SIX LECTURES 
 
 INTRODUCTORY TO 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 
 OF CICERO; 
 
 WITH 
 
 SOME EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER 
 OF THE ACADEMICA AND DE FINIBUS. 
 
 BY 
 
 T. W. LEVIN, M.A. 
 
 ST cathabine's college, 
 
 INTER-COLLEGIATE LECTUEEK ON LOGIC AND MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Facile etiam absentibus nobis Veritas se ipsa defendet." 
 
 CAMBSTDGE : 
 DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 
 
 LONDON: BELL ANl) DALDY. 
 1871. 
 
Cambnlrge: 
 
 PKINTBD BY C. J, CLA.Y, M.A. 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 

 WITH THE HOPE THAT 
 
 THE FOLLOWING LECTURES 
 
 MAY TO SOME SLIGHT EXTENT 
 
 AID IN REVIVING AN INTEREST IN SPECULATIVE SUBJECTS 
 
 AMONG THE STUDENTS OP THIS UNIVERSITY, 
 
 THE AUTHOR, 
 
 BY PERMISSION, 
 RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBES THEM 
 TO THE 
 
 REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D. 
 
 MASTEB OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBEIDGE, 
 AND LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK. 
 
 
 thr 
 
 Cambridge, 
 October, 1871 
 
 109337 
 
LECTURE I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 *'Non enim hominmn interitu sententiae quoque occidunt: sed lucem 
 auctoris fortasse desiderant." 
 
 § a. The general object of these Lectures is to familiar- 
 ize you with the distinctive spirit which pervades and informs 
 the later manifestations of Greek speculative opinion. The 
 character we shall there find exhibited was undoubtedly- 
 impressed by Pyri'ho the Eliensic philosopher, diffused by 
 the writings of Timon the Phliasian, and adopted by the 
 representative men of the later Academy. Yet, influential 
 as the teaching of Pyrrho was, the real nature and tend- 
 ency of his doctrines have been strangely overlooked or 
 misunderstood by most writers. To his figure has never 
 yet been assigned its proper niche in the gallery of history. 
 We shall therefore eadeavour, if possible, to remedy this 
 lack of just appreciation by making the aims and effects 
 of Pyrrhonism one of the chief subjects of our enquiry. 
 Another point we shall also consider is, the real extent to 
 which the special doctrines of Pyrrho were entertained by 
 the leaders of the so-called New Academy. This has always 
 been a vexed question with historians, and one indeed which 
 
 L. L. 1 
 
2 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 there is not much prospect of satisfactorily determining. 
 Further, we shall attempt to present to you in as clear a 
 light as possible, that problem which formed the centre 
 of discussion between the Stoics and Academicians, and 
 which is equally conspicuous in modern Metaphysics, namely, 
 the nature and reality of the phenomena of perception. 
 Some previous acquaintance with these subjects will, I hope, 
 give the philosophical writings of Cicero a higher degree 
 of interest for you than they have perchance hitherto pos- 
 sessed, since it is somewhat difficult for those not habitu- 
 ated to the atmosphere in which Cicero's characters think 
 and speak, to follow their arguments or understand their 
 allusions. 
 
 It is our purpose then to examine a portion of the 
 history of Greek Philosophy comprised within the last three 
 centuries before the commencement of the Christian era\ 
 This is a period which perhaps has not commanded either 
 the attention of historians^, or the interest of students to 
 the same degree as the age preceding, when Greek thought 
 attained its highest development in the hands of Plato and 
 
 ^ We may consider the period before us to have commenced with Pyrrho, 
 and closed with Cicero. The exact date of Pyrrho is uncertain, but he is 
 known to have accompanied Alexander the Great on his Indian campaign. 
 (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61. 68.) 
 
 2 Professor Maurice calls this period, "the lees of Greek philosophy," 
 and favours it accordingly with a very brief notice. Moral and Metaphysical 
 Philosophy, Part i. chap. vi. Liv. iv. sec. iv. Degerando remarks on the slight 
 interest historians have taken in this part of Greek philosophy : *' On est sur- 
 pris de voir que la nouvelle Academic n'ait pas obtenu en general des historiens 
 toute I'attention qu'elle meritait. Brucker, qui a consacr6 un livre entier k 
 la philosophic Antediluvienne, et de longs chapitres a des philosophes sans 
 importance, accorde a peine quelques lignes a Philon et a Antiochus, quelque 
 pages k Arc^silas et a Carn^ade. On pent cependant consulter avec fruit 
 V Academique de Pierre de Valentia. Toucher: Histoire des Academiciens 
 (Paris, 1690). De philosophid Academica (Paris, 1792). On trouve dans les 
 Memoires de V Acadimie Royale de Berlin en 1748, une dissertation sur 
 Clitomache, et dans ceux de 1' Academic des Inscriptions la dissertation de 
 
I.] INTRODUCTORY. 3 
 
 Aristotle ; or as that succeeding, when the once brilliant flame 
 of Athenian speculation flickered with the uncertain light of 
 Alexandrian mysticism, before its final extinction in the 
 obscurity of the dark ages. A careful consideration of the 
 course of Greek thought during this period, may, I think, 
 reveal to us many points of interest, which will render it 
 worthy of minute investigation, — which may discover for it 
 a character of its own, too marked to be overlooked by the 
 historian of the development of human opinion, — and may 
 show that it involves issues too important to be neglected 
 by the critic of later systems of philosophy. Every event 
 in general history should be viewed in connection with the 
 circumstances which preceded and caused it, with those 
 which accompanied and determined it, and with those which 
 followed and resulted from it. So, in recording the succes- 
 sive phases of human opinion, which are the events in a his- 
 tory of philosophy, we must consider them with reference to 
 preceding speculations, to those contemporaneous with them, 
 
 Gautier de Sibert." Histoire comparee des Systemes de PMlosophie,^^ Tome 
 III. p, 110 (note). To these works of the Academy we may add the 
 following, which profess to treat directly of the Tyrrhenian philosophy : 
 Dissert, de Philosophia Pyrrhonia (Jac. Arrhenii, Upsal, 1708) ; Dissert, de 
 notione ac indole scepticismi, nominatim Pyrrhonismi (Jo. Gottl. Munch, 
 Altdorf, 1796); Dissert, de Epoche Pyrrhonis (God. Ploucquet, Tubingen, 
 1758); Diss. Adumhratio quaestionis : an Pyrrhonis doctrina omnis tollatur 
 virtus (Ch. Vit. Kindervater, Leipzig, 1789) ; Examen du Pyrrhonisme (M. 
 Crousaz). This book is, however, more a consideration of the results than 
 the principles of Pyrrhonism, and is in fact little more than an attack on M. 
 Bayle. Bishop Huet's Traite philosophique de la faiblesse de Vesprit humain 
 is a good introduction to the subject, although it is encumbered with the 
 false notion of perception through representative images prevalent among 
 philosophers up to the age of Keid. Perhaps the fundamental problems of 
 early scepticism are most clearly stated by Herbart, Einleitung in die Phi- 
 losophie, 59. 173. Sextus Empiricus, who lived about the middle of the 3rd 
 century a. d., wrote a voluminous treatise on the doctrines of Pyrrho and 
 the Sceptics generally. The best edition is the Fabrician. Histories of 
 Greek Philosophy by Brandis, Zeller, Schwegler and Lewes, are most ac- 
 cessible to English students. 
 
 1-^2 
 
4 INTBOD UCTOR Y. [Lect. 
 
 and to those of succeeding generations. Hence, adopting 
 this method of procedure in the discussion before us, we shall 
 first give a preliminary sketch introducing the principal ques- 
 tions which occupied the attention of the schools of philo- 
 sophers, the investigation of whose opinions is the object of 
 the present course of Lectures. 
 
 Next, we shall as far as possible from original sources give 
 the substance of these opinions with their bearing on con- 
 temporary schools of thought, smd finally, we shall endeavour 
 by criticism and comparison to determine the value their 
 decisions or speculations may have for the present generation 
 of labourers in similar fields of enquiry. 
 
 § /3. It is universally admitted that the great impulse 
 Greek philosophy received from the teaching of Socrates 
 was mainly owing to the method he introduced into the 
 processes of speculation, and the ethical direction he gave to 
 its aims. Before his advent, sages had thought and sceptics 
 had doubted, but their thoughts had been as the wonder of 
 infancy, the stirrings of that love of knowledge which Aris- 
 totle says is "a primary instinct of humanity;" for to them 
 the great questions concerning man and the universe had 
 first appeared in all their importance and mystery. "In- 
 dagatio ipsa rerum tum maxim arum, tum etiam occultissi- 
 marum, habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid occurret, quod 
 verisimile videatur, humanissima completur animus volup- 
 tate\" The endeavour to discover the ultimate genesis of 
 phenomena had already engaged the attention of the Ionian 
 philosophers; the inability to reconcile the manifestations of 
 these phenomena with the testimony of reason had given 
 rise to the abstract idealism of the Eleatics ; — the exclusive 
 materialism of the former had resulted in the gloomy 
 nihilism of Heraclitus, — and the subtle dialectic of the 
 
 ^ Lucullus, 41. 
 
I.] INTRODVGTORY. 5 
 
 latter in the flippant scepticism of the Sophists \ But al- 
 though the spontaneous activity of the human intellect had 
 marked out distinct paths of speculation, the pre-Socratic age 
 was distinguished by no definite method of conducting phi- 
 losophical enquiries. Moreover, there was wanting some 
 motive principle which might sustain the speculative facul- 
 ties in investigations not directly connected with the com- 
 mon requirements of life. Thus philosophy soon came to be 
 considered mere otiose and barren speculation ; and, falling as 
 an instrument of power and venality into the hands of the 
 Sophists, it was not surprising that its professors suffered 
 under the disrepute Plato describes in the Sixth Book of 
 the Eepublic^ and that the pursuit itself should be threat- 
 ened with extinction. 
 
 At this crisis in the development of Greek thought, 
 the genius of Socrates came to the aid of philosophy, and 
 vindicated the higher energies of the human intellect by 
 directing them into a worthy channel. Perceiving the bar- 
 renness and inutility of physical investigations, consisting 
 as they did among the early thinkers in vain efforts to dis- 
 cover the causes and essences of things, he pronounced these 
 setiological and ontological speculations beyond the range 
 of the human faculties, and taught that of all the objects 
 of which man was conscious in the universe, he (man) him- 
 self was the most important subject of investigation {yvoc^Oi 
 aeavTOp). 
 
 1 Gorgias Leontinus, sometime an adherent of the Eleatic school, was 
 the author of a systematic treatise on scepticism thus described by Sextus 
 Empiricus, " cV yap ry e'!nypa<l>ofjLiu(p irepl tov fii] ovtos rj wepl 0i5creaj5 rpla /caret 
 t6 ii'^s K€(f)d\aia KaraaKevd^ei, iv fih Kai irpCoTov otl ovdiv iari, de&repov on et 
 Kal ((TTtv, dKaTdXrjiTTOv dudpcoircp, rpirov otl el kuI KaToKrjTrTov, dWd toI ye dvi^- 
 OKTTOv Kal dvep/xT^vevTov rtp TrAas." — Adv. Math. vii. 65. 
 
 2 " JlpiSrov yih roivvv iKcTvou tov davp-d^ovTa, otl ol <pi\6<ro(pOL ov TificSirraL iv 
 TOLS wdXeffL, 8l8a(TK4 Te ttjv eUova Kal ireLpQ ireldeLv, otl ttoXi) du davfia^TOTepov 
 TJv, el iTifMcSpTO. 'AXXct StSa^w, ^(prj. Kal otl toLvvv TaKyjO-rj XiycLS, oJj dxp^roi 
 Tois TToWoTs ol ewLeLKiffTaTOL TUP ip <pi\o(ro<piq,.^^ k.t.X. — Mep. vi. 489. 
 
6 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 The distinguishing feature then of all the philosophical 
 enquiries which engaged the attention of the various schools 
 founded by the followers of Socrates, was the endeavour to 
 determine the relation and proper position of man with 
 respect to the other objects in nature — man as a creature 
 susceptible of pleasure and pain, perpetually aroused by 
 his connection with these objects, and endowed with a 
 primary and irresistible instinct to obtain for himself that 
 fulfilment of his susceptibilities which he denominates 
 happiness. The nature of happiness, the possibility of its 
 attainment, and the means to be employed for this end, 
 we find were the foremost questions of discussion, and the 
 bases of the leading systems of thought during the four 
 centuries which immediately preceded the Christian era; 
 constituting a common groundwork sufficient for the per- 
 petual antagonism of schools whose different solutions of 
 the same problems were as opposed as those of the Cyre- 
 naics. Stoics, and Pyrrhonists. "Nam omnis ratio vitse 
 definitione summi boni continetur: de qua qui dissident, 
 de omni ratione vitse dissident \" But although ethic was 
 substituted for physic, as the object of intellectual acti- 
 vity we soon find that the very nature^ of the questions 
 constituting this science involved the necessity of more or 
 less consideration of many of those branches of investi- 
 gation which had occupied the main place in the field of 
 thought during the predominance of the so-called physi- 
 cal subjects of speculation. Socrates had already attempted 
 
 ^ Lucullus, 43. 
 
 2 "Die Tugendlehre aberbedarf der Kenntniss des Menschen ; nnd sie wird 
 um desto umber praktisch anwendbar, je mebr sie theils von der Erfahrung, 
 theils von tbeoretiscber Einsicht in die Natur des Menschen dasjenige in 
 sich aufnimmt, was iiber die Veranderlichkeit des Menschen zmn bessem 
 und zum schlechtern Aufschluss giebt. Daher ihre Abhangigkeit von der 
 Psychologie, und mittelbar von der Metaphysik."— Herbart's Einleitung in 
 die Philosophic, Seite 157. 
 
I.] INTRODUCTORY, 7 
 
 to solve the great problem of happiness by identifying it 
 with virtue, and virtue again he defined to be synony- 
 mous with knowledge. Man according to his doctrine 
 would, if he were acquainted with the true science of life, 
 i.e. if he foresaw distinctly the real consequences^ of his 
 actions, or the real effects of the causes perpetually influ- 
 encing him, necessarily only involve himself in the circum- 
 stances calculated to bring him the satisfaction of those 
 desires implanted by nature. Hence, the true meaning of 
 the maxim of Socrates — "/ca/co9 eKoov ovBek" — no man 
 would be willingly evil because no man could be willingly 
 unhappy — vice was the result of ignorance, as knowledge 
 inevitably led to virtue — knowledge then was indispen- 
 sable to a right practice of virtue, and virtue constituted 
 the true happiness of man. We shall see that this notion 
 of Socrates, viz. that evil was the result of intellectual 
 not moral depravity, had a most powerful influence upon 
 the subsequent development of Greek thought, and in fact 
 forms the leading distinction between Christian and heathen 
 ethical philosophy. Socrates imagined that by appealing 
 to the universal and irresistible instinct of humanity to- 
 wards happiness, he would establish a permanent motive 
 for the practice of virtue, and the pursuit of knowledge. 
 No sooner, however, were his doctrines put to the test than 
 the futility of this expectation was. abundantly demon- 
 strated. 
 
 § 7. On the one hand, it was maintained by the sensualists, 
 or Hedonistic sect of moralists, that if, as seemed to be uni- 
 versally admitted, human knowledge was purely relative 
 and subjective — if, according to the apophthegm of Protago- 
 ras, "man was the measure of all things," then our sensa- 
 tions were the only objects of which we had absolute know- 
 
 ^ "AoKet 8^ Koi 77 ifiireipla ij vepl 'dKaara dvdpeia ris ehaf odev koX 6 'ZwKpa- 
 Ti;j (^ridTi ImaTTip.riv dvai rrjv dvdpeiav.^^ Aristotle, Eth. Nicorn. in. 11. 6. 
 
8 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 ledge, and of which we could predicate certain existence 
 (ra re iraOif], KaraXTjirra. ^FiXeyoi^ ovv avra, ovk d<f) cov 
 r^lveraiy. Pleasure and pain^ consequently, were the only- 
 criteria of good and evil. The natural tendency of man to 
 obtain the one and avoid the other, had been expressed by 
 the institution of conventional canons of right and wrong. 
 Justice was law, some said the law of the strongest, others 
 the instinctive means of defence adopted by the weak ; and 
 similarly with regard to the other virtues, they had no exist- 
 ence beyond that obtained from the sanction of law, tra- 
 dition, or custom. A good man therefore practised virtue in 
 order to avoid censure or punishment. (Mi^hev re ehai cpvaet 
 SiKacov, rj KoXbv, rj alcr^ov' aXXa vojjlo) koI eOei. 'O fxevrou 
 a7TovSaLO<; ovBev oltoitov irpct^ei hia ra? iTnKeifJLeva^ ^ijfjuia'i fcal 
 S6^a<;^.) Here then was one result from the Socratic theory 
 that virtue, knowledge and happiness were co-ordinate with 
 each other. On the other hand, there was another sect 
 among the disciples of Socrates headed by Antisthenes and 
 Diogenes, who, starting from the same subjective idea of 
 pleasure and pain, but instituting a more subtle analysis of 
 the relation of those feelings to their causes, arrived at very- 
 opposite conclusions with respect to the attainment of hap- 
 piness. They perceived that pleasure was the equilibrium 
 between the desires or affections of the human mind and the 
 means provided by nature for their gratification, and that 
 experience continually showed the inadequacy of the latter 
 to meet the demands of the former. Consequently, said they, 
 it is impossible, according to the present constitution of 
 
 ^ Diogenes Laertius, Lib. ii. cap, viii. 92. 
 
 ^ " Aoff ei 5' a&rois Kal riXoi evdai/xovias Sia<pip€iP. TAos /ut.kv yap etvai rrju 
 Kara fiipos rjhovf^v evSai/xoviav S^, to iK twv fiepiK(3u i^Sovuv amTrjfMa, ats avvapid- 
 fjLOvurai Kal al irapi^xvi^^^^h '^"^ "^ jxiWovaai. 'Eitval re Trjv fxepiKriv '^dovrjv, 
 5t' avT-qv alpeTi]v' Triv 5' evdai/xoviap, ov St' avrriv, a'XXd 5ia Ta% Kara /i^pos 
 ^Soj'as." — Diogenes Laertius, Lib. ii. cap. viii. 87, 88. 
 
 ' Diogenes Laertius, Lib. ii. cap. viii. 93. 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 I.] INTRODUCTORY. 9 
 
 things, to expect satisfaction from the action of external 
 causes. The only alternative was to moderate the cravings 
 of humanity as much as possible in order to meet the paucity 
 of means at hand for their fulfilment. Thus the Cynics 
 hoped to live in proud independence of the circumstances 
 around them, superior to pain, unallured by pleasure; and, as 
 if to form the most marked antithesis possible to the follow- 
 ers of Aristippus, they, as Diogenes Laertius tells us, used to 
 maintain that they owed no allegiance to any laws but those 
 of virtue. (Kal tov aoc^cv ov Kara tov? Ketfievov^ v6/jlov<; tto- 
 "X creveadat, dWa Kara top t^? dp6Tfj<;^.) The sentiments of 
 both schools on this point were the natural corollaries from 
 their respective systems. The Eudaimonists, finding the end 
 of life in pleasure, were compelled to consider the individual 
 as dependent, social, and interested in the welfare of the 
 community of which he was a member. His canon of right 
 and wrong, therefore, would be the laws to which society had 
 agreed to submit; whereas the Cynic, isolated and self-suf- 
 ficient, was unwilling to confess himself amenable to any 
 claims but those of what he considered his own higher nature. 
 The one affirmed there was no virtue but that constituted 
 by law, the other that there was no law but that constituted 
 by virtue. It was perhaps in view of these conflicting 
 conclusions respecting that which was the common object 
 of both parties, viz. the attainment of happiness, that 
 Pyrrho, the Eliensic philosopher, was induced to attempt on 
 his own part the institution of an art of life. He probably 
 compared the systems of the Cynics and Cyrenaics with the 
 views of Socrates himself, a knowledge of whose opinions it 
 is said was imparted to him by his fellow-townsman Phsedo^ 
 
 1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. vi. cap. i. v. 11. 
 
 2 "Auch darf uns die Frage, auf welchem Wege er Kenntniss vom 
 Sokrates erlangen konnte, gar nicht in Verlegenheit setzen, weun auch weder 
 Dry son noch Klinomachus, chronologischer Schwierigkeiten wegen, seine 
 
lO INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 and the result of this comparison must have been soon to 
 reveal to him that neither of these sects of philosophers had 
 developed the Socratic notion of happiness in a way that 
 would have been endorsed by Socrates himself. Some au- 
 thors have striven to point out traces of the Socratic doc- 
 trines in the teaching of P3niTho, and we find Cicero refers 
 to his school as one of those professing to be sprung from 
 the Athenian sage (fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum, 
 qui se omnes fere Socraticos esse dicebant; Eretriacorum, 
 Herilliorum, Megaricorum, Pyrrhoniorum\) It seems to us, 
 however, that the Socratic influence is only so far discernible 
 in the Pyrrhonian system as determining the subject about 
 which it treated, viz. human happiness. But, as we have 
 before observed, this question was the fundamental problem 
 of all the post-Socratic schools of philosophy. Mr Grote re- 
 marks* upon this point: "Tennemann seeks to make out 
 considerable analogy between Socrates and Pyrrho. But it 
 seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far — that both 
 agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical. But in 
 regard to Ethics, the two differed materially. Socrates 
 maintained that Ethics were matter of science, and the 
 proper subject of study. Pyrrho, on the other hand, seems 
 to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and 
 science just as unattainable, upon Ethics, as upon Physics; 
 that nothing was to be attended to except feelings, and 
 nothing cultivated except good dispositions." Cannot there, 
 then, be a science of feelings; and was it not exactly this 
 which constituted the positive side of the Pyrrhonian sys- 
 tem ? In truth Pyrrho, as he is represented to us by ancient 
 
 Lehrer waren, da Phado aus derselben Stadt war, und daselbst auch eine 
 Schule errichtet hatte."— Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie, zweiter 
 Band, Seite 171. 
 
 1 De Oratore, iii. 17. 
 
 ' HUtory of Greece, Vol. viii. note, p. 666. 
 
I.] INTROD UGTORY. 1 1 
 
 writers, appears in two different, and by some thought in- 
 compatible characters, viz. Pyrrho the moralist, and Pyrrho 
 the sceptic. By Cicero he is mentioned solely in the former 
 light, as making virtue the single aim and object of his 
 teachiDg. (Pyrrho — qui virtute constituta, nihil omnino, 
 quod appetendum sit, relinquat\) And it is a singular fact 
 that this author never once mentions Pyrrho in connection 
 with the sceptical philosophy, not even in those fragments 
 of his works which are especially devoted to the discussion 
 of this subject^. Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, to 
 whose voluminous treatise we are mainly indebted for the 
 information we possess concerning the spirit and tendency 
 of the Pyrrhonian philosophy, emphatically proclaims Pyrrho 
 as the author of the sceptical method, and he is by most 
 modern writers recognised ^ and certainly popularly known, 
 as the father of scepticism. The question then arises, how 
 far these two characters are reconcilable as belonging to 
 the same individual; and we have endeavoured in the en- 
 suing chapter to show that in the blending of these appa- 
 rently discordant elements lies the whole originality of early 
 Pyrrhonism. Scepticism was adopted by Pyrrho as an in- 
 strument for the attainment of virtue, and the only means of 
 securing the greatest amount of happiness. Let us for a 
 moment consider what may have been the steps by which he 
 arrived at this conviction. 
 
 § 8. It is often not difficult among the circumstances or 
 conditions of life to which a great thinker has been sub- 
 ject, to detect some cause or other which had probably 
 a determining influence upon the direction of his specu- 
 lations. If Antisthenes had been as wealthy as Aristip- 
 
 ^ Be Finibus, iv. 16. 
 * Prior and post Academics. 
 
 ' Cudworth's Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality, chap. 1, 2. 
 527. 
 
1 2 INTRO D UGTORY. [Lect. 
 
 pus, or Aristippus as poor as Antisthenes, would they 
 ever have been celebrated as the respective founders of 
 the Cynic and Cyrenaic sects of philosophers? Little is 
 known of the life of Pyrrho, and that little is not calcu- 
 lated to throw much light upon the formation of his 
 opinions. There is, however, one circumstance connected 
 with him which we think may have been somewhat con- 
 ducive to the development of his peculiar views — we mean 
 his profession, that of an artist. Pyrrho we know derived 
 his disbelief in all science from the uncertain character of 
 sensible perception, and, as we shall find in the heKa rpoiroL, 
 many of his arguments found upon the illusive nature of 
 judgments concerning the magnitude and figure of ex- 
 ternal objects*. It is not improbable then that the atten- 
 tion of Pyrrho was especially directed to this subject by 
 the frequent opportunity he had of observing in the prac- 
 tice of his art the various artificial effects that could be 
 produced by a knowledge of the laws of perspective. 
 Again, as a moralist, in the work of Sextus Empiricus 
 there is nothing stated with such emphatic distinctness as 
 the decided and uncompromising hostility which Pyrrhon- 
 
 ^ Even those who are least favorable to the Pyrrhonist doctrines admit 
 that there is some force in their arguments based upon the discrepancy of 
 visible perception. ♦' On peut bien savoir par les sens qu'un tel corps est 
 plus grand qu'un autre corps ; mais on ne saurait savoir avec certitude quelle 
 est la grandeur veritable et naturelle de chaque corps ; et, pour comprendre 
 cela, il n'y a qu'a consid^rer que si tout le monde n'avait jamais regard^ 
 les objets ext^rieurs qu'avec des lunettes qui les grossissent, il est certain 
 qu'on ne se serait figur^ les corps et toutes les mesures des corps, que selon 
 la grandeur dans laquelle ils nous auraient 6t6 repr^sent^s par ces lunettes : 
 or, nos yeux memes sont des lunettes, et nous ne savons pas prdcisement 
 s'ils ne diminuent point ou n'augmentent point les objets que nous voyons, 
 et si les lunettes artificielles que nous croyons les diminuer ou les augmenter, 
 ne les ^tablissent point, au contraire, dans leur grandeur veritable ; et partant, 
 on ne connalt pas certainement la grandeur absolue et naturelle de chaque 
 corps." — Arnauld, La Logique de Port-Royal, p. 281. 
 
I.] INTRODUCTORY. 1 3 
 
 ism bore to the voluptuous philosophy of the Cyrenaics\ 
 May it not have been that this determined opposition to 
 the idea of pleasure containing the essentials of happiness 
 was in some part due to the observations he had made 
 of the disastrous effects which attended its pursuit? for it 
 was his art to depict the human countenance distorted 
 by ungovernable passions. In truth, if man could have 
 been brought to view life with the apathy Pyrrho so assi- 
 duously endeavoured to inculcate, there would have been 
 few objects left for the employment of the limner's talent. 
 To the writings of Democritus and Homer, which we are 
 told were the favourite works of Pyrrho, we may undoubt- 
 edly attribute many of his speculative and moral con- 
 clusions. 
 
 Democritus is said to have been the first of the mate- 
 rialist philosophers who, contrary to the natural beliefs of 
 mankind, distinguished in the sensible qualities of things 
 those which were real, permanent and objective, from those 
 which were only apparent and relative, thus furnishing a 
 plausible pretext for the paradoxes of the early Sceptics. 
 The perusal of the Homeric poems describing the conflicts 
 of cities and nations, had probably the same effect on the 
 mind of Pyrrho as the study of the history of individuals 
 revealed by the expression, stamped upon their features. 
 Reflecting on the strife and misery consequent on the in- 
 dulgence of love, anger and ambition, 
 
 " Hunc amor, ira quidem communiter urit utrumque. 
 Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi, 
 Seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira 
 Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra ^." 
 
 ^ ** 5ia0^/3ei hk auTiJs' ^iretbr] eKeivrj fikv rrju ijdovrjv Kal t^v \elap TTji crapKbs 
 Kivrjaiv rfKos ehai X^yei, ij/xels 8k ttjv drapa^iav, ^ ii^avrtovraL rb Kar iKeivovs 
 tAoj* Kal yap irapoiarit ttJs 7i5ovt]% koI firj wapoOarjs, rapaxds VTOfihei 6 Sta/Se- 
 Paioijfieuos tAos eTvai t^v ifdovTfiv.''^ — Hyp. I. 31. 215. 
 
 * Horatii Epistolarum, i. 2. 13—16. 
 
14 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 he would naturally be led to the conviction that of all 
 the paths to happiness, the one making pleasure its sole 
 end and aim was the least likely to lead to the expected 
 goal, and that the truly wise and truly happy were alone 
 
 "those who far aloof 
 From envy, hate and pity, spite and scorn, 
 Live the great life which all our greatest fain 
 Would follow, center'd in eternal calm." 
 
 Some historians refer the sceptical and moral elements 
 in the views of Pyrrho to the teaching of Bryson, son of 
 Stilpo, the Megaric philosopher, but this hypothesis must 
 be rejected on account of chronological difficulties. Others 
 again have conjectured that Pyrrho derived many of his 
 doctrines from the Gymnosophists, with whose institutions 
 he is said to have become acquainted when he was in 
 India with the expedition of Alexander. There is certainly 
 a strong Oriental tinge in the idea of drapa^la, or tran- 
 quillity, inculcated by Pyrrho as the summum bonum of 
 existence. But as this notion was prominent in the system 
 of the Cynics, and afterwards in that of the Stoics, there 
 was no reason for supposing Pyrrho should have been in- 
 debted for it to foreign influences. Indeed the tendency 
 to fatalism, which is the groundwork of all the apathetic 
 schools of Greece, is essentially characteristic of Aryan 
 thought. We do not, however, for this reason consider 
 Greek philosophy any more than Greek language was 
 directly derivative from eastern sources. As the many 
 analogies between the forms of the Sanscrit and Greek 
 languages only betray that both were originally from a 
 common stock, so the parallelism of thought discernible in 
 the Greek and Indian philosophies is an evidence certainly 
 of consanguinity, but not necessarily of filiation. Those 
 who read the treatise of Cicero on the subject of 'whether 
 virtue be sufficient for a happy life/ will find there sug- 
 
I.] INTRO D UCTOR 7. 1 5 
 
 gested a train of reflection similar to that which must 
 have led Pyrrho to the adoption of his solution of the 
 question. After having peremptorily dismissed the idea 
 of pleasure as conducive to happiness, we may imagine his 
 meditations to have concluded thus : ^'Quod si est, qui 
 vim fortunse, qui omnia humana, quae cuique accidere 
 possunt, tolerabilia ducat, ex quo nee timer eum, nee 
 angor attingat: idemque, si nihil concupiscat nulla effera- 
 tur animi inani voluptate, quid est, cur is non beatus sit : 
 et si hsec virtute efficiuntur quid est, cur virtus ipsa per 
 se non efficiat beatosM" At this point the difficulty would 
 have presented itself which must inevitably occur to any 
 one possessing the slightest experience of human nature: 
 How is it possible that the suppression of natural impulses 
 can, at least in the process, be attended with happi- 
 ness? — the very notion is self-contradictory. How can 
 peace and tranquillity be present where there is a con- 
 tinual struggle? Virtue, if it must be practised at the 
 cost of a perpetual conflict with nature, would be a harder 
 taskmaster even than pleasure. Here then Pyrrho seems 
 to have thought he had discovered a method of recon- 
 ciling the claims of our higher and lower nature. If the 
 denial of desires was too painful to be consistent with 
 the idea of happiness, were there no means, not of ex- 
 tinguishing the tumultuous cravings of nature, hut of pre- 
 venting them from ever arising ? This object Pyrrho thought 
 might be accomplished by the cultivation of a habit of 
 doubt, namely, whether those qualities in objects a belief 
 in the existence of which is the parent of desire, had any 
 absolute, necessary, or permanent power. 
 
 Such was the moral aim of the Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
 which we will not discuss further at present, having made it 
 the subject of the following lecture. 
 
 1 Tusc. Disput. V. 6. 
 
1 6 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 Before concluding these introductory remarks, however, 
 on the doctrines of Pyrrho, we must advert to some difficul- 
 ties meeting us in the historical development of our subject. 
 
 § €. In treating of the doctrines and influence of Pyrrho and 
 the Pyrrhonists it is not easy to determine, from the historical 
 remains extant, which are the views of Pyrrho himself — which 
 are due to the promulgators of his opinions — and, above all, 
 which are the individual conclusions of Sextus Empiricus his 
 expounder. In comparing, therefore, the tenets of the Pyrrhon- 
 ists with those of the New Academicians, the question arises: 
 How much of the accounts delivered to us by Sextus Empiri- 
 cus are we to regard as essentially typical of Pyrrhonism ? P3rr- 
 rho himself left no writings, but his friend and pupil Timon 
 of Phlius compiled his celebrated satirical poem (the Silli) with 
 the object of enunciating the principles and aims of scepti- 
 cism \ This work, however, is unfortunately lost, but from 
 the few fragments we find of it quoted by other authors we 
 can gather what were the distinguishing characteristics of 
 early Pyrrhonism. From these we infer that the intention 
 of Pyrrho was mainly that which we have already indicated, 
 viz. to construct an art of life on a basis of doubt ^ {diropla) 
 — doubt was to lead to suspension of judgment {eTro^rj), and 
 this again to tranquillity of mind {arapa^ia). Through the 
 equilibrium of reasons {laoo-deveca) was engendered an equi- 
 librium of motives, and hence an absence of emotion and 
 action. This form of Pyrrhonism, like most of the tentative 
 systems of philosophy which sprang up on the death of 
 Socrates, did not survive the introduction of the more scien- 
 tifically conceived schools of thought consequent upon the 
 promulgation of the Aristotelian method. The sceptical por- 
 tion of Pyrrhonism was then adopted by Arcesilaus, and 
 
 1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. ix. cap. xi. 5. 
 
 2 Prceparat. Evang. xiv. 18 (758 a.). '0 5^ ye fia$ijTr]i avrov TlfAuw ^prjal, 
 Seiv rbv fi^Wovra ev8aifiouifi<X€iPf k.t.X. 
 
I.] INTRODUCTORY. 1 7 
 
 employed mainly, we think, as a weapon against the Stoical 
 dogmatists by him, and afterwards by Carneades and the 
 New Academicians. When the conflict between this latter 
 sect and the Stoics had been terminated by the desertion of 
 Antiochus to the Porch (or rather by the introduction of 
 Stoical opinions into the Academy), Pyrrhonism is said to 
 have been revived by -^nesidemus and Agrippa. We do 
 not think, however, that this second school of Pyrrhonism 
 had much in common with the first, but was only a prolon- 
 gation of the Academic scepticism. That there was a dif- 
 ference, we admit, between the scepticism of iEnesidemus, 
 Agrippa, Menodotus, and that of the New Academy, but the 
 distinction was this: Carneades only opposed his scepticism 
 to the dogmatic pretensions of the Stoics, reserving at the 
 same time the traditions of the older Academy concerning 
 the possibility ai a priori knowledge; whereas the Empirical 
 sceptics whom Sextus Empiricus still denominated Pyrrhon- 
 ists were absolute sceptics, because in denying the certainty of 
 empirical knowledge they denied virtually the possibility of 
 knowledge altogether. Carneades and the New Academicians 
 carried their scepticism as a shield, the Pyrrhonists wore it 
 as a o^arment. Yet we think there was less difference be- 
 tween the New Academy and the later Pyrrhonists than 
 between the earlier and second school of Pyrrhonism. Sex- 
 tus Empiricus distinctly repudiates ^nesidemus for mingling 
 the dogmas of Heraclitus among the sceptical doctrines "ot 
 irepl TOP Alv7]aLS7]/jL0V eXe'yov oSov elvai rrjv (TK67rTLKr]v djcoyTju 
 iirl rrjv 'UpaKXetreLov (j)L\oa-o(j)[av, Slotl irporjyelraL tov Tavav- 
 Tia Trepl to avrb V7rap')(eiv to Tavavria irepl to avTo (paive- 
 aOai^f then, after distinguishing clearly between the Hera- 
 clitic and sceptical views, he adds: "cltottov Be icPTiv to Tt)v 
 pba')(pfjbev7]v dycoyrjv oBcv elvai X&yeLv r?;? alpeaeco^i eKeivq^^ y 
 fjLd')(^eTai,. ciTOirov dpa to ttjv aKeiTTiKrjV aycoyrjv iirl tyjv *Y{pa- 
 1 Hijp. I. 29. 210. 
 L.L. 2 
 
1 8 IN TROD UCTOR Y. [Lect. 
 
 kXeLTeiov <f>t\oao<j>iav oBbv elvai Xeyeiv^." -^nesidemus is, 
 however, still more emphatically separated from the older 
 Pyrrhonism by his abandonment of the original object of the 
 whole system, viz., the attainment of drapa^ia, Aristocles 
 in Eusebius, quoting the words of Timon concerning the 
 principles and aims of Pyrrho, says: "Tot? fMevrot BiaKecfiivoif; 
 ovrco 7repi€(T6aOac Tlficov ^rjal irpwrov fiev d(f>ao-Lav, eVetra 
 5' drapa^lav A.lvr]o-ih7]fjbo<; Be r^Bovifjv^y Comparing this passage 
 with the uncompromising disgust with which the idea of 
 pleasure is viewed in the 1st book of the Hypotyposes, we 
 should infer that ^nesidemus can scarcely be reckoned a 
 follower of Pyrrho. Tennemann seems to think that the 
 later P3n:rhonists are distinguished from the earlier princi- 
 pally by having shifted their sceptical point of view, the 
 former professing mere subjective doubt, whereas the latter 
 had extended this doubt to the nature of the object: "Die 
 Zusammenstellung der Widerspruche in den Systemen der 
 Dogmatiker musste zum Beweise das Unvermogens der 
 Objekte dienen, ihre Natur zu erkennen zu geben, und 
 hieraus folgerten sie die Unverlassigkeit der Sinne und des 
 Verstandes zur Erkenntniss der Wahrheit. Die neuem 
 Skeptiker, durch die Gegengriinde der Dogmatiker veranlasst, 
 welche den Skepticismus von der Seite vorziiglich angrififen, 
 dass er selbst eine objective Behauptung enthalte, diese 
 namlich, die Objecte sind unvermogend, eine Erkenntniss 
 zu begriinden, gaben mit grosser Einsicht diese auf, und 
 blieben bei der Ansicht stehen, dass bis jetzt in keinem 
 Stiicke etwas entschieden sey, und die widersprechenden 
 Behauptungen den Yerstand in eine Art von Gleichgewicht 
 setzen, dass er weder bejahend noch verneinend zu entschei- 
 den wast'." 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 29. 212. 
 
 ' Prcepar. Evang. Lib. xiv. 18. 758 b. 
 
 3 Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie. Zweiter Band, s. 186. 
 
L] INTRODUCTORY. 1 9 
 
 The information we possess as to the real opinions of 
 Carneades is not much more direct than that concerning 
 
 o 
 
 those of Pjrrho : in both cases it is but the echo, not the 
 voice of the master we hear ; for Carneades, like Pyrrho, left 
 no record of his own tenets. As Sextus Empiricus was the 
 expounder of the Pyrrhonian method, so we may consider 
 Cicero to have been the mouthpiece of Carneades, at least 
 on the subject of metaphysics — on points of morality Cicero 
 professes entire disagreement with the New Academy. We 
 have, however, among the philosophical w^ritings of Cicero, 
 but one really undertaking to discuss expressly the views 
 of the later Academy on speculative subjects. This treatise, 
 intended to present an account of the course of the pole- 
 mic between the New Academicians and the Stoics concern- 
 ing the grounds of certitude of human knowledge, is one 
 of the least satisfactory of the productions of this great 
 author. No writer has ever better understood, or more 
 distinctly stated, the requisites of a finished philosophical 
 style, viz. to handle impoirtant points exhaustively, subor- 
 dinate ones tersely (grandia ornate, enucleate minora 
 dicere^); yet in the Lucullus this canon seems almost to 
 have been reversed ; fundamental principles are scarcely 
 approached, while assertions instead of arguments on either 
 side are repeated with tedious iteration. The inadequacy 
 of the treatment indeed to the exigencies of the subject 
 did not escape the attention of Cicero himself; and, as he 
 explains to us the circumstances^ which occasioned it, there 
 
 1 De Finihus, iv. 3. 
 
 2 " Illam dKadr)fiiK7]v criVra^tj' totam ad Vai*ronem traduximus. Primo fuit 
 Catuli, Luculli, Hortensii: deinde, quia irapd rb irpeirov videbatur, quod erat 
 hominibus nota, non ilia quidem aTratSevo-i'a, sed in iis rebus drpL^ia, simul 
 ac veni ad villain, eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli." 
 — Ep. ad Att. XIII. 16. ** Haec Academica, ut scis, cum Catulo, LucuUo, Hor- 
 tensio, contuleram. Sane in personas non cadebant. Erant enim \oyi- 
 Kcarepa, quam ut illi de iis somniasse umquam viderentur." — Ep. 19. It would 
 appear from these extracts that Cicero in his first edition a^lapted his method 
 
 2—2 
 
20 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 is no place for criticism. In fact, he recalled the work in 
 question, and substituted for it another dissertation on the 
 same subject [Acad. post). Of this there are but twelve 
 sections extant, the last of which only introduces Arcesi- 
 laus, and therefore just commences to expound the peculiar 
 views of the New Academy. 
 
 § f The relation of the New to the Old Academy must 
 be mainly determined by the degree of sincerity with which 
 the sceptical or negative arm of philosophy was employed by 
 the former. If we are to believe the testimony of Sextus 
 Empiricus, Arcesilaus was a sceptic to his adversaries, but 
 a maintainor of the more positive part of the Platonic 
 doctrines to his friends. *' cjyaalv otl Kara [xev to irpox^t- 
 pov Uuppcoveto^i e^aiVETO elvai, Kara he rrjv aXr^Oeiav Soy- 
 fjLaTLKO<=; Tjv, Kol eVei twv eralpcov airoTTeipav ekafxIBave hta 
 rfj^; diropTjfjiaTLKrjf;, el eiy^ucG? €')(ou(TC tt/oo? rrjv avaXrjylriv 
 Tcov UXaTcovLKcov Soyfjidrcov, ho^au avrov diTop'qTiKov elvai, 
 To?9 fJLevTot, ye ev^veat tojv eraipcov rd UXaTcovo^; irapey^ 
 'Xeipelv^r As we have already remarked, we think it pro- 
 bable that the integrity of Platonism was preserved by Car- 
 neades and Philo. How else can we interpret the position 
 of the latter — that we could know things per se, but not 
 through the cataleptic phantasm? (paov fiev iirl tm I^tco'Ckm 
 KpLT7)pL(p, TovreaTL rf) KaraXTjirrLKy ^avraaia, dKaTd\r}7rra 
 eivaL rd irpdypbara, oaov Se evrl ry (pvaei toov rrpay/judrcou 
 avTcov KardXTjirra^). It seems to us indeed that the real 
 cause of hostility between the Stoics and Academicians was 
 this very adherence by the latter to the views of Plato, 
 in opposition to the empirical and materialist philosophy 
 
 of treating the subject to the capacity of the assumed interlocutors ; hence, 
 the constant lack of logical sequence discernible in the LucuUus, and the 
 repetition of puerile and frivolous matter. There is no doubt, however, that 
 the amended work was as perfect as the other was deficient even from the 
 meagre but invaluable fragment which has survived. 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 33. 234,. « j/^^. j. 33^ 235^ 
 
t] INTRODUCTORY. 21 
 
 of the former. One of the first effects of the triumph 
 of the Aristotelian philosophy had been to re-open the great 
 question concerning the certainty of knowledge. Plato had 
 proclaimed his ideal theory, as the only refuge from scep- 
 ticism, the only foundation of absolute truth; therefore, on 
 the overthrow of this theory, the opinions of the Sceptics 
 touching the relativity and consequent uncertainty of all 
 things had become more and more prevalent. It was to 
 stem this torrent of scepticism that Zeno and the Stoics, 
 while maintaining the empirical nature of all our knowledge, 
 endeavoured to derive a basis of certitude from those in- 
 tuitive perceptions of the real qualities of objects which 
 they thought were to be found in the cataleptic phantasm. 
 Thus the attention of philosophers was concentrated upon 
 the psychological process, in which material objects of know- 
 ledge assumed the form of mental perceptions, and on the 
 validity of the assent or instinctive belief {avyKardOeaL^) 
 afforded by the mind to the testimony of consciousness. It 
 was the opposition of the Academy to the Stoics on this 
 point which constituted the scepticism of the former — a 
 scepticism relative indeed only to the empiricism of the 
 latter; and which, as we have seen, for this reason differed 
 essentially from the scepticism of the Pyrrhonists. In this 
 controversy, on the one hand, the question at issue was 
 Avhether or not a realist theory of perception could be 
 demonstrated to bo true. That any theory of perception 
 is demonstrable, especially by empiricism, involved a self- 
 contradiction, because the facts of consciousness which were 
 called as evidence could only be interpreted by the assump- 
 tion of the theory, and yet upon these facts alone could any 
 theory be based. 
 
 The New Academicians, on the other hand, still hold- 
 ing the ground formerly occupied by Plato that the 
 mind in perception was conscious of nothing but its own 
 
2 2 INTRODUCTORY. [Lect. 
 
 modifications, the mere shadows of external objects, showed 
 irrefutably that all hope of escaping from mere subjective 
 knowledge was impossible (iravTa elvai dKardXrjTrra) ; and 
 so the contest continued, from Arcesilaus to Antiochus, 
 without hope of any satisfactory termination. Each side, 
 safe under the shelter of its own theory, eagerly watched 
 for the weak place in that of its adversary — 
 
 ^'Tjaaov 5^ \6yxo-i-s' olW ixpi^avov k6k\ois, 
 d'TTWS aiSrjpos i^oXicddvoi /xdrrju. 
 el S' 6/JLfx virepcTX^v trvos drepos fxddoi, 
 \6yxw ^vth^ia (yrdfiaTi, irpocpdi^vai ^^Xwv^." — 
 
 and thus, without ever fairl}^ grappling the problem, they 
 left it as a legacy for later philosophers to attempt to 
 solve. 
 
 It may be gathered from these preliminary remarks, 
 that the main subject which is to occupy our attention in 
 the following Lectures, must be the consideration of the 
 features and tendencies of ancient scepticism; for it is 
 obvious, scepticism in one form or another was the essen- 
 tial characteristic of each of the three schools — that of 
 Pyrrho, of the New Academy, and of the later Pyrrhonists. 
 We shall therefore conclude this introductory chapter with 
 a few observations on this aspect of Greek philosophy. 
 
 § 7j. Scepticism is one of those words which, from the 
 earliest date of their use, seem to convey a meaning different 
 from their real signification. According to the etymology of 
 the word, a sceptic was simply an enquirer, and we have 
 the name aKeirTiKr) used always synonymously with ^tjttjtlkt) 
 by Sextus Empiricus. But through that habit of confusing 
 cause with effect we so often see indicated in the use of 
 words, cTKeirTLKrj was soon understood to mean solely aTroprjTCKi^, 
 or the art of doubting. Although, however, the Sceptics 
 
 ^ Phocnissa, line 1397. 
 
I.] INTRODUCTOliY, 23 
 
 professedly adhered to the literal meaning of the word as 
 justly applied to themselves, few will hesitate to admit that 
 the love of doubt is a more prominent feature throughout 
 their system than the love of investigation. 
 
 M. Cousin, synthetically deducing all the schools of phi- 
 losophy from a priori consideration of the instinctive tenden- 
 cies inherent in the human mind, determines scepticism to 
 be an inevitable result from the opposing dogmatisms of 
 sensualism and idealism, "le sensualisme, I'idealisme, et le 
 scepticisme." Such is the inevitable succession in the human 
 mind, — a like order of succession then we must expect to find 
 in the history of the development of human thought ; and, 
 according to the facts M. Cousin adduces, such seems to have 
 been actually the case. But this theory is obviously only 
 applicable to scepticism considered as a manifestation of the 
 doubting, not the enquiring element in the mind. Every 
 new system of thought must be sceptical in relation to the 
 system it supplants, and the transition from one to the other 
 necessarily supposes the exercise of that zetetic faculty which 
 scepticism primarily implied. In this sense, therefore, scep- 
 ticism would be the alternate link in the successive phases 
 of opinion, the motive or dynamical element in the intellec- 
 tual constitution of man continually urging him forward in 
 his search after truth, — a search which, although the attain- 
 ment of its object may be impossible, evokes the employment 
 of his noblest powers. "Speculative truth (says Sir W. 
 Hamilton) is subordinate to speculation itself, and its value 
 is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it oc- 
 casions^" — scepticism and true philosophy are thus identical. 
 
 The moment a philosopher begins to dogmatize, he ceases 
 to be a philosopher, for then he virtually admits his search 
 after truth is at an end. Of course the dogmatic and philo- 
 
 1 Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions (n. Essay). "Philosophy of Percep- 
 tion," p. 40. 
 
,2 4 INTROD UCTOR Y. [Lect. 
 
 sopliic tendencies in human nature will find expression: the 
 former as the stable, conservative, practical ; the latter as the 
 moving, progressive, speculative. 
 
 Tlie due adjustment then of these apparently conflicting 
 elements will constitute a healthy intellectual tone either in 
 the individual or in what is termed the spirit of the age, 
 which is but the common expression of an aggregate of indi- 
 viduals ; and the preponderance of the dogmatical or scepti- 
 cal tendencies is always indicative of an abnormal state in 
 any period of the history of human thought. 
 
 *' The negative side of Grecian speculation stands quite as 
 prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the 
 intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive side. 
 It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by a 
 certain measure of plausible premise — and then to proclaim 
 it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all 
 objectors — that Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask 
 not only positive falsehood, but even affirmation without 
 evidence, exaggerated confidence in what was only doubtful, 
 and show of knowledge without the reality — to look at a 
 problem on all sides, and set forth all the difficulties attend- 
 ing its solution — to take account of deductions from the 
 affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted 
 as true upon the balance — all this v/ill be found pervading 
 the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of all 
 progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the grounds 
 of negation should be freely exposed than the grounds of affir- 
 mation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and the 
 negative vein indeed the more impressive and characteristic 
 of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history \" It seems 
 evident that scepticism always has been, and always must be 
 necessary to the advancement of human thought: the paradox 
 of one age may become an axiom in the next, a prejudice in 
 
 ■ ^ History of Greece (Grote), chap, xlvii. p. 472. 
 
I.] INTRODUCrORY. 25 
 
 the succeeding; and if there was no disposition to question, 
 examine, and sift the grounds of opinion, intellect would 
 stagnate, and the natural aspirations of man onwards and 
 upwards would be blunted and impeded. Why then has the 
 word "scepticism" such an obnoxious sound to the ears of most 
 people, that the very enquiry into its character and history is 
 looked upon with mistrust? It is for this reason, thaty in the 
 infancy of thought among the Greeks, and to a great degree 
 in modern times, the limits and functions of the different 
 fields of activity of the human mind have never been pro- 
 perly or adequately defined. In Greece, philosophy, science 
 and religion being alike treated as products of reason, the 
 conclusions of one were considered applicable to the solution 
 of problems properly belonging to the other two. Thus it 
 was that the false methods of physical enquiry, which seemed 
 to render the attainment of any positive science impossible, 
 threw an unhealthy feeling of doubt and discouragement on 
 speculative or philosophical pursuits, and subverted or clouded 
 with uncertainty all the fo.undations of natural morality. 
 When virtue and knowledge were considered identical, what 
 wonder that to impugn the validity of the latter seemed to 
 involve a questioning of the authority of the former. So in 
 our own day the claims of philosophy, science and religion 
 are held by many to be conflicting, and they who rely upon 
 one are frequently led to discard the other. The man of 
 science certain in his results, confident in his processes, despises 
 the dreaming philosopher, who in his search after truth 
 appears to neglect all that is substantial and practical; both, 
 confident that the reason of man is potent to measure the 
 mysteries of the universe, look upon faith, which is beyond 
 the range of reason because it is above it, as the offspring of 
 bigotry and superstition. In fact, however, the tendency of 
 zetetic philosophy, which we think is all philosophy, is, as we 
 shall endeavour in the following pages to show, to render 
 
2 6 INT ROD UGTOR Y. [Lect. I. 
 
 man more and more dependent upon faith, faith being the 
 principle on which the validity of all the processes of reason 
 must ultimately depend. Every new phase of speculative 
 opinion must lead the thoughtful observer to the conviction 
 that it is not given to the human intellect to unlock the 
 secrets of the absolute — man is not the measure of all things 
 — ^'areXh ovBev ovBev6<i fjuerpov^" If philosophy has succeeded 
 in convincing the proud reason of man of this fact, it surely 
 has contributed something to the interests of religion — if it 
 points out to science her proper domain and limit, science 
 cannot but admit herself on this account under great obliga- 
 tions to speculation. It is then with these objects in view 
 that the historian of ancient thought should engage in his 
 task ; not treating opinions as the venerable ruins of bygone 
 ages, but as the expressions of tendencies in the human mind, 
 which, being constant in their operation, must perpetually 
 recur as long as human nature remains the same ; so that any 
 judgment passed will be of as much importance as a contri- 
 bution to the study of modern as of ancient thought, and, by 
 deciding for ever those questions the recurrence of which 
 may be calculated on as isochronous perturbations, leave the 
 attention of philosophers free to be concentrated on new 
 fields of discovery and speculation. 
 
 1 Plato, Bep. Lib. vi. 404. 
 
LECTURE II. 
 
 ON THE PYBBHONIAN ETHIC. 
 
 " HovTO fj-oi, (3 Hvppuv, Ifieiperai rjTop aKovaai, 
 IIws TTor' dvT:]p ir dyeis p^ora ixed' •^cri;xtcts, 
 Movpos iv dvdp<hTroL<n. deod rpbirov TjyefxoveOcoy." 
 
 § a. Sextus Empiricus in his Hypotyposes asserts that 
 the name of Pyrrho had been rightly associated with the 
 sceptical philosophy, from the fact that he above all his 
 predecessors had systematised and developed its peculiar 
 opinions. *' Kal YivppwveLo^ airb tov (f>alvea6at tj^lIv tov 
 Hvppcova (Tco/jLariKcoTepop kol eirK^avearepov toov irpo avTOv 
 irpocrekriXvOevai rfj aKe-^ei^y Let us now consider wherein 
 consists the claim of Pyrrho to be recognised as the 
 special founder of a new sect of philosophers. Scepticism, 
 as a tendency of the human mind, must have been ante- 
 cedent to the earliest efforts of man towards philosophical 
 research, for doubt is as much the parent as the offspring 
 of enquiry^, and we find it appearing as a positive feature 
 in one of the earliest manifestations of Greek speculation. 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 3. 7. 
 
 2 " Jeder tiichtigen Anf anger in der Philosophie ist Skeptiker. Und um- 
 gekebrt: jeder Skeptiker, als soldier, ist Anfanger." — Herbart, Einleitung in 
 die Philosophic, chap. iv. p. 62. 
 
28 THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. [Lect. 
 
 Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic 
 school, had denied the possibility of attaining certain know- 
 ledge : 
 
 Socrates had recommended doubt as the best prepara- 
 tion of the mind for humble enquiry : ""^H XcoKpare^, tJkovov 
 fjiev eycoye, irplv koX (rxryyeveaOai aoL, on av oiSev aWo 
 rj auT09 T€ aTTOpeU, KoX Tov^ aXkov<; Trotet? diropelv. koX 
 vvp, W9 7' i/JLol BoKet<;, yorjrevei'^ fie kcli (j)apfidTT€L<;y koI 
 dT6')^vco<; KaT67rd6et<;, wcTTe fiearbu diropia^ fye^^ovevaL^.^^ Be- 
 sides, Heraclitus, Democritus, Protagoras, and the whole 
 of the Hedonistic school of philosophers, had implicitly or 
 explicitly based their views of the relation of man to 
 external nature on a sceptical method. Pyrrho then can 
 scarcely be said in this respect to have introduced any 
 novel system into the processes of philosophical investi- 
 gation. Again, with regard to the avowed end of the 
 Pyrrhonian doctrines, viz., the attainment of drapa^ia^, or 
 a state of tranquil inaction as the summum bonum of a 
 wise man*, Socrates himself to a great degree, and the 
 sect of Cynic philosophers had inculcated a life of con- 
 templative virtue, as the proper end of a rational existence ; 
 and therefore Pyrrho cannot lay claim to originality in 
 introducing this ascetic aim as the ultimate object of his 
 whole philosophy. In what, we may ask, then did the 
 
 1 Hyi). II. 4. 8. 
 
 2 3Ieno, p. 80. 
 
 " 5ri 5^ aroTTwraros clfxi Kal ttoiCj rois avOpibirov^ diropeiv.^* 
 
 Thccetchis, 149 a. 
 
 * Cicero refers this notion of drapa^la to Democritus. "Democriti 
 autem securitas, quas est animi tanquam tranquillitas, quam appellant ev- 
 6vfiiav, eo seperanda fuit ab hac disputatione quia ista aiiimi tranquillitas ea 
 ipsa est beata vita." — De Fin. v. 8. Cf. Aiistotle, Eth. Nic. 11. 8. "Atd Kal 
 ipl^ovrai. Tcks dperhi diraddat TivdiS Kal ■^pe/i/as." 
 
 * "rd p-h fnjSevos Seladat, deiov eTuaL, t6 5^ wj iXax^O'TUV iyyvraTCo tov Oeiov.^' 
 
 Xen. Meinor. i. 6. 
 
 
II.] TEE PYRRHONIAN ETIIIG. 29 
 
 teaching of Pyrrho entitle him to the reputation of having 
 founded a distinct school of philosophy? To this question 
 we may reply : The distinguishing characteristic of Pyrrho's 
 system was the employment of a sceptical method as an 
 instrument for the attainment of virtue. Thus, in con- 
 formity with the tendency of the age, he attempted to 
 unite speculative with practical philosophy ; and, as Aris- 
 tippus had deduced an art of life from the principles ot* 
 subjective materialism — as Plato had endeavoured to found 
 an ethical system on a basis of idealism — so Pyrrho in his 
 turn essayed to solve the great problem of happiness by 
 the aid of scepticism. It is, therefore, this aspect of Pyr- 
 rhonism to which we shall first direct our attention ; con- 
 stituting, as we think it does, a manifestation of human 
 thought novel amongst its contemporaries, and unique 
 amongst subsequent phases of opinion. 
 
 § /5. Every desire in the human mind implies also a 
 belief in the existence of its object \ " Quod si aliquid ali- 
 quando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, 
 videri." Lucullus, 8. This object is some quality or power 
 in things to satisfy the appetite or feeling which has given 
 rise to the desire. A belief in the existence of the object of 
 desire, then, is a belief that the thing we desire is capable 
 of producing an effect on us suitable to the feeling which 
 prompted the desire. Hunger, for example, produces a de- 
 sire for food, and we desire food because we believe that 
 there exists in it a power to satisfy the cravings of hunger. 
 Now in whatever way we may define that state of mind 
 
 ^ " 7/' re ykp (}>CKapyvpla virbXrixpU i<TTL rod t6 dpyijpcov KaXbu etvai Kal i] [xidrj 
 h\ Kal T] (XKoXaala ofiolws kuI T&Wa.^^ — Diog. L. vii. 110 sqq. 
 
 '• Quamobrem simul objecta species cujuspiam est, quod bonum videatur 
 ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura." — Tus. Dis. iv. 6. Kant's defini- 
 tion makes desire create its own object. "Begehrungsvermogen ist das 
 Vermogen durch seine Vorstellungefi Ursache der Gegenstande dieser Vor- 
 stellungen zu seyn." — Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten, i. p. 9. 
 
 ^ OF THE 
 
30 THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. [Lect. 
 
 called belief, it is at any rate certain that such a state of 
 mind is utterly opposed to, and incompatible with, that 
 condition of consciousness we denominate doubt. Where 
 there is doubt, there can at the same time be no belief. 
 If belief, then, in the existence of the object of desire is a 
 constitutive element of the desire itself, it is evident that 
 any means employed to induce a state of doubt in the mind 
 must have the effect of suppressing desire. Again, any 
 determination of the mind to action, or act of volition, 
 implies a previous presence of some desire or motive direct- 
 ing the will to some definite object \ It is true that every 
 desire is not necessarily followed by action, but it is equally 
 certain that every voluntary action must have been pre- 
 ceded by some desire. 
 
 Here then we have the central notion of the Pyrrhonian 
 system, viz. to collect conflicting evidence concerning the 
 reality of external objects, or the qualities of external ob- 
 jects^. By this means a feeling of doubt {airopla) as to this 
 reality is established in the mind, hence desire for the object 
 is suppressed, and there being no incentive to effort, a state 
 of inaction, or drapa^la, ensues. *' Alterum est, quod negatis 
 actionem uUius rei posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem assensu 
 suo comprobet. Primum enim videri oportet in quo sit etiam. 
 assensus. Dicunt enim Stoici, sensus ipsos assensus esse: 
 quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi. Tolli au- 
 tem omnia, si visa tollantur^" " For," says Sextus Empiricus*, 
 "he who believes that anything is really {(jyvaec^) good 
 
 ^ " In all determinations of the mind that are of any importance, there 
 must be something in the preceding state of the mind that disposes or 
 inclines us to that determination." — Eeid, " On the Active Powers of Man," 
 Essay ii. (Hamilton's Reid). 
 
 ^ "EffTi 5k 7) (TKeirTLKT] biva^iis avTiOeriKT] <f>atvo/Jt,ivo}v re koI voovfjt^vwv, k.t.\. 
 —Hyp. I. 4. 8. 
 
 » LucuUus, 33. « Hyp. i. 12. 27—29—30. 
 
 ° On this meaning of the word 0i5(rci, see note on the Fabrician edition of 
 Sextus Empiricus. {Hyp. i. 12. 27, note I., p. 18). It is there translated by 
 
II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 3 1 
 
 or evil, is for ever being disturbed, and as long as those 
 things he imagines good are not attained by him, he con- 
 siders himself the victim of real evils, and he pursues eagerly 
 those things he thinks are really good. But the attain- 
 ment of them only leads him to further disquietude, because 
 he is unreasonably and immoderately elated, and because 
 dreading any change he strives his utmost to prevent these 
 supposed benefits escaping him\ While on the contrary 
 he who doubts concerning the reality of that which he 
 considers good or evil, neither vehemently pursues, nor pre- 
 cipitately shuns anything, and therefore remains calm and 
 tranquil^" "Now," continues Sextus Empiricus, "the Sceptics 
 at first hoped to attain tranquillity by demonstrating the 
 discrepancy between things perceived through the senses and 
 those apprehended by the intellect; failing in this, they 
 suspended their judgment (eVeo-^oi/), and, as a necessary 
 result, tranquillity followed this withholding of assent, as 
 the shadow follows a body. Not that we mean to say a 
 Sceptic is totally exempt from trouble; we admit he may 
 
 the Latin adverb revera. It seems to mean really or hy nature, or 'per se, or 
 any word which implies objective existence. 
 
 1 "Ye Powers, why did you man create 
 With such insatiable desire? 
 If you'd endow him with no more estate 
 You should have made him less aspire. 
 But now our appetites you Vex and Cheat 
 With reall Hunger, and Phantastic meat." 
 
 Norris' Miscellany. " The Complaint." 
 2 Cf. "Partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis 
 nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis ; ita esse quatuor. Ex bonis libidinem et 
 laetitiam, ut sit Isetitia prsesentium bonorum, libido futurorum. Ex malis 
 metum et asgritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, gegritudinem praesen- 
 tibus. Quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt asgritudine in- 
 stantia. Lsetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur : cum libido 
 ad id, quod videtur bonum, illecta et inflammata rapiatur : laetitia ut adepta 
 jam aliquid concupitum, efferatur et gestiat. Natura enim omnes ea, qu8B 
 bona videntur, sequuntur fugiuntque contraria." — Tusc. Disp. iv. 6. Cf. 
 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 3. 
 
312 THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. [Lect. 
 
 suffer from thirst, cold, or any of the inevitable evils of life. 
 But even under these circumstances, ordinary individuals 
 are exposed to double suffering, both from the so-called 
 evils themselves, and from believing them to be essentially 
 evil. The Sceptic, dismissing the idea that there are any evils 
 per se, endures them with fortitude. We say therefore that 
 the aim of scepticism is inaction [arapa^la) under possible 
 (ho^aaToh) circumstances; and moderate emotion (jxeTpLo- 
 irdOeiav) under actual {KarrjvajKao-fievoLf;)" From these pas- 
 sages we are enabled to form some estimate of the scope 
 and tendency of the Pyrrhonian teaching. Popularly stated, 
 it was founded on the result of experience in common life ; 
 viz. that any good is greater in the anticipation, than in 
 the enjoyment ; and that evil is more in the dread, than in 
 the suffering. In point of fact man, in virtue of the rational 
 part of his nature, is more concerned with the future and 
 possible, than with the present and actual. Hopes and 
 fears are the levers of life, and the main incentives to all 
 action. But on what are these hopes and fears grounded? 
 Simply on our belief that the good and evil we see in things 
 have an absolute and necessary existence. The poor man 
 wishes to be rich. Why? Because he believes that the 
 benefits to be derived from wealth are inherent in riches ; 
 he does not see that the happiness they confer is dependent 
 on the susceptibilities of the possessor, and contingent on 
 the circumstances which attend their possession. Health 
 and strength of body, the attachment of friends, the affec- 
 • tions of domestic life, may insure to him a much greater 
 degree of happiness than is enjoyed by the rich man, to 
 whom perhaps these accessories are wanting. Sextus E. 
 mentions a forcible example of the effect of imagination 
 in inducing a belief in the absolute and necessary nature 
 of evil, instancing as a fact that, when witnessing a surgical 
 operation performed on a friend, the bystander is often more 
 
II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 33 
 
 overcome by the pain he supposes is being suffered than the 
 patient is from the actual infliction. " 'II9 fiev yap avOpwiro^ 
 aladyTCKO'^ TTcto-p^et, fir) TTpoaSo^d^QJV Be ltl tovto o iraa'^ei, 
 KaKOV iart (^vaeL fJueTptoiradel' to yap 7rpoaSo^d^€iv n tolovto 
 X^^pop icTTL Kol avTov Tov irdaxeiv, m evlore rov(; fjuev refi- 
 vojJLevov^ rj aWo tl toiovto 7rdaxovTa<; (I)ep6i,v, rov^; Be irapea- 
 TGora^; Bed rrjv nrepl tov yLvo/jievou So^av w? (^av\ov Xeiiro'^^v- 
 %erz/\" If then we admit that a life of tranquillity, of free- 
 dom from unrest and disquiet, should be the aim of a wise 
 man, we cannot impugn the validity of the means the 
 Pyrrhonists proposed for attaining that object. They cut at 
 the root of all human hopes, fears, and desires, and left man 
 in the possession solely of that consciousness of the present 
 and actual which we suppose him to share with the brute 
 creation. " Ergo hi, qui negant quidquam posse compre- 
 hendi, hsec ipsa eripiunt, vel instrumenta, vel ornamenta 
 vitse: vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus, 
 ipsumque animal orbant animo^" Whether such a result, 
 if it were possible, would be worthy the aspirations of an 
 intelligent being we will leave for the present to the judg- 
 ment of the reader. Sextus E. gives a characteristic sum- 
 mary of the Pyrrhonian reasoning on this subject, the con- 
 clusiveness of which seems at any rate not to have been 
 doubted by him. "''OOev eTrLkoyi^o/jLeOa otl, el to Kafcov 
 TTOirjTiKov, KaKOV eaTL Kal (pevKTOv, 77 Be ireiroiOrjai'^ tov TaBe 
 fiev elvai ^vaei dyaOd TdBe Be Kaicd, Tapa^d^ Trocei' KaKov 
 ecTTL KOL ^evKTOv TO viroTiOeaOat Kal ireTTOLOevai <pavX6v tl 
 7] ayauov (»9 7rpo9 TrjV cpicriv etvat . 
 
 1 H7/p. III. 24. 236. 2 LucuUus, 10. 
 
 3 Hyp. III. 24. 238. The following reflections of M. Crousaz seem to 
 embody the really common-sense view of the main aim of Pyrrhonism, viz. 
 the attainment of tranquillity, and absence of all disquietude. "Le But dont 
 les Sceptiques tiroient leur gloire renfermoit done une contradiction pal- 
 pable. L'ignorance oii je suis sur la verity ou sur la realite de ce qui parolt 
 Bien, et de ce qui paroit Mai, m'empeche d'etre agitd de Ddsirs et de Craintes, 
 
 L.L. 3 
 
34 THE PYERHONIAN ETHIC. [Lect. 
 
 § 7. Of course we should not expect that a philosopher 
 who considered the great end and aim of virtue to be the 
 suppression of all incentives to action, would devote much 
 attention to establishing any rules for the guidance of action. 
 Pyrrho (and Aristo), says Cicero ^ insisted that every thing 
 was comprised in virtue alone, to such a degree as to de- 
 prive it of all power of making any selection of external 
 circumstances : " Enim in una virtute sic omnia esse volu- 
 erunt ; ut eam rerum selectione exspoliarent^." Even a 
 Pyrrhonist, although he might be able to subdue all motives 
 to voluntary action, could not always resist the force of ex- 
 ternal circumstances, obeying them, however, as they said, 
 simply in order not to oppose, following them without any 
 inclination or proclivity, as a boy does his master, " to yap 
 irelOeaOaL Xeyerai SLacpopco^, to re //.?) avTLTelveiv, dX)C dirXoo^ 
 eireaOaL avev a(j^oBpd<; irpoaKXiaew'^ koI 7rpoa7rad€La<;, w? 6 
 TTOL^ XiyeTao ireiOeaOai tm Trat^aycoyM^, k.t.X." Since then 
 the Pyrrhonists admitted that they could not always remain 
 inactive, they found it expedient to enunciate a standard 
 of conduct according to which certain things were to be 
 done, and certain others left undone. We say then, writes 
 Sextus E/, that the criterion of life according to the scep- 
 
 et m'affermit dans une tranquillity inebranlable. Voila mon but, disoient-ils. 
 C'est tout le contraire leur dira une personne qui raisonne de bonne foy : car 
 ignorant si mon ^tat present tournera a mon avantage, ou k mon malheur : 
 ne connoissant aucun moien sur pour me rendre heureux, ni pour me garantir 
 de misere, qu'est ce qui me rassurera contra la Crainte? Pour vivre au des- 
 sus de la Crainte, ce n'est pas asses de savoir que le Mai pourroit n'arriver 
 pas. 11 faut que je sache du moins tres vraisemblement qu'il n'arrivera pas. 
 II y a plus, car dans I'Hypothese des Sceptiques, cette Proposition, Peut-etre 
 quHl n'arrivera pas du rnal, est en elle-meme incertaine, et celle-ci, Peut.-etre 
 m'est il impossible de I'^viter, n'est pas moins croyable. Un bomme est-il 
 au-dessus de la Crainte, lorsque, par la situation o^ la Pbilosopbie a mis son 
 esprit, cette Proposition, Peut-etre n'eviterai-je point les plus grands malheurs? 
 est pour lui aussi vraisemblable qu'aucune autre. II faut etre bien abruti, 
 pour tenir contre cette Id6e. — Examen du Pyrrhonisme, Part 11. Sec. 2, p. 67. 
 
 1 De Fin. 11. 13. 2 j)g jrjTi. ly. 16, et passim. 
 
 3 IIUp. I. 33. 230. * Hyp. i. 11. 21—22—23-24. 
 
IL] THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. 35 
 
 tical philosophy, is the apparent and actual {to (j)ai,v6fjLevoi>), 
 as a perception of a representative image in the mind {Bvvd- 
 fiet, Trjv (pavrao-lav avrov ovrco KakouvT€<;), We live then, 
 continues Sextus E., guided by the phenomenal manifesta- 
 tions around us (roh ^aLvojuuevoL^; 'iTpoae')(ovTe^), and con- 
 sistently with the general order of nature {Kara rrjv ^cayriKrju 
 Tr)pr)(Ttv^). Now this consistency has reference to four regu- 
 lative principles : 
 
 (1) Natural instinct {iv ix^'q^Tqaet ^vaem^^)^ according to 
 
 which we think and feel naturally. 
 
 (2) The impulse of appetite (dvdyKij iraOwv), by which 
 
 hunger leads to food, thirst to drink. 
 
 (3) The authority of laws and customs (eV irapahoaei 
 
 vofjLwv re koX eOwv), by which we are led to ac- 
 knowledge that to live virtuously is good, to live 
 viciously evil. 
 
 (4) The inductions of experience {iv hLhaaKaXlq Tex^cov), 
 
 by which we advance in those arts we have un- 
 dertaken to cultivate. 
 It is difficult to conceive how any criterion of action 
 could have been derived from such principles as these. 
 But in fact the most elevated systems of heathen morality, 
 or at any rate those of the Empiric schools, did not seek 
 any higher sources for rules of conduct. The * summurn 
 honum ' was at best but a conception generalized from the 
 results of experience, i. e. common sense ; from the sugges- 
 tions of appetite, i.e. the law of nature, the end of desire, as 
 Cicero calls it, ' extremum expetendi^' But it was this very 
 
 1 Hence the lines of Timon : 
 
 " 7] yap iythv ip^o) ofs fioi KaracpalveTai dvai, 
 
 p.vdov dXrjdeiTjs dpdbv ^x^" x-O-vbva' 
 W5 7] Tov deiov re ^tJcns /cat rdyadov at'ei 
 e^ wv labTaros yivcTat dvdpl jStos. " 
 
 Sextus E., Adv. Math. xi. 20. 
 a Hyp. I. 11. 23. ^ Lucullus, 9. 
 
 3—2 
 
36 THE PTRRHONIAN ETHIC, [Lect. 
 
 conception, or ^ summum bonum," in which the distinction lay- 
 between the sceptical and dogmatical moralists ; for while the 
 latter, from observations of the intentions of nature ^ esta- 
 blished principles of action which might guide them to live 
 in accordance with her laws, the former, rejecting the validity 
 of such inductions, on the ground of the uncertainty of all 
 things, would not admit any rule of life but such as could 
 be immediately deduced from the circumstances of the 
 present, and the exigencies of our natural appetites. 
 
 Against the possibility of there being any absolute stand- 
 ard of good or evil the Pyrrhonists were most vehement in 
 their attacks ^ The greater part of the chapter on ethics 
 in the work of Sextus E. is devoted to this subject, and 
 the whole armoury of sceptical logic is ransacked for argu- 
 ments in support of their general assertion, viz. that if there 
 were any absolute good or evil it would appear the same 
 to all. We will extract a brief summary of the Pyrrhonian 
 reasonings on this subject from the writings of Diogenes 
 Laertius^ Pyrrho (says he) used to affirm that nothing was 
 honourable or disgraceful, just or unjust; and on the same 
 principle he (Pyrrho) said there was no such thing as down- 
 right truth, but that man did everything in consequence of 
 custom or law. 
 
 For that nothing was any more this than that. The same 
 thing is just in the case of some people and unjust in that of 
 others. If there be any natural good, or any natural evil, 
 then it must be good to everyone, or evil to everyone, just as 
 snow is cold to everyone. But there is no such thing as one 
 general good or evil common to all beings. Therefore there 
 is no such thing as natural good, or natural evil, for either 
 
 1 " Cum omnium artium is finis esset, quid natura maxime quosreret, 
 idem statui debere de totius arte vitse." — De Fin. iv. 8. 
 
 2 Hyp. III. chap. 23. 
 
 3 Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61—83—90—101. 
 
II.] THE PYRRHONIAN ETIIIG. 37 
 
 one must pronounce everything good which is thought so by- 
 anyone whatever, or one must say that it does not follow 
 that everything which is thought good is good. Now we 
 cannot say that everything which is thought good is good, 
 since the same thing is thought good by one person (as for 
 instance pleasure is thought good by Epicurus) and evil by 
 another (as it is thought evil by Antisthenes) ; and on this 
 principle the same thing will be both good and evil\ 
 
 Again, we assert that it does not follow that everything 
 which is thought good is good. Then we must distinguish 
 between the different opinions, which it is not possible to do, 
 by reason of the equality of the reasons adduced in support 
 of each. It follows then that we cannot recognise anything 
 as good by nature. Such are the logical consequences of an 
 empirical ethology, where happiness is the criterion of life, 
 and reason the arbiter of happiness. For can the purely 
 subjective and apparent furnish any immutable principles of 
 morality, unless the existence of some internal sense is 
 admitted by which a natural distinction in things can be 
 perceived ? Such an innate principle the adversaries of the 
 Sceptics would not allow, hence the morality of Pyrrhonism, 
 however low and unsatisfactory it may have been, was really 
 only the inevitable result of the rejection of all a "priori 
 sources of knowledge. It may have been merely to support 
 this conclusion that Pyrrho, and afterwards the New Acade- 
 micians, proclaimed the contingent and arbitrary nature of all 
 distinction between right and wrong. The idea of laws in 
 
 1 «• The language about the good and the base is the ordinary language 
 of sceptical despair. Such despair being compatible with the belief that 
 anything is possible because nothing is true." — Maurice, Moral and Meta- 
 physical Philosophy, Chap. vi. Div. 4, Sec. ii. p. 212. 
 
 "Dass er alien Unterschied von Gut und Bose, Gerecht und Ungerecht, 
 gelaugnet und nur Sitte und Gesetz als Eichtschnur unsrer Handlungen 
 anerkannt habe, ist wohl als Folgerung aus seiner Behauptung von der 
 Unerkennbarkeit der Dinge zu betrachten." — Brandis, Geschichte der Ent- 
 wickelungen der Griechischen Philosophie, Vol. ii. p. 177. 
 
38 THE PYRRHONIAN ETHIC. [Lect. II. 
 
 the moral constitution of man, which modern philosophers 
 have substituted for purely objective reasons in things, was 
 not yet understood by the ancient Greek moralists. There 
 seemed therefore no alternative between Platonism and Em- 
 piricism; and since the latter was the prevailing tendency of 
 the post- Aristotelian philosophy, its data were of course the 
 groundwork of scepticism. We have now glanced at some of 
 the main features of the Pyrrhonian ethic. As a basis for an 
 art of life it was simply impossible. If we are to believe the 
 anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius it would appear to have 
 required all the care of Pyrrho's friends to prevent him being 
 a victim of his own principles. 
 
 But we do not imagine his doctrines had many votaries. 
 Sextus Empiricus states^ that the later Sceptics abandoned 
 the idea of drapa^ia as the end of their philosophy, and 
 Cicero tells us that in his day Pyrrhonism had long since 
 fallen into oblivion, "Nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Herillus, jam diu 
 abjecti^" "Jam explosse ejectseque sententiae Pyrrhonis, 
 etc.^" In our next Lecture we shall proceed to the considera- 
 tion of the purely sceptical side of the Pyrrhonian philosophy, 
 constituting as it does by far the greater portion of the 
 treatise of Sextus Empiricus. 
 
 ^ Hyp. I. 12. 30. 2 Dg jrin. ii. 11. 
 
 3 De Fin. v. 8. 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 ON THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 Tois fxkv ydp '^drj, tois 5' iv vaript^ XP<^*'V 
 rd Tepirvd iriKpd yiyverai Kaddts ^t'Xa." 
 
 § a. Every perception is a modification or change of 
 our consciousness, an effect of the joint operation of some 
 power in the external object causing the perception, and 
 some degree of susceptibility in the mind of the perceiv- 
 ing subject/ Now, if the same object when brought alone 
 
 1 We are not attributing here any special theory of cognition to the 
 Sceptic. As we shall have frequent occasion to remark, scepticism is always 
 founded on the dogmas of its adversaries. We have only attempted to catch 
 the crude notion of perception which seemed to have been assumed by the 
 sceptical philosophers, where the physical and metaphysical, logical and 
 psychological points of view are interchanged and confused. As a proof of 
 this compare the exposition of the same subject by a modern metaphysician. 
 *' Consciousness presents itself as the product of two factors, I and some- 
 thing. The problem of the unconditioned is, briefly stated, to reduce these 
 two factors to one. For it is manifest that, so long as they remain two, we 
 have no unconditioned, but a pair of conditioned existences. If the some- 
 tliing of which I am conscious is a separate reality, having qualities and modes 
 of action of its own, and thereby determining, or contributing to determine, 
 the form which my consciousness of it may take, my consciousness is thereby 
 conditioned, or partly dependent on something beyond itself. It is no matter, 
 in this respect, whether the influence is direct or indirect — whether, for 
 instance, I see a material tree, or only the mental image of a tree. If the 
 
40 THE ROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 into connection with the perceiving subject always pro- 
 duced the same percept, we might argue that the sensi- 
 bility of the subject was constant, and that the percept 
 was a measure, so to speak, of the power of the object. 
 Again, if the object being brought not alone, but together 
 with others, into connection with the percipient subject, 
 produced the same percept, we should say that the power 
 of the object was absolute, necessary, and independent of 
 contingent circumstances; and still we might continue to 
 assert that the percept was a measure, as it were, of the 
 power of the object. 
 
 Now with regard to the phenomenon of perception as 
 taking place momentarily in ourselves, experience tells us 
 that neither of the hypotheses mentioned above is true. 
 For the same object alone does not always produce the 
 same percept, nor does it when accompanied by different 
 circumstances. The inference therefore is that, 
 
 1. The mental susceptibility varies in the subject, and 
 therefore that the power of the object is manifested in the 
 percept, not absolutely, but only relatively. 
 
 2. That the power of the object is dependent upon cir- 
 cumstances extraneous to the percipient subject, and is there- 
 fore only manifested in the percept relatively to those cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 From these considerations the Sceptics argued that we 
 
 nature of the thing in any degree determines the character of the image— if 
 the visible form of a tree is different from that of a house because the tree 
 itself is different from the house, my consciousness is, however remotely, in- 
 fluenced by something different from itself, the ego by the non-ego. And on 
 the other hand, if I, who am conscious, am a real being, distinct from the 
 things of which I am conscious — if the conscious mind has a constitution 
 and laws of its own by which it acts, and if the mode of its consciousness is 
 in any degree determined by those laws, the non-ego is so far conditioned by 
 the ego ; the thing which I see is not seen absolutely, and per se, but in a 
 form partly dependent upon 'the laws of my vision." — Mausel, The Philo- 
 sophy of the Conditioned, pp. 4 — G. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 4 1 
 
 could not predicate of any given object what percept it 
 would produce in the mind, and conversely, from any per- 
 cept the object which had caused it. Now, as we have 
 already seen, a belief in the capacity of known objects to 
 produce constant effects is a necessary element of those 
 states of mind we call hopes, fears, and desires, which are 
 the antecedents of action. ''Quare qui aut visum, aut as- 
 sensum tollit, is omnem actionem toUit e vita\" Again, a 
 belief in our ability to recognize an object from our percep- 
 tion of its effect on the mind is what we call knowledge'', and 
 the degree of certitude which this knowledge possesses is 
 proportional to the degree of this belief But it is obvious 
 that the degree of confidence with which we can assign any 
 absolute power or property to an object must depend upon 
 the amount of faith we accord to the testimony of those 
 perceptions by which we originally discriminated the exist- 
 ence of these qualities. Now what is the nature of this 
 testimony, and how far are we justified in granting it our 
 assent? A, B, and C, we will say, are about to form a judg- 
 ment on some quality of an object perceived by the sense of 
 taste. A, judging by the testimony of his consciousness, pro- 
 nounces the object to be sweet, B perhaps says that it has 
 no taste at all, and C that it is even bitter ^ Now here 
 are three conflicting decisions on the same fact; how are 
 we to tell which of them is true? Is there any absolute 
 and permanent quality in the object causing our percep- 
 tion of sweetness ? Surely we could not say so, on such 
 evidence ; appearances there may be. Three different ap- 
 pearances, says the Sceptic, and the existence of these I will 
 believe ; but what am I to infer from the discrepancy of 
 
 1 LueuUus, 12. 
 
 2 "Knowledge implies three things: 1. Firm Belief; 2. Of what is true ; 
 3. On sufficient grounds." — Whately, Logic, Book iv. chap. 2, note 13. 
 
 3 Cf. Lucretius, iv. 658: 
 
 "hoc ubi quod suave est aliis, aliis fit amarum." 
 
42 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 their deliverances as to the real nature of the external object. 
 Heraclitus answers that the same thing is both sweet and 
 bitter. " koX ol fiev XKeirrLKol ^aiveaOao Xeyovac ra evavrla 
 irepl TO avTO, ol Se 'UpaKXeiTetoi, airo tovtov koI iirl to 
 vTrapxetv avra /jLeripxovrat^" Democritus denied reality of 
 existence to everything but space and atoms, declaring that 
 all the other attributes of matter were but apparent and 
 phenomenal. " dwo yap rod tol<; fiev yXvKv (^alveaOai, to 
 fxeki, Tol<^ he TTLKpov, TOP AvfJ'OKp/.TOv eirCkoyl^ecrdaC <f)a(T(, 
 TO iJbr)T6 yXvKv avro elvai /jLtjTe irtKpov^.'' Protagoras the 
 Sophist declared his opinion on the limit of reality in the 
 well-known aphorism, " iravrfov xpVH'^'^^^ elvat /jbirpov rov 
 dvdpwiTov^r Meaning that we could affirm existence of 
 nothing but our momentary sensations, a simple relation 
 between subject and object, "tlOtjo-i ra (^auvofieva eKaaro) 
 /jLova, KoX ouTO)? eladyei to Trpo? r^^" The Cyrenaics, extend- 
 ing this doctrine, maintained that they only properly per- 
 ceived those things which they felt by their inmost touch, 
 such as pain or pleasure. ''Quid Cyrenaei videntur? mi- 
 nime contempti philosophi, qui negant esse quidquam, quod 
 percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, quae tactu 
 intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem : neque se, quo 
 quid colore aut quo sono sit, scire, sed tantum sentire, affici 
 se quodam modo^." Thus we see, from the uncertainty at- 
 taching to the reports of sense, philosophers concluded that 
 the real nature of things must be very different from that 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 29—210. 
 
 2 Hyp. I. 30. 213. " At]ijl6kpitos 5^ 8ti jxh dvaipel rd tpatvofiem tois aladrj- 
 o-eo-i, Koi TOVTWP \4yec fiTjUv (ftaiveaeai Kara dXrjdelav ctXXct fiovov Kara 56^av 
 d\T)6^s dk iv Tois oda-iv virdpxetv rh drSfiovs elvat Kal Kevov 'vo/Kp yap' <f>-q<TL 
 'yXvKd Kal pofxtp iriKpov, vofKf depfxov, j/o/^y i^vxpop, vopn^) XPO'-'n, ^t^V ^^ drofia Kal 
 Kevov.' ''—Adv. Math. vii. 135. 
 
 ♦Vc3v 5' dWuv aladrjTQv odSevbs eXpai (piciv, dWd irdvTa irddrj rijs aladriaem 
 dXXoiovfi^prjs, i^ ^s yipeadai ttjp tpapraalap. /c.r.X."— Theophr. de Sensu, 63. 
 
 3 Hyp. I. 32, 210. 4 ;, i 2I6. 6 LucuUus, 24. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 43 
 
 whicli the common convictions of mankind ascribed to them. 
 But still we observe that, although commencing by doubting 
 that which the majority of mankind believe, many of the 
 early thinkers ended by believing much that the majority 
 of mankind would doubt. They in fact drew dogmatic con- 
 clusions from sceptical premises. 
 
 § /?. The Pyrrhonists did not fail to detect the incon- 
 sistency in the reasonings of their predecessors, and while 
 proclaiming the untrustworthiness of all knowledge founded 
 on the evidence of sense, declared that this very uncertainty 
 rendered it impossible to posit any dogma concerning things 
 beyond our immediate consciousness {ra dSyXa). Thus they 
 maintained a consistent attitude of doubt respecting every- 
 thing but the subjective phenomena revealed in perception. 
 *' ra yap Kara ^avracriav TraOrjrcfca^ d/3ov\')]r(o<^ ijfid<; ayov- 
 ra 669 avyKardOeo-Lv ovk dvarpeTrofiev, — ravra 8e iari rd 
 (paovofieva, orav Be ^Tjraifiev el tolovtov eart to VTroKelfJie- 
 vov, oTTocov (jialverac, ro fiev on ^alverai BlSofjuep, ^tjtov- 
 fiev S* ov irepl rod ^atvofiivov, dWd irepl eKelvov o Xeyerai, 
 irepl rod (^aivofjuevov. — olov ^alverac rjjMV yXvKd^eiv to fiekt' 
 TOVTO crvyx^pov/jiev' yXvKa^ojjueOa yap aLa6i]TLKco<;. el Be 
 /cat yXvKV iartv ocrov eirl rep Xoyo), ^r}Tovp,ev ' o ovk eart 
 TO (j)aLv6/jLevov, dXXd Trepl tov ^aivo/jbevov Xeyofjuevov^" From 
 this passage it is apparent that the Pyrrhonists regarded 
 our knowledge as extending no further than the perception 
 of one term of a ratio, which afforded no evidence as to the 
 nature of its correlative. Of course the maintenance of such 
 a position as this, a position opposed to the natural con- 
 victions of humanity, would really depend upon the ability 
 of its supporters to shake the common faith in the veracity 
 of consciousness, by adducing a multitude of proofs as jus- 
 
 1 For meaning of the word wadrjTtKos, see Hamilton's Reid, note D. (note 
 on paragraph 6). 
 
 2 Hyp. I. 10. 19, 20. 
 
44 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 tification of their own scepticism. Accordingly Pyrrho enun- 
 ciated the celebrated Se/ca rpoiroi, or tottol, ten presumptions 
 derived from a consideration of the circumstances under 
 which our commerce with the objects of external nature 
 takes place. From these reasons he argued that the relation 
 between the object and subject is probably so variable and 
 contingent, that from the subjective phenomena of our 
 consciousness we can affirm nothing certain, either through 
 the evidence of sense or the conclusions of reason. 
 
 These considerations the Pyrrhonists verified by a mass 
 of examples drawn from observation and experience, and they 
 are therefore the facts upon the truth of which must mainly 
 depend the validity of their whole method. We will briefly 
 narrate these ten grounds, together with a few examples of 
 each. They will afford the reader a glimpse of the kind of 
 reasoning ancient philosophers did not think unworthy of 
 advancing in support of their own views. 
 
 1. The first ground of doubt is derived from a con- 
 sideration of the variety observable in the physical organisa- 
 tion of animals (irapa rrjv rwv ^(ocov i^aWay^v^). 
 
 For according to the different constitutions of animals, 
 their senses, or faculties of judging and perceiving, may be 
 supposed to vary. 
 
 In confirmation of this presumption instances are adduced 
 where, when the organs of sight, taste, smell etc., have been 
 abnormally deranged, the apprehensions which we derive 
 through them appear to suffer alteration. For example, 
 writes Sextus Empiric us, they who have the jaundice say 
 that those things are yellow which appear white to us, and 
 they whose eyes are bloodshot affirm them to be red. Now 
 some animals have their eyes yellow, others bloodshot, 
 others whitish, and others different colours. It is therefore 
 probable that the conception of colour is different in the 
 1 Hyp. I. 14. 36. 
 
HI] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 45 
 
 case of these animals (et/co? ot/^at Bidcpopov avroh rrjv rwv 
 '^pcofjudrcov dvTik'qy^nv yiyveadaL^). Again, a concave mirror 
 shews the object it reflects as smaller than reality, and one 
 that is convex, as narrower, and more elongated ; and some 
 reflect the head of the observer downwards, with his feet 
 upwards. Now since the eyes of some animals protrude, 
 while those of others are sunken, of others flat, it is pro- 
 bable that the images of external objects vary for this 
 reason, and that dogs, fish, lions, men and grasshoppers do 
 not see the same things as equal in size, or alike in form, 
 but that the vision receives the object, and makes an image 
 corresponding to the faculty of each, (olav eKaarov iroiei 
 TVTTcoaiv r} he^ofjuevT) to (^aivofievov oyjnf;^). Again, with the 
 sense of taste when the tongue is parched and dry, as in 
 fever, we seem to taste everything bitter and earthy. We 
 experience this in consequence of the different degree of 
 moisture pervading us ; and since some animals have a 
 variety of tasting organs, and are full of different humours, 
 they would naturally receive different impressions through 
 the sense of taste. In fine, as the same food being adminis- 
 tered turns to a vein in one place, to an artery in another, 
 to a bone here, a nerve there, and to each of the other parts 
 of the body evinces a variety of capabilities according to 
 the susceptibility of the parts which receive it ; as also water 
 given to plants although of one and the same kind, in one 
 place becomes bark, in another branches, in another fruit, 
 now a fig, now an apple, etc. ; as the breath of a musician, 
 although one and the same, when breathed into the flute is 
 sometimes sharp, and sometimes deep ; and as the same 
 touch of the hand on the lyre may produce both a shrill and 
 a dull tone, so it is probable that external objects may be 
 perceived differently according to the constitution of the 
 percipient subject (6t/<:o9 /cal to, eKTcx; viroKetjueva Bidcpopa 
 1 1. 1. 44. 2 I I 49, 
 
46 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 OeeopeladaL irapa rrjv Sid(j)opov KaraaKevrjv tccv Ta<i <^avTa- 
 aia^ VTTOfievovTwv ^wwv^). 
 
 2. The second ground considers the variety in the consti- 
 tution of men {irapa ttjv twv dvOpcoTrcou Stacpopdv^). Man, 
 says Sextus Empiricus, has a twofold nature, sensuous and 
 intellectual. In virtue of the former, as was shown in the 
 case of animals, it is probable that differences of constitution 
 would produce differences in the perception of the same ex- 
 ternal object, or qualities of an object. Again with regard to 
 his mind the variety in desires and aversions has been the 
 theme of poets in all ages I Now, continues Sextus Empiri- 
 cus, since desire and aversion originate in pleasure and pain, 
 and pleasure and pain depend upon sense and perception, 
 inasmuch as one seeks and another avoids the same thing, it 
 is easy to conclude that all are not affected in the same way 
 by the same object. If they were they would all desire the 
 same thing. But if the same things affect men differently 
 according to their different susceptibilities we should con- 
 sider this sufficient ground for suspending our judgment. 
 Each one is able to pronounce from his own point of view 
 how an object appears to him, but no one can determine 
 what is the real power or nature of anything (o re fjuev e/ca- 
 CTTOV ^alverai rwv viroKei^fxevcov, w? ttjOO? eKdarrjv hLa<j)opdv 
 Lo-(o<; Xeyecv i^/jlwv hwajMevcav " tl Be iari Kara hvvajjbiv co? irpo^; 
 Trjv (j)vaiv ov^ oiwv re ovroov dnroi^rjvaadaL)*^, 
 
 3. The third occasion of doubt is found in the different 
 
 ^ h I. 55. 2 i^ I 36^ 
 
 ^ 6 fiku 'ydp HLv8ap6s <pr)ar 
 
 '* 'AeXXoTrdSwi/ /x4y tiv evcppalvoiaLv Xiriroiv 
 
 tLixlo. Kal (TTi<pavoi, Toi>s 5 ' iu ttoXvxp^cois daKdfiOis ^lord • 
 ripireraL Zk Kal rts iir oldp,' dXiov val doq. 
 aus 5ia<7reij9wj'. " — Cf. Horace, lib. i. Ode 1. 
 
 aWots yap r' dWoLatv &vr}p ^wLTipir€Ta.L (pyois.^'' — Odyss. ^. 228. 
 Hyp. I. 14. 86, 
 * I. I. 87. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 47 
 
 functions of the organs of sense {irapa ra? Bcacf^opov^ rwv 
 ala6rjTripL0)v KaiaaKeva^y. Each organ of sense seems to 
 indicate to us a separate quality in the external object. An 
 apple, for example, appears smooth to the touch, fragrant to 
 the smell, sweet to the taste, and of a certain colour to the 
 sight. But how do we know that it has really more than 
 one quality, and that this apparent diversity is not due to 
 the various capabilities of our organs of sense? For, as we 
 have previously remarked, the same breath produces different 
 notes on the same instrument, and the same nourishment is 
 differently appropriated according to the different parts of 
 the body to which it is assimilated. Again, can we assert 
 that these are the only qualities of an apple? Let us imagine, 
 for instance, a man who from his birth has possessed but the 
 sense of touch, of taste, and of smell. This man would not 
 be able to conceive the existence of such qualities as affect 
 the sense of sight and of hearing. It may happen, then, that 
 having only five senses we are unable to detect qualities 
 which may yet really be in the apple. Since then there is 
 no absurdity in saying that the different qualities we think 
 we may perceive in an apple are inherent in it, and many 
 more besides perhaps, or, on the contrary, that there is in 
 reality only one cause in the object which produces different 
 effects according to the diversity in our organs of sense, we 
 cannot state with certainty the nature of this apple. Now 
 if external objects are incomprehensible through the senses 
 we cannot assuredly judge of them by the reason; therefore 
 we ought to suspend our judgment {rwv alaOr^aecov fjuiv Tot 
 jjurj KaraXa/jb^avovacov ra ckto^, ovBe 77 Bodvoia ravra hvvaTat, 
 KaraXa/jL^aveLV. ware Kal Bia tovtop tov \6yov rj irepl rwv 
 eKTO'; vTTOKeifjLevwv erroxv (TvvwyeaOai Sofefc)^ 
 
 4. The fourth reason for doubt is found in the subjective 
 circumstances under which objects are perceived (irapa Ta9 
 1 1. 1 36. * I I. 99. 
 
48 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 Trepia-rdcreL^^). The condition of the body or mind of the 
 percipient subject has great effect in modifying the impres- 
 sions received from external objects. As has been already 
 noticed, a person in sickness detects a different smell, taste, 
 or colour in things from one in health ; strong mental emotions 
 also are well known to influence the ideas we receive from 
 objects^. Of course it is an obvious rejoinder to arguments 
 drawn from this source, that the Sceptics have no right to 
 bring the discrepancy of perceptions received in an abnormal 
 state of the body or mind as evidence against the veracity of 
 those we have in our natural state. To this, however, Sextus 
 Empiricus replies, that for such an objection to be of any 
 value we ought to have some good reason for supposing that 
 the impressions we receive in health are more trustworthy 
 reports of external qualities than those of sickness or deli- 
 rium. Now, continues Sextus Empiricus, he who considers 
 the perceptions of a man in one state more trustworthy than 
 those of a man in another, either makes this preference after 
 proof and demonstration, or without proof and demonstration. 
 In the latter case one would certainly not believe him, and 
 in the former, one could scarcely afford him much more 
 credit. For if he is going to prove to us the veracity of his 
 perceptions he must employ some criterion or standard of 
 their truth {el ryap Kpivel ra? ^avraaia^, irdvTcof; Kpi,Tr]pi(p 
 KpiveTf. But he must also be convinced that the criterion 
 itself is trustworthy, for if it is false it is of no value as a 
 measure of truth. Now if he maintains this criterion to be 
 reliable, he must either do so after proof and demonstration, 
 or without proof and demonstration. If the former, he is not 
 worthy of credit, if the latter, he must show that his proof 
 
 1 1. 1. 36. 
 
 * " Olos H Kul rrjv 6\f/iv etpai (palveraL 
 
 a0' ov TOio^Tos yeyovev, oXov 6'qpiov. 
 
 rh fiTjdh ddiKeiv Kal Ka\oi/s i)fx.d$ rrotet." — I. 1. 108. 
 « I. I. 114. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 49 
 
 and demonstration are conclusive. But here again he will 
 require a criterion by which to measure the truth of his 
 demonstration; but the truth of this criterion will again 
 require demonstration, and so on, "every criterion a demon- 
 stration," and "every demonstration a criterion." For neither 
 is the demonstration true, but in virtue of the truth of the 
 criterion, or the criterion, except in virtue of the truth of the 
 demonstration. Thus, when we try to prove the truth of the 
 demonstration by the truth of the criterion, and the truth of 
 the criterion by the truth of the demonstration, we fall into the 
 sophistical circle, which we call the diallel (xpv^ei, yap del 
 teal 7) d7r6B€i^L<; Kpcrrjpiov, Li/a ^e^accodfj, kol to KpLTr/piov 
 aTToBel^ecix;, iva dXTjOe*; elvaL Bei-^dfj. kol ovre dirohei^L'^ 17*779 
 elvai Bvparai, jjurj 'irpoinrdp')(ovTO^ Kporriplov dXrjOov^, ovre 
 KpcTTjpcov d\r)6e<^, jult^ irpoireTrtcTTev/iiivr]'; ttj^; dirohei^ew^i. koI 
 ovTci)(; i/HTTLTrTOVO-LV eh Tov htdXkrjXov Tpoirov ro re Kpirypiov 
 KOL rj aTToSetff?, eV g5 d/xcfiOTepa evplcTKeTaL airLara' eKarepov 
 yap Trjv Oarepov ttljtlv irepip^evov o/jlolo)^ tm XoLirtp eariv 
 diriarov^). 
 
 5. The fifth ground refers to the diiference in position, 
 distance, and objective circumstances of things {irapd Ta9 
 6ea€L^ KOL rd Staarrffiara kol toi)? tottou?^). Any change in 
 the relations of objects to one another, or to us, with respect 
 to distance, or position, effects a change in their appearance. 
 A colonnade^ seen by an observer at one extremity, seems to 
 narrow towards the other, but when seen from the middle, 
 the breadth appears equal throughout. Again, the same 
 tower appears round at a distance, square when near^ The 
 blade of an oar appears broken in the water. The colour of 
 the neck of a dove seems to vary as it turns. The light of 
 
 1 Htjp. I. I. 116, 117. 2 I I 36 
 
 ^ " Uniformitas sequalissim.'e porticus acuitur in fine, dum acies in con- 
 cluso stipata illis tenuatur, quo et extenditur." — TertuUian, Be Aninia, c. 17. 
 * " Quadratasque procul turris cum cernimus urbis, 
 
 Propterea lit uti videautur sa^pe rotundae." — Lucretius, iv. 353, 4. 
 
 L. L. 4 
 
50 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 a lamp is faint in the sun, brilliant in the shade. It may be 
 urged of course that, of these manifestations, some are ac- 
 cording to the true nature of the object, others not; to which 
 the Sceptic replies, that it must then be demonstrated in 
 which position, distance, or situation the real object is re- 
 vealed, otherwise one is as good as another. This demon- 
 stration requires another demonstration to show that the 
 result of the first is true, and so on, usque ad infinitum. 
 Thus, although we may be able to say how an object appears 
 to us in a certain position, or at a certain distance, we cannot 
 assert what its absolute independent nature is [ottoIov fiev 
 ^alverac e/caarov Kara ryvSe rrjv 6e<Ttv rj Kara rohe to hiaarr]- 
 fia rj iv ToSSe, elirelv X(T(o<i Swafjuiveov rjfiwv, oirolov Se ecTTLv cw? 
 7rpc9 TrjV xpvariv aBwarovvTcov aTro^alveaOac Bca ra TTpoeipr}- 
 
 6. The sixth reason for doubting is founded on the com- 
 plexity of objects {irapa t«9 eVi/xtf/a?^). We never can say 
 any object is perceived alone simply and singly, but is always 
 accompanied and modified by something extrinsic to itself, 
 as air, light, moisture, cold, or heat. Thus, it is impossible 
 to distinguish the real nature of anything, owing to the 
 difficulty of separating it from contingent circumstances. 
 The same body is heavy in the air, and light in the water. 
 A tone sounds muffled and dull in a full room, which is 
 clear and loud in a spacious apartment ; and other examples 
 analogous. Hence, in consequence of this complexity, the 
 senses do not receive faithfully the qualities of external 
 objects, and the reason cannot judge of them because she 
 relies on the reports of the senses, and they are deceived 
 (ware Zta t«9 iTrtjjui^la^ al ala6ria€i<; ovk avTiXa/jL^dvopTac 
 birola irpo^ aKpi/Seiap to, eKTO'i viroKelfievd iariv. dX)C ovBe 
 rj Btdvoia* fidXiara fiev iirel al oSrjyol avTfj<; aladrja-ei^ 
 ar(j)dX\ovTai,^). 
 
 ^ Hyp. I. 14. 37. 2 I I 134 s i i ^7. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 5 1 
 
 7. The seventh ground of scepticism is derived from a 
 consideration of the different proportions and ingredients of 
 matter in objects {irapa ra? iroaoT'qra'i koL o-tcevaala^ twv 
 t7roK€c/jLevQ)v^.) It is observed by the chemist if he mixes 
 his drugs in a certain proportion, the resulting compound 
 may be a restorative to health and strength, whereas more 
 or less of one of the ingredients may cause the dose to be 
 baneful, or even destructive. Thus the difference a slight 
 alteration in the component elements of a substance makes 
 in its qualities or powers, shows that we can only have an 
 obscure notion of the real constitution of objects {ovrax; 6 
 Kara ra? TrocroTT^ra? Kol (TK€va(Tia^ X0709 arvyyeZ ttjv To3t» 
 e/CT09 viroKeifjuivcov virap^iv. Bioirep ecKOTox; av kol ovto<; 6 
 rpoTTo? ek eirox^v rjfJba^; Trepcayoo firj Bwa/juevov^ elXcKpcvok 
 a7ro(f>r)vaa6ai irepl t^9 (l>v(T€(o<i tcov eWo? VTroKetfiiveov^), 
 
 8. The eighth cause of doubt founds on the relativity 
 of all things (airo rod irpo^ tl^). This rpoiro^ merely draws 
 attention fo, and places in a stronger light, the conclusions 
 of the first Seven. We have seen that the substance of the 
 first four rpoiroL is, the impossibility of arriving at a know- 
 ledge of the absolute nature of objects, because, to be per- 
 ceived, implies a relation to a percipient subject. And again 
 the fifth, sixth, and seventh rpoiroi show, that as we never 
 perceive anything singly, our notions of objects must always 
 involve their relation to those which are perceived with 
 them, therefore we cannot imagine anything which is un- 
 conditioned, either with respect to ourselves or anything 
 else {irXrjv aX>C ovtch irapaaTavTwv tjijlcov otl iravTa earl 
 
 TTpO'i Tt, OrjXoV i(TTL TO XoLTTOV OTL, OTToloV i(TTCV e/CaaTOV TCOV 
 
 viroKetfievtov KaTa ttjv iavTov ^vctlv koi elXiicpLvwf; Xeyeiv ov 
 hyvqaofxeOa, aXX! oirolov (jiaiveTai iv to) nrpo^ tl' aKoXovdel 
 TO irepi T^9 (/>i;crew9 twv irpayiMaToav Seiu i^/j,d<; inre'^eLp*). 
 
 ' I' I' 37. 3 I, I. 134. 
 
 ' I' I' 37. 4 I I 140. 
 
 4—2 
 
52 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISyf. [Lect. 
 
 9. The ninth mode rests on the frequency or rarity of 
 the apparition of objects (irapa ra? avve-^eh rj (nraviov^ 
 €yKvpr)a€L<;^). 
 
 The effect of objects on us is much modified by the 
 conditions of time under which they occur. The sun (says 
 Sextus E.) is, per se, a more wonderful object than a comet, 
 but because we see a comet seldom, and the sun daily, the 
 apparition of the former so affects our imagination that we 
 believe it the forerunner of some special events Again, we 
 value things which are rare, and view with indifference such 
 as are easily attainable. If gold was as common as flint we 
 should not covet it. Since then the same things appear 
 precious or contemptible according as they are abundant or 
 scarce, we conclude that we may be able to say how things 
 appear to us when fettered with the conditions of time, but 
 we cannot affirm what they are absolutely (eVet ovv ra avra 
 TTpdj/jLara irapa tcl^ avvex'^h rj (Jiraviov'i irepiTrrwaei^ ore 
 fjuev eKTrk'qKTiKa rj tI/jlui, ore Be ov rotavra elvac BoKei, iiri- 
 Xor/itpjJbeOa on ottoIov /mev (fyaiverai tovtcov eKaarov fjuerci 
 (Tvve^ov<; TrepLTTTOoaemf; tq airavia^^ taco<i BwrjcrofMeOa Xiyecv 
 •^tXcT? Be OTTOIOV ecTTLV CKaaTov twv eKTb<i viroKecjJbevcov ovk 
 eafJLev Buvarol <f)ciaK6Ljj^). 
 
 10. The tenth and last ground regards institutions, 
 customs, laws, superstitious beliefs, and dogmatical opinions 
 {irapa rd^ dycoyd;, Kal ra eOrj, /cal toi)<? vofxov^, fcal ra? 
 /jivdcKd<; iTi(TTei^y Kal rd^i BoyjjbaTLKd<; uiroXrjyjrecf;'^). 
 
 An institution is a certain standard of conduct in life, 
 founded on the judgment of one man (as Diogenes), of a 
 nation (as the Lacedaemonians). A law is a decree imposed 
 
 1 1. 1. 37. 
 
 2 «« Solis exortus, cursus, occasus nemo admiratur, propterea quod quotidle 
 fiunt : at eclipses solis mirantnr, quia raro accidunt : et solis eclipses ma^is 
 mirantur, quam lunse, quoniam has crebriores sunt." — Cicero, ad Hercmiiuin, 
 3. 22; Aristotle, Meteorolog., lib. i. c. 7; Seneca, Qitast. 7. 28. 
 
 8 Hyp. I. 14. 144. 4 I i^ 37 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 53 
 
 by the rulers of a state, the infraction of which involves 
 the punishment of the transgressor. A custom is a con- 
 vention arrived at by the unanimous consent of many, the 
 violation of which does not entail punishment. A super- 
 stitious belief is the approbation accorded to legends of 
 doubtful authenticity. A dogmatical conception is a con- 
 clusion deduced by the reason from given premisses \ In 
 reference to these definitions the Sceptics adduced the facts, 
 that that which was legal in one country was illegal in 
 another. Similarly, that customs, institutions, and opinions 
 vary among nations, among classes in the same nation, 
 among sects of philosophers, and even among individuals. 
 Hence it was to be concluded that the nature of objects, 
 as far as regards their value and importance, their capacity 
 of producing pleasure and pain — in short, all their etfective 
 qualities — is dependent upon the existence, or non-existence, 
 of these artificial and arbitrary institutions. Therefore, we 
 may be able to prononnce judgment on the attributes of 
 objects as they are in relation to the established opinions 
 of an age or country, but we cannot say what they are 
 absolutely or necessarily (irXrjv ToaavT7}<; dvcofzaXia^; irpaj- 
 /idrcov KoX Zid tovtov tov rpoirov BeiKvv/JLevr)<;, ottolov fjuiv 
 ian TO vTroKel/xevov Kara rrjv <pvaLV ov^ e^ofiev Xiyeiv, ottoIov 
 he <f>aiveTav 7rpb<; T^vBe rrjv dycoyrjv, 17 irpo^; rovBe tov vo/jlov, 
 rj 7rp6<s ToBe to eBo<; koI twv aXXojv €Ka<TTOv, Kot Bid tovtov 
 ovv irepl TTj^ (j)V(T€a)<; touv 6kto^ inroKei/iiivcov Trpar/fjLaTcov iiri- 
 'X^etv r}iJba^ dvdyKT]. ovtco fiev ovv Bid to3z/ BeKa Tpowcov KaTa- 
 \7jyofjL6v et? Ttjv iiTO')(f)v^), 
 
 § 7. We have now given an outline of the ten argu- 
 ments by which the Pyrrhonists attempted to demonstrate 
 
 ^ There are three kinds of relativity indicated in the ten rpotroi: 
 
 1st, The relation between object and subject; 
 
 2nd, The relation between object and object; 
 
 3rd, The relation between object and some pre-conceived maxim. 
 2 I. I. 163. 
 
54 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 the impossibility of determining the nature of the thing from 
 the appearance, of the cause from the effect, the <j>alv€<T6aL 
 6v from the (palveo-Oav elvai. 
 
 These rpoiroi are generally ascribed to Pyrrho himself, 
 but by some authors to his admirer, Timon of Phlius. It 
 is probable, however, that they are not the work of a single 
 individual, but represent the accumulated reasonings of the 
 Sceptics on the futility of sense-knowledge; and were col- 
 lected by Sextus E., and inserted with regard to the follow- 
 ing order*. The first four refer to simple perceptions, the 
 next five to complex notions, the last to conventional ideas. 
 This arrangement appears to be the same alluded to by 
 Cicero : " Dividunt enim in partes, et eas quidem magnas : 
 primum in sensus-: deinde in ea, qu8e ducuntur a sensibus, 
 et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt^" The 
 first and fourth of the rpciroL, found upon the varying sus- 
 ceptibility of the percipient. Supposing there were constant 
 and permanent causes in objects, our knowledge of them 
 could never transcend their effects. But, since the operation 
 of the ego as a concause introduces an element into the 
 effect, variable and dependent upon the constitution of 
 each individual, it follows that our knowledge of external 
 things can amount to no more than, a mere subjective 
 
 ' For the order in which the Tpowoi have heen arranged by different 
 writers, see Diogenes Laertius, ix. 87. 
 
 ^ LucuUus, 13. Compare also the threefold division of ideas in James 
 Mill's Analysis of the Mind. " There are three classes of ideas, which we 
 have occasion to name : 
 
 1st, Simple ideas, the copies of single sensations; 
 2nd, Complex ideas, copied directly from sensations ; 
 8rd, Complex ideas, derived indeed from the senses, but put together in 
 arbitrary combinations. 
 
 The two former maybe called 'sensible,' the last 'mental' ideas."— Chap. 
 IV. sec. I. p. 95. Aristoclus in Eus. Prcep. Ev. speaks of the nine rpoiroi of 
 iEnesidemus; they were probably identical with the above, omitting the 
 eighth, which is, in fact, only the expression of the conclusions from the 
 others. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, 55 
 
 opinion or judgment. The ultra-materialist element ob- 
 servable in the theory of perception implied in these TpoiroL, 
 is of course not to be considered a feature of scepticism. 
 The Sceptics particularly avoided positing any doctrine re- 
 garding the processes of cognition (Xiyofjuep kuO' olov hrjiroTe 
 
 TpOTTOV* Tj Ka0* olov B^TTOTe TpOTTOV (l)aiV0/M6V(0V T€ Kol VOOV' 
 
 fjuevcov, Lva firj ^rfrocfjuev 7rcS<? (^aiverai, ra (^aivofjueva rj tto)? 
 voelraL ra voovfieva, d\}C a7rXo3? ravra Tut/Jb/Savcofiev^). 
 
 The very nature of scepticism is to base its reasonings 
 upon data furnished by positive and dogmatical systems of 
 thought. Now the theory of knowledge upon which the 
 Pyrrhonians proceeded was that of the Stoics. With them 
 (the Stoics) mind was a mere material substance, a passive 
 recipient of external impressions (aX\oLcoo-et<i — TV7rooa-ei,<i — 
 (f>avTaalas;) . 
 
 No wonder then in the rpoiroL we find the processes of 
 perception not only compared to, but actually treated as 
 analogous to, those of digestion. The mind is made to re- 
 ceive and assimilate its materials as the body its food, or as, 
 the French Ideologists used to say, "the brain secretes thought 
 as the liver secretes bile." We say then, in estimating the 
 value of the sceptical arguments that we can only fairly 
 consider them relatively to the data supplied by their op- 
 ponents. Granting then that a mental image is scarcely 
 more than the resultant of chemicaP or even mechanical 
 action, let us consider whether the Sceptics really handled 
 the phenomena of perception in an accurate or philosophic 
 manner, and whether they really succeeded in establishing a 
 good case against the trustworthiness of the senses. Take, 
 for example, the argument of the jaundiced or bloodshot eye. 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 4. 9. 
 
 2 "Plurima autem in ilia tertia philosophise parte mutavit (sc. Zeno). In 
 qua primum de sensibus ipsis qusedam dixit nova, quos junctos esse censuit 
 e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus: quam ille (pavraalav, nos 
 visum appellemus." — Ac. Post. xi. 
 
56 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 It is a capital instance with the Pyrrhonists, and is urged in 
 reference to one or other of the senses in each of the ten 
 rpoTTOL In what does really the act of perception consist? 
 Is it the absolute modification of consciousness? Is it not 
 rather an apprehension of a succession of modifications? 
 Sensitive perception (says Galen) consists not in the passive 
 affection of the organ, but in the discriminative recognition 
 — the dijudication of that affection by the active mind 
 ("EcTTt 8e aLa6r)(n<i ovfc dWoLcoai,*;, aXXa hid'yvaicnf; dWocw- 
 0-60)9^). All the materialistic philosophers have concurred 
 in this view. ''To have no change of feeling is the same 
 thing as to have no feeling at all. Sentire semper idem, 
 et non sentire, ad idem recidunt^" The 'penser c'est sentir' 
 school, indeed, denying any reflex operations to the mind, 
 affirm that the knowledge of the change cannot be separ- 
 ated from the passive impression. "To have a different sen- 
 sation, and to know that it is different, are not two things, 
 but one and the same thingl" But still the essence of per- 
 ception is discrimination. Where there is no power of dis- 
 crimination there can be no perception properly so-called. 
 Now the Pyrrhonists maintain that, because a white object 
 appears yellow to a jaundiced eye, there is no credit to be 
 placed in the reports of the senses. The fact is, to the jaun- 
 diced eye, not only white would appear yellow, but every 
 other colour would be similarly modified*. Thus the discri- 
 minating faculty would bo lost to the sense altogether, i.e. 
 
 1 Galen, de Placit. Hipp, et Plat. lvii. ec. 14, 16, 17. 
 
 2 Hobbes, Elem. Philos. P. iv. c. 25, § 5. 
 
 3 James Mill, On the Human Mind, Vol. II. Sect. u. 
 ^ " Lurida prseterea fiunt qusecumque tuentur 
 
 Arquati, quia luroris de corpore eorum 
 Semina multa fluunt simulacris obvia rerum, 
 Multaque sunt oculis in eorum denique mixta 
 QuoB contage sua palloribus omnia pin^^unt." 
 
 Lucretius, iv. 332 — 6. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 57 
 
 there would be no perception through it. In point of fact 
 people with blue eyes do not see everything blue, by virtue 
 of the same dijudicative power. How few of those whose 
 sense of hearing is otherwise acute are able to appreciate the 
 distinctions of musical intervals. There must here be a 
 defect, not in the sensorium but in the dijudicative faculty. 
 Plato in the Thecetetus, when confuting the doctrine KlaOrj- 
 o-fc? = ^ETno-Trjfii] — shows that the knowledge we have of the 
 objective and essential in things is obtained, not from any 
 single perception, but from the judgments made by the mind 
 through the comparison of several perceptions {dvaXoyi^o- 
 fJuevT] (rj yjrvxv) ^^ iavrfj ra yeyovora kol ra irapovra 7rp6<; ra 
 fjieWovTa^). This kind of knowledge corresponds to the 
 ideas of reflection of Locke, the categories of Kant, or the 
 relative suggestions of Brown, and is the condition of that 
 comparing, abstracting, or generalising process, which is the 
 foundation of all science. Now it is a question how far the 
 validity of positive predication is open to the attacks of 
 scepticism, when such predication is the consequence of 
 purely mental comparisons. Mr Grote observes on this point, 
 after commenting on that part of the discussion in the Thece- 
 tetus which we have just noticed: "In the train of reasoning 
 here terminated, Plato had been combating the doctrine 
 Aladrjat^ = ^Ftina-Tri/jLTj. In his sense of the word ato-67]ai<; 
 he had refuted the doctrine. But what about the other 
 doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the same pro- 
 gramme — Homo Mensura — the Protagorean formula? That 
 formula, so far from being refuted, is actually sustained and 
 established by this train of reasoning. Plato has declared 
 oiKTLa, dXrjdela, ivavTt6Tr)<;, djadov, KaKov, etc. to be a distinct 
 class of objects not perceived by sense. But he also tells us 
 that they are apprehended by the mind through its own 
 working, and that they are apprehended always in relation to 
 
 1 Thecetetus, 186 c. 
 
58 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. 
 
 each other. We thus see that they are just as much 7'elative to 
 the concipient mind, as the objects of sense are to the percipient 
 and sentient mind. The subject is the correlative limit or 
 measure (to use Protagorean phrases) of one as well as of the 
 other. This confirms what I observed above, that the two 
 doctrines, 1. Homo Mensura. 2. Atad7jaL^ = ^'E7naTr)/j,7] — 
 are completely distinct and independent, though Plato has 
 chosen to implicate or identify them\" Does then MrGrote 
 mean to assert that the relation discerned by the comparison 
 of ideas is, in the same sense, relative to the comparing 
 subject as the ideas themselves, considered as the simple 
 products of sensible perception ? — surely it is not so. In the 
 latter, the terms related may be each unknown, and the 
 resulting perception is but their ratio. In the former, how- 
 ever, these ratios are at least known as the terms of the new 
 ratio which the mind evolves by its judging faculty. In the 
 relativity of sensible perceptions are involved the physical 
 conditions upon which our intercourse with the external 
 world depends — but in mental judgments only the laws of 
 thought or regulative principles of the understanding are 
 operative. A sensible perception is a mere subjective acci- 
 dent, incapable of being expressed in language or made 
 apprehensible to the consciousness of another, whereas 
 mental conceptions are the contents of language and com- 
 mon to every one by whom the same language is spoken. 
 Whether or not the Protagorean formula included any but 
 mere external perceptions, it is at any rate certain that the 
 ten TpoTTot of the Pyrrhonists are only levelled against the 
 products of sense, although they distinctly profess to be 
 embodied by the Protagorean Trpc? ri — {iraKiv he ol Tpeh 
 ovToi dvdyovrai ek to tt^o? rt* m elvai yeviKcorarov fiev top 
 TT/ao? Tt, elBi,Kov<; Be tov<; rpel^, viro/Se^rjKora^ Be roix; Bi/ca^). 
 
 1 Grote's Plato, Theaetetus, Chap. xxvi. p. 373, Note h. 
 
 2 Hyp. I. 13. 39. 
 
III.] THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 59 
 
 We think '^ then that Plato was justified in identifying the 
 Protagorean doctrine with that of knowledge being sensible 
 perception, and that if this doctrine meant that each man is 
 the measure of all things to himself, it never could have ex- 
 tended beyond that life of the individual which is made up 
 of sense and memory. We nowhere find in ancient philoso- 
 phy the distinction between the conceptive and imaginative 
 faculties articulately enunciated, although to establish this 
 distinction was probably the chief aim of the Platonic Psy- 
 chology. The admission then of an idealistic theory of 
 perception on the one hand, and the failure to distinguish 
 clearly between the forms and materials of consciousness on 
 the other, seem to have been the chief incentives to earlier 
 Pyrrhonism. The Stoics, as we shall presently see, en- 
 deavoured to evade scepticism by substituting an ultra-realism 
 for the idealism which prevailed to a greater or less degree 
 among all the other sects of philosophers, and the adoption 
 of Kantian principles, which clearly separate the thinking 
 and imaginative faculties, preserves the modern Idealist 
 from the paradoxes of the Sceptic. The burden then of 
 meeting the Sceptical arguments rests with those who assert 
 that the mind is only conscious of its own modifications, and 
 that these modifications are but present or past sensations. 
 In the third of the rpoTroi seem to be suggested the germs 
 of all those metaphysical theories respecting the relation 
 between knowledge and existence, which, under one phrase 
 or another, have occupied modern speculatists since the days 
 of Descartes^ Into these questions it would be foreign to 
 
 1 This opinion is at variance with that of the present standard au- 
 thorities on the subject — Jowett, Grote, Dr Thompson. The discrepancy, I 
 apprehend, arises from a difference in our point of view — epistemological or 
 ontological. 
 
 2 The reader will find every theory of Perception which has ever been 
 propounded, named and classified by Sir William Hamilton in Note c. to hia 
 edition of Eeid's Works. 
 
60 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICIS.\f. [Lect. 
 
 our present purpose to enter, but we might remark that, to 
 use a phrase common among philosophers of the present age, 
 the problem involved is one which requires to be construed in- 
 telligibly to the mind, before it is worth while setting about 
 the task of its solution. The two rpo-rroL most difficult to bring 
 into the focus of modern intelligence are, perhaps, the second 
 and tenth. In the second the feelings of pleasure and pain, 
 which we rightly consider purely subjective^ affections, are 
 treated as being as much the immediate effects of external 
 objective qualities in things, as the feeling of colour, heat, 
 taste, etc. Thus, if A. and B. respectively like and dislike 
 the same object, it is implied, that this discrepancy argues a 
 difference in their perceptions of the same object, 'Wb Be 
 hLa<f)6poL^ ')(aipeLv rod TraprjWayfjiiva^; airo twv V7roK€tfiev(ov 
 (^avTa(jia<i Xa/jufidveiv earl firjwTCKov^." To explicate this, we 
 must again remind the reader that the Sceptics often made 
 use of weapons placed in their hands by their adversaries. 
 The Stoics held the doctrine that pleasure and pain were 
 the forms under which men were affected by external objects 
 in accordance with a fixed law of Nature; that that which 
 was conformable to nature must produce pleasure, that which 
 was contrary to it pain. Admitting the existence of such a 
 law, then, it was competent to the Sceptics to argue that, 
 since the discrepancy in the tastes of men wsls too proverbial to 
 be called in question, this variety must arise from the different 
 
 1 Man nennt aber die Fahigkeit, Lust oder Unlust, bei einer Vorstellimg 
 zu haben, darum Gefuhl, well beides das bios Subjective im Verhaltnisse 
 unserer Vorstellung, und gar keine Beziehung auf ein Object zum moglichen 
 Erkeuntnisse desselben (nicht einmal dem Erkenntnisse unseres Zustandes) 
 enthiilt ; da sonst selbst Empfindungen, ausser der Qualitiit, die ihneu der 
 Beschaffenheit des Subjects wegen auhangt (z. B. des Eotben, des Siissen 
 U.S.W.), doch auch als Erkenntniss-stUcke auf ein Object bezogen werden, die 
 Lust Oder Unlust, aber (am Eotben und Siissen) scblecbterdings nichts am 
 Objecte, sondern lediglich Beziebung aufs Subject ausdriickt." — Kant's 
 Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten, i. 
 
 2 Hyp. I. U. 89. 
 
III.] TEE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. 6 1 
 
 mental representations which different individuals receive 
 from the same object. For, as that which was agreeable to 
 one person was so necessarily, and by nature, and as nature 
 was uniform, it was impossible it could be disagreeable to 
 another, unless through presenting a different appearance. 
 "Non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommo- 
 datum ad naturam appareat (Grgeci id oIk€lov appellant \" 
 A similar explanation may be given of the tenth Tpoiro^, in 
 which is contained the rather startling argumentation, that 
 the want of uniformity in the laws, customs, and institutions 
 among nations is an evidence of our inability to discover the 
 real qualities of objects. Plutarch, however, affords us some 
 means of detecting the drift of the sceptical reasoning. 
 ""Ort fiev 'yap aladrjrd ian Ta<ya6a Kol ra KaKo. kol TOVTOi<i 
 eKTroiel Xiyeiv ov yap jxovov to, irddr] iarlv aladrjTa (Tvv rot? 
 eiheaiv, olov XvTrrj koI (pojSo^; Kai tcl irapairkr^cna, dWa kqX 
 K\o7rri<i Kal /iiOL')(^eLa<i kcli rwv ofioimv iariv alaOeadai, Kal 
 KaOoKov d(f)poo-vv7]<; Kal BeiXla<i /cal dWcov ovk oXlywv KaKiwv ' 
 ovBe fiovov %a/oa9 /cal evepyeaiwv Kal aWcov ttoWoov KaropOcc- 
 (T€(ov, dWd (f)povr}(Te(t)<; Kal dvSp€La<; Kal roov Xoittcov dperoov^.'* 
 From this passage it seems that the Stoics extended their 
 theory about pleasure and pain to the apprehensions of good 
 and evil, considering them to have arisen from sensible im- 
 pressions, which obtain their distinctions under a ruling 
 principle in nature, viz. the summum bonum. The Pyr- 
 rhonists therefore force their opponents into the dilemma, 
 either of denying the existence of such an uniform law, or, 
 from the fact of the conflicting ideas found to prevail about 
 right and wrong, to be obliged to admit that perceptions 
 could only be grounds of opinion, not of certainty. The 
 Stoics, however, were at no loss to find an escape from the 
 
 1 Lucullus, 12. 
 
 2 Chrysipp. ap. Plut. de Stoic. Rep. 19. 
 
62 THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM. [Lect. III. 
 
 difficulties in which their own principles involved them. 
 They endeavoured to discover a criterion of truth, as a means 
 of distinguishing true from false perceptions. But the dis- 
 cussion of this point would bring us into the midst of the 
 polemic between the Sceptics and the Stoical dogmatists, a 
 sketch of which we will present in the ensuing Lecture. 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 
 ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 
 
 "Les hommes cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent pas ce qu'ils 
 cherchent." 
 
 § a. The Pyrrhonian philosophy had two developments, 
 separated by a period of about 300 years. During the earlier 
 period, Pyrrho himself promulgated his doctrines, which were 
 not much more advanced than those we havejdiscussed in the 
 preceding Lecture. The moral element of his teaching, as we 
 have already remarked, is scarcely discernible in any but the 
 earliest form of the system. After the death of Timon of 
 Phlius, friend and pupil of Pyrrho (who flourished about 
 B.C. 272), little is known of Pyrrhonism, till it reappeared in 
 a somewhat modified shape in the teachings of ^nesidemus 
 and Agrippa, about the beginning of the Christian era. This 
 later manifestation of scepticism we shall consider afterwards. 
 It is our purpose in the present Lecture to follow the fortunes 
 of Greek philosophy during the interval which elapsed be- 
 tween the age of Pyrrho and that of ^nesidemus. How- 
 ever great may have been the difference in the original 
 views of Plato and Aristotle themselves, it seems that in 
 the hands of their respective followers, viz. the Academics 
 and Peripatetics, these were so far modified, that, according 
 
64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 to Cicero, there ceased to be any perceptible difference be- 
 tween them: " Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus dif- 
 ferentes, re congruentes \" Their united forces, however, 
 were apparently of little avail in opposing the advance of 
 scepticism, whose positions, established and fortified by Pyr- 
 rho, were unassailable, either by the arguments of reason 
 or the evidence of facts. 
 
 In truth, the Sceptics had so opposed <l>aLv6fi€va to voov- 
 /xeva, the reports of sense to the conclusions of reason, that 
 their adversaries could hardly use one or the other, without 
 laying themselves open to the possibility of being defeated 
 with their own weapons. Did the dogmatists not say that 
 truth originated in the senses, but that the power of judg- 
 ing of the truth was not in the senses ? The intellect, they 
 asserted, was the judge of things, and alone worthy of 
 belief, because it alone discerned that which was simple 
 and uniform, and perceived its real character : '* Quanquam 
 oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse judicium veritatis in 
 sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse judicem : solam 
 censebant idoneam, cui crederetur; quia sola cerneret id, 
 quod semper esset, simplex, et uniusmodi, et tale quale 
 esset V But, replied the Sceptic, if the senses are fallacious, 
 where are the materials of reason ? If they are true, what 
 faith can be placed in the processes of the intellect ? " Ergo 
 si, rebus comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio 
 hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi : quid potest reperiri, 
 quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis^?" For have we not by 
 those very processes proved, by a multitude of arguments, 
 the falsity of the senses ? If reason and common sense bear 
 opposite testimony, who is to believe either, whether in the 
 simple judgments that accompany recognition, or the arti- 
 ficial generalisations of your scientific method ? et yap tocov- 
 
 1 Lucullus, 5. 2 j^c. Post. 8. ^ Lucullus, 14. 
 
ly.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 65 
 
 T09 dirareciov eariv 6 XC709, ware Kol ra ^acvofieva jxovovovvl 
 Twv 6(j)da\/LLoov rjfJLOov v(j)ap7ra^€LV, ttoD? ov '^prj v^opdadat 
 avTov ev rol^; dSrjXoc^ ooare fitj KaraKoXovOovpra^ avra> irpo- 
 TrereveaOat^ . 
 
 Thus Scepticism, like a spectral enemy, eluded every 
 method of refutation, and by its presence seemed to threaten 
 the existence of all science and certitude. An attempt, 
 however, was made (with what success we shall see) to 
 weaken the influence of scepticism, by a new school of 
 philosophy, founded by Zeno of Cittium, which, taking its 
 name from the Portico {arod) at Athens, where their meet- 
 ings were originally held, became known to the world as 
 the celebrated sect of the Stoics. This school, the rise of 
 which may be regarded as a direct effect of Pyrrhonism, 
 united in its doctrines the scientific method of the Peripa- 
 tetics, and the ascetic morality of the Cynics, with a theo- 
 logical pantheism^ or hylozoism, and a psychological mate- 
 rialism peculiar to itself. Like Locke in the last century, 
 Zeno thought that the best way of settling the controversies 
 about the nature, extent, and certainty of human know- 
 ledge, was, to reconsider the whole subject; investigate the 
 origin of all the materials of thought ; and analyse, if possible, 
 the operations of the mind in the acquisition and retention 
 of its ideas and notions. We have seen that the favourite 
 position of the Sceptics, and the one from which it was 
 apparently the most difl&cult to dislodge them, was that of 
 the co-operation in the production of ideas of the mind 
 
 1 ffyp. I. 10, 20. 
 
 2 " We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might 
 have entertained such an atheistical conceit as this — that the original of this 
 whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly, and methodical, but 
 senseless nature, lodged in the matter : but we cannot trace the footsteps of 
 this doctrine anywhere so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, 
 who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly on this point (whether the world 
 were an animal or a plant), belonged." — Cudworth's Intellectual System, 
 Vol. I. chap. III., XXVIII. 
 
 L. L. 5 
 
66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 itself, whose varying susceptibility renders tlie action of 
 external causes so uncertain, that our knowledge of them 
 can only be said to amount to an opinion. It was in direct 
 opposition to this notion that Zeno enunciated two princi- 
 ples, which form the starting-point and basis of his whole 
 psychological system : viz. 1st, the complete passivity of the 
 mind under the influence of external objects ; 2nd, the non- 
 existence of any mind whatever prior to its reception of 
 such external impressions. All nature, according to the 
 Stoics, was the manifestation of one primordial substance, 
 of which both the mind or soul of man and the external 
 universe were but different modifications. " Statuebat enim 
 ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque gigneret, et mentem 
 atque sensus\" The soul of man consisted of eight parts, 
 of which the principal was to rj^efjiovLKov or \6yc(rfjio<;, the 
 governing or reasoning faculty, and from this the senses 
 took their origin. " When a man was born (said the Stoics) 
 the T^ye/ubovcKov /xepo? resembled a sheet of white paper (%a/5- 
 Tiov evepyov et? diroypac^r^v), and on this were to be stamped 
 all the impressions received from external objects. The first 
 characters it receives are those through the senses, for the 
 mind having perceived anything, as, for example, a white 
 object, bears away a remembrance of it when absent. After 
 it has received and retained many like impressions, it is said 
 to possess experience, for experience is a multitude of similar 
 impressions {iixireipia yap ian to toov ofioeL^cov ^avTaatwv 
 TfkrjOo^). Of these presentations some are produced natur- 
 ally {(j^va-f.Km) and undesignedly {dveinTexvv'^co';), others we 
 acquire through study and careful observation (Sl rjfjbeTepa^ 
 BcBao-KaXla^ koI eTrt/i^eXe/a?). The latter are called evpoiat, or 
 scientific ideas, the former irpoXrjylreL^;, or simple ideas. But 
 reason (6 X070?), in virtue of which we are called rational 
 beings (Xoyt/co/), is said to be developed in fourteen years 
 1 Acad. Post. 11. 
 
IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 67 
 
 from natural and accidental ideas (irpoXij-^ei^). A rational 
 being has also the capacity of forming a concept [vo'qfia), or 
 idea of the understanding {(fyavrao-fia hiavoLa<^), and this 
 faculty belongs to men and the gods alone \" In the account 
 given above of the Stoical psychology, we see the origin 
 of the well-known doctrine, which was afterwards adopted 
 by Locke ^: "Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit 
 in sensu." But the Stoics gave a much wider significa- 
 tion to this principle, for they not only meant to imply 
 that there was nothing in the mind which had not entered 
 through the senses, but that there could be nothing in the 
 mind which was not founded upon something existing in 
 the real and external universe. It was by this, indeed, they 
 hoped to turn the principal argument of the Sceptics, viz. the 
 inability of reason to correct the mistakes of the senses. 
 The mind, according to the description given in this passage 
 from Plutarch, is built up through the aggregation^ of ideas 
 from without, iTpokrj'^eL'^ — (6 he X0709, KaO' ov irpoorayopevo- 
 fxeOa XoyLKoi, e/c tcov irpoXr/'y^ewv avfiTrXrjpovaOac Xiyeraij. 
 Reason, in fact, seems to have been considered by the Stoics 
 as little more than memory or experience, and since it was 
 wholly composed of ideas whose archetypes were real and 
 external objects, it followed that, being a storehouse of true 
 impressions, a criterion might always be found in it, by 
 
 1 Plutarch, de Plac. Ph. iv. 11. 
 
 2 In regard to the passage {Be An. L. iii. c. 5) in which the intellect 
 prior to experience is compared to a tablet on which nothing has actually- 
 been written, the context shows that the import of this simile is with 
 Aristotle very different from what it is with the Stoics ; to whom, it may be 
 noticed, and not, as is usually supposed, to the Stagirite, are we to refer the 
 first enouncement of the brocard — In InteUectu nihil est, quod non prius 
 fuerit in Sensu. See Hamilton's Reid. 
 
 2 It is not to be supposed that the Koipal hvoiai, (pvcriKal irpoX-qxl/eis, of the 
 Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more than generalisations ajyosteriori. 
 Yet this is a mistake into which, among many others, even Lipsius and 
 Leibnitz have fallen. — Eeid's TVorks (Hamilton), note A, page 774 (note). . 
 
 5—2 
 
68 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 which to test the validity of any new perception : " Quod 
 autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appella- 
 bat ; et, si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non 
 posset, scientiam ; sin alitor, inscientiam nominabat : ex qua 
 exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla\" The faculties 
 of the mind, according to the Stoics, were simply sensation 
 and memory, and these are the only powers allowed it by the 
 modern Materialists. It is true, Plutarch speaks of a general 
 notion or conception, evvorjixa, but this, he adds emphatically, 
 is of the genus cjidpTaafia, i. e. it belonged to what we should 
 call the imagination, and not the conceptive faculty '^ {ean 
 Be vorjfjua (^avraajjia hiavoia'^ \oyf./cov ^wov to yap (pavraaf^a, 
 iweihav XoyiKf} irpoaiTliTrri '^vxfl, Tore ivvori/uLa KoXetrat, elX?]- 
 <^09 Tovvofjia irapa rev vovv, Bcoirep ocra to'l<; aWoL<; fcoot? irpoa- 
 TriTrrec, ravra ^avracrfiara jjlovov iariv, oaa Se koI toI<^ 6eol<i 
 KoX Tot9 rjixtv ye, ravra Kal (pavrda/xara Kara yevo^ Kal ivvor)' 
 fiara Kar elSo^). This error, of classing general notions or 
 conceptions with the mere sensible impressions of memory, 
 an error which exposed Locke to so much ridicule from hos- 
 tile critics, was particularly guarded against by Aristotle, 
 who expressly states: "The same affection happens in think- 
 ing of anything as in drawing it, for though we do not 
 require any particular size in drawing a triangle, neverthe- 
 less we do draw it of some definite magnitude; and we think 
 in the same manner, even if we do not think it of any parti- 
 cular magnitude, — we place some magnitude before the eyes. 
 If the thing itself is of an undefinable magnitude, we still 
 imagine it of some definite magnitude ^" The only way of 
 
 ^ Acad. Post. 11. 
 
 ^ For the distinction between Imagination and Conception, see Hansel's 
 Prolegomena Logica, ch. i. 
 
 ' " avfifialvec yhp to avro irddos iv T(p vodv oirep Kal iv Ti^ diaypd<p€iv 
 iKei re yap cvdkv irpoaxP^^fJ-^voi ry to iroaov (Jipiffixivov iXvai to Tpiyibvov, Sfius 
 yp<i<pofX€v upiafx^pov Kara to iroaov' Kal b voi2v uxrourws, koLv ixtj rroaov voy, 
 riOcTai irpo 6/JifxdTUv Trocrou, voeT 5' oCix v t^octov Kv 5' t] ^vats ■^ ti2v irocrujj', 
 
IV.] THE P;sYCHOLOGY OF THE STOWS. 69 
 
 escape for the Materialist is in ultra-nominalism, which 
 allows the concept no existence in thought. But how did 
 the Stoics, by reducing the mind to sensations and the 
 memory of sensations, hope to further their object, viz. the 
 establishment of some certain basis on which to build the 
 truths of science and morals? The real problem Scepticism 
 offered for solution was tliis^ When we compare objects for the 
 sake of observing their resemblance or difference, how do we 
 know that the resemblances or differences we think we per- 
 ceive are intrinsically in the objects, and do not arise from 
 differences in the points of view under which we consider 
 them, so that, in classifying or arranging, we are but clas- 
 sifying and arranging appearances, not things^ It must 
 be confessed the Stoics never met this question fairly. 
 Ideas, they insisted, were the correlates of things, and he 
 who discriminated ideas could discriminate things. " There 
 is the greatest truth in the senses," says Antiochus, defend- 
 ing the Stoics, " if they are in sound and healthy order, and if 
 everything is removed which could impede or hinder them — 
 so that there is not one of us who in each one of his senses 
 requires a more acute judgment as to each sort of thing." 
 But, replies the Sceptic, what does this judgment amount 
 to ? You pronounce that an object is such and such, because 
 the sensations you receive from it now are the same as, your 
 memory tells you, you derived from it before. " So a skilled 
 ear at the first note of a musical composition can say, that is 
 the Antiope or the Andromache, when there are others, you 
 admit, who have not even a suspicion of it\" Of course then 
 on this point the judgment of the musician and the non- 
 musician would be different. The fact alone would verify 
 the truth or falsity of each. Now, continues the Sceptic, 
 
 abpKTTov 8i, TiOeraL ixkv TroffoV Cipiafilvov, voeX S' ■^ Troabu fiovov.''^ — Aristotle 
 (Ilepi MvyjfxrjS, k.t.X.). 
 
 1 Lucullus, 7 ; compare 27. 
 
70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 the fact may verify the judgment, but I want a judgment 
 ■which can pronounce a priori on the fact. To this the 
 Stoic replied, that the impressions of memory were the 
 ultimate tests of truth, for memory had once been sensa- 
 tion, and the reality of its impressions would stand on the 
 same footing as that of present perceptions. So Antiochus 
 urges, if evvoiai (notions) were false, or impressed from per- 
 ceptions of such a kind as not to be able to be distinguished 
 from false ones, then I should like to know how we were to 
 use them, and how we were to see what was consistent with 
 each thing, and what was inconsistent with it ? Certainly 
 no room is here left for memory, which alone contains not 
 only philosophy, but the whole practice of life, and all the 
 arts. For what memory can there be of what is false? or 
 what does any one remember which he does not comprehend 
 and hold in his mind ? " Memorise quidem certe, quae non 
 modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitse usum omnesque artes 
 una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae 
 potest enim esse memoria falsorum, aut quid quisquam me- 
 minit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet ^ ? " 
 
 In this passage is revealed at once both the strength and 
 the weakness of the Stoical system. The strength, inas- 
 much as it furnishes a groundwork of common sense, and 
 the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient 
 certitude for the requirements of life : on the other hand, 
 the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense 
 of the word, was abandoned. Knowledge here meant only 
 recognition, and the ability to discriminate rightly, instead of 
 being that a priori idea, by which we could pronounce what 
 anything is, from the knowledge of what it ought to he. The 
 reader of the Thecetetus will readily discern the drift of this 
 discussion; he will perceive that the knowledge which the 
 Stoics professed to have of the external universe was limited 
 1 Lucullus, 7. 
 
IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 7 1 
 
 to that faculty of right judgment which Plato there shows 
 to be an inadequate notion of cognition (AetTrerat tolvvv 
 TO, '\fr6vSr] So^daaL iv ToSSe, orav 'yi^vworKcov ere Kal ©eoScopov 
 KCil 6')((ov iv eKeivcp to5 Krjplvw wairep SaKTvXicov a(^wv ofx^olv 
 TO. crrj/jiela, Sid fxafcpov koI /jlt] i/cavco<i opoov ajx^co, TrpoOv/nrjOM, 
 TO OLKelov eKaripov arjfjielov dirohov<; rfj OLKela oylret, i/j,^ifidcra<; 
 TTpoaapfjicaai eh ro €avTpj<^ ^'X^^**? "^^ yivrjrac dvajvcopLcn^;, 
 elra tovtcov dTroTV')(wv kol wairep 01 e/jLTrdkiv vTroBovfjuevoi, 
 irapaXKa^a^i Trpoa^dXco rrjv eKaripov 6'\{nv 7rp6<; to dWorpcov 
 orffjielov, rj Kal, ola rd iv rot'; KaroTrrpoL^ rrj^; 6'\jreco<; irdOrj 
 he^id ek dpLarepd /LLerappeoiarj^;, ravrov iradwv BiafidpTCO' 
 Tore hr) avfilSaLveL rj erepoho^ia Kal to '\]reuSfj So^d^eivy. 
 
 § /3. The cardinal notion of the Stoics is contained in 
 the last clause of the paragraph we have quoted from Lu- 
 cuUus, in the preceding section, '^quod non animo compre- 
 hendit." This comprehension {KaTd\7]-\^i<^), which we think 
 we shall be able to show was little more than the " involun- 
 tary association" of the modern Materialists ^ was defined by 
 the Stoics as the instinctive discrimination of the mind between 
 real and false impressions. *' For/' said they, " we ought 
 not to give credit to everything which is perceived, but only 
 to those perceptions which contain some especial mark of those 
 things which appeared I" Such a perception then was called, 
 the cataleptic phantasm {(pavraala KaraXTjirTiKr}), or compre- 
 hensible perception. As this cataleptic phantasm was the 
 grand crux or bone of contention between the Stoics and 
 New Academy, during a succession of generations, and as it 
 illustrates the chief peculiarity of the dogmatic empiricism 
 which was the only positive system of philosophy then pre- 
 valent in Greece, we shall endeavour to explicate its real 
 
 1 Thecetetus, 193, b. c. 
 
 2 The reader will remember Hume's notion of belief. The subject is clearly 
 expounded in the chapter '*0n Belief" in the Analysis of the Human Mind, 
 by James Mill (Vol. i. c. xi.). 
 
 3 Acad. Post. 11. . . - 
 
7'2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 meaning. Philosophers had discovered in man the faculty of 
 abstracting in perception the phenomenal appearance from 
 the objective reality. The Stoics were the first to attempt to 
 bridge over this gulf between the object in thought and the 
 object in natu7'e, to. tjixIv and ra (j^ucreL. They maintained that 
 this object of thought was co-extensive with the real object, 
 that although with reference to the mind it was an image, or, 
 as Chrysippus thought, a modification (dWoLoxjL^), still it 
 covered, embraced, and comprehended the object, so that the 
 perception was in fact intuitive, and our knowledge was not 
 that of the mere subject-object, but of the object-object. <j}av- 
 raala he rvTrcDav^ iv "^VXV^ Tovriariv aXXo/ojcri?. ov yap 
 B6KT60V TTjv TviTcoaiv, oloveX TVTTOV a(f>pa<yi,a'Tr]po(;' iirel dvev- 
 BeKTov iarc 7toWov<; tvitov^ Kara to avro TrepLylveaOao. voelraL 
 Be (pavraala r) cltto v7rdp)(^ovTO'i Kara to vTrdp'^ov iyairofiefjiay- 
 /jbivi] Kol evaTTorervTray/jLevT] kol iva7roa(j)payLa/jbevr], oia ovk av 
 yevoiTo dirb fjurj v'n'dpj(ovro<;\ Besides this theory of the 
 relation of knowledge to existence, the Stoics also thought 
 that every object had by nature a distinctive or characteristic 
 mark, so that there were not two objects, however similar in 
 appearance, which really were identical on close inspection. 
 "Omnia dicis sui generis esse; nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. 
 Stoicum est quidem, nee admodum incredibile ; nullum esse 
 pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius nullum gra- 
 men'^." It is in connexion with these two notions that we 
 must look for an explanation of the cataleptic phantasm. Since 
 perception was an intuition of a real external object, and no 
 two objects in nature were exactly alike, it was possible for a 
 
 1 Diogenes Laertius, Lib. vii. cap. i. 60. 
 
 Cf. "The external senses have a double province — to make us feel, and 
 to make us perceive. They furnish us with a variety of sensations — some 
 pleasant, others painful, and others indifferent ; at the same time, they give 
 us a conception and an invincible belief of the existence of external objects." 
 — Reid, On the Int. Powers, Essay II. c. xvii. p. 318. 
 
 a Lucullus, 26. 
 
IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS, 73 
 
 wise man to discern this mark or distinctive feature of objects, 
 and, by storing it up in the memory, make it a criterion with 
 which to compare other perceptions or observations \ Thus 
 Epicurus, identifying irpoKriy^i^ with KaraXTjyfnff, says it is a 
 
 ^ The student will find that the dispute between the Stoics and Acade- 
 micians was not really about objective ontological existence, but an enquiry 
 into the nature of evidence as a ground of inference. The same point is 
 elucidated by Mr Mill in his Logic, Book iv. ch. i. § 2 : "In almost every act 
 of our perceiving faculties, observation and inference are intimately blended. 
 What we are said to observe is usually a compound result, of which one- 
 tenth may be observation, and the remaining nine-tenths inference. I affirm, 
 for example, that I hear a man's voice. This would pass, in common 
 language, for a direct perception. All, however, which is really perception is 
 that I hear a sound. That the sound is a voice, and that voice the voice of 
 a man, are not perceptions, but inferences. I affirm, again, that I saw my 
 brother at a certain hour this morning. If any proposition concerning a 
 matter of fact would commonly be said to be known by the direct testimony 
 of the senses, this surely would be so. The truth, however, is far otherwise. 
 I only saw a certain coloured surface ; or, rather, I had the kind of visual 
 sensations which are usually produced by a coloured surface ; and from these 
 as marks, known to be such by previous experience, I concluded I saw my 
 brother. I might have had sensations precisely similar when my brother 
 was not there. I might have seen some other person so nearly resembling 
 him in appearance, as, at the distance, and with the degree of attention 
 which I bestowed, to be mistaken for him. I might have been asleep, and 
 have dreamed that I saw him, or in a state of nervous disorder which 
 brought his image before me in a waking hallucination. In all these modes, 
 many have been led to believe that they saw persons well known to them, 
 who were dead, or far distant. If any of these suppositions had been true, 
 the afiirmation, that I saw my brother, would have been erroneous, but 
 whatever was matter of direct perception, namely, the visual sensations, 
 would have been real. The inference only would have been ill-grounded ; 
 I should have ascribed those sensations to a wrong cause." 
 
 The reasoning runs thus : such and such marks are marks of my brother, 
 here are such and such marks, therefore here is my brother. But in the 
 major proposition the induction does not preclude the possibility of a 
 plurality of causes. Such and such marks may belong to other people 
 besides my brother, hence the Stoical assumption, that everything had a 
 distinctive mark. The reader will find the whole of the Lucidlus turns upon 
 the above passage from Mr Mill. The reason why the ontological and 
 logical notions were confounded arose from the misapprehension as to the 
 nature of the copula which was supposed to import real existence. 
 
 See in the ensuing Lecture the account of the doctrine of probahility of 
 Carneades. 
 
74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 right opinion, notion, or general idea in the mind, i.e. a re- 
 membrance of things which have often appeared externally 
 (l^TTL/covpo'i Be 6 (f)L\6ao(f)0'; Xiyec TrpoXrjyjnv oiovel KaraXrjyjnv, 
 rj So^av opOrjv, y evvoiav, rj KaOoXiKTjv v6r]cnv ivaTroKetfjuepTjv, 
 Tovreart fjLvr]/bbi]v rod TroXXa/ct? t^codev ^avevTO<^^). It is pro- 
 bable that the cataleptic phantasm was really a complex 
 idea'^ in memory, composed of a group of those marks or 
 qualities which constitute the differentia of a species. Thus 
 Zeno, comparing the steps of the process by which the mind 
 acquires its furniture, to the open palm, the half-closed hand , 
 the closed fist, and that again grasped by the other hand, 
 illustrated the method of arriving at science or knowledge by 
 observation, comparison, abstraction, and classification; but 
 of course, if the mind could grasp single objects so as to re- 
 cognise them by their accidents, a fortiori it could acquire 
 those complex conceptions through which we refer an indi- 
 vidual to its species. So the cataleptic phantasm seems to 
 be, sometimes a single complex perception of an individual, 
 and sometimes a more general notion. Cicero appears, how- 
 ever, to regard it always as the former, although the basis 
 on which the validity of general notions was established. 
 " Quodque natura quasi normam scientise et principium sui 
 dedisset, undo postea notiones rerum in animis imprimeren- 
 tur ; e quibus non principium solum, sed latiores quaedam, ad 
 ration em inveniendam vise, reperiuntur^" 
 
 § 7. We have before remarked that the passivity of the 
 mind in perception was one of the most prominent features 
 in the Stoical system. The assent {a-vj/caTd6eat<;) with which 
 the mind accepted phenomena was involuntary, and it is not 
 
 1 Suidas in TrpoXi^i/'is. 
 
 2 Compare the description of a Conception in James Mill: "My concep- 
 tion of a horse is merely my taking together, in one, the simple ideas of the 
 sensations which constitute my knowledge of a horse." — Analysis of the 
 Human Mind, Vol. I. chap. vi. p. 175. 
 
 3 Acad. Post. 11. 
 
IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. 75 
 
 very easy to see in this respect how the Stoical notion of 
 knowledge was so very different from that of opinion or 
 simple judgment, between which extremes comprehension or 
 KaTa\7jyjn<^ occupied the middle place. According to Gellius, 
 assent was voluntary, and in this knowledge differed from 
 opinion, the latter being involuntary and receiving no assent 
 from the mind. "Visa animi, quas ^avTaala^ philosophi ap- 
 pellant, quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis rei 
 pellitur, non voluntatis sunt neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam 
 sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda. Probationes autem, 
 quas av^Karadeaei^ vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac 
 dijudicantur, voluntaria sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu\" 
 On the other hand, Cicero, discussing the same subject, seems 
 to leave the voluntariness of assent as very doubtful. "For 
 as it is evident (says Lucullus) that one scale of a balance 
 must be depressed when a weight is put in it, so the mind 
 too must yield to what is evident; for just as it is impossible 
 for any animal to forbear desiring what is manifestly suited 
 to its nature, so it is equally impossible for it to withhold its 
 assent to a manifest fact which is brought under its notice V 
 To reconcile these conflicting statements we must have re- 
 course to the physical theory of the Stoics, which powerfully 
 influenced the logic as well as the ethic of their whole system. 
 They thought that "the whole universe being material, there 
 was a reason immanent in everything, under the fixed and 
 immutable laws of which all nature developed after its kind." 
 But to avoid the fatalism which such a principle would 
 involve, Chrysippus insisted on the doctrine of "auxiliary 
 causes," or confatalism, by which, although the action of 
 
 1 Gellius, XIX. cap. i. It is probable that the act of inference was the 
 voluntary part of the process of knowledge; simple judgment was involuntary; 
 but inference involves the weighing of evidence, hence the simile above from 
 Lucullus. — See Note 17, from Mill's Logic. 
 
 2 LucuUus, 12. 
 
76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. 
 
 nature was fixed, still, as every event was the resultant of 
 compounded causes, so their concomitance as a condition of 
 the coefficiency of each cause was contingent. For example, 
 motion must ensue to a body on the application of a force. 
 But the same force might communicate a motion of rota- 
 tion to one body, and a motion of translation to another. 
 Thus (says Chrysippus) "a man who pushes a cylinder gives 
 it a principle of motion, but not immediately that of revolu- 
 tion. So, an object strikes our sense and conveys its image 
 to our soul, yet leaves us free to believe in it or not; as in 
 the case of the cylinder which is set in motion from without, 
 it will continue for the future to move according to its own 
 proper force and nature." "Ut igitur, inquit, qui protrusit 
 cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem 
 non dedit: sic visum objectum imprimit illud quidem, et 
 quasi signabit in animo suam speciem: sed assensio nostra 
 erit in potestate: eaque quemadmodum in cylindro dictum 
 est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est suapte vi et natura 
 movebitur^" Still, this belief or assent of the mind was the 
 result of the action of an immutable law, and therefore, as is 
 the inevitable consequence of materialistic principles, the 
 pure spontaneity of the mind is not admitted. It is true it 
 acts according to its own nature, and so far as its action is a 
 concause its determination is voluntary. What was this law 
 under which the mind evolved its knowledge? Modern phi- 
 losophers would call it the law of "the association of ideas," 
 the principle under which belief and knowledge are alike in- 
 voluntar}^ The first law, property, or faculty of the human 
 mind brought into operation in earliest infancy is that of the 
 association of ideas. To recollect, to imagine, to abstract, 
 and to reason, according to the Hume, Brown, and Mill 
 school of philosophy, are not active, but neuter verbs, imply- 
 ing a succession of mental states, determined by this fixed 
 
 ^ De Fato, 19. 
 
IV.] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. -J 7 
 
 law of association and suggestion, of which the mind is the 
 passive subject \ Ancient Philosophy, however, was not ripe 
 for such an articulate enunciation of the views which they 
 yet unconsciously foreshadowed, the complete systematization 
 of which was reserved for the philosophers of the eighteenth 
 century I 
 
 § 8. In the complete antithesis the Stoics intended 
 their system to exhibit to the pernicious opinions of the 
 
 ^ Brown's celebrated analysis of the process of composition is a luminous 
 illustration of this theory : — " In the first place, to sit down to compose, is to 
 have a general notion of some subject which we are about to treat, with the 
 desire of developing it, and the expectation, or perhaps the confidence, that 
 ,we shall be able to develop it more or less fully. The desire, like every 
 other vivid feeling, has a degree of permanence which our vivid feelings only 
 possess ; and, by its permanence, tends to keep the accompanying conception 
 of the subject, which is the object of the desire, also permanent before us; 
 and while it is thus permanent the usual spontaneous suggestions take 
 place — conception following conception, in rapid but relative series, and our 
 judgment, all the time, approving and rejecting, according to those relations 
 of fitness and unfitness to the subject, which'it perceives in the parts of the 
 train. Such I conceive to be a faithful picture of the state, or successive 
 states of the mind, in the process of composition. It is not the exercise of a 
 single power, but the development of various susceptibilities — of desire— of 
 simple suggestion, by which conceptions rise after conceptions — of judgment, 
 or relative suggestion, by which a feeling of relative fitness or unfitness 
 arises, on the contemplation -of the conceptions that have thus spontaneously 
 presented themselves. We think of some subject ; the thought of this 
 subject induces various conceptions related to it. We approve of some, as 
 having a relation of fitness for our end, and disapprove of others, as unfit. 
 We may term this complex state, or series of states, 'imagination,' or 'fancy,' 
 and the term may be convenient for its brevity. But, in using it, we must 
 not forget that the term, however brief and simple, is still the name of a 
 state that is complex, or of a succession of certain states ; that the phenomena 
 comprehended under it, being the same in nature, are not rendered, by this 
 use of a mere word, different from those to which we have already given 
 peculiar names, expressive of them as they exist separately; and that it is to 
 the classes of these elementary phenomena, therefore, that we must refer the 
 whole process of imagination in our philosophic analysis — unless we exclude 
 analysis altogether, and fill our mental vocabulary with as many names of 
 powers as there are complex affections of the mind."— Dr Brown's Lectures. 
 Lecture xlii. page 271. 
 
 2 Hamilton's Eeid. See notes to chap. vi. On the Active Poxcers, page 616. 
 
78 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE STOICS. [Lect. TV. 
 
 Pyrrhonists, not only did they maintain that all sceptical 
 doubt was inconsistent with knowledge, but also that all 
 reasonable belief was insufficient for a wise man. ''Mihi 
 porro non tam certum est, esse aliquid, quod comprehendi 
 possit, de quo jam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapien- 
 tem nihil opinari, id est, nunquam assentire rei vel falsse, vel 
 incognitseV' was a sentiment the Stoics were never tired of 
 reiterating. Ignorance, opinion, and belief, were, with them, 
 convertible terms, which might suffice for the unthinking, 
 uneducated, and superstitious vulgar; but certainty, know- 
 ledge, and assent, were alone conformable to the wisdom of 
 the thoughtful philosophic sage. It was this arrogation of 
 absolute certainty, this dogmatic assumption of unqualified 
 conviction, which, probably, first aroused the opposition of 
 the successors of Plato in the Academy to the Stoical doc- 
 trines. Men who had read and understood the purport of 
 the ThecBtetus, and who had in that work seen every em- 
 pirical avenue to knowledge tested and found inadequate, 
 whether it was sensation, judgment, or reason — men who had 
 inherited and secretly cherished the belief of their immortal 
 founder in the existence of principles in the higher reason of 
 man, through which they had cognition of things prior to and 
 beyond experience — these men would ill brook the usurpation 
 of absolute knowledge, and certitude, by a set of philosophers 
 who maintained that man was endowed with a soul which, 
 previously to its contact with external phenomena, was devoid 
 of every intellectual or moral attribute. It was probably, we 
 say, such latent influences as these which tended to maintain 
 that long hostility between the Stoics and later Academicians 
 — an hostility which, although ostensibly confined to contro- 
 versies respecting questions of apparently limited scope, yet 
 involved problems of vital importance to the interests of 
 moral and metaphysical truth. ! 
 
 1 LucuUus. 18. 
 
LECTURE V. 
 
 THE NEW ACADEMY. 
 
 '^ El flT] "^dp 7]V Xpi^CTiTTTTOS, OVK CLV TjU €706." 
 
 § a. " HlSTOKiANS," says Sextus, "generally distinguish 
 three Academies. A first and principal, founded by Plato 
 himself; a second or middle, commencing with Arcesilas; a 
 third or new, under the presidency of Carneades." 
 
 To these some writers add a fourth, under Philo and 
 Charmidas, and even a fifth, that of Antiochus\ 
 
 Cicero, however, seems to think, that if there ever was 
 any divergence in the doctrines of the successors of Plato 
 from the original method of their founder, it commenced 
 with Arcesilas, who thus gave the distinguishing character to 
 the New Academy: ''Sed tamen ilia, quam exposui, vetus; 
 hsec nova nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, 
 qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilas ratione per- 
 mansit^" Of the opinions of Arcesilas himself, however, we 
 have not any very certain information; he appears to have 
 appropriated so much of the scepticism of Pyrrho as was not 
 inconsistent with the traditions of the Academy. But that 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 33. 220. Eusebius, 14. 4. Prcsparat. Evang. p. 726. 
 
 2 Ac. Post. 12. De Fin. v. 3. 
 
8o THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 by which he may be considered to have most especially de- 
 termined the attitude of the Academy towards the Stoical 
 dogmatists, was the controversy he commenced respecting 
 the cataleptic phantasm, upon the validity of which, as a 
 basis of certitude in the acquisition of knowledge, depended 
 the pretensions of empiricism. This controversy lasted for 
 nearly 300 years \ according to the testimony of Cicero; and 
 in fact has been, and for ever must be, the fundamental pro- 
 blem of metaphysics. If we have no knowledge prior to ex- 
 perience, what degree of certainty attached to the knowledge 
 obtained from experience? ivhat is the nature of that know- 
 ledge, and what its extent^ After the lapse of so many cen- 
 turies these questions seem as far from a satisfactory solu- 
 tion as ever. Perhaps, however, as Professor Ferrier remarks, 
 that ever-increasing tendency among speculatists towards 
 "the great gulf-stream of idealism" had already set in, being 
 either the natural reaction from the materialistic realism of 
 the Stoics, or a less positive form of the Platonic system. 
 Both these influences are discernible in the opinions of Arce- 
 silas, Carneades, and Philo. Idealism, however, was most 
 articulately expressed by Carneades; and it is the dogmatic 
 enunciation of the impotency of human knowledge to tran- 
 scend the sphere of subjective reality, the dKaraXrjTrTov, or 
 incomprehensibility of all things, as it was then termed, 
 which marks his speculations as the commencement of a new 
 era in metaphysical philosophy, and, from their coincidence 
 with the tendencies of thought of the present age, renders 
 their explication at once easier and more interesting. 
 
 It is curious, indeed, to observe, how principles, the anti- 
 thesis of which was as decided in the theories of Cbrysippus 
 and Carneades as in the corresponding speculative systems 
 of the present day, should have led to results almost the op- 
 posite to those we are accustomed to consider as inevitable 
 ^ Lucullus, 24, et passim. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY, 8 1 
 
 consequences from their respective premises. In Stoicism 
 we have united a psychological system of materialism which 
 left the human soul little better than an ingenious mecha- 
 nism, a rigid morality whose precepts inculcated habits of 
 fortitude and temperance, and a notion of causality which 
 excluded all spontaneity from the voluntary effort, as well as 
 from the cognitive process. On the other side, we have the 
 absolute freedom of the active principle maintained by Car- 
 neades, side by side with total scepticism as to the existence 
 of any motive to virtue beyond utility, and a denial of all 
 external and objective elements in the materials of conscious- 
 ness. But there is no doubt the Stoical doctrines, by reason 
 of their scientific method, their elevated morality, and their 
 accordance with the prevailing superstitions of the age, were 
 much more popular among all who upheld the interests of 
 religion and virtue, than the apparently lax scepticism of the 
 New Academicians. 
 
 § /3. Carneades is certainly the representative man of 
 the New Academy; and in his method and opinions we shall 
 find the indications of that mighty change which was shortly 
 to dislodge all the old-world notions so strenuously upheld 
 and cherished by the Stoics: notions which, rooted in the 
 pride of the reason of the learned, and in the traditional su- 
 perstitions of the vulgar, it seemed the mission of Carneades 
 and the later Academicians systematically to oppose. In 
 truth the Stoics may be considered to have combined in their 
 system all that was positive in theology, morality, and specu- 
 lative science. Carneades, on the other hand, principally 
 comes before us as embodying in his opinions the negation of 
 every article of Stoicism ; and it is this aspect, therefore, of 
 his doctrines that we shall proceed to examine. Carneades, 
 like most of the later Academicians, left no writings of his 
 own ; we have to seek for his views in the works of his illus- 
 trious expounder Cicero, who himself was perhaps the noblest 
 
 L. L. 6 
 
82 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 upholder of the New Academy, and in those of Sextus Em- 
 piricus, whose scepticism perhaps leant more to that of Car- 
 neades than to that of Pyrrho. It is easy to detect, even 
 from the brief sketch we have given of the Stoical doctrines, 
 that their main positions may be reduced to four coherent 
 and dependent articles; and it is with reference to each of 
 these that we shall consider the opposing opinions of Car- 
 neades. 
 
 1. Their physical theory of the universe, as the inalien- 
 able and immortal subject of a one primary law or cause, 
 which as a regulative, and by the Stoics considered an intel- 
 ligent principle, determines and directs all the manifestations 
 of nature. "Ait enim (sc. Chrysippus), vim divinam in ra- 
 tione esse positam, et universse naturae animo atque mente : 
 ipsumque mundum dicit esse, et ejus animi fusionem uni- 
 versam\" 
 
 2. That, under this law, cause, or principle, the succes- 
 sions and changes of things are the immutable links in an 
 eternal sequence of causation {elfiapfjuivr]), the passive invo- 
 luntary agents of absolute necessity ("tum ejus ipsius princi- 
 patum, qui in mente et ration e versetur, communemque 
 rerum naturam, universa atque omnia continentem: tum 
 fatalem vim, et necessitatem rerum futurarum) ^" 
 
 3. That in the act of perception the mind or human 
 subject is passively illuminated with a consciousness of its 
 own existence, and that of the object causing the perception ; 
 and that this consciousness or cataleptic phantasm imparts 
 the conviction of its own reality, conformity, and indivi- 
 duality '* si illud esset (sc. KarakTjTTTLKr) ^avraa-ia) sicut 
 Zeno definiret, tale visum igitur impressum effictumque ex 
 
 1 Be Nat. Dear. i. 15. 
 
 2 I. I. 15. "Hinc vobis exstitit primum ilia fatalis necessitas, quam 
 el/nap^-^uriv diciiia; ut, quidquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate, causarumque 
 continuatione fiuxisse dicatis." — /. I. 20. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 83 
 
 eo, uiide esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non 
 esset'." 
 
 4. That since knowledge is but the instinctive appre- 
 hension of the mind's obedience to the laws of its nature, it 
 is not competent to a wise man to credit any authority or 
 evidence short of this necessary assent which consciousness 
 accords to the cataleptic phantasm {avrr) yop rjv (j)a(Ti Kara- 
 Xij'yjrLV Kol KaTaXr)7rTtKrj<i (^avraala^; avyKarddecnv rjroL iv 
 ao(f>S rj iv (j^avXoi jLveraL dX)C idv re iv ao^o) yevijraL iin- 
 a-Tr]iJbr] iariv, idv re iv ^avXo), Bo^a) ^. 
 
 § 7, To the first of these articles, embracing as it does 
 the entire theology of the Stoics, Carneades opposed a mul- 
 titude of arguments, which Cicero, in his treatise De Natura 
 Deorum, has put into the mouth of Cotta, who speaks against 
 the Epicureans as well as the Stoics. For although Cicero 
 does not expressly attribute all the negative opinions in this 
 work to Carneades, yet it is evident, from the identity of 
 style between the reasonings of Cotta and those ascribed 
 by name to Carneades, that they are the utterances of one 
 mind ; and especially from the exordium prefixed to the 
 work we are led to the conclusion that they must have 
 been eminently the sentiments of Carneades. " Contra quos 
 (sc. Stoicos) Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret 
 homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem^." 
 
 The first book of this work is devoted to a controversy 
 between C. Yelleius on behalf of the Epicureans against Q. 
 Lucilius Balbus defending the Stoics. In the second book 
 the latter takes up the argument, and expounds and defends 
 the theology of the Stoics ; and in the third book Balbus 
 is in turn attacked by Cotta as the representative of the 
 New Academy. 
 
 *' My belief in the existence of the gods," says Cotta, 
 
 1 LucuUus, 6. 2 ^^^, ]!^icLiii^ yii^ 153^ 
 
 3 2)g Nat. Deor. i. 2. 
 
 6—2 
 
^ 
 
 84 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 *' is based on the traditions of my ancestors ; but since you 
 disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit me to 
 measure my reason against yours; for the proofs on which 
 you found the existence of the gods tend only to render a 
 proposition doubtful that in my opinion is not so." (" Affers 
 haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint : remque mea sententia 
 minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis\") This passage 
 is remarkable as evincing the tremendous strides scepticism 
 must have made in subverting the natural tendency of man 
 to trust in the conclusions of his reason. That which is 
 solely upheld by reason, the same reason may confute ; but 
 there is a belief not founded on demonstrative evidence 
 which reason cannot touch. We see the traditional manner 
 of the Old Academy preserved in the playful Socratic banter 
 with which frequently the gravest subjects are handled ; and 
 highly characteristic of the contempt in which the logic of 
 the Stoics was held by Carneades and his followers is the 
 ensuing passage : " All that you have so much enlarged 
 upon in treating this subject," observes Cotta, "is that old, 
 concise, and, as it seemed to you, acute syllogism of Zeno, 
 Quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non 
 utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur mundus 
 utitur^." By parity of reasoning Zeno could just as well 
 prove that the world could read a book, for " that which can 
 read is better than that which cannot ; — nothing is better 
 than the world, the world therefore can read. So arguing 
 one might shew the world to be an orator, a mathematician, 
 a musician, — that it professes all sciences, and in short is a 
 philosopher." This is a good specimen of the mode of fence 
 so often adopted by Carneades, which Cicero elsewhere tells 
 us was particularly obnoxious to Chrysippus, his Stoical 
 adversary. "Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interro- 
 
 1 De Nat. Deor. iii. 4. 2 I. I. 9. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 85 
 
 getur, verbi causa, tria, pauca sint, anne multa: aliquanto 
 prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis 
 dicitur, rjcrv)(ai^eLv, Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carnea- 
 des, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? sequitur enim 
 qui te ex somno excitet, et eodem modo interroget\" If 
 however the manner of Carneades was somewhat flippant, 
 his arguments seem often to have been urged with great 
 subtlety and acuteness. The reason or intelligence said to 
 pervade nature by the Stoics, although considered by them 
 an efficient, was really nothing more than a physical cause, 
 the natura naturans of the Pantheist. When Cotta there- 
 fore distinguishes it from a natural cause, he apparently only 
 means that the all-pervading law of the Stoics implies an 
 unity, and in that sense a personality for the Deity, which 
 the Academicians were not disposed to admit, although they 
 allowed that the harmony and the regularity of the universe 
 indicated the action of at least mechanical or perhaps chemi- 
 cal laws. " Itaque ilia mihi placebat oratio de convenientia, 
 consensuque naturae, quam quasi cognatione continuatara 
 conspirare dicebas. Illud non probabam, quod negabas id 
 accidere potuisse, nisi ea uno divino spiritu contineretur. 
 Ilia vero cohaeret et permanet, naturae viribus, non deorum : 
 estque in ea iste quasi consensus, quam o-vfiiraOeLav Graeci 
 vocant. Sed ea, quo sua sponte major est, eo minus divina 
 ratione existimanda est^" In this however there is little 
 more than a logical distinction. The natura naturata is but 
 the passive subject, in which inheres the natura naturans, 
 active in nothing but its logical antecedence". Thus the 
 broad distinction between the theological system of the 
 
 1 LucuUus, 29. 2 De Nat. Deor. in. 11. 
 
 3 " Stoici naturam dividunt in duas partes: unam, quseefficiat, alteram, 
 quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praestet. In ilia prima esse >dm faciendi, 
 in hac materiam, nee alteram sine altero esse posse. Ita isti uno natursB 
 nomine res diversissimas comprehenderunt, Deum et mundum, artificem et 
 opus, dicuntque, alteram sine altero, nihil posse, tamquam natura sit Deus 
 
86 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 Epicureans and Academicians and that of the Stoics was, 
 that while the latte7' conceived that passive matter could be 
 endowed with a self-acting energy, the former saw that the 
 forces and powers in nature were but attributes or properties 
 of the material substance; and therefore merely physical 
 laws, and not intelligent or efficient causes. The great in- 
 centive to Pantheism in all ages has been the inability of the 
 human mind to conceive 2^ first cause; b. primary consequent 
 which itself has had no antecedent. To avoid this the Pan- 
 theist devises the hypothesis of an eternal substance in which 
 cause and effect are as it were synchronous. 
 
 There was no universe without a God, and no God in- 
 dependent of the universe. The notion of the immortality 
 and the infinity of the material universe was an assumption 
 essentially involved in the Pantheistic system, since it was 
 absurd to suppose that that, the duration of which had been 
 unlimited in the past, could terminate in any period of the 
 future ; and, as we have seen, this past eternity was the fun- 
 damental principle of the system. To demonstrate therefore 
 the mortality, mutability, and finite nature of matter, would 
 be to aim a fatal blow at the leading conception of the Pan- 
 theist. Cicero has preserved to us the argumentation of 
 Carneades on the subject. The general scope of his reason- 
 ing seems to be that the attributes of a thing cannot be in 
 their nature contrary to its essence ; and that matter, as 
 manifested to us, is mutable, soluble, and finite, therefore it 
 is impossible to conceive it the inalienable seat of an immu- 
 table, immortal and infinite essence. 
 
 " Si nullum corpus immortale sit, imllum esse corpus sem- 
 piternum. Corpus autem immortale nullum esse, ne indivi- 
 duum quidem, nee quod dirimi, distrahive non possit. Cum- 
 
 mundo permistus, Nam interdum sic eonfiindunt, ut sit Deus ipsa mens 
 mundi, et mundus corpus Dei."— Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. vii. cap. 3, 
 p. 781. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 87 
 
 que omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est 
 eorum quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus, id est, 
 .quasi ferendi et patiendi necessitatem. Et, si omne animal 
 mortale est, immortale nullum est. Ergo itidem si omne 
 animal secari ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum, 
 nullum seternum. Atqui omne animal ad accipiendam vim 
 externam, et ferendam paratum est. Mortale igitur omne 
 animal, et dissolubile, et dividuum sit necesse est." (And 
 again continues Carneades), " Si omnia, quae sunt, e quibus 
 cuncta constant, mutabilia sunt; nullum corpus esse potest 
 non mutabile. Mutabilia autem sunt ilia, ex quibus omnia 
 constant, ut vobis videtur. Omne igitur corpus mutabile est. 
 At si esset corpus aliquod immortale, non esset omne muta- 
 bile. Ita efficitur, ut omne corpus mortale sit Quod si 
 
 ea intereant, ex quibus constet omne animal; nullum est 
 animal sempitemum^" In all the above we see the same 
 idea preserved, viz. that of the passivity of matter as con- 
 trasted with the activity of intelligence, which the Stoics 
 consistently confounded, both in the reason of man as an 
 individual, and in that of the universe as a whole. In fact, 
 between a passive, suffering, perishable subject, and an active, 
 efficient agent there is an entire diameter of being, which 
 seems to separate them even in conception as much as in 
 reality. Bishop Butler uses similar arguments to prove the 
 immortality of the soul as Carneades to demonstrate the 
 mortality of the universe, both endeavouring to show that 
 a thinking principle, as in its essence one and indivisible, can- 
 not be a function of that which is subject to perpetual flux 
 and attrition. Carneades further indicates how the Pan- 
 theism of the Stoics leads to Polytheism, and hence to 
 Fetishism. 
 
 For with the vulgar, to whom the metaphysic of the 
 system would be unintelligible, the deification of the uni- 
 1 De Nat. Deor. in. 12. 
 
88 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 verse, by an easy transition, would be transferred to its 
 parts ; — so, "There is a divinity presiding over every human 
 affair, and every idle phantasm, every figment of the imagi- 
 nation, are Deities." (" Ergo etiam Spes, Moneta omniaque, 
 quae cogitatione nobismet ipsis possumus fingere\") But 
 enough has been said to prove the decided hostility of Car- 
 neades and the later Academicians to the theological doctrines 
 of the Stoics, or, more properly, of the great mass of the hea- 
 then public. Ought Carneades then to be considered an 
 atheist? Cicero denies that such a consequence would be 
 consistent with any form of philosophy. "Hsec Carneades 
 agebat; non ut deos toUeret; quid enim philosopho minus 
 conveniens ? sed ut Stoicos nihil de diis explicare convince- 
 ret'^." Perhaps the divinity of the Academicians was that 
 " Unknown God" whom St Paul told the Athenians, that 
 having ignorantly worshipped he now declared unto them, 
 ('Ey avTa> 'yap ^w/nev koI KcvovfieOa Kal iafxev), 
 
 § S. The notion of a fatal necessity ordering and com- 
 pelling both the actions of men, and the changes in the 
 external universe, seems to have been ingrained in the 
 Greek mind. Every poet, every tragedian, finds in this 
 instinct a ready fountain of sympathy with his narrations, 
 representing man as the sport of a relentless destiny, whose 
 decrees he unconsciously fulfils, and yet is punished for 
 obeying. This idea then, although common to the vulgar, 
 and inextricably bound Lip with the ancient theogony of 
 Greece, was really the logical consequence of a philosophical 
 Pantheism. For it is impossible to conceive of law inherent 
 in passive matter apart from an immutable order of suc- 
 cession — a chain every link of which is potentially involved 
 in the primary principle. Such a result, however, vv^hen 
 combined with psychological materialism, must evidently 
 
 1 /. I. 18. ^ l.L 17. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 89 
 
 lead to the denial of all freedom of will to the human 
 agent. 
 
 This consequence, besides being opposed to the evidence 
 of facts, would annihilate all moral responsibility, and there- 
 fore all distinctions between virtue and vice. 
 
 Thus ensued ample materials for the controversial pro- 
 pensities of the Stoics and their contemporaries ; and their 
 discussions, we are told, were dependent on three propo- 
 sitions, known among logicians as "the dominative argu- 
 ment" viz. 
 
 1. Tiav 7rap6\7}\v9o<; oXr/^e? dvayKatov elvai. 
 
 2. AvvarS aBvvarov //,?) aKoXovOelv, 
 
 3. Avvarov etvau o ovt ea-riv d\T]6h ovt earai. 
 From the acceptance of any two of these propositions 
 
 followed logically the denial of the third; and so the question 
 of necessity or freedom in the succession of human events 
 was supposed to be decided. The second or m^iddle of these 
 propositions was the most important, and may be thus in- 
 terpreted : '' All nature either acts in conformity to a fixed 
 immutable law, or it does not ; and it is impossible to con- 
 ceive that the same law can be at one time fixed and at 
 another time variable. Now if this axiom be admitted, and 
 likewise the first, viz. that everything which has happened 
 has occurred in conformity with a fixed law, it follows that 
 the third and last proposition must be rejected, viz. that that 
 which neither has occurred, nor will occur, yet might happen, 
 for, if it did, it could only be fortuitously, but by the first 
 proposition past events are admitted not to be fortuitous, 
 therefore by the second no event can be fortuitous. Q.E.D." 
 Here we have the doctrine of absolute necessity maintained 
 by the Megaric school, and especially by its most illustrious 
 representative, Diodorus Cronus. The Stoics Zeno and 
 Cleanthes, it seems, admitted the second and third propo- 
 sitions, and therefore rejected the j^rs^; for, by admitting the 
 
90 THE FEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 third, they virtually allowed the fortuitousness of future 
 events, and therefore, by the second, they were compelled 
 to deny the necessity of the past, and thus abandoned the 
 ■idea of fate altogether. Chrysippus, however, although a 
 Stoic, attempted to cut the logical knot by which this argu- 
 ment w^as connected, for he refused to admit the validity of 
 the second proposition, and thus was left to the alternative 
 V of allowing that the past was necessary, but that the future 
 might be to a certain degree fortuitous. We have already 
 explained, in the preceding chapter, by what process of rea- 
 soning Chrysippus arrived at this result, viz. by the adoption 
 of the principle of confatalism, or auxiliary causes. This 
 notion, which in substance was held by the Epicureans as 
 well as by the Stoics, was perhaps more intelligibly, although 
 quaintly, illustrated by the former. Cicero tells us that 
 Epicurus, when he found, if his atoms were allowed to de- 
 scend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our 
 power, because their motions would be certain and neces- 
 sary, invented an expedient which had escaped Democritus, 
 to avoid necessity. He says, that when the atoms descend 
 by their own weight, or gravity, they move a little obliquely: 
 "Ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsum 
 feratur, declinare paululum^" Now, although in the con- 
 text to the above passage it appears that Cotta considered 
 this argument so despicable, that he affirms Epicurus could 
 
 1 Be Nat. Deor. i. 25. 
 
 •* lUud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus, 
 corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur, 
 ponderibus propriis incerto tempore ferme 
 incertisque loci spatiis decellere paulum, 
 tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis. 
 Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum, 
 Imbris uti guttas, caderent per inane profundum, 
 nee foret offensus natus nee plaga creata 
 principiis: ita nil umquam natura creasset." 
 
 Lucretius, ii. 216—224. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 91 
 
 only have advanced it for the sake of affording his adver- 
 sary the gratification of an easy victory, yet it seems to us 
 susceptible of explanation and application to the subject 
 under discussion, although perhaps more appreciable to a 
 mathematician than to a logician. The oblique direction 
 of the atoms was a crude notion of a resultant force which 
 might have an infinite number of pairs of components, which 
 again might be compounded in an infinite number of ways, 
 and therefore the successive changes in nature would appear 
 fortuitous, although subject to the operation of immutable 
 laws of force, whereas vertical resultants would, as it were, 
 be susceptible of no reciprocal action, and therefore must 
 continue to act in the direction of the force primarily im- 
 pressed on them \ The attempt of Chrysippus, as we have 
 seen, to reconcile the idea of a fixed law in the order of t^ 
 things, with that of the spontaneity of the human agent, 
 was founded on somewhat similar reasoning, viz. the co- 
 operation and coefficiency of causes. That this expedient 
 did not fulfil the end desired, is logically and clearly de- 
 monstrated by Carneades, whose arguments Cicero has re- 
 corded in his treatise De Fato, one of the most elegant and p 
 luminous fragments of the great author's works. After relat- 
 ing the Stoical and Megaric logomachies on the subject of 
 free will and necessity, ''Carneades," he continues, ''rejected 
 
 1 "Denique si semper motus conectitur omnis 
 et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo, 
 nee declinando faciunt primordia motus 
 principium quoddam quod fati fcedera rumpat, 
 ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, 
 libera per terras unde hsec animantibus exstat, 
 unde est base, inquam, fatis avolsa potestas 
 per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluntas, 
 declinamus item motus nee tempore certo 
 nee regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 
 nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 
 principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur." 
 
 Lucretius, 11. 251—262. 
 
92 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 these metliods of reasoning, and considers their conclusions 
 are adopted too hastily. He therefore pushed his argument 
 in a plainer manner, and avoided these subtleties. ' If,' says 
 he, * everything happens by anterior causes, all these causes 
 must be closely and compactly bound to each other by a 
 natural connexion. Now if this is the case, necessity governs 
 all things ; we are no longer free agents ; nothing is in our 
 own power. But some things are in our own power ; but if 
 all things happen by fate, then all things happen by anterior 
 causes : therefore all that happens does not happen by fate.' " 
 Carneades thus shows that an eternal concatenation of causes 
 is incompatible with the idea of a free agency ; and that the 
 Stoical doctrine on this point leaves the question unsolved. 
 
 We find the real difficulty underlying all these conse- 
 quences about fate and necessity to have been the utter 
 inability of the disputants to conceive anything as possible 
 X in existence which was impossible in thought. Thus the great 
 crux in the question of free will was the inconceivability of 
 an effect without any apparent cause. Whence proceeded 
 that determination of the mind which we call the act of 
 volition ? In conformity with the materialism of the Stoics 
 it must originate externally to the mind. But this was as 
 illogical, or as little conformable to the idea of free will, as 
 an independent effect was to the idea of causation. The 
 only legitimate solution was to suppose the existence in man 
 of an absolutely free, independent, and active principle, 
 having no attribute in common with matter, and whose very 
 essence was the power of originating motion. It was in sup- 
 port of this opinion that Carneades and the later Academi- 
 cians were most decidedly opposed to the Stoics. As we 
 have already explained how the Epicureans attempted to 
 parry the consequences of their own mechanical hypotheses, 
 the following reasoning* of Carneades will be easily under- 
 
 ^ Be Fato, XI. 
 
Y.] THE NEW ACADEMY, 93 
 
 stood: "Acutius Carneades, qui docebat, posse Epicureos 
 suam causam sine hac commentitia declinatione defendere. 
 Nam cum doceret esse posse quendam animi motum volun- 
 tarium, id fuit defendi melius, quam introducere declina- 
 tionem, cujus praesertim causam reperire non possunt. Quo 
 defenso, facile Chrysippo possent resistere. Cum enim con- 
 cessissent, motum nullum esse sine causa, non concederent, 
 omnia, quae fierent, fieri causis antecedentibus : voluntatis 
 enim nostrse non esse causas externas, et antecedentes. Com- 
 muni igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, cum ita dici- 
 mus, velle aliquid quempiam aut nolle sine causa. Ita enim 
 dicimus, sine causa, ut dicamus, sine externa et antecedenti 
 causa, non sine aliqua. — Motus enim voluntarius eam natu- 
 ram in se ipse continet, ut sit in nostra potestate, nobisque 
 pareat : nee id sine causa ejus enim rei causa, ipsa natura 
 est." Here we have a clear and explicit statement of the 
 nature of a free agent, and subsequent exposition has con- 
 tributed little to the illumination of the subject. Those 
 who maintain that the act must follow the strongest motive, 
 and that that motive must be primarily extrinsic, do but 
 echo the opinions of Chrysippus, while, on the other hand, 
 the conclusions of those who uphold the pure spontaneity of 
 the voluntary act apart from appetite or deliberation, were 
 already articulately announced by Carneades and the later 
 Academicians. It was indeed the radical and substantial 
 difference of their views on this point that constitates the 
 irreconcileable divergence of the two schools. To recognise 
 a self-acting determining principle in the individual man, 
 was but to see the reflection of an analogous power in the 
 universe; and to him who was conscious of the presence of a 
 spontaneous intelligent faculty in himself, it would not be 
 illogical to conceive a Deity with similar attributes presiding 
 over and originating the order of nature. We have seen 
 that the theory of perception adopted by the Stoics was 
 
94 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 implicitly involved m, and naturally issued from, the passiv- 
 ity of the perceiving subject. Sir William Hamilton indeed 
 makes Pantheism the corollary of that theory which admits 
 the equipoise of the subject-object in the act of perception \ 
 It seems, however, probable that at least in the case of the 
 Stoics this order was reversed, and the notion of the com- 
 prehension of the object by the subject in perception was a 
 necessary consequence from their Pantheistic principles. The 
 fundamental idea indeed of Pantheism, viz. "that a cause 
 cannot produce an effect unlike itself," seems naturally to 
 suggest an intuitive theory of perception, where the repre- 
 sentative image or modification of consciousness exactly 
 measures its external cause. 
 
 § e. Carneades, we shall see, as in theology and logic, 
 propounded a diametrically opposite view concerning the 
 nature and limits of human knowledge to that of the Stoics ; 
 substituting, for the ultra-objectivism of the latter, an equally 
 uncompromising idealism, which allowed in the subjective 
 object of perception nothing but a vicarious representation or 
 indication of the external cause. The opinions of Carneades, 
 in opposition to the cataleptic phantasm of the Stoics, have 
 been preserved to us by Sextus Empiricus ; and as his ac- 
 count of them is brief, explicit, and comprehensive, we shall 
 give a translation of those passages of his work. Contra Ma- 
 thematicos, in which it is contained^: "But Carneades was 
 opposed on the question of the criterion of knowledge to all 
 preceding him. His first argument was of a more general 
 nature, in which he showed that there is no absolute criterion 
 of truth; neither reason, nor sensation, imagination, nor any- 
 thing else. But all these things, in short, deceive us. Se- 
 condly, he differed from preceding philosophers, inasmuch as 
 he demonstrated, that even if there were this criterion it 
 
 1 Reid's Works (Hamilton). Note A. § 1. p. 749, i. " If the veracity," &c. 
 " Contra MathemaUcos, vii. 159—101. 
 
v.] THE ^EW ACADEMY. 95 
 
 could not exist apart from the act of consciousness. Now an 
 animal differs from inanimate objects in having sensuous sus- 
 ceptibility, through which it becomes a percipient of itself 
 and external objects. But as long as sensation is unaroused, 
 dormant, and unaffected, neither is it sensation, nor is it a 
 percipient of anything. But being excited and provoked in 
 any way by the incidence of material objects, then it shows 
 us external things. The criterion, therefore, must be sought 
 in the act of consciousness (eV apa toS airo t^9 ivepy6ia<; nrd- 
 BeC). But the act must be indicative of the subject itself, 
 and also of the subject-object (tovto Se to irado^i avrov ivBeLK- 
 TLKOv 6(f)€l\€0 TV'y'^aveLV Kol Tov ifM7roi^aavTO<; avro (paivofxivov), 
 which act then is inseparable from the image, object of 
 thought, or subject- object (oirep ttcz^o? iaTiv ovx erepov rrj^ 
 ^avracrias:)" Into the above section^ is condensed an entire 
 theory of perception : a theory differing little from that of 
 Reid, and Brown, and which Sir William Hamilton calls the 
 theory of Cosmothetic Idealism, or Hypothetical Realism I 
 In it we have to remark fom^ distinct assertions, by which 
 this theory is mainly distinguished. 
 
 1. The activity of the mind in perception is emphati- 
 cally announced, the awakening to consciousness being termed 
 the TO aTTo Trj<; ivepyela^; Trddo^. 
 
 1 Adv. Math. vii. 161. Some read ivapyelas for iuepydas. To do this 
 would be to beg the whole question at issue. 
 
 2 Eeid's Works (Hamilton). Note A. § 1. p. 749, iv. "If the testimony 
 of consciousness to our knowledge of an external world existing be rejected 
 with the Idealist, but with the Eealist the existence of that world be affirmed, 
 we have a scheme which, as it, by many various hypothesis, endeavours, on 
 the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown material universe, 
 and on the other, to explain the ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called 
 the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism, Hypothetical Realism, or Hypothetical 
 Dualism." Sir W. Hamilton would not admit that Eeid and Brown held the 
 same theory. Our limits forbid our entering upon the discussion of this 
 point, which is exhaustively treated in Sir W. Hamilton's celebrated Essay 
 on Perception. 
 
g6 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 2. It is expressly denied that there can be any con- 
 sciousness apart from the conscious act\ rj he ye ala-Orja-i^ clkl- 
 PTjTO'i fiivovaa /cal dirad^^i fcal arpeiTTO^ ovre aLaOrjal^^ iariv 
 ovre avTiXyjiTTiKr) tivo^. Aristotle had already anticipated 
 this obvious and philosophical conclusion, from which, as we 
 know, Reid, and some later French writers, have differed. 
 
 3. Carneades recognises nothing in the mental image 
 but a phenomenal representation of its cause, a mere effect 
 in which we are conscious of nothing but the presence (uTrch 
 irrcocrtv) of the external object. But the object of thought is 
 not the external object, but that which stands for it in the 
 mind (tov ifiTroiijaavro'; avrb ^aivojxevov). 
 
 4. Is enunciated the observation that the act of percep- 
 tion is identical with the object of thought, oirep 7rd6o<i icrTip 
 ovy^ erepov r^? (l>avTaa-La^. 
 
 Here then we see already detected that identity of the 
 act and object of perception which Sir William Hamilton 
 reiterates was never noticed before M. Crousaz, the whole 
 credit of which he attributes to Reid^. But to return to 
 Sextus Empiricus^: "Whence we may say that a mental pre- 
 sentation {(fyavTaaia) is a sort of consciousness in an animal, 
 making the animal aware of its own existence, and the exist- 
 ence of that which aroused it. As Antiochus remarks, 
 * When we look at an object we are conscious somehow of 
 vision, and feel the sense of vision to be in a different state 
 to what it was before we looked at the object {irpoa^Xe'^av'- 
 re? TLVL, BiaTtOi^edd ttco? ttjv oyjnVy Koi ovx ovrco^ avrrjv Bia- 
 
 1 " Consciousness is not to be regarded as aught different from the mental 
 modes or movements themselves. It is not to be viewed as an illuminated 
 place, within which objects coming are presented to, and passing beyond are 
 withdrawn from, observation ; nor is it to be considered as an observer — the 
 mental modes as phaenomena observed."— Eeid's Works (Hamilton). Note 
 H. p. 932. Brown's Lecture on Consciousness. Hamilton's Essay on Per- 
 ception. 
 
 2 Hamilton's Essay on Perception. 
 
 3 Adv. Math. vii. 162. 
 
v.] THE NEW academy: 97 
 
 KeifjLevrjv la-^ofxev w? irplv tov ^XhjraL BLaK€t/jLev7)v €t')(Ofi€p)/ 
 In fact, however, we are conscious of two things in this 
 modification. 
 
 1. The modification itself. 
 
 2. The thing seen, or that which constructs the modifi- 
 cation; and similarly of the other senses. As light both 
 shows itself, and everything around it, so the mental modifi- 
 cation being the originator of consciousness in an animal, as 
 an illumination displays itself, and also the subject-object 
 which caused it. But since it does not always report its ob- 
 ject according to truth, but often lies, and differs from the 
 objects which caused it, like sorry messengers, it follows ne- 
 cessarily that, not every representation can afford a criterion, 
 but only that which is true, if there be a true one. Again, no 
 appearance is so true but that it might be false, and corre- 
 sponding to every one apparently true there may be a false 
 one indistinguishable from it. The criterion, therefore, will 
 not primd facie distinguish the true from the false^ But an 
 appearance partaking of both the true and the false cannot 
 be comprehensive (KaTaXrjTrrL/cr)), and not being comprehen- 
 sive, cannot be a criterion. No phantasm being capable of 
 deciding, neither can reason be a criterion; for the reports of 
 sense are the materials of reason. For that which is judged 
 of must first be brought before the reason, but nothing caii 
 appear to the reason without the intervention of the senses ^ 
 Neither then is there a criterion in reason, nor in sensation." 
 It is impossible to understand the controversy about the cri- 
 
 ^ ^'-rrapaXa^ijiv aX'rjde'L jxh S/xoiov xf/evdos, KaTaXrjTrTiKr] 5^ (pavraaiq. Kara- 
 "K-rjiTTOP 6,aoi.ou, Kai (£707^1/ ets ras ftras ovk eiaaev oUre to akrjdks etvai oUtc rb 
 xpevdos, 7j ov fxaXXov rb ^repov tov eripov, rj p,dX\ou dirb tov mdavov.'" — Nume- 
 nius apud Eusebium, 14. 8. 
 
 2 " Quid majore fide porro quam sensus haberi 
 debet? an ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit 
 dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibuB orta est ? 
 qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis." 
 
 Lucretius, iv. 482—485. 
 
 L. L. 7 
 
98 TEE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 terion of truth, without having a distinct appreciation of the 
 nature of the problem to be solved, although it is not evi- 
 dent, from the discussions recorded, that the exact nature of 
 the question was ever perceived by either party of the dis- 
 putants. What then was this criterion of truth, or rather, 
 what was truth? Truth seems to have meant the reality of 
 the existence of the object of thought in perception: the 
 agreement of the <paiv6jj,6vov with the vTroKeifievov, of the 
 ohjectum quo with the objectum quod. Now it is evident in 
 every representative theory of perception, where the object 
 of thought only affords a mediate cognition of the object in 
 existence, that the degree of this reality or truth can only be 
 hypothetical. For, as the Sceptics continually urged, unless 
 one could see the exteymal object, independent of its represen- 
 tation in the onind, how is it possible to know that they are 
 conformable to one another? How can you assert that the 
 picture of Socrates is like him, unless you have seen Socrates 
 himself? But who has ever transcended the sphere of con- 
 sciousness, who has ever seen things but as ideas in the 
 mind? and if this comparison of the idea and the thing is 
 impossible, where is the criterion of truth? By such reason- 
 ing Carneades denied the possibility of a criterion; but the 
 fact was, the Stoics never asserted that in this sense there 
 was any. For, as we have seen, their theory of perception, 
 although partly representative, was analogous to that which 
 we should now term immediate cognition, where the know- 
 ledge is of the thing itself, the objectum quod, and therefore 
 involves the fact of its existence\ The very definition of the 
 cataleptic phantasm implied its comprehension, or perfect 
 representation of the object; and its fidelity was founded 
 upon the logical conception of causation. The real supe- 
 riority of the opinions of Carneades over those of the Stoics 
 
 1 Reid's Worhs, Hamilton. Note B. § 1. 1. p. 805. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY, 99 
 
 with respect to the question of knowledge was, the consist- 
 ent maintenance by the former of an active principle in 
 the mind, the real subject of cognition. The existence of 
 such a principle of intelligence is implied in the passages 
 quoted above from Sextus Empiricus, as in the expression 
 TO aTTo T?7? ivepyela^ iraOo^, indicating the fact that in per- 
 ception, although the mind may be passive in respect to the 
 external causes of its modifications, yet that cognition or 
 knowledge is an act implying the presence of an independent 
 agent. This doctrine is, however, more explicitly announced, 
 though apparentl}^ not very clearly understood, by Cicero, 
 who, while controverting the doctrine of probabilities pro- 
 pounded by Carneades and the later Academicians, makes 
 the following remark : " Simili in errore versantur, cum con- 
 victi, ac vi veritatis coacti, perspicua a perceptis volunt dis- 
 tinguere, et conantur ostendere, esse aliquid perspicui, verum 
 illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen 
 id percipi ac comprehendi posset" The distinction taken 
 here between perspicua and percepta is radical and substan- 
 tial. Perspicua distinguishes the act of cognition from per- 
 cepta, mere passive impressions on the mind, but not neces- 
 sarily implying knowledge. A percept then, according to 
 Carneades, was nothing but a modification of the mind de- 
 termined by some unknown external cause, and a perspect 
 was the active recognition of this modification by the diano- 
 etic faculty, a power in the mind which materialists have 
 never admitted. The limits of human knowledge appear to 
 have been thus determined by Carneades. The mind was 
 
 1 LucuUus, 11. To understand this point fully we must refer the reader 
 to the discussion on the subject in the Thecetetus, p. 185 n. S/coVei yap, 
 diroKpicTLS irorepa Spdorepa, y opCofiep, tovto elvai ocpOaXfioi/s, t) 5l ov 6pQfJ,€v, Kal, 
 ({) aKoiopiev, WTtt, 17 bC ov aKovofiev. 0EAI. At' wv '^Kaara alffOavo/xeOa, ^fxoiye 
 doKei, (3 2w/f/)ares, fxaXKov rj oTs. 20. AeLvbf yap irov, c3 irac, el noWai riues iv 
 Tjfjuv, Ciairep ev SovpeioLs 'iwirois, alad^creis iyKdOrjurac, dWd /xr] els puav Tivd Ideai', 
 etre t/'i^xV? ^'^^ ^ ^^^ KaXeTu, iravra ravra ^vvTeivec fi did tovtwv oXqv opydfoov 
 ala9av6p.e6a oaa alcrdrjrd, k.t.X. 
 
 7—2 
 
100 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 competent to weigh, compare and judge its own ideas, and 
 detect their agreement or disagreement. But the external 
 causes of those ideas he declared to be incomprehensible 
 (aKardXrjTrTov), or imperceptible, 'still he left to man more 
 than he took from him;' for the Stoics, in giving man the 
 faculty of the immediate cognition of external objects, at the 
 same time deprived him of any agency in the process. But 
 Carneades, although proclaiming that our ideas were only 
 the indications, and not the resemblances of things, yet al- 
 lowed the subject the power of the free and deliberate com- 
 parison of them. The Stoics found in man a feeling of con- 
 viction, certainty or assent, which the mind accorded to the 
 results of its own operations; but they made this belief or 
 assent only an involuntary and necessary acquiescence in a 
 scarcely more than mechanical law. Whereas Carneades, al- 
 though he maintained the uncertainty and inadequateness of 
 our knowledge of the existence or relations of things beyond 
 the sphere of consciousness, still allowed man the power of 
 intelligently estimating the value of evidence and the degree 
 of probability. 
 
 § 5*. This doctrine of probability which, as distinguished 
 from certainty, produces belief as the latter knowledge, is by 
 most writers considered as the eminent and essential charac- 
 teristic of the teaching of Carneades. But Cicero in com- 
 mencing the defence of his school against Lucullus asserts 
 that sages had always admitted a degree of knowledge short 
 of certainty. " Nemo, unquam, superiorum non modo ex- 
 presserat, sed ne dixerat quidem, posse hominem nihil opi- 
 nari: nee solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti\" Still 
 as the only and sufficient ground of action, the validity of 
 probable evidence separates the school of Carneades most 
 completely, in theory at least, from the contemporary dog- 
 matic, as well as sceptical sects of philosophers. In a con- 
 
 1 Lucullus, 24. 
 
yW ^/L'^^\ 
 
 v.] THE NEW ACADEMY, lOI 
 
 tinuation of the passages already quoted from Sextus Em- 
 pi ricus we are enabled to gather the opinions of Carneades 
 on the subject of probability^ "Carneades asserting these 
 things against the other philosophers, demonstrated the im- 
 possibility of any criterion of truth, but when pressed for some 
 criterion in the conduct of life, or the pursuit of happiness, 
 was compelled to admit the virtual existence of such a rule, 
 taking the simply probable perception, and that perception 
 which, besides being probable, is disturbed by no doubt, but 
 is evident and clear [jcaX ttjv iriOavrjv a/jua kol aTrepiairaaTov 
 KoX BL€^(oB€VfM€vr)v). What then is the difference between 
 such perceptions we will briefly consider. A mental image 
 or representation (77 (f>avTaaLa) may be considered in relation 
 either to the object it represents, or to the subject to whom it 
 represents it, the object {to <f)avTaaT6v) being something ex- 
 ternal to the mind, the subject (6 <l)avTa<TcovfjLevo<;) being man ^. 
 According to the relation of the image with its object, the 
 perception is true or false. It is true whenever it is con- 
 formable to its object, and false when not. In relation to 
 the subject the image appears to be either true or false. 
 That perception which appears true is called by the Acade- 
 micians emphasis (6/A(/)a(7i9), probability, or a probable percep- 
 tion. And that which does not appear true is called aTre/ic^a- 
 0-^9, improbability, or the improbable perception. For neither 
 that which is evidently false, nor that which, although true, 
 does not appear so, is adapted to convince us. Now, that 
 which appears true, and appears sufficiently clearly, is a cri- 
 terion according to the followers of Carneades. Since no 
 phantasm comes singly, but one follows another in a sort of 
 chain, there will be a second criterion, the probable and 
 unopposed phantasm^. For when one distinguishes a man 
 
 1 Adv. Math, vii. 166, 167, 168, 169, 173, 176. 
 
 2 Cf. Philebus, 254. 255. "5o^a, do^a^ov, do^a^ofxevov.''' 
 
 3 "Probabilis visio et quae non impediatur."— Lucullus, 11. "Probabile 
 neque uUa re impeditum."— ?. I. 31. 
 
102 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 one necessarily perceives those things which belong to a man, 
 as complexion, height, figure, &c.^ and those which environ 
 him, as the air, sky, earth, &c. Whenever then none of these 
 accessories induce us to doubt, but all are equally credible, 
 we are naturally inclined to believe the evidence of our 
 senses. Again, still more worthy of credit and probable in 
 a higher degree is that complex perception, which, besides 
 having all its parts consistent with each other, has each of 
 those parts probable and trustworthy in itself. Such a per- 
 ception we shall next describe. For a second degree of 
 probability we only require that each element of a complex 
 conception shall be consistent with the whole, and that they 
 all should appear true and not improbable. But' in a pro- 
 bable conception of the third degree we examine each part 
 separately somehow, as is done in the election of public 
 functionaries, when the claims of each candidate are examin- 
 ed for the purpose of determining who is worthy to be a 
 magistrate or ruler." These three degrees of probability are 
 elsewhere illustrated by Sextus Empiricus thus^ They, the 
 New Academicians, say that some perceptions are barely 
 probable {in6ava<^), that others are probable, and after consi- 
 deration deserving of belief (TTi6ava<; fcal Bte^coSevfjieva^;) , and 
 that a third sort are almost convincing {in6ava<i koI irepiW" 
 S6VfjL€va<; Kol airepLa-Traarov^). As for example, to one sud- 
 denly entering a darkened chamber the appearance of a rope 
 lying on the floor would suggest the idea of a snake^; this 
 would be a prohable perception. Secondly^ after a considera- 
 tion of the circumstances attending the phenomenon, such as 
 this thing does not move, is of such a colour, &c., the rope 
 stands revealed as far as a probable and plausible impression 
 
 ^ Lecture iv. page 73, note 1. 
 
 a Hyp. I. 33. 227. 
 
 ^ Kal 6rav toIvvv T<p [xkv irapfi aiaOrjaii tQv arjixdojv, ro) 5^ /x^, to Sh r^s 
 awovarjs aladrjaeus rfj Trapovay TrpoaapfMoarj, irdyTrj ravrrj rJ/evdeTUi i] StaVota." — 
 Thecetetus, 194, a. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY. 103 
 
 goes {<f)alveTai, (T')(pivlov Kara ttjv <^avTaaiav Ttjv TrcOavrjv koX 
 7r€pt(oBevfji6U7]v). As an instance of the third degree of pro- 
 bability, Hercules, it is said, brought back from Hades the 
 dead Alcestis, and showed her to Admetus, and he recognised 
 the image of Alcestis after accurate consideration, although, 
 since he knew that she had died, his mind was not disposed 
 to consent, but more inclined to be incredulous. This notion 
 oi probabilities was really an attempt on the part of Carneades ^ 
 to compromise between the absolute scepticism of the Pyr- 
 rhonists, and the stolid dogmatism of the Stoics. Where 
 there is no criterion or canon of truth, said the former y all 
 our perceptions being only appearances and not facts are 
 equally true or equally false. Our perceptions, the latter 
 maintained, being cognitions of facts immediate and direct, 
 carry with them their own evidence, and require no other 
 criterion. Our perceptions, said Carneades, are appearances, 
 not facts, but the evidence of facts ; and there is a faculty in 
 the mind by which we are enabled to estimate the force of 
 this evidence, and to yield to conviction when reason has 
 been satisfied with the proofs. But, replies the Stoic, if you 
 deny me the power of detecting the true from the false in my 
 judgment of facts, by what standard or criterion can you 
 pronounce that sufficient evidence has been obtained to make 
 a perception probable or improbable? For why admit the 
 ability of estimating the probable when you deny that of 
 judging of the truth? "Quamobrem, sive tu probabilem 
 visionem, sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carnea- 
 des volebat, sive aliud quid proferes, quod sequare: ad visum 
 illud, de quo agimus, tibi erit revertendum (scilicet Kara- 
 XrjTTTCKrj (pavraala'^).'' The question was really limited to 
 that second solution in the Thesetetus, that time-honoured 
 enquiry, What is knowledge? Knowledge is right judgment 
 {6p66<; X670?), and so the dilemma which this question was 
 
 1 LucTillus, 11, 
 
104 THE NEW ACADEMY, [Lect. 
 
 propounded to intensify, was not evaded by the probabilities 
 of Carneades. To weigh evidence is the function of reason, 
 but according to what idea shall that evidence be declared to 
 be sufficient or insufficient, conclusive or inconclusive ? Hence 
 it has been maintained by some writers that Carneades 
 taught esoterically the Platonic doctrines \ We should think, 
 however, that it was not so much the Platonic idea that was 
 preserved by Carneades, but merely that belief in, or reliance 
 on, those original instincts of the intellect which constitutes 
 the foundation of all reasoning. It seems indeed to require 
 no d, priori idea to enable the mind to determine that the 
 corroborating evidence of a dozen independent witnesses 
 approaches nearer to demonstration than the unsupported 
 testimony of one. And that, although the veracity of each 
 taken singly might be doubted, the chance that they would 
 all unite in a falsehood would be less than the probability 
 that they were reporting a truth. Our cognition of an ex- 
 ternal object is really the complex idea of it, of which each 
 of its qualities, attributes, or accidents, is a component, and 
 each is an independent witness, by which we may identify 
 the object ''. Nature has provided us with such testimony by 
 allowing us to discern a separate quality in everything 
 through each sense, making as it were a sort of natural and 
 voluntary analysis of things. But, says the Sceptic, senses 
 deceive ; they do not tell you of anything in the object — you 
 only perceive changes in your own consciousness — perhaps so 
 — but at least these changes must have an external cause. 
 When, then, many sensations are united in one object, their 
 presence is cumulative evidence of the presence of the object 
 which is their cause, and the greater the number of witnesses, 
 the more convincing will be their corroborating testimony. 
 Hence we can see the utility of increasing the number of the 
 
 1 Eusebiiis Frcep. Ev. xiv. 38. 
 ^ Aristotle, de Aniina, lib. in. 1. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY, 105 
 
 componeDts of our complex perception of an object, by adding, 
 to the natural analysis of the senses, the artificial analysis of 
 experiment, by which we interrogate nature, and by the 
 process of induction arrive at least, if not at a knowledge of 
 the secrets of her combinations, at a high degree 0^ probability* 
 The reader will find the subject of probabilities treated from 
 the common sense point of view, as the only possible, and at 
 the same time perfectly adequate rule of action, by Cicero in 
 Lucullus. "Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis sapiens inducitur, 
 multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta, 
 neque assensa, sed similia veri, quae nisi probet, omnis vita 
 tollatur. Quid enim ? conscendens navem sapiens num com- 
 prehensum animo habet atque perceptum, se ex sententia 
 navigaturum, &c.^" 
 
 § 77. We have, we trust, indicated with sufficient detail 
 the opinions of Carneades on those four points with re- 
 spect to which the views of the New Academy seem most 
 decidedly hostile to those of the Stoics. We have not indeed 
 alluded to their views on the subject of morality, princi- 
 pally because it would be difficult to pronounce on this 
 topic, which of the later Academicians we ought to con- 
 sider as representing the sentiments of this school. Cicero, 
 who on every point of speculative philosophy seems to 
 have adhered to the method, and approved perhaps of 
 the teachings of Carneades, on questions of morality was 
 diametrically opposed to the apparent views of Carneades 
 and his followers : " Perturbatricem autem harum omnium 
 rerum Academiam, banc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem, 
 exoremus, ut sileat. Nam si invaserit in hsec, quae satis scite 
 nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas. 
 Quam quideni ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo^" 
 It seems, however, most probable that the opinions expressed 
 
 1 Lucullus, 31. 2 Cicero, dc Legibus, i. 13. 
 
I06 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. 
 
 by Caraeades on the instability of moral distinctions, in 
 direct opposition to the absolute nature of the obligations 
 of virtue maintained by the more positive schools of phi- 
 losophy, were only a manifestation of that general hostility 
 which he constantly exhibited towards the Stoics. And 
 there is no reason to suppose, that while attacking the 
 immutability of the fundamental principles of morality 
 putatively fixed by the order of nature, he did not secretly 
 adhere to the traditions of the Older Academy, wherein 
 Plato had propounded the existence of a good beyond and 
 above nature, the manifestation of eternal laws and causes ^ 
 It would indeed have been utterly at variance with the 
 spirit of the rest of his teaching for Carneades to have 
 admitted the possibility of generalising certain and ulti- 
 mate principles of good and evil, from observations of the 
 conformity or nonconformity of actions to the intentions of 
 nature. Therefore, for those who would allow none but 
 empirical sources of knowledge, he consistently maintained 
 the subjective character of all human conceptions of right 
 
 1 " Trutli in the power, or faculty, is nothing else hut a conformity of its 
 conceptions or Ideas unto the natures and relations of things, which in God 
 we may call an actual, steady, immoveahle, eternal Omniformity, as Plotinus 
 calls the Divine Intellect, iv irdpTa, which you have largely described by him. 
 And this the Platonists truly call the Intellectual World, for here are the 
 natures of all things pure and unmixed, purged from all those dregs, refined 
 from all that dross and alloy which cleave unto them in their particular in- 
 stances. All inferior and sublunary things, not excluding Man himself, have 
 their excrescences, and defects. Exorbitances or privations are moulded up 
 in their very frames and constitutions. There is somewhat extraneous, hete- 
 rogeneous, and preternatural in all things here below, as they exist among 
 us; but in that other world like the most purely fined gold, they shine in 
 their native and proper glory. Here is the first goodness, the benign Parent 
 of the whole Creation, with his numerous offspring, the infinite throng of 
 Created Beings. Here is the fountain of Eternal Law, with all its streams 
 and rivulets. Here is the Sun of uncreated glory surrounded with all his 
 rays and beams. Here are the eternal indispensable Laws of Eight and 
 Justice, the immediate and indemonstrable principles of truth and goodness." 
 • — Dr Kust, A Discourse on Truth, Sect, xviii. 
 
v.] THE NEW ACADEMY, 107 
 
 and wrong, and decided that prudence and utility were the 
 only criteria of good and evil. With regard to the suc- 
 cessors of Carneades, Philo seems to have denied the 
 validity of the cataleptic phantasm as a criterion of truth, 
 but yet to have asserted that knowledge could attain to 
 the nature of things : " 01 he irepl ^iXcovd (paatv, oaov 
 IJblv eirl Tft) Xtcolkq) KpLTrjpio), rovrecTTi, ry KaraXTjirrcKf} 
 (pavraaia, aKaTdXTjirra etvai ra Trpdyfiara, oaov Be iirl rfj 
 (jyvaec toov irpaj/jLarcov avTwv KaraXTjirra^" This statement 
 favours the impression that Philo more emphatically sup- 
 ported the traditions of the Old Academy. We can only 
 have cognition of things |;er se either by means of the 
 cataleptic phantasm or through d priori ideas. The former 
 source was explicitly rejected by Philo, he therefore must 
 have reserved the latter. Antiochus, after having been a 
 stanch upholder of the Academic method, seems to have 
 finally compromised with the Stoics, and thus brought the 
 long polemic between them and the Academy to a close : 
 "6 'Ai^r/o^o? ryu Xrodv fjLeTrjyayev et? ttjv ^AKaBrj/jiiav, w? 
 Kol elprjadat eir avr^ on iv ^AKaSTj/jbla <^L\o(TO(f)ei rd 
 Xrco'iKd' eTreSeUvve yap ore irapd TiXdTcovi Kelrau rd toov 
 Xtcolkoov hofyfjuara^r The victory then would appear to 
 have ultimately rested with the dogmatists. The judimim 
 incogniti et cogniti — the point about which the whole con- 
 troversy had eddied — seems at last to have confounded 
 and interchanged with the Platonic idea, and thus a 
 ground of certainty was admitted as a principle of human 
 knowledge. 
 
 Still from the writings of Cicero we might infer that 
 this positivism did not extend beyond the region of ethical 
 
 1 HTjp. I. 235, chap. 33. 
 
 2 Hyp. I. 33. 235. " Licetne per ipsum Antiocliuni? Qui appellabatiir 
 Academicus: erat quidem, si perpaiica mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus." 
 — Lucullus, 43. 
 

 I08 THE NEW ACADEMY. [Lect. V. 
 
 enquiries ; and in physical and metaphysical speculations 
 a tendency to eclecticism is apparent, which is generally 
 significant of a relapse into utter scepticism : " Horum 
 aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur : nostro, ne quid 
 maxime quid em probabile sit, occurrit. Ita sunt in pie- 
 risque contrariarum rationum paria momenta \" 
 
 1 Lucullus, 40. 
 
LECTURE VI. 
 
 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— ANCIENT AND 
 RECENT. 
 
 •'Die menschliche Vernunft ist so baulustig, dass sie mehrmalen schon 
 den Thurm aufgefiihrt, hernach aber wieder abgetragen hat, um zu sehen, 
 wie das Fundament desselben wohl beschaffen seyn mochte." 
 
 § a. We have now, we trust, dwelt sufficiently long on 
 the details of our subject to enable you to form some notion 
 of the spirit and method of ancient Scepticism, both as ex- 
 hibited in its extreme form by Pyrrho and his followers, as 
 well as in its partial manifestation under the representatives 
 of the New Academy. We shall proceed to take a general 
 view of the doctrines of these two schools, for the purpose of 
 comparing their opinions and influence, in conformity with 
 the object of our lectures.. The positions of Scepticism were 
 reduced to five, by Agrippa, a later representative of Pyrrho- 
 nism, which have been preserved to us by Sextus Empiricus, 
 as the irevre rpoiroL^. In these are comprised all the argu- 
 ments the most advanced Sceptics have urged against the 
 probative force of all evidence, hence, against the possibility 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 15. 164. 
 
no IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 of man's attaining by mediate or indirect means any certain 
 knowledge whatever. The first argument is derived from the 
 discrepancy of opinion (o anro rrj^ hLa<f>wvLa<;) observable both 
 amongst philosophers and the vulgar, in consequence of which 
 inconsistency the Sceptic has no alternative but to suspend 
 his judgment on all points. Secondly, every process of demon- 
 stration must be continued to infinity (6 airo rr]^ ek aireipov 
 eKiTTwaeo)';), for all evidence requires other evidence to attest 
 its validity ; therefore proof would demand proof without end. 
 The third is founded on the relativity of all our knowledge 
 (o d-n-o Tov 7rp69 rt). For we can only affirm that anything 
 is such as it appears, either to ourselves or with respect to 
 surrounding objects, but of its absolute and independent 
 nature we can assert nothing. The fourth position is directed 
 against the assumption of general indemonstrable principles 
 (o ef vTTodeaecD^), from which all reasoning must commence, or 
 be reduced to an infinite regression. Fifth is the diallel (6 
 BLoXXrjXo^ Tpoiro^) — petitio principii — the fallacy of circle \ or 
 the method of showing that a proof which is employed to 
 establish the truth of a proposition, can itself only be proved 
 by the proposition in question: as for example, "if anyone 
 should infer the authenticity of a certain historj^, from its 
 recording such and such facts, the reality of which rests on 
 the evidence of that history." The Sceptics had not much 
 difficulty in proving that every imaginable case not an object 
 of immediate cognition could be brought under one or other 
 of these objections, therefore all demonstration was fallacious, 
 all truth impossible of attainment; not because anything 
 could be demonstrated to be false, but because there was no 
 faculty in the human intellect w^hich could decide on the 
 validity of its own ojDerations. Such was the length and 
 breadth of absolute scepticism, as propounded by the Pyrrho- 
 
 ^ Whately's Logic. Of Fallacies, Book in. 13. 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. Ill 
 
 nists. Let us now offer a few remarks on their doctrines 
 separately, before viewing them in connection with those of 
 the other school of thinkers which stands at the head of our 
 subject. 
 
 § p. First, we will examine some erroneous opinions 
 prevalent even among the more enlightened respecting the 
 real nature and tendency of Ancient Scepticism. It is n6t 
 uncommon to hear urged as a triumphant refutation of Pyr- 
 rhonism, that, as a system of thought, it is self-annihilating 
 and logically impossible \ Yet that this is not so, will we 
 think be obvious, directly we understand the limits which the 
 most absolute Sceptics have never transcended. The line 
 indeed at which all scepticism, ancient or modern, must cease, 
 is exactly that at which every school of later psychological 
 and metaphysical speculatists have commenced. " Descartes 
 recherche quel est le point de depart fixe et certain sur lequel 
 peut s'appuyer la philosophie. II se trouve que la pensee 
 pent tout mettre en question, tout, excepte elle-meme. En 
 effet, quand on douterait de toutes choses, on pourrait au 
 moins douter qu'on doute — or, douter c'est penser: d'oii il 
 suit qu'on ne peut douter qu'on pense, et que la pensee ne 
 peut se renier elle-m^me, car elle ne le ferait qu'avec elle. 
 La est un cercle dont il est impossible a tout scepticisme de 
 sortir; la est done le point de depart ferme et certain 
 cherch^ par Descartes; et comme la pensee nous est donnde 
 dans la conscience, voila la conscience prise comme le point 
 de depart et le theatre de toute recherche philosophique^" 
 " The facts of consciousness as mere phenomena, facts of which 
 we have immediate and direct cognition, and to admit which 
 
 1 "No conclusion can be drawn from it, viz., the inconceivability of the 
 absolute, in favour of universal scepticism ; first, because universal scepti- 
 cism equally destroys itself, &c." — Hansel's Bam;pton Lectures, Lecture ii. 
 p. 59. 
 
 ^ Cousin, (Euvres, Vol. i. Cours de Vhistoire de la philosophie. Onzieme 
 Le^on. 
 
112 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM--^ [Lect. 
 
 is merely to affirm the existence of consciousness itself, have 
 never, and could never have been doubted, for doubt is itself 
 a manifestation of consciousness \" To doubt whether we 
 doubt, would be as contradictory as to be conscious of being 
 unconscious. Scepticism therefore has always allowed the 
 subjective reality of our mental presentations, and so far does 
 not differ from the more positive schools of metaphysicians. 
 To attempt then to force the Pyrrhonist to self-destruction 
 in maintaining his own method is not feasible, since the hasis 
 of his system is, precisely that consciousness on the evidence 
 of which all truth must rest. If Scepticism is suicidal, every 
 other system is likewise. Similarly, we find in Eusebius an 
 attempted answer to scepticism quoted from a work of Aris- 
 tocles founded upon the supposed inconsistency of the Pyrrho- 
 nian method : " *E7rei rolvvv (sc. ol aKeiTTLKoC) iiricrTjf; dBcacjiopa 
 nravra (paalv elvai, Kal Blcl tovto Kekevovai /nrjSevl TrpoarlOea- 
 6ac, fjLTjBe Bo^a^ecv, etVoro)? av, oT/jLai, ttvOolto rt? avTcoV ^Apd 
 76 Bia/jLapTdvovo-cv ol Bia(j)€p€iv avrd vofiL^ovT€<;, rj ov; IldvTCO<; 
 ydpy el fiev dfiapTavovaLv, ovk 6pdw<i viro\ap.p6voL€v av. 
 ' flcrre dvajKr] Xiyeiv avrol^ elval TLva<; tov<; rd yjrevBrj irepl twv 
 6pt(ov Bo^d^ovTa^;' avrol rolvvv elev dv ol rdXTjOTj Xeyovre'i' 
 ovT(o Be etT] dv dXrjOe^; n koI '\jrevBo<i. Et 8' ov^ d/iapTdvo/jLep 
 ol TToWol, rd ovra Biai^epeuv olo/xevot, rl iradovre'i eTrnfKijTTov- 
 GLv r]iMv\ avTol yap dfiapTclvocev dv, d^LovvT€<; firj Bcacfyipeiv 
 avrd^" But this manner of confuting the followers of Pyrrho 
 seems as little to meet the real point at issue as that of the 
 Cynic philosopher', who, when he heard the possibility of 
 motion denied, got up and walked as a proof of its reality; 
 whereas the apparent or phenomenal existence of motion had 
 never been called in question. So when the Pyrrhonist 
 maintained the indistinguishability {dBid<j>opa) of all things, 
 
 1 Hamilton's Reid, Note A. § 1. p. 744. 
 
 2 Eusebius, Prcep. Ev. xiv. 18. b. 
 
 3 Hyp. III. 8. 66. 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 113 
 
 it was only by the contradiction of appearances that his as- 
 sertion was corroborated. It was not then the existence of 
 distinctions in appearances that the Sceptic denied, on the 
 contrary, it was these distinctions which, although antitheti- 
 cal, w^ere equipollent, and therefore prevented him from 
 arriving at a decision. The words, to, 'sfrevBrj irepi twv ovtwv, 
 seem to obscure the real question ; followed as they are by 
 So^d^ovra^i, they imply a contradiction. There can be no 
 opinion about realities, for realities are objects of knowledge, 
 not of opinion. Opinion implies subjectivity, and by an 
 ultimate law of consciousness contradiction in appearance 
 forces upon us the conviction of our ignorance of the fact. 
 But the avowed impossibility of comprehending the objective 
 fact, imports no inability to distinguish appearances as mere 
 phenomena of consciousness. So with the subsequent reason- 
 ing of Aristocles, it is assumed, that the assertion of every- 
 thing being unknown involves the notion of the existence of 
 a faculty by which the known and the unknown can be 
 distinguished, viz. the judicium incogniti et cogniti, or intel- 
 lectual conscience. Now it is precisely through the absence 
 of such a faculty that scepticism justifies itself; and to say 
 that nothing certain is Tcnown, simply means that there is no 
 criterion by which we can judge, when we think we know, 
 whether we know or not. 
 
 This is the very essence of scepticism, when it insists upon 
 our inability to attain certain knowledge of anything. Such 
 ignorance does not refer to the object of knowledge, but to 
 the subject knowing. In the same sense Professor Mansel 
 says: ''Contradiction, whatever may be its ultimate import, 
 is in itself not a quality of things, but a mode in which they 
 are viewed by the mind." So scepticism does not touch the 
 incognitum et cognitum, but the judicium incogniti et cogniti. 
 There is no assumption of knowledge in its absolute denial, 
 because knowledge refers to its object or material; the denial 
 L. L. 8 
 
TI4 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 ' to the knowledge itself, or the faculty of knowing. The em- 
 ployment of sceptical weapons, then, is not logically impossible; 
 but can they be employed against all the operations of reason, 
 with equal chance of success? Now, according to the admis- 
 sions of the Sceptics themselves, our ideas, as mere modes of 
 consciousness, are intuitive facts; so must therefore be the 
 conclusions which may be deduced from the comparison and 
 judgment of those facts. Those ideas Locke calls the ideas 
 of reflection, the archetypes of which are in the mind itself. 
 Hence mathematical truths were not attacked by the Pyr- 
 rhonists, except in so far as any reasoning on the reality of 
 things was attempted to be deduced from them. All abstrac- 
 tions indeed, inasmuch as they are abstractions, are neces- 
 sarily phenomenal, subjective, and apparent. If then these 
 form the only materials of our knowledge according to the 
 idealist theory. Scepticism, after all, does but narrow the field 
 of certain knowledge within the limits assigned to it by a 
 large portion of modern thinkers. " Knowledge (says Locke) 
 then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the 
 connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, 
 of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this 
 perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, 
 though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come 
 short of knowledge V 
 
 The position of Scepticism is also often represented as 
 untenable because it is supposed to invalidate the illative 
 processes of the understanding, and therefore destroy itself, or 
 render the attempt nugatory, because, to disprove anything, 
 we must make use of proofs and inferences. Thus Sextus 
 Empiricus reports the arguments of the Dogmatists on this 
 point: — "ot he ^oyfjuarcKol rovvavriov KaTao-Kevd^ovri^ (paaLv, 
 OTi rjTOL diroheiKTLKoi elcriv ol Kara Trj<; aTToSe/few? rjpwTrjfjbevot 
 \6yoc rj ovK diroheiKTiKoL Koi el fjuev ovk aTToBeiKTiKol, ov Bvvav- 
 ^ Locke, Human Understanding, Book iv. cliap. i. 1. 
 
VL] ANCIENT AND RECENT. II5 
 
 rat hevKvvvai on ovk earcv rj aiTGhei^h^; • el Se airoheiKTLKoi elatp^ 
 avTol ovTot Ti)v vTToaTaatv T/y9 dirohei^eonf; ix irepLTpoirrj^ 
 ela-cuyovG-Lv^r 
 
 But it must be remarked that the real inferential force of 
 an argument was strangely overlooked by the Stoical logi- 
 cians, and therefore by the Sceptics, who invariably sought 
 their opponents on their own ground. The truth of the hy- 
 pothetical proposition, w^hich was the organ of demonstration 
 among the logicians of that time, was considered to be de- 
 pendent on the truth or falsity of the propositions which 
 formed the separate members, whereas, of course, the real 
 probative power lies in the consequence ^ This question, 
 then, was obscured and confused by the antagonistic opinions 
 of the Megaric and Stoical philosophers to such a degree, 
 that the Sceptics had only too much occasion to throw doubt 
 upon the whole process of demonstration. But it must be 
 understood that it was only the artificial formulae, and not 
 the natural operations of the ratiocinative faculty, which they 
 seemed to impugn. Perception of the agreement or disagree- 
 ment of our ideas by the intervention of other ideas or 
 media, being demonstrative ^ was not and could not be de- 
 nied by the most extreme Sceptics; and when they oppose 
 the conclusions of reason, as forming a sufficient ground for 
 the rejection of both or the suspension of judgment, they do 
 but obey thdii first principle of the reason by which we can- 
 not conceive it possible for the same thing to he and not to he. 
 
 In the example Sextus Empiricus gives'* of the apparent 
 conflict of inferences, when to the conclusion— that there must 
 be a Providence from the order observable in nature — it is op- 
 posed that the wicked are often prosperous, and the virtuous 
 
 1 Hyp. II. 13. 185. 
 
 2 Elements of Logic, Whately, Book 11. chap. iv. § 3. 
 
 '^ Cf. Locke, Huvian Understanding, Book iv. chap. iv. 7. 
 * Hyp. I. 13. 32. 
 
 8—2 
 
Il6 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 in adversity, hence that an inference might be drawn the ex- 
 act opposite to the preceding, the real opposition is in the 
 facts or premisses upon which the argument is based. It is 
 therefore the inductive, and not the deductive process, which 
 is here made a ground of doubt. And since induction, in as 
 far as it means the observation and comparison of particulars 
 without reference to the resulting generalization, is merely 
 an operation of the judgment, scepticism cannot be said to 
 attempt to subvert our belief in logical consequences. The 
 judicium incogniti et cogniti in this case would be allowed 
 as a subjective fact, proclaiming the inherent connexion of a 
 conclusion with the premiss, in which the conclusion itself 
 was originally involved. But how to establish the premiss, 
 in the first place, is the problem to which all synthetical 
 reasoning is ultimately reduced; and it is at this point that 
 the five dilemmas of Agrippa, which constitute the principal 
 momenta of scepticism, challenge the upholders of the ability 
 of the human mind to comprehend and grasp the truth and 
 reality of objective existence. 
 
 § 7. "Aristotle (says Professor Maurice) to a great ex- 
 tent proclaimed the search for wisdom to be at an end. 
 He left the impression on the minds of his disciples, that the 
 whole scheme of the universe could be brought under the 
 forms of the human understanding." Could any conclusion 
 be more fatal than this to the cause of the advancement of 
 human knowledge? Could any announcement be more pro- 
 vocative of the latent scepticism to which the Greek mind 
 had always, by its peculiar constitution, been rendered more 
 or less prone? It needed no special enquiry, either into the 
 possible objects of knowledge, or the capabilities of the hu- 
 man instruments of cognition, at once to perceive that, if 
 knowledge imported the apprehension of whatever was stable, 
 real, essential, and causative, the Dogmatist had not even 
 yet attained the first condition of all science, viz. a con- 
 
VJ.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. II7 
 
 sciousness of its own nescience. For how, urged the Sceptic, 
 can he who imagines that his task is completed before it is 
 even begun, expect to prosecute it with much advantage? 
 If the province of the philosopher is but to verify a precon- 
 ception, where is there any field for discovery? "opa he firj koI 
 vvv OL AoyfiaTLKol ^TjT^area)^ airelpyovraL' ov yap Tot9 ayvouv 
 ra TTpayfxara co? e^et tt/oo? Tr]v <f>v(Tiv o[id\oyov<n to ^tfrecv eri 
 TTcpl avToov dvaKoXovdov, rot? S' eir aKpi^e^ olofiivoi^ ravra 
 yiyva>aK€CP, oh f^ev yap iirl Trepan 7)81] irdpeariv rj ^r^Tr}cn^ (w? 
 V7r6iXr)(l>a<riv, oU Be to 81 o irda-a <Tvvi(rTaTai ^rJT7f(Ti<; oKfirfv 
 virap-^ei, to vo/jLi^etv co? oy;^ evpijfcacnv^.'* It would seem, 
 therefore, that the systematization and articulate enunciation 
 of the principles of Scepticism synchronised mith, if they did 
 not result from, the introduction of a scientific method into 
 the processes of investigation. Thus, those who believed in, 
 and those who discredited the ability of the intellect to pe- 
 netrate the arcana of nature, were revealed to each other, 
 and compelled to push their respective doctrines to lengths 
 which equally menaced the existence of all philosophy. On 
 the one hand the Stoics, the most dogmatic of the dogma- 
 tical schools after the age of Aristotle, pretended that, so far 
 from admitting the incompetency of human reason to attain 
 certainty of knowledge, all belief, or degree of assurance 
 short of certitude, was unworthy of a wise man. On the 
 other hand, the Pyrrhonist equally discarded belief, not as a 
 degree of knowledge unworthy of a philosopher, but as un- 
 attainable by any one who could appreciate the force of evi- 
 dence. So the characteristic distinction of Pyrrhonism or 
 Scepticism was, the declaration of the inability of man to 
 attain that assurance of anything which is entitled belief 
 owing to the conflict of evidence or testimony on which belief 
 could alone he grounded. As a consequence of the opposition, 
 and equal cogency of the reasons urged in support of and 
 
 1 Hyp. II. 1. 11. 
 
Il8 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 against any proposition, the mind, they said, not feeling itself 
 determined in one direction more than in a,nother, rested in a 
 sort of equipoise or equilibrium, well known as the cttoxV) or 
 suspension of judgment. This eVo^?) is so identified with, 
 and so essentially the differential characteristic of ancient 
 scepticism, that it may be interesting to consider under what 
 conditions, either with reference to the object of knowledge, 
 or the subject knowing, such a mode of consciousness is pos- 
 sible. The term eVe^o) is thus explicated by Sextus Empi- 
 ricus\ "The word eVe'^^o) is employed by us (viz. the Pyr- 
 rhonians) in the following signification: I am unable to de- 
 clare what one should believe or not believe with respect to 
 the objects of cognition (roov nrpoKeifjievwv), meaning that 
 things appear equal as to their credibility or incredibility. 
 That they are equal we do not assert, only that they appear 
 so subjectively and phenomenally when presented to us. 
 The word eiroxn imports retention or negation of judgment, 
 elpr)Tai otto tou eirex'^aOai rrjv hiavouav, because we abstain 
 from affirming or denying anything, on account of the equi- 
 pollence {la-oadevLo) of evidence on which the proposition de- 
 pends'^." Thus the iiro^n is a purely negative state of mind, 
 equally removed from the attitude of belief or disbelief, yet 
 somehow intermediate between the two. The avowed object 
 of its adoption, as we have already seen, was to absent, as far 
 as possible, all motive to action ; but the Sceptics continually 
 asserted that this state of suspension was not by any means 
 voluntary, but was forced upon them by the consideration of 
 the relations in which man stood to the materials of his con- 
 sciousness. Thus the hroxi appears as the centre of the 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 22. 196. 
 
 2 " A proposition, as we have said before, is a portion of discourse in 
 which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject." — Mill's Logic, Book i. 
 chap. IV. 1. "We say of a fact or statement, that it is proved, when we believe 
 its truth by reason of some other fact or statement from which it is said 
 io follow.'''' — Mill's Logic, Book ii, cliap. i, 1. 
 
VL] ANCIENT AND REGENT. I [9 
 
 Sceptical philosophy, as determining its special peculiarities 
 both with respect to speculative and practical science. For, 
 on the one hand, it marked the speculative negativism of 
 philosophical despair, and, on the other, it purported to be 
 the instrument for the attainment of that apathy which must 
 result from the removal of all motivity. The Sceptics them- 
 selves generally asserted that, in suspending their judgment 
 on matters of doubtful evidence, they only followed the 
 example of Socrates, whose maieutic method of discussion 
 seemed to encourage the notion that he considered it the 
 part of a philosopher to collect the opinions of others without 
 forming any of his own\ The retentiveness of Socrates, 
 however, could only have extended to the enunciation of 
 decided views; as far as the mental act or judgment went, 
 it seems more probable that his method was the effect of 
 clearly-defined sentiments, which he thought could be more 
 effectually inculcated by this indirect manner of teaching. 
 " II n'est pas croyable que Socrate ait v^cu sans venir a bout 
 de se persuader aucune verity car il a mieux aim^ mourir 
 que se resoudre a conserver sa vie par des voyes qui ne lui 
 paroissoient point dans I'ordre. Peut-on reconnoitre dans cette 
 conduite le moindre caractere d'un esprit fldttant, et qui fait 
 profession de ne pouvoir jamais distinguer surement le Vrai 
 d'avec le Faux, et le Juste d'avec Vlnjuste^V The voluntari- 
 ness or involuntariness of the state of mind which the eTro^^ 
 indicated would really depend upon whether the arguments 
 reviewed in support of any proposition were adscititious or 
 adventitious; and it is more consistent with that general pas- 
 sivity characteristic of Pyrrhonism that reasons, the equal co- 
 gency of which induced the liro'xrj, were not sought after, but 
 were forced on the attention of the post-Aristotelian Sceptics. 
 The entire work of Sextus Empiricus is an evidence of this. 
 
 ^ M. Crousaz, Examen du Pyrrhonisme, Sect. 11. vi. p. 17. 
 2 /. l. p. 18. 
 
I20 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 The array of opposing dogmas exhibited in his treatise, com- 
 prising as it does every shade of philosophical or unphiloso- 
 phical opinion, conjecture or belief, leaves lis little room to 
 wonder how those, who were at once learned and unprejudiced, 
 found it impossible to feel assurance on any subject whatever. 
 In truth, the Sceptic did not make the objections, but the 
 objections made the Sceptic. M. Crousaz complains of the 
 Sceptics, that their constant aim and object is to stifle every 
 question with a mass of conflicting testimonies. But in 
 reality the quibbles and sophistical shuffles, with which the 
 work of Sextus Empiricus abounds, are arguments drawn 
 from the opposing systems then prevalent, which cannot be 
 laid to the account of the Pyrrhonists, inasmuch as they only 
 availed themselves of materials found ready to their hands. 
 Thus it was that the first trope of Agrippa could be appHed 
 in every branch of philosophical enquiry. Perhaps then the 
 eTToxn was the inevitable result of the dawn of science, when 
 the shadows of poetical theogonies, supernatural agencies, 
 and traditional superstitions, were beginning to disperse, but 
 still obscured the paths to knowledge. 
 
 § B. There is no doubt that the iwoxVySiS a psychological 
 phenomenon, was a result of the constitutional peculiarities 
 of individuals, as well as of the circumstances of the age. To 
 rest with the mind undetermined would argue either great 
 indecision of character, or a restless hypercritical spirit, but 
 certainly could not accompany a narrow or superficial under- 
 standing. The man who sees one idea to the exclusion of 
 every other, or who reflects little, could not become a victim 
 of the sceptical malady. It was quite natural then that the 
 leaders of Pyrrhonism should have been men of great culture, 
 and acute intellect; but for this very reason scepticism in its 
 extreme form could never have been seriously niaintained 
 for any length of time. Accordingly we find it first tempered 
 by Arccsilas, who maintained tlic ejwch only in mattci-s of 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 121 
 
 speculative science; and subsequently more substantially 
 modified by Carneades, and the later Academicians, by whom 
 the indifference-point of scepticism yvSiS past, in three marked 
 particulars. These constitute the basis of the distinction 
 between the ultra-scepticism of the older Pyrrhonists and the 
 more qualified form in which it was retained by the New 
 Academy. The epocha then may be considered in some 
 respects as the line of demarcation between Pyrrho and 
 Carneades ; and where the infraction of its reticence occurred 
 the latter seems to have been considered by Sextus Empiri- 
 cus to differ from the former. We have the main points of 
 this distinction thus summed up in the Hypotyposes^. "The 
 New Academicians differ from the Sceptics. 1. Inasmuch 
 as they say all things are incomprehensible, for in this very 
 affirmation, irdvTa elvat aKaToXTjirra, they assert something 
 positively, whereas the Pyrrhonist does not despair of being 
 able eventually perhaps to arrive at certainty, and the com- 
 prehension of things. 2. They differ from us more emphati- 
 cally in their judgment concerning the good and the evil. 
 For the Academicians pronounce things to be good or evil, 
 not in the same sense as we do, but with the conviction it is 
 more probable they are one rather than the other; whereas 
 in our assertions about the good and the evil, we have no 
 such conviction, but merely speak doubtfully, being forced to 
 decide provisionally by the exigencies of life : — " rjfjucov d<ya66v 
 Ti rj KUKov elvai XeyovTcov ovSev jxerd tov Tndavov elvac 
 vo/uLL^ecv o (pa/xev, dX)C dBo^daTco^ erro/jLevfov Ta> /5/ft), Lia fir) 
 dvevipyrjTOL wjjuevJ' 3. We say that all our mental represen- 
 tations are equally trustworthy or untrustworthy, as materials 
 for judgment. But they say some are probable, others impro- 
 bable, and that there are degrees of probability. " to? re (fyav- 
 Tacria<; y/xel^ fxev taa^ Xeyofiev elvat Kara iriaTiv i) dincnrLav, 
 oaov iirl rm Xoyw, eKetvoi Be ra? /mev nnOavds elvac <^aai, rus 
 1 Ihjp. 1. 33. 226. 
 
 "TX B R A fT^ 
 
 OF THE 
 
122 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Leot. 
 
 8t' airidavov^, koX toov iriOavcou Be Xiyovcrc BLa(f)opd<i" This 
 comparison, together with the exposition of the Academic 
 doctrines to be found in the concluding chapters of LucuUus, 
 enable us to estimate the essential distinction between the 
 Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism. The groundwork of 
 this distinction, which was evidently detected by Sextus Em- 
 piricus himself, is, undoubtedly, the decision enunciated by 
 the New Academicians concerning the relations of knowledge 
 and objective reality. The fundamental problem of philoso- 
 phy, viz. to distinguish the thing from the appearance, the 
 noumenon from \h.Q phenomenon, the (fyaiveaOai ov from the 
 (j>alveadaL e 1 1/ at, was abandoned as insoluble by the Acade- 
 micians — for that is what we are to understand from the 
 expression iravra elvai aKaTaXrjTrTa — and in declaring the 
 insolubility of this metaphysical problem, they separated 
 themselves from the Pyrrhonists, in infringing the epoch by 
 the decision itself, but most especially in completely altering 
 the position of man in relation to metaphysical truth. Pyrrho 
 is reported by Timon to have placed the knowledge of objec- 
 tive reality as a point of primary importance to man, Beiv tov 
 fieWoma €vBaifiovi]cr6Lv et? rpia ravra /BXeTreiv irpmrov jjuev, 
 oirola 7r6<l>vK€ tcl Trpdy/jLara^. When then the New Acade- 
 micians declared that our knowledge did not, and nevei^ could 
 extend beyond phenomena, they virtually enunciated that 
 the phenomenal apparent universe contained all that was of 
 any interest to man. This declaration is remarkable, and 
 indicates the close of an era in the history of philosophy. It 
 separates metaphysic from physic by declaring the incompre- 
 hensibility of the former — it distinguishes speculative from 
 practical knowledge, in that it resigns the hope of the former 
 for ever. Here then we have the final decision of philosophy, 
 confirming, however, only what Socrates had already an- 
 nounced, viz. that the enquiries into the ultimate causes, 
 
 ^ Pupparat. Ev. xiv. 18 (Eusebius). 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 123 
 
 essences, or substantial existence of things, were beyond the 
 grasp of human faculties. It was in the lingering adherence 
 to the old fields of enquiry that Pyrrhonism found its most 
 powerful incentive. The end pursued being unattainable, it 
 was not difficult to challenge all endeavours to reach it. The 
 Academicians not only resigned the chase, but implied that 
 the happiness of life was alone dependent upon the relative 
 and the phenomenal. It is thus that we interpret the second 
 distinction taken by Sextus Empiricus between the Pyr- 
 rhonists and Academicians, viz. the positive decisions of 
 the latter on the questions respecting the conduct of life. 
 Man lives in a world of appearances, but on the relations of 
 those appearances to himself and to each other depends 
 everything which to a heathen philosopher constitutes hap- 
 piness. Within this sphere then there is sufficient certitude 
 upon which to ground principles of action. From observa- 
 tion and experience the good and the evil, or at any rate 
 that which brought good and evil to man, could be deter- 
 mined; and it was absurd to maintain an attitude of suspense 
 where the exigencies of life called for prompt decision. 
 Hence arose that which has always been considered the dis- 
 tinguishing doctrine of the New Academy, namely — that a 
 belief founded on probable evidence was sufficient ground of 
 action for a reasonable being. This theory of probability 
 seems principally to have been intended to meet a sceptical 
 difficulty which had arisen in consequence of the confusion 
 amongst early thinkers of the notions of cognition and i^ecog- 
 nition. The gist of this objection seems to have been — how 
 can you distinguish one thing from another when you do not 
 know either of them ? It was to this quibble that the Aca- 
 demicians supplied the answer, that recognition only involved 
 a comparison of appearances, and that these appearances 
 might be taken as valid evidence in reference to each other. 
 It was, indeed, not very philosophical of the Pyrrhonians to 
 
124 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 maintain that the mind had such a faculty of weighing evi- 
 dence as to be able to detect its equivalence exactly, and yet 
 not to admit that it was sometimes inclined in one direction 
 more than another. Where there is the power of discerning 
 equipollence there must also be the ability to perceive pre- 
 ponderance. It was true that recognition did not involve 
 the assurance of that certainty which the Stoics imagined 
 they had found in the cataleptic phantasm. Man might 
 mistake Geminus, or fail to recognise Cotta; still, if the 
 number of marks by which an object could be distinguished 
 was observed with sufficient care, the degree of probability 
 there would be that our judgment was right might amount 
 to a virtual certainty. So the Academicians argued with 
 equal cogency against the Stoics, who denied that they ever 
 believed, and the Pyrrhonists, who denied that they ever could 
 believe, or rather that the inconsistent beliefs destroyed each 
 other. In opposing the special dogmas of the Stoics there is 
 no doubt that Carneades far outstepped the reticence of 
 the Pyrrhonian epoch, as in discussing the question of the 
 criterion of truth. Still, as Cicero tells us, they retained an 
 attitude of suspense in every science the premisses of which 
 were incapable, or seemed incapable, of being established on 
 any but probable evidence. As we said before, then, in mat- 
 ters of speculation the early Pyrrhonists and New Acade- 
 micians may be said to have coincided in maintaining the 
 iiroxr) ; but in the affairs of practical life the latter declared 
 a reasonable probability to be sufficient ground for action. 
 
 § €. With regard to the later development of Pyrrhon- 
 ism, commenced by ^nesidemus soon after the death of 
 Cicero, Brandis makes the following remarks*: "But in what 
 consists the essential distinction between the Pyrrhonian and 
 Academic scepticism? This is not easy to determine. They 
 both disputed the possibility of knowing the nature of things, 
 
 ^ Entwichehmricn dcr Gricchischen Phil., p. 230. 
 
VL] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 1 25 
 
 or of attaining any certitude whatever. They both allowed 
 the facts of consciousness, and both aimed at the same end, 
 viz. the enjoyment of a life undisturbed by knowledge, with 
 its attendant hopes and fears, or by a useless struggle against 
 the inevitable. But Carneades and the Academicians could 
 not so far ignore the claims of science, as not to attempt a 
 theory of probability ; whereas ^nesidemus and his successors, 
 convinced of the impracticability of such a theory, did not, 
 like Antiochus the Academician, on this account give them- 
 selves up to a dogmatic eclecticism, but, without deserting the 
 sceptical attitude, endeavoured to meet the emergencies of 
 life, by observing the teachings of experience, by obeying the 
 dictates of nature, by respecting laws and customs, and by 
 acquiring useful arts, Kemembered impressions — experience 
 — appeared to belong to the phenomenal, for the images in 
 memory could not be called in question, inasmuch as they 
 were reproductions of appearances ; especially as memory did 
 not guarantee the causal dependence of events as necessary, 
 but only suggested their possible recurrence in cases where 
 absolute assurance was not required \ Similarly, the Sceptic 
 might allow himself to be guided in his conduct by laws and 
 customs, although he might neither approve of nor .disallow 
 them per se, and the inductions of experience he also ad- 
 mitted as a criterion of action. Opposition to established 
 laws and customs, in fact, would have disturbed the tranquil- 
 lity of his life; and he had no objection to avail himself of 
 the experience of others^ For the same reason he did not 
 hesitate to recognise piety as conducive to a peaceful exist- 
 ence I The Sceptic substituted empiricism for science — 
 which contented itself with meeting the requirements of life 
 — ^which did not seek to discover the reality or ultimate 
 causes of things, but merely observed the connexion of phe- 
 
 1 Adr. Math. viir. 291. = Hyp. n. 256. 
 
 3 Hyp. I. 24. 
 
126 IDEALISM AiVn SCEPTICISM— [Lfict. 
 
 nomena, in order to be able to predict the future from a re- 
 membrance of the past, by virtue of the notion of causation, 
 the natural attribute of humanity, without, however, commit- 
 ting himself to any decision respecting the reason of the 
 thing. Hence Sextus Empiricus, in his discussion on the so- 
 called five sciences, directs all his attacks against their theo- 
 retical principles, without in the least denying their utility 
 for the purposes of life; but thinks they ought to be solely 
 confined to practical limits, still with the consciousness that 
 this restriction could seldom be strictly observed. So the 
 Pyrrhonian scepticism allied itself to that which was in every 
 case probable, and only attacked the theoretical part of 
 science \" 
 
 § f. We thus see that, as far as practical results went, 
 the Sceptical Empiricism of the Academy, of which the final 
 chapters of the Lucullus give us such a distinct picture, was 
 adopted and maintained by the later representatives of Pyr- 
 rhonism. This accounts for the fact that Sextus Empiricus, 
 although upholding the doctrines of Pjrrrho, was in practical 
 science a follower of the Empirical method. The extreme 
 or earlier Pyrrhonism, he tells us^ was only strictly adhered 
 to by the so-called Methodists, who, with the Rationalists or 
 Dogmatists and the Empirics, carried their respective phi- 
 losophical opinions into the only art to which scientific prin- 
 ciples were in those days applied, viz. that of Medicine. It 
 is easy to see how well the Pyrrhonian or sceptical principles 
 must have accorded with the circumstances of the times in 
 which they were received. With the general collapse of the 
 ancient national faith; with the universal corruption of mo- 
 rals; with a tyrannical government and a degenerate people; 
 with just enough light in science to make darkness visible, 
 
 1 Adv. Math. vii. 435. 
 
 2 Hyp. I. 34. 236—241. Also, Note g, "Tria constat celebrari genera ae 
 tres, veluti sectas medicorum," &-c. 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 12 j 
 
 luhat could better correspond than a philosophical system 
 which considered all religions as equally true, or equally 
 false; which held the distinctions of good and evil to have no 
 higher sanction than the arbitrary caprice, or hereditary tend- 
 encies of nations and individuals; which inculcated submis- 
 sion to the inevitable as a more certain means of ensuring 
 tranquillity and happiness than brave and manly resistance ; 
 and which recognised in the human intellect no faculty of 
 attaining to a knowledge of aught beyond the range of ob- 
 servation and experience ? Wherever the features of scepti- 
 cism are discernible they bear the stamp of despair, they 
 indicate the close of a period in the world's history; they are 
 the heralds of some mighty revolution in the moral, intel- 
 lectual, and political relations of man. Such a revolution, 
 we know, was even then in progress; and, at the time when 
 Sextus Empiricus wrote, must already have attracted the at- 
 tention of those who interested themselves in observing the 
 varying phases of human development. It is then a ques- 
 tion of some interest, why a philosopher with such a range 
 of information, as the expounder of the sceptical doctrines 
 evidently possessed, should have omitted even a passing no- 
 tice of the Christian sect. It has, indeed, been supposed 
 that he himself was a Christian, and the author of a book, 
 mentioned by Eusebius, on the Kesurrection\ Fabricius, it 
 is true, does not seem to entertain this opinion; but, whether 
 he was or was not a Christian himself, it is evident his si- 
 lence concerning the new faith could not have arisen through 
 ignorance. Perhaps respect for the pure lives and precepts 
 of the Christians prevented him including them in the cata- 
 logue of heathen sects, of whose doctrines and manners he 
 has only to relate something obscene and ridiculous I Per- 
 haps there was an element in scepticism favourable to Chris- 
 
 ^ De Sexto Empirico, Testimonia vii, 
 2 Hyp. III. 24. 
 
128 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 tianity, opposing as they both did, without reserve or excep- 
 tion, every form of heathen superstition. Paley, indeed, 
 says, sceptics are not generally tolerant of a new religion. 
 We doubt, however, whether this remark is applicable to the 
 Pyrrhonian method. The Pj^rrhonians only professed to sus- 
 pend their judgment, declaring themselves perfectly willing 
 to give their adherence to one opinion or another, the mo- 
 ment it could be made manifest to them that any given one 
 was more worthy of credit than another. It is not probable, 
 then, that a Pyrrhonian Sceptic would primd facie reject 
 any new doctrine, but rather be inclined to entertain it: 
 not perhaps with much sincerity, but at least as affording 
 additional justification for witholding his assent to any opi- 
 nion whatever. Scepticism, under one form or another, was 
 certainly the prevailing tone of Greek philosophy for three 
 centuries before the commencement of the Christian era. 
 We may be sure, then, that with the "increasing purpose, 
 which through all ages runs," this tendency to invalidate all 
 human attempts to attain the assurance of truth, was signi- 
 ficant of the disclosure of a new faculty, which could be ap- 
 pealed to through some other avenue than that of the reason. 
 " ' We know (says St Austin) what rests upon reason; we be- 
 lieve what rests upon authority! But reason itself must rest 
 at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not 
 rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the 
 authority of what is beyond itself These data are, therefore, 
 in rigid propriety. Beliefs or Trusts \" Now it may seem at 
 first sight paradoxical to assert that Pyrrhonism could in any 
 way have been influential in guiding philosophers to the con- 
 viction that faith was the ultimate ground of reason ; yet we 
 think we can show that such a conclusion might result not 
 illogically from the Sceptical habit of viewing things. We 
 can illustrate what we mean by considering the force of that 
 
 1 Eeid's Worlts (Hamilton), Note A. § v. 2. 
 
YI.J ANCIENT AND RECENT, 1 29 
 
 favourite weapon in controversy employed by the Sceptics, 
 which we have had occasion more than once to notice, viz. 
 the dialiel. Of this logical net (M. Bayle says) " Si les Pir- 
 roniens s'aretoient aux dix moyens de I'Epoque, et s'ils se 
 bornaient k les employer contre la Fisique, on pouroit encore 
 ndgocier avec eux: mais ils vont beaucoup plus loin; ils ont 
 une sort d'armes, qu'ils nomment le Diall^le, qu'ils empoig- 
 nent au premier besoin, apres cela on ne sauroit faire ferme 
 contr'eux sur quoi que ce soit*." M. Bayle evidently regards 
 the dialiel as an arm against which reason was helpless. To 
 what then did it reduce the adversary against whom it was 
 employed? For example, suppose one asserted that the tree 
 he was contemplating was really an external object, a mode 
 of Tuatter, and not a mere idea, repi'esentation, or mode of his 
 own mind. The Sceptic would reply, Unless you have ever 
 apprehended a tree, apart from your idea of it, how can you 
 tell whether you are now contemplating an object in reality y 
 or only an idea in the mind? you can only know the truth of 
 your idea by the knowledge of the object of which it is the 
 idea; but you can only know this object by the assurance you 
 have of the truth of your idea. Here then are two things so 
 related that you can alone establish the Jirst by the second, 
 and the second again by the first; thus you argue in a circle. 
 But one might ask the Sceptic, Do you, in shewing the re- 
 ciprocal dependence of the premise and conclusion of such an 
 argument, make the belief of their actual existence absurd or 
 impossible? It is clear that you do not; you merely fail to 
 demonstrate either of them; you still leave it possible that 
 they may be true; hence all you do is to throw me back on 
 a principle of belief. The same consequence resulted from 
 another of their logical meshes, viz. that of the proof regres- 
 sing to infinity ; for it is clear that, in this case also, the 
 object was to drive the opponent back to some fundamental 
 
 '^ Diction. Hist, et Crit. (3 edit. Tom. iii. p. 1005). 
 L. T,. 9 
 
130 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 notion, or axiom, some instinctive belief. In fine, the scep- 
 tical method of arguing was, to force their adversary upon 
 hypotheses; and it was then that the chief and most signifi- 
 cant effect of their method of reasoning became apparent. 
 The Sceptic did not refuse to admit first principles, incapa- 
 ble of demonstration ; but he demanded that these principles 
 should be consistent with one another, and lead to results 
 which were so. It was here that scepticism could never be 
 met, because philosophers either refused to recognise these 
 innate principles, a j^riori truths, or fundamental notions; or 
 they had destroyed the credibility of them all by refusing to 
 admit some. In the former case, the diallel and the infinite 
 regression obtained an easy victory; and in the latter, the 
 Sceptic would urge with unanswerable justice, / accept the 
 testimony of natural evidence; but, since you make it lead 
 to opposing conclusions, / still need a criterion of truth. The 
 point, however, we here want to establish is, that the perti- 
 nacious logic of the Sceptics must have forced the attention 
 of philosophers to the nature of belief, and so have prepared 
 the way, in some measure, for the acceptance of truths the 
 most important to man, but which were, at the same time, 
 incapable of demonstrative proof. We have seen that in the 
 Academy the attempt to compass the objective reality of 
 things was formally abandoned ; but that belief, on probable 
 evidence, was allowed as a practical principle in the affairs 
 of life. Thus also in the scepticism of the Academy proof 
 short of demonstrative was considered sufficient ground of 
 action for a reasonable being. Hence, the influence of this 
 school, as well as that of the Pyrrhonists, would be indirectly 
 to accustom the philosophic mind to admit by faith that 
 which could never become an object of knowledge. We 
 should say then that the doctrines of Christianity probably 
 found more adherents among the ranks of the sceptical than 
 those of the dogmatic Empiricists. They, indeed, who held 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 131 
 
 by the long-established conviction of the ancient sages, that 
 the objective and the absolute were within the range of the 
 human intellect, and who therefore aspired to the construc- 
 tion of a rational theology, sought refuge from scepticism in 
 the mysticism of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists. Thus 
 faith, or reason, were each evoked as resting-ground from 
 scepticism, on the quicksands of which the human mind 
 could never find any permanent or solid satisfaction. 
 
 § 77. That the limits of knowledge prescribed by scepti- 
 cism do not hinder the free exercise of faith, has been dis- 
 tinctly enunciated by the most orthodox theologians of the 
 present day. 
 
 " Truth and falsehood are not properties of things in 
 themselves, but of our conceptions, and are tested, not by 
 the comparison of conceptions with things in themselves, but 
 with things as they are given in some other relation. My 
 conception of an object of sense is truCy when it corresponds 
 to the characteristics of the object as I perceive it ; but the 
 perception itself is equally a relation, and equally implies 
 the co-operation of human faculties. Truth in relation to no 
 intelligence is a contradiction in terms : our highest concep- 
 tion of absolute truth is that of truth in relation to all 
 intelligences. But of the consciousness of intelligences dif- 
 ferent from our own we have no knowledge, and can make 
 no application. Truth, therefore, in relation to maD, admits 
 of no other test than the harmonious consent of all human 
 faculties \" There is not a statement in this passage which 
 an ancient Sceptic would not have endorsed, and yet his 
 very avowal of such opinions constituted his scepticism. For, 
 allowing for the difference of language consequent upon the 
 more philosophical distinctness of modern conceptions, what 
 is there in this but an assertion that truth has for man 
 no objective signification, but is limited to the relation of 
 1 Mansel's Bampton Lectures, Lecture v. p. 149. 
 
 9~~2 
 
131 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 appearances, or of a subjective notion to an equally subjec- 
 tive perception ? Truth not of what is but of what appears 
 to be ; not of the (paiveaOat, op, but of the <l)aLV€a6at elvat ; 
 internal not external harmony. But still more striking is 
 the accordance between ancient scepticism and modern 
 orthodoxy in respect to the central notion of Pyrrhonism, 
 viz. the relativity of all our knowledge ; the to irpo^ tl ; the 
 impossibility of separating subject and object even in thought. 
 "A second characteristic of consciousness is, that it is only 
 possible in the form of a relation. There must be a Subject, 
 or person conscious, and an Object, or thing of which he is 
 conscious. There can be no consciousness without the union 
 of these two factors ; and, in that union, each exists only as 
 it is related to the other. The subject is a subject, only in 
 so far as it is conscious of an object : the object is an object, 
 only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the 
 destruction of either is the destruction of consciousness it- 
 self^." OTi he Kol TTpo^ Tt i<rr\ iravra ra alcrdrjra BrjXoV earl 
 ryap 77/309 T0^9 alaOavo/JLevov;. dWa koI iTpo<; ri earl rd 
 voTjTa, TTpc'; yap rov voovvra Xiyerai,^. Mansel even quotes 
 Sextus Empiricus^ in opposition to the German Absolutists, 
 who seek to unite the subject and object as the only means 
 of solving the logical difficulty of conceiving something out 
 of relation to the thinking subject. The whole tenor, in 
 fact, of Hansel's opinion coincides with that of ancient 
 scepticism, much as the Oxford theologian might resent the 
 imputation. In fact, both have the same end in view, to a 
 certain extent, viz. the disparagement of the human reason ; 
 but ancient philosophers knew no faculty of belief in man 
 which was not placed either in sense or in intellect, con- 
 
 1 Mansel's Bampton Lectures, Lecture iii. p. 75. 
 
 2 Hyp. I. 15. 175—177. 
 
 * ""OXou 5' 6vTos ToO KaToXafi^dvovTos oi/div ^ri ^crat t6 KaTakafipavd.ucvoy 
 T&v 5i dXayurdrup iarl rb etuai /x^v rbu KaToKafi^dpovTa, /xt] elvai 8^ t6 ov iarlv 
 7] KaTOLKfj-^L^.'" — Adv. Math. vii. 311. 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 1 32 
 
 sequently the Pyrrhonist, in demonstrating the feebleness of 
 reason, destroyed all hope of attaining assurance. The Scoto- 
 Oxonians have, however, devoted all their energies to the 
 task of showing that we have an organ of faith independent 
 of reason. It is a question whether, by adopting this method 
 of defending their cause, they have met with the success they 
 might have, had they taken up a rather different position. 
 Sir W. Hamilton makes belief a mode of consciousness, and 
 as such it necessarily implies a knowledge of its object. 
 Professor Mansel, applying the principles of Hamilton to the 
 discomfiture of the German rationalist theologians, endeavours 
 to separate belief and knowledge, after setting out with the 
 assumption that such a separation was impossible. Of course 
 such a contradiction at the root of an argument would en- 
 danger the acceptance of the best cause. We think that the 
 fundamental error of Hamilton and Mansel lies : 
 
 1st, in not distinguishing with sufficient clearness between 
 the faculty and act of belief. 
 
 2nd, in making belief identical with feeling. 
 " I know it to be true, because I feel and cannot but 
 feel,'' or " because I believe and cannot but believe, it so to 
 be." And if farther interrogated, how I know or am assured 
 that I thus/eeZ, or thus believe, I can make no better answer 
 than, in the one case, " because I believe that I feel," in the 
 other, "because 1 feel that I believe\'' But surely this is 
 not a complete account of the kind of assent the mind gives 
 to its natural testimony. The very notion of an a priori 
 truth seems to us to be that the prejudice to accept it must 
 be potentially in the mind, independent of the act which 
 constitutes a belief identical with feeling; and this faculty, 
 as distinguished from the act of belief> might, and in fact does, 
 exist in the mind- apart from reason, and exerts its influence 
 without consciousness. Such- is the belief the mind has in 
 1 Keid's Works (Hamilton). Note A. § v. p. 760. 
 
134 ' IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM— [Lect. 
 
 the validity of its own processes, which constitutes indeed 
 the complement of the ultimate laws of thought. Belief 
 then as a faculty or potentiality we might admit to be 
 exercised on objects which could not be embraced by reason, 
 but not as an act or energy, A nervous dread of German 
 rationalism seems to have driven Dr Mansel to a denial of 
 any relation between God and the human reason what- 
 ever; a degree of scepticism which might be more dangerous 
 to orthodoxy than Teutonic mysticism. 
 
 § 6. But to return to ancient scepticism: there is another 
 aspect of the Hamiltonian philosophy, bringing it into a re- 
 lation to early thought, which, as illustrative of our subject, 
 demands some consideration. We have already noticed that 
 a result of Pyrrhonism must have been to have forced philo- 
 sophy into the admission of some ultimate principles innate 
 in the human mind, as the sources and highest credentials 
 of all our knowledge. In fact, the exaggerated empiricism 
 of the Stoics was more than anything conducive to the 
 spread of sceptical principles. Such a result we have also 
 seen in the scepticism of Hume, which, following the empi- 
 ricism of Locke, staggered the philosophical mind of Europe 
 in the last century. The issue involved indeed in all the 
 controversies between the ancient Dogmatists and Sceptics, 
 but never explicitly stated, was forced into prominence by 
 the subtle mind of Hume, when he shewed that the notion 
 of causahty, on which depends all our reasoning either moral, 
 physical, or metaphysical, could not, on the hypothesis that 
 the mind has no ideas but those derived from experience, be 
 demonstratsd to have any validity as a basis of argument. 
 The dilemma into which he forced philosophers was really 
 an example of the employment of the ancient diallel. No 
 conviction is so universal, or so deeply seated in human 
 intelligence, as that of the necessary connection between 
 cause and effect, and no statement could consequently so tend 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND REGENT. 1 35 
 
 to shake our faith in the testimony of consciousness as the 
 announcement that this conviction was ill-grounded. " You 
 say," said Hume " that we have no notions prior to experience, 
 wherefore the idea of causation is only derived from ex- 
 perience, i.e. we trust to it because experience has always 
 shown it to be worthy of confidence ; but whence could this 
 confidence have arisen if we had had no antecedent notion 
 that the experience of the past was a guarantee in our anti- 
 cipations of the future 1 Thus you affirm that we believe in 
 causation from experience, and then say that we believe in 
 experience through the notion of causation; here is a diallel. 
 The notion of causation is therefore no necessary law of con- 
 sciousness at all, but only the result of habit; and it is 
 consequently no premiss to be assumed as fundamentally 
 necessary ; hence the testimony of consciousness, proved falla- 
 cious in one of its most undoubted deliverances, is not to be 
 relied upon in any other — false in one, false in all ^ — scepti- 
 cism could go no farther." The important bearing which the 
 opinions of Hume had upon the interests of truth, subverting, 
 as they appeared to do, the whole fabric of human know- 
 ledge, evoked the genius of Kant to undertake a searching 
 investigation into the nature of our apprehensions of neces- 
 sary and universal truths. It is doubtful whether the results 
 of his critique of these notions much tended to re-establish 
 faith in their objective validity, or whether he did not rather 
 separate the spheres of the noumenal and phenomenal more 
 irretrievably than ever. Even the controversy on the origin 
 of our notions of mathematical and logical necessity seems as 
 far from a satisfactory termination as ever. Dr Whewell 
 (remarks ManseP) in confounding the necessary laws under 
 which all men think, with the contingent laws under which 
 certain men think of certain things, seems to have given 
 
 * Hamilton's Discussions. Philosophy of Perception, p. 95. 
 2 Prolegomena Logica. Note A. 
 
1 
 
 136 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM-— [Lect. 
 
 some advantage to the empirical arguments of his antagonist 
 Mr Mill. For Dr Whewell says of certain discoverers of 
 physical laws : " So complete has been the victory of truth in 
 most of these instances, that at present we can hardly imagine 
 the struggle to have been necessary. The very essence 
 of these triumphs is that they lead us to regard the views we 
 reject as not only false, but inconceivable \" Of course to 
 this Mr Mill could instantly reply : "The last proposition is 
 precisely what I contend for ; and I ask no more, in order 
 to overthrow the whole theory of its author on the nature of 
 the evidence of axioms. For what is that theory ? That the 
 truth of axioms cannot have been learnt from experience, 
 because their falsity is inconceivable. But Dr Whewell him- 
 self says, that we are continually led, by the natural progress 
 of thought, to regard as inconceivable what our forefathers 
 not only conceived but believed, nay even (he might have 
 added) were unable to conceive the reverse of^" We have 
 quoted a fragment of this discussion in support of the asser- 
 tion we just made, that the same questions which occupy 
 modern thought were underlying the ancient antagonism of 
 the Sceptics and Dogmatists. Thus we find Cicero (on behalf 
 of the New Academy opposing the pretensions of Lucullus, 
 who in the name of Antiochus is maintaining the claims to 
 infallibility of the Stoics) noticing that tendency of the mind 
 to assent unhesitatingly to certain propositions, continues : 
 " Geometrae provideant (de persuadendi necessitate) qui se 
 profitentur non persuadere, sed cogere : et qui omnia vobis, 
 qua3 describunt, probant. Non qusero ex his ilia initia 
 mathematicorum : quibus non concessis, digitum progredi 
 non possunt. Pujictum esse, quod magnitudinem nullam 
 habeat. Eootremitatem, et quasi libramentum, in quo nulla 
 omnino crassitude sit : Lineam autem, longitudinem latitu- 
 
 i Phil. Ind. Sc. II. 174. 
 
 2 Mill's Logic, Book 11. v. p. 273. 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 137 
 
 dine carentem. Hsec cum vera esse concessero : si adigam 
 jusjuraiidum, sapientemne prius, quam Archimedes eo in- 
 spectante rationes nines descripserit eas, quibus efficitur 
 multis partibus solem majorem esse quam terram juraturum 
 putas\" In this passage the distinction between objective 
 and subjective laws seems to have been unconsciously recog- 
 nised (if we may use the expression), and might warrant us 
 in the conclusion that certain principles of reasoning were 
 left unassailed by the Sceptics. It is true that Galen asserts 
 Carneades denied the truth of the maxim, 'things which are 
 equal to the same are equal to one another :' " 6 701)1/ Kap- 
 vea.hri<^ ovhe tovto to iroLvrayv ivapyio-rarov (Tvy^^^copel iriarTeveiv, 
 on TO, Tft) auTft) Xaa fieyedrj koI dXX,ri\ot<i lara ylyverai^y 
 
 Brandis thinks^ this refers to the application of the 
 axiom to the prosecution of real knowledge owing to the un- 
 certainty of the senses. We are inclined to think, however, 
 all that Carneades meant was, that such a truth was not a 
 generalisation from experience ; and in this he probably was 
 only maintaining the traditions of the Academy. The fact 
 of the universal belief in such a proposition he certainly 
 could not have challenged. Perhaps here again we have 
 the scepticism of Hume anticipated. However uncertain we 
 may be about the opinions of the New Academy respecting 
 first principles, Sextus Empiricus, on behalf of the Pyrrho- 
 nists, enunciates them continually, as the basis of all rea- 
 soning. Thus, arguing on the impossibility of demonstra- 
 tion, he urges that there is a class of truths indemonstrable, 
 because they are self-evident : " rcov cvtcov iraarL ^aivofievcou 
 eir Lar]<; ecrrai dSiSaKTa'^" Just as Aristotle defines an axiom 
 
 1 LucuUus, 36. 2 Galen, de Opt. Doctr. c. 2. p. 45. 
 
 3 *' Carneades scheint daraus die praktische Unanwendbarkeit des Satzes 
 gefolgert zu haben, das zwei Grossen die einer dritten gleich, auch unter 
 einander gleich seien." — ^Brandis, Enwickelungen der Griechischen Phil. ^. 
 187, Note 50. 
 
 * Adv. Math. 1. 2. 11. 
 
138 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM-^ [Lect. 
 
 to be, "that, which he who would learn aught, must himself 
 bring, and not receive from his instructor." And in the ex- 
 ordium to his work against logicians, Sextus Empiricus says, 
 "<W9 eiTrep ev iravrl jMepeu (^Ckoao^ia^ ^rjTTjriov earrl TaXiy^e?, 
 TTpo nravTO'i heZ Ta<; dp^a<; kol tov^ rpoTrou? t/J? tovtov Biayvo)- 
 o"6ft)9 e)(ei,v TTta-Toix; : — eirel ra jxev evapyrj Bta KpLTTjplov rtvo<^ 
 avTodev fyvcopi^eaOaL hoK€t, ra Be d8r)\a Bia (TT] jjuemv Koi diro- 
 Bei^ecov Kara ttjv dirb Totu ivapjmv p^erdfiaaLV €^L')(yev€(T6at^" 
 As we remarked before, Pyrrhonism never refused the admis- 
 sion of primary truths, but founded exclusively on their ap- 
 parent contradiction. The universal beliefs of mankind were 
 undoubtedly criteria of truth to the Sceptic^; and his very 
 scepticism arose from his professed inability to discover such 
 beliefs common to the human race. There are no truths, 
 says he, moral or physical, because that which is true would 
 appear so to all. Such is the reiteration of the Pyrrhonist : 
 " That which is true would appear so to all, but nothing does 
 appear so to cdl, therefore nothing is true." Scepticism, 
 therefore, "en demiere analyse," really acknowledged a cri- 
 terion of truth, viz. " the common beliefs of mankind." Phi- 
 losophy had subverted these beliefs; and it was quite com- 
 petent then for the Sceptic to demand of philosophy a new 
 criterion in place of the one she had disallowed. Such was 
 the real attitude of scepticism in relation to dogmatic philo- 
 sophy, when stripped of the exaggerations of its own pro- 
 fessors, and the misrepresentations and misapprehensions of 
 its adversaries. On this ground alone can scepticism be fairly 
 met and confuted. It would be a task of much interest and 
 of great importance to the cause of philosophy to investigate 
 when and how the schism between philosophy and common 
 
 1 Adv. Logicos, vii. 24. 25. 
 
 ' Cf. "6 ydp irdcrL doKCi, tovt elvai. (f>a/j^j/. 6 8' dvaipQv Ta&rrjv rijv irlariv oi 
 vdvv Tiardrepa ipeV^ — Aristotle, Eth. Nic. K. 2. 4c. 
 
 "/ca^ws 6 Tlfitov /xefiaprvprjKev dirdsv, dXXa rb (paip6/x€fov iratrrl (rdhu, ovirep tv 
 ^e-ri.'" — Adv. Logicos, vii. 30. 
 
YI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 139 
 
 sense first originated. Scepticism is not a natural product 
 of the human mind, at least, as far as regards the testimony 
 of consciousness. It is an universally admitted characteristic 
 of children and barbarians, that they believe implicitly until 
 their natural faith has been shaken by some extraneous 
 cause; and the stronger the instinctive belief has been, the 
 more difficult would it be to restore it when once impaired. 
 It was on this account that the writings of Hume created 
 such an effect on the minds of philosophers. In the infancy 
 of Greek speculation such an advanced scepticism as that of 
 Hume was hardly likely to have appeared. But there are 
 beliefs common to the human race, and as unhesitatingly ac- 
 cepted by the natural mind as the belief in causation. To 
 the undermining of these, Greek scepticism owed its origin. 
 To illustrate our meaning we will quote the following pas- 
 sage from Eusebius : " It is worth while to enquire on what 
 authority they (the Pyrrhonists) say, that everything is 
 hidden (a^Xa) ; for they ought to be able to determine the 
 evident (to ^fjXov), then they would be competent to de- 
 clare what things are not evident. One ought to know the 
 affirmative, before one can state the negative. If they do 
 not know what is evident, they will not know what is non- 
 evident. Thus, when Enesidemus in his Hypotyposes insti- 
 tuted his nine rpoTroc, by which he tried to show that every- 
 thing is uncertain {aByXa), let us ask whether he did it 
 knowing them or not. For he says that animals differ, and 
 we ourselves, and cities, habits, customs, and laws; that our 
 senses are weak, and that external circumstances hinder our 
 knowledge, such as distance, size, and motion. That the 
 young feel differently to the old, the waking to the sleeping, 
 the healthy to the sick. That nothing we apprehend is ab- 
 solute or simple {aKpaupvk), that all things are relative and 
 complex. I say he talks nonsense, for some one would in- 
 
r4a IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM-^ [Leot. 
 
 stantly enquire, does he affirm these things knowing how far 
 they are so, or not knowing it. If he did not know, how 
 should we believe him ; but if he knew it, he would be a fool, 
 inasmuch as he at the same time says that he knows these 
 things, and yet declares that everything is hidden \" In this 
 argumentation, it would appear that the philosopher sought 
 to force the Sceptic into a self-contradiction; "how do you 
 know everything is hidden, and yet know nothing?" but, to 
 this the Sceptic might reply, I should not have known that 
 all things were hidden, unless your philosophy had suggested 
 such a conclusion. "Democritus (says Sir W. Hamilton) 
 was the first who enounced the observation, that the Sweet, 
 the Bitter, the Cold, the Hot, the Coloured, &c. are wholly 
 different, in their absolute nature, from the character in 
 which they become manifested to us'^" Now, if this was the 
 case, Democritus was the first who discovered to man a fa- 
 culty of separating the appearance from the thing, the appa- 
 rent from the real, the (patveaOac ehat from the (fialveaOai ov) 
 and, in endowing man with this faculty, Democritus lent to 
 him a real basis for the art of doubting; and we are not sur- 
 prised to read that it was the perusal of the works of Demo- 
 critus which first suggested to Pyrrho the notion of systema- 
 tising scepticism into a method of philosophy. "Men are 
 carried away by a natural instinct to repose faith in their 
 senses. When they follow this blind and powerful instinct 
 of nature, they always suppose the very images presented to 
 the senses to he the external objects, and never entertain 
 any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of 
 the other^." But once shake this faith, once demonstrate to 
 man, that the testimony of his consciousness (than which 
 
 ^ Prceparat. Ev. xiv. 18. 
 
 2 Eeid's Works. Hamilton. Note D. § 1. 
 
 a Hume, Phil. Works, Vol. iv. p. 177. 
 
YL] ANCIENT AND RECENT. 141 
 
 nothing pr'imd facie is mere certain) is a fallacy and a delu- 
 sion, then you cannot deny to scepticism a valid and plau- 
 sible ground of argument. Philosophers are (as Hume states) 
 thrown upon this dilemma: "Do you, he asks (firstly), fol- 
 low the instinct and propensities of nature in assenting to 
 the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that 
 the ver^ perception, or sensible image, is the external object." 
 (Thus secondly), "Do you disclaim this principle in order to 
 embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are 
 only representations of something external? You here depart 
 from your natural propensities, and more obvious sentiments, 
 and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never 
 find any convincing argument from experience to prove that 
 the perceptions are connected with any external objects." 
 And we maintain that a careful examination of the principles 
 of Pyrrhonism cannot but lead to the conviction, that it was 
 on this false theory of perception, which, in one form or an- 
 other, seems to have been universally accepted by ancient 
 thinkers, that scepticism grew and fattened. " Plato's theory 
 of perception is that denoted by some modem writers as the 
 'representative theory.' Of things as they are in them- 
 selves the senses give us no knowledge: all that in sensation 
 we are conscious of is a state of mind or feeling {7rd6o<i) ; the 
 existence of self or the perceiving subject, and of a some- 
 thing external to self — a perceived object — are revealed to 
 us, not by the senses, but by a higher faculty. The negative 
 portion of this theory Plato holds in common with the Cy- 
 renaics, with Protagoras, and with the later Academics and 
 Sceptics. It was controverted by the Stoics, who maintained 
 that the external world is the object of immediate conscious- 
 ness {KaraXTj-TTTOv). But all the remaining schools of anti- 
 quity, — sceptical, dogmatic, and mystical, — agree with Plato 
 in denying that our sensations reveal to us anything beyond 
 themselves. Tbev are modifications of consciousness, feel- 
 
142 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM-^ [Lect. 
 
 ings, states, — perjnotiones intimce (as Cicero has it), — and 
 nothing more^." 
 
 This account of the opinions generally held by ancient 
 thinkers on the degree of knowledge we have of the external 
 universe leads us to assert that Greek scepticism was mainly 
 determined by a mistaken view of the real object appre- 
 hended in perception. To whatever results an habitual 
 methodical unbelief may have led, however deplorable they 
 may have been, and subversive of all immutable principles 
 of morality, still it is not through and on account of these 
 results that scepticism is to be met and refuted; — it is the 
 principles, and not their consequences, that ought fairly to be 
 attacked, and for these, as we think, we have shewn not 
 scepticism but philosophy is responsible. Scepticism, both 
 ancient and modern, has never and could never have been 
 an independent manifestation of human opinion, but where- 
 ever it has appeared it has been due to an erroneous method 
 of philosophising. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton detecting this, made it the 
 principal end of his teaching to reconcile the conflicting 
 judgments of philosophy and common sense, on this much 
 vexed question of the nature of our perceptions, in order 
 to remove the contradictions which Hume showed must in- 
 evitably arise from according belief to some of the deliver- 
 ances of consciousness and withholding it from others. Locke 
 had articulately enunciated a distinction which he considered 
 
 1 Dr Thompson's note to Butler's Lectures, Lecture vii p. 96. Tenne- 
 mann seems to think that Plato considered a knowledge of the subject to be 
 involved in the act of perception: "Dass mit jeder Vorstellung einBewustsein 
 verbunden ist, war ein Faktum, das sich jedem Beobachter von selbst auf- 
 dringet ; und es ware eine Art von Wunder, wenn sie dem Plato entgangen 
 ware. Man findet zwar dieses Faktum in seiner Allgemeinheit und mit 
 bestimmten Worten au?gedruckt nicht in seinen Schriften erwahnt, aber doch 
 einzelne Bermerkungen und Aeusserungen, aus welchen so viel erhellet, dass 
 es ihm nicht unbekannt geblieben war." — Tennemann's Platonischen Philo- 
 Sophie, zweiter Band, Kap. 1. p. 13. 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT, 1 43 
 
 must be taken between the primary and secondary qualities 
 of external objects. Of the latter he asserted we only had 
 a mediate and relative knowledge as the unknown causes of 
 certain modifications of consciousness, or ideas, as he termed 
 them; — that our apprehensions of colour, taste, and smell 
 were but knowledge of changes in the percipient subject, 
 ideas which resembled nothing external to the mind. Of 
 primary qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity, &c. 
 he maintained we had a distinct and quasi-immediate cog- 
 nition, or, what amounts to the same thing, that our ideas of 
 them did resemble their cause in nature. It was not long 
 after Locke had published his celebrated work, that Berkeley 
 completed the idealism of Locke by demonstrating that the 
 so-called primary qualities were no more the objects of 
 immediate perception than the secondary. That in fact all 
 we could assert of things apparently external was our act 
 of perceiving them; their esse is percipi. Although this 
 doctrine was carried by him, or rather carried him, to some 
 very extravagant conclusions, there is no doubt that this 
 placing of the primary and secondary qualities of bodies on 
 the same footing, as phenomena of consciousness, was a 
 conclusion of the last importance to the interests of phi- 
 losophy ; and if regarded from a right point of view, the most 
 substantial bulwark against the encroachments of scepticism. 
 Unfortunately, however, the idealistic tendency which phi- 
 losophy had received from the writings of Locke caused the 
 opinions of Berkeley respecting the primary and secondary 
 qualities of bodies to have an exactly opposite effect. Scepti- 
 cism in its subtlest form broke out, and, as we have already seen, 
 Hume challenged philosophers on their ideal theory of percep- 
 tion to demonstrate logically, the existence of any external world 
 at all. It was then that Reid attempted to meet scepticism by an 
 appeal to the common sense or common beliefs of mankind, 
 which, as an ultimate criterion of truth, he invoked against 
 
144 IDMLISM and scepticism— [Lect. 
 
 the assaults of the sceptic. For this purpose Keid, while for 
 ever annihilating a capital error, vitiating up to his time all 
 speculation (viz. the separation of the act from the object 
 of perception), revived Locke's distinction between the pri- 
 mary and secondary qualities; maintaining that our know- 
 ledge of the former was intuitive — an universal belief of 
 mankind, and a sufficient proof of the existence of an ex- 
 ternal and extended universe. With regard to secondary 
 qualities, however, he held to the opinion of philosophy, 
 and at the same time appeared to hold it doubtful whether 
 philosophers and the vulgar really differed concerning them. 
 *' We are now (says he) to consider the opinions both of the 
 vulgar and of philosophers upon this subject. As to the 
 former, it is not to be expected that they should make 
 distinctions which have no connection with the common 
 affairs of life; they do not, therefore, distinguish the pri- 
 mary from the secondary qualities, but speak of both as 
 being equally qualities of the external object. Of the pri- 
 mary qualities they have a distinct notion, as they are im- 
 mediately and distinctly perceived by the senses; of the 
 secondary, their notions, as I apprehend, are confused and 
 indistinct, rather than erroneous. A secondary quality is 
 the unknown cause or occasion of a well-known effect; and 
 the same name is common to the cause and the effect. Now, 
 to distinguish clearly the different ingredients of a complex 
 notion, and at the same time the different meanings of an 
 ambiguous word, is the work of a philosopher, and is not 
 to be expected of the vulgar, when their occasions do not 
 require it. I grant, therefore, that the notion the vulgar 
 have of secondary qualities is indistinct and inaccurate. 
 But there seems to be a contradiction between the vulgar 
 and the philosopher upon this subject, and each charges the 
 other with a gross absurdity. The vulgar say, that fire is 
 hot, and snow cold, and sugar sweet; and that to deny this 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND RECENT, 1 45 
 
 is a gross absurdity, and contradicts the testimony of our 
 senses. The philosopher says that heat, and cold, and 
 sweetness are nothing but sensations in our minds, and it 
 is absurd to conceive that these sensations are in the fire, 
 or in the snow, or in the sugar. The philosopher says, 
 there is no heat in the fire, meaning that the fire has not 
 the sensation of heat. His meaning is just ; and the vulgar 
 will agree with him, as soon as they understand his meaning. 
 But his language is improper; for there is really a quality 
 in the fire, of which the proper name is heat ; and the name 
 of heat is given to this quality, both by philosophers and 
 by the vulgar, much more frequently than to the sensation 
 of heat\" Upon this account of the natural beliefs of man 
 as to what they are actually conscious of in perception, Sir 
 W. Hamilton grounds his doctrine of Natural Realism, which 
 proclaims, that that which in the act of perception is pre- 
 sented to us as an external extended substance, is really the 
 external extended substance, and not a mere representation 
 of it — a real mode of matter, and not a mere mode of mind ; 
 and thus, he maintains, and only thus, is it possible to con- 
 trovert the sceptical dilemma by which philosophy is made 
 to stultify itself by first wresting from man one of his most 
 cherished and universal beliefs, and then appealing to the 
 same belief as a certain evidence of the existence of external 
 objects. Now the whole value of the service Sir W. Hamil- 
 ton has rendered to philosophy must evidently depend upon 
 the fact whether or not the doctrine he upholds is one in 
 accordance with the universal belief of mankind. For the 
 object he professedly has in view is to shew that these 
 beliefs are the ultimate criteria of truth ; and it is only in 
 deserting them that philosophy has laid herself open to the 
 attacks of Scepticism. Now, we reply, that, so far from the 
 
 \ On the Int. Powers, 11. xvii. 241. 
 L.L. 10 
 
146 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICim— [Lect. 
 
 testimony of consciousness revealing to us any distinction 
 between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, 
 the maintenance of this distinction would cause that very 
 conflict which, as Sir W. Hamilton admits, is and always 
 has been the prime cause of scepticism. 
 
 The natural and universal belief of mankind is certainly 
 that, in the act of perception, one is conscious of an ego, and 
 a non-ego — of oneself as subject perceiving, and of a not- 
 self as object perceived : and it is the changes in this object, 
 as modes of matter, not modes of mind, which constitute 
 for man the materials of his consciousness. He makes, 
 however, no distinction between his apprehensions of colour, 
 fragrance, figure, or solidity; all are alike to him qualities 
 of the object, as Reid, in fact, in the first part of our quota- 
 tion admits. Heat, cold, and such subjective sensations, 
 man apprehends not as modifications of his own mind, but 
 as changes in his body. These changes are perceived as 
 the effects from objects external to the body, which are 
 causes; and when we speak of the qualities of external 
 objects, as heat in the fire, we regard them as the causes 
 of changes in our own bodies, and they correspond to those 
 powers or qualities which Locke calls the tertiary qualities, 
 and James Mill the causes of the causes of our sensations. 
 Sir William Hamilton admits that it is absurd to ask how 
 the ego can be conscious of the non-ego, unless it can be 
 shewn how it can be conscious of changes in itself. As far 
 as the so-called primary qualities go, he would have us 
 believe that we perceive changes in matter, or in the non-ego; 
 but, with regard to the secondary^ they are changes in the 
 percipient mind. As we have said, the vulgar do not make 
 this distinction, but regard all their perceptions as appre- 
 hensions of changes in matter. Sir W. Hamilton says. 
 Common sense does not mean the opinion of the vulgar, but 
 those ultimate principles of belief which are to be dis- 
 
VI.] ANCIENT AND REGENT. 147 
 
 criminated by the philosopher. Let us turn then from the 
 opinions of the vulgar to. those of philosophers. 
 
 There are certain laws of thought which would prevent 
 us logically from allowing any difference between primary 
 and secondary qualities of matter. "All the secondary 
 qualities may be generalized at one sweep into our mere 
 knowledge of things. But the primary qualities — which 
 are usually restricted to extension and figure, and which 
 constitute, it is said, the objective or real essence of things, 
 and which are entirely independent of us — into what shall 
 they be generalized? Into what but into this? Into the 
 knowledge of something which exists in things over and 
 above our mere knowledge of things. It is plain enough 
 that we cannot generalize them into pure objective exist- 
 ence in itself; we can only generalize them into a know~ 
 ledge of pure objective existence. But such a knowledge, 
 that is to say, a knowledge of something existing in things, 
 over and above our mere knowledge of them, is not one 
 whit less our knowledge, and is not one whit more their 
 existence, than the other more subjective knowledge desig- 
 nated by the word me7'e. Our knowledge of extension and 
 figure is just as little these real qualities themselves as our 
 affection of colour is objective colour itself. Just as little, 
 we say, and just as much. You (we suppose ourselves 
 addressing an imaginary antagonist), you hold that our 
 knowledge of the secondary qualities is not these qualities 
 themselves ; but we ask you, Is then our knowledge of 
 the primary qualities these qualities themselves ? This you 
 will scarcely maintain, but perhaps you will say. Take away 
 the affection of colour, and the colour no longer exists; 
 and we retort upon you. Take away the knowledge of ex- 
 tension, and the extension no longer exists. This you will 
 peremptorily deny, and we deny it just as peremptorily ; 
 but why do both of us deny it ? Just because both of us 
 
 10—2 
 
148 IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM. [Lect. YI. 
 
 have surreptitiously restored the knowledge of extension 
 in denying that extension itself would be annihilated. The 
 knowledge of extension is extension, and extension is the 
 knowledge of extension \" 
 
 Such are the arguments by which a distinguished meta- 
 physician of the present age has, as we think, irrefutably 
 demonstrated the impossibility of separating the primary 
 and secondary qualities of bodies in consciousness. We do 
 not say we are prepared to subscribe to the ultra-idealism, 
 or rather Berkleyism, which his philosophy implies ; but we 
 maintain, that to distinguish our knowledge of the external 
 universe into two kinds, is to endow man with a putative 
 faculty which nature has not given him, by which he is 
 induced to separate the apparent from the real, and thus 
 institute a discrepancy in the testimony of consciousness, 
 which, as Hamilton has laboured with so much earnestness 
 to show, is the one and only means by which this testimony 
 could be invalidated. Positivism and empiricism are at the 
 present day the popular tendencies of thought. 
 
 Induction is the only method of attaining knowledge; 
 and cb priori principles, on the existence of which the whole 
 validity of induction depends, the ablest supporters of this 
 method refuse to admit. It becomes then the duty of 
 philosophers to unite in defence of such principles as the 
 only barrier against scepticism. Let the instinctive beliefs 
 of mankind, discriminated and interpreted, be accepted as 
 the ultimate criteria of truth. But, above all, let philoso- 
 phers take care to maintain the integrity of their testi- 
 mony. The philosopher's infirmity is the sceptic's oppor- 
 tunity. 
 
 1 Ferrier, Berkeley and Idealism, p. S17. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 NOTES FOE LECTURES ON CICERO'S LUCULLUS. 
 (Text, Edition op Klotz.) 
 
 Chap. I. 2. artem ei memoriae quae tum primum profereha" 
 tur\ The Sophists were probably the first who attempted to 
 cultivate the memory by artificial means. Such proficiency was 
 an indispensable accessory to rhetorical art, Aristotle has left 
 us the best and most pregnant essay on memory {De Mem^ria), 
 in which the phenomenon is carefully analysed, the laws of the 
 association of ideas indicated, and the nature of the mental image 
 precisely defined. The notice of the faculty of memory in the 
 exordium to this work is remarkably relevant, since it was really 
 the only power the Stoics allowed to the mind. See Chapters vii. 
 22, memoriae quidem, &c., x. 30, xxxiii. 106. 
 
 II. 4. Quum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur 
 AntiochuSy Philonis auditor excellere, &c.] See Lecture V. § a, 
 
 ibid. § ^. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent^ &c.] Cicero was evidently 
 
 brought to the same opinion ultimately. Hence the recall of the 
 first edition of this work. See Lecture I. p. 20, note 2. 
 
 III. 7. Restat unum genus, &c.] The Dogmatists, i.e. the 
 Stoics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics. These, with the Academi- 
 cians (Sceptics) divided between them the domain of Greek 
 Philosophy during the three centuries preceding the Christian 
 Era. 
 
 Sextus Empiricus opens his review of the doctrines of the 
 Sceptics with the following leading distinctions among philoso- 
 phers : ' They who seek for anything (says he) must either have 
 
I50 APPENDIX A. 
 
 found it, or admit that it is not to be found, or, finally, uncertain 
 whether it is to be found or not persevere still in the search.' So 
 it is with the questions of Philosophy. One sect say they have 
 discovered the truth, a second that it is unattainable, and a third 
 continue its pursuit. The first are the Dogmatists; the second, 
 Carneades, Clitomachus, and the Academicians; the third, the 
 Sceptics. In this description a distinction is made between the 
 Academicians and Sceptics which is unreal ; or, rather, it applies 
 
 to the end and not to the method of Philosophy. ratio non 
 
 prohatur] The proper translation oi ratio is method, i.e. any road, 
 way, or means to an end in the field of knowledge or philosophy 
 the end is truth; the method or means to that end is evidence; 
 hence method in its philosophical signification is the theory of 
 evidence (logic) as understood by Mr Mill. The Dogmatists and 
 Sceptics then differed concerning the theory of evidence or means 
 of discovering truth. In this controversy the Academicians were 
 certainly Sceptics. But the truth indicated in this passage from 
 Sextus E. is what we understand now as metaphysical or ontolo- 
 gical truth; that is, the reality of things per se. This, the 
 Academicians, anticipating the decision of Kant, resigned as un- 
 attainable. The Dogmatists, considering all truth to be bound 
 up with the real nature and essence of things, confused metaphy- 
 sical and physical enquiries, never distinctly separated until the 
 
 present day. Nos auterri] Cicero here proclaims himself as 
 
 belonging to the school of the Academy. Only in metaphysical 
 speculations, however, for in moral philosophy he must be classed 
 
 with the Stoics. He was more properly an eclectic. eliciant 
 
 et tamquam exprimant'] The cross-examining, maieutic method or 
 dialectic of Socrates is here alluded to. It was the characteristic 
 manner of the Academy to discover truth by questioning man, 
 in whom, according to the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, the 
 first principles of knowledge were latent. Socrates adopted a 
 pseudo-inductive method for eliciting these principles; i.e. he 
 endeavoured to eliminate conflicting opinions, So^at, from the 
 genuine irrLaT-qixr]. It was Bacon who first announced the fertile 
 observation that to arrive at knowledge it was necessary to ques- 
 tion nature, not man. 
 
 IV. 10. Etsi heri, inquit'] The nature of the pi^ceding dis- 
 cussion is betrayed by the following references: vi. 18, jam enim 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS, 151 
 
 hoc pro f^avTacria verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus; xiii. 
 
 42, XVI. 49, XVIII. 59, xxv. 79. non vinci me malim quam 
 
 vincere] This is a Socratic adage, as in the Gorgias Socrates tells 
 his interlocutor he would rather be refuted than himself refute. 
 
 11. in ista philosophia] That of the Academy, Clitomachus 
 
 was the pupil and mouthpiece of Carneades, the third leader of 
 the Academy j Philo was the fourth, Antiochus the fifth, who 
 coalesced the opinions of the Academy with those of the Stoa; 
 hence was in opposition to Carneades and Philo. The doctrines 
 of the Academy were revived again by the later Pyrrhonists 
 
 under ^Enesidemus. 1 2, contra suum doctoreni] Thus Antiochus 
 
 ranged himself in direct antagonism to Philo and Carneades. 
 
 Ad Arcesilarri] the second leader of the Academy. Thus the five 
 chief men were Plato, Arcesilas, Carneades, Philo, and Antiochus. 
 
 V. 13. me autem] Cicero — the two interlocutors therefore 
 are Cicero speaking as and for the Academy against LucuUus 
 personating Antiochus, who had deserted the Academy for the 
 Stoa; therefore is attacking the Academy with all the hostility 
 
 of a renegade. veteres physicos] It is a common habit with the 
 
 upholders of certain opinions to maintain that the same doctrines 
 have been held by every one else. So the Sceptics tried to show 
 that all former philosophers had been Sceptics likewise (cf. Diog. 
 L. IX.). The Pre-Socratic philosophers were called physical 
 because their enquiries were chiefly concerning <^uo-ts, or the real 
 nature of things. They would now be called metaphysical or 
 
 ontological speculatists. 15. Peripateticos et Academicos, nomi" 
 
 nibus differentes, re congruentes] It has been a prevalent opinion 
 that there were antithetical distinctions between Plato and 
 Aristotle. Every man it is said is born either a Platonist or an 
 Aristotelian. Sometimes Plato is considered an Idealist, Aristotle 
 a Materialist. Plato is often held to have depended on ci priori 
 or intuitive principles of knowledge, whilst Aristotle was an 
 Empiricist, or one who derived all knowledge a posteriori from 
 experience. We have not space here to refute these erroneous 
 views, but recommend the student to adopt the opinion expressed 
 in the text, trusting to his own reading for confirmation of it. 
 
 YI. 17. ullaiKh rationem] We have said above '(iii. 7) that 
 ratio means method, and that method is the way to truth, i.e. 
 evidence. How evidence is to be collected, estimated, verified 
 
152 APPENDIX A. 
 
 and applied, is method.— Now the Academicians challenged the 
 validity of evidence altogether. With what evidence, therefore, 
 was it possible to meet them 1 We may consider the subject- 
 matter of the following discussion to be the evidentness of evidence. 
 An illustration will place the dispute in a clear light. A witness 
 gives his evidence in a court of justice ; it is manifest the value 
 of his evidence must in a great measure depend upon his veracity. 
 This can be attacked, and requires evidence to support it — this 
 second evidence may again have to be based on other evidence, 
 and so ad infinitum. Now the Stoics maintained that there was 
 a kind of evidence whose evidentness was in itself and shone as it 
 were by its own light. Such evidence they called KaTdXrjxj/Ls 
 
 (cognitio aut perceptio aut comprehensio, quam KaTdXrjij/Lv illi 
 
 vocant). For the origin of the term KardX-qxpi';^ see Ch. xLVii. 
 145. Also Lect. lY. § p. The Academicians held that such self- 
 evident evidence was impossible. The instance which is to be 
 taken in the following treatise, and which in fact afforded a 
 capital opportunity for each side to try the temper of their 
 weapons, was the phenomena of external perception. Here the 
 nature of evidence conld be tested in its simplest, most general, 
 and most important applications. The student must not be re- 
 pelled by the apparent puerility of many of the arguments j — the 
 eviderdness of evidence is one of the most momentous questions for 
 man to decide upon, and, although human beings can get on very 
 well with the unsupported evidence of their senses, yet the greatest 
 philosophers of every age have made the theory of perception the 
 
 basis of all psychological, logical and metaphysical enquiries. 
 
 eosque, qui persuadere vellent aut evidentiam nos'\ The student 
 
 must attend particularly to this passage, the meaning of which is 
 that the Academicians would not admit the evidentness of any evi- 
 dence. It is therefore no use trying to convince them by persuasion, 
 argument, or evidence, because the process would be interminable. 
 
 sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa evi- 
 
 dentia reperiri posse] Tr-dnslsite orationem, argument. 18. id 
 
 enim volumus esse aKaTdX-q-KTov] This doctrine of dKardX-q-n-Tov or 
 incomprehensibility simply denied the evidentness of any evidence 
 whatever. The counter- doctrine was illustrated by Zeno the 
 founder of the Stoics through the ^avrao-ta or visum, i.e. the 
 change of consciousness in tlie individual through which as an 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS, 153 
 
 effect, impressum ejffictumque, any external object betrays its pre- 
 sence as causes. Now on what evidence do we say a white object 
 is white 1 surely, this is a case of self-evident evidence where belief 
 is compelled. The sceptical reply to this instance we have dwelt 
 upon with sufficient length in Lecture III. § a. The whiteness ia 
 consciousness is only self-evident evidence of itself. Its cause or 
 the external object may produce in another person a different 
 consciousness — or it may be excited by a ner\ous disorder (See 
 Lect. TV. note 1, page 73). So far from being a capital instance 
 of self-evident evidence it is merely a proof of the fallibility of 
 every kind of evidence. 
 
 There is an anacoluthon in the paragraph id enim volumus 
 esse (XKaTdXrjTTTov, — si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum — 
 jain enim hoc pro <f>avTacrLa verhum satis hesterno serTnone trivimvs 
 
 visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset, quale 
 
 esset non posset, ex eo, unde non esset. — First, illud refers to aKard- 
 XrjTTTov, then is apposed by tale visum, then the sentence is broken 
 and the visum afterwards described is a perception impressed on 
 the mind by such a cause or external object as could not but 
 produce it, i.e. the effect could only have but one cause; now the 
 aKaTdXrjTTTov is the exact opposite of this. The anacoluthon may 
 be avoided by omitting the non in the sentence quale esse non 
 posset; in this case it will not be the visum which is defined, but 
 
 the aKaTdX-rjiTTov visum. Quo minime vult, revolvitur] The 
 
 vicious circle in which it is sought to involve Philo is, that if, as 
 he said, all evidence rests on other evidence, upon what does he 
 Philo rest the evidence of this assertion 1 
 
 YII. 19. remo injlexo aut de collo columhce'\ See Lecture III. 
 page 49 — infra ch. xxx. Favourite illustration with the Sceptics 
 of the fallibility of the senses. A stick in the water appears bent 
 when it is really straight. 
 
 ♦' Law is God, say some ; no God at all, says the fool ; 
 For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool." 
 
 Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa] Cf. xxv. 79 ; xxxii. 101. 
 The Epicureans or Epicurus thought that perception was caused 
 by an object throwing off a sort of filmy image of itself which 
 impinged on the senses and was an exact representation of the 
 object from which it proceeded. Thus in vision they held it 
 
154 APPENDIX A. 
 
 absurd to say tlie sun or moon were any larger than they appeared 
 
 to be. si et sani sunt] This is begging the question altogether; 
 
 as Cicero's object is to upset the arguments of the Stoics main- 
 tained by Lucullus, he would naturally not establish them on too 
 firm a basis. Eor an exposition of the entire subject, see Lectures 
 III. and IV., especially the note from Mill's Logic, Lect. IV. 
 page 73. Most of our judgments through the senses are not 
 simple judgments; they are inferences, as the student will there 
 
 see. Quod idem fit in vocibus, &c.] See Bain, On the Senses 
 
 and Intellect, Book ii. ch. 2. The power of discriminating 
 differences and detecting resemblances is the ultimate fact of 
 
 consciousness, the basis of all intelligence. 20. Cyrenaici] The 
 
 followers of Aristippus; they held that the distinctions of pleasure 
 and pain were the only immediate judgments which did not 
 involve an inference. This is pleasant to me is a judgment about 
 that which philosophers term a subjective fact; it cannot be gain- 
 sayed, it requires no proof, and is therefore not an inference ; but 
 the judgment this is white (21. illud est album, hoc dulce) is by 
 no means on the same footing, i.e. if by this I mean some external 
 object the permanent cause of a constant effect called whiteness, 
 because the same object will often not produce the same effect. 
 -The ratiocination Tiucompanying such a perception would be, what- 
 ever appears white is white, this object appears white, therefore we 
 have the inference this object is white. Here the Sceptics attack 
 the major premiss allowing only the minor ; see Sextus Empiricus, 
 Hyp. I. 10, 19, 20, also Lect. IIL § /3. 
 
 "We do not arraign the passive representations of conscious- 
 ness, Ttt Kara tfyavTaa-tav TraOrjTCKoi. For they compel our assent 
 involuntarily, inasmuch as they are phenomena. But, when we 
 come to enquire whether the external object (to vTroKetfxcvov) 
 is such as it appears to be, we admit there is no question about 
 the phenomenon, but about that which is in/erred from the 
 phenomenon, Trcpt cKctVov o Aeycrat Trepl rov <f>aivoixivov. For ex- 
 ample, 'honey tastes sweet;' so much we allow, for we are 
 conscious of the taste through a direct sensation, y\vKat,6}i€6a yap 
 ala-OrjTLKw?. But we doubt whether we are justified in passing the 
 judgment 'this is sweet,' for that is not the phenomenon, but some- 
 thing asserted concerning the phenomenon, o ovk ^avL to (patvofjie- 
 vov, dXXd Trepl tou ^aii/o/x-eVov Xeyd/xei'oi/. 21. AniTilO jam hceo 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 1 55 
 
 tenemus compreJiensa, non sensibus] The meaning of this is, 
 before we can recognise an object as white, we must have a clear 
 idea of what whiteness is. This will apply equally to any judg- 
 ment even the most subjective — we cannot say this is pleasure 
 unless we have a general idea of pleasure already in the mind. 
 Hence the formation of conceptions or general notions is always 
 considered the first step in the acquisition of knowledge. Mr 
 Mill, however, controverts this opinion (see Mill's Logic, i. ch. v.). 
 *Ille* deinceps ^equus est, ille Ganis''\ See note from MilFs 
 
 Logic, Lect. lY. p. 73 and Lect. Y. 22. cvvotas.] See Lecture 
 
 lY. § a, p. Q%, &c. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, 
 
 qui artem fractabit, multa perceperit?^ The Stoics derived all 
 knowledge from experience. Now experience is a storing up in 
 the memory of the distinguishing marks of objects by which we 
 classify, recognise, and communicate our notions of them. But 
 this group of marks is what we have termed the constant effect of 
 
 • a permanent cause. — as by the general name horse we mean a 
 /certain bundle of qualities, or attributes, common to a great many 
 
 • objects which we therefore call by one name. The Stoics argued 
 w^e should be disabled from acquiring any kind of knowledge if 
 we were led to doubt the validity of the signs or marks by which 
 we grouped external objects. Practically they were right, theo- 
 retically wrong, and principally they failed in pointing out any 
 reliable method of induction by which the connection of an effect 
 with its cause, or the sign with the thing of which it was a sign, 
 could be verified. One can hardly imagine the Stoics themselves 
 neglected such an important process of verification, although even 
 theoretical. Scepticism is proof against the most overwhelming evi- 
 dence. Sir G. C. Lewis would doubt, on seeing a man with a bullet 
 iti his heart, though otherwise completely intact, whether he was 
 killed by this bullet (see Bain's Logic, Yol. ii. p. 60). As we have so 
 often stated, the signs or marks of things we call their qualities are 
 effects, from the presence of which we infer their cause. But from 
 the presence of an effect we can never infer a cause with theoretical 
 certainty, unless we know d, priori that no other cause could have 
 produced the same effect. From the flower-beds being wet, we 
 could not infer that it had rained in the night — they may have 
 been watered, or there might have been dew. In the same way 
 the marks or qualities of a horse may be present to my conscious- 
 
156 APPENDIX A. 
 
 ness, but unless I can assert ct priori that nothing else could have 
 in any case produced these marks I cannot be sure that a horse is 
 present — I may be dreaming — my nerves may be out of order, &c. 
 VIII. 23. Ea autem constantia si nihil haheat percepti et cog- 
 nitif qumro unde nata sit aut quo modo ^] * Since then our inward 
 feelings and the perceptions we receive from our external senses 
 are equally real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as 
 little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute 
 speculative truth.' (Butler, Sermon 11.) The whole moral system 
 of the Stoics was a rigid deduction from principles; but these 
 principles were empirically induced from observation and experi- 
 ence of the laws of nature. Hence, if the faculties by which man 
 acquired his knowledge were wanting in veracity, the whole art of 
 life must fall to the ground, at least as a necessary, permanent, and 
 natural standard of conduct, which the Stoics held it to be. The 
 rules of life were, according to the Sceptics, founded on the laws 
 of man. By the Dogmatists, on the laws of nature. By the one 
 nian was made the standard of good and evil, by the other nature. 
 For example, justice with the Dogmatists would be the manifesta- 
 tion of the principle of harmony, order, and consistency, pervading 
 all nature, while, with the Sceptics, it is but conformity to the 
 arbiti-ary enactments of some individual or community. For an 
 account of the ethical doctrine of the Stoics see De FinibuSy 
 Book III. ; Diogenes Laertius, vii. 84; Stobseus, Eel. Eth. p. 90 sqq. ; 
 
 Seneca, Epistle 89. 14. tarn graves leges'\ There is no better 
 
 test of a man's belief than the amount he will endure for the sake 
 
 of it. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia sapientice?] The ultimate 
 
 evidentness of some evidence is here appealed to. The final ground 
 of wisdom or knowledge can no more be impugned than that of 
 taste or relish, whence its name is derived — the crux of Greek 
 speculation was, how do you know, when you think you know, 
 whether you know or not? The English word taste, expressing 
 the science of the beautiful, is sufficiently analogous to enable us to 
 comprehend the point of view of the Ancients regarding knowledge. 
 Nothing seems so subjective, artificial, conventional, and arbitrary 
 as the judgments of men concerning the beautiful in art or nature, 
 yet there is an objective standard — an ideal something, whither 
 all opinions tend and converge. Philosophers have, in vain, 
 endeavoured to resolve this into association, habit, custom; so 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 157 
 
 with our moral judgments, towards wliicli this part of the discus- 
 sion evidently turns, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, 
 quum quid agere incipiat sequatur, &c. It was supposed by the 
 Peripatetics that the process of action in the case of an animal 
 could be analysed into the following syllogistic form : 
 
 1. Major Premiss. Such and such an action is universally 
 
 good. 
 Minor Premiss. This will be an action of the kind. 
 Conclusion. Performance of the action. 
 
 See De Motu Animalium, vi. 2. Aristotle's Eth. Books vi. vii. 
 initium = dpxij is the princij)le or major premiss, idque esse naturae 
 acGommodatum. The standard of good and evil must be deter- 
 mined by nature, that is, nature as Bishop Butler understands it, 
 viz. as decided by the cool, calm, dispassionate judgment of an 
 
 intelligent being. appetitio = opfjit]. There is another form of 
 
 the practical syllogism : 
 
 2. Major Premiss. Such and such an end is desirable. 
 Minor Premiss. This step will conduce to the end. 
 Conclusion. Taking of the step. 
 
 With regard to these two forms Sir A. Grant observes (Essay iv. 
 p. 214), "These two different ways of stating the practical syllo- 
 gism are, in reality, coincident; for, assuming that all action is 
 for some end, the major premiss may be said always to contain 
 the statement of an end (Eth. vi. xii. 10). And again, any 
 particular act which is the application of a moral principle may 
 be said to be the means necessary to the realization of the principle. 
 * Temperance is good,' may be called either a general principle, 
 or an expression of a desire for the habit of temperance. * To 
 abstain now will be temperate,' is an application of the principle, 
 or again, it is the absolutely necessary means toward the attain- 
 ment of the habit. For *it is absurd, as Aristotle tells us' when 
 one acts unjustly to talk of not wishing to be unjust, or when one 
 acts intemperately of not wishing to be intemperate" (Eth. iii, 
 V. 13). "We do not agree with ^ir Alexander in his opinion that 
 these two forms are coincident ; in fact, neither does the first involve 
 the second, nor the second imply the first. A man in concluding 
 
158 APPENDIX A. 
 
 that such and such a course of action is good, does not necessarily 
 desire it, and in desiring it he need not think about the good — at 
 least this is a question lying at the bottom of all moral controver- 
 sies. See Gorgias, 474 D. where Socrates is endeavouring to 
 identify the base with the bad, i.e. the undesirable; and the right 
 
 with the good or desirable 25. Illud autem, quod movet prius 
 
 02)ortet videri eique credi] See Lecture II. § ^, where we have 
 attempted to explain how the Sceptics applied this principle. 
 
 VIII. 26. si ista vera sunt\ The scholar will know that 
 ista must be translated, the arguments of my opponents, i.e. the 
 
 counter-arguments to the preceding reasoning. Qucestio autem 
 
 est appetitio cognitionis qucestionisque finis inventio] AU desires 
 are natural, i.e. have an end given and provided by nature. The 
 Stoical argument will therefore be 'the desire of knowledge is 
 natural,' 'the appropriate end is discovery or truth,' therefore 
 truth is discoverable — in opposition to the Sceptics or Acade- 
 micians who held truth to be aKaTdXrjTrTov. turn inventa dicun- 
 
 tur\ The word invenio does not convey the idea intended as well 
 as our English 'discover' or German entdecken — involuta implies 
 
 an analytic process which invenio does not. Sic et initium 
 
 quaerendi et exitus percipiendi, &c.] That which moves desire 
 is also that which satisfies it, but that which moves the desire of 
 knowledge is truth, therefore truth alone will satisfy it. 
 
 IX. 27. quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit] Cf. De 
 Fin. III. v. 18, A falsa autem assensione, &c.] The Stoics held that 
 to entertain a falsehood was a direct violation of the laws of nature, 
 which were the standard of all virtue; for an objective fact, i.e. a 
 reality, was among the Greeks the notion expressed by the term 
 <f>iiacL, and the antithesis of i/o/ao) the mere subjective appearance. 
 Thus the pursuit of truth was the highest virtue with the Stoics, 
 for it was the coming face to face with nature and nature's laws. 
 
 28. Carneades acutius resistebat] See ch. vi. 18 supra. Qui 
 
 enim negaret quidquam esse quod perciperetur'] Self-evident evi- 
 dence we have before stated was the goal of Greek Philosophy. 
 The question is, does the assertion there is no self-evident evidence 
 assume a perception of this very fact — must there not be some 
 light to make darkness visible? Carneades says 'No,' the Stoics 
 *Yes.' Whenever men disagree on first principles they are in- 
 volved in th<) same difficulty. Carneades assumed ignorance as 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS, 1 59 
 
 the natural condition of man, tlie Stoics hnowledge. Then the 
 Stoics called on Carneades to establish his position, while Carneades 
 summoned the Stoics to prove theirs. decretum = Soyfxa, an em- 
 pirical judgment, the very antithesis of iincrTyjfjir} according to the 
 Platonic doctrines, as our d posteriori knowledge is opposed to cb 
 
 priori. judicium veri et Jinem honorurri] ao^ta koX tfypovrja-LSf 
 
 theoretical and practical wisdom. cognoscendi initiura] First 
 
 principles, such as axioms of geometry. extremum expete^idi^ 
 
 the objects of natural desire, which, being attained, are the natural 
 causes of happiness, therefore the proper end of action for a wise 
 man. The entire philosophy of the Stoics, with its aim, its method 
 and its matter, is here compressed into a few lines. 
 
 X. 30. Aliquantum a physicis\ Ch. vii. describes the pro- 
 cess of acquiring knowledge. In this chapter more is intended 
 but not executed ; it is little else than a repetition of vii. For 
 the distinction between Ivvotaq and Trpohjif/eiq see Lecture TV, 
 
 ipsa sensus est\ The Stoics allowed the mind the faculty of 
 
 memory at any rate in addition to mere sensuous sensibility. 
 Memory involves perception of self and time, neither of which 
 ideas have their source in the senses, but are necessary to the 
 exercise of sense, for unless the mind had been endowed with a 
 retentive faculty the impressions of sense would no more leave a 
 consciousness of themselves than the fleeting shadows of summer- 
 clouds cause the lake in which they are pictured to be mindful of 
 
 their presence. Ccetera autem similitudinihus constituii\ The 
 
 process of forming general notions as described in most text-books 
 on Logic. See Thomson's Laws of Thought, ch. 2 j Hamilton's 
 Lectures on Logic, On perceiving that many objects are alike, we 
 form them into groups or classes, and their points of resemblance 
 
 constitute the key of recognition. 31. quum ipsam per se 
 
 amat turn etiam propter usutu] Psychologists tell us that the 
 
 senses have in the first instance a natural and spontaneous 
 attraction to their objects, that infants are known instinctively to 
 turn their eyes towards the window or fire, and are similarly 
 fascinated by any intrusive sound if not so acute as to be painful 
 to the membrane of the ear. Thus it seems the senses crave a 
 sort of pabulum for their support and invigoration ; and this 
 appears to be implied in the text. — KaTdXr]{f/L<s is the natural light 
 of the understanding — self-evident evidence. Cicero translates it. 
 
l6a APPENDIX A. 
 
 by comprehensio, but seems to warn his hearers it is merely for 
 
 want of a better word in the unphilosophical Latin tongue. 
 
 quasi sensus alteros] So by means of a balance we can discrimi- 
 nate differences of weight with more accuracy than by mere 
 
 muscular sense. ut viftutem efficiat\ Knowledge of the laws 
 
 of nature renders man able to obey them. Of. De Fin. i. xix. 63. 
 Morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. 
 
 32. Quce in profundo veritateon] The school of extreme 
 
 Sceptics is here dismissed as incurably illogical, inconsistent and 
 impracticable. They wei^ probably the Pyrrhonists and those of 
 the New Academy who had adopted the views of the Pyrrhonists 
 with theoretical rigour. Henceforth the doctrines to be con- 
 sidered are those of Carneades, who endeavoured to erect a 
 standard of probability between the extremes of dogmatical cer- 
 tainty and sceptical doubt. Inter incertum et id, quod percipi 
 
 non possitf &c.] The mind is susceptible of degrees of belief 
 according to the preponderance of testimony in one direction or 
 another. So Carneades and the more rational of the New 
 Academicians affirmed where demonstrative evidence was wanting 
 there might still be sufficient to constitute a reasonable ground of 
 probability. We shall see that the notion of the probable could 
 not be theoretically supported, but Carneades was the first to 
 maintain that probability was the only attainable rule of action. 
 The difference between the unknown and the uncertain is not 
 very precisely defined in this placa 
 
 XI. 33. Si nihil interest, notam] To understand the 
 
 Stoical argument let us suppose a traveller trusting to be guided 
 to his destination by a beacon. If encountering an ignis fatuus 
 he is unable to distinguish the illusive from the genuine mark. 
 The real arbiter of his step would not be reason or evidence, but 
 accident and chance. Such the Stoics thought would be the 
 position of those who denied the self-evident character of evidence, 
 quidquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modofalsum etiam possit 
 
 videri. sic reliqua visis. The reader will remember that in 
 
 Ch. VI., the cataleptic phantasm was rendered by visum. 
 
 prohabilem et quce non impediatur'] The probable judgment of 
 Carneades was simply an inductive conclusion from the evidence 
 
 of particulars as explained in Lect. V. 34. perspicua a per- 
 
 oeptis volunt distinguere] I should conceive the distinction be- 
 
NOTES ON THE LUGULLUS. l6l 
 
 tween perspicua and percepta to be the former referring to the 
 relation of things, the latter to their nature. Of one we have 
 ample and accessible evidence, of the other we know nothing. 
 
 Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, <fec.] 
 
 Thus a black object is known relatively to a white with respect to 
 its colour ; — but of their absolute nature we can affirm nothing. 
 From the Carneadean point of view a black object could not 
 appear white because it would then be a white object. From the 
 Stoical point of view, however, the colour would not be a mere 
 relation of one object to another, but the determining objective 
 
 quality, accident, mark or sign. 36. fiotwni iis esse debebit 
 
 insigne veri, &c.] Here we are round again at the same point, 
 how do we know when we think we know, whether we know or 
 not ? Science with the ancients was a knowledge of causes, but 
 the idea of cause was with them such that causes must for ever 
 remain unperceived, because there was no faculty in man capable 
 of apprehending them. 
 
 To an effect a multitude of causes may be assigned, and as long 
 as they remain in the nebulous region of noumena it is impossible 
 to apply the method of difference by which alone a real cause 
 could be verified. 
 
 XII. 37. o-vyKaTdOea-Lv, see Lect. IV. 37 — 38. Quae est 
 
 in nostra sita potestate jyerspicuam non approbare] Assent = 
 
 belief seems in one passage to be considered voluntary, in the other 
 involuntary. 
 
 It is certain that determination to action depends solely on 
 our belief in the reality of the existence of the object of desire. 
 So far then as determination to action is voluntary the assent or 
 belief is voluntary, . but, regarding consciousness as a passive 
 recipient of external impressions, it is involuntary. We speak 
 about weighing an opinion, or weighing evidence, in which expres- 
 sion there is obviously a mixture of the voluntary and in- 
 voluntary. We weigh the evidence, but the evidence influences 
 us ponderibus impositis. Perhaps the meaning of avyKaTaOeo-ts is 
 not simply belief, but belief in external existence, as it is said 
 
 belief = perception. Qui enim quid pera'pit, adsentitur statim'\ 
 
 Thus perception is used as in Reid's works, viz. the apprehension 
 of the external cause of a change of consciousness. The measure 
 of belief is the tendency to action. This was the cardinal maxim 
 
 L. L. 11 
 
1 62 APPENDIX A. 
 
 assumed by the Stoics.- 39. Omninoque ante videri, &c.] See 
 
 Lect. II. § (3. 
 
 XIII. 40. The cause of the plaintiffs (the Stoics) is now 
 closed, but their counsel LucuUus = Antiochus proceeds to set 
 forth the counter-arguments of the defendants (the Sceptics = New- 
 Academicians), whose mouth-piece was Carneades represented in 
 
 this work by Cicero himself. Gomponunt igitur primum artem 
 
 quandam, the science of succession and co-existence. Totidem 
 
 verbis quot Stoici\ See Lect. Y. § e. 
 
 The theory of perception of the Stoics and Academicians was 
 substantially the same. It was on the value and import of 
 evidence that they were so irreconcilably opposed. The theory of 
 perception is never explicitly set forth in this work, but is 
 assumed as the basis of controversy by both sides. We have 
 
 indicated it with sufficient detail in Lectures lY. and Y. Qucb ita 
 
 videantur discerni non possint] Compare with the four maxims 
 
 given subsequently in this chapter, of which this passage is a con- 
 densation; but there appears something hopelessly obscure about 
 
 it as here presented. 
 
 41. Axiom 1. Quse visa falsa sint, ea percipi non posse. 
 
 2. Inter quae alia ut non possint. 
 
 3. Quae videantur eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa. 
 
 4. Omne visum . . . possit esse. 
 
 1. Mental images which are false cannot be perceived. 
 
 2. Of mental images among which there is no difference, it is 
 impossible that some are of such a kind as to be perceived and 
 others not. 
 
 3. Of things which appear, some are true, some are false. 
 
 4. Every mental image caused by a real object is of such a 
 kind that it might have proceeded from an unreal one. 
 
 Compare XXYI. where, however, the order in which these 
 flxioms are stated is somewhat different : 
 
 1 in XIII. corresponds with 2 in XXYI. 
 
 2 3 
 
 3 1 
 
 4 ,. 4 
 
 The student had better consult XXYI. at once, the matter being 
 identical though treated perhaps with more perspicuity. 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 165 
 
 We translate visum in every case here by mental image or 
 representation, following the obvious meaning in Ch. vi. 18, 
 reminding the reader, however, that the word image is only used 
 figuratively, and that although visum seems to refer exclusively to 
 the sense of sight, it is equally applicable to the representations of 
 any other sense; there may be a visum of hearing, of taste, or of 
 smell. We find no indication of the so-called muscular sense 
 which plays so important a part in the doctrines of modern 
 psychologists, and which has contributed more than any other to 
 the elucidation of the subject of external perception. The 
 question is, when are such mental images, being efiects, signs, or 
 marks of their causes, valid evidence of real external objects 1 
 By axiom 1, if the mark or sign is false, i.e. has not proceeded 
 from the object, it is of course no evidence at all, i.e. cannot be 
 perceived. The Stoics argued that this reality was a qualitative 
 mark of the mental image, so that a man could distinguish 
 between a dream and an objective fact. Carneades, on the other 
 hand, maintained that there was no such qualitative distinction, 
 that it was not the connection between the sign and the thing 
 signified which influenced belief, but the relation of one sign to 
 
 another ; see Lect. Y. § c. 42. Dividunt enim in partes] This 
 
 is the division observed in the SeVa rpoTrot ; see Lect. III. § ^. A 
 threefold relation, 1. Of object to organ of sense. 2. Object to 
 object. 3. Object to the maxims of prejudice and tradition. 
 
 XIY. 43. quod minime illi volunt] An attempt is here 
 made to refute the Academicians by showing that they would 
 invalidate an illative argument by an illative process. But the 
 Sceptics never questioned the illative process, as we have shewn 
 Lect. YI. § /?. It is intuitive evidence they called in question. 
 
 44. Maxime autem convincuntur, &c.] On holding a shell 
 
 to the ear we fancy we perceive the distant murmur of the sea, 
 but it is not the murmur of the sea ; nevertheless it is not any 
 qualitative difference in the mental image (visum) qua mental 
 image, which assures us of the falsity of the representation, but a 
 comparison of circumstances, such as the sea is 500 miles off", &c., 
 besides the simple mode of verification by method of difference, i.e. 
 
 by removing the shell — This is all the Academicians asserted. 
 
 45. Opinionem a perspicuitate, &c.] Epicurus was what would 
 now be called an ultra-realist — materialist, or an intuitive realist, 
 
 11-^2 
 
164 APPENDIX A. 
 
 He considered that we envisaged material objects immediately, that 
 when we said the sun of a foot diameter there was really an 
 external sun of a foot diameter objectively presented ; hence there 
 was no inference, judgment or opinion, but a direct intuition, per- 
 spicuitatas; see note from Mill's Logic, Lect. IV. p. 73. 
 
 XY. 48. Ut non Tuodo non internoscat (minino ^ The 
 
 distinction between a false sensible impression and an erroneous 
 judgment is here drawn between the thing distinguished and the 
 faculty which distinguishes. With regard to the marks or sen- 
 suous modifications we have spoken above, Ch. xiii. Sin 
 
 autem sunt, <fec.] Carneades and the New Academicians could 
 not maintain the doctrine of probability consistently without 
 admitting that the modifications of consciousness were reliable 
 marks of external objects. Granting this, the Stoics maintained 
 that it was as competent for a wise man to arrive at certainty as 
 probability. But although this argument was available against 
 the ultra-Sceptics, who founded on the equipoise of evidence, it 
 missed the Carneadeans, who regarded probability as the asymp- 
 tote to certainty always approaching, but never touching it. 
 
 XVI. 49. Soritas] See infra Ch. xxix. 50. Si quid 
 
 cui dlfficiliter possit ?] Two things may be similar in every 
 
 respect but one — they are not therefore difficult to distinguish. 
 And, even where marks are indiscernible, the objects are not 
 identical — as several shillings are indistinguishable but not identi- 
 cal. 51. Nam ah omnibus ejusdem inodi visis, &c.] This is 
 
 exactly the i-easoning advanced by Carneades; see Lect. V. § e. 
 
 It is not any qualitative mark by which we recognize the 
 reality of a mental mode, but simply by comparing it with juxta 
 events. In respect to the illustrations from dreams, insanity, &c., 
 it must be remarked that there is a wide difierence between our 
 judgments concerning dreams while dreaming and afterwards 
 (xxvii. 88). In the first place, when dreaming we never 
 question the reality of our perceptions; when we begin to do so it 
 is a sure sign sleep is quitting us. When we dream that we 
 dream it is near the awakening. In drunkenness or madness 
 there is no doubt an overpowering intensity or heightening of the 
 nervous state, which is a concomitant of the mental mode, while 
 in dreams there is a corresponding enfeeblement. Thus in mad- 
 ness there is an irresistible determination to action; in dreams, 
 
NOTES ON THE LUGULLUS. 1 65 
 
 I think, we are never powerfully moved, there is a lazy contem- 
 plation of a panorama, without surprise at its anomalies, without 
 much interest in its vicissitudes. 
 
 XVIII. 56. rerum singulas proprietates esse] See Lect. IV. 
 If everything has a distinguishing mark then there is no danger 
 of making a wrong inference from the possibility of a plurality of 
 causes. On the other hand, as we have shewn above, if many 
 external objects produce the same or an indistinguishable mental 
 mode, there is no means of inferring, when such a mental mode 
 is produced, which particular object has caused it. But the Stoics 
 insist that each separate object has some distinguishing quality, 
 appreciable at least to him who is sagacious and industrious 
 enough to detect it; which, affecting a correspondingly distin- 
 guishable mode of consciousness, becomes a sign of its external 
 
 cause. Of. 57. ii quum ovum, &c. 58. neque id est contra nos^ 
 
 The id refers here to the proverb that one egg is like another; 
 still, as was observed above, great similarity does not imply 
 indiscernibility. The illustration of the hen and the e^ is 
 perhaps a travesty of the relation between cause and effect as 
 
 understood by the ancients. 59. necessario nata est liroyrj] The 
 
 nature of cttox'/ has been sufficiently dwelt upon in Lect. VI. 
 As we have already noticed above (xiv. 49), the doctrine of the 
 €TToxq is more illogical than that of probability; for if there is 
 such a power of weighing evidence that exact equipollence is the 
 result, there must be the ability to discern preponderance. Cicero 
 seems not to have understood the real character of the €7rox>i, for 
 he regards it apparently as an a priori determination to resist all 
 evidence, and an obstinate refusal to entertain it; whereas it is 
 manifest that the liroxq was the deliberate suspension of judg- C> 
 
 ment after, not before, the witnesses on both sides had been heard. 
 Arcesilas undoubtedly imported the Pyrrhonian form of scepti- 
 cism into the Academy. See Lect. V. 
 
 XIX. 62. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam sententiam minime 
 liceat defendere\ * Beware lest you, in advocating the worthless- 
 ness of all authority, cause your own opinion to be regarded with 
 scant respect.' 
 
 '^^. ^^. Visa enim ista quum acriter...tame7i] Translate wsa, 
 appearances. When appearances are strong my belief is enforced 
 in the reality of their objects, although I would not admit that 
 
1 66 APPENDIX A. 
 
 such reality is manifest. I may believe where I cannot prove. 
 
 visis cedo] I yield to appearances. cavere ne capiatur, nefallor 
 
 tur videre] The former implies 'fallacies of deduction/ or 'logical 
 fallacies;' the latter, * fallacies of induction/ or * extra-logical.* 
 Cf. Whately's Logic, Chap. On Fallacies; Mill's Logic, Book v. 
 
 XXI. 67. Ilanc conclusionem... secundum] The argument may 
 be regarded as a Destructive-Hypothetical (see Whately's Logic). 
 
 If A is B, C is D, but C is not T> ; therefore A is not B. Or, 
 categorically, Fig. 2, AEE. 
 
 Fig. 2. A. All who believe form opinions. 
 
 E. But the wise man is not one who forms an opinion. 
 E. Therefore the wise man is not one who believes. 
 
 Arcesilas, it is said, admitted the first and second premiss. The 
 syllogism of Carneades would be 
 
 A. All who believe or assent form opinions. 
 
 E. The wise man sometimes believes. 
 
 E. Therefore the wise man sometimes forms opinions. 
 
 Thus, admitting the major premiss. All ivho believe form ojnnions, 
 both Arcesilas and Carneades could maintain their point. The 
 
 Stoics and Antiochus therefore denied this proposition. si ad- 
 
 sensurus esset, etiam opinaturum^ To opine or form an opinion is 
 to admit a proposition without evidence, or to admit an appear- 
 ance as a reality, or to admit the known as a mark or sign of the 
 unknown without having any ground, or only an insiifficient 
 ground, for connecting one with the other. Perhaps an opinion 
 is never without some foundation, either in the experience of him 
 who holds it, or of others in whom he trusts. An inductive pro- 
 cess is the only one by which the connection between a sign and 
 the thing signified can be established ; but the ancients seem to 
 have had no method of verifying induction ; they therefore either 
 rushed into Dogmatism or lapsed into Scepticism. To say then 
 that nothing could be perceived was equivalent to denying the 
 possibility of establishing any general proposition, hence of per- 
 forming any ratiocinative process whatever, not because the validity 
 of the process itself was impugned, but because the major premiss 
 
 was infirm. QB>. a me sumpsero et quod tu mihi das, &c.] If 
 
 the ability to form general propositions be denied, then those who 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCVLLUS. 167 
 
 believe in them must do so without sufficient evidence, i.e. such 
 belief is mere opinion. The major premiss then of the above 
 syllogism will have to be granted, viz. 
 
 ^ All who believe or assent form opinions.^ 
 The minor premiss every one grants, viz. 
 
 ' That the wise man does not form opinions.'' 
 The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable. It is the establishment 
 of this major premiss, ^ All who believe form opinions,^ grounded 
 on the inability of man to affirm general propositions, that Cicero 
 
 undertakes. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse per dpi: etenim- de eo 
 
 omnis est controversial The question whether all assent or believe 
 does involve the assumption of a general proposition, is fully 
 argued by Mr Mill, Book 11. ch. 3, where the possibility is dis- 
 cussed of assenting that A, B, or C is mortal, without having 
 first virtually admitted the proposition, 'All men are mortal.' If 
 we admit Mr Mill's reasoning the proposition, ^ All who believe 
 form opinions,' would not demand attention, being obviously 
 untrue; if, however, the necessity of affirming a particular through. 
 a general be insisted upon, then there must be granted the ability 
 to form general propositions, or the impotence of man to assent 
 positively to anything. The student will do well to consult 
 Mr Sidgwick's lucid exposition on this topic. See Contemporary 
 Review, July, 1871, Article 9, ' Verification of Beliefs.' 
 
 XXII. 70. hcEG Academicorum est una sentential viz. the 
 incompetency of man to positive and general affirmation, assent, 
 
 or belief 71. quce a te, Luculle, dicta sunt] The real business 
 
 of the book here begins. Cicero expounds perspicuously and 
 earnestly the doctrines of the New Academy as developed and 
 determined by Carneades and Philo. The salient points of their 
 system have been sufficiently indicated in Lectures Y. and YI. 
 
 XXIII. 72. Anaxagoras nivem nigram dixit esse] Water is 
 black, snow is water, therefore S7iow is black. A flagrant fallacy, 
 since there are two middle terms, snow is not water but frozen 
 water. Sextus E. notices this sophism as an example of the 
 discrepancy between the conclusions of reason and the perceptions 
 
 of sense (Hyp. 1. 13.) ostentationis aut qucestus, &c.] A view of 
 
 the Sophists, much questioned at the present day, and especially 
 by Grote the historian. 73. Quid loquar de Vemocrito ?] There 
 
1 68 APPENDIX A. 
 
 is no doubt that Benaocritus^rs^ drew attention to the distinction 
 between reality and appearance, by showing that many qualities 
 of bodies could be only modifications of the percipient subject. 
 Cicero's object seems to be, besides showing that the most renowned 
 philosophers agree with him, to claim moderation in comparison 
 
 with tJiem. 74. Fur ere tibi Empedocles . . . dicere. ^ Scire 
 
 se nihil se scire '] A portentous exception; for to know one's ignor- 
 ance is the highest knowledge, and as completely unattainable as 
 any other knowledge (see post Acad. xii. 45). Arcesilas saw the 
 scojDe of Socrates' assertion. The admission of it, however, was 
 the distinctive feature of the Pyrrhonist doctrine which Arcesilas 
 had adopted. 
 
 XXI Y. 75. Stilpon^nij Diodorum^ Alexinum] Eepresenta- 
 tives of the Megaric school ; one of the three minor sects which 
 sprung up immediately among the hearers of Socrates, viz. — the 
 Cynics under Antisthenes, — Cyrenaics under Aristippus, — Me- 
 
 garics imder Euclid. 77. Quid ergo id esset] The student 
 
 who wishes thoroughly to understand the controversy respecting 
 the theory of perception and the bearing this controversy has 
 upon the whole subject of certainty, knowledge, belief, assent and 
 comprehension, will find its cradle in this passage. What things 
 can be perceived'? Of what things have we intuitive evidence'? 
 i.e. evidence which itself requires no evidence to establish its 
 evidentness. The Stoics answered this cataleptic phantasm or 
 visum; for definition of which, cf. Lect. lY., and what has been 
 said above. 
 
 XXY. 80. Quasi quceratur quid sit nan quid videatur'] The 
 fact is, there is only one candle, the appearance that there are two. 
 But the point is, what inference can be drawn from appearance 
 with regard to fact; the appearance or mental image being ac- 
 cepted as a mark or sign of the reality. The Epicureans held 
 that there was no ci priori ground for discrediting the testimony of 
 the senses. They must first be convicted of falsity before their 
 evidence is* doubted. The Sceptic then would point to the 
 example just adduced, the Epicurean would reply that the error 
 was in the inference not in the mark. But this could not be 
 urged here, although it might be in the case of the broken oar; 
 there the appearance was objectively correct, although the in- 
 ference was erroneous ; the mental image was a broken oar, so 
 
^ OFTHi 
 
 UNIVEP^ 
 
 O'l 
 
 NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. 1 69 
 
 would have been its representation on a camera ohscura. In 
 the case of the candle, however, the organ itself distorted the 
 presentation. — - — 81. Videsne navem illam ? Stare nobis vide- 
 tur r\ In the y)henomenon of motion is most clearly presented the 
 problem discussed in this dialogue, and which is the foundation of 
 all metaphysical enquiries, viz. the relation of appearance to 
 reality — the means of discerning one from the other — and of 
 inferring one from the other. For centuries it was supposed that 
 the sun moved round the earth, and to every one the appearance 
 {visum) is so. But the examination of other cases of motion 
 shows that the appearance to us would be the same whether the 
 sun moved round us or we round the sun. 
 
 This then is what is termed the subjective or phenomenal side ; 
 the objective or actual being the reality or fact of the sun moving 
 in space round the earth, or the earth round the sun. Whether 
 the sun moved round the earth as one fact, or the earth round 
 the sun as another, the visum would be identical. Here then was 
 a visum, mark, sign, or appearance originating in what was true 
 of such a kind that there might be a similar one originating in 
 what was false. It was only by observing the inconsistency of 
 this inference, with other facts of the same kind, that Copernicus 
 was led to the conclusion that the sun, not the earth, was the 
 centre of the planetary system. 
 
 In this case, as Carneades would have insisted, there was no 
 qualitative mark by which to discern the real from the apparent. 
 It was only by comparison and estimation of evidence that a 
 high degree of probability, or, as it is termed, a theory, has been 
 arrived at. 
 
 XXVI. 83. 1. esse aliquod visum /alsum] For example, 
 the appearance of the candle mentioned in the preceding chapter. 
 
 Epicurus, as there stated, did not admit this axiom. 2. id per- 
 
 cipi non posse^^ From a false appearance a true inference, i.e. 
 knowledge or matter-of-fact could not be deduced. If the mark or 
 sign is not the mark or sign we imagine it to be, how can a thing 
 of which it is a mark or sign be rightly conceived? The correct 
 meaning of percipere is to draw a true inference, i.e. a correct 
 
 statement of a matter of fact. 3. Inter quae visa nihil in- 
 
 tersitj &c.] Of course this is a self-evident axiom ; things which 
 appear the same cannot be distinguished. 4. Nullum esse 
 
170 APPENDIX A. 
 
 visum verum, &c.] This axiom is the great crux of contention. 
 Cf. Ch. XIII. 
 
 Axiom 1 corresponds with 3 in XIII. lA 
 
 4 ..4 
 
 84. Incidehat in ejus modi visum, &c.] Here the mark is 
 true, but the inference false. 
 
 Such and such marks are those of my friend. 
 This person has such marks. 
 Therefore this person is my friend. 
 
 So in Hudibras : 
 
 " His notions fitted things so well, 
 That which was which he could not tell." 
 
 The error is in the major premiss which contains the general 
 notion — bundle of marks, or characteristics of my friend. 
 Through inaccuracy of observation this notion or group of marks 
 may be either so few, so indistinctly imagined or retained in the 
 memory, that they will fit, agree, or conform to many individuals. 
 The process is carefully analysed in the Thesetetus. Let us apply 
 th.e four axioms to the example we gave in the preceding chapter 
 of the heliocentric and geocentric hypotheses. Taking the 1st, 
 the marks are true marks_, the 2nd and 3rd will have no place, 
 but the 4th conclusively demonstrates the untenability of the 
 Stoical position. 
 
 The apparent direction of a body is Us real direction. 
 
 This is its apparent direction. 
 
 Therefore this is its real direction. 
 
 Here again the major premiss is erroneous, but this could 
 never have been discovered without extrinsic observation, which 
 involves another inference, viz. that the case we are considering is 
 analogous to other cases of motion besides other judgments and 
 comparisons. 
 
 XXYII. 88. turn, quum videhantur, &c.] See Ch. xvii. 51. 
 
 XXVIII. 91. Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, &c.] The 
 word Dialectic has 3 significations. It refers to the conversational, 
 cross-examining, eliminating method of Socrates. With Plato it 
 
 ^^ 
 
NOTES ON THE LUCULLUS. I7I 
 
 seems to signify the process of discovering objective truth by the 
 analysis of ideas. Lastly, it was used by the Stoics as synony- 
 mous with Logic as the science of reasoning, i.e. of the employ- 
 ment of the discursive faculty. Plus autem pollicebatur.'\ An- 
 cient Logic professed to be a real science, i.e. a means of 
 discovering objective truth. The value of its pretensions is here 
 most accurately estimated. Logic investigates the manner in 
 which conceptions or ideas of the mind are related to one another. 
 But the external facts upon which such conceptions are based are 
 not amenable to the laws of thought, but the laws of nature. 
 These laws of nature are the matter of which science is composed. 
 The laws of thought which Logic examines concern only the forms 
 in which this matter is moulded by the mind. We may, however, 
 extend the province of Logic so as to make it investigate the 
 general theory of evidence, and then taking the results of observa- 
 tion and experience as its material, it will be a real organon for 
 the discovery of facts by establishing rules according to which the 
 estimation and acquisition of evidence may be directed. 
 
 XXIX. 92. Multa pauca, magna parva] It must be ob- 
 served that the sorites sophism is only applicable to subjective 
 and arbitrary conceptions such as are here indicated. For ex- 
 ample, there is no doubt whether a man is on this side of a 
 boundary line or the other, though the barrier of separation may 
 be indefinitely narrow; but in the case of such distinctions as 
 few, many, broad or narrow, since the limits have no real 
 objective existence they have no real defining power. Sir William 
 Hamilton remarks, (Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 464,) 
 that the sorites "attempts, from the impossibility of assigning 
 the limit of a relative notion, to show by continued interrogation 
 the impossibility of its determination at all. There are certain 
 notions which are only conceived as relative — as proportional, and 
 whose limits we cannot assign by the gradual addition or detrac- 
 tion of one determination. But there is no consequence in the 
 proposition that, if a notion cannot be determined in this manner, 
 it is incapable of all determination, and therefore absolutely incon- 
 ceivable and null." — With regard to these observations of Sir 
 W. Hamilton we think it is the arbitrariness and subjectivity not 
 the relativity of a notion which renders the sorites applicable to it. 
 A colour, for instance, is not a relative notion (at least not in the 
 
172 APPENDIX A. 
 
 same sense as magnitude or degree), and yet the sorites might suc- 
 cessively present all the shades between white and black, and so 
 argue black was white. The student must notice that the argu- 
 ment termed Sorites by modern logicians has no analogy to that 
 indicated here, but is a chain of reasoning of the form A \b B, B is 
 (7, Cis D, &c., therefore A is D. The mode of application of this 
 kind of ratiocination, which is in fact the real type of all ratiocina- 
 tion, is admirably analysed and illustrated in Mr Mill's Logic, 
 II. 5. The following is Sir W, Hamilton's historical review of 
 this fallacy, "Sorites, though a word in not unfrequent employment 
 by ancient authors, nowhere occurs in any other logical meaning 
 than that of a particular kind of sophism of which the Stoic 
 Chrysippus was reputed the inventor (Persius, Sat. VI. 80). Swpos 
 you know in Greek means a heap or pile of any aggregated sub- 
 stances, as sand, \vheat, &c. and sorites, literally a heaper, was a 
 name given to a certain captious argument, which obtained in 
 Latin from Cicero the denomination of acervalis {De Div. ii. 4). 
 This sophism, as applied by Eubulides (who is even stated by 
 Laertius to be the inventor of the sorites in general), took the 
 name of cbaXaKpos, calvus, the bald. It was asked, was a man 
 bald who had so many thousand hairs ? you answer, No : the 
 antagonist goes on diminishing and diminishing the number, till 
 you either admit that he who was not bald with a certain number 
 of hairs, becomes bald when that complement is diminished by a 
 single hair ; or you go on denying him to be bald, until his head 
 be hypothetically denuded. Such was the quibble which obtained 
 the name of Sorites, acervalis, climax, gradatio, (fee. This, it is 
 evident, has no real analogy with the form of reasoning now 
 known in logic under the name of Sorites. But when was the 
 name perverted to this, its secondary signification 1 Of this I am 
 confident, that the change was not older than the fifteenth 
 century. It occurs in none of the logicians previous to that 
 period" (Lect. xix. pp. 375, 6, 7). I cannot help thinking that 
 the Differential method in Pure Mathematics had its origin in 
 
 reasoning of this kind. 95. ars ista'] The rules of Logic. 
 
 u^tco/xa] For the history of this word see Hamilton's Reid, 
 
 Note A, § 5. Si te mentiri, dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris'\ 
 
 The words idque verum est contain the key of the fallacy. In a 
 hypothetical syllogism it is not upon the fact asserted by a proposi- 
 
NOTES ON THE LVGVLLUH. 173 
 
 tion that the argument rests, but upon the consequence of one 
 proposition from another. Thus, If A is B^ G is J), but A is B, 
 therefore, G is D. Such a conclusion would rest upon the ad- 
 mission of the assertion A is B, but not upon the fact of A being 
 B. There is therefore no question of truth or falsehood in the 
 argument, but only of admission. (See Whately's Logic, On 
 Hypotheticals ; also Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. 
 p. 466, On the Sophisma heterozeteseos.) 
 
 XXX. 98. Sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet] The allusion 
 is to the story told by Aulus Gellius, lv. ch. 10, of Protagoras 
 and Euathlus. 
 
 XXXI. 99. Non comprehensa neque percepta...omnis vita 
 tollatur] The doctrine of probability as held by Carneades in no 
 way resembles the theory of chance elaborated by modern 
 mathematicians (see Lect. Y. § e). The probable judgment was 
 based on observation, and is analogous to an inductive inference 
 established by the method of agreement and the joint method of 
 agreement and difference. In like manner Bishop Butler, in his 
 Analogy, argues that a reasonable probability is a sufficient 
 ground of action for a wise man. 
 
 XXXII. 103. Academicis placere esse Terum...et cognitum 
 possit esse] The philosophers of the Academy held that there are 
 differences between things of such a kind that some appear pro- 
 bable and others the contrary. But this is not equivalent to 
 Baying that some of these can be perceived and others cannot, 
 because many things which are false are probable, but nothing 
 
 false can be perceived and known. veri et certi notanij The 
 
 possibility of any qualitative mark of truth is denied by the 
 Academicians ; qualitative evidence, however, is admitted, so that 
 any degree of probability may be attained, and this is considered 
 sufficient ground of action. With regard to the ontological or 
 substantial nature of things it would seem that the Stoics as well 
 as the Academicians had renounced the pursuit, and were both in 
 this respect Sceptics. It will be remembered that in the These- 
 tetus the question was discussed whether cognition equalled right 
 recognition. It was implied, though never demonstrated, that it 
 involved something more. The Stoics, however, had entirely 
 abandoned the metaphysical point of view, and, as we have indi- 
 cated elsewhere, we imagine that the Academicians had preserved 
 
174 APPENDIX A. 
 
 the Platonic doctrine, and were indirectly defending it in sub- 
 verting the theory of recognition as advanced by the Stoics. 
 
 XXXI JI. 105. expedito, soluto, lihero\ Cf. 7n6ava.<s . . .-mOava^ 
 KoX Sie^oiSevixivaq . . . TnOavds kol TrcpiwSev/x-cVas koX aTrepLcnrda-TOvg. 
 Hyp. I. 33. 227. tamen own possis . . . de/endere] Of all these 
 diverse appearances you could not say which is the permanent 
 constant and natural quality of the sea with respect to colour. 
 
 XXXYI. 116. In tris igitur partes^ &c.] They, says Sextus 
 E. (Adversus Logicos, vii. 3 — 17), who divide Philosophy into 
 three parts are unanimous in distinguishing them as Logic, Ethic, 
 and Physic. The Stoics compare Philosophy to a fruitful field, in 
 which Physic resembles the tall trees, Mhic the fragrant fruit, 
 Logic the strong wall. And others liken her to an egg ; Uthic is 
 the yolk, or embryo, Physic the white, or nourishment to the 
 yolk. Logic the shell. 
 
 XXXYII. 118. Princeps Tholes, &c.] With this catalogue 
 
 of early Philosophers compare Aristotle, Met. i. Pythagorei 
 
 ex numeris, &c.] The Pythagoreans did not, as is vulgarly sup- 
 posed, consider number the material cause of things. Number was 
 with them the idea, form, or regulative principle, according to which 
 the universe was constituted objectively, and construed by the mind 
 subjectively. ^'vofiiKoi yap d (}>vcrLS d tc3 dpiOfiw kol dycfjiovLKd kol 
 StSafTKaXi/ca t<3 drropovfMevoi iravTO^ kol dyvoovfxevo} TravTL, K.T.A^"(Stob. 
 
 Eel. p. 8.) 119. earn sic animo, tfec] That is, he will believe 
 
 on evidence not demonstrative, for even the evidence of the senses 
 is fallible with regard to objective existence. The presence of 
 light is evidenced by a change of consciousness, but it would have 
 to be proved that the objective fact of light could be the only 
 cause of this change of consciousness before this evidence would 
 be demonstrative. Eor a notice of the Stoical Pantheism see 
 
 De Nat. Deor. Book ii. Lect. Y. § p. 120. inter deos Myrme- 
 
 cides^ There must have been an idea of the Ant before its 
 
 creation. 121. Docet omnia effecta esse natura] The student 
 
 is recommended to read Cudworth's Intellectual System^ Mos- 
 heim's Edition. 
 
 XXXIX. 122. Nee eo tamen aiunt empirid, &c.] Cf. Hyp. i. 
 XXXIV. Note g. 123. Iliretas Syracusius . . .moveretur] In refer- 
 ence to this and the following chapters the student should con- 
 sult Whewell's History and Philosophy of tJie Inductive Sciences. 
 
NOTES ON THE LUGULLUS. 175 
 
 Platonem in Timaeo] See Jowett's Dialogues of Plato; Sir G. 
 Lewis's Astronomy of the Ancients; Grote's Essay on the Timceus. 
 Whether Plato understood the diurnal rotation of the earth or 
 not seems to depend on the meaning we attach to the word 
 €l\Xofji€vr)v, which may either signify " revolving," or compacted, 
 as Mr Jowett calls it. 
 
 XL. 125. aut hiane, &c.] This and the following are the 
 theories of Democritus, adopted by Epicurus, and expounded in 
 the poem of Lucretius, De Rerum Naturd. See also Theophras- 
 tus, Be Sensu, 63, Lect. III. p. 42. 
 
 XLII. 129. Megaricorum fuit nohilis discipUna, &c.] Tlie 
 minor sects, springing directly from the teaching of Socrates_, are 
 
 here enumerated. Cf. Lecture L p. 10. 131. Et vetus Acade- 
 
 mia] See Appendix B. Madvig's Excursus iv. 
 
 XLY. 138. prima naturcEJ See Appendix B. Madvig's 
 Excursus IV. For a fuller account of the moral doctrines Oicero 
 here sketches the student must consult the De Finihus. 
 
 XLYI. 142. id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur] 
 This is a definition, not a proposition. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 EXCURSUS IV. 
 
 Translated from Madvig's Edition of the Be Finihus of Cicero. 
 On the Formula "Prima Naturse," and the Carneadean di- 
 vision of the opinions concerning the 'Chief good.' De Finihus. 
 Book II. chap. 11., Book v. chap. 6, and elsewhere. 
 
 1. Cicero in this work frequently introduces the formula 'prima 
 naturae/ both by this particular name and by others differing 
 slightly from it, but, as if the meaning were obvious and every- 
 where the same, he omits in any place to explain clearly and 
 methodically the force of the expression or the nature of the thing. 
 Not only to the attentive student, however, will certain obscurities 
 and difficulties present themselves, but even Cicero himself appears, 
 whilst he follows others incautiously, or adds somewhat of his 
 own, to have comprehended this notion vaguely, and in places to 
 have applied it unskilfully — and without explanation such pas- 
 sages cannot be adequately understood or criticised. Many writers 
 on the history of philosophy have either entirely omitted or but 
 cursorily treated this matter, because in the philosophical treatises 
 of the Greeks the subject is rarely discussed, and in the annals of 
 diverse sects it only attained prominence in those later writings 
 Cicero followed. Beier, one of the commentators on Cicero {De Off. 
 III. 13) has collected at random the various forms of expression 
 Cicero uses without distinguishing their signification. Elsewhere, 
 in his seventh Excursus on De Off. Book i., he has so commented 
 as there not even to have alluded to the difficulty in question less 
 patent perhaps in this work of Cicero ; and in some places, while 
 following his author, he appears to have discussed the form of this 
 doctrine among ancient philosophers inaccurately. The difficulty 
 
EXCURSUS IV. 177 
 
 arises primarily from the fact that Carneades through his IjBvity 
 obscured a notion originally ill-defined by the Stoics among whom 
 it arose; secondly, because Antiochus, on whom Cicero depends, 
 imported it, with other Stoical theories, into the Academic and 
 Peripatetic doctrines as reformed by himself; and the confusion is 
 increased because Cicero, not content with a single and appropriate 
 expression for one and the same thing, employs an unnecessary 
 redundancy and variety of language, thereby confounding both in 
 conception and expression those matters which even Antiochus 
 had discriminated. 
 
 2. Ta Trpwra Kara (^vcrii/ (the equivalent Greek form for prima 
 naturce) is nowhere used by Aristotle, nor is this form of expres- 
 sion attributed to the leaders of the Old Academy by any author 
 except Cicero. He following Antiochus assigns alike to Aristotle 
 and Polemo definitions of the ^summum honum of this kind, 
 "honeste vivere, fruentem iis rebus, quas primas homini natura 
 conciliet" (Acad. 11. 131), or again, "virtute adhibita, frm primis a 
 natura datis" {Be Fin. 11. 34; cf. iv. 15, where the word primorum 
 is not added) ; again, '' adipisci, quse essent prima natura qujeque 
 ipsa per se expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima" {Acad. J. 22), and in 
 the 4th and 5th books of this work {De Fin.) he always credits 
 those authors (Aristotle and Polemo) both with an idea of the 
 thing and the employment of the expression. But although Cicero 
 (v. 55) introduces Piso declaring that he had traced to their cradle 
 all the ancient philosophers, especially the Peripatetics, I do not 
 remember any expression of this kind in those passages of Aris- 
 totle's works where he defines the notion of the good; for {Magn. 
 Moral. II. 7) when he disputes concerning virtue, instituting a com- 
 parison between children and beasts, and investigates the laws of 
 desire and aversion, he does not even use the contrasting forms 
 Twv Kara <jiV(TLv or twv Trapa <^v(tiv. The Stoics enquiring into the 
 principles of action, estimation, and selection, argued that a certain 
 primary appetition, primus appetitus, is apparent in every animal 
 yearning towards that which nature herself had commended and 
 made attractive to the creature. For thus Cicero renders what in 
 Greek Chrysippus and others were wont to call oIkuovv and 
 oiK€iu)crLv. They said that this attraction promoted self-regard, 
 and the maintenance by the animal of its own condition or consti- 
 tution. Hence, therefore, arose desire for those things conducive 
 L. L. 12 
 
J 78 APPENDIX B. 
 
 to self-preservation sought for by nature, and repugnance to 
 contrary things which nature rejected because injurious to that 
 condition. Those objects which they supposed to be thus desired 
 by a primary impulse were not only declared to be /cara (fiva-Lv, and 
 the opposites Trapa <f>v(rLv (Stob. Ucl Eth. p. 134, 142, 250; Plut. 
 adv. Stoic. 23, p. 1069 f., Clem. Alexandr. Strom, ii. p. 179, Sylb.), 
 but because they were the first to move the appetite they were 
 called ra Trpwra Kara ffivortv (Plut. adv. Stoic. 26, p. 1071 A.; Luci- 
 anum, Vit. Auct. 23; Gellium, xii., 5, 7; Stobseum, Eel. Eth. 
 pp. 144, 148); Stobseus also uses the form ra Trpwra Trapa <f>v(TLv, 
 and p. 136, he designates those things Trporjyovfxeva Kara <l)vcnv, 
 which he elsewhere terms Trpwra. Yarro in Latin, in his book 
 on philosophy (apud August, de Civ. Dei, xix. 1 et 2), had called 
 them primigenia and prima naturae; Cicero says that some 
 natural objects are secundum naturam, and others contra (in 
 many places, as iii. 21 and 31, iv. 25, v. 72); again he terms 
 them naturalia (iii. 61), and more emphatically prima natu- 
 ralia (ii. 34), but most frequently with Yarro, prima naturae 
 (hi. 30, IV. 41, 43, V. 21, 45), also prima secundum naturam 
 (v. 18, 19, 45); in Book iii. 61, prima naturae secunda and 
 contraria are conjoined (cf. Stob. p. 148). But he uses other terms 
 and significations, such as the following : principia naturae (iii. 22, 
 23), ov principia naturalia (ii. 35, iii. 17), initia naturae (ii. 38, 
 III. 22), prima naturae conciliationes (in the plural number, iii. 
 22); we find also prima appetitio naturalis {op/JLyj, iv. 25, 26) ea, 
 quae secundum naturam sunt, appetens (iv. 32). The same things 
 are said Academ. i. 22, prima esse natura, where the ablative case 
 is used, meaning that they occupy the first place by natural ap- 
 pointment; but in II. 34 they are somewhat exceptionally called 
 prima a naiura data, which has no reference to the actual acqui- 
 sition of the things, but simply means that they are originally 
 proposed and suggested by nature for acquisition; thus they are 
 termed, IV. 18, pHncipia a natura data. Advancing from this form 
 Cicero has more concisely written (ii. 33) prima data esse natura^ 
 i.e. by the law of nature (cf. iv. 17), in the same meaning iii. 17, 
 prima ascita esse natura, i.e. approved and selected for acquisition. 
 3. But although the Stoics do not appear to have profoundly 
 analysed this idea of natural attraction (prima conciliatio) so as to 
 render evident what and how much it might comprise, they argued 
 
EXCURSUS IV. 179 
 
 that in the course of time a light of reason having suddenly 
 arisen, which in the infant had not been kindled, and the 
 uniformity and propriety of nature having been experienced, a 
 certain will to agree with a nature arose in which was present 
 both virtue and perfection of reason. This will they separated 
 emphatically from natural attraction, and declared that the good 
 sought after diflfered in kind from those objects primarily desired. 
 Therefore although virtue is in the highest degree an accordance 
 with nature (iii, 21, 22 note to v. 34), nevertheless natural 
 attraction not only does not contain any disposition towards 
 virtue (for then virtue would be found in those natural objects of 
 desire which corresponded to this attraction), but not even can 
 the germs and beginnings of virtue be thought of in it, if the 
 Stoics would be consistent with themselves. Natural objects are 
 sought for as such, but he who strives after the beginnings of 
 virtue, seeks virtue herself; hence virtue is at once separated. 
 Natural objects of desire are by the Stoics comprehended in the 
 class of things indifferent riov aZiaf^optav (Stob. pp. 142, 148), and 
 TTpoi/y/xcVa (p. 148). Therefore when Carneades instituted the 
 acquisition of these primary objects of desire as the sunimum 
 bonum there is said to be no addition made of virtue in any place 
 (as is explained in note to iv. 15); and in the doctrine of the 
 Peripatetics those things termed bona corporis et externa are called 
 by Cicero himself (11. 34, 38), by Cato (iii. 30), and in Book v. 21, 
 prima naturae. It does not appear, however, to have been accu- 
 rately defined by the Stoics what particular things were included 
 in this expression of primorum; but the perception, strength, 
 and health of the body and senses generally ranked first, as li. 34, 
 V, 18; Stob. p. 144. Gellius includes under this term the 
 pleasures only of the body, and the removal of physical pains. 
 Cicero, 11. 34, adds (ingenii motum) the things which in the system 
 of the Peripatetics are called involuntary virtues ; the same are 
 reckoned by Stobaeus, p. 60, amongst the prima natures, and 
 possibly understood by the Stoics in their objects of primary 
 appetition or simple preference, which they also called Trporjyfjiiva 
 (Dio. L. VII. 107). Although Cicero (iii. 17) places ras KaraXr]- 
 \f/€L<s amongst the prima naturce, or so conjoins them that unless 
 they are of the same class it would not appear why they are 
 spoken of together, yet this ij KaraAr^i/^ts seems to be so peculiar to 
 
 12—2 
 
l80 APPENDIX B. 
 
 ripe reason, as scarcely to hold this position amongst the prima 
 naturce. Because the Stoics were wont to look for the origin of 
 notions in the perceptions of the senses, KardXrjif/Lq was readily 
 combined with the perfection of the senses, as in Stobseus (p. 148), 
 vyUia KOL aia-O-qcn^, Xeym Se ttjv KaToX-qxpLv. I still more wonder 
 that technical aptitudes (artes) are included by Cicero because 
 they are totally adverse to the notion of primaries. 
 
 Furthermore, when Cicero (v. 18) would attribute to the mind 
 certain first principles as the sparks and seeds of virtue, he 
 incautiously intermixes matter from a source of which I shall 
 presently speak. 
 
 Finally, the Stoics are to be commended because they did not 
 admit of pleasure among those things craved after by the animal 
 part of one's nature, but said that it was iTnyivvrjixa (aftergrowth), 
 the subsequent affection of a creature feeling that it has attained the 
 primary objects of desire (cf note to iii. 17). In their anxiety, 
 however, to oppose Aristippus and Epicurus they scarcely allowed 
 this secondary place to pleasure (ct apa la-riv), nor did they show 
 how such a lower kind of pleasure was consistent with the nobler 
 emotion experienced by a man through the consciousness of co- 
 operating by virtuous conduct with that higher nature of which 
 he was a part j hence they confused the subject and left a loop- 
 hole for error. 
 
 4. Somewhat different from this idea of the primary objects 
 of desire, if carefully considered, is that first constitution or in- 
 stitution of nature which in Books iv. {\f> sqq.) and v. (24 sqq.) 
 is explained by the system of Antiochus. This sysitem, regarding 
 the nature of man as a whole, whilst including the body, attaches 
 much more importance to the mind and to the perfection of 
 reason in the mind, i.e. virtue (iv. 17, 41 j v. 36, &c.), so that, 
 although virtue may not be present at the first dawn of conscious- 
 ness it nevertheless springs from that constitution, and is desired 
 in the same manner as other objects which are contained in it, 
 claiming for itself, however, a far higher degree of consideration. 
 But because the desire of preserving the body is the most marked 
 instinct in the early life of an animal, it was incumbent on 
 Antiochus to explain this in his constitution and connect it with 
 his definition of the chief good; he therefore appropriates from 
 the Stoics the appellation oi prima naturce, and although they are 
 
EXCURSUS IV. iSi 
 
 goods of the body, they are at last joined by Antiochus to virtue 
 (iv. 41, 43, 47). Therefore that which among the Stoics con- 
 stitutes the idea of natural attraction is not mentioned in a very 
 great portion of the constitution of Antiochus. 
 
 5. Cicero, following Antiochus, does not notice this dis- 
 crepancy, and argues through the whole of the fourth book as if 
 it were altogether the same thing, and in his exordium actually 
 states as much (§ 15, "constitutio ilia prima naturae, a qua tu quo- 
 que ordiebare"), then he continues to say afterwards that the Stoics 
 and the Ancients (i.e. Antiochus) set out from the same principles. 
 Hence the same name by which in Book in. 22 and 23 he had 
 indicated iwima naturm calling them principia naturae, in the 
 Fourth Book, he applies (perhaps more conveniently and ac- 
 curately) to that constitution of nature the notion of which he 
 supposes Zeno to have derived from Polemo (42), and which he 
 says must be modified by him if he wished to retain his own 
 views of the summum honum (34). To whom Zeno, if he had 
 been present, would have answered so far rightly, that his idea of 
 good was not derived from natural attraction. But in this Fourth 
 Book, where Cicero follows Antiochus closely, he errs only in 
 supposing that the Stoics attributed much more than they did to 
 this notion of natural attraction. In the second Book, where 
 Cicero refutes Epicurus in his own person, he lapses into still 
 greater error. For, when endeavouring to avail himself of the 
 Antiochian notion of original adaptation in order to convict 
 Epicurus of inconsistency (inasmuch as he, Epicurus, had not 
 arrived at a view of the summum honum corresponding with that 
 form of it which he had laid down), he imprudently substituted 
 the narrow view of the primary objects of desire of the Stoics, 
 together with their catalogue of them, instead of that general 
 view of the constitution of man entertained by Antiochus, saying 
 that the rest of the philosophers agreed with him, thereby falling 
 into an inexplicable distortion. For after he (Cicero) said that in 
 the opinion of Polemo and Aristotle the prima were the limbs, 
 senses, disposition, perfection of the body, health, he adds that 
 hence arose their doctrine that to live according to nature was the 
 summum honum, that is, to enjoy in a virtuous manner those 
 objects of desire primarily indicated by nature, virtute adhihita, 
 frui primis a natura datis. Whereas what can be more obvious 
 
l82 APPENDIX B. 
 
 even to a casual observer than that the living according to nature 
 could have been so defined that there need not have been the 
 least reference, among these primary objects of desire, to that 
 which is the chief point in his (Cicero's) explication of a life in 
 conformity to nature {adhihitavirtute), whether the primary objects 
 were these or far different ones ? Hence he joins Calipho and 
 Diodorus to the ancients in the same commendation for con- 
 sistency, and appears to point them out as having held the same 
 primaries; certainly he does not mention others, and yet they 
 differ in the idea of the summum honuni. I have already explained 
 in a note that Cicero seems to have said something concerning the 
 prima of Aristippus, Hieronymus, and the Stoics, which he may 
 have erased ; but, whether he did or not, it is difficult to imagine 
 what relation he supposed there was between the p-ima of the 
 Stoics and a chief good founded on virtue alone ; and it is the more 
 to be wondered at, that a confusion so great as this should have 
 overtaken Cicero, because, in that very division of the opinions 
 concerning the chief good made by Carneades which Cicero 
 employs after Antiochus, there was left some distinction among 
 these notions. 
 
 6. Carneades eulogized by Cicero for his remarkable pro- 
 ficiency in dialectic (iii. 41), although he displayed sufficient skill 
 in controverting the superficial doctrines of the Stoics concerning 
 the theory of knowledge, was not possessed by any ardent desire of 
 investigating the truth, and had such a dislike to the minute 
 labour of discriminating the exact character of notions and opinions, 
 that he affected to treat them with rhetorical levity and flippancy. 
 Nevertheless he prepared the way for Antiochus, who subsequently 
 deserting his sect, amalgamated the doctrines of the Peripatetics, 
 Academicians and Stoics. Carneades then undertook an ex- 
 haustive enumeration of the opinions of dissentient philosophers 
 concerning the chief good. This division, approved by Antiochus, 
 Cicero explains in Book v. 16 and following chapters. For Car- 
 neades having laid down as a first principle that the art of life 
 as well as other arts had some extrinsic end in view, and that 
 such end ought to be consistent with, and adapted to nature, 
 affirmed that the whole diversity of opinion was about primary 
 appetition {de primo appetitu), and that on that point there 
 were three doctrines; for some thought that pleasure was aimed 
 
EXCURSUS IV. 183 
 
 at by it; others, freedom from pain; others, all natural objects 
 of desire. In this exposition it appears, firstly, that the primary 
 appetition occupies such a place, that in it the entire bias of 
 human nature is contained, and from it every good springs. So 
 far therefore it corresponds with that primary constitution 
 set forth by Antiochus. Cicero also (17 and 19) designates it 
 by the term ' normal incitements,' primorum invitamentorum, 
 and natural motives, principiorum naturalium. Further, it is 
 manifest that this instinct is so defined as to be restricted entirely 
 to self love and regard for the body, excluding all those things 
 which subject a man to the law of reason and universal nature. 
 From this point of view therefore this appetition or instinct re- 
 sembles the natural attraction {conciliatio) of the Stoics, whence 
 also Carneades derived the prima naturcB. Yirtue is so far 
 banished that those who would place her among natural goods 
 find only a collateral admission. It is very extraordinary how 
 Antiochus could have approved of this classification of Carneades, 
 cancelling as it did its own conception of a primary constitution, 
 in which the whole man and the perfection of reason are contained. 
 The Stoics, indeed, were the last to allow that which Carneades 
 laid down as a first principle, viz. that the art of life was deter- 
 mined by any extrinsic end, maintaining rather that it was wisdom 
 entirely engrossed in itself (iii. 24). Moreover, Carneades in his 
 enumeration has most clumsily compared pleasure (i.a as I have 
 said the emotion of a man who has gained the object of his desire) 
 with the prima naturoe, that is, with the very objects desired, 
 and has placed exemption from pain (the negative idea of pleasure) 
 as a distinct member of the division; an error which soon gene- 
 rates other obscurities. 
 
 Hence we have the following table of ends : 
 
 A. To seek after 
 
 1. Pleasure. 
 
 2. Freedom from pain, - 
 
 3. Natural objects of desire. 
 
 B. To do all things 
 
 1. For the sake of pleasure, 
 
 2. or exemption from pain, 
 
 3. or natural objects of desire. 
 
184 APPENDIX B. 
 
 7. From these premisses, Oarneades, although he appears to 
 be intending to find tria summa bona, from the gratification of a 
 threefold primary instinct, suddenly deduces an inference for which 
 not the least ground or cause had been shewn, viz. that virtue is 
 the doing all things for the sake of anyone of those three ends 
 (see Table), whereof some said one was chiefly to be desired, and 
 some another, even though a man might not gain the object of his 
 desire. Consequently not only does he reach the idea of duty 
 through that primary instinct, but, what is still more remarkable, 
 although the notion of good had been evolved out of the gratifica- 
 tion of a natural desire, we are all at once confronted with some 
 who place the chief good in virtue per se, when even natural desire 
 has not been satisfied at all. It is manifest that this remarkable 
 method of reasoning originated from the definition Antipater of 
 Tarsus was in the habit of employing, when he said that virtue or 
 the chief good, is irav to ko.0' avrov iroielv 7rp6<s to Tvy)(dv€Lv tiov 
 TTporjyovixivoiv KaTa cfivaiv (see III. 22); and which definition I am 
 inclined to suspect had been already laid down by Diogenes (v. 20). 
 This definition, while it attempts to associate with the notion of 
 virtue one of duty rudely constructed from the selection of twv 
 TTpoyjyovfxevoiv, although it implies a contempt of utility for the sake 
 of a higher law, greatly obscures the significance of virtue as 
 understood by Zeno, and separates it from its true source, viz. 
 the universal law of nature, to which it is voluntarily subject. 
 From the rest of their system, however, it was apparent how virtue 
 might be determined, and how it might contain good separated 
 from the acquisition of utilities. Carneades both omits this por- 
 tion of the doctrine, and contrives two other virtues, viz. pleasure 
 and exemption from pain, opining that in these any one may find 
 a happy life. We are not surprised then that those two doctrines 
 concerning the chief good so ineptly devised should have found 
 no defender. 
 
 8. Carneades also contended that, in addition to these simple 
 notions concerning the chief good, there were three complex, made 
 by combining the former in twos. The first that of the Academics 
 and Peripatetics, the second that of Callipho, the third of Diodorus, 
 and that there could not possibly be more if the nature of the 
 subject were thoroughly examined. But if the original division 
 of Carneades be correct, six compouijd notions should have been 
 
EXCURSUS IV. ]85 
 
 formed out of four simple ones (i.e. taking them two together); nor 
 is it apparent why, if pleasure and freedom from pain were 
 radically distinct both from each other and the prima naturm, 
 either pleasure and exemption from pain, or each of them and 
 prima naturce, may not have been properly combined. 
 
 9. Moreover, Carneades, who had originated this division, 
 did not the less persistently oppose it, inasmuch as he maintained 
 that there was no dispute about facts between the Stoics and 
 Peripatetics (iii. 41), of whom one held the simple, the other 
 the complex notion concerning the chief good, which is equivalent 
 to annulling that whole division and neutralizing whatever truth 
 it contained. Antiochus, however, approved both of this division 
 and of this opinion respecting the Peripatetics and Stoics. 
 
EXCURSUS V. 
 
 On the arrangement of the Subject-matter in the Third Book of 
 the De Finibus, and on the division of Ethic among the Stoics. 
 
 1. Although the Stoics themselves were wont to boast of the 
 admirable arrangement and systematization of their doctrines, yet 
 in every highly developed theory ideas are so linked together, that 
 for their due consideration it is very necessary they should be set 
 forth in regular order. We are therefore justified in enquiring 
 whether Cicero in his exposition of the Stoical doctrines has 
 followed the plan and sequence of matter adopted bj this school 
 itself; and this appears to be the more necessary because although 
 we do not hesitate as to the general plan, we have expressed a 
 doubt whether the arrangement of some few matters has been 
 altogether satisfactorily executed; and even recently a learned man 
 has attempted to discover some new principle of division of the 
 Stoical Ethic, and to substantiate it from this very third book. 
 
 2. In the first place, since the system of the Stoics after the 
 age of Zeno (their chief legislator and preceptor) had been amplified 
 and developed by the exigencies of controversy, and certain notions 
 not a little modified, it is evident that we might expect to find 
 a considerable variation between the original form of their doctrine 
 and that which generally obtained after the time of Chrysippus. 
 But it is not certain that Chrysippus himself, although he seems to 
 have included every part, preserved a systematic arrangement of 
 the whole code, inasmuch as he treated of the leading subjects 
 separately, and not in one continuous discourse. Nevertheless the 
 very nature and affinity of the tenets of the Stoics, and their 
 method of deducing and treating them as from one source, seem to 
 have determined a certain sequence of the chief heads common to 
 Chrysippus and those who succeeded him, especially since little 
 care was taken to reduce ethic to first principles, or to connect it 
 
EXCURSUS V. 187 
 
 at all closely or radically with theology and physic, both fruitful 
 occasions of schism. Variety of order chiefly attaches to their 
 treatment of individual virtues and actions. In Diogenes Laertius 
 and Stobseus, as well as in Cicero, we have some indication of that 
 sequence and arrangement of parts to which I am alluding, but, as 
 might be anticipated in that class of writers, an indication not 
 without obscurity. Diogenes (vii. 84) says, that ethic is divided 
 by the Stoics cts tc tov -n-cpi opixrjs kol €ts t6v vepi ayaOdv koX KaKwv 
 
 TOTTOV Kttt €tS rOV TTCpl TTaOt^V Kttt TTCpt CtpCT^S Kttt TTCpt TcXoVS TTCpt T€ 
 
 T^S 7rp(OTrj<s a^tas kol twv Trpa^cwv kol rrepl twv KaOrjKOVTWv irpoTpoTrwv 
 T€ KOL dirorpoTrMv. It is evident at the first glance that in this 
 enumeration cognate matters are disjoined, and the same things 
 repeated as if they were different, because they had necessarily 
 been discussed on separate occasions. For, how could the question 
 of ends be dissociated from the discussion of good and evil 1 
 
 And it is manifest from the brief notice of Cicero (§ 20) 
 how very closely bound up with the question of intrinsic value 
 (a^tas) is that concerning the primary appetition and natural 
 attraction. These points were both touched upon as prefatory 
 to the notion of the good, and subsequently more fully treated 
 of when the distinction between things in relation to action and 
 duty was discussed (§ 50). The same may be said concerning the 
 notion of virtue which, divided from the good and evil, is inter- 
 placed between rd TrdOrj and to rcXog. Nor are at Trpa^ets and rd 
 KaOijKovTa properly disjoined. Moreover, what I now say is con- 
 firmed by the next paragraph (85) of Diogenes himself in the 
 explanation of this doctrine, where, although roughly treated, 
 the incongruities to which I have referred are for the most part 
 avoided. For, from the normal appetition (85) he proceeds to 
 the chief good (87), and to virtue (90), in which the chief good 
 lies; then the notions and divisions of good are set forth (94), and 
 the virtues in which the chief good is are indicated (100). 
 
 Then follows the technical distinction rwv a8ta</)opo)v (of things 
 neither virtuous nor vicious, 104); next duty is explained (107), 
 To this exposition of things pertaining to a well-regulated life is 
 added a notice of the passions {twv iraOwv, 110), with which are 
 contrasted the lawful affections of the mind {y xapd rfj i^Sovfj). 
 Annexed is a description of a wise man and in what he differs 
 from a fool (116), which, while containing multifarious precepts 
 
l88 APPENDIX B. 
 
 for the conduct of life, somewhat inopportunely includes the 
 maxim that all faults are equal (120)* The doctrine of the 
 identity of all virtue is added (125), as well as t^ irpoKOTrrj (127), 
 growth, the perpetuity of virtue, and its all-sufficiency for happi- 
 ness, obviously belonging where the general nature of virtue was 
 discussed. Still as these matters were frequently canvassed sepa- 
 rately, and in the person and example of a wise man the charac- 
 teristics of virtue and maxims for the conduct of life were set 
 forth, I do not deny that Diogenes Laertius had some of the 
 Stoics to countenance his arrangement. 
 
 A misplaced expression of opinion, defending the law of 
 nature against the Epicureans, belongs to those precepts of life 
 to which I have referred. If we carefully compare with this 
 order of Diogenes Laertius that observed by Cicero, we shall 
 easily see that although some things are differently arranged, and 
 some found in one which are omitted in the other (indeed the 
 design of Cicero's work altogether excluded those special precepts 
 for the conduct of life), there is yet that similarity in the con- 
 secution of chief points which I have above indicated, arising from 
 the nature of the ideas involved. For from primary appetition 
 Cicero advances to the good, and the end, and to the nature 
 of virtue, then to the distinction of things indifferent (tojv aSta^c'- 
 pwv), lastly, to duty by which the conduct of life is guided. Stobseus 
 obscures to a much greater degree the continuity of the matters 
 ajid opinions constituting the ethical system of the Stoics (Ucl. 
 Eth. p. 90 sqq.), and dwells upon subjects of which I shall merely 
 mention the names; good and evil (90); the definitions and divi- 
 sions of the good (96); virtues (102); their end, the living ac- 
 cording to nature (108); the identity of virtues (112); the cha- 
 racter of the wise man (120); the division of goods (124); the 
 end, to live consistently (132); to. dScd^opa (142); duty (158); 
 desire {opixrj, 160); passions (166); friendship (18G); the cha- 
 racter of a wise man, and general precepts (188); the definition 
 of KaropOiofxaTO'; and dp-apT-q piaro^ (192); equality of faults (198). 
 It is plain that at the commencement the mention of appetite 
 and natural attraction is omitted, whereas in the explanation of 
 the end, and of the good, things intimately connected are separated 
 and arranged apart. But here also, as with Cicero and Diogenes 
 Laertius, duty is treated of immediately after rd dhid^opa. Passions, 
 
EXGlfRSUS V. 189 
 
 in explaining which the idea of appetition is involved, are treated 
 of after duty, as with Diogenes. 
 
 3. Cicero, as I have already remarked, observes the same 
 order as Diogenes Laertius. He has obscured it, however, either 
 by his scholastic handling, or, as those who are well acquainted 
 with this kind of Cicero's works will more probably think, he 
 has derived it from that Greek writer whom he had elected as 
 his guide when composing the book. And this is confirmed by 
 the fact that Cicero himself in the person of Cato openly declares 
 that the order of matter was suggested to him from elsewhere, 
 33, and especially 50. But this author, if a single one, was not 
 Chrysippus, as Petersen thinks with Gorentz (Introduction, 
 p. XXV.), although the discussion of Cato is deduced from a senti- 
 ment precisely analogous to that of Chrysippus in Diogenes 
 Laertius, but was either Diogenes the Babylonian, or some one 
 later than Diogenes who had made use of his work. 
 
 For, both that exposition of Chrysippus of natural attraction, 
 and other subjects in this book attributable to him, as those which 
 are mentioned §§ 27, 46, 61 and 73, together with those in which 
 Cicero himself describes Chrysippus by name, 57 and 67, were 
 communicated without doubt by him to others, as well as to his 
 pupil Diogenes, whom Cicero himself in a former place joins to 
 Chrysippus. But Cicero so follows Diogenes, even in a matter 
 in which there was some divergence from the Stoics, that he 
 seems to have chosen him as his authority (33), and he intrudes 
 his opinion concerning the power of riches (49), too inopportunely 
 for him to have done, unless he had had Diogenes' book in his 
 hand, and had extracted copiously from it. And that part of 
 the discussion, in which is expounded the difference of opinion 
 between the Stoics and Peripatetics (41 sqq.), although it con- 
 tains the maxims and opinions of all the Stoics, nevertheless 
 seems to have been derived from some one else, who like Diogenes 
 had lived contemporary with Carneades or after him. Nor is 
 that to be overlooked, which is adverted to in § 22, that 
 Cicero speaks of a formula of the summum bonum, attributed to 
 Antipater a disciple of Diogenes, which would not be inconsistent 
 with Diogenes himself. As to his indication of Stoics later than 
 Diogenes (57), he might very easily have added sentiments about 
 glory and fame from Panss tins and Posidonius, with wjiose 
 
190 APPENDIX B. 
 
 writings he was extremely familiar, notwithstanding that in the 
 more profound reasoning of this whole book he had Diogenes or 
 some follower of Diogenes as his guide. 
 
 But whether Gicero has followed Diogenes or any one else, 
 or one or more in the composition of this book, it appears that 
 whencesoever he derived his material, he found the subject already 
 treated in the manner of the later Stoics, as if the aim was to 
 determine and to corroborate the same notions in many different 
 ways, sometimes following the pervading spirit of the whole 
 system, sometimes contending with arguments deduced in con- 
 formity with some special doctrine, whence it easily happened 
 that the same things were often repeated, and cohering doctrines 
 were in some measure sundered. That something of this kind had 
 happened in the part of this book where the good and the virtuous 
 and the end are defined, we have already intimated (25 and 34), and 
 still more might be remarked. For, 2%, 27, by a new mode of 
 argumentation nothing is accomplished but what had been already 
 demonstrated, and after it is here explained that virtue is the 
 only good (36), it is reiterated that virtue must be sought for 
 its own sake. Cicero, again, when extensively extracting the 
 main heads of opinions from one or more Greek writers relating 
 to the chief good and quality of things, seems in two places 
 (35, 49) to have inadvertently retained something which may 
 originally have been connected with another discussion, and to 
 have placed it in his book, so that it does not appear to what 
 it refers, or what it has to do with the matter. Finally, in the 
 midst of the exposition twv aSta^opwi/ (55), he suddenly introduces 
 a division of goods, as if it belonged there, sequitur ilia divisio 
 ut honorum alia sint, (fee, which it is evident ought to have been 
 placed where he was speaking of the conception and definition 
 of the good, as is the case in Stobaeus (p. 100) and Diogenes 
 Laertius (vii. 96, sqq.). Either Cicero introduced it here, think- 
 ing of a similar enumeration twv Trporjyficvoyv affixed to § 5Q, or 
 because in the Greek writer whom he followed he found it in this 
 connection for the sake of comparison. 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J.'TJEaP, i;|f MoAl^LPE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
RETURN TO: CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT 
 198 Main Stacks 
 
 LOAN PERIOD 1 
 Home Use 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS. 
 
 Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. 
 Books may be renewed by calling 642-3405. 
 
 I 
 
 DUE AS STAMPED BELOW. 
 
 
 ;^{ 1 mz 
 
 
 
 APR 2 5 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORM NO. DD 6 
 50M 6-00 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY 
 Berkeley, California 94720-6000 
 
 ljlX'ai—X\}\Jin-t, uj7v*» 
 
I09-ZZ7 
 
 76Bz 
 L6^ 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY