausman v. 168; Lewis v. Hinman, 56 Conn. Drahos, 8 Neb. 457; Stuyvesant 55, 13 Atl. 143; Boone v. Clark, V. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 151; 129 111. 446, 5 L. R. A. 276, 21 First Nat. Bank of Dickinson v. N. E. 850; George v. Wood, 9 Big Bend Land Co., 38 N. D. Allen, 80, 85 Am. Dec. 741; 33, 164 N. W. 322; Stivens v. Howard Insurance Co. v. Halsey, Summers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 67 N. 8 N. Y. 271, 59 Am. Dec. 478; E. 884. Lynchburg Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n 7. Davis V. Monroe, 187 Pa. v. Fellers, 96 Va. 337, 70 Am. 212, 67 Am. St. Rep. 581, 41 Atl. St. Rep. 851, 31 S. E. 505. So, a 44. judgment lienor may release part 8. HoUey v. Hawley, 39 Vt. of his lien without first examin- <§> 567] Peioeities and Recobding. 2203 cumbrance duly recorded to the same extent as the pur- chaser of the legal title. In case the prior conveyance involved a disposition of the legal title, the grantor has nothing left of which to dispose, and in case it involved a disposition of the equitable title only, it would be entitled to priority as being first in order of time.^*^' (m) Persons entitled to assert failure to record. The statute in a number of the states pi'ovides that an unrecorded conveyance shall be void as against a sub- sequent purchaser without notice ''whose conveyance is first recorded," thus making the question of priority depend to a considerable extent upon priority of re- cording.^^ In the absence of such a clause, it has usu- ally been held that the later purchaser may, without recording his conveyance, assert priority over an earlier unrecorded conveyance of which he has no notice. ^^ The statutory clause referred to, by which the priority of a subsequent conveyance over an earlier unrecorded conveyance is made dependent upon the earlier record of the subsequent conveyance, has been referred to^'^ as not in accord with the general policy of the recording laws, which is to protect a subsequent purchaser who takes for value and without notice as against the prior ing the records to see how it will 37; McGuire v. Barker, 61 Ga. affect other persons. Taylor's 339; Sanborn v. Adair, 29 N. J. Ex'rs V. Maris, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 51. Eq. 338; Swanstrom v. Washing- 10. See Digman v. McCoUum, ton Trust Co., 41 Wash. 561; 47 Mo. 372. And ante, § 566(c). Webb, Record of Title, § 13, 166. 11. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § But Houlahan v. Finance Consol. 1611. See Simmons v. Stum, 101 Min. Co., 34 Colo. .^65, 82 Pac. 111. 454; Clabaugh v. Byerly, 7 484; Brookfield v. Goodrich, 32 Gill (Md.) 354, 48 Am. Dec. 575; 111. 363; Simmons v. Stum, 101 Drake v. McLean, 47 Mich. 102, 111. 454 are to the effect that even 10 N. W. 126; Westbrook v. Glea- though the statute does not in son, 79 N. Y. 23; Pennsylvania terms require the later convcy- Salt Mfg. Co. V. Neel, 54 Pa. St. 9. ance to be first recorded thin is 12. Steele v. Spencer, 1 Pet. necessary in order that it bo (U. S.) 552, 7 L. Ed. 259; Miller given priority. V. Merine, 43 Fed. 261; Coster's 13. Webb, Record of Title, §§ Ex'rs V. Bank of Georgia, 24 Ala. 13-15, 165-167. 2204 Real Property. [§ 567 unrecorded conveyance, it being said that ^'wliere, through the neglect of the first grantee to record his deed, a subsequent party has been led to part with a valuable consideration, a race for registry between the two does not afford a proper criterion by which their rights should be determined." There is considerable force in this view, but as a practical matter a ''race for registry" is not likely to occur, since ordinarily each party is ignorant of the conveyance to the other, and the subsequent purchaser can ordinarily protect him- self against the possible subsequent record of a prior conveyance by promptly recording his own conveyance. There does not seem to be any particular injustice in confining the benefit of the recording acts to those sub- sequent purchasers who act promptly in placing their conveyances or contracts upon the records, although such a provision involves, to some extent, a departure from the theory that a purchaser is to be protected from a prior unrecorded conveyance because he is in effect a purchaser without notice thereof. Such a provision has a beneficial operation as encouraging the prompt record of conveyances, since no grantee can feel as- sured that a prior conveyance, unknown to him, may not be filed for record after the time of his purchase, and before he files his own, unless he does this im- mediately. Claimant under quitclaim deed. In a very considerable number of jurisdictions it has been decided that the grantee under a ''quitclaim deed" is entitled, to the same extent as the grantee in any other convey- ance, to the protection of the recording laws as against a prior unrecorded conveyance. ^^ These decisions are usually in terms based upon the broad and inclusive language of the recording law^s and sometimes upon the 14. Henry Wrape Co. v. Cox, Pac. Ill; Marshall v. Pierce, 13 122 Ark. 445, 183 S. W. 955; Frey Ga. 543, 71 S. E. 893; Reed r. V. Clifford, 44 Cal. 335; Kelsey McConnell. 5 111. 117; Smith v. V. Norris, 53 Colo. 306, 125 McClaiu, 146 Ind. 77, 45 N. B. 41; § 567] Priorities and Eecording. 2205 fact that what is ordinarily known as a quitclain] deed, that is, a deed which in terms conveys only the grantor's right title and interest in certain property, v/ithout covenants of title, does not, in that jurisdiction, diifer in its nature and operation from one in terms convey- ing the property itself.^^ In some states, however, a different view has been adopted, that a purchaser under a quitclaim deed cannot claim as a bona fide purchaser for value, as against a prior unrecorded deed, or at least that he is put on inquiry, b}' the form of the convey- ance, as to possible defects in his grantor's title. ^^ In support of this view two reasons have been given. One is that the fact that the vendor offers a conveyance in this form is sufficient to raise a suspicion in the mind of the purchaser that the title is defective. As to this, however, it may well happen that the vendor prefers this form with an absence of covenants for title, merely Eger V. Brown, 77 Kan. 510, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459, 94 Pac. 803; Williams v. White Castle Lumber & Shingle Co., 114 La. 448, 38 So. 414; Dow v. Whitney, 147 Mass. 1, 16 N. E. 722; Fox V. Hall, 74 Mo. 315, 41 Am. Rep. 316; Schlott v. Dosh, 49 Neb. 187, 59 Am. St. Rep. 531, 68 N. W. 386; Brophy Min. Co. v. Mining Co., 15 Nev. 101; Wilhelm v. Wil- ken, 149 N. Y. 447, 52 Am. St. Rep. 743, 32 L. R. A. 370, 44 N. E. 82; Morris v. Daniels, 35 Ohio St. 406; Babcock v. Wells, 25 R. I. 23, 105 Am. St. Rep. 848, 54 Atl. 596; Shutz v. Tidrick, 26 S. D. 505, 128 N. W. 811; Campbell v. Home Ice & Coal Co., 126 Tenn. 524, 150 S. W. 427; Cutler v. James, 64 Wis. 178, 54 Am. Rep. 606, 24 N. W. 874; Eyanson v. Waidlich, 57 Wash. 234, 106 Pac. 746; Ellison v. Torpin, 44 W. Va. 414, 30 S. E. 183; Olmstead v. McCrory. 158 Wis. 323, 148 N. 2 R. P.— 64 W. 87; Moelle v. Sherwood. 148 U. S. 21, 37 L. Ed. 350; United States V. California & O. Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 37 L. Ed. 354; Boynton v. Haggart, 57 C C. A. 301, 120 Fed. 819. That a sheriff's conveyance of "all the right, title, and interest" of the execution debtor in certain described land is effective as against a prior unrecorded con- veyance by the debtor, see Wood- ward V. Sartwell, 129 Mass. 210, and Parker v. Prescott, 87 Me. 444, 32 Atl. 1001. 15. See cases cited post, this section, note 21. 16. Wood V. Holly Mfg. Co., 100 Ala. 326, 46 Am. St. Rep. 56, 13 So. 948; Townley v. Corona Coal & Iron Co.,— Ala.— . 77 So. 1; Snow V. Lake, 20 Fla. 656. 51 Am. St. Rep. 625; Steel v. Sioux Val. Bank, 79 Iowa, 339. 7 L. R. A. 524, 18 Am. St. Rep. 370. 44 N. W. 564; Hannen v. Sciden- 2206 Real Pbopeety. [§ 567 because he knows nothing about the title, or because, though believing the title good, he prefers not to as- sume any resiDonsibility, and it seems hardly proper to say that this preference on the vendor's part is calcu- lated to raise a suspicion on the purchaser's part of a defect in the title.^^ Indeed, as has been forcibly sug- gested by an able writer, the fact that a purchaser ac- cepts a quitclaim deed without covenants of title, tends to indicate his contidence in the title, while his insist- ence on such covenants might well indicate the con- trary.^^ It is, moreover, very questionable whether the fact that the grantee in a conveyance has reason to sus- pect that the grantor has doubts as to the validity of the title should of itself preclude him from claiming as a bona fide purchaser for value, he having no clue by the aid of w^hich to determine the propriety of the grant- or's doubts. The other reason given for the view that a "quit- claim deed" does not take priority of a prior unre- corded conveyance, is that by a quitclaim deed one un- dertakes to convey only his right or interest in the property, whatever that may be, and that it consequent ly passes only such interest as may remain to him after the execution of the first conveyance, and can pass no interest as against this latter, although this is not rc- topf, 113 Iowa, 658, 86 N. W. 44; 74 Tex. 453, 15 Am. St. Rep. 850, Lasley v. Stout, 90 Kan. 712, 136 12 S. W. 67. Pac. 249; Reed v. Knights, 87 17. See opinion of Field, J., in Me. 181, 32 Atl. 870; Peters v. Moelle v. Stierwood, 148 U. S. 21, Cartier, 80 Mich. 124, 20 Am. St. 37 L. Ed. 350; Babcock v. Wells, Rep. 508, 45 N. W. 73; Backus 25 R. I. 23, 105 Am. St. Rep. V. Cowley, 162 Mich. 585, 127 N. 848, 54 Atl. 596. W. 775; McAdow v. Black, 6 18. Rawle, Covenants for Title, Mont. 601, 13 Pac. 377; Wetzstein § 29. See Schott v. Dosh, 49 Neb. V. Largey, 27 Mont. 212, 70 Pac. 187, 59 Am. St. Rep. 531, 68 N. 717; Muller x. McCann, 50 Okla. W. 346; Babcock v. Wells, 25 710, 151 Pac. 621; Fowler v. Will, R. I. 23, 105 Am. St. Rep. 848, 19 S. D. 131, 117 Am. St. Rep. 54 Atl. 596; Wilhelm v. Wilken, 9.-58, 8 Ann. Cas. 1093, 102 N. 149 N. Y. 447, 32 L. R. A. 370, W. 598; Garrett v. Christopher, 52 Am. St. Rep. 743, 44 N. E. 82. § 567] Priorities and Eecording. 2207 corded. The soundness of this reason for the view in- dicated appears to be beyond question, provided it be conceded that the deed was intended, not as a convey- ance of the property as such, but as a dis])osition mere- ly of what interest the grantor had therein, subject, as it w^ere, to any prior conveyance made by him or another in the chain of title. If a conveyance is to be con- strued as equivalent to a conveyance of "such interest as I ma}^ now have" or of "such interest as I have not disposed of,"^*' the grantee therein cannot well claim any interest which has been previously disposed of by the grantor, whether the previous conveyance was or was not recorded, and if the previous conveyance dis- posed of all the grantor's interest, the later convey- ance would be nugatory. Whether a conveyance in the form of a quitclaim deed is thus to be limited in its operation is a question, it seems, of the intention of the parties thereto, to be determined by a construction of the language used with reference to the circumstances of its execution, including the usage of the community as to the employment of such deeds. This view has been clearly expressed in occasional decisions.-*^ The view expressed in some of the decisions up- holding the priority of the subsequent quitclaim deed, that such a deed is in its operation and effect equiva- lent to a deed of grant or of bargain and sale,^^ does 19. As, for instance, a con- • topher, 74 Tex. 435, 15 Am. St. veyance of "Juch interest only as Rep.. 850, 12 S. W. 67; Cutler they (the grantors) now have, v. James, 64 Wis. 173, 54 Am. whatever that may be." Virginia Rep. 603, 24 N. W. 874. And see & T. Coal & Iron Co. v. Fields, Hooper v. Leavitt, 109 Me. 70, 82 94 Va. 102, 26 S. E. 426. And Atl. 547; Schmittou v. Dunham, see Mason v. Black, 87 Mo. 329; —Tex. Civ. App.— , 142 S. W. 941; Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v. Rich- Gallup v. Harding, 241 Fed. 858, mond, F. & P. R. Co., 116 Va. 154 C. C. A. 560. 211, 81 S. E. 93; Eaton v. Trow- 21. Robinson v. Clapp, 65 bridge, 38 Mich. 454. Conn. 365, 29 L. R. A. 582, 32 20. Brown v. Banner Coal Co., Atl. 939; Frey v. Clifford, 44 97 111. 214, 37 Am. Rep. 103; Cal. 335; Brown v. Banner etc.. Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 Co., 97 111. 214, 37 Am. Rep. 105; S. W. 1094; Garrett v. Chris- Babcock v. Wells, 25 R. I. 23, 105 2208 Eeal Property. [§ 567 not necessarily conflict with the view, above expressed, that it is a question as to what is the meaning of the language used. The courts rendering these decisions would hardly assert that a deed might not be so phrased as to pass only such rights as the grantor actually has, that is, to transfer merely a chance of the title, and these decisions merely assert in etfect, it would seem, that the fact that a conveyance is in the ordinary form of a quitclaim deed does not of itself show an inten- tion merely to relinquish such claim or title ss the grantor may have. And the same may be said of the statutory provisions which are in force in some states, making a quitclaim deed equivalent to a deed of grant or bargain and sale.^^ These do no more, it would seem, than create a presumption that such a deed is not to be given a limited effect. But a conveyance in terms of ''such interest or title as I now have," though it might properly be denominated a quitclaim deed, would presumably, even in those states, not take priority over a prior unrecorded conveyance by the same grantor. Neither such a statute, nor a statute invalidating an unrecorded conveyance as against a subsequent pur- chaser, could well give priority to a person who under- takes to purchase merely what the vendor has not pre- viously disposed of, and so give to the conveyance an operation not intended by the parties. The tendency of the courts is no doubt in favor of the view that the purchaser under a quitclaim deed is entitled to protection as against a prior unrecorded deed, a tendency which has become much more marked since the United States Supreme Court adopted this Am. St. Rep. 848, 54 Atl. 596; Lynn, 38 Minn. 315, 37 N. W. 448, Southern Ry. v. Carroll, 86 S. C. it was held that such a statute 56, 138 Am. St. Rep. 1017, 67 S. gave the grantee in a quitclaim E. 4. deed the right to claim as a 22. See Chapman v. Sims, 53 6ona fide purchaser, a previous Miss. 154; Smith v. McClain, 146 decision denying such right to Ind. 77, 45 N. E. 41; Cutler v. him (Marshall v. Roberts, 18 James, 64 Wis. 173, 54 Am. Rep. Minn. 405) having been rendered 693, 24 N. W. 874. In Strong v. before the adoption of the statute. § 567] Priorities and Eecording. 2209 view,^'^ repudiating prior dicta in that court to the con- trary. That the view favored by the later decisions works in favor of justice and the security of titles seems sufficiently apparent. That one takes a convey- ance of the grantor's "right, title and interest" in cer- tain property, rather than of the property itself, does not, as a matter of fact, ordinarily indicate that the pur- chaser intends to take, not a title such as appears on the records, but a mere chance of a title, subject to any unrecorded conveyances that may have been made by the grantor, and it does not seem desirable that the courts should, by reason of the use of that language, impute such an intention. In some of the states, while priority is accorded to a bona fide purchaser holding under a quitclaim deed, the view has nevertheless been expressed that the fact that one accepts a quitclaim is evidence tending to show a lack of good faith.^^-*^ But, as is remarked above, it appears most questionable whether, as a practical matter, this can properly be regarded as indicative of bad faith.-' It has usually been assumed, and there are express decisions to that effect, that, even if the grantee in a quitclaim deed cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser, a purchaser from him for value holding under a warranty deed can so claim. That, in other words, one may be a bona fide purchaser although a quitclaim deed occurs in his vendor's chain of title.^^ 23. MoeUe v. Sherwood, 148 U. Records & Breen, 165 Iowa, 134, S. 21, 37 L. Ed. 350. 144 N. W. 336; Lasley v. Stout, 24-26. Moore v. Morris, 118 90 Kan. 712, 136 Pac. 249. Ark. 516, 177 S. W. 6; Ennis v. 27. Ante, this section, note 18. Tucker, 78 Kan. 55, 130 Am. St. 28. United States v. California Rep. 352. 96 Pac. 140; Schott v. & O. Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 37 Dosh. 49 Neb. 187, 59 Am. St. L. Ed. 354; Stanley v. Schwalby, Rep. 531, 68 N. W. 386; Lowry 162 U. S. 255, 40 L. Ed. 960; V Brown, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 456. See Meikel v. Border, 129 Ind. 529, McDonald v. Belding, 145 U. S. 29 N. E. 29; Winkler v. Miller, 492, 36 L. Ed. 788; Mansfield v. 54 Iowa, 476, 6 N. W. 698; Dyer, 131 Mass. 200; Boileau v. Hannan v. Seidentopf, 113 Iowa, 2210 Real Property. [§ 567 The reason ordinarily asserted for this view is that otherwise the occurrence of one quitclaim deed in a chain of title would to a great extent render the title unmarketable. But it is difficult to see how, if a quit- claim deed is insufficient to give a good title to the grantee therein, as against a prior unrecorded convey- ance, such grantee can give a good title to another, and thereby divest the rights of the grantee under the prior conveyance. The practical necessity, if it be so re- garded, of protecting a subsequent claimant under the grantee in the quitclaim deed, tends strongly to indicate the propriety of protecting the grantee himself. A conveyance purporting to convey land by a gen- eral description, such as "all my land," or ''all the land which I have," or "all which I now have," in a certain place, has been held not to take precedence of a prior unrecorded conveyance of particular land in such place, the language used, construed in connection with the sur- rouiiding circumstances, showing an intention to con- vey only such land as the grantor still retains.^^ 659, 86 N. W. 44; Rich v. Downs, Persons Unknown, 43 Me. 432; 81 Kan. 43, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) Fitzgerald v. Libby, 142 Mass. 1035, 105 Pac. 9, and note; Cul- 235, 7 N. E. 917; Ames v. Robert, bertson v. H. Witbeck Co., .92 17 N. M. 609, 131 Pac. 994; Mc- Mich. 469, 52 N. W. 993; Otis Namara Syndicate v. Boyd, 112 V. Kennedy, 107 Mich. 312, 65 N. Va. 145, 70 S. E. 694; See Hen- W. 219; Marston v. Catterlin, 270 derson v. Armstrong, 128 Ga. 804, Mo. 5, 192 S. W. 413; Snowden 58 S. E. 624; Buttergeld v. V. Tyler, 21 Neb. 199, 31 N. W. Smith, 11 111. 485; Brown v. 661; Martin v. Ragsdale, 71 S. Banner, etc., Co., 97 111. 214, C. 67, 50 S. E. 671; Campbell v. 37 Am. Rep. 105. In Hethering- Home Ice & Coal Co., 126 Tenn. ton v. Clark, 30 Pa. St. 393, the 524, 150 S. W. 427. And see question whether such a con- Brown V. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368, 112 veyance was intended to convey S. W. 373. But see to the con- only such land as the grantor trary Schmidt v. Musson, 20 S. D. still retained was regarded as a 389, 107 N. W. 367; Cook v. question for the jury. In Garner Smith. 107 Tex. 119, 174 S. W. v Boyle, 97 Tex. 460, 79 S. W. 1094, 1095; Muller v. McCann, 50 1066, it was considered that such Okla. 710, 151 Pac. 621 (semble). a conveyance passed all land 29. Callanan v. Merrill, 81 which on the records appeared Iowa, 73, 46 N. W. 753; Coe v. to belong to the grantor, an uu- § 567] Prioeities and Eecording. 2211 Purchaser from heir or devisee. It has oc- casionally been decided that a purchaser from an heir or devisee takes subject to a conveyance by the ancestor which was not recorded, on the theory that the convey- ance being valid as against the ancestor, he retained no interest which could pass to the heir or devisee and con- sequently the latter 's grantee acquired nothing,^^ But usually it has been held, more consistently, it would seem, with the policy of the recording laws, that a purchaser from an heir or devisee is, like a purchaser from any other person, entitled to rely upon the title as it appears of record. ^^ Purchaser of equitable interest. To what ex- tent one who acquires an equitable interest is entitled to take advantage of the failure to record an instru- ment earlier in date, as giving him priority over the earlier instrument, would properly depend on whether the person acquiring the equitable interest could be re- garded as a purchaser or incumbrancer such as the statute undertakes to protect. In several cases the pur- chaser of an equitable interest has been regarded as en- titled to protection as against a prior unrecorded convey- ance,^- while in one or two states the right to take ad- recorded conveyance being regard- Mass. 491; First Nat. Bank of ed as non existent. And see Durand v. Phillpotts, 155 Mich. Cook V. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 331, 119 N. W. 1; Youngblood S. W. 1094. V. Vastine, 46 Mo. 239; Powers 30. Hill V. Meeker, 24 Conn. v. McFerran, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 211; Hancock v. Beverly's Heirs, 47; McCulloch's Lessee v. Eudaly, 6 B. Men. (Ky.) 531; See Hender- 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 346; Holmes v. son V. Armstrong, 128 Ga. 804, 58 Johns, 56 Tex. 41; Keenon v. S. E. 624. The Kentucky rule in Burkhardt, — Tex. Civ. App. — , this regard was changed by stat- 162 S. W. 483; Memphis Land & ute. See Dozier v. Barnett, 13 Timber Co. v. Ford, 58 Fed. 452, Bush (Ky.) 457. 7 C. C. A. 304. 31. Hallett v. Alexander, 50 32. Weston v. Dunlap, 50 Iowa, Colo. 37, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 328, 185; United States Insur. Co. v. Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1277, 114 Pac. Shiver, 3 Md. Ch. 381; General 490, 491; Kennedy v. Northup, 15 Insur. Co. v. United States Insu.r in. 148; McClure v. Tallman, 30 Co., 10 Md. 517; Tarbell v. West. Iowa, 515; Earle v. Fiske, 103 86 N. Y. 280; Trogden v. Wil- 2212 Eeal Peopeety. [§ 567 vantage of the failure to record is apparently confined exclusively to purchasers of the legal title. ^^ Lessees. The question whether a lessee is within the protection of the recording statute, so as to be able to assert the failure to record a prior convey- ance, is one which is not calculated to arise, since a lessee, agreeing merely to pay a periodical rent, as is usually the case, could not well be regarded as a pur- chaser for value. If, however, he does pay value, he may come within the protection accorded to purchasers for value, the fact that the estate acquired by him being for years only instead of in fee simple being immate- rial.^* Claimant under judicial decree. In at least one state it has been decided that one taking title by judicial decree is to be regarded as a purchaser for the purpose of receiving protection under the recording acts as against a prior unrecorded conveyance.^^ Creditors. The recording acts, in many juris- dictions, in terms invalidate an unrecorded instrument only as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, and consequently a creditor of the grantor cannot assert a claim in priority over the grantee by reason of the failure to record, except so far as the failure to record may operate, under the doctrine of estoppel by repre- sentation, to j^reclude the grantee from asserting his title as against such creditor's claim.^^ In some juris- dictions, however, the statutes expressly require a con- liams, 144 N. C. 192, 10 L. R. A. 34. That a lease is a "con- N. S. 867, 56 S. E. 865 (semble); veyance" within the protection of Bellass v. McCarty, 10 Watts, the recording act, see Waskey v. (Pa.) 13; Rhines v. Baird, 41 Pa. Chambers, 224 U. S. 564, 56 L. 256; Batts v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59; E 885. Contra, Topping v. Preston v. Nash, 76 Va. 1. Parish, 96 Wis. 378, 71 N. W. 33. Combs v. Nelson, 91 Ind. 367. 123; Wailes v. Cooper, 24 Miss. 35. Wilkins v. McCorkle, 112 208; Dedeaux v. Cuevas, 107 Tenn. 688, 80 S. W. 834. Miss. 7, 64 So. 844. 36. Ante, § 546, note 80a. § 568] Peiorities and Recording. 2213 veyance or mortgage to be recorded in order that it may be effective as against creditors of the grantor or mortgagor as well as against subsequent purchasers.^"'^ Such a statute, in terms protecting creditors against un- recorded instruments, is ordinarily construed as pro- tecting only such creditors as have, by attachment or judgment, acquired a lien on the property,^* though oc- casionally the statute is given a broader effect, in favor of general creditors.^^ The usual construction of the statutes, as not applying to general creditors unless the language clearly shows an intention to that effect, is based on the theory that the purchaser, in failing to record his deed, has done merely what the creditor has done, unduly trusted the grantor, and that the equity of the creditor is no higher than that of the purchaser under the unrecorded deed, who, if deprived of the prop- erty, would also be a creditor of the grantor. Ordinarily the statutes are construed to protect creditors as to such claims only as were created after the execution of the instrument in question, it being considered that, as regards claims which existed pre- viously, they could not have suffered by reason of the failure of the record to show the true state of the title.-'« § 568. Notice as substitute for recording. Of the statutes in reference to the recording of conveyances, 37. The provisions of the re- gent v. Priebastch, 61 Miss. 402; cording acts, as regards their King v. Fraser, 23 S. C. 543; operation in favor of creditors, Grace v. Wade, 45 Tex. 522. are conveniently summarized in 39. See e. g., Sixth Ward a note in 13 Columbia Law Rev. Building Ass'n v. Willson, 41 at p. 539. Md. 506; Henderson v. McGheo, 38. See McGhee v. Importers' 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 55. & Traders' Nat. Bank. 93 Ala. 40. See, e. g., Clift v. Williams, 192, 9 So. 734; Martin v. Dry- 105 Ky. 559, 49 S. W. 328; Dyson der, 6 111. 187; Campbell v. v. Simmons, 48 Md. 207; Brown Remaly, 112 Mich. 214. 67 Am. v. Brabb, 67 Mich. 17, 11 Am. St. St. Rep. 393, 70 N. W. 432; Hall Rep. 549, 34 N. W. 403. Contra, V. Sauntry, 72 Minn. 420, 71 Am. Price v. Wall, 97 Va. 334, 75 St. Rep. 497, 75 N. W. 720; Nu- Am. St. Rep. 788, 33 S. E. 599. 2214 Eeal Peopekty. [§ 568 some provide that a conveyance, if not recorded, shall be invalid as against a subsequent purchaser without notice, some, that it shall be invalid as against a bona fide purchaser or purchaser in good faith, and some omit any reference to the matter of notice or good faith. The statutes almost invariably, however, without refer- ence to the particular language used, have received the same construction, as affording protection to a subse- quent purchaser only when he is without notice of the unrecorded conveyance.^ ^ This appears to be merely a logical result of the construction put upon the record- ing acts, as making the record of an instrument equiva- lent to notice thereof on the part of a subsequent pur- chaser, since this construction implies that notice other- wise obtained will have the same effect.^^ In a con- siderable number of cases, however, the rule that notice obtained otherwise than from the record excludes a pur- chaser from the protection of the act, is based upon the theory that one taking a conveyance with the purpose of impairing prior rights in another of which he has notice is guilty of fraud,'*"' a view which was originally adopted from the decisions of the English courts in connection with the local registration acts of that coun- try.''^ 41. See cases cited, 24 A. & E. this is so in the case of a con- Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) 131; 2 veyance as well as a mortgage. Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 649; Webb, Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. Pvecord of Title, § 201; 2 White C. 145, 19 S. E. 99; Moore v. & T. Lead. Cas. Eq., Judge Hare'^ Johnson, 162 N. C. 266, 78 S. E. notes, 213. Occasionally the stat- 158; Allen v. Roanoke Railroad ute has been construed as so & Lumber Co., 171 N. C. 339, 88 absolutely requiring the record S. E. 492. As also in Louisiana, of a mortgage as to make it McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, invalid, if not recorded, even as 51 So. 100; Somat v. Whitmer, against a subsequent purchaser 141 La. 235, 74 So. 916. having actual notice thereof. May- 42. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § ham v. Coombs, 14 Ohio, 428; 665. Building Ass'n v. Clark, 43 Ohio 43. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ St. 427, 2 N. E. 846; Dodd v. 659, 660; 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Parker, 40 Ark. 536; Moore v. Eq. 213; Webb, Record of Title, OUson, 105 Ark. 241, 150 S. W. § 215. 1028. And in North Carolina 44. See Le Neve v. Le Neve, ^ 569] Pkiorities and Eecoeding. 2215 Xotice of one defect in a title is obviously not suf- ficient to charge one with notice of an entirely different defect.^^ In states in which lien creditors are protected as against an unrecorded conveyance,^^ the protection does not ordinarily exist if the creditor, at the time of ac- quiring the lien, had actual or constructive notice of the convevance.^''^ § 569. Information putting on inquiry. In most states it is sufficient, in order to deprive a person of the right to claim as against a prior unrecorded convey- ance, that he has either actual knowledge of such con- veyance, or that he has information sufficient to put him on inquiry in regard to such conveyance,"*^ and this con- Ambl. 436, 1 Ves. Sr. 64; Webb, Record of Title, § 215. 45. Koons v. Grooves, 20 Iowa, 373; Thompson v. Lapsley, 90 Minn. 318, 96 N. W. 788; Ruther- ford Land & Improvement Co. v. Sanntrock, (N. J. Ch.), 44 Atl. 938, aff'd 60 N. J. Eq. 471, 46 Atl. 648; Todd v. Eighmie. 10 N. Y. App. Div. 142, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1013; Allen v. Anderson & Anderson (Tex. Civ. App.), 96 S. W. 54. 4,6. Ante, § 567m, note 38. 47. Richards v. Steiner, 166 Ala. 353, 52 So. 200; O'Rourke v. O'Connor. 39 Cal. 442; West- ern Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Mc- Caffrey, 47 Colo. 397, 107 Pac. 1081; McAdow v. Wachob, 45 Fla. 482, 33 So. 702; Feinberg v. Stearns, 56 Fla. 279, 131 Am. St. Rep. 119, 47 So. 797; Van Gundy v. Tandy, 272 lU. 319, 111 N. E. 1020; Baldwin v. Crow, 86 Ky. 679, 7 S. W. 146; Stan- hope V. Dodge, 52 Md. 483; Priest V. Rice, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 164, 11 Am. Dec. 156; Northwestern Land Co. V. Dewey, 58 Minn. 359, 59 N. W. 1085; Loughridge v. Bow- land, 52 Miss. 546; Hutchinson V. Bramhall, 42 N. J. Eq. 372, 7 Atl. 873; Ildvedsen v. First State Bank of Bowbells, 24 N. D. 227, 139 N. W. 105; Britton's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 172; Brown v. Sartor, 87 S. C. 116, 69 S. E. 88; Frei- berg V. Magale, 70 Tex. 116, 7 S. W. 684. But that notice to the creditor is immaterial, see Edwards v. Brinker, 9 Dana (Ky.) 69; May- ham V. Coombs, 14 Ohio, 428; Lookout Bank v. Noe, 86 Tenn. 21, 5 S. W. 433; Dobyns v. Wraing, 82 Va. 159. 48. Thompson & Ford Lumber Co. V. Dillingham, 223 Fed. 1000, 139 C. C. A. 376; Gamble v. Black Warrior Coal Co., — Ala. — , 55 So. 190; White v. Moffett, 108 Ark. 490, 158 S. W. 505; Lawton V Gordon, 37 Cal. 202; Bradford V Carpenter, 13 Colo. 30, 21 Par. 908; Hunt v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 120; 2216 Real Property. [§ 569 structioii has usually been given to statutes which provide that an unrecorded conveyance shall be void except as against persons having "actual notice."-*^ But in one state at least such a statutory require- ment of "actual notice" has been held to involve the necessity of actual knowledge of the prior con- veyance.^'^ That information sufficient to put one on inquiry in regard to an adverse right is prima facie sufficient to charge one with notice of such right is a principle well settled in equity, without refer- ence to the recording acts, and the question as to what constitutes such information in connection with these acts, when actual knowledge is not required, is deter- mined by an application of equitable considerations. Erickson v. Rafferty, 79 111. 209; Young V. Wiley (Ind. App.), 72 N. E. 54; Clark v. Holland, 72 Iowa, 34, 2 Am. St. Rep. 230, 33 N. W. 350; Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 54 Am. Dec. 567; Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578; Lyon v. Gom- bert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N. W. 774; Nute V. Nute, 41 N. H. 60; Wil- liamson V. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Doran v. Dazey, 5 N. D. 167, 57 Am. St. Rep. 550, 64 N. W. 1023; Brooks V. Reynolds, 37 Okla. 767, 132 Pac. 1091; Musgrave v. Bon- ser, 5 Ore. 313, 20 Am. Rep. 737; Alexander v. Fountain, 195 Ala. 3, 70 So. 669; Hingtgen v. Tbackery, 23 S. D. 329, 121 N. W. 839; LeVine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah, 260, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 407, 109 Pac. 2; Lamoille County Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. 1002. 49. Hamilton v. Fowkes, 16 Ark. 340; Pope v. Nichols, 61 Kan. 230, 59 Pac. 257; Farris V. Finnup, 84 Kan. 122, 113 Pac. 407; Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 1 Am. St. Rep. 295, 9 Atl. 122; Maupin v. Emmons, 47 Mo. 304; Drey v. Doyle, 99 Mo. 459, 12 S. W. 287; Creek Land & Imp. Co. V. Davis, 28 Okla. 579, 115 Pac. 468; Rector v. Wildrick, — Okla. — , 158 Pac. 610; Musgrovo V. Bonser, 5 Ore. 313, 20 Am. Rep. 737; Manigault v. Lofton, 78 S. C. 499, 59 S. E. 534; Tol- land V. Corey, 6 Utah, 392, 24 Pac. 190; Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498. 50. Pomroy v. Stevens, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 244; Lamb . v. Pierce, 113 Mass. 72; Toupin v. Peabody, 162 Mass. 473, 39 N. E. 280. See Crassen v. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 427; Wade, Notice, § 14; 2 White & Tudor, Leading Cas. Eq. Amer. Notes, 218. In Ohio it was held that when the statute made an unrecorded conveyance invalid as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser having "no knowledge" of such conveyance, the fact that he took under circumstances suffi- cient to put him on inquiry as § 569] Peiobities and. Recording. 2217 The information thus sufficient to put one on in- quiry may consist of a statement made by the claimant of the adverse right,^^ or by a third person not pecuni- arily interested, if he is in a position to know the facts, and his statement is definite. ^^ The information must be sufficient to furnish a basis for investigation, and a mere rumor or indefinite statement that there is an ad- verse claim is not sufficient to put one on inquiry.^" Knowledge by the purchaser of the condition of the land, as by the presence of structures thereon, may be sufficient to put him on inquiry as to whether this does not indicate the existence of some adverse right or ease- ment.^^ The fact that a purchaser obtains the property at a very inadequate price is also, it is usually consid- ered, a fact which should put him on inquiry as to the to such conveyance did not cause him to take subject thereto. Varwig v. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co., 54 Ohio St. 455, 44 N. E. 92. 51. Davis V. Kennedy, 105 111. 300; Nelson v. Sims, 23 Miss. 383, 57 Am. Dec. 144; Epley v. Witherow, 7 Watts (Pa.) 163; Bell V. Bell, 103 S. C. 95, 87 S. B. 540. 52. Lawton v. Gordon, 37 Cal. 202; Cox V. Milner, 23 111. 476; Curtis V. Mundy, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 405; Jackson, L. & S. R. Co. v. Davison, 65 Mich. 416, 32 N. W. 726; Jaeger v. Hardy, 48 Ohio St. 335, 27 N. E. 863; Butcher V. Yocum, 61 Pa. St. 168, 100 Am. Dec. 625; Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551; Pocahontas Tan- ning Co. V. St. Lawrence Boom & Manufacturing Co., 63 W. Va. 685. 60 S. E. 890. See 2 Pome- roy Eq. Jur. §§ 600-612. 53. Tompkins v. Henderson, 83 Ala. 391, .? So. 774; Smith v. Yule. 31 Cal, 180, 89 Am, Dec. 167; Hopkins v. O'Brien, 57 Fla. 444, 49 So. 936; City of Chicago V. Witt, 75 111. 211; Buttrick V. Holden, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 355; Shepard v. Shepard, 36 Mich. 173; Loughridge v. Bow- land, 52 Miss. 546; Condit v. Wilson, 36 N. J. Eq. 370; Ray- mond V. Flavel, 27 Ore. 219, 40 Pac. 158; Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. St. 167; Martel v. Somers, 26 Tex. 551. 54. Webb v. Robbins, 77 Ala. 176; Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. V. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. Rep. 112, 22 Pac. 53; Pollard V. Rebman, 162 Cal. 633, 124 Pac. 235; Blatchley v. Os- born, 33 Conn. 226; New York N. H. & H. R. Co. V. Russell, 83 Conn. 581, 78 Atl. 324; Ashel- ford V. Willis, 194 111. 492. 62 N. E. 817; Joseph v. Wild, 146 Ind. 249, 45 N. E. 467; Brown v. Honey- field, 139 Iowa, 414, 116 N. W. 731; Kamer v. Bryant, 103 Ky. 723; 46 S. W. 14; Illinois Cent. R. Co. V. Sanders, 93 Miss. 107, 46 2218 Eeax. Pkopeety. [§ 569 possible existence of an adverse claim.^^ As is, it has been decided, knowledge on his part that one under whom his grantor claims acquired the property at an exceedingly inadequate price.^*' If one put on inquiry makes such investigation as may reasonably be demanded of a person of ordinary diligence and understanding, and fails to ascertain the existence of the adverse claim, any inference of notice is rebutted.^''' One is, it has been held, not charged with notice of an adverse claim by the fact that there are circum- stances sufficient to put him on inquiry in reference thereto, and that he makes no inquiry, if inquiry by him would necessarily have been futile. ^^ The circumstances So. 241; Seng v. Payne, 87 Neb. 812, 128 N. W. 655; Day, Wil- liams & Co. V. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co., 41 Ohio St. 392; Mc- Dougal V. Lame, 39 Ore. 212, 64 Pac. 864; Randall v. Siiverthorn, 4 Pa. 173; Eshleman v. Parkers- burg Iron Co., 235 Pa. 439, 84 Atl. 399. 55. Mason v. MuUahey, 145 111. 383, 34 N. E. 36; Kuhn v. Wise, 90 Kan. 583, 135 Pac. 571; Atty. Gen. V. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 13 L. R. A. 251, 28 N. E. 346; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Smith, 117 Mo. 261, 38 Am. St. Rep. 656, 22 S. W. 623; Durant v. Crowell, 97 N. C. 367, 2 S. E. 541; Wood v. French, 39 Okla. 685, 136 Pac. 734; Hume V. Hare, 87 Tex. 380, 28 S. W. 935; Wisconsin River Land Co. v. Selover, 135 Wis. 594, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) ]073, 116 N. W. 265; Lufkin Land & Lumber Co. v. Beaumont Timber Co., Ltd., 151 Fed. 740, 81 C. C. A. 98. See Booker v. Booker, 208 111. 529. lOO Am. St. Rep. 250, 70 N. E. 709. 56. Winters v. Powell, 180 Ala. 425, 61 So. 96; Gaines v. Sum- mers, 50 Ark. 322, 7 S. W. 301; Hume V. Franzen, 73 Iowa, 25, 34 N. W. 490; Webber v. Taylor, 2 Jones Eq. (55 N. C.) 9; Baldwin V. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578. See Moore v. Sawyer, 167 Fed. 826. As to whether a purchaser is, by notice of the inadequacy of the consideration for the con- veyance to his grantor, affected with notice that such conveyance was fraudulent as to the grant- ors' creditors, see LongbeeJ v. Armstrong, 84 N. J. Eq. 49, 92 Atl. 93, and cases there cited. 57. Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508; Gregory v. Savage, 32 Conn. 250; Gavin v. Middleton, 63 Iowa, 618, 19 N. W. 805; Schweiss v. Woodruff. 73 Mich. 473, 41 N. W. 511; WiUiamson V. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Loomia v. Cobb, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 159 S. W. 305: 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § G07. 58. Cornell v. Maltby, ir,5 N. Y. 557, 59 N. E. 291; Herbert § 570] Priorities and Recording. 2219 may be such, however, that a reasonably diligent in- quiry would necessarily involve the ascertainment of the adverse claim, and in such case the presumption of notice may be regarded as conclusive.-^^ Each case must, to a very considerable degree, depend upon its own peculiar circumstances, and it is impossible to frame any absolute rule by which to determine whether an intending purchaser has sufficient information to put him on inquiry, and what constitutes due and suffi- cient inquiry.^*^ § 570. Notice to agent. The rule that notice to an agent is notice to his principal applies in the case of a purchaser of land acting through an agent, and he may consequently be charged with notil Gibson. C. J., in Woods v. partly executed, which is not SeT^r . . "^T- ^"""-^ '''■ ^"--Ptible Of registration; yet "q7 ; ^; , 0". why register another, when, Wa ts rPaT'38'2 "p.f^^'^^^L^' J '' "^'^h-'- -ere registered, the Watts (Pa) 382, Gibson, C. J. possession would be notice of says that an exception to this both." Bnt this omits to reoog- m|ght be th« case of possession „ize the possibility that the taken under a parol contract person in possession may have 2230 Real Pkoperty. [§ 571 rights of B. Furthermore, if a purchaser is justified in refraining from inquiry as to the rights of the per- son in possession merely because such person has a title, which appears of record, to which his possession may be attributed, it is difficult to see why he is not so justified when such person has such a title, not of record, of which the purchaser has notice. But the imputation of such an effect to an unrecorded title is practically denied by the decisions, hereafter referred to,**^ that the possession of a tenant under a lease is notice of rights in such tenant not based on the lease. The tenant in possession under a lease has a title, namely the lease, adequate to explain his possession, and the purchaser has, in the ordinary case, knowledge of such title, and yet it is held that the possession of the tenant is notice, not only of his interest under the lease, but of any other interest which he may have. (e) Joint possession or occupation. The cases not infrequently assert that the possession of a third person, in order to affect a purchaser with notice of such person's claim, must be "exclusive." Just what this means is by no means clear. Legal possession is in its nature exclusive of others, the only case in which the possession of one person is not exclusive of others being when there is a joint possession in him and an- other or others. The statement referred to probably means that the possession must be an actual legal pos- session, and not a mere occupation under a license, in connection with possession in another. When two persons are together in the possession of property, a person purchasing the property from a third person, not in possession, would ordinarily be put on inquiry as to the claims of such joint possessors. If one person is in possession, and another person is apparently associated w^ith him in the use of the prop- registered his one title without of registration, knowing that he might subse- 58. Post, § 571(f), note 20. quently acquire another incapable § 571] Priorities and Recording. 2231 erty, as a member of his family, for instance, but. not as sharing in the legal possession, a purchaser froni a third person would presumably be put on inquiry as to the rights of the former but not of the latter. There are a number of decisions to the effect that if two persons, A and B, are in occupation of land, and B is merely a lodger with A, or is a subordinate mem- ber of A's family, or otherwise A appears to be in control of the land, the presence of B upon the land is not such possession on his part as to charge a purchaser from A with notice of an adverse interest in B.^'^ In such case B is, in the ordinary case, and strictly speak- ing, not in possession, and furthermore the fact that he has apparently no powers of control serves to indi- cate that he has no actual interest, in the land, but is there merely in the right of A, and by his permission. On the other hand, a purchaser from B, would, it ap- pears, by the possession of A, be put on inquiry as to the rights of A.^ If the two persons on the land ap- pear to have equal rights of control thereover, a pur- chaser from either would, it is conceived, be put on inquiry as to the rights of the other, the presumption being that each has a joint interest. In perhaps a majority of the decisions as to the effect of joint occupation, as charging a purchaser from one occupant with notice of the other's claim, reference is made to the matter of record title, it being said that if, of two joint occupants, one alone has the record 99. Townsend v. Little, 109 U. N. W. 843, 111 N. W. 343; BeU S 504, 510, 27 L. Ed. 1012; v. Twilight, 22 N. H. 500 (scm- Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U. S. ble) ; Rankin v. Coar, 46 N. J. 379, 40 L. Ed. 463; Adams-Booth Eq. 566, 11 L. R. A. 661, 22 Atl. Co. V. Reid, 112 Fed. 106; Miinn 177; Patterson v. Mills, 121 N. V. Achey, 110 Ala. 628, 18 So. C. 258; Atteberry v. O'Neil, 42 299; Rubel v. Parker, 107 Ark. Wash. 487, 85 Pac. 270. But see 314, 155 S. W. 114; Goodwynne Wyatt v. Elam, 2.3 Ga. 201. 68 V. Bellerby, 116 Ga. 901, 43 S. Am. Dec. 518. E. 275; Harris v. Mclntyre, 118 1. Watson v. Murray, 54 Ark. 111. 275, 8 N. E. 182; Nabel- 499, 16 S. W. 293. spach V. Shaw, 146 Mich. 49;{, 109 2232 Real Propeety. [