THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES THE TRANSVAAL WAR THE TEANSVAAL WAE 1880-81 EDITED BY LADY BELLAIRS WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS EDINBUKGH AND LONDON MDCCCLXXXV fBCX ANNEX (ft? {fit DEDICATED TO THE GALLANT MEN (COMRADES OF MY HUSBAND) FORMING THE BRITISH GARRISONS DURING THE TRANSVAAL WAR, WHO, BY THEIR BRILLIANT DEFENCE OF THE POSITIONS IN THEIR CHARGE, ADDED RENOWN TO, AND KEPT UNSULLIED, THE PRESTIGE OF BRITISH ARMS. 1965003 P E E F A C E, THE accounts given in these pages, as well as the opinions expressed, are mainly based upon official docu- ments which have already appeared in print in Parlia- mentary Blue-books, Transvaal Government Gazettes, and other publications, but, as these sources of infor- mation are scattered and troublesome to get at, it has been thought convenient to reprint, in Appendix or footnote form, extracts from some of the despatches, orders, and correspondence to which reference is made. In the first chapter we have endeavoured to indicate the causes which brought about a most unnecessary war, and the further errors which led to a state of unpre- paredness to cope effectively with it. And in the last we have treated of the way in which that war, after having passed through certain phases, the besieged gar- risons heroically holding their own, but the Natal column beaten back in the attempt, with miscalculated means, to relieve them, was abruptly brought to an inglorious close. Vlll PREFACE. The second and tenth chapters tell the pitiful tale of disasters and reverses incurred Bronkhorst Spruit, Laing's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba through the too common fault of making light of your enemy. In the intervening chapters we have related the stories of the besieged garrisons : how seven detach- ments of troops, aided by volunteers Pretoria, Potchef- stroom, Rustenburg, Marabastadt, Lydenburg, Stander- ton, and Wakkerstroom successfully defended their posts under enormous difficulties, such as have rarely fallen to the lot of British soldiers. Thrown suddenly on their own resources and responsibilities, isolated at widely distant points of a territory almost as extensive as France, beset by foes without, and in the case of Pretoria secret foes within, fighting clay by day for three weary months, in the midst of troubles, anxieties, discomforts, even at Potchefstroom want of food, and with depressing, disheartening influences all round them, they yet beat back, and made themselves respected by, the enemy. Hidden away in a remote country, these garrison- posts were without special correspondents or telegraph wire to enable them to supply a daily summary of their proceedings, and claim the attention of the public at home. They could not as seems so often arranged O nowadays by would-be heroes in the estimation of their countrymen get delicately rendered little com- iminiques about their doings inserted in the papers, or PREFACE. IX even as perhaps more generally done prompt " their sisters, their cousins, and their aunts," to do this wire- pulling, and judiciously keep them constantly before the public. So it happened that, at the close of the war, the people of England knew little of the facts con- nected with, or the sacrifices made for, the defence of the Transvaal capital, and other towns and military posi- tions so well retained in possession. Their attention naturally enough had been directed to Sir George Colley's movements the whole time ; and when there came continued reverses in that quarter, immediately followed by unsatisfactory peace negotiations, they naturally enough again evinced a disposition foment- ed by some from political and a few from personal mo- tives to bury the whole campaign in oblivion. The official judgment to that end may be said to have already gone forth before even tedious communication could be o reopened with the interior of the Transvaal. Thus the Transvaal force suffered for faults committed elsewhere, and its distinguished and meritorious services in a most unusually trying campaign were passed by with but little notice or recognition. 1 STRAWBERRY HILL, TWICKENHAM. 1 Only about three dozen officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates belonging to the whole Transvaal force, inclusive of volunteers, were rewarded receiving brevet-promotion, honours, or medals. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. PAGE Confederation in the future, ..... 1 Attempt to force on confederation led to war, ... 2 An onward policy requires constant military success, . . 2 Causes of ill success at commencement of Zulu war, . . 3 Frequency of military errors conveys a lesson against lightly engaging in war, ...... 3 Position of the Transvaal after annexation, .... 4 Course of action which, had it been followed, might have resulted in Transvaal remaining British territory, ... 6 Danger of legislating counter to popular opinion, ... 7 Soothing influence exercised by Sir T. Shepstone when Adminis- trator, ........ 9 Imprudence of withholding representative institutions, . . 10 Resistance of Boers to system of direct taxation, ... 12 Mistaken estimate of Boer courage, . . . . .14 Boer tactics with hill- tribes, . . . . . .15 Our own difficulties in coercing hill-tribes, . . . .15 Characteristics of the Boers, . . . . . .18 Indications of coming storm, . . . . .19 Armed mass meetings, ...... 20 Boer women urging on the men, ..... 20 Determination of the Boers to act early expressed, . . . 21 Warnings were not missing, . . . . . .21 But for the Bezuidenhout affair, hostilities might have been avoided, ........ 23 Debate in the Legislative Assembly, .... 25 Imprudent reduction of military force, .... 26 Xll CONTENTS. Military force in the Transvaal, May 1880, .... 27 The troops being scattered, no longer formidable, ... 27 Early remonstrances from the officer commanding, ... 28 Time for reduction ill chosen, ..... 28 The dangerous situation remained the same, ... 29 No change in system of government, . . 29 Economy sought for in wrong direction, .... 30 The troops healthy but for enteric fever, .... 30 Considerable invaliding after Sekukuni war, ... 31 Causes of enteric fever in South Africa, .... 31 Attempts made to remedy the evils, .... 32 Discipline suffers from troJfps being detached, ... 32 Checks to arrest crime, ...... 33 Great loss through desertion, ' . . . . .34 Deserters to Transvaal prior to annexation, .... 34 Anecdote of a deserter to the Orange Free State, ... 34 Inducements to desert, ...... 35 Eisks attending desertion, ...... 35 Facilities offered for desertion, . . . . .35 Offer made to two officers, ...... 36 Boer women marry deserters, ..... 36 " An underground railroad," ..... 36 Large cost of desertion, ...... 37 Discomfort of soldier's life in Transvaal, .... 38 Soldiers Avere underfed, ...... 38 Their dislike to biscuits and tinned meats, .... 39 Anecdote of another deserter, ..... 39 Danger resulting from AvithdraAval of cavalry, ... 39 A mounted force essential to cope with Boers, ... 40 The reason Avliy the cavalry Avere Avithdrawn, ... 40 Effect of departure of King's Dragoon Guards, ... 41 Mounted infantry, ..... .41 Inopportune moment chosen to offer assistance to Cape Government, 42 Three hundred armed men thus draAvn aAvay, ... 42 Military force in Transvaal, November 1880, ... 43 Force in Natal, .... . 43 Insufficient transport for mobilisation, .... 43 False impression entertained by Government of moral effect of detached posts, .... .44 Detached posts in Kafir Avars, . . .44 Altered conditions require changes in tactics, . . . . 44 The Be/uidenhout affair, ...... 45 Troops sent to Potchefstroom, . . 48 CONTENTS. Xlll Mr Hudson's report, ....... 49 Military force in Pretoria inadequate to form a field column, . 51 Troops ordered in from Marabastadt and Lydenburg, . . 53 Delay in requisition for the movement of the troops, . . 55 Additional troops asked for from Natal, .... 56 The movement begun too late, ..... 56 Date for assembly of mass meeting advanced, ... 58 Number of Boers under arms, ..... 59 Intended place for their meeting surveyed, .... 60 Projected attempt to bring about greater concentration of troops, . 60 Telegraph wires cut, ...... 61 Hazardous military position, ..... 62 Boer proclamation and resolution, ..... 62 Virtual declaration of war by the Boers, .... 63 Boer Government established at Heidelberg, ... 63 Boer troops sent to intercept British detachments on the march, . 63 Local forces raised in Pretoria, ..... 64 Moral effect of dynamite experiments, .... 67 Agent sent by Boer Government with their ultimatum, . . 67 Proclamation issued by the Administrator, .... 68 Defences of the town of Pretoria, ..... 68 The first shots, ....... 69 Captain Lambart taken prisoner, .... .70 Eeports from Potchefstroom, ..... 70 News of the Bronkhorst Spruit disaster, .... 71 CHAPTER II. THE BROXKHORST SPRUIT DISASTER. The Lydenburg detachment ordered to Pretoria, . . .73 Nature of instructions sent, ...... 73 Lydenburg deficient of means for mobilising, ... 74 Difficulty in hiring transport, ..... 74 Excessive quantity of transport required by the commanding officer, ........ 75 The detachment leaves Lydenburg, .... 75 Inquiry ordered at headquarters into cause of delay in march, . 76 Details of the march, ...... 77 Warning of possible attack sent from Pretoria, ... 77 Warning received and acknowledged, .... 79 Order of march described, ...... 80 Insufficient scouting, . . . . . .81 XIV CONTENTS. Other irregularities, . . . . . . .81 Boer preparations to attack, ...... 82 The fight, ........ 83 Cessation of the action, ...... 86 Casualties, . . . . . . .87 Care of the wounded, ...... 88 Medical help sent for to Pretoria, ..... 88 The colours saved, ....... 89 Boer losses, ........ 89 Arrival of additional medical assistance, .... 90 Death of Lieut.-Colonel Anstruther, .... 91 A PARALLEL MARCH. Circumstances, . . . . . . .91 Details of the march, ...... 92 Boer threat delivered, ...... 92 Large commissariat convoy from Natal joins, ... 93 Difficulties on the march, ...... 93 Warning from Standerton received, .... 93 Armed Boers watching and following the troops, ... 94 A Boer messenger arrives from Commandant-General Joubert, . 94 Night march, ....... 95 Safe arrival at Standerton, ...... 95 CHAPTER III. THE DEFENCE OF PRETORIA. Town and country around, ... 97 Military position, ... 99 Martial law proclaimed, . 99 The townspeople ordered into the military camp, . . . 100 Opposition of the townspeople overcome, .... 102 Effects of declaring martial law, . 104 Commandeering carried out, . . 104 Calculated that the state of siege might last three months, . . 105 Messenger sent to Natal, . . 106 The town vacated, .... 107 Civilian appointments in camp, . . 108 Volunteer corps, . . . 109 Mounted corps, . . 109 Artillery, . ... .110 Pretoria Rifles, .... HO Civil Guard, .... H2 CONTENTS. XV Native scouts, . . . . . . .113 Pay of the volunteers, . . . . . .113 Hill-forts constructed, . . . . . .113 Fort Royal, ........ 114 The Jail Laager, . . . . . . .114 Convent Redoubt, . . . . . . .114 Headquarter Camp, . . . . . . .115 Civil Laager, . ...... 117 Natives, ........ 117 Boer positions, . . . . . . .117 Soldiers' helmets and belts dyed, . . . . .118 Skirmish on 28th December, ..... 119 Reconnaissance and skirmish on 29th December, . . .120 Camp Orders, . . . . . . .122 Complimentary order, . . . . . .124 Camp omnibuses, . . . . . . .125 Shops in the town reopen, ...... 125 Dutch Seminary teaching, . . . . . .126 Onerous duties, ....... 127 The enemy kept at a distance, . . . . .127 Foraging expeditions, . . . . . .128 Captain Burr's expedition, . . . . . .129 Attack of 6th January, . . . . . .129 Strength of attacking force, . . . . . .130 Signalling-party detached, . . . . . .130 Disposition of Pretoria Carbineers, ..... 131 Pretoria Carbineers engaged, ..... 131 Disposition of the main body, ..... 132 Abuse of the white flag, ...... 132 Prisoners taken, . . . . . . .134 Return of the column, . . . . . .135 British losses, . . . . . . .136 The enemy's losses, . . . . . . .137 Bronkhorst Spruit wounded, . . . . .137 Funerals, ........ 138 Cemetery, . . . . . . . .139 Natives, ........ 139 Commissariat supplies, ...... 141 "Water-supply, ....... 142 Conservation of water, . . . . . .142 Slaughter-cattle, . . . . . . .143 Food for horses and cattle, ...... 144 Haymaking, . . . . . . . .144 XVI CONTENTS. Capture of a mowing-machine by the enemy, . . . 145 Attack of the 16th January, ...... 146 Strength of the column, ...... 146 Diversion made by explosions, . . . ... 147 Disposition of the force, ...... 147 Progress of the attack, ...... 148 Boer reinforcements arrive, ...... 149 Circumstances leading to withdrawal, .... 150 Gallant conduct of two men, . . . . .153 Return of the column, ...... 154 Losses, ........ 155 The town threatened by another party of the enemy, . . . 155 Relief of Potchefstroom finally abandoned, . . . .156 Medical arrangements, . . . . . . .158 Civil surgeons, . . . . . . .160 Wood-cutting, . . . . . . .162 Biltong manufactured, . . . . . .163 Manufacture of fuel, . . . . . . .164 Message from Sir George Colley, . . . . .165 Effectives in the garrison, ...... 167 Communication with outside places, . . . . .168 How messages were carried, . . . . . .170 The situation on 29th January, . . . . .171 Skirmish on 23d January, . . . . . .172 Attack on Derde Poort, . . . . . .172 News of Sir George Colley's first reverse, . . . .173 The " Sister Annes," . ...... 174 Delusive reports from the signal-stations, . . . .174 Native reports, ...... 175 The Schoeman family, . . . . . .176 Amusements provided, . . . . . .177 Concerts, ..... 178 Theatricals, ...... 179 Christy Minstrels, ....... 180 Loretto Convent concert, ..... 181 Fusilier band, . . . . . . igi National Hymn of the South African Republic, . . . 181 Losses in attacks on the enemy's positions, .... 183 Attack of the 12th February, .... 185 Strength of column, .... 186 Disposition for attack, . . . 187 The attack commenced, . . 188 The Carbineers driven in, . . 189 CONTENTS. XV11 Confusion resulting, . . . . . . .189 Lieutenant-Colonel Gildea wounded, . . . .190 Retreat ordered, ....... 191 Panic with the mule-waggon drivers, .' . . .191 Losses, ........ 192 Exchange of prisoners, . . . . . .193 Boer mode of fighting, . . . . . .193 Mounted infantry, . . . . . . .194 How mounted infantry should be organised, . . . 195 Conveyance of infantry in mule-waggons, . . . .196 Clerical services, . . . . . . .197 Dutch, ........ 197 Wesleyan, ........ 197 Eoman Catholic, . . . . . . .197 Loretto Convent, ....... 197 Death of Lady Superior, . . . . . .198 Bishop of Pretoria, . . . . . . .199 People suspected of holding communication with the enemy, . 200 Optical delusions, ....... 201 Spies and traitors in the camp, ..... 202 Accidents, ........ 203 Minor injuries, ....... 203 Deputy- Assistant Commissary-General Whitley thrown and kicked by his horse, ....... 203 An artilleryman accidentally shot, ..... 204 A mounted infantryman and horse drowned, . . . 204 Lieutenant O'Grady injured, ..... 204 Mr Hendricks accidentally shot, ..... 204 Sergeant Goldie killed by a kick from his horse, . . . 205 Losses in horses and mules, ...... 205 Evasions to commandeering, ...... 206 March, ........ 207 Expenditure of ammunition, ..... 209 Natives sent by Boers with false information, . . . 209 Falsity of such intelligence proved by reconnaissances made, . 210 Risks from fire, . . . . . . .211 Precautions adopted, . . . . . . . 2] 1 Camp newspaper, ....... 212 Photography, ........ 213 Administration of martial law, ..... 214 Provost-Marshal, . . . . . . .216 Police, 217 Gold robbery, ...... 217 XV111 CONTENTS. Jail prisoners, . . . . . . . .218 Mrs Jorrisen and Mrs Bok under surveillance, . . . 219 No unnecessary alarms, ...... 220 Baboon mistaken for Boer movements, . . . .221 Vagaries of sentries, . . . . . . .221 The ration reduced, ....... 222 Change of position effected by a Boer laager, . . . 222 Flag of truce sent in with news of an armistice, . . . 225 English opinion on the war, ...... 225 Feeling of the Dutch population of Cape Colony and Orange Free State, ........ 225 How the news was received in camp, .... 226 Strong political feeling, ...... 227 Final order of the day, ...... 229 Cessation of active hostilities, ..... 230 Peace notified, ....... 230 Observations on the defence and its results, .... 231 Arrival of Commandant-General Joubert, .... 233 Attitude of the townspeople, ..... 234 Boers return to the town, ...... 234 Distress in the town, ....... 235 Sir Owen Lanyon recalled, ...... 236 Health of the garrison, ...... 237 Health of the civil population, ..... 237 Casualties, ........ 237 Closing despatch, ...... 238 CHAPTER IV. THE SIEGE OF POTCHEFSTROOM. The town, ...... . 242 Garrison, ...... 243 Special Commissioner's arrival, . . . 244 Failure to raise volunteers, ..... 244 Indications of rebellion disregarded, .... 244 Boer force enters Potchefstroom, .... 247 Eefugees from the town, ..... 247 Military posts held, ....... 247 The first shot, .... 248 Surrender of the Court-house, . . . 249 Attack on the fort, .... 251 Truce, -..... 252 Boer treachery, .... 252 CONTENTS. XIX The jail abandoned, ....... 252 Want of water, ....... 253 Horses and mules lost, . . . . . .254 The oxen lost, . . . : . . . 254 Eefugees in the fort, ....... 255 Natives in the fort, ....... 255 The enemy's strength, ...... 256 The fort improved, ....... 256 New- Year's Day attack, ...... 257 Town magazine occupied, ...... 257 Night sortie, ........ 258 Day sortie, ........ 259 News of reinforcements from England, .... 260 Union-jack made, ....... 260 Outer communication, ...... 261 Ruse of the enemy, ....... 264 News of Sir George Colley's first reverse, .... 264 Enemy's gun reopens, ...... 265 Sunday amenities, ....... 265 Further advance of the enemy, ..... 266 Lady refugees, ....... 268 Food supplies, ....... 268 A suspected Boer spy, ...... 270 Capitulation, . . . . . . . .271 Good behaviour of the Boers, ..... 272 Departure of the garrison, ...... 273 Our losses, ........ 273 Boer losses, ........ 274 District Order, ....... 274 Capitulation cancelled, ...... 275 CHAPTEE V. THE SIEGE OP RUSTENBURG FORT. Town, . ....... 276 Fort and garrison, ....... 276 Opening of hostilities, ...... 277 Progress of the siege, ....... 278 Captain Auchinleck wounded, ..... 278 Surrender demanded a second time, ..... 278 A cannon brought into action, . . . . .279 Third demand for surrender, . . . . .279 XX CONTENTS. Despatches from Pretoria, . 280 February, ... 280 Sortie, ... .281 Boer gun reopens, ... Notification of intended armistice, . . 283 Peace, ... .283 CHAPTER VI. THE SIEGE OF MAEABASTADT FORT. Position, ........ 285 Site of fort unsuitable, .... 286 Feelings of inhabitants, ...... 286 Garrison reduced, ..... . 287 Imprudent action of civil authorities, .... 288 Commencement of hostilities, ..... 289 Energetic proceedings, ...... 290 Skirmish, ... .292 Loss of cattle and horses, ...... 292 Boer works, ........ 293 Method of posting sentries, ...... 293 Boer cannon, ........ 294 Natives, 295 Water-supply, ....... 295 Fresh-meat supply, ....... 296 Sanitary conditions, . . . . . . . 296 Notice of armistice agreement, ..... 297 Peace notified, ....... 297 Evacuation of Marabastadt, ...... 298 Casualties, ........ 298 CHAPTEE VII. THE SIEGE OF LYDENBURG FORT. Garrison, ........ 300 The fort, ....... 301 Townspeople refuse to co-operate in defence, . . . 302 News of the Bronkhorst Spruit disaster, .... 303 Measures taken to improve the defence, .... 304 Excellent spirit displayed by the 94th Regiment, . . . 305 Commissariat supplies, ...... 306 A few volunteers join, ...... 307 CONTENTS. XXI Boer demand for surrender, ...... 307 Short armistice agreed upon, ..... 308 Messenger sent to Pretoria, ...... 308 Fatal accident to a volunteer, ..... 309 Boer force appears, ....... 309 Natives tampered with, ...... 309 Commencement of attack, . . . . . . . 310 Fresh demand for surrender of fort, ..... 310 Boer cannon opens, . . . . . . .311 Day sortie, . . . . . . . .311 Message from the town, . . . . . .311 Gallant conduct of Conductor Parsons, .... 312 Progress of the siege, ....... 312 Fresh meat obtained, . . . . . . .313 A sad incident, . . . . . . .313 Night sortie, ........ 314 Fatal act of hardihood, ...... 315 Intrepid behaviour of some men, ..... 315 Scarcity of water, ....... 316 Fresh daring act by Mr Parsons, ..... 318 Additional defences made, . . . . . .318 An extemporised gun, ...... 319 Boer gun in a fresh position, ...... 319 Union-jack made, ....... 320 Quieter days, ........ 320 Zigzag trench made towards Boer position, .... 320 Reduction of ration, . . . . . . .321 Messengers sent to Newcastle, ..... 321 Fall of a hut, . ..... .321 Boer gun again moved, . . . . . .321 Fresh element of danger : huts fired, .... 321 Excellent service performed by some men, .... 323 News from outside, ....... 323 Enemy offers terms for capitulation, ..... 324 The fort ordered to be held to the last, .... 324 News of the armistice, but hostilities still continued, . . 325 Peace notified, ....... 325 CHAPTEE VIII. THE DEFENCE OF STANDERTOX. Town, . . . . . . . .327 Military position, ....... 32S XXI L CONTENTS. Defences, .... . 328 Telegraph destroyed, ....... 329 Christmas Eve, ....... 329 Eefuge for women and children, ..... 329 False alarm, ........ 330 Christmas Day, ....... 330 Martial law declared, . . . . . . .331 First skirmish, ....... 331 Boer positions, ....... 333 Hospital arrangements, . .... 334 First sortie, ........ 334 Gallant conduct of natives, ...... 335 Another work erected, ...... 337 Supplies, ..... . 337 Reduction of rations, ...... 339 Commandant-General Joubert's arrival, .... 339 A "scare," ........ 339 Arrival of a Zulu messenger, ..... 340 Escape from disaster, ...... 343 More works erected, ....... 344 A native shot, ....... 344 Second sortie, ....... 344 Curious enterprise, ....... 347 The last shot, . . ... 348 Armistice notified, but the possibility of peace being made not entertained, ....... 348 CHAPTER IX. THE DEFENCE OF AVAKKERSTROOM. Military position, . .... 350 Disturbed state of the district, ..... 351 Arrival of Captain Saunders, ..... 352 Tii-truetions from Sir George Colley, .... 353 Volunteers for defence of the town called for, . . . 353 Projected capture of the town frustrated, .... 354 Town defences, ....... 355 How messages were sent out, ..... 356 Xatives come in for protection, . . 358 Skirmishes, . ...... 358 Mr Fa\vcus taken prisoner, but escapes, .... 360 Boer movements, ....... 361 Sharp skirmish. ... . 3(53 CONTENTS. XX111 Gallant behaviour of Private Osborne, .... 365 Armistice, ........ 366 Notification of peace, ...... 367 CHAPTER X. THE NATAL RELIEF COLUMN. The main body of the enemy invades Natal, . . . 369 Premature movement made by Sir George Colley from New- castle, thus placing his column in similar position to that of the Pretoria garrison, ..... 370 Mistaken estimate of Boer power, ..... 371 Forward movement determined on, ..... 373 Action of Laing's Nek, ...... 374 Observations on action at Laing's Nek, .... 375 Action at the Ingogo, . . . . . .377 Action at Majuba Hill, ...... 379 What the English reverses brought about, .... 383 General good behaviour of Boers, ..... 383 A flight of fancy, ....... 384 CHAPTER XL ARMISTICE AND PEACE. Reflections, ........ Action of President Brand, ...... Lord Kimberley's proposed terms for negotiating peace, Sir Evelyn Wood assumes command, .... Sir Evelyn Wood's instructions those already sent to Sir George Colley, .... ... 393 Curious telegrams, ....... 396 " History of the armistice," ...... 401 Singular conditions of the armistice, .... 402 Progress of peace negotiations, ..... 403 Scheme for severance of territory fortunately abandoned, . . 406 War passages interspersed in Sir Evelyn Wood's telegrams, . 407 The situation is well stated by a " Quarterly Reviewer," . . 409 Decay of English influence throughout South Africa, . . 411 Native question, . . . . . . .414 Final reflections, ....... 419 APPENDIX, . . 423 BEITISH POSITIONS IN THE TRANSVAAL. THE TEANSVAAL WAR 1880-81, E K II A T A. I'age 19, line 6 from foot, for " Inliloblane" read " Iiihlobane. n 159, line 7 from foot, /or " Dr Sheen " read " Dr Skeen.'' >. 185, first line, for "note'' read "page." .. 221, sidenote. for " Baboon" read ' Baboons.'' plete. Intercommunication by railways will in due time do much, and closer community of interests, brought about by the creation of railway, telegraph, postal, customs, and other unions, together with the adoption of a common native policy, may be expected to educate gradually the local governments and peo- ples in favour of the change. Still, the result will scarcely be achieved until the self-interest of each Colony or State demands it, and ability is shown by each country to bear, financially and otherwise, the A BRITISH POSITIONS IN THE TRANSVAAL. THE TEANSVAAL WAB, 1880-81, CHAPTER I. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. THE confederation of the several Colonies and States CHAP. of South Africa will, there can be little doubt, be- . . , _ -. .. Confedera- come an accomplished tact at some future day ; but, tion in the future. in the natural course of events, the process of assimi- lation must be slow, and take many years yet to com- plete. Intercommunication by railways will in due time do much, and closer community of interests, brought about by the creation of railway, telegraph, postal, customs, and other unions, together with the adoption of a common native policy, may be expected to educate gradually the local governments and peo- ples in favour of the change. Still, the result will scarcely be achieved until the self-interest of each Colony or State demands it, and ability is shown by each country to bear, financially and otherwise, the A 2 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, burden of self-defence against possible interior or i. . ... exterior native risings. Attempt to Such a slow modus operandi, though carrying confedCTa- with it the advantage of being in accord with the war. c ' phlegmatic character of the 'large majority of the peoples to be dealt with, did not, in 1876-77, satisfy the Imperial Government, and an onward as it has been termed policy was, in preference, determined on. This too great eagerness to carry out a confeder- ation scheme defeated its own object, leading, as it did, to a too hasty annexation of the Transvaal the primary cause of the Zulu war, and bringing in its train the Boer rebellion. Anon- Aii onward policy, pursued in countries whose ward policy .,,. lin . -jiii requires " inhabitants are not wholly in agreement w r ith tne military order of government enforced, requires continued success. . military occupation and success all round, or tailure occurring in any quarter may cause an ultimate col- lapse of the whole system. Isandlwhana may be said to have sounded the knell of, and raised a strong revulsion of English feeling against, such a policy. Even the restoration of prestige to our arms at Ulundi did not avail to change the current of that feeling ; and very probably the Zulu war, in succeeding gen- erations, will l)e better remembered by the disaster of Isandlwhana than the victory of Ulundi. Had all gone well at the outset of that campaign as was reasonably anticipated must be the case how differ- ent would have been the result of such success to the THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 3 whole of South Africa, and to those concerned in the CHAP. i. government of that land at the time ! It was well understood, from the character of causes of the Zulus and their military organisation, that the at com- . _ mencement issue of the first serious encounter in our favour ofzuiu war. would practically end the campaign. The greater, therefore, was the need for caution to ensure that result. The British force originally in the field, sup- plemented by colonial and native contingents, was sufficient to have assured the defeat and subjugation of the enemy in a short and comparatively inexpens- ive war, but for lamentable omissions, a faulty plan of campaign, too great division of forces, want of ordinary military precautions, and the too common British error of despising your enemy. The numerous grave military errors committed Frequency even since Isandlwhana from similar causes, not- errors con- veys a les- withstanding the terrible warning then oiven - - son against 15 _ lightly should surely tend to make statesmen pause in the engaging in war. future before lightly engaging in war, and staking their reputations on the chances of military success. The miserable surprise at Inhlobane l in Zululand, the disastrous defeat at Maiwand in Afghanistan, and the successive reverses Laing's Nek, Ingogo, and 1 Sometimes spelt Zlobane. Fortunately for Colonel Evelyn Wood, he succeeded the following day after he had withdrawn behind his laager defences at Kambula in repulsing the Zulu attack on his posi- tion ; so that the news of the two conflicts being mixed up and arriving together, little notice was taken of the surprise of his troops the first day at Inhlobane, and the consequent heavy losses suffered on that occasion. 4 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. Majuba endured from the Boers on the Transvaal- Natal border, should convey a lasting lesson in this respect. If a German critic is correct, we even narrowly escaped another "dark passage in English military history " in the Egyptian campaign ; l and Tamai in the Soudan campaign furnishes a further example. Position of The annexation of the Transvaal was carried out the Trans- . t> -, n>-r< -i i vaai after in th e early part oi 1877, when it seems to nave tion. ' been expected by the authors of that act that the people, after having been accustomed to republican or even individual independence ever since the coun- try was first settled, would quickly become reconciled to the high-handed change made to a Crown-colony form of government a form from which our colonies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and at the Cape had for some time past shaken themselves free. The declarations made at the time by Sir Theophilus Shep- stone had led the people to suppose that the with- drawal of their liberties was intended to be merely temporary, and that self-government would, in due course, follow a short transition period. How delu- sive were the promises thus held out, time plainly showed. High Commissioner and Administrator were replaced by other men, and a Conservative gave way 1 " Graver results than those of the 3d August might have been pro- duced by the surprise, as General Havelock calls it, of the English vanguard by a more numerous body of Egyptian troops at Kassassin. It is due solely to the timely and gallant interposition of the cavalry under Sir Urury Lowe that the fight did not constitute one of the dark passages in English military history." Contemporary Review, April 1 883. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 5 to a Liberal Government in England, but the pro- CHAP. misecl free institutions were still kept back. It would seem that, until the time came when it was at last seen that the prospect of forcing on a confederation was hopeless in June 1880, when the Cape Parlia- ment rejected the proposal for a Conference on that head it was deemed politic to withhold the grant of self-government, in the hope that the malcontent Boers might be the more disposed to fall in with the views of the Imperial Government, and lend their influence towards confederation, in the desire to obtain repre- sentative institutions themselves, by joining the self- governed Cape Colony. 1 These expectations were doomed to be disappointed, and the Cape Colony, having declined to join in a Conference, unmistakably intimated its intention of standing by itself for the present. The time had thus, then, clearly arrived for the adoption of one of two courses with regard to the Transvaal either to annul the annexation, or endeavour to satisfy the legitimate wishes of its people by giving them representative government. 2 Never- 1 This object is developed in the last paragraph of a despatch Feb. 19, 1880 from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Sir Garnet Wolseley. See Blue-book (c. 2505), No. 60, March 1880. 2 The following extract from a letter we have seen, written from the Transvaal, on the 6th July 1880, by an officer then occupying a high military position, will show that the danger of not then meeting the wants of the Boers was not unforeseen by all on the spot at that period : " The Confederation Conference proposals laid before the Cape Parlia- ment having been shelved, the Transvaal agitators, Messrs Kruger, Joubert, and Jorissen, who have been awaiting the result of the debate at Cape Town, will now, no doubt, return to stump this province. Had the Conference taken place, these gentlemen would probably have been provided for as delegates, and thus further agitation against annexation have been prevented. Should the Home Government grant greater 6 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, theless, this opportunity was allowed to slip by ; nothing was attempted in the latter direction ; and smooth despatches continued to be received at the Colonial Office in Downing Street, reporting to the effect that the financial condition of the country was improving, and that the people, while paying their taxes, were quieting down. course of Had we been desirous of preserving the connec- which, tion the grant of responsible government, assented to had it been * . followed, i n time even to within a lew weeks 01 tne actual might have resulted in outbreak of hostilities might have been the means Transvaal remaining O f t ] ie Transvaal remaining British territory. Though British _ territory. C i eac l_l cks, rendering the task of government diffi- cult, would, no doubt, have followed, means would have been found there, as elsewhere, to overcome them, and any general insurrection would have been avoided. Had the gift of such a popular measure been also coupled with the loan of a million ster- ling, towards the construction of a railway from Dela- goa Bay, the results gained would soon have proved that a master-stroke of statesmanship had been made. Such an expenditure, while eventually turning out financially a good investment, would have worked as an insurance against disaffection, by gratifying a long-felt ambition of the Boers communication by I'm-dom, and iin elective franchise, instead of the present nominee system in force for the Transvaal House of Assembly, then there might lie some outlet for the energies of these men, but a deadlock in govern- ment would soon ensue. Failing this, it may be feared that they will persuade the Boers to resume their obstructive tactics, verging on open hostilities, though probably never actually coming to fighting." THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 7 the shortest route with the finest seaport in South CHAP. Africa ; creating a market for agricultural produce, and opening out the mineral wealth of the land ; and causing, for the purpose of making the railway, and through the greater development of the country, such a flow of emigration into the province as would speed- ily have neutralised the power of the Dutch element. There were those who, early after the annexation, fore- saw the advantages to be thus gained, and advocated such a loan. The Boer war cost a great deal more than a million in money, and something more besides ! There is a principle which seems to have now Danger of TI i i i 1-1 legislating fairly taken root in England by which our states- counter to men are usually guided or influenced in legislating opinion. for their countrymen at home, that extreme caution is expedient, if not absolutely necessary, not to go beyond or outside of public opinion. Unfortunately this safe general rule has not always been sufficiently attended to by our proconsuls in Crown-governed dependencies, the mother country suffering propor- tionately. In a popular sense, and outside certain party and missionary circles, it was a matter of in- difference to the mass of Englishmen whether we kept any hold on the Transvaal or not. We might well have receded any time before the Boer out- break from the mistake originally committed in annexing that province. It would not have been the first time that, for the sake of expediency, we had voluntarily abandoned territory we had acquired. On South African soil, in former years, we had can- 8 THE TKANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, celled the annexation of British Kaffraria, and had restored the Orange Free State to the Boers. Not to mention the many places which fell into our pos- session during the wars of the last and present cen- tury, and which we gave up when peace ensued, the cession of the Ionian Islands in recent years may be cited. Tangier also, held by us for more than sixty years during the seventeenth century, was abandoned as too troublesome and costly to keep, owing to in- cessant attacks from outside. But, whatever may have been the feeling in Eng- land, there can be little question as to the direction it took in the Transvaal after annexation. The vari- ous mass meetings, held at intervals, convened and attended by the Boers the landed proprietors of the country, a singularly quiet, undemonstrative class, forming the large majority of the white population gave unanimous expression to the desire to be cut adrift from us. No attempt was made to dispute this fact, by obtaining a vote on the point by ballot or otherwise ; and any counter-wishes expressed by the trading or other sections of the inhabitants were far outweighed by the numbers on the other side. Badly advised as to the real condition and sen- timent of the country, the Imperial Government did not perceive the urgent necessity for giving way to popular feeling. No soothing concessions were made. On the contrary, it was notified that the act of annexation was irrevocable, and the High Com- missioner in 1879 publicly emphasised the decision THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 9 by declaring that, "so long as the sun shines, the CHAP. Transvaal will remain British territory." Whatever blame may attach to Sir Theophilus soothing , p i i i'i -1 influence JShepstone lor his share in too hastily annexing the exercised . by Sir T. Transvaal, he certainly subsequently exercised a calm- shepstone J when Ad- ing influence, which was absent after his departure, . .... . . tor - During his administration there existed a certain degree of sympathy between the governing body and the Dutch community ; but, with his removal, all touch with the Boer class ceased. 1 Sir Theophilus could speak Dutch, and understood the Boer char- acter. During the period for Nachtmaal, 2 when the farmers from the outlying districts trekked 3 into Pretoria with their families, often from long dis- tances, in order to attend the services of their church, he would be seen in the large market square, passing 1 Extract from " The Boers at Home," ' Blackwood's Magazine ' for December 1881 : "Sir Owen Lanyon, who followed Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proved a most unfortunate selection ; exactly the man to rub up the Boers the wrong way, and that with no wish on his part, but with the desire to do all that he could for them compatible with his duty. To begin with, he was a soldier ; and to a Boer a rooi batjee is the incarnation of all that is bad in the English Government. He belonged to a West India regiment, and the cleverer Boers were not slow in finding out that these are black regiments. To associate or have anything to do with blacks, except to make them work, or sjambook them if they don't work hard, is an unpardonable crime in a Boer's eyes. Worse than all, the Governor was a man of swarthy com- plexion, and they at once started the idea that he was of black descent himself ; carrying their hatred of the race to such a height, that I am told a Boer one day said to him to his face that he would not be ruled by a black man. Of course the idea was utterly false, the Governor being as pure - bred an Irishman as any other ; but it was spread about, notwithstanding, and did much harm to him and his govern- ment." 2 The Lord's Supper. 3 Journeyed. 10 THE TRANSVAAL WAE, 1880-81. CHAP, from waggon to waggon, and among the tents, ex- j OO OO * O * changing familiar greetings with all, and indulging their love for talk over their own affairs, and argu- ment on political matters. All this being suited to their habits and customs, and he being easy of access to all who chose to call at Government House to dis- cuss questions with him, rendered him peculiarly fitted to gauge popular feeling, as well as to moderate extreme opinions. It was said that many a Boer, after conversing with him on some imaginary griev- ance, personal or otherwise, would depart acknow- ledging that he saw the matter discussed in a different light from what he did before. Had Sir Theophilus Shepstone continued to administer the government, one cannot but think that he would have been more alive to the danger of delaying, for too long, a return to a representative form of govern- ment, and, instead of prophesying smooth things, would have warned the Imperial Government to give way, in time to have averted the Boer rising, the natural production of previous indifference, vacilla- tion, or procrastination. Their pastoral farms being of great extent gen- erally upwards of 6000 acres each dotted over the more fertile parts of a country estimated to have an area of 120,000 square miles, the Boers number- ing about 40,000 souls from their scattered, and more or less necessarily isolated condition of life, are naturally a slow-thinking, independent people, dis- liking change, especially when brought upon them THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 11 without their consent or instrumentality. Yet these CHAP. men, if only judiciously treated, and allowed the full liberty of debate to which they have always been accustomed, could be persuaded, little by little, to acquiesce in measures which, attempted to be hastily thrust upon them without due consultation, would only entail stolid opposition and excite disaffection. Discussion with them as with others nearer home- acts as a safety-valve. The pity of it was that this protective remedy was not appreciated by those in authority, and that instead of discussion being util- ised and directed in a representative assembly, the Volksraad the representative Parliament before an- nexation remained closed. With the Boers, more than any people, it was incumbent upon us to pursue a policy which aimed at carrying them with us, in making any alteration in their laws or customs, and thus avoid playing the part of a paternal Govern- ment urging on fresh legislation, however beneficial, neither asked nor wished for without taking into our counsel those most affected by our action. The men who had by their courage and endurance gained possession of the territory, and had spread home- steads, flocks, and herds over the land ; who had, notwithstanding all that has been averred to the contrary, managed their affairs fairly well sumciently so for their wants, according to their lights, were now set aside, and deemed unfitted to have a voice in their own government. They were told, in hazy language, to wait patiently, when perhaps hereafter they might be trusted with some share in the direc- 12 THE TRANSVAAL WAK, 1880-81. CHAP, tion of their country's affairs. Being a patient people, they did wait for some years, meanwhile trying to make the authorities placed over them, and the Imperial Government, believe that eventually their patience must give way, and that delay in giving them back their freedom would certainly cause them to rise. But the local, who were responsible for keeping the imperial, authorities well informed of the state of the country and attitude of the people, did not believe them ; but credited them with being only temporarily stirred up by professed agitators and adventurers from Holland, and looked upon them as altogether too lethargic and cowardly to attempt any overt action, their threats as too laughable and bom- bastic to have any reality of purpose in them. So, having formed a totally wrong estimate of the people under their rule and control, the local Government went on in the even tenor of their way, initiating fresh " beneficial " legislation, and assimilating certain of the laws to the more advanced ones of the Cape and Xatal ; but, before all, striving to stand well at Downing Street, by endeavouring to produce a good financial balance-sheet all the time profoundly igno- rant of the increasing irritation around, and apparently indifferent to the feelings of the large majority whose wishes ran counter to the policy adopted. if Boers to system of Resistance The Boers had often proved restive individually, , ,f I !, it.r-0 +,-, / * and sometimes collectively under taxation, even before we took over the country. Resistance to the tax-collector was not offered for the first time THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 13 under our rule. This is clearly set forth in de- CHAP. spatches from the Administrator in 1881 ; but Sir Owen Lanyon, while seeking to show that such re- sistance has resulted from the naturally lawless and turbulent character of the Boers, has apparently failed to draw the obvious lesson and conclusion which the historical details given, properly read, afford, that the opposition exhibited at different periods, often causing serious commotion plainly originated from the common dislike to direct taxa- tion, and that the intelligent remedy to guard against such antagonism and possible conflict in the future, would have been, at an early period, to have varied the system to one of indirect taxation. Excluding the inhabitants of towns under 10,000 the white population of the province may be said to have consisted of but one class, landowners, who, with their families and some natives, work their own farms. The direct taxes levied on each farm may therefore be viewed as virtually a kind of poll- tax on the majority of the population an objection- able form of raising revenue, well calculated to excite discontent. The large increase which had taken place in the revenue during 1880, was, no doubt as Sir Owen Lanyon reported 1 in part due to "an improved system of collection and supervision ; " but the con- stant pressure therefrom, brought to bear upon the Landdrosts and other officials charged with the col- lection, caused these officers, in their turn, to exercise 1 See Blue-book (c. 2950), No. 24, June 1881. 14 THE TRANSVAAL WAK, 1880-81. CHAP, greater urgency than had previously been customary, and more than probably contributed to increase the general irritation and discontent around. Even arrears were claimed for bygone years, which the old South African Republic had neglected or had been unable to collect ; and this often in doubtful cases, when, through the defective mode of keeping the public accounts of that period, no official proof was forthcoming as to the justice of the claims advanced, the tax -payers being required to show that they had already been settled. Wonderful ledgers and an elaborate system of accounts were introduced into all the country districts, which, how- ever fitted for India or places having a long-practised official class, capable of complying with their require- ments, were bewildering and little suited to the pre- vious want of training of the Landdrosts and others of Dutch extraction. It may be that, in consequence, many of these men looked back with some regret to */ o past days of greater official calm and slackness, and were the more inclined to sympathise in the avowed object of their fellow-countrymen, to bring back the old government. The underestimate of the warlike qualities of the Boers, formed very generally by Englishmen before the outbreak the main cause of subsequent reverses to our arms was largely due to a too hasty judg- ment, engendered by generalising from the want of success attending the Boer commandoes 1 in prose- 1 Burgher levies. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 15 cuting the war against Sekukuni, and their failure CHAP. to support their native allies, the Swazis, when storm- ing his place, followed by their break-up and igno- minious retirement in 1876. For political purposes, more than necessary was made of the cowardice and insubordination then exhibited, and the state of collapse which resulted. The war was a local one, which did not threaten other parts of the province. The men, commandeered l from other localities, were half-hearted, and without enthusiasm in carrying on hostilities against a chief who, many of them declared, was an independent one, who should have been origi- nally left alone and his territory not encroached upon. The Boers have never experienced much difficulty Boer tac- in contending with the natives in the plains or open Mi-tribes, country ; but, in the mountainous and rocky districts, offering natural defences, they have generally preferred slower tactics bringing; the enemy to terms by de- O O J J stroying their means of subsistence, together with constantly harassing them rather than incur con- siderable loss of life through directly attacking or storming a strong position. We have not been without experience of the diffi- om- own culties attending the coercion of hill-tribes. In 1853, in coercing r< /-< I-IIIIT i hill-tribes. Sir George Catncart, although he had present a large well-appointed force of all arms, encountered a reverse when entering Basutoland, and was not sorry to close with Moshesh's proposals for peace which immediately followed. The later experiences of the Cape Colonial forces at Morosi's Mountain, and against the Basutos, 1 Forced levy. 16 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, may also be instanced. But, in the Transvaal, even after we had taken over the conduct of the Sekukuni war from the Boers, we did not progress satisfactorily until, on the close of the Zulu war, the arrival of an overwhelming force, under Sir Garnet Wolseley, ren- dered success no longer doubtful. After two and a half years' skirmishing around the position, with but one serious advance on our part to take it, Seku- kuni still held out. Finally, in November 1879, Sir Garnet Wolseley deemed it prudent to bring up over 2000 British troops and Colonial levies, and to sup- plement these with 10,000 Swazis or other natives finer warriors than those they had opposed to them. Sekukurii's place was then stormed and taken, our loss in killed being 8 Europeans and about 500 Swazis. It is not easy to afford any intelligent explanation, other than that attempted above, of the lamentable mistake made in undervaluing the spirit of the Boers. Are we to suppose that our forefathers' feeling of contempt, and prejudices entertained against all for- eigners, in the days when " Dutch courage " was a common proverb, had descended to some of the au- thorities in South Africa ? The Duke of Wellington o is said, when asked which nationality produced the bravest men, to have expressed his belief that all men were brave a true remark, which might have l)ecn remembered with advantage at the time we are writing of, for it only requires a common enthusiastic cause to firmly knit together a people, and courage and intrepidity will not be found wanting. Annexa- THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 17 tion gave the required impetus, united the various CHAP. elements, and created such a cause. 1 If any one wishes to realise how far enthusiasm, and what is deemed a just cause, can lead a handful of men to cope successfully with overwhelming num- bers of disciplined troops, let him read Mrs Bray's most interesting work, published in 1870, ' The Eevolt of the Protestants of the Cevennes, with some account of the Huguenots, in the Seventeenth Century.' There he will learn how some 3000 peasants who may be termed the progenitors of the Jouberts and other descendants of the French Huguenots to be found throughout the Transvaal and other parts of South Africa were able to hold their own against 60,000 troops, the flower of the French army, under a marshal of France. 2 1 Extract from ' De Volksstem ' Report from a special correspondent on Boer meeting, December 10, 1879 Blue-book (c. 2505), South Africa, page 115 : " When I walked back to my tent, and once more cast my eye on that assembled crowd, come together here from far and near, it seemed to me that the annexation, after all, had a beneficial result for the Trans- vaal people. It called into existence the mass meetings, of which we have now the fifth, and by that very means the various elements of the country were, as it were, securely knit together ; and where for- merly speaking about the Transvaal, we could only mention a thinly populated country, whose inhabitants were severed by many divergent interests, and, as it were, bound together by no single bond of union, these same inhabitants now come forward as one people, with their own history, and indissolubly bound together by the highest virtue patriotism. Thus a bad cause sometimes brings forth some good results." 2 An excellent essay on " The Camissards," based on Mrs Bray's and other works, was published in the October number of the ' Quarterly Review' for 1880 too late, unfortunately, for the intelligent reading and education of those who were most concerned on our side in bringing about the Boer revolt. B 18 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. Generations of open-air activity, in one of the finest climates of the world, have made the Boers Character- . . isticsof of the present day, in their physical attributes, one the Boers. J J of the most favoured of races. Let any visitor to the Cape, willing to satisfy himself on this point, go into one of the Dutch country districts say, for convenience, that of the Paarl, near to Cape Town and take note of the splendid physique of the men and women generally met with, and then, on return to England, landing at Plymouth or Southampton, mark the contrast presented by the numerous un- der-sized, ill-developed English men, and women too, commonly seen. Sir Arthur Cunynghame, early in 1879, in ' My Command in South Africa,' gave to the public a very correct opinion he had formed of the characteristics and qualities of the Boers. He writes at page 208 : " I have often remarked the hardihood of these Boers ; and whether for bearing cold, heat, depriva- tion of food, or for. power to continue in the saddle, 1 look upon them as quite equal to the Cossack of Russia, and very far superior to him in the use of the ritk'/' And again, at page 241 : "There are no finer young men in the world than the young Dutch Boers, who are generally of immense height and size, and very hardy. Their life is spent in the open air by day, and frequently at night they sleep on the veld with no tent or covering. Men more fit for the Grenadier Guards, as to personal appearance, could not be found." THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 19 The writer of the "Boers at Home," in ' Blackwood's CHAP. Magazine 'for December 1881, also vividly portrays the chief outward observable points of the Boers. Among other remarks, he says: " Your Boer might pass any day for a small English farmer, perhaps a bit more untidy about the beard, not unlikely evincing a stronger dislike to the wash-tub in more senses than one. The superior class are just substantial gentlemen-farmers, while many of them are strikingly handsome. They are a tall race, six-feet-four being a common stature, and differ from English of the same class only in dress corduroy suits of hideous shades of brown and yellow being worn almost without exception." An ominous but disregarded sign was early given indications ,,,. .. .-.' -if coniing oi the unfavourable disposition entertained towards storm. us, by the absence of support, co-operation, or even sympathy from the Boers, during the progress of the Zulu and Sekukuni campaigns, 1878-79, not- withstanding that these hostilities may be said to have been in their cause, and advantageous in break- ing down the power of native chiefs, who had already occasioned them great troubles and losses. The few followers, under the brave Piet Uys who were so uselessly sacrificed at the sad affair of Inhloblane : were, notwithstanding the inducements then held out to the Boers to join us, the only party which came forward in the Zulu war ; and, later on, not a Boer was present at the taking of Sekukuni's stronghold. 1 See note, p. 3. 20 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. The successive mass meetings, attended by upwards of 6000 men, who took their arms with them, were, Armed . 1 . . mass meet- however, sufficient testimony to the disaffected state in^s of feeling throughout the country, and showed the alarming; extent of readiness for insurrection. For o some time before the rising, fears had been expressed here and there that the Boers, through having lost all hope of the rendition of their country, or of obtaining self-government by means of remonstrances addressed to the imperial authorities, had grown more deter- mined to take active steps, and really intended open Boer resistance. 1 Even the women were said to be urging women urging on the men. l Sir Garnet Wolseley, in his despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 29th October 1879, shows how great were his apprehen- sions (in this head, even at that early date : "' I am compelled to recognise the continuance of grave discontent. I am informed on all sides that it is the intention of the Boers to fight for independence. . . . There is no doubt, I think, that the people are in- cited td discontent and rebellion by ambitious agitators ; but I am com- pelled also to allow that the timid and wavering, who are awed into taking side against us, are comparatively a small party, and that the main body of the Dutch population are disaffected to our rule." This accurate estimate of the state of disaffection prevailing through- out the country, and clanger of insurrection, was, however, most materi- ally modified, six mouths later. Sir Garnet being then about to quit South Africa wrote, on the 10th April 1880 : " Reports from all parts of the Transvaal sustain the opinion that the people, being thoroughly weary of the uncertainty and the troubles at- tendant upon opposition to the Government, and seeing no hope of any successful issue from the dangerous measures in which they have been induced to place confidence, have determined to renounce all further disturbing action, and to return to the peaceful cares of their rural life, which was already beginning to suffer from the continuance of political irritation. "The resolution of a part of the people to deny the trade of their produce to Englishmen failed utterly, and expired with conspicuous lack of vitality before the natural forces that were fated to over- power it. " Taxes are being paid, and the revenue of the country, so long THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 21 on the crisis, the young ones rendering their sweet- CHAP. hearts savage by continually taunting them, saying : " You talk a great deal always of what you will do, but it invariably ends in your doing nothing ! " An officer who had been moving; through the coun- Determma- . ! tion of the try the previous June, on a tour of inspection, re- Boers to act early lated how much he had been impressed by the em- expressed. phatic warning uttered by a highly intelligent Irish yeoman, at whose house he stayed a night. This farmer had remarked to the effect that, owing to the Boers regarding persons of his nationality as, like themselves, disaffected to British rule, they were less guarded and gave expression to their real opinions and intentions with greater freedom before him than they would in the presence of an Englishman ; and that, from what had come to his knowledge at private meetings of the Boers and otherwise, he felt convinced that they were fully resolved to proceed to extreme measures, and, if necessary, fight to get back their country. In fact, indications and warnings of the threaten- Warnings . , . . -, were not ing storm were certainly not missing to those who missing. chose to look for them, and wished to shape their course accordingly. Mr Aylward, writing towards the close of 1878, in disturbed, and in part suspended, is flowing in steadily in its natural course. " I believe that, with the check which has thus been imposed upon the organisation of discontent, a foundation has been laid for the admin- istration of affairs in the Transvaal, upon which there may be built, with the aid of time, a fabric of Government in furtherance of the pros- perity of the people, and in unison with their sympathies and their wishes." 22 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, his ' Transvaal of To-day,' spoke with prophetic warn- ing in his final words : " The Transvaal question will soon become the question of the day, and is likely to absorb quite as much attention as the Abyssinian war did in its time ; and I have not the least doubt that, if not speedily looked to, it will cost as much in money. A great war of races is being provoked at the present moment. I doubt if this work will be in the hands of the public before it shall have commenced. " In this and in all future native wars the English in Africa must fight alone. In former cases, the Boers have refused to aid the Government against native tribes, and this for a most excellent reason. British wars are undertaken to protect one tribe against another. Natives will squabble. The last war in the colony was in favour of the Fingoes ; whilst the monstrous waste of public money now going on in the Transvaal is incurred because, forsooth, Captain Clarke must protect Pogwani and Logwani insignificant robbers, against Legolani and Secocoeni greater robbers. Burghers will not join in any hostilities undertaken on account of natives. Why did not Captain Clarke order the paltry tribe of .Pogwani to go into some inside location if they so badly wanted protection ? During the sovereignty l a similar tiling occurred ; and Noble, in his history, remarks : " ; The Resident now found himself committed to exten- sive operations against Moshesh's tribe, which numbered at the least 1.0,000 fighting men, whilst he had no adequate force to oppose against them. The burghers refused to muster for such service. They could not comprehend or appreciate the motives which induced the Government of so powerful a nation as Great Britain to call out farmers from their homes and lawful employments on the occurrence of these chronic squabbles among the natives. Military duty under such circumstances was extremely distasteful and harassing to them, especially as, in addition to their own personal hard- 1 Xow the Orange Free State. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 23 ships and risks in the field, their families and property were CHAP. exposed to be plundered and ruined by the tribes against __ L whom they acted. Many of the farmers had already in this manner suffered severe losses of their flocks.' " To all these causes for not fighting in quarrels not their own, is now added the vexation they must feel at having been deprived of their liberties. And if they will not fight, neither will they pay. It is yet to be seen if any attempt to tax them for wars undertaken by a foreign governor, and without their own consent, will be resisted. " The English people will find out, sooner or later, that they must begin to keep a firmer hand on colonial governors. Up to the present, in Africa their action has produced little save heart-burnings, mischief, and expense. Their Kafir policy has ever been, and still is, a costly failure ; and their schemes for the extension of the empire in South Africa are tending hourly to put England to the cost of keeping dow T n one, if not several, insurgent populations. " But Sir Theophilus Shepstone's annexation of the Trans- vaal is, of all, the most disastrous experiment yet undertaken. It has cost one Kafir war, and will cost another. It has injured the natives, irritated the Boers, and thrown the whole country into a state of anarchy." l But although a dangerous, dogged resolution, dis- But for th playing the common tenacity, or famous fault of hout affair J & . hostilities the Dutch, had no doubt been previously formed by T mi s ht lm ; J been avoid the majority of the Boers in some way, by force all ed - others failing, to obtain redress of their grievances- it may yet be reasonably doubted if there would ever have been occasion for them to have resorted to open hostilities, had not the Bezuidenhout incident, an attempt to levy taxes which were, in amount, if not illegal, certainly inequitable, been most unnecessarily 1 See also Appendix A*. 24 THE TRANSVAAL WAE, 1880-81. CHAP, forced into prominence by the maladroit action of the local government, who thus suddenly fanned into a flame the smouldering discontent of the country, and so infuriated the people that not only did they rise en masse, but, worst of all, escaped from the ordinary control of their leaders, who were even threatened with death if they did not head the movement, and assist the former in obtaining by arms what they con- ceived to be their rights. 1 There had been no intention on the part of the disaffected Boers to take any active steps in that direction until the assembly of the people, which had been called for the 8th January 1881. The attempted arrest of Bezuidenhout by a body of constables specially raised for the purpose there being no police forthcoming in the Transvaal for such duty followed by the despatch of a military force to Potchefstroom in November, in the belief that its presence would alone suffice to exercise such a moral restraint as would cause the arbitrary decisions of the Government to be respected, occasioned the imme- diate assembly of several hundred armed men to guard Bezuidenhout from arrest, and the advancement of the date originally fixed for the mass meeting by a month. Had nothing occurred to have obliged the leaders to call an earlier meeting, the Boers would have assembled on the 8th January in a much less excitable spirit, more amenable to control, and, as before, disposed to leave the direction of their cause in the hands of their leading men. Some kind of 1 See Appendix A. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 25 ultimatum would have been drawn up, and presented CHAP. by the latter ; but time would have been afforded for its consideration, and the reply to be made. There would have been no hurried act on either side. The telegraph would not have been destroyed. The Administrator would have been able to have con- sulted with and been guided by the High Commis- sioner, who, again, would have asked for the views and decision of the Imperial Government, before any summary action was taken. The attitude of the leaders and people would meanwhile have been such as to offer some reasonable prospect for peaceful negotiations, and opportunities for mutual concession or compromise. Such, it may fairly be believed, were the hopes and designs of the Boer leaders, who hith- erto, up to the Bezuidenhout affair, had been suffi- ciently influential with the people to prevent their committing themselves to actual collision and blood- shed. The minutes given by Mr Hudson, Transvaal Colonial Secretary, of his interview, at the close of November, with Mr Kruger and others, serve to show this. 1 On the same day that Mr Hudson had his in- Debate m . , ,. r T7 - T . . the Legis- terview with Mr Kruger, the Legislative Assem bly lative AS- a body consisting of fifteen members, of which six were ex officio and nine Crown nominees - - were debating at Pretoria on " the existing form of gov- ernment," apropos to Mr C. K. White moving a resolution, of which he had given previous notice : 1 See Appendix A. 26 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. " 1. That the Government of this province, as at pre- sent constituted, has failed to secure the confidence or the support of its inhabitants. 2. That a repre- sentative form of government is desirable, and has become necessary, to ensure the re-establishment of confidence and to secure the support of the inhabitants of the Transvaal." Mr White made an incisive speech, forcibly dilating upon the dangerous condition of the country, and insisting upon the urgency for granting the representative institutions promised at the time of the annexation three years and eight months before. Although Mr White stood alone in the House in pressing for this immediate change in the form of government, there is little doubt that the feelings of the larger section of the English-speaking population of the Transvaal were up to this period with him in respect to his motion. 1 imprudent From the moment the act of annexation was de- reduction of military chired irrevocable, and it was determined that the force. time had not arrived when a representative constitu- tion could be safely granted, it should have been apparent that we could only rule the Transvaal by force, and that consequently a sufficient number of British troops to ensure the stability of the Govern- ment was absolutely essential. As has been shown, from whatever side the general situation of the pro- vince in 1880 is viewed, everything pointed to this conclusion. After the capture of Sekukuni's stronghold, and 1 See Appendix B. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 27 until the apprehended danger was past which was CHAP. feared from the national mass meeting called for the 6th April, but postponed owing to the anticipated change of Ministry in England, and expected rendi- tion of the country through Mr Gladstone's advent to power a considerable body of troops remained detached over the province or massed at Pretoria. Then the forces were reduced, Sir Garnet "Wolseley leaving for Natal, and soon after for England. The troops left in the Transvaal at this period Military . force in the numbered about 3600, consisting of one cavalry Transvaal, ' J May 1880. regiment, three battalions of infantry, part of a battery of field artillery, one company of engineers, and detachments of the commissariat, transport, ordnance, and hospital corps ; in fact, a complete little force of all arms, under the command of Major- General the Hon. H. Clifford until the middle of May, when that officer was relieved by Colonel W. Bellairs. This force, had it been kept together, or only The troops ,,,.,. . , , , being scat- aetacned within supporting distances, would have tered, no been formidable, but through being broken up and widely scattered, it lost much of its power. As it may be gathered from opinions expressed at other times by Sir Garnet Wolseley, that that general was very averse to, and recognised the imprudence of thus breaking up a regular military force, it can only be inferred that the wishes of the Adminis- trator in that arrangement were deferred to then, as unfortunately they were said to have been later on by Sir George Colley, when he visited the 28 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. Transvaal in August, Sir George having replaced Sir Garnet Wolseley as High Commissioner, Gov- ernor, and General Commanding for Natal and the Transvaal. 1 Early It is well known that Colonel Bellairs, from the remon- . . . strances time he arrived in the country, had unceasingly drawn from the J & J officer attention to the faulty disposition of the troops, and, command- ing- while strongly deprecating any reduction, particularly in cavalry and transport services, had pressed for greater concentration ; but his well-founded appre- hensions were not believed in, owing, it must be supposed, to the nature of the reports which con- tinued to be received at this period by the Imperial Government and Sir George Colley, from the Admin- istrator. It is true that three of the detached military posts those of Heidelberg, Middleburg, and Lulu Mountains were given up in August and Sep- tember ; but, as a considerable reduction of the troops -nearly one - half the total strength, one cavalry regiment, one infantry battalion, and a large portion of the transport and branch services was effected at about the same time, the detached positions, Stand- erton, "Wakkerstroom, Lydenburg, Marabastadt. and Rustenburg, which were retained, thus became even more isolated and difficult to communicate with than previously. ! Colonel Sir G. Pomeroy-Colley, when selected for this civil and military appointment, stood about 245th on the list of colonels. In order to give him supreme military command Colonel Bellairs being much senior in date of commission it became necessary to give him temporary higher rank. He was accordingly made Local Major- ( Jeneral. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 29 The time selected to effect this reduction of the CHAP. troops was specially ill chosen just after the Cape Parliament had rejected the Conference proposals ; l and when the Boer leaders had returned, strength- ened by the sympathy they had met with from their fellow-countrymen and well-wishers at the Cape. The situation, in regard to the malcontents, had The dan- in no way altered for the better. If there had been situation remained no fresh mass meetings or demonstrations in the the same. country, the explanation w r as simple : it was the cold dry season, when, as customary, it was necessary for the farmers to remain in the distant bushveld, where their cattle could obtain good grazing, and greater warmth and protection than on the highveld. That quiet season over, they, in ordinary course, would return to their homesteads, and, as arranged, assemble at the January meeting, when they might be ex- pected to become as troublesome or more 'so than before. Neither, on our side, had there been any departure NO change from the high-handed system of government in vogue, of govern- or effort made to conciliate the leaders and people, which could at all warrant running the risk of having to encounter insurrection with insufficient means to overcome it. It would surely have been prudent as at the time was forcibly urged by Colonel Bellairs to have delayed the consideration of reduction until after the January meeting, and the intentions of the leaders had been better ascertained. As it was, the action partook something of the nature of a gambler's 1 See ante, p. f>. 30 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, stake on chance to effect an economy of a few thousands. Economy sought for in wrong direction. Economy was sought for in the wrong direction. It would have been better and safely gained by concentrating, instead of unwisely reducing, and yet not then concentrating the remaining troops. The out-stations, being at long distances from headquar- ters, cost enormously ; largely increased commissariat, transport, ordnance, and medical services were neces- sary ; great loss was incurred of stores in transit and on the spot from deterioration, want of cover, super- vision, &c.; and excessive destruction of waggons, animals, and transport equipment took place, as only those who have had experience of the roads or tracks of that country at different seasons can possibly understand. To these items for extra expenditure, generally entailed by such outlying, and, to the soldier, more or less unsatisfactory posts, might be added others caused by increased sickness, insub- ordination, and desertion. But for the occasional appearance of typhoid or enteric fever, the result of drinking water charged with organic matter, generally when on the march, the troops were particularly healthy, as might be expected in such a fine climate as that on the high- veld. Continued observation and careful investiga- tion into the origin of each case had enabled Brigade- Surgeon Skeen, the principal medical officer, to arrive at the conclusion that the fever was wholly due to THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 31 germs, taken into the system by drinking impure CHAP. water. Statistics showed that when the troops remained stationary in places where proper sanitary precautions were taken to ensure no contamination to the water, the fever ceased ; and that fresh out- breaks could usually be traced to outside causes soldiers returning from marches, when the same pre- cautions and control could not be exercised. For some months after the Sekukuni war, the Consider- able inval- hospitals were filled with cases which had originated iding after 1 . ... Sekukuni in this way, and considerable invaliding followed war - an item of expenditure that is generally forgotten in calculating the cost of a campaign. These men had to be sent down to the coast for embarkation, by an expensive system of ambulances, taking several weeks in transit ; and their places had to be filled by drafts of trained men from the depots, who in turn had to be replaced by fresh recruits, raised to meet this extra drain. The causes of this evil in South Africa will be more causes of easily understood, when it is explained that the fever in . . , . . South streams met with at the various halting-places on Africa. the roads were, more especially in the dry season, liable to organic impurity from the numerous dead oxen lying about. The heavy road traffic, greatly increased when a campaign is being carried on, or large bodies of troops are occupying the country, being conducted by means of ox-waggons, moving about thirteen miles a -day, the number of oxen turned adrift to die sick from some epidemic, or exhausted from bad roads and deficient [*rass was 32 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, very large. The poor animals would then generally ~ seek water, and often drop down and die in the streams. Attempts The officer commanding the troops endeavoured, with some success, to allay the mischief, by directing transport officers and military parties, when on the move, to draw the dead oxen away from the imme- diate vicinity of streams, and issued orders for the drinking water to be invariably taken from above streams. But even the vultures, which assembled in such crowds to feed on the carcasses, though useful as scavengers, were suspected of defeating all these pre- cautions, by repairing to the water after they had over-eaten themselves and disgorging into the streams, flowing but sluggishly in dry seasons. A suggestion made by Dr Skeen, that wells such as used in Eastern countries with weighted pole would answer should be sunk along the main roads, was considered good, but in advance of the means of the country to cany out successfully. From the foregoing it may be surmised that, had the troops not been so detached, fewer parties would have been on the march, and fewer casualties would consequently have arisen from sickness. Discipline invariably deteriorates in some par- ticulars, when troops like those referred to have been campaigning for a long period in such a country as South Africa, or when, broken up into fragmentary detachments, they occupy a territory so extensive as the Transvaal, and small armed parties are frequently THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 33 marching from station to station, or to the coast, CHAP. traversing long lonely roads for weeks together under insufficient control. It is not surprising if, in the latter circumstances, many instances of depredation occurred, committed by passing soldiers on inhabi- tants or farms at wayside places. These acts some- times seemed to show that the men looked upon themselves as in an enemy's country, where they need not be over particular. In many cases, no doubt, the sufferers did not consider it worth their while to lodge complaints with the Landdrost, who often resided miles away at an inconvenient distance ; and be- sides, the culprits might have, meanwhile, had time to get into another district before any formal identi- fication or arrest could be made. In other cases, the owners having ridden after and obtained resti- tution of some articles taken, would be satisfied, and decline to take further steps ; or compensa- tion having been offered, the affair would be thus compromised. The military authorities, however, while carrying Checks to 11 r arrest out as many checks as possible upon the conduct ol crime. parties proceeding through the country, gave every encouragement and assistance in their power for the detection and punishment of such crime ; indeed, with such good effect that, during the month pre- ceding hostilities, there were more than a score of soldiers at one time in prisons undergoing sentences for various civil offences of a bad type shooting cattle and sheep, and carrying off the carcasses, horse- stealing, breaking into stores, &c. c 34 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. It has sometimes been urged that British troops when stationed in a colony cost no more to the Great loss through Imperial Government than if at home. This was desertion. certainly a fallacious estimate in regard to the Trans- vaal, where the expenditure in transport, stores, and in other ways was, as shown in the preceding para- graphs, 1 largely in excess. A fertile source of this extra cost, and at the same time weakness, was that arising from the large number of men deserting only' approached during the period we had garrisons stationed throughout Canada an item of expenditure which, like that on account of invaliding, 2 is very generally forgotten, when making such a comparison or counting up the cost of an army of occupation. Deserters This crime had always been rife among the troops to Trans- . _ . . vaai prior stationed in south Amca, and a large proportion 01 tion. the deserters had found their way to the Transvaal before our arrival there, many of whom had become thriving citizens. It was not thought expedient to molest these men unless they had recently deserted, and they were accordingly furnished with certificates to protect them from arrest. The Orange Free State lias .similarly benefited from a like supply of labour, sometimes skilled, from the same source ; and the 1 )iamoncUfields and other mining districts have plenty of such men. 3 Just prior to the withdrawal of the King's Dragoon Guards, an officer of that corps crossed over into the 1 Sre ante, pp. 30-32. 2 g ee ant6j p p _ 30-32. r> Many of the Filibusters now in Bechuanalancl are said to be de- serters from our forces. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 35 Free State to attend the Harrismith races. Stopping CHAP. on his way at a smith's one of his horses having cast a shoe he recognised the name over the door as one familiar to him, and the man himself coming out, proved to be a deserter of a few weeks before from his own regiment, who had set up a forge, and was driving a very paying trade. The officer's horse was shod, but a heavy price had to be paid for the favour ! With startling; evidence occasionally brought before inciuce- J & ments to him of the prosperity enjoyed by former deserters, Desert. and feeling acutely the contrast between his small army pay, scanty fare, and tent life, and the enormous wages, with plentiful board and lodgings, offered to him if he would desert, it is not to be wondered at that the British soldier should so frequently have been tempted to run all risks to change his lot. The risks were certainly great : mounted look-out Risks at- parties hovering around, and following up a chase for desertion. fifty or even a hundred miles, in the hope of gaining the large reward 5 offered for capture ; heavy punishments on conviction ; danger of starvation or death from exposure. The bodies of two artillery- men were reported in the papers to have been seen on the veld between Potchefstroom and the Diamond- fields: the unfortunate men having evidently suc- cumbed and perished miserably from hunger and cold. The inducements to desert were, however, too often 11 i r -T r rviT offered for irresistible, and iacilities were frequently anorded to desertion. take men beyond the reach of the patrols. A builder was suspected of having placed horses at the disposal of two soldiers, which enabled them to reach a 36 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, village, a hundred miles off, where he was carrying out a contract. offer made Two officers, who were out shooting in the country officers. in plain clothes, went to a Boer's house. The man, in the course of conversation, told them that he was willing to give 7, 10s. a -month, with board and lodging, to any person who could keep his books, and do other clerical work for him ; and ended by asking if either of them would accept the situation ! Boer While mentioning the inducements to desert, we women - . . marry must not omit that the lair young Boer woman some- deserters. . times exercised her influence. A look-out officer, as he was termed, in charge of the mounted patrols, had reason to suspect that a deserter was harboured in a certain farmhouse, which he insisted on entering. When the door was opened, only the daughter of the house could he seen ; but presently, looking up the chimney, he espied his man. It transpired afterwards that the poor fellow was about to be married to the girl, and had arranged with her father to settle down on the farm. The Boers generally rendered assistance quietly to men passing by their farms, and endeavouring to escape over the border ; and no doubt deserters who had already succeeded in getting clear away, in some cases communicated with their former comrades as to the best line of country to follow. Cavalry men sometimes departed with their chargers ; and infantry men, if they could ride, supplied themselves with their officers' or some one else's horses. They fre- quently, also, took with them their rifles, ammuni- THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 37 tion, and blankets, probably disposing of them to the CHAP. Boers in order to pay their way. The men thus lost were all trained soldiers of some Large cost of d.6 standing, by no means always the " black sheep " of tion. their corps, but often of long-tried service and char- acter, who could be ill spared, and only replaced at considerable cost and the lapse of some months. The expenses attending keeping up mounted look- out parties on the roads, payments for rewards and information, conveyance of deserters, increased prison accommodation, losses of horses, rifles, ammunition, and clothing, &c., formed a heavy item. To this must be added the loss of the services of those de- serters retaken for from one to two years' detention in prison after conviction, and period of absence before and the cost of replacing those who were never recovered. Altogether, 200 for every man raised, trained, and sent to such a distant part five weeks' march into the interior after disembarking to fill each vacancy created by desertion, would not be an overestimate. Numerous cases of desertion occurred at the com- mencement of the year 1880, after the close of the Sekukuni war ; then the number lessened, until the warmer months coming round again, admitting of less exposure in crossing over the high open plains, the cases again rapidly increased. They rose to the highest number during the month of August, when, out of a force then about 3000 men, 70 went off, of whom perhaps one-third were subsequently recovered. We have not before us precise statistics, but, never- 38 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, theless, sufficient data to enable us to form a belief that we shall be under the mark when we compute the loss by desertion in 1880 to have been 260 men, representing, at the foregoing estimate, a money loss of no less than 52,000. Discomfort The troops left iii the Transvaal had been sub- of soldier's . , life in jected to much hard work and exposure the previous year, in the Zulu and Sekukuni campaigns ; some had even been engaged in the Galeka and Gaeka war of 1877-78. Their lot had not been cast in pleasant, lively garrisons, surrounded by comforts, amuse- ments, and civilising influences ; but then, at least, they had a certain degree of the excitement and occupation incidental to campaigning life, which was missing when quartered in the Transvaal, until the close of 1880. Although their officers did as much as lay in their power to create a few amusements for them, still the soldiers found their existence at the out-stations monotonous and dreary in the extreme. Some took the matter into their own hands and deserted, while the rest anxiously anticipated the order to move down country to the coast. Tent life is, with fine weather, and other surround- ings being propitious, an agreeable novelty for a short time, or even longer, with some definite object in view ; but when it comes to spending years, in all seasons, under canvas, the feelings are apt to alter and take a different view, especially if other cir- Soidiers cimistances contribute to render it distasteful. Now fed. the soldier was under-fed for such a life as he was THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 39 leading, on an elevated plateau several thousand CHAP. feet above the sea. The field-ration he had enjoyed - during the campaigns was reduced to the ordinary ration given to soldiers in quarters. The 1 Ib. meat, including bone, did not, during the dry season in the Transvaal, when, for want of good grass, the cattle became exceedingly poor, afford the same nourish- ment as a similar quantity elsewhere, while the amount of bone was proportionately greater. It was difficult for the soldier, with his small means, to pur- chase extra articles, as customary, to supplement his messing. Eggs, butter, and milk could not generally be obtained, and, if forthcoming, sold at extravagant prices. With a view to reducing; the surplus stores accu- Their dis- , . 7 , Hke to mulatecl lor past campaigning purposes, an order was biscuits received to issue preserved meat and biscuit twice meats. a-week. As may be imagined, this order ran counter to the prevalent prejudice entertained by our lower classes to tinned meats. A deserter left a letter on his bed containing the Anecdote , f another following words : " Private s kit is complete, i deserter. am going- to see if i can get a little better dinner O o o somewhere else than i got here to-day old Bully meat ! " In order to cope effectively with the possible ris- Danger J . resulting ing of a mounted population like the Boers hunt- fromwith- f x drawal of ers from their childhood, and consequently prac- cavalry. tised horsemen and excellent shots at long distances, combined with thorough knowledge of country it 40 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, was obviously essential that a sufficient mounted force should remain at hand ready to meet such an A mounted n . . . , force essen- emergency. Only so could the communications be tialtocope with Boers, kept up, assistance rendered to the well-disposed, or protection afforded beyond the immediate vicinity of infantry posts ; and only so could support and ade- quate security be given to infantry or artillery on the march. A body of infantry, moving with guns and supplies, would otherwise be always liable to be taken at a disadvantage by such a foe, wherever rocks or other cover were forthcoming, offering facilities for attack or disputing the way, and certainly such spots were easily met with along all the roads spots which could not always be avoided by a column obliged to carry its supplies with it. By the enemy hanging on the flanks and rear, as well as impeding the ad- vance in front, the artillery horses and transport animals would soon be destroyed, and the guns and supplies imperilled. The reason Such being the case which should have been as vairy were clear before the outbreak as it was after, why was it withdrawn. , , T7 - . , -,-. /-NIT that the King s Dragoon Guards, the only cavalry regiment not alone in the Transvaal, but in South Africa was withdrawn ? Why was all proper cau- tion set aside, when an element of risk still remained, and a game of chance instead played, 1 all being staked on the settled but erroneous conviction entertained by some officials, that the Boers were wanting in pluck, and would not therefore become dangerous. 2 1 See ante, p. 29. 2 See ante, pp. 14-17. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 41 The Imperial Government would certainly not CHAP. have sanctioned such a risky reduction, but that they had been led astray, through receiving what they deemed reliable reports, satisfying them that all danger was past, and no further fear need be enter- tained of insurrection. By October the regiment was on its way to India. Effect of Its departure announced far and wide by advertise- of King's in i Dragoon ments 01 the sale oi its horses, &c., could not have Guards. failed to attract great attention, and have deeply influenced the disaffected Boers in all their subse- quent movements and decisions. A mounted troop of the Transport Service Corps followed, but, together with a detachment of the King's Dragoon Guards, were detained in Natal, awaiting transport to proceed to their depots in Eng- land, when, hostilities breaking out, they were im- mediately remounted, at some trouble and expense, and utilised by Sir George Colley at Laing's Nek, in the January following. The only remaining mounted military force left in Mounted the Transvaal consisted of about one hundred men, taken from the two infantry battalions. This body was used, partly to furnish escorts to Government officials engaged in visiting or collecting taxes in the native districts, and partly in look-out parties to check desertion. A proposal made by Colonel Bel- lairs, on the removal of the King's Dragoon Guards, to largely increase the number of mounted infantry, profiting by the horses and saddlery of the departing regiment for that purpose, was not entertained, the 42 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, political outlook being considered such as not to warrant such an expenditure. Inoppor- tune mo- ment chosen to oft'er assistance to Cape Govern- ment. As if to show yet further how little apprehen- sive they were of any disturbance taking place, the local government took this inopportune time, the close of October soon after the loss of the cavalry regiment, with a reduction of the total military force by nearly one-half, to offer assistance to the Cape Government then prosecuting a war against the Basutos by raising and equipping, in Pretoria, a mounted volunteer corps of 300 men, under Comman- dant Ferriera, C.M.G., a volunteer officer who had greatly distinguished himself in previous border war- fare. As the Government had no ordnance stores available for this purpose, the consent of Sir George Colley was obtained for the required rifles, &c., to be supplied from the military store. 1 Two field- guns were also issued from the local government stores. Thus, 300 more armed men of the material best adapted to act as a mounted levy in the coming struggle together with an experienced commander, whose knowledge of the country and people would have proved most valuable, were lost ; drawn away to take part in a native war with which the province 1 The rilles intended to replace those supplied to Ferriera's Horse urgently demanded by the officer commanding the troops in the Trans- vaal in October were, apparently, only sent from Pietermaritzburg in the enrly part of December. The delay was fatal, and they failed to reach their destination. See paragraph 4 of Sir George Colley's letter to Sir Owen Lanyon, in Blue-book [c. 2783], February 1881. Enclos- ure 3 to No. 14. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 43 had no concern whatever, and from the results of CHAP. which it had nothing to fear. When November arrived prior to the develop- Military ment of the Bezuidenhout affair the military forces Transvaal, November were thus spread over the country, viz. : isso. Pretoria (199 miles from Newcastle). Headquarters and five companies of 2d battalion Boyal Scots Fusiliers ; mounted troop of do. ; four guns, X battery, 5th brigade, Royal Artillery ; one company Eoyal Engineers. Rusteriburg (67 miles from Pretoria). Two companies of 2d battalion Eoyal Scots Fusiliers. Marabastadt (165 miles from Pretoria). Two companies of 94th Regiment. Lydciibery (188 miles from Pretoria). Headquarters and two companies of 94th Regiment, WaJcJcerstroom (162 miles from Pretoria ; 33 miles from Newcastle). One company of 94th Regiment ; mount- ed troop of do. Standerton (114 miles from Pretoria; 85 miles from New- castle). One company of 94th Regiment. In Natal there were two infantry battalions the Force in 58th Regiment, recently withdrawn from the Trans- vaal, and the 3d battalion 60th Rifles two guns, Royal Artillery, one company Royal Engineers, and one company of the 94th Regiment, the last being- stationed at Newcastle, the nearest military post to the Transvaal border. The transport service in the Transvaal having been insufficient transport reduced, 1 there were no longer the same means lor for mobil- isation. mobilising the whole of the troops as previously. 1 See ante, pp. 26-28. 44 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. Transport was only kept up for mobilising a small column at Pretoria, one company at Eustenburg, and one company at Marabastadt. The remaining out- lying garrisons were now regarded as stationary posts. False im- The strange belief entertained by the governing entertained powers would appear to have been, that the presence ment of of a British detachment, however small, even of effect of infantry alone though surrounded by an armed detached posts. mounted population, should suffice to overawe and control the district in which it was placed no mat- ter how distant from support and so prevent any thought of insurrection. Detached In the Kafir wars of 1851-53, and 1877-78, small Kafir infantry posts, separated by only a short march, were usefully employed, and suited to the character of the operations necessary to subdue the enemy ; but here, in the Transvaal, were isolated, weak infantry detach- ments, from 70 to 200 miles apart, without cavalry support or transport, in the midst of an armed dis- affected white people, and in a country where the rivers and streams, at certain seasons, become impass- able for days or even weeks together. Was it sup- nosed that, because such posts might serve to keep in check a native population, they would equally answer the same purpose with the Boers ? It would seem so. Each war that we have undertaken of late years in South Africa has necessitated complete change in tactics and mode of operations, to meet the altered circumstances which arose in each case. The same has happened in New Zealand and Indian campaigns. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 45 No army but that of England lias had so frequently CHAP. to adapt itself to sudden change to re-educate itself at short notice, for the ever-varying localities of hostilities. The Kafir war of 1877-78, on the Cape eastern frontier, partook mainly of the character of bush- fighting the natives taking to the dense bush and forests, and having to be driven out by skirmishing parties. Then followed the Zulu war, when we be- came the defending, the natives the assailing party -we in square or laager formations, awaiting the enemy's onslaught. In the Sekukuni operations, this latter method was reversed, we having to attack the natives, hidden behind their strong rocky fastnesses. The Boer hostilities introduced a different element from our previous experiences in warfare an enemy wholly mounted, with the hunter's training and eye for cover and distance. As shown, 1 we neglected to provide an adequate mounted force to meet this new contingency, with the result that the detached garrisons in the Transvaal were reduced to act chiefly on the defensive ; while the general officer on the Natal border, not having the patience to await his cavalry reinforcements, then on their way from Eng- land and India, suffered defeat for the want of them. It was during the early part of the month of The Be- AT i i i i III/-N zuidenliout .November that the proceedings taken by the Govern- aitair. ment in the Bezuidenhout affair which had been going on for some weeks culminated in a crisis and 1 See ante, pp. 39-41. 46 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, rising of the people. As we have already remarked, 1 the case arose out of an attempt to enforce the payment of taxes which were, in amount, if not illegal, certainly inequitable. The case was, however, but the last of many previous wrongful attempts at official exaction. In the account which Mr Hudson, the Colonial Secretary, gives of his interview with Mr Kruger and the Boer Committee which took place at Kaul- fontein, near Potchefstroom, on the 29th November, an account, given in the Appendix, which we espe- cially recommend to the notice of our readers, Mr Cronje, who subsequently commanded the Boers at the siege of Potchefstroom, is mentioned as express- ing his desire to state " all the circumstances which have led to the present difficulties," and as proceed- ing as follows : O " Mr Bezuidenhout was served with a tax notice to pay '2~, os. He appeared at the office of the Landdrost of L'otchefstroom, and told him he was willing to pay 14, \vhich was all that could legally lie demanded. The Land- drost refused to receive it, but said Bezuidenhout must pay 27, 5s.; but lie declined to do so. He was then summoned for 27, 5s., and appeared, presenting' his last receipts, and tendered again 14. The Landdrost answered as before. Bezuidenhout Hatly refused to pay. Subsequently judgment was given for 14, with 8 costs, and the waggon was attached for the 14. If this matter is looked into, it will be seen how illegally the Government has acted." Xo dates are given in the foregoing summary of particulars, but we believe we are correct in stating 1 Sec ante, pp. 23-25. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 47 that, in the considerable intervals which elapsed CHAP. between the several times that the case came before the Landdrost, Mr Goetz was in correspondence with and throughout acted under the instructions sent to him from headquarters. There would appear to have been no hasty or inconsiderate action on his part, all responsibility for his decisions and action resting on the Government. To make Mr Cronje's statement still clearer, it should further be mentioned that Mr Bezuidenhout was possessed of certain half or por- tions of farms, which were assessed at the full or same rate of tax as levied on full farms, reckoned at 6000 acres each. The law probably through an omission, or because the division of farms was not at the moment foreseen only specified one rate for farms, meaning the recognised farms of 6000 acres each. For half farms, at half rates only, Mr Bezui- denhout's tender of 14 in payment of all taxes due by him was correct, and should have been accepted. From the fact of the Landdrost having finally revised his decision, and given judgment for 14, it would seem that the Government had tardily recog- nised their error to that extent. But, not satisfied with having put Mr Bezuidenhout to great unneces- sary trouble, as well as expense, in employing an attorney to resist a wrongful claim, he was mulcted in costs for proving that he was right. 1 As Mr Bezuidenhout refused payment, a waggon belonging to him was attached in execution, and 1 See Appendix A. 48 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, steps taken to sell the same in front of the Land- drost's office at Potchefstroom on the llth November. The sale was interrupted by an assembly of about one hundred Boers, who forcibly took the waggon away. 1 The Landdrost having reported this interference with his authority, the Administrator considered that serious notice should be taken of the act, and that the occasion demanded that prompt measures should be adopted to support the civil authority. He accord- ingly requested the officer in command of the troops to despatch a military force at once to Potchefstroom, and, at the same time, sent Captain Kaaf, C.M.G., to enrol special constables, and assist th'e Landdrost in carrying out the process of his Court, and causing his judgments to be respected. Troops The detachment of troops consisting of one com- potcia-f- pany of the 2d Battalion 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers, half the mounted troop of the same corps, and two -pounder guns of the Royal Artillery under the command of Major Thornhill, R.A., left Pretoria on the 14th November, and reached Potchefstroom a few days later, being there joined by another company of the 2d Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers, sent direct 1 In his letter of the 14th November, calling upon Colonel Bellairs to despatch troops to Potchefstroom in aid of the civil power, Sir Owen Lanynii gives a different version of the cause of Bezuidenhout's non- payment of tuxes. lie says "This waggon had been taken under authority of the Court for non-payment of taxes, Bezuidenhout having refused to pay the same, not because he was unable to do so, but on the grounds that lie would not recognise her Majesty's Government." No mention is made of the real facts of the case. See Blue-book (c. 2740), page 1 10. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 49 from Rustenburg. 1 This force was equipped as a CHAP. flying column, in readiness for any emergency ; and although the Government did not anticipate that its services would be more than temporarily required, Colonel Bellairs took the precaution to desire the officer in command to intrench himself outside the town, and form a similar defensible position to those occupied at the permanent out-stations ; while large supplies of ammunition and commissariat stores were forwarded, in addition to those fourteen days' rations required for a field column. Shortly after, finding that the position grew more Mr Hud- serious ; that Captain Kaaf, even with his body of report. special constables, was unequal to arrest defaulters protected by over three hundred armed men ; and that 1 Extract from the ' Siege of Potchefstroom,' by Lieutenant H. M. L. Bundle, R.A. : "On Saturday, 13th November 1880, it was rumoured in the camp at Pretoria that a riot had taken place at Potchefstroom, the old capital of the Transvaal. Three hundred Boers had ridden into the town and forcibly taken away a waggon, which was being sold by order of the Landdrost for arrears of taxes. It was known by 5 P.M. that, at the request of the Government, a small force was under orders to march on the following day at one o'clock for Potchefstroom. The troops at this time stationed at Pretoria were : headquarters and four guns N/5, R.A. ; headquartei'S 2d Company R.E., strength about 45 ; headquarters 2/2 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers, strength about 350 ; one troop of mounted infantry, strength about 35 ; a few men of the Army Service and Army Hospital Corps. Out of this force the following were formed into a ' Field Force,' under the command of Major C. Thornhill, R.A., and marched for Potchefstroom in less than 24 hours from the time the orders were received viz., two guns, N/5, R.A. ; 25 mounted infantry ; one company Royal Scots Fusiliers strength, 75. This force marched into Potchefstroom at 2 P.M. on the 18th, having thus done the 104 miles in 96 hours. On the 20th the force was further strengthened by the arrival of another company of the Royal Scots Fusiliers from Rustenburg, under the command of Lieutenant R. A. Browne strength, 49 N.C.O.'s and men." 50 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. Mr Goetz, the Landdrost, was desirous of being re- lieved he wishing to avoid the responsibility of a collision with the Boers, which he was of opinion would cause a general rising, 1 the Administrator deemed it necessary to send the Colonial Secretary to take temporary civil charge at Potchefstroom until the arrival of Major Clarke, Special Commissioner for the Northern Districts, on the 30th November. If reference is again made to Mr Hudson's report of his meeting with the Boer leaders, it will be observed that the Colonial Secretary is mentioned as replying to Mr Cronje's statement of Mr Bezuidenhout's case : " The Government is not aware of the case as you have stated it," meaning, we presume, that he personally had been left in ignorance of the particulars as then given. That the progress of the question at issue, when it was under consideration at headquarters, should have been apparently withheld from the Colonial Secretary, is sufficiently singular ; but that Mr Hudson should have been sent to Potchefstroom without a correct knowledge of all the details con- O corning the matter which, it is to be supposed, he was to endeavour to arrange, seems most extraor- 1 In his report of the 22d November, Mr Goetz thus writes : " 2. Judging from Captuiii Raaf s report and the character of the Boers, whom I have known for many years, I am of opinion that if a collision with them should take place, the matter will not end here, but a general rising may be expected. " 3. I'nder the present state of affairs as I have taken all the steps in my power, and as I have failed to enforce obedience to the law I would earnestly suggest to the Government to send or appoint some one here, with full power to act should military force be used, as I cannot take the responsibility of the result of such an important matter." See Blue- bock (c. 2740), page 123. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 51 dinary. He was evidently greatly impressed with CHAP. the statement of facts given him by Mr Cronje, as well as the proceedings on the case supplied to him by the Landdrost, and winds up his report with the following significant words : " The political results which would appear to have arisen out of this case require, I think, that Government should investigate it." We are not told that any such inquiry as that recommended by Mr Hudson would be or was made ; neither are the Landdrost's proceedings in the case enclosed with Sir Owen Lanyon's covering despatch. On the 16th November, Colonel Bellairs is found Military . . force in representing to the Administrator that, consequent Pretoria inadequate on the departure of the troops for Potchefstroom, the to form force left in Pretoria was inadequate "to send out a column. strong field column should any pressing emergency arise to require it ; " and recommending the with- drawal of the troops from Marabastadt (two com- panies of the 94th Eegiment) and Eustenburg (one company of the 2d Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers), as he was of opinion that having at disposal a stronger body of troops at Pretoria was of greater importance than maintaining those military outposts. 1 Sir Owen 1 From Colonel W. Bellairs, C.B., Commanding Transvaal District, to the Administrator, Transvaal'. ' PRETORIA, November 16, 1880. " Consequent on the recent despatch of troops to Potchefstroom, and this garrison having been thus materially reduced, I shall no longer be able, iinless reinforced, to send out a strong field column from this station, should any pressing emergency arise to require it. "At this moment, leaving, say, 150 infantry for the protection of Pretoria, there would remain available for field purposes only two guns, 52 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. Lanyon, however, in his reply of the following date, 1 demurred to the removal of the troops from these stations, but remarked that " there would be no ob- jection to a temporary withdrawal of some of the troops from Lydenburg." 2 No immediate action Royal Artillery, part of a company of Royal Engineers, a few mounted men, and about 240 infantry. " In the present condition of this province there should be a sufficient force maintained at Pretoria to render it possible to detail a field column consisting of at least four guns, a company of Royal Engineers, a troop of mounted infantry, and 500 infantry or about 700 men. " Under these circumstances I have the honour 'to recommend the withdrawal of the troops now stationed at Marabastadt (two companies 94th Foot) and Rustenburg (one company 2d Battalion 21st Foot) to Pretoria, as I am of opinion that having at disposal a stronger body of troops at Pretoria is of greater importance than maintaining the military outposts referred to." 1 From the Administrator, Transvaal, to the Colonel Commanding, Transvaal. " PRETORIA, November 17, 1880. " In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honour to state that it would be better to reduce the garrison at Lydenburg than to withdraw either of the detachments at Rustenburg or Marabastadt. The former place is one of the centres of disaffection amongst the Boers, and the moral effect of having troops there has already been productive of good. " 2. The force at Marabastadt, on the other hand, exercises considerable influence over the natives, who are most numerous in that district ; and I am informed by the Secretary for Native Affairs that already the late action of the Cape Government in Basutoland has, to a certain extent, caused a feeling of uneasiness amongst them. This feeling is, I fear, 1 icing fostered by a certain section of the Boers. " 3. There would be no objection, however, to a temporary withdrawal of some of the troops from Lydenburg, but I think such should only be done to meet the present necessity to which you refer." - From the Administrator, Transvaal, to the Colonel Commanding, Transvaal. " ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, TRANSVAAL, XovemlerlZ, 1880. ' In view of the present state of affairs in the Transvaal, and the mass meeting about to be held by the Boers in January next in the vicinity THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 53 being pressed, the question was then referred for the CHAP. decision of Sir George Colley. 1 In a few days the Administrator seems to have Troops or- dered in become more alive to the desirability of assembling; a fromMara J bastadt larger force at Pretoria. On the 23d November he a . ... burg. writes, asking Colonel Bellairs to bring in one of the companies from Marabastadt, and the headquarters of the 94th Regiment from Lydenburg ; also to con- centrate the mounted infantry. In ordinary course, the Major-General's authority would have been applied for before ordering these moves to be carried out ; of Pretoria, I think it is desirable that as many troops as possible should be concentrated at Pretoria. " I should therefore be obliged if you would take the necessary steps to accomplish this object, by bringing in one company from Marabastadt, and the headquarters of the 94th Regiment from Lydenburg, leaving such men as yon may think necessary for the protection of the military stores and the town. " P.S. It would also be well to concentrate as many of the mounted infantry here as possible." 1 From Colonel W. Bellairs, C.B., Commanding Transvaal District, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, Pietermaritzburg. " PRETORIA, November 18, 1880. "1. This correspondence, pointing to the urgent necessity for greater concentration or reinforcements for the garrison of Pretoria, is transmitted for the information of the Major-General Commanding, and for such instructions as he may be pleased to give on the subject. " 2. His Excellency Sir Owen Lanyon suggests the temporary with- drawal of a portion of the troops from Lydenburg ; but the removal of one of the two companies 94th Foot from that station would not, in my opinion, suffice or fully meet the object in view viz., that the garrison of Pretoria should be of such strength as to admit of sending out a field column of four guns, a company Royal Engineers, a troop of mounted infantry, and 500 infantry, whenever serious emergency called for it. " 3. Should Sir George Colley decide on withdrawing a company from Lydenburg, will you kindly, to save postal delay, telegraph to that effect 1 There is only a weekly mail (Tuesdays) to Lydenburg, and with ox-transport the company would be twelve or more days on the road at this season." 54 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, but the telegraph to Natal that day being defective, and Colonel Bellairs viewing the matter as urgent, the necessary orders were at once despatched. To this end, native runners were procured and sent off to Marabastadt, carrying instructions that, in addition to one company of the 94th Eegiment, a detachment of the mounted troop of that corps which had been escorting the Secretary for Native Affairs, collecting hut taxes, for the previous five months should be sent in. The other detachments of the troop, at Newcastle, Wakkerstroom, and Stan- derton, were ordered, by telegraph, to meet at the last station, and thence march to Pretoria. The orders for Lydenburg were conveyed by a mounted sergeant of the Transport Corps, with a led horse, the weekly post-cart having already left that morning. Headquarters and two companies of the 94th Kegi- ment were to come in, less about 50 men, to remain in charge of the camp and stores. 1 1 From Colonel W. Bellairs, C.B., Commanding Transvaal District, to the Deputy Adjutant-General, Pietermaritzburg. " PRETORIA, November 25, 1880. " 1. After consultation with the Administrator, and in compliance with the request contained in his Excellency's letter of the 23d instant (copy enclosed), I sent orders by special messenger the same day, overtaking the post-cart, which had already left that morning, for the headquarters and two companies of the 94th Foot less about 50 men, including sick, to remain for the protection of barracks, stores, &c. to proceed without delay by ordinary route march from Lydenburg to Pretoria. " 2. Also by special native runner, for one company 94th Foot to march from Marabastadt to Pretoria, together with a detatchment of the mounted troop of the same corps, which has been on escort with the Minister for Native Affairs, collecting hut taxes for the past five months. " 3. And, by telegraph and letter, for the detachments mounted troop THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 55 Looking back, after the terrible disaster which sub- CHAP. sequently overtook the Lydenburg detachment of the . . Delay in 94th Regiment, one cannot but see that the delay in requisition for the writing or delivering Sir Owen Lanyon's letter of the movement & J . of the 23d November was a most untoward event. 1 It troops. reached Colonel Bellairs, when in his office, at about noon the same day. Although he instantly sent off his staff officer Captain Churchill at a gallop to delay the post-cart, in case it should not have left, as usual, while he remained writing the requisite orders, it was too late ; and, as before mentioned, it became necessary to despatch the sergeant, in the endeavour to overtake the cart, as it was hoped he might be able to do, at a place about forty-five miles off, where it sometimes stayed for a few hours during the night. In this attempt he proved unsuccessful, the cart having passed on after only a short halt. O J. J 94th Foot, now at Wakkerstroom, Newcastle, and Standerton, to con- centrate at this last station and then march to Pretoria. " 4. The commissariat stores in the town at Lydenlmrg, and the sick, in hospital, have been directed to be brought into the new barrack huts, thus saving rent for buildings hired, and rendering the defence of the post easier. " 5. The above troops may be expected to reach Pretoria about the 12th proximo, provided satisfactory transport arrangements can be made on the spot. "P.tS'. When the decision regarding the above moves was arrived at, telegraphic communication with Pietermarit/burg was defective ; but on the 24th instant a telegram reporting the action taken was sent to you." 1 So little importance was apparently attached to the immediate execution of this request for reinforcements, that no effort was made, by an order from the Administrator's office, to delay the departure of the post-cart the only weekly means of quick communication with Lyden- lmrg leaving that forenoon, and so enabling the officer commanding to despatch his orders by that opportunity. 56 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. The sergeant's horses on reaching Middleburg were knocked up, and he experienced difficulty and delay in replacing them, but eventually reached Lydenburg on the morning of the 27th two days after the post-cart. Additional It was not until the 25th November that the troops . . . asked for Administrator considered it necessary to represent, by telegraph, to Sir George Colley that, "Hostile attitude of the Boers has become more marked. Mass meeting takes place in January. I think it would be advisable that 58th should return to Transvaal." Sir George Colley replied the following day to the effect that he could ill spare the 58th Regiment, in view of an expected outbreak of Pondos on the Natal-Cape frontier, but was willing to send two companies to Newcastle, so as to relieve and render available the companies of the 94th Regi- ment there and at Wakkerstroom. On receipt of this answer, Sir Owen Lanyon reported further, by letter (six days' post), on the subject, and urged that more troops should be spared for service in the Trans- The move- vaal. As a result, later on, Sir George Colley de- ment l>i'L, f un . too late! tached four, instead of only two, companies of the 58th Regiment to Newcastle, with the intention that they should relieve Wakkerstroom and Standerton, thus setting free those companies of the 94th Regi- ment for the Pretoria garrison. 1 The movement was, however, begun too late to gain this last object, and hostilities had broken out for some days before the 1 See Blue-book (c. 2783), January 1881, No. 14 and enclosures. THE OKTGIN OF THE BOEK REVOLT. 57 companies of the 58th and 94th Regiments were able CHAP. to reach Standerton. Orders were sent out, during the first week in December, by the military authorities in Pretoria to the out-stations and detachments on the march, desir- ing that, in the existing disturbed state of the country, every possible precaution should be exercised against surprise or attack, and for the safety of the cattle both by day and night when grazing or kraaled. 1 But even to so late a period as the 5th December, Sir Owen Lanyon does not appear to have thought 1 The following instructions, enjoining the utmost caution, were issued as early as the 24th November : " Officer Commanding, Pretoria. " 1. It behoves us at the present time, when armed Boers are known to be moving about the country in opposition to the law, to exercise great caution, and guard against any possible sudden attack. There must be no chance afforded to an adventurous and desperate leader, with one or two hundred followers, of being able to inflict damage by carrying off arms, ammunition, &c. " 2. No body of men, other than of her Majesty's troops, should be allowed to approach the camp by day or by night without a sufficient alarm having been given to enable the troops to stand to arms. " 3. Special precautions will be taken to secure the safety of all Royal Artillery and other guns, as well as all reserve arms, ammunition, &c. It may be expected that these guns, &c., will be the special object of attack, surprises, or sudden rush, should hostilities ensue. " 4. Steps will be taken to remove the imperial and colonial ammuni- tion and stores from the present outlying magazine to the central white building in the ordnance yard, the guard over the former being then withdrawn. " 5. The colonial guns will be placed in suitable position for the pro- tection of the town and camp, and parties of infantry will be told off for working them. " 6. Should the garrison become reduced by departure of a flying column, or an attack be expected, the unarmed natives could be utilised as scouts, to give notice of any bodies of men approaching or being in the vicinity. W. BELLAIRS, Colonel commanding Transvaal District. "PRETORIA, 24. 11. 80." 58 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, the situation in any way critical. On that day, while reporting to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the date for the assembly of the mass meeting had been advanced one month (to the 8th December), and with the full knowledge that none of the troops called up as mentioned in this and the preceding note could reach Pretoria in time, he writes, " I still do not think there is much cause for anxiety." l Indeed as the despatches given in the Blue-book show 2 the principal causes of anxiety at this period seem rather to have been, how best to reply to Mr C. K. White's criticism on " the existing form of government " 3 ; framing and carrying through a new law for the regulation of " the puny press of the Transvaal," as Mr White aptly termed it, con- sisting of only two struggling papers ; and the prose- cution of Mr Celliers, the editor and proprietor of the ' Volksstem ' 4 the only Dutch organ. As some of the later despatches sent from the Transvaal reached Downing Street only after it had become known, by telegraph, that the Boers had risen and invested all our garrisons, we cannot but think that they must have been found somewhat odd reading. Mr Hudson was formally informed, the day fol- lowing his interview with the Boer Committee, that 1 See Blue-book (c. 2783), February 1881, No. 12. 2 See Blue-book (c. 2740), January 1881, No. 68, besides other despatches. :i See ante, p. 25. 4 'Voice of the People.' THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 59 a general meeting of the people had been called for CHAP. the 8th December. 1 Owing to the short notice given, Boers at a distance Number of Boers un- were unable to arrive so early at the place appointed Paarde Kraal a farm about thirty-five miles from Pretoria, towards Potchefstroom ; but, by the 13th, 4000 men were said to have met a number probably increased a few days later. Altogether, by the 16th, 1 Letter from Mr KRUGER. (Translation.) " KAALFONTEIN, November 29, 1880. " SIR, I beg to inform you herewith that I have submitted an account of our interview of this morning to the assembled people. " We have agreed upon holding a general meeting of the people on the 8th December next. " I hope and trust, as I informed you and as you agreed to, that the Government will place no obstacle in the way by summonses, writs of execution, or any military movements. " Should it happen, however, that movements are taken on your part, I must distinctly inform yoii I shall not be responsible for the consequences. I have, &c. S. J. P. KRUGER. " The Honourable G. HUDSON, Government Secretary." Mr HUDSON'S Answer to Mr KRUGER'S Letter. "POTCHEFSTROOM, November SO, 1880. " SIR, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date received by me at 1.25 P.M. to-day. " I clearly placed before the committee my contention that no Government worthy of the name would submit to be called upon to suspend the operation of the law. In the form in which you placed matters before me, you threw upon the Government the responsibility of what might arise from any precipitate action on its part. The Government is fully aware of, and prepared to accept, the responsibility of its course of action. '' Major Clarke has now been appointed Special Commissioner for the district of Potchefstroom, to whom further correspondence if necessary may be addressed. I have, &c. GEORGE HUDSOX, Colonial Secretary. "S, J. PAUL KRUGER, Esq., Kaalfontein." 60 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, it was reported there were 7000 men under arms i. throughout the country. intended Early in December, Lieutenant Littledale, of the their meet- Eoyal Engineers, accompanied by Mr Melvill, the veyed. Surveyor-General of the province, had been sent to sketch the approaches to Paarde Kraal, and gain information which might prove useful in a military point of view. The locality was found well chosen for the purposes intended. Situated on a plateau of a range of hills, offering a large field of observa- tion, and at the foot of which the road from Pretoria to Potchefstroom passes, the position was naturally a strong one. The direct approaches from Pretoria were few, of a rocky precipitous nature, such as could easily have been defended by a determined foe ; while, had the position been turned from the Heidelberg side, many serious obstacles presented themselves to an attacking force. The opportunity to avail our- selves of the knowledge thus gained did not, however, Projected arise ; though, on the 17th, before the Boer Govern- brin'gabout ment's ultimatum had been received, and it became greater eon- -. -. i -11 centration known that hostilities might be expected, with an of troops. . . immediate descent on Pretoria and attempt to capture the town, should its garrison be weakened, it had been proposed and arranged by Colonel Bellairs in the endeavour to improve the military position by eventual greater concentration for a field column to leave the following morning for Potchefstroom, for the purpose of bringing away the guns, mounted infantry, and one company of infantry of the latter's garrison the Administrator desiring that one com- O O THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 61 pany should still be left. The column, thus strength- CHAP. ened, was, on its way back, to have been joined by another under Colonel Bellairs, as soon as the arrival of the Lydenburg detachment admitted of it, when, it was thought, should necessity require it, a com- bined attack could be adventured on the Boer posi- tion. With the advent, however, the same night, of Mr Hendrick Schoeman, bringing the Boer ultima- tum, this plan was and well it was so abandoned, and the order cancelled, as involving too much risk to the town. The telegraph wires were cut on the 15th, com- Telegraph wires cut. munication with Natal by that means then ceasing. Sappers sent from Pretoria to endeavour to repair the line, were unable to effect their object, being in- terfered with by the Boers, and the poles thrown down. 1 Probably the last telegrams sent from Pre- toria were those from Sir Owen Lanyon and Colonel Bellairs to Sir George Colley, giving the resolution passed at the mass meeting establishing the South African Republic, Colonel Bellairs referring to the positions of the detachments of the 94th Regiment, then on the march, and foreshadowing the probability of conflict commencing, by attack on the latter.' 2 1 See Appendix C. - From Colonel Commanding, Pretoria, to the Deputy Adjutant- General, Pietermaritzburg, 14th December : " Boer meeting said to consist of four thousand, who have unfurled Republican flag, elected Kruger Vice-President, Joubert Commandant- General, and others as Commandants. Further intentions not known, but stated that first attack will be on Potchefstroom doubtful. 94th left Lydenburg 5th, but may not be here before 20th, roads being bad and rivers full. 94th from Newcastle and Wakkerstroom will be con- 62 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP. The hazardous nature of the military position deliberately chosen, and obstinately adhered to, not- Hazardous J J military withstanding the frequent protests and advice of the position. officer commanding the troops was now fully exem- plified, and seen to be bearing its natural conse- quences. By the act of the Boers assembling earlier than originally notified, the military pow r er for con- centration was reduced to a minimum more or less dependent on their abstention from attack of detach- ments on the march. No sufficient body of troops remained available for a strong field column, and, at the same time, to prevent the capital falling into the hands of the enemy. While threatening the seat of Government, from a camp only a day's ride distant, large bodies of armed mounted men could be rapidly detached, in any direction, to harass or overwhelm small numbers of troops, unaccompanied by cavalry, endeavouring to concentrate. All that the various military posts could do was to act on the defensive. The mass meeting, on the 13th December, pro- ceeded to elect Mr P. Kruo-er Vice-President, and O 7 with Messrs M. W. Pretorius and P. J. Joubert to form a triumvirate, to carry on their Government. Mr P. J. Joubert became Commandant-General; Dr Jorisseu, State Attorney; and Mr E. Bok, State Secretary. The members present belonging to the centrated at Standerton about 21st, and then march for Pretoria. All have been warned to proceed cautiously, and guard cattle against surprise. " If any conflict takes place, will perhaps commence by attack o/i 94th.'' * * Cipher. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 63 former Volksraad resumed their sittings. A pro- CHAP. clamation was drawn up setting forth their griev- ances under British rule, and declaring their former independence now restored. This document was then sent to Potchefstroom to be printed, accom- panied by a body of about 800 armed men to pre- vent any interruption of the work. The proclama- tion was finally dated the 16th December. Its last virtual declaration clause made known that, from that date, the whole of war by . r the Boers. country was " placed in a state of siege, and under the stipulations of the War Ordinance." The Boer patrols from the Paarde Kraal camp had Boer GOV- ernment been met by our scouts within twenty-five miles of established J J . . at Heidel- Pretoria ; but on the 16th a large portion of their ^erg. forces had moved on Heidelberg, where their Govern- ment took possession of the public offices, and estab- lished themselves. The Republic was, the same day, formally proclaimed, and the flag hoisted amidst great cheering. In order "to prevent the concentration of a laro;e Boer troops 1 sent to body of troops at Pretoria," 1 Commandant F. Joubert intercept J British de- was sent with a force in the direction of Middleburo- tachments ' on the to intercept the detachment of the 94th Regiment march - on the march from Lydenburg, and then detained at the Oliphant river. Similarly, another force was despatched towards Standerton. " To prevent all bloodshed " as it is grimly put in a later proclama- tion of the triumvirate 2 circulars were given to the Boer Commandants in charge of these parties, ad- 1 Blue-book (c. 2838), March 1881, Para. 23 to enclosure 13. - See Para. 5 of above proclamation. 64 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, dressed to the officers in command of her Majesty's - troops wherever met with, desiring that any further advance should be arrested, or such movement would be taken as a declaration of war. The details con- nected with the surprise and destruction of the Lydenburg detachment are given in another chapter. That the other detachments did not share a similar disastrous fate, may be largely ascribed to the officers in command having, in the spirit of the instructions they had received, adopted proper precautions, and made forced marches to their destinations. When it became known that the mass meeting had been summoned a month earlier than originally intended, urgent messages were sent by telegraph or other means to officers commanding detachments on the march, desiring them to provide against surprise, and hasten their movements. The company of the 94th Regiment, under Captain Campbell 58 non- commissioned officers and men, with 6 mounted infantrymen which left Marabastadt on the 30th November, used such expedition that it reached Pretoria on the 10th December, without molestation on the way. The mounted troop of the 94th Regi- ment, under Captain O'Grady and Lieutenant Garden, had arrived two days before. When replying to the telegraphic inquiry made raised iu by Sir Georo-e Colley " What local forces can you Pietoria. J J enrol, if necessary ? Loyal inhabitants must support Government in maintaining order," Sir Owen Lanyon remarks upon " the difficulty which the Government THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 65 will experience in obtaining support from the loyal CHAP. inhabitants," and says, " little can be expected from them in this direction ; " and that, " owing to the cir- cumstances in which this province was annexed, and the fact that all the people are mixed up with and dependent on the Boers, in trade and other pursuits, it is impossible that the Government can rely upon them for that material assistance which might be expected in other places." 1 Praiseworthy efforts were, however, made by some of the leading inhabitants to raise corps of volunteers, which formed the nuclei of what, later on, became known as the Pretoria Carbineers, Nourse's Horse, the Pretoria Eifles, and the Volunteer Artillery. From 150 to 200 men were thus enrolled, a portion of whom, under drill instructors furnished by the garrison, or some few of themselves who had already gone through their novitiate in arms might be seen each evening, during the fortnight preceding hostili- ties, intent on qualifying themselves to take their part in the coming tug of war. In a later despatch, Sir Owen Lanyon illustrates still further the impediments which stood in the way, at thi$ period, of forming a serviceable local force. After mentioning that only about one-third of those capable of bearing arms came forward to aid the Government, in case any attack should be made, he adds : " In some instances the young men of the town were prevented from following the dictates of their loyalty by their employers, who feared to lose some 1 See Blue-book (c. 2740), January 1881. Enclosure 4 in No. 73. E 66 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, of their Boer customers, should it become known that their employes had joined the volunteers. Others held back from motives of false prudence, or from a dislike to be under military control, in which possibly their juniors in rank and position might be placed over them, on account of their being trained and more fit." The intention of Sir George Colley, in directing the Administrator to call upon all loyal inhabitants to support the Government, would appear to have been that such men should be employed solely in the defence of the town, and not for purposes of attack; for in his despatch of the 19th December, he is found writing thus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies : " I had previously asked the Ad- ministrator to call upon the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal to support the Government, and a volun- teer force of 200 men has been raised for the defence of Pretoria. I propose, however, to employ this and similar forces as far as possible in the defence of these towns, &c., and to avoid, where practicable, bringing them directly in contact with the Boers. The feelings that would be aroused by such a civil war would be more bitter and enduring than any resulting from a direct conflict with Government." l With the further development of the situation, how- ever, this wise course was not found wholly practi- cable as the main patrolling duties around Pretoria had to be assigned to the mounted volunteers, and no attack on the enemy's positions could be under- taken without their co-operation. 1 See Blue-book (e. 2783), February 1881, No. 37. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 67 With the object of giving the people around some CHAP. idea of the power in the hands of the military for 1 A I T -, 1 defensive purposes, experiments were publicly carried effect of out with dynamite and powder, under the direction experi- ments. of Major Le Mesurier, R.E., on the camp ground ; and sundry explosions were effected after dark on the hills overlooking the town, to convey the impression that mines were in process of construction in various parts. Although the Landdrost had been requested to give notice to the townspeople, somehow many did not learn until too late what was about to take place, and in consequence one heard afterwards of ludicrous cases of dire alarm and consternation, show- ing that, in some instances, at all events, the moral effect had been reat ! At about eleven o'clock on the night of the Agent sent 17th December, Mr Hendrik Schoeman presented ment with himself at Government House, accredited as the their ulti- matum. " diplomatic agent " of the triumvirate, and bearing copies of the proclamation already issued by the latter at Heidelberg on the 16th, together with a letter to Sir Owen Lanyon, requesting that, as " in 1877 our then Government gave up the keys of the public offices without bloodshed," so " we trust that your Excellency, as representative of the noble British nation, will not less nobly and in the same way place our Government in the position to assume the admin- istration. We expect your answer within twice twenty-four hours." A proclamation was thereupon issued on the 18th 68 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, by the Administrator, declaring the province to be in a state of rebellion, and that in consequence, the Proclama- tion issued officer commanding her Majesty's troops had been by the Ad- ministra- requested to put down insurrection wherever found to exist. Copies of this proclamation were on the 19th given to Mr Schoeman, with merely a covering letter from the Colonial Secretary, acknowledging the receipt of the " communication " brought from Heid- elberg. Hostilities had, however, before this com- menced at Potchefstroom ; and Sir Owen Lanyon's answer was not even waited for, before despatching the force sent to intercept the detachment coming from Lydenburg. Defences of The vicinity of such a large body of armed of Pretoria, horsemen, together with the advent of Mr Schoemaii bringing the Boer ultimatum on the 17th December, caused increased activity in recruiting and drilling the volunteers ; many now joining, " as an example to others," who had never before handled a rifle, and were likely to be certainly at first more dangerous to friend than foe. Major Le Mesurier, Commanding Royal Engineer, was placed in command of the town district, and directed to organise its defence, with the help of the local artillery and foot volunteers, the central market - place being adapted for the main post, and certain buildings as block-houses to com- mand the entrances to the town. With the aid of the sappers, and parties of natives pressed into the service the townspeople generally preferring to look on and criticise this plan for defence soon THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 69 assumed shape. Houses and walls were loopholed ; CHAP. doors and windows barricaded ; the Dutch church in the centre of the large market-square was enclosed within a parapet and ditch, forming an inner line of defence to the houses surrounding the square ; and w r aggons were drawn across the entrances as barriers. Cordons of sentries inner and outer lines were thrown out at night, when the challenging and de- manding the countersign became incessant. Through- out the nights of the 19th and 20th, the energy shown in this way was tremendous. It could scarcely have continued at such fever-heat. The " rounds " were on the move, visiting the citizen soldiers at all hours, seeing that each man was alert on his post and under- stood his duty. The first shots exchanged in the immediate neigh- The first bourhood of Pretoria were on the morning of the 19th December, when Lieut. - Colonel Gildea, ac- companying a mounted patrol along the Potchef- stroom road, observed, about nine miles out, a Boer scout on a hill. Putting spurs to his horse, he and Mr Francis, a volunteer of the party, chased him for over a mile, when, Mr Francis having been left be- hind, Lieut. -Colonel Gildea captured man, horse, and rifle. Another scout, meanwhile, coming into sight, fired on the party, who thereupon returned the shot ; but then perceiving about forty Boers preparing to saddle-up at a farmhouse laager near by, the party deemed it prudent to fall back, the prisoner being 70 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, taken with them." l The fact of a live rebel having been lodged in the jail seemed to give great satis- faction to the loyal party in the town, then busy holding meetings, clamouring for martial law, or joining in the defence of the place. Captain Intelligence was now received of the capture of Lambart r taken pris- Captain Lambart. of the 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers, oner. and his being held as a prisoner at Heidelberg. This officer, accompanied by a Mr M'Hattie, had been sent in October from Pretoria to purchase horses in the Orange Free State, to complete the artillery and mounted infantry ; Mr M'Hattie to obtain horses similarly for Ferriera's Horse, then marching through the Free State to Basutoland. 2 Captain Lambart had reached to within a day's journey of Pretoria on his way back, bringing between forty and fifty horses with him, when the Boers took both him and his horses. No means of communication with Captain Lambart had offered, his whereabouts being latterly unknown. Report* Then came bad news from Potchefstroom a report Potchef- from Lieut. -Colonel Winsloe, dated 16th December, stroom. smuggled past the Boer patrols the last message received from thence in Pretoria. Hostilities had commenced on that date ; the enemy occupied the town, whilst the troops were restricted to the camp 1 Colonel Bellairs, in liis observations made on the report of this inci- dent, says : "A spirited little outpost affair ; but Lieut.-Colonel Gildea must iutntst such minor expeditions to .subordinate officers, and refrain as far us possible from personally exposing himself on such occasions." 2 See ante, p. 42. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOER REVOLT. 1 position, jail, and public buildings ; Captain Fulls, CHAP. of the Eoyal Scots Fusiliers, who, together with - Major Clarke Special Commissioner Captain Kaaf, and twenty volunteers, held the public buildings, had been killed, and several men wounded. This intelli- gence was supplemented, from Boer sources, by the further information that the public buildings had been taken, together with their defenders. But the morning of the 21st December brought still Jj^j of more gloomy news into Pretoria, spreading dismay and ^rst consternation through the town, and intensifying the disastei- - already growing ill-feeling against the Boers the intelligence that the headquarters detachment of the 94th Regiment had been surprised the previous day, when on the march about 37 miles off, every officer and man having been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. It had been calculated that Lieut. -Colonel An- struther, having at length been able to cross the Oliphant, might reach Botha's Pass, a dangerous de- file, 16 to 20 miles from Pretoria, on the 21st; so, accordingly, Lieut. -Colonel Gildea had been in- structed by Colonel Bellairs to proceed in that direction at an early hour that day, with the double object of bringing in forage from a farmhouse nine miles away the same one mentioned hereafter as visited by Captain Burr on the 5th January and, with the mounted men, feeling for or giving assist- ance to the 94th detachment in the neighbourhood of Botha's Pass. For this purpose, a company of in- fantry, with a Krupp gun carried on a waggon, and 72 THE TRANSVAAL WAR, 1880-81. CHAP, all the available mounted men sixty moved off at two o'clock. The morning was dark ; they had pro- ceeded only about two miles out when two weary, footsore men, both slightly wounded, were discovered in the hands of the advanced scouts, thrown out for the protection of the town. These were Conductor Egerton of the Commissariat and Transport Depart- ment, and Sergeant Bradley of "the 94th Regiment, who, allowed by the Boers, had left the fatal ground of Bronkhorst Spruit soon after the conflict, and for eleven long hours had trudged through the dark night to Pretoria, there to tell the sad tale of disaster. They were at once mounted on horses, and by four o'clock Mr Egerton was making his report to Colonel Bellairs, and delivering an urgent message for surgical help. Arrangements were quickly made. A civil practitioner, Dr Harvey Crow, was engaged to go out and remain with such of the wounded as would not be able to be moved ; and this gentleman, in com- pany with Surgeon-Major Comerford who was to return some hospital orderlies, and two ambulances, were soon on the road to render the assistance asked for. The Rev. Father Meyer also accompanied the party. CHAPTER II. THE BROXKHORST SPRUIT DISASTER, 1 THE circumstances which led to and attended the CHAP. despatch of the order for calling in the greater portion of the Lydenburg detachment of the 94th burg