>* .] ^1 .A *'"': THE WORLD'S CRISIS By L. B. WOOLFOLK. "Quo, quo scelesti ruitis ? aut cur dexteria Aptantur enses conditi ? Parumue campis atque Neptuuo Buper Fusum est ... . sanguiniB ? [Hob ACE. CINCINNATI: MIAMI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING CO., PRINT. COBNEB BEDINQEB ST. AND UIAMI CANAL. 1868. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S68, Bt L. B. AVOOLFOLKy In the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. V\ICC TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE EXCITEMENTS ARE ALLAYED, PASSIONS LULLED, AND ENMITIES APPEASED — WITH UNFALTERING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RETURNING CONSERVATISM, THE EXALTED DESTINY OF OUE COUNTEY— THIS WORK, AS A TRIBUTE TO REPUBLICANISM, AND AN OFFERING AT THE SHRINE OF PATRIOTISM AND PHILANTHROPY, IS DEDICATED, BY TSB AUTJSOTi. MS972G1 PREFACE. This volume has been written during the last two years, amidst the pressure of constant and imperative engagements, and with several long interruptions caused by absence from home and by protracted attacks of disease. The fact is not mentioned to excuse the faults which the critical reader may observe; but because it cannot escape notice that diflferent portions were written at periods separated by wide intervals of time. The second " Book," giving a view of the political state of Europe, was completed early in the fall of 1866: the entire Manuscript was ready for the press in the spring of 1867. Consequently, the view of European events is nearly eighteen mouths old; and the political condition of our own country is depicted from the standpoint of nine months ago. In one point of view, this is a defect. But the rapid movement of events forbids the delay necessary for such a revisal, as would bringtheworkupto the standpoint of the present. The author, however, is the chief sufferer from the lapse of time since dif- ferent portions of the work were written ; for much that he predicted has become history; and many tendencies outlined in this work long before they had been suggested elsewhere, have now been perceived by the general public, and are no longer novel suggestions. Events have moved faster than the pen, and the author, in many instances, finds himself be- hind the status of the time, where he hoped to lead the van of thought. This, however, will not be esteemed an unmiti- gated misfortune, if the prognostications already fulfilled shall PREFACE. cause a candid examination of the suggestions respecting events yet lying in the future. In justice to himself and others, the author must disclaim any wish to be considered the exponent of the views of any political party. Responsibility for the opinions and the policy suggested in this work rests with him alone. Political expe- diency and the rally words of the moment have not been con- sidered in it. The range of thought is too broad for a merely political work; and many of the views presented, clashing with prejudices and views of present expediency, may perhaps prove unpalatable to persons of all parties, and all sections. The author is not, nor does he propose to become, a poli- tician. He has not written from a party, nor from a sectional, but fi'om an American standpoint. If he advocates Conserva- tism, he does so because the principles of Conservatism con- stitute, as he conceives, the only hope of America and of mankind: If he assails Radicalism, it is not from party spirit, but because Radicalism is destructive of our prosperity, of Re- publicanism, and of the best hopes of man. He does not aim to discuss the questions involved in such a manner as to fall in with the views, passions, and prejudices of the time: his sole aim is truth ; his object discussion from the elevated phi- losophic point of view the future historian will occupy when the parties of the past and present, with their principles and their policy, shall be regarded with calmness, and the dispas- sionate verdict of posterity pronounced upon them. His aim is not the advocacy of partisan' or sectional issues ; but the development of the true principles of Republican government; the presentation of the momentous world-important issues in- volved in the existing crisis ; and the suggestion of the policy necessary to save from impending ruin the prosperity of Our Country and the cause of Human Progress. THE CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. t STATEMENT OP THE QUESTION. Our age a transition period from an old to a new era. Feudalism worn out, and must give way to a new form of social order. Two principles struggling for the mastery of the new era: — Liberal mon- archy verging upon Republicanism, toward which it is tending — Absolute despotism aspiring, under Russia, to universal dominion — These principles have long been struggling for the supremacy in Europe, and their struggle is approaching a crisis which will give to one or the other a definitive vic- tory. — The United States holds the scales, and upon its policy, as determ- ined in the next Presidential election, will depend the issue of the struggle, and the destiny of the earth for generations to come. This fact constitutes this " THE WORLD'S CRISIS." 2. This work will discuss the questions that come within its scope, under the three following propositions: Prop. I. The Government of the United States has, almost throughout its en- tire career, maintained a system of aomixistkation in violation of the fun- damental principles of the Constitution: with the effect upon HOME AFFAIRS of tarnishing THE National Honor; dwarfing our Industrial Prosperity; ivarpiiig our Social Life; and plu7iging the country into fright- ful Political Evils. Prop. II. These past violations of the Constitution have reacted most in- juriously upon Foreign Nations : fostering a false Industrial System throughout the World; gendering dangerous Social Evils; and strength- ening the cause of Absolutism, rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a political reaction eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty/ and Advance- ment. Prop. III. The present is a crisis in ivhich the Government of the Uii-iied States may, by a ivise and conservative policy, enable the country to enter upon a course of Unexampled Prosperity; and exert an influence upon Foreign Affairs that ivill arrest the Industrial and Political Evils now menacing the World with ruin : But where an ill-advised policy will involve the COUN- 7 8 THE CONTENTS. TRY in Financial Rdin ; and suffer the World to drift without restraint into a Chaos of convulsion, threatening with overthrow the cause of Htbian Advancement. These Propositions attribute to the United States an extent of influence which requires that we show, in an INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION, THE UNITED STATES A NATION OF PROVIDENCE. CHAPTER I. FORESHADOWINGS OF AN EXALTED DESTINY. Sec. I. The Circumstances of the Colonization op America. I. The reservation of the country from French and Spanish Catholic ad- venturers. II. Its settlement by fugitives from religious persecution. III. The circumstances which preserved the hardy virtues of the Colonists. Sec. 2. The Revolutionary War. I. The Preparatory Era — The Old French War. Preparative for the suc- cess of the struggle : — The increase of the military spirit of the Colonies — The preparation of the maritime States of Europe to make common cause with the revolted Colonies. — Inaugurating the collisions which brought on the struggle. II. The War of Independence. The advantages of Britain : — Her superiority in wealth and power, and in the quality of her troops — Her superiority of position, having command of the sea. — The means by which her superiority was prevented from being decisive: Three plans of ope- rations open to the British, either of which would have proved decisive : — First plan: to move upon the Colonies from Boston — Means by which the plan was rendered abortive. Second and third plans : to sever the Colonies on the line of the Hudson; and to assail the South; — Why they failed of success: Contrary winds — Escape of Washington from Long Island and New York — Campaign in the Jerseys — Howe's failure to co-operate with Burgoyne — Burgoyne's dilatory tactics — His fatal error. Other Providential events: The storms which prevented deci- sive engagements of French and English fleets — the contrary winds which saved American army at Newport — the detection of Arnold's treason — The Battle of King's Mountain — the Providential escape of Greene from the pursuit of Cornwallis — The Providential events which resulted in the capture of Cornwallis. — Washington's opinion. THE CONTENTS. CHAPTEE II. THE PKOVIDENTIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES — the es- tablishment OF Republicanism throughout the earth. Sec. I. Thk unexampled excellence op ofr system op government. I. Organic defects of former republics. The want of a representative sys- tem ; and of a proper distribution of the powers of government. Ex- emplified in Athenian Kepublic. — The clashing of rival classes. Exem- plified in Greek republics and in Rome. — The lack of the Federal prin- ciple. — The evil of Leagues : — The Amphictyonic Council — The Swiss Confederation. — The evils of Centralizations: — The Achaean League. II. Our system of government avoids all those errors. Ifanner in which principles of Republican government were slowly evolved duri.ig centuries. The evolution of the principle of popular representation : — Its birth and development in England — The evolution of the distribution of the powers of government. — The evolution of the Federal principle: — Provi- dential direction of preliminary events — No example in history — The outline of the proper system suggested : — On the one hand by the rela- tion of the Colonies to the mother country, which was a centraliza- tion — On the other by the evils of a disjointed League, as experienced under the old Confederation. — The causes which impelled the States to establish a better government. — The labors of the Constitutional Convention. The outline of governmental powers. — The limitations of Federal power — Giving it entire control over foreign relations — Leaving internal administration in the control of the States. Addi- tional safeguYirds in constructing the government upon a federal basis : — The Federal Congress— Divided into two branches — The Senate rep- resenting the State governments — The House of Representatives repre- senting the people of the several States. — The Senate the conservative branch of the legislature : — The long term of its members, the better enabling it to control the temporary ebullitions of passion. in the pop- ular branch of the legislature. — The Federal Executive: — The Repre- sentative of the state governments, and the people of the states jointly — His veto power a restraint upon Congress. — Tlie Supreme Court: — Re- moved from political excitement — Its power to annul Unconstitutional laws. III. Federal Republicanism the only stable form of Government. Insta- bility of all other forms of government. — Instability of monarchy : — Neces- sarily dependent upon force — It is founded upon the suj>port of a lim- ited class : either of — An imperial nation rallying round the throne and holding in subjection conquered provinces ; or — A favored aristo- cratic class. — It has always been exposed to revolution and revolt. — The 10 THE CONTENTS. instability of monarchy inci-eased with the enlightenment of the age: — Absolute monarchy no longer practicable under existing conditions— Nor is Aristocratic monarch}' : — Evident from the French Revolution — From the course of events in England. — Nor is liberal monarchy ; be- cause — Monarchy is of necessity a centralization, and a centralization can only be maintained by force. — The time is coming when monarchy, as it now exists, can rule by force no longer. — The only possibility of a much longer continuance of monarchy lies in some nation attaining Universal Dominion. InstahilUy of all other systems of Republicanism. Instability of all Confederations of states, united either in Centraliza- tions or Leagues. — Instability of republics consisting of a single state; arising from — Their exercise of all powers of administration, domestic as well as foreign — This causes neglect of governmental duties and abuses of administration, leading to discontent and revolution — The only remedy for this is the di.stribution of power, as in a federal repub- lic. The stahiliiy of our system of government. Centralization of power is the prime cause of the downfall of republics: — It causes the convul- sions, whatever form they assume, which subvert republics — The only remedy is the distribution of power — In the American Constitution the distribution of power carried almost to perfection : — The internal administration left with the states — The internal administration is so complex and so important that, if deposited in a single hand, it would inevitably lead to convulsions — But, divided among all the states, it produces no excitement whatever. — -The Federal government having control of foreign aifairs — Its powers distributed between the three departments of government — All elections quiet except the presiden- tial, which shows that the power exercised by the executive is too ex- tensive — The powers of the office more extensive than were contem- plated by the framers of the constitution. — The evils that have troubled the country have been caused by the unconstitutional centralization of all ijowers of administration, domestic as well as foreign, in the hands of the Federal government. — The excellence of our system of government when constitutionally administered: — It is the most efficient government — It secures the most perfect equity of administration — It maintains perfect domestic tranquillity. — Such a system of government capable of maintaining tranquillitj' in any countr}', even though the population be little advanced in civilization. — Such a government capable of indefinite expansion, becoming more stable as its boundaries are enlarged. Sec. 2. The past career op the United States evidence op its providential mission. I. The unprecedented progress of the country. The causes of this unex- ampled progress : — A new age of industry — Caused by striking and novel inventions. THE CONTENTS, ll II. The political influence op the country. In the past : — In giving a new impulse to liberty — In giving direction to popular aspirations. — Our in- fluence has almost effected the overthrow of feudal monarchy. — We are destined to yet greater political influence in the future: — Proved by the analogies of past history. BOOI I. EYILS INFLICTED UPON OUR OWN COUNTRY BY OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. . Prop. I. The Government of the United States has, almost throughout its en- tire career, maintained a system of administration in violation o/the fun- damental principles of the Constitution: icith the effect upon HOME AFFAIRS of TARNLSHiNG the iSTational Honor; dwarfing our IvDVfirmxi. Prosperity; ivarping our Social Life; and plunging the country into fright- ful Political Evils. PART I. EVILS OF THE CARRYING TRADE. CHAPTER I. THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. Sect. I. Policy of the Federalists. The industrial condition of the country. — The establishment of the Bank : — A policy of Centralization. — Motives which influenced Washington to sign the bill — The first false step, from which we have never recovered. — Hamilton's scheme of power. — The French Revolution: — Its influ- ence upon American politics. Sect. 2. Humiliations arising from the policy of the Federalists. The annihilation of the French marine. — The Bank precipitates the coun- try into the Carrying trade. — Deteriorating effects of the trade upon the national character. — Complications with France. — British aggress- ions: — Jay's treaty — Its shameful conditions. — Antagonism with France. — Adams' administration — French insults to our envoys — Pop- ular indignation. — Alien and Sedition laws. — Division of sentiment among the Federalists — The policy of Adams — Alienation of members of his party — Treaty with France — Election of ISOO — Intrigues which weakened the Federalists — Triumph of the Republicans. 12 THE CONTENTS. CHAPTEK II. THE EKA OF EEPUBLICAN RULE. Peace of Amiens — Renewal of the war — Violations of our flag — Defensive measures — British paper blockade — British policy — The position of the United States — British restrictions — The Berlin decree — British orders in council — The Milan decree — The Embargo — Impropriety of the measure — Repeal and passage of non-intercourse act — Nego- tiations — Declaration of war with England — Resume. PART II. EVILS OF THE AMEKICAN SYSTEM. CHAPTER I. NORMAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES. Sect. I. The Normal Industrial development op the United States. I. The Normal Industrial career op the United States at the in- auguration OF THE Government. The true industrial sphere of the United States, — to become the manufacturer for the world. We excel all other countries in the conditions essential to manufac- turing success: — An energetic and enterprising population having adaptation to mechanical industry — An abundant home supply of raw material — An abundant home supply of provisions for opera- tive population. — Nature has marked the United States as the great world-manufacturing site. Obstacles that had prevented our engaging in manufactures before the adoption of the Federal constitution : — In the Colonial period — Under the old Confederation. Advantages for manufacturing at the inauguration of the Federal Government. — The new government put an end to all previous disadvantages : — The in- dustrial condition of the country was eminently favorable to manufac- tures — Immense advantages of the American manufacturer, at that era, over British competition. — These advantages and the condition of the country would necessarily have turned the enterprise of the country into them, if industry had been left to its natural course: — But Ham- ilton's United States Bank changed the course of industry. — It made manufactures impossible: — By inflating the currency and enhancing all prices; thus increasing the cost of production — By embarking the enterprise of the country in the speculations of the carrying trade. THE CONTENTS. 13 II. Normal industrial career of the United States after the peace of 1815. Once again the state of the country presented the necessary conditions of manufacturing success, and would have forced us upon a career of manufacturing greatness. The state of the country direct- ing emigration toward the South, — This rush of emigration would have glutted the cotton market, and caused the South to be self sustaining, as regards the necessaries of life. — The influence of general stagnation in forcing the West to engage in manufactures : — Without a market in the South, or in the East, the West, being unable to import, would have been driven to manufactures to supply the home demand. — The cheap cost of manufacturing in the West. — Far cheaper than in England: — It had an abundance of labor, raw material, and provisions, all at the lowest rates. — Prices of all were low on account of — The state of the currency — The want of demand — The low rate of taxation. — While the cost of manufacturing was low beyond example, the diffi- culty of transportation from the seaboard made the price of all manu- factured articles extravagantly high. — Cheap production and high sales would have given birth to Western manufactures, especially when there was no other opening to enterprise. — Vast superiority of the West, then, over Great Britain as a site for manufactures : — The Western manu- facturer had a cheaper power than the English — The Western manu- facturer had cheaper raw material — Provisions cheaper in the West — Labor cheaper in the West. — These advantages would have made the West the seat of manufactures for the world. — We should have had a world-wide commerce. — The natural features of the West point it out as the destined seat of the world's manufactures. — Its destiny must yet be attained. Sect. 2. ISTormal Social state of the United States. Our normal industrial career would have reacted upon our social life. I. We should have escaped social excitement. II. No oppression of the laboring classes : — Of the factory operative popula- lation — Nor of the slave population of the South. — Slavery, from in- dustrial causes, would have been a mild institution : — No slave trade between the States — No excessive exaction of labor — Natural causes would have gradually brought about emancipation — Virtuous sim- plicity of manners would have characterized the social lifeof the whole country. Sect 3, The normal political destiny op the United States. I. Political agitations avoided. Party passions could not have arisen : — No sectional bitterness — No Tariff agitation — No Slavery excitement. — We should have been an united, harmonious people — one in interest, in aim. — Then we might have exerted an unalloyed and irresistible in- fluence for freedom. 14 THE CONTENTS, II. Our peosrerity perpetual. The Constitution prevents the fomentation of political agitations, by governmental action. — Our social condition would have prevented the social demoralization so dangerous to states. — Our geographical position would prevent the centralization of com- merce and wealth, which generates corruption and leads to decline. CHAPTER II. IXFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN WARPING OUR INDUSTRY. Sect. 1. Eise of the American * System. General depression at the close of the war with England. — Bank and Tariff as relief measures.— Bank (for obvious reasons) did not afford the de- sired relief: — The inflation of the currency by the Bank enhanced the cost of production, and made manufactures impracticable — Ruinous effect of an inflated currrency upon national industry. — Manufactures being impracticable, owing to the Bank, industry continues to languish, except in the South — Flourishing condition of the South, and large emigration to that section. — Eff'orts to force manufactures by means of a high protective Tariff! — Mr. Clay's plan of Tariff and Internal Improvements — Defeated during Monroe's administration. — The Tariff of 1824. Sect. 2. Ruinous influence of the American system upon the development of our manufactures. I. The Bank and Tariff dwarfed our viaitufactures hy locating them in Kew England. The manner in which tliis was effected. — The West, by this means, diverted from manufactures, to supply the other sections with produce. — The disadvantages of a New England location. II. The Bank and Tariff dwarf our manufactures through the abnormal system they originate. — A vast system of interchange between the sec- tions. — Its injury to industry: — Rendering vast resources nugatory — Levying charges upon productive industry — Enhancing the scale of prices by promoting a spirit of speculation — Withdrawing a vast amount of capital and population, otherwise engaged in manufactures, and embarking them in internal traffic. III. The Bank and Tariff dwarf our manufactures hy their men direct in- fluence in raising the standard of prices. The inflation of the currency an injury to productive industry. — The injurious influence of currency inflation not compensated by a Tariff: — The enhancement of prices * By a latitude of expression, the phrase American System, is used as including the Bank; the Tariff, and Internal Improvements. THE CONTENTS. 15 increases the cost of production in the ratio of the increase of prices — This causes combinations to force down labor and agricultural produce to an inadequate price. CHAPTER III. INFLUENCE OF THE AMEEICAN SYSTEM IN PERVERTING OUR SOCIAL LIFE. Sect. 1. Social excitement resultant from our abnormal, forced industrial system. Influence of commerce in quickening the springs of social life: — An excessive commercial activity causes abnormal social excitement, — Effect of our excessive internal traffic upon our social life : — Lowered the scale of intellect in public life — Promoted social demoralization — Abnormal state of Southern society. Sect. 2, Oppression op the Industrial population, through our abnormal industrial system. Oppression of the laboring class. Oppression of Northern labor: — The farm- ing population — The city laborers — The factory operatives. — Oppres- sion of Southern labor: — The poor whites — The negro population — The slave trade between the States — The severance of family ties — The subversion of the old relation existing between master and servant — Excessive exaction of labor. CHAPTEE lY. INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN EXCITING POLITI- CAL ANIMOSITIES. Sect. I. The American System, the prolific Source op Political Evils. Original good-feeling between the sections. — Alarm of the South. — Tariff of 1824. — Tariff of 1828: — Extreme Southern excitement— Election of Jackson. I. The contest over the American System during the Administration op Jackson. The balance of parties. — Tactics of the opposing factions — Jackson's policy of rotation in office: — Its ruinous effects. — Attack on the Bank of the United States. — The breach with Mr. Calhoun. — The contest over the Tariff: — Caution of Jackson — Nullification — The Com- promise Tariff. — Contest over the Bank: — Jackson's motley party — Ad- vantages of the Bank — The removal of the deposits. — Summary. — Character of Jackson. 16 THE CONTENTS. II. StJBSEQUENT CONTEST OYER THE AMERICAN StSTEM. Whig triumph of 1840: — Death of Harrison prevents the definitive success of their measures — Tyler's course — Veto of Bank. — Tariff of 1842. — Election of 1844. — Tariff reduced to revenue standard. Sect. 2. The Slavery Agitation. Sectional animosities growing out of tariff agitation: — Anti-slavery agita- tion — Uneasiness of the South — Annexation of Texas — The blunder of a war with Mexico — Sectional strife over the annexed territories — Compromise of 1850 — The Kansas-Nebraska Act — Anti-slavery party formed — Furious agitation — The Kansas strife — The excitability of the public mind — All moderate measures fail — Fatal termination of agita. tion in war. BOOK II. Prop. II. Our past violations of the Constitutiox have reacted most in- juriously upon FOREIGN NATIONS : fostering a False Industrial Sys- tem throughout the WORLD; gendering dangerous Social Evils; and strengthening the cause of Absolutism, rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a political reaction eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty and Advancement. PART I. OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE INJURED FOREIGN NATIONS BY FOSTERING A FALSE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. CHAPTER I. BRITISH MONOPOLY OF COMMERCE. Sect. 1. The Elements and Principles op Commerce. Sect. 2. British Centralization op Commerce. This centralization of commerce based upon our industry. — Extent of the British centralization of commerce. — Its injury to the industry of the world. CHAPTER II. BRITISH CENTRALIZATION OF WEALTH. Profits of British mercantile traffic in the products of other countries. — Profits of manufactures. — The expenditure of the country — Prevalence of THE CONTENTS. 17 economy — Balance of trade explained — Growth of all branches of British enterprise — Loans to foreign nations — Britain ruining the world — Crafty utterances of British statesmen — Crafty policy of British capitalists — British imperialism of capital — Present prosperity of the nations delusive. PART II. OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE INJURED THE WORLD, BY GENDERING SOCIAL EVILS DANGEROUS TO CIVILIZATION. CHAPTER I. SOCIAL EXCITEMENT. Origin of the prevailing social excitement. — Forms of social excitement: — No repose — Continual agitation. — Mental Deterioration of the Age. — The golden mean suited to the germination of Genius, — Great men of for- mer ages. — The decay of poesy — Of oratory — Of literature — Of states- manship. — Socialistic 7nania. — Various classes of visionaries: — Politi- cal visionaries — Social monomaniacs — Eeligious monomaniacs — Chria- tian apostacy. — Menacing ruin. CHAPTER II. THE OPPRESSION OF POVEETY. Necessary result of abnormal system of commerce : — The poor of all countriei oppressed by it — Especially the poor of Great Britain. — Grades of English society. — Aristocracy — Middle Class — Working Class.— Suf- fering of the impoverished scions of Nobility — Of Middle Class — Of Working Class. — Prevalence of economy: — The Lodging-house sys- tem — Hunger — Mutual insurance — Burial customs — Petty pilfering — " Tramps " — Destitution — Poverty unpitied. — Governmental legisla- tion: — Licensed Drunkenness — Pawnbrokers — the Poor-house system. — Class subordination. — Moral condition of English poor: — Cheating and pilfering universal — Drunkenness and crime increasing — Irrelig- ion — Heathenism — Degraded vice. — Inadequacy of all measures of amelioration : — Only remedy the overthrow of the industrial system out of which it arises. 18 THE CONTENTS. PART III. OUR UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE HAS INJURED THE WORLD POLITICALLY : STRENGTHENING ABSOLUTISM ; RESCUING IT FROM RUIN ; AND GIVING BIRTH TO A PO- LITICAL REACTION EMINENTLY DANGEROUS TO THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY AND ADVANCEMENT. CHAPTER I. POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. The British government in sympathy with Ahsohitism : — Not a government of the people — Eule of Aristocracy. — Historical review: — Origin of the House of Commons — Falls under the control of the Nobility — Reform Bill of 1832. — Object of the Whigs in framing it — A compromise. — Whig and Tory contests. — ^The balance of parties — Triumph of the Whigs in 1S46 — A motley party — Conservative Whigs — Liberals — Liberals hold balance of power — Administrative reforms — Reform agi- tation: — Demand of administrative reforms — Parliamentary reform. — Whig and Tory intrigues. — Both try to use Reform, to increase party strength. Tory intrigue with Liberals: — Its failure. — "Whig coalition and intrigue — Failure. — Tory accession to power: — The party policy — Its certainty of success — Tory triumph definitive. — England, under Tory rule committed to Absolutism. CHAPTER II. POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. Sect. 1. General Statement of the Question. Disquieting elements of the European system. — Dynastic ambition: — Balance of Power. — Restlessness of Nationalities: — The oppressed Nationali- ties of Europe. Sect. 2. Causes which brought about the Present Condition op Europe. 1. Conquest. 2. The Feudal system. — Feudalism. — Decline of royal author- ity. — (1.) Course of events in France: — Wars with English Plantage- nets. — Increase of royal power — Consolidation of French territory — Lo.=is of the Flemish provinces — (2.) Course of events in England : — Consolidation of power. — (3.) Course of events in Germany: — Decline of imperial authority — Nobility become sovereign princes — Rise of feu- dal house of Austria — Rise of feudal house of Prussia. the contents. 19 Sect. 3. Forces in Conflict to Overthrow and Maintain the Old Order op things. T, First Epoch : Wars of the French Revolutiox. Monarchs assail France — Revolution triumphant under Napoleon — The conqueror em- braces the policy of Absolutism — Overthrow, by outbreak of national patriotism. '. II. Second Epoch: The Rule of Absolutism prom 1815 to 1848. The treaties of 1815: — Holy alliance — Russia the champion of Absolut- ism. — Revolutions of 1830: — Absolutism still dominant. III. Third Epoch: The successful Aggression of French Progressive Ideas from 1848 to 1866. (1.) First Period: The Revolutionary out- burst. — French Revolution of 1848: — Agitations throughout Europe — Timidity of France — Supremacy of British influence — Suppression of popular ebullitions. — Policy of Napoleon III for restoring the Nation- ality. — Policy of the despots. — (2.) Second Period: Napoleon emerges from isolation. — Russian ambition : — Crimean war. — (3.) Third Period: Napoleon s Restoration of Italian Nationality. — Preliminary measures — Victor Emanuel's intrigues — Austrian menace — Napoleon's interven- tion — Italian war — Napoleon's cautious policy — Results of the war — Conquest of Naples. — Italian excitement against Austria — Napoleon's treaty respecting Rome. — German war: — Cession of Venetia. (4.) The Napoleonic prograimne for effecting the national unity of Germany. Ger- man agitation upon the Holstein-Schleswig question: — Interference of the German Diet — Intervention of Prussia and Austria — Danish war — Napoleon's policy. — Ambition of Prussia : — Opposed by all the German states — Favored by Napoleon. — Russo-Italian alliance. — Napoleon's programme. — German war: — Prussian triumph — Intervention of France — Treaty of peace. CHAPTER III. FOURTH EPOCH IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ABSOLUTISM AND PROGRESS: THE IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. Sect. 1. The Forces at work in Europe. L The impending Outbreak of the Nationalities. — Germany progressing to- ward revolution. — Causes which inspire National enthusiasm. — Effect of German outbreak — Universal revolution. IL The Policy of Absolutism: — To establish the unity of Germany under Prussia. — Russia committed to this policy — (1.) By a wish to avert revolution: — Absolutism then safe from revolution. (2.) By ambi- tion: — Will of Peter the Great — Past Russian policy — Its Austrian 20 THE CONTENTS. alliance — Its French alliance — Its Prussian alliance. — Danger to Eu- rope of this coalition. III. The Present Posture of Affairs. Prussian policy : — Its absolutist principles — Coerced by Napoleon. — Ruinous effect of Tory ascendancy in England. — Preparations for war. — Dangerous ascendancy of Abso- lutism. Sect. 2. The Impending Struggle; and the Triumph op Absolutism. Certainty of an approaching struggle. — Understanding between Russia and Prussia: — The aims of this alliance — The Tory Government of Eng- land a party to the understanding — Its devotion to Absolutism. — Craft of the despots: — Their ostensible aim the union of Germany. — The contest imminent. — The attitude of England fatal to the Liberal cause: — The triumph of Absolutism assured — Napoleon overmatched. — The despots will abuse victory : — France overrun- -Britain subjugated — War with America. — Universal dominion a necessity to despotism — Its practicability. BOOK III. THE CRISIS. Prop. III. The present is a CRISIS in which the Government of the United States viay, by a wise and conservative policy, enable Our COUNTRY to enter upon a course o/" Unexajipled Prosperity; and exert an influence upon FOREIRN AFFAIRS that will arrest the Industrial and Politic.u. Evils now menacing the World with ruin : But where an ill-advised policy will in- volve the COUNTRY in FiNANCi.iL Ruin ; and suffer the WORLD to drift, without restraint, into a Chaos of convulsion, threatening with overthrow the cause of Human Advancement. JNTRODUCTION. — THE CRISIS. Dangers on every hand : — Industrial — Social — Political. — All have their origin in British centralization of industry : — This causes industrial evils — Social evils — Political dangers. — Necessity of its overthrow : — This the only rem- edy for all evils. — We alone can do it. — Means of effecting it: — We must monopolize the cotton manufacture. THE CONTENTS. 21 PART I. THE SITUATION; AND ITS CAUSES. CHAPTBE I. A RESUME. Eeview of the line of causation thus far traced.-^FirsFLine of causation. — Second line. — Third. — Fourth. — Fifth. — Sixth. — Seventh. CHAPTEE II. EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR— 1. NEGATIVE EVILS. Sect. 1. The influence op the over-supply of the Cotton Mar- ket UPON the institution op Slavery. I. Effect upon Slavery in the Border States. Effect upon slavery in Maryland an'd Virginia. — Effect in Kentucky and Missouri. II. Effect upon Slavery in the Cotton States. The extinction of slavery inevitable fi'om two causes : — The want of space for slave plantations — The want of sufficient demand for slave products. Sect. 2. The effect of the supply of the Cotton Market upon our Manufacturing Industry. The West, the seat of manufactures : — Its superior advantages — Britain unable to compete. — The United States the manufacturers for the world. — Bless- ings of this: — To ourselves — To the world. CHAPTEE III. EVIL RESULTS OF THE WAR: Continued.— 2. POSITIVE EVILS. Sec. 1. The War has enabled England to fortify her Central- ization OP Industry. The production of cotton in new fields: — Danger of their superseding the South. — Their advantages: — Brazil — The countries around the Medi- terranean — Egypt — India. — Danger of our losing the cotton production. Sect. 2. The War has weakened us. I. By Devastation of the South and prostration of Southern Industry. II. By the National Debt it has accumulated. III. By seating the Latitcdinarian Constructionists firmly in power. CHAPTEE IV. POSITIVE EVILS. Continued.— RUINOUS RADICAL POLICY. Sect 3. Policy of Eadicals, subversive of Eepublicanism. I. Establishing A Centralization. Reaction against them in the North. — Their aim to subject the South. — They crush all opposition: — Intimidation of Executive — Of Supreme Court — Subversion of State Governments — 22 THE CONTENTS. Confiscation — Universal negro suffrage — Elections in all tlie States to be controlled by Federal bayonets — Subversion of the Constitution. — Com- bination of New England manufacturers and Southern negroes. — Sway of a faction imminent. — Rule of the sword. — Danger of the West. II. Radicalism — like all Centralizations — administers the Government IN the interests op its two Constituencies, — the Southern Negro, and the Northern Capitalist : to the ruin of the National Indus- try; and the Oppression of tbe Northern Industrial Class. — Tney areruining the country in thedesire to court the Negro. — Demoralization of Southern labor — Class antagonisms fomented — Radical emissaries — Vagrancy promoted — Confiscation promised. — This misrule ruining the country. 2. Their Revenue Siistem is rxiining the country fur the benefit of the Northern Capitalist. — Reckless appropriations. — Extravagant ex- penditure. — Odious and unjust revenue syatem: — Taxes levied exclu- sively upon industry and the laboring class — The tariff a bonus to the capitalist. — Oppression of industry: — Oppression of the laboring class — Reduplicated taxation of the poor. Sect. 2. Eadical System of Finance is promoting an excessive Rise op Prices, and is ruining our Productive Industry. I. Rise of Prices — Caused by: — Inflation of currency — Oppressive Tariff — Ruinous system of internal taxation. — Operation of these causes. n. The Inflation of Prices ruinous of every branch of Productive In- dustry. It oppresses every indiistrial class : — The capitalists engaged in mechanical production — The agriculturist — The laboring class. — The inflation of prices is ruining our productive industry: — Our manufactures unable to compete with foreign industry — Our ship- building interest almost annihilated — Improvements stopped — Our ag- riculture depressed — Breadstuff trade declined — The growth of cot- ton unprofitable — Will be abandoned. — We cannot compete with for- eign industry — Policy of the Radicals ruining the countrj'. — Carlyle. PART II. OUR TRUE POLICY.— ITS ADVANTAGES.— ITS NECESSITY. CHAPTER I. OUR TRUE POLICY.— OUR OBJECT— TO WREST THE COTTON MAN- UFACTURE FROM GREAT BRITAIN. Sect. 1. Measures Necessary to promote the Growth and Manu- facture of Cotton. I. Measures necessary to make the Growth and Manufacture of Cotton safe branches of business, a reliable Labor System for the South.— THE CONTENTS. ZtJ Negro labor adapted to cotton culture. — The indolence of the race: — Negroes in Jamaica — South America — St. Domingo — Our Northern States — These instances not a fair test. — Superior advantages of negro in the South. — Ruinous policy of the Radicals: — Its influence upon the negro population — 'J'heir demoralization. — A change of policy ne- cessary. II. Measures necessary to make the Grotvth and Manufacture of Cotton PROFITABLE. Two ways of making a business profitable: to increase the price of commodities; or to diminish the cost of production. — The price of commodities limited by British competition — We must dimin- ish the cost of j;roduction. 1. The first essential to cheap manufactures is the location of our manufactories in the West. — Advantages of the West over New England. — State aid. 2. The prime essential to cheap production is the reduction of the entire rate of prices prevailing in the counti-y. — To this end. — (1.) We must remodel the Tariff, and change altogether our system of protection : — Objections answered. — Full dis- cussion deferred. — (2.) The public revenue should he raised chiefly by a tax upon property. — Justice of a property tax. — Expediency of a prop- erty tax : — It will embark capital in productive industry — It will tend to lower the standard of prices. — (3.) The excessive issues of Paper Money must be loithdraivn from circulation, and a Specie Currency or its Equivalent be established. — [1.] The necessity of establishing a specie currency : — All measures useless without it. — Errors confuted. [2.] Measures necessary for the establishment of a Specie Currency — A bank note currency objectionable — A specie currency or its equivalent essential. — Difliculties of our position : — Specie drain — For interest — For commercial balance ; — The National Banks. — The proposed plan : — Its freedom of objection — Its advantages. — 3. We should give peculiar advantages to our cotton interest. — Cotton lands and factories should be exempt from taxation. Sect. 2. Measures necessary to prevent Great Britain from destroying our cotton industry. I, Financial Measures necessary for Self-Protection. 1. We must stop the exportation of Specie. — Our immense exportation of specie — Its ruin- ous influence — The basis of English prosperity. — 2. We must forbid the further exportation of bonds: — Tlie balance of trade against us — Rapid exportation of bonds — $1,450,000,000 now abroad. II. The Government must Regulate our CoiiMERCE with Foreign Nations. 1. Change of the Warehouse System necessary. 2. A Discriminating Tariff against England necessary. — Constitutionality of such a Tariff. — Justice of such a Tariff": — British selfish policy — Her Tariff against our industry. — Expediency of such a tariff: — A general Tariff" nugatory — Discriminative tariff' effective against British competition. 24 THE CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. BENEFITS OF THIS POLICY. Sect. 1. The rapid development op our Manufactures would soon WREST the Commercial Supremacy from England. I. First Era: Advantages of our Manufactures in our own Market under THE MEASURE.S PROPOSED. — Little foreign competition. — Cotton manufac- ture. — Its benefits to other branches of manufacture. II. Second Era: Advantages of our Manufactures in the Markets of the World. — Superiority of the West: — Cheaper raw material — Cheaper labor — Cheaper provisions — Lower taxes — A lower scale of profits. Sect. 2. Advantages op our Industrial Supremacy. I. Advantages to Ourselves. — Industrial benefits : — Benefit to agriculture — Breadstufis — Cotton. — Benefits to the West — The East. — Social advan- tages: — Tranquillity — Elevation of labor. — Political benefits: — No sectional antagonisms — No bickerings respecting constitutional inter- pretation. II. Advantages to the World. • 1. Advantages derived to Industry. The overthrow of British centralization — Fair conjmercial principles. — We should benefit the world by establishing free trade: — Free trade impos- sible with British monopoly — Our commerce a blessing. — We should stimulate the industry of the Tropics: — Vast consumption of tropical luxuries. — 2. Benefits to social life: — Excitement quelled — Elevation of labor — 3. Political benefits : — The dangers from Absolutism averted. CHAPTER III. EUINOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY. Sect. 1. The Euin op America. I. The Political Ruin of the Country. 1. The political ruin of the South: — Negro rule — Confiscation — Ruin of the negro population. 2. Political ruin of the West: — Subjection to New England — Negro bayonets — Dr. Bacon's views — Daniel Webster — Danger of convulsions. II. The Industrial Ruin of the Country. Overthrow of Southern indus- try : — Loss of the cotton planting. — Destruction of the export and im- port trade. — Depopulation of cities. — Stagnation of agriculture.- -Ruin of the shipping interest. — Extravagance. III. The Soci.\l Ruin of the Country. — Social demoralization : — Corruption in public life — Demoralization in the South — In the North — Tlie labor- ing poor. — Danger of social convulsion. Sect. 2. The Ruin of Christendom. The political reaction in Europe. — The Tory policy. — The Luxemburg im- broglio. — The coming conflict. — Overthrow of Liberalism. — This the World's Crisis. INTRODUCTION. The attention of the student of history is frequently arrested by crises in human progress, which give to events a new direction, and prove the pivots on which advancement hinges. The great eras of history usually have their origin in revolution, and give birth to new forms of social order, which continue until the movement of the age, progressing toward a new era, hastens their decline. In each successive era some nation is the recognized leader in the career of progress. The circle of its influence is all-embrac- ing; its policy determines the course of events; either diffusing blessings by its wisdom and beneficence, or wrecking progress by its blunders, and spreading desolation and ruin by its crimes. The influence of the country that leads the march of advancement is most potent in one of those crises when an era is approaching its close. The periods of transition, when the scepter is passing from the grasp that has long swayed it, to the hands of a young and vig- orous nation, are especially pregnant with destiny to the world. Our age is such a transition period. The Europe of the Middle Ages is rapidly passing away. Feudal- ism, with its singular mingling of tyranny and freedom, is worn out, and has, for three-quarters of a century, been convulsing Europe with the throes of appi'oaching dissolution. Two hostile principles are struggling for the supremacy, each ambitious of seizing the scepter falling from the palsied grasp of Feudalism. On the one hand is Liberal Monarchy, seeking to combine the principles of monarchy and republicanism, vesting in the people all legislative authority, while the executive functions are exercised by an hereditary sove- reign. On the other, is Absolute Despotism, aiming to crush the liberal aspirations of the age by military force, and re-establish Ab- solutism unalloyed by admixture with freedom. The struggle between these two principles has been progressing for three-quarters of a century. The crisis of this struggle is now (25) 26 THE world's crisis. rapidly approaching, which will finally decide whether Europe shall be ruled by Liberal government, or by unmixed Despotism, flushed •with victory, and aspiring to universal dominion. The next few years will determine this question so pregnant with destiny to the world. The present is the most important crisis that has ever occurred in the history of nations. The conflicting principles are even now arraying their forces for the final and decisive conflict. The balance of power and of in- fluence rests with our own country. If we are true to ourselves and to our destiny, our weight in the doubtful scale will determine the issue in favor of advancement. If we continue the policy which has.of late years marked our national existence, we shall continue to be a cipher in the list of nations, and Absolutism will triumph in the impending struggle, dominate Europe with autocratic sway, and menace our country with the power of the combined world. The political and industrial policy of the United States, in the present exigency, will determine the destiny of the world for ages to come. We are now in The World's Crisis. It will be the aim of the following pages to show that the past policy of our country has been destructive of our own best interests, and has brought the nations of Christendom into a condition dan- gerous to enlightened progress ; that it has marred our own indus- trial and political destiny, has warped the industry of the world, and retarded the political advancement of the nations, until a crisis has risen which threatens to prostrate mankind beneath the sway of Despotism ; and that, if the operation of the same causes be con- tinued yet a little longer, the financial ruin of our own country will be consummated, and Despotism will dominate Europe with absolute sway, and force us to engage in a long and doubtful struggle for liberty and religion. The subject will be discussed under the following propositions : PROPOSITION I. The Government of the United States has, throughout almost its entire career, maintained a system OF administration in violation of THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION : With the effect upon HOME AFFAIRS of tarnishlng the National Honor; INTKODUCTORY DISSERTATION. 27 dwarfing our Industrial Prosperity ; warping our Social Life ; and plunging the country into frightful Political Evils. PROPOSITION 11. These past violations of the Constitution have reacted most inju- riously upon Foreign Nations: fostering a false Industrial System throuyhout the World; gendering dangerous Social Evils; and strengthening the cause of Absolutism, rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a 'political readtion eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty and Advancement. PROPOSITION III. The present is a CRISIS in which the Government of the United States may, by a wise and conservative policy, enable the country to enfer wpow a course 0/ Unexampled Prosperity; and exert an in- fluence upon FOREIGN AFFAIRS that will arrest the Industrial and Political Evils noiv menacing the World with ruin : But where AN ill-advised policy ivill involve the COUNTRY in Financial Ruin; and suffer the WORLD to drift without restraint into a Chaos of convulsion, ihreateni7ig ivith overth'oiv the cause of Human Ad- vancement. The foregoing propositions attribute to the United States a most important influence upon the destinies of the world. Though Americans are obnoxious to the charge of national vanity, yet very many will, no doubt, be disposed to withhold credence from proposi- tions which seem to declare our country the great world-radiating center of influence. Before entering upon the discussion of these propositions, we will prepare the way by an Introductory Dissertation. 28 THE world's crisis. HTEODUCTORY DISSERTATION, THE UNITED STATES A NATION OF PROVIDENCE. The facts which demonstrate our country to be the favored in- strument of a benign Providence, are so numerous and striking, as to arrest the attention of every thoughtful student of our history. At the close of the Revolutionary war, a philosophic observer of our career must have been impressed with the thought that a country, whose past history presented such signal marks of divine favor and protection, was destined to some great work. Only subsequent events, however, developing more clearly the sphere of our influ- ence, marked us the predestined leader of the nations in the path of Republican Liberty. The two following chapters will be devoted to the development of the remarkable circumstances in our career which point us out as destined to an exalted influence upon the course of future events. THE COLONIZATION OF AMERICA. 29 CHAPTER I. FOEESHADOWINGS OF AX EXALTED DESTINY. Section I. — The Circumstances of the Colonization of America. Among the many facts which point to the United States as a favored nation of Providence, destined to exert a powerful influence upon the destinies of the world, not the least remarkable are the circumstances attending the planting of the Colonies upon the American coast. The two great events of modern times — the Discovery of Amer- ica, and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century — filled the same generation with astonishment. The nations of Northern Europe were so profoundly agitated by the great Religious movement, that they gave little heed to the new career of discovery opened to the enterprise of the Old World. The preponderant power of the Papal nations of Southern Europe, and their aggressive temper, occupied the Protestant states with measures of self-defense, to the exclusion of commercial enterprise. For nearly a century, the Papal states enjoyed a monopoly of Colonial enterprise, and were busily engaged taking possession of the newly-discovered regions of the Eastern and Western hemispheres. While the Portuguese turned their attention to the East Indies, America became the thea- ter of French and Spanish enterprise. It is remarkable that the adventurers of those nations were turned aside from the most valuable regions in the New World, leaving it for the colonization of Protestant races. They were im- patient of immediate returns. The mineral wealth of the Tropics tempted the Spaniards far to the southward ; the French traders were attracted to the inhospitable shores of the St. Lawrence, and the frozen lakes of the North, by tbe abundant peltries of the na- tives. Between the Colonies of the two adventurous nations lay a broad wilderness tract, stretching from the Lakes to the Gulf of 30 THE world's crisis. Mexico, unoccupied by either, except a feeble colony of each upon its extreme Southern border. The declaration that this territory remained unoccupied because it was the finest region on the continent, may seem paradoxical — yet such was the fact. The immediate commercial advantages sought by these adventurers, were found in the luxurious productions of the Tropics, and the furs of the frozen regions. For these com- modities Europe afforded a ready market. The intermediate region, blessed with the same salubrious climate as Europe, was adapted only to the productions of the temperate zone. Of these, the teeming soil of Europe yielded an abundant supply. Adventurers turned aside to the frozen zone and the tropics, for whose produc- tions they foumj an European market, and for almost a century the finest region in America lay an unexplored wilderness. The world-roving avarice of the Spaniard, indeed, penetrated its wilds in search of gold ; but the disasters of De Soto, and the re- pulse of Ponce deLeon, warned them away to regions more enticing to avarice, and less vigorously defended by native courage. The attempts of Spain to effect a lodgment upon the Carolina coast, and to establish a colony in Georgia, were frustrated in a manner strik- ingly providential. Thus did Providence reserve the chosen land for nobler colonists than swarms of bigoted, avaricious adventurers. The region re- mained unoccupied until the Papal nations, having spent their en- ergies in commercial enterprise, and wasted their strength in boot- less religious wars, suffered the Protestant states to rest in peace. The wilderness between the Lakes and the Gulf was now the only region open to their occupation. So little inducement, however, did it offer to commercial enterprise, that few were willing to for- sake the comforts of civilization for a waste, peopled by daring savages, and yielding no products marketable in the Old World. A single colony (Virginia), formed on the coast, served to establish the claim of England, and to display, in the ruin of its founder, and the abject misery of the settlers, the hopelessness of the coloniza- tion enterprise. The country remained unsought, until intulerance in Protestant countries rendered necessary an asylum for the ob- jects of religious persecution. Then the desert region, from which THE PREPARATORY ERA. 31 Papal adventurers turned aside, remained the only place of refuge ; and the Frank and the Scandinavian, the Hollander and the Briton, the Norman, the Saxon, the Celt, all fled to the asylum of perse- cuted virtue. The Scotch Covenanter and the French Huguenot, the Welsh Baptist and the English Quaker, the Swedish Lutheran and the Dutch Calvinist — all fugitives for conscience' sake — mingled \vvith the Puritan and the Episcopalian, each flying in turn from the persecution of the other. All planted their colonies, side by side, on the desert coast. The first settlers of other countries, both in ancient and modern times, have been adventurers in search of wealth, or expatriated criminals and degraded beings gladly spared at home. The emi- grants to America alone were composed of the best material of their respective countries. Only the courageous would brave the dangers of new settlements surrounded by treacherous savages. Only generous spirits could so appreciate the blessings of freedom as to prefer the hardships and self-denial of the free wilderness, to the comparative ease they left behind, in lands of intolerance and oppression. Only deep piety and sterling independence of char- acter would have foregone all advantages of worldly position for the sake of civil and religious liberty. The same commercial disadvantages of a temperate climate and productions similar to those of Europe, which reserved the region for the exiles of persecution, preserved the hardy virtues of the colonists during the entire Colonial era. The Colonies had no ex- traneous advantages to force their growth. Colonial life was an existence of patriarchal simplicity. There was little inducement to enterprise, no opening for speculation. The country attracted few adventurers in search of wealth — the severe, even stern char- acter of the colonists repelled the dissipated and the frivolous. The growth of the Colonies was slow; the virtue of their inhabitants was preserved by the ordeal of hardship and danger. During a cen- tury and a half they slowly developed from infancy to vigorous adolescence. Their development was sufiiciently rapid for healthy growth, but slow enough to prevent the hardy virtues of poverty from being supplanted by the hot vices of prosperity. The people ■were the healthy growth of a temperate clime — neither stunted by 32 THE world's crisis. ■wintry poverty, nor forced into the rank, noxious growth of tropical luxuriance. Only such a people — too poor for luxury, but rich enough for hardy independence — were fitted to meet the great crisis they were approaching, — to emerge triumphant from the suflFerings of an unequal struggle, and to plant deep and enduring the pillars of Constitutional Liberty. /■ Sect. II. — The Revolutionary War. The footprints of Providence are distinctly visible in our war of Independence — both in the preparatory era, and in the fluctuations of the conflict. (I.) The Preparatory Era. Twenty years before the American Revolution, a successful revolt would have been impossible. In the middle of the Eighteenth Century, the English Colonists were eminently loyal to the Bi'itish crown. Kothing seemed more im- probable than an attempt to free themselves from the sway of the mother country. If the attempt seemed in the highest degree improbable, its suc- cess appeared a manifest impossibility. The colonists were des- titute of the martial spirit, and of military training; their mutual isolation, varied only with antagonisms, rendered them incapable of concerted action. Even the removal of these disabilities would not have rendered successful revolt more practicable. The united strength of the Colonies was wholly inadequate to a contest with the power of Britain. Foreign aid seemed hopeless. France, Spain, and England were the three great Colonial Powers of Europe. France and Spain were the only maritime Powers that could render any assistance to the Colonies in a struggle with England. But their Colonial policy rendered their interest identical with that of Britain. Self-interest must have induced both those powers to discountenance any Colonial revolt, which, however it might weaken a rival, was a precedent to be imitated by their own dependencies. To bring about successful revolution, it was necessary that the Colonies should be brought into concerted action, animated with martial ardor, and inspired Avith confidence by military training, and THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 33 the consciousness of their united strength; that events should take such a turn as to influence the two great Colonial Powers, France and Spain, to lend their aid to the revolted Colonies of Britain ; and finally, all things being prepared for the result, that the Colonies, remarkable for their loyalty, should be driven into revolt. All these ends were effected by the Old French War, the grand prelude to the Revolution, and which may be termed the cradle of Independence. Pressed by the necessities of the contest, England was compelled to abandon the astute policy which suffered the military spirit of the Colonies to slumber. She was forced to summon them to her assist- ance, and rely on their active co-operation for the success of her arms on the American continent. The feeble efforts put forth by England, and the inefficiency of the royal commanders and troops, caused the colonists to depreciate the prowess of the Mother Country; while the efficiency of the Colonial auxiliaries served to exaggerate their estimate of their own power. Their awakened martial ardor, and the consciousness of new found vigor, roused their courage to a pitch that would, upon occasion, nerve them for a contest with the power of Britain. In this war also the public eye was attracted to the great qualities of Washington. And the only British general whose promptitude and ardor might have crushed the incipient revolt of the Colonies, fell in the arms of victory on the heights of Quebec. In this war, moreover. Great Britain stripped France of her American possessions, and thus reversed the policy of her great colonial rival. The motive was removed, that would have secured to Britain the sympathy, and, perhaps, the assistance of France, in a struggle with revolted Colonies, and that power was inspired with the jealous desire of humbling, in every possible mannei', the too aspiring supremacy of her ancient rival. The ascendancy acquired by Britain in this war aAvakened the jealousy of Europe. Spain, in the hope of curbing her imperial aspirations, was influenced to act in opposition to the principles of her own Colonial policy, and was ready to unite with France, in virtue of a family alliance, to aid the Colonies in their struggle for independence. When everything was thus prepared for a successful revolution, 3 34 THE world's crisis. » the haughty Aristocracy which ruled the government of Britain began, with singular blindness, a course of oppression which alienated the affections of the Colonies, and gradually prepared them for revolt. Conceiving that they ought to share the burdens of a a war from which they derived great advantages, they proceeded to levy taxes upon them at the will of Parliament. Taxation without representation was the system of Roman Imperialism, by which the Provinces were made to bear the exclusive burdens of public ad- ministration. A system which would have converted Britain into a military empire, swayed by an aristocracy as haughty as that of Rome, occasioned much discontent. Appeals for redress, beginning in humble petition, and progressing to remonstrance, first calm and then indignant, were made in vain. The policy of the British aristocracy at length outwearied the patience of the Colonies, con- verted their devoted loyalty into resentment, and led to outbreaks of popular violence, and finally to systematic revolt. II. The War of Inuepkndence. Never were combatants more unequally matched, than in the American War of Independence. The British officer who boasted that with five regiments he would march through the Colonies, quelling all opposition, undervalued the courage of the Americans. But no military man, in view of the position and comparative resources of the belligerents, would have believed that the Colonies could offer any continued resistance to the power of England. Imperial po^\'er, against Colonial depend- ence — sixteen millions, against three — unlimited resources, against barrenness of wealth and all material of war — disciplined soldiers, against raw militia — seemed to render the idea of a successful struggle improbable in the highest degree. Even the extent of territory, so far from being advantageous to the Colonies, as has sometimes been supposed, was an important advantage to the invader. The sparsely-peopled territory, and the impracticable roads, rendered supplies difficult of obtainment for the Americans. The immense distances to be traversed, embar- rassed all military operations of our army, whose movements were embarrassed with inefficient wagon trains; while the British, mas- TUE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 35 ters of the sea, miglit transfer their operations from point to point at will, availing themselves of the numerous deep bays to penetrate the narrow settlements wherever they chose, and every where find- ing an abundant source of supplies in their fleet. The Continental troops were never equal to the British veterans in the open field. They were never able, at any period of the war, to prevent the invaders from traversing the country at will. With their superiority in resources, in position, and in the discipline of their troops, the British leaders had only to conduct their move- ments upon some intelligent plan, steadily adhered to, and the sub- jugation of the Colonies was not of difficult achievement. Three plans were open to adoption. The simplest in design, and easiest of execution, was a march across New England from Boston to New York, driving the Continental forces before them, and sup- pressing resistance in their rear by military posts to keep the country in subjection. Their command of the sea would have en- abled them to force a retreat by flank movements from the Sound in rear of the American forces ; but even before an attack in front, Washington must have retreated from Boston, as he was afterward forced to do from New York.' New England paralyzed, the other Colonies could have off"ered but a feeble resistance ; and a south- ward march from New York would have reduced the disheartened insurgents to submission in a single campaign. A movement from the extreme Southern Colonies would have been equally efl"ectual. No resistance worthy of the name could have been made south of Virginia ; New England would not have co- operated heartily at a point so remote from her borders ; the royal authority would have been restored in the Southern states, almost without resistance. Then the Middle states, discouraged, and over- awed by assaults from the South, and from the deep bays on the seaboard, must soon have been overrun. Then New England, stand- ing unsupported, and vital at every point, could have made no pro- longed resistance. The third plan was to pierce the Colonies at some point, so as to dissever them, and then subdue the detached portions in detail. No force of the Americans could have prevented the British commander from seizing and fortifying the line of the Hudson, when either 86 THE world's crisis. New England, or the Middle states might have been overrun in de- tail, without the possibility of concentrating the Colonial forces for the common defense. The British commander first made Boston his base of operations. But intimidated by the skirmish at Lexington, and the defense of Bunker Hill, he suffered himself to be cooped up in the town, for months, by an army destitute of ammunition, and was at length forced to evacuate the place. The next Spring, •when the arrival of large reinforcements had given Lord Howe an overwhelming superiority of force, instead of resuming the enterprise from the original base, the British commander resolved to transfer the seat of war to New York. This decision was an abandonment of the first, and best plan of overrunning the Colonies. It proved the sal- vation of America ; for if Washington had been driven from Boston as disastrously as he afterward was from New York, the catastrophe must have proved fatal to the American cause. Lexington and Bunker Hill saved America by their effect upon the minds of the invader. In abandoning the first plan of overrunning the Colonies by a inarch across New England from Boston, Lord Howe adopted the plan of piercing them on the line of the Hudson, with a view to their subjugation in detail. The vicinity of the point to Can- ada, and the ease with which it might be held by a line of posts, determined their choice. This was the plan of campaign for 1776. "With it "was combined a movement against the Southern states. The loyalists were numerous in North Carolina, and were ready to rise in arms upon the appearance of a British force upon the coast. A powerful force was to be sent to occupy North Carolina, paralyze the Colonies to the South, and move against Virginia at the head of the loyal strength of the Southern Colonies. The plan was a good one. But the movement against the South failed through the preva- lence of contrary winds ! The lo^^alists of North Carolina, weary of awaiting the arrival of the expected British fleet, rose in arms ; and the expedition arrived on the coast only in time to witness the suppression of the movement. Disappointed here, the British fleet turned their arms against South Carolina. Charleston was protected THE WAR OP INDEPENDENCE. 37 only by a fort at the entrance of the harbor. This fort passed, the city had no alternative but surrender. But instead of passing the fort into the open harbor, as might easily have been done, the fleet engaged it and were eventually repulsed. Thus, by a series of mishaps and blunders, the campaign of 1776, against the Southern states, resulted in total failure. The same prevalence of contrary winds, which frustrated the campaign against the South, prevented the complete success of the British movements upon the Hudson. The arrival of reinforce- ments was delayed so long that the campaign was not opened until the last of August. The first movements of the British were completely successful. Washington was driven from Long Island, and compelled to retreat from New York, narrowly escaping capture, and the broken rem- nant of his army was forced to retreat precipitately across New Jersey. The retreat of Washington left the Hudson open, and the British had only to ascend it, take possession of the heights, and the object of the campaign was accomplished, and the Colonies hopelessly severed. But their easy triumph tempted them to turn aside from the prime object of the campaign. Neglecting to seize the heights of the Hudson, the British pressed in pursuit of the American army across the Jerseys, in the hope of annihilating it, and terminating the war at a blow. Had the campaign commenced two months ear- lier, they might have succeeded, and the flight of Washington across the Jerseys, vigorously pressed, might have resulted in the disband- ing of his army. But the advance of winter arrested the operations of the enemy, and afforded Washington the opportunity to strike the blows of Trenton and Princeton, and to move with impunity upon the line of British advance — events which raised the declining hopes of the Colonies, and encouraged them to prepare with vigor for the campaign of 1777. Withdrawn from their design of seizing the line of the Hudson by the inviting prospect of utterly crushing the fugitive army of Washington, when this aim had failed, it was clearly the policy of the British commander to resume, in 1777, the design of the pre- 38 THE world's crisis. vious campaign, and bend all his energies to the accomplishment of the plan of penetrating the country along the line of the Hudson. This was the plan of campaign devised by the British Ministry, and General Burgoyne was sent to Canada with a fine army, to co-ope- rate with Howe by descending from Canada to meet the British army ascending the Hudson from New York. These combined ope- rations seemed to menace the Colonies with almost inevitable ruin. But, with a fatuity that looks like judicial blindness, Howe, instead of moving up the Hudson to co-operate with Burgoyne, at the mo- ment when that general began his southward march from Canada, left New York, abandoning the movement on the line of the Hudson, and transferred his army to the Chesapeake for a movement upon Philadelphia. He was successful, as might have been expected. He beat the American army in every encounter, and took possession of Philadelphia. But his blows were not aimed at a vital point; and while he was winning barren victories, Burgoyne was left to execute alone the grand operation of the campaign on which the success of the contest depended. With ordinary celerity of movement, Burgoyne might have reached New York, and achieved, at least in part, the objects of the campaign. But his dilatory march gave the militia time to rally in his front; the defeat of detachments, injudiciously exposed to disas- ter, encouraged raw troops to resist his veterans ; and his blunder in crossing to the right bank of the Hudson allowed the Americans to check his march, and enabled them finally to capture his army. Thus two of the plans for the subjugation of the American Colo- nies miscarried through the blundering incapacity of the British generals. They were almost always successful in the field, but vic- tory only enticed them into injudicious situations, and exposed them to disasters worse than would have resulted from defeat. Their superiority of strength was frittered away in purposeless enterprises. But superiority of force, however unskillfully directed, must press with crushing weight upon the feebler combatant. The blundering prowess of the British repeatedly reduced the Americans to extrem- ities, from which they escaped so narrowly, and by chances so singu- lar, that we must regard them as providential interventions. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 39 In the first place, if the British had remained in Boston until reinforcements arrived, they must have driven Washington from Boston and across New England, as they afterward drove him from NeAV York and across the Jerseys. Such an event must have been fatal to the American cause. The course of events which issued in their evacuation of the place, and the consequent abandonment of their original plan of operations, was singular in the extreme. They were besieged in Boston for months by an army destitute of powder, and, strange to say, never felt the position of their inactive adver- saries by a sally. And when Washington, having received rein- forcements, took possession of Dorchester Heights, a storm arose, to suspend the attack of the enemy until the works were rendered too strong to be assaulted — leaving them no alternative but to evacuate the city. But it is especially remarkable how their campaign of 1776, which threatened the colonies with ruin, was thwarted by contrary winds. The Southern campaign miscarried from this cause, and their victo- ries in the North were rendered fruitless by the delay thus caused in opening the campaign. The circumstances attending the retreat of the beaten army of Washington from Long Island are especially remarkable. The prevalence of a northeast wind prevented the British fleet, for two days, from entering the bay, and cutting off the retreat of the Americans across the bay to New York. The same wind, which prevented the entrance of the British vessels, was unfavorable to the retreat of the Americans from their dangerous position. But when they were ready to execute the movement, the wind suddenly veered round to a favorable quarter ; a dense fog — extraordinary at the season of the year — vailed their embarkation; and a loyalist, who sought to convey to the enemy intelligence of the movement, was detained, upon his arrrival at their camp, by a Hessian guard who could not understand his eager statements, until it was too late to prevent the escape of the army. The retreat of the army from New York Island might have been easily intercepted ; but the strange delay of the enemy allowed Washington to extricate himself, though by the narrowest chance. A few days after, the dispirited army lay in the grasp of Howe at White Plains ; but incessant rains came on, which compelled the British general to 40 THE world's crisis. defer liis intended attack, and gave Washington an opportunity to retire to a stronger position. When, later in the campaign, Wash- ington was driven across the Delaware with the broken remnants of his army, and a single effort would have enabled the enemy to cross the river, and complete the overthrow of the American cause in the dispersion of the little army which alone sustained it, the advanced season induced the British to wait the freezing of the stream — a delay which resulted in the subsequent turn of fortune that robbed the British of the fruits of all their victories. Washington availed himself of the respite to summon to his standard the forces left on the Hudson, without which he was too weak to strike a blow. General Lee, however, who commanded that detachment, instead of promptly obeying orders and advancing to the aid of Washington, was meditating some rash adventure, when the fortunate capture of his person by the British placed Sullivan in command of his army, who promptly effected a junction with the commander-in-chief, and enabled him to take the offensive against the extended British cantonments, and electrify the public mind by the brilliant success of Trenton. Soon afterward Washington was placed in a position of supreme peril : the Delaware River was in his rear, and the superior army of Cornwallis in his front, separated only by an insignificant stream. It was impossible to hold his position, and seemed equally impossible to move his army through muddy winter roads. A sudden freeze enabled him to move round the position of the enemy, and make that bold march which rescued his army, and saved the cause of Independence. These providential events, together with the failure of Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne — the slow movements, and the injudicious route of the latter general — and the failure of Clinton to move to his relief while waiting reinforcements from England, caused the failure of the British arms in two campaigns, which, according to every human probability, ought to have issued in the overthrow of the American cause. The capture of Burgoyne's army encouraged France and Spain to intervene in behalf of the Colonies. Still, so great was the disparity of resources, that even the assistance of those Powers would not have THE WAK OF INDEPENDENCE. 41 availed to save the cause of Independence, had not a series of events, which must be regarded as providential, contributed to further the result. Want of space will not allow any connected narrative of events, and will only permit brief allusions to the singular prov- idences which repeatedly saved the cause of Independence from ruin. The French were always inferior to the English in naval skill. A single decisive naval defeat would have deprived the Americans of all the benefits of the French alliance ; and it is remarkable how invariably tempests arose to separate the hostile fleets, when on the point of a decisive engagement. This occurred repeatedly during two or three years. A decisive naval engagement was in this manner prevented until the crisis of the war was past ; then the sig- nal victory of Rodney, in the West Indies, forever broke the naval power of France in the American waters. After the capture of Burgoyne, the war languished in the Northern states. On two signal occasions, providential events saved the languishing cause of the Colonies from blows, which would have probably involved irreparable disaster. When the American army was engaged in prosecuting the siege of the British post upon Newport island, a British fleet was hastening to the point to prevent its retreat. Fortunately a contrary wind delayed it. The Continental army succeeded, by the narrowest chance, in effecting a retreat to the main land before its arrival. The success of Arnold's treason would have exposed a large force to capture, thrown the line of the Hudson into the hands of the British, and exposed the whole American army to disastrous attacks in detail. A singular combination of incidents led to the capture of Andre, and nipped the treason in the bud. After the surrender of Burgoyne, the British transferred their active operations to the Southern states. The colonies were now almost exhausted. In those states, a large portion of the population was loyal to the British crown. The aim of the British was to organize this element, and lead it against Virginia, and the exhausted Middle states. After achieving signal successes. Lord Cornwallis, the British commander, sent a strong force into the mountain region of North Carolina, the headquarters of loyalism, for the purpose of 42 THE world's crisis. rallying the population to the British standard. The movement threatened the most serious danger to the American cause. The chance by which it was defeated involved the most remarkable com- bination of incidents that occurred during the war. Three detached bands of mountaineers assembled in arms at their homes in Virginia, East Tennessee and Carolina, and happened to unite without any definite object. As they were strong enough to attempt something, and as nothing else ofi"ered, they decided to march against the British detachment operating in the Tory region of North Carolina. Their attack annihilated the detachment at King's mountain, and struck the southern Tories with such terror that they could never after be induced to lend efficient aid to the royal cause. The battle of King's mountain was the first check to the British career of victory in the South. The blow was severe, but it still seemed possible to achieve the object of invasion, and suppress all resistance in the Southern states. Gates had been defeated, and General Greene was at the head of the last army the Americans could bring into the field. Resistance was suppressed in Georgia and South Carolina, and Cornwallis re- solved to destroy the army of Greene, and place himself in a position to carry out the plan of a movement upon Virginia. He detached Colonel Tarleton, at the head of his cavalry, against General Mor- gan, who commanded a large detachment of Greene's force. The defeat of Tarleton by Morgan, at Cowpens, was an unexpected blow, and deranged all the plans of Cornwallis, by demoralizing his splen- did cavalry, so necessary in the movements he was contemplating. Nothing discouraged, however, Cornwallis, with characteristic enter- prise, destroyed his heavy baggage, and threw himself upon the army of Morgan, now in hasty retreat to effect a junction with Greene. Morgan escaped only by the fortunate rise of a stream on the night after he had crossed, which interrupted the pursuit for two days. Again Cornwallis pressed on in pursuit of Greene, and came up with him at the Yadkin, in time to drive the rear-guard across the river, with the loss of a great part of the baggage. Again a sudden rise in the river interrupted the pursuit; and while Cornwallis made a detour for the purpose of heading the swollen stream, Greene pressed forward toward Virginia, and succeeded in THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 43 crossing the Dan vritli his rear-guard as the van of the pursuing army came in sight. The defeat of Tarleton's cavalry, and the fortunate rise of the two rivers just after his army had crossed, alone saved the army of Greene from ruin. By great efforts, Virginia sent forward reinforcements to the army of Greene, with the avowal that these were the last levies that could be raised. Thus reinforced, Greene again advanced into North Car- olina, where he was attacked and beaten by Cornwallis at Guilford Court-house. And now the British General adopted a singular resolution. In- stead of bringing up reinforcements from South Carolina, and hold- ing the territory he had won, he determined to make a flank move- ment, and advance on Virginia, leaving Greene to advance again upon South Carolina. This decision of Cornwallis proved the salvation of the American cause. In 1781 the American armies seemed on the eve of disbanding. The troops were without pay, ill clad, and famishing. Several mu- tinies occurred, which were with difficulty repressed. The most extraordinary efforts were necessary to place the army in a position to take the field. For three years no success had attended the American arms. No military operations of importance had occurred in the North, while disaster after disaster befel us in the South. French co- operation had resulted in nothing. Exhaustion was telling surely, upon the Colonial cause. General discouragement prevailed. It was become evident that unless some signal success were achieved in the campaign of 1781, the cause of Independence was desperate. So thoroughly satisfied was Washington of this, that he had re- solved upon the desperate venture of assailing the British army in New York, in conjunction with the fleet and forces of France. Just at this juncture, Cornwallis, at the head of all the British forces in the Middle states, placed himself at Yorktown, where a decisive blow might be struck against him. It was resolved to make a com- bined movement of the French and American forces against his army. The accurate and extensive combinations necessary to insure its success, rendered the siege of Yorktown one of the most critical 44 THE world's crisis. movements of the war. "With the resources at their command, the British commanders ought to have defeated it, and converted the crowning triumph of the Revolution into irretrievable disaster. In accordance with the plan of campaign, the French Admiral, De Grasse, steered from the West Indies for the American coast. Had the British Admiral upon that station followed him, his fleet, united with the British squadron in New York harbor, would have driven the French Admiral off the coast, and disconcerted the entire movement. But instead of adopting this obvious policy, the Brit- ish Admiral in the West Indies contented himself with detaching a sufficient number of vessels to overmatch De Grasse when joined by the fleet stationed at New York, and sailed with the rest of his fleet to England. Fortunately, Admiral Graves, who commanded the New York fleet had met with a storm, in a recent cruise ofl" the New England coast, which disabled several of his ships. Rein- forced by the West India ships, he left these at New York to refit, and sailed for the Chesapeake ; but his inferiority of force pre- vented any interference with the preparations for the siege of Yorktown. Still, Cornwallis might have held out until, the fleet being repaired, sufficient reinforcements might arrive to raise the siege. But hav- ing received the promise of relief at an early day, he was only anxious to maintain his position with the least possible loss, and withdrew from his outw^orks, which he had ample force to hold effi- ciently. But the siege was pressed with unexampled vigor by the allies, who knew the importance of time ; and, before the reinforce- ments arrived, Cornwallis found his position untenable. With characteristic vigor, he resolved to cross York river to Gloucester Point, and cutting his way through the Aveak lines on that side, make his escape to New York. His first division of troops had crossed the river, when a storm arose and prevented the passage of the rest of his army. No alternative was left but surrender. Five days after the British laid down their arms, the English fleet arrived at the mouth of the Chesapeake, from New York, with large reinforcements, for the purpose of raising the siege. The British were, providentially, always too late during the en- tire war. In 1776, a storm prevented the British troops, in Boston, THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 45 from crossing Boston Harbor, until it was too late to attack the American works on Dorchester Heights. A contrary wind pre- vented the British expedition against the Southern states from arriving, until it was too late to second the rising of the Carolina loyalists. The same contrary winds delayed the arrival of British reinforcements and compelled the British commander-in-chief to delay the commencement of his attack upon New York, until it was too late in the season to reap the full fruits of his victories. When the Americans were routed on Long Island, a contrary wind de- tained the British fleet, until it was too late to intercept their retreat. On the same occasion, the detention of a Tory by a Hessian guard, prevented the British commander from obtaining intelligence of the movement, until it was too late to attack them in the confusion of embarkation. A short time after, when the British army had already felt the position of the Americans and obtained decisive advantage, a storm arose which induced Howe to defer his assault until it was too late — Washington having availed himself of the re- spite to retire to a stronger position. Burgoyne was influenced by the defeat of his detachment at Bennington to stop a whole month at Fort Edward, until the country had time to rally ; then, appre- hensive that it was too late to reach New York by the left bank of the Hudson, he crossed the stream, and met with impassable obsta- cles at Saratoga. The delay of the expected reinforcements from England, prevented Clinton from moving from New York to the relief of Burgoyne until too late, and his army had surrendered. The opposition of the elements prevented the arrival of the British fleet and army at Newport, until it was too late to intercept the retreat of the American army from the island. Andre inadvert- ently prolonged his midnight interview with Arnokl, until it was too late to return to his vessel, which led to the detection of the trea- son, and saved the American cause. Opportune rains delayed the headlong chase of Cornwallis after Greene, until he was twice only a little too late to crush the flying army of his adversary. A storm shattered the ships of Admiral Graves, and delayed them so long in repairing, that the expedition arrived oS" the Chesapeake only a little too late to raise the siege of Yorktown and save the army of Corn- wallis. 46 THE world's crisis. And then the many instances where, in critical periods, the action of the elements favored the American arms : the unusual fos:, and the sudden shift of wind which favored the escape of the Americans from Lono; Island — the sudden freeze which enabled Washington to execute his movement around the British army at Trenton — the storm which, after the battle of Brandywine, separated the opposing forces, when, with his habitual daring, Washington was about to risk a decisive battle in defense of Philadelphia — the storm which pre- vented the escape of Cornwallis — the repeated tempests which, during several years, separated the French and English fleets when- ever they were about to engage in decisive action. And then the fatuity of the British commanders : the error which caused them to attack New York, when Boston, evacuated by the Americans, was open to occupation — the strange delay in hemming Washington in New York island — the failure to seize the line of the Hudson, when the defeat of the Americans left it open to occupation — the strange want of enterprise which suffered the American army to remain in a defenseless condition for months without an attempt to assail it — the fatuity of Howe, in striking at Philadelphia, instead of co-ope- rating with Burgoyne — the strange delay of Burgoyne's march, and his fatal blunder in crossing to the right bank of the Hudson — the fatal error of Cornwallis (his first blunder during the war), in leaving the Carolinas and marching into Virginia — the blunder of the admi- ral of the British West India squadron, in not following De Grasse to the American coast — the error of Cornwallis in abandoning his outer works. Surely, all these display the intervention of that Being who swayeth the councils of man, no less than the elements, at his will. In reviewing the events of the War of Independence, we may use the language of Washington : " The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he who lacked faith must have been worse than an infidel ; and he more than wicked, who had not grati- tude to acknowledge his obligations." THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 47 CHAPTER II. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. At the close of the Revolution, a philosophic and devout mind, in tracing the past history of the Colonies, must have been impressed ■^ith the belief, that a people so favored were destined for some great career. But events had not yet developed the mission, to ■which destiny pointed the country. Subsequent events have de- veloped the fact, that the Providential mission of our country is The Establuhment and Diffusion of Republican Liberty. Various converging lines of cumulative inference force this con- clusion on the mind. Sect. I. — Tue Unexampled Excellence of our System of Government. Tke mission of the United States, as the destined promoter of Republican Liberty, may be inferred from the excellence of our matchless Constitution. The excellence of this instrument appears in a striking light, in contrast with the faulty constitutions of all former republics. Many persons, judging from past experience, have reached the conclusion that Republicanism is a radically defective system of government. They regard it as an impracticability, beautiful in theory, but impossible of successful execution. These views are derived from the history of republics whose constitutions were radi- cally defective. A brief examination of their organic defects ^Yill show that their failure must be attributed to other causes than any radical inefficiency of Republicanism as a system of government. Let us briefly glance at some of these. I. Orgaxic Defects of Former Republics. Id. Former Republics had no proper Republican Organization. In this age, certain principles of government are regarded as fun- damental, without which popular government can not exist. Among these are : — 48 THE world's crisis. 1. The powers of government must be exercised bj the people through representatives, not by democratic assemblies of citizens. 2. The legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government, should never be vested in the same body, but must be kept wholly distinct from each other, as separate branches of administration. These two principles, which to us seem so simple, and so essential to the success of government, are discoveries of modern times. The simple republics of antiquity embodied no such subtleties. In the earliest form of government — the Patriarchal — the Chief was the leader of his tribe, its lawgiver, and its judge. When the patriarch became merged in the sovereign, the monarch continued to exercise all these powers, and thus centered in his own person, legislative, executive and judicial functions. In states which dethroned their kings, the people seized upon the functions of sovereignty, and ex- ercised them as a matter of course. The entire powers of govern- ment were lodged in Assemblies of the people, and were exercised with that rash and ill-advised precipitancy, always characteristic of democratic assemblies. The populace, under the influence of turbu- lent demagogues, passed hasty and injudicious laws ; and, as the su- preme executive authority, appointed executive agents ; and in angry mobs passed unjust sentences upon the best citizens. This want of the Representative system, and of a proper distri- bution of the governmental power, caused the downfall of the Athenian republic, where the form of government was an unmixed democracy. While such statesmen as Themistocles and Pericles swayed the national councils, bringing forward wise and salutary measures, and obtaining the appointment of judicious executive officials to carry out their policy, the evil tendencies of these dem- ocratic assemblies were held in abeyance. But when the Athenian people yielded themselves to the control of weak and turbulent orators, the republic rushed headlong to ruin. 2nd. Former Mepublics ivere convulsed by the dashing of Rival Classes. In many republics another fact combined with the organic de- fects of the government to work their downfall. They were all THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 49 originally monarcliies, with tlie aristocratic element Tvliich is always gathered about the throne. The dethronement of the king left the aristocracy and the people to struggle for supremacy. In the absence of any constitutional balance of powers between these rival orders in the state, their jealousies led to civil broils, which con- tinually agitated the unskillfully organized republics. The contests between the aristocratic element and the democracy, more than once involved all Greece in civil war. Athens and Sparta were respectively the champions of the opposing factions, and their conflicts divided Greece into hostile camps, and set in operation the train of causes which led to the overthrow of Grecian liberty. Rome presents a still more memorable example of the ruin con- sequent upon the collisions of rival orders in the state, and the abuses of democracy arising from the want of the representative principle. When monarchy was abolished at Rome, a Senate was already in existence, and at once assumed control of the state. It enacted all laws. Members of the patrician order were alone elig- ible to the public offices, especially to the consulate, the executive office of the republic. The only political right originally vested in the people consisted in their privilege of choosing the consuls from among the patricians. The uncontrolled domination of the pati'icians became at length so intolerable as to lead to a revolt of the people, who extorted from the nobility the institution of the tribunate. The tribunes were chosen by the people from the plebeian ranks. Their persons were sacred from violence, and the vote of a single tribune imposed an authoritative veto upon the legislative proceedings of the Senate. Step by step the people gained accessions of political power, until their Assemblies acquired the right to make laws for the Common- wealth. Rome now presented the singular spectacle of a republic with two rival classes, both possessed of independent legislative authority. A tribune of the people, unless bribed or intimidated, might arrest the passage of an unpopular law of the Senate. Against the adoption of factious laws by the Assemblies of the people, the pat- ricians were under the necessity of securing the veto of a bribed or subservient tribune; or of calling in the aid of superstition to delay 4 50 THE world's crisis. its passage ; or, failing in this, of rushing into the Comitium where the Assemblies were held, and dispersing the people by force of arms. This anomalous political condition gave rise to a factious and anarchial administration, which, in the absence of constitutional remedy, could only result in violence and bloodshed whenever the matter in dispute was sufficiently irritating to stimulate mutual pas- sions into activity. The decline of the republic, caused by the want of balance in the constitution between rival classes, was hastened by the manner in which the legislative power of the people was exercised. Like Athens, Eome had no representative assembly. While the republic was limited to the environs of a small town, the people met in popular assembly to deliberate and act upon public affairs ; the prac- tice was continued when the population of Rome numbered millions, and the political franchise had been extended to all the inhabitants of Italy. The millions of citizens could have no voice in the di- rection of affairs. A few thousand persons, generally the dregs of the populace, and followers of some popular and ambitious leader, controlled the republic. The natural result soon followed: all measures were carried by violence. Armed factions fought in the Comitium, and political power inured to the fiercest. The respectable class of citizens could not attend such assemblies. Public affairs were left at the disposal of any faction bold enough to assume the reins of government, or rather to keep possession of the Comitium; and Rome was governed by factious leaders, parading the streets with armed bands of gladiators, and filling the Comitium with legislators whose hands were red with fratricidal slaughter. The Assemblies of the people at length interfered with the execu- tive department of government, and, in violation of the constitutional functions of the consuls, bestowed extraordinary commands upon favorite leaders, thus arming them against the liberties of the com- monwealth. The republic could no longer exist; and Caesar, the foe of the Senate, the idol of the people, defeated Pompey, the champion of the aristocracy, upon the battlefield, and became the sovereign of Rome. That such riotous democracies, engrossing all the functions of THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 51 government, slioulJ have fallen, is not surprising : especially when the populace was opposed to a rival order in the Commonwealth, whose policy kept the people in a continual ferment of inflamed passions. The fliilure of such governments militates nothing against Republicanism as a system. The statesman, perceiving their defect- ive organization, is not surprised at their fall, but rather wonders how governments so constituted should have been able to work at all. 3^. Former Republics lacked the Federal Principle. Yet another fault of constitution conduced to the instability of all Republics of ancient or modern times : Confederation of states were established upon improper principles. All former Confedera- cies belonged to one of two classes : they were either Leagues of Independent States, or Centralized Governments, in which the general Congress was endowed with supreme power over states re- duced to the exercise of merely municipal rights. 1. The evil of Leagues. In Leagues, where each of the confederated states retained all the rights of sovereignty — raised armies, built navies, and exercised the power of peace and war — the loose confederation was only a league of allies, and served only to foster jealousies, and excite com- motions. We find in the Amphictyonic Council of Greece, the first example of a league of independent states. In this league the several states preserved their absolute independence. They waged war against foreign powers, or the members of the league; made peace; attended to all their political relations, domestic and foreign ; and exercised all the functions of nations, independent, though in alli- ance with others. Each state was entitled to an equal number of votes in the Amphictyonic Council. This general Council, or Con- gress, was vested with legislative and judicial powers. It had the right to decide all controversies between the members of the league ; to fine the aggressor, and to call out the entire force of the Confed- eration against a contumacious state. It was vested with unlimited power to take any legislative action judged necessary for the public welfare; it was the guardian of the national religion; and was em- powered to declare, and carry on war. 52 THE world's crisis. With powers so extensive, had the Confederation possessed an organized Executive, with a national army and navy to execute its decrees, it would have constituted an efficient government, and might, perhaps, have eventually made Greece a consolidated Re- public, depriving the allied states of their independent governmental powers, and restricting their authority to municipal regulations. The crowning defect of the league was its want of executive power. This prevented it from assuming the functions of a government, nnd restricted it to the office of an advisory Council of the Grecian states. It served to establish a public law for Greece, and for a great while, preserved the states in tolerable concord. But during the Persian war, having no national army and navy, the Council subsidized the Athenian state, which had a powerful navy, to prose- cute the war. Athens thus became the executive of Greece, and built up an empire at the expense of the allies, attaining a danger- ous ascendancy. A combination was formed, under the lead of Sparta, to break down her overgrown power, and succeeded, after years of desolating war, in accomplishing its aim. Sparta, in turn, was humbled by an alliance headed by Thebes ; and Greece was rent by civil convulsion, until a fatal interference of the Amphic- tyonic Council, with one of the states of the league, precipitated a civil war, which gave Macedon a footing in Greece, and caused the downfall of liberty. The Amphictyonic Council was the prime element of discord in the Grecian republics. Its decisions, enforced by a majority of the states, continually embroiled Greece in civil wars. The history of the period proves that its existence was a calamity. The states had far better maintained their isolated independence, than become involved in an alliance of jarring elements, whose electrical activity desolated the country with continual tempests. The League of the Swiss cantons is an example of similar con- stitutional defects. It is inadequate to preserve harmony among the cantons, or to secure efficiency in the government ; but the isolation of the country, and the simple habits of the mountaineers, have usually counterbalanced the evils of the constitution, and prevented them from inducing the perpetual intestine discords, gen- erally attendant upon leagues of confederated states. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 53 2. The evils of Centralization. The opposite fault — Centralization — has proved equally ruinous to confederated republics. An imperial centralization, like Rome or Athens, "whose power is derived from conquest, is a mere des- potism over the provinces. It matters not that the imperial state is a republic ; its rule over its dependents is as absolute as that of Austria, and more oppressive, inasmuch as a democracy is the most heartless of all tyrannies. A different form of centralization, where the deputies of all the states assembled in general congress, have unlimited power over all the interests of the republic, though apparently more just in the exercise of its authority, has always resulted in abuses which issued in the overthrow of liberty. This abuse of power is sure to occur where a diversity of interests exists. Under such circumstances, a majority of states combine to control the republic, and use the government for the advancement of their own interests. The aggrieved minority seize an opportunity to revolt against the oppressive rule ; civil war ensues ; foreign alliances are foiimed ; and either the republic falls, or, resting its power on the sword, de- generates into a despotism beneath the control of some military leader. Of such a centralization the Achaean League is the most memo- rable example of ancient times. Though occupying a district so small and secluded as to preclude the rise of antagonistic interests, yet the domination of the majority, uncontrolled by constitutional limitations, proved so intolerable, that the Republic was the prey of ceaseless strife. Its history is the narrative of continual discords, ending only with the existence of the Republic. It is remarkable that leagues and centralizations, though repre- senting, in respect of their organization, opposite principles of confederation, have run the same career. Both were vested with jurisdiction over the internal interests of the republic ; both, by the injudicious exercise of their authority, came in collision with some of the allied states : the Centralization, employing the national forces to maintain its authority; the League summoning to its aid the armies of the several states. Their policy equally resulted in civil con- vulsion; leading either to the disruption of the republic, or to the 54 THE avorld's crisis. establishment of imperialism. The downfall of every confederated republic that has ever existed — whether league or centralization — may be traced to the unwise interference of the general Congress with the domestic interests of the Commonwealth. These faults in the constitution of former republics — the want of a proper republican organization — the clashing of class interests — or the lack of the Federal principle — caused the downfall of them all. Their ruin may invariably be traced directly to the lack of a system of representation ; to the want of a proper distribution of the func- tions of government; to the clashing of rival orders ; or to the abuses arising from an improper system of confederation. They fell before the abuses of riotous assemblies of the populace, assuming all the functions of administration ; or from the civil discord of clashing orders ; or from the Congress of the confederation abusing its vested power over the individual states. II. OcR Sv^STEM OF Government avoids all these Errors. In tracing the means by which the framers of the American Constitution were enabled to avoid the organic defects which wrecked former republics, and to establish a Constitution perfect in its outline, and almost faultless in respect of details, the mind is im- pressed with the conviction that our system of government owes its origin to the care of a benign Providence. 1st. The overruling care of Providence discerned in the manner in ivhich 'principles of government, essential to Hejnihlicanism^ ivere slowly evolved during the lapse of centuries previous to the Coloniza- tion of America. 1. The Evolution of the principle of Popular Representation. No ancient republic ever conceived the idea of a representative government. In some of the confederated republics. States were represented by their delegates ; but the idea of the People delegating to representatives their governmental powers, instead of exercising it in person, never occurred to the citizens of ancient republics. Indeed, had some sage statesman conceived the idea, and suggested it to the people, the proposition to yield to an elective body the powers of government, belonging to the citizens, would have been THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 55 rejected with disdain. It involved an abdication of power to which its possessors would by no means consent. The Representative system could not have arisen in the state of society existing in ancient times. We find its germ in the social state of the free barbarians who overran the Roman empire. Patriarchism was the mould which gave form to all the ancient governments. The Patriarch, ruling his tribe with mild but absolute sway, bequeathed his prerogatives to the monarch. The sovereign was absolute. His prerogative extended to the power of taxation. And, in some states, the governments which displaced monarchy, succeeded to these prerogatives. But in the barbarism of the north of Europe this power of the national leader was lost. The chief might demand the military service of his tribe ; but he had no power over the property of his followers. When they overran the Roman empire, these free barbarians retained their original privileges, especially that of exemption from taxation at the will of the sovereign. When his military service was paid, the vassal was free from the requisitions of his king. The royal revenues were at first chiefly derived from lands belong- ing to the crown. At length, however, the monarch began to obtain revenue from his feudal dependents by accepting money in lieu of personal service, which the feudal chief obtained from his vassals upon the same conditions. Thus the custom gradually arose, of the nobles granting to the sovereign certain sums levied upon their vassals, to defray the expense of his wars. But the principle obtained that these pecuniary grants were not taxes levied at the will of the sovereign, but free gifts of his loyal nobles. In the progress of industry, however, burghs or towns arose, whose citizens were, by charter, free from the levies of the nobles. Reve- nues could only be derived from them by their own free consent. In the Saxon Witenagemote, or Parliament, beside the nobility and clergy, the magistrates of the burghs attended, as representatives of the burghs. It would appear from a stipulation of Magna Charta, that no taxes could be imposed by the monarch, except by the consent of the Great Council ; that in the Saxon times, this was the custom of the realm, violated by the tyrranical rulers of the Norman line, and sought to be revived. The Witenagemote lapsed into disuse 56 THE world's crisis. under the early Norman sovereigns. It was not until Magna Charta prohibited the monarch from levying taxes at his arbitrary will, that the burghs were again represented in parliament. But the prin- ciple once established, that taxation could only be levied by the consent of the people, the increasing wealth of the middle class, and the constant necessities of the English monarchs prevented the representation of the Commons from falling into desuetude. The Scottish wars of Edward I, and the French wars of Edward III, compelled the monarchs to apply regularly to the commons for sub- sidies, and they could not always deny the petitions w^ith which the grants were accompanied. The representatives of the Commons thus gradually attained greater political consequence, and, after many contests with the crown, obtained the recognition of their claim that no law should be passed without their consent. Still the Parliament passed no enactments. It petitioned the king, who, if he chose acceeded to its request; but, in issuing the statute, he modified the petition of Parliament as he saw fit. But the usurpa- tion of Henry IV, and the French wars of his successor, enabled the Parliament to strengthen its position, and under the weak reign of the Sixth Henry, it changed the form of its proceedings, and, instead of presenting petitions to the monarch, it framed measures in the form of bills subject to his approval. The fierce Wars of the Roses, in breaking the power of the nobles, greatly increased the relative importance of the Commons. They soon after became a ruling power in the Commonwealth, and the British constitution approxi- mated its present form. It may seem strange that the Bepresentative principle never occur- red to any philosophic statesman, as a remedy for the evils of unbri- dled democracy. That it did not, evinces the want of originality in the human mind. No advance in government has ever been elabor- ated by human reason. Man only elaborates systems which the course of events has germinated. The manner in which the Represen- tative system took its rise, exemplifies the fact that divine Providence prepares the gradations of human progress, by so directing events as to evolve systems essential to the political advancement of the race. Adopted first for the sake of convenience, without any eye to consequences, the representation of the boroughs gradually ex- THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 57 panded into the English House of Commons. It is interesting to observe the manner in which it Tvas fostered. Originating in the free barbarism of the German nations, it was germinated bv Masfna Charta, and fostered into vigor by the profusion, the usurpations, the weakness of monarchs, by ambitious foreign wars, and deso- lating civil strife, until, from the most feeble beginning, it developed into the most important branch of the English government. Every event favored its development. It is the great principle of advance- ment which has been evolving during a thousand years. This is the single great gift of the Middle Ages to modern times. The sea- girt shores of insular Britain w"ere severed from the Continent of Europe by some geological convulsion, long ages ago, that the prin- ciple might have a home where its infancy might be cradled, and "where, free from external violence, it might, during the course of centuries, be fostered into maturity. Its development affords the key to the tangled skein of English history ; the wars, the tyran- nies, the usurpations — every event of a dark and turbulent career, while crushing industry and bringing wretchedness to millions, all afforded aliment to this heaven- cherished principle. 2. Distribution of the Powers of Government. Originally, the monarch was the possessor of all the powers of government. Legislative, and judicial, as well as executive author- ity, vested in him. This was very nearly the condition of the English government during the century after the Norman Conquest. The powers of Parliament were restricted to the granting of sup- plies; the royal judges who administered justice w^ere merely the delegates of the sovereign, in whom he vested his judicial authority, to be exercised according to his will, and resumable at his pleasure. The sovereign engrossed all the functions of govern- ment. But as the Parliament gradually wrested from the king, and con- centered in itself, the legislative functions, it became necessary to wrest from his hands judicial power also. When finally, after many struggles, the Parliament as a legislative body became free from royal control, the next step was to secure the independence of the Judiciary. Unless this were accomplished, the legislative power of 58 THE world's crisis. Parliament was a nullity ; for while the sovereign might impose his own construction upon its enactments, he remained the virtual legislator for the realm. After another contest, the Judiciary was rendered independent of the crown. The sovereign remained pos- sessed of executive authority only, with the power to protect him- self against parliamentary encroachment by imposing a veto upon its enactments. It became a recognized principle among all Englishmen, that the powers of government should be distributed among three depart- ments, mutually independent — the legislative, judicial, and execu- tive. During the Colonial period, the Colonies had been ruled by gov- ernments framed in accordance with these principles. The Repre- sentative system, to which they were accustomed in the mother country, was generally adopted : the legislature of each colony was composed of delegates elected by the people. This feature, so essential to republicanism, was the groundwork of the Colonial governments. The English principle of the distribution of the powers of government between three co-ordinate departments, was also generally adopted. The adoption of these principles — the Representative system, and the distribution of the powers of government — gave to the Colo- nial governments a stability and dignity, for which we may look in vain among former republics. The government of a single state was established upon proper principles, and may be said to have approached perfection. 2nd. The care of a benign Providence evident in the Evolution of the Federal principle. 1. Providential direction of preliminary events. Though the colonies were able, from the example of England, to educe the plan of government necessary for a single state, the his- tory of the past presented no model, on which might be formed a system of confederation. The records of the past might be searched in vain, for an example of a confederacy of states, united under a government at once efficient and harmonious. All past THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 59 confederacies were either leagues or centralizations, and their his- tory only served to warn the framers of the constitution against adopting the organic faults which wrecked them. Yet even here, though history presented no example of a confed- eration to be copied, the position the Colonies had occupied toward each other, and toward the mother country, suggested to the minds of reflective statesmen the system of government adapted to their ■wants. The Colonies had been always mutually independent of each other, and united only by their common connection with the mother coun- try. This independency of the several colonies the people were attached to by centuries of use, and were resolute in maintaining. But their common connection with the mother country suggested the possibility of a plan which might unite them in a general con- federation, while the independency of the several Colonies should be still maintained. The struggle against the pretensions of England had even sug- gested the principles on which the confederation might be based. The pretensions of England, arrogating an absolute supremacy over the Colonies, placed the common government in the attitude of a Centralization, having supreme control over all the affairs of the Colonies, foreign and domestic. It claimed the right not only to control their foreign relations, through trade regulations and by assuming the power to involve them in war at will; but also to con- trol their internal affairs, regulating their industry, and modifying their governmental action at will. The English government claimed the right to interfere with the industry of the Colonies by an abso- lute prohibition of traffic with other nations, and by imposing restrictions on all branches of manufacturing industry. It claimed the right to annul the acts of their legislative assemblies by the vetoes of governors of royal appointment, or by refusal of the royal sanction. It claimed the right to change their chartered forms of government, and impose upon them such governments as England deemed most fitting; in fine, to subject them in every respect to the legislation of the British government. The Colonies were so much disgusted with the arrogant claim of centralization, set up by the British government, that, when it be- 60 THE world's crisis. came necessary to combine their strength during the Revolutionary war, they erred in the opposite extreme, and refused to constitute a general government, but, under the "Articles of Confederation," formed themselves into a league of sovereign, and mutually inde- pendent states. They carefully restricted the Congress of the Con- federation from the exercise of the powers which had seemed so odious in England, The right to levy taxes, and to regulate com- merce were absolutely withheld from Congress. It was not suifered to declare war, enter into treaties, regulate the currency, nor incur expenditure, without the concurrence of nine, out of the thirteen states. Indeed, the jealousy of centralization prevented the states from vesting in the Congress of the Confederation any of the im- portant functions of government. The Confederation was de- signed to be a "League," in which " each state retains its sover- eignty, freedom, and independence." It had neither an Executive nor a Judiciary ; and, indeed, in the narrow sphere allotted to its action, neither was necessary. The bitter experience of the evils attendant upon centralization drove the colonies to the opposite extreme, and induced them to form a League, instead of a Govern- ment, and to debar the Congress from the exercise of powers es- sential to the common welfare. Providentially, the condition of the country was such as to expose the evils of this system in a glaring light. England, France, and Spain, the three great Colonial powers of Europe, from a desire to engross the traffic of their colonies, had each framed a system of restrictive trade regulations, known as " the colonial system." Under this system, each country prohibited its colonies from all traffic with any foreign country, or colonies. During the colonial era, the American colonies of England enjoyed a traffic with the British West India possessions ; but, now, the colonial system of England, and the other European powers, shut them out altogether from the tropical trade. This was felt the more severely, since, from their locality in the temperate zone, their products generally were unsuited to the European market, and marketable only in those tropical dependencies of the European powers. A stagnation of trade, affecting both the agriculture, and the commerce of the states, was the necessary consequence, reducing them to a condition of THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 61 industrial depression greater than had been known during the Colo- nial era. These evils were attributed to the want of an efficient govern- ment. It was believed that, if Congress had the power to adopt retaliatory trade regulations, the European powers might be induced to relax their prohibitory regulations. The public welfare impera- tively demanded that Congress should have the power to regulate trade with foreign countries. It was peculiarly fortunate that this stagnation of industry urged the states to modify the system of confederation at the juncture when it was accomplished. Had not the Constitution been framed when it was, the probability is, that it never would have been. The French revolution soon opened first the French, and afterwards the Spanish and Dutch colonies to American trade. Had the Constitu- tion not been framed when this occurred, the states, relieved from the stagnation which induced the change of government, would have continued under the old Articles of Confederation, until diversity of character and interests would have impelled them to separate and follow out their destiny on difi"erent paths. At this juncture, how- ever, the evils of stagnation had reached an unbearable height, and seemed to call imperatively for a change of the Articles of Confed- eration, and an increase of the power of the general Congress. Another fact also created general dissatisfaction with the narrow limitation of the powers of the confederation. The public creditors were clamoring for payment of the debts incurred during the War of Independence. Congress had no power to raise a national revenue, and the states, suffering from a general stagnation of industry, failed to raise the sums assessed upon them. Even the obligations of the country to the veterans of the War of Independence remained unliquidated. Unable to pay its debts, or to protect its foreign interests, the League failed to command the respect of foreign nations, or the confidence and attachment of the American people. It was falling into contempt at home and abroad, and indications were not wanting, to show that, unless the defects were promptly remedied, the Confederation would soon fall to pieces. This state of things induced the several states, in 1787, to send 62 THE world's crisis. delegates to a convention, with authority to amend the Articles of Confederation. 2. The labors of the Constitutional Convention. The states had now experienced the opposite evils of a Central- ization, and a League with inadequate governmental powers. The Convention was authorized to amend the Articles of Confederation, so as to give efficiency to the confederation while avoiding the evils of centralization. In appointing delegates to the Convention, the states did not contemplate the surrender of their sovereignty and independence. Hence, they were only authorized to amend the Articles of Confederation, retaining the distinctive features of a league. But the powers especially needed, — the power to raise a national revenue, and to regulate the foreign commerce of the country, were most important functions, which could be properly ex- ercised only by a Government. And if a Government were to be formed, instead of a League, it was necessary to establish it upon a proper basis, having tliree departments — the legislative, executive, and judicial. It should also be vested with all other powers neces- sary to give it stability and efficiency; while it should be hedged round with such limitations as to prevent it from trenching upon the cherished sovereignty and independence of the states. The op- pressiveness of English Centralization, and the inefficiency of the Confederation, were the Scylla and Charybdis providentially placed as landmarks, between which the Convention must steer. The cen- tralization of England was its Scylla, skirting which, it avoided widely the dangers of an inefficient league. Guided by this landmark, the Convention readily traced the pow- ers, proper to be vested in the new government. It must have the powers experience had proved to be essential to the public welfare, as the right to raise revenues, and to regulate foreign commerce; and such further powers as the colonies had conceded to England ; but none of the oppressive claims which they had contested. This train of reasoning would lead the Convention to trace some such outline as the following, to guide their labors : — (1.) The powers essential to be exercised, render it necessary to organize a government. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 63 (2.) Every government should have three departments — the legis- lative, executive, and judicial. (3.) The government must have the power to raise revenue. (4.) It must have the power to regulate the commerce of the country with foreign countries. (5.) It must have the power of peace and war, and, consequently, to maintain an army and navy. (6.) It must have the power to coin money. (7.) It must have the power to regulate the intercourse and comity of the several states. These powers are inherent in every government, from the exigency of foreign relations and internal comity, and the resolution to es- tablish a government necessarily involved their bestowal. But the functions of the government were to be carefully re- stricted within these limits. The rights claimed by Great Britain over the colonies, involving the principle of centralization, were to »to be withheld. England had claimed the right to impose laws upon the colonies ; to control and restrict their industry ; to annul their legislation; to modify their governments; and in all respects to regulate both their foreign relations, and their internal affairs. All control over the internal affairs of the states was carefully with- held from the new government. It was proposed to bestow upon it the power to annul state laws in contravention of its enact- ments, and to coerce a factious state by force of arms ; but these features were rejected, and the Constitution presents no suggestion of the possibility of a state and federal collision. Indeed, the con- vention, in framing the Constitution, exercised the most watchful care to guard against the possibility of such a collision. No powers were granted to the general government whose exercise would bring it into antagonism with the states. It was designed to exercise functions which could not be efficiently exercised by the several states; leaving altogether to them the administration of their domestic con- cerns. Hence, in the Constitution, the powers conferred were most jeulously guarded. Every safeguard was thrown round the reserved rights of the states ; every precaution was taken to debar the gen- eral government from trending upon their reserved province. This object was sought to be accomplished in two ways: first, by 64 THE world's crisis. specific limitations of the power of the federal government; second, by the balances of the Constitution, and the federal features of the government. The Limitations of Federal Power. Two instances will illustrate the careful limitation of the powers of the general government. In time of peace, the general gov- ernment could only trend upon the reserved province of state ad- ministration, in the exercise of two of its vested powers, — and both these were most jealously guarded. (1.) The right to raise revenues by import duties, when viewed in connection with the power to regulate commerce, might have been supposed to confer the right to impose duties for the purpose of affording protection to the domestic industry of the country. This construction would allow the government to interfere with the internal development of industry, fostering the interests of one section of the country at the expense of other interests. Th^ convention guarded against this construction by providing that duties should be imposed for revenue only, — " to pay tl:i^ debts, etc., of the United States." So far from granting Congress the power to levy duties for the purpose of giving it power over the internal interests of the country, the power was granted for the purpose of preventing Congress, as far as possible, from coming in contact with the province of the states. Raising revenues by direct taxa- ation does unavoidably bring the Federal government into contact with the reserved province of state legislation, — the internal in- terests of the country. To prevent this, as far as practicable, it was deemed expedient to permit the government to raise its reve- nues by duties, which, being levied at the ports, avoided the unde- sirable contact with the province of state administration incident to direct taxation. It is true that the imposition of duties does regulate commerce, and is a legitimate means for that end. But when the regulation of commerce is the aim of the government, the power must be exercised for the objects contemplated by the framers of the constitution. And they certainly never contem- plated the establishment of a monopoly, by the imposition of duties upon the goods of all foreign countries. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 65 The power to regulate commerce is essentially a retaliatory power. It was bestowed in order to vest in the government the power to employ retaliatory legislation against nations which excluded our products from their home, or colonial ports. If any country would not permit us to traffic with its dependencies, Con- gress might so " regulate our commerce " with it as to exclude its products wholly, or in part, from our ports. If any nation adopted a policy adverse to our interests. Congress might retaliate by the imposition of discriminating duties upon its commodities. Congress might also regulate our commerce with any country which seeks to use its preponderance of capital for the purpose of crushing our industry, in such a manner as to thwart its injurious policy, and to maintain an advantageous system of commercial exchange. But this retaliatory legislation is very different from general duties laid upon the imported products of all foreign countries for the purpose of securing a monopoly to some favored interest. The intention in conferring this power on the Federal government, was not to give it power to foster any particular branch of domestic industry by hos- tile legislation against the industry of all foreign countries, but to retaliate upon any foreign country that wished to foster their in- dustry by a policy hostile to us. The policy of the Constitution was to secure to our industry an equal competition in the ports of the world, untrammeled by adverse legislation. In a word, the regulation of commerce was designed to 'promote intercourse, on equal terms, with foreign countries, not to impose barriers to it; to free the entire industry of the country from foreign oppression, not to oppress almost all its branches for the benefit of a few favored in- terests ; to secure our industry free course, not to trammel it ; to obtain for it the privilege of flowing in its natural channels, not to warp it into abnormal development. While the government restricted its action within the limits fixed by the Constitution, while it imposed duties only for revenue, and regulated commerce only to retaliate hostile foreign policy, it could not interfere with the internal interests of the country, nor come in contact with the reserved province of state jurisdiction. (2.) The power over the currency, might have been made to vest in the government the power to establish banking corporations in 5 66 THE world's crisis. the several states. This power was exercised by all the European governments. But it would have brought the government at once within the province of the states, — the internal interests of the country. It was withheld, and the power of the government over the currency was restricted to coining money and regulating its value. The framers of the Constitution went even further than this. The evils of an inflated paper currency had been severely felt. The paper currency of the colonies during the colonial era had depreci- ated into absolute worthlessness. The currency issues of the Rev- olution were of no greater value. The people were disgusted with the entire system which substituted paper for coin. In consequence of this state of feeling, the framers of the Constitution not only withheld from the general government the right to charter a bank that might issue paper money ; but prohibited the states from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender in the payment of debts. The evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution was to make specie the exclusive circulating medium of the country. " Now,'" said Oliver Elsworth, " is the favorable moment to shut and bar the door against paper money." The convention acted* upon this principle. In no other point could the government interfere with the inter- nal administration of the country, — The only power granted respect- ing internal improvements is the permission to establish post roads. In time of war, indeed, the government might impress property if the exigency demanded it ; but the value of the impressed property was always to be paid. It would seem that a government, with powers so carefully limited, could not prove dangerous to the sovereignty and independence of the states. With the sole exception of the power of taxation, it was not suffered to intrude within their sphere. Its jurisdiction was restricted to the administration of the foreign relations, and domestic intercourse, with only so much power over the internal concerns of the country as was necessarily incident to the discharge of its appropriate func- * In carrying out the same policy, the first revenue act of Congress made all revenue dues and duties payable in specie. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 67 tions. Except this incidental right, the entire control of the domestic interests was carefully reserved to the several states. Additional Safeguards. Still the representatives of the states in the Convention, were distrustful. The idea of a Government, instead of a League, filled them with apprehension. Conscious of the tendency of power to aggregate and consolidate itself, they feared that the vast superior- ity of power possessed by the general government might tempt it to extend the limits of its authority into the reserved province of state jurisdiction, and engross in its own hands the entire adminis- tration of the country, domestic, as well as foreign. They thought it necessary not only to deny the general government the power to trench upon the reserved province of state jurisdiction, but to constitute it with such a system of balances and equipoises, as to oppose insuperable obstacles to its unconstitutional action. They even aspired to more than this ; and labored to construct the gov- ernment upon such a basis as to array all the functionaries of the general government in zealous support of the reserved rights of the states, and resolute opposition to any usurpation of unconstitutional power. The Legislative body was constituted in two branches. The House of Representatives was made, as far as possible, the repre- sentative of the several states. Its members were not national, but state representatives. The People of the several states, not the nation, were their constituencies. The Constitution recognized them as state representatives, in allowing each state a certain num- ber of representatives in ratio to the population, and in providing that any fractional excess of population, in any state, should be lost. The districts from which they were elected were apportioned by the state legislatures, and they were chosen by the people of each state in accordance with state regulations. It was naturally supposed that the lower House of Congress, as composed of state representa- tives, would jealously guard the rights of the states against uncon- stitutional usurpation. But, lest a majority of the people of the states should be carried away with gusts of excitement, or be swayed by sectional interest, 68 THE world's crisis. a co-ordinate branch of Congress was established. The Senate was designed to be the great conservative branch of the government. It was composed of representatives of state Governments, as the lower house was composed of representatives of the People of the states : they were elected by the state legislatures, and responsible to them for their acts. In the Senate, the state governments, being equal in dignity, were allowed an equal representation, irrespective of size or population. It was an assemblage of state delegates, representatives of their sovereignty, to carry out their will in the councils of the general government. If the House of Representa- tives should transcend the limits of constitutional powers, surely the conservative Senate would impose its negative in behalf of the rights of the state governments which were its constituencies. An additional barrier against legislative usurpation was erected in the veto power of the President. It was supposed that one who had attained the highest station in the republic, would be removed from the sphere of popular excitements, and henceforth live for his- tory. The electors who choose him are the representatives, partly of the people of the several states, and partly of the state government ; the states, and not the nation, are the constituency of the President, and it was supposed that he, in view of his exalted position, would guard the rights of the states, if necessary, against the action of both branches of the Federal legislature. The jealousy of federal usurpation, entertained by the framers of the Constitution, induced them to impose yet another barrier against legislative usurpation of power. A law transcending the limits of authority bestowed in the Constitution might be brought before the Supreme Court, and be annulled by the decision of that body. The constitution of the Supreme Court rendered it emi- nently conservative. The class of men from whom its members are selected are more impressible by legal principles than popular excitement; their appointment removes them from the clash of political agitation ; and the mode of their selection, rendering them indirectly the representatives of the several states, would incline them to watch jealously against federal encroachments. They are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Senate being the especial representative of the state THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 69 governments, the presumption was that, as a rule, its advice and consent would be given to the appointment of those only who were known to be the determined advocates of the rights of the states. Thus the Senate, the representative of the state governments, was made the balance-wheel of the legislative department. The state governments, through their senatorial delegates, might pre- vent any unconstitutional legislation attempted by the Lower House. The length of the senatorial term was designed to protect it from temporary gusts of passion which might disturb the conservatism of the other branch of the legislature. Should, however, the Sen- ate itself assent to encroachments, and the President yield to the Bway of the general impulse, then the Supreme Court would stem the tide of usurpation, and, by its firmness, give vigor to a reaction- ary movement. The conservative Senate was also made a restraint upon the Ex- ecutive. Executive appointments to office were to be made only with its advice and consent. Treaties with foreign nations were to be made only with its sanction ; and a vote of two-thirds was nec- essary to sanction business so important. Thus the sovereign states administered the most important business of the government through their delegates in the Senate. It would seem that, in a government thus constituted, the reserved rights of the states were safe from encroachments of the general government. Every safeguard was thrown around them human ingenuity could devise. Either house of Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court, could arrest unconstitutional action ; and the government, in all its departments, was constructed on a federal basis. The states, severally, were the constituencies of its Legis- lature, its Executive, its Judiciary; the lower house of Congress represented the people of the several states ; the Senate, the state governments ; the President and the Judiciary, both the state gov- ernments and the people of the states. It was not a national, but a federal government, constituted by the states to exercise func- tions to which they were incompetent in their several capacity. It was not 'a government over the states ; it was not an agent of the states ; it was the representative of the states, invested by them with powers to administer their foreign relations, and regulate their 70 THE world's crisis. mutual intercourse. The states were not merged in one under tlie government ; they were allies united in the government. It Avas their bond of union, and their representative agent. They stood to each other in the relation of representative and constituent; the constituent retaining all original powers except those vested in per- petuity in the representative. Neither could be pronounced supe- rior to the other; their spheres of power were distinct — each being sovereign in its own sphere and possessed of no power in the sphere of the other. The Federal Government was vested with absolute control of the foreign relations of the states in union ; the states retained the entire control of their domestic concerns. The states, individually, had no right to interfere with their foreign relations ; the Federal Government was equally powerless to interfere with the domestic interests of the states. It is remarkable that an instrument which, in its grand outline, embodies the perfection of government, was regarded by its framers as exceedingly imperfect. When the convention had completed its labors, not a member of the body was satisfied with the Constitution which had been framed. Embodying a compromise of opposing views and clashing interests, it was generally regarded as full of imperfections — an improvement, perhaps, upon the old Articles of Confederation, but far inferior to the ideal systems severally framed by the theorists of opposing schools. The advocates of centralization thought that the states retained too much power in their own hands, and asserted their influence so strongly through the federal features of the government, that their vigorous vitality would reduce the Federal Government to a nullity, and ultimate in the disintegration of the Union. On the other hand, the advocates of state sovereignty, from the tendency of power to accumulate authority in its own hands, were apprehensive that the aggregated power of the Federal Government being so vastly superior to that of the several states, would tempt it ultimately to assert a supremacy over them that would lead to centralization and imperialism. The Constitution was a compromise of these con- flicting parties. The one party secured a government, instead of a league, which the other preferred; the other carried their point in THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 71 having the government based upon the sovereignty of the states. The one succeeded in establishing a vigorous Executive as a coun- terpoise to the federal features of the Constitution; the other labored to secure the rights of the states by vesting the most important functions of government in the conservative Senate, the immediate representative of the state governments. Each party believed that it had yielded too much to the other, and that the imperfections of the Constitution must secure the downfall of the government; the one believing that it would end in disruption through the power and jealousy of the states ; the other that the tendency to centrali- zation would destroy the reserved powers of the states, and engross all authority in a centralized imperialism. It is strange that the clashing of discordant views should have given birth to a constitution which, in its general outline, strikes the golden mean between centralization and a disjointed league. In respect of details, the philosophic theorist may suggest amendments. Some of the granted powers might be conferred in phraseology more explicit, so as to debar the possibility of a dubious construc- tion ; the power and patronage of the Executive might be advanta- geously restricted to the limits contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, with the effect of diminishing the periodical excite- ments of the Presidential election ; but, in its grand outline, the system of federal union is perfect. The idea of dividing the powers of government between the States and the Federal Govern- ment, allotting to each its sphere in which it is supreme, is a con- ception too brilliant for human genius to originate ; it could only arise from the suggestion of events, overruled and guided by divine Providence to that end. This idea, properly elaborated in its de- tails, embodies the perfection of government. It avoids the evils attendant upon every other system, and combines, in an eminent degree, efficiency of administration with the surest guaranties of liberty. III. Federal Republicanism the only Stable Fokm op Government. 1st. InstabilUy of all other Forms of Government. 1. Instability of Monarchy. In the present state of the world, monarchy is, perhaps, the most 72 THE world's crisis. unstable of all governments. It involves an abnormal social state, which nothing but force can uphold. Force is the foundation of monarchy. It is the violent rule of one, or the few, over the many. It had its origin in violence, and when the masses will no longer be oppressed by armed force, the day of monarchy is over. The conditions, under which monarchy had its origin, are those most favorable to its continued existence. The chief of a warlike tribe subdued adjacent tribes, and subjected them to his sway. Here the oppression of subjected tribes bound his own people to the conqueror by the ties of pride and advantage, and the support of a favored portion of his subjects enabled the monarch to hold the rest of his dominions in unwilling and enforced subjection. Thus, monarchy owed its origin to the loyalty of the few, bribed by advantage, and seduced by pride to support the monarch in the oppression of the many. In the first age of monarchy, territorial position distinguished the loyal subjects of the monarchy from, the oppressed : the population of the conquering tribe aided the monarch in keeping the con- quered in subjection. But gradually monarchies became consoli- dated. The recollection of conquest was erased from the minds of the subjected population, and a sentiment of loyalty became generally diffused throughout the extent of the kingdom. The support of the throne by the population of a limited territory was no^v exchanged for the support of a limited class. The leaders of the conquering tribe became the nobles of the realm, holding extensive possessions throughout the kingdom, and enjoying exclusive privileges. This class, linked to the throne by the ties of interest, enabled the mon- arch to maintain his sway over the unarmed and oppressed masses- But, whether maintained by the support of a limited territorial population, or of a favored aristocratic class, monarchy has always been the rule of violence, the few oppressing the many. The Roman dominion is the most memorable example of domination main- tained for ages by the swords of the conquering nation. Persia, the kingdoms of modern Europe, and almost all other monarchies, are examples of royal sway maintained by the loyal devotion of a favored class. Monarchy, however, has never been a stable form of government. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 16 It is always menaced with revolutions, — explosions of general dis- content. In oriental despotisms, where the sluggishness of the masses leaves the populace out of view, monarchy is often convulsed by dynastic revolutions, arising out of court intrigues or ambitious rivalry. European monarchy has always been threatened with popular revolution, arising out of the oppression of the masses. Here, from the eai'liest ages, popular outbreaks have compelled the sovereign to trust his power to the guardianship of the sword. The instability of monarchy increases in the ratio of the advance- ment of the age. The uninquiring loyalty of a dark age of general ignorance and debasement, patiently acquiesces in the rule of the sovereign, however oppressive his sway. Advancing civilization renders the subject impatient of oppression, and it becomes neces- sary to reinforce loyalty with priestcraft, in order to secure tole- rance of oppression and wrong. At length advancement reaches a stage where Absolutism is no longer practicable : the sovereign must appeal to force to maintain his power, and must ally the aristocracy to the throne by taking them into copartnership in the government, or at least exempting them from the oppression under which the masses groan. Monarchy now passes from unlimited despotism to the second stage, — aristocratic monarchy. But Aristocratic Monarchy is as impracticable in modern times as absolute despotism. Heavy taxation is a necessity of the existing order of things. The first aim of a dominant aristocracy is to secure and advance its material interests. It monopolizes the patronage of government, and exempts the property of the aris- tocracy from bearing its proportion of the public burdens. Tax- ation is so levied as to bear exclusively upon the industrious classes. At first this does not press insupportably upon industry. It is strong, and able to bear the heavy burden unflinchingly ; but gradu- ally, by the natural law of accumulation, property aggregates more and more in the hands of the wealthy and unburdened class ; the circle of exemption grows wider and wider ; the burden of taxation presses more and more heavily upon the diminishing means of the industrial class. The privileged aristocracy profits by the sufferings of industry to increase its possessions, so that the poorer the people become, the richer the aristocracy grows ; and the richer the aris- 74 ■ THE world's crisis. tocracy grows, the heaviei* presses the burden of taxation upon the impoverished masses. This process is continually going on until the pressure of taxation and poverty becomes unendurable, and the peo- ple rise against their oppressors, and revolutionize the government. This was the course of causation which led to the French revolu- tion. The nobility refused to be taxed, and finally engrossed so much of the property of the country that the people could no longer support the burden of taxation necessary to meet the public expenditure. The government was under the necessity of assem- bling the States General to coerce the refractory nobles ; the depu- ties of the nation, once assembled, imposed a constitution upon the government, and, step by step, France became a republic. The only escape an aristocratic monarchy has from revolution and republicanism is, to widen the circle of privilege, and admit a greater number to share in the government. The British govern- ment has resorted to this alternative. Since the revolution of 1688, the Aristocracy has obtained entire control of the Parliament, and ruled the country with uncontrolled sway. But, in 1830, the general discontent reached such a height that the Aristocracy could not carry on the government alone, and were compelled cither to face revolution, or to take the wealthy Aristocracy of Trade into copartnership in the government. This extension of political privilege has enabled the British government to go on for thirty years. The Nobility, supported by the Aristocracy of Trade, have been enabled to rule the country, in spite of the dis- content of the suffering masses. But it cannot stop here. Now the educated mechanics are clamoring for a share of political power. It is denied them by the aristocratic classes. Excitement is already running high; and only a period favorable to convulsion is needed to precipitate England into the vortex of revolution.* The governing classes in England must maintain their monopoly of government by violence. The Working Class once admitted to a share in the government, monarchy and privileged aristocracy are doomed, *This was, of course, written before the passage of the recent English Reform Bill. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 75 Such is the tendency of the age. The stability of monarchy is past. The absolute sway of a king is no longer possible. The day of irresponsible, despotism is over. Aristocratic monarchy is equally impracticable : royal oppression, even supported by a privi- leged aristocracy, can no longer silence the demands of an oppressed people, awake to a sense of injustice, and panting for redress. The throne and the aristocracy will concede as far as concession is con- sistent with the existence of their privileges; when concession ceases, then revolution will precipitate the monarch from his throne, and establish a republic. European monarchy can not exist half a century longer. Every throne in western Europe has been compelled to make concessions to popular discontent. Europe is even now tottering on the verge of general convulsion. Monarchy has but one hope, — to attain universal dominion. Could a nation like Russia once master the ^Yorld, the ruling nation, bound to the throne by pride and privilege, might rule the earth for ages, as Italy governed the Roman empire. Monarchy can no longer maintain itself by the support of a privi- leged class ; it must rest upon national support ; and the support of a nation to a throne can only be secured by the pride of conquest, and the plunder of a conquered world. Universal dominion, or ex- tinction, are the alternatives of monarchy. But it will be asked, why cannot monarchy adapt itself to the movement of the age, and base its sway upon popular affection? Because as a system of government it is radically defective. Cen- tralization is a necessary part of the monarchical constitution. A monarchical government must necessarily exercise control over the internal administration, as well as the foreign relations of the country. Enacting laws for the internal, as well as the external administration of the country, and enforcing them by executive authority, the mo- narchical government comes continually in contact with the people. It thus becomes the object at which discontent spits its venom. It is responsible for the unpopular acts of its agents: injudicious leg- islation brings reproach, and favoritism excites indignation. Even when unmerited, popular clamor attributes to the government the disasters of every financial crisis, and all the evils under which a population labors. No government w'hich takes under its control the 76 THE world's crisis. internal affairs of a country can maintain its popularity. And mon- arcliy when unpopular must abdicate, or maintain its rule by the sword. Monarchy, being a centralization, can be maintained only by violence. Monarchy can not exist without having control of the internal concerns of the country: it can not exist without a privileged aris- tocracy. Neither of these is consistent with popularity. Popular consent would not long suffer a nobility to exist ; and a throne un- supported by an aristocracy could not co-exist with a democratic government. The first gust of discontent would overturn it; and the control of the internal administration could not but breed dis- content. Monarchy, founded in violence, can be perpetuated only by force. And the time is rapidly approaching when monarchy, as at present constituted, can be maintained by force no longer. Monarchy can only continue to exist by changing its form, through some powerful nation attaining universal dominion. 2nd. Indability of all other Systems of Republicanism. History has rendered its verdict against the stability of a Confed- eration of Republics united in either a Centralization or a League. A Republic, consisting of a single state, is equally incapable of stability. The concentration of all the powers of administration, foreign and domestic, in a single hand, is even more objectionable, here, than in a monarchy. It leads equally to neglect of the duties of government ; it equally causes abuses of administration, oppress- ing one portion of the country to foster the interests of another, or one branch of industry to promote another. In a monarchy these evils are borne until they become intolerable and induce sedition. They equally cause outbursts of discontent in a republic. This first seeks redress at the ballot-box. Every election is an attempt to revolutionize the administration, engendering animosities which ultimately find vent in an appeal to arms. Even where the government does not provoke sectional discon- tent, the excessive concentration of power leads to agitations which end only in the subversion of republicanism. Elections are exciting in ratio to the importance of the office to be filled. No government THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 77 can stand the shock of periodical elections where the powers of government are unlimited. Opinions will always dijBfer respecting the policy of gov.ernment, especially as regards the internal admin- istration. Here the government touches the dearest interests of every individual. Every commercial crisis, every period of finan- cial disaster, is traced to its influence ; and opposing factions, assail- ing and defending its policy, will eventually come to blows. Republicanism has always been menaced by two great and oppo- site dangers : popular excitement, tending to revolution ; and gov- ernmental usurpation, leading to tyranny. Both these evils take their rise in the centralization of power, and find their only remedy in its proper distribution. The concentration of power, vesting too much authority in a single hand, increases the excitement of elec- tions to a point dangerous to the stability of government. Were the government an absolute centralization, with all power vested in a single officer, the election of the ruler of the state would shake the republic to its center ; and the excitement of elections is intense in precise ratio to the degree of centralization. As centralization endangers a republic by gendering popular excitement, so the dis- tribution of the powers of the government diminishes the importance of the respective offices, until elections cease to be the occasion of popular fervor. Again, the concentration of power suggests tempt- ation to usurpation by the facility of its achievement ; but the dis- tribution of power renders combination at once necessary and hopeless, and withers disorderly ambition in the bud. The Distribution of Power is the only talisman to insure tran- quillity and secure the stability of government. The past experience of the world demonstrates the justice of this reasoning. All former republics have centralized in the hands of the government, both the foreign and domestic administration ; and all have fallen from the convulsions induced by this concentration of power. All the simple, unconfederated republics of former ages fell through popular turbulence, the fruit of the concentration of power in the hands of the people ; or through usurpation, induced by the concentration of power in the hands of the government. The representative system is no safeguard against the evils of cen- tralization. The factions which convulsed the French Republic, 78 THE world's crisis. derived their passionate energy from the magnitude of the stake ; the government was possessed of all power, and the factions strug- gled in blood-stained conflicts for its control, until the nation shel- tered itself from their fury beneath the shadow of despotism. The passions, which have so long convulsed INIexico, and at last led to the establishment of imperialism, arose from the unlimited power of the government over domestic as well as foreign relations. The concentration of all power in a single government — whether monarchy or republic — leads inevitably to convulsion. It is una- voidably incident to monarchy. That form of government was stable while it was the simple rule of force. But since the people are awake to their rights, monarchy has come to partake of the instability of centralized republics. The old system of a single government, in which all the powers of administration were central- ized, would answer in a former age ; for then, if a republic fell, the people might find repose beneath the shadow of monarchy. But now monarchy gives no repose. Force can no longer rule. Pop- ulations have learned their rights, and have been taught their power. Oppression now always provokes revolt, and populations fly from the oppression of monarchy to republicanism. In our age a centralized government is no longer possible. The old system of a centralization of power, would keep the nations oscillating be- tween monarchy and republicanism, and finding repose in neither. The French nation is a striking instance of the working of the old system of government — a nation flying from tyranny to repub- licanism, taking shelter from the convulsions of a centralized repub- lic in the power of a despotic throne ; again, wearied of oppression, unseating the monarch and establishing a republic; and finally forced again to seek shelter from the factions, gendered by central- ization, beneath the strong arm of imperialism. In another century every civilized nation would be in the position of France, bal- ancing between the evils of despotism and centralized republican- ism, and oscillating, in periodical convulsions, from one extreme to the other. There are but two forms of stable government now possible for the world. The one is the sway of imperial despotism, subjecting the world to the rule of a conquering nation ; the other is the sys- THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 79 tern of federal republicanism, outlined in the Constitution of the United States. Russia is preparing to subject the world to the one: Providence raised up the United States to give to the world the other. Sd. The Stability of our System of Government. Just at the crisis when the political progression of mankind had completed its cycle, and Russia was preparing to carry back the course of progression to its beginning by subjecting mankind to the sway of a conquering despotism, divine Providence interposed to give to mankind, in the American Constitution, the system of government which alone is possible in the present state of the world. The Centralization of Power has been the cause of the downfall of all popular governments. No popular government has ever been able to stand which centralized in its hands both the foreign and the domestic administration. This centralization was the great primal cause of their ruin. The minor defects of their constitu- tions, as the want of the representative principle and of the division of the powers of government into three departments, exercised only a minor influence in bringing about their downfall. These were secondary causes. The ruinous defect of all former republics, — the prime cause of their downfiill, was the centralization of all the powers of administration in the same government. Where this defect has existed, it mattered not whether the people exercised their sovereign powers in democratic assemblies or through a repre- sentative body ; it mattered not whether all the powers of govern- ment were lodged in the same hands, or distributed into three departments, — the government has invariably trodden the same road to ruin. Fallen man is too imperfect to be trusted with unlimited power. The errors, the delinquencies, the misdemeanors of officials, sooner or later, ruin every government which is possessed of too extensive jurisdiction. The only security lies in so distributing power that little shall anyAvhere be lodged in the same hands. Tlie downfall of republics has been invariably brought about by centralization, as the prime cause, and by civil convulsion and violence in some form, as the means. The forms of civil convulsion are various : 80 THE world's crisis. 1. Sometimes it is tlie collision of the several states of a con- federation. 2. Sometimes the revolt of states against the centralized govern- ment. 3. Sometimes the struggle of rival factions to obtain possession of the government. Centralization leads to civil convulsion by various paths ; but one follows the other as surely as death brings decay. 1. Sometimes the ineflBciency of the government injures the public interest, causing discontent, which ultimates in revolution. This is a frequent incident to centralized government, where the multiplicity of interests under its charge almost necessarily causes the neglect of some. 2. Sometimes the injustice of the government, displaying local favoritism or a partiality to special interests, excites the resent- ment of states, or classes of men, and leads either to the insurrection of masses of individuals, or to the revolt of states. 3. Sometimes the clashing of parties, advocating adverse lines of policy, begets a political excitement which issues in civil strife. 4. Sometimes the magnitude of the power and emoluments of oflfice excite disappointed partizans to attempt to seize the govern- ment by violence. The cause of the excitement of passions, in every instance, is the centralization of all departments of administration in the hands of the government. The government is so oppressed with business that it performs its functions negligently ; or it has power enough to become oppressive ; or its course of administration becomes so important as to excite factious struggles between the advocates of opposite lines of policy; or the prize of power and emolument is so alluring as to excite defeated factions to an appeal to arms. The only safety to republicanism lies in the distribution of power. This alone can prevent the strife of angry passions, and secure the tranquillity and perpetuity of government. In the American federal system the distribution of power is car- ried to perfection. The original powers of government, inherent in the people, are vested in two depositories : the internal administration is left to the 1 THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 81 states ; the management of foreign relations, and of inter-state comity, is vested in the Federal government. And each of these departments of the public administration is so intimately subdivided, that no important powers are lodged in any single office. The internal administration is so complex and so important that, if its entire control were vested in a single government, it would lead to the most violent political contests, resulting either in violent disruption, through popular excitement, or in the aggregation of all power in the hands of the government of internal administration. The danger of turbulence on the one hand, and of oppression on the other, is avoided through the subdivision of this power among the various states, and the distribution of the power of each state among three departments of administration. Through this minute subdivision of power the internal administration causes no excite- ment whatever. State politics are almost entirely devoid of excite- ment. The powers of the Federal government are also similarly distrib- uted among the several departments ; no powers of extreme im- portance being lodged in any branch of the administration. Con- sequently, the elections to federal offices are, with one exception, generally unattended with passion. The election of representatives and senators to Congress, and the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court never convulsed the country. And had the Federal government always restricted its action to the foreign relations of the country, Congressional elections would have proved still less exciting, and would have been attended with as little passion as elections of state legislators. The single exception is found in the election of the Federal Ex- ecutive. Presidential elections have always profoundly agitated the country. But this is not owing to any constitutional defect in the structure of the government. The fact shows that too much power inures* in the presidential office. This is true, but it is power * What follows upon the power of the President, appertains not to our Gov- ernment, as administered in the past, but to the Government as framed in the Constitution. The power of the Executive is too great, but it will not answer to diminish it while unconstitutional legislative authority is assumed. It has fre- 6 82 THE world's crisis. with which the Constitution did not vest the Executive. The ex- altation of the executive authority is owing to the unconstitutional encroachments of the Federal government upon the internal admin- istration of the country ; and to the fact that Congress has never imposed the restrictions upon Executive patronage which the Con- stitution contemplated. The power of the President is two-fold, — legislative and execu- tive. The veto power vests the President with legislative power, and his voice is equal to the vote of one-sixth of Congress. While the government restricted itself to the foreign relations of the country, this would not vest the executive office with excessive importance. But when Congress assumes power over the internal administration also, the veto power of the President invests his office with tran- scendent importance. In a nearly balanced state of parties he holds the balance of power, and can sanction or annul the action of Congress at will. The party which is in a minority in Congress strains every nerve to elect a President devoted to its views, since his veto can arrest the legislation of its opponents. The result is periodical contests of unexampled violence. The struggle to secure the legislative power of the President is rendered the fiercer from the fact that the usurpation of Congress, in transcending the limits of its constitutional jurisdiction and trenching upon the internal administration, has invested federal legislation with excessive im- portance. The laws of Congress touch the dearest interests of the people, and the President's power to sanction or thwart them ren- ders him a most important legislative functionary, Avhose election cannot but be attended with the most passionate excitement. The executive power of the President, also, is increased much beyond the limits contemplated by the Constitution. That instru- ment authorized Congress to limit the patronage of the executive quently occurred in our past history, that the great power of the President, being the only counterpoise to the unconstitutional action of Congress, lias saved tiie republic from disaster. Wliat we need is the restriction both of executive and legislative puwer, to their constitutional limit. To diminish one without diminishing the other, would destroy the balance established by the Consti- tution. I THE MISSION OP THE UNITED STATES. 83 by vesting the appointment of sub-officials, either in the heads of departments, or in the courts of law. Vesting this power in the courts of law would have removed public offices from politics ; but instead, political parties, desiring to increase the power of the Execu- tive for party aims, have left patronage in the hands of the Presi- dent, and that monstrous innovation — Rotation in office — has exalted executive patronage until every presidential election agitates the country as with the throes of a political earthquake. The remedy lies in the distribution of power, for which the constitution has provided. Let the executive be stripped of its patronage by vesting the appointment of sub-officials in the courts of law, and let the Federal Congress abandon the course of uncon- stitutional usurpation of power over the internal administration, — and the power of the President will no longer be so great as to agitate the country in presidential elections. In a government administered in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, a presidential election would excite no greater passion than the election of the governor of a state. The evils that have afflicted our republic arise, not from defects in the Constitution, but from violations of the Constitution. The unconstitutional centralization of power in the Federal Congress, and in the President, has proved the Pandora's box whence issued all our woes. Let not the reproach due to unconstitutional usurpa- tion be heaped upon our system of government. The distribution of power for which it provides, is perfect. — Such a government presents the surest guarantees of stability, in its efficiency, its jus- tice, and its freedom from excitement. Let us briefly notice its excellence in these particulars. 1. It is the most efficient government that can be devised ; pro- viding for the best administration, both of foreign relations and domestic interests. The Federal Government, occupied exclusively with foreign re- lations, need neglect no department of the public interest. Em- bodying in itself the power of all the states, it commands the respect of foreign nations. The states, sheltered beneath the aegis of Federal protection, and withdrawn from the excitements of 84 THE world's crisis. foreign aflFairs, turn their undivided energies to the domestic admin- istration. Thus, neither of the grand departments of public admin- istration can suffer from neglect. No exigency of foreign politics can withdraw the state governments from a judicious internal ad- ministration ; no domestic crisis, industrial, or financial, distracts the Federal government from its watchful oversight of foreign policy. This system secures the most perfect equity of administration. Under this system, every state, and every interest, is secure of equal justice and equal rights. A general government that con- trols the internal affairs of a country must afford undue advantages to some sections, and some interests, to the detriment of others, giving rise to a sense of grievance and begetting alienation. But here domestic concerns are left entirely to the control of the states ; and in the Constitution, the states mutually agree not to further their several interests by legislation adverse to the interests of others. Each state manages its own affairs without external influ- ence, and the industry of all sections is left alike to the action of the laws which govern industrial development. The influence of the Federal government is never felt within the province of the states. Its power can never become oppressive of the people, or injurious to their interests. This system maintains perfect domestic tranquillity. The efficiency and equity of the Federal government are sufficient guarantees against agitation arising from popular discontent. The limitation of Federal power prevents the government from becoming an object of such supreme importance as to induce factious bitterness in elections, and civil war for its control between excited parties. A crisis would rarely occur when the foreign policy would possess sufficient importance to cause excited strife; and such crises never continue long enough to admit of opposing parties consoli- dating in support of adverse lines of policy. In quiet times such a government would be entirely free from political agitation ; no issues would exist on which parties could be organized : worth and merit would be* the only title to political position. * It is evident that the framers of the constitution did not anticipate exciting party contests. Had they expected such a state of things they would not have THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 85 Tliis system carefully guards against the convulsions Avliicli have caused the downfall of all former confederations. Leagues have fallen from the collision of rival states arraying all the members of the confederation beneath their hostile banners : Centralizations have fallen from the revolt of insurgent states against the oppression of the central government. Here, both these evils are carefully guarded against. The states can not come into antagonism with each other. The limits of their several jurisdictions preclude a collision of the gov- ernments ; antagonism of their citizens is prevented from involving the states in controversy, by the intervention of the Federal judiciary, which alone has jurisdiction of such cases. Rivalry of interest may excite individual emulation; but, when neither state has land and naval forces, it can never lead to armed collision. The federal sys- tem secures uninterrupted harmony between the state governments. Nor can a collision occur between the states and the Federal govern- ment. Each moves in a separate and distinct sphere. The Federal government can not interfere in the reserved province of state sov- ereignty: the states can not intrude into the sphere allotted to fed- eral jurisdiction. The entire system moves forward in harmonious adjustment under the constitution, without the possibility of collision. The Federal government is only known to the states and the people as the dis- penser of benefactions. Its judiciary is the arbiter of their differ- ences; its power is their shield against foreign violence; its voice, its arm, is the powerful interposition of all the states to allay irri- tation, to appease discord, in any one. As the peacemaker and promoter of friendship between the states, and the common executive of them all to administer foreign relations, the Federal government must endear itself by the experience of its benefits. arranged the presidential elections as they did. They provided that the second candidate on the hst should be Vice President. This vVas a good arrangement if a presideivtial election was merely a choice between distinguished citizens, to determine which should be elevated to an honorable office. But, when parties sprung up it was very inconvenient; for the Vice President might belong to a different party from the President, when the death of the President would give the administration into the hands of his political antagonists. 06 THE WORLD S CRISIS. The system is so simple, so beautiful, so harmonious, that it seems •\\'on(lerful that it was never discovered before : the internal admin- istration, ever the fruitful source of faction and discord, withheld from the Federal government, and retained in the control of sov- ereignties too small for their interests to become the subject of factious discord; the foreign relations committed to the exclusive control of the federal agent of the state governments. Were such a government as this established in France, republic- anism would become possible among that mercurial people. If each geographical " department " of France were organized into a state, with «, local government having exclusive jurisdiction of its internal affairs, while the general government of the nation was restricted to the foreign administration, the cabals, intrigues, and outbreaks of fac- tions, which have repeatedly wrecked the republic, could never occur. The last French republic fell before the fanaticism of the Red Re- publicans, who sought to control the government for the establishment of their leveling principles. The property classes, in alarm for their interests, sought protection in Imperialism from the schemes of these fanatics. But Red Republicanism could have no aim in a government having no jurisdiction of domestic affairs. Such a government could take no cognizance of their schemes. Their agitation would be restricted to the local governments of the " departments ;" here they would be no longer dangerous ; and the Federal republic, released from all agitating questions, would move quietly on in its sphere. The same disquieting control of the internal affairs of the country has caused all the convulsions which have shaken the Mexican republic ever since its establishment. It has been the fashion to affirm that Mexico and the European na- tions are not sufficiently advanced for self-government. But the diffi- culty lies in the machinery of government. If a government becomes oppressive — as every government does which arrogates to itself the in- ternal administration of a great country — enlightenment will never render the people submissive. On the contrary, their restiveness will be in the ratio of their advancement. No people are, or ever will be, too enlightened to resist oppression : any nation in Christendom is sufficiently advanced to rest contented under a government which neither contravenes their prejudices, nor infringes their rights. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 87 Not advancement, but a proper govermental system, is needed. A constitution properly framed so subdivides the powers of adminis- tration, that there is not power enough lodged at any point to induce agitation in the public mind, or to enable unbridled ambition to pre- cipitate revolution and seize upon the administration. Such a govern- ment, restricted within its constitutional limits, may be harmoniously conducted by a people but slightly advanced in civilization. It is the only form of government which will not be continually shaken by discord, and eventually overthrown by revolution. The past expe- rience of republics does not apply to a government constructed on the principles of the American Constitution. That instrument provides against the evils which wrought their ruin. It is destined to solve the grand political problem of a government of the people, combining in itself the merits of freedom, efficiency, and stability. A republic, founded upon the division of power established in the Constitution of the United States, is not only stable, and capable of perpetuity ; it, furthermore, has the capacity of indefinite exten- sion. Other forms of government become too unwieldy by enlarge- ment of boundaries. The internal administration becomes too complicated for management. The interests of some sections are neglected, or are sacrificed by bargain and intrigue for the further- ance of other national interests. " Log-rolling " is reduced to a system, and corruption or neglect reaches a point where the prompt- ings of self-interest compel the dismemberment of the republic. But this is obviated in the division of the powers of government. Where the several states attend each to its own local interests, each can adopt necessary measures without neglect, and without the bargain and compromise necessary in a broader territorial sovereignty. So far as the internal administration is concerned, it does not matter how extensive the boundaries of a Federal republic. Nor does the enlargement of boundaries increase the difiiculties of the foreign administration. On the contrary, the difficulty of foreign relations diminishes in ratio to the enlargement of the re- public ; until, should it embrace the whole earth, there would no longer remain foreign relations to administer, and the powers of the government would be restricted to promoting the intercourse be- 88 THE world's crisis. tween the states. Thus, such a government presents the singular anomaly, of having the sphere of its powers narrowed as the field for their exercise is widened. Every enlargement of its boundaries renders the task of administration lighter : its energy may be diminished with every extension of the area of its sway. A federal republic grows more stable with every enlargement of its boundaries. No danger can arise from the internal administra- tion, for this is under the control of the states. The only danger that threatens it arises from foreign wars. While the world is at peace, foreign affairs are too tranquil to excite the public mind : no question of foreign policy can arise, upon which party lines may be drawn. But when foreign nations are at war, the question of neu- trality or intervention agitates the public mind; and when the republic is itself engaged in war, its administration undergoes an instantaneous change. Its task is, then, to organize and direct the energies of the nation. War brings it into immediate contact with the people. The necessity for energy in its sphere compels it to impose burdens not always patiently borne. Moreover, military chieftains arise, whose battle-won popularity enables them to usurp an influence, to which their habits prompt them to aspire. War is the only rock upon which a Federal republic, whose government is administered under a states-rights constitution, can break. And the more powerful the republic, the less the danger arising from war. Every accession of power diminishes the chances of war ; and, in the event of its occurrence, the increased strength of the republic en- ables it to bear the burdens it imposes without trending dangerously upon the internal administration ; as the effort which cracks the sinews of a pigmy is scarcely felt by a giant's arm. An extensive Federal republic is more stable than one confined within narrow limits. The stability of such a government will only reach its maximum when it embraces all the nations of the earth. The destiny of Republicanism is peace. Its genius is unsuited to the stern conflicts of war. The rocking of the earthquake dislo- cates the machinery which revolves Avith easy, noiseless motion while resting upon the tranquil earth. Republicanism was designed for peace, not for the din of arms. Justice and beneficence are its blessed agencies of influence ; gratitude, reverence, and affection THE MISSION OE THE UNITED STATES. 89 are the golden links which bind the willing subjects of its sway. Its destiny will only be realized when our noble Constitution, the best gift of Providence to the nations, shall link the world in the bonds of amity. May that destiny be realized in our own republic. With its ffovernment at length administered in accordance with the principles of the Constitution — inflicting wrong upon none, con- serving the rights of all — may it at length unite mankind in the bonds of a common patriotism, and, maintaining peace and good will among men, usher in the Millennial era of peace and blessed- ness, and strong in the affections of mankind endure forever. Sect. II. — The Past Career of the United States, evidence of ITS Mission as the Promoter of Republican Government. The strongest argument in support of the Providential mission of the United States, ought to be found in the past history of the country. And had the administration of the government faithfully exemplified the principles of the Constitution, such would be the fact : the grandeur to which we should ere now have attained, and the immense influence we should have exerted, would exhibit the manifest destiny of the country in so clear a light as to place the subject beyond the necessity of argument. But our unfaithfulness to our institutions has no parallel, except that of Israel. The ad- ministration of our government, as will appear in the following pages, has been almost continually in violation of the Constitution. These violations of the Constitution have dwarfed and warped our growth, and marred our influence; and, consequently, our past career bears very imperfect testimony in support of the fact that divine Providence has marked out for us a path nobler than any nation has ever trod. Still, through our marred career, glimpses of what we might have been, appear. Even in its present fallen state, our country appears 'Not Less than Arch-angel ruined, and th' excess Of glory obscured" What we might have been, it boots not now to inquire. But even in what we have been, and are, the traces of a glorious destiny appear. 90 THE world's crisis. I. The Unprecedented Progress of the Country. Many considerations point to the conclusion that Republicanism is the form of government destined to prevail in the earth. Mon- archy is not of divine appointment, but is the offshoot of ambition and violence. When the Almighty gave a government to his chosen people, a Theocratic Federal Republic was the form estab- lished. But perhaps the most significant fact of all is the remark- able manner in which republics have, in every age, been the most favored nations of the earth, — foremost in wealth, in arts, in influ- ence. It is one of God's laws in governing the world to center the attention of mankind upon the nation whose elevated institutions mark it as the destined leader of advancement, by bestowing upon it extraordinary prosperity. Thus the attention of the world was attracted to the institutions of Israel — political and religious — by the extraordinary prosperity of the nation, — a prosperity the nation might have enjoyed ages before, if it had been imbued with the spirit of its institutions. Afterward, Babylon was raised up, to lead guilty Israel into cap- tivity, and to transfer the trade of the world from Tyre to the free states of Greece. For centuries, the glory of republican Greece attracted the attention of mankind to its Thought, and its Free institutions. When Greece withered — as all nations wither, in the glare of prosperity — Rome, with greatness born of Grecian thought, and Grecian institutions, became the center of power and wealth. In the Middle Ages, wealth and commerce centered in the Italian republics, and the free cities of Germany. The Dutch Republic next became the great commercial center ; until England having become a republic by the Revolution of 1640, and having conserved her free institutions by the revolution of 1688, the scepter of com- merce passed to her hands. — The singular way in which prosperity has always clung to republics, making them the leaders of progress, is profoundly significant. Something is doubtless due to the energy of character which free institutions develop. But a history of commerce, showing the causes through which commerce has passed from nation to nation, will show that, not in the operation of the regular laws of industry, but in events directed by super-human THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 91 design, must be recognized the causes wliich, in every age, have given into the hands of republics the scepter of progress. But nothing in history is so remarkable as the line of causation, •which has enabled the United States to condense into half a century the growth of five hundred years. Six years ago, every ocean was covered with our sails ; innumerable vessels plied upon our internal w^aters ; canals and railways supplied artificial communication in every quarter ; cities have sprung up, as if by magic, in the heart of the wilderness : in all the elements of wealth, of development, we stand abreast of the oldest and richest nations on the globe. Though dwarfed and warped by the unconstitutional legislation of the government, and far short of what it might have been, our growth is without a parallel in the history of the world. Its history seems more like a creation of the oriental imagination than the realization of sober fact. Whence this unparalleled growth? What is the origin of this almost preternatural development, not only in population, but in all the elements of wealth ? It is not attributable to population and energy merely, but to capital. We have had an unlimited command of capital which, though not wisely used, has wrought wonders, — capital derived from a system of industry which sprung up contem- poraneously with our national existence, as if expressly for our benefit. The American Constitution and a noAV Industrial Era had simulta- neous birth, — twin blessings, with which Providence designed to crown the same nation. The obligation and the recompense were conferred together, — and our reward has been proportioned to our faithfulness. Had we have been true to our institutions, the prize of the industrial era would have been ours. Our governmental derelictions have caused us to fall short of the glorious prosperity within our grasp, and have suffered European nations to partake the feast, while we have only gathered the crumbs that fell from the table. Still, our portion has advanced us, as nation never advanced before. — Let us trace the rise of this era of manufactures and in- dustry which has so wonderfully fostered our growth. The perfection of the steam-engine was the first step in the won- derful course of invention that has revolutionized the industry of 92 THE world's crisis. the world, and multiplied its commerce and "wealtli. The next step ■was the perfection of the ' spinning jenny,' which spun yarns by machinery without the employment of manual labor. These in- ventions created a demand for cotton, greater than the whole world could supply while the staple was picked from the seed by hand. Next, the cotton-gin was invented, and America readily supplied the limited demand by her seaboard production. The cheap and abundant supply of cotton stimulated ingenuity to invent some machine which would enable manufacturers to weave the cloth more rapidly and cheaply than by means of the hand-loom. The power- loom was at length perfected, — and now the manufacture of cotton goods was only limited by the demand, and the supply of raw mate- rial. The seaboard of America could no longer meet the growing de- mand of the cotton market, and flatboats bore the staple down the in- terior rivers to the sea. But this involved great labor and expense; and without the discovery of some new mode of navigation, the cotton manufacture must have languished, and the finest lands on the Western Continent remained unproductive. But, lo ! as soon as needed, steamboats plow the waters of our streams, and readily convey the products of the teeming soil to the ocean. Still the cycle of invention is incomplete : the manufacture of cotton is restricted by the difficulty of conveying the raw material from English ports to the mills in the interior ; by the difficulty of access to many interior markets for cotton goods ; and by the impossibility of producing the raw material in interior districts remote from river transportation. Then railways are invented: and the planter in the interior conveys his cotton to market without difficulty ; the manufacturer transports it with facility to his mill ; and railways open up markets in the remotest districts for the new and grandest manufacture of the age. America suddenly becomes the center of the world's industry. The whole nation enters with ardor into the production of cotton : the South, furnishing the soil and the industry ; and the North sup- plying stock, farming implements, food and clothing for the opera- tives, and the means of transportation to market. The population is insufficient for the demands of industry, — and millions of industrious foreigners swarm upon our shores, to make our railways, to build THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 93 our cities, and fill the thousand avocations to "which enterprise invites. The vrealth of the world flows in upon us, enabling us to command the industry of all nations, to speed our progress. The earth yields its hidden treasures : the gold of California fills our coffers, and is diffused among the nations to stimulate industry, awaken commercial life, and open new markets for our products ; and, finally, the wheels of commerce are lubricated with the oil distilled in the laboratory of nature millions of ages ago, and now first brought to light, — a new and unexpected gift of a bountiful Providence to its favored child. Our growth has not kept pace with our advantages. The grand benefactions of Providence are more wonderful than our progress. A new Era, born of new inventions and novel modes of industry, springs into existence to bless our birth. New inventions are made, to entice us into a new course of industry, for want of which the colonies had languished nearly two hundred years. No new inven- tion is needed to further our interests, but it is instantly made. The human mind, suddenly, as by inspiration, seeks new channels of practical thought, unknown, undreamed of since the world began, — and of it all we derive the benefit. The new era makes compara- tively little change in the Old World, already developed by a thou- sand years of plodding industry ; — but it nerves us for our career as with a Titan's vigor. We claim to ourselves the credit of our advancement ; but our energy has not surpassed that of our fathers while the country languished through its colonial existence. — Not to us the honor belongs, but to Him who has given his chosen, richest blessings to us, the last and noblest of the republics. Let us be humble : not we, but our institutions are honored of God, that mankind may revere the liberty which attracts to us the smiles of heaven. II. The Political Influence of our Country. Compare the present political condition of the world with its state when the American Declaration of Independence startled monarchs, and aroused oppressed nations by its bold enunciation of princi- ples,— and how great the change. Then, except the Swiss Confed- eration, not a really liberal government existed in the world. 94 THE world's crisis. Absolutism prevailed upon tlie continent of Europe : there did not exist a single constitutional throne. Aristocracy and crown alike oppressed degraded populations, who had scarcely heard the name of Liberty. The professedly free government of England was a sham : the aristocracy had robbed the monarch of his power and appropriated it to themselves ; and the country groaned beneath the sway of an oligarchy as absolute and oppressive as the govern- ment of Russia. Now all seems chano;ed. Absolutism has been declinino; ever since our War of Independence. The English oligarchs have been deposed from power ; France is governed by a parliament elected by the vote of the whole population ; every sovereign of Central and Western Europe occupies a constitutional throne: the liglit'has even penetrated Russia, and forced the Czar to make concessions to the aggressive spirit of the age. Europe seems slowly tending by a regular course of progression toward republicanism. Mon- archy has been compelled to propitiate Republicanism by admitting it to a partnership in the throne. But monarchy and free repre- sentative assemblies cannot coalesce. The partnership between incompatibilities cannot much longer endure. Unless through our fault a reaction occur in favor of despotism, progress must con- tinue, and Republicanism, dissatisfied with existing concessions, will topple its gray-beard partner from the throne, and sway alone the scepter of government. How came this great change about? Philosophers had declaimed against existing evils, and indulged in many speculations with refer- ence to the best remedy for the growing corruption of the body politic ; — but neither their complaints nor their speculations had been productive of benefit. The people, stung by misery to insurrection, had risen again and again upon their oppressors ; but their objectless struggles had proved fruitless, and, after every efi"ort, they sunk into more abject slavery than before. The American Revolution changed all this in a moment. It shone, a bright beacon, to light the oppressed to the haven of liberty; and henceforth, in periods of political tem- pest, every eye was strained upon it ; and now strong arms are nerved, and longing hearts are cheered, by perceiving that, despite THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 95 the adverse buffetings of a rough and stormy sea, they are gradu- ally nearing the goal of their hopes. The French Revolution transplanted a shoot of Am-erican liberty to the soil of Europe. The torch which lighted Europe ■«ith con- flagration was kindled at our altar. The outbreak in France was an inevitable result of overgrown and intolerable abuses ; but it would never have attained the rank of Eevolution had not our example given it intelligent direction. The tendency to Republicanism was given by minds influenced by observation and contact with American institutions. The Revolu- tion failed ; — but it left Constitutional Monarchy as its legacy to posterity. To it was owing the partial reform of the English gov- ernment relieving the country from the domination of a feudal aris- tocracy, and the establishment of constitutional government in all the states of Central and Western Europe. Had we been true to our Constitution, the prolonged struggle going on in Europe between Absolutism and Progress would, ere now, have been decided in favor of the latter. The cause of lib- erty would now be safe, and Europe, on the highway toward re- publicanism. But we have done very little to forward repub- licanism by direct influence. Our example gave the impulse, but when the crisis came to complete our work, the violations of our Constitution by the Federal Government had brought us into a position which rendered our influence nugator}^, and left events to take a course adverse to liberty. Had we been true to our Consti- tution, the world would now be free. As it is, we may be said to have abdicated our place as the leader of republican progress. France has become the standard-bearer. Reaction, through our fault, has set in ! Absolutism is arming itself to crush out liberty in Europe and the world ! France stands unsupported in the breach! Unless we return without delay to the abandoned principles of the Constitution, all that has been won will be lost, and we shall be left to fight the battle of Freedom alone against a world in arms ! We have done much for liberty : Ave have left more undone. HI. The Analogies of Past History. The present condition of the world is truly alarming. In Europe "96 THE world's crisis. the ■wave of republicanism that rose so high upon the battlements of monarchy and threatened to sweep thrones away, is receding. A violent reaction is setting in, which threatens to establish des- potism on a firmer basis than during centuries before. We might well tremble for republicanism, were it not for our hope in the God of providence. Our faith is strengthened by the analogies of past history. Despite our derelictions, we shall yet fulfill our destiny. Awakened to our errors before it is too late, we will return to the path from which we have strayed, and assuming our rightful posi- tion marshal the nations on in the career of liberty and advance- ment. Nature and history are the records of the working of the same Infinite Mind. As the phenomena of the material universe display the outworking of the great laws of material development, so in the political world, the great eras of history present the embodi- ment and the development of the principles which govern human progress. And as every great convulsion of Nature inaugurating a new geological era is marked by features which assimilate it to those that preceded it, so each grand era of political convulsion cradling a new era of progress presents marks to identify it with similar epochs in former ages. The great transition periods of the world's progress offer striking points of analogy. The grand eras of history, like successive waves rolling from the ocean to the shore, present strong features of re- semblance, even in minor points. The student of history need not greatly err in reasoning from the past to the present. Some facts are so universally true, that they may be stated as historical axioms. Among them are the following : — 1. An effete civilization is the sure indication of the decline and approaching ruin of the institutions in which it has embodiment : it has performed its office in the course of human advancement, and must give way to a higher form of social, governmental, and intel- lectual life. A declining Civilization is never revivified into the freshness of a second youth. It flowers but once, and when its petals wither, and its leaves fade and fall, it languishes in exhausted THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 97 vitality until the plowshare uproots it, to give place to a new and more vigorous plant. 2. In the absence of any fresh embodiment of the principle of ad- vancement, the decadence of the old institutions continues to un- dergo new modifications in endless progression ; until the principles of progress, having taken root in a new soil, give birth to a new form of political life, which in its progress shall overthrow and dis- place the institutions whose vitality is exhausted. 3. The existence of an effete state of society, side by side with new and vigorous elements of progress, is an indication that the Old era is about to give place to the New. History bears unalterable testimony to the truth of these axioms. No effete civilization has ever renewed its vigor. Oriental des- potisms, once so powerful, have been languishing for centuries. They never have, they never can revive their pristine vigor. The state of society to which they were adapted, and which gave them their energy, is worn out, and its vitality can never be restored. They will continue to stand powerless and inefficient, until some fresh form of social life, embodied in young and vigorous institu- tions, shall come into contact with and supersede them. Such has always been the course of human advancement. The idolatrous Sabianism had run its course, and Chaldean Magi- anism had developed its highest form of civilization, when Persian Magianism appeared on the scene. The Iconoclasm of Persia in its triumph overturned the idol temples of Babylon, and established in their stead the Avorship of the spirit God of Magianism. The glory of the Persian empire disseminated among the nations the noble system of philosophy, based on the idea of one Supreme Being. But soon the force of the idea was spent. The Persian empire sunk into the decline con- sequent upon its decaying civilization. Meantime the sages of Greece had seized upon the new thought which the grandeur of Persia had disseminated. The schools of learning had elaborated it into systems of philosophy which roused the national mind from the slumber of ages. The freshness of in- tellectual ardor gave birth to an exalted virtue and a patriotism 7 98 THE world's crisis. unknown before. Old ideas were discarded. The development of new thought led to astonishing political changes. Honored dynas- ties fell, and in the establishment of republics upon their ruins, the world beheld with wonder the development of democratic institu- tions, — an unheard of innovation in politics. The coexistence of Grecian freedom and philosophy with the inert despotism of Persia might have indicated to the philosophic mind that the decaying life of the latter was about to give place to the fresh vigor of Grecian institutions. The conquests of Alexan- der fulfilled the presage. But soon the philosophy of Greece lapsed from its influence over national thought. Corruption and decay marked the decline of Grecian virtue. Grecian power only remained until a more vigor- ous form of national life should come in contact with and super- sede it. Meanwhile Rome was ripening for its mission. The results of Greek philosophy had been transplanted into Italy, where Rome engrafted upon its Etruscan civilization the elevated institutions of its polished neighbors. Greek philosophy molded into law, cast the Roman character into a form of stern, stoical virtue, without precedent or parallel. As Greece declined, Roman civilization was assuming a form which fitted it to seize the abandoned scepter of progress, and marshal the world on in the career of advancement. But the virtues do not flourish beneath the shadow of poAver. The stern dignity of the Roman character was tarnished by the prevalence of luxury : Lust of dominion bound Patriotism to its chariot, and dragged it in chains behind the triumphal car. The power of a new and holy religion then proclaimed to the world, failed to arrest the decay and infuse fresh life into the decrepit frame of Roman civilization. But when Roman virtue faded, no successor occupied the field ready to seize the abandoned scepter of progress. The Barbarians who issued from the Northern wilds might overturn the tottering empire, but they could substitute nothing better in its stead. They destroyed the decaying temple of Roman grandeur, and used its materials, to rear rude structures on its site with barbarian hands. The civilization of Modern Europe is Roman civilization, modified THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. 99 by Christianity and the rude customs of warlike barbarians, and developed in the course of ages into its present form. This civili- zation has, in turn, become eflfete. The structures of Power erected upon it are tottering and clashing in convulsions which betoken their fall. Judging from the analogies of the past, the effete Roman civili- zation of Europe is about to fall into ruins. Will it continue under new modifications ? or will it give place to a higher form of social and governmental life ? Russia is aiming to sweep it away, and replace it with a despotism. She would succeed were not a power in the field ready to supersede effete institutions with the noblest system of government. The contest is approaching, which is to decide whether Europe is to be Cossack or American. The analo- gies of the past pronounce us victor in that contest : no effete sys- tem of government has ever been restored to vigor through an infusion of new life, when a higher order of government was in existence and ready to take its place. A new Power has risen to seize the scepter of empire, and the voice of the Past announces that it is about to plant the standard of Higher Progress upon the ruins of European Monarchy and Medi- eval Tradition. As the Babylonian despotism sunk before the march of the free Persians : as the Persian empire fell before the assault of Greece under the lead of the martial chief of the free Macedonians : the Macedonian kingdoms before the onset of Re- publican Rome : the Roman Empire before the frpe Barbarians of the North ; so must the tottering thrones of Europe fall before the rising Power, bearing the standard of Liberty, inscribed with the rights of man. The mystic voices of the past hail us with no inauspicious omen, " King that shall be hereafter I" THE WORLFS CRISIS. BOOK I. PROPOSITION I. The GovEKNMENT of the United States has, throughout almost its entire career, maintained a system of administration in violation of THE fundamental PRmCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION: — With the effect upon HOME AFFAIRS of tarnishing the National Honor ; dwarfing our Industrial Prosperity ; ivarping our Social Life ; and plunging the country into Frightful Political Evils. (101) BOOK I. EVILS INFLICTED UPON OUR COUNTRY BY OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. The stormy character of our political career, and, latterly, the prevalence of political corruption must strike every student of American history. The observer of our social life cannot fail to remark the decay of republican simplicity of manners, coupled with a social excitement unparalleled in the annals of the world. Monarchist statesmen have inveighed against these irregularities as the spawn of Republicanism : Philosophers more favorable to our institutions would charitably account them the wild offshoots of a too rapid growth. But neither the genius of Republicanism, nor prosperity, however great, is responsible for these evils. They are the spawn of political pruriency. Radicalism, stealing with Tarquin step to its design, has debauched our Government, and engendered a misbegotten brood of Shame, and Vice, and Crime. The insults which shamed our flag during the early period of our national career, and the social demoralization and political troubles which mark our later history, may all be traced directly to violations of the Constitution. A strict adherence to the principles of that instrument, would have induced a healthy development, combining simplicity of manners and social tranquillity with a grand, steady and permanent prosperity, free alike from foreign insult and domes- tic vicissitude. The abnormal development we behold is the conse- quence of the action of a government wrested from its constitu- tional moorings. (103) 104 THE world's crisis. The evils wliich have afflicted our counti-y are divided, in the order of time, into two eras : 1st. The evils arising out of the Carrying Trade, staining our early history with dishonor, and ending only with the disasters of the War of 1812. 2d. The evils arising out of the American System, dwarfing our industrial development, corrupting our social and political life, and ending only in the calamitous Civil War from which we are just emerging. The subject will be presented under these natural divisions. PART I. EVILS OF THE CARRYING TRADE. CHAPTER I. THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. Adherence to the principles of our Constitution would have caused us to avoid all the evils which beset our early, as well as our later history. But, almost cotemporaneously with our national birth, an evil fate precipitated the government into an unconstitu- tional course of administration. Two antagonistic Theories of constitutional construction arose immediately upon the inauguration of the Federal government. These Rival Theories, advocated by successive political parties, have ever since been wrestling for the mastery. The fierce politi- cal contests which have rendered the history of America one long turmoil, took their rise in the ceaseless antagonism of these conflict- ing systems of constitutional interpretation. As we have seen, the Constitution was a compromise of opposing views in the Convention. Its adoption only transferred the conflict between the advocates of these conflicting views from the hall of the Convention to the arena of the nation. Two RIVAL PARTIES arose under the administration of Wash- ington. In the Convention, the advocates of State rights thought that the Constitution established a government so powerful as to endanger the reserved rights of the states. But they gave their adhesion to it as much preferable to the weakness, the adverse interests, and, perchance, the military antagonism of separate nationalities. When the instrument had been adopted by the states, the State-Rights party accepted it in good faith, adhering to its letter, and its spirit. (105) 106 THE world's crisis. They cheerfully acquiesced in the assumption by the Federal gov- ernment of all the powers vested in it by the Constitution ; but they were disposed to resist to the uttermost any attempt of the govern- ment to exercise powers beyond the limits of its constitutional juris- diction. It had been well for the country, had the advocates of a strong central government in the Convention accepted the Constitution, with its careful limitations of Federal power, in equal good faith. Had they been willing to acquiesce in the simple literal meaning of the instrument, taken in the sense designed by its framers, America would never have been a prey to political agitation and the num- berless evils of our past career. But, unfortunately, they con- temned the Constitution as organizing a government too feeble to sustain itself, and too narrow in its range of powers to foster do- mestic interests. They had accepted it, not cordially, but as the best instrument the prejudices of their opponents would concede. They now resolved to bestow upon the government, hy construction, those powers, which the Convention that framed the Constitution had refused to confer. Alexander Hamilton was the leader of this party. He had been a member of the Convention ; but he had retired from the body in disgust weeks before its labors terminated. He was now resolved to amend the Constitution at will, by subjecting its articles to a construction so broad as to make it confer upon the government any posvers he deemed it necessary to exercise. Thus the government might free itself from obnoxious limitations, and placing its own in- terpretation upon the charter of its powers, extend its functions as expediency or ambition might dictate. Many who believed with Hamilton that powers more extensive should have been conferred, yet shrank from his scheme of con- struction, as enabling the Federal Government to usurp authority vt'ithout limit or control. They had wished the Convention to con- fer powers more enlarged ; but now, dreading unlimited usurpation, they contended for a strict construction as the only security against unbridled autocracy. When Hamilton broached his scheme of con- structive powers, all these, under the lead of Madison, separated from his party, and united themselves with the advocates of state's THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. 107 rights in endeavoring to restrict the Federal government to the exercise of those powers only, which the Constitution actually con- ferred. Thus, at the very outset of the government, the country became divided into two opposing parties. In strict nomenclature, these parties should have been styled, the one, Latitudinarian Construc- tionists, the other. Strict Constructionists. But political parties rarely assume a cognomen which designates their principles. The former assumed the title of Federalists ; the latter styled them- selves Republicans. The political strife then inaugurated has ever since distracted the country. Since that age the struggle has as- sumed various phases ; issues have changed ; parties have fallen, and risen again, with new names, to renew their ceaseless struggle under new banners ; but, in every era, the Constitution has been the bone of contention, — the party of Latitudinarian Construction struggling for power with the party maintaining a strict construc- tion of the Constitution. Whatever names they have assumed, the one party has been Latitudinarian Constructionists, the other Strict Constructionists. And violations of the Constitution by the Lat- itudinarian Constructionists, during the periods of their tempo- rary triumph, have gendered all the evils that have afflicted the country. Sect. I. — The Policy of the Federalists. In the mind of Hamilton the stability of the government was the first object to be secured. Every other consideration must yield to this. He believed Republicanism, at best, a weak system of gov- ernment, to which only the best and surest safeguards can give stability. A close and practical observer of human nature, he placed little confidence in the power of mere sentiment. Observa- tion had taught him that the patriotism which springs from self- interest is the surest support of a government. In monarchical countries, government is pillared upon the attachment of privileged orders, whose privileges depend upon its stability. As the gew- gaws of rank and title had no place in Republican America, Ham- ilton proposed to secure the stability of the Federal government, by 108 THE world's crisis. attaching to it powerful property classes with the solid ties of in- terest. He never paused to inquire whether the measures he pro- posed were constitutional. He consulted expediency only. The declaration of the preamble, that the instrument was designed to promote the public welfare, was the only clause in the Constitution which he regarded. In his view whatever would promote the pub- lic welfare was constitutional. The formula which satisfied his scruples was similar to that which has become fashionable at a later period: "The Government must live: to this end it must concili- ate the attachment of wealth and influence : if the Constitution does not sufl'er it to adopt a policy that will secure this end, the life of the Government is superior to the Constitution, and that instrument must give place to the necessity of self-preservation." He saw, as he believed, grave dangers arising to menace the stability of the government. His comprehensive and statesmanlike intellect grasped every point of the situation, and conceived the measures necessary to avert the dangers he apprehended, and im-. part to the government the requisite stability and strength. Thus satisfied that his measures were expedient for the general welfare, he gave no further thought to the question of their constitution- ality. A brief retrospect will show the dangers he apprehended, and display the sagacity of the statesman who grappled them with a boklness, which, whatever our opinion of his principles, must chal- lenge our admiration. The climate and productions of the Southern states gave them an immense advantage over those of the North. Their products con- stituted almost the entire exports of the country. Their tobacco, rice, and indigo found ready sale in the markets of Europe, and cotton now began to be exported. But Europe afforded no market for^ cereals and live stock, the only products of the North. During the Colonial era, the West Indies had aflForded a limited market for rum, live stock, and vegetables; but Independence had cut off this only market, and, at the inauguration of the government, the trade of the Northern states languished in absolute stagnation. The advantages of the Southern colonies had caused them to outstrip those of the North during the Colonial era. Though all THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. 109 except Virginia of more recent planting, and, at first, of slower growth, yet, in 1790, their population was almost equal to that of the Northern states. If the two sections should continue to grow in the same ratio, the South would soon be the stronger. The apprehension that the South might in a few years attain entire control of the government, the North sinking into a provincial con- dition, caused much hesitancy in the latter section in adopting the Constitution, unless such advantages were secured to their industry as would enable them to maintain an equality in the Union. The comprehensive mind of the astute statesman who was about to give direction to the policy of Federal government grasped this state of affairs. He beheld in it grave cause of alarm. The coun- try w^as already divided by sectional lines ; and it had been dis- turbed by sectional jealousy even during the War of Independence. Should the South attain the decided predominance which its greater prosperity rendered probable, Hamilton might fear that the North would be impelled by jealousy to separate from the Union. He resolved to avert the danger by giving to Northern industry such advantages as would maintain the equilibrium, and attach that sec- tion to the Federal government by the ties of gratitude and interest. With an eye to this end, the great statesman sought to place him- self in a position that would enable him to mould the policy of the government. The unbounded confidence of Washington permitted him to select his position in the cabinet. As Secretary of the Treasury he had jurisdiction of the entire internal policy of the in- fant Republic. It needed not his influence to secure the passage of a tariff law giving incidental protection to American manufactures, and a nav- igation act for the protection of the shipping interest. These were carried with the support of Madison. But these measures, in the existing state of affairs, afforded scarcely any special advantage to Northern interests. Manufactures were in their infancy; the ship- ping of Virginia rivaled that of New England: while the North was crippled for want of capital, there seemed a probability that the proceeds of Southern exportations might be invested in these new channels of enterprise, and give that prosperous section the same superiority in manufactures and shipping as in agriculture. 110 THE world's crisis. The pressing want of the North was capital. While the labor of the South was profitably directed toward agricultural staples which found ready sale in the markets of the world, only so much industry was diverted from these products as was necessary to produce ar- ticles of prime necessity. If the North were supplied with the necessary capital, it might, while the South was occupied with agri- culture, engross the manufactures and the shipping interest of the country. It possessed every requisite for success in these pursuits except capital. It had no market for its agricultural produce; in dustry was stagnant for want of necessary capital to engage in profitable enterprise: the two prime requisites — labor and pro- visions — the North possessed in abundance. It was the aim of the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish it capital, to embark with energy in commerce, which the fostering care of government rendered so profitable an investment. A legitimate means of partially accomplishing his object was ob- vious. The Federal government was bound in honor to pay, at some fair rate, the revolutionary debt. The armies had been stationed, for the most part, in the Northern states during the war, and the debt was in the hands of Northern capitalists. Its assumption by the government would give the North a capital of fifty million dol- lars, yielding an annual income of three millions from the Federal treasury. Hamilton challenged the gratitude and admiration of the Eastern and Middle states, by his earnest and influential advocacy of assumption ; and he sought to make the capital available, by having the bonds issued in a form negotiable in the European market. — But returns from this source would be slow. Money could not be promptly realized from the bonds of an infant republic; and the three millions of annual interest was not sufficient to advance Northern interests 80 rapidly as was desirable. The North needed a large and avail- able ready capital. To effect this object Hamilton brought forward a plan for a United States Bank. An attempt had been made in the convention to invest the Fed- eral government with power to incorporate chartered institutions, but the power had been denied. The Bank was clearly unconstitu- tional. No clause in the Constitution could be strained to bestow THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES. Ill this power upon the government. But the North needed money, and the government only could furnish it. The Secretary of the Treas- ury deemed this a fit occasion for a latitudinarian construction of the Constitution. The loan of money based upon public credit and cre- ated for their express benefit would attach large property classes in the Middle and Eastern states to the government by the strongest ties of interest : it would enable the North to embark, at once, in profitable enterprises, and rival or outstrip the growth of the South, — thus averting the threatened danger of Southern predominance, and Northern secession. The measure seemed expedient in every point of view ; it promised to promote the general welfare, — a main design of the establishment of the government : and even if power to char- ter a Bank was not granted in the Constitution, the safety of the government is superior to the instrument on which it is based ! the Constitution must not be suffered to become a barrier to the well- being of the country ! Hamilton maintained that the government has the right to per- form all acts which tend to promote the general welfare, without looking further for a grant of constitutional authority. Expediency was the only limit he recognized to its powers. He was inclined to contemn limitations which restricted the government within a sphere too narrow for his imperial temper, and did not scruple to call the Constitution " a thing of naught which must be changed." With the temper of a monarchist, he deemed gradual augmentations of power a justifiable art of State craft ; and, conscious of the author- ity of precedent, he knew that a power once exercised is soon con- ceded as a right. He embarked upon his policy of centralization without scruple, and with consummate craft and boldness. The Bank project encountered the most strenuous opposition. Madison, and many others were unwilling to blot out all the limita- tions of federal power by a sweeping system of latitudinarian construction, which perverted the Constitution from the safeguard of liberty into an instrument of usurpation. They took issue with Hamilton in opposition to the measure. But the Bank favored too many interests to be defeated. Its location at Philadelphia, securing to her merchants large prospective loans, conciliated the great State of Pennsylvania : the shipping interests of New En- 112 THE world's crisis. gland influenced the vote of that section. Constitutional limitations were insufiicient to withstand the dictates of self-interest. The Bank charter was carried through Congress, by the votes of the Eastern and Middle states. When the Bank charter was presented for his approval, Wash- ington found his position one of peculiar delicacy and embarrass- ment. To assist him in his decision, he asked the opinions of his cabinet ministers. Their counter opinions — the Northern members, Hamilton and Knox, favoring the measure, the Southern, Jefferson and Randolph, opposing it — increased his irresolution. He hesi- tated long, wavei'ing between opposing views. He even asked Madison to prepare a veto message. His vacillation proves that, upon the abstract constitutional question, he would have refused his sanction. But personal and political considerations combined to sway his mind in the opposite direction. Jefferson and Randolph were from his own state: Hamilton and Knox were his companions in arms. Himself a citizen of a Southern state, his veto would ap- pear the result of sectional prejudice : magnanimity, — always the strongest impulse of that great soul, prompted Washington to con- sider favorably a measure designed to relieve the severe distress of the North. Moreover, the Federal government was as yet only an experiment, which a gust of sectional anger might overturn : the measure would attach the North warmly to the government, and to his administration : its rejection might subject him to the imputa- tion of narrow views, sacrificing Northern interests to his sectional feelings, and might precipitate the crisis which it was Hamilton's aim to avert. The perpetuity or the disruption of the Union seemed to hang upon his decision. In such a crisis the bill seemed neces- sary " to promote the general welfare ;" and, after long hesitation, Washington signed it, and it became a law. Here was the first false step of the government, which, in its issues, proved the fruitful source of all our subsequent calamities. The United States Bank changed the entire course of national in- dustry and development. It brought about a present good : but we sacrificed to it our normal destiny. It was the apple " pleasant to the eyes," for which we gave up our Eden of peace, virtue, tran- quillity, and sacrificed the progress which Nature designed for us, THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. 113 tranquil and void of excitement, but glorious beyond all v^e have attained, or even imagined. The charter of the United States Bank — our ifirst violation of the Constitution — brought the influence of the Federal government within the prohibited province of the internal interests, of the coun- try. It diverted the industry of the country from the natural channel in which the laws of industrial development would have impelled it, and gave it an unfortunate direction, from which it never afterward recovered. The normal course of our national industry will be best considered in a future chapter. We confine ourselves, here, to tracing the evils which flowed from the establishment of the Bank. As we proceed, it will appear that the charter of the United States Bank was the Pandora's box whence issued all our calamities. The influence of the Bank was instantly felt by the industry of the North. The Southern states, having already a large capital invested in profitable agriculture, left the Bank accommodations to be engrossed by Northern enterprise. The Bank capital was freely loaned, and instantly infused new activity \nto the warehouses and dockyards of the North. Having no other field for enterprise, the North, having command at last of capital, turned its entire atten- tion to commerce. Ships were built with Bank loans, and soon re- paid the cost of construction with the enormous profits derived from the navigation laws. Again bank loans and navigation profits were invested in new vessels ; and in a few years, through the impulse of bank capital and the protection of navigation laws, the growing marine of the North became more than adequate to the carrying trade of the country. The influx of government capital quickened Northern industry in every nerve. Labor was diverted from profitless agriculture to profitable enterprise. The control of the shipping interest carried with it" the control of the mercantile interests of the country. Northern ships naturally brought their cargoes to Northern ports ; and, while the South was engrossed w^th agriculture, Northern en- terprise monopolized the entire commerce and shipping of the country. Northern agriculture also felt the impulse : the numbers diverted to commercial enterprise freed it from the stagnation inci- 8 114 THE world's crisis. dent to excessive production, and gave it a ready and profitable market in the increased consumption of the seaport towns. Hamilton's policy succeeded in averting the dangers threatening the Union from the approaching preponderance of the South ; and it strengthened the government with the interested devotion of the Middle and Eastern states. But his object was broader than this. He wished to identify the policy of the government with his Party, and to attach the Middle and Eastern states, with equal devotion to the Federal government and the Federalist party. He proposed to base his party upon the close union and firm support of those two sections, and govern the country by means of their votes. He might with justice hope that they would support with constancy the party whose policy origi- nated their prosperity, and was necessary to maintain it. The Strict Constructionists found their chief support in the Southern states. Southern interests, needing no patronage, united with reverence for the Constitution and zeal for State rights, to commit the South to the support of that party which aimed to re- strict the Federal government within the constitutional limits of its authority, and debar it from interference with the internal interests of the country. The leaders of this party beheld with concern the Middle and Eastern states leagued by interest in support of a policy subversive of the Constitution and dangerous to liberty. Self interest would cause them to maintain the policy it had impelled them to adopt: the leaders of the "Strict Constructionists" perceived that a direct issue upon the question of policy would result in the firm establish- ment of the Federalist party. Hamilton had planned his scheme of party domination with the skill of a consummate statesman. His antagonists prepared to counter him with skill and finesse equal to his own. Hamilton's scheme of power was admirably conceived, and but for the force of an element which he had not calculated would have infallibly proved successful. His system of administration compre- hended a double aim, — a means, and an end. It was the immediate I THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. 115 aim of his measures to confer vast benefits upon the Middle and Eastern states ; his ultimate object, to transform the government into a Centralization based upon a moneyed aristocracy. He trusted that the immediate advantages derived from his system of adminis- tration would reconcile the people to its Anti-Republican tendency. lie relied entirely upon interest, without estimating the force of sentiment. He trusted to the aid of the property classes, without taking into consideration the sentiments of the masses, who feel more than they reflect, and are swayed more by impulse than cal- culation. In resting his party upon the support of the wealthy class, Ham- ilton was governed by prudent calculations based upon past expe- rience. During the Colonial era,, the American colonies had much of the aristocratic class distinctions which obtained in the Mother country. Men of wealth and high social position swayed the public sentiment of the Colonies. Even at the period of which we write, the property class continued to control the states by their influence.' Hamilton seemed to consult the principles of sound policy, in choos- ing the support of the moneyed aristocracy as the foundation of his party. The Federalist party, founded upon the interested support of the Eastern and Middle states and the established influence of the aristocratic class, seemed stable beyond the possibility of overthrow. But an event now occurred, destined to exert the most important influence upon the political and industrial development of the United States : The French Revolution broke out simultaneously with the organization of the Federalist party, and disappointed all the calcu- lations of Hamilton. It everywhere fanned democratic sympathies into a flame. The reverence which prevailed in America for aristo- cratic position was changed into antagonism. Instead of bowing, as formerly, to the influence of superior social position, the masses were ready to assert democracy against rank, and oppose the pride of equality to the pride of aristocracy. Slow alike to comprehend the policy of Hamilton and the constitutional scruples of Jeff"erson, they had a keen perception of the gradations of rank, and were easily wounded by the purse-proud assumption of wealth. The mass of 116 THE world's crisis. the American popula.tion, especially in the Middle states, were democratic in their tastes and warmly republican in their feelings, and Avere keenly jealous of the aristocratic sympathies and monar- chical tendencies of the Federalists. The leaders of the "Strict Constructionist" party seized this feature in the aspect of the age, and determined to array it against their opponents. The Federalists desired to lead the people into an Aristocratic Centralization, by conferring upon them unconstitu- tional benefits : it was their policy to enlarge upon the benefits de- rived from their system of administration, ignoring its aristocratic tendency. On the other hand, it was the policy of the Strict Con- etructionists to denounce the ultimate aim of the Federalists, ignor- ing the practical benefits resulting to the North from their measures. By appealing to class feelings and republican sympathies, they hoped to gain the masses in the Middle states, and array that sec- tion against the party with whose policy its interests were identified. Their rally words were Democracy and Republicanism, against Aris- tocracy and Monarchical tendencies. The better to enforce the grand issues they chose to present, and inflame the passions they wished to enkindle, they fixed upon a name which embodied this dis- tinction, and styled themselves Republicans. The attitude of the parties toward each other, and their respective eympathies, necessarily made European politics a prominent feature of antagonism. The French Revolution had entirely changed the aspect of American politics. It wrested from the Federalists a vic- tory already won, and compelled them to dash down the chaplet of victory to harness them for doubtful conflict. They had expected to array the Eastern and Middle states against the South : it roused the masses in those sections against them. They expected puny assaults from opponents armed with abstractions : it confronted them with an angry democracy. They naturally resented the injury the French Revolution inflicted upon their cause : they saw in it the mob rule they dreaded at home : they hated it as an insurrection against established authority — the triumph of principles they deemed inimical to all government and tending to universal anar- chy. These views naturally led them to oppose the French Repub- THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. 117 lie, and sympathize with Great Britain in the wars raging in Europe. The Kepublicans, on the other hand, hailed the French Revolution as the Savior of America, and the Deliverer of Europe. Their enthusiasm was heightened by gratitude and admiration. In their eyes, it was the triumph of the People over long-established wrongs, the victory of Liberty over Oppression, They declared themselves the champions of French Republicanism against the armed despo- tisms of Europe, applauded its triumphs, excused its excesses, and palliated its crimes. The Republican leaders availed themselves with energy and skill of all the advantages of their position. They cast a vail over the measures of the Federalists so popular at the North. The funding system was complete : the Bank was established for twenty years : the Republicans declared these measures beyond the politics of the time, and pointed attention exclusively to the monarchical sympa- thies, and ulterior aims of the Federalists. They denounced them as an aristocratic party, opposed to republicanism, every where; secret- ly aiming at monarchy at home, and in sympathy with despotism abroad. Their attachment to England was characterized as syco- phancy to our oppressor ; their hostility to France, as treason against Liberty, and black ingratitude toward our Revolutionary benefactor. The Federalists were obliged to meet the issues tendered by their antagonists, and in the march of the French Revolution, European politics, originally incidental, became a leading feature in the anta- gonism of the parties. The long, fierce contest of these parties, with its vicissitudes and changing fortunes, constitutes the first grand epic of our political history. A cursory sketch of its salient points is all our limits will allow. Sect. 2. Humiliations arising from the Policy of the Fed- eralists. The outbreak of the French Revolution exerted an influence upon the material progress of America, not less potent than upon the political condition of the country. The immense mass of French population withdrawn from agriculture and thrown into the armies, 118 THE world's crisis. caused an immense demand for American breadstuffs, stimulating both our agricultural and shipping interests. The supremacy of Great Britain on the ocean cut Finance off from communication "with her colonies ; and the French government, abandoning the colonial system which had hitherto been strictly maintained, threw open her colonial and home ports to the vessels of neutrals. The fortune of Avar which soon after subjected Holland to the arms of France opened the Dutch colonies, also, to the trade of neutrals. Spain also relaxed her colonial system ; and, in a few years, the course of events consigned the entire trade of her colonies, also, to neutral vessels. A narrow mind deeming money the chief good, may hold it fortu- nate for America that the financial policy of Hamilton had stimu- lated the naval enterprise of the North into such activity that American vessels were ready to engage in this lucrative Carrying Trade. But measured even by the pecuniary standard, this neutral Carrying Trade was unfortunate for the country; its uncertain and interrupted profits turned us aside from a career of steady, unin- terrupted, and enduring prosperity. — And then the measureless humiliation to which it subjected us! If wealth is purchased at a price too dear in the sacrifice of national honor and the deteriora- tion of national character, the financial policy which, by enabling the North to extemporize a great merchant navy, embarked the Eastern and Middle States in the neutral Carrying Trade, was a great national misfortune. We obtained commercial advantages, it is true ; but in acquiring them we became the football of the com- batants. They both despised us, Avhile availing themselves of our neutral position ; and they mutually gave us such kicks, as wrest- lers might bestow upon a beggar who was groveling around their feet for the coins that dropped in their struggle. This accession of prosperity was dearly purchased by moral de- cadence, also. In the reckless fever of maritime speculation, the simplicity of manners that characterized the Colonial era wag Avholly lost. The thirst of sudden wealth seized the Northern mind, no longer patient of steady industry, and the prosperity attendant upon economy and patient application. New England was espe- cially engaged in this new branch of marine speculation ; the Mid- THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE. 119 die states being more occupied with mercantile enterprise, and agricultural industry. It was the grand pursuit of New England, and its effects were chiefly visible upon the New England character. The character of the race was fused in the crucible of maritime speculation, and underwent a lasting and deleterious change. The stern, hardy Puritan pioneers would have failed to recognize their crafty and avaricious descendants. The New Englander became a speculator by natural bias. The wealthy embarked in the Colonial Carrying Trade where success was won by finesse and trickery; those in humble circumstances, seized with the prevailing mania, became perambulating peddlers of " Yankee notions." Then Avere developed the peculiar characteristics, which, wherever the race is known, have generated the proverb, " As sharp as a Yankee." From being stern, unbending, upright, they became models of ad- dress, suppleness, and finesse. Even the stern enthusiasm of the Puritan character partook of the general deterioration, and assumed a modified form of fiery fanaticism, controlled and directed by the dictates of crafty policy. Far better for America, had Bank loans never enabled American shippers to extemporize a merchant navy, the fruitful source of gain — and demoralization. Without the Bank, we should not have had a navy sufiicient to engage in the Carrying Trade, until the course of events rendered it impracticable. Pursuing our career of normal industry, we should have escaped the complications and humiliations which characterize an era of our history, upon which no American can look back without a blush. [Here, thirty-one pages of Manuscript (comprising a sketch of the foreign relations of the country, full of humiliations, from 1793 to 1800) are omitted, as not essential to the design of the work.] Tlie political revolution of 1800 which ejected the Latitudinarian Constructionists from power, is a proper epoch at which to pause a moment and note the fruits of their policy. At this point of Amer- * * * * ^ * * * * -^ * * * >!= 120 THE world's crisis. ican history, we find the following " counts," in the indictment against the unconstitutional Centralization policy. 1. It laid the foundation of its power in public corruption, de- bauching the national mind into violations of compact, by bribes offered to interest. 2. It convulsed the country with party strife. 3. It gendered political trickery, causing the presentation of false issues, vailing Truth at the shrine of Expediency. 4. It fostered sectional interests, and embittered sectional strife, — which would otherwise have remained dormant, and sunk into oblivion. 5. It compromised the national dignity, making the Federalists and Republicans, respectively, the subservient partizans of England and France. 6. It diverted us from a career of steady prosperity which would have maintained our tranquillity, fostered our virtues, and conserved our honor, and plunged us headlong into the Carrying Trade, — a vortex of reckless, exciting speculation, that engulfed them all. 7. Through the agency of the Carrying Trade : a: It subjected us to ceaseless humiliations at the hands of the European belligerents : h : It brought upon us the contempt of mankind : c: It debased the national character, teaching us to submit to humiliations with patience which at first had fired our blood with in- dignation : d: In the absorbing pursuit of gain, it rendered us oblivious of honor, heedless of insult, and regardless of our plighted faith. No American can look back upon that period without shame. The Carrying Trade demoralized us. We were ready to endure all things, 60 the Trade were not taken away. We entered upon it full of be- coming national pride, taking fire at insult, from whatever quarter it came. But this pride soon forsook us, and the roar of indignation sunk into the whine of the peddler robbed of his wares. Nor is it strange that such causes produced national degeneracy. Humiliation debases the character as rapidly as vice, — and we were steeped in humiliation to the lips. We were the ally of France by revolution- ary treaties, and had conceded to her the sole right to enter our THE ERA OF REPUBLICAN RULE. 121 harbors with captured prizes, to the exclusion of her enemies. En- gland heaped indignity upon us : instead of resenting it, we agreed to violate our treaty with France, exclude her vessels with prizes, and admit those of England alone ! — so that we might be allowed to prosecute the Carrying Trade ! France, in turn, trampled upon us : we sent an embassy to solicit a treaty ! It was spurned out of the country: we sent another! — and agreed to pocket all past wrongs! — and violate our treaty with England, and allow French prizes to enter our ports ! so that we might but prosecute the Carrying Trade ! Thus we shuffled between the combatants, making outcry as a cuff was received from one, and a kick from the other; begging dis- honorable treaties with both, and keeping faith with neither ; but always with a keen eye to the main chance, industriously engaged in the Carrying Trade ! Pah ! the deeds of that time smell to heaven, and even yet taint our reputation with mankind. CHAPTER II. THE ERA OF REPUBLICAN RULE. The policy of Centralization Avas overthrown in the election of Jeiferson, but the consequences of the policy remained when the party which had maintained it had fallen. The policy of Centralization left the nation a legacy of insult and humiliation to be borne, more galling than any yet received. The peace of Amiens gave a respite to Europe from war, and to America from insult. But the tocsin was soon heard again ; and its sound was the signal for a renewal of contemptuous assaults upon our rights, and our honor. ** * * * * :{; * [Another hiatus of nineteen manuscript pages, sketching the course of aggressions, growing out of the Carrying Trade, which issued in the War of 1812.] 122 THE would's crisis. The War of 1812 was necessary to vindicate our rights and assert our honor. The excessive insolence of the British govern- ment passed the measure of patience; the impudence of its negotia- tions surpassed, if possible, the insulting arrogance of its acts. Had the pacification of Europe found us still tamely enduring out- rage and contumely, we had been branded with dishonor forever. Still, it was a sad necessity which drove us to make common cause with Napoleon, at the very moment when he crossed the Russian frontier, to overthrow the last barrier to universal dominion. It was the last curse of Hamilton's system. The War of 1S12 was the legacy, which the Bank, expiring the year before, bequeathed to the country. In a domestic point of view, the war was the greatest evil the country had ever suffered. It destroyed the wealth which had been accumulated in the Curry- ing Trade ; it paralyzed commerce ; prostrated industry ; and left the government overwhelmed with debt, and bankrupt in credit. In 1815, the system inaugurated by Hamilton had run its course; and it left the country in a worse condition than it found it. We were deeper in debt than in 1791, when the Bank was chartered; credit was as prostrate ; bankruptcy was as general ; commerce and industry were at as low an ebb. The system of interference with the internal interests of the country by the Federal government had run its career. It had violated the Constitution, to force a hectic prosperity; — the short lived prosperity was dead. It had trampled down limitations of power, to foster accumulation of wealth ; — the wealth had vanished. It had disregarded the institu- tions of the country to foster commerce ; — commerce was ruined. Nothing remained of the fruits of Hamilton's system but a few hulks rotting in our harbors — Yes, the opprobrium it had brought upon us, hardly eifaced by all the blood of the war, still lingered on our garments ! and it had planted the seed of Centralization, and covered it in the ruin wrought by war, where it germinated as in a congenial soil, and overshadowed the country with a new and more baneful growth of Federal usurpation. We have now traced the history of causation through which the financial system of 1791 led the country into the humiliations and THE ERA OF REPUBLICAN RULE. 123 short-lived profits of the Carrying Trade, ending in the ruin of the War Avith England. It will be the work of a future chapter to trace the operation of natural causes, broken by the intervention of the Federal government in the internal development of the country, and mark the unbroken career of prosperity on which they would have borne us. We look not to that now. But leaving this out of view, no one will deny that even the most moderate degree of prosperity would have been preferable to the career on which Hamilton's sys- tem launched us. No one who traces the history of the country from the inauguration of the Federal government down to 1815 will maintain that our abnormal career of factious politics and ex- cited speculation, with its concomitants of reverse and opprobrium, and its denouement in war, and industrial and financial ruin, is preferable to a normal career of steady, uninterrupted development. Far better had the industry of the country been left to the in- fluence of natural laws, without the interference of government. Then our people, escaping the demoralizing vicissitudes of specula- tion, would have remained tranquil and virtuous : no party banners would have waved over the Republic : no complications with Euro- pean affairs would have induced alternate breaches of faith toward both belligerents, and brought upon us a series of humiliations dearly purchased by the gains of trafiic, and expiated by the ruin of a war which swept all the fruits of toil and humiliation away. — Instead we should have been content with our own commerce : British jealousy would not have imposed restrictions upon our inter- course with foreign countries in violation of national law: our own mariners would have sufficed for our commerce, without tempting British sailors with high bounties to engage in our merchant service, thus inducing impressment in violation of our flag. A steady pros- perity would have illustrated our progress ; and with a spotless fiirae, resources conserved, and energies unwasted, we should have entered the course when quiet was restored in Europe, ready to bear away the palm of industrial prosperity from the war-worn na- tions of the Old World. 124 THE world's crisis. PART II. EVILS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM. The prosperity of the United States has been unprecedented, their growth and development, without example. In little more than three-fourths of a century, three millions of people have be- come the most powerful nation on the earth. We are apt to attribute this prosperity to the action of govern- ment, and to view it as proof of a wise system of administration. But it is really due to the energy of our people, and to our unpar- ralleled natural advantages. The intermeddling of the government with the industry of the country has retarded our growth. But for faults of administration, we should now be far in advance of our present position. We have grown with unprecedented rapid- ity ; — but we have remained a satellite of the British industrial system, instead of ourselves becoming the center of the world's in- dustry. We might have engrossed to ourselves the unparalleled advantages natui-e has lavished upon us. But, instead, we have only reaped from them a secondary advantage, lavishing our re- sources upon England, — resources which have rendered that country the industrial center of the world. We might have become the great center of industry and wealth, and of moral and political in- fluence. This was the natural destiny of our country. We should have realized it under a constitutional administration of the govern- ment that left industry to the development of natural laws. Viola- tions of the Constitution have cheated us of our destiny, and made us the satellite of England, incapable of controlling the course of events ; — instead of the Central Luminary, round which all the na- tions would have revolved, swayed by our influence, governed by our example. Before noticing the evils wrought by the American System, let us (224) NORMAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES. 125 mark the advantages Nature has besto-wed upon us, and trace the career in which the force of irresistible causes would have directed our country. CHAPTER I. NORMAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES. This subject will be best treated under the three grand depart- ments of national development, — Industrial, Social, and Political. We shall therefore discuss the subject of the chapter in respect of, 1. Our Industrial Development; 2. Our Social Life; 3. Our Political Career. Sect. 1. — The Normal Industrial Development of the United States. The close attention of the reader is solicited to the course of reasoning presented in this Chapter, and especially in this Section; since the conclusions here elaborated become the basis of the course of thought presented in the subsequent part of the work. The train of thought is necessarily much condensed; much is left to the sug- gestion of the thoughtful mind; but the attentive reader will have no difficulty in following out the train of reasoning, and reaching the conclusions to which it infallibly leads. In the discussion of our normal industrial career, Fancy will be discarded ; our conclusions will be sought under the stern guidance of lleason. We shall not trench upon the realm of fanciful specu- lation, but trace the laws of cause and effect to their necessary and inevitable results. The relations of mathematical principles are not more fixed and unalterable than the relations of cause and effect. The principles of Political Economy, — the laws which govern in- dustrial development, are as immutable as the first principles of Geometry. In reasoning upon industrial progress, deduction from cause to effect is susceptible of the same scientific accuracy as the demonstration of a geometrical problem. It is only necessary to 126 THE world's crisis. weigli accurately all the elements of a situation, and estimate the force of active causes, to arrive at a definite and correct conclusion. The cause being given, the effect may be positively known. The history of our industrial development is naturally divided into two eras. The first began in the financial system of Hamilton, which launched us upon the neutral Carrying Trade. The second had origin in the American System, which undertook, a second time, to cause a forced growth of national prosperity, derived especially from the protection of home manufactures. The first era began in 1791, and extended to the peace of 1815. The commencement of the second may be dated in 1816, extending down to the present time. It will be necessary, in tracing the normal development of our national industry, to mark, 1st, The causes in operation at the foundation of our government, which would have given direction to the national industry, had not their influence been destroyed by the intervention of the Federal government; and 2nd, The causes in operation in 1815, at the close of our War w'ith England, ready to give direction to the national industry, when the intervention of the Federal government frustrated their influence. In both these periods, the state of the country presented all the conditions necessai'y to promote a steady, uninterrupted prosperity. And in both periods, the unconstitutional interference of the Fed- eral government in the internal affairs of the country changed the face of the situation, and rendered a career of normal prosperity impossible. Let us mark the circumstances of the situation in both these eras, and trace the necessary operation of existing causes, in giving di- rection to our industrial development. I. The Xorjial Industrial Career of the United States at the Inaugu- ration OF THE Government. It is the true destiny of the United States to become the manu- facturer for the world. We ought, now, to be far advanced upon our career of industrial grandeur. NORMAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES. 127 There are four conditions essential to the highest manufacturing success ; — 1. An energetic and enterprising population, having adaptation to mechanical occupations ; 2. An adequate motive power for driving machinery ; 3. An abundant home supply of raAv material; 4. An abundant home supply of provisions for the operatives engaged in manufacturing and auxiliary branches of industry. These are conditions imposed by nature, essential to the highest manufacturing prosperity. Where all exist in the same country, the seal of nature has stamped that country as the destined manu- facturer for the world. And though ignorance and governmental incompetence and folly may divert the country for a time from its normal career, its natural destiny will, sooner or later, be accom- plished. Of these conditions, the first may be termed fundamental. There can be no manufacturing success, without a population, energetic, enterprising, and having a mechanical adaptation. Such a popula- tion sometimes enables a country to triumph over all natural ob- stacles, and achieve high success in manufactures, without a home supply of either raw material, or provisions for operatives. Thus England, though importing raw material and provisions from all the world, has, by dint of the energy and mechanical adaptation of her people, attained great success in mnnufactures. This success, how- ever, is owing to the fact that Great Britain has never yet been brought into active competition with a country having superior nat- ural advantages. Other things equal, that country would be placed at great disadvantage in competing with a rival having a population equally ingenious and energetic, equal facilities for motive power, and an unlimited home supply of provisions and raw material. The United States possesses all these advantages in an eminent degree. Our people are unsurpassed in energy, enterprise, and mechanical ingenuity; our rushing streams and immense coal-fields supply unrivaled facilities for driving machinery ; we have an abun- dant home supply of provisions; and our capacity for the produc- tion of raw material for every kind of manufacture is unlimited. Our country possesses in an unrivaled degree the prime essentials 128 THE world's crisis. of manufacturing success. Nature has stamped it the great world- manufacturing site. The causes were in operation at the inauguration of the Federal government which, if the government had not interfered, would have turned the energy of the country into the channel of manufac- tures. Many obstacles had prevented the development of manufacturing industry, prior to that period. During the Colonial era, England had prohibited manufactures in the Colonies, that they might afford a better market for the manufactures of the mother country. Since the War of Independence, the want of comity between the states had prevented the development of manufactures in the Eastern and Middle states. Each state had the right, under the Articles of Confederation, to impose duties upon the commodities imported from the others. This prevented any attempt in the Northern sections of the country to manufacture for the South; and, domestic manu- factures being general, there was no home market in those sections to foster manufactures upon an extensive scale. But the adoption of the Constitution changed all this. The whole country was by it opened to home manufactures free of duty, while a revenue tariff afforded important incidental jirotection against foreign competition. The obstacles which had before prevented the development of manufacturing industry, were now removed. Furthermore: the industrial condition of the country must have soon turned enterprise toward manufactures, as the only field open to it. Let us note the elements of the situation. Abroad, the French Revolution was brewing, — soon to plunge Europe into a bloody war, and interrupt with British cruisers and blockades our communication with foreign nations. At home, the South was occupied in growing products for the foreign market, leaving commerce and manufactures to the Eastern and ]Middle states. The marine of the country was not yet adequate to the wants of our commerce. Until our tonnnge was equal to the na- tional freight, the impulse of the navigation laws would cause the profits of commerce to be invested in more ships. Before that maxi- mum was reached, the repressive regulations of Great Britain would have deterred us from embarking in the neutral Carrying Trade. NORMAL CAREER OP THE UNITED STATES. 129 Where could the profits of commerce then be invested ? Not in more ships, — our tonnage being akeady suflficient for our Avants. Not in agriculture, — that business being already overcrowded, and throwing redundant products upon a glutted market. Manufiictures would be the only investment for capital. In the general stagna- tion of industry, they would be developed, as a matter of simple necessity. Circumstances like these have always proved the cradle of Industry. Industrial greatness has always had hardy birth in circumstances of adversity and depression. The poor fishermen who peopled the Syrian coast, having no recourse but the sea, under the impulse of neces- sity worked cheaper than their wealthier neighbors ; and thus engrossed the traffic of adjacent regions, and laid the foundation of the commercial greatness of Phoenicia, The fugitives who fled for refuge from the sword of Atilla to the rocky islands at the head of the Adriatic, in their exceeding poverty, developed an enterprise, and a resolute, persevering, and cheap industry, which gave birth to the wealth and power of Venice. In our own era, the poor peasants of Lancashire, far removed from the highway of British commerce, devoting themselves to labors of the spindle and the loom, laid the foundation of the manufacturing and commercial greatness of England. So in our poverty, would our enterprising population have turned of necessity to manufactures, as the only opening in the general stagnation of business. Industry is a hardy plant, which germinates best in a sterile soil. Like the Alpine oak which takes hardy root and towers in grandeur upon rocky crags where tempests beat fiercest, Industry only grows to greatness when rooted in necessity, and nurtured in the bleak air of competition. The greenhouse is for exotics only; — the hardy plant rooted in its native soil needs but the sun and tempests of its natal air to further its growth. We were then importing manufactures from England ; the ques- tion must soon have suggested itself to our enterprising men in search of investments for capital that could no longer be embarked in shipping, whether we could not manufacture more cheaply for ourselves, — a ques-tion which must have been answered in the affir- mative. 9 130 THE ayorld's crisis. At that time the spinning of yarn by machinery was perfected, but the old handloom was still the only method of weaving. The expense of machinery, therefore, was not very great. The compe- tition between the English and American manufacturer resolved it- self into a question of cheap production. A competition in manufacturing between two countries having equally energetic populations resolves itself into a question of 1. Cheap raw material ; 2. Cheap food; 3. Cheap labor ; 4. Cheap motive power. In other words, the country will bear away the palm which can maintain the lowest scale of prices. The conditions upon which a low scale of prices in manufacturing depends, may be divided into two classes. In the first place, it depends greatly upon the natural advantages of the respective countries ; and secondly, upon their relative adventitious con;DITI0N of ENGLAND. 363 liament with petitions, and rose in mobs ; when, rather than risk all the privileges of the Nobility upon the chances of civil war, many moderate Tories decided to abandon the obnoxious measures. When it came into power in 1846, the Whig party was composed of three wings. 1. First, there was the main body of true Whigs, devoted entirely to the interests of the Middle class aristocracy, and in fiivor of all the administrative reforms necessary to relieve the commerce of the country from its excessive burdens. 2. There was a strong body of what we may term Tory-Whigs, — persons devoted at heart to the class interests of the Nobility, but satisfied that the true interests of that class lay in assenting to such reasonable administrative reforms, as were necessary to allay public discontent, and prevent danger of outbreak. They deemed it safer to co-operate with the Aristocracy of trade in such partial reforms as they desired, and obtain, in return, their cordial co-operation in maintaining the government against organic changes dangerous to the existence of the Nobility. It may be asked why the Whigs submitted, and have continued to the present day to submit, to this kind of alliance with moderate Tories ? Why have they not elected Whigs, in their stead ? The answer reveals the secret of the weakness of the Whig party, and discloses the key to its intrigues, for years past. In many of the English Borough towns, the influence of the No- bility and that of the Middle class aristocracy are nearly equal, with perhaps a slight preponderance of the influence of the Nobil- ity. In such Boroughs, on a fair comparison of strength, the Whigs would be beaten. The party can carry them, only by adopting as its candidate some scion of the Nobility, firmly devoted to the interests of his class, but willing to administer the government on liberal principles, and represent the interests of the Commercial aristocracy in so far as they do not come in collision with the in- terests of his own class. The principles of such a candidate are satisfactory to many moderate Tories, and his family influence carries Tory votes enough to secure his election. These representatives are Whigs, while Whig measures consist with the privileges of the 364 THE world's crisis. Nobility ; but on tlie first symptom of danger to the interests of their class, they abandon the Whig party, and range themselves with the Tory party, where their fealty belongs. 3. The third section of the Whig party, in 1846, consisted of "Liberals," — a party representing the mechanics, and the better portion of the Working Class. The rise of the " Liberal party " occurred much to the discomfiture of the Whigs. In arranging the provisions of the Reform Bill of 183:2, the Whigs accounted the cities of England as their own. They expected that the Middle class aristocracy would control the elections, by compelling the clerks and mechanics who had the right of suifrage to vote for the Whig candidates. But, unfortunately for their calculations, the mechanics soon freed themselves from the dictation of their employers, by means of Trade Unions. They now resolved, instead of voting for Whigs, to elect men to Parliament devoted to the interests of the Working class. In the large manu- facturing towns, where mechanics are most numerous, they obtained a decided political ascendancy. Thus, a number of cities were wrested from Whig influence, and committed to a class whose aspi- rations after political power were more obnoxious to the Whigs than even Tory domination. In 1846, however, the " Liberals " were too feeble, and too modest, to hope for any distinct party influence upon the destinies of the nation. They modestly and wisely shrunk beneath the mantle of Whig protection, satisfied with the recognition of their separate existence, and hoping by their co-operation to give a more liberal direction to the policy of the Whigs. The union of these incongruous elements in the Whig party has exerted the most important influence upon the course of English politics, and also upon political movements throughout the world. The Whigs were completely at the mercy of the two antagonistic elements attached to their party. A defection of the Tory-Whigs, or of the Liberals, would throw them out of power. They were, therefore, under the necessity of adopting a policy that would secure the support of both their allies. The Tory- Whigs were content with compelling the Whig party to POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 365 proceed with extreme caution in changing the system of taxation. Under such circumstances, the reform of the system of taxation proceeded slowly ; but under the impulse of Liberal agitation and Whig purpose, it did progress; and after years of agitation, during which the Tories came into power again, and failed to obtain by their system sufficient revenue for the wants of the government, the Whigs succeeded in forcing their Tory allies to consent to a modification of the revenue system, and the adoption of the system of taxation that now prevails in England. The following is an outline of the modifications adopted : — 1. The abolition of the duties on imported provisions, and of the objection- able direct taxes on houses. — 2. The retention of the system of raising revenue by customs, excises, stamps, and license taxes ; — but many articles formerly dutyable were placed on the free list, for the benefit of the commercial and manufacturing interests, — the revenue from customs being raised from duties on a comparatively small number of articles. — 3, The deficiency of revenue caused by the release of articles from duty, and by the abolition of corn laws and house taxes, was raised by a tax levied on incomes. These modifications, though at first resisted by the Tories, were soon accepted by the party. The changes they wrought were in- deed very slight, leaving the framework of the system of taxation devised by the Tories, unaltered. The Liberals were then content with efi'ecting these reforms, and with controlling the foreign relations of the country. In the last particular, the Liberal party has exerted a powerful influence upon the course of events. They were in sympathy with liberal move- ments abroad, and have been able to compel the British government to maintain a friendly attitude toward them. The Liberals have controlled the foreign policy of the British government, for the last fifteen years. It is mainly owing to them, that Great Britain as- sumed the friendly attitude toward the French government which has enabled Napoleon to achieve so much in behalf of liberal move- ments in Europe. The Anglo-French alliance, which has firmly held Absolutism in check, owed its existence to the influence of their balance of power in the British Parliament. But the time soon came when the Liberals refused to be content 366 TUE world's crisis. ■with the administrative reforms of the Whigs. They had been gradually growing in strength. In city after city, the mechanics had emancipated themselves from the dictation of their employers, and sent " Liberals " to Parliament. Every gain to the Liberals was a diminution of Whig strength : in 1857, this had progressed so far, that the Liberals held the balance of power between the other two parties. The Whigs, composed of representatives of the Middle class aristocracy and moderate Tories, were in a majority when sup- ported by the Liberals ; but the transfer of the Liberal vote to their opponents would leave them in a minority. Since, under the En- glish parliamentary system, an administration must retire from power, whenever it is in a minority in Parliament, the Liberals now had tiie power to break down any administration, by joining the opposition upon a test question. They were in a position to pro- pound their demands with confidence ; and they demanded that the Whigs should continue to tread the path of Reform. The power of the Liberals filled both the other parties with dis- may. Neither could carry on the government without their aid; and they demanded, as the price of their support, concessions which neither was willing to grant. This state of things led to the system of maneuvering which has characterized English politics for the last ten years. To comprehend the party tactics of the three parties, it is neces- sary to understand the aims of the Liberal party. The policy of the Liberals embraces a two-fold aim, — a thorough parliamentary reform ; and a thorough reform of the public admin- istration. In respect of parliamentary reform, they demand, in the first place, a new apportionment of parliamentary representatives, in which population shall be made the basis of representation. The adoption of this basis would disfranchise the remainder of the rot- ten boroughs, vastly increase the representation of the cities and towns, and give a small additional representation to the counties. L^poii this basis, the cities and towns would control Parliament by an overwhelming majority. — The second feature in the proposed plan of reform would give the cities and towns into the control of POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 367 the Working class. To this end, the liiberals demand an extension of the franchise that will allow the better portion of the Working class to vote; and the adoption of the ballot, that they may vote free from the dictation of their employers. This parliamentary reform would transfer the Parliament to the absolute control of the Working class. When by means of parliamentary reform, the Liberals shall have obtained control of the government, they propose to carry out a thorough system of administrative reforms. In the first place, they demand a radical reform of the revenue system. They desire the substitution of a general property tax for the present system of raising revenue by customs, excises, stamps, license, and income taxes, which levies all the public burdens upon the industrial classes. Their object in this is to relieve the Work- ing class from the burden of taxation at present borne by them ; and to force the wealthy classes to diminish their magnificence, or at least to pay taxes upon the property withheld from use, and devoted to purposes of display. But the Liberals are not content with demanding a reform of the revenue system. They do not share the tenderness of the Middle class aristocracy for the Nobility. They aim at the reformation of all the time-honored abuses of the British government, through Avhich the Nobility maintain the power of their order. The revenues of the Church of England are derived from arbi- trary levies upon the incomes of Dissenters, as well as Churchmen. It is an oppressive hierarchy, maintained because it aiFords a multi- tude of berths, emphatically termed " livings," for the younger sons of the Aristocracy ; and, because the right of presenting to these "livings" is a vested property right of the Nobility, as well estab- lished as their right to their lands. The revenues of the Church of England exceed those of all the state churches of the rest of Europe. The Working class are almost all Dissenters ; and the Liberals pro- pose to take from the Established Church the patronage of the state, leaving it to rely, like the other sects, upon the voluntary contribu- tions of its votaries. The Liberals also propose to reform the public administration in 368 THE world's crisis. respect of the system of office holding. Hitherto, the army, navy, and civil departments of government have been crowded with scions of the Aristocracy, whose relations have no other means of provid- ing for them, — " noble Barnacles," as Dickens styles them, who have fixed themselves upon the ship of state. The Crimean war showed the incapacity of these officials, in striking contrast with the effi- ciency of the French system. The Liberals propose to adopt the French system, where all offices, civil and military, are open to merit rather than rank, and where promotion by merit is the system, in- stead of promotion by family influence, or by purchase. The execution of these reforms would be fatal to the Nobility. The overthrow of the Established Church, and of the system of government patronage, would compel every noble house to provide for its younger branches. This would be a heavy burden ; and when property taxation was superadded to it, the Nobility would find their magnificence diminished, indeed. Under this system, the downfall of the Nobility would be only a question of time. The discontented younger children, deprived of all resource, would lead a clamor for the abolition of inheritance by primogeniture, and the division of estates among all the heirs ; and, their petition granted — which a Liberal Parliament would not be reluctant to do — the English Nobil- ity would soon be numbered among the things that were. It may easily be imagined that the Tories, knowing the ultimate aims of the Liberals, looked with inquietude upon their demands for additional reforms. Not less was the uneasiness of the Whigs. They saw that j^ill ad- ditional reforms only approximated to the ultimate aim of the Lib- erals, and they were as unwilling to risk the rule of mechanics, as were the Tories. The Whigs were willing to relieve the Working class from oppression, so far as consistent with the interests of the Middle class aristocracy ; but they were very far from being willing to extend to it greater political rights. They feared that Labor, if invested with political power, might oppress Capital. The Middle class employers did not choose to have the government ruled by their men. The spirit of communism was of too recent date to be forgotten. They might apprehend that, under a government ruled POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 369 by mechanics, the men might choose to purchase mills and run them on their own account; or, at least, that the government might adopt a policy fatal to their class interests. — Moreover, the Tory wing of the Whig party were resolutely bent upon yielding no further to the demands of a party whose ultimate aims were so dangerous to the Nobility. Influenced by such apprehensions, the Whig administration, in 1857, refused to yield further to the agitation of their Liberal allies for additional reforms. Lord Palmerston, who was then premier, belonged to the Tory wing of the Whig party. He had reached the limit of his progress in reform. The administrative reforms already accomplished were sufficient to satisfy the Middle class aristocracy, and he was unwilling to go further for the gratification of the Working class. III. Whig and Tory Intrigues. Now began the system of intrigue which has ever since charac- terized English politics. The Liberals (1857), finding that the W^hig administration main- tained in power by their votes would not yield to their demands, resolved to signalize their displeasure and prove their strength, by unseating it from power. Events prove that they came to an under- standing with the Tory leaders ; and that the terms of the alliance were, that the Tories, in return for the adhesion of the Liberals, should pass certain measures of administrative reform, and, espe- cially, that they should pass a Reform Bill extending considerably the area of suffrage. A test question was brought up ; the vote of the Liberals with the Opposition, defeated the ministry; and the Tories came into power. The question arises, Why did the Tories enter into such an ar- rangement? Were their leaders so much in love with office as to make concessions dangerous to their order, to secure it? No: the Tories looked far beyond the interests of the moment ; the^'' were governed by a far-reaching policy, which sought to use the vote of the Liberals, with Reform as the bait, to pass a bill that would con- solidate the power of their own party. The Tory leaders perceived that, in the existing balance of 24 370 THE world's crisis. parties, neither of the great parties could carry on the government without the aid of the Liberals ; and that this state of things ena- bled the latter to extort concessions, which, sooner or later, would bring the government under their control. If the Nobility and Middle class aristocracy were united against the Liberals, they might rule the country without difficulty. The dissension of these two classes gave the Liberals influence, as holding the balance of power between them. The Tory leaders sought to remedy this state of things, by so weakening the Whig party, and strengthening their own, as to destroy the former, and cause them to disband as a po- litical organization ; when, in a contest between the Tories and the Liberals, the Middle class aristocracy would promptly side with the former. The aim of the Tory leaders was to simplify English poli- tics, by blotting out one of the great parties, and rallying all the aristocratic elements to their own organization, in opposition to the party of the Working class. To this end, they proposed to frame a Reform Bill that Avould cut down the strength of the Whig party, and increase the power of the Tories and Liberals ; — thus, as one of their pamphleteers phrased it, " giving to a Reform measure a Tory signification." It was not difficult to frame a Reform Bill that would have this effect. The Whigs occupy a position between the Tories and the Lib- erals, and antagonistic to both. In many of the larger towns, they wage a hard conflict with the Liberals, while they maintain, in the small boroughs, a doubtful contest with the Tories. If a Reform Bill were framed, that would give a few more votes to the Liberals in the cities, and a few more to the Tories in the small Boroughs, the Whig party, pared down on both sides, would be reduced to in- significance. This arrangement would strengthen the Liberals, it is true ; but it would give the Tories all the doubtful Boroughs so long contested with the Whigs, and insure them a clear majority in Par- liament, sufficient to carry on the government against the opposition of both the other parties. Then, the Middle class aristocracy, hope- less of power for themselves, and compelled to choose between the Nobility or the Working class, would ally themselves with the former ; and the Tories would rule the country with strong majorities. The Reform Bill of the Tories was carefully framed with an eye POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 371 to tlie end in view. It proposed no change in the basis of repre- sentation. It proposed to retain the " rotten boroughs ;" also the open vote, that landlords might still influence the votes of their tenants and employes. The Bill simply proposed to extend the franchise, — in such a way as to include a greater number of rustics under the control of Tory landlords, and a greater number of mechanics in the towns. The votes of the former would enable the Tories to wrest from the Whigs many closely-contested small boroughs ; the latter would carry a number of large towns in favor of the Liberals. The scheme was well concocted, and if the Bill had passed, it would have extinguished the Whig party. But many of the Tories were unwilling to extend the franchise under any conditions, for fear of dangerouslv increasing the stren<2;th of the Liberals. The Whigs, too, were awake to their danger. They were resolved to defeat the Tory project, at all hazards : at the critical moment, they offered a motion which promised the Liberals a better Reform Bill than that of the Tories. This secured the Liberal vote, defeated the Tory project, and drove the party from power. This defeat was a critical period for the Tories. The Whigs were in a situation to turn their own batteries ag-ainst them. The Whigs might as easily frame a Reform Bill that would annihilate the Tories, as the Tories one that would ruin the Whigs ; and the course of the Tories had stimulated the partisan feelings of their antagonists to such a pitch, that they were ready to use their advantage to the utmost. The Tory leaders perceived the stern resentment of the Whigs, and foresaw that the leaders would avail themselves of the passions of the hour, to unite the whole party upon a fatal Reform Bill. They resolved, therefore, to gain time, and suffer the passions of the moment to cool : instead of at once retiring, and suffering the Whigs and Liberals to form a coalition government, they chose the alternative of a dissolution of Parliament, and went before the country on the question of Reform. — The result of the election showed that the voting classes of England were opposed to Reform. The Tories gained twenty-five members : the Whigs, besides this loss, found themselves under the necessity of adopting, in many 372 THE world's crisis. doubtful Boroughs, candidates know to be opposed to Reform. The Tory wing of the Whig party received, in this manner, many ac- cessions. When the new Parliament assembled, the Whigs and Liberals, combined, had a bare working majority. A coalition was formed, in which Lord Palmerston was premier. — The Whigs were under the necessity of passing several measures for the gratification of their Liberal allies. Among these was the repeal of the obnoxious paper tax, — a most important political measure, as it reduced the price of newspapers, and brought political reading within the reach of the masses. At length, the Whig ministry brought forward a Reform Bill, which, under pretense of extending the suffrage, was so framed as to redound to the advantage of the Whig party at the expense of the Tories. The Bill proposed to disfranchise some thirty-five "rotten boroughs," which added materially to the Tory strength; and to reduce the sufii-age basis in the towns from a ten pound rental, to a rental of six pounds. The reduction of the suffrage basis would add to the Liberal strength in the manufacturing towns, where the mechanics had freed themselves from the dictation of employers ; but it would give them control of very few boroughs not already under their sway, inasmuch as Whig employers could control the votes of all employes except mechanics. While the Bill would not materially weaken the Whigs in the boroughs contested with the Liberals, it would give them a mass of new votes in the boroughs contested with the Tories, suf- ficient, in many instances, to give them a decided preponderance. The party would thus be freed from the necessity of accepting mod- erate Tories as their candidates in such boroughs ; and, besides, it would gain so many representatives from Tory boroughs, as to secure a firm majority in Parliament. This increase of strength would free the party from the necessity of compromising with moderate Tories on the one hand, and, on the other, of a coalition with the Liberals. The plan was well conceived ; but when the ministers brought forward the Bill in Parliament, the Tory wing of the Whig party showed unequivocal signs of revolt. They were decidedly opposed to the measure, both because it increased the power of the Working POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 373 class, and because it diminished the power of the Nobility. The Whig ministry found that the measure would not pass, and withdrew it; recapitulating to their Liberal allies all the reforms of admin- istration effected by the Whigs for the benefit of the Working class, and bidding them " rest and be thankful." The introduction of the Bill was sufficient to save the faith of the Whig ministry. Palmer^on himself, from his Tory predilections, was not ardent in support of the Bill, and only assented to it as a propitiatory offering to the Liberals : it soon became evident that he was not favorable to the introduction of any other Bill proposing organic reform. The Liberals were resentful, but powerless ; for the Tories, satisfied with the Conservatism of Palmerston, made no effort to unseat him. He continued to govern England as long as he lived, by the easy pliancy with which, as chief of a motley party, he suffered events to take their course. The Tories might at any time have overthrown his administra- tion, if they would have accepted of an alliance with the Liberals. But their past experience satisfied them that they could not control any Reform Bill they might introduce in co-operation with the Lib- erals : the Whigs could always propose such modifications as would carry the Liberal vote, and thus wrest the bill from their control. Their only hope of carrying such a Reform Bill as would redound to the advantage of the party, lay in obtaining the support of the Tory wing of the Whig party. Until then, they resolved to wait, and let reform alone. They knew the weakness of the Whig party, with its two discord- ant wings, — one urgent for reform, the other resolutely opposed to it. The defection of either would overthrow the party, and the de- fection of one or the other was bound to occur at no distant date. If the Whigs, in deference to the wishes of their Tory allies, refused to introduce a Reform Bill, the Liberals would withdraw their sup- port; if the Whig leaders yielded to the Liberal pressure and intro- duced another Reform Bill, the Tory Whigs would go over to the opposition: in either event, the Whig party would fall from power. The Tories, under the circumstances, felt themselves masters of the situation, and able to wait for the approaching crisis in the fortunes of the Whiss. 374 THE world's crisis. The event fulfilled their expectations. While Palmerston lived, he kept his party clear of the rock of reform ; parrying -with easy good nature the sarcasms of his restless Liberal allies, and keeping them in a humor of surly compliance, in the hope that his death would enable them to extort the desired concessions from the next Whig Premier. The death of Palmerston was the signal for renewed agitation. The Liberals, whose patience was spent, demanded of the Whigs fulfillment of their compact. During the past summer,* the new Whig ministry brought forward a Refox'm Bill. The Bill proposed, as usual, the disfranchisement of the " rot- ten boroughs," and the maintenance of open voting ; — also the be- stowal of the franchise upon all householders paying a rental of seven pounds, and all lodgers paying an annual rent of the same amount. The object of the bill was to consolidate Whig power, by securing for them, in the boroughs contested with the Tories, an additional number of votes. The franchise basis was fixed at a seven pounds rental, instead of six, to propitiate the Tory-Whigs; the lodger franchise was introduced for the same purpose, many of the lodgers on whom the franchise would be conferred, belonging to the Aristocratic and Middle classes. But the Tory wing of the Whig party was not to be propitiated. Unalterably opposed to any change that would diminish the power of the Nobility, they manifested in the course of the debate their disposition to oppose the measure, if it were pressed. The Whig ministry pressed it to a vote : that section of the party seceded, and went over to the Tories : the Whigs were defeated : the Tories, strengthened by these accessions from the Whig party, have taken possession of the government. England is now under Tory rule, — Tory rule, stronger than when the party held power seven years ago, by a doubtful alliance with the Liberals. The Tories are now supported by the Tory wing of the Whig party, — an element which has always been devoted at *Tliis chapter was completed early in tlie Fall of 1866. POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 375 heart to the Tory interest ; and which will probably prove firm and true to the alliance. What use will the Tories make of power? If we judge from their past course, they will avail themselves of the occasion, to pass a Reform Bill that will annihilate the Whigs, and place their own party firmly in the ascendant. The time is propitious. The agita- tion the Whigs and Liberals are making for Reform will be advan- taireous, inasmuch as it will convince the reluctant members of the Tory party that the question must be settled, — that the government cannot go on as it has for the last ten years, — and that it is better to settle the question, now, before the Liberals excite a dangerous agitation, and while Tories, supported by the Tory element of the Whig party, are able to control the Bill, and give it a direction favorable to their party interests. The Tory leaders have evidently been waiting for the present opportunity, for several years. Disraeli, the planner of the former bill, who persisted in his purpose to the end, in the face of the fiercest opposition from his own party, is too astute not to seize the present opportunity, to carry his policy to a successful issue. It will no doubt be Ims policy to carry a Reform Bill that will give his party such a decided ascendancy over both the other parties, as will enable it to sway the country, despite their combined opposition. It will be easy, as we have shown, to frame such a bill. Admit more mechanics to the franchise in the towns, so as to strengthen the Liberals against the AVhigs, and more country rustics in the boroughs disputed between the Tories and Whigs, — and the work is done. The Tory landlords can control the votes of their tenants and laborers, and thus defeat the Whio-s in the doubtful boroughs. This would give them at least all the boroughs heretofore repre- sented by Tory Whigs, — an accession of strength sufficient to give them a clear majority in Parliament. This adjustment is attended with only one danger: If an indus- trial crisis involving great distress should occur pending a parlia- mentary election, the general distress might drive the enfranchised tenants of the Tories to desperation, and cause them to vote for the Liberals despite the influence of their landlords, and thus give that party a majority in Parliament. In such event, the Liberals would 376 THE world's crisis. remodel the whole governmental fabric. This, however, is a future contingency. Meantime, the Tories would rule the government with a clear majority. The danger of such a future contingency will hardly prevent them from strengthening their position, by means of an extension of the suffrage. But if the Tories refuse to pass a Reform Bill, still, they have control of the country for years to come. In pressing their bill even to the rupture of the party, the Whigs have thoroughly com- mitted themselves to reform. Their course has lost them the boroughs represented by the Tory-Whigs, which are opposed to such an extension of the franchise as would weaken the Nobility. Those boroughs will elect Tories, in future, and maintain that party in possession of the government, at least for years to come. If the Tories decide not to venture on Reform, their power is safe until the agitation of the masses shall extort from them such a Reform Bill as shall give their opponents a majority in Parliament. But no dangerous agitation can be excited while the country is prosperous. Hence, whether the Tories frame a Reform Bill for their own ad- vantage, or not, they will keep possession of the government until some crisis occurs that shall excite the British population to an out- break against the authority of the Nobility. We may take it as a fixed fact, that England is, for the time, firmly under Toi'y rule, and base our political calculations upon that fact. If we now turn our attention to European affairs, it will be evi- dent that the government of Great Britain, in Tory hands, will wreck the political hopes of mankind. A full exposition of the political status of Europe must be left to future chapters. It is sufficient for our present purpose, to remark that, on the Continent of Europe, a prolonged struggle has been going on between Absolutism and Progress. Which side will the Tory government of England take, in the approaching crisis of that struggle? The English Tories have always sympathized with the despotic governments, against popular movements. They sympathized with Austria, in her attempt to maintain her hold upon Italy. They sym- POLITICAL COA^DITION OF ENGLAND. 377 pathized with Bomba, the tyrant of Naples, against GavibaUIi. They sympathized with Denmark, in her attempt to maintain her feudal sway over the German state of Holstein. The Tories have sympa- thized with all efforts to maintain the existing status. They sym- pathized with the Bourbons, against the French Republic of 1848; with Austria, against Hungary; with the despots, against Poland. They have regarded with bitter hostility every effort to introduce a new and better order of things. All their sympathies are for des- potism, and against the people. They have heaped derision upon the aspirations of the oppressed and disparted nationalities of Eu- rope after their lost national independence ; and they have denounced, in unmeasured terms, the sympathy of Napoleon with their cause, as dangerous to Europe, and in violation of the faith of treaties. The English nobility feel that their own privileges belong to the Feudal Ages, and are identified with the feudal cause on the Con- tinent of Europe. The same spirit which is wrestling for Nation- ality, on the Continent, is endeavoring, in England, to wrest from the Nobility their oppressive feudal rights. The English nobility are well apprised that their cause is the cause of despotism, everywhere. They lean upon Russia, as firmly as do the despotic kingdoms of Europe. They feel that she is their most puissant ally. This feel- ing is so strong, that it prompted them to sympathize with Russia during the Crimean war ! Though her triumph would menace the British empire in India, it would increase her prestige, and strengthen the cause of Absolutism in Europe ! They deprecated her humilia- tion, as a blow to the cause of "order," struck against its most puis- sant champion ! The Tories are the same party, now, they were when they warred to the death against the French Revolution. They have never changed their principles. In the decisive conflict approaching be- tween Absolutism and Progress, the Tory government of England will take sides with Russia and Absolutism, against France and Progress. Judging from the recent foreign policy of Great Britai^i, it may be supposed that the British government, whatever its sympathies, will hokl aloof from the conflict. But the policy of the Whigs and Liberals, who have governed England, with a brief interval, for fifteen 378 THE world's crisis. years, is no indication of the Tory policy. The Whigs represented the commercial interest, whose policy is peace and traffic. Their alliance with the Liberals, also, placed them in a nugatory position. The Liberals sympathized with Progress, and would not suffer the British government to take any step to its prejudice. The Liberals have ruled England for ten years. Every administration has been compelled to court their support, and yield to their influence. The Liberals held England in a neutral position, while Napoleon drove Austria out of Lombardy. The Liberals prevented the government from ordering the British cruisers to intercept the expedition of Garibaldi against the king of Naples. That the Whigs were in- fluenced by no sympathy with the popular cause, is evident from the fact that, when Garibaldi visited England, two years ago, to tender in person his thanks for the sympathy of the nation with the cause of Italy, Mr. Gladstone, the most liberal member of the Whig minis- try, requested him to leave the country, on the ground that his pres- ence was embarrassing to the government. The predilections of the Whigs incline them to sympathize with the existing status. Tliey are merchants, and desire peace and traffic ; they are bankers, and have immense sums loaned to the existing governments ; they are conservative, and deprecate revolution ; they are aristocrats, and sympathize with power against population. Their predilections have been neutralized by their alliance with the Liberals. This coalition produced the equilibrium of opposing forces, and compelled the gov- ernment to adopt the shuffling policy of friend of both parties, busy in endeavoring to keep the peace, but standing aloof from committal to either side. In pursuit of this policy, England has been over- whelmed with humiliation, until the nation is eager to engage in a war for any or no cause, so that it may erase the stains from the national escutcheon. The attitude of England during the past few years has not arisen from a decay of the national spirit, but from the fact that the parties that ruled the country, by coalition, mutually neutralized each other. But the Tory policy is not neutral. Their sympathies are positive and fixed. They are allied to Absolutism, by common traditions and a common interest. Their power in England is insecure, and must fall, ere long, before the encroachments of the Liberals, unless their POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND. 379 position is fortified by a strong reaction abroad in favor of Abso- lutism. They know this, and in self-defense, will exert all their power to give success to the common cause. The warmer the sym- pathy of the English people with popular movements abroad, the more urgent the necessity of the Nobility acting efficiently to sup- press movements on the Continent, whose success must be disastrous to their political interests. Already, we see indications of the change of policy the Tories are effecting. Since they came into power, the alliance with France against Absolutism is ended. Already, the Tory organs have opened a storm of abuse upon Napoleon, and are gratulating over the suc- cesses of Prussia, which power they declare will, in future, constitute a counterbalance to French influence in Europe. The shufiling neutrality of England is ended. The Tories will adopt a consistent and vigorous foreign policy. They will quietly place England on the side of the despotic Powers, and when the contest comes, they will, if necessary, throw the whole power of Britain into the scale, and combat in favor of despotism, as ardently as in 1793. [6^" Note. — This chapter was finished, as above, in September 18(J6. Tlie course of events, in England, has demonstrated the justice of the course of thought 2:)resented. The Tories have sub- mitted to Parliament a Eeform Bill, designed to consolidate the political 250wer of the Nobility. In its passage through Parliament, the extension of the franchise was made much broader than the Tory leaders at first intended. Still, the Bill was under the control of the Tories, throughout, and its evident tendency, as a whole, is to increase their power and that of the Liberals, while it cuts down the power of the Whigs so materiallj', as to endanger the existence of their party organization. If the Whigs maintain an efficient jjarty organization, in futui*e, they must do it by dint of bribery. The Tories ai'e the rulers of England for years to come, and the Liberals will, in future, be their chief antagonists. But the Tories have, in this Eeform Bill, planted the germ of future danger to the Aristocracy. So great an extension of the franchise must end, sooner or later, in placing the government 380 THE world's crisis. in the hands of the Liberals. At some time or other, political agitation will run so high that the Nobility cannot control the peas- antry. The Liberals have the voters, now, who can place them in power. It only remains to fan the flame of excitement. We may expect intense agitation, having for its object to inflame the minds of the voters to such a pitch as to make them throw oft' the yoke of aristocratic influence. This agitation will be full of danger to the Tories. It must eventually succeed. The danger will fill the Tories with alarm. The triumph of the Liberals is the downfall of the Nobility. Will notthe Nobility struggle fiercely for the maintainance of their power? Absolutism and Progress are engaged in a death struggle on the Continent of Europe. The triumph of Progress will hasten the success of the English Liberals. The only hope of the English No- bility lies in the success of Absolutism, abroad. The Eeform Bill, while it secures their present power, is full of future danger, to avert which the Tories will, by every possible means, further the aims of Absolutism on the Continent of Europe.] CHAPTER II. POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUKOPE. Within the last twenty years, a succession of tempests have dark- ened the political heavens of Europe. Indeed, a state of continual disquiet has prevailed, ever since the French Revolution of 1789. The seething cauldron has never slept. Agitation has sometimes sunk into troubled slumberings, only to be roused again into starts of revolutionary violence. But, since 1848, Europe has been kept in a state of sleepless agitation, by one or another of the elements of disturbance seething in perpetual unrest in its political system. Sect. I. — General Statement. There are three disquieting elements in the European political system. But the active elements of disturbance may be reduced to two, — the ambition of monarchs ; and the aspiration of nationalities POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 381 after unity and independence. The third, — aspirations after politi- cal liberty — need not now be noted, since it is, at present, too feeble to exert much influence anywhere, except in England. Let us note more particularly these disturbing elements. The first is the ambition and mutual jealousy of the five great Powers, — Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and England. Their mutual jealousy has given rise to a tacit compact among them, to combine against any one of the number that threatens to gain a decisive ascendancy. Wars to maintain the Balance of Power have hitherto been the chief occasions of European strife. Indeed, the history of Europe for the last three hundred years may be termed a series of wars waged for the maintenance of the Balance of Power. When the nations emerged from feudalism, just before the Reformation of the sixteenth century, they were, for the first time, in a condition to enter upon a career of ambition. Ever since that period, some one or another of them has been meditating an ambitious career, from which the others combined to drive it back. First, Spain, emulous of the grandeur of Charles V., aspired to an eminence inconsistent with the general safety ; and Europe was Avatching and countering the ambition of Spain, long after the nation ceased to be formidable. Next, the House of Austria had to be beaten back, by a coalition of France and Sweden with the Protestant states of Germany. Next, France under Louis XIV. made the Continent tremble ; and a co- alition of England, Holland, and Austria, was necessary to humble its power. Then, England, by its maritime conquests and growing colonies, awakened jealousy; and France, Spain, and Holland com- bined, to aid the American Colonies in their struggle for indepen- dence. Next, France again, under Napoleon, entered upon the career of conquest ; and Europe combined against the conqueror, and drove him from his throne. Finally, Russia undertook to annex Turkey, as a step in the road to India and maritime greatness ; and England and France laid aside their former enmity, to repulse the Autocrat from his prey. The Great Powers of Europe are all jealous of each other. Eu- rope dreads France ; Europe fears Russia ; Europe is jealous of the 382 THE world's crisis. maritime supremacy of Great Britain, and her monopoly of wealth and trade. Perhaps Austria is the only one of the five Great Powers that has foregone ambition ; it is content to maintain its present po- sition, and guard against menacing ruin. Europe, however, would have little to fear from the ambition of any of the Great Powers, were this the only source of danger. The system of maintaining the Balance of Power is reduced to a science; a coalition might easily restrain the ambition of any single state. The ambition of sovereigns is chiefly dangerous through the aid am- bition derives from the peculiar political condition of the European states. The danger most threatening to the peace of Europe has arisen from the dissatisfaction and restlessness of Nationalities. The question of the Nationalities is little understood on this side of the Atlantic. Our journals have derived their views of European affairs from the British press : upon this question, silence has, for years, been the policy of English politicians ; and the British press never goes in advance of the party leaders. Austria and Prussia, like England, have desired to taboo the subject. France alone of the Great Powers has nothing to dread, but much to gain from the agitation of the question ; yet prudential reasons have caused Napo- leon t^ desire that it should slumber, as far as possible ; and he has discouraged its discussion by the French press. The question of Nationalities has been a prohibited subject in Europe. It has occu- pied the miuds of statesmen, — but as a vision of terror ; they avoid its mention, as the peasant abroad at night fears to name the Evil One, lest the sound may invoke his presence. We will endeavor to present this important, yet somewhat obscure question, in such a light as that it may be comprehended in all its bearings. Let the reader take a map of Europe, published fifteen or twenty years ago, and count the states there laid down. They are, 1. Portugal; 2. Spain; 3. France ; 4. Holland; 5. Belgium; POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 383 G. Austria ; 7. Prussia; ^ 8. The minor German states; 9. Switzerland; 10. Denmark; 11. Russia; 12. Turkey; 13. Britain — including Scotland and Ireland ; 14. Sweden. Besides these, he will find Italy — divided among more than half a dozen states Avhich do not deserve a rank among the European powers ; and Greece — too feeble to be counted. Mark, we do not call those states laid down on the map Nations, but Powers. Some of these Powers are not nations, but are ag-g-lom- erations of different nations. Several of the nations of Europe do not appear on the map ; their territories being divided out among different sovereigns. Others are set down, indeed, but they have no national or political existence. A map of Europe delineating the nations of that quarter of the globe with their several boundaries, will present an appearance alto- gether different from one representing the existing Powers. It con- tains the following nations : — 1. Portugal; 2. Spain ; 3. France ; — but the French boundai-y is larger than at present, and runs up through Belgium to the Rhine ; 4. Holland; 5. Italy; 6. Switzerland; 7. Germany; 8. Denmark ; — but the Danish territory is diminished by the assignment of the southern part of the peninsula to Ger- many ; 9. Hungary; 10. Greece, — including the present Turkish dominions in Europe ; 11. Poland; 12. Russia; 384 THE world's crisis. 13. Sweden ; 14. Great Britain, — including with England, Wales, whose na- tionality is merged in the conquering nation — and Scotland, which has entered into a voluntary union ; 15. Ireland. How astonishing the change ! Six nations appear in this map which were not in the other, — Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Ger- many, and Ireland, Three powers have entirely disappeared,— Turkey, Austria, and Prussia. Three nations have had their dimen- sions vastly curtailed, — Russia, Denmark, and Great Britain. Three nations only remain unchanged, — Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. Only two, — France and Sweden — have their boundaries enlarged. But why these changes? Why blot out Austria, Prussia, and Turkey, from the map of Eu- rope ? Because they are Powers, not nations. The Turks are not a nation, but a horde of warriors, who have conquered, and are now ruling, the Greeks of the old Greek empire. They are the rulers of the Greek nation. The country belongs to the Greeks. Expel the foreign rulers, and they at once become an independent nation, in possession of their own country. Neither Austi-ia nor Prussia are nations. Neither has a foot of national territory. Every foot of Austrian territory belongs either to Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Ger- many. Restore those nations, and the Austrian power falls. All the territory of Prussia belongs to Germany and Poland. Austria and Prussia are kingdoms, not nations. The bond of union which holds their respective territories together is not national, but per- sonal. They belong to the monarch. Take the monarch away, and there is no tie to unite them. Those kingdoms are agglomerations of different peoples, who are subjects of the king. Unseat the king, and the different nations at once resolve themselves again into their national unity. The nationalities of Europe have been disparted and subjugated in every conceivable manner. In some instances, the nation is still united, but subjected to the yoke of an alien monarch; as Hungary, to the emperor of Austria, Ireland, to England, and the Greek pop- ulation, to the Turks. In other instances, a nation is divided out among a number of sovereigns : thus Poland was divided between POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 385 Russia, Prussia, and Austria; Italy, into a number of states, some subject to Austria, some to the Pope, others to various rulers; Germany, among no less than thirty-five different rulers, — some kings — some dukes — some Germans — some foreign sovereigns. In other instances, a nation still maintains its national existence, but provinces have been wrested from it, and annexed to another, by feudal inheritance, or by war : thus France lost its fairest province by feudal alienation ; and Sweden, the greater part of its territory, by Russian conquest. Of all these, the disparted nationalities are the most unfortunate. Hungary and Ireland maintain their national unity, though sub- jected to a foreign sovereign. But Germany, Italy, and Poland are divided : the national unity is destroyed ; people of the same nation and tongue, animated by the same sympathies, are sundered, and subjected to different rulers, who govern by different la^, direct their policy on different principles, and frequently, influenced by political antagonisms, assume a hostile attitude toward each other. Then, Italians are arrayed against Italians, Germans against Ger- mans, and Poles against Poles. This parceling out of nations was effected under the old regime, when rulers considered people and territory as their property, and settled boundaries, and transferred lands and people from one to another, as coolly as farmers will exchange stock. The human chattel of royalty had no political voice, and his royal master could transfer him at his will. But, in our age, new influences are at work. Mankind have learned something of their rights. Nations are no longer the contented chattels of a crown. Populations are demanding that the wrongs of the past shall be redressed. The Nationalities are forcing their grievances upon the attention of monarchs. The map of Europe cannot remain as it is. It must be read- justed. To attain a correct view of the question of Nationalities, it is necessary to note, 1. The forces which brought Europe into its present condition ; 25 386 THE world's crisis. 2. The clashing forces now in antagonism, the one endeavoring to overthrow, the other to maintain the status of Absolutism. Sect. 2. — Causes which brought about the Present Condition OF Europe. The manner in which the kings of England established their do- minion over Ireland needs no explanation : British domination over Ireland was obtained by conquest, and it has been the rule of the sword ever since. The Turks, also, subdued the Greek empire, and held it by the right of the strongest ; the despots of Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned Poland; Italy was subjected to Germany, and parceled out among its various rulers, by the sword ; and Rus- sia has extended its boundaries, by conquests from Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and various barbarous tribes on its borders. But how happened Germany to be divided among so many differ- ent sovereigns ? Why is the finest province of France separated from the country ? AVhence the rise of Austria and Prussia ? The germ of these complications must be sought in the circum- stances which attended the establishment of the Northern nations in the Roman Empire. Space will not permit any attempt to trace the gradual changes, through which the barbarism of Germany and the effete Roman civilization mingled, and slowly merged into the civilization of Modern Europe, Nor is this necessary to our present purpose. It is sufficient that we comprehend something of the ele- ments which, passing through the chaotic era of Feudalism, resolved themselves into the forms of social order that now exist. One thousand years ago, almost all Central and Western Europe was covered with the great empire of Charlemagne. A great part of the territory of this empire was divided into districts similar to the counties upon the maps of our own states. These districts were called counties or duchies, and were ruled by powerful nobles, — counts or dukes, — who held them as hereditary property. These nobles were sovereign over their respective districts, ruling their vassals with absolute power, while themselves subject to the mon- arch of the realm. The sovereign had no right to levy taxes upon the nobility, his revenues being chiefly derived from the crown POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 387 lands, — territories Avliich, in the general division of the conquered Roman provinces, had been allotted to the kings of the conquering races. The nobles were obliged to attend the monarch, in war, at the head of their vassals, for a certain number of days in a year. This military service was almost their sole duty ; when it was ren- dered, nothing more could be exacted of them. This subordination of the feudal lords to the sovereign, and of the vassal population to the nobility, — termed the Feudal system, — was the germ of the institutions of Modern Europe. A mutual jealousy always existed between the crown and the feudal nobility. During the reign of Charlemagne, his ifirm hand kept the nobles in subjection to the royal authority. But after his death, under the feeble rule of his successors, this jealous}^ led to frequent collisions, — the kings endeavoring to maintain, and increase their royal supremacy ; the nobles striving to diminish their depend- ence upon the crown. The political condition in which Charlemagne left his empire, tended to excite this jealousy between crown and noble into active collision. His empire was divided among his children. France and Germany became separate nations, — Germany assuming the rank of empire and having the Italian conquests of Charlemagne finally annexed to it. Out of this division sprung long wars, in which the sovereigns were compelled to court the feudal nobility. Political necessity, and the extravagance and improvidence of successive monarchs, led to the gradual alienation of the crown lands, which were variously bestowed, upon favorites and military followers. AVith this diminution of the royal revenues, the sovereign authority declined, the power of the nobility increasing in the same ratio. They gradually diminished their dependence upon the crown, until they became almost entirely independent, exercising in their domains the authority of sovereign princes. It is necessary to remark particularly one of the means by which these feudal nobles increased their power. — Frequently the only child of a noble was a daughter, the heiress of his domains. Her marriage with a noble united both districts, which became the in- heritance of their heir. A succession of these marriages some- times united a great number of these districts under the sway of a 388 THE world's crisis. single noble, and rendered him even more powerful than the sovereign. By means of such marriages, many of the nobles were aggrandized, while the monarch was alienating the crown lands. In France, the royal authority gradually declined until it sunk into contempt; the last weak king of the line of Charlemagne gave way to Hugh Capet, one of the great French dukes, who mounted the throne and founded a new dynasty. The kings of the house of Capet had the advantage of grafting the monarch upon the noble. They had the power of their feudal domains, to assist in maintaining the royal dignity. They alienated no crown territory ; on the con- trary, they enlarged their ducal domains by marrying heiresses of the great nobility. At first, however, their authority was very feeble. They waged war and made treaties with the nobles whose domains lay adjacent to their own feudal inheritance, very much on equal terms. The more distant nobles of France paid little attention to the royal authority. Gradually, however, the Capets extended their power ; compelling one after another of the great vassals to bow to their authority. At this juncture occurred the most important event of the era, — an event destined to exert a controlling influence upon the course of history. William duke of Normandy, one of the great French vassals, achieved the conquest of England, about fifty years after the accession of the Capetian dynasty to the throne of France. This accession of power rendered the dukes of Normandy more powerful than their feudal sovereigns, the kings of France. Per- petual wars were waged between them. The dukes of Normandy added vastly to their French possessions, by marriage with the heirs of other duchies. Matilda, granddaughter of the Conqueror, married Geofiry Plantagenet, ducal sovereign of two counties,' Anjou and Touraine. Her son Henry, in consequence, besides the English crown, was lord of four French provinces. He married Eleanor of Aquitaine, who, through various intermarriages of her ancestors, was heiress of the provinces of Guienne, Poitou, Santogne, Auvergne, Perigord, Angoumois, and the Limousin. The union of his inher- ited domains with those acquired by his marriage made Henry lord over nearly half of France. Leaving out of view his English king- POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 389 dom, he was much more powerful than the French monarch ; for, as feudal lord, his territories were completely under his control, wliik many of the vassals of the king of France lent him but a cold assistance. Yet the consolidation of the royal authority, in France, grew out of the struggle of the French sovereigns with the Plantagenets. It rallied the other noble houses of France around the throne ; and, though driven to the most unworthy intrigues against the great Henry, the French monarch, in the next generation, wrested from the weak hands of John of England almost all his French dukedoms, and annexed them to the French crown. This accession of territory added greatly to the power of the kings of France, and enabled them to attain a decided ascendancy over the nobles of the realm. From this period, the crown advanced rapidly in its ascendancy over the feudal nobles, until, in the reign of Louis XL, about fifty years before the Reformation of the sixteenth century, it achieved a final triumph. That monarch completely humbled the great no- bility, and left France to his successor a united monarchy under the absolute sway of the crown. In stating that Louis XL humbled the power of the feudal nobility, one important exception must be made. Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, was too powerful for the French monarch to subdue. By marriage and inheritance, the dukes of Burgundy had acquired various provinces of the Loav countries (now Holland and Belgium), and united them to their patrimonial duchy. Several of these pro- vinces, — as Flanders, Hainault, and Guelders, occupying the terri- tory now known as Belgium, and stretching to the Rhine, — were the feudal dependencies of France. Louis XL anxiously sought to main- tain his supremacy over these national domains. But Charles the Bold held his feudal dependence lightly ; and he was too powerful to be coerced by the French monarch. The death of Charles in battle with the Swiss relieved Louis from a dangerous dilemma; and, as the deceased duke left no heirs except a daughter, Mary of Burg- undy, the French king seized upon Burgundy as a male fief. Thougli Burgundy thus reverted to the French crown, Mary was still possessed of the rich Flemish provinces, and was the greatest heiress of the age. The House of Austria, ever eager in quest of feudal 390 THE avorld's crisis. heiresses, could not overlook this fortunate occasion ; Maximilian of Austria, son of the Emperor of German}'^, married her, and added the Low Countries to the feudal possessions of his family. In this manner were lost to France the fairest provinces of the kingdom. Thus, in France, the Feudal System terminated in the consolida- tion of the monarchy. The royal authority was firmly established over the feudal nobility. France emerged from the feudal chaos, a great and united nation, — but Aveakened by the loss of her richest and most important frontier provinces. Of the political condition of England, it is at present sufficient to remark that, owing to the manner in which the Conqueror divided out the English lands among his followers, the feudal nobility of England never became so powerful as those of France. The wars of the Roses completely broke the power of the feudal barons ; in the age of the French king, Louis XL, the English monarchs, gov- erning by means of parliaments, dominated the nobility with a power as absolute as that of the French sovereign. In England and France, the Feudal struggle between the crown and the nobles terminated in the triumph of the former, leaving those countries consolidated nations. In Germany, Feudalism ran a different course. The German emperors struggled in vain, to maintain their authority over the powerful nobles of the empire. The same causes which induced the decline of the Carlovingian dynasty in France, operated a similar result in Germany. There, as in France, the power of the feudal noble was brought to reinforce the feeble royal authority ; but the act Avhich reinforced Imperialism, ever after prevented the consoli- dation of the imperial authority, and placed the crown at the mercy of the nobility. The line of Charlemagne having failed, the nobility elected one of their own number to the imperial dignity. Hence- forth, the Emperors were elected; at first, by the assembled nobility of the empire ; afterward, by seven nobles, who engrossed this func- tion and became known as Electors. The character of the empire as an elective monarchy, together with the ceaseless Italian wars in which the emperors expended their resources, prevented the con- solidation of the Imperial authority. The Popes, assailed in Italy POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 391 by the Emperors, retaliated by exciting commotions in Germany. Civil contentions and Italian campaigns so far weakened the Impe- rial resources, as to enable the feudal nobility of Germany to con- solidate their authority into a recognized sovereignty over their respective domains, free from the control or interference of the emperor; who could neither impose taxes upon them, nor interfere with the internal administration of their territories. They became, in fact, sovereign princes in every sense of the word. They ac- knowledged a kind of feudal superiority in the emperor ; they a\ ere under obligation to arm in the common defense, and follow his ban- ner in war ; but they did this as confederated princes, for the pro- tection of the empire of which they were a part, rather than as the inferiors or subjects of the emperor. Thus, in Germany, the Feudal System ultimated in the triumph of the feudal princes over the royal authority. The imperial dig- nity fell into contempt, the emperor possessing only the shadow of power. The princes of the empire were sovereigns over their re- spective territories ; the empire became a confederation of sovereign states. In some instances, intermarriages united several of these states under one prince, who became a powerful sovereign in the empire. In other instances, by the intermarriage of the heir with foreign rulers, German states became dependencies upon foreign crowns. In the end, the German nation became divided among a number of sovereigns, some of native birth, others foreign rulers. Out of this principle of the Feudal System, the royal houses of Austria and Prussia took their rise. Both are feudal sovereigns, ruling an agglomeration of territories united by no national tie, but simply owing obedience to the monarch as their feudal lord. Let us trace, in the first instance, the rise of the House of Austria. In the middle of the 13th century, the power of the German em- peror had so far fallen into contempt, that an interregnum of twenty years ensued, during which Germany had no emperor. At length, the Electors chose as emperor Rodolph of Ilapsburg, an obscure Swiss baron, having too little power to excite the jealousy of the powerful nobles. Roilolph was the founder of the House of Austria. He introduced a new imperial programme. Former emperors 392 THE world's crisis. had employed the power of their feudal domains to maintain the imperial authority. He determined, on the contrary, to make the imperial dignity auxiliary to the advancement of the feudal interests of his family. An occasion soon oflfered to carry out his policy. The duke of Austria died without male heirs : the king of Bohemia claimed the duchy in right of his wife, heiress of the deceased duke ; but Rodolph set up a pretended claim, seized the dukedom, and conferred it upon his son Albert, — and thus founded the House of Austria. Albert was chosen Emperor of Germany, and the House of Aus- tria continued, almost without interruption, to fill the imperial office for three hundred years. The dukes of Austria were wiser than their predecessors in the imperial chair. They did not seek power by aggrandizing the imperial office ; but, carrying out the policy of Rodolph, they used the imperial dignity to advance their interests as feudal princes. They sought by matrimonial alliances to add other duchies to their own : they were constantly on the watch for heiresses of ducal domains. Principally by a series of fortunate marriages, they successively added to the duchy of Austria the Ger- man principalities of Bohemia, Moravia, Styria, Tyrol, Carinthia, Carniola ; and, outside of Germany, the kingdom of Hungary, sev- eral of the Italian states, and (as we have already seen) the Low Countries. The further marriages, by which they annexed Spain, and narrowly missed obtaining possession of England, need not be mentioned, owing to the division of territory that subsequently oc- curred between the Spanish and Austrian branches of the family. By this series of marriages, the duke of Austria became the most powerful prince of the German Empire. He was, however, only the peer of the other princes. His German dominions were all portions of the empire, just as theirs. He was usually elected emperor of Germany; but his rank as Emperor was entirely distinct from his position as a prince of the empire. Any other German prince was equally eligible to that office ; and in the event of the election of another, the Austrian duke would rank only as the most powerful of the feudal nobles of Germany. The House of Austria continued to rule its scattered possessions down to the period of the French Revolution, but without being able POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 393 to merge them into a consolidated nationality. It then lost its provinces in the Low countries, leaving its dominions restricted to Hungary, part of Poland, and its German and Italian states. We turn our attention to the rise of the royal house of Prussia. Brandenburg is one of the seven electoral states of Germany. The Margraves of Brandenburg never made an important figure in the history of Germany, until the close of the seventeenth century. Then, the accession of Frederic William, the Great Elector, proved an era in the annals of his house. His dominions comprised only the German marquisate of Brandenburg, and the Poland duchy of Prussia ; but his able rule elevated the house of Brandenburg to an influence it had never known before, and laid the foundation of its subsequent greatness. His successor was ambitious of the royal dignity, and, to obtain it, seconded earnestly the policy of the Im- perial House of Austria in a war with France. The Austrian sov- ereign supposing it a magnificent stroke of policy to establish a kingdom in Northern Germany as an equipoise to France, conferred the royal title upon the elector of Brandenburg, naming his king- dom after the Polish duchy of Prussia. It soon appeared that the Prussian sovereigns were far more jeal- ous of Austria than of France. Their German possessions were of greater extent than those of any other German prince except the Duke of Austria. Ranking second in the empire, Prussia began to aspire to the first place. Frederic the Great, grandson of the first Prussian king, wrested Silesia from Austria ; and, afterward, just before the French Revolution, arranged with Russia and Austria the partition of Poland. Up to this period, sovereigns ruled their dominions with absolute sway. They partitioned nations out among themselves, according to the dictates of ambition or caprice. They acted as absolute owners of the territories under their rule. Lands and people were heritable property. War, marriage, and treaty, severed populations from their proper relations, and consigned them to the ownership of new lords, uniting them to foreign, perhaps hostile countries. While the populations had no voice in political events, national boundai-ies were utterly disregarded by potentates. The authority 394 THE world's crisis. of the king was the central point of government; the unity of nations was left altogether out of view. At the commencement of the French Revolution, the severance of national ties had reached its culmination. Henceforth, the impulse of the populations was felt, aspiring to regain their lost nationality. Sect. 3. — Forces in Conflict to Overthrow, and to Maintain THE Old Order of Things. The French Revolution inaugurated a new era. In denying the divine right of monarchs to reign and partition out peoples and ter- ritories at their pleasure, proclaiming the right of the people to self-government, it assailed the fundamental principle of Abso- lutism. It ushered in an era of conflict between Absolutism and Progress, which has, thus far, been Avaged with varying success, and which must continue, until one or the other shall achieve a definite triumph. The struggle, thus far, has passed through three epochs ; it now seems approaching a crisis, in which Absolutism threatens to achieve a decisive predominance. I. P'iKST Epoch : Wars of the Feench Revolution. The new doctrines of the French Revolution, the gift of America to Europe, filled the monarchs of the old world with dismay. They banded together, to stifle the movement in the cradle, and prevent its leavening the minds of their subjects. The despots of Central and Eastern Europe resolved, as the surest means of suppressing republican doctrines, to partition the territory of France after the manner of Poland. Of all the enemies of the French Revolution, the Tory government of England was the most embittered and per- sistent ; the more from the warm sympathy of the English people with the movement. France was deluged with armies on every side. But the enthu- siastic French soldiery overwhelmed the generals of the potentates, commanding troops indifferent to the cause for which they fought. The invading columns were repulsed: Napoleon appeared the scourge of monarchs : he appealed to the national feeling in Italy, which had slumbered for ages: he proclaimed himself the avenger of nations against despots who disregarded their rights : his arms extended the POLITICAL CONDITION OP EUROPE. 395 principles of the revolution tlirougli Europe. But, at length, his ambitious career brought him into antagonism with the rights of nations. He embraced the old axiom of Absolutism, that territories and peoples belong to crowns; he began, himself, to enslave and dis- member nations, becoming the greatest despot of them all. Mon- archs endeavored to resist him, by wars waged in accordance with the principles of Absolutism ; — but in vain : in despair, they appealed to the principles of the French Revolution, and aroused the national impulses of their subjects against the Conqueror. From that moment, the star of Napoleon waned. He was hurled from his throne by the enthusiasm of roused populations. Tliis movement of the nations fixed the idea of national rights in their minds too deeply to be eradicated. The sovereigns had raised a spirit they could not lay. Henceforth, deep in the hearts of disparted and trampled nations smoldered longing aspirations after lost nationality, only waiting the breath of revolution to fan them into flame. II. Second Epoch: The Kule op Absolutism from 1815 to 1848. The monarchs were aware of the powerful emotions that had been summoned into existence ; but, in the moment of victory, they relied upon force, to suppress any discontents of the people. They re- adjusted the map of Europe, by the treaties of 1815, treating nations as property to be distributed at the will of the royal owners. The Bourbons were re-established in France. Germany was divided afresh, and partitioned out as the congress of sovereigns deemed the various German princes merited punishment or reward : Prussia, especially, with the countenance of Russian diplomacy, re- ceived large accessions of territory, at the expense of various princes who had allied themselves with Napoleon. Several Italian states were given to Austria, of which Lombardy and Venetia were the most valuable ; and a number of Hapsburg princes received duchies in Italy, to be held by them in dependence upon the Austrian crown. The Neapolitan states were again assigned to the Bourbon king of Naples, The partition of Poland was confirmed. Belgium was annexed to Holland, as a precautionary measure, to prevent the possibility of its being ever annexed to France ; its territory 396 THE WORLD'S CRISIS. beloncring of right to that nation, and its reannexation being, from the age of Louis XIV, the cherished aim of French ambition. It was the triumph of Absolutism. In the treaties of 1815, the despots of Europe threw down the gauntlet to the new ideas of the age. In subduing France, and restoring the Bourbons as to their rightful inheritance, they issued a declaration of irreconcilable enmity to the principle of popular rights : in repartitioning Europe at the arbitrary will of kings, they proclaimed their contempt for the rights of nationalities. It was necessary to adopt some measures, to maintain the high stand they had assumed. They found themselves face to face with an antag- onistic element, whose triumph would overturn their thrones. It was for the time suppressed ; but there was every probability of French ideas breaking forth, again, at the first favorable opportunity. They resolved to keep them down by force of arms; to "that end, the council of sovereigns deemed it necessary to come to an explicit understanding among themselves respecting their future policy. A secret compact, termed the Holy Alliance, was formed, for the pur- pose of maintaining the rights of kings against populations. This treaty was signed by Prussia, Russia, and Austria; the plenipo- tentiaries of the British government and the restored Bourbons ap- proved it, but deemed it best, owing to the popular sentiment at home, not to become actual parties to the instrument. In the Holy Alliance, the sovereigns agreed to mutually assist each other against their subjects, and to unite their forces for the suppression of all popular movements in Europe. In this Holy Alliance, the European monarchs crouched beneath the mantle of Russia, for protection against French principles. Russia became the equipoise of the French nation in the European political system. The Czar, from the necessity of his position, is the champion of Absolutism. He is sovereign of immense territories, peopled by different races, — Finns, Russians, Poles, Cossacks, and Tartars, — whose sole bond of union is subjection to the Russian crown. His throne is based upon Absolutism. His power could not stand for a year, if the principle of Nationality prevailed abroad. Were the rest of Europe to overturn the feudal monarchies, when the divided POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 397 nations regained their unity and independence, the impulse of na- tionality would spread to Russia, overturn the throne, and dismem- ber the empire into its national elements. The Czar is aware of this ; it is his policy to maintain the feudal monarchies of Central Europe, against the outbreaks of the restless Nationalities. He is incited to this policy by ambition, also. Russia aspires to universal dominion. It is an hereditary ambition. Peter the Great, in his celebrated will, marked out the policy his successors should pursue, in order to attain this object. This career of ambition is open to Russia, while the Nationalities are writhing beneath feudal thrones ; but the establishment of the Nationalities in independence closes it forever. From 1815 to 1848, Europe reposed beneath the shadow of Rus- sia. The Czar occupied the only stable throne ; and the Bourbons, the liapsburgs, the HohenzoUerns, the feudal monarchs of Central and Western Europe, leaned upon his power. But the new ideas engrafted in the hearts of the nations continued to grow and expand. In 1830, the French people again rose in revolution, and expelled the Bourbon dynasty which had been re- stored in 1815. Inspired by the example of France, the Poles rose in arms to regain their lost independence ; Belgium threw oflF the yoke of the sovereign imposed by the monarchs, and declared its independence of Holland. But Absolutism maintained its prestige. The rising in Poland was promptly suppressed; the Belgians, awed by the Great Powers, agreed to accept a sovereign of their choice ; and the French nation, to propitiate the leagued despots, placed a Bourbon upon the throne from which a Bourbon was expelled. The influence of Russia again prevailed; Absolutism asserted its predominance. For eighteen years more, the new ideas continued to slumber, cradled in the popular heart. Meantime, the sovereigns, aware of the existence of danger ready at any moment to burst forth with revolutionary violence, clung closer to the protection of Russia. 898 THE world's crisis. III. Thied Epoch : The Successful Aggression of French Progressive Ideas, FROM 1848 TO 1866. 1st. First Period: the Revolutionary Outburst. In 1848, the French again rose in revolution, dethroned the Bour- bons, and proclaimed a Republic. Instantly the impulse flashed through Europe. Germany was in commotion; Ireland attempted to revolt from British rule ; Italy rose in revolution ; Hungary threw off the Austrian yoke, and declared its independence. The Czar was overwhelmed by the revolutionary outburst. So far from attempting to carry out the stipulations of the Holy Alliance, he quailed before the storm, and crouched behind his own frontiers. Drawing a military cordon around his borders, to protect his own douiiiiions from the revolutionary contagion, he left Austria and Prussia to breast the storm as best they might. A bold movement on the part of France, at that juncture, might have readjusted the map of Europe. The populations were every- where ripe for revolution, and only needed a head. Had the French Republic issued a declaration in favor of the Nationalities, the whole of Central Europe would have burst into a revolutionary flame ; the Austrian and Prussian thrones must have fallen; and Germany, Po- land, Italy, and Hungary would have regained their lost nationality. The whole question, so full of danger to Liberty, so pregnant of possibilities for reaction in favor of Absolutism, Avould have been settled forever ; leaving no danger in the future of a combination between despots, to conquer Europe and the world. The nations miglit all have fallen back, as did France, into the arms of mon- archy ; but it would have been liberal, constitutional monarchy, rest- ing, not on divine right, but the will of the people, — the national monarchy of independent nations. Europe might thenceforth have had peace. The colossal armies now employed by despots to hold trampled and disparted nations in subjection, and to guard against each other's ambition, might have been disbanded. Monarchs, rec- ognizing the people as their constituents, and governing in accord- ance with their will expressed by representatives freely elected, need no armies to support their thrones ; and the balance of power would be sufficiently maintained by the equal strength of the various na- POLITICAL CONDITION OP EUROPE. 399 tions, and by the universal recognition of the right of a nation to choose its own government. Then industry, relieved from the drain of conscription and the pressure of taxation, would soon have ush- ered in a prosperity hitherto unknown. The nations would have moved onward in a career of progress, only emulous of social, indus- trial, and political advancement, — an undeviating career, eventually culminating in universal freedom. As the nations ripened in intel- ligence and republican thought, thrones would have peacefully fallen, like mellow fruit from the boughs of autumn. And events would have taken this course had America occupied the position we might have attained, even then, by using properly the advantages God and Nature had given. Had we, instead of England, been queen of the seas, or, had we been able to counter- balance the English navy and English loans, the French Kepubli- cans woulti have chosen the bold course, and led the nations on to freedom. But England was already far advanced in the career of commer- cial grandeur our course had opened to her. Her sails covered every sea, and the wealth of the world was pouring into her coffers in a golden stream. The sympathies of the English government were in favor of the established Powers, and against revolution. The influence of Britain in that hour of crisis overawed the French Kepublic. France could not head the march of freedom, nor strike a blow for the rights of man. Money is the sinews of modern war, and France was penniless : the Republic feared to enter again, as in 1793, into a contest with despotisms backed by British loans and British fleets. The French republicans adopted the course the pre- dominance and hostility of Britain forced upon them : they pro- claimed neutrality between the monarchs and the people, leaving each nation to determine its own political destiny. They, no doubt, believed that, in thus securing British neutrality also, they were beat subserving the interests of the nationalities in their struggle with the crowns. But British neutrality was not secured. The government, true, held aloof; but British gold, the sinews of the nation's power, was poured out in a stream, to strengthen the des- pots, and enable them to equip armies against the national move- 400 THE world's crisis. ments. On the otlier hand, the patriots, left to their own unguided impulses, without the nucleus French armies would have afforded, frittered away their advantages without concerted action. The German people, after crushing their sovereigns, temporized with them, and were soothed with promises that were not intended to be kept ; Russia, recovering from her panic, and strengthened with British loans, placed her armed heel upon Poland, and aided Austria to subdue the Hungai*ian patriots ; England suppressed the Irish movement ; Austria, with recovered strength, assailed and crushed Italy. After a brief convulsion, Central Europe was forced back, by means of English subsidies, into its former condition. Thanks to England, Absolutism regained its ascendant. The feudal Powers replaced their yoke firmly upon the necks of the sub- jected and disparted nations. But the revolutions of 1848 were not fruitless. France was free : the Bourbons, reinstated by foreign bayonets, in 1814, were ex- pelled ; the majesty of tlie nation was vindicated against Absolutist principles. France had trampled upon the treaties of 1815 ; and, though suppressed elsewhere, national aspirations continued to smolder in the hearts of the nations. Italy, and Germany, and Hungary, and Poland, and Ireland, still continued to long for their lost nationality. Henceforth, the struggle between the principles of Nationality and Absolutism must continue, until one or the other achieve a final triumph. The French Republic ran its brief career, and terminated in the ele- vation of a Bonaparte to the imperial throne. The event proved that France is not ripe for republicanism ; though it has reached a point of advancement which places it in irreconcilable antagonism with Absolutist principles. Napoleon III. became emperor in opposition to the treaties of 1815 which restored the Bourbons. His elevation was a triumph of the principles of nationality, a declaration of the right of each people to determine their own form of government, in opposition to the principles of Absolutism, which make the people the property of monarchs. Napoleon, in virtue of his imperial dig- nity, is pledged to the cause of nationalities. His throne is founded on a nation's choice. He recognizes the fact in all his public acts. POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 401 He heads his proclamations, " Napoleon III., by the grace of God, and the will of the French people," When the Opposition in the French Chambers has grown violent, his ministers have stated that the emperor acknowledges the French people as his constituency, and recognizes his obligation to abdicate, if the people who elevated him demand it. But they further stated, that the imperial govern- ment would not fall without a struggle; that it would recommend itself, in every possible way, to the popular favor, and meet its op- ponents upon their own ground in courting the good will of the nation. This declaration embodies the principles which govern the imperial administration. Napoleon is emperor, to carry out the ideas of the French nation, and to administer the government in accordance with their will. Upon his accession, two distinct ideas committed Napoleon to the championship of the rights of Nationalities, — necessity, and ambition. In the first place, he was compelled to adopt this policy, in order to maintain his throne against Absolutist pi'inciples abroad, and revolutionary tendencies at home. The French empire is established upon principles adverse to the other crowns of Europe. The Absolutist principles which maintain other monarchs upon their thrones against the wishes of their people, would dethrone Napoleon, and re-establish the Bourbons. On the other hand, the principle of national consent upon which the Napo- leonic dynasty is founded, would give independence to Hungary and Ireland, and nationality to Italy, Germany, and Poland, But furthermore : the French emperor has not only to defend himself against reactionary principles abroad, but against progressive revolutionary tendencies at home. The French people idolize him as the representative and vindicator of the principles of the French revolution, against the Absolutist principles of foreign monarchs. They are indoctrinated by the national historians with the belief that it is the destiny of France to champion the principles of the Revo- lution. They glory in the success of the First Napoleon while he represented the Revolution, and moralize upon his fall, as occasioned by his apostacy from freedom. The least symptom of turning aside 26 402 THE world's CIIISIS. from his policy, to coalesce with foreign potentates, would cost Na- poleon III. his popularity. Instead of leading French opinion, he would suffer it to leave him behind ; when he might expect the fate of Louis Phillippe. Napoleon's position necessarily renders him the opponent of Absolutism, and the champion of the oppressed Nation- alities of Europe. That he appreciated his position, and was pre- pared to accept its duties is evident from the significant, though guarded language of his celebrated Bordeaux address, in which he indicated the policy of the empire. "We have everywhere," he exclaimed, " ruins [Nationalities] to be raised, false gods [the prin- ciples of Absolutism] to pull down, and truths to make triumphant." This was his acceptance of the duties of his position. The ambition of Napoleon, also, has incited him to adopt this pro- gramme. Of the five great powers, France alone has nothing to fear, but much to hope from the triumph of the principle of nationality. That principle wrests Ireland from England, dismembers Russia, and destroys Austria and Prussia ; but it promises to France the re- annexation of the Flemish provinces, severed from the country three hundred years ago. Moreover, the championship of the movement confers upon Napoleon a position of commanding influence. It has made him the storm-king whom monarchs must court, — the ^olus imprisoning tempests whose unbridled fury would scatter in broken wrecks the feudal thrones. To this must be added the lofty fame success will give to him who shall liberate Europe from the domina- tion of Absolutism and the dread of Russian ascendancy. Napo- leon I. pronounced a great truth when he said Europe was destined to be either French or Cossack. He who should secure the ascend- ancy of liberal French principles, and thus save Europe from Rus- sian domination, would leave to history the loftiest name in the records of time. Thus France and Russia are the poles of European politics. Na- poleon and the Czar represent the extremes of Absolutism and Pro- gress. Absolutism menaces Napoleon Avith ruin, and promises the Czar security and universal dominion; Progress threatens Russia with downfall, and ofl"ers to Napoleon a most glorious career, and the loftiest niche in the temple of fame. Absolutism against Pro- gress, — France against Russia, — one or the other must fall. POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE, 403 2nd. Second Period : Napoleon Emerges from Isolation. The European sovereigns perceived, upon the accession of Napo- leon, that circumstances devolved upon him the championship of the Nationalities. They knew that he could only rule France by enter- ing upon a career that flattered the national pride ; and they watched his movements with dread. Their fears caused them to rally more firmly around Russia, as the champion of Absolutism, and the equi- poise of France. The policy of the sovereigns was plain. France must be isolated from the rest of Europe, and Napoleon debarred from all influence. In pursuance of this policy, the sovereigns treated the parvenu with cold and contemptuous aversion. The European press united in heaping derision and abuse upon him; by turns, charging him with the most towering schemes of ambition, and holding him up to scorn as a lucky simpleton. Foreign countries were entertained with caricatures of his personal appearance, misrepresentation of his public acts, contemptuous estimates of his capacity, and taunts upon his utter want of influence in Europe. It was hoped, either that the endurance of these taunts and patient acquiescence in isola- tion, would beget a general contempt, depriving him of all influence with the Nationalities, and exposing him to the contempt of France, as a weak ruler who suifered the nation to be deprived of influence abroad ; or, that an impatient attempt to vindicate himself by a rash intervention in foreign politics, would give Europe an excuse for com- bining against him, not as the sovereign of France, but as a man dan- gerous to the public peace. The sovereigns seemed to have placed him in a dilemma where either alternative threatened him with ruin. But Napoleon was equal to the occasion. He realized the strength of his position, and knew he could aff'ord to wait. He was strong in the afiections of the French ; and Nationalities abroad looked upon him as their champion. The national idea was grow- ing stronger continually ; and every revolutionary tendency would increase his influence. He disregarded foreign comments upon his character and administration, and patiently bided his time. An event occurred soon after his elevation to the presidency, which afforded him the coveted opportunity of intervention in for- eign affairs. A disturbance broke out in the Roman States. The 404 THE world's crisis. Pope appealed for aid to foreign powers. Austria, who already held iu subjection all the states of Northern Italy except Sardinia, was ready to intervene for the purpose of establishing her authority in Central Italy, also, under cover of a militai-y protectorate of the Pope. This would shut Napoleon out from all intervention in the affairs of Italy. He anticipated Austria, and established a French force at Rome, to uphold the authority of the Pope. The potentates did not foresee the important influence this inter- vention was destined to give him over the affairs of Italy. They thought it but a slight advance from his isolation, to achieve which he had been compelled to depart from French principles, and uphold a ruler against his people. Delighted to see him involving himself in the meshes of a contradictory and vacillating policy, they readily acquiesced in his intervention. And now the contempt of the other powers afforded Napoleon the coveted opportunity so essential to his prestige, of emerging from his enforced isolation. The ambition of Russia precipitated that power into a blunder fatal to the interests of Absolutism. The Czar had long aspired to the possession of Constantinople. Before the French Revolution of 1789 affrighted monarchs with popular revolution, the sovereigns of Europe were especially intent upon the maintenance of the Balance of Power, and kept Russia back from this goal of its ambition. Then, the wars of the French Revolution occupied its attention until the downfall of Napoleon; and afterward, the treaties of 1815 placed Turkey under the pro- tection of the Great Powers. But so commanding was the position of Russia, so necessary was its protection to the other powers, that none were prepared to oppose its ambition. The restored Bourbons leaned upon its protection even more entirely than the feudal mon- archs of Central Europe. The French Revolution of 1830 alone prevented the Czar from achieving his aim. Louis Phillippe, the king of the French, relying upon popular favor more than foreign bayonets, would have hailed an opportunity of giving stability to his dynasty by repulsing Russia from Constantinople. During his reign, the Czar could not venture on an attempt that would array England and France against him, supported probably by Austria, now reassured by twenty years of tranquillity. POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 405 The Revolutions of 1848 seemed to give the coveted opportunity, France governed by a Bonaparte was isolated in Europe : Austria, chastened by revolution, leaned upon Russia in greater dependence than ever : Prussia, in virtue of a secret understanding, -which will hereafter be further mentioned, favored the ambition of the Czar : England stood alone, and the English ministry seemed little disposed to press its opposition to extremity. The Czar thought it a favor- able opportunity to achieve the conquest of Turkey, and after en- deavoring, in vain, to obtain the acquiescence of England, by offer- ing a division of the spoils, he engaged in the enterprise alone. This movement at once interrupted the cordial understanding that existed between Russia and her allies. Her movement threatened the India possessions of England. The Tories were opposed to war, because they desired to strengthen the power of the puissant cham- pion of Absolutism. But the ministry then in power represented the Trading Aristocracy ; and they were resolved to repel the Auto- crat from the road to India, at all hazards. They began to cast about for an alliance. Austria could not venture to provoke an issue with the Czar ; Prussia seemed ready to second his schemes : England was compelled to accept an alliance with France. The alliance was concluded, despite the protestations of the Tories, who regarded it as an egregious political blunder, far more to be de- plored than the Russian acquisition of Turkey. Napoleon's grand object was attained. He was no longer iso- lated. The false step of Russia enabled him to become the neces- sary friend of the very chiefest of his uncle's foes, — the power whose alliance was most important to the ends he had in view. The allied arms drove Russia from her prey. France reaped the laurels of the war. Just as England, having tardily mustered her resources, was prepared to act efficiently, Russia, exhausted by her herculean efforts, sued for peace. England wished to continue the war, with the double aim of winning laurels and of reducing Russia to a con- dition in which she would cease to be formidable. But this was not Napoleon's policy. He had ulterior aims ; having obtained the friendship of England, he now sought to win the gratitude of Russia. He acted the part of a magnanimous foe, and met the overtures of Russia with cordial acquiescence. England protested in vain. He 406 THE world's crisis. forced the British government to assent to peace, by avowing his resolution, otherwise, to make a separate peace, and leave it to carry on the war alone. At the close of the Crimean war, the harmony of the parties to the treaties of 1815 was irrevocably broken. Russia was hostile to England, and resentful against Austria. On the other hand, Napo- leon had emerged from his isolation, and won the friendship of England by his aid, and the gratitude of Russia by his forbearance. The time was come when he might cautiously move in the delicate question of the nationalities. 3d. Third Period: Hapoleoii's Restoration of Italian Nationality. The French emperor began with Italy, where he had already, with profound foresight, paved the way for intervention. He already had a footing in the country, as the protector of the Pope ; and he had taken Victor Emanuel, the king of Sardinia, under his protec- tion, as the only liberal sovereign in Italy, and, consequently, the only ruler suited to become the monarch of the united nation. He had also paved the way for the future elevation of his proteg6, by .engaging him in the Crimean war as the ally of England and France ; thus giving the future Italian agitator a claim upon the gratitude of the English government. It was the policy of Napoleon, now, to fix the eyes of Italians upon his protege as their future king. For it is his profound policy not to excite the revolutionary spirit, without giving it an object round which to Tally. He thus gives revolution ahead; prevents its running into excesses ; and obtains the power of controlling and guiding it at will, Avithout coming himself in contact with revolu- tionary masses. With the countenance of Napoleon, the king of Sardinia assumed the championship of Italian nationality, and en- couraged patriotic aspirations throughout the whole country. The Italians turned their eyes to him as the hope of Italy. The role of agitator assumed by the king of Sardinia at once brought him into collision with Austria. That power held all Northern Italy, except Sardinia, beneath its yoke ; and dependent dukedoms ruled by Austrian princes extended into Central Italy, down to the boundary of the Papal States. Austrian spies found POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 407 Sardinian agents everywhere, exciting the Italian mind with the desire of national unity. Austria took umbrage, but dared not as- sail Sardinia covered with the mantle of French protection. The agitation progressed, until all Northern Italy was ready to burst into a flame. The Italians turned their eyes to Napoleon for aid. The French emperor waited until the excitement fostered by Sar- dinia rose to such a pitch, as to threaten an early outbreak. He then assumed the character of friend of order, and took the ground that, to avert a revolution dangerous to his own throne and to the peace of Europe, Austria must evacuate Italy. The demand of Napoleon was supported by the moral aid of all the Great Powers, except England. Russia lent him her counte- nance, ostensibly because his policy was the only means of averting revolution, but really because its own policy required the humilia- tion of Austrian power. Prussia, seconded by Russia, has long aspired to effect the union of Germany beneath its sway. Both those powers, therefore, favored the union of Italy, as a step toward the achievement of the aim of their policy ; and as the power of Austria is the grand obstacle to the intended union of Germany, they hailed the movement that promised to humble its formidable power. Russia, therefore, openly favored the policy of Napoleon : Prussia declared its neutrality so long as the war was confined to Italy ; but, in its ambitious championship of Germany, vaunted its resolution to instantly resent the movement of a French army upon German soil. The British government alone manifested a warm sympathy with the Austrian cause. The Tories were then in power, by means of a coalition with the Liberals ; and, in defiance of the sympathies of the English people with the patriotic Italian movement, they on all occasions manifested their sympathy with Austria and Absolutist principles. Before moving in the Italian question, Napoleon found it neces- sary to take precautions to muzzle the English Tory party, and prevent it from throwing the power of England against him in his conflict with Austria. He knew he might rely upon the sympathy of the Liberals ; but to make their sympathy eff'ective, it was neces- sary to secure the co-operation of the Whigs. He invited Lord Palmerston, the Whig leader, to visit him ; and Palmerston's subse- 408 THE world's crisis. quent course in Parliament showed that, during their interviews, Napoleon made him a convert to his Italian policy. He constantly supported the policy of the French emperor, and showed that his party was prepared to take issue with the Tories, if they attempted intervention in favor of Austria. The Tories knew that, upon that issue, their Liberal allies would go over to the Whigs, and unseat them from power. They were, therefore, precluded from active opposition to Napoleon. But they did what they could. They en- couraged loans to Austria ; and they endeavored, by the most active and earnest diplomacy, to avert a war and maintain her in posses- sion of her Italian provinces. All, however, proved vain. Napoleon moved steadily toward his purpose. He concluded an alliance with Sardinia, and adroitly defeating the persistent maneuvers of British Tory diplomacy, took the field in the cause of Italian nationality. In a short cam- paign, the French and Sardinians drove the Austrians out of Lom- bardy. By pursuing his advantage. Napoleon might have driven them out of Italy. But, in that event, Austria would continue the war, which would involve him in a serious dilemma : if he remained on the defensive, the war would last perpetually; if he crossed the German frontier, Prussia and all the German states were ready to combine against him. This posture of affairs compelled Napoleon to stop short in the career of victory, and make peace, leaving Vene- tia, and several other Italian states, in the hands of Austria. He contented himself with annexing Lombardy to the dominions of his ally, the king of Sardinia, together with the duchies from which the dukes of the House of Austi-ia had been expelled. In the negotiations which preceded the Italian war, we perceive the policy which characterizes the movements of Napoleon as the champion of nationalities. He never presents himself as the zeal- ous partisan of their cause. On the contrary, he affects to be em- barrassed by the necessity of his position as emperor of the French, which imposes upon him the necessity of championing them in their struggles, as the only means of preventing revolution at home. The position of the French emperor has required the most watchful pru- dence. He has stood alone in Europe upon this question. The POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 409 other Great Powers have been watching his movements with jealous eyes. To assume boldly the position of Agitator would bring against him a coalition which he could resist, only by summoning the Nationalities to arms ; — an extreme measure, which would in- volve a war to the death with the existing powers ; and, unless the populations were ripe for revolution, the colossal weight of Russia would suppress the premature movement, and roll upon France an irresistible torrent of invasion. Napoleon has been under the im- perative necessity of patiently waiting, and secretly guiding, the course of events. It is his policy to remain behind the scenes, moving the puppets who stimulate revolutionary impulses, until his agents have excited popular fervor to a pitch which justifies him in interfering, as the friend of order, rather than the champion of revolution. The Italian war and the peace of Villa Franca only began the work of Italian unity. Lombardy and the Austrian Duchies were annexed to Sardinia; — but Austria retained Venetia, in virtue of a treaty which the faith of Napoleon was pledged to respect; the Central states were under the dominion of the Pope, whose power was maintained by a French garrison ; while the South of the penin- sula was swayed by the Bourbons of Naples. — The Italians soon grew impatient of delay. But Napoleon made no movement. Gari- baldi, the Italian patriot, levied a band of guerilla adventurers, to make a fillibuster expedition against the kingdom of Naples. It will not be known until time gives the archives of the present age to history, what connection Napoleon had with this enterprise. With his usual caution, he sought to avoid the suspicion of complicity, by suggesting to the British government to order its cruizers to inter- cept the expedition, — a suggestion obviously made for political effect; for he knew that the coalition of Whigs and Liberals who then ruled England would not entertain the proposition for a mo- ment. — Garibaldi landed in the Neapolitan states, routed the royal forces, drove the Bourbon king out of his dominions, and annexed them to Sardinia, or, as it was now termed, the kingdom of Italy. All Italy was now united, except Venetia and the Papal States. Italian patriots became clamorous for continued progress toward unity. But the soldiers of Napoleon garrisoned Rome, and his faith 410 THE world's crisis. was plighted to respect the Italian possessions of Austria. The French emperor was placed in an embarrassing position. Italian excitement ran high against Austria, and powerful armies were levied with the avowed object of driving her out of Italy. It seemed as if a collision were imminent, in which the sympathies of France would involve the emperor, contrary to the faith of treaties. The situation of German affairs promised to extricate him from his di- lemma, if the crisis were postponed; and, with profound sagacity, Napoleon employed all the arts of diplomacy, to defer the assault upon Austria until the propitious moment. To appease the ex- citement of the Italian mind, he engaged (1864) to withdraw his troops from Rome at the expiration of two years, leaving the question between the Pope and his subjects to be determined between them- selves; but, for the sake of decency, exacting from the king of Sar- dinia — or rather of Italy — an engagement that he would not suffer any assault to be made from without upon the Papal territories. This engagement was a virtual surrender of the temporal power of the Pope, and a consent to the union of the States of the Church with the kingdom of Italy, at the expiration of a limited time. It was regarded in this light, both by Italy and France. French pamphlets speaking by authority were issued, to prepare the mind of the Catholic world for the approaching downfall of the temporal power of the Pope. Appeased by this concession, Italy withheld the threatened blow against Austria. The German imbroglio, fostered no doubt by the secret maneuvers of the French court, took the expected direction. Prussia became involved in war with Austria, and, at the suggestion of Napoleon, formed an alliance with Italy against their common foe. Austrian disasters compelled that power to solicit the mediation of Napoleon, and cede Venetia as the price of his good offices ; and that state is now united to the kingdom of Italy. All Italy is now united, except the States of the Church. The French troops will soon evacuate Rome according to agreement, and then, if no unfortunate turn of affairs occurs to thwart the far-seeing policy of Napoleon, Italian nationality will be restored. The policy of the French emperor, combining a rare union of prudence, skill, and energy, may be said to have brought the Italian imbroglio to a favorable conclusion. POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE, 411 Unless a great reaction in favor of despotism shall occur, the first act in the drama of European reconstruction will soon be complete. We have thus, to avoid prolixity of statement, traced the progress of the Italian question down to the present time. It remains to trace the important events to which progressive French ideas have given rise in Germany. 4th. The Napoleonic Programme for effecting the National Unity of Germany. It will be remembered that, as Italy was divided between the king of Naples, the Pope, the king of Sardinia, the emperor of Austria, and various Austrian dukes, so Germany was divided be- tween the emperor of Austria, the king of Prussia, the king of Den- mark, and more than thirty other feudal princes. When Napoleon first assumed the championshii) of the principle of nationality, the German mind Avas as thoroughly imbued with aspirations after national unity as the Italian ; the same process of agitation which wrought such grand results in Italy would have produced effects not less important in Germany. Napoleon selected Italy as the first field for agitation, not because it was riper for revolution, but because fewer difficulties were to be encountered in carrying the question to a successful issue. The princes v/ho divided Italy among them had no common policy; they might be assailed in detail; but agitation in Germany would have been met by the action of the Bund, and must have precipitated a general war. Again, agitation might progress in Italy without involving European complications. Prussia, as already mentioned, aspired to unite Germany beneath her scepter; regarding all steps toward the union of Italy with approval, as facil- itating her own ambition, she rejoiced in the blows which weakened the power of Austria, the great obstacle to her intended career. Russia, also, sympathized with the aims of Prussian ambition, and was not disposed to make any opposition to measures which so directly facilitated it. Napoleon, therefore, selected Italy as the field for agitation, leaving Germany to ripen gradually for a move- ment in favor of Nationality. Whether the recent agitation in Germany originated in the secret 412 THE WORLD'S CRISIS- maneuvers of French diplomacy, cannot be certainly known in this age. But that agitation reached a crisis very opportunely, and res- cued Napoleon from an embarrassing position in respect of the Italian imbroglio ; whether its beginning was fostered by French intrigue or not, it is certain that French diplomacy fostered it, and gave it direction. We must understand the policy of the French emperor with re- gard to Germany, in order to comprehend the tangled skein of events which ultimated in the Prusso- Austrian war of 1866. His policy is the key to the course of the German imbroglio. The events of the last three years prove that Napoleon had a consistent, well- devised plan, by which he proposed to effect the re-establishment of all the European nationalities, by means of the movement in Ger- many. A statement of the facts will prove the existence of a far- reaching policy in the mind of the French emperor. It will be remembered, that Germany is an agglomeration of feudal states, governed by feudal princes, some of sovereign rank, but all united in a loose confederation, and represented in a general federal diet. Several centuries ago, the German duchy of Holstein became, by inheritance, the feudal possession of the king of Denmark. The Danish sovereigns, having inherited the duchy, regarded it as their own, by as good a title as the rest of their dominions. Never sup- posing that their possession, running through centuries, would be questioned, they did not restrict the German population of Holstein to their own territory, but suffered them to settle in the adjoining Danish duchy of Schleswig. So that, in process of time, half the duchy of Schleswig became peopled with Germans. The people of Holstein and the German population of Schleswig have been, for years, restive beneath Danish rule. They were separated from German interests and association, and governed as a portion of a foreign kingdom. Their dissatisfaction at length (1863) reached such a height as to threaten a revolt from the Danish yoke. The king of Denmark, like other feudal sovereigns in similar circum- stances, strengthened his garrisons and bade defiance to the popular aspirations. <^ The question now assumed a new phase. The people of Germany POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 413 sympathized warmly with the cause of the Holsteiners. Mutterings were heard indicative of a rising storm of national indignation. The question now boded danger to the other feudal sovereigns, for indig- nation aorainst one might soon embrace them all. The German Diet made haste to anticipate the popular fermentation, and, to that end, resolved to take the question into its own hands and call out the troops of the Confederation, to wrest Holstein and Schleswig from the king of Denmark. The open interference of Prussia in the question, now began. It has long been the policy of Prussia to assume the championship of German nationality ; doubtless, with the design of fixing the national mind on the Prussian monarch, as the prince under whose scepter the long hoped for nationality may be attained. Prussia now came zealously forward, to become the executive of the national will. Austria, jealous of this officious zeal, placed herself abreast of her rival. The two Great German Powers took upon themselves the ex- ecution of the decree of the Diet, and promptly prepared to attack Denmark with overwhelming forces. At this juncture, British diplomacy interposed, to avert the storm that was about to burst upon Denmark. The Prince of Wales had married a Danish princess, and British sympathies were enlisted by the family alliance. Austria was willing to consent to a compro- mise. But Prussia, no doubt meditating the appropriation of the Duchies, even then, was inexorable, and dragged Austria reluctantly after. The British government then solicited the intervention of the other two Great Powers, France and Russia, and avowed its will- ingness to fight, if either of them would second its arms. But both refused to interfere. Russia, no doubt, knew the ultimate aims of Prussia, and approved them, in furtherance of its own ambitious policy. Napoleon saw that the Great German Powers were cham- pioning the principle of Nationality against a feudal sovereign, and that affairs were taking the direction he wished. True to the prin- ciple of Nationality, he responded to the British overtures by pro- posing an European Congress that should settle all the vexed ques- tions embroiling Europe: upon the rejection of his suggestion, he held aloof, while the belligerents brought the question to the arbitra- ment of force. 414 THE world's crisis. A short campaign drove the Danes out of the Duchies, and com- pelled the king of Denmark to sue for peace on any terms the Ger- man Powers chose to impose. In the treaty that followed, Denmark ceded the disputed Duchies. Thus far, the sympathy of Napoleon with the cause of Nationali- ties is sufficient to account for his course, without supposing that he had a definite plan by which to avail himself of the course of events. His general policy in the cause of Nationality would induce him to favor an attempt to wrest the Duchies from a feudal sover- eign, and unite them to the German nation. But the question now assumed a new phase, in which the course of the French emperor was either dictated by mad folly, or by a profound scheme for pro- moting the union of Germany and the restoration of all the Nation- alities of Europe. When the Duchies were surrendered by Denmark, it was expected that they would be given to the next heir of the Ducal domains. Both the principles of the feudal system, and the policy of Europe for the maintenance of the Balance of Power, required the adoption of this course. Claimants were not wanting. But the Prussian government maintained its hold upon the Duchies ; and, after delay- ing upon various pretexts the final settlement of the question, it, at lengtii, avowed its resolution to annex them to its own domains. The aim of Prussia in attempting to secure this acquisition was patent to all familiar with the past policy of that State. The rest- lessness of the German nation in its disparted condition, and the popular aspirations after national unity, have long made it evident that, sooner or later, the unity of Germany must be consummated. Prussia has long aspired to become the imperial state of German}^, around which the whole nation may be united. With this end in view, it, from policy, always assumes the championship of the na- tional interests. This policy induced it to menace Napoleon during the Italian war, in the event of his crossing the German frontier: the same policy caused it to stand forward in asserting the national cause against Denmark. It hopes that, being associated in the Ger- man mind with the cause of national unity, popular aspirations may POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 415 rally around it, as the exponent of the national idea, and the proper head of the German empire. But the superior power of Austria in Germany has been an in- superable obstacle, hitherto, to the consummation of Prussian am- bition. Austria possessed the greater extent of German territory; and all the minor princes of Germany, standing equally in dread of the assressive ambition of Prussia, made common cause with Aus- tria, in the German Bund. Prussia occupied the position of a rest- less agitator dangerous to the existing status, whom the other princes united to restrain. Before it could make any advance to- ward the goal of its ambition, an increase of power and influence was imperatively necessary. But it could not hope to rival Austria in extent of dominions ; its only hope of attaining an ascendancy in Germany lay in becoming the commercial agent and industrial center of the nation. Commerce has, in our age, become the great source of wealth and power. The situation of the Austrian domin- ions in the center of the European continent, Avith only a few ob- scure ports upon the head of the Adriatic sea, precluded that power from becoming a commercial state. The Prussian dominions, whose • only ports lay on the Baltic, were not more favorably situated for commerce. Prussia has deeply felt her disadvantageous situation ; years ago, she manifested her desire of becoming a commercial state, by purchasing of Russia (in the Duchy of Oldenburg) a site for a port on the North Sea. This site, however, was too far removed from the rest of the Prussian territories to further materially the aims of that power. The purchase only served to show the anxiety of Prussia to become a commercial state, and the sympathy of Rus- sia with the ambitious project. The situation of Holstein is most favorable for commercial pur- poses. It has a number of fine harbors situated on the German Ocean; and the river Elbe, which drains a great part of Germany, forms the boundary between Holstein and Hanover down to the sea. The possession of Holstein would give Prussia the ocean ports she coveted, and the command of the mouth of the Elbe ; and would en- able it to become a commercial power, and drain the entire trade of Germany to its ports. Traffic always carries with it political power; the consummation of the scheme would give Prussia a 41G THE world's crisis, decided political ascendancy in Germany, and prove an important step toward the goal of its ambition. All Europe was apprised of the aim of Prussian ambition ; and the important bearing its acquisition of the Duchies would have in furthering its ulterior aims, was patent to all. Austria and the minor German princes were seized with alarm, and protested vigor- ously against the attempted acquisition. They resolved to prevent it by force of arms, and appealed to the Great Powers of Europe to aid them in preventing Prussia from acquiring a dangerous increase of power. England, always devoted to the maintenance of the Bal- ance of Power, lent a favorable ear to their representations. If either France or Russia had taken a stand in opposition to Prussian ambition, the coalition would have been too formidable to confront ; and Prussia must, perforce, have Avithdrawn from the Duchies, and yielded them to the lawful claimant, the duke of Augustenburg. But both France and Russia favored the designs of Prussia. The motives which influenced Russia will appear when we shall hereafter analyze its policy. But why did Napoleon favor Prussia? Why did he, when a word would have forced it to give up the Duchies, lend his countenance to its ambition ? The Prussian government, opposed by Austria and all the minor German states, was overmatched. It could not proceed with its de- sign alone. The Prussian minister, Bismarck, applied for an alli- ance — to whom ? To Napoleon. Then an understanding existed between the courts. The Prussian government knew that it might rely upon the sympathy of Napoleon, before it ventured to avow its resolution to appropriate the Duchies. And now in the face of an opposition too formidable to be confronted alone, it applied to him for assistance. Napoleon declined to interfere, but referred Bis- marck to Italy, and suggested that an Italian alliance would answer the purpose. The Italian alliance was formed with the full approval of Napoleon, at his suggestion indeed, and Prussia and Ital}'- con- fronted Austria allied with all the minor German States. We cannot suppose that Napoleon was induced to countenance Prussia, merely for the purpose of obtaining her alliance to aid Italy in wresting Venetia from Austria. The end was too trivial to be obtained by such means. The Prussian acquisition of the Duchies POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 417 would completely overturn the balance of power in Germany, giv- ing Prussia a decided ascendancy, and putting in operation causes which would effect the union of Germany beneath her sway, at no distant period. Napoleon is an able statesman, and he would never have suffered the Balance of Power to be thus irretrievably sub- verted, merely to effect a temporary object in providing Italy with an ally. He must have had a profounder aim, a far-sighted policy, to be furthered in the aggrandizement of Prussia, — nothing less than the final adjustment of the question of the Nationalities. Napoleon must have foreseen that the establishment of Italian unity would excite national enthusiasm in Germany and Central Europe, and that the issue would force itself upon him at no distant day. It is not his habit to suffer issues to come upon him unpre- pared. By his occupation of Rome, and his patronage of Sardinia, he prepared himself to take control of Italian events, years before he attempted any active intervention. So, it was his policy to anti- cipate German agitation,, and obtain a position to direct and control the movement, before the outburst came. Napoleon never suffers national aspirations to break out in popular revolution ; but he aims to direct the popular impulse, by selecting some state as the nucleus round which national imj^ulses may center. We have seen how he selected Sardinia as the center round which to unite Italy. So, in effecting the unity of Germany, it was his programme to select some German sovereign, under whose supremacy all the States of the Confederation might be united. Several considerations pointed to Prussia as the state best fitted to become the Sardinia of Germany. — (1.) It had power enough, seconded by France, to carry out the movement and effect the union of Germany. The union of Germany under Prussia would be much less difficult to effect, than the union of Italy under the Sardinian crown. (2.) It had but a small extra German territory, in Poland, which it might readily give up to the national principle, in order to secure the aid of France in achieving the union of Germany beneath its sway. (3.) It seemed ready to enter upon the career ; having, since 1848, assumed the championship of German nationality, as Sardinia had of Italian. — The only drawback was its past career, which committed the government to absolutist principles. Its share 418 THE world's crisis. in the partition of Poland, especially, linked it witli Russia. Napo- leon was apprised of the policy of Russia for the last fifty years, in seeking the aggrandizement of Prussia in the interest of its own ambi- tion. He was also apprised of the cordial understanding which has existed between the two crowns during the whole of that period. He knew that the union of Germany under the Prussian crown would be fatal to liberal institutions in Europe, if the Prussian sovereign continued to cling to Absolutism, and used his accession of power for the furtherance of Russian policy, and Russian ambition. He is too profound a statesman to suifer a movement to progress, that would strengthen Absolutism and enable it to dominate Europe. Napoleon perceived the risk involved in trusting Prussia with increased power, but he must, notwithstanding, have decided that Prussia should become the Sardinia of Germany. I doubt not, when the secret history of our time is known, it will be found that an understanding existed between the two governments before the Danish war. The French emperor, with the sublime self-confidence of greatness, relied upon his own ability to keep Prussia true to his policy while it was being carried to a successful termination ; and, indeed, to so direct events, as to give that government no oppor- tunity to play him false, until the question of the Nationalities was finally settled on so firm a basis as to make Prussian treachery hopeless. Confident in his ability to direct events and control Prus- sia, he countenanced its designs and seconded its ambition, by lending the moral support of France and furthering an alliance with Italy. Let us note the probabilities which at that time must have dwelt in the far-seeing mind of Napoleon. It seemed probable that, with the assistance of Italy, Prussia would make good its claim upon Holstein and Schleswig; and that, after a short war, peace would be made upon the basis of the cession of those duchies to Prussia, and Venetia to Italy. Then the German enthusiasm for nationality, stimulated by French agents, would continue slowly to rise, compelling Prussia to take the option of going down before the movement, or of co-operating with Napoleon to direct it to her own advantage. Under the circum- POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 419 stances, Prussia would have no alternative but to co-operate with France and head the national agitation. Soon, Germany, Hungary, and Poland would grow" ripe for a revolutionary outburst. If Napoleon could trust Prussia implicitly, he might then inter- vene by arms, as in the case of Italy, and effect the unity of Ger- many, by aiding Prussia to overrun the territories of Austria and the other feudal princes. But the genius of Napoleon is rather politic than military. He would rather effect his object by nego- tiation than arms. Besides, he could not trust Prussia. Germany once united beneath its sway, the Prussian government might return to its absolutist proclivities, and, bidding defiance to France, enter into an alliance with Russia to arrest the further progress of liberal principles. Prudence would counsel Napoleon to keep the thread of events in his own hands, until his object was consummated. Therefore, when Germany, Hungary, and Poland were ripe for revolution, he would exact of the Prussian government a renewed pledge to give up its Polish provinces, and second him in restoring all these Nationalities, on condition of having Germany united beneath its sway. This preliminary arranged, (and Prussia, Avitli revolution menacing its throne as the alternative, would be com- pelled to submit,) he would repeat his call to the European Powers to meet in a European Congress, to avert an universal revolutionary outbreak, by adjusting the question of the Nationalities. His call would be seconded by Ital3'', on principle ; and by Prussia, from anxiety to avert revolution and secure the sovereignty of Ger- many : a pledge not to introduce the Irish question would secure the adhesion of Great Britain, always anxious to maintain tranquillity : the Austrian government, completely at the mercy of revolution ready to break out in all its dominions, might be easily won over, by the promise of indemnity in Turkey for the dominions it would be required to cede. Russia alone would be reluctant ; but Russia would be forced to acquiesce in the united voice of Europe. The Congress assembled, Napoleon would propose, in order to settle forever the question of Nationalities and give peace and secu- rity to Europe, that Germany should be united under the Prussian scepter ; that Poland should be restored to national unity and inde- pendence ; that the Swedish provinces conquered by Russia should 420 THE world's crisis. be restored ; that the Austrian dynasty should make Hungary its imperial seat, and receive indemnity for its German and Polish ter- ritories in the Turkish principalities, — an arrangement every way advantageous to the Hungarians, which would be highly acceptable to them ; that the Greek population of Turkey should be restored to nationality, with the limits of the old Greek empire, having the Danube on its northern border ; that the Belgic provinces wrested from France three hundred years ago should be restored ; and that the unity of Italy, if still imperfect, should be completed. This programme would give general satisfaction. France, Prus- sia, Austria, Italy, England, and Sweden would embrace it with one accord. Russia might demur ; but confronted, on the one hand, by revolution, and on the other, by the united voice of Europe, Russia, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, would yield with a good grace the spoils she found it impossible to keep. The arrangement once consummated, Europe would rest upon the equipoise of ten great nations, — Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Russia, and Greece. There would no longer be any danger of Russian ambition, nor of a com- bination dangerous to the independence of the nations. Gradually, the progress of the principle of Nationality would cause England to consent to the independence of Ireland : it would also dismember the Russian empire into its national elements; when the Russian territory left, after restoring the Polish and Swedish boundaries, would be divided into Great Russia, Kasan, Ukraine, the Cossack territory, and Circassia. Then, at length, freed from the dread of dynastic ambition, the nations of Europe might give themselves to the arts of peace. Such a consummation Napoleon must have designed for the ques- tion of Nationalities, when he gave his sanction to the Prussian acquisition of the Duchies, and lent that power his support in a war to maintain its claim. His programme supposed that, in the war with Austria, Prussia would merely maintain its possession of the Duchies ; and, that his policy would have the moral support of the British government which had sustained him hitherto. This last was especially important to the success of his policy. Supported by the moral influence of England, or left unembarrassed by its POLITICAL CONDITION OP EUROPE. 421 neutrality, he felt himself master of the situation ; the success of his policy seemed infallible ; Prussian treachery impossible ; and the reconstruction of the map of Europe, and the re- establishment of the Nationalities at an early day, absolutely certain. But both the contingencies upon which he relied for success failed him. Prussia achieved more decisive success than he had antici- pated ; the British government, under Tory rule, ranged itself against him. The war began. The allies of Austria displayed the proverbial slowness of a league in taking the field ; and, as a great part of the Austrian forces were detached to resist the assault of Italy, Prussia gained the advantage of the initiative. The Prussian government made a levy en masse of the military population, and, assuming a vigorous offensive, overran the territories of the North German states in alliance with Austria, and then invaded the Austrian states with one of the largest armies that has taken the field in modern times. The opposing forces met at Sadowa, in Bohemia, and after a terrible conflict, the superiority of the Prussians in numbers, arms, discipline, and dash, achieved a decisive victory. The Austrians were utterly routed, leaving 75,000 men on the field of battle. The rout of Sadowa reduced Austria to extremity. Lying at the mercy of its antagonist, as its only hope, it appealed to the inter- vention of the Great Powers. To Napoleon it proffered Venetia, the bone of contention with Italy, as the price of his good offices. The rapid and decisive success of the Prussian arms outran the expectations of Napoleon. The event showed that Prussia was suf- ficiently powerful to achieve the union of Germany by conquest, without the aid of France. The Prussian armies were pressing forward to another victory, which would have completed the de- struction of the Austrian power and laid Germany at the feet of the conqueror. At this moment, Napoleon intervened. He was justly distrust- ful, from the past course of Prussia, that the government, if per- mitted to achieve the union of Germany by conquest, might violate all its pledges, set him at defiance, and employ its power for the consolidation of Absolutism in Europe. He accepted Venetia, thus 422 THE world's crisis. preventing further attack by Italy, and enabling Austria to confront Prussia with all her forces; and gaining an impregnable base of op- erations, if he should find it necessary to take up arms, to force Prussia to treat, Napoleon intervened, not to prevent the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, but to prevent Prussia from achieving that union under circumstances that would render it inde- pendent of French influence, and enable it to contravene all his plans, and even endanger liberal institutions in Europe. He was still ready to co-operate with Prussia, as before, but he was resolved to keep the key of the situation in his own hands, that he might in- sure the fidelity of Prussia to his policy. His distrust was well founded. Subsequent events prove that, if he had sufi'ered Prussia, then, to achieve the union of Germany by conquest, it would have abused its power to the advancement of Absolutism. But it was then in the power of Napoleon. Russia, it is true, was ready to lend its support ; but even with the aid of Russia, it was not able to cope with France and Austria. Upon the appearance of France in the field, Italy would change sides ; a rapid movement of the French armies upon the Rhine would expel the Prussian troops from the German states they had overrun, and com- pel them to evacuate the x^ustrian territories ; and that power would stand stripped of all its conquests, in opposition to all Germany allied with France. Prussia perceived that Napoleon was master of the situation, and, with whatever reluctance, it promptly paused in the career of con- quest at his bidding. The terms of peace Napoleon imposed show that his policy still looked to the union of all Germany under the Prussian crown. Prussia had taken up arms, only to make good its possession of Holstein and Schleswig. Napoleon might easily have enforced a demand, that peace should be made on the basis of the restoration of the territories overrun by the Prussian arms to their feudal princes, Prussia retaining only the duchies which were the occasion of the war. But Prussia, throughout the imbroglio, had proclaimed itself the advocate of French principles. It had asserted the principle of nationality against feudalism, in wresting the duchies from Denmark ; in its alliance with Italy, it championed Italian na- tionality; during the war with Austria, it summoned Hungary by POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE. 423 proclamation to strike for its national independence. In all this, it proclaimed itself the exponent of French liberal principles. Still further to propitiate Napoleon, it now proposed to settle the ques- tions involved in the treaty of peace, upon the basis of French prin- ciples. It proposed that the destiny of the conquered territories, either to return to their feudal princes, or to be annexed to Prussia, should be left to the vote of the people ; thus asserting the progres- sive idea that the choice of the people is higher than feudal rights. It proposed, furthermore, that a North German Confederation should be established, to be governed by a national parliament elected by universal suffrage. These propositions seemed to commit Prussia fully to the Napo- leonic ideas, and the French emperor acquiesced in the vast increase of power the arrangement would secure. Peace was made upon the following basis : (1.) The States of Holstein and German Schleswig, the original ground of contention, were ceded to Prussia. (2.) The States overrun by the Prussian arms, — Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Saxony, etc., — were to be annexed to the Prussian dominions, or return to their feudal lords, according as their populations should elect. (3.) The old Germanic Bund was dissolved, and a North- German Confederation established under the presidency of the king of Prussia, which included all those states of Northern Germany not actually annexed to his dominions. This treaty nearly doubled the German territories of Prussia, and gave that power complete control of all Northern Germany; while the South-German states, including Bavaria, Baden, Wirtemberg, and the Austrian possessions, were left out to form a South-German union or not, as they chose. The arrangement places Prussia in a position to achieve the union of all Germany beneath its scepter. It is already head of half the country; and the other portion is phiced in a position to feel more acutely than ever the severance of the nation, and to aspire ardently to an union with the Prussian North-German Confederation. With this treaty we may close our chapter upon the state of Eu- rope. It also closes the third epoch in the struggle between pro- gress and Absolutism. It constitutes an era in the question of the 424 THE world's crisis. Nationalities, from which the historian will date a new phase of this important and exciting issue. Down to that event, French progressive ideas were aggressive. Napoleon controlled events for years, and he dictated the terms of that arrangement. Prussia seemed, at that time, to have committed herself thoroughly to his policy; and Napo- leon seemed to have the fairest prospect of guiding events according to his desire, and securing, at no distant day, the establishment of the Nationalities. But just at this crisis, occurred the political revolution in England mentioned in the preceding chapter, which gave the Tories control of the government. This change of English politics completely revolutionized the face of affairs on the Continent. It wrested the helm from the hand of Napoleon, and closed the era of French ag- gression against Absolutism ; it rescued Absolutism from approach- ing downfall, and placed it at once in a haughty ascendant, which will enable it to dominate Europe, and threaten Liberty, throughout the world. But we must reserve the new era so full of dangers, inaugurated by the Tory ascendancy in England, for another chapter. CHAPTER III. FOUETH EPOCH IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AB.^OLUTISM AND PROGRESS: IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. Since the French Revolution of 1789, as has been seen in the preceding chapter, the question of the Nationalities has passed through three successive stages. The First Epoch comprises the French Revolutionary wars, from 1789 to 1815 : embracing, first, the period when France Avaged a defensive struggle with the armies of the Absolute nations; secondly, the period when, under Napoleon, revolutionary thought was ag- gressive, until the ambition of that monarch diverted the Revolution from its true channel, and perverted it to subserve the aims of IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 425 dynastic ambition; and, thirdly, the period when the despots appealed to the patriotism of their subjects, and crushed the conqueror with the onset of outraged nations. The Second Epoch was inaugurated by the treaties of 1815, and extended to 1848 : during this period Absolutism was predominant ; but the nations were restive beneath the yoke, and were held in check by tlie rule of the sword. The Third Epoch took its rise in the French revolution of 1848, and stretches to 1866 : during which, the two forces, Progress and Absolutism, have been standing armed, front to front ; Absolutism on the defensive ; Progress gradually winning its way to what seemed a decisive supremacy. Throughout this epoch, France — supported by the alliance with England where the Liberal party held the balance of power — has been the standard-bearer of Progress. But the revolution in English politics, during the past year, which established the Tories firmly in power, has inaugurated a Fourth' Epoch. That revolution rescued Absolutism in the very crisis of the struggle from approaching ruin, and placed it in an ascendancy that will enable it to crush Progress in Europe — perhaps to trample the world beneath its feet. The epoch in the question of National- ities now just begun, will be marked by a decisive conflict between Absolutism and Progress, in which the power of England under Tory rule will give the former a decisive victory, in the highest degree disastrous to the cause of Freedom in the earth. To present a view of the political forces that will govern this epoch, and trace the necessary course of European events in this eventful crisis, will be the design of this chapter. Sect. 1. — Forces at Work in Europe. It is now admitted on all hands, that the existing status in Europe cannot continue. The question of Nationalities has reached a crisis in which some change is inevitable. The issue is, now, whether this change shall take such a direction as to re-establish all the Nation- alities, and give a definitive victory to Progress ; or whether events shall be controlled by reactionary forces, in such a manner as to firmly re-establish the ascendancy of Absolutism. Europe is in a critical condition. It is in that unsettled posture which marks the 426 THE world's crisis. decline of an old era, when worn out forces are about to be ex- changed for the viojorous energetic agencies that mai'k a new age. Two rival principles, — Liberal Government, and Consolidated Ab- solutism, — are struggling for supremacy, battling for the sway of the dawning era. The present unsettled state of Europe may give place to either. Whichever principle is the victor in the approaching crisis will dominate Europe with irresistible sway. Both give promise of peace from the agitation of this unsettled age : the one, beneath the shadow of Despotism ; the other, in the prevalence of constitutional liberty. I. The Impendixg Outbreak of the Nationalities. If events are left to take their course, within a few years, a gen- eral revolutionary outbreak in Germany, Hungary, and Poland, is inevitable. Several distinct lines of causation combine their influence to hasten an outbreak of German national enthusiasm. — (1.) In the natural progress of thought, the German mind must, ere long, be thrilled with eager aspirations after national unity. • The leaven has already been working, for years. The profound agitation of the German popular mind was manifest in the national movement re- specting Holstein and Schleswig, which led to the Danish war. — (2.) The issue of that war, and the recent acts of Prussia, have contrib- uted to deepen the excitement. That power, for the furtherance of its ambition, has appealed to the patriotic impulses of the German nation ; and has dethroned various feudal princes whose rights stood in the way of the realization of national unity, — thus pointing the way to nationality over the ruins of feudal thrones. — (3.) The suc- cess of Italy, also, will exercise a powerful influence upon the Ger- man mind. Hitherto, ridicule has been the most powerful weapon of the advocates of feudal rights. They have derided the idea of nationality, as the fimcy of weak and visionary minds — the fanciful ideal of patriotic dreamers, not to be realized in practical life. Its advocates, themselves, have hitherto regarded it as the object of dreamy longing rather than the aim of assured hope. But the ex- perience of Italy has refuted every scofi". The condition of that country seemed more hopeless than that of any nation on the Con- IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 427 tinent: when, in spite of every obstacle, the Italians shall have achieved their national unity, their -example will nerve the other disparted nations to a persevering struggle in behalf of their lost nationality. It will prove that no obstacles are too great to be over- come by a nation resolved to be free. Italy standing at the goal, waving the banner of national independence and beckoning the nations on in the path to freedom, will thrill the hearts of the op- pressed with an ardor tenfold greater than that awakened by the commotion of her struggle. — (4.) The arrangements of the treaty which terminated the recent war will fire the German heart with national enthusiasm. The Northern states of Germany are united under the lead of Prussia, while the Southern are excluded from this union, and subjected to the sway of Austria and their respective feudal princes. The severance of Germany is thus more palpable than ever before; which fact, alone, will excite a greater fervor of aspiration after national unity. This impulse will be quickened by material interests. Prussia, by her late acquisitions, having obtained an extended line of coast, with numerous fine harbors, will be able to consummate her aim of becoming a great commercial power. Her administration will be so directed as to foster commercial in- dustry, of which Northern Germany will have the benefit. The necessary effect of this will be dissatisfaction in the Southern German states that are excluded from the benefits of the new regime. They will long for a participation in the commercial advantages of their Northern brethren, and for an union with them as the only method of obtaining their end. North Germany will sympathize with the South, and the whole nation will glow with the impulse of national emotion. If events are left to take their course, Germany will, in a few years, be ripe for revolution in favor of nationality. A revolutionary outburst in Germany would quickly spread to Hungary and Poland. The thrill of national emotion diffuses itself with electric rapidity through the oppressed nations of Europe, — the impulse of one nation vibrating through all. The French Rev- olution of 1848 threw all the European nations into a convulsion of national excitement. Three years ago, the growing enthusiasm of Italy found a response in the movements of the Irish Fenians — in 428 THE world's crisis. the resolute, though unsuccessful insurrection in Poland — and in the excitement of the German masses on the Holstein question. But the Italian movement has been regulated by the guidance of Victor Emanuel ; and the detached situation of Italy has prevented its ex- citement from thoroughly fevering the rest of Europe : Germany has • thought and reflected upon the subject of nationality, but the na- tional passions have not been deeply stirred : Hungary and Poland have made fierce, spasmodic efforts to regain their independence, but theirs have been isolated struggles, easily suppressed. But, unlike Italy, Germany is the heart of Europe ; its fevered pulsa- tions will be felt to the extremities of the Continent. It borders upon Hungary and Poland, along their entire western frontier. A revolutionary outbreak in Germany will throw all Central Europe into a flame. II. The Policy of Absolutism. But Absolutism has a policy by which to counter these national aspirations, which will not only render them harmless, but make them contribute to the firm establishment of despotic government. Absolutism feels it imperatively necessary to avert the impending . revolution in Germany, which will imperil all the absolute crowns in Europe : the insurrection of the populations of Germany, Hungary, and Poland, supported by France and Italy, would be too powerful to be suppressed even by the power of Kussia. The crowned heads of Europe have reduced the management of popular impulse to a system. It is their policy to anticipate its demands, and prevent an outbreak, by achieving, themselves, what the people would otherwise attempt by revolution. Such was the polic}'^ of Napoleon in Italy, and of Austria and Prussia in wresting the German duchies from Denmark. So, it is the policy of Absolutism, now, to unite Ger- many under some sovereign devoted to absolutist principles, before the German masses rise for the establishment of national unity. The agitations of Europe by no means indicate the necessary de- cline of Absolutism. They only show that the form of Absolutism which has hitherto prevailed, where absolute governments are con- tinually clashing with each other, and with the national aspirations of populations, cannot continue. Absolutism may take a new lease IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 429 of existence under a new arrangement. The day of feudal despot- ism is over. If Absolutism is to continue, it must change its base, and found its power upon National Despotism. This change of base is now the policy of Absolutism. Russia will no longer attempt to maintain feudal thrones in Central Europe. It is her aim to erect a great national throne in Germany, firmly committed to Absolutism, and resting upon the proud and devoted attachment of a great and imperial nation. The union of Germany beneath the Prussian scepter before the impending outbreak of the Nationalities occurs, is essential to the safety of Absolutism. The German mind, inflamed and revolutionary, would set all Central Europe on fire. But satisfy the national aspirations of Germany by uniting it under the Prussian scepter ; then make it an imperial nation ruling neighboring subject dependencies, — and Germany will be firmly arrayed on the side of Absolutism, and will aid in crush- ing out the national aspirations of the populations held in subjection to the German empire. Make Germany under the Prussian sovereign what France was under the first Napoleon, — the imperial center of subject prov-- inces, — and Absolutism will have no more devoted adherent. Ger- many must be brought by this means to the support of Absolutism ; — or Absolutism must fall, and all the Nationalities achieve their in- dependence. The only hope of Absolutism lies in establishing a new Germanic empire over the countries of Western Europe. Russia, as the champion of Absolutism, is committed to this aim. But the policy of Russia, in this regard, is not swayed solely by the conservative principles of Absolutism. The union of Germany under Prussia, and the establishment of a German empire over Western Europe, are measures necessary, not only to suppress rev- olutionary tendencies and give stability to despotism ; they are, also, especially essential to the success of the ambitious designs of Russia. Dynastic ambition has long swayed the counsels of that empire. Its policy in all European questions, for the last century and a half, has been dictated by the ambition of universal dominion. Peter the 430 THE world's crisis. Great, wlio died 1725, left a celebrated will, which marked out the policy Kussia has consistently followed, ever since. He directed that Russia should first efiect the conquest of Turkey ; that it should then propose, either to France or Austria (Prussia was then too feeble a power to attract attention), a division of Eu- rope between them ; that, this consummated, it should afterward overturn the feeble, discordant Empire of the West ; — when, Europe being subdued, the empire of the earth would be easily attained. The Russian government at once entered upon the career so strikingly indicated in this remarkable document. Ten }'ears after- ward, it entered into an Austrian alliance — an alliance which was firmly maintained for three-quarters of a century, during which period Russia steadily endeavored by every means to further the consolidation of Austrian power in Germany. In 1736, the two powers entered into an alliance for the conquest of Turkey, which awakened the jealousy of the rest of Europe ; but, after a war of two years duration, they were foiled by the persevering valor of the Turks. — In 1740, when, upon the accession of Maria Theresa, the grand coalition was formed for the dismemberment of the Austrian dominions, Russia was the firm friend of Austria, and was only pre- vented from rendering active and efficient aid, by a Swedish Avar purposely excited by the coalition. — During this war, Frederic the Great, who had just ascended the Prussian throne, wrested from Austria the German states, Silesia and Glatz, This loss of power did not comport with the policy of Russia. That policy required that the power of Austria should be supreme in Germany ; and in 1756, the Czarina Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, formed an alliance with Austria for the purpose of conquering and dismem- bering Prussia. The French government was weak enough to be cajoled into this coalition, which, if it had succeeded in its objects, would have rendered the imperial house of Austria absolute in Ger- many, and enabled it to wield the whole power of the German na- tion in furtherance of the common objects of its own, and Russian ambition. Frederic the Great won his title by his heroic resistance of this overwhelming coalition. But he must have succumbed, had not the Czarina died just as his resources were exhausted. Peter III., who succeeded to the Russian crown, was won by admiration IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 431 of Frederic to abandon the policy of liis predecessor, and form an alliance ^^•ith Prussia. This seasonable aid enabled Frederic to re- trieve his ruined fortunes, by a last desperate effort forcing his remaining adversaries to consent to a peace. It is probable the Czar Peter was convinced by Prussian heroism, in contrast with Austrian incapacity, that Prussia was the German power whose alli- ance would best forward the ambitious designs of Russia. If such was his policy, he did not live to execute it; for his desertion of Austria and abandonment of the traditional policy of the empire just in the moment of success, gave rise to a conspiracy which cost him his throne and life. Russia was true to ambition and the Austrian alliance, and sacrificed an emperor to its policy. — Again, in the reign of Joseph II. of Austria, Russia manifested its desire to in- crease Austrian power : its sympathy with his efforts to consolidate his dominions was openly expressed; it also sanctioned his pro- posed exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria, — an arrangement which, if effected, would have vastl}'' increased the power of the House of Austria in Germany; and it concluded an alliance with him for the conquest and division of Turkey. These various intrigues, all looking to the aggrandizement of Austria, were thwarted by the intrigues and diplomacy of the Prussian government, which knew that the aworrandizement of Austria involved the fall of Prussia. The king of Prussia fomented discontents which prevented the con- solidation of the Austrian dominions ; thwarted the projected ex- change of the Netherlands for Bavaria, by a German league ; and, at the moment of decisive success in the Turkish war, excited an insurrection in the Netherlands, which compelled Austria to withdraw its armies from Turkey. — Again, it is this aim of Russia which gives the key to Russian and Prussian policy, during the early period of the French revolution. While Prussia rejoiced in the humiliation of its Austrian rival, Russia battled long and fiercely to maintain Austria against the assaults of the French. But, at length, the re- peated defeats of the Austrian armies revealed the intrinsic weak- ness of the state, and its utter unfitness ever to aid in the ambitious designs of Russia. — The Russian government now gave up the Aus- trian alliance forever. Upon abandoning the idea of an Austrian alliance, Russia em- 432 THE world's crisis. braced. the alternative presented in the will of Peter the Great, and adopted the policy of a French alliance. It lent itself to the ambi- tious aims of Napoleon I., until it became evident that the conqueror would not admit Russia to an equal partition of the spoils. As soon as the Czar found that Napoleon would not consent to the Russian conquest of Turkey, he became his determined foe, and at length effected his downfall. But Russia was still true to the ambitious traditions of the empire, and to the far-seeing policy marked out by Peter the Great. Its ulterior aims could only be attained by an alliance with Germany, or France. All idea of an alliance with either Austria, or France, was now abandoned. The distracted empire of Austria was too feeble to effect the Union of Germany beneath its scepter; and public opinion was too advanced in France, to permit that country to be a safe ally of despotic ambition. But Prussia, in the partition of Poland, which it was the first to suggest, had indicated its willingness to commit itself to the policy of Absolutism ; and the obstinate valor of the Prussian troops promised to render Prussia a most useful ally. Henceforth, Russia looked upon Prussia as its destined coadjutor, and lent all its influence to the aggrandizement of the monarchy. The treaties of 1815 show the adoption of this policy by the Rus- sian government. In those negotiations, it laid the train by which Prussia was to be elevated to the head of the German -empire. By Russian influence, great accessions of territory were granted to Prus- sia, which elevated it to the front rank among European nations; and Germany, instead of being placed under the emperor of Austria, as before the French revolution, was erected into a confederation of states without an imperial head. The arrangements of the treaties of 1815 freed Prussia from all subordination to Austria, and gave it such an accession of power as placed it upon an equal footing with its rival. — Russia has ever since maintained the same policy : events have showed that the most cordial understanding exists between the two governments, which mutually further each other's ambition, in utter disregard of the Balance of Power, and the interests of the other states. Before the Crimean war, when France and England were negotiating to secure the neutrality of the German Powers, Austria, which was fully aware of the changed German policy of the IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABS .UTISM. 433 Czar, and beheld in it the omen of approaching ruin, cordially ac- quiesced in the movement of the Westez'n Powers ; but Prussia, on the contrary, threw all its influence in favor of the Autocrat, and even displayed a willingness to take up arms in his behalf, until it saw that Germany would not follow its lead in such a movement. — The policy of exalting Prussia as a maritime state induced the Czar to sell the Prussian sovereign a port on the North Sea, in the duchy of Oldenburg. — The same policy of exalting Prussia at the expense of Austria, induced Russia to urge forward Napoleon's attack upon Austria, in Italy. — Hence, also, the acquiescence of Russia in the Prussian appropriation of Holstein ; and also, in its more recent acquisition of the territories of the minor German princes, overrun during the last war. — These are all steps to the goal of German unity under the Prussian crown, so necessary to the consummation of the ambitious aims of the Czar. Germany once united under the Prussian scepter, and the Prusso- German sovereign in cordial co-operation with Russia, — the coali- tion might dominate Europe without let or control. The Austrian monarch would then be reduced to the Hungarian crown, and com- pelled to second the wishes of his powerful neighbors, under penalty of dethronement. No power in Europe could prevent the allied despots from seizing upon Turkey. A movement upon the flank from Russia, might be supported by an army marching to the rear from Germany, and the allies would meet upon the Hellespont. The movement would be far beyond the reach of the other European powers, who could not even make an effort to prevent it. What powers in Europe could resist the coalition of Russia and Germany, then, wielding, in addition, the power of Turkey and Hungary ? III. The Present Postukb of Affairs. Three years ago, the Prussian government occupied a position of singular advantage. Its aggrandizement was a part of the pro- gramme of each of the conflicting forces which divided Europe. Russia wished to secure the union of Germany beneath the sway of Prussia : in order to fortify Absolutism ; and to open the way for a career of conquest, by means of a Prussian alliance. France 28 434 THE world's crisis. ■wished to further the same end, that it might secure the Prussian government to a liberal policy, and obtain its co-operation for the cause of Progress. Prussia had only to decide which alliance it ■would choose. The Prussian monarchy is a feudal power, and all its traditions link it with Absolutism. Its possessions were all obtained, and are still held, by the right of the sword. Its sympathies are all Abso- lutist. It has maintained a suspicious understanding with Russia for fifty years, and has always been ready to second the ambition of that power. — Ambition, moreover, prompted it to prefer the Russian to the French policy. Napoleon's policy offered it only the throne of Germany, as one among the independent nations of Europe : the Russian programme offered it the empire of Western Europe; and if the issue between the allied despots afterward came to the arbit- rament of the sword, the chances were at least equal that the mili- tary spirit of the German nation would bear away the victory from the phlegmatic Muscovites, and achieve for Prussia universal do- minion. Influenced by all these considerations, Prussia would have decidedly preferred to achieve the union of Germany by means of a Russian alliance, if Russia had been sufficiently powerful to en- able it to achieve the aim of its ambition. But while Napoleon was supported by the friendship, or even the neutrality of England, he was master of the situation : Prussia could not take the first step in the career of aggrandizement without his consent. Without being assured of his concurrence, it could not have ventured to annex Holstein and Schleswig. England, Austria, and all the minor German states were opposed to it : had France taken a stand on the same side, Prussia must have abandoned the undertaking, even though supported by the power of Russia. The Prussian government had no alternative but to secure the counte- nance of Napoleon, on any terms he chose to impose. Throughout the German war, therefore, it assumed the character of a decided champion of progressive principles. And even at the close of the war, it maintained the same attitude ; and probably with a real in- tention of carrying out its engagements, and keeping faith Avith Napoleon ; for, supported by a liberal government in England, the French emperor was in a position to enforce the maintenance of his IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 435 policy, notwithstanding the accession of power obtained by Prussia in the Avar. France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German states, backed by England, still held the Balance of power, and could strip Prussia of its recent acquisitions, and hold Russian ambition in effectual check. While under a Whig and Liberal administration. Great Britain gave a steady support to the liberal cause in Europe. Supported by England and Italy, Napoleon was the arbiter of the Continent, He might either maintain Austria against Prussia, while the national enthusiasm was rising that would overturn both their thrones ; or, if Prussia were docile, he might direct the movement, until it ulti- mated in the establishment of all the Nationalities. But the political revolution in England which brought the Tories into power, at once changed the face of European politics. England holds the balance of power in Europe. The Tories at once with- drew the government from its attitude of co-operation with France, and threw all its influence in favor of Absolutism. The Tory organs commenced pouring volumes of abuse upon Napoleon, and gratula- tions upon Prussia, rejoicing in the prospect of its becoming the equipoise of France. The Prussian government saw that, with the support of England, a Russian alliance would enable it to achieve its aims, in defiance of Napoleon. No sooner did it see the Tories firmly established in power and exciting it to achieve the union of Germany despite of France, than it discarded the policy of acquies- cence in French principles, and placed itself boldly upon the plat- form of Absolutism. It positively refused to carry out its engage- ment to submit the question of the annexation of the territories it had overrun to the votes of the population. It now declared that it had conquered those territories, and would hold them as conquests, treating with contempt the idea of consulting the people on the question. It thus threw the gage of defiance at the feet of Napo- leon, and reasserted the principles of Absolutism on which the monarchy is founded. The animus of the press of the several countries plainly shows the present drift of European politics. The press of Prussia and France are indulging in mutual and fierce recriminations, which in- 436 THE ^vorld's crisis. dicate an approaching rupture between the governments. The Tory press of England is inciting Prussia to a rupture with France, and urging it on to attempt the consolidation of Germany. The press of Russia is glorying over the present position of Prussia, and de- claring that an alliance of the two countries may bid defiance to the rest of Europe. Napoleon himself maintains his usual calm reti- cence. He has displayed no mark of resentment at the tergiversa- tion of Prussia. But he has announced the policy of France in a calm sentence, expressing his conviction that the recent treaty has established the political state of Europe for years to come. He will not suffer the Absolutist Prussian government to consummate the union of Germany beneath its sway ; but will, at all hazards, main- tain the existing status in Germany. The Tory ascendancy in England threatens to be fatal to liberty in Europe. "While England seconded the policy of Napoleon, the French em- peror had Prussia, like a led hound, held unwillingly in his leash, and compelled, however unwillingly, to do his behests. Events, too, were approaching a crisis, where the far-seeing, patient policy of Napoleon would attain a definitive ascendancy, and enable him to reconstruct the Nationalities in such a manner as to render des- potism powerless ever after. And he would have attained his object without a struggle, by the universal consent of Europe, Russia alone excepted. But the Revolution of the British government has changed everything — reversed everything. Just in the crisis of the struggle between Progress and Absolutism, when the former was about to achieve a decisive and final victory, this fatal change of sides reverses the relative strength of the opposing parties, and will give to Absolutism a victory ruinous to the world. Before this change, the parties stood — France, England, and Italy, for Progress — Russia for Absolutism. In such a balance of power, the liberal governments were able to control Europe, and compel Prussia to submit to their policy. But, now, the British abandon- ment of the cause of Progress leaves France and Italy alone; and encourages Prussia to follow out the traditional policy of the monarchy, and seek to achieve its aims supported by a Russian al- liance. Parties now stand — England, Russia, and Prussia, for Abso- IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 437 lutism — France and Italy, for Progress — "with Austria the bone of contention. The dangers arising out of the question of nationality are but just begun. A great reaction against liberal government has set in. It will progress until it threatens the very existence of liberty in the world. Hitherto the question of Nationalities has been menacing to monarchs : it has now grown big with danger to liberty. Hitherto Napoleon, as the champion of Nationalities, has dominated Europe ; and the despots have trembled at his frown: henceforth, the despots may sway Europe ; and Napoleon will be overmatched, or must suffer events to be governed by their dictation. The despots have, for fifteen years, waged a defensive struggle, divided among themselves, and drifting without a defined policy upon the current of events : henceforth. Absolutism will assume a firm aggressive attitude, with every advantage in its favor. The French emperor has hitherto been the arbiter of Europe. Holding the Nationalities in his leash, and awing the despots from any attempt toward reaction, he steered the vessel of European politics with a firm hand, safe between the Scylla of revolution and the Charybdis of universal war. Austria ■was too entirely at the mercy of revolution to provoke him : Prussia was too feeble to act alone ; Russia was too assiduously engaged in promoting internal reforms, and recruiting her resources exhausted by the Crimean war, to attempt any active intervention in European affairs. But, now, Russia has recovered from exhaustion ; Prussia has become a power of the first magnitude : an alliance of the two powers, countenanced by England, can dominate Europe. Na- poleon stands alone, or supported only by the embryo government of Italy. He can no longer sway events. Absolutism rules the hour. Sect. 2. — The Impending Struggle, — Triumph of Absolutism. I. The Impending Struggle. The certainty of an approaching struggle between Absolutism and Progress is beyond question. We cannot venture a suggestion, however, as to the time of its occurrence. Either party may pre- cipitate it by an early movement; or both may, by common consent, defer to the latest moment a crisis fraught with utter ruin to one or 438 THE world's crisis. the other. But the nature of the circumstances forbids a very long procrastination. The revolutionary spirit in Germany must bring it on ; and it cannot be many years, as we have seen, before Germany will be agitated with national enthusiasm. It is evident that there is, even now, an explicit understanding between Russia and Prussia. The Muscovite government shows that it is ready to lend all its power to further the ambitious aims of Prussia. The past career of Prussia shows that power to be re- solved upon achieving the union of Germany beneath its sway ; and it cannot effect its object alone, but needs an alliance, either with France or Russia. Napoleon has manifested his readiness to further its aim, on certain conditions; and Prussia would not forego the French alliance, unless Russia had entered into a positive engage- ment to aid it in achieving the union of Germany. Its rupture with Napoleon and its defiant attitude toward France, augur too surely an understanding with the Czar. The first object of this alliance is undoubtedly the union of Ger- many under the Prussian crown. But the ambitious policy of Russia renders it evident that the alliance embraces the further object of securing for Russia an equivalent, in Turkey, for the Prussian acquisitions in Germany. But the possession of Constantinople by Russia involves the ne- cessity of further Prussian acquisitions in Western Europe. The Southern part of Germany is not a sufficient offset to Turkey. In- deed, the first Napoleon declared that the Russian acquisition of Turkey was more than an equipoise to the union of all Western Europe under the French Empire. If Prussia acquired no extra- German territory, Russia, with Turkey annexed, would completely overshadow Germany, and speedily reduce it to a subordinate position. Prussia must have equivalents for the Russian acquisition of Con- stantinople. — Where but in Western Europe are those equivalents to be obtained ? — And, with Germany united, and Turkey annexed to Russia, Avhat European powers could prevent the combined despots from partitioning Europe as ambition and policy dictated? The Tory British government is a party to this understanding between Russia and Prussia. A significant editorial has recently IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 439 appeared in the London Times, the organ par excellence of the Tory aristocracy, which broadly intimates the future policy of the British Tory government. The Times depreciates the importance of the acquisition of Constantinople by a foreign power, declaring it a mat- ter of little concern to England, and insinuating that a British pro- tectorate over Egypt would afford ample indemnity. The British Tory administration will contribute all its power to insure complete success to the reactionary movement. The British government is reckless of consequences. The Tory nobility are will- ing to save their privileges on any terms ; and, if the advancing movement of the age, which is threatening their feudal rights, can- not be arrested save by Russian predominance, they are ready to hail the triumph of Absolutism. They would rather enjoy their privileges under the shadow of Bussia, than lose them by the ad- vance of republican thought. The failing cause of the English nobility cannot long withstand the march of popular sentiment, un- less reinforced by a great political reaction on the Continent ; and the Tory government of Great Britain will enter zealously into the schemes of the allied despots. It is not probable, however, that the British government will solicit an explanation from the despots of their ulterior aims. It will be content with the surface of things, and will refuse to look beyond. The Tories will concentrate their minds and the minds of the British nation upon the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, and will refuse to look further. They will see that this movement settles definitely the question of Nationalities ; puts an end to revolutionary tendencies ; extinguishes French ideas of pro- gress ; and promises the crowned heads and the feudal nobility of Europe a long enjoyment of their rights, free from the specter of impending revolution ; — and this will suffice them. The question also has its popular aspect, in which it will win the applause of the unthinking multitude. The Prussian dynasty is closely allied to the royal house of England, and the union of Ger- many under that crown may be represented as a triumph of British policy, — establishing a powerful ally on the continent, as a strong barrier against French and Russian ambition. But the crowning popularity of the movement will lie in its surface aspect of cliam- 440 THE world's crisis. pioning German nationality against the opposition of French jealousy. By vailing all ulterior aims, the enterprise of the despots will be highly popular in England, and the Tories will be able, should it become necessary, to cast all the power of Britain into the scale against France and Progress. Were all the aims of the despots unvailed, the sturdy independence of the English yeomanry would drive the Tories from their fraternization with despotism, or unseat them from power before the grand scheme were accomplished. The British public must be hoodwinked, until the despots shall have passed the crisis of their movement. It will be time enough to throw oflF the mask, when, Germany united and committed to Abso- lutism, a counter-revolution in English politics can no longer turn the wavering balance in favor of Progress. Until then, the catch- word of the Absolutist despots will be, The National Union of Germany. The National Union of Germany : the coming war, may, from motives of expediency, be based upon some other issue ; but what- ever the ostensible ground of war, this will be the real issue that will soon convulse Europe with a war of giants. Russia, Prussia, and, if necessary, England, Avill take the field in favor of it ; France and Italy must oppose it to the death. For Napoleon knows that the only hope of countering the ambi- tious aims of the despots, and preventing their complete ascendancy, lies in preventing the union of Germany under the Prussian scepter. That once achieved, the vast accession of Prussian power would enable them to override all opposition. Their career of ambition could not afterward be checked. While willing to forward the ag- grandizement of liberal Prussia, Napoleon will oppose to the utter- most any further accessions of power to Prussia allied with Absolut- ism, lie must take a determined stand against the proposed con- solidation of Germany, and stand or fall upon the issue. It is impossible to say when the struggle may come on ; conflict- ing motives counsel both parties to delay, and to immediate action. Potential reasons influence Napoleon to assume a prompt initiative : IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 441 his best hope of success lies in assailing Prussia before her power over her recent conquests is consolidated, and re-establishing the former status by a bold aggressive campaign ; and his advancing years •warn him of the expediency of bringing the existing complications to an issue, while his life and power are in their prime, instead of leaving them to his own old age, or to the minority of his son. — On the other hand, the present preponderance of power on the other side admonishes him of the prudence of waiting : perhaps a change in English politics bringing the Liberals into power, may secure to France a British alliance again, and give it the preponderance of power ; or, the approach of revolution in Germany may render the struggle less hopeless. The motives which influence the Absolutist governments are equally conflicting. By delay, Prussia will have time to consolidate its poAver ; and infirmities or death may remove Napoleon from their path. — But on the other hand, the danger of counter-revolution in England against the Tories, and of revolution in Germany against Absolutism and in favor of France and Progress, admonish them of the expediency of striking promptly, while their present excessive preponderance of strength gives them every advantage. There are three possibilities : Napoleon may take a prompt initi- ative, and make a fierce assault upon Prussia ; or the despots may take the initiative ; or both parties may stand armed, face to face, each afraid to strike, until revolution in Germany shall force the issue upon them. Whichever direction events take, the triumph of Absolutism seems certain, with its necessary consequence, the utter overthrow of Pro- gress. At the danger of being tedious, we will examine the three contingencies, somewhat in detail. Isf. First Contingency^ — French Initiative. If Napoleon decides that his best hope of success lies in striking Prussia before its power is consolidated, two alternatives are before him. — (1.) He may form an alliance with Austria and Italy, and take the field against Prussia supported by Russia and England, for the avowed purpose of re-establishing the former balance of power. But this course would place him at great disadvantage, both in re- 442 THE world's crisis. spect of policy, and military force. He Avould assume the attitude of a disturber of an arrangement in which all Europe has acquiesced; and the predominance of force against him would leave hardly a hope of success. — (2.) He would more probably desire to force a single combat between France and Prussia. If so, he would make cause of war upon some new issue, which does not involve the na- tionality question ; then, if a rapid initiative should enable him strike Prussia down, he as conqueror, backed by Austria and Italy, might strip her of her recent acquisitions, and re-establish the former balance of power in Germany. This policy would give Na- poleon his best hope of success, and it is probable he would adopt it, if he could induce Russia and England to stand aloof while he assailed Prussia. But there is very little probability that those powers will suffer him to engage in a single-handed war Avith Prussia. Great Britain is the self-constituted preserver of European peace. The British government has attempted to mediate in every contest that has arisen between the other powers of Europe, for the last twenty years. Any attempt of Napoleon to force a war upon Prussia alone, will be countered by the mediation of England, as the professed friend of both parties, but really as the secret partisan of Prussia. A conference would be proposed by England, which, being accepted by Prussia and acceded to by Russia, Napoleon could not reject; then, such proposals would be made by England and backed by Rus- sia, as Prussia would accept; and if Napoleon were inclined to re- ject them and go to war, he would find himself confronted by all three of the Absolutist powers arrayed against him as a disturber of the peace of Europe. An initiative on the part of the French emperor is hardly pos- sible, unless he goes openly to war with Prussia backed by Russia and England; when he must seek the alliance of Austria and Italy, and make an open struggle upon the direct issues involved. If he decides upon this, he might gain some advantages, at first ; but a Russian invasion of Hungary would recall Austria to the defense of her own dominions; another Russian army in Northern Germany would enable Prussia, supported by British subsidies, to protract the struggle, until British blockades of French ports would break IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 443 down the finances of France, and leave it a prey to a grand onset of the despots. — Napoleon's only hope in such a struggle would lie in a vigorous offensive, ohtaining great advantages, and conquering a peace upon his own terms at a blow. But the dashing strategy of Napoleon First, by which an inferior force compensates its weak- ness by rapidity of attack, is no longer practicable. It would be countered by the skillful engineering tactics of recent wars, which would enable the despots to protract the struggle, until, between military expenditure and British blockades, French resources would be exhausted. Then, the allies would assume the offensive ; British descents would keep Italy on the defensive ; a Russian army in Hungary would occupy Austria ; a rapid march would overrun the South German states and annex them to Prussia ; — and then the whole weight of Eastern Europe would be rolled upon France. The issue of such a struo;o;le could not be doubtful. 2nd. Second Contingency. — An Absolutist Initiative. Many considerations combine to induce the Absolutist powers to carry out their programme with promptitude, waiting only long enough for Prussian power to become consolidated. Revolution in Germany is imminent at no distant day ; and in the uprising of populations, there is danger that feudal Prussia, the oppressor of Poland, the sympathizer with Absolutism, the ally of Russia, will not be the chosen champion of German patriots. A struggle with the Nationalities supported by France and Italy, would be full of danger to Absolutism. The active support of England would be necessary, in that event, to give Absolutism the victory; and they might fear that a movement on the part of the British gov- ernment in open support of Absolutism against the Nationalities, might cause a revolution in England that would place the Liberals in power, and range the country firmly on the side of Progress. It is the interest of the despots to run no unnecessary risk. The late political revolution in England has given them, for the time, an un- expected advantage, and they will not wish to forfeit the favor of Fortune by unnecessary delay. They will wish to bring the pend- ing issues to a crisis while they are sure of the support of Great 444 THE world's crisis. Britain. Their vast preponderance of strength, also, "will embolden them to assume a prompt initiative. Should the despotic powers decide to assume the initiative, the choice of three lines of policy is open to them. — (1.) They may seek to effect the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, by means of negotiation Avith Austria and the other Southern Grerman states ; or, failing this, (2.) They may assail Austria, and aim to carry out their object by force of arms ; or, (3.) They may begin the conflict upon a side issue, by Russia's making an attack upon Turkey. It seems probable that, before attempting to achieve the union of Germany by force of arms, negotiation may be first resorted to. The position of England holding the balance of power between Ab- solutism and Progress may enable the British government to dictate the plan by which the union of Germany shall be achieved. If so, the policy of Great Britain will incline that government to propose some plan that will obtain the assent of Austria to the programme. The British government, as the friend of Austria, may propose that the House of Hapsburg retain possession of Hungary and the Polish territories, but cede its German provinces to Prussia, and accept of indemnity out of the Turkish territories. This proposition, if carried out in good faith, would be eminently advantageous to Austria. Such an arrangement would settle for- ever the distracting question of the Nationalities. It would appease the restless aspirations of Germany; and would make Hungary imperial, and the seat of the new empire, when it would become as warmly attached to the Austrian dynasty as it has been restless in a provincial condition. Poland alone would remain restive ; but surrounded and pressed by Imperial Russia on the East, Imperial Germany on the West, and Imperial Hungary on the South, the Poles would have no recourse but submission. The arrangement would give the Austrian sovereign an empire absolutely secure against internal revolution. The loyal Hungarians would easily keep the Polish and Turkish provinces in subjection. Again, the arrangement would be eminently advantageous in another point of view. The Austrian territories are now without seaports, and are shut out from commerce. But the possession of IMPENDING TRIUMPH OP ABSOLUTISM. 445 the states of Servia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia, south of the Danube, and the principalities of Wallachia, and Moldavia, on the north bank of the river, would give Austria a broad seaboard upon the Adriatic, and the navigation of the Danube down to its mouth. With such advantages of commercial position, the new possessions, though not more extensive than its present German dependencies, would be of much greater value. It would open up a commercial career which would soon double the resources of the empire. If the Austrian government could rely upon the good faith of Russia and Prussia, it would accede to such an offer; and, if so, Napoleon could make no effectual opposition. The united power of England, Russia, Germany, and Hungary would be arrayed in its favor, against which France could not venture to contend. But it is probable that Austria would fear to trust the faith of its powerful and ambitious neighbors, and would demand that all the great European powers should guarantee the arrangement. Napoleon might possibly consent, if the Belgic provinces of France were re- annexed to his dominions, so as to appease public sentiment in France, and equalize the balance of power, disturbed by the increased power of Prussia and the house of Hapsburg. But England would not consent to this; nor would Russia and Prussia agree to any increase of French territory. This would probably frustrate any such arrangement. Austria would not enter into it in opposition to the wishes of Napoleon ; for it knoAvs that it would have to lean on France and Italy for support against the ambition of Russia and Prussia. It would prefer its present position, however critical, to an arrangement which would place it completely at the mercy of its ambitious neighbors. If Austria should decline (as it probably would) the proposition to exchange its German territories for a Turkish indemnity, it will be the policy of the reactionary powers to achieve the union of Ger- many by force of arms, before the revolutionary spirit issues in outbreak. They may begin the conflict by a direct assault upon the South German states ; or they may provoke it in a more politic manner, by a Russian attack upon Turkey. 446 THE world's crisis. Whatever phase the issue may present, Napoleon will be under the necessity of forming an alliance with Italy and Austria, to main- tain the existing status ; he will thus be placed in the false attitude of a supporter of despotism, while the despots will have the popular role of assertors of the national principle. — Under such circum- stances, the great preponderance of force on the other side would easily strike down the French alliance. Judging merely from the map, England, Russsia, and Prussia, would be matched not unequally by France, Italy, and Austria. But this is only in seeming. It must be remembered that Italian troops will not face Russian and German bayonets. Moreover, the majority of the Austro-German population would be on the other side: Prussia would advance the popular issue — The National Union of Germany — which would spread disaffection throughout all the Austrian territories.— If left to clioose their own time for movement, the agents of Prussia will busily promote disaifection in the Austrian territories ; then, when tlie im- pulse in behalf of nationality shall have ripened to the proper point, a sudden advance of the Prussian armies upon Southern Germany, and of Russia upon Hungary, would strike Austria down before France and Italy could come to her assistance. Prussia alone has beaten Austria and all the princes of Germany, combined, — and beaten them without the aid of disaffection in the opposing ranks. Now that all Northern Germany is united to Prussia, how easy would be her triumph, when her advancing armies would find friends at every step ! And when the power of England and Russia is thrown into the same scale, how inadequate is the power of Napoleon to uphold tlie tottering Austrian empire against their combined assault, supported by internal disaffection ! Then, Austria stricken down, the contest would resolve itself into a conflict between France and the rest of Europe. The strong probability is, that Russia and Prussia with the aid and countenance of Great Britain, will, within a few years, overwhelm the strenuous opposition of France, and achieve the union of Ger- many under the Prussian crown, either with the consent of Austria, or by conquest. IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 447 Bd. Third Contingency/, — Both Parties Delay until the Outhreak of the Nationalities. This contingency is in the highest degree improbable. It is the interest of Prussia to delay her movement until the national feeling in Southern Germany rises to such a pitch as will second her aims. But as soon as German sentiment attains that standard, it is then her policy to strike, before enthusiasm rises to a point in harmony with French principles of progress, and consequently antagonistic to a throne so thoroughly committed to Absolutism. But nations are not always guided by the dictates of sound policy. A mighty purpose sometimes stands awed in the presence of great attempts. Caesar hesitated at the Rubicon. Mere irresolution (though that does not seem a failing of Bismark) may keep the despots hesitating on the brink of a great war that must involve all Europe, until the Nationalities rise in revolution supported by France and Italy. This is the best hope for liberal institutions ; but even in this event, the assistance of the Tory government of En- gland will enable the despots to crush the movement. For in every such revolution, there are royalists who rally round the throne from sentiment, and peasants who are influenced by the priesthood and by hatred of their landlords to support the crown against the patriots, — and these elements, supported by Russian bayonets and British fleets and subsidies, would triumph over the patriotic movement, and enable the triumphant despots to hurl the united force of Europe against France. The Tory ascendancy in England is fatal to Progress. We can conceive no contingency in which the power of Great Britain will not enable the despots to achieve a decisive victory over Progress, and unite Germany under the Prussian crown. II. Abuse of Absolutist Ascendancy. How will the despots use their success ? When Prussia is head of imperial Germany, what will be the con- sequence of this triumph, to France and Italy, and the other liberal governments in Europe? 448 THE world's crisis. Of two tilings, one will happen. Napoleon will endeavor to coun- ter tlieir policy, and be stricken down; or, overawed by the strength of the coalition, and despairing of successfully opposing it, he will proclaim non-intervention, and suffer the despots to carry out their programme unopposed. The first is the more probable. 1st. If Napoleon is beaten in endeavoring to thwart the aims of the despots, he will have nothing to hope from their forbearance. The French empire with its progressive principles, is a standing men- ace to Absolutism, which the latter, in the hour of victory, will not fail to destroy. His unsuccessful resistance of their ambition would be stigmatized as a renewed example of the ambition of the Bona- parte dynasty ; and the fiat of overthrow would be uttered against it — for the sake of the peace of Europe! Another invasion of 1814 would occur, and France would be crushed beneath the heel of despotism. 2d. But take the most favorable prospect for the cause of Pro- gress that the defection of Great Britain leaves : suppose Napoleon, hopeless of resisting the combination of the despots, proclaims non- intervention, leaving them to carry out their programme unopposed. Still, the overthrow of Liberal government in Europe will be equally certain. In this hypothesis, the union of Germany will soon be achieved : either with the consent of Austria ; or by force of arms. 1. The first alternative is most favorable to Liberty. Suppose then, this arrangement consummated — and the Prussian crown possessed of Germany — while Turkey is divided between Russia and Austria, as an equivalent for the Prussian accession of territory. What a revolution do these changes work in the aspect of Europe ! The first effect of the arrangement would be to quiet the restless aspirations of Nationalities. Germany united, with part of Poland dependent upon the empire, the German nation becomes at once enthusiastically attached to the new dynasty which has elevated the nation to imperial grandeur ; for, however zealous a nation may be in asserting its own independence, it never hesitates to aggrandize IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 449 itself by trampling dovrn the independence of its neighbors : Hun- gary also becomes the seat of Austrian power ; and the Hungarian nation is ardent in support of a dynasty which elevated the country to imperial power : the Greeks will not trouble their despots for ages to come : Poland alone may be restless ; but Poland is crushed be- tween Russia, Germany, and Hungary, until the feeble aspirations of nationality are extinguished. The arrangement frees Absolutism from all its dangers. It also quadruples its power in Europe. Heretofore, Turkey has exerted no active influence upon the political destinies of Europe ; and Germany and Hungary have been neutralized by the antagonis- tic attitude of the governments and the people : France and Russia have been the only powers on the Continent capable of exerting a positive influence upon political events. In the nugatory condition of the other Continental powers, and the neutral attitude of England, the balance of power on the Continent has been maintained by the antagonism and equipoise of France and Russia. — But under this arrangement, the equipoise between the liberal and absolute powers exists no longer. It wrests Turkey, and Germany, and Hungary, from their nugatory position, and converts them into the strong, earnest partisans of Absolutism. France stands alone, or supported by the embryo government of Italy, against all Eastern and Central Europe, arrayed in opposition to the principles of governmental progress. — How vast the preponderance. The German empire alone, with its Polish dependencies, is more powerful than France. The Hungarian empire, firmly based upon the attachment of the loyal Hungarians and the inertia of the Greek population, is as powerful as France. Russia with its colossal power increased by its acces- sions of Turkish territory, overmatches France almost as two to one. Two antagonisms in the presence of each other, the one so pow- erful, the other so weak, must soon come into collision. France might avoid ofi'ense ; but the innocence of the lamb never averts the assault of the wolf. The liberal constitution of the French empire is alone sufficient ofi'ense to despotism possessed of an overwhelm- ing superiority of strength. The parties to the Holy Alliance of 1815 would avail themselves of their ascendancy to renew their alli- ance against Progress, and lay forever the specter of revolution, 29 450 THE world's crisis. wliich has, for twenty years, sat at their feasts. The Austrian dynasty would be so completely in the power of the despots whose dominions envelop its own, that it must yield absolutely to their dictation. Despotism always abuses its ascendancy. Banded Europe would be hurled against France. 2. The same result would follow the consummation of the union of Germany, by force, upon the ruins of Austrian power. In the event of the union of Germany under Prussia, no conceiv- able circumstances could prevent the despots from entering upon a career of conquest which would subject Europe to their sway. As we have seen, the ambition of Russia has long aspired to a con- quering career, and Prussia is evidently prepared to abet her aims. Prudence also will urge them to enter upon the career to which am- bition invites. The spread of republican thought will then be the only danger the despots will have to apprehend. The example of America is constantly menacing Absolutism with danger. England is rapidly ripening for Republicanism. Republicanism is constantly aggressive, and if the despotic powers wait its advance, it will, ere Ions:, undermine their thrones. France, especially, is a mine that would soon explode. The French nation is content with an emperor, only on condition of his maintaining the ascendancy of France abroad, and advancing the principles of liberal government. As soon as it perceives that Ab- solutism has proved too strong for Napoleon, it will become restless beneath his sway. If it cannot cope with Absolutism by dynastic power, it will assail it with revolution, and, proclaiming a republic, summon the oppressed populations of Europe to follow in the path of Freedom. Then, such an outburst in Germany as occurred in 1848, supported vigorously by French bayonets, might shatter the thrones of the despots to ruins. The independence of France is incompatible with the safety of Absolutism. If Absolutism is to be safe, France must be subjugated. The mere overthrow of the Napoleonic dynasty, and the re- establishment of the Bourbons, will not suffice. That expedient was tried in 1815; audit resulted in the French Revolution of 1848, which shook the power of Absolutism to its base, and which, in its IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 451 results, has, for nearly twenty years, kept it trembling for existence. The danger of revolution can be averted only by carrying out the programme of 1793 : until France is disarmed, and permanently garrisoned by foreign soldiers, Absolutism can never be secure. The despots, in the hour of triumph, will not hesitate to take the precautionary measures necessary to secure their power. They will endeavor, by every means, to prevent the recurrence of the dangers they will have so narrowly escaped. Let Germany once be united under the Prussian crown, and the despots will not hesitate to enter upon the career of conquest to which prudence and ambition will invite them. The Russian policy will be carried out. France would no doubt make a heroic resistance. But a resistance as heroic as that of 1793 Avould not avail against vastly superior numbers. The old strategy of frontier maneuvers has passed away. Napoleon I. taught despots how to conquer. The French empire would fall before the rapid march of overwhelming numbers ; and liberal gov- ernment would disappear on the Continent of Europe before the aggressive career of dominant Absolutism. And then what would be the fate of England ? — When the English people discover too late the betrayal of the cause of Progress by the Tory Aristocracy, their indignation will probably hurl the party from power. But what will this avail, when the Continent is at the feet of Absolutism ! A country so rich, and so defenseless, could not escape the grasp of the despots. The same prudential motives which urged the conquest of France, would urge, "with even greater force, the subjugation of England. Republican thought is making rapid strides in Great Britain. The moral in- fluence of the country is dangerous to Absolutism. Eventual antag- onism is certain. And with time for preparation and alliance with America, its immense resources would enable England to equip fleets that would hold the continent in blockade, and eventually break Ab- solutism down by exhaustion. The despots would seek to prevent this possibility by conquering the country while it lay exposed de- fenseless to their arras. The war fleets of the Continental nations, "when combined, are twice as powerful as that of England; a descent might easily be eflfected ; and, an army once landed, resistance would 452 THE world's crisis. be vain. Indeed, it seems not improbable that the Tory Aristocracy ■would welcome the invaders. Driven from power by a popular re- action against the ruin they had brought upon Europe, and with all their privileges at stake, rather than submit to the rule of the me- chanics, the British Tory Aristocracy would not hesitate to summon the despots to their aid. An Aristocracy will always betray its country, to preserve its privileges ! And, then, America ! — What will be our fate ? — Despotism will not stop short in the career of victory. It will make no compromise with Liberty, It has learned that the world is not wide enough for Absolutism and Freedom, both. In our age, Absolutism and liberal government cannot coexist. The irreconcil- able enmity between them can only terminate in the destruction of one or the other. Unfettered Freedom is continually widening its sway, and sapping the foundations of despotic government. If Absolutism is to live, Freedom must be destroyed : if Freedom lives, Absolutism must perish. In the present state of the world, despotism can only exist by attaining universal dominion. Ambition is the only safety. The dominating nation may be warmly attached to the throne by the pride of conquest, and the spoils of the earth ; and, converted into a nation of soldiers, it might rule a disarmed world, for ages. We may scoff the idea of universal dominion, but it is by no means an impracticability. Rome swayed the Mediterranean na«- tions for a thousand years, and, during the entire period, no nation ever revolted that had once been subdued. It were far easier, now, to sway the world. Then, the means of communicating intelligence and moving troops, were equally slow. A year was spent in receiv- ing intelligence of a war or a revolt, and dispatching an army to the frontier. Now, the telegraph flashes tidings round the earth faster than the sun can move; and steamers and railways can, in a month, transport an army to the antipodes. With proper means of transportation, telegraphic orders might concentrate, in a week, an overwhelming force upon any revolting nation. A revolting nation ! How can a disarmed nation revolt? A Roman province might re- volt; for when the weapons were swords and spears, they might be IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM. 453 secretly made by any country smith. But can muskets and cannon be secretly manufactured ? Can powder manufactories be secretly established? or magazines of the thousand articles of supply indis- pensable to equip a modern army ? In the present state of military* advancement, the world, once disarmed, could never revolt. An overwhelming force might be sent from the imperial country to the antipodes, long before an insurrectionary nation could equip an army. Let us not attempt to drive away apprehensions with a sneer, until despotism is prepared to fix the yoke upon our necks, — a yoke which, once imposed, never can be shaken off. Ambition and prudence will alike incite Russia and Germany to enter upon a career of universal conquest. No power in Europe can withstand them. We shall be compelled to engage in a death- struggle with Despotism at the head of the marshaled forces of Eu- rope. When that struggle comes, God grant that half our country may not be driven by oppression to welcome the invader, whose feet, once firmly planted on our soil, might never be dislodged ! Upon us the destinies of the earth will depend, and I trust we shall not fail ! It will be, it must be, a desperate conflict. But I believe in the destiny of Republicanism! I believe in the mission of Amer- ica ! I believe in the God of Providence ! In giving to England the colossal power she wields, and which will be thrown at the critical moment into the wrong side of the scale, we have brought the world to the verge of political shipwreck. Ah ! when the crisis comes in Europe, were America but in a con- dition to turn the wavering balance in favor of the cause of Progress ! We might have been, had we been true to our Constitution, and trodden the path of greatness Nature marked out for us. We may be, still, if we in this crisis of our destiny return to a constitutional administration of the government. If, at a future day, the cause of Liberty and Religion is exposed to deadliest peril, the historian who chronicles that dreadful conflict, will attribute it all to our violations of the constitution of our country. Note. — My view of European alFairs was completed in the Fall of 1S66, and they are presented without change. The course of subsequent events has dem- onstrated tlie correctness of the view of the situation then taken. 454 THE world's crisis. In the imbroglio that sprung up on the Luxembourg question, Napoleon showed his anxiety to precipitate a conflict with Prussia on a side issue between the two governments, which did not involve the question of nationality. But tlie prompt interposition of the British government saved Prussia from a con- flict, for which it was not prepared. Since tlien, seemingly convinced that he will not be suffered to engage Prussia single-handed, Napoleon has visited the emperor of Austria, and has, no doubt, come to an explicit understanding with regard to the future policy of the two states. The Italian question, however, was not so near a final solution as I then sup- posed. The turn taken by German atfairs has embarrassed Napoleon, and com- pelled him to adopt a cautious policy with regard to the Pope, which has prevented, as yet, the annexation of the Papal States to the kingdom of Italy. It is now the policy of Napoleon to unite all the Catholic States, if possible, against the ambition of Russia and Prussia. To make head against their am- . bitious aims, he will need the alliance of all the Catholic Powers, — Spain and Portugal, as well as Austria and Italy. This change of the situation renders it necessary to conciliate the Pope. And Napoleon, who, two years ago, virtu- ally abandoned the temporal sovereignty of the Pope to the kingdom of Italy, now finds it advisable, in order to conciliate Austria and Spain, his natural allies against Prussia and Russia, to become the cliampion of Papal authority. No doubt Napoleon is acting in cordial cooperation with the Italian govern- ment. Victor Emanuel would like to annex the Papal territories. But to at- tain this object, he will hardly co-operate with Prussian ambition. He will rather, if he is wise, relinquish his private ambition for the time, to promote the the general safety, and cheerfuljy co-operate with the policy of Napoleon in maintaining the authority of the Pope, as a concession to the Catholic Powers. But this understanding is necessarily a State secret between the two courts. The king of Italy cannot venture to take part against the movement of the pat- riotic fillibusters, for fear of losing popularity with the Italians. He therefore pro- fesses to favor the movement against Rome, while he, no doubt, secretly invites the movement of French troops to drive Garibaldi from -the Papal territories. From present indications. Napoleon must continue to protect the temporal power of the Pope, as a propitiation to the (/atholic powers, who are his natural allies against Russian and Prussian ambition. Events that have occurred since the chapters on European afl^airs were com- pleted confirm the views there presented of the imminence of the approaching conflict. The antagonism of France and Prussia; the sympathy of Englnnd and Russia with Prussian ambition ; the understanding between France and Aus"tria, — all point to a grand conflict, inevitable, however it may be deferred. BOOK III. PROPOSITION III. The present is a CRISIS in which the Government of the United States may, by a wise and conservative policy, enable Our COUN- TRY to enter upon a course of Unexampled Prosperity ; and exert an influence upon FOREIGN AFFAIRS that will arrest the Indus- trial and Political Evils now menacing the World with ruin : But where an ill-advised policy will involve the COUNTRY in Financial Ruin; and suffer the WORLD to drift, without restraint, into a Chaos of convulsion, threatening with overthrow the cause 0/ Human Advancement. THE world's crisis. 457 BOOK III. THE WORLD'S CRISIS. ^ This is the World's Crisis. Whether we look at home or abroad, whether we contemplate the condition of the world in its industrial, its social, or its political aspect, we are equally impressed with the conviction that this is a momentous crisis in the destiny of the earth. Dangers arise on every hand, menacing with ruin the cause of hum^n advancement. The world's industry has been warped into abnormal development; social life is reeling with excitement, and threatens to smother civilization with the fungus growth of prurient development; in the political world. Despotism is recovering from the severe blows inflicted upon it within the last century, and is threatening Liberty with a stern reaction. Industrial, social, and political evils seem hastening to a crisis, as though emulous which shall first strike down the hopes of man. If we analyze the causes of the dangers which overshadow the world, the centralization of industry and commerce in the hands of England, will be found the prime cause of them all. The industrial evils under which the world is laboring have their origin in British centralization of commerce. It oppresses the in- dustry of all other countries, compelling them to sell raw material and provisions to a foreign market, accepting prices diminished by the profits of various speculators and the cost of heavy transporta- tion. It also places them under the necessity of buying manufac- tures from a foreign country, at prices enhanced by speculation and mercantile profits, both on the raw material, and the manufactured article. Thus selling cheap and buying dear, they are impoverished by a losing traflic. Every country in Christendom is becoming 458 , THE world's crisis. annually more deeply involved in debt to England. That country is becoming the annuitant of the world; and unless the tendency to centralization is arrested, it will soon have the nations bankrupt dependencies of its imperial grandeur. The same centralization of industry and commerce is causing the general excitement so deleterious to the social and moral advance- ment of our age. It has stimulated commercial exchange into un- due activity, making raw material and provisions — bulky articles, which should be consumed and manufactured in the countries which produce them — the prime commodities of' traffic. This has led to excitement in traffic, withdrawing millions from productive industry to engage in some of the departments of trade, and massing popu- lation in cities under such circumstances as to corrupt the fountains of social life. The result has been wide-spread excitement, attended with social demoralization throughout the civilized nations of the earth. The same centralization of commerce and wealth in the hands of England has given that country the balance of power, which has enabled it to give to Absolutism a vigor which, in this age it has never before possessed. It is the Tory government of England which gives Russia and Prussia the power to control the affairs of Europe at their will, and which, unless a timely check is given to the evil, will enable them to trample down liberty in Europe, and endaiiorer free institutions throuo;hout the world. This last and most imminent danger derives its threatening aspect entirely from the alliance of British wealth and power with the Absolutist govern- ments. The power of trade and commerce is thus thrown into the balance, in favor of despotism. This state of things will continue as long as the Tories retain control of the British government. All their sympathies and in- terests ally them with Absolutism against the principles of progress. It is now evident that the Tories will remain in power so long as England continues to enjoy the prosperity she now possesses. The Liberal leaders are endeavoring to obtain a Reform Bill* which *Thi8 was written before the passage of the recent Eeform Bill by the En- glish Parliament. THE world's crisis. 459 shall so extend the suffrage as to give their party the control of the government. But the Tories are resolved to so frame the measure as, to destroy the Whig party, by strengthening their own and the Liberal parties; knowing that in a contest between the landed aris- tocracy and the mechanics, the Middle class aristocracy will range themselves on the side of the former. From the known devotion of a great number of nominal Whigs to Tory principles, it seems probable that the Tory ministry will be able to carry a bill through Parliament, substantially such as they desire. If they succeed, they will turn to their own advantage the entire Reform movement, strengthen their own party, crush the Whigs, and place the Liberals in a decided minority in Parliament. The Reform bill now before Parliament will doubtless so adjust the suifrage, as to establish the Tories firmly in power. But the Tory position has one weak point. In extending the suffrage they will increase the power of the people, and they can control the votes of the enfranchised masses only so long as no period of general discontent intervenes. Whenever an industrial crisis shall inflict general suffering upon the English masses, the people will cast off the influence of the Aristocracy, and with their votes bring the Liberals into power. Until then, the Tories will control the government with strong parliamentary majorities. The only hope of getting the Liberals into power, and arraying the British government on the side of Progress in the coming Eu- ropean struggle, lies in bringing about a period of industrial distress which will wrest the enfranchised masses from Tory influence. It must not be supposed that, in urging this consummation, the writer is actuated by hate of England, or a desire to cause yet deeper suf- fering among the oppressed masses of that country. On the con- trary, he is influenced by a sincere desire to promote the true in- terests of Britain. Her centralization of industry is a false system. It is oppressing the British people no less than foreign nations. It does not benefit the country ; it only increases the colossal fortunes of an already overgrown aristocracy. Besides, a false industrial system must sooner or later, be overthrown. The sooner the crisis comes, the less suffering it will involve. Far better that it should come at a period when it will stimulate the English people to unseat 460 THE world's crisis. the aristocracy from power, and place their government in alliance with liberty in the approaching crisis, than that it should be deferred until the manacles of despotism are riveted upon themselves, and upon mankind. A blow to the commercial centralization of England would cause general discontent among the suffering masses. The thousands of operatives thrown out of employment would demand labor and re- lief from taxation. They would point to half the lands of the coun- try devoted to pleasure grounds, pasturage, and the growth of timber. They would notice the unequal distribution of taxation, of ■which more than half is imposed upon the suffering people, while the property of thfe rich is exempt from public burdens. They •would demand that taxation should be removed from articles chiefly consumed by the poor, — that excises and customs upon articles con- sumed by the laboring classes should be abolished. They would demand that the public revenues should be raised by a property tax, which would free industry from public burdens, and compel the aris- tocracy to devote their parks and forests to tillage, and thus afford food and employment to the millions languishing in want. The Tories would never yield to these demands, without a struggle. They would bring all the engines of wealth and power to bear, in order to control elections. But the famine-stricken people would not recede. A fair election would elevate the Liberals to power : an attempt to control the polls by fraud or violence would lead to revolution. If this revolution in English politics precedes the great coming struggle in Europe between Feudalism and Progress, all will be well :. the British Government, under Liberal rule, will place itself in the van of Progress, and assure oppressed populations of its sympathy and support. Meantime, our own country, through the measures necessary to break down British monopoly, would make rapid strides in manufacturing industry and commercial greatness. Our moral influence would afford a powerful support to liberal move- ments abroad, and a combination of the United States, France, and England, would overawe the despotic powers. An European Con- gress might then be held, whose decisions would re-establish the Na- tionalities, reduce Russia within proper limits, and settle without an THE world's crisis. 461 I appeal to the sword the dangerous issues which have so long agitated Europe. We should become the great leader in the march of ad- vancement. Stimulated by our example, and encouraged by our sympathy and moral aid, the nations would tread the path from monarchy to republicanism, and, at no distant day, thrones would give place to universal freedom. If the world is to be saved from the dangers which menace it, the centralization of Great Britain must be overthrown. We are more deeply interested in the achievement of this object than any other country. To us will inure the advantages resultant from it ; upon us, especially, will be inflicted the evils it is engendering. America more than any other country is the victim of the social excitement gendered by the British centralization of commerce ; it will be the first country doomed to bankruptcy ; and, if the programme of Ab- solutism furthered by England is consummated, the United States will be the victim immolated upon the broken altar of freedom. It behooves us to bend our undivided energies to the overthrow of this baneful centralization. It should be made the chief aim of our policy. To this grand purpose every thing else should be made secondary. The centralization of commerce in the hands of England was occa- sioned by our departure from the principles of the Constitution, which gave that country the opportunity to engross the cotton man- ufacture, and thus lay the foundation of that centralization it has since attained. We thus dwarfed our own manufactures, perverted our industry, and gave England advantages which she has used to the utmost. We must now undo our work. We have built England up. We must now, in self-defense, and in the interests of human progress, pull her down. The only hope of averting a great catastrophe lies in breaking down the British centralization of industry and com- merce, and becoming, ourselves, a great manufacturing and com- mercial nation. We must return from our departures, and enter, though at the eleventh hour, the path of industry for which nature designed us. The cotton manufacture is the only one in which we can, at pres- 462 THE world's crisis. ent, successfully compete with England ; and it is the only branch of industry of sufficient importance to overthrow the commercial monopoly of England, if wrested from her. "We have much fewer .advantages in attempting to compete with her in woolen manufac- tures. She can obtain an unlimited supply of wool from Australia, South America, and the Mediterranean, at prices cheaper than we can, at present, grow it. Moreover, the woolen manufacture is not of sufficient importance, even if wrested from England, to cause the downfall of her centralization of industry. The cotton manufacture is the vital point. In 1859, the exports of Great Britain were nearly £120,000,000, ($600,000,000,) of which nearly £50,000,000 (§250,000,000) were cotton manufactures. In 1861, the cotton famine had begun to influence the manufacture, but even then, cotton fabrics comprised £47,000,000 (§235,000,000) out of £125,000,000, (§625,000,000),— the entire exports of tiie coun- try. When we reflect that, besides the cotton goods exported, a great quantity is consumed in Great Britain, instead of woolen and flaxen goods, leaving those to be exported in larger quantities ; and when we further reflect that the cotton exports are used in exchange, to stimulate the production of many articles of British commerce which would not otherwise be produced ; and, furthermore, that the transportation of cotton goods and raw products received in ex- change, creates a demand for British coal, and railway iron, and machinery, — we shall see that more than half of the commerce of England is based on the manufacture of cotton goods. In depriving her of the cotton manufacture, we should, at a blow, divert one-half of the commerce of Great Britain to ourselves. Accomplish this, and we shall rescue ourselves and the world from the calamities now impending. It will at once arrest the ab- normal system of commerce that has prevailed, stop the drain of wealth from all the world to be centralized in England, and avert from us the bankruptcy otherwise inevitable; it will check the social excitement generated by centralized commerce, now threatening the downfall of civilization; it will avert the political ruin now over- shadowing the world. We can do this. No other nation can. We alone have been en- THE world's crisis. 463 dowed by nature with advantages, "vvhich, wisely used, will enable us to outrival Britain, and dispossess her of her baneful supremacy. We can do it. We must do it. In this, the most important crisis that has ever occurred in the history of the world, all the great in- terests of humanity hail us on to the rescue. We may achieve this aim. But it will be no easy task. It will challenge all our energies, and require the adoption of the wisest policy. We might, in 1860, have wrested from Britain the scepter of commerce, with little difficulty. But the events of the last five years have almost wrecked our industry, and have enabled England to fortify her position to such an extent as to almost defy compe- tition. It now becomes a question of the utmost importance to consider the policy necessary to be adopted, in order to achieve the overthrow of British monopoly. This will be the aim of the remaining portion of this work. It is necessary, however, before entering upon this discussion, to notice the elements of the present situation, together with the causes which have brought affairs to the present pass. This will be the subject first before us. 464 THE world's crisis. PART I. THE SITUATION, AND ITS CAUSES. It will appear, in the ensuing chapters, that the dangers of the present situation arise entirely from the unconstitutional inter- ference of the Federal government with th^ internal interests of the country. We propose, in the first place, to give a brief resume of the train of causation already traced, showing that all the past evils of the republic arose out of the unconstitutional course of the Federal gov- ernment, and that the recent Civil War, itself, is but the necessary result of causes thus set in operation ; and, secondly, to trace the evil effects of the War, especially upon our industry as in competi- tion with Great Britain. We shall thus obtain a clear view of the elements of the situation, and be the better prepared to consider the measures necessary to be adopted, to enable us to enter into successful competition with Great Britain. CHAPTER I. A RESUME. The evil consequences of the unconstitutional intervention of the government in the internal industry of the country, as already traced, may be stated in their regular order, as follows : — First Line of Causation. 1. The influence of the Bank and Tariff fostered manufactures in New England, which was the only section of the country that had capital to engage in them. A RESUME. 466 2. The Bank and Tariff raised the scale of prices throughout the country, and increased the cost of production in the same ratio. This operated greatly to the disadvantage of the South, which pro- duced cotton at prices enhanced by an inflated currency and by high duties, while it sold in a foreign market at prices graduated by a specie standard. 3. The Eastern market relieved the West from stagnation, and gave an impetus to its industry that made it the most prosperous section of the country. 4. Emigration was thus diverted from the South to the West ; and the development which Southern industry would have derived from a large emigration was prevented. Second Line of Catisaiion. The comparatively slow development of Southern industry was productive of the most unfortunate results : — 1. It prevented the South from growing its own supplies besides supplying the English cotton market, and compelled it to concen- trate its entire industry upon cotton, importing its supplies in great measure from the West. 2. This extensive demand in the East and South compelled the West to concentrate its industry upon agriculture, and thus diverted it from manufactures. 3. The absence of sufficient emigration to the South gave rise to the slave trade between the states : fortifying slavery in the border states ; and, in the cotton states, increasing the hardships of the negro, and generating a slave aristocracy. Third Line of Causation. The Industrial System that now sprung up, in which the East was chiefly devoted to manufactures and merchandise, the South to planting, and the West to supplies, led to a third train of industrial results : — 1. The inability of our New England factories to compete with those of Great Britain, especially when the cost of manufacturing was en- hanced by a scale of prices inflated by a redundant currency and a 30 466 THE world's crisis. protective tariff, prevented us from becoming a great manufacturing country. 2. This system of industry, in which no section produced its own supplies, gave rise to an excessive internal commerce where pro- visions and raw material, as well as manufactured articles, were hurried to and fro from one end of the country to the other. 3. This excited system of interchange gave rise to speculation, and massed vast populations in cities ; and it thus generated a social excitement impairing the judgment and depraving the moral per- ception of large masses of our people, and fitting them to run to any extreme in morals, politics, or religion. ^ ... Fourth Line of Causation. 1. The oppression of the South by the Bank and Tariff was read- ily perceived by Southern statesmen, (though they attributed the combined influence of both exclusively to the latter,) and caused a most determined and excited opposition to the Tariff system. This was met as resolutely by the friends of the system, who were chiefly in the North and West. The political antagonism was intensified by the social excitement which now began to pervade the country. 2. The Tariff generated antagonistic interests where nature in- tended all to be harmony, and the agitation of this issue first gave rise to the sectional bickering which afterward rose to such a height, and ultimated in civil war. 3. The Tariff agitation, by exciting fierce passions on both sides, first caused a collision between Federal and State authority, which, under the Constitution, was never contemplated, and ought never to have occurred. In Nullification, it planted the seeds of Secession and Coercion, — the germs of civil war and national ruin. 4. The exigencies of the Tariff agitation compelled Andrew Jack- son to introduce into the administration the innovation. Rotation in ofiice ; which ended in making politics a trade, and the government a prize of contest to ambitious and grasping place-hunters, who sac- rificed the best interests of the country to the lust of office. 5. The contest over the Tariff question generated passions among the advocates of protection which caused them to originate and fos- ter the slavery agitation as a means of retaliation upon the South. A RESUME. 467 And, aftenvard, when the West and the Middle states united with the South to break down the protective system, the advocates of the Tariif seized upon the abuses of Slavery, caused mainly by the Tariff system, to unite the entire North against the South, and en- able them again to set on foot the protective system. 6. And, now, the social excitement fostered by our industrial sys- tem, and the political corruption engendered by rotation in oflfice, exerted a combined influence to embitter the sectional agitation, rendering both sections deaf to the voice of reason and the counsels of moderation, and plunged the country, despite the restraining ef- forts of conservatism, headlong into civil war. Fifth Line of Causation. 1. The location of our factories in New England, causing us to fail of becoming a manufacturing country, left British enterprise to engross the manufacture of our cotton, and to construct upon the basis of that manufacture, a gigantic commercial centralization, rendering the whole world tributary to its industry. 2. This commercial monopoly, based upon a violation of just commercial principles, is preying upon the industry of all nations, compelling them to exchange raw produce for manufactures, to sell cheap and purchase dear, and is making England the annuitant of all countries to an extent which threatens the world with bank- ruptcy. 3. This commercial centralization, making staple commercial commodities of provisions and raw material, — articles which ought never to enter into the system of commercial interchange — has given rise to a general social excitement throughout Christendom, developing erratic impulse, and tending to demoralization. 4. The commercial centralization of England has given that coun- try a wealth and influence which invest it with controlling power in the present political condition of the world; — power which it has hitherto used in critical periods in favor of Absolutism, and which is now strengthening despotism for a decisive conflict with freedom in Europe. Sixth Line of Causation. The Civil War from which we have just emerged was the direct 468 TUE world's crisis. result of the Tariff policy of the country and the industrial and political forces it had set in operation ; and it became, in turn, a more potent cause of evil to the country and the world, than any we have hitherto noticed. — It remains to trace in the detail its impor- tance demands, the baneful results flowing from our Civil War. The influence of the War requires attention, both under its nega- tive, and positive aspect. Its evils are to be sought, both in the good it prevented, and in the positive evils it inflicted. We will view it in both these aspects : tracing 1st. The negative influence of the War, in arresting our career of normal prosperity ; and 2d. The positive evils to which the War has given rise. The extent of the subject demands that one or more chapters be assigned to each of these topics. CHAPTER II. THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR.— 1. ITS NEGATIVE IN- FLUENCE IN ARRESTING OUR CAREER OF NORMAL PROS- PERITY. We have now traced the line of industrial, social, and political evils which flowed from the Bank and Tariff" as their primal source. But, as in the human system, so in the body politic, diseases run their course; when reaction sets in, tending to repair the ravages of disease and restore healthy action. As the influence of the Bank of 1791 had run its course in 1812, leaving the country with a tendency to enter once more upon a course of normal industry ; so, in 1860, the influence of the Bank and Tariff" policy had spent its force upon the industry of the country, and the causes were already at work which would have arrested abnormal development, corrected the evils from which we suff"ered, and restored us to a healthy condition. But, as the War of 1812 arrested the return to a healthful state, and set in THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 469 operation a train of causes "vrhicli plunged the country into new evils ; so the Civil War of 1861 arrested the tendency to healthy reaction, and precipitated evils an hundredfold worse than any we had endured. The War of 1861 was an unpardonable blunder on the part of all concerned. Every step that led to it was a blunder, from the organ- ization of the Abolition party, to the passage of the first Ordinance of Secession. It will remain to posterity the most memorable ex- ample on record of the worse than folly of attempting the violent removal of evils, instead of leaving them to the operation of natural laws. The Abolition and Free soil parties were suc- cessively organized to check the spread, and eifect the overthrow of slavery, when the operation of natural laws would have effected its peaceful extinction within half a century. The organization of those parties was a blunder. They originated in the shortsighted policy of men who were unable to read the signs of the times, — who could not see that Nature had affixed boundaries, beyond which slavery could not pass ; nor trace the industrial causes which doomed the institution to an early and peaceful extinction ; — men, who were too impatient to wait the sure operation of nature's laws, and too faithless to trust the advancement of the world to the guiding hand of the Almighty ; — Uzziahs who, excited to frenzy by the prevailing excitement, upon seeing the ark of progress tottering, as they supposed, stretched forth sacrilegious hands to its support. It will be remembered that our abnormal course of industry, with all its consequent evils originated in the diversion of emigration from the South. This prevented the South from over supplying the English cotton market : and compelled it to concentrate its labor upon cotton; to rely upon the West in a great measure for supplies ; and to purchase slaves from the border states. The want of emi- gration to the South perverted the entire industry of the country. AVhile the labor of the South continued inadequate, industry could not resume its normal channels. So long as the South could not supply the English cotton demand, that section would continue to purchase slaves from the border states, and to concentrate its in- dustry upon cotton, depending upon the West for supplies. And so 470 THE avorld's crisis. long as this state of things continued, Slavery would maintain its vigor, and continue to be oppressive : and the West would be too busily engaged in growing agricultural supplies, to turn its attention to manufactures. Before the evils under which the country labored could cease, the South must acquire sufficient labor to over supply the cotton market. As soon as this end were attained, our warped industry would begin to leave its erratic channels, and return to its natural course. Now, the South was, for years, approximating to this condition. For forty years the maxim of the Southern planter was, "Buy more negroes, to raise more cotton ; and raise more cotton, to buy more negroes." As each succeeding crop grew larger, the purchase of negroes became more extensive. The labor of the South increased in arithmetical progression. Rapidly as the cotton market extended under the impulse of British enterprise, the labor of the South in- creased more rapidly still. Year by year, a full supply of the cotton market was approximated more nearly. In 1860, the end was achieved. The two full crops of 1859 and 1860 overstocked the market. Vast quantities of cotton were stored in English ware- houses; and English factories manufactured so far in excess of the demand, that eighteen months of short supply, consequent upon our civil war, hardly sufficed to reduce the stock of goods on hand to the normal quantity. It was evident that production had at length outstripped consumption. Southern labor had at length so far in- creased, as to over supply the demand for cotton. Let us mark the necessary effect this state of things would have produced upon the industry of the country, if the war had not in- tervened to arrest our natural progress. We will trace its influence, 1st. Upon the institution of Slavery. 2nd. Upon the industrial condition of the West. Sec. 1. — The Influence of the Over-supply of the Cotton Market upon the Institution of Slavery. The over-supply of the cotton market, as its first effect, would cause the planter to turn a part of his labor to the production of supplies for home consumption, and for adjacent town and city THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 471 markets. The purchase of negroes from the border states might continue a few years longer, until the labor of the South were suf- ficient to grow all necessary supplies, besides growing cotton enough to supply the demand. Then, other investments would be more profitable than negroes, and planters would cease to buy slaves from the border states. The slave trade between the states would cease. I. The Effect of the Cessation of the Slave Traffic upon Slavery in THE Border States. 1st. Effect upon Slavery in Maryland and Virginia, Slavery has not, for years, been profitable in Maryland and Vir- ginia, except in the raising of negroes for the Southern market. The farmers in those states have long been unable to meet their expenses by the cultivation of the soil. Two or three young negroes were annually sold to meet the expenses of the plantation. What could those farmers do, when the Southern demand for negroes ceased ? In Virginia and Maryland, tobacco is the only crop that will afford profitable employment for a large force of negroes upon a plantation. If the farmer increased his tobacco crop in the effort to make up the deficit arising from the Avant of market for surplus slaves, his land would soon be exhausted : if he continued to limit his crops to the capacity of his land, his negroes would be an incumbrance instead of a profit, and an annual deficit of thousands of dollars, formerly made up by the sale of slaves, would threaten him with beggary. What resource would the Virginia farmer have, whose farm was thus overstocked with negroes? It might be his first impulse to rid himself of the oppressive num- ber of his slaves, by sending a portion of them with his children to settle in the South or West. But the want of money to meet the expenses of removal, and to purchase land at the destination, would render this impracticable. His negroes being unsaleable, the only method of raising money would be the sale of his land. But the sale of part of his land, to obtain means to send away part of his 472 THE world's crisis. negroes, would not better his condition. — The Virginia farmer who was oppressed by the number of his negroes exceeding the capacity of his land, would find it his only resource to sell his land and migrate with his slaves to the South or West. The migration of slave owners would soon leave too few negroes in Virginia, and Maryland, and Delaware, to influence public sentiment, and those states would follow the example of states farther north, by estab- lishing a system of gradual emancipation. — Virginia came very near declaring gradual emancipation in 1832. The demand of the Southern market afterward strengthened the institution. The with- drawal of that market would soon have ripened public sentiment in favor of emancipation. 2nd. The Influence of this State of Things upon Slavery in Ken- tucky and Missouri. What would be the effect of this migration of slaveholders into Kentucky and Missouri ? Hemp is the only crop in those states, upon which large gangs of negroes can be profitably worked in a limited space. But the con- centration of immense numbers upon the hemp crop, would soon glut the market and reduce the staple to a merely nominal value. What would the slaveholders then do ? If they turned their attention to tobacco, the very limited market for the article would be glutted, with a consequent decline of price ; and the same result would follow as in Virginia, — the exhaustion of the soil. Grain crops require too extensive a surface in proportion to labor, for gangs of negroes to be profitably employed upon them. In the absence of a Southern market to which the Western negroes might be sent, the negro pop- ulation of the West would soon increase, by immigration and natural growth, to such a degree as to become burdensome to their owners. No Western crop would enable the Western farmer to meet the nec- essary expenses of his plantation. — The slave owner of the Western states would be under the necessity of selling his lands, and mi- grating with his slaves to the cotton states, leaving the border states to go into gradual emancipation. THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 473 II. The Effect of this State op Things upon Slavery in the Cotton States. Two causes would soon render this negro population concentrated in the cotton states an injury to the country, and a burden to the owner, of which he would gladly rid himself: — 1st. The over-population of negroes in the cotton states would, in less than half a century, have rendered emancipation and colonization an unavoidable necessity. 2nd. The cotton market would be gorged, and the labor of a plan- tation of slaves would not justify the expense of maintaining them. Let us, in the first place, take the most favorable view of the question, for slavery, and suppose that a steady demand continued for the products of slave labor. Still, it is capable of easy dem- onstration that slavery in the cotton states was doomed to an early extinction by the mere over-peopling of the soil. Isf. Slavery doomed to Early Extinction hy the Narrow Limits of the Territory adapted to Slave Labor. The first thing to be considered in this connection is, the rapid exhaustion of the soil by slave labor. Cotton is an exhausting crop, and with a large gang of negroes upon a limited quantity of land, the first consideration with the planter must be, not the improvement of the soil, but employment and subsistence for his slaves. The result would be the absolute exhaustion and abandonment of millions of acres of uplands, in a few years. The exhaustive system of cul- ture was, before the war, already awakening apprehensions for the future, in the minds of reflective Southern men. Tract after tract had been exhausted, and abandoned by emigration to a virgin soil. This exhaustion of land is an important feature in the estimate of the profit of negro labor. If, in thirty years, the net profits of the labor of a plantation of negroes is $40,000, there is a net loss of $10,000, if, meantime, they have worn out and compelled the owner to abandon lands whose value as a virgin soil would be $50,- 000. With the immense influx of negroes to the cotton states, this item would swell into overshadowing dimensions. The increase of population would enhance the value of land, while it would neces- sitate its rapid exhaustion. 474 THE world's crisis. How long would it require for this increase of slave population to overstock all the good lauds in the Cotton States, and necessitate emancipation through the exhaustion of the soil? The following are the statistical facts necessary to make an es- timate : First : The negro population of this country has, since the begin- ing of the century advanced at a regular ratio of increase, — it has doubled once in thirty years. It doubled in the interval of thirty years from 1810 to 1840; again the negro population of 1820 had doubled in 1850 ; and the population of 1830 was doubled in 1860. Second: Upon an average, the eifective force of a plantation of negroes was equal to two-thirds of their whole number, — one hun- dred and fifty negroes, men, women, and children, were estimated as equal in the cultivation of cotton to one hundred " hands." Third: Ten acres of cotton to the " hand" was the usual crop. To make our estimate as favorable to the existence of slavery a3 possible, let us suppose that only eight acres of cotton to the "hand" are grown. Fourth: For the support of the plantation it was necessary to raise, besides the crop of cotton, five acres of Indian corn to the hand; and upon a self-sustaining plantation, an equal quantity either of some other grain, or of peas, would be necessary. We will suppose, however, that eight acres of grain to the hand are suf- ficient for all plantation uses. Fifth : To prevent the exhaustion of the soil, and to supply neces- sary pasturage for stock, it would be necessary to have a quantity of fallow, or grass land, equal to one-third of the whole tillable land. Sixth: Hence a judicious system of tillage would allow to every hand eight acres of cotton, eight of grain and other supplies, and eight of fallow or grass. Consequently, apart from the land re- served for timber and fuel, every self-sustaining plantation would require twenty-four acres of land to each hand, or sixteen acres to evei-y head of negro population. Now let us see how many negroes the cotton states would support in full employment, without exhausting the soil. Let us make the most favorable estimate. Suppose the entire non-slaveholding white population to be concentrated in cities and towns, or living on poor THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 475 lands unsuited to slave plantations, leaving to slave plantations all the fertile lands in the cotton states. This certainly is a most favor- able estimate for slavery. It will not be counterbalanced if, to sim- plify our calculation, we suppose that the entire slave population is concentrated on plantations, leaving to whites the avocations of towns and cities, and every class of business except planting. Furthermore, as we take it for granted in this estimate, that there is an unlimited demand for cotton, it is not necessary to draw any distinction between the production of cotton and other Southern staples : for the purpose of our estimate we may suppose the entire slave population of the cotton States assembled on plantations engaged in the production of cotton. How much good land is there in the cotton States ? — Leaving out Texas and Florida, there are in round numbers in the cotton States, including Arkansas, one hundred and seventy-five million acres of land. From this, however, we must deduct the swamp lands of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Georgia, and South Carolina, and the vast upland barrens iu all the states, covered with pine and oak, and wholly unfit for the growth of cotton. Of the surface of Louisiana, it is estimated that over three-sevenths or nearly one- half is swamp. Every traveler in the cotton states remembers the immense extent of the pine and oak barrens which comprise the uplands. It is a liberal estimate, to suppose that one-third of the surface of those states, or 60,000,000 acres, is a fertile soil suited to the growth of cotton. — The greater part of Florida is either swamp, or pine barrens ; and of Texas, far the greater portion is composed of dry plains, only suited to pasturage. Of the 195,000,- 000 acres of surface in those two states, less than one-fourth is adapted to cotton plantations. — It will be a most liberal estimate to suppose that, of the 370,000,000 acres of land in the cotton states, one-fourth, or 90,000,000 acres are* fertile soil adapted to cotton plantations. * A writer in the Southern Quarterly Review, — speaking of the extent of surface adapted to the cotton culture, says: "A very low latitude, even in llie United States, is not favorable to a large yield of the upland cotton. Low down in Texas or Louisiana, the plant runs too much to weed, with long joints and few bolls. The truth is, the real cotton region is, comparatively speaking, a narrow belt in the 476 THE world's crisis. Now let us suppose every acre of this land to be devoted to slave plantations ; and let it all be devoted to tillage, not reserving an acre for timber or fuel. How many negroes could find profitable employment, Avithout exhausting the soil ? As we have seen, twenty- four acres would be required for every hand, — being sixteen acres to every head of negro population. At this rate, 5,625,000 negroes would occupy all the good cotton lands in the Southern states. This number would be equal to 3,750,000 hands, and would cultivate, at eight acres to the hand, 30 million acres in cotton, 80 million acres in cereals, and 30 million acres in grass and fallow. In 18G0, there were about 2,500,000 negroes in the cotton states. Suppose that, prior to emancipation in the border states, only one- third of the negro population were sent South. Then, at their regular rate of increase, doubling once in thirty years, the 2,500,000 negroes in the cotton states in 1860, together with the subsequent immigration from the border states, would amount to 6,000,000, in 1890. They would then have occupied every acre of cotton lands in the cotton states. Their subsequent increase Avould be a burden, either taxing the soil with excessive culture and rapidly exhausting it, or diminishing the cotton crop to give place to supplies. In 1900 A. D., the negroes of the cotton states would have in- creased to nearly 8,000,000, of whom two-thirds, or 5,333,000, would be hands. These must continue to grow eight acres, each, of grain for supplies. The planters would now be under the necessity of choosing whether they would exhaust their land with excessive cul- ture — abandon the growth of cotton — or emancipate their negroes as United States. Take the latitude of 33 degrees and run it west, and it will be found to be the center of the belt. Seventy-five miles north and south of that de- gree will comprise the cotton region of this country, and the plant will degenerate as fast going south oftliat line as it will north of it, as far as the quantity per acre is concerned. The weed will not degenerate, but the bolls will grow fewer, as you go south ; and as you go north of that latitude, they will not mature so fully. Even within that belt there is great inequality." The writer states that the climate of Texas " will forever prevent that region from being permanently a cotton country." He concludes: " We infer from all this, that the climate suited for cotton, even in the United States, is far more limited than was formerly supposed."— From his remarks it appears that the estimate given in the text is much too large. THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 477 expensive and unprofitable, and employ coolie labor, instead. If they gave up the necessary quantity of land to grass and fallow, there would not remain five million acres for cotton : if they con- tinued to cultivate the usual quantity of cotton, their lands would be so exhausted in a few years, as to be unable to support their negroes. In either case, ruin would confront them. The longer they deferred action, the worse their condition would become. In 1910, there would be 10,000,000 negroes, requiring, at our estimate, 50,000,000 acres to be devoted to supplies; leaving only 40,000,000 acres for cotton, if the entire surface were devoted to ceaseless cultivation. In 1920, there would be 12,000,000 slaves, requiring 04,000,000 acres to be devoted to the production of sup- plies. The subsistence of the negroes alone, would then give full employment to the soil. This tendency would be readily perceived, and as soon as slavery became less profitable than coolie labor, a system of gradual emanci- pation and colonization would be adopted. This state of things would occur in 1900; when, as we have seen, slavery would be unprofitable unless with the exhaustion of the soil, while coolie labor would yield a large profit. Three and three-quarter millions of coolies would cul- tivate the 90 million acres of land, — 30 million acres in cotton, 30 million in supplies, and 30 million in fallow\ The land cultivated in cotton would yield, at the usual average, 15,000,000* bales, worth, at ten cents a pound, $600,000,000. Their wages, at $50 each a year, would amount to §187,000,000, leaving a profit of §413,000,000. Let us reduce this estimate to the scale of a single plantation. A planter with 1,200 acres of land would, in 1890, have on it, by our estimate, seventy-five negroes, equal to fifty hands. They would cul- tivate every acre of his land, — four hundred in cotton, four hun- dred in cereals, and four hundred in fallow. — In the year 1900, these negroes would have increased to one hundred, requiring the culture of 530 acres of cereals for the support of the- plantation, and dimin- ishing, proportionally, the amount of cotton produced. This tend- ency would go on until 1920, when the negroes would have increased * It will be recollected that this estimate is based upon the supposition that the cotton market is unlimited; so that, by hypothesis, the labor of the l?outh b limited only by the quantity of land on which to employ it. 478 THE world's crisis. to one hundred and fifty, and the support of the plantation would require 800 acres to be cultivated in cereals, and tax the soil to its full capacity of production for the support of the plantation. The planter, in the year 1900, would already perceive the tendency. The negroes would at that time be a burden, while, by the employ- ment of coolie labor, the planter would realize a large annual profit. Fifty coolies would cultivate his land, at a cost for wages of $2,500, and produce a cotton crop worth $8,000, leaving a net profit of $5,500 annually. The result would be that, by the close of this century, the cotton states would be driven to the adoption of a system of gradual eman- cipation, in connection with African colonization. Southern statesmen foresaw this result. They perceived that the time was coming when the increase of the slave population in the cotton states would overstock the soil, and render the institution a burden. Hence their efforts to prevent this consummation, by ob- taining territory into which slavery might spread. — But this could not have averted the impending doom of the institution. Slavery could not exist on an extensive scale in the territory occupied by Mexico. The six months of dry season which there prevails, unfits the country for the growth of slave products, except where the land can be artificially irrigated; and the valleys susceptible of irrigation are suiall, and the supply of water is wholly inadequate to the irri- gation, even of these. Slavery could not be saved by expansion. Divine Providence had assigned its limits, and fixed the bounds of its duration, in the immutable laws of industry. It thus appears that, under the most favorable supposition, slavery could not have endured half a century. It may be objected that, in our estimate, too large a surface has been devoted to the produc- tion of cereals, inasmuch as the surface devoted to cereals would not increase in the ratio of the negro population. Admit this, and still our estimate is much too favorable to the institution. — We have supposed that the white population of the cotton states, who at the reo-ular rate of increase would have numbered eight millions in 1890, would yield all the fertile lands to the occupancy of negro planta- tions; and, furthermore, that these lands would be equally distrib- THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 479 uted among slave owners in proportion to the number of tlieir slaves. But practically, neither of these suppositions is correct. Many of the fertile lands would be held by non-slaveholding whites ; many slaveholders would have engrossed lands much in excess of the number of their negroes; — leaving many slave owners to settle on inferior lands, which slave culture would soon exhaust. Their clamors under the burden of slavery would lead the cry of emanci- pation, while yet extensive landowners in fertile districts found slavery profitable. These causes would materially shorten the du- ration of the institution. 2nd. Slavery Doomed to Early Extinction by the Over-supply of the Cotton Market. In the preceding estimate, we have supposed that the cotton de- mand would be boundless, and that the institution would be exceed- ingly profitable until the increase of the negro population compelled the diminution of the cotton crop, to give place to cereals. In car- rying out the calculation based on this supposition, the cotton crop of 1790 was estimated at fifteen million bales. This supposition yields altogether too much to the duration of slavery. The limited demand for cotton would cut short the profits of the institution during the entire period. — Our cotton production began at zero, in the presence of a demand which the supply could not meet. Our production doubling about once in fifteen years, grew faster than the demand; and at this ratio of increase, we, at length, in 1860, produced a quantity surpassing the demand. — It would be a liberal estimate to suppose that the demand for cotton would double once in thirty years. At this rate ten million bales would supply the cotton market in 1890. Tlie glut of the cotton market would exert a most important influ- ence in shortening the duration of slavery. Even if we Imd an unlimited surface upon which slavery might spread, the want of demand for slave products suited to the soil, would soon render the institution a burden. In 1890, there would be in the cotton states six million slaves, of whom at least four millions and a half would be gathered upon cot- ton plantations. We should then have four million five hundred 480 THE world's crisis. thousand negroes engaged in raising supplies, and growing ten million bales of cotton as an extra crop. Two million laborers are sufficient to grow that amount of cotton ; so that the South would be sustaining two million and a half of negroes in practical idleness. By the year 1900, the negroes on cotton plantations would have increased to six millions, of whom three and one-third millions would be an useless burden. In 1910, the idlers on cotton planta- tions would number over four millions ; in 1920, five millions, out of a population of nine millions. The question would arise. Why keep millions of idle negroes occupying the best lands of the country, when less than half their number would suffice to do their work ? The non-slaveholding whites would see themselves excluded from millions of acres of the best lands by negroes, of whose labor there was no need, who were an incubus upon the country, and a burden to their owners. They would demand that a different system of labor should be introduced. The slave owners would see that the interest of the capital invested in lands and farming implements for the support of these idle negroes, together with the amounts expended in clothing them, etc., would pay for the labor necessary to supply the cotton market. If they were disposed to hold out, their obstinacy must give way when they saw these idle surplus negroes requii'ing so much land to be devoted to their subsistence as to trench upon the surface devoted to the production of cotton. As they saw their cotton crops, year by year, diminished, to give place to supplies necessary to maintain their negroes, they would be forced to recognize the necessity of ridding themselves of the incubus of slavery. Slavery in the cotton states was menaced by two horns of a dilemma, one, or both of which assured its destruction. The Avant of sufficient land to support the negroes would be fatal to it: the want of sufficient demand for cotton Avould be fatal to it. The com- bination of the two doomed it to early and inevitable extinction. — Indeed, slavery can only exist under peculiar circumstances. It requires two things to render it profitable, — an abundance of cheap and unoccupied lands where a wasteful system of culture is of little consequence, and an unbounded market for products on which shive labor may be profitably employed. It becomes unprofitable when THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 481 the slave population increases beyond the ratio of the demand for slave grown products; or, when the country in which it exists be- comes populated to such an extent as to leave no room for the fur- ther spread of slave population. It can only exist in a new coun- try growing slave products, for which the markets of the world afford an unlimited demand. Slavery had been highly profitable once in the border states. In 1860, it was no longer so, except in connection with the southern slave market. It was still highly profitable in the cotton states, and would continue to be so, for years to come. So long as the market for cotton and for agricultural produce afforded the negroes active employment, the profits of the institution would continue. But when the increase of the slave population exceeded the limits of the demand for their productions, and the capacity of the country for their support, the institution would become a burden, and would pass away with the circumstances which gave it vitality. Far better for our country had slavery been left to the operation of natural laws. By the close of the present century, the institu- tion would have been brought under the influence of emancipation legislation, which would have quietly freed the country from its presence. Our civil war came on at the very moment when indus- trial forces were being developed tending to emancipation. Had the crisis been deferred a few years longer, the evident wane of slavery in the border states would have quieted all excitement, and the institution w^ould have been left by general accord to the opera- tion of industrial laws. Let us consider, Sect. 2. — The Effect op the Supply of the Cotton Market upon OUR Manufacturing Industry. The concentration of southern labor upon the cotton crop, caus- ing that section to rely largely upon the West for agricultural sup- plies, was one of the chief causes which turned the industry of the latter section away from manufacture, to the production and trans- portation of cereals. The supply of the cotton market would, as a first effect, divert a great part of the labor of the South to the 31 482 THE world's crisis. growth of supplies ; and this would continue until the entire wants of the section were met. The Southern market for Western produce would cease. The stagnation of Western industry would find no relief except in manufactures. — Cities have grown up on the south- ern borders of the West, engaged in the Southern supply trade. Both their population and their capital would now be idle. Their laboring population would be under the necessity of dispersing into the counti-y to increase the already too great production of agricul- tural supplies. The capitalists and property holders of the cities, and the country farming population, would be equally interested in averting this depopulation, alike ruinous to them all. The only alternative would be, to employ this population in manufactures ; and the immense capital of the West would all be promptly invested in manufacturing industry. None can question the ability of Western manufacturers, at that period, to compete with British cotton and woolen fabrics, in our own markets, where the incidental protection of a revenue tariff was afforded them. — But it may be questioned whether they would have been able to compete with English manufactures in the markets of the world. A comparison of advantages will show that the West still possessed the superiority Avhich, at an earlier day, should have secured to that section manufacturing supremacy. England, it is true, then possessed greater advantages than thirty years before. During that period, her manufactui'ing industry had attained extraordinary dimensions ; her industry had become thoroughly systematized ; and unexampled prosperity had given her the power of an immense accumulated capital. But the West had also developed in an unexampled degree all the elements of indus- trial greatness. If it had not the accumulated capital of England, it had enough to establish manufactures to the full extent of the wants of industry. If it had not the organized operative industry, it had the population already assembled at desirable points, and ready to engage in manufactures at the first signal. Everything was ready but the manufactories, — raw material, operatives, ware- houses, steamboats, railways, and labor in abundance. No enter- prise is capable of such rapid development as manufactures. In a THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 483 few years, the West miglit have had in operation as many looms and spindles as Great Britain. Once in operation, British manufactures would have been driven from competition. In every element of successful industry, the West had immeasurably the advantage. 1. The English factories were supplied with American cotton, for- warded to Liverpool as the depot of supply for English mills. The cotton from the Mississippi valley could be forwarded to St. Louis, Louisville, and Cincinnati, about as cheaply as to New Orleans. The Western manufacturer, therefore, would save in the cost of raw materia], the freight from New Orleans to New York — factorage there — freight from New York to Liverpool — brokerage there — and freight from Liverpool to Manchester. 2. The English operative was fed on Western produce, at prices enhanced beyond the Western cost, by transportation to New York — mercantile profits there — freight to Liverpool — mercantile 4)rofits there — and freight to Manchester. 3. The price of imported commodities was not enhanced by Tariff duties with us so much as in England, Our Tariff was then reduced to the revenue standard, averaging only a duty of 19 pjgr eent. ; and the cost of imported commodities and luxuries used by the laboring class was much cheaper, here, than there. 4. The difference of taxation gave the Western manufacturer a great advantage over the English. We were free from debt; while England owed £894,644,060 ($4,473,220,300), entailing an annual burden of £30,110,000 ($150,- 550,000), for interest. Besides this, Great Britain was under the necessity of maintaining a heavy military and naval armament, cost- ing annually £27,385,000 ($136,925,000). The whole expenses of the British government involved an annual taxation of $350,000,000. But moreover, the mode in which British taxation was adjusted, caused it to press upon industry with excessive severity. The Aris- tocracy would not suffer a tax to be laid upon their property, — the system that presses most lightly upon industry. The system of taxation was so adjusted as to press with undue weight upon the industrial, and especially upon the laboring class. 484 THE world's crisis. Compare the weight of taxation in the two countries : — The American paid no tax upon breadstuffs, and scarcely any upon tea, sugar, and coffee; the English people paid on these articles $47,000,000. The American paid no tax upon his distilled and malt liquors, of which great quantities are consumed by the laboring class of all countries ; — the English people paid upon these articles in Tariff duties, excises, and tavern licenses, $170,143,140. The American people paid no tax upon tobacco ; — the English people paid $32,779,720. The business men of America transacted their business without paying taxes on business transactions ; — the business transactions in England were charged with stamps to the amount of $47,500,000. The business men of America invested their profits without any deduction from taxation ; — the business of England paid an income tax of $40,000,000. The only point in which England had the advantage of us lay in the currency. Our currency was then much less inflated than it had been at any recent period. We had just emerged from the crash of the free banks in 1857, whose issues, like those of the National Banks, now, were based on public bonds, and the people were dis- gusted with expanded paper issues. There were, then, in the United States, 1,118 banks founded on a specie basis, having $83,- 000,000 of specie in their vaults, and a circulation of $178,000,000 : besides these, there were 444 stock banks, based on state bonds, and having a circulation of $29,000,000 : it is estimated that our specie circulation, at that time, amounted to $10,000,000. The entire cir- culation of the country was $217,000,000, of which $188,000,000 consisted of specie and the notes of banks on a specie basis. — The circulation of Great Britain at that time was $225,000,000, — fifty millions of coin, and one hundred and seventy-five millions of paper currency. Our circulation was much more inflated than that of Great Britain, when the commercial transactions of the two coun- tries are compared; and it was attended with its natural result, — an inflation of prices beyond the English standard. But this draw- back was not sufficient to counterbalance our advantages in every other particular. THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR. 485 In view of the high prices of provisions imported from abroad, and the burden of taxation imposed upon the hxboring classes in duties and excises upon the articles they consumed, the British manufacturer was compelled to pay his operatives high wages, to enable them to subsist. Wages in Lowell were lower than in Man- chester. The wages paid in New England were too little, in view of the high price of all articles of subsistence, enhanced by trans- portation from the West; but in the midst of the Western agricul- tural region, those wages would have subsisted the operative in comfort. The establishment of manufactures in the West Avould lower the cost of our manufactured goods ; and, by breaking down the false industrial system that had sprung up, it would lower prices so far, that wages might be reduced fifty per cent below the English standard, and yet yield the operative a better subsistence than that class has ever hitherto realized, in any country. — But the American manufacturer could afford to pay the same wages as the English, and still manufacture at a cheaper cost : the greater cheapness in the cost of raw material would alone make a handsome profit; and this with the cheaper cost of living, and the absence of government tax- ation, would enable him to sell his goods at a lower scale of profit, and still realize the same clear gains as his British competitor. These two facts would be decisive. The American could afford to sell his goods in the world's market thirty per* cent, cheaper than English fabrics, and still realize the same net profit as his competitor. It is needless to trace in detail the advantages flowing from the establishment of manufactures in the West, and our wresting from Great Britain the centralization of manufacturing industry. As the subject will be treated more in detailf hereafter, it will suffice merely to indicate results, leaving the mind of the reader to supply the chain of causation. 1. It would have struck down at a blow all the evils under which our country has labored so long. (1.) All political evils would have soon disappeared. — Sectional * See a more detailed estimate of the relative expenses of the English and American manufacturer, on page 612. which fully bears out this declaration. ■j- See page 616. 486 THE wokld's crisis. animosity would have ceased through identity of interest, — the West and South being copartners in the cotton supply, and the East their commercial agent. — The slavery agitation would have ceased, from the identity of Northern and Southern interests, and from the amelioration of the institution and its evident decadence. — New England, engaged in its legitimate business, the carrying trade of the country, would cease to clamor and conspire for the triumph of the protective policy. The country would have peace. (2.) Our industrial evils would soon have disappeared. — Industry would have flowed in its normal channels. — With our abnormal in- dustry, would have passed away the industrial evils, and the social excitement, to which it had given rise. 2. The attainment of our proper industrial position would have quietly averted the dangers now so menacing to the Avorld. (1.) The downfall of the British commercial centralization would carry with it the industrial oppression and the social excitement it has occasioned. (2.) The event w^ould dispossess Britain of the colossal power which has always been used to strengthen Absolutism, and which is now strengthening Despotism for the overthrow of Progress. If the industrial reaction which had begun in 1860, had been suffered to work out its results unimpeded, the w^orld would now be safe. Had slavery been left to the solution of natural causes, our career of prosperity would have been uninterrupted. The crisis that is now menacing the world so dangerously would have been averted without effort. But the War has wrenched us from our career of normal industry, and suffered events to drift on to a crisis, where only the most prompt, resolute, and well-directed efforts can save all from impending ruin. The Anti-slavery agitation has been, from the first, a positive evil. It precipitated a struggle, which checked, in its incipiency, the ten- dency to emancipation ; which has cost the lives of one-fourth of the negro population ; which has paralyzed our national industry, and burdened the country with debt ; — and all, to effect precipitately, and at the wrong time, the emancipation which would have been brought about, at the proper time, by the laws of industry. It may POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR. 487 prove, in the future, the source of yet greater evil. The want of the organized systematic industry of the South may prove the cause of wide-pervading industrial ruin, from which no quarter of the country will escape. If the influence of America is paralyzed in the hour of the World's crisis, and the hopes of mankind drift helplessly on to shipwreck, it will be because the American people committed the fatal error of precipitating a movement which should have been left to the guidance of Providence, and thus ruined their country at the very moment when its prosperity was greatest, and when it might and would have achieved every thing for itself, and for mankind. CHAPTER III. EVIL RESULTS OF THE WAR— Continued. POSITIVE EVILS. A GREAT industrial contest with England is now our only hope. In this contest we should have nothing to fear, if our condition were the same as before the War. Our victory would be sure. If we had now the same monopoly of cotton production as then; if En- gland were entirely dependent upon us, now, for her supplies of raw material ; if we were, now, in the same industrial condition, free from debt, with a revenue tariff, a specie basis, and an organized Southern industry, — we might easily wrest from England the cotton manufacture, and overthrow her commercial supremacy. But the War has not only made the contest necessary ; it has rendered our position well nigh desperate. The War has afforded England the opportunity to strengthen her position. It has robbed us of the sinews of our strength. Sect. I. — The War has Enabled England to Fortify her Cen- tralization OF Industry. Great Britain has always regarded with uneasiness her depend- ence upon us for raw material ; knowing that whenever we adopted a wise industrial policy, our competition would Avrest from her the 488 THE world's crisis. most profitable and important branch of her manufactures. The far-sighted commercial statesmen of Britain have long anxiously desired to free their country from dependence upon us for the raw material of her cotton manufactures. For years, the energy, and capital, and finesse of that country, were directed to the furtherance of this object. British policy has had two aims, — to develop rival fields of cotton production ; and to diminish our efficiency as cotton growers. With one hand, British capitalists lavished money to develop the cotton culture in new fields ; with the other, they showered gold to foster the anti-slavery movement in the United States, having in view the subversion of the labor system of the South. The first aim of their policy proved fruitless. A supply of seed, machinery, and capital was ofi'ered to every country that would en- gage in the cotton culture. But while the Southern states Avere growing cotton with slave labor, no country could compete with us in the cotton market. Nowhere else was there a labor system so thoroughly reliable, and so cheap. The Southern planter could afford to grow cotton at a price which barely paid expenses, — the natural increase of his slaves affording sufficient profit. In the in- terval between 1825 and 1860, Avhile the supply of American cotton had increased 976,000,000 pounds, the supply from Brazil had fallen off 16.000,000 pounds, that from the West Indies 9,000,000 pounds. Egypt and India only had increased their supply, — the former 22,000,000 pounds, the latter 18,000,000 pounds. American slave labor distanced all competition, and bade defiance to every effort to foster rival fields of production. The effort to foster the anti-slavery excitement in this country was more successful. Philanthropy was the vail used to cover the deep interest manifested by British statesmen in the war waged in the North against slavery. But it seems suspicious that British capital should be lavished to strike down an institution which gave her only dangerous commercial rival a decided advantage. The historian may, perhaps, declare that the efforts both of British capi- talists, and of the leaders of British public sentiment, were influ- enced more by jealousy and commercial rivalry, than by philan- thropic hatred of slavery. POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR. 489 Be this as it may, when the issue between the North and South, fomented as far as possible by British influence, approached a crisis, British capitalists promptly prepared to avail themselves of any op- portunity to foster their cherished object which the fermentation of American passions might offer. In 1857, when the " Kansas War" was embittering sectional passions and strengthening the Republican party, British capitalists organized " The Cotton Supply Asso- ciation," having for its aim the systematic development of the growth of cotton in new fields. Then, no sooner was war declared in 1861, than Britain seized the coveted opportunity to stimulate cotton production all over the world. British capital was poured out with a lavish hand upon every quarter of the globe. A supply of seed, of farming utensils, of necessary machinery, was offered wherever needed; dams and sluices were constructed for irrigation ; and railroads were built, to open up cotton fields to market. Under the stimulus of high prices and specie payment, cotton was grown in large quantities wherever the soil and climate were adapted to its culture, and the necessary labor could be obtained. The result shows the grandest triumph of enterprise and capital ever witnessed. The growth of cotton has everywhere been largely increased; and countries which never before produced cotton have engaged extensively in its culture. Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, and India now supply England with an amount of cotton almost equal to the supply received from the United States before the War. The following table exhibits the British importations of cotton since 1857 : 1857 = 969,618,896 lbs. 1858 = 1,034,452,176 lbs. 1859 = 1,225,989,072 lbs. 1860 = 1,390,938,752 lbs. 1861 = 1,256,684,735 lbs. 1862 = 523,973,296 lbs. 1863 = 669,583,264 lbs. 1864 = 893,304,720 K)s. 1865 = 977,968,288 lbs. 1866 = 1,377,129,936 lbs. 490 THE world's crisis It appears from this table that England has so far succeeded ia stimulating production in these new fields, that, notwithstanding the comparatively small amount received from the United States, her cotton supply is now as great as in 1860. British manufacturers now seem in a fair way to achieve their cherished object of becoming independent of our supply of cotton. If the present state of things continues a few years longer, they will dispense with our cotton as readily as they now dipense with our wool. This state of affairs is full of menace to our prosperity. Cotton has always been our chief article of export, upon which both the foreign commerce, and the internal traffic of the country is based. British enterprise threatens to exclude us from the cotton production, altogether. The "British Cotton Supply Association" Avill, of course, continue to cherish the culture of cotton in these new fields of production ; and if there is any competition in the market, it will give their products the preference over ours. And it is un- questionable that, once fairly embarked in the cotton culture, with labor systematized, these new fields can grow the staple cheaper than we can, in the present industrial condition of the country. If our industry continues in its present abnormal condition, and we remain the satellite of British industry, growing raAV material and provisions for her market, in a few years more we shall find ourselves driven from the cotton production, altogether. We now have to protect our home wool-growers from foreign com- petition by a tariff on foreign wool. If the present state of things continues, in a few years hence, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and India, after supplying England with cotton, will compete with our own cotton planters in our home market ; and we shall be under the ne- cessity of protecting our home-grown cotton from their competition by high duties, as we now protect our wool. That this is not a meaningless jeer, will appear in a glance at the natural advantages of those fields for the production of cotton. We notice them as briefly as the importance of the subject will warrant. POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR. 491 We will notice : 1. Brazil as a Cotton-producing Country. Brazil has advantages which will render it_, if once embarked in the culture of cotton, a formidable rival of the United States. It has a boundless extent of fertile soil, and a climate finely adapted to the growth of cotton. Indeed, cotton is an indigenous plant, growing without culture, and in its wild state continuing five or six years without decay. An American traveler who investi- gated the subject with care, states that two-thirds of the surface of the country is adapted to the production of cotton. Brazil has also an abundant supply of cheap and reliable labor, in four million African slaves. The emperor has recently expressed himself in favor of a system of gradual emancipation, to take effect at the expiration of twenty years. But the Congress has taken no action on the subject; and, in any event, this generation will not find any modification of the labor system now prevailing in that country. Besides the advantages of soil, climate, and labor, adapted to the culture of cotton, Brazil has every requisite to cheap production. Its vast extent of seaboard, and its numerous navigable streams in- tersecting the interior, give the best facilities for cheap transporta- tion ; its exuberant soil yields to agriculture ample returns, and countless herds of cattle roam its boundless plains; facility of pro- duction, and the distance from market, will always render agricul- tural supplies cheaper than with us. In all the natural advantages for cheap and abundant production, Brazil surpasses our own country. Lack of enterprise, and ignorance of its vast resources, alone prevent it from taking the front rank among cotton producing countries. Had England lavished upon Brazil the enterprise and capital Avith which In- dia has been inundated, it would have rushed with a giant's step upon the career of industrial grandeur. As it is, — its slumbering energies not yet fully awakened to the fiery ardor of which the Portuguese character is capable, — the profitable nature of its other productions, and the modest recognition of our industrial supremacy, withheld it from attempting to rival our production while interrupted by the War. It was expected that, peace once restored, we would again monopolize the cotton market in defiance of competition. But let 492 THE world's crisis. it be seen that the locks of our strength are shorn, and Brazil will enter the field of competition in earnest, and assist in driving us from the English market. 2. The Countries around the Mediterranean. The soil and climate of these countries are well adapted to the growth of cotton. Under the stimulus of British enterprise, many of the Turkish dependencies have engaged extensively in the culture. Egypt has engaged in the culture with remarkable energy. The influence of the government has co-operated with British enterprise in stimulating production to the utmost. For years to come, Egypt may be expected to send an annually increasing crop to the British market. The country has the capacity for immense production. The delta of the Nile still retains the proverbial fertility which en- abled it, in the days of the Pharaohs, to sustain a population of fifteen million souls, besides exporting large quantities of bread- stuffs to the neighboring countries ; and which, under the Roman empire, gained it the title of "Granary of Italy." — And, to its full capacity for growing cotton, Egypt presents the conditions of cheap production. Its staple is finer, and commands a higher price than any sent to the English market, except our small product of the sea-island variety; the Fellah Arabs cultivate their own lands, avoiding expenditure for labor ; the productiveness of the soil, and the absence of market for breadstuff's, reduces life-sustain- ing products and the profits of labor to a much lower standard than with us. Egypt now exports a great quantity of cotton ; but the production has not yet nearly reached the limit of the capacity of the country. 3. India. But India is the great cotton-field, whence England hoped — and hopes to draw its chief supplies of staple. Imagine a country larger than the entire territory of the United States east of the meridian line of the western border of Missouri, all lying within the cotton zone, and peopled by an industrious pop- ulation four times larger than that of the United States, — and we have some idea of the immense capacity of India as a cotton pro- ducing country. Cotton has always been grown in India, and the POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR, 493 cotton manufacture has, from its earliest history, been one of the staple branches of industry. Its annual cotton crop was estimated in 1851 at 400,000,000 lbs, being half the amount of the cotton im- ports of England, at that period. But until recently, owing to the stereotyped habits of the people and the want of transportation to the coast, only a small portion of the product was exported. The greater part was used in household manufactures upon the primitive hand-loom. But its past production is no criterion of the capacity of this vast region as a cotton growing country. Its fertile uplands, and the inexhaustible deltas of its great rivers, are equally adapted to the growth of the staple. India has hitherto been depressed by the evils of misgovernment : many of the works constructed in former ages for irrigation were suifered to fall into ruin, and no new works were built : the rudest system of culture has prevailed : the want of roads has cut off the interior from market. Under such circum- stances, industry might be expected to languish. Still, under these accumulated disadvantages, the cotton exports of India have steadily advanced during the last forty years. About half the cotton exported was sent to England, the other half finding a market in China. In 1825, it exported to England 20 million pounds ; 41 million pounds in 1835 ; 77 million pounds in 1840 ; 118 million pounds in 1850; 204 million pounds in 1860; and 370 million pounds in 1861. Then, British enterprise began the lavish use of capital, to foster cotton production in the country. Millions were spent in the con- struction of railroads to open up the interior cotton-fields ; millions more were advanced for repairing old, and constructing new works of irrigation ; and other millions were expended in providing proper implements and machinery for cultivating and preparing cotton for market. — A few statistics will show how earnestly British enterprise is engaged in developing the vast resources of India. In 1864, there were completed 2,688 miles of railway; in 1865, there were completed 3,186 miles, and the completion of nearly 5,000 miles was guaranteed. Immense works for irrigation have been con- structed along the Ganges, and other streams. The main channel of the Ganges canal is 900 miles long, with over 1,800 miles of dis- 494 THE world's crisis. tributing channels, besides many hundred miles of minor channels. It irrigates a million and a half acres. Along other streams canals have been constructed varying from 100, to 500 miles, in length. In the presidency of Madras, nearly all the great rivers have been in- tersected by wiers, or dams, which prevent the water of summer rains from flowing to the sea, retaining them for irrigation. The govern- ment of India, withal, has been much ameliorated, and the country now enjoys a just and beneficent system of administration. Great Britain is neglecting no means of fostering the production of India. The fruits of the wise policy so recently adopted are manifest in an industrial development wholly without precedent. In 1862, the fostering care of England had not had time to pro- duce effect, and the cotton export was 388,000,000 pounds, only 18,000,000 pounds more than in the preceding year. But in 1863, the export was increased to 430 million pounds, and in 1864, to 506 million pounds, — a quantity greater than the United States exported in 1850. If we compare the development of cotton exportation in India since 1860, with the increase of production of our own country, we are deeply impressed with the vast resources of that region. Its export, in 1860, was about equal to ours in 1825. Four years later, its exportation was equal to ours in 1847. Indian exportation ad- vanced as rapidly in four years, as ours did in twenty. If we look at the industrial development of India in another point of view, we are equally impressed with its extraordinary prog- ress. In 1833. the entire sea-borne commerce of India, includ- ing imports and exports, only amounted to $95,000,000. In 1864, its sea-borne commerce amounted to $784,000,000, equal to one-tliird of that of Great Britain, and exceeding our own im- port and export trade for 1865, and our commerce in any for- mer year. India has suddenly become the commercial rival of the United States. The development of these new fields warns us that, if Great Britain is suffered to continue her policy of fostering their produc- tion, in a few years more, they will drive us from the cotton market. We are in the habit of soothing our apprehensions by various POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR. 495 suggestions, all utterly futile. It is better to look the situation in the face, and adopt a decisive policy that will avert the dangers that threaten us. It was long urged that the India staple was of such inferior qual- ity that it could never come in competition with ours. But this in- feriority was chiefly owing to the indifference of the cultivators to the improvement of its quality. The same inferiority was once characteristic of India indigo, which was so worthless as to be unfit for the European market. The attention of English superintendents, however, so far improved its quality as to make it one of the staple exports. The same system of careless, slovenly management, with- out proper machinery for ginning and packing, allowed the India cotton to remain an inferior staple, hardly fit for the English market, and only suited to coarser fabrics when mixed with the American staple. While it was used in this manner, merely as an auxiliary to American cotton, to eke out the inadequate supply, its improvement was not very essential. The producers, finding a ready demand for their staple as it was, gave no care to the production of a better article. But when the American supply fell off, and the stock from these new fields became the prime staple of manufactures, the im- provement of the quality became a matter of the first necessity. The "British Cotton Supply Association" forwarded to India large quantities of the seed of the fine Egyptian cotton, and furnished the Hindoo cultivators with the most improved machinery for ginning and packing. Tlie result has been a remarkable improvement in the quality of the India staple. The Egyptian seed produces, on India soil, a cotton of larger and stronger fiber than the American, which answers well in manufactures for those purposes to which the latter has hitherto been applied. It is again urged that these new fields cannot become formidable competitors, from the fact that their inhabitants are not sufiiciently advanced in civilization to require manufactures in exchange ; and that, consequently, a traffic which requires from Christendom an annual exportation of specie to pay for cotton must soon cease. This objection has some weight. England is draining Chrisrendom of specie to pay for her cotton supply. But the process lias gone 496 THE world's crisis. on for five years without producing any financial crisis. The re- mittance is systematized, and England is careful not to increase the remittances of specie beyond the amount of the annual product of the American and Australian mines. The traffic, therefore, merely serves as a conductor to prevent the accumulation of specie in Christendom. Moreover, time only is wanting to restore the balance of trade. Nothing introduces the wants of civilization so rapidly as commerce. The introduction of new and cheap articles of man- ufacture into a country, soon creates an extensive demand for them, — a demand which experience proves is only limited by the ability to purchase. England is exporting to Egypt, South America, and India, an annually increasing quantity of manufactured articles. In a few years, she may succeed in stimulating those countries into consuming manufactures in sufficient quantities to pay for their ex- ports, and thus establish the balance of trade. Again it is urged, that the system of culture is so rude in those new fields that high prices are necessary to remunerate the culti- vator of cotton ; and that systematic industry is so little developed, that nothing but high prices will stimulate production. This objection seems plausible, but experience has furnished an answer. We know that those fields did furnish cotton in considerable quantities, at the old prices prevailing before the "War. And ex- perience has taught us what prices were sufficient to stimulate pro- duction. India cotton was always two cents per pound lower in the Encrlish market than the American. It was found that, whenever American cotton was worth fourteen cents a pound in Liverpool, or eleven cents in our own ports, production was stimulated in every foreign field. Sixpence a pound in the English market always pro- duced a large export of cotton from India. It is a mistake to sup- pose that their rude culture enhances the cost of cotton to any great extent. The chief expense in cotton culture is, not the cultivation of the plant, but picking the cotton. In this operation, the cheap labor and the manual dexterity of the Hindoos give them a great advantage. Experience proves that these fields, even in their old rude system of culture, were able to produce cotton as cheaply as we. The facts in the case, so far from soothing our apprehensions of POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR. 497 rivalry, give us grave cause of uneasiness. Under favorable cir- cumstances, nothing improves so rapidlj as husbandry — nothing develops so rapidly as industry. Forty years ago, our own system of husbandry was rude. Our agricultural implements were of the most primitive model, and our system of culture was little in ad- vance of that which now prevails in India and South America. Nor was systematic industry much further advanced. Their system of culture has already been much improved. The lavish use of British capital, and four years of extraordinary prosperity, have enabled them to adopt improved processes in every part of the cotton cul- ture. If, under the old system, — with imperfect implements for culture, primitive machinery for ginning and packing, no roads, and a bad government, — India was able to sell cotton for twelve cents a pound in the Liverpool market, that price will certainly suflSce, now, when such improvements have been made. The question with us is, not whether those fields will maintain their standard of production Avhen cotton falls to the price of 1860 ; — the past proves that ! — but, whether they will not, as their system of husbandry continues to improve under the fostering care of England, be able to export cotton at a price cheaper than we can alibrd. If their industry continues to develop, we may expect them to compete with us in the Liverpool market, with cotton worth only twelve cents a pound, and perhaps even lower than that. But it is urged as a last resort, that the cotton market is un- limited, and that the industry of all is not more than sufficient to supply it. This is a grave mistake. That the demand for cotton is advancing, and will continue to advance, is unquestionable. But the increase of the crop in our own country more than kept pace with it. In 1860, we had glutted the market. If our production, alone, sufficed to glut the market, how will it be when the United States, South America, Egypt, Turkey, India, and China, are all competitors in the market, and all annually increasing their crops ? The market will be glutted to the gorge, and the fields which can produce cheapest will drive others from competition. It will then come to the test of cheap production. And when those fields shall have improved their system of agriculture, what 32 498 THE avorld's crisis. advantage shall we have over them ? They have the conditions of cheap production in a more eminent degree than we. They have the low scale of prices based upon a specie currency. Their luxu- riant soil and tropical climate enables them to grow life-sustaining products in the greatest abundance; and the distance of a foreign market keeps prices at a standard far lower than with us. In Bra- zil, beef is worth only a cent a pound ; the distance of a market renders Egyptian produce extremely low ; in India, the ordinary price of rice and wheat, the principal food of the population, is only forty cents a bushel. Moreover, the tropical climate of those coun- tries produces cheaply products of luxurious consumption, which we must purchase at greatly enhanced prices. Furthermore, the clothing of the cultivators of Hindostan, Egypt, and Brazil, is much less expensive than with us. And finally, they have fewer of the expensive habits of civilization. — If it comes to the test of cheap production, they will, in the end, drive us from the English market. Such are the elements of the industrial situation we have to face. England has fortified her position, and become independent of our supply of cotton, and even threatens to supersede it, altogether, with the production of foreign fields. The War has given her an immense advantage over her position six years ago. Then, we might, by a resolute, well-directed effort, have easily deprived her of her cotton manufacture. Now, with her factories supplied with staple from those new fields, Britain is a formidable competitor. Sect. 2. — The War has Weakened Us. The War has not only enabled Great Britain to strengthen her position, and fortify her centralization of industry; — it has dimin- ished our resources for competition, in even a greater degree. I. The War has Weakened us, by the Devastation of the South, and the Prostration of Southern Industry. Who can estimate the losses it has entailed! In the usual ratio of progress, the Southern States ought, now, to be advanced far beyond the status of 1860. In the ten years preceding the war, millions of acres were added to farms. The value of the farming lands more than doubled. Instead of the usual rate of increase, the POSITIVE EVILS OF THE WAR. 499 present condition of the Southern States presents a most deplorable contrast with their prosperous state, in 1860. The track of armies is marked with desolation ; the condition of the country is one of general poverty, — resources wasted, property ruined, labor demor- alized. Of the negroes who cultivated our great staple, vast numbers have perished, and a great part of the survivors are subsisting in comparative idleness, a burden, rather than a benefit to the commu- nity. The supply of cotton has greatly fallen off, with no prospect, from present indications, of a change for the better. Large districts in Georgia and South Carolina are being forsaken by the negro pop- ulation; in the Mississippi delta, the country is threatened with desolation by the destruction of levys, and the bankrupt landowners, disheartened by the unpromising circumstances of their condition, are almost ready to abandon their lands to the river. Six thousand million dollars will not cover the losses of the South from the War. The loss of property, — representing accumulated capital, — will amount to nearly or quite five thousand millions; and one thousand million dollars will not cover the losses from the stag- nation of industry during the war. The devastation of war, the dismantling of plantations, the de- struction of property and stock, the demoralization of labor, — have reduced the Southern states to a condition the most unfavorable for competing with the new cotton fields developing under the intelli- gent patronage of Britain. II. The War has Weakened us by the National Debt it has Accumulated. The war has imposed on us a national debt of almost unexampled magnitude. The recognized debt of the country amounts to $2,500,- 000,000. Bounty grants, and the assumption of state war debts, increase it by several hundred millions. Besides this, there are said to be outstanding claims to the amount of $3,000,000,000 more. Leaving this aside, the recognized debt will, involve an annual tax- ation of $150,000,000 for the payment of interest. This debt entails upon us another serious disadvantage, pregnant with danger to our prosperity. While the British debt is owned by capitalists at home, a considerable portion of ours is in the hands of foreign capitalists. It has been estimated that the payment of 600 THE world's crisis. interest on American securities abroad requires the annual exporta- tion of $100,000,000 of gold, or its equivalent. This is hardly an exaggerated estimate. The foreign debt is sufficient to keep us drained of the precious metals. The produce of our mines is insuf- ficient to meet the draft. In default of a large cotton production, the balance of trade has, for years, been heavily against us ; and this, with the payment of interest, necessitates a large annual ex- portation of our bonds, with increasing drafts upon the resources of the country for the payment of interest. The existing tendency, unless soon arrested, will have caused, at no distant day, the ex- portation of the entire debt, mortgaging us to a ruinous extent to foreign capitalists. The effect of this state of things upon our competition with Great Britain is apparent. It places our credit at the mercy of English capitalists ; and London bankers, acting in the interest of British manufacturers, may, upon occasion, by a turn of the screw, prostrate the national credit, and bring upon the country a ruinous financial revulsion. But these evils, however great, would not prevent us from engag- ing in successful competition with Great Britain. Under a wise and conservative administration of the government, the Southern states would soon repair the ravages of war, and regain their former pros- perity. Nor would the debt, under a prudent financial system, endanger the prosperity of the country. III. But the War has inflicted upon the country an evil worse than military ravage, or the burden of debt. It has seated the Latitudinarian Constructionists, — the party whose ascendancy in former periods produced such great industrial, and political evils, — FIRMLY IN POAVER ; and they are carrying out to the uttermost their crude and ruinous theories of government. But the extent of this subject demands a separate chapter. RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RADICALS. 5OI CHAPTER IV. POSITIVE EVILS— CONTINUED. RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RAD- ICALS. The worst infliction of the War is its having given the country over to the domination of a radical, revolutionary party. They are no longer merely Latitudinarian Constructionists of the Consti- tution ; — they have boldly adopted the policy of disregarding the Constitution, trampling its restraints under foot, and forcing, by violence, the adoption of such changes in the instrument as they see fit to dictate. The policy of the Radical party is both subversive of our repub- lican system of government, and ruinous to our industrial interests. Sect. I. — The Policy op the Radicals Subversive of Repub- licanism. I. They are Establishing a Centralization. The Radical party has at length thrown aside the flimsy vail which masked its principles and its purposes, and has boldly inaugurated the policy of Revolution. Having obtained uncontrolled possession of Congress, by the ex- clusion of representatives elected from Southern states, they are using their congressional majority, thus obtained, to pass unconsti- tutional and revolutionary laws, having for their sole object the per- petuation of their power. — The vote in the Northern states at the last Congressional election* filled them with uneasiness. In seven of the great states of the North, their majorities were so small, that a change of twenty-five thousand votes would have given all the states in a presidential election to Conservatism. It was apparent that a very slight change in public sentiment in the North would enable the Northern Conservatives, with the vote of the Southern states, to * It may be necessary to remind the reader that this part of the work was written in the Spring of 1867, and is published without alteration. 502 THE WORLD S CRISIS. elect the next President. The Radicals were resolved to prevent this consummation at every hazard. To this end, they determined to adopt measures the most revolutionary, in order to revolutionize the Southern state governments, and bring them to the support of the Radical party. Many obstacles were in the way. The citizens of the Southern states were almost unanimously op- posed to the Radicals, and regarded their measures with the utmost abhorrence. The negroes of the South might be relied on ; but they were not invested with the right of suffrage ; and the people of the states, who alone had jurisdiction of the matter, were most resolutely opposed to investing them with the franchise. Moreover, the negroes, even if enfranchised, were, in most of the states, a minor- ity of the population, and could not control elections. The Radical leaders grappled resolutely with all these difficulties. They devised a scheme of policy that would overcome all obstacles. As the state governments would not invest the negroes with the franchise, they resolved to reduce the states to a territorial form of government; to invest the negroes in these inchoate governments with the right of suffrage ; and to place the states under military domination, until the population should establish state constitutions investing the negro with the franchise, ratify certain amendments of the Federal Constitution, and send such representatives to Congress as the Radicals should approve. But the white population of those states would prefer to remain under military domination forever, rather than adopt these measures; and the white vote in most of the states would overbalance the negro vote, and defeat the programme. They resolved to overcome this obstacle by ordering an election, in which none should vote but those whose names were registered by officials appointed in the interest of the Radical party ; — these registration officers to have the power of rejecting whom they would, with no appeal from their decision. By this means, a majority of negro and submissionist votes might be secured, without difficulty. Having devised these measures for revolutionizing the govern- ments of the Southern states, the leaders of the Radical party found RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RADICALS. 503 several obstacles in the way of carrying them into execution. The first was the repugnance of the more scrupulous Radicals in Con- gress, to vote for measures so plainly unconstitutional, so pal- pably revolutionary. The next obstacle was found in the foreseen opposition of the Executive, and the adverse decision of the Judici- ary. The framers of the Constitution provided safeguards against unconstitutional and revolutionary measures, by requiring the co- operation of all three departments of the government for their ex- ecution. It was known that the President disapproved of the rev- olutionary policy they contemplated, and though, by their exclusion of the Southern representatives, their Congressional majority was so great as to render his veto a nullity, yet he might refuse to carry out their acts, until the Supreme Court should pronounce upon their constitutionality. And it was known that, if the question were ever brought before the Supreme Court, that respectable bench of judges could not do otherwise than pronounce the measures unconstitutional and revolutionary. The Radical leaders resolved to overcome these obstacles. They began their programme by subjecting all the congressmen of their party to a thorough party drill, whipping in the reluctant and the conscientious, and forcing them to go with the majority. Having thus secured the requisite majority, they resolved to override the opposition of the executive and judicial departments of the govern- ment, if possible, by intimidation, if necessary, by the impeachment and removal of the President, and the reconstruction of the Supreme Court. Having taken these preliminary measures, the Radical leaders pressed through Congress the Military Reconstruction Bill, followed b^' a supplementary act ; both embodying the details of their plan for revolutionizing the governments and the politics of ten States of the Union. The policy of the Radicals is revolutionary, throughout. The Reconstruction act is revolutionary, in reducing the states to terri- tories — in subjecting them to military domination — in enfranchising the negro population in opposition to the will of the people of the states — in forcing the states to ratify constitutional amendments against their will, thus changing the Constitution by revolutionary violence. Not only is the law revolutionary, but it was carried by 504 THE world's crisis. revolutionary violence. The requisite majority to pass it was ob- tained by the revolutionary exclusion of Southern representatives. Its execution was enforced by the revolutionary intimidation of the co-ordinate branches of the government. But the policy -will succeed. The President, overawed by the fear of removal, is executing the Reconstruction law ; the Supreme Court, Avith the fear of reconstruction before its eyes, has declined to con- sider the merits of the law, when brought before it for adjudica'.ion. The Southern people are preparing to submit to the inevitable. The train is laid which must inevitably force the reconstruction of those states under the Radical programme, in defiance of the opposition of the citizens. The negroes who have a voice in the election of members of the conventions to form state constitutions are of course eager to vote themselves the franchise! The great mass of the population, overawed by the presence of soldiers, discouraged by the helplessness of their condition, and apprehensive of further Congressional oppression, cannot venture to offer any opposition. The Southern states will be reconstructed upon the negro and Rad- ical programme. The Southerners are indulging the delusive hope that they may control the negro vote, and thus prevent the States from being rev- olutionized into Radicalism. In that hope they are endeavoring to fraternize with the negro. If the negroes were left to their own impulses, the impressible nature of the race would probably induce them to vote in the interests of conservatism. But it is a part of the astute Radical programme to prevent the black race in the South from harmonizing with the white. The party leaders have already taken their measures with pro- found sagacity and foresight, to secure to their own party the solid neofro vote. They began their propitiation of negro favor by the constitutional amendment declaring them citizens of the United States, — one of the amendments they are now embodying by vio- lence in the Constitution, through the coerced ratification of the Southern states. They have taken other measures to propitiate the negro vote. To this end, Stephens introduced his bill into Congress, providing for the wholesale confiscation of Southern property for RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RADICALS. 505 their benefit. Sumner's bill enfranchising them by law of Congress in all the states, had the same object in view. Those measures could not be passed in the present constitution of Congress. They were therefore merely offered, as indicative of the purposes of the Radical leaders, to propitiate the Southern negro vote, and secure their allegiance to the party. Those bills summon the negroes of the South to the aid of Radicalism, and urge them to send repre- sentatives to Congress who will strengthen the ultra Radical party, and enable it to pass those measures over the veto of the President and the opposition of Conservatism. The appeal will not be in vain. The negro population of the South will give* a solid vote for the Radical party. The trickery of the irresponsible Radical registration oflScers, and the presence of soldiers at the polls, will .give the states to the domination of negro and Radical voters. They will follow the lead of Tennessee and Missouri in passing disfranchisement laws that will give them undisputed control of the states. They will send such represent- atives to Congress as will urge on Stephens' confiscation bill, and the bill of Sumner giving suffrage to the negroes in every state in the Union. When the Southern states shall have been revolutionized, and brought to the support of the Radical party, the first act in the drama of Centralization will be over. What next? Will Radicalism pause in its career? Will it retrace its steps? — A fate attends crime which always prevents the criminal from returning to the path of virtue. New forces are forever arising, which urge him onward to the consummation of his career. In summoning the Southern negroes to their assistance, the Radicals have invoked a spirit that will not down at their bidding;. The Southern negroes have had Confiscation, and negro suffrage in all the states, held out to them ; * John Sherman, of Ohio, in a recent speech expressed the views and expec- tations of liis party. He said : "Within a few years from this time theiSouthem states will be, I believe, the most Radical states in the Union. We have some illustration of this in the hi.story of Missouri and Tennessee." And they evi- dently expect the same means to be employed in the Southern states, as have delivered those two bound into the loathed embrace of Radicalism. 506 THE world's crisis. and when they are represented in Congress, tliey will demand the fulfillment of the bond. A refusal to comply with their wishes would leave the negroes to go eventually with the Southern Con- servatives. The Radicals have not taken so many unconstitutional and revolutionary measures, already, in order to secure the negro vote in the South, to flinch from the final acts necessary to the ai hievement of their object. The confiscation and distribution of- Southern lands is a necessary part of the Radical programme. . The enfranchisement of the negroes in all the states is equally essential to their scheme of power. But it will be urged that the Congress has no constitutional power to enfranchise the negroes of the Northern states. How many other things has Congress done it had no constitutional povrer to do ! The power can easily be manufactured out of the new con- stitutional amendment that is being carried by the bayonet in the Southern states, — an amendment which invests the negro with citizenship. No government is Republican, is the dogma, which deprives citizens of the right of voting.; the Federal government is bound to secure to the states^ a republican form of government ; ergo, the Federal government, has the right to force the states to admit negroes to the suifrafro. Concrress will not blink at the question of constitutional p<5wer. It will only ask the question, Is it expedient for the achiev«ment of party power ? — In Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, the, negro vote holds the balance of power; arid, in a closely contested election, the 56000* negroes in Penn- sylvania, the 50,000 in New York, the 36,000 in Ohio, the 24,000 in New Jersey, the 10,000 in Indiana, the 7000 in Illinois, the 6000 in Michigan, would carry those states for the Radicals. Mr. Sum- ner is pressing the question through the press, seeking to leaven the public mind. The New York Tribune, in many respects more moderate in its tone than the Massachusetts Radical, yet agrees with * These numbers are taken from the census of 1860. The number of negroes in the Northern states has considerably increased by emigration from the South since that time, so that the influence of the negro vote in those states is really more important than is here represented. RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RADICALS. 507 him in the advocacy of this* measure. It only remains to educate the Radical party up to the issue, — a less difficult thing than many already achieved, — and Congress "will pass the law. It will be easy to carry the measure, when Northern Radicalism is infused with fresh ardor by the Radical representatives from the South, who, themselves elected by negro votes, will aim to carry out the wishes of their constituents, by placing Northern representatives upon the same basis as themselves. The party in power have established what the old Federalists aimed at, — a Centralization ruling the states with autocratic power, and dominating the country by the armed rule of force. They have carried out the dogma of Hamilton, "The Constitution is a thing of nought which must be changed," It is now boldly avowed that the Constitution must give way to the wants and ideas of the age, and its restrictions are haughtily put aside whenever they impose a bar against the will of a dbn^inant majority. The Federalists were insidious in their usurpations of power by means of construction ; but, now, the mask is cast aside, and the Radicals trample the Con- stitution, trample the Executive, trample the Judiciary, trample the States; and they boldly bring bayonets to bear to force the states to adopt such changes in the Constitution as they choose to suggest, and to submit to usurpations in opposition to law, to justice, and ta right. Hitherto the Southern states have been the chief objects of this coercive rule. But already the principle is avowed that in the Northern states, also, the Federal government will pronounce upon the qualification of voters, and overrule the states at will. The trampling of the Southern states is the inauguration of the sway of a Centralization resting its power upon force. The forco is now applied to the Southern states, to compel them to revolution- ize their governments, so as to give the Radicals control of their elections. This is the initial step in the programme, by which the Radicals are determined to rule the country by violence, in opposi- * In a recent issue the Tribune says : " Men who hold that none but whites should vote may be very well in their place; but there is no room for them in the Republican party. Every one who stays in it keeps at least ten votes out of it." 508 THE WORLD S CRISIS. tion to the will of a majority of the American people. They use a temporary victory in the Northern states, to revolutionize the South- ern states by force, and bring thera to the support of their tottering party ; then, when reaction comes in the North and "West, the people of those sections will find themselves controlled by the votes of Southern negroes, and New England fanatics and manufacturers. G'heir scheme for maintaining their power is a bold one ; and it is so well devised, that, once on foot, it can hardly fail of success. In all the states in which slavery recently existed, the negro holds the balance of power. In a presidential election, New England and the Southern states including Kentucky and Missouri, will cast one hun- dred and sixty nine* electoral votes ; while the Middle, North- * The following is the electoral vote of the several states for 1868. The vote of the Northern states is taken from the election returns of 1864; the vote of the Southern states is calculated upon the census of 1860, counting the negro population as voters and, consequently, entitled to full representation, instead of three-lifths as formerlv. Maine New Hampshire Massachusetts - Ehode Island Connecticut Vermont Maryland - Virginia North Carolina South Carolina • Georgia - Florida Alabama Mississippi - Tennessee West Virginia Kentucky Missouri Arkansas Louisiana - Texas - 7 New York 5 New Jersey 12 Pennsylvani; 4 Delaware 6 Ohio 5 Indiana 8 Illinois - 10 Michigan - 10 Wisconsin 8 Iowa - 11 Minnesota 3 Kansas 10 Nevada - 9 California • 11 Oregon 5 12 Total 12 6 33 - 7 26 - 3 21 13 16 8 8 8 4 3 2 5 3 160 Total 169 RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RADICALS. 509 western, and Pacific states, all combined, only cast one hundred and sixty votes. New England manufacturers and Southern negroes will maintain the Radicals in power, against the votes of all the rest of the country, combined. Radical domination would thus be very much simplified. As the party stands at present, its sway is continually threatened by the just dissatisfaction of the West with the protective policy dictated by Mew England. But, then, the votes of Southern negroes would be secured by the confiscation and distribution of Southern lands ; while they lived in lazy indolence upon homesteads received from Radical beneficence, the negroes would vote with the party to which they owed their lands, without perplexing themselves with regard to the policy of the government : the manufacturers of New England, by coercing the sufi'rage of their employes, can easily control the vote of that section. — And it will be the constant policy of the Ra- dicals to propitiate those two sections. The cunning which looks no higher than party aims will always enable them to present issues that will secure them the support of New England and the Southern negro population; and, assured of this, the party can rest its gov- ernment upon the bayonet, and bid defiance to the rest of the coun- try. Let them once firmly establish their power, and. the Middle and Northwestern states will be the objects of their oppression, as the South is, now. Let the West remonstrate against negro suf- frage, and the oppressive system of legislation that will end in the prostration of its prosperity — the only answer will be the bayonet. A measure has already been proposed in Congress* which pro- vides for the organization of a standing army of half a million men completely devoted to the interests of the party controlling the centralized government, — a force that will enable it to crush out all opposition to its power, by force of arms. The measure was laid aside for the moment, having met with bold exposure of its danger- ous tendencies. But its suggestion shows that the Radical leaders contemplate a government resting upon military power. It was no * The bill organizing a national guard of half a million men is referred to. It has been boldly exposed by Doolittle and others, as an attempt to form an immense military force, devoted to Kadicalism, and fit to maintain its domina- tion over all the states by the bayonet 510 THE WORLDS CRISIS. ^loubt offered in accordance with their usual subtle policy of prepar- ing public sentiment gradually for the adoption of startling innova- tions. The measure is the natural and necessary sequence of the 'policy of violence inaugurated by the party. — Military force is the essential support of all centralizations. Let the Radical scheme of power* once be fairly established, and the country will be placed under the rule of the sword. The Middle and Western states, hav- ing assisted in placing the yoke upon the neck of the South, will find, in turn, the subjugated South become the instrument of tyranny, to fix the yoke upon thSir own necks. The retribution denounced against Ahab will be theirs: "i/i the place ivJiere dogs licked the blood of Nahoth, shall dogs lick thy blood, even thine.'" II. Radical Cen-tralization Policy Ruinous and Oppressive. Radi&alisra — like all Centralizations — administers the govern- ment in the interest of its two constituencies, the Southern Negro, and the Northern Capitalist ; to the ruin of the national industry, and the oppression of the Northern industrial class. The Radical party is devoted to the principles of centralization.- They have conformed the public administi-ation to their model. Centralization is already inaugurated under their rule. The party is resolved to maintain their possession of the government at all hazards, — if necessary, by the exhibition of force. They remove with inflexible resolution every obstacle from their path. They have overawed the executive by the threat of impeachment ; the Supreme * The result of tlie recent Northern elections has given the Radicals pause. They dare not, on the eve of the Presidential election, continue their high- handed course in the face of this expression of i)ublic opinion, so far as to carry out the policy of impeachment, of confiscation, and of negro enfranchisement in all the states by Congressional law. They now wait the result of their past revolutionary policy toward the i^outh. Let the Radicalized Southern states come in, and let the next Presidential election go in their favor, and the Radi- cals will then carry out their entire plan of revolution and Centralizatiop. They now pause in view of the expression of sentiment in the Middle and Western states;, but, then, power will have passed from those sections, and they mu. amounted to 2,600,000 tons. In 1865, it had declined to 1,092,000 \ tons, a loss of more than''^ half. — It has been the fashion to attribtfte' this decline to the dread of Southern privateers ; but it was-'• • — » ■ * The following table shows the proportion of American and- forelgp fehi-pping. - in the port of New York during a series of years. The amopnt is gijven injtona^ Yeai\ American tonnage. -Foreigfi tonyia^e. * 1861 - - 1,018,258 - - - - • ■ .865,446 . "• * 1863 - - - 986,713 - - - • . - lf895,634 »^ 1864 - - -845,172 - - ■■.■".;-.■■ 1,'41&,734 - 1865 - - - 774,458 - .-■.-■* -'1,473,815'^ «' 648 THE world's crisis. export, we could force its shipment upon our own bottoms ; for Britain was compelled to buj it, even at prices enhanced by our shipping profits : and then, our vessels having made a handsome profit upon the outward voyage, were able to bring return freight, at prices that distanced competition. But when cotton was no longer one of our exports, British merchants could dictate the terms on which they would take our other commodities ; and, with charac- teristic shrewdness, they preferred to buy them in our ports, that their vessels might make the profit of transportation. The conse- quence was, our large marine could not find employment, and ship- owners preferred to sell their vessels, rather than sufier them to rot at the wharves. The same process diminished the number of our ships, which will soon diminish the population of our cities. Our shipping is continuing to decline. Old vessels are decaying, and no new ones are being built. Let our cotton production cease, and our imports and exports decline with the ruin of Northern and Southern industry, — and our shipping will be annihilated. Finally, the prostration of Southern industry will lead to national bankruptcy. How rapidly our debt is being exported, has already been shown ] and how, in a few years more, it will all be owned by foreign capi- talists. This will ruin us; but bankruptcy will not wait this slow process. In the general stagnation of industiy, it will be found impossible to collect the necessary amount of revenue to pay the interest on the public debt, and carry on the public administration : the revenue from the tariff must fall off immensely; and, in the stag- nation of trade, the inteimal taxation will scarcely yield any returns. The credit of the government will fail, and avowed bankruptcy will close the scene. This is not idle speculation. The laws of cause and effect upon in- dustrial relations, are immutable. Universal ruin must follow the pros- tration of Southern industrv. unless a chan se in the government arrests the causes, before they shall have produced their ultimate effects. It may be, that industrial depression in the North may lead to revolutionary measures looking to the adoption of the same policy there, that is now being inaugurated in the South. When the popu- RUmOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY. 649 lation of Northern cities are starving — without the means of subsist- ing there, or of removing to the country — the masses may demand a redistribution of Northern property, for their benefit, such as the Radicals will then have made in the South, for the benefit of the negro ! They may demand a redistribution of lands to give them homesteads ! or a fine upon the wealthy, enforced under penalty of confiscation, to afibrd them means of emigrating to the vacant government lands ! We cannot conjecture what course events may take, when universal ruin is falling upon the business interests of the country. If the Radical administration can enforce order with negro bayonets, it may compel the surplus population of the cities and workshops, to disperse quietly into the rural districts. If the famishing people obtain the upper hand, none can foresee the revo- lutionary measures into which desperation may hurry them. — The most favorable solution would be the displacement of the Radicals from power by the votes of the people, and the reversal of the policy which caused the sufi'ering. Unless this is done, utter industrial ruin seems inevitable. Al- ready, the first fruits of Radical policy are seen. Business is gen- erally stagnant in our cities. In Boston, hundreds of stores are inscribed with the ominous words, " To let ;" and its line of ocean steamers have no freights to carry, and will probably soon leave the port which commerce has forsaken. Throughout the country, the goods' market during the last spring has been dull ; drummers of city merchants vainly endeavor to sell upon the longest credits. Although Southern production has, to some extent, revived, and the activity of our foreign trade is maintained by the exportation of bonds, yet there is general complaint of business stagnation. Im- provements have stopped. Thousands of mechanics and laborers are out of employment. The tendency is already begun, that will, unless arrested, end in the depopulation of our cities. The Northern papers are already advising the laboring classes who cannot obtain employment, to leave the cities and engage in agricultural production. The New York Tribune estimates that the population of our cities is now too great, by one- million souls, for the present amount of business. According to this estimate, one-third of the population of our cities 650 THE world's crisis. according to the census of 1860, ought now to remove to the coun- try and engage in agriculture. In a recent issue, the Tribune urges an exodus to the country, in the following terms : — "There are at least one million hanging on where they are not wanted, and not likely to be. ' Can 't you give us something to do ? ' is their incessant whine, when there is work enough and good pay for all, if they will only go where it is, and do what is needed. They cannot find work on a few square miles of pavements, be- cause there are too many people here, and too few on the farms, and in the rural factories and workshops. Thousands must be starved back into productive labor: and the sooner this is done, the better for all. " Understand then, ye waiters on Providence ! that there is no room for you in the cities, and that you ought to go out of them, at once. Do not say you have no means ; for you have feet, and can get out of sight of paving stones, by using them. Do not plead the needs of your families ; for you can do them no good by staying w^here you have nothing to do. — Tell us not of your ignorance of farming ; it is high time you knew something that is wanted, and that will not go out of fashion. And besides, there are many things to do in the rural districts, other than farming ; and if you are really good for anything, you will there find a chance to prove it." It is not necessary to pause to expose the fallacy of this reasoning, by showing that both farmers and rural workshops have as many laborers as they can afford to hire, and that an exodus of famishing multitudes from the cities would both glut the labor market in the country, and cause a great excess of production over the demand. The home demand of the South, and of our cities and workshops, is the great market of our agriculture ; and when this is lost, agriculture is ruined. The extract is only quoted in evidence of the fact that the causes are already in operation that will both ruin our cities, and our agriculture. Already, thousands of persons have left the Eastern cities, some going West, others South, in search of em- ployment. But stagnation is equally prevalent in both those sections. Trade is dull in the cities ; and the country population, depressed by the state of business, is studying economy. Public improvements have stopped, throwing thousands out of employment. Our manufactures are depressed, except a few favored interests. RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY. 651 Nothing can more clearly show the stagnation of industry, ihan the falling off of the incomes of business men in our cities, and the diminution of the revenue from internal taxation. The published returns show that the aggregate incomes of one hundred and thirteen business men in New York city have fiillen off, from $9,- 216,000 last year, to $3,617,000, this. These figures show more clearly than any other argument, the extent to which our industry is declining, under the policy of the Radical party. We already see "the beginning of the end." The causes already in operation will, in a few years more, plunge the government into bankruptcy, and prostrate every department of industry. III. The Social Ruix of the Country. Little need be said on this subject, more than has already been advanced. Social demoralization seems already approaching its acme. Political corruption and bribery have been reduced to a system. Men high in position are charged with the corrupt use of their political power. The corrupt use of money in lobbying is noto- rious — not only in Congress, but in the state legislatures. Even the ermine is not free from reproach. Society is agitated by a general excitement, inducing demorali- zation. Not one-twentieth of the population of our cities attend church. The press teems with accounts of vice in all its most hideous forms. Purity and gentleness would seem to have taken their flight, leaving the fiercest and most degrading passions to run riot through the land. But the predominance of Radicalism threatens to engulf us in a yet lower deep. What hope for social life in the South, when the negroes are made the ruling class ? — when the present race of whites will be reduced to beggary, and a new class are made the type of Southern social life? — In the North, also, the old society will be equally submerged. The dearness of living is even now compelling the refined people of former days, to retire from Northern cities to country towns and villages. The palatial residences of New York city are chiefly oc- G52 THE world's crisis. cupied by the " shoddy " aristocracy, who bring to their position the pretension and arrogance of recent wealth. The poor of the Northern cities are being degraded to the con- dition of the European pauper class. The inadequacy of their wages is lowering them in the social scale ; as extreme poverty always blunts the sensibilities, and, in the end, brutalizes the popu- lation exposed to its influence. — When the ruin becomes general, what will become of the poor ? When unable to subsist in the cities, or to remove to the country, what resource against extreme desti- tution ? Thousands must famish with cold and hunger, and other thousands drag on a miserable, hopeless existence. The state of general poverty will tell most severely upon those habits which promote refinement, and advance civilization. When absolute physical wants consume the income, nothing can be spared for what are considered the superfluities of life. Personal adorn- ment, and the elegancies of social life, must be retrenched. The social party, the concert, the lecture, must be given up ; and poverty will even retrench the educational, and religious advantages of com- munity. Those classes whose services are necessary only to social and moral advanccement, are the first to feel the pressure of hard times. It is to be feared that American society will be upheaved to its foundations. We may be on the eve of industrial, social, and polit- ical changes, almost as radical and as disastrous as those wrought by the irruption of the Northern barbarians upon the Roman Empire. Were the ruin caused by the Radical policy limited to ourselves, it would admit of remedy. Sooner or later, it is to be hoped, the country would expel the Radicals, however firmly seated, from the power they abused; and so great are our natural advantages, that the adoption of a wiser system of administration would soon repair the temporary loss of our prosperity. And indeed, the philanthrop- ist might regard a period of industrial stagnation as a corrective of the frightful social evils, into which the industrial excitement of the last thirty years has plunged us. The extravagance of thought, and impulse, and action, — the irreligion, and disregard of moral obliga- tion prevailing among so large a portion of our population, — might RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY. 653 find a cure in the enforced simplicity of manners, incident to the gripe of honest, industrious poverty. The temporary loss of our riotous prosperity might not be regarded as an unmitigated evil, if it restored us to the hardy virtues of Republicanism, through the discipline of adversity. But the evils of Radical misrule will extend beyond ourselves. They will involve the world in ruin. Sect. 2. — The Ruin of Christendom. It is unnecessary to dwell further upon the social excitement and the industrial evils induced by the Radical policy, which will pros- trate America, and enable England to maintain its centralization of industry. The most formidable evils that are to be feared are political. The great danger is the political reaction in Europe, which will be fatal to the cause of liberty and religion in the Old World. In the present attitude of affairs, nothing can counteract the tend- ency to reaction, but the ascendancy of American influence. The loss of our prosperity, and the eclipse of our influence, will be fatal to the cause of progress. If events abroad continue to progress in the direction they have taken in the last few years, Europe will, be- fore two decades have elapsed, be overshadowed by Russian domi- nation. And events will continue to drift onward toward the crisis, if Britain is suffered to maintain its prosperity, and the command- ing influence arising from its centralization of commerce. The Reform Bill now* progressing through the English Parlia- ment will blot out the Whig party, and leave only the Tories and the Liberals to struggle for the ascendancy. Though the Liberal party will be much stronger than before, a great majority of Whig boroughs will go over to the Tory party, and give it, for the time, firm control of the government. The domination of the party will continue, until some period of suff'ering shall so irritate the enfran- chised peasantry, as to carry them beyond the control of the Aris- tocracy, and place the Liberals in power. * Written in the Spring of 1867. 654 THE world's crisis. Before that shall occur, it is the hope of the Tory leaders that the progress of reaction may give Europe to the sway of Absolutism, and enable them to repose in peace beneath the shadow of Conti- nental despotism. The recent imbroglio between France and Prussia upon the Lux- embourg question, that threatened to plunge Europe into war, has been peacefully settled. But it is only the lull in the tempest before it bursts forth with renewed fury. It did not suit the despots to submit their cause to the arbitrament of battle, while yet the Tories of England were in the crisis of their Reform Bill, and while the power of Prussia was yet unconsolidated over its newly conquered territories. When delay promised certain triumph, they were not willing to risk their cause upon the issue of a precipitate struggle. A war with France at the present time, could not, in any event, sub- serve the purposes of Russian and Prussian policy. A French vic- tory over Prussia, won before Russia could bring her forces into the field, would have enabled Napoleon to re-establish the deposed Ger- man princes, and strip Prussia of all her recent acquisitions : on the other hand — if Prussia triumphed — in the present critical situation of the British Tory party, the victory could not be pressed to a triumph of Absolutism, in the complete overthrow of the French monarchy. The reigning family of England are German in blood and sympa- thy. The British Queen would take no action, except in the interest of Prussia. Her intervention, which brought about the settlement of the French and Prussian imbroglio on the Luxembourg question, must be regarded as a movement of Prussian diplomacy, desirous of putting off the inevitable conflict to a more favorable moment. The recent adjustment cannot be regarded as a definitive peace, nor as indicative of a pacific disposition on the part of Prussia and her sympathizers. There are open issues enough to bring on a conflict, whenever it may seem expedient. The despots desire to choose a more auspicious time. When the power of Prussia shall be consolidated, aud when the British Tories shall have secured in Parliament a trusty majority of adherents fully devoted to their re- actionary policy, then will be the time to bring the issue between Absolutism and Pro2;re8s to a crisis. Unless our national prosperity be restored, and in such a manner RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY. 655 as to "wrest the governraent of England from Tory control before that crisis comes, Russia will have Europe under her dictation. Backed by the reactionary government of England, the Czar will be master of the situation. It is not impossible that, in desperation, the French Emperor may endeavor to outbid Prussia for the Rus- sian alliance. By an alliance either with Prussia, or with France, the Czar might then carry out the traditional programme of a divis- ion of Europe. Then America will stand, the sole barrier to the ultimate triumph of Despotism allied with the Papacy. Liberty and religion will hang trembling upon the issue of a desperate conflict. In that struggle, the chances will be all against us. If we triumph, we shall triumph through the destiny of Republicanism — of Christianity — and through the favor of the God of providence. It may be, that in the inscrutable providence of God, the Rad- icals may be suffered to control the government, until their policy shall bring about this crisis. If the policy of the party is to meet with everlasting reprobation, the direr ruin it causes, the deeper the execrations heaped upon it. If the Radicals were hurled from power, now, and our country and the world were saved from ruin by a prompt return to Conservatism, the party might again lift its head, and its latitudinarian principles might continue to agitate Repub- licanism, perpetually. But if its policy be carried out, until it wreck our own prosperity, and place Europe beneath the domi- nation of Russia, and necessitate a terrific struggle for liberty, — irre- vocable judgment will be pronounced upon it. The hand of irrevers- ible fate will write its doom, and it will fall, to rise no more forever. Radicalism must go down. The doom of Latitudinarian Con- struction is sealed. The only question is — shall it fall while yet the safety and prosperity of the country and the world may be secured; or — maintain its poAver a little longer — and sink amid the convulsions of general ruin, branded with the eternal hatred and loathing of mankind. The determination of this question makes the present time, The World's Crisis. FOURTEEN DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. IN ST.-ft^' ^^CC'O vo av 10^^96^ LIBRARY USE AUG 29 1955 Ay6.^9iqs5/,'j ioijigy'5^"^' m prrcrD VD fu u ^ssg -:^EC^D LB MAY 4 1353 t^ ^ew LD 21-100m-2,'55 (B139s22)476 General Library University of California Berkeley sa^s^^i/^.