rft THE DISCOURSES WITH THE ENCHEIRIDION AND FRAGMENTS. TXAA'SLATED, WITH NOTES, A LIFE OF EPICTETUS, AND A VIEW OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. BY GEORGE LONG, M.A. DOXOHUE BROTHERS CHICAGO NEW YORK EPICTETUS. VERY little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a native of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, a town be- tween the Maeander and a branch of the Ma^ander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv. 13 ) ; from which it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis at the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Kpictetus is unknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Rome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the emperor Xero. There is a story that the master broke his slave's leg by tor- turing him : but it is better to trust to the evidence of Sim- plicius, the commentator on the Encheiridion or Manual, who says that Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how he became a slave ; but it has been asserted in modern times that the parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority for this statement. It may be supposed that the young slave showed intel- ligence, for his master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, an eminent Stoic philoso- pher. It may seem strange that such a master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher ; but Garnier, the author of a Memoire sur les ouvrages d'Epictete, explains this matter very well in a communication to Schweig- haeuser. Gamier says : " Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor parents, was indebted apparently for the iii 2040787 i v EPIC TE TUB. advantages of a good education to the whim, which was com- mon at the end of the Republic and under the first emp( among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous slaves Grammarians, Poets, Rhetoricians, and Philosophers, in the same way as rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a great cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one which can explain to us, how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, had received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of Epaphro- ditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannot suspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine -and for his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries of Nero would have desired to possess such a slave." Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master; but I can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton. Domit. 14) afterward put Epaphroditus to death for this service to 'Nero. We may conclude that Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teach at Rome ; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by Domitian, A. D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a school or lecture-room at Nicopolis, where he taurjht till he was an old man. The time of his death is unknown. Epic- tetus was never married, as we learn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, Tom. ii. ed. Hemsterh. p. 393).* When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax and advising him to take a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was a philosopher's duty, to leave in place of himself another in the universe, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering, Give me then, Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Sim- * Lucian 's " Life of the Philosopher Dement^.." EPICTE TUS. v plicius says (Comment, c. 46, p. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of Epictetus' friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, bui Epictetus took the child and brought it up. Epictetus wrote nothing ; and all that we have under his name was written by an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterward the historian of Alexander the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher's discourses (the Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius, p. i ). These discourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the title of 'ETTIKTJITOV Siarpi^a.1. Simplicius, in his . commentary on the 'E-yxeipiSio* or Manual, states that this work also was put to- gether by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epic- tetus what he considered to be most useful, and most neces- sary, and most adapted to move men's minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of the Encheiridion are found nearly together and in the same words in various parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the life and death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher's studious life were probably not many nor remarkable ; but we should have been glad if this work had been preserved, which told, as Sim- plicius says, what kind of man Epictetus was. Photius (Biblioth. 58) mentions among Arrian's works Con- versations with Epictetus, < Ofj.i\lai 'ET^TOV in twelve books. Upton thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations. Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrian on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works by Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read these books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books, which he enumerates in his Biblio- v theca. '1'he conclusion is that we are not certain that there was a work of Arrian, entitled the Conversations of Epic- tetus. The Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion and Fragments were translated into English by the learned lady Mrs. Elizabeth Carter; who is said to have lived to the age of eighty-nine. The fourth edition (1807) contains the trans- lator's last additions and alterations. There is an Intro- duction to this translation which contains a summary view of the Stoic philosophy for the purpose of explaining Epictetus ; and also there are notes to the translation. The editor of this fourth edition says that " the Introduction and notes of the Christian translator of Epictetus are, in the estimation of most readers, not the least valuable parts of the work : " and he adds " this was also the opinion of the late Archbishop Seeker, who though he thought very highly of the Philosophy of Epictetus, considered the Introduction and notes as ad- mirably calculated to prevent any mistake concerning it, as well as to amend and instruct the world." The Introduction is certainly useful, though it is not free from errors. I do not think that the notes are valuable. I have used some of them without any remarks ; and I have used others and made some remarks on them where I thought that Mrs. Carter was mistaken in her opinion of the original text, or on other matters. The translation of Mrs. Carter is good ; and perhaps no Englishman at that time would have made a better transla- tion. I intended at first to revise Mrs. Carter's translation, and to correct any errors that I might discover. I had re- vised about half of it, when I found that I was not satisfied with my work ; and I was advised by a learned friend to translate the whole myself. This was rather a great under- taking for an old man, who is now past seventy-six. I have however done the work with great care, and as well as I could. I have always compared my translation with the F.riCTKTUS. vii Latin version and with Mrs. Carter's ; and I thin* that this is the best way of avoiding errors such as any translator may make. A man who has not attempted to translate a Greek or Latin author does not know the difficulty of the undertak- ing. That which may appear plain when he reads often becomes very difficult when he tries to express it in another language. It is true that Epictetus is generally intelligible ; but the style or manner of the author, or we may say of Arrian, who attempted to produce what he heard, is some- times made obscure by the continual use of questions and answers to them, and for other reasons. Upton remarks that '' there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes." The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker (Wolf). Schweig- haeuser also observes in a note (11.336 of his edition) that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connection of the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every man must judge for himself. But 1 should not have trans- lated the book, if I had not thought it worth study ; and I think that all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all. The text of Epictetus is sometimes corrupted, and this corruption causes a few difficulties. However, these diffi- culties are not numerous enough to cause or to admit much variety or diversity in the translations of the text. This remark will explain why many parts of my translation are yiii KPICTETUS. the same or nearly the same as Mrs. Carter's. When this happened, I did not think it necessary to alter my transla- tion in order that it might not be the same as hers. I made my translation first, and then compared it with Mrs. Carter's and the Latin version. I hope that I have not made many blunders. I do not suppose that I have made none. The last and best edition of the Discourses, the Enchei- ridion, and the fragments is by J. Schweighaeuser in 6 vols. 8vo. This edition contains the commentary of Simplicius on the Encheiridion, and two volumes of useful notes on the Discourses. These notes are selected from those ot Wolf, Upton, and a few from other commentators ; but a large part are by Schweighaeuser himself, who was an ex- cellent scholar and a very sensible man. I have read all these notes, and I have used them. Many of the notes to the translation are my own. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. I HAVE made a large Index to this book ; and any person, who has the necessary industry, may find in it almost every passage in the Discourses in which the opinions of the phi- losopher are stated ; and thus he may acquire a general notion of the philosophical system of Epictetus. But few readers will have the time and the inclination for this labor, and therefore I shall attempt to do the work for them. I have found two "expositions of the system of Epictetus. One is by Dr. Heinrich Ritter in his Geschichte der Phi- losophic alter Zeit, Vierter Theil, 1839. The other is by Professor Christian A. Brandis.* Both of these expositions are useful ; and I have used them. I do not think that either of them is complete, nor will mine be. I shall not make my exposition exactly in the same form as either of them ; nor shall I begin it in the same way. Ritter has prefixed a short sketch of C. Musonius Rufus, a Roman Stoic, to his exposition of the system of Epictetus. Rufus taught at Rome under the emperor 'Nero, who drove him from Rome ; but Rufus returned after the tyrant's death, and lived to the times of Vespasian and his son Titus. He acquired great reputation as a teacher, but there is no evidence that he wrote anything, and all that we know of his doctrines is from a work of Pollio in Greek, which was * Article EPICTETUS in the "Dictionary of Greek and Roman L'i ography," etc., edited by Doctor William Smith. ix X EPICTETUS. written after the model of. Xenophon's Memorabilia of Soc- rates. Of this work there are many fragments.* Rufus taught a practical philosophy, one that was useful for the purposes of life, and for the life of a philosopher who was not hindered by following the common occupations of mankind from philosophizing and aiding others to phil- osophize, t He urged young men especially to the study of philosophy, and even women, because without philosophy no person can be virtuous and do his duty. He asks, what hinders the scholar from working with his teacher and at the same time learning from him something about moderation (j). \Ve can only conjecture that Rufus did not busy himself about either Dialectic or Physic ; for he said that philosophizing was nothing else than an inquiry about what is becoming and conformable to duty ; an in- quiry which is conducted by reason, and the result is exhib- ited in practice. The old Stoics considered virtue to be the property only of the wise man ; and they even doubted whether such a man could be found. But Rufus said that it was not impos- sible for such a man to exist, for we cannot conceive such virtues as a wise man possesses otherwise than from the ex- amples of human nature itself and by meeting with men such as those who are named divine and godlike. The Stoical doctrine that man should live according to nature is not pressed so hard by Rufus as by some Stoics, and he looks on a life which is conformable to nature as not very difficult ; but he admits that those who attempt philosophy have been trained from youth in great corruption and rilled with wickedness, and so when they seek after virtue they re- quire more- discipline or practice. Accordingly he views philosophy as a spiritual medicine, and gives more weight to the practice or exercise of virtue than the older Stoics dici. The knowledge and the teaching of what is good, he says, should come first ; but Rufus did not believe that the knowl- edge of the Good was strong enough without practice (dis- cipline) to lead to moral conduct, and consequently he be- lieved that practice has greater efficacy than teaching.* He makes two kinds of exercise : first, the exercise of the soul in thinking, in reflecting and in stamping on the mind sound rules of life ; and second, in the enduring of bodily labors or pain, in which act of endurance the soul and the body act together. " The sum of his several rules of life," says Ritter, " may be thus briefly expressed : in his opinion a life according to Nature results in a social, philanthropic and contented state of mind, joined to the most simple satisfaction of our neces- sary wants. We see his social and philanthropic disposition in this that he opposes all selfishness (selbstsucht), that he * I have followed the exposition of Ritter here. Perhaps a literal translation of the Greek is still better : " Reason which teaches how we should act co-operates with practice, and reason (or teaching) comes in order before custom (habit) or practice : for it is not possible to become habituated to anything good if a person is not habituated by reason (by teaching) ; in power indeed the habit (practice) has the advantage over teaching, for habit (practice) is more efficacious in leading a man to act (properly) than reason is." I have given the meaning of the Greek as accurately as I can. In our modern education we begin with teaching general rules, or principles or beliefs ; and there we stop. The result is what might be expected. Practice or the habit of doing what we ought to do is neglected. The teachers are teachers of words and no more. They are the men whom Epictetus (iii. 21, note) describes : " You have committed to memory the words only, and you say, Sacred are the words by themselves." See p. 269, note. It is one of the greatest merits of Rufus that he laid down the principle which is expended above ; and it is the greatest demerit of our system of teaching that the principle is generally neglected : and most particularly by those teacherg who proclaim ostentatiously that they give a religious education. EPICTETUS. xiii views marriage not only as the sole right and natural satis- faction of the sexual feelings, but also as the foundation of. family, of a state, and of the continuation of the human race ; and accordingly he declares himself against the ex- posure of children as an unnatural practice ; and he often recommends beneficence.'' Epictetus was a pupil of this noble Roman teacher, whose name occurs several times in the Discourses. Ritter con- jectures that Epictetus also heard Euphrates, whom he highly commends. It has been justly said, though Epictetus is named a Stoic, and that his principles are Stoical, he is not purely a Stoic. He learned from other teachers as well as the Stoic. He quotes the teaching and example of Socrates continually, and the example of Diogenes the Cynic, both of whom he mentions more frequently than Zeno the founder of the Stoic philosophy. He also valued Plato, who accepted from Socrates many of his principles, and developed and ex- panded them. So Epictetus learned that the beginning of philosophy is man's knowledge of himself (yi&Ot 09*0*9*^ and the acknowledgment of his own ignorance and weakness. He teaches (i. c. 17 ; ii. c. 14; ii. c. 10) that the examination of names, the understanding of the notion, of the conception of a thing, is the beginning of education : he consistently teaches that we ought to pity those who do wrong, for they err in ignorance (i. c. 18 ; ii. c. 22, p. 202); and, as Plato says, every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. Epictetus strongly opposes the doctrines of Epicurus, of the newer Academics, and of Pyrrho, the great leader of the Skeptical school (i. c. 5, c. 23 ; ii. c. 20). He has no taste for the sub- tle discussions of these men. He says (p. 89), " Let the fol- lowers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defense of common consent (opinion)." " How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I can- x v not explain ; for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it ? When I intend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own. And you yourselves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise ? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill?'' He also says (ii. c. 20) that " the propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who contra- dict them; and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that anything is universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true." Kpictetus did not undervalue Dialectic or Logic, and the solution of what are called Sophistical and Hypothetical arguments (i. c. 7) ; but he considered the handling of all such arguments as a thing relating to the duties of life, and as a means toward Ethic, or the practice of morals. Rufus said, " for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument nor demonstration nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent : is there no error in this?'' Accordingly Dialectic is not the object of our life, but it is a means for distinguishing between true and false appearances, and for ascertaining the validity of evidence, and it gives us security in our judgments. It is the application of these things to the purposes of life which is the first and necessary part of philosophy. So he says in the Encheiridion (LI.) : " The first and most necessary place in philosophy is the use of theorems ("precepts), for in- stance, That we must not lie : the second is that of demon- stration, for instance, How is it proved that we oujjht not to EPTCTETUS. xv lie : the third is that which is confirmatory of these two and explanatory, for example, How is this a demonstration ? " The philosophy of Epictetus is in fact only the way of living as a man ought to live, according to his nature. Epictetus accordingly views that part of the Stoic teach- ing, named Physic or the Nature of things, also as subor- dinate to his philosophy, which is purely Ethical. We ought to live according to Nature, and therefore we must inquire what the Law of Nature is. The contemplation of the order of things is the duty of man, and to observe this wonderful system of which man is a part ; but the purpose of the con- templation and the observation is that we may live a life such as we ought to live. He says (Frag. CLXXV.), " What do I care whether all things are composed of atoms or of similar parts, or of fire and earth ? for is it not enough to know the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures of the desires and aversions, and also the movements toward things and from them ; and using these as rules to administer the affairs of life, but not to trouble ourselves about the things above us ? For these things are perhaps incom- prehensible to the human mind : and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what then is the profit of them, if they are comprehended ? And must we not say that those men have needless trouble who assign these things as necessary to a philosopher's dis- course ? Epictetus then did not value the inquiries of the Physical philosophers, or he had no taste for tlu-m. His Philosophy was Ethical, and his inquiry was. What is the rule of life ? ' With respect to gods," says Epictetus a.vTaaia.L by Epictetus ; and the word is translated " Visa animi '' by Gellius (Frag, clxxx.). This Phantasy is not only the thing which is perceived by the eyes, but the impression which is made on the eyes, and generally it means any impression received by the senses; and also it is the power of the mind to represent things as if they were present, though they are only present in the mind and are really absent. This power of Phantasy exists also in animals in various degrees according to their several ca- pacities; animals make use of appearances, but man only un- derstands the use of appearances (i. c. 6).* If a man cannot or does not make a right use of appearances, he approaches the nature of an irrational animal ; and he is not what God made him capable of being. The nature of the Good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise ; and things independent of the will do not admit either the nature of evil or of good (ii. c. i). The good and the bad are in man's will, and in nothing ex- ternal. The rational power therefore leads us to acknowl- edge as good only that which is conformable to reason, and to recognize as bad that which is not conformable to reason. The matter on which the good man labors is his rational faculty : that is the business of the philosopher (iii. c. 3). A man who wishes to be what he is by nature, by his consti- tution, adapted for becoming, must " struggle against appear- ances " (ii. c. 18). This is not an easy thing, but it is the only way of obtaining true freedom, tranquillity of mind, and * I suppose that this will be generally allowed to be true. Whatever an animal can do, we shall hardly admit that he understands the use of ap- pearances, and uses them as a man can. However the powers of some animals, such as ants for example, are very wonderful ; and it may be contended that they are not irrational in many of their acts, but quite rational. i-:ricTi:'rrs. xxi the dominion over the movements of the soul, in a word happiness, which is the true end and purpose of man's ex- istence on earth. Every man carries in him his own enemy, whom he must carefully watch (Ench. xlviii). There is dan- ger that appearances, which powerfully resist reason, will carry you away : if you are conquered twice or even once, there is danger that a habit of yielding to them will be formed. "Generally, then, if you would make anything a habit, do it : if you would not make it a habit, do not do it ; but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it " (ii. c. 18). As to pleasure Epictetus says (Ench. xxxiv.) : " If you have received the impression (avTa : We were sailing, he says, from xx v Cassiopa to Brundisium when a violent storm came on. In the ship there was a Stoic philosopher, a man of good repute. He who told the story says that he kept his eyes on the philosopher to see how he behaved under the circumstances. The philosopher did not weep and bewail like the rest, but his complexion and apparent perturbation did not much differ from those of the other passengers. When the danger was over, a wealthy Greek from Asia, went up to the Stoic, and in an insulting manner said, How is this, philosopher? when we are in danger, you were afraid and grew pale; but I was neither afraid nor was I pale. The philosopher after a little hesitation said, If I seemed to be a little afraid in so violent a tempest, you are not worthy to hear the reason of it. However he told the man a story about Aristippus,* who on a like occasion was questioned by a man like this Greek ; and so the philoso- pher got rid of the impertinent fellow. When they arrived at Brundisium, the narrator asked the philosopher for an ex- planation of his fear, which the philosopher readily gave. He took out of his bag a work of Epictetus, the fifth book of his discourses, in which was the following passage (Frag. clxxx.): The affects of the mind (visa animi), which philoso- phers name arraffta.t, by which a man's mind is struck by the first appearance of a thing which approaches, are not things which belong to the will nor in our power, but by a peculiar force they intrude themselves on men. But the assents, which they name NOT IN OUR POWER. OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon men- tion), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself ; and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power ? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music ? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then con- template itself ? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you must write ; but whether you should write or not, gram- mar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds ; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you ? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty ; * for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines I rational faculty is that <>f which Antoninus says (xi. i) : "These are the properties of the rational soul : it sees itself, analy/es itself, and makes itself such as it chooses ; the fruit which it bears, itself enjoys." 3 all other faculties : for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves ? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances.* What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses and points out the occa- sions for using them ? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances ; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose ? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not.f For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals ? But what says Zeus ? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little prop- erty free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this : this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I * This is what he has just named the rational faculty. The Stoics gave the name of appearances to all impressions received by the senses, and to all emotions caused by external things. t Compare Antoninus, ii. 3. Kpictetus does not intend to limit the power of the gods, but he means that the constitution of things being what it is, they cannot do contradictories. They have so constituted things that man is hindered by externals. How then could they give to man a power of not being hindered by externals ? Seneca (De 1'rov- identia, c. 6) says: "But it may be said, many things happen which cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Because (God says) I could not save you from them, I have armed your minds against all." This is the answer to those who imagine that they have disproved the com- mon assertion of the omnipotence of God, when they ask whether He can combine inherent contradictions, whether He can cause two and two to make five. This is indeed a very absurd way of talking. KP/CTETl'S. 5 have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us,* this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things : and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments ; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters ? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit clown and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us ? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please .-Eolus ; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but .-Kolus. What then ? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then ? As God m?y please. Must I then alone have my head cut off ? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you maybe consoled ? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranust did at * Schweighaeuser observes that these faculties of pursuit and avoid- ance, and of desire and aversion, and even the faculty of using appear- ances, belong to animals as well as to man ; but animals in using ap- pearances are moved by passion only, and do not understand what iln-y are doing, while in man these passions are under his control. t I'lautins l.ateranus. consul-elect, was charged with being engaged in Hso's conspiracy against Nero. 11^ was burned to execution without Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded ? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Kpaph- roditus,* Nero's freedman, who asked him about the cause of offense which he had given, he said, ' If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master/' What then should a man have in readiness in such cir- cumstances ? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine ; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lament- ing ? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament ? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from go- ing with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment ? Tell me the secret which you possess. 1 will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains.f Man, what are you talking about ? Me in chains ? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off ? These are the things which philos- ophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves. Thrasea $ used to say, f would rather be killed to-day than being allowed to see his children : and though the tribune who executed him was privy to the plot, Lateranus said nothing (Tacit. Ann. xv. 49- 60)- * Epaphroditus was a freedman of Xero, and once the master of Kpictetus. He was Nero's secretary. One good act is recorded of him : he helped Xero to kill himself, and for this act he was killed by Domitian (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 14). t This is an imitation of a passage in the Baccha* .of Kuripides (v. 492, etc.), which is also imitated 1-y Horace (Kpp. i. if>). \ Thrasea Pzetus, a Stoic philosopher, who wa* ordered in Nero's time to put himself to death (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 21-351. " e was tne nus " EPICTETUS. 7 banished to-morrow. What then did R.ufus* say to him ? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice ? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you ? What then did Agrippinus f say ? He said, " I am not a hindrance to myself." When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, " I hope it may turn out well ; but it is the iifth hour of the day " this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath ' let us go and take our exercise." After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death ? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then,! he said, and dine. This it is to have studied what a man ought to study ; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am band of Arria, whose mother Arria, the wife of Chechia Psetus, in the time of the Emperor Claudius, heroically showed her husband the way to die (Plinius, Letters, iii. if>). Martial has immortalized the elder Arria in a famous epigram (i. 14) : " When Arria to her Paetus gave the sword, Which her own hand from her chaste bosom drew, ' This wound,' she said, ' believe me, gives no pain, Hut that will pain me which thy hand will do.' " Munsonius Kuhis. a Tuscan by birth, uf equestrian rank, a philosopher and Stoic (Tacit. Hist. iii. Si). t Paconius Agrippinus was condemned in Nero's time. The charge against him was that he inherited his father's hatred qf the head of the Roman slate (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 28). The father of Agrippinus had been put to death under Tiberius (Suetonius, Tib. c. 61). { Aricia, about twenty Roman miles from Kom :>pia. 8 EP1CTETUS. -~eady to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour ; after this I will then die. How ? Like a man who gives up * what belongs to another. CHAPTER II. HOW A MAN ON KVK.KY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS I'KOI'KK CHARACTER. To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is rational is tolerable. Mows are not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how the Lace- daemonians | endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational ; and, on the contrarv, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational, But the rational and the irrational appear such in a dii ferent way to different persons, just as the good and the had. the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, partic- ularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to deter- mine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the esti- mates of external things, but we consider also what is appro- priate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with * Epictetus, Encheiridion, c. 1 1 : " Never say on the occasion of any- thing, ' I have lost it,' but say, ' I have returned it.' " t The Spartan boys used to be whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthia till blood flowed abundantly, and sometimes till death ; but tliev Mttered even a groan (Cicero, Tuscul. ii. 14. v. 27). /:/>/(' 77: 7T.\. 9 reason to hold a chamber put for another, and to look to this only, that if he docs not hold it. he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food : but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to an- other man not only does the holding of a chamberpot appeal- intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, 1 shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiv- ing of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged ; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. " But this," you say, " would not be worthy of me." \Yell, then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I ; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself ; for men sell themselves at various prices. For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero's spectacles,* and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, Go clown : and when Florus asked Agrippinus, \Yhy do not you go down ? Agrip- pinus replied, Because I do not even deliberate about the matter. For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life ? 1 say life. Pain or pleasure ? I say pleasure. But if 1 do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. (io then and take a part, but I will not. \Yhy ? Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the VTO was passionately fond of scenic representations, and used to indue e the descendants of noble families, whose poverty made tlu-iu consent, to appear on the stage (Tacitus. Annals, xiv. 14; Suetonius, Nero, c. ai). io EPICfETUS. tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no de- sign to be anything superior to the other threads. But 1 wish to be purple,* that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many ? and if I do, how shall I still be purple ? Priscus Helvidius | also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, '' It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." Well, go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think right. But if you do, I shall put you to death. When then did I tell you that I am immortal ? You will do your part, and I will do mine : it is your part to kill ; it is mine to die, but not in fear : yours to banish me ; mine to depart without sorrow. What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person ? And what good does the purple do for the toga ? Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other things ? But in such circumstances another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, I thank you for sparing me. But such a man Vespasian * The " purple " is the broad purple border on the toga named the toga prcetexta, worn by certain Roman magistrates and some others, and by senators, it is said, on certain days (Cic. Phil. ii. 43). t Helvidius Priscus, a Roman senator and a philosopher, is com- mended by Tacitus (Hist. iv. 4, 5) as an honest man : " He followed the philosophers who considered those things only to be good which are virtuous, those only to be bad which are foul ; and he reckoned power, rank, and all other things which are external to the mind as neither good nor bad." Vespasian, probably in a fit of passion, being provoked by Helvidius, ordered him to be put to death, and then revoked the order when it was too late (Suetonius, Vespasianus, c. 15). i's. n would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would cither sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished, and add even more. In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium ? But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Kpictetus, How he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? As a man, Epictetus replied, and a man who had been pro- claimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's school.* An- other would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations. Come, then, Epictetus, shave t yourself, li I am a phi- losopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. Hut I will take off your head ? If that will do you any good take it off. Some person asked, How then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character ? How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defense of the whole herd ? It is plain that with the powers the perception of * Baton was elected for two years gymnasiarch or superintendent of a gymnasium in or about the time of M. Atirslius Antoninus. See Schweighaeuser's note. t This is supposed, as Casaubon says, to refer to Domitian's order to the philosophers to go into exile; and some of them, in order to con- ceal their piofesMon of philosophy, shaved their beards. Epictetut would not take off his beard. 12 /: /Y( "/Y; 7 r.V. having them is immediately conjoined; and, therefore, who- ever of us has such powers will not he ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man ; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer cam- paign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us. Only consider at what price you sell your own will ; if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him ? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints ? What, then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains ? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates ; but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me ; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body ; nor shall I be a Crcesus, and yet I do not neglect my property ; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree. CHAPTER III. HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OP GOD BEING THE FATHER OF ALL MEN TO THE REST. IF a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from God * in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and of gods, * Epictetus speaks of God and the gods. Also conformably to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. " Father of men and gods," says Homer of Zeus; and Virgil says of Jupiter, M Father of gods and king of men." KFICTKTI'S. 13 T suppose that he would never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if C:esar (the Emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance ; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated ? Yet we do not so ; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and mortal ; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean or ignoble thoughts about them- selves ; but with the many it is quite the contrary. For they say, What am I ? A poor, miserable man, with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed ; but you possess something better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which is better, and why do you attach yourself to this ? Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and inisi.iiic rvou-. : some become like lions, savage and untamed ; hut the greater part of us become foxes and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner .mimal ? See* then and take care that you do not become some one of these miserable things. * Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6 and remarks that many expressions In Epictetus are not unlike the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Kpktetus was teaching. Schweighaeuser also refers to Wetstein's New Testament. 14 MflCTETUS. CHAPTER IV. OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT. HE who is making progress, having learned from philos- ophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things ; having learned too that happiness * and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid ; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it, f but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with some- thing which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress toward virtue is prog- ress toward each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perL ctir.g of anything leads us, prog- ress is an approach toward this p ;int. How then do we admit tha: virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it ? What is the product of virtue ? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement ? Is it he who has read many * The notion is that of " flowing easily," as Seneca (Epp. 120) ex- plains it : " beata vita, secundo defluens cursu." t The Latin translation is : "in futurum tempus rejicit." Wolf says : " Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est : philosophic tironem non nimium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubitantem expoctare dum connrmetur judicium." XPICTETUS. 15 books of Chrysippus ? * But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus ? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, name- ly, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress ? But why do you mock the man ? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improvement ? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work ? In de- sire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid ; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error ; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which 1 have named. t But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. Do you then show me your improvement in these things ? If J were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders ; ud then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres* look to that. I should. reply, I ! ,!ertius (( 'hry.-ippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatis> -. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in it. C, _'S<>, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Ckanthes. t Compare iii. c. 2. \ Haltures are gymnastic instruments (dalcn. i. De Sanitate tuenda ; Martial, xiv. 40; Juvenal, vi. 420, and the Scholiast Upton). Halteres is a (Ireek word, literally " leapers." They are said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making jumps. The effects of such weights in taking a jump is well known lo boy* who have used them. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose. 1 6 EPICTETUS. wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say, Take the treatise on the active powers, and see how I have studied it, I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making prog- ress : but if not conformably, be gone, and not only ex- pound your books, but write such books yourself ; and what will you gain by it ? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii ? Does then the expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii ? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress toward it in another. Where then is progress ? If any of you, withdrawing him- self from externals, turns to his own will to exercise it and to improve it by labor, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest ; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of necessity must sub- ject himself to others who have the power to procure or pre- vent what he desires or would avoid ; finally, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man ; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief principles as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not traveled in vain. But if he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labors only at this, and has traveled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there ; for this for which he has traveled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to Kt'lCTKTl'S. 17 study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groan- ing, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters. Dear C'rito,* if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say, Wretched am I, an old man : have f kept my gray hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus? I )<> you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition ? Does not Priam say this? Does not (Kdipus say this? Xay, all kings say it ! f For what else is tragedy than the perturbations of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry ? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will con- cern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish. What then does Chrysippus teach us ? The reply is, To know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune! O the great benefactor who points out the way! To Tviptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, be- cause he gave us food by cultivation ; but to him who dis- covered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, o> a. temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them : but because they have produced in the * This is said in the Criton of Plato, i ; hut not in exactly the same way. t So kings and such personages speuk in the (Ireek tragedies. Cora- pare what M. Antoninus (xi. 6) says of Tragedy. a 1 8 EflCTETUS. human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us t'he truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this ? CHAPTER V. AGAINST THE ACADEMICS.* IF a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man's strength or the teacher's weakness ; for when the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argument ? Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the under- standing, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. And indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad condition : but if the sense of shame and modesty is deadened, this we call even power (or strength). Do you comprehend that you are awake ? I do not, the man replies, for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am awake. Does this appearance then not differ from the other ? Not at all, he replies. Shall I still argue with this man ? ' And what fire or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is deadened ? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He is even * See Lecture V., The New Academy, Levin's Lectures Introductory to the Philosophical \Vritings of Cicero, Cambridge, 1871. r.rrcTF.TUs. 19 worse than a dead man. lie does not see the contradiction : he is in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and makes no improvement : he is even in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his sense of shame; and the rational faculty has not been cut off from him, but it is brutalized. Shall J name this strength of mind ? Certainly not, unit :so name it such in catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into their head. CHAPTER VI. OF P K (J V I D K N C E. FFOM everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qual- ities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen ; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colors, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use ? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not made light ? in that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife ? Is it no one ? And, indeed, from the very struct- ure of tilings which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of 20 EPfCTETUS. some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him ? And the existence of male and female, arid the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman ? If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we do not simply receive im- pressions from them, but we also select * something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them : is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman ? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion ? \Yhat, then, are these things done in us only ? Many, in- deed, in us only, of which the rational animal had peculiarly need ; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is done ? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another : God had need of irrational animals to make use of appear- ances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient ; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and con- formably to the nature and constitution of each thing, \ve shall never attain our true end. For where the constitutions oi living beings are different, there also the acts and the ends * Cicero, De Off. i. c. 4, on the difference between man and beast. EP/CTETUS. 21 are different. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough : but in an animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agricult- ure, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use : for which purposes what need is there to understand appear- ances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has in- troduced man to be a spectator of God * and of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do, but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us : and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in away of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators of these things. But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of *The original is avrov, which I refer to God ; but it may be ambigu ^ch\veighaeuser refers it to man, and explains it to mt^f. liiut man should be a spectator of himself, according to the maxi: atr6. le that man can in a manner contemplate himself and his faculties as well as external objects ; and as every man can be an object t.-. other man, so a man may be an object to himself when he examinci his faculties and reflects on his own acts. Schweighaeuser asks how can a man be a spectator of God, except so far as he is a spectator of God's works ? It is not enough, he says, to reply that God and the universe, whom and which man contemplates, are the same thing to the Stoics ; for Epirtetus always distinguish^-; C.od the maker and governor of the universe from the universe itself. Hut here lies the difficulty. Tin- universe is an all-comprehensive term: it is all that we can in any way perceive and conceive as existing ; and it may therefore comprehend < Imi, not as something distinct from the universe, but as being the universe himself. This form of expression is an acknowledgment of the weak- ness of the human faculties, and contains the implicit assertion of Locke that the notion of God is beyond man's understands 8.17). 2J EPICTETL'S. Phidias,"'' and all of you think it is a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand them ? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have re- ceived the faculty of sight ? But you may say, there are some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are there none in Olympia ? Are you not scorched ? Are you not pressed by a crowd ? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing ? Are you not wet when it rains ? Have you not abundance of noise, clamor, and other disagreeable things ? But I suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens ? Have you not received greatness of soul ? Have you not received manliness ? Have you not received endurance .> And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul ? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful ? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens ? Yes, but my nose runs.t For what purpose then, slave, have you hands ? Is it not that you may wipe your nose? Is it then consistent with reason that there should be run- ning of noses in the world ? Xay. how much better it is to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out ? * This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus (Jupiter) by Phidias, which was at Olympia. This wonderful work is described by Pausanias (Eliaca, A, 1 1). t Compare ii. 16, 13. 23 And what would he have been doing if there had been noth- ing of the kind ? Is it not plain that lit; would have wrapped himself up and have slept ? In the first place then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away ail his life in such luxury and ease ; and even if Iv: had been one what would have been the use of him ? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other pnrts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if sue h circum- stances and occasions had not roused and exercised him ? Well then must a man provide for himself such means of ex- ercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some place into his country, and a boar and a hydra ? This would be folly and madness : but as they did exist, and were found, they were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exercising him. ( 'ome then do you also having observed these things look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say : Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for 1 have means given to me by thee and powers for honor- ing myself through the things which happen. You do not so : but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen : and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety ? And yet God has not only given us these faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything that happens without : depressed or broken by it ; but, like a good king and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hin- drance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding. You, who have received tin-so powers free and as your own, use them not: you do not even see what you have received, and from whom : some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor, ard others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves to f . ill-finding and making 24 charges against God. Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul and manliness : hut what powers you have for finding fault and making accusa- tions, do you show me. CHAPTER VII. OK THK t'SK OK SOPHISTICAL ARGUMEXTS AM) HYPOTHETICAL AND THE I. IKK. THE handling of sophistical and hypothetical arguments, and of those which derive their conclusions from questioning, and in a word the handling of all such arguments, relates to the duties of life, though the many do not know this truth. For in every matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the proper method of dealing with the matter. Let then people either say that the grave man will not descend into the contest of question and answer, or that, if he does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not conducting himself rashly or care- lessly in questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry ought to be made into those topics on which particularly questioning and answering are em- ployed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning ? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this ? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also enough for a man, who would not make a mis- take in the use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he should receive the genuine drachma;; and reject the spurious ? It is not enough. What then ought to be added fo this precept ? What else than the faculty which prove? 25 and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachma: ? Consequently also in reasoning what has been said is not enough ; but is it necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Besides this, what is proposed in reasoning ? That you should ac- cept what follows from that which you have properly granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know this ? It is not enough ; but a man must learn how one thing is a con- sequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider then if it be not necessary that this power should also be acquired by him who purposes to conduct himself skillfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating himself the several things which he has proposed, and the power of understanding the demonstrations of others, and of not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstrating. There- fore there has arisen among us the practice and exercise 01 conclusive arguments * and figures, and it has been shown to be necessary. But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the premises or assumptions, and there results from them some- thing ; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does result. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit th" falsehood ? And how is that possible ? Well, should I sax that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon ? But you are not allowed to do even this. Shall I then say that the consequence does not arise through what has been conceded ? But neither is it allowed. What then must be done in this case ? Consider if it is not this : as to have borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor, but to this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to * These are syllogisms and figures, modes by which the syllogism has its proper conclusion. j EPfCTETUS. cofnpel you to admit the inference that you have granted the premises, but you must abide by what you have granted. Indeed, if the premises continue to the end such as they were , wns not true, and that he took it to mean something different from what the person intended who put the question. lie understood that A and P> were co-extensive. Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong ; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong somewhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, but yet 't is not true. f/CTETL'S. 27 does it result with our assent, since \ve have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. \Ye ought then both to examine such kind of premises, and such change and variation of them (from one meaning to another), by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way. the premises undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what con- clusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to examine? In order that we may not in this matter be em- ployed in an improper manner nor in a confused way. And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments : for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which fol- lows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one ? And if not every one, which should we allow ? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it ? or must he some- times withdraw from it. but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions ? Yes ; but suppose that a man says, If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility. With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him ? But what other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is skillful in ques- tioning and answering, and incapable of being cheated and deceived by false reasoning ? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly ? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be ? But without some such - nd preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument ? Let them show this ; and all these speculations become super* rluous, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a ood and serious iS EP/CTETUS. V.'hy are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do we seek pretenses for not laboring and not being watchful in cultivating our reason ? If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father ? Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him ? What then have you done ? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus * when he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism : I suppose, I said, that I have burnt the Capitol. Slave, he replied, was the thing omitted here the Capitol ? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father ? But for a man to use ap- pearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and care- lessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to seem in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent ; is there no error in this? CHAPTER VIII. THAT THE FACULTIES f ARE NOT SAFE TO THE rNINSTRVCTED. IN as many ways as we can change things! which are equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we can * Rufus is Musonius Rufus (i. i). To kill a father and to burn the Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp. Horace, Epode, iii. Cicero, De Amicit. 11 ; Plutarch, Tib. (Jrac- chus, c. 20. t The faculties, as Wolf says, are the faculties of speaking and argu- ing, which, as he also says, make men arrogant and careless who have no solid knowledge, according to Bion's maxim, "arrogance (self-conceiO is a hindrance to improvement." See viii. 8. J Things means " propositions " a.nd " terms," /.v/r '//: 7T.S-. 29 change the forms of arguments and enthymemes in argumen- tation. This is an instance : if you have borrowed and not repaid, you o\ve me the money : you have not borrowed and you have not repaid ; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skillfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher ; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also. Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner ? Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation ? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from language: and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the danger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage * to them, but to make them an appendage to himself ? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside ? What then was not Plato a philosopher ? f I reply, and * A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of speaking, his chief excellence. He should use ii u> set off something which is superior. t 1'lato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is :i reason for not allowing him to he a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that Hip- wus |i physician, and eloquent too. lint not us u physician. 30 was not Hippocrates a physician ? but you see how Hippo crates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in respect of being a physician ? \Yhy do you mingle tilings which have been accidentally united in the same men ? .And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavor to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher ? \Yill you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to them in other respects ? And if I were a philosopher, ought you also to be made lame ?* What then ? Do I take away these faculties which yoH possess? By no means-, for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect to appearances. f CHAPTER TX. NOW FROM THE KACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO COD A MAX MAV PROCEED TO I HE CONSEQUENCES. IF the things are true which are said by the philosophers about the kinship between God and man. what else remains for men to do than what Socrates did ? Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are * Epictetus was lame. t In i. 20, 15, Epictetus defines the being or nature of good to be a proper use of appearances ; and he also says, i. 29. i. that the nature of the good is a kind of will, and the nature of evil is a kind of will. But Schweighaeuser cannot understand how the " good of man " ran be " a certain will with regard to appearances ; " and he suggests that Arrian may Have written, " a certain will which makes use of appearance*." F.PICTJ-.Tl'S. 31 an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world.* For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth ? Is it not plain that you call yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and all your family, but even the whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you ? He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the enrth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with Him f why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God,$ and why should he be afraid of anything which * Cicero, Tuscul. v. 37, has the same : " Socrates cum rogaretur, cuja- tem se esse diceret, Mundanum inquit. Totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur." (Upton.) t It is the possession of reason, he says, by which man has communion with God ; it is not by any external means, or religious ceremonial. A modem expositor of Epictetus says, " Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the deity as though they were part of him " (Epictet. i. 14, 6; ii. 8, ii, 17, 33). In the Epistle named from Peter (ii. 1,4) it is written : " Whereby are given to us exceeding great and precious promises that by these (see v. 3) ye might be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.'' \ So Jesus said, " Our Father which art in heaven." Compare Acts of the Apostles, xvii. zS, where Paul quotes these words. It is not true then that the " conception of a parental deity," as it has been asserted, was unknown before the teaching of Jesus, and, after the time of Jesus, unknown to those Greeks who were unacquainted with His teaching. 32 EPICTETUS, happens among men ? Is kinship with Cresar (the emperor) or with any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us to live in safety, and above contempt and without any fear at all ? and to have God for your maker and father and guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears ? But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat when I have nothing ? And how do slaves, and runaways, on what do they rely when they leave their masters ? Do they rely on their lands or slaves, or their vessels of silver ? They rely on nothing but themselves, and food does not fail them.* And shall it be necessary for one among us who is a philosopher to travel into foreign parts, and trust to and rely on others, and not to take care of himself, and shall he be inferior to irrational animals and more cowardly, each of which being self-suf- ficient, neither fails to get its proper food, nor to find a suitable way of living, and one conformable to nature ? I indeed think that the old manf ought to be sitting here, not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble talk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any young men of such a mind, * In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some lookout for any work that they can find and get their pittance by honest labor. You may see such men everywhere, if you will keep your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labor, live an heroic life, which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian. Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals. Millions die an- nually for want of sufficient food ; and many human beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did not know these facts. Compare the passage in Matthew (vi. 25-34). It is said, v. 26 : " Behold the fowls of the air ; for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they ? " The expositors of this passage may be consulted ,t The old man is Epictetus. 33 that when they have recogni/ed their kinship to God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and its possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to us for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw off these things as if they were bur- dens painful and intolerable, and to depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labor that your teacher and instructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should be. You should come to him and say, " Epictetus, we can no longer endure being bound to this poor body, and feeding it and giving it drink, and rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the wishes of these and of those.* Are not these things indifferent and nothing to us, and is not death no evil ? And are we not in a manner kins- men of God, and did we not come from Him ? Allow us to depart to the place from which we came ; allow us to be re- leased at last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers and thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and think that they have some power over us by means of the body and its possessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any man.'' And I on my part would say, " Friends, wait for God ; when He shall give the signal f and release you from the service, then go to Him ; but for the present endure to dwell in this place where He has put you : short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for those who are so disposed : for what tyrant, or what thief, or what courts of justice, are formidable to those who * He means, as Wolf says, " on account of the necessities of the body seeking the favor of the more powerful by disagreeable complian t Upton refers to Cicero, Tuscul. i. 30 ; Cato Major, c. 20 ; Somnium Scipionis, c. 3 (I)e Republica, iv. 15) ; the purport of which passages is that we must not depart from life without the command of God. See Marcus Antoninus, ii. 17 ; iii. 5; v. 33. But how shall a man know the signal for departure, of which Epictetus speaks? 3 34 EPICTETUS, have thus considered as things of no value the body and the possessions of the body ? Wait then, do not depart without a reason." Something like this ought to be said by the teacher to in- genuous youths. But now what happens ? The teacher is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch, if you have it, you will have it ; if you have it not, you will depart from life. The door is open.* Why do you grieve ? where does there remain any room for tears? and where is there occasion for flattery ? why shall one man envy another ? why should a man admire the rich or the powerful, even if they be both very strong and of violent temper ? for what will they do to us ? We shall not care for that which they can do ; and what we do care for, that they cannot do. How did Socrates behave with respect to these matters ? Why, in what other way than a man ought to do who was convinced that he was a kinsman of the gods ? " If you say to me now," said Socrates to his judges, t " we will acquit you on the condition that you no longer discourse in the way in which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble either our young or our old men, I shall answer, you make yourselves ridiculous by think- ing that, if one of our commanders has appointed me to a certain post, it is my duty to keep and maintain it, and to * Upton has referred to the passages of Epictetus in which this ex- pression is used, i. 24, 20; i. 25, 18; ii. i, 19, and others; to Seneca, De Provid. c. 6, Ep. 91 ; to Cicero, De Fin. iii. 18, where there is this con- clusion : "e quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, quum beatus sit; et stulti manere in vita quum sit miser." Com- pare Matthew vi. 31 : "Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall ; ? or, What shall we drink ? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek :) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things," etc. \ This passage is founded on and is in substance the same as that in Plato's Apology, c. 17. EPICTETUS. 35 resolve to die a thousand times rather than desert it : but if God has put us in any place and way of life, we ought to desert it." Socrates speaks like a man who is really a kins- man of the gods. But we think about ourselves, as if we were only stomachs, and intestines, and shameful parts ; we fear, we desire ; we flatter those who are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also. A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who, as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all, and was living here. I wrote on his behalf in a submissive manner ; but when he had read the letter, he gave it back to me and said, " I wished for your help, not your pity : no evil has happened to me." Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, used to say : This and this will befall you from your master; and when [ replied that these were things which happen in the ordinary course of human affairs, Why then, said he, should I ask him for anything when I can obtain it from you ? For, in fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and foolish to receive from another. Shall I then, who am able to receive from myself greatness of soul and a generous spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial office ? I hope not : I will not be so ignorant about my own posses- sions. But when a man is cowardly and me'an, what else must be done for him than to write letters as you would about a corpse ? * Please to grant us the body of a certain person and a sextarius of poor blood. For such a person is, in fact, a carcass and a sextarius (a certain quantity) of blood, and nothing more. But if he were anything more, he would know that one man is not miserable through the means of another. The meaning is obscure. Schweighaeuser thinks that the allusion is f\> A defeated enemy asking permission from the conqueror to bury the dead. Kpictetus considers a man as a mere carcass who places his hap- piness in externals and in the favor of others. 36 LMCTLTL'S. CHAPTER X. AGAINST THOSE WHO EAGERLY SEEK. PREFERMENT AT ROME. IF we applied ourselves as busily to our own work as the old men at Rome do to those matters about which they are employed, perhaps we also might accomplish something. I am acquainted with a man older than myself who is now superintendent of corn* at Rome, and I remember the time when he came here on his way back from exile, and what he said as he related the events of his former life, and how he declared that with respect to the future after his return he would look after nothing else than passing the rest of his life in quiet and tranquillity. For how little of life, he said, remains for me. I replied, you will not do it, but as soon as you smell Rome, you will forget all that you have said ; and if admission is allowed even into the imperial palace, he t will gladly thrust himself in and thank God. If you find me, Epictetus. he answered, setting even one foot within the palace, think what you please. Well, what then did he do ? Before he entered the city he was met by letters from Caesar, and as soon as he received them he for- got all, and ever after has added one piece of business to another. I wish that I were now by his side to remind him * A " Praefectus Annonse," or superintendent of the supply of corn at Rome, is first mentioned by Livy (iv, 12) as appointed during a scar- city. At a later time this office was conferred on Cn. Pompeius for five years. Maecenas (Dion. 52, c. 24) advised Augustus to make a Prefect us Annonae or permanent officer over the com market and all other mar- kets. He would thus have the office formerly exercised by the aediles. 1 1 cannot explain why the third person is used here instead of the second. See Schweig.'s note. KPICTKTUS. 37 of what he said when he was passing this way, and to tell him how much better a seer I am than he is. Well then do I say that man is an animal made for doing nothing ? * Certainly not. But why are we not active ? t (We are active.) For example, as to myself, as soon as day comes, in a few words I remind myself of what I must read over to my pupils ; % then forthwith I say to myself, But what is it to me how a certain person shall read ? the first thing for me is to sleep. And indeed what resemblance is there between what other persons do and what we do ? If you observe what they do, you will understand. And what else do they do all day long than make up accounts, inquire among themselves, give and take advice about some small quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of profits ? Is it then the same thing to receive a petition and to read in it : I entreat you to permit me to export a small quantity of corn ; and one to this effect : " I entreat you to learn from Chrysippus what is the administration of the world, and what place in it the rational animal holds ; consider also who you are, and what is the nature of your good and bad. Are these * The Stoics taught that man is adapted by his nature for action. He ought not therefore to withdraw from human affairs, and indulge in a la/y life, not even a life of contemplation and religious observances only. Upton refers to Antoninus, v. i, viii. 19, and Cicero, De Fin. v. 20. t Schweighaeuser proposes a small alteration in the Greek text, but F do not think it necessary. When Epictetus says, " Why are we not act- ive ? " He means, Why do some say that we are not active ? And he intends to say that We are active, but not in the way in which some people are active. I have therefore added in ( ) what is necessary to make the text intelligible. { This passage is rather obscure. Th; word used signifies, it is said, to read over for the purpose of explaining as a teacher may do. The pupil also would read something to the teacher for the purpose of show- ing if he understood it. So Epictetus also says, " Hut what is it to me," etc. $ A plain allusion to restraints put on the exportation of grain. 38 F.PICTETUS. things like the other, do they require equal care, and is it equally base to neglect these and those ? Well then are we the only persons who are lazy and love sleep ? No ; but much rather you young men are. For we old men when we see young men amusing themselves are eager to play with them ; and if I saw you active and zealous, much more should I be eager myself to join you in your serious pursuits." CHAPTER XI. OF NATURAL AFFECTION. WHEN he was visited by one of the magistrates. Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had ; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circum- stances. Miserable, the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect, for men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered. Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right ? I acted naturally, the man replied. But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that every- thing which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. This is the case, said the man, with all or at least most fathers. I do not deny that : but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behavior is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumors also come for the good of the body, because they do come ; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, be- cause nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you EPICTETUS. 39 show me then how your behavior is natural. I cannot, he said ; but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and is not rightly done. Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing between them ? The sight, he said. And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion ? The touch. Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should employ ? I do not know, he said. And yet not to know the criterion of colors and smells, and also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm ; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm ? The greatest harm (I think). Come tell me, do all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming rightly appear such ; and at present as to Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right? How is it possible ? he said. Well, I suppose it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the rest must be wrong : if the opinions of the Jews are right, those of the rest cannot be right. Certainly. ]>ut where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary. 1 It- assented to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of things which are according to nature, and by using it also to determine each several thing. But in the present matter I have so much as this to aid you toward what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? Certainly. Well, is such affection natural and good, 40 F.riCTETl'S. and is a thing consistent with reason not good ? By no means. Is then that which is consistent with reason in con- tradiction with affection ? I think not. You are right, for if it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so? It is, he said. Whatever then we shall discover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good. Agreed. Well then, to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is ; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection. Yes, let us consider. Did you then, since you had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when you ran off and left her : and has the mother no affection for the child ? Certainly, she has. Ought then the mother also to have left her, or ought she not ? She ought not. And the nurse, does she love her ? She does. Ought then she also to have left her ? By no means. And the pedagogue,* does he not love her ? He does love her. Ought then he also to have deserted her ? and so should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of you the parents and of those about her, or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor cared for her ? Certainly not. Now this is unfair and unreasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection. It is absurd. Come then, if you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you alone and deserted ? By no means. And would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in * " When we are children our parents put us in the hands of a peda- gogue to see on all occasions that we take no harm.'' Epictetus, Frag EPICTKTUS. 4t sickness ? or for this reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by your enemies and deserted by them ? But if this is so, it results that your behavior was not at all an affectionate act. Well then, was it nothing which moved you and induced you to desert your child ? and how is that possible ? But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while a horse was running which he favored ; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he required sponges to recover from his fainting fit. What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion perhaps ; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding anything or pursuing : the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. And what is this ? Is it any other than our will to do so ? No other. But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do ? This then was the cause of Achilles' lamentation, not the death of Patroclus ; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion ; but it was because he chose to do so. And to you this was the very cause of your then running away, that you chose to do so ; and on the other side, if you should (hereafter) stay with her, the reason will be the same. And now you are going to Rome because you choose ; and if you should change your mind, you will not go thither. And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the .kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing ; but our own opinions and our wills. Do 1 convince you of this or not ? You do convince me. 42 RPICTRTUS. Such then as the causes are in each case, such also are the effects. When then \ve are doing anything not rightly, from this day \ve shall impute it to nothing else than to the will from which we have done it : and it is that which we shall endeavor to take away and to extirpate more than the tumors and abscesses out of the body. And in like manner we shall give the same account of the cause of the things which we do right; and we shall no longer allege as causes of any evil to us, either slave or neighbor, or wife or children, being persuaded, that if we do not think things to be what we do think them to be, we do not the acts which follow from such opinions; and as to thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in externals. It is so, he said. From this day then we shall inquire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs, nothing else than opinions. I hope so. You see then that you must become a Scholasticus,* an animal whom all ridicule, if you really intend to make an examination of your own opinions : and that this is not the work of one hour or day, you know yourself. CHAPTER XII. OF CONTENTMENT. WITH respect to gods, there are some who say that a divine being does not exist : others say that it exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no forethought about any- thing ; a third class say that such a being exists and exer cises forethought, but only about great things and heavenly * A Scholasticus is one who frequents the schools ; a studious and literary person, who does not engage in the business of active life. EPJCTKTUS. 43 things, and about nothing on the earth ; a fourth class say lhat a divine being exercises forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say : " I raove not without thy knowledge" * (Iliad, x. 278). Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them ? t And if they exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be right to follow them ? But if indeed they do exist and look after things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them) ? The wise and good man then after con- sidering all these things, submits his own mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall I be contented with the * The line is from the prayer of Ulysses to Athena : " Hear me, child of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even move without thy knowledge." Socrates said that the gods know evry- , what is said and done and thought (Xenophon, Mem. i. I, 19). ( ipare Cicero, De Xat. Deorum, i. i, 2j and Dr. Price's Dissertation on Providence, sect i. Epictetus enumerates the various opinions about the gods in ancient times. The reader may consult the notes in Schwelg- haeusers edition. The opinions about God among modern nations, who are called civilized, and are so more or leas, do not seem to be so varied as in ancient times ; but the contrasts in modern opinions are striking. These modern opinions vary between denial of a God, though the number of those who deny i* perhaps not large, and the superstitious notions about God and His administration of the world, which are taught by teachers, learned and ignorant, and exercise a great power ovr the minds of those who are unable or do not dare to exercise the faculty of reason. t "To follow God," ia a Stoical xprion. Antoninus, x. 1 1. 4; divine administration, and how can I become free ? For he is free to whom everything happens according to his will, and whom no man can hinder. What then is freedom madness ? Certainly not : for madness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I would have everything result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing ? But for me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing ? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose ? Xo, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know any- thing, if knowledge were adapted to every man's whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately ? By no means ; but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that everything may happen as it does.* And how do things happen ? As the disposer has disposed them ? And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and ull such opposites for the harmony of the whole ; f and to each * This means that we ought to learn to be satisfied with everything that happens, in fact with the will of God. This is a part of education according to Epictetus. But it does not appear in our systems of educa- tion so plainly as it does here. Antoninus (iv. 23) : " Everything har- monizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee." t Upton has collected the passages in which this doctrine was men- tinned. One passage is in Gellius(vi. i). from the fourth book of Chry- sippus on Providence, who says : " nothing is more foolish than the opinions of those who think that good could have existed without evil." Schweighaeuser wishes that Epictetus had discussed more fully the KP/CTETVS. 45 of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions. Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change the constitution of things for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the power, but in order that, as the tilings around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen. For can we escape from men ? and how is it pos- sible ? And if we associate with them, can we change them ? Vv'ho gives us the power? What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce with them ? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to nature ? But you are unwilling to endure and are discontented : and if you are alone, you call it solitude ; and if you are with men, you call them knaves and robbers ; and you find fault with your own parents and children, and brothers and neighbors. But you ought when you are alone to call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to think yourself like to the gods; and when you .uc- with many, you ought not to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly, and so accept all con- tentedly. question on the nature and origin of Evil. He refers to the commen- tary of Simplicius on the Fncheiridion of Epictetus, c. 13 (Sj, and 34 (27), for his treatment of this subject. Epictetus (Enchciridion, c. 27), >uys that " as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither dors the nature of evil exist in the universe." Simplicius observes (p. 278, ed. Schweig.) : " The Good is that whii.h i< according to each thing's nature, wherein each thing has its perfection : but the Mad is tin- ills- position contrary to its nature of the thing which contains the bad, by which disposition it is deprived of that which is according to nature. namely the good. For if the I -id as well as the (juod were a disposition and perfection of the f..r..i ia which it is, the bad itself would also l, e good .ind would mil then ! < .iMt.-.I llad." 46 EPIC TE TUS. What Then is the punishment of those who do not accept ? It is to be what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone ? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents ? let him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatis- fied with his children ? let him be a bad father. Cast h : -n into prison. What prison ? Where he is already, for 1 there against his will ; and where a man is against his will, there he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly. Must my leg then be lamed ? Wretch, do you then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world ? Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole ? Will you not withdraw from it ? Will you not gladly part with it to him who gave it ? And will you be vexed and dis- contented with the things established by Zeus, which he with the Morae (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your generation, defined and put in order ? Know you not how small a part you are compared with the whole. I mean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less ; for the magnitude of intelli- gence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts. Will you not then choose to place your good in that in which you are equal to the gods? Wretch that I am to have such a father and mother. What then, was it permitted to you to come forth and to select and to say : Let such a man at this moment unite with such a woman that I may be pro- duced ? It was not permitted, but it was a necessity for your parents to exist first, and then for you to be begotten. Of what kind of parents? Of such as they were. Well then, since they are such as they are, is there no remedy given to you ? Now if you did not know for what purpose you possess the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched if you closed your eyes when colors were brought before them ; but in that you possess greatness of soul and nobility of spirit for every event that may happen, f-.PfCTETUS. 47 and you know not that you possess them, are you nol more unfortunate and wretched ? Things are brought close to you which are proportionate to the power which you possess, but you turn away this power most particularly at the very time when you ought to maintain it open and discerning. Do you not rather thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these things which they have not placed in your power ; and have made you accountable only for those which are in your power ? As to your parents, the gods have left you free from responsibility ; and so with respect to your brothers, and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For what then have they made you responsible ? For that which alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why then do you draw on yourself the things for v.hich you are not re- sponsible ? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to yourself. CHAPTER XIIL HOW EVERYTHING MAV RE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS. WHEN some one asked, How may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered : If he can eat justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately and orderly, will it not be also acceptably to the gods ? But when you have asked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has brought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, then not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this acceptable to the gods ? How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave ? Slavp yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his pro- genitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from above ? But if you have been put in any such higher place, will you immediately make yourself a 48 tyrant ? Will you not remember who you are, and whom you rule ? that they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?* But I have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what direction you are looking, that it is toward the earth, toward the pit, that it is toward these wretched laws of dead men ? f but toward the laws of the gods you are not looking. CHAPTER XIV. THAT THE DEITY OVERSEES ALL THINGS. WHEN a person asked him how a man could be convinced that all his actions are under the inspection of God, he answered, Do you not think that all things are united in one ? t I do, the person replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a natural agreement and union with heavenly things? I do. And how else so regularly -i-. IT by God's command, when He bids the plants to flower, do they flower / v/hen He bids them to send forth shoots, do * Mrs. Carter compares Job xxxi. 15 : " Did not he that made me in the womb make him (my man-servant) ? And did not one fashion us in the womb ? " t I suppose he means human laws, which have made one man a slave to another ; and when he says " dead men," he may mean mortal men, as contrasted with the gods or God, who has made all men brothers. | Things appear to be separate, but there is a bond by which they a.re united. " All this that yon see, wherein things divine and human are contained, is One : W2 are members of one large body" (Seneca, l-'.p. 95). " The universe is either a confusion, a mutual involution of things and a dispersion ; or it is unity and order and providence " (Antoninus, vi. 10) : also vii. 9, " all things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy ; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing." See also Cicero, I)e Nat. Deoruin, ii. 7 ; and De Oratore, iii. 5. ETUS. 49 they shoo* ? when He bids them to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit ? when He bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen ? when again He bids them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them down ? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves ? and when He bids them to fold them- selves up and to remain quiet and rest, how else do they remain quiet and rest ? And how else at the growth and the wane of the moon, and at the approach and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration and change to the contrary seen in earthly things ? * But are plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, and are not our souls much more ? and our souls so bound up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of Him; and does not God perceive every motion of these parts as being His own motion connate with Himself? Now are you able to think of the divine ad- ministration, and about all things divine, and at the same time also about human affairs, and to be moved by ten thou- sand things at the same time in your senses and in your understanding, and to assent to some, and to dissent from others, and again as to some things to suspend your judg- ment ; and do you retain in your soul so many impressions from so many and various things, and being moved by them, do you fall upon notions similar to those first impressed, and do you retain numerous arts and the memories of ten thousand things ; and is not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive from all a certain communication ? And is the sun able to illuminate so large a part of the All, and to feave so little not illuminated, that part only which is occupied by the earth's shadow ; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go round, being a small part of Himself compared with the whole, cannot He perceive all things ? But I cannot, the man may reply, comprehend all these * Compare Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-35^- 50 RPJCTETUS. things at once. But who tells you that you have equal power with Zeus ? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a guardian, every man's Demon,* to whom he has com- mitted the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived. For to what better and more careful guard- ian could He have intrusted each of us ? When then you have shut the doors and made darkness within, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not ; but God is within, and your Demon is within, and what need have they of light to see what you are doing ? TO this God you ought to swear an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. But they who are hired for pay swear to regard the safety of Cassar before all things ; and you who have received so many and such great favors, will you not swear, or when you have sworn, will you not abide by your oath ? And what shall you swear ? Never to be disobedient, never to make any charges, never to find fault with anything that he has given, and never unwillingly to do or to suffer anything that is necessary. Is this oath like the soldier's oath ? The soldiers swear not to prefer any man to Caesar : in this oath men swear to honor themselves before all. * Antoninus, v. 27 : " Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the Demon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man's understanding and rea- son." Antoninus (iii. 5) names this Demon " the god who is in thee.'' St. Paul (i Cor. i. 3, 16) says, " Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you ? " CHAPTER XV. HTHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES. WHEN" a man was consulting him how he should persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any exter- nal thing. If it did (or, if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowing something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter's material is wood, and that of the stat- uary is copper, so the matter of the art of living is each man's life. What then is my brother's ? That again be- longs to his own art ; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like rep- utation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable to nature. Whose governing part ? His in whom I am, she says. How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me ? Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger. When the man, who was consulting him, said, I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature ? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time : let it flower* first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is * " The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom " (Mrs. Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which becomes the fruit. 52 Ef'lCTETUS. then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily ? Do not expect it, even if I tell you. CHAPTER XVI. OF PROVIDENCE. Do NOT wonder if for other animals than man all things are provided for the body, not only food and drink, but beds also, and they have no need of shoes nor bed mate- rials, nor clothing ; but we require all these additional things. For animals not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit for them to be made so as to need other things. For consider what it would be for us to take care not only of ourselves, but also about cattle and asses, how they should be clothed, and how shod, and how they should eat and drink. Now as soldiers are ready for their commander, shod, clothed and armed : but it would be a hard thing for the chiliarch (tribune) to go round and shoe or clothe his thousand men ; so also nature has formed the animals which are made for service, all ready, prepared, and requiring no further care. So one little boy with only a stick drives the cattle. But now we, instead of being thankful that we need not take the same care of animals as of ourselves, complain of God on our own account ; and yet, in the name of Zeus and the gods, any one thing of those which exist would be enough to make a man perceive the providence of God, at least a man who is modest and grateful. And speak not to me now of the great things, but only of this, that milk is produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and wool from skins. EPICTEITS. 53 Who rrmde these things or devised them ? Xo one, you say. Oil. ama/ing shamelessness and stupidity ! Well, let us omit the works of nature and contemplate her smaller (subordinate) acts. Is there anything less useful than the hair on the chin ? What then, has not nature used this hair also in the most suitable manner possible ? Has she not by it distinguished the male and the female ? does not the nature of every man . forthwith proclaim from a dis- tance, I am a man ; as such approach me, as such speak to me ; look for nothing else ; see the signs ? Again, in the case of women, as she has mingled something softer in the voice, so she has also deprived them of hair (on the chin). You say, not so: the human animal ought to have been left without marks of distinction, and each of us should have been obliged to proclaim, I am a man. But how is not the sign beautiful and becoming and venerable ? how much more beautiful than the cock's comb, how much more becoming than the lion's mane ? For this reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given, we ought not to throw them away, nor to confound, as much as we can, the distinctions of the sexes. these the only works of providence in us ? And what words are sufficient to praise them and set them forth accord- ing to their worth ? For if we had understanding, ought we to do anything else both jointly and severally than to sing hymns and bless the deity, and to tell of his benefits ? Ought we not when we are digging and plowing and eating to sing this hymn to God ? " Great is God, who has given us such implements with which we shall cultivate the earth : great is God, who has given us hands, the power of swallowing, a stomach, imperceptible growth, and the power of breathing while we sleep.'' This is what we ought to sing on every oc- casion, and to sing the greatest and most divine hymn for giving us the faculty of comprehending these things and us- ing a proper way. Well then, since most of you have ben urn: 54 EPICTETUS. blind, ought there not to be some man to fill this office, and on' behalf of all to sing the hymn to God ? For what else can I do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to God ? If then I was a nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale ; if I were a swan, I would do like a swan. But now I am a rational creature, and I ought to praise God : this is my work ; I do it, nor will I desert this post, so long as I am allowed to keep it ; and I exhort you to join in this same song. CHAPTER XVII. THAT THE LOGICAL ART IS NECESSARY. SINCE reason is the faculty which analyzes and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalyzed, by what should it be analyzed ? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason ; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyze that reason ? For if that reason does this for itself, our rea- son also can do it. But we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end.* Reason there- fore is analyzed by itself. Yes : but it is more urgent to cure (our opinionsf } and the like. Will you then hear about * This is obscure. The conclusion, " Reason therefore is analyzed by itself" is not in Epictetus; but it is implied, as Schweighaeuser says (p. 197, notes). So Antoninus, xi. i, writes: "These are the properties of the rational soul ; it s es itself, analyzes itself." If reason, our rea- son, requires another reason to analyze it, that other reason will require another reason to analyze that other reason ; and so on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analyzed, it must be analyzed by itself. The notes on the first part of this chapter in the edition of Schweighaeuser may be read by those who are inclined. t " Our opinions." There is some defect in the text, as Wolf re- S3 those things ? Hear. But if you should say, " I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely," and if 1 should ex- press myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, " Distinguish," 1 will bear with you no longer, and 1 shall say to you, ' It is more urgent." * This is the reason, I sup- pose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything ? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accu- rately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully anything else ? Yes ; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit. But it is a thing which can measure corn. Logic also pro- duces no fruit. As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes ? And does not Antisthenes say so ? f And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education ? And does not Socrates say so ? And of whom dors Xt.-nophon write, that he began with the examina- tion of names, what each name signified ? t Is this then the marks. "The opponent," he says, " disp.i; (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, ami he prefers moral teaching to Logic : but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching." * lie repeats the words of the supposed opponent; and he means that his adversary's difficulty shows the necessity of Dialf t Antisthenes, who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and Physic (Schweig, note p. 201). | Xenophon, Mem. iv. 5. 12, and i\. 6, 7. tpictetus knew what edu*- great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus ? Who says this ? What then is the wondrous thing ? To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power ? and what more have you need of ? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right. But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is ? They say that it is Chrysippus. I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says : 1 seek an interpreter of Chrysippus. Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.* What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter?! There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods ; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but be- cause through them signs are given ; nor do we look with tion ought to he. We learn language, and we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the case of children this can only be clone imperfectly as to some words, but it may be done even then in some degree ; and it must be done, or the word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunderstood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we use ; some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ignorance to some degree. * The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says " the Roman tongue," perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman and does not know Greek well. t Kncheiridion, c. 49. " When a man gives himself great airs because he can understand and expound Chrysippus, say to vour:>elf. If Chrysip- EPIC I'l: Tl '.V. e *r j / wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs ? * I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacn- ficer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets them : Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth ? Xo man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? Xo man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise ? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit ? and what can overcome desire and aversion (^Xto-tv) except another desire and aversion ? But, you object : " If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you ; that is, will com- pelled will, f For if God had made that part of himself, which pus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of." See the rest. Compare Xenophon, Mem. i. i, 3. t This is true. If you place before a man the fear of death, you threaten him with the fear of death. The man may yield to the threat and do what it is the object of the threat to make him do ; or he may make resistance to him who attempts to enforce the threat ; or he may refuse to yield, and so take the consequence of his refusal. If a man yields to the threat, he does so for the reason which Kpictetus gives, and freedom of choice, and consequently freedom of will really exists in tliis case. The Roman law did not allow contracts or agreements made under the influence of threats to be valid ; and the reason for declaring them invalid was not the want of free will in him who yielded to the threat, but the fact that threats are directly contrary to the purpose of all law, which purpose is to secure the independent action of every person 58 EPICTE/L'S. he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims : these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free ; if you choose, you will blame no one : you will charge no one. All will be at the same time accord- ing to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets. CHAPTER XVIII. THAT WK OUGHT NOT TO UK ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS (FAULTS) OF OTHERS. IF what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion that a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also in the case of a movement toward anything the persuasion that a thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to be proper and to move toward another, why then are we angry with the many ? * They are thieves and in all things allowed by law. This matter is discussed by Savigny, Das heut. Romische Recht, iii. 114. See the title " Quod metus causa," in the Digest, 4. 2. Compare also Epictetus, iv. i, 68, etc. * Epictetus says that men will do as they do, so long as they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts which bad men do ; and he says that we should pity them and try to mend them. EPJCTETUS. 59 robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity them ? But show them their error, and you will see how they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion. Ougtit not then this robber and this adulterer to be de- stroyed ? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way : This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him ? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and cleaf man ? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him ? Man, you ought not to be affected Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness, and he will do right. lie will pity, and still he will punish severely, if the interests of society require the guilty to be punished : but he will not punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties ; and I assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others ; the matter of the dis- is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have toward .vho do wrong, " because they are mistaken about good and evil." He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men's mistakes further than this : men think that a thing or act is advantageous ; and it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and to another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he fills us to show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not here examining the way of showing them their error ; by which I suppose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to ad- mit that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors ; for h 6o Kt'ICTETCS. contrary to nature by the bad things of another.* Pity him rather : drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter : " these accursed and odious fellows." How have you been made so wise at once ? and how are you so peevish ? Why then are we angry ? Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us ? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry ? But so long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus : you have fine clothes ; your neighbor has not : you have a window ; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and take them away ? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you ? Do not provoke them : do not have a window : do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods : hearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done nothing strange. What then ? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen lamp : for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. The reason is that you had a gar- ment. I have pain in my head. Have you any pain in your horns ? Why then are you troubled ? for we only lose says, " if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion." * Here the text, 9, 10, 1 1 is defective. r.jTs. 61 those things, we have only pains about those things which we possess.* But the tyrant will chain what ? the leg. He will take away what ? the neck. What then will he not chain and not take away ? the will. This is why the ancients taught the maxim. Know thyself. t Therefore we ought to exercise ourselves in small \ things, and beginning with them to pro- < liDivar." Compare Lactantius, DC falsa relipone, c. 20. 1 Comp. i. c. 3. r,., i-.ricrr.rrs. useful to man ; and, universally, he has made the nature of the rational animal such that it cannot obtain any one of its own proper interests, if it does not contribute something to the common interest* In this manner and sense it is not un- sociable for a man to do everything for the sake of himself. For what do you expect ? that a man should neglect himself and his own interest ? And how in that case can there be one and the same principle in all animals, the principle of attachment (regard) to themselves ? What then ? when absurd notions about things independent of our will, as if they were good and (or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, \ve must of necessity pay regard to tyrants ; for I wish that men would pay regard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men.f How is it that the man becomes all at once wise, when Caesar has made him superintendent of the close stool ? How is it that we say immediately, " Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he were ejected from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool. Kpaphroditus \ had a shoemaker whom he sold because he was good for nothing. This fellow by some good luck was bought by one of Casar's men, and became Ca>sar's shoe- maker. You should have seen what respect Epaphroditus * This has been misunderstood by Wolf. Schweighaeuser, who always writes like a man of sense, says : ' Kpictetus means by ' our proper interests,' the interests proper to man, as a man, as a rational being; and this interest or good consists in the proper use of our powers, and so far from being repugnant to common interest or utility, it con- tains within itself the notion of general utility and cannot be separated from it. t A lord of the bedchamber, as we might say. Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis, c. 14, speaks "of the pride of the nomenclator (the announcer of the name), of the arrogance of the bedchamber man." Even the clerk of the close-stool was an important person. Slaves used to carry this useful domestic vessel on a journey. Horat. Sat. i. 6, 109 (Upton) J Once the master of Kpictetus (i, i, to.) EPICTETt'S. 65 paid to him : " How does the good Felicion do, f pray? '' Then if any of us asked, " What is master (Epaphroditus) doing ? " the answer was, " He is consulting about something with Felicion." Had he not sold the man as good for nothing ? Who then made him wise all at once ? This is an instance of valuing something else than the things which depend on the will. Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship ? All who meet him offer their congratulations ; one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and the slaves kiss his hands.* He goes to his house, he finds torches lighted. He ascends the Capitol : he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Xow who ever sacrificed for having had good desires ? for having acted conformably to nature ? For in fact we thank the gods for those things in which we place our good.f A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of Augustus. $ I say to him : "Man, let the thing alone : you will spend much for no purpose." But he replies, "Those who draw up agreements will write my name." Do you then stand by those who read them, and say to such persons, " It is I whose name is written there ? '' And if you can now be present on all such occasions, what will you * Hand-kissing was in those times of tyranny the duty of a >Iave, not of a free man. This servile practice still exists ajnong men called free. t Matthew vi. 2r, " for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.'' So these people show by thanking God, what it is for which they are thankful. J Casaubon, in a learned note on Suetonius, Augustus, c. iS, informs us that divine honors were paid to Augustus at Xicopolis, which town he founded after victory at Actium. The priesthood of Augustus at N'icopolis was a high office, and the priest gave his name to the year ; that is, when it was intended in any writing to fix the year, either in any writing which related to public matters, or in instruments used in private affairs, the name of the priest of Augustus was used, and this was also the practice in most Greek cities. 5 66 EflCTETUS. do when you are dead ? My name will remain. Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come, what remembrance of you will there be beyond Xicopolis ? But I shall wear a crown of gold. If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of s and put it on, for it will be more elegant '.n appearance. CHAPTER XX ABOUT REASON, HOW IT CONTEMPLATES ITSELF.* EVERY art and faculty contemplates certain things espe- cially. When then it is itself of the same kind with the objects which it contemplates, it must of necessity contem- plate itself also : but when it is of an unlike kind, it cannot contemplate itself. For instance, the shoemaker's art is em- ployed on skins, but itself is entirely distinct from the material of skins : for this reason it does not contemplate it- self. Again, the grammarian's art is employed about articu- late speech ; is then the art also articulate speech ? By no means. For this reason it is not able to contemplate itself. Now reason, for what purpose has it been given by nature ? For the right use of appearances. What is it then itself ? A system (combination) of certain appearances. So by its nature it has the faculty of contemplating itself also. Again, sound sense, for the contemplation of what things does it belong to us ? Good and evil, and things which are neither. What is it then itself ? Good. And want of sense, what is it ? Evil. Do you see then that good sense necessarily con- templates both ilself and the opposite ? For this reason it is the chief and the first work of a philosopher to examine ap- pearances, and to distinguish them, and to admit none with- * A comparison of lib. i. chap i, will help to explain this chapter Compare also lib. i. chap. 17. out examination. You see even in the matter of coin, in which our interest appears to be somewhat concerned, how we have invented an art, and how many means the assayer uses to try the value of coin, the sight, the touch, the smell, and lastly the hearing. He throws the coin (denarius) down, and observes the sound, and lie is not content with its sound- ing once, but through his great attention he becomes a musi- cian. In like manner, where we think that to be mistaken and not to be mistaken make a great difference, there we apply great attention to discovering the things which can deceive. But in the matter of our miserable ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we carelessly admit every appearance, for the harm is not noticed. When then you would know how careless you are with respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to things which are indifferent (neither good nor evil), observe how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight of the eyes, and how with respect to being deceived, and you will discover that you are far from feeling as you ought to do in relation to good and evil. But this is a matter which requires much preparation, and much labor and study. Well then do you expect to acquire the greatest of arts with small labor ? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very brief. If you would know, read Zeno's * writings and you will see. For how few words it requires to say that man's end (or object) is to follow f the gods, and that the nature <>f good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say, What is God, what is appearance, and what is particular and what * Zeno, a native- of ('ilium, in the island of Cyprus, is said to have come when he was young to Athens, where lie spent the rest of a long life in the study and teaching of Philosophy. Ue was the founder of the Stoic sect, and a man respected for his ability and high character. lie wrote many philosophical works. Zeno was succeeded in his school by Cleanthes. t Follow. See i. i 2, 5. 68 KJ'fCTKTUS. is universal * nature ? then indeed many words are necessary. If then Epicurus should come and say. that the good must be in the body ; in this case also many words become necessurv. and we must be taught what is the leading principle in vis. and the fundamental and the substantial ; and as it is not probable that the good of a snail is in the shell, it is probable that the good of a man is in the body ? Hut you yourself, Epicurus, possess something better than this. What is that in you which deliberates, what is that which examines every- thing, what is that which forms a judgment about the body itself, that it is the principal part ? and why do you light your lamp and labor for us, and write so many f books ? it is that we may not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what we are with respect to you ? Thus the discussion requires many words. CHAPTER XXI. ACSAINST THOSK WHO WISH TO J!K ADMIRED. \VHKN a man holds his proper station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do you wish to * " I now have what the universal nature wills me to have, and I do what my nature now wills me to do." M. Antoninus, v. 25, and xi. 5. Kpictetus never attempts to say what God is. He was too wise to attempt to do what man cannot do. But man does attempt to do it, and only shows the folly of his attempts, and, I think, his presumption also. t Kpictirus is said to have written more than any other person, as many as three hundred volumes (ir6yu>8pot, rolls). Chrysippus was his rival in this respect. For if Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus vied with him in writing as much; and for this reason he often repeated himself, because he did not read over what he had written, and he left his writings uncorrected in consequence of his hurry. Diogenes Laertius, x. Upton. See i. 4. 77:77 IV. 69 happen to you ? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid con- formably to nature, if I employ movements toward and from an object as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit ? My wish has always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim. Oh, the great philosopher. Who are they by whom you wish to be admired ? Are they not those of whom you are used to say, that they are mad ? Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen ? CHAPTER XXII. ON PR K COGNITIONS. PRECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and precognition is not contradictory to precognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all cir- cumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it ? And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and be- coming? Wlien then does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the precognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, He has done well : he is a brave man, and another says, " Not so ; but he has acted foolishly ; " then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans ; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles ; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon ? ought not that to which is proper and right ? Certainly. \\V11, what 70 I'.riCTF.TUS. do you say, Achilles ? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done ? f do most certainly. Adapt your pre- cognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, I ought to give up Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the precognition of "ought" or "duty." Further. Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles replies, " Would you then take her whom I love?" Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize ? And must I be the only man who has no prize ? Thus the dispute begins. What then is education ? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural precognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not ; in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will ; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To what kind of things shall we adapt it? To the things which are in our power ? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life ? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this ? Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain toward society a proper behavior? He cannot. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbor. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is mv interest also F.riCTKTL'S. 7r to steal it from the bath.* This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty toward Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me ; and what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am ? 1 now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil demons, such as to Fever; | and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows. What should we do then ? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who is in labor. \ Now I do not see what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad ? Yes. But sup- pose that I place the good somewhere among the things which depend on the will : all will laugh at me. There will come some gray-head wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize ; but you ought to have * The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had the op- portunity of carrying off a bather's clothes. From men's desires to have that they have not, and do not choose to labor for, spring the disorders of society, as it is said in the epistle of James, c. iv., v. i, to which Mrs-. Carter refers. t See page 65, note. J Upton refers to a passage in the Theajtetus (p. 150, Steph.), where Socrates professes that it is his art to discover whether a young man's mind is giving birth to an idol (an unreality) and a falsity, or to some- thing productive and true; and he says p. (151) that those who associ- ate with him are like women in childbirth, for they are in labor and full of trouble nights and days much more than women, and his art has the power of stirring up and putting to rest this labor of childbirth. The conclusion in the chapter is not clear. The student is supposed to be addressed by some rich old man, who really does not know what to s.iv ; and the best, way of getting rid of him and his idle talk is by dis- missing him with a joke. See Schweighaeuser'a note. 7 2 I-J'ICTETUS. some brains also : all this that you are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers ; but you know how to act better than philosophers do. Man, why then do you blame me, if I know ? What shall I say to this slave ? If I am silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way : Excuse me, as you would excuse lovers : I am not my own master : 1 am mad. CHAPTER XXIII. AGAINST EPICURUS. EVEN Epicurus perceives that -we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk * he is no longer able to say anything else. For on the other hand he strongly maintains this, that we ought not to admire nor to accept anything which is detached from the nature of good ; and he is right in maintaining this. How then are we [suspicious], j if we have no natural affection to our children ? Why do you advise the wise man not to bring up children ? Why are you afraid that he may thus fail into trouble ? For does he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house ? What does he care if a little mouse in the house makes lamentation to him ? But Fpicurus knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who has any sense * That is in the body; see i. 20, 17. Compare ii. 20, at the begin- ning of the chapter. I The word is not intelligible. Schweighaeuser suggests that it should read, " how have we any care for others ? " Epicurus taught that we should not marry nor beget children nor engage in public alfuirs, be- cause these things disturb our tranquillity. 73 also does not engage in political matters; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things ; for, indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you do among a swarm of flies, what hinders you ? But Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that we should not bring up children. But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf ; and shall a man desert his child ? What do you mean ? that we should be as silly as sheep ? but not even do they desert their offspring : or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young. Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground ? For my part I think that even if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle that you would say what you have said, they would not have cast 3-011 away. CHAPTER XXIV. HOW WE SHOULD STRl"<;GI.K WITH CIRCUMS TAN'OKS. IT is circumstances (difficulties) which show what men are.* Therefore when a difficulty falls upon you, remem- ber that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with a rough young man. For what purpose ? you may say. Why that you may become an Olympic conqueror ; but it is not accomplished without sweat. In my opinion no man has had a more profitable difficulty than you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an athlete would deal with a * So Ovid says, Trist. iv. 3, 79: " Qux latet inque honis cessat non cognita rebus, Apparet virtus arguiturqne mails." young antagonist. \Ve are now sending a scout to Rome ; * but no in. in sends a cowardly scout, who, if he only hears a noise and sees a shadow anywhere, comes running back in terror and reports that the enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and tell us. Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome, terrible is death ; terrible is exile ; terrible is calumny ; terrible is poverty ; fly. my friends ; the enemy is near \ve shall answer. Begone, prophesy for yourself ; we have com- mitted only one fault, that we sent such a scout. Diogt-nes.t who was sent as a scout before you, made a different report to us. He says that death is no evil, for neither is it base : he says that fame (reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has this spy said about pain, about pleasure, and about poverty ? He says that to be naked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground is the softest bed ; and he gives as a proof of each thing that he affirms his own courage, his tranquillity, his freedom, and the healthy appearance and compactness of his body. There is no enemy near, he says ; all is peace. How so, Diogenes ? See, he replies, if 1 am struck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man. This is what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and tell us one thing after another. * In the time of Domitian, philosophers were banished from Rome and Italy by a Senatusconsultum (Sueton. Domitian, c. 10 ; Dion, 67, c. 13), and at that time Kpictetus, as Gellius says (xv. 11), went from Rome to Nicopolis in Kpirus, where he opened a school. We may suppose that tpictetus is here speaking of some person who had gone from Nicopolis to Rome to inquire about the state of affairs there under the cruel tyrant Domitian. (Schweighaeuser.) t Diogenes was brought to king Philip after the battle of Chaeronea as a spy (Hi. 22. 2.)). Plutarch in the treatise, Qtiomodo assentator ab amico dignoscatur, c. 30, states that when Philip asked Diogenes if he was a spy, he replied, Certainly I am a spy, Philip, of your want of judg- ment and of your folly, which lead you without any necessity to put to the hazard your kingdom and your life in one single hour. 75 Will you not go back, and you will see clearer when you have laid aside fear ? \Yhat then shall I do? \Vhat do yo, do when you leave a ship ? Do you take away the helm or the oars? What then do you take away ? You take what is your own. your bottle and your wallet ; and now if you think of what is your own, you will never claim what belongs to others. The em- peror (Domitian) says. Lay aside your laticlave.* See. I put on the angusticlave. Lay aside this also. See, I have only my toga. Lay aside your toga. See, I am now naked. But you still raise my envy. Take then all my poor body; when, at a man's command, I can throw away my poor body, do I still fear him ? But a certain person will not leave to me the succession to his estate. What then ? had I forgotten that not one of these things was mine ? How then do we call them mine ? Just as we call the bed in the inn. If then the innkeeper at his death leaves yon the beds, all well ; but if he leaves them to another, he will have them, and you will seek another bed. If then you shall not find one, you will sleep on the ground : only sleep with a good will and snore, and remember that tragedies have their place among the rich and kings and tyrants, but no poor man fills a part in the tragedy, except as one of the Chorus. Kings indeed commence with prosperity : %l ornament the palaces with garlands," then about the third or fourth act they called out, " O Cithadron,f why didst thou receive me ? " Slave, where are the crowns, where the diadem ? The guards help thee not at all. When then you approach any of these persons, remember this that you are approaching a tragedian, not the actor, but (Kdipus him- * The garment with the broad border, the laticlave, was the dress of a senator; the garment with the narrow border, the angusticlave, was the dress of a man of the equestrian order. T The exclamation of CEdipus in the CEdipus Tyrannus of Sophocles, v. 1390. self. But you say, such a man is happy ; for he walks about with many, and I also place myself with the many and walk about with many. In sum remember this : the door is open ; * be not more timid than little children, but as they say, when the thing does not please them, " I will play no longer," so do you, when things seem to you of such a kind, say I will no longer play, and begone : but if you stay, do not complain. CHAPTER XXV. ON THE SAME. IF these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the will, and the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid ? The things about which we have been busied are in no man's power : and the things which are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have we still ? But give me directions ? Why should I give you directions ? has not Zeus given you directions ? Has he not given to you what is your own free from hindrance and free from im- pediment, and what is not your own subject to hindrance and impediment ? What directions then, what kind of orders did you bring when you came from him ? Keep by every * This means "you can die when you please." Comp. i. c. 9. The power of dying when you please is named by Plinius (X. II. ii. c. 7) the best thing that God has given to man amid all the sufferings of life. Horace, Kpp. ii. 2, 213 " Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis : Lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti : Tempus abire tibi.' KPICTKTUS. 77 means what is your own ; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtuous shame is your own ; who then can take these things from you ? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them ? But how do you act ? when you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you still ask from me ? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence ? lint if you observe these, do you want any others besides ? Well, but he has not given these orders, you will say. Produce yourprecognitions, pro- duce the proofs of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you have meditated on ; and you will then see that all these things are from God.* How long then is it fit to observe these precepts from * The conclusion "and you will then see," is not in the text, but it is what Kpictetus means. The argument is complete. If we admit the existence of God, and that he is our father, as Epictetus teaches, we have from him the intellectual powers which we possess ; and those men in whom these powers have been roused to activity, and are exercised, require no other instructor. It is true that in a large part of mankind these powers are inactive and are not exercised, or if they are exercised, it is in a very imperfect way. But those who contemplate the improvement of the human race, hope that all men, or if not all men, a great number will be roused to the exercise of the powers which they have, and that human life will be made more con- formable to Nature, that is, that man will use the powers which he has, and will not need advice and direction from other men, who professing that they are wise and that they can teach, prove by their teaching and often by their example that they are not wise, and are incapable of teaching. This is equally true for those who may deny or doubt about the existence of God. They cannot deny that man has tl. - intellectual powers which he does possess; and they are certainly n,,t the persons who will proclaim their mv.'i want of these powers. If man has them and can exercise them, the fact is sufficient : and \\v need n,.r dispute about the source of these powers which are in man Naturally, that i-, according to thr i oii^titution ol' !ii-> Nature. ? 8 KPJCTETUS. God, and not to break up the play ? * As long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Saturnalia f a king i.-> chosen by lot, for it has been the custom to play at this game. The king commands : Do you drink, Do you mix the wine, Do you sing, Do you go, Do you come. I obey that the game may not be broken up through me. But if he says, think that you are in evil plight : I answer, I do not think so ; and who will compel me to think so ? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is ap- pointed to play Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis. I go. He says, Come, and I come. For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I sup- pose that it is night. Well then ; is it day ? Xo, for I ad- mitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you think that it is night ? Suppose that I do. But also think that it is night. That is not consistent with the hypothesis. So in this case also Suppose that you are unfortunate. Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy ? Yes. Well then are you troubled with an unfavorable demon (fortune) ? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This is not consistent with the hypothesis ; and another (Zeus) forbids me to think so. How long then must we obey such orders ? As long as it is profitable ; and this means as long as I maintain that which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour and of bad temper, and they say, " I cannot sup with this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he * See the end of the preceding chapter. Upton compares Horace's " Incidcre ludum '' (Epp. i. 14, 36). Compare also Epictetus, ii. 16, 37. t A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and license (Livy, xxii. i). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15, in which Nero is chosen by lot to be king : and Seneca, De Constant. Sapient. c. 12, " Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur." EPICTETUS. 79 fought in Mysia : " "I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill : then I began to be besieged again." But another says, " I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes." And do you compare these estimates (judgments): only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to that. Has it smoked in the chamber ? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay ; if it is excessive, I go out : for you must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is open. Well, but you say to me, Do not live in Xicopolis. I will not live there. Nor in Athens. I will not live in Athens. Nor in Rome. I will not live in Rome. Live in Gyarus.* I will live in Gyarus. But it seems like a great smoke to live in Gyarus ; and I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling- place is open to all ; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the reason why Demetrius f said to Nero, " You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my ad- miration on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave : if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave : for I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught : as if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he guards ; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master * Gyarus or Gyara a wretched island in the /Kgean sea, to which criminals were sent under the empire cf Rome. Juvenal, Sat. i- 73. i Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca (De Benef. vii. i) says : "lie was in my opinion a great man, even if he is com- pared with the greatest." One of his sayings was : " You gain more by -ing -A f<-u precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many, if you have them not at hand." Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also at- tributed to Ana.xagoras (Life by Diogenes Laertius) and to Socrates by Xenophon (Apologia, 27). go A/Y6-7/;7Y/.Y. will attack. Remembering this whom will you still Hatter or fear ? But I should like to sit where the Senators sit.* Do you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself. How then shall I see well in any other way in the amphitheater ? Man, do not be a spectator at all ; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble ? ( )r wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze our- selves, who put ourselves in straits ; that is our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is it to be reviled ? Stand by a stone and revile it ; and what will you gain ? If then a man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (or lad- der) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes something. Strip him. What do you mean by him ? Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you. This was the practice of Socrates : this was the reason why he always had one face. But we choose to practice and study anything rather than the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say, Philosophers talk paradoxes. f But are there no paradoxes in the other arts ? and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in order that he may see ? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker ? Where is * At Rome, and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for the different classes of nu-n at the public spectacles. I Paradoxes, things contrary to opinion," are contrasted with paralo- " things contrary to reason "(iv. I, 173) Cicero says (Proemium to his Paradoxes), that paradoxes are " something which cause surprise and contradict common opinion;" and in another place he says that the Romans jiavu tlit- name of ;ulmirabilia " to the Stoic paradoxes. The puncture of the oye is the operation for cataract. KI'fCTKTUS. the wonder then if in philosophy aisomany things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced ? CHAITKR XXVI. WHAT IS THK J.A\\' OF I.IFK. a person was reading hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said. This also is an hypothetical law that we must accept what follows from the hypothesis. But much before this law is the law of life, that we must act conform- ably to nature. For if in every matter and circumstance we wish to observe what is natural, it is plain that in everything we ought to make it our aim that neither that which is conse- quent shall escape us, and that we do not admit the contra- dictory. First then philosophers exercise us in theory * (contemplation of things), which is easier ; and then next they * This is a profound and useful remark of Kpictetus. General prin- ciples are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to under- stand general principles of law which are true and good ? Hut in prac- .^es are presented to us which, as Hacon says, are "immersed in mailer;" and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the principles, and requires the ability and study of an experienced man. It is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the rules of life ; hut the difficulty of applying them is that in which the young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered; but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion and morality know well, if they are tit to teach. If they do not know this truth, they are neither tit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to the practice of them by the only method which is possible ; and this method is by their own examine, assisted by the examples of those who direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons live. 6 Sj RPICTETUS. lead us to the more difficult things ; for in theory, there is nothing which draws us away from following what is taught ; but in the matters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things ; and we ought to employ this fact as an argument to those parents who are vexed at their children learning philosophy : Am I doing wrong then, my father, and do I not know what is suitable to me and becoming ? If indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you blame me ? but if it can be taught, teach me ; and if you can- not, allow me to learn from those who say that they know how to teach. For what do you think ? do you suppose that I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good ? I hope that it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing wrong ? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should get rid of my ignorance ? Who was ever taught by anger the art of a pilot or music ? Do you think then that by means of your anger I shall learn the art of life ? He only is allowed to speak in this way who has shown such an in- tention.* ISut if a man only intending to make a display at a banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypo- thetical arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what other object has he than that some man of senatorial! rank who sits by him may admire ? For there (at Rome ) are the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches here cu Nicopolis.) appear to be trifles there. This is the reason why it is difficult for a man to be master of the appearances, where the things which disturb the judgment are great. I know a certain person who complained, as he embraced the knees of Epaphroditus, that he had only one hundred and " Such an intention " appears to mean " the intention of learning." " The son alone can say this to his father, when the sou studies philos- ophy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of ili>j>lay." Wolf. fifty times ten thousand denarii * remaining. What then did Kpaphroditus do? Did he laugh at him, as \ve slav Epaphroditus did? No, but he cried out with amazement, " Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how did you endure it ? " When Epictetus had reproved (called) the person who was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader, Epictetus said to the teacher, "You are laughing at yourself: you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascertain whether he was able to understand these matters; hut perhaps you are only employing him as a reader." Well then, said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to understand a complex (syllogism), do we trust him in giving praise, do we trust him i:i giving blame, do we allow that he is able to form a judg- ment about good or bad ? and if such a man blames any one. docs the man care for the blame? and if he praises any one, is the man elated, when in such small matters as an hypo- thetical syllogism he who praises cannot see what is conse- quent on the hypothesis ? This then is the beginning of philosophy,! a man's per- ception of the state of his ruling faculty ; for when a man knows that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the greatest difficulty. Hut at present, if men cannot swallow even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to devour them ; and this is the reason why they vomit them up or suffer indigestion : and then come gripings, defluxes, and fevers. t Such men ought to consider what their ability * This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae, or of the Ro- man equivalents denarii. Jn Roman language the amount would he briefly expressed hy " sexagies centena milli? II. S.." or simply by '' sexii. ii. c. 1 1. f Seneca, 1 >< Tranquillitate animi, c. 9, says : " What is the countless books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life the uibK ;its ? The number only confuses a I X 4 RPICTRTUS. is. In theory il is easy to convince an ignorant person : hut in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to he convinced and we hate the man who has convinced us. Hut Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected to ex- amination.* CHAPTER XXVII. IV IIOW MAXV WAYS AJ'PEARAXCES EXIST, AXD WHAT AIDS WK SHOri.D PROVIDE AdAIXST THEM. APPEARAXCES are to us in four ways : for either things appear as they are ; or they are not, and do not even ap- pear to he ; or they are, and do not appear to he ; or tln-v are not. and yet appear to he. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys (troubles) us. to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho f and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which some things ap- pear to he good, when they are not good, let us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we find against habit ? The contrary habit. You hear the igno- rant say : " That unfortunate person is dead : his father and not instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than to wander through many." * See Plato's Apology, c. 28 ; and Antoninus, iii. 5. t Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He is said to Ir.uv accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition (Dio- genes l.aerthis, ix. 61). The time of his birth is not stated, but it is siiil that he lived to the age of ninety. mother are overpowered with sorrow : he was cut off by an untimely death and in a foreign land.'' Hear the con- trary way of speaking : Tear yourself from these expres- sions : oppose to one habit the contrary habit ; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason ; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have manifest precognitions, cleared of all impurities and ready to hand. When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it ? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way : I will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to another the opportunity of doing so ; if I cannot succeed in doing anything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble. Suppose that it is above our power to act thus ; is it not in our power to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death : discover for me the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do you wish me to do ? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the origin of perturba- tion is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals accord- ing to my wish, I change them ; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and mot to endure the falling into the evil. Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are they to im- ? Yes. but you will he an impious man. In wh.a n-sM-.-rt then will it be worse for EPfCTE me than it is now? To sum up, remember this, that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem neces- (true)? Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defense of co'mmon consent (opinion).* If I had a suit even about a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. With what evidence then am I satisfied ? With that which belongs to the matter in hand.f How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain : for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it ? When I intend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own. When I in- tend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, but I always go to the bread as to a mark. And you yourselves (the Pyr- rhonists). who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise ? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went ir.to a mill ? What then ? Ought we not with all our power to hold to * " This means, the received opinion about the knowledge and cer- tainty of things, which knowledge and certainty the Sceptic philoso- phers attack by taking away general assent or consent " (Wolf)- Lord Shaftesbury accepts this explanation. See also Schweig.'s note. t " The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this, whether there i* a criterion of truth ; and in the first place, the question is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in tho.ve things which are perceived by the senses.'' Schweighaeuser. The strength of the Stoic system was that " it furnishes a ground-work of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life : on the other hand, the rual question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the word, was abandoned." Levin's Six Lectures, p. 70. r.rfCTI-'.Tl'S. 87 this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortifying ourselves against the arguments which are directed against it ? Who denies that we ought to do this ? Well, he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it ; but as to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly broken in heart (spirit), he must employ his time better on something else. CHAPTER XXVIII. THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN ; AND WHAT ARK THE SMALL AND THE GREAT THINGS AMONG MEN.* WHAT is the cause of assenting to anything ? The fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to that which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of the understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the false, and in matters uncertain to with- hold assent. What is the proof of this ? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night. It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not possible. Persuade yourself or take away jour persuasion that the stars are even in number.t It is impossible. When then any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says : but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood ? We have the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty\ the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think j c. 18 of this book, t We cannot conceive that the number of iar-< is ( ithur even or odd. that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? lie cannot. How says Medea ? *- " "I'is true I know what evil I shall do, Hut passion overpowers tliL- better counsel." She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so : but she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it : but so long as you do n< it show it, what can she follow except that which appears to herself (her opinion) ? Nothing else. Why then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper in- stead of a human creature ? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which are supreme ? Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion) whether the thing appears good or bad : if good, he is free from blame ; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and he who suffers another person whoever remembers this will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with any man. So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the appearance (opinion ) ? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared f to Alexander to carry oft" the wife of Menelaus ; it appeared to Helene to follow him. If then t The Medea of Euripides, 1079. * This is the literal version. It does not mean " that it appeared riylu," as Mrs. Carter translates it. Alexander never thought whether it was right or wrong. All that appeared to him was the possessing of Ilelene, and he used the means for getting possession of her, as a dog who spies and pursues some wild animal. /-://( //: 7T.S-. 89 it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? X >: only would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did such great things depend ? But what do you mean by such great things ? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing? But what great matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed ? Are these things then like those ? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and sheep ; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful ? Or show me what is the difference between a man's house and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling ; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a man then like things ? What say you ? In body they are very much alike. Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork ? Don't suppose that I say so ; but there is no difference in these matters (which I have mentioned). In what then is the difference ? Seek and you will find that there is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man the understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social com- munity, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelli- gence. Where then is the great good and evil in men ? It is where the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved ; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city^ then the man too perishes ; and in this consist the great things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers perished. By no means : for no man is damaged by an action which is not his own ; but what hap- 3 , EPIC rr. TUX. 1 at that time was only the destructions of storks' nests : now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was Achilles ruined ? \Yas it when Patroclus died ? Xot so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he w r as at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted. When then women are carried off. when children are made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not evils ? How is it then that you add to the facts these opinions? Explain this to me also. I shall not do that ; but how is it that you say that these are not evils ? Let us come to the rules: produce the precognitions : for it is because this is neglected that we cannot sufficiently wonder at what men do. When we intend to judge of weights, we do not judge by guess : where we intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess. In all cases where it is our in- terest to know what is true in any matter, never will any man among us do anything by guess. But in things which depend on the first and on the only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we are inconsiderate and rash. There is then nothing like scales (balance), nothing like a rule : but some appearance is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I then suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon, so that they by following appear- ances do and suffer so many evils : and shall not the appear- ance he sufficient for me ? And what tragedy has any other beginning? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? An ap- pearance. The CKdipus of Sophocles, what is it ? An appearance. The Phujnix? An appearance. The Hip- polytus ? An appearance. What kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this matter? KPfCTETL'S. And what is the name of those who follow every appear ance ? They are called madmen. Do we then act at all differently ? CHAPTER XXIX. OX CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS) TitK being (nature) of the Good is a certain Will ; the being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What then are externals ? Materials for the Will, about which the will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the good ? If it does not admire* (overvalue) the materials ; for the opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good : but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law. and says, li If you would have anything good, receive it from yourself.' 1 You .say. No, but I will have it from an- other. Do not so : but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me. I say, Whom do you threaten ? If he says, I will put you in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off vow head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me with banishment, I say \\w. same. !><>es lie then not threaten you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern me. he does not threaten * This is the maxim of Horace. Kpp. i. <>; and Macleam/s note ' Nil iidmirari prope re* e.st una, Nimiiei, Solaque qua; possit facere et servare bcatum ; " on which I'pton remarks that this maxim is explained very philosophi- cally and learnedly Ly Lord Shafteslmry (the author of the Characterib- tics), vol. iii- p. 202. 9 , EPICTETUS. me at all ; but if J fear any of them, it is 1 whom he threatens. Whom then do 1 fear ? the master of what ? The master of things which are in my own power ? There is no such master. Do I fear the master of things which are not in my power ? And what are these things to me ? Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? \ hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they possess ? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things. t!u-y may truly accuse me. Yes, but I intend to command your opinions also. And who has given you this power ? How can you conquer the opinion of another man ? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself, * and is not conquered by another? But nothing else can conquer. Will except the Will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, which is this : Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than one. For what ? For putting in chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker ? If the one possesses right opinions and the others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter ? How is it possible ? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which it is ? How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates ? Speak of the thing as it is : how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that any one should have given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should * Tins is explained by what follows. Opinion does not really con- quer itself; but one opinion can conquer another, and nothing else can. :/ '/( '77: '// '.V. 93 breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things blame God ? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these things ? Where then for him \vas the nature of good ? Whom shall we listen to, you or him ? And what does Socrates say ? Anytus and Melitus* can kill me, but they cannot hurt me : and further, he says, " If it so pleases God, so let it be." But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near showing it ; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is superior. One body is stronger than another : many are stronger than one : the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the reason why I also lost my lamp,| be- cause in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price : for a lamp he be- came a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and is drawing me to the public place : then others bawl out, Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions ? see you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of philosophy could I have made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged off ; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not be cast in ? Have I learned nothing else then ? I have learned to see that everything which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask if you have not gained by this. Why then do you seek advantage in anything else than in that in which you have learned that advantage is ? Then sitting in prison I say : The man who cries out in * The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, Apology, c. |S; J''.pictetns, ii. 2, i ^) I See i. 18, 15. r,^ EriCTETVS. this way* neither hears what words mean, nor understands what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philoso- ophers say or what they do. Let him alone. But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your prison. If you have no further need of me in prison. I come out : if you should have need of me again, I will enter the prison. How long will you act thus ? So long as reason requires me to be with the body : but when reason does not require this, take away the body, and fare you well.f Only we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any slight reason ; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it to be done, and he has need of such a world and such in- habitants in it..t But if he sounds the signal for retreat, as he did to Socrates, we must obey him who gives the signal, as if he were a general. ^ \Yell then, ought we to say such things to the many ? \Viiy should we ? Is it not enough for a man to be per- suaded himself? When children come clapping their hands and crying out. 4i To-day is the good Saturnalia," || do we say, " The Saturnalia are not good " ? By no means, but we clap our hands also. Do you also then, when you are not able to make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child, and clap your hands with him. and if you do not choose to do this, keep silent. A man must keep this in mind ; and when he is called * ( ine of those who cry out " Philosopher," etc. e i. 9, 20. | See i. 6, 13. Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was con- tent to die, and thought that it was a good thing; and this was the rea- son why he made such a defense as he did, which brought on him con- demnation ; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreating the dicast.s (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things unworthy of himself, as others did. Plato, Apology, cc. 29- "53. Compare Epict. i. 9, 1 6. || See i. 25, 8. EPICTETrS. 95 to any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has practiced the resolution of syllogisms : and if any person proposes to him an easy syllogism, he says. Rather propose to me a syllogism which is skillfully complicated that I may exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dissat- isfied with slight young men, and say, " He cannot lift me." "This is a youth of noble disposition."* [You do not so] : but when the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, " I wish that \ had learned more, little more of what ? If you did not learn these things in order to show them in practice, why did you learn them ? I think that there is some one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a woman in labor, and saying, ''Oh, that such a difficulty does not present itself to me as that v! !"h has come to this man; oh, that 1 should be wasting m) life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia. When will any one announce to me such a contest ? " Such ought to be the disposition of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar (the Emperor) there are some who com- plain grievously that they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer up prayers to God and address themselves to their superintendents entreating that they might fight.* And will no one among you show himself such ? I would willingly take a voyage [to Rome] for this * See Schweighaeuser's note. This appears to he the remark of Epictetus. If it is so, what follows is not clear. Schweighaeu-- plains it, " But most of you act otherwise." t The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and that of the people (Lipsius, Saturanalia. ii. 16). Seneca says (De Provid. c. 4). " 1 have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the time of C. Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibitions : " What a glorious period of life is wasting." " Virtue," says Seneca " is eager after dangers ; and it considers only what it seeks, not what It may suffer." Upton. 9 6 purpose and see what my athlete is doing, how he is study ing his subject. I do not choose such a subject, he says, \Vhy. is it in your power to take what subject you choose ? There has been given to you such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such a country, such a place in your country : then you come to me and say, Change my subject. Have you not abilities which enable you to manage the sub- ject which has been given to you ? [You ought to say] : It is your business to propose ; it is mine to exercise myself veil. However, you do not say so, but you say, Do not pro- pose to me such a tropic,* but such [ as I would choose] : do not urge against me such an objection, but such [as I would choose]." There will be a time perhaps when tragic actors will suppose that they are [only] masks and buskins and the long cloak. t I say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter something that we may kno'v whether you are a tragic actor or a buffoon ; for both of you have all the rest in common. If any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom, is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain ? If he has voice, he still remains. An example of another kind. ' Assume the governorship of a province." I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I show how an instructed man behaves. " Lay aside the lati- *Tropic, a logical term used by Stoics, which Schweighaeuser tran- slates " propositio connexa in syllogismo hypothetico.'' The meaning of the whole is this. You do not like the work which is set before you : as we say. you are not content " to do your duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call you." Now this is as foolish, says Wolf. a for a man in any discussion to require that his adversary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man's own case. t Theie win ue a time when Tragic actors shall not know what their business is, but will think that it is all show. So, says Wolf, philoso- phers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their life and morals what they really are ; or they will be like false monks, who only wear the cowl, and do not show a life of piety and sanctity. /./>/( //-. "I T.v. 97 clave (tlie mark of senatorial rank) and clothing yourself in come forward in this character." What then have I not the power of displaying a good voice (that is, of doing something that I ought to do) ? How then do you now appear (on the stage of life)? As a witness summoned by (od. " Come forward, * you, and bear testimony for me, for you are worthy to be brought forward as a witness by me : is anything external to the will good or bad ? do 1 hurt any man ? have I made every man's interest dependent on any man except himself ? What testimony do you give for God ? " I am in a wretched condition, Master t (Lord), and I am unfortunate : no man cares for me, no man gives me anything ; all blame me, all speak ill of me. Is this the evidence that you are going to give, and disgrace his sum- mons, who has conferred so much honor on you, and thought you worthy of being called to bear such testimony ? But suppose that he who has the power has declared, " I judge you to be impious and profane." What has happened to you ? I have been judged to be impious and profane ? Nothing else ? Nothing else. But if the same person had passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism (vnt*.tfvov), and had made a declaration, "the conclusion that, if it is day, it is light, I declare to be false," what has happened to the hypothetical syllogism ? who is judged in this case ? who has been condemned ? the hypothetical syllogism, or the man who has been deceived by it ? Does he then who has the power of making any declaration about you know what is pious or impious ? Has he studied it, and has he learned it ? Where ? From whom ? Then is it the fact that a musician * God is introduced as speaking. Schweighaeuser. t The word is Kvpun, the name by which a slave in Epictetus ad- drev>es his master (duminus), a physician is addressed by his patient, and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists. They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matt. i. 24) ; and Jesus is addressed bythe same term (Matt. viii. 2), Lord or master. 7 9 g EP1CTETUS pays no regard to him who declares that the lowest * chord m the lyre is the highest ; nor yet a geometrician, if he declares that the lines from the center of a circle to the circumference are not equal ; and shall he who is really instructed pay any regard to the uninstructed man when he pronounces judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what is just and unjust ? Oh, the signal wrong done by the instructed. Did they learn this here ? * Will you not leave the small arguments about these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them anything ; and will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned ? For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now : the writings of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted ? A man who shall apply them, one who by hi* acts shall bear testi- mony to his words, f Assume, I entreat you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools the examples of the ancients, but may have some example of our own. To whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophical inquiries) belong ? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves do ; * In " the lowest chord or note," it must be remembered that the names employed in the Greek musical terminology are precisely the op- posite to ours. t I think that Schweighaeusers interpretation is right, that " the in- structed " are those who think that they are instructed but are not, as they show by their opinion that they accept in moral matters the judg- ment of an ignorant man, whose judgment in music or geometry they would not accept. \ " What is the profit, my brethren, if any one should say that he hath faith and have not works? . . . Thus also faith, if it hath not works, is dead in itself. But a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works : shew nvj thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works : ." Epistle of James, ii. 14-18. EPICTETUS. 99 we should sit, as in a theater, free from distraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another lime to the h-.te player ; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time looks round : then if any one calls out his master's name, the slave is immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shame- ful for philosophers thus to contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master ? Man is not the master of man ; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain ; for if he comes without these things, bring Cassar to me and you will see how firm I am. But when he shall come with these things, thundering and lightning,* and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to recognize my master like the runaway slave ? But so long as I have any respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theater, so do 1 : I bathe, I drink, I sing ; but all this I do with terror and uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, that is from those things by means of which masters are formidable, what further trouble have I, what master have I still? What then, ought we to publish these things to all men ? No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the igno- rant t and to say : " This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself: I excuse him." For Socrates also excused the jailer, who had the charge of him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink the * I'pton supposes that Kpictetus is alluding to the verse of Aris- tophanes (Acharn. 531), where it is said of Pericles : " He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas." t He calls the uninstructed and ignorant by the Greek word " Idiotae," "idiots," which we now use in a peculiar sense. An Idiota was a pri- vate individual as opposed to one who filled some public office ; and thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any parti- cular art, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy. poison, and said, How generously he laments over us. * Does he then say to the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the women ? No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it ; and he treats the jailer as a child. CHAPTER XXX. WHAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE READY IN DIFFICULT CIRCUM- STANCES, f WHEN you are going in to any great personage, remember that another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him rather than the other. He then who sees from above asks you : In the schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace ? I used to say that they are things indifferent (neither good nor bad)- What then do you say of them now ? Are they changed at all ? No. Are you changed then ? No. Tell me then what things are indifferent ? The things which are independent of the will. Tell me, also, what follows from this. The things which are independent of the will are nothing to me. Tell me also about the Good, what was your opinion? A will such as we ought to have and also such a use of appearances. * Compare the I'haedon of Pluto (p. 116). The children of Socrates were brought in to see him before lie took the poison by which he died; and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to hia death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before he had his last conversation with his friends, and she was taken away lamenting and bewailing. t The reader may understand why Kpictetus gave such a lesson as this, if he will remember the tyranny under which men at that time lived. ETCS. ior And the end (purpose), what is it ? To follow thee. Do you say this now also ? I say the same now also. Then go into the great personage boldly and remember these things ; and you will see what a youth is who has studied these things when he is among men who have not studied them. I indeed imagine that you will have such thoughts as these : Why do we make so great and so main- preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which men name power ? Is this the antechamber ? this the men of the bedchamber ? this the armed guards ? Is it for this that 1 listened to so many discourses ? All this is nothing : but I hzi-rc been preparing myself as for something great. BOOK II. CHAPTER I. THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION. THE opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a paradox ; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do everything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind : if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and confi- dence in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said ? for if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should em- ploy confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution ? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things in- I0 3 104 /iriCTETl'S. dependent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence ; and thus we shall both be cautious and confident and indeed con- fident because of our caution. For by employing caution toward things which are really bad. it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so. \Ye are then in the condition of deer ; * when they flee from the huntsman's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe ? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act : in what cases do we fear ? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger ? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness ; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will imme- diately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoid- ing what he chooses : but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, * It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying feathers of various colors on ropes or strings and thus frightening them toward the nets. Virgil, Georg. iii. 372 Puniceaeve agitant pavidos formidine pennae. 105 he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but, the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet* who said Not death is evil, but a shameful death. Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape ; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, rashness and indifference. These things Socrates f properly used to call tragic masks ; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child ? Ignorance. What is a child ? Want of knowl- edge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death ? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated \ from the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will be separated afterward. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, * Euripides, fragments. 1 In the Phaulon, c. 24, or p. 78. } It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion of the divinity sent down into human bodies. This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diog. Laert. vii. 137) speaks of (lod as " in certain periods or revolutions of time ex- hausting into himself the universal substance (ovSta) and again generat- ing it out of himself." Antoninus (xi. i) speaks of the periodical re- novation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then l>eing renewed, is of no practical value. The present is enough for most men. Hut for the few who are able to embrace in thought the I0 6 //'/(.'/'A' 7 Y'.s. and the future, and of the past. What is pain ? A nia.-,k. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open : * if it does, bear (with things ). For the door ought to be open for all occasions ; and so we have no trouble. What then is the fruit of these opinions ? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not be- lieve the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who say that the educated only are free. How is this ? In this manner. Is freedom anything else than the power of living as we choose ? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error ? We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear ? Do you wish to live in sorrow ? Doyou wish to live in perturbation ? By no means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free ; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we con- tinue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, We only allow free persons to be educated ? For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated ; that is, past, the present and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature of all exisiting things may have a certain value by elevating their minds above the paltry things which others prize above their worth. Sec. i. 9, note 7. Schweighaeuser says that he does not quite see what is the meaning of " ought to be open ; " and he suggests that Epictetus intended to say "we ought to consider that the door is open for ail occasions ; " but the occasions, he says, ought to be when things are such that a man can in no way bear them or cannot honorably en- dure them, and such occasions the wise man considers to be the voice of God giving to him the signal to retire. EPICTETUS. 107 God does not allow it. When then a man has turned * round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing ? He has done something. What ? He has turned round his own slave before the prcetor. Has he done nothing more ? Yes : he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this cere- mony become free ? No more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round (free) others no master ? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind ? It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious : courageous in that which does not depend on your will ; cautious in that which does depend on it. Well have I not read to you, f and do you not know what I was doing? In what? In my little dissertations. Show me how you are with respect to desire and aversion * This is an allusion to one of the Roman modes of manumitting a slave before the praetor. Compare Persius, Sat. V. 75 Heu steriles veri, quibus una Qairitem Vertigo facit ; and again Verterit hunc dominus, momento turbinis exit Marcus Dama. The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five per cent., established in B. C. 356 (Livy, vii. 16), and paid by the slave. Epictetus here speaks of the tax being paid by the master ; but in iii. 26 he speaks of it as paid by the enfranchised slave. See Bureau de la Malle, Economie Politique des Remains, i. 290, ii. 469. t These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has written. 10 S EPJCTETUS, and show me it" you do not fail in getting what you wish, and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid : but as to these long and labored sentences you will take them and blot them out. What then did not Socrates write ? And who wrote so much?* But how? As he could not always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations have leisure, or to such as are too foolish to reckon consequences. And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show, and say, See Low I make dialogues ? Do not so, my man : but rather say : See how I am not dis- appointed of that which I desire : See how I do not fall into that which 1 would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemna- tion. This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things ; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it ; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labor at forensic causes, problems and * No other author speaks of Socrates having written anything. It is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that Socrates wrote so much. Socrates talked much, and Epictetus may have spoken of talking as if it were writing; for he must have known that Socrates was not a writer. KP/CTETl'S. 1Q<) syllogisms : do you labor at thinking about death, * chains, the rack, exile ; f and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous : courageous toward the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will. CHAPTER II. OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION'). CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For it you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally * " The whole life of philosophers," says Cicero (Tusc. i. 30), follow- ing Plato, "is a reflection upon death." t " Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile and sudden executions, can be ranked among the com- mon accidents of life, may be surprised to find Kpictetus so frequently endeavoring to prepare his hearers for them. I'.ut it must be recollected that he addressed himself to persons who livfd under the Roman emperors, from those tyranny the very best o( men wi-it: perpetually liable to such kind of dangers." Mrs. Carter. All men even now are exposed to the accidents and misfor: i ,t which there is no security, and even the most fortune ..-.- of men must die at last. The lessons of Epictetus may be us useful now as they were in his time. See i. 30. EPIC TE TUS. md if you are content with these, what else do you care for ? For who is the master of such things ? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so ? If you choose not to be re- strained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire ? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not think fit to avoid ? But what do you say ? The judge will determine against you some- thing that appears formidable ; but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that ? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do you care for ? Let this be your preface,* this your narrative, this your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your applause (or the approbation which you will receive). Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his trial,! Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my life ? By what kind of prepara- tion ? I have maintained that which was in my own power. How then ? I have never done anything unjust either in my private or in my public life. But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise you tu make from this moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees; if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, * Epictetus refers to the rhetorical divisions of a speech. t Xenophon (Mem. iv. c. 8, 4) has reported this saying of Socrates on the authority of Hermogenes. Compare the Apology of Xenophon near the beginning. EPICTETUS. nr either a well-bred cock or a mean one, either endure t r>c beaten until you die or yield at once ; and let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of evil and good ? It is where truth is : where truth is and where nature is, there is caution : where truth is, there is courage where nature is. For what do you think ? do you think that, if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, he would have come forward and said : Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but to harm me they are not able ? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and fortune, but to another end ? What is the reason then that he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates them ? Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to the judges that his case was just, said when he had come to the pero- ration of his speech, I will neither entreat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it is you rather than I who are on your trial. And thus he ended the business.* What need was there of this ? Only do not entreat ; but do not also say, " I do not entreat ; " unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order to submit to trial ? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come : but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you maintain what is your own (your proper char- acter). For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest some- thing to mef (tell me what to do). What should I suggest * The words may mean either what I have written in the text, or "and so he lost his suit." t " The meaning is, You inust not ask for advice when you arc come j,_, l-.riCTETU.S. to you ? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but that of Theon. what will be done? what will he write ? But if you have practiced writ- ing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) anything that is required. If* you are not, what can I now suggest? For if circumstances require something else, what will you say or what will you do? Remember then this genei.il precept and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is the master ? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain or try to avoid. t into a difficulty, but every man ought to have such principles as to be ready on all occasions to act as he ought : just as he who knows how to write can write any name which is proposed to him." Wolf. * " i he reader must know that these dissertations were spoken ex- urapore, and that one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker. So the reader will not be surprised that when the dis- course is on the maintenance of firmness or freedom from perturbations, Kpictetus should now speak of philosophical preparation, which is most efficient for the maintenance of firmness." Wolf. t In the Encheiridion or Manual (c. 14) it is written, " Eve; 1 )' man's master is he who has the power to give to a man or take away that which he would have or not have : whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither seek anything or avoid anything which is in the power of others : if he does not act thus, he will be a slave." WICTI-.TUS. 113 CHAPTER III. TO THOSE WHO RECOMMEND PERSONS TO PHILOSOPHERS. DIOGENES said well to one who asked from him letters of recommendation. ' That you are a man," he said, " he will know as soon as he sees you ; and he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is by experience skillful to distinguish the good and the bad ; but if he is without experience, he will never know, if I write to him ten thousand times."* For it is just the same as if a drachma (a piece of silver money) asked to be recommended to a person to be tested. Jf he is skillful in testing silver, he will know what you are, for you (the drachma) will recommend yourself. We ought then in life also to have some skill as in the case of silver coin that a man may be able to say, like the judge of silver, llring me any drachma and 1 will test it. But in the case of syllogisms I would say, Bring any man that you please, and I will distinguish for you the man who knows how to resolve syllogisms and the man who does not. Why ? Because I know how to resolve syllogisms. I have the power, which a man must have who is able to discover those who have the power of resolving syllogisms. But in life how do I act? At one time I call a thing good, and at another time bad. * Cicero (De legibus, i. 9) says that the face expresses the hidden character. Euripides (Medea, 518) says better, that no mark is im- pressed on the body by which we can distinguish the good man from the bad. Shakespeare says There's no art To find the mind's construction in \\\v face. g Maclk:th, act i. sc. 4. What is the reason ? The contrary to that which is in the case of syllogisms, ignorance and inexperience. CHAPTER IV. AGAINST A PERSON WHO HAD ONCE BEEN DETECTED IN ADULTERY. As EPICTETUS was saying that man is formed for fidelity, and that he who subverts fidelity subverts the peculiar charac- teristic of men, there entered one of those who are con- sidered to be men of letters, \vho had once been detected in adultery in the city. Then Epictetus continued, But if we lay aside this fidelity for which we are formed and make designs against our neighbor's wife, what are we doing ? What else but destroying and overthrowing ? Whom, the man of fidelity, the man of modesty, the man of sanctity. Is this all ? And are we not overthrowing neighborhood, and friendship, and the community ; and in what place are we putting ourselves ? How shall I consider you, man ? As a neighbor, as a friend ? What kind of one ? As a citizen ? Wherein shall I trust you ? So if you were an utensil so worth- less that a man could not use you, you would be pitched out on the dung heaps, and no man would pick you up. But if being a man you are unable to fill any place which befits a man. what shall we do with you ? For suppose that you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold the place of a slave ? And who will trust you ? Are you not then con- tent that you also should be pitched somewhere on a dung heap, as a useless utensil, and a bit of dung? Then will you say, no man cares for me, a man of letters ? They do not, because you are bad and useless. It is just as if the wasps complained because no man cares for them, but all fly from /'/'/C -// 7V. V. ii- tliem, and if a man can, he strikes them and knocks them down. You have such a. sting that you throw into trouble and pain any man that you wound with it. \Yhat would you have us do with you ? You have no place where you can be put. What then, are* not women common by nature ? * So I say also ; for a little pig is common to all the invited guests, but when the portions have been distributed, go if you think it right, and snatch up the portion of him who reclines next to you, or slyly steal it, or place your hand down by it and lay hold of it, and if you cannot tear away a bit of the meat, grease your fingers and lick them. A fine companion over cups, and Socratic guest indeed ? Well, is not the theater common to the citizens? When then they have taken their seats, come, if you think proper, and eject one of them. In this way women also are common by nature. When then the legislator, like the master of a feast, has distributed them, will you not also look for your own portion and not filch and handle what belongs to another. But I am a man of letters and understand Archedemus. | Understand Archedemus then, and be an adulterer, and faithless, and instead of a man, be a wolf or an ape : for what is the difference ? t is not clear what is meant by women being common by nature in any rational sense. Zeno and his school said (Diogenes Laertius, vii. ; Xt'iio. p. 195. London, 1664) : " it is their opinion also that the women should be common among the wise, so that any man should use any woman, as Zeno says in his Polity, and Chrysippus in the book on Polity, and Diogenes the Cynic and Plato ; and we shall love all the children equally like fathers, and the jealousy about adultery will be removed." These wise men knew little about human nature, if they taught such doctrines. t Archedemus was a Stoic philosopher of Tarsus. We know little about him. [ A man may be a philosopher or pretend to be; and at the same time he may be a beast. CHAPTER V. HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE. THINGS themselves (materials) are indifferent ; * but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall a man pre- serve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time be careful and neither rash nor negligent ? If he imitates those who play at dice. The counters are indifferent ; the dice are indifferent. How do I know what the cast will be ? But to use carefully and dexterously the cast of the dice, this is my business. Thus then in life also the chief business is this : distinguish and separate things, and say, Externals are not in my power : will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good and the bad ? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does not belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage or anything of the kind. What then ? Should we use such things carelessly ? In no way : for this on the other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently against nature; but we should act carefully because the use is not indifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from pertur- bations because the material is indifferent. For where the material is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me nor compel me. Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is not in my power, nor is it good * The materials on which man works are neither good nor bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indifferent. But the use of things or of material, is not indifferent. They may he used well or ill, con- formably to nature or not. Kr/CTKTI'S. 117 nr bad ; but the use is cither bad or good, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to bring together these t\vo things, the carefulness of him who is affected by the matter (or things about him) and the firmness of him who has no regard for it ; but it is not impossible : and if it is, happiness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What can I do ? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for ? for my part is done. The business belongs to another the master. But the ship is sinking what then have I to do ? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming, nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish : for I am not an immortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day : I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What difference then does it make to me, how I pass away, whether by being suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means ? This is just what you will see those doing who play at ball skillfully. -\o one cares about the ball as being good or bad, but about throwing and catching it. In this there- fore is the skill, in this the art, the quickness, the judgment, so that if I spread out my lap I may not be able to catch it, and another, if I throw, may catch the ball. But if with perturbation and fear we receive or throw the ball, what kind of play is it then, and wherein shall a man be steady, and how shall a man see the order in the game ? But one will say, Throw ; or, Do not throw; and another will say, You have thrown once. This is quarreling, not play. Socrates then knew how to play at ball. How ? By using pleasantry in the court where he was tried. Tell me, he says, Anytus, how do you say that I do not believe in God. The Demons, who are they, think you ? Are they not sons of Gods, or compounded of gods and men? When Anytus admitted this, Socrates said, \Yho then, think you, can be- lieve that there are mules (half asses), but not asses : and this he said as if he were playing at ball.* And what was the ball in that case ? Life, chains, banishment, a draught of poison, separation from wife and leaving children orphans. These were the things with which he was playing ; but still he did play and threw the ball skillfully. So we should do : we must employ all the care of the players, but show the same indifference about the ball. For we ought by all means to apply our art to some external material, not as valuing the material, but, whatever it may be, showing our art in it. Thus too the weaver does not make wool, but exercises his art upon such as he receives. Another gives you food and property and is able to take them away and your poor body also. When then you have received the material, work on it. if then you come out (of the trial) without having suf- fered anything, all who meet you will congratulate you on your escape ; but he who knows how to look at such things, if he shall see that you have behaved properly in the matter, will commend you and be pleased with you ; and if he shall find that you owe your escape to any want of proper behavior, he will do the contrary. For where rejoicing is reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonable. How then is it said that some external things are accord- ing to nature and others contrary to nature ? It is said as it might be said if we were separated from union (or soci- ety) : for to the foot I shall say that it is according to nature for it to be clean ; but if you take it as a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off * In Plato's Apology c. 15, Socrates addresses Meletus; and he says, It would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals of horses and as^es, and should not believe that there are horses and Hut Socrates says nothing of the mules, for the word mules in some texts of Uic Apology is manifestly wrong. I: / ( .\. 1 ly for the benefit of the whole body ; otherwise it is no longer a foot. \\'e should think in some such way about ourselves also. 'What are you ? A man. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider your- self as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. \Yhy then are you troubled ? Do you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is a man ? A part of a state, of that first which con- sists of Gods and of men ; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the universal state. What then, must I be brought to trial ; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be con- demned ? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a universe of things, among so many living together, that such things should not happen, some to one and others to others. It is your duty then since you are come here, to say what you ought, to arrange these things as it is fit.* Then some one says, " I shall charge you with doing me wrong." Much good may it do you : I have done my part ; but whether you also have done yours, you must look to that ; for there is some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice. * He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is come into the world, he must do his duty in ii. 120 CHAPTER VI. OF INDIFFERENCE.* THE hypothetical proposition is indifferent : the judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or opin- ion or error. Thus life is indifferent : the use is riot indiffer- ent. When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become negligent ; and when a man invites you to be careful (about such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advan- tage over you. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them ; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, "I have learned them, and you have not." Thus also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which is required from the need (of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind. Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window ; and when I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the * This discussion is with a young philosopher who, intending to return from Nicopolis to Rome, feared the tyranny of Domitian, who was particularly severe toward philosophers. See also the note on i. 24, 3. Schweig. Compare Plin. Epp. i. 12, and the expression of Corellius Rufus about the detestable villain, the emperor Domitian. The title " of Indifference" means " of the indifference of things ; " of the things which are neither good nor bad. I ; i window. But still speak to him. In what way? Not meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and not his ? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another ; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature ; for God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move toward it ; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the mud.* For why are ears of corn produced ? Is it not that they may become dry ? And do they not be- come dry that they may be reaped ? f for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped ? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, never to be reaped. So we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it ; for we neither know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrys- antas I when he was going to strike the enemy checked * Sec. ii. 5, 24. t Kpictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Compare Antoninus (vii. 40) ; " Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn: one man is born; another dies." Cicero (Tuscul. Disp. iii. 2^) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are these two : turn vita omnibus Metenda ut fruges ; sic jubet necessitas. J The story is in Xenophon's Cyropzdia (IV. near the beginning) where Cyrus says that he called Chrysantas by name. Epictetus, as Upton remarks, quotes from memory. 122 KPICTKfTS. himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weep- ing and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them "circumstances." What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been produced ? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. \Yhy do you care about the way of going down to Hades ? All ways are equal.* But if you will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months : but a fever is often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty names. I am in danger of my life from Caesar. And am not I in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes : and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what hazard do you run? Is it not the hazard of your life? But I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own ? how ? For who can compel you to have any opinion which you do not choose ? But is it as to another man's opinion ? and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opinions ? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it to be banished ? To be somewhere else than at Rome ? Yes : what then if I should be sent to * So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is the same from all places. (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43.) What follows is one of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death are not indifferent : some ways of dying are painful, and even he who can endure with fortitude, would prefer an easy death. EPICTETUS. 123 Gyara?* If that suits you, you will go there : but if it does not. you can go to another place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then do you go up to Rome as if it were some- thing great? It is not worth all this preparation, that an in- genuous youth should say, It was not worth while to have heard so much and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remember that division by which your own and not your own are distinguished : never claim anything which belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans in prison. f But in our present disposition, con- sider if we could endure in prison another person saying to us. Would you like me to read Pagans to you ? Why do you trouble me ? do you not know the evils which hold me ? Can I in such circumstances listen to paeans ? What cir- cumstances ? 1 am going to die. And will other men. be immortal ? CHAPTER VII. HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION. THROUGH an unreasonable regard to divination many of us omit many duties. \ P'or what more can the diviner see * See page 82 note. t Diogenes Laertius reports in his life of Socrates that he wrote in prison a Paean, and he gives the first line which contains an address to Apollo and Artemis. } Divination was a great part of ancient religion, and, as Epictetus says, it led men " to omit many duties." In a certain sense there was ,24 KI'ICTKTUS. than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind ? If then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my duty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination ? Have I not within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil, and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both ? What need have I then to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he says, It is for your interest ? For does he know what is for my interest, does he know what is good ; and as he has learned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good and evil ? For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both of the beautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do you tell me, man, what is the thing which is signified for me : is it life or death, poverty or wealth ? But whether these things are for my interest or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don't you give your opinion on matters of grammar, and why do you give it here about things on which we are all in error and disputing with one another ? * The woman, therefore, who intended to send by a vessel a month's provisions to Gratilla f in her banishment, made a some meaning in it. If it is true that those who believe in God can see certain signs in the administration of the world by which they can judge what their behavior ought to be, they can learn what their duties are. If these signs are misunderstood, or if they are not seen right, men may be governed by an abject superstition. So the external forms of any religion may become the means of corruption and of human debase- ment, and the true indications of God's will may be neglected. Upton compares Lucan (ix. 572), who sometimes said a few good things. * A man who gives his opinion on grammar gives an opinion on a thing of which many know something. A man who gives his opinion on divination or on future events, gives an opinion on things of which we all know nothing. When then a man affects to instruct on things unknown, we may ask him to give his opinion on things which are known, and so wa may learn what kind of man he is. t Gratilla was a lady of rank, who was banished from Rome and Italy by Domitian. Pliny, Epp. iii. u. good answer to him who said that Domitian would seize what she sent, I would rather, she replied, that Domitian should seize all than that I should not send it. What then leads us to frequent use of divination ? Cow- ardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father ? Let us see: let us sacrifice on the occasion. Yes, master, as fortune chooses. When he has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if we received the inheritance from him. The con- sequence is that they play upon us.* What then should we do ? We ought to come (to divi- nation) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the man whom he meets which of two roads leads (to his journey's end), without any desire for that which leads to the right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any road except the road which leads (to his end). In the same way ought we to come to God also as a guide ; as we use our eyes, not asking them to show us rather such things as we wish, but receiving the appearances of things such as the eyes present them to us. But now we trembling take the augur (bird interpreter) by the hand, and while we invoke God we entreat the augur, and say, Master have mercy on me ; suffer me to come safe out of this difficulty. Wretch, would you have then anything other than what is best ? Is there then anything better than what pleases God ? Why do you, so far as in your power, corrupt your judge and lead astray your adviser ? * As knavish priests have often played on the fears and hopes of the superstitious. CHAPTER VTIT. WHAT IS THK NATURi: OK THE OOOD ? * GOD is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial. f It is consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also the nature of the good should be. What then is the nature of God ? t Flesh ? Certainly not. An estate in land ? By no means. Fame ? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason ? Yes. Herein then simply seek the nature of the good ; for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal ? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it anywhere except in the superiority of rational over irra- tional animals ? Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it require this use only? For if you say that it requires this use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and you do right ; for if they possess even in the highest degree the use of appearances, * Schweighaeuser observes that the title of this chapter would more correctly be God in man. There is no better chapter in the book. 1 Socrates (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 6, 8) concludes " that the useful is good to him to whom it is useful." } I do not remember that Kpictetus has attempted any other descrip- tion of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who have attempted to answer a question which cannot be answered. But see ii. 14, 1 1-13. Compare Cicero, de Offic. i. 27. yet they have not the faculty of understanding the use of appearances; and there is good reason for this, for .they exist for the purpose of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, docs not exist for any superiority over others. No ; but because we had need of a back which is able to bear something ; and in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for this reason he received also the faculty of making use of appearances, for otherwise he would not have been able to walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that consistently with, reason he would not then have been subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services, but he would have been equal to u.s and like to us. Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal ? for if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal .1. What then ? are not plants and animals also the works of God ? They are ; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts of the gods. But you are a superior thing ; you are a portion separated from the deity ; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent ? * Why do you not know whence you came ? will you not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed ? When you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not remember who you are who do this thing ? When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god ? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not.f Do you think that I mean some god of silver or of /le descent. See i. c. (j. The doctrine that ( iod is in man is an old doctrine. or. vi. 19. "What ? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye aruot J2 .S EPJCTETUS. gold, and external ? \'ou carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing : but when God himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do we fear when \ve are sending a young man from the school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have im- proper intercourse with women ; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make yo-ir own ?" This follows v. 18, which is an exhortation to " flee forni- cation." The passage in 2 Cor. vi. 16 is " And what agreement hath :h temple of God with idols ? for ye are the temple of the living God ; a.s God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them," etc. It is cer- tain that Kpictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles in the New Testament ; but whence did these writers learn such forms of ex- pression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Kpictetus and that they applied them to the new religion svhich they were teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Kpictetus does not differ: the spirit of God is in man. Swedenborg says, " Tn these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the Ix>rd resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being the Lord's mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees by these faculties ; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior degrees of love __and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and the Lord in him." Swedenlx>rg, Angelic Wis- dom, 240. Again, " the faculty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man's, but God's in man." I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist ought to be understood in the Church of English service. Some English divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of his body which was broken ; as we see in T. Burnet's Posthumous work (de Fide et Officiis Christian- orum, p. So). It was a commemoration of the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. 15ut this does not appear to be the sense in which the EFICTETUS. 129 him proud ? This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God : he knows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure when he says, " I wish I had you (God) with me." Have you not God with you ? and do you seek for any other, when you have him ? or will God tell you anything else than this ? Jf you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, and if you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to appear in an unbe- coming dress (attitude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not ceremony is now understood by some priests and by some members of the Church of England, whose notions approach near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the Communicants, for the prayer is " Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of thy dear Son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he in us." This is a dif- ferent thing from Kpictetus' notion of God being in man, and also dif- ferent, as I understand it, from the notion contained in the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and wine remain what they were, " and that the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here ; it being against the truth of Christ's natural body to be at one time in more places than one." It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English Church that the pres- ence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines : and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted ; and even Cal- vin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, " that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have 4 true Communion in Christ's body and blood.' " (Contemporary Review, p. 464, August, 1874). \Vhat would Kpictetus have thought of the sub- tleties of our days ? 9 I3 o EPICTETUS. how you shall appear ? And yet is the artist (in the one like the artist in the other ? or the work in the one case like case) the other ? And what work of an artist, for in- stance, has in itself the faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or bronze, or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias when she has once extended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory * stands in that attitude forever. But the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you dishonor him ? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also intrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself ? Will you not think of this too, but do you also dishonor your guardianship ? But if God had intrusted an orphan to you. would you thus neglect him ? He has delivered yourself to your care, and says, I had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself : keep him for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion and perturbation. And then you do not keep him such. But some will say, whence has this fellow got the arro- gance which he displays and these supercilious looks ? I have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher ; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what I have assented to : I still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have : then I will show to you the statue, when it is perfect- ed, when it is polished. What do you expect ? a supercilious *Thc Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame-work of wood, covered with ivory and gold (Pausanias, i. 24). The figure of Victory stood on the hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. Sec ; f - ,23, and Cicero, cle Natura Deorum, Hi. 34. 7T.V. l^i countenance? Does the Zeus at Olyinpia * lift up his brow ? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail. Iliad, i 526. Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation. What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness ? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess ; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What nerves f are these? A desire never disappointed, an aver- sion t which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit, a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see. CHAPTER IX. THAT WHEN WK CANNOT FULFILL THAT WHICH THE CHAR ACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, WK. ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A PHILOSOPHER. IT is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfill the promise of a man's nature. For what is a man ? The an- swer is, a rational and mortal being. Then by the rational great statue a: Olympia was the work of I'hidias (I'ausaiiias, v. n). It was a seated colossal chryselephantine Statue, and held a Victory in the right hand. ' An allusion to the combatants in ilu- public exercises, \\ show their shoulders, muscles and sinews as a proof of their strength. See i. 4, ii. 18, iii. __. J See Book iii. c. 2. l$2 KPICTKTl'S. faculty from whom are we separated ?* From wild beasts. And from what others ? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild beast : but if you do. you have lost the character of a m in ; you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep : but if you do. in this case the man is lost. What then do we do as sheep ? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, svhen wj act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined ? To sheep. What have we lost ? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfully and passionately, and violently, to what have we declined ? To wild beasts. Con- sequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others little beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me be eaten by a lion, t Hut in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunc- tive (complex) proposition maintained?! When it fulfills what its nature promises ; so that the preservation of a com- plex proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained ? When it fulfills what it prom- ises. When are rlutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved ? The abuse of the faculties, which are proper to man, called ration- ality and liberty, is the origin of evil. By rationality is meant the faculty of understanding truths and thence falses and goods and then evils ; and by liberty is meant the faculty of thinking, willing and acting free! 1 / and these faculties distinguish man from beasts.'' Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom. 264 and also 240. See Epictetus, ii. c. S. t This seems to be a proverb. If [ am eaten, let me be eaten by the nobler animal. J A conjunctive or complex axiom or lemma. Gellius (xvi. S) gives an example : " P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was the colleague of I.. Mummius in his censorship." Gellius adds, "in every conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, the whole is said to be false." For the whole is proposed as true: therefore if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive is of this kind: >: pleasure is either bad or good, or neither good nor bad." 133 (when they severally ki-ep their promise i. What is the won- der then if man also in like mannei is preserved, and in like manner is lost ? K.ich man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian bv acts of grammar. Hut if a man accustoms O * himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him : and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the con- trary actions destroy him. And on the other hand con- trary actions strengthen contrary characters : shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the faithless O man, abusive words the abusive man. anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more avaricious. For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satis- fied with learning only, but also to add study, and then prac- tice.* For we have long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not * We often say a man leam.s a particular thing'; and there are men who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art ; ;ind they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn ; and learning means that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art professes that the scholar shall be able to practice the art, the art of making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. Thesr men may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue ; and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality, and of virtue, mean that the learner will do the acts of religion and of morality and of virtue; which is a very different thin^ from knowing what the acts of religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The tcac her's tearhin.n i- in fact only made etricient by his f.\ani]>lr, by hi.- doing thai i IK- lead.- I 3 4 EPICTETl'S. able to discuss according to the rules of art about good and evil things (in this fashion) ? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent : the good then are virtues, and the things which participate in virtues ; and the bad are the contrary : and the indifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things which you were talking about ? Whence did you produce and utter them ? From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you corrupt the aids provided by others ? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice ? For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it ; but you have no other advantage from it except so far as to ap- pear to possess it. For what is the difference between ex- plaining these doctrines and those of men who have different opinions ? Sit down now and explain according to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus him- self.* Why then do you call yourself a Stoic ? Why do * " He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and proper manner the Stoic principles : for the same person can ex- plain the principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean ; which is absurd." Schweig. Me means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must according to Stoic principles practice them in order to be a Stoic philosopher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know him to be a religious man. What lie says and pro- EPfCTETUS. 135 you deceive the many ? Why do you act the part of a Jew. * when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian, or an Egyptian ? and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say. This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew. t Thus we too being falsely imbued (baptized), are in name Jews, but in fact we are something else. Our affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words ; we are Mr from practicing what we say, and that of which we are proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfill even what the character of a man promises, we even add to it the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a burden, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should attempt to raise the stone which Ajax \ lifted. * fesses may be false ; and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions are true. The uniformity, regularity, and con- sistency of his acts are evidence which cannot be mistaken. * It has been suggested that Epictetus confounded under the name of Jews those who were Jews and those who were Christians. We know that some Jews l)ecame Christians. t It is possible, as I have said, by Jews Kpictetus means Christians, for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. c. 7, Epk:- tetus gives the name of (ralilxans to the Jews. The term (".alilacans points to the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii. 28), " For he is not a Jew. which is one outwardly but he is a Jew which is one inwardly." etc. His remarks (ii. 17-29} on the man " who is called a Jew, and rests in the law and makes his boast of God " may be com- pared with what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not practice that which he professes. \ See ii. 24, 26 ; Iliad, vii. 264, etc. EPICTETUS. CHAPTER X. HOW WK MAY DISCOVKR THE DUTIKS OF LIFE FROM VAMES. COXSIHER who you are. In the first place, you are a man ; * and this is one who has nothing superior to the fac- ulty of the will, but all other things subjected to it ; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from Subjec- tion. Consider then from what things you have been sepa- rated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts : you have been separated from domestic animals. Further, you are a citizen of the world, f and a part of it, not one of the subservient (serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine ad- ministration and of considering the connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise (profess) ? To hold nothing as profitable to himself ; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate toward his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows \ that these things are * Cicero (de Fin. iv. 10) ; Seneca, Ep. 95. I See i. 9. M. Antoninus, vi. 44 : " But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world." | This may appear extravagant ; but it is possible to explain it, and even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the course of human events, he would not try to resist that which he knows F.PICTRTUS. 137 assigned to him according U the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen.* Hut now because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this. After this remember that you are a son. What does this character promise ? To consider that everything which is the son's belongs to the father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to make concessions ; to be easily per- suaded, to speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which are independent of the will, but readily to give them up. that you may have the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so hap- pen, or a seat, to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the advantage.! Next to this, if you are senator of any state, remember that you are a senator : if a youth, that you are a youth : if an old man, that you are an old man ; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper it is appointed for him to suffer : he would submit and he would endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively promote the end or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher's saying is too hard to deal with ; and as it rests on an impossible as- sumption of foreknowledge, we maybe here wiser than the philosophers, if we say no more about it. Compare Seneca, de Provid. c. 5. * Antoninus, vi. 42 : " \Ve are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do." t A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably means a seat of superiority.a magistrate's seal, a Roman sella curulis. I3 8 KP/CTKTl'S. duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you. You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith ; and if you have forgotten the brother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? Hut (I suppose) you must a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And the loss of nothing else do a man damage ? If you had lost the art of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage ? and if you shall lose modesty, moderation (Vara anything which is insecure ? No. Is then pleasure anything secure ? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far 'away from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for * Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb used also by Persius, Sat. v. 119; compare Cicero, de Fin. iii. 17 ; and Antoninus, ii. 1 6. EffCTETUS. 143 you. bring another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good ? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure ? See that you do not say that it is proper ; but if you do, I shall then not think you are worthy even of the balance.* Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules ; and then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good man.t CHAPTER XII. OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION. WHAT things a man must learn in order to be able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by our philosophers (the Stoics) ; but with respect to the proper use of the things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he cannot discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a little, if he answers beside the pur- pose, he does not know how to treat him. but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says. He is an illiterate man ; it is not possible to do anything with him. Now a guide, when he has found a man out of the road, leads him into the right way : he does not ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show the illiterate man the truth, and you * That is, so far shall I consider you from being able to judge rightly of things without a balance that I shall understand that not even with the aid of a balance can you do it, that yo:i cannot even use a balance, and consequently that you are not worth a single word from me. t This is a just conclusion. \Vc must fix the canons or rules by which things are tried ; and then the rules may be applied by the wise and good to all cases. I44 KPICTETUS. will see that he follows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather feel your own incapacity. How then did Socrates act ? He used to compel his adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he wanted no other witness.* Therefore he could say, " I care not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disputing with me." For he used to make the conclusions drawn from natural notions so plain that every man saw the contradiction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus): Does the envious t man rejoice ? By no means, but he is rather pained. Well, Do you think that envy is pain over evils ? and what envy is there of evils ? Therefore he made his adversary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then, would any man envy those who are nothing to him ? By no means. Thus having completed the notion and dis- tinctly fixed it he would go away without saying to his adver- sary, Define to me envy : and if the adversary had defined * 1 hi- i- >vhat i=- said in the Gorgias or Plato, pp 472, 474. t Socrates' notion of envy is stated by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 9, 8), to be this : " it is the pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons." Bishop Butler gives a better definition ; at least a more complete description of the thing. " Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of greater/if/; To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at is the same; namely, that equality or superiority : and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end." Sermons upon Human Nature, 1. envy, he did not say, You have defined it badly, for the terms of the definition do not correspond to the thing defined. These are technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers) cannot lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who follows the appearances presented to him should be able to concede anything or reject it, we can never by the use of these terms move him to do. Accordingly being conscious of our own inability, we do not attempt the thing ; at least such of us as have any caution do not. But the greater part and the rash, when they enter into such disputa- tions, confuse themselves and confuse others ; and finally abusing their adversaries and abused by them, they walk away. Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to be irritated in argument, never to utter anything abusive, anything insulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the quarrel. It you would know what great power he had in this way read the Symposium of Xeno- phon,* and you will see how many quarrels he put an end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most highly praised. Quickly with skill he settles great disputes. Hesiod, Theogony, v. X;-. Well then ; the matter is not now very safe, and particu- larly at Rome ; for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but must go to a man of con- sular rank, if it so happen, or to a rich man, and ask him, Can you tell me, Sir, to whose care you have intrusted your horses ? I can tell you. Have you intrusted them to any person in- differently and to one who has no experience of horses ? By * The Symposium or Hanquet of Xenophon is extant. Compare Kpictetus, iii. 16, 5, and iv. c. 5, the beginning. 10 14 6 EP/CTETUS. no means. Well then ; can you tell me to whom you intrust your gold or silver things or your vestments ? I don't intrust even these to any one indifferently. Well ; your own body, have you already considered about intrusting the care of it to any person ? Certainly. To a man of experience, I sup- pose, and one acquainted with the aliptic,* or with the heal- ing art ? Without doubt. Are these the best things that you have, or do you also possess something else which is better than all these ? What kind of a thing do you mean ? That I mean which makes use of these things, and tests each of them, and deliberates. Is it the soul that you mean ? You think right, for it is the soul that I mean. In truth L do think that the soul is a much better thing than all the others which I possess. Can you then show us in what way you have taken care of the soul ? for it is not likely that you, who are so wise a man and have a reputation in the city, incon- siderately and carelessly allow the most valuable thing that you possess to be neglected and to perish ? Certainly not. But have you taken care of the soul yourself ; and have you learned from another to do this, or have you discovered the means yourself ? Here comes the danger that in the first place he may say, What is this to you, my good man, who are you ? Next, if you persist in troubling him, there is danger that he may raise his hands and give you blows. I was once myself also an admirer of this mode of instruction until I fell into these dangers.! * The aliptic art is the art of anointing and rubbing, one of the best means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equiv- alent to tiie gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exer- cises, which are also a means of preserving the body's health, when the exercises are good and moderate. t Epictetus in speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome. EMCTETUS. 147 CHAPTER XIII. <\ AVXIKTV (sourrrrnE). WHEN* I see a man anxious, I say, What does this man want ? If he did not want something which is not in his power, how could lie be anxious ? For this reason a lute player when he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theater, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute ; for he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause : but this is not in in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he has confidence. 15ring any single person who knows nothing of music, and the musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knows nothing and has not been prac- ticed, there he is anxious. What matter is this ? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. How- ever he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest ; * but what the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life he neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessity tremble and grow pale. I can- not then say that a man is not a lute player when I see him afraid, but I can say something else, and not one thing, but many. And first of all I call him a stranger and say, This man does not know in what part of the world he is, but though he has been here so long, he is ignorant of the laws of the State and the customs, and what is permitted and what is not ; and he has never employed any lawyer to tell him and to explain the laws. But a man does not write a will, if he does not know how it ought to be written, or he employs * See page 98, note, I4 8 hl'ICTETUS. a person who does know : nor does he rashly seal a bond o-. write a security. But he uses his desire without a lawyer's advice, and aversion, and pursuit (movement), and attempt and purpose. How do you mean without a lawyer? He does not know that he wills what is not allowed, and does not will that which is of necessity ; and he does not know either what is his own or what is another man's : but if he did know, he would never be impeded, he would never be hindered, he would not be anxious. Ho\v so ? Is any man then afraid about things which are not evils ? No. Js he afraid about things which are evils, but still so far within his power that they may not happen ? Certainly he is not. It then the things which are independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and all things which do depend on the will are within our power, and no man can either take them from us or give them to us. if we do not choose, where is room left for anxiety ? But we are anxious about our poor body, our little property, about the will of Caesar : but not anxious about things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a false opinion? No, for this is in my power. About not exerting our movements contrary to nature ? No. not even about this. \Yhen then you see a man pale, as the physician says, judging from the complexion, this man's spleen is dis- ordered, that man's liver so also say, this man's desire and aversion are disordered, -he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For nothing else changes the color, or causes trem- bling or chattering of the teeth, or causes a man to Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot. Iliad, xiii. _Si. For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus,* he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of * In Diogenes Laertius (Zeno, vii.) there is a letter from Antigonus to Xt-no and /eno's answer. Simplicius (note on the Encheiridion, c. 51) supposes this Antigonus to be the kin.c; of Syria; but Upton remarks ihat it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia. KTICTETUS. 149 the things which Zeno admired ; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus had power. But Antig- onus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he wished to please Zeno ; but this was a thing external (out of his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is skilled in any art wishes to please one who has no such skill. Should I try to please you ? Why ? I suppose, you know the measure by which one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains to learn what is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or the other ? Why then are you not good yourself ? How, he replies, am I not good ? Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me. how will he listen to me ? Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what belongs to others ? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what proceeds from you ? Certainly. And is it possible that a fault should be one man's, and the evil in another ? No. Why then are you anxious about that which belongs to others ? Your question is reasonable ; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him- Cannot you then speak to him as you choose ? But I fear that I may be disconcerted ? If you are going to write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted ? By no means. Why ? is it not because you have practiced writing the name ? Certainly. Well, if you were going to read the name, would you not feel the same ? and why ? Because every art has a certain strength and confidence in the things which belong to it. Have you then not practiced speaking? and what else did you learn in the school? Syl- logisms and sophistical propositions ? 4 For what purpose ? was it not for the purpose of discoursing skillfully ? and is not discoursing skillfully the same as discoursing seasonably See EffCTfTVS. and cautiously and with intelligence, and also without mak- ing mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all this with confidence ? Yes. When then you are mounted on a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practiced, and he is not ? Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me. Speak the truth then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, but so long as you present this handle in your body, follow every man who is stronger than yourself. Socrates used to prac- tice speaking, he who talked as lie did to the tyrants,* to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison. Diogenes had practiced speaking, he who spoke as he did to Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. These men were confident in the things which they practiced. But do you walk off to your own affairs and never leave them : go and sit in a corner, and weave syllogisms, and propose them to another. There is not in you the man who can rule a state. 'The Thirty tyrants of Athens, as they were named (Xenophon, Hellenica, ii.). The talk of Socrates with Critias and Charicles, two of the Thirty, is reported in Xenophon's Memorabilia (i. 2, 33). The defense of Socrates before those who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato's Apology, and in the Phaedon and Crito. Diogenes was captured by some pirates and sold (iv. i, 115). CHAPTER XIV. TO NASti. WHEX a certain Roman entered with his son and listened to one reading, Epictetus said, This is the method of instruc- tion ; and he stopped. When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus said, Every art when it is taught causes labor to him who is unacquainted with it and is unskilled in it, and indeed the things which proceed from the arts immediately show their use in the purpose for which they were made ; and most of them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed to be present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a pleasant thing : but the shoe is useful and also not disagreeable to look at. And the discipline of a smith when he is learning is very disagreeable to one who chances to be present and is a stranger to the art : but the work shows the use of the art. But you will see this much more in music ; for if you are present while a person is learning, the discipline will appear most disagreeable ; and yet the results of music are pleasing and delightful to those who know nothing of music. And here we conceive the work of a philosopher to be something of this kind ; he must adapt his wish to what is going on,* so that neither any of the things which are taking place shall take place con- trary to our wish, nor any of the things which do not take place shall not take place when we wish that they should. From this the result is to those who have so arranged the * Encheiridion, c. 8 : ' Do not seek (wish) that things which take place shall take place as you desire, hut desire that things which take place shall take place a* they do, and you will live a tranquil life." ,-2 Kf'JCTETl'S. work of philosophy, not to fail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which they would avoid ; without uneasiness, without fear, without perturbation to pass through life tlu-in- st-lves, together with their associates maintaining the relations both natural and acquired.* as the relation of son, of father, of brother, of citizen, of man. of wife, of neighbor, of fellow- traveler, of ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we conceive to be something like this. It remains next to in- quire how this must be accomplished. \Ye see then that the carpenter when he has learned cer- tain things becomes a carpenter ; the pilot by learning certain things becomes a pilot. May it not then in philos- ophy also not be sufficient to wish to be wise and good, and that there is also a necessity to learn certain things ? We inquire then what these things are. The philosophers say that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he provides for all things ; also that it is not possible to con- ceal from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. t * Compare iii. 2, 4. iv. 8, 20. Antoninus (viii. 27) writes : " There are three relations [between thee and other things] : the one to the body which surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all ; and the third to those who live with thee." This is precise, true and practical. Those who object to " the divine cause," may write in place of it " the nature and constitution of things; " for there is a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to dis- cover ; and for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say that it is of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discovered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists ; or, if that expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists and we cannot help thinking so. t See i. 14, 13, ii. 8, 14. Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. i, 19) said the same. That man should make himself like the gods is said also by Antoninus, x. 8. See Plato, l)e Legg. i. 4. (Upton.) When God is said to pro- vide for all things this is what the Greeks called " Providence." (Epic- tetus, i. 16, iii. 17.) In the second of these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to providence. Epictetus could only or believe what God is by the observation of phenomena ; and he EPICTETUS. 153 The next thing is to learn what is the nature of the God - : for such as they are discovered to be, he, who would please and obey them, must try with all his power to be like them. If the divine is faithful, manal so must be faithful : if it is free, man also must be free ; if beneficent, man also must be benificent : if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous : as being then an imitator of God, he must do and say every- thing consistently with this fact. With what then must we begin ? If you will enter on the discussion, I will tell you that you must first understand names * (words). So then you say that I do not now under- stand names. You do not understand them. How then do I use them ? Just as the illiterate use written language, as cattle use appearances : for use is one thing, understanding is another. But if you think that you understand them, pro- duce whatever word you please, and let us try whether we could only know what he supposed to be God's providence by observing his administration of the world and all that happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God's works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way. ( >n the supposition that all man's powers are the gift of God, man's power of judging what happens in the world under God's providence is the gift of God ; and if he should not be satisfied with God's administration, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, condemns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man, who is God's work, are in op- position to one another. If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because of the contradictions and difficulties involved in this belief or supposed to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties **ich as he cannot reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judgments are his own, and that he cannot show how he- acquired them, or how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man can say is that he has such powers. * See ii. 10, i. 17, 12, ii. u, 4, etc. M. Antoninus, x. 8. '54 F.PICT!: 7!'S. understand it. But it is a disagreeable tiling fur a man to be confuted who is now old, and, it may be. has now served his three campaigns. I too know this : for now you are come to me as if you were in want of nothing: and what could you even imagine to be wanting to you ? You are rich, you have children and a wife perhaps, and many slaves : Cffisar knows you, in Rome you have many friends, you ren- der their dues to all, you know, how to requite him who does you a favor, and to repay in the same kind him who does you a wrong. What do you lack ? If then I shall show you that you lack the things most necessary and the chief tilings for happiness, and that hitherto you have looked after every- thing rather than what you ought, and, to crown all,* that you neither know what God is nor what man is, nor what is good nor what is bad ; and as to what I have said about your ignorance of ether matters, that may perhaps be en- dured, but if I say that you know nothing about yourself, how is it possible that you should endure me and bear the proof and stay here ? It is not possible ; but you immediately go off in bad humor. And yet what harm have I done you ? unless the mirror also injures the ugly man because it shows him to himself such as he is ; unless the physician also is sup- posed to insult the sick man, when he says to him, Man. do you think that you ail nothing ? 1-5 ut you have a fever : go without food to-day : drink water. And no one says. What an insult ! But if you say to a man, Your desires are inflamed, your aversions are low, your intentions are inconsistent, your pursuits (movements) are not conformable to nature, your opinions are rash and false, the man immediately goes away and says. He has insulted me. Our way of dealing is like that of a crowded assembly. Beasts are brought to be sold and oxen ; and the greater part of the men come to buy and sell, and there are some few who * The original is " to add 'the colophon," which is a proverbial expres- sion and signifies to give the last touch to a thing. EPICTETUS. 155 come to look at the market and to inquire how it is carried on, and why. and who rixt-s the meeting and for what purpose. So it is here also in this assembly (of life) : some like cattle trouble themselves about nothing except their fod- der. For to all of you who are busy about possessions and lands and slaves and magisterial offices, these are nothing except fodder. But there are a few who attend the assem- bly, men who love to look on and consider what is the world, who governs it. Has it no governor ? * And how is it possible that a city or a family cannot continue to exist, not even the shortest time, without an administrator and guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be adminis- tered with such order and yet without a purpose and by chance ? t There is then an administrator. What kind of administrator and how does he govern ? And who are we, who were produced by him. and for what purpose ? Have we some connection with him and some relation toward him, or none ? This is the way in which these few are affected, and then they apply themselves only to this one thing, to examine the meeting and then to go away. What then ? They are ridiculed by the many, as the spectators at the fair are by the traders : and if the beasts had any understanding, they would ridicule those who admired any- thing else than fodder. *Sunt in Fortunae qui casibus omnia ponunt, Et mundum credunt nullo rectore moveri. Juvenal, xiii. 86. t From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that we must admit that there is a greater intelligence. (Letter to Mdc_ Necker. Vol. 67, ed. Kehl. p. 278.) EPICTETUS. CHAPTER XV. TO OR AGAINST THOSK WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT THEY HAVE DETERMINED. WHEN* some persons have heard these words, that a man ou^lit to be constant (firm), and that the will is naturally frt;c and not subject to compulsion, but that all other things are subject to hindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they suppose that they ought without deviation to abide by everything which they have deter- mined. But in the first place that which has been deter- mined ought to be sound (true). I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such as exists in a healthy body, in an athletic body ; but if it is plain to me that you have the tone of a frenzied man and you boast of it, I shall say to you, man, seek the physician : this is not tone, but atony (deficiency in right tone). In a different way something of the same kind is felt by those who listen to these dis- courses in a wrong manner ; which was the case with one of my companions who for no reason resolved to starve him- self to death. I heard of it when it was the third day of his abstinence from food and I went to inquire what had happened. I have resolved, he said. But still tell me what it was which induced you to resolve ; for if you have resolved rightly, we shall sit with you and assist you to de- part; but if you have made an unreasonable resolution, chatige your mind. We ought to keep to our determina- tions. What are you doing, man ? We ought to keep not to all our determinations, but to those which are right ; for if you are now persuaded that it is right, do not change 57 your mind, if you think fit, but persist and say, we ought to abide by our determinations. Will you not make tin- beginning and lay the foundation in an inquiry whether the determination is sound or not sound, and so then build on it firmness and security ? But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will not your miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and the stronger are the materials which you shall lay on it ? Without any reason would you withdraw from us out of life a man who is a friend, and a companion, a citizen of the same city, both the great and the small city.* Then while you are com- mitting murder and destroying a man who has done no wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by your deter- minations ? And if it ever in any way came into your head to kill me, ought you to abide by your determinations ? Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his mind. But it is impossible to convince some persons at present; so that 'I seem now to know, what I did not know before, the meaning of the common saying, That you can neither persuade nor break a fool.t May it never be my lot to have a wise fool for my friend : nothing is more untractable. " I am determined," the man says. Madmen are also ; but the more firmly they form a judgment on things which do not exist, the more ellebore J they re- quire. Will you not act like a sick man and call in the physician ? I am sick, master, help me ; consider what I *The great city is the world. t The meaning is that you cannot lead a fool from his purpose either by words or force. " A wise fool" must mean a fool who thinks him- self wise : and such we sometimes set-. " Though thou shouldst bray a fool in the mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolish- ness depart from him." 1'roverbs xxvii. 22. { Kllebore was a medicine used in madness. Horace says, Sat. ii. j, 82 panda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris. 1 5 8 must do : it is my duty to obey you. So it is here also : I know not what 1 ought to do, but I am come to learn. Not so ; but speak to me about other things : upon this I have determined. What other things ? for what is greater and more useful than for you to 'be persuaded that it is not sufficient to have made your determination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy) of madness, not of health. I will die, if you compel me to this. VVhy, man ? What has happened? I have determined I have had a lucky escape that you have not determined to kill me I take no money.* Why ? I have determined Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which you now use in re- fusing to take, there is nothing to hinder you at some time from inclining without reason to take money and then say- ing, I have determined. As in a distempered body, subject to defluxions. the humor inclines sometimes to these parts, and then to those, so too a sickly soul knows not which waj to incline : but if to this inclination and movement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then the evil becomes past help and cure. * " Epictetus seems in this discussion to be referring to some professor, who had declared that he would not take money from his hearers, and then, indirectly at least, had blamed our philosopher for receiving some fee from his hearers." Schweig. EPICTETUS. '59 CHAPTER XVI. THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL. WHERE is the good ? In the will.* Where is the evil ? In the will. Where is neither of them? In those things which are independent of the will. Well then ? Does any one among us think of these lessons out of the schools ? Does any one meditate (strive) by himself to give an answer to things f as in the case of questions ? Is it day ? Yes. Is it night? No. Well, is the number of stars even ? \ I cannot say. When money is shown (offered) to you, have you studied to make the proper answer, that money is not a good thing ? Have you practiced yourself in these answers, or only against sophisms ? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which you have studied, in those you have im- proved ; but in those which you have not studied, in those you remain the same ? When the rhetorician knows that he has written well, that he has committed to memory what lie has written, and brings an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious ? Because he is not satisfied with having studied. What then does he want ? To be praised by the audience ? For the purpose then of being able to practice declamation he has been disciplined : but with respect to praise and *See ii. to, 25. t " To answer to things " means to act in a way suitable to circum- stances, to be a match for them. \ Perhaps this was a common puzzle. The man answers right ; he cannot say. ,r.o /://('//: rrs. blame he has not been disciplined. For when did he hear from any one what praise is, what blame is, what the nature of each is, what kind of praise should be sought, or what kind of blame should be shunned ? And when did he prac- tice this discipline which follows these words (things) ? * Why then do you still wonder, if in the matters which a man has learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in which he has not been disciplined, there he is the same with the many. So the lute player knows how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and yet he trembles when he enters on the stage ; for these matters he understands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a crowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what anxiety is, whether it is our work or the work of another, whether it is possible to stop it or not. For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves the theater puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, the swollen bladder has been punctured and subsides. This is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire ? Externals. About what things are we busy? Externals. And have we any doubt then why we fear or why we are anx- ious? What then happens when we think the things, which are coming on us, to be evils ? It is not in our power not to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. Then we say, Lord God, how shall I not be anxious ? Fool, have you not hands, did not God make them for you ? Sit down now and pray that your nose may not run.f Wipe yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he given to you nothing in the present case ? Has he not given to you endurance ? has he not given to you magnanimity ? has he not given to you manliness ? When you have such *That is which follows praise or blame. He seems to mean making the proper use of praise or of blame. t By the words "Sit down " Epictetus indicates the man's baseness and indolence, who wishes God to do for him that which lie can do him- self and ought to do, A/VC'77-./Y'.V. 161 hands, do you still look for one who shall wipe your nose ? But we neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a man who cares how he shall do anything, not for the obtaining of a thing, but who cares about his own energy. What man, when he is walking about, cares for his own energy ? who, when he is deliberating, cares about his own deliberation, and not about obtaining that about which he deliberates ? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well we have deliberated ; did I not tell you, brother, that it is impossible, when we have thought about anything, that it should not turn out thus ? But if the thing should turn out otherwise, the wretched man is humbled ; he knows not even what to say about what has taken place. Who among us for the sake of this matter has consulted a seer ? Who among us as to his actions has not slept in in- difference ? Who ? Give (name) to me one that I may see the man whom I have long been looking for, who is truly noble and ingenuous, whether young or old ; name him.* *" It is observable, that this most practical of all the philosophers owns his endeavors met with little or no success among his scholars. The Apostles speak a very different language in their epistles to the first converts of Christianity: and the Acts of the Apostles, and all the monuments of the primitive ages, bear testimony to the reformation of manners produced by the Gospel. This difference of success might in- deed justly be expected from the difference of the two systems.'' Mrs. Carter. I have not quoted this note of Mrs. Carter, because I think that it is true. We do not know what was the effect of the teaching of Epictetus, unless this passage informs us, if Mrs. Carter has drawn a right inference from it. The language of Paul to the Corinthians i.s not very different from that of Epictetus, and he speaks very unfavorably of some of his Corinthian converts. We may allow that "a reformation of manners was produced by the Gospel " in many of the converts to Christianity, but there is no evidence that this reformation was produced in all : and there is evidence that it was not. The corruptions in the early Christian church and in subsequent ages are a proof that the re- forms: made by the Gospel were neither universal nor permanent; and tins is the result which our knowledge of human nature would lead us to expect. II j62 EP1CTETUS. Why then are we still surprised, if we are well practiced in thinking about matters (any given subject), but in our acts are low, without decency, worthless, cowardly, impatient of labor, altogether bad ? For we do not care about things nor do we study them. But if we had feared not death or banishment, but fear itself,* we should have studied not to fall into those things which appear to us evils. Now in the school we are irritable and wordy ; and if any little question arises about any of these things, we are able to examine them fully. But drag us to practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some disturbing appearance come on us, and you will know what we have been studying and in what we have been exercising ourselves. Consequently through want of discipline we are always adding something to the ap- pearance and representing things to be greater than what they are. For instance as to myself, when I am on a voyage and look down on the deep sea, or look round on it and see no land, I am out of my mind and imagine that I must drink up all this water if I am wrecked, and it does not occur to me that three pints are enough. What then disturbs me ? The sea ? No, but my opinion. Again, when an earthquake shall happen, I imagine that the city is going to fall on me ; but is not one little stone enough to knock my brains out ? What then are the things which are heavy on us and dis- turb us? What else than opinions? What else than opinions lies heavy upon him who goes away and leaves his companions and friends and places and habits of life ? Now little chil- dren, for instance, when they cry on the nurse leaving them for a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive a small cake. Do you choose then that we should compare you to little children ? No, by Zeus, for I do not wish to be paci- fied by a small cake, but by right opinions. And what are these ? Such as a man ought to study all clay, and not to be affected by anything that is not his own, neither by com- * See ii. i, 13. KP/CTETUS. 163 pan ion nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own body, but to remember the law and to have it before his eyes. And what is the divine law? To keep a man's own, not to claim that which belongs to others, but to use what is given, and when it is not given, not to desire it ; and when a thing is taken away, to give it up readily and immediately, and to be thankful for the time that a man has had the use of it, if you would not cry for your nurse and mamma. For what matter does it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on what he depends ? In what respect are you better than he who cries for a girl, if you grieve for a little gymna- sium, and little porticoes and young men and such places of amusement ? Another comes and laments that he shall no longer drink the water of Dirce. Is the Marcian water worse than that of Dirce ? But I was used to the water of Dirce.* And you in turn will be used to the other. Then if you be- come attached to this also, cry for this too, and try to make a verse like the verse of Euripides, The hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water. See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men. When then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis ? Wretch, are you not content with what you see daily ? have you anything better or greater to see than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea ? But if indeed you com- prehend him who administers the \Vhole, and carry him about in yourself, do you still desire small stones, and a beautiful rock ? t When then you are going to leave the sun * Dirce, a pure stream in Boeotia, which flows into the Ismenus. The Marcian water is the Marcian aqueduct at Rome, which was con- structed 15. (.'.. 144, and was the best water that Rome had. Some of the arches of this aqueduct exist. The "bright stream of Dirce " is spoken of in the Hercules Furens of Euripides (v. 573). t The " small stones " are supposed to be the marbles which decorated Athens, and the rock to be the Acropolis. 164 /;/'/t //; 7 r.v. itself and the moon, what will you do? will yon sit and weep like children ? \Vell, what have you been doing in the school ? what did you hear, what did you learn ? why did you write yourself a philosopher, when you might have writ- ten the truth ; as, " I made certain introductions, and I read Chrysippus, but I did not even approach the door of a philosopher." For how should I possess anything of the kind which Socrates possessed, who died as he did, who lived as he did, or anything such as Diogenes possessed ? Do you think that any one of such men wept or grieved, be- cause he was not going to see a certain man, or a certain woman, nor to be in Athens or in Corinth, but, if it should so happen, in Susa or in Ecbatana ? For if a man can quit the banquet when he chooses, and no longer amuse himself, does he still stay and complain, and does he not stay, as at any amusement, only so long as he is pleased ? Such a man, I suppose, would endure perpetual exile or to be condemned to death. Will you not be weaned now, like children, and take more solid food, and not cry after mammas and nurses, which are the lamentations of old women ? But if I go away, I shall cause them sorrow. You cause them sorrow ? By no means ; but that will cause them sorrow which also causes you sorrow, opinion. What have you to do then ? Take away your own opinion, and if these women are wise, they will take away their own : if they do not, they will la- ment through their own fault. My man, as the proverb says, make a desperate effort on behalf of tranquillity of mind, freedom and magnanimity. Lift up your head at last as released from slavery. Dare to look up to God and say. Deal with me for the future as thou wilt ; I am of the same mind as thou art ; I am thine : I refuse nothing that pleases thee : lead me where thou wilt : clothe me in any dress thou choosest : is it thy will that I should hold the office of a magistrate, that I should be in the condition of a private man, stay here or be an exile, be 165 poor, be rich ? I will make thy defense to men in behalf of all these conditions.* I will show the nature of each thing what it is. You will not do so ; but sit in an ox's belly, and wait for your mamma till she shall feed you. Who would Hercules have been, if he had sat at home ? He would have been Eurystheus and not Hercules. Well, and in his travels through the world how many intimates and how many friends had he ? But nothing more dear to him than God ? For this reason it was believed that he was the son of God, and he was. In obedience to God then he went about purging away injustice and lawlessness. But you are not Hercules and you are not able to purge away the wickedness of others ; nor yet are you Theseus, able to purge away the evil things of Attica. Clear away your own. From yourself, from your thoughts cast away instead of Procrustes and Sciron,| sadness, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance. But it is not possible to eject these things otherwise than by looking to God only, by fixing your affections on him only, by being consecrated to his commands. But if you choose anything else, you will with sighs and groans be compelled to follow what is stronger than yourself, always seeking tranquillity and never able to find it ; for you seek tranquillity there where it is not, and you neglect to seek it where it is. *" There are innumerable passages in St. Paul, which, in reality, bear that noble testimony which Kpictetus here requires in his imaginary character. Such are those in which he glories in tribulation ; speaks with an heroic contempt of life, when set in competition with the per- formance of his duties ; rejoices in bonds and imprisonments, and the view of his approaching martyrdom ; and represents afflictions as a proof of ( 'rod's love. See Acts xx. 23, 24 ; Rom. v. 3, viii. 38, 39; 2 Tim. iv. 6." Mrs. Carter. t Procrustes and Sciron, two robbers who infested Attica and were destroyed by Theseus, as Plutarch tells in his life of Theseus. { Antoninus, x. 28, " only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens ; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all," <' named the Liar, and the Unit-scent. 74 EPICTK rns. Over sucli a victory as this a man may justly be proud ; not for proposing the master sophism. How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says,* Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to the temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you resort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go to Socrates and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and mocking his beauty : consider what a victory he at last found that he had gained over himself ; what an Olympian victory ; in what number he stood from Hercules ; t so that, by the Gods, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man, you who have conquered not less these sorry boxers and pancratiasts, nor yet those who are like them, the gladi- ators. By placing these objects on the other side you will conquer the appearance : you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance, but say, Appearances, 'wait for me a li' : let me see who you are. and what you are about : \ let me put you to the test. And then do not allow the appearance to leiul you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beauti- * The passage is in Plato, Laws. ix. p. S;.}. The conclusion is. " if you cannot be cured of your (mental) disease, seek death which is better and depart from life." This bears some resemblance to the precept in Matthew vi. 29, " And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee," etc. t Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have been the first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling and in the pancratium were reckoned in the list of victors as coming in the second or third place after him, and so on. t Compare iii. 12, 15. KPICTETUS. 175 ful and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only trifling words, and nothing more. This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat, divine is the work ; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from per- turbation. Remember Clod : call on him as a helper and protector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri * in a storm. For what is a greater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent and drive away the reason ? For the storm itself, what else is it but an appearance ? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as many thunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm f and serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same again, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even know afterward that you are doing wrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defenses) for your wrong- doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod \ to be true, \Vith constant ills the dilatory strives. * Castor and Pollux. Horace, Carm. i. 12 : Quorum simul alba nautis Stella refulsit, etc. t " Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless pay." Antoninu.-., xii. -2. \ Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 411. 176 LP1CTETUS. CHAPTER XIX. AGAINST THOSK WHO EM BRACK PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS ONLY IX WORDS. THE argument called the ruling argument appears to have been proposed from such principles as these : there is in fact a common contradiction between one another in these three positions, each two being in con- tradiction to the third. The propositions are, that everything past must of necessity be true ; that an im- possibility does not follow a possibility ; and that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus * observing this contradiction employed the probative force of the first two for the demonstration of this proposition, That nothing is possible which is not true and never will be. Now another will hold these two : That something is possible, which is neither true nor ever will be : and That an impossibility does not follow a possibility But he vail nor allow that everything which is past is necessarily true, as tht- followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and Antipater copiously defended them. But others maintain the other two proposi- tions, That a thing is possible which is neither true nor will be true : and That everything which is past is necessarily true ; but then they will maintain that an impossibility can follow a possibility. I5ut it is impossible to maintain these three propositions, because of their common contradiction.! If then any man should ask me, which of these proposi- * Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of Ptolenueus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and dis- tinguished in dialectic. t If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction to the third and destroy it. /:/'/( ' 7V: 77 'S. '77 lions do L maintain ? I will answer him, that I do not know ; but 1 have received this story, that Diodorus maintained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I think and Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and those of Chrys- ippus a third. What then is your opinion ? I was not made for this purpose, to examine the appearances that occur to me, and to compare what others say and to form an opinion of my own on the thing. Therefore I differ not at all from the grammarian. Who was Hector's father ? Priam. Who were his brothers ? Alexander and Deipho- bus. Who was their mother ? Hecuba. I have heard this story. From whom ? From Homer. And Hellanicus also, I think, writes about the same things, and perhaps others like him. And what further have I about the ruling argument ? Nothing, liut, if I am a vain man, especially at a banquet I surprise the guests by enumerating those that have written on these matters. Both Chrysippus has written wonderfully in his first book about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has written specially on the subject, and Archedemus. An- tipater also has written not only in his work about Possibilities, but also separately in his work on the ruling argument. Have yl^u not read the work ? I have not read it. Read. And what profit will a man have from it ? he will be more trifling and impertinent than he is now ; for what else have you gained by reading it ? What opinion have you formed on this subject ? none ; but you will tell us of Helen and Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and never will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great importance if you retain the story, but have formed no opinion of your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic) this happens to us much more than in these things of which we are speaking. Speak to me about good and evil. Listen : The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores Brought me.* Odyssey, ix. 39. * " Speak to me," eu ., may be supposed to he sakl to Kpictetus, who 12 178 KPICTETUS. ( )f things some are good, some are bad, and others are in- different. The good then are the virtues and the things which partake of the virtues : the bad are the vices, and the things which partake of them : and the indifferent are the things which lie between the virtues and the vices, wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you know this ? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history ; for what difference does it make to say this, or to say that Diogenes has it in his Ethic, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes ? Have you then examined any of these things and formed an opinion of your own ? Show how you are used to behave in a storm on shipboard ? Do you remember this division (distinction of things), when the sail rattles and a man, who knows nothing of times and seasons stands by you when you are screaming and says, Tell me, I ask you by the Gods, what you were saying just now, Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck : does it participate in vice ? Will you not take up a stick and lay it on his head ? What have we to do with you, man ? we are perishing and you come to mock us ? But if Gesar sent for you to answer a charge, do you remember the distinction ? If when you are going in pale and trembling, a person should come up to you and say, Why do you tremble man ? what is the matter about which you are engaged ? Does Caesar who sits within give virtue and vice to those who go in to him ? You reply, Why do you also mock me and add to my present has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians' learning. \Vhen he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, Listen. There is nothing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearers as anything else. Then he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a philosopher. He is bantering the hearer: it makes no matter from what author I learned them ; it is all the same. The real question is, have you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion yourself ? EPICTETUS. 179 sorrows ? Still tell me, philosopher, tell me why you tremble ? Is it not death of which you run the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment, or disgrace ? What else is there ? Is there any vice or anything which partakes of vice ? What then did you use to say of these things ? " What have you to do' with me, man ? my own evils are enough for me." And you say right. Your own evils are enough for you, your baseness, your cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what belonged to others ? Why did you call yourself a Stoic ? Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find to what sect you belong. You will find that most -of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics,* and those feeble. For wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal to everything else or even superior ? But show me a Stoic, if you can. Where or how ? But you can show me an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse ? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also with equal accuracy ? who then is a Stoic ? As we call a statue Phidiac, which is fashioned according to the art of Phidias ; so show me a man who is fashioned according to the doctrines which he utters. Show me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him : I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic. You cannot show me one fashioned so ; but show me at least one who is forming, who has shown a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favor : do not grudge an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the Athena, a work of ivory and gold ? t Let any of you show *The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed >pylife; but still they contended that the smallest mental ex- cellence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5, 31. 1 See ii. c. 8, 20. me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to blame * either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about anything, not to consider himself damaged by any- thing, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous ; and why should I not say it direct ? desirous from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellowship with Zeus.f Show me the man. But you cannot. Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others ? and why do you put on a guise which does not belong to you, and walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and things which do not belong to you. And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my school. And I have this purpose, to make you free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free, prosper- ous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great. And you are here to learn and practice these things. Why then do you not finish the work, if you also have such a purpose as you ought to have, and if I in addition to the purpose also have such qualification as I ought to have ? What is that which is wanting ? When I see an artificer and material lying by him, I expect the work. Here then is the artificer, here the material ; what is it that we want ? Is not the thing one that can be taught? It is. Is it not then in in our oower ? The only thing of all that is in our power. *"To blame God " means to blame the constitution and order of things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked ; as absurd as for the potter's vessel to blame the potter, if thr.t can be imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break. I " Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ," i John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity between Epictetus and the Scriptures; and will perceive from them, either that the Stoics had learnt a good deal of the Christian language or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes i.i the philosophers, especially Epictetus." Mrs. Carter. /:r/C77-:TUs. 181 Neither wealth is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor in a word anything else except the right usi: of appear- ances. This (right use) is by nature free from restraint, this alone is free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the work ? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both. Well then, are you will- ing that we begin at last to bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of the past ? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and you will see. CHAPTER XX. M;AI.N i i in i fi LKKANS AND ACADEMI propositions which are true and evident are of neces- sity used even by those who contradict them : and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it the same time. For in- stance, if a man should deny that there is anything uni- .versally true, it is plain that he must make the contra- dictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this ? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say : Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all things are in- capable of sure evidence ; or if another say, lielieve me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to be- ^ 2 Kl'ICTETUS. lieve anything ; or again, if another should say. Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn anything; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose? Now in what respect do these differ from those ? Whom shall I name ? Those who call themselves Academics ? " Men, agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another] : believe us that no man believes anybody." Thus Epicurus * also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? "Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken : there is no natural fellowship among rational animals; be- lieve me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons." What is this to you ? Per- mit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved ? Xay, it will lj>e much better and safer for you ? Man, why do you trouble yourself about us ? Why do you keep awake for us ? Why do you light your lamp ? Why do you rise early ? Why do you write so many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men ; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure ? For if this is so. lie clown and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy : eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore. T And what is it to you, how the rest shall think * Cicero, de Kin. ii. 30.31, speaking of the letter, which Epicurus wrote to Ilermarchus when he was dying, says "that the actions of Epicurus were inconsistent with his sayings, 1 ' and " his writings were confuted by his proliity and morality." t Paul says. i. Cor. xv. 32 : " If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Kphesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not ? let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." The words "let us eat and drink," etc.. are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander- men- . ,S 3 about these things, whether right or wrong ? For what have we to do with you ? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked ? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans : but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before everything to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing ; in order that all things may be secured for you ? * Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others ? With whom then ought we to maintain it ? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellow- ship ? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines ? What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepi- ness, and compelled him to write what he did write ? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and complaining ? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of The meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the fxt. *It would give security to the Kpiciireans, that they would enjoy all that they value, if other men should be persuaded th:il we are all made llowship, and th;it tcmpr-runn- i< a good thing. ,S.j Kl'JCTKTl'S. Cybele) ? So strong and invincible is man's nature. For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree ? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine ? It is impossible : it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man ; and even those who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man's desires. Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not mutilate hu- man desires, for he could not ; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though tiev have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a. man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve them, but just the contrary, endeavors to take away and destroy whatever en- ables us to discern the truth ? What say you philosopher ? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are ? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it, that our citizens may be turned and honor the deity and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations ? 1 have, and I am thankful. Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary : That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them ; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong-doers.* Well done, philosopher, you have done some- * Polyhius (vi. 56), when he is speaking of the Roman state, com- mends the men of old time, who established in the minds of the imihi- tudf tlu- opinions about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they EPfCTETUS. 185 thing for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine. What then, does not this satisfy you ? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing. Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as those have grown our well-constituted states ; by these was Sparta founded : Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honorable, nor the condition of free men more honorable than base, and that those who died at Ther- mopylae* died from these opinions ; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city ? f Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ them- selves in public affairs and make themselves priests and in- terpreters. Of whom ? of gods who do not exist : and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they repeat the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture. Man what are you doing ? \ are you refuting yourself every day ; and will you not give up these frigid attempts ? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to ? to your mouth or to your eye ? when you wash yourself, what do you go into ? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit ? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be acted more wisely than those in his time who would destroy such opinions. * Kpictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae M. age 1 6, note on Hal:- r See ii. ^5. { " In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic pr'uicii/ic that friend- ship is only p);i>k- I,ci.,eu\ tin.- good." Scrr.veijj. lie also sa;. - there was an<-thi !y F.pictetus on this snbjt-i't. in which he EPICTFTUS. 101 the tilings which are bad ? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things which in no way concern them- selves ? Not to these either. It remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are good ; and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such things also. Whoever then understands what is good, can also know how to love ; but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving ? To love then is only in the power of the wise. How is this? a man may say ; 1 am foolish, and yet I love my child. I am surprised indeed that you have begun by making the admission that you are foolish. For what are you deficient in ? Can you not make use of your senses ? do you not distinguish appearances ? do you not use food which is suitable for your body, and clothing and habitation ? Why then do you admit that you are foolish ? It is in truth because you are often disturbed by appearances aud perplexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you ; and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad : and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are changed. This is the reason why you confess that you are foolish. And are you not changeable in love ? But wealth, and pleasure, and in a word things themselves, do you some- times think them to be good, and sometimes bad ? and do you not think the same men at one time to be good, at another time bad ? and have you not at one time a friendly toward them, and at another time the feeling of an expressed some of the opinions of Musonius Kufus (i. i, note 12). Schweig. draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobzeus; and he supposes that this dis>crtati -.m of Kpj, in one of the last four l>ooks of F.pictetiis' ilis our-, > \\\ Arrian, which have been lost. Cicero (de Amicit. c. 5) says " nisi in bonis amidtiam esse non posse," ant! c. 18. jg 2 Kricri-:rrs. enemy ? and do you not at one time praise them, and at another time blame them ? Yes ; I have these feelings also. Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about a man is his friend ? Certainly not. And he who has selected a man as his friend and is of a changeable dis- position, has he good-will toward him ? He has not. And he who who now abuses a man, and afterward admires him ? This man also has no good-will to the other. Well then, did you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one an- other, so that you might say, there is nothing more friendly? but that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh among them, and you will learn. Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change your tone and say, what a son I have brought up ! He has long been wishing to bury me. Throw a smart girl between you ; and do you the old man love her, and the young one will love her too. If a little fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. You will utter the words of the father of Admetus ! Life gives you pleasure : and why not your father.* Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little ? that he was not in agony when the child had a fever ? that he did not often say, I wish I had the fever instead of the child ? then when the test (the thing) came and was near; see what words they utter. Were not Eteocles and Poly- nices from the same mother and from the same father ? Were they not brought up . together, had they not lived together, drunk together, slept together, and often kissed one another ? So that, if any man, I think, had seen them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for the paradoxes which they *The first verse is from the Alcestis of Euripides, v. 691. The second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. Schweighaeuser thinks that it has been intruded into the text from a trivial scholium. EPICTETUS. 193 utter about friendship. But when a quarrel rose between them about the royal power, as between dogs about a bit of meat, see what they say. Polynices. Where will you take your station before the towers ? Eteotlcs. Why do you ask me this ? Pol. I will place myself opposite and try to kill you. Et. I also wish to do the same.* Such are the wishes that they utter. For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest. Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses : for its nature is to love nothing so much as its own interest ; this is father, and brother and kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of yEsculapius to be burned when his dear friend died.f For this reason if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured : but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsman and justice itself, all these give way being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines : if in the flesh, there is the ruling power : if in the will, it is there : and if it is in externals, it is there. \ If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I * From the Phoenissse of Euripides, v. 723, etc. t Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian, Expedition of Alexander, vii. 14. J Matthew vi. 21, "for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also." 194 FPICTETUS. ought to be, and son, and father ; for this will be my interest to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing my rela- tions (toward all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).* It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians quarreled, and the Thebans with both ; and the great king quarreled with Hellas, and the Mace- donians with both : and the Romans with the Getre.f And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus ; and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that they were not friends. But there \vas cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends, appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they say it and swear that it is im- possible for them to be separated from one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted, it is * " By ' self ' is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13, ' the whole of man.' The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in anything but a right choice (a right dis- position and behavior) . but how it is the interest of each Individual in every case to make that choice in preference to present pleasure and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense." Mrs. Carter. t The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. i.) The quarrel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of Herodotus (i. I.) The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Persians is the subject of Arrian's Expedition of Alexander. The Romans were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may assume that Epictetus was still living then. 19$ insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appear- ances. But examine, not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and brought up to- gether, and under the same pedagogue ; but examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free: do not name them even men, if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nat- ure which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains,* and in the courts of justice dis- play the acts of robbers ; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and are companions, but when you have ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is a communion of honest things and of nothing el.- But you may say, such a one treated me with regard so long ; and did he not love me ? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast? *Schweig. thinks that this is the plain meaning: " as wild beasts in the mountains lit: in wait for men, M> men lie in wait for men, not only in deserted place.*, b;ii even in the forum." IIo\v (to you knmv, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel. lie will not throw you away like a broken platter ? I5ut this woman is my wife, and we have lived togeihci so lor.g. And how long did KripLyle live with Amphia- raus, and was the mother of children and of many? a necklace * came between them : and what is a necklace ': It is the opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was the thing 1 which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife, that which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a mother. And let every man among you who has seri- ously resolved either to be a friend himself or to have an- other for his friend cut out these opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he will not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next place, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and completely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his igno- rance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the greatest importance ; but he will be harsh to no man, be- ing well convinced of Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other respects as friends do, drink to- gether, and lodge together, and sail together, and you may be born of the same parents ; for snakes also are: but neither will they be friends nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opinions. * The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband for a neck- lace. Tl A. , ,97 CHAPTER XXIII. OX THE POWKR OF SPKAKIXG. KVK.RY man will read a book with more pleasure or even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters. There- fore every man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if it is signified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then that there is no faculty of expression : for this affirmation is the characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious man. because he undervalues the gifts which come from (Jod. just as if he would take away the commodity of the power of vision, or of hearing', or of seeing. Has then < )od, given you eyes to no purpose ? and to no purpose has he infused into them a spirit* so strong and of such skillful contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things which are seen ? What messenger is so swift and vigilant ? And to no purpose has he made the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and elastic that the vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a manner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without the presence of which there would be no use in any other thing ? Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things which are superior to J;hem. But indeed for the *The word for "spirit " means a vital spirit, an animal spirit, a nt.-rv- ous fluid, as Schweighaeuser explains it, or as I'lutarch says (I>e Placit. Philosoph. iv. 15), "the spirit which has the power of vision, which per meat js from the chief faculty of the mind to tin- pupil of the eye ; "' and in another passage of the same treatise (iv. S), " the instruments of per- rjpt'.on are said to be intelligent spirits which have a motion from the ; li'nl faculty of the mind to the organs." power of seeing and hearing-, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which contribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine and oil give thanks to God : but remember that lie has given you something else better than all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them and estimating the value of each. For what is that which gives information about each of these powers, \vhat each of them is worth? * Is it each faculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of vision saying anything about itself ? or the faculty of hearing? or wheat, or barley, or a horse or a dog ? No ; but they are appointed as minisU-rs and slaves to serve the faculty which has the power of making use of the appearances of things. And if you in- quire what is the value of each thing, of whom do you inquire ? who answers you ? How then can any other faculty be more powerful than this, which uses the n ministers and itself proves each and pronounces about them ? for which of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them knows when it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from ob- jects to which it ought not to apply them and does apply them to other objects? Is it the faculty of vision ? No : but it is the faculty of the will. What is that faculty which closes and opens the ears ? what is that by which they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary un- moved by what is said ? is it the faculty of hearing ? It is no other than the faculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing that it is amid all the other faculties which are blind and dumb and unable to see anything else ex- cept the very acts for which they are appointed in order to minister to this (faculty) and serve it. but this faculty alone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each of the rest ; will this faculty declare to us that anything else is the * See i. 1. EP1CTETCS. 199 best, or tliat itself is? And what else does the rye ) ; Cicero (De Fin. ii. c. 30) quotes this letter. F.PlCTl-.Tl'S. 201 to neglect the eyes, nor the ears nor the hands nor the feet, nor clothing 1 nor shoes. But if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all thing's, what must I say ? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of the will, when it is right. For it is this which uses the other (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both small and great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who is not good becomes good : but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is through this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one an- other, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look after it makes happiness. But to take away the faculty of speaking and to say that there is no such faculty in reality, is the act not only of an ungrateful man toward those who gave it, but also of a cowardly man : for such a person seems to me to fear, if there is any faculty of this kind, that we shall not be able to despise it. Such also are those who say that there is no difference between beauty and ugliness. Then it would happen that a man would be affected in the same way if he saw Thersites and if he saw Achilles ; in the same way, if he saw Helen and any other woman. But these are foolish and clownish notions, and the no- tions of men who know not the nature of each thing, but are afraid if a man shall see the difference, that he shall immediately be seized and carried off vanquished. But this is the great matter: to leave to each thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving to it this power to see what is the worth of the power, and to learn what is tin; most excellent of all things, and to pursue this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other things of secondary value compared with this, but yet, as far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most ex- cellcnt thing, but \ve must take care of them on account of the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true natural condition, if it does not rightly use the other faculties, and prefer some things to others. What then is usually done ? Men generally act as a traveler would do on his way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being pleased with it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your purpose : you were not traveling to this inn, but you were passing through it. But this is a pleasant inn. And how many other inns are pleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant ? yet only for passing through. But your pur- pose is this, to return to your country, to relieve your kinsmen of .anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the usual magistracies.* For you are not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the kind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the aid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must advance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty which makes use of the appear- ances of things ; and since it is necessary also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be effected by a certain *The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace (Ep. i. i, 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic prin- ciples : " Xunc agilis no et mersor civilibus undis." but this was only talk- The Stoic should discharge all the duties of a citizen, says Epictetus ; he should even marry and beget children. But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty; and the continu- ance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the Roman censor Mettellus gave to his fellow-citizens, that, as they could not live without women, they should make the best of this business of marriage. (Gelliu*. i. 6.) j: /y.s. 203 mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharp- ness, some persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another again by sophisms, and still another by some other inn of the kind : and there they stay and waste away as if they were among Sirens. Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of using conformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires not to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into that which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor ever to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, conforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able from your whole soul to utter these verses : Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny.* Then having this purpose before you, if some little' form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you abide among them and choose to dwell there, forgetting the things at home, and do you say, These things are fine ? Who says that they are not fine ? but only as being a way home, as inns are. For what hinders you from being an unfortunate man, even if you speak like Demosthenes ? and what prevents you, if you can resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus, f from being wretched, from sorrowing, from envying, in a word, from being dis- turbed, from being unhappy ? Nothing. You see then * The rest of the verses are quoted in the Kncheiridion, s. 52. t Chrysippus wrott a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous among Dia- lecticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic among the Gods, it \vould not be any other than that of Chrysippus. , 204 EPICTETUS. that these were inns, worth nothing-; and that the pur- pose before you was something else. When I speak thus to some persons, they think that I am rejecting care about speaking or care about theorems. But I am not rejecting this care, but I am rejecting the abiding about these things incessantly and putting our hopes in them. If a man by this teaching does harm to those who listen to him, reckon me too among those who do this harm : for I am not able, when I see one thing which is most excellent and supreme, to say that another is so, in order to please you. CHAPTER XXIV. TO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT VALUED (ESTEEMED) BY HIM. A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus) : Frequently I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any answer : and now, if it is possible, I entreat you to say something to me. Do you think, said Epic- tetus, that as there is an art in anything else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art, will speak skillfully, and he who has not, will speak unskill- fully ? I do think so. He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able to benefit others, will speak skillfully : but he who is rather damaged by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others benefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they hear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some dam- aged ? There are both among these also, he said. In F.riCTETUS. 205 this case also then those who hear skillfully are benefited, and those who hear unskillfully are damaged? He ad- mitted this. Is there then a skill in hearing also, as there is in speaking? It seems so. If you choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom does it belong ? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it belongs ? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skillfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art ? This also requires the aid of art. Then if speaking properly is the business of the skillful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit is the business of the skillful man ? Now as to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully,* let us for the present, if you please, say no more, for both of us are a long way from everything of the kind. But I think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so ? Tell me then about what I should talk to you : about what matter are you able to listen ? About good and evil. Good and evil in what ~ J In a horse ? No. Well, in an l\ r o. \Vhat then ? In a man ? Yes. Do we know then what a man is, what the notion is that we have of him. or have we our ears in any degree practiced about this matter? But do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstration to you ? How ? Do you under- stand this very thing, what demonstration is, or how any- thing is demonstrated, or by \vhat means ; or what tilings are like demonstration, but are not demonstration? Do *" That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in the art f speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantagr from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a philosophical discussion." Schweig. you know what is true or what is false ? What is conse- quent on a thing, what is repugnant to a thing, or not consistent, or inconsistent? But must I excite you to philosophy, and how? Shall I show to you the repug- nance in the opinions of most men, through which they differ about things good and evil, and about things which are profitable and unprofitable, when you know not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is ? Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with you ; excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclination to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will not be moved to eat ; so there are in us certain natural inclinations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be somebody, when he himself shall excite us : but when he shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite a man's desire (to speak) ? Does the vine say to the husbandman, Take care of me? Xo, but the vine by showing in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman, if he does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When children are attractive and lively, whom do tney not invite to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them? But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it? for though it is small, it is still a little ass. Why then do you say nothing to me ? I can only say this to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is this world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire according to nature nor turn away n'or move upward, nor intend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent, nor suspend his judgment : to say all in a few words, he KPTCTF.TUS. 207 will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is some- body, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have arisen through this ignorance? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles quarrel with one another? Was it not through not know- ing what things are profitable and not profitable? Docs not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her father, and does not the other say that it is not profita- ble ? does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of another, and does not the other say that he ought not? Did they not for these reasons forget, both who they were and for what purpose they had come there? Oh, man, for what purpose did you come ? to gain mistresses or to fight? To fight. With whom ? the Trojans or the Hel- lenes ? With the Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your sword against your own king? And do you, most excellent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the people's guardian and have such cares : and are you quarreling about a little girl with the ni.^t warlike of your allies, whom you ought by every means to take care of and protect ? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well-behaved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all respect? Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what is profitable does? But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Agamem- non ! But I am also handsome. Are you then more handsome than Achilles ? Hut I have also beautiful hair. Hut had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold-colored ? and he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as Hector or Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Are you the son of a goddess mother ? are you the son of a father sprung from Zeus ? What good then do these things do to him, when he sits and weeps for a girl ? But 1 am an orator. 20 8 EJ'ICTETUS. And was he not ? Do you not see how he handled the most skillful of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix ? how he stopped their mouths ? * This is all that I have to say to you : and I say even this not willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are aroused by generous horses ? Must I look to your body ? You treat it disgrace- fully. To your dress ? That is luxurious. To your be- havior, to your look ? That is the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, You tell me nothing ; but only show yourself wor- thy of hearing or fit for hearing ; and you will see how you will move the speaker. CHAPTER XXV. in/, i LOGIC IS ..FCESSARY. \ WHEN one of those who were present said, Persuade me that logic is necessary, he replied, Do you wish me to prove this to you ? The answer was, Yes. Then I must use a demonstrative form of speech. This was granted. How then will you know if I am cheating you by argu- ment ? The man was silent. Do you see, said Epictetus, that you yourself arc admitting that logic is necessary, if without it you cannot know so much as this, whether logic is necessary or not necessary? * In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messen- gers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonder- ful example of eloquence. t See i. 17. CHAPTER XXVI. WHAT is THK PKOPKRTY OK KKKOR. EVF.RY error comprehends contradiction : for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what does the thief wish to do? That which is for his own interest.* If then the theft is not for his interest, lie does not do that which he wishes. But every rational soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered from doing contra- dictory things : but when it does understand the contra- diction, it must of necessity avoid the contradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from the false when he sees that a thing is false ; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth. He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man the contradiction through which he errs and clearly to prove how he does not do that which he wishes and does that which he does not wish. For if any one shall show this, a man will himself withdraw from that which he does ; but so long as you do not show this, do not be sur- prised if a man persists in his practice ; for having the appearance of doing right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also rusting to this power used to say, I am used to call no other witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom I am discuss- * Compare Xenophon, Mem. iii. 9, 4. '4 2io /;/'/<:/ A yr.s-. ing, and I ask him to give his opinion and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is sufficient in the place of all. For Socrates knew by what the rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and then it must incline, whether it chooses or not.* Show the rational governing- faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from it ; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him who is not persuaded, f * There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (Acad. Priori. 12), "ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi; sic animum perspicuis cedere," appears to supply the deficiency. t M. Antoninus, v. 28 ; x. 4. BOOK IK, CHAPTER I. OF FINERY IN DRESS. A CERTAIN young man a rhetorician came to see Epicte- tus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his attire in an ornamental style ; whereupon Epicte- tus said, Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some men also beautiful and others ugly ? Certainly. Do we then for the same reason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar ? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to be beautiful then when it is most excellent according to its nature ; but since the nature of each is different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which maki-s a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly ; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It seems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridicu- 211 2 1 2 //'/<' /'/: ri 's. lous ; and ho who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling.* It is so, said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful ? The possession of the excellence of a horse. What then makes a man beautiful ? Is it not the possession of the excellence of a man ? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labor at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But what is this ? Observe whom you your- self praise, when you praise many persons without par- tiality : do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate ? The temperate. If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful : but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly, even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful. Further I do not know what to say to you : for if I say to you wh.it I think, 1 shall offend you, and you will 'perhaps leave the school and not return to it : and if I do not say what I think, sec how I shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave you unconnected. If at any time afterward your shall acquire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say. What did F.pictetus observe * A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised rive exer- cises, which are expressed by one Greek line. Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling. Compare Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5. EPIC TEH'S. 213 in me that when he saw me in such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he neglected me and never said a word ? did he so much despair of me? was I not young ? was I not able to listen to reason ? and how many other young men at this age commit many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Polemon ;* yet he might have set my hair right, he might have stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my body ; but when he saw me dressed like what shall I say ? he kept silent. I do not say like what ; but you will say when you come to your senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such a dress. If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what defense shall I make ? Why, shall I say that the man will not be persuaded by me ? Was Laius persuaded by- Apollo ? Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for tho oracle ?f Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to tell him the truth ? I indeed do not know, * Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253. Qusero, faciasne quod olim Mutatus Polemon ? etc. The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dissolute youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lecturing, he and his drunken companions hurst into the school, hut Polemon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the school of the Academy. Jsee Epict. iv. 1 1, 30. t Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children. The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child CEdipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer of Laius. _ , j. /.7Y< ' whether you will be persuaded by nic or not ; but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But why did he speak ? I say in reply. But why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed himself in this place as a Prophet and source of truth and for the inhabitants of the world to resort to him ? and why are the words Know yourself written in front of the temple, though- no person takes any notice of them ? Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his judges ? "If you acquit me on these condi- tions that I no longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I will not desist : but I will go up both to young, and to old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now ; and most particularly will I do this to you my fellow-citizens, because you are more nearly related to me. " * Are you so curious, Socrates, and such a busy- body ? and how does it concern you how we act ? and what is it that you say ? Being of the same community and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show r your- self a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a bad neighbor to your neighbors. Who then are you ? Here it is a great thing to say, " I am he whose duty it is to take care of men ; for it is not every little heiter which dares to resist a lion ; but if the bull comes up and resists him, say to th^ bull, if you choose, ' And who are you, and what business have you here ? ' ' Man, in every kind there is produced something which excels ; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that which excels, Who then are you ? If you do, * Plato, Apology, i. 9, etc., and c. 17. //. vr.v. 215 it will find a voice- in some way and say, I am such a thing as the purpu .rment : * do not expect me to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest of men. \Vhat then ? am I such a man ? Certainly not. And are you such a man as can listen to the truth ? 1 wish you were. Hut however since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being ; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. Bui what is meant by "rationally?" Con- formably to nature f and completely. What then do you ->s which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of using appearances?^ No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing : adorn and beautify this ; but your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you ? Are you man or woman ? Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate ; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is nu lustrous not to have hair ; and if he has no hair he is a * Page 10, note. t Cicero, de Fin. ii. 11 : Horace, Epp. i. 10, 12. This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in thf Preface to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is "a manner of speaking not loose and undetcrminate, Init clear :md distinct, strictly just and true." } The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals ; a rational use of th-m i* |>t-i uiiar to man. Mrs. < ..itrr. hurod. le sight ! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature ? That it made you a man ? What then ? was it lit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being; adorned ? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women ? "But you are not pleased with the matter : set to work then upon the whole business. Take away what is its name? that which is the cause of the hairs : make your- self a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken : do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please ? The women ? Please them as a man. Well : but they like smooth men. Will you not hang- yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one ? Is this your business ? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you ? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a prefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games ? Well, and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out ? To please whom and for what purpose ? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs ? A beautiful citi/en, and senator and rhetorician. We ought to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up. Do not so, I entreat you by the Gods, young man : but when you have once heard these words, go away and say EPICTETUS. 217 to yourself, " Epictetus has not said this tonic; for how could he ? but sonic propitious God through him : f>>r it would never have conic into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger." You say. No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies anything to you, it is not the crow winch signifies, but God through the crow ; and if he signifies anything through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger? What else is it which the poet says: For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent Hermes the careful watcher, Argus' slayer, The husband not to kill nor wed the wife.* Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to him (.^Egisthus) ? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beau- tiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will ; and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men Alcibiades : Try then to be beautiful. What does he say to him ? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. Mow with the body ? Leave it as * From the Odyssey, i. 37, where Zeus is speaking of /ligisthus. 2 i8 KPJCTETUS. it is by nature. Another has looked after these things : intrust them to him. What then, must a man be un- cleaned ? Certainly not ; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man. a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You Say no : but let us also pluck out the lion's mane, that he may not be uncleaned. and the cock's comb for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog. CHAPTER II. IN WHAT A M ,\N OfGHT TO feE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE PRO- FICIENCY ; AND THAT WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS. THERE are three things (topics) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire.* The second con- cerns the movements (toward an object) and the move- ments from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents. Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to the affects (perturba- tions) ; for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which a man desires or a falling into that which a man would wish to avoid. This is * Antoninus, xi. 37, "as to sensual desire he should altogether keep away from it ; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power." KPICTETl'S. 219 that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortune's, sorrows, lamentations and envy ; that which makes men envious and jealous ; and by these causes we are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties of a man ; for I ought not to be free from affects like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations .natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen. The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in in- toxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But the present philosophers neglect- ing the first topic and the second (the affects alid duties), employ themselves on the third, using sophistical argu- ments, making conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not de- ceived. Who must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest ? Are you free from deception in the matter of money ? If you see a beautiful girl, do you re- sist the appearance? If your neighbor obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind? Wretch, you hear these very things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was. Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. iiut if another who is present says. You are mistaken : it is not worth while to 220 listen to a certain person, for what does he know? he has only the first principles, anil no more? then you are con- founded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher. It is seen by these very things : why do you wish to show it by others ? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger ? * And then when the man was wild with rage, This, he said, is the certain person : I have pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood : but when any person shows the man's principles, then he shows him as a man. Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value not at all your own will, but you look ex- ternally to things which are independent of your will ? For instance, what will a certain person say ? and what will people think of you ? will you be considered a man of learning ; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you have read Archedemus f also, you have everything [that you can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you should not show us who you are ? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us that you are ? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with every- thing, blaming everybody, never quiet, vain : this is what you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Arche- demus ; then if a mouse should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. P'or such a death awaits you as it did what was the man's name ? Crinis ; \ and he too was proud, because he understood Archedemus. *To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the greatest contempt for him. t As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, n. * Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of fright. EPfCTETUS. 22 i Wretch, will you not dismiss these thing's that do not concern you at all ? These things are suitable to those who are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who can say: "I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy : I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What re- mains for me ? I have leisure, I am tranquil : let us see how we must deal with sophistical arguments;* let us see how when a man has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to anything absurd." To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine ; if they choose, both to sing and to ;lance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails, f CHAPTER III. WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTICE OURSELVES. THE material for the wise and good man is his own rul- ing faculty : and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons) ; the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nat- ure : and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense * See this chapter above. t The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those only who are free from disturbing passions and arc quite happy, which is not the philosopher's condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, ami at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless lahor ot hoisting the sail*. 222 KP/CTJiTUS. as to that which is uncertain ; so it is its nature to be moved toward the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil ; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money- changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar's coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not. he must give up what is sold for the coin ; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts to. itself ; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject the mani- fest appearance of the good, any more than persons will reject Caesars coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man and God.* For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relation- ship between me and my father, but there is between me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted ? Yes, for such is my nature; and this is the coin which Cod has given me. For this reason if the good is something different from the beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neg- lected), and brother and country, and everything. But shall I overlook my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you ? Why ? 1 am your father. But you are not my good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. But if we place the good in a right determination of the will, the very observance of the relations of life is good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of broth- erly affection ? For who will eject you from this posses- sion ? Not even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so ; * Comp. i. 19, ii. EFICTETUS. 223 but he has made this in my own power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it himself, free from hin- drance, compulsion, and impediment. When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if a man presents this coin, he receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that there comes into the province a thievish pro- consul, what coin does he use ? Silver coin. Show it to him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is an adulterer, what coin does he use ? Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy [what you want]. Another is eager to possess boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. Another is fond of hunting : give him a fine nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, he will sell for it that which you want. For another compels him from within, he who has fixed (determined) this coin.* Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you see, every man whom you hear ; answer as to a question. What have you seen ? A handsome man or woman ? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or dependent ? Independent. Take it away. What have you seen * Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to tlie Romans, vii. 21-23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly ; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be car- ried away by the passion which rules him. The "another" who lomp'jl-s is God, Schweig. .--ays, who has made the nature of man such, that he must po- rvthing else to do that thing in which he places his Good: and he adds, that it is a man's fault if he places his good in that thing, in which God has not placed it. Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is "compelled and allows himself to be carried away," etc. The notion of " compulsion " ii incon- sistent with the extrci.-e of the will. The man is unlurky. He is like him "who sees," as the Latin poet says, "the better things and ap- proves of them, but follows the worse." man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. lias the proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a proconsul's office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it? Independent. Take this away also : it does not stand examination : cast it away : it is nothing to you. If we practiced this and exercised ourselves in it daily form morning to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half-asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched : he has nothing to eat. We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting ? Opinion. What is bad fortune ? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling ? All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with gid- diness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are con- founded, but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed ; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are restored. EP1CTETUS. 225 CHAPTER IV. AGAINST A PERSON WHO SHOWED HIS PARTISANSHIP IN AN UNSEEMLY WAY IN A THEATER. THE governor of Kpirus having shown his favor to an actor in an unseemly way and being publicly blamed on this account, and afterward having reported to Epictetus that he was blamed and that he was vexed at those who blamed him, Epictetus said, What harm have they been doing ? These men also were acting as partisans, as you were doing. The governor replied, Does then any person show his partisanship in this way ? When they see you, said Epictetus, who are their governor, a friend of Caesar and his deputy, showing partisanship in this way, was it not to be expected that they also should show their parti- sanship in the same way ? for if it is not right to show partisanship in this way, do not do so yourself ; and if it is right, why are you angry if they followed your example ? For whom have the many to imitate except you, who arc their superiors ? to whose example should they look- when they go to the theater except yours ? See how the deputy of Caesar looks on : he has cried out, and I too then will cry out. He springs up from his seat, and I will spring up. His slaves sit in various parts of the theater and call out. I have no slaves, but I will myself cry out as much as I can and as loud as all of them to- gether. You ought then to know when you enter the theater that you enter as a rule and example to the rest how they ought to look at the acting. Why then did they blame you ? Because every man hates that which 226 BP/CTS7VS. is a hindrance to him. They wished one person to be crowned; you wished another. They were a hindrance to you, and you were a hindrance to them. You were found to be the stronger ; and they did what they could ; they blamed that which hindered them. What then would you have ? That you should do what you please, and they should not even say what they please ? And what is the wonder ? Do not the husbandmen abuse Zeus when they are hindered by him ? do not the sailors abuse him ? do they ever cease abusing Cassar ? What then ? does not Zeus know ? is not what is said reported to Csesar? What then does he do? he knows that, if he punished all who abuse him, he would have nobody to rule over. What then ? when you enter the theater, you ought to say not, Let Sophron (some actor) be crowned, but you ought to say this, Come let me maintain my will in this matter so that it shall be conformable to nature : no man is dearer to me than myself. It would be ridicu- lous then for me to be hurt (injured) in order that another who is an actor may be crowned. Whom then do I wish to gain the prize ? Why the actor who does gain the prize ; and so he will always gain the prize whom I wish to gain it. But I wish Sophron to be crowned. Celebrate as many games as you choose in your own house. Ne- mean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympian, and proclaim him victor. But in public do not claim more than your due, nor attempt to appropriate to yourself what belongs to all. If you do not consent to this, bear being abused : for when you do the same as the many, you put yourself on the same level with thsm. EPICTETUS. 22? CHAPTER V. AGAINST THOSE WHO ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS GO AWAY HOMK. I AM sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish to return home. At home, I suppose, you were free from sickness. Do you not consider whether you are doing; anything here which may be useful to the exercise of your will, that it may be corrected ? For if you are doing nothing toward this end, it was to no purpose that you came. Go away. Look after your affairs at home. For if your ruling power cannot be maintained in a state con- formable to nature, it is possible that your land can, that you will be able to increase your money, you will take care of your father in his old age, frequent the public place, hold magisterial office : being bad you will do badly anything else that you have to do. But if you un- derstand yourself, and know that you are casting away certain bad opinions and adopting others in their place, and if you have changed your state of life from things which are not within your will to things which are within your will, and if you ever say, Alas ! you are not saying what you say on account of your father, or your brother, but on account of yourself, do you still allege your sick- ness ? Do you not know that both disease and death must surprise us while we are doing something? the husband- man while he is tilling the ground, the sailor while he is on his voyage? what would you be doing when death sur- prises you, for you must be surprised when you are doing something ? If you can be doing anything better than this \vhcn you arc surprised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by disease or death when I am looking after nothing else than my own will, that I may be free from perturbation, that I may be free from hindrance, free from compulsion, and in a state of liberty. I wish to be found practicing these things that I may be able to say to God, Have I in any respect trangressed thy commands ? have I in any respect wrongly used the powers which thou gavest me ? have I misused my perceptions or my preconceptions ? * have I ever blamed thee ? have I ever found fault with thy administration ? I have been sick, because it was thy will, and so have others, but I was content to be sick. I have been poor because it was thy will, but I was content also. I have not filled a magisterial office, because it was not thy pleasure that I should : I have never desired it. Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discontented ? have I not always approached thee with a cheerful counte- nance, ready to do thy commands and to obey thy signals? Is it now thy will that I should depart from the assem- blage of men ? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy ad- ministration. May death surprise me while I am think- ing of these things, while I am thus writing and reading. But my mother will not hold my head when I am sick. Go to your mother then ; for you are a fit person to have your head held when you are sick. But at home I used to lie down on a delicious bed. Go away to your bed : indeed you are fit to lie on such a bed even when you are in health : do not then lose what you can do there (at home). But what does Socrates say ? f As one man, he says, On "preconceptions," see i. 2. t Xenophon (Memorab. i. 6, 14); but Epictetus does not quote the words, he only gives the meaning. Antoninus (vjii. 43) say.-,, " Different El'/CTKTl'S. 229 is pleased with improving his land, another with improv- ing his horse, so I am daily pleased in observing; that I am growing better. Better in what ? in using nice little words ? Man, do not say that. In little matters of speculation ? what are you saying ? And indeed I do not see what else there is on which philosophers employ their time. Does it seem nothing to you to have never found fault with any person, neither with God nor man ? to have blamed nobody ? to carry the same face always in going out and coming in ? This is what Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he knew anything or taught any- thing. * But if any man asked for nice little words or lit- tle speculations, he would carry him to Protagoras or to Hippias ; and if any man came to ask for pot-herbs, he would carry him to the gardener. Who then among you has this purpose (motive to action) ? for if indeed you had it, you would both be content in sickness, and in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true, f things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the thing?, which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes, and using everything according to its value." * Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous l>y imitating his example. (Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2,3.) t Upton explains this passage thus : "He who loves knows what it is to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers, and even death, what would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Universal, the chief of beautiful things? " 230 EP1CTETUS. CHAPTER VI. MISCELLANEOUS. WHEN some person asked him how it happened that since reason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the progress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he answered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the progress greater then ? For in that in which it has now been more cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. At present it has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving syllo- gisms, and progress is made. But in former times it was cultivated for the purpose of maintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to nature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are different, and do not expect when you are laboring at one thing to make progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent upon this, the keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and living so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a man. The good man is invincible, for he does not enter the contest where he is not stronger. If you (his adversary) want to have his land and all that is on it. take the land ; take his slaves, take his magisterial office, take his poor body. But you will not make his desire fail in that which it seeks, nor his aversion fall into that which he would avoid. The only contest into which he enters is that about things which are within the power of his will ; how then will he not be invincible ? Some person having asked him what is Common sense, 231 :etus replied. As that may be called a certain Common hearing which only distinguishes vocal sounds, and that which distinguishes musical sounds is not Common, but artificial ; so there are certain things which men, who are not altogether perverted, see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named Common sense. It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for neither is it easy to hold (soft) cheese with a hook. * But those who have a good natural disposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason. Wherefore Rufus f generally attempted to discourage (his pupils), and he used this method as a test of those who had a good natural disposition and those who had not. For it was his habit to say, as a stone, if you cast it upward, will be brought down to the earth by its own nature, so the man whose mind is naturally good, the more you repel him, the more he turns toward that to which he is naturally inclined. CHAPTER VII. TO T1IK ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FKEK CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN. \YHF.N the administrator \ came to visit him. and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you who are phi- * This was a proverb used by Bion, as Diogenes Laertius says. Th* cheese was new and soft, as the ancients used it. t Rufus is mentioned page 7, note. \ The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs in inscriptions, and else where. 232 EPICTETUS. losophers, * as those who come to a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maxim us f sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh ? When the man said that it was not, and added, Far be that from him. Is it not fit then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best ? It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than the flesh ? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are they better, or the good things of the worse ? The good things of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or not within the pou < i oi the will ' They are within the power of the will 1-. then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the pou the will ? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But that cannot be con- ceived : for there must first exist a certain substance or nature of good, by obtaining which we shall have pleas- ure in the soul. Pie assented to this also. On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul ? for if it * The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them were arrogant men. See what is said of them in Cicero's De Nuturu Deorum, i. 8. Schweig. t Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, in which he lost his life. Dion Cassius, ii. 1 108, iu(>, Reimarus. Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the sea, and between Pandosia and Nicopolis, where Epictetus lived. KPJCTKTl'S. 233 shall depend on things of the soul, the substance (nature) of the good is discovered ; for good cannot be one thing, and that at which \ve are rationally delighted another thing ; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what is incon- sistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the body : and again that those bodily things must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the good. For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh, that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts foolishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when he is a judge and able to take it. But, if you please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know it. For not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad.* but he admits that detection is ; and because it is impossible to have security against detection, for this reason he says, Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done cleverly and cautiously, we shall not be detected : further also we have powerful friends in Rome both men and women, and the Hellenes (Greeks) are weak, and no man will venture to go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do you refrain from your own good? This is senseless, foolish. But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe you. For as it is impossible to assent to that which appears false, * Diogenes I.aertius (x. 151), quoted by Upton. "Injustice," says Epicurus, " is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on account of suspicion." 234 //. , and to turn away from that which is true, M> it is impos- sible to abstain from that which appears good. But wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in producing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth And why should we not corrupt our neighbor's wife, if we can do it without detection ? and if the husband foolishly prates about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house ? If you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a perfect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines [you must act thus]. If you would not. you will not differ at all from us who are called Stoics ; for we also say one thing, but we do another : we talk of the things which are beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practicing what is good. In the name of God,* are you thinking of a city of Epicurean.^ ? [< >ne man says], ' I do not marry." "Xor I, for a man ought not to marry ; nor ought we to beget children, nor engage in public matters. " What then will happen? whence will the citizens come ? who will bring them up ? who will be governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exercises ? and in what also will the teacher instruct them ? will he teach them what the Lace- daemonians were taught, or what the Athenians were taught ? Come take a young man, bring him up accord- ing to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becoming to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief city : it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to abstain from that which belongs to others ; no woman ought to seem beautiful to you except your own wife, and 110 youth, no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold (except * Upton compares the passage (v. 333) in the Cyclops of Euripides, who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage in public affairs were Epicurean doctrines. See Epictetus, i. 23, 3 and 6. /:/ v (// / Y '.v. 235 your own). Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have such per- suasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as this which helps to push us on toward them and strengthens us to this end, what will be the conse- quence? In a piece of toreutic* art which is the In-si part ? the silver or the workmanship ? The substance of and is the flesh : but the work of the hand is the p.aicipal part (that which precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three : those which are directed toward the existence of a thing ; those which are directed toward its existence in a particular kind ; and third, the chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things). What are these? Engaging in public business, marrying, begetting children, vener- ating God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires, aversions, pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do these things, and ac- cording to our nature. And how are we constituted by nature ? Free, noble, modest : for what other animal blushes ? what other is capable of receiving the appear- ance (the impression) of shame ? and we are so con- stituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these things, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, in order that it may keep us constant in cicLn which are conformable to nature. But I am rich and I want nothing. Why then do you pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your sil- ver vessels are enough for you. What need have you of principles (opinions) ? But I am also a judge of the * The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material. 23'') EPICTETUS. (irt-i'ks. Do you know ho\v to judge ? Who taught you to know ? Ca;sar wrote to me a codicil.* Let him write and give you a commission to judge of music ; and what will be the use of it to you ? Still how did you become a judge ? whose hand did you kiss ? the hand of Symphorus or Xumenius? Before whose bedchamber have you slept ? t To whom have you sent gifts ? Then do you not see that to be a judge is just of the same value as Xumenius is? But 1 can throw into prison any man whom I please. So you can do with a stone. But I can beat with sticks whom I please. So you may an ass. This is not a governing of men. Govern us as rational animals : show us what is profitable to us, and we will follow it : show us what is unprofitable, and we will turn away from it. Make us imitators of yourself, as Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like a gov- ernor of men, who made them subject to him their desires, their aversion, their movements toward an object and their turning away from it. Do this : do not do this : if you do not obey, I will throw you into prison. This is not governing men like rational animals. But I (say) : As Zeus has ordained, so act : if you do not act so, you *A " codicillus *' is a small "codex," and the original sense of " codex " is a strong stem or stump. Lastly, it was used for a book, and even for a will. "Codicilli" were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codi- cillus is a book or writing generally ; and a writing or letter by which the emperor conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament; but this sense is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Dig. 29, tit. 7, de jure codicillorum.) t Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you ? and he compares i. 19. But Schweig. says that this is not the meaning here, and that the meaning is this : He who before daybreak is waiting at the door of a rich man, whose favor he seeks, is said in a derisive way to be passing the night before a man's chamber. EPICTETUS. 337 will feel the penalty, you will be punished. What will be the punishment ? Nothing else than not having done your duty : you will lose the character of fidelity, mod- esty, propr ty. Do not look for greater penalties than these. CHAPTER VIII. HOW WK MTST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES. As WE exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appear- ances ; for these appearances also propose questions to us. A certain person's son is dead. Answer ; the thing is not within the power of the will : it is not an evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think of it ? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil Caesar has condemned a person. It is a thiiif !< yond the power of the will, not ui. evil 'i !' man is afflicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends on the will : it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. That is a thing within the power of the will : it is a good. If we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress ; for we shall never assent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being com- prehended. Vour son is dead. What lias happened - Your son is dead. Nothing more ? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened.- Your ship is lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened ? He has lieeii led to prison. lint that herein he has fared badly. every man adds from h!^ own opinion. Hut Zeus, vou say, does not do ri^ht in these matters. Why lieeau-e he lias made Vou capable of endurance: l>ivau>e he has EPJCTETUS. :n:ul.' you magnanimous? Because he has taken from that which befalls you the power of being evils ? because it is in your power to be happy while you arc suffering- what you suffer ; because he has opened the door to you, when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not com- plain. Hear how the Romans feel toward philosophers, if you would like to know. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, once when I was present being vexed with his own friends and as if he was suffering something' intolerable said, " I cannot bear it, you are killing me : you will make me such as that man is ; " pointing to me. CHAPTER JX. TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON A SUIT. WHKN a certain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a suit which had regard to his rank. Epictetus inquired the reason of his going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the mat- ter. Epictetus replied, If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no rule about this. But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you : if you have right opinions, you will fare well : if they are false, you will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For what is the reason why you desired to be elected gov ernor of the Cnossians ? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome? Your opinion. And going in win- ter, and with danger and expense, i must go. What EPICTETUS. ^39 you this ? Your opinion. Then if opinio; causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the cause may be, such also is the effect. Have we then ail sound opinions, both you and your adver- sary ? And how do you differ ? But have you sounder opinions than your adversary ? Why ? You think so. And so does he think that his opinions are better : and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your opinions and have taken some pains about them. And as now you are sailing to Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and you are not content to stay at home with the honors which you had, but you desire something greater and more conspicuous, so when did you ever make a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and casting them out, if you have any that are bad? Whom have you approached for this purpose ? What time have you fixed for it? What age ? Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are ashamed of me (knowing the fact) when you were a boy, did you examine your own opinions ? and did you not then, as you do all things now. do as you did do ? and when you were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and yourself practiced rhet- oric, what did you imagine that you were deficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged in public matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gaining reputation, who then seemed your equal? And when would you have submitted to any man examining and showing that your opinions cire bad ? What then do you wish me to say to you? Help me in this matter. I have no theorem (rule) for this. Nor have you, if you come to me for this purpose, come to me as a philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what pur- pose then have philosophers theorems ? For this purpose, that whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and 240 continue to be conformable to nature. Docs this seem to you a small thing? No; but the greatest. What then? does it need only a short time ? and is it possible to seize it as you pass by ? If you can. seize it. Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone or a statue : for you saw me, and noth- ing more. But he meets with a man as a man, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn my opinions : show me yours ; and then say that you have visited me. Let us examine one another : if I have any bad opinion, take it away ; if you have any, .show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher. Not so (you say) : but this is only a passing visit, and while we are hiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. Then you go away and say : Epictetus was nothing: he used solecisms and spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges ? Well, but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), I shall have no land, as you have none ; I shall have no silver cups as you have none, nor fine beasts as you have none In answer to this it is perhaps sufficient to say : I have no need of such things : but if you possess many things, you have need of others : whether you choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have 1 need of? Of that which you have not : of firmness, of a mind which is conformable to nature, of being free from perturbation. Whether I have a patron * or not, what is that to me ? but it is something to you. I am richer than you : I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me : for this reason. I flatter no man. This is what I possess instead of vessels of silver and gold. You have utensils of gold ; but your discourse, your opinions, your assents, your movements (pursuits), your desires are of earthen * The Roman word "patronus," which at that time had the sense of a protector. Kl'IC 77-: 7T.V. 241 ware. But when I have these things conformable to nature, why should I not employ my studies also upon reason ? for I have leisure : my mind is not distracted. What shall I do, since I have no distraction ? What more suitable to a man have I than this ? When you have nothing; to do, you are disturbed, you go to the theater or you wander about without a purpose. Why should not the philosopher labor to improve his reason ? You em- ploy yourself about crystal vessels: I employ myself about the syllogism named the lying : * you about myr- rhine f vessels ; I employ myself about the syllogism named the denying. To you everything appears small that you possess : to me all that I have appears great. Your desire is insatiable : mine is satisfied. To (children) who put their hand into a narrow-necked earthen vessel and bring out figs and nuts, this happens ; if they fill the hand, they cannot take it out, and then they cry. Drop a few of them and you will draw things out. And do you part with your desires : do not desire many things and you will have what you want. * On the syllogism named "lying" see Epict. ii. 17, 34. t "Murrhina vasa" were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they were made. Pliny (xxxvii. c. 2) has something about them. 16 242 KPICTETUS. CHAPTER X. IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BKAR SICKNKSS. WHEN the need of each opinion comes, we ought to have it in readiness : * on the occasion of breakfast, such opinions as relate to breakfast ; in the bath, those that concern the bath ; in bed, those that concern bed. Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes Before each daily action thou hast scann'd ; What's done amiss, what done, what left undone; From first to last examine all, and then Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice.t And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim ' : Paean Apollo. "J Again in fever we should have ready such opinions as concern a fever ; and we ought not, as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. (A man who has a fever) may say : If I philosophize any longer, may I be hanged : wherever I * M. Antoninus, iii. 13. "As physicians have always their instru- ments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine ; nor the contrary." I These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to Pythagoras. See iv. 6, 32. \ The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Sat. i. 17 : " namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant : Apollo Maedice, Apollo Paean." 243 go, I must take care of the pour bod}', that a fever may not come. But what is philosophizing? Is it not a preparation against events which may happen . : Do you not understand that you are saying something of thi.: kind? "If I shall still prepare myself to bear with patience what happens, may I be hanged." But this is just as if a man after receiving blows should give up the Pancratium. In the Pancratium it is in our power to desist and not to receive blows. But in the other matter if we give up philosophy, what shall we gain ? What then should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing ? It was for this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. God says to you. (me me a proof that you have duly practiced athletics, that you have eaten what you ought, that you have been exercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler and rubber). Then do you show yourself weak when the time for action comes ? Now is the time for the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well : now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your power? who shall hinder you ? The physician will hinder you from drinking ; but he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well : and he will hinder you from eating ; but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger well. But I cannot attend to my philosophical studies. And for what purpose do you follow them ? Slave, is it not that you may be happy, that you may be constant, is it not that you may be in a state conformable to nature and live so? What hinders you when you have a fever from having your ruling faculty conformable to nature ? Here is the proof of the thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of life, like walking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is fever. Do you read when you are walking ? No. Nor do you when you have a fever. But if you walk about well, you have ail that be- 244 longs to a man who walks. If you bear fever well, you have all that belongs to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well ? Not to blame God or man ; not to be afflicted at that which happens, to expect death well and nobly, to do what must be done : when the physician comes in, not to be frightened at what he says ; nor if he says, "you are doing well,"* to be overjoyed. For what good has he told you? and when you were in health, what good was that to you ? And even if he says, " you are in a bad way," do not despond. For what is it to be ill ? is it that you are near the severance of the soul and the body? what harm is there in this? If you are not near now, will you not afterward be near? Is the world going to be turned upside down when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the physician ? f Why do you say if you please, master, I shall be well ? J Why do you give him an opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud ; or showing his importance) ? Do you not value a physician, as you do a shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is building your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is not yours, but by nature dead ? He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this : if he does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to look after these externals, neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling power. But as to externals how must he act ? so far as not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for fear ? where is there then still reason for anger, and of fear about what belongs to others, about things which are * See ii. 18, 14. t Et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere monies ? Persius, iii. 65. Craterus was a physician. J Upton compares Matthew, viii. 2. " Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean." i-.iTs. 245 of no value? For \vc ought to have these t\vo principles in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad : and that \ve ought not to lead events, but to follow them.* My brother ought not to have behaved thus to me. No ; but he will see to that : and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself toward him as I ought. For this is my own business: that belongs to another; no man can prevent this, the other thing can be hindered. CHAPTER XI. CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS. THERE are certain penalties fixed as by law for those who disobey the divine administration. f Whoever thinks any other thing to be good except those things which de- pend on the will, let him envy, let him desire, let him flatter, let him be perturbed : whoever considers anything else to bo evil, let him grieve, let him lament, let him weep let him be unhappy. And yet, thoiu ; . erely punished, we cannot desist. Remember what the poet f says about the stranger : Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come. * To this Stoic precept Horace (Epict. i. i, 19) opposes that of Aris- tippus. Kt mila res, non me rebus, subjungere conor. both wisely said, if they are rightly taken. t " As to the divine law, see iii. 24, 32, and Xenophon's Memorabilia, iv. 4. 21," etc. Upton. } The poet is Homer. The complete passage is in the Odyssey, xiv. v. 55, etc. Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man torn* I'll treat a stranger, for all come from Zeus, Stranger* and poor. 246 This then may be applied even to a father : I must not. even if a worse man than you should come, treat a father unworthily : for all are from paternal Zeus. And (let the same be said) of a brother, for all are from the Zeus who presides over kindred. And so in the other relations of life we shall find Zeus to be an inspector. CHAPTER XII. ABOUT E X K R C I S K. WK ought not to make our exercises consist in means contrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for if we do so, we who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. For it is difficult even to walk on a rope ; and not only difficult, but it is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practice walking on a rope, or setting up a palm tree.* or embracing statues ? By no means. Everything which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for practice : but that is suitable which con- duces to the working out of that which is proposed to us * ' To set up a palm tree." He does not mean a real palm tree, but something high and upright. The climbers of palm trees are mentioned by I.ucian, de Dea .Syria (c. 29). Schweig. has given the true inter- pretation when he says that on certain feast days in the country a high piei-e of \\ood is fixed in the earth and climbed by the most active youths by using only their hands and feet. In England we know what this is. It is said that Diogenes used to embrace statues when they were covered with snow for the purpose of exercising himself. I suppose bronze statues, not marble, which might be easily broken. The man would not remain long in the embrace of a metal statue in winter. But perhaps the story is not true. I have heard of a general, not an English general, setting a soldier on a cold cannon; but it was a.- a punishment. /://(' /7-yrs. as a thin;^ to be worked out. To live with desire and aversion (avoidance of certain things) free from restraint. And what is this ? Neither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into anything which you would avoid. Toward this object then exercise (practice) ought to tend. For since it is not possible to have your desire not disappointed and your aversion free from fall- ing into that which you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you must know that if you allow your desire and aversion to turn to things which are not within the power of the will, you will neither have your desire capable of attaining your object, nor your aversion free from the power of avoiding that which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads (prevails), and we are accus- tomed to employ desire and aversion only to things which are not within the power of our will, we ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. I am rather inclined to pleasure : I will incline to the contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise. I am averse to pain : I will rub and exercise against this the appearances which are presented to me for the purpose of withdrawing my aversion from every such thing. For who is a practitioner in exercise? He who practices not using his desire, and applies his aversion only to things which are within the power of his will, and practices most in the things which are difficult to conquer. For this reason one man must practice himself more against one thing and an- other against another thing. What then is it to the pur- pose to set up a palm tree, or to carry about a tent of skins, or a mortar and a pestle ? Practice, man, if you are irritable, to endure if you are abused, not to be vexed if you are treated with dishonor. Then you will make so much progress that, even if a man strikes you you will . 4 S EPICTETUS. say to yourself, Imagine that you have embraced a statue : then also exercise yourself to use wine properly so as not to drink much, for in this also there are men who foolishly practice themselves ; but first of all you should abstain from it, and abstain from a young girl and dainty cakes. Then at last, if occasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself at a proper time you will descend into the arena to know if appearances overpower you as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself: the contest is unequal between a charm- ing young girl and a beginner in philosophy. The earthen pitcher, as the saying is, and the rock do not agree.* After the desire and the aversion comes the second topic (matter) of the movements toward action and the with- drawals from it ; that you may be obedient to reason, that you do nothing out of season or place, or contrary to any propriety of the kind. The third topic concerns the assents, which is related to the things which are persuasive and attractive. For as Socrates said, we ought not to live a life without examination, f so we ought not to accept an appearance without examination, but we should say, Wait, let me see what you are and whence you come ; like the watch at night (who says) Show me the pass (the Roman tessera). Have you the signal from nature which the appearance that may be accepted ought to have ? And finally whatever means are applied to the body by those who exercise it, if they tend in any way toward desire and aversion, they also may be fit means of exercise ; but if they are for display, they are the indications of one who has turned himself toward something external and who is hunting for something else and who looks for spectators who will say, Oh the great man. For this reason, Apol- * There is a like fable in .flisop of the earthen pitcher and the brazen. Upton. * See i. 26, 18, and iii. 2, 5. /. TIC 7'/;/T.V. 219 lonius said well, When you intend to exercise yourself for your own advantage, and you are thirsty from heat, take in a mouthful of cold water, and spit it out and tell nobody.* CHAPTER XIII. WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLITARY MAN IS. SOLITUDE is a certain condition of a helpless man. For Itecause a man is alone, he is not for that reason also soli- tary ; just as though a man is among numbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to repose, we say that we arc left solitary, though we are often in Rome, though such a crowd meet us, though so many live in the same place, and sometimes we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless person and exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this reason when we travel, then especially do we say that we are lonely when we fall among robbers, for it is not the sight of a human creature which removes us from solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and helpful to us. For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may say that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration * * Schweighaeuser refers to Arrian's Expedition of Alexander (vi. 26) for such an instance of Alexander's abstinence. There was an Apollo- nius of Tyana. whose life was written by Philostratus : but it may be that this is not the man who is mentioned here. t This was the doctrine of Heraclitus, " that all things were composed from (had their origin in) fire, and were resolved into it," an opinion after- ward adopted by the Stoics. It is not so extravagant, as it may appear and bewails himself saying, Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son. nor descendant, nor kinsman. This is what some say that he does when he is alone at the conflagration.* For they do not understand how a man passes his life when ho is alone, because they set out from a certain natural principle, from the natural desire of community and mutual love and from the pleasure of conversation among men. But none the less a man ought to be prepared in a manner for this also (being alone), to be able to be suffi- cient for himself and to be his own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil by himself, and thinks of his own administration and of its nature, and is employed in thoughts suitable to himself: so ought we also to be able to talk with ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not to be unprovided with the means of passing our time; to observe the divine administration, and the relation of ourselves to everything else : to con- sider how we formerly were affected toward things that happen and how at present ; what are still the things which give us pain ; how these also can be cured and how to some persons, to suppose that the earth had a beginning, is in a state of continual change, and will finally be destroyed in some way, and have a new beginning. See Seneca, Ep. 9 : " cum resolute mundo, diis in unum confusis, paulisper cessante natura, adquiescit sibi Jupiter, cogitationibus suis traditus.'' * The Latin translation is : " hoc etiam nonnulli facturum eum in conflagratione inundi .... aiunt." But the word here may mean that the conflagration has happened, and will happen again. The Greek philosophers in their speculations were not troubled with the considera- tion of time. Even Herodotus (ii. 11), in his speculations on the gulf, which he supposes that the Nile valley was once, speaks of the possibility of it being filled up in 20,000 years, or less. Modern speculators have only recently become bold enough to throw aside the notion of the earth and the other bodies in space being limited by time, as the ignorant have conceived it. EFICTETUS. ^51 removed : if any things require improvement, to improve them according to reason. For you see thatCrcsar appears to furnish vis with great peace, that there are no longer enemies nor battles nor great associations of robbers nor of pirates, but we can travel at every hour and sail from east to west. But can ' give us security from fever also, can he from ship- wreck, from fire, from earthquake or from lightning? well, I will say, can he give us security against love ? He cannot. From sorrow? He cannot. From envy? lie cannot. In a word then he cannot protect us from any of these things. But the doctrine of philosophers promises to give us security (peace) even against these things. And what does it say? Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing, you will not feel sor- row, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations and free from everything. When a/man has this peace, not proclaimed by Ccesar (for how should he be able to proclaim it ?), but by God through reason, is he not content when he is alone ? when he sees and reflects, Now no evil can hap- pen to me ; for me there is no robber, no earthquake, everything is full of peace, full of tranquillity : every way, every city, every meeting, neighbor, companion is harm- less. One person whose business it is, supplies me with food ; * another with raiment : another with perceptions, and preconceptions (irpoX^ns). And if he does not supply what is necessary, he (God) gives the signal for retreat, opens the door, and says to you, Go. Go whither? To nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came. t<> your friends and kinsmen, to the elements :f what * See iii. i, 43. t "What a melancholy description of ^eath and how gloomy the ideas in this cctiso/a/t'ry chapter ! All beiifgs reduced to mere elements in successive conflagrations ! A noble contrast to the Stoic notions ou 2-' EPICTETUS. I'KOCKKI) WITIf rlKCC.MSPKCTION' TO EVERYTHING.* I.\ every act consider what precedes and what follows, and then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you will at first begin with spirit, since you have not thought at ail of the things which follow : but afterward when some consequences have shown tnemselves, you will basely desist Itrom that which you have begun). I wish to conquer at the < Hympic games. [And I too, by the gods : for it is a fine thing.] But consider here what pre- and what follows : and then, if it is for your good, undertake the thing. You must act according to rules, follow strict diet, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself by compulsion at fixed times, in heat, in cold : drink 'Id water, nor wine, when there is opportunity of drinking it. t in a word you must surrender yourself to mpaiv Kncheiriclion 29. " This chapter has a great conformity to Luke xiv. 28. rir. Hut it is to lie observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some persons incapable of being philosophers; that is, virtuous and pious men : but Christianity requires and enables all to be such." Mrs. Carter. The passage in Luke contain* ;i pr.n ;i..il . and so far is the same as the teaching of Kpictetus : but the con- clusion in v. 33 does not appear to 1; lu-lped by what immediately pre- cedes v. 21^-32. The remark that Christianity "enables all to be such " is not true, unless Mrs. Carter gives to the word "enables" a meanini; which I do not t The commentators refer us t,. Paul, i Cor. c. 0,25. Compare Horace, Ari Poetica. te diu quid fenr recusent, Ouicl valiant luuneri. the trainer, as you do to a physician. Next in the contest, you must be covered with sand, sometimes dislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity of dust, be scourged with the whip ; and after undergoing all this, you must sometimes be conquered After reckoning all these things, if you have still an inclination, go to the athletic practice. If you do not reckon them, observe you will behave like children who at one time play as wres- tlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a tragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So you also do : you are at one time a wrestler (athlete), then a gladiator, then a philosopher, then a rhetorician ; but with your whole soul you are nothing : like the ape you imitate all that you see ; and always one thing after another pleases you, but that which becomes familiar displeases you. For you have never undertaken anything after consideration, nor after having explored the whole matter and put it to a strict examination ; but you have undertaken it at hazard and with a cold desire. Thus some persons having seen a philosopher and having heard one speak like Euphrates * and yet who can speak like him ? wish to be philosophers themselves. Man, consider first what the matter is (which you pro- pose to do), then your own nature also, what it is able to bear. If you are a wrestler, look at your shoulders, your thighs, your loins : for different men are naturally formed for different things. Do you think that, if you do (what you are doing daily), you can be a philosopher ? Do you think that you can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same way be angry and out of humor ? You must watch, labor, conquer certain desires, you must de- part from your kinsmen, be despised by your slave, * The younger Pliny (i. Ep. 10) speaks in high terms of the merits and attractive eloquence of this Syrian philosopher Euphrates, who is men- tioned by M. Antoninus (x. 31) and by others, KP/CTKTUS. -'57 laughed at by those who meet you, in everything you must be in an inferior condition, as to magisterial office, in honors, in courts of justice. When you have considered all these things completely, then, if you think proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in exchange for these things freedom from perturbations, liberty, tran- quillity. If you have not considered these things, do not approach philosophy : do not act like children, at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then a rhetori- cian, then a procurator (officer) of Ca-sar. These things are not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad : you must either labor at your own ruling faculty or at external things : you must either labor at things within, or at external things : that is, you must either occupy the place of a philosopher or that of one of the vulgar. A person said to Rufus * when Galba was murdered, Is the world now governed by Providence ? But Rufus re- plied, Did I ever incidentally form an argument from Galba that the world is governed by Providence ? * Rufus was a philosopher. See i. i, i. 9. Galba is the emperor < ialha, who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter 1 1 or 14, or perhaps to the end of chapter 17. 17 258 EP1CT&TUS. CHAPTER XVI. THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE WITH MEN. IF a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, or drinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must either become like them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a man places a piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning charcoal will light that which is quenched. Since then the danger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such inti- macies with those of the common sort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself. For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men ? Such a person is bad, such a person is good : this was well done, this was done badly. Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition ? Is any man among us pre- pared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as he has touched the strings, he discovers which are discord- ant, and tunes the instrument ? such a power as Socrates had who in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his own purpose ? How should you have this power ? It is therefore a necessary consequence that you are carried about by the common kind of people. Why then are they more powerful than you ? Because they utter these useless words from their real opinions : but you utter your elegant words only from your lips ; for A/'/f 2trt this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your miserable virtue, which is talked of everywhere (up and down). In this way the vulgar have the advantage over you : for every opinion is strong and invincible. Until then the good sentiments are fixed in you, and you shall have acquired a certain power for your security, I advise you to be careful in your association with common persons : if you are not, every day like wax in the sun there will be melted away whatever you inscribe on your minds in the school. With- draw then yourselves far from the sun so long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason also philosophers advise men to leave their native country, because ancient habits distract them and do not allow a beginning to be made of a different habit ; nor can \ve tolerate those who meet us and say : See such a one is now a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also physicians send those who have lingering diseases to a different country and a different air ; and they do right. Do you also introduce other habits than those which you have : fix your opinions and exercise yourselves in them. But you do not so : you go hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, to a place of exercise, to a circus ; then you come back hither, and again from this place you go to those places, and still the same persons. And there is no pleasing (good) habit, nor attention, nor care about self and observation of this kind. Mow shall I use the appear- ances presented to me ? according to nature, or contrary to nature ? how do I answer to them ? as I ought, or as I ought not? Do I say to (hose things which are independ- ent of the will, that they do not concern me? For if you are not yet in this state, tly from your former habits, fly from the common sort, if you intend ever to begin to be something. 260 EPICTETUS. CHAPTER XVII. ON PROVIDENCE. WHKN you make any charge against Providence, con- sider, and you will learn that the thing has happened ac- cording to reason. Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage. In what ? In money. Yes, for he is su- perior to you* in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the wonder ? But see if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, in being modest : for you will not find it to be so : but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because Philos- torgus was fortunate : Would you choose to lie with Sura ? * May it never happen, he replied, that this day should come ? Why then are you vexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells ; or how can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means as you abominate ; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better things to the better men ? Is it not better to be modest than to be rich ? He admitted this. Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the better thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an advantage over the inferior in that in which he is superior ; and you will never be vexed. But my wife treats me badly. Well, if any man asks "."pton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, iv. 53), or Palfurius Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 13). EPICTETUS. you what this is, say. my wife treats me badly. Is there then nothing more? Nothing-. My father gives me noth- ing [What is this ? my father gives me nothing. Is there nothing else then ? Nothing] : but to say that this is an evil is something which must be added to it externally, and falsely added. For this reason \vc must not get rid of poverty, but of the opinion about poverty, and then we shall be happy. CHAPTER XVIII. THAT -WE OUGHT NOT TO BE DISTURBED BY ANY NEWS. WHEN anything shall be reported to you which is of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readiness, that the news is about nothing which is within the power of your will. Can any man report to you that you have formed a bad opinion, or had a bad desire ? By no means. But perhaps he will report that some person is dead. What then is that to you ? He may report that some person speaks ill of you. What then is that to you ? Or that your father is planning something or other. Against whom ? Against your will ? How can he ? But is it against your poor body, against your little property ? You are quite safe : it is not against you. But the judge declares that you have committed an act of impiety. And did not the judges make the same declaration against Socrates? Does it concern you that the judge has made this declaration ? No. Why then do you trouble yourself any longer about it? Your father has a certain duty, and if he shall not fulfill it. he loses the character of a father, of a man of natural affection, of gentleness. Do not wish him to lose anything else on 262 this account. For never does a man do wrong in our thing, and suffer in another. On the other side it is your duty to make your defense firmly, modestly, without anger : but if you do not, you also lose the character of a son, of a maai of modest behavior, of generous character. Well then, is the judge free from danger ? No ; but lie also is in equal danger. Why then are you still afraid of his decision ? What have you to do with that which is another man's evil? It is your own evil to make a bad defense : be on your guard against this only. But to be condemned or not to be condemned, as that is the act of another person, so it is the evil of another person. A certain person threatens you. Me ? No. He blames you. Let him see how he manages his own affairs. lie is going to condemn you unjustly. He is a wretched man. CHAPTER XIX. WHAT IS THE CONDITION' OF A COMMON KIND OF MAN AND OF A PHILOSOPHER. THE first difference between a common person and a philosopher is this : the common person says, Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for my father.* The philosopher, if he shall ever be compelled to say. Woe tome, stops and says, "but for myself." For nothing which is independent of the will can hinder or damage the will, and the will can only hinder or damage itself. If then we ourselves incline in this direction, so as, when .re unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember that nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of tran- * Compare iii. 5, 4. EPfCTETUS. 263 quillity except our o\vn opinion, I swear to you l>y ail the gods that we have made progress. But in the pi state of affairs we have gone another way from the be- ginning. For example, while we were still children, the nurse, if we ever stumbled through want of care, did not chide us, but would beat the stone. But what did the stone do ? Ought the stone to have moved on account of your child's folly ? Again, if we find nothing to eat on coming out of the bath, the pedagogue never checks our appetite, but he flogs the cook. Man, did we make you the ped- agogue of the cook and not of the child ? Correct the child, ^improve him. In this way even when we are grown up we are like children. For he who is unmusi- cal is a child in music ; he who is without letters is a child in learning : he who is untaught, is a child in life. CHAPTER XX. THAT WF, CAN DF.RIVK ADVAXT.UJK FROM AI.I, KXTF.RXA1, THINGS. IN the case of appearances which are objects of the vision, nearly all have allowed the good and the evil to be in ourselves, and not in externals. Xo one gives the name of good to the fact that it is day, nor bad to the fact that it is night, nor the name of the greatest evil to the opinion that three are four. But what do men say : They say that knowledge is good, and that error is bad ; so that even in respect to falsehood itself ther >od result, the knowledge that it is falsehood. So it ought to be in life also. Is health a good thing, and is sickness a bad thing? No, man. .But what is it .' To be healthy, and healthy in 264. KPICTETUS. a right way. is good : to be healthy in a bad way is bad ; so that it is possible to gain advantage even from sickness, I declare. For is it not possible to gain advantage even from death, and is it not possible to gain advantage from mutilation ? Do you think that Menceceus gained little by death? * Could a man who says so, gain so much as Menoeceus gained? Come, man, did he not maintain the character of being a lover of his country, a man of great mind, faithful, generous ? And if he had continued to live, would he not have lost all these things ? would he not have gained the opposite ? would he not have gained the name of coward, ignoble, a hater of his country, a man who feared death ? Well, do you think that he gained little by dying ? I suppose not. But did the father of Admetus t gain much by prolonging his life so rgnobly and miserably? Did he not die afterward? Cease, I adjure you by the gods, to admire material things. Cease to make yourselves slaves, first of things, then on account of things slaves of those who are able to give them or take them away. n advantage then be derived from these things ? From ail ; and from him who abuses you. Wherein does the man who exercises before the combat profit the athlete ? Very greatly. This man becomes my exerciser before the combat : he exercises me in endurance, in keep- ing my temper, in mildness. You say no : but he, who lays hold of my neck and disciplines my loins and shoul- ders, does me good ; and the exercise master (the aliptes, * Menoeceus, the son of Creon, gave up his life by which he would save his country, as it was declared by an oracle. (Cicero, Tuscul. i c. 48.) Juvenal (Sat. xiv. 238) says Quarum Amor in te Quantus erat patriz Deciorum in pectore ; quantum Dilexit Thebas, si Gnccia, vera, Menoeceus. Euripides, Phoenissa, v. 913. t The father of Admetus was Pheres (Euripides, Alcestis). or oiler) does right when he says : Raise him up with both hands, and the heavier he is, so much the more is my ad- vantage. But if a man exercises me in keeping my tem- per, does he not do me good ? This is not knowing how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbor bad ? Bad to himself, but good to me : he exercises my good disposition, my moderation. Is my father bad ? Bad to himself, but to me good. This is the rod of Hermes : touch with it what you please, as the saying is. and it will be of gold. I say not so : but bring what you please, and I will make it good.* Bring disease, bring death, bring poverty, bring abuse, bring trial on capital charges : all these things through the rod of Hermes shall be made profitable. What will you do with death ? Why, what else than that it shall do you honor, or that it shall show you by act through it, what a man is who follows the will of nature ? What will you do with disease? I will show its nature, I will be conspicuous in it, I will be firm, I will be happy, 1 will not flatter the physician, I will not wish to die. What else do you seek ? Whatever you shall give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, honored, a thing which a man shall seek. You say No : but take care that you do not fall sick : it is a bad thing. This is the same as if you should say, Take care that you never receive the impression (appear- ance) that three are four : that is bad. Man, how is it bad? If I think about it as I ought, how shall it then dome any damage ? and shall it not even do me good ? If then I think about poverty as I ought to do, about disease, about not having oflice, is not that enough for me? will it not be an advantage ? I low then ought I any longer to look to seek * Mrs. Carter quotes the epistle to the Romans (viii. 28): "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God ; " but she quotes only the first part of the verse ami omits the conclusion, " to them who are the called according to his purpose." 266 evil and good in externals? What happens? these doc- trines arc maintained here, but no man carries them away home ; but immediately every one is at war with his slave, with his neighbors, with those who have sneered at him, with those who have ridiculed him. Good luck to Lcsbius,* who daily proves that I know nothing. CHAPTER XXI. AtiAINST THOSK WHO READILY COME TO THE PROFESSION OF SOPHISTS. THEY who have taken up bare theorems immediately wish to vomit them forth, as persons whose stomach is diseased do with food. First digest the thing, then do not vomit it up thus : if you do not digest it, the thirig be- comes truly an emetic, a crude food and unfit to eat. But after digestion show us some change in your ruling fac- ulty, as athletes show in their shoulders by what they have been exercised and what they have eaten ; as those who have taken up certain arts show by what they have learned. The carpenter does not come and say, Hear me talk about the carpenter's art : but having undertaken to build a house, he makes it, and proves that he knows the art. You also ought to do something of the kind ; eat like a man, drink like a man, dress, marry, beget children, do the office of a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an un- reasonable brother, bear with your father, bear .with your * Some abusive fellow, known to some of the hearers of Epictetus. We ought perhaps to understand the words as if it were said, " each of you ought to say to himself, Good luck to Lesbius," etc. Schweig.'s note. 267 son, neighbor, companion.* Show us these things that we may see that you have in truth learned something from the philosophers. You say, No ; but come and hear me read (philosophical) commentaries. Go away, and seek somebody to vomit them on. (He replies') And in- deed I will expound to you the writings of Chrysippus as no other man can : 1 will explain his text more clearly : I will add also, if I can, the vehemence of . \ntipater and Archedemus. t Is it then for this that young men shall leave their country and their parents, that they may come to this place, and hear you explain words? Ought they not to return with a capacity to endure, to be active in associa- tion with others, free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a provision for the journey of life with which they shall be able to bear well the things that happen and derive honor from them : i And how can you give them * The practical teaching of the Stoics is contained in iii. c. 7, and it is good and wise. A modern writer says of modern practice : " If we open our eyes and if we will honestly acknowledge to ourselves what we discover, we shall be compelled to confess that all the life and efforts of the civilized people of our times is founded on a view of the world, which is directly opposed to the view of the world which Jesus had " (Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 74.) t Cicero (Academ. Prior, ii. 47) names Antipater and Archidemus (Archedemus) the chief of dialecticians, and also " opiniosissimi homines." t This passage is one of those which show the great good sense of Epictetus in the matter of education ; and some other remarks to the same effect follow in this chapter. A man might justly say that we have no clear notion of the purpose of education. A modern writer, who seems to belong to the school of Epictetus says : " It cannot be denied thru in all schools of all kinds it ought to be the first and the chief object to make children healthy, good, honest, and, if possible, sensible men and women ; and if this is not done in a reasonable degree, I maintain that the education of these schools is good for nothing. I do not propose to make children good and honest and wise by precepts and dogmas and preaching, as you will see. They must be made good and wise by a 2 r,s i-:nc TK ITS. any of these things which you Jo not possess ? Have you done from the beginning- anything else than employ yourself about the resolution of Syllogisms, of sophistical arguments ( O i jwTaTMrroi>T), and in those which work by questions ? But such a man has a school ; why should not I also have a school ? These things are not done, man, in a careless way, nor just as it may happen ; but there must be a (fit) age and life and God as a guide. You say, No. But no man sails from a port without having sacrificed to the Gods and invoked their help ; nor do men sow without having called on Demeter ; and shall a man who has undertaken so great a work under- take it safely without the Gods? and shall they who un- dertake this work come to it with success ? What else are you doing, man, than divulging the mysteries ? You say, there is a temple at Eleusis, and one here also. There is an Hierophant at Eleusis,* and I also will make an Hierophant : there is a herald, and I will establish a herald ; there is a torch-bearer at Eleusis, and I also will establish a torch-bearer ; there are torches at Eleusis, and I will have torches here. The words are the same : how do the things done here differ from those done there? Most impious man, is there no difference ? these things are done both in due place and in due time ; and when cultivation of the understanding, by the practice of the discipline nec- essary for that purpose, and by the example of him who governs, direct and instructs." Further, " my men and women teachers have something which the others have not : they have a purpose, an end in their system of education ; and what is education ? What is human life without some purpose or end which may be attained by industry, order and the exercise of moderate abilities ? Great abilities are rare, and they are often accompanied by qualities which make the abilities useless to him who has them, and even injurious to society." * There was a great temple of Demeter (Ceres) at Eleusis in Attica, and solemn mysteries, and an Hierophant or conductor of the cere- monies. EPICTETUS. 269 accompanied with sacrifice and prayers, when a man is first purified, and when he is disposed in his mind to the thought that he is going to approach sacred rites and an- cient rites. In this way the mysteries are useful, in this way we come to the notion that all these things were established by the ancients for the instruction and cor- rection of life. But you publish and divulge them out of time, out of place, without sacrifices, without purity ; you have not the garments which the hierophant ought to have, nor the hair, nor the head-dress, nor the voice, nor the age ; nor have you purified yourself as he has : but you have committed to memory the words only and you say : Sacred are the words by themselves.* You ought to approach these matters in another way, the thing is great, it is mystical, not a common thing, nor is it given to every man. But not even wisdom f perhaps * The reader, who has an inclination to compare religious forms an- cient and modern, may find something in modern practice to which the words of Epictetus are applicable. t This is a view of the fitness ot a te^chei which, as lai as I know, t~ .iw; and it is also true Perhaps the; u e notion ot ...d in modem Europe at the time when teachers of youths were only priests, and when it was supposed that their fitness for the office of teacher was secured by their fitness for the office of priest. In the ; i "Ordering of Deaion- " in the Church of England, the person, .vho is proposed as a fit person to be a deacon, is asked the following [iiestion by the bishop: " Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by .he Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration to serve iod for the promotion of his glory and the edifying of his people"'" "In the ordering of Priests" this question is omitted, and another question only is put, which is used also in the ordering of Deacons : " Do you think in your heart that you be truly called, according to th- \vill of our Lord Jesus Christ," etc. The teacher ought to have God t-> him to occupy the office of teacher, as Epictetus says. He dot - not say how God will advise: perhaps he supposed that this ;ul\n,- might be given in the way in which Socrates said that he received ii. Wi.-dom perhaps is not enough " to enable a man to take < youths. \Yhatever " wisdom " may mean, it is true that .1 t<:urhcr -Jiuuld 2 -jo EPICTETL'S. is enough to enable a man to take care of youths : a man must have also a certain readiness and fitness for this pur- pose, and a certain quality of body, and above all things he must have God to advise him to occupy this office, as God advised Socrates to occupy the place of one who confutes error, Diogenes the office of royalty and reproof, and the office of teaching precepts. But you open a doctor's shop, though you have nothing except physic : but where and how they should be applied, you know not nor have you taken any trouble about it. See, that man says, I too have salves for the eyes. Have you also the power of using them ? Do you know both when and how they will do good, and to whom they will do good ? Why then do you act at hazard in things of the greatest importance ? why are you careless ? why do you undertake a thing that is in no way fit for you ? Leave it to those who are able to do it, and to do it well. Do not your- self bring disgrace on philosophy through your own acts, and be not one of those who load it with a bad reputation. But if theorems please you. sit still, and turn them over by yourself ; but never say that you are a philosopher, nor allow another to say it ; but say : He is mistaken, for neither arc my desires different from what they were before, nor is my activity directed to other objects, nor do I assent to other things, nor in the use of appearances have I altered at all from my former condition. This have a fitness and liking for the business. If he has not, he will find it disagreeable, and he will not do it well. He may and ought to gain a reasonable living by his labor : if he seeks only money and wealth, he i> on the wrong track, and he is only like a common dealer in buying and selling, a butcher, or a shoemaker, or a tailor, all useful members of society and all of them necessary in their several kinds. Hut the teacher has a priestly office, the making, as far as it is possible, children into good men and women. Should he be " ordered " like a Deacon or a Priest, for his office is even more useful than that of Priest or Deacon ? Some will say that this is ridiculous. Perhaps the wise will not think so. EPTCTETUS. you must think and say about yourself, it" you would think as you ought : if not act at hazard, and do what you are doing ; for it becomes you. CHAPTER XXII. ABOUT CYXISM. WHEN one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and he was a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynism, what kind of person a Cynic ought to be and what was the notion of the thing, we will inquire, said Kpictetus. at leisure : but 1 have so much to say to you that he who without < n>d attempts so great a matter, is hateful to God, and lias no other purpose than to act indecently in public. For in any well-managed house no man comes forward, and says to himself, 1 ought to be manager of the house. If he does BO, the master turns round, and seeing him in- solently giving orders, drags him forth and flogs him. So it is also in this great city (the world) : for here also there is a master of the house who orders everything. (He says) You are the sun; you can by going round make, the year ami seasons, and make the fruits grow and nourish them, and stir the winds and make them remit, and warm the bodies of men properly : go, travel round, and so administer things from the greatest to the least. You are a calf: when a lion shall appear, do your proper business (/. c. run away): if you do not, you will suffer. You are a bull ; advance and light, for this is your busi- and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead the army against Ilium ; be Agamemnon. You can light in single combat against Hector; be Achilles. But if 272 I-.P/CTKTUS. Thersites * came forward and claimed the command, he? \vould either not have obtained it ; or if he did obtain it, he would have disgraced himself before many wit- nesses. Do you also think about the matter carefully : it is not Avhat it seems to you. (You say) I wear a cloak now and I shall wear it then : I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep hard then : I will take in addition a little bag now and a staff, and I will go about and begin to beg and to abuse those whom I meet ; and if I see any man plucking the hair out of his body, I will rebuke him, or if he has dressed his hair, or if he walks about in purple. If you imagine the thing to be such as this, keep far away from it : do not approach it : it is not at all for you. But if you imagine it to be what it is, and do not think yourself to be unfit for it, consider what a great thing you undertake. In the first place in the things which relate to yourself, you must not be in any respect like what you do now : you must not blame God or man : you must take away desire altogether, you must transfer avoidance only to the things u'hi.:h are within the power of the will: you must not feel ang-er nor resentment nor envy nor pity; a girl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little reputa- tion, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to know that the rest of men throw walks around them and houses and darkness when they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment. A man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber : if a person comes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of all these things must use modesty as his protection : if he does not, he will be indecent in his naked- ness and under the open sky. This is his house, his door : this is the slave before his bedchamber : this is his dark- ness. For he ought not to wish to hide anything that he * See the description of Thersites in the Iliad, ii. i\2. :loes : and if In- (iocs, lit- is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man who lives under the open sky, of a free man : he has begun io fear some external thing-, he- has begun to have need of concealment, nor can he get concealment when he chooses. For where shall lie hide himself and how ? And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, this pedagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? when then a man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men ? It cannot be : it is impossible. In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work on is my understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to the shoemaker ; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the body is nothing to me: the parts of it are nothing to me. Death ? Let it come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you say. And whither ; can any man eject me out of the world ? He cannot. But wher- ever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens, and the conversation with < iods. Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied with this ; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men about good and bad things,* to show them that they have wandered and are seeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it is. they never think ; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes f was carried off to Philip after the battle of Choeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic is a spy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and it is his duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and not to be struck with terror so as to point out as enemies * The office which in our times correspond* to this description of the Cynic, is the office of a teacher of religion. ! See page 77, note. 18 274 AV/r/y- /TX those who ctre not enemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearance's nor confounded. It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing' on the tragic stage to say like Socrates: Men, whither are you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches ? like blind people you are wandering up and down : you are going by another road, and have left the true road : you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not. and if another shows you where they are. you do not believe him. Why do you seek it without ? * In the body ? It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius.f In possessions? It is not there. But if you do not believe me, look at Crossus : look at those who are now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In power ? It is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been twice and thrice consuls ; but- they are not. Whom shall we believe in these matters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled by an appearance, or the men themselves ? What do they say ? Hear them when they groan, when they grieve, when on account of these very consulships and glory and splendor they think that they are more wretched and in greater clanger. Is it in royal power ? It is not : if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sardanapalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, * Quod petis hie est, Kst Ulubris. animus si te non deficit ajquus. Horace, Ep. i. 1 1 . 30. Willst du immer weiter schweifen ? Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah. Lerne nur das Gliick ergreifen, J )enn das Gliick ist immer da. Goethe, Gedichte. I These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. Crcesu.s is the rich king of Lydki, who was taken prisoner by Cyrus the Persian. EPh 275 though he was a better man than Sardanapalus and Xero ; but while others are snoring, what is he doing? Much from his head he tore his rooted hair. Iliad, x. 15. And what does he say himself? " I am perplexed," he says, " and Disturb'd I am," and "my heart out of my bosom Is leaping." Iliad, \. oi. \Vrctch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your posses- sions ? No. Your body ? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you ? That part of you. whatever it is. has been neglected by you and is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, with which we move toward and move from things. How neglected ? He knows not the nature of good for which he is made by nature and the nature of evil ; and what is his own, and what belongs to an- other ; and when anything that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Wo to me, for the Hellenes are in danger, Wretched is his ruling faculty, and alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die ? Yes : but not all at once. What difference then does it make ? For if death is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, it is equally an evil. Is anything else then going to happen than the separation of the soul and the body ?* Nothing. And if the Hel- lenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to die? It is. Why then do you lament (and say) 11 then is supposed to consist of a soul and a body. It may be useful to remember this when we are examining other passages in Kpictetus. 27 6 F.PICTETUS. Oli, you who are a king and have the scepter of Zeus ? An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappy god. What then art thou ? In truth a shepherd : for you weep as shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off OIK- of their sheep : and these who are governed by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was your desire in any danger? was your aversion (^oryum) ? was your movement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things: He replies. No; but the wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife? Shall we be despised then by the Tro- jans? What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If they are wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do you care about them. In what then is the good, since it is not in these things? Tell us, you who are lord, messenger and spy. Where you do not think that it is, nor choose to seek it : for if you chose to seek it, you would have found it to be in yourselves ; nor would you be wandering out of the way, nor seeking what belongs to others as if it were your own. Turn your thoughts into yourselves : observe the precon- ceptions which you have. What kind of a thing do you imagine the good to be ? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that which is not impeded. Come, and ra torium, but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want ? Am I not without sorrow ? am I not without fear? Am I not free? \Vhen did any * " It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary quali fication in a teacher sent from God for the instruction of mankind to !>.- destitute of all external advantages and a suffering character. Thus doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine- wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the Cospel; whose great author had not -uherc to lay Ins lieaJ; and whirh some in lat> have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the ( 'hristian religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of Diogenes in Kpictetus and of our Redeemer in the New Testament is too obvious to need anv enlargement." M> of you see me failing in the object of ray desire ? or falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever blame God or man ? * did I ever accuse any man ? did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countenance? And how do I meet with those whom you are afraid of and admire? Do not I treat them like slaves? Who, when he sees me, does not think that he sees his king and master ? This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, * Some of the ancients, who called themselves philosophers, did blame God and his administration of the world ; and there are men who do the same now. If a man is dissatisfied with the condition of the world, he has- the power of going out of it, as Epictetus often says; and if be knows, as he must know, that he cannot alter the nature of mail and the conditions of human life, he may think it wise to withdraw from a state of things with which he is not satisfied. If he believes that there is no God, he is at liberty to do what he thinks best for himself; and if he does believe that there is a God, he may still think that his power of quitting the world is a power which he may exercise when he chooses. Many persons commit suicide, not because they are dissatisfied with the state of the world, but for other reasons. I have not yet heard of a modern philosopher who found fault with the condition of human things, and voluntarily retired from life. Our philosophers live as long a* they can, and some of them take care, of themselves and of all that they possess ; they even provide well for the comfort of those whom they leave behind them. The conclusion seems to be that they prefer living in this world to lea /ing it, that their complaints are idle talk; and that being men of weak minds, and great vanity they assume the philosopher's name, and while they try to make others as dissatisfied as they profess themselves to be, they are really enjoying themselves after their fashion as much as they can. These men, though they may have the means of living with as much comfort as the conditions of human life permit, are dissatisfied, and they would, if they could, make as dissatisfied as tliem- srlvt-s those who have less means of making life tolerable- These grumblers are not the men who give their money or their labor or their lives for increasing the happiness of mankind and diminishing the un- avoidable sufferings of human life ; but they find it easier to blame God, when they believe in him ; or to find fault with things as they are, which is more absurd, when they do not believe in God, and when they ought to make the best that they can of the conditions under which we live. FPfCTF.TUS. 279 this is their purpose. You say Xo : but their charac- teristic is the little wallet, and staff, and great jaws : the devouring of all that you give them, or storing it up, or the abusing unreasonably all whom they meet, or dis- playing their shoulder as a fine thing. Do you see how you are going to undertake so great a business ? First take a mirror : look at your shoulders ; observe your loins, your thighs. You are going, my man, to be enrolled as a combatant in the Olympic games, no frigid and miser- able contest. In the Olympic games a man is not per- mitted to be conquered only and to take his departure : but first he must be disgraced in the sight of all the world, not in the sight of Athenians only, or of Lacedaemonians or of Xicopolitans ; next he must be whipped also if he has entered into the contests rashly : and before being whipped, he must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow much dust. Reflect more carefully, know thyself,* consult the divinity, without God attempt nothing ; for if he shall advise you (to do this or anything), be assured that he intends you to become' great or to receive many blows. For this very amusing quality is conjoined to a C'ynic : he must be flogged like an ass, and when he is flogged, he must love those who rlog him, as if he were the father of all, and the brother of all. f Vou say no : but if a man ' The expression " Know thyself" is attributed to several persons, and to Socrates among them. Self-knowledge is one of the most difficult kinds of knowledge ; and no man has it completely. Men either esti- : eir powers too highly, and this is named vanity, self-conceit or arrogance ; or they think too meanly of their powers and do not . plish what they might acconipii-di, if they had reasonable seif-confidem v. iiHpan- 'his \\\\\ :;d love to enemies, Matthew v. .7 (-44. The reader will observe that Christ 'I provoi ation-. doth ; and requires of a// his fpllowers, whai only as ilu- duty 280 EPICTETUS. flogs you, stand in the public place and call out, " Caesar, what do I suffer in this state of peace under thy protec- tion ? '' Let us bring the offender before the proconsul. But what is Ca-sar to a Cynic, or what is a proconsul, or what is any other except him who sent the Cynic down hither, and whom he serves, namely Zeus ? Does he call upon any other than Zeus ? Is he not convinced that whatever he suffers, it is Zeus who is exercising him ? Hercules, when he was exercised by Eurystheus did not think that he was wretched, but without hesitation he at- tempted to execute all that he had in hand. And is he who is trained to the contest and exercised by Zeus going to call out and to be vexed, he who is worthy to bear the scepter of Diogenes ? Hear what Diogenes says to the passers-by when he is in a fever, Miserable wretches, will you not stay ? but are you going so long a journey to Olympia to see the destruction or the fight of athletes ; and will you not choose to see the combat between a fever and a man ? Would such a man accuse God who sent him down as if God were treating him unworthily, a man who gloried in his circumstances, and claimed to be an example to those who were passing by ? For what shall he accuse him of? because he maintains a decency of behavior, because he displays his virtue more conspic- uously ? Well, and what does he say of poverty, about death, about pain ? How did he compare his own hap- piness with that of the great king (the king of Persia) ? or rather he thought that there was no comparison between them. For where there are perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and desires not satisfied, and aversions of things which you cannot avoid, and envies and jealousies, how is there a road to happiness there ? But where there are corrupt principles, there these things must of neces- sity be. When the young man asked, if when a Cynic is sick, KP/CTKTL'S. 281 and a friend asks him to come to his house and be taken care of in his sickness, shall the Cynic accept the invita- tion, he replied. And where shall you find, I ask, a Cynic's friend? For the man who invites ought to be such an- other as the Cynic that he may be worthy of being reck- oned the Cynic's friend. He ought to be a partner in the Cynic's scepter and his royalty, and a worthy minister, if he intends to be considered worthy of a Cynic's friend- ship, as Diogenes was a friend of Antisthenes. as Crates was a friend of Diogenes. Do you think that if a man comes to a Cynic and salutes him, that he is the Cynrc's friend, and that the Cynic will think him worthy of receiving a Cynic into his house ? So that if you please, reflect on this also : rather look round for some conven- ient dunghill on which you shall bear your fever and which will shelter you from the north wind that you may not be chilled. Rut you seem to me to wish to go into some man's house and to be well fed there for a time. Why then do you think of attempting so great a thing (as the life of a Cynic) ? But, said the young man, shall marriage and the pro- creation of children as a chief duty be undertaken by the Cynic ? * If you grant me a community of wise men, Epictetus replies, perhaps no man will readily apply him- self to the Cynic practice. For on whose account should he undertake this manner of life ? However if we sup- pose that he does, nothing will prevent him from marry- ing and begetting children ; for his wife will be another like himself, and his father-in-law another like himself, and his children will be brought up like himself. But in the present state of things which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the minis- * The Stoics recommended marriage, the procreation of children, the discharge of magisterial offices, and the duties of social life generally. tration of God,* able to go about among m^n, not tied down to the common duties of mankind, nor entangled in the ordinary relations of life, which if he neglects, he will not maintain the character of an honorable and good man ? and if he observes them he will lose the character of the messenger, and spy and herald of God. For con- sider that it is his duty to do something toward his father-in- law, something to the other kinsfolk of his wife, something to his wife also (if he has one). He is also excluded by being a Cynic from looking after the sickness of his own family, and from providing for their support. And to say nothing of the rest, he must have a vessel for heating water for the child that he may wash it in the bath ; wool for his wife when she is delivered of a child, oil, a bed, a * "It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word with St. Paul, i Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. From this and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think that he was not acquainted with St. Paul's Epistles or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine." Mrs. Carter. I do not find any evidence of Kpictetus being acquainted with the Epistle of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine, but I have not ob- served any evidence of the fact. Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul says that "if they cannot contain, let them marry : for it is better to marry than to burn.'' Accordingly his doctrine is " to avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband." He does not directly say what a man should do when he is not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do (i Cor. vii. 2). Paul's view of mar- riage differs from that of Epictetus, who recommends marriage. Paul does not : he writes, " I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I." He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children as a duty; which Epictetus did. In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the " minister of God " should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract him and make him unable to discharge his duties. There is sound sense in this. A " minister of God " should not lie distracted by the cares of a family, especially if he is poor. EPICTKTCS. 283 tup : so the furniture of the house is increased. 1 say nothing of his other occupations, and of his distraction. Where then now is that king, he who devotes himself to the public interests, The people's guardian and so full of cares. Homer, Iliad, ii. 25. whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children ; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly : who quarrels ; what family is well administered, what is not ; going about as a physician Joes and feels pulses ? He says to one, you have a fever, to another you have a headache, or the gout : he says to one, abstain from food ; to another he says, eat ; or do not use the bath : to another, you require the knife, or the cautery. How can he have time for this who is tied to the duties of common life ? is it not his duty to supply clothing to his children, and to send them to the school- master with writing tablets, and styles (for writing). Besides must he not supply them with beds? for they cannot be genuine Cynics as soon as they are born. If he does not do this, it would be better to expose the chil- dren as soon as they are born than to kill them in this way. Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him. Yes, but Crates took a wife. You are speaking of a circumstance which arose from love and of a woman who was another Crates.* But we are inquiring about ordinary marriages and those which are free from distractions, and making this inquiry we do not find the affair of marriage in thi- of the world a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic. How then shall a man maintain the existence of society ? * The wife of Crates was Hipparchia, who persisted against all advice in marrying Crates anil lived with him exactly as he lived. Diogenes Laertius, vi. <;6. Upton. In the name oHiod, are those men greater benefactors to society who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who super- intend as far as they can all mankind, and see what they do. how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect contrary to their duty? Did they who left little children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died childless ? And did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons or Danaus or .rKolus contribute more to the community than Homer? then shall the duty of a general or the business of a writer exclude a man from marriage or the begetting of children, and such a man shall not be judged to have accepted the condition of childlessness for nothing : and shall not the royalty of a Cynic be considered an equivalent for the want of chil- dren ? Do we not perceive his grandeur and do we not justly contemplate the character of Diogenes ; and do we instead of this turn our eyes to the present Cynics who are dogs that wait at tables, and in no respect imitate the Cynics of old except perchance in breaking wind, but in nothing else? For such matters would not have moved us at all nor should we have wondered if a Cynic should not marry or beget children. Man, the Cynic is the father of all men ; the men are his sons, the women are his daughters : he so carefully visits all, so well does he care for all. Do you think that it is from idle impertinence that he rebukes those whom he meets ? He does it as a father, as a brother, and as the minister of the father of all, the minister of Zeus. If you please, ask me also if a Cynic shall engage in the administration of the state. Fool, do you seek a greater form of administration than that in which he is engaged ? Do you ask if he shall appear among the Athenians and say something about the revenues and the supplies, he who must talk with all men, alike with Athenians, alike i-:ricTi-:rrs. 285 with Corinthians, alike with Romans, not about supplies. nor yet about revenues, nor about peace or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about good fortune and bad fortune, about slavery and freedom ? When a man has undertaken the administration of such a state, do you ask me if he shall engage in the administration of a state? ask me also if he shall govern (hold a magisterial office) : again I will say to you, Fool, what greater government shall he exercise than that which he exercises now ? It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a certain habit of body : for if he appears to be consump- tive, thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight. For he must not only by showing the qualities of the soul prove to the vulgar that it is in his power' inde- pendent of the things which they admire to be a good man, but he must also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of living in the open air does not injure even the body. See, he says, I am a proof of this, and my own body also is. So Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh-looking, and he attracted the no- tice of the many by his personal appearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he seems to be a beggar : all persons turn away from him, all are offended with him ; for neither ought he to appear dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men ; but his very roughness ought to be clean and attractive. There ought also to belong to the Cynic much natural grace and sharpness ; and if this is not so, he is a stupid fellow, and nothing else ; and he must have these quali- ties that he may be able readily and fitly to be a match for all circumstances that may happen. So Diogenes iv- plied to one who said. Are you the Diogenes who does not believe that there are gods? And, how, replied Diogenes, can this be when I think that you are odious to the gods ? On another occasion in reply to Alexander, 2 86 EPICTETUS. who stood by him when he was sleeping, and quoted Homer's line (Iliad, ii. 24) A man a councilor should not sleep all night, he answered, when he was half-asleep, The people's guardian and so full of cares. But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than the sun ; and if it is not, he must necessarily be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, since while- he himself is entangled in some vice he will reprove others.* 'For see how the matter stands : to these kings and tyrants their guards and arms, give the power of re- proving some persons, and of being able even to punish those who do wrong though they are themselves bad ; but to a Cynic instead of arms and guards it is conscience which gives this power. When he knows that he has watched and labored for mankind, and has slept pure, and sleep has left him still purer, and that he thought whatever he has thought as a friend of the gods, as a minister, as a participator of the power of Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to sax- Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny ; and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be ; why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word to his kinsmen ? For this reason he is neither overcurious nor a, .busybody when he is in this state of mind ; for he is not a meddler with the affairs of others when he is superintending human affairs, but he is looking after his own affairs. If that is not so, you may * The Cynic is in Epictetus the minister of religion. He must In- pure, for otherwise how can he reprove vice ? This is a useful lesson to those whose business it is to correct the vices of mankind. l-.'lTS. 2.S; rtlso say that the general is a bus} body, when he inspects his soldiers, and examines them and watches them and punishes the disorderly. But if while you have a cake under your arm, you rebuke others, 1 will say to you, Will you not rather go away into a corner and eat that which you have stolen ; what have you to do with the a flairs of others ? For who are you ? are you the bull of the herd, or the queen of the bees? Show me the tokens of your supremacy, such as they have from nature. But if you are a drone claiming the sovereignty over the bees, do you not suppose that your fellow-citizens will put you down as the bees do the drones ? The Cynic also oug-ht to have such power of endurance as to seem insensible to the common sort and a stone : no man reviles him, no man strikes him, no man insults him, but he gives his body that any man who chooses may do with it what he likes. For he bears in mind that the inferior must b overpowered by the superior in that in which it is inferior ; and the body is inferior to tin- many, the weaker to. the stronger. He never then de- is into such a contest in which he can be over- powered ; but he immediately withdraws from things which belong to others, he claims not the things which are servile. But where there is will and the use of ap- pearances, there you will set- how many eyes lie has so that you may say. Argus was blind compared with him. Is his assent ever hasty, his movement (toward an object) rash, does his desire ever fail in its object, does that which he would avoid befall him, is his purpose un- .uvomplished. dors he ev find fault, is he ever humili- ated, is he ever envious ? To these lie directs all his attention and energy : but as to evervthing <-Ne he snores supine. All is peace : then- is no roliber who takes away his will, no tyrant. Hut what say you as to his body? I say there is. And as to magistracies and honors? What 288 EPICTETUS. does he care for them ? When then any person would frighten him through them, he says to him, Begone, look for children : masks are formidable to them ; but I know that they are made of shell, and they have nothing in- side. About such a matter as this you are deliberating. Therefore, if you please, I urge you in God's name, defer the matter, and first consider your preparation for it. For see what Hector says to Andromache, Retire rather, he says, into the house and weave : War is the work of men Of all indeed, but specially 'tis mine. II. vi. 490. So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness. CHAPTER XXIII. TO THOSE WHO READ AND DISCUSS KOK THE SAKE OK OSTEN- TATION. * FIRST say to yourself Who you wish to be : then do ac- cordingly what you are doing ; for in nearly all other things we see this to be so. Those who follow athletic exercises first determine what they wish to be, then do accordingly what follows. If a man is a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of walking, * Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger 1'liny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis corrupt* eloquently. Upton. E/'ICTETUS. 289 rubbing and exercise : if a man is a runner in the stadium, all these things are different ; if he is a Pentathletc, they are still more different. So you will find it also in the arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such and such things: if a worker in metal, such things. For everything that we do. if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose ; and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. Further, there is a general end or pur- pose, and a particular purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is comprehended in this ? We must not be like a sheep, though gentle ; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end has reference to each person's mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philoso- pher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you : take care first of all that you are not doing this without a pur- pose ; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is the right pur- pose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised? Im- mediately you hear him saying, To me what is the value of praise from the many ? and he says well, for it is of no value to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geometrician. Do you then wish to be useful ? in what ? tell us that we may run to your audience-room. Now can a man do anything useful to others, who has not received something useful himself? No, for neither can a man do anything useful in the carpenter's art, unless he is a carpenter ; nor in the shoemaker's art, unless he is a shoemaker. Do you wish to know then if you have received any advantage ? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the thing which desire promises? Not to fail in the object. What does aversion promise ? Not to fall into that which you would avoid. Well ; do we fulfill their '9 * 9 o EPICTETVS. promise? Tell me the truth: but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when your hearers came together rather coldly, and did not give you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What did you think of me ? Wonderful, master, I swear by all that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular matter? Which ? The passage in which I described Pan and the nymphs?* Excellently. Then do you tell me that in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? Begone ; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not praise a certain person contrary to your opinion ? and did you not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? Would you wish your own children to be such persons ? I hope not. Why then did you praise and Ilatterhim? He is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses. How is this ? He admires me. You have stated your proof. Then what do you think ? do not these very people secretly despise you ? When then a man who is conscious that he has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a philosopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think that he says ex- cept this, This man has some need of me ? Or tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown ? Observe ; he has been in your company a long time ; he has listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading ; has he become more modest ? has he been turned to re- flect on himself? has he perceived in what a bad state he is ? has he cast away self-conceit ? does he look for a person to teach him ? He does. A man who will teach him to live ? No, fool, but how to talk ! for it is for this that he admires you also. Listen and hear what he * Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day delighted in. \ /.7Vr/7- /T.s. 4 9 i says : This man writes \vith perfect art, much better than Dion.* This is altogether another thing-. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from perturbations? and even if he did say it, I >hould say to him, Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I should add this, First understand what you say, then speak. You then, who are in a wretched plight and gap'ing .after applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be useful to others? To-day many more attended my discourse. Yes, many ; we suppose five hundred. That is nothing ; suppose that there were a thousand. Dion never had so many hearers. II ow could he ? And they understand what is said beautifully. What is tine, master, can move even a stone. See, these are the words of a philosopher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to others ; here is a man who has listened to dis- courses, who has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. " I have often wondered by what arguments." f Not so, but "by what argument :" this is more exact than that. What, have you read the words at all in a different way from that in which you read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you would not have been attending to such matters, but you would rather have been looking to these words : " Anytus and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me : " " and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to nothing of my own except on of I'rnsa in Uithynia \v.is named < 'hrysostomus (golden- mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, ;is the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in ('/reek are slill extant, and some fragments of fifteen. | These words are the beginning of Xenuphon's Memorabilia, i. i. 292 I-.r/CTE'JTS. to the reason which on inquiry seems to me the best. " * Hence who ever heard Socrates say, " 1 know something and F teach : " but he used to send different people to different teachers. Therefore they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by him ; and he- would take them and recommend them. Not so ; but as he accompanied them he would say. Hear me to-day dis- coursing- in the house of Quadratus. f Why should I hear you ? Do you wish to show me that you put words to- g-ether cleverly ? You put them together, man ; and what good will it do you ? But only praise me. What do you mean by praising ? Say to me, admirable, wonderful. Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which philosophers mean by the name of good, what have I to praise in you ? If it is good to speak well, teach me, and 1 will praise you. What then ? ought a man to listen to such things without pleasure ? I hope not. For my part 1 do not listen even to a lute-player without pleasure. Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear what Socrates says, Nor would it be seemly for a man of my age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before you. \ Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them together, and to come forward and gracefully to * From the Crito of Plato, c. 6. t The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we learn from Pliny, Ep. viii. 12 and Juvenal, vii. 40. Si dulcedine famas Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes. Quadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do so: but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the road; I hope you will come to hear me. I don't find anything in the notes on this passage; but it requires explanation. J From Plato's Apology of Socrates. read them or to speak, and while he is reading to say, There are not many who can do these tilings, 1 swear l.y all that you value. Does a philosopher invite people to hear him ? As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive benefit ? What physician invites a man to be treated by him ? Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Rome do invite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were invited. 1 invite you to come and hear that things are in a bad way for you, and that you are taking care of everything except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the good and tin- bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine kind of in- vitation ; and yet if the words of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say : If you have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose.* Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of us who were sitting there supposed that some one had accused him before Rufus : he so touched on what was doing, lie- so placed before the eyes every man's faults. The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery : you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter : one has dislocated his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a headache. Then do I sit and utter to you little thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess just as they were ? Is it for this then that young men shall quit home and leave their parents and their friends and kins- men and property, that they may say to you. Wonderful ! * Aulus Gellius, v. i. Seneca, Kp. 5.'. Upton. 294 r.ric //: 77 '.v when you are uttering your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or ('leanthesr What then ? is there not the hortatory style ? Who denies it ? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, the style of display ': What is the hortatory style? To be able to show both to one person and to many the struggle in which they are engaged, and that they think more about anything than about what they really wish. For they wish the things which lead to hap- piness, but they look for them in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I entreat you by the gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. Nothing can have more power in exhortation than when the speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who when he hears you reading or discoursing is anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or when he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me well : I must no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to some person ? He spoke finely about Xerxes ; * and another says, No, but about the battle of Thermopyla-. Is this listening to a philosopher ? * Cicero, de Officiis, i. 18 : " Qtiae magno animo et fortiter excel- lenterque gesta stint, ea nescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Mine Khetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plata-is, Thermopyli*, Leuctris." EPICTETUS. 295 CHAPTER XXIV. THAT vrr. oronT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT IX OUR POWER. LET not that which in another is contrary to nature be an evil to you : for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, remember that his unluippiness is his own fault : for (iod has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his own, and other things not as his own : some things subject to hindrance and compulsion and de- privation ; and these things are not a man 'sown : but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own : and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to-be done by him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own. But you say. I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved. Why did he consider as his own that which belongs to another? why. when lie looked on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country? Therefore he suffers the con- sequences of his own folly. Hut why do you or for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not thought of these things? but like poor women who arc- good for nothing, you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation ; and now you bit KPfCTETL'S, and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in the same places. Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and ravens who have the power of Hying 1 where they please and changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without lamenting or regretting their former condition. Yes, but this happens to them because they are irrational creatures. Was reason then given to us by the gods for the purpose of unhap- piness ami misery, that we may pass our lives in wretch- edness and lamentation ? Must all persons be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants ; and if any of our familiar friends go abroad, must we sit and weep ; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance and clap our hands like children ? Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we have heard from the philosophers? if we did not listen to them as if they were jugglers : they tell us that this world is one city,* and the substance out of which it has been formed is one, and that there must be a certain period, and that some things must give way to others, that some must be dissolved, and others come in their place ; some to remain in the same place, and others to be moved ; and that all things are full of friendship, first of the gods.f and then of men who by nature are made to be of one family ; and some must be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who are removed from them ; and man in addition to being by nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this pro- perty not to be rooted nor to be naturally ilxed to the earth, but to go at different times to different places, * See ii. 5, 26. t See iii. 13, 15. -- 77'.9. 297 sometimes from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who saw ' >f many men the states, and learned their ways.* And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world Seeing men's lawless deeds and their good rules of law : t casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and intro- ducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in Thebes, how many in Argos, how many in Athens? and how many do you think that he gained by going about ? And he married also, when it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them as orphans : for he knew that no man is an orphan ; but it is the father who takes care of all men al- ways and continuously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that Xeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happiness and desire of what is not present to come together. For that which is happy must have all J that it desires, must resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have neither thirst nor hunger. But Ulysses felt a desire for his wife and wept as he sat on a rock. Do you attend to Homer and his stories in every- thing? Or if l.'lysses really wept, what was lie else- than an unhappy man ': and what good man is unhappy? In * Homer, Odys>cy, i. 3. t Oclyss:y, xvii. 487. { See iii. z, ij. Paul to the Phi'.ippi.ms, i'. . iS. 298 /-.v/r: '//: /Y '.s-. truth the whole is badly administered, if Zei^ take care of his own citizens that they may be happy like himself. But these things are not lawful nor right to think of: and if Ulysses did weep and lament, he wa* not a good man. For who is good if he knows not who he' is ? and who knows what he is. if he forgets that things which have been made are perishable, and that it is not possible for one human being to be with another always ? To desire then things which are impossible is to have' a slavish character, and is foolish : it is the part of a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way that he can, by his opinions. But my mother laments when she does not see me. Why has she not learned these principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take care that she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is an- other's sorrow : but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, for it is in my power : and the sorrow of another I will endeavor to stop as far as I can ; but I will not attempt to do it by t-verv means : for if I do, I shallbe fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the universe ; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God and of this dis- obedience not only will the children of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending on the letters of others. Some person has arrived from Rome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you. where you are not ? From Hellas (Greece) some one is come : 1 hope that there is no harm. In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, 299 and must you be so even beyond sea. and by the report of letters ? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state of security ? Well then suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from me. What elsehave they suffered than that which is the condition of mortals ? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age. and at the same time not to see the death of any per- son whom you love ? Know you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds of things must happen ; that a fever shall overpower one, a robber an- other, and a third a tyrant ? Such is the condition of things around us, such are those who live with us in the world: cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, unfortunate, depend- ent on another, and dependent not on one or two. but on ten thousands upon ten thousands. Did you hear this when you were with the philoso- phers ? did you learn this ? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one man must keep watch, another must go out as a spy. and a third must light ': and it is not possible that all should be in one place, nor is it better that it should be so. But you neglecting to do the com- mands of the general complain when anything more hard than usual is imposed on you, and you do not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in your power ; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor ex- pose himself to danger, but will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a vessel if you a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if you are ordered i<> climb the mast, retusc : if to run to the head 300 EriCTKTL'S. of the ship, refuse ; and what master of a ship will endure you ? and will he not pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to the other sailors ? And so it is here also : every man's life is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe the duty of a soldier and do everything at the nod of the general ; if it is possible, divining what his wishes are : for there is no resemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean place ; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that such a man must give little time to the affairs of his household, but be often away from home, either as a governor or one who is governed, or discharging some office, or serving in war or acting as a judge ? Then do you tell me that you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to be rooted ? Yes, for it is pleasant. Who says that it is not ? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is pleasant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end ? Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language ? that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites ? Next while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions, do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates ? Will you not throw away as far as you can the things belonging to others with which you decorate yourself, though they do not fit you at all ? For what else do they desire than to sleep without hindrance and free from com- pulsion, and when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash the face, then write and read what they choose, and then talk about some trifling matter being praised by their friends whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and having walked about a little to bathe, and then eat and sleep, such sleep as is the fashion of such men ? why need we say how ? for one can easily EPICTETUS. 301 conjecture. Come, do you also tell your own way of pass- ing the time which you desire, you who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diogenes. What do you wish to do in Athens ? the same (that others do), or some- thing else? Why then od you call yourself a Stoic? Well, but they who falsely call themselves Roman citi- zens* are severely punished; and should those, who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name, get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law divine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the sever- est punishments from those who commit the greatest crimes ? For what does this law say ? Let him who pretends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a vainglorious man : f let him who disobeys the divine administration be base, and a slave ; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, let him pity ; \ and in a word let him be unhappy and lament. Well then ; do you wish me to pay court to a certain person? to go to his doors? If reason requires this to be done for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the sake of mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the door of a shoemaker, when you are in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, * Suetonius (Claudius, 25) says: " Peregrinz conditionis homines etuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Ro- inanam usurpantes in campo Esquilino securi percussit." Upton. t This is a denunciation of the hypocrite. } " Pity " perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning ' What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded ; but belongs to the general subject of the chapter. "Mrs. Carter. " Tin- person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems to h.uc been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, Hi. 4, i) and to visit his \\<>r. Schweig. $02 F.PJCTETl'S. when you want lettuces ; and are you ashamed to the doors of the rich when you want anything ? YL I have no awe of a shoemaker. Don't feel any awe of the rich. Nor will I flatter the gardener. And do not flatter the rich. How then shall I get what I want ? Do I say to you, go as if you were certain to get what you want? And do not I only tell you, that you may do what is be- coming to yourself? Why then should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may have discharged the duty of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And further remember that you have gone to the shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power in anything great or noble, though he may sell dear. You go to buy let- tuces : they cost an obolus (penny), but not a talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for to the rich man's door. Well, I will go. It is worth talking about. Let it be so ; I will talk with him. But you must also kiss his hand and flatter him with praise. Away with that, it is a talent's worth : it is not profitable to me, nor to the state nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils a good citizen and a friend. But you will seem not to have been eager about the matter, if you do not suc- ceed. Have you again forgotten why you went ? Know you not that a good man does nothing for the sake of ap- pearance, but for the sake of doing right ? What advan- tage is it then to him to have done right. And what advantage is it to a man who writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought? The advantage is to have written it. Is there no reward then?* Do you seek a reward * The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer : " For what mort dos' KPrCTETUS. 33 for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympin yon wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man. do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their weeping move you and make you effeminate ? Will you thus never cease to be a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of u child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is ? In Athens did you see no one by going to his house? I visited any man that I pleased. Here also be ready to see. and you will see whom you please : only let it be without meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it depends on what is within, on your opinions. When you have learned not to value things which are ex- ternal and not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of them is your own, but that these things only are your own, to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, t<> move toward an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, where is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness? why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and for the places to which you are ac- customed? Wait a little and you will again find these places familiar : then, if you are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also, weep and lament. thou want when thou hast done a man a service ? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to he paid for it ? just as if the eye demanded a recompense fcr seeing <> r th<- feet for walking." M. Antoninus, ix. .}.-. Compare Senca, de Vita Leata, c. y. EPICTETUS. How then shall I become of an affectionate temper? By being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not reasonable to be mean-spirited nor to lament yourself, nor to depend on another, nor even to blame God or man. I entreat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no profit in being affectionate. And what pre- vents you from loving another as a person subject to mortality, as one who may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own children ? He did ; but it was as a free man, as one who remembered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For this reason he violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making his defense nor by fixing a penalty on himself,* nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and others for breth- ren's sake. But it is not fit for us to be unhappy on account of any person, but to be happy on account of all, l.ut ,'hiefly on account of God who has made us for this end. Well, did Diogenes f love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so much labor and bodily sufferings? He did love mankind, but how? As became a minister * It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had de- termined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon, Apo- logia, 23). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for him- self, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, c. 26; Cicero, De Oratore, i. 5-1). t The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epictetus from that which we read in common books. of God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For this ivason all the earth \vas liis country, and no particular place ; and when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to improve them : and being sold afterward he lived in Corinth as before at Athens : and he would have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of the Perrhoebi. * Thus is freedom acquired. For this reason lie used to say, Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have not been a slave. How did Antisthenes make him free? Hear what he says : Antisthenes taught me what is my own, and what is not my own ; possessions are not my own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor repu- tation, nor places familiar, nor mode of life ; all these belong to others. What then is your own ? The use of appearances. This he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and from compulsion, no person can put an obstacle in my way, no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than I wish. Who then has any power over me ? Philip or Alexander, or Pcrdiccas or the great king ? How have they this power? For if a man is going to be overpowered by a man, he must long be- fore be overpowered by tilings. If then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit out all his poor body in a man's face and depart from life, whose slave can he still be ? But if he dwelt with pleasure in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his affairs would have been at every man's command : the stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How do you think that Diogenes would have flattered the- pirates that they might sell him to some Athenian, that some time he * A people in Thessaly between the river I'rneius and Mount ' Hympus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country. 2O " 306 /://( 77 77 '.v. might see that beautiful Piraeus, ami the Long Walls and the Acropolis ? In what condition would you see them ? As a captive, a slave and mean : and what would be the use of it for you ? Not so : but I should see them as a free man. Show me, how you would be free. Observe, some person has caught you, who leads you away from your accustomed place of abode and says, You arc my slave, for it is in my power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my power to treat you gently, and to humble -you : when I choose, on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to Athens. What do you say to him who treats you as a slave ? What means have you of rinding one who will rescue you from slavery ? Or cannot you even look him in the face, but without saying more do you entreat to be set free ? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, hastening, going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you, are you unwilling to live in Rome and desire to live in Hellas (Greece) ? And when you must die, will you then also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion ? Have you gone abroad for this? was it for this reason you have sought to find some per- son from whom you might receive benefit ? What bene- fit ? That you may solve syllogisms more readily, or handle hypothetical arguments ? and for this reason did you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you might return when you had learned these things you did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor freedom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may maintain your relative position without impediment? This is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms and sophistical arguments and hypothetical : if you like, take your place in the agora (market or public /7V < 37 place) and proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic.*" Will you not deny even all that you have learned that you may not bring a had name on your theorems as useless : What harm has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured you thai you should prove by your acts that his labors are useless ? Were the evils that you had there (at home) not enough, those which were the Cause of your pain and lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad ? Have you added nj Ore to the list? And if you again have other acquaintances and friends, you will have more causes for lamentation : and the same also . take an affection for another country. Why then do you live to surround yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which you are unhappy ? Then. I ask you, do you call this affection ? What affection, man ! If it is a good thing, it is the cause of no evil : if it is bad. 1 have nothing to do with it. I am formed by nature for my own good : 1 am not formed for my own evil. What then is the discipline for this purpose? First of all the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it were at the entrance, is this ; when you are delighted with anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not one of those which cannot be taken away, but as with something of such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup. that when it has been broken, you may remember what it was, and may not be troubled. So in this matte 1 : also : if you kiss your own child, or your brother or friend, give full license to the appearance, and allow not * This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people. ' (1'ro Cluentio, c. 14) speaks of such a quack (pharmacopeia), who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. 1 IKUC seen a traveling doctor in France who went about in a cart, and rang a bell, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were deaf had stnif puun-il into their ears, paid their money, and made way for other.-, who h:id other complaints. 308 /:/'/(' '/'/: rrs. your pleasure to go as far as it chooses : but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them that they are mortal.* Do you also re- mind yourself in like manner, that he whom you love i- mortal, and that what you love is nothing of your own : it has been given to you for the present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been given to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, you must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter. Fo: such as winter is to a fig, such is every event which hap- pens from the universe to the things which are taken away according to its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping voice, To-morrow you will die ; and to a friend also, To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again ? But these are words of bad omen. And some incantations also are of bad omen : but because they are useful, I don't care for this ; only let them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are significant of some evil ? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and and shamelessness. These words are of bad omen : and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to pro- tect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which is significant of any natural thing is of evil omen ? say that even for the ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the destruction of the ears, * It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a sla\'e to stand behind the triumph LIIH general in his chariot and to remind him that he was still mortal. Juvenal, x. 41. KPICTETl'S. 309 but not of the world. Say that the falling of the loaves also is ot' bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place of the green fig. and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes from a former state into other states : not a destruction, but a certain fixed econo- my and administration. Such is going a\vay from home and a small change : such is death, a greater change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.* Shall I then no longer exist ? You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need : for you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world had need of you. + * Marcus Antoninus, xi. 35. Compare Epict. iii. 13, 14, and iv. 7, 75. t I am not sure if Epictetus ever uses oj in the sense of " Uni- verse," the " universum " of philosophers. I think he sometimes uses it in the common sense of the world, the earth and all that is on it. Epic- tetus appears to teach that when a man dies, his existence is terminated. The body is resolved into the elements of which it is formed, and these elements are employed for other purposes. Consistently with this doc trine he may have supposed that the powers, which we call ratioi. intellectual, exist in man by virtue only of the organization of his brail., which is superior to that of all other animals ; and that what we name the soul has no existence independent of the body. It was an old Greek hypothesis that at death the body returned to earth from which it came. and the soul returned to the regions above, from which it came. I cannot discover any passage in Epictetus in which the doctrine is taught that the soul has an existence independent of the body. The opinions of Marcus Antoninus on this matter are contained in his book, iv. 14, 21, and perhaps elsewhere : but they are rather obscure. A recent writer has attempted to settle the question of the existence of departed souls by affirming that we can find no place for them either in heaven or in hell ; for the modem scientific notion, as I suppose that it must be named, does not admit the conception of a place heaven m ;i place hell (Strauss, Der Alte und der Neue Glaube, p. 129). \\ < may name Paul a contemporary of Epictetus, for though Epictrtus may have been the younger, he was living at Rome during N.-n.'s reign (A. D. 54-o.Si : and it is affirmed, whether roriectly or not, I do not EPICTEJVS. *J \Yherefore the wise and good man, remembering who he is and whence lie came, and by whom he was pro- duced, is attentive only to this, how he may fill his place with due regularity and obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to exist (live) ? I will continue to exist as free, as noble in nature, as thou hast wished me to exist : for thou hast made me free from hindrance in that which is my own. But hast thou no further need of me? I thank thee : and so far I have remained for thy sake, and for the sake of no other person, and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost thou depart ? Again, I say, as thoxi hast pleased, as free, as thy servant, as one who has known thy commands and thy prohibitions. And so long as I shall stay in thy service, whom dost thou will me to K- ? A prince or a private man, a senator or a common person, a soldier or a general, a teacher or a master of a family ? whatever place and position thou mayest assign to me, as Socrates says, I will die ten thousand times rather than desert them. And where dost thou will me to be? in Rome or Athens, or Thebes or Gyara. Only remember me there where I am. If thou undertake to say, that Paul wrote from Ephesus his first epistle to the Corinthians (Cor. i. 16, S) in the beginning of A. D. 56. Epictetus. it is said, lived in Rome till the time of the expulsion of the philosophers by Domitian, when he retired to Xicopolis an old man, and taught there. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians (c. 15) contains his doctrine of the resurrection, which is accepted, I believe, by all, or nearly all, if there are any exceptions, who profess the Christian faith : but it is not under- stood by all in the same way. Paul teaches that Christ died for our sins, that he was buried and rose again on the third day ; and that after his resurrection he was seen by many persons. Then he asks, if Christ rose from the dead, how can some say that there is no resurrection of the dead ? " But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen ** (v. 13) ; and (v. 19), "if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." But he affirms again (v. 20) that "Christ is risen and become the first fruits of them that slept." In v. 32, he asks what advantages he has from his struggles in Ephesus, RPrCTRTUS. 3 ir sendest me to a place where there are no means fur men living according to nature, I shall not depart (from life) in disobedience to thee, but as if thou wast giving nu . the signal to retrea? : I do not leave thee, let this be far from my intention, but I perceive that thou hast no need of me. If means of living according to nature be allowed me, I will seek no other place than that in which I am, or other men than those among whom I am. Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day : these you should write, these you should read : about these you should talk to yourself, and to others. Ask a man, ("an you help me at all for this purpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if anything that is said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first will immediately relieve you. that it is not unexpected. For it is a great thing in all cases to say. I knew that I begot a son who is mortal. For so you also will say, I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave my home, I knew that 1 may be ejected from it, I knew that / may be led to prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek the place from which comes that " if the dead rise not : let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." He seems not to admit the value of life, if there is no resurrection of the dead ; and he seems to say that we shall seek or ought to seek only the pleasures of sense, because life is short, if we do not believe in a resur- rection of the dead. It may be added that there is not any direct asser- tion in this chapter that Christ ascended to heaven in a bodily form, or that he ascended to heaven in anyway. lie then says (v. 35), "But some man will say. How are the dead raised up ? and with what body do they comu .- " He answers this question (v. 36), "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die: " and he adds that " Ciod giveth it (the seed) a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body.'' We all know that the body, which is produced from the seed, is not the body " that shall be : " and we also know that the seed which is ;ul that if the seed died, no body would be produced from su< 1> x_< d. His conclusion is that tht .MI a natural body; it i- rai-.-i! ;i spiritual 1,< :> have ivason sufficient for keeping away fear and sorrow. Pmt if once you have gained exemption from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant's guard, or attend- ants on Cai'sar ? * Or shall any appointment to offices at court cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on the occasion of being named to certain func- tions, cause pain to you who have received so great authority from Zeus ? Only do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it : but show it by your acts ; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and happy. CHAPTER XXV. TO THOSK Wild FAI.I, OFF (l)KSIST) FROM THEIR PfRl'OSK. CONSIDKR as to the things which you proposed to yourself at first, which you have secured, and which you have not ; and how you are pleased when you recall to memory the one, and are pained about the other : and if it is possible, recover the things wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when we are engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows, t For the combat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancration. in which both the successful and the unsuccessful may have the greatest merit, or may have little, and in truth may be very fortu- nate or very unfortunate ; but the combat is for good fort- une and happiness themselves. Well. then, even if we have renounced the contest in this matter (for good fortune * See i. 19, u). t Compare iii. 15. 4. 3'S and happiness), no man hinders us from rencwii. combat again, and \ve are not compelled to wail for another four years that the games at Olympia may come again ; * but as soon as you have recovered and restored yourself, and employ the same xeal. you may renew the combat again : and if again you renounce it, you may again renew it : and if you once gain the victory, you are like him who has never renounced the combat. Only do not through a habit of doing the same thing (renouncing the combat) begin to do it with pleasure, and then like a bad athlete go about after being conquered in all the circuit of the games like quails who have run away. | The sight of a beautiful young girl overpowers me. Well, have I not been overpowered before? An inclina- tion arises in me to rind fault with a person ; for have I not found fault with him before ? You speak to us as if you had come off (from these things) free from harm, just as if a man should say to his physician who forbids him to bathe, Have I not bathed before ? If then the physician can say to him. Well, and what then happened to you after the bath? Had you not a fever, had you not a headache ? And when you found fault with a person lately, did you not do the act of a malignant person, of a trifling babbler ? did you not cherish this habit in you by adding to it the corresponding acts ? And when you were overpowered by the young girl, did you come off unharmed? Why then * These games were < elebrated once in four year-. \llthecircuitofthe games" means the circuit of tl.e Pythian, Isthmian, \emean, and Olympic games. A man who had contended in these four games victoriously was named IVriodoiii( 68, or Periodeutes. Upton. Th Lsed to put quails in a cockpit, as (hose who are old enough may remember that we used to put gam-cocks to fight with one another. Schweighaeuser describes a way of trying the courage of these quails from Pollux (ix. 109) ; but 1 suppose that the birds fought also with oue another. 316 EPJCTETUS. do you talk of \vhat you did before ? You ought, I think, remembering- what you did, as slaves remember the blows which they have received, to abstain from the same faults. But the one case is not like the other ; for in the case of slaves the pain causes the remembrance : but in the case of your faults, what is the pain, what is the punishment ; for when have you been accustomed to fly from evil acts ? Sufferings then of the trying character are useful to us, whether we choose or not. CHAPTER XXVI. TO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT.* ARE you not ashamed at being more cowardly and more mean than fugitive slaves ? How do they when they run away leave their masters ? on what estates do they de- pend, and what domestics do they rely on ? Do they not after stealing a little which is enough for the first days, then afterward move on through land or through sea, con- triving one method after another for maintaining their lives. And what fugitive slave ever died of hunger ? f But you are afraid lest necessary things should fail you, and are sleepless by night. Wretch, are you so blind, and don't you see the road to which the want of necessaries *" Compare this chapter with the beautiful and affecting discourses of our -Saviour on the same subject, Matthew vi. 25-34; Luke xii. 22-30." Mrs. Carter. The first verse of Matthew begins, " Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink," etc. Xo Christian literally follows the advice of this and the following verses, and he would be condemneft by the judgment of all men if he did. t It is very absurd to suppose that no fugitive slave ever died of hun- ger. How could Epictetus know that? J: res. 3'7 leads? Well, where does it lead? To the same place to which a fever leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not often said this yourself to your companions ? have you not read much of this kind, and written much ? and how often have you boasted that you were easy as to death ? Yes : but my wife and children also suffer hunger. * Well then, does their hunger lead to any other place ? Is there not the same descent to some place for them also ? Is not there the same state below for them ? Do you not choose then to look to that place full of boldness against every want and deficiency, to that place to which both the richest and those who have held the highest offices, and kings themselves and tyrants must descend? or to which you will descend hungry, if it should so happen, but they burst by indigestion and drunkenness. What beggar did you hardly ever see who was not an old man, and even of extreme old age ? But chilled with cold day and night, and lying on the ground, and eating only what is absolutely necessary they approach near to the im- possibility of dying, f Cannot you write ? Cannot you teach (take care of) children ? Cannot you he a watch- * He supposes that the man who is dying of hunger has also wife and children, who will suffer the same dreadful end. The consolation, if it is any, is that the rich and luxurious and kings will also die. The fact is true. Death is the lot of all. Kut a painful death by hunger cannot l>e alleviated by a man knowing that all must die in some way. It seems as if the philosopher expected that even women and children should be philosophers, and that the husband in his philosophy should calmly con- template the death of wife and children by starvation. This is an ex- ample of the absurdity to which even a wise man carried his philosophy ; and it is unworthy of the teacher's general good sen.-.-. I We see many old beggars who endure what others could not endure ; but they all die at last, and would have died earlier if their beggar life had begun sooner. The living in the open air and wandering about help them to last longer; but the exposure to cold and wet and to the 318 /./vr/y-./r.v. man at another person's door? But it is shameful to come to such a necessity. Learn then first what are the things which are shameful, and then tell us that you are a philosopher: but at piesent do not. even if any other man call you so, allow it. Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that of which you are not the cause, that which has come to you by accident, as a headache, as a fever? If your parents were poor, and left their property to others, and if while they live, they do not help you at all, is this shameful to you? Is this what you learned with the philosophers? Did you never hear that the thing \vhich is shameful ought to be blamed, and that which is blamable is worthy of blame ? Whom do you blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not do himself? Did you then make your father such as he is, or is it in your power to improve him? Is this power given to you? Well then, ought you to wish the things which are not given to you. or to be ashamed if you do not obtain them ? And have you also been accustomed while you were studying philosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from yourself? Lament then and groan and eat with fear that you may not have food to-morrow. Tremble about your poor slaves lest they steal, lest they run away, lest they die. So live, and continue to live, you who in name only have approached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far as you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable to those who take them up ; you who have never sought constancy, freedom from perturbation, and from passions : you who have not sought any person for the sake of this object, but many for the sake of syllo- gisms ; you who have never thoroughly examined any of want of food hastens their end. The life of a poor old beggar Is neither so long nor so comfortable as that of a man, who has a good home and sufficient food, and lives with moderation. F.PTCTETUS. 39 these appearances by yourself, Am I able to bear, or am I not able to bear ? What remains tor me to do ? But as if all your affairs were well and secure, you have been resting on the third topic,* that of things being un- changed, in order that you may posse.--.* unchanged what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of the rich, desire without attaining any end, and avoidance (fcdcXtou-) which fails in the attempt ': About security in these things you have been anxious. Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and then to have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see building a battlement all round and not encircling it with a wall ? f And what door- keeper is placed with no door to watch ? But you practice in order to be able to prove what ? Vou practice that you may not be tossed as on the sea through soph: and tossed about from what ? .Show me first what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh ; and show me the scales or the mcdimnus (the measure) ; or how long will you go on measuring the dust ? \ Ought you not to demonstrate those things which make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and ac- quiesce in the administration of the universe? Show me these. "See. I show them : I will resolve syllogisi: you/' This is the measure', slave : but it is not the thing measured. Therefore you are now paying the penalty for what you neglected, philosophy: you tremble, you lie awake, you advise with all persons : and if your delihera- * See iii. c. 2. t " Plato using the same simile teaches that last of all disciplines dia- lectic ought to be learned." Schweighaeuser. \ This is good advice. When you propose to timate things, you should first tell us what the thin. >npt to fL .ieir value ; and what is the measure or scales that you 320 j'.r/cTi-'.rrs. tions are not likely to please all, you think that you have deliberated ill. Then you fear hunger, as you suppose : but it is not hunger that you fear, but you are afraid that you will not have a cook, that you will not have another to purchase provisions for the table, a third to take off your shoes, a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, and to follow you, in order that in the bath, when you have taken off your clothes and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified you may be rubbed on this side and on that, and then the aliptes (rubber) may say (to the slave), Change his position, present the side, take hold of his head, show the shoulder : and then when you have left the bath and gone home, you may call out, Does no one bring something to eat ? And then, Take away the tables, sponge them : you are afraid of this, that you may not be able to lead the life of a sick man. But learn the life of those who are in health, how slaves live, how laborers, how those live who are genuine philosophers ; how Soc- rates lived, who had a wife and children ; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, * who attended to the school and drew water. If you choose to have these things, you will have them everywhere, and you will live in full con- fidence. Confiding in what? In that alone in which a man can confide, in that which is secure, in that which is not subject to hindrance, in that which cannot be taken away, that is, in your own will. And why have you made yourself so useless and good for nothing that no man will choose to receive you into his house, no man to take care of you ? but if a utensil entire and useful were cast abroad, every man who found it would take it up and think it a * Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno in his school, was a great example of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties : during the nigh the used to draw water from the wells for the use of the gardens : during the day he employed himself in his studies. He was the author of a noble hywn to Zeus, which is extant. /./'/(//,/y.v. ^r gain : but no man will take you up. and every man will consider you a loss. So cannot you discharge the office even of a dog, or of a cock? Why then do you choose to live any longer, when you are what you are ? Does any good man fear that he shall fail to have food? To the blind it does not fail, to the lame it does not : shall it fail to a good man ? And to a good soldier there does not fail to be one who gives him pay, nor to a laborer, nor to a shoemaker : and to the good man shall there be wanting such a person ? * Does God thus neglect the things that he has established, his ministers, his witnesses, whom alone he employs as examples to the uninstructed, both that he exists, and administers well the whole, and does not neglect human affairs, and that to a good man there is no evil either when he is living or when he is dead ? What then when he does not supply him with food ? What else does he do than f like a good general he has given me the signal to retreat ? I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the commander, praising his acts : for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when it pleases him : and while I lived, it was my duty to praise God both by myself, and to each person severally and to many. | He does not supply me with many things, nor with abundance, he does not will me to live luxuriously; for neither did he supply Hercules who was his own son; but another (Kurystheus) was king of Argos and Mycenae, and Hercules obeyed orders, and labored, and was ex- ercised. And Eurystheus was what he was. neither king of Argos nor of Mycenae, for he was not even king of him- self; but Hercules was ruler and leader of the whole earth * It seems strange that Kpictetus should make such assertions when we know that they are not true. Shortly after he himself speaks even of the good man not being supplied with food by God. t See i. 29, 29. } See i. 16, 15. 21 322 KP1CTETUS. and sea, who purged away lawlessness, and introduced justice and holiness ; * and he did these things both n and alone. And when Ulysses was cast out shipwrecked, did want humiliate him, did it break his spirit ? but how did he go off to the virgins to ask for necessaries, to beg which is considered most shameful ? f As a lion bred in the mountains trusting in his strength. Od. vi. 130. Relying on what ? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that is, on his opinions about the things which are in our power and those which are not. For these are the only things which make men free, which make them escape from hindrance, which raise the head (neck) of those who are depressed, which make them look with steady eyes on the rich and on tyrants. And this was (is) the gift given to the philosopher. But you will not come forth bold, but trembling about your trifling garments and silver vessels. Unhappy man, have you thus wasted your time till now ? What then, if I shall be sick? You will be sick in such a way as you ought to be. Who will take care of me ? God ; your friends. I shall lie down on a hard bed. But you will lie down like a man. I shall not have a con- venient chamber. You will be sick in an inconvenient chamber. Who will provide for me the necessary food ? Those who provide for others also. You will be sick like * Compare Hebrews xi. and xii., in which the Apostle and Philosopher reason in nearly the same manner and even use the same terms ; but how superior is the example urged by the Apostle to Hercules and Ulysses ! "Mrs. Carter. t The story of Ulysses asking Nausicaa and her maids for help when he was cast naked on the land is in the Odyssey, vi. 127. EPICTETUS. 323 Manes.* And what also will be the end of the sickness ? Any other than death ? Do you then consider that this the chief of all evils to man and the chief mark of mean spirit and of cowardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? Against this fear then I advise you to exercise yourself: to this let all your reasoning tend, your exer- cises, and reading ; and you will know that thus only are men made free. * Manes is a slave's name. Diogenes had a slave named Manes, his only slave, who ran away, and though Diogenes was informed where the slave was, he did not think it worth while to have him brought back. He said, it would be a .shame if Manes could live without Diogenes, and Diogenes could not live without Manes. BOOK IV- CHAPTER I. ABOTT FREEDOM. HE is free who lives as he wishes to live : * who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force ; whose movements to action are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid. Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean ? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes ; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one ; nor then do we find any bad man free.f If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man ; this is nothing to you : he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, * Cicero, Paradox, v. " Quid est enim libertas ? Potestas vivendi ut velis. Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur," etc. t " Whoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin," John viii. 34. Mrs Carter 325 326 I-.r/CTETl'S. and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows ? For he says, What. I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free, I whom no man can purchase : I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Csesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves. In the first place, most excel- lent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you ? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature ; if they were fearless, and you a coward : if they had the power of self-restraint, and you arc not abl to exercise it. And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this noth- ing to do with being a slave ? It is something, you say : but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Csesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all : but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Csesar. * we are free. However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this : did you never love any per- son, a young girl, or slave, or free ? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free ? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which *A usual form of oath. See ii. 20, 29. Upton compares the Roman expression " Per Genium," as in Horace Epp. i. 7, 94 : Quod to per Genium, clextramque, Deosque Penates Obsecro et obtestor. A/V( you did not wish tu do? have you never fluttered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet it' any man compelled you to kiss CeCSar's feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery ? Did you never go out by night to some place whither you did not Avish to go. did you not expend what you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded ? * But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see Avhat Thrasonidesf says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Cieta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would haA'c cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thra- sonides say ? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a giri, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your serv- ice in the army ? Then he calls for a sword and is angry Avith him who out of kindness refuses it ; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and entreats and \\ and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how ? was he free enough neither lo desire nor to fear? Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ .otion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about : and who will say * A lover's exclusion by his mistress \v,is a common topic, and a seri- ous cause of complaint (Lucretius, iv. 117^): At l.tcriiiians extln-iiis amat!;r lini'iaa Kloribus ct fertis operit. See also Horace, Udes, i. 25. t Thrasonides was a charact.-r in <>uc of Mciuuuler's plays, entitled " The Hated." 328 EP1CTETUS. that this lion is free ? * Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish. condition ? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape ? f and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardiy live and with suffering pine away ; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural lib- erty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this ? What do you say ? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose : you deprive me of all this, and say. what harm is it to you ? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught, escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is one way to freedom, and that is to die content : and he writes to the Persian king-, You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you ca fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them ? If you r.urh them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave yr. fishes do ; for if you catch a fish, it dies- ; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the prep- aration for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it ? The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why ? *lt must have been rather difficult to manage a tame lion; but we read of such things among the Romans. Seneca, Epp. 41. I The keeping of birds in cages, parrots and others, was also common among the Romans. Ovid (Amor. ii. 6) has written a beautiful elegy on the death of a favorite parrot. Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collect- ors of twentieths ?* No; but because lie imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered arid unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is si-t free ; and forthwith having no place where he can eat. he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup : then he either works with his body and en- dures the most dreadful things ; f and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery ; or even if he is become rich, being a man with- out any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his happiness laments and desires to l>e a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery ? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness ; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave of many instead of to one. But however, he says, iflshall acquire rings, J then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, if I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. lie obtains military service. He suffers as much as a fie slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a * See ii. i, 26. The Publicani were men who farmed this and other taxes. A tax of a twentieth of the value of a slave when manumitted was established at an early time (Livy, %-ii. if>K It appears from this passage that the manumitted slave paid the tax out of his savings (pecu- lium). See ii. I, note 7. t The reader may guess the meaning. t A o\d riuj; was worn by the Kquites ; anil accordingly to desirt- tin- gold ring is the same a.s to desire to be raised to the Equestrian class. 33 EPICTRTUS. third. After this, when he has put the finishing strok? (the colophon) * to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering inti. tlv_ assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery not to be a fool, but to learn what Social; taught, what is the nature of each thing lhi-.t exists, a:.d thai a maa should not rashly adapt preconception. t-> the scv:ral things which arc. f For this is the cause to m~n of . '1 'heir evils, the not being able to adapt the gen .ral preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man Ihriks that he is sick : not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father : mother ; and another again that C'a'sar is not favorahl., Lo him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who ..a^ no; a preconception of that which is bad, that it in hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against ? One preconception is not repugnant to another, J only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided ? He answers not to be Qesar's friend. He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter ; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar's friend, nevertheless he has failed in finding what he sought. For what ij that which every man seeks ? To live secure, to be happy, to do everything as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance ? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he * The Colophon. See page 1 54, note. After the words " most splended slavery" it is probable that some \vordshaveaccidentallybeen omitted in the MSS. I Compare i. 2, 6. \ Compare i. 22. EPh 33' happy? Of whom shall we inquire ? What more trust- worthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar's friend? Come forward and tell us when did sleep more quietly, now or before you became Ceesur'h friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I entreat and do not mock me : you know not what mi.- i . after, and sleep doe.s not come to me ; but one comes and says, Ca>sar is already awake, he is now going forth : then come troubles .ml fires. Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained : and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the w.iilo being anxious that he >t say or do anything foolish. And what -lo you suppose that he is afraid of ; lest h ; should be lashed like a slave ? How can he expe--' ,- ny*hin^ so good? No, but as bjfits so great a man, Caesar's iri^nd, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free trouble, and take your gymnastic, exercise more quietly? In line, which kind of life did you prefer? your presenior your former life ? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own mis- fortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Ca- Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free ? Seek, and you will find ; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the in- quiry. What do they say ? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. I. it possible then that he who obtains the greatest '*ood can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away 332 /-.wr //: from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property ; for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice con sul. Be it so. Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable ? How should it not seem so ? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean ? It is not possible. When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free ; ;.nd not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consul- ship : and call these men little slaves vho for the sake of lit- tle matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be. This is admitted also. Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self-governing ? Certainly. Whom- soever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold ; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, " Mas- ter," even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, "Wretch that I am, how much I suffer," call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining-, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. * If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compul- sion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune ; and *Sic praetextatos referunt Artaxata mores. Juv. ii. 170. See page 10, note. EPICTETUS. 333 if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia : * say that his master is from home : lie will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return ? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away ? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters ; and these cir- cumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circum- stances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, hut he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods ; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the gieatest advantage on us is di' ;>.< 1 h-n we \n> assume that a certain person has the power ot cent- the greater-! advantages ; therefore lit- is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person ha power of conferring the greatest advantages, it '. a nec- essary consequence that the conclusion trom those premises must be false. What then is that which makes a man iree from hin- drance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else iiuiht be diM m r ered. turnalia. See ]>age 81, note. At iliis season the slaves h.ul lilfcrty to enjoy thriu-.-lvr - and to t.ilk lu-cly with ilit-ir masters. Hem r yi ^ i' '''- " ;!>c!Ulc JJciembri, I . ita mujurvs voluerum, utere. 334 EPICTETUS. What then is that which \vhen we write makes us free fro n\ hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing- the lute ? The science of playing- the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way : but ex- amine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance ? No. Is it possible for him to be unimpeded ? No. Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then : whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others. What do you mean ? When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not? It is not in my power. When you wish it to be healthy ? Neither is this in my power. When you wish it to be handsome? Nor is this. Life or death? Neither is this in my power. Your body then is another's, sub- ject to every man who is stronger than yourself? It is. But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please? No. And your slaves ? No. And your cloth-- '- ? Xo. And your house ? No. And your horses? Not one of these things. And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power ? This also is not in my power. Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of the kind? I know not. Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false ? * No man. In the matter of assent then you are free * He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii 22, .\2. " In the matter of assent then," this is the third " locus " or division in A/V 335 from hindrance and obstruction. Granted. Well : and can a man force you to desire to move toward that to which you do not choose? He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move toward it. If then, you despise death ami bonds, do you still pay any regard to him ? X<>. Is tlu-n the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours? It is my act. It is your own act then also to desire to move toward a thing : or is it not so? It is my own act. But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that ? This also is your act. What then if I have attempted to walk, sup- pose another should hinder me. What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent? No : but my poor body. Yes, as he would do with a stone. Granted : but I no longer walk. And who told you that walking is your act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was tree from hindrance, to desire to move : but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own. Granted this philosophy (iii. 2. 1-5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Kpictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, " I believe," etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to or to f.\nrc-s the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express their belief when they have- it not. The ca>e of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may V- strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in sonic way be punished by God, if he denies that which he ]> i'he unbeliever will not have the same mot reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his absent to that which he does not believe or 336 EPICTETl'S. also. And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish? No man. And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man corhpel you ?' He cannot do this : but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining' what I de- sire. If you desire anything which is your own, and one of the thing-s which cannot be hindered, how will he hin- der you ? He cannot in any way. Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance ? Must I then not desire health ? By no means, nor any- thing else that belongs to another : for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave ; you have subjected your neck, if you admire anything not your own, to every- thing that is dependent on the power of others and perish- able, to which you have conceived a liking. Is not my hi- A,-,-tnt 1 here remains nothing then t... u&ubie lain it he expresses his asseni to that which he does not believe, except the the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe ; oi in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to anything which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under con- sideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept volun- tarily a thing as true, when he believes that it is not true; and tliU .u t of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Vet it is said (Mark xvi. 16) in the received text, as it now stands, " He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned " (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians ; but all men do not admit the expla- nation to be sufficient ; and it does not concern the present subject. 77: 77 -.V. 337 hand my own It is a part of your o\vn body ; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of everything which is stronger. And why do I say your hand ? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press,* and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur ; if you do, you will receive blows, and nevertheless you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with re- spect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits be- longing to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, f barley, fodder. Let these also go : get rid of them quicker and more read- ily than of the ass. When you have made this preparation, and have prac- ticed this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man ? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil ? and who has power over these things ? who can take them away ? who can impede them ? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about *The Greek word is of 1'ersian origin (Herodotus, viii. 98). Il means here the seizure of animals for military purposes when it is necessary. t Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the Word in Epictetus is " fern-it taK :e-." I y being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report) ? I do not say. that your child is dead for how could you bear that ? but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us ? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man ? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and \vhether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not. And who is your evidence for this ? who else than yourselves ? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedi- ence to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countenance ; you who court old women* and old men, and say, I cannot do this : it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power ? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free ? But Aprullaf has hindered me. Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom, when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner Horace Sat. ii. 5. t Aprulla is a Roman woman's name. It means some old woman who is courted for her money. EPICTETUS. 349 a divine power.* But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women's noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physi- cians whether they are sick unto death ? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much-admired magis- tracies and honors, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave. even of freemen. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a pra?tor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion f and endure his arrogance and servile insolence ; for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by * Compare Plato (Symposium, p. 206) : " All men conceive both as to the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age, our nature desires to procreate. But it cannot procreate in that which is ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and woman is generation ; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting." See what is said in ii. 23, note 10 on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth ; and therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man's duty is to labor in some way, and if necessary, to earn his living and sus tain the life which he has received; and this is also a divine act. Paul'- opinion of marriage is contained in Cor. i. 7. Some of his teaching on this matter has been justly condemned. He has no conception of tin- true nature of marriage; at least he does not show that he has in thi> chapter. His teaching is impracticable, contrary to that of Kpictctn*., and to the nature and constitution of man ; and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who affect to receive his teaching; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body of Christians, who recommend and commend the so-called religious, and unmarried life, I I-Vlicion. See i. 19. 350 F.PfCTETUS. the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not pos- sess it entire.* But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because lie had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him. nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would rather have let it go and be yours, than he v/guld have followed you for it : if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg : if of all his body, all his poor body : his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them or to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he Was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every- thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who ad- ministers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes : "For this reason," he says, " Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the king of the Persians and with Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. " Was it because he was born of free parents ? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves, could not talk with * Epictetus alludes to his lameness; compare i. S, 14,!. 16, 20, and other passages. Upton. EPZCTETUS. 35* them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because la\v* is every- thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free. And that you may not think that I show you the ex- ample of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various direc- tions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own ; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit : friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the oht-dirnco due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he e.\; himself to danger most unsparingly ; f and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliber- ate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal) if it so happened-! And what difference did that make to him ? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honorable char;. * The sense of " law " can be collected from what follows. Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law. (Criton, c. 1 1, etc.) I Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Odium. He is said to have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier i philosopher, a union O f qua!;' >mmon. (Plato's Apology.) t Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrants, who at that time governed Athcn- ;iu.- and to bring him to be ), rates rcfi order. Few men would have done what he di< : . (Plato's Apology; M Antiminu.;, vii. 66.) 35 2 These are things which could not ho assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defense of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife ? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say ? * did he consider the power of escape as an unex- pected gain ? By no means : he considered what was fit and proper ; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act ; he who would not put the Athe- nians to the vote when they clamored that he should do so,f he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who dis- coursed in such a manner about virtue and right behavior. It is not possible to save such a man's life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? "If," said Socrates. " I had gone off to * The Dialogue of Plato, named Criton, contains the arguments which were used by his friends to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and the reply of Socrates. t This alludes to the behavior of Socrates when he refused to put to the vote the matter of the Athenian generals and their behavior after the naval battle of Arginusae. The violence of the weather prevented the commanders from collecting and honorably burying those who fell in the battle ; and the Athenians after their hasty fashion, wished all the commanders to be put to death. But Socrates, who was in office at this time, resisted the unjust clamor of the people. Xenophon, Ilellenica, L c. 7, 15; Plato, Apologia; Xenophon, Memorab. i. i, j8. 353 Thessaly, would you have taken care of them : and if I depart to the \vorld below, will there be no man to take care of them ? " See how he gives to deatli a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, " I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if 1 die, I shall be useful to no man." For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man ? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought ? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. * *This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued : the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. " The life of the dead," says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero's friend, " rests in the remembrance of the living." Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught ; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or couidnot have used. Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man's daily life and his intercourse with other men ; in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will ; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, " Know thyself : " and the object of his philosophy was to com- prehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations ; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all. .is Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not 2 3 354 EPICTETUS. Think of these things, these opinions, these words . look to these examples, if you would be free, if you de- sire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great ? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw them- selves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished : and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given ? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging, and in a word to give up all which is not your own ? If you will not. you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul ; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Ceesar's residence), you will no less be a slave : and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to the end of man ; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates '.vas conformable to his life and teaching. " Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it (Xenophon, Apol. 22), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution fora holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind." ( > Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christ us, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by ]!auris very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers ill disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in EP1CTETUS. 355 ihose who have obtained them ; and to those \vho have not yet obtained them there is an imagination, that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them ; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present ; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which arc desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have labored for those things, so transfer your labor to these : be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free ; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man : be seen about a philosopher's doors : you will not disgrace yourself by being seen ; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least : the trial (attempt)'is not disgraceful. some resj>ects nrore just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. " What prejudices, what blindness must a man have," says Rousseau, " when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary ! The death of Socrates philosophizing tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire ; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that a man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps ; Jesus in his horrible punishment pray* for liis savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are >f a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God." (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. t<36. Amsterdam, 1765.) 356 Ll'lCTETUS. CHAPTER II. OX FAMILIAR INTIMACY. To this matter before all you must attend, that you be never so closely connected with any of your former inti- mates or friends as to come down to the same acts as he does.* If you do not observe this rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises in your mind, " I shall seem disobliging to him and he will not have the same feeling toward me," remember that nothing is done without cost, nor is it possible for a man if he does not do the same things to be the same man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will have, to be equally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the same with your former self ; or being superior, not to ob- tain from your friends the same that you did before. For if this is better, immediately turn away to it, and let not other considerations draw you in a different direction. For no man is able to make progress (improvement), when he is wavering between opposite things ; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to this only, to work out this only, give up everything else. But if you will not do this, your waver- ing will produce both these results : you will neither im- prove as you ought, nor will you obtain what you for- merly obtained. For before by plainly desiring the things which were worth nothing, you pleased your associates. * He means that you must not do as he does, because he does this or that act. The advice is in substance, Do not do as your friend does simply because he is your friend. EPICTKTrs. 357 But you cannot excel in both kinds, and it is necessary that so far as you share in the one, you must fall short in the other. You cannot, when you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, be agreeable to them as you were before. Choose then whether you will be a hard drinker and pleasant to your former associates or a sober man and disagreeable to them. You cannot, when you do not sing- with those whom you used to sing, be equally loved by them. Choose then in this matter also which of the two you will have. For if it is better to be modest and orderly than for a man to say, lie is a jolly fellow, give up the rest, renounce it, turn away from it, have nothing to do with such men. But if this behavior shall not please you. turn altogether to the opposite: be- come a catamite, an adulterer, and act accordingly, and you will get what you wish. And jump up in the theater and bawl out in praise of the dancer. But char- acters so different cannot be mingled : you cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you intend to be Thersites,* you must be humpbacked and bald: if Aga- memnon, you must be tall and handsome, and love those who are placed in obedience to you. CHAPTER III. WHAT THINGS WK Stiol I.I) K\(H.\\(iK KOK OTHKK THINGS. KKKP this thought in readiness, when you lose anything external, what you acquire in place of it ; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss ; neither if you See Iliad, ii. 216; and for the description of Ayanu-innon, ITud, ii> 167. 358 EPICTETUS. have got a horse in place of an ass, or an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit of money, nor in place of idle talk such tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of lewd talk if you have acquired modesty. If you remember this, you will always maintain your character such as it ought to be. But if you do not, consider that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that whatever pains you take about yourself, you are going to waste them all and overturn them. And it needs only a few things for the loss and overturning of all, namely a small deviation from reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, he has no need of the same means as he has need offer saving it : but if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost ; and if he does not do this purposeh r , but has been neglecting his duty a little, the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in this case also : if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have up to this time col- lected is gone. Attend therefore to the appearances of things, and watch over them ; for that which you have to preserve is no small matter, but it is modesty and fidelity and constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of mind undisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a word liberty. For what will you sell these things ? See what is the value of the things which you will obtain in ex- change for these. But shall I not obtain any such thing for it ? See, and if you do in return get that, see what you receive in place of it. I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship : he possesses a praetorship, I possess modesty. But I do not make acclamations where it is not becoming : I will not stand up where I ought not ; * for I am free, and a friend of God, and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) anything else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor good re- port, nor in fact anything. For he (God) does not a"liov. r * He alludes to the factions in the theaters, iii. 4, 4; iv. 2-9. Upton. EPICTETUS. 359 ) claim (sock) them : for if ho had cli< sen, he \vould have made them good for me ; but he has not don. and lor this reason I cannot transgress his commands.* Preserve that which is your own good in everything ; and as to every other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave consistently with reason in respect to them, con- tent with this only. If you do not, you will be unfortu- nate, you will fail in all things, you will be hindered, you will be impeded. These are the laws which have been sent from thence (from God) ; these are the orders. Of these laws a man ought to be an expositor, to these he ought to submit, not to those of Masurius and Cassius. f CHAPTER IV. TO THOSE WHO AKK DESIROUS OK PASSINC I. IKK I\ TRANQUILLITY. RK.MI -MHI-.K that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of traveling abroad, ami of learning. For to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What then is the differ- ence between desiring to be a senator or not desiring- to be one ; what is the difference between desiring power or being content with a private station ; what is the differ- * See i. 25 ; iv. 7, 17. t Masurius Sabinus was a great Roman jurisconsult in the times of Augustus and Tiberius. He is sometimes named Masurius only (Persius, v. 90). C. Cassius Longinus was also a jurist, and, it is said, a descend- ant of the Cassius, who was one of the murderers of the dictator C. Cscsar. He lived from the time of Tiberius to that of Vespasian. 360 PICTETUS. ence between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse ; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading ? For as saluta- tions and power are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read ? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of enduring labor.* But if you refer reading to the proper end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it. And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things ? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do some- thing : I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep f of actii.c" with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion tc things external : \ and then that I may attend to men, what they * See Bishop Butler's remarks in the Preface to his Sermons, vol. ii. He speaks of the "idle way of reading and considering things : by thi-> means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of without the pain 01 attention : neither is any part of it more put to the account of idleness, one can scarce forbear saying, is spent with less thought than great part of that which is spent in reading." t Sed vene nurnerosque modosquee cliscere vitae. Hor. Epp. ii. 2, 144. M. Antoninus, iii. r {"The readers perhaps may grow tired with being so often told what they will find it very difficult to believe, That because externals air not in our power they are nothing to us. Hut in excuse for this frequent repetition.it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, !>; rejecting stronger aids. ( >ne cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the KriCTKTUS. 361 say. how they are moved : * and this not with any bad disposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule ; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then shall I cease to commit them ? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not : thanks to r,od. Come, when you have done these things and have at tended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many ? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading ? are you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exercise ? Why then do you not act consist- ently in all things, both when you approach Ca?sar and when you approach any person ? If you maintain your- self free from perturbation, free from alarm, and steady ; if you look rather at the things which are done and hap- pen than are looked at yourself; if you do not envy those \vho are preferred before you ; if surrounding circum- stances do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want ? Books ? How or for what purpose ? for is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life ? and is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than this ? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for this purpose that you very few, who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this foun- dation. No one perhaps ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no one ever spoke so well in support of the argument as Epictettis. Y.-i notwithstanding his great abilities and the force of his example, one linds him strongly complaining of the want of success; and on. from this circumstance as well as from others in the Stok writings, That virtue cannot be maintained in the world without the hope f a future reward." Mrs. Carter. ' Compare Horace, Sat. i. 4. 133 : N'eque enim cum lectuliis, etc. 362 EPICTETUS. used to practice exercise ; for this purpose were used the halteres (weights),* the dust, the young men as antago- nists ; and do you seek for those things now when it is the time of action ? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances present themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some* cannot be com- prehended, we should not choose to distinguish them but should choose to read what has been written about com- prehension. What then is the reason of this ? The reason is that we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in a way conformable to nature the appearances presented to us ; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, f and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all means the things which are not in your power ? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action, not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well : if we read what is said about desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid : if we read what is said about duty (offi- cium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor con- trary to these relations ; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conformable (to the rela- * See i. 4, iii. 15, 4 ; and i. 24, i, i. 29, 34. The athletes were oiled, but they used to rub themselves with dust to be enabled to lay hold of one another. ; M. Antoninus, i. 17, thanks the gods that he did not waste his time in the resolution of syllogisms. Rpi< 363 tions), and we should be reckoning: not what so far we been accustomed to reckon : To-day I Inn many 1 have written so many ; but (we shou'.d To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers ; I have not employed my desire ; I have u>ed avoidance only with respect to things which are within the power of my will ; I have not been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of another ; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my co-operation with others ; and so we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we do not know that we also in another . are like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have power : you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man ; but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have a dread of water like a man who ]-> mad. Or how will you still be able to say as Socrates' did, If so it pleases God, so let it be? Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to discourse daily with the young men, would have readily served iu militar peditions so often as he did ; and would he not have- lamented and groaned, Wretch that I am : 1 must now he .tble here, when I might be sunning myself in the :m ? Why. was this your business, to sun yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be t hindrance, free from impediment? And could he still rates, if he hi d lamented in this way : how would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison ? * In short remember this, that what you shall prize which * Plato in the Phaedon (c. 4) says that Socrates in his prison wrote a hymn to Apollo. 364 is beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But these things are out of the power of the will, not only power (authority), but also a private condition : not only occupation (business), but also leisure. Now then must I live in this tumult ? Why do you say tumult ? I mean among many men. Well what is the hardship ? Suppose that you are at Olympia : imagine it to be a panegyris (public assembly), where one is calling out one thing, an- other is doing another thing, and a third is pushing an- other person : in the baths there is a crowd : and who ot us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it unwill- ingly ? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious about what happens. Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sharp ; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like leisure : it is a desert : I do not like a crowd ; it is confusion. But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought : talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to you), work up your preconceptions. If you fall into a crowd, call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a fes- tival : try to enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleasant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men ? We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen : we are delighted when we see many ships : who is pained when he sees many men ? But they deafen me with their cries. Then your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you ? Is then the power of making use of appearances hindered ? And who prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a thing and aversion from it ; and movement toward a thing and movement from it ? What tumult (confusion) is able to do this ? Do you on.y bear in mind the general rules : what is mine, what is not mine ; what is given (permitted) to me ; EP1CTETUS. 365 what does God will that I should do now ? what does he not will ? A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to prepare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Xow he says to you : Come now to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have practiced the athletic art. How long will you be exercised alone? Now is the opportunity for you to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one of those who go about the world and are defeated. Why then are you vexed ? No contest is without confusion. There must be many who exercise themselves for the contests, many who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters, many spectators. But my wish is to live quietly. Lament then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy ? Would you not release yourself from these things? And how shall I release myself ; Have you not often heard, that you ought to remove entire; apply aversion (turning away) to those things, only which are within your power, that you ought to give up every- thing, body, property, fame, books, tumult, power, private- station ? for whatever way you turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness. Lead me. O Zeus, and thou necessity.* Is it your will that 1 should go to Koine ? I will go to Rome. To Gyara , ; 1 will go to < ivara. To Athen- will go to Athens. To prison 5 1 will go to prison. If Compart- hiu IK iri ' ii.untlu->. uuv .1 Stoic philosopher, who also w i"!,- n .i-i.- piiriiy. 366 you should once say, When shall a man go to Athens ? you are undone. It is a necessary consequence that tl-is desire, if it is not accomplished, must make you unhapp_, : and if it is accomplished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at things at which you ought not to be elated ; and on the other hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched because you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give up then all these things. Athens is a good place. But happiness is much better : and to be free from passions, free from disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation.* But happiness is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish to avoid them ? what necessity is there to carry a burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick r But if you do not so, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you. and you must serve him as an evil genius, f There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in the morning and during the day and by night ; the rule is not to look toward things which are out of the power of our will, to think that nothing is our to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune ; to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made so ; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which cannot be hindered : and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes ; *He alludes to the practice of dependents paying formal visits in the morning at the houses of the great and powerful at Ror"e refers to Virgil, Georgics, ii. 461. t Compare i. 19, 6. I'.PICTETUS. 367 and even if a man adds that he reads all night, I C say so, if he knows not to what he should refer his read- ing. For neither do you say that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl : * nor do I. But if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover of money, not a lover of labor ; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning. But if he refers his labor to his own ruling power, that he may keep it in a state eonformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles) ; for these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season, f If you see anything which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling : if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastin /gish- ness ; if you are not moved by what you formerly wcrj, and not in the same way as you once were, you can rate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province? These things come to you from yourself and * Compare Horace, Sat. i. 5, 83. 1 See Antoninus, vi. 2; and ix. 6, "Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct directc-d to social good, and thy : disposition of contentment with everything which happens that is enough." 368 I'-t'tCTETL'S. from the gods. Remember this, who gives thet>e things and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God ? Are not the gods equally distant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on ? CHAPTER V. AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS. THE wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can pre- vent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to quarrel See in Xenophon s Symposium * how many quarrels he settled, how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles ; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son f who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For IK- remembered well that no man has in his power another man's ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this ? Not that this or that man may act according to nature : for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, la- may nevertheless be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it. only doing what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state conformable t; * See ii. 12, 15. t See Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii. ... /./'/dpxom.) and enjoys no honor to be happy ; or to show yourself to them as rich and in power? For the second of these things belong to a man who is boastful, silly and good for nothing. And consider by what means the pretense must be supported. It will be necessary for you to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often lla- same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they arc the same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to show that you are a man honored by the great, anil to try to sup at their houses or to br suppoM-d to sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and 376 rriCTi-.Ti-s. nobler than you arc. These thing-s you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad.* Is this power given to you ? This only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to persuade other men ? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you have of convincing yourself ; and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How then have you not convinced yourself in order to learn ? At present are not things upside down? Is this what you have been earnest about doing, to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others ? For another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it ? It is a thing independent of the will. Then is it nothing to you ? It is nothing. When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced about good and evil ? Will you not then letting others alone be to yourself both * Here it is implied that there are things which God cannot do. Per- haps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will and therefore of action, he cannot at the same time exercise the contradictory powers of forcing man's will and action ; for this would be at the same time to give power and to take it away. Butler remarks (Analogy, chap. 5) " the present is so far from proving in event a discipline of virtue to the generality of men that on the contrary they seem to make it a dis- cipline of vice." In fact all men are not convinced and cannot be con- vinced in the present constitution of things " what things are good and bad." ET1C Tl: ITS. 3;; scholar and teacher? The rest of mankind will look after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a state contrary to nature : but to me no man is nearer than myself. What then is the meaning of this, that I have listened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them, but in fact I am noway made easier (more content)? Am I so stupid? And yet in all other things Mich as I have chosen. 1 have not been found very stupid : but I learned letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllogisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no other things have I from the beginning so approved and chosen (as the things which arc rational) : and now I read about these things, hear about them, write about them : I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living according to nature). In what then am I deficient ? Have the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me? Have the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor used to be applied to action, but as armor are laid aside and rusted and cannot fit me ? And yet neither in the exercises of the pahestra. nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with learning, but I turn up ami down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also. But the neccssary theorems by proceeding from which a man can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hindrance, and a free man. these I do not exercise myself in nor do I prac- tice in these the proper practice (study). Then I care about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy. Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying about yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be ? in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things, in your movements (purposes), in your preparation (for anything), in your designs (plans), and in other acts suitable to a man ? But do you trouble yourself about 378 EPICTETUS. this, whether others pity you? Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be. Are you then pruned at this? and is he who is pained, an object of pity ? Yes. How then are you pitied not as you ought to be ? For by the very aet that you feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make your- self deserving of pity. 'What then says Antisthenes ? Have you not heard? li lt is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be ill-spoken of."* My head is sound, and all think that I have the headache. What do I eare for that ? I am free from fever, and people sym- pathize with me as if I had a fever (and say), Poor man, for so Ion a time you have not ceased to have fever. 1 also say with a sorrowful countenance, In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill. What will happen then ? As God may please : and at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me. What then hinders the same being done in this case also ? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my poverty? I am not in power (not a magistrate) ; but others are : and I have the opinion which I ought to have about having and not having power. Let them look to it who pity me : but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor do I suffer cold : but because they are hungry or thirsty they think that I too am. What then shall I do for them ? Shall I go about and proclaim and say, Be not mistaken, men. I am very well, 1 do not trouble myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than right opinions. These I have free from restraint, I care for nothing at all. What foolish talk is this ? How do 1 possess right opinions when 1 am not content with being what I am. but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be ? But you say, others will get more and be preferred to * M. Antoninus, vii. 36. KPICTETUS. 379 me. What then is more reasonable than for those who have labored about anything to have more in that thing in which they have labored They have labored for r . you have labored about opinions : and they have labored for wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. See if they have more than you in this about which you have labored, and which they neglect ; if they assent r than you with respect to the natural rules (meas- ures) of things; if they are less disappointed than you in their desires ; if they fall less into things which they would avoid than you do ; if in their intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves, if in their pur- , if in their motions toward an object they take a I >ettcr aim ; if they better observe a proper behavior, as men. as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names by which we express the relations of life. But if they ex- ercise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this (power), and they do all ? But it is most unreasonable that he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who does not look after it. Xot so : but since I care about right opinions, it is more reasonable for me to have power. Yes in the matter about which ym do care, in opinions. lUit in a matter in which they have cared more than you, give way to them. The cas; is just the same as if because you have right opinions, you thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better than an archer, and in world; you should succeed better than a smith. (Jive up then your earnestness about opinions and employ your- ibout the things which you wish to acquire : and : unent, if you do not succeed ; for you d lament. Hut now you say that you are occupied with other things, that you are look^ other things : but the many say this truly, that one act has no community with another. * lie who lias risen in the morning- seeks whom (of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to whom lie shall say something- agreeable, to whom he shall send a present, how he shall please the dancing man. how by bad behavior to one he may please another. When he prays, he prays about these things : when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these things : the saying of Pythagoras Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes t he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Any- thing like a free man, anything like a noble-minded man ? And if he finds anything of the kind, he blames and ac- cuses himself: "Why did you say this? Was it not in your power to lie ? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from telling a lie. " But do you, if in- deed you have cared about nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon as you have risen in the morning reflect, " What do I want in order to be free from passion (affects), and free from perturbation ? What am I ? Am I a poor body, a piece of property, a thing of which something is said ? I am none of these. But what am I ? I am a rational animal. What then is required of me? " Reflect on your acts. Where have I omitted the things which conduce to happiness ? What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as to these things which I ought to have done ? So great then being the difference in desires, actions, * Schweig. says that he has not observed that this proverb is men- tioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv. 10, 24), "alterum opus cum altero nihil commune habet.'' I think that the con- text explains it : if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper means, and not the means which do not make for the end t F.pictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. wishes, would you still have the same share with others in those things about which you have not labored, and they have labored ? Then are you surprised it" they pity you, and are you vexed? Hut they are not vexed if you pity them. Why ? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have : but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what you have : since if you were really convinced, that with respect to what i> good, it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought o( what they say about you. rilAPTKK VII. ON KKEKDOM KKOM I FAR. WHAT makes the tyrant formidable ? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid ; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man doe-, understand what guards arc and that they have swords and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose becau.-e he wishes to die. on account of some circumstance and B to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? Xo, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then neither any man wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may 1" mitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinder.- him 382 approaching the tyrant without fear ? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property aa man whom I have instanced has about his body . also about his children and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleas- ure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords ? Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed toward these things, and the Galilaeans through habit,* and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole ? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it ; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being natu- rally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the * By the Galilaeans it is probable that Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Antoninus also mentions (xi. 3). Epictetus, a contem- porary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behavior of some of the converts. That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on undoubted authority ; and also that there always have been such, and now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed no argument against such doctrine or religious opinions ; and it is a fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be perverted, misunderstood, and misused. EflCTKTUS. tilings which surround him some arc free from hindrance and in his power, and the other tilings arc subject to hin- drance and in the power of others ; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the \vill : and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the po\vcr of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, lie will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, mag- nanimous, pious, thankful to God * for all things : in no matt.T rinding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest arc in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded. Vie a slave to those who have the power over things which he admires (desires) and fears ; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by ( iod, and he must be unjust because lie always claims more than belongs to him : and lie must of necessity be abject and mean. What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (com- prehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting everything which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty ' i'ome and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you me to po^M-ss power: Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment : When I shall go. there it will be well with me : for here al>o where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me. but } f my opinions which I shall carry olf with me : for neither can any man deprive me of them : - i . . , . _-o : ' tiiving thanks always for all to < ;.).!.' '' Mr-,. Carter. 384 EPICTETUS. but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die ? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is : it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here ? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe ? * what new thing or wondrous is going to happen ? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable ? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp ? Say this to others ; but I have considered about all these things ; no man has power over me. I have been made free ; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom ; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body ? What then is that to me ? Are you not the master of my property ? What then is that to me ? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains ? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bid- ding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. Whom then can I still fear ? Those who are over the bedchamber ? Lest they should do. what ? Shut me out ? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out ? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am * He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is composed : none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said else- where, will go to him who gave it (iii. 13, note 4). But I do not sup- pose that he means that the soul will exist as having a separate con- sciousness, EPIC TE ITS. 385 always content with that which happens ; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose.* I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him ; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires ; in a word, I have the same will. There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in ? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honored by Caesar, I say, what does he hap- pen to get ? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought ? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well ? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar's chamber) ? A man scatters dried figs and nuts : the children seize them, and fight with one another ; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not sei/.e them. Provinces are distributed : let children look to that. Money is distributed : let children look to that. Proctorships, consulships are distributed : let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves : but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then ? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled : if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it ; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I should stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar's) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor anything else "Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt," Matthew xxvi. 39. Mrs. Carter. " Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his ; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itielf most just and right and good." Bp. Butler, Sermon on the Love of God. 25 386 EPJCTETUS. of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good. Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do ? They kill. And what does a fever do ? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen : but when I have once learned that everything which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear anything which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire anything which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admira- tion) ? Why am I still confounded ? Why do I fear the guards ? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me ? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am ? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do anything foolish or unreasonable. But if lie says to me, Go and bring Leon * of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says) : Lead him away (to prison). I follow ; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off. Does the tyrant's head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him ? But you will be cast out unburied ? If the corpse is 1, I shall be cast out ; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly * See iv. i. &P1CT&TVS. 3*7 accurding as the fact is. and do not think of frightening me. These thing's are formidable to children and fools.. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's school and knows not what he is, he deserves to he full of and to flatter those whom afterward he used to flatter : (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews, but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs them and follows (under- stands) the appearances of thii. Yes. but this talk makes us despise the laws. And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk ? And the things which are in the p* of a fool are not law.f And yet sec' how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property ve that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all : it only make- exception of the opinions, which even Xeus has willed the select property of every man. What trans sion of the laws is there here, what folly ''. Where you Here Kpictetns admits that there is some power in man whii 1 the body, directs and governs it. Ho does not say what the power is nor what he supposes it to he. " Upon the whole then our origin- of sen>e and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living p< ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with." l!utler'> Analogy, chap. i. . fool does not make law. I iit<>rtunately it if we use the word law in the >tn law ; for : eral command from .1 prr-on, .in absolute kins.', for example, who has power to enforct- it on those to whom the i omm.md N addressed, or if not to enforce it. t<> puni>li fni di>< ilu- to wear a cloak and long hair, men would say well ; but if what lie professes is this rather, to keq> himself free from faults, "why do wr not rather, because i\ 1 3g o i-:rrcTF.rrs. he does not make good his professions, take front him the name of philosopher? For so \ve do in the case of all other arts. When a man sees another handling- an ax badly, he does not say. What is the use of the carpenter's art ? See ho\v badly carpenters do their work ; but he says just the contrary, This man is not a carpenter, for he uses an ax badly. In the same way if a man hears an- other singing badly, he does not say. See how musicians sing : but rather, This man is not a musician. But it is in the matter of philosophy only that people do this. When they see a man acting contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title, but they assume him to be a philosopher, and from his acts deriv- ing the fact that he is behaving indecently they conclude that there is no use in philosophy. What then is the reason of this ? Because we attach value to the notion of a carpenter, and to that of a musi- cian, and to the notion of other artisans in like manner, but not to that of a philosopher, and we judge from ex- ternals only that it is a thing confused and ill defined. And what other kind of art has a name from the dress and the hair : and has not both theorems and a material and an end? What then is the material (matter) of the philosopher ? Is it a cloak ? No, but reason. What is his end? is it to wear a cloak? No, but to possess the reason in a right state. Of what kind are his theorems ? Are they those about the way in which the beard becomes great or the hair long? No. but rather what Zeno - to know the elements of reason, what kind of a thing each of them is, and how they are fitted to one another, and what things are consequent upon them. Will you not then see first if he does what he professes when he acts in an unbecoming manner, and then blame his study (pur- suit) ? But now when you yourself are acting in a sober way, you say in consequence of what he seems to you to be doing wrong. Look at the philosopher, as if it were proper to call by the name of philosopher one \vh these things : and further. This is the conduct of a philos- opher. But you do not say, Look at the carpenter, when you know that a carpenter is an adulterer or you see him to be a glutton ; nor do you say. See the musician. Thus to a certain degree even you perceive (understand) the profession of a philosopher, but you fall away from the notion, and you are confused through want of care. But even the philosophers themselves as they are called pursue the thing (philosophy) by beginning with things- which are common to them and others on as they have assumed a cloak and grown a beard, they say, T am a philosopher. But no man will say. I am a musician, if he has bought a plectrum (fiddlestick) and a lute : nor will he say, I am a smith, if he has put on a cap and apron. But the dress is tilted to the art ; and they take their name from the art. and not from the dress. For this reason Euphrates* used to say well. A long time I strove to be a philosopher without people knowing it : and this, he said, was useful to me : tor first I knew that when I did anything well, I did not do it for the sa the spectators, but for the sake of myself: I ate well for the sake of myself ; 1 had my countenance well com: and my walk: all for myself and for ( iod. Then, as 1 struggled alone, so I alone also was in danger : in no t through me. if 1 did any tiling base orunbecoii was philosophy endangered : nor did 1 injure the many by doing anything wrong as a philosopher. For this reason those who did not know my purpose used to wonder how it was that while 1 conversed and lived altogether with all philosophers. I was not a philosopher myself. And what was the harm tor me to be known to * See Ui. 1 5, S. 392 J-.P/CTETL'S. be a philosopher by my acts and not by outward marks ''. * See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how 1 bear and forbear, how I co-operate, how I employ desire, how I employ aversion (turning from things), how I maintain the relations (to things) those which are natural or those which are acquired, how free from confusion, how free from hin- drance. Judge of me from this, if you can. But if you are so deaf and blind that you cannot conceive even Hephics- tus to be a good smith, unless you see the cap on his head, what is the harm in not being recognized by so foolish a judge ? So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher by most persons ; and they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers. Was he vexed then as we are. and did he say, And do you not think that I am a philoso- pher ? No. but he would take them and introduce them, being satisfied with one thing, with being a philosopher : and being pleased also with not being thought to be a philosopher, he was not annoyed : for he thought of his own occupation. What is the work of an honorable and good man ? To have many pupils ? By no means. They will look to this matter who are earnest about it. But was it his business to examine carefully difficult theorems? Others will look after these matters also. In what then was he.f and who was he and whom did he wish to be ? He was in that (employed in that) wherein there was hurt (damage) and advantage. If any man can damage me, he says, I am doing nothing : if I am waiting for another man to do me good. I am noth- *" Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works : thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works," Epistle of James, ii. 18. So a moral philosopher may say, I show my principles, not by what I profess, but by that which I do. t" In what then was he " seems to mean "in what did lie employ himself ? " 393 ing. If I wish for anything, and it does not happen, I am unfortunate. To such a contest he invited every man, and I do not think that he would have declined the contest with any one. What do you suppose ? was it by proclaiming and saying. I am such a man ? Far from it. but by being such a man. For further, this is the char- acter of a fool and a boaster to say, I am free from pas- sions and disturbance : do not be ignorant, my friends, that while you are uneasy and disturbed about things of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation. So is it not enough for you to feel no pain, unless you make this proc- lamation : Come together all who are suffering gout, pains in the head, fever, ye who are lame, blind, and ob- serve that I am sound (free) from every ailment. This is empty and disagreeable to hear, unless like /Esculapius you are able to show immediately by what kind of treat- ment they also shall be immediately free from di^ and unless you show your own health as an example. For such is the Cynic who is honored with the scepter and the diadem of Xeus, and says. That you may s men, ti'at you seek happiness and tranquillity not where it is, but where it is not, behold I am sent to you by (Jod as an example.* I who have neither property nor house, nor wife nor children, nor even a bed, nor coat nor household utensil ; and see how healthy I am : try me. and if you see that I am free from perturbations, hear the remedies and how I have been cured (treated). This is both phil- anthropic and noble-. But see whose work it is, the work of Xeus, or of him whom he- may judge worthy of this service, that he may never exhibit anything to the many, by which he shall make of no effect his own testi- mony, whereby he gives testimony to virtue, and bears evidence against external things : inpan- iii. < 394 His beauteous face pales not, nor from his cheeks He wipes a tear. Odyssey, 'xi. 52.S. And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks any- thing, nor man nor place nor amusement, as children seek the vintage or holidays : ahvays fortified by modesty a> others are fortified by walls and doors and door-keepers. But no\v (these men) being only moved to philosophy, as those who have a bad stomach are moved to some kinds of food which they soon loath, straightway (rush) toward the scepter and to the royal power. They let the hair grow, they assume the cloak, they show the shoulder bare, they quarrel with those whom they meet; and if they see a man in a thick winter coat, they quarrel with him. Man, first exercise yourself in winter weather : see your movements (inclinations) that they are not those of a man with a bad stomach or those of a longing woman. First strive that it be not known what you are : be a philosopher to yourself (or, philosophize to yourself) a short time. Fruit grows thus : the seed must be buried for some time. hid. grow slowly in order that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the ear before the jointed stem, it is imperfect, a produce of the garden of Adonis.* Such a poor plant are you also : you have blossomed too soon ; the cold weather will scorch you up. See what the husbandmen say about seeds when there is warm weather too early. They are afraid lest the seeds should be too luxuriant, and then a single frost should lay hold of them and show that they are too forward. Do you also consider, my man : you have shot out too soon, you *" The gardens of Adonis" are things growing in earthen vessels, carried about for show only, not for use. " The gardens of Adonis " is a proverbial expression applied to things of no value, to plants, for instance, which last only a short time, have no roots, and soon wither. Such things, we may suppose, were exhibited at the festivals of Adonis. Schweig.'s note. F.r/CTKTUS. 395 have hurried toward a little fame before the proper season : you think that you are something, a fool among fools : you will be caught by the frost, and rather you have been frost-bitten in the root below, but your upper parts still blossom a little, and for this reason you think that you are still alive and flourishing. Allow us to ripen in the natural way : why do you bare (expose") us ? why do you force us ? we are not yet able to bear the air. Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, then the second, and then the third : in this way then the fruit will natu- rally force itself out, even if I do not choosr. For who that is pregnant and filled with such great principles docs not also perceive his own powers and move toward the corresponding acts ? A bull is not ignorant of his own nature and his powers, when a wild beast shows itself, nor 'ie wait for one to urge him on : nor a dog when he sees a wild animal. But if I have the pou good man, shall I wait for you to prepare me for my own (proper) acts ? At present I have them not, believe me. \\'hy then do you wish me to be withered up before the time, as you have been withered up? CHAPTER IX. TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHAN(iKI) TO A CHARACTER OK SHAMF.LESSNI WHEN you see another man in the possession of power (magistracy), set against this the fact that you hav * "They, who are desirous of taking refuge in Heathenism from the strictness of the Christian morality, will find no great consolation in reading thi< chapter of F.pictctus." Mrs. Carter. 396 KPICTl-.TUS. the want (desire) of power ; when you see another rich, see what you possess in place of riches : for if you possess nothing in place of them, you are miserable ; but if you have not the want of riches, know that you possess more than this man possesses and what is worth much more. Another man possesses a handsome woman (wife) : you have the satisfaction of not desiring a handsome wife. Do these things appear to you to be small? And how much would these persons give, these very men who are rich, and in possession of power, and live with handsome women, to be able to despise riches and power, and these very women v/hom they love and enjoy ? Do you not know then what is the thirst of a man who has a fever? Me possesses that which is in no degree like the thirst of a man who is in health : for the man who is in health ceases to be thirsty after he has drunk ; but the sick man being pleased for a short time has a nausea, he converts the drink into bile, vomits, is griped, and more thirsty. It is such a thing to have desire of riches and to possess riches, desire of power and to possess power, desire of a beautiful woman and to sleep with her : to this is added jealousy, fear of being deprived of the thing which you love, indecent words, indecent thoughts, unseemly acts. And what do I lose? you will say. My man, you were modest, and you are so no longer. Have you lost nothing ? In place of Chrysippus and Zeno you read Aristides and Evenus ; * have you lost nothing ? In place of Socrates * Aristides was a Greek, but his period is not known. He was the author of a work named Milesiaca or Milesian stories. All that we know of the work is that it was of a loose description, amatory and licentious. It was translated into Latin by L. Cornelius Sisenna, a con- temporary of the Dictator Sulla ; and it is mentioned by Plutarch (Life of Crassus, c. 32), and several times by Ovid (Tristia, ii. 413, etc.). Evenus was perhaps a poet. We know nothing of this Evenus, but we may conjecture from being here associated with Aristides what his char- acter was. 397 and Diogelies, you admire him who is able to corrupt and seduce most women. You wish to appear handsome and try to make yourself so, though you arc not. You like to display splendid clothes that you may attract women ; and if you find any fine oil (for the hair), you imagine that you are happy. But formerly you did not think of any such thing, but only where there should be decent talk, a worthy man, and a generous conception. There- fore you slept like a man, walked forth like a man, wore a manly dress, and used to talk in a way becoming a good man ; then do you say to me, I have lost nothing ? So do men lose nothing more than coin ? Is not modesty lost ? Is not decent behavior lost ? is it that he who has lost these things has sustained no loss ? Perhaps you think that not one of these things is a loss. But there was a time when you reckoned this the only loss and damage, and you were anxious that no man should disturb you from these (good) words and actions. Observe, you are disturbed from these good words and actions by nobody, but by yourself. Fight with yourself, restore yourself to decency, to modesty, to liberty. If any man ever told you this about me, that a person forces me to la- an adulterer, to wear such a dress as yours, to per- fume myself with oils, would you not have gone and with vour own hand have killed the man who thus calumniated me? Now will you not help yourself? and how much easier is this help? There is no need to kill any man, n<;r to put him in chains, nor to treat him with contumely, nor to enter the Forum (go to the courts of law), but it is only necessary for you to speak to yourself who will be most easily persuaded, with whom no man has nun power of persuasion than yourself. First of all, condeim. what you are doing, and then when you have condemned it. do not despair of yourself, and be not in the condition of those men of mean spirit, who. when they have onee EPICTETUS. in, surrender themselves completely and are carried away as if by a torrent. But see what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen ? Rise, they say, wrestle again till you are made strong. Do you also do something of the same kind : for be well assured that nothing is more '.ractable than the human soul. You must exercise the U'ill, * and the thing is done, it is set right : as on the other hand, only fall a-nodding (be careless), and the thing is lost : for from within comes ruin and from within comes help. Then (you say) what good do I gain? And what greater good do you seek than this?f From a shameless man you will become a modest man, from a disorderly you will become an orderly man. from a faith- Jess yon will become a faithful man, from a man of un- bridJed habits a sober man. If you seek anything more than this, go on doing what you are doing : not even a God can now help you. * The power of the Willis a fundamental principle with Epictetus. The will is strong in some, but very feeble in others ; and sometimes, as experience seems to show, it is capable of resisting the power of old habits. t Virtue is its own reward, said the Stoics. This is the meaning of Epictetus, and it is consistent with his principles that a man should live conformably to his nature, and so he will have ali the happiness of which human nature is capable. Mrs. Carter has a note here, which I do not copy, and T hardly understand. It seems to refer to the Christian d<" - trine of a man being rewarded in a future life according to hi.s works : but we have no evidence that Epictetus believed in a future life, and lie therefore could not go further than to maintain that virtuous behavior is the best thing in this short life, and will give a man the happiix .,.-, which he can obtain in no other way. EPiC TUTUS. 399 < HAPTF.R X. WHAT THINGS \VK OULHT 10 I>I-SI>I>K, .\xi> WHAT THINGS WK (in.HT TO VA, THE difficulties of all men are about external things, their helplessness is about externals. What shall I do, how will it be. how will it turn out, will this happen, will that ? All these are the words of those who are turning themselves to things which are not within the power of the will. For who says. How shall I not assent to that which is false ? how shall I not turn away from the truth ? If a man be of such a good disposition as to be anxious aboutthe.se things, I will remind him of this, Why are you anxious ? The thing is in your own power : be as- sured : do not be precipitate in assenting before you apply the natural rule. On the other side, if a man is anxious (uneasy) about desire, lest it fail in its purpose and miss its end, and with respect to the avoidance of things, lest he should fall into that which he would avoid. I will first kiss (love; him. because he throws away the things about which others arc in a Mutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs his thought about his own affairs and his own condition. Then I shall say to him, if you do not choose to desire that which you will fail to obtain nor to attempt to avoid that into which you will fall, desire nothing which belongs to (which is in the p of) others, nor try to avoid any of the things which are not in -your power. If you do this rule, you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall into that which you would avoid. What is the difficulty here ? where is there room for the words. How will it be? and How will it turn out? and will this happen or that? 400 EP1CTETUS. Now is not that which will happen independent of the will ? Yes. And the nature of good and of evil is it not in the things which are within the power of the will ? Yes. Is it in your power then to treat according to nat- ure everything which happens ? Can any person hinder you? No man. No longer then say to me, How will it be ? For however it may be, you will dispose of it well,* and the result to you will be a fortunate one. What would Hercules have been if he had said, How shall a great lion not appear to me, or a great boar, or savage men ? And what do you care for that ? If a great boar appear, you will fight a greater fight : if bad men appear, you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I may lose my life in this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble act. For since we must certainly die, of necessity a man must be found doing something, either following the employment of a husbandman, or digging, or trading, or serving in a consulship or suffering from in- digestion or from diarrhoea. What then do you wish to be doing when you are found by death ? I for my part u r ould wish to be found doing something which belongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the general interest, noble. But if I cannot be found doing things so great, I would be found doing at least that which I cannot be hindered from doing, that which is permitted me to do, correcting myself, cultivating the faculty which makes use of appearances, laboring at freedom from the affects (laboring at tranquillity of mind), rendering to the rela- * See a passage in Plutarch on Tranquillity from Euripides, the great store-house of noble thoughts, from \\hii h ancient writers drew much good matter ; and perhaps it was one of the reasons why so many o his plays and fragments have been preserved. We must not quarrel with the things that are, 1 or they c.ire not for us : but lie who feels them, If he disposes well of things, farts well. EPJCTETUS. 401 lions of life their due ; if 1 succeed SD far. also (I \voui.l be found) touching on (ad\ anci:i:; to) the third topic- 'or head) safety in the forming judgments about things. ' If death surprises me when I run busy about these things, it is enough for me if lean stretch out my hands to (Jodaml say : The means which I have received from thee for seeing thy administration (of the world) and following it. I have not neglected : I have not dishonored thee by my acts : see how I have used my perceptions, see how I have used my preconceptions: have I ever blamed thee? have 1 been discontented with anything that happens, or wished it to be otherwise ? have I wished to transgress the (established) relation (of things)? That tliou hast given me life, 1 thank thee for what thou hast given : so long as I have used the things which are thine I am content ; lake them back and place them wherever thou mayest choose ; for thine were all things, thou gavest them to me.f Is it not enough to depart in this state- of mind, and what life is better and more becoming than that of a man who is in this state of mind? and what end is more happy ? \ * See iii. c. 2. t" Thine they were, and thou gavest them to me." John xvii. 6. Mrs. Carter. { " I wish it were possible to palliate the ostentation of this passage, by applying it to the ideal perfect character : but it is in a general way that Kpictetus hath proposed such a dying speech, as cannot without shocking arrogance be uttered by any one born to die. Unmixed as it is with any acknowledgment of faults or imperfections, at present, or with any sense of guilt on account of the past, it must give every solx/i reader a very disadvantageous opinion of some principles of the philos- ophy, on which it is founded, as contradictory to the voice of conscience, and formed on absolute ignorance or neglect of the condition and cir- tumsunces of such a creature as man." Mrs. Carter. I am inclined to think that Epictetus does refer to the "ideal perfect character;" but 26 402 KPfCTKTUS. But that this may be done (t!i-ii such a declaration may be made), a man must receive ibeur) no small things, nor are the things small which he must lose (go without*. You cannot both wish to be a consul and to have these things (the power of making such a dying speech), and to be eager to have lands, and these tilings also ; and to be solicitous about slaves and about yourself. But if you wish for anything which belongs to another, that which is your own is lost. This is the nature of the thing : nothing is given or had for nothing.* And where is the wonder ? If you wish to be a consul, you must keep awake, run about, kiss hands, waste yourself with exhaustion others may not understand him in this way. When Mrs. Carter says " but it is in a general . . . dying speech," she can hardly suppose, as her words seem to mean, that Epictetus proposed such a dying speech for every man or even for many men, for he knew and has told us how "bad many men are, and how few are good according to his measure and rule : in fact his meaning is plainly expressed. The dying speech may even be stronger in the sense in which Mrs. Carter understands it, in my translation, where I have rendered one passage in the text by the words, " I have not dishonored thee by my acts," which she translates, "as far as in me lay, I have not dishonored thee :*' which apparently means, 'j as far as I could, I have not dishonored thee." The Latin translation " quantum in me fuit," seems rather ambiguous to me. There is a gen- eral confession of sins in the prayer-book of the Church of England, part of which Epictetus would not have rejected, I think. Of course the words which form the peculiar Christian character of the confession would have been unintelligible to him. It is a confession which all per- sons of all conditions are supposed to make. If all persons made the confession with sincerity, it ought to produce a corresponding behavior and make men more ready to be kind to one another, for all who use it confess that they fail in their duty, and it ought to lower pride and banish arrogance from the behavior of those who in wealth and condi- tion are elevated above the multitude. But I have seen it somewhere said, I cannot remember where, but said in no friendly spirit to Christian prayer, that some men both priests and laymen prostrate themselves in humility before God and indemnify themselves by arrogance to man. * See iv. 2, 2. EPICTRTUS. 403 at other men's doors, say and do many things unworthy of a free man, send gifts to many, daily presents t> some. And what is the thing that is got ? Twelve lumd' rods (the consular fasces), to sit three or four times on the tribunal, to exhibit the games in the Circus and to give suppers in small baskets." 1 < )r. if you do not agree about this, let some one show me what tin-re is besides these things. In order then to secure freedom from passions. tranquillity, to sleep well when you do sleep, to be really awake when you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious about nothing, will you spend nothing and give no labor? Hut if anything belonging to you be lost while you are thus busied, or be wasted badly, or another obtains what you ought to have obtained, will you immediately be i at what has happened ? Will you not take into the account on the other side what you receive and for what, how much for how much ? Do you expect to have for nothing things so great ? And how can you? One work (thing) has no community with another. You cannot have both external things after bestowing care on them and your own ruling faculty : t but if you would have t: give up this. If you do not. you will have neither this nor that, while you are drawn in different ways to both.} The oil will be spilled, the household vessels will perish : (that may be), but I shall be free from passions (tranquil). There will be a fire when I am not present, and the books will be destroyed : but I shall treat appearai. .rding * Tli. hat the Romans named "sportula.-." in which the rich eatables to poor dependents who .-.tiled to pay their .irly hum. N.IIK sjrtuU )irinm I .inline p.tr\.i -.filet tiulM r.ipicnd.i ! . t You f.iniK.t ierve <;! :md M.uiunon." Matthew \\ - '\ Mis. Tarter. -. 5- 404 I'.riCTETUS. to nature. Well ; but I shall have nothing- to eat. If 1 am so unlucky, death is a harbor; and death is the harbor for all ; this is the place of refuge ; and for this reason not one of the things in life is difficult : as soon as you choose, you are out of the house, and are smoked no more.* Why then are you anxious, why do you lose your sleep, why do you not straightway, after considering wherein your good is and your evil, say. Both of them are in my power ? Neither can any man deprive me of the good, nor involve me in the bad against my will. Why do I not throw myself down and snore ? for all that I have is safe. As to the things which belong to others, he will look to them who gets them, as they may be given by him who has the power. Who am I who wish to have them in this way or in that ? is u power of selecting- them given to me ? has any person made me the dispenser oi them ? Those things are enough for me over which 1 have power : I ought to manage them as well as I can : and all the rest, as the master of them ((iod) may choose. When a man has these things before his eyes, does lie keep awake and turn hither and thither? What would he have, or what does he regret, Patroclus or Antilochus or .MenclausPt For when did he suppose that any of his friends was immortal, and when had he not before his eyes that on the morrow or the day after he or his friend must die? Yes, he says, but I thought that he would survive me and bring up my son. You were a fool for that reason, and you were thinking of what was uncertain. Why then do you not blame yourself, and sit crying like girls ? But he used to set my food before me. Because lie was alive, you fool, but now he cannot : but Automedon * Compare i. 25, 18, and i. 9. 20. i Ki>irteUis refers to the passage in the Iliad xxiv. 5, where Achilles is lamenthi ; the death of I'atroclus and cannot sleep. ErrCTKTUS. 405 wfll set it before you, and if Automedon also dies, you will find another. But if the pot, in which your meat was cooked, should be broken, must you die of hunger, because you have not the pot which you are accustomed to ? Do you not send and buy a new pot ? He says : No greater ill than this could fall on me. (Iliad xix. 321.) Why is this your ill ? Do you then instead of removing it blame your mother (Thetis) for not foretelling it to you that you might continue grieving from that time ? What do you think ? do you not suppose that Homer wrote this that we may learn that those of noblest birth, the strong- est and the richest, the most handsome, when they have not the opinions which they ought to have, are not pre- vented from berny; most wretched and unfortunate? CHAPTER XI. ABOUT PURITY (CLEAXLINESS). SOME persons raise a question whether the social feeling* i? contained in the nature of man ; and yet I think that these same persons would have no doubt that love of purity is certainly contained in it, and that if man is dis- tinguished from other animals by anything, he is distin- guished by this. When then we see any other animal cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man : and on the other hand, if the man blames an animal for being dirty, straightway as if we were making an excuse for it, we say that of course- the animal is not a :iip.U<- i. Jj, I, ii. I". 14. -. & .406 EffCTETUS. human creature. So we suppose that there is something superior in man, and that \ve first receive it from the Gods. For since the Gods by their nature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men approach them by reason, so far do they cling- to purity and to a love (habit) of purity. But since it is impossible that man's nature can be alto- gether pure being mixed (composed) of such materials, reason is applied, as far as it is possible, and reason en- deavors to make human nature love purity.* The first then and highest purity is that which is in the soul ; and we say the same of impurity. Now you could not discover the impurity of the soul as you could discover that of the body : but as to the soul, what else could you find in it than that which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which are her own ? Now the acts of the soul are movement toward an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, preparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these acts makes the soul filthy and impure? Nothing else than her own bad judgments. Consequently the impurity of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; and the purification of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions ; and the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollution. Now we ought to work at something like this in the body also, as far as we can. It was impossible for the defluxions of the nose not to run when man has such a mixture in his body. For this reason nature has made hands and the nostrils themselves as channels for carry- ing off the humors. If then a man sucks up the deflux- ions, I say that he is not doing the act of a man. It was impossible for a man's feet not to be made muddy and not be soiled at all when he passes through dirty places. For * In the text there are two words, one which means "pure," and the other which means "of a pure nature," "loving purity." EPICTKTUS. 407 this reason nature (God) has made water and hands. It wan impossible that some impurity should not remain in the teeth from eating : for this reason, she says, wash the teeth. Why ? In order that you may be a man and not a wild beast or a hog. It was impossible that from the sweat and the pressing of the clothes there should not remain some impurity about the body which requires to be cleaned away. For tin's reason water, oil, hands. towels, scrapers (strigils),* niter, sometimes all other kinds of means are necessary for cleaning the body. You do not act so : but the smith will take off the rust from the iron (instruments), and he will have tools prepared for this purpose, and you yourself wash the platter when you arc going to eat, if you are not completely impure and dirty : but will you not wash the body nor make it clean ; Why ? he replies. 1 will tell you again : in the tirst place. that you may do .the acts of a man ; then, that you may not be disagreeable to those with whom you associate. You do something of this kind even in this matter, and you do not perceive it : you think that you deserve to stink. Let it be so : deserve to stink. Do you think that also those who sit by you. those who recline at table with you, that those who kiss you deserve the same ? Hither go into a desert, where you deserve to go, or live by your- self, and smell yourself. For it is just that you alone should enjoy your own impurity. l>ut when you are in a city, to behave so inconsiderately and foolishly, to what character do you think that it belongs? If nature had intrusted to you a horse., would you have overlooked and This \v;i- th. Koin.ui " siri.uilis," whiiii was n^i-dlo- of the body in bathing "I, plKT. I''. 'I'll ^J I'.ll'l' The sttigiles " were of bronze or iron <>t" \arimi- t'..nns. They plied ti> the- body niu applied to a sweating !i ; c8 i-.i'icTh /T.S-. neglected him ? And now think that you have been in- trusted with your own body as with a horse : wa>h it, wipe it, take care that no man turns away from it. that no one gets out of the way for ii. Hut who does not get out of the way of a dirty man, of a stinking man, of a man whose skin is foul, mon- than he does out of the way of a man who is daubed with muck ? That smell is from without, it is put upon him : but the other smell is from want of care, from within, and in a manner from a body in putrefaction. But Socrates washed himself seldom. Yes, but his body was clean and fair : and it was so agreeable and sweet that the most beautiful and the most noble loved him, and desired to sit by him rather than by the side of those who had the handsomest forms. It was in his power neither to use the bath nor to wash himself, if he chose ; and yet the rare use of water had an effect. [If you do not choose to wash with warm water, wash with cold.*] But Aristo- phanes says Those who are pale, unshod, 'tis those I mean. (N'ubes, v. 1 02.) For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the air and stole clothes from the palaestra, f But all who have written about Socrates bear exactly the contrary evi- dence in his favor ; they say that he was pleasant not only to hear, but also to see. \ On the other hand they write the same about Diogenes. For we ought not even by the appearance of the body to deter the multitude from phi- losophy : but as in other things, a philosopher should show himself cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in * See what is said of this passage in the latter part of this chapter. t Aristophanes, N'ubes, v. 225, and v. 179. \ Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 12. See iii. 22, 88, AVVcVA/T.V. 409 tiio things that relate to the body. See. ye men. tli:it T nothing, that I want nothing : see how I am withmit a iiuuse, and without a city, and an exile, if it happens i<> be so,* and without a hearth I live more free from trouble and more happily than all of noble birth and than the rich. But look at my poor body also and observe that it is not injured by my hard way of living. But if a man says this to me. who has the appearance (dress) and face of a condemned man, what ( Jod shall persuade me to approach philosophy, if it makes men such persons? Far from it ; I would not choose to do so, even if I were going to become a wise man. I indeed would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements toward philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed than with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain notion (appearance) of beauty anil a desire of (attempt at) that which is becoming; and where he supposes it to be, there also he strives that it shall be. It is only necessary to show him (what it is), and to say : Young man, you seek beauty, and you do well : you must know then that it (is produced) grows in that part of you where you have the rational faculty : seek it there where you have the movements toward and the movements from things, where you have the desire toward, and the aver- sion from things : for this is what you have in yourself of a superior kind ; but the poor body is naturally only earth : why do you labor about it to no purpose ? if you shall learn nothing else, you will learn from time that the body is nothing. But if a man comes to me daubed with tilth. dirty, with a moustache down to his knees, what can I say to him, by what kind of resemblance can I lead him on ? For about what has he busied himself which resem- * Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native town Sinope in Asia on a charge of having debased or counterfeited the coinage. t"pt"ii. It i- probable that this is falsi-. .jro EJ'JCJ'KTUS. blcs beauty, that I may be ;.ible to change him and say. Beauty is not in this, but in that? \Vould you have me to tell him, that beauty consists not in being- daubed with muck, but that it lies in the rational part ? Has he any desire of beauty? has he any form of it in his mind? Go and talk to a hog, and tell him not to roll in the mud. For this reason the words of Xenocrates touched Pole- mon also ; since he was a lover of beauty, for he entered (the room) having in him certain incitements to love of beauty, but he looked for it in the wrong place.* For nature has not made even the animals dirty which live with man. Does a horse ever wallow in the mud, or a well-bred dog? But the hog, and the dirty geese, and worms and spiders do. which are banished furthest from human intercourse. Do you then being a man choose to be not as one of the animals which live with man. but rather a worm, or a spider ? Will you not wash yourself somewhere some time in such manner as you choose ? t Will you not wash off the dirt from your body ? Will you not come clean that those with whom you keep company may have pleasure in being with you ? But do you go with us even into the temples in such a state, where it is not permitted to spit or blow the nose, being a heap of spittle and of snot? When then ? does any man (that is. do 1 ) require you to ornament yourself? Far from it ; except to ornament that which we really are by nature, the rational faculty. the opinions, the actions : but as to the bod}' only so far as purity, only so far as not to give offense. But if yen are told that you ought not to wear garments dyed with * As to Polemon see iii. c. i. 14. t It has been suggested that the words s. 19 [if you do not choose to wash with warm water, wash with cold] belong to this place. I-.TTCTf-lTl'S. 411 ]>urple, go and daub your cloak with muck or tear it.* !>ut how shall 1 have a neat cloak: Man. you have water : wash it. Mi-re is a youth worthy of being lon-il. f here is an old man worthy of loving and being 1 loved in return, a fit person for a man to intrust to him a son's instruction, to whom daughters and young- men shall come, it opportunity shall so happen, that the teacher shall deliver his lessons to them on a dunghill. Let this not be SO : every deviation comes from something which is m man's nature : but this (deviation) is near being some- I'lin-r not in man's nature. rilAl'TKR XII. ON ATTKNTION. WHKN you have remitted your attention for a short time, do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose ; but let this thought be present to you, that in consequence of the fault committed to-day your affairs must be in a worse condition for all that follows. F< first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not attend- ing is formed in you : then a habit of deferring your attention. And continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it the happiness of life, proper be- havior, the being and living conformably to nature. If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the * Thus is the literal translation ; l.ut it mean*, "will , tear it ? " i t"The youth, probably, means tin .- scholar, who neglects neatness; and the old man, tin- tutor, that gives him n<> precept or example of it." Mrs. CarU-i. 4-J F.PICTI complete omission of attention is more profitable : hut if it is not profitable, why do you not maintain your at- tention constant ? To-day I choose to play. Well then, ought you not to play with attention ? I choose to sing. What then hinders you from doing so with attention ? Is there any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend ? For will you do it (anything in life') worse by using attention, and better by not attending at all ? And what else of things in life is done better by those who do not use attention ? Does he who works in wood work better by not attending to it ? Does the captain of a ship manage it better by not attending? and is any of the smaller acts done better by inattention ? Do you not see that when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to recall it. either to propriety, or to modesty, or to moderation : but you do everything that comes into your mind in obedience to your inclinations ? To what things then ought I to attend ? First to those general (principles) and to have them in readiness, and without them not to sleep, not to rise, not to drink, not to eat. not to converse (associate) with men : that no man is master of another man's will, but that in the will alone is the good and the bad. No man then has the power either to procure for me any good or to involve me in any evil, but I alone myself over myself have power in these things. When then these things are secured to me, why need I be disturbed about external things ? What tyrant is formida- ble, what disease, what poverty, what offense (from any man) ? Well. I have not pleased a certain person. Is he then (the pleasing of him) my work, my judgment? Xo. Why then should I trouble myself about him ? But he is supposed to be some one (of importance). He will look to that himself; and those who think so will also. But I have one whom I ought to please, to whom I ought to subject myself, whom I ought to obey, God and those 4>3 who are next to him.* He has placed me with myself, and has put my will in obedience to myself alone, and has given me rules for the right use of it ; and when 1 follow these rules in syllogisms, 1 do not care for any man who says anything else (different) : in sophistical argument, I care for no man. Why then in greater mat- ters do those annoy me who blame- me? What is the cause of this perturbation ? Nothing else than because in this matter (topic) I am not disciplined. For all knowl- edge (science) despises ignorance and the ignorant ; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Produce any shoemaker that you please, and he ridicules the many in respect to his own work f (business). Produce any carpenter. First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to do nothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others (or is in the powerof others), but to do as he has appointed who has the power ; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to this we ought to remember who we are. and what is our name, and to endeavor to direct our duties toward the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in this manner : what is the season for singing, what is the senson for play, and in whose presence : what will be the consequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us, whether we shall despise them ; when to jeer, and whom to ridicule ; and on what occasion to comply * Compare iv. 4, 30, i. 14. i - : and Kndieirid. C. ;,-'. and tiu remark* of Simplichi*. t Compare ii. 13, 15 and 20 ; and Antoninus, vi. 35 : " Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the (the principles) of their own arts than m.in to his own reason, whidi is common to him and the gods ? " and with whom ; and finally, in complying how to main- tain our own character. * But wherever you have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not from anything external, but from the action itself. What then ? is it possible to be free from faults (if you do all this)? It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never remitting this attention \ve shall escape at least a few errors. But now when you have said, To-morrow I will begin to attend, you must be told that you are saying this, To-day I will be shame- less, disregarded of time and place, mean ; it will be in the power of others to give me pain : to-day I will be passionate, and envious. See how many evil things you are permitting yourself to do. If it is good to use atten- tion to-morrow, how much better is it to do so to-day ': if to-morrow it is in your interest to attend, much mon to-day, that you maybe able to do so to-morrow - and may not defer it again to the third day. f CH AFTER XIII. io.UXST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR OW.X AFFAIRS. WHEN a man has seemed to us to have talked with sim- plicity (candor) about his own affairs, how is it that ;it last we are ourselves also induced to discover to him our * See iii. 14, 7, i. 29, 64. t Compare Antoninus, viii. 22: " Attend to the matter which is before ihee, whether it is an opinion, or an act, or a word. Thou sufferesi this justly, for thou choosest rather to become good to-morrow than tu Lu good to-day." F.PTCTF.Trs. 4,5 own secrets and we think this to be candid behavior? In the first place because it seems unfair for a man to have listened to the affairs of his neighbor, and not to com- municate to him also in turn our own affairs : next, be- cause we think that we shall not present to them the ap- pearance of candid men when we are silent about our own affairs. Indeed men are often accustomed to say, I have- told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing of your own ? where is this done ? Besides, we have also this opinion that we can safely trust him who has already told us his own affairs ; for the notion rises in our mind that this man could never divulge our affairs because he would be cautious that we also should not divulgr In this way also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a common dress and begins to speak ill of Caesar ; then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourself also what you think, and then you are carried off in chains.* Something of this kind happens to us generally. Now as this man has confidently intrusted iris affairs to me, shall I also do so to any man whom I meet ? (No), for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a dis- position ; but he goes forth and tells all men what h- heard. Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I resolve to l>e revenged, 1 divulge what !: told me ; I both disturb others and am disturbed nr *The man, whether a soldier or not, was an informer, one of those vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. !!<_ was what Juvenal names a "delator." Upton, who refers to the life of Hadrian by /Klius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing soldiers named Frumentarii for the purpose of discovering what wa and done in private houses. John the Uaptist (Luke iii. 14) in to the question of the soldiers, " And what shall w_- do?" said unto them " Do violence to no man, neither accuse any fa!.-- tent with your wages." Upton. 4iG KP/CTETUH. But if I remember tluit one man does not injure another, and that every man's acts injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not anything- like him, but still I suffer \vhat I do suffer through my own silly talk. True : but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor for you in turn to communicate nothing to him. Did 1 ask you for your secrets, my man ? did you communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should in return hear mine also ? If you are a babbler and think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be like you ? But why, if you did well in in- trusting your affairs to me. and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be so rash ? It is just the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it. and you should come and de- posit with me your wine that I might put it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did not intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it. How then is there any equality here ? You intrusted your af- fairs to a man who is faithful and modest, to a man who thinks that his own actions alone are injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing external is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man who has dishonored his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money or some office or promotion in the court (emperor's palace), even if you should be going to murder your own children, like Medea ? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness) ? But show yourself to me to be faithful, mod- est, and steady : show me that you have friendly opin- ions : show that your cask has no hole in it ; and you will see how I shall not wait for you to trust me with your affairs, but I myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not choose to make use of a good vessel ? Who does not value a benevolent and faithful adviser ? who will not willingly receive a man /./'/(//-. vr.v -n; who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of the dim'- culty of his circumstances. and 1>y this very act to ease the burden, by taking a part of it. True: but I trust you: you do not trust inc. In the first place, not even do you trust me, but you are a bab- bler, and for this reason you cannot hold anything ; for indeed, if it is true that you trust me, trust your affairs to me only ; but now whenever you see a man at leisure, you seat yourself by him and say : Brother, I have no friend more benevolent than you nor dearer ; I request you to listen to my affairs. And you do this even to those who are not known to you at all. Hut if you really trust me, it is plain that you trust me because I am faith- ful and modest, not because I have told my affairs to you. Allow me then to have the same opinion about you. Show me that if one man tells his affairs to an- other, he who tells them is faithful and modest. For if this were so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every man, if that would make me faithful and modest. I5ut the thing is not so, and it requires no common opinions (principles). If then you see a man who is busy about things not dependent on his will and subjecting his will to them, you must know that this man has ten thousand persons to compel and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to compel him to declare what he knows : * but a little girl's nod, if it should so happen, will move him, the blandishment of one who beloi ( 'u-sar's court, desire of a magistracy or of an inheritance, and things without end of that sort. You must remem- ber then among general principles that secret discourses (discourses about secret matters) require fidelity and cor- responding opinions. Hut where can we now find these easily? Or if you cannot answer that question, let some * The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract con- fessions. Seu ii. 6, iS. 2 7 4l g EPICTETUS. one point out to me a man who can say : 1 care only about the things which are my own, the things which are not subject to hindrance, the things which are by na- ture free. This I hold to be the nature of the good : but let all other things be as they are allowed ; I do not con- cern myself. THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL i. OF things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion, movement toward a thing, desire, aversion (turning from a thing) ; and in a word, whatever are our own acts : not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hin- drance : but the things not in our power are weak, slav- ish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. Remem- ber then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men : but if you think that only which is your own to be your own. and if you think that what is another's, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man will do nothing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you. you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm. If then ymi desire (aim at) such great things remember that you must not (attempt to; lay hold of them with a small effort ; but you must leave alone some things en- lin-ly. and postpone others for the present. I5ut if you 419 4 o /://( v/; / T.v. \vish for these things also (such great things), and power (office) and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things (power and wealth) because you aim also at those former things (such great things) : certainly you will fail in those things through which alone happiness and freedom are secured. Straightway then practice saying to every harsh appearance. * You are an appearance, and in no manner what you appear to l>e. Then examine it by the rules which you possess, and by this first and chiefly, whether it relates to the things which art- in our power or to the things which are not in our power : and if it relates to anything which is not in our power, be ready to say, that it does not concern you. II. Remember that desire contains in it the profession (hope) of obtaining that which you desire ; and the pro- fession (hope) in aversion (turning from a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you attempt to avoid : and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate ; and he who falls into that which he would avoid is unhappy. If then you attempt to avoid only the things contrary to nature which are within your power, you will not be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if you at- tempt to avoid disease or death or poverty, you will be unhappy. Take away then aversion from all things which are not in our power, and transfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power. But destroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire any- thing which is not in our power, you must be unfortu- * Appearances are named " harsh " or " rough " when they are " con- trary to reason and over exciting and in fact make life rough (uneven) by the want of symmetry and by inequality in the movements." Sim- plicius. v. (i. 5). KP/CTRTUS. note : but of the things in our power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet is before you. But em- ploy only the power of moving toward an object and re- tiring from it ; and these powers indeed only slightly and with exceptions and with remission. III. In everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the (description, notion) ; what is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest ? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love ; for when it has been broken, you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed. IV. When you are going to take in hand any act, remind yourself what kind of an act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what happens in the bath : some splashing the water, others pushing against one another, others abusing one another, and some stealing : and thus with more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, I now intend to bathe, and to main- tain my will in a manner conformable to nature. And so you will do in every act : for thus if any hindrance to bathing shall happen, let this thought be ready ; it was not this only that I intended, but I intended also to main- tain my will in a way conformable to nature : but I shall not maintain it so, if I am vexed at what happens. Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but 422 F.riCTETUS. by the opinions about the things : for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, it would have seemed so to Socrates ; for the opinion about death, that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded or dis- turbed or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves, that is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame others for his own bad condition ; it is the act of one who has begun to be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction is com- pleted, neither to blame another, nor himself. VI. Be not elated at any advantage (excellence), which be- longs to another. If a horse when he is elated should say, I am beautiful, one might endure it. But when you are elated, and say, I have a beautiful horse, you must know that you are elated at having a good horse.* What then is your own ? The use of appearances. Consequently when in the use of appearances you are conformable to nature, then be elated, for then you will be elated at some- thing good which is your own. VII. As on a voyage when the vessel has reached a port, if you go out to get water, it is an amusement by the way to pick up a shell-fish or some bulb, but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, and you ought to be con- stantly watching if the captain should call, and then you must throw away all those things, that you may not be bound and pitched into the ship like sheep : so in life also, if there be given to you instead of a little bulb and a shell a wife and child, there will be nothing to prevent (you * Upton proposes to read " elated at something good which is in the horse.'' T think tlint he is right. I-.PICJ'KTUS. 433 from taking them). But if the captain should call, run to the ship, and leave all those things without regard to them. But if you are old, do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are called you make default. VIII. Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish ; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life. IX. Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lameness is an im- pediment to the leg, but not to the will. And add this reflection on the- occasion of everything that happens : for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not to yourself. X. On the occasion of every accident (event) that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use. If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to resist is tem- perance (continence). If labor (pain) be presented to you, you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will find it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the (proper) habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them. XI. Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. Is your child dead ? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored. Has your 424 EPJCTETUS. estate been taken from you? Has not then this also been restored ? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what is it to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back? So long as he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to another, as travelers do with their inn. XII. If you intend to improve, throw away such thoughts as these : if I neglect my affairs, I shall not have the means of living : unless I chastise my slave, he will be bad. For it is better to die of hunger and so to be released from grief and fear than to live in abundance with perturbation : and it is better for your slave to be bad than for you to be unhappy.* Begin then from little things. Is the oil spilled ? Is a little wine stolen ? Say on the occasion, at such price is sold freedom from perturbation : at such price is sold tranquillity, but nothing is got for nothing. And when you call your slave, consider that it is possible that he does not hear : and if he does hear, that lie will do nothing" which you wish But matters ruv not ~o well him, but altogether well with you. that it shrn.. in his power for you to be not disturbed t XIII. If you would improve, submit to be considered without sense and foolish with respect to externals. Wish t>- l.c considered to know nothing : and if you shall seem to ' He means. Do not chastise your slave while you are in a p.-. lest, while you are trying to correct him, and it is very doubtful whet her you will succeed, you fall into a vice which is a man's great and only calamity. Schweig. t The passage seems to mean, that your slave has not the power of disturbing you, Irecause you have the power of not being disturbed. Hee Upton's note on the text. /:/'/< //: i T.S. 425 some to be a person of importance, distrust yourself. For you should know that it is not easy both to keep your will in a condition conformable to nature and (to secure) external things: but if a man is careful about the one, it is an absolute necessity that he will neglect the other. XIV. If you would have your children and your wife and your friends to live forever, you are silly ; for you would have the things which are not in your power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others to be yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults, you are a fool ; for you would have badness not to be badness, but something else.* But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are able to do that. Practice then this which you are able to do. He is the master of every man who has the power over the things, which another person wishes or does not wish, the power to con- fer them on him or to take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither wish for anything nor avoid anything which depends on others : if he does not observe this rule, he must be a slave. XV. Remember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that something is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your hand and take a por- tion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. I ><> *\Vheu Epictetus says "you would have badness not to be badness," he means that " badness " is in the will of him who has the hadiu-sv, and as you wish to subject it to your will, you are a fool. It is your business, as far as you can, to improve the slave: you may wish this. It is his business to obey your instruction : this is what he ought to wish to do; but for him to will to do this, that lies in himself, nut hi yon. Schweig. 426 not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with respect to children, MI with respect to a wife, so with respect to magisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some time a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take none of the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then you will be not only a fel- low-banqueter with the gods, but also a partner with them in power. For by acting thus Dioger.es and Heracleitus and those like them were deservedly divine, and were so called. XVI. When you see a person weeping in sorrow either when a child goes abroad or when he is dead, or when the man has lost his property, take care that the appearance do not hurry you away with it. as if he were suffering in external things.* But straightway make a distinction in your own mind, and be in readiness to say, it is not that which has happened that afflicts this man, for it does not afflict an- other, but it is the opinion about this thing which afflicts the man. So far as words then do not be unwilling to show him sympathy, f and even if it happens so, to lament with him. But take care that you do not lament internally also. * This is obscure. " It is true that the man is wretched, not because of the things external which have happened to him. But through the fact that he allows himself to be affected so much by external things which are placed out of his power." Schweig. t It has been objected to Epictetus that he expresses no sympathy with those who suffer sorrow. But here he tells you to show sympathy, a thing which comforts most people. But it would be contrary to his teaching, if he told you to suffer mentally with another. /:/>,(//: 7 Y/.V. 427 XVII. Remember that thou art an actor in a play of such a kind as the teacher (author) may choose ; it" short, of a short one ; it loncj;, of a long one : if he wishes you to act the part of a poor man, see that you act the part natu- rally ; if the part of a lame man, of a magistrate, of a private person (do the same). For this is your duty, to act well the part that is given to you ; but to select the part, belongs to another. XVIII. When a raven has croaked inauspiciously, let not the appearance hurry you away with it; but straightway make a distinction in your mind and say, None of these things is signified to me, but either to my poor body, or to my small property, or to my reputation, or to my chil- dren or to my wife : but to me all significations are auspicious if I choose. For whatever of these things re- sults, it is in my power to derive benefit from it. XIX. can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in ii is not in your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honored before oth< possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any reason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by the appearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy nor jealousy will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish to be a general or senator or consul, but a free man : and there is only one way to this, to despise (care not for) the things which are not in our power. Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When then a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion which has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be car- ried away by the appearance. For if you once gain time anil delay, you will more easily master yourself. XXI. Let death and exile and every other thing which ap- pears dreadful be daily before your eyes ; but most of all death : and you will never think of anything mean nor will you desire anything extravagantly. XXII. If you desire philosophy, prepare yourself from the be- ginning to be ridiculed, to expect that many will sneer at you, and say, He has all at once returned to us as a philosopher ; and whence does he get this supercilious look for us ? Do you not show a supercilious look : but hold on to the things which seem to you best as one ap- pointed by God to this station. And remember that if you abide in the same principles, these men who first ridiculed will afterward admire you : but if you shall have been overpowered by them, you will bring on your- self double ridicule. XXIII. If it should ever happen to you to be turned to externals in order to please some person, you must know that you have lost your purpose in life.* Be satisfied then in * " If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Chri.-i." Gal. i. 10. Mrs. Carter. n-.rrs. 4 _^ everything with being a philosopher ; and if you wish to seem also to any person to be a philosopher, appear so to yourself, and you will be able to do this. XXIV. Let not these thoughts afflict you. I shall live unl.onored and be nobody nowhere. For if want of honor (dr^ia) j s an evil, you cannot be in evil through the means (fault) of another any more than you can be involved in any- thing base. Is it then your business to obtain the rank of a magistrate, or to be received at a banquet ? By no means. How then can this be want of honor (dishonor)? And how will you be nobody nowhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your power, in which indeed it is permitted to you to be a man of the greatest worth ? But your friends will be without assistance ! What do you mean* by being without assist- ance ? They will not receive money from you. nor will make them Roman citizens U'hi. tl.M. these arc among the thiny- not iii the power of other? - AIM who other what ho has not himself A.-i t i,irr- mo;. your friends say. that we also may have somoth.M !: I can acquire money and also keep myseil mo.u-st, and faithful and magnanimous, point out the way. and i will acquire it. But if yon ask me to lose the things which are good and my own, in order that you may gain the things which are not iMiod. see how unl.u'r and silly vmi are. Besides, which would you rather h.\e, money or .1 faithful and modest friend? For this end then rather help me to be such a man. and do not a>k me to do this by which I shall Ifise that character. Hut my country, you say. as far as it depends >n me. will be without my help. I ask again, \vh. it help do you mean- It will not have 430 I'.riC porticoes or baths through you. And what does this mean ? For it is not furnished with shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms by means of a shoemaker, is enough if every man fully discharges the work t' his own : and if you provided it with another citizen faith- ful and modest, would you not be useful to it ? Yes. Then you also cannot be useless to it. What place then, you say, shall I hold in the city ? Whatever you can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelity and modesty. But if when you wish to be useful to the state, you shall lose these qualities, what profit could you be to it, if you were made shameless and faithless ? XXV. Has any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being saluted, or in being invited to a consultation ? if these things are good, you ought to rejoice that he has obtained them : but if bad, be not grieved because you have not obtained them ; and remember that you cannot, if you do not the same things in order to obtain what is not in our power, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. For how can a man obtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a man's doors as that other man does, when he does not attend him when he goes abroad, as the other man does ; when he does not praise (flatter) him as another does? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do not part with the price, in return for which those things are sold, and if you wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of lettuces? An obolus* perhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and receives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not obtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive less than he who has got the * The sixth part of a drachma. lettuces ; for as lie has the lettuces, so you have UK > which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter also you have not been invited to a man's feast, for you did not give to the host the price at which the supper is sold : but he sells it for praise (flatter}'), he sells it for personal attention. Give then the price, if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you wish both not to give the price and to obtain the things, you are insatiable and silly. Have you nothing' then in place of the supper ? You have indeed, you have the not flat- tering of him, whom you did not choose to flatter ; you have the not enduring of the man when he enters the room. XXVI. We may learn the wish (will) of nature from the things in which we do not differ from one another : for instance. when'your neighbor's slave has broken his cup, or any- thing else, we are ready to say forthwith, that it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that when your cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when your neighbor's cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater tilings also. Js another man's child or wife dead? There is no one who would not say, this is an event incident to man. Hut when a man's own child or wife is dead, forthwith he calls out. \Y<> to me. how wretched L am. But we ought to remember how we feel when we hear that it has happened to others. XXVII. As a mark is not set i:p tor the purpose of missing the aim, so neither docs the nature of evil exist in the world.* *This passage is explained in the commentary of Simplicius (xxxiv., in Schweig.'s ed. x.xvii. p. 264), and Schweigliaciisur .igrucs with tin- 432 EP1CTETUS. XXVIII. If any person was intending to put your body in the power of any man whom you fell in with on the way. you would be A'exed : but that you put your understanding' in the power of any man whom you meet, so that if he should revile you, it is disturbed and troubled, are you not ashamed at this ? XXIX.* In every act observe the things which come first, and those which follow it ; and so proceed to the act. If you do not, at first you will approach it with alacrity, without having thought of the things which will follow ; but afterward, when certain base (ugly) things have shown themselves, you will be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the Olympic games. I also wish indeed, t for it is a fine thing. But observe both the things which come first, and the things which follow ; and then begin the act You must do everything according to rule, eat according I.; strict order?, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself as you are bid ai appointed times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold water, nor wine as you choose ; in a word, you must deliver yourself up to the exercise master nation, which is this : Nothing in the world (universe) can exist or be clone (happen) which in its proper sense, in itself and in its nature ir. bad ; for everything is and is done by the wisdom and will of God and for the purpose which he intended : but to miss a mark is to fail \i\ -tii intention ; and as a man does not set up a mark, or does not form :i pur- pose for the purpose of missing the mark or the purpose, so it is absurd (inconsistent) to say that God has a purpose or design, and that he pur- posed or designed anything which in itself and in its nature is bad. The commentary of Simplicius is worth reading, l.ut how many will read it ? Perhaps one in a million. *" Compare iii. 15, from which all this passage lias been transferred to the Encheiridion by the copyists." Upton. 433 as you do to the physician, ami then proceed to the con- test. And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the ankle out of joint, swallow much dust, sometimes l>e flogged, and after all this be defeated. When you have considered all this, if you still choose, go to the contest : if you do not, you will behave like children, who at one time play at wrestlers, another time as flute players, again as gladiators, then as trumpeters, then as tragic actor- you also will be at one time an athlete, at another a gladia- tor, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, but with your whole soul you will be nothing at all ; but like an ape you imitate everything that you see, and one thing after an- other pleases you. For you have not undertaken any- thing with consideration, nor have you surveyed it well : but carelessly and with cold desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher and having heard one speak, as F.u- phrates speaks, and who can speak as he does ? they wish to be philosophers themselves also. My man, first of all consider what kind of thing it is : and then examine your own nature, if you are able to sustain the character. Do you wish to be a pentathlete or a wrestler ? Look at your arms, your thighs, examine your loins. For differ- ent men are formed by nature for different things. Do you think that if you do these things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in the same manner, and in the same manner loathe certain things ? You must pass sleepless nights, endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be de- spised by a slave, in everything have the inferior part, in honor, in office, in the courts of justice, in every little matter. Consider these things, if you would exchange for them, freedom from passions, liberty, tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little children, you be not now a philosopher, then a servant of the publicani, then a rheto- rician, then a procurator (manager) for C&sar. These things are not consistent You must be one man. either 28 434 I'.PICTKTUS. good or bad. You must either cultivate your own ruling faculty, or external things ; you must either exercise your skill on internal things or on external things : that is, you must either maintain the position of a philosopher or thai of a common person. XXX. Duties are universally measured by relations. Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things, to submit when he is reproachful, when he inflicts blows. But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature made akin to a good father ? Mo ; but to a father. Does a brother wrong you ? Main- tain then your own position toward him, and do not examine what he is doing, but what you must do that your will shall be conformable to nature. For another will not damage you, unless you choose : but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are damaged- In this way then you will discover your duty from the relation of a neighbor, from that of a citizen, from that of a general, if you are accustomed to contemplate the relations. XXXI. As to piety toward the Gods you must know that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and that they administer the All well and justly ; and you must fix yourself in this princi- ple (duty), to obey them, and yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being ac- complished by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will never either blame the Gods, nor will you u>. them of neglecting ypu. And it is not possible for t.. be done in any other way than by withdrawing from the things which are not in our power, and by placing the /:/'/ good and the evil only in the- which are in our power. For if you think that any of the' things which an- no! in our power is good or bad, it lely nee*. that, when you do not obtain what you wish, and when you fall into those things which you do not wish, you will tind fault and hate those who are the cause of them : for every animal is formed by nature to this, t> n and to turn from the things which appear harmful and the things which are the cause of the harm, but to follow and admire the things which arc useful and the causes of the useful. It is impossible then for a poison who thinks that lie is harmed to be delighted with that which he thinks to be the cause of the harm, as it is also impossible to be pleased with the harm itself. For this reason also a father is reviled by his son, when he gives no part to his son of the things which are considered to be good : and it was this which made Polynices anil Kteoc'es * enemies, the opinion that royal power was a good. It is for this n that the cultivator of the earth reviles the Gods, for this lilor does, and the merchant, and for this reason those who lose their wives and their children. For where the useful (your interest) is. there also piety is. f Consequently he who takes care to desire as he ought and to avoid as he ought, at the same time also piety. But to make libations and to sacrifice and to See ii. 22, 13, iv. 5, 9. t "It is plain enough that the philosopher does not say this, that the reckoning of our private advantage ou;;ht to he the sole origin .tml foundation of piety toward God." Schweig., and hepr \plain the sentence, which at first appears rather obscure. Perhaps Airiun intends to say that the feeling of piety coincides with the opinion of the useful, the profitable; and that the man who takes care to desire as he ought to do and to avoid as he ought to do, thu^ and so he will secure his interest (the profitable) am! he will not ! contented. 436 offer first fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely ami not meanly nor carelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do. XXXII. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know how it will turn out, but that you are come to inquire from the diviner. But of what kind it is, you know when you come, if indeed you are a philos- opher. For if it is any of the things which are not in our power, it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. Do not then bring to the diviner desire or aversion (*K/tXru>) : if you do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in your mind that everything which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, and does not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in your power to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then with confidence to the Gods as your ad- visers. And then when any advice shall have been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you will have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, as Socrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all the inquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not given either by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is the subject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend's danger or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner whether you ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you that the signs of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a token of death or mutilation of part of the body or of exile. But reason prevails that even with these risks we should share the dangers of our friend and of our country. Therefore attend to the greater diviner, the Pythian God, who BPICTETUS. . J37 ejected from the temple him who did not assist his friend \vlien he was being murdered. XXXIII. Immediately prescribe some character and some form to yourself, which you shall observe both when you are alone and when you meet with men. And let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in few words. And rarely and when the occasion calls we shall say something ; but about none of the common subjects, nor about gladiators, nor horse-races, nor about athletes, nor about eating or drinking, which are the usual subjects ; and especially not about men, as blaming them, or praising them, or com- paring them. If then you are able, bring over by your conversation the conversation of your associates to that which is proper ; but if you should happen to be confined to the company of strangers, be silent. Let not your laughter be much, nor on mai. Rrfr.se altogether to take an oath, n il if n is not, refuse as far as you are able. id banquets which are given by strangers and l>v ignorant persons. But if ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention be carefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (the uninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, he also who keeps company with him must beconi. pure, though he should happen to be pine. Take (apply) the things whirh relate to the body as far as the bare use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves : but exclude everything which is for show or luxury. A> to pleasure with women, abstain a^ i;u ;i-. you can ,jj,S EPICTETUS. before marriage : but if you do indulge in ; ; ilo it in the \vay \vhicli is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures, or reprove them : and do not often boast that you do not indulge in them yourself. If a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you, do not make any defense (answer) to what has been told you : but reply, The man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have men- tioned these only. It is not necessary to go to the theaters often : but if there is ever a proper occasion for going, do not show yourself as being a partisan of any man except yourself, that is, desire only that to be done which is done, and for him only to gain the prize who gains the prize ; for in this way you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from shouts and laughter at any (thing or person), or violent emotions. And when you are come away, do not talk much about what has passed on the stage, except about that which may lead to your own improvement. For it is plain, if you do talk much that you admired the spectacle (more- than you ought).* Do not go to the hearing of certain persons' recitations nor visit them readily, t But if you do attend, observe gravity and sedateness. and also avoid making yourself disagreeable. When you are going to meet with any person, and par- ticularly one of those who are considered to be in a superior condition, place before yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, and you will * To admire is contrary to the precept of Epictetus ; i. 29, ii. 6, iii. 20. Upton. t Such recitations were common at Rome, when authors read their works and invited persons to attend. These recitations are often men- tioned in the letters of the younger Pliny. See Kpictetus, iii. 23. have no difficulty in making a prop ision. When you are going to any of those \vho are in great power, place before yourself that you will not find the man at home, that you will be excluded, that the door will not be opened to you, that the man will not care ; you. And if with all this it is your duty to visit him. what happens, and never say to yourself that it wa worth the trouble. For this is silly, and marks the char- acter of a man who is offended by externals. In company take care not to speak much and exces- sively about your own acts or dangers : for as it is pleas- ant to you to make mention of your dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happened to you. Take care also not to provoke laughter : for this is a slip- pery way toward vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the respect of your neighbors. It is a dang' habit also to approach obscene talk. When then any- thing of this kind happens, if there is a good opportunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this talk: but if there is not an opportunity, by your silence at least, and blushing and expression of dissatisfaction by your counte- nance, show plainly that you are displeased at such talk. XXXIV. Ifj'ouhave received the impression of any pleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it ; but let the thing wait for you, and allow yourself a certain delay on your own part. Then think of both times, of the time when you will enjoy the pleasure, and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure when you will repent and will reproach yourself. And set against these things how you will rejoice if you have abstained from the pleasure, and how you will commend yourself. 1'nt if it si-em to you seasonable to undertake (do) the thing, take i;.re that 440 the charm of it, and the pleasure, and the attraction of it shall not conquer you : but set on the other side the con- sideration how much better it is to be conscious that you have gained this victory. XXXV. When you have decided that a thing ought to be done and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form an unfavorable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoid doing the thing ; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those who shall find fault wrongly ? XXXVI. As the proposition it is either day or it is night is <>;' great importance for the disjunctive argument, but for the conjunctive is of no value,* so in a symposium (enter- tainment) to select the larger share is of great value for the body, but for the maintenance of the social feeling is worth nothing. When then you are eating with another, remember to look not only to the value for the body of the things set before you, but also to the value of the behavior toward the host which ought to be observed. XXXVII. If you have assumed a character above your strength, you have both acted in this matter in an unbecoming way, and you have neglected that which you might have ful- filled. XXXVIII. In walking about as you take care not to step on a nail or to sprain your foot, so take care not to damage your * Compare i. 25. H, etc, EP/CTETVS. .,,, own ruling faculty : and if we observe this rule in every act, we shall undertake the act with more security. XXX IX. The measure of possession (property) is to every man the body, as the foot is of the shoe. If then you stand on this rule (the demands of the body), you will maintain the measure : but if you pass beyond it, you must then of necessity be hurried as it were down a precipice. As also in the matter of the shoe, if you go beyond the (necessi- ties of the) foot, the shoe is gilded, then of a purple color, then embroidered : for there is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure. Women forthwith from the age of fourteen* are called by the men mistresses (dominie). Therefore since they see that there is nothing else that they can obtain, but only the power of lying with men. they begin to decorate themselves, and to place all their hopes in this. It i.> worth our while then to take care that they may know that they are valued (by men) for nothing else than ap- pearing (being) decent and modest and discreet. XLI. It is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things which concern the body, such as much exer- cise, much eating, much drinking, much easing of the body, much copulation. Hut these things should be done as subordinate things : and let all your care be dir to the mind. ' Fourteen was considered the age of puberty in Kini;in inalo, but in fein.ile.s the age of twelve (Justin, lust. I. tit. M). < nmp.ire ( ;.uus. i. 442 EPICTETUS. XLII. When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, re- member that he does this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is not possible then for him to fol- low that which seems right to you, but that which seems right to himself. Accordingly if he is wrong in his < ion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who has been deceived ; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction to be false, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man who has been deceived about it. If you proceed then from these opinions, you will be mild in temper to him who reviles you : for say on each occa- sion, It seemed so to him. XLIII. Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other by which it may not. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold of the act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this is the handle which cannot be borne ; but lay hold of the other, that he is your brother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of the thing by that handle by which it can be borne. XLIY. These reasonings do not cohere : I am richer than you, therefore I am better than you : I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better than you. On the contrary these rather cohere, I am richer than you, therefore my possessions are greater than yours : I am more eloquent than you, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neither possession nor speech. tPlCTETUS. 443 XLV. "Hoes a man bathe quickly ('early)? do not say that he bathes badly, but that he bathes quickly. man drink much wine? do not say that he does this badh say that he drinks much. For before you shall hav termined the opinion,* how do you know whether he is acting wrong? Thus it will not happen to you to com- prehend some appearances which are capable of being comprehended, but to assent to ot!. XLVI. On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not speak much among- the uninstructed about theorems (philosophical rules, precepts) : but do that which follows from them. For example at a banquet do not say 1.' man ought to eat. but eat as you ought to eat. For re- member that in this way Socrates + also altogether avoided ostentation : persons used to come to him and ask to be recommended by him to philosophers, and he used to take them to philosophers : so easily did he submit to being overlooked. Accordingly if any conversation should arise among uninstructed persons about any theo- rem, generally be silent ; for there - that you will immediately vomit up what you have not di- gested. And when a man shall say to you. that you know nothing, and you are not vexed, then be sure that you have begun the work (of philosophy). For even sheep do not vomit up the grass and show to the shep- herds ho\v much they have eaten ; but w!. have internally digested the pasture, they produce extcr: s. Carter translates thin. " Unless you perfectly nndr*tand the principle [from which any one a t bee iii. 23. 22; jv. S, z. U 4. EFICTETUS. wool and milk. Do you al&o show not your theorems to the uninstructed. but show the acts which come from their digestion. XLVII. When at a small cost you are supplied with everything for the body, do not be proud of this ; nor. if you drink water, say on every occasion. I drink water. But con- sider first how much more frugal the poor are than we. and how much more enduring of labor. And if you ever wish to exercise yourself in labor and endurance, do it for yourself, and not for others : do not embrace statues.* But if you are ever very thirsty, take a draught of cold water, and spit it out, and tell no man. XLVIIL The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed per- son is this : he never expects from himself profit (advan- tage) nor harm, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this : he expects all ad- vantage and all harm from himself. The signs (marks) of one who is making progress are these : he censures no man, he praises no man, he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says nothing about himself as if he were somebody or knew something ; when he is impeded at all or hindered, he blames himself: if a man praises him, he ridicules the praiser to himself : if a man censures him, he makes no defense : he goes about like weak persons, being careful not to move any of the things which are placed, before they are firmly fixed : he removes all de- sire from himself, and he transfers aversion (KK\IOIV) to those things only of the things within our power which are contrary to nature : he employs a moderate move- * See iii. 1 2. 44S ment toward everything : whether In- is considered fool- ish or ignorant, lie cares not : and in a word he watches himself as if he were an em-my and lying in ambush. XI. IX. When a man is proud because lu- can understand and explain the writings of Oirysippus. say to yourself, If Oirysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. But what is it that I wish ? To understand Nature and to follow it. I impure therefore who is the interpreter : and when I have heard that it is Chrysippus, I come to him (the interpreter). But I do not understand what is written, and therefore I seek the interpreter. And so far there is yet nothing to be proud of. But when I shall have found the interpreter, the thing that remains is to use the precepts (the les.- This itself is the only tiling to be proud of. But if 1 shall admire the exposition, what else have I been made unless a grammarian instead of a philosopher? except in one thing, that I am explaining Chrysippus instead of Homer. When then any man says to me. Read Oirysippus to me, I rather blush, when I cannot show my acts like to and consistent with his words. L Whatever things (rules) are proposed * to you [for tin- conduct of life j abide by them, as if they were laws, you would be guilty of impiety if you transgressed anyol them. And whatever any man shall say about you, do not attend to it : for this is no affair of yours. How Ion- will you then still defer thinking yourself worthy of the * This may mean, " what is proposed to you by philosophers," ;mok. S< hweighaeu^rr think', that it m.iv nx-.m " what VMM have proposed to yourx-lf : " hut he is im lim-cl I-' imtl. it simply. " \\liat i- proposed above, or taught V 446 best things, and in no matter transgressing the distinctive reason ? Have you accepted the theorems (rules), which it was your duty to agree to, and have you agreed to them ? what teacher then do you still expect that you defer to him the correction of yourself ? You are no longei a youth, but already a full-grown man. If then you are negligent and slothful, and arc continually making pro- crastination after procrastination, and proposal (intention') after proposal, and fixing day after day, after which you will attend to yourself, you will not know that you are not making improvement, but you will continue ignorant (uninstructed) both while you live and till you die. Im- mediately then think it right l<> live as a full-grown man, and one who is making proficiency, and let everything which appears to you to be the best be to you a law which must not be transgressed. And if anything labor- ious, or pleasant or glorious or inglorious be presented to you, remember that now is the contest, now are the Olympic games, and they cannot be deferred ; and that it depends on one defeat and one giving way that progress is either lost or maintained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you arc- not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates. LI. The first and most necessary place (part; in philosophy is the use of theorems (precepts), for instance, that we must not lie : the second part is that of demonstrations, for instance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie : the third is that which is confirmatory of these two and ex- planatory, for example, How is this a demonstration? For what is demonstration, what is consequence, v. contradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood ? The third 447 y on account of the second, and the second on account of the first ; but the most necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the first. But we do the contrary. For we spend our time on the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it : but we entirely neglect the first. Therefore we lie ; but the demonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready to hand. LII. In every thing (circumstance) we should hold these maxims ready to hand : Lead me, ( > Zeus, and thou O Destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go : To follow I am ready. If I choose not, I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.* But whoso nobly yields unto necessity, We hold him wise, and skill'd in things divine, t And the third also : O I'rito, if so it pleases the Gods, so K't it be ; Anytus and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me. * The first two verses are by the Stoic Cleanthes, the pupil of Zeno, and the teacher of Chrysippus. He was a native of Assus in Mysia; and Simplicius, who wrote his commentary on the Kncheiridion in the sixth century, A. I >., saw even at this late period in Assus a beautiful statue of Cleanthes erected by a decree of the Roman senate in honor of this excellent man. t The two second verses are from a play of Euripides, a writer who -upplied nv :or quotation than any ancient tragedian. I The third quotation is from the C'riton of Plato. Socrates is the speaker. The last part is from the Apology of Plato, and Socrates is also the speaker. The word* " and the third also." Schweig!; have been introduced from the comnn : Simplicius concludes his commentary thus : K|>ictctu> connects the end with the beginning, \\hich reminds us of uhat wa> said in the beginning, that the man who places the good and the evil among the things which are in our power, and not in external-., will neither be compelled by any man nor ever injured. FRAGMENTS OF EPICTETUS. THP.SE Fragments are entitled " Epicteti Fragmenta maxime ex loanne Stobaeo, Antonio, et Maximo collecta" (ed. Schweig. ). There are some notes and emendations on the Fragments ; and a short dissertation on them by Schweighaeuser. Nothing is known of Stobeeus nor of his time, except the fact that he has preserved some extracts of an ethical kind from the New Platonist Hieroclcs, who lived about the middle of the fifth century A. D. ; and it is therefore concluded that Stolueus lived after Hierocles. The frag- ments attributed to Epictetus are preserved by Slobieusin his work entitled ' Av9o\6ymi>, or Florilegium or Sermoncs. Antonius Monachus, a Greek monk, also made a Flori- legium, entitled Melissa (the bee). His date is uncertain, but it was certainly much later than the time of Stobu-us. Maximus, also named the monk, and reverenced as a saint, is said to have been a native of Constantinople, and born about A. I). 580. Some of the Fragments contained in the edition of Schweighaeuscr are certainly not from Epictetus. Many of the fragments are obscure ; but they are translated as accurately as I can translate them, and the reader must give to them such meaning as he can. I. THE life which is implicated with fortune (depends on 29 449 450 EPICTETUS. fortune) is like a winter torrent : for it is turbulent, and full of mud, and difficult to cross, and tyrannical, and noisy, and of short duration. II. A soul which is conversant with virtue is like an ever- flowing source, for it is pure and tranquil and potable and sweet and communicative (social), and rich and harmless and free from mischief. III. If you wish to be good, first believe that you are bad. IV. It is better to do wrong seldom and to own it, and to act right for the most part, than seldom to admit that you have done wrong and to do wrong often. V. Check (punish) your passions that you may not be pun- ished by them. VI. Do not so much be ashamed of that (disgrace) which proceeds from men's opinions as fly from that which comes from the truth. VII. If you wish to be well spoken of, learn to speak well (of others) : and when you have learned to speak well of them, try to act well, and so you will reap the fruit of being well spoken of. /.vv s i \ll\. Freedom and slavery, the one is the name m" virtue, and the other of vice : and both are acts of the will. Hut where there is no will, neither of them touches (affects) these things. But the soul is accustomed to be master of the body, and the things which belong- to the body have no share in the will. For no man is a slave who is free in his will. IX. It is an evil chain, fortune (a chain) of the body, and vice of the soul. For he who is loose (tree) in thr ! but bound in the soul is a slave : but on the contrary lie who is bound in the body, but free (unbound) in the soul, is free. The bond of the body is loosened by nature through death, and by vice through money : * but the bond of the soui is loosened by learning, and by experience and by discipline. XI. If you wish to live without perturbation and with pleas- ure, try to have all who dwell with you good. And you will have them good, if you instruct the willing, and dis- miss those who are unwilling (to be taught) : for there will fly away together with those who have fled away loth wickedness and slavery : and there will be left with those who remain with yon , ; , .odnos and liberty. * " He does not say ihi.- ' (hut it is bad if a man by money .-hould re- hiinself from bonds,' but he mean* ili.u ' i-ven a bad nian. if he lias money, can redeem himself from the bonds of the body and so si-cure his liberty.' " Schweig. 452 EP1CTETUS. XIL It is a shame for those who sweeten drink with the gifts of the bees, by badness to embitter reason which is the gift of the gods. XIII. Xo man who loves money, and loves pleasure, and loves fame, also loves mankind, but only he who loves virtue. XIV. As you would not choose to sail in a large and decorat- ed and gold-laden ship (or ship ornamented with gold), and to be drowned : so do not choose to dwell in a large and costly house and to be disturbed (by cares). When we have been invited to a banquet, we take what is set before us : but if a guest should ask the host to set before him fish or sweet cakes, he would be considered to be an unreasonable fellow.. But in the world we ask the Gods for what they do not give ; and we do this though the things are many which they have given. They are amusing fellows, said he (Epictetus), who are proud of the things which are not in our power. A man says. I am better than you, for I possess much land, and you are wasting with hunger. Another says, lam of con- sular rank. Another says, I am a Procurator (^irpoTros). Another, I have curly hair. But a horse does not say to a horse, I am superior to you, for I possess much fodder, and much barley, and my bits are of gold and my harness is embroidered : but he says, I am swifter than you. And every animal is better or worse from his own merit (virtue) or liis o\vn badness. Is tin-re then no virtue in man only ? and must \ve look to the hair, and our clothes and to our ancestors? XVII. The sick are vexed -\vith the physician who gives them no advice, and think that he has despaired <>t them, why should they not have the same feeling toward the philosopher, and think that lie has despaired of their com i ing to a sound state of mind, if he says nothing at all that is useful to a man ? XVIII. Those who are well constituted in the body endure both heat and cold : and so those who are well constituted in the soul endure both anger and grief and excessive joy and the other affects. XIX. Examine yourself whether you wish to be rich or to be happy. If you wish to be rich, you should know that it is neither a good thing nor at all in your power : but if you wish to be happy, you should know that it is both a good thing and in your power, for the one is a temporary loan of fortune, and happiness comes from the will. XX. when you see a viper or an asp or a scorpion in an ivory or golden box, you do not on account of the costli- ness of the material love it or think it happy, but because the nature of it is pernicious, you turn away from it and loath it : so when you shall see vice dwelling in wealth and i:i the swollen fullness of fortune. IK- not struck by 454 EPICTRTVS. the splendor of the material, but despise the false charac- ter of the morals. XXI. Wealth is not one of the good things ; great expenditure is one of the bad ; moderation is one of the good things. And moderation invites to frugality and the acquisition of good things : but wealth invites to great expenditure and draws us away from moderation. It is difficult then for a rich man to be moderate, or for a moderate man to be rich.* XXII. As if you were begotten or born in a ship, you would not be eager to be the master of it, so f For neither there (in the ship) will the ship naturally be connected with you, nor wealth in the other case ; but reason is everywhere naturally connected with you. As then reason is a thing which naturally belongs to you and is born in you, consider this also as specially your own and take care of it. XX I IT. If you had been born among the Persians, you would not have wished to live in Hollas (Clreece), but to have *" How hardly shall they that have riches enter the kingdom of God." Mark x. 23 (Mrs. Carter). This expression in Mark sets forth the dan- ger of riches, a fact which all men know who use their observation. In the next verse the truth is expressed in this form, " How hard it is for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God.'' The Stoics viewed wealth as among the things which are indifferent, neither good nor bad. t The other member of the comparison has been omitted by some ac- cident in the MSS. Wolf in his I. atin version supplied by c onjcn m.- the omission in this manner: " it:i neque in terris divitix tibi expetend;e sunt." Schweig. 455 lived in Persia happy : ><> :t you tire burn in poverty, why do you seek to grow rich, and why do you not remain in poverty and be happy ? * XXIV. As it is better to lie compressed in a narrow bed and be healthy than to be tossed with disease on a broad couch, so also it is better to contract yourself within a small competence and to be happy than to have a great fortune and to be wretched. XXV. It is not poverty which produces sorrow, but desire ; nor does wealth release from fear, but reason (the power of reasoning). If then you acquire this power of reason- * To some persons the comparison will not seem apt. Also the notion that every man should be taught to rise above the condition in which he is bom is, in the opinion of >ome persons, a better teaching. I think that it is not. Few persons have the talents and the character which enable them to rise from a low condition ; and the proper lesson for them is to stay in the condition in which they are born and to l>r content with it. Those who have the power of rising from a low condition will rise whether they are advised to attempt it or not : and generally they will not be able to rise without doing something useful Those who have ability sufficient to raise themselves from a low and at the same time to do it to the damage of society, are perhaps only few, bnt certainly there are such persons. They rise by ability, by the fraud, by bad means almost innumerable. They pain wealth, they fill high places, they disturb society, they are plagues and and the world look.- on sometimes with stupid admiration until death remove* the dueling and deceitful image, and honest men breathe freely again. In the Church of Kngland ( atechie accepted by Kpictetus. except such few words as were not applicable to the circumstances of his The second answer ends with the words " to learn and labor to pet mine own living and to do my duty in that state of life unto which il shall please God to call me." 45 6 E/'/CTKTUS. ing, you will neither desire wealth nor complain of poverty. XXVI. Neither is a horse elated nor proud of his manger and trappings and coverings, nor a bird of his little shreds of cloth and of his nest : but both of them are proud of their swiftness, one proud of the swiftness of the feet, and the other of the wings. Do you also then not be greatly proud of your food and dress and, in short, of any external things, but be proud of your integrity and good deeds. XXV II. To live well differs from living extravagantly : for the fir.st comes from moderation and a sufficiency and good order and propriety and frugality : but the other comes from intemperance and luxury and want of order and want of propriety. And the end (the consequence) of the one is true praise, but of the other blame. If then you wish to live well, do not seek to be commended for pro- fuse expenditure. XXVI I i. Let the measure to you of all food and drink be the first satisfying of the desire ; and let the food and the pleasure be the desire (appetite) itself : and you will" neither take more than is necessary, nor will you want cooks, and you will be satisfied with the drink that comes in the way. XXIX. Make your manner of eating neither luxurious nor gloomy, but lively and frugal, that the soul may not be perturbed through being deceived by the pleasures of the body, and that it may despise them : and that tin- soul 157 may not be injured by the enjoyment of present luxury and the body may not afterward suffer from disease.* XXX. Take care that the food which you put into the stomach does not fatten ('nourish) you, but the cheerfulness of the mind : for the food is changed into excrement, and ejected. and the urine also flows out at the same time : but the cheerfulness, even if the soul be separated, remains always tin corrupted, f XXXI. In banquets remember that you entertain two guests, body and soul : and whatever you shall have given to the body you soon eject : but what you shall have given to the soul, you keep always. XXX 11. Do not mix anger with profuse expenditure and serve them up to your guests. Profusion which fills the body is quickly gone ; but anger sinks into the soul and remains for a long time. Consider then that you be not trans- ported with anger and insult your guests at a great ex- pense ; but rather please them with frugality and by gentle behavior. XXXIII. In your banquets (meals) take care that those who serve (your slaves) are not more than those who are served ; * Mrs. Carter says, " 1 have not translated this fragment, because I do not understand it." Schweighaeusur say. also that he does not under- hand it. I have given what may be the meaning; but it is not an exact translation, which in the present state of the text is not possible. t This fragment is perhaps more corrupt than XXIX. 458 for it is foolish for many souls (persons) to wait on a few couches (seats). XXXIV. It is best if even in the preparations for a feast you take a part of the labor, and at the enjoyment of the food, while you are feasting, you share with those who serve the things which are before you. But if such behavior be unsuitable to the occasion, remember that you are served when you are not laboring; by those who are laboring, when you are eating by those who are not eating, when you are drinking by those who are not drinking, while you arc talking by those who are silent, while you are at ease by those who are under constraint ; and if you remember this, you will neither being heated with anger be guilty of any absurdity yourself, nor by irritating an- other will you cause any mischief.* XXXV. Quarreling and contention are everywhere foolish, and particularly in talk over wine they are unbecoming : for a man who is drunk could not teach a man who is sober, nor on the other hand could a drunken man be convinced by a sober man. But where there is not sobriety, it will appear that to no purpose have you labored for the result of persuasion, f XXXVT. Grasshoppers (cicadae) are musical : snails have no voice. Snails have pleasure in being moist, but grass- hoppers in being dry. Next the dew invites forth the * I am not sure about the exact meaning of the conclusion. t This is not a translation of the conclusion, Perhaps it is something like the meaning. Ei'lCTJ . 459 snails, and for this they crawl out : but on the contrary the sun when he is hot, rouses the grasshoppers ami they sing in the sun. Therefore if you wish to be a nv man and to hurmoni/e well with others, when over the cups the soul is bedewed with wine, at that time di permit the soul to go forth and to be polluted ; but when in company (parties) it is tired by reason, then bid her to utter oracular words ami to sing the oracles of justi XXX VII. Kxamine in three ways him who is talking with you. as superior, or as inferior, or as equal : and il he is superior, you should listen to him and be convinced by him : but if lie is inferior, you should convince him ; if he is equal, you should agree with him ; and thus you will never be guilty of being quarrelsome. XXXVI II. It is better by assenting to truth to conquer opinion, than by assenting to opinion to be conquered by truth. XXXIX. If you seek truth, you will not seek by every means to gain a victory ; and if you have found truth, you will have the gain of not being defeated. XI, Truth conquers with itself; but opinion conquers among those who are external.* XLI. It is better to live with one free man and to be without than to be a slave with many. ii i-i not cleur 460 KJ'ICTETl'S. XLII. What you avoid suffering, do not attempt to make others suffer. You avoid slavery : take care that others are not your slaves. For if you endure to have a slave, you appear to he a slave yourself first. For vice has no community with virtue, nor freedom with slavery. XLIII. As he who is in health would not choose to be served (ministered to) by the sick, nor for those who dwell with him to be sick, so neither would a free man endure to be served by slaves, or for those who live with him to be slaves. XLIV. Whoever you are who wish to be not among the num- ber of slaves, release yourself from slavery : and you will be free, if you are released from desire. For neither Aris- tides nor Epaminondas nor Lycurgus through being rich and served by slaves were named the one just, the other a god, and the third a savior, but because they were poor and delivered Hellas (Greece) from slavery.* XLV. If you wish your house to be well managed, imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. For as he did not fence his city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants by virtue and pre- served the city always free ; f so do you not cast around (your house) a large court and raise high towers, but * It is observed that the term "just " applies to Aristides; the term " god " was given to Lycurgus by the Pythia or Delphic oracle ; the name "savior" by his own citizens to Epaminondas. * Schweig. quotes Polybius i.x. 10, i, " a city is not adorned by eternal things, but by the virtue of those who dwell in it." l-.r/CTETUS. 461 strengthen the (hvellers by good-will and fidelity and friendship, and then nothing harmful will enter it. not even if the whole band of wickedness shall array itself against it. XLVI. Do not hang your house round with tablets and pict- ures, but decorate it with moderation : for the one is of a foreign (unsuitable) kind, and a temporary deception of the eyes ; but the other is a natural and indelible, and perpetual ornament of the house. XLVI I. Instead of a herd of oxen, endeavor to assemble herds of friends in your house. XLVIII. As a wolf resembles a dog, so both a flatterer, and an adulterer and a parasite, resemble a friend Take care then that instead of watch-dogs you do not without Unov.-insf it let in mischievou- y.-oi . XLIX. To be eager that your house should be admired by be- ing whitened with gypsum, is the mark of a man who has no taste : but to set off (decorate) our morals by the goodness of our communication (social habits) is tin- mark of a man who is a lover of beauty and a lover of man. L If you begin by admiring little things, you will not be thought worthy of great things : but if you despise the little, you will be greatly admired. 462 EPICTETUS. LI. Nothing- is smaller (meaner) than love of pleasure, and love of gain and pride. Nothing is superior to magna- nimity, and gentleness, and love of mankind, and benefi- cence. LII. They bring forward (they name, they mention) the peevish philosophers (the Stoics), whose opinion it is that pleasure is not a thing conformable to nature, but is a thing which is consequent on the things which are con- formable to nature, as justice, temperance, freedom. What then ? is the soul pleased and made tranquil by the pleasures of the body which are smaller, as Epicurus says ; and is it not pleased with its own good things, which are the greatest? And indeed nature has given to me modesty, and I blush much when I think of saying any- thing base (indecent). This motion (feeling) does not permit me to nuike (consider) pleasure the good and the end (purpose) of life. LIII. In Rome the women have in their hands Plato's Polity (the Republic), because it allows (advises) the women to be common, for they attend only to the words of Plato. not to his meaning. Now he does not recommend mar- riage and one man to cohabit with one woman, and then that the women should be common : but he takes away such a marriage, and introduces another kind of marriage. And in fine, men are pleased with finding excuses for their faults. Yet philosophy says that we ought not to stretch out even a finder without a reason. hPICTKTL'S. 463 LIV. Of pleasures those which occur most rarely give the greatest delight. LV. If a man should transgress moderation, the things which give the greatest delight would become the things which give the least. LV1. It is just to commend Agrippinus for this reason, that though he was a man of the highest worth, he never praised himself : hut even it another person praised him. he would blush. And he was such a man (Kpictetus said) that he would write in praise of anything disagreeable that befell him : if it was a fever, he would write : if lie was disgraced, he would write of disgi . if he were banished, of banishment. And on one (he mentioned) when he was going to dine, a n. brought him news that Nero commanded him to go into banishment ; on which Agrippinus said, Well then we will dine at Aricia.* LVII. Diogenes said that no labor wa> good, unless the end (purpose) of it was coura/c and strength of the soul, but not of the body. I.VI11. \- a true balance is neither corrected by a true balance nor judged by a false balance, so also ajust judge is neither vted by just judges nor is he judged (condemned) by unjust judges. i. i. 464 LIX. As that which is straight does not need that which is straight, so neither does the just need that which is just. LX. Do not give judgment in one court (of justice) before you have been tried yourself before justice. * LXI. If you wish to make your judgments just, listen not to (regard not) any of those who are parties (to the suit), nor to those who plead in it, but listen to justice itself. LXI I. You will fail (stumble) least in your judgments, if you yourself fail (stumble) least in your life. LXIII. It is better when you judge justly to be blamed unde- servedly by him who has been condemned than when you judge unjustly to be justly blamed by (before) nature. LXIY. As the stone which tests the gold is not at all tested itself by the gold, so it is with him who has the faculty of judging. LXY. It is shameful for the judge to be judged by others. LXVI. As nothing is straighter than that which is straight, so nothing is juster than that which is just. * Compare Iviii. LXVIL Who among us docs not admire the act of Lycurgus the Lacedremonian ? For after lie was maimed in one of his eyes by one of the citizens, and the' voting man wa- livered up to him by the people that lie might punish him as he chose, Lycurgus spared him: and after instructing him and making- him a good man he brought him into the theater. When the Lacedemonians expressed their sur- prise. Lycurgus said, I received from you this youth when he was insolent and violent : I restore him to you gentle and a good citizen. LXVIII. Pittacus after being wronged by a certain person and having the power of punishing him let him go, saying. Forgiveness is better than revenge : for forgiveness is the sign of a gentle nature, but revenge the sign of a savage nature.* LXIX. But before everything this is the act of nature to bind together and to fit together the movement toward the ap- pearance of that which is becoming (fit) and useful. LXX. To suppose that we shall be easily despised by others, if we do not in every way do some damage to those who first show us their hostility, is the mark of very ignoble and foolish men : for (thus) we affirm that the man is considered to be contemptible because ;;f his inability to do what is good (useful). * I'ittacus was one of the seven wise men, as they are named, authorities state that he lived in thr M-venth ceiiiniy I'. < I'.y this maxim he anticipated one cf the Christian doctrine^ I 3 466 KPICTETCS. LXXI. When you are attacking (or going to attack) any person violently and with threats, remember to say to yourself first, that you are (by nature) mild (gentle) ; and if you do nothing savage, you will continue to live without repentance and without blame. I, XXII. A man ought to know that it is not easy for him to have an opinion (or fixed principle), if he does not daily say the same things, and hear the same things, and at the same time apply them to life. LXXI 1 1. [Nicias was so fond of labor (assiduous) that he often asked his slaves, if he had bathed and if he had dined.] LXXIV. [The slaves of Archimedes used to drag him by force from his table of diagrams and anoint him ; and Archi- medes would then draw his figures on his own body when it had been anointed.] LXXV. [Lampis the shipowner being asked how he acquired his wealth, answered. With no difficulty, my great wealth ; but my small wealth (my first gains), with much labor.] LXXVI. Solon having been asked by Periander over their cups (irapa TT&TOV), since he happened to say nothing, Whether he was silent for want of words or because he was a fool, replied ; No fool is able to be silent over his cups. //' 4 <>7 I XXVII. Attempt on every occasion to provide for nothing so much as that which is safe: for silence is safer than speak- ing. And omit speaking whatever is without sense and reason. I.XXYTH. As the fire-lights in harbors by a few pieces of dry wood ;i great llaine and give sufficient help to ships which are wandering on the s.-;i ; so also an illustrious man in a state which is tempest-tossed, while he is himself sat with a few things, does great services to his citb I.XXIX. A- if you attempted to manage a ship, you would tainly learn completely the steersman's art, [so if you would administer a state, learn the art of managing a For it will be in your power, as in the first case, to manage the whole ship, so in the second case also to man- age the whole state. If you propose to adorn your city by the dedication of offerings (monuments), first dedicate to yourself (decorate yourself with) the noblest offering of gentleness and jus- tice and beneficence. LXXXI You will do the greatest services to the st-t". if you raise not the roofs of the houses, but th /eiift : for it is bt-ttrr that great souls should dwr!l in houses than for mean - ;reat hou 468 EPICTETUS. LXXXII. Do not decorate the walls of your house with the valu- able stones from Euboea and Sparta ; but adorn the minds (breasts) of the citizens and of those who administer the state with the instruction which comes from Hellas (Clreece). For states are well governed by the wisdom (judgment) of men, but not by stone and wood.* LXXXII I. As. if you wished to breed lions, you would not care about the costliness of their dens, but about the habits of the animals : so. if you attempt to preside over your citi- zens, be not so anxious about the costliness of the build- ings as careful about the manly character of those who dwell in them. LXXXIV.t As a skillful horse-trainer does not feed (only) the good colts and allow to starve those who are disobedient to the rein, but he feeds both alike, and chastises the one more and forces him to be equal to the other : so also a careful man and one who is skilled in political power, attempts to treat well those citizens who have a good character, but does not will that those who are of a contrary character should be ruined at once : and he in no manner grudges both of them their food, but he teaches and urges on with more vehemence him who resists reason and law. *The marbles of Carystus in Eubcea and the marbles of Taenarum near Sparta were used by the Romans, and perhaps by the Creeks also. for architectural decoration. f This fragment contains a lesson for the administration of a state. The good must be protected, and the bad must be improved by disci- pline and punishment. LP1CTETCS. 469 I. XXXV. As a goose is not frightened by cackling nor a sheep l) V bleating, so let not the clamor of a senseless multitude alarm you. LXXXVI. As a multitude, when they without reason demand of you anything of your own, do not disconcert you, so do not be moved from your purpose even by a rabble when they unjustly attempt to move you. LXXXVII. What is due to the state pay as quickly as you can, and you will never be asked for that which is not due. LXXXVI 1 1. As the sun does not wait for prayers and incantations to be induced to rise, but immediately shines and is saluted by all : so do you also not wait for clappings . and shouts and praise to be induced to do good doer of good voluntarily, and you will U- In-loved as much as the sun. LXXXIX. Neither should a ship rely on one small anchor, nor should life rest on a single hope. We ought to stretch our legs and stretch our hopes only to that which is possible. XCL When Thai.- asked what is most universal, he 470 answered, Hope, for hope stays with those \vho have nothing else. XC1I. It is more necessary to heal the soul than the body, for to die is better than to live a bad life. XCIII. Pyrrho used to say that there is no difference between dying and living : and a man said to him. Why then do you not die ? Pyrrho replied, Because there is no dif- ference. XCIV.* Admirable is nature, and, as Xenophon says, a lover of animated beings. The body then, which is of all things the most unpleasant and the most foul (dirty), we love and take care of: for if we were obliged for five days only to take care of our neighbor's body, we should not be able to endure it. Consider then what a thing it would be to rise in the morning and rub the teeth of another, and after doing some of the necessary offices to wash those parts. In truth it is wonderful that we love a thing to which we perform such services every day. I fill this bag, and then * Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 4. r;. The body is here, and else- where in Epictetus, considered as an instrument, which another uses who is not the body; and that which so uses the body must be something which is capable of using the body and a power which possesses what we name intelligence and consciousness. Our bodies, as Bishop Butler says, are what we name matter, and differ from other matter only in be- ing more closely connected with us than other matter. It would be easy to pass from these notions to the notion that this intelligence and power, or to use a common word, the soul, is something which exists independ- ent of the body, though we only know the soul while it acts within and on the body, and by the body. /v ' 471 I empty it :* what is more troublesome? Hut I must art as the servant of God. For this reason I remain (:. and I endure to wash this miserable body, to feed it and to clothe it. But when I was younger, < iod imposed on me also another tiling, and I submitted to it. Why then do you not submit, when Nature who has given us this body takes it away? I love the body, you may Well, as I said just now. Nature gave you also this love of the body : but Nature >ays. Leave it now, and have no more trouble (with it). XCY. When a man dies young, he blames the gods. When he is old and does not die, he blames the gods because he suffers when he ought to have already ceased from suffer- ing. And nevertheless, when death approaches, he wishes to live, and sends to the physician and entreat- him to omit no care or trouble. Wonderful, he said men, who are neither willing to live nor to die. XCYI. To the longer life and the worse, the shorter life, if it is better, ought by all means to be preferred. When we are children our parents deliver us pedagogue to take care on all occasions that we sul: harm. Hut when we are become men. (iod delivers us to our innate conscience to take care of us. This -uanlian- ship then we must in no way despise, for we shall both displease ( iod and be eneniie- to our own COnSCietl This hag is the body, or that "part ( it which !u>hU tin- food which is t:it '<*>. 472 '. XCVIII. [We ought to use wealth as the material for some act, not for every act alike.] XCIX. [Virtue then should be desired by all men more than wealth which is dangerous to the foolish : for the wicked- ness of men is increased by wealth. And the more a man is without sense, the more violent is he in excess, for he has the means of satisfying his mad desire for pleasures. ] C. What we ought not to do. we should not even think of . . fe doing. CI. Deliberate much before saying or doing anything, for you will not have the power of recalling what has been said or done. CII. Every place is safe to him who lives with justice. cm. Crows devour the eyes of the dead, when the dead have no longer need of them. But flatterers destroy the souls of the living and blind their eyes. CIV. The anger of an ape and the threats of a flatterer should be considered as the same. CV. Listen to those who wish to advise what is useful, but Awry/. yy.Y. 47 j not to those who are eager to Hatter on all occasion.- : lor the first really see what is useful. Imt the second look to that which agrees with the opinion of those who po power, and imitating the shadows of bodies they assent to what is said by the powerful. CVI. The man who gives advice ought first to have regard to the modesty and character (reputation) of those whom he advises ; for those who have lost the capacity of blushing are incorrigible. CVI I. To admonish is better than to reproach : for admonition is mild and friendly, but reproach is harsh and insulting : and admonition corrects those who are doing wrong, but reproach only convicts them. CVIIL Give of what you have to strangers and to those wh<> have need : for he who gives not to him who wants, will not receive himself when he wants. CIX A pirate had been cast on the land and was perishing through the tempest. A man took clothing and gave it to him, and brought the pirate into his house, and supplied him with everything else that was necessary. When the man was reproached by a person for doing kindm the bad, he replied, I have shown this regard not to the man, but to mankind.* *Mrs. Carter in her notes often refers to ilic Christian precepts, hut she says nothing here. The fragment is not from Kpictetus ; lint, whether the story is true or not, it is an example of the behavior of a wise and pood man. .174 &PICTETVS. CX. A man should choose (pursue) not every pleasure, but the pleasure which leads to goodness. It is the part of a wise man to resist pleasures, but of a foolish man to be a slave to them. CXII. Pleasure, like a kind of bait, is thrown before (in front of) everything which is really bad, and easily allures greedy souls to the hook of perdition. CXIII. Choose rather to punish your appetites than to be punished through them. CXIV. No man is free who is not master of himself. CXV. The vine bears three bunches of grapes : the first i> that of pleasure, the second of drunkenness, the third of violence. CXVI. Over your wine do not talk much to display your learn- ing ; for you will utter bilious stuff. C'XYII. He is intoxicated who drinks more than three cups : and if he is not intoxicated, he has exceeded moderation. EP1 47 5 ( 'XVII I. Let your talk of God be renewed every day, rather than your food. rxix. Think of God more frequently than you breathe. (XX. If you always remember that whatever you are doing in the soul or in the body, God stands by as an inspector, you will never err (do wrong) in all your prayers and in all your acts, but you will have God dwelling with you.* (XXI. As it is pleasant to see the sea from the land, so it is pleasant for him who has escaped from troubles to think of them. CXXI1. Law intends indeed to do service to human life, but it is not able when men do not choose to accept her serv- ices ; for it is only in those who are obedient to her that she displays her special virtue. CXXIIt A.s to the sick physicians are as saviors, so to tl who are wronged are the laws. < XXIV. The justest laws are those which are the tn This i.- tin.- doctrine of God hdii^: in man. See tin i 476 A/'/ CTE '1 //.S. cxxv. To yield to law and to a magistrate and to him who is wiser than yourself, is becoming. CXXVI. The things which are done contrary to law are the same as things which are not done. CXXVII. In prosperity it is very easy to find a friend ; but in ad- versity it is most difficult of all things. CXXVII I. Time relieves the foolish from sorrow, but reason relieves the wise. CXXIX. He is a wise man who does not grieve for the things which he has not, but rejoices for those which he has. cxxx. Kpictetus being asked how a man should give pain to his enemy answered, By preparing himself to live the best life that he can. CXXX I. Let no wise man be averse to undertaking the office of a magistrate : for it is both impious for a man to with- draw himself from being useful to those who have need of our services, and it is ignoble to give way to the worthless : for it is foolish to prefer being ill-governed to governing well. CXXXII. Nothing is more becoming to him who governs than t despise no man and not show arrogance, but to preside over all with equal care. (XXXIII. [In poverty any man lives (can live) happily, but very seldom in wealth and power. The value of poverty ex- cels so much that no just man would exchange poverty for disreputable wealth, unless indeed the richest of the Athenians Themistocles, the son of Neocles, was better than Aristides and Socrates, though he was poor in virtue. But the wealth of Themistocles and Themistocles himself have perished and have left no name. For all things die with death in a bad man, but the good is eternal.]* CXXXIV. Remember that such was, and is, and will be the nature of the universe, and that it is not possible that the things which come into being can come into being otherwise than they do now ; and that not only men have partici- pated in this change and transmutation, and all other living things which are on the earth, but also the things which are divine. And indeed the very four elements are changed and transmuted up and down, and earth becomes water and water becomes air, and the air again is trans- muted into other things, and the same manner of tran>- mutation takes place from above to In-low. If a man attempts to turn his mind toward these thoughts, and to persuade himself to accept with willingness that which is necessary, he will pass through life with complete modera- tion and harmony. *This fragment is not from Kpictrtu-;. 478 cxxxv. He who is dissatisfied with things present and what is given by fortune is an ignorant man in life : hut he who bears them nobly and rationally and the things which pro- ceed from them is worthy of being considered a good man. ( 'XXX VI. All things obey and serve the world (the universe), earth and sea and sun and the rest of the stars, and the plants of earth and animals. And our body obeys it also both in disease and in health when it (the universe) chooses, both in youth and in age, and when it is passing through the other changes. What is reasonable then and in our power is this, for our judgment not to be the only thing which resists it (the universe) : for it is strong and superior, and it has determined better about us by admin- istering (governing) us also together with the whole. And besides, this opposition also is unreasonable and does nothing more than cause us to be tormented uselessly and to fall into pain and sorrow. The fragments which follow are in part assigned to Epictetus. in part to others. CXXXV1I. Contentment, as it is a short road and pleasant, has great delight and little trouble. CXXXYIll. Fortify yourself with contentment, for this is an impreg- nable fortress. EPICTETUS. 479 CXXXIX. Let nothing be valued more than truth : not even selec- tion of a friendship which lies without the influence of the affects, by which (affects) justice is both confounded (disturbed) and darkened. * CXL. Truth is a thing immortal and perpetual, and it gives to us a beauty which fades not away in time nor does it take away the freedom of speech which proceeds from justice; but it gives to us the knowledge of what is just and law- ful, separating from them the unjust and refuting them. CXLI. We should not have either a blunt knife or a freedom of speech which is ill-managed. CXLII. Nature has given to men one tongue, but two ears, that we may hear from others twice as much as we speak. CXLI 1 1. Nothing really pleasant or unpleasant subsists by nature, but all things become so through habit (custom). CXLIV. Choose the best life, for custom (habit) will make it pleasant CXLV. Be careful to leave your sons well instructed rather th *The meaning of the second part is confused and uncertain. 480 EPICTETUS. rich, for the hopes of the instructed are better than the wealth of the ignorant. CXLVI. A daughter is a possession to her father which is not his own. CXLVII. The same person advised to leave modesty to children rather than gold. CXLVIII. The reproach of a father is agreeable medicine, for it contains more that is useful than it contains of that which gives pain. CXLIX. He who has been lucky in a son-in-law has found a son : but he who has been unlucky, has lost also a daughter. CL. The value of education (knowledge) like that of gold is valued in every place. CLI. He who exercises wisdom exercises the knowledge which is about God CLIL Nothing among animals is so beautiful as a man adorned by learning (knowledge). CLin. We ought to avoid the friendship of the bad and the enmity of the good. EPICTETUS. 481 CLIV. The necessity of circumstances proves friends and de- tects enemies. CLV. When our friends are present, we ought to treat them well ; and when they are absent, to speak of them well. CLVI. Let no man think that he is loved by any man when he loves no man. CLVI I. You ought to choose both physician and friend not the most agreeable, but the most useful. CLVIII. If you wish to live a life free from sorrow, think of what is going to happen as if it had already happened. CLIX. Be free from grief not through insensibility like the irra- tional animals, nor through want of thought like the fool- ish, but like a man of virtue by having reason as the con- solation of grief. CLX. Whoever are least disposed in mind by calamities, and in act struggle most against them, these are the best men in states and in private life. 3* 482 EPICTETUS. CLXI. Those who have been instructed, like those who have been trained in the palaestra, though they may have fallen, rise again from their misfortune quickly and skill- fully. CLXII. We ought to call in reason like a good physician as a help in misfortune. CLXIII. A fool having enjoyed good fortune like intoxication to a great amount becomes more foolish. CLXIV. Envy is the antagonist of the fortunate. CLXV. He who bears in mind what man is will never be trou- bled at anything which happens. CLXVI. For making a good voyage a pilot (master) and wind are necessary : and for happiness, reason and art CLXVII. We should enjoy good fortune while we have it, like the fruits of autumn. CLXVIII. He is unreasonable who is grieved (troubled) at th things which happen from the necessity of nature. EPICTETUS, 483 SOME FRAGMENTS OF EPICTKTI s OMITTED BY UPTON AND BY Ml. I HUM IIS. CLXIX. Of the things which are, (iod has put some of them in our power, and some he has not. In our own power he has placed that which is the best and the most important, that indeed through which he himself is happy, the use of appearances. For when the use is rightly employed. there is freedom, happiness, tranquillity, constancy : and this is also justice and law, and temperance, and every virtue. But all other things he has not placed in our power. Wherefore we also ought to be of one mind with God, and making this division of things, to look after those which are in our power ; and of the things not in our power, to intrust them to the I and \\ ! it should require our children, or our country, or our body, or anything else, willingly to give them up.* CLXX. When a young man was boasting in the theater and saying, I am wise, for I have conversed with many men ; Epictetus said, I also have conversed with many rich men, but I am not rich. CLXX1. The same person said, It is not good for him who IKIS been well taught to talk among the untaught, as it is not right for him who is sober to talk among those who are- drunk. * This is a valuable fragment, and I think, a genuine f Moment of Epictetus. There is plainly a defect in the text, which Schweigh.. has judiciously supplied. 484 JEPICTETUS. CLXXII. Epictetus being asked, What man is rich, answered, He who is content (who has enough). CLXXIII. Xanthippe was blaming Socrates, because he was mak- ing small preparation for receiving his friends : but Soc- rates said, If they are our friends, they will not care about it ; and if they are not, we shall care nothing about them. CLXXIV. When Archelaus was sending for Socrates to make him rich, Socrates told the messengers to return this answer : At Athens four measures (chcenices) of meal are sold for one obolus (the sixth of a drachme), and the fountains run with water : if what I have is not enough (sufficient) for me, yet I am sufficient for what I have, and so it becomes sufficient for me. Do you not see that it was with no nobler voice that Polus acted the part of CEdipus as king than of CEdipus as a wanderer and beggar at Colonus ? Then shall the good man appear to be inferior to Polus, and unable to act well every character (personage) im- posed on him by the Deity ? and shall he not imitate Ulysses, who even in rags made no worse figure than in the soft purple robe ? CLXXV. What do I care, he (Epictetus) says, whether all things are composed of atoms, or of similar parts or of fire and earth ? for is it not enough to know the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures of the desires and the aver- sions, and also the movements toward things and from them ; and using these as rules to administer the affairs of EP1CTE TVS. 485 life, but not to trouble ourselves about the things above us ? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind : and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what th the profit of them, if they are comprehended ? And must we not say that those men have needless trouble who assign these things as necessary to the philosopher's dis- course ? Is then also the precept written at Delphi super- fluous, which is Know thyself? It is not so, he s What then is the meaning of it? If a man gave to a choreutes (member of chorus) the precept to know him- self, would he not have observed in the precept that he must direct his attention to himself? CLXXVI. You are a little soul carrying a dead body, as Epictetus said. CLXXVII. He (Epictetus) said that he had discovered an art in giving assent ; and in the topic (matter) of the movements he had discovered that we must observe attention, that the movements be subject to exception, that they be social, that they be according to the worth of each thing ; and that we ought to abstain entirely from desire, and to em- ploy aversion to none of the things which are not in our power. CLXXVI 1 1. About no common thing, he said, the contest (dispute) is, but about being mad or not 486 EPICTETUS. CLXXIX. AUL. GELLIUS, xvn. 19. Favorinum ego audivi dicere Epictetum philosophum dixisse, "plerosque istos qui philosophari videntur, phi- loSOphoS CSSe hujuscemodi, &vev TOV irpdrreiv, ^XP' TV X^yeti/."* Id significat, factis procul, verbis tenus. Jam illud est vehementius, quod Arrianus solitum eum dictitare in libris, quos de Dissertationibusejus composuit, scriptum reliquit. Nam, "quum," inquit, " animadverterat hominem pudore amisso, importuna industria, corruptis moribus, audacem, confidentem lingua, caeteraque omnia praeter animum pro- curantem ; istiusmodi," inquit, " hominem quum viderat studia quoque et disciplinas philosophise contrectare, et physica adire et meditari dialectica, multaque id genus theoremata suspicari sciscitarique, inclamabet deum atque hominum fidem, ac plerumque, inter clamandum his eum verbis increpabat : "AvOponre, irov /3dXXe ; arra- (7/as, id est, visa istaec animi sui terrifica non approbat : hoc est ov tamquam iure metuenda sint, sua quoqi probat Kai vpofftTTtSo^ti (hoc enini vcrbo Stoici quum ista re disserunt utuntur). Sapiens autem quum l>r. et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, ov ffvyKararietra^ statum vigoremque sententia? sua- retmet, quani de hujus- cemodi visis semper habuit, ut de mimrne metuendi- fronte falsa et formidine inani territanti: $& EPICTETUS. CLXXXI. ARNOBIUS ADVERS. GENTES, IN FINE LIBRI SECUNDI. Quum de animarum agitur salute ac de respectu nostn ; "aliquid et sine ratione faciendum est,"* ut Epictetum dixisse approbat Arrianus. *"Nempe ubi ratio deficit, ibi sola fiducia in Deum reposita et obsequio vpluntati ejus ab ipso declaratae unice subjecto agendum est." Schweig.' See Encheirid. xxxii. *1batha\va\>" Series of Boohs for BOUND I.\ LIXE.V fiLOTH, GOLD BACK AND r Price, 75 Cents. By BRACEBRIDGE HEMINO- N'o. TITLE. 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