UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE SCHOOLMEN AND QROTIUS. FARTS I, II, and III. # BY J. MARTIN LITTLEJOHN, University Fellow in Political Philosophy. 11 XiihmlttM in parthil fulfilment of the regalrcmmfs for ll» f>t>f/ree of Doctor of Philosophi/. in the Faailti/ of rolitical Science, Columhiti Unirerxiti/.-X. Y. 1896 A<^. Preface. The following pages art' the result of investigations in the field of Medieval Politics. The topic was first selected and the original plan, which has been adhered to throughout, was first formulated under the inspiration of the ideas of the late Professor Lorimcr of Edinburgh University. Valuable sug- gestions were received from Advocate W. G. Miller, lecturer on Political Philosophy and International Law in my Alma Mater, G]nsg 163 ' ' 39 181 ' • 18 201 • ' 40 202 ' 7 202 • ' 9 202 ' ' 26 204 ' ' 8 206 ' ' 16 207 ' ' 5a 213 • • 17 216 • • 13 224 ■ ■ 38 231 • • 3 232 • 14 232 • • 24 237 • • 31 238 • • 33 257 • • 42 261 • • 9 262 • ■ 42 263 ■ • 14 273 • ■ 2 275 • • 17 282 • • 3 292 • • 35 293 • • 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Introduction.— 1. Aristotle.— 2. Science of pnlitics.—3. Why unite School- men and Grotius?— Estimate of the Schoolmen.— 4. Grotius.— Estimate of Grotius. — 5. Transition to Scholasticism, Origin and Character.— Work of Grolius and predecessors pp. 1-9. PART I. SCHOLASTIC POLITICAL THEORY BEyORE AQUINAS. CHAPTER I.— PREPARATION FOR SCHOLASTICISM.— METHOD OF SCHOLASTICS. 1. Age of Clmrch Fathers and early Middle Ag'es. — 2. The Conflict of Sec ular and Spiritual power. — 3 Rise of Scholastic philosophy. — Study of dia- lectics pp. 1 l-K). CHAPTER II.— POLITICAL THEORY BEFORE AQUINAS. 1. Where Scholasticism takes up political theory. — 2. General character of Scholastic philosophy.— 3. Scholastic political Theory begins with Augu.s- tine. — Political principles of Augustine;— (1) property; (2) slavery; (3) the origin and character of government; (4) the state and the Church; (5) the Uni- ty of humanity.— 4. The influence of Stoicism.— Stoic principles.— Boethius.— Alcuim.— Joannes ScotusErigena. — Anselm.— Abelard.— 5. Hincmar, Archbp. of Rheims. — His theory.— 6. The Ecclesiastical system of politics. — Gregory the Great, and his works. — Growth of the Church power. — Nicolas I.— Hilde- brande and his position. — Manegold. — Waltram. — Innocent III. and Summit of papacy. — 7. Divisions of Scholasticism.— 8. First period of Sciiolasticism.— Bernard.— Hugh St. Victor.— 9. Peter Lombard.— Alexander Hales.— Bona- venture. — Albert the Great. — Works of Albert. — JO. John of Salisbury. — (1) Theocratic idea of the state.— (II) The State as an organism.— (Ill) Doctrine of Tyrannicide.— 11. Hugh of Fleury pp. 17-48. PART II. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THOMAS AQUINAS. CHAPTER I. —PRELIMINARY. 1. Political Science of Middle Ages untouched.— Revival of interest in Science.— 2, Who was Thomas?— His works.— Estimate of Thomas.— Works on politics. — 3. Aquinas great representative Schoolman.— Authority in Schol- asticism. — Method pp. 49-57. 1 1 . TABLE OF COXTEXTS. CHAPTER TI.— ETHICAL PKINCIPLES AT THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICS. 1. Political Science inTlioraas.— Division of Sciences.— Natural and super- natural.— 2. Law.— (1) eternal, (2) natural, (3) human, (4) Divine law.— Law of nature in the liistory of political Science.— .S. Justice.— Definition and nature of justice and right PP- "j-S-OS. CHAPTER III.— CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS SOCIAL ELEMENTS. 1. Association and concept of civil societ5'.--(l) assDciation: (2) the idea of power; (3) comna unity of interest.— 2. Right of property.— Private property distinguished from community.— Community in use.— 3. Political disaliilities. —Slavery.— (1) pyschological, and (2) theological basis for slavery, not opposed to natural law.— Mitigation of slavery pp. 69-83. CHAPTER IV.— THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF 'J'HE STATE. I. Origin of the state.— Natural and actual origin.— Idea of contract.— It is establishment of government.— 2. Nature of the state.— (1) The state is an order of social life.— (2) The state is a natural order of social life.— (3) The state as an organism.- 3. Psycho-physical charater of the state.— Moral and physical elements.— Physical basis of the state.— Territory.— Climaie.—An agricultural state.— Beauty of landscape.— 4. People.— One people.— Cultured people.— Elements of state-population.— Farmers, intermediate classes, gov- ernors.— Land in relation to the people.— Citizenship.— 5. Nature of the ideal state pp. S4-103. CHAPTER V. — THE END OF THE STATE. 1. The end in general— Same for individual and state-happiness.— 2. Two- fold end in the state.— (1) Union of social neings: (2) making tliem good citizens.— 3. Temporal aim ot the state, unity and peace.— Aim of rulers of the state.— Aim of state in as far as subjects are concerned.— 4. Sum- mary PP- 104-114. CHAPTER VI. — ACTIVITY OF THE STATE. SOVEREIGNTY. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE. 1. Activity.— Power and government. — 2. Sovereignty in the state.— Pow- er in itself, in its origin, and in its use.— Sovereignty of political virtue and sovereignty of the people.— 3. Functions of the government.— The relation of government to the unity and peace and w elfare of society.— A complete ruler.— Political virtue, prudentia.— Executive, legislative, and judicial . . .pp. lir)-]27. CHAPTER VII. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 1. Form of government, not of state.— Governments ere. just or unjust.— Governments classified according to the ends of llie society and the numbers in the governing body.— Constitutions of the Slate, Kingdom, Aristocracy and Polity.— 2. Actual forms. — Monarchy.— Tyranny.— Aristocracy and Oli- garchy.— Republic and Democracy.— 3. The best form of government.-DitTei- cnce between the best, in theory and practice.— Two kinds of kingdoms.— In the De Reg. Prin. practical theory.— The ideal form in the Summa.— 4. The worst form of government.— Tyranny the worst.- Tyrarmy under the three TABLE OF CONTENTS. III. t'oriDS pp. 128-UH. CHAPTER VIII. RULE AND OBEDIENCE. LIMITATIONS UPON THE ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND STATE. 1. Idea of the power.— Mode of acquisition and manner of use.— Despotic, nt.val, and political power. — 2. Limitations arising from the position of the rulers. — Motives that lead to rule well. — Love of right and fear of punish- ment. —Limitation in qualification for office. — Constitutional government. — 3. Limitations arising from the position of the subjects. — Is obedience abso- lute. — 4. Positive limits. — The right of revolution.— Sedition.— Tyrannicide. - -5. To prevent corruption. — Resistance to the judgment of the ruler. — Con- Hscation. restitution pp. 144-101. CHAPTER IX. THE RELATION OF THE TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL. CHURCH AND STATE. 1. Temporal and Spiritual power. — Differs from Ai'istotle.- 2. The believ- ing anfl un believing. — .3. I ii tolerance. — Inquisition.— Persecution, .pp. 1()2-176. CHAPTER X. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VIEWS OF AQUINAS. GERMS OF NATION- AL-POLITICAL ECONOMY. 1. Introduction. Trade and commerce. — 2. State regulation. — Marriage. — Education. — Progress. — 3. Wealth. — Taxation. — Money.— 4. Usury. — lieason- abl e price pp. 1 77-1 U4. CHAPTER XL CONCLUSION OF AQUINAS. 1. View of the anonymous continuator of Thomas. — Theocratic idea of poli- tics.— 2. Estimate of Thomas pp. I!),")-!!)!). PART III. POLITICAL THEORY OF THE LATER SCHOOLMEN. CHAPTER I. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS AND TRIUMPIIUS. 1. Transition to later Schoolmen. — Change, (1) the assertion of national consciousness, (2) Impeiialism becomes a dream: (.'{) In the d(>cline of t be Empire the Church is gi'adually becoming stronger. — 2. Aegidius Romanus. — (I) Ethical basis of political theory. (1 1) Economic basis of political theoi'v. — .'5. ( III) Political theory proper;— (1) The philosophy of civil rule; (2) the best politics in time of peiice; (:5) policy of war.— (lY) Ecclesiastical politics. — 4. Augustinus Triumfo.— Temporal and spiritunl powers pp. 200-21."). CHAPTER II. DANTE MARSILIUS. OCKIIAM. MYCLIF. 1. Contest of the 14th. Century.— Nationality.— I'-ipal liulls. — Pliilip of France and Louis of Baviiria. — Peter du Bois. — De uf ra(iue potestate. — Raoul de Presles.— 2. Dante. — (I) Is universal temporal monarchy as represent I'd in tlie emi)ire necessai'y to the good of the liunnin race?- (II) Did llie Roman people rightly possess Imijeiial powerV— (111) Is the Imperial autliority de- rived from Ciod or from the \'ic;ir of (i(»dy— 15. Marsilius of Padua.- (I) (Jen- eral Tlieory of the state. — Legislative, executive, official and military power. — (II) Theory of the civil and religious oiders.— Doctiine of toleration. -(Ill) Conclusion. — Dist inguisliing lheoiog\ fiom politics. Tlie Sliite as an organ- 1\. TABLE OF CONTENTS. ization of free men. — The people is sovereijfn. — 4. William of Ockliam. — Posi- tion ill the Imperial contest. — Position in the Franciscan stru^^sjle.— (I) Nominalist ideas at the basis of politics. — (lI)Tlie()losrical politics. — (1) Liber- ty. — (2) Authority. — Pope or Emperor. — .5. John Wyclif. — Position. — (I) Gen- eral theory of lordship.— (II) Application of the theory of lordship. — No one guilty of mortal sin has any ri^^ht to property. — Righteousness is the fundamental principle of lordship.- The gospel law alone is necessary in the exercise of lordship. — Lordship implies service.— Summary — pp. 216-252. CHAPTER III. SPANISH JURISTS. VICTORIA. SOTO. SUAREZ. 1. Introduction. — Humanism.— Spanish Jurists.— The Jesuit schools.— 2. Vasquez. — Francis de Victoria. — Relectiones Theologicae.— Antonio Augus- tino, author of Emendationes Juris Civilis.— Dominic Soto.— De Justitia et de Jure. — Topics treated. — 3. Francis Suarez. — Position and Life.— (I) First principles in politics. — (II) Law. — Divisions of law and definition. — Justice. — (III)— Civil society.— Man as asocial being and a being of law.— (IV) Sover- eignty and temporal power. — Tyranny and tyrannicide. — (V) Government, its elements and forms. — Potestas which is delegated and alienated. — Legislative power.— (VI) The Civil and Ecclesiastical.— Position of papal and civil pow- ers. — Liberty of conscience. — (VII) International law pp. 253-296. INTRODUCTION, 1. Not inappropriately may vre invoke the name of the great fatlier of Political Science upon the effort to set forth a philosophy that was in a great measure inspired hy his genius. Tlie memory of Aristotle formed the grand inspiration of the men who cover this wide field of Scholasticism and Re- n iscence. From Greece, or better through Greece, came to modern civilization almost every contribution that has been made to the advance of learning. Chiefly through the tempering and humanizing influence of the logical system of the Stagyrite, although it came at first through the adulterated medium of Saracenic philosophising, learning arose out of the corruption of the age of darkness, to takeits place as the guiding star of the world towards happiness and greatness. In no Science does the Greek influence occupy a positionof such commanding importanceas in tbatof politics. Tliespiritthat founded the Science brought it forth frtmi the womb of time to a second birth, more than a thousand years after its first conception. Aristotle, as the first great writer on the Science of Politics, gathered into complete system the scattered fragments of an earlier antiquity, basing it upon an analytical study of over one hundred and fifty constitutions, and gave an impetus to Political studies that has f>nly been intensified with the lapse of ;r:os. It is not wonderful that the introduction of a system poscssed of such scientific completeness, even in imperfect translations, should tend to dispel the dark- ness which had enveloped every science within its mazes and produce the first awakening of a promised scientific reformation.* 2. In order to define our field the (luestion may bo asked, is there such a Science as P(tlitics? This (luestion has been answered by r)ther writers. It is a question of importance, where does Politics stand in the great i':i. 493. 5. Lecturi'.s on recent iScience, 54. !). Hist, of I'liil. Trans. I'or. I. 3. 10. Phil, of Hist. p. 371). T'sTIMiDTr TTfi Now, li()\vc\ci'. ill tlic liK'it "f icsea cclu's inadciti thova^^t fielfldf Scholastic litoratui-e a tnifi' isi iinatc has been formed of the learniiij,^ and worth of 1 hrsc iiicM nC ;i toi ind a.ui'. Aside from ) he works of Mohl, Janet, Bluntschli, Sliiekland lllakry in wliicli we have a true, though Virief account of the hihors of these men, t here is amassing a comprehensive literature in praise of the schoolmen, in which there is a recognition of the indel)tedness of the modern woild to lie se wiitings so long unread. Sir William Hamilton, than whom n(» hrig'ilei' ligure shines in the philosophical history of Europe, speaks of them with much appieciation: (1) among others are Maurice, (2) Sir .1. .AFcTntosh. Cii I'ope. (4) ITampden, (■")] Lord, (H) Guizot, (7) Neander, (S) t'onsin, (9) Townsciid. (lO) Draper, (11) Coleridge, (12) Staughton, (13) Thomas JIarijer. S. J.. (14 1 l)"Aui)igne. (IT)) We trust thai liir result of a fulU'r acquaintance with these men and their writ ings will jnsi ii\ 1 lie most laudatory senlimentsof recent writers. "In treating of the suhjeci of jurisprudence," writes Townsend of Thomas A(iuinas, 'iie was led by the iirincijjles he adopted into conclusions which, if followed out lo t heir last result, vvould produce the most complete over- Ilii'owofall tyranny boih civil and ecclesiastical. lie insists that in the I'eason of man law is dominaiil . ll is a standard of human action and must be considered as the iiilc and measure of all acts of the i'eason. A law thus existing is iwwerfully operative and the acts of the reason are within its ojierations. But this touches also iheaction of the will in t he at tainment of the ends for which reason co-oixiatcs activcdy and etl'cct ually. These ideas lie applies to social and political life: he artirms that the will of tlie majority f»f the people is the only i-eallv governing and legishttiv(> authority: that the Pi-ince is only the interpreter of the will of the great body of the Nation. Thus he anticipated someofliie must earnest [ileadeis of Constitutional liberty in laying down lliis juinciple as a corner stone of his system, and es- pecially as Prof. Maurice has well pointed out, he anticipated Locke in ad- vocating a view of so democratic a tendency, which c-ould not fail to produce final fruit in the course of succeeding ages." (Ki) "The Schoolmen were the liist gi'cat reformers in Kurope. . . .leaders on the side of a wronged humanity . . . .there was never wanl ing a Sclioolm in to tight on the side of liberty of conscience and freedom of I hoiii^in until the grand result was obtained, "the right of thinking as we will and of speaking as we think." (IT) "They did not 1. Disriissions, I4n. :l. Mor. and Met. I'hil. 1. Cli;. :(. Worli.s vol. I.4S. 411. 4. Coinin'iid. of 'riirni. \.l\. ."). |{:i 1111)1 on bicl. VII 1. I'l. Ht'iicoii Liiihls (if llisioiv. 7. Coins .1' llisl. M,,(l. 1. :.'M. 5. (ll. liist. ^■ol. VI. 4,"i; \lll. 17. Ili'cnii. lli^i. lU's. :a(i: ■r.]\\ iisiiid. p. :{i7 !i. Mod. I'liil. II. \i. 1(1. (ir. Scliooliiicn in Mid. .Ssii'.s. II. IiiUd. Devel. of Euf. 11 ;i. l:>. Tuble Talk. 240. 13. .\.u;fsof (.'liiisl. :itl4. 14. .M.-lapli. of (licScJiool. Intiod. 1.-.. \(i:cc(if till' cliuirh. HI. pD, :?:i4. :,. succeed in obtaining for the world the full blessing of libertj' they were a powerful force in preparing for the battle in the future; they sowed the seeds of political, moral, metaphysical and religious truth they succeeded in evoking a love of wisdom and a spirit of enqtiiry which could not, and would not be restrained they were left behind by new generations who, witlioutdne acknowledgemeni, of tne services or tender gratitude for the sacritices of their predecessors were borne on to triumph. Meantime those who had done so much were left to neglect and contumely until in the far distant future the morning should dawn when thsir services sliould have recognition and their reputation a bright resurrection."* '4. By a remarkable coincidence Hugo Grotius has been subjected to the same measure of reproach as these scholastic precursors whoso system he frees from the fetters of Ecclesiasticism. His works were composed amid circumstances of personal adversity; his life, one of exceptional honour, was largely spent in exile, while his sympathies towards the free rights of man were called forth by the struggles of blood through which the nations of Europe were then called to pass. In his great work, the Summa of all his other works, his design was "to settle the grounds of the rights of men in civil society,"! being one of the first great political philf)sophers who attempted to establish a basis for society and human governaient apart from the dictation of the Church and independent of Theological Dogmat- ism. But tliis attempt to revolutionize the ideas at the basis of the political system lirought upon him the contempt of others. Voltaire scoffs at Gr(»lius, "On est partage, dans les ecoles entre Grotius et Puffendorf. Croyez-moi, lisez les Offices de Ciceron."t De Quincey has said, the book is <(iually divided between empty truisms and time-serving Dutch falsehoods. § Dugald Stewart, speaking of Grotius and Putfendorf, says, "notwithstand- ing all their industry and learning, it would be very difficult to name any class (»r writers, whose lai)ors have been of less utility to the world. "|| This is well answered in the Edinburgh Ueviow.'l The work of (ii'olius is in reality the climax of the better part of Scholasti- cism, the resuirecti(»n of what was eternal from the sepulchre of these decaying systems, the transit ion from the freer spiiit of the Spanish School- men, who by the principles of the llouian jurisprudence, accommodated to the casuistical character of .lesuitism, departed fr(»m the iron-bound yoke of scholastic philosophy and pointed the way, totlie emancipation of reason * Townst'iul pp. :m. (i. NkKI) tORK.KPI.OHINr. THE FIKM) OK THE SCHOOr.MEN. TlllllOliin II. (Ji sihicic (Icr I'liilosophie VIII. Miiiici. INll; Cousin, ("ours de rhist.de la I'liil. p. :,'<(. I'aiis I Kiilicld.llivl, uf I'liil. p. 11:24. :; I l:i luilldiis h'.(\. ol' Sicwuil . works I. j). l','<. Note. S Kiicyc. Miil. (Jiolius; llcly. Etudo .siir ledroii dv la ;?iu'rii' de Grotius Paris 1S75. II Sii'w.irfs Mlsc. i;;!. • Vol. .X.WII. pp. ■.VJii-.M^. •■ \, TXTi'.f.DTCTTOX. (•Ii:ir;ict('i islic of niodorn times. It sol, licldrc King.^; r.r.d Covci nors tlio son- liinents of nil wliorn Jparnod men iuld in reverence, and contributed ••to ditTuse a i'ev(M-ence for principles of justice" wiucii conjmended itself 1(1 liic tlic approbation of all tbinkin^' men. The key-note of a new order is sonnded in the sentiment expressed with pathos by Grotiiis at 1 he very close (tf Ins Masterpie:-e. "unn pofc.-if (JIk jirnd^'asc Clor'yinit qicii- honuncni l.< iniihliis hisrcldhildii fiirlt."^ ••That doctrine can have no petinanent xalidiiy which renders man the enemy of his fellow-men." Doctrines cannot work well which make men unlit for society. It is the prophecy witii which a reirenerated political theory is presented to mankind. Jilniilsclili. speakinii of (Jrf)t ius. justly dechires. '•the eloquence of hisdic- ijiin. I he p<';ii Is (if classical anti(iuity with wliich he adorned his page.s, the lenip( idl hinnanilN which pervaded his arjiument, his effort to mitigate the lioiiors of I he t liirl \ yeais wai-. in the midstof which he wrote, and the warmth of his swnpaiby foi- a moral opposed to a material order, enlisted men's hearts on t he side of his reason in >:. while the deficiencies of his doctrine were iini ;is yet detected. "t The reputation of Grotius and the enduring inlluence of ills writ ings need no recommendat ion in the light of to-day. Tlie most etTecti\e answei- to the unmeasured censure of pseudo-ajxilogists is the fact ihat political science gathered around the centre which Grotius set up in dc- lens"(if the rights f)f men and the liberties of nations as well as the political sovei-eigiit.\' of the |)eople foi' more than a century. .'). 'I'h'Te is a natural s(>(]uence in the order of thought fi'om the School- men toGi'otius. A(iuinas, '•the Saint. Schnlar and Monk of the Medieval ages.""+ is the iMosf cot^si^icuous figure in the live centuries preceeding the gcneial refoiuiat ion arid his SEC'TNDA skcuxdae remained during that per- iiid the Klhieal ( 'ode of (Jhi-istendon). 'I'he later Schf»ol men all speak of the sujjerior ehaiac tcr ( f .\( uiras" works. I'oiitenelle says of him. ■"in ai;other aye .\(|Uin;is might have be(Mi a Itescartes." ]luf it was n simvi d for Lcilitiil /. I he illusi rioiis pbildsoplier. to strikethe key-note of t he relati(;n of Gro Ml IS to I he School men in thai saying of his so often r(* pea ted. ■"t here was a trold in the impure mass of Scholastic l'hilosoi)hy ;ind (imtius dis- co vei'ed ][.'"'/. This JiiflgiiK lit avoids t he t wo ext I'cmes and jireseiit s t he t rut h that there is very much gold in t hese writ ings. Scholasi irism pidperl,\ s|(.;\i : S( |n;.!iii \'il . (iioi. I'lnnkr. Ad X.k' ii. i;::'.': '11: (.11;;.-. Ili^t. .Iiir. N;0 . |). C.S: (ii(i( iiiii;;-. Ilil;. .i m. (lent . p. '^.M : Itili. .) iii'. l!i.|,ci-ls. on I'll nciidoi f. : l!i-;n-(,n l.lL;hl>. I.ni.l. II. 'IM i ll.i lupd-'n's Life 1)1" .\(|iiiii;is. F,n;-y.'. Me: lopul.: I!l;il;ystematising. There is found amonj^ his works a system of Lo^ic, mainly Stoic, which is that followed chiiinj,' the Middle Aji-cs.* Under the guise of Augustine's name the subtle- ties of dialectics were taught in the schools of the Monks. f The writings of Aristotle were known only in tiie manual "f Augustine till the beginning of the 12tii Centuiy.i 1" Ihe 12Lh Century the system of dialectics which had been tauglit for centuries in a manufactured translation, was studied in the original language <5 Tlie position of the Schoolmen m ly be described, Aquinas was tlie most distinguished chamijif)n ftf Aristotelian Augustinianism. He represented the more mf)derate views, declaring thai the civil powers possessed Ihesupi'emecy in purely temporal atfiirs. while the Church was limited in her authority to spiritual matters. || Moral duty is based up;):i mati's nature and the social welfare. Ockliam the celebrated Englisli Schoolman modifies this doctrine Ity making tin' absolute will of God the ground of morality, so that '•if God had commanded his creaturesto hate him" it should have ))een man's duty to ol»ey.1 Tlie Sclioolmeri derived their name from those who taught in theCathedral Schools. These Schools or Colleges were erected adjacent to the Cathedral Cliurches, or in the Monasteries, and were given into the charge of the learned doctors whose duty it was to attend t(» tlie education of those entrusted to them. After the regime of these schools passed out of the hands of the Church teachers into the professional class they still retained the old name. Out of tlie Monastic Schools sprung the public institutions of learning in wliich philosophy was taught by those professors, named Scholastics, who vied with one another in the useof dialectics. The Institutes of Augustine, and latterly the W(n-ks of Ai-istotle, until the sc!i:)lastics prepared commen- taries, Sutnmas. etc., were the te.xt-buoks in these schools of learning, ajjplied chiefly to the study of Theology. Scholasticism thus gradually rose up from the beginniag of the .Jth to the 12th Centuries, after which it nourished for three centuries.** During the sixteenth century, in Spain, tlun the leading nation of Europe, we not ice t he appearance of an independent spirit in the study of political sultjects. Taking as their basis the Scholastic writings tlie Spanish Jourists with a keen insight into tin; essential principles of justice, apirt altogether f/(uu p;»silive law. began to piililish t r<;il ises on .histiceand IMglit, in which, though not freed from the authority of the Doctors and thongii still fettered by the inlluences of the confessional, they iiresented the duties of men and of ■ Itihli.ill., I,;i1. l-:il.i- III. p .".i:i. ■I Liiiliuiilis (If Scliolis Ccl. ('. .V.) ;iit. 1. p. ir^'. 1 1 :i m:). 1717. :l; luilit'ld. Ili.sl. I'liil 4s:). S Ci;is.sviul. Exi'l'c. I'.ii-;i(l. !l(lv. Arist. r,\. Ill; liaiiiKiiiis dc I'o;!. .Viisl.C. I. li .\(|'.iiti;is. Vol. \' I II. 4 U. (),) •:■,•!. Paris 1 ;il: M -Inlosli. I'll !li)M)))liy. p. -111. '.'. iiolc 11. * Ciidworlli's I iiiiiiiiliibh' Mobility, p. M. ■^ r.i!)!. •(•!!. )v. (!.■ Itiv S -li .1. ('. l-;i. Cuiii I'liicf. Iliiiiriiiiii: HmcIiI. Is:i,'. Hisl. Tln-ol. If. 1: ANu il !■ I <>c. I I . II..: .N :nl ili i, <..v .v, Ltl. J\.< i.;..sl. 1 1 ; 1 nl.. ;(! 1 li.si . J 1..! -I! :> i>; i-ii.illi. Kcl. JJi.>I. W.I. ll I'l. II. * . :.'s. J,, i:,:\ Mj. T":cTrLor>rrT7r.-:c. iiMlirms (M) llic I'l'iiiidation of liiiiiKiii iiat iiic;ii):irl t'loni aiiv Code (/(' morals (ir lt'i;al iiist itiit ions dl' slatos. Francis dc N'ictoria was tlie first, to wlioni (Jrolius acknowlcdjics^ liis olilij^ations. who broke I lie spell of sclioiast icisin. His illustrious pupil Dominic Soto, 1 lie oi'acle ot llie Council ot'l^renl. dedicated Ills woik I ii JiisHlin ti dr Jmr to Don Carlos. We notice in this work the movement towards freedom. The necessity of manuals for the {Tuidance of priests in the advice ^iven in the Confessional produced in this i^reat stronyliold of CaUiolicism many works on Natural Ilii„'ht. l''rancisSuarez, "the acutestof philosophersand divines" according toCrotius, the last of the Schoolmen, presents even more clearly than (Jrotius -himself till' piMctica! application of justice to nu'U and nations.* S|)iin havino- now mider Cliarli's and Philip become the foremost nation in Europe felt the need (if ihi' h.'lp which Natural Law could ^ive in the conduct of military oDcral i:ius. Tiie war n of Gentilis was cultivated by Grotius whose attenliou was called to 1 he snliject by the Tliirty Years' War.f The Spanish re\(ilution directed his mind to the limitations placed upon human l>ow numbers, noi' by Hie W(^ight of olticial standing, Init lie r.-g;irde(l ihein as "the rei»osi1 ories of llictse moral senfiments with which (iviliz.-d men had s.\iiipat hized from age to age.";i; (Jrotius looked upon 111, .11. Mill as poeis or pliilosojtlieis or chiirch-fal liers. Imt as men in whom during all I he ages, and in all lands, the spirit of reason, of liberty, and of jusl ice was exiiibil ing itself, bringing all his doct riiies. as Zoncli declares, to 1 be touclisione of re.ison. He was a reviewer of tiie history of blood, a |)eace- niaker in I lie age of at idc it ies. 1 iKM'nibodimenl in emb'-yo of Hi" spirit of tol- i;|)i-,|. Apuil. Aiiliiri. r.iljj. Hist. Non a. M:i(lii ii!ic;Oi() Urill. IC. /(iiirli. l'i:ict';ilin: Kiliop -ii-icly ;iii(l its I'll i l(is( phy . |)( ;iii. ;: iviin. K-y. \'»\. X X \' 1 1 IM. ij. :'>i IXTRODUCTIOX. 9 oration lliat could embrace witliin its catholic charity lieretics as well as the orthodox: himself a sufTercr. atone time a bigoted controversialist, he gathers from all that men hold dear the solace of his exilic career, in order to present to the world that fraternity which should characterise mankind. It is now political philosophy, not for a nation, but for the world: it is peace, not for the sake of a people or their prince, but for mankino; it is the vic- tory of learning raised above the jealousy and rivalry of schools and'sects* If such isa true picture of the influence of those principles dug from the mine of scholasticism by the deft hands of Grotius, filled with the lustre of his own personality, and handed on through others to us, we may be pardoned if we makefile attempt to trace theevolution of the political theory from the Schoolmen to Grotius so as to set it forth in the clearest light. Tlie closing words of Grotius may be regarded as the watchword of the movement from thedark ages to the present moment. ''MonUa adfidpm ct nd paccm."' * -'That the book of Grotius beciinie the coinpiinion of Gustavus Adolphus during the war undertaken by that virtuous hero for civil and religious liberty is a very striking proof of its extraordinary fitness for its purpose.... The name of Grotius gave lustre to this part of knowledge for more than a century. His successors ratlier derived credit from his name than improved tlie science which he leff, them. From the p3a?,eof Munster to the French R'ivoluticm writers on this subject incessantly succeeded each other. It became a principal part of the education of all politicians; the treatises concerning it were appealed to Ijy all sovereigns and st-ates in their controversies. It wa.i thought an advantage by tlie most powerful and ambitious prince to have them on his sido and whatever was positive and practical in these systems, whatever regulated the conduct and rights of individuals under the general usage of European War was adopted by the tribunals of one country from the writers and courts of foreign and even liostile communities. Xo otuer age of the world had witnessed such an appearance. The opinion of men without power or office or even super- ior genius was appealed to by conquering Monarchs. discussed by statesmen and never publicly disregarded but by those who had renounced all pretensions to the exterior of molality. Every sucli appeal was a lesson taught by the sovereign to his sub.jects of tlie Jiomage due from both aliki' tt) til- Sjprjiii' ajtlijrity of ic?.i;a;i." E lin. Rjv. XXVIT. p. PART I. SCHOLASTIC POLITICAL THEORY BEFORE AQUINAS. CHAPTER I. Preparation for ScnoLASTiciSM. Method of Scholastics. 1. From the time of the Church Fathers during wliat is termed the dirk ages there is little that can be described as philosophy. The doctrines es- tablished in the 'elaborate treatises of the Fathers of the Church, as the Christians increased in numbers so as to embrace the greater part of the Ro- man Empire, so far as they were political, concerned cliiefly the relations of the Church and the State. The Church of the Apostles, living so near its founder, was governed by the principles enunciated in the gospel system of Political Ethics. In opposition to the Stoics who based their Ethics upon reason, the Christians took their stand upon the platform of brotherhood and developed their system on the basis of Christian love. Under the persicu- tions to which the Christians were subjected, the estimate they formed of civil government was in harmony wiili the teachings of Llieir Master who declared that his Kingdom was not of this world. Civil government they legarded.as an ordinance of God Wiierever man is found, this ordinance linds a place. The duty of the subject is tliat of obedience witliin the limits of "the law of God." While civil government itself is a divine institution, civil governors are not necessarily divinely appointed, and when they an- tagonize the will of God, it is the duty of Christians to dissent from their l)o]icy by separation frcmi the governing body which opposes the will of God. After the Cluirch rose into imp(jrtance, especially after Ciiristianily became the established religif)n in the Roman Empire in the time of Constantine, the great question around which all pliilosoiihie thinking clustered was llu^ relation of the Secular and Kcclesiastical i)owers. 'Jlie supeiiority of the spiritual was set forth in the promulgation of the codes of Ju.st inian's Law '•in the name of the Lord Jesus Chi'ist." Tiu; History of the Middle Ages is lai'gely the history of the long struggle 12 J'ilK I()LITiCAL TJIEORY OF THE l)L'Uvi'eii those two powers as embodied in the Latin Church and the Fioman l']nii)ire.* In the old llonuin Empire, when Christianity became the state icliyion. the p]mi)eror ])ecame the recognized head in civil and ecclesiastical affairs. Tlie lirst evidence of a change is to be found in the decline of the Empire, when the Church iiisliops are entrusted with important functions bearing" upon the posit iiiii of those unsound in tlie faith, and the relations tliey sustain to the civil government. Tlu' large issue before the Church, aside tiom tlie puri'Iy Ecclesiastical one of the superiority of one central authority in tlie Chuix-h herself, is that of the light of the spiritual power to l)riority and superiority over the civil power. First the Bishop of the Imper- ial city becomes the (Miiliodiment of Church dignity and the receptacle of Eceleslastical authority. This was first set forth in an otiicial manner in 44.") A. I), in the decree of N'alentiuian III., in which it is declared tliat the r.ishoi) of Home shall form the ultimate court of appeal from the other Bishops of ihe Church. Then followed the decadence of the Papal suprem- acy in the period succeeding the Justinian administration, and during the supremacy of the IlNzantiiie Empire. During the Lombard incursions into Italy, there arose a succession of politic and wise popes, who upon the basis of the rupture of the Eistern Empire built up the supremacy of the Papal power and attached to the I'apal See a large amount of territory, still admin- istered in name under the Eastern Emperors in opposition to the Lombards. In the struggle that ensued the Popes were able to establish their own independence. In theseparation from the Eastern Empire, consummated prin- cipally by a religious dispute, the popes fearing the growing importance and 1 he combined force of the Lombards had recourse to the Franks. The Franks came to theaid of the Popes and were successful in defeating the Lombards. The Bishops of Rome secured the papal territories in return for their favor towards tlie Carolingian family. Thelast of the Merovingians was deposed by ]japal decree and Pepin Le Bref was crowned king by Pope Zacharias, while Charles, Pepin's son. was placed at the head of the Empire. In this way in Cliarlemagne, wlio had coixiuered nearly thewholeof Europe, uas estal)lislied the Imperial Empire, when Charles the (Jreat was crowned at the liandsofLeo III in Kome, 800 A. 1)., nominally, at least in the Papal view, under the Pope's suzerainty. With the decay of ^ the imperial authority in the suc- cessors of Charlemagne, and the consetiuent disctrder in tlie secular affairs of the Empire, the popes were able to establish their own authority, under a centralized and well-organized system of unity. The principles of tiiis si)iritual supremacy are to lie found, not in the political theories, but in tlie concrete facts of history. t During the eleventh and twelfth centuries the * JMilirinii's llisl. of Lnliii Cliristianity Vol. 1: SinUli's Eccl. Hist. Vol. 11. I't. I; liiyrc's Holy Hciiuui Kiiipiie, |). .'ill: Fiicyc. Hiilaii. l'oi)f(l<)iii. '.Itli Ed. ■'■ Kit;/.lor. Die Litoi-iiriscln'n Wide s ifiii' i der I'li pasts' zui- Zeit, Ludwi;? dos Balers, IS-r-t; Niiliiu's. Kiiisoilluiiii mid I'iipstluiiu iiii INIittcla Iter, is :!: Lnuiont. L'Eglise et I'Etat, 1866; |{a\iiiatiii, I'dlltlk der I'apstf Von Greijor T. bis (iren'or VII. Is;iS. .^eriOOLMES AND GROTins. r.l theory or' spirituiil ascendancy gained its greatest triumphs and in the person of Innocent III the secular power is completely under the control of the Ecclesiastical. He exercised his power in the deposition of kings and in the settlment of secular affairs to establish a purely theocratic rule under the Roman See.* 2. But what part had been played by the Secular power itself? Did it present no claim to independence? During the confusion of the Carolingian disintegration the chief feature of all the political struggles was the use of brute force. Disorder everywhere prevailed, even among the sentiments of the people there was no settled thought. The feudal chiefs took advantage of every opportunity afforded of exercising their tyrannical lordship, in robbing one another and plundering their own wealthy vassals. While the Church protested against anarchy, she had no force to support her protests. The Barons had little need for the clergy, because the principle of their re- ligion and morality was "might is riglit."' All authority fell into disrepute, and the warriors had the benefit of any victory they gained; but these warring classes were so much disunited that there was little, if any, central- ized power. Hence, when through the growing influence of the papal power the Church started the crusade for unity, the secular powers were placed at an enormous disadvantage, because of theirdisorganization, while the Church presented a solid organization with a definite aim. The demand of the Popes was for the submission of the feudal lords, and in this they succeeded to a large extent, because secular authority had been weakened by the fierce struggles of the warrior class, and by the selfish policy of the feudal lords. Out of this struggle in reference to the relations of the secular and Ecclesiastical powers there sprung up two counter theories, the theory of secular iN^DEi-ENDEiSrcE and the theory of spiritual supremacy. The great support of the spiritual supremacy was found in the Church au- thorities. Its earliest introduction took place, when by a side issue, the bishops were successful in securing control over secular questions that in- volved issues of morals. In the Isidorian decrees, falsely attributed to the lirst century, there is an assertion and vindication in the ninth century, that all clerical disputes are to be settled by Episcopal judgment, not by civil jurisdiction, and that the penalties of excommunication are to be used by the ('liurch to bring the secular princes into subjection. In the celebrated work ofnincmar, Archbp. of Rheims, we have the separation of Church and State in the Christian dispensation, t]ie former founded l)y Clirist, the latter continuing to exist from ancient times. The Church possesses the superior authority, exercising the limiting power over the secular princes, to prevent tyranny, to outroot hereby and to keep the Secular powers in allegiance to the Divine hQin^ thr.)ugn the Church which is God's r.>pres?ntative on earth. * B;ir()iiiu^ Air.i:i.l. K:;lcs. A. D. lorj; riuiiry, Hi.st. K •:!. Xlll. ]1 THE POLITICAL THEOFiY OF THE (Irogory Yll. inaiiilaiiied and extended the doctrines of Hincmar, lie being liie first, pope to establish the supremacy of the papal court over the secular rulers, in the deposit ion of Henry IV. Gregory vindicates his authority on the ground of scripture precedent, historical precedent and abstract principle as set forth in the Church fathers and papal decrees. This theory received sanction in tlie codification of the decrees, writings and declarations of the popes, prepared in the twalfth caatury under the name of Dlscorcluniium Cdfionum Concordia by Gratian, the foundation of the Church law [Jii% Canon- ■iciim). This collection was prepared to support papal authority. In it we llnd the oath fallen by the Emperor Otho, in placing himself under the papal surveillance as a feudal vassal of the pope; and also the alleged donation of Constantine in which is set forth the gift of C jnstantine the Emperor to Sil- vester, Bishop of Rome in 32-1: A. D., of the Western Empire of which Rome is the chief city, as a tree gift of love in gratitude for the fniracle whicli had cured his leprosy. The political doctrine formulated by the Churcli at this time ascribed to political sovereigns a two-fold dignity— (I) that of uplulding llie imperial ottice; (2) of championing the Church and truth, because the soul is of greater concern than the body.* The Theory of secular inlepsndence which was developed in opposition to the doctrine of spiritual supremacy was based, first of all, on the revived conception of universal monarchy. The idea of the old Roman Empire, embracing within it the wliole civilized world, led to the conception of the imperial dominion as universal. But it was chiefly by the renascence and revival of the Justinian Law in tlie lioly Roman Empire that the theory of civil independence became enforced. By the renewed study of the Justinian system in the universities, the Doctors of law became enthused with the imperial ideas and worked out the prin:3ipie of a cr)Qtinuous imiK'rtnm as the basis of their defence against the spiritual power. It was pleasing to Emperors lilfeBarbarossa to bj told that they were the lineal descendants and successors of Augustus Ca^s.ir la autli irity, and that the imjcriii.n they exercised was quidquid pJwitit.f '.\. In the very midst of this strife, disorder and cf)nilict of theory arose the Scholastic Pliilosophy. It was not the product of a single mind, nor was it t lie grenvth of a single generation. ''The S>;liolastic philosophy appears to have risen up by almost ioperceptible degrees from the twelfth century, * I).)vo. DL'.jui'is'lictioiiis F,L"clesiiistiL-:ie pro^Jjressii. IS.V); RalTcl. Geschiclilliclio D.irstel Imi','- (1 M' Vcrhaltiiiss- /. visL"li?n KircliMiiul Stni*-, ISii; Gibbon's Holy RjJii. Eaipire; BlaU-jy. \()1. I. C ti p. ISl; Ziesilcr. de orig- ('1- iiicroin. Jur. C'tin.; Decrees of Gratia-a, Janet, Sc. Polit. Vol. 1 pp. :i44 .TiO. • Ciibhan. Holy Uom. F.nip- C'h. (•.;>; Bi'yce, Holy Horn. Emp. 0. 10: Fitthi.u;.: Die Ki'clitssrhule zu Bologna. 18S,S; Mutber, Konii.sclu's luul Kaiioii. Reclit ini Miltelalter, 1871; S.'hool of Uolo.jtia— M. Laf.srriero, Hist, da droit fraiu-. I V; I niparial supremacy. M. lliiuly, De .liuibus Sancti Iinper. Koiiiani. SCHOOLMEN A"NDGROTinS. 15 vvlien it attained its tuaturiiy."* The seeds of it were sown in Stoicism, as Luriruor says, the Sunimas of the Scholastics being inriitations of the systems of the Stoics. The church fathers were the first to nourish this seed especially those who ranked as authorities on church dogma. For the system exists in gsrm the moment we notice the method, and the content of that theological current of thought which supersedes as well as swallows up philosophy. It arose during the dark ages when the church became the incarnation of learning, auLhority and organization. This meant that the church luid become the sole channel through which knowledge, power, civil as well as ecclesiastical, and organic unity were received. The old^ philo- sophic schools of antiquity have disappeared from the world, only remnants of tnc bright intelligence of ancient ages gleam through the thick crust that covers it. Christianity had dsstroyed much of the refinement and had thrust from her the works of the philosophers because they were pagan and opposed to the christian spirit. The Saracens in their zeal to gain supremacy for them3elve3 had done what they could to destroy what Christianity had left of ancient learning, because it was opposed to their spell-liound revela- tions. Phitonism had kept its liold upon the thought of these ages, blended as it was with rigid Sto'cism. When Aristotle came to be studied in the Schools and Universities, at first through Arabic and Latin translations, the new learning was utilised in the defence of Theology. This fragmentary knowledge of Aristotelian principles led to the distorted method of the earlier Schoolmen, by which they sought to explain and pliilosophise upon the dogmas of the christian faitli. Tliis led to the use of dialectics in the explana- tion, interpretation and defencs of Theology, resulting in hair-splitting analyses and vague conceptions of truth. The characteristic of the School- men all tlirough the centuries of their history is the attempt to reconcile the old philosophy and the theology of the Church fatliers. The rationalism of pagan philosophy is wedded to the simple faith of the christian fathers; in that relation of wedlock there is born a hybrid offspring the characteristics of which we are to study. f The study of dialectics, loaded with metaphysical subtleties, was the scholastic preparation of the S(dioolnien. Abelard teils us how he began his studies at Paris, "'preferring the study of logic to "all others and the dispu- tation of theschools to the trophies of war, 1 entirely devoted myself to this pursuit, and like a peripatetic philosopher, travelled through dilfurent countries, exercising myself wliciever an opportunity olTcrcd in these contests.''^ A pliilosop'.ur says that it was "the employment of the pliiloso- phical world to dispute ds lanci C qmna/'i While it is true the method they * En.'u^ld, Hist, of Phil. p. 4)',; S:»ilh Ejcl. Hist. Vol. II. I'f. 11 p. 4.;-.. + Loriiiiur. hi.it. of L:i\v, p. 181; Smitli Ejc. lli.st. Vol. II. 1';. 11. p. 4 T.; E.\liii:i!):i. Hist, riiil. 1. p. is7-!il. :|: Hist, ('iiliitjiila; iiiu Suaruiii, ('.-111. I'aiis lUlG. S Eii:i;-l(l. p. 4'.iU. 1(5 THE POLITICAL THEORY OE THE omploi-ed was "an ostentatious display of inj^onuity," in which they assumed unproved axioms, unfounded distinctioni and delicate differences, yet we must not lose sight of the fact that the art of reasoning was used in their writings with much acuteness, if with little advantage. John of Salishury complains of their spending not a few years but a lifetime in such disputes.* Lord Bacon's judgment is expressed in the simile, "if, like the spider, the human mind draws its materials from within itself, it produces cobwebs of learning, wonderful indeed from the fineness of the threads, and delicacy of the wori^manship, but of no real value or use."t Like all other writers they "found their environment prepared for them. They were nursed and trained under the over-shadowing influence of the great politico- Ecclesiastical system, which called itself the Christian Church. Under its shadow and by its influence they were moulded and educated. They never had the opportuniny of experiencing a different discipline or coming within tlie range of-other forces." The great question is. did they do the utmost they could under the circum- stances in which they were placed? As systematizers of thought tliey deserve the grateful thanks of posterity. If they were hound to a method that was pernicious, they had no other they could use. The Aristotelian philosophy had established its supremacy among the Saracens in the East and the Moors in the West, and through them had placed the Key of Knowledge in the hands of Christian Europe. Do we wonder that as loyal sons of "the parent of Science, the Master of Criticism and the founder of logic," as Coleridge calls him,t they used the mould that he cast, for the purpose of presenting to humanity the truth they held d^ar- in a well-fashioned form. To rebuke their use of the logical method is "to blame providence for not having given to them a different mental constitution and a more penetrating insight into abstract principles and things. "1 * Metal. II, 10. ■I- De Aui;. ScifiU. T. Op. T. C. 9. % Table Tiilk. 101. 's Townsend. p. IJO. 34-1; Confess. Lud. Vives de Corrupt. Art. III. p. 112; V. p. loG; Coiif. Thonius de Canst. Inept. Seliol. Pi'iiefat. S2 p. .541; Meiruiclilhoii Apolog. p. ftJ. chapter ii. Political Theory before Aquinas. 1. At what point does Scholasticism take up political theory, or what is the theory at the point when the Schoolmen appear on the scene? In order to understand Scholastic political theory we must know its connection witli the historical evolution of philosophy. The doctrines associated with the political power of the state and the authority of the Church in Secular and Ecclesiastical matters slowly became a general theory. As Cliristianity de- veloped the Cliurch grew in importance and strength, accomodating itself to the political life and becoming in the end a partof civil polity. As Chris- tian principles were opposed to Paganism, the early Christians found them- selves in a position of antagonism to the existing governments. Starting in opposition to civil authorities under whom they suffered persecution, the ultimate conversion of these powers to Christianity meant the dominance of theology in tlie sphere of politics, because Christianity itself had become corrupted. Christ and his apostles recognized the principle of government as an ordinance of God for man's well being; but as the existing authorities were hostile to Cliristianity, they maintained an attitude of indifference towards them, at the same time yielding obedience to the powers that be for conscience sake, in so far as this did not lead them into disregard of the will of Gjd. Tlie Apostolic fatliers assumed tlie same attitude, their indifference becoming opposition under the cruel persecutions of tlie Emperors, inspiring the watchword they bequeathed to the ages to comv, ''hnnud) frecdo)n (oul Justice,'' Tlie Church took up this war-cry of religious liberty and brought to l)ear all the inlluence her Ciiristian doctrii.es could command, and all tiie oiithusiasm of lier religious life in defence of this liberty. Tlie Church se- cured peace in the establisiiuient of Christianity as the state religion by Con- stantine in :J24 A. D., and by the promulgation (if the .lusiiaiaii Code of'Law in the name of .Jesus Christ in the years 'y'lS-ry'Xi A. 1). The Christian system is not only a theological system, it contains a politi- cal theory, and hence Christianity accomiiiotlated itself to civil polity. Human freedom has its best defence in Christian toleration. Christian freedom em- liraces hotli religious and civil liberty, or c p'llitical history of the c:)ni:ng ages. Through the writings Ifi THE l^OLITICAL THEORY OP THE of tlio Church fatliors the despotic policy of heathcD rulers was exposed, clearing the way for the Church in advising and ultimately in commanding obedience to the demands of Christianity. The learning of the clergy and Ihe close relations they sustained to the people brought the religious influence into state-life. Hostility to the rulers led to the upraising of a rival system which found its climax in jxnjtdl'^m. The old polity that had never been re- formed by Christianity, but had simply attached Christianity to itself to save its life, became too weak to stand against the powerful organism that had lieen built up on the historic foundation of Christianity. As the civil ]jower failed, the Church power was strengthened. It was not pure Christiani- ty, but an outgrowth from early Christianity and pagan philosophy, the combination lieing accomplished by reason of the fact, that these were the two great forces arrayed against misrule, and that they united in a common struggle, wlien the civil power threatened to destroy them both. The Church was a new organization, and it had the new force of a spiritual victory al- ready achieved. The ancient learning had been buried, but a resurrection was taking place and that new life was easily drawn into the Church organ- ism. For nearly four centuries the Church had known no political party io the state. Rut as it enters upon its new career under state sanction, it re- ceives from Constantine the organized form in which it is at a later date to suliject the state to itself. On the model of the civil power it became the ideal of the Cliurch to attain external unity. Forgetting the war-cry of some of the early Christians for human freedom, and Cliristiau toleration, a toleration extending to private judgment in religion and a free inquiry after truth,* she used her organization and the power she had secured, to maintain unity in her government and in her doctrine. Encouraged by the Imperial presence the Council at Ts ice altered its tlrst anethemas against the heretics, and thereafter invoked civil help against all refractory members. The one great principle which had pressed to the front during the tlrst four centuries, was the right of private judgment in religion, free from civil l)ains and penalties. Many of the clergy protested against persecution to death for religious opinions. But the two great lights whose voices are raised against tlie world in which they stand alone, were Lactantius and Athanasius. From the tifth to the eleventh centuries another great principle is added to political philosophy, namely, the superiority of the Church over the civil power, in granting to thecivil authority its priviUgesand investing it with the inspiration of heaven under the sanction of God's representative on earth. t '2. At tliis point Scholasticism conies in. Of the philosophy as a whole we may state tiial it is more theological than political. However, as it * TfiliiUiiiii Apolo;.;. :i4: ('jpiiiin Epist.")!; Lufluntius. Inslit. Diviii. II. c. 7; Eusebius Ec. Hist. lik. V; Liiichier's Credibility II. c. ti.'i. + Blalioy I. c. (■>; Siiiilli El-el. Histy. Vol. I; Vol. 11. Pt. I. Review of Centuries up to ]((jO A. D.: Eidiiiami. Hist. I'hil. I. :><)0 1. Houtrli. London. 1S90. SCHOOLMEI!^ A^U)GI(0T1DS. U, dealt largely with ethics and with theoloj^y in au ethical manner, wo have tlie foundation principles of politics or political ethics. All the Scholastics talve the ethics and the politics of Aristotle, and blending them with Chris- tian principles, produce not in reality a science of politics, for no such science existed in those days, but a science of civil government. The greater Schof)lmen present in tlie form of handboolcs for the rulers and ruled their treatises on this important subject. The only social science with them is religion; yet this religious science has as its fundamental basis broth- erhood, however exclusive, as the Christian foundation of social being in man as man. The wide field they cover in their intellectual contempla- tions, and the freedom they use in applying reason and rational principles to all matters of faith in the social life, elevates human freedom to the very highest place in their system, although in practice they often deny it, espe- <;ially in their relations with heretics and refractory civil rulers. "Scholastic philosophy," says Blalcey, "gave a unity of design and scientific arrangement to political speculations witli wliich they had not been previously invested since Aristotle and I'lato. The Schoolmen took up the science of govern- ment and formally installed it as a distinct branch of knowledge in the collegiate curriculum. This exercised a great and marked influence directly and indirectly on its future progress and prospects. Its principles were more gradually separated from the other elements of human nature; they were more minutely scrutinized and more fully tested by appeals to well- established facts. Students in the Universities carried with them many of the elements of civil polity and often bore good fruit. The maxims of political philosophy came to be regarded in different aspects, truth elicited by discussion."* The reasun why they did not frame a science is to be found in the fact, that their political ideas were not based up)n historical facts, but gathered from tlie "instinctive impulses" of human nature; they began tlie edifice in the Divine being, and brought it down to human realization in the abstract ideas of right and duty found in the mind of man, the intuitive principles, as they conceived it, at the foundation of human relations witli God. 3. Scholastic political theory b?gins with the celebrated cliurcli father Augustine.f Augustine was a Schoolman in tliis sense, that his high reputation in the church and in the scliools led to the adoption of his pliilosophic method of applying the subtleties of stoic reasoning to sacred doctiines, and also as Lorimer points out, his doctrines tliemselves form part of the Scholastic system, because the Schoolmen, even St. Thomas, could not contradict what Augustine had said, and only upon points not referred to by Augustine or upon which he left the matter an open (luestion could Tlioiiias exercise an independent .judgment. Augustine's contribution to * Hisl. of Polit. t.iliT. Voi I. ('. 10. p. :>18. •|' Marl iiIdsIj, i'liil()Si)I>l).V- |)- 'Xi-'Xt. 20 THE rOLITICAL TIIEOrvY OF THE politics, like Ills theological doctrines, were accepted as the voice of church- men and even of Christendom.* iVugustlnc was born at Tagastc in 354 A. D. He studied philosophy at Carthage and received his first inspiration from the writings of Cicero. Not satisfied with Cicero, he studied tlie Scriptures; but soon he abandoned them because of their unadorned simplicity of style. He next studied Aristotle under whose abstract philosophy he adopted the Maiiichaean conception of two independent principles, the good and the evil. He became disgusted with this system and fled to Rome, and later to Milan, where he studied and taught oratory. At Milan he met Ambrose, a christian teacher of great elocjuence and profound knowledge. Under the influence of Ambrose's pure life and eloquent teaching, aided by tlie platonic conception of tlie Divine being, lie embraced cliristianity, returning to Africa where he became a renowned churchman and a vigorous defender of the christian faith, especially applying the platonic doctrine to Natural Theology. f There are in Augustine two influences apparent, that of the church and that whicti springs from his study of pagan philosophy. In all human relations the ciiurch does not keep the upper hand, because man is a political being as well as a religions boing. The fact tliat a man has accepted of Christianity oiit^lii not to lessen bul rat iirr 1o intensify ills desire to be a good citizen. Augustine rei)u;liates the insinuation that political interests will lead man to oppose cliristianity, and refuses to believe that human passion can be led into antagonism to religion. It cannot be doubted that his conception of 1 lie twocities. tliecity of God and the city of the world, introduces an element of e )nlradietiuii. i>iit he did not believe that the dwellers in the city of the world could exeicise a prejudicial ctTcct upon the inhabitants of the city of (;i)d. liernnse nil liiinian good was to lind its permanent abiding in tlie city of iieaven. If liiere is an opposition [ov the present, it springs from the fact of I he eon upl ion of man's ,iature by reason of sin, whicli sets defective man ill antagonism to true man in God's likeness. Augustine^ was well acquaint- ed with Cieero's deiinil ion of the state, in wiiich there is an association of jieople united on tile )):isis of a nmtual understanding in regard to law and eomnion inf(M-esl. in fact a s iciely of men united under the bond of law, the law preceeding the organization of tlie society, the lawof nature. Augustine 111 aces I he human sUite on adilT M'enL b i^is. Cicero's definition of the state he applies e'X"hi>ively to the Divine state in which there is a fixed law and (!( Unite loiiiis of justice, whereas in the pirely haniin society which results * I.in-iiniT. 1 n--l il . of 1/1 \v. |). I>1. 1 iiiluMi.' • III' A ii j:iis! in,' nii tlu- cciil iiries up to tlio K 1 h i-iiil HI y NiiuiiNsdii, l/:i pliilii-^oiiliif dr S;. A iili.u--; iiic \'(il. II. pp. hVi-lTil. I- Au,i;:usl. I'd II Cess. :in(l |)r I'lilit. Ci-cd. :r 1'">.1 ii;ilur, ini|nil .\ I'l iraiiiis. r( >piil)lic,-i ks poijiili: poimliis Miitein lion oiiiiiis iHiininiiiii ((Mius i;i:( (;iii) iiu.do eciijrii gill i;s. sid cooliis imillil iidinis jiiris conscMisii ot mi 111 ill is I ( II ii.r. ii:( r.c > ci :;.'. i;.s. ("ivilr.s rs;t c( nsti'. alio i ci uli." V.v IJc i;ul). 1. 2"-. :2(i.: SCITOOLMEI^^ AND GROTIUS. 21 from a voluntarj^ association of individuals, there is the absence of law and justice in the proper sense, all human law being tentative and preparatory to a divine state. With him earthly society is imperfect, at best it is a temporary union to preserve social peace and prepare man for entering a higher state in which his aspirations after perfection can find complete realiza- tion. As distinct from the aim of the state which presents itself ki the idea of the state, namely self-presersvatlon, there springs up from the chiistian conception of the state, the idea which Augustine presents, that the state being the immediate work of G(»d is destined to exalt and advance the glory of God. Hence he naturally speaks of the divine will as the law which is supreme in the state and in him we find the first tendency towards the acceptance of hx aderna, as the highest law; and in subordination to this lex acterna we have the human order in the conception of a law in harmony with and answering to the eternal law, the divine will being the fundamental foundation of all law in the universe. An unjust law does not merit the name of law, mihi lex es^sc von i'id?tiir quae junta non fuerit* The law is written in the heart of men. Augustine looks upon the city or the state just as ancient philosophers had done, as of the highest importance, while the individual and the family cire in subordination. The church is uppermost in his mind. The political principles of Augustine may be classified under five heads;— (1.) property; (2.) slavery; (3.) the origin and character of govern- ment: (4.) the state and the church; (5.) the unity of humanity. {!.) Pro]ycrty. The basis of property according to him is to be found in Divine Right, consequently the cmly right which any one has to possession and dominium springs from the gift of God. But how is this gift bestowed and upon whom? Only those who render obedience to the true God can have any property by right. Barbeyrac, regarding this as a precarious right according to Augustine, characterizes it as an abominable idea.f (^nly the faithful have any right to possess anything. The unfaithful have and pctssess only by sufferance. He thus makes the right of property purely sub- jective. He qualities this harsh idea as to property later, by ascribing a human right to property, which comes to be p(tsscssed by the dispensatory power of the sovereign. The prince, receiving by Divine delegation the' right t(t all property, dispenses the human right to it, but this only on the ' condition of a good and proper use of what is received.! According to this ' theory the use legitimates tlie right of property, not as it is conceived with us property legitimating use. Property objectively is the result of a proper use of what comes fr(mi the prince, and the will of the prince is the condi- tioning determination upon which it rests. Use or abuse is determined by * I>e lib. art. It. C. 1. Confess, lil). IV. •(• I'ufJViulorf. Tiiinsl. p. 207. + .Voolo^nt' (le la Morale dos Peers <)(> TEsrlise. roiifre les in.itistes aocusalioiis (In Baibeyi-.u-. p. 41i). I'aii.s. 17\H. ■2.1 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE the prince. The prince luis the right and it is his duty, to combat lu'reLics: hence if it is his will to demand conformity to thechnrch, property is an enjoy- ment at the pleasure of the sovereign. There is a confusion of a natural right and a civil right of property, the latter being the same as the former only under guarantee: there is a confusion of the use of property and the rigiit which gives the use. The prince is God's representative and what he has by 'divine right, he has a right to give or take civUiter according as men are i faithful or unfaithful. Nourrisson characterises his idea of property as WDimnnismc ilwocratique, a theocratic communism.* (2.) Sldi-cyij. His idea of property led to the idea of slavery? According to the natural order established by God at first, man was not destined to com- mand man, Init thi.s order has been reversed by sin, and servitude is a just chastisement for sin, conditi quippe strviiiiHs jure intelliyiiur impositd peccutorL Slavery is an effect of God's judgment, who measures the penalty by the sin.t He was led astray in his conception of property by considering the use of it rather than the fact of its existence; so he was misled in slavery, l)y viewing man in hishistory rather than man in himself. He prefers the idea of the Stoics, giving up of that Aristotle. He looks upon slaves, not as chattels, but as individual beings, who have the dignity of human l>eings and who but lor accidental circumstances should have enjoyed the privilege of human nature, namely, freedom. Slavery is a result of sin. It is an essential quality of innocent human nature that it be free. How did slavery originate? The ancients declared that it arose from war, when the conqueror gave life to his- captives upon condition ol degradation into slavery. But, says Augustine, war sprung from the evil passions of men, and passion has its origin in sin. Slavery therefore is one consequence of the fall of man. Just as property is legitimated by use, slavery is legitimated by the fall, or by the history of man in which the chief fact is sin. Slavery is incompatible with man's uncorrupted being; but since human nature has lost its original purity and become corrupted, slavery is possible, even necessary. So close is the relation between sin and slavery that in the present condition of society, slavery is ineradicable: nay, slavery is a blessing to those who are subjected to it. It Is a part of the penalty attaching to the fall and as man under it is subjected to divine chastisement on account of sin, it is an expiation offered by man to the inexorable divine justice, leading in some measure to the restoration of man's natural primitive state of liberty. Man has fallen out of the city of God in his fall into the city of tlie world. IHs aspiration is to regain hi.s liberty in this city of heaven. While he is compelled to make his habitation in this prison house upon earth, he cannot but expect that those who keep the prison-liouse will gall him with the chains of bondage. In order to * Vol. II. p. 402. + De Civil. Dei. c.l'>. SC11(.H>LME:n AN'I; GliO'i'H'S. j; reorganize our being we must be content to sulVcr luimiliiition. Lincrtj' is reserved for man's restoration. (li.) The nriyin and character of government. He unites various disparite ele- ments in his conception of authority. ' The prevailing element is the ecclesiastical. All power flows from the Divine being and as such is possessed of a sacred character. It is a first principle that nothing can liave a place in politics contrary to the will of Gftd. Cicero ascribed the real origin of the- State to tiie social nature of man, yet iie introduced the secondary element of uiiUtarianism as leading man to find in the state the best means of preserv- ing life and property. Augustine introduces a new idea, due to the persecution i to which the Christians were subjected. He ascribes tlie origin of the state to \ the defective constitution of man under the regime of sin since man's fail. Cain and Romulus are the founders of this human civil government. Yet the human state is in accord with the divine will as a lower and more im- perfect realization of what the will of God presents in the more exalted, divine and perfect city. This idea kept its hold upon Medieval political i pliilosophy, for the fact that the secular government was in some way con- nected with human corruption presented the reason for the exaltation of the u spiritual power above the inferior organization of the state. Forms of gov- ' ernmentareof no consequence. The patriarchal principle however gives the nearest approach to a perfect model of governmental authority. Pater- nalism is the keynote of government. The end of government is, as tlje Platonic philosophy had pictured it, virtue; but with Augustine true virtue is to live according to orthodox Christianity. The ideal to which government tends is the complete infusion of Christian principles into the political or- ganism, the head of which, the prince, is God's defender of the faith. In this character he speaks of the prince as "aprosecutor of crime" that lie may become "a liberator of humanity."* It is not only his right but his duty to use this coercive and protective power. The circumstances of Augustine's life no doubt account for these ideas. Amid the conflicts of Donatists, relagiuiis and Pagans, he felt the need of some guardian of the peace and champion of the trutli. He preaches in his mildest tones and yet he invokes the secular power to defend religion because he feels it a necessity. TIn' ])unislnuent of heresy is as necessary in the interests of public peace as the punishment of civil crimes. The prince is lord of the conscience as lie is owner of the goods of the citizens. Hislawniust be oboyt'd because in wiil- '( Jng the right he acts in the name of God. Resignation and humility are tiie duties owed in the spii'it of Christianity to the civil power and to the prince as God's ruler. 4. Conccpdoii of ihr stale and Ihe t'Jiurch. Having establislied the prince as the divinely appointed and commissioned governor, whose will is law, we must see how he is kept in check. The state is not a society of men working 1. Epist. I5;j. 24 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF TFIE • for coman)n ends and united by a common bond of peace. The state is a "Monastery," as iSourrisson puts it, tbe peace enjoyed is christian peace, and tlie subjects are true members of the orthodox faith. Tlie great Idea in his mind is that of the Church and Chiiicli-unity. The state is synonymous with the Churc.il, except in otTicers. Only the faithful can bo citizens in the coiniuonwcalth. It is from the Church that the state receives its power and tliroiicrh the Cliurch it attains its highest end, the unity and government of Christians. Therefore the check upon the government would be found in the fact that the Cliurch would be judge of the orthodoxy of the prince and therefore of his qualilications to rule. The sovereign power is vested in the Church, so tl>at we have a theocratic state, in which an autocractic orthodox sovereign rules with a limitless power, save that in tlie matter of orthodoxy he is subject to the Church. (.").) The Vnify nfhumanfli/. His belief in and adoption of Christianity led him to tliat univeisal idea of union and unity among all the faithful. There is a unity of race wliich among Chiistians is the higliest ideal of all social relations. He studied in detail all the elements in human society. He spealvs in the iiis. best terms of a state of virginity, yet he does not condemn mairiage, luit rath?r vindicates its sanctity. He sustains parental authority, Vmt distinguishes it from the absolute power of the old putria jiote.^tas. In the marriage iciat iotiship !)(> asserts a perfect and natural equality between luisband and wife. Clu'istianily has l)een the means of vindicating marriage and the family relationsliips. In the same way he speaksof ttie social charac- ter of city and state lite. He deprecates the practice of devoting time and attention to speculation that ought to be given to the duties of the civil and jiolitical life. While pieacliing lil)erty of conscience, it is to obey the prince when h( declares the law of God. He strenuously resists the barl)arous practice of torture. The grand aim of war is not conquest or aggrandize- ment, but peace. It is impossible, he thinks, to separate politics from et hies, because justice is tlie foundation of peace, the basis of prosperity and the only motive of olx>dience to dury. Justice which finds its liappiest expression in religion is tlie only means of rising superior to the corrupt world: si)ecially in princes religious duty tempers the exercise of a seemingly autocrai ic authority. As with Plato a philosophic king is the ideal, so with Aiigu-il inc. a Cliristian king is his ideal of goodness and good government. \\\\\\ Anuustiiie man cannot be con lined within the limits of individuality: be cannot lind a i)roper s], here for ills energies in tlie family or in the city, (-hrislianity had broken down the l)-irriers of nationality, at least exclusive iial ioiialily such as we lind in the old world, and removed the cur.se of scllish lact li((i(i. to l.-.unch man into ihelaiger area of humanity. There is a coiuinuniiy among men based on hnman rationality, a community that nalnrall.N aris's from the tact of man's common origin and common destiny. Christian and nipn-CiirisUan unite togeiher in tiie toiiniUiun vi this uiiilated for Charles the P.ald the works of Dionysius the Areopagite. supposed to be tlie first ChrisMan teacher in France, "On ihe eelefiiml mondrc'ifi." '^Ihc «r/cs»(.s'.';Vv(/ hkrarchii." and on ••Miis'r Tin'ohMjij." Despite the prohibition of Pope Nicolas I. tlu-sc woi'ks introduced the platoiiic (Mem)nts of mystic theology int-o the western clinrcli and laid the foutiflation of the fir.st opposition in Western Europe to the; received faith of tiie Clrarcli of Rime. His system of phiiosop'.iy was inseparably associated with religion and was a kind of science of everytliing wliich lie derived from the fulness of nature and idealised in a nature-deity. || * I'abf. |{il)l. L;it. 1. :ui(l III. ■I' Aluibillon. .si'c. I\'; (Joiiriiirj Aiit. Ac. Diss. Ill p. 7.V, L;iuiK>iiis 1. p. l.'i luid ;fl. 'i Loi'iinei', Inst. p. 119. S Doaii. Hist, of Eiii'. Soc. 2:i:)-40. Scliools (,f Clv.ulcs lin> Oii-at. .1. li. Miilliiijrer. 1S77; I'oolc. p. N4. II Koi-fiiiii. IV r.); Clirnii. Scdi. Ed. 1)V Oaiaciis; ('(iiiviiiir. .\nt, Ac. Siipp. :!!; Ma'inrMl), do Gi'st. !<('!.' All-. ll.4: .\iat. Wcs'.ii.. iluf.liisl. ::u Am. ,;.,. I I il;i( r. His. u.ini. \\,.. \11. r. [".', p. (;0."). SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 27 JTe wrote a work "oh fhc nature of things,'' puhlishccl by Gale at Oxford, ICi^l, under the t\t\c Jon nn I Scoti Erlgenae ds dlvMone naturae lihri qiiimjn", \n "Which we have the scholastic idea of nature. Like the monk ot later .iiiares. he retires from the world of sense, into Uie nuiterial world •of e^jQteraplatioa including Ood, the creator^ and nature, the rlhinw created. He divides nature into four parts:— (1.) that which <;reates and is not created; (2.) that which is created and creates; (34 that which is created and does not create; (4-) that which neither creates nor is created. God is all things and all things are God.* He renounces this world for the next in which God will be all in all and nothing will reniain hut Go.l alone. t The idea at the foundation of this system is the repudiation of external nature's tciiching. It was this antagonism to nature in its phenomena tliat opened the way for the assertion on the part of the church of supreme authority over theology and philosophy. Men who retired into the unknown prepired the wiy for the voice of the unknown speaking through the ecclesiastics. Monkory and asceticism were the two pillars upon whicli .■scholasticism rested. It is this that has made the Catholic faith of the middle ages the irreconcilealde foe of free thought and political auton^omy. The enthusiasm of Erigena sprang from a deitjcation f»f the divine which easily gave place to the mysteries of Ecclesias ticism. Tlie one idea Jianded down from the church fathers through Augustine to this age was the Divine manifestation in humanity. This the church laid huld of, and .giving forth the utterances of theology as the will of God, they descended into dogmatism. Tlie grand problem of Scholastic writing Mierefore was the reconciliation of faith and humm reason. It was in this sense that Anselm Jl)3")-1109, the first reviver of Auj;ustini.inism wrote his I''IS Ti;?!. E ■.•!. c. TjI. . ):i!ij t's In ;; p. W.. !l TiiiJj.'...iu.s >].■ S. K. c. :i,i4. li^ THE POLITICAL TITEOIIY OF THE liio two: whereas in the Christian system there is a separation of the powers for the purpose of promoting' human well-beirg and e^^pcoially to carry out the instructions of the founder of Chi istiaiiity Jesus Ch; ist four.ded the Chris- tian Cliurch and gave to her laws, authority and organization. He had noth- ing whateA-erto do with the foundation of a state. He rather submitted to the iv)\vei' (if tlie state, declarins^ tliat liis Kingdom was not of this world. Jesus Christ alone held the twofold office of King and Priest. Knowing the weak- ness of men he has separated by definite acts and special cliaracieristics the two powers, desirous of keeping the holders of the power from failing into undue pride, as did the Emperors under paganism prior to Christ. It was his will that Christi:ui Kings sh.oiild b? in sut)je?tion, in all due humility, to the priests in inalters coiu'erning eto:'n;il life, wh'l- tlie priests as Go-'i's soldiers were not to take anything to do wiLh tenjporal things, but to be subject to the Emperor in civil matter.'-. Especialy. men who are ent rusted with ten.- p.'iral a!f,ii:s shou'd not preside over councils on spiritual matters.* Kings arc subject to no law but that of God, I he royal partisans say. Everything be has as King is by God's perm's-;ion becanst; God (Stablishes the princes, "ihe h-Mrt of the K:ru is ill the h;:nd of (J')d."' as it is vcrit'eii. Tiie p )\ver of I Ik- King is absolute as against the clergy and Kings may u.'it be exc;un- nv.inicited by Ibsliops or oEher.j. Hinrmir opposes any lim:t to tlic pouer of t lie prince, save as it is in subordination to the spiritual power, ('luist estab- li.shed his Kingd jm and placed it where the priesthood of Moses stood. Jesus Christ accepted the foundation, laws and organizai ion ot the stata as set forth in the Old Testament. In tluit revelation of the will of God, c )n- lain^d in the Old Testament, there is the vindicatic n of the superiority nf t he Church, as possessing a higher because a spiritual authority. Natiian subjects King David to certain pennances, as his superior, the servant of the L' rd. S.iul is calltid to be King and an jint^d before the per)ple by Samuel the priest: he is also commanded to be subject to the I):vine autiioriiy. T ;•■ apostolic injunction addresse.l to Kings is u^ reges obedlant pra-cpod'is aiiis ■/; JJominO. that they be in sul)je.;tion to those placed over them in tlie Lord, evidently quoting from the psuedo-Isidorian Decretals, as no sucii passngc ()cc\ws in the New T(-stan)ent writings. f In this way the secular power is limited by the authority of Gtd, entrusted to the Church so as to prevent t\r,inny. He distinguishes between a Kingand a tyrant, the f>:ra)er is sub- jiMi eiily to G(;d, while tlie latter being a violator of God"s law is subject lo 1 he juc'.g nent of G.id's representatives on earth the Church or the clergy. It is true, he say.s. th-? King is not subj'.-ct to any .law or judgment save that (d" (rod. if he is a true Kin.-'. Hex is to exercise his oifice )vijr;r on 1 he princiijle (it .•■■','(m rL^(,'M!aj?/. tluit is rule according lo right and oppose ev.l; leal if a ■ De Tot. Rpf? c. 1. ■' Opi'iii do Divort. Lo:!i pp fj^lS-". SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 29 heretic, adulterer, slave of vice, then he is subject to be judged by the bish- ops who are the supporters of God's authority, in whom He resides and by whona He gives his judgments to men. In a letter written for Cliarles the Bald, he expresses a different idea, "Kings are not deputies of Bishops but masters of the country. They are not the serfs of Bishops."* Hincmai, while admitting the superiority of the spiritual over the the temporal pow- er, does not admit that the Pope is above the other Bishops; he claims that the Bishops are responsible only to themselves as God's officers. He also denies the validity of the principle of heredity in the succession to royal power. It may be a means of determining who has the best claim to the succession, but it is subject to the judgment of the Church against any who may possess such a claim but who is a violator of God's law. He says, pater- nal nobility is not sutticient to secure the suffrage of the people to the childien of Kings; because vice on the part of an individual tends to the for- feiture not (mly of rights (»f nobility, but even of liberty. There is no such thing as a divine riglit of Kings, and inviolability does not attach to the per- son merely as a person, but it depends upc»ri the value of the person. There are here two lil»eral ideas, Kingship depends upon the suffrage of the people, and qualification for office is the determining principle of selection. The Ecclesiastical doctrine then comes in. As the Bishops say to Louis, "Jesus Christ created Bishops to govern and instruct thee," so says Hincmar. He Joined in the conflict after Lothair's deatli in 855 which tended to strengthen the Ecclesiastical supremacy. After rescuing Charles from his own nobility, lie said, "if Kings rule acc(trding to God's will they are subject to no one; if they be great sinners then is their judgment in the hands of the Bishops. "t 6. Intimately associated with the Scliolastic pniitical theory, in fact form- ing a part of it, is the Ecclesiastical system of politics that sprung up during the conflict between the Church and state carried (m between the Popes and Emperors and their respective followers. There were two great doctrines set up the one in opposition tf» the other— firsllv, the sovereignty of the state and its independence in governing the naticm, without Ecclesiastical inter- ference; and, secondly, the divine right of the Cluirch, as representing God's sovereignty, to control the secular government in the natne of (Jod. The controversy sprang up gradually and is to be foi.-nd in the Ecclesiastical and political history fif the early centuries of the Middle Ages.t (ircijorif (lie. Great, whose blind zeal led him into the persecution of paganism and oppct- sition to learning is the first in whom we discern the growing arrogance <»f * M. Ampere, Hist. Litt. III. c. l(t. + Janet, Sc. Pol. I. 328-32; Encyr. Hi-it. Hincninr; Works of Hiiirmar. Krt. by Sirmoixt, 2 Vols., KUf); Misnr's f'uisiis, Pat. Coiiip.; I'rii-li;irss. Mcrk wiiidi^Ui'ileii aiis ticiii Lcboii uiid scliiifti'ii lliiiciiiars, l«0(j; Ceillier, Hist. Cieii. des. atuouis Sacix's. Vol. Xll. c. 71. t Aorounf of the coulict I^iiiilli's Eccl. Illst. Vol. fl. Pi. I. ;«) TITE POLTTTCAL TITEOPvY OF TTTE Ecclesiastical power.* His celebrated />'ooA- of Momh is itself the emDodiment of the claims of reli^fious supremacy al)f)ve morality and even above gram- mar: and the claim of the Church to possess and gyiard all human knowledge. In a letter addressed to the Eastern Emparor he claims to oppose a law for- bidding soldiers to be received in tlie Monasteries as a law contrary to the Sovereign Lord. As the servant of (xod and of the Emperor, for he docs not refuse obedience as a subject, he says to the Eaiperor in the name of Christ, "I haveniiide Caesar Emperor and the Father of Emperors." '"I have entrust- ed my priests to thy care and thou art to give thy soldiers to my service," calling upon him to answer to these words at the judgment day. lie dis- tinguishes between the ol)edience he owes as still a sut>ject of the Empire and that he owes to the truth of God.f The words of the Ilishop of Rome are those of a subject speaking in terms of respect in the name of God to the F]mi)eror. There is no id(\t of usuri)ation. When the King of Loml)ardy took possession of Ilavenna the seat of the Eastern Exarchate. Pope Stephen, suc- cessor of Zachary. invoked the" aid of Pepin King of France to re])ulse the Loml)ards. When the Lombards were defeated Pepin assigned the spoils of his victf»ry to be held by the successors of St. Peter. The routed King signed the order, delivering \\\) the Exarchate with all the cities '"to be forever held and i)ossessed by the most holy ])o])e Stephen and his successors in the a])ost()lic see of St. Peter. "The Lombard King soon retook what he had given up. Stephen in order to gain tlie ear of Pepin pres?nt?d the famous forged letter (tf St. Peter.t In the time of Charlemagne the relations of Cluirch and state are still the same. The conqueror of Europe, however, aided in strengthening the temporal power and establishing the political pretensions of the Pap:icy. Charlemagne addresses Leo III on the occasion of his election. •We greatly rejoice at the unanimity of your election and the humility of your obedience and t\\v promises of fidelity you have made." Leo III replies to the Enrperor "if we have not lollowed the sensc^ of th? true law we are ready to icform after your judgment and that of your commissioners." About the same time was forged the second letter which appeared under ])apal sanc- tion, known in history as the Donation of Constant ine. We attribute to the Chair of St. Peter, all imperial dignity, glory and power. Moreover we give to Silvester and to his successors our palace of Lateran. . . .We give liim our ccown. our mitre, our diadem, and all our Im])erial vestments; we resign to him the imperial dignity We give to the holy pontiff the city of Rome and all the western cities of Italy as well as the western cities of other coun- tries. To make r ):)m fo)' him we abdicat ' our si)V(>rignty over all these jjro- vinccs; and we withdraw from Rome, transferring the seat of our Empiie to Hyzantium since it is not just that a terrestrial Emperor shall retain any power where God has placed t'lie head of religion."'^ After Charlemagne the * Siirislierioiis. I'olior;it. 1.9: II.2(i-9: VIII. 10. ■y Gi-('i praec^fir monprif:."f All men, princes as well as subjects are commanded to render obedience to the church and in case of disobedience they are accounted infamous and expelled from the church. t The priests a:e exhorted to renumber it is their ottice to instruct I)rinces and it is the duty of rulers to obey the priests as they w(»uld obey God.^ The Roman Church has received her primacy direct from Christ: Peter and Paul both consecrated the R omin Church is above all others: and the spiritual judges must have the final decision in all matters because they are substitutes for God himsolf.ll In a letter of Gregory the (rreat the climax is attained when it is asserted, if any king, prince, or secular ruler violate the authority of the apostolic see he ought to be divested of his secular aulli- ority.'l Nicholas I. the earliest of the Popes to reali/.e the idea of a universal dominion for the Churcli of Rome copying the example of llincniar. lays down the principle upon which to make use of this power of deposition of rulers. Writing to Auxentius, Risliop of Metz, he says, "see if these kings atid princes to whom you are subject are true kings and prin;'e-;; see if they govern first themselves and after the people; see if they rule according to the right, for if they do not, they ought to be considered tyrants, not kings, and ought to be resisted. If we ai-e subject to them, or favor them in any way. then we are reckoned to favor tlieir vices.'-* After a century of disorder and darkness the conllict between church and state revived with increased force during the eleventii century. Out of the * IV 'iKlD-Isidoi- 1. 'tt. I. p. i;. Cii'iU'v:i. 1C.2S. II 1. p. 110; 1 1, p. rZl : 1 1 1, p. i:!S. + p. '.I. 'i p t)'):5. :|: n. ;il. ** Guizot . Hist, clf C'i vU. L-r. -.'7: .l.i niM . I :c.'".-N s n -'A. 111. :) r.i. 32 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE onflicts of nations, amid intellectual and political renascence, the church raises herself as a nnitcd organism above the mass of confusion. It was now the mission of the church to regenerate society and to reform the state. It was the policy of the populace to bring the state into subjection to this church organism. It could not be done without a reformation in the cliurch herself. It is because Hildebrandewasanimated by this ideal, the reformation of the church as a preliminary to the reformation and submission of the state, that we are able to see a better side to a pf)licy that was carried out by dubious means, characterised by luiughtiness and cruelty. This led to the strict separation of the clerical caste from the laity and ultimately to the elevation of the priest above the people and above social forms. This gave to the cliurch organization whii-li claimed to be divine, as against the civil power which was regarded as human, an influence it used in tlie warfare between cluuvh and state to the advantage of tlie former. Gregory VII. is the embodiment of this principle in the war he wages against the empire and in tlie use he makes fnr tlie first time of the power of deposition. The cie.-gy of the empire make aloud protest against this fi-esli assumption of papal prerogative.* "He is raised abjve all as if he were God. He not only pardons sin, Vjut he frees men fioai the force of the law of Cnrist, and from llie obligation of oaths— all this tie calls tlie law of God." Gregory is com- pelled lo defend his position against the clerical protest. He does so in his two letters to the IJisli ip Hermann of Metz. Civil government he regards as an insiitution of man. It is so deflled by its origin among sinful men, f .r Cain and is'imrcd are its founders, that it is itself sinful. Between the church which is divine and the state which is human and sinful there can l)e no permanent peace, until the latter is brought into harmony with the divine through the former. He argues from history, from the scriptures of the old and new Testaments, in favor of the superior power of the church. He ascribes the source of the power of the prince to God through his repre- sentative on earth. Wicked kings, he says, owe their power to the devil. t 'i lie i>ir/r(f»,s Pr/jjff? which is ascribed to Gregory VII. 1075 A. 1)., embodies the papal conception of Ecclesiastical authority and supremacy. ''The Koman chuich is founded by God alone. Ihe Roman Pope alone is jure styled nniversdli-ft. He alone can use imperial insignia. At the feet, of the Pope (inly are all princes to bow. He can depose Emperors. Pynoonecan he he judged. He can absolve subjects from allegiance to wicked rulers. "J The hing conflict between the papal and imperial powers drew foith many letters fr( m lioth sides :i). Apilo^. pro Iiiii)?r. II Mir. IV arlv. Grc;;. VII. p. 4(i. Hanover, Kilil. t Matisi. Coll. of Counrils XX. Ep. Gro^. VII. blc. IV. Ep. 2. VIII Ep. 21. •4: .latiot. I. p. UU; Its aiillieniJcity is (iiieslioried. I'a.niiis, OrJtica. in Annalcs Baronii. S Goldast. Mon.p. 1-2M. ll.uios'er, l.ijl: Kii'/lur. dio Liierar. Wid.n-. dei- I'ap.isie. SCHOOLMEN AND GrvOTIUS. 37 fhDiuois pa- iiu twoswoids. the temporal and spiritual, these ouglit to be used independently so as to avoid usuiping 1 heautboiity exercised by eit her of them. Against the sei)arat;(m of the two powers he citesl he exam pie of Christ, in driving out the money-changers from the Temple, in which case Clirist exercised a temporal jurisdiction: Moses also was judge ;is well as pontiff: the priestliood is an institution of God, while I'oyaliy is of the pri(>sthood by the command of God, the blessing bding given l)y the liaiuU of t he priesthood to the people and rulers alike. His own opinion is i)iesented by a scholas- tic distinction. The two powers, he says are distinct, nHtiad cxrrrifiinn. in as far as their separat" exercise is concerned: and they are so dist inguisiied (jHoad inipcriiini. ])U{ not ijiiond //»'((»/. that is in as far as they ari> l)oth * Hus- (io S. Victor. I)c S.iciainciilis II, 'l. r. 4; .Imiu'I. J. ICiS-il: Uliiki'V. I'ol. l-il. I. i'. 10: Mifiiic. I'iitr. Lut, \'.)1. 17.)-I7;. t 'rritlifiiiiiis. di' Si-i i|). I'",c;'. c. iTT. p. 'MV. I>;i iiioius. (Id'ort. .\rist. pp. isi-l'.l'i: Mi:j:iH'. I'iitr. L;0. Vol. I'.tl. :f Suiiiiiiii. I'lifis III. (ju. 4^'. Ill . '.. u. 016 : : 38 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE impcvinm. thoy are separato, but they have not a sepcrate initum. The spirit- ual power pos.-csses its own inqicriHrn and nidum; hut the secuhir power while possessing its own iuqjcn'um is subject to the mtfum (will) of the Ecclesiastical power. Hence Alexander puts it, "the relation of the secular to the Ecclesiastical power is not the same as the relation of the Ecclesiastical to the secvilar: for the Ecclesiastical is never subject to the secular, while in some thiiijjjs the secular is subject to the Ecclesiastical." It was in this way the pains and penalties of the state were nieeted out to the heretics. The church professed tf> have no power to punish, hut it had the will, that will handing over the refractory to the power of the state for its exercise in inllicting the jenalty. This is also shown in the fact that the church possesses the powei' of detei mining who shall hf)ld and exercise and how tliey shall exercise the civil power: that is, the sovereign power of instituting civil government and of judging who shall be civil rulers, as well as of impeaching and deposing them, rests with the church.* Eonaventui e, 1221-1274, was a member of the Franciscan order, a student and Ijoctor of philosophy at Paris and a Cardinal under Gregory X. He was :i deputy at the celebrated Council at Lyons, dying during the session of the Council. His writings are chiefly of a mystical-theological character. Ac- cording to liim all human knowledge is divided into three branches, logical, physical and moral, all the branches being contained in the sacred Scriptures. Pliysical knowledge is concerned with the symbolical parts of Scripture; log- ical philosophy reasons from the external words or expressions, to tiie internal: while moial philo^ophy is the peculiar outcome of the monastic life of contimplation in communion with God.t In this v.'e have the key to Lis political sentiments. All power, he says, in as far as it is power and by virtue of its-' relation to him who commands is just and comes from God. So far as the power itself is concerned it is just and good: but on account of the sin of man, man may get this power by unjust and unlawful means. If it is leceived in a lawful manner, it is from God and its exercise is just: if in an unlawful manner, it is not from God and its exercise is unjust. A go( d civil ruler is from (Jod: a bad ruler comes from sin and is from the devil. Yet by reason of man"s corruption, no power of man is wholly just: tlierefore we can only say of every power, it comes in pai't from God. The power ought to l)e in harn:ony with order and right; if it is against order and contrary to the I'ight il is unjust. 1 1 all power comes from God, at least in part, we ought not to dispossess any of those who have the power. Power he answers to this, is not inviolable. If God gives power absolutely and without condi- tion it would l>e inviolable: but if God gives it for a time or on a certain .)()ndition. then it would not be inviolable, .lust as justice compels the * Sum. Paris. H. qu. Hit. in. :i. ii. 1: III. (in. 4(1 in. 5: .laiict. I. p. :j:;;i: Tritlioiii. de Scr. Ecr. c. 4.5;; Fill)!-. BUM. Lat. iVU;cl. 1. p. 170. ■I- T)c Itoductione iutiusu ad TlicologUiru, lit. 1. (Ipu.sj-ulu. Ixiigd. 1(J4";; Trithciiiius de Scrip. Keel. c. 4'i4. p. U2. SCHOOLMEN AND GHOTTUS. 39 juflge to tnke away the life of the brigand witliont injustice: so the abuse of the sovereign power dernands that it be destroyed and its privileges taken away in order to vindicate right, and prevent wrong-doin?. He next asks if civil control is an institution of nature or simply a form of chastisement. In order to answer this question he distinguishes between the rule of a Master over a subject, which is according to nature, and the other two forms in which power presents itself, namely, that of a spouse or father over anoth- er spouse or child, and that of a person over a thing which are extm natimi. The subjection of subjects to Masters arises from the corruption of tlie fall and is the penalty of sin. Christianity frees man from sin, but he is not wholly set free from the faculty of and inclination to servitude, which appears as the penalty of sin. It is a part of the Divine order that Chris- tiansshould besubjectto princes and rulers, but not in all things, nor in those which are against reason and cu^itom. Christianity frees from theservitude of sin and the bondage of the Mosaic law: but not from human law which ought to lead us to the observance of the Divine law. On earth this distinction of ruling and ruled classes will continue as a discipline to lead man up to hea- ven, where there is a full enfranchisement from misery and domination such as man is subjected to in this life. Obedience then is not absolute in all things, and human power is not unlimited; yet obedience is a virtue like self-sacrifice with the monk. Self-sacritlce and charity become the founda- tions upon which ho bases a kind of mystic socialism, such as has been clevektped more fully on somewhat diflrerent lines among the Christian socialists of later centuries.* Albert the Great, 1193-1280, the predecessor and Master of Aquinas was possessed of much learning. He became a Dominican Friar in 1221, and a professor at Cologne and later at Paris, where he acquired a high reputation. Few men in that age possessed the same skill and knowledge of the natural sciences, and his skill in their use was attributed by the men of his times to magic or some other infernal art. No mere abstract truth, he thouglit can be accepted as a guide to legislative action. Political maxims cannot be laid down as universal postulates for permanent application in the course of the human history of society. Aside from tlie abstract, which cannot always be perceived, as divested of special circumstances of time and place, there are rapacities of mind and sympathies of soul which exhibit themselves in politi- cal conibinations of individuals, which cannot beinfluenced by naked maxims and which cannot be guided by general principles of politics. Hunr.in idiosyn- <-r,icies must b? studie 1 tiy !iim who would bo an adept in politics in order to find o'.it what is suitable to man's wishes and conditions of life; the subjective conditions of man, his feelings, desires, aspirations, and affections exercise an influence upon liis soei.il character and mould society itself. In every social * Lib. S.-Mti-iit. II. H art. 3; Vn'.n: Uib. L;it. .Mi'tl. IV. \). 1:21; Opoia. Hoiuiv. Uoiiie. l.ws EiiliiKinii, 1. :>;Ki. 40 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE change tliere are a variety of conditioning causes to be taken into account. AVe cannot assert positively that tliere is any principle or set of principles which can beapplied with legislative sanction to regulate the movements of men in society. He is against the abstract in the sphere of politics, denying the rigidity of rule in social life. "The consciences of men, their affections, reason, sensitiveness to dishonor and coercion, desire of glory and haj)piness, benevolent affections and sympathies, their ideas of what is just, good, expe- dient, are all matters for the contemplation of the politician, and these are all matters which lie in vast abundance on the surface of society, and hence living and active agents of varied intensity in every symptom of change and innovation. Truth in politics, therefore, becomes hedged about with a peculiar sanctity, apart from its sacred character. It is truth in relation with many things and not truth barely conteajplated in its own naked char- acter."'* Wliat is interesting in the political ethics of Albert is the fact that liberal ideas are not rejected by him simply because they are innovations. Although iiis knowledge of Aristotle and ancient philosophy cannot be regarded as very trustworthy, coming as it did through Arabian channels, on account of his ignorance of the Greek language: yet he gathered enough from these sources of independent thought to give him an insight keener than that of any of his predecessors, into the variable cluiracter of politics and political maxims. The rights, the conditions and tlie feelings of the people, as well as the external relations of things, these are ideas that break down, or at least modify in a large measure the unchungeable maxims of Hildebrandine politics. Derangement may naturally enough arise in political government and may inlluence the form of governuient. Sir Robert Filmer's contention tha-t the doctrine, that men naturally born free from subjection by nature have a right to choose their own gDvernment and that the power of one over others was first bestowed at the discretion of the many, was hatched in tlie schools, does not fall far short of the mark, when we consider the democratic tendencies in politics in men like Albert. t Albert had no special preference for Monarchy and to him political theory was the product of so many internal and external causes, that with different surroundings and in a more e^nlight- ened age, he migiit have been the most radic il of tlieorists. The man who through love or humility and dislike of the pride associated with the episco- pal dignity, could abandon thechair of rule for the lifeof study is not the man to hanker after the Divine right of any person or to contend for a changeless system of authority. Elasticity is the law of life, it muse be the law of institutions likewise.: The diligent study of Tlieulogy and his extensive acquaintance with natural science, led Albert to take a deep interest in the * Bliikey. Pol. Lit. I. c. 10. + Filnier\s Patriarcha. c. I. p. 2. 2ikI. edition. II- * ^'".(••/f"'"''"- '" ^'i'i' -^I'x^'l' Ma.i;-.: Spaiilieiiii. C'hi-onif. A. P. lyA: TrltiuMiiius. Ann. I Ills. I. p. ii'.rz. SCHOOLMEN ANT) GROTiUS. ^1 world arouiici liimanrt in which he lived. One grand difference between him and his disciple Thomas is to be found in the fact that to Albert the world is the physical worldofsen.se, while to Thomas it is the moral and political world. This marks off the politics of Albert from the politics of Thomas, giving to the latter just pre-eminence. An examination of his political ideas might reveal many gems of thought for which others at present receive credit. Such a judgment is verified by tlie fact that his political speculations which are contained in eight books embrace the most extensive field of political ethics and of politics. One merit of his treatise on politics is tVjat it is more philosophical than theolog- ical. He has digested the Polit'cs of Aristotle as he got it from Latin translations, notes and Arabian commentaries. We notice two designs in all the works Albert, (1) an attempt to christianize Aristotle's philosophy: (2) a well defined effort to present tlie Ciiristian faith in a philosophic system. He had the boldness in tiiat early age of christian civilization to modify Aristotle's principals so as to unite the ancient philosophy and Christianity. Never l)efore had Aristotle been the special subject'matter of lectures in the Chiistian u'^choolsand Albert deserves the praise as his first expositor, however imperfect his knowledge may have been. He exercised a strong influence on the mind of liis pupil Aquinas.* The sutgects of which he treats are as fol- lows. (1) He considers the abstract natuie of political power in itself and the various divisions into which it falls among different nations. He speaks of the civitas and its parts and rulers, of the power of governing in the house- liold and state, of the difference between dominatio and gubernatio, the latter being the government of a state. (2) He enters upon a discussion of the principles and gives an analysis of governmental systems found in the history of Greece, Carthage, and Egypt. He refutes the opinion of Socrates that all union and community is found in the state, rejects community of goods, examining the diffeient states of Solon's constitution, the Lacedamonian and Carthaginian types. (.3) He examines the abstract question of human society, ^he nature and origin of social combinations, and points out the differences in the different f(»rras of the state-republic. Democracy, Aristoc- racy, Oligarcliy and Monarchy. He defines the state and considers the end of the state, and the end of man as an indi\idual. (4) He treats separaiely all these forms of government, giving a detailed account of the Politics of Aristotle. The different species of slates, he points out, differ specially in t he quality, not the (luantity of each. He specifies various kinds of Democ- racies and Oligarchies, and treats of tyranny. He specifies the three parts of a governmental power, consilium, magistratus nnd judicium. (5) He men- tions the causes whieh produce disorder in the exercise of political power, and examines the effect which these causes have upon the different forms of * lAfv and labors of St. Tlios. of A(iiiin. K. B. Vaustiaii. Vol. I. p. 115. 2 Vol.s. Lon- don. 1X71 42 THE R:)L1TICAL THEORY OF THE jiovernment. He points out the causes of changes in states, by which one form gives place to another. (6) He treats of proprietorship and of the nature of polity, indicating the ends and purposes of popular government. (7) He shows what is the best life and the happy state, giving the activity to be employed and the means to be used in attaining these ends. He dwells upon the material situation, possessions, and en.ir)yraents of the state, the fortifications necessary for its defence and the best division of the state. (8) He considers the subject of education and kindred subjects bearing upon the discipline of the citizens so as to prepare them for occupying their places with advantage to themselves and the state. How are good and free citizens to be made? He says that mental training and the acquisition of knowledge Vtecome proper instruments of extending the influence of good government. In order to promote good order among members of the community and to produce the best government on the part of the political body, it is tlie duty of legislators to attend to the interests of natural educatidn among tliem- selves and among the youth.* 10. .Jcthn of Salisbury who died in 1182 was one of the most learned men of Ills age. He went to Paris in 1137 and attended the lectures of Abelard and otiier masters of Theology and Philosophy, acquiring an extensive knowledge of science, morals and languages, being a Greek and Hebrew scholar, a rare accomplishment in the 12th. century. He was the friend, strenuous support- tr of and after 1103 the companion in exile f>f Thomas a Beckett. Conscious of the frivolous nature of dialectics as taught and practised in his own time, he cultivated a high regard for true philosophy and exercised his fruitful genius with the correctest sense of literary tnste he could foster in the elevation of true wisdom and enlightened principle above the ignorance of his time. There is no truer picture of the philosophical spirit of the age than that which he presents of his own visit to the former home of his sud- dent life in Mount St. Genevieve: "dialectic studies however useful they may lie when connected with other branches of learning, are in themselves useless and barren. "t His Policraticus is the first production that can be character- ized as a systematic treastise on politics. It is above ail a philosophy of politics. We have no hint from beginning to end of the Policraticus that there was a struggle going on between Frederick and Hadrian, just becoming ripe for open hostilities: tiiere is nothing to Indicate that John himself through his attachment to and advocacy of the policy of fieckett has l)een alienated from the royal favor and c;uise: there is not even a reference to the history of the time, c»r to the then existing forms of government, far less * Albertus Magnus. Opera. 21 Vols. Lusduni 16.51. 1654. Politios 4th. volume; 21 Vols. Lyons Ed. 1615: Bhikey. Po! Lit. 1. c. 10. p. 228; Bach, Albertus Magnus. Wien. 1881, for gen- eral view of his relation to the Gteelcs. Latins .Jews and Arbians; Albertus Magnus. Seiu Leben und seine VVissenschaft. Sighart. 1857; D'Assailly. Albert le Grand. 1870; Stockl. Gesoh. d. Schol. Phil.; Erdniann. Grand, d. Gerh. Vol, 1. + Metal. L 2. :^: IT. 17-19. SCHOOLMEN ANT) GROTIUS. ^'^ any account of tlie struggles through which the papal power has passed in its antagonism to the Greek Empire, and in its conflict with the barbarian forces and the Franco— feudal ideas. His forms are drawn from the ancient Scripture and Roman times: his theory of state is a repioductjon of Plutarch's idjaUand his official designations are purely classical. Overlooking all con- ditions in human society that are changeful, such as the order of feudal lords and barons, he gets right into the principles of civil polity, as these nre con- ceived by him to be enduring and unchangeable.- (I.) Theocratic idea of the state. In the first bo(»ks he lays down the general principles upon which he bases political speculation and thinking. When darkness and error prevail the truth disappears and the foundations of virtue are shaken. Who is so unworthy as the man who despises knowledge, for man borne away from truth and consequently from virtue becomes a brute, loses the imaga of the Divine and therewith loses his dignity as a rational creature. t In judging of what is right, we df) not question, whether it brings pleasure or promotes utility, but we say that whatever opposes natura and officium ought to be characterized as siinjAiciter alienwn.X We gather the idea of the distrii)uti()n of duties, officia, from the political consti- tutions of the ancients; justice in its precepts and morals gives us the ground of prosperity in the great society of men.^ All things yield to the use of the wise, and they who are wise use all things in the exercise of virtue. 1| Public safety is the concern of man in general, individual safety of single lives, for nothing is more valuable tlian liuman life, nothing more durable than safety.^I It is not only lawful but just and right to kill a tyrant, for he who takes a sword in his hand, deserves to die by the sword. He wlio receives power from God, serves the law and is a chilc\of justice. But he who usurps it destroys right and suV)jects the laws to his own arbitrary will. No crime is so grave as treason, because it is against justice and the body of justice. Tyranny is worse than treason and more than a public crime, because it is a crime againt the whole i)ody of the earthly republic.** Inbook IV. hegoes on with the treatment of tyranny, distinguishing the tyrant from the princeps who rules by law and according to the principle pf puhlica potestas embodied in himself as the very image of Divine majesty upon earth; whereas the tyrant believes himself to be law, and rules for his own exclusive benefit. The princeps is tiie minister of God. 7 he king is on a level with eternal law as its exponent and interpreter for the people, and is independent in the sense that he is the embodiment of the universal sense among the members who follow him as their Head. The prince's power comes from God and is not * Buiaci Hist. Ac. Piir. II. p. 750: Kiibr. Bib. Lat. Med. III. p. :)«<». + Bk. I.e. I. * c. 2 S i;. 8. II II. c. I. 1 III. c. I. * II I.e..'). 44 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE the less divine in that it is exercised through his minister.* Equity as the jurists call it, convenientia rerum, theperfect adjustment of things, the natural law of the Stoics, the arrangement of the ovdo ?ia;t{r«i!i.s, giving to each one what is his own under the guidance of reason, forms the basis of civil govern- ment, the foundation principle of the civil order. The prince and the law which is his ordinance, interpret justice for the people. The prince is the absolute legislator provided he be just. Th() princejjs \s to promote the gof)d of others before his own private good, and lie is to be guided by justice and equity. He m;iy not deviate from the strict law of equity, his own opinion and judgment having legal force only if conformed to justice. He speaks of the prince as one freed from the bonds of law, not that he has freedom to do evil, but because the motive thai leads him lo promote the welfare of Uie state, should be, not the dread of punishment, but the love of just ice. We can- not speak of the prince's will, for he has no will to do anything save what equity directs and what the public good commands. When his will is guided by equity and utility it forms a right judgi'jent and liis decree has the force of law to all the members of the commonwealth. f The pnncef)s \s thus raised above everything else, so as to elevate aiiove him the Ecclesiastical power. The princ3 is the minister of God, but (iod is represented by the priestlu)od: therefore the prince is the minister of the priesthnod. and thus inferior, for he receives the sword of pnwer fmm the liand of the church, since tiiechurch cannot hold the sword of blood, but uses it in the hand of the prince to coerce the bodies of men. The temporal power exercises that part of the sacred office that seems to be unworthy ot the hands of the clergy. The sec- ular power derives its authority mediately from God, for tlie sacred laws are treasured in the church, which receives her power and dignity immediately from God.t The prince must be subject to the law of justice embodied in the Divine Law.g All law is worthies* if it does nf)t bear the image of God's law and the prince's decree is void unless it conforms to the churcti's discipline. || The King ought to be a fearer of God and luimble in the sight of God that his public authority be not lessened by reason of pride or presumption.*] The state according tf) this reasoning is established upon the principlesof eternal righteousness and as these are under the custody ot tlie churcii it is natural ;hat the state, in its ideal of perfect conformity to litihicousness. siiould be under the control of ihe church. The divine law is the rule of the prince's life, and the regulat(r of his public as well as his private actions. Justice and mercy and moderation are the virtues of his life and the attributes of his administration, executive and legislative. The reward of the good prince is prosperity and tlxity of rule lor himself ai^d liis sons. All political systems not founded upon these principles of truth and equity, fall into the category of tyranny, being based on these maxims of misriile. which arise from false ideas concerning the nature, position and puipose of the common * lY. c. I. + c. 2. i c. :!. s c. i. II CO. ^ c 7. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. io wealth. When priDCcs fall into such a position, involving injustice, injury to others, contumely and deceit, their kingdoms are and ought to be trans- ferred to others. Injustice is a habit of mind which 'destroys equity and sweeps it out of the region of both morals and politics.* (II.) llie State as an Organism. Having established his theocratic and Ecclesiastical state, and constituted the ruler in it as the tool of the sacred Church, he proceeds to give an account of the state in itself and of the ele- ments of the commonwealth. Finding no Biblical text-book, which could guide his thoughts he had recourse to Plutarch's Institihtio Trajani. The principate is the greatest of all human things, for it fills all things and by the force of virtue brings glory to the republic. The prince is conceived as the head of that living organism, the commonwealth, which is animated by thejorce of religion as the soul of the organism. As the head is governed and controlled by the soul, so the ruler is guided and controlled by religion in the republic, subject to God's will and authority. The different classes of society in the organism are represented by the separate and different mem- bers of the body. The heart is the Senate; the eyes, ears, and tongue r represent the judges and presidents of provinces; the hands are the soldiers and • endowed with strength of body and force of intellect, the wise men of the state.** Soldiers are not only to light *. .-. S-12. + V.o.2-i;j; VI. 1-20. :i: VI. c. 24-20. S V. C. a. II C. 5. ICG. ** O. 9. -l(i THE rOLITICAL THEORY OF THE for the temporal honor of the republic, but the special use of the military fs lo preserve the Cliurcli, to flght ap of equal nature an:l conlition with him>?lC.tt The differ- ence between a tyrant and prince consists in this, the Irue prince rules by the laws and fights f(»r the laws and liberty of tlie people, while the tyrant is only satislied by oppressing the people through violent domination and by reducing the people to servitude. The prince is the image of Divinity, tlie tyrant of Lucifer, the devil: the prince is and ought to be feared and rever- enced, but the tyrant is to be and ought to be watched p/cfHm^M^occMZ^ijfto.s.gg 'Law is the gift of God, the form of equity, the norm of justice, the image of the Divine will, the m?ans of securing the safety, unity and consolidation of the i)eople, as well as the exclusion and extermination of vicesand the punish- *VI. C-.8. +0.21. ? VII. C". 17. S C.25. II IV. c.l. T V. c. b. ** TV.c. 15; Vlll.r. ir2\ +•■ VIII.f..'>. « VII. c. 17. S,5VIII.c.l7. SCHOOLMETs^ ANDGROTIUS. 47 ment of the violent, unjust and deceitful.* It is lawful to lure a tyrant to his death, ci namqw licet (nluJarL quern licet occidere. It is both aequm and justum to kill him f The exception to this rule is to be found in the case of the priests, who are not allowed to use the material sword against the tyrant, out of respect to the sacraments and lest damage be done to religion, so that tyrannicide may be .si»€ religionis honestatisqiie disfpendiH.X The end of all tyrants is misery and destruction and God"s vengeance unless they are reclaimed by divine mercy.?. Such is the doctrine of John of Salisbury. The state is under the control of the church. It possesses a large amount of freedom in action, to develop itself on tliQ lines of the social classes, provided these remain within the limits marked out for them by the ideas of justice. Injustice and oppression on the part of civil rulers are held in check by the obligation of removing and killing an oppressor. || 11. Hugh of Fleury, Hugo Floriacencis, was a benedictine monk, who wrote in the beginning of the 12th century, a treatise De regia j}otestate et saceydot((li dignitate, in defence of the imperial independence and in opposition to the claims of supremacy made by the spiritual power. The foundation of the treatise is tlie tect of scripture, "all power comes from God." It is part of the general plan of creation, he says, by which God set man over the other creatures and placed the head above the other members of the body, that God should distribute among men themselves different degrees of dignity and honor, just as he who is the sole monarch of the kingdom c»f heaven estab- lished the orders of archangel and angel in the heavenly world.'] There are two great powers upon earth, the kingly and the priestly. These two powers are united in no one person, save in the Lord -Jesus Christ. In the person of Christ, the kingly ottice is the image of the Fatherliood of God. and the priestly office of the sonship of the son of God, so that the priestly office is in subDrdination to the kingly. Just so in the earthly kingdom, the bishops are to be in subjection to the kings. It is the duty of the kingly power to promote the interests of the spiritual kingdom, and to bring the people into subjection to the rigiit by means of the laws. The spiritual power is to use the word of God to brin'J the people to obedience and the temporal power is to ex- ercise the disciplinary authority of law for the same end. The people are kept in check by the king, but the king is only checked by God. JJad Kings is well, as good Kings are sent by God; in his anger he sends the bad as a chastise- ment to the people when they need correction: the people have no riglit to resist, save by spiritual means, such as prayer. It belongs to God alone to rebuke the pride of the haughty and to remove from their places the un- worthy ruleis.** Thus the doctrine of pfissive obedience is proclaimed in opposition to the doctrine of tyrannicide in John of Salisbury, in the twelfth *. VIII. c. 17. t. VIH. c. 18; III.c. l.V ?. VIII. 17, 18, 20. S. VIII. 21. n. Policraticus. Leyden, 1.57.5; Migne. Patr Lat. Vol. 199; Poole. lUust. of M. Tli. pp. 2.3.' '' Janet. Sc. I'ol.I. :m1-4: HlaUey. Pol. Lit. I.e. 10. 1 I.e. 1. **. I. c. 2. 48 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE century, as the mninstay of the imperialism which is set up in opposition to- the usirrpation of temporal jurisdiction hy the spiritual pjower.* At this point we meet witli the great li^jlit of the Scholastic Theory, the scholar and expounder of the Medieval Thcclogy, rolilics and Philosophy- Thomas Aquinas. *. ^lilmiiii's ih' 15;ilii/A-. I'.k. [V. A. I), llill: .hiiu-t. Sc. Pol. [. i)p. li'S-^iO. SCHOOLMEN AND GEOTIUS- PAET II. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THOMAS AQUINAS. CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY. I. The Political Science of the Middle Ages has until very recently been left untouched. Different writers have studied the institutions, laws, general literature and the natural science as found in the writings of that age; but few have thought it worth while to study the social and political theories, thinking the labor would not be repaid by its results. The more we investi- gate this so called barren field, the more rich do we find it in the materials for science. One philosopher in bidding adieu to the thorny and intricate patliway of the middle ages on turning towards the renascence of literature and the revival of science, does so in the rather quaint language of Martial;— "Turpe est difficile habere nugas, Et stultus labor est ineptiarum." "Tis a folly to sweat o'er a difficult trifle, And for silly devices invention to rifle."* The age of trifles, inventions and speculations was as essential in the progress of thought as that of the positive scientific thinking. It is not entirely a misfortune that Theology was the Science of Sciences in the Middle Ages, and that political science occupied only a secondary place in the scheme of knowledge. It was fitting that Christian thought which left in the back- ground all purely pliilosophic systems and had brought the new civilization of humanity to b3ar upon ideal and semi-deistic conceptions of the world and man, should contribute its quota to the upbuilding of man's civil life. The Christian thinkers alone cared for kn')wledge in these dark ages, and if they threw their monastic spell over the thought of a freer political era, it was that it might be preserved in th3 shell of sacred tradition as the kernel of freedom to break forth in new forms and with fresher life in the resurrec- tion of the ages. More than this, we owe a tribute of grateful praise to the * Enfield. Phil. p. 517. 50 THE POLITICAL THEORY OI' THE memory of the men who demonstrated to the world, that pagan philosophy was not an unmixed evil, that the better elements of its rationalistic system could be incorporated into the Christian system. Christianity had begun the war against paganism and pagan ideas; it had been carried on by the representatives of that system whose founder professed to betheLight of the world: for more than a thousand years it seemed as if Christianity refused toown that there was a better side to man in his pre-Christian life, and that the same God who gave the fuller light of the incarnation could have given the few gems of thought and rays of light that shone amid the rubbish of an age of atheism, idolatry and superstition: faith had fought against reason and refused to acknowledge that the rational nature of man could be any- thing but darkness. But now^ tne time has come, in the fulness of the ages, grossly dark though these ages may appear, when faith and reason are to be reconciled when Christian thought and philosophic truth are to be incar- nated in one human system, when the (rod providentially the same in the pa- gan and Christian wolrds is to manifest Himself as the same God all through time. The body into wliich that truth is put may be a body of clay, but it must be so, because the body must die in the after ages before the new germ of life can spring up. It was fitting, yea it was a necessity of nature, tliat Theology and Theologians should accomplish this task. Any other science, purely material or natural, would have destroyed the spiritual and moral, the result would have been a morbid pessimism; whereas tlie spiritual and religious life of Theology and its aim after immortality gave an elevating and sui^limating influence to the natural and political sciences which pre- vented these from degradation to pure materialism, until they were so ma- tured as sciences that they could stand alone. It is for this reason that we place such a high value up )n Thomas Aquinas and his work, in whom nature and revelation, science and theology, faitli and reaso"h find a coitus, that bears fruit nearly tlvc centuries later. Tluis though Political Science occupies but a humiile place in the Theological system, consummated by Thomas, it still holds ci place of lionor and it has received through its relations with Theology a new form which canuDt be overlooked in the history of politics. Social, political and econoteic science. as well as Public and International Law appear in a now light after the age of the Summa and the Christian commentators on Aristotle and on sacred Scripture. The institutions, social and civic, of the Middle Ages stand forth in greater grandeur in the light of these writings, because the establishment of these institutiiins is written in the lives and conflicts of the very men who stood in tiie heat of the battle. Politics can never forget that John of Salis- bury was the most war-like and courageous spirit of his time, as Cousin well says; that Tliomas Aquinas was the most celebrated among reformers and publicists, the ideal of the p-ipulace ani the oracle of the Cliirch: that SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. •"'1 Aegidius Romunus was the preceptor of Philip le Bel and the royalist lawyer of France; that Marsilias was the friend an] counsellor of the Imperial cause, the moving spirit in defence of a peaceable nationality: that Dante was the poet and philosopher of universal empire: and Suarez the last publi- cist of Scholasticism, the progenitor of the new order, and the champion (u popular sovereignty. These are the men who in the history of their own times led the van of theoretical acquaintance with science and have given to us the details of that political science whicla forms a part of the develop- ment of the science. Thomas stands head and shoulders above them all, because of his massive genius, because of the position he occupies as fifth Doctor of the Church by the decree of Pope Pius V., because of the place assigned him by the learned world as the Universal and Angelic Doctor, and because of the influence, almost amounting to infallibility as a standard, which his writings exercised during the centuries upon Church decisions as well as political opinions, among laymen and Ecclesiastics alike. A special interest attaches to his works because he wrote, not as a prejudiced partisan, while fully acquainted with the controversies of tlie times and reflecting the spirit of the age in the calm reflections of his own monastic life upon political pr.)blems, but as a dispassionate seeker after truth. He couibines general with special political theory in the essay he wrote upon the government of a kingdom by a prince; and he systematizes and collects into Scientific form the opinions of past writers with an accuracy that may be cliaracterized as indepc ndent and faithful. Aquinas is the star of Scholasti- cism, the highest and best embodiment of its principles, method and spirit. To know his political principles is to be introduced to the general thought of his own age and to understand the guiding ideas that kept alive the same system, that propagated the same spirit with a force and clearness varying during the successive ages for well-nigh a thousand years. 2. Thomas Aquinas was an Italian, of the illustrious family of Aquino, in the Terra di Lavoro, and related to the Hohenstaufen house. He was l)oru in ■1224 at the Castle Aquino, near Mouto Cassino. He was educated as a cliild at Monte Cassino. after which he went to the University of Naples. Here he acquired the habits f)f a retired life, and despite tlie opposition of his family and the entreaties of his mother. h(! became a Dominic:in. entering tiie order of the preaching Friar.-. After entering the order he was forcibly ( conveyed to the Cai^tle at Aquino and there detained for two years by his mothei's orders. He escaped by the aid of some Dominicans and took up liis residence in Naples. Afterwards he became a pupil of tlie celebrated theolo- gum and philosopher, Albert the (rreat. l>y persistent discipline and patient study, he overcame a natural dirlidence and dullness, and very soon outstripped ills n)aster. He became a distingui^hed teacher in Paris, then tlie University Capital of Christendom. After a few years spent as Doctor oT Theology at "•- THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE Paris, he retired to Naples where he spent the rest of his life lecturing on Theology. He died in 1274 in the Monastery of Fossa Nova in Campania, on the way to the Council at Lyons, to present a refutation of the errors of the Greel< Church, prepared by the order of Pope Urban [V. Albert called him "the light of the Church," and the Catholic Church grateful to his memory enrolled his name among her worthies as her greatest theologian and philos- opher and canonized him as one of her saints.* The collected works of Thomas are very extensive, embracing in all over twenty volumes. Several editions have been published at Parma since 1851, and several editions have been published at Rome, under the authority of the Popes from Pius V. in J5")7 to Pius IX. and Leo XIIL His chief works are Summa Theologiae, Summa Contra Gentiles, the latter being a defence of Christian doctrine againt heathen doctrines of Mahammedanism and the Arabian philosophy, the former being a system of Theology in which philos- ophy and Christianity are declared, defcQded, ani summarized. He wrote also extensive commentaries upon Aristotle's works, physical, metaphysical and political, also commentaries upm holy Scripture. Great men have spok- en of him with admiration. Erasmus regarded Thomas as the most superior genius of any age. Ludovicus Yives speaks of him as the soundest of all the Schoolmen. Cliarles Werner published his work on "the life and doctrines of St. Thomas" in two volumes Regensburg, in 1858, 59. He characterizes Thomas as "the most thoroughly educated theologian who has arisen in the Church, standing unri vailed, t the most honored teacher of sacred science." Maurice in his "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy" writes of him, "A time may be com- ing when it will bo possible to derive nnre goad from Aquinas than any age has owed to him because we are free from his trammels.. .Protestant Europe may even yet do him a j'jstice which cannot be done by those who dread lest he sht)uld make them s'-eptics, or who sit at his feet and receive his words as those of one who understood all knowledge and all mystery."! "In the progressive systematizing of trutlis in philosophy and theology the massive figure of the saint, scholar and monk of Medieval ages holds a fore- most place," is perhaps the tru?st estimate of his merit.? In the literature of Political Science Thomas has received a more careful con- * G. tie Thoco. Vit. Aquiii. in Act. S. T. III. p. 6r>r); Oudin. de Script. Eccles. III. p. 2r>9; Liuinoius, de Fort. Arist. c. 10. p. 213. ■•• Vol. I. p. 871. * Vol. I. p. t>16. 8 Lord, Beacon Lights of Hi.story. VoL II. p. 37ii; see also Stockl, Hist, of the Phil, of the Mid. Ages. Vol. II. p. 122, Main, 1805; Townsend, Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages; Hampton, Bampton Lectures; Hist, de la vie et des Ecritsde St. Th.d'Aquin., Abbe Bareille; Lond. Quar. July 1881, Th. .\quin.; Werner's Loban des Heiligen Thos. Von Aquin.; Hamp- den's Article in Encycl. Metrop. on Thomas and Seholast. Phil, which Hallam regards as the l)est KM I hi' sub.iect in the English language. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 53 sideration within recent years. Forster,* gives some account of the politics of Thomas in an unsatisfactory manner. Blakey devoted tliree pages to him in the History. of Political Literature.t Mohl does not set a high value upon Medieval writers. 1 H. R. Feugeriy^ gives an extended account of the Politics of Thomas. Fredericlc A"on Raumer|| gives an account of justice, ethics, hu- man and divine law, the relation of the Church and state, and statesmanship as found in Tiiomas and considers the question of tlie authenticity of the De Reg. Princ. and De Ernd. Princ. Bluntschli^] mentions Thomas' views in reference to the superiority of the Church over the state. Frohschammer published his Die Pliilosophie des Tiiomas Yon Aquino in the year 1889 in which he devotes pp. 477-502 to the politics of Thomas, giving a brief sum- mary of his views, specially in relation to the Church, and also a trenchant criticism of his Ecclesiastical politics. Franck.** and Janetft and Pooletl give us valuable Summaries of the political doctrines of Aquinas. But there are two writers, the one a German and the other an Italian, to whom we are indebted for the most satisfactory and systematic account of the politics of Thomas. Baumann published his Politik Von Thomas Yon Aquino, 1873 in which he presents a translation of the De Reg. Princ. with supplementary ex- tracts from the rest of the works of Aquinas bearing upon political subjects. Burri presents in his Le Teorie Politiche Tomas Aq., Rome, 1884, a sys- tematic and scientific account of the political doctrines of Thomas in seven chapters: (1) the concept or the nature of the state; (2) the end of the state; (3) the sovereignty in the slate; (4) the form of the government; (5) the func- tion of the sovereign power: (6) the limit of the action of the state; (7) the relation of the church and state. The works in which St. Thomas has treated of politics are; (1) llicologkaL i^umma Theologiae, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Expo.'iitio of the Book of >S'«j/e}i/i«e, with the commentaries on the Bible. (2) Philomijhiad. Treatises on Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. (3) General work.l(>;Ty jn the Middle Ages bearing the sanction of Mie Catholic Church we are not surprised that the relation or Theology and Politics is very close; especially from the fact that Thomas is the reconciler of reason with faith, we naturally expect that the entire basis of Ixidy to the soul, and the soul to r-'-ason, because the good of reason is truth. I-'iom these first principles which are really tendencies and neccssil ies man is led by reasoning to judge of tlse contingencies and special cases arising in iii'acti- cal life.tt Man should be good bv his obedience to natural law. All goo:! acts are conformed to and all bad acts opposed to nature. JJ R^'ison is th > same for all beit^'s, tlicrefore there can be but f)n'> natiir.il law for all ration- al beings. ?:(; It is univeisal and unch:ingeal)le by its relation to the eternal * Ausiisliiie, I)c lil). arl)i1. I)k. II. ^' lii. :2ae. (|U '.\ + lii. 2'lO. qu. !)1. I li: 0:t. 1. 'pi. DO. 1. '1: 'M. :j; 0-J. 3. :l: qu- i'l. 2; 9:j. l-:i. H+ (iii.i)4. :.'. S (|il. 111. 2. tt (111. '.14. :i. II (|ii. li:i. (•>. SS (111. ill. 4. t.2 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE law.* The tendencies iind necessities which pixtpsl man to seek the good t'orra natural law. All humanity is subject to this law: b„v a process of de- rluction from it all human laws are evolved. There are certain universal ;i];])licatiOns of this law. Reason teaches to man the special applications of 1 hosc.t (3) Natural law re(]uires to be perfected and corrected by htunan l^ According as law is derived from ; Ivo principles of natural law in general as a conclusion, or from the law of nature by particular determinations, it is./«.s gentium, or jus civile. There are thrfee species of laws: — '1 ' h-ecomes identified with natuml law. In tln^ later Roman jurisprudence natural law is presented as the original from which and the standard i>y which positive law isdetermined. In the writings of Aquinas, as we have seen, natural law is distinguished from Divine super- natural law revealed in the Scriptures; from Eternal law, the divine plan of tlic universe in creation and government; and from positive human law, (1) as a rule of right reason, distinguishing between good and evil, conscience directing to follow the good and avoid the evil, this being the primary natur- al law; (2) as the law of human nature, in the secondary sense, imperfect because nature is corrupted and thereforo needing correction and completion liy Divine law. Thomas calls this the so(5ond:iry law of nature, as distin- guished from the primary participation in eternal law. There is a natural process of evolution in his idea of law. Th-^ eternal is the Diviuc! reason, with the plan of relations; the natural is whit is known of eternal law by human reason: the human is man's application of the natural to finite condi- tions and affairs: while the divine is the application of the eternal to elevate man above the condition of knowledge and life i;ossible to reason, the cor- * qil. lO'). I. SCHOOLMEN AND OROTIC ri. ^^ rection of what is subject to vitiation in all human judj^ments, tlie salvation of man in an eternal and supernatural order of life. From this idea of natur- al law of human reason sprung the first germs of International law, as ap- plied to the idea of community among states and developed among nations in connection with the Ecclesiastical imperialism of Aquinas.* 3. Justice. Thomas next procceeds to consider the conditions of social human existence in so far as these are not solely concerned with the rights of man as an individual. All these conditions he embraces under the term natural km. He means by it justice, equality and all other social prin- ciples. In his conception of society he does not regard individual liberty or personal rights, but is engaged with the social idea. In this social life the grand governing principle is justice. Jus or what is just is the special object attributed to the virtue of justice, justitia.f A thing may be just from its nature, in which case it is ittswa^itraZe. For example, in the case in which sonic one gives just as much as he receives.! Justice rules the actions of men in their relations with others, ordinet homineminhis quae sunt ad alterutrum. The essence of justice is equality. In the other virtues good is measured by the individual but in justice it is judged by his relations to others. That is just which is according to the law of equality as in the case of payment made for something received. There is an equality between the money paid and the thing received, therefore it is just. This exact proportion between the two things is an abstraction from the will of the agent and what we call Jus or right.? Jus is of two kinds, natural and positive. Eight .spoken of in itself is naturale, secundum riaturam, giving rise to what are known as natural rights; regarded as a common agreement, right is positive. According to the agreement which determines the right it may be private or public, the latter representing the case of a contract between the people and their prince. Some distinguish between jus naturale, jus gentium SLtiA jus cv'ik. Jus naturale is com- mon to men and animals, as the union of the sexes: ./m.s gentium is peculiar to men; whereas jus dvile is peculiar to a special community of men. To jus civile belongs the special laws made by a special state to suit their necessities and to satisfy utility. To jus gentium belongs every right which is deduced from the first principles of natural right as a natural and necessary result. Jus- tice like, /h.s is either in the nature of things or according to agreement or consent. II Thomas distinguishes between commutative and distributive justice; the * I'ulszky, Theory of Law and Civil Society, pp. 78 sq. London. 188S; Maurice. Hist, of Phil. L p. 606 sq. Lorlmer. Inst, of Law. p. 3; Blakey, Pol. Liter. I. p. 228-9; .Tanet. Hist, de Pol. Sc. L 369-71; Heron, Hist, of Jurisp. p. .59; Feugeray, Essai etc.. p. 41 sq.; Franck, Ref. et Pul). Moy. age. p. 39-53. t 2a. 2ae. qu. .'57. 1. $ 57. 2. 3. 4. 8 57. 1. II 57. 2. 3. 4. m THE POLITICAL TIIECJRY OF THE lirst lias for its ol)ject the relation ot individuais to one another, while the second has for its oliject the relation of all the parts to the entire whole. Distributive justice divides the common j^ood, such as honors, power, and the privilejjes of the State amono- the individuals who constitute the social body: it also distriliutes the public char<]|-es on a similar basis. In commu- tative just ice the rule is absolute eiiuality, each person having the same value, on the principle of Aritlimetical proportion. In distril)Utive justice the rule is that which considers separately the persons among whom things aie distril)uted and the thing-; wiiich are distrii)Uted, according to a kind of geometrical proijfu'tion. Account is taken of personal position and social rank in th(> society, a special value being placed upon each individual in th'^ distriliul ion of common good.- To gi ve to each one his due is the iifiiiri|)le of all justice. This rule is applied to men in ail Iheir private relations and alsr> in their social relation-;. In the former case each man is entitled to be regarded on an alisolute equality with evei'v otlicr: l)ut in the hitler when nian is socially united with man a distinctiftn is drawn that is leased uiioii social merit. Thus there is a kind of inequality in justice a^^ well as an equality. To treat tlio>e who are upon an e(iua]ty as if an i;ie(iuali.ly ex- isted an.ong them would involve injustice: and to regard, th )se who are unequal as entitled to be considered on an equality would be similarly an injusti(;e.t This doctrine is ;;pplied liy Aquinas to the dilTerence in rank and posit ion occupied by different citizens in the state, not necessarily in- volving a hereditary or Aristocratic idea. With Aristotle tlie distiiigui same family, the result of rank and the product of nature rather than of personal value or merit. J Aquinas is content to explain the doctrine of Aristotle without giving it the Christian basis of community and equality except on the principle of personal merit. Virtue is that which makes a man good and makes hnnum that which he does. So political virtre makes a good citizen and renders his civic work good; that is, it qualifies men tf) rule and to render obedience in their own proper sphere. Thus good citizen- ship and good rulership depend on two thing, (1) the possession of the moral virtues: and (2) capacity to use these to the common welfare; for the moral virtues lead up to the political, piaidenc:", temperance, being the essentials of all whether they are ralers or subjects.^ It is on this principle that Aquinas sets up the legitmate royalty and nobility. At creation mankind was not only uneiual in sex. but in some there was * qn. c.i. 1. 2. t E.xpos. Aiist. I'ol. III. lect. 9; V. lect. 1. * Arist. Pol. III. .5 and 0. g 2a. 2ae. qu. 47. 10 and 12; 50. 1. 2. SCHOOLMEN AiSD GROTIL18, 117 a super-eminence f»f knowledf^e and justice over and above others.* Amon^^ men who possess tlie political virtues there are different dej^rees ot relative perfection. Chiefly in the exercise of justice and prudence do men become entitled to higher consideratifni in the enjoj'meut of social honors. The more one labors for the good of tlie state, the more does he in- crease his influence and raise himself above tliose who are otherwise his equals in the enjoyment of freedom or wealth, he b iing superior in political virtue. It is not only justice to give pre-eminence to tliose who merit it, it is an injustice to deny it to one who has real Superiority in Political virtue. It becomes in fact the basis of his doctrine of s(»vereignty in government.! According to Aristotle there are different kinds of government according to the principle of distril)uting power. In some cases ]> )wer is givei\ on the ground of wealth, in others on the ground of hereditary relationship, and in others distribution takes place on the principle of eciuality. Tliese are, as the Scholastics say. ,/h.s7h/» .sf-r((;(r7((»M/»/>7. tluit is justice is relative tft a cer- tain arbitrary standard. In the ideal stat(> the distribution of power is according to absolute justice and is therefore jn-^lnm xlmplicilcr. Men are judged according to tlieir efforts t') pronvite tiie virtue and liappiness of the state, enjoying higher honor and greater power the mire they do to promote this social end. That is. there is a twofold standard by which capacity for power is judged, luunely ntllilds in securing the common gfo 1 and rirtus which tits foi the service of ntUUas. Distribution of power on such a basis is Jusiiim.t Aquinas is content to put this do(;trine in scholastic language. The conception of justice and riglUeousness says Thomas is determined ac- cording to tiie nature of the state-constitution, liightcousness chiefly respects tiie state, for it is tlie continuing characteristic of the state which has power to do right and wills t(» effect right.? The sul)jects must have virtue and righteousness according to the standard which tlie states have. For in every state-constitution there is an equality according to its idea of iliyniUi>< to whicli righteousness and justice must correspond. To say that anything is just in the state is to assort that justice is an adequate means to attain the end of the state. Right is the true object of justice. Right is both natuiai and positive, viewed in their utilitarian aspect. Justice is the constant will, determinatirm and iiabit to give to each one what is his duo. Justice also rcq'ers to the dealings of one man with another or with others, the proper organ and residence of justice is iu»t the understanding but the human will. Justice in its general sense nny he sail ti embr.ice within itall other virtues, in its m')re special sjii'i'.Mt is a distinct virtus dealing with the external acts of men having nothing to do witli the passions * la. qu.fltJ. :$. 4. t E.xpos. Hist. III. liH-t. 7; V. loct . I. t E.\pos. rolit. Alls. V. I. S Com. Pol. Arist. \'ol. XXI. p IS]. I'uiiiui. m THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE or the intellect of men. The other virtues are hased on justice, because they are attempts to realize in a measure the rit,'ht. The religious virtues, the family virtues, the social virtues— all these tend to fulfil the end of jus- tice vs»hich is that of giving to each one his due.* * Bauuiunn. Politik voii Thomas von Aquino, p. 144. SC H ( )0 L M E N A ^^ D G ROT I U S. m CnAPTEK III. Civil Society and its Social Elements. 1, Tbo powers of tlie Soul are associated together as a unity and in sub- jection t) reason; tlie different parts of the world are united to form what we call nature, and these are placed in subjection to the divine being", lil//.s (state) and yet having a community with others that identities him with the principle of soeial)ility. Man's nature requires association and we cannot think of man except as associated with those of his own kind.i (2.) The idea ofjwirer. Tliere ar(> two senses in which the word doniiniiim is used, (a) a dominus of scrvi, and (b) donnnuf^ of libcrL Of the first tliere is no trace before the fall; the second is natural, even in innocency. lie who di- rects others with a force that ii directed to the common good or his own good is i. This determines tb(' concep- tion of civil society. If it is natural for a man to live witli a multitude in society there must of necessity be something to lead men into society. If men were living in society and each one eared only for himself and his own pleasure, then society would be bioken up, because no one would interest himself in llse common welfare. "Where there is no counsellor the people perish,'" said Solomon. J This idea is rational for what belongs to the indi- vidual does not exhaust the social idea. The princiijle of individualism is diversity, that of the common is unity. Whatever one does for one's own good tends to promote the good of the community. In order to guide to this there is a common principle of reason in all human constitutions. As in the heavenly bodies all are governed by the Creator with an order of providence, so among creatures they are all governed under the guidance of nature. ji Thomas's ideas of justice and equality give to his conception of tlie state a peculiar sense. lie docs not emphasize or indicate the importince of indi- vidual rights or liberty. His ideas are fully associated with tlic society itself and the prevailing principle is the social one of community. The ne- cessity of society finds its relation in the idea of a social community with all the social organization necessary to maintain its composite being. The so- cial bo(Jy is an organism consisting of certain organs, the one in necessary relation to the other, all in union accomplisliing the ends of human life. Overlooking, practically ignoring individual rights, man in his necessities and interests is only viewed in society. The words communis and communitas * Aquinas on Iloiii. XIII. t Do Keg. I'rin. 1. i:i. t Piov. XI. 14. § la. 2ae. (ju. 91. 74 THE POLITICAL THEORY OB" THE :ir? ropfntodly used to set fortli this idea.* In his metaphysical cnnceptions we have the foundation of this principle, for with him all beinfj is simply the ahsoliito hoins" nnd tlie individuals arc'only particular parts or sliadows (tf the supreme being. Hence the human individuality of the soul dil not according to him spring from a spiritual personality unicjue and peculiar t(» every human being: but arises from the relationshii) of each being with the whole oriranism which ditlercniiates and distinguislies individuality. Hence individuality and community spring from a psychological idea in which tlie organism is all in all and the individual is sacrificed. The great p-evailing ])rinciple of sociability only brings man into the organic community; when he has been inti-oduced into it and merged in the society justice is the alJ prevailing and ruling principle, distributive justice, that is, which accords to each one what is his due in the social community.! Another evidence of the strength of community is found in the permanence attaching to natural law as against human law chiefly in casc:^ of urgency. Non-r»bsr'rvance of human law is justified in certain cases. In ordinary cas- e** every one subject to the law must observe it in i,he literal sense; l)ut if its observance would entail danger upon the cimmunitv. especially in the case of a sudden emergency when there is no time for taking advice or pro- viding for the circumstances an individual may disregard the human law and act according to natural law ad commune bonum. In the case of the rulers as in the subjects there is the same exemption from the operation of human law in urgent and extraordinary circumstances and wlien there is just cause for the exercise of the power of dispensation. J 2. Right ofpwpcrti/. i^atural right may exist, (a) in virtue of the essential nature of two things, or (b) in virtue of some utility or question of expedien- cy involved in the relation of things. /Vnything may be therefore of natural right for one of two reasons, (a) on the basis of a natural and absolute agree- ment between two things; in which case one cannot be the property of anoth(!r and one cannot be absolutely controlled by another; or (b) in relation to a definite result or a> considered of value for a certain utility; in which case one must control the other to secure the utility and to obtain the de- sired result. Absolutely, for example, a field cannot be said to belong to anyone by natural right, excepting to the creator and sovereign owner: but in relation to an individual as an article of use there arc certain natural reasons which p)int to the fact that it f)ught to be attached to a certain person. In order to cultivate land, in order to establish a relation between the land and the worker there n)ust be a certain right of property. The re- lation therefore between a field and the idea of property is not immediate, but indirect and derived from utility and from the results which follow from * I)e lii'j,'. Piin. I. 1. t 2a. 2ae. qu. (il. 2. * la. 2!io. Vol II. p. ;{'>1 and :r>;;. ([u. !ir. 1. I'ai-tiKi. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIU5. 7.') such property.* Things in llieir essence and of themselves do not belong to man, nor arc they subject to his power, but are subject to divine power be- cause thoy belong absolutely only to God. The divine absolute being, therefore, in this sense is sole owner and proprietor. But in the sense of utility man does possess a natural right of dominion over material things in so far as he can by his reason and will possess them and use them for him- self. God's absolute right of property is transferred to man in so far as it is a relative right to his necessities. Man's relation to material things is, oitiier, (m) the possession of them by expending labor upon them; or (b) the possession of tliem by the use of them. In expending individual labor upon material objects man particularizes them in relhtion to his work, for three reasons, (a) because an individual expends more toil upon and takes greater care of what is individual than of what is general; (b) human society would be muci) more easily C(mtrolled were each one to concentrate his attentions and labors upon his own, r.na\ fc) common peace would be preserved better if oach one was satisfied with his own portion and abstained from the lust for what is another's, nUcno; and consequently dissensions would be avoided be- cause order would be more firmly established. In this way the idea of personal property springs not from absolute na- tural right but from considerations of personal interest, public utility and general welfare. Men have a natural right to things not in the sense that t!i(\v lielong to them in themselves. Init that they have a right to use them f(ir tlieir good as things made and also destined for their use. This right is common to all men. It compreiiends, pofcsta^ jiivcnramU et dii lays great stress upon the right of property in * 2il. 2!ic. qil. .^T. ii. t 2a. 'Vio. qu. GO. 1. 2. T(i THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE possession and disposition; and reconciles or tries to reconcile many contrary passages in the writinjjfs of the Church fathers on this point. I?, isil compares the wealthy man who possesses the common ^'ood of humanity to a man who luis taken possession of some house and refuses to let the others enter into it. But, says Ttiomas, it is not the fact of his havinsr tal n )t say. The only explanation he gives on this point is, that to distribute the use of tliesc com- mon goods is not simply an act of charity, it is also and prim irily an act of virtue, that is of justice. Yea more, it is the extinction of a debt due to others, so much so that the injustice would be less in the case of him who took the goods possessed by others under the demand of necessity than in the case of him who refused to give tliem.* It would be a simple matter to infer from this that, when we add, that rulers are entrusted with the execu- tion of justice, which is a tlrst principle with Aquinas, these common goods in use ought to be legally divided in order to c(mform to strict natural and hunian law. Thomas does not draw this conclusion. He gives however to tliose in urgent necessity the rigiiL to take for the satisfaction of jiressing needs from what is in excess in the hands of others. Humi;n right ought not to take precedence over natural or divine right. In the natural order of divine providence materia! goads were created for serving human necessi- ties; therefore in virtue of natural law, what is superabundant among the rich should supply the needs tif the poor. t The general rule implies that the possessor himself dispenses his superfluous goods but in such cases of necessity as danger of deatli, all men in sucli hazard have a natural right to take the goods at his hands to prevent starvation. He ought to take them openly and in such a case his action would not amount to rapine or plunder; for necessity gives bin) right confirmed by the divine order. It is allowable even to help another to supply his necessities in tiiis way.j In tlie Si'cunda Scc-unda^ all this doctrine is set forth at length. Tliomas is lilled with a deep reverence for justice and cliaritable feeling towards the needy and is led into these socialistic ideas out of a profound regard for those who are in miserable destitution. He entertains a high regard for human industry; l)ut lie is cairied away by the theological conception of all material goods as the direct gift of tlie benefactor of muikind to m^n, for the purpose * qu. 66. 3. + (iu. m. 7. * (lU. ()(). 7. SCHOOLMEN AND rrROTIUS. 77 of supplying all the necessities of human crcivturcs. He does not apply his own principle: animals lie says, have all g-ood things provided for them, but man gets his wants supplied only in society with other men, by means of which society his life is preserved. Community of all in possession and use is only a principle of unorganized society: organized society protects human industry and lal)or. To tlie Divine tirst ciuse of all things we only need to add the second cause of human work and agency. This he has acl liis own, suae, but as com- mon so that lie may without ditHculty crmimunicate {communlcet) in case of the necessities of ot iiers.J He concludes from this general principle, to appro- priate what belongs to another cannot be chaiacterized as a theft or robbery. He asks whether it is lawful to steal in a case of necessity. His answer is on the basis of the ruitural right ol community. Tin; order of liitman right cannf)t, nullily the nat oral and divine ai rangements of right: in accordance with natural law under the divine providence arrangenients are made in reference to material things so as to piovide for the lelief of necessities. Therefore t lie division and ap[)ropiiation of human things cannot be inter- fered with by human right rer.s/ts luitur il right. In oi'.ler to reliove the necessities of man tliose things which men liavc in excess ought by natural law {debentur) to got.) the poir fort'ieir suppo/t. Sinc^ there are many needy and dependent, and since one cannot give to each one the same thing it. is right for each one to make over his property that the needy may be relieved. If the nect ssily is pressing it must be immediately relieved by whatever is at hand; the taking of what is not one's own but another's under such circum- stances, either secretly or openly, doi'S not fall within tlie compass of robbery ortiieft. To justify si!ch appropriat i( n imioiifling dangers must threaten the peisf.n when help cannot be (.btaiiud in any otlu-r way.^ This amounts to a restatement of the principle of Aristoi le that private property is necessary liut tliat the use should be comnifui. lU' enjoins the right of prop- erty on general moral grounds because i^ there was absolute ccmm'unity it would destroy virtue and charity. || *la. 2iie. qu. 105. 2. :{. * 2ii. 2ae. Vol. III. p. 247. faiina. + Arts. Vo\. II. a. SIlMd. 250. II Pol./Ar. 11.5. SCFIOOLMEN AND GROTILTS. 70 :5. Political dimhilities.— Slavery. This is a subject of considerahie import- ance because the verdicLof Aquinas affects the entire Schohistic history and upon its solution depends liis attitude toward free institutions and liberty. Ddcs he accept of slavery? Yes, because the principle of Scholas- ticism compelled him. Aristotle and Augustine, tlie two pillars of tlie sys- tem, admitted the lejjitimacy of slavery, aithougli on verv different grounds. A risiotle based slavery on tlie principle of natural inefjuality. .Some men are impotent to reason and naturally in subjection to others.* Augustine bases slavery on tlie fact of tlie fall. In a stnte of innocency there is an in- equality among men, but tjot the same as servitude; thus it is a punislinient for sill and we cannot hope to be freed f r )m it till we enter the kingdom of heaven. Aquinas could not escape tiie conclusion of t,hese thinkers. Hence he docs not oppose slavery, but gives it a place in his system. In tlie ancient state tlie majority of human beings enjoyed no civic rights and shared no civic duties. Females and children were excluded from the membership in the state. They were members of the small liousehold com- munity and tliey participated in the state privileges only through the male members who were themselves parents or husbands. Among the rest of the population laborers, commercial men and agriculrural farmers were placed in a semi-servile position which in the greater number of cases soon became servile. In Plato political power and privileges belonged to the priests and warriors, otliers being condemned to the deprivation of civil rights. In Aristotle's ideal rupublic the population is divided into two classes, the tlrst being composed of those who act as warriors, perform the functions of priest- hood, and exercise the offices of government, administration of justice and enjoy an exclusive monopoly in possessing land; the second class embracing artisans, traders and servants who occupy a semi-servile position. Thomas carries out thesocial principles of antiiiuify in regard to the elementsof popu- lation. In t,he same treatise in which lie discusses justice and elabc^rates the ideas of equality, the wife and daughter and slave are not acknowledged as liaving any legal life which c;tn be called individual: their only relation with the community as a whole and with the civil rulers is through tne hus- band, parent and master. The positir)n of the child and slave is that of dependence fin the parent, and ninster vvlio is a member of the state, aliquid imlrlii et domiml; the child is an element in the parent's civic life and the slave a chattel of the master. The standard of right which regulates the relations of patent and child, master and slave, differs from t.lie justice wiiich regu- lates the relations of citizens, in that it, is an inferior justice suitable to tin; particular lot of each, known as paternal and dominical justice. The child and slave are not only barred from the enjoyment and use of projjerty, they can only enjoy civic justice through the judiciary at the will of and by the pleasure of tlie parent. Domestic society re(;ogni/,es a head Just as civil .so- *l'ol. I. 5. (>. 80 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE ciety: he alone is responsible to tlie civil ruler who is its bead and be only can be the intermediary of all rigbts and privileges.* Tbomas looks on all tiie laboring classes, the class of traders and profes- sional artisans as lower class persons {i-iles)\ the form of life they live is con- trary to virtue and right reason and as a consequence their works arc to be regarded as despicable. In his estimate these occupations are derogatory to the dignity of one who esteems justice and prudence, for manual labor and trading are inconsistent with the virtues of a social and civic life that would lead man to attain his ideal in life. No m-in engaged in trade', lal)or or in- dustry is competent to exercise pf)lilical rights in the state and anyone who does menial service lacks knowledge as well as virtue, and consequently is below the average standard fixed for the enjoyment of social privileges.! All other political and social disabilities circle around slavery and the con- ception of slaves in servitude. The ideasof knowledge, power, charity, justice astound in Aquinas are limited by the distinctions of inequality, lack of capacity, and absence of individuality. In the idea of servitude we trace the same principles. Aristotle had distinguished between natural and legal slavery. The former he held to be just because based on differences in per- sonal endowments, and on the necessity of the pre-eminence of the capable over the incapable; the latter, founded on the light of war, he thought con- formed to a relative justice that regulates the relations of conqueror and conquered, by means of which the justice of victory on the part of the con- querors is mingled with cliarity in preserving the life of the vanquished. Legal slavery is therefore a state institution because war is a valuable source of utility and strength to rjations and it also advances the public welfare. Thomas accepts without demur the specious defence of slavery by tlie mas- ter genius of antiquity. J According to Thomas the world's inhabitants may be divided into two classes, those who rule and those who are ruled, forming a natural hierachy, extending over all creatures, finding its model in God, the world-ruler, and men the subjects: in the soul, the body ruler, and the body its subject: and in the reason which governs the appetites and desires. Among men there are inferiors who can only obey and superiors who are capable of command- ing. So is slavery: for a slave is ordinatur ad aVium.l This superiority ex- tends to one race or certain races over others, and to certain nations which are superior in the scale of sovereignty, the others being subject. ||He also ac- cepts legal slavery as an institution for the sf)cial welfare, chiefly becau!?e it accords with his theory of dominium and with his view of justice and charity *2a. 2ae, qu. 57. 4; Expos. Avis. VT. lect. .5. + Expo.s. Ar.VlI. lect. 7. lect. 3. g. and 4. o. *lMo. 1.5. 6. 7. § la. 2u. 1)6. 3.4; Expos. Aris. I. lect- 3. i. U Expos. Arist. V. 1. I. lect. 2. W. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 81 in promoting ilio interest of relative justice and good among men.* Some thinlc tliat Atiuinas only commented on Aristotle witliout accepting these theories. It is to be premised that he would have stated if Aristotle's tlieory had been in his view opposed to Christianity, just as he repudiates distinctly polytheism. This view is confirmed by the statements in the ASimima Theologiae. Natural law he asserts is the same as the law of na- tions; in supporting this, he says, servitude among men is natural for some are naturally slaves; but servitude is from the law of nations, therefore na- tural law is the same as the law of nations. The reason of slavery is not to be found in nature absolutely, but in utility, that is, he qualifies Aristotle's view of slavery maintaining that utility demands that tlie feeble be placed under the strong and wise.t He sets forth the essential elements of Domin- ical power over the slave X He discusses the Mosaic law on slavery. § Thomas eulogizes its moderation as more liberal than the pagan. Yet he does not follow it, nor does he regard it as better than the Roman system. The Mo- saic was simply an adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the people of Israel in which God liberates them from servitude to their oppressors and places them in servitude to Himself. The liberation of the slave every TO years he regards as an exceptional measure conformed to the special rule of justice in vogue among the people of Israel, so tliat it is no exception to slav- ery iuself. Slavery like property belongs to a relative kind of natural right. It is not in the absolute nature of things but depends on expediency. This inequality of f7oj»M)».s and .■^f)TM.s is born of sin. Is it then a political inferiority':' There are two senses in which we use power, (a) in so far as we oppose dnmhiium to servitude, the (f/wtwits to .sf7T7t.s; and'(b) in so far as we place power over againstsubjeL-tion or obedience. In this latter sense the gov- ernment of free persons is embodied in a master-ruler. According to Aristotle the two powers are political and dominical or despotic. The slave is differ- ent from the free man because he is causa sui, while the slave reckons himselt, another than himself. Tlie f7ortmi?i.s therefore commands the slave btr his good and exercises a power which is disciplinary in character. It did not exist in a state of innocence. Political power of a free man over free men existed before the fall. Therefore the only inequality whicli would liave been absent if sin had remained away, and which is ])resent as a conse(iuent of sin. is tliat of master over slave.H Thomas recoiiriies .slavery and natural law. The primary principles of natural law are changeless. Hut the secon- dary principles which deix-nd upon utility and human law are not. 11 is objected that the liberty of all is a n;itural right. Thomas says that at tiie lirst liberty was of natural right, that is, there was nrithing contrary to liber- ty in natural right. Man w;is created naked, but he liad a rigiil to cldtlie * Expo.s. Ar. 1. loct. 4. o; V. li'ct. 3. i. t- qu. ru. 4. + 2a. 2ac. qu. .")". .i. S lii. 2;io. (lU. 107. 4. II Com. Sent. 4."). (lis natural rijfht because it is useful to min's life, slavery therefore is legitimate.* Slavery is supported by two arg-uments. a p-iychological and a theological, the one Aristotelian the other Augustiniaii. (a) It is really upon j>siiclioloyi- ail yroutuh that he advocates slavery. Arist(»tle builds his psychology upon imaginary ditl'erences among men, ranging from wisdom to ignorance, from sanity to folly, and from strength to weakness. Tliomas" conception of the human soul accounts for his doctrines of liberty and slavery. Soul is the presiding genius over every form of life; even the human physical systemcan- not be said to possess vitalizing lite apart from the soul. It is the sovereign in the human life, in physical action, in mental and moral activity, the form of unity amid the complex and diverse functions which are performed by the various organs, the one principle which pervades all human being. All the faculties of being are fused in the soul and conseciucntly the difTerentiat ing principle in human beings is found in the soul, according to sex, intelligence, etc., the energy of the soul being proportionate to the capacity of nature in each individual.! It is in this way that human individuality and libeity are lost sight of, because personality is closely related to materiality and there are different grades of perfection among human souls, giving rise to the in- equality among individuals reaching from wise to foolish. From such a conception it is natural to infer thatthose who are superior will control and direct those who are inferior. (b) A Thcologiail fxisLs for darcrif. In a condition of innocence there was no servitude. There existed certain natural inetpialities; there existed also a social power which divided mankind into ruling and subject. Ti.v reason of the fall of the first human beings humanity was placed in circumstances which gave rise to the condition of master and slave. Slavery is a punish- ment for sin, at least for those men who are in the condition of fallen nature, not those who are in the condition of thesupenuitural, that is, in the fellow- ship of the Church. This last condition lies at the foundation of the policy of the Church whose Head on several occasions condemned excommunicated persons to slavery,— for example, the Venetians— permission being given to anyone to make tiiem slaves. This is made use of to support the idea that the Church of Home was not opposed to slavery. So Tliomas regards the slavery of the Jews to Christians as legitimate, and he gives the Christians the right to the property of those set free without compensation. He justi- lies this on the ground of the murder of the Son of God in Jewish unbelief, and their wilful rejection of the divine law made known to them in the Christian system. J This does not imply that slavery was in any sense op- posed to human nature, but rather that it was suitable to the altered * lii.2jl,e. (|U. 94.5; 05. 5. t l:i. qu. «,5. 7. X Krohscluiiiiiin'i', p. 481. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 83 cindition of man's lite. As a penally for sin man lost ori^jinal rectitude and by reason of liis departure from the communion (jf God which was the foun- dation of his likeness to the divine, he was bereft of his birthright and cast out into an estate and condition contrary to his original condition. The penalty incurred was the loss of that divine dominium which was his original right. Mitiyation of davcry. Slavery is not unlimited, its evils are not unmitigat- ed. Slaves are not subject to their masters in servile work and in obedience to the orders that fall within the limits of the dominical power. Beyond these limits the slave is naturally free. Obedience in all things, that is absolute obedience, would be of a questionable character on the pre- text of acting as an intermediary between the subject and God. Above the limits of servile obedience the slave is subject to God directly, through natur- al and revealed law; hence Thomas does not recognize the despotic powers of life and death which are found in the old Roman conception.* In marriage the slave is free from the controlling power of his master. A slave ought not to be sold separately and so be separated from his wife and family. lie dis- tinguishes therefore between certain acts done as a slave in obedience to dominical law and certain acts in which a slave possesses the rights of a man. Christianity tempered the hardships of slavery by counselling slaves to ac- cept their positicm as a discipline in preparation for a higher freedom hereafter.f * 2ii. 2ac. qu. 102. 5. + 3a. qu. 52; Feugciay. pp. 00-81; p. ITS sq.; .Janet. I. pp :i74-3S0; I'opc.l'rincc and Pbople. Pius Melia. 18ti0. ^^ THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE C IT ATT EI! IV. THE OKIGIN AND NATT'IJE OF THE STATE. I 1. Origin of the slate. Accord intj to Thomas tlie srate is only itulircctl.v |ot' Divine origrin. The people must be recognized as the instrument or means ,by which God has called the state actually into existence. Likewise the constitution of the state springs from the people exactly in the way in which the power of government springs principally from the people in whom is re- served the right of revolt against Lhe abuse of such pov.'er as is conferred, and in all cases the alteration and changes in the state constitution depend upon the people, according to their circumstances and requirements. Plato's ideal state is of divine origin; his historical state arises in sudden changes which take place among men. alt.ering the primary conditions of humanity, giving rise to different kinds of states from the patriarchal to the contractual and historical. Aristotle associates the origin of the state with the natural and necessary growth of the family and commune, resulting in a higher and larger organization in the community. AsS(. elation is the real originating cause in all society, natural association giving rise to the family and voluntary association to the state. Cicero ascribes tlie primary origin to man's social nature adding as a secondary cause the principle of utility in the preservation of life and tlio protect ion of property. Augustine under the influence of theology ascribes the human origin of tlie state to the im- perfections of man due to the fall, but the divine origin is to be found in the divine will. Feudalism in its perpetual strife of partisanship, gave rise to the principle of unity in the community embodied in the feudal lord, as the natural foundation of government, from which point Aquinas starts in fol- lowing Aristotle, going back to the idea of natural dominium, on the principle of inequality in the extent and power of sociability.* If we might interpret the Aristotelian idea of origin as expounded by Aquinas, we would distinguish between the origin p/ji7o.sop/(?"crti and acfual. The origin jjhilosophical or in principle is to be found in the nature of man. that is, the state principle or ideal is founded upon human sociability and hidden beneath the forms of association as a conception of human reason. Whereas the adval origin in the definite appearance of tlie state is more arbi- trary depending upon human will and accomplished in fact under the * la. qu. 96. 3. 4. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. S5 direction of tiie people or of a governor. The idea or conception of the state in tlie mind of man is precedent to the idea of individuality. But the state, wliich before is intelligible only as a principle, becomes an actual fact only when an alliance is demanded, offensive and defensive, against all external perils and in favor of temporal well-being, as well as for ethical and spiritual progress. Thus according to Thomas, it appears as if the state was created by a formal agreement between men. A distinction must therefore be drawn: the community can and does assume shape in the course of historical evolu- tion acc-ordingto thewill of the people, but the state does not originate in that way, neither does the original power of governing, nor the original constitu- tion of tlie state arise from the people. The state did not originate arbitrarily or by agreement; but it sprang up naturally from the fact of the oxistence of men by generation, out of the family and family relations, which gradually extended to and embraced the race, and comprehended the entire people under the supreme power of the rulers of the different families. In rirder to the establishment of powerful states, various arbitrary changes were wrought. dilTerent forms of state, and kinds of government being insti- tuted l:)y human law in the hands of the people themselves through their representatives or by a single autocratic ruler. It is this secondary origin and consolidation which is effected by the means of contract.* Thomas suggests the idea of contrad as a prominent principle in the forma- tion of the state. Wlien he introduced tlie doctrine of natural law and the social principle in man as a political animai, he gave scipe to the theory of the social contract which grew up in the minds of the people and embodied itself in the writings of the Churchmen, the idea of a contract between the people and the government. The first introduction of tliis theory is due to the cf)nsideration thnt was given to the mutual obligations of rulers and ruled in the writings of men before Aquinas. This was enforced by the con- ception which was adred of the responsibility of kings to God and their duty to the ])eople. to rule among them so as tc) promote the highest virtue. It r)ecame common to speak of natural law as the limit placed upon the prince and given into the hands of the people, so that natural law is viewed in it- self as a fcjrm of contract lietween rulers and ruled which is always presupposed. This, when combined with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, that princes derive their power from tlie people, give full sway to the idea of contract in this medieval form. "To order anything for the common good belongs either to the wliole multitude or to some one acting in place of the whole multitude."! Political society is founded up;)n liuman nature and those whf) form the political society arc .sovereign. Such is the form of the contract theory found in Aquinas. It differs from the contract theory found in Rousseau in this, that according to the latter, * De Rcf?. Piiiic. I. 1. 4, 14: Expos. Ai. I'ol. I. 2. t la. 2iio. qu. 1)0. :j. 86 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE man in a state (»r nature is not in sc)ciet\', his rights as man in a natural state are all individual: and that he enters socieiy In ending the state of war of each against all, by making a formal post-natural contract with his fellows l)y which the state is originated and authority is established over the society entering into the contract. According to Aquinas there is a two-fold basis bir the state, and accordingly a two-fold origin, the submission of all the members to a common law of justice wliich is over them all in common, and the advantage everyone gains in the common union of all.* Society origi- nates in human nature, its principle is implantijd in the human l)reast and it manifests itself in the human life. A condition of savagery and isolation is foreign to man's moral and physii-al being, and unnatural to his life. Hu- man association is coeval v\ith nji.n's existence and develops with human generation. Man is the mosr> social of all the animals. The other animals are supplied by nature with what they require for protection, sustenance and continu'-'d existence. Tliey have natuval wea])ons by which to defend themselves, or the power of flight to escape from danger. But rain has none of thesj natural resources. He has only his reason to guide his hands and to enable him to devise nieans of supplying all his wants. Man in isolation cannot look after himsfilf and his wants. The other animals are guided by instinct in follow- ing after what tends to their advantage an 1 avoiding what is hurtful (<» them; man has only his understanding to enable him t ) ,)udj:e what actions are suitable in special cases. It would be impr)ssihle for an individu;il to gain a knowledge of all possible circumstances that may arise, hence the collective society is required with its distribution of function, so that indi- vidual men may have the benefit of the wisdom and skill of the collective body, and power to carry it into execu'io.a. Man likewi -se is endowed with speech to enable him to express his desires and communicate his tlioughts to his fellow men which is impossible in the case of the animals, who express their ideas only in a general way to otlier animals.t We have seen that he distinguishes between pawer itself in its abstract nature and the means by which the power is obtained. Just in the same way ho distinguishes between the natural principle of association which is b)und in man's nature, and the particular application of it iri the combina- tions that depend upon circumstances of time, place, fortune, which are all guided by human will.l There is no idea of divine right in the api)li('at ion of this principle of association to the particular form of i he state, at least in the sense in which Divine Right of Kings was used in tlielTth. century. Hy na- tural right the power is in the liandsof all oriiiinally and any change is broui^'ht about by human law and depends upon ulility, advantage or expediency. <( The origin of the state is the establishment of a government. Society is * De Reg. Pr. 1. 1. :f 2a. 2ao. qu. iO. 10. t Do Reg. Pr. T. 1. S la. 2ao. qu. 00. H. SCHOOLMEN AT^DGnOTI us. 87 natural to man as a multitude, but every aggregation of men has need of be- ing governed: therefore the society requires a government and fnr this purpose it is organized and the power is given into the hands of one or some. The .soul governs and keeps in unity the body, the sun commands and leads all tlie planets, the intelligent being guides all creatures, and the providence of God controls the entire universe. The appointment of that government or gov'erniog body is of human will and law.* In the iutroduclion to the De Regimine Prindpum, he says that his design is to set lorth the fountain of kingly power and the calling of a King accord- ing to Scripture, the doctrines of the philosophers and the examples of much-praised princes. In the beginning, progress and completing of the work he says he expects to enjoy the assistance of ITim who is the King of Kings and Lord of Lords from whom all Kings have their Kingdom.--, God the great King and Lord over all Gods. Evidently the ultimate origin of the government of a Kingdom comes from God as the first source. In saying o»07i.s2>o/e.sfa.s « iJeo he does not say ./«.s?rt. Paul, therefore, enjoins absolute oliedience, although there are certain reserves. Ail power in itself, in its essence conies from Gfid: Init relatively it does not come from God, if the means of acquiiing it are unjust, and the use that is made of it is unjust. Yet all power just and unjust depends upon the permission of God and there- fore is permissive. Often the unjust power is used by God as a means of punishment.! It would seem tlien that in principle the origin of the state, (.r which is the same thing in Aquinas, the power set up in Society, is from God, but the application of tliat power to a special state is from God only in tlie sense in whicli it is permissive, and consequently it is of human law. Thomas does not consider temporal authority as a necessary evil as many Ecclesiastical writers and even Popes ha^e done, nor does he regard it as a direct work of the devil.- The state with its ruler is the natural and neces- sary foundation for the preservation and development of tlie temporal existence and well-being of huma.nity. The state is a necessity growing up out of the strivings of men to satisfy their wants, natural inasmuch as it is tlieemliodimentof thesocial impulsesin man, originating primarily in liuman nature, receiving confirmation in the association of men. i 2. Nature of Ihe slate. It is difficult to distinguisli the nature from the end of the state as treated by Thomas, because the nature according to him de- pends upon the end. Several points liowever may be established in this connection, (a) Tlie state is an order of social life. Thomas defines man as an ani- mal sociale ct politicvm. Py natural and nec(s.-ary association tliecommi;nity of the state is formed. Human society in yenetal is, in dirersa di.'^jjcryeretiir * Dei;. Res- Princ;. I. 1. + Com. Sent. 45. qu. I. 2; i\u. IV. 3. $ Feugeray, p. 32 'S-'; Pulszlty, pp. 24")-.)3; Social contract thoory in Pol. Sc. (,>ii:ift. V'l. 651) sq. D. G-Ritcliiu; Annals of .Amer. A.-ad. of Pol. and So-. S;Men.M>. Vol. I[r.2;t: Frolischam- niiT. pj). 47s-'.i: l''i()liscliatiiiii('r. Oiiirlii .-iiid ('iilt iiii' of Soi'ii'ly. p. 7(is(|. ISS"). 88 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE fiicut rt corpiishomini^ et ci{jufiHbet (niimaUs defln^'ret, nid esset aliqua ris regitivn commwns in corpore. quae ad J)Onitm commune omnium memhrovum intenderet.* The nature of the state depends upon the proper relations of the rulers and ruled; some are naturally fitted to rule, others to be ruled,— when these two classes in the social community are organized into a coj^jh.s or body, they form the basis of the state. Man is an animal, sociale in regard to the ma- terial element: poUticum in regard to the formal element of Society, that is, in form the life of man is political, in matter it is social. Thomas disting- uislies in the social order three different societies, domus, ciritas, and regnum. Domus is the family consisling of matter and servants, husband and wife, parents and children; ciritasis the communitas ciritatis or city state; regnum is the state or kingdom or province state, larger and more perfect than the other sodetates. Domus est communitas consisiens in /;ispergirin. I. 1. « Veiit.qii. I. 10. c;2. 2. c. + ('oin. Pol. Vol. XXI. p. -.m. Parma. II Ol- Rpj?. Prin. I. Z. t la. 2ae. riu. .57. 3; qu. 06. 2. H la. 2ac. (ni. 70. 3. ** 2a. 2iic. qu.2!). 3.4. 90 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE elation gives rise to four different comniUDitios, the natural, domestic, civil and divine.* Thus the natural association takes place under the authority which is intrinsic, friendship and virtue, and is then reduced to social unity in the society which is placed under extrinsic authority or government, in other words the state is a natural order of social life. (c) The state is an organvtm. The individuals who form the community are all members of one great body.f The soul by nature rules over the body: so do all who are placed over others. The result is that those who have a pre- dominance of intelligence rule over others and those who lack intelligence are in subjection. Solomon says the fool shall serve the wlse.J There are various degrees in human society but the highest community is found in the state. It is so constructed that human life may have satisfaction in itself as an organized unity. It therefore stands higher than all other communi- ties which human intelligence can devise. It belongs to this state as an organism to unite in itself all other lesser societies. § In every plurality there must be something which unites and governs. The understanding unites all the faculties of the soul and controls all the members of the body, each mem- ber and faculty contributing to the formation of the organic unity. In the state the natural differentiation of rulers and ruled embraces the entire range of the state, including those who have no rights, or only rights through others, as well as those who have rights. That which determines however the nature of the state is the fact that it is a moral organism. It is not an organization for the play of mere force or authority, but is an ethical organ- ization potius aguntur quam agunt.\\ The moral force in the organism of the state is unity of thought and unity of action, as these tend to ethical ends and are guided to such ends by rationalism in the organism of state.^ There are different elements or members in the state, these are all united by the bond of communitas.** Each member holds its own place in the organism and performs its own functions, producing harmony or peace,tt peace on the other hand being regarded as effectus caiitatis in the organized life.tt The lesser communities thefamilia or dormis, and the civitas, are Ijkewise organic in structure; but they develop upwards into the grand organic structure of the regnum or state. The different elements which form constituent mem- bers of the regnum are individuals, families, cities: and as these are all ethi- cal in their nature, they constitute a state which has a moral nature. Thus * Sent. Com. III. disq. 27. qu. 2. 2. c. + la. 2ae. qu. 1. 8. ■X Com. Pol. Vol. XXI. p. 877. § ibid. p. 366, 7. II la. 2ae. qu.1.2. t Burri. p. 21; Taparelli, Sagio di Dir. Nat. Diss. If. 1. no. 304. ** 2a. 2ae. qu. 58. 9; qu. 47. 10. t+ la. 2ae. qu. 70. 8. n 2a. 2ae. qu. 29. 3. 4. SCHOOLMEN AT^Tf GROTIUS. 91 the political communitas of the state may be charactized as a moral organism by means of which the end of human life in its highest form is attained.* The principal element in the nature of the state as an organism is found in the idea of self-rule. Thomas takes his theory from Aristotle who de- fends the principle of autarchy, based upon the ideal that the virtue of a good man and of a good citizen is identical. Goridness determines not only the principle of authority, but those who are to exercise it: consequently it influences the form of government. Where one is good by eminence above others, he ought to rule; where a few are good and no one pre-eminent, they are the aristocracy of rulers; where all are good we have a Democratic poli- ty. t The principle of union is the sovereign power, deposited somewhere and exercised by some per.'On or per.-ons in the social br)dy. It is the formal element in the nature of the state and determines the state organization. 3. P.^ijcJio-phjiskdl character of the state. The cnmmimitas of the state is made up of moral and physical elements. It is a social order tending to the organ- ization of human society so as to attain the highest ends. It is an organism in which the exercise of human intelligence is the ruling principle; but for thp satisfaction of the requirements of human life and for the preservation^ of life there is required a physical basis for the community. Tliis material basis provides for the sustenance of life and furnishes a sphere of activity for the weaker members, who are unable to rule by lack of wisdom. Even the working population depend upon the wise and forseeing, for only as workers are guided by tlie wisdom of superior guides, can they employ their energies aright. Tiie psychic principle of reason then determines the relations of the elements of population toone another and tlieir spheres of activity, as well as their relations to the land. External possessions wliich really lie outside of the true spirit of virtue he refuses to regnrd as the highest aim either of man or of the state. Many sjiy that little virtue is sufficient to give complete happiness, and that not loo much wealth, fame, honor and power can belong to it; therefore it is said that happiness consists chiefly in securing external possessions. Some regard wealth, some fame as the highest of earthly possessions. They desire virtue first and then say that it is related to these possessions. | Thoni- a'^ rejects this tlieriry and declares that iiappines, consistschiefly in virtue, that is, in the habitsof our usual activities as those are guided tiy reason, and especially a perfect activity of miiul jiloug with a moderate possession of « xter- nal goods. Happiness consists in the possession of what we liaveacciuired ami rightly can regulate, for that through whicli something is guided and meas- ured seems the principal tiling. F^xiernal jxissossion^ are aeciuired and applied according to right reason by the activity of virtue and discernment, * Burri, 22, 2;(. + Arist. Tol. III. 4 and 7. * Com. Aii.-it. Vol. XXI. p. t):t4. 92 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE and as such are not perverted. Virtue and its activity are tiie chief elements of happiness. Virtue in itself, in the state, and in the individual, is of the same character and in reference to its efficiency as well. It is distinguished only as the whole is from a part. Tlie ethical virtue of the state, or its mor- al basis, is made up of the virtues of the citizens as the parts of the state.* The best activity is that of theoretical reason or scientific contemplation. t The possession of land tlierefore by the state as by the individual is subordi- nated to reason and regarded as of value in so far as it promotes the virtues of the citizens. Phyfasis of the state. Thomas is very familiar with all the material necessities of a state. He prefers for the material provision of the commun- ity agriculture to commerce, because by the latter arises selfishness and a mercenary spirit. It is to be remembered that if a city or kingdom had not been founded there would be nothing to govern. In the ottice of a gov- ernor the establishment of a city and kingdom is comprised. Many have founded cities which they governed themselves as Ninus, Nineveh, and Romulus Rome. One cannot perfectly know the office of a ruler if one does not know the foundation principles of the establishment. This is to be drawn from the prototype, in the establishment of the world. In this there comes first the production of the things themselves, and then the orderly di- vision of the world. The different parts of the world are different kinds of things, stars of the sky, birds of the air, fish of the water, and other animals of the earth, and at last God provides in abundance what is needed by indi- viduals. He refers to the Mosaic account of creation in which step by step the world is prepared, and last of all man the lord of earth and animals is created. If anyone plants a kingdom he cannot produce new living beings, nor another place of abode, nor a new means of livelihood; but he must make use of what already exists in nature as the workman uses the materials which he receives from nature. It is therefore necessary for the founders of a city or kingdom to seek first for a suitable place which will be healthy for the people, whose fertility will suffice to support them, whose beiuty will charm and which will also be secure from foes. The more it has of these qualities, of such at least as are necessary, the more suitable it will be. It is necessary that the founder of a city select a site that will meet the wants of the inhabitants when the city or kingdom reaches perfection. Wlien a Kingdom is to be founded we must consider which territory will be suitable for laying out cities, villages, fortresses, universities and schools, {studia h7eran«n,) where soldiers should receive military instruction, where markets are to be held, and meeti og places (conreniws,ea;c/ian^es,) for the merchants and others, and everything necessary for a perfect Kingdom. If a city is to be founded it must be considered where the Churches [sacra) are to be, where * ibid. 635. + ihid. 642. SCHOOLMEN A^'D GROTIUS. m the courts of justice should be located and where trades are to be carried on. The men must be brought together whose business or callinfi is suitable for common residence, that there may be a difference in the residence part and in the business part, and different classes of people associated together. Care must also be taken that each one is satisfied according to his position and circumstances: for otherwise the Kingdom or city cannot long endure. Tlie important point is that there is a matter of choice in locality, situation, and that it depends upon many circumstances and very much on the ple;;si:re of the parties concerned. It looses very much as if the social contract v.::s not indistinctly seen in the matter of selection of a site.* In the conduct of a good life in an individual it is neceessary that there should be virtuous effort, for it is in virtue that good living consists. But as a mean> to this end there is a second necessity, namely, the existence of ma- terial possession^ the use of which is ne3assary to effective virtue. The unity of men in society as individuals is secured by nature and this unity prepares for the unity of society, called peace. For the good of society requisite ma- terial things are demanded.! He goes on to the founding of new states or enlarging existing ones. The mightiest nations and princes whose names have been most famous have srmght either to found new cities or to enlarge those already in existence, which have been named after their founders. The name of Romuhis would be unknown had he not founded Rome. In establishing a state, the king should clioose a suitable location, for the inhabitants gain many advantages by a suitable climate. In a comforta- ble climate there is better iiealth of body and more prospect of long life. If there is an excess of warmth or cold it becomes necessary in tile changed condition of the air to change the condition of the body. Hence many animals l)y natural instinct resort t3 a warmer region in time of cold and to a colder in time of great heat, in order to enjoy comfortable circumstances during undesirable weather. Living beings who live through the warmtli and cold, in case the lieat is great become languid, and life is shortened. In some of the warmer legions of Ethiopia men do not live tf»be more than thirty years of age. In extremely cold regions life is exposed to many perils. A mild climate has favorable influences upon the carrying on of war, by means of which, he says incidentally, human society becomes tirmly established. People who live near the equator ar3 weakened by the heat: they have really more wisdom but little vitality and therefore have little per- severance, lack confidence in awar-like encounter. They fear being wound- ed because they are tim;d. On tlieotlier hand, Norl hern peoples do not fear war, because they have courage andareskilful in war. Those wholive intem- perate regions do not fear to be wounded: they have also more practical intelli- * De Reg. I'rinc. I.KJ. + I. 14. 04 THE POLITIUAL THEORY OF THE genco{i)riifleritn()\\hich enables tliem todiscern the value ol' temperance in camp life, and {ruide tliem in the conduct of war. A temperate climate has a great i nfluence upon the conduct of state 11 fe. The people who live in cold regions arc courageous, but intelligence and skill in the arts. They remain free but at- tain no perfection in state-life, because they have not practical prudence to enable them to become better than their neighbors. People who live in warm countries have bright intelligence and great skill, but they lack cour- age. The result is they are subjected to other nations. Those who live in the middle regions have both of these qualities, enjoy freedom, attain a higher standard of state-life and have practical knowledge of how to govern others.* In selecting a location it should be remembered that living together as a nation is based upon natural life. Natural life is preserved by menns of healthful air. The most healthy site is one that lies high, because the air moves freely and so is not misty, where neither the extreme of heat nor th" extreme of cold prevails. It must not be in the neighborhood of marshes. The sun striking the earth and water sets free a variety of gases found more in valleys and low-lying districts than in the high-lying parts. From marshy places there arise vapors which unite with animal bacilli and create a pesti- lence. In sea-board states he speaks of the value of walls which form a protection, the sea cleansing it from impurities, and destroying disease germs and other nuisances which cause an unsanitary condition in cities and states. The laying out of the city or of the state should be attended to so that full advantage may be taken of the genial warmth of the sun and the cool, re- freshing breezes which tend to promote health among the inhabitants. It is not conducive to health to be transferred to a warmer atmosphere than that in which one has lived heretofore. At it is necessary also to have suitable food the choice of a location should be made with a knowledge of the nature of the food that is grown in the district. The ancients got this knowledge by investigating the nutritive animals. For the nourishment of men and animals springs from the ground, and if animals thrive upon the fruits produced in a certain district so will man. If the animals that are found in the placo are unhealthy, then man naturally would be unhealthy also. Good water must be sought for. for the health of the body depends upon water of which man uses so much. We in- hale air into our bodies, hence it is the first essential of life; we use water not only to quench thirst but also as a part of food, therefore nothing is so conducive to health as good water. Another sign of the healthfulness of a region is to be found in the complexion of the people who live there, whether their bodies are strong, their limbs well developed, whether the children are numerous and vigorous and whether many old people are found in the place. * Do Kcu'. Prinr. I. 1. SCITOOLMEX AKD GROTIUS. 95 Such are the climatic and public sanitarj- arrangements considered ncccs.-;ary by Thomas in a well regulated state.* The agricultural Hi ate. The location of a state must be in a place that is fruitful and such as will provide sufficient food. A society of men cannot live where there is not plenty of food. Aristotle says that it is imprudent to build a city in a mountain where sufficient arable land does not exist to [iro- vide food. A state cannot have a strong population without sufficient means of livelihood. A state can command its food supply in two ways, (a) by select- ing a fruitful district that produces enough to support it; or, (b) by the use of trade, by means of which from everyquarter the necessaries of life are brought in. The first means is the more suitable and worthy, because where there is a scarcity it is known as soon as the want is felt. A state has greater self- sufficiency when the products of the country immediately around it suffice for the sustenance of life, than when recourse is had to other provinces hv trad! tig. A state is the more worthy if it can supply its own needs without having recourse to the merchants. It presents greater security to its people for in case of war or not importation of supplies can easily be suspended and the state may perish. It is more suitable also for state-life, for the state which depends on merchants for its food must live a common life with, com- mingling with foreigners. Life with foreigners tends to destroy the good habits f>f the citizens, for foreigners trained under different laws and cus- toriis act difTerently from the citizens. The civil life becomes corrupt by citizens fallowing the example of the foreigners. If citizens themselves en- gage in business as traders there are many gateways opened to vice, for merchants strive chiefly for gain and so a desire would l)e created in tlie citizens ' mind that everything should bemercliantable in the state, and all kinds of impositions and frauds would be practised in reference to the pro- duets of the fields, and the welfare of the community would be lightly esteemed, each one seeking his own interest, and the effort to be virtuous would cease. Commerce is also opposed to the bearing of arms. Traders are not used to hardships because they live in rooms and warehouses, not in the open air; they also need delicacies^ and so tend to Decomc effeminate, their bories being weak arid unfit for the hardships of war. Hence commerce is forbidden by state law in time of war {jus civile). The state whose popula- tion is assembled is more likely to be peaceable. In the association with men outside an opportunity arises for strife, and conditions arise which pro- duce unrest. If the state is given to commerce tiie citizens must remain inside the walls to carry on their trade, therefore it is better that a stat- should have the satisfaction of providing its means of living from iis own lands rather than that it should trade for a living. Yet it would not do to exclude entirely the merchants from the state, because it is difficult to find a place where there is a superfluity of the means of livelihood and no need to * Do Ke!X. Piinc. II. 2. 96 THE POLITICAL TIIEOriY OF THE import anything from the outside. There would then be an excess of pro- visions in one place that would go to waste, which by the merchants might be carried to other regions and utilized where there is a scarcity. A complete state therefore must have traders, but trade must be conducted in moder- ation.* Bcautii qfJundsccqjc. In founding states the location should by reason of its agreeable characteristics give pleasure to the people. A charming country will be hard to forsake, and many people will not go where there is an ab- sence of the beautiful in nature. Without the plfasirg and enjoyable man's life cannot long last. This sense of beauty will be satisfied if the district is abroad plain, if it has fruit trees, a view of mountains near by, beautiful woods and flowing streams. These must only be enjoyed in nidderation, be- cause overpowering beauty allures men into unrestrained pleasure and tliat is hurtful to the state. Men who live only for pleasure are dull io spirit: the sweetness of pleasure sinks the soul intosensuousness, so that they can- not exercise sound judgment. Those who give themselves to excessive pleasure become timid and faint-hearted, and become slothful in business, neglecting necessary exertions for the good of the state. Therefore it is in- jurious to the statctto give excessive pleasure to the people in the situation of the kingdom.t States on the sea. There is danger to a state that is located on the ccast. It is better, as Aristotle says, that a state should not be too near the sea. be- cause very many enter who have been brought up under different laws and accustomed to strange habits and manners as is seen in all states and cities beside the sea. Strangers detract citizens from the observance of tiieir own laws.J It is not fitting that a state should be bounded by the sea because tlic location is also Mable to be unhealthy as well as dangerous. Yet it is not well to be too far from the sea for the state derives from the sea many ad- vantages. It is better therefore that the location be a middle one so that the state may gain the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of the sea.? Choice of location, agricultural condition and the nature of the climate are all applied to the end to be realized by the state and therefore to be judged in their relation to reason and virtue. 4. People. The state must if possible, by preference (po^Mts) consist of one people or nationality, besiuse the simihirity of people in customs, habits and manners creates a relation of friendship among the citizens. States that have been formed out of various nationalities have perished in consequence of lack of unity and difference in customs never unified, leaving one portion ofthestateinaniagonismtoanother.il Aristotle alleges that it is because of differences that innovations are brought into states, for when men are * II. 3. * Ar. I'ol. XXI. p 049. + II. 4. 8 p. (550. II Ar. Pol. XXI.p. 4.-)4. SCHOOLMEN A^^DGROTIUS. !iT found in slates wliich manifest diversity of customs there is every likelihood of a war of customs, if the peoples have lived a long time together without becoming blended intoone people. Those who have different manners of life tend to different ends and use different means in attaining tliem: ther(^ springs up a diversity of interest which produces confusion. Among those who have dltferent customs and have lived long together, it generally hap- pens tnat one people gives place to the other, the stronger prevailing. In this case no great changes take place in the state. Those who live long together and still continue to have different customs will tinally come into conflict with one another. Statehood then Thomas, following Aristotle, thinks should be based on nationality, the principal idea of a nation being a community of customs and manners in a single people.* Scientific contemplation is the highest occupation for the individual. Tt cari only be realized however by individuals in a state, and tnan only reaches his highest condition in a society which is the national state, whether that nationalify is n itural or historical.! It is by the power of reasonthat men in a state are gf)verned under the authority of rational laws: it is by the same intelligence they are led to cultivate science. That policy is scientific and rational which prr)vides a written language in the vernacular of fhe people, hdbcrc litcrdlem locuiionrui in sua vidyari idiomate. Those people who do not pos- sess such a vernacular speech and rationality in thought are accounted birharians. .\ (MiUurerl people on the other hand is distinguished by two characteristi(;s. (a) p( ssossing a literature in the popular language: (b) hav- ing the rational regulatif)ns to regulate life embodied in the form of thC: state and its leg;il requirements.^ Some nations are more fitted to rule than others. Aristotle says. For ex- ample, Greece, naturally and by its geographical position united the cDiira'it! of the Tsorl h(!rn peoples with the intelligence of the Southern, and it is called accordingly to a state life of a higher order and to the govern- ment of f)thers. To this df)Ctrine of Aristotle Thomas objects, that if it were true of the Greeks on natural grounds, they would always liave had the same dtmiinion over others and never have lost it. Ilisfftry is against this, for the Persians and Romans have controlled the Greeks and have had inturn tlie empir'! of th(! world, that of the Romans being much wider and of long- er duration. Thomas explains the view of Aristotle. lie explains it on liie ground of tli ; natural p.isition of the country which gave it an advantage over other counti-ies. In this way the Greeks, niidway bet ween cold and heat were intelligent and l)rave. tluMr bravery being inspired by the patriot- ic spirit cultivat(Hl on her plains and hills. Tlie position of t he kingdom according to the location ol the planets and fixed stars also had an inlliience * p. .">liO. + Biivimn !iii. p. 10. OS TFIE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE upon it. This position varies. Whenever her position dianserl relative to tlie heavenly bodies her qualification for empire would cease and the empire would pass to others. Thit the influence of the heavens and heavenly bodies cannot affect the under- standing or the will of man. Gifted people attain to the government of the world through moral and intellectual genius, and likewise the governing power is lost by sloth and misdoing. Tiiis is one reason why the empire of the world was lost by the Greeks and Romans. When they had the empire they were luxurious and covetous, and thereby the rule of the world passed to others.* This forms an approach in idea to a universal empire, -under the ontrol and authority of the best nation, in culture, situation and laws. Elements of state population. The state must of necessity consist of men oc- cupying different pt.sitions and in different circumstances. If all the men in a state followed the same business and dwelt under the snni'^ roof it would be a domestic or family society, not a state. In a state tlier^ must exist a variety among the population, each one or each class following its own pro- fession; yet this variety of population-elements must be united togetlier to form a state unit by the discipline {disciplinn) of good laws properly adminis- tered. There are several constituent parts in the population of the state. In the Jirst class we find farmers, common laborers, (called vifes because they soil their bodies with their labor) as tanners, weavers, laundresses, and musi- cians: trading and peddling merchants; lastly those who v/ork for wages, called operae, because they lease or let their work. The second class embraces all who occupy a middle position, intermediate between the highest and the lowest classes of the people. It includes live different grades, soldiers, luiights, steward-!, advisers, the rich and the popular leaders. These are called defenders of the people and are a necessity in the state to preserve it Ircm falling into a servile condition; and since it is contrary to nature that the state should be unfree, the state must possess self-sufficiency, having freedom of action to direct its own progress. If the state did not have de- fenders then it would have to be dependent on some other state and consequently be in a feudal position. The principal part in this class con- sists of those who fulfil the offices of the state under the governors. The li'Klhest class consists of those who possess the governing power in the state and occupy therefore the position of heads. t Ail who are embraced in these three classes do not hold the rank of citizen- sliip. A citizen is one who has held an administrative office, or some other office of authority in the state, or is capa'tile of holding such office. Those who do not enjoy the privilege of such official dignity do not take part in the state-life as such and are not citizens of the * p. 653. t Ar. Coin. XXT. p. .51?-U. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTTT^S. !>^ politia.* Slaves also who are necessary to complete the work of the state by menial seTvice are not citizens. t In reference to the position of women and children Thomas follows Aristotle. Care for what belongs to many in common is of liitle importance: every one cares for what belongs peculiarly to himself. Two things produce what men care for and love, (a) what is their own and belongs to no one else; (b) and the special love which one has for a certain thing. Love is lessened by its division among many. Parents love one child more than they do many. Hence children and women do not belong to the general citizen-society of the state, but are embraced in the fdmiUa.X The position of women is somewhat higher than that of children. They are free and may have an advisory part in state affairs, but have no deciding power in its management, potesfrtfem consiliandi sed C07isilmm ejus est invalidum, their influence being exerted through the husband in their domi- ciliary position. The nature of women is weaker than that of men, and her opinions are not staid, but are easily changed by her passions,— hence she is a creature of desire or feeling, while man is a being of intelligence and reas- on.?; The duty of women is to attend to domestic affairs which suit her nature: to these she ought to give her undivided attention and leave state affairs to men.H True nobility among men is excellence of race, that is, it is a pre-disposi- tion towards virtue descending from father to son. "Nobility of race and of wealth are of the same kind: not that among the poor there is no nobility or inclination to excellence; but since wealth necessarily tends to promote vir- tue the inheritance of property by a child from his father is as much an inheiitance of nobleness as is virtue. Hence the aristocracy of virtuous ex- cellences generally that of wealth. 1| But such a position of wealth is not unqualifiedly approved, because wealth promotes greed of gain and selfish- ness. The middle position is the best, comprising those who are neither too rich cor too poor, they are the true aristocracy of a state. They are the most obedient, for those who excel in wealth, nobility, military skill or beauty scorn others and become haughty, and by reason of their elevation above others tend to yield to unlawful desires. Such a pre-eminence sub- jects them to passion and leads away from reason. On the other hand the needy become unreasonable in their demands and give way to selflslmess and force, to get what they desire from others. If the legislator would act in the be.^t interests of the state he would promote the middle class in the state and establish by means of a constitution such men in the government. Tlie more the middle class is set up in the state to keep in check the rich and poortlie more permanence will attach to it, because they are more even- ly in iheir performance of duty and more steady as defenders of the * p. 452. s p. -.m. t p. 4(i0. II p. H:'). ;i: 40(1. 40:). *: p. .u-.. ino THE rOLITICAL TIIE(^RY OF THE state.* The state raust consist of those who have not only reason and'a competent portion of goods, as well as weapons of warfare, hut 'of such as have previously used these, that not the unskilful, not the self-sufficient and independent, but the middle class who know how to use themselves and their weapons in defence t)t the state.t Thomas, therefore, would elevate what he calls the middle class, that is, the moderately rich and noble class who hold military and other offices by succession, not those who in modern times would be spoken of as the ordinary citizen class of farmers and me.chaMts, for those engaged in handicraft and those occupied with farming he debars from a share in the state. Land in relation to the people. The state must be so large and only so large as to secure that the land can support the people, and that they may have -ibil- ity to defend the territory and the state from the attacllessedness in tins life. It is this last imperfect happi- ness which man as an individual and man in pjliticai society secures in the present order of things. + * Pulszky, Theory of Law and Civil Society, p. 280; Erdniaii. Hist, of I'hil. I. C. 284. + 1h. 2ae. qu. 1. ■X la. 2ae. qu. 4. 5: Expos. Aiist. VII. lect. 2. 66. SCHOOLMEN A'SJ) GROTIUS. KJfi Willi Aristotle he distinguishes three kinds of good, the good of the soul, of the body and purely external good, which man uses for the perfection of of his soul and body. The combination or union of these three kinds of good in the virtuous life produces the condition of imperfect blessedness. To at- tain it there is required a certain perfection of the body in health and strength, a proper disposition of soul and rational faculties, and also the external necessaries to sustain the physical system. The proper play of th«^se elements in a life of activity, in which a rational being is brought into iflalion with the divine by a knowledge of God and obedience to his laws, is the best means of securing the end of lite. It is only when the external goods and the health of body are used in the exercises of the soul that they become instruments in attaining the measure of blessedness possible in tliis life.* Thomas makes friendship, amicitia, the condition by which man real- izes this happiness in the state-society, for by means of unity man enjoys the social good and makes use of himself in promoting the good of others, and tiie common good of scciety. Blessedness consists in a man tilling his place in the social order according to the directions of natural law and the will of God.t The design of society may be embraced in two things in general, (a) that men siiould live together; (b) that they live together virtuously, or that they live according to human nature and reason. The result is happiness for the inrividual, blessedness and prosperity for the state, for the perfect life is the final cause of the state. The common good is attained by means of vir- tue and by means of virtue the society becomes an end in itself and to the individual members.^ The ethical nature of the state as a moral organism implies the element of \ nieWi'^encG agens per intelledum mjus est manifcstc projttrr finem ojjerari. 'i The state has an ethical force and acts just as a complete man. The end of the state may he described as Rurri describes it, philosophical-political- christian, in which the political issuhordinateorsecondary.il The individual is completely sacrificed to the state, or rather the end of the individual and the end of the state are identical. 1 There is a primary and a secondary or subordinate end, the one superior to the earthly, for the Godlike on earth are akin to the divine essence. The secondary or subordinate end has for its object the good of society.** Inthestateas in individual man iheboiin rit. , Therefore the end of the state is not an end subordinate to that of the indi- vidual but it is an end of the same kind.* In that comnmiritas of the state which can bo described as ^jer/'(?c?a it is necessary that there should be a set- tled harmony among the members, thisunityof the multitude is accomplished puceA The general end to which society tends i?. ?>oy))(m coh^hhojc and it is this which determines all state activity. J The final end of man \9- per virtuo- mm vitam perrenire ad fruUionem divmam.l The association of the state, rigmmi is described as communitas ciritatis omnia cnntiurt qiiar ad ritam hominis fiunt necessaria. . . .propter timoroyihoHtium necessuria est comyynmitas civitaturii phir- inin quae faciunt unum regnum.\\ The special virtue in the state is citizenship and to accomplish its end free citizenship as explained above is in full exer- cise.^ The end is determined either as primary or secondary, a.s.so/»/acM(/ reJativa, according to the law human or divine which directs it, the end of divine law being eLernal happiness and the end of human law being the tranquility and peace of the city or state.** Human law directs in state-life pioid ordinahir Iwmirtcs inter se, the result of which is peace. ft The end ot state society therefore in general is an individual one, the individual and tiie state tending to the same end, virtuosa iyilio- vita e>tt confjregationis humanae .finis.XX 2. Twofold end in the stale. Following atter Aristotle Thomas gives to the state a twofold end, (a) the end of placing man who is a social being in uniim with his fellow men, especially to render possible the fultllment of his life- work in its physical aspect, and to protect and continue his existence: (b) an eiliical task in making men g(tod citizens and virtuous men, and to promote their virtue and happiness, that is, their eartlily happiness; but as spiritvuil and eternal happiness is the goal ('f man's efforts and the final end of his being, the Church alone can perfectly promote this end, because the state is not concerned directly witii spiritual affairs. In harmony with his eccles- iastical position ho places the Cliurcli back of the state and regards the state as simply an instrument directing towards tiie spiritual end of the Church. gg There is a groat difference between the earthly aim of man wliich he recog- nizes liy ttu> human intelligence and by natural pt)wers, and the spiritual aim which can only be apprehended by faith, wliich depends upon free will. |||| ■" i:)e Res. Princ. I. 14. t DeKes. Priric.1.2. -;: Vorit. qu. 1. 10. c: la. 2ao. qu. 92. 1. S 1)0 R(\?. Prill. 1. n. li Cotii. M.itt. c. XII. •' Verit. qu. 1. 10; (ju. 2. 2. c. ** la. 2ac. qu. 98. 1. c; qu. 100. 2. 5. c: IT. Sent. fli.s<[. !). :!. c; la. 2ao. qu. i)n. 2. li; (ju. !)2. 1, ++ Opusc.73. c. 5; 2a. 2ae. qu. 29.3.4. S De Re-. Princ. 1.14. S§ Fi'oh.schaninior. p. 477. 478. III! At. Expos. XXI. p. 070. SCHOOLMEN AND GUOTIUS. 107 The state can take action upon the natural aim, because it rests upon hu- man understanding: tlie second design is above understanding, except in so tar as it depends upon the activity of human freedom, and this individual liberty raises ii above state regulation. Tiiere is the distinction in aim be- tween common understanding and individual voluntary will. Since the state is an emanation from the common reason it is debarred from everything which depends upon the individual free will. Hence the state has nothing to do with the Church by interference, because her aim is higher tlian that of the state, being to complete the individual members in eternal blessed- ness. To the Church isentrusted the cause of individual freedom, to the state the interests of common understanding and common humanity.* Thomas often changes his expression of opinion regarding the real aim of the constitution of the state. He uses such formulas as these, the aim of the state is the J eace and unity of society, the declaration of the rights and privileges of princcss human laws can only prohibit what the condition of society demands. The state in other words only has a practical aim.f The calling of the king is described as that of guardian of justice and the living practical righteous- ness. The aim of human law-making is to make virtuous citizens, and the failure to interdict the wrong conduces to the destruction of society. The end of the state-unity is to live virtuously, this virtue being what is called ethical and scientific contemplation, or in other words the activity of the state is always directed to a higher end than the physical or social good, namely, the supernatural. In subjecting human beings in society to the state and the whole order of society, you say to them, ''honor, wealth, power should not be the desire of thy life, but a moral activity which takes in contempla- tion of the divine order: in this way alone can life be happy." This springs from the idea of natural right and justice as ethical elements of the social life. Consequently for the state to attain its real end there is required, not simply right but also religion, for religion crowns the edifice with glory. Thomas's view of the Church and state bears very directly upon the aim of the state, for while the Church may restrict and limit the activity of the state, the state cannot dictate to the Church in regard to her end. The state is a necessity for social order, but this is only the lower form of life: man to reach a measure of perfection and happiness must rise into the supernatural sphere of the Church. Hence religion gives an ethical direction to every aim in the state-life.t This will be treated more fully in the chapter on the re- lation of the Church and the state. In general the state is subordinate to the Church in all cases where the aim of the Church and the authority it claims comes in conflict with that of the state. This fact is founded upon the aim of both institutions and the means used to attain their aims. The * Biiuruan, p. 16-21. t DeKeg. Piiii. 1.2. t naiinian, p. 10-21. 108 THE POLITICAL TIIEOEY CF THE state is flttcd for the promotion of the earthly, temporal welfare of the na- tion and of individuals, and to preserve human life as well as protect human possessions, and to direct in the obtaining and retaining of all earthly posses- sions. The Church is qualified to aid man in securing his eternal and supernatural aim, namely, everlasting blessedness, which the state cannot df>. The Church has a higher work and a more glorious aim. And as the supernatural aim of man is of greater importance than anything earthly it is the ultimate end of his existence to which the state must contribute in guiding him under the direction and according to the counsel of the Church.* The temporal government must help earthly citizens to become heavenly citizens. This assistance is rendered chiefly in the state protecting with its legislation and political power the Ecclesiastical community and defending her doctrines against enemies, as well as punishing apostates, executing by the secular arm the Ecclesiastical sentence [hrachmm seculare). 'i. Temporal aim of the state, unity and peace. The intention of every ruler must be directed towards the preservation of that which he has undertaken to govern. Thus it is the duty of the helmsman to preserve the ship for the voyagers and to bring it unharmed into a safe haven. The welfare and pros- perity of a united people implies the preservation of their unity which is called freedom, for when this is absent the usefulness of life in society falls totheground. Certainly a disunited people is a burden to itself. Thrrefoie the ruler of a community must direct his chief aim to caring for the unity and peace of the community, and it is right for him to consider how to re- store peace among his subjects; for so far as the aim for which he should strive is concerned there should be no deliberating except in regard to the means of attaining the end. With this view speaks the apostle when he commands unity in the case of believers "endeavoring to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace." The more active a government is to pieserve unity and peace, the more suitable it is. We call that most fitting which best leads to the realization of the aim. It is apparent that what is in itself a unit can better effect unity than several units. f Aim of the state in so far as the rulers are concerned. Shair of the king in the ( ood. The aim is not self . It isthe duty of a king or other ruler to seek the welfare of society, yet his vocation would be very hard were it not that something of a personal nature comes to himself. This is expressed in the usual reward of a good king. Many are of opinion that honor and fame are the only reward. For this reason Cicero in his political teaching states that the leader of the state musL be satisfied with fame. As a reason for this Aristotle states in his Ethics that the prince who is not content with fame would become a tyrant. It seems to be an innate principle that each one seeks apersonal good for himself. If jbhen the prince is not satisfied with fame and honor he will * Frohschanimer, p. 485 sq. t DeReg. Prin. 1.2. SCHOOLMEN A^T> GF.OTIUS. 109 seek pleasure and wealth and turn even to robbing and oppressing his sub- jects. Tf we accept these views many evil results will follow. If it were the pt»rtion of kintjs to bear so much trouble and pain for a perishable prize, kingship would have little reward. There is nothing in human affairs that appears so transitory as fame and honor and the favor of men. Itallde- pr^nrls upon the op init n of men which is most changeable in human life. To please men he will become a slave of opinion. The desire for fame robs mon of present freedom, on which independent men will expend all their exertions. Nothing is more seemly for a ruler whois trying to promote good than independence of spirit. The prize of fame is an inadequate recom- pense for a king. It is also injurious to society when such a prize is set up. Tliough fame follows virtuous actions, yet fame for the sake of virtue is re- garded as of little consequence, and a man through small esteem of fame acquires fame. The disciples of Christ showed this as servants of (xod, whether in fame or in disgrace, in ignominy or in good reput!\ Therefore fame such as the worthy despise is not a suitable reward for a worthy man. Were this the only reward that lay before a ruler the result would be that brave men would not accept the dignity of the otflce, or if they did they would go without reward. Out of the ambition for fame spring many dan- gerous evils. For many in their boundless strivings for war-fame have caused themselves and Iheir armies to perish, and brought their fatherland into the power of the enemy. Am.bition for fame has another closely related evil, namely, desire for i>h(>w {simulatio). As it is ditticult to acquire, and few succeed in acquiring true virtue to which alone honor pertains, many men out of desire for fame have merely the appearance of virtue. Therefore, asSallust says, avarice has made many men false, some in heart and others in speech. Our Saviour called those who did good works to be seen of men, hypocrites, that is men of pre- tence. When the prince seeks pleasure and wealth as his reward, there is danger to society that he will become a robber and a defamer, there is dan- ger that when the prize enchains the soul he will become full of self-conceit and pretence. It is clear however fiom the opinion of the wise that they do not esteem honor and fame as a reward for the ruler, as though his mind were set on them as the principal aim; but when a king does seek fame he is more worthy of toleration than when he is avaricious or goes after self-pleas- ure. Each vice stands near to a virtue. The fame which men desire is, according to Augustine, simply tiie favorable opinion of men, and the desire of fame has in it a trace of virtue, in that it seeks the approval of the good and does not wish t) displace them. As few succeed in being truly virtuous, it is preferable to take those for rulers who at least respect the judgment of men and so are held back from open wickedness; for one who is desirous of fame goes either in the true way tlirough virtuous actions to the goal of approval oy men, or he strives to attain his end by means of cunning and deceit. On 110 THE rOLITICAL THEOIIY OF THE the contrary, he who has an inordinate desire tor power, but is without desire for fame and is indifferent to the judgment of t'oe wise {bene judicantes) will seek to reach his aim generally by wrongful methods. In this he will outdo even the animals in his vicious life, as it was with the Emperor Nero, whose gluttony was such that we cannot believe anything manly could find ;i place in him, and whose cruelty was such that he could do noLhinggentlyor ld from reason. In all who have the use of understanding there is im- l)l;in!,rd the conciousness that the reward of virtue is happiness. The virtue of each action may be described as, "what is done is good and the doing of it tends towards gotd." Every one strives to acquire through good works that which he longs for, namely, to be happy: tnerefore the reward of virtue, that which makes men happy, is expected with good reason. If it is the ministry of virtue to be actively engaged at work, it is the king's ministry to rule his subjects well, so that the king's reward shall be happiness. It remains to be soen what that is. Happiness i-i the ultimate yearning of the soul; this longing does not reach into the infinite, because the desire implanted by na- lurc would then be void as the infinite cannot be taken in. The further t he ye.irning of an intelligent being goes out toward universal good, the more does that kind of good really produce happiness, after the attainment * TH- Ileg. Pr. I. 7. t Ezek. 29. M. 20. • SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. HI of which no other good rpmiitis to bs desired. For this reason happiness is called a perfect {j^ood, because it possesses in itself all that is desirable. This is not found in any single earthly good, for he who has wealth wishes more, and so with all other earthly possessions. There is no permanency in earthly things, therefore nothing earthly can satisfy and form the aim of a king. Again every perfect and complete good depends upon a higher one. Even material things I'ccome better by union with something better and higher, as they hrc'ime worse by mingling witii what is bad. All earthly things arc infcriir lo i lie human spirit, and hence nothing earthly can make man happy. Augustinesays, "we do not call earthly Christian princes happy be- cause they have reigned longer or have died more peacefully than others, or because their sons have preceeded them, or because they have conquered their enemies and obtained wealth, or have defended themselves against rebellious citizens whom they have subjected: but we call them happy if they rule- justly, if they prefer to master their own passions rather than rule over a peojile, and if they do nothing out or mere regard for empty fame but from a desire of eternal happiness. vSuch Christian rulers as we call happy, because they hope for that which later will be a reality In their exper- ience.* Thecauseof the human spirit was God, therefore God alone can be its Viefitting aim. The human spirit recognizes a universal good, and desires it through its will. Universal good flnds its realization only in God. The answer of the Psalmist is. "It is my good to draw near to God: I have set my trust in God the LorJ."'t He it is certainly that gives prosperity to the king, not only for the present but forever. The reward of a king then is honor and fame, not earthly but heavenly. For what transitory glory can be compared to the honor of being a citizen of heaven and a companion of God. as a son of God and heir of heaven with Christ. What human praise can be compared with God's, not the deceitful tongue of flattery nor the delusive opinion of men, but the testimony of the inmost consciousness confirmed by the testimony of God. Those who seek this honor acquire with it the fame of those whose opinion they seek not.t Aimof the state in so far as the subjects are concerned. Government is the di- recting of the governed in a proper manner towards the desired goal. A ship is managed when it is, through the activity of the ship-master, brought safely and directly to the haven. Itdevolves not only upon the master to k?ep it from damage on its voyage but also to bring it U) the haven. How miicli more fitting is it in matters pertaining to God and men that pains should be taken to reach the highest end.?; Thomas shows the relation of individuals * Do Civit. Dei, I. 5. t Psalm 73. 28. * De Reg. Pr. I. 8. S Df Reg. Piinc. I. 14. U2 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE to the whole or^nnisni ;u:cl its aim. One individual is probably anxious that what relates to him should be left to his own will, another that he should succeed in obtainiiif,' a liigher de^'-rec of perfection than others. In the management of the ship the carpenter repairs whatever has been damagred on board, the shipmaster however attends to the bringinpr of the ship into har- bor. Among men in society the physicians attend to the health of the people, the steward supplies the necessaries of life, the teacher of science educates in the truth and the moralist (instiluior morum) directs according to reason. If man were not destined for a higher end he would beself-sulflcient. But there is another possession for man, outside of himself, the highest happiness which is hoped for in the enjoyment of God after death. These requirements are provided for through the servants of the Church. We must regard the final aim of society as a whole as well as tha' of the individual members. If the ultimate aim of individual man were seme possessien lying within himself, the final aim in the government of society would be, that society had the right to this possession in him. Hence if the final end of individual man were physical health and life, the tasl< of securing it should devolve upon the physician; were it to obtain an excess of property, the economist incconomm) would be the kin;j; of society; were it to secure such a knowledge of truth as societ^' could attain, the king would be a master of knowledge; but the aim of uniting a mass of men in a state is, tl^at 1 hey may live in acciirdance with virtue, for men form themselves into unions to live a good life {bene vivere), to which the individual couid not attain of him- self. Therefore the virtuous life is the aim of human af-sociation. An evidence of this is found in the fact that only those who have a mutual in- terest in helping one another unite in such an association. For if men formed a society simply to live, animals and slaves would loim a part of the state. If men simply wanted by union to acquire piopeity, then all wlio carry on business and trade must necessarily form part of the state. T-!ut only those are members of society who are under the same laws and the same government, tending to develop a well regulated life. Man living virtuously is destined to a higher aim because through virtuous living he reaches the enjoyment of God. If this could be attained by the powers of human nature the king would guide to this ultimate end, for the king is the most import- ant element in human affairs {summa regiiiiinis). But it belongs to those who reach the u\t\m-die n\m {ad qiicm pertinct ult I mus finis) to guide those who are aiming after it. This is a divnie guidance and belongs to that king who is not only man but God, the Lord Jesus Christ, who acts through his Church and priesthe)od on earth.* The state then has an ethical task to p(>rform. Originally it was formed that human beings might get sufHcient means of livelihood, and not simply that man might live, but live aright in so far as human life is directed * De Rerate eating, drinking and revelling, resulting in vices that lead to imprisonment and luinishnKMit under the regime of social order. * Ar. Com. Vol. XXI. p. 307 sq. + see Chapter X. t ibid. p. 469, 678. S p. 2. ^I-t THE rOLITICAL THEORY OF THE The other two forms are lives of intelligence, and only the life of reason in its practical and theoretical formscanbe called traly human. The political or practical life in which theactivity of the state society relates to the com- niuriity is a preparation for the activity of pure reason, unannoved by the unrest of political life, such a life of pure reason being realized in contem- plative study.* The aim of desire regards the state as the best society in which to secure wealth, honor, jjleasure or power: the aim of human life which seeks possessions as a reward of virtue regards the state as the best society in which to enjoy social peace and to attain to social virtue; virtue in the individual and in the state are of the same character, the only difference between the two being that of the whole in relation to a part. The best activity for man Is that which leads him to the superior being who is above himself. Means must be utilized to attain the ultimate end of recognizing the supreme being. This is done by reason in its perfect exercise so as to bring it under the notice of the Supreme being. In order to accom- plish this four things are necessary in the individual and in the state, (a) a perfect condition of reason; (b) an imperfect condition of reason; (c) the con- dition of soul such as leads desire away from the natural and centres it upon the supernatural; (d) certain virtues by means of which externgl things are utilized.! As the upright life on earth is intimately connected with the happy life in heaven, so it is in regard to the welfare of human society. All the peculiar possessions procured by human effort, wealth, trade, health, civilization are connected together. Those who have a regard for the ulti- mate aim must control those who have the care of the goods of the earth, the king in final issue must be subject to the government exercised through the priesthood to realize this higher aim.:I: * Cotii. on Ethics, pp. 11. 20. 22; on Politics pp. 6.^. 678. + p. G79. ? De Keg. Princ. I. 15. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. Ill CnArTEK VI. ACTIVITY cr THE FTATE. SOVEREIGNTY. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE. 1. Activity. The possession of power implies its exercise and the exercise of power implies activity. Man is a social and political animal in nmltitudine rivens, such implying human activity.* A multitude without order cannot enjoy peace or prosperity. Order in a multitude -cannot be preserved with- out the moral consent and the unity of all the parts and members in performing the functions necessary to life. This unity of all the organic members can be obtained only by means of some moral head; consequently man was made to live in the society of other men, and by the very same law of nature he is directed to live under authority. Power is a necessary conse- quence of our nature in order to the attainment of the social end of life. The act of association is natural; it may be reckoned the first step in the active life of the state; following this association is the establishment of a I. overning body, by the consent of the people, or by the authority of a strong ruler who establishes himself in the seat of power; then follows the activity ( f the gov( rnor or governors in securing peace to the state, the best form of which is found where all the members have a share In it. The activity of the state par excellence is the activity of government, controlling the society for its best interest.* The general embodiment of this activity is found in the chief ruler: as the shipmaster to whom belongs the ordering of the voy- age, directs those who repair and ttt the ship, as the man who uses the weapons directs the smith what kind of weapons he is to prepare, so the chief ruler is the head of activity in the state. As what is seen in art is an imitation of what takes place in nature, we learn from nature by our under- standing to be active and also the manner in which that activity^ shows and conducts itself. t It is the characteristic of virtue that good comes through the activity of men; it is also the greater virtue that through activity a greater good is wrought. The welfare and the good of society are greater and more divine than that of the individual, therefore the activity of society is the sovereign or supreme activity. For this reason an evil is endured (s«seing and in the attainment of the end lie has need of guidance. What is needed direction? Man has the natural light of intelligence. To a man liv- ing a life of isolation this is sufficient, each one being a king of and to iiim- self under the sovereignty of God, ruling his own life by the light within him. But man is naturally a social being. Individuals are mr-mbers of a so- cial body, and this social organism requires a uniting force or power in order to prevent its general dissolution. This uniting social force which guides to the common good he calls fl^iiyita ris regitiva communis. It gives constitu- tion to the social body and is tlie means of realizing the state activity. The state is the larger body for it includes those who hold office and per- form the functions of vis regitiva. By tiiis latter term Thomas designates the government as that social force whicli has the ruling power for the common good. It is the moving cause for the good of the society. Wherever there is a unity there is some governing power or person, securing this unity. The soul rules the body of man; and in the complex faculties of the soul the reaf^- on is the ruling principle. So in every multitude there is aregulative power (regiYm/m), that is a government. Government occupies a large place in the theory of Thomas. The citizen of the state attends to his own private affair.^, the government takes the sole charge of common affairs and administers all the oltices wliicli pertain to the common welfare. The people in general lack rea.son and need guidance in order to do what is right. t Thomas compares the recourse which a people have to an intelligent governor to the depen- dence of a mariner upon the pilot or the workman upon an architect^. It is * De Res. Princ. 1. 9. + Aris. Expos. IV. Icct. 3. 1. $ 2a. 2ae. qu. 47. 12. SCHOOLMEN AN'D GROTIUS. H7 in the royal office tliat he finds the concentration of governmental power and activity. He exaggerates in a sense the attributes of regal aiithorily. Roy- alty arises from naiure. because art always imitates nature. In the universe at large God is sole governor, in the individual man reason is tin' king ruling the body and the other forces of the soul. Royalty, activity jun- f.rcc?/f>?cc, is the reflex of these natural gf)vernments, Kkat anima in corpore ft JL'ec.s /» »i»»f7r), so likewise is the king in his kingdom.* We shall see that sovereignty ultimately belongs to the state. The state institutes the power of government and makes it legitimate by its authorization and consent. But after its institution the government performs its functions without cou- sultintr the society, so long as its activity keeps within natural law. The foundation of popular government is to be seen in Thomas, its primary con- ception beins,' derived from the constitution of the Church perfected before the time of Thomas. Government is natural to society, its chief activity is expressed in the duty of providing for social necessities and guiding the social community to its end. But this does not imply that it is beyond con- trol, or independent, or that the direction of the governing body is the supreme cause of unity, for the common good is the directing cause, to be interpreted by the intelligence of the government. The government is an institution, as Thomas points out, distinct from the principle of power.t resting upon human law and in which the people have certain rights that enable them to express their minds. Government is a means of realizing the sticial principles embodied in society and therefDre in the use of its activ- ity the government is limited, although it is the supreme power in the state. as the rational organ of authority. This is the grand mistake which Thomas makes. He does not make and keep clear the distinction which he has al- ready pointed out and to which he often refers, between the principle of ])o\ver and the form it assumes in any particular country, at any given time, as well as the person in whom it is placed. J 2. Sovereignty in the state. Absolute sovereignty belongs only to God for He alone has power to do with man and with the world as he pleases without appeal. Man has no absolute right to command or do with man according to his will. Hence the sovereignty which we speak of as residing in the hu- man state is relative, not absolute, and is founded upon the will of (Jod. Human sovereignty depends for its sanction upon divine sovereignty. (Jod's sovereignty is unlimited in its nature and extent; human sovereignty is lim- ed both in its nature and extent.^ In regard to the state the questions arise to wht>m does sovereignty appertain? Upon what basis does it rest? How far does it extend? These * DeRe;?. I'lin. T. 12. t Com. Sent. Super. 45; Com. Kom. XIII. $ lii. 2ae. qu.ao. ;i. § 4 Sent. disq. 40. qu. 1 and 2; la. 2ae. qu. i:{ and 109. 118 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE questions have been discussed by Thomas from the point of view of Paul, '■all power is from God." '■omnis po(est(isa Deo."* Thomas refuses to recog- nize that every power of fact is a power of right, distinguishing the powers de facto and de jure. In his commentary on Rom. XIII. he considers power (l^otestas) in three senses, (a) power in itself, in which case it is from God: (b) power in its origin,— if it is just, it comes from God: but if unjust, originating in the wicked perversity of man. it is not from God; (c) power in its use. In this case it is from God, if it conforms to, it is not from God, if it opposes, the principles of justice. According to this there is a divine right of the power, not of the prince or ruler, a divine right of authority, not of kings. Where does Thomas wish sovereignty to rest and what titlegives aright to it? We have seen already that he sets up the sovereignty of political virtue. The foundation of this virtue is reason or intelligence, and its guide is utili- ty. In his ideal state the citizen is one possessed of such virtue, whose standard of reason and activity is divine justice. Upon those who are en- dowed with such political virtue a full sovereignty rests, yneJiuft est jriincipari quod melins e.'^t et studiosu,s, it is right Xhiit l\ie best and virtuous command. t On the other hand naturale est quod dcjicicns siup'ponetur perfecti in unoquoque. genere,X it is natural tliat the imperfect be in subordination to the perfect. It is according to nature that he who is conspicuous for virtue, surpassing all other citizens should be lord of all: if there is a collective number who share this virtue in an equally eminent degree they have a collective right to the supreme pDwer. The eminently virtuous man or b')dy of men have a right to rule the society in the state, just as God rules the woild and the hear -^ the human body. This right of sovereign authority belongs to them as rulers in sueh a degree that they have power to quell rebellinns and to opp<»-e all sedi- tious xiiu\ Q\n^\\ls. rationahUiter et peccaren »i non moverent seditioncm.'i In the same way f)ne of very great eminence above the others and of superior merit may have reasonable cause to stir up a s3ditious movement against any p*^''- son not acting in such sovereign capacity, rationabiliter.\\ Where the members of the society are all of one race or class the principle of eminence is utiliztd. l)ecause they are all judged by the same standard. But when the communi- ty is large there is seldom an incontestab'e superiority In one or even in s(;mp, and in such a case the sovereignty of all ihe peo le comes in as a nat- ural right. Where there are different classes and different races among a people, when the industrial and laboring classes have been excluded, it is difficult to take account of the many and judge the superiority of ihe few. In tills cise the standard or principle is changed from that of the sovereign- * Rom. XIII. + Expos. Ar. III. lect. 8. tii. t VII. lect. 2. y. 8 E.xpos. Arist. III. lect. 12. o. II Expos. Ar. V. lect. 1. d. SCHOOLMEN AKD GROTIUS. 119 ty of virtue to the sovereignty of the multitude, or of the people. Thomas thus arrives at those who are the possessors of supreme power in the state hy the principle of exclusion, excluding all those who do not come up to the standard of virtue found in one or a few, and failing such persons of exclus- ive virtue, lie throws the sovereignty into the people as a whole. In all large societies such as the regnnm this principle is the determining one. Hence lie reduces the abstract theory of sovereignty to this practical rule, in omnibus ordinare in finem est ejus cujus est jyt'opriiis illi finis, in all things it is the office of him who has an end to rule with a view to that end. And as the multitude has for its end the common good, when it is united, then it l)elongs to the multitude or to some one acting for it to rule for the common good. Ordinare aUquid in bomnn commune est vel totius multitudinis, vel alicujus gereniis viccm totius multitudinis. It belongs to it to make laws, to appoint magistrates, to check the current of tyranny, — in a word the multitudo in so- ciety is sovereign, the prince holding his place and the magistrate acting in its name, I'icem totius gerens.* Thusout of the theory of the sovereignty of political virtue Thomas evolves the sovereignty of the people. It rests upon natural law, and the principle of adequate means to attain an end, in this case the end of the state. Since there is no one in a large or complex community who can judge or rule for all. by reason of conspicuous virtue, the collective wisdom of the mass deter- mines the end and tlie means that are adequate to its attainment. He supports this general theory by many secondary considerations. He accepts the saying of Aristotle, that the multitude in its totality is more indepen- dent and impartial than one or a number of persons, it is less subject to corruption, and it preserves more pure and uncorrupted wisdom on account of tlie collective reason. f In it welind riches, virtues, nobility and the entire pow(M- of the people,— individual citizens wf)uld have little virtue, less wealth and sLill less power— in union the defects and wants of one are made up by the merits of others. This collective society would be comparable to a per- fect man, endowed with all nature's gifts and qualities and able by its united strength to utilize everything that belongs to the whole in wisdom and power and resources for the public good. In the general case then, where there is no pre-em'Uint qualification in the individual or a few to rule in tlie state, and even in this case the multitude are the persons whom they represent and in whose name they act, the aggregation of citizens in the state possesses the sovereignty. Even in the case of a kingdom, the king rules over subjects who desire him to rule over them.t Hut there is a condition attached to the sovereignty of the people. The rule of the individual is an illustration of the sovereignty of virtue, which in * la. 2ae. qu. 90. 3. + Expos. Ar. III. lect. 8. * Com. Aris. Vol. XX f. p. 59;5-(). 120 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE the abstiucl is llie only real sovereignty. The power of the multitude is an example of the practical sovereif2:nty of virtue, for the multitude derives its power from the virtue to which attaches sovereij^^nty, it administers as well as enacts laws, it performs the judicial functions, distributes the state offices among its members on the basis of political virtue. If virtue is al)- sent from the multitude it has no sovereign power. Tlie old distinction between fZ('./«re and t?e./'«do wliicli he applied to power, he now applies to sovereign power. Hence he distinguishes between two multitudes. There is a multitude wliich willingly accepts and obeys the voice of reason, lend- ing naturally towards virtue. Each individual is not only viituf>us but the mass of citizens can be characterized as such and acts with a view to show its virtue. Such a multitude is sovereign de/rtc/o.* The other mass disre- gards reason, despises virtue and follows after tlie aims dictated by tlie animal nature of desire and passion. To this multitude belongs no sover- eignty: it lias no right to a place in the social community, because it does not live a political life of reason. t The sovereignty of the state manifests itself in the activity towards its end, bonum commune. Tliis action is political, that is, furnishes the formal element in the state which is its constitution. In the constitution of the states, sovereignty is deterrtiined, for it is a necessity that it reside somewhere to the attainment of the state end. The stale is a plurality and it implies concentration and unity. TIence the ris regUivd directs the totality to the common good of tlie members. J The sovereign is God's minister in the world as a second cause.?! 3. Functions of the goventmcnt. As the sovereign power has been located in the state we pass to survey the functions of ilie government to whom is en- trusted the supreme power in the state. In Thomas the typical form of government is the monarcliy, therefore the activity of the prince forms the chief part of his discussion of the right and function of tlie ruler's power. The function of the rex is implied in the term regere. rex dlcitiir cui committitur universalis gubern((tio-,\\ the function of the king then is that of governing the state universally, tiiat is, in all its departments. It is best to obtain from nature the manner in which a liing should conduct himself. In nature there is a double government,— a universal and a special one. The universal is that which is kept under God's direction and is governed by His providence. The special government is similar to the divine direction. It is found in man who for this reason is called the litLle world, b(^cause in him is found the m(>thod and manner of universal direction. For as common corporeal nature and all spiritual beings are under divine direction, so also the mem- * Expos. Ar. in. loct. 11. + lec'ts. S and 9. :l: De Keg. Prin. I. 1. § De Res- Princ. I. 8; 2 .sent. cli.s(|. 44, II Expos. J'siihn TI. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 121 bers of the body and tlie powersof the soul are governed by the understanding: and so in a certain way the understanding in man is vvhat God is in the world. Because man is a social being who lives with others, there is not only a copy of the divine government in man who as an individual is gov- erned by the understanding: but through the understanding of an individual society is governed. This direction of society pertains chiefly to the office of the king. The kiog should be conscious that he has undertaken an office which makes him in his kingdom, what the soul is io the body and what God is in the world.* If one considers what God does in the world, it will be clear what the king will have to do. There are in general two agencies in God's world to be no- ticed, one through which tVie world was established [instituit], the other through whifh the established world is governed {gubernare). First, the body was fashioned by the power of the soul {informatur); after the body is gov- erned and moved by the soul. Of these two agencies the second belongs in a peculiar manner to the king's office. In this way governing pertains to kings {regimine) and from the fact of ruling they receive the name kings {r<'g<'s).f The king must superintend all human affaii-s (o^cta), and direct them by means of his government. On whomsoever the obligation rests of developing fully what is ordered to be done by another, on him must also rest the duty of seeing that the efforts put forfeh are calculated to attain the end. The smith makes a sword that serves for fighting, and the builder erects a house that is suitable for a dwelling. As therefore the aim of the present well-ordered life is heavenly happiness it belongs to the king's office to lead a good life, hy way of showing to society what he desires, in so far as it is suited to the attainment of heavenly happiness, that he should com- mand what will be helpful and forbid what will be injurious. But as the b'st way to learn the path to true happiness is the word of God, he should apply to the priest for direction, "the lips of the priest should keep knowl- edge, and they should seek the law at his mouth. '"J The unity of society which is called peace is effected by the efforts of the rulers. Consequently, to the ordering of a good way of living for society, three things fire necessary, (a) that society be placed in the unity of peace; (b) that through the bond of peace, society shall be led to a good way of liv- ing; for human society is hindered in right doing, if it is deprived of the unity of peace, and there is fighting am )ng the members: (c) that through the efforts of the ruler there is a sufficiency of what is essential to leading a good life, (a) The good way of living is set forth to society through tne ac- tivity of the king, and may be said to correspond with legislation on the king's part; ((!;) the next thing is thit his attention be given to securing the * De Reg. Princ. I. 12. + DeReg. Princ. 1. li. X Mai. 2. 7. De Rsg- Princ I. 1.5. ]22 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE observance of this good way of living, corresponding with executive adminis- tration. There is a threefold hindrance to the stability of the public society [honum pulAicum). (i) One arises from its nature. The public good cannot be ar- ranged for a time, but must be continuous. Men as mortals cannot live forever; even while they live they do not continue in the same efficiency, because human life has many changes, (ii) Another hindrance in promoting the welfare of the society proceeds from within and consists in the perversity of the will of the members, when they are too slothful or careless to do what the state requires, or when they become injurious to the peace of socie- ty by transgressing the laws and disturbing the peace of others, (iii) The third hindrance is an external cause, when an attack is made by the enemies of peace; often the result is, that the kingdom or city is dissolved. To meet these three hindrances to state peace and stability, there devolves upon the kirlg a threefold task, (i) The first relates to the fact that men have suc- cessors, and that different individuals have special capacities in different activities. Just as God does in the government of the world with affairs of a transitory nature, because they cannot endure forever, taking care that through the existence of others their places may be filled and sotne integrity of the universe is preserved; so the king takes care to fill the places of those who die. The vacant places are filled by appointments in the succession of office, (ii) The king should by means of laws and ordinances, punishments and rewards keep his subjects from unrighteousness and lead them to vir- tuous actions. For this he has the example of God who has given to men his law and to thos3 who observe it promises rewards, threatening to punish transgressors, (iii) The king is to preserve his subjects safe from eneniies. It would be useless to avoid dangers from within if there were no defence from dangers that are without. (c) In order to the good arrangement and the preservation of society the king should be careful to promote good order and to preserve the state. He must try to improve what is ill adapted to the state (inordinuhim), to supply what is lacking anc to strive to perfect what is capable of perfection.* A perfect ruler must have three characteristics, (a) Love of ruling. He cannot be a perfect ruler who lacks this, because he must have practical insight iprudcniid) which is right reason, in knowing what he ought to do and not to do. As he must guide others, he must exercise judgment and this he can- not have unless he love the aim and the means to attain it. He must have a love of ruling and an affection for the state, (b) He must have power ade- (luate to the performance of the important functions of his office. The ruler has to guide his subjects to the state-end. Among subjects there are some easily persuaded by reason; these do not need any chastisements. Others cannot be reached by reason, being disobedient and intractable: in the cas^ * De Reg. Piiric. I. If). SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 123 of these force must be usod. The king cannot use f'^^rce to punish without power, (c) lie must have virtue. The ruler must have practical sagacity and this is not possible apart from the right desire which comes through virtue* The ruler must not only have power, he must have more power than any other individual: for if hedoes not have it he cannot punish those who will not (they him. He must have more power than several persons together, otherwise he could not keep them in check or punish them if necessary. But he must have less power than the state as a whole [ciritas). for if he had greater power than tlie state he would be oppressive and turn the govern- ment of the kingdom into a tyranny. Here we have a distinct assertion of tlie sovereignty of the state to which the governmental functions must be subject.t The kingly office would seem to be a kind of professional occupa- tion which one enters out of love for the work and which one exercises in subordination to the supreme power in the state. Thomas not only ascribes excellence to the king but a very extensive pow- er and he gives him the power on account of the excellence. It is the duty of a king to be tlie guardian of righteousness. Togo to the king for refuge should be the same as gf)ing to a living embodiment of power for refuge, be- cause it is the purpose of the king to guard and care for the welfare of the community [honum commune). This he cannot do unless he is tlie guardian of justice. This office he must exercise so that those who have property and wealth may not suffer wrong from those who are destitute of property and that these in turn may not be oppressed by the rich. He must therefore be a just judge. In tine he is a king whD aims at the good of all society. He must be virtuous and therefore wrong mne of his subjects; lie must be ricli so that he may not oppress his subjects: he must liave honor, for eminence in vi rtue pertains to a high souled-h)mr. His bodyguard consists of citizens, for a king rules his subjects for their benefit. Therefore he can rely upon them to lielp him in performing his functions and confide in their guardianship.! Thus all the essential functions of government have been presented in con- nection witii kingship. To govern is regcre, including habere alios sub sun providentia.'^. To govern is to execute providence, 1| and providence itself is (»rder.^ In tlie execution of this order of providence the mode of activity corresponds with the form of the agency, oportcl modum actionis esse secundum modum formae (tyentis.** To govern may be described as the function rem ad debitum finem producere, of which primary function there are three secondary * Aiist. Expos. Vol. XXI. p. 581. + ibid. p. 49.5. * il)id. p. 586. S 4 sent. disq. 49. qu. 1; qii. 5; in. 2ii«'. (|U. 49. 0. II la. qu. Zl 1; 1 sent. (\m\. ;i9. qu. 2. 1. 1 la. qu. 22. 1; qu.2:}. 1. ** 3 sent. dis(|. 27. ini. I, 4: Ctr. 2. c. 21. 22. li?4 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE t'nnclkms, consiUum, judiduni. and })raeceptum.* The general name by which the political virtue of government is known is prudentia.f Of this political prudence there are three kinds, individualis, domestica or pnlitica, militaris or regnutiva.X The poUtica 2)rudentia applies to the rule in political society. The supreme office of the sovereign is curam habere communitatis.'i and this office is fulfilled by the threefold function of power, fZirigo'e correspDndiug to cons/^mm. I'orngere to judicium an^ regere to praeceptum. in the ideas of Thomas there is the abstract distril)ution r)f the power, and the concrete distribution of the distinct elements of the power, these being bound up in the person of the prince. In his zeal for royalty the state activ- ity is identified with the activity of the prince. Consequently the supreme ruler is 2)0testas summa, or majestas, or potentia ctctiva cum aliqua prae€minentia,\\ in which the state becomes personified in its ruler. The special character- istic function of consilium is inventio agendorum;^ of judicium, it is actus judicis in quantum estjudicens; idea est actus justitiae;** praeceptum is applicationem legis ad ea quae ex lege regulantur.iflawheing described as dirigere intentionem ostenden- doquaUs debet esse actus propiortinnatus jini ultimo. XX The necessity of thispraecep- tmn is quod importet ordinem adfinem in quantum praecipitur id quod est necessarinm vel expediens adfinem abeo qui communitatis curam habet promulgata.U Thus the executive, legislative and judicial functions are ascribed to tTie ruling power in the state. To the judicial and legislative functions a high place is assigned. Justitia is said to exercise judgment in the place of God in the king- dom, ut loco Dei judicium inregno exerceat.\\\\ This justice includes the jusdicere and the jits puni7-e,^*i\ and when it is spoken of as a corrective power it implies cogere ad emendationem per poenas.*** Thus judicium eml)races the right of summoning before a court of justice, of punishing tor a crime and l>y p'^nal- ties seeking to lead to reformation. In legislation there is exercised a fourfold power, imperare seu praecipere, vetare sen prohibere, permittere tt punire.-fff Legislation and execution. The essential function of supreme power is the legislative, the power of making laws, in its wide sense. It is the chief characteristic of sovereignty. This power of legislation belongs to the whole multitude or to some person representing them. Originally it rests with the whole, but it is vested in the hands of one or more persons who represent the state. JU It is for the good of the whole that the prince or rulers ought to make laws. We have seen that sovereign power resides in the same mul- * 2:1. 2ae. qu. 51. 2; 3 sent. disq. 2a. qu . 1. ++ la. 2ae. qu. 90. 2. + 2a. 2ae. qu. 49.6. « 2 sent. disq. 41. qu. 1. 1. * la. 2ae. (lu. .57. 6; 2a. 2ae. (|u. 47. 11. SS la. 2ae. qu. 90. 4. S 4 sent. disq. 19. (ju. 2. 1. INI De Reg. Prin. I. 12. I! 4 sent. disq. 24. (]u. 1. 1. 11*1 I. 15. T 2a. 2ae. qu. 51. 2. *** 4 sent. disq. 19. (|U. 2. 1. ** (lU. 60. 1. ii+ la,. 2ai'. qu. 92. 2. *« la. 2ae. qu. 90.3. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 125 titude and that the good government is that in which all have a share.* There is thus a primary and a secondary sovereignty, that of the people and tliat of the government, the latter derived from the former. The sovereign- ty of the former is maintained, (a) in the matter of choice and desire, in selecting a governor; (h) in the limitations placed upon rulers to prevent tliem degenerating into tyrants; (c) because they may deprive a tyrant or unjust ruler of his power, so that the power not only originates with them but returns to them in case of abuse. t The ruler or rulers are representative in legislation. Even in the case of the distinction he draws between royal power and political piwer, the former ruling after the model of providence by its own wise discernment of right and wrong, the latter governing ac- cording to the law, the ultimate point of interest in both is that all human laws are an emanation of human reason, — in the case of the royal power equally with the political, government by law must conform to the standard of reason. The true law whether enacted by the authority of one or many is an expression of reason, not of will or caprice or power, from which tyranny and unjust government proceed. Laws are given simply as an assistance in carrying out the state-end. If the aim of the state is right so will be the consLitutif)n and laws that are used as a means to attain the end. The law must govern and guide in all tliat which it was appointed to do. The ruler must govern in all that cannot be definitely reduced to law, for the law is made for general application, but it permits of exceptions in special cases {instantimn). The lawgiver cannot foresee all the peculiar circumstances in whieli a law will be faulty. In such cases the rulers teps in. This distinguishes the executive or administrative character of the ruler from the legislative cliaracter. It may even be said to apply to the judicial, because it is l>y the jridicium that a judgment is given as to tlie application of the general law to the special case.l The formula therefore may be put tlius, the law rules in ordinary, the ruler in peculiar cases using his wisdom and discretion. The reason for the indisputable authority of law is that law is free from passion, through which the decision of the understanding is destroyed. These laws are not necessarily written. In every properly con- stituted state the ruler governs according to the laws, for in every state sr)me one governs according to a rule which is equivalent to law. Some of tlie laws are internal, in the will and understanding of the monarch, otliers are external and written. In government by a l<, and cities, eitlier of one or n)ore than one. ruling according to laws aud customs. It is th*^ same as limited power. While distinguishing these classes of power we have in Thomas a confusing comparison of three powers, despotic, rotf(d and political in the form of monarchy, [w) Despotic power is that of a master ovt-r ."slaves. ,4o THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE which with Thomas, as with Aristotle and Angu«tine, is perfectly lawful' Amon^f men certain are qualitied to command and others to occupy a servile position, by nature slaves to their master.* Despotic power is not to be confounded with tyranny— a despot being a monarcli ruling with alisolute pow- er who may l)e a good king. A tyrant always conveys tlie idea of oppression: therefore every tyrant is a despot, but every despot is not a tyrant, al- thriugh despotic poweiis liable to fall into tyranny. Every rulrr must have due power. In this meaning only free members of a human society are suVijects and rulers are the masters and lords. t Aristotle says tiuit slavery as a result of war is unjust. Thomas says it is just as a means of inciting to courage in warfare, and it is just because it is a result of sin. There are therefore three classes of servile persons, those naturally slaves. accf)rd- ing to Aristotle, those in slavery as a result of sin. according to Augu— tine, and those who are slaves by war and subjection, according to the Jurists. These classes under the -despotic power are unfree and therefore excluded from the power of the state. This power is domestic and does not exist in the case of rulers and sul)jects, except in tyranny. Despotic royal power is for the good of the ruler and cf all forms it is the worst. t (b) Royal power. He distinguishes regal power from domestic. As it is ])ut by him regmim non est propter regem, sed rex propter regnnm.'i. The royal power is to care for the kingdom and the security of its subjects, in this way re- flecting the kingly administration of God overmen. The royal power is ihat which is left to the wisdom of the prince and where the only limitation is the duty of copying the divine providence. Despotic power in this way may be introduced into kingly government: for example, the laws given liy Sam- uel to Israel were despotic laws. Royal power implies a certain servitude on account of the corruption of sin, because since the fall man needs to be held more firmly in check. Therefore the despotic character of royalty springs from sin. Differences in the people give rise to royalty. Those wiio are free are inclined to political power while those people who are suited to serve are inclined to subjection to despotic royalty. Here we have tlie tendency to confuse despotisna and monarchy. || (c) PoKiicaipoM'cr is that which is limited by the laws. Thomas seenxs to ludicate a preference for this form, because it is a better government, the rulers being temp()rary and their interests being those of the people. He cites the example of Moses who challenges Israel, "Have I taken aught from any man," and of the great Roman citizens who manifested a disinterested- ness in their conduct of public affairs and in the wars for the establishment * Ar. Pol. 1.8. 9. 10; III. 2. 9. * + la. qu. 96. 4. ? De Keg. Piiiu-. U. 8. 9. § DeReg. Princ. III. 2. II Ibid. 1.9. 10. SCHOOLMEX AND GROTIUS. 147 of the republic. The political power is limited by the laws and hence al- though tending to a mercenary character of itself it is Icept in check by the conventions and customs of the people. Tiiis idea of political power is the practical application of the principle ofThomMSthat all government is lim- ited and checked by reason and natural riglit. The theory of the Jimitaticjn upon tiie s<^ate and government arises from the fact that the state has a definite aim and that government is designed for the realization of that end. In the state as in the individual tlierearea series of agencies, one in subordination to the other and these in themselves form a check.* The ultimate eid of the state as we sav\' is (leterna beatitudo, and the general limit placed upon tlie action of the state and of the subjects of the state is qui 'potentate re.'iistit. Del ordinalioni resiiifit.f To the supremacy of the king tliere is the general limit of the end of governmental power. This in the estimation of Thomas is a spiritual (»ne. and hence the priests are over lords aViOve tlie civil ruler. Thedestiny of man can only be realized by the su- pervisory direction of tiie Divine law + The will of the prince has the forceof \;iw. voluntas principi.'^ Icy is hnhct rigorcm.l The limitation placed upon this exercise of sovereign power is that three requisites are imposed upon the sovereign act i vity. /n,s7;7/V/, anctoritas and prudent ia.\\ The Judex is limited by the fact thnt J list itia implies reddere unicuique quod suum est Pt proprius actus Justiti(te.*'\ Auctoritas 6e\)t'nds as we have seen upon the acquisition of tlie power. In the exercise of the executive power the grand limitation is tliat the ofHcc implies the u>e of pnidentio.** the absence of crudelit(is,f-f of an imo sity. rapacity and severity, and tlie exercise of doniiuivm to the good of the citizens vv'tliout any detriment or injury to liberty, nullum praejadidum re detrimentum Uhertati.XX 2. Limitation derived frmn tlic position of the rulers. Thomas establishes not oiil.\ the power that is possessed by the ruler of the state, but also the condi- tions upon which such power is held, and the duties owed by the ruler to his subjects. A tyrant is one who gives himself up to self-pleasure and the pur- suit of self-interest. Pleasure is injurious to the state. Men who live only for pleasure are dull in spirit, and they are unable to exercise sound judtr- rnent. So according to Aristotle, the reflections of a judge were corruiited by amusement. Men give up excessive pleasures out of a regard for virtue [honestide). Nothing is more likely to increase beyond limits than pleasure, although it is the means wherehy virtue continues to exist, yet it often de- stroys virtue. Because nature is greedy of pleasure one by means of it is thrown into the charms of lust. It is tiierefore a task of virtue to ab'^tain * la. qu. IK). II U. 2iie. (lU. CO. 2. + 2 sent. dis(|. 44. (111. 1.(1. T la. iiu. 21. 1; 2:i. 2;it>. (|ii. .VS. 11. t I)e Rcfi. Frill. F. 14. •* 2a. 2a«'. (|ii. tld. 5. § la. 2ae. qu. '.)0. 1; ini. !)2. I. -i-l c|ii. 157. •!;X 2 sent. (lisi]. 44. (jil. 1. 2. 148 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE frr)m excessive pleasure, for if one avoids the excess one is more easilj' able to use the right mean? of securinpr virtue. Those who t?ive themselves to ex- cessive pleasure become timirl and faint-hearted, so that they do not attempt what is difficult, they cannot endure hardship and shrink from danger. For this reason pleasures are injurious to the practice of war, because, as Vege- tius says, thev fear death lea.st who have bpcn conscious of little pleasure in life. Those who are entirely given up to pleasure are generally slothful, neglect necessary exercise atid busin-^ss. and turn their attentions solely to their f)wn pleasure, while they are prodigal in spending whit has been gath- ered by others. If they become poor, yet they cannot dispense with accustomed pleasures, but would rather steal and plunder in order to have tlie means of satisfying their lusts. Therefore it is injurious to the state to yive facilities for injurious and excessive pleasures. Rulers as well as sub- jects are led into such excesses and become slaves to self.* 3£ntires thai lead thekhig to rule well. Eeivard. They have an exalted place itj heaven who worthily fulfil the calling of a kinsr. If the reward of virtue i.-* happiness, the greater the virtue, the higher the degree of blessedness that w'll be granted. It is a conspicuous virtue when a man tri. s to guide not himself only, but others aritrht. for even in physical virtue one is esteemed the more praiseworthy the more he overcomfs or the greater the difficulties he can remove. So much greater virtue is required to govern a house than to govern oneself, and greater still to govern a city or a kingdom. It is a proof of excellent virtue that a king practises well the calling of a ruler» therefore to him belongs a great reward in heaven. In all arts and 'activi- ties those merit greater praise who guide others well tlian those who sini'ily follow the lead of others. It is more honorable to transmit a svstem of im- parting truth thin merely to he able to comprehend what has been taught by others, ^raong trades the aichittct is more hitrhlv honored and receives a larger price for the plan of the buildinu- which he des gns than the work- man who works meclianically according to the plan. In war incise of a seitre. the general receives greater fame for his tact than the soldiers do for their bravery. So it is with the ruler of society in tho^e things which have lo be done with skill as with the instructor in science, tl^e architect in build- iiiiJf and the general in war. Tlie king deserves greater reward if he rules his subjects v.ell than does any on ' of his suhjecis who acts under him. Among men every private person is praised and accounted by God to be worthy of nwa'd when he assists the needy, brings peace to tiie discordant, saves the oppr s-ed from the power of the mighty, any one in fact who helps another. How inueh more is one to be prais-^d bv G )d ani men who brings peace to an entire nation, whtt stops acts of violence, upho'ds righteousness and decides by his 1 iws and statutes what mf^n are to do. The g -eat height of kingly virtue is siiown in tills, that the king is in a conspicuous way an image of *De iWa:. Piine. II. 4. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 1-^9 God and that lie does in tlie kingdom what God does in the world. There- fore kings are called judj^es of the people of God. God i« better pleased with them the nearer they appr(»ach the imitation of his works. Good kings are the most pleasing to God and best rewarded by Him. It is very difficult for princs, as Augustine says, to bear in mind that they are merely men and not be unduly exalted when they hear exaggerated expressions of veneration and meet with servile subjects. Many fall from virtue as .soon as they come to a high position, although they appeared to be virtuous while humble. Here is the difficulty which princes find to be good. They are not to forget to come to God in humility and prayer. God himself promises a high reward to deserving kings. The house of David will be as God's house and all worthy kings shall reign with Christ. So the heathen conceived of rulers and pre- servers of states as changed into Gods * Nothing can be so desirable as to be taken away from the glory of kingship and placed in the honor of heaven. Therefore kings have a great motive to lead them to avoid tyranny. Ty- rants make a mistake when for the sake of earthly advantage they cheat themselves out of the great reward of rig]it?f>usness, which if they had governed justly they migl.t have received in heaven. Tyrants give up right- eousness for transitory advantage. Nothing in tliis world is t,o be preferred to an honorable friendship which unites virtuous (jualities. preserves and promotes virtue itself. It is this that is needed in all hnmin affairs in prosperity or adversity. One cannot rejoice without friend-. This love makes the severity of life easy. In no tyrant is cruelty so great tliat he cannot appreciate friendship's joy. The liistoiy f)f Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse proves this. He wanted to kill one of two friends, Damon and Pythias The condemned one pleaded fur a Slav of the execution ersby association and enai)le them to confide in each other. The king must so conduct liimseir that he will seem to care for the good of all and not expend aimlessly what he receives from his subjects. In this way he should render accounts of what has been received and expended, which means a regular public flnance. The reason is that one manages and governs, when beseems to be economical, shows his care for the common welfare and acknowledges his representative character. In what concerns religion and culture the ruler must show himself zealous and reverent, because if the subjects believe that the ruler is religious and fears God they will not believe that he can do wrong. From godly men no one expeets evil. The subjects will be less inclined to conspiracy, for if they believe God is favorable to the king, they will strive for him against con- spirators.* The king has all the necessary force to do good and he ought to use it ac- tively and usefully, (a) in defence of the territory of the state, and (b) in assisting the feeble and especially the unfortunate. This is a new duty en- joined upon the royal power derived from Christian politics. It has been developed -upon a Christian basis and Thomas sets it forth as a duty devolv- ing upon the royal power to exercise public charity and to minister help to the weak and unfortunate.! These duties which kings owe to their subjects and in the doing of whicii kingly power is strengthened and made honorable * ihid. p. r)9r>-.5S)!l. t De Reg. Piin. II. U-14. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 153 are moral duties viewed by Thomas from the moral standpoint of obligation. Tbey act as limits upon kingriy power. 3. LimUnI ion arising from the iwHition of the mhjects in the state. The question is what obligation rests upon subjects to render obedience to rulers and to the human laws of such rulers. Human laws are not obligatory upon sub- jects as the legislation of men merely, because man is not always bound to obey man; but they are binding because they derive their force from and are in cf)nformity with eternal right, and because such eternal law gives rise to such commands as are delivered by human authority. If they cease to be in conformity with the Divine law, they cease to have binding effect, that is, only such crimmands and laws as are just are to be obeyed by subjects.* So A ugust i ne says, lex esse nan videtur quae justa nonfuerit. Un j ust statutes or laws are not laws at all but a declination from law. There are many different kinds of unjust laws, such as contravene the public utility, such as express the caprice or will of the legislator, such as ignore distributive justice which is t he presiding principle in all social administration— such laws have no c )mpulsury force. Such commands have no authority and to disobey them is a right of subjects. Christian subjects are bound to yield obedience to the temporal autliority of the rulers, but when they pass beyond thislimit Chris- tians are to obey God before man, God revealing Himself in quantum ordo JHsiitiae requirit. If the prince's authority is illegitimate, and if the command he gives, even if his authority is just, he contrary to justice, subjec]t.s are not bound to obey. These are tlie fundamental rights of subjects which must not he invaded V)y the executive or legislative authority of the rulers. There is no passive obedience for in all that does not pertain to civil or military life, and in all that pertains to virtue man is subject only to God. Obedience IS tlie queen of virtues in tl)e social life, but unlimited obedience would de- stroy maiTs responsiliility to God and make him the tool of another human will.t Tl)e chief duties of the members of the state may be summarized, (a) sut)- jection and obedience to tlie laws and to the lawful commands of the higher l)owers over them; (b) reverence, honor, and fear towards the rulers: (c) will- i'lyness to obey in the civil or military sphere of life; (d) leading a practical life of peace, justice and cliarity in common with all the otliers members of tile community.! The fundamental principle of government is that thesub- jectsof the state must exercise themselves to serve those wlio are set over them by nature to govern them, for tliis governing isjust and a rigliteous war is carried on against those who show signs of rf])elli()n. Such a relation is the foundation of all just government.^ * la. 2ae. qu. SKi. 4. t la. 2ae. qu. bound to obey his su- periors, as they are placed over him, as soldiers obey the general in what relates to war, the slave his master in what relates to his work, the son the father in what relates to thediscipline of life {disciplina) and ii. what belongs to the house.* The position and duty c)f the subject should prevent tyranny. Society should be on its guard in relation to the king that it may not find in him a tyrant. The first thing for those who have to do with filling the otflce is to elevate the kind of man to the office who is not likely to degenerate into a tyrant. Samuel praised God's providence in the appointment of the king. The government of a kingdom should be so ordered as to remove the opportun- ity of becoming a tyrant from the appointed king. At the same time his power must be so tempered (tem^jeraiwr) that he cannot easily Regenerate to tyranny. Provision should be made also as to how to act in case the king does become a tyrant. In the institution of government stipulations ought to be made limiting the power and providing for the case of abuse. If no excess of tyranny takes place it is better to bear moderate tyranny for a time, than by opposition to develop greater dangers. It does happen that those who oppose tyrants do not always succeed in getting the upper liand, and the excited tyrant is more enraged than before. On the other hand when the mastery over a tyrant is gained tliere is often the greatest dissen- sion among the people. It may be at the time of the uprising or after his overthrow that the society divides into parties over the kind of government desired. It also often happens that those with whose help the society has expelled the tyrant get possession of the power and become tyrants them- selves, and from fear that they will have to suffer from others what they have caused others to endure hold their dependents in a more severe bond- age. It is usually the case in dealing with tyrants that the later evil is worse than the former, that in removing one form of oppression out of the 2a. 2ae. Vol. III. pp. 379-89. Parma. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 155 wickedness of their hearts tliey produce others So the aged woman who prayed for the life of Dionysius when all Syracuse desired his death, said, "in my girlhood we had a had tyrant and I desired his death. He was killed and after him came a much worse. The end of his reign 1 deemed a deliverance. The third one was worse still."* The popular will is thus a limit upon royal power, in the constitution and p.'oper safe-guarding of the instituted Kingship. 4. Positive limits. Right of Revolution. The question arises is it permissible to free the state from a tyrant? Is revolution legitimate? Who has the right to exercise the power of revolution if it is legitimate? Thomas ans- wers, "the reverse of tyranny does not bear the character of sedition. "t We have seen there are circumstances in which subjects are in duty bound to obey. But not to obey and to use violent means to subvert the power are two different things. On this point Thomas does not conceive it to be a duty to be subject absolutely. What are the rights of subjects under an un- just government ? What measure of obedienc2 are they to yield and at what point are they to resist ? Even the apostle acknowledges that there is a lim- it to I he obedience of suhjects, for man is to obey God rather than men. A government has no right to compel obedience in what is contrary to God's will or ftrder. In commands and laws purely human the question is, is there any limit to obedience ? It is a matter of conscience and Thomas does not hesitate to pronounce himself in favor of the freedom of the popular con- science which alone can determine how to act. Thomas distinguishes between sedition and insurrection — the former he condemns, the latter he acknowledges to he lawful and in certain circumstan- ces praiseworthy. Sedition he describes as ptigna injtista, an unjust strite St irred up between citizens which is directed against the public peace and d'lrimental to the public utility and for this reas(»n a grave offence. It is n(tt directed against any special power.t If the power attacked is an unjust (me. a tyrannical government, then the attack is not sedition and those at- tacking are not seditious. An independent people has always the right of destroying the kingship it has established, if the king fall into tyr:uitiy. Even if the subjects have sworn perpetual fealty, when the prince has viola- ted his compact, the people have the right of revolution or insurrection. The tyrannical governmeni is unjust because it does not act with a view to the common good, but for the good of the particular ruler. The reversal of such a government is not seditious, it is the tyrant who is seditious. On tlie ground of natural right revolution against an unjust government is allow- able. In general, sedition is in a sense sinful. It is against the unity and • De Reg. Pi nc. I. «■ + 2a. 2ae. qu. 42. 2. * 2ji. 2ae. qu. 42. 1. ]56 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE peace of society, that is, of the people in a state or city, According to Au- gustine, the wise do not call every union of a mass of people a nation, but only those associated together through harmnny in subjection to a common law jind community of interest. It is clear that the unity to which the se- dition is ill opposition is the unity of justice and the social union for the commnn advantage It is clear that the sedition is against not only justice, but also jigj'inst the common welfare, and therefore it is a deadly sin of its kind [ex sua genere), the more so because the common welfare which is attacked is greater than the welfare of a private person, who may be attacked in a quatrel. The sin of rebellion lies chiefly with those who brin-j; the sedition and secondarily with those who aid them. The opposition of these should be such as will defend the common welfare in so far as they can accomplish the opposition without sedition. Revolution against a tyranny does not come under the name of sedition, perturhatio hujus reginiinis non habet rationem sedi7«Vn?i.s, except where the government of a tyrant is disturbed in such a disorderly way tliat the subjects suffer more from the revolution than they did from the tyrant's government. The tyrant is the Insurgent because through him the people are encouraged in dissension. The distinction be- tween sedition and revolution is marked by the language used by Thomas. Seditio and seditiosus are used in the bad sense of sedition which is not justi- fied, whereas the word insurgere is used in the commendable sense of an up- rising against a despotic government. This nomenclature is now adopted in the French and English languages as the scientific nomenclature to denote this distinction borrowed from the scholastics of the thirteenth century.* Tyrannicide. The murder of a tyrant is not lawful chiefly after the insur- rection against a tyrant or usurper has taken place. In the battle against a tyrant or usurper they are merely to be put to death when deeds of vio- lence are done by them or they seek an unjust conquest of the country. It is ditticult to determine however the boundary line between lawful and unlaw- ful putting to death. Is there any recourse against a power that is legiti- mate but abused ? Such power is permitted sometimes as a punishment for sin, but it is not always so. In such cases it is lawful to refuse even legiti- mate power when it is abused. t Thomas sets up constitutional regulations which will limit the power of the ruler, as we have seen. It is better to en- dure the t.vrant and supplicate (lOd's help against him. If the normal gov- ernment becomes tyrannical he is in favor of opposing the tyrant, with cer- tain reservations, (a) that nothing worse come to pass than the tyranny opposed; (b) that there be some prospect of success; (c) that an individual does not appear as a private person against the tyrant, but that the opposi- tion be common and carried through in a lawful way. It is wrong to act by private means or in a private capacity. It is lawful and reasonable only to * 2a. 2ae. qu. 42. 1-3. t Com. Sent. disq. 45. qu. 1. 2; 2a. 2ae. qu. 42. 3. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 157 proceed hy public authority. If by some fundamental law it is established that the people or some of them have the right to appoint a king, then the people or some of them, as the case may be, in a regular way may depose or restrain him and are not unfaithful in dethroning an unfaithful king, nee putanda est tcdis multiiudo injideliter agere, tyrannum destUuens, etiam si sidem in ^jerpetuufin se ante subjecerat, quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis reyimine se non fidel- iter gerens {ut exigit regis officinm) quod ei pactum a subditisnon servitur. Si ad, pis multitudinis pert ineatsibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui. If the people is independent it can in justice destroy the kingship which it has made, or recall the power if the prince abuse it, and in destroy- ing a tyrant the peoie does not prove unfaithful ; even in the case in which it has vowed perpetual subjection to a prince it is not acting unfaithfully, for liie royal behavior has merited it because the pact between him and his subjects has not been observed. So Rome banished the Tarquins when they fell into tyranny. In order to this, the monarchy, even hereditary monarchy, must be elective by the choice of the people.* Thomas is opposed to tlie murder of a tyrant unless he has recourse to war and is killed in the lawful strife ; but he thinks that he should be dethroned or limited in power. There is a lawful revolution as there has always been in history. But often as in the civil strife among the Romans that freedom for which they had borne so much is torn from them. Yet such a degree of virtue is not found in society {in multis) that it will refrain from casting off the undeserved yoke of bondage when the opportunity occurs. It will more probably lie according to the view of society (i)i»ifi) to consider it not at all against fidelity to oppose in any manner the misrule of a tyrant. A tyrant governs through fear and this gives opportunity to those who can release themselves from Vtondage to do so. Fear is not without danger, for by it many are brotight to desperation and the desperate will venture anything. If one studies ancient, and modern history one will see that the roign of tyranny has not endured long. Aristotle shows that the tyranny lasted longer where the tyrant imitated thegentleness [modestia] of kings. The same is the judgment of Scripture. God will not long allow such an one to reign, for after he has allowed the tyrant to punish his people he will overthrow him to bring rest to them.f If the excess of tyranny is unbearable, in the opinion of many, it is proper and right for brave and virtuous men to kill the tyrant and thus expose themselves to the hazard of death for the freedom of society. We have ex- amples of this in the Old Testament history. Eglon, King of Moab, held the people in hard bondage. Ehud killed Eglon and himself became judgcof Israel. Rut this does not agree with the teaching of the apostle. Peter * DeKeg. Piinc. I.(J. + De Res. Princ. T. 10. |-S THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE teaches us with becoming reverence not only to be subject to good and gen- tle, but also to froward masters. P'or it is a grace of God to suffer wrong and bear it patiently. Hence when many of the Roman emperors tyrannically per- secuted Christians on account of their faith, even when a multitude of nobles as well as the common people embraced Christirinity, they patiently suffered death and were courageous for (Christ's sake. In tiie case of Ehud it must be specially noticed that he killed an enemy and a tyrant over the people. It would be dangerous to society if from mere personal presumption (j>r/(Yf/f/ preaumpHone) a few could murder the rulers, even if they were tyrants. For most people would rather expose themselves to tiie hazardous undertaking for bad men than for good and it happens that under the government of a king there are bad men as well as under a tyrant. It is more just to proceed against the oppressors not according to the view of a few (jnesumptinne), but by the public authority {auctoritate puhlica). (a) In case the right to choose a king belongs to the society then it can without injustice [non injuste) remove him or limit liis power if he misuse it. Such a so(uety does not act contrary to fidelity when it removes the tyrant, even when he is dethroned forever, for he has not conducted himself with fidelity in the government of the so- ciety as is required of a king. He has brought it on himself so that his subjects are no longer obliged to keep the contract, (b) If it is the right of a superior ruler to choose a governor it is expected that he will be a safeguard against tyranny. Archelaus who ruled in Judea instead of his father Herod whose wicked policy he imitated, when the Jews complained to Augustus, was deprived of part of his power and his title of king was tak^n away and the half of his wealth divided between his two brothers. As he did not howev- er check his tyranny he was sent by the Emperor Tiberius into exile, (c) When no human help can be had against tyrants one must fly for lielp to the King f)f all, God, who is a present help in time of trouble. Tyrants who are not worthy of conversion He can put out of the world or place in a low cdiidilion upon earth. He saw the oppression of his people in Egypt and drowned Pharaoh and his army in the sea. He hurled Nebuchadnezzar from his throne and drove him from the companionship of mankind, changing him into tlie likeness of an animal. He can even yet free his people from tyranny. In order that the people may merit this favor they must forsake sin, because it was as a punishment for sin that God allowed the tyrannical to rule over them. Thomas shows that, (a) royal power should be elective and limited, to pre- vent it from failing into tyranny. Thisis not pcssiblein hereditary monarchy which is excluded. Prudence is the only check, because it is to the king's own interest to avoid such acts, (b) The authority of the king ought to be temp- ered to prevent tyranny, that is, certain limits are set to royalty, (c) Tyrannicide is condemned, but tlie right of depo8ing and banishing belongs to the multitude or to a superior power which evidently is the Churcli. In SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 159 these principles we have the germs of the principles of freedom which are found in later ages, though the ediflce is crowned by theocracy. There is no redress for misgovernment unless according to law.* This doctrine isconflrmed in the other worksof Thomas. If any one begins arevolution in the state he must have a just cause and power to carry it througli. Now virtuous people as a rule have not the power and do not believe they have just cause for revolution, and therefore they do not begin any. In case however they have just cause and powerand noinjury tothecommon wel- fare will result, they will begin a revolution with good reason and they would sin if they did not. The virtuous are the wise of whom it is said, the wise man loves the common welfare before his own interest.! If a monarch does not govern in the interest of tlie community efforts must be made to banish him. Revolution is thus permissible, but is to be avoided if possible, being a remedy to be used only in case of extreme necessity. Insurrection is always a dangerous experiment even. in case of success. Often it leads to civil dis- sension and anarchy; oftener still to a new and worse tyranny. Yet, while Thomas counsels moderation he defends the rights of the people against the abuse of power, and the peace of the state against the disturbances of the re- volter. Jn regard to Tyrannicide which was accepted by many of the Doctors of the Middle Ages he follows the same moderate course. When tyranny has passed beyond endurance and violates all human and divine laws it is per- missible to reverse it. He regards tyrannicide as moved by a personal sentiment, privata presumptione. and a particular opinion cannot affect a pub- lic personage. It is to society alone the right belongs. Only in one case does he regard it with favor, when th:; tyrant has recourse to public war and is killed in the struggle ensuing. It is better to let the murder of the tyrant rest upon the judgment of God. Tyrannicide is expressly condemned. J The onlv authentic passage in Thomas dealing directly with Tyrannicide \^ \\\ hS'^ CommenUtrn np(m the sentencef^.l In this passage he approves of the position of Cicero in his Ik Officiis, in which sanction is given to the murder of Caesar and in which the murderers are praised. In this case the powers are usurped by violence. The one who killed the tyrant is praised and re- ceives a reward. Thomas says the praise is not deserved because the act was not a praiseworthy one. Yet this passage was the basis of the doctrine of tyrannicide in the middle ages and especially in the sixteenth century. It does not however meet with the approval of Thomas, because he only re- fers to the incident, lie does not commend it. The best way to avoid tyranny is to choose a proper king at the first and to limit his government in such a way that there will be no occasion for falling into tyranny, sic tempcmtur po- * De Res- Vr\u. I. ti. t Expos. Arist. V. Wet. \. :3. * DeReg. Prin. I. fi. S flisq. 4. S. nu. 2.2. IfiO THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE test<(s nf tt/rannidem dc facile dcclinari non posslt.* Tliere are two possible cases of lyrynnj', (a) m^urpatione, (b) regiminc ov (idniinifttraHva per leges manifestc in jusias.'f 5. To 2^Tevent corrnptinn. The king should guard the people from tlie mis- use of office on the part of rulers and prevent his servants and officials falling into oppressive measures against the people. The sale of officer by the princes does not appear to Thomas to be unlawful, provided the purchasers seem capable of performing the duties of the office, and provided that the price of sale is not so large that it would amount to oppression or corruption. If this is not the case such a sale is improper for several reasons. It often happens that those who have ability to fill official positions are poor and can- not buy them. If they are rich they do not desire such positions and do not see any advantage in the acquisition. The result is that in the most of cases those persons get the offices who are of inferior ability and desirous of office and money. Of these it may be said that they oppress the subjects and do not care for the interests of the princes. It is therefore much better to select brave and capable men to fill the offices and If necessary to compel them against their will to do so. For by their bravery and zeal tho princes and subjects will derive greater advantage than through those who buy offices. Thomas permits an additional loan to the princes by the officers. When people lend. a prince money under condition that an office will be granted in return for it, this is without doubt a usurious traffic ( jieictnin usurarimn), be- cause they have for the loan the privilege of office. Thus the prince presents to them a chance of sinning and they themselves are forced to hold an office which they have used for gain. If however the prince has conferred the office without price and afterwards receives a l(»an from what the office has yielded there is no sin.J lie.Histance to the judgment of a ruler. One who is justly condemned to death is not permitted to defend himself. When however he is unjustly condemned, such a judgment is similar to a deed of violence by a robl)er. ''Her princes in her midst are like wolves, they rob the prey in order to shed blood, to get dishonest gain."? As it is allowed to withstand robbers, so one ought in such cases to oppose bad rulers, except it be to avoid a scandal (scandeduni) when a great- disturbance is to be feared as the result. || Confiscation. Restitution. Can those who were banished in consequence of schism demand their possessions from those who remained behind? Either they were justly banished, being guilty, in which case they cannot recover what they have lost by conliscation; or they were unjustly banished, without * De Reg. Prin. I. 0. + Ibid. I. B; 2a. 2ae. qu.42. 2; qu. 67. 1; la. 2ae. qu. 96. .5. $ Essay on Jews. Vol. XVI. pp. 293-29.5. Parma. § Ezek. XXII 27. II 2a. 2ae. Vol. II I. p. 259. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 361 guilt, and in an unlawful way, so that they can recover in this case their lost property. If tliey have a superior, then they must through him ask for the return of their property; if they have no superior then they can them- selves recover what they lost, if such restitution is possible.* When princes contrary to justice by their power take from others that which belongs to them they act unlawfully, commit robbery and are bound to give restitution. If princes exact from their subjects what justly belongs to them {dehetur) for the preservation of the community, it is not robbery, even if force be used: but if they extort what does not belong to them, it is robbery. Therefore they are bound to make restitution, the same as would be required of rob- bers, and their sin is more hsinous being more dangerous to public justice, because they are set to be theguardians of public right.f * Summa Theolog. Vol. IX. p. 627. + ibid. Vol. III. p. 257. 162 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CHAPTER IX. THE RELATION OF THE TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL. THE CHURCH AND STATE. 1, Temporal and spiritual power. The relation of the temporal and spirit- ual powers opens up one of the most difficult problems of medieval politics and furnishes us with the weakest part in Lhe political theory of Aquinas. Here Thomas leaves his ancient master, and in a sense departs from many of his former principles in order to crown the political structure with a the- ocracy. The general position he takes is that of the absolute supremacy of and consequently the temporal supremacy of the Church over the state and over all the states of the world. If kings and other rulers have a right to govern the states, God has a superior right over all rulers. God's rule over the universe is rendered manifest in the Vicar of Christ upon the earth. Earthly rulers govern to promote the earthly good of the states, but this is subordinate to the higher end of all men, eternal blessedness. God has en- trusted the power to guide into this eternal happiness to the priests over whom presides the Pontiff. The result of this theory is a confusion of the two cieties. the Church and state, and of the two powers temporal and spiritual, as also the twofold law which is administered in these societies. Tlie Church is a society similar to the political society or state, civitas per se sufficiens et unita* The divine law is ultimate and rulers in governing must have re- spect thereunto in order to lead Individuals and states alike to the ultimate end of life which can be secured only tlirough the Church. The Church is superior to the civil society and religious authority pre-eminent because of its end. The definite and final end of every man and society of men is not simply living according to virtue, but living according to virtue for the purpose of securing eternal life with (^od. Since it cannot be secured by tempornl me ins it does not belong to the temporal ruler to secure it, there- fore super-natural means must be used, gratia Dei vita aeterna. To bring men to this heavenly end belongs to the Divine ruler, the lord jbsus Christ, who by the ngency of his own righteousness and the sacraments of theChurcli prepares men for heaven. Although all disciples are kings and priests in th3 heavenly life, yet in the Christian community upon earth there is insti- tuted the priesthood, chiefly the successors of Christ and his Vicar, the High Priest of the Church, to whose charge the Christian kingdom is committed, * Psairn 45. m; Eph. IV. lect. 2; De Re)gnizod and he has forfeited the right to rule and enjoy his kingdom. Tiie sul)jects are then authorized 10 refuse him obedience and may recognize another ruler. The Cliurch does not tolerate other religions and all who have left the fold of the true Church are to be forced back by penalties of body and soul. Tlie rights of unbelievers in relation to tlie faith are peculiarly precarious because the Church can suspend these rights by her decision. 7 hose wlio have never l)een believers are safest, because vviMi their rights and privileges the Church is not concerned, only tlie believing nat ions may declare war against the in- * Sum. Cont. Gent. Vol. V. p. 'in". t 2a. 2ae. Vol. III. p. 9. Criticism of \(|iiiiiiis' Tlicory of Cliurcli and State. Kiolisrliam- mei', p. 4><()Sq.; Burri, c. VII. 1H8 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE ridel peoples if the.v refuse to suffer the preaching of Christianity in their countries. These views are represented and to be executed by the Pope. In general this is the doctrine of Thomas. Thomas does not allow to the Church the right to condemn and depose infidel princes. Here he draws a distinction. Infidelity is not in itself contrary to sovereignty for it is of hum- an law and comes from nature. On the other hand the distinction of believing and unbelieving is of divine right and springs from grace. And as divine right does not suppress human right, it does not belong to the Church to punish the unbelief of those who have never received the faith nor does it abolish the power of the unbelieving over the believing. Yet the Church which acts for God in the interests of religion ought to abolish such authority of unbelieving over believing, for it is detrimental to religion and infidelity destroys authority. In regard to those who have received the faith the Church has power in their relapse into infidelity to excommunicate them and release the subjects from their oaths of fidelity.* Apostacy entails along with it the destruction of authority. The example of Julian the apostate does not overcome this, because as yet the Church had not the power to re- strain princes and therefore subjects were permitted to continue in obedience in order to avoid a greater evil. In support of this position he cites the au- thority of Gregory VII. f This raises the question, in how far do Christians owe obedience to super- iors in the world? Faith in Christ is the principle and cause of righteousness, therefore faith in Christ does not abolish the regulation of righteousness, but establishes it. The ordinance of righteousness requires however inferiors to obey their superiors, otherwise the condition of human affairs could not con- tinue to exist. Therefore believers through faith in Christ are not released from the obligation to obey their worldly princes. Before thi-t, Thomas ob- jected, that the government by worldly princes is generally unrighteous, or has been in origin an unjust usurpation, and from this it would appear that Christians do not owe obedience to worldly princes. But, he says, man is only to obey worldly princes in so far as it is required by the ordinance of righteousness. When they have no regular government but are under a usurpation, or when what is unjust Is commanded, then the subjects are not bound to obey, except in peculiar circiimstances or to avoid great danger. J In regard to the distinction between Christians and unbelievers Thomas brings out the medieval conceptions in regard to the Jews. Through their guilt in regard to the death of Christ, they have fallen into endless slavery, but Christian mildness allows them to live together, and instead of being actual slaves they are domestic servants, servo^ tributarios. Only the tradi- tional duties may be demanded and no unusual obligations may be laid upon * 2ii. 2ae. yu. 10. 10. t 2ii. 2ae. cju. 12. 2. t 2a. 2ae. Vol. III. p. 380-1. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 169 them, because what is unusual produces unrest. The mistake committed by the Jews in Brabant who malte tlieir living by taking usury,— that is, all their possessions were according to the view of the time unjustly acquired— is to be taken along with the mistake of the princes themselves in the impo- sition of special taxes upon the Jew. To avoid possible disadvantage the Jews should be made to bear some burden, for it would bebetter to compel the Jews to work for the earning of their maintenance as they do in Italy, than that they should live without work and enrich themselves by usury.* Anoth- er question is. is it right that the Jews should be distinguished from Christians by the wearing of a sign? Here the answer is clear and in accor- dance with the decision of a general council. Jews must in some outward manner he distinguished from other people. This is also commanded in their law that on the four corners of their cloaks they shall make fringes to dis- tinguish thorn from others. This is the brand of their iniquity. t Many unl)elieving rulers have authority (rfommmm) over believers. If at the first establishment f)f the authority unbelievers are allowed to have pow- er over believers, it is not permissible to make such a bargain. Only danger could in this way come to believers, for it would be easy for them if they were under the jurisdiction of another power to change from those to whom they were subject. In a simili'r way the unbelievers would despise the be- lievers when they saw the defection in the position they occupied. Therefore the Apostle forbad believers to take their quarrels before unbelieving judges for settlement. So the Church does not allow unbelievers to rule over be- lievers or iti any way to be officially over them. The case is different when the establishment of power is already in existence. Here it ought to be con- sidered that authority and superintendence are exercised by the power of human law, the distinction between believers and unbelievers being of divine law. The divine right which is of grace does not abolish the human right whi(;h is of natural reason. Thus the government of believers by unbeliev- ers is not abolished by the distinction between believers and unbelievers. There can, however, by means of judgments and ordinances through the Church which has the authority of God be such an abolition of the right of governing, because unbelievers have lost through the guilt of unbelief power over believers, who have become the sons of God. Sometimes the Church does this, sometimes she does not. For unbelievers who in temporal matters are subject to the Church and her members, there is the ordinance of the Church. A slave who is a Jew is free without lecompense, through accept- ing of Christianity, If he was born a slave or if he had been purchased; if however he is again to be offered for sale his master must do so within three months. The Cliurch does no wrong here because the Jews are the slaves of the Church over whom she lias authority. Worldly princes have given many * Sumnia on Jews. p. 292-294. Vol. XVI. + ibid. p. 292-4. 170 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE laws concerning the freedom of subjects. For the unbelievers who in tem- poral matters are aot subject to the Church and her members the Church has no established rule, although she has the right to do as above in order To avoid offence, as the Lord showed in Matthew XVII. 26, that lie might t)e excused from pa.N ing tribute because tbp sons were free, but commanded tliat; the tribute be paid in order to avoid offence. So Paul when he says slaves should honor their masters, adds, "that the name of tlie Lord and his teach- ing be not blasphemed "* In reference to the relation of the Church to those who have never believed and to lieretics and apostates, he says, among un- believers who have never had the faith as heathens and Jews, such are in no wise to be forced, that Is, they are to believe of themselves, because faith is a matter of the will. There are however among unbelievers cases in which power should be used to compel them not to hinder believers, si adsit facnltas, but this is a case of protection afforded unbelievers. t .3. Intolerance. Inquisition. Persecution. If a believing prince has fallen away from the faith and denied the true Church of (Jhrist then he is to be refused recognition, having alienated his right of rule and his kingdom. In such a case the subjects have the right of revolt against him even more dis- tinctly than in case of tyranny. Naturally the Ecclesiastical autocrat will not delay to call forth positive insurrection or to pronounce sentence of ex- communication and formal removal. He who is an apostate and a heretic from the faith has incurred the penalty of death, if he can be reached by the inquisition, for there is to be no toleration granted to heretics and apostates but rather excommunication and the death-penalty. Such is the general doctrine of Thomas on this point. J An important question is, are unhelievers to he compelled to accept the true Christ- ian faith? Augustine asserted that a man can believe only willingly and that his will cannot be compelled in this matter. Jews and Gentiles therefore who have never received Christianity are not to be forced to accept of it and they are not to be subjected to wars or penalties by way of compelling ihem, unless they positively and openly hinder the progress of the Christian faith. But it is different In the cause of those who have accepted Christianity, for if they depart from their pr^ fession of faith, they may be subjected to corporal penalties in order to force them to fulHl their promises. Such is the /)oniiH- ican doctrine which {lave scope to the persecuting spirit in the middle ages, Thomas himself heing a Dominican. The Dominicans argued against the doctrine of Augustine, that to make a promise is an act of will, whereas to fulfil a promise is an act of necessity— to accept a faith is voluntary but to keep the faith is an f)bligatory act. Man becomes thus a creature of necessi- ty the moment he has by consent expressed his assent. Thomas in theory * 2a. 2ae. Vol. III. p. 44. t ibid. p. 42. ? 2a. 2ae. qu. 11. 1; qn. 12. 2. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 171 rpfultes and repudiates this distinction, holding that the spirit of God is the orii^inator as well as the sustainerof faith in man. But in as far as he was a Dominican he was bound by the fetters of this belief, and his tine distinction between believers and unbelievers is at bottom nothing else but this funda- mental principle which has been at the foundati(m of all the persecutions V)V the Church, in her false zeal and still more false idea of devotion to an unal- terable belief.* In the case of unbelievers who never accepted the faith no force is to be used because faith is of the will. There are among unbelievers cases in which power should be used to compel them not to retard believers, even by opeu persecution. F^rir this reason Christians frequently carry on war against unbelievers, not to force them to believe, but with the idea of compelling them to refrain from hindering Christians. There are also other unbelievers who at some time (g'MaHdo'/ue) liave received the faith and con- fessed it. as heretics and all apostates, these must be forced by means of corporal punishments {corporaliter) to fulfil what tliey promised and to retain what they once had.t Thomas declares these ideas in connection with the fundamental principle of the intercourse of believers and unbelievers. The Church does not forbid intercourse between believers and unbelievers who have departed from the faith they once received, as heretics do, or who deny it as apostates df). For against both of these tlie Church expresses her opinion in the penalty of excommunication. Tiiat which concerns intercourse with those who have never believed must be decided by circumstances, location of the persons, the transactions referred to (>)€yor/a), and the times. If they are strong in the faith so that their intercourse with unbelievers may restore them rather than that the believers may be turned away from the faith, their intercourse with unbelievers is not forbidden, that is, those who have not accepted the faith as heathens and Jews, and especiajly when compelled by necessity. If however the believers are simple and weal< in the faith and likely to be led astray, intercourse with unbelievers must be forbidden to them, and chiefly there must not be much of a contldential nature between them and no intercourse unless it is necessary. t Are the religious rites (n7u.s) of unbelievers to be tolerated":* These rites are to be tolerated in so far as they contain anything tluit is useful or true for believers, as those of tiie .lews which as prototypes, types of Christianity, witness on behalf of the Chi istian faith. On the other hand, rites of unbe- lievers which have nr» trutli nor anything useful in them are in no way to 1)6 tolerated, except to avoid an evil; for example, to avoid offence or disunion. {dismluum) whicli might ensue or to avoid a hindrance to the salvation of those persons in tolerating tilings which if tolerated miglit hringthem to the • Maurice. Hist, of Fhil. 1. tV'U si\. t 2a.2ae. Vol. III. p. 42. X ibid. p. 4a. 372 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE faith, for oftea the Chareh has tolerated the rites of heathen and Jews when the number, of unbelievers was large.* In principle, that is, there is no tol- eration, but for human expediency if it is likely to lead to salvation there is toleration. Thomas condemns the compulsory baptism of the children of Jews, and other unbelievers a. 'Hinst th<^ will of thoi- p-^rr^nts. The custom of the Church which i-^ to he followed in all c.it-es has uever sanctioned it. It would be contrary to ntif urnl justice and might yilace the faith in hazard, because the compulsory iiar>tistn of j^iowinu- persons wlio are easily led astray fromtheir parents results ill th'ir failiirj awity ay;iiti. h; cause the natural right of the child before it lias Llie use of reason is to be under the guardian- ship of its father. t Concerning heretics two things are to be observed, as to themselves -find as to the Church. Concerning themselves they, have sinned and deserve not r)nly to, be separated from the Church by suspension, but alsoio be excluded from the world by deatii, for it is very much worse to destroy Che faith in which is the life of the soul, than to counterfeit money by which the temporal life is forfeited. I{j,|iherefore forgers and other evil'doers are immediately con- demned to (^eath by the princes, with much more right should heretics who liave been convicted of heresy, be: not only ^excommunicated but put to death. inTegard toithe Church she has compassion and is desirous of the return of the erring and so does not immediately condemn him, bat only after a tlrst and second admonition. If he still cf)ntinues obstinate in his error, then the Church hopes no longer ff'r his return and has care for the salvation of others in that-she separates him from the Church by excommunication and hands him over to a worldly tribunal that he may be put out of the world by death [exterminandu7n\.X ■<-■•':■ The Church according to the connnand.of the Lord loves all, not only her friends, but her enemies and persecutors. It pertains to love, not only to wish well to a rieighbnr but also to de found in this, the social institutions of government were almost buried in the ruins of the llrst ten centuries, weak nations had per- ished, barbarian inroads had been checked, imperialism proved but an empty dream, and there was left only the ecclesiastical institution to rejjresent ad- vancing civilization; it usurped universal government, made itself or tried to make itself the imperialism of tiie world l)ecause no power was strong enongli to resist it, and it kept alive the organic unity of men at the expense of its own despotic career in preparation for the stable institutions of later cen- turies. Thomas is in spirit tolerant, but he is the master mindof tlic Churcli and the exaggerations of this part of liis theory may well lie pardoned in the * 2a. 2ao. qu. 10. 8. 9 10. 8 2a. 2ac. qu. 11. 3. t qu. 10. 8. II (ju. II. 4. t Gregor. Deer. Bk. VII. c. 13. ^ 2a. 2a'?. qu. W. 2. iic^ THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE remembrance of liis lidelity to political principles in other parts and in the thought that his genius kindled afresh the fires of liberty at the beginning of the middle ages. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 3 m CHAPTER X. ECONOMIC VIEWS OF AQUINAS. GERMS OF NATIONAL-POLITICAL ECONOMY. 1. Intrnduction. The account of Thomas's views would be incomplete with- out a presentation of his economic ideas. Thomas starts with the activity of human beings. Ee takes for granted a material basis for a state, desiring even the most beautiful location, that the citizens may have the gre itest possi- ble, pleasureandenjoy every facility for health and comfort. In order to make material provision for the wants of the community he prefers a strong agri- cultural state, in which the land Is fertile and productive, because commerce and trade introduce the selflsh, mercenary spirit and destroy the spirit of self-sufficiency which characterizes the best state. States should as far as possible produce what would support their own population and depend as little as possible on trade with foreigners, because foreign trade Is detrimen- tal to the customs and laws of a state. He maintained what are regarded as the founoation principles of modern state-civilizition, private property and tli(! family. Private property is not opposed to natural law, but an addition t')iton the basis of hnra-m right. T'rivate property arose chiefly from the desire to avoid the confusion involve!) in cr)mmon property and to encourage individual activity and iniii>i rv, b'>cause a man cares nnre for what is his own. Yet, the use of property should be common, because all have a right to bf supported out of the excess in other;' possessions. He acknowledges the value of wealth, and the excess of population i-; to l-e cheeked hy neces- sary rfgulations in reference to mairiage. The end of man's life is not wealth, nor power, nor property, btit a virtiioos life. Only in the state which is the highest form of human society, and in a national stnte, c;m man really be a man. The whole state-regulntion should be promoted as much as possit)le by the necessary subjection of every one: this state-regulition is specially manifest in the training and education of children for thesfite. The monarch (;ares for the individuals in the state as lie would for the members of his own bodv. Sta'e constitutions are change- able, depending upon the location, circumstances, culture of the slate; in the ideal state artisans, laborers and peasantfnr:n**rs are not citizens, but ITS THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE only the railitary and official marnbers who ma.'^t be laoded proprietors are real cit,iz?ns. The lower kinds of work, m inu:il labir and industrial opera- tions, are at a disount when compired with the higher occupations, railitary, scientific and contemplative. There is a division of lab')r, for the workman is naturally a servant of toil, and the virtuous mm a m ister of employment, and governor of states, cities, etc The nobili'i.y of virtue is above that of wealth, although the latter is generally the foundation of th3 former, be- cause of the natural advantages afforded for a higher forra of life. Slavery is a natural and necessary condition arising from tlie difference in the nature of men. and the result of sin. This marks off the population of the state in- to two classes, slave and free. The individual is merged In the state and the unity of the state is the great consideration in its p . 67S-9. ]80 THE PC^LITICAL THEORY OF THE ey, to avoid possible disadvantages they are to be compelled to bear the burden of toil and taxation in order that they may live honorably and honest- ly like other citizens. It is the duty of the state to provide for the wants of tlie memVters so that none shall suffer through lack of the necessaries of life.* Marriage. Thomas expressly defends the view of Aristotle that the women should marry at eighteen and the men about thirty-seven years of age. For, when we consider the good condition of the spouses and the good future condition of those whf) are to be brought up and consequently the general welfare of the state, it is better that this union should take place when the bodies of both parties are in a perfect condition. Circumstances may occur in which this union may take place earlier or later, in cases where the bodies have more slowly or more quickly developed, or where there has been im- moral intercourse (fornicatio cum aUenut) or something of that kind exists. Thomas says, some may i-efer to the Roman laws as against Aristotle, which gives as a rule that the common welfare demands that women should be twelve and men fourteen or thereabouts before marriage takes place. On the contrary Thomas objects, justice does not require that the marriage should take place when the male and female are lourteen and twelve years respectively, but that this is the earliest period at which marriage is com- petent, because at these years the earliest mutual cronscnt can be given by the use of their reason. f Thomas prohibits intercourse outside of wedlock, and only monogamous marriages are allowed. In the companionship of hus- band and wife, nature has for its aim the perfection of posterity; all sexual intercourse which takes place outside of that relation is against nature (m- naturalis).X The state is a society which has sufficient within itself to support life, and therefore the citizens should have a sufficiency and not be in poverty. The state must be on its guard to prevent want from coming into its midst. This may arise from its having too many children to inherit the patrimony. For when a large inheritance is divided among many children it is very small for each individual, especially whsn it comes to the third or fourth generation. Aristotle is dissatisfied (non placuif) with the law which gives to the first- born the entire inheritance. He would have the inheritance divided amon-,' all according to the Greek usage. Thomas regards the overthrow of the suc- cession law of nobility, as a proof of its impracticability. The reasonsfor the overthrow were, (a) the tirstborn is only one child, the later chidren are many and the consequence is the majority are poor and the few rich; (b) the owners of property are members of the state, non-owners are not, therefore the property must be in the hands of the citizens. If now the later children did • Sum. Jud. Vol. XVI. pp. 202 4. t Expos. Arist. Vol. XXI. p. GSO. t ibid. p. 689. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 181 not inherit a portion from their parents, the greater part of the children would not be citizens and so would be excluded from the state, (c) The later born children may be as fully qualfied by nature for doingr great things as the first born. If therefore they have no means with which to work, then they are forced to get means where they can find them [accipcre undenimque), by waylaying citizens and others, robbing and murdering them, or by com- bining with enemies and doing what is unprofitable and injurious. Are there any means to be used to limit the number of children? Thomas denies that Aristotle permits the use of abortion, since he only mentions the custom as prevailing in some nations. It is the opinion of Aristotle that to limit the population means should be taken to limit the males to the ages of between thirty-seven and fifty-five years, and the women from eighteen to thirty-seven years in the bearing of children: for both men and women arc then in their most perfect condition. For this reason and in this way not only are better children born but they are fewer in numbers {pmtcioref:).* State educntion. Thomas considers that the nurture of children belongs to the mother. Yet no one who has the right use of reason ran doubt that the legislator who esteems the welfare of the state must specially look after the education and regulation of the youth. To neglect to provide for the training of the young and to let them behave as they wish is to injure and destroy the state. Aristotle says that the legislature must have absolute control of the training of children and that it must not be left to others as is the case in many states, where each one cares for his own childron as seems best to him. so that one trains them in one way and another in a difTercnt way. Where the training is comuKm there is a commtm care, and pains are tMken with all. su''h as are appropriate to all. All in the state should have the same training and the same rational aim. Thomas does not follow Ari."-- totle fully. The text says, one cannot believe that amony the citizens each one is for himself (sibi esse) but that they all belong to the stato. In the ex- position Thomas puts it for himself alone, which rescues individuality, for althoutih it is for the state it is for himself also. It is to be observed, he says, that not only does a citizen belong to himself and exist for the snke of him- self (esse sni ipsius se)htm, neqve gintin sui), but that all belong to the state and arc for its snke: consequently the provisions and regulations for each ind- \idual citizen are made in respect of his relation to the entire state and its welfare. So the youth are to be provided for and regulated by the entire state, having for its aim the welfare of the community. For all that per- tains to youth must be measured and determined by its utility to the state in attaining its end, which is the perfect possession and use of reason. f The liberal sciences are those according to the ancients wliich dispr)se man to work and act according to rea.son. Those are illiberal sciences which • ibid. pp. ()88-88r. + ibid. pp. fl92-fia'>. 182 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE simply regnrd the welfare of the body and are called servile, because they are concerned with external good. Thomas wants only the liberal sciences, for it makes a difference what is the end for which one learns and practises science. If he does it to attain excellent virtue, then it is not illiberal, whether he seek to attain personal excellence or the good of others, for a friend is like a second self. If some one learns the sciences and is diligently engaged for the sake of others, it is different from the case of those who pursue them for the sake of advantage and external possessions, as do many lawyers and physicians: such is the work of an hireling and is servile. He who engages in science for the love of truth and virtue and for the love of benefiting others, without matcing it a source of greedy gain is worthy of praise.* He thus. em- phasizes the duty of the state to encourage learning and to provide for the education of all its members. Education proceeds on the basis of capacity. There are many so circum- stanced by nature that it Is dirticult for them to become good by education: this natural position which iscaiised by the condition of the brain at birtli gives an inclination towards good or evil, but such an inclination carries with it no necessity in regard to intelligent action. t A cliild imperfectly foimsd at birth is not fitted for intelligent activity or state life and is not to be ed- ucated with the same care as the perfectly formed children; but Thomas does not accept of the position of the ancient philosopher that such children are not to be reared, for Christianity has changed the view in regard to the pre- ciousness of human life.J His idea of state-education results from his view of the family. It is an imperfect society, not of itself self-sufHcient, but simply a part of the perfect community, the state, and subject to it. If the family master and head has a wide power over the females and cluldren in the household, he is in subjection to the power of the state, and acts as it were in the family circle as an official of the state, subject to the surveillance of the government. Progress. In the princij)le of education we find the predominatingclement is progress. It is natural to human reason to go from imperfect to perfect. We see in the speculative sciences the first philosophers have transmitted to their successors an imperfect knowledge, transmitted to them to perfect it. In the practical sciences it is the same. The first who considered the wel- fare of the human community created imperfect institutions which require much modification and enlargement by their successors.^ There is a natural progress among the sciences and arts among men, seen in the changes In human laws and institutions effected by human reason in conformity with the changeful circumstances of the times. Human nature audits capacity * ibid. pp. 696-7. + ibid. p. 60;^. * ibid. p. 682. 8 la. 2ae. qu. 97. 1. SCIIOOLMEIi! AND (JROTIUS. 183 for development is the basis of education and progress in laws and institu- tions. Tliis principle of elasticity applied to sciences, arts and human life is oneof the best features of an otherwise stiff scholasticism. At first man makes an invention and he transmits it incomplete for perfection by succes- sors.* The idea of imperfect and perfect as stages in human life and progress, a conception applied alike to the hierarchy of Church and State, gives the possibility of constant development. Humanity is compared to a single man who in childhood received from the divine Being a law suitable to his life, to the feebleness and insufficiency of childhood, to the vigor of youth arid to the perfect constitution of manhood. t The ancient law was not absolute- ly perfect, it is perfect according to the time and circumstances, suitable to the age and condition of the people. The law of Mose« in like manner was perfect in its suitability to the Hebrews, forming the intermediate link in the chain that had as its first link the revelation of nature and as its last the revelation of grace. Therf is thus a natural progress in the evolution of law conformed to the evolution of man and to the environments of human life. Progress is led by man for human ri'ason is the captain; it is limited by man for mans circumstances condition it; and it is perfect at each stage for in man's perfection it secures its perfection. In this view the whole theory of Thomas occupies its natural place in the historic development of truth. 3. Wealth. Taxation. Money. On the subject of money the works of Aris- totle presented materials for attacking the abuses of the middle ages. The coins were depreciated by the arbitrary action of the rulers who appropriated to themselves the difference' iu value in the coins which they put in the mar- ket and the standard measure. Aquinas is the first to make such an attack upon political abuses of the currency. The king or whoever has tlie right to rule ouglit to see that proper money is used ana that the weights and meas- ures are of the proper standard. Tlie s|)ecial use which money serves is that it is a standard by which value is measured. It is tl)e rule of measurement in prices and as there is a natural price for mai kclable commodities th-i standard ought to be fixed and rigid. If v;i lues arc changeable at the pleas- ure of the prince then the comm Mce of the state is leduced to the arbitrary will of the ruler and money is no longer sacred. Money is of value because it is an index ot price.! Money i.re, unless for the reasons named above, and when it is for the good of all. The seventh question was, when your officers have unlawfully (a7w7»c./M?7.s ordine) extorted from the subjects that wliicii comes into your hands, or per- haps does not, what ought you go do? If it has come into your liands, you should restore it to the persons, if possible or spend it for some pious purpose, or for the ccimmon go'id, if you cannot remit it to the particular persons. If it lias not come to your hands, then you must compel your officers [cnmpcUvrc) to make a similar restitution and also when the persons cannot be found from whom it was taken, for the officers should gain notliing by their wicked acts, they mustgive itup, and you must severely punish tliem for their injustice, so that in future they may abstain from anything of the kind. Thus the sub- * Aqnin. Opcr, Uonio. Opusculao XXI. qu. (i. 7 in Vol. XVII; Piirmii Ed. Vol. XVI. p. 292-94. + EzoU. XXII. 27. ISfi THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE jects are to be protected from arbitrary oppression at the hands of the king's othcers. 4. rsiiri/ an:] Reasonable J'ricc. {I) Uxury. With Dominican strictness he condemns thf tai; Politics. I. .5. fi. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 187 price for tlic use of money which is called interest is not lawful, and since a man is bound to return what lias t)een unjustly acquired he is under obliga tion to return money received as interest. On the other hand an appeal cannot be made to human law. for human laws allow often a sin to Ro unpun- ished on account of the condition of imperfect men, in which many advan- tages would have to be given up if it were decided to accompany all sins with punishment. Consequently human law has permitted interest, not because it is believed to be according to right, but that men may not be deprived of whatever advantages it hns. In opposition to the , first of th-e above arguments in favor of interest, it is said, he who is not hound to lend can require a restitution of what ho has given, but he cannot demand anything morp. It must be a return according to the equality of right, if one is to receive the same as he lent. If he in ad- dition requires .lom^thing more for the usufruct of the article, which has no use apart from the consumi)tion of its substance, he may require a price for that which is not in existence at all. and such a reiiuirement is therefore un- just. Against the .second argument Thomas says, the cases are not alike, because the chief use of gold and silver vessels is not their consumption. Therefore their use can bo bought with the reservation of their property, just as the dominium of a house is retained when it is rented. There is also a secondary use that can be made of gold and silver vessels, when there is a lack of money they m;iy be used in exchange: in such a case it is illegal to take anything for the use of them. Similarly there is secondary use of coin, when one makes over coined money for displaying in a shop, or a deposit for a pawn. It is lawful to sell such a use of money bec:iuse the domitiium is reserved.* May there be an evasion of the prohibition to take interest? Is it lawful to ask a profit under any circumstances for a loan of money (comnioditas)'? It is answered, (a) every one is allowed to provide for his indemnification. Many suffer damage through lending monev. Therefore it is lawful for any- one besides collecting the loaned money to exact (mgere) something to recoup for damages sustained, (b) Everyone is bound in honor to do what is i)loas- I'ng. In this case it seems lawful tliat the reoeiver should consider himself bound by what is according to natural right, 'c) He removes himself from his money wholends it more than he who entrusts it iconnnitHt) to a mer- chant or trader {artifici). One can however receive gain from money which has been given to a trader, therefore one may also receive gain from loaned money, (d) For money that is deposited one may take a pawn, the use of which can be sold fftr a price: for example, when a field or iiouse that is inhabited is given in pledge. Therefore one may receive gain from a loan of money, (e) It often happens that one in case of a loan [ratimw mntui) sells his article dearer or buys it cheaper than he could otherwise, or on account r>f delay the * 2a. 2ae. qu. 7iK. 1y reason of haste tVvc price may be lowereri. In all tliopo rases tlie reimbursement should be equal to the loss sustained by the loan of money. This seems lawful. It seems also lawful to demand a profit for loaned money, provided it do not amount to extortion. In opposition to all these reasons given in favor of taking interest there is this that is said of what a just man should require of another, "He that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, hath executed true judgment between man and man.'"* Thomas distinguishes between the reasons given in favor of U'Jury and the contrary reasons. As all money is just whose price can be ywid with inoney. he sins against righteousness who for a loan of money or something else re- ceives what has been consumed in use and ,i price for itand is silent in regard to the matter of having received more. If however he receiver scmiething he did not demand, not by reason of his own silence or express agreement with the other, but as a free gift from the other, he does not sin. for bef'^re he lent the money he could have received somethinyr as a present. ;ind he lias not dune wrong in lending the money and taking a present after the loan. A return of what cannot be purchased with money may be required for the loan {exigere). for example, gond will and love for those to whom a loan is made and something of that kind. Asrainst the. /??•«« argument above Thomss says, whoever makes a loan can, without sin in the agreement with the receiver of tlie loan, bargain for resti- tution for damages according to wliat is right {debet); for that is not selling the use of money, but avcuding injury; and it is possible the receiver of the loan avoids a still greater iniury than the lender does and to the receiver offsets [compciimtin) tlie profit of the one ayainsr. the damage sustained by the other. But reparation ff»r the damage in so far as it can be taken into ac- count, and as the lender gets no gain from the money, is implied even though it is not brought into the agreement. To the aecond, he replies, ^according to strict justice the receiver of a loan of money or other perishable goods is not to be bound to more than a simple return of wliat i'^ !)orrowed. To the fifth he replies, the lender conveys the propert;y of mpney to the receiver, there- fore the receiver has the risk agd is bound to return the sum in its entirety liut no more. He who however entrusts his money to a mercliant or trader in the form of a trading society {socictas) does not make the money over to him, but it remains with liim in property, so that tiie merchant does the bus- iness at his own risk and also the risk of the trader and he can lawfully require a part of the gain. To the sixth he replies, when any one has pledged an article for a loan of money which can be valued in money, he must con- sider tlieuse of the thing in the arrangement of the loan; if he does not, it is tlie same as taking interest for his loan, and it is like the customary usage among friends to give tlie use of an article without compensation as when a * Ezck. XVIII.R. SCnOOLMET^ AND GROTIUS. 189 book is borrowed. Ilespectiriif the seventh he says, when one wants to sell his article dearer than the just price, waiiinj? a time for the purchaser to paj', this is a clear case of desire to take interest, because such a waiting for pay- ment is a deferred payment and falls under the class of loans. What therefore is the just price for the deiay is ecjual to the price f<(r a loan and Is tlie same as taking interest. It is similar when the purchaser wants to buy an article cheaper tlian its just price because he pays the money before the article is delivered to him. It is also the same as taking interest, because it falls under the category of loans, since a price is taken for the article whicli is subtracted from its just price. If however one will remit part of the just price in order to get his money sooner he has not committed the sin of tak- ing interest.* Is it lawful to lend money on interest? No man may lead another into sin, hut it is lawful to use tliesins of others for good, because God uses the sins of all men for some good purpose. In the present case it is not lawful to mislead, by lending money for interest, but it is lawful in the case of one who is prepared to do it to take a loan in the interest of so.nethlng good, for example, for the assistance of one's own or a stranger in time of need, or if ofU' has fallen among thieves to relieve the goods he has which is the sin of tlie robbers when they take them, his aim being to secure that he be not killed himself. t One may under certain circiimstances deposit money with a usurer. If any one entrusts his money to a usurer who has not already oth- er mrtney from whicii interest accrues, or entrusts it to him with the object of getting protlt by usury he creates an opportunity for sinning and himself t;ikespart in the sin. However should any ftne entrust his money toa usurer v\ ho already hling to the Kimi- an law of res fungihilis and res infungibUix, the former being the subject-matter • ibid. pp. 280-281. + ibid. pp. 282-283. ^ * Ibid. p. 283. 9 De Usuris, c. 6. ]Uu THE POLITICAL TITKOKY OF THE of an obligation returnable in the same kind, quantity or measure, the latter requiring the return of the specific subject; also between rps coi?,swwjj/i/;^//.s arifl imonsumptibilis, the former being^ consumed in use, the latter reuiainiug iri substance after the use is eXhau; ted. In the case of infungibiles and incon- sumptibilcs the use is different from the thitjg itself whereas in the fuvgibile^ and consumptibiles the use and the thing are indistinguishable. Money is used for exchange purposes and is con.suinptib't7is et fungibilis; therefore in lending money when the moneyis returned all is returned that belongs to the lender, the price for the use being unlawful and lience called, usura, prctium n^-iis. ' l\. Justum pretium. Beaaonable prke. There wa.s no market cotnpet.ition to'determine the price of goods. The government deemed it in the interest of all parties to prevent such competition in the buvin-i Mr>d selling of com- modities; the theologians supported this idea of the times, on the ground tint such variations in price from the reasonable or natural value were fraudulent and to be^pr'evcnted. The result was that by state-oidinance regulations were ordained fixing the reasonable price of marketable goods, so that tlx; markets became a department of national administraiiim. In Aquinas we find the best and fullest statement of the thcoi'v of reason- able pricie prevalent in the middle ages; for this reason we give a full account of. his theory. Question I. May any one lawfully sell a thing for a gnater price tiuin he paid for if? Is it permissible to sell anything for more than its vaiueV He gives tlie reasons alleged for the supposed permission, (a) It is in harmony with the civil law upon which justice is based, (b) Everyone is anxious to purchase clieap and to sell dear, (c) If any one receives a gift from a friend and feels bound to make a return for it, what is given in return must be measured by tlie benefit conferred. Now the benefit may be of more value than the substance of the gift. If it is permissable to do tiiis in the case of friendship, it is also allowable in case of a sale. Against this per- missibility he alleges, that the gospel commands, •'whatsoever ye would that men do to you do ye likewise unto them." No one wishes to pay more for a thing than its worth. To buy or sell for more than the worth is not allowable, because if it were by fraud it would besinful. Buying and selling iscarried on for the benefit of the community, that is, of the contracting parties: that wliich is done for the benefit of the community, of contracting parties, must not be done more ff)r tlie oppression of one than of another, and there must therefore be an equality in the matter of business between them. Commerce can only be of equal advantage to both if each orie gets his sliare of the equal value. The thing will be rated according to a given price, and when the price is greater than the value of the article or the article of more value than the price the equality of justice is annulled. Therefore it is unjust and un- lawful to sell dearer or buy cheaper than the worth of a thing. There are peculiar circumstances however to be considered; for example, when buying and selling is profitable to one and disadvantageous to another, as when SCITOOLMKTs^ AND GROTiUS. 191 some one desires a thing very much and another is a loser by parting with it. In this case tlie just price will be, not what the thing sold appears to he valued for, but the value jjks the loss which the seller sustains by the sale. In this case compensation for damage may be demanded. Also a thing may be sold dearer than its wo^rth, as well as for less than its worth to tlie owner. If however one issatisfi3d with the thing he has leceived and on tlie other liand the seller hassufferea no wrong, when he parts with it lie must not ov- ersell isiqjen-cndere), because the advantage whicli comes to the ether is not from what is bought, but proceeds from theposil ion of the buyer. No one may however sell what does not belong to him although he can sell to him the dariiage he sustains. He refutes the three arguments in favor of ])ermitting to sell for more than the just value, (a) Just price is a matter of conscientious duty, not a legal matter. Ilunjan law was given to the people among wliom were many who had departed from virtue. It was not given merely to the virtuous. There- fore human law has not forbidden e\'erything that is contrary to virtue: it is enough if it forbid vy'i'it disturbs the common social life of men and tends to break up society. Other things have been permitted (haheat quasi licita), not because they were reasonable, but because they were i;iOt. punishable. So then if the matter does not h'»d to punishment, the case is allowed wliere the seller witlumt drceitoverbuys, or the buyer underbuys (huys too cheaply) the ex- cess will ih'^n b:' too great, because tlien the human law presses for a restitu- tion; for example, when anyone is cheated to the amount of half the price. 'J'he divine law does not let those go unpunished who act contrary to virtue. Therefore it would be according to the divine law, not to permit in buying and selling, a failure in the observance of the equality of justice, and this failure has done much to establish what is detrimental in cases wliere the damage is considerable [notahile). (b) The fact that a vice is common to all does not make it just,, because the masses are generally vicious, (c) The justice demanded in commerce is different from the virtue of friendship. In the case of commerce there is demanded e(iuality in the things themselves, in friendship it is equality in the quality of tlie virtue or rclati(msliip. While a just price is the true value, it is not d^^'stroyed by a slight varia- tion, because just value depends up-ui ;in esiimale. so that a slight addition or subtraction does not abolish tli(> e(iuality of jlis dear, eitlier sells it atjove its value or buys it below its value, both of which are unlawful, (c) As Jerome sa vs. one should avoid aclerfervman who out of poverty becomes rich: so (uie ouglit to l)e avoided as something pestilent wlio becomes rich among the laity. It is lawful Aquinas admit-; to engage in trade butrmly u« provide the necessaries of life. It belongs to traders to m ike an excliange of possess- ions. According tr» Aristotle,* there is a double exchange ut to keej) it, and then f(tr some cause sells it, it is not trade, even if it be sold dearer. One can do this lawfully, either because. he has improved it or because the price of the article had risen from a ctiange of tii) powers andof necessity the si)iritual is the su- perior. This superiority is not simply moral and religious, it is political also, because all power rests in the representative of Jesus Clirist, the Sole King and Priest of the world.* Temporalis jurisdiciio princqium per spiritunlem Petri et successor am, ejnx. Jurisdiction is the test of superiority as Thomas himself * De RoK. Prill. III. Ki. 12- If,. 1% THE POLITICAL THEOKY OF THE "•a} >.jH r jnrisiUvluim lit CDnstilnitur nli^stern Empire tf> Pope Sylvester, the translation of the empire from the East to the West, from the Greeks to the Germans by Adrian, accomplished under the author- ity of the Papacy, the deposition of emperf)rs by papal power, chiefly that of Childeric III. by Zechariah and the crowning of Pepin, the elevation to the empire of Otho IV. by Innocent III. and of Frederick by Honorius. The early pagan Emperors were in revolt against the kingdom of God and for a time persistently persecuted it: but reparation was made when C mstantine placed himself in subjection to Pope Sylvester. All the Emperors after Con- stantiue with the exception of the Apostate Julian were in submission to the spiritual power, until Charlemagne was advanced to the Emperorship fty the authority of the Pope. When the Greek Emperors became too feeble to de- fend the Church against the barbarians tiien it became necessary to seek new lieutenants. If the papal power could institute and remove the repre- sentativesof the temporal power then the spiritual has absorbed the temporal within itself, becoming the embodiment of that single sovereignty which Jesus Christ has established upon earth, which alone has supreme power of judgment over monarchs and subjects alike. History therefV)re establishes that the pontifical power is abrjve all others and that the Pontiff is in the temporal order as he is in the spiritual -'le mi des rot.s."| As there is but one supreme power so there is in human -society and human life but one great end, eternal salvation and virtue. In such a theocracy politics becomes entirely subordinated to the Church- power. Monarchy is no longer regarded as the government of the single wise man in political virtue, it is the only lawful government having the di- vine sanction. Subjects are to be in obedience to the kings who are unlimited 4 Sent. dis. 18. gu. 2; 19. qu. 1. + DeReg. Prin. III. 10. * ibid. III. 10. 16. S Kranck, Pub. et Rt'f. Moyen Age. p. 68. SCIIOOLME?^ AND GROT! US. 197 in power and prerogative, save by the pontiff. Servitude marks off the two classes of men, those fitted to command and those competent only to obey, slavery marking the degradation of sinful men who have by fall been de- prived of freedom.? Thus reason, scripture and history unite in giving their unanimf)us testimony on behalf of the papal supremacy over all temporal as well as spiritual power. At that time it would seem as if history did confirm tliis opinion. Tiie Empire may be said to have ex- pired with Frederick II. who was declared deposed by Innocent III. A.t the time when Thomas wrote his book the title of King of the.Rf)mans and Imperator was claimed by two candidates and it was not till the begin- ning of the 14th. century that a new Emperor was crowned. Consequently before the opening of the 14th, century it seemed as if the spiritual power had conquered and merged in it.«elf the temporal authority, as a Universal Emperorship, over and above the petty national states of the civilized world, as the arbiter of tlie peace and the basis of unity in the states of Christendom. As Pf'Ole suggests, this idea of a spiritual imperialism indicates that the fol- lowers of Aquinas had learned what civilians did not know, ''that the world had outgrown the imperial conception." A revolution was at hand in tlie political relations of the P^uropean states, tlie results of which were to Vtefelt during the next five hundred years in preparation for the downfall of tlie spiritual imperi ilism, that upon the ruins of pagan and spiritual empire there might be reared up the statehood of nationality, only vaguely dreamed of as a vision in the dark night of ages in the mind of Aquinas. A people that values its free institutions will not forget that the saint and scholar of the 13th. century is tlie bridge between tlie old and the new. and that he saw the light although he could scarce disti^nguish it amid the darkness which sur- rounded decaying institutions, and that in his writings there are found germs of that newer condition of things which he cfuild not see clearly, be- cause bound by the cliains of the old order. We reverence the genius of tliat political philosopher who ranks next to Aristotle, if not above him. 2. Close. Tliomas properly belongs to tlie philosophical school of ixiiitical philosophers. His political theory pur- and simple, divested (»f all its in- tricacies, is based upon tlie law of nature whicli presents the social condi- tion of men and places organized society under the natur.il hier.ircby of government to perfect its being. Tlie consequence is that experience, tra- dition and history play only a small part in the process of upbuiMiny. and that the principal weight is given to autho.'ilies as expressing the universal sentiments of man. conformed to nature anl reason. Yet the actual events of the day and theconllicting issues of the time color the !()gical and meta- physical conceptionsof iiis writings. Tiie De lt;(jimiue Piinfipum is a standing witness to the fact tliat the political (luestions of the day are treited witli fairness, and tiiat the customs and institutions of the time are thoroughly S Ibid. 111. irs(!. I'lS THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE iindtM-stood by hiui. He does not, it is true, concern himself with everything that got^s on around, otherwise his book would have been full of stirring rem- iniscences and interesting details. The missing links and the lacunae in the work of Thomas are many: he takes no notice of representation, except in stating that the supreme power represents tlie people, gives no account of the assemblies of the people, takes no notice of tiiat idea of imperialism which was beginning to gatlier togetiier itsforci-s in liis own day for tlie struggle with the spiritual power, —all this is explained liy the fact tiiat science to Thomas is contemplative and profoundly speculative. This is all the more natural, wlieu we consider that he combined in iiimself the conceptions of the great Master of antiquity, the sentiments of Christianity gathered from the sacred writings, and also in a lesser degree the teachings of tlie canon and civil systems of law. The sacred writings and the doctrines of \i istotle iiold a cliief place, buti he is not ignorant of tlie civil law, allhouiih it lias been asserted by some writers .that he never shows any knowledge of it. It was in imitation of the glossators tliat tlie Summa was first introduced and even through canon law he could not be ignorant of the Roman Jurisprudence. His conceptions of rigiit, justice and institutions are Aristotelian, showing a marked veneration for antiquity and ancient ideas, not surpassed in the renascence, of classic literature. It was the age of revival and that revival gave to the political ideas of the time an antique cast repeatecr in all the writers of medieval ages. The political science of Aegidius Romanus the publicistof French monarchy, of Bartolus the civil jurist, and of the Spanish Jurists— all present the same ideas of antiquity which had first received ex- pression in occidental language in Aciuinas. One result of this was the freedom which.always attached to political ideas inherent as it was in the politics of the Greek republics; such doctrines as the sovereignty of the people, the illegality cif tyranny and the right of re- moving a tyrant kept alive the spirit of independence that was to struggle with the absolute monarchies of later centuries. And there was not only the old; the e(iuality and fraternity which entered into the conception of justice, as a Christian idea, forms in Thomas the connecting link with the newer civilization of social order such as the 17th. century developed. He commends the new order of ('ivilization in preference to the old because it rules by love, not by coercion, but this new law which he describes as, lex nova is super veterem addere non dclmit circa exteriora agenda.* Thomas falls short here in the judgment ne has formed. The law of sal- vation, as he conceives it, makes no change in temporal things, save in introducing them entire into the supernatural, spiritual order. He did not conceive of a Christian politics or a Christian state, on parallel lines with a Christian theology and a Christian Church, each equally independent. His politics becomes adepartment of theology, and his state a part of the Church. * la. 2ae. qu. 108. 2. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 199 Had he adopted the idea of a (Jhristian state, purified as the Church from ancient errors, of a Christian politics elevated ahove partisanship, tyranny and bigotry, and made socially as well as morally just, without transferring these in toto to the sp>iere of religion and the Church, his view would have been complete. The keynote of his error is sounded in the words quoted above. Despite his errors and mistakes, we honor his genius and revere his memory as the Aristotle of the new dispensation, occupying as lie does a de- servedly high place in the temple of political fame.* * Fi;inck. Moycn age. pp. ?9-69; M. .Tourdain. La Philos. flo St. Th. d'Aquin. 2 Vols. Paris. ISoS; Kiezlcr. Die Litoraiischeii Widcrsachor dor PapstL-, pp. 37-:i'.l; Poolo. Illu.str. of Hist, of Medio 'al Thoufiht. pp. 240 .sij. 200 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE PART III. POLITICAL THEORY OF THE LATER SCHOOLMEN. CnAPTER I. .EGIDIUS ROMANUS AND TRIUMFO (TRIUMPHUS). I. The Middle Ages have been called the age of the Christian Theocracy. It was not a pure Theocracy in the same sense in which the antique system of Egypt or the modern system of the Jesuits in Paraguay may be character- ized as pure theocracv, for the temporal power was always in a measure self- existent and self-controlling, however much subjected to thespiritual power. Yet, although not distributed nor guided by the spiritual power the tempor- al power was in a great measure the instrument and tool of the Church. But in the sense in which religious power is brought in, more or less, in the di- rection of the affairs of the temporal state, it is true of these ages, that theocracy did prevail. Catholic Europe in these ages may be viewed as one immense theocracy, for if a certain independence was enjoyed by the two powers, in ultimate resort that hierarchy whose head possessed the power of benediction, excommunicatiftn, and dispensation, whose members ranked as a spiritual aristocracy in the temporal state, and whose judicial power was felt in the Inquisition as well as in temporal affairs of a testamentary and marital character, could not but claim a certain precedence. This question divided the political writers following Aquinas into two schools, the advocates and the opponents of the theocracy. It is on this point alone that the great philosophers of the later middle ages have an indepen- dent opinion. It was a problem unknown to the ancient world. The question therefore of supreme interest, outside of what we have seen to be the uni- versal politics of the school as set forth in Aquinas, is, has the papacy supreme temporal power as well as spiritual, or what power has it? The Church and its defenders have entered the discussion, as they allege, by SCHOOLMET*^ AND GROTIUS. 201 supernatural right, and they have failed to solve the problem because they treated it as a problem of theology, a matter for the consideration of Church- men, rather than a question of social humanity. It is in this age in the vehemence of the spiritual supremacy theory and in the opposition that sprung up from tiie. very heart of the Church itself that we date the beginning of the freedom of politics from theology, little by little accomplished as the people and the popular will come upon the scene in the struggle hitherto confined to the pope and the Emperor. It is when the people begin to be regarded as a third party that the new era opens. There arise the questions of liberty, equality, freedom of thought, and in the discussion of these the foundations of political independence are laid upon natural law, preparing the way for the establishment of the modern state upon the citizenship of man, not upon the dictatorship either of pope or emperor. This change was accomplished by three potent factors, (a) The assertion of national consciousness, [n the struggle between the empire and the Cliurch two nationalties were developed both of which manifested an independent attitude towards the papal claims. Th^se were Eagland and France whicli became powerful I'jonarchies. Neither of the two kingdoms were closely al- lied t ) Rome, and in both the clergy under the royal direction manifested an independen.t spirit, while the kings and the people claimed the rights and liberties of nationality, (b) Imp3rialisai had become little more than a dream. At the best the imp3rial dominion was purely accidental. At tiiis time Imperatorship of Rome is simply a title and at most a dignity, without even the semblance of p)wer. Its holder is the sovereign of a principality and it is because of precedent national s:)vereignty that he is elected to the emperorship. In the matter of leiislatlve, executive or judicial power he is really nonest. (c) In the decline of the Empire the Clinrch is gradually as- serting her supreme preroi^atives, not as a Church, but as a state, finally to rank as one state among many states. The papacy had reached its zenith in Innocent III. In the struggle of Philip the Fair with Boniface VIII., French nationality comes to the front and combats an imperial papacy as well as an imperial empire, b^queathin,' to the Kingdoms of Eiiroi)e as a re- sult of that struggle, the idea of independent nationhood. The papacy had attempted to i)olsLer itself up by false spiritual pretensions, false writings and by diplomatic intrigue. This three-fold foundation of papal claims became the subject of an attack by some of the clergy themselves, and also by the defenders of universal tem- poral empire. Hence we have in these succeeding centuries the preparation for the reformation, in the discovery by members the Church as well as by others, of the untenable character of the church's position in the liglit of reason, history and the nationality of the kingdoms of Europe. Wyclif in England, Savonarola in Florence, Rienzi in Rome, Huss in Bohemia, are the _r,-2 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE representatives of that spirit, called by the Church heresy, but stirred up by the church herself at the first through the indefensible claims and preten- ti(.ns of Boniface YIII. and John XXII. In the struggle carried on by these two Popes we have political philosophy represented in Aegidius Romanus and August! nus Triumphus. In later times Ockham, Marsilius and the poet iJanto represent the freer spirit that inscribes itself upon the political phil- osophy, the schoolmen, as they oppose the power that claims to give and withhold temporal dominion at its pleasure.* 2. Aegidius Romanus, or Colonua, or Gilles of Rome, 1250-1316. He was a member of the order of St. Augustine, and attended to the teaching of phil- osophy and theology as a follower of Aquinas with such distinction in the University of Paris that he received the appellation of most profound Doctor. He attracted the attention of the King of France, Philip III., who made him tutor to the young heir, after Philip the Fair. He wrote his chief political thesis in imitation of his master Thom is, entitled Dz Rzyimine Principum, as a book of instruction to his royal pupil. In 1285 Philip the Fair succeeded to the French monarchy. Aegidius became Archbishop of Bourges, and died in 1316, leaving on the monument to his memory the noble inscription, hix in lucem reducens dubia, light bringing to liglit dark things. t His work is perfect in form and its arrangement is scientific. . 1. Ethical basis of political theory. In philosophy Aegidius laid the founda- tion for his political theory. There is a human science or philosophy quite distinct from and independent of divine revelation, which has as its primary source reason. Authority is not the primary, but only a subordinate basis of philosophy, and only a secondary source insofar as it conforms to reason. Non credimiis philosophos nisi guatenus rationabiliter locuti su7it.X He sets such a higii value upon reason that even apart from revelation it is possible to secure salvation from condemnation through natural 1 ivv, p'ytidt salvariin leye- iidturae. Reason is the basis of human freedom.^ Hs De Reg. Print, is a general treatise on natural law as applied to the re- lations of the individual, the family, the state, in whicli hedevelopcsa three- fold clissitication of government according to these three societies and king dnms. The first book treats of monastics or ethics in their application to the conduct of princes, consisting of a subtle blending of Aristotelian ethics and ciiristian principles. In the second book he treats of the economics of the family, in relation to property and slavery, master and servant, male and fe- male, parents and children. In the third book politics is treated of, in which he sets forth the fundamental conceptions of .society, government and obed- ience, in presenting the relations of the government and the state, citizens, * Poole, pp.*243 sq.; Janet, Vol. I. pp. 475-485. + Bulacl Hist. III. p, 671; Satninaj-than in Gall. Christ. I. p. 17J. r Ma?. Lent. I. II. qu. 1. 2. S ilnd. qu. 1. 2. SCHOOLMEIS^ AND GROTIUS. 20:^ and rulers, governors nmong themselves, and lastly the relations of war and peace within the state and in the state's public relations with other states. In this book we have the outline of a complete treatise upon the laws of na- ture and of nations, professedly based upon human reason independent of theology, but like all the works of the 13th century based largely. desi)ite the author's profession to the contrary, upon authority. ;Still it is an honest attempt to give an independent accountof a new science. In the first book the author views individual morality as an indivisible totality, consisting of goodness and virtue. He applauds Aristotle for plac- ing contemplation above activity, atid consequently virtue aiiove pleasure. According to him activity is feeble and even to be avoided as perilous un- less it is actuated by goodness and charity. The ancient philosophers do not set up charity, because felicity i^ said to consist in acting prudently in as far as the act is impelled by love. It is not enough for princes and kings to seek goodness in pleasures, riches, honors, not even in civil power which .sees the subjects in obedience to liis authority; not even in the riglit exercise of power is happiness placed because tliis leads to fortitude not to justice, whereas justice is greater than fortitude: the soul of a ruler ought to seek the highest good in the contemplation of truth and in the acts of prudence in the political life, vivitied b> the love of God, for the l^.|| Con- jugal society is natural to man not only because human nature demands it for its continuation, but also because the species is divided into male and female, the one being fitted for active work out?ide and the other for home- work.'] Marriage is indissoluble in the interest of the spt)uses, because apart from such a relation fidelity is impossil)le; and in tiie interests of the off- spring for their upbringing.** Marriage ought to be monagamous, because neither husband nor wife is respected under polygamy, and the children are not well raised. The birds give to man an example of solicitude for the wel- fare of offspring. Kings ought more particularly to respectjmarriage.ft So also ought wivt'S to be content with one man, and marriage ought not to be * ibid. 0. 10. S II. i. 1-3. + ibid. c. 11. II ibid, c r> and (i. . t ibid. I.iii and ilii. 1 ibid. c. 7. ** ibid. c. 8. t+ ibid. c. 9. SCEIOOLMET^ AND GROTIUS. 205 of near kin because marriage destroys the respect existing between certain degrees and also because a man ought to increase his circle of friendship in- stead of limiting it by marrying a relative.* This is the first defence of monogamy on the ground of human nature and human reason. In the choice of a wife, chiefly in case of a king, tlie liusband ought to see thai she is of noble race, as well as a splendid physique, and having m my friendly alliances as a plurality of riches. f Aegidius's sentiments of women are those of a man devoted to the monkish life of a cloister. J It is the men who are to rule the house. Tliey are uot to take counsel with their wives unless in cases when prompt action is needed. The husband is not to confide in her secrets.?* Yet, he is to treat her as a companion, uxnrem non se habere ad viruno quasi servam sed quasi sociam.W 2. The position of parents and children determines their respective duties. In giving life to another a parent undertakes to provide for its necessities, to educate it and protect it from danger, till it is able to look after itself. This obligation gives him as parent power to command obedience. Kings are specially anxious to govern their children for their intelligence and good- ness and for the good of the kingdom, bt'Ciuse a kingdom is good only when those in it are good.^l Paternal rulp originates in love such as induces chil- dren to obey.l This rule of love is specially concerned in (he instruction and discipline of the young. The system of educati«)n Aegidius recommends is that f(Mind in the Univer- sities of his own age, the tririum and quadrivinm. In addition to these which are ancient studies he says it is necessary to teach them theoU)gy, a knowl- edge of God and angels, ethics, economics, and politics so as to qualify them for their places in the household, and kingdom. 2 He divides the educational career into three epochs, from nativity up to the seventh year, from the seventh year to the fourteenth year, and over fourteen years to adult age. During the first period the pliysical nature alcme should be attended to, the supply of physical wants by good food and moderate exercise: also tlie learn- ing of some fables to develop memory and imagination, and the elements of music; but theoretical study should be entirely avoided. During th(^ second epoch, the body, the moral nature and the intellect should be attended to, — for the physical system a variety of exercise is required and good manners and proper dress; for the moral nature the will should be exercised in the government of the passions; for the intellect there should be education in language. During the third epoch care should be taken in the cultivation of good dispositions, the development of tiie faculties and the subjection of the * ibid. c. 10. 11. II Ihid.r. 20. + ibid. c. 12 and 13. 1 II. 11. 1 and 2. T Ibid. c. 18. 1 ibid. c. 3. 4. § ibid. c. 23. 2 ibid. c. 5 and H. 2007 defense of a country.* There are also servants who are not slaves, some con- demned to service by law, because of tlieir conduct, others from choice the best and most virtuous class of dependents. t ;i III. Politicdl Theory of Aegidius. The rest of the book treats of the political conditionsof the state and kingdom, ii'iritas ct regum). Ae^rjdius adds the regum to the three forms of Aristotle. In his time the French Kingdom was a reality; its nationality was asserted in the consolidation of the entire community for defence under a single prin<'.e. Nationality had amalgamated the lesser feudal Barons with their vassals under a single great lord or ruler. There is in all by nature an impulse to community. The community of the state is for the highest good, being superior to the household [domua) and village {vicus). Without such a life of community man cannot live socially. Man re09 Inws, that tlipy sprin<^ t't'Dm wisdom and that they bo well-siiHrdort by civil power, and that the laws be well administered and applied in cases of dispute. The prince is custos of these laws; in order that they may be well-founded ne hHs the consilium: that thev mny be proj^erly applied he has the praetorium: and for the observance of the laws lie looks to all the citizens, popuius. The end of lejjistation is to avoid evil and promote t^ood, the consilium disC'tvetiii'X 'he {jood and evil and remedyinj? the evil, the practorium decidinjj wiiat is just and unjust, and the popu^MS deteriiiining what is laudable and wliat is riin- perabih. These are the different branches of the government.* There are three good and three bad principates,— the kingdom, aristocracy and polity being good, and tyranny, obligantia and democracy being bad. If a single ruler governs for the common good of subjects that is monarchy or ]vernment of states.^ The kingdctm in which monartthy is hereditary is the best. Abstractly it is better that the prince should he chosen by election, but, because men are apt to be corrupt, it is V)etter prac- tically that choice should be by heredity, because it is more likely the good of the kingdom will be the king's wlien fatlier and son are united in making it the best, because an adventurer is more apt to be elated at the prospect of a kingdom, and because to the people custom is like second nature, teaching them obedience without a scruple.^ 4 good king wishes to be loved by the people, to procure the common good and to punish seditious and troublesome persons; to this end he excels in hcncficiunt, distril)ut ing gifts, in virtue as an example to the people and in dignity and power t)y whicli he corrects abuses. A tyrant seeks liisown good, aims after pleasure and money instead of virtue and uses his power to oppress. || Tyranny is tlie wjrst government and care should betaken lest princes fall into it. A good government is founded upon reason, a tyranny upon passion and caprice. 11 The king is to act like God, the King of all the kingdoms of nature. He must have virtue, knowledge and external possessif)ns, encf)urage the study of literature and the practice of virtue.** Everything good is perverted to the use of tyranny, whether tyranny of one, a few or many. ft There are three modes in which corruption * ITT. ii. 1. i Ibid c. fi. i). + ii.id. !• i. ' il)iil r, 7. t il)i(l. <•. :i. ** (• S. S ibid c. .5. ••+ ibid. i-. II. Ii. -]'i rilK POLITICAL THEORY OF THE takes place, (1) a se /yv'annifleni corrwmp?, (2) a tyrannide alio, (3) a regno. Evil perverts one to injustice, or one is corrupted by another tyrant, or on account of the kingdom itself.* The prince ought to take the advice of his advisers, cons^7^M?n. Every consilium has some quaestio so that it may be defined as quaestio aglbiUum humanorum. Counsel is taken in regard to what is not yet determined and care should be taken that tlie secrets of such a counsel are kept and that truth not flattery is tlie subject of advice.f Goodness, friendship and wis- dom are essential in counsellors. Counsel is taken by the princeps in what- ever concerns the interest of the kingdom for its peace and unity, the nxh- sistence and the resources of the country. J All matters are to be determined according to the laws and (he judgment is to be in the hands of judges who form the 2}^'<^"torium. Judges are x,n judge according to law, and if they do not act in this way tliey are corrupt and should be rem)veJ. As little as po-isible should be lefL to the^disorebion of the judges by the legislators. I'utiishmcnt should not be left entirely t.o their «)-5i/77"m?u lest they be swayed by opinion. Law should determine as much as possible because judges must form an opinion suddenly and are apt to err.^ WiuMi a matter is in jftcZicis passionate speeches before tlie judges ought to be prohibited, for the judge sliould be left free between litigants to form an impartial judgment, not to be moved by passion. || Judges reijuire authority, knowledge of law and experience of human actions, as well as moral qualities of justice and equity. Ij There are different kinds of laws, some written and some unwritten, com- mon and proper, natural and positive. There is also a ditTerence between jus naturale and jw.s ycntiuni. Properly there are four kinds of jus, anhnalium, naturale, civile and gentium. Jus naturale is wliac accords with reason or to which there is a natural impulse. Justa positiva is that which is just by agreement or institution of man, these may be naturalis traditis, positive sta- tutum. These different forms may be reduced to natural which is non scriptum and positive which is scriptmn.** Jus naturale in this wide sense is not peculiar U) human beings but common to animals, because nature teaches it to all creatures; ./it.s (/e»fiu«t is peculiar to the human race and implies the conventions adopted l;)y men in society. tf Lex humana ouglit to be conform to natural law, useful for the people in securing their common good, possible of fulfilment and oljedience according to the manners and customs of the people. Jt Laws have no force unless promulgated, for since law is the man- date of a superior for the guidance of our acts, there is no law unless it is * ibid. c. 14. II ibid. c. 21. + ibid. c. 17. H ibid, c 22. * ibid. c. IS. 19. ** Ibid. c. 24. § ibid. c. 20. ++ ibid. c.25. ti- ibid. r. 2t). SCHOOLMEN' AND (IROTIUS. 211 notified to subjects.* He distinguishes human law aud civil power Ironi divine law and religious authority. The first is concerned with the defence of society and'aims at relative perfection, to encourage all the virtues which aid and to discourage the vices which hinder social order. It does not com- mand every virtue or forbid every vice. Divine law, however proposes abso- lute perfection and opposes evil in thought as well as in word and action, and recommends virtues which society ignores. f The last element in the rule of the state isthepopWws The state or i :«;. T HI. iil. !-.>. S .X.XVII. 122 .s(|. i:iO-i:i:i. Isis. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 21 a or are in opposition to the Cliuich are declared iinflt to be owners of property and all such as hold property are declared no longer proprietors hut detain- ing in unlawful possession. Ultimate ownership of all temporal possessions is vested in the Church; this right is cZejwre and although it may not be re- cognized de facto the right remains notwithstanding. The reason of, this is that all goods relate to the body, in use, the body is for the snuj, Hnd the soul is placed under the control and guidance of the Pontiff. 'Jlie entire system of secular government and temporal power is placed at the left of tlie pope who alone possesses sovereign authority upon earth. In this Aegidins (-(tn- sistently carries out tlie ideas of l^onifMce to wliom he dedicMted the work, rpprodui'inif almost the exact langufige (if his famous liulls parliculailv tlie Vnam Sonctant, i;302. But tlie time for such asserrions was past because Phil- ip was tirmly established on the French tliroiie. 'JMiis does not however pre- vent him from recording his opinion, pa^e? quod omnia trmporalia sunt siih dominio ecdesiae callafa, et si non de facto, quoniam niulti forte huicjuri rebellantur, do jure traiien et ex detiito temporrdia santnio pontifci stintsidijccta.aquojnreeta quo debito mdlatenus possunt aholri* 4. Aiigustinus Trionfo (Triumphus), 1244-131S. He was t lie contemporary of Pope John XXII. and wrot'^ in defence of the Pope and papal claims, de- dicating his work to him in the contest Vietween tlie Pope nnd the Emperor Louis. }l\^ wovk IS enlit\ef\ Snmnia De Poteslafe EcclemJte and it ascribes to the papacy the very highest prerogatives, setting the pope in the place of God as his sole representative upon earth with sovereign power for God. If God alone is entitled to divine honor and worship, the character and position of the pope entitle Inm to an adoration that is superior t,o tlie angels and to the saints, because the papal power is universal over men whether the pope himself be good or bad personally, his personal chiracter making no ditler- ence as to the transmission and enjoyment of tlie power. t The two swords of the scripture symbolize the two powers deposited in the hands of Peter and his successors, the one power being delegated by him to temporal rulers that it may be exercised for the good of man and t iu' jidvancement of t lie Church, the other being retairied in the hands of the pope. J Tills prerogative possessed by the Supreme ruler independent of liis cliiir- acter, whether he be good or bad, is in f)pp:)sition t.() tlie prior scholasl ie view of Thomas in which he makes the good ruler first of all and chielly a good man. His divine right as successor of Peter according to Triumphus is independent of man. He cannot be elected either l»y the king or the peojije. nor can he be removed from otliceby either. In the case of heresy his depo- sition may beenacted by ag^mei'al council, liutthis doe> not remove him from * Bk. II. 4; .ronni:il Kuiienil de I'In.st. pub. p. i:Ji. w. 1. .liinct. Vol. I. pp. 4(l;.>-41.'>: I'ltiiick. Kef. et l>ub. Moyeri !ip;e. pp. 71-102; Rie/.ler. pp. i:fe,sse Romano Pontifici omneni hunianam creattiram declaramus. This amounts to a claim of universal dominion by the Popes. It is met by the practical sagacity of Philip of Fiance and Lf>uis of Bavaria, and the spirit of nationality in France and England, around whicli the literature of the Schoolmen circles at this period. Nationality is one of the grand issues of the 14th. Century as may be seen in Dubois and other writers. The great names of Dante and Ockliam are inseparably associated with the theory of tiie Schoolmen in reference to tliis papal claim. Across the border the voice of Marsilius is heard, and in the reff)rming spirit of Huss in Bohemia and Wyclif with his russet friars tlie doctrine of nationality is pro- claimed in the island Kingdom of England. At the time when Boniface was making his vi( lent attempts to snatch a victory an interesting writing appears under the name of Peter Du Bois of SCHOOLMEN AND GROTllJS. 217 ^1 Normandy in tlic year 130i), in the interest of the French nationality and Enipiie. His aim is to establish the French Kintrdom in a state of peace and iherel^y to secure freedom from war over all the world, bringing the other Kingflonis into sulijection to France. He claims that the P>ench are pecul- iarly (pialilied to act nasonabiy. with impartiality and I'ight judgment. France is a kingdom peculiarly adapted for tlie nurture and training of kings. He acknowledges that the Pope has a right to all the lands known as tlie papal dominions, granted to him in the Donation of Consfantine. At the same time the Pope is unfitted for temporal kingship, because being generally old an I iiilirm before he reaches th;' papal chair, he cannoti avoid tlie disas- ters of war wliich destroy so many of the subjects. Therefore he advises the Pope to be content with the guardianship of souls jind to leave the bodies and temporal interests to strong and well-equipped rulers. H? then reviews the position of the different kingdoms and asserts that by delicate diplom- acy, secret treaties and some minor concessions everything mightbe arranged satisfactc^irily so as to secure a P'rench monarchy over the whole civilized world, while the Pope might be content to accept a satisfactory pension in return for tlie yielding upof hisclaims, and attend to thespiritual interestsof tlie Church. He tlius represents the idea at the opening of the 14th. Century of the papacy as a state among other states of Europe, of the P^mpire as notliing more than a petty princ.ipalitv, and of the temporal dominion of the Pope as the cause of immense evil to society. Obedience he asserts to be due not to the temporal power for the sake of the spiritual, but to llie tem- poral for its own sake as a duly constituted earthly power. It is impossible to reform society by reforming the abuses in the Church and placing it as a purified f)rganization at the liead of all powers. Pie asserts the nationality of the PYench Kingdom. It is different from and independent of the Empire. The latter is under the surveillance of the Pope, who as temi)oral chief crowns and confirms the Emperor; there is no such tiling in P>ance, for P'rance is free from any subjection as a kingdom to the papacy. It is b?cause she is not subject to the trammels of Roman E-;pionage that in the enjoyment of national freedom she is fitted to be the leader of the world and lu;r king the universal earthly ruler. This idea was developed fluting the remainder of the Century under the sanction of the TTniversity of Paris, llien the light of Europe, from wliich came forth all the learned Doctors of the School.* Anotlier writing that is to be noticed is J)e J^traquc potentate. It is the work of a learned man equally theologian and jurist who can manipulate facts in defence of liis position, skillfully hiding tlie Scholistic bent. Itwaspub- * I'ooh;, pp. 2.")()-2t)0; WaiUy. Moiaoire siir an opusculo aiionyiiM^ hi Mi-nioiros do'l Aciid- oniii' di'.s Inscriptions (>t hcnt's-ldttres. t. 18; 4^.')— 404. 1H41I; Quaostlo do potcstatc papae. En- quiry touchintr tlie power of the Pope by du Hois, jjiinted l)y Diipny, in Acts et Preuves appended to Histoire du difYerend d'eiitre le Pope Uoniface VIIF. ef I'hilippes le lie!. Roy de I<''i'ani"e. pp tirtii tiSlf. Ki.'Sri; Kie/.ler. pp. 14J sq. I 218 TIFE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE lislied in 1304 in connection with the controversy between Boniface anri Piiilip. It has been ascribed to Gilles of Rome by nearly all the Gallican writers. But it is impossibe to ascribe it to him.* He declares that there is no singrle power sovereign and absolute in jurisdiction. The two powers are distinct, the spiritual having no jurisdiction in temporal affairs. He maintains the independence of the temporal pov/er (n) jMJnsophicdlhi. This proof is drawn from Aristotle. In the soul twu faculties are distinct which differ according to their acts, their objects, and their ends. In the teniporai and spiritual powers there are different ends, objects, and acts, s > that they are not to ^)e confused, nor i-; one to be subordinate to the otlier. (l)) Revela- tion confirms the voice of reason. In this connection he proves from the du- plex character of objects presented in Scripture, earch and sky, two orders of creatures, two worlds, tw) luminaries, the difference in the two powers. (c) This conclusion is ratified by quotations from the Chnl law, and (d) from Canon law. He then goes on, having established the distinction of the pow- ers, to show (a) that both powers are divine in origin and institution: (b) that they are independent of one another having different organizatifius and laws, needs and ends, the one securing temporal peace I he other spiritual: (c) that spiritual power having its concern in the eternal life of men has no authoritv over temporal things; (d) the spheres of each can be easily distinguished. He distinguishes in human affairs three sorts, the purely spiritual such as mar- riage, divorce, heresy; the purely temporal as the feudal rights and the right of taxation; and the mixed in character as the feudal oath of feality which is religious in appealing to God and temporal as a tie between vassal and lord. Civil and religious society have each their own domain, (e) He claims for the King of j^'rance the same independence as he grants to the Emperor. France existed it is claimed before the Western Empire was established, be- fore Charlemagne became Emperor over it; it was a nation before the Roman Empire. He traces their origin to the migration of Trojans after the de- struction of their city by the Greeks to the region now known as Hungary, from whence they moved, because they refused to be subjected and forced to pay tribute by Valentinian, to the borders of the Rhine territory, passing in- to Gaul and founding the kingdom of France. The French nation was always independent and never in vassalage to the Empire. It is an interesting idea that is here developed, that of nationhood. t Another work which is anonymous but has been ascribed to William of Ockham deserves honorable notice. It was produced in 1303 in the quarrel be- tween Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. The writing is in the form of a dialogue between a cavalier and a priest in which the respective rights and * M. Jourdaln, on Gilles of Rome; also Journal general do I'lnstruction publique et des Cultes. XXVII. p. 122. sq.; Riezler. pp l.li) sq.; Poole, p. 2.55; De Monarchla, Goldast. II. !)5sq. + Golda.st, Moiiarcliia. S. I, III. p. lOli; Franck. p. 119. SCHOOLMEJS AND GROTICS. 219 powers of the spiritual and temporal princes are discussed. The priest meets the cavalier and questions him on the position of the Church. There is a sa- tirical representation of the contest in which Boniface is the chief fitrure. The priest then claims that Jesus Christ has committed all the power he himself pf)ssessed to his Vicar the Pope. The soldier siys he distinguishes two conditions In Christ, that of humiliation and exaltation. IV.ter is the Vicar of Christ only in Ills humiliation and not in !!!> glory.* This writing formed the model upon whicli in 1376 another work was pro- duced, the Songc du Verger {Somnium Viridarii) by Raoul de Presles.f This writing is allied to Scholasticism, because its author was the translator of Aeg'dius Romanus, and the translator of and commentator upon Augustine, from whfim he largely drew the inspiration of his work. The author sees in vision two queens appear before the throne of Charles V., the secular and the ecclesiastical powers, the end being to secure peace and amity between them. The one has tlie power of the priesthood, theother that of civil command; the one pardons sin, the other reprieves and punishes attacks upon the social order; the first is guided by tlie Canon, th'^ second by the Civil law. The rights of each are inviolable, the temporal fu:ictions do not pertain to the spiritualpower, the temporal powt^r is associated with the social order of the state. The King of PVance appoints two advocates, a priest and a cava- lier, the one to plead the cause of the Church, the other tiiat (»f the state. In two parts the discussion proceeds; in the lirst the priest attacks and the cavalier defends: in the second the cavalier attacks and the priest defends. In this work we have a summary of all the arguni'-nts used by predecessors, taken from Scliolastic writers, jurists, papal constitutions and imperial re- scripts. It may he regarded as a review at the close of tlie 14th. Century of the position on botli sides of the controversy. In it there are maintained and defended many of the free doctrines of later times, individual liberty, the independence of the kingdc)m, the distinction of the powers found later in Montesquieu, the rational basis of monarchy and of the succession to the crown as established by the Salic law, the limitation of war to the promo- tion of the peace of the state, natuial nobility as the basis of political nobil- ity, — these are some of the lilieral ideas contained in this remarkable writing of the 14th. Century.: 2. Dantf Allighieri, 12f)r)-i;521. He was the poet of Scholasticism, the author of J)u'«irt Co??ifcZiV/, jurist, theologian and Schoolman. In early life he was a poet but through his study of the Schoolmen, he became a zealous philosoph- er and an eloquent lecturer at Paris and Bologna. At first he was a Guelf, * Goldiist. Monarchia I. 17; Dialofii Pjprltitort in En,i,'Iisli by .lanios Savage. London. IHOH; Kiezler, pp. 27(5 sq. t Franck, Ref. et. Pub. Moyoii Arc. p. 21!) s(). * .Janet. Vol. I. pp. 430-;i; Fianck, p. 20!t .sq.; Acadciiiif (i(>s Inscriptions, 17S.i; Uiozler. pp. 27.'> sq.; Goldast, Moiian-bia, I. :>H; Manuscrlts francais. Vol. IV. 229. 220 TIIK POLITICAL THLOKY OF THE but boiuj; conipellc'c] to retire int;i exile tlirouM^h the division amonK the vic- torious (hielt's. he avowed the Ghibeilii.e party in tlie stru^'^fjie and became an ardent believer in tlie unity of Italy and in the strong ])(»sition of a jxiw- erful Emperor, independent of the Pope. The civil law liavinj? readied its preeminence in the Holo^na School, and the Emperor Henry of Luxembour-^^ liavintr the desiie to re-eslal)lish tlie imperial dominion over Haly. was en- trenched in his fiosition against the Pope liy tlie civil law whicli fnmislied him with a powerful we-apon to estaVilish his sovereignty in temporal matters. In opposition, the School of Canonists supported the supremacy of tlie Pope in all matters. In Thomas Dante found the conflict of the temporal atid spiritual. In the Italian republics t here was the division into factions and in the Neapolitan King(iom there was usui'iiat ion. while the papacy was !n exile at Avignon. The only central power in which there was any hope for unity in Western Europe was in Henry V'll. Dante during his exile medi- tated on these subjects as is seen in tiis Omrito* Paradlm\ and in his Ptmja- lorio.X He became a patriot t(>r Italian freedom. In tlie year in which Henry VIII. died h-' wrote his famous work De Mnnarchid in which he pre- sents the substance of his meditations, noton monarchy compared with other forms as the title seems to indicate, but in an account of the disputes of the times from the standpoint of philosophy, revelation, and history, the demon- stration of the fact that in the Empire of the Univtrse God has no superior, and likewise the Emperor upon Earth in the temporal kingdom is supreme governor. He puts his theory in a single phrase, the most perfect happiness is realized when the Church as wagon rests upon the Empire as beam. He is a strong and ardent follower of Thomistic politics and his chief merit lies in this that he accepted the Scholastic principles, and used them to build up Imperialism against Rome. His work was chiefly critical. The most distinguished humanist in the age of revival he writes the Epitaph for the dead system, refuting one im- possible theory by jiropounding another equally impossible.? He like the Scholastics dealt with a theory that fitted into ancient history, but was out of place in the history and circumstances of his own time. If he did not give life to the dead he showed the people that a new regime was mucli need- ed. He is the earliest defender of nationality in Italy. He is a follower of Thomas and Aegidius. Man's goal is happiness both earthly and heavenly. He attains the former by the proper use of reason and those virtues which are dependent upon the guidance of reason; man's normal condition in life is peace and it is preserved and secured by the State. The State should be a monarchy to avoid tlie confusion of dividinig the power. Weary of an age * V. 1(57. t 27th. Chant. * 16th. Chant. § Bryce. Holy Roman Empire. 205 sq. SCHOOLMEJS AND GROTirs. 221 of disorder and tyranny he raises his voice against lawlessness on behalf of unity and peace for Italy and the world. But he goes on to add his own con- tribution to the discussion of politics, princes as well as subjects need to I)reserve peace, and in order to the preservation of peace in the multitude of states, a univc^rsal Emperor is required, a prince of princes. This Emperor is the feudal lord of the pope in reference to his tempf>ral possessions, as much as in the case of the temporal princes. Heavenly happiness comes through grace and revelation by means of the spiritual institutions in the hands of the Church, which is controlled by the Pope. The more he confines himself to spiritual things and uses spiritual means to attain human happi- ness the more success will he have and the greater honor among temporal rulers. The Dt Monarchia is a kind of philosophy of history in which Dante treats of the science of history and of politics. The work is divided into thiee parts which consist of the answers to three separate questions.* (I) Is universal temporal moriarthy as represented in the empire necessary to the good of the human race? Monarciiy is the empire df a single chief ov('r all men who live in his time, and therefore over everything temporal. Monarchy therefore embraces the universal human rac \ human intensts and temporal concerns. To discover the character of government among men one must find out the aim of political society. P(iliti(;s being a practi- cal science is concerned with actions. Actions are determined by the end in view. A man builds a house suitable to his object. In human beings the end is not individual lift; nor intellectual knowledge of life; but it is comnion to all men to seek and to find the realization of their hopes nf t in a single being but in the unity of a multitude of men. Tliei(>are two degrees in the activity, the practical and speculative; according to the tlrst, mnn is active in doing or wori sovereign in the temporal and spiritual. There is a fal- * I'iiradiso, c. ;i atul tJ. II HI. 4. + III. 1. n in. f). t III 2. S Sopli. El. II. 3. ** III. ti. 226 THE POLlTICiVL THPJORY OF THE lacy in the reasoning because Goci in the major is not the same as Vicar f)f Gofl in the minor premise. A A'icar does not possess the power of him who is represented, hut only a part.* Again, it is argued, -'thou art Peter and on this rock will 1 build my Church,'" "whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven," and the saying of Peter, ''here are two swords," gives th(> basis in the life of Christ for the supremacy of the Church. Dante replies, that these words refer entirely to the spiritual kingdom, as Christ declared he had notliing to do with earthly dominion, "my kingdom is not of this world. "t Dante's answers are characterized t)y subtlety and tlnesse and gave materials to future theorists for some centuries to come. (f>) Arguments from history. The defenders f)f papa! supremacy dejjended upon the donation of Constantine and tiie translation of the empire from the Greeks to the Germans by Pope Adrian. Dante does n(tt seriously con- sider the accuracy of the-.e supposed historical foundations, but he proves that they have fK) real foundation as a liasis of right. lie repudiates the donation of Constantine to Sylvester, on the ground that Constantine had no power to alienate the iriglits and liberties of the Empire and that the Church had no rijjht to be a party to such a transaction. It- is the design of tlie Imperial Ernpiic to protect the territory and t(i preserve the laws of the Empire. If tlie Emiieror attempt to divide the Empire then lie is aband()n- ing liis duty which is to keep the dominion under a single ruler. It is Cfin- trar-y to the hunuin right of an Empire to divide, or destroy, or alien;ite it. In abandoning his duty he acts ultr(( rives and in destro,\ing tlie rights of oth- ers nuilitles Ins own acts The property and liberties of I he Empire are in- alienable. Therefore the Donation of Constantine is illegal and the Church cannot receive the hnperirmi Viecause she rests it upon an act that is void. Tf> destrdv the Empire is contrary to liuman right. Not only was the P]mperor incompetent as a divider of Enipire and Westowerof it, but- the Church was uniiualiti(d to receive it, bt^-ause she is expressly forbidden by Christ to re- ceive temporal power. Therefore the gift was invalid t)oth in givins.;' ;ind r(>ceiving.t In regard to the translation of fiie Enijure. Dante declares usur- pation i,'^ not a groutid of right. Even if Adrian crowned Charlemagne, t ranster ring the Imperial dignity from Micluiel Empei-or at Constairtlnople to Charles, the fact is not sutticient to establisir the right, nor does it destroy Imperial independence It could likewise be shown tliat the Church depend- ed iiporr the Empir'e. for Emper'or ( )t ho established Pope Leo \'III. on the paj);)! cli;iir and deposed Henedict. condemning him lo exile in Saxony.^ Therefore historical proofs fail. ((•) Philosophical iVrgiiments. In t his he iiiti'oduces t lie finesse of [)hilosopli- * III. 7. + III.K. i(. till. 10. s 111 II. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 227 ic thought. All things, it is argued. V)elonginy to one genus are to be brought under one head, which is the standard of all under it. All things that are of the same kind f)ught to he reduced in subjection to a unity.* All men are of the same race, genus, therefore they ought to he reduced in sul)jection to a unity wiiicli becomes the measure of all And since the Emperor and sover- eign pope are likewise men they must be reduced to subjection under a single man. But tlie pope cannot be subjected to the Emperor, because he cannot be subject to any man; therefore tlie Pope must l)e the measure and rule of the Emperor. So argue the Pontifical devotees. But, says Dante, there is a fallacy in tlie argument, for it distinguislies in tlie genus of man tlie quality of Pope and tlie quality of Emperor. They refer not as they allege to the genus of a common individual, hut of a perfect man. Hence tliey cannot be merged in any single individual man, the only being to whom they can be united on equal terms is God. To l)e a man is one thing, to be a pope or emperor quite a different thing. A man exists in essence, but a pope or em- peror in the quality or accident; therefore as they owe their existence to the papacy or empire they fall under the category of relation: both beinji relative they are relative to each other and fall under a liigher genus or unity which is God.f Condusion Dante does nnt carry out his ideas into i)rac1ical life. He is a reformer, but a reformer who remains in the Church he is trying to reform. It is reserved for Marsilius and Ockham to present the more practical side of the theory. Yet Dante has a grand ideal. He does not desire the emperor to be in vassalage to the papacy, nor does he wish to see the pope in vassalage to the empire. He desires an Emperor who is a true feudal sovereign and yet spiritually a true son of the Church. The authority of tlie empire does not spring from the Church, because the empire had its power while the Church was either u(»t existing at all or had no [)ower of acti(m. The author- ity of the empire springs from God directly. Christ acknowledged the power of the empire to judge, submitting to its judgment. Paul sa,\s, "1 stand at (]a?sar's tribunal wliere I ought to be judged. "| He wish(\s these two to abide independent, since they d(rive iiidep"nd(uit power from the same Di vine source. The good of man and tiie welfare of the state demand the independence of Church and State. This ideal is the dream of fancy kept before the eye of a jioet. his argunuiuts the lines of thought that lead up to it. The earliest germs of International law were found in the conception of the world as an Diiperial Empire inwhich the dilTerent states were united under one world governcu'. Starting from liuiuau Christian community which found its unity realized in the superior j)ower of Ecclesiast icism Atiuinas ex- * .\ri.st. Mctapli. X. 1. + III. 12 t III. i;j 228 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE pressed these scntinionts: but the Hist to delineate the world of states was Dante in his Dc Monarchia. Nationality was be^innintr to assert itself in the clianfied condition of institutions and chiefly in the decay of feudalism. To prevent the nations crumbling to atoms Darite conceived the plan of unitin}? all the natif)ns, still preservintr nationality, in one great world-empire. He places his ideal monarchy, the Universal Empire, side l)y side with the Church as the instrument "f the Divine will. His Empire he defines to be a sfate above everything temporal in the world, concerned with the government of all secular HtTairs. His idea of war too as an appeal to force, after every other peaceful mcrins had failed, resorted to by consent of the parties, gives us in germ the tvvo great princijiles for which International law has contend- ed, the necessity of declaring war, and also of consulting jieace before war is declared.* 3. Marsilins of Padua, 1270-1342. Anmng the political ojiponenfs of the supremacy of the papacy there titrures a name that has been alm^^st forgotten in history, that of (.ne whose personality occupied a large place in the strug- gle to eliminate from Fcc'lesiastic;il policy the pretensions to control and snt)ject the temporal powers and tf) give to the secular ptince his rightful place. Marsilius was a man of passion and vehemence and he created a st'r in the school and in tiie world in whicli he figur(>d. Marsilius or Marsiglio was born in Padua. He issurnamed I'atavinus. It isasserted by Papadopoli, the historian of Padua, t that Marsiirlio was a member of the Franciscan or- der and attached to the faction excommunicated tiy John XXII. On the other hand Wadding in his History of the Minorcsl denies that he was a Franciscan. It is probable that he was not a member of any religious order as Michael Cesena doi's not allude to him and Ockliam does not refer to him, and his name is not mentiotu'd in the Ph[i;i1 ttull of Exconimnnication of 1327. He seems to have l)een the chief in an independent group m1( ng with his comrade and friend, John of Jandun. Marsilius studied at I'adua medicine aiifl philosophy. He w;is naturally a dist inguished orator. From Padua he went to Milan and from thence visited other cities in Italy. In 1312 he was Rector of the' University of Paris when William of Ockham reigned in the intellectual world there ^ In liis hit^h position he devoted himself to the study of Theolgy hut particularly medicine. No doubt his contacts with Ockham ser'^-ed to give him an insight into the political doctrines of Ockham himself. The ardent nature of Mar'^ilius would act as a magnet in the polit- ical friendsliip of the two. They did not rest satisfied with mere speculative * t'ulszU-y, pp. 94-95; .Janet. \. pp. 4:«-445; Erdiuan. T. p. 47:i sq.; Franck. p. lOHsq.; llanck. do Rotii. Sdipt. ir.c. 43. p. 194; Poole, pp. 2H2 sq.; De Monarchia. translated, F. .1. Ohurcli and R. W. tJluirch, London. 1879; Bryr.e. Holy Rom. Empire, pp. 2li5-269, .Analysis of I)c Monarchia; Transl'n of A. Torri, Leshoin, 1H44; liie/Jer. pp. I(i9 sq. + History of the Gymnasium of Psi.tavinus. t Aunales Ordlnis Minorum, Bk. VII. 8.5. S n;il)oulay. Hist. I^iiiv. Paris. IV. 16::! 974. SCHOOLMEiS AND GROTiUS. 229 idens. When the conflict wiisstnrted heiwoen Louis of Bavaria and Pope John XXII., Ocliham and Marsilius left the university home of liberal spec- ulation to devote their ^iant intellects to the cause of independence and enlightenment represented b.v Louis, heedless of the ostracism it implied and the anger of the papacy it provoked. Marsilius with his companicui .loliii of Jandun led the independent order of defenders that followed the German prince. When Louis was excommunicated in 1324 Marsilius took ihe counsel of Jandun and with him formulated the plan of the great work which after- wards became the I>f/«).sor Pr/cj.s. In two months he produced the treatise as a defence of Louis and as an attack upon the very foundation f)f the papal power. It is the mo-;t clear defence of constitutional right that has yet l)een written; it stands to-day as a witness to the truth t iiat it was imposs- ible to effect a compromise on the lines of the old establishrd order of society and that nothing less than an entire reconstruction of society can place it in its rightful posiiion. It was a prophecy of the new order as Dante's work was the epitaph of the dead system of Medievalism. Very so(m after this Marsilius and his followers retired from Paris to the court of Louis at Nuremberg. iJy the eloquence and activity of Marsilius many friends were gained for the cause of Louis. The Pope vainly tried to anethematize and arrest the progress of the work. To Marsilius and his co- workers is due the policy as well as the scheme of the Emperor to deliver the empire from the hands of the Pope and to vindicate the independence of the empire. Louis was too weak to conquer such a foe. He gained a temporary victory and became possessor of Rome. A new Pope was set up in the city and MarsiiiL's was appointed the Pope's Counsellor and Vicar in Rome. This state of affairs was of short duration, for in 1330 Louis was again baffled, com- pelled to retire to Germany and his followers were excommunicated as here- tics. In 1336 Louis was reconciled with John XXII. But Marsilius and his genius were forgotten, he was forsiken by the Emperor on wliose behalf he had wielded such a mighty influence, anathematized by the Pop*', reproached by the Sorbonne, and forbidden to enter tlie University of Paris.* The Defensor Pads is unlike any other work of the age. It is divided into three parts. (1) Rf)ok I. treats of political right in general. (2) Hook II. considers particular rights, especially the Church organization, in which Marsilius comes out boldly against the organization of tlie Catholic Church and against the temporal and spiritual sfjvcreignty ol tlie Pope as pretended head of the Church. (3) He presents the chief principles develojjed in the lV)rmer part of the work, giving some conclusions tliat mark him off from the political writers of the age in which he lived, the princii)al one heing the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and that of universal suffrage. Tlie * Baldassaie Labanca. Marsilius du Parioua, 1H82; Uiezler, pp. IjOsq.; Exanien Judiciale Fianc. Veneti Marsil. de Padua. Haluzp, MiscoU. II. 280; Marsiglio de Maynardina, Dr. Ii'ricdbei'K II. 21 s(i.; Goldast. II. l.">4. s(|.; AliuM-tiiio Mussato. Latin poem to Marsi;rlio; I'dolo, pp. 2(>;i-2()(>. 2;{() THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE work makes almost no allusion to the stirring events of the times. It follows in general the lines laid down in Aristotle. (I) General Theory of the State. The defensor jxicis commences with the foun- dation princi[)le that government is established in the state with the object of preserving and securing peace. The end proposed is to discover what is the goal of society, in what the goid of society consists, the welfare of the state. The good of the state is simply the good of the members of the state, pliysical and moral good, such as was in view in the first institution of the civil sf)ciety. Jts existence is simply to promote the peace and the good of those who make it up.* Marsilius gives tlie cause of the origin andtheorigin itself of civil society. If men had not felt the need of mutual helpfulness and of associating in a large community where that aid is pledged and organ- izati(m is perlected for its exercise, they would n(»t have been able to rise above tlie union of the sexes in the family, of families in the tribe, of tribes in the city and from those to kingdoms and large empires which have laken such a conspicuous place in the history o^' the world. Man's civil association is a natural so<-iety. He adopts the idea which Aquinas opposed, that civil instituti(»ns are a result of sin. Adam was made in innocence and with per- fect integrity. In his fall civil control is utilized to bring him into subjec- tion. The cause of the origin of the state is to enable men to live the best life; and in order to live such a gnod life man must <>ngage his time and at- tentions in meditation and activity, cultivating virtue of soul, and man- ifesting virtuous thought in a life of action. t The state is not simply an association of individuals, but is also a collec- tion of separate estates, as they were called in the Middle Ages, or profes- sions of which the individuals are members, and in which they are associated together. Tlie peace of society depends upon t,h<^ proper harmony of the different classes in the state. There are in all six estates, three general and three particular. The three general estates or public ijrofessions are. magis- tracy, military, and ecclesiastical ottices; the three particular estates or professions are those of agriculture, industry and commerce. These public and private functions are to he discharged in the interests of all, for the common utility — thus in marked contrast with the classes of the middle ages which always acted in private or class interest. These six classes form the civil society, form the organic elements in the living organism of the state. When each of the estates keeps its proper place and does its own part, as organs in the body of the community, there results that condition of social health which we call peace, harmony leading to material prospsrity, moral force, and the general good order and security of the state. As the estates are not perfectly separate, there is a tenden(;y to confusion and comming- ling in the performance of duty and the exercise of power, — the one over- * Def. I'ac. I. 1. + r. c. 4. SCHOOLMEN AND riROTlHS. 231 stepping the limits ot its authority and the other falling short in the performanceof duty. Hence springs up disorder in the state. In such a case the social body is diseased. Consequently, ther is required a legidatwe power to make laws to regulate the functions and the duties of the different estates and an executive government to see to the execution of these laws.* To whom then belongs the legislative power and in whom is the executive autliority of government vested? He gives tlie classification of Aristotle in regard to the various forms of government, slating that perhaps the most perfect form is the royal. He does not however decide very strongly in favor of the monarchy, although he dedicated liis h()ol< to the Emperor. He simply indicates hi< preference for this form, without any of the servile royalistic sentiments which are generally found in the Imperialistic writers. In the definition he gives of law and in liis idea of sovereignty as inhering by nature in the state he limits the prerf)gatives of the monarch. t (1) The legislative pmmr. The foundation of the social structure of the state which others had failed to recf>gnize, in ascribing to the prince the at- tributes of the state, he asserts is to be found in the principle that the sover- eign power of the state vests in the people, and that legislation springs from such sovereignty, and laws depend for their force and validity upon the legislative power of the people. Legislative power, like sc)vereignty, pertains to the entire people, or to the majority which evidences its will in the public assembly of or representative of the people. The people alone have the right to impose laws upon themselves and if absolute unanimity is impossible then there should he a majority of suffrages. It is upon the principle of injustice that one or some should make the rest of the people slaves, for all men are equal among themselves. When the whole people legislate the laws are most legitimate, and they are more likely to lie obeved, for every man will ob(!y his own will. To make one or a few the absolute masters of legislation is to employ constraint in commanding obedience. J Tlie nation or people itself is the source of all power and right, it alone has the authority to legislate for the people, hummms legislator fidelis superiore careyis.'i He shows the dilTerence between the making of laws and the judging of their goodness or badne.ss, justice or injustice, utility or di.'^advantageousness under certain conditions. The making f)f laws belongs to one wise man or a few wise men, but the judging of their applicability f)r suitability rests with the whole people. He claims for the people the right of accepting or rejecting laws framed in ad- vance by the powers named as legislative otiicials or draft legislators. In other words draft laws should be submitted for approval to the people. As in the case of codification, a drafting or codifying commission should prepare tlie laws and then submit theiM to the whole people. For if the few had ab- * 1. c. 5-8. + I. c. 9. * I. c. 12. s II.c. 21. 2^2 THE POLITICAL THPJORY OF THE solute power in law-making we should be subject, tn the mistakes and even to the selfishness of tliat few, constituting an oligarchy. The people best know their requirements, what will satisfy their purposes. Therefore the mass of the citizens or the majority expressing its opinion by electing its own representati7es possesses the sovereign power of the state. * (2) The executive power. If wisdom belongs to a few, the incf»rrupt ible sense of justice and riglit behmgs to the wliole body of the people, and the just and proper combination of these two elements, the wisdom of a few and the jus- tice of all, pi'oduces the best laws. Legislative power thus belongs to the entire nation. But the people require otlicers to execute their will. There- fore they choose executive persons and entrust them witii governmental powers. CiijusUbet pHncipatus, nut alterius officii, per electionem, inf>titucvdi, prae- vipue vim coactivam habentis, electionem a fn ?'e?'o quasi instrumentalenn sen execntivani dicimns principantem per auctoritatem alegislatoresihi concessame. This executive ruler or rulers are charged with the execution of laws, j>fr ip.sHm execufio ieg«?mm. The executive power in wiiatever manner it is constituted has simply the authority delegated to it bv the entire people, that only being legitimate which the peopla gives and grants. Whatever the executive does is subject to the will of the people in which we notice the marking off the state from the government clearly, in which case the government is the official servant of the state. t Elective monarchy is the preferable form in which the choice of achief ruler is made, the hereditary is not consonant with the idea of pf)pular sovereignty. He cites the papacy as an example of elective monarchy, in which the principle of election works better than heredity. The same principle was exemplified during the present century in the Italian cities of Florence, Padua, and Pisa. The government must have a unity somewhere, not necessarily however a numerical unity, official unity is sufficient. Unity may be secured wiien the government is conducted by an executive body as well as by a single king or ruler: in the case of tlie body tlie entire committee or council act unitedly or by the majority, not by any individual separately or on his own responsibility. The unity of government is not, according to Marsilius. that of numbers, it is a unity of principle and policy, in (luality not in quantity. t (3) Military and official power. If a king is chosen as the chief ruler then he requires defense and the means of supporting his authority. This is done by means of an armed body of men at the cfimmand of the ruler. In numbers they must not be too gieat. or so strong as to give to the king a position inde- * I.e. 12. + 1.0. 13. * I. e. 15. § I. c. 17. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 233 pendent of the people, nor must tliey be too few or too weak so as to place him In the power of scheming men. So soon as he has been elected to office in the state, not before, these forces must be accorded to him, because they are intended to support the royal dignity bestowed by the people on a person of distinction, not as resources to wrest the power from an unwilling nation. The king has in reality no prerogatives because he owes his kingship to the people's choice, and the people reserve the residuary power of sovereignty to themselves. Kings derive their authority from the fons of power, and they are responsible to the same people. Therefore the king acts as a chief in in- terpreting law and directing the state according to the people's will.* Subor- dinate officials of the state equally receive their authority and office from the people, although the king may deliver the seals of office to the holders, yet he does so in the people's name, executing all the necessary arrangements for the good government of the state. The people in last resort is supreme in everything. They supervise the king and his subordinates, and if he should overstep the limits of his commission, although he is above the law in his executive capacity, yet he is not above the lawgiver, but amenable to the will of the people. The people may depose him for violation of the terms of his election. The popular will is the controlling force in preventing des- potism, t (II) Tlmoi-y of the civil and rcUyiov.s orders. One of the six classes in the community requires special attention because of the difficulties and dangers associated with its existence, namely, the priesthood. It is not absolutely essential to the existence of a properly organized state, that there be such a priesthood. For while it is the special province of tlie clergy to educate the people so as to prepare them for a future life, they whose commission was and is to preach the gospel and instruct the ignorant, have abandoned their spiritual vocation and usurped autliority over temporal affairs, even over the emperor himself. The present disf)rd('red state of society is due largely to this usurpation. Marsilius has laid the foundation for his treatment of the religious ottice in its lelation to the civil state, in thedistinction he hasdrawn between public functions and puitlic powers. The state and the Church are parallel organizations, the former embracing all the people as citizens, tlie latter all the people as Christians. In the secular order it is civil or liuman law that guides the executive in governing, in the religious order the only guide is revealed law or the Bible. The word Church is used in a non-apos- tolic sense, as he says, in that age, embracing the clergy and other Church dignitaries; whereas it ought to include, in its apostolic application, now as then, the whole body of Christians, all the members of tlie Church being alike included, priests and laymen, viri Ecdesiastid- Church dignitaries have usurped the title Ecclesiastics which belongs of right to all Church * I.e. 1.5. + 1. c 15-18. ^;^4 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE members. It is absurd and wron^ that clerics should usurp sole pre- rofjative in tlie Church of Christ as alone possessed of sacerdotal power. In the Clnirch as in the state the people are and have the real i)ftwer.* Civil power is concerned with the temporal wf^lfare of society and its pres- ervation from the danj^^ers that arise in the worldly relations of men, and the sMnctiun upon whic.li it acts is corporal punishment in the sphere of the liiimnn life by the exercise of coercive pow<>r equally ayainst Ecclesiastics and laity, when they break the laws of civil society or revolt atrainst social order in the state. Divine law is limited in its opcrat ion to tlie souls of men, and to those means of a spiritual kind that promote the salvation of the soul, beinjj; limited to spiritual mean-^, spiritu'il rewards and spiritual penal- ties with resjject to the future life. All the power even ot' a spiritual kind which the Church otticers possess is incluied in the pr(»mise of eternal life, and the denunciation of eternal corrdemnation. Excommunication from the Church is not a penilty that can be imposed by a single |)riest or council of priests. The priesthood as Doctors (if Divine law exercise the functions of advising wliat should be done and avoided in the interests of the salvation of souls; they are entitled to he consulted as experts in regard to charges against the unfaithful, but the decision of such a char-ge rests with the con- gregation of which the culprit is a member or with the general council of the Church, not of th ■ clerics alone. The clertry act not in the manner of judges, pronouncing a penalty, but as physicians prescribing remedies in the interest of health. The piiests are the physicians of the soul as Jesus professed to be and their acts should not have a material character lest it hinder salvation. Clergy are not entitled to be called Ecclesiastics exclusively, nor are they just in arrogating tlie name of spirittial to all that attaches to them, such as revenues, lands, and other temporal perquis-ites. and to ail their actions even of a temporal kind. They are not entitled to freedom from legal burdens. Their office is spiritual in the Church but in all relations outside of the Church in regard to land, finance, and temporal things they are subject to the same laws as the common people in the state. In the Church they are Churchmen, in the state they are citizens of the (commonwealth: their tem- poral affairs are subject to civil law and their crimes are punishable by comiiion law. t)ut with greater severity because they are crimes of educated meri.t Citizenship with all its rights and duties is independent of a man's religiim. The clergy in tiiis respect stand on an eciuality with all others in civil rela- tions and as citizens are tieated in all respects alike, claiming and receiving no exempt ion r of clergy in each district, lest an over- growth of clerics tend to disturb the peace of the society by an unequal dis- * II. c. 2. + II. c. 7.8. SCHOOLMEJS AND GROTIUS. 235 tiibution of cleric and lay elements in the [iopulation. The power of the priesthood is strictly spiritual. Temporal punishment docs not belong to them. The gospel is doctrirte, not law, and no force is authorized by it to compel its acceptance. The priest may admonish and even denounce spiritual threatenings, but he has no temporal power to enforce them. Heretics and unbelievers so far as the Divine law i.s concerned are only responsible to God, and only can be judged in the future life The priest has the right to forewarn of what they shall receive hereafter at the judgment of Christ, the sole judge of heresy. If a heretic becomes dangerf)us to sDcial order he may he tried by the civil tribunal, but only upon social causes; errors of opin- ion and unbelief are ^^/^ra rircs of any human judicature. The only ground of tinman punisiiment is contra praeceptum humanae legis. ' The civil tribunal should never pronounce any sentence against heresy, errors or any infraction of matters of belief. As is often the case the civil law interdicts spiritual crimes and so oversteps its authority.* Marsilius thus teacties io plain terms the doctrine of toleration which has triumpiied in modern civilizatif)n. He attacks the spiritual hierarchy in its ascending scale of powers and dignities, as destitute of scriptural authority. Bishop and priest are interciiangeable titles in the New Testament for the same officials in the Church: and the popedom has no foundation in fact, for Peter had no supremacy over the other apostles and gave no such primacy to a successor or successors. Christ gave the Church no head upon earth. The papacy springs from the fact of the Church being identified with the imperial city and empire in the temporal domain, and results from courting the favor of and then conquering the emperor. The supreme power of the Church is deposited in the Church itself, that is, in a general assembly of clergy and laity, convened by the legislative power of the civil state, that is, not by the executive but by the legislative power which is in the pecjple. The Emperor as representative of the people has the right of calling and dissolv- ing assemblies of the Church. Such an assembly has power to decide all ecclesiastical matters, and representing as it does the whole community has power to suspend and depose the execnitive ruler and to suspend the opera- tion of his commands which are beyond his jurisdiction. Such an assembly is the sole authority in matters of faith. It has jurisdiction also over the pope, because he cannot claim any supreme authority over clergy or people in human affairs. Church and state are reconciled in the fact that they are ultimately the same body of the people, with different functions, spiritual and temporal. Priests have no temporal jurisdiction for they received none from Christ. In regard to the ceremony of crowning Emperors, it has no validity in fact or right, but is at best an act of recognitif)n. He rejects all ecclesias- tical assumptions and prerogatives as a departure from the primitive sim- plicity of the Church of the Apostles and an attempt to attach to a purely » II. (• 9. 10. 236 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE spiritual organization temporal sovereignty, temporal functions which are inconsistent with the spiritual nature of her officers, duties, assemblies, and ends. He thus declares long before the reformation the principles which he applied in politics and theology alike, a protestantism which gives a harmon- ious theory of Church and stats, equally indepfmdent and exclusive.* (Ill) Conclusion. In the last part of the work we have a summary of the conclusions reached by Marsilius, conclusions which mark the first dawn of the political renaissance. (1) He distinguishes theology from liolitics and the sphere of the temporal from that of the spiritual power. He defends the civil power and separates it from the Church. He maintains liberty of conscience. To be compelled to observe precepts f»f divine law by punish- ment or temporal penalty is not allowed, A priest has no temporal jurisdic- tion, his province being to guide men to seek eternal life. The ministry is to serve the Church; the assembly of the clergy and laity, is to stand where the hierarchy has stood; nodutocr;it is to be permitted to rule either in Church or state. (2) The State is an organization of free men. There can be no freedom when one or some are despotes aliormn. Men unite in society to obtain common ;id- vantage and there can he no obedience on the part of citizens if they do not themselves make the laws. He might have ;idopted the langunge of Rousseau who seeks "to find a form of assofiation in wliich everyone united to all obeys only himself. "t People best know what is for their advantage and dis- advantage, and such knowledge is the surest safeguard of well-being in the state. (3) The people is sovtreiyn. The opinion of Aristotle and truth itself (.sccwnrZitm veritatem) establish that human legislators are to be the Universitas ot cWizens, (.r the majority of them, through their elected representatives. All know what is best for them and no one willingly injures himself, wcrjio .s^7>^ wocrf scienter. The sovereignty of the people is manifested in appointing and also in removing the executive as well as in making the laws. He presents the division of the i:)owcrs essential to a true democracy, (a) legislative power ne- longsto the people; (b) the people in their legislative capacity [institute the executive; (c) similarly it exercises judicial power, for it is the supreme court before whom the executive is placed upon trial for failure in duty. Thus Marsilius laid the foundation of the modern constitutional state which he prophetically forecasts in his bnok.| 4. William of Ockham, )2S0-1347. (1) Position in Imperial contest. The great English schoolman, the disciple of Duns ScoUis, lived through most exciting times, as a man. a politician and a phihsopher of exceptionally * II. C. 15. 1(5, 18. 22. + Contrat social. (;. 6. t Franck, pp. 135-150; .lanot. Vol. I. 4.')7-4()l; Poole, pp. 2^>-2.7(y, Riezler. pp. 193-233; Fried- crs. II. 32-4H; Goldast, II. 154. SCnOOLMElS' AND GROTIUS. 237 wide sympathifs. and involved in interests that covered a large area. He was a raan of action more tlian of speculation and his political tlieory comes out in the practical issues of his lime. lie was lecturing in Paris during the celebrated dispute between Eioniface VTII. and Philip the Fair, but he did not take any part in the controversy. The greatest intellectual genius in an age of iniellectual disputation, he Mgured as a prominent personage in the sceptical movement tiiat swept over the field of theology, in the political struggle between the pope and the Emperor, wliich developed the liberal doctrines of politics; and also in the struggle between the papacy and the extreme order of Franciscans on the question of poverty and the right of the Cliurch to hold property. He is best known for the courage he displayed in opposing the tyranny of the papal overthecivil power. Louisof Bavaria had been legally elected to the Imperial dignity; the pope, John XXII., refused to own him, claiming that he had a right to veto his election. This content was waged for over 25 years and the principal interest of it centres in the writings it produced. The men who espoused the Imperial cause found a shelter atMunich and publisiied their works in defence of the law of thecivil order versus the hierarchical despotism. Ockham published Several treatises during the struggle. He was contemporary with Marsilius and hisctlleague in the University of Paris. Pope Clement III. charges Orkham as the teacher of error to Mar- silius. His writings however are all subsequent to the Defensor Pads and are more theological, as well as treating of the controversial details of the time in whicii however the grand purpose is the same as that of Marsilius. to cut short the temporal and spiritual power of the pope. Marsilius no doubt learned much from Ockham. Ockliam on the other hand fell under the spell of the Italian orator's p ditic il eiLhusiasin. Marsiliuselaborated his theory in Paris and as a result of his supreme faith in it cast in his lotwith Louis. Ock- ham after fighting in the tliickest of the struggle accepts and formulates his ideas as the result of the part ho played in the melee. Marsilius stands like a iiary figure looking backward and pointing forward; Ockham on the other hand with torcli in hand makes his way onward, carrying the trend of tbougiit from the greater sciioolmen to tlie lesser, pionee.'ing the progress of reform, till it meets the passionate soul of IIuss, the popular spirit of Wyciif, and the reforming geniusof the German and Swi.ss anti-ecclesiastics. Ockhani's ciiief work is Dc poteslate Ecclesiastica et seculare, 132(). in which he attacks the temporal sovereignty of the pope and declares the independence of kingly power as a divine institution, inveigliing against the vices of Rome.* From the very nature of spiritual trutii and from the agencies it uses to apply itself to the hearts and lives of men, it must be subordinate to the principle of authority in any state where it is accepted as the founda- tion of a national religion. On account of the boldness (tf this writing he was forced to seek refuge in France for a time. * Goldiist. Mnn!iTchi;i. I. p. l.i. 238 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE In his work jLHsputatio super jMestate praelatis atqne principibns tcrranim commissa lie declares that no power can be exercised except in accordance with its natural and lawful attributes as a power; henCe the French kin^y does not possess superior authority over the Emperor, neither can the Em- peror exercise superior power over tlie French Monarch: that temporal rulers have no right to intermeddle with spiritual affairs, neither have spiritual officials any rif^ht to control temporal matters. Hence the spiritual minis- ters ought to confine their attention to the things that concern salvation, leaving to the princes of the temporal kingdom the government of the state, the conduct of war and the preservation of peace, as well as all executive ad- ministration. The pretension of the Pope is not founded upon fact and as a right it seems too absurd to need refutation. He declares that the priest is a citizen as much as ordinary subjects, and as such is to be subject to the temporal authority, to pay his share of the taxes and charges of government, as he shares its benefits and to support the civil institutions upon which the state is founded and by which its existence and peace are preserved.* In his Super potestatc siimmi jjontificis, l'Mi^-13i2, he p](icns the temporal power above the spiritual. t He still more strongly insists on this principle in the Trac- tatus (le Jurisdictione Imperatoris in causis nmtrimonialilms, 1342, in whicli he ascribes to the Imperial authority the right of declaring the degrees of affin- ity in marriage and of deciding judicially all contested cases X The indepen- dence of the civil power and the rights of election he assert plainly in his Tractatus de Electione Caroli ZT'.f (2) Position in the Franciscan struggle. Ockham was closely associated with Michael of Cesena, and Francis of Ascoli in the order c)f Franciscans. His life is largely bound up in this controversy, which arose between the Domin- icans, of which St. Thomas was a representative, and the Franciscans re- presented by Scotus. the predecessor and teacher of Ockham, iu the time of Thomas. Ockham was the greatest pupil of Duns Scotus and upon him fell the mantle of his master. Tiie Franciscans were mendicant friars and taught humility, bringing in the new doctrine of poverty, in which they de- clared that as Jesus Christ Himself had no property neither should the Chuch entangle herself with ihis worldly bnrden. They appealed to the Pope to sanction th's new departure, but the Pope and a general council de- cided against them, the pope at the same time fulminating his anethemas and decrees against the order. When they were handed over to the power of the Inquisition in the hands of their Dominican opponents, Ockham went * Scriptoies Oidiiiis Mhioruni. Ockham. Rome lt;.50. t Goldast, Monarchia. I. !558-(i47; Kiezler. p. 249. t Goldast, I. 21-24; Eiezler, p. 254. g Riczler, p. 271; Lindsay. "Ockham and his connection with the Reformation." Brit. Quart. Review, July 1S72; Lelland, c. :i26; Account of writings of Ockham, Riezler. pp. 241 sq. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 239 over to Louis of Bavaria who was himself in conflict with John XXII. in regard to the supremacy of the papal power over the imperial power, and joined issues with him, "defend me with the sword and I will defend you with the pen," the words he uttered on arriving as a fugitive at the Emper- or's court being the motto of their alliance. Francis had based the order of Minor Friars he instituted upon the principles of humility and the renuncia- tion of all property, individual and common; every individual was a brother or sister; the brotherhood was a conglomerate mass of individuals united on the extreme conception of charity, with little discipline or authority. The followers and successors of Francis were divided iuto a number of sects, many of them yielding themselves to great excesses in belief and practice, finding refuge in mysticism and monasticism, in which they despised all authority, temporal and spiritual, each individual being his own priest. Wadding tries to distinguish the Franciscans from these extreme factions, but they were all united on a common basis of poverty. It is in this connection that Cesena and Ockham appear as their defenders against the papacy. In 1316 Michael of Cesena, the general chapter of the Minor brothers or- dained a more strict adherence to the doctrine and practice of evangelical poverty; and with a view to restore the extreme sects called by the general name of spirituals, he appealed to John XXII. to ordain the dissolution of their separate orders and to impose severe penalties upon recalcitrants who refused submission. This measure reunited the order. But it opened the way for the opposition of the papacy. Jn 1322 a Franciscan was seized by the Domin- ican Inquisitors and through the intervention of one of the Franciscans the question of poverty was raised. It was carried to the papal court and the Doctors were set to investigate whether Jesus and his apostles had property. The order of Franciscans held a chapter general at which they decided, that having examined the proofs relative to the question, it was true, they be- lieved, that Jesus and his apostles had no right of property, general or indi- vidual, and therefore the principle of poverty is sound Catholic doctrine. To this decision Ockham appended his name as one of the provincials of the order; in fact he wrote the resolution of the order himself. The Pope deposed Cesena, and declaring him a heretic depfived him of all otflce and dignity in 1329. He retired to Louis at Munich, who made him his adviser and in whose cause he wrote while defending himself against the attacks of the Pope and the Council of Perpignan, in which he declares that the Pope has forfeited his right to share in the government of the world in the interests of Christianity, and that it remains with the emperor to govern the world in the interests of the cause of the poor.* Ookham entered into this controversy with all theenthusiaim of his being. * Goldast. Monarchiii, III. I334-4fi; WaddinR. Ann. Old Mlnornni, Anno. 1:522. No. TiH. Bk. VII.2nd. Ed.; Kleury, Reel. Hist.J?2. c. fia, 94. c. Ki; Smith's Eecl. Hist. Vol. II. I't. U. p 382; Fianrlv. pp. ir>:t-170; Tiipzlcr, pp. ."iit. sq. 240 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THET The manifesto drawn up and signed at Perouse is Hie motto which guided his lacile pen in elaborating his principles. He published a defence of pov- erty in opposition to the errors of Jolin XXll.* Jn this writing he becomes the champion of spirituality, in which the rule of Francis is pushed to its furthest limit in defence of the Fratricelli who proclaimed themselves tlie enemies of all property, individual and collective. He sets forth at the same time the doctrine of equality in the Christian brotherliood which has no distinctions and makes no differences among indiyiduals. On these two points he bore against the pap;icy, for the foe of property is the adversary of tiie papal d(uninion and the friend of a Church organization purely spiritual: and the friend of brotherhood is the opponent of hierarchical dignitaries and despotic actions in the name of Christianity. He is li d lo leb 1 against the authority of the Church and tolaystress upon the lay element just as Marilius liad done. An outlaw from tlie Church he continued to reside under imper- ial favor as a defender of civil independence in respect of the Ecclesiastical ])ower, witlistanding the encroachments of the papacy and censuring the ex- cesses of the monks. (I) The nominalistic ideas of OcJihrim at the hofiis of Politics. Nominalism was nut merely a pet theory with him. it exercised an influence upon his political doctrines and his idea of natuial tight. Knowlerige exercises an influence upon the religioiisand morMlorder. Kiuiwledge spi ings from a d(iuV)le source, intuition and abstraction, called ct'.s Mi^ui^tm rf ah)itract<(tiva. By the former l)rocess be means t lie experience which results from observation, whereby the faculty of the mind apprehends wiiat ispr(sent( d to it in evidence whetlu^r external to Hie senses or internal to the n ird. and judges of its existence: by the- latter process he understands the capacity of ahstracting the particular facts (ir ideas with tlieir special circumstances, which we have perceived, and considering them by themselves in separation from all others. It is In this way we particularize objects and ideas, the quiilities pertaining to tlu-m :ind 1 lie circunHt;in(<'s c(inn('Cti'd wit b t iieni. According to this the nature of knowledge presents ideas as nothing in themselves, simply a eiuality e)f the mind, wire li cuni.ot I'e' sepaialed freini it, excited i)y I heexlernal object: there is ijd iiiterm(>diary l)ei\veen I lie object known and the subject kimwing it, he'r;ce genera! ideas are simply sigi;s by means eif which paiticulars ;ire united by their sitnilarii ies in a ceimme;n term. All that is univer'^al exists e)tdy in t lie inli vidnals (|iiit (' elisi itict fiDUi exie anol her. Weknow nothing, for ex- am|ile. eif universal humanity except what we kne)w of the individuals as they are disLinguisiied freim one ane)ilier. All e»ur knowledge therefore which is re^ii comes directly ttirough the senses or thre)ugh the mind; whatever else we know is ahstracliem. In this case the moral qualitii^s are known only in their Iiart icular aspect, and tliere can be no menal duty universally binding upon * I'nblisliocI by lii-owii. in the apijendix of P:isrictilns icinni e».\petotuljiiiui). IT. p. 4:i(i. London, UiOO; Kie/lei-, p. 24!); Singiihiri' opus oidinis S. l''i'aiici.sci. Venetiis. 151i{. III. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTiUS. 241 all rational beings. Hence we cannot know virtue or sciertce aVisolutely, but only as they are particular qualities of a human soul. Instead of unitingr and reconciling human reason and faith, as did Thomas, Ockham separates these, denying to reason the right of speaking concerning anything touching theology. He does not use this to destroy religion or re- ligious liberty, because however much he has been opposed and subj<-clcd to the penalties of the Church for insubordination to religious authority, his philosophy has not been placed under censure. Ockhatn accepted this posi- tion in all sincerity, as giving to faith a more secure position, wilh less hazard, and in this lie was followed by some of the purest spirits of the 14th. and 15th. centuries. Reason is relegated to that which is relative and tem- poral, in order that faith may be reserved for the absolute and divine. How does he apply this? By emphasizing the principles of his own order. When faith unquestioningly accepts the instructions of the Scripture, abandoning at its call all worldly goods, even life itself, to obey the voice of the Master, he has the best defence he could make of poverty, and consequently against property. In the same mystic spirit the voice of revelation interdicts all worldly power so far as the Christian is concerned: as a result the voice of God commands the head of the Church to abstain from all temporal author- ity and to give up all temporal possessions, in order to devote his spiritual office to a spiritual end. Thus besets up the power of the temporal rulers independent of the Church. The temporal power is a secular one and as such the Cliurch can have noth- ing to do witii it. In defending the temporal sovereign he has less respect tothe temporal power than to the spirituality of the Church and her separ- ation from the world. 'J he Emperor and all human princes are like reason, the pope, clergy and all Christians are like revelation. The eartlily ruler is contined to earthly concerns and objects, and governs in conformity with the rule of reason, the spiritual officer governing only by spiritual means, so as to promote the salvation of the soul. The result is that spirituality alone is perfection; ail propeity is to be despised in order to attain such a condi- tion. The soul is to have free play, but the body needs clothing and nourish- ment. To secure these one needs earthly goods and the help of others, physical as well as spiritual. Unless there is the title to these goods, who has the right to buy them? According to Ockham, the only right to proper- ty in a spiritual being is tliat of charity. In his abstraction he has forgotten that man is a creature of the earth as well as a being for heaven and that property is necessary to realize personality. His idea is that of the monk.* (II) Theological politics. Ockham is a theologian and he commences from that point of view to develop his politics. His opposition to the papacy is based upon the papal condemnation of the new doctrine of the Franciscans * Haureau. Srhol. IMiil. II. 450; Fianrk. pp. 184 sq. 242 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE concerning evangelical poverty. To deny the clergy property is to strip them of temporal authority and to lay low the Church of Rome. Ockham interpreted the course of history; for while the simple political theories of Marsilins were forgotten, the theory of Ockham is alive and is vindicated in the religious reformation of the Kith, century. It was as he had predicted two centuries before it took place, a theological revolution that shook the temporal power of the papacy, and wrought or at least opened the way for tlie accomplishment of tlit^ political changes in Europe.* (1) Liberty. Tlie Christian system is appealed to as a law of freedom in which tliere is introduced an entirely uew element. If the pope, he argues, possesses such large powers, then ail Christians who are under him must be his slaves, and one only can be free, for tlie pontiff, according to this idea of supreme prerogative exercises over all, kings and subjects alike, a power in respect of goods and property as well as of persons, not less despotic but more arliitrary than that of the master over his slaves. Christ in freeing Christians from the bondage of the law has rescued them from all servitude; and iiis law is not a law of liberty if they are freed from one servilude to be subjected to another. It is objected by some tiiat Christians are n(;t entirely set free from domination, because it is permitted to Christians to be themselves and to have slaves. It is true that the new law of Christ does not rescue man from every kind of service, because Christians are permitted to be serfs and villains; but it does not permit them to be placed in a greater degree of sub- jection than were the Jews. This does not imply that Christians are tiie slaves of the pope, for while Christians are permitted to have and hold pro- jierty in earthly possessions, slaves and seifs are not. The Christians by l)ermission of the imperial laws liave possession of goods so that the pope is not the sole owner. Likewise Christians are permitted to have serfs whereas serfs have no liberty to possess slaves. Cliristians. tlierefore. are not serfs or slaves of the pope, but free men, and tliat by the law of Christianity. There- fore (Jliiistum liberty is the foundation and guarantee of civil liberty, relig- ious freedom the basis of political inrlependence on the part of the citizens, and consequently Clifistian freerkim is one of tlie essential principles of a free state. The principle is that a free soul demands a free body. Christian- ity enfranchises t lie soul from sin ami servitude to the Mosaic law; therefore it, ought to tree the body. History has illustrated this jjrincipie which Ockliam did not fully com- prehenil himscMf, tlie progress of Cliiistian civilizal ion having been the means of rescuing liumanity frttm servitude. Ockham aoes not measure tlie full consequences of his principle, for while he declares that Christians ought not to be slaves, he permits them to have others as slaves. He gets over this however by discriminating between two classes of human beings, as most of the Schoolmen had done, the believer and unbeliever, the Christian and * Coinpend. error, papao I. .'5; Goldiist. It. 9.58 sq. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTiUS. 243 the barbari.-in or foroig-ner. It is not yet the freedom of man as man. hut of pjrin as a Christian, that is the foundation of civil freedom. It is theological or Christian liberty that is introduced into politics.* (2) Authority. The Pope or the Emperor. It is difficult to jjet at the definite views of Ockham. Accordin'^ to his method which is set forth in the treat- ment of the subject of power, the ecclesiastical and secular power oug'.t they to be united in a single pf^rson, he asks. In answering hf gives the affirma- tive and negative reasons, going back over every answer to give the arguments for and against. Hisopinioncan only he gathered from the woight he attach- es to the an-^wers and arguments. He strenuously repudiates the imperial authority claimed by the pope, as a usurpation: and at the same time he does not express his wish to give it to any other person or body of persons. It is enough for him to take away the autocratic power from the spiritual head, he does not transfer it to the emperor although in some respects the emperor he allows is above the pope.f Not onlv is the popedeprived of his supreme power, the general councils are placed in the same category! The assembly of the Church is to be composed of representatives, not of clergy alone, but also of the lay element,, men and women alike being represented. Even to such a representative council of Christians, representative of all, male and female, lay and clerical, there does not pertain absolute authority in the matters of faith. g The emperor in a sense as the supreme power, entrusted with it by the people under certain limitations, is the natural final judge in ecclesiastical and civil matters, the pope himself being subject to him.|| The assembly of the Church is regarded as an Ecclesiastical Council, not as a representative of the legislative power of (he people, and its functions are purely Ecclesiastical. It cannot be said that supreme power in matters of faitli belongs to any earthly power. With Ockham this council is an Ecclesiastical tribunal to be used only in case of the pope becoming a heretic or incompetent for his office. Women, he ad- mits, to this Ecclesiastical council as members, propter unitatem fidei rironnn et muliernm, quae omues taugit et in qua non viasculus vecfconiva. . . .non est mulier a qeneraU concilio exdudenda .^ It is human to err, hence in man we naturally find an element of error. Therefore no form or organization or system of man can he said to contain perfect truth.** Inspired truth alone is infallible. The tradition of the Church and the decrees of Popes and councils are tainted with imperfection. Hence the infallibility of popes or councils is no part of Ockham's creed. tt He i.s not carried away with the imperial idea, nor does he place absolute confi- dence in unity, that is numerical unity in power, for he regards it as better * Dialojru.s III. tract, i. lib. IT. c. .VS. II Dial. III. ii. ITT. 17. + Dial. III. i. T. 9-l(). 1 Dial. I. i. VI. a5. Goldast. II. G0.5. t Dial. I. i. V. l-,5: III. i. III. 8-13. ** Dial. I. i. V. 25-35. S Dial. T. i. VI. m. tt Dial. III. 1. III. 1-4. 244 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE in certain circumstances tliat tliere should be several popes and likewise sev- eral princes.* In political affairs he prefers the nationality of the state, such as he found it in his own native land and in France where he spent a great part of his life to any fanciful imperial conception. f In history there is a progress that is moulded by thecircumslancesof the tiraesrnostateof society, nohuman insti- tution can presume to be absolutely final in form, that is, there is no absolute- ly rigid and unchangeable form of government, nodivine right of any special theory; and no single individual be he pope or emperor can impose his will as a barrier to the progressive adaptation in form of government to the condi- tions of society. J If the empire at present is worldwide, it is siiitf^fi tn tbe necessities of the world: but it is not universal, for it does not include every- thing, for spiritual concerns cannot he subordinated to temporal sovereignty. Neither can rhe pope claim to exercise the pipe's spiritual power in the temporal domain. The state is an o-ganic independent organization, free in its own domain, subject to th'^ will of the entire community; the Church IS a spiritual organism independent in spiritual concerns, also subject to the popular will of Christf^ndom expressed in the general assembly or council of the Church.^ Each power has its own definite position and sphere, free and untrammelled. The independent P'ranciscan spirit of Ockham draws upon the apostolic ex- amples. Deen as his reverence is for spirituality lie is in favor of free thought and denies to the Pope the right of trenching upon the liberal ideas of phil- osophy or theolf]gy. The stale is in its sphere independent of and SHperiC)r to the Church. In the Church the pope he acknowledges as the head, but he is subject to the voice of the Church and there is a right of appeal from him to the gent-ral body of Ciiristians, to the society of Christendom, in whom the residuar-y spiritual power resides. If the pr pe errs evps. In default of eccles- iastical judgment he may be judg'd by the secular power, if he is guilty of any serious crimes. 0<'khani has alreadv defended the independence of tlie Ecclesiastical and civil powers, hut now when crime or heresy endanger Sf>- ciety and the Churcli action is necessary somewliere. That action is impera- tive on the part of the Emperor, but also on the part of the people as a whole, in order to prevent the overthrow of iilierty, truth and authftrity. It is the first sign of a popular, independent movement in the settlern*^nt of the ques- tion of tire age, the Schism between Church and State, and the Schism in the Church itself. It bore fruit in the reforming Councils of Basleaad Constance * Dial. irr. i. n. 2.5-30. + Dial 111. ii. 1. 1-12. * Dial. TIT. ii. 1.5. S Dial. III. ii. II. ti-9. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTiUS. 245 and prepared the way ff)r the general reformation of Church and State, en- franchising the people, all the people, as members of the Church and as ciuizens in the state.* 5. John Wycllff, i;^24-lHS4. Wyclif lias heen called the "morning star of the Reformation."' A brilliant scholar and M asler at Oxfoid, a hard-working parish cleric, and a mf)sl energi-tic organizer he left his impress upon the English Chuicli. peopleand nation. His preaching friars in their russet gowns were themselves witnesses of the activity and enthusiasm of a man who per- haps next to Chaucer, the father of English vnse, did more for English manners, language and civilization than any other before the reformation of the 16t,h. century. Tlie share lie took in opposing the pretensions of papalism and in asserting the independent nationality of the English people and the na- tional character of the English Church has given nim an imperishable place in the memory of the Anglo-Saxon race- In the contest between Pope Urban Y. and the King of England in regard to the payment of the annual tribute promised by the weak King John as an acknowledgment of the Pope's feudal superiority, Wyclif defended the English monarchy against papal usurpa- tion. There was but one Church in his time; while in that Church he crlesout vigorously against her abuses. The papacy at this time was more than any- thing else a great political institution, claiming to regulate the affairs of all Cliristendom. It sought to exercise certain prerogatives over the English national Ciiurch which were offensive to the secular rulers, claiming in fact the island as its property. Wyclif was the representative of the School when he made his attack on the papal excesses. The seeds of liberty he sowed excited the hatred of the Roman priesthood, a haired manifested not only during his life by constant annoyance and vexatious decrees, but even after his death in cremating his corpse and scattering its dusi upon the waters of the Swift, a branch of the Avon, to be borne on the tide irito the bosom of the ocean. Wyclif was not only a saint, scholar, and evangelist, he was a Churchman and Scliolastic. Like Marsilius and Ockham, Wyclif represents a national opposition to the papacy. About 13(i(i he published his work entitled Determinatio qtiaedam de Dominio in defence of the Englisii Parliament which repudiated the power of the pa- pacy to exact the tribute promised by King Jolin. In it we find the earliest traces of his doctrine of lordship, domininm, in which he presents the idea of a spiritual feudalism on parallel lines with the temporal feudalism; and in which he sets forth the grounds of his antagonism to the papal claims, which he i)ased not upon theological, but upon political grounds. lie denied the right of the spiritual authority to interfere in temporal afifairs, which led * Riezler. pp. 258-271; Goldiist. Monarchia, II. 399-992; F'abriclus 1. c. III. p. 46(i; Janet, I. 445-4.57; Poole, pp. 277-281; Fraiick, pp. 18...-200; Haenel, CjitaloKi llbror. Manusoript, in bibliotli. Galliae, .53 and 5ti. -^6 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE him to the Franciscan doctrine that the Church ougrht to have no temporal possessions, but ought to be purely spiritual.* His doctrine of Dommium he is said to have derived from his predecessor and teacher, Richard Fitz Ralph, Archbishop of Armagh, a doctrine which Fitz Ralph had used in opposing the friars and in supporting the beneficed clergy. t Wyclif does not accept his theory intoto, but rather modifies it by the Franciscan conception of spir- itualism versus temporalism. He really established a theory of his own which is religiou^-prilitical. In substance it is, (a) man has lost by sin all right to the po-!session of anything; (b) the consequence is, all property should be held in community; (c) th^ spiritual power is quite distinct from the tempor- al, and in overriding the limits of its authority it subjects itself to the tem- poral authority, because of usurpation: (d) the Church ought to have no property and ought not to pronounce the sentence of excommunication in the case of any temporal offence; if it does s'» there is really no excommunica- tion. Wyclif sets forth these ideas in his treatises De Doniinio.X His theory was vastly difft-rent from that of Marsilius and Ockham, his predecessors, and in fact from that of the men o1 his own age. Other theo- rists were groping in the mine of Aristotelian philosophy to discover, or hewing from the quarry of Old Testament Theology, a system to graft on to the modern society; while the jurists were culling selections from the civil law to support the imperial idea, and the papal devotees from thecancm- ists. There was iio attempt to formulate a theory on the basis of the then existing constitutions. There was one theory, however, preposterous as it may seem that adjusted itself tothp conditi<»ns of feudal society and present- ed an ideal picture of what society ought to be. It was not a practical theory, and it was basrd upon as impracticable an idea of the Scripture theory as that of any of the hierarchical writers. Pure and simple as understood at the time it was Christian socalism. The doctrinal theology ot Wyclif was orthodox, his character sustained, but he had an ardent desire as a Churchman to reform the papacy and to establish it above the reproach and the corruption into which it had fallen.? His political and theological ideas, are contained in the word Lordship. Bomimvm, the title he gives to histheory He develops this lordship in twf> directions in his two worlds, De 7)omim"o JDivino, Divine Lordsiiip, and De Civili Dominio. Civil Lordship t| (1) Genernllheoi-y of Lordship. Godand humanity are inseparably united. Their * Printed by J. Lewis. \Ate of Wiclif. Oxford. 1820. AppLMidix. pp. 349-a'>t) from M. S. in Bodleian Library, Oxford, arch. Seld. B. 26. ff. .'54. sq. + See F. D. Mathew. in Introd. to English Worli.s of Wyclif. p. W. 1S80. t De Civili Dominio, edited by R. L. Poole. 188.t; De Ecclesia. by J. Loserth, 1886. S Lechier, Johann Von Wyclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation. I. ."iTS. n. 2. II Published under theVVyclif Society by R. L. Poole from the original codices in the palace Library at Vienna, the De Dominio Divino from Codex. 13:59 corrected from 1294 and 39.3.5; the De Civili Dominio from the only extant copy, Codex 1^40 containing book III. and l;i41 books I. and IL SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 247 union is effected by means of lordsiiip and service. The idea of lordstiip does not pertain to the natural order of existence, for lordsiiip is correlative with service and there was no possibilitj' of service until God by an act of crea- tion, depending upon an act of will, produced creatures capable of standing in relation to Himself as creatures.* The Elohim-God of Genesis I. is presented as the Jahveh-Elohim, Lord-God, in Genesis IL The self- existent being, self-sufficient because of plurality, becomes the Lord, I am as I am, because he has creatures in the positirm f)f service to him; just as man is lord over the lower animals by his creation. Lordship and service therefore imply mutual relations of itoings, and are corresponding terms in denotintr the two sides of the relation. Lrtrdship, implies authority and right and something more, because lordship cannot exist unless there are subjects in obedience to it, over whom it has rights and upon whom it exercises its power. Ltrdship, therefore, implies the use of power and the exercise of rights; for rights and powers may exist without the enjoyment of the one or the use of the other. O.i the other hani, lordship beinj; more than a right or power, is an inherent characteristic or habit of the ration- al nature and manifests itself as a habitual element of nature in the fact of its superiority over other inferior creatures. Drmiininmest hahitudo naturae ratiimalis secundmn quam dcnominatui- sufi ytrefici servicnti.t Divine lordship belongs to God by virtue of his creating power and the act of creation, and it shows its power in exercise in the control of the universe and the governni'mt of man for His own purposes. The Divine is the only sovereign lordship, because it is universal; and while it is not required on the part of God that he receive service from man, though he is independent of man's service, yet it is of such an absolute character that all creatures offer him homage. J God acts immt'diately in his government of man and the uni- verse, neither reqnirinff nor using the mediation of others in establish- ing and sustaining Ins lordship over all, but holding all things in immediate relation with himself. God is the sovereign lord, all creatures are his imme- diate vassals. In feudalism there was a series of subinfeudations, the king being chief vassal, his vassais-immediate the greater barons, their vassals immediate and the king's mediate being the lesser barons, and so on down the scale of vassalage. Divine feudalism views God as the supreme Lord and every creature his immediate vassal by the same kind of tenure, each one holding directly from the supreme Lord. Every individual is dependent upon God and upon God alone, no one is an intermediary between God and man. I Here we have the substance of Wyclifs independent theory as distinct * De Div- I>on). 1.2. + ibid. I. 1-2. * ibid. I. H. 8 Ibid. I. 4. 5. i:48 THE rOLlTICAL THEORY OF THE from the tlieory and practice of th^ age in which he lived. As Ockham laid low the priesthood by nominalism, Wyclif strikes out the priestly power and denies priestly interference by placing all men on an equality before God and making them all hold equal rank as citizens under the sole universal lordship of (t id Himself. Everyone "holds" from God in the language of feudalism. (II) AjrpHcation of the I'hcory of Lordship. He applies this doctrine of Divine feudalism to man and every man in his remarlunting to mortal sin acts as a forfeiture of any and every right of dominium given to man. J [2) Righteousness is the fundamental princijile of LordshijK consequently every righteous [)ers')n is lord in the visible world. This lordship is not limited to a part or a few things in the sensible world, but extends to all things; for if a righteous man has a right to enjoy anything he has tiie right to enjoy every- thing, liecause all things are gifted by God, and God gives everything to a truly righteous man by first giving Himself. Even in adversity the righteous are lords of all tlie world, because all things work for the good of the right- eous and serve him whether they are in harmimy with his present position * DeOiv. Dom. I. 1. + ibiri. 1.2. * ibid. \.h. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 249 or whether they afflict and trouble him.* Seeing that there are many right- eous ones and as each one is entitled to the lordship of the whole world (dominus imiversitatis), there cannr)t be any private possessions, everything in the shape of goods or possessions ought to be held in common, for the good and service of all {Omnia debent esse commHnia).f The consequence of this dictrine is twofold, (a) all lordship, possession and gf)vernment is founded up- on grace, not upon moral nature, but upon moral nature regenerated tey grace from God [si est in gracia est dominus universitatis). (n) Only the subjects of this divine grace have any right to lordship, or possession, or control of anything; therefore the wicked when they do enjoy them usurp their posses- sion or control. This is the natural result f)f the doctrine that domination of man over man was introduced by the sin and fall of man.t (3) Following from the last principle is another, that the gospel low alone is necessary in the exercise of that lordship. All (irdinances and laws of a human kind are, if not superfluous, at least not essential but accidental. Such hu- man laws and arrangements result frtm the fall, giving rise to tyranny ac- cording as men arbitrarily set-k a self-interested dominium. Accordingly there is a distinction between natural lordship and civil lordship, the latter be- ing subordinate to the former, springing up as a consequence of, and possess- ing only a relative character, depending upon and varying with the changing necessities and circumstances of men in society. Natural l(»rdship is domin- ium divinitus institiitum, civil \or(\s]\i\) \ii occasione peccaii hnmanitus institutum. All human institutif)ns are variable and fallible; and consequently in civil lordship there is no inflexible and unalterable form of government. TVie fact that a certain form is assumed or that a certain ruler is chosen by a peo- ple to govern in a certain way does not make the government conform to the law of natural lordship. Natural law with Wy(;lif is different from the na- tural law of the other Schoiilmen; natural law is the law of the gospel laid down in the distinoiioii i.f righteous and wicked.? Like Aquinas he goes to the Old Testament for the model of the best gov- ernment. It is a kind of righteous Aristocracy in which the administration and legislation depend upon judges who are chosen in a plurality from the people and by them, because such a gftvernnient in the abstract comes near- est to natural Lordship. His appreciation of the Republican form arises from the fact of the history of Israel, that the origin of the republican form was in God's own appointment, while tl)e monarchic sprung from the will of the people, when they fell away into defection fntm the divine form of government. He depreciates the priestocracy, because he says that the final form of degenerate government in Israel was that of the priests in which * ibid. 1.7. ( + ibid. 1 14. 15. * ibid. I. .'i. § ibid. I. 17-19,34. 230 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE were introduced more of human ordinances, the introduction of which led the people first of all to captivity and finally to entire disintegration. The ideal form of government then in natural lordship is the Aristocracy. But when it comes to the practical application in civil lordship, he thinks mon- archy is the best, because seeing that all men are sinful and tendencies exist among all men to detreneracy and corruption, a strong government is needed to check excesses and to prevent decay. Such a strong government is more easily found in the single will of a powerful ruler.* He discusses the respec- tive merits of succession by heredity and by election in the transmis>ion of lordship. Hereditary succession tends to develop tyranny, becauf^e the cer- tainty that the son nr heir will follow the present ruler gives him a security in the government which one depending upon personal merit does not enjoy. This is confirmed by the medieval idea that a hereditary prince has the dominium of his kingdom and cannnt be deposed even for tyrannical use of his power; that the sr)ciety can only depose one whom it has elected, not a hereditary' prince. On the other hand such an idea of transmitting to his son or heir his rulnrship may and ought to exercise a beneficial influence up- on the c )uduct of the ruler, that he >^hall make the best possible u.se of his trust and receive the highest approbation from those whom he governs. Popular election is vitiated by the re^iulis of the fall, the consequence being that often, even inthe majority of cases, the vote of the people, even of all the people is give ^ in support of what is evil, so that the electing power of the community is used in elevauing the wiong person or persons to the rulership. Neither heredity nor election however gives absolute title to lordshiji, unless the person so succeeding is a subject of grnce and so qualified as a righteous person to exercise the lordship t (4) Lordship presupposes and implies its correlative, service. That is, those who are themselves lords are t)0und in service to God from whom they derive their lordship and to whom they are rasp')usihie.J This is the means of keeping them from excess, because as custodians of power received from God, they exercise it in his s(>rvice. Kings are limited by thair responsibility to Gf»d. The absolute lordship of God alone is unconditional and unlimited, authori- ty in the hands of man is limited and c )nditional. \ll men are the ministers of God and servants of one another I Even the Pontiffs acknowledge in their bulls and decrees that they are servants of God. And since they are servantsof God, they ;ire not infallineorsoveieign, ; r.das lords th( yarestew- ards.ll All men who are just and faitiiful are co-participat ors in lordship, and hence all power is in common, and all property is held in common. To take possession of power or possessions by force is illegitimate, because con- trary to the commands of God's word; and to alter the form of society, im- * ibid. I. 27. t ibid. I. 11. + ibid. I.29-H0. S \hU\. 1. 19. II ibid. I. 14. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 251 perfect and unformed though it be, is illegal because the divine being has given his sanction to the present constitution of human society, and a change is contrary to his will. It is a pari of the plan of providence which orders all things for the good of the righteous. The righteous may not enjoy all things in the present life, but they have aright to them, although they are not to exercise their right to enforce possession from present possessors; thuir right will become actual possession in tiie life to come. It is enf»ugh to be con- scious that as Christiiins we are erititled to all things, and that the wicked whatever they have, have no right to its possession: they liave their enjoy- ment and possession iiere; in the future it is cut (tff and in tl)e removal of sin every wrf)ng is thoroughly rectified.* Walsingham charges to the communistic doctrines of Wyclif and his disci- ples the peasant's revolt of 1382. Ball boasttd that he had imbibed tlie views of Wyclif upon property ownership and civil power. It is but justice to Wy- clif to say, that such violent measures never entered his mind, and no word that he has written can be construed into an incitement or encouragement to the use of violence, for his first principle clearly laid down is that force is contrary to the law of God.t (5) Summary. The one idea running through the whole theory is the dis- tinction of the righteous and the wicked; the righteous have a natural right to everything, but it is founded on grace; the wicked have no rights natural, all their enjoyments and possessions being civil. Every distinction in socie- ty and among men is based upon this primary conception. It gives rise to the tyranny that is found, so often in society and in history, the fact that enjoyment and po.»Jsession are always veith the wicked a usurpation. Feudal- ism is the theocratic conception that realizes the relations of lordship and service, this feudalism being determined by two factors, (a) every relationship of lordship and service among men implies and presupposes the over-lordship of God and the seiv ice ol man: (b) the determining element in man's charac- ter is not his outward positif)n of otlice, but his inward relation of lieart and soul with God. Wliile every individual has a natural right to all things and all power, he may not use liis power or enjoy Ills right in opposition to the present form of the civil structure of society, nor may he refuse to acknowl- edge the civil governor, even though he be a tyrant, because he rules in accordance with divine permissicm. Wyclif goes so far in this permissive will of God tliat if the devil should usurp aul,hority in the world, God ought lie says to obey even the devil. Tyranny or usurpation of power gives no excuse for disobedience, for refusal to acknowledge it or for tyrannicide. The fact of the existence of a power gives tlie right of obedience which must ac- cordingly be passive.! * ibid. 1.9. 12. 16. + Poole, p. 299. * ibid. I. 28. 252 THE POLITICAL TriEORY OF THE He distinguishes between the temporal and spiritual powers, and limits each to its own province. In the present condition of life and state of so- ciety the temporal is sovereigrn in secular affairs, and the spiritual in religious matters, each being independent and free from interference in itsown depart- ment. Nobishnpor pope can exercise any secular office, because to enter upon any temporal function is to degrade the sovereign dignity of the sp'ritual f»fflcereceivedfr"(m God.* Yet he does not proscribe thr> pope's benediction or grant, hecause only by the blessing of the Pope does God give h's special fav- ors to men. t Uo regards all human legislation as accidental and arising from thf necessities of a sinful condition of man. In the future state, or the external order as he calls it, the power of the righteous will be estab- lished: human ordinances will no longer be necessary, because sin will bo eradicated and man will return to thp divine, eternal law. He concedes the necessity of civil society as a providentially permissive nocessitv. J Mean- while tho present order is one of confusion; the conflict of the temporal and spiritual powers is due tosinand sin's selfishness and tyranny. Them is- use of the power of the dodo has brought him and the papacy into discredit. So much has the Pone interfered, especially in England, in legard to tem- poralities Wyclif is led to assert tlie cemplote independencr^ of the nation in temporal things; and even within the splierp of tlie Church herself he joins Ockham in questioning the utility and the indispensable character of the popedom in spiritual matters. Temporal revenues are to be restored to tne temporal province and the Church limited to spiritual things. § He qups- tions if the time may not yet come when Ecclesiasticism will be abolished and the Church return into the hands f)f the laity. [] An office does not give an individual any suneriority, unless he has an excellence of character to back it up. He arrives at the conclusi(m that man is an individual, his liberty, responsibility, and authority are individual, so that toleration and qualifica- tions for office in Church and State depend upon the personal status. Con- sequently in Churcli or State the individual is independent and self deter- mining, so far as the organization to which he attaches himself is concerned, and the organization itself is free from thr interference of every other such organization. Yet a porson is nothing and has no power by right unloss he belongs to the body of Christ, and rrcrives through grpce a qualification of character that gives him a right to all the gifts of God. He thus becomes the advocate and exponent of Christian individualism and Christian social- Ism as the two great principles in politics and religion. Tj * ibid. T 11.17. + ibid. T. n. t ibH. I. 17. § ibirl. If. 12. II ibM. I.4:j. 1 Poole, pn. 290-807: Smith's l^cclas. Hist. Vol. IT. Pf,. IT. r. :n. n. raOsn.: Lifo of Wv<'lif ny .Tnhn Lowis. 1719. Robert Vjiusihan 1S28 and IS^H. T.c Uao 1K:!'^: Lo(-h'pr. .Tolinnn Von ' Wi- clif iind (Wo Vorsrcsfliicliti' dor Hoformation. I,oii)^ir ls7:i: IJoacon Lislits of History. Vol. n ('.24. p. 4:i;{sq.: Work.sof Wvlif edited bv V I). M;it hew: D'Aubicup. Hist, of Reform. Vl!;, ^- '■; 'tt'!"^' ^- P ""^-'-I'l- Kdirib. 18.5a; Poole, Wiclille and Movoinents for Refoiiu. Epocbs of Church History. London ISWI. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 253 CHAPTER III. THE SPANISH JURISTS. VICTORIA. SOTO. SUAREZ. 1. Introdicction. Humaniftm. Spanish Jurists. The fifteenth century pro- duced some learned Scholastics. It was the period in which Scholasticism became disintegrated through the influence of mysticism and rationalism. This was the age of brotherhood or community, asserting itself equally in Germany, France, Italy and England. Above all it was the age of Humanism, that revival of letters and literature called Classicism which was the prelude of the Reformation in the 16th. Century. Among the first, perhaps the first, both in point of time and in excellence of spirit and work was the poet and philosopher Dante. He had a conscious purpose of banishing barbarism, and in the dawn of an awakened interest in literature to prepare the way for the revival of science, the revival of rational philosophy ;;iid the reformation of society. One of the brightest stars in the humanistic sky was the success- or of Dante, Francis Petrarcha. To the revival of purity in the Latin tongue and the perfection of Italian poetry may be added the grace and elegance with which he clothed morality in some of the choicest flowers of literature.* This was the age of the conquest of the East by the Turks and the exile of the Greek scholars in Italy and AVestern Europe. Greek Literature which had lain in silence for centuries arose with fresh light to revive the world. The Italian poets, having created a taste for literature, left the task of en- couraging it to the laudable rivalry of princes, and especially to that human- istic prelate, Nicolas V. whose patronage made Rome the home of learning. Lorenzo de Medici, the prince of Florence, expended the wealth of his noble family in procuring the most valuable manuscripts which anticiuity possessed. In the latter half of the 15th. Century .lohn Argyropolus taught the philoso- phy of Aristotle under the authority of the Roman see at Rome. Laarentius Valla the most celebrated Latin of liis age refuted the absurdities of the narhariaris. resurrected Italian literature and the Latin tongue and gave to Italians their former splendor of eloquonce, contributing to learning thi?, that learned men after his day were compelled to use accurate language in speaking and writitig.f Following upon this revival of learning scholastic philosophy was attacked in two different directions, by the followers of pure peripateticism and by the followers of platonism. The Greek refugees finding that Aristotelianism * Squarziifich, Vit. Petiarcli. Opor. proem. + Erasmus, Epist. VII. 7. 254 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE had become corrupted through Arabian translations, used their influence to introduce Aristotle himself and to throw out the Arabian and Scholastic adulterations. The platonists seizing the opportunity of appealing to the impiety cultivated by the doctrines of Averrlioes, recommended their system as better adapted to religion. Among the Scholastics themselves one de- serves special notice because he united in himself scholastic training and tendencies of a humanistic ll)y into a state of rebellion and tyranny. Divine revelation opens up a cliannel whereby the Divine mind is brought to bear upon the human mind in legislation and government. Thf grand design of the iv.litical life and of civil government is to elevate man to a higher life of perfection. \\v c(»tu'entrat.»s all his en- ergies upon this more perfect life, and in the social ai.d polit leal sphere he is guid(>d by the pfiwer of intellect or reason. Legislation is the chief province of tlie governor in the state, wlio tries to harmonize the actions of all so as to attain the end set forth. To possess true political knowledge and to impart it is tlie duty of the legislator. This political knowledge must be purely intellectual and develops .nilireedi- 256 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE reciioas, (a) an examination of the political causes which determine political action; (b) an abstract conception of the moral nature of man, apart from the sensuous nature, for legislation must depend upon the former if it is to be in a measure perfect and preserved from sensuous corruption; (c) to reach a perfectly clear political knowledge it must be viewed in its spiritual rela- tions, apart altogether from material things and relations. Legislation to be perfect in a word must be abstract, ideal and religious, moulded by reve- lation. To perfect legislation and through legislation to perfect men in so- ciety is the end of God's delegation of power to men in civil society. These Spanish .Jurists were Jesuits. One great design in the origin of the society of Jesus was a political end, to bring all nations into su])jection to the Roman see as the channel through which all political power is dispensed by God. This is the realization of the doctrine that God is the direct source of all power. The first Jesuit School was opened in 1546. It was soon creat- ed a University by the Papal Bull and the rescript of the Spanish king. The establishment of the Jesuit school was like the establishment of the Bologna School for the revival of Roman jurisprudence and it was an attempt to counteract the effect of the Reformation which had already been felt in Europe. While the kings and potentates whose empires had been shaken by the reformation were seeking to And some power to strengthen the unstable political structure, the pope was equally concerned to support and strengthen his own temporal and spiritual position. The Council of Trent, 1540, is an evidence of this desire; the existence and recognition of the Jesuits is anoth- er evidence. These Jesuits were tenacious and persistent in their efforts. One feature of their whole course and system, if thev ever had a system, is its variable character; they have lost the strict riiridltv of Scholasticism and in their political speculations they are guided largely by expediency and temporizintr expedients to gain success. Pope.Cleraent felt tlla^ they were a thorn in the Church's flesh, for he declared that "they troubled the entire Church." The main object of the society was to secure the recognition of the Pope as the holder of universal political power and to exert their influ- ence upon kings and governors to secure this end. In their opposition to the Reformation which preached the gospel of Christ, and consequently of free conscience and liberty of action, they dwelt earnestly upon the duty of obedience and enforced the moral side of religion, opposing the democratic tendency of the reformation by political expedients to secure obedience to Rome. In turn they used war, imprisonment and the torture to bring Protestants and Catholirs alike to subjection. In their zeal for truth, as they conceived it, they declined Ecclesiastical preferments, and threw themselves into the task of educating in the Universities and public schools. As educators they exercised a good influence upon Europe, taking advantage of the opportunities opened up by the revival of letters to spread their intellectual acquirements with great zeal and much talent. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 257 Europe owes much to the enthusiasm of the men who willingly travelled into every country to communicate the knowledge they had themselves acquired. We do not palliate any of the crimes of the order, nor commend the secret intrigues that were followed hy the majority of the members. We look to the noble and self-sacriflcing minority of nominal members of the order who were above the order itself, and whose writings present to us the last feeble, yet living and transforming views of the Schoolmen of Medieval ages.* 2, Victoria, f^oto. We cf me to a class of men who expound justice, mor- als and politics. Ferdinand Vasquez was the first to distinguish formally between the law of nature and the law of nations, or the particular ordi- nances of states, these two forming the wider, jus gentium, International Law. But the earliest exponent and systeniatizer of the general principles of Span- ish Scholasticism was Francis de Victoria, who when he died was a profess- or in the University of Salamanca, in 1546. He was a man of exceptional ability and genius in Spain, then one of the most enlightened and powerful of European naticms. He took as his guide the works of the Latin School men, chiefly the treatise upon laws in the Sim.nta of St. Thomas, the method he followed being casuistical. He was the first to elaborate these primal j rinciples which later became the foundation of the law of nations. The independence of the national state was asserted and vindicated by the establishment of the Science of International Law. which set up a determining authority to settle questions of right between those States. International Law and its advo- cates were the real promoters of nationality and independence in the State. In order to secure a solid foundation upon which to rest the princi- ples of justice and right among nations, Victoria placed the sanction of the obligations upon a theological principle and enforced it by appealing to the moral sentiments of the body of mankind in all ages and in all countries. His sentiments upon national honor and justice are exceedingly liberal and laudable. Theological casuistry was the foundation upon which was built up by means of local statutes and the lo()se practice of nations this system. It was recognized that not alone in jjeace. but also in war were there rights and duties belonging to and encumbent upon states and princes, and even enemies in comliat were entitled to receive a certain consideration at the hands of tiieir opponents on the principle of reciprocity. Ancient and medieval history and especially the tenets of the Christian faith supported this principle. The Spanish colimizat i( n niovemmts of this and the pre- ced in;? century gave rise to new principles of procedure in government and legislat ion. The discovery of America placed the old worldi n a new position, and demanded a new policy in administration and in the consideration of territorial nationality. Europe seemed awakened to a new interest in politi- ♦ Dio Maral !i.k1 I'olitik dor .lesuitcii. Ell.-i.dorf, Diiiinstadt, IS4(1; Ludovlcus Vivcs. Hclaliogestoiuui I'atniin .^ocictiitis. ISmi; Hlakcy. Hist, of I'ol. J-lt. II. p. :Jti.'S sij. 2'">« THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE cal questions by the opening up of new fields of enterprise and political problems assumed a new aspect in the li^jlit of developing trade and expand- ing civilization. Victoria was among the first to condemn publicly the poli- (■y of Spain in her sanguinary contest with the American races, even when that policy was dictated by a pretended desire of extending Christianity among the barbarous races in the new world. He refused to acknowledge this as asuffi ;ient groual for a just war. The chief worl< of Victoria is, '^Relectiones Theologime,'" in which he attempts to restore the supremacy of Theology. This work was known to Grotius. Dupin gives a brief summary of the work. In ihe work there are tl)irteen treatises upon different topics. The third relection is entitled, i)f-^>o?e.s?ft?e nvili, in wliich he declares that government and royal power originate imme- diately from divitic institution. The majority of a state may elect a king and to him the minority must be suiiject. Likewise the majority of Chris- tians may choose a universal emperor and subject all others to him. In the Jf/?/; reliction he presents the various titles upon which the king of Spain claims to rest liis sovereignty over the new world and its inhaV)itants. He vindicates the natural rigiit of the Indians to the sovereign control of their own territory and to the supreme dominion in tlieir own government, deny- ing the alleged dominion wliich is basid upon the infidelity and the barbar- ism of these people as non-Christians. He refuses to acknowledge the statement of the jurist Bartolus, that the Emperor is sovereign of the whole world, or that the pope had ;iny rigiit to give the dominion over Indians, barbarians, or intidels to the kings of Spain or any other Monarch. He as- serts that the title of the King of Spain over the new world rests upon what he designates the natural right of interamrse and society which permits the Spanish people to trade with and to enter into the country of these natives for the purpose of trading, without inflicting any injury upon them. The refusal of permission to trade and to hold intercourse with these native bar- barians is a just cause of war and gives the right to the King of Spain to acquire the sovereignty over these parts by means of arms, but this conquest must be validated by cessions such as were made by the Spanish allies among the native chiefs. In the m-?/i relection he treatsof war. While admitting the justness of war to compel the intidels to trade, he denies that their refusal of Christian- ity is a jnst cause for declaring war; yet th(^y ought to he compelled to per- mit those among tliem who are willing to hear the gospel to receive it at the hands of the miS'^ionaries; and that the force of Spain ought to be used justly in preventing the intidels from persecuting the converts to Christian- ity among them. Fearing lest his permission might seem to justify the ex- cesses of his countrymen, he limits even this permission by declaring the unwarrantableuHss of using violence, which in the name of religion might he practised in an avaricious and a worldly spirit. Christians are justified, he SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 259 thinks, in declaring war in order to defend tViemselves from attacks, in order to meet the force of the enemy which threatens their lives and properties and in order to retake what has been taken from them by an enemy. Defen- sive war is justifiable on the part of Christians. Offensive war is also justifi- able when it falls within his definition, which is, that which seeks repara- tion for damage or injury received at the hands of others. He argues these questions scholastically, giving the arguments on both sides. He supports his own views oy Scripture references and quotations from the fathers. He permitsa private warfare, provided it be used only in defense of property or life. Private war is limited to self-defense, and does not extend to the avenging of a wrong already done, or to the recapture of what has been already lost. Private defence is to prevent a present impending calamity, not to redress a prior wrong. A state however has tlie right of war in de- fense and also in offensive warfare to redress the wrongs that have been done to the state or the members of it. Tlie power to make war is a prerogative of the state in its sovereign capac- ity. In order to determine who possesses this authority he defines what a state is. It is a perfect as distinguished from an imperfect organization, possessing independence, and separate from any other ciramunity, having its own executive, legislative authority, and governed by its own laws. Such is the Republic of Venice or the Kingdom of Arragf)n and Castille. This is a national state. There may be an imperial state in which a number of per- fect or imperlect communities are associated together under the control of a single ruler, in whom is placed the sovereign authority of the united states, but each state under such a union does not possess the right of declaring war. He proceeds to state what are the just grounds of war. Religious belief is not a just ground of war, neither is the fact that a nation or race of people reject Christianity, neither is personal or pul)lic ambition or desire for con- quest, or extension of territorial control, just ground for war. The prince or rulers in the state ought to be actuated solely in government by the desire to promote the common good of the community. Government is a public, not a private trust; the aim of gftvernment therefore is public utility. A gocd king governs for the good of the state, a tyrant in his own personal interest. Hence the tyrant leducos his sut)jects to slavery by imposing on tliem un- bearable burdens, and by engaging in useless and wrongful wars. The (mly justifiable cause of war is an injury done to a state, and not every injury in- flicted upon a state, because as every crime f»f an iiidlvidiiai Is not worthy of capital penalty, so every crime of a state or race against a state does not meilt the condign punisliment of war. In reality the justice of war can on- ly be determined by the wise men. Hence there is need of tiie wisest coun- sels on the part of princes before entering upon war. Suljjects are not bound to support their sovereigns In a war they believe to be plainly without jusr, cause. No authority can command to do an unjust act, tlu^refore the sub 260 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE jecL is warranted in refusing to follow his monarch when he manifestly de- parts from justice. Yet if the sovereign has taken the advice of his chief counsellors, and if they decide upon the justness of the war, subjects are to abide by this decision, that the authority of the wise may not be brought into disrepute.* Another Spanish jurist and professor of considerable repute is Antonio Augustino, the author of Emendatirmps Juris OirUh, 1544, and a smaller writ- ing on the princi'ples of government. He pr(>sents some most liberal and profound ideas. All sovereign power is directly derived from God and it must be ex- ercised so as to harmonize with the will of God. Everything that tends to violenceor cruelty, every act of self-will must be avoided. The Creator alone has the absolute disposal of human lives and he delegates his authority to the rulers of states to be exercised by them only to the extent of preserving the life of the community. The goods of individuals and the property of subjects are absolutely free from the control of the sovereign and not subject to his impositions. The interests of human society and the welfare of the state demand such a principle. Rulers have no power over the individ- ual members of the state, beyond what is demanded for the public good. The same standard of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious applies to the sphere of politics as to that of morals; hence the principle of determining what is good and what is bad in the conduct of individuals and of societies is of tlie same nature. What is right for the individual is right for the so- ciety and for persons in the social life. Personal will only regards one's self and therefore any action guided by such self-will is injurious to the society and wrongful to nmn. Man acts rightly when he is actuated by the common good and guided by thf^ interest of the community. The public-political poli- cy of the ruler ought to be controlled by the welfare of the entire state, hence legislation must promote the common weal.f Dominic Soto, 1494-1560, was the greater di^^ciple of his great master Vic- toria. He was Dominican confessor in the Court of Charles V., and in such high repute at the Roman see that when sent as a theologian he was the ad- viser of the Council of Trent. His famous work is Dejustitia et de Jure, being the lectures he delivered in public at Salamanca. He published it in 1560, dedicating it to Don Carlos. Hallam says it is the first original work of any reputation on Ethical philosophy since the revival of letters. It is the con- necting link between the Spanish writers of whom he is a representative and the purely systematic treatises upon Ethics that were to follow by the writ- ers of the revival. Every subject is discussed carefully and in judicial de- tail. It is a scholastic compound of morals. It gives evidence of the * Tractiitus Tiactatuurn. Venice 1,>84; Hallam. Eur. Lit. I. 324; D. C. Heron. Hist, of Jurisprudence, pp. 297-304; Blakey, Hist, of Pol. Liter. IL p. 383; Summary in Wheaton's Law of Nations. + Blakey, Hist, of Pol. Liter. IL p. 384. SCHOOLMEN AND CfROTlUS. 261 enlightenment produced by the revival of learning and of the deepening in- terest taken in the political issues of the time as well as the liberal tenden- cies introduced into the scholasticism of St. Thomas, whose works are the basis of liis treatise. Juf^jbice is to him the foundation principle of all Ethics, illustrissima justitiae virius, fidei nostrae Ugitima jnokfi, s-])ei 'i-oJmr charitati'^ 2jedissequa, caetenmiqae virtutem darissimum jnbar, quamcum 2)rofa')Hi turn mim 2)rimis Divina oracula mper aethera ioUunt; ut jjofe quae Iwmims, civile animal, in nmmi congreyat, ab injuriis vimlicat, anuyre conciliat, in pace, retim't, virtutihus oruat, ad actcrnam denique felicitatem divino numere Huhvehit.* In regard to the doctrine of tyrannicide and the limits of the kingly power. Soto declares, "the king cannot be justly deprived of his kingdom by the community at large, unless his government becomes tyrannical." Victoria had Hlready declared unlawful the Spanish war agninst the rintive Ameri- cans. In the celebrated dispute between Sepulveda and Las Casas the Emperor Charles V. appointed Soto as arbiter and his decision is given in conformity with his humane conception of political Ethics, neque dificrepanlia Ht rear est inter christiavos et infidek.r. quonUini jus< gentium cunctis gentihuH equate est, "there cnn be nodilference between Christians and pagans for the law of nations is the same to all nations." He deserves to be kept in remembrance hs the first philosophical thinker wlio employed the principles of Christian liberty to brand the African slave trade as illegal and unjust. The same Scholastic principles with which Aquinas had covered the slavery of nature and conquest yielded in the hands of Soto an unquenchable antagonist to the slave traffic, to which the Span- iards clung until recent years with fearless tenacity. The new political science was becoming the instrument of freedom. "If the report which has lately been current is true that the Portugese traders entice the wretched natives of Africa to the coast by amusements and presents, and every species of seduction and fraud, and compel them to embark in their shif)s ns slaves; neither those wiio take them, nor those who buy tliom from the traders, nor those who possess them can have clear consciences, until they mnnumit these slaves, however unable thpy may be to pay the ransom price. t He excuses in the sovereigns of states miiny defects, and he thus pleads for tolerance towards then) by tiieir subjects. "We ought not to censure the conduct of princes too freely and put)licly; they are often honest in their intentions, but prove unjust and oppressive by beirjg deceived and surrounded by their ministers who are not (lualilled to discover ihe trulli. We ought rather to accuse ourselves of not having the courage to declare to rulers what is true and expedient to be done. The love of our cotintry is almost extinguished now; everyone thinks only nf himself and how he niiiy aggrandi/e his power and fortune careless of the sullerings and privations of others. Kingdoms * Do Just, ot dc.Juri". M()flii\ii. 15K0. + DeJu.st. et fh'.Iiiii". IV ipi- 1-2. 262 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE perisb more through want of havinfj good subjects than because there are often bad sovereigns."'* Such men deserve remembrance for introducing snch humanitarian ideas in an age of cold-hearted political and religious indifference. In recognizing the equality of men. in repudiating the cruelties of slave-traffic and in com- miserating the condition of rulers, as well as presenting a system of morals equally adapted for the confessional and the political life. Soto brings before us his desire to adapt the ancient doctrines to the conditions of men and so- ciety in his own age. and especially to introduce that democratic sentiment which not only emphasizes the rights and liberties of the individual but al- so especially calls attention to the duties and responsibilities devolving upon men as men in every relation of life. The earliest dawn of this idea is found in the wrilincfs of these Spani^^h writers. The schools had been tending to greater independence, partly due to the equality of justice springing from the movement of humanism, and partly from the conception becoming clearer to the minds of the wise that instituti<^ins must in some measure be in harmony with existing conditions of society. Instead of commentaries on ancient works the writers digest into manuals the prominent moral principles, guided in their discussion of prin- ciples not only by the Schoolmen, but by the canon and civil law; these principles are presented in the form of ethical rules for the guidance of the moral and religious cleric in the confessiona\ and when the era of war ar- rives the same method is employed to distinguish between. just and unjust use of arms. Militarism united with the confessional may be said to have produced these adaptations of Scholasticism to the times. The work of Soto is scholastic in form and method. He treats the subject in ten books, dis- cussing the classification and definition of the different forms of law and of justice, and also the divisions of dominium, and kindred subjects. f 3. Francis Suarez. 1548-1617. Jesuitism has emphasized three points, the reaction against protestantism, the defence of the doctrine of free will, and the support of the papal power. Against the doctrine of the divine institu- tion of the state, they place its human origin, by means of an early social compact: against the inviolable majesty of the sovereign in contrast with his subject, they set up the doctrine that when the ruler proves himself un- faithful to the commission of the people, they may resume the power entrust- ed to him: in support of the papal power they allege the divine institution of the papacy and assert that the pope cannot be deposed. Atthispoint Suarez comes upon the scene, the most prominent writer in the era of Scholastic reaction, the greatest writer among the Jesuits and the representative of * Opera Vol. IV. p. 216. t De.Just. etde.Ture. Lu^^duni. l.)69. Antouii Bibliothcca Hispana Nova. Madrid. 1783; cTntosh, Philosophy, pp. 109-110; Heron, pp. 304-5. Edinb. Review. Vol. XXVII. pp. 230 sq.; Hallani. Europ. Liter. I. 299; Blakey, II. 38(5. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 263 conservatism airi conciliation, the last prominent representative of the schoolmen and a worthy disciple of the schools. The position he occupied is that of a philosophical jurist. The basis upon which his theory rests is that all paternal and legislative power is derived immediately from God and the authority of every law resolves itself into the authority of God. He is the last link in the old and the first link in the new chain, being the precursor of Grotius. Taking Aquinas as his foundation he becomes the channel through which takes place the transmission of scholastic doctrines to Grotius. whode- clared that Suarez had hardly an equal among the theologians and philoso- phers. The basis of his treatise of laws is that of A(iuinas whose system he reproduces with slight modifications. He is the only writer who gives a complete system of politics and natural right based upon philosophy and in complete accord with theological beliefs. He was brirn in 1.548 of a noble family of Graanda. He gave himself to the study of law at the University of Salamanca and entered the order of the Jesuits. Under the direction of the celebrated Rodriguez he soon beca.ne an expert in philosophy and thoolf.gv. He became Professor soon after and successively filled the theoli»gical chairs in A'allSdolid. Alcala, Salamanca and Rome. He was regarded by many as a reincarnation of the celebrated Master of the Schoolmen, being the most erudite and profound scholar of his age. In response to the invitation of Pope Paul ^'.. he wrote his work against James 1. in defence of the Catholic faith against the error of the Anglicans, in whicn he made an attack ui:on the crown rights of James I. Afterwards he retired into the Jesuit convent of Lisbon where he actively wielded a powerful pen. }l\> Tractatus de legilma ac IJeo Legislatore \)nh]\^hefi in 161.3 is his Masterpiece, an encyclopaedic volume upon law and politics in which natural and positive, civil and canrm, human and divine law are classi- fied and discussed in an elaborate way. the principles, cf)nse(iuences and rela- tions of these being set forth. IT s method is the scholastic, in which we find careful systematization, and a multiplicity of divisions in exhibiting the principles in everv possible light. He tirst states the proposition he examines, next gives the opposing opinions arid concludes by presenting his own ideas. It isa splendid plan to avoid omitting anything but it tends to confusion by such a variety of divisions and subtle distinctions. His work is burdened t)y the weight of authorities referred to. Church fathers, canonists, schoolmen, casuist.-" having an almrtst equal share of the weight. In method he evinces a desire to show that the elements of morality and politics have always been found in the writings of the school. His whole work is free from the excess- es of the extreme school of Cathol/c theorists representc^d by Mariana and comes much nearer the modern democratic, views in regard to Ilic relations of ruler and ruled. He views these from the standpoint of morals, jurispiu- dence and politics. The importance of Suarez lies in this, that he collects. 204 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE condenses and compares what has been written already by a)l the writers in the different schools, including the Christian fathers, the ancient philoso- phers and later writers on justice and ritrht, so that to comprehend what Suarez has written is to digest the entire doctrines of the middle ages, upon Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Politics. (1) First Princqjles. Suarez distinjfuishes between morals and politics; in the former the legitimate foundation of natural law is the chief question, in the latter the foundation of positive law is the main problem. Morals in other words deals with ethical obligation, politics with the principle of sov- ereignty. He thus discriminates between ethics and political scierue, but he unites them under the general head of law. God is the supreme legisla- tor, and the ultimate end to which all creatures tend. If law is divine it comes from G;)d; but if law is human it comes from man as the minister of God and Vicar of God. The leading principle is tliat all power of gf)vernment Comes from G )d, proceeding either directly from Him or indirectly from Him through man who represents him on earth. Civil laws deal with the natural order of man in the world: cancn law looks tf> the supernatural. We must distinguish between two things: (a) in every Ecclesiastical state there ought to be constituted a political order, to guard peace and justice and temper by right reason every thing which looks to the external Ecclesiastical form, (b) All t'aintfs which bear on divine worship and the salvation of souls, purity of faith and morals, fall rightly and prudently into the purely Ecclesiastical sphere.* The end of civil power is peace and temporal felicity in the human republic: therefore (mly laws that involve and have principles of justice in them and preserve felicity belong to the civil power, that is, the peculiar virtue of the state is justice. t Civil laws not only enjoin right in the matter of justice but of all othormnrnl virtues, and can forbid vices ccmtrary to all virtues. Civil law cannot fulfil its end unless it enjoins the matter of all virtues, temperance, fortitude, prudence which are all necessary in a commonwealth for the common good. In so far as they are for the common good civil law takes cognizance of them all. Hu- man external power only takes cognizance of external acts and human acts of the human communify. . No one naturally is subject in soul but only in body, only indirectly can pure human law bear upon internal actions.! The two fundamental principles of Suarez are, (a) man is a social being; (h) and he is under the influence and force of law. Man is a being of law. The human commonwealth is one of law; law is the ruling principle in all man's relations, monastic (single), economic (family), and civil (state). Thus every- thing is brought under the notion of legalism, everything rests on law. His idea is that of a society of right and the subjects in a society of morality. * De Leg. proem. + Deleg. III. 12. a. t Bk. III. l;i 14. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 2fi5 He works in the system of Roman law in his treatment of dominium, justitia restitutio, etc. This is seen also in the case of tribute. The power of the prince is the foundation of rijjht. Rut if there is a new tax and it is not agreed the prince has power to levy it. he asks the question, quid agendum in dubio? He carries out letralisni in his answer. In duhin melior est crmdiiio possidentis, because subjects are assured of one thing, that they possess their goods and their liberty, but they are in doubt, thr y are not assured that they owe this part of their goods to the prince. This (luestion is to be an.swered in a legal spirit according to law.* The Science of civil right \i^pnidentia Jrais ni-ilis, it is a certain application or extension of moral philosophy used to regulate and govern the political morals of the state. That is political science. He gives us thus from the standpoint of law the details of his sys- tem (if morals, tiie science of jurisprudence and political philosophy.! (II) Law. This is the predominating element in the entire system. Hence Suarez treats in the various books, of laws in general, their common charac- ter, their causes, effects and end: the forms in which tlicy are promulgated, with the definitions and divisions of former writers: natural law and the law of naticms: civil law in its relations with natural law: canon law in relation to natural law: the principle of penal laws: the interpretation of laws: un- written law or custom: the laws of immunity or privileges: tiie revealed laws of the old Tesiument and the law of the gospel. All law presupposes justice of whicli it is the measure or rule, milri lex esse non ridetur quae justa non fucrit.X Hence Suarez says law is a certain measure of moral acts of such a nature that by conformity to it these acts are morally right, but if contrary to it they are morally wrong. /ct f.vi' »if».sMn/ quaedam actuum moralium. ita vt per conformitdtem ad iUam, rec.titudinera moraJem halieant, et si ah ilia discordejit. obliqui sunt. Law is a certain measure and rule according to which anyone is induced to act or restrained from actinii. accordint: to Thomas. Lex est quae- dam reyuln ct mensura seaindiim quam indudtur (diquis ad nqemhim reJ ah agendo retrahitur.'i After givinir a number of references to what might be embraced in tlie detinition of law. Suarez says the proper and absolute term of law pertains tf) morals 1| .Justice, that supreme law which jiresupposes the other laws, is nothing else than natural law. that is, reastm itself or the light whiclidistinguishe>.; all rational creatures, tli.' internal voice wliidi jioinlsout t(t all free beings the usage whicli makes for lit'crty. Suarez analyzes the conceptions (tf./HS and lex. distinguislies tlie dilferent senses in whieh they h;ive been used and confused bv preceding writers. According to Thor)ias./».s is not the same as hx. but is ijiiod hyc jiraescrihiUtr. Jus is what is prescribed by law. which is to be understood of laws respecting special justice, as distinct from law in gcnnal. which respects all the v'r- * Bk. V. 18. 14. '■'■ AiiKi'^t. (If. lib. iiib. II. \ + Dc Leg. proem. >- ^"'n- Thcol. 1m. Ur. ,|.i. !»o 1. I lie I.cirihiis, 1. 1. .'i 26(j THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE tues. .7h.s may sijroify the object of justice (ohjectam jnstitiac). or a certain moral faculty of possessing a right which any one has in w'nat is strictly his own and what is owed to him by another.* Isidore conipares^us and tfic as genus and species, the former consisting of laws and customs.! Suarez how- ever snys. that, laying aside all metaphysical meanings and subtle distinc- tions, in the present treatise lie usesi(t.s as a term whicli is interchangeable with lex, because fer In final resort is in impciio or iu jussione.X Law, then, is necessary and absolute, that is, per se: but this can only be so of (Jod, be- cause all law implies creation or a creature, so that law is nocsssary in regard to its end. Its end is uHlis and bonus. There are four kinds of law. accord- ing to Plato, divina, coelcstis, miturali^ and h^tinana.'i Tiie second le7^natria; ■universi in Dei mente existent. From this idea of Divine or Eternal law may be inferred the first division of lex into eternal and temi)()ral. for we sup- po.se nothing is eternal which is (atra i>ew?», but many laws are extra Deum and they are therefore temjm-aUs rersiis aetcrna lex. Suarez describes positive Divine law as that immediately promulgated by God, teposiZu'd dm«a(/?; I. 2. 11. 11 ibid. I.;t. -i. ** ibid. II. 4 ') SCHOOLMEN AND r.ROTlUS. 2(57 which settles in the human mind so as to enable to discern lioncst from base, because there is uo such law in the irrational creatures. So Thomas speaks oi imrtidpatiolcgisaetevnaen.i^hc'\nginYation(ilicrcatura. This law may bo either awi n((lnr7f?j of the intellect. This controversy about the necessary act or acts involved in a law arose in the effortto distinguisli natural from positive law. In the case of positive law there must be both intellect and will, in the case of natural law simply intellect. t In regard to the use of the term law, it seems to refer rather to the exter- nal imperium. and to be the ostensible sign of the commanding will. Law has. its source in intellect but is made law by being made a rule according to the will of the lawgiver. J Law in the proper sense is oniy for man and may be said to be purely human. Is law for individual man or man in the L-om- munityy Thomas says, all law is for the common good. What is imposed on one person is not law. that is. law is given in fact to the community which is perpetual. Tlie question is, has law its end in the common good or in the individual? Law has its final end in ihe public good and its reason in the public power, because it requires a power to impose it. Every precept is not a law, though every law is a precept, so that there is a difference between preceptive and legislative power. Justice. There are three kinds of justice, (a) legal justice, whicli is for the common good. It is peculiar to lex to tend to the preservati(m of the rights for the common good, (h) Commutative justice, to which the legislator looks. This justice is chiefly necessary to strengthen law. If princes make laws not for their subjects but for themselves they violate commutative justice, (c) Distributive justice is required in law, liecause in ruling a multitude distri- bution is made of the burdens of the repuboiic in order to the good of each and all.<> Eternal law is ^x;;- (.s.'ioi^iam, all other law is per participationeni. Law has a double status, in the mind of the legislator, and in relation to the subjects. Therefore all law is the effect of eternal law. All law must be just and ac- cording to reason, but man is just by participation with God and reason is the image of God's being. Human law comes to subjects through the medium of man and its obligation springs from tiie will of man who has power to constitute new laws. That is. its proximate obligation is in man. the ulti- mate in God. II Natiiral law is the light of reason which reveals the propriety or improprie- ♦ ihid. I. .5. S. t ibid. I. 3. 2."). + ibid. 1. rx 20. 22. S Bk. I. H. 12. 13. II ibid. T1.4.t<. SCHOOL ME>J AND (".ROTIUS. 2. ■*■ Hk. II. I.i. (i-12 . t Hk. II. I.i. S-U: II. 1(>. 21. ?r). -'72 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE oroign Master, Lord of all things. As legislator (rod is supreme reason and therefore he cannot change natural law which expresses the justice of reason: but as absolute Lord of all men. creatures and goods, he may delegate part of his power and give to man the right to do what He does Himself. So he commanded Abraham to take away the life of Isaac, without breaking na- tural law, because He did so as proprietor of the life of Isaac, as owner and lord having the right to take away life. Thus what cannot be justified by natural right can be accomplished by a positive command, implying the dele- gation of power from the supreme proprietor. Natural law binds the con- science because it is the law of God. It cannot be dispensed with by any human power, even by the Popes, because they cannot dispense with divine law, much less natural law. Can God dispense with natural law? It seems so. because among men every legislator can dispense with his own legisla- tion. We distinguish three classes of natural precepts, or moral laws, (a) Universal principles. God cannot dispense with these, (b) Direct conclu- isons, altogether intrinsic, as the precepts of the decalogue. Ockhamand Gerson say He can dispense with these, because they are prohibitions he has himself imposed: but there is an intrinsic goodness in actions independent of God's commands, (c) Other precepts farther removed from first principles, not belonging to the decalogue. God cannot dispense with these though he may change the circumstances upon which rests the binding obligation of the law, as when he releases from a vow. Scotus said God could dispense with the second table: but all precepts- of the decalogue are indispensable even by God. God cannot change any precept of nature, all he can do is to change its matter or circumstances.* As we have seen. /n.s is used in the same sense as ?ex-, to signify the rule of acting honestly and the principle of equity. We may speak of ju. (JROTIUS. 27S sayiner that the former has intrinsic necessity in its precepts and only diff- ers from the latter because the \iittor is sine diticurfi >et fad Itimn discurs in- nntcsnt, v/h\\o jus gentiuni iri ^nthercd per plurcs illatinncs ft diffinliorei^* Sot.f' and later Thomists inter[)ret Thomas as distinguish inu jns (jndiuni from ./»/.< natm-ale, because nature gives the natural law by reason without any dilTicul- ty in understanding it, whereas/ws gf<'«rmni is collected from many examples and is more ditlicult to understand, (c) Another opinion declares that jks naturalc obliyes without dependence upon human power while. /ris gciitium does not. The former embraces things so necessary that no supposition of human .society or fact of human will is needed to furnish or suggest it. but it follows from plain principles of nature. Other principles do not follow simply from nature but suppose human .society and other circumstances which give rise to necessity for precepts and laws. Even this i^ not a just distinction for many things embraced in natural law do not oblige nor have they a place unless something is supposed to be done; for example, we cannot suppose theft unless there is a divisicm of goods; obedience to masters has no place unless masters and servants exist, etc. To distingush./ns nat•■ naturak as concessive and preceptive with Vasque-/.. for the former differs from the latter in the consent of men To distinguish bet ween jus rivilr and jus gentium the former is mutable in totnm, the latter only in pnrti. Jus gen- tium is the medium fietween civile and nntunde. What is the end of civil law? Some say it is not only eternal peace but the felicity of man. Hut human happiness is of two kinds, present and future, natural and supernatural. Civil power has only t(t do with the natural, such power has nothing to do with the supernatural. Civil law is constituted by the will of the princeps.J Law is signnm roluntdtis principis: law must besuHl- ciently promulgated before it has force. An unjust law is n(»t a law. because it enjoins what is evil, and thor(ff»re it is not binding, even it it has been accepted.^ Change in law is twofold, (a) change in the legislator either in will or intellect. Such is unreasonable because it is not a \t\ovc inatt(>r ot will, but ought to be governed liy rf>asf)n: therefore unless the pri(u- will wa.« * Bk. II. IT. h ? HK. 111. i.vi. + Uk. (I. IT '.'. f 1. 2. + Bk. III. 11. 8-10. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 275 Law is said to relate to a community, not collective but distributive. What is a community that is fit for proper law? (a) In general community can be distinguished into tvpo kinds:— ^rsf, there is a natural community by the convenience of union, based in the rational nature, such community of the human race as is common to all man alike; but secandiy, there is com- munity which may be said to be political or mystical by special association in a moral combination. \Natural law respects the first community and it is propounded to each man by the light of reason, (b) A later community is to be distinguisned of a particular kind. Some understand by it an addition to nature, yet not by human right but by divine, because instituted by God himself. More perfect is the Catholic Church which is not for one people but for the whole world as appointed by Christ, (c) In addition to these there is a community of humanity congregated together, which is called coitus, the association or meeting together of men, such as are associated by means of right; it is called civitas, in which it is not enough to have a multitude of men. There must be in order to community rulers among them, the mem- bers hy some fa edus, treaty, being joined for a certain end and being under ahead. So Aristotle says a state is a multitude of citizens having a moral bond uniting them. But communities are distinguished by the moral phil- osopher into perfect and imperfect, the perfect being capable of political government. The state is a perfect community and a fortiori a kingdom or a part of it will be a perfect community. Thomas says that which is a part of either is imperfect. Among communities some are definitely marked, some local, because enclosed by some real boundaries; others are said to be person- al because they consist more in persons than in places; as is the case in some religious orders or fraternities which ought to be placed among the perfect communities, if they have a perfect rule and moral union. But an imper- fect community is different; the reason being the community is not self-suffi- cient, and because in it the individual persons are not united as common members composing one political body, but only as inferiors who are found in the service of the master and under his dominium: and such a community is not ruled by a proper power of jurisdiction but by dominium as in the case of slaves, a wife and family. Wherefore it has not perfect unity nor uniform power nor do its members share the political power, and hence the community is said to be imperfect. Human laws have properly a place only in the perfect, not in the imperfect community. This is proved by the fact that every perfect community is a proper political body and governed by proper jurisdicticm, having legitimate coactive power. So precepts and rules of living are proposed to such a com- munity, if they possess the other conditions requisite to laws, such precepts or rules having the reason of law. As that community is perfect, the pre- cept imposed upon it may be called a common precept, that is. law. Ths community of a single house is not sutticient for pioper law, because in such iiVH THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE a onmmiinitv thoro is not proper jurisdiction nor c(»active force such as is required in a proper ruler. Hut the real reason is found in the imperfection of such a natural community, because it is not sutticient of itself to procure human felicity. Parts of such a community are not capable of i^ivins the help which human society needs to secure its end and to preserve itself: sucli a community beinpr part of a whole, the legislative power is not in such a community, such as it is in states subject to civil law. This applies to Ec- clesiastical power, because thoucjh Ecclesiastical legislative power rests, not in the community but in (Christ, yet it is communicated and distributed ac- cording to the common good. It is plain the statute of a house is not the law of the imperfect community, because that community is part of the per- fect community in which there are a great number of such imperfect com- munities.* The end (.f the human state is true political felicity which cannot be se- ^ cured without honest morals: by means of civil laws the state is directed into that felicity, and therefore it is necessary that these laws tend to moral good. When Aristotle distinguishes a good citizen from a good man he does so, because mpre is required in order to the virtue of a good man than of a good citizen: for. though the virtue of a good citizen is moral and honest, it is not sufficient to make a got.d man. So if any one were alone he could be a good man tint not a good citizen. He who is part of a state will not simply be gfiod. although he can be a gof)d citizen though he is not a good man. (Janon laws make a man good simply but do not make him good in everything, for example, in citizenship.f Among men we find three types, (a) Monastic, the rule of a single life: (b) Economic, pertaining to the rule of a family: (c) political, which pertains to the rule of a state or perfect community. i. We must distinguish four classes of persons in the state, (a) those inferior tp the legislator, that is, subjects: (b) others superior to the legislators; (c) those in- dijj'ercntes, who from the nature of their being, are neither subjects nor .super- iors, but are equals: (d) the legi.slatoT him.self. We omit the class of superiors in considering society because they are not bound by the law of inferiors.^ .Suarez often refers to the pact between the prince and the commonwealth, as the basis of civil society, according to which the ruler governs and his subjects obey. The constitution of kingdoms and the power of kings are not immediately of natural right, but immediately the concession of the people: therefore, i,he extent or restriction of power is not a matter of jun naturale but depends on the r(r6i7ni(w of men and upon ancient convention or pact between the king and the members of his kingdom. Monarcliy may be established in two forms, (a) The prince may make laws by the con.sent of the people or Senate on behalf of those who have a definite franchise (sultragium). He does not deprive society of its rights: all political * Bk. I. e. 18-a4. + Hk. 1. 13. 7. t Bk. 111.11. T. S Bk. 111.31. 1 .SCROOLMEN ANT) GROTIUS. 277 power is founded upon its vote and ought to be by an act of will on the part of the state, (b) Power maybe simply and solely in the prince though he oufTht to u>e the cbunsel of his advisers and the members of society. The latter form is more characteristic of monarchic rule and more consonant with prudence, .i\istice, and obedience on the part of suhjects.* The creation of ly whatever name it is known and in whatever way it is exercised. To whom t lien helftngs the sovereignty, or the power of making laws? Suarez concludes that sovereignty resides in the people, in the civil order, or in other words, the temporal powet* rests upon the sau)e basi.piil>lie seeks to promote the common good. Tlie power of jurisdicl ion is jjiihlie. nnd t liercroi(^ is found * Bk. V. 17. :i. 4. + I?k. V. 17.5. 278 THE POLITICAL THROKY OF THE only in that power which is capable of making laws, A distinction exists then between rlfyminus and pntrstns ptrisdictinvis. What power is supreme to make lawsV Whence does this supreme power derive its anthorityV (a) Per sr. by essence God alone is supreme. (V>) Sover- eiijnty is communicated to kings and rulers by such a participation in the su- preme power of Ood, that they can make laws accf)rding to the measure of the power given. In every community t here is some power supreme relative- ly, in tlie Church the Pope, in the kingdom the king, in the republic all the republic, for no body can be without a head except it be a monstrosity. The pow.T of making laws is in the supreme head or authority.* What is the title of sovereignty? The temporal authority, says Suarez, is in origin uniquely divine, because it is natural and indispensable to civil so- ciety and the same quality appertains to it under any form; "all power comes from God,'" says the Apostle, but this does not mean an express d(«legation f»f power, that is incomprehensible to human reason and above all rights. No doubt in certain cases given in Scriptuie there was an express appointment by God. but this extraordinary sanction of God was not the general order, but the exception to the general rule. The sovereignty in the temporal is in the people naturally, and they delegate a part or the whole of it to the kings or rulers. Some casuists allege, the sovereign power resides in a supreme prince to whom God has given it and who transmits it by successicm. Suarez says, .sovereignty does not reside in a man but in a cf)llection of men, that is, in society as a whole or the people. For the idea of the sovereignty of tiie people, he cites the Doctors of the School, the jurists and the canonists. It has been so obscured by the conflict between tiie Emperors and Popes that it has never risen above the surface. He traces it back to the definition of Justinian, lex eat rrmstitutin populi qua majorcs natu siimil cjim plebibun aliquid snnxernt. which gives a feeble expression to the popular idea of Roman re- publicanism. t Suarez then prf>ves rJiat sovereignty dftes not reside in anyone jierson. All are born and are by nature free, no one having pf»wer naturally over others. It is alleged that this power over rtthers was given to Adam and has been transmitted by heredity ever since, f)r in other words sovereignty is patri- archal. Suarez refutes this theory. Adam possessed economic or patriar- chal power but not politicnl p'»wer. Such an idea has neither foundation nor authority. Theologians, civilinns and casuists agree that th'^ prince's power of making law is derivei frV)m the people's consent. The state first arises from the consent of many families. The head of the family is not the chief of the state and cannot give a royal right to his posterity by primogen- iture. When the number of families increased each head of a household had the same power. Political power onlv hegnn when men collected into a com- * nu. I. 8. .'s-io. "■ Isidoi'o of SevUle. Oriuincs. I.r>. 10. SCHOOLMEN AND (JROTICS. 279 munity. Thoroforo as this did nnt take plaee till lontj after Adam's time, he had nf)thiiis to do with the royal power. There is no record in Scripture that r.od made Adam king of men as he made him lord of the animals and of the material world. So sovereignty does not belong to a single person. If it does not belong to one it must pertain to all. This is only a negative proof. Suarez gives a positive proof. We may con- sider the multitude in two ways, either it is a single aggregate withontorder, physical or moral, and therefore it needs government, because there is no body politic: or else it is collected together by the will of men who consent to unite into a political society and form a body mystical which comes to \^G a bodv moral. A body politic cannot exist without agovernmentof the body, and the creation of a common body requires the cr<^ation of acommon power. Therefore the creation of the political society and of the governing body is one and the same act, both originating in the people who create it or give their consent. Sovereignty therefore is in the universality of the people. This sovereignty does not reside in the entire population of the world, but in the peoples grouped into nations according to local divisions. Immediately this power resides in man in political society, because it. springs from the will of man, united with fellow-men. Mediately it comes from God who is the source of ail power. The power by the very nature of the thing itself is immediately in t,heeommunity and in order that it may be in the hands of any person legitimately, for example, in a supreme prince, it is necessary that it be given with the consent of the people.* The temporal power is only a condition of human society, not. the origin or cause of it. Therefore* the temporal power should be subordinate to the in- terests of the society and subject toils will. Society has its foundatirm in nature and the civil state derives its prtwer from a delegatif)n of power, not on the part of the general society, but of the special nation or people constituted into a state. Sovereignty is originally in the peoplo, and they alone can give it. Society may delegate it to one. a few or many, for a time or in perpetuity, in whole or in part, reserving it or part of it to exercise iii its collective capacity. The power therefore is either exercised by itself or by others in its name, and hence the civil laws framed by legislation are obligatory upon tho whole sftciety.t Sovereignty implies the promulgation of law. Law demands obedience of subjects and this cannot be expected unless the law is ciearlv r.oi forth. Law is a precept of the princo and ought to bespoknn by tho king as a pul)iic person. The sovereignty of the poople is maintained and proved bv thf lim- its placed upon Siiprcuue rulors vvhr» have and exercise temporal powei. Can a man rf)mma'id other men at willy Man by nature is subject to no one save liis Creatf)r. being a tree being: tlieiefore a liiuuan princijiate against * Uk III. 2!indH:.t. 2. t nu. 111.4. 1 280 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE reason is against the order of nature and is tyranny. The sovereip^nty of the prince is limited by the following? facts, (a) that an unjust law is not law, be- cause it exceeds the power of the legislator; (b) if a law is found to be hard, it cannot be supposed to be the will of a prince to bind absolutely but only t,o make an experiment; (e) when the law is not observed by the people or the majority, it cannot be supposed to be the will of the prince to l)ind one or more when it is not kept by all. Also if its observance in the kinjidftm en- ^fpnders disturbance tending to popular sedition or scandal it cannot possess sovereign authority.* No human legislator has a perfect will, l)ecause God alone has such; therefore a legislator has not power to bind by unjust laws. Every power is from (rod, therefore every human legislator is limited by the will of God as superior. t The people who create the king may also dethrone him. To the question, whether the people possesses or reserves to itself part of the sovereignty, Suarez has two answers to give, (a) .\.gainst a king who is legitimate but who ordains unjust laws there ought to be no recourse sa>^'e by passive resistance, that is, l)y disobedience to the unjust laws, because an unjust law is not a law. Against a tyrant or usurper there is the right f)f war because he is a public enemy: yet unless tl^e tyrant is a usurper and, the tyranny unbearable, submission is better because insurrection is often much worse than a moderate tyranny. He does not admit this power against princes who impose taxes against the will of the people. J (b) Against a royal i>ower that claims unlimited authority, he allows recourse only when the faith of Christianity is to be defended; a tyrant* or usurper ought to be killed by the citizens if they have no other means of opposing his aggression. Htme ty- rannum quod titulum intcrfici posse a quacunque privata pcrsdna , qum-sil: mepihriim reipxihlicae quae tyrannidem putUur, si alifcr non possit revijinblicamtd) iUa ii/nmni- de Hberare. In the case of a legitimate king who abuses hispow'er, he dis- tinguishes two cases, — in the one the abuse of power is' a menace to an individual's own life, or some of his relatives: in the otiier, the entire com- munity's liberty and existence is endangered. In botli cases the king may law- fully be killed by the sword of an assassic; in the last case it is: legitimate for any citizen to kill him.{! Where there is only injurv done or danger threat- ened to one self or li is friends, he may forthepublicpeacf^rnd vn response to the call of charity give up his right of tyrannicide. If however the country is imperilled the murder is legal, even private murder, if it is the only means of ridding the country of the tyrant: for every one ought to take arms to avenge the public wrong. || This is the extreme doctrine of tyrannicide which ajjpeals to the sover- eignty of the sword, even of the private sword. The desire of Suarez was * Bk. I. 7; III. li). 11. 13; 111.22. * Bk. III. 10. 22. + Bk. I. !). i. 4. 8 Bk. VI. 4. .5-7. II Bk. III. :i. s: IV. H. SCHOOLMET^ ANT) GROTIUS. 281 to protect popular rights and popular liberty from tlie execesses of usurpation and tyranny. He does not {jo so far as to say that the popular sovereignty depends upon force and force adequate to conquest, like some more modern theorists; force is the guardian of popiilar rights witli him. This same prin- ciple has a bearing upon his theory of the relation of the civil and ecclesias- tical powers. The sovereign power includes the pr>wer of life and death over the citizens, because a citizen behitigs more to the republic than to himself. An inter- esting quest ion in regard to sovereignty arises, does law bind a legislatf>ry The constant doctrine of the Schools is that the b'sislat'ng power is held bound to observp its own laws, only the schof)lmen distinguished between 'di- rective and coactive power. Directive force is equivalent to natural law, and to this the law maker is bound: coactive force is the authority the ruler wields, to which he is not subject, except to God whose representative he is. or else subject to the spiritual power of the Church wiiich is unlimited. The answer is twofold: — in the case of a community which is supreme the law of the community l>inds the whole community: in the case of a prince having received supreme power, if the law is for the common good, then as a mem- ber of the community the prince is bound, but if not then natural law gives him the right to t'e aliove it. If a tax is imposed upon things which are common and the prince lias private domains, he sins against justice if he ex- empts himself: but if he makes a law against carrying arms, then he is ex- empt because it is not meant to include himself. In general power is universally binding uiion the whole fommonwe;tltb. God gives this power to princes, that is, power to legislate, vis direct iva et vis codctira. Directive power directs those it commands, coactive power is of constraint, attaching to legal obligation a necessity. Some allege that it is by a kind of pact that submission to the laws is recjuired of the legislature as well as of the people. Suarez does not accept this explanation from the nature of a pact, because the obligation comes from (Jod who is the first cause of the rtower: the king being God's minister he is subject only to the true legislator. Hence law ought U) iloiiiiiHtn iti re])i(b]ica s not th<> law is ren- dered useless and the peace of tlx' state is disturbed. The prince is not bound Viy law so far as it is coactive, because that would imply lie was bound by force wbicli is exercised by his own law. Tlie prince is bound cirililcr to the laws because he is bound to stand to a contract havitig force and value as a bond of civil law; this arises from the directive force of law which rests with the prince. \n action «(./«(7«cio cf)nipels t h<> debtor; therefore, it can- not be allowed against the prince, and so he cannot in this sense be bound civiliter. Yet. if V)y the opinion of the judge there is declared ./w.s creditionis against the prince, so that judicially be is bound to ol)serve it. and cannot * I'ol. llf. 7. 282 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE deny it without injustice, an action can be sivpn a^'ainst liim so that lie is bouno to admit c^" permit it in conscience. In this w;iy he is bound diiliter sive coactione. lu this case however the question is. is the price bound by the law. does he incur a penalty by the hiw. or liy not executinj^ tVie law? In all cases he seems free from the force of law because hv is judj^fed by an authority superior to the laws, as the minister of God iind is responsible to him and to the pact by which he rules* One of tlie chief attributes of sovereijjnty is the power of taxation and this point really determines whether the prince is sovereign or not.t Interpreta- tion of the law is another prerogative of sovereignty. The iniperauu- who has power to make hiw alone can interijret it. There is a double power in the legislator, (a) a 7i«fMra/ one, of willing f»r not williiif:. whu-h we c;ill po- testasfacH. (b) Another is superadded, jurisdiction to hind nihcrs. Thepoiil leal power is entrusted with the defence of human liyhts. (a) i)unishingevil-doeis and Hdministering the law of life and death: (b) avenging injuries. These rights con)e from God to the political body. God create s the civil power as a Qualify which springs frrtm human nature and accf)rding to the law of rens- on, in order that society may not be left without the right of governing itself. God does not by a special act create the power, but when the political society is I'oi'med the sovereignty is nttached therewith by divine inst it ul ioti. as a result of reason and springing from the nature of such ;i body as civil society. J This analysis of pf)litical sovereignity which is distinguished from the pow- er of government or legal sovereignty, is tlie most ;icute tliat we have as yet found in tlie history of political theory up to the age of Sunrez. He ebibor- ates the principle of contract, in which he gives us the genesis of the con- tract of society, and of government. Government results from the institu- tion of civil society and the civil society (triirinates in the consent of the people, naturally social beings as yet free allying themselves under the dominion of human law. as distinct from natural law. 4ccording to natural right one man has no dominion over another man or body of men; neither is it according to divine law as a direct institution; accotdingly sovereignty resides in the whole l)ody of the society, whether general ay particular. The people are brought together and by agreement they delegate the sovereignty or part of it to the ruler or rulers. (V) Government, its elements and its forms. The civil power considered natur- ally and absolutely is in the hands of the whole people who are sovereitra, the determination of the exercise of it. by whom, in what way, and to what extent it is to be exercised must be solved by the sovereign body politic.^ The question arises, if the people is sovereign and if each individual is free and subject to no one but God, is not- the principate of man a tyranny and * Bli. 1 1 1. 35. 22. 23. t Bk. XL 19. 11. + Hk. V. 17.18. S Bk. in. 4.1. SCHOOLMEN ANT) GROTIUS. 2S3 aofiiin.st natiueV Civil irovernment in tile nancis of magistrates wiih tempor- al power lo rule over men is just, especially in conformity with human na- ture. God approves of it in sending judges and kings to the Jews who undoubtedly had the principate and temporal power, and held sucli in vener- ation. If it is said they possessed it in a special manner, this did not pre- vent them from pcwsessing the power itself. It is also useful in the rule of a hiininn coniniunily and therefore has the consent of nature itself; and tliis amply confirms the cu.stom of men that kings were sacred and hi^ihiy rever- enced in Script ur-^s. The argument ot reason is taken fronj Thomas. Man is a social animal: he naturally and riglitjy d(>sires to live in community. CVmimunity isdouble, imperfect as in the family, and perfict as in the political society. The first is natural because male and female unite to propagate humanity in society: but this community is not self-.«uflicient and it is necessary for the good of man that political cf-mrnunity be constituted as a state, in the coalition of many families, Viecau>e nf) family can in itself have all the ministries and all the arts necessary to human lite, and mucli less is it sufficient to secure the knowledge of necessary tilings. In single families peace could not he pre- served nor injuries avengi^d. Tliei'e is not hing bett(M' than that man should unile in a perfect political society or cjr<7a.s. Ttiiscommunity can heenlarged into a kingdom or piincipate Ijy the society of many cir;7«/(°.s. whicli union is more us(Mul for' the human race. In a |)erfect community of this kind it is necessary that there be a power to wliich the community looks for govern- ment. Where Iheie is no government, ihe wise man sa.\s. the people become corrupt. Nature d(»es not fail: therefore, as the conininnity is perfect in reason and competent in natural right, so the [lower of governing it is there without which there would Vje contu-'ioi!. The necessity of government is seen in all (thei human societies, tiie hnsliand has power over the wife, the parents over tin children. 1 lie masicr ove' servants: so likewise we find in such community some one family, thoutrh it is not found in the marriage relation- ship, but in the race of iiumaii society, liial takes tlie lead. No one can pre- serve Older urdess some one is chief lo whoiu pertains the power to prut alienat ion. or tlie perfect trans- fer of all the power- which was in tlie community in so far as thecomniunity could give it. Bariolus dist ir.guij^hes be! ween tire communitv and the prince: the coniniunity can delegate power because it has the power in ordinary and can use its discretion regarding its disposal: but. princes are per.scms to whom is entrusted this jurisdiction and therefore tJM'y cannot delegate it. liulers to whom this authoi'ity is given with the liiuhest powers may delegate it.t The supreme power of nriiking la ws is in lire piiiice with common consent * Uk. 111.4. (). + \\k. III. 4. 1-12. 286 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE under condition of bestowal and transfer througli the community. What of princes who are not supremeV Magistrates and governors who are cf)nsti- tuted by kings have authority under concession or by permission of the su- preme prince, in as far as he grants it. Communities wliich are governed aristocratically or popularly retain in themselves the supreme governing power, not giving it to any prince. Hence in Venice and Genoa the people retain in themselves supreme power which, though they elect a leader, they do not transfer to him. Here thesovereign power is not in the prince only or in the community but in the whole body with its head (in toto corpnre cum caiyite). Yet in the state it would be possible to give all such power to the head. In all states except democracies the people transfer supreme power t(* the prince or rulers either with or without the i)ower of ndvice of the senate, and so it needs no acceptance of law enacted by them before their legislative enactments are binding on the people. Who are eligible for office in governmertt? Women are exchuled from government. It is beyond the capacity of a female to make laws and so be supreme; they can neither be kings nor magistrates nor judges nor officers of any kind be- cause these offices are and ought to be be exercised in all communities by men. Suarez speaks of civitatefi a^maximae, majores and minores. There should be no religious test required in governors. Neither the law of nature nor the divine law nor ecclesiastical law require faitii or morals on the part of a hold- er of the po^estos in order to make laws, Itecause kings who were evil in the Old Testament were not removed from their offices. Alienation or delegation ofprncer to the government. In th?ory the people is sov- ereign and superior to the prince. But when the contract is made between prince and people it is a contract of alienation, not of delegation, unless it is stipulated that reservation is made of ultimate powers, so that the prince becomes supreme legislator, executive and judge subject to residuary sover- eignty in the people. The people generally transmits the power absolutely to tlie prince, at least in hereditary monarchy. In the case of what we call limited monarchy and democracy the people still retain the power in its final form. In theory however the people still retain the power and the govern- ment is the servant of the political body. In the absolute monarchy which is preferable on grounds of utility the prince becomes superior to the people and obedience is due from the people because they have been deprived f)f absolute freedom. The prince is possessor (»f the dominium by proprietor- sliip and cannot be deprived of it unless in case of tyranny, in whicli case the kingdom is reduced to a statp of war, this state of war being really a popular limit upon the absolute sovereignty of the prince. This exception which Suarez admits, giving therightto the people to judge the government in case of tyranny shows that it is not after all an absolute alienation but really a delegation of power, residuary power beingretained 'n the people. In regard to the act of the people in entrusting to the government its authority. Suarez SCHOOLMEN AND GROTiUS. 287 says, that the people can alienate absolutely the sovereignty and give up its freedom in favor of one, liberty being of natural right and capable of aliena- tion by free will: and the people having received legislative povver from God can if it wishes transfer it to another pers()n or to another community. In connection with the power of the government the question arises, does the legislation of the government require to be accepted by the people be- fore it is binding? Is legislative power absolute? Canonists have two opinions on this point, that law has no force without acceptance, and that law when sntflciently propjulgated implies acceptance and is therefore binding. In support of the former opinion, the majority of the Doctors allege, that gov- ernors have no power to impose laws upon the people without the consent of the people, because they hold the legislative power from the people and the prince is not presumed to bind the people against their wish, since they have placed him in the government to rule on the basis of the common interest. Suarez supports the other opinion, that acceptance is implied in the imposi- tion of t^ws by the properly constituted authority of the people themselves, that is. the prince. Consent of the people is of the essence of law, but it is given in the case of absolute principate in and with the appointment. In oth- er circumstances the people do give their consent separately, when legislative power is divided between the king and the kingdom, regrmm mm rege being the legislature. In any of the forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy or mixed, that power which is sovereign can impose laws and exact obedience. In any (vise the people does not give a formal acceptance, because it appoints some one or more to legislate as representing it and this implies consent. Di principle in absolute monarchy consent is necessary and is given already, for the people have alienated this power to the prince, the act of cession is consent. Suarez admits certain objections to this presumed acceptance. Di the CMse of an unjust law. which is not a law per S6, having n) obligation even it accepted: in the case of a law that bears hard upon the people because fne pnnce does not presume to oppress the people: if in fact the majority of the people cease to observe it the minority is no longer bound. Ttiis places in the hands of the people the power o1 examining and judging the validity of laws, making tlie people the supreme court of judgment as to the question of constitutionality. rfi)lacing in tliis form of examination and rejection of law what he had swept away in the form of consent.* (YI). The Civil (unl Erchsiostical 1 tie political theory of Suarez comes out more clearly when he examines the relations of the temporal and spiritual powers. He discusses the twct extreme theories of canonists, jurists and th(>ologians. wh'ch assert respectively th - universal dominion of thi- Sm-ereign Pope and of the Sovereign Emperor. He lays it down, that the pope is not by right the universal lord of the universe, not having temporal sovereignty and only interfering indirectly in temporal affairs l)y virtue of his relations to * Bk. in. 4. l-ll. -'.^'^ TIFE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE the spiritual or^er. ordine ad spirituaUa. This indirect sovereignty involves the power to abrogate laws, but not to establish new laws in the civil do- main. He j^sserts that this indirect temporal sovoreignt-y is inherited not from Christ, as the other schoolmen asserted, but from Mie gift of the Emperors themselves who placed it in the hands of the Popes. The tempor- al power does not depend for its sanction upon Christian faith, nor solely upon the customs according to which the princes exercise it. It is a natural right sanctioned by human law and pertains to the unbelieving as well as the believing and does not rest upon faith or grace, but upon nature. He does not support the claim of Gregory VII. to absolute power over kings and rul- ers as derived from the apostles of Christ. He does not even with Thomas subordinate the temporal to tlie spiritual on the analogy of tlie body and soul. He apprehends tiie changed position of affairs and in a certain way meets it. Tlie reformation has broken with the papai'y. He recognizes the work of the reformers, although not in the way of accepting what they had done. The opinion of some obscure sectaries that grace has l)roken the Christian away from all obedience to the temporal authority, he alleges to be improper, because witliout the temiioral authority there is no society possi- ble.* He does not stand on the old ground of the papacy which declared the pope to be armed with two swords, and kings to be subject to him even in temporal affairs. He maintains ttie riglits of princes, even wlien they are infidels, because their autlioiity is uniquely based upon nature, was exercised before Christianity and has not been abrogated liy the religion of Jesus Christ.t What iH the position then of the papal and civil jwu-icrsf God put the spiritual power in Peter and his successors and it cannot be changed by man. J All the faithful are said to be freed from the law in the wi'itirigs of Judas the Gallilean, the precepts of the Scripture which teach them 1,0 obey Christ frees them from natural, much more from civil law. But the gospels enjoin obedience and kings are true kings if they possess a just title. On convei'- sion to the Church kings do not lose their civil power, because grace does not destroy nature. The civil kingdom is founded upon nature not on grace, that is. it comes from God as the God of nature. The end of civil law is good per se and this end is necessary for Christians, therefore the laws v.'lnch are ordained t.o that end. and the magistrates by whf)m they are established are necessary to the state and Cliurch alike. As to the Emperor and the Pope. Many Doctors say the .sovereign pope lias power to make civil laws for th<^ Church and alsn for the whole world. If so, it includes the believing and unbelieving which is dearly false. Christ never gave this power to the Church save in respect of the Ix'lievin-.;: he did give * Hk. III. .'S. + Bk. III. 10. 2 and a X Bk. III. 2. 1. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 289 them the power anrl rig-ht of preaching' to all outsido of the Chtirch in the whole world, but that is all. Hence Innocent III. declares, canon laws do not bind pagans outside the Cliurch. Princes who are infidel are not bound to recognize the pope as a superior prince. In the Christian world the pope has universal power by the gift of Christ, and therefore it extends to all the world, if all tlie world has received the faitli: but only in parts where the Church exists is tliere such a power. The sovereign pope has not direct tem- poral power in all the universe, but only in that kingdom or those provinces of wliicli he is the temporal lord. He has temporal jjower l)y which he can govern civilly all the Church, not on account of the temporal power of the Church but on account of the spiritual power. Christ only promised Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven. But if he has supreme temporal prtwer then it would exclude all tlie rest because there only can be one supreme power. Christ did not give such universal power. No dominion is given to the Pionian Church, but that which it has In lands subject to it temporally, by the donation of Emperors and princes. Such universal power is not necessary at any rate to the propagation of the faith nor to the good govern- ment of the Church: it is not necessary that such power should be divinely given to the pope. Altliough the pope has no direct temporal power over princes, we cannot refuse to liim an indireci power, as the common father of all Christian people, the paster of the body of Christ. As such he can abro- gate civil laws which seem to be susceptible of leading souls to ruin.* Can the Emperor m Master and Prince of all the world hind all the tvorld bii hix civil laws? The Doctors of Civil Law said that Emperors have ,/w.s and jims- dictio over all the world. But the Roman Emperor did not derive such a uni- versal power fnmi God or by the election of man and no one can take it to himself. Neither Emperor nor any single man has power of making laws for all the world. No one has in reason a title to claim temporal subjection from all the world. The pope has crowned Emperors, yet he is not to cliange at will, nor subject temporalities which are free, l)Ut only when ttie spiritual good rea.sonaldy demands it. Tlie Emperor therefore cannot make civil laws to bind all the Church or all tlie world, but the subjects in tlie Roman do- minion. If lln^e is any supremacv in Emperor or Pope it is hedged in by limits on itotli sides.! The princes and kings have sufiremc power in tlH> civil Older of law-making, but it is limited liy the mode in whicii and by 1 lie cotidil ion on which it isgivcnaiul t lansfcii'iHl from t he conmiunity. The civil law has t(»dooiily with the natural in the lifeof iiian. the Ecclesiastical has to do witli the supernatural, t hat is.it icfers to the future life. Civil law, moreover, does not liave anything to do with spiritual happiness in this life.t Civil law is all luini;in law, liecaiisc it is the minister of (iod in t lie * Bli. in t;. i-s. + Hlc. lit. s other material and temporal: the end of the civil being the highest natural felicity of this life unly perfect in relation to the coiumuni t> . God is the author and supernatural governor, and immediate origin of the spiiilual: but as author of nature he gives civil power and it is given not per sc. hut per modium pvoprietatis from nature itself. The spiritual exceeds the temporal power because civil power is imme- diately in tlie community of man. but si)iritiial power resides principally in ihc Christ-man. Civil power can be in any person even an unbaptized, but l)ai)t ism is the door of the Church, (,'ivil power can lie in men and women. Ecclesiastical power can only h(> in men. Civil power can be in a layman. Ec- clesiastical power only in the clergy. {i Although tlie spiritual is more ex- cellent, this does not imply that it is superior in jurisdiction or order of power. In t he old law kingly ]»(i\ver was not subject to sacerdotal law. In tlie New Testament Chrisi did iioi inst it iite any superiority. There is only one power iti tiie Popi- and \ hat is spirit ual and extends to the tenijioral. 1 1 * IJk IV. 2. X nu. TV. (i. + Bk. IV. ;i. l-lf). S \\k. IV. s. 1-s. 292 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE has the two swords, spiritual and natural, because it is necessary that in one body there should be one Head: it is necessary that the Vicar of Christ should have all power to rule over the body. Even kings and emperors are under Christ as sheep, therefore it rests with the Pope to ordain anything in regard to kings as to other men. This is contirmed by the usage of the Church and the institution of Christ. Tlie two keys were promised to Peter and there- fore the supremacy of the Pope is established.* These two powers ate neith- er necessarily conjoined nor separated, because neither is according to pre- cept or prohibition of the divine law. The Church for a long time had no temporal power as far as the Civil rule of a state is concerned and f)nly as kings were converted tf) the faith was there a change. In the new law of Christ Ecclesiastical power is nf)t natural, but super- natural and specially given by Christ, but it i:< never given to earthly kings nor does Christ enjoin that it be united with kingly pawer. Yet tiie Civil and Ecclesiastical may be united in the same person, for the pope is king in his own lands. It is therefore ncit illegal but admissible because it leads to reverence for the Ecclesiastical prince. Christdid not give it but He did not forbid it. t Whom does Ecclesiastical pmver hindf In gcMieial tiiesame persons as the civil, all those in the territory, whether livingpermanently or temporarily in it. A question arises in regard to the position f)f princes who are infideles, not Church members nor ot the Ecclesiastical ccimmunity. Though bound by the civil laws they are not- bound by the Ecclestiastical laws, because they are not subject t(»t,lie Church jurisdiction. But heretics r retain the character of bajitized persons, because bapl ism is the fundanientuni jnrisdictioms. They accordingly retain the sign of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction and are therefore bound to obey the Cliurcli's precepts. In distinguisliing between ./?c7e?i!.s and m/ideli,s the mark is the form of baptism l)y the Chiu-cli. whicl) places under Church jurisdiction. Canoti laws bitid Christians every- wliere and are not like civil laws which bind only in the state, because the power of the pope is universal in the Church. The laws of the Bishojjs and councils bind withiti the territory over which they have control, kings as well as subjects if they are Christians. J The Pope has. asa temporal prince, pow- er to levy taxes in his own territory, not iti the s[)iritual utiless it is necessary to defend the Church from intidels or heretics, because in that case lie has supreme power, even in temporal tliitigs.^ The power of dipensing behtugs to the pope and emperor equally, the princes in the Ecclesiastical and Civil spheres respectively, because the power of dispensing belongs to him who lias the power of legislating. tl Civil and cancm law are not subordinate interne, for though the canon law is more dignified formally, it has not sujterior juris- diction, for the civil is supreme in its own order. Yet, in f)rder to the good of the soul civil law is suboidinaled to the canon and in this respect the Ec- Bk. IV. 9. 1-7. -i HU. IV. li). l-(). t n\i. IV. 10. 1-5. S T?k. V. 14. :{. II Blv. VI. 14. SCHOOLMEN AND GROTIUS. 293 clesiastical can abrogate the civil. If the civil law treat of spiritual things under the guise of temporal, as in the contract of marriage, and if the civil law even in purely temporal concerns isccmtra honos mores or implies danger of life, then the canon law may abrogate it.* (Jhrist is not only Saviour; he is also true and proper legislator and king as is proved by the title of rex given in Scriptures to him. This is contlrmed by the Canons of the Council of Trent. As King and Judge he perfectly rules his subjects and governs his kingdom: therefore the law of Christ in the New Testament is properly law. He instituted his Church as a spiritual commoti- wealth in which he rules [ijyse). In this way the unity of the Church is de- clared and its rule is under a pastor, Christ Himself or His Vicar. t Although in theory the temporal prince is independent, this wide power which is called spiritual, given to the pope, of examining and judging whether civil laws are detrimental to the faith, and of dethroning princes who antagonize Christiani- ty, practically makes him King of Kings. Th.e one power is human, fallible and limited, the other is divine, infallinle and unlimited. It is an advance to take away the temporal power from the latter, but it is reverting to the old order to give it back under thename of spiritual power; however this of itself is a preparation for the entire separation of the temporal and spiritual, the admi-sion of such devout canonists as the Jesuits carrying along with it immense weight. Is there a liberty of conscience^ The civil law in some Christian states punish- es blasphemy with severe penalties anfd inflicts upon heretics the se\'erest penalties. Is this just? It is not, says Suarez, from the point of view of natural law; but it is legitimate from another point of view. This power comes from God alone to the Church, who is not only legislator but sovereign Lord; and in the latter capacity God gives this power to the civil society througli the preservation of truth and Christianity. t Suarez distinguishes the infidel from the heretic. All men are subject to the law and bound to obey it and after the advent of Christ there is a new law to which those are subject to whom grace is given. Those who are extra Ecclesiam are bound on- ly by the law of nature.^ In regard to the infidel princes the Church has not power to expel them unless they oppress their Christian suf)jects, in which case the Church may declare a just war against them. As to heretics the Church has the right, on account of their aposiacy, to take away from them their kingdoms, only they are not dispossessed ipso facto, and according to the judgment of the Church they retain their power. As far as unjust kings arc concerned the Church has power to remove them and depose them ipso facto. In such a case the subjects have a right of revoK, against the princes and dis- order would ensue. Out of this would spring peace. {Wl) International lair. Suarez does not make much ad vanci- upmi his pre- * Bk. Vr.2(i. 3. t Hk. HI. 11. 10. t Bk. X. l.a. « Bk. 1.18. 5. 294 THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE decessors in the matter of the law of nations. He however saw clearly its importance as a science and gave it a place in his legal system. His anti- imperialistic views led him to the conclusion that national states were the best. These national states, inter gentes, seemed to point to the fact that there is a law of nations distinct from the law of nature, based upon the very same principles, which laws have arisen from the usages and concessions of separ- ate communities and are as binding as the laws of natural right. He %vas able to see that there is a difference between the law of nations and Interna- tional Law properly speaking; the flist springs from the nature of reason as manifested in the necessary relations of human societies, these human so- cieties, just lil. Scotland, 1893; Joint Editor of Qlaagoir University Ma guzint. 1891 %, (Edit- orial and Literary contributions) ; Joint Editor and Review Editor ( f the VhriHtiun Nation. IS. Y..\^^2-'i)A. (Editorial, Review, and generaj contributions.) 815 b i This book is DUE on the last date stamped below APR 2 1 194' JUhl2 5 \Jp JUL Zh'^ |Y 20 1947 lAR r )S48 #^ Form L-9-15m-7,'33 mi P RENEWAL *" ° SFPne 51983 ■"ffH 1983 ii ■■ ^' J UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 261443 4 tKU