^SKwf^S^?i^» '■^■^''P^' r PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY LONDON ■NTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 22, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1904 OIXUI URL l^(J^ ; 4 1 7 (/» ? 1 ^ EAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA BY LIErTENANT-COLONEL II. EKOT Imlhiii AriKii {Rdircil) EAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA SYKIA, ASIA MINOE, AND MESOPOTAMIA. In dealing' witli the question of Railways in Western Asia, I propose to take them in the following order and grouping : Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia, then the Caucasus, and, lastly, Persia and Central Asia. A glance at the map will show that Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are portioned out into two great divisions of tahle-land and plain. The table-land — of an elevation of from 3,000 to 7,000 feet, forming part of the high plateau which reaches from the Himalayas to the ^Mediterranean — is buttressed by the great circle of mountains extending from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Inside this half- circle lie the rich plains of Mesopotamia and of the Karun, the seats of ancient civilizations, and the valuable prize for which the East and West have so often struoo-led in the past, and are fated to struggle in the future. When in the fifties the question of connecting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf first came into public view, Western Europe alone a])peared vitally interested. There was no Eastern European competition of any consecpience ; the question seemed one more of finance than of politics. Now we hear again the ancient clash of contending interests ; Russia has risen al)()ve the horizon as an embodiment of luiiopcan as well as Asiatic nii^Iit. ^Mesopotamia is lo licr a iactoi' ol" ^rcat iiitcfcst. :iii(l il is 1 — -J 4 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA the clash of Eastern and Western ideals which makes the (juestion of such supreme import. At the time the project for uniting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf was first mooted there were no railways in view nearer than Brindisi, on the overland route to India. The natural basis, therefore, for the j)roposed line lay in the Mediterranean, in the waters dh-ectly east of the island of Cyprus. The problem of Asia Minor and its bearing on the future of Turkey was at that time but partially understood, and it Avas very natural that directness of route to India and the saving of time and money determined the question of the /race of the line. It is still of considera])le interest to us to take note of the various routes to which the attention of the promoters of the Euphrates Valley Railway were directed. The following alternative routes were considered : that of Alexandretta via Aleppo to the Euphrates, thence l)y the right bank to Koweit ; or that from the same point, cross- ing the Euphrates at Belis, thence by the left bank of the Euphrates, or the right bank of the Tigris, to Baghdad and Koweit ; or, again, that from Bir on the Euphrates, tlience by Urfa and Diarbekr by the left or the right ])ank of the Tigris to Koweit. Other pro])osed routes ran from Tri})oli or Beyrout, across the desert to Palmyra, and so to the Euphrates and Koweit ; also from Haifa across Arabia to the 8hat-el- Aral), the shortest of all in point of time, but of little value in other respects. Mention was also made much later of a line to run from Ismailia to Koweit, just north of the 30th parallel of latitude. Very little is known of this latter scheme, which seems to have died a natural death. The estimates of these lines varied from (1,000,000 to 10,000,000 sterling. Particular stress was devoted to the a(l\ iintaues of direct routes as being the more economical. RAILWAYS JN WESTERN ASIA 5 Capital was not tlien abundant, and questions ot" expendi- ture were thorny ones which loomed even larger in the eyes of the promoters of 1857 than in those of their successors in 1900. That Great Britain should prefer the most direct and least costly route, though that route might not perhaps be to the greatest advantage of Turkey, affected that country but little as long as she did not provide any definite guarantee. The conditions, of course, changed wdien kilometric guarantees were de- manded, and the question had to be recast in an entirely different mould — viz., as it affected primarily the interests of that country. The opportunity lost to us in 1857, when the Govern- ment of Lord Palmerston refused its support to the scheme, could not be restored again in 1872, wdien the question was referred to a Parliamentary Committee. In the eighties the situation had entirely altered. The development of the railway system in J^Jiiropean Turkey had brought about important changes in the outlook of the Porte. Asiatic Turkey had sprung into significance, and through com- munication of that country with the capital Avas more essential to her than through communication with the Mediterranean. The strategic value of linking Constanti- nople by rail with Asia Minor and liaghdad was now clearly seen. As earh^ as 1858 it had l)een jiointed out that the secure possession of the Euphrates line would be decisive as regards the ownership of jMesopotamia and Syria, and in the hands of a first-class Power might give the control of the Suez Canal. Also that Russia could not turn upon Turkey through Asia until she had secured her left flank by seizing Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that, given their possession, she would advance from the direction of Kars to the valley of the Euphrates, as well as from Erivan by Lake Van to Mosul in the valley of the Tigris. Eurther, it was also seen that predominance in Azerl^aijan would 4 RAILWAYS IN IV E STERN ASIA enable her to threaten the southern part of Mesopotamia by way of Tabriz and Kirmanshah. The full meaning of all these possibilities was mean- while only gradually brought home to the Porte ; but, once realized, the furtherance of a scheme with a debouche on the ^lediterranean, instead of on the Bosphorus, could no longer be entertained. The deputation which waited on Lord Palmerston in 1857 stated the general conviction that the Euphrates Valley route would most assuredly pass into other hands if England declined the task. Their words were indeed prophetic. The task, as the original syndicate first saw it, could, in 1872, be no longer accom- plished — our opportunity had been lost. Having failed, then, to bring about the construction of the Euphrates Valley Railway, the attention of British capitalists turned to more local projects in Syria and Asia Minor. I will briefly refer to the Syrian railways. The most important of these are as follows : The line from Haifa to Damascus and Bosra, the concession for which was granted in 1890. It was partly constructed by a British company, and was spoken of as one of the most important of existing or proposed railways in Asiatic Turkey. It attracted great attention at one time from the belief that it was destined to become the terminus of the Eu])hrates Valley Railway. Its present importance is due to its port, which is by far the best for large ships on the Syrian coast, and because it taps the exceptionally fertile districts inland. In November, 1902, the Sultan purchased this line from the li(juidators of the Syrian Ottoman Railway Company, and the works on it are now being j)ushed forward under the superintendence of German engineers at the expense of the Sultan's civil list. The line has been completed as far as Beisan — the Bethlehem of the B)il)le — and it will sliortly reach the Jordan at rli.sr-el-Majania. This line Avill traverse those scenes with wliich Cliristians are familiar until it reaches Damascus, RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASL^l 5 which ^Mahomet deemed so stroniJ: a rival ot" the heavenly Paradise. The line Beyroiit-Damascus-Haiiran, which is in French hands, was opened for through traffic to Mezerib in ](S96. Considerable difficulties were met with in taking the line over the Lebanon, and a heavy expenditure was made in consequence. The port is unsatisfactory, steamers of any size having to lie outside, whilst the port dues are heavy. Despite these drawbacks, the commerce is increasing. Beyrout itself has grown from 25,000 inhabitants in 1860 to 140,000 in 1900. This railway, which has not yet realized the fond hopes of its promoters, will doubtless ultimately benefit by the great increase in the prosperity of the surrounding country, which is rapidly o])ening up both as regards population, agriculture, and home industries. The liyak-Hamah branch, opened in 1902, with its different gauge and rolling-stock, may l)e cited as a separate railway. This line is remarkably well built, and Avill be extended ultimately to Aleppo and some point bej'ond, to connect it with tlie projected Baghdad Railway. The Turk'sh (roverument pays a kilometric guarantee on this line, and will do the same when it is prolonged northward. Branch lines are to be built to the sea, as Ions: as the rights of the Bao-hdad Railwav are not infringed. This branch represents the northern portion of the Ilejaz Railway, which will unite the Baghdad Railway with Damascus, and ultimately with the holy cities of Islam, Madina, and Mecca. About oOO kilo- metres of the Hejaz Railway have been constructed, and trains are now runnino- as far as Maan. Funds for the o purposes of the line have hitherto been found l)y the Sultan's civil list, assisted by the offerings of devout Moslems, but other financial arrangements will be necessary as the line is extended. Another link in the Syrian railwav system is the line 8 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA marked as British, and intended to unite the Haifa- Damascus line with Ismailia and the Egyptian system. It runs ])arallel with the coast, and at no great distance from the sea. No special mention need be made of the JafFa- Jerusalem Kail way. It will be seen from the foreooins; short sketch of railways already built or building that Syria is being rapidly opened up by a well-conceived system of railways, subsidiary to the more ambitious schemes of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Taking Kills or Birejik as the point of junction on the future Baghdad Bailway, we may at no very distant date be able to traverse the whole of Syria in its length from north to south. The prolongation to Medina and Mecca will be the tirst step at breaking ground in Arabia, and must lead to great economic and social changes in that portion of Asia. That British enterprise and capital should have so little part in the opening of Syria by road and rail is not surj^rising. The political influence of France was for long supreme in Syria, and we could, I think, have viewed an increase of that influence with perfect goodwill, but French influence is on the decline. The most suggestive factor in the present economic situation in Sjria, to my mind, is the entry en .scene of German agencies for the financing and construction of its railways. German engineers trained on the Anatolian Kailway are now supervising the construction of the Haifa-Damascus and the Hejaz Railways, the Sultan's own })et schemes, and there seems no doubt that German financial assistance will be offered, and probably accepted, when the cash resources of the Sultan's civil list become exhausted. I now come to the network of railways of Asia Minor, and will take them in order of construction. The Smyrna-Aidin Railway dates from 1856, when a conces- sion was granted to British ca])italists without the advan- RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA g tfige of a kilometric guarantee. The line was constructed by English engineers, and opened in 18GG. It continues to be worked under English management. Major Law, who reported on this line in l.SUG, and to whose report I am indebted for many of these details, stated that 'It is the only railway in Asiatic Turkey which, on its own merits and without Government assist- ance, has proved a profitable concern,' whilst Government revenue and the prosperity of the population have been greatly increased by the remarkable development of the fertile districts opened up. The mileage has gradually been extended eastward to Diner and Chivril, tapping further rich districts. The latest reports for 1903 are extremely satisfactory, and within its present restricted area it continues to prosper ; but the dream of the promoters of a future extension to the Euphrates Valley has definitely vanished, owing to the advance of the Anatolian Railway to Ivonia. This dream was a very natural one, for the route taken by the Smyrna-Aidin line followed the ancient caravan route by which the famous cities of Asia Minor conducted their commerce with the interior. The Smyrna-Kasaba Kailway also owes its inception to an English company, to whom a concession Avas granted in 1863. The progress of the line was slow, and in 1893 only lOo^ miles were ready for traffic. Financial difificulties supervened, owing to the failure of the Turkish Govern- ment to fulfil its ol)ligations, and in 1894 the company accepted an offer for its purchase. It is now under French control, and enjoys a Government guarantee. Owing to engineering difficulties, the construction caused a heavy outlay, and confidence in the line has not yet been justified. It was hoped that the working would leave but a small mariiin to be met bv the guarantee, but at present it draws heavily upon Turkisli funds. Tlie overpowering interests of the Anatolian Kailway have also reacted to the lo RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA detriment of this line. The extension to the Anatolian llailwav at Afium-Karahissar was hroken at the instance of the Anatolian llailway, to prevent goods seeking an outlet at Smyrna instead of at Ismid. Perhaps the best t'.iat the line can expect is final al)sorption in the greater scheme. The ^lersina-Adana railway, like the foregoing, was huilt with English capital. The concession was granted in IScSi), the line opened in 188G. In 189G it was transferred to a French company. The promoters had other aims than the exploitation of the rich belt between the sea and the Taurus. They had in view a prolongation to Birejik, where it was hoped it might affect a junction with the Svrian svstem. Extensions to Eregli and Konia were also under consideration, but all these ])lans were held in abey- ance owing to the opposition of the Anatolian Railway. Quite a large trade has developed at Mersina, despite its want of a port, l)ut the future of the line must depend on its community of interest with its Anatolian rival, with which it Avill effect a junction when the Konia-Eregli section is })rotracted southward. I believe it has already been merged into the greater scheme. The Mudania-Brussa Kailway of 26^ miles, though dating from 1(S7(), was only completed in 1802, It is held in French interests, and doubtless, like all other .Vsia Minor railways, will become a dependent of the Baghdad Railway. Until such time its extension to Levke and Ine-Oenu is not likely to take j)lace. There is no ])ort, though the roadstead is sufficiently sheltered, and no (rovernment guarantee. The first section of the Anatolian Railway, from Scutari to Ismid, 08 miles in length, was built by the Turkish Government in 1871, antl afterwards leased for a term of twentv years to an English company. This lease was held till 1888, when a (iennan syndicate, ojx'rated by the Deutsche liaiik of IJcrliii, aiMinircd i-iuhts ox ci' tlic I laidar-Faslia-Ismid RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA ii Railway, together Avitli the ninety-nine years' concession for an extension to Angora, the Government guaranteeing milea2:e revenue over each section. In 1893 the Anatolian Railway came into heing. It was under this company that the line to Angora was completed, and further concessions obtained for prolongations to Kski Shehr, and Konia, and from Ano'ora to Kaisariveh. These concessions were, as before, supported hy kilometric guarantees. The con- cessionnaires were bound to buikl a railway from Angora to Sivas, from Sivas to Diarbekr and Baghdad, as soon as the receipts on all the lines reached a figure freeing the Government from the kilometric guarantee. The line to Angora was completed in 1(S92, to Konia in 189G, both sections having l)een pushed on with energy, despite physical and climatic obstacles. The extension to Sivas and beyond was abandoned out of deference to Russian susceptibilities. The financial results of the line to Angora have been poor. The main line to Konia tells a different tale. It would a})pear from recent results that the com})any will shortly find itself independent of the Government guarantee. The utilization of that guarantee for the extension from Konia to Eregli on the Baghdad line has even been contemplated, but it is doubtful that the Anatolian Railway will forego its rights, when the prosperity of the line might be seriously affected, by bad years and failing harvests Before proceeding to the (piestion of the Baghdad Railway, I would like to pass in review certain apprecia- tions of the circumstances attending railway construction in Asia Minor. Just as British enterprise was first in the field when the Euphrates Valley scheme was under consideration, so was it first in opening up n.'W ground in Asia Minor. With the excei)tion of the short line from ]\Iudania to l^russa, every one of the lines mentioned, tlie Smvrna-Aidin, Smyrna-Kasal)a, Mersina- Adana, and the 12 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA Haidar-Pasba-Isiiiid Railways, were built, I believe, in the first instance, with English capital, under English manage- ment, with English material, and yet at the present day all we have to show for our labours is the Smyrna-Aidin IJailway, certainly the most successful financially of the various schemes, l)ut, still, a poor result after all our effort. I need not trace the reasons of our want of success in the Euphrates A^alley Railway, but it seems necessary to attempt some analysis of our failure in Asia Minor. It would appear that British financiers asked for little or no support from tlie Turkish Government : they were satisfied with tbe results likelv to follow on les-itimate l)usiness, and were ])repared to await the development of the country before projecting tlieir lines into the interior. Progress was to be slow but sure. Now, this policy, though excellent in itself, was not suited to its environment. The Ottoman Government demanded an instrument adapted to the ra])id construction of raihvays, to subserve Turkish interests rather than the immediate profits or views of the individual ; moreover, an instrument with a large financial backing, and this our British com])anies in Asia Minor never ajipear to liave had. English financial establish- ments, too, are often averse to risking their ca])ital under foreign guarantees. They discount the su])port they are likely to receive from tlieir own (iovernment, and are consecjuently afraid of tying up their capital. It follows, tberefore, that where large and influential baidvs are afraid to tread the public will not venture. British enterprises must suffer in ventures sucb as those under discussion when opposed by foreign companies having strong financial backing as well as (iovernment support. Tliis was the kind of competition encountered in Asia Minor, and with the advent of the Deutsche Bank of Berlin the tide set steadily against us. Another and pcrliaps even nearer cause of failure was the iiiabilitv of Ih'itisli (•oni])aiiies to keep in toncli with RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 13 Turkish ideals. Tliej were never able to realize that whatever aclvanta2:es the Mediterranean niav have had in the fifties, in the seventies Turkey was more interested in linking up her capital w.'tli the outlying provinces. She was not a sea Power, and free communication with Con- stantinople was everything to her. The base had shifted from the Mediterranean to the Bosphorus, and we had not shifted with it. She had found German agents capable of fulfilling her purpose, and of building railways in Europe to suit her needs ; she now turned to these same agencies to assist her in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. They were adaptable, ready to meet the wishes of the Porte, and to accept her guarantees. What more could be desired ? The Times makes the following somewhat involved lament on our displacement : ' It is hard to refrain from indulging in a lament at the remorseless regularity with which the life- long efforts of more than one patriotic Englishman were destined to flicker out in a pitiful succession of unreAvarded and abortive endeavours. The attempts made during the first half of the nineteenth century to navigate the Euphrates . . . followed during the early years of the latter half by the railway schemes inseparably connected with the names of Chesney and Andrews ; the reawakening of public interest a few years later in a short road to the East, which led to the drawing up of a report by a Select Committee, and which was indicated again early in the last quarter of the waning century by the formation of the Euphrates Valley Pailw^ay and Association, pass succes- sively across the scene, to terminate by a group, chiefly English, to obtain a concession, uji to the very time that a telegram was despatched to the Emperor William at Windsor granting to a German syndicate a concession to draw up a report concerning the construction of an iron way which should pavSS through the heart of the Asiatic dominions of the autocrat at Yildiz.' The apathy of our statesmen in the past has brought 14 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA us to the present uupasse. It Avas against this apatliy and want of imagination tliat all the genius of a Chesney and the persistence of an Andrews beat in vain. I will now ])ass on to the IJaghdad Railway scheme. The attention ])aid by German financiers to railways in European Turkey had as a natural corolhirv their counter- part in Asiatic Turkey. The Anatolian Ruilway Company were either compelled to extend their scene of operation or to submit to absorption by extensions inland from the Smyrna side. They were quick to realize the trend of feeling in Constantinople, and, strengthened by the Deutsche Bank, found no difficulty in retainino; the held their energy had opened up to them. The course of their negotiations w^ith the Porte has been drawn by Mr. Chirol in his book on the 'Middle Eastern (Question.' He meiiti(»ns that in 1809 the right was accorded to the Anatolian Railway Company to extend their system from Konia to the Persian Gulf. The negotiations, continued till 1902, resulted in 1903 in a convention oivino- to the ' Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company ' the right of constructing railways to the Gulf in extension of the Anatolian Railway system. This convention not only assured to German enterprise a monojjoly in Asia jNIinor and Mesopotamia, but added thereto a predominance in Syria. The Baghdad Railway, as at present traced, is to run fi'om Konia throuoh the Taurus, whence it descends bv tlie fertile plains of Southern Cilicia to Adana (here it joins the Mersina-Adana line) ; from Adana to Kilis and Tel Habesch, thence east across the Euphrates to a point 20 kilometres south of Birejik by Haran, Ras-el-Ain, and Xisibin to INIosul, and so to Baghdad and the Persian (rulf. Branch lines are to run to Ale])})0, Trfa, Khanikin, and to a point of the Gulf from Zubeir. The line has been divided for financial reasons into sections of 200 kilometres, each of whi(di will l)enefit. when RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 15 constructed, by a kiloinetric guarantee from the Turkish Government. Before the ratification of the convention, the Deutsche Bank, representing the financial interests of the Baghdad Railway Company, addressed themselves to the Ottoman Bank, as representing French interests, with a view of obtaining their co-operation in the undertaking. The Ottoman Bank would, it was hoped, insure the political support of the French Government as well as the financial support of the French public. Later, similar advances were made to financial houses in Great Britain, with the same objects in view. Both advances were met in the first instance favourably, if: without enthusiasm. The Govern- ments of France and Great Britain expressed their general ac(|uiescence by supporting the scheme, but it is said they took no active part in tlie negotiations between the })rinci})al parties concerned. That the German sj^ndicate Avished to internationalize the scheme certainly, in a measure, tended to advance its interests. France had been one of the first in the field in both Syria and Asia Elinor. It was plain that if they did not march with the times they would be driven out of the field, to find themselves in the same position towards Germany in Asiatic Turkey as they are towards Great Britain in Egypt. The enterprise had its detractors in France as in Great Britain. The (piestion of French support was early raised in the Senate. M. Firmin Faure argued that the con- struction of the Baghdad Bailway could only injure French infiuencc, and build u]) the trade and prestige of Germany in Asia j\linor. jM. Delcasse's views were diametrically opposed to those of M. Faure. M. Delcasse naid : ' If this great scheme is to be realized any way, it is l)etter that France should have a hand in it than be left, out in tlie cold,' and on the nu)tion tliat French capital should be prevented by law from joining the enterprise, the Cliamljcr i6 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA expressed its opinion in a verv decided way by registering 398 votes to 72 against the motion. The discnssion raised in the House of Commons followed a different course, though the views of the respective Governments were curiously alike. The scheme was regarded with nuich benevolence by Government, but, as we know, was opposed by a strong party in the House. Mr. Balfour's views were based on the belief — I give his own reported words — that ' whatever course English financiers mav take, and whatever course the Eno'lish Government may pursue, sooner or later this undertaking will be carried out. There is no difficulty in point of money. Whether the English Governn:ent do or do not assist, it is undoubtedly in the power of the British Government to hamper and impede and inconvenience any ]n'oject of the kind, but that that project will ultimately be carried out with or without our having a share in it there is no question. Therefore, the point on which His ^lajesty's Government will have ultimately to decide, and which the Government may safely and wisely take into consideration, is whether it is or is not desirable that, if this railwav connectino- the base of the ^Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf is to be constructed, British ca])ital and British interests should be as largely represented in it as the ca})ital of any foreign Power.' If Mr. Balfour has correctly summed up the situation, too nuich emphasis cannot be laid on the fundamental and dominating factor — viz., that whatever our attitude, be it for or against, the enterprise will be carried through. In the debates in the House attention was devoted rather to the detail of the scheme. The fundamental factor received scant considera- tion, and the Government, as we know, reluctantly with- drew its countenance. The situation is a curious one. In the days of the Euphrates A alley Pailway the public favoured the scheme, and Govermnent withheld its support. Now the rnlcs are reversed. RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 17 France followed our lead, and for the time being it would appear that negotiations are in abeyance. The attitude of Russia has been consistent throughout. Her press threw the whole weight of its opposition into the scales ; it expressed more of sorrow than of anger at the attitude of France. That her ally should support a scheme carrying in its train the possible rehabilitation of Asiatic Turkey was to her indeed surprising. It pointed out that the project conceived in Germany would, despite all internationalization, remain German in its essence, and would only lead to German aggrandizement at the expense of Europe in general, and of Great Britain in particular. Dire pictures were drawn of loss to British trade and prestige, of the aggressive element imported into the Persian Gulf, where Great Britain had hitherto reignt^d supreme. The Russian press deprecated also, Avith all its voice, a change in the status quo^ and sought to emphasize other personal differences between the two countries. Finall}^, Great Britain and France Avere heartily congratu- lated when the negotiations came to a standstill. Let us now criticise some of the details of this scheme. The generally accepted view was that the offers made by the German Syndicate for British support were inadequate. In return for providing some 30 per cent, of the capital, for assenting to an increase in Turkish tariff's, for finding a desirable port for the terminus of the line in the Persian Gulf, we were to receive inadequate representation on the Board of Directors. The question of equality of treatment was to l)e an open one ; nothing was said of special spheres of influence, though the Anatolian Railway Avas to maintain its separate entity. Taken at their face value, some of these details ap])eai" to offer an insuj)erable obstacle to a fair understanding, l)ut T venture to submit tliat they are not really as grave, as they would appear at first siglit. They seem to be 1 8 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA ratlier of the character of those ordinary business interests negotiation and goodwill often succeed in reconciling. Take the question of the enhancement of the tariffs. To this we may apply the arguments that the rights of the l)()ndholders would be effected, and that Great Britain would have to find the greater part of the enhanced rates. Now, are the exclusive interests of the l)ondholders to be allowed to wreck a scheme of reform the reasonableness of which is generally admitted ? Is the country at large to suffer because a small bodv of foreio-n bondholders take a hostile attitude ? Surely this is a matter for compromise ! The argument that Great Britain would pay the greater ])art of the revenue raised by the higher tariff is probably true. As to equality of treatment. Rejiorts ajipeared in the press that preferential rates were to be granted for all goods in through transit from Europe — i.c.^ not breaking bulk on reaching the Bosphorus — and it was argued that British imports, having to uidoad after their sea journey, would naturally suflt'er. I have never seen any confirmation of this report. It was explained that what British goods AYOuld have to pay in excess of German goods would be for storage whilst awaiting transit, and possibly certain port dues. Against this we nuist consider that British sea-borne goods could be landed cheaper at the Bosphorus than German rail-borne goods, and that the balance would thus probably be struck in favour of British goods. A fear, again, was expressed that German influence might be exerted in favour of special rates for different classes of German goods. It is often argued that so-called equality of treatment does not always mean justice of treatment. The recent commercial treaty, for instance, between Russia and Persia may be instanced as a case in point, for although we are supposed to benefit by the most favoured nation clause, the treaty was so framed as to favour Russian RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA uj imports. The remedy would seem to depend ii[)oii fair and equitable representation on the Board of Directors. It would, moreover, be essential that the Anatolian Railway should be subordinated in all such vital (piestions as rates to the common interests of the through line. Much has been said and written of the choice of a Gulf terminus to the Bao-hdad Railwav. The advantages of Koweit were recognised in 1857. These advantages remain the same now as then. The line does not, however, depend upon Koweit, other places may be found in Turkish territory ; but it is of much importance to us that the terminus should be located in some place where we cm readily exercise political control. Of our financial share in the enterprise, it has been suggested that, whilst German and French capital might well finance and construct the northern part of the line, British capital should do the same for the southern, the respective spheres of interest and control following the same broad division. This would seem to offer a possible practical solution of our differences The Anatolian Railway on the north and the Britisli Railway on the south w^ould thus hold the same relative positions towards the scheme as a whole. Much has been said in disparagement of the kilometric guarantee, and of the burden it imposes upon the Turkish Government. The burden would presumably be much less if the British Government supported the proposal for the enhanced tariffs. The fact, too, must not be forgotten that the Anatolian Railwav is now doinii; so well as to l)e practically independent of the kilometric guarantee. There is no reason for thinking that the Gulf-Baghdad section would not in reasonal)le time do equally well, as soon as the branch line l)e built to Khanikin. Tiie desert section would certainly entail heavy sacrifices on tlie part of the Turkish Treasury, which, by all accounts, it is prepared to accept. In any case a guarantee fountl good 20 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA enough for (Jerinan money niiglit be found good enough for British. Another and important (juestion remains — that of representation on the Board of Directors. The representa- tion, as originally proposed, was based roughly on a capital basis, with special regard for the riglits of the Ottoman Government and the Anatolian liailway, and would have o;iven an overwhelmino- voice to German CD O ca])ital. This, Mr. Chirol says, was admitted by the Germans both in Paris and London to be an impossible arrangement. If this be so, both France and England could doubtless obtain such representation as the material and moral advantages they have to offer would warrant. Any special rights accorded to the German Anatolian liailway might well be accorded also to the British Southern Railway, and a satisfactory answer found on these lines. In fact, I venture to believe that the whole question of detail might be settled on business principles. I do most sincerely hope that we shall take up the thread of negotiation, and give our best support to the f altilment of this enterprise. The solidarity of our permanent interests with those of Germany should be strong enough to brush away the cobwebs ephemeral jealousies have woven. The statii.s quo in the Persian Gulf, as we now know it, can no lonoer be maintained, and it is to oar interests to take a leading part in a scheme which will ultimately change the political and social relations of the whole of Asia jSIinor and Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia and the Karum districts are the richest undeveloped fields in the Middle East, of surpassing promise and ])otentiality. I pray that the genius of the Anglo-Saxon races may be the moving powers in the regeneration of these regions. RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 21 CAUCASUS AND PEESIA. I now come to that hraiich of iiiv subject wliicli refers to the Caucasian system of railways, more especially in its relation to the future question of Turkey in Asia and Persia. The map will show that great efforts are being- made to remedy the chief defects in the communications between Russian railways in Europe and the frontiers of Turkey and Persia. The gap on the western littoral of the Black Sea separating the Kerch-Dhankoi line from that of the Black Sea coast-line remains to be bridged, whilst direct central communication between the lines on the northern and southern side of the Caucasian mountain rano'e has vet to be effected. The Russian Government have, it would appear, under consideration a new line to connect the European and Western Asiatic railway systems. This line will pass through Voznessenk, Nicolaiev, and Kherson, in order to meet at Dhankoi. The Kerch- Dhankoi line is to be extended towards Anapa and Xovoros- sisk, to effect a junction with the Black Sea coast-line, which will finally l)ranch to Kars and Erivan. The Tiflis- Erivan line is to be extended to Julfa. The European system will thus be brought into direct touch with the Turkish and Persian frontiers, Kars being the objective in the one case, Julfa in the other. Another extension to connect the Batoum-Baku line witli the Cas})ian provinces of Talisli and Gilan has been repeatedly talked of. This branch would start from a point south of Baku on the main line, and run through Lenkoran and Astara to the south and east till it reached the Persian tableland. It is doubtful whether this latter ])roject has ever assumed any practical shape. It would be ditHcult to construct, expensive, and neitlier commer- cially nor strategically would the gain be commensurate with the cost. Leavinii this extension, lliercrore, entii'cl v out 22 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA of the (question, we see that much remains to be done l)e£ore Russia can be satisfied with the means of communication by huid l)etwecn her European provinces and those of her Western Asiatic frontier. It is an appreciation of such factors that lias induced Russia to impose on the Government of Persia an agree- ment by which railway enterprise must lie dormant for a term of years. She thus prevents any competitor entering the lists before she is ready to do so herself. In the present state of her finances it stands to reason that she cannot undertake any large scheme of construction in a countr}' of no immediate vital importance to her. Rail- ways in Persia such as Russia would require would mean not only a large initial outlay, but a continuous burden for their maintenance, whilst their strategic value would be doubtful. For these reasons I am inclined to believe in the continuance of her present policy — that is, a renewal, if })ossible, of the present agreement with the Persian Government. That Russia would have liked to impose a simiLar paralysis on railway enterprise in Asia Minor and Meso- ])otamia I have no doubt. Any change in the status of Asiatic Turkey, or any concentration of European interests in Mesopotamia, can only prejudice Russia's future in those regions, and that she should stand as the exponent of the .sfdfifs (jKo in that country, as also in Persia, is the natural result of her ])resent stage of development and of her resources. It Avas about eio-ht vears a^o that Itussian engineers, bent on railway reconnaissance, commenced to travel over Persia. They examined the following lines of country : from Abbassabad or JuU'a on the Araxes to Tabriz, Tehran, Kaslian, Yezd, Kirman, Bander Abbas, and the ports on the Persian coast of the Indian Ocean ; from Tabriz again bv Kurdistan to Kirmanshah and Khanikin on the Turkish frontier ; and cpiite recently the country between ]\Ieshed RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 23 and the Indian Ocean, striking* Persia from north to south. Anotlier line of importance likewise examined in Eastern Persia is that which may one day unite the Quetta-Chaman Railway with the Transcaspian system, passing through the north-eastern corner of Persia. This can better be touched ujion when referring to the Transcaspian Railway system. The through line from Meshed southward along the borders of Afghanistan and Baluchistan, which has caused so much discussion, has been shown by Sir Thomas Holditch to offer almost insuperable difficulties. The trend of the mountains is against its trace, its cost would be prohibitive, whilst the danger to which it would be exposed in the event of trouble along its Afghan and Baluchistan border would recommend caution. The question of a defensible port for the southern terminus of the line is one also now likelv to be a factor of much greater consideration in view of recent Russian experience in the Far East. The Indian Ocean, with its open roadstead, dominated by a great naval power, offers no attractions in this re.s])ect. • A'more likely line would l)e that from Tabriz to Bander Abbas via Tehran, Yezd, and Kirman. It presents no great physical problems. Engineers might, indeed, regard it as an ideal line for constructive purposes. It would, moreover, be protected either by its proximity to the Russian frontier or by the great desert of the Lut. On tlie other hand, its cost and maintenance would be heavy. Finally, there is tlie sjime inhospitable coast of the Persian Gulf or the Indian ( )cean. Its construction would foreshadow a serious alteration in external relations Avith Persia. It would affect the integrity of that country, and would a])pear to menace the Baluchistan frontier. Mahan talks of the fear of Russia outfiaiikir.g the nu)uutains of Afghanistnn, a fear which Avould be accentuated 11" K'lissin wci-c ever in raihva\' 24 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA communication with a point so far south as Kirman. A rearrano-ement of the Baluch frontier mio'ht then become necessary, whilst the Nushki line of railway would possibly he ])rolonged to the west and south towards Bander Abbas. It must always be remembered in this connec- tion that the Nushki line could })e projected westward to strategic centres very nuich more quickly than could any line starting from the Russian frontier. The political advantages of this line do not seem to balance its inherent disadvantages, whilst, financially speaking, the outlook would l^e deplorable. A much more important line to Russia would appear to be from Julfa to Tabriz, Kirmanshah, and Khanikin, pointing directly at Baghdad — a line easily protected, easilv constructed, and offering many facilities for trade. It must be remembered that Fuad-Pascha, in his political testament of 1860, gave it as his belief that 'in future the most serious attacks of Russia will be directed on Asia Minor.' If Fuad-Pascha's prediction be of any value, a line through Azerbaijan to the Turkish frontier would add considerably to the striking power of Russia. It would place her in a safe position on the flank of the whole of Mesopotamia. At Kirmanshah she would be able to feed and mass troops not only by her line of rail, but by road from the Caspian vi;i Kazvin and Hamadam, at all of which places would supplies and transport be sufficient, if not al)undant. At her back would be Azer- baijan, with the best fighting material in Persia, supplying men by no means adverse to leading an attack on their traditional enemy across the border. I need not comment further on the fresh complications with which Turkey would have to deal with an Achilles' heel in jMesopotamia. It is regrettable that British enter])rise, under present economic and jiolitic-al conditions, is unable to interest itself seriousl\- in railway construction in Persia. RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 25 TEANSCASPIA. Now, to pass to Transcaspia. The main features of the railway system of Transcaspia have not been altered in great degree of recent years. The progress of con- struction has not been rapid, but up to the present the single line of rail from Krasnovodsk to Tashkend and Andijan has fairly well met the economic needs of the country. The amount of land under cultivation is strictly limited by the water-supply, and as that cannot be added to with- out great initial outlay, for which money is not available, there can be no expectation of further rapid development of new agricultural areas. The railway has eifected a curious economic change, for a large proportion of the area, once under wheat and other cereals, now grows nothing but cotton. To such an extent is this the case that Turkistan has become an important consumer of Russian and Persian wheat, immense quantities being- imported from the Kuban and other districts of the Caucasus, as well as from Khorassan. It was at one time thought that the country irrigated by the Zerafshan River would be able to meet the deficit in Bokhara, but this proved to be far from the case. I travelled through Turkistan in 1893, before the cotton cultivation had reached its present expansion, and even then found that grain was pouring in from Kussia. Russian civil officials have always taken rather the economic than any other view of the cotton question in Turkistan, and the ])essi- mistic fear of the military element as to the difficulties a shortness of grain foods might give rise to in time of Avar were never allowed to react to the detriment of the industry of the country. I have drawn attention to this one fact to show that an important economic as well as strategic question had to 26 RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 1)0 solved ill Turkistan. From both tlicse points of view tlie earlv construction of another line strikins: back from Taslikend through Orenburg to liussia became an im- perative necessity. As long as Turkistan was served by a sino'le line of rail losins; itself in Fersfhana, the situation was one of isolation, if not of danger. Now the loop to be formed from Krasnovodosk around to Orenburg via Tashkend will, in case of trouble on this Eastern border, serve the double purpose of allowing an influx of food- stuffs from Russia for military exigencies, as well as the usual efflux of cotton, any check to which would be severely felt by the merchants of Moscow and Poland. Turkistan, instead of being a detached province of the Empire, will thus form a part of the body politic of Russia, and, both economically and strategically, be not inadequately served. This line is under construction by way of Orsk, Irghiz, and the valley of the Syr Darya, and is said will be completed early in 1905. Russian papers speak of it as ])art of the great scheme whereby Moscow is to be united with the heart of Central Asia and of Afghanistan, and which will })laec the keys to the routes of India in the hands of Russia. This may or may not be so, l)ut it will certainly enal)le her to carry out all her movements, military or otherwise, in Central Asia behind a screen almost impossible of penetration. A scheme very dear to the heart of General Annenkoff, of Central Asian fame, was a prolongation of the Trans- caspian system, via Chimkend, Auliata, Yernoe, and Semiretchi, to Semipalatinsk, north of which it would unite ultimately with the Trans-Siberian line — another ideal line from a ])urely engineering point of view, the only works of first-class importance on it being probably the bridging of the Hi River and the Irtish at Semi- palatinsk. This is a line wliicli must eventually be made RAILWAYS IN WESTERN ASIA 27 to insure direct communication Ix'twecn Transcnspia and Siberia. I travelled through Kashgar to Semii)alatinsk in 1