THE 
 
 STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE 
 FOR SUPREMACY IN INDIA.
 
 THE 
 
 STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLAND 
 AND FRANCE 
 
 FOB 
 
 SUPBEMACY IN INDIA. 
 
 (QHje " 3Le Bas " Prt^e ssag for 1886.) 
 
 /EDWARD J. RAPSON, B.A. 
 
 CLASSICAL FOUNDATION SCHOLAR, AND HUTCHINSON (INDIAN LANGUAGES) 
 STUDENT OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 LONDON: 
 TKUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. 
 
 1887. 
 [All rights reserved.}
 
 "Baflantgne p? 
 
 BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO. 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON
 
 TO 
 
 MRS. GOLDNEY, 
 
 Cbis j5s?a\:. 
 
 JUDGED WORTHY OF THE PRIZE 
 INSTITUTED IN HONOUR OF HER FATHER, 
 
 THE REV. CHARLES WEBB LE BAS, M.A., 
 
 IS, WITH PROFOUND RESPECT, 
 
 Dedicated 
 
 BY 
 
 THE AUTHOR.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION . 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE 13 
 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 
 THE OUTBREAK. OF WAR 33 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 43 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 57 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 85 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND 1 04
 
 " The French fight for glory ; . . . but John Bull, who is a reasonable, 
 moral, and reflective character, fights to promote trade, to maintain peace 
 and order on the face of the earth for the good of mankind in general ; 
 and, if he has conquered any one, it was to improve his condition in this 
 world, and to secure his welfare in the next." MAX O'RELL. 
 
 ERRATUM. 
 
 Page 46, line 24 ) , dtendu read e ntendu.' 
 48, 20 y
 
 THE 
 
 STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE 
 FOR SUPREMACY IN INDIA, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Literature of the subject Interest in the period at the present time 
 Treatment of the period by historians The earliest accounts chiefly 
 English Results of recent study of original documents Scope of 
 the present work. 
 
 THE complaint, with which Macaulay begins his essay 
 on Olive, of the want of interest shown by British 
 readers in the history of their own countrymen in 
 India, could not be repeated with anything like equal 
 truth at the present day. Interest in the affairs of 
 India, whether past or present, is certainly still far 
 from general, but it has of late years enormously in- 
 creased ; and this increase has called forth a vast body 
 of literature dealing with every branch of the subject. 
 In Macaulay's time, Orme's " History of the Military 
 Achievements of the British in Indostan " and Mill's 
 " History of British India " were the chief and almost 
 the only works, from which a knowledge of modern 
 Indian history could be gained. Both of these works
 
 2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 were excellent in their way ; and it says much for their 
 excellence that Mill, as edited by Professor Wilson in 
 1851, still remains the standard work on the history of 
 British India, taken as a whole, while Orme's history, 
 with its scrupulous accuracy and minuteness of detail, 
 will ever remain the great storehouse of materials for 
 an account of the particular period with which the 
 present essay deals. But neither of these important 
 works was written in a style sufficiently popular to 
 attract the attention of the general reader. At the 
 present time, however, there are very many books deal- 
 ing with the history of India, whether regarded as a 
 whole, or with special reference to particular periods ; 
 and many of these are of a high degree of excellence, 
 while, at the same time, they are written in a most 
 readable style. The difficulty of the reader now is not 
 a lack of books, but the choice of the best. 
 
 The period, during which English and French fought 
 for supremacy in India, has only during the last 
 twenty years gained any considerable attention on the 
 part of English readers. This attention it has gained 
 not more by its importance than by the fact that its 
 true history, and especially the history of some of the 
 great men who took part in the struggle, had been 
 until recently perverted; and, in the place of facts, 
 the bare assertions of prejudiced chroniclers were 
 implicitly believed. 
 
 The struggle in India was but an episode in the 
 grand struggle between England and France, which 
 lasted through so many centuries. To use the words
 
 INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 of Professor Seeley, India was but a "part of the 
 chessboard, on which England and France played out 
 their game of skill." To contemporary Englishmen 
 its importance could not seem very great. A very 
 small space is allotted to it, for instance, in the 
 columns of the "Annual Eeview." When contrasted 
 with the European affairs of the period, its importance 
 could not be properly appreciated. In the one case, 
 our forefathers saw the two mightiest nations of 
 Europe straining every muscle in a life-and-death 
 contest ; they were apt to think of the other as little 
 more than a feud between rival commercial com- 
 panies, strengthened every now and then by reinforce- 
 ments from home. 
 
 To us, however, as we look back, the scene wears 
 a very different aspect. We live among the gigantic 
 consequences of that apparently insignificant struggle ; 
 and, in tracing step by step the wonderful history, 
 which lies between the middle of the eighteenth and 
 the middle of the nineteenth century the story how, 
 in that period, a foreign mercantile corporation became 
 the supreme rulers of India our attention cannot fail 
 to be attracted, in an especial manner, to that period 
 of about fifteen years, which was the very crisis of our 
 existence in India. 
 
 But the struggle with Erance was even more than 
 this. As we glance backwards, and examine the 
 course of events then by the light of subsequent ex- 
 perience, we can plainly see that, as surely as defeat 
 would have brought with it perpetual banishment, so
 
 4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 surely did victory bring to the victors the necessity of 
 continual progress in the road entered upon. The game 
 was played for annihilation or for empire; although 
 the players, at the time, could not be conscious of 
 the magnitude of the stake. The positions, to which 
 English and French attained during the struggle, were 
 such as to make the continued existence of a French 
 and English power side by side in India an impossi- 
 bility. The event of the struggle, too, was such as to 
 make the existence of the victorious nation, under the 
 rule of the native powers, equally an impossibility. 
 The weakness of the empire of the Great Mogul was 
 laid bare; the inefficiency of his armies was proved 
 again and again ; his utter inability to keep the sub- 
 ordinate powers in control, the constant mutual feuds 
 and jealousies of these subordinate powers, their una- 
 nimity in rebellion against the supreme power, when- 
 ever opportunity presented itself all these things 
 were impressed on the minds of the Europeans, who, 
 during the struggle, were brought into contact with the 
 native powers ; and the Europeans could not help also 
 seeing how easily such a state of affairs might be used 
 to their own advantage. Prospects so glorious pre- 
 sented themselves, that it was beyond the power of 
 man's nature to resist; but even leaving out of con- 
 sideration such temptation, it was not possible that 
 the Europeans, now that they had learned their own 
 strength and the weakness of their masters, could ever 
 again resume their former position, in which they had 
 been, to a great extent, subject to the will of native
 
 INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 princes. There had been a time, when they would 
 meekly suffer the insult and exaction of the meanest 
 of native powers; but that time was past, and could 
 never come again. 
 
 The study of this period, marking as it does the 
 commencement of our empire in India, is highly im- 
 portant. It is, moreover, highly interesting for the 
 reason mentioned above the remarkable treatment it 
 has received at the hands of historians. . The early 
 accounts of the struggle between English and French 
 in India were written chiefly by Englishmen, and 
 founded on the reports of Englishmen, many of whom 
 had taken an active part in the struggle. At that 
 time, national hatred and national prejudice were too 
 strong to allow Englishmen and Frenchmen to form 
 a calm and fair opinion on the actions of one another. 
 Neither nation scrupled to attribute the meanest 
 motives to its rival. In such cases, when we possess 
 the accounts given by both sides, it is usually not 
 difficult to get at the truth, by striking the balance, 
 as it were, between them; but, in this particular 
 instance, circumstances were such that the English 
 accounts at last gained general acceptance, and were 
 regarded as true by both French and English readers. 
 The reason for this lies in the nature of the French 
 accounts, such as they were. All the great French- 
 men, who served in India, wrote " Memoirs " on their 
 return to France ; but these memoirs were one and 
 all written with the object of justifying the course 
 followed by their writers while in India. Thus
 
 6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Dupleix, Bussy, and Lally wrote in defence of them- 
 selves, in answer to charges brought against them 
 by the French East India Company or the French 
 Government. Such accounts would naturally be re- 
 garded as one-sided. More than this, they were in 
 certain cases directly conflicting. Dupleix and De la 
 Bourdonnais each wrote in his own defence against 
 the accusations of the other; and Law wrote in de- 
 fence of himself against the charges of Dupleix. Such 
 causes prevented the few early French narratives from 
 being regarded as veracious history, and it was not 
 until at least eighty years after the termination of 
 the war in the Carnatic that any important historical 
 work dealing with this period appeared in France. 1 
 By this time, the English accounts had attained to 
 the rank of standard works on the subject; and the 
 names of the great French leaders still continued to 
 be associated with much unmerited ignominy. The 
 only Frenchman, for whom the English had conceived 
 any admiration, was M. de la Bourdonnais, the Gover- 
 nor of the Isle of France; and he, without any doubt 
 whatever, after a career, in which he had triumphed 
 over misfortune and adversity in a manner truly won- 
 derful, turned traitor to his own countrymen at the last. 
 The neglect, with which this period has been 
 treated by French historians, has been frequently com- 
 mented on ; and the cause usually assigned for this 
 neglect is, no doubt, the correct one. The Great Eevo- 
 
 1 " L'histoire de la conquete de 1'Inde," par le Baron Barchou de 
 Penhoen, Paria, 1844 ; and " L'Inde," par M. Dubois de Jancigny et 
 M. Xavier Raymond, Paris, 1845.
 
 INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 lution makes a huge gap in French history. It came 
 like a second chaos; and out of this chaos proceeded 
 the elements which constitute the France of to-day. 
 It is back to the First Empire that the French love 
 to trace the origin of their national life. All beyond 
 this they are apt to view with diminished interest; 
 and the short but glorious episode of French achieve- 
 ments in India has been passed by almost unnoticed. 
 
 It is gratifying to think, now that the hatred and 
 bigotry, which blinded Englishmen and Frenchmen to 
 everything but the faults of each other, are matters of 
 the past, that the removal of all the misconception 
 and misrepresentation, by which the French name in 
 India suffered for a century, was due, in the first in- 
 stance, entirely to the efforts of Englishmen. This was 
 done, within the last twenty-five years, by the examina- 
 tion of unpublished and almost forgotten documents. 
 
 The keeper of the archives at Pondichery during the 
 war was M. Ariel, who, at his death, bequeathed the 
 papers in his possession to the Bibliotheque Nationale. 
 It was from a study of these Ariel papers, that a 
 writer in the National Review, in 1862, was able to 
 give to the world a true account of the part taken by 
 M. Dupleix after the surrender of Madras, in 1746, and 
 of his celebrated quarrel with M. de la Bourdonnais. 
 It was this article in the National Review, which sug- 
 gested to Colonel G. B. Malleson the idea of subjecting 
 the whole period to a thorough examination by the aid 
 of unpublished documents. In addition to the infor- 
 mation afforded by the Ariel papers, he was able to
 
 8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 throw much light on the subject, through the perusal 
 of papers relating to the East India Company, in the 
 library of the India Office. The results of his inves- 
 tigations were, at first, published periodically iii the 
 Calcutta Review, during the years '1865-1867. These 
 were subsequently published in the form of a book 
 entitled "The History of the French in India." Of 
 this work it is impossible to speak too highly. It 
 marks a distinct epoch in the study of the period with 
 which it deals, and gives the result of patient historical 
 research clothed in the most readable English. That it 
 was appreciated by French readers was shown by its 
 translation into French by Madame S. le Page, and by 
 the appearance of an excellent French work, which was 
 directly suggested by it, " Dupleix, d'apres sa corre- 
 spondence ine'dite," by M. Tibulle Hamont. This last 
 work appeared as recently as the year 1881, and is a 
 befitting monument to that great man, whom France 
 neglected to honour during his life, and whose memory 
 was held in dishonour even by his own countrymen for 
 a hundred years after his death. The diligent search, 
 which M. Hamont made in the different French libraries, 
 was amply rewarded, not only by the discovery of the 
 correspondence of Dupleix with his officers, with the 
 officials of the French East India Company, and with 
 his own family, but also by the discovery of an im- 
 portant account of the conquest of the Dekhan written 
 by M. Kerjean, the nephew of Dupleix. 
 
 The result of all the above-mentioned investigations 
 has been, in many instances, a complete reversal of
 
 INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 opinions previously held. Our faith has suffered a 
 severe shock ; and our present danger is the danger of 
 allowing ourselves to be carried too far by the reaction 
 which has set in. In the opinion of the writer of this 
 essay, neither Colonel Malleson nor M. Hamont has 
 been altogether able to resist the temptations to hero- 
 worship. For this M. Hamont has more excuse than 
 Colonel Malleson : the former is a biographer, the 
 latter an historian. In the course of this essay in- 
 stances will be pointed out, in which Colonel Malleson, 
 while nobly defending the cause of French honour and 
 French courage, has, in the opinion of the writer, for- 
 gotten to do justice to the English. The failures of 
 the English to keep in the path of strict honesty, in 
 their dealings with the native powers, invariably bring 
 down the wrath of Colonel Malleson, and with justice. 
 Such an affair as the forgery of Watson's signature 
 by Clive (if true and it would appear that there was 
 some doubt on this point) rightly excites the ire of every 
 honest man ; but surely Colonel Malleson, if regarding 
 the matter at all from a moral standpoint, should be 
 equally severe on the transgressions of the French in 
 this respect; and they were by no means free from 
 such, although to a reader, whose only guide was 
 Colonel Malleson, it would seem almost as if they 
 were. Colonel Malleson blushes for Clive's lapse ; 
 while he quotes with approbation the conduct of his 
 favourite, Dupleix, when, to ordinary mortals, it seems 
 equally blameworthy. To take one instance only, 
 with regard to the course pursued by the envoys of
 
 io INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Dupleix, when Nasir Jang, the claimant to the 
 throne of the Dekhan, favoured by the English, 
 appeared for the moment victorious, and without a 
 rival ; Colonel Malleson says (" History of the French 
 in India," p. 251): "To favour their negotiations, they 
 had recourse to those wiles which they had learned 
 from the Asiatic princes, and which they now showed 
 they could use more skilfully than their masters. 
 Thus they took credit for the defeat of d'Auteuil 
 (their own general !) . . . All this time (i.e., while 
 they were trying to come to terms with the Nizam 
 himself) these same agents intrigued with the chiefs 
 of the Nizam's army, especially with the Patan 
 Nawabs of Kuddapa, Kurnool, and Savanore, and suc- 
 ceeded in establishing with these and others relations 
 of a confidential nature." Truly, these disciples had 
 learned to outwit their masters ; but so had Clive, and by 
 precisely similar means duplicity and deceit of the very 
 worst kind ; and it is not easy to see on what prin- 
 ciples a different verdict should be given in each case. 
 
 The fact is, that stirring events, like the struggle 
 between English and French for supremacy in India, 
 excite to their utmost all the deep-seated principles 
 of human action. Such times always produce great 
 men ; and great warriors and great diplomatists are, 
 as a rule, men whose faults also are great. Contem- 
 porary historians treat them each in accordance with 
 the bias of his own mind. Such has always been 
 the lot of men like Caesar, or Cromwell, or Napoleon. 
 Such, in subsequent Anglo-Indian history, was the
 
 INTRODUCTION. n 
 
 lot of Dalhousie. To deliberate partisans fairness is 
 impossible; a true verdict, in such matters, can only 
 be given by an unbiassed posterity. 
 
 If the quotation of instances such as that men- 
 tioned above should produce in this essay the 
 appearance of patriotic partiality, it will be an ap- 
 pearance only. With the adequate materials, which 
 we now possess for forming an opinion on the subject, 
 no one can doubt any longer that, in point of personal 
 bravery, the French were at least our equals ; in tact 
 and foresight, certainly our superiors. The causes, 
 which produced our ultimate success and their failure, 
 had nothing to do with these : they were, to a great 
 extent, beyond the control of either the English or 
 the French settlers in India. 
 
 Anything like a complete record of even the most 
 important events during the war would be beyond 
 the scope of the present essay. The object here will 
 be principally to describe the position held in India 
 by English and French, both in relation to each other 
 and to the native powers, previous to the struggle; to 
 point out the policy, in accordance with which the 
 actions of each had, up to that time, been directed ; 
 to sum up, at convenient intervals, the influence, 
 which the course of events during the war, and the 
 action of the controlling powers in Europe, had in 
 changing the status and the policy of each ; and, in 
 this way, to seek for an explanation of those causes, 
 which led ultimately to the triumph of the one and 
 to the downfall of the other.
 
 12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In addition to works previously mentioned, the 
 following have been used : " British Power in India," 
 Auber ; " History of the Britannic Constitution," 
 Creasy ; " British Eule in India," James ; " History 
 of the East India Company," Kaye ; Macaulay's 
 "Essay on Clive," and Malleson's "Life of Clive;" 
 "Final French Struggles," Malleson; "History of 
 India," Marshman ; " British Eule in India," Mar- 
 tineau ; " Manual of Indian History," Meadows Taylor ; 
 " India on the Eve of the British Conquest," Owen ; 
 " Expansion of England," Seeley ; " Empire in India," 
 Torrens ; " Early Eecords of British India," Talboys 
 Wheeler ; " Historical Sketches of the Kingdom of 
 Mysore," Wilks ; and articles in the " Cyclopaedia of 
 India," the " Encyclopaedia Britannica," and the " Bio- 
 graphic Generale." 
 
 The question of the spelling of oriental names of 
 persons and places is one of considerable difficulty. 
 The two extremes are the purely phonetic spelling of 
 Orme and the rigid system of transliteration (as far 
 as possible with the Eoman alphabet) adopted by 
 Malleson in his "Life of Clive." Both of these sys- 
 tems are open to the same objection at the present 
 day, in so far as they frequently make words difficult 
 of recognition to the general reader. It was thought 
 best, therefore, to follow a system similar to that 
 adopted by some well-known work on Indian history, 
 which effects a compromise in this respect; and the 
 work chosen was Elphinstone's " History of India," 
 as edited by Professor Cowell (sixth edition).
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 European settlers in India : Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French 
 Political state of India Dissolution of the Mogul Empire English 
 and French East India Companies General attitude of natives 
 towards settlers Policy of the English Company purely mercantile 
 One short period an exception Different views on this point 
 Friendly relations with native powers of French, under Martin, 
 Lenoir, and Dumas Affair of Karikal The French resist the 
 Mahrattas Dupleix Difference of status occupied by French and 
 English Possible reasons for this. 
 
 IN the year 1740, six years before the outbreak of war 
 between the English and French in India, these two 
 nations alone, out of the four . chief European nations, 
 who had embarked in Eastern enterprise, continued to 
 hold any considerable power. The Portuguese the 
 first on the scene had for a century maintained a 
 complete monopoly of Eastern trade, and had raised 
 up on the continent of India itself a power such as 
 none of their European successors attained for a cen- 
 tury and a half after their downfall. But their glory 
 had long ago departed. The bigotry and intolerance 
 and cruelty, which characterised the successors of 
 d' Albuquerque, had long ago met with their just re- 
 ward. The Dutch, who succeeded, in like manner 
 failed to maintain the enormous power which they had
 
 14 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 once gained. They brought about their own ruin by 
 a flagrant abuse of the monopoly, which they had 
 wrested from the Portuguese. Next came the English, 
 who, at this time, still continued to keep in their own 
 hands the greater share of the traffic between Europe 
 and India; and, some sixty years after the English, 
 came the French, whose commercial success, while not 
 equalling that of the English, was still such as to make 
 them formidable rivals. 
 
 Up to this time, English and French had existed 
 side by side in India, without coming into serious col- 
 lision, for more than seventy years, although England 
 and France had been at war with each other for a con- 
 siderable portion of that period. The settlers of the 
 two nations had hitherto pursued entirely independent 
 courses. The policy adopted by either side towards 
 the rulers and inhabitants of the country, in which the 
 settlements stood, was neither imitated from nor in- 
 fluenced by that pursued by the other, and the result 
 of this was an important difference between the nature 
 of English and French power and policy in India, 
 which very greatly influenced the character of the sub- 
 sequent struggle. In fact, this distinction, which was 
 doubtless to a great extent the outcome of circum- 
 stances acting on the different national temperaments, 
 made the contest an unequal one at the very outset, 
 by placing the combatants on entirely different levels ; 
 and, had it not been for the preponderating influence 
 of external causes causes beyond the control of the 
 settlers, whether English or French the result of the
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 15 
 
 contest would, in all probability, not have been what 
 it was. It will be necessary, therefore, to gain a 
 general idea, first, of the political state of India at this 
 period, and, secondly, of the history of English and 
 French in India up to this date. 
 
 At no time, of which we possess any historical 
 record, did India constitute "a conscious political 
 whole." l Throughout history the term " India" is 
 little more than a geographical expression, under which 
 is included a greater or less number of distinct states 
 possessing a varying share of power and independence. 
 For a few years, during the reigns of Akber and his 
 immediate successors, the majority of these states were 
 linked together by conquest, and formed a great con- 
 solidated power, having its forces centered in the 
 throne of Delhi. This was the empire of the Great 
 Mogul, as our ancestors termed it, and a very mighty 
 empire it was; but, even in its most powerful days, 
 there remained Hindu states which it could never con- 
 quer, and which paid it no allegiance, or an allegiance 
 in name only. Such a state was that of the Mahrattas 
 a power which, from small beginnings, had grown 
 until now, on the eve of the French and English 
 struggle, it was feared more than any other power in 
 India. The Mahrattas had already more than once 
 dictated terms to the Emperor of Delhi. They were 
 one of the chief causes of the disintegration of the 
 Mogul Empire. The other chief cause was the great 
 
 1 Much of this account of the political state of India at this period 
 is borrowed from Professor Seeley's "Expansion of England."
 
 1 6 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 Persian invasion tinder Nadir Shah in 1739, during 
 which the Persian troops had occupied and devastated 
 Delhi, and taken the Emperor, Mohammed Shah, pri- 
 soner. Nadir Shah retired only through the persuasion 
 of an enormous bribe. Such attacks from within and 
 without severely tasked the central power, and lessened 
 its control over the subordinate powers. Of this fact 
 the subordinate powers were nothing loth to take 
 advantage ; and, at the time of which we are writing, 
 each of the chief subdivisions of the vast Mogul 
 Empire constituted practically an independent power. 
 
 These principal subdivisions were called " siibahs," 
 and their rulers " subahdars " or viceroys. In discuss- 
 ing the struggle between the English and French in 
 India, we shall have occasion to mention two of these 
 the subahdar of the Dekhan and the siibahdar of 
 Bengal. Under the rule of the subahdars were in- 
 cluded various subordinate powers, called by different 
 names in different parts of India; and, just as the 
 subahdars, when they felt themselves strong enough, 
 threw off allegiance to the Emperor of Delhi, so did 
 the nawabs and rajas, when an opportunity presented 
 itself, throw off allegiance to their subahdar. Of 
 these minor subordinate powers, the one with whom 
 we shall have most to do is the nawab of the Carnatic, 
 in whose dominions by far the greater part of the 
 struggle was fought out. This nawab, too, was prac- 
 tically independent, and the post, which was theo- 
 retically in the gift of the subahdar of the Dekhan, 
 had become hereditarv.
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 17 
 
 Thus, at this period of Indian history, might was 
 right. The various subordinate powers were divided 
 one against the other, and were unanimous only in 
 rebellion against the supreme power. Beyond this 
 there was no common feeling of nationality, no com- 
 mon bond of religion. A state of almost complete 
 anarchy was universal, and everything was decided 
 by force or intrigue. It was only the existence of such 
 a state of things which rendered possible the mighty 
 empire which Europeans have established in India. 
 
 It was no uncommon thing for mere soldiers of 
 fortune to fight their way to the highest positions in 
 the empire, and, such being the case, it would have 
 been nothing incredible, if at this period a band of 
 European settlers, united for the purpose of conquest, 
 had gained for themselves considerable political power 
 in India. Indeed the Portuguese had long ago shown 
 the extent to which this was possible. Up to this 
 time, however, neither French nor English had attained 
 to any such power. Their settlements were in no 
 sense of the word political settlements. They were 
 the possessions not of the French or of the English 
 crown, but of the French or of the English East India 
 Company; and these companies were in dependence 
 on the home governments only in the sense that the 
 right of exclusive trade to the East, which they 
 claimed, was founded upon the authority of royal or 
 parliamentary charters. Such hatred as existed be- 
 tween the servants of the two companies in India was 
 due to commercial and not to national jealousy.
 
 1 8 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 As might naturally be expected, the histories of the 
 French and English settlements in India, founded and 
 governed as they were in imitation of their rivals the 
 Dutch, have much in common with each other. The 
 ruling idea of both was to monopolise, as far as pos- 
 sible, all Indo-European trade, and they had, therefore, 
 the same kind of difficulties to contend with, in their 
 endeavours to prevent encroachment, from whatsoever 
 source, on this as they regarded it their peculiar 
 privilege. At first the sole concern of each was 
 traffic, and nothing was farther from their thoughts 
 than the idea of extensive territorial possession on 
 their own account. They held the land, on which their 
 factories were built, either as tenants of the native 
 powers, in consideration of the payment of an annual 
 rent, or as their own property by gift or purchase. 
 In every case they were directly subject to the native 
 prince, in whose territory such land was situated. 
 They were tolerated for the sole reason that their 
 commerce brought an accession of wealth to the states 
 in which they settled. The native powers, however 
 jealous they might feel towards the settlers, were too 
 wise to drive them away altogether ; but, short of this, 
 they as a rule made the servants of both companies 
 feel their power to the uttermost by imposing exor- 
 bitant taxes and transit duties, and sometimes by 
 enforcing large donations. That such an attitude as 
 this should be generally taken up by the native powers 
 towards the settlers seems after all only natural. The 
 fact is important only in so far as it contributed to
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 19 
 
 what may be called the formation of the characters 
 of the English and French peoples in India. To start 
 with, there would naturally exist a want of sympathy 
 with the natives on the part of the Europeans; and 
 the Europeans might either accept this want of sym- 
 pathy as inevitable and as not to be overcome, or they 
 might attempt to come to a better understanding with 
 the natives by respecting native customs and pre- 
 judices. As will be seen, the English, on the whole, 
 followed the former course, and the French the latter ; 
 and the importance of this difference is seen from the 
 fact that, on the eve of the struggle, the English still 
 held aloof, as far as possible, from all intercourse with 
 native princes, while the French had gained not only 
 the friendship of the royal family, in whose territory 
 their chief settlement, Pondichery, was situated, but 
 also the respect of its foes. 
 
 The history of the English in India, from the in- 
 corporation of the East India Company, in the year 
 1600, until the outbreak of war with the French a 
 period of nearly a century and a half is little more 
 than the history of a mercantile body attempting to 
 gain and hold a monopoly. In this attempt they were 
 brought into collision with both Portuguese and Dutch ; 
 but it will be unnecessary to relate their various 
 struggles with these, since their relations, whether 
 with the natives or with the French, were in no way 
 influenced thereby. With the notable exception of a 
 short period, which will be discussed hereafter, it may 
 be said that they consistently followed, as far as circum-
 
 20 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 stances allowed them, the advice given by Sir Thomas 
 Eoe, in the year 1615, "to seek their profit at sea and 
 in quiet trade, and not to affect garrisons and land 
 wars in India." The object which brought them to 
 India was trade, and on this they concentrated all 
 their energies. For this reason they not only abstained 
 from siding with any of the native parties in their 
 struggles with one another, but they even submitted to 
 much unjust and vexatious treatment which, otherwise, 
 they might have felt strongly tempted to resent 
 
 This fact has led some writers to speak in dispar- 
 aging terms of the English settlers as a set of cravens, 
 who would submit to any imposition rather than run 
 the slightest risk of losing any of their trade. But 
 this is putting the case unfairly. Their great wish 
 was, indeed, to be allowed to go their own way in 
 peace, but they showed again and again that there 
 were limits to their endurance of unjust treatment 
 even to secure this. That they were quite prepared 
 to hold their own was shown in 1664, when the Mah- 
 ratta general, Sivaji, attacked Surat. On this occasion 
 the natives fled in despair, and the only opposition 
 offered to Sivaji was by the English at that place, 
 who undertook to defend not only themselves but also 
 the natives a piece of bravery in gratitude for which 
 the Emperor Aurungzib remitted the greater portion 
 of the duties, which he claimed on the English traffic. 
 
 Strangely enough, the very opposite opinion has 
 been held by some writers, 1 and the English settlers 
 
 e.g., Torrens, "Empire in Asia."
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 2r 
 
 represented, not as traders wholly absorbed in buying 
 and selling, but as deliberate aggressors whose chief 
 aim, from the very first, and throughout their career, 
 was the attainment of power in India. How such 
 an opinion can be compatible with a knowledge of 
 this period of history it is quite impossible to under- 
 stand. 
 
 The short period alluded to above, as affording an 
 exception to the usual course of the policy of the 
 English in India, lasts from about 1685 to 1690. 
 For some reason or other, a fit of ambition seized 
 the directors of the Company at this time, and the 
 English in India assumed an offensive attitude to- 
 wards the native powers. The ruling spirits in this 
 movement were the brothers Sir Josiah*and Sir John 
 Child, the former being head of the Court of Directors 
 at home, and the latter in sole command of an expedi- 
 tion sent out from England. There seems to be little 
 doubt that the war was, to a very great extent, the 
 work of these two men. The pretext was the unjust 
 and cruel conduct of the native powers towards the 
 English in Bengal This was without doubt a real and 
 serious grievance; but it is equally certain that the 
 expedition was prompted by an ambitious project of 
 establishing an actual English power in Bengal itself, 
 no less than by the desire to obtain satisfaction, or to 
 bring the native powers to equal terms. As it hap- 
 pened, the expedition, from one cause and another, 
 after a small share of success, failed entirely. The 
 wrath of the Great Mogul, the Emperor Aurungzib,
 
 22 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 was fully kindled, and the English were expelled from 
 every part of India. They were permitted to return 
 only by making " the most abject submissions." They 
 had received a lesson, which they did not forget for 
 very many years. 
 
 It is from this very point, strange to say, that Mill 
 dates the aggressive policy of the English. After de- 
 scribing their utter defeat, he says, " It was now laid 
 down as a determinate object of policy, that independ- 
 ence was to be established in India, and dominion 
 acquired." As a matter of fact, the whole history of 
 the Company for the next fifty years is a direct contra- 
 diction of this. The only instance adduced by Mill in 
 support of his statement is the purchase and forti- 
 fication of Fort St. David. If this proves anything, it 
 proves that the English had been taught, by recent 
 events, how precarious their existence in India was, 
 and that they thought it necessary to possess some 
 stronghold on the western coast, to which they might 
 escape, if Madras were at any time attacked by an 
 overwhelming force. In spite of the celebrated in- 
 structions of the Directors, which Mill quotes, and 
 which have been quoted since so often, 1 nothing is more 
 certain than that the English in India, whatever may 
 have been the views of their masters at home, ceased 
 to make any such attempts to gain extensive territorial 
 
 1 " The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care as much as 
 our trade : it is that must maintain our force, when twenty accidents 
 may interrupt our trade : it is that must make us a nation in India ; 
 without that we are a great number of interlopers united by charter, 
 fit only to trade where nobody thinks it their interest to prevent us. "
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 23 
 
 possession, and relapsed once again into their original 
 position of merchants and merchants only. Referring 
 to the document quoted by Mill, Marshman describes 
 it as the " dying indication " of the " sudden spasm of 
 ambition," with which the Directors had been seized 
 at this time. 
 
 Certain it is that from this time onwards, the English 
 continued to regard any scheme of extensive territorial 
 possession with positive aversion. This conduct was 
 by no means caused by any lofty ideal of national 
 morality, but by the plain matter-of-fact consideration 
 that an aggressive policy was risky, and just as likely 
 to result in failure as in success. They were plain 
 business men, whose one object was to make for them- 
 selves fortunes sufficient to enable them to return to 
 their native country, and to spend the remainder of 
 their lives there in peace and comfort. They failed to 
 see in what manner the actual possession of numerous 
 places in India would benefit their commerce. The 
 position they held as tenants, or, at all events, as 
 subjects of the Great Mogul, was, in their opinion, far 
 preferable provided that they were free from molesta- 
 tion. They wished only to have factories which were 
 nothing more than warehouses and counting-houses 
 combined and even of these they wished to have as 
 few as they conveniently could. The establishment of 
 new factories was always accompanied with much 
 grumbling at the hard necessity. As for forts and armed 
 troops, they dispensed with both as far as they possibly 
 could ; and, when these were necessary to protect their
 
 24 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 goods from robbery at the hands of organised bodies of 
 natives, or to protect their trade against other Euro- 
 peans, or, perhaps most of all, against the " interlopers," 
 as they styled those English adventurers who, from 
 time to time, made bold to infringe on their monopoly, 
 they never allowed them to rise above the minimum 
 state of efficiency compatible with their safety. Indeed, 
 at one time, the old Company nearly lost its monopoly 
 altogether for this very reason. One of the arguments 
 urged against it and in favour of Courten's Association 
 in 1635, was that the former had neglected to build 
 forts. So very remote does interference in native 
 affairs seem to have been from the minds of the 
 English, that, during the war of succession at the end 
 of Shah Jehan's reign, they actually imported from 
 England stores of warlike ammunition, thinking that 
 such would be likely, at that time, to find a good 
 market. While their imagination failed to detect any 
 advantage to be gained by territorial possession, or by 
 a policy of interference in native affairs, such as the 
 French adopted to gain this end, they were quite awake 
 to the fact that failure in such a project would certainly 
 bring disaster to their trade, and, in all probability, 
 eternal banishment of themselves from the peninsula 
 of Hindostan. 
 
 On the eve of the struggle between English and 
 French in India, the English had had settlements 
 there for about one hundred and forty years. The 
 French had been there for little more than half that 
 time. We have seen that the English hitherto had
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 25 
 
 conducted themselves merely as traders in^ a foreign 
 land, that they had entered into no alliance with a 
 native power, and that they had not made one step 
 towards acquiring for themselves territorial rule in 
 India. Let us see how the French had conducted 
 themselves in this respect during their much shorter 
 sojourn there. 
 
 In the year 1674, ten years after the foundation of 
 the French East India Company, the French bought 
 from the Bijapur government the land, on which the 
 town of Pondichery stands. Three years afterwards, 
 Pondichery was threatened by the Mahratta force 
 under Sivaji, but was saved by the judicious measures 
 adopted by the governor, Francois Martin. The tact 
 displayed by the French on this occasion gained for 
 them the admiration and friendship of the ruler of 
 Bijapur. Not many years after this, the kingdom of 
 Bijapur was incorporated with the Mogul Empire, and 
 placed under the rule of the nawab of the Carnatic. 
 The first nawab of the Carnatic, who assumed any- 
 thing like independent power, was Sadat Alia Khan. 
 With him the French established friendly relations, 
 but it was with his nephew and successor, Dost Ali, 
 and with his son-in-law, Chanda Sahe'b, that they 
 established that firm alliance, which so greatly affected 
 their future. Chanda Sahe'b especially was an enthusi- 
 astic admirer of the French, and showed, by his sub- 
 sequent conduct, that he both appreciated their good 
 qualities and had, at the same time, detected their 
 desire for power in India. When this desire on the
 
 26 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 part of the Trench first arose it is impossible to say 
 quite exactly, but it was certainly early in their 
 career in India. 
 
 This policy, which the French adopted, of making 
 native alliance the means by which they might ulti- 
 mately gain their ends, was above all things unaggres- 
 sive in character; and so it remained until the time 
 of Dupleix. Every fresh addition to the power of 
 the French under Martin, Lenoir, and Dumas, was 
 made without striking a blow, and, in the case of the 
 two first, without making an enemy. During the time 
 that M. Benoit Dumas held the office of governor- 
 general of the French settlements in India, he main- 
 tained a close friendship with Dost AH, the nawab of 
 the Carnatic, and continued to extend this friendship 
 to his family after his death. By means of this friend- 
 ship he obtained from the Emperor of Delhi, Moham- 
 med Shah, through the mediation of Dost AH, the 
 permission to coin money at Pondichery an item of 
 no small importance in the growth of French com- 
 merce in India. 
 
 The idea entertained by the natives of French power 
 was even now considerable. During the struggle in 
 1738 for the sovereignty of Tanjore, Sahuji, the eldest 
 living son of the late raja, sent to implore the assist- 
 ance of the French, offering to grant them, in return, 
 the town of Karikal, and a considerable portion of the 
 neighbouring territory. Dumas aided him with money 
 and arms, and he was successful; but, like a true 
 Oriental, he evaded the fulfilment of his promise.
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 27 
 
 Here was certainly a great temptation for the French 
 to employ force ; but their friendship with the family 
 of Dost AH saved them from the necessity. Chanda 
 Sahe'b, who was at this time the raja of Trichinopoly, 
 came forward and offered to make Sahuji fulfil his 
 promise and hand over Karikal to the French. He 
 was as good as his word, and, early in 1739, Karikal 
 became a French possession, without the French in 
 India having struck a single blow to obtain it. Sahuji 
 himself hastened to make friends with them, and sent 
 them a ratification of the treaty, and an order to the 
 inhabitants to obey their new masters. Soon after 
 this, Sahuji was driven from the throne by his brother, 
 Pratab Sing, who likewise made a bid for the con- 
 tinuance of French favours, by adding to the territory 
 given to them, and even advising them to fortify the 
 towns in their new possessions. 
 
 The affair of Karikal is a good instance of the policy 
 pursued by the French governors of this period. They 
 were keen enough to see that diplomacy was all that 
 was needed to gain everything they could want, and 
 they were prudent enough not to let their anger at any 
 time lead them to attack any of the native powers. 
 They clearly saw that it was their best policy to play a 
 waiting game. 
 
 During the same year, an event happened, which 
 placed the French in a somewhat different position. As 
 they had never of themselves attacked a native power, 
 so they had hitherto remained free from actual attack 
 by a native power. They gained their first experience
 
 28 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 of this, just as the English had, at the hands of the 
 Mahrattas an enemy dreaded above all throughout 
 the length and breadth of Hindost^h. These Mahrattas 
 had made another incursion into the Carnatic, and had 
 slain in battle the nawab and his second son. The 
 eldest son, Safder AH, and the son-in-law of the nawab, 
 Chanda Sahe"b, had not been present with their forces ; 
 but thinking that the arms of the Mahrattas would now 
 be turned against them, and doubting their ability to 
 make an effectual resistance, they sought some place of 
 refuge for their families and treasures. Pondichery 
 occurred to both of them, and they asked consent to 
 place there the one his mother, and the other his wife. 
 Here was a dilemma. On the one hand, the friendship 
 of the French with the nawab had been productive of 
 too many advantages to be lightly ignored, while, on the 
 other, this protection afforded to his family was certain 
 to provoke an attack of the Mahrattas. Dumas chose 
 the latter alternative, and presented a bold front to the 
 enemy, which seems to have inspired these hardy war- 
 riors with admiration for French pluck. On the first 
 occasion, the Mahratta general seems to have contented 
 himself with threatening Pondichery and demanding 
 tribute. Both the threat and the demand were calmly 
 ignored ; but, about the end of the same year, the Mah- 
 rattas again returned, in accordance with a disgraceful 
 understanding with Safder Ali, whose interest it was 
 now to have Chanda Sahe'b out of his way. While on 
 this expedition against Chanda Saheb, the Mahrattas 
 took the opportunity of carrying into practice their
 
 THE EVE OF THE STEUGGLE. 29 
 
 previous threats against the French. Again Dumas 
 was resolute. In fine, the Mahrattas raised the siege 
 and withdrew, and the French had gained more prestige 
 than they could have gained by the most brilliant vic- 
 tory. The French had made their name ; and the mean 
 opinion which the natives were previously inclined to 
 hold of Europeans in general perhaps only tended to 
 augment the admiration they felt for this one nation 
 now. This resistance of Dumas may be said to have 
 created a prestige, without the aid of which the glorious 
 career of the French subsequently would scarcely have 
 been possible. In the case of peoples, and especially in 
 the case of oriental peoples, so disorganised, so split up 
 into innumerable factions, so entirely devoid of any 
 bond to k&p them together, nothing conduces to suc- 
 cess so much as prestige. This alone, for instance, 
 accounts for some of the most remarkable successes of 
 Olive. The prestige, which the French had now gained, 
 was, moreover, of no ordinary kind. They had run an 
 enormous risk against a most formidable foe, not from 
 any compulsion, but simply because they had deter- 
 mined to stand by their friends. They had shown a 
 degree of courage, joined to a nobility of mind, such as 
 the natives could never have seen before, but which 
 none are more capable of appreciating than Orientals. 
 In the state of universal insecurity, each petty conqueror 
 had quite enough to do to look after his own interests, 
 and, as a rule, did not scruple to throw his friends over- 
 board when they had ceased to be of service to him. 
 Henceforth the French occupy a distinctly higher
 
 30 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 status, and are by all recognised as by no means the 
 least of the powers of India, Thanks, accompanied by 
 the most valuable presents, came to the French from 
 all the great native powers, and, what is most signifi- 
 cant as indicating the relation of the French to the 
 native powers, the Emperor of Delhi himself conferred 
 on the Governor of Pondichery and his successors the 
 rank and title of nawab, and the high dignity of the 
 command of 4500 horse. 
 
 Soon after this Dumas resigned, and left all the 
 honours he had gained for his successor, Joseph Fra^ois 
 Dupleix, the Governor of Chandernagor, a man who 
 possessed an equal knowledge of the state of native 
 affairs, and joined to this an ambition even greater. 
 His promptitude and boldness formed a contrast to the 
 cautious policy of Dumas. The policy of Dumas had 
 been essentially one of peace, of interference only when 
 interference was safe, and of resistance only when the 
 honour of the French name called for it. Dupleix 
 mingled more freely in the affairs of native' princes, 
 and tended more to take up an independent position. 
 The French had hitherto acted the role of humble allies 
 of a native prince. These positions were shortly to be 
 completely reversed. Dumas had laid the foundation 
 of French power in India : it remained for Dupleix to 
 raise the superstructure. The characters of these two 
 men seem to have been admirably adapted to the work 
 each had to do. 
 
 Dupleix was strongly convinced of the importance 
 of gaining the sympathy of the natives, and took pains
 
 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 31 
 
 to impress upon them the fact that, in his capacity of 
 nawab, he too was an officer of the Great Mogul. He 
 adopted the Eastern mode of life, and paid and received 
 visits among the native princes with the greatest punc- 
 tiliousness. In this way he learnt the real weakness 
 of every native state, disguised though it might be by 
 pomp and display. By skilful and patient diplomacy, 
 he gained a complete knowledge of every little move 
 in the intricate game of intrigue, which was going on 
 all around, and saw that it would be possible to take 
 advantage of such a state of things for the purpose 
 of founding a French empire in India. In this work 
 Dupleix found an enthusiastic assistant in his wife, 
 whose intimate acquaintance with the native languages 
 proved of the greatest service. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that the positions of English 
 and French in India, with reference to the native 
 powers, though identical at first, had, in course of 
 time, become as widely different as possible. There 
 is, no doubt, much in national temperament to account 
 for this. The English, slow and sure, turned away 
 from an ambitious dream, the fulfilment of which 
 might be a future possibility, to reap the certain ad- 
 vantages of material wealth in the present. The 
 French, impulsive and sanguine, no sooner saw before 
 them a glorious prospect, than they subordinated to its 
 attainment every act of their existence in India. 
 
 Besides this, there is one fact in connection with 
 the foundation of the French East India Company by 
 Colbert, in the year 1664, on which little stress has
 
 32 THE EVE OF THE STRUGGLE. 
 
 been laid, but which may not unreasonably be regarded 
 as having, at the very outset, influenced their subse- 
 quent career in India, by promoting the development 
 of those characteristics which distinguished them from 
 the English. This was the proclamation of Louis XIV., 
 to the effect that a man of noble birth suffered no 
 degradation by engaging in the East Indian trade. 
 The primary motive for this proclamation was to en- 
 courage the noblesse to subscribe to the East India 
 Company ; but may it not also have produced another 
 effect? When we consider what the state of the 
 French nobility was at this time, the number of its 
 members, its rigid exclusiveness, and the fact that for 
 these reasons many of its members were doomed to 
 lives of idleness and, at the same time, of almost 
 abject poverty, we can well understand that full ad- 
 vantage was taken of this outlet for its energies. 
 Many young scions of the nobility, who had no career 
 to look forward to in France, proceeded to India in 
 the service of the Company ; and may not this sprink- 
 ling of men, who had been taught all their previous 
 life to scorn the pursuits of commerce, and to look 
 upon the career of a statesman as the ideal of life, 
 help to explain the fact that the French had fully 
 conceived the idea of political power at a very early 
 period of their career in India ?
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
 Ill-feeling between the two Companies Extension of the Austrian war of 
 succession to the settlements in India Prospect of war viewed dif- 
 ferently by English and French The French try to obtain a treaty 
 of neutrality An English fleet despatched for the Indian seas The 
 nawab of the Carnatic prohibits the English from attacking Pondi- 
 chery Commencement of the actual struggle Division of the war 
 into three periods The scene of action. 
 
 ALL this time the English in India had remained 
 stationary, steadily plodding on, wholly intent on 
 fortune-making. It may well be supposed that these 
 peaceful traders viewed with extreme alarm the am- 
 bitious projects of the French, and many were the 
 complaints on this subject which they made to their 
 masters at home. 
 
 The state of feeling which existed at this time may 
 be imagined, if we consider that this last source of irri- 
 tation was superadded to the hatred begotten of com- 
 mercial jealousy, which had always existed between the 
 two peoples in India. Want of enterprise characterised 
 both companies ; and this, joined to the commercial 
 systems which were followed by each, and which were, 
 in certain points, radically wrong, kept them both in 
 a state of penury. Numbers of fortunes were made,
 
 34 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
 indeed, by members of the companies ; but neither of 
 the companies themselves was, at this period, a great 
 success. Neither company had the insight to see that 
 the remedy lay, for the most part, in its own hands. 
 Each attributed its failure in commerce to its inability 
 to maintain a strict monopoly of the traffic between 
 Europe and India. The result was that, instead of re- 
 forming its own trade-system, each thought the great 
 end to be obtained was the destruction of the com- 
 merce of its rival; and, to obtain this end, neither 
 neglected to employ every means in its power, whether 
 honourable or dishonourable. Eival traders thus situ- 
 ated are perhaps, without exception, the most un- 
 scrupulous of mortals. The utter want of good faith 
 and common honesty not to speak of open or in- 
 sidious attacks on the material wealth of each other 
 which characterised the dealings of all the early East 
 India Companies, whether Portuguese, Dutch, English, 
 or French, almost passes belief ; and perhaps the 
 degradation of baseness was never greater than in 
 the case of the English and French during the few 
 years before they came to an open rupture. Neither 
 scrupled to encourage and bribe bands of outlaws 
 to inflict what damage they could on the other ; each 
 held out rewards to the servants of the other to desert ; 
 and both were continually doing their best to persuade 
 native powers to harass their rivals by unjust laws, or 
 by exorbitant taxes, and so to make their position on 
 the continent of India unendurable. 
 
 Such a state of feeling, existing on the eve of the
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 35 
 
 struggle, no doubt increased the bitterness with which 
 it was carried on ; but was not, in itself, the direct 
 cause of the war between English and French in India. 
 The direct cause was the outbreak of the Austrian war 
 of succession, after the death of the Emperor Charles 
 VI., in 1 740. In this war the English and French first 
 took part as auxiliaries on opposite sides, but even- 
 tually became the principals in the war. The war of 
 the Austrian succession itself was nothing but a pre- 
 text, such as England and France never failed, in those 
 days, to take advantage of, " the actual end desired by 
 either party being the attainment of complete mastery 
 in all points, whether as regarded political ascendancy 
 in Europe, transatlantic dominion, trading monopolies, 
 or maritime power." l 
 
 Even as early as the year 1741, the news, that Eng- 
 land and France were at war, had reached India, and 
 the probability of an extension of the war to the settle- 
 ments of the two nations in India was rumoured. Such 
 a probability was entertained with very different feel- 
 ings by each. Such an event would be cordially wel- 
 comed by the English, who saw in it the opportunity, 
 for which they longed, to make an attempt to put a 
 stop to what they considered as French encroachment. 
 From a military point of view, they were almost power- 
 less of themselves ; but the war would bring to their 
 aid British ships-of-war and troops. They regarded 
 their very existence in India as seriously imperilled by 
 French ambition. It was probable that the question 
 
 1 Martin, " British Colonies."
 
 36 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 would have to be settled sooner or later by an appeal 
 to arms, and no opportunity more suitable than the 
 present was likely to occur. The French, on the other 
 hand, dreaded nothing more at this time. Until recently 
 they had not taken into their calculations the possi- 
 bility of war with the English ; and most of their pos- 
 sessions were inadequately defended. It is true, that, 
 on the first rumour of the probable outbreak of war in 
 India, an effort was made to render the French settle- 
 ments more capable of defence ; but this effort was, on 
 the whole, at least as much hindered as assisted by the 
 French government and the Directors of the French 
 East India Company. Their chief settlement, Pondi- 
 chery, remained ill fortified; and although Dupleix, 
 immediately on his appointment as governor, had set 
 himself energetically to remedy this defect, yet it was 
 two years after the outbreak of the war before the for- 
 tifications he had planned were completed, and Pondi- 
 chery was in a position to defend itself against a Euro- 
 pean enemy. The French, moreover, had much to lose 
 in case of a defeat. They were in the course of raising 
 an empire by other means. They had without doubt 
 long ago dreamed of the possibility of driving the 
 English out of India altogether ; but they had not pro- 
 posed to effect this by an actual conflict with them, at 
 all events until their own power was such as to leave 
 the English little chance of successful resistance. Their 
 grand idea was power by means of native alliance, of 
 making France a great power in India by the side of 
 the native powers. The extension of the European war
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 37 
 
 to India simply upset all their calculation for the 
 time. 
 
 Similar to the views held by their subjects in India 
 were the views held by the controlling powers at 
 home. The cabinet of Versailles proposed to the Eng- 
 lish government a convention of neutrality between 
 the two companies. This proposal was, however, re- 
 jected; and, in 1745, an English fleet was despatched 
 for the Indian seas. The French company seem to 
 have made so sure of obtaining a treaty of neutrality 
 on the part of the two companies, that they actually 
 wrote to Dupleix, ordering him to reduce expenditure, 
 as much as possible, and, above all things, to expend 
 nothing further on fortification. 
 
 Here was seen the real evil, of a body of men in 
 Europe, absolutely ignorant and careless of Indian 
 affairs, beyond what concerned their own commerce, 
 having supreme control in all matters relating to the 
 Indian settlements. It was impossible for such men 
 to appreciate the causes, which, at this particular time, 
 made the English eager for a war, in spite of the fact 
 that war would, for a time at least, greatly hinder 
 their trade. It was only by bold disobedience to their 
 orders, by pushing forward the work of fortification 
 with all possible speed, and by supplying from his own 
 fortune the sums which the Company withdrew, that 
 Dupleix saved French power in India. At the same 
 time Dupleix himself tried every means of bringing 
 about a convention of neutrality ; but to such a pro- 
 posal Mr. Morse, who was, at this time, the English
 
 38 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
 governor of Madras, could not agree. The instructions 
 from home were quite definite, and it was not in his 
 power to dispute them. 
 
 Having failed, then, to obtain a treaty of neutrality 
 with the English, the French in India, with their chief 
 settlement ill fortified, found themselves in extreme 
 peril. The English fleet under Commodore Barnet 
 was on its way, and it was well known that its instruc- 
 tions were, if possible, to annihilate French commerce. 
 The French government had indeed ordered M. de la 
 Bourdonnais, the governor of the Isle of France, to 
 proceed with a fleet to the assistance of Pondichery ; 
 but, almost at the last moment, news was brought to 
 Dupleix that de la Bourdonnais had received instruc- 
 tions to send all his fleet home to France. With this 
 news, the last shadow of hope seemed to have fled. 
 
 But now were reaped the firstfruits of that policy of 
 friendly alliance which previous French governors had 
 established with the nawabs of the Carnatic. At the 
 present time the nawab was Anwar-ud-din, and to him 
 the French appealed, as feudal lord of both English 
 and French in the Carnatic, to prohibit the English 
 from attacking their settlements. Anwar-ud-din turned 
 a ready ear to their request, and sent to inform the 
 Governor of Madras that the English settlement there 
 should atone for any injury done to his French subjects. 
 Governor Morse replied as before, that his instructions 
 from home were imperative ; but the case was not the 
 same now as it was when he had urged the same plea 
 in answer to the request of Dupleix for a treaty of
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 39 
 
 neutrality. Anwar-ud-dfn answered that it mattered 
 not to him from whom the instructions came. All 
 who came to the Coromandel Coast were ipso facto his 
 subjects, and would refuse obedience to him at their 
 peril. He, however, promised that he would, in like 
 manner, prevent the French from making any future 
 attack on the English settlements. 
 
 The English were intimidated by the threat of Anwar- 
 ud-din, and Pondichery, a place unprotected by a fleet 
 or by proper fortifications, a place which Barnet's squad- 
 ron could have taken in a very short time, without any 
 risk to itself, was saved. The enormous disadvantage, 
 at which the English had placed themselves by their 
 utter ignorance of native affairs, was nowhere seen more 
 strikingly than in this instance. They had been con- 
 tent to remain in the belief, which their fathers had 
 held, that the powers of the Great Mogul were invin- 
 cible. The French, on the other hand, while mingling 
 with native princes, had initiated themselves in all their 
 rivalries and intrigues, and had fully learned the weak- 
 ness which these rivalries and intrigues produced. A 
 very short time after this, Anwar-ud-din, in a temporary 
 fit of rage, threatened the French in a somewhat similar 
 manner, and, moreover, had begun to carry his threat 
 into practice with a vast army. Far from submitting, 
 Dupleix ordered a small band of 230 Frenchmen and 
 700 Sepoys, under a young officer named Paradis, to cut 
 right through this vast army, said to number 10,000, 
 and the result was one of the most complete routs on 
 record.
 
 40 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
 Orme says, " The rudeness of the military art in 
 Indostan can scarce be imagined but by those who 
 have seen it. The infantry consists of a multitude of 
 people assembled together, without regard to rank and 
 file." This fact was perfectly well known to Dupleix, 
 who could easily take advantage of it. It was either 
 not known to Morse, or, if known, its importance was 
 not appreciated ; and so he and the rest of the Madras 
 council meekly bowed to the threat of Anwar-ud-din, 
 and the strong squadron of Barnet had nothing to do 
 but to occupy itself in the capture of stray French 
 merchantmen utterly incapable of offering any strong 
 resistance. 
 
 It is from this point that we may most conveniently 
 date the commencement of the actual struggle between 
 English and French in India. In one form or another, 
 this struggle may be said to have extended over a period 
 lasting until the end of the eighteenth century; but 
 the period of the struggle for supremacy, properly so 
 called, is much more confined. It lasted only about 
 fifteen years from 1746 till 1761. By the fall of 
 Pondichery in this last year, French power in India was 
 completely overthrown, and the question of supremacy 
 may be said to have been settled once for all. France 
 indeed made subsequent efforts to reopen the question, 
 and for a short period from 1781-1783 a portion of 
 our empire in Southern India was seriously imperilled ; 
 but these efforts could scarcely, under any circumstances, 
 have proved completely successful, since British power 
 was, by this time, too firmly planted in India to be
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 41 
 
 easily rooted up. They are, however, sufficiently im- 
 portant, as regards the amount of damage they inflicted 
 on British power in the East, to call for special notice 
 in connection with our subject. 
 
 The whole course of the struggle for supremacy natu- 
 rally divides itself into three periods, the divisions being 
 marked by two unsuccessful attempts, on the part of the 
 controlling powers at home, to make a lasting peace 
 between the French and English settlers in India. The 
 first period extends from the commencement of the 
 war until the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, by 
 which an attempt was made to place the combatants 
 in the positions they had respectively occupied before 
 the outbreak of war. This attempt was a complete 
 failure, and our second period begins almost imme- 
 diately after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and lasts 
 until the treaty of Pondichery in 1754. This second 
 period begins with the renewal of the contest in an- 
 other form that of an indirect struggle through the 
 medium of native allies and ends with the recall of 
 Dupleix from India, and an attempt, on the part of 
 France, to abandon his imperial policy, and, in its place, 
 to inaugurate a policy whose chief feature was to be 
 non-interference in native affairs. After a hollow peace, 
 during which the treaty of Pondichery was violated 
 again and again by both sides, a direct war between 
 English and French commenced again, in consequence 
 of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 ; and 
 our third period extends from this time until the over- 
 throw of the French in 1761.
 
 42 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
 The scene of action, during the first two periods 
 of the war, is the Carnatic, and, during the second 
 period, it will be necessary also to take a glimpse 
 at the progress of French power in the Dekhan. 
 This, although really outside the struggle, is im- 
 portant, as being the most extensive development of 
 French power in India. In the third period, the 
 scene shifts for a time to Bengal, and then returns 
 to the Carnatic. 
 
 As has been indicated before, anything like a de- 
 tailed account of the events of these three periods 
 would be out of place in an essay like the present. 
 The problem before us may be stated thus : given 
 certain historical facts, to formulate the causes which 
 produced them. An attempt has therefore been made, 
 first of all, to determine accurately the precise posi- 
 tions, which English and French held in India, at the 
 time when the struggle between them began ; and, for 
 the future, events will be noticed only in so far as 
 they may be regarded as modifying these positions.
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 French fleet under M. de la Bourdonnais Action with the English fleet 
 The nawab refuses to prohibit the French attack on Madras Fall 
 of Madras Quarrel between Dupleix and de la Bourdonnais Its 
 results Battle of St. Thome The superiority of European arms and 
 discipline shown French attacks on Fort St. David The English 
 lay siege to Pondichery Peace declared Summary of first period 
 Object of terms in the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle relating to India 
 Temptations to Europeans to engage in the affairs of native powers 
 Number of European troops in India Alteration in positions of 
 English and French. 
 
 THE first attack of the English had, as we have seen, 
 been diverted from its proper object. Pondichery, if 
 attacked by Barnet's squadron, must have fallen ; and 
 the fall of Pondichery must have been fatal to French 
 power in India, both commercial and political. The 
 first blow might have finished the war ; but the grand 
 opportunity was lost, and the tide of fortune now 
 turned. 
 
 The French governor of the Isle of France, M. de la 
 Bourdonnais, of whom mention has already been made 
 above, was a man of infinite resource, and altogether 
 one of the most remarkable men who took part in the 
 war. Some years before, when the rumour of a pro- 
 bable war in India was first spread abroad, he had
 
 44 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 impressed on the French government the importance 
 of providing a strong fleet to protect Pondichery, in 
 case of an English attack. This fleet had been built, 
 and sailors to man it had been trained, by M. de la 
 Bourdonnais, and all was ready to resist the English, 
 when, as we have seen, the French government ordered 
 M. de la Bourdonnais to send the fleet to France. 
 After the disappointment of seeing the fleet, on which 
 he had expended such pains, sail away for France, 
 M. de la Bourdonnais set to work at once to create 
 another. In the whole of history there is probably 
 not a more admirable instance of energy and deter- 
 mination. The fleet was ready in a marvellously 
 short time, and now M. de la Bourdonnais hastened 
 with it to contest the rule of the seas with the English 
 squadron. 
 
 An action took place between the two fleets in July 
 1746 off the coast of Negapatam, a Dutch settlement 
 to the south of Fort St. David. The action was in- 
 decisive in itself, but it had the important effect of 
 leaving the Coroniandel Coast clear of the English 
 fleet, which sailed away to get some repairs done to a 
 sixty-gun ship. This sixty-gun ship proved a verit- 
 able nuisance throughout ; and more than once subse- 
 quently we find it put forward as the excuse for the 
 failure of the English fleet to be in its place or to take 
 proper action. 
 
 The absence of the English fleet from the Coro- 
 mandel Coast gave the French, now that they had a 
 fleet of their own, the very opportunity, for which they
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 45 
 
 bad been waiting, to attack Madras. The English, 
 seeing the designs of the French, sent to inform the 
 nawab of the fact, and to claim from him the pro- 
 tection he had promised to afford them in such a case. 
 The messengers of Governor Morse found Anwar-ud- 
 dfn apparently in a state of indecision. He would give 
 them no definite answer. His state of displeasure is 
 said to have been partly due to the omission of a point 
 of etiquette, which is always scrupulously observed in 
 the East the English had forgotten to accompany 
 their request with the usual valuable present ; but there 
 must, no doubt, have been more tangible reasons for his 
 refusal than this. We have seen the close alliance 
 which the French had made with the nawab; and it 
 was probably no part of his plan to issue an injunction 
 against them, at all events, until matters assumed a 
 more serious aspect. Besides, the French had already 
 shown, that they were by no means at the beck and 
 call of native powers. There were reasons for not 
 issuing an injunction against the French; there were 
 no reasons, at all events as yet, to extend his protec- 
 tion to the British. But, whatever his reasons may 
 have been, the messengers of the British governor 
 returned without any satisfactory assurance ; and the 
 French proceeded to set about the capture of Madras. 
 
 About the fall of Madras there was never any doubt, 
 now that it was abandoned by the fleet. The town 
 itself was almost entirely unprotected by fortifications, 
 and the strength of Fort St. George, which had been 
 designed as a defence to Madras, was insignificant.
 
 46 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 The English, as we have seen, had preferred to build 
 Fort St. David, as a stronghold, further down the 
 Coromandel Coast, rather than make Madras itself 
 secure. The siege of Madras was intrusted to M. de 
 la Bourdonnais ; and both he and M. Dupleix seem to 
 have regarded its capture as a certainty from the very 
 first. While the siege was going on, however, Anwar- 
 ud-din had thought it time to interfere, and had 
 written to Dupleix accordingly. The substance of the 
 nawab's letter, and the means by which Dupleix pro- 
 posed to pacify him, are best related in the words of 
 Dupleix himself. In a letter to de la Bourdonuais, 
 dated the 2ist of September (the very day on which 
 Madras surrendered, but before the news had time to 
 reach Pondichery), Dupleix says: "Le nabab, sans 
 doute gagn6 par les offres des Anglais, vient de me 
 depecher une lettre, par laquelle il me marque sa 
 surprise de ce qui se passe a Madras, et menace, si je 
 ne fais lever le siege, d'y envoyer son armee. Je sais 
 a merveille ce que cela veut dire, et je crois avoir 
 trouve" le moyen de le faire taire en lui faisant dire 
 par rhomme que nous avons a Arcate, que lorsque 
 nous serons maitres de Madras, on la lui remettra, 
 bien ^tendu dans I'e'tat que nous jugerons convenable. 
 II faut prendre la place, et ne point ecouter les pro- 
 positions que Ton pourrait faire pour la ran^onner. 
 Ce serait tromper le nabab et 1'engager a se joindre a 
 nos ennemis." l 
 
 After the capture of Madras occurred that celebrated 
 
 1 Quoted by Hamont, p. 50.
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 47 
 
 quarrel between Dupleix and de la Bourdonnais, on 
 which so much has been written, and which was, until 
 quite recently, so thoroughly misunderstood. It will 
 not be necessary here to enter into any details of this 
 quarrel, which arose about the manner in which the 
 captured Madras should be treated, M. de la Bourdon- 
 nais wishing to allow the English to ransom the place, 
 M. Dupleix vehemently opposing such a course. All 
 the early English accounts of this period are unanimous 
 in holding up M. de la Bourdonnais as a pattern of 
 honour and integrity, and in assailing M* Dupleix with 
 the most unqualified abuse. With the fuller know- 
 ledge of the period, which has since been gained from 
 unpublished records, there can no longer be any doubt 
 that, on this point, these early English accounts are 
 completely in error. Full and convincing proofs of 
 this will be found in the pages of Colonel Malleson and 
 M. Hamont. It must suffice here to mention two 
 facts, which give the clue to the whole mystery. 
 Madras surrendered unconditionally. Of this there is 
 no doubt whatever, for de la Bourdonnais himself states 
 the fact in the plainest manner in a letter to Dupleix 
 two days after the surrender. De la Bourdonnais had 
 accepted a bribe of .40,000 from the English East 
 India Company, on condition that he would undertake 
 to make a ransom of the place possible. Of this, too, 
 there can be no doubt; papers in the records of the 
 East India Company are proof positive. We no longer 
 wonder at his pertinacity. 
 
 The results of this quarrel were most important in
 
 48 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR, 
 
 so far as they affected the interests of English and 
 French in India. It caused an antagonism between 
 the two great French leaders, both of whom were men 
 of boundless energy and boundless ambition in the 
 cause of French empire in India, and either of whom 
 was infinitely more than a match for any leader, who 
 had yet appeared on the English side. It was, more- 
 over, eventually the cause of the departure of de la 
 Bourdonnais from India. In its issue it deprived the 
 English altogether of Madras, their most important 
 town ; but, on the other hand, it was the cause of that 
 gallant defence of Fort St. David, which came like the 
 first dawn of hope to the English. It affected the 
 French, too, in another way not less important. For 
 some time de la Bourdonnais remained in India, and 
 in possession of Madras ; and, meanwhile, Anwar-ud- 
 din began to think it was time that Madras should be 
 given up to him, as had been agreed. There is no 
 doubt that Dupleix fully intended to do this, but " bien 
 |tendudans 1'etatque nous jugerons convenable," that 
 is to say, with its fortifications razed. To give over 
 the place, while de la Bourdonnais remained in posses- 
 sion of it, was of course impossible ; but Anwar-ud-din 
 would not understand this, and surrounded the place 
 with his army soon after the departure of de la Bour- 
 donnais, and before Dupleix had had time to destroy 
 the fortifications. To have destroyed the fortifications 
 before the very eyes of Anwar-ud-din would have 
 been to excite his wrath in the strongest manner pos- 
 sible; to hand over the town, with its fortifications
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 49 
 
 complete, was quite out of the question. Dupleix 
 therefore decided to bear the brunt of Anwar-ud-din's 
 wrath ; and the result was the celebrated victory of the 
 French at St. Thome, on the banks of the Adyar, of 
 which mention has been made above. 
 
 The French had two darling projects : the acquisition 
 of territory for themselves, and the expulsion of their 
 rivals, the English. In the case of Madras, they had 
 decided to sacrifice the first, in order to obtain more 
 effectually the second. The impatience of Anwar-ud- 
 din was the means of their gaining both. 
 
 The battle of St. Thome was also important in other 
 respects. It was the first direct collision between a 
 native and a European force, during the period of which 
 we are writing ; and it had the effect of helping to 
 dissipate that feeling of almost awe, with which Euro- 
 peans were inclined at first to regard the forces of 
 native powers. It demonstrated, once for all, the 
 superiority of European discipline ; and the lesson 
 taught by experience was not wasted. Mill, in his 
 history, has a short note, which has been quoted over 
 and over again, and which deserves to be still quoted, 
 as it puts the whole cause of European supremacy in 
 India in the most concise manner. He says, "The 
 two important discoveries for conquering India were : 
 ist, the weakness of the native armies against European 
 discipline ; 2dly, the facility of imparting that discipline 
 to natives in the European service. Both discoveries 
 were made by the French." It was, in fact, the Indians 
 themselves who conquered India, under our guidance.
 
 5 o FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 When we consider that, as a rule, there have been in 
 European armies at least five sepoys to one European 
 soldier, we can no longer continue to hold the com- 
 placent belief, that all our victories were the result of 
 the physical superiority of Europeans. 1 
 
 When the treaty, which was made by de la Bour- 
 donnais with the English at Madras, was overruled by 
 Dupleix, several of the principal English residents, 
 considering themselves no longer bound by their parole, 
 escaped to Fort St. David. Among those who thus 
 made their escape, was Olive. 
 
 The French were certain now to exert themselves to 
 the utmost to effect a capture of Fort St. David and of 
 Caddalor, the English town with which it was almost 
 joined; and the little English garrison determined to 
 hold out to the very last ; for, with the fall of Fort St. 
 David, all the English power in the south of India 
 would fall. Four attacks in all did the French make 
 on Fort St. David ; and it was only, in one case, the 
 arrival of an English fleet under Admiral Griffin, which 
 threatened Pondichery and made the French hastily 
 withdraw their troops to its assistance, in another, 
 the skill displayed by Major Lawrence, who had then 
 recently arrived to take command of the English forces 
 in India, which prevented them from succeeding. The 
 nawab, smarting under the defeat inflicted on him by 
 the French, had at first joined the English alliance ; 
 but afterwards, thinking their cause desperate, he left 
 them and joined the French again. 
 
 1 See " Expansion of England," II. iii.
 
 FIRST PEEIOD OF THE WAR. 51 
 
 After the failure of the attacks on Fort St. David, 
 the English assumed the offensive, and laid siege to 
 Ariancopang, which they took. This was a small place 
 about two miles distant from Pondichery; and by its cap- 
 ture the French were shut up in Pondichery, which was 
 now besieged by the English. The siege was conducted 
 by Admiral Boscawen, who had been appointed com- 
 mander-in-chief of all the English forces in India, both 
 naval and military. It had been determined in Eng- 
 land to strike a blow at Pondichery, which was rightly 
 regarded as the heart of French power, and a large 
 armament had been gathered together for this purpose, 
 and Admiral Boscawen, who was a grand-nephew of 
 the famous Duke of Marlborough, was chosen as the 
 fittest person to command it. However great his 
 powers were as a naval commander, he was by no 
 means a first-class general. The English government 
 without doubt were unwise in expecting to find these 
 two qualities, in any great degree, combined in one 
 person. 
 
 On the French side, the chief officer of Dupleix, 
 Paradis, was now dead ; and, there being no one capable 
 of filling his place, Dupleix himself had to take the 
 command during the siege. Though without any mili- 
 tary training, Dupleix succeeded in baffling every 
 attempt the English made to take Pondichery ; and, at 
 the end of five weeks, the siege was raised. 
 
 Dupleix no sooner got rid of the English, than he 
 began to project another attack on Fort St. David on a 
 larger scale than ever ; when, in the midst of his pre-
 
 52 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 parations, news arrived in India that peace had been 
 made between England and France. By the treaty of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, which followed the declaration of peace, 
 a mutual restitution of prisoners and places taken in 
 the war was enacted ; and the English were once more 
 the possessors of Madras, the French receiving, in 
 exchange, Cape Breton. 
 
 Taken altogether, it must be said that, in this first 
 period of the war, the French had the best of the 
 struggle. At the very commencement of hostilities, 
 the English omitted to take advantage of the golden 
 opportunity given them of taking Pondichery ; and we 
 have seen for what reasons. When at last they laid 
 siege to Pondichery, its fortifications had been completed, 
 and it was strong enough to resist their attack. At 
 one time during this period, we find the English entirely 
 confined to Fort St. David ; and it was only the spirit 
 which animated its garrison which enabled it to hold 
 out even against the French attacks hitherto, badly 
 conducted as they had, for the most part, been. Had 
 a really strong force, such as Dupleix was preparing, 
 when he was interrupted by the news of the declara- 
 tion of peace, with a really good general at its head, 
 been brought against Fort St. David, there can be little 
 doubt that it must have surrendered. That Fort St. 
 David was far from impregnable, was shown by what 
 happened some years later, after its fortifications 
 had been strengthened, when it was besieged by the 
 French troops under Lally. The English had been 
 placed, therefore, in a most critical situation, and
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR, 53 
 
 they owed their rescue from this to the treaty of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. 
 
 The articles in the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which 
 related to India, were a direct attempt to place the 
 English and French settlers once more on the footing 
 which they had occupied there, before the outbreak of 
 hostilities. The home governments, and the directors 
 of the two companies in Europe, were anxious that 
 there should be peace in India ; and they fondly hoped 
 that the provisions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 would insure peace. The war in India had naturally 
 proved most disastrous to the traffic of the companies, 
 and the directors were far from seeing that any com- 
 pensating advantage either had been gained, or could 
 possibly be gained, thereby. They expected now that 
 their servants in India would settle down once more 
 to peaceful commerce ; and they were apt to think of 
 the recent war as of a storm, the effect of which would 
 be to clear away much of the ill-will, which had existed 
 between the companies for years. 
 
 But there were causes which must effectually pre- 
 vent any such a renewal of peaceful commerce, at all 
 events for any considerable period. The treaty of Aix- 
 la-Chapelle might decree peace between the English 
 and French in India; but it could not make peace 
 among the native powers. During the late war, the 
 native powers had had an opportunity of learning the 
 vast superiority of European arms and of European 
 discipline as compared with their own ; and they now 
 quite appreciated the advantages to be gained by an
 
 54 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 alliance with one or other of the European com- 
 munities. They consequently left no means untried, 
 whereby they might attract Europeans to their side. 
 They offered large sums of money, accession of terri- 
 tory, and everything else, which could possibly tempt 
 the settlers. Even if the English and French in India 
 had been really anxious for a lasting peace, it would, 
 under the circumstances, have been an act of great 
 restraint, to refuse to take any part in native affairs ; 
 and, when once they mixed in the disputes of different 
 native princes, indirect collision with one another was 
 certain to come sooner or later. But it does not appear 
 that any such eager desire for peace possessed them. 
 The late hostilities seem, on the whole, rather to 
 have served to inflame their ambition, than to fatigue 
 them. 
 
 The great reason, however, which rendered it so 
 difficult for them to refuse the prizes held out as the 
 reward of their assistance, was the great number of 
 troops, which had been gathered together in India in 
 the late struggle. These were far more numerous than 
 was necessary for their safety, and were, besides, the 
 source of no inconsiderable expense ; and, as Mill 
 characteristically remarks, " with the masters of 
 troops, it seems to be a law of nature, whenever 
 they possess them in a greater abundance than is 
 necessary for defence, to employ them for the dis- 
 turbance of others." 
 
 Leaving out of the question, for the moment, the im- 
 portant factor in the subsequent his.tory of French and
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR. 55 
 
 English in India, which this great accession of troops 
 on both sides forms ; and also leaving out of the question 
 another factor of equal importance the prestige they 
 had gained in the native mind, by their actions during 
 the war let us regard each community as placed once 
 more upon its original footing by the treaty of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle. Let us regard, for the moment, the accession 
 of troops as supplying the power, and the prestige they 
 had gained as supplying the inclination, to take part in 
 the complicated game, which the native powers were 
 playing. If we leave both these elements out of con- 
 sideration, we shall then find both nations in the exact 
 " statu quo ante bellum;" and it will conduce to a 
 better understanding of the part taken by each in 
 subsequent events, if we clearly bear in mind what 
 that status precisely was. 
 
 The French, it will be remembered, had, since the 
 time of Francois Martin, maintained a policy of friendly 
 alliance with the successive nawabs of the Carnatic : 
 the English had kept almost exclusively to themselves. 
 The French had formed a definite plan of establishing 
 their power in India, through the aid of such native 
 alliance, and in this way not by direct war, the war 
 with the English had been within a hairbreadth of 
 destroying their schemes at the very outset of 
 eventually getting rid of their rivals : the English, on 
 the other hand, showed no anxiety for permanent pos- 
 sessions of any description in India. Their one wish 
 was for commodious business places ; and these, so 
 long as they were free from undue interference, they
 
 56 FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 
 
 would rather prefer than otherwise to hold as tenants, 
 so that they might quit them, if necessary, at a 
 moment's notice. 
 
 After the interruption, which the war had made in 
 the course each had mapped out for itself, each returned 
 to its own course, under circumstances changed in each 
 case by the addition of the two factors, to which refer- 
 ence has been made above strength of forces, and a 
 consciousness of this strength, when compared with 
 that of the surrounding native powers.
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 Motives for interference in native affairs French alliance with Mozaffer 
 Jang and Chanda Saheb English alliance with Nasir Jang and 
 Mohammed All The French declared governors of Southern India 
 French power in the Dekhan Critical position of the English 
 Siege of Trichinopoly Clive and the siege of Arcot " Dupleix- 
 Futteh-abad " Surrender of French force under Law The English 
 and French theoretically not at war Unsuccessful French expedi- 
 tion against Fort St. David Truce between English and French 
 The Treaty of Pondichery. 
 
 THE inducements to interfere in the concerns of native 
 powers were too strong to be resisted by either French 
 or English, and, as a matter of fact, such interference 
 began almost immediately after the news of the treaty 
 of Aix-la-Chapelle reached India. In the history of 
 this interference, the first stage is one in which each 
 community followed its own particular bent, without 
 regard to direct influence on the other. The first Eng- 
 lish interference, for instance, was for the sole purpose 
 of gaining a convenient harbour ; the first French in- 
 terference was for the sole purpose of placing over the 
 subah of the Dekhan, and its subordinate division the 
 Carnatic, two claimants, who should be indebted for 
 their success to French arms, and who should conse- 
 quently become little more than mere puppets in the
 
 58 SECOND PEEIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 hands of French diplomacy. It was only at a later 
 stage, when their interests clashed, that they con- 
 sistently took opposite sides, under the name of auxi- 
 liaries, in every struggle. It was still later, when war 
 broke out once more in Europe, that they threw off all 
 disguise, and fought openly as principals. 
 
 The English were the first to act. Sahiiji, of whom 
 we have heard before, as having been driven from his 
 throne of Tanjore, by his brother Pratab Sing, now 
 offered the town of Devicottah to the English if they 
 would assist him in the recovery of his throne. The 
 English had for a long time eyed the splendid harbour 
 of Devicottah with envy, and such an opportunity of 
 gaining it as the present was not to be neglected. 
 They failed, in their first expedition, to restore their 
 claimant ; and, in their second expedition, they neglected 
 Tanjore altogether, and set to work to claim the reward 
 by capturing Devicottah, without the performance of 
 their part of the bargain. Never perhaps has every 
 idea of justice been more completely set aside for in- 
 terest. No sooner had they obtained Devicottah than 
 they willingly undertook to keep Sahiiji in confinement 
 at Madras, provided that Pratab Sing would confirm 
 them in the possession of the town they had captured. 
 
 The French had not long to wait. In June 1 748 the 
 siibahdar of the Dekhan died, and the usual struggle 
 amongst the various claimants to the throne began. 
 The two chief were: Mozaffer Jang, his grandson, 
 whom he is said to have appointed to succeed him; 
 and Nasir Jang, his second son, whose claims would
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 59 
 
 naturally be founded on his nearer relationship. At 
 the time of the siibahdar's death, Mozaffer Jang was 
 absent, while Nasir Jang possessed the great advantage 
 of being on the spot. Mozaffer Jang's first thought 
 was of the Mahrattas, and he went to Satara to nego- 
 tiate with them, with the object of gaining their assist- 
 ance in his contest with his uncle, Nasir Jang. At 
 Satara, Mozaffer Jang met Chanda Saheb, who has been 
 already mentioned as that member of the royal family 
 of the Carnatic, who above all the others favoured the 
 French. Chanda Sahe"b was at the present time living 
 at Satara as a prisoner of the Mahrattas, who, in 1741, 
 had invaded the Carnatic and taken the town of Trichi- 
 nopoly, of which he was raja. At the time when 
 Chanda Sahe"b was made prisoner by the Mahrattas, 
 the nawab of the Carnatic was his father-in-law, Safder 
 AH, who had since been assassinated ; and, at the pre- 
 sent time, another family was ruling over the Carnatic. 
 During his captivity at Satara, Chanda Saheb had 
 resolved, if fortune should at any future time favour 
 him, to dispute the supremacy of the Carnatic with the 
 ruling nawab, Anwar-ud-din. The present occasion 
 therefore seemed a good opportunity, if he could only 
 gain his release from the Mahrattas, for co-operation 
 with Mozaffer Jang. The first idea of Mozaffer Jang 
 had been, as we have seen, to gain the aid of the 
 Mahrattas. This, however, was distasteful to Chanda 
 Sahe"b ; who was, naturally, not anxious to intrust the 
 capture of the Carnatic his great object of ambition - 
 to his own captors. Correspondence with the French
 
 60 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 resulted in the ransom of Chanda Saheb from the Mah- 
 rattas by M. Dupleix, and the promise of the French 
 to aid both himself and Mozaffer Jang. This then 
 was the object of French interference in native affairs 
 to make of their own proteges a subahdar of the 
 Dekhan, and a nawab of the Carnatic. 
 
 In the existent state of native affairs, the plea of 
 right might be put forward to justify almost any inter- 
 ference whatever. Everything was in a state so un- 
 settled, practice was so completely contradicted by 
 theory and theory by practice, that it was, for the most 
 part, quite impossible to say what was right and what 
 was not. We must, therefore, cease to be surprised at 
 the interference of English or French on any occasion, 
 when their interest might be forwarded thereby. Mac- 
 aulay has admirably expressed this state of affairs in 
 the Mogul Empire of this period, in his essay on Clive. 
 " All rights," he says, " were in a state of utter uncer- 
 tainty ; and the Europeans, who took part in the dis- 
 putes of the natives, confounded the confusion, by 
 applying to Asiatic politics the public law of the West, 
 and analogies drawn from the feudal system. If it 
 was convenient to treat a nabob as an independent 
 prince, there was an excellent plea for doing so. He 
 was independent, in fact. If it was convenient to treat 
 him as a mere deputy of the Court of Delhi, there was 
 no difficulty ; for he was so in theory. If it was con- 
 venient to consider his office as an hereditary dignity, 
 or as a dignity held during life only, or as a dignity 
 held only during the good pleasure of the Mogul, argu-
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 61 
 
 merits and precedents might be found for every one of 
 these views." 
 
 Mozaffer Jang, Chanda Saheb, and their French 
 allies first set about the conquest of the Carnatic, and 
 in one battle there fell the nawab, Anwar-ud-din, and 
 his eldest son, Maphuz Khan ; while the younger son, 
 Mohammed AH, saved himself by flight. Thus, for the 
 present, Chanda Sahe'b was freed from all rivals ; and 
 at Arcot, soon after the battle, Mozaffer Jang proclaimed 
 himself siibahdar of the Dekhaii, and confirmed Chanda 
 Saheb, as his subordinate, in the office of nawab of the 
 Carnatic. 
 
 On the part of the English, it serves to show, perhaps 
 more plainly than anything else, the absence of all 
 ulterior designs, beyond the immediate possession of a 
 convenient commercial post, when they joined them- 
 selves as allies to a native power, that, immediately 
 Chanda Saheb became nawab of the Carnatic although 
 this post had been gained by the assistance of French 
 arms they hastened, as beseemed them as tenants, to 
 pay their respects to him at Arcot. 
 
 But amidst all this plotting and counter-plotting, it 
 was impossible that French and English could remain 
 long, without coming into indirect conflict. Admiral 
 Boscawen, before returning to Europe, saw that, with 
 the defeat of Mohammed All, the younger son of 
 Anwar-ud-din, who had saved himself by flight, and 
 shut himself up in Trichinopoly, the power of Chanda 
 Saheb, and therefore French power, would be supreme 
 in the Carnatic, and that the French scheme for the
 
 62 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 expulsion of the English would become an accomplished 
 fact, and be brought about by the means they wished. 
 
 To counteract this, Admiral Boscawen strongly ad- 
 vised alliance with Mohammed Ali, who himself had 
 been doing his best to obtain this ; but the Council of 
 Madras shrank from supporting a cause, which seemed 
 so hopeless ; and the Admiral returned with his fleet to 
 Europe. This was the very event for which Chanda 
 Saheb had been waiting. He left Pondichery, where 
 he had been staying, to advance against Trichinopoly ; 
 and, had he gone straight there, there can be little 
 doubt that he would have succeeded in capturing it. 
 He, however, delayed on the way, having turned aside 
 to extract money from the King of Tanjore, and this 
 delay proved fatal; for, in the meantime, the English 
 had learned to appreciate the extreme gravity of the 
 situation, and had decided to assist Mohammed Ali 
 with all their power. 
 
 So the first great opportunity to capture Trichinopoly 
 was lost. There were many subsequent opportunities, 
 which were lost too ; and Trichinopoly, attacked again 
 and again, never was taken. For the greater part of 
 this period, it was the one point on which the event of 
 the struggle depended ; and Mill is certainly wrong in 
 thinking that both sides attached too great an im- 
 portance to this place. In reality, its importance 
 could not be exaggerated; it was all-important. Its 
 capture would necessarily have entailed the capture of 
 Mohammed Ali, the claimant to the office of nawab, 
 whom the English favoured ; and would have thus left
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 63 
 
 the French protege" without a rival. The capture of 
 Trichinopoly, therefore, meant nothing less than French 
 supremacy in the Carnatic ; but, as long as it continued 
 to hold out, so long was it impossible for the French to 
 establish this supremacy on a firm basis, so long did 
 there exist a secure base of operation for their rivals. 
 Both sides saw this most clearly. The difference be- 
 tween them was, that Dupleix, who professed to be no 
 soldier himself, had at hand no generals who were 
 competent to carry out his designs ; while, on the other 
 side, Saunders, the English Governor of Madras, could 
 intrust his plans to great soldiers like Lawrence and 
 Clive, with the certainty that they would be fully 
 carried out. 
 
 Circumstances had, therefore, at length absolutely 
 forced the English into alliance with a native power. 
 Their very existence in India depended on it. Bos- 
 cawen's anticipations were verified, and that at a time, 
 when want of foresight on the part of the Madras 
 Council deprived them of his assistance. Their alliance 
 with Mohammed Ali was a departure, and a necessary 
 departure, from all their previous policy. At first they 
 had refused to take any part in native affairs; next, 
 when the number of their forces in India enabled them 
 to do so without inconvenience, they had, of their own 
 free will, elected to take part in native affairs, if their 
 commercial interests could be promoted thereby: at 
 the stage, at which we have now arrived, they were 
 left without any option on their part, and forced into 
 alliance with Mohammed All, as an absolute necessity
 
 64 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 of the continued existence of a British community in 
 India. So far their policy continued to be strictly 
 defensive : they had not, as yet, like the French, any 
 further idea of gaining for themselves empire in India. 
 By allying themselves with Mohammed Ali, the 
 English had also allied themselves with Nasir Jang, 
 the claimant to the subah of the Dekhan, with whom 
 Mohammed Ali had not unnaturally made common 
 cause. We have then two triple alliances : Mozaffer 
 Jang, Chanda Saheb, and the Trench, on the one side, 
 against ISTasir Jang, Mohammed Ali, and the English, 
 on the other. The most formidable member of this 
 latter alliance was Nasir Jang. The very news of the 
 approach of his vast army had caused a panic among 
 the French allies. Nasir Jang himself was totally 
 given up to every species of luxury, and hated nothing 
 more than the cares and toils of warfare ; and Dupleix, 
 well knowing this, tried by every means to come to 
 terms with him. In this he would perhaps have suc- 
 ceeded, had it not been for a spirit of disaffection, which 
 sprang up among some of the French officers on the 
 very eve of a battle ; and this, acting to demoralise the 
 whole army, made a retreat necessary. This event had 
 consequences more important than a mere retreat of 
 the French contingent. Mozaffer Jang, in despair, 
 decided to trust himself to the clemency of his uncle, 
 Nasir Jang, and surrendered himself on condition that 
 his life should be spared, and that he should be restored 
 to liberty. Chanda Sahe'b, on the contrary, decided to 
 trust still in the French.
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 65 
 
 The claimant for the post of siibahdar, favoured by 
 the English, was therefore now without a rival ; and, as 
 being the supreme lord over the whole of the Dekhan, 
 he might be considered to have the right to nominate 
 Mohammed AH as nawab of its subdivision, the Carnatic. 
 
 The recent retreat of the French had certainly 
 inflicted considerable disaster on their plans ; but 
 Dupleix was too skilful a diplomatist to let the enemy 
 see his weakness. He continued to keep up a corre- 
 spondence about terms with Nasir Jang ; and his 
 demands continued to be not less than they had pre- 
 viously been. The difficulty, which Nasir Jang found 
 in agreeing to the French proposals, was in reference 
 to those which referred to Mozaffer Jang. To have 
 restored him to liberty, and to have placed him again 
 in his old government of Bijapur, would have been to 
 renew the contest. But a few months' more warfare 
 had the effect of making him willing to embrace almost 
 any terms ; and he had already sent to notify this fact 
 to the French, when a counter-plot, which Dupleix had 
 carefully laid, came to a head. This was a plot with 
 the Patan nawabs, who commanded an important por- 
 tion of forces of the siibahdar. These Patans were 
 brave and fierce Afghan soldiers, who, at this period, 
 were very commonly hired to serve in armies of the 
 Mogul Empire. The object of the present plot of 
 Dupleix with them was to make Mozaffer Jang 
 siibahdar. These Patan nawabs now revolted; and, 
 in the revolt, Nasir Jang was shot through the heart. 
 Mozaffer Jang was taken from captivity, and pro-
 
 66 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 claimed siibahdar in his stead. His first act was to 
 write to Pondichery promising to take no steps without 
 French sanction. 
 
 Thus the diplomacy of Dupleix had once more 
 made the French party triumphant. There now re- 
 mained only Mohammed Ali ; and he, terrified by 
 recent events, offered to resign his pretensions to the 
 post of nawab on the fulfilment of certain conditions, 
 which seemed likely to be agreed to by the other side. 
 To crown all, at a grand ceremony held at Pondichery, 
 Mozaffer Jang was installed as siibahdar of the 
 Dekhan, and Dupleix himself was appointed, by the 
 siibahdar, governor over all the country south of the 
 river Kistna as far as Cape Comorin, with other enor- 
 mous advantages both to himself and to the Company. 
 Dupleix, however, requested that, while he himself 
 remained nawab in name, the real sovereignty and 
 emoluments of this large tract of country might belong 
 to Chanda Saheb. We are quite ready to follow 
 Colonel Malleson, when he praises Dupleix for being 
 true to the traditional policy of France on this 
 " tempting and trying occasion." We can also imagine 
 the influence which such an act as the gift of a nawab- 
 ship must have had on the assembled Orientals; but 
 we cannot follow Colonel Malleson in his rhapsody 
 about the extraordinary generosity and self-denial of 
 Dupleix. The events of that day were the outcome 
 of a deeply laid, and patiently elaborated, system of 
 policy ; by himself accepting the office of Governor of 
 the South of India, Dupleix would simply, in one
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 67 
 
 moment, have ruined the work of years. It is quite 
 gratuitous to suppose, that Chanda Saheb would so 
 meekly have given up the one object for which he 
 was striving ; and his force, though not enormous, was 
 still by no means to be despised. The English, above 
 all, would certainly have been more thoroughly aroused 
 than ever to the necessities of the situation, and have 
 lent all their power to aid Mohammed Ali, who, 
 although he had made an offer of surrender on some- 
 what easy terms, had not as yet given in, and did not 
 seem in any great hurry to do so. No ! Dupleix was 
 a far-seeing statesman ; and it was no romantic friend- 
 ship for Chanda Saheb, which made Dupleix give up 
 to him the emoluments of the rule of the South of 
 India. Chanda Saheb probably cared more for these 
 emoluments than for anything else. The actual rule 
 might apparently be his ; but in reality the actual, as 
 well as the nominal, power of nawab was in the hands 
 of M. Dupleix. The time had not yet come, when 
 Dupleix considered that he could safely throw off the 
 mask. When that time did come, we shall see that 
 he was by no means reluctant to do so. He made, 
 indeed, the recognition of himself as nawab the one 
 obstacle to a treaty with the English, by which he 
 might still, in the course of events, have remained an 
 enormous gainer. 
 
 The installation of the new subahdar at Pondichery 
 denoted the supremacy of the French. The lord of mil- 
 lions was really the servant of the French. The gift of 
 the nawabship to Dupleix was nothing but a gift to the
 
 68 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 giver, for it was to Dupleix that Mozaffer Jang owed his 
 subah. When we reflect, that it was from the aid of 
 French arms that Mozaffer Jang's first pretensions de- 
 rived any prospect of success, that the result of a momen- 
 tary distrust in the French on his part had gained for 
 him captivity with his rival and uncle, Nasir Jang, that 
 eventually by French intrigue this rival was slain 
 and he himself taken out of captivity to be made 
 subahdar once more, we cannot fail to see how com- 
 pletely Mozaffer Jang was in the power of the French. 
 Dupleix was one of the most consummate masters of 
 intrigue that ever lived, and prepared himself before- 
 hand for every event, which the future might bring 
 forth. Knowing every little feeling of disaffection 
 among the followers of the subahdar, he knew both 
 how to repress and how to use such to his own ends. 
 Such perfect control had the French over the subahdar, 
 that it is not too much to say, that any divergence on 
 his part from the course mapped out for him by the 
 French, would have entailed his own deposition, and 
 the elevation of some other pretender to his throne. 
 History perhaps cannot show a more perfect instance 
 of the power of diplomacy. The little band of French 
 soldiers, under the great French general, M. Bussy, 
 which accompanied the new subahdar to his capital, 
 G-olconda, was outnumbered by thousands of times by 
 the forces of the subahdar himself ; but, for all that, 
 it was the one controlling power amidst all this vast 
 multitude. Through it French power eventually be- 
 came absolute in the Dekhan, and remained so until
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 69 
 
 quite a late period in the struggle between English and 
 French, when it was given up by the French them- 
 selves. It is not the place here to follow the march 
 of M. Bussy, who was distinctly the greatest French 
 general in India at this period, to Golconda with the 
 subahdar and his forces. What concerns us chiefly, 
 beyond the fact of the establishment of French power 
 on such a vast scale in this part of India, is that, after 
 Mozaffer Jang was slain in another revolt of the Patan 
 nawabs, M. Bussy released from captivity Salabat Jang, 
 a brother of Nasir Jang, and made him subahdar, with 
 the usual result of a fresh and more emphatic con- 
 firmation of all the French powers and privileges. 
 
 All this time, the English held in the Carnatic only 
 Madras, Fort St. David, and De'vicottah ; and their 
 ally, Mohammed All, was on the point of surrendering 
 to the French. He, however, kept adding one stipu- 
 lation after another to the proposals for surrender : and, 
 when these at last obtained the consent of the French, 
 and had been ratified by the subahdar, he changed his 
 mind, broke off the negotiations, and determined to 
 hold out to the last in Trichinopoly. Nothing in the 
 history of the struggle of French and English for 
 supremacy in India can be more important than this 
 decision of Mohammed AIL The extreme gravity of 
 the situation of the English it is impossible to overrate ; 
 although the English at that time do not seem to have 
 fully appreciated it themselves. It does not appear, 
 as would seem to us natural, that they made any great 
 effort to induce Mohammed Ali to hold out in Trichi-
 
 70 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 nopoly. Indeed, it seems that, on the contrary, all the 
 offers came from him, and that it was some considerable 
 time before the English could be persuaded to support 
 him thoroughly. Perhaps it was the experience of their 
 former alliance with him, which made them hesitate 
 now. He had then shown himself headstrong, and 
 unwilling to be governed by any advice. He had 
 refused to recompense the English soldiers for the 
 services they afforded him. He had, moreover, shown 
 the greatest cowardice by headlong flight at the head 
 of a large army before a mere handful of Frenchmen. 
 In addition to these reasons, the state of his power at 
 the present time was scarcely such as to afford much 
 hope of ultimate success. The English may have 
 begun to think, that, in view of such tremendous odds, 
 inaction was perhaps after all their best policy. At 
 length, however, they listened to Mohammed Ah', and 
 despatched forces to aid Trichinopoly. 
 
 After some struggles, the French gained entire pos- 
 session of the country around Trichinopoly, and sub- 
 jected the town itself to a strict blockade, in such a 
 manner, that it must inevitably fall in the course of 
 time. And now comes the great achievement of Olive, 
 which made his name famous at once and for ever 
 the capture and subsequent defence of Arcot. Clive 
 saw that the only hope for Trichinopoly lay in striking 
 a blow in the northern part of the Carnatic, and thus 
 creating a diversion. With the consent of Saunders, 
 the Governor of Madras, he carried this bold plan into 
 execution, and with success. The garrison of Arcot
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 71 
 
 surrendered in a panic, caused, it is said, by seeing the 
 army of Clive calmly marching on the town through 
 a dreadful storm of lightning and thunder. It is by 
 no means improbable that this was actually so. With 
 their superstition and belief in omens, Orientals are 
 influenced by such causes to an extent almost beyond 
 belief by less imaginative Westerns: and several in- 
 stances of similar occurrences might easily be quoted. 
 Although this diversion created by Clive met with 
 considerable success, it failed in producing the full 
 effect intended of drawing away the greater portion 
 of the army, which was besieging Trichinopoly. That 
 the ruse did not completely succeed, is due entirely 
 to Dupleix, who saw through it. Chanda Sabs' b was 
 eager to start off at once, with his whole army, to take 
 vengeance on the army which had thus captured his 
 capital ; and it was with great difficulty that Dupleix 
 dissuaded him. Nevertheless he despatched a large 
 force, under the command of his son, Baja Saheb, to 
 lay siege to Arcot. The story of this siege is perhaps 
 the best known episode in Indian history. The 
 gallantry of Olive's little band of English soldiers 
 and sepoys, in successfully resisting for seven weeks 
 the attacks of an army 10,000 strong, produced an 
 enormous influence on the minds of the natives. It 
 was the immediate means of inducing the Mahrattas, 
 and the Eaja of Mysore, to join the alliance of 
 Mohammed Alt 
 
 After the successful defence of Arcot, a continual 
 war, between the English forces under Clive and the
 
 72 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 forces of Kaja Sahe'b, went on. The English, on the 
 whole, were decidedly victorious. The warfare of this 
 particular period is noticeable chiefly for the attack, 
 which was made directly on British territory. The 
 country up to within a few miles of Fort St. David 
 was laid waste. It was only defeat in one battle, 
 the battle of Kave'ripak, which prevented these forces, 
 French and native, from striking a blow, which, at this 
 time, would most likely have proved successful, at the 
 chief settlements of the English. 
 
 Another event, worthy of mention chiefly because 
 it has lately been misinterpreted, was the destruction 
 by Clive of " Dupleix-Futteh-abad," " the town of the 
 victory of Dupleix," which that statesman was raising 
 to commemorate his triumphs. Colonel Malleson says, 
 "Allowing for the moment his hatred of the great 
 French statesman to stifle his more generous instincts, 
 Clive razed the town to its foundations." But surely 
 all, who know the enormous effect, which display of 
 this description has on the Eastern mind, and how 
 much Dupleix himself had accomplished by means of 
 such display, will rather agree with Macaulay, when 
 he says, " He was induced, we believe, to this step, not 
 by personal or national malevolence, but by a just and 
 profound policy. The town and its pompous name, 
 the pillar and its vaunting inscriptions, were among 
 the devices, by which Dupleix had laid the public 
 mind of India under a spell. This spell it was Clive's 
 business to break. The natives had been taught, that 
 France was confessedly the first power in Europe,
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 73 
 
 and that the English did not presume to dispute her 
 supremacy. No measure could be more effectual for 
 the removing of this delusion than the public and 
 solemn demolition of the French trophies." 
 
 Great preparations had been made at Fort St. David 
 for the relief of Trichinopoly ; and the expedition, 
 when ready, set out under Major Lawrence, with Clive 
 as his second in command. During all this time, Law, 
 the leader of the French forces who were engaged in 
 the operations around Trichinopoly, had been satisfied 
 with merely blockading the place, when a determined 
 siege might have been successful. At all events, much 
 time had been spent to little purpose ; and now Dupleix 
 urged Law to do his best to intercept the English force 
 under Lawrence and Clive. This Law set about doing, 
 at first, with an utterly inadequate force, and, afterwards, 
 with a much larger force, when it was already too late, 
 and the English had been able to make a practical 
 junction with the garrison of Trichinopoly. Now, 
 despairing of ever taking Trichinopoly, Law withdrew 
 with his forces; and, after some battles, he was at 
 length completely shut up in the island of Seringam, 
 which is formed by the two rivers Cauveri and Col- 
 roon. The besieger was thus himself besieged ; and 
 no attempt on the part of the French from Pondichery 
 availed to rescue him. Eventually Law, with the 
 whole French force, surrendered ; and, at the same time, 
 Chanda Saheb too surrendered himself to the keeping 
 of the Tanjorean general, who acted as the ally of 
 Mohammed Ali. The Tanjorean general, after solemnly
 
 74 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 swearing to protect the life of Chanda Sahe'b, first 
 loaded him with chains, and next, probably at the 
 instigation of Mohammed Ali, stabbed him. 
 
 By the successful resistance of Trichinopoly, and by 
 the successful military operations of the English and 
 their allies, the aspect of affairs in the Carnatic was 
 completely changed once more. The French, before 
 the siege, had been all-powerful. Now the claimant, 
 whose cause they had advanced, was no more; and 
 they themselves, after suffering defeat after defeat, 
 were at last most seriously weakened by the capture 
 of a great portion of their army by the enemy. 
 
 The blame of all this lies with the leaders of the 
 French forces at this time. They had not one really 
 first-class leader except Bussy, who was at the court 
 of the siibahdar, while the English had at least two, 
 Lawrence and Clive. The French had at their head in 
 India one of the most far-seeing statesmen, and one of 
 the most skilful diplomatists, that ever lived, but he 
 did not combine, like Clive, the qualities which make 
 a good soldier with these. He could plan operations 
 to every little detail required for their accomplishment ; 
 but the performance of his plans he was obliged to 
 leave to his officers. Had there been another Bussy 
 to conduct the siege of Trichinopoly, it must, in all 
 probability, have fallen ; at all events, after the siege 
 had been given up, the English would never have had 
 the chance of capturing the whole French force blocked 
 up in the island of Seringam. It is quite conceivable 
 that, under different management, this portion of the
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 75 
 
 war might have had an entirely different termina- 
 tion. 
 
 The result of the siege of Trichinopoly was of the 
 utmost importance to the English. While Trichinopoly 
 alone remained in the hands of Mohammed AH, their 
 right to interfere, as his partisans, depended on it 
 alone; but, now that the siege was raised, and its 
 successful defence had been followed up by victory 
 after victory; now that the nawab favoured by the 
 French was dead, and their own nawab was, for the 
 time, without a rival, they were in no want of a pretext 
 to justify their interference in native affairs, had such 
 been their object ; and they might, moreover, have so 
 interfered as to secure much ultimate advantage to 
 themselves. Theoretically, they were not at war with 
 the French; and this at least must be said for the 
 English that they really did their best to observe this 
 theoretical aspect of affairs. The English troops were 
 forbidden by the strongest commands to advance, in 
 any case, on Pondichery itself; and this they never 
 attempted to do, although, at times during the struggle, 
 it was left almost without defence. The French, on 
 the other hand, had no scruples on this point. The 
 two nations, they argued, were practically at war with 
 each other ; and Dupleix did not scruple, as we have 
 seen, to order Eaja Sahe'b to create a diversion by 
 ravaging English territory. After this time, moreover, 
 he did not scruple to capture some Swiss mercenaries 
 of the English on the seas, or to order his nephew, M. 
 Kerjean, to attack Fort St. David itself. The English
 
 76 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 were, therefore, to a great extent hampered in their 
 movements ; while the French were unrestrained. The 
 explanation of this is, of course, that the French con- 
 sidered themselves in fact lords of the Carnatic : they 
 distinctly regarded their native allies as auxiliaries, not 
 themselves as the auxiliaries of a native power. The 
 English, on the contrary, always most scrupulously 
 maintained the position of mere auxiliaries. They 
 supported one native prince rather than another, be- 
 cause, as tenants under him, they imagined that they 
 might continue their pursuits in safety; while their 
 position under the French, or, what amounted to the 
 same thing, under a naw&b favoured by the French, 
 would be simply unendurable. 
 
 In referring to the state of affairs after the siege of 
 Trichinopoly, and the surrender of Law, Orme says, 
 that the French " would have been compelled to cease 
 hostilities . . . had not M. Dupleix been endowed (and 
 this at least is much to his honour) with a perseverance 
 that even superseded his regard to his own fortune, of 
 which he had at that time disbursed 140,000, and he 
 continued with the same spirit to furnish more." This 
 remarkable perseverance, the outcome of boundless 
 ambition, to some extent perhaps personal as well as 
 patriotic (and we cannot deny that his pure patriot- 
 ism, apart entirely from any selfish interest, was very 
 great indeed) had the effect of entirely reopening the 
 struggle. 
 
 The allies of Mohammed Ali, in addition to the 
 English, had been the rajas of Tanjore and Mysore,
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 77 
 
 and the Mahratta general, Morari Rao. The first of 
 these was tired of a contest, which brought little gain ; 
 and the other two were soon brought over to the alle- 
 giance of the French, partly by the intrigues of Dupleix, 
 who promised to assist them, partly by the refusal of 
 the English to assume an independent position, and 
 their persistency in regarding everything by the light 
 of the interests of Mohammed AH. In a weak moment, 
 Mohammed All had bought the assistance of the My- 
 soreans by promising, without the remotest intention 
 of ever fulfilling his promise, to hand over the town of 
 Trichinopoly to them, if it should successfully resist 
 the siege. The Mysoreans now demanded the fulfil- 
 ment of this promise ; and, in this demand, they were 
 backed up by the Mahrattas, who hoped so to manage 
 affairs between the two, that Trichinopoly, which had, 
 at one time, been a Mahratta possession, should again 
 belong to them. The result was another siege, this 
 time by the Mysoreans. Had the English taken an 
 independent course, and carried matters with a high 
 hand, in this dispute, the siege would have been pre- 
 vented, and the war finished. The great Lawrence, 
 among others, advised the adoption of such a course, 
 and suggested that, while the persons of the Mysorean 
 and Mahratta chiefs were seized, Mohammed Ali should 
 be made to keep his word and hand over Trichinopoly. 
 Mill puts the case with his usual clearness. "It is 
 worthy of remark," he says, " that the delicacy of the 
 Presidency withheld their hands from the persons of 
 the hostile chiefs, but easily endured the violation of
 
 78 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 
 
 the engagement respecting Trichinopoly. Delicacy 
 would have been less violated in the one instance by 
 following the advice of Lawrence, and prudence would 
 have been consulted by following it in both." But 
 such a course would have been a departure from the 
 policy, which they had hitherto followed; and, by 
 refusing to adopt it, the English showed how far they 
 were distant, even yet, from that position, in relation 
 to the native powers, which the French had occupied 
 for a long time past. 
 
 The success of the intrigues of M. Dupleix, his in- 
 defatigable exertions in raising troops with his own 
 fortune, and the opportune arrival of troops from 
 France, placed the French once more in a position to 
 contest the advantages recently gained by Mohammed 
 Ali and his allies. Added to this, a firman arrived 
 from the present siibahdar of the Dekhan, Salabat 
 Jang, appointing M. Dupleix himself nawab of the 
 Carnatic, in place of Chanda Sahe'b deceased. M. 
 Dupleix was once more "generous," and appointed 
 Eaja Sahe'b to hold that office ; but, finding him utterly 
 worthless, he deposed him and placed in his stead, 
 Mortiz All, the son-in-law of Dost Ali on considera- 
 tion of his advancing considerable sums of money " for 
 the good of the cause." 
 
 An expedition against Fort St. David, under Kerjean, 
 the nephew of Dupleix, was not successful ; and had the 
 effect, for a time, of making the Mahrattas join the 
 English alliance, and delaying the siege of Trichinopoly 
 by the Mysoreans a good instance of the conduct of
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 79 
 
 native allies. This lasted, however, but a very short 
 time. Very few weeks passed before the Mahrattas had 
 changed sides once more, and the Mysoreans undertook 
 the siege of Trichinopoly. Both sides exerted them- 
 selves to the utmost, until a truce was made, which 
 was the prelude to the peace of January 1755. 
 
 This truce came about chiefly through the negotia- 
 tions of the companies at home. For some years past, 
 complaints had been sent by Mr. Saunders to the 
 Directors of the East India Company in London of 
 the policy Dupleix was pursuing. They pointed out 
 the impossibility of a lasting peace in India so long 
 as such a policy continued to be carried out; and 
 negotiations on this point had taken place not only 
 between the French and English Companies, but also 
 between the French and English Ministers. Among 
 the Directors of the French Company were found a 
 good number, and eventually a majority, who were 
 willing to listen to the complaints of the English. 
 The French had hoped for great things from Dupleix, 
 and, above all else, for a great accession of wealth to 
 the Company. As long as they saw any prospect of 
 this, they aided him ; and the French Government 
 showed its appreciation of Dupleix by making him a 
 Marquis. They were looking, however, in their com- 
 plete ignorance of the magnitude of his designs, for 
 more speedy success. They became impatient ; and at 
 length decided to abandon all such designs, and make 
 an effort to return to a purely commercial status, 
 uninterrupted by any further interference in native
 
 8o SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 affairs. Dupleix himself had made proposal after pro- 
 posal to the English for peace, and had even offered 
 them most important concessions ; but all these pro- 
 posals of Dupleix embraced the recognition of himself 
 as nawab of the Carnatic, and therefore the abnegation 
 of the one point the English had been fighting for 
 the supremacy of Mohammed All 
 
 It was decided in Europe, that commissaries should 
 proceed to India to arrange a peace there, the terms of 
 the peace to be ratified or altered subsequently by the 
 authorities in Europe. Such was the state of feeling 
 in France with respect to Dupleix, at this time, that, 
 when the English agitated for his recall, it was agreed 
 to without much difficulty. An agreement was how- 
 ever made, at the same time, that Saunders should 
 likewise be recalled ; but, for some reason or other, 
 this last agreement was never carried out. Thus, 
 throughout the negotiations, the English possessed the 
 enormous advantage of having a man to act for them, 
 who was not only cognisant of affairs in India, but ready 
 to take advantage of every opportunity afforded him ; 
 while M. Godeheu, the representative of the French, 
 had taken no part in recent events in India, and was 
 besides essentially a weak man, ready to compromise 
 everything. 
 
 A truce was made in October 1754, to last for three 
 months. During this period, all military operations 
 on the part of Europeans in India should cease, there 
 should be an ad valorem exchange of prisoners, and 
 deputies should meet at Pondichery to discuss the
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 81 
 
 terms of a peace. These terms were agreed to on 
 both sides in January 1755, and were provisional 
 only, until a ratification of them should arrive from 
 Europe. The chief terms of this peace were :- that 
 both the European nations should cease for ever from 
 taking any part in the disputes of native powers, or 
 from holding any native dignity ; and that the pos- 
 sessions of both in India should be arranged on a 
 principle of equalisation. 
 
 Much has been written about this Peace of Pondi- 
 chery ; but much misconception on the subject might 
 be avoided, were it borne in mind, that, like the terms 
 of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which related to 
 India, it was confessedly an attempt to place the two 
 European communities "in statu quo ante lellum;" 
 and that this attempt was a deliberate one on the part 
 of the two companies, and sanctioned by the two 
 governments. It was an attempt to do that, which 
 the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had failed to do, by its 
 inability to entertain the question of native alliance. 
 The struggle, which the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was 
 called upon to decide, was a European struggle, and 
 the articles in it relating to India had reference only 
 to that relatively insignificant portion of the struggle, 
 which had spread to India. It regarded the English 
 and French in India in reference only to the mother 
 countries ; and had no reference to their relation with 
 native powers, whether regarded as allies or as subject 
 powers. It had of necessity omitted to deal with the 
 
 one cause, which, while it lasted, must for ever prevent 
 
 F
 
 82 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 a lasting peace between the settlers French aspira- 
 tions to found an empire in India, through the medium 
 of alliance with native powers. The remedy of this 
 omission was the main object of the treaty of Pondi- 
 chery. Its very first article deals with it. It laid 
 down emphatically, that the two companies should 
 " renounce for ever all Mogul dignities and govern- 
 ments, and should never interfere in the differences 
 that might arise among the princes of the country." 
 The treaty of Pondichery was an attempt to make 
 peace by doing away once for all with what had proved 
 the cause of war for the last six years. That the 
 treaty, by its very nature, entailed a vastly greater 
 sacrifice on the French than on the English, there can 
 be no doubt whatever. It simply took away, at one 
 blow, all that they had been striving for, the one object 
 to the attainment of which every action of theirs had 
 been directed. Colonel Malleson complains that by 
 the treaty the English gained all they had fought for. 
 Of course they did; but they had not fought for so 
 much as the French. Nobody would dream of attempt- 
 ing to bring forward a particle of evidence to show, 
 that Governor Morse or Governor Saunders ever aspired 
 to power in the Carnatic by means of Mohammed All. 
 Every act of theirs directly contradicts such a supposi- 
 tion. The one object for which they had fought was 
 the supremacy of Mohammed Ali ; and, now that the 
 French had agreed to waive their own pretensions to 
 the post of nawab, who remained nawab if not Moham- 
 med AH ? Certainly not Mortiz All, whom Dupleix
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 83 
 
 had chosen to share the " emoluments," while he him- 
 self held the actual rule. 
 
 The real grievance in the treaty was the proposal to 
 arrange the possessions of the two communities on the 
 principle of equality. This was quite unnecessary, and 
 proved one of the chief means to defeat the end of the 
 treaty. The French lost too much by this article to 
 bear it patiently. All French governors would not be 
 possessed with the desire to purchase peace at any 
 price whatever, which seems to have principally ruled 
 their commissary, M. Godeheu. 
 
 Until the ratification of this treaty came from Europe, 
 each side was to remain "in statu quo." It is to be 
 noticed, therefore, that so far the position of the French 
 at the court of the subahdar remained unaltered. Had 
 M. Bussy been suddenly withdrawn at this time, the 
 result must have been most disastrous. The French 
 power alone at the court of the subahdar prevented a 
 general conflagration. 
 
 The treaty of Pondichery, and the recall to France 
 of M. Dupleix, who was doomed to suffer not only 
 disappointment but insult, from the masters he had 
 attempted to serve only too well, mark the end of the 
 second period of our history a period, which is in 
 most respects by far the most important, and the most 
 interesting of the three. It marks the almost complete 
 success, followed by the complete discomfiture, of the 
 designs, which the French had persistently attempted 
 to carry out for so many years. On the other hand, it 
 marks a distinct growth in the policy of the English.
 
 84 SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 We have already summed up various successive stages, 
 through which this policy with relation to the native 
 powers had already passed. The last stage of all, which 
 was yet to come, was when, like the French, they came 
 to look upon alliance with a native power only as a 
 means to an end their own political power in India.
 
 CHAPTER VL 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 Reasons for the failure of the Treaty of Pondichery Events in Bengal 
 Destruction of French power there Outbreak of the Seven Years' 
 War French armament under Count Lally English, in the Car- 
 natic, reduced to the possession of Madras Attack of Colonel Forde 
 on the Northern Circars Colonel Eyre Coote Defeat of French at 
 Wandewash Fall of Pondichery Contrast of third with previous 
 periods Comparison of English and French resources in India The 
 chief causes of French failure due to France. 
 
 THE Treaty of Pondichery was doomed to failure ; and 
 perhaps, in the complicated circumstances of the 
 period, it would have been impossible even for a treaty, 
 whose terms were framed by men possessing the most 
 complete insight into Indian politics, and influenced 
 by the most sincere desire . to be just, to have suc- 
 ceeded. The challenge to the contest for superiority, 
 thrown down years before by the French, was at 
 length being accepted in reality, and its issue was be- 
 coming more and more appreciated by the English 
 as the days went on. Both parties in India had 
 committed themselves so far, that it was scarcely any 
 longer in their power to draw back ; and the surround- 
 ing circumstances were such as to strongly tempt them 
 from time to time to a renewal of the contest. A
 
 86 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 lasting peace could be made only by the home 
 governments; and by these only if possessing certain 
 requisites and influenced by certain desires. To enable 
 them to dictate to their settlers in India such a peace 
 as should be lasting, the home governments must 
 possess, first of all, the absolute control over their sub- 
 jects, so as to prevent their using to their own advan- 
 tage the numberless tempting opportunities to inter- 
 fere in native affairs ; and secondly, each government 
 must be influenced by the desire to promote the real 
 welfare of its subjects by such a peace, so that the 
 subjects of neither may feel themselves deeply wronged, 
 and cherish the idea of winning back, at some future 
 opportunity, by war the rights, of which they have 
 been deprived by peace. No treaty, such as the 
 treaty of Pondichery, by which the one side gains 
 everything, and the other side loses everything, can 
 ever hold for a great length of time, unless the gaining 
 side possesses power sufficient to keep the losers in 
 absolute subjection. In the present instance, the 
 Trench commissioners, who took part in drawing up 
 the terms of the treaty, and the French settlers, who 
 were to be bound by the treaty, were entirely out of 
 sympathy. The latter were filled with ambition ; they 
 were encouraged by the most remarkable success ; and 
 they were looking forward with hope to the establish- 
 ment, in the not far distant future, of a mighty Trench 
 power in India. Dupleix could make and unmake 
 princes ; the Carnatic was his province, over which he 
 exercised the sway of a despot ; and with the subahdar
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 87 
 
 of the Dekhan French power was complete. All this 
 the French commissioners determined to undo. The 
 plan was not one dictated by ignorance; it was de- 
 liberate, and part of a definitely formed policy. Let 
 us pause for one moment to consider what this meant. 
 It meant, first of all, that the French East India Com- 
 pany, as a body, considered the immediate question of 
 silk, spices, and pepper, of such importance, that, in 
 comparison with it, the sacrifice of the political life of 
 their settlers in India was a mere trifle; it meant, 
 moreover, that the French Government in Europe was 
 bent before all things on conciliating England, and, for 
 the sake of peace in Europe, was willing to sacrifice 
 all that its subjects had fought and intrigued for in 
 India. The possibility or impossibility of a lasting 
 peace in such circumstances depends upon the answer 
 to the question Would the settlers be ready to suffer 
 this sacrifice of themselves ? Self-sacrifice is above 
 the average virtue of humanity ; yet, as in the case of 
 individuals, " peradventure for a good man some would 
 even dare to die," so, in the case of states, there have 
 been instances, where some, rising above common 
 patriotism, have suffered much in patience, if thereby 
 the welfare of a mother-country might be secured. 
 But there could be no such bond between the govern- 
 ment of Louis XV. and the French community in 
 India. It has been truly said that, at this period, 
 France was disgraced at home and all the world over 
 except in India ; and there could be little in common 
 between the constant zeal of the Indian settlers for
 
 8 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 the cause of French power, and the usual indifference, 
 interrupted only by fits of insensate hostility towards 
 England, of the French government. The settlers had 
 little to be grateful for. In the moments of their greatest 
 danger, they had actually been deprived of the sources 
 to which they looked for succour ; and now, when they 
 may be said to have stood almost on the brink of 
 success, the command had come from home, that they 
 should go no farther; nay more that they should 
 retrace their steps. Is it a matter for wonder, that 
 future French governors should have felt little inclined 
 to render implicit obedience ? 
 
 In framing the treaty, the English, guided by the 
 astute Saunders, had availed themselves to the full of 
 every concession, which their rivals could be induced 
 to make; and it seems almost as if the English had 
 been emboldened by their success on this occasion to 
 make an attempt to overreach the French still further 
 by infringing the treaty. Strangely enough the treaty 
 of Pondichery marks the period at which the English 
 enter on a distinct policy of aggression. The fact is 
 however beyond dispute; and Olive, in one of his 
 letters a very short time after this, confesses as much. 
 The first move of the English was to join their forces 
 to those of Mohammed Ali, in direct contravention of 
 the treaty, for the purpose of subduing some of the 
 minor semi-independent powers. For this they certainly 
 put forward the pretext, that they were only assisting 
 in the collection of rent. This was, of course, no real 
 excuse at all. The terms of the treaty on this point
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF TOE WAR. 89 
 
 were as definite as possible. The Trench protested 
 against this infraction of the treaty ; but, finding all 
 their protests vain, they after a time set about violating 
 the treaty themselves in a similar manner. 
 
 In another quarter, the designs of the English did not 
 admit even of such an excuse as they put forward to 
 justify the aid they gave to Mohammed All. They 
 meditated an attack, with the aid of the Mahrattas, on 
 French power in the Dekhan. This plan received the 
 sanction of the authorities at home, and a force was 
 sent to Bombay for the purpose of putting it into opera- 
 tion. The Bombay government, however, refused to 
 entertain the project, on its own responsibility, as being 
 a flagrant breach of the treaty of Pondichery. Advice 
 was therefore asked of the English authorities at Madras. 
 These had no longer any such scruples ; and the English 
 would have proceeded to make their projected attack 
 on Trench power in the Dekhan, either from Bombay 
 or from some other quarter, had not events in Bengal 
 diverted their attention. 
 
 The subahdar of Bengal, Suraj-ud-Dowlah, had cap- 
 tured the English settlement at Calcutta; and all its 
 inhabitants, who had not been taken prisoners, had 
 fled. The terrible incident of the Black Hole of Cal- 
 cutta followed; and, to take vengeance on this, the 
 English decided to send all their available forces into 
 Bengal. 
 
 In the history of the growth of British power in 
 India, the events, which now followed, are of the utmost 
 importance. They found their consummation in the
 
 9 o THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 battle of Plassey, from which the origin of our Empire 
 in India is usually dated. For our subject, however, 
 which is strictly an account of the relations between 
 the English and the French in India, it will be neces- 
 sary only to mention the results obtained by the war in 
 Bengal, and it will not be necessary to do more than 
 merely indicate the means by which these results were 
 obtained. The episode lies, for the most part, outside 
 the actual struggle between the English and the French. 
 It was, first of all, a struggle between the English and 
 the ruling native power. It is true that, in the course 
 of this struggle, the French power in Bengal, which was 
 never of great importance, was utterly swept away ; but 
 the destruction of the French power was not the prim- 
 ary object of the English attack. It was little more 
 than a means to the chief end. With regard to the 
 difference, which the events of this war made in the 
 relations of English and French in India to each other, 
 the chief interest lies in the fact that after the defeat 
 of the subahdar, Suraj-ud-Dowlah, the English nomi- 
 nated and set up in his place a siibahdar of their own ; 
 and, as was inevitable, the supremacy of this subahdar 
 was equivalent to the supremacy of the English, just as 
 we have seen that, in the Dekhan, the supremacy of 
 Salabat Jang was equivalent to French supremacy. 
 This fact is most important. It marks the stage, 
 beyond which it will be unnecessary for us to trace 
 the growth of English policy in India. After this time 
 we recognise the English as having attained to that 
 position in Bengal, which the French had gained in the
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 91 
 
 Dekhan, and from which they were to be removed by 
 the action of the controlling powers in Europe. After 
 having once gained the position, the English were not 
 displaced in a similar manner. Starting from Bengal, 
 the growth of their power, although threatened again 
 and again, and, in some instances, retarded for a period 
 of years, was never wholly interrupted until it had 
 filled the whole of India. This growth began imme- 
 diately after the battle of Plassey, and the progress of 
 British power in India, during the twenty years follow- 
 ing, was very great. We shall have to bear this fact 
 constantly in mind, when we come to discuss an 
 attempt made by the French to reopen the question 
 of supremacy with the English, some twenty years 
 after the destruction of French power in India by the 
 capture of Pondichery in 1761. 
 
 We have seen that, in the Carnatic, English and 
 French first came into collision directly, as represen- 
 tatives of the two European powers then at war in 
 Europe ; and that subsequently their struggle, though 
 indirect, was conducted on the definite plan of oppo- 
 sition to each other. In Bengal their contest was 
 more of an accident. After the recapture of Calcutta, 
 and the defeat of Suraj-ud-Dowlah, by the English, 
 the news reached India of the outbreak of the Seven 
 Years' War between the French and English in Europe. 
 This made the position of the English in Bengal a most 
 critical one. The defeat at present inflicted on Suraj- 
 ud-Dowlah had done little or nothing to impair his 
 power; and the combined forces of Suraj-ud-Dowlah
 
 92 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 and of the French would certainly, at this period, prove 
 more than sufficient to crush the English in Bengal. 
 The English under Clive, therefore, made a peace with 
 Suraj-ud-Dowlah ; and, acknowledging his position as 
 supreme ruler over both French and English posses- 
 sions in Bengal, they tried by every means to obtain 
 his permission to attack the French. The siibahdar 
 no doubt was suspicious that this attack would prove 
 but the prelude to a renewed and more vigorous attack 
 on himself, and, at first, definitely refused to give this 
 permission. His subsequent answers to the same 
 request were vague and undetermined ; and at length 
 the English, afraid of the consequences of longer 
 delay, tortured one of these ambiguous answers into 
 an expression of consent. They thereupon attacked 
 the chief French settlement Chandernagor, and by its 
 capture French power in Bengal was destroyed. Cir- 
 cumstances had prevented Bussy from marching from 
 the Dekhan to its assistance. A very short time after 
 this, at the battle of Plassey, we read of a gallant little 
 band of Frenchmen, who had taken service with Suraj- 
 ud-Dowlah, and who formed the only portion of that 
 vast multitude, which did not fly in confusion before 
 the attack of Clive. Frenchmen in Bengal might still 
 join the siibahdar in his opposition to the English, but 
 French power, properly so called, was no more. 
 
 To return to the Carnatic. It has been mentioned 
 above that the treaty of Pondichery was only provi- 
 sional until its terms should be ratified in Europe. It 
 has also been mentioned that the performance of these
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 93 
 
 terms would necessitate an enormous sacrifice on the 
 part of the French community in India. In M. Gode- 
 heu, the French government and the French company 
 had found a servant most ready to carry out to the full 
 their policy of concession to the English. After the 
 return of Godeheu to Europe, however, there came out 
 to India, as French governor, M. de Leyrit, who was by 
 no means so eager to carry on this policy. With the 
 English openly disregarding the treaty, he determined 
 that the sacrifice, which the treaty demanded of French 
 interests, was impossible. The matter then stood thus. 
 If the treaty were not ratified in Europe, war would go 
 on again in India as a matter of course ; and, if it were 
 ratified, M. de Leyrit determined to make the flagrant 
 breaches of the treaty on the part of the English the 
 pretext for a declaration of war. A renewal of the war 
 was therefore certain in any case. Only the news of 
 the ratification or non-ratification of this injudicious 
 treaty was waited for. 
 
 The news of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War 
 in Europe dispelled all uncertainty; and the English 
 and French settlers settled down to war in earnest once 
 more. The events from this time until the capture of 
 Pondichery by the English in 1761 form what we have 
 called The Third Period of the Struggle. This third 
 period is simpler in character than either of the other 
 two ; and it will be unnecessary, therefore, to follow its 
 events with the same detail as was necessary in the 
 first, and, still more so, in the second period of the war. 
 During the first two periods, the English and French in
 
 94 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 India fought, so to speak, on different levels, and much 
 complexity was introduced into the contest by the 
 diplomatic skill, which the French knew, and which 
 the English did not know, how to employ. At the 
 present time the rivals stood on an equality with each 
 other; and, with Dupleix, the French lost that power, 
 which had saved them at times, when destruction 
 seemed certain, and which had, in certain instances, 
 availed to turn their very defeats into what might 
 almost be called victories. The third period was essen- 
 tially a struggle between the two European commu- 
 nities undisturbed by any preponderating influence 
 derived from native alliance on one side or the other. 
 Throughout the period the Europeans were indeed 
 strengthened by native allies, but these formed no im- 
 portant part of the struggle, and can scarcely be said to 
 have determined its issue in any way. 
 
 With a view to striking a severe blow at England, 
 the French Government had decided to make a tremen- 
 dous effort towards driving the English out of India 
 altogether. With this object they prepared an arma- 
 ment such as had never before been seen in India; 
 and, at its head, they placed Count Lally, a brave 
 soldier, but little fitted to conduct such an expedition, 
 by reason of .his hasty temper, and his utter ignorance 
 of both European and native affairs in India. He went 
 out from France, impressed more than anything else 
 with the idea that pillaging and pilfering were univer- 
 sal among the servants of the French Company in 
 India. He, therefore, took upon himself, first of all, to
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 95 
 
 effect a thorough reform, in this respect, at Pondichery. 
 This was to some extent, no doubt, necessary ; but it 
 might have been done, both at a more convenient 
 season, and in a gentler manner. As it was, the effects 
 of this start were seen all through the remainder of the 
 war. Discontent and dissatisfaction gave rise to deser- 
 tion of troops and sometimes to open revolt. This state 
 of things universally prevailed and lasted until the end 
 of the war ; and there can be little doubt, that, of all 
 the causes, which assisted to bring about the ultimate 
 failure of Lally and his enormous force, this was the 
 chief. In such a case, insubordination so prevalent 
 must prove fatal. The treatment, which Lally be- 
 stowed on the natives, also provoked their hatred. He 
 had actually plundered one of their most venerated 
 temples, and committed the crime of crimes by blowing 
 away six Brahmans from guns. .The commissariat 
 department of the French army, during the whole of 
 this period, was also another frequent cause of deser- 
 tion. The troops were for the greater part of the time 
 half starved. Altogether it would seem as if this expe- 
 dition were one of the most ill-organised and ill-fated 
 on record. The English, on the contrary, suffered from 
 no such disadvantages. The generals, to whom they 
 had been accustomed for years, still continued to lead 
 them, and their power continued to be reinforced by 
 liberal supplies of troops and arms from home. 
 
 Still, with everything against him, the proceeding 
 of Lally was, for a time, like a triumphal procession. 
 Fort St. David fell, and province after province became
 
 96 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 the property of the French. The English were quite 
 reduced to the possession of Madras ; and, had the 
 French succeeded in their attack on this place, English 
 power in the Carnatic would have been a thing of the 
 past. The English forces were, however, concentrated 
 here ; and the conduct of the siege by the French was, 
 for various reasons, feeble. 
 
 All this time Clive remained in Bengal. The state 
 of that province was as yet too unsettled to allow of 
 his leaving. He, however, created a diversion by send- 
 ing one of his best generals, Colonel Forde, to attack 
 the French possessions in the Northern Circars. This 
 diversion, in the end, proved itself a grand success. 
 Forde made a midnight attack upon Masulipatam, 
 which fell, and with it 3000 Frenchmen as prisoners 
 of war. Such an event had the usual effect on the 
 native allies. On his arrival at Pondichery, Count 
 Lally had thought fit to withdraw Bussy from the 
 court of the siibahdar of the Dekhan ; and now the 
 subahdar, Salabat Jang, deserting the conquered for the 
 victorious, came forward and made an agreement with 
 Forde to expel the French altogether from the Dekhan, 
 and to grant certain districts, which had been in the 
 possession of the French, to the English. 
 
 On October 27, 1759, Colonel Eyre Coote landed at 
 Madras with a royal regiment of infantry, and strong 
 reinforcements of soldiers in the service of the Com- 
 pany. This was the force which decided the doubtful 
 struggle. Early in the year 1760, occurred the great 
 battle of "Wandewash, in comparison with which,
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 97 
 
 all the previous battles in India appear insignifi- 
 cant, from the fact that so great a number of 
 Europeans on each side here met in conflict. The 
 result was a complete English victory ; and after this 
 the end was never doubtful. Nothing short of a miracle 
 could ever raise French power again to the position it 
 had once held. After this, the war was carried on from 
 point to point with success .on the side of the English, 
 until at last the French were shut up in Pondichery, 
 which surrendered on January 16, 1761, there being at 
 that time only provisions left for two days. 
 
 Regarded as a history of military exploit, this third 
 period is perhaps the most interesting of all. The 
 number of European soldiers in India was greater than 
 it had ever been before ; and the sepoys had been 
 brought to a greater state of efficiency than ever. But, 
 from other points of view, it is not so interesting. It 
 is simply, like most other struggles, a contest depending 
 almost entirely on force, and on what we may call, for 
 want of a better term, the fortune of war ; whereas the 
 great triumphs of the struggle before this period had 
 been brought about by other means. 
 
 On looking back at the whole course of the struggle 
 between England and France in India, we cannot fail 
 to remark, that, while in most respects, the powers, 
 which the two nations could bring into the contest, 
 were not dissimilar in point of strength, there was one 
 weapon, which, for the greater part of the struggle, the 
 French used with great effect, and which the English 
 were, from the nature of the case, precluded from using
 
 98 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR, 
 
 at alL This was the knowledge of all the arcana of 
 native politics, which brought to its possessors the 
 power of pitting one native prince against another to 
 their own advantage. Even had the English acquired 
 this knowledge, the putting of it into practice could 
 only have been brought about by a determination to 
 gain political and territorial power for themselves, as 
 the French had determined. Such diplomacy could in 
 fact have no other object. As it was, the French and 
 English, for a long time, fought from entirely different 
 standpoints, and consequently the struggle was a most 
 unequal one. They fought not only with entirely 
 different objects ; but this distinction of objects brought 
 into play a most powerful weapon, on one side, which 
 the other side could not, in the nature of things, 
 effectively employ. The object of the French (to re- 
 peat what has been expressed more than once before) 
 was the supremacy of themselves, brought about by 
 taking advantage of the weakness, which was produced 
 by native discords : the object of the English was 
 simply their own safety, and alliance with a native 
 power as a means to this. The object of the French 
 was certainly the more heroic, in the usual sense of the 
 term. It is, however, nothing less than absurd to raise 
 them on the lofty pinnacle, which Colonel Malleson 
 and other recent writers have prepared for them. 
 Colonel Malleson is continually calling the attention of 
 his readers to the preternatural dulness of some of the 
 English governors, and takes every opportunity to hold 
 up to scorn Governor Morse, and Governor Floyer, and
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 99 
 
 the rest, who failed to profit by the brilliant example 
 afforded them by the governors on the other side, M. 
 Dumas and M. Dupleix. One would almost think from 
 Colonel Malleson's works that dulness and stupidity 
 were the inevitable characteristics of an English gover- 
 nor of Madras. But be it remembered that they acted in 
 accordance with the directions of the controlling power 
 at home, and with the advice of the members of their 
 Council in India, and that their actions were, for the 
 most part, strictly in accordance with the predominating 
 opinion of the English in India. It is surely no sign of 
 dulness (if we regard the matter from any other point of 
 view than a soldier's, and there are other points of view 
 from which such matters may be judged) that the English 
 did not engage of their own free will, as did the French, 
 in the struggle for empire. Their dulness, if such it 
 was, did not, at any rate, prevent them from seeing 
 that empire in India was the distinct object of the 
 intrigues of Dupleix with native princes ; and many 
 were the complaints, which they sent home, of this 
 man, who was doing his best, in this way, to make a 
 lasting peace in India impossible. When the English 
 entered on the last stage of their policy, and devoted 
 themselves to the attainment of power in India, there 
 were not wanting skilful governors and able warriors, 
 who proved the equals of Dupleix, Bussy, and Lally ; but 
 it is only fair to say, that the vast empire, which these 
 Englishmen and their successors have raised up, has 
 been raised by precisely the means, which the French 
 were the first to discover.
 
 zoo THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 But, it might be asked, if the French in India had, 
 during the struggle, a power of their own generally 
 equal and sometimes superior to that possessed by the 
 English, if, moreover, they had on their side this won- 
 derful weapon of diplomacy, which, in its application, 
 proved so much more powerful than mere force, what 
 were the causes, which produced at the last their 
 downfall and our success ? It was certainly not any 
 great excess, on the side of the English, of personal 
 courage or military skill. Certainly we find, on the 
 English side, great men like Lawrence, Clive, Forde, 
 Coote, and Sannders ; and their names will always be 
 honoured by Englishmen ; for, had it not been for men 
 like these, every English settlement in India would 
 many a time have been destroyed, and every English- 
 man expelled. But, much as we owe to such men, it 
 is impossible to conceal the fact that, to a very great 
 extent indeed, the success of the English was due to 
 the misfortunes of the French. The foes of the French 
 were, in very truth, those of their own household : 
 they were the French government and the Directors 
 of the French East India Company. After all, these 
 were, no doubt unconsciously, our greatest allies ; and 
 to them alone the English owed their rescue from 
 perils, from which it is impossible to imagine any 
 other mode of escape. Was every English place on 
 the Coromandel Coast, with the exception of Fort St. 
 David, in the hands of the French? the French 
 government agreed to the terms of the treaty of Aix- 
 la-Chapelle, which directed that a mutual restitution
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 101 
 
 of all persons and places taken in the war should be 
 made. Was French influence in India so great, that 
 one Frenchman guided the counsels of subahdars and 
 nawabs, and even influenced those of the Great Mogul 
 himself? the French Company, sighing because of a 
 diminished revenue, and the French government, ab- 
 jectly cringing before the wrath of England, were ready 
 to give up all their influence, and to recall and treat 
 with contumely the Great Governor, who had spent 
 life and wealth for the glory of France. Against odds 
 like these not even a Dupleix, a Bussy, or a Lally, 
 could succeed. Such was the chief, and in all proba- 
 bility the sole, cause of the failure of the French in 
 India. They had conceived a project too vast for the 
 comprehension of either the debased government of 
 Louis XV., or the Directors of the "Compagnie des 
 Indes." 
 
 The most disastrous blow was therefore struck at 
 French power at the conclusion of what we have called 
 the second period of the war. Previous to the Treaty 
 of Pondichery, the chances of ultimate French success 
 were overwhelming. The grand outline was already 
 sketched ; it remained but to fill in the details. The 
 master-mind of Dupleix had gathered together into one 
 whole, forces previously discordant ; and, in his ability 
 to enlist all these in the cause of French power, lay 
 an almost certain hope for the future. At a critical 
 moment the master-mind was removed ; the policy 
 which had achieved such triumphs was abandoned ; 
 the coign of vantage was given up ; and, for the future,
 
 102 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 
 
 France must meet England on equal, if not on inferior 
 terms. 
 
 It was inevitable that the French designs should be, 
 in an especial manner, subject to risk, both from 
 their nature and from their vastness ; but for France it 
 was unfortunate that a misfortune like that of the 
 capture of Law's army and the death of Chanda Sahe'b 
 should have resulted in their abandonment. The dis- 
 aster, though severe, need not have been more than 
 temporary. It most certainly had not proved the de- 
 struction of French hopes, as is sometimes represented. 
 The English were still in a most perilous position. 
 From a French point of view, the great difficulty was 
 still the status of Mohammed AH ; and we can scarcely 
 imagine that Dupleix would have failed to find some 
 mode of settling this question. The whole state of 
 India was, in fact, ripe for the exercise of that power 
 in which he excelled ; and it can scarcely be doubted 
 that he would have taken advantage of Mahratta and 
 Mysorean affairs to establish French power more 
 securely than ever. The great victories of Dupleix 
 were due to moral rather than to physical force ; but it 
 was precisely this fact that his masters at home were 
 incapable of understanding. 
 
 The third period of the war was one, in which France 
 possessed no advantage even in the Carnatic ; and, even 
 if Lally had proved completely victorious here, even if 
 French power in the Dekhan had been allowed to 
 remain and to become consolidated, the English now 
 possessed a stronghold in Bengal, from which it would
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR. 103 
 
 have been difficult to expel them. As time went on, 
 the question of French or English supremacy in India 
 was limited to an ever-decreasing area. Certainly, the 
 Carnatic still continued to be debateable ground ; but 
 the struggle, during the third period, was one of union 
 against division, and its result was such as might natu- 
 rally have been anticipated.
 
 104 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 Subsequent French attempts The "French party" in India Privateers 
 of the Isle of France "Way for European dominion prepared by the 
 weakening of every formidable native state Growth of English 
 power Its abuse Hyder All Confederacy of native powers 
 Alliance of French with Hyder False feeliug of security on the 
 part of the English at Madras Hyder invades the Carnatic Critical 
 position of the English French forces under D'Orves, Duchemin, 
 Suffrein, and Bussy Peace of Versailles. 
 
 THE ruin of French power in India was, for the time, 
 complete. In 1761, not one of the numerous posses- 
 sions, which France had once held, remained ; and there 
 was not to be found in the whole of India a single 
 native prince, whose actions continued to be controlled 
 or directed by the counsels of French statesmen. The 
 question of French or English supremacy was settled, 
 and, as events proved, settled once for all. Attempts 
 were indeed made subsequently by France and by 
 Frenchmen to re-open the question ; but none of these 
 attempts were successful. All that the most vigorous 
 of them can be said to have done was to retard the 
 progress of British power. 
 
 For many years to come, the idea either of driving 
 the English out of India altogether, or of inflicting a
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 105 
 
 severe blow on England by means of her Indian pos- 
 sessions, continued to form a chief feature of French 
 policy. Only one actual attack was organised and car- 
 ried out by the French government, during the years 
 1781-1783; but, at various periods all through the 
 remainder of the century, we find the French govern- 
 ment establishing friendly relations with native powers 
 hostile to England, and cautiously awaiting an oppor- 
 tunity to take advantage of the perplexity of English 
 affairs. Napoleon Bonaparte, in his vast scheme, looked 
 upon the conquest of India as an effectual means of 
 humiliating England ; but the accomplishment of such 
 a design was frustrated by the vigorous policy carried 
 out at the time by Lord Wellesley in India, and all 
 chances of its success were for ever destroyed by the 
 defeats which Napoleon himself sustained in Europe. 
 The policy of Lord Wellesley resulted in the conquest 
 of the kingdom of Mysore, and the death of its raja, 
 Tippu Sahe'b, with whom Napoleon had contracted an 
 alliance, in the last year of the eighteenth century. It 
 is from this point that we may perhaps most fittingly 
 date the cessation of all really dangerous designs on the 
 part of France, as a nation, to dispute the supremacy of 
 India with England. We do, indeed, some nine years 
 later, find the French intriguing with Sind, Cabul, and 
 Persia, but the danger from this source was easily 
 averted by treaties made between these powers and the 
 British government. 
 
 Such French designs created much uneasiness 
 amongst the British governors in India, and the
 
 io6 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 " French party" in native states was dreaded beyond 
 everything else. Under this term, however, was in- 
 cluded a large number of adventurers, 1 the majority of 
 whom were certainly Frenchmen, but who were under 
 no direct orders from the French government, and were 
 inspired, perhaps, quite as much by the love of adven- 
 ture as by patriotism. These soldiers of fortune, who 
 enlisted in the service of native princes, often succeeded 
 in creating discipline and military ardour amongst 
 forces, which, without their influence, would have been 
 no more formidable than those described by Orme ; and 
 it is not too much to say, that they did more than the 
 government of France to impede the progress of British 
 power. 2 Much damage, too, was inflicted on British 
 commerce at various times by the privateers of the 
 Isles of France and Bourbon. Possessing a stronghold 
 in these islands, they sallied forth to attack British 
 merchantmen with such effect, that the number cap- 
 tured in the years 1793-1797 is estimated at 2266. 3 
 Their depredations were only put a stop to in 1810, 
 when the islands were captured by a British force sent 
 out for the purpose by Lord Minto. 
 
 But, however vast were the designs of France, and 
 
 1 Some of thege were Englishmen, who found themselves placed in a 
 most awkward position, when war broke out between the states in which 
 they served and the English. For an account of one of these, Colonel 
 Gardner, see "Wanderings of a Pilgrim in search of the Picturesque," a 
 most entertaining work, being the journal of a lady, Mrs. Fanny Parks, 
 in India during the years 1822-1845. 
 
 An excellent account of the most famous of these soldiers of fortune 
 is to be found in Colonel Malleson's " Final French Struggles ia India." 
 
 3 " Final French Struggles," p. 81.
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 107 
 
 however great the injury inflicted by French soldiers 
 of fortune and privateers, there was only one short 
 period subsequent to the fall of Pondichery in 1761, 
 during which the government despatched forces of any 
 considerable extent to attack the English possessions 
 in India. In the meantime, vast changes had taken 
 place. Favoured by the most remarkable combination 
 of circumstances, British power had grown with won- 
 derful rapidity ; and France no longer possessed a secure 
 basis for military operations in India. The Treaty of 
 Paris in 1763 gave back to France the possessions she 
 had held in India in the year 1749, and the French 
 were once more the owners of Pondichery, Karikal, 
 Chandernagor, and Mahe'. These places were, however, 
 given back with their fortifications destroyed ; and, 
 although subsequently re-fortified, they were so situated 
 as to ensure their falling a prey to England in case of 
 war. Such, in fact, has been their history ever since : 
 taken almost always without difficulty, when war has 
 broken out between the two nations, they have again 
 become French possessions at the declaration of peace ; 
 and as such they remain to the present day. It was 
 scarcely possible that Pondichery, situated in the terri- 
 tory of Mohammed All, could ever again become what 
 it had been under Dupleix the centre of a great 
 French power. For the future, all hope for France in 
 her opposition to England must depend on an alliance 
 with some native state ; and, in such an alliance, she will 
 have to deal with a British power, which, even in 1761, 
 might be regarded as at least the equal of any in India.
 
 io8 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 Almost simultaneously with the English victory in 
 the Carnatic, the way was prepared for European domi- 
 nion in India by the weakening of the most formidable 
 native states. " Few historical coincidences," says Mr. 
 Sidney Owen, 1 " are more remarkable than the precise 
 synchronism of Lally's final contest with Coote, the 
 Maratha strife with the Abdali, and Hyder's struggle 
 with Kunde Eao." At the battle of Panipat the 
 Afghans inflicted on the Mahrattas a blow from which 
 they never fully recovered ; and by the contest between 
 the adventurer, Hyder Ali, and the Mysorean general, 
 the growth of the most formidable native power, with 
 which England has had to struggle, was retarded for 
 years. 
 
 Within a decade after the battle of Plassey, English 
 rule was firmly established over Bengal, Behar, and 
 Orissa : the province of Oudh had been conquered, but 
 was returned to the nawab on condition of alliance : 
 the Emperor of Delhi himself had sought refuge with 
 the English, and become, in reality, a dependant on 
 their bounty. He still remained, in theory, supreme 
 ruler over the whole of India ; and the English found 
 it convenient to uphold the validity of imperial edicts 
 announcing to the world " that, in consideration of the 
 attachment of the high and mighty, the noblest of ex- 
 alted nobles, the chief of illustrious warriors, our faithful 
 servants and well-wishers, worthy of our royal favours, 
 the English Company, we have granted them as a free 
 gift," &c. In the Carnatic, too, the English were vir- 
 
 1 "India on the Eve of the British Conquest," p. 338.
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 109 
 
 tually the chief rulers, although, for reasons of their own, 
 they continued to keep Mohammed All on the throne. 
 
 More astonishing than the growth of the Company's 
 power is the abuse to which it was at first put by the 
 servants of the Company, with a few notable exceptions. 
 The history of Bengal for five years after the battle of 
 Plassey, and of the Madras Presidency for a much 
 longer period after the fall of Pondichery, would dis- 
 grace the annals of any nation. The majority of those 
 to whom the direction of affairs was committed were 
 devoid of the most elementary principles of common 
 honesty. They had little thought for the advantage of 
 the Company, and none at all for the honour of Eng- 
 land. To enrich themselves at the expense of native 
 princes was their one object. This object was best to 
 be achieved in Bengal by setting on the throne a 
 nawab, who should be willing to surrender every 
 vestige of power, and, at the same time, able to pay 
 heavily for the privilege. Mir Jaffi'r had been forced 
 to bribe until his treasury was empty ; he was there- 
 upon deposed, and Mir Kasim put in his stead. Mir 
 Kasim showed signs of possessing a will of his own : 
 he was therefore deposed likewise ; and Mir Jaffir was 
 once more placed on the throne, and subjected to a 
 constant system of extortion, until, in a short time, he 
 died worn out with grief. In the Carnatic, on the other 
 hand, it was found more profitable to pander to the 
 vices of Mohammed Ali a ruler probably as worthless 
 as any that even India has ever seen. By advancing 
 sums of money at exorbitant rates of interest to this
 
 no THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 spendthrift, and by receiving, in lieu of payment, the 
 rents of large tracts of land in the Carnatic, many 
 Englishmen amassed enormous fortunes. The vices of 
 Mohammed Ali proved a most fertile source of wealth, 
 and were accordingly encouraged by the English, who 
 showed themselves willing to abandon every idea of 
 self-respect and to stop short at nothing in their sub- 
 serviency. They allowed themselves to use a phrase 
 of Colonel Wilks "in the exclusive character of 
 dupes," to be led into quarrels, with which the govern- 
 ment or Company could not possibly have any concern, 
 and to engage in contests with native powers simply 
 for the purpose of enabling Mohammed AH to replenish 
 his coffers by the plunder of his neighbours'. In a 
 word, the Madras Council was, regarded as a body, as 
 bad as bad could be ; and consistently left undone those 
 things which ought to have been done, and did those 
 things which ought not to have been done. We are 
 scarcely surprised, then, to find that in 1779, on the 
 eve of the greatest peril through which British power 
 in Southern India has passed, no due precautions had 
 been taken for the safety of the Company's possessions 
 in the Carnatic, and that Hyder Ali was able to ravage 
 the country and burn the villages up to within a few 
 miles of Madras, before the English were aware of 
 danger. It was at this period, and in conjunction with 
 Hyder Ali, that the Trench government made the last 
 actual attack on British possessions in India. No time 
 could have been more opportune for France ; for, besides 
 being itself disorganised, British power was, at this
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 1 1 r 
 
 time, menaced in a greater or less degree by all the 
 most powerful native states. 
 
 The history of India from the year 1761 up to the 
 date of this French alliance with Hyder All is one of 
 the utmost complexity. Of all the existing powers in 
 India, no one had as yet shown itself to be without 
 doubt superior to the others. In Bengal alone was 
 British power so firmly established as to control, rather 
 than to be controlled by, the circumstances of neigh- 
 bouring states. The Bombay Presidency was forced to 
 take part in the disputes of the adjacent Mahratta 
 states, which, though nominally a confederacy, were in 
 reality so many distinct petty powers in an almost per- 
 petual state of dissension ; while, as we have seen, the 
 English in the Carnatic were, to a very great extent, 
 swayed by the caprice of Mohammed Ali. To the east 
 of the Mahratta country was the kingdom of Hyder- 
 abad or what we have previously called the subah of 
 the Dekhan, considerably reduced in size by the Mah- 
 ratta conquests of 1 760 now ruled by Nizam All, who 
 had caused his brother, Salabat Jang, to be assassinated; 
 and in the south, bordered on the west by the Malabar 
 coast and on the east by the Carnatic, was the kingdom 
 of Mysore, governed by Hyder Ali, one of the most 
 remarkable men, whether regarded as a soldier or as a 
 statesman, that ever lived. The numerous and ever- 
 changing combinations and divisions of these and other 
 powers remind one of the forms in a kaleidoscope ; and, 
 in estimating the strength of the various alliances, it 
 must not be forgotten that, at this time, European sol-
 
 ii2 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 diers of fortune were playing an important pait in the 
 organisation of nearly every native state. For a thorough 
 comprehension of this period, a special study of each 
 separate division must be made in such works as Grant 
 Duffs " History of the Mahrattas," and Colonel Wilks's 
 " History of the Kingdom of Mysore ; " but for our pur- 
 pose it must suffice to sketch, in the briefest manner 
 possible, the career of Hyder AH in its bearing upon 
 British power. 
 
 Hyder AH began by showing the greatest respect for 
 his English neighbours : he ended by hating and de- 
 
 o / 
 
 spising them. His policy was at first to establish and 
 protect the kingdom of Mysore by an alliance with the 
 English : failing to obtain this, he devoted all his ener- 
 gies to the formation of a confederacy of all the native 
 powers, Hindu and Mohammedan, which should expel 
 them from every part of India. In 1766, Mohammed 
 Ali had induced the English to join him in an attack 
 on Hyder ; and the result of that rash and ill-considered 
 proceeding was that Hyder, in 1769, was in a position 
 to dictate his own terms for a peace. Bent on carrying 
 out his favourite idea, he proposed, and the English 
 accepted, in their own behalf for Hyder persisted in 
 ignoring Mohammed All a defensive alliance between 
 the two powers. Had the English faithfully observed 
 their part of the agreement, much future evil might 
 have been averted, and any further French attack 
 would, in all probability, have been impossible ; but, as 
 it was, they took the first opportunity of breaking their 
 word, when, two years later, Hyder was attacked and
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND.' 113 
 
 defeated by the Mahrattas. After this, Hyder's policy 
 seemed to fluctuate. On the one hand, he was sceptical 
 as to the advantage to be derived from treaties with 
 people who had shown so little scruple in refusing to 
 fulfil a solemn engagement ; while, on the other, there 
 is no doubt that he fully appreciated the numerous 
 causes which would favour the English in a conflict 
 with a native power. Some five years later, Hyder, in 
 turn, defeated the Mahrattas, and made a proposal to 
 them of alliance defensive and offensive against the 
 English. He, however, paused, and once more made 
 an oft'er of alliance with the English and of assistance 
 to the Bombay Presidency, which was at this time im- 
 plicated in the disputes of the Mahratta states. With 
 the refusal of his offers, Hyder seems definitely to have 
 made up his mind. In 1778, came the news of the 
 outbreak of war between England and France, and he 
 began to entertain the hope of French co-operation. 
 He moreover brought about a confederacy with the 
 Nizam and the majority of the Mahratta states for the 
 avowed purpose of driving the English out of India 
 altogether. Fortunately for British power in India, 
 this confederacy was first weakened and eventually 
 broken up by the skill of Warren Hastings ; and, when 
 the struggle came, it was almost confined to Hyder Ali, 
 assisted by the French in Southern India. 
 
 Immediately on the outbreak of war with France, 
 the English attacked and captured without difficulty 
 all the French possessions except Malid This place, 
 situated on the Malabar coast, lay in territory which
 
 H4 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 Hyder Ali regarded as his ; and he accordingly warned 
 the English that he should regard any attack as a 
 declaration of war against himself. In spite of this 
 warning, Mahe* was captured ; and Hyder prepared to 
 invade the Carnatic with an army of more than 80,000 
 men and a considerable French force in his service. 
 This vast army, which was disciplined and commanded 
 as no native army had ever been before, began its march 
 in June 1780, two months after Sir Thomas Eumbold, 
 the President of Madras, had, in bidding farewell to his 
 Council, complacently told them, " It affords me a par- 
 ticular satisfaction that the whole of the Carnatic and 
 the Company's northern possessions are at present un- 
 disturbed, and in perfect tranquillity. ... I think there 
 is the greatest prospect that this part of India will 
 remain quiet, especially if the Government here cau- 
 tiously avoid taking any measures that may be likely 
 to bring on troubles." l The Government at Madras 
 certainly did most cautiously avoid taking any measures 
 whether for the purpose of irritating their neighbours 
 or of protecting the English possessions. Twice subse- 
 quently, on the 1 9th June and on the i/th July, when 
 not only the general fact but many of the details of 
 Hyder's march were known, motions urging the neces- 
 sity of immediate defensive preparations were brought 
 forward and rejected by the majority. Surely, to use 
 the words of Professor Wilson, " The history of British 
 India affords no similar instance of such utter want of 
 foresight or such imbecility of purpose." When, at 
 
 1 Quoted by Professor Wilson in a note to Mill's History.
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 115 
 
 length, the presence of Hyder within a few miles of 
 Madras made further delay impossible, the defensive 
 measures taken were miserably inadequate. Twenty 
 years of wholesale corruption had produced their natu- 
 ral effect on the Company's finances, while luxury, and 
 vice, and English usury, kept Mohammed AH in a state 
 of perpetual insolvency. Left to itself, British power 
 in Southern India must in no long time have fallen a 
 prey to the Mysoreans. Its salvation was due to Warren 
 Hastings, who invested Sir Eyre Goote with dictatorial 
 power, and sent him to the Carnatic at the head of the 
 strongest force which could be collected in Bengal. 
 Until the arrival of this force at the end of the year 
 
 1780, Hyder's course was one of almost unbroken suc- 
 cess. Almost every important place in the Carnatic 
 was in his hands, and a large detachment of the English 
 army had been forced to surrender. For a time Madras 
 seemed to lie at his mercy. The French inhabitants of 
 Pondiehery had seized the place, and entered into nego- 
 tiations with Hyder, and were awaiting the arrival of 
 help from France. Such was the first crisis of the war. 
 For a time the aspect of affairs was changed by the 
 arrival of Sir Eyre Coote. In the beginning of the year 
 
 1781, the forces of Hyder sustained more than one 
 severe defeat ; but shortly afterwards the English found 
 themselves placed in a position even more critical than 
 the one described above ; for it must be borne in mind 
 that the army commanded by Sir Eyre Coote practically 
 represented the whole of the available English forces 
 in India.
 
 ii6 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 In view of the arrival of a French force, the import- 
 ance of Pondichery was very great ; and Sir Eyre Coote 
 set out for the purpose of recapturing it. He was fol- 
 lowed by Hyder, who managed to secure a strong 
 position which effectually blocked the road to Madras. 
 Just at this time a French squadron under the command 
 of the Chevalier d'Orves arrived off the Coromandel 
 Coast ; and the English were thus completely hemmed 
 in. Supplies were cut off in every direction; and 
 Hyder, secure in his position, was far too wise to risk 
 a battle. The surrender of the whole British army 
 appeared to be nothing more than a matter of time ; 
 when, to the relief of the English and the amazement 
 of all, the French squadron moved off and left the 
 English free to obtain supplies by sea. This extra- 
 ordinary move on the part of D'Orves seems absolutely 
 inexplicable. He had no reason to fear the English 
 fleet ; for, at this time, it was far away on the other 
 side of India. He " was not required to fight. He was 
 required to ride at anchor in the finest season of the 
 year, a time when storms are unknown in the Indian 
 seas, and see an enemy starve, and he would not." * 
 
 The English army, scantily supplied with provisions 
 obtained by sea, was forced to remain inactive until 
 Hyder at last, in July 1781, offered battle and sustained 
 a serious defeat at Porto Novo. This is justly regarded 
 as the decisive battle of the war. The English were 
 rescued from a most dangerous position; and the 
 successes which Hyder was able to gain in the future, 
 
 1 "Final French Struggles," p. 8.
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 117 
 
 were temporary only. Twice subsequently French 
 forces were landed in India for the purpose of assisting 
 the Mysoreans ; but in both cases they were feebly 
 commanded, and failed to produce the effect which 
 might have been expected from their numbers. In 
 January 1782, a few days after a detachment of English 
 troops had been defeated and taken prisoners by an 
 overwhelming force commanded by Tippu Sahe"b, the 
 son of Hyder, the celebrated French admiral, Suffrein, 
 succeeded in landing a force numbering about 3000. 
 The golden opportunity for French interference had, 
 certainly, been neglected; but vigorous co-operation 
 might yet have accomplished much. In point of 
 numbers, the English army was insignificant as com- 
 pared with the allied Mysorean and French forces ; it 
 was inadequately supplied, and on every hand there 
 was reason to fear treachery on the part of the officers 
 of Mohammed All The French commander, Duchemin, 
 however, from the first declined to adopt the plans sug- 
 gested by Hyder, and refused to take advantage of the 
 only opportunity for inflicting a severe defeat on the 
 English which occurred, when Coote offered battle 
 to the Mysoreans and French, who were together en- 
 gaged in the siege of Wandewash. On this occasion 
 Coote's army was outnumbered by at least five to one ; 
 and the fact of his offering battle at all can only be 
 accounted for by supposing that he regarded the relief 
 of Wandewash as of the utmost importance. After this, 
 Hyder seems to have regarded his French allies as 
 worse than useless. He abandoned them to their own
 
 Ii8 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 devices, and pursued the war on his own account until 
 his death at the end of the year 1782. 
 
 In striking contrast with the inertness of the French 
 .commander on the mainland was the energy shown by 
 Admiral Suffrein. He lost no opportunity of attacking 
 the English fleet under Admiral Hughes ; and, although 
 none of the contests were decisive, there can be no 
 doubt that the general result was favourable to the 
 French ; and it is morally certain that, if Suffrein had 
 occupied the place of D'Orves in 1781, the history of 
 Southern India would have been changed. 
 
 One of the reasons put forward by Duchemin to 
 excuse his inactivity was that he awaited the arrival of 
 a French force under the renowned Bussy. This force 
 landed at Porto Novo in March 1783, and, in the fol- 
 lowing June, was reinforced by 2300 marines and 
 sailors from Suffrein's fleet. The conditions of the 
 struggle were, at this time, considerably modified. 
 Hyder was succeeded by Tippii Sahe'b, and Sir Eyre 
 Coote by General Stuart; and both Mysoreans and 
 English suffered by the change. The position of the 
 French, on the other hand, seemed to be improved in 
 every way. The number of troops they now possessed 
 in India was considerable ; and, if their object was to 
 re-establish a French power, the substitution of Tippii 
 for Hyder was certainly in their favour. The conduct 
 of the latter shows that he quite appreciated the danger 
 of invoking the assistance of Europeans, and had deter- 
 mined in no case to allow the French to become his 
 masters. Tippu Sahe'b, on the contrary, possessed no
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 119 
 
 such sagacity, if we may judge from what happened 
 in after years, when he intrigued with the Eepublic, 
 donned the red cap of liberty, and allowed himself to be 
 hailed " Citoyen Tippu ! " 
 
 Early in the year 1783, the English, now in alliance 
 with the Mahrattas, made a vigorous attack on the 
 western part of the kingdom of Mysore ; and this had 
 the effect of withdrawing Tippu with a large portion of 
 his army from the Carnatic. The war in this province 
 was therefore now, to a greater extent than before, one 
 between English and French, influenced by the opera- 
 tions of their respective fleets off the coast. The main 
 interest of this period centres in Caddalor, the port of 
 the English settlement of Fort St. David. This place 
 was held by the French, and besieged by the English ; 
 while Suffrein, by out-nianceuvring Sir Edward Hughes, 
 succeeded in covering it with his fleet. A French sortie 
 on June 26 was defeated with considerable loss ; but it 
 appears to have been not only badly conducted, but also 
 deficient in numbers. The position of General Stuart 
 was in no way improved. His army was wasting away 
 with sickness, he was deprived'of all hope of aid from 
 the fleet, and his plans had been, to a great extent, 
 frustrated by the authorities at Madras, who showed 
 themselves to be true successors of those worthies who, 
 a few years before, had done so much to imperil British 
 power. It is scarcely probable that a resolute and well- 
 organised French attack could have failed ; and, after 
 the defeat of Stuart's army, there would have been little 
 to prevent a complete French triumph over the whole
 
 120 THE SUPREMACY OF ENGLAND. 
 
 of the Carnatic. But while Bussy, whose caution now 
 presents a striking contrast to his boldness, when, more 
 than twenty years before, he had established French 
 power in the Dekhan, was thinking about such an 
 attack, the news came that peace was made between 
 England and France ; and English power in Southern 
 India was saved by the Peace of Versailles, just as it 
 had been saved thirty-five years before by the Peace of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. "War with Tippii still went on until 
 the following year, when it was terminated by the 
 disgraceful treaty of Mangalor also the work of the 
 Madras authorities, in direct opposition to the Governor- 
 General, Warren Hastings a treaty of concession to 
 Tippii, which rendered necessary the Third Mysore 
 War of 1790. 
 
 Thus ended the last actual attempt of France to 
 wrest from England the supremacy of India. While 
 the period can scarcely vie in importance with those 
 which we have previously discussed, it affords an 
 example, perhaps more striking than any other to be 
 found in history, of the fact that a great power may be 
 brought to the brink of destruction by the carelessness 
 or ignorance of a few of its servants. 
 
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