THE <3canl) dhte&fotl O R A N ESSAY TO PROVE That the Soul of Man is not, neither can it be^ IMMORTAL. THE Whole founded on the ARC u M E N T s of LOCKE, NEWTON, POPE, , &c. By ONTOLOGOS. Slave to no Setf who takes no private Road, But looks thro' Nature up to Nature's God. POPE, DUBLIN: Pointed for G. WILSON, and fold by the Book- fellers ot Great-Britain and Ireland. MDCCLI. ^Price One Shilling and Six-Pence.) '*'-: .. . ' .yj = 4-2- INTRODUCTION K3 Neceflary to be read. IN this Age of Doubt and Enquiry, when any Diffention from the Sentiments of the reft of Mankind is efteem'd an In/lance of fuperior and refindQualifications, it is highly probable that many of our fafii enable Philofophers will be ftrangely elate don the Appearance of an EJJay of this Kind * and begin to triumph over thofe Set of Men why have Confidence enough in any particular Syftem, as to think Reafon can afford no better or furer way to Virtue and Happinefs. But however thefe People may value tbemfthesfor differing from the reft of the World, had the Author of this Effay no other View than to foevi him ft If in this Light, he would havj kept his Sentiments ever to him- feff, fence that Man mufl necej/arily be a Villairt who endeavours to dijlurb the Means of univerfal Happinefs, by bring ng in Dcubt y or confuting any material Point in that Syflem on which that Happinefs depends. From a Knowledge of this, the virtuous philofofhic Heathens forbore to un- deceive the World as to the Veracity of their My- thology j For doubtlefs in thofe Days of general Ignorance, if their moral Precepts had beenftrip'd tf 'a religious Reverence, they would have been, much left regarded ; as the Difficulty would havs been too great for the Philofophers ever to have ffcfa&Ud the reft of the World of the Necejjity tind Beatify of Virtue. A 2 Si 863199 iv INTRODUCTION. So if this Age was as much involved In Igno- rance as theirs , it would be the higheji Piece of Injuftice tofeparate Morality from any one Syjltm of Religion, however falfe and abfttrd Reafon might make that Syftem appear : But while the World abounds, as now it does, with fo many thcu- fands 'who are refolvd to think for themfelves, however little capacitated for fuch a Tajk ; 1 think it a neceffary Piece of Jufiice juft to point the Way the Powers cf Reafon naturally lead them, left from a ridiculous Dejire of being particular, they run headlong on, and inflead of forming one rational Scheme for their own Satisfaction and Happinefs^ they life all their Art to fubvert the Doctrines of Revelation, which can only difturb and perplex others, without bringing the Icajl Ad- vantage to themfelves. On the other Hand, 1 think this Effay may be ufeful tojhew that thofe who have engag'd tofup- port the Caufe of Chri/iianity by Reafon, havt taken very wrong Steps, as muft evidently appear when their own Arguments have reducd me to the NeceJ/ity of concluding the Soul cannot be />/- mortal. Tofapport fuch a Caufe therefore with rational and pbilcfophical Arguments, is the only way to give its Enemies the Advantage : And (f we think the Scripture is the immediate Word of God, what need have we of Reafon to make us /r- lieve it -, but if we think it is not, then Reafcn muji be cur be/1 andfurejl Guide. It is howtver not at all material, whether the Author of this Ejjay is directed in his own pri- vate INTRODUCTION. v f oate Sentiments by Scripture or Reafon, Jince all bis Arguments are here purely rational ; neither doth he intend in the lea/t to depreciate the Caufe of Cbriftianity, well knowing that it is impojjible that a .fine ere Chriflian can be at all ft agger' d in, his Faith by the flrongejl Appearances of Re a fen ; becaufe the Chrijlian firmly believes that Reafon itfelf is a blind and inefficient Guide to Truth. And tho* an Argument Jlmdd apfear rccn to fenfible Demonftration^ he would nevertheless con- demn it as a Piece of Sophiftry, and think there ivas fome unfeen, unknown Caufe that might at once confute it all. Reafon therefore cannot effect or endanger the Caufe of Chriftianity, when founded on its only true Bafis, the Syftem of Revelation. But from hence appears the NeceJ/ity that Men ficuld be altogether Chriflians or Philosophers, left by en- deavouring to join twofuch oppofite Syftcms, they offend and entangle tbemfehes in both j and in- jtead of knowing what Virtue is by Revelation, or of feeing the NeceJ/ity and Beauty of it by Philofephy, they are hurried from one Opinion to another , and become nothing but Dijlurbers of the World^ Madmen, Fools, and at laft, if poffible, meer Atheifts. It may, perhaps, be thought further, that this Effay may be detrimental to the Caufe of Mora- lity, by deftroying the Fear of future Punijlments y even among thofe who might be prevailed on to think and judge rationally. It vi INTRODUCTION. // is evident, that religious Precepts, or th* I 7 ear of future Juftice, will not rejlrain Men from Villainy , elfe why are our necefjary and in- dtfpenfible Laws ? And I Jliould be very forry to think Mankind were virtuous for no other Caufe than a View of a future Reward for their Actions ; or to think Men bad Jo mean an Opi- nion of the wonderful and eternal God, as to imagine he will give them cverlajling Happinefs for paying him fuch a fcj-vile, mercenary Ado- ration, which they would not pay but out oj Fear of Pmifonent, or in Hopes of Recompence. It may aljb be faid, that the Expectation of future Elifs, whether juji or no, ought not to be taken away, becaufe it ferves to comfort the Vir- tuous under Misfortunes ; inJlicJed on them by the Vitiom : But is not a Conjcioufnefi of Innocence equal to this 1 ? That which Horace ftiles the bra- zen Wall of the Virtuous, Nilcontire libi, nulla pallcfcerc culpa. But certain it is that, how- ever Appearances may deceive us, whether Vir- tue has a future Reward or no y it is a hifficient Recompence to iff elf in this World. However, whether it be thought fo or not, the Man that fium the common receivd Actions of Vice only cut of a Thread of futurity, and not from his na- tural Gcodnefs of Heart, willjind Means to be a Villain, tho his Paffions Jhould to that End be Jtrcd to varnifi over the Crime with the mo/i jacrcd and religious Colour^ So tho a Man Jhouldfee the Necefftty and Beauty cf Virtue ever Jo clearly, yet without GoodneJs of Heart he would INTRODUCTION. vii would find Means to convert even his flrongefl Plea of Virtue, into a Reafon for executing hi* favourite Villainy. And notwithftanding religi- ous Precepts may influence Men to Virtue, equally as well as known philofophical Truths, yet if they have not a fufficient Share ofGoodnefs of Heart implanted in their Nature, they will be Villains in fpite of both Religion or Philofophy. And as that Man is not a Chriftian or good Man who is only virtuous in Expectation of future Recompence, fo that Man is not a Philofopher or a good Man, who doth notjind it his Inter eft and Happinefs to purfue Virtue, tho he believes he never Jhall have a future Reward for his Aftions* Hence then it appears, that no Man has room to be proud of his Virtue j and that the more abandon' d and vitious any Man is, the more he deferves our Pity. The Reader may now pro- ceed to the Treatife before him, being only dejir'd to think candidly, and to under/land well bejore he either difapproves or commends the Truth of the Argument. CON- CONTENTS. SECT. I. A "Definition of the Soul, as given by Philofo- phers, and a Conclufion of its Immortality drawn from it. Page j SECT II. The Univerfality of the Opinion of the Soul's being immortal confider'd, its Founda- tion and infufficient Confequence. 5 SECT. III. Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul examirid. 12 SECT. IV. Reafons to think fuch an Immorta- lity neceflary. 1 7 SECT. V. Virtue and Vice, their Foundation and EfTence examined. i 9 SECT. VI. Certain Reafonsfor the Necejfity of fu- ture Rewards rfWPunimments examined. 33 SECT. VII. Our Relation to the Brute Crea- tion confider'd. 37 SECT. VIII. The Souls of Brutes, what Philo- fophers agree they are. 41 SECT. IX. The Powers of Underftanding in Men and Brutes compar'd. 4^ SECT. X. The Poffibility and Probability of the Soul's being Mortal, with a jufl Definition of God. 6 1 ( 1 ) E S A N s A Y To Prove From the Arguments of the- beft Phi- lofopherSy that the SOUL of Man is not, neither can it be IMMORTAL. SECT. I. A Definition of the SOUL, as given by Phikfe- phers, and a Conclujion of its Immortality drawn from it, IT is necelTary before we form one Objec- tion to fo general an Opinion, as the Im- mortality of the Soul, that we mould cpn- fider how far we agree, as to its eflential Exigence, with thofe*, who fupport this important Dodrine. Ftrft * As the late Dr. Watts was a Man that expreiTed the united Sentiments of the beft Philosophers, in the molt intelligent and perfpicuous Manner, arid was befide as ftrenuous a Profeffor of the Soul's Immortality as any Man j I hope I fhall not be accufed of unfair Dealing Fir ft then We allow that the Soul is an intellectual Being, not at all fubject to the Ac- cidents and Properties of Matter, in general; liich as Solidity, Extenfion, Contraction, Ex- panfion, or any Quality whereby it is rendered local *, or in a Capacity to take up the leaft or the moft infinite Space. II. That this intellectual Being is aCting on, only, a particular Part of Matter, /. e. the Body, by certain inexplicable Means, as utterly un- known to us as the Means how the Planets act in their Orbits^ by wonderful Dependen- cies on their proper Centers of Gravitation ; all which we can attribute to nothing but the Will of the Great Creator, from whom they have received fuch necetfary Laws as are ftiled the Lows of Nature. MI. That the Soul is nothing but that Power in Man, or rather aCling on the Body of Man, that enables him to perceive? to rc- fletf, and to wilL IV. That the Soul is a perpetual or con- flant Power of Thinking, and that upon its for reafoning upon his Definitions and Arguments, with- out introducing and reconcilin2;.the more abftrufe Afier- tions i f thofe Philofophers from whence he has drawn thofe Definitions ; the Truth of which, their Arguments t varied, concur to maintain. *As to that nice DifUntion, made by fomePhilofophers, in faying that Spirit hasZ7^;V/y but not Locality,--- or that it may be font/where and yet be in no Place, I efteem it mighty ridiculous, as having no real Meaning at all in it. ceaiirg ( 3 )_ ceafing to be aflive it muft immediately ceafe to be. It is from thefe dated Principles that r. Ir.t: Philofopber, who (if we fet aiide his irrational Attachment to fome particular Syiiems) had of all Mankind the greateft Perfpicuity and Juftnefs of Reafoning, draws thcle two Co- rollaries* jft. " That the Soul is in its own Nature "immortal; for nothing but the Power " which hath given it this active Life and " Being can deftroy it : It is entirely out of " the Reach of the material World to hurt " it : Tt cannot lay afide its own Thinking, r even tho' fome of them were the greateft Lyars, yet they being all in the fame Story, would he form one Doubt of the Truth of it, even tho' he faw no Reafon to believe it? Certaiuly no ; or if he did, his Belief and his Doubts would be of the fame Kind ex* aclly, as that which a Man entertains con- cerning the Immortality of the Soul, that has been told of it a thoufand Times, by a thoufand People, and has never impartially examin'd the Probability or Poflibility of the C 2 Truth Truth of fuch a Belief. Here then is, I think, clearly demonftrated the Source of the Opinion concerning the Soul of Man being itr.mortal', and it is plain from it, that we may juftly affert, that the Univerfahty of that Be- lief, is net thekaji Proof of the Truth of it. Now we will confider then, firft, the Vali- dity of the Proofs brought by the above- quot^ ed Philofopher of the Doctrine in Difpute, and then examine the Reafons that may be given to think fuch an Immortality neceflary, and then proceed to give other Reafons for thinking there is no fuch a Neceffity, and for our believing the Soal incapable of ex- ifting after the Deceafe of the Body. SECT. III. Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul examined. FIRST, then, the Soul is immortal, fays our Philofopher, bccaufe nothing but the Power which hath given it this a&ive Life and Being, can dejtroy it. This Reafon, granting it true, has no Weight at all relating to the Afftrtion, un- lels it had been before prov'd, that the Au- thor of the Soul's Being Kculd not deftroy it; which is the moft material Point in que- flion: And this is what this Philolopher has omitted to mention, as if the divine Volition or 'or Will was lefs neceflary or lefs doubtful in this Cafe, than that P (river which is only the Confequence of that Volition. But as this Suggeftion would have quite difconcerted his Hypothecs, he has fumm'd up the Caufe without it. 2dly, // is entirely out of the Reach of the material World to hurt it. If our Author here means, that the. Soul (as a Power not at allfubjefl to Matter's Pro- perties, as at fir (I allow- d) cannot be offered by Matter in itfelj, confidefd as a Sub fiance that has no Power at all, his Attention is as ridiculous and as childifh, as 'twould be to fay, if any Thing is out of our Reach, we can't reach it. But if he means, as he certainly does, that the Sou/, confider'd as a Power and an exiftent Being in itfelf, cannot be affeded by that Power, which ads upon all Matter in general, in fome Degree or other, and is call'd the Law of Nature, I mufl en- ter a little into the Truth of his AfTertion. If we confider the Soul abltraded from the Body, as having nothing at all to do with Matter, we may then fay, neither Matter, or the Powers atting upon Matter in general^ can affect it. But if we confider the Soul ading in Conjundion with the Body, it may, and will, be affeded by the Power ading upon Matter in general, by Means peculiar to that Part of Matter or Body to which it is united ; that is, on which it ads : As if a ( H) a Stone {hould fall on my Head, the Power acting on the Stone would, by means of the Organs of Senfation, affect my Soul. The fame in Cafes of Difeafes, broken Limbs, and the like, the Soul is affected with extreme Pain, which without, the Soul would not be felt ; and this Pain muft pro- ceed from fome Caufe to which Matter in general is fubjected, as no Man has a Pain peculiar to himfelf ; but it is poffible a Man of the fame Conduction may be liable to it as well as he. It is true, indeed, he,becomes fenfible of this Power acting upon Matter in general, by the Means of Senfation iden* tically particular to himfelf j for one Man doth not feel the Pain of another, as each is affected with his own. Now there are Inftances of the rational Faculties being impair'd and render'd ufelefs to the neceffary Offices of Life, from the Difeafes of the Body : As in Cafes of Luna- cy ; at which Time the fenfathe Faculties^ or the Powers of Se njation, which are more immediately acting on the 13ody, feem much lefs affected than the Reafon or the Soul's Power of aft ing upon itfelf: Since a Lunatic, that cannot remember^ reflect QI judge^ is often very fenfible that he fees, bears and feels. Now if the Soul is fo liable to be affect- ed, even in that Part in which it is faid its Immortality confifts, viz. that of acting upon t by the (lighter Accidents of the Body ; furely, ( '5) furely, when the Body receives the Shock of Death, when the Blood ceafes to flow, the Eyes to fee, the Ears to hear, and all the whole Body to move, certainly the Soul muft be fo artected as to ceafe altogether to be. We fee a Man wounded and maim'd, fo that he cannot fupport himfelf } yet may fo recover, as to be as ufeful and agreeable to himfelf and others as before: We fee a Lunatic, oftentimes, entirely incapable of reafoning, yet may be fo reftor'd, as to re- flect and judge as nicely and juftly as ever. Again : A Man may be fo wounded, or by Difeafes render'd incapable of putting his Limbs to their former Ufe,but muft be forced to fupport an infufficient Body 'till it drops into the Grave. The Soul of a Lunatic may be fo affected, that it (hall fupport the In- fufficiency of Reafon 'till \\.+~fha8vxiSrtfay+ 'till it ceafes to act at all j coniequently ccaj'es to be. ' For if it is allow'd that thofe Powers of the Soul, which are called the Powers of Senfation, immediately become inactive when the Body dies, according to the fecond Co- rollary, the Sou/, in a federate State, isjreed from all the Avocations ofSenfatioxs and fen- fible Things, &c. And if it is evident, as I have prov'd it is, that the Power of the Scut's atting on itfelf, is full as fubjefl to be afeSted by Accidents peculiar to Matter, as the Power f cfSenfation is, have we the leaft Shadow of Reafon to infer, that the Powers of Reflexion can exift without the Affiftance of the Body, any more than the Powers of Senfation ? I think not. But you will fay, perhaps, this is no de- monftrative Proof. Well, tho' it be not, and we mould allow, in favour of this Arti- cle, that it is out of the Power of the whole material World, or the Power acting upon all Matter, to hurt the Sou/, confider'd fe- parate from the Body ; yet we muft firft know that it can exift in this Separation, before we allow this a Reafon for its Im- mortality. (In other Words) We muft know the Soul's Immortality from fome other Caufe, for this is an Argument of no Moment at all. 3dly. It cannot lay afide its own thinking? it cannot put itfelj out of Being. It is poffible for a Man to take a Piftol and (hoot out his Brains, by which Action he at once a?mihihites the Powers of Senfa- tion, no inconfiderable Effence of the Soul : But whether the Soul is altogether rendered inactive by Death or no, this AfTer.im of the Impoffibility of the Soul being able to deftroy itfelf, is no Reafon to conclude its Immortality ; unlefs you will fay, that a Man's being unable to walk, is a Proof he never fliall depart from the Spot he is in, before < '7 ) before you have prov'd the Impofiibility of his being carried. 4thly, We cannot conceive how any other Spirit can make the Soul ceafe to aft, i. e. ceafe to be. This is the lead of a Reafon that can pof- fibly be given : For if our not conceiving how any thing could be, is a Reafon why it is not or cannot be, we have the fame Rea- fon to conclude that the Soul and Body do not adt in Conjunction, becaufe we cannot conceive by what means j tho' we Have daily fuch evident Demonftrations of the Veracity of fuch mutual acting. Thefe then are the great Proofs of our Philofopher, deduc'd from the beft and moft rational Arguments of his own, and of others,, in favour of the Immortality of the Soul. We will now examine the Reafons that may be given to think fuch an Immortality neceffary. SECT. IV. Reajons to think the Immortality of the Soul neceffary. i ft. TT may be thought neceffary, to the Ho- J_ nour and Wifdom of our great Crea- tor, that a Soul, poffeffed of rational Facul- ties info high a Degree^ and capable of fuch cx~ D traor- traordlnary Attainments^ Jkould he continued longer in Being , than the Jkort Space of 'TwK allotted fir the Life of the Body. As to this, we are incapable of forming any true Judgment of thofe high,- noble, and extraordinary Attainments we may imagine the Soul pofTefs'd of: For nothing is high, great, or noble but by Comparifon ; and as we are fo ignorant of the effential Greatnefs of the Deity ', we cannot form any juft Idea of what Confequence we are of, in refpecl to its wonderful and incomprehenfible Nature. It is therefore highly probable, that we entertain a much greater Opinion of our Be- ings, than is ftritly confonant to the Nature of Things, and the Extenfivenefs of God. This Suppofition then, argues nothing of a Necefiity for the Immortality of the SouK 2dly. It may be thought neceffary from the fieming Neceffity of future Rewards and PitniJ/jmenfs. This has, for many Ages, been efteem'g 1 , by the Rationales of almoft all Perfuafions, as a fufficient Reafon to expect, if not an abfolute Proof of, a future State: -We will therefore confider it very impartially. This Principle can have no other folid Foundation than the abftra&ed Notions of Virtue and Vice j for if our Actions were neither Good or Evil, where is the Neceflity of Rewards or'Punifhments ? Wemuft then, iirft, ( '9 ) confider what is Virtue, and what its oppofite, Vice. SECT, V. Virtue and Vice, their Foundation and EJJence examirid. THERE has been nothing, in all the Syftems of Philofophers, fo much con- teited as this. What are Virtue and Vice 1 ? The Man of Faith will tell me, that it is plainly reveal'd in the Word oj f ' God \ the only true Standard of Wrong and Right. Now I think it abftird to imagine, that the great Creator permitted Mankind to act: for fo many hundred Years, as, according to chrono- logical Account, were elaps'd before the Bible was wrote, without a juft Standard for their Actions. But be that as it will. I allow that the Syftem of Morality, to be found in the fa- cred Writings, abftradted from that Heap of Abfurdities wherewith it is inculcated, is a Syftem as truly perfect, juft and noble, as is to be met with in any Writings whatever. Yet fhall we not think this rather the Syftem of the philofophic Heathens improv'd, than a new one immediately reveal'd to us from onr Creator. What are more noble and juft (according to our Notions of Juftice) than the Senti- ments deliver'd under that allegorical Heap D 2 Of of Abfurdities in the : Heathen Theology ; / and it is evident, thefe Sentiments were as capable of influencing moral Practices : For where have we had one Inftance of a Chri- Jlian being a better Man than Socrates ? 'Shall we not think then, -that thefe two Sy- ftems of Morality fpring from the fame Source in the rational Mind ? And (hall we not cad afide the Heap of Abfurdities taught us by Revelation, as Socrates^ Plato y and other Philpfophers of thofe Days, did thofe of the antient Mythology ; which, neverthelefs, were as much and as literally believed by thofe who were incapable of thinking then, as the Scriptures by the Generality of Chriftians are now ? It is poflible the Man of Faith may fee no manner of Reafon in all this : I (hall there- fore leave him to the Vanity of his own Imagination, and confine my Difcourfe to the Man of Reafon, who is the only juft Difputant. We will examine then firfr. what Vice and Virtue appear to be, and then proceed to confider their Cauie or Foundation. As to the former, it will be needlefs for me to enter into the Subject in my own Words, when it is already fo juftly exprefs'd, and fo clearly demonftrated by the truly in- genious Mr. Brown, who, in K\<* fcccnd Ejfay on the Cheratterijlic^ after having fully prov'd the Imperfection of the Definitions 'of Virtue, laid V. ( 2I } laid down by Clarke, ffiollaflon, and Lord Sbaftejburfr aflerts That Happinefs is the lajl Criterion or 7<$, to ivhich the moralBeau- ty t Truth t or Reflitude of our Affeftiom is to be referred, which he thus demonftrates by two Circumftances. 1. " Thofe very Affections and Actions, " which in the ordinary Courfe of Things " are approved of as Virtues, do change their " Nature and become vicious, in the rtricteft " Senfe,when they contradict this fundamen- " tal Law of the greateftpublick Happinefs. " Thus, altho' in general, it is a Parent's " Duty to prefer a Child's Welfare to that of " another Perfon, yet if this natural and juft " Affection gain fuch Strength, as to tempt " the Parent to violate the public for his " Child's particular Welfare, what was be- " fore a Duty, by this becomes immoderate conftitutes a great Part of the Science of Mankind. Who doubts, nay, is it not commonly laid down as the moft evident of all Truths^ that we pall all die ? But whence do we draw this-Truth ? Why, from Reafon,- from this Manner of Comparifon : We daily fee that Creatures of fimilar Form, Organs and Faculties to ourfelves, are fubject to Death ; and meet with none whofe length of Years are fo far beyond the common Account of our Lives, as to give us the leaft Room to think them exempt from itj becaufe we find their growing up, their Maturity and Decay, exactly refemble thofe that went before them. We fee alfo this fame Decay and Death happen to every Animal jn the Brute-Creation j and tho' we (liould meet with a Creature of fo extraordinary a Kind as to have lived for two or three Centuries, and to have been tranfmitted from Father to Son, we (hould admire it as an Animal of excefTive long Life, but fhould jiot in the leaft doubt , ^oubt but that it would die fome Time of other ; tho' we never faw or heard of any iuch a one's dying in our Lives. Now this Accident, as well as many others, Mankind have in common with the Brutes. We cannot live without Suftenance any more than they 3 -are as liable in our Na- ture to Hurts, Pains and Difeafes as they are : And if it mould be prov'd we are pof- fefs'd of the fame Kind of a Soul, however fuperior, (tho' it may perhaps be fhewn in fome Cafes to be efTentially equal) is it ndt as indifputable a Truth that our Souls muft ceafe to exift like theirs, or if we fuppofe ourfelves immortal, that their Immortality muft be fimilar to ours. I hope no one will, too raflily, think this Manner of reafoninga Difparagement to the Dignity of human Nature, before he has well oonfider'd the Dignity and Wifdom of an Horfe, a Fox, and an Elephant. Let us then now examine how nearly we are allied to the Animal Creation ; and firft, as to the Body. Philofophers agree, that all Matter is ef- fentially the fame, and differs only in its Mo- dification ; but that tlie different Modifica- tion of Matter, gives it no fuperior or infe- rior Degree of Merit, in itfelf confider'd. For whether the Clay be converted into the moft pompous and fuperb Figure, with re- fpect to us, it is exactly the fame Clay, con- fider'd - (39) iider'd in if " as that which is converted to the me J $ left Ufes. But fhori we bring the rnofi plaufible Reafons,. -irom Experience, or Philofophy, to prov^ the Bodies either of Men or Brutes fuperior, we muft give the Caufe entirely againft ourfelves. Experience tells us, that the human Body, diverted of the Soul, is to us more naufeous and deteftable, than that of moft Brutes : And if, from Philofophy, we fhould agree that Beafts have no Thought or Liberty at all, but are only Pieces of finely organiz'd Matter, capable of many fubtile Motions communicated to them by outward Objects, we, by this, yield them the Superi- ority -, fince we own the Matter of our Bo- dies is not capable of fuch Senfation, but that our Senfation is the Faculty of the Soul. We find alfo, that by a fucceffive Revolution of Particles of Matter, that fame Matter which is at one Time Grafs, becomes part of a Beaft, and from thence to be part of a Man, by Means of the Suftenance of Life. Neither doth the Form of Man give him any Pre-eminence in the Order of Beings, as it is no more ferviceable to him in the Offices of his Life, than are the Forms of the Brutes to them ; and tho' we diftinguifh a Man from a Brute rather by his outward Form than by the Dignity of his Soul, of which we cannot fo immediately judge, yet it' is potable there are, nay, there have been, many Inflances t 4 > fe Inftances of Creatures mor^efernbling in their Form the Hunisjti than trie Brute Spe- cies j fuch as the > Chimpanzee^ and which for want of undeffranding Speech and Talk- ing, have yet been efteem'd Brutes.' On the other Hand, I never heard any body prefume to fay, that a wild Boy, I re- member to have feen, was not of the Human Species, tho' he could not fpeak, nor under- ftand Speech any otherwife than a Dog might do, and was betide all over hairy like a Dog or a Monkey ; tho' his Features were almofl as regular as I ever faw thofe of a Man. It is plain then, from fuch Inftances as thefe, that it is poffible, by an intermixing of Species, that there are Creatures in the World whofe Form and Intellects are fo join'dj that no body can pretend to deter- mine juftly whether they are Men or Brutes. Now if this be, as certainly it is, the Cafe, there is no other true Distinction in the Or- der of Beings, than by that Power which is their Life j that which directs them to feek Happinefs or fliun Mifery, to ivit, the Soul. We will now then ~confider what is the Soul of a Brute, and how far it refembles the Soul of Man. SEC T. SECT. VIII. 'The Souls of Brutes, what Philcfiphers agree they are. IF Mr. Locke's Suppofition be true, * that Spirit may be only a Property of Matter j and that it is pojjlble for the Creator to join fitch an Influence to Matter , as to make it ca- pable of all we fee it aft, the fame Syftem is as juftly applicable to theMax as the Brute : And that Man has a Soul confider'd not as a Property of Matter, but as a Being in itfelf, was at firft agreed on. We mufl conclude then, that the ading Principle in the Brute, is of the fame Kind with that of Man j and if of the fame Kind, what poflible Degree of Inferiority, fuppofe the loweft, can affect iiny Being fo much as to make it mortal, white another Being, adling in the fame Manner, is immortal. Take the moft ignorant and ftupid of all the human Species, and compare his inteU ledual Faculty or Soul to that of a Locke > a Newton y or a Boyle-, what a wonderful Dif- ference ! how weak, how infignificant, how naean are the Ideas on one Side ! -how ftrong, * If Spirit be only a Property of M~*ter, it muft cvf necefiky ceafe to he when that Matter has evidently no particular Property at all. But if we eflcem the Soul jmrto.l, it matters not at all whether vvc judge it a Property of Matter, or a Beina in itfeif. G hr.v (40 how copious, and how elevated on the other t and yet we don't fcruple in the leaft to al- low the one a Soul as immortal as the otfar. Is it becaufe they refemble each other in their outward Form that we do this j if fo, how exceffively, how poorly, ridiculous do we judge of the Order of Beings ! Now fince from fuch an Inferiority in the Faculties of the Soul, we draw no Inference of the want of Immortality, we {hall cer- tainly find, by comparing the actuating Power of fume Brutes with that of fome Men, that there being not fo much Difference between Brutes and Men as there is between Men and Men, that we have no Ground to fuppofe one more immortal than the other. But to confirm the Juflice of fuch a Man- ner of reafoning, we will quote a PafTage from the learned Eimop Burnet y wherein he advances more than could, from him, be ex- pected in favour of the Brute Creation. This Writer, after fuppofing that human Nature can hardly receive or bear the No- tion of Beafts having no Senfation or Thought at all about them, becauie there are fuch evident Indications of even high Degrees of Reafon among the Beads, lie therefore con- cludes, " That it is more reafonable to ima- *' gine there may be Spirits, of a lower Or- -< tier, in Brutes, that have in them a Ca- " pacify of thinking and chufing, but that " 'tis fo entirely under the Impreflions of " Matter, (43) * Matter, that they are not capable of that "" Largenefs either of Thought or Liberty, " that is neceflary to make them capable of " Good or Evil, of Rewards or Punishments ; ' but that, therefore, they may be perpetu- " ally rolling about from one Body to ano- " ther" ; that is, by Tranfm ignition. Dr. Wsttti having quoted this Paflage, ilates the Cafe on both Sides -the Queftion ; and for want of one iingle Argument to pro- -ceed further (without injuring that Syflem, to the Promotion of which, however ab- iiirdly, he wanted to reduce all his philofo- phical Arguments) very fairly gives it up, and fays he can make nothing at all of it. And yet, after this Confeffion, he goes on to tell you, no Conclusions can be drawn from the Nature of Beafts, let the Cafe be decided how it will, that can affect the Na- ture, Reafon, or Religion of Mankind. This, however, you are to take upon the Credit of his Word only, and are to believe the Immortality of the Soul, from the Ne- ceffity of future Rewards and Punimmems, which, he lays, it is th-: Glory and Inter eft of the fupreme Ruler of the Vniverje to ap- point. For tho* he fo frankly owns, he knows fo little of the eflential Dignity of a Brute , yet he does not at all fcruple to de- cide what is the G/tfryand inter eft of aGoD t whofe eflential Perfections, it is impofiible> G 2 after ( 44 ) after all our Searches., to know any thing at all about. As to the Bifhop's Conclufion, that the Soul of a Brute rnuft be more fubjed: to Mat- ter than that of a Man, it is merely a Con- jecture, the Force of which will appear when we come to confider the Actions of Brutes in Comparifon with thofe of Men. ' . Yet to infer, that (fuppoling it prov'd) becaufe they are incapable of Rewards and funiJhmentSy they mult be transmigrated from one Body to another, is excefiively ftupid j for the Diftribution of Rewards and Punifh- ments, feems more applicable to this Syftern than any other. As that Soul that fuffer'd exceflive Toil and Drudgery in one Beaft, and was in itfelf of a harmlefs Nature, might, by Tranfmi- gration, be converted into another Body, the Bufmefs of whofe Life might be nothing but Eafe and Pleafure ; fo, on the contrary, the Soul that in one Life and Form had tailed all the Sweets and Enjoyments in its Kind, and was an offensive Animal, might have a fuitable Retaliation in fome other Body. Thus we fee, that thofe Philofophers who moft ftrenuoufly infift on the Immortality of the Soul of Man, are neceffitated to conclude, that Brutes have Souls capable of Senfation and Reflection : And we find, that upon granting this, when they endeavour to di- itinguifh it from the Soul of Man in fo im- portaa (45) portant a Point as its Immortality, what egre-? gious Blunders they fall into. This Watts faw ; and rather than make any Blunder that might prejudice his Caufe from a Conclufion in this Point, very judi- cioufly, doth not decide any thing at all about it ; tho* in avoiding this, he unluckily falls into that Miftake I have above expos'd. We will now come to compare the De- grees of Underftanding in Men and Brutes. SECT. IX. 'The Powers of Underftanding in Men and Brutes compared. WE have confider'd the Soul of Man as elTentially confifting in the Fa- culties of Senfation, Rejiefticn, and, what is- direfted by thefe, the "Will Firft, then, as to perception or Senfation. We have a thouiand Inftances wherein the nice Diftinclions of Scnfatiod are more rea- dily communicated to the Soul of the Brute than the Man. Of this there needs no other Example than that wonderful Fower in the Dog, whereby he (hall trace, by the fubtle Efflu- vias of Smell, not only an Animal, but a human Creature : We daily fee this, and are iurpriz'd at that extraordinary InftincT: which we (46 ) we find ourfelves fo void of j that a Man, with all the Faculties of his Soul engaged, (hall not be able to tell which Path, among twenty, his Friend hath taken -, while we fee his Dog, without any other Advan- tage from external Objects, in themfelves con- ^iider'd, fhall purfue the right Track after him. Thus, in every Article of Senfation, there remains not the leaft Doubt but that, among fome or other of the Brute Creation, they are found to have Perception equal> and, in many Cafes, Juperior to Man. Now then, we muft confider in what De- gree they have Refe&ion or Reafon ; and un- der this Head, we will juft fpeak. of the Will* It is plain that the Power of Volition is, in fome Cafes, influenc'd by Senfation > as, when theSenfes are acting, we cannot chufe but fee, hear, feel, Gfc. Now in other Cafes, it is plainly influenc'd by the Powers of Sen- fation, acting with thofe of Reafon : As fuppofing a Man fhould fee a prodigious Weight falling towards his Head, the Ap- prehenfion occafion'd by the Senfation at that' Time, which makes the Will direct theBody to get out of Danger, is partly the Effect ofRrbJbn : For if a Man was to fee a Feather falling down, he would perhaps entirely difrcgard it, tho' he may be as fenfihle of the Deicent of the Feather as of the Weight. And (47) And this Power of Volition, Brutes have in common with Men ; for by this, their Bodies move and act, equally wife for their own Ufe and Safety as we do. Now Reflection or Reafon is a Faculty fo neceffary to the Soul's ejfential Exlflence> that, without it, we fhould not be capable of acting for our Prefervation. This we findalfoin a great Degree effential to the Souls of Brutes* for it is plain that Animals remember Perfons and Things, Acts of Kindnefs and Difldnd- nefs, of which we have daily ten thoufand Inftances. Some Animals ftand in Dread of what has offended them ; others again remember to re- fent the Offence receiv'd. A Horfe ftands in fear of a Whip and the Smack of it, becaufe he remembers the Smart he felt at the Time he law the fame Object, or heard the fame Sound. A Horfe naturally ftarts at the Sound of a Drum, becaufe it occalions aSen- fation he is a Stranger to, and therefore he doth not know the Confequence of it ; but after hearing it feveral Times repeated, and feeling no Hurt arife from it, he takes no more Notice of that than of any other fami- liar Sound. So a Man is equally ftartled at an unufual Noifc, but when he rinds no hurtful Confe- quence arife from it, the Repetition of the lame Accident will lefs and kfs affect him, till C 48 ) till it comes at laft to have no other Effect than that of confirming him when there ia fuch a Noife. A Man is alib afraid of a Thruft from a Sword, becaufe either he has felt the Smart it can occafion, or from Information or Re- flection on the Effects of a fimilar Caufe, he juftly imagines it can hurt him : So if you could inform a Horfe that had never felt the Whip, that it would hurt like fomething he had felt, he would ftand in the fame Fear. Neither doth the Difficulty of informing the 'Horfe this, argue any thing of his want of Reflection or Reafon : For if you were to fhew a Man, whole Language you were a Stranger to, an Inflrumcnt, the Effects of which he had never feeri, or the Effects of any thing fimilar to it, you would find per- haps as much Difficulty in communicating the Knowledge of its Effects to him by In- formation, as the Effect of a Whip to a Horfe. For frppofing the Horfe entirely ignorant of the Whip, the Sound attending it, and the Action accompanying the Blow, yet if you take another Horie and lafh him with it, the Animal that ftands by will be immediately apprehenfive of fomething from it j but not becaufe he hears the Sound, or fees the Blow, but by the Agitation and Concern in which he fees and hears his fellow Creature at that Time, and of this he is naturally .a Judge. Now (49 ) Now to this Apprchenfan are join'd thft Circumftances of the Blow, the Whip, and the Sound, which are infeparable Ideas $ and therefore when he hears or fees the one, he is immediately apprehenfive of the other. So, in the former Cafe, you muft {hew the Man its Effects upon fornetbing whofe Na- ture and Properties he is acquainted with^ and then he can be juftly apprehensive of the true Effect of fuch an Inftrument. Hence it is evident, that the Soul of a Brute has, befldes all the Properties of Sen-^ fation, the Powers of Volition, and that of retaining fimple Ideas equal to Man, and o acting as rationally from thofe Ideas. BuC we .will conflder this further. The Rule Mr. Pope lays down is evident* We cannot rtafon but from what iv? know. A Man cannot form any Ideas of Things whofe Nature he is entirely ignorant of, and of any thing fimilaf thereto, (for the moft abflracted and metaphyfical Ideaj muft have its Foundation from the Knowledge of phy- ilcal and natural Caufes.) A Man who never had the Sen(e o bear~ ing t cannot reafon of Sound, or of any thing firnilar to it if &i feeing he ^:an form no Idea relative to Por;;i or Colours, Reafon then is the Power of drawing In- ferences from Ideas acquir'd by Senfation, which Inferences are Ideas form'd purely by H "th* the Soul's Reflection, or Power of compar- ing Effects and Properties within itfelf, tho the Caufe of thofe Effects, and the Things pofTefs'd of thofe Properties, may perhaps be ten thoufand Miles withdrawn from any of the Organs of Senfation. In what Degree then are fome Men pof- fefs'd of this Power of Reafon ? We find here, that while we have had Men whofe profound Capacities have been able to com- prehend and retain almoft every Kind of Knowledge, we have had others who have been capable of entering but into one or two Branches of Science ; and others again en- tirely incapacitated to comprehend or retain any thing at all of Science. Thus we fee fome Men fa deeply enter into mathemati- cal Learning and the Science of Algebra, while others can't imagine in the leafl what they are about, who talk of fome Quantities lefs than nothing, and of .others not quite 'to much lefs than nothing. And yet thofe who can't comprehend this, perhaps may very well underftand that two, imd tivo wake four, and that three times three make nine ; becaufe thefe are Ideas, the Truth of which may, by the Organs of Sen- fation, be demonftrated : And whenever the Mind doth judge, it can judge no otberwife ; and yet there are fome Men fo dull and void of the Power of thinking, that they cannot comprehend by 'what Means or hoiv this Axiom. Axiom is true, without fuch a fenfative De- monftration. I {hall not pretend to affert that a Beaft, of any kind, is capable of this Knowledge; other wife than that a Horfe muft feel that the Weight or Power of one is lefs than that of two, of two lefs than three, ?<:. This appears by his Act of Volition, in putting out an additional Strength to refift in pro- portion to fuch an added Force. Neither is it any ways material to the Purpofes of that Beafr, or doth it argue againft the effontiai Power of Reafon in theB:ute, that this Truth does no: come to him in the Form of a Propo- fition, iinceheis asfenfible of ihe Juftice of the Axiom, as a Man who is convinc'd by his Senfes, that the fame Thing or Accident is fo many Times repeated, and cannot judge of it without the Evidence of his Senfes, or the Remembrance of that Evidence. Now, tho' fuch an Evidence is the Teft of the moft fublime Reafqning, yet the Man of Science, taking fuch certain Axioms for granted, goes on, thro' a thoufand complex, iimilar, and diffimilar Ideas, without ever having occafion to examine the fenfative Truth of any one of thofe Ideas. Now fuch a Manner of Reafoning, I will not pretend the Brutes to be poflefs'd of ; and yet at the fame Time Experience tells us, that fuch a Manner of Reafoning is as little inherent to fome of the human Species, H 2 Either (50 Either then we muft deny the Souls of thefe Men to be of the feme Nature with' thole of a fuperior Capacity of receiving Knowledge, or by admitting that the Souls of Brutes are efientidly the 'fame with Men of an inferior Capacity, we muft allow that they are of the fame Nature with thbfe of the in oft elevated Genius. But perhaps it is. not furrjciently evident that the Souls of Men of narrow and weak TJnderftandings, are as incapable of Reafon as the Bruies y we will then compare their Intel lefts more particularly. There can be no Inftance of the want of Reafon in Man or Brute, but what muft ef- fect them either in Speculation or Praffice. ' Firft then as to Pra&ice, we can have no Caufe to imagine the Brute wants Reafon as to its Actions, if it provides as wifely for itfelf in its own Nature, as Man doth for himfelf in his; neither is the Effect of rational Propo- iitions cf any Moment in this Cafe : For 'we tlcn'c fay that Man wants Reafon, who avoids er chufes any thing that is agreeable or de- trimental to his Nature, from his Knowledge of its Propert.es immediately by Senfation, any more than another who avoids or chufes the lame Thing, becaufe, from a long Train of Examinations into the Nature of Beings, their Effects, Modes and Properties, he is iennble why fuch a Thing is agreeable or de- itul to his Nature, - - - - The : The Philofopher will not run his Hea4 ngainft a Wall, becaufe he is fenfible of the Motion and Properties of Matter, and the Conftrudtion of his own Organs, Fibres, Gfr. by which Knowledge he is fenfible he (hall feel Pain by fuch an Action. A Man that is no Philofopher, will not run his Head againft a Wall, becaufe, tho* he knows nothing at all concerning the Pro- perties of Matter, or the Conftruction of him- felf, yet he knows, by the Means of Senfa- tion, and the rational Conclufions he of ne- cejjity draws from thofe Senfations, that fuch an Action will hurt him. Now for fome Reafon or other, a Horfe xvili not run his Head againft a Wall, any fooner than a Man or a Philofopher. Again, we fee with Wonder the great Improvement Men have made toward the mutual Benefit and Advantage of each other by the Arts of Navigation^ Commerce, Gfc. Yet thefe. Improvements, we are fenfible, muft be made by Men of the moft refin'd or extenfive Talents, and not by Men of mean or narrow Capacities. We fee, on the Side of Brutes, the won- derful Means they have taken, and daily take, for the mutual Intereft and Prefcrvation of their Species, equal, perhaps, in their Nature and Knowledge of Things, to ours. - We have Inftances of many Men that, notwithflanding all the Advantages of Infor- ( 54 ) mation, by Means receiv'd from Creatures of their own Kind, yet cannot retain the Method whereby they ihould know how to fpell a Word or a Name : And yet we have feen a Dog in this Metropolis, that would riever mifs to fpell the Names of Julius Ctfar and others, by only hearing the Sounds of them : And in fome Dogs, of polite Edu- cation, we have found them alfo capacitated to the moduli Qualifications of dancing a Minuet ', which fome Men perform much more clumfily with the fame Advantage. I have alfo a Dog now by me, who, upon hear- ing the Name of a Gentleman, who has offend- ed him, only mentioned, will immediately begin barking, tho' the Party fhould be a hundred Miles diftant. We fee fome Par- rots and Magpies take off or imitate our Speech articulately. Is it then becaufe we do not find in the fame Animal the Power of Speech join'd with the Underftanding, in the fame Manner as it is in us, that .we conclude its Underftanding is not eitentially like ours : - Thus we may object againft the Parr of for talking what he does not under/land^ againft the Dog for not 'f peaking what it un- der/lands ; and may not the Parrot or Mag- pye laugh at you for not imitating its natural Chatter, or knowing what it means, and perhaps it does, and only takes off human Voice out of Derifion ? And may not the Dog efteem us a Parcel of ignorant, ftupid Beings, that .... . that cannot trace the Footfteps of each otherj as fagacioufly as he can thofe of his Matter, a Hare or a Fox ? But in Oppofition to what I would here infer, Mi. Pope fays, The Lamb thy Riot dooms to bleed to Had he thy Reafon would hejkip and play ? Mr. Pope here puts the Lamb in the Place of a Man, which is not the Cafe } we are to fuppofe the Lamb endow'd with a human Soul : Yet, as a Lamb, it is yean'd, brought tip in the Fields and Paftures, knows nothing at all, or very little, of the Actions of Man $ does not know a Butcher's Knife from a Piece of Wax in that Form ; it fees its Shep- herd, indeed, drive it or gently lead it from one Place to another, provide Fodder or a Fold for it at Night ; this is all it knows of Mankind. What Ground has it then to be apprehenfive of Danger, whether it is in- clos'd in a Butcher's or a Shepherd's Pen ? Since, fuppoiing it to have a human Soul, it cannot reafon but jrom 'what it knows : And it is very certain the Lamb, with its own Soul, is under terrible Apprehenfions when it hears the Complaint of its Fellow Crea- tures, with whom it never fails to fympa- thize, or when he is tied by the Heels for the Slaughter j this appears evident from its ftruggling to get free, and if it was once loofe, it it would make its Efcape with all pofftble Speed. Mr. P0/tf then fhould have faid, Had be thy KNOWLEDGE,, would be Jkip and play% For the Want of more extenfive Knowledge, in any Creature wanting the Opportunity of acquiring more Knowledge, does not in the leaft argue its Want of the Power of Reafon- jng from the Knowledge it has. And it is alfo plain to me, that if a Lamb knew as much of a Butcher as it does of a Dog, it would ftand in fear of one as much as it does of the other j and would no fooner permit itfelf to be drove into a Butcher's Shop, than jt would into a River, where it might be 'drown* d, or into a Ditch where it might be fmothered. It is plain then, that a Lamb, tho' perhaps as ilupid a Creature as moft of the Brute Species, acts rationally from what it knows $ and as wifely, to anfwer the Ends of its Crea- tion, as a Man. You may perhaps fay, it is Irijlind in the one, and the EfTe&s of a rational Mind in the other : but I will not quarrel with you about Words , you may call it biftincJ, Soul, Mind^ or what you pleafe j but you muft firffc prove an effential Difference in two Beings, before I will allow them to^be of a different Kind. Mr. Pope was very unwilling to go fo far as to think the Soul of the Brute of the fame (57 ) fame Nature with that of Man, and there- fore after fpeaking of the wonderful InftincT: of Brutes, he fays, 'Tivixt that and Reafon ivbat a nice Barrier ? For ever ji'par ate, yet for ever near : "Remembrance and Refection how ally'd. What thin Partitions Senfe Jrom 1 bought divide ? This Hair-breadth Difference, this Cob- web Partition doth not at all exift, but in the Vanity of Imagination ; neither doth our Author give us any other Proof of its Being than a bare Aflertion that it is : But Reafon feels no fuch Thing : Reafon cannot help telling us, that when two Things are exactly alike, they muft be of the fame Nature: Would it not be ftupid to fay, that any thing exactly round, may not be or that it is not a Circle 3 when all the Idea we have of a Circle is, that it is exactly jound ? : I believe you will fay, yes : certainly then, if the Soul of a Brute is pofTeft of the fame eilential Fa- culties as the Soul of a Man, it muft, pofi- tively muft, be efteem'd of the fame Nature. But let us examine into the Powers of Reafon in the Brute Creation, relating to Speculation. There are fome Points of Speculation fo immediately applicable to Practice, that, per- haps they (hould have been -before confider'd. Thefe are thofe which are the Foundations I of of Arty fuch are the Theories of Arithmetic, Geometry and Government ; from which arife the Arts ot Architecture, Commerce and Law. - Let us turn to the Brutes, and fee the Effects of thofe Sciences among them. The Spider's Web^ the Bird's Neft, the Laws of t$e Bees, and the O economy of the P if mire, are wonderful Inftances : Then why moulcl not we infer \.\\zfame ~Effett muft proceed from the fame 'Cdufe ? -Or will you fay this feems to be ratlier Inftiri& than Renfon, becaufe the Bead, Bird, and Infect vary little in thefe Ads from the reft of the fame Kind ; whereas fome Men build one Kind of Houfes, fomc another ; fome have one Method of Commerce, fome another ; fome one Kind of Laws, fome another. Yet (hall not we as rationally account for this by faying, that Man, having more Pride and Curiofity, is more whimfical and wavering in his Actions than the Brutes, who ftudy no more than is nscelTary to the Ufe of Nature ; and there- fore they are * uniform in their Actions : For it is certain the Ufe of a Houfe is not its Form, Advantage is the Defign of Commerce, and I-Iappinefs the Defign of 'Laws, however their Form or Method may vary. Is it then trcm the idle Vanity of Curiofity that w e '* It is not, however, clearly evident, that all the r rutes are uniform in fuch Adions with ih< fc of their Specie*, (ince if we were as fenfible of their Mechanifm as of our own, I make no D;ubt but we-fliould difcover ingenious and conftdefable Variations. adjudge ( 59 ) -, adjudge the Actions of Men to proceed from Reafon - y and from the Want of that only, that we allow the Actions of Brutes to be directed by bare Inftinct. I think this is ftupid enough, fince we allow that Inftin$ performs the Purpofes of the Animal to the full as well, and in fome Caes much better, than Reafon performs ours. But to come to pure Speculation. Is the Brute capable of laying down Pro- pofitions, and of forming Concluiions from them, relating to Things perhaps unnecefTary for them to know. Of this we may ever remain ignorant, unlefs the Brutes could in- vent a Way to communicate to us their Ideas; but here we are as ignorant, with refpect to our Fellow-Creatures as to the Brutes. For if I meet a Man, or keep him Company for twelve Months, and in all that Time he nei- ther fpeak?, writes, or by any Means com- municates his Thoughts to me, I'm entirely- ignorant whether he be a Man of Science, or the moft illiterate of his Species. How- ever, if we mayguefs from Pbyfioghomy, as we do among Men, I think it quite eafy to imagine, when a Dog, Cat, or any other Animal is buried in deep Contemplation^ and when a yack-Daiv, Magpye or Ape^ is chat- tering, 1 efteem them coxcombly Brutes, that cannot think : And whenever I look at an O^ 1 /, I cannot help fufpecting but that, from Its little Concern ftiewn to external Objects, I 2 ( 60 ) it is logically weighing forne very nice Point of Metapbyjics. But here it is poffible I may be decciv'd ; ---yet if I am, it is nothing more than we are daily in the Appearances of Men, when we iniagine a. grave Look and zfolemn Behct- v'ioitr, denote PPffdbm and Experience, and that a Man that chatters is a Coxcomb, which is not always the Cafe. Having now brought all the Reafons that at prefent occur, and which I think fufficient to place Mankind in a true Light, with re- ipect to their Fellow Creatures, for fo now I will prefome to call the Brutes, we muft draw this Conclufion, that Men of Science are of the higheft Order of Animals, and that next them, all Creatures, without Diftinctiorr, muft take their Places^ not according to the Form of their Bodies, but according to t! Q native Greatnefs of their Souls; by which Order it will doubtlefs be found, that fome Part of Mankind will ftand not only equal to but below fome of the Brute Creation. Now then to apply the Delign of our Ar- guments i If we allow Immortality to the Soul of the Philofopher, and every Soul of the like Kind, we muft allow- it to the meaneft of all Animals ; whereby a Moufe, a Rat, a Loufe and a Flea, will have immortal Souls, *-- an intolerable Conclufion ! or elfe we muft allow Immortality to the higher Order only, and fo fix a certain Degree at which it muft flop ; ftopj and if we fix that fo low as to take irt #//and every Soul of an equal Degree to the Souls of the meaneft of Mankind, it is plain we muft include fome of the Brutes in our Svftem ; or by admitting none of the Brutes, we muft (hut out fome Part of Mankind with them. We will therefore proceed now to confider the Poflibility as well as the Proba- bility of the Souls, both of Brutes and Men, being mortal or ccafmg to exi/t, as Beings in tbcrnfefoes, after the Death of the Body. SECT. II. Ihc PoJfibiHty and Probability of the Soul's being Mortal^ with a Definition of GOD. IT was at firft allow'd, that the Soul is not a material Being, but only a Spirit or Power adling upon Matter by Means entirely unknown ; that it is alfo capable ofa&irig OH itfe!J\ as by Refection ; and that upon its ceaiing to afl, it muft immediately ceafe to be. Now all Power muft be effentially the fame, however its Manner of adting may vary ; as we muft allow that that Power which caufcs the Planets to move in their Orbits, is exa'clly of the fame Nature as that which induces a Stone thrown upwards, to fall down again towards its proper Centre : Exadly ( 62 ) Exaftly the fame that enables a Horfe t$ draw, a Man to walk, &c. As that may bs a Piece of Steel, exactly of the fame Nature, and capable of the fame Impreffions, that lies in a rude Form, and is acting in a very fimple Manner ; as that which is moft fur- prizingly and ingeniously active in a Clock or Watch : So 'tis that Power, called the Law of Nature, that moves the Planets, the iamc that adts upon a htone, upon a Brute j and upon a Man: For tho' a Man be con- fider'd ever fo much of a free Agent, and may chufe and refufe his Actions, yet he can't go beyond fuch certain Laws j he can't walk in the Air, nor move a Limb contrary, nor without an Aft of Volition in his Mind, any more than a Watch can ceafe to go, or can go wrong, when all its Parts are juflly conjlrufted and put together. Pp that Power, whereby we move Bodies from one Place to another, is dill the fame Power of Nature, notwithstanding their Motion be zipwards, directly contrary to the known Laws of Gravitation ; becaufe the Motion of the Arm, whereby fuch Bodies are impelPd, is the Effect of the fame Power in a greater Degree ; and it is as natural for a Stone tb rife in the Air, when thrown up, as it is for it to fall again of its own accord. Now fuppofe a Man throwing a Bull up- wards, it is plain he occafions a Power to at upon the Ball ; for when it is out of hits Hand, (63 ) Hand, he doth not affift its Motion any more, yet the Ball proceeds : The Power therefore acts upon it j but how, or by what Means, we can tell no other-wife than by faying, it is the Law or Power of Nature. Now it is the fame Law of Nature that acts upon that Matter, which particularly con- firutted is call'd Man. But to our Suppo- fition. We fee that the Law of Gravitation, which acts without Diftindtion upon all Bodies (whether endow'd with a human Soul or not) leflens by degrees the Power acting on the Ball till it goes no further ; the Power then ceafes to act, confequently ceafes to be. And it is in vain to deny that this Power is a Soul, becaufe we can't imagine it to be a cogitative or thinking Power, which means no more than a Power which can aft on //- fef&s well as on Matter. Neither can we imagine this Power to be communicated jrom, or to be a Part of the human Soul; becaufe the fame Power may be occaiion'd by Things ckll'd infenfible. Thus it is poffible for even Man himfelf to be in fuch Circurnftances, that by the Force occafiori'd by inanimate 'Thing?, he may be thrown up an. exceflive Height into the Air by Earthquake, Gun- powdtr, and the like. Now this Power or Soul that forces him up, is fuperior in Strength to the Force of all the Faculties of his Soul adting acting together : For neither his exerting the iirongeft Act of Volition or of Reajbn, can poffibly prevent his fubmitting to the Eff&, if he reiift the Cmtje. It is plain allb, that however nearly Mat- ter may be inftrumental in fuch an Accident, yet as the Soul doth not exiji till it afts, and is nothing but A8ion> fo there is no Soul acting on the Gunpowder or Sulphur , till there be fuch a particular uniting of Particles of Matter 3 at which Juncture the Soul imme- diately exifls y a$s y and no fooner ceafes to aft that in ccafes to be. The Soul of Mem doth not atf, i, e. exift, till there be fortn'd fuch a particular Union of Matter, fram'd into Organs of Senfe, Fi- bres, &c. fit for the Soul to act on ; juft then the Soul begins to exift, and exifts acting, till by iome * Accident or other thofe Parti- cles of Matter are broken^ impair d^ or dif- united; and then the Soul ceafes to act. No\v it is equally evident, that if a Child is be- >v I woukl have none here conclude bv the Word Ac- cident,.t\V3t I think there is any luch Thing as Cba;ne^ f>r that any Thin^ may or may t'oi be ; nncc however and wethould have theUniverfe ftrangely llock'd with active Beings. We mult conclude then that thofe Powers or Souls are annihilated * > 1C cr * Here then it is evident, that the greater Power will always annihilate the lefs, let the Properties of that Power or the Manner of its afh'ng be what they will whether weak or ftrong, violent or prygrefiiveji animate or in- aniulate. ( 66 ) or if there be any Idea of their exifling af- terwards, they muft be loft and mixed with the Power of the Univerfe, the Law of Na- ture. Hence then, it is evident, that thofe Pow- ers which act upon Men, on Brutes, and upon inanimate Things, are nothing more than the Laiv of Nature which is the Confequence or the ErTed of the divine Volition or Will : And that thefe Powers as ftill Effects of the lame Caufe, whether they act rationally and on themfelves as in Men and Brutes, or by NecefTity and purely on Matter, as in Things inanimate: And certainly, if they are Effects V ft he fame Caufe, the Effefls muft be all of the fame Nature. And here then will appear the Probability of the Soul's Mortality or Ceffation of Being ; by confidering the Af- finity of thefe Powers or Souls. We fee the Soul of a Man, at firft very weak -, not at all capable, or but very faintly, of exerting its rational Faculties : By degrees it grows Wronger and ftronger, and acquires extenfive Knowledge j till at length, in Old-age, not- withftanding all its Acquirements, it grows exceffively weak and childifh again. It is true we fee, in violent Powers, fuch as throw- ing a Ball, nothing but the gradual Decay ; but in progreffive Powers, fuch as in thofe of Plants, Trees, Gfc. Things always deem'd inanimate, we fee exactly fuch a Beginning, Progrefs and Decay, If then we judge juftly, (and (and that is certainly the only right Way of judging) fromjimilar Caufes and Effetfs, is not here a Probability, nay, do not our Argu- ments, all put together, give us a demonftra- tive Proof that the Soul cannot exift, as a Being in itfelf, when the Body becomes in- active ; in other Words, that it cannot be immortal. Now from hence to form the moft juft Definition of a Deity, we muft conclude that God is in himfelf, nothing but Volition * or a Will) and that that Power which has been called the Soul or Law of Nature, and which Mr. Pope calls God, is nothing more than the Effeft of the divine Will or the Deity himfelf - y that it is not the Being, but only .a ConJ'equence of the Being of God. So that whatever God ivi//s t is by that Will, actually done : Becaufe Volition being a Spirit, and a Spirit or Soul being nothing but Affion, * Sir ffaac Newton will have God to be extended, and to be a Sub/lance, for, fays he, Power without Sub/Janet cannot fubjijt. Now, God, confidered as ffili, muft be a Spirit, and as a Spirit, muft be Power, and as Power may be Sub/tana ; but, it is evident that God is not that Sub/lance which is the Power of Nature of which our Souls are, identically part ; but he is that Will or Power which is the Caufe of that Power ,of Nature Now while we are fo ignorant of what Kind of Subftance that Power or Spirit is (material Subftance it is al- lowed by all it cannot be) of which our Souls are Part, who can pretend to define what Kind of a Subftance, God is? I think therefore, it is a little idle to pretenJ to lay that God is Subjiance at al! ; when we don't know what we mean by it. K 2 God's (68 ) God's Willing and Acting i c exactly the fame Thing. And thus he is the prime Caufe of all Things : And this is all we can under- tfand, as to the eflentia! Being oj a God. For, to fay the Deity is Power, or the Deity is Space > allows, from what I have proved, that we and every thing in Nature are iden- tically Part of the Divine Being j fince we take up fome Space, and are poffeiTed of fame Power but it is plain neither Space or Power are, in themfelves, infinite Things ; however they may furpafs our Comprehen- iion : For we cannot allow Space to extend any further than God pleafes ; and we fee evidently thatPo^rr cannot exert itfelf a Jot further than the Will of its Creator afllgns it. ~- Hence it is plain that Power is a Being capable of Reftraint, and entirely acted on by the Deity ; and is infinite no other wile than, as ' confider'd capable of executing the molt infinite and unbounded Commands of the Deity ; and Space is infinite no otherwife than that wkerevcr Power is, it there finds Space But (uppofe we give up Space as a I>V.'77g-,and fayil is nothing then we (hall fay, how- extenfive foever is Poxver, it meets with no Qbftruction or Want of Space to act in. But here now may arifc an Objection a- e.ainlt this Definition of God, from ourhav- ing proved the Mortality of the Soul. For you may lay, that the Power of Volition or the Will found in Man,muft be limilar to the Na- Nature of the Deity, and may have Immor- tality annexed to it. In Aniwer to this I fay, It is evident that Will confidered as GW, and the Will in Man have no ejfential Con- nection ; for theVolition of God, or,GW//- felf, is the foteCai/fe of all Power, and the#7// in Man is only, as it were, a Property of the fame Power in a very narrow Degree For the Will acts fubiervient to every other Faculty of the Soul. I cannot per- ceive what I will 1 cannot think what I will, nor how I will-^ I cannot think two and two make^w, tho' I would ever fo fain ; neither can 1 think any thing doth not ft and before me, which I fee and know actually doth ft and there; tho' I exert the ftrongeft Act of Volition I am capable of. So, in forming Proportions I cannot draw what Conclufion I w///, from fuppofed ConcefTions or known Facts, but muft dmw that which the Power of Reafon tells me necefiarily fol- lows. Thus not one Act of the Soul is fub- ject to the Will of Man. And we fee that Brutes and Idiots have often a greater Share of Will than the wiieir. and heft Philoibpher. . The Matter of the Body indeed is fub- ject to Will, and that is all and that, but in fome Cafes ; for if a Man's Leg is broke, he may will long enough before it \vill move. Shall we then give up the Powers of Reafon to Annihilation, and fcruple to give up the Will, the moft fenfua-1 and beatify Faculty of ( 7' ) of the Soul, acting ib much beneath its other Faculties, that it feems rather to be a Pra* perty annexed to the Sott! than any thing ef- jential to //.I am fure you will fay, No if we give up the other Powers, the Will muft neceflarily follow j for where there is neither Perception or Reflection, there can benoM//. Thus we fee that the Will of God or the Deity, is the fole Caufe of the moft exteniive Power ; and the Will of Man but, at belt, the meanefl Faculty of a very fniall and li- mited Portion of that Power. Where is then the Similarity ? Here is neither the Caufe of the fame Effect, nor the Effect of the fame Caufe. It is plain then, they are not effentially in any degree the fame. And as this is our only Way of judging rightly, here evidently appears the Reafon why we cannot judge of the Effence of God ; becaufe ive can- not rcafon but from whet ive know. Now all We know is, that all Power is the Effect of the Being of God. Hence we have God as the Caufe y and Power the Effeft : But do we know the Caufe of any other Ejf'efl fimilar to, Power ; if we did, we might then judge of God, and fay he was like that Catije. We may fay, indeed, God is a//-ivi/e t aUyy/licf* all Goodnef^ and the like.- But what are thofe Things we call Wifdom, Jujlice, and Goodnefs Why, they are Ideas, which are the Effects of ay/;W/Purt of that moft r.v- tenfive fenfive Power, which is the Ejfetf of Gcd Shall we then patch up a God, with the Ef- fects of par t of a Caufe, which 'whole Caufe is the Effeffi of himfelf? Is this doing Honour to God ? No - Let us fay then, that God is the Caufe of all ^Things, and there put an end to our Enquiries ; for we have riot Ground to flep one Foot further. This, Reader, is the Effect of my firft ra- tional Enquiry into the Nature and Depen- dency of my own Being. The Tendency of inculcating and publifhing this Doctrine, it is impofiible I fhould forefee : But I cannot think it will at all hurt the Morality of thofe who underftand it ; but will rather lead them to admire and adore the Infinity of that Gcd, in whom our Ideas and Reafonings are loft ; as well as excite them to that general Hu- manity, that mould be extended to every liv- ing Creature, to make them encourage thofe which are injirumental, and to deftroy thofe which are prejudicial to the greateft general Good, in whatever Order of Beings they may exift. Hence will follow the Idea of Virtue, and the Juftice will appear evident, in killing a mad Dog, in the lawful Execution of a vil- lainous Man, or in deftroying every offensive Animal. But after all, I am fo willing to believe, even to de/ire the Immortality of the Scul (that is, a Capacity of retaining thofe Ideas I am pofiefled of in this World) that I heartily 72 icartrly and lincerely wifli to fee thefe Rea- Ibns I have here given, confuted and prov'd erroneous, and proniife the World, that if tver I iho'uld be of a contrary Opinion, 1 will undoubtedly give them my Rsalbns for re- nouncingtt'hat I have here written. ? N I ,S V ..