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 OUTLINE OF THE OPERATIONS 
 
 BRITISH TROOPS 
 
 SCINDE AND AFFGHANISTAN, 
 
 BETWIXT NOV. 1838 AND NOV. 1841 
 
 WITH REMARKS OI^'TtfE POLlCir OF THE WAR. 
 
 By GEO. BUIST, L.L.D., 
 
 EDITOR OF THE BOMBAY TIUES ; SECRETARY TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND 
 AGRI-HORTICULTURAI- SOCIETIES ; AND Ilf CHARGE OF THE OOVERNMENT OBSERVATORY, BOMBAY. 
 
 BOMBAY: 
 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT THE TIMES OFFICE. 
 
 MDCCCXLIII. 
 

 UCMf^ 
 
 Y MORSE STEfHEMS 
 
Ci^ 
 
 The following memoir was drawn up for the Bombay Times 
 and Monthly Times newspapers : the former a bi-weekly print, 
 chiefly read in India ; the latter, for which it was principally in- 
 tended, being published on the morning of the dispatch of the 
 Overland Mail, and having much the greater part of its circula- 
 tion in Europe. Various valuable narratives, giving accounts 
 of the campaign of 1839, were published in the year 1840, the 
 titles of which have been quoted as their pages have been 
 referred to and drawn upon for the substance of the Second 
 Chapter of the present volume. The writers of these treat, 
 after their own fashion, of the events of which they were wit- 
 nesses or sharers : Dr Kennedy confines himself to an account 
 of the march of the Bombay column, which at first, for three 
 months, pursued a different route from the Bengal portion of the 
 army ; until, reaching the mouth of the Bolsui Pass, it afterwards 
 followed the track of the leading column, although ten marches 
 in its rear, until the whole assembled at Candahar on the 4th May, 
 where the elements of the grand army were, for the first time, 
 united. The march between this and Cabool furnishes common 
 ground, which has been traversed by all the writers who describe 
 the operations of Sir John Keane. Dr Kennedy retires with 
 the Bombay force by the new route over the Toba mountains, to 
 the southward of that which had been previously traversed, and 
 brings the reader back through Sukkur with the last fragment 
 of the force. Major Outram's "Rough Notes" are entirely 
 confined to what he himself did or saw : he gives us his adven- 
 tures at starting in Cutch in quest of camels — the gallant, 
 
 51.1.711 
 
engaged iu one or more of the several campaigns under review, 
 and nearly all of them at the heads of departments in the de- 
 tachments to which they belonged, and each of whom most 
 frankly and willingly complied with his request for their advice 
 and assistance. The introductory and concluding chapters are 
 the only ones which have not been subjected to this species of 
 ordeal. To these gentlemen the Author's most grateful acknow- 
 ledgments are due; and he only regrets that, in consequence of the 
 etiquette of the Service, forbiding them to be formally known 
 as contributors to a newspaper, he cannot thank them by name 
 for the labour and pains bestowed by them in correcting casual 
 errors, which fortunately were less numerous than might have 
 been apprehended, — as well as for the complimentary manner 
 in which they have been pleased to express themselves as to the 
 accuracy of the narrative. For the opinions maintained as to 
 the policy and management of the war, the gentlemen alluded to 
 are, of course, in no way to be held responsible. 
 
 The sale of books of the present description is in Western 
 India in the last degree limited : the want of curiosity so con- 
 stantly manifested in England in reference to the concerns of 
 the East, left no reason to suppose that a work of greater mag-' 
 nitude on this subject, if published separately, would have 
 covered the heavy charges incurred in printing at Bombavj — 
 the difficulty at once and necessity, of having the proofs care- 
 fully corrected and revised, put home publication out of the 
 question, — and the style of the writing pretended to none of 
 the graces which might have attracted the attention of the reader 
 where the subject by itself was to him of little interest. On 
 these grounds, a very small edition (200) of the volume has been 
 thrown off: this being not, strictly speaking, a reprint from the 
 Bombay Times, but an impression from the types as re-adjusted 
 and placed in pages. Several errors have been corrected, and 
 some few changes in arrangement, and a slight enlargement 
 made, while the whole has been subjected to repeated and very 
 careful revisals: and this is all that has been done in the way 
 
VI I 
 
 of alteration. These explanations are required to account for 
 the numberless imperfections with which the volume is charge- 
 able, — for the defects in style, and occasional want of me- 
 thod which, though inexcusable in a formal historical work, 
 may be pardoned in a newspaper memoir, written occasionally 
 amidst attacks of sickness, at all times in haste and under the 
 pressure of nume^us, complicated, laborious, and varied avo- 
 cations. The duties of a newspaper editor at home give no 
 sort of idea of the labours and perplexities of a journalist in 
 India : — without reports of public meetings or parliamentary 
 debates, — where political discussions, in the English sense of 
 the term, which at all times furnish food for unlimited specula- 
 tion to a ready or fluent writer, are disrelished, — with a hot and 
 relaxing climate to contend against, and many of the duties 
 which in Europe are discharged by correspondents, reporters, 
 sub-editors, or other assistants, thrown entirely into his hands. 
 
 In drawing up the present narrative, each month demanded its 
 chapter complete, however numerous might be the documents 
 required to be consulted, or perplexing and inaccessible the 
 authorities to be referred to, — whatever might be the amount of 
 interruptions, or the pressure of extraneous avocations ; and the 
 several sheets were generally taken away by the compositor as 
 written — the first proofs not being ready for revision till the last 
 pages were out of the writer's hands. The dispatch of the mail 
 required that the printing machine should be at work by a given 
 hour, without regard to the fatigues of the party who prepared for 
 it its supplies of food. This will account for, if not excuse, much 
 repetition and not a little confusion, which will be observed espe- 
 cially in the first and second chapters, and of which no one of those 
 which follow is wholly free. To have got rid of these, which even 
 an author's partiality for his own writings leaves sufficiently ap- 
 parent to himself, would have required an amount of alteration, 
 incurring an expenditure of money and of labour which there 
 was no reason to suppose the return of sales would compensate, 
 and which no prudent person would have recommended a poor 
 
man to undertake without hope of requital, for the benefit of 
 those who might not, after all, have appreciated the outlay 
 that had been incurred in their behalf. 
 
 No exertion has been spared to complete the work to the best 
 of the writer's ability under the disadvantages which hurried 
 periodical publication always impose ; he is conscious of no sel- 
 fish motive, or personal bias towards any one ; and has neither 
 been influenced by fear or favour of any party ; he has warmly 
 and fearlessly assailed the dishonest and aggressive foreign policy 
 alike of Lord Ellenbo rough as of Lord Auckland, aware 
 that, in so doing, he should incur the displeasure of the men of 
 both parties who might happen to favour his speculations with 
 perusal : he undertook the task in his capacity of newspa- 
 per editor, in the hope of supplying something not quite fami- 
 liar nor wholly unacceptable to the reader, but under no delusion 
 as to his pre-eminent qualifications for its discharge, — and now 
 passes the result of his labours from his bands, not as a volume 
 worthy of the name of history, or capable, as a literary produc- 
 tion, of withstanding the censures of the critic, but as a mere 
 reprint of an ephemeral memoir, which may help to assist the 
 recollection of those into whose hands it shall chance to fall, — and 
 who prefer a book to a series of chapters spread over seven months 
 of a newspaper file, — of the connection betwixt the victories of 
 Lord Keane and the terrific disasters of the army of General 
 Elphinstone. The excessively limited amount of its circulation 
 precludes it from being considered so much even as a memoir to 
 serve in the place of history till history be written. It was ori- 
 ginally intended that the chronicle of events should have been 
 brought down through the calamities of winter and spring 1841- 
 42 to the triumphant return of our armies to India : and this 
 is a work of much interest and importance which yet remains to 
 be performed by some one, — the narratives of the prisoners being 
 confined to the affairs at Cabool. But the parliamentary papers 
 and numerous journals published in the course of the past six 
 months, furnish a mass of material which would, after the utmost 
 
IK 
 
 compression, occupy as large a space as that devoted to the events 
 of the three preceding years ; and it seemed doubtful whether 
 public interest might not flag had this been attempted to be issued 
 in chapters, — more than doubtful whether it would have been cared 
 for as a separate volume. The narrative, therefore, was broken 
 off at the period supplied by the Ghilzie insurrection — when 
 a new roll rather than a new chapter in our history may be said 
 to have been opened up. 
 
 The woodcuts of Nufoosk and Surtof were engraven for a 
 work of a different nature from the present : that having fallen 
 aside they are now taken advantage of. This, it is hoped, will 
 be accepted as an explanation why, if any illustrations were 
 thought of, more were not given. These are presented to the 
 reader because they were at hand, at any rate ; they were not 
 purposely prepared : more could not have been afforded. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 At page 2, line 7 from the top, for 1837 read 1839. 
 
 17, ... 2 from bottom, fov fall of Herat read safety of Herat. 
 
 49, ... 4 from the bottom (note 41,) /or expected rea^? expressed. 
 
 63, ... 10 from top, /or presents to Lahore read presents to Ilunjeet 
 
 Sing. 
 92, ... 11 from the top, for 6th April read 26th April. 
 124. — Omitfrom line 5 to line 10 from the top of the page. The change 
 of plan adopted in the course of publication excludes the ac- 
 count of the destruction of the Cabool army and advance of 
 General Pollock's troops, proposed to have been given in the 
 concluding chapters. 
 127, line 15 from the bottom,/or Lieut. McKenzie read Lieut. Nicholson. 
 148. — A note, copied from the Agra Ukhhavy states, that the chiefs who 
 fell into the hands of Lieut, Nicholson were executed con- 
 trary to agreement. Sir W. Maonaghten in his letter, printed 
 at p. 287-89, states, that the chiefs were perfectly aware that 
 they were to be capitally punished, and that there was no 
 stipulation whatever to the contrary. 
 203. — Line 15 from the bottom, /or judgment of a court of inquiry read 
 
 decision of a court, &c. 
 233, ... 16 from top, /or Kojuck reac? Kujjuck. 
 
 243 Mr Bell's demise is said to have taken place on the 1st August : 
 
 it occurred late on the evening of the 31st July. 
 ... 249.— Line 7 from top It is stated that Lieut. Outram was specially 
 mentioned by Colonel Deacon in his account of the capture of 
 Kittoor. This was not Lieut. James (afterwards the distin- 
 quished Major) Outram> as stated by mistake in the text ; 
 but his brother ; both were present and did good service, but 
 liieut. Outram of the engineers is the party stated to have 
 been named in the dispatch. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 Opinions of the British in India little affected by consideration of Home party politics— Per- 
 plexity in the Narrative from the diversity of authorities, the imperfections of the pub^ 
 lished papers, and the incessant alternations betwixt peace and war amongst the rulerg 
 of Central Asia— Feeling of all the Affghans against Persia in 1832, Affairs op Pesha- 
 wuR~Hostile movements of Runjeet Singh against the Doorannce States in 1818 ; 
 Seizes on Attock and Mooltan— On Cashmere — Captures Peshawur — Resigns it in favour 
 of Kamran Shah and Dost Mahomed— Hurry Singh gets possession of, by treachery, in 1834 
 — Defeat of the Shah Soojah near Candahar— Dost Mahomed attempts to recover Pesha- 
 wur in 1835— Retreats before the Seikhs— Successful attaek on Nao Nehal Singh in 1836 
 —The Prince seizes Deera-Ishmael Khan— Preparations for anot'ier descent of troops 
 from Cabool— Battle of Jumrood in May, 1837— Death of Hurry Singh— Prostration of 
 the Soikhs— Our tender of mediation. .Affairs of Hbkat — Size of the Principality- 
 Character of Kamran Shah, and his Vizier— Dea?h of the King of Persia in 1834- 
 Warlike preparations of the new King — Lord Palmerston's remonstrances — Preparations 
 to march on Herat in 1836— Mr Ellice's alarm — Mr M'Neil and Mr EUice agreed upon 
 his right— Advance of the Persian army in July, 1837— Occupation of Karrack — Our com- 
 plete command of Persia throughout the Gulf— Money wasted on the embassy— Grati- 
 tude of Kamran Shah. Relations with Russia — Harmony of the Courts of St Peters- 
 burgh and London in 1834 and 1835— Suspicions of Mr EUice— Bugbear of Russian in- 
 fluence— Count Simonich joins the Persian Camp before Herat— Gives Directions— Nego- 
 tiations with the Candahar Sirdars— Mission of Lieutenant Vicovich to Cabool— With- 
 drawal of Count Sinaonich and Captain Vicovich — English Cabinet express themselves 
 _ entirely satisfied— Sir J. Hobhouse's Speech in 1842— Remarks on— Assumptions of False- 
 hood and Folly of Russia unsupported. Captain- Burnbs's Negotiations at CAROot— 
 Mission at first Commercial— Became Political in June 1837— Letter to Mr M'Neil— Dost 
 Mahomed and Lord Auckland's Correspondence in 1836— Burnes arrives at Cabool— Cordial 
 Reception— Opinion of the reasonableness of Dost Mahomed's Demands — Russian and> 
 Persian influence— Candahar Affairs — Mission of Lieutenant Leech— Arrival of Kohun 
 Dill Khan at Cabool in April — Arrival of Vicovich — Unwise importance attached to— 
 His Character— Barnes's Despatch of 22d January in reference to Sooltan Khan— Insolent 
 papers of the Government of India— Despatch of 5th March with Suppressed Passages- 
 Further Misunderstandings— Farewell Letter of Lord Auckland— Retirement of the Mis- 
 sion—Determination to have a War— Negotiations at Lahore— Vacillation of Lord Auck- 
 land— Inllueucc employed with. 
 
Xll 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Rnnjeet Singh refuses to permit o«r troops to pass through the Punjaub-Route by the Bolan 
 Pass— Augmentation of the array by 13,000 men besides the Contingent— Retirement of the 
 Co-nmander-in-Chief, Sir H. Fane— Sir J. Keane nominated Generalissimo of the Army of 
 the Indus— Entrance into Affghanistan— Bengal column— Reserves -Bombay column lands 
 at Vikkur— Hostile aspect of Scinde— Want of camels— Scarcity of Commissariat stores- 
 Demonstrations on Hydrabad— Ameers agree to our terms— Bengal column reaches Roree, 
 and crosses the Indus to Sukkur— Misunderstandings betwixt the Bengal and Bombay co- 
 lumns about camels — Colonel Dennie's remonstrances on the inutility of the Shah's 
 levies— Capture of Kurrachee— Reserve left there— Amount of force at Shikarpore in 
 February— Bengal troops ascend the BoUn Pass— Apprehensions on reaching Quettah— 
 Rumours of a retreat— Conduct of the Khan of B^ielat — Sir A. Bumes's mission to— 
 Breaks his agreements — We resolve to dethrone him— Extreme scarcity of provisions- 
 Troops on half rations for six weeks — Arrive at Caudahar and enter it unopposed- 
 Progress of the Bombay column — The Lukkee Pass — Larkhana— The desert— Reach 
 Dadur — Excessive heat — Enter the Bolan Pass— Reach Quettah— Arrive at Candahar— 
 Adventures of Colonel Dennie betwixt Shikarpore and Candahar — Force at — Condi- 
 tion of— Remain six weeks at Candahar — March on Ghuznie — Description of fortress- 
 Conflicting accounts of enemy's force— Open fire of artillery on the walls of— Move 
 round from the Candahar to the Cabool side — Plan of attack of— Captain Outram's 
 attack on the enemy's irregulars— Slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners — Preparation for the 
 attack— Successful explosion of powder-bags at the gate— Storming of the gate— Capture 
 of the fortress— Excellent conduct of our troops— Advance on Cabool— Dost Mahomed 
 abandoned by his troops— Capture of his guns and baggage— Pursuit of, by Capt. Ontram — 
 —Treachery of Hadji Khan Kakur — The Dost makes his escape into Toorkistan — Return 
 of the pursuing party to Cabool— The Shah enters Cabool— State Durbar for the purpose 
 of conferring the Doorannee Order, Dr. Kennedy'* account of— Bengal column quits Ca- 
 bool— Proceeds by J ellalabad and Khyber, through the Punjaub, to Ferozepore— Bombay 
 column proceeds to Ghuznie— Captain Outram's operations against the Ghilzies- Column 
 takes the left of Candahar— Reaches Quettah — One portion descends the Bolan Pass and 
 reaches Scinde — Loss by Cholera— General Willshire advances on Kbelat— Gallant cap- 
 ture of— Slaughter at — Captain Outram's adventures — General Willshire descends the 
 Gundava Pass to Scinde— Lord Keane's return to Bombay, and reception— General re- , 
 flections— Troops required to be left in Affghanistan -Opinions of the campaign enter- 
 tained in England. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Extent of the Doorannee Empire under Ahmed Shah— under Shah Soojah— Political Agents- 
 Establishment and Expense of— Expedition to the northward, November 1839— The Shah 
 and Envoy winter at Jellalabad— Colonel Orchard's unsuccessful expedition to Pushoot 
 —Affair with the Hazarah Tribes— Grand Convoy arrives at Jellalabad in April— Expedi- 
 tion against the Ghilzies betwixt Candahar and Ghuznie— Detachments under Captains 
 Walker and Tayler— under Captain Anderson— Colonel Wallace's Detachment— Successes 
 of— Returns— Surrender of Nawaub Jubbar Khan and two of the Sons of Dost Mahomed 
 Receptionof at Cabool— Dost Mahomed proceeds to Bokhara and is made prisoner— Ad- 
 ventures of —Escapes and returns to Khooloom— Discontented state of the country— Alarm- 
 ing state of Kohistan— Captain Hay compelled to fall back on Syghan, which is reinforced— 
 Captain M'Gregor's mishap near Jellalabad— Alarm of the Envoy— Apprehensions that we 
 ^ouid require to quit all our outposts and concentrate on the Capital— Colonel Whee- 
 
XIll 
 
 ler's success agaiast the Kudjah Chiefs — Affzul Khan repulsed near Bajgah— Detach- 
 ment abandons Sjrghan leaving: much private property behind— Desertion of a part of the 
 Shah's Troops— Colonel Dennie dispatched from Cabool to reinforce Bameean— Extreme 
 apprehensions of Dr Lord —Colonel Dennie's brilliant manojuvres on the Irak mountain 
 — Reaches Bameean— Advance of Dost Mahomed- Battle of Bameean — Dennie's Advance 
 on Syghan— Flight of the Afff?hans— The Khooloom Confederacy broken up— Sir R. Sale at- 
 tacks Tootan Durrah— Death of Lieutenant Connolly— Destroys the whole of the Tootan 
 Durrah Forts— Attack on Joolgah— At first unsuccessful— Movements of Dost Mahomed- 
 Destruction of the Village of Heibuk and adjoining forts — Battle of Purwan Durrah — 
 Disgraceful conduct of the 2d Cavalry— Death of Dr Lord, Lieutenants Broadfoot, and 
 Crispin— Surrender of Dost Mahomed to the Envoy— Sir Alexander Burnes's account of 
 the State of tne Country. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Mr Ross Bell, Political Affent for Scinde— State of Khelat— Expedition under Major Billamore 
 to Kahun and Deyrah— Attacks the Bhoogties— Captures the chief Beebruck— Sacks the 
 village— Retires by Kahun and Nufoosk to the plains— Futility of the expedition— Detach- 
 ment dispatched under Captain Brovrn and Lieut. Clarke to occupy Kahun— March from 
 Poolajee— DiflSculties of the way— Arrive at Kahun, and find it empty — Clarke's party, and 
 that of a Subedar, attacked and cut to pieces on their return— Captain Brown shut up in 
 Kahun— Puts the men on half-rations on the 24th May— Patience and skill of the defence- 
 Offers of assistance from Quettah— Hear of Major Clibborn's convoy— Are informed of its 
 destruction— State of garrison in the end of August— Detachment under Major Clibborn 
 dispatched from Sukkur on 12th August— Reach Poolajee— Enter the hills— Arrive at 
 Surtof— Examine the ground where Clarke's party were cut to pieces— Difficulties of the 
 way— Reach Nufoosk— Want of water- Dreadful heat— Attempt to storm the Pass unsuc- 
 cessful—Storming party driven back, four officers killed— Main body keep their ground till 
 10 P.M. — Parties sent out for water — Return unsuccessful — Part of them cut up — Clibborn 
 retires on Surtof— Attacked during the night— Lose all their baggage —Return to Poolajee— 
 Total loss of convoy generally overstated— Court of Inquiry upon— Extraordinary proceed- 
 ings of— Premature publication of their report— Observations on— General Brooks and Col. 
 Valiant recalled— Reflections. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Genealogy of the Khans of Kelat— Doubtful extent of Mehrab Khan's treachery in 1859— His 
 preparations for defence sudden and imperfect— His death— Escape of his Widow and Son— 
 Unsuitableness of Newaz Khan to rule over the Brahoes— Lieut. Loveday appointed Envoy 
 —Dismemberment of the Khanate— Sharawan and Cutchee made over to the Shah Shoojah 
 — Cutchee given to the Indian Government by the Shah — Rent exacted from the free Jagheers 
 — Resistance the consequence — Bad selection of our Native agents— Mahomed Sherreef, 
 villany of— Revocation of jagheers— The Chiefs left in ignorance of the change in their con- 
 dition—Customs of the port of Las ceded by Newaz Khan to the British Governujent- 
 Claims are abandoned— Nusseer Khan pursued— Vengeance inflicted on those who protected 
 bim— L'^nhappy proceedings of Lieut. Loveday — Kakurs threaten Quettah — Reinforcements 
 arrive from Candahar— Insurgents retire from Quettah and invest Kelat— Pusillanimity of 
 the Envoy— Lieut. Haramersley defeats the insurgents at Moostung— Attempts at negotia- 
 tion with Captain Bean— Lieut. Loveday and Mr Masson put in close confinemeut^Insur- 
 
XIV 
 
 gents proceed to Moostung— Misunderstandings in negotiating with Captain Bean— Depute 
 Mr Masson as Ambassador — He is placed under arrest on suspicion of being a Russian spy — 
 Proceedings connected therevvithi— His release — Conabination of mishsps — Large reinforce- 
 ments sent to Scinde— Brahoes attacked and defeated at Kundah— Lieut. Vardon attacks and 
 defeats them near Bhag and captures 1100 camels— Sxpertness of the Enemy in seizing 
 camels experienced by Major Boscawen— Sack of Gundava— Three days' fighting round Dadur 
 — The enemy on each occasion defeated — Loss estimated at from 300 to 400— Murder of Lieut, 
 Loveday — The insurgents disperse — Nusseer Khan left a wanderer— General Nott recap-- 
 turesKelat— General Brooks, Brigadier Valiant, and Major Holland, leave Bombay and joui 
 the force— Views of the Politicals towards Herat— Colonel Marshall takes command of the 
 Kotra Brigade- Negotiates with the enemy— Nusseer Khan makes submission— Receives 
 pecuniary assistance — Ordered by General Brooks, who was ignorant of pending negotia- 
 tions, to be attacked— Brilliant victory at Kotra— Entire dispersion of the insurgents— A 
 large reinforcement moves towards the Bolan Pass— Colonel Stacey improves the aspect of 
 affairs at Kelat— Cutchee affairs- Seebee tribute — Detachment advances on Kojjuck — Misun- 
 derstandings, and attack on the town unsuccessful— Inhabitants abandon it— Occupied by 
 our troops— Reinforcements arrive — Kojjuck sacked and burnt — Submission of the Beebee 
 Gunjani — Herat affairs — Troops ascend the Bolan Pass— Expedition to Noosky — Acci- 
 dent in the Bolan to Captain Haldane's Irregulars— Similar accident in the Khyber Pass- 
 General Brooks and Colonel Valiant deprived of their command— Surrender of Nusseer 
 Khan — Death of Mr R. Bell — Major Outram takes political charge - Restoration of Nussces 
 Khan— Coronation at Kelat— General state of Affairs— Memoir of Major Outram. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Events near Cabool in the beginning of 1811— Brigading of the Troops in AfPghanis- 
 tan — Shelton's Brigade leaves Ferozepore— Alleged reduction of the Army— Expedi- 
 tion into the Nazian valley in February— Lieut. Pigou killed by an explosion — Captuiu 
 Douglas shot — Arrival of the 3d Convoy at Cabool— Return of the Shah and Envoy to the 
 Capital — Arrogance of the Shah — Seikh affairs — Death of Kurruck Sing— Of Nao Nehal Sing 
 — Shere Sing proclaimed King — Dissipated habits of — His coronation — Queen Dowager 
 declared pregnant — Shere Sing withdraws himself — A revolution in the Army — He is restored 
 to the throne— Tranquillity of the Punjaub— Captain Broadfoot's convoy — Death of one of 
 the Royal Ladies— Danger of the Convoy — Coolness and good conduct of Captain Broad- 
 foot— Arrives at Peshawur— Scene of Narrative changes— Suftur Jung Governor of Canda- 
 har— His misconduct and dissipation— Discontents in the Ghilzie country— Expedition to 
 Ghirisk— Detachments of the Shah's troops destroyed— Captain Farrington sets out— Pur- 
 sues Ukhtar Khan and defeats him on the Helmund— Major Tod's arrival from Herat— Rein- 
 forcements sent to Ghirisk— Major Lynch's management of the Ghilzie country— Resolves 
 to fortify Kelat-i-Ghilzie— Unhappy affair at KuUa i- Ingoz— General rising of the country- 
 Colonel Wymer's reinforcement from Candahar— Defeats the enemy— Detachment from 
 Ghuznie quarteredat Mookloor--Colonel Chambers's expedition— Success of Captain Walker 
 and Lieut. Bazzett— Captain Woodburu's Detachment sent to Ghirisk— Battle with Ukh- 
 tar Khan on the Helmund— Misconduct of the Janbaz Horse— Brilliant victory Ex- 
 pedition under Captain Griffin— Battle with Ukhtar Khan's troops— Great slaughter 
 of the enemy— Expedition under Colonel Wymer into the Teeree country— Capture 
 of Akram Khan — His execution — Colonel Maclaren's Brigade leaves for India— Di- 
 rected to return and proceed to Cabool— Advance found impossible — Posts in Western 
 AfTghanistan in October 1841_Airairs at Cabool— Expedition into the Zoormut Valley— 
 Sti'cngth of Army in Eastern AfTghanistan— Ghilzie insurrection occasioned by stoppage of 
 
XV 
 
 tribute— Conclusion— Loss of life during the Affghan war— Loss of Treasure— Sir W. Mac- 
 naghten's letter on presenting Sir Alexander Barnes's memorial— Apathy of the people at 
 home — Lord Palmerston's Tiverton speech— Proposed continuation and subsequent aban- 
 donment of our Affghan policy— Reflections on the conduct of the Political Agents— Noble 
 conduct of the Army— Conclusion. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Affghanistan is walled in on the north by the Hindoo Koosb and 
 the Paropamisan range of mountains,* many of which reach the 
 elevation of 20,000 feet—the summit level of the passes through 
 which the intercourse betwixt the countries to the north and south of 
 these is maintained, varies from 10 to 13,000 feet, t On the south 
 and east it is bounded by the river Indus from Attock in longitude 
 73° east, latitude 34° north, to as far south as latitude 32° 20'. On 
 the east it is divided by stupendous mountain ranges from Chinese 
 Tartary— on the west it borders with Bokhara, Koondooz, and Persia ; 
 on the south-west with Beloochistan and Scinde, from both of which 
 it was wont to claim allegiance, military service, and tribute. The 
 kingdom of Cabool, which more immediately concerns us at present, 
 arose out of the dismemberment of the empire of Nadir Shah. When 
 that monarch was murdered in 1747 he was succeeded by Ahmed 
 Shah, the founder of the Doorannee monarchy ; — a skilful, brave 
 and enterprizing soldier, whose ^yhole reign, to the period of his death 
 in 1773, was spent in war. He bequeathed an empire which reached 
 from Khorassan to Sirhind, and from the Oxus to the sea, to his son 
 Timor, a weak and indolent monarch, unable to rule the extensive 
 realms and turbulent subjects the more vigorous hand of his father 
 had with difficulty controlled. Timor Shah transferred the seat of 
 government from Caudahar to Cabool, and was, in 1793, succeeded 
 by Zemaun Shah, one of the youngest of his sons. J On the elevation 
 of this prince to the throne, which had been effected by a faction of 
 
 * Hamilton's Gazetteer. 
 
 t Rough Notes on the Campaign in Scindo and Affghanistan, &c. By 
 Captain James Outram, p. 110. 
 
 t Asiatic Journal from September to December, 1838. The whole of the 
 papers in this periodical on our Affghan policy are able and excellent, and 
 would, form valuable subjects of study to those who have the ignorance or 
 mpudence to assert that the mischiefs of the Affghau war were only first diS' 
 overed after it began to appear unfortunate. 
 
the nobles, his elJer brothers broke out in open insurrection : one had 
 himself proclaimed king of Candahar, but was afterwards defeated and 
 blinded by Mahmoud Shah, another brother, who seized Herat, which 
 he was permitted to retain. The elevation of the Shah Zemaun to the 
 throne, had given rise to much popular discontent : and Futteh Khan, 
 head of the Barukzyes, having formed an alliance with the ruler of 
 Herat, advanced to the eastward, where, near Candahar, he defeated 
 Zemaun, who was afterwards betrayed into the hands of the con- 
 queror, by whom he was blinded and sent prisoner to Cabool. Shah 
 Soojah, a still younger son of Timor, and brother of Zemaun, now, 
 for the first time, appears in the field. In 1801, on learning the mis- 
 hap of his brother, he advanced on Cabool from Peshawur, but was 
 defeated, and his army dispersed by Fotteh Khan and his Barukzyes, 
 An attempt in 1803 was more successful. When Futteh Khan, 
 acknowledged on all hands to have been a man of talent and courage, 
 was absent from his capital engaged in quelling an insurrection, 
 advantage was taken of some religious quarrels betwixt the leading 
 Mahommedan sects : and the Shah Soojah, who had shortly before 
 been a second time defeated, from a fugitive living on the bounty of 
 the tribes was raised to the throne. After six years of almost unin- 
 terrupted turbulence and discord, during which he, on more than one 
 occasion, nearly lost his crown, he was, in 1810, totally defeated by 
 Futteh Khan, and driven from his kingdom. In 1811 he made an 
 unsuccessful attempt to regain the sovereignty. He subsequently 
 resided in the Punjaub till stripped of the crown jewels and all his 
 other property by Runjeet Singh. This is a brief but exact outline of 
 the early career of the Shah Soojah. His grandfather obtained the 
 kingdom by conquest. His brother, to whom he temporarily suc- 
 ceeded, was one of the younger sons of Timor, the son of Ahmed 
 Shah, and was raised to the sovereignty by force over the heads of 
 .his elder brothers ; to whom, if seniority and hereditary right were 
 to be considered grounds of claim, it properly belonged. Kamran 
 Shah of Herat, son of Mahmoud, the eldest of these, has throughout, 
 since his father's death, been the representative of the lineal branch, 
 and is so still. The Shah Soojah maintained a weak and troubled reign 
 for the space of seven years, during which he never exercised authority 
 over one half the territory or subjects, or claimed one tithe of the 
 rights of which we afterwards for a time put him in possession. It 
 is well to recollect these things, because the general impression amongst 
 
the public at large appears throughout to have been, that in placing 
 the late Doorannee ruler on the throne, we were restoring a once 
 powerful and popular monarch to rights which he had formerly en- 
 joyed : — to a kingdom and subjects so ruled by him through a long 
 period of time, as that, from them with him as their sovereign, we 
 might look for a strong and imperishable barrier against all invasion 
 from Persia and Russia. Instead of this, we associated ourselves with 
 an ally who was only able to maintain a precarious rule, because of the 
 dissensions of the other chiefs : — who never possessed the confidence 
 of the AfFghans to an extent that would have enabled lim to ward 
 off foreign aggression, from whatever quarter it might have been 
 threatened. 
 
 Futteh Khan, though actually holding the power and destinies of the 
 kingdom in his hands, had never claimed the title of Sovereign, 
 which was enjoyed by Shah Mahmoud, the hereditary Grand Vizier, 
 The former chief was shortly afterwards deprived of sight at Cahidahar 
 by a son of the latter, in revenge for the contemptuous manner in 
 which he had spoken of the ruler of Cabool. This barbarous act of 
 vengeance immediately converted the brothers of Futteh Khan into 
 the most active enemies of Mahmoud Shah and his family.* After 
 a considerable period of turbulence and strife, the Doorannee empire 
 was dismembered. In 1826, Dost Mahomed made himself entire 
 master of Cabool.f He deprived his brother Jubbar Khan of the 
 Ghilzee country, of which he had just before obtained possession, and 
 made him his vizier; seizing also on Jellalabad, which had belonged 
 to Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Candahar fell under the rule of three 
 of Dost Mahomed's brothers. In 1833, the Shah Soojah made a last 
 attempt to recover the sovereignty ; he defeated the Scindians and 
 possessed himself of Shikarpore. Having advanced by the Bolan Pass 
 and Quettah, he was, on the 2d of July 1834, defeated by Dost 
 Mahomed near Candahar, and sought refuge from the Khan of Kelat. 
 From this date he lived a pensioner on the Indian Government within 
 the Company's territory. He had, indeed, resided at Loodianah 
 since 1818 : we allowed him a pension of £4500 a-year, but avoided 
 meddling with his quarrels. { Sixty winters had cooled his ambition, 
 and he seemed content to spend his days in affluent and luxurious 
 
 ■ ill- , m . . , r . I » 111. , , I . 
 
 * The above is chiefly an abridgement from the Asiatie Journal) as already 
 quoted. 
 t Major Hough's March and Operations of the Army of the Indus, p, 414., 
 X Ibid, p. 404, note. 
 
iv 
 
 exile, when in 1838 it pleased the British Government to treat with 
 him as a sovereign about to be placed once more in power ! 
 
 Having given thus much of a cursory glance at the state of politics 
 in Affghanistan when we first embroiled ourselves with its affairs, — its 
 revenue, and the character of its people fall next to be noticed 
 before enlarging on the political questions whose discussion imme- 
 diately preceded preparations for war, and which will not, for some 
 time to come, have ceased to occupy public attention. 
 
 The entire population of the Doorannee empire is estimated by Mr 
 Elphinstone at about a million of souls: of these, from 80,000 to 
 100,000 are inhabitants of Cabool,* and about a similar number of the 
 city of Candahar.t The town of Istaliff, but little known to us till 
 attacked and destroyed by Gen. McCaskill on the 29th Sept. 1842, 
 contains about 15,000 inhabitants ; Charekar about 3000 ; Ghuznie 
 about 3000; and Quettah about 6000. The last-named town was at 
 this time a portion of the Khanate of Kelat^ to which it has since been 
 re-annexed ; from 1839 to 1842, we held it as belonging to the Shah 
 Soojah. There are no other towns of nute in the kingdom, save 
 Jellalabad, which is within the first line of passes. Cabool, the capital, 
 is situated in Lat. 34 deg. 30 min. N., and Long. 68 deg. 31 min. E. 
 It is more than three miles in circumference. It is surrounded by 
 rocky hills ; and the beautiful but narrow valley in which it stands 
 is no less than 6396 feet above the level of the sea.J It is remark- 
 able for the excellency and abundance of its fruits. The Bala Hissar, 
 or citadel, is placed on an eminence, half a mile long and half as 
 much broad, overlooking and commanding the town, which is difficult 
 of access either to friend or foe. It is, or rather it was, chiefly 
 remarkable for the magnificence of its bazaars. These buildings, 
 formed by a continuation of streets roofed in and crossing each other 
 at right angles, were, until our troops blew them up in 1842, the 
 admiration of every traveller, and the architectural pride of Central 
 Asia. The revenues of Cabool with all its territories, amounted in 
 Dost Mahomed's time to from £250,000 to £300,000 a year ; || during 
 the period of our occupation they seldom exceeded £220,000;^ while, 
 
 * Burnes. Major Hongh. 
 
 t Major Hough states that there are 40,000 houses, and 100,000 inhabitants 
 in Candahar (p. 135.) We are disposed to take a lower estimate. 
 
 I Major Hough, pp. 284 and 430. 
 
 II See Burnes's Travels. 
 
 ^ Letter of Sir Alex. Burnes, published in the Bombay Times* 
 
in addition to this, Candahar yielded £80,000 ; and the whole revenue^ 
 of the Shah Soojah betwixt 1839 and 1841, never probably amounted 
 to any thing like £400,000 a year. The charges we incurred on his 
 account annuall^^ were about eight times this. The winter throughout 
 AfFghanistan is exceedingly severe, the thermometer at Cabool often 
 sinking below zero, and remaining 8 or 10 deg. under freezing for 
 three or four months together. 
 
 Recent occurrences have occasioned so much wrathful discussion as 
 to the character of the Aifghan population, that instead of attempting 
 an analysis or delineation of it for ourselves, we shall borrow what 
 appears to us an e»xceedingly fair one from the Asiatic Journal ; the 
 article we are about to quote being an abstract of the views of Elphin- 
 stone, Conolly, Burnes, and Moorcroft : — . 
 
 *' These tribes differ so much in their internal government, manners, and 
 customs, that they may be almost regarded as distinct nations ; the only fea- 
 ture which is most marked amongst the AfFghan tribes, as common to all, is a 
 wild independence, which, in some approaches to a republican sentiment of 
 equality. They are all, likewise, remarkable for a lofty martial spirit, sim- 
 plicity of manners, and hospitality. The original number of their tribes, or 
 family divisions, is four ; but these have been subdivided into several branches, 
 each ruled by its own independant khan, or chief, though retaining an idea of 
 a community of blood and interests. Each tribe, or ooloos-, has a distinct form 
 of government, of the patriarchal character, constituting a complete common- 
 wealth in itself. The Affghan nation is composed of an assemblage of those 
 commonwealths, which form one state by obedience to the authority of a 
 common sovereign, though the submission of some of the tribes has ever been 
 but nominal. The Affghans exult in the free spirit of their institutions ; they 
 cherish the notion that ' all Affghans are equal.' When Mr. Elphinstone 
 urged, on an intelligent old man of the Meeankhail tribe, the superiority of a 
 secure life, under a powerful monarch, to the discord and bloodshed which 
 prevailed under their present system, he replied proudly, * We are content 
 with discord, we are content with bloodshed, but we will never be content 
 Avith a master.' 
 
 *' The condition of the Affghan women, who are described as large, and 
 very fair and handsome, varies with their rank j those of the upper classes are 
 entirely concealed, those of the poor do the work of the house- The former 
 are not uneducated. In the country, they go unveiled, and exercise hospi- 
 tality when their husbands are from home. * I am not sure,' says Mr 
 Elphinstone, ' that there is any people in the East, except the Affghans, 
 where I have seen any trace of the sentiment of love, according to our ideas of 
 the passion.' 
 
 "The Affghans exhibit a remarkable contrast to other Mahommedan nations 
 in their treatment of Christians, to whom they have not the smallest aversion. 
 M. Durie, an Indo-Briton, who travelled through Affghanistan as far west as 
 
VI 
 
 Candahar, mixing with all classes as a Mahommedan, though suspected of 
 being a Feringhee, represents the people as kind, free, liberal, and tolerant ; 
 their aversion towards the Sikhs arises from their regarding them as pagans. 
 
 "One of tiieir most remarkable characteristics is their hospitality j the 
 practice of this virtue is so much a national point of honour, that their 
 reproach to an inhospitable man is to say that he is no Affghan. A man's 
 bitterest enemy is safe while he is under his roof, and a stranger who has 
 come into an Affghan's tent or house is under the protection of the master as 
 long as he stays in the village. The protection, however, does not extend 
 further ; there are instances, in some of the predatory tribes, of travellers 
 being entertained and dismissed with presents, and yet robbed by the same 
 tribe, when met again without the bounds of their protection. 
 
 " The tribes most addicted to rapine in the west are about Candahar, in the 
 desert country on the borders of Persia and Beloochistan, and the Ghilzees, 
 who inhabit the Paropamisan mountains. All the tribes of the range of Soli- 
 man, especially the Khyberees and Vizcerees, are notorious plunderers ; many 
 others in the east are disposed to plunder, and it is remarked that all the pas- 
 toral tribes in the west are more disposed to robbery than those who live by 
 agriculture ; robbery is, however, never aggravated by murder. 
 
 " The nomade population is diminishing, though the Dooranees extol the 
 charms of a pastoral life. Those who live in tents are chiefly to be found in 
 the west, where they amount to one-half the population. All over the east, 
 the people live in houses. The commonest house is built of unburnt brick 
 one story high, and roofed with a terrace or low cupola. There is little or no 
 furniture within, except a coarse woollen carpet, and pieces of felt to sit on. 
 The houses of the great are of two or three stories, and enclosed with high 
 walls containing stables and offices, and several courts laid out in gardens 
 with fountains. The halls are supported by pillars and Moorish arche&» 
 carved and painted. The walls are ornamented with paintings in dbtemper 
 or oil, and pictures- The furniture consists chiefly of carpets and felts. The 
 tents of the shepherds are of coarse black camlet ; those of the common people 
 are from twenty to twenty-five feet long, ten or twelve broad, and eight or 
 nine high, supported by poles, and divided into two apartments by a curtain ; 
 those of the khans are larger and better— the Dooranees line their tents with 
 felt. 
 
 '' The Afi'ghans are a social, sober, steady, cheerful people. Though merry, 
 they do not laugh much, though they talk a great deal. They are fond of 
 tales and songs, which are of love or war 3 but their favourite amusement is 
 the chase or hawking. 
 
 '' The men are all of a robust make, generally lean, though bony and 
 muscular. They have high noses, high cheek-bones, and long faces. Their 
 hair and beards are generally black ; sometimes brown. They shave the 
 middle part of the head, but wear the rest of their hair, which is coarse and 
 strong. Their countenance has an expression of manliness and deliberation, 
 united to an air of simplicity. The western Affghans are larger and stouter 
 than those of the east, and some Dooranees and Ghilzees are of surprising 
 
Vll 
 
 strength and stature ; but, generally speaking, the Affghans are not so tall as 
 the English. Their manners are frank and open, and though manly and inde- 
 pendent, they are entirely free from military pride and/erocity. About towns? 
 the Affghans are in some degree polished ; but in many parts of the country 
 they are plain and rustic, but never fierce or insolent. Their deportment is 
 easy, yet it is not uncommon to find them bashful, a defect rarely seen in an 
 Asiatic. Their conversation is rational, they are desirous of information, and 
 the bulk of the people are remarkable for prudence, good sense, and observa- 
 tion. Capt. Burues says they always interrogated him closely regarding 
 Europe, and that * it was delightful to see the curiosity of even the oldest 
 men.' Though far behind Europeans in veracity, and though they would 
 seldom scruple to deceive when their interest was at stake, they have not the 
 habitual falsehood of the natives of India and Persia. They are all remarka- 
 bly hardy and active, industrious, and laborious. From the nature of theij: 
 country, they are exposed to endure cold and heat, and accustomed to 
 climbing mountains and swimming torrents. They are impatient of heat, 
 though much of the climate of Afighanistan is hot- They are attached to 
 their clans and families, proud of their ancestry, and all take a lively interest 
 in the honour of their country. They are kind to their immediate dependents, 
 though the Affghan rule over conquered nations is severe and tyrannical 
 They are faithful in friendship, and mindful of favours. They are neither 
 irriteble nor implacable-, but they retain a long remembrance of injuries not 
 retaliated ; revenge is esteemed a duty. Capt. Burnes taxes them with idle- 
 ness and a passion for intrigue ; yet he adds, ' I imbibed a very favourable 
 impression of their national character. Mr. Elphinstone sums up their ch<t- 
 racter in these words. — ' Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity, 
 obstinacy j on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their 
 friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious? 
 and prudent ; and they are less disposed than the nations in their neighbour- 
 hood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit.' " — Asiatic Journal 1838, pp. 306 — 
 308. 
 
 There is, in one particular, a remarkable difference betwixt the 
 Affghans and the tribes to the north and west of them in a matter 
 which of itself is sufficient to mark the character of a people. The 
 Heratees, Khivans, Uzbegs, and Tartars of every race deal freely and 
 extensively in slaves. 
 
 '* In the Khurm valley we overtook another slave party from the Hazara 
 country. The owners, to the astonishment of our party, were men of Cabool. 
 They appeared greatly mortified at being seen by us, hung down their heads, 
 and wished, but in vain, to escape notice. The Khirakushes recognised them 
 as inhabitants of Chardeh, a plain in the vicinity of Cabool, and at once 
 charged them with carrying on a traffic as degrading to an Affghan as it is 
 accounted honourable in an Uzbek. They were asked how they could face 
 their clansmen after such disreputable conduct. In extenuation of their con- 
 duct, they stated, that after trading to a considerable extent with the Hazaras, 
 
•viu 
 
 and waiting twelve months for a settlement of their claims, they had been 
 unable to obtain payment. The correctness of the demand was readily 
 acknowledged, and slaves, valued at its full [amount, offered in lieu of all 
 claims. At first they refused this mode of payment, but were at Icugtli 
 induced to comply. Unable after such a description of compromise to return 
 direct to their own country, they were now proceeding to the Uzbek mart of 
 the Khurm, or Tash Kurghan, there to realize by sale the proceeds of this 
 discreditable barter. 
 
 " Nothing surprises one so much, nor is more difficult to be accounted for 
 on rational principles, than the marked shades of difference which often, as in 
 this case, are exhibited in the moral character of neighbouring nations. 
 Here we have two races of men, professing the same belief, whose habits in 
 many respects are alike, and whose location and pastoral pursuits offer many 
 points in common, yet differing in almost every feeling that marks the man, 
 and which in their combined influence constitute the peculiar genius of a 
 people. Of the freedom enjoyed by the Aftghans, the Uzbeks know nothing. 
 The liberty of the slave they capture is not more at their disposal than their 
 own life is in the hands of their chief or Beg. To love of country, a feeling 
 dominant in the breast of an (Affghan, and which glows with more or less 
 intensity in the soul of every other people from the Zahara to the Esquimaux, 
 the Uzbek is almost a stranger. The custom of man stealing appears to have 
 smothered every better feeling ; and the pratice of trafficking in human beings 
 extends even into their domestic arrangements j for their wives are as much 
 articles of property as their slaves, and are bought and sold with the same 
 callous indifference." — Wood's Journey to the Oxus-, pp. 210 & 211. 
 
 The following extract, from Mr Masson's late work, gives an idea 
 of i^ffghan liberality and toleration, for which we should in vain seek 
 a parallel in the wide limits of Asia : — 
 
 " Affghan Toleration — It is matter of agreeable surprise to any one 
 acquainted with the Mahomedans of India, Persia, and Turkey, and with 
 their religious prejudices and antipathies, to find that the people of Cabool 
 are entirely free from them. In most countries few Mahomedans will eat with 
 a Christain ; to salute him even in error, is deemed unfortunate, and he is 
 looked upon as unclean. Here none of those • difficulties or feelings exist. 
 The Christian is respectfully called a * kitabi,' or * one of the book.' The 
 dissolute Vazir Futi Khan, when occasionally an Armenian Christian pre- 
 sented himself desiring to become a convert to Islam, was wont to inquire 
 what he had found deficient in his own religion that he wished to change it ? 
 and would remark, that those persons who possessed a book and would adopt 
 a new faith, were scoundrels, actuated by love of gain, or other interested 
 motive. To the Hindu anxious to enter the pale of the Mahomedan Church, 
 he made no objection j on the contrary, he applauded him who, having no 
 religion, embraced one. I at first imputed the indifference of the Cabool 
 people to their own laxity, for I soon observed that there was very little 
 religion among them. Those called Shias were very generally of the Sun- 
 mazzabz, wluch, whatever its mystical pretensions, I fear implies no religion at 
 
IX 
 
 all. The same system largely prevails among the Suni professors : but when 
 the same liberality was found to extend over the country and among all 
 races whether Affghans, Tajiks, or others, who could not be chargeable with 
 Sufi doctrines, I was sensible that there must be some other reason. * * 
 
 " Living with the Armenians of the city, I witnessed every day the terms of 
 equality on which they dwelt among their Mahomedan neighbours. The 
 Armenian followed the Mahomedan corpse to its place of burial ;— the Ma- 
 homedan showed the same mark of respect to the remains of the Armenian 
 community. They mutually attended each other's weddings, and participated 
 in the little matters which spring up in society. The Armenian presented 
 gifts on Id Noh Roz, or the Mahomedan New-year's Day ; he received them 
 on his own Christmas Day. If it had happened that a Mahomedan had mar- 
 ried an Armenian female who was lost to the Church of th« Cross, I found 
 that the Armenians had retaliated? and brought Mahomedan females into their 
 families and inducted them into their faith. An Armenian, in conversation 
 with the present head of the Wais family, said, that some person had called 
 him a Kafir, or Infidel. The reply was, ' He that calls a kafir is a kafir himself. 
 It is something for a Christian to reside with Mahoraedans so tolerant and 
 unprejudiced. Wine prohibited to be made or sold in the city, is permitted to 
 be made and used by Armenians, who are simply restricted to indulge in their 
 own houses. They have not unadroitly induced the Mahoraedans to believe 
 that to drink wine is part of their religion, and to interfere on that head is 
 impossible. There are a few families of Jews at Cabool; but, while perfectly 
 tolerated as to matters of faith, they by no meaua command the respect 
 which is shown to Armenians. Like them, they are permitted to make vinous 
 and spirituous liquors j and they depend chiefly for their livelihood upon the 
 clandestine sale of them. Some years since, a Jew was heard to speak dis- 
 respectfully of Jesus Christ: he was arraigned, and convicted before the 
 Mahomedan tribunals on a charge of blasphemy ; the sentence was sangsar, 
 or to be stoned to death. The unhappy culprit was brought to the Armenians, 
 that they, as particularly interested, might carry into effect the punishment of 
 the law. They declined j when the Mahomedans led the poor wretch without 
 the city, and his life became the forfeit of his indiscretion. It was singular 
 that an attack upon the divinity of our Saviour should have been held cogni- 
 zable in a Mahomedan ecclesiastical court, and that it should have been 
 resented by those who, in their theological disputes with Christians, never fail 
 to cavil on that very point." 
 
 These matters are given with the greater minuteness and detail, 
 because it has been the habit ever since our armies entered AfFghanistan, 
 to speak of the people as treacherous and deceitful savages, charac- 
 terized by scarcely a good or estimable quality, and hardly, amidst the 
 severest sufferings inflicted on them, or the most intolerable exaspera- 
 tions to which they were exposed, entitled to the sympathies of 
 civilized men ! It appears of late to have been forgotten that Affgfaan- 
 
istan and its people were well known to us before our soldiers entered 
 it; that it had, betwixt 1808, when Mr Elphinstone went on em- 
 bassage, till 1832, when Conolly and Burnes traversed it from the 
 love of travel and desire to extend our knowledge of geography and 
 statistics, been described by travellers surpassed by none in modern 
 times in unimpeachable veracity, in careful and minute research, and 
 in powers of graphic description.* The testimony of these and of 
 those who followed after them in 1837 and 1838, on the eve of the 
 outbreak of the war, of whom Lieut. Wood was one, is perfectly 
 unanimous, — the passage already quoted from the Asiatic Journal 
 giving a full and faithful abstract of their opinions. No man knew 
 more of the Affghan character than the late Sir Alexander Burnes : he 
 had lived with them in peace, and traversed their country before our 
 discords began with them; he ha J negotiated with them, and striven 
 to avert collision, and examined every turn and winding, every nook 
 and crevice of their policy : he had watched them in open war, and 
 purchased their forbearance when it could not otherwise be procured. 
 On the 23d October 1841, within a week of his death, he writes 
 thus : •' I have often wondered at the hatred of the officers towards 
 the Affghans. They surpass their western neighbours, the supple 
 lying Persians ; their northern ones, the enslaved Uzbegs ; their 
 
 * The books of travels referred to are the following :— . 
 
 Travels into Bokhara, containing the Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus 
 from the sea to Lahore, &c. ; and an Account of a Journey from India to 
 Cabool, &c., in 1829 and 1830. By Lieut. Burnes. 3 vols. Svo. 1832. 
 
 Journey to the North of India, overland from England through Russia , 
 Persia, and Affghanistan in 1830. By Lieut. Arthur Conolly. 
 
 Moorcroft's Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindostan and the Puu- 
 jaub, in Ladakh and Kashmir, Peshawur, Cabool, Koondooz and Bokhara. 
 Prepared for the press by H. H. Wilson, Sanskrit Professor, Oxford. [These 
 volumes were not published till 1841, though referring to the period inter- 
 vening betwixt 1819 and 1825. Moorcroft had corresponded very extensively 
 with the Government as well as with his friends in India, and a large amount 
 of the information, systematically arranged by Dr Wilson, had appeared 
 before in fragments.] 
 
 Wood's Journey to the Sources of the Oxus in 1837-8. 1 vol. 8vo. 1841. 
 
 Cabool ; being a personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that 
 country in 1836-8. By Lieut.-Col. Sir Alex. Burnes. 1842. This journal, 
 though prepared by Sir A. Burnes at the date just mentioned, was not passed 
 from his hands till May 1841 ; so that he had abundance both of leisure and 
 ©pportunity to correct any imperfections in his previous observations. 
 
 Narrative of a Journey in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, 
 betwixt 1826 and 1838, by C. Masson, 3 vols. 1842. The best portion of these 
 volumes appeared in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographcal Society 
 for 1840. 
 
XI 
 
 Eastern, the timid Indian ; and their southern ones, the fierce savage 
 Beloochees. Yet they are blamed because they fight at night, when 
 in fact the poor wretches are unable at any other time to cope with 
 disciplined armies. This course, after all, is I imagine, nothing else 
 than is allowable ; it was the same as the Scotch Highlanders pursued 
 a century since." * The AfFghans throughout found themselves unable 
 to withstand us in the field : our guns, with which they had nothing 
 to cope, mowed them down in hundreds, and although certainly on 
 numerous occasions they threw themselves upon us regardless of all 
 danger, charging home to the points of our bayonets, as often as they 
 could they took advantage of the darkness of night, or the defiles and 
 ravines which their country supplied, and which did something to 
 equalize the condition of the disciplined soldier with that of the 
 untrained warrior of the mountains. This was provoking for us, but 
 it was the only wise course they could have pursued : the vexation 
 and annoyance, the frequent mischiefs and continual irritation occa- 
 sioned by it, made our officers as indifferent judges of the people 
 against whom they were employed, and of whose character they wrote, 
 as honourable-minded men could well become. They were placed in 
 a false position : they saw everything through a tinted medium ; and 
 they naturally described as they observed : being at the same time in 
 the worst possible position for philosophical observation. 
 
 * This is copied nearly verbatim from an entry, dated 23d October, in a 
 private journal of Sir Alexander Burnes's, which extends to the 1st November, 
 the day before his murder, and which, singularly enough, amidst the wreck of 
 all other things has been preserved entire- It is now in the hands of hia 
 friends. 
 
OPERATIONS 
 
 IN 
 
 SCINDE AND AFFGHANISTAN, 
 
 FROM 1837 TO 1842. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Opinions of the British in India little affected by consideration of Home party politics. Per- 
 plexity in the Narrative from the diversity of authorities, the imperfections of the pub- 
 lished papers, and the incessant alternations betwixt peace and war amongst the rulers 
 of Central Asia— Feeling of all the Affghans against Persia in 1832. Affairs of Pesha- 
 wuR — Hostile lEOTcments of Runjeet Singh against the Doorannee States in 1818 — 
 Seizes on Attock and Mooltan— On Cashmere— Captures Peshawur— Resigns it in favour 
 of Kamran Sliah and Dost Mahomed — Hurry Singh gets possession of, by treachery, in 1834 
 — Defeat of the Shah Soojah near Can dahar— Dost Mahomed attempts to recover Pesha- 
 wur in 1835— Retreats before the Seikhs— Successful attack on Nao Nehal Singh in 1836 
 — The Prince seizes Deera-Ishmael Khan — Preparations for anot^ier descent of troops 
 from Cabool— Battle of Jumrood in May, 1837— Death of Hurry Singh— Prostration of 
 the Seikhs — Our tender of mediation. Affairs of Herat— Size of the Principality — 
 Character of Kamran Shah, and his Vizier — Death of the King of Persia in 1834- 
 Warlike preparations of the new King— Lord Palmerston's remonstrances— Preparations 
 to march on Herat in 1836— Mr EUice's alarm— Mr M'Neil and Mr Ellice agreed upon 
 his right— Advance of the Persian army in July, 1837— Occupation of Karrack— Our com- 
 plete command of Persia throughout the Gulf — Money wasted on the embassy— Grati- 
 tude of Kamran Shah. Relations with Russia— Harmony of the Courts of St Peters- 
 burgh and London in 1834 and 1835— Suspicions of Mr Ellice— Bugbear of Russian in- 
 fluence—Count Simonich joins the Persian Camp before Herat— Gives Directions— Nego- 
 tiations with the Candahar Sirdars— Mission of Lieutenant Vicovich to Cabool— "With- 
 drawal of Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich— English Cabinet express themselves 
 entirely satisfied — Sir J. Hobhouse's Speech in 1842— Remarks on— Assumptions of False- 
 hood and Folly of Russia unsupported. Captain Bcrnks's Negotiations at Cabool— 
 Mission at first Commercial— Became Political in June 1837— Letter to Mr M'Neil— Dost 
 Mahomed and Lord Auckland's Correspondencein 1836— Burncs arrives at Cabool— Cordial 
 Reception— Opinion of the reasonableness of Dost Mahomed's Demands — Russian and 
 Persian influence— Candahar Affairs— Mis -ion of Lieutenant Leech— Arrival of Kohun 
 Dill Khan at Cabool in April — Arrival of Vicovich— Unwise importance attached to— 
 His Character— Burnes's Despatch of •22d January in reference to Sooltan Khan— Insolent 
 papers of the Government of India— Despatch of 5th March with Suppressed Passages- 
 Further Misunderstandings— Farewell Letter of Lord Auckland— Retirement of the Mis- 
 sion—Determination to have a War— Negotiations at Lahore— Vacillation of Lord Auck- 
 land—Influence employed with. 
 
 This chapter has, with a view to explicitness and perspicuity, been 
 broiten up into four subdivisions — on the aflPairs of Peshawur and those 
 of Herat — on the alleged intrigue of Persia and Russia, and negocia- 
 tions of Sir Alexander Burnes at Cabool, betwixt September 1837 and 
 May 1838 ; though it must be allowed that the danger of occasional 
 
repetition has thereby been incurred. As the statements put forvrard 
 may appear strange and new to the English reader — at variance, as they 
 are, with most of what has been set forth in and out of Parliament by 
 the defenders of Lord Auckland's policy, — it is proper to explain that 
 Yery nearly the whole of the facts are taken from the official papers of the 
 Government of India, or Foreign OflSce, selections from which were, in 
 1837, published by order of Parliament. The sources of all the informa- 
 tion have been carefully and copiously indicated, that the reader, who may 
 chance to suspect prejudice or partiality, may have an opportunity of satis- 
 fying himself as to whether the extracts have been fairly dealt with. The 
 works whence these are taken are perfectly open and accessible ; and we 
 have every wish that the suspicious should resort to them to see whether 
 their doubts are capable of verification. 
 
 The writer has no hesitation in admitting that he is, and has always 
 been, conservative in his views, — opposed to the late Governor-General in 
 his English politics, but not, therefore, opposed to him in his Indian admi- 
 nistration. In India, these considerations have little weight in the dis- 
 cussion of general questions. The keenest and most consistent advocate of 
 Lord Auckland'^s policy, is the Englishman newspaper — a conservative in 
 its politics: one of its ablest opponents is the somewhat more than Whig 
 Bengal Hurkaru. Divided as the newspapers of India have been in their 
 ideas of the wisdom of the Simla policy of 1838, they have borne unanimous 
 and willing testimony to the good intentions of Lord Auckland, and the 
 amiable and benevolent character of his domestic administration. They 
 have been still more heartily cordial and united in ridiculing and exposing 
 the alternate bursts of madness and imbecility, the fickleness, vacillation, 
 and caprice which have throughout characterised the rule of Lord 
 Ellenborough. These considerations may perhaps be permi-ted to have 
 some weight in exempting us from the charge of that undeviating partizanship 
 which manifests itself in England, where, amongst one class of disputants, 
 nothing is wrong — nothing censurable or dubious in the conduct of the late 
 Gov.- General —nothing in that of the present one which is not more or less 
 liable to one, or all, the three imputations — and where, amongst their op- 
 ponents, these predicaments are maintained — the individuals placed in them 
 being shifted. With all the opprobrium of the Afighan war on its head, 
 the administration of Lord Auckland will, in India, be regarded hence- 
 forward with far more respect than that of Lord Ellenborough with un- 
 disputed claims to the popularity and wisdom of the abandonment of the 
 unimaginably wicked and disastrous scheme of his predecessor. To the 
 European reader much confusion of ideas must necessarily arise from the 
 constant references to parties at war the one day and peace the next, inces- 
 santly making arrangements for attack or for defence ; terrifying the Calcutta 
 cabinet with the ideas that the flames of war were to be lit up in the very 
 
regions vrhere we were endeavouring to extend our commerce— the next 
 with alarms for intrigue and coalition, threatening danger on the threshold 
 of our Indian possessions, and filling the rulers thereof with alarm and 
 dismay. These constant alternations are in the last degree perplexing in 
 the study of the Parliamentary papers ; from which th« advocates of either 
 side, who chose to restrict their selections to isolated passages, may draw 
 weapons enough to defend themselves against their opponents. 
 
 The documents themselves have been furnished by a variety of individuals, 
 very differently situated from each other, in respect, alike, of their oppor- 
 tunities, as of their aptitude for observation, and deducing their conclusions 
 from appearances in the last degree varying from each other. 
 
 The papers themselves besides, have been garbled and sent forth to serve the 
 purposes of the late Cabinet in supporting their Affghan policy, rather than 
 to supply correct information : they are in some cases, as in tha,t of the 
 «bare supplied by the late Sir Alexander Burnes, so made up as to support 
 positions as much as possible opposed to those they were intended to sus- 
 tain, which they now establish when set forward entire. It is evident besides, 
 from the allusions in many of the unrautilated despatches, that much of 
 the information which it would be desirable to possess remains to this hour 
 concealed in the archives of the Board of Control. 
 
 No pains have been spared to clear up the obscurity flowing from these 
 channels in so far as this could be accomplished by a careful study and com- 
 parison of all the papers which appeared with or without consent of parlia- 
 ment. There are other sources of perplexity which can only be surmounted 
 by a careful consideration of a few leading particulars about to be 
 explained. 
 
 It must, in the first place, be kept in view amongst the constant allusions 
 to the alternifKons of hostile and of friendly intercourse amongst the chiefs 
 themselves, that they in fact had no settled or consistent system of policy : 
 that their alliances were transient and uncertain : that the incursion of one 
 month was followed by the embassage of the next. Take the case of Persia 
 and Herat as an illustration : we find the former threatening the latter early 
 in 1834, and before the end of the year they were on terms of friendship ; 
 and in 1836, 1837, and 1838, Herat was besieged — and Persia agreeing with 
 Kussia to have Kamran, the Suddozye prince, set aside, and Kohun Dil Khan, 
 the Barukzye Sirdar, put on the throne in his stead. In Nov. 1838, Persia 
 foregoes all these schemes, and once more makes peace ; in 1840 the tables 
 are turned, and the king of kings is induced by England to strengthen the 
 hand, and increase the territory, of the Suddozye. Scarcely is this arrange- 
 ment completed, when the latter turns his back on England, makes spontane- 
 ous submission to Persia, and restore* what we had procured for him. Turn 
 next to Candahar : the Sirdars there had, from the time their brother Dost Maho- 
 med acquired supremacy in Cabool, been almost incessantly at feud with him. 
 
They were throughout in league with another brother to destroy his power, 
 Sooltan Mahomed Khan, on whom the Ameer had conferred Peshawur ; and 
 seemed ready to accept the assistance of Herat and Persia in turn to accom- 
 plish their objects as these presented themselves. On one point only were all 
 the Mahomedan princes just named thoroughly agreed, — in their hatred to the 
 Seikhs, and their determination to recover Peshawur from heathen dominion. 
 In this great object they were united, but in nothing beyond it. Dost Maho - 
 med had given it to his brother, from whom it had been fraudulently wrested 
 in 1834, and he desired to re-annex it to Cabool. His brother, himself in 
 league with the Candahar Sirdars, coveted it for their own use alone, being 
 in the last degree jealous of the Cabool chief, and eager to subvert his 
 authority. Kamran Shah apparently lent himself to this confederacy 
 without hope of immediate gain, unless indeed the dream might have crossed 
 his mind that in the midst of the confusion he might have some chance of 
 recovering a further portion of the territories ruled over by his grandfather ; 
 his chief object being to avenge himself on the Barukzye chief, who had 
 successfully driven and excluded the last hope of the Suddozyes from kingly 
 power. The king of Persia obviously desired to increase the Doorannee em- 
 pire as much as possible, in the hope of making it all his own. It must be- 
 sides, be recollected, that war in these countries, so far from being regarded, 
 as in civilized Europe, the worst of evils, is looked upon as a heroic and 
 exciting occupation, — as the only means by which power and glory are 
 really to be won. The rapture of the strife is reason enough for the 
 leaders — the hope of plunder for the followers — rushing into battle. 
 
 In 1832, when Captain Burnes first visited AflPghanistan, Persia threatened 
 Candahar'; and the Sirdars, alarmed at the danger from the west, and aware 
 of how little they merited kindness at their brother's hands, knew not 
 where to look for assistance. Dost Mahomed was too large-minded a poli- 
 tician to permit personal feeling to betray him into the folly of suffering his 
 country to be endangered. He knew that if Persia advanced on Candahar, 
 she would come farther, and that Ghuznie or Cabool itself might suffer. 
 He wrote to his brother — " When the Persians come, let me know, and as I 
 am now your enemy will I then be your friend." (1) The threat of invad- 
 ing Affghanistan seems indeed to have been a peculiarly favourite one with 
 Persia ; made use of from time to time from the period of the final dissolution 
 of the Doorannee monarchy. Dost Mahomed appears to have been the only 
 prince in those parts who had seriously set himself about extending the inte- 
 rests of commerce, and maintaining the vigorous administration of justice 
 amongst his subjects. As nothing could mare seriously have impeded the tran- 
 quil advancementof these than the continual alarm to which the threats allud- 
 
 1. Ti'avels in Bokhara, vol. iii. p. 272, 12tno edition. 
 
ed to from time to time gave rise, the wisest course he could have pursued was 
 to have endeavoured to obtaia a secure and permanent alliance with the 
 sovereign who uttered them. His anxiety to establish relations with distant 
 foreign powers was equally an evidence of his desire for peace, and ought, 
 so far from exciting our jealousy, to have elicited our warmest approbation, 
 — the more especially when it appeared that an alliance wiih ourselves was 
 that which he preferred above all others, and for whose sake he was willing 
 to sacrifice them all. One thing alone he refused to concede to us — the 
 abandonment of his claims to Peshawur, — a measure which, if yielded, 
 would have disgraced him for ever in the eyes of his subjects, as well as of 
 surrounding nations. For this refusal we expelled him from his throne ! 
 
 No stronger evidence can be had of the solicitude of all the Affghan chiefs 
 as far west as Seistan, for an alliance with England, than the promptitude 
 with which all their own individual schemes were abandoned so soon as the 
 appearance of the mission in 1837 held out a prospect of this being acceded 
 them. It must be kept in view that we offered our interposition betwixt 
 them and their enemies at a time when they asked not our assistance ; that 
 they were under no treaty or obligation to us whatever ; and that if they had 
 something to hope from our friendship, they had no reason to suppose that 
 they had any grounds of fear from our enmity. They were perfectly inde- 
 pendent of us, and entitled to accept or decline the friendly offers so super-^ 
 fiuously and officiously proffered them, without our having the slightest 
 grounds of anger, further than may be considered justifiable when felt by one 
 who, meddling with the affairs of his neighbour, receives, as he deserves, 
 the meddler's requital. 
 
 "When we tendered Kamran Shah, the Suddoyze, help against our 
 allies of Persia, he frankly told us, he did not want us. " With regard to 
 the coming of the Persian army," says he, as stated in the official des- 
 patches, ** I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you 
 trouble or annoyance. Should the Russian government evince any great 
 desire to come to Heraf, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take 
 any trouble about the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them 
 come, in order that they may be able to prove what they can do. May it 
 please God, the most Merciful ! the steed of their wishes shall not accom- 
 plish the journey of their design," 
 
 AFFAIRS OF PESHAWUR. 
 
 " "With a view to invite the aid of the oa facto Rulers of Aflfjjhanistan to the measures 
 necessary for giving fuU effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the 
 close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomnaed Khan, the Chief of Cabool. The 
 original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Cap- 
 tain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the 
 Governor General, that the troops of Dost Mahommed Khan had made a sudden anl ua- 
 
provoTced attack on those of our ancient ally, Maha Raja Runjeet Singh. It waa naturally 
 to be apprehended that His Highness the Maha Raja, would not be slow to avenge this ag- 
 gression ; and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the rery 
 regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and 
 beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to 
 avert a result so calamitou?, the Governor General resolved on authorizing Capt. Burnes 
 to intimate to Dost Mahommed Khan that, if he should evince a dispositioa to come to just 
 and reasonable terms with the Maha Raja, His Lordship would exert his good offices with 
 His Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. 
 The Maha Raja, with the characteristic confideace which he has uniformly placed in the 
 faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Go- 
 vernor General to the effect, that in the meantime hostilities on his part should be suspended." 
 — Simla Proclamation, 1st October, 1838. 
 
 The troubles of Affghaaistan, and strife of its Chiefs, had, from an early 
 period, been watched with intense interest by Runjeet Singh ; eager to 
 profit by every opportunity of extending his dominions to or beyond the Indus. 
 In May 1818, the Affghan forces having been withdrawn from Peshawur to 
 meet the exigencies of civil broils at home, the ruler of Lahore — who had 
 some time before possessed himself of the Fort of Attoek — dispatched a 
 select body of troops with a heavy battering train to lay siege to Mooltan, 
 The expedition was successful : after a gallant but unsuccessful defence, in 
 which 1000 of the garrison fell, the town was captured and sacked, the 
 mosques destroyed, the muzzin forbidden, and the cow declared sacred. 
 The following year he attacked the Capital of Cashmere, and after a severe 
 engagement, where the Affghans fought with all the rage and zeal of reli- 
 gious enthusiasm, he made good his conquest. Driving the enemy before 
 him, he next entered Peshawur, and received the submission of the inhabi- 
 tants. (1) These aggressions were commenced without the claim of right, 
 or pretence of quarrel, and on no colourable grounds but lust of conquest. 
 The territories on his north-western frontier were valuable and desirable : 
 the disagreements of their rulers rendered them weak and ill -defended ; and 
 accordingly they were seized upon and annexed to the Seikh dominions. 
 The countries beyond the Indus were at this time so torn by internal 
 dissensions that the rebel Sirdars feared to leave Caboo), — apprehensive that 
 the heir of Timour might return from Herat and claim the sovereignty. 
 Tranquillized on this point by three years delay, in 1823 Azeem Khan, 
 learning that the Seikhs were about once more to cross the Indus, advanced 
 to Peshawur to meet them : another engagement, more severe and bloody 
 than any which had hitherto occurred, again ensued : the Seikhs were vic- 
 torious, and the Affghans retired upon Cabool. 
 
 So excited was the state of public feeling, that Runjeet found himself 
 unable to retain Peshawur as a Seikh province, and accordingly he divided 
 it betwixt Kamran Shah of Herat, grandson of the emperor Nadir, — and Dost 
 Mahomed Khan, the bitter rival of the Suddoyze race of kings, and most ac- 
 tive of theBarukzye chiefs, as yet only struggling for the supremacy soon after- 
 
 1. ConoUy's Travels, vol. ii., p. 402. 
 
wards attained by him at Cabonl. (2) Five months afterwards, Cashmere was 
 lost to the Doorannees. Dost Mahomed having possessed himself of supreme 
 authority at Cabool, in 1826 made over his share of Peshawur to his elder 
 brother, who had been the last of his competitors for power, on his aban- 
 doning further pretences to the capital. (3) In 1834 the Shah Soojah, as 
 already mentioned in the preface, made one more attempt to regain his 
 throne. It fell in with the views of Runjeet Singh, on the present occasion 
 to offer him assistance, on the condition that Peshawur, together with the 
 whole of the Affghan territory betwixt the Hills and the Five Rivers, should 
 be formally ceded to him, and annexed to the Punjaub. The treaty was 
 agreed to, — the only portions demurred at being the surrender of the gates 
 of Somnath, then at Gbuznie, and the giving of Shahzadah as a hos- 
 tage.(4) The presence of Dost Mahomed and his chiefs was in July requir- 
 ed to the westward to repel the advances of the Shah Soojah, now ap- 
 proaching Candahar with a numerous army. The Chiefs of Peshawur 
 took advantage of these events to arrange a series of plans against the 
 authority of the Cabool Chief: and fearing, from the rapidity with which 
 he had just before overrun Jellalabad, that he might, so soon as his hands 
 were free, inflict on them summary chastisement, they solicited aid from 
 Lahore. Hurry Singh, the most fortunate and talented of the Seikh com- 
 manders, was at this time encamped with a powerful force near Attock j 
 watching, as is supposed, the opportunity of seizing on Peshawur, lest 
 perchance the Shah Soojab, on recovering his throne, should be supported 
 by us in making it, if found more convenient, tributary to Cabool : his master 
 wished to be beforehand with us in securing this new acquisition, that we, on 
 giving assistance to the Shah, should have no pretext for claiming it as com- 
 pensation for our services, should this other untoward alternative present 
 itself.(5) He appeared within six miles of the city of Peshawur, on 
 pretence of receiving the usual tribute of horses, rice, swords, &c., which 
 the Sirdars had bound themselves to pay ; finessing to gain lime, which 
 was of the utmost importance to him, he delayed his departure on pre- 
 tence that the horses were not of such quality as had been agreed upon. 
 Finally, it was proposed that Nao Nehal Singh, the prince royal, should 
 be permitted to make a friendly visit to the capital. Under cover of 
 this conciliatory concession, the whole Seikh army advanced, and at once sat 
 down in hostile attitude opposite the walls. The Affghan Sirdars, wholly 
 
 2. Masson's Journeys in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, 
 Tol. ill., p. 60. 
 
 3. Ibid. 4. Parliamentary Papers 1839, p. 143. 
 
 6. This is the explanation given by an apparently well-informed writer in 
 the Delhi Gazette^ June 1835, and it seems a probable one. Strange that two 
 years afterwards we should make the claim of Runjeet Singh on this province, 
 which he had snatched to keep it from us, the chief pretence for the deposition 
 of Dost Mahomed. See Asiatic Journal, 1836. 
 
8 
 
 unprepared for this, had no means of resistance : they fled at once with 
 their wives and treasure — yielding to an arnay of 9000 men a territory which 
 a few years before the Seikh sovereign himself had been unable to retain 
 with a force of 25,000. (6) This digression is essential for the full under- 
 standing of the events jast about to be related, which formed the chief 
 ostensible cause of our resolution to dethrone Dost Mahomed. (7) The 
 Shah Soojah having been defeated near Candahar, as narrated at the close 
 of the preface, retired once more to the previous asylum the British Govern- 
 ment had provided for him within their territories at Loodianah. It was 
 not to be supposed that Dost Mahomed would submit with patience to an 
 act of such fraudulent and barefaced spoliation without an attempt to reco- 
 ver the portion of his kingdom which had been ravished by trickery. He 
 was stated by Captain Wade (•25th September, 1834), to have roused the 
 whole Mahomedan population for an attack on the Seikhs. Runjeet Singh, 
 who had then 25,000 men at or near the s3eQe of action, was determined 
 (writes the Loodianah Resident) not to let go his hold on Peshawur, while 
 Dost Mahomed Khan, and the other Aflfghan rulers, were equally resolved 
 to stake their political existence on the capture of the place. Little could 
 be done before the setting in of winter, and the earlier operations appear to 
 have been of inconsiderable importance. Some severe skirmishing ensued with 
 small parties of troops detached from the main array, assembling at Jellalabad 
 under Ukhbar Khan, — in which Hurry Singh had the worst of it, — hav- 
 ing on one occasion been repelled with the loss of 150 men. (8) The Maha- 
 rajah himself made every preparation to meet the approaching contest on 
 a larger scale than had hitherto occurred. He reinforced his army; and 
 advancing from Lahore remained encamped for some time at Rotas, and 
 then proceeded to Peshwur, around which a very large force was assembled 
 by the end of April. (9) Dost Mahomed having joined the army, which for 
 some time had been collecting under his favourite son, prepared to descend 
 through the Khyber Pass. Runjeet Singh a IvanceJ to meet him, and drew 
 up his Seikhs in battle array across the line of the advancing Affghans, 
 
 6. Masson, vol. iii., pp. 225—228. 
 
 7. Sir Alexander Burnes thinks that the Maharajah was urged to this against 
 his better judgment, by Hurry Singh. *' It has proved [says he] a source of 
 annoyance, and latterly of serious disaster. Its revenue, under the Dooran- 
 nees, used to be £SO,000 a year ; under the Seikhs it is £l 00,000 j but of 
 this £60,000 is allocated amongst the Chiefs holding Jaghires— Mahomed Khan 
 Barukzye and his tribes enjoy £40,000 of this, and the bulk of the remainder 
 is devoted to religious purposes." " It is [concludes Burnes] a drain on the 
 finances of Lahore, with the additional di advantage of being so situated as to 
 lead the Seikhs into constant collision with fierce and desperate tribes, who, 
 were it not for their poverty, would be dangerous antagonists." — Cabool, by 
 Sir A. Burnes, vol. i., 1842. 
 
 8. Calcutta Courier, June 3, 1835 j and Delhi Gazette, April, same year. 
 
 9. Delhi Gazette-^ June 3, 1836. 
 
add within two miles of their front. The Ameer, who seemed at no time to 
 have been sanguine of success, on seeing himself outnumbered by the pow- 
 erful and disciplined array of the Maharajah, considering affairs hopeless, 
 returned towards Jumrood, and was followed for some distance up the 
 Khyber Pass by the enemy (Ilth May, 1835.) Proposals were sent to him, 
 that if he would abandon all clai ns to the conquered territory, and give one 
 of his sons as an hostage for the maintenance of peace, he would receive a 
 Jagheer (estate) worth £30,000 a-year. (10) This proposition was at first 
 favourably received, but afterwards declined. Meantime the Affghan Sirdars 
 had tendered unconditional allegiance to the new ruler; audit was agreed 
 that they should receive a territory of equal value with that rejected by Dost 
 Mahomed, — they doing homage, and acknowledging tho Seikh sovereignty. 
 This reward for their hostility and treachery to the Ameer was accepted of, 
 and they became thereafter the dependents of the infidel. 
 
 General Avitabile, one of the Corsican officers who had, many years be- 
 fore, joined the service of the Maharajah, was made Governor of Peshawur, 
 — the duties of which office he has now for seven years discharged with the 
 utmost ability : 2000 cavalry and 5000 irregulars were left to protect the 
 country. It was said that Dost Mahomed on retiring towards Cabool, 
 pledged himself to retake Peshawur or die in the attempt. (11) He returned 
 to his capital, leaving his sons to settle the affairs of Jellalabad ; while his 
 principal opponent retired to Lahore, withdrawing all his troops from beyond 
 the Indus, save those already referred to. The Affghans of Peshawur, dis- 
 contented with the new order of things, meanwhile repaired in vast numbers 
 to Caijool to lay their grievances before their former ruler, and express their 
 desire to be led against the Seikhs ; and their eagerness to sacrifice their 
 lives for the faith, and in the expulsion of the infidels. Influenced by these, 
 and with the desire for the recovery of his territory unslacked and unabated, 
 it was determined that his eldest son, Afzul Bey Khan, should proceed to 
 
 10. We are at a loss to understand the allusion of Mr. Masson, vol. iii., p. 
 416, where he says—" The proposal [made in 1837 or 38] to give Peshawur 
 to the Ameer — Runjeet Singh receiving in return one of his sons, had never 
 been made by the Maharajah j — Capt. Wade denouncing it— and I am sorry 
 to say justly— as insidious." Why it was the very offer Runjeet Singh 
 had himself made in 1835 — only instead of the whole of Peshawur he was to 
 receive a jagheer of £30,000 a-year. Dost Mahomed, as will be seen from 
 the te'kt, for a time entertained the proposal. Runjeet Singh had made a 
 similar one to the Shah Soojah in 1833, when negotiating for his restoration.— 
 Parliamentary Papers, 1838. 
 
 11. Asiatic Journal, December 1835. This passage is a quotation ; but ite 
 source whence it is taken is not named. The officers referred to are Generals 
 Avitabile, Allard, Court, and Ventura, — all men who have distinguished them- 
 selves for military skill and general literary acquirements, and for the wisdom 
 and the friendly feeling towards our Government with which they have con- 
 ducteel the affairs of the Maharajah. 
 
10 
 
 measure h's sword with the unbeliever. An army of 20,000 men, mostly 
 Kuzzilbashes, were, without delay, accordingly assembled at Jellalabad. De- 
 scending* the Khyber Pass with about half of this number, he came up with 
 the Seikh army only 5000 strong, under Nao Nehal Singh, at the Ghurry of 
 DeCassah, in June 1836. The fight was obstinate, and the slaughter on 
 both sides severe, when victory determined in favour of the Affghans : their 
 enemies completely defeated, dispersed and fled. Just before, a bloody en- 
 counter had taken placenearthecity betwixt the troops of Shere Singh, father 
 of the prince already named, and immediate heir to the Seikh throne, and the 
 Chief of Lalpoora : both suffered severely, and each claimed the victory ; but 
 the Affghans appear to have had the best of it. A few months after this, Nao 
 Nehal Singh descended by the line of the Indus towards D^jerat, and obtained 
 Deera Ish:aael Khan by stratagem — imprisoning the Chief, Shah Newaz 
 Khan ; the'alleged ground of offence being, that the Sacred Cow had been 
 openly killed within his territories. This fresh appropriation of Affghan 
 territory, effected almost without bloodshed, was an evidence that the Lion 
 of the Punjaub had given all consideration of right and justice to the winds, 
 when an opportunity presented itself of aggrandizing himself at the expense 
 of his Mahommedan neighbours beyond the Indus; and the rumour now ran, 
 that as he had taken possession of neirly the whole of the Doorannee ter- 
 ritory on the hither side the mountains, he might be expected to prepare 
 himself without delay for an advance upon the capital ; an idle boast, pro- 
 bably encouraged by the Court to cover the mischances which had just been 
 experienced at Peshawur, and brazen out the appropriations he seemed de- 
 termined to make, so far as his power permitted. 
 
 Preparations were meanwhile made by the Seikhs for the seizure of Shikar- 
 pore, a wealthy and populous town belonging to the Ameers of Scinde, who ap- 
 pear to have given not the slightest cause for quarrel or displeasure. From 
 the beginning of autumn 1836, till the approach of spring in the following 
 year, though we read of no encounters of note betwixt the Seikhs and 
 Affghans, the hostility betwixt them appears not for a moment to have been 
 modified or interrupted. Great preparations having, in the course of 
 the winter and early in spring, been made by Dost Mahomed for a fur- 
 ther attempt upon Peshawur? an army, said to have consisted of about 
 fifteen thousand men, descended the Khyber Pass, and came up with 
 the enemy at the Fort of Jumrood, just beyond the mountains, on the 1st 
 May 1837. The strength of the Seikh army is not mentioned : they were 
 commanded by the celebrated leader Hurry Singh. The Affghans com- 
 menced by cannonading the Fort; and, findin'; themselves for a time un- 
 resisted, considered that the day was their own. (12) Hurry Singh having 
 
 12. Masson, vol. iii, p. 424. 
 
11 
 
 suddenly burst upon them with a compact body of disciplined warriors, while 
 their irregular troops were divided from each other by separate ravines, for 
 a time carried every thing before him. Victory appeared for a while to lean 
 first to one side, then to the other, as the parties were alternately success- 
 ful The Seikhs had captured fourteen of the guns of their enemies, who 
 managed in the course of the day to recover eleven of them, and make up 
 their original number by the seizure of three pieces of Hurry Singh's artil- 
 lery. The Seikhs, who had committed themselves in pursuit of a body of re- 
 treating AflPghans, were unexpectedly met by a fresh and powerful force, 
 and compelled to retire. Their gallant and able leader had fallen, and the 
 troops were everywhere compelled to quit the field. The Aff^hans claimed 
 the victory : but hearing that heavy and highly-disciplined reinforcements 
 would immediately be sent to join the beaten army, considered it hopeless 
 to proceed further, and retired accordingly on Jellalabad, elatei with the 
 pride of success. It has generally been asserted, that the incursion termi- 
 nating in the battle of Jumrood was designed in the knowledge that at this 
 time the bulk of the Seikh forces were absent at Am*itsur in celebration of 
 the marriage of Nao Nehal Singh, and it is to this that the term '* sudden^'* 
 in the Simla Proclamation, is assumed to apply. Mr Masson publishes a 
 letter from Captain Wade under date the 7th April, blaming the Ameer for 
 having overlooked the opportunity then gone by. The festivities were over 
 In March, and the Maharajah immediately afcerwards hurried oflF his forces 
 to Peshawur in the full knowledge of what had been for several months 
 impending. 
 
 It appears (says Masson, vol. iii., p. 424) that the Maharajah was so con- 
 founded at the death of Hurry Singh, that he informed Captain Wade he 
 should be glad to give up Peshawur, preserving his pardah or his honour. 
 Nothing could be clearer (continues the same writer) than that he was 
 willing, at the request of the British Government, to have abandoned this 
 unjust conquest — such request would have saved him the appearance of a 
 forced surrender. Capt. Wade, on the 15th Sept. 1837, wrote to Mr Masson 
 that the Seikhs are ready to bring their quarrels to an amicable adjustment on 
 any reasonable terms, in accordance to our wishes for mutual peace. (13) 
 "Witn this in view, it is important to observe, that there was nothing, save in 
 the death of a man of such note as Hurry Singh, at all diflferent in the cir- 
 cumstances or concomitants more than in the half dozen other encounters 
 which had taken place betwixt the conquerors of Peshawur and its former 
 possessors throughout the four preceding years. It will be seen, also, that 
 Runjeet Singh had all along acted on a system of most unprincipled 
 aggression towards all his neighbours on every side of him : that Dost Ma- 
 
 13. Masson, yol. iii, p. 424. 
 
12 
 
 homed only strove to recover tlie territory of which he had been robbed. 
 In the Simla proclamation, issued on the 1st October following', the Ameer 
 was reported as the disturber of the peace on our N.W. frontier, (14) whereas 
 Runjeet Singh had maintained the whole line of the Indus from Sukkur to 
 Attock,— a scene of incessant strife. We tendered our mediation, to the 
 effect that we would guarantee the robber the permanent possession of his 
 plunder, and he very naturally accepted so generous an offer : — the party 
 robbed declined it on these terms, and we dethroned him for his pains ! 
 
 AFFAIRS OF HERAT. 
 
 *' It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor General, that a Persian Army 
 was besieging Herat ; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Alfghanistan, for 
 the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, andeven beyond, 
 the Indus ; and that the Court of Persia had net only commenced a course of injury and 
 insult to the Officers of Her Majesty's Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evi- 
 dence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the piinciples and objects of its 
 alliance with Great Britain.'' • * * * * 
 
 *' The Governor General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, 
 and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by 
 the Persian Army tor many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel 
 aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remon- 
 strances of the ISritish Envoy ot the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming of- 
 fer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gal- 
 lantry and fortitude worthy of Ihe justice of their cause, and the Governor General would yet 
 indulge the hope, that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until 
 succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Per- 
 sia, affecting the interests of the British Government, ha \:e been, by a succession of events, 
 more and more openly manifested. The Governor General has recently ascertained by an 
 official despatch from Mr McNeil, Her Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been com- 
 pelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted 
 towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a pub- 
 lic declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The ne- 
 cessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian 
 Arms into Aflfghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially commu- 
 nicated TO the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty's Government."— Sito^m Procla- 
 mation, October 1, 1838. 
 
 Herat, a principality on the borders of Persia, was one of the provinces 
 of the Doorannee empire, as constituted under Nadhir Shah, and his two 
 
 14. "With those facts iu view — given as they are on admittedly unquestion- 
 able authorities — how are we to regard such passages as the following ? — 
 
 " Whilst Captain Burnes was on his journey to Cabool, informatiou was re- 
 ceived by the Governor-General that the troops ot Dost Mahomed had made 
 a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally Runjeet Singh ! ! !'* 
 — Simla Proclamation, para. 4. 
 
 *' It was naturally apprehended that his Highness vrould not be slow to 
 avenge this aggression j and it was to be feared, that the flames of war being 
 once JiindJed la the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend 
 our commerce} the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government 
 would be altogether frustrated." — Ibid. Runjeet Singh, from the time he took 
 Moultan and Attock, and invaded Cashmere and Pesh.iwur, had> for ten years, 
 kept the flames of war blazing along the Indus, and we never interposed ! It 
 was him who fed them now, when we blamed Dost Mahomed ! Capt. Burnes 
 mentions that we had no objection to his seizing on Jellaiabad in June 1838, 
 or doing what he liked with Dost Mahomed ; so that we had no dislike to the 
 flames of war in the abstract,— it depended entirely on the party who kindled 
 them whether we should fan or quench them. Dost Mahomed's preparations 
 were incessantly commented on by the newspapers from March onwards. 
 
13 
 
 successors, Ahmed and Timor, whose joint reigns occupied the greater 
 portion of last century. It was ruled over, under the crown, by one of the 
 principal chiefs or princes of the empire. Its revenue amounts to about 
 £90,000 ; the population of the city to about 50,000 souls. When the 
 Suddozyes were driven into exile, Shah Mahomed, the lineal heir and elder 
 brother of the late Shah Soojah, was, in 1818, expelled from power; he 
 found refuge in Herat, and was permitted by the Barukzyes to retain a hold 
 on the principality after the authority of the other members of his family had 
 become extinguished throughout the rest of the Doorannee empire. He died 
 in 1829, and was succeeded by the present ruler, Kamran Shah, nephew 
 of ©ur late royal protege, and, as descending from the elder branch, rightful 
 representative of the Suddozye line. This prince, who seems a man of in- 
 tellect without principle, has lived without a friend, and has often suffered 
 from the treachery of those he trusted ; and, having been driven to a corner 
 of his dominions by rebel enemies, he has thought it expedient to fill his 
 coffers by any means that could be resorted to, in order, perhaps, to be pre- 
 pared for still greater reverses. (1) For ten or fifteen years he has ap- 
 parently resigned the cares of government to the hands of his Vizier, Yar 
 Mahomed, a man still more unprincipled and detested than his sovereign. 
 With this short personal notice, attention must be turned to the affairs of 
 Persia, which will speedily bring back our narrative to the more immediate 
 consideration of the concerns of Herat. 
 
 In Oct. 1834, the death of Futti AH Shah raised his grandson and adopted 
 heir, Prince Mahomed Meerza, by the title of Mahomed Shah, to the throne 
 the late sovereign had bequeathed to him. Fearing that the recollection of 
 his father's successes in the field might tempt the youthful sovereign to en- 
 deavour to signalize the commencement of his reign by extended schemes of 
 conquest to the eastward. Lord Palmerston, in July 1833 (letter dated 22nd) 
 instructed our ambassador at Teheran that the Persian Government should be 
 specially warned against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war 
 with the Affghans. (2) The course apprehended was the very one which 
 the King had resolved to pursue. (3) "It is unsatisfactory to know,'* 
 writes Mr EUice in November 1833, (4) ** that the Shah has^ very ex- 
 tended schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan ; and, in com- 
 mon with all his subjects, conceives that he has the right of sovereignty 
 over Herat and Candahar. He proposed various expeditions for spring 
 1836 — one against Herat — one against Candahar — and another against 
 
 1. Conolly, vol. ii., p. 416. 
 
 2. Lord Palmerstou's Letter, 22nd July 1835. Parliamentary Papers 18395 
 No. 10. 
 
 3. Mr Ellice to Lord Palmerston, November 1 3. December 24> and Decem- 
 ber 30. Parliamentary Papers with Supplement. 
 
 4. Memo, to Lord Palmerston for lb35. 
 
14 
 
 the Belooehres : (5) the minister stated that the dominions of Persia ex- 
 tende < as far as Ghuznie." (6) Whether the young king- really thought 
 of this at the time, or merely spoke of it in empty bravado, does not 
 appear. It might have been either, or partly both : but this is beyond 
 dispute, that whatever were his purposes eastward of Herat, it required 
 not the (lisasirous experience of a year spent in preparation tor the attack 
 of the fortress to no end, but that, after a nine months' si5ge, lie should 
 retire baffled fr< m its wails, to prove that he was unable to carry them into 
 effect, or to march an army a hundred miles beyond his own frontier, cal- 
 culated to alarm any one but the peasantry on the line of march. In Sep- 
 temt er 1832. when Captain A. Burnes visited the Persian camp at Koochan, 
 he found the Prince Roxal Abbas Meerza, whose exploits afterwards fired 
 his son with martial ardour, at the very pinnacle of his triumph. Yet bis 
 success was ascribed by him entirely to the British officers who had trained 
 his troops : he had no money to pay his army, and admitted that, without 
 supplies from us, he despaired of success. (7) 
 
 In April 1836 Mr EUice informed Lord Palraerston that the king had 
 resolved to march upon Herat to chastise Kamran Shah for a gross 
 bieach ot treaty, in having failed to fulfil the agreement made with Abbas 
 Meerza for the restoia ion of (jhonan, and of certain Persian families 
 de ained by him from their native country ; and the payment of i£iO,000 
 annually to the Shah. Mr Ellice considered that he had a perfect right to 
 obtain redress on these points by lorce of arms. (8) Mr McNeil took 
 exactly the same view of the que>tien, expressing himself in still stronger 
 terms: — '* Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty of Herat," 
 writes the Ambassador to Lord Palmerston, under date 24th February 1837 ; 
 *'and, regarding the question as one bewteen two separate sovereigns, I am 
 inclined to believe that the Government of Herat will be found to have 
 been the aggressor." From the death of Abbas Meerza, when an agree- 
 ment had been concluded for a suspension of hostilities between the parties, 
 and the line of boundary agreed upon, Persia had committed no act of hos- 
 tility against the Affijhans (of Herat; » but at the death of the late Shah 
 (October 1834) the Government of Herat made a predatory incursion into 
 
 5. Parliamentary Papers with Suf)plement. Mr Ellice in his note, 8th Ja- 
 nuary 1836, states to Lord Palmerston tiiat he had explained to the Persian 
 Minister that the Shah had the most absolute right to obtain redress from 
 the Herat Prince but that the British Government would much rather pn far 
 negociation than force of arms :— the friends of Lord Auckland have, as yet, 
 omitted to explain on what grounds this were called in the Simla procia- 
 ma'ion — a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression. 
 
 6. Letter to Lord Palmerston, received 28th February, 1839. Parliamen- 
 tary Papers 1839. 
 
 7. Ibid, December 24 ; received April 7. 
 
 8. Ibid, December 30 ; received ibid. 
 
15 
 
 the Persian territories, in concert with the Turcomans and Hazarehs, and 
 captured the subjects of Persia (to the extent of 11,000) for the purpose of 
 selling them as slaves." At the very time the Shah was making preparations 
 for an advance on Herat, with ulterior views on Candahar and Ghuznie if any 
 faith could have been placed on the vapouring threats of his ministers, a source 
 of alarm of a precisely opposite description, and from a different quarter, ap- 
 pears to have burst on Mr Elliee. In March 1836, an ambassador arrived from 
 the most important of the destined victims of the purposed invasion of the 
 conntries to the east, — the Candahar Sirdars themselves — proposing that 
 an alliance, offensive and defensive, should be entered into betwixt them, for 
 the purpose of attacking Kamran Shah , betwixt whom, as ihe representa- 
 tive of the Suddoz) e dynasty, and the Barukzye chiefs^ there was a blood- 
 feud. The chiefs required an acknowledgment of their independent adminis- 
 tration in the internal arrangements uf the country, and submitted them- 
 selves to Persia in their foreign relations only. (9) The terms of the pro- 
 posed alliance were immediately granted them. It was probably these suc- 
 cessive threats of the Shah of advancinar on Ghuznie, baseless as they might 
 have been considered, which induced Dost Mahomed at the same time to 
 send an ambassador with overtures of alliance. These were to the effect, 
 that the Cahool Ameer would assist in attacking Herat, taking vengeance 
 on the enemy of his house, on condition that the King of Persia should aid 
 him against the Seikhs, who, taking advantage of the embarrassments the 
 Shah Soojah had in 1834 occasioned him, were now stripping the Doorannee 
 empire of the whole of its former dependencies west of the Indus. The pro- 
 position was a most natural one : a power threatening to undermine or over- 
 throw him was about to be converted into an ally, — Persia, Candahar, and 
 Cabool were jointly to attack first Herat, and then Peshawur, the joint 
 powers severally benefiting by the result. It was scarcely to be expected 
 that the Ameer was to regard England with much affection, when he knew 
 that we protected, and were in closest alliance with, his most hated enemy— 
 the Lion of Lahore, and that we supplied the Shah Soojah, his competitor 
 for the crown, with a safe hiding-place whence to sally out an 1 attack him, 
 under cover of our wing, when he thought fit. *' Pressed on one hand by 
 the Seikhs," says Mr (now Sir John) M'Neil,(iO) " and, on the other, 
 
 9, Bokhara Travels, 12mo edition, vol. iii. p. 79 — Burnes's Address—*' I 
 did tell him (on his application for money) as I have ever felt, that I considered 
 the payment of money to such a Cabinet derogatory to the name and honour 
 of Britain J since it has tended more to lower our estimation in Asia than 
 our most noble deeds have done in India to raise it," — a sentiment which should 
 be written on the girdle of every British ambassador at the Court of Persia. 
 
 10. So writes Mr EUice on the 1st April 1836 ; on the lOth we find him once 
 inore stating, that His Majesty had been encouraged and promised pecuniary as- 
 sistance from the Russians, who well knew that the conquest of Herat and Can- 
 dahar by the Persians is in fact an advance for them towards India, if not 
 
16 
 
 fearing that some member of the Suddozye family may incite the Dooran- 
 nees against him, he had for some time been seeking to strengthen himself 
 by a foreign connection." The Ameer had forwarded letters almost simulta- 
 neously to the Emperor of Russia, the Shah of Persia, and the newly ap- 
 pointedGovernor-General of India — all sent ambassadors in return, and none 
 at first wrote more cordially than Lord Auckland in reply. The anxiety of 
 the Russian Minister for the chastisement of these man-stealers, was most 
 satisfactorily explained by the extent to which they kidnapped the subjects of 
 his country. It was not wonderful that parties having a common object of 
 such importance in view, should have been drawn somewhat closely towards 
 each other — the marvel was, that, considering the causes, they were not 
 more so. We have*, however, in these observations, permitted ourselves to 
 wander from the subject of the eastward march of the Persian army, to 
 which attention must now be directed. 
 
 The summer and autumn of 1836 were occupied in preparing an expedi- 
 tion meant to be of overwhelming magnitude, — but so unskilfully hud ar- 
 rangements been made, that, on the approach of winter, the head-quarters 
 of the army, with all their supplies, were still 600 miles to the westward of 
 the declared point of operation. Alarmed at these things, Kamran Shah 
 now of himself proffered terras of treaty ; he acknowledged his previous 
 man-stealing practices, but pledged himself to abstain fr®m this 
 and every other species of aggression, if the Shah would bind him- 
 self to abandon the present advance. This he declined to do, and accord- 
 ingly in July 1837 an army of 40,000 men, with 70 pieces of artillery, 
 was on its march from Teheran to Herat. The utter worthlessness of any 
 professions of submission on the part of Kamran Shah had, before this, 
 become apparent. The British ambassadors had laboured incessantly to 
 bring about an amicable arrangement, and had in part succeeded : when, on 
 a check which had been sustained by the Persian army, the Herat ruler 
 sent a message full of contumely and insult. On receipt of this, the coun- 
 cillors of Persia determined that a force should, next season, be marched 
 to chastise the faithless and unprincipled chief. The fear of the approach 
 of this, occasioned a second overture for negociation. (11) New light on all 
 these matters appears about this time to have beamed from Downing Street on 
 the Government of India : and a communication from the Governor- General 
 entirely altered the opinions of Sir John M'Neil; He now considered the war 
 eminently unjust, and urged the utmost remonstrances against it. The Per- 
 
 for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorgani- 
 zation." ! ! ! This within ten days of the time when he had given an account 
 of a treaty, offensive and defensive, having been concluded betwixt Persia and 
 Candahar ! The name of Russia seems to turn the wits of British statesmen ! 
 11. Letter to Mr Macnaghten, 22d January, 1837. 
 
17 
 
 sian route lay wholly through their own country, yet they were unable to reach 
 Herat before the end of November, — the sole obstructions arising from an 
 emptytreasuryand defective commissariat, and an undisciplined and disorderly 
 array, which frequently threatened to melt utterly away before they had seen 
 the enemy ; an excellent illustration of the futility of our fears of the 
 danger of aggression on AflPghanistan from the troops of modern Persia. 
 The siege lasted nine months, the Persian array having retired from before 
 it on the 30th of September. An expedition from Bombay, which had 
 landed at Karrack, in the Persian Gulf, in the middle of June, showed 
 them how completely Persia was within our grasp : that we could disem- 
 bark any force we pleased at Bushire within a fortnight of its quitting Bom- 
 bay, and possess ourselves of the chief towns of the empire before the people 
 at large could be made aware that hostilities were intended. This, to- 
 gether with the urgency of our remonstrances, were assigned by the Shah 
 as the reasons for his retreat. Yet it must be kept in mind that his at- 
 tempts against Herat had throughout proved failures; that he in one un- 
 successful assault lost 1800 men : that his casualties had exceeded 3000. 
 He wa?, in September 1838, as remote from his object as in Nov. 1837. 
 His army was short of provisions, and without clothing or pay ; and rather 
 than have continued before the fortress which had so repeatedly defeated 
 them, for another winter, would, in all likelihood, have dispersed of them- 
 selves in spite of all remonstrances. It may here be remarked as one of 
 numerous illustrations of the crooked and hollow policy in which we had 
 now engaged ourselves, that though the occupation of Karrack was an able 
 and most effective military movement, both this and the preparations 
 against AfFghanistan, in consideration of any movement Persia might have 
 in view, were specific violations of treaty. It had, in 1814, been expressly 
 stipulated by us, that if war should be declared between the Affghans and 
 Persians, the English Government should not interfere with either party 
 unless their mediation to effect a peace should be solicited by both par- 
 ties ; (12) and in a despatch from Lord Palmerston to Sir J. M'Neil, 
 dated 2d June 1836, the obligation to neutrality was emphatically recog- 
 nised. Yet we took possession of Karrack, an island belonging to Persia 
 in the centre of the Shah's dominions, which placed the whole sea coast of 
 the country at our command, and we prepared to attack Affjjhanistan on 
 suspicion of her desire to ally herself with Persia, or to resist her aggressions, 
 the alternative apprehended by Government not being apparent 1 The intima- 
 tion of the fall of Herat, one of the alleged causes of our invasion, reached the 
 Government before a single regiment had marched ; while Runjeet Singh, 
 
 12. Treaty of 1814, article ix. The previous article binds Persia to assist us 
 with troops in case the Affghans should be at war with the British nation. — 
 Parliamentary Papers, 181:9. 
 
 K 
 
18 
 
 whose personal animosity, another cause of our movements, was on his death- 
 bed, and Dost Mahomed had consented to postpone his claim to Peshawur, 
 and to keep all Russian and Persian embassies out of his territories would 
 we only afford him temporary protection- Every one of the pretexts of 
 quarrel had thus vanished before conflict began ! Wc had still the bugbear 
 Russia before us as a pretended source of apprehension, let surely little 
 weight, in reality, was attached to this, however much might have been 
 pretended, when the Cabinet waited till Russia had offered an explanation of 
 her conduct — declared to be frank, gratifying, and satisfactory — before either 
 remonstrances or inquiries were thought of! What definite project we imagined 
 the Court of St Petersburgh to have had in view, has never been explained 
 by any one. A foreign writer had the sagacity to point out, that should all 
 the powers of the empire, with all the material the best appointed army could 
 desire, reach the western borders of Beloochistan in safety, that a descent 
 by us on Bushire would place us in possession of all their communications, 
 compel Persia at her peril to act against them, and place the rear of their 
 armies, and the line of their advance and relief, completely at our mercy. 
 The descent on Karrack gives practical proof of the soundness of Count 
 Bjornstjerna's speculations. (I a) The uniform testimony of travellers had 
 speculatively shown that which the expedition to Khiva practically demon- 
 strated — that/or Russia to send an army as far as the eastern border of Persia, 
 was impossible. Our own experience is now sufficient to convince the most 
 sceptical that were they there, the mountain tribes would cut off their 
 supplies, destroy their cattle, and appropriate their baggage, before they 
 reached the Indus, without our intervention. We could, any day, cut an 
 expedition from the westward to pieces, by landing a force at Bushire, 
 where the coast country, with our fleet and supplies, would furnish a 
 base of operations from which Europe and Asia together could not drive us. 
 A Russian army would take twice the time to march from her furthest to 
 our nearest frontier that the armies of England would occupy in being 
 transported from the banks of the Thames to those of the Indus. We take 
 no account of how our fleets might meanwhile be employing themselves in 
 the Baltic or Black Sea. 
 
 The manner in which Kamran Shah has manifested his gratitude to- 
 wards us since 1837, might furnish a salutary lesson as to the nature of 
 these treaties of amity ; how hopeless it is to attempt to establish an alliance 
 betwixt barbarous and civilized nations, which can be made agreeable or 
 advantageous to either — and how worse than wasteful to fling a na- 
 tion's wealth away on wretched chiefs who can never be satisfied or enriched 
 — who east us off the moment we stop our subsidieSj—whose gratitude ex- 
 
 13. The British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna — Translated by 
 H. Evans Lloyd. 1840. J. Murray. 1 vol. 8vo. 
 
19 
 
 tends not beyond the hour of their receiving our gifts into their treasury, — 
 and who employ the bounty we bestow on them for the basest and worst 
 of purposes. It has bean seen how incessantly Messrs EUice and 
 McNeil laboured to dissuade the King of Persia from advancing on Herat, 
 and how anxious they were to promote negociation. When this failed, and 
 an array of 40.000 men appeared under its walls, Herat was first defended 
 by the prowess of an English officer, and then relieved by the descent of an 
 English force on the shores of Karrack. Their requital was, that, within 
 two months of' the Persian retreat, Major Todd and Lieutenant Pottinger 
 were ordered to quit. (14) The following year another deputation was sent 
 from the army then at Candahar on its way to Cabool. They remained 
 for nearly two years, and spent £300,000 in bribes, and in endea- 
 vouring to repair the fortress. The moment they began to shorten their 
 expenditure they were dismissed with contumely. The British Ministers 
 had laboured incessantly to obtain from Persia the cession of Ghorian, and 
 its annexation to Herat, with a view of establishing it as an independent 
 princedom. They had no sooner succeeded in this, than the object of our 
 solicitude being now no longer in our pay, made his submission to the Shah 
 spontaneously, and restored to him, under certain conditions as to which 
 we never were consulted, the very possession we had just before procured 
 for him ! These things all stand on official record ; the oldest of them 
 have occurred since the year 1836 : yet we go on wasting millions annually 
 on embassies at the courts of wretches who only hold to us while we bribe 
 them : when we could purchase them for any service they could perform, 
 for one- tenth of the sum we pay them annually.; and for whose hostility, 
 aided by all the assistance all the nations of Europe could coQveaiently 
 supply, we need not give ourselves the slightest disturbance ! 
 
 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. 
 
 So much for the Persian branch of the Russo-Persian question apart from 
 the affairs of Cabool, — a part of which will shortly be considered under the 
 head treating of the last-mentioned subject- In September 1834 so cor- 
 dially were Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode at one on Persian 
 affairs, that the English minister directed the ambassador at St Petersburgh 
 to intimate the gratification experienced by His Majesty's Government that 
 the Governments of Great Britain and Russia were acting in the same spi- 
 rit, and were equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the 
 internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity, of Persia. (1) 
 
 14 Despatch of Sir A. Barnes to Mr Torrens. dated Shikarpore, Oct. 31. 
 1. Lord Palmerston to Mr Bligh, 5th September, 1834.— Parliamentary 
 Papers, 1834. 
 
20 
 
 The letter (dateJ 5th Sept.) in -which these expressions of amity and 
 good- will are contained, had been crossed by one from Count Nesselrode 
 (Aug. 22) couched in terms still more satisfactory — the Russian minister 
 stating '' that the Court of St. Petersburgh continued to think that a con- 
 formity of language and conduct on the part of tlie representatives of 
 Russia and Great Britain would, of all political combinations, be the one 
 which would most effectually contribute to maintain tranquillity in Persia, 
 and to prepare the country for a new reign without exposing the empire 
 to the disorders inseparable from any contested succession." (2) In 
 1834, the Shah of Persia, Futteh AH, died, and was succeeded by his 
 grandson, as already explained : the same harmonious feelings which up 
 to this time had existed betwixt the Courts of London and St Peters- 
 burgh appear to have continued without any interruption. In December, 
 Mr Bligh writes Lord Palmerston — ''Ihave just seen Count Nesselrode, 
 who has given me some details respecting the death of the Shah of Persia. 
 Count Nesselrode seems to anticipate that Persia will inevitably become the 
 scene of civil commotion, and expresses his satisfaction that, under such 
 circumstances, the British and Russian Governments should have come to a 
 good understanding about this matter." (3) Upon this hint our foreign 
 minister writes to the ambassador at Teheran, warning the Persian Go- 
 vernment against aggressive war. (4) It does not appear whether Mr 
 EUice had been duly kept informed in reference to the friendly terms of the 
 correspondence betwixt Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode on Persian 
 affairs — it is to be presumed he was : but a very different train of feelings 
 had obtained hold of his mind in regard to the views of Count Simonich, 
 his brother ambassador at Teheran. In January 1836 he writes *• that the 
 Shah had determined on attacking Herat ; and that his success was 
 anxiously looked for by Russia, whose minister did not fail to press its exe- 
 cution.'' (5) " The motive," continues the ambassador, " cannot be 
 mistaken : Herat once annexed to Persia, may become, according to the 
 
 2. Ibid, Nov. 8. 
 
 3. Mr Bligh 's note dated St Petersburgh, December 5, 1834— received 5th 
 January, 1835 Ibid- 
 
 4. Ibid— Lord Palmerston's note to Mr EUice, July 25, 1835, referred to 
 under Herat affairs. 
 
 5. The Parliamentary Papers, from which the whole of the above facts are 
 derived, are marked as extracts. After the mutilation of the Cabool papers, so 
 justly characterised by Barnes as *' sheer trickery" — we knew not well what to 
 make of them ; they form of course what ministers mean to be set up as a jus- 
 tification of their measures. They are full of confusion, which might probably 
 vanish had we the documents complete. In speaking of Herat affairs, Mr 
 EUice constantly refers to the Persian claims on Ghuznie ; yet there seems to 
 have been no intention of advancing even to Candahar, as there were no pre- 
 parations attempted, or capable of being made, for doing so. It is possible 
 that the entire documents would shoAv that there were two different expedi- 
 tions in view, and that Count Simonich was favourable to that oa Herat only. 
 
21 
 
 Commercial Treaty, the residence of a consular agent; who may from 
 thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, through- 
 out Affghanistan." ** The extension of the Persian monarchy in the direc- 
 tion of AflFghanistan, will at once bring Russian influence to the very 
 threshold of our empire ; and as Persia will not, or dare not, place herself 
 in a condition of close alliance with Great Britain, our policy must be to 
 consider her no longer an outwork for the defence of India, but as the first 
 parallel from whence the attack may be commenced or threatened." This 
 metaphor of Mr Ellice seems at once to have been accepted as a substan- 
 tial and tangible fact : and from the hour this view of it began to be taken, 
 the Board of Control seemed to think of nothing but a battery of Rus- 
 sian cannon playing on the walls of Delhi — 1500 miles off I What 
 there would have been either objectionable or inconvenient in the establish- 
 ment of a Russian commercial agent on the frontiers of Persia — seeing 
 that Russia carried on an extensive trade with these countries, and was the 
 only European power which did so, is not explained to us ; — nor does 
 it appear what damage India could have sustained from any researches or 
 communications, either secret or open, which he could have conducted. 
 But this was the political mania of the Foreign Office for the time; 
 and any one demanding an explanation of the words *' Russian in- 
 fluence," or daring to doubt the potency and malignancy of its effects 
 on his country, must have run the risk ot having his sanity, sin- 
 cerity, or patriotism called in question- This fantasy affected the sound 
 understanding of Sir Alexander Burnes ; and in all his communications — 
 clear and sagacious as they are in every other respect, and full of statesman- 
 like policy and prudence — whenever the visions of Russian intrigue, and 
 Persian influence come across him, he becomes visionary, and all but unin- 
 telligible. From this time forward, we find that every look and word of 
 Count Simonich is tortured into something threatening evil to the common 
 weal, and portending mischief to India ! The shake of Lord Burleigh's 
 head conveyed not half so many meanings, when nodded most strongly, 
 according to the directions of Mr Puff, as did the most meaningless civil 
 speech of the Russian ambassador, interpreted by the lights of Mr EUice 
 and Mr McNeil ! Yet Count Nesselrode assures Lord Palmerston that, if 
 the Russian envoy comported himself as described by the members of the 
 British mission, he was acting in direct contradiction of his instructions : 
 and that so late as the 4th May 1837, he had received the most positive 
 orders " to employ all his credit with the Shah [of Persia] to dispose him 
 to a formal accommodation with Herat." (6) Count Simonich's own 
 
 6. Count Nessehrode's reply to Lord Palmerston, 1st Nov- 1838— Parlia- 
 ttentary Papers. 
 
22 
 
 letters to his government give evidence that these instructions were most 
 heedfuUy attended to. On the 28th of May— before receiving the des- 
 patch of the 4th of the same month just noticed — he writes to his own 
 Cabinet, " I have made the most pressing representations, in order to 
 induce his majesty [of Persia] to content himself with the voluntary sub- 
 mission of the Prince of Herat, and not undertake that expedition at least 
 before placing the affairs of his country in order." (7) The Emporor of 
 Russia called back the battalion in the Persian service, formed of Russian 
 deserters, at the very time when he knew that this was the principal force 
 in the Persian army, then before the walls of Herat. (8) Instead of ac- 
 companying the army with the view of urging on hostilities, Count 
 Simonich attended the movements of the Shah with the same peaceful 
 intent as Mr McNeil : and he did this by special permission, asked for 
 and obtained, from the Court of St. Petersburgh. On his arrival in camp, 
 in the end of April, a fortnight after Mr McNeil, and in the seventh 
 month of the siege, when danger to Herat was considered nearly over, 
 the Ambassador, witnessing the distress from which the Persian army was 
 suffering, did not think that he ought to refuse his assistance to the Shah 
 ■when the sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of the 
 siege. (9) Any English officer placed in similar circumstance?, would 
 unquestionably have acted in the same manner, in order to render a friendly 
 sovereign the assistance he might have applied for in so critical a situation. 
 Count Nesselrode further declared, that if the King of Persia had suc- 
 ceeded, by the capture of Herat, in getting victoriously out of the danger- 
 ous situation in which he had placed himself, it V7as the determina- 
 tion of his cabinet to have refused sanctioning the extension of Persian 
 power in that direction ; and to have negociated the cession of the city 
 and territories to Kohun Dil Khan, chief of Candahar, on an arrangement 
 having expressly for its basis the very thing we pretended most to desire — 
 a formal obligation being imposed on Persia in no other way to assail the 
 integrity of the country of which the Sirdars were in possession, or the 
 tranquillity of the tribes of "whieh they were the chiefs. (10) The explana- 
 tion in reference to the appearance of Captain Vicovich at Cabool was still 
 
 7. Count Simonich to H. E. Count Nesselrode, 28th May 1837— Ibid. This 
 was forwarded to Lord Palmerston 15, and received July 24, 1337- 
 
 8. Count Nesseh'ode's note t® Lord Palmerston, Nov. 1838, ut supra. 
 
 9. We have taken the above nearly verbatim from Count Nesselrode's 
 note J — a fine, bold, perspicuous document, — as given in the Parliamentary 
 Papers selected for publication by the Foreign Office. 
 
 10. Count Nesselrode's note to Lord Palmerston, October 20, 1838 — We 
 have, throughout, in a great measure copied the note verbatim. Also note of 
 
 same, March 5, 1839 Mr Leech sent a copy of the treaty to Mr M'Neil iu 
 
 March 1837. 
 
23 
 
 more minute and satisfactory: he was sent there from Herat by Count 
 Siraonich, in consequence of the arrival of an agent from Dost Mahomed 
 Khan, or rather, as it will by and bye be seen, from Mirza Sami Khan 
 his minister, who had taken it upon himself to address the Emperor of 
 Russia in name of his master. (11) The objects of his mission were 
 purely commercial ; in order to ascertain the advantages, and degree of 
 security Russian merchants might expect in entering on commercial specu- 
 lations with Cabool.(12) Surely we were the last parties in the world 
 who had a right to find fault with such a measure as this, — our own coua- 
 tryman Burnes, having, six years before, approached the very gates of 
 Orenberg on a similar expedition. On one point the Russian ambassador 
 exceeded his instructions when before Herat, and he frankly confessed it, 
 as did his cabinet before being called upon to do so : he not only lent his 
 aid in negociating a treaty betwixt the King of Persia and the Sirdar of 
 Candahar, with a view to the cession of Herat to the latter, *t securing 
 thereby the tranquillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end 
 to the acts of plunder by which they were incessantly disturbed," (13) 
 but he gave the guarrantee of Russia for the maintenance and 
 fulfilment of the agreement. The determination of the Emperor had 
 ever been not to maintain with AfFghanistan any other than purely 
 commercial relations : he would take no part in the civil wars of the 
 Chiefs, nor in the family feuds, which had no claim on his attention. 
 Count Simonich's guarantee was therefore at once disallowed, and he him- 
 self recalled. Not only so, but General Duhamel, by whom he was suc- 
 ceeded, so soon as he discovered that the objects of Capt. Vicovich's mission 
 had been misconstrued by us or by himself, or by both, without waiting for 
 fresh directions from St. Petersburgh, and in conformity alone with the 
 spirit of his original instructions, immediately on his arrival at Teheran 
 ordered the agent to return. "With these assurances, given with the utmost 
 
 11. Masson, vol. iii. p. 465. Masson doubts if Vicovich really was accredited 
 by the Russian minister at all j or whether he was not adopted after the sen- 
 sation which his appearance at Cabool had made became known : he says — 
 " Count Nesselrode, in acknowledging the mission of Vicovich, may be sup- 
 posed to have adopted his letters, although he does not expressly say so : I 
 still, however, believe it to have been a fabrication while admitting the Russian 
 minister's dexterity in relinquishing projects he never entertained." The ex- 
 planation in Count Nesselrode's note quoted in the text, is such that we cannot 
 for a moment concur in this view of the case. Sir J C. Hobhouse calls him a 
 Polish renegade (See Speech, June 23). He appears to have been murdered 
 on his return from Cabool, and no more inquiries made after him. It might 
 have been enough to know this much, to feel assured that Russia had no inten- 
 tion of attempting the revolution of empires when an agent such as this was 
 resorted to- 
 
 12. Count Nesselrode, ut supra. 
 
 13. Ibid, March 5, ISdd—verbatlm. 
 
24 
 
 apparent frankness anJ candour in two very able and elaborate papers, of 
 dates 1st November 1838, and March 5, 1839, Lord Paltnerston declared 
 Her Majesty's government to be entirely satisfied (Dec 20, 1838)— con - 
 Yinced that Russia harboured no hostile designs against the interests of Great 
 Britain in India j and that the two powers would thereafter unite in earnestly 
 dissuading the King of Persia from undertaking any similar expedition to 
 that against Herat. In reply to the second note (that of 5th March, 1839,) 
 the declarations of reconciliation were still more cordial, — axpressing the 
 satisfaction which the renewed assurances of friendship afforded H. M.'s 
 government,, and the gratification f^lt especially by the information, that the 
 first act of General Duhamel on arriving at Teheran was the recall of the 
 commercial agent already referred to. The same declaration on the part of our 
 foreign minister was afterwards emphatically repeated in Parliament. It is 
 impossible to peruse the o'iicial papers, even as prepared for publication — 
 tricked out as a portion of them has since been proved to have been, to 
 bolster up the policy of Lord Auckland— without coming to the conclusion, 
 that a more baseless vision than that of hostile design on the part of Russia, 
 conjured up by Mr. EUice, and unhappily believed in by Lord Palmerston, 
 never misled the rulers of a country. If it be affirmed, as it has often 
 been, that the declarations of Russia, however plausible and specific in ap« 
 pearance, are wholly untrustworthy, — it must be replied, in the first place, 
 that H. M.'s ministers declared that they implici'ly confided in them: they 
 may take the alternative of confessing, that in this they uttered a falsehood 
 knowing it to be such ; or that they then said what they believe I to be true, 
 but which has since been proved to them to be the opposite. If so, however, 
 we are entitled to demand what new light has been thrown on the intentions 
 of Russia in regard to the affairs of Central Asia, since March 1839? If 
 the affirmations of the Court of St. Petersburg!! are at any time to be received 
 with less confidence than those of other kingdoms, it will require to be 
 shewn on what grounds ? When, and how, it has deceived its allies ? 
 If it be established that its assertions are untrustworthy, then it is 
 a mockery to receive, or respond, to them; or to maintain towards 
 a country, thus affirmed to be self-outlawed from the society or privileges of 
 civilized nations, the demeanour required where ordinary principles of poli- 
 tical morality are adhered to : those who neglect or violate the laws of the 
 European commonwealth have no right to require that these be observed 
 towards them. With matters as they now appear before us, the accusations 
 of duplicity and dishonesty brought against Count Nesselrode and his 
 colleagues, in reference to their conduct towards Persia and Affghanistan, 
 must be looked on as base and malignant slanders. Lord Palmerston asks, 
 with a confident air of triumph, whether the intentions and the policy of 
 
25 
 
 Russia were to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode, or 
 from the acts of Count Simonich and Lieut- Vicovich ? (14) The reply to 
 this is simple — that the acts referred to are no where to be found but in 
 the fancies of the members of the Persian and Cabool missions; — the 
 grounds of suspicion set forth by Mr Eilice and Mr McNeil, as published 
 in the Parliamentary Papers, would not have been admitted as circumstan- 
 tial evidence to convict an English poacher ! Captain Barnes g-ives us his 
 suspicions only ; we are wholly in the dark, as to the grounds on which 
 they were founded. The explanations of Count Nesselroie were de- 
 clared to be so entirely satisfactory, that the accusations against Russia 
 were thereby de facto admitted to have fallen to the ground. Under these 
 circumstances, the following passage from the Speech of Sir John Hob- 
 house, delivered in Parliament on the 2.3J of June 1842, in opposition to 
 the motion of Mr. Baillie for the production of the papers on which the 
 justification of the Affghan War was grounded, is worthy of quotation :— 
 
 ** I am sorry to say (observes the Hon. Bart.) that that advice came from the Rus- 
 sian Minister at the Court of Persia. It came from the representative of that most 
 powerful state, who had hitherto acted in the most friendly way with the British Minis- 
 ter, but who gave advice to the Schah totally contrary to the advice that was tendered 
 by the British Minister^ and carried his advice afterwards into effect by the interven- 
 tion which I must more particularly allude to hereafter — an intervention on the part 
 of the representative of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which was totally imcorapa- 
 tible — I say was totally incompatible with the very safety of India. Count Simo- 
 nich advised the advance upon Herat. Hon. Gentlemen are now so familiar with 
 the importance of that city and state, from its position in Central Asia, that it is 
 unnecessary for me to dwell upon it. Tnis, however, I must state, that the best 
 authorities had laid it down as an indisputable fact, that that city and its immediate 
 dependencies are the most important of all the cities and slates of Central Asia, 
 and that the master of Herat is in a position, both with reference to Persia and to« 
 the Affghan slates, to hold the balance) if he has anj considerable power, between 
 the parties who might contend for empire much further and with much greater 
 proximity to India. But Count Simonich did not confine himself to giving advice. 
 At the very time that the English Minister, in consequence of instructions from 
 Lord Palmerston, retired, after fruitless endeavours to prevail upon the Schah to 
 relinquish his pretensions, Count Simonich remained in the neighbourhood, and 
 actually, it might be said, superintended the siege, and an officer of distinction, 
 who had been in the Russian service, assisted at the siege, and I think I recollect, 
 ■was killed there. 
 
 '' But it did not stop there. The intervention of Russia did not stop with the 
 
 14. Dratt ot a note presented to Count Nesselrode, dated Foreii^n Office, 
 26ih October, 1838. The >in]la Proclamadon was issued three weeks before 
 Lord Palmerston thought of enquirhig whether Russia had given any cause for 
 our going to war with Dost ftiahomed! It turned out she had given none: 
 yet we went to war notwithstanding, when the last of our pretences for sa 
 doing had admittedly failed us ! ! ' 
 
26 
 
 mere appearance of the Russian ambassador at the siege of Herat. Forsootli, a 
 treaty was entered into — it will be found in the papers before the House — by 
 which, in the most summary way, the lawful sovereign of Herat (the real represen- 
 tative of the ancient dynasty) was to be dethroned, and hi» dominions were given 
 to one of the princes of Candahar, a brother of Dost Me.homed. By that treaty an 
 entire change was to occur in the whole of that important part of Central Asia; 
 and who does the House of Commons think was the guarantee of that treaty ? No 
 less a person than the Russian ambassador, and I hold a proof of it in my hand. 
 "Was the Governor-General of India, or the Minister at home charged with the In- 
 dian department, or my noble friend, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Af- 
 fairs, or the Cabinet at large, to permit such a state of things for a moment ? Was 
 Lord Auclcland to look on tamely when this transaction was taking place^ I might 
 say, at the very gates of India? But there was a person who has gained an un- 
 happy notoriety by the publication of these papers, deputed also, I am sorry to 
 say, by the Russian Ambassador — a renegade Pole he was said to have been — a 
 Captain Vicovich, whose exploits, no doubt, Hon. Members have read of in this 
 history. That individual was deputed by Count Simonich to go — whither ? To 
 the ex-chief of Cabul — and he went there accordingly. But not contented with 
 that, there wa& to be another mission, a sort of branch mission to the Arat ers 
 of Scinde, and another to the Court of Lahore 5 and was Lord Auckland t® con- 
 sider those things as nothing but a trumpery effort made by the Schah of Persia, 
 which the very shadow of the British bayonet from beyond the Sutledge would at 
 once put down ? No! Lord Auckland considered, with the Cabinet at home, that 
 the time was come for resistance. My noble friend (Lord Palmerston) directed a 
 remonstrance to be made to Count Nesselrode, and an answer was given to it. 
 The Hon. Gentleman said, that my noble Friend, in his reply, considered the 
 answer satisfactory ; that was not the word. My Noble Friend said he considered 
 the assurances were satisfactory, and so they were, for they were carried into 
 effect. For what occurred ? Count Simonich was recalled ; and, moreover, the 
 unhappy man. Captain Vicovitch, who was a tool in these intrigues, was also re- 
 called, and has been heard of no more. The rumour was, that he put an end to 
 his own existence j but he has been heard of no more. An effect, however, a 
 very serious and dangerous effect, had been produced by these intrigues. It did 
 not signify to those barbarous states whether or not that ambassador, Count Si - 
 xnonicb^ or that envoy. Captain Vicovitch, had exceeded their orders or not, as 
 Count Nesselrode said they had. "What did Dost Mahomed know of that ? How 
 could he judge ?*' 
 
 Sir John Cam Hobhouse, who now adduces charges of the grosses t 
 duplicity and fraud against the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, was, by his 
 ewn showing, in possession of the evidence supplied by Mr McNeil 
 and Lord Auckland in 1838 : this was embodied in a note to Count Nessel- 
 rode of date 26th October, but had been unofficially before him in a sepa- 
 rate form i and the several points replied to specifically and seriatim by a note 
 from the Russian minister of date 1st November— before the formal note of our 
 foreign minister was received. Lord Palmerston states, that Count Nessel- 
 
27 
 
 tode's communication had received all tlie attention that its importance so 
 justly demanded, and that its general result had been highly satisfactory to 
 H. M.'s government. '^ The proceedings of Russian agents in Asia [con- 
 tinues the noble viscount] had for some considerable time been so much at 
 variance with the professed policy of the Russian government, and so incon- 
 sistent with the friendly relations subsisting between Great Britain and 
 Russia, that the British Cabinet deemed it its duty to ascertain, by frank, 
 explanations rith that of St, Petersburgh, whether any change had taken 
 place in the declared policy of the Imperial cabinet in regard to the affairs 
 in question, or its friendly dispositions towards Great Britain ? The 
 despatch of Count Nesselrode contains upon these points, assurances the 
 most full and complete, and H. M,'s government accept, as entirely satis^ 
 factory, the declarations of the Imperial cabinet, that it does not harbour 
 any designs hostile to the interest of Great Britain in India; and that its 
 own policy, with respect to Persia, remains unchanged, and is the same 
 which, in 1834, the two powers agreed to adopt." 
 
 Sir John Cam Hobhouse was, in 1833, President of the Board of Con- 
 trol, and one of the members of the Government who stated themselves 
 satisfied with the explanations in reference to tha conduct of the Per- 
 sian and Affghan missions j — admitting by this declaration, that the impres- 
 sions founded on their previous information were groundless, and that the 
 statements now recapitulated, on which these were based, were utterly falla- 
 cious ! The statement contained in the revised report of the speech, — that 
 " Lord Palmerston and his colleagues considered the assurances of Count 
 Nesselrode satisfactory, because they were carried in^o effect^ '* Count 
 Simonich and Lieutenant Vicovich having been recalled when the intima- 
 tion of the pleasure of the Cabinet was conveyed to the Court of St 
 Petersburgh , is at variance with the evidence supplied by official documents 1 
 The announcement of the recall here referred to is contained in a note 
 dated 5th March, 1839 : this again called forth expressions of pleasure 
 and satisfaction from Her Majesty's Government, who had " been much 
 gratified by learning, that one of the first acts of General Duhamel, on en- 
 tering upon his functions at Teheran, [in supercession of Count Simonich] 
 was to recall Lieut. Vicovich from Affghanistan."(15) The paper of ex- 
 planations referred to by Sir John Cam Hobhouse with which the Cabinet 
 first expressed themselves so highly gratified, is dated the ist November, 
 and contains not one word of the second mentioned recall ! Why should not 
 
 15. The very wor.ls of the official correspondence have, for the most part* 
 been retained in the text, — which throughout this section is little else than an 
 abridgement of the Parliamentary papers of 1839; in which the late ministry 
 put what they then meant ti be the defence of tlieir policy. These are now- 
 abandoned, and old exploded or refuted statements once more dragged into 
 the field. 
 
28 
 
 Russia or Persia have sent missions to Cabool, or Laliore, or Sciude, — or 
 China, or Burmah, or Japan if it so pleased them ? We were then on 
 terms of amity with them all, — though the first three enumerated were at 
 deadly feud with each other, — so that no deputation could have any com- 
 mon hostile object in y'lew. Ihe explanation in reference to the trans- 
 ference of the sovereignty of Herat from the wretched effete Suddozye 
 prince, to the more vigorous Barukzye Sirdar, was fully set down in 
 Count Nesselrode's notes, — and this also was, in 1838 and 1839, con- 
 sidered entirely satisfactory: well it might, if our pretended wishes for 
 peace in Central Asia contained one particle of sincerity : the wretch pro- 
 posed to be set aside was the son of the elder brother of the father of the 
 Shah Soojah, who had seized upon Herat on the general dismemberment 
 of the kingdom, and was permitted to retain it. He was, according 
 to the rules of legitimacy and priraogeniturej the rightful sovereign 
 of the Doorannee empire, to the exclusion of the Shah Soojah himself. 
 He had no more claim on Herat than on the Punjaub, Peshawur, Cash- 
 mere, Cabool, or Ghuznie, — save that given him by the sword. His 
 character as a sovereign, and his value as an ally, may be gathered from 
 the section referring to the affairs of Herat. Russia desired to have 
 him removed and a better man put in his place, *' to secure the tran- 
 quillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of 
 plunder by which they ; re incessantly disturbed. ''(16) Kamran Shah, 
 " the lawful sovereign — the real representative of the ancient dynasty" — 
 derived his revenues from man-stealing, — from plundering merchants pass- 
 ing in his neighbourhood, and by making inroads into conterminous coun- 
 tries to carry off their inhabitants and sell them as slaves. The more peace- 
 ably-disposed states which suffered from his malpractices, were as much en- 
 titled to depose him as a common nuisance, or a robber in the highways of 
 commerce, as were England and France in dealing with the far more digni- 
 fied and honourable plunderers the Deys of Tunis or Algiers ! The ex-pre- 
 sident of the Board of Control states, that the guarantee for the fulfilment 
 of the treaty by which these changes were to be effected, " was no less a 
 person than the Russian ambassador." He might, in candour, have added, 
 that in doing so this ambassador acted in opposition to his instructions, and 
 was recalled for having so acted before Lord Palmerston offered any remon- 
 strance or complaint :(17) — as also, that thus much was admitted by the 
 ambassador himself to the British embassy ! How lightly Dost Mahomed 
 held the Russian mission in comparison to the hope of the friendship of 
 England, the members of the late Cabinet knew right well, though their 
 hearers might not. The portion of the despatch referring to this was sup- 
 
 16. Count Nesselrode's note, 5th March 1837 ; also 1st November 1838. 
 
 17. See Count Nesselrode's Note of isfe November 1838. 
 
29 
 
 pressed, when all the extracts injurious to the credit of Russian candour 
 were given to the world. Sir Alex. Burnes, in one of these, of date 27th 
 December 1837, writes to the Government of India : — " On the morning of 
 the 19tb, that is, yesterday, the Ameer came over from the Bala Hissar, 
 with a letter from his son, the Governor of Ghuznie, reporting that a Rus- 
 sian Agent had arrived at that city on his way to Cabool. Dost Mahomed 
 Khan said, that he hati come for my counsel on the occasion ; that he wished 
 to have nothing to do with any other power than the British ; that he did 
 not wish to receive any agent from any other power whatever, so long as he 
 had a hope of sympathy from us ; and that he would order the Russian 
 agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act in any other way that I 
 desired him." In a further suppressed portion of another despatch, dated 
 26th January 1838, Sir John knew that the following statement was to be 
 found : — " Since arriving here [at CaboolJ I have seen an agent of Persia 
 with alluring promises, after penetrating as far as Candahar, compelled to 
 quit the country, because no one sent to invite him to Cabool. Following him, 
 an agent from Russia, with letters highly complimentary, and promises more 
 than substantial, has experienced no greater civility than was due by the laws 
 of hospitality and nations. It may be urged by some, that the offers of one or 
 both are fallacious ; but such a dictum is certainly premature. The Ameer of 
 Cabool has sought no aid in arguments from such offers, but declared that his 
 interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, which he 
 will never desert so long as there is a hope of securing one. It is evident, 
 therefore, that in this chief [Dost Mahomed j we have one who is ready to 
 meet us ; and from what is passing in Central Asia at this moment, it is any 
 thing but desirable to exhibit indifference to the solicitations of one whose 
 position makes him courted ; and whose aid may render powerful for or 
 agaiuht us." (18) Amongst the various anomalies apparent in these singular 
 passages of our political history, it is not unworthy of remark, that the 
 speech on which these observations have been offered, was delivered on the 
 debate on a motion by Mr. Baillie for the production of papers alleged to 
 have been on a previous occasion printed in a garbled form. Sir J. C. Hob- 
 house was opposed to this— the chief argument against granting the request 
 of the mover turning on the misunderstandings this might generate betwixt 
 
 18. Burnes's suppressed Despatches. Lord Fitzgerald and Vesci, the 
 present President of the Board of Control, took upon himself to affirm in 
 his place in the upper house, that his predecessor in ottice was not liable to the 
 chari,'e of unfairly garbling Burnes's papers : we must in charity believe that the 
 noble lord had not examined them when he made the affirmation; yet under 
 such ignorance of what he assisted to defend, the assertion was something more 
 than bold, in the face of the declaration of Sir Alexander himself—that the 
 publication was sheer trickery, and that he had been made to support doctrines 
 which he denounced. The noble lord may, by this time, have had the means 
 of correcting his impression ! 
 
30 
 
 us and Russia I When the papers were posthumously published from the MSS. 
 of Sir Alex. Burnes entire, without consent of Parliament, it turned out that 
 the tenor of the cancelled portions was calculated to produce an effect the 
 very opposite of animosity I In contrast to the English minister's perversion 
 or concealment of the contents of state papers, Count Nesselrodehad himself 
 explained *' that Lord Palmerston's having informed him that the aflPairs of 
 Persia would probably form the subject of serious discussion in Parliament, 
 and that the English cabinet will probably find itself obliged to give publicity 
 to the communications which have been exchanged on this subject betwixt our 
 cabinet and that of London) — the Emperor desires me to state to you, in his 
 nan^e, that he does not see any inconvenience in that publicity. The policy 
 of our august master does not fear open day. On the contrary, His Majesty 
 will be glad to see that explanations which he has spontanously ofi^ered to 
 England should be generally known." (19) " Strong in our rectitude, and 
 in our conscience, we shall never have anything to conceal or to dissemble 
 which we have designed or undertaken." 
 
 It seems throughout to have been assumed by the Melbourne administra- 
 tion, that such was the policy of Russia that no faith whatever was to be 
 placed in her professions ; this postulate has already been adverted to above : 
 -—we had no right to assume that Count Nesselrode and his colleagues were 
 fools as well as scoundrels. Yet nothing short of fatuity could ever have in- 
 duced the Cabinet of St Petersburgh to believe that Russia could have possibly 
 maintained herself in India, had Britain made her a gift of it : that she 
 could ever have reached it, even had she attempted to do so : or that, if 
 having succeeded in the inconceivable exploit of placing a hundred thousand 
 men on our frontiers, she could have maintained them on British ground for 
 a single campaign. To any nation in Europe less used to enlightened, 
 liberal, and honest government — less blessei with commercial enterprise 
 and perseverance than our own, India would prove a ruinous possession. 
 
 To those who have perused the contents of the previous pages, it will 
 have become apparent, that so far from the attack of Persia on Herat being, 
 as asserted by Lord Auckland, " cruel and unjustifiable," it was declared by 
 two successive ambassadors the very opposite of both — that so far from being 
 at variance with the principles and objects of our alliance, we were bound 
 by a special clause contained in each of three successive treaties to give no 
 assistance, except as mediator at the solicitation of both parties, to either 
 Affghan or Persian, should war arise betwixt them. (20) So far from the 
 attack of Dost Mahomed on Peshawur being either sudden or unprovoked, 
 it had been long premeditated — was one of a series which had been going 
 
 19. count Nesselrode 's Notes of 5th March 1839, and 6th Nov. 1838. 
 ^ 20. Treaty of 1814—1826, repeatedly referred to by both parties as in force 
 m 1837. 
 
31 
 
 on without interruption for three years in succession— and was provoked by 
 the perfidious conduct of the Seikh ruler seizing on a portion of the Doo- 
 rannee territory, which the Ameer of Cabool was endeavouring to recover. 
 It will be perceived from what immediately follows, that the Ameer of Ca- 
 bool, who in 1838 had been declared by the Governor-General to be an 
 usurper, had just two years before (22d Aug. 1836) been written to by 
 Lord Auckland, the same Governor- General, in terms expressive of ''re- 
 gard and esteem" — the Dost having been designated Ameer, without ques- 
 tion as to the validity of his title, and called by the name of '^friend " ; — that 
 Runjeet Singh was desirous that the Governor- General should be the chan- 
 nel of submitting to his consideration the pretensions described as unreason- 
 able ; — and that the Cabool ruler himself, in case any difficulty should be 
 made on this point, was willing that this should be left in abeyance through- 
 out the lifetime of the Lahore chief. The negociations at Cabool betwixt 
 September 1837 and May 1838 require next to be examined. We cannot 
 in this, as in two of the preceding sections, draw our materials from papers 
 printed by Parliament : the portions which will most avail the purposes of 
 the present enquiry were withlield from the public as long as the ministers 
 could keep them back : they have been published from the private papers 
 of the late Sir Alexander Burnas, being portions of his despatches forwarded 
 to Government, but suppressed when the others were printed by order of 
 the House of Commons. 
 
 CAPTAIN BURNES'S NEGOCIATIONS AT CABOOL. 
 
 " After much time spent by Captain Barnes ia fruitless negotiation at Cabool, it appearei 
 that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encourage- 
 ment and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding: with the Sikhs, in urging the 
 most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor General could not, consistently wiih jus- 
 tice, and his regard tor the friendship of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, be the channel of sub- 
 mitting to the consideration of His Highness ; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement 
 and amibition, injurious to the security and peace of the Frontiers of India; and that he 
 openly threatened in furtherance of th se schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he 
 could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs of 
 Affghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British 
 Power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of tha views and interest of 
 the British Government, compelled Capt. Burnes to leave Cabool without having eflfected 
 any of the objects of his Mission." * • ^. * . 
 
 " It was now evident, that no further interference could be exercised by the British Go- 
 vernment to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh Ruler and Dost Mahom- 
 ed Khan, and the hostile policy of the later Chief showed too plainly that so long as Cabool 
 remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbour- 
 hood would be secured, or that the interests of oar Indian Empire would be preserved 
 inviolate.''— 5im^* Proclamation, October 1, 1838. 
 
 We have in this, as in the two preceding portions of this narrative, placed 
 the paragraph of the Simla Proclamation to which the observations which 
 follow next in order more particularly relate, as a text to which the reader 
 may refer : should he succeed in reconciling it with the official documents 
 on which it is professed to be based, and on the examination of which we are 
 now about to enter, he will have been moire fortunate than the writer of the 
 narrative. 
 
32 
 
 In 183-2, treaties had been entered into with the Ameers of Scinde, the 
 Nawab of Bahawulpore, and the MaharajahRunjeet Singh,whieh had fur their 
 object the extension of British commerce by means of the opening up of the 
 navigation of the Indus. (1) The glowing de?criptions of Burnes (2) appear 
 to have given a very exaggerated idea of the value of the internal traffic 
 of the countries beyond the Indus. It was forgotten that where there was no 
 industry, no manufactures, or mineral wealth, no sea- coast or rivers to per- 
 mit exportation, there could be little or nothing to give in exchange for im- 
 ports : — and that the wants of a population, purely nomade, must at all times 
 ^e simple and singularly few. The whole of our commerce with Persia has 
 never exceeded two raiilions sterling a-year, rarely got above one ; (3) the 
 total of our trade with Affghaoistan certainly never exceeded a million 
 annually, and has very rarely amounted to much more than the half of one. (4) 
 Besides this, the Indus in reality was never closed save by its own dangerous 
 entrances and shallow depth of water. (5) Lord Ellenborough has opened the 
 Indus as far as Mithen Kote, and the Sutlej in continuation of this to the 
 Markunda, where it ceases to be navigable for the smallest craft. Yet the gross 
 value of the British goods consumed by the countries adjoining does not at pre- 
 sent amount to a quarter of a million sterling, and will not in all likelihood 
 be doubled for ten years to come; the expense of maintaining troops be- 
 twixt Kurrachee and Bukkur, both stations included, exceeding £600,000 
 a-year ; M'ith a less force, it would be unwise to think of keeping these 
 Stat ionsat all. The great line of traffic was not along, but across, the Indus 
 by the Delhi frontier, (6) or parallel to it, at a distance of ICO miles, by 
 Scnmeanee and Kelat. The countries beyond the Indus, besides, have 
 always been open to the free admission of every variety of foreign im- 
 ports on paying a moderate fixed duty. Ihe chief obstructions in reach- 
 ing these, are irremediable by treaty : and arise from the attacks of the 
 plundering tribes in the passes, which cannot be restrained save by the 
 payment of a black mail or subsidy. This, in the time of the Doorannee 
 monarchy, amounted to £8000, and during the short reign of the Shah 
 
 1. Masson, vol. iii. p. 4.^2. 
 
 2. Simla Declaration, October 1, 1838 — ut supra. Bokhara Travels, Book 
 iii. The term exaggerated, is applied without censure on liurnes : his state- 
 ments are apparently quite within the mark, but tlie idea of commerce with 
 the interior at all appears to have induced all sorts of absurd conclusions. The 
 inferences were exaggerated j the premises were glowing, but not too much so. 
 
 3. Sir J. M'Neil, quoted iii Houghs Preface. 
 
 4. See Mr Torrens's Tables, June 1841. 
 
 5. Burnes's Cabool, p. 126. 
 
 6. Masson's Keturns sujl plied to the Bombay Times, and given in detail, July 
 1841. Torrens's Trade 'J'ables by the Delni Prontier—a set of pr.pers of verv 
 dubious authority- the last j— from which it appears that £670,000 worth o'f 
 goods crossed the Delhi frontier for Cabool in 1840 41. 
 
33 
 
 8o«jah from 1839 to 1841, to £12,000 a-year (7) for the use of the Khyber 
 Pass alone. 
 
 In the month of October 1836, Captain (afterwards Lieut. Col. Sir Alex.) 
 Burnes was directed by the Government of India to proceed from Bombay 
 through Scinde, and thence to Cabool on a commercial mission, whose ob- 
 ject was to bring, if possible, into operation, a line of policy some years be- 
 fore chalked out by Lord William Bentinck, for the extension of trade and 
 promotion of our intercourse with the countries to the westward of the In- 
 dus. The traveller had, six years before, traversed the countries to which 
 he was now sent on mission, and acquired the friendship of many of the 
 chiefs, especially of Dost Mahomed of Cabool — one of the most able, vigo- 
 rous, and enterprising rulers in central Asia ; and he had, besides, distin- 
 auished himself beyond any man of his time in the Company's service, for 
 the accuracy and copiousness of the Commercial statistics he had, from time 
 to time, laid before the Government. With him in this embassage were as- 
 sociated, Lieut. Wood of the Indian Navy, Lieut, (now Major) Leech of 
 the Bombay Engineers, and Dr Lord of the Company's Medical service. 
 
 A combination of events occasioned the speedy alteration of the objects 
 and character of the mission. Before the end of June he had received 
 instructions to proceed without delay to Cabool, and enter on a train of po- 
 litical arrangements, — destined, as it proved, to terminate in the dethrone- 
 ment of Dost Mahomed, and the restoration of the Shah Soojah ; — in the 
 murder of the latter, and eventual reinstatement of the former in power. 
 
 Urged forward by successive expresses with instructions from the Govern- 
 ment of India, as the emergencies seemed to arise,he proceeded to Peshawur, 
 where he arrived on the 12th and left on the 30th August ^ having delayed 
 in hopes of the arrival of an escort, expected to have accompanied them 
 through the Khyber Pass. (8) On 20th Sept., the mission entered Cabool 
 with great pomp and splendour. Ukhbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Ma- 
 homed, had been sent out to meet them, with a fine body of cavalry. The Sir- 
 dar, a youth scarcely twenty years of age, but the largest man in the cortege, 
 placed Sir Alex. Burnes on the same elephant with himself, and conducted 
 them straight to the Bala Hissar to bj introduced to his father's court, 
 where his reception was most cordial. A spacious garden, close to the palace 
 and under the Bala Hissar, was allocated as the residence of the mission. 
 The following day they were admitted to a formal audience. The Ameer's 
 view of the Governor- General's letter was all that could b« desired. 
 On being informed that some of the rarities of Europe had been brought to 
 him as presents, he promptly replied, that Captain Burnes and his friends 
 were the rarities the sight of which most pleased him. As they passed 
 
 7. Journey to the Oxus, p. 171 • 
 
 8. Major iJough, p. 318. 
 
 G 
 
34 
 
 through the city, some of the people cried out, " take care of Cabool ;" " do 
 not destroy Cabool," — and wherever they went they were received with cordial 
 welcome. "Power frequently spoils men (says Sir A. Burnes in his ex- 
 cellent work on Cabool) ; but with Dost Mahomed, neither the increase of 
 it, nor his new title of Ameer seems to have done him any harm. He seemed 
 even more alert and full of intelligence than when I last saw him. "(9) 
 The following account is given of the Dost by Lieut. Wood, a member of 
 the mission. (10) 
 
 " Dost Mahomed Khan is about forty-five years of age, and looks worn out and 
 aged before his tinae, Hia frame is large and bcny, and %11 his features strongly 
 marked. There is a sternness in the general expression of his features^ which is 
 increased by his flowing, jet-black beard, but his countenance is lighted up by eyes 
 of peculiar brilliancy and intelligence : when he fixes them upon those by whom he 
 is addressed, they actually seem to flash with approbation or dissent. From the 
 ease with which he ran over the names of places vis.ited by Captain Burnes in 1832-3, 
 it is evident that his memory must be a good one; and the various subjects on 
 which he spoke, the good sense of his remarks, and the readiness of his replies, 
 proved that his conversational talents were of no mean order. When any one of 
 us addressed him, he sat with his eyes rivetted upon the speaker, and his whole 
 soul appeared absorbed by the subject : when he himself spoke, though he did not 
 resort to Persian gesture, nor assume the solemnity of a Hindoo rajah, there was 
 that in his manner and tone of voice which enforced attention. 
 
 '* Our welcome had been cordial ; and as we left the apartment I could not help 
 contrasting the audience we had just quitted with the scene in a Haiderabad dur- 
 bar on alike occasion, and the bearing of the blunt, homely Afghan with that of 
 the vapouring Beluche. Dost Mahomed's reception of the mission was less warm- 
 ly expressed than that of the Sind Amirs, but the ruler of Kabul felt what the 
 others only feigned. He deemed himself honoured by the arrival of a British mis- 
 sion at his capital ; while on the contrary the potentates ^of Sind, when they grant 
 an interview to a British agent, aflfect to think that the condescension is on their 
 part ; they consider only the servant who is sent to them ; but the more intelligent 
 Aflfghans view in the servant the government which he represents." — Wood's Jour" 
 ney to the Oxus, pp. 171 and 172. 
 
 The following extract from a letter, addressed, after the march on Herat 
 had begun, to Mr M'Neil, Ambassador at the Court of Persia, is im- 
 portant, as explaining the views of Captain Burnes oh the claims of Dost 
 Mahomed, just before the Government of India had determined that no 
 concession whatever ought to be made to the Ameer, and that the claims 
 
 9. Burnes's Cabool, p. 149. It may be of interest to recollect, that this is 
 the celebrated Ukhbar Khan who had, six months before this, distinguished 
 himself against Hurry Singh at Jumrood. If Wood's statement be correct, 
 he could be no more than 24 when he joined the Cabool insurgents. He is 
 now about 25. 
 
 10. Wood's Journey to the Oxus, pp- l7l and 172- 
 
35 
 
 which the best-informed of their own servants considered equitable and jusf, 
 should be set aside, and he deposed, on the plea of putting forward aggres- 
 sive pretensions calculated for his own aggrandisement, and injurious to 
 British views :— 
 
 Extract ; Letter from Captain a. Burnes to the British Ambassador in Persia, 
 dated above Mooltan, on the Indus^ 6th June 1837. 
 
 Assuming thetij as I have done in ray late communications to Calcutta, that a 
 friendly commercial connexion with the states beyond the Indus, and between that 
 river and Persia, would be highly beneficial to our interests, the advantage would 
 be greater if we could render that connexion political. There is certainly now no 
 alteration since 1809, and it was then desirable. The only objection to it at present 
 is the offence which we shall give to cur old ally at Lahore, but as his death cannot 
 be very distant, I have urged upon notice the propriety of taking a middle course. 
 Supposing it were found that D ost Mahomed Khan possessed all the influence, and 
 all the ability, for which he universally receives credit, much embarrassment is not 
 likely to accrue to us, by either promising to that chief, or entering into a secret 
 treaty with him, that we should throw our influeace into his hands, to establish 
 himself on the right bank of the Indus, as far down as Shikarpoor, on the demise 
 of Runjeet Sing. Till then, by a judicious friendly intercourse we might so guide 
 the course of events, as to consolidate his power, and prepare the way for the closer 
 future connexion, which we contemplated. A loan of money would of course be 
 by far the most substantial way, but that I was afraid to suggest, not that I think 
 it should be withheld, but from the utter hopelessness of getting it 3 nor would I 
 urge its being given at all, if the cash were to be employed against Runjeet. To 
 that I see strong objections. We should let him keep Peshawar while he lives, and 
 meanwhile, turn Dost Mahomed Khan's attention to Candahar and Herat. He 
 has annexed Jeltalabad to his country since I was in Gabool in 1832, which gives 
 him an addition of six lacs of rupees to his revenue. 
 
 Though the above be the outline of the policy which it appears to me we should 
 follow, I should like first to see with my own eyes^ the state of affairs in Caboo), 
 the more so, after reading your letter of the 22nd of January — As for Suddozye 
 ascendancy in Gabool, I consider that hopeless, either from Kamran, or Shoojah 
 ool Moolk ; the former, by the way, is said to be dying of dropsy, and the latter 
 has not the head to manage any thing. — The most powerful tribe of the Doora- 
 nees is assuredly the Barukzye. Your view of the influence of the Gabool 
 Kuzzilbashes is new to me. At first sight it might appear anti-national, and the 
 power of Dost Mahomed Khan in consequence to be anti-national j but stil^ 
 Ahmed Shah, Timor Shah, Zeman Shah, and even Shoojah, trusted greatly to 
 these Kuzzilbashes, and the Ghoolam Khanee, as they are called, have at all 
 times had great influence in Cabool. I look upon them as the main stay of Dost 
 Mahomed Khan, and it is to them that he will owe the crown of Gabool if he 
 ever gets it. His own clan the Barukzye, will not oppose their influence, as I think, 
 
 with some few exceptions, they were glad of the supremacy which a Barukzye 
 
 has secured. It is certain that the chief of Candahar acknowledges in some degree 
 
36 
 
 the superiority of Dost Mahomed Khan, as you have been informed jand I hear 
 that it was by the advice of the whole clan, that the chief of Cabool has taken 
 the title of Ameer. In fact, there is a circumstance written to me by Mr. Masson 
 quite corroborative. On receiving the Governor General's notification of my ap- 
 proach, Dost Mahomed Khan summoned Kohun Dil Khan to Cabool, and if he 
 would not come himselfj requested him to send one of his brothers and not re- 
 proach hira hereafterj since every thing depended on this visit. I very much fear 1 
 shall find one of the Candahar Sirdars at Cabool. On all these points, however, I hope 
 soon to be better informed, and before I get to Cabool to find myself invested with 
 other authority than what I now hold. The part which the Candahar chief is acting 
 requires particularly to be watched. Immediately I got your letter I sent oflf a mes- 
 senger from Dera Ghazee Khan to Candahar, through the Lukkee Surwur pass, by 
 which it has been reached in 8 days, to ascertain what was going on there, and 1 ad- 
 dressed Kohun Dil Khan for the first time as to the objects Government had in view 
 in deputing me to the countries west of the Indus. I shall very soon hear what pas- 
 ses, for since I dispatched the messenger, which is but four days ago, I have had 
 a letter from Candahar saying ** that the Persian Elchee is expected to reach in a 
 day or two, and that the Sirdars have made pompous preparations to receive the 
 Embassy," though my informant had no idea of presents from the Russian Envoy. 
 I shall not fail to avail myself of the worthy Meer Mahomed Candaharee, and if 
 things are not right in Candahar, when I get to Cabool, I shall wait there till I 
 put them so. At all events, I shall leave nothing undone to try and put a stop to 
 their intercourse with the Russian minister, and if matters go rightly we shall, I take 
 it, be able to neutralize the power of the Candahar chiefs, or, at all events, place 
 them in complete subjection to Dost Mahomed Khan, whose influence increases 
 daily, and will be nought diminished by his late victory over the Sikhs. As to that 
 indeed, a letter from Captain Wade, which has just reached me, says " that the 
 't Sikhs have never been so severely handled, and a near move at the present time 
 *' towards the Sutlej might secure the independence of Dost Mahomed Khan," so 
 that the game at present is all in favor of Cabool. 
 
 Captain Burnes was entrusted "with a letter of the most warm and cordial 
 tenor from the Governor- General to the Ameer, written in the same kind 
 and friendly strain as that of the preceding year. It was dated 15th May, 
 1837. It is needless to say how much gratified Dost Mahomed felt at what 
 he assumed to be a fresh instance of our good wishes towards him. At this 
 time, Lord Auckland was perfectly aware of the King of Persia's prepara- 
 tions for attacking Herat, (1 1) as also of the allegations in reference to the ad- 
 vice given to this efi'ect by Count Simonich. (12) He knew, likewise, that 
 messages of friendship, (13) and letters of amity and regard, (14) had been 
 
 11. Mr McNeil's Letter to Lord Palmerston, Nov. 3, 1836. 
 
 12. Ibid. As also Letter of Lord Palmerston to the Earl of Durham, 16th 
 January, 1837- 
 
 13. Mr M'Neil) &c., December 30, 1836. 
 
 14. lbid> Feb. 20, 1837. The above is abridged from Extracts of Letters 
 
37 
 
 exchanged betwixt the Araeer of Cabool, the Candahar Sirdars, and the 
 King of Kings. The incessant attempts of Dost Mahomed Khan to recover 
 Peshawur, Nsrere known to every one. There wa?, in fact, nothing which had 
 occurred, so far as appears by anything on recorJ, betwixt the 15th May, 
 when the letter of friendly greeting which was to introduce Captain Burnes 
 as a commercial agent was written, and the 1st of June, when it was deter- 
 mined to convert this into a threatening embassage, demanding explanations 
 and denouncing vengeance, for the sole crime of defeating the Seikhs at 
 Jumrood on the 1st of May. The preparations for attacking them were long 
 before well known ; the result of the action was the only thing which had tran- 
 spired. (15) We have assigned the last fortnight of May as the period in 
 which this wonderful alteration was wrought in the Calcutta Council Cham- 
 ber. The letters of Captain Burnes, indicating this, are dated Indus 5th of 
 July ; it must have taken a month or nearly to transmit letters from Cal- 
 cutta to the Indus. He says, *' I came to look after commerce, and already 
 I have required to abandon my ledger for treaties and politics. (16) I was 
 ordered by express to pause ; and, while hurrying on ray accounts, another 
 express cries pause, — which places a vast latitude in my hands. * • I have 
 not as yet got replies to ray recommendations on our line of policy in Ca- 
 bool, consequent on a discovered intrigue of Russia, and on the Cabool 
 chief throwing himself in despair into Perso-Russian arms." If these things 
 were new to Burnes, the published papers show that Lord Auckland and 
 Lord Palmerston had been for many months acquainted with them. It was 
 the interpretation which was to be put upon them, and the line of policy to 
 be pursued inconsequence, which were the only things that were novel — and 
 new these were with a vengeance. No papers relating to these have been 
 published, and we are left to look to Downing Street, where a tottering 
 Cabinet required some achievement in India, considered certain of success, 
 to divert public attention from mismanagement at home, for a solution of the 
 mystery which attends them. 
 
 Lord Auckland had, a year before, as will be seen by the subjoined com- 
 munication, expressed himself in the warmest terms towards the Araeer, 
 calling him his friend, and expressing his anxiety to know in what manner 
 he could be of service to him in bringing about a reconciliation with 
 the Seikhs! » 
 
 Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool, to Lord Auckland, the Governor-General 
 of India, 31st May, 1836. 
 After compliments. 
 As 1 have been long attached to the British Government by the ties of friendship 
 
 published in most of the London newspapers, from the posthumous papers of 
 the late Sir Alex, Burnes, first printed in Bombay for private circulation. 
 
 15. Delhi Gazette, Feb. 15, 1837 ; and so on till May. 
 
 16. Cabool, p. 142. Letter to Mr Secretary M'Naghten, dated Sept. 24. 
 
38 
 
 and affection, the late intelligence of your Lordship's arrival, enlightening with your 
 presence the seat of Government, and diffusing over Hiudoostan the brightness of 
 your countenance, has afforded me extreme gratification ; and the field of my hopes 
 (which had before been chilled by the cold blast of the times) has, by the happy tid- 
 ings of your Lordship's arrival, become the envy of the garden of Paradise. 
 
 It maybe known to your Lordship, that, relying on the principles of benevolence 
 and philanthropy which distinguish the British Government, I look upon myself 
 and country as bound to it; and the letters I have received from that quarter have 
 all been replete with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the effect that, in the 
 time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. The late transactions 
 in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their breach of 
 treaty, are well known to your Lot dship. Communicate tome whatever may novr 
 suggest itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it 
 may serve as a rule for my guidance. 
 
 I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own ; and favour 
 me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship 
 may be pleased to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly. 
 
 Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Kharif \*ritten 22d August, 1836. 
 After compliments. 
 
 I have had the pleasure to receive your friendly letter, which was transmitted to 
 me through Captain Wade; and I am gratified at the opportunity which it affords 
 me, so shortly after my assumption of the Indian Government, to convey to you the 
 assurances of my unfeigned regard and esteem. 
 
 It is my wish that the Affghans should be a flourishing and united nation j and 
 that, being at peace with all their neighbours, they should enjoy, by means of a more 
 extended commerce, all the benefits and comforts possessed by other nations, which) 
 through such means, have attained a high and advanced state of prosperity and 
 wealth. 
 
 My predecessor, aware that nothing was so well calculated to promote this object 
 as the opening of the navigation of the Indus, spared himself no pains in procurino' 
 this channel for the flow of industry and enterprise j and it shall be my study to se- 
 cond his philanthropic purpose, and to complete the scheme which he so successfully 
 commenced. I feel assured that you cannot but take a lively interest in the success 
 of this undertaking, so especially conducive as it must be, to the prosperity of the 
 people over whom you rule. 
 
 It is probable that I may, ere long, depute some gentleman to your Court, to dis- 
 cuss with you certain commercial topics, with a view to our mutual advantage. 
 
 I have learned with deep regret that dissensions exist between yourself and Ma- 
 harajah Runjeet Sing. My friend, you are aware that it is not the practice of the 
 British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states; and 
 indeed it does not immediately occur to me how the interference of my Govern- 
 ment could be exercised for your benefit. I shall be happy, however, to learn from 
 you by what means you think that I can be of any assistance; and, in the meantime, 
 I have only to hope that you will be able to devise some mode of effecting a recon- 
 
39 
 
 ciliation with the Sikhs; it baing not only for your own advantage, but for the ad- 
 vantage of all the countries in the vicinity, that two nations so situated should ever 
 preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and concord. 
 
 Begging that you will accept my renewed assurance of friendship and regard, 
 
 lam, &c. CSigned) AocKiiA-ND. 
 SirA. Burnes's instructions, in reference to the mercantile portion of his mis- 
 sion, were sufficiently copious and explicit : when this was transmuted into an 
 embassage of a widely different character, he appears to have been left almost 
 wholly to the guidance of his own understanding. (17) If we consider the 
 very imperfect condition of our informatien at this period, or rather the im- 
 penetrability of our ignorance, and the total want of justification for the 
 measures afterwards adopted, that Burnes's reports did actually supply, the 
 conclusion is almost forced on us, that the mission was sent to see and 
 speak of matters on which a quarrel might be founded. When this failed, 
 Captain Wade fell back on the reports supplied by Mr Masson in 1835.(18) 
 Captain Burnes had learnt, on his way to Cabool, how easy would be the 
 adjustment of the Peshawur question on the part of Runjeet Singh. (19) On 
 arriving at Cabool, he found Dost Mahomed anxious to come into all the 
 views of Government. 
 
 Persian influence was rapidly on the decline : and though a Persian Elchee 
 was then known to be on his way to Cabool, it seemed doubtful if he would 
 be received j if he had been so, there were no offers which he could have 
 made which would have been placed for a moment in the balance against 
 those of the British Government.(20) Our Envoy, ten days after his arri- 
 
 17. In a private letter, dated Cabool, 30th October, Burnes thus writes: — 
 " I hardly know what the Government of India will think of my measures, for 
 my line of conduct is only indicated by them, not marked out. I am in a very 
 critical position, and they tell me so totidem verbis.'' Masson complains 
 incessantly of this matter; he quotes a letter from Burnes, in which the writer 
 says? — '' My last accounts from Calcutta are, in plain language, as follows,^ 
 that Lord Auckland looks with great anxiety to hear from me in Cabool, after 
 I have seen about me ; the meaning of which is clear enough, that they are to 
 act after I have reported. This looks like toasting our toes at Cabool for the 
 winter." 
 
 18. Masson's Travels. 
 
 1 9. We .have, in the text, given Burnes's own views of this matter. Mas- 
 son's are almost word for word the same. In commenting on a letter received 
 on thctt subject from Captain Burnes, he says, '' While perfectly aware that the 
 occupation of Peshawur was unprofitable, and the constant source of alarm and 
 inquietude to Runjeet Singh, and satisfied that he would relinquish it if soli- 
 cited to do so, I had not hoped that he would have voluntarily come forward 
 and expressed a desire to be eased of it." — Masson, vol. ii., p. 447- 
 
 20. Burnes's Letter to Sir W. M'Naghten— Cabool, Oct. 4, 1837— Blue Book, 
 1839. We shall require to refer to these papers almost incessantly for some 
 space to come. They form a continued series from the 25th September to the 
 1st May. Those quoted as " unpublished papers" are fragments of the ori- 
 ginal despatches as forwarded to Government. They Avere suppressed by the 
 Board of Control when ordered by Parliament to be published irri839. They 
 give a totally altered complexion to the conduct of Dost Mahomed. 
 
40 
 
 val, was closetted with the Ameer, and found him most frank and circum- 
 stantial in his explanations. He had been before, as already explained under 
 a previous head, on treaty of alliance with Persia ; he declared that he al- 
 ready bitterly repented ever having had anything to do with that country — 
 the more especially since he had received the Governor- General's no- 
 tification of Captain Burnes's intended mission. He stated that the 
 Candahar negociations with Mahomed Shah were entirely without his 
 concurrence, and much against his inclination. If the affairs of Pesha- 
 wur were ever adjusted, he said he would be expected to have no more oc- 
 casion for aid from any one ; but whether the British Government interested 
 itself in this or not, he was resolved to do every thing he could to show his 
 respect for its wishes ; if he could not succeed in regaining our friendship, 
 he was equally resolved to have nothing more to do with Persia. It was 
 impossible that anything could have been more satisfactory than this, if we 
 really were in earnest in our desire to treat with him as an independent 
 sovereign. The same tone of friendship was maintained with the most per- 
 fect consistency to the end, when our offers of alliance became so absolutely 
 insulting, considering the terms on which they were made, that he had no 
 choice left but to decline them. The following extract from a private letter, 
 dated Cabool, 30th October, gives Captain Burnes's opinions in a more con- 
 cise and graphic form than do his communications with the Government of 
 India, though the two are in substance identical :— 
 
 •' Cabool, 30th October, 1837. — Here a hundred things are passing of the high- 
 est interest — I arrived here on the 24th of last month, and have had a very cor- 
 dial reception — Dost Mahomed Khan has fallen into all our views, and in so doing 
 has either thought for himself, or followed my counsel, but for doing the former I 
 give him every credit, and things now stand so, that I think we are on the thres- 
 hold of a negotiation with King Runjeet, the basis of which will be his withdrawal 
 from Peshawar, and a Barukzye receiving it as a tributary of Lahore, the Chief qjf 
 Cabool sending his son to ask pardon. — What say you to this after all that has been 
 urged of Dost Mahomed Khan's putting forth extravagant pretensions? Runjeet will 
 accede to the plan I am certain, but *** is a. great little man, if you comprehend 
 what I mean, and while he is looking to the horizon (to use bis own words^ of po- 
 litics and considering, events crowd on, and spoil his speculations. I have, 
 in behalf of Government, agreed to stand as meaiator between the parties, and 
 Dost Mfchomed has cut asunder all his connexion with Russia and Persia, and 
 refused to leceive tbe i^mbassador from the Shah now at Candahar. — His brothers 
 at that city have however caressed the Persian Elchee all the more for this, and I 
 have gent them such a Junius as I believe will astonish them. 1 had indeed rea- 
 son to act promptly, for they have a son setting out for Tehran with presents to the 
 Shah and the Russian Ambassador, and I hope I shall be in time to explain our 
 hostility to stich conduct.— Every thing here Las indeed run well, and but for our 
 deputation at the time it happened} the house we occupy would have been tenant- 
 
41 
 
 eil by a Russian Agent and a Persian Elcliee. I hardly know what the Govern- 
 ment of India will think of ray measures, tor nny line of conduct is only indicated 
 by them, not marked cut, — Yet I am inspirited by their free use of laudatory ad- 
 jectives regarding my proceedings hitherto — * * I am in a very critical posi- 
 tion, and so they tell me — toiidem verbis, — but I like difficulties — they are my 
 brandy." 
 
 We have already had occasion to refer to the utter want of instruc- 
 tions frorn which the mission suffered on first reaching Cabool. So far 
 from this having been remedied, it became aggravated each month of 
 their stay. The pure no meaning of the terms "Persian aggression" and 
 ** Russian intrigue" puzzled them far more than the phantoms they ap- 
 prehended -would have done if converted into substantial realities. Mr 
 M'Neil sounded the double alarm, that Persia was about to march on 
 Herat, Candahar, and Ghuznie, and that Mahomed Shah and Dost Ma- 
 homed were about to form an alliance— out of which some fearful and 
 indefinite mischief was to spring, whose form was too dreadful to be 
 described, its power too terrific to be resisted. Dost Mahomed was 
 forbidden to make terms for himself with Persia, on pain of our 
 severest displeasure, and the Ameer at once declared that if this would 
 please us, we should have no g ouuds of dissatisfaction: he had treated 
 with Persia as he had done with other powers, with a view of strengthening 
 his authority, and without any idea of annoying us. But then again, 
 Persia threatened to advance towards Cabool with a view to invasion. This 
 intention, which, whether real or pretended, we have every reason to believe 
 incapable of being carried into effect, was fully believed in as practicable and 
 imminent by the whole Persian mission, (21) by Dost MahomeJ, and the 
 members of the mission at Cabool ; Captain Burnes having offered himself 
 to serve with the troops of Candahar, and to assist the Sirdar wiih money 
 in case it should be carried into effect. (22) It was implicitly relied 
 on by Lord Auckland, and is yet held as an unquestionable article of creed 
 by the then chairman of the Board of Control. (23) Yet Lord Auckland de- 
 
 21. See letters of Mr Ellice, Mr McNeil, Major Tod, &c. from 1834 to 1838 ; 
 they will be found more fully quoted and reierred to under the Herat and 
 Russian heads, 
 
 22. Barnes's private letters, also despatches. — See Mr Macnaghten's letter, 
 dated Belleiry, 20th Jan., severely blaming Captain Burnes for having made 
 an oifer of assistance. Burnes himself says, *' 1 entertain the belief that if we 
 keep our footing in Cabool and Herat faiis> the presence of Mr Leech alone 
 will prevent the Shah of Persia from attacking Candahar." — Suppressed 
 Despatch, 22d February, 1838. 
 
 23. Sir J. C Hobhouse's speech, 23d Jane, 1842. The ex-chairman quotes 
 Mr Ellice as an authority on the imminence of the dangers ot invasion Irom 
 Persia. This is naive enough 5 he seems to have forgotten that the alleged 
 cause of the war was, the desire of Dost Mahomed to screen himself from this 
 danger, by an alliance with Persia. We would not help him in fighting with 
 
 H 
 
42 
 
 clared in hi: minute (12ih May, 1838), that he had before stated to the 
 Secret Committee his determination not to oppose the hostile advance of 
 Persia upon Candahar or Cabool, whether by arras or money. (24) He, 
 in short, would not permit Dost Mahomed to enter into a treaty to save himself 
 from Persian invasion, nor suffer him by alliance with her to protect himself. 
 This was the state of matters in the beginning of the year 1838, but a 
 change in our conduct towards the Cabool chief was at hand, to which, 
 after noticing the affairs to the eastward, we shall speedily have occasion 
 to advert. On the 25th December, two months after the arrival of the 
 mission at Cabool, Lieutenant Leech was dispatched to Candahar to 
 ascertain how matters stood in that quarter. The three brothers who 
 ruled in Western Affghanistan, were Kohun Dil Khan, Rehem Dil Khan, 
 and Meer Dil Khan : the first described by Captain Burnes as an honest 
 good man and staunch Soonee ; the second, as having some energy ; and 
 the third, as possessed of more talent than either of the other two. (25) 
 These chiefs were at this time in treaty with Persia, with a view to their 
 assisting in the attack on Herat. It does not appear whether or not any 
 hint of the intentions of Russia as to the bestowment of the princedom 
 on the eldest of the brother Sirdars, had transpired. The treaty was 
 submitted to them and agreed to in January : (26) how long before this they 
 were informed of the intentions of Persia and Russia in their favour we 
 have not discovered. If, in the knowledge of this, they were still disposed 
 to break o3 ail arrangements with Persia and Russia in our favour, we 
 surely could have desired no stronger evidence of their anxiety for our 
 alliance: — nor could we assuredly blame them for endeavouring to complete 
 an arrangement so favourable to themselves, if their exertions for this 
 had only begun after they saw that there was no longer reason to hope 
 for our friendship, much less for our assistance. Herat, and the territory 
 dependent upon it, would have more than doubled in extent, and tripled 
 in value, and infinitely increased in political weight their territorial pos- 
 sessions. (27) However these things may be, we find from the instruc-. 
 
 her, and deposed hirn because he would not comply with our wishes in endea- 
 •youring to make friends with her 1 
 
 24. We only became aware of the existence of this very important document 
 by a reference to it in a paper of subsequent date. It bore upon the pacific 
 view of the question apparently, and was therefore suppressed- 
 
 26. Lieut. Leech's despatch, 12Dh March, encloses Count Simonich's guaran- 
 tee. 
 
 25- Burnes's Instructions to Lieutenant Leech. This very important despatch 
 was omitted by Sir J. Hobhouse ou the publication of the Parliamentary 
 Papers. It was found amongst the posthumous papers of Sir A. Bunies :— . 
 we quote from a copy publistied in the Caledonian Mercury of 22d October 
 1842. 
 
 27. Quarterly Review, June 1839. The article referred to is a review of the 
 mutilated Parliamentary Papers. It is believed to have been written by Sir 
 
43 
 
 tions of Captain iJurues to Lieutenant Leech, as well as from his other 
 letters, that by the beginning of December " they had listened to advice — 
 declined sending one of their sons to Persia as previously agreed to — dis- 
 missed the Persian Elchee, and began to look with serious anxiety for coun- 
 sel and assistance towards the British Government, and their brother Dost 
 Mahomed." The King of Persia, in referring to this, sent back infor- 
 mation that their assistance against Herat was no longer desired. (28) 
 Serious and not unnatural apprehensions were however entertained by 
 them, that, in case of the Shah succeeding at Herat, their proceedings on 
 this head might so incense him as to furnish him with an excuse for re- 
 suming his ofcen threatened measures for an eastward march, with a 
 view to the subjection of the countries to which he never failed to 
 prefer claims so often as opportunity occurred : claims which, when put 
 forward^ invariably filled our statesmen with alarm. In reply to a repre- 
 sentation from the Sirdars, apparently to this effect, received on the 22d 
 December, (29) Captain Burnes stated that, in the event of Persia attempt- 
 ing to subdue their chiefship, he would proceed in person along with the 
 Ameer of Cabool to assist them ; that he would do every thing in his pewer 
 to aid them — even to the extent of paying their troops. The sum proposed 
 to be advanced for this latter purpose was three lakhs of rupees — i. e. 
 £30,000. The chiefs declined the pecuniary portion of the offer, writing, 
 in return, that the original intent of their negociations had been to keep off 
 Persia, — to ruin Kamran, and make themselves masters of Herat. This 
 was understood to mean that their apprehensions at this time were more 
 from the aggressions of the latter than the former power. (30) It is difficult 
 to reconcile this with the previous representations of the brother Sir- 
 dars. This proposition appeared calculated to meet all the exigencies of 
 the case, assuming that our designs were honest, — that we wished to main- 
 tain the Barukzye chiefs in the position in whic^h we found them; (31) 
 
 John McNeil, and at any rate is embued with the darkest tints of Russo- 
 phobia. The writer had only the minor half of Barnes's papers to resort to. 
 He deals in the broadest assertions beyond the records he pretended to 
 review. The article is full of talent, and has had more influence in favour 
 of Lord Auckland's policy than all the other writings which have been 
 published on the subject. Some admirable remarks will be found in the 
 Spectator newspaper of July 25, 1839, relating to this subject. 
 
 28. Instructions to Lieutenant Leech, ut supra — Caledonian Mercuri/. 
 
 29. Neither the letter nor the reply appears amongst the printed papers, 
 though both must be in the hands of oovernnaent. We know of the existence 
 of the former, and quote ttie substance of the latter from Burnes's instructions 
 to Lieutenant Leech. The sum offered was stated by Masson, in a MS3. 
 note to the present writer, at three lakhs — £30,000. 
 
 30. Letter of Captain Burnes to Dost Mahomed Khan, April 23, 1838. We 
 confess we are unable to reconcile some of these very prominent contradic- 
 tions in the Parliamentary' Papers. 
 
 31. Mr Secretary Macnaghten, in his letter 20th January, just about to be 
 examined in the text, stiited^that *' it was our object also to mark our wish for 
 
44 
 
 but so far from this being the view of the matter taken by Lord Auckland, 
 Burnes's conduct was severely censured, and only not repudiated to prevent 
 exposure of ihe fact that he and his Government were at variance. A 
 different view of it was taken by the Secret Committee of the Court of 
 Directors, and when the Governor- General intimated that her Majesty 
 had been pleased to confer the honours of Lieutenant-Colonel and Knight- 
 hood upon him, (December 1839) his Lordship was obliged to confess that 
 this very policy which had incurred his severest displeasure, had been judged 
 by the authorities at home as the wisest that could have been adopted. We 
 learn little more than the above from the published papers of the intent of 
 Lieutenant Leech's mission, or the motive of his residence at Candahar ; 
 and here, without regard to order of time, we may bring the narrative of 
 the negociations in this quarter to an end. The treaty wiih the King of 
 Persia, by which Herat was to be made over to Kohun Dil Khan, some time 
 before concluded, had been guaranteed by the Russian ambassador in March, 
 and probably at this time only waited the sanction of the Cabinet of St 
 Petersburgh. This was not only not accorded to it, but Count Simonich 
 was recalled immediately on its being known that he had so far exceeded 
 his instructions as to give the authority of Russia as a voucher for its 
 fulfilment. Of all these things it is to be presumed our minister at Cabool 
 was fully aware, as we find by the printed papers, that Mr M'Neil, then 
 in the camp before Herat, had been made acquainted with them by Mr 
 Leech before the 11th of April. Under these circumstance's, and with no 
 further light before us on the subject than that which the Blue Book sup- 
 plies, we are unable to explain how in the account given of the arrival on 
 the first week of April of Kohun Dil Khan at Cabool in quest of pecuniary 
 or military aid against Persia, they happen not to be referred to- There 
 was at this time no doubt entertained in Western Affghanistan that the fall 
 of Herat was at hand;(32) and apparently in anticipation of the speedy 
 occurrence of this event, the Sirdar waited on Captain Burnes, with a 
 view of obtaining a direct promise of protection from Persia, should 
 she, in the event of succeeding in her present expedition, advance with 
 hostile purpose to the westward. It is difficult to suppose, after what 
 ■we know to have occurred, that the apprehension pretended could real- 
 ly have been experienced, or if it had been so, that the supplies ap- 
 
 the maintenance in their actual position of all the chiefs of Affghanistan, being 
 the most just course of proceeding ia itself, and as the existing division of 
 power amongst them was felt to be on the whole dfcidedly most beneficial to 
 British interests,'^ By the middle of May Lord Auckland had come to conclu- 
 sions exaetly the opposite of these ! 
 
 32. Burnes's Despatch, 25th April— Blue Book. It is curious that Mr 
 M'Neil, writing at this same date from the camp before Herat, apprises Lord 
 Palmerston that there is no apprehension of its fall. 
 
45 
 
 plied for could have been expected to be received. Yet the enormous 
 amount of treasure which we had lavished in Persia caused it to be 
 believed throughout the whole of Central Asia, that whenever we in- 
 terposed our authority, or proflfered friendly offices, money would be 
 scattered in almost boundless profusion. The expenses of the embassy 
 at the Court of Teheran, including subsidy, amounted to about £128,000 
 annually betwixt 1809 and 1827, and betwixt this latter date and 1837 to 
 about £ {0,000 a-year, or in all to about two and a half miUions(33) — a sum 
 justly deemed enormous by us, till taught by the Doorannee alliance that a si- 
 milar one might annually be required to maintain a so-called wise and popular 
 Suddozye sovereign on the throne of Cabool. The able writer in the 
 Quarterlg Review states, that "the hope of playing off England against 
 Kussia and Persia, an! these powers against England, and the prospect of 
 advantage to themselves, which they believed to be opened to them by a 
 competition between states so powerful and wealthy, for their attachment — 
 divested their communications of all sincerity, and enough transpired to de- 
 stroy every feeling of confidence in their good faith. A comparison of dates 
 will shew that they were at the same time holding out to England on the 
 one side, and to Persia an I Russia on the other, professions of the most 
 cordial attachment and exclusive alliance." Of the last mentioned fact 
 there is no sort of doubt — the first two assertions are pure assumptions. 
 Russia and Persia in agreeing to the cession of Herat, should it fall before 
 the armies of Mahraoud Shah, had guaranteed all that was desired of them 
 already, and more perhaps than ever had been hoped for before. There was 
 therefore no reason why England should be playe 1 off against them. From 
 us, again, the aid they asked was purely condiLioual on two contingencies, 
 neither of which ever arrived — the fall of Herat, and the hostile advance of 
 Persia, with a view to the conquest of the Affghan states to the eastward. 
 We can only suppose this danger to have been apprehended as the result of 
 the alliance the Sirdars had entered on with us, and the indignation the 
 King of Persia might have been expected to have felt at the slight put upon 
 him and his offers of alliance, so soon as Captain Burnes promised them the 
 friendship of England ; or the alternative vengeance of Kamran Shah, 
 should the siege prove unsuccessful. Captain Burnes had formerly been 
 severely snubbed for offering aid of any sort : he of course — now on 
 the eve of his departure from Cabool — had no choice left but to refuse 
 it. He probably began to suspect, what proved to be the case, that the 
 Government of Inadia desired any thing rather than the conciliation of the 
 
 33. Pamphlet of Sir Hartford Jones Brydges, late ambassador at the Court 
 of Persia ; Lon., Oct. 1838. Lord Auckland considered the fall of Herat, and 
 the consequent advance of Persia eastward, as the most probable event so late 
 as the 12th May. (See Simla Minute of that date.; 
 
46 
 
 Affghan chiefs. Had it been otherways, we could readily liava afforded to 
 promise them all that they desired from uS} conditional as this was on two 
 things never realized. If Herat had fallen, and Persia advanced, we should, 
 if we had left hor progress unopposed, have permitted her to take up a posi- 
 tion, through sheer lust of conquest, which would have enabled her to assume 
 a threatening attitude towards us, the idea of which Lord Auckland pretended 
 to deplore.(34) The arrival and requisition of Kohun Dil Khan — an event 
 of sufficient importance to warrant the present amount of remark, was, in all 
 likelihood meant for no other end than to ascertain, by a specific proposi- 
 tion, what at any rate were not the intentions of the Government of India ; 
 that some sort of conclusion might from this be drawn, as to what they pro- 
 bably were. On this last point Capt. Burnes was unable to form anything 
 like a conjecture ; he was as much at a loss as the Ameer .or Sirdar, what 
 was meant to be the result of his mission, and long after his departure, when, 
 as it appears from the minute of the 12th of May, Lord Auckland's mind was 
 made up for something very warlike, he writes to Mr Macnaghten, un- 
 der date 29th June, indicating how much he was at a loss to conjecture the ul- 
 timateintentiousof Government, — not more s > than they themselves appear 
 at the lime to have been. (35) Accounts being for the present closed at 
 Candahar, the condition of the state of aff.iirs at Cabool falls to be resumed, 
 back as far as the arrival of Lieut. Vicovich on the 20th December. Sub- 
 sequent events have brought many things to liglit in reference to the charac- 
 ter and position of this adventurer, of which Mr M'Neil and Capt. Burnes 
 were at the time necessarily ignorant ; yet it does seem most unaccountablf, 
 that, taking into consideration the only objects which could by possibility be 
 contemplated by Russia, supposing her likely to pursue the same principles 
 of action winch had in all other quarters throughout guided her policy during 
 the past and present reign, and the questionable shape in which Vicovich at 
 first and throughout appeared, — such consequence should have been attached 
 to his approach, and such ill-supported inferences drawn from his detention. 
 This man is reported by Captain Burnes as a Cossack Lieutenant ; by Sir J. 
 C. Hobhouse as a renegade Pole. His credentials appear to have consisted of 
 a letter, professedly written by the Emperor himself, not by any secretary or 
 minister — a circumstance sufficient to have excited suspicion. (36) He was 
 
 34. Lord Auckland's Minute, dated I2th May 1838 — We have copied his 
 Lordship's observations almost verbatim. It was curious, that when so much 
 alarm was experienced lest Persia should advance, we refused to permit any 
 steps to be taken for driving or keeping her back. 
 
 35. See letter quoted in part, unfairly as usual, b}- Sir J. C. Hobhoase in 
 his speech of 23d Jure. It is given entire in the i^o;n6ay Times oi. the 24th, 
 and Summary of the 27th, August. 
 
 36. Masson's Journeys, &c. In quoting Mr Masson on this subject, we are 
 bound to state, that whatever he writes in reference to Captam Burnef| bears 
 an appearance in the last decree suspicious. 
 
47 
 
 said to have been provided with money, wliich he promised liberally ; but 
 there is not the slightest reason to believe that ever it made its appearance. 
 He bore with him a genuine letter, of a general and perfectly inoffensive 
 character, from Count Simonich, which appears amongst the Parliamentary 
 Papers, expressive of respect and promising presents ,• but the presents them- 
 selves, like the pecuniary assistance, appear never to have reached their 
 destination. (37) He spread reports in all directions " that he was sent to 
 intimate the arrival at Astrabad of a large Rilssian force destined to co-ope- 
 rate with the Shah's army against Herat." (38) This we now know to 
 have been a falsehood so monstrous, tiiat the man who could have had re- 
 course to it was wholly untrustworthy. So much opposed to this was the 
 fact, that every Russian soldier in the service of Persia was ordered, in the 
 course of the siege, to return to his own country to prevent the possibility 
 of suspicion. He was admitted by Count Nesselrode to have been sent by 
 the Russian ambassador at Teheran as a commercial agent, and it is now 
 demonstrated that even in this capacity his rank must have been of the 
 humblest. Mr M'Naghten alludes to him as appearing in this character, 
 and Captain Burnes himself) in one despatch, declares his disbelief that 
 he could by possibility be acting on the instructions of the imperial 
 court. He was ordered back by General Duhamel, and when he disap- 
 peared near Candahar, where he is supposed to have been murdered, (39) 
 no notice of the event was taken by his Government. The mission of 
 Lieutenant Vicovich, as already stated, was explained by the Russian 
 minister to have been in return to a messenger from Dost Mahomed. The 
 arrival of this man with his letter, says Charles Masson, " astonished the 
 Ameer, particularly as he was unconscious of having written a letter to 
 Russia. He did not at the time remember Hussein Ali [the messenger 
 sent to St Petersburgh, who was said to have fallen sick and been de- 
 layed at Moscow] and he required to be told that he was the son of Baji 
 Nurwari. He then observed, I gave him no letters, and Mirza Samee Khan 
 [the minister] explained that he had written one, and claimed for himself 
 much credit for having procured the Ameer the honour of a reply from the 
 Emperor. (40) Whether the Ameer believed his Mirza or not I cannot 
 tell. It was known that Hussein Ali bad accompanied Vicovich from 
 Bokhara to Orenburg. His non-appearance with the Cossack officer was 
 considered badly accounted for by the pretence stated that he was sick at 
 
 37. Masson, in a MS. note in the Quarterly, states that they never were re- 
 ceived. 
 
 38. Mr M'Neil to Lord Palmerston.— Parliamentary Papers. The circula- 
 tion of the report is deponed to by Masson, MS. note. 
 
 39. Masson's Travels. Sir J. C. Hobhouse's speech. 
 
 40. Masson's Travels, vol. iii. p. 464. 
 
48 
 
 Moscow, and the general opinion was that Vicovlch had murdered him ; 
 and this I state not wishln» to belie Vicovich, but to shew the little respect 
 in which his mission was held." " The reception of Vico\ich was not such as 
 he had reason to boast of, and in the house of Mirza Saraee Khan he resided, 
 in fact, under surveillance." 
 
 This agent remained some seven or eight months at Cabool. We can- 
 not discover in any paper, public or private, a single overt act of intrigue 
 *aid to his charge. With all the means and appliances possessed by 
 the various missions at Cabool, Candahar, Herat, and Teheran, which seem to 
 have been resorted to so unsparingly, and with such success, that scarcely any 
 communication of note escaped them, not one letter, either to or from Vico- 
 vich, from any party whatever , has ever been produced or referred to. His 
 vocation seems to have been limited to " a system of enormous Ijing" — to 
 the exhibition of his Cossack uniform, and certain mysterious closetings 
 w^ith the Chiefs, with a view, probably, on their part, to discover whether 
 the man, to whose appearance we attached such mighty consequence, had 
 really been intrusted with any commission at all from his Government, or had 
 any function whatever, above those already described, assigned to him, with 
 the wish on his side of appearing a greater man than till now he had dreamt of 
 becoming. Political quacks of this sort have been found to emanite from other 
 countries than Russia without being similarly successful in attracting atten- 
 tion. Yet, if Count Nesselrode, with half his Cabinet, had been at Cabool, 
 ■with a Russian army half-way on its march to Delhi, greater consequence 
 could hardly have been attached to them than that with which we find this 
 miserable adventurer treated in the official papers of Lord Auckland and 
 Lord Palmerston, and in half the other despatches ! About the 20th of 
 January, Captain Burnes received letters of dates •25th November and 2d 
 Dec, from Mr M'Naghten, giving him, for the first time, apparently some 
 definite instructions on one or two points as to how he was to proceed and 
 what to require, for up to this period he seems on both questions to have been 
 left to follow his own discretion. From this it appeared, that though Run- 
 jeet Singh was asserted to be unlikely to consent to the restoration of Pesha- 
 wur to Dost Mahomed, he might probably be induced to make it over to its 
 former ruler, — Sooltan Mahomed Khan, the Ameer's brother. It is singu- 
 lar, that up to the time of the publication of the Simla Proclamation, the 
 Governor-General had never taken the very simple and obvious step of 
 directly ascertaining from the Maharajah himself whether or not he would 
 cede Peshawur without objection. Captain Burnes and Mr Masson, the 
 only two authorities referred to on these matters, had both assured Go- 
 vernment, as has already been stated, that the Seikhs would at this 
 time have been most thankful to have got rid of it: and wanted but 
 the pretext of our interposition with them to save their honour, to make it 
 
49 
 
 over to any one we were disposeil to have named. (41) It appears to hav»- 
 occasioned much mortification in the Simla cabinet, that the Affghan chiefs, 
 one and all, had come so readily into our views, as to leave scarcely a 
 single point on which to disagree with them. It looks as if serious appre- 
 hensions had bean entertained that Runjeet Singh, if applied to, might 
 have manifested so much of the same complying spirit, as to have left no 
 room for a quarrel, the only thing which from the commencement appeared 
 to have been determined on ; and relieved us even from the impertinence 
 of intruding the offer of our friendly offices on those who desired them 
 not, and stood ia no need of them. Sooltaa Mahomed Khan, it will be 
 recollected, was stripped of all authority when Dost Mahomed obtained 
 power at Cabool, but had the half of Peshawur assigned to him in compen- 
 sation for his loss. He had from this time forward been constantly en- 
 gaged in plots against his brother : it was in the course]of one of these while 
 intriguing with the Seikhs, that Hurry Singh seized on his territories, as 
 well as those of the Ameer on the Attock in 1834. At this very time the 
 Ameer had just been made acquainted with an intrigue against him that 
 had originated at Peshawur ; Sooltan Mahomed Khan having sent an 
 agent to the Shah Soojah at Loodianah with a view of obtaining his restor- 
 ation. The position in which matters at this time stood will be most readily 
 understood by the republication of one of the mutilated despatches of 
 Captain Burnes, extracts from which are to be found in the Blue Book. 
 The portions marked with single inverted commas were suppressed by the 
 Board of Control on its original appearance, and have been extracted from 
 his posthumous papers :>« 
 
 Capt. A. Burnes to W, H. Macnaghten, Esq^ 
 (Vide Blue Book, No. V. p. 22.) 
 Sir, Cabool, 26th January, 1838. 
 
 ' I have now the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of tho 
 *25th Nov. and 2nd of December last, which reached me about the same time, 
 
 41. " Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance on 
 Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunder- 
 standings with the Seikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such 
 as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his regard 
 for the friendship of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submit- 
 ting to the consideration of his highness.*' — Simla Proclamation. It was 
 surely a pity that they should not at any rate have been submitted, when 
 Lord Auckland had such strong assurances that had they been so, they would 
 have been favourably considered. The passage about assistance from Persia 
 contrasts curiously with the paragraph in the Simla minute of 12th May already 
 referred to, where such serious apprehensions are expected by his Lordship, 
 that Persia might, in sheer lust of conquest, occupy AflEghanistan altogether. 
 Was it Persian alliance or Persian invasion that was apprehended ? They 
 seem to have been put forward alternately just as suited. Sir J. C. Hobhous* 
 feared the latter when he last expressed himself on tk© subject- 
 
 I 
 
50 
 
 ♦ and conveyed the views of the Right Hon. the Governor General' regarding the 
 overtures made by Dost aiahomed Khan, for adjusting his differences with the 
 Sikhs, and the apprehension that the Maharajah would not be disposed to sur- 
 render Peshawur on those terms, but be more likely to restore it to Sooltan 
 Mahomed Khan, its former governor. I lost no time in making known these 
 circumstances, * as well as the sentiments of his Lordship on them,' and the 
 policy which it would be advisable for the Ruler of Cabool to pursue. 
 
 2. After listening with considerable attention to what I impressed upon hira, 
 the Ameer proceeded to make his own comments on what was recommended. 
 He said that he felt satisfied that the British Government was actuated by the 
 most pure and upright motives in making known its sympathy with the suffer- 
 ings of the Affghan nation, and that, in seeking to apply some remedy to them, 
 it only followed the generous course for which it was celebrated throughout 
 Asia; that there were, however, obstacles and objections to what had been 
 recommended, 'which the Government of India might not know' which it 
 behoved him to unfold, * for its deliberation,' before any adjustment of differ- 
 ences on such terms was carried into effect. 
 
 3- " In offering to render tribute, horses, and apology, to Runjeet Sing, and 
 to hold Peshawur under him,'' continued he, '' 1 was actuated by no motive of 
 hostility to Sooltan Mahomed Khan : he is my brother, and though we have 
 differed, the rancour is on his side, and not on mine. 1 stated that I would 
 secure to him and his brothers thejagheers they enjoy ; and this, with what 
 would have to be paid, would not have rendered it a very profitable appendage 
 to my power J for these were precautionary measures to secure myself in 
 Cabool, and prevent injury befalling me. Of Runjeet Sing's power to invade 
 me in Cabool, I have little fear j of his power to injure me, if he reinstates 
 Sooltan Mahomed Khan in the government of that city, I have great apprehen- 
 sion, for in it I see a Mahomedan ruler instead of a Sikh j and had the Maha- 
 rajah been more conversant with the politics of Affghanistan, and bent on my 
 destruction, he might ere this have succeeded, had he not displaced Sooltan 
 Mahomed Khan from Peshawur, and supplied him with funds to corrupt those 
 about me, who are inimical, and envy the rise to my present elevation. 
 
 4. *' At the present time, many of the chiefs who belonged to Peshawur . 
 and their retainers, are subsisted by me. They fled from their country on 
 its invasion by the enemies of our religion, and on my brother becoming a ser- 
 vant to them. Itcannot be supposed that with my limited revenues I can ei« 
 thtr give to these persons what they are entitled to, or what they received iu 
 their own country j but at this moment I expend about 90,000 Rupees annu- 
 ally in giving them bread. When Peshawur is restored, these individuals will 
 of course leave me, and along with them will proceed every one who may 
 take offence at his merits not being appreciated as he considers they deserve ; 
 and thus, instead of being freed from enemies, I shall be lowered among my 
 countrymen far below my present situation ; and, far from being free from 
 danger, as at present, have that situation most certainly endangered. I think, 
 
51 
 
 therefore, that I see in the contemplated plans for altering the arrangement 
 for governing Peshawur, a rectification of the errors of the Ruler of Lahore ; 
 and that his designs are sinister, and his object to draw the British Govern- 
 ment unawares into them. 
 
 6. '* In the friendly expression of the feeling entertained towards the Aff- 
 ghansby the British Government, I see clearly, that it would not permit itself 
 to be made a party to my destruction. If you are not disposed to strengthen 
 my hands, and raise me above the rank which I at present enjoy, it cannot be 
 your intention, with offers of sympathy, to bring about my ruin. On that point 
 I am at ease j but in separating us all one from another ; in seeking to keep the 
 chiefs from being dependent on one another 5 you are certainly neutralizing 
 the power of the Affghan nation, and sowing the seeds of future dissension. 
 Your object is to prevent harm j you will prevent good. You will secure to 
 yourselves the gratitude of Peshawur, of the Eusufzyes, the Khutucks, and the 
 tribes near the Indus j but as for myself, you open a new door of intrigue 
 against me ; and as you see injury likely to accrue from the Chief of Canda- 
 har entering on an alliance with Persia, I see injury to myself in Sooltan Ma- 
 homed Khan, when restored to his chiefship of Peshawur, being in alliance 
 with Lahore : and, above all, what security am I to have that the chiefs of 
 Peshawur and Candahar will not join to injure me, and be aided in their de- 
 signs by Maharajah Runjeet Sing ?" 
 
 6. To these arguments I opposed the views of the British Government, and 
 said that it would ill tally with its wishes to find new causes of quarrel arise 
 consequent on an adjustment of the differences between the Sikhs and Aff- 
 ghans ; that as the Ameer had renounced his connexion with Persia, we had 
 in return hoped to do him a good office by entering into a negociation with 
 Runjeet Sing on the differences existing between them, but that if he was 
 thoroughly sincere in his belief that the restoration of Peshawur to Sooltan 
 Mahomed Khan was positively injurious to him, it was proper to state most 
 decidedly that we had no such design, * and would be a party to no measures 
 
 * of such a tendency. I then pointed out the various advantages which must 
 
 * arise from the Sikhs withdrawing themselves to the other side of the In- 
 
 * dus, and I dwelt upon the increase of reputation which must follow to him- 
 
 * self on his having contributed, by his determined opposition, to the release 
 
 * of his brothers, their wives and their children, from the hands of the Sikhs, 
 ' to have once more in the possession of the family the burying place of ita 
 
 * ancestors, and to hear again in a country inhabited by Mahomedans the 
 
 * Summons to prayer (eezan,; and secure the permission to follow the usages 
 
 * o# Islam, and their Mosques from defilement and spoliation.' 
 
 « 7. Giving every weight to what had been urged, I proceeded to lay be- 
 
 * fore him (the Ameer), the positive advantages derivable from an altered 
 
 * state of things in Peshawur.—* The number of troops entertained by you 
 ' will become unnecessary, your increased exactions from the merchant and 
 « the cultivator will cease, because war with the Sikhs will no longer engage 
 
5^ 
 
 * your attention, decrease of expence will be tantamount to increase of re» 
 
 * venue, your resources will be improved, your power concentrated and 
 ' strengthened, and as to the charge brought forward of our raising up many 
 
 * Chiefs in AfFghanistan, he was to recollect that those Chiefs were his bro- 
 
 * thers, that Candahar, Cabool, and Peshawur, would thus be in possession 
 
 * of one family, the sons of one father, who had a common interest against 
 ' the enemies of their house, and whose family differences whatever they 
 
 * were, might be made to disappear when they ceased to be threatened by a 
 
 * powerful Ruler like Maharajah Runjeet Sing j that as to the neutralization 
 ' of the Affghan nation which he complained of, it was certainly no part of 
 
 * the policy of the British Government to injure any of the present holders 
 
 * of power in this country more than himself, and that we looked to the ge- 
 
 * neral good of all parties; that the Ameer no doubt understood better 
 ' than we did what injured, and what availed him; but it appeared to me 
 t that he had too exaggerated a view of Runjeet Sing's designs, and that it 
 
 * would certainly be taken into the Governor General's consideration, if this 
 ' subject proceeded further, how far he should receive security against the 
 » plans of Lahore to be compassed by means of his brothers in Peshawur, 
 
 * and also the nature of the counteraction which would be used to prevent 
 
 * his brothers at Peshawur and Candahar combining to do him injury/ 
 
 8. To this Dost Mahomed Khan replied, that there were no doubt many 
 advantages in prospect, and that the arguments adduced had both foundation 
 and solidity, but that the advantages were chiefly on the side of others ; that 
 he had hitherto been able to stand on the defensive against Runjeet Sing, and 
 to do it with some effect ; that that Ruler's withdrawal was more injurious to 
 him on the terms proposed, than his continuance at Peshawur ; that he him- 
 self now received a degree of respect which he could then no longer command, 
 and that it was better to leave things as they were, in the hopes of some fu- 
 ture charge, than to shackle himself by being a party to an arrangement, which 
 did him little good, and seemed fraught with danger; and in return for which, 
 things might be expected of him which he could not perform. Peshawur, 
 gaid he, has been conquered by the Sikhs ; it belongs to them j they may give 
 it to whomsover they please ; if to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, they place it in the , 
 hands of one who is bent on injuring me, and I cannot therefore acknowledge 
 any degree of gratitude for your interference, or take upon myself to render 
 services in return. ' I admit that it will be highly beneficial in many ways to 
 
 * see the Sikhs once more Eastward of the Indus, but I still can dispense with 
 
 * none of my troops, or relax in my precautionai'y measures, as equal if not 
 
 * greater anxieties will attach tome — I have unbosomed myself to you, and 
 
 * laid bare, without any suppression, my difficulties. I shaU bear in lively 
 ' remembrance the intended good offices of the British Government, and I 
 
 * shall deplore that my interest did not permit me to accept that which was 
 ' rendered in a spirit so friendly, but which to me and my advisers has only 
 « seemed hastening my ruin. To Runjeet Sing your interference is beneficial, 
 ' as he finds himself involved in serious difficulties by the possession of Pesha^ 
 
53 
 
 * wtir, and he is too glad of your good offices to escape from a place which is a 
 ' burthen to his finances, but by that escape a debt of gratitude is exactible 
 
 * from him, and not from me : and if your Government will look into this raat- 
 
 * ter, they will soon discover my opinions to be far from groundless, and my 
 
 * conclusions the only safe policy I can pursue-' 
 
 9. The Nawab Jubbar Khan followed his brother, and said, it was undoubt- 
 edly true that the Ameer had not mistaken the evils which might ensue to him- 
 self from the entire restoration of Peshawur to Sooltan Makomed Khan, but 
 that the Affghan nation could not afford to lose the sympathy which had 
 been exhibited by the British Government ; and an arrangement might be 
 made on the basis of a treaty which Runjeet Sing had once entered into with 
 the Ameer and his deceased brother Yar Mahomed Khan, which was to divide 
 Peshawur between them and receive equally at their hands a fixed tribute. 
 Such an arrangement might now be made, and the Ameer would be free from 
 fearof injury, and Runjeet Sing receive from him and Sooltan Mahomed 
 Khan conjointly, the amount on which he was disposed to surrender it. The 
 Ameer added, that such an arrangement would remove his fears : and he 
 should wish no other person placed there but the Nawab himself, and one or 
 two of his own agents under him. ' These observations coming from the Nawab 
 
 * Jubbar Khan are the more remarkable, since he is devoted to his brother 
 ' Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and would rejoice to see him restored to Peshawur 
 
 * — They consequently carried with me a conviction that the Ameer's fears are 
 
 * not groundless, and that they will deserve all due consideration before Go- 
 
 * vernment enters upon any measures for attaching this Chief to its in- 
 t terests.' 
 
 10. To the proposition of the Nawab, and the observations of the Ameer 
 which followed upon it, I made no further remark than that the plan , would 
 also be taken into consideration ; but before proceeding further, it was in- 
 cumbent on me to ask one categorical question ; * I had stated that the 
 
 * British Government considered itself conferring an everlasting favor on the 
 
 * Affghan nation by prevailing on the Sikhs to withdraw from this side of the 
 ' Indus J that I who had seen this country, considered this act as one of the 
 
 * greatest blessings which could happen to this people. I had however heard 
 < from the Ameer, that he did not appreciate this service as we did,' and 
 « was 1' then ' to consider that he would rather have the Sikhs in Peshawur. 
 ' with all their exercise of prejudice and all the disgrace that it entailed', in 
 preference to Sooltan Mahomed Khan's being restored to his government in 
 that city ? 
 
 11. The Ameer replied, that this was certainly placing the matter in an ex- 
 treme light, and that he found a difficulty in answering the question ; < He 
 ' admitted fully the advantages of getting rid of the Sikhs, and was far from 
 
 * depreciating the good offices of removing them if it could be done, but' he 
 would candidly ask in return, if the mode of accomplishing an act generally 
 beneficial were proved to be detrimental to himself, who had the most sub- 
 
54 
 
 stantial share of power in the Affghan domiuions at this time^ it could be said 
 to be applying a remedy to the difficulties under which the Affghans laboured ; 
 and it in return for it, the British Government could reckon on those acts 
 which all powers naturally look to in return for benefits conferred. * I ask 
 you not to aid me in achieving a supremacy throughout this country ; but I do 
 ask to be allowed to stand in the position in which you have found me : if 1 am 
 to be protected from intrigues in Peshawur, I will then consider myself bene- 
 fitted, but without such a plan as that which the Nawab has stated, or some 
 such other, that places a Barukzye there, which the Governor-General must 
 devise, I foresee evils which cannot have entered into the minds of those who 
 are my well-wishers. 
 
 *' 12. * As an instance in point, at this moment I have been made acquaint- 
 
 * ed with an intrigue that has originated in Peshawur, and as I believe with 
 
 * Runjeet Sing, which will convey to your Government juster notions than any 
 ' expressions of general apprehension. Sooltan Mahomed Khan has just sent 
 
 * an agent to the ex King at Loodianah to offer his services to combine against 
 
 * me» and to secure my brothers at Candahar in support of this coalition j what 
 ' security am I to receive against a recurrence of such practices ? As for the 
 •ex King himself I fear him not, he has been too often worsted to make head 
 
 * here unless he has aid from the British Government, which I am now pretty 
 
 * certain he will never receive. If my brother at Peshawur however, under a 
 
 * promise of being made his minister, and assisted with Sikh Agents and rao- 
 
 * ney, appears in the field, I may find that in expressing my satisfaction at his 
 
 * restoration to Peshawur I have been placing a snake in my bosom — and I may 
 ' then, when too late, lament that 1 did not let the Sikhs do their worst instead 
 
 * of replacing them by another description of enemies.' ' 
 
 13. I have thus placed before the Right Honorable the Governor-General 
 the opinions and views entertained by tlie Ruler of Cabool, and the nature of 
 the arguments which I have opposed to them. * It has appeared to me that 
 
 * they call for much deliberation. It will be seen that the Chief is not bent on 
 
 * possessing Peshawur, or on gratifying an enmity towards his brothers, but 
 
 * simply pursuing the worldly maxim of securing himself from injury -, the ar- 
 
 * guments which he has adduced seem deserving of every consideration, and the ' 
 
 * more so, when an avowed partizan of Sooltan Mahomed Khan does not deny 
 
 * the justice of the Ameer's objections. It will be for His Lordship to judge 
 
 * how far the British Government will agree to an interference through its 
 « Agent that will prevent the Chief of Peshawur from caballing against his 
 
 * brother in Cabool, and if this could not be brought about by the plan suggest - 
 
 * ed of placing the Nawab Jubbar Khan there on the part of the Ameer, and on 
 
 * the terms proposed. It would give Runjeet Sing tribute from both the Ameer 
 
 * and Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and thus gratify him, while the known good feel- 
 
 * ing of the Nawab towards the British Government would give confidence to 
 
 * Runjeet Sing in the arrangement, and secure to the British a great reputation 
 
 * in these countries. In the event of this arrangemeat being also rejected, it 
 
55 
 
 * does certainly appear to rae that we are bound in some way to protect the 
 
 * Ameer from the cabals of Peshawur and Candahar, without which tliis coun- 
 
 * try will become a scene of strife, injurious alike to our commerce and our po- 
 ' licy. Those Chiefs will acknowledge the Ruler of Cabool as the head of the 
 
 * family., and respect him accordingly, but they do not admit being dependent 
 
 * on him, nor is it desirable to make them so. If we stand aloof and do not en- 
 
 * courage Runjeet Sing to recede, the Ameer of Cabool will hold his present 
 
 * ground, since he is the most powerful of his family — If we interfere, we en- 
 
 * danger his supremacy such as it is, and consequently it seems incumbent on us 
 
 * to prevent such interference being detrimental.' 
 
 * 14. Under such circumstances it might be urged that all interference had 
 f better be avoided, but this, as it appears to rae, would be, under the existing 
 ' state ©f affairs, a very doubtful line of policy, unless it is intended to put 
 
 * forth the ex- King at Loodiana, secure through him a footing in these eoun. 
 
 * tries, and sweep the present rulers from their authority, which has happily 
 
 * never been contemplated. Besides the very questionable nature of such a 
 
 * proceeding, it would not gain the objects of Government, for we should 
 ' then be unable to balance one Chief-ship against another, and though we 
 ' might be sure of him whom we advance to the throne of his fathers, Ave may 
 
 * experience in his successor all the evils of a powerful Mahomedan neigh- 
 
 * bour. With the Barukzye family in the three Eastern divisions of Affgha- 
 « nistan, we have to deal as it were with but one house, and we have the cer- 
 
 * tainty of their good will and services for these good offices, which will keep 
 
 * them stable, as they are, and prevent them injuring each other In time, 
 
 » when one Chief found he could not destroy another, the family differences 
 
 * will be allayed, and we shall thus force into one mass materials which are 
 *■ less incoherent than they appear, and have all that is wished on this impor- 
 
 * tant frontier of our Indian Empire.* 
 
 * 15. I have not hesitated, while reporting on a question of this 
 
 * magnitude, to give expression to sentiments which have been adopted 
 
 * after much reflection on the scene of these distractions. Since arriv- 
 
 * ing hero I have seen an Agent of Persia with alluring promises, 
 « after penetrating as far as Candahar, compelled to quit the country, 
 
 * because no one was sent to invite him to Cabool. Following him, an Agent 
 
 * of Russia with letters highly complimentary, and promises more than sub- 
 
 * stantial, has experienced no more civility than is due by the laws of hospita- 
 
 * lity and nations. — It maybe urged by some, that the offers of one or both 
 
 * were fallacious, but such a dictum is certainly premature ; the Ameer of 
 
 * Cabool has sought no aid in his arguments from such offers, but declared 
 « that his interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, 
 ' which he never will desert as long as there is a hope of securing one. It is 
 ' evident therefore that in this chief we have one who is ready to meet us, and 
 
 * from -what is passing in Central Asia at this moment it is any thing but 
 
 * desirable to exhibit indifference to the solicitations of one whose posi- 
 
56 
 
 * tion makes liim courted, and whom aid' may render powerful for or against 
 us.' 
 
 • 16. As this letter contains matter which may materially affect an adjust- 
 
 * ment ot the differences between the Sikhs and Affghans, I have sent a copy 
 
 * of it specially to Captain Wade.— I am not in possession of his letter to yoa 
 ' handing up the first overtures of the Ameer of Cabool> and I cannot in con- 
 
 * sequence give my sentiments thereon, which will be received as an apology 
 
 * for my not having touched upon them in this letter Captain Wade and 
 
 * myself have, I am sure? but one object, which is to gain the ends of Govern- 
 
 * ment by using our most strenuous endeavours respectively at Lahore and 
 
 * Cabool, but I mustrespecttully entreat that Dost Mahomed Khan's views be 
 
 * subjected to strict scrutiny before they are pronounced to be a mere " gra- 
 ' tification of his personal resentments."— Did I think so, I would not trans- 
 
 * mit this letter, but this Chief is perfectly aware of the policy we have mark- 
 
 * ed out for ourselves in this country, and his conduct has been already in some 
 
 * degree put to the test by Persia and Russia — With regard to the latter? the 
 ' importance of it has now become manifest by the arrival of an express from 
 
 * the Bombay Government, conveying tome the despatches of our Ambassador 
 
 * in Persia, which prove all previous conjectures to be well founded, and that 
 ' Mr. Vickovitch is, what he has given himself out, an Agent from the Empe- 
 
 * ror of Russia. — The necessity for a good understanding with this Chief has 
 
 * thus become more than apparent, as the dangers from such an alliance are no 
 
 * longer imaginary, but fairly developed.* 
 
 < 17, I have just received a letter as I finish this, from the Ameer to the 
 
 * Governor General, which I enclose with its translation.' 
 
 I have, &c, 
 Alexandeb Bubnes. 
 
 Nothing, certainly, could be more conclusive or convincing than the rea- 
 soning of the Ameer : the accuracy of his facts we never disputed. But 
 this was a mild specimen of the requirements of the Government of India! 
 A letter from Mr Macnaghten, dated 20th January, was received by 
 Capt. Burnes on the 22d of Feb., containing another from Lord Auckland 
 himself. The latter of these was smooth in expression, but imperious in de- 
 mand ; the furmer was in the last degree insolent in both — such only as we 
 were entitled to prefer to a ruler, who, having placed himself absolutely ia 
 our hands, was still urging the most unreasonable and absurd requests. The 
 immediate object of this was to intimate Lord Auckland's extreme dis- 
 approbation of the assistance proposed to have been given by Burnes to 
 Candahar, in the event of an attack from the westward. The principles 
 laid down on which Dost Mahomed was for the future to be treated with 
 were, — first, the Dost being now essentially dependent upon our good 
 
57 
 
 offices for the removal of his apprehensions from Seikh power, (42) his 
 compliance in having thrown himself on our friendship, and cast aside the 
 alliance of other states, was to be taken advantage of; and now that he 
 had left himself without an ally save ourselves, we were to abuse, insult, and 
 plunder him as the reward of his esteem and regard for us 1 Burnes was once 
 more (43) instructed to tell him "that, in the precarious position in which 
 he was placed, our good offices for the peace and security of his remaining 
 territory should be thankfully accepted by him." This was the language the 
 British envoy was to employ towards the most vigorous minded and enlighten- 
 ed ruler in Central Asia : — a ruler who, from the time our intercourse began 
 with tiim, had, according to our own account of the matter, treated all the 
 Europeans who ever visited him with tne utmost kindness and consideration : 
 who having lo<it one of the most valuable portions of his territory while 
 engaged in de'ending himself against a wretched and unpopular imbe- 
 cile, to whom we gave harbourage and assistance, had for four years striven 
 without intermission to regain it — who had in the majority of cases been 
 successful, and in no case, even when compelled to retire, quitting the 
 field under such circumstances of disaster, as that he did not, within 
 three months of any given retreat, return undismayed into the field, 
 —and who, when we officiously interposed our uncalled for ** good offices," 
 had given the en^my so severe a hanaling, that had we kept away 
 they were ready of themselves to have come in to his terms I (44) That 
 Dost Mahomed could have endured a proposition so insulting, evinces 
 an anxiety to avoid offence almost without a parallel in the annals 
 of royal forbearance. Well might his brother reply — "that government 
 must be ignorant of the true state of affairs in the country ; that so far from 
 the proffered protection from Runjeet Singh being of the nature stated, the 
 Maharajah had never sought to attack Cabool, and that hitherto all the 
 aggression had been on the part of the Ameer, and not the ruler of Lahore '' 
 — " ot his attacks they were under little apprehension. "(45) But we must 
 
 42. Letter of Mr Macnaghten, 9th paras^raph. This paper does not appear 
 in the lilue Bo -k. There certainly was good reason why it should have 
 been suppressed as a manifestation ot the commencement of the most unjust 
 and rigorous system of policy on record. The comparatively mild letter 
 of L<'rd Auckland to the Ameer of the same date and superscription, is given 
 at length in the Blue " liook> so as to throw the odium of the impending mis- 
 understandings on Dost .Mahomed ! The bullying and overbearmg note of 
 the Secretary told too much. 
 
 43. Tlie same instructions appear to have been given in a letter of 27th 
 Decembef, not publisiied. 
 
 44. See extract from Burnes's Cabool, under head Peshawur, note 1 ', also 
 extract from Captain Wade's letter to Mr M isson, under the present head* 
 
 45. This it will be observed, is one ot Burnt s's longest despatches : — there 
 are just 22 lines of it given in the Blue Book, and these are garbled 5 250 lines 
 are suppressed without intimation ! 
 
1- 
 
 58 
 
 give the suppressed despatch entire, illustrating as it does the clear and 
 vigorous intellect of the good Nawab, and how ill able the sophisms of the 
 Indian Government— which Captain Burnes was directed to employ, to 
 bolster up a dishonest course — could stand against the arguments of the 
 untutored Affghan, with right upon his side : — 
 
 Captain Burnes to W. II. Macnaghten, Esq. 
 ( Vide Blue Book, No. V. p. 28.; 
 
 Cabool, March 5, 1838. 
 
 Sir, — On the 23d ultimo^ I had the honor to report to you the result of my 
 intercourse with the Ameer of Cabool, on the subj ect of the extent to wl»ich he 
 was to reckon on the good ofEces of the British Government, in an adjustment of 
 his difierences with the Sikhs, and the returns which would be expected from him 
 in consequence. 
 
 2. From various quarters I h ave meanwhile heard, that the Ruler of Cabool is 
 but ill disposed to meet Government in its wishes ; and the advice given to him 
 by one of the first individuals whose counsel he sought, • viz. Mahomed Khan Byat* 
 was that he should take the British Government at their word) and dismiss their 
 agent, since there was nothing now to be expected from his presence in Cabool. 
 From the receipt of the G overnor General's letter to the present time, nightly 
 meetings have been held at the Bala Hissar, and the Ameer has, on more than 
 one occasion, given vent"to very strong expressions, both as to his future proceed- 
 ings) and the disappointment at the slight degree of appreciation entertained by 
 Government regardmg him. 
 
 * 3. On the morning of the 2nd instant, I had a visit from the Nawab Jubbar 
 
 * Khan, who arrived at Cabool on the preceding day from his estate, having set 
 
 * out immediately he heard of the decision of tlie British Government. He had 
 
 * previously read His Lordship's letter to the Ameer, awd he had just come from 
 ' visiting his brother, — I need not detain Government with a repetition of what I 
 
 * stated to the Nawab, since I made him fully acquainted with the views of Go- 
 
 * vernment, and the only terms which it seemed just in regard to Maharaja Run- 
 
 * jeet Sing^ that we could tender our good offices, which consisted in an endea- 
 
 * vour to use our influence at Lahore to put a stop to future aggression on the part 
 
 * of the Ruler there on the Affghan dominions, and tnus releasing them from the 
 
 * wrath of a powerful sovereign whom they had offended, against the danger of 
 
 * whom their applications in every quarter for succour afforded manifest proof of 
 
 * their fear and danger. — I further told the Nawab of the views of Government 
 
 * regarding Peshawur, of its restoration being in the hands of Runjeet Sing, but 
 ' most certainly it would not be given to the Ameer.* 
 
 * 4. The Nawab replied, that the Government must be ignorant of the true state 
 
 * of affairs in this country, that it was well known he was an avowed and open 
 
 * partizan of the British) and that he might therefore give his opinions with a 
 f- frankness that was not liable to be mistaken; that the good offices of the Go- 
 
 * vernment to remove the Sikhs and their future attacks, and to make some set> 
 
59 
 
 » tlement in Pashawur were proofs of sympathy, but his Lordship might not have 
 » reflected that so far from the proff*ered protection from Runjeet Sing being of 
 
 * the value stated, that the Maharaja had never sought to attack Cabool, and 
 Mhat hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer and not the 
 
 * Ruler of Lahore — That it appeared we valued our offers at a very high rate, 
 « since we expected in return that the Aifghans would desist from all intercourse 
 
 * with Persia, Russia, Toorkistan, &c, &c. &c. Were the Affghans to make all 
 ' these powers hostile, and to receive no protection against the enmity raised for 
 
 * their adhering to the British ? As for Peshawur being withheld from the Ameer, 
 t it might be got over, and he believed he did not over-rate his influence with 
 
 * Sooltan Mahomed Khan when he stated that he might bring about a reconcilia- 
 
 * tion between him and the Ameer ; but he must say that the value of the Aff- 
 ' ghans had indeed been depreciated, and that he did not wonder at the Ameer's 
 ' disappointment/ 
 
 < 5. I replied to the Nawab that 1 really did not comprehend the motives 
 
 * which swayed him or his brother — I had before found that it was not Candahar 
 ' which he wisheil to subdue, and that the difiiculties about Peshawur were not 
 ' insurmountable, and that in consequence it could not be that Chiefship which the 
 ' Ameer sought to conquer. — What then were his wishes or expectations ? Digni- 
 <• ty and respect (izzut wa ikram,) was the reply, and to be looked upon in the light 
 ' of being able to do something for the British Government, and for such service to 
 
 * receive its real friendship and not a proffer of its sympathy, which did not insure 
 ' protection from the West, and which dwelt upon the good done on the Eastern 
 
 * frontier by withdrawing Runjeet Sing, of whose attacks they were under little 
 ' apprehension.— The whole ©f the Affghan country, continued he, is now at your 
 <• back, and no future opportunity may prove so favorable to gain any ends which 
 ^ you may have to establish your influence in Cabool, and if you lose thisopportuni- 
 *■ ty you will have yourselves to blame. — Before leaving, the Nawab asked me to 
 ^ tell him confidentially if the real object of the Governor General's letters was to 
 ^ withdraw from the Affghans, or to make friendship with them, for he hoped he 
 ^ would be told his exact meaning that he might use his influence to bring about 
 *■ a good understanding, or at once to save himself from disgrace, refrain from in- 
 < terfering. I gave him an assurance that we did most sincerely sympathize with 
 ^ his brother and all the Affghans, and that the use of his influence would be much 
 c appreciated, but that after the explicit letter of the Governor General, and the 
 ' instructions which I had received, I would deceive him if he founded hopes of 
 ^ any thing farther being done for the Affghans than what had been stated. — He 
 ' took his leave, telling me that he hoped for the best, but that he too was disap- 
 
 ^ pointed. He made also the singular declaration, that if you wish the good of this 
 ' country, you must either put aside by force the Ameer, or find some means of 
 ( obliging him.' 
 
 * 6. On the 3d instant I had a visit from Mirza Samee Khan, the principal 
 ' Secretary, who made me acquainted, of course by desire of the Ameer, with what 
 ' had passed since I last sav him ; he stated that the Ameer was more depressed 
 
60 
 
 * at what had occurred than he had erer been, that he had often written to the 
 
 * British GoTernment about his affairs, and in return they replied to him about 
 
 * their own, and spoke of commerce : that the answer which he had however re- 
 
 * ceived from Lord Auckhind on his assuming the Government, differed from all 
 ' others, and had been most acceptable : that it now appeared if the Ameer took 
 ' any means which he thought adyisable to resist Runjeet Sing, it will be consider- 
 
 * ed a direct breach of friendship, so that by seeking the good offices of the British 
 
 * he had brought upon himself their enmity instead of their indifference. And for 
 ^ what did the Government claim the gratitude of the Ameer and from abstaining 
 
 * from all communication with powers to the West? that it would use its good 
 
 * offices with Runjeet Sing to prevent future aggression, and that the Ameer 
 ' should be satisfied with this and his remaining territories. The Government 
 
 * could not as it appeared to the Ameer have known the true state of things when 
 
 * Runjeet Sing had never made aggression on Cabool, or taken a jureeb (acre) of 
 ' the Ameer's territories, which are now larger than ever, and that he had hitherto 
 
 * successfully resisted. He had however no hope against the Sikhs if the British 
 ' Government aided or encouraged their attacks, but he certainly would consider it 
 
 * unjust if he sought other aid to hi nder Runjeet Sing, and the British Government 
 
 * interfered. — That the offers to adjust affairs at Peshawur did not suit the Ameer's 
 « views, that he waved all expectations of that place for himself since it was dis- 
 *■ pleasing to us, but that he regarded Sooltan Mahomed Khan and Runjeet Sing 
 
 * as identified, and that by such a settlement his character Cpurdeh^ did not remain 
 
 * with the people who had attached themselves to him, whose injury would follow 
 ' on Sooltan Mahomed's restoration, and whdm he would then have the disgrace 
 
 < ef having deserted — In addition to all this, he was to get no protection from 
 
 < Persia, or any power whose anger he might have raised because of his adherence 
 
 * to the British, which in Mahomed Shah's approach to Herat seemed both an act 
 
 * of honesty and justice.* 
 
 * 7. These, continued the Mirza, are not only the views of the Ameer himself, 
 
 * and tho' as yet no general assemblage of his advisers had taken place he had 
 
 * had the opinion of others. The Nawab Mahomed Osman Khan had written in 
 
 * reply from Bala Bagh, that subjugation by Runjeet Sing could never disgrace 
 
 * him even if it did take place, but a desertion of those who had served him in his 
 
 * wars with the Sikhs would most certainly do so, and if he could not ma- 
 
 * nage to have some influence in Peshawur such must follow, but that he 
 
 * must know he had no hopes of resisting the British Government what- 
 
 * ever he might do to that of Lahore. — Tiie Mirza made nearly the same obser- 
 ( vation as the Nawab about the expectations which the Ameer bad cherished of 
 
 * doing service for the British and devoting himself to it, that it was not the ad- 
 « justment of Peshawur affairs that dissipated his hopes, but the indifference to his 
 
 * sufferings and station which it was now clear we felt, and this was the more 
 
 < strange as he abandoned all his intercourse with Persia and every other power to 
 
 * please us, for he could not be charged with over civil'ty to Captain Vickovitcb, 
 
 * who had not been even received till he had consulted with me, and whose con- 
 
 * tinuance here depended upon the mooD| and to whom letters which had been 
 
61 
 
 < written, had not been given because they met nay disapproval. — The Ameerj said 
 
 * he, has taken up an inapression that your Oovernment has misunderstood the 
 
 * nature of the correspondence with Russia^ and attached to it a degree of 
 
 * blame which would only have been just, had it taken place after an exhibition of 
 
 * your friendly feelings.' 
 
 * 8, I replied to Mirza Samee Khan, that they knew as well as I did the views 
 
 * of the British; that I could not take upon myself the responsibility of doing more 
 
 * than reporting all they had to say, and that I really did not see how Goverrment 
 C were to blame, since I did not know exactly at this time what the Ameer of 
 
 * Cabool expected of us. — That as far as the respect due to his situation, my 
 
 * presence here was proof enough of the friendly estimation in which we held him, 
 
 * and that there was no doubt some grounds for the claims made to protect him 
 
 * from the west, but my Government knew its own interests best, and the extent 
 
 * which the British agreed to go in its good offices had been ex plicitly stated, and 
 
 * that if they considered their own interests they would gladly accept what had 
 ' been tendered in a spirit so friendly, for if we did not appreciate the services of 
 
 * the Affghans in the light which they themselves did, we wished to do them a 
 
 * substantial service, which it grieved me to see that they did not hold in that 
 
 * light. It was certainly true, I added, that C^tain Vickovitch had been received 
 
 * as bad been stated, and that the letters which were to be sent had been altered^ 
 
 * but I begged him to remember the message about waiting till the vernal equi- 
 
 * nox (nowroz) for an answer, and if he thought a Government like the British 
 
 * would submit to be tied down by such a limit.' 
 
 * 9. The Mirza observed, that the Ameer had apologized for that message, which 
 
 * was decidedly wrong, but that I who was on the spot, should judge of the agi- 
 ' tating circumstance. — I took this occasion to say, that if the Ameer thought we 
 '.were in error about Russian letters, be had it in his power now to transmit the 
 ( originals from Russia to the Governor General, but I observed that this was a 
 
 * suggestion far from agreeable, and the Mirza said that if I wished to see these 
 
 * letters again he would bring them to me> but he did not think the Ameer would 
 ( ever permit their being sent to India, but we had received copies of them.— 
 
 * I treate(i the reply with indifference, and said that the remark on my part had 
 ' arisen from his own observation. — Before Mirza Samee Khan left, I gathered 
 
 * that the result of all the conference up to this time (3d instant) went to claim 
 
 * from the British Government a means of protection from the West as the price of 
 » their adherence to us, and farther, that, however Peshawur might be se'tled by 
 ' Runjeet Sing, no acknowledgment could be made for our good offices unless means 
 ' were taken to prevent injury from such settlement to those who had befriend- 
 
 * ed the Ameer— even with this latter arrangement it appeared we could nut carry 
 
 * the Ameer's heart along with us, — since he believed it in his power to do service 
 ( from the position he held, and the anxiety to be allied to us above all others, to 
 ' which we seemed to give little or no weight, but on the contrary had shewn in 
 
 * the Governor General's letter that we looked with a degree of indiflference (be 
 
 * purwaee) to any connection with the Affghan nation.' 
 
62 
 
 <■ 10. On the morning of the 4th, I had another visit from the Nawab. WhiU 
 
 * conversing on the contents of the Governor General's letter I observed that no 
 
 * communication could more clearly convey the sincerity and good feelings of the 
 ^ British Government than such a declaration, to which he assented, adding that 
 t there were hopes conveyed in it which appeared on a re-perusal to be satisfactory, 
 
 * but that I dimmed all these expectations by declining to give any |)romises about 
 t protection from Persia, or any proof of our friendly feelings towards the AfFghans ; 
 ( we had weighed much on our good offices at Peshawur, and no one would be 
 ' more rejoiced to see Sooltan Mihomed Khan once more established in his Go< 
 
 * vernment than himself, but we had really gone too far in fixing that as the limit 
 
 * of our good offices, and if we meant to purchase the AfFghans by it we should 
 
 * not succeed, that our policy appeared to him the more strange since we had fur- 
 ' nished cannon, muskets, Sec. &c , and even officers and money, to Persia, when 
 
 * in Affghanistan the door of India (durwaza i Hind) we mean to do nothing, and 
 
 * what was more, to consider Dost Mahomed Khan our enemy if be entered 
 4 into any description of political intercourse vvith others. — The singular attachment 
 
 * of this man to tke British Government made its appearance however in a form 
 
 * different from what has been stated — he made a serious proposal to me to keep 
 
 * the Ameer in check if we were determined to go no farther, by drawing closely 
 
 * to Candahar^ establishing Sooltan*Mahomed Khan in Peshawur, and then bidding 
 ' defiance to the Ameer 3 but to effect this, added he, you must substantially pro- 
 
 * tect Candahar. I replied that Government had not contemplated any such 
 
 * measure, and it was its object to maintain all the Affghan Chiefs in their actual 
 
 * position.' 
 
 11. It seems very clear, from what has been above stated, although the final 
 answer of Dost Mahomed Khan has not been received, that we have little hope of 
 establishing a friendly connection with him on the terms wished for by Govern- 
 ment ; even if it could be brought about before a vast change of opinion takes 
 place, the friendship would be delusive, and no degree of dependence could be 
 placed on this Chief. 
 
 ' I am aware that the views of Government are decided, and it would be high- 
 ' ly presumptuous in me to make any observations on the record of the different 
 ( conversations which have been above reported.' As Mr. Yickovitch still remains 
 in Cabool (and bis presence is the strongest test of the Ameer's disposition to 
 make use of him against us) 3 and as Dost Mahomed Khan does not appreciate 
 our good offices in Peshawur, I shall deem it my duty to retire when I receive 
 the Ameer's letter unless some very decided change of tone takes place at Cabool. 
 ^ The only feeling, and it is one of the highest importance, which will counteract 
 
 * this step is the expression of His Lordship's opinion that the line of Policy mark- 
 
 * ed out in respect to Dost Mahomed Khan ought to be readily successful, and the 
 t belief that this Chief will have judged better for his interests than to compel me 
 *" to quit Cabool. I am well aware of the responsibility when 1 shall incur as a 
 ( public servant by this act, if it be too precipitately taken, but as our unavoidable 
 ^ loss of character must equally follow my contiauauce here under expectations 
 
63 
 
 ' which appear deceptive, I shall not hesitate between such responsibility and the 
 ' paramount consideration of what appears to tne due to our national honor.' 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 Alex. Burnes. 
 
 Even this, however, was insufficient to obtain the quarrel which we 
 had, it would appear, three times determined to provoke. We had a 
 last resource yet left us : it was now clear that there was hardly any 
 thing which we could demand of the Ameer which he was not prepared to 
 concede to us, rather than forego the hope of our friendship : the master- 
 stroke of our policy was to ask him for what he couid not give. It was 
 proposed that the Ameer should be requested to send presents to Lahore, 
 in testimony of his gratitude for having been relieved of Peshawur — to make 
 submission to him after having inflicted on him severer humiliation and 
 chastisement than he had ever before endured at the hands of aa enemy—. 
 and ask his pardon for having endeavoured to get back his own ! The 
 whole of the papers on this subject are suppressed, and we only discover the 
 fact of this scheme having been in contemplation from Burnes's posthumous 
 MSS. It would be important to possess the documents to which these are 
 replies. This last act of tyranny was one to which our envoy refused to be a 
 party. ** He found that he could not propose to the Ameer of Gabool to 
 send presents to Lahore as an opening to the establishment of future friend- 
 ship : the diflaculdes had been great, without adding to them. Had Dost 
 Mahomed Khan himself assented, the Mahommedan populace would have 
 despised him, and probably have prevented him. "(46) An untoward event at 
 this time occurred, which, with parties less determined for hostilities than 
 the war party in the secretariate,— for Lord Auckland unhappily was now 
 removed from his council, in which, we have every reason to believe, he 
 would have been out-voted, — would have deprived us of all excuse for the 
 AfFghan campaign. (47) 
 
 On 5th March, the Ameer called on Capt. Burnes. The usual explana- 
 tions were gone over — it was no wonder that they were in so far unsatisfac- 
 tory, when Burnes admits that, up to this time, he could not discover what 
 were the intentions of the Governor-General.(48) The Envoy told him 
 explicitly, that if he did not wish our good offices on the terms proposed, 
 he should dismiss him. The Dost (49) professed himself shocked at this 
 
 46. Suppressed portion of despatch, 13th March. 
 
 47. He ,was on his way to Simla. A most unwise provision in the Charter 
 Act permits the Governor to act alone, and on his own responsibility, when 
 absent from Calcutta. The Commander-in-Chief is known to have been hos- 
 tile to the w.ir, and the Hon. Messrs. Prinsep and Bird were universally be- 
 lieved to be the same— Three out of five. 
 
 48. Suppressed portion of the despatch of the 5th March. The presentable 
 fragments are given in the Blue Book> pp. 29, 30, and 31. 
 
 49. The above is given nearly verbatim. What the phrase, "our good 
 
 < 
 
64 
 
 last propositien, from which he considered disgrace to hira would flow:— 
 " You have been welcomed," said he, ''by every Mahoramedan Stale since 
 you left Bombay, from the belief that you were the bearer of p^ood news to 
 an unhappy race of men, whose internal discord has made them the prey of 
 a nation of another faith. I dare not, if I wished it, set myself up against 
 the Affghan people ; the belief has gone abroad that your presence is con- 
 nected with their advantage, and, though I admit that I profit by it, still 
 the objects of ray heart are not fully accomplished." 
 
 *■' There are Affghaas in Tak fighting in thousands at this hour against the 
 Sikhs J they have aided me, and they looked to me, but their sufferings will 
 have no abatement; bat I throw myself upoa thj generosity of tlie Governor- 
 General of India, and I rely on the sympathy which his Lordship has 
 expressed. 
 
 '* I congratulated the Ameer on his having seen his own interest better 
 than to permit of friendship being interrupted between him and a nation so 
 well disposed towards him; but that it was novv my duty to tell him clearly 
 ■what we expected of him, and what we could do in return. You must never 
 receive agents from other powers, or have aught to do with them, without 
 our sanction ; you mast dismiss Captain Vickovitch with courtesy; you must 
 sarrender all claim to Peshawar on your own account, ^s that chiefship 
 be ongs to Mai arajah Runjeet Sing j you must live on friendly terms with 
 that potentate ; you mast also respect the independence of Candahar, and 
 of Peshawur ; and co operate in arrangements to unite your family. In 
 return for this, I promise to recommend to the Government that it use its 
 good offices with its ancient ally Maharajah liu njeet Sing, to remove p esent 
 and future causes of difference between the Sinhs and Affghans at 
 Peshawar ; but as that chietship belongs to the .Maharajah, he may confer 
 it on Sooltan Mahomed Khan or any other Affghan whom he chooses, on his 
 own terms and tribute; it being understood that such arrangement is to 
 preserve the credit and honour of all parties. 
 
 " * To this I assent' said the Ameer ; ' but as these arrangements are not set 
 forth in full in his Lor. 1 ship's letter, it would be desirable for you to reduce 
 the matter to writing, as far as your knowledge of the Governor- General's 
 views will permit you, that I may fairly see what is expected, and what is to 
 bs done in return. The differences of the Affghans and Sikhs can never be said 
 to be adjusted so long as the Maharajah keeps his troops and Officers at Pesh- 
 awur : and, conseqaently, though I place every faith in the friendly interven- 
 tion of the British, and know that the Maharajah must be left to himself I am 
 bound to state that fresh causes for disturbance mast arise if his Hig mess does 
 not place my brother, or an A.ffghan, in Peshawar, and leave him to govern it 
 subject to his (the Maharajah's) orders, but without the presence of Seikh 
 
 ofiices" meant, the Affghans appear never to have been able to discover,— nor 
 will the reader be very likely to find it out from the Blue Book. 
 
65 
 
 troops.'' I replied, that since the Ameer agreed himself to peace^ it was better 
 to leave these things to be settled hereafter, since the less that was now said 
 about them the better.'' 
 
 18. • Having thus, it appeared to me, gained the ends desired by Government, I 
 ' proceeded to improve the dawn of goad feeling towards his brothers, and sued 
 
 * for the Nuwab Jubbar Khan's co-operation in making up matters between the 
 
 * Ameer and Sooltin Mahomed Khan. This most amiable man declared to me 
 
 * that the matter was easy, and begged that I would write to the Governor Gene- 
 
 * ral and say that lie pledged himself to bring it about, and that there was but one 
 
 * difficulty which cauld prevent it, and this would be the disapproval of the Maha- 
 ' raja Ranjeet Sing. If this was no obstacle, he would proceed at once to Pesha- 
 ' wuraiid bring all his brothers to JelUlabad, where they would be met by the 
 
 * Ameer, and in my presence he would get them to exchange papers that the Pesha- 
 ' wur family miy coma to Cabool in summsr, and the Ameer go to Peshawur 
 
 * in winter, eacli with a few hundred horse ; and that further, he pledged himseif 
 
 * to bring together the whole family from Gandahar, or at least one of the bro- 
 
 * thers, aid to witness the much desired object of the restoration of harmony 
 
 * and una limity in tlieir house. On this he added that all ths Ameer's feara 
 
 * for his Peshawur adherents, now with him. would end, if the affair could 
 ' be a(ijusted. — I assured the Nuwab Jubbar Khan that his exertions would 
 
 * receive high applause and appreciation, and that if things went right and I hap- 
 ; pened to be present at the peace-making, I would consider it one of the most 
 c happy events that had occurred, and wliich would rescue a brave nation from 
 ' inevitable destruction. I do n3t believe the Nuwab overrates his influence ; he 
 < has great weight both at Peshawur and Candahar, through Sooltan Mahomed, 
 
 * Kohun and Riihum Dil Khans, and when war no longer disturbs the peace 
 ' of the Easiern frontier of AfF^jh mistan, these much wished for objects will cer- 
 
 * tainly follow, as is amply proved by ray previous correspondence. With Persia, 
 
 * we should have had Russian influence in her train, and had the Ameer been 
 ' disposed to doubt the sincerity of the Shah, the presence of the Russian Agent, 
 ' Captain Vickovitch, would have gone far to remove his suspicions.' 
 
 Here, then, so late as the noonth of March were the last of our difficulties 
 surmounted, and everything gained frona the Ameer which the British Go- 
 vernment appeared to have desired. Nothing of any moment— save the 
 arrival of Kohun Dil Khan from Candahar, formerly noticed at length, 
 is recorded as having occurred for the next four weeks. 
 
 There were said to have been letters written to Candahar by the Dost, 
 stating that he had now lost all hope from the British— no great marvel that 
 there should,— and interviews discovered with Captain Vicovich, of which no 
 one professed to know the purport ; and with matters in this alarming %Xs.iQ, 
 Burnes felt that he could no longer remain at Cabool consistently with 
 his instructions. He left on the 26th of April, being accompanied in all 
 honour by three of the Ameer's sons and the prime minister two miles be- 
 yond the gates. Captain Burnes writes from Jellalabad (30th April,) that he 
 
66 
 
 had heard reports of the Dost's having gone over to Persia, and sought the 
 security of Russia,— that some of the Ameer's family, or of his brothers at 
 Candahar, were to be sent with letters to the Shah ; that Captain Vicovich 
 had promised to get the guarantee of Russia to all their arrangements,— 
 and that, when Herat fell, the King of Persia would either assist with 
 troops or money for an attack upon Peshawur. Barnes at the time seems 
 to have been very doubtful of the weight to be attached to this report, 
 and on more mature consideration he manifestly held it of no account 
 whatever. The light which subsequent disclosures has thrown upon the 
 subject, now shews that Captain Vicovich had no political authority ; but that 
 he was one of the most wild and unscrupulous of romancers. Russia 
 formally refused to give any guarantee whatever in the case of the cession 
 of Herat to Candahar : the latter place never fell into the hands of Persia, 
 80 that this most mendacious of nations could never have been brought into 
 the predicament of requiring to fulfil her promise, if she had made any : she 
 had no money to pay her own troops, and was therefore sufficiently unlikely 
 to afford subsidies to Dost Mahomed ; and as she required a twelvemonth 
 to march her army from her capital to the nearest frontier — from Teheran 
 to Herat, — it is sufficiently unlikely that she could, even had she desired it, 
 have succeeded in ever reaching Peshawur, a thousand miles beyond it ! With 
 this closes the narrative of our negociations with Dost Mahomed : the reader 
 may judge whether anything had arisen in the course of these to justify the 
 infliction on him and his brothers of the last of ills rulers can endure. We 
 took their country from them and gave it to the enemy of their race, leaving 
 them the choice of the alternatives of becoming outcasts and wanderers 
 from the land of their fathers, or prisoners of state within our territories. 
 The majority of thena preferred the former — the nobler selection. The 
 subject of this chapter was introduced by a letter from Lord Auckland 
 to Dost Mahomed, and with another at the interval of less than two years, 
 it may be closed. 
 
 Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, 
 
 After compliments. Simla, 27 April 1838. 
 
 I Have received your letter, and fully comprehend its contents. 
 
 It has been a source of much regret to me to find that your views of what 
 is most for your advantage, have led you to decline the good offices which 1 
 have tendered, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between you and 
 Maharajah Runjeet Sing, on the only terms on which I could, consistently with 
 what has appeared to me just, engage to exercise my mediation for the 
 settlement of the unhappy diftereaces existing between you. 
 
 With the explanation, however, of your sentiments which you have now 
 afforded to me, my farther interposition in this affair could not lead to bene- 
 ficial results ; and as, in so unsettled a condition of things, the continuance of 
 Captain Burnes, and of the officers under his orders, in Affghanistan, would not 
 
67 
 
 be conducive to the good ends which I had hoped to accomplish by their de- 
 putation, I have now issued orders to thetn to return to India ', and they will 
 accordingly set out, on receiving from you their dismissal, for which their im- 
 mediate application will be made to you. 
 
 I have to express to you my acknowledgments for your attention and kind- 
 ness to these officers while residing in your dominions . 
 
 (Signed) Aucklahtd. 
 
 Dost Mahomed and Captain Burnes had parted in sorrow but not in anger, 
 and surely, from aught that has yet appeare I, there was nothing to lead to 
 the belief, from any thing which had occurred, that the country would be in- 
 vaded by our armies, and its chiefs — not one but all — rendered fugitives or 
 captives. From what appears in the printed papers, there is no reason 
 whatever to believe that the Ameer or his brothers were, from this date, 
 guilty of one disloyal act towards us. The assertion that Dost Mahomed 
 ever threatened to call in foreign aid to enable him to consummate schemes 
 of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the 
 frontiers of India, is founded on no better grounds than the declaration that 
 Persia was prosecuting throughout Affghanistan intrigues, " having for their 
 object the extension of her inflaence to the banks of, or even beyond, the la— 
 dus ; '* (50) and both, so far as the printed papers are concerned, are as 
 thoroughly unsupported as any averments ever made by the most reckless 
 statesman. Lord Auckland, in his Simla minute of the 12th of May states, 
 ** that Dost Mahomed Khan had shown himself to be so disaffected and am- 
 bitious (51) that with him we could form no satisfactory connection; al- 
 though he might not, under such circumstances, furnish us with grounds 
 of direct hostility against him." This is most decidedly an admission 
 that, up to this date, no grounds of direct hostility had been furnished by 
 the Ameer. The probability is, that the secretaries, or the leaders under 
 whose influence the Governor- General had placed himself, had, by this 
 time, arranged the whole matter without his Lordship's knowledge: the 
 mission of Mr Macnaghten to Cabool, three days afterwards, proves 
 that the thing was completed by the 15th May. 
 
 This mission, from which results so singular in many ways arose, was 
 as strange as it was important. It has just been seen that on the 12th 
 of May the Governor-General placed on record, opinions in many respects 
 pacific — in no respect countenancing the idea that Dost Mahomed was to be 
 dethroned. Three days afterwards the chief secretary set out on a mission 
 
 60. Simla proclamation. 
 
 51. Verbatim extract from the minute. His Lordship does not condescend 
 to enlighten his readers in what way the Ameer had evinced either ambition 
 or disaffection to us. The published papers exhibit none , but much of the 
 contrary of both. 
 
68 
 
 to Lahore with the draft of a treaty ready prepared, by which the Indian 
 Government, the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and Sliah Soojah-Ool-Moolk, 
 bound themselves together so that the friends and enemies of any one of the 
 parties were to be considered the friends and enemies of all the others. 
 After this had been duly discussed and determined on, and was on the very 
 eve of being subscribed, Mr Macnaghten continued to consult Sir Alexander 
 Burnes and Mr Masson, as if every thing was to be regulate I by their ad- 
 vice. The opinion of both these gentlemen on this point, almost exactly 
 coincided. That of Sir Alexander Burnes, as expressed in his official letters 
 not quoted in the Blue Book, is as follows : — 
 
 Extracts : Opinions as to the mode of restoring Shah Shoojah^ submitted 
 by Sir A. Burnes. 
 
 Lahore, ISch June, 1838 — But objections arise to sending Shooja-Ool-Moolk 
 from the country of the Sikhs, of which Dost Mahomed Khan would not be 
 slow to avail himself, agitating the country to war against the infidels who 
 had come to invade him. These objections seem stronger than they really are? 
 and indeed amount to little when we have gained the end of directing the 
 Sikhs. Sikh troops should if possible not be used at all ; but I adhere to the 
 opinion, which I have already expressed, that one if not two of our Regiments 
 should be given to the Shah nominally as an escort to his person, and to show 
 decidedly to the AfFghans how much we are interested in his safety and wel- 
 fare. The smallest number of our troops will be exaggerated in Cabool to an 
 army, and we shall speak at once to men's eyes and senses. If Maharaja Run- 
 jet Singh objects to the use of our troops when he has so many of his own, he 
 might be told they were merely honorary, as their small number proved, and 
 that the Shah required them as the nucleus on which he was to form his future 
 forces. Besides this direct assistance, opportunity should be given to the 
 troops of our army to volunteer, as they have lately done for the force in 
 Oude, and instead of rp. w levies a good army might soon be collected ; but though 
 it is doubtless necessary to have a force of sufficient strength to cope with the 
 Chiefs of Cabool and Candahar, for my part I have raoi*e f.iith in political 
 agitation for the Shah's cause than in physical force.* * * * 
 
 Matters being thus arranged, I would recommend the following lino of pro- 
 ceedure. From Peshawur, Shah Shooja should issue a proclamation and send 
 it in hundreds through the Affghan country, that he had arrived at Peshawur to 
 recover the throne of his forefathers, to put an end to Avars with the Sikhs, to 
 unite the Affghan nation, and to repel the enemies of their creed, the Persians, 
 who had dared to invade the kingdom ; that he was now able to chastise his 
 enemies, both internal and external, since he and the British Government 
 were one j and that, from the affection he bore to his people, he could not 
 think of declaring war till he had given all parties a fair opportunity of re- 
 pairing to his camp and tendering their allegiance j that the treatment all 
 would experience would be according to their early presence, and that His 
 Majesty's object was not to ecrutiuize particularly what had passed, but to 
 
69 
 
 restore the glory of the Dooraneo Monarchy. This, with a distribution of 
 money in Khyber, Avhere Shooja has more friends than in any part of Aff- 
 ghanistan, and the Kohistau of Cabool, which could easily be managed, would 
 in all human probability dissolve Dost Mahomed's power, and the Shah's ad- 
 vance on Cabool would be a triumph without bloodshed ; for the Affghaa 
 nation never will submit to Persia but by fear, and Dost Mahomed Khan by 
 going over to Mahomed Shah, has converted doubting friends into enemies, 
 and materially contributed thereby to Shah Shooja's success. ^< • • 
 
 '' The next, and probably the most delicate, of all questions which present 
 themselves, is the disposal of Dost Mahomed Khan. His ambition makes it 
 more than questionable if he ever would consent to act in a subordinate capa- 
 city, but he should have the offer, for he will be a dangerous antagonist if he 
 flies to Persia, and we have the first authority for recording that one of Shah 
 Shooja's most serious errors, when King, was in failing to conciliate Futteh 
 Khan Barukzye, the brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, and in whose place he 
 may now clearly be said to be. These are the words of Mr Elphinstone : 
 * Futteh Khan was soon after persuaded to make his submission to the new 
 King (Soojah). An opportunity was now offered of securing the attachment 
 of this powerful and active Chief, but it was allowed to escape, and hence 
 arose the misfortunes which disturbed the rest of Shah Shoojah's reign, and 
 which drove him at length from his throne.' This is high authority, and 
 though it perhaps would be impolitic to offer the Viziership to such a Chief, 
 some situation as a Doorannee Lord, such as existed in the old court of the 
 Suddozyes, might be found for him, and a liberal provision in land. The 
 presence of a British agent, and an active aiid decided influence in all that 
 relates to the political affairs of Cabool, which I take for granted is to be our 
 policy, if it did not break the factious spirit of Dost Mahomed Khan, would 
 prevent his doing harm. I think also that it would be highly to the credit of 
 the British Government to aid in such an offer of conciliation; for if the 
 Ameer is disappointed, our hopes, the difficulties that beset him from the west 
 are to be considered, and vve escape the odium of being privy to his entire 
 destruction by showing that our object is the restoration of the Dooranee 
 monarchy, and not the punishment of the Chief of Cabool. It is to be 
 observed, that Affghan differences are much easier healed than those Of 
 other nations ; and, above all things, it should be Shah Shoojah's policy to 
 forget the past, and the talents of Dost Mahomed Khan may yet avail him in 
 subduing some of his rebellious subjects. Much is to be said on this subject, and 
 it requires great reflection and consideration, which may and must be given 
 to it when matters are more advanced. 
 
 Lahore, 19th June, 1838. — 2. I attach importance to the presence of a small 
 portion of our troops from the prestige it will exercise. There are as solid 
 objections to the presence of our officers as our troops ; a disaster in either 
 case would be unfortunate, and going so far as to give money and officers, an 
 honorary escort is not a step far beyond. It is not essential to success, 
 but I think would contribute to it. 
 
70 
 
 The reference by Mr. Macnaghten to Capt. Burnes, replied to on the 18th 
 and 19th of June, was clearly nothing else than a pretext, with a view of 
 extracting something from him capable of receiving a construction favourable 
 to the views of the war party — now unhappily in the ascendant ; so as to 
 satisfy, if possible, the still wavering resolution of the Governor- General. 
 The treaty, providing for war on the largest scale, and ratified onthe26tb, 
 betwixt the British Government, the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and the 
 Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, must before this have been drawn up. 
 
 It has already been seen that Mr Macnaghten was, so late as the end of 
 January, in favour of the maintenance of the arrangements among the Ba* 
 rukzye chiefs as they stood, considering their divisions well calculated 
 to ward off the advances of a foreign foe. He had now abandoned this 
 and taken an entirely opposite view of the case, and determined that 
 nothing could save India but the re -integration of the Dooraunee empire 
 under the Shah Soojah, the proverbially unfortunate. The sole original 
 objection to the maintenance of Dost Mahomed's claims upon Peshawur 
 was, that it kindled up the flames of wsr in those regions where we were 
 most anxious to promote the interests of commerce; but when it appeared 
 that the equitable claims of the Ameer cculd readily be adjusted by peace- 
 ful negociation, — our aversion to hostilities took another form, and 
 it was now the aggrandizement of this man, who had, more than any 
 Ruler in Asia, courted our friendship without selfishness — without hope of 
 favour or fear of injury — until we meddled with his affairs, that alarmed 
 us! A few months afterward?, when Runjeet Singh asked permission 
 to advance with fire and sword on Jellalabad, and increase his territories 
 by fresh appropriations from his neighbour, our fears, both of war 
 and aggrandizement on his part, had vanished. If the historian were 
 permitted to examine into the archives of the Colonial Oifice, with a 
 view of ascertaining when certain unsatisfactory despatches from Calcutta 
 first began to be received — and were then to turn to the Board of Control, 
 and see whether the first warlike instructions sent out by Sir John Hob- 
 house had not considerably more to do with these than with any tidings 
 sent by the Persian mission — the results might be curious. 
 
 The arrival in India of the news of the unfortunate issue of the general 
 election of August 1837, would, if examined into, probably be found to 
 coincide remarkably with some of the more pugnacious Simla minutes. 
 These things will be matter of speculation for the annalist to inquire into, 
 when the records of the public offices are transferred to the Tower or the 
 British Museum. 
 
 Although it was obviously our intention, from the month of June 1837, 
 to pick a quarrel,and have a war on some account,soraewhere, with somebody— 
 a source of recreation in which our statesmen were permitted to indulge with- 
 
71 
 
 out enquiry, by virtue of an accumulated surplus of ten millions of hoarded 
 treasure in the coffers of goveruraent, — the form and pressure this was to 
 assume was left to be determined by the chapter of accidents. According 
 to Mr Masson, it was the Punjaub that the Board of Control wished us to 
 seize upon, and the mistake into which we fell was that of marching on 
 Cabool, when Lahore was intended to have been the point of our destina- 
 tion — making a traverse of 1500 miles instead of 50. The gentleman re- 
 ferred to professes to have been shewn, by Captain Burnes, the letter 
 to this effect from the Secret Committee. It passed through the hands 
 of Lord Auckland and his secretaries, and might be worth while en- 
 quiring after. There was said to have been such difficulty in keeping 
 Lord Auckland's courage at the sticking point, that the secretaries 
 were terrified lest the whisper of the possibility of pacific arrange- 
 ments should reach his ear. An amusing anecdote is mentioned on 
 this subject by Masson. "I had previously learned," says this not over- 
 trustworthy authority, '' a strange account of the mode in which the amiable 
 Lord Auckland had been driven into measures which his better judgment 
 disapproved, and how he was obliged to yield to the assaults of certain fe- 
 male A. D. C's and Secretaries, and I now questioned Sir Alexander on 
 the part he had taken, particularly as regarded this useless expedition. He 
 replied that it was arranged before he reached Simla, and that when he 
 arrived, Torrens and Colvin came running to him, and prayed him to say 
 nothing to unsettle his Lordship ; that they had taken all the trouble in the 
 world to get him into the business, and that even now he would be glad on 
 any pretence to return from it." The correspondent of a London daily 
 paper is still more explicit as to the sources of the plan of the campaign on 
 the great scale — how Mr Macnaghten was at once ambitious and unpopular, 
 he wished to become an Envoy, and was wished out of the Secretariat to 
 make room for Mr Torrens, whose wife, a fashionable and accomplished 
 woman, was in great favour with the rulers of the ruler of India — the Hon. 
 Misses Eden, sisters and managers of Lord Auckland ! 
 
 From the subscription of the treaty at Lahore, on the 26ih of June, the 
 State Papers furnish no further light on the course of events till the middle 
 of August, when a despatch of Lord Auckland's to the Secret Committee 
 indicates that matters were finally arranged, much as set forth \n the Simla 
 proclamation of the 1st Ot3tober— the bulk of which has been quoted in 
 paragraphs at the heads of the sections of the present chapter. It was one 
 amongst the singular anomalies with which the arrangements of the Affghan 
 expedition abound, that we relied for our means of getting into the country 
 on the (lovernmeuts of Scinde and Khelat— both in former days dependen- 
 cies of the Doorannee empire, but both for thirty years perfectly independent 
 of all superiors. The inducement to assist us which we held out to them 
 
72 
 
 was, that they should be once more replaced under their old oppressive 
 masters, be annexed to the Doorannee empire, and merge their individual 
 authority in the sovereignty of the Shah Soojah! The alternative offered 
 for declining a request so modest aad equitable was — deposition, or probably 
 death I ! 
 
 It must not, in conclusion, be forgotten, that we never gave Dost Maho- 
 med the most distant hint that we intended to wage war with him. He 
 had, on numerous occasions, expressed himself so awed by British power, 
 and so appreliensive of its being employed against him in assisting the 
 Seikhs, that had we made him aware that we purposed attacking him, 
 it is probable he would have made any sacrifice that could have been re- 
 quired of him. We never gave him the alternative; we never made him a 
 tender of the terms on which we were willing to have abstained from invad- 
 ing his country. We, on the 1st October, for the first time announced our 
 intention of restoring the Sliah So )jah, and deposing the Ameer and the 
 Candahar Sirdars, — not pretending that with the last we ever negotiated or 
 had any grounds of quarrel! We marched an array into the country with- 
 out having asked whether, with the alternative of invasion before them, the 
 chiefs would not concede the points which they knew we would compel them 
 to yield to us in the long run at any rate. The Affghans knew our power 
 too well, — as indeed they had often told us, — to imagine that they could 
 keep the field against u^. In this particular the campaign of 1839 was 
 wholly without precedent : and it is beyond question, that according to the 
 principles of civilized war. Lord Keane's army could not have complained 
 had they been treated as marauders. The Colonial Society has drawn up 
 a statement on the subject, shewing, that had the whole of our people who 
 fell into the hands of the enemy during the period of our occupation of the 
 country, been hanged, the AflFghans would have acted under the sanction of 
 the highest European authorities, and would have been countenanced by 
 the conduct of all civilized nations, on whose territories similar aggressions 
 had been attempted. It has of late become the custom to affirm, that the ob- 
 jections to the policy of Lord Auckland only began to make their appearance 
 after the calamities of Nov. and Dec. 1841 : a statement more unfounded can- 
 not exist. It has already been seen that had Lord Auckland been at Calcutta 
 when hostile measures were in agitation, he would in all likelihood have 
 been outvoted at his own Council Board on the question of Affghan inva- 
 sion. The whole of the military chiefs in India viewed the expedition as 
 one of pure insanity. The aversion of the Government of Bombay, far 
 more intimately acquainted than that of Calcutta with the countries we 
 proposed to subdue, to the whole scheme of the Simla policy, has long been 
 notorious. The press of India, though far from unanimous certainly, gene- 
 rally condemned the measure, and predicted with very great accuracy, as the 
 
73 
 
 results afterwards exemplified, the mischiefs to which it must give rise. We 
 have already seen with what aversion the matter was reg-arded at the India 
 House, and how early Sir Henry Willoclc, and Mr St John Tucker, recorded 
 their opinions against it. The press, in general, entered but slightly into 
 the discussion ; the journals which ventured on an examination of the ques- 
 tion, witli the exception of the Quarterly RevUw^ gave their opinions deci- 
 dedly against if. The Asiatic Journal, as the best informed of those on 
 Oriental aflFairs, has been repeatedly referred to, and its articles on the sub- 
 ject in 1838 and 1839 are well worthy of perusal. We cannot deny our- 
 selves the pleasure of quoting, in conclusion, some extracts from a very 
 exc Uent article in the Spectator newspaper, of 27th July 1839, on the 
 Review's observations on the Parliaraentaiy papers, pointing out not 
 only the general danger incurred by the newly adopted policy of the Gover* 
 nor- General — for that of the Government of India it[could in no sense be 
 called — but the shape this danger was likely to assume, and the quarters 
 whence it might be expected to approach us. The Spectator's views were 
 gi^en to the worM in the midst of our triumphs ; he boded evil while the 
 •shouts of victory still filled our ears. His anticipations have been realized : — 
 
 '* THE WAR IN INDIA. 
 
 "The current number of the Quarterly Review has an elaborate piper on Russia, 
 Persia, and India 3 distinguished by a tone of friendliness to the Government and 
 its agents, and what is more, a substantial vindication of recent British policy and 
 proceedings in Asia.which fenr would have expected at the hands of that stanch organ 
 of the Opposition^ even in charity. To us, indeec'} it seems that the Reviewer is, 
 for once, foo charitable : for a pretty careful examination of the file of papers laid 
 before Parliament in the passing session, leads us to conclusions considerably at 
 variance with ids ; and at the same time it has confirmed some of our previous 
 opinions and speculations, it enables us to correct or qualify others. In short, we 
 rise from the perusal of the Eastern Correspondence with a persuasion, that our 
 present war in India, or rather outside of India, is more questionable in its objects) 
 and suspicious in its pretexts, and likely to be more extensive and perilous, than 
 any which the British Government of that country has ever yet waged with any 
 Asiatic power. 
 
 ■*' Let us begin by examining the pretext for the war. For thirty years and up- 
 wards, we have maintained, without interruption, an embas>y at the Court of Persia, 
 and paid in silarie^, in snbsi lies and gifts, in arms and ammunition, between three 
 and four millions sterling. The object of our Persian diplomacy was to secure 
 India against French and Russian invasion. The upshot of our thirty years' ex- 
 penditure of money, protocols, and despatches, is, that Persia, on our own admis- 
 sion, instead of being a bulwark against the aggression of an European power, has 
 become a stepping-stone for Rus^i^. In a word, by our own showing, all our 
 Persian diplomacy has been worse than useless — it has been highly detrimental. 
 
 ** With the Shah of Persia we have tiiree respective treaties, every one of which 
 
 M 
 
74 
 
 contains the following article — * If war should ensue between the Persian and 
 Afghan Governments, the English Governnjent shall take no part in it; nor shall 
 it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both 
 parties, for the purpose of producing peace.' Well, a war arises between the Per- 
 sian King and the Afghans— as just, upon the part of the former, as any ever waged 
 by an Europ{»an government, and farjuster than most of them. The Prince of 
 Herat, the moit westerly state of the Afghans, tiking advantage of a moment of 
 anarchy, invades a Persian province, burns its towns and villages, and, carrying off 
 twelve thousand of its inhabitants, sells them^ man, woman, and child, as slaves. 
 The King of Persia, naturally indignant at this outrage, marches an army to chas- 
 tise the public roLber, and invests Herat. According to the admission of the Bri- 
 tish Envoy, (a man of mark and talent,) twice repeated in the papers laid before 
 Parliament, the King of Persia has right and justice on his side. Well, then, are 
 the English Minister, the Envoy, and the Gover lor-General of India, neutral and 
 quiescent, as in good faith became parties to the treaty we have just quoted ? Quite 
 the contrary. They are not only not asked to interfere as mediators by both par* 
 ties, but one party ex^jressly repudiates their interfere ic-- ; while the other does 
 not solicit it, and only accepts it when it lias b^en often obtruded: as we may see 
 from the following curious passage of a letter fro;n the Prime M'nister of Herat to 
 the British E:JVoy — * With regard to thi coining of the K jjur (Persian) army to 
 this country, I am not, and never sha-l be, in any way willing to give you trouble 
 or annoyance. Should the Persan Governmeat svince any gr>at; d.^sire to come to 
 Herat, do not prevent tlie advance of the army, or take any trouble in tlie matter. 
 It is an affair of no consequence. Lst them come, in order lliat they may prove 
 what they are able to do. May it please God the merciful, by the grace and 
 assistance of the Ahniglity, the steed of their wislies sliall not accomplish the jour- 
 ney of their design.' This is the polite Oriental fashion of saying * laissez nous 
 faire' to a meddler ; an i the recent obstinate refusal of the Prince of Herat to ac- 
 cept a British subsidiary forcj lor his protection, shows that our interpretation is the 
 right one. The English Government is not only not neutral, it directly interferes, 
 and witiiout bei-ig ad^el. Itisfar from stopping even at the point of impertinent 
 negotiation. A roving agent of the Governor-Geiieral of India, a skilful engineer, 
 throws himself into the fortress of Herat, and assists in its defence against the Per- 
 sians ; a squadron of men of war is sent and takes p«ssesdon of a portion of 
 our allies* territory on the l^ersian Gulf; and a great army is marched 
 to dethrone an Affghan chief susjjeciec? of preferring a Persian to an English alli- 
 ance, {some alliance or other bting indispensable, and W3 having expressly refused 
 him ours except on terms intolerable,) for his protection against a fourth party, 
 the Seiks, who had wrested from him, by a series of aggressions, a large portion of 
 his dominions. In reference to this conduct, the Persian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs has the following pertinent remarks — * We are ignorant by what evidence 
 the British Government considers our iaterfeience in the affairs of Afghanistan as 
 a mark of hostility against itself. Besides the auspicious treaty, the observation of 
 the stipulations of which is the foundation of the friendship of the two states, are 
 there any other treaties or engagements between Persia and England relative to 
 
75 
 
 which any neglect or non-observance has proceeded from us ? or did the pltnipo- 
 tentiariesof both states forget this point at the time of forming the treaty, that 
 they omitted any allusion t > it ? or have new rules cf friendship been instituted 
 in this world, with which we are not acquainted ? or does the party which consi- 
 ders itself strongest consider also that the observation or violation of treaties rests 
 on its discretion?' Here \s a shocking charge of Punic faith, made against the 
 government cf a civilized country by a people whom we have been accastomed to 
 look upon as faithless barbarians ; and the only reply we have made to it, virtually 
 amounts to this, that our original intention in making the treaty was not accom- 
 plished, — that is) that Persia did not turn out to be the bulwark against Bussiau 
 aggression which we mistakingly supposed it would. In short, we talk of the 
 'spirit' of the treaty, carefully avoiding to say one word about its plain and obvi- 
 ous letter. 
 
 (' Against the faith of treaties, then, we set up necessity and expediency. Now 
 let this plea be looked into. Herat is declared to be the key to the British domi. 
 nions in India — the key which is to open the door to the Russians and their 
 allies the Persians, to Hindoos'.an. The supposed key, in this case, is surely at a 
 vast distance from the door. Our own army has been already five months on its 
 march from the frontier, backed by all the resources of India, and without firing a 
 single shot, unless at a few freebooters; and there is no trustworthy intelligence 
 that it has yet reached the first spot where there is any p'obabiiity of its meeting 
 with resistance, viz. Gandahar ; in the neighbourhood of which, by the way, it is 
 proposed that we should canton for the whole summer, — by which (for Cabool) the 
 main point, and a month's march through snowy mountains and narrow defiles, 
 remains untouched) it is plainly pronounced that the affair is to cost us two cam- 
 paigns. From Candahar to Plerat, allowing for halting-days, and supposing no in- 
 terruption from an enemy, is at least a month's march. Thus, therefore, without 
 meeting an enemy — and, supposing the barren country which it had in its rear 
 and along its line of march could afford it the same supply of food which fertile, 
 populous, and peaceful India affords us — it wouid take a Uussian army five months 
 to march from Herat to the nearest British frontier, with many a * key' to get pos- 
 session cf, and many a door to unlock, between ; and, after th it, there is a march of 
 at least fifteen hundred miles further to the clwef seat of our power and re- 
 sources, Lower Bengal and Calcutta ; which would take at least four months more, 
 supposing the climate, our armies, and our fortresses ofiTered no resistance, and that 
 John Bull (who in one half the whole time mentioned could send an army from 
 the banks of the Thames) were to look on with his hands in his breeches-pocket 
 doing nothing. But to reach India, is not to conquer India, (never so powerful and 
 united as under our own administration J as any one wlio will take the pains to read, 
 may learn from the history of its invaders from Alexakoer to Ahmed Shah. 
 Most of them never penetrated much beyond the frontier, and the few who estab- 
 lished themselves in the North-west, took not months oi years, but from one to two 
 centuries, to conquer the East and the South. Tho truth is, that a Russian inva- 
 f ion, and conquest of India, is but the dream of a troubled and uneasy conscience. 
 
76 
 
 No mftii in lii^ waking momeiits and sober senses itnagines tlie possibility of th>e 
 things or fancies it even probable that any nation whatever, without the command 
 of the sea atjd of immense pecuniary resources, would be mad enough even to make 
 the attempt. * At the conclusion of your letter,' says the Persian Prime Minis- 
 ter to one of our agents, ' there are some remarks about alarm. I am in great as- 
 tonishment at this declaration, considering the distance of four months' journey and 
 the great friendship between the two states, which during this length of time, has 
 never been interrupted by a hair's breadth on either side. What cause is there lor 
 alarm,. or for these remote speculations, which have never entered into the mind 
 of any one> nor ever will ?' It is clear, from these remarks of the Persian Tizier, 
 that his Excellency had no personal acquaintance with Lf^rd Auckland or Lord 
 Palmeuston, or he would not have expressed himself so rashly. What, after all, 
 does the reader fancy has thrown the Indian Council Chamber and the foreign 
 Ofiiee into a turmoil ? The Russian Envoy at the Court of Persia is supposed^ 
 contrary to his instructions, to have advised the Sliah to attack Herat : and a 
 Russian Lieutenant of Infantry goes on a commercial mission to an Affghan slate ; 
 and this has sufficed to frighten the Forevgn Secretary and the Governor-General 
 from their propriety. At the very moment we are making this charge against Rus- 
 sia and Persiu, our English officer of Engineers, being the agent of the Governor- 
 General, is fighting in the ranks of the Heraltees ; and there is a diplomatic agent 
 at Cabool, and another at Candahar, endeavouring to force treaties on the chiefs 
 of those two places, by which they are to break off' all connexion with Persia ^nd 
 Russia. "Where is our sense of political justice ? 
 
 " There is not the least doubt but the very measures we are pursuing lead us into 
 far greater difficulties than the actual invasion of the Persians and Russians them- 
 Belves could produce. The war with the Burmese cost us fifteen millions. If we 
 e»eape from the present more difficult contest with a penalty of double theamounty 
 w« may look upon oarselves a& fortunate. This will add just one«half to the nation- 
 al debt of India, and an annual interest of a million and a half will add a tithe to 
 the taxes of the already over-taxed Hindoos. Is it not better to stay at home, admi- 
 nister justly, tax lightly, and thus gain the support of tlie conquered millions, than 
 squander their money in so dangerous, extravagant, and Quixotic an enterprise? 
 The very undertaking itself proves that we are ill at ease at home, conscious of the 
 instability of our power, and suspicious that we have misgoverned India, to the dis- 
 satisfaction of its inhabitants. 
 
 ** If our diplomatists and politicians would only keep their hands out of mischief, 
 it is astonishing how perfect a bulwark nature and fortune have opposed to the 
 possibility of a successful invasion of British India from the westward. The coun- 
 try lying between Persia and British India is one either of rugged mountains or of 
 uncultivated and almost impassable sandy deserts- On the side of Persia, all but 
 on one narrow quarter, it is a sandy desert two hundred miles bread. On the side 
 of India, there is a far more extensive one, generally of double that breadth, except 
 at one point also. Even at this last point there is, according to Mr. Ei/PHISSTONE, 
 one hundred and sixty miles of ♦ the strongest country' he hai * ever seen.' 
 
77 
 
 The peorle that an invadirg army would have to ercounter, if not alieinted by 
 cur ambition, is as formidable as their country is strong. They are estimated at 
 fourteen millions J a fourth part of whoni) probably, are in that shepherd or no- 
 made state in which men liave little to lose and much to gain by war. The ruling 
 people exceed four millions in number ; and in their manners, habits, and cus- 
 toms, are rather Europeans of the middle ages than Asiatics. 'Au European,* says 
 Mr. EiPHiNSTONE, * coming among then, would scarce fail to admire their martial 
 and lofty spirit, their hospitality, and their bold and simple manners. He would 
 admire their strong and active forms, their fair complexions, and European fea- 
 tures ; their industry and enterprise; the hospitality, sobriety, and contempt of 
 pleasure, which appear in all their habits; and, above all, the independence and 
 energy of thtir character. The Afghans themselves (he adds) exult in the free 
 spirit of their institutions. They endeavour to maintain that all Afghans are equal. 
 I once s'rongly urgtd on a very intelligent old man, of the tribe of Meankhail, 
 the superiority of a quitt and secure life, under a powerful monarch, to the dis- 
 cord, the alarms, and the blood which they owed lo their present system. The 
 old man replied with great warmth, and thus concluded an indignant harangue 
 against arbitrary power — ' We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, 
 we are content with blood — but we will never be content with a master.' ' 
 
 ♦' The plain truth is, that we are breaking down, by our aggression, the most 
 formidable portion of the bulwark that lies between us and invasion to the VV'est. 
 We are making, in fact, the false movement of a general, who, finding abroad 
 marsh between himself and his opponent, wantonly crosses it, with great loss 
 and inconvenience, posts himself on the opposite margin, and, cutting himself off 
 from his supplies, affords his opponent, at the first favourable moment, an oppor- 
 tunity of driving him into the swamp, or starving him to death, or compelling him 
 to surr»;nder at discretion. Such is a fair view of our present adventure ; nor can 
 we see any termination, utfer discomfiture excepted, to the course into which it 
 leads, until it bring us to the very thing we deprecate— contiguity and collision 
 with the power of Russia in ?er&i&J*— Spectator, July *21 , 1839. 
 
7"^ 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Rnnjeet Singh refuses to permit our troops to pass through the Punjaub— Route by the Bolan 
 Pass— Augmentation cf the army by 13,000 men besides the Contingent—Retirement of the 
 CoTimander-in-Chief, Sir H. Fane— Sir J, Keane nominated Generalissimo of the Army of 
 the Indus— Entrance into AfFghanisfan— Bengal column—Reserves -Bombay column lands 
 at Vikkur— Hostile aspect of Scinde— Want of camels— Scarcity of Commissariat stores- 
 Demonstrations on Hydrabad— Ameers agree to our terms — Bengal column reaches Roree 
 and crosses the Indus to Sukkur— Misunderstandings betwixt the Bengaland Bombay co- 
 lumns about camels— Colonel Dennie's remonstrances on the inutility of the Shah's 
 levies— Capture of Kurrachee- Reserve left there— Amount of force at Shikarpore in 
 February— Bengal troops a&cend the Bolm Pass— Apprehensions on reaching Qiiettah— 
 Rumours of a retreat — Conduct of the Khan of ELhelat — Sir A. Burnes's mission to— 
 Breaks his agreements— We resolve to dethrone him— Extreme scarcity of provisions- 
 Troops on half rations for six weeks— Arrive at Caudahar and enter it unopposed- 
 Progress of the Bombay column— The Lukkee Pass— Larkhana— The desert— Reach 
 Dadur— Excessive heat— Enter the Bolan Pass— Reach Quettah— Arrive at Candahar— 
 Adventures of Colonel Dennie betwixt Shikarpore and Candahar— Force at— Condi- 
 tion of— Remain six weeks at Candahar— March on Ghuznie— Description of fortress- 
 Conflicting accounts of enemy's force— Open fire of artillery on the walls of— Move 
 round from the Candahar to the Cabool side— Plan of attack of— Captain Outram's 
 attack on the enemy's irregulars— Slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners— Preparation for the 
 attack— Successful explosion of powder-bags at the gate— Storming of the gate— Capture 
 of the fortress— Excellent conduct of our troops— Advance on Cabool— Dost Mahomed 
 abandoned by his troops— Capture of his guns and baggage— Pursuit of, by Capt. Outram 
 —Treachery of Hadji Khan Kakur— The Dost makes his escape into Toorkistan— Return 
 of the pursuing party to Cabool— The Sliah enters Cabool— State Durbar for the purpose 
 of conferring the Doorannee Order, Dr. Kennedy's account of— Bengal column quits Ca- 
 bool — Proceeds Wy Jellalabad and Khyber, through the Punjaub, to Ferozepore— Bombay 
 column proceeds to Ghuznie— Captain Outram's operations against the Ghilzies— Column 
 takes the left of Candahar— Reaches Quettah— One portion descends the Bolan Pass and 
 reaches Scinde— Loss by Cholera— General Willshire advances on Khelat— Gallant cap- 
 ture of— Slaughter at— Captain Outram's adventures— General Willshire descends the 
 Gundava Pass to Scinde— Lord Keane's return to Bombay, and reception— General re- 
 flections — Troops required to be left in AflFghanistan -Opinions of the campaign enter- 
 tained in England. 
 
 So soon as it became maniftst that nothing but a war on the largest scale 
 would fully meet the views of the Governor-General and his advisers, it 
 was resolved that this should be commenced in form next spring, as early as 
 the disappearance of the snow beyond the passes would permit. Runjeet 
 Singh declining to suffer our troops to traverse the Punjaub, our principal 
 rendezvous was appointed to be Shikarpore in Scinde j our line of advance, 
 by the Bolan Pass, Quettah, and Candahar. 
 
 During the preliminary diplomatic arrangements, which had occupied 
 
79 
 
 from December, 1837, till August, 1838, military preparations had been in 
 rapid progress. The Army of India, which had, since 1826, been reduced 
 from an effective force of 274,000, did not, in 1837, exceed the strength of 
 190,000, exclusive of contingent or subsidiary troops. (1) This was, before 
 the month of October in the following year, raised to 203,000 ; — an augmen- 
 tation of ten men to each company (2) ordered on the 30th June, and a 
 second of similar amount on the 28th August, having given an increase of 
 13,000 men. (3) Besides this, a force raised am-^ngst the eamp-follovvrers 
 at the Company's various frontier posts, officered from the Indian army, 
 and paid by the British treasury, under the name of the " Shah's Contin- 
 gent," added, before next midsummer, nearly 8,000 men to the muster- 
 roll of the army: these, if not very efficient, vireie as expensive as our best 
 drilled veterans. The encrease of our army, occasioned by the Affghaa 
 war, betwixt 1833 and 1842, amounted to 30,826 men. 
 
 Sir Henry Fane was at this time Commander-ia-Cbief of all India. He 
 is said to have disapproved both of the principles of policy, and the arrange- 
 ment of the details of the expedition ; (4) and viewed with great appre- 
 hension the prospect of having our armies so far removed from their base of 
 operations — our own frontier. The Commander-in-Chief was, besides, in 
 indifferent health and about to proceed to Europe : he had, indeed, retired, 
 and was succeeded by Sir Jasper Nicholls, before the expedition returned 
 
 1. British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna, 1838 Translated 
 
 by H. Evans Loyd. London, 1840. Vol. i., p. l85. The following is given by 
 this illustrious ioreigner as the strength of our armies iu 1837 : — 
 
 staff, British 312 Broughtover 17,.'76 
 
 Company's officers of British birth .. 3,416 Artillery train 1,392 
 
 Officers of Hindoo biith 3,416 Cavalry 14,529 
 
 Engineer corps 3,498 Infantry 124,281 
 
 Horse artillery 1,022 European troops 26,582 
 
 Foot ditto 5,»92 Medical Staff, &c 5,000 
 
 17,576 Total 189,360 
 
 2. See General Order, Simla, 30th June and 28th August,- -republished in 
 Bombay G. O. to the same effect, for the army of the Western Presidency, 
 July 12th and September 3rd. 
 
 3. Asiatic Journal, new series, second part, p. 328) for Dec. 1838. The 
 cost of the Company's military establishment was in 1830 set down in the Par- 
 liamentary papers at 94 millions sterling. The ordinary annual charge of a 
 sepoy regiment of 1000 men, every thing included, is reckoned at about 
 £40,000 :— that of a European regiment at about £»0j000. Cavalry charges 
 are double those of infantry. 
 
 4. Letter from his son, published in the London Times of 5th June 1842 : 
 
 " 1 am prepared to prove, if called upon, [says Colonel Fane] that the mili- 
 tary head in India and second member ot council of that country, did op- 
 pose, or perhaps rather point out to the Governor -General, the extreme 
 danger of this wild and unmeasured expedition." — *' He ensured Lord Auck- 
 1 md of the success Avhich did at first appear to attend us, but warned lum, 
 that to maintain large bodies of troops in countries so distant, and which 
 scarce produced food sufficient ,or the scaiity population, v>as next to impos- 
 sible," 
 
$0 
 
 to India. (5) He resigned the command of the onward force at Perozepor*, 
 and boa's were provided for himself and staff to drop down the Sutlelge 
 and Indus, (keeping; parallel with the marching column) with the intention 
 of reraaininj^ at Bombay, (Arhich lie in fact did for several months after- 
 wards) but retaining the post of Commander-in-Chief in India until his 
 successor should be appointeJ from home. The Governor- General, imme- 
 diately upon this resignation in December 1833, nominated Sir John Keane 
 to the chief command and direction of the whole force ; a brave and expe- 
 rienced officer^ but head-strong, passionate, vindictive and domineering, 
 thon2;h bold and determined in action. From this period he was instructed by 
 ihe G H'ernor- General to give his own orders to Sir Willonghby Cotton, who, 
 as senior officer, succeeded to the command of the Bengal column as a 
 temporary measure, until its junction with the Bombay troof)8. This also 
 gave the temporary command of a division to Major General Nott, and of a 
 brigade to Colonel Dennie. The head-quarters of the Bengal column had 
 assembled at Ferozepore, an outstation on the banks of the Sutlfj, about 
 50 miles from Lahore, the capital of the Punjaub. The nearest course for 
 this body to have pursued would have been through the Seikh territory ; by 
 which route a march of 350 miles from their cantonments would have 
 brought them to Peshawur ; 200 more through the Khyber and Khoord 
 Cabool passes and by Jellalabad, would have taken them at once to Cabool. 
 The difficulties of this line have at all times been considered formidable : 
 no army save our own ever appears to have forced them. Nadir Shah, in 
 1739, paid £100,000 for the use of the passes ; (6) and the Khyberies and 
 Ghilzies who inhabit the adjoining mountains, have always been in the 
 habit of receiving from £4,000 to £8,000 a-year as black-mail, fron the 
 Doorannee rulers, for free passages to kafilas to and from Cabool. Yet the 
 facility with which Colonel Wade made his way, the following August, 
 from Peshawur to Cabool with 10,000 men, shews that when the natives 
 are liberally treated, and prudently dealt with, and not previously excited to 
 hostility, their country may be traversed with comparatively little trouble. 
 The objections to this route, however, lay not in the physical difficulties 
 which presented themselves to our progress, — these have grown upon ns as 
 we have become better acquainted with them. They were at the time sur- 
 mounted by the Shahzada Timour's contingent, and were held compara- 
 tively lightly of by officers of experience. (7) The insurmountable objec- 
 
 5. Narrative of the War m Affifhaaistan, by Capt. H. liavelock, H. M. 
 iSthL.I., Vol. ii.,p. 173. 
 
 6. March and Operations of llie Army of the Indus— 1840. Major Hough, 
 to whom we shall feave many occasions of acknowledging our obligations, 
 omits to quote his authority on this point. 
 
 7. Captain Havelock reasons this matter very ably : he gives the prefer- 
 ence to an advance by Dera-Ismael Khaa — a, littlo-kaown path over the 
 
81 
 
 tions of our ancient ally Runjeet Singh to tlie passage of so formidable a 
 force through the centre of his country, compelled us to take the western of 
 Bolan Pass route, towards which the Bengal column now prepared to 
 march. By the beginning of December, the force on the Bengal side, just 
 mentioned as destined to proceed without delay to Scinde, amounted to 
 9,500 men. A considerably larger number had originally been intended; 
 but intelligence of the retirement of the Persian army from Herat in the 
 end of September^ diminished the exigencies of the service ; and the intima- 
 tion which notified this^ stated that, under these altered circumstances, the 
 command of the column would be assumed by Sir WilloUghby Cotton, on 
 the march downwards to Shikarpore. (8) Besides this, a reserve division 
 , of 4,250 men was stationed at Ferozepore under Major-General Duncan. 
 A Seikh army of observation of 13,000 was agreed by Runjeet Singh to be 
 maintained at Peshawur, while the levies of the Shahzada Timour, the 
 eldest son of the Shah, amounted to 4,800 of the contingent, with 6,000 
 Seikh allies. This last was taken charge of by Lieut. -Colonel Wade, (9) 
 and moved on Cabool by the eastern passes. 
 
 The Bombay column, under Sir J. Keane, landed at Vikkur, on the 
 eastern bank of the Hujamry mouth of the river Indus, 50 miles to the 
 right of the town and fort of Kurrachee, betwixt the 20th and 28th of 
 November. (10) The Ameers of Scinde — feudatories of the Doorannee 
 Empire, with whom, for the space of ten years, we had been on terras of 
 alliance (II) — had faithfully promised to provide suppliea and the means of 
 conveyance for our armies. On our arrival at Kurrachee, so far from find* 
 ing that either the one or the other had been attended to, it was discovered 
 that they entertained the most jealous and hostile feelings towards us, and 
 had done all that they could to obstruct and annoy us on our advance. 
 
 mountains from Dejerat direct upon Ghuznie ; by which it was pretended 
 General Nott's force were, on a recent occasion, ordered to return. Have- 
 lock wrote after returning to India by the Khyber route ; and speaks dis- 
 paragingly of the Khoord Cabool and Tezeen defiles, which at that time ho 
 had not seen. It is curious that this officer should have had three times to 
 force his way through this series of passes — once on the march of Sir R. Sale's 
 force in October 1841, and twice with that of General Pollock in September 
 and October 1842. 
 
 8. General order quoted by Hough, p. 3? dated Secret Department, De- 
 cember 4. 
 
 9. Captain, now Lieut- Colonel Sir, C. M. Wade, then political agent in 
 these parts. 
 
 10. Rough notes of the Campaign in Scinde and Affghanistan, by Captain 
 James Outram— Campaign of the Army of the Indus, by K. H. Kennedy, M. 
 D., Superintending Surgeon to the Bombay column of the force. The port 
 of Kurrachee, at which the British force has, since 1838, been stationed, is 50a 
 miles by sea from Bomba}'. A Lighthouse, and new cantonments, have just 
 been ordered to be constructed, with a view of maintaining it as a permanent 
 possession* 
 
 f 11. Visit to the Court of Scinde, by James Burnes, M. D., K. H., F. R. S. 
 
 N 
 
82 
 
 "While they continued to profess the utmost friendship for us, they began to 
 levy, en masse, their fighting men from seventeen to sixty years of age. 
 From 1(3,000 to 17,000 Beloochees occupied the Hydrabad side of the river. 
 So eager were these undisciplined hordes to attack us, that it was said the 
 Ameers had to distribute from £50,000 to £60,000 amongst them to keep 
 them at peace. (12) Captain Outram, (who acted as extra A. D. C. to 
 Sir John Keane,) one of the most active, indefatigable, and adventurous 
 soldiers in the army, was dispatched without loss of time to Cutch, a sub- 
 sidiary state to the eastward, with letteis from Sir John-Keane and Colonel 
 (now Sir Henry) Pottinger to the Rao. His Highness was the personal 
 friend of both, as well as one of the most zealous and faithful supporters of 
 the British g^overnment to be found among the princes of India, and his 
 aid and influence on this occasion enabled Captain Outram to succeed 
 in collecting a considerable supply of camels — a most seasonable help to 
 Sir John Keane. The troops which had disembarked at Vikkur 5,500 
 strong, after various difficulties and delays, advanced towards Tatta on the 
 24th December. They crossed an arm of the Indus by a bridge of boats : 
 the heavy baggage was transported in flat-bottomed vessels up the stream. 
 The climate here was very trying for the native troops : the thermometer, 
 which rose to about 90° during the day, descending as low as 35° over 
 night, — a temperature, this latter, which nearly incapacitates the sepoy, as 
 the former unfits the European, for duty. (13) It had originally been pro- 
 posed that, for the sake of producing a moral efi'ect, the army should 
 proceed up the river by boat ; but this unwise project was afterwards 
 renounced. Its extreme inexpediency was subsequently proved by the diffi- 
 culty experienced in providing boats for the transportation of the mere 
 ordnance stores of the army, — whatever was transported by the river being 
 afterwards found an impediment and vexation. (14) 
 
 The granaries had been plundered by the Beloochees, as was believed by 
 the sanction of the Ameers. At length, seeing that we could make our 
 way without their aid, and in spite of their resistance, they agreed to the' 
 terms of the treaty proposed by us ; having further pledged themselves to 
 supply us with whatever we required, on being duly paid for it. A tribute 
 of £280,000 having been set down as due by them to the Shah Soojah, we, 
 as his patrons, for the present compelled them to make payment to us of 
 £100,000 as a first instalment of the long arrear. By the 1st February 
 they had duly professed submission, their army having, with much difficulty, 
 
 12. Outram, p. 30. 
 
 13. Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and 
 Affghanistan, In 1838-39— By R. H. Kennedy, M. D., Chief of the Medical Staflf 
 of the Bombay Division. 
 
 14. Kennedy, A''ol. i) p. 145. 
 
83 
 
 been disbanded by them.' Their resolution on this point was probably 
 stimulated by the fact, that while the Bombay column was encamped within 
 two marches of their capital, the Shah's contingent, 6,000 strong — which 
 was the first to approach the river at Shikarpore on their left, moved down 
 parallel to the line of Sir John Keane's upward advance, and occupied 
 Larkhana, while halt the Bengal column moved upon their right, the other 
 half standing fast at Sulckur ; so that they had in their immediate neigh- 
 bourhood three armies, amounting in all to above 20,000 men. After a 
 considerable halt at Tatta, collecting camels and making other prepa- 
 rations, as well as carrying on negotiations with the Ameers, the force 
 moved on to Jerruck, one of the strongest positions on tbe Indus, and 
 within two marches of Hydrabad. Here it was that the Ameers were 
 desired to communicate their final answer to the terms proposed. They at first 
 resolutely refused their assent to these, and Sir John Keane adopted measures 
 without loss of time to compel them to come in to our views. He dispatched 
 messengers and additional guards down the river to hasten up and protect 
 the heavy ordnance and ammunition, which would be required in the event 
 of an attack upon Hydrabad becoming necessary; while the other demon- 
 strations from the force above were directed as already detailed. The 
 Ameers seeing themselves in this serious predicament — threatened with an 
 attack upon their capital from all points, immediately gave in to all the 
 terms proposed to them. 
 
 It did not come within the plan for the campaign that Hydrabad should 
 be taken, or the Ameers deposed : the instructions of Lord Auckland were 
 very strong and specific on this point, and nothing short of an actual attack 
 on our troops, or positive refusal of the Ameers to come in to our terras, 
 would have justified the Commander-in-Chief in using force and attacking 
 their capital; it being thought tiiat the consequences of such a measure 
 might retard the ulterior operations of the campaign, and perhaps tlie 
 season bo so far advanced as to render hazardoiis the march of the troops 
 through the Bolan Pass, and thereby delay the operations for a whole year 
 The resident, Colonel Potlinger, was most resolute in resisting all proposi- 
 tions involving the idea of actual aggression, to which abundant provocation 
 had been given. The Governor-General was afterwards greatly pleased 
 with Sir John Keane's management of the affair. (15) The brushwood 
 adjoining the camp having taken fire, during the halt at Jerruck, three 
 promising young officers, who had been out shooting, were burnt to death. 
 
 On the 24th Jan. the Bengal column reached Roree, on the Indus ; and on 
 
 15. "SVe state this on the authority subsequently referred to as unquestion- 
 able, although not named. An impression has hitherto very generally pre- 
 vailed that bir J. Keane was in fault in not having attacked Hydrabad : on. 
 no point were his instructions more explicit : thev were to the effect notified^ 
 in the text. 
 
84 
 
 the '27th crossed to Sukkur, on the left bank, by a bridge of boats. 
 Bukkur, a strong fort situated on a rocky island in the middle of the river, 
 was, after some delay, ceded to us by authority of the Ameer of Khyrpoor. 
 On the 28th, a detachment of 5,500 men was dispatched towards Hydra- 
 bad, under Sir W. Cotton, to act in concert with the army of Sir John 
 Keane, whose movements have just been given, should the conduct of tlie 
 Ameers have compelled active measures to be resorted to. The treaty had, 
 however, meanwhile been subscribed ; and, when seven marches on his 
 way, Sir W. Cotton was, on the 6th February, ordered to retrace his steps. 
 The Shah's contingent having marched in a line nearly parallel to that of 
 Sir W. Cotton's detachment, but on the western side of the river and at 
 some distance from its banks, had meanwhile occupied Larkhana some 25 
 miles lower down, but on the same side with Shikarpore. Intimation 
 having been received that there was no further occasion for their services in 
 the direction of Hydrabad, the two detachments retraced their steps, and 
 returned to, head-quarters ; that on the right bank of the river having 
 crossed the Indus from Roree to Sukkur by a bridge of boats betwixt the 
 I3th and 15th. At Sehwan, Sir Henry Fane and Sir John Keane met by a 
 preconcerted plan, and the raeetiog was such as could not but gratify all 
 who saw it. The tvi'o men embraced : they had always, it seems, been 
 upon the most intimate and friendly terms, and meeting for the first time in 
 the east on such an occasion, and in such a place, was full of interest- 
 On reaching Larkhana, Sir John Xeane, in a general order, dated 10th 
 March, announced to the troops of both presidencies the arrangements con- 
 sequent upon his assuming the comniand, in obedience to the Governor- 
 General's orders, by which amongst other things Sir Willoughby Cotton, 
 as a matter of course, fell back to the command of his division, General 
 Nott to his brigade, and Colonel Dennie to his regiment; Major* General 
 "Willshire to command the Bombay division, Major- General Thackwell the 
 cavalry division, and Brigadier Stevenson, as senior officer, the artillery of 
 both presidencies. The troops of Bengal and Bombay to be guided as much, 
 as possible by the regulations of their own particular presidency ; and the 
 orders of the Commander-in-Chief intended for both to be issued through, 
 and signed by, Lieut. -Colonel Macdonald, the Teputy Adjutant-General of 
 Queen's troops, Bombay, and senior officer in the department of the 
 Adjutant- General with the force, officiating also as Military Secretary to 
 his Excellency. 
 
 Sir John Keane quitted the Bombay column a f^w days afterwards for 
 the advance, taking as his escort a wing of the 1st cavalry, and one of the 
 I9th Native Infantry, On reaching Dadur, he had his first interview with 
 his Majesty Shah Sonjah and Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Macnaghten, 
 whose camp had reached that place the day before, and all moved on 
 
8^ 
 
 together through the Bolan Pass. The Shah's camp continued during all 
 the after operations with the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 The Governor- General employed Sir Alexander Burnes, Major Leech, 
 and several other officers to collect camels, and was under the impression 
 that when all should be concentrated at Shikarpore, they (including those 
 with the Bengal column) would amount to 45,000 ; and this number, he 
 informed Sir John Keane, should be distributed into fair proportions 
 between the troops of the two presidencies and Shah Soojah's contingent, 
 but not one half this amount was ever collected. The Bengal column, 
 which had just arrived, took, it for granted that all the camels were for 
 them ; and thought it extremely hard that the Commander-in-Chief should 
 order any to be appropriated for the Bombay troops, or for the Shah : the 
 Bengal Commissariat officers left at Shikarpore, in particular managed to 
 evade every order sent to them to dispatch camels to Larkhana, until Cap- 
 tain Outram was sent there, and Colonel Dennie, who was then in charge, 
 exercised his authority very properly on that point. At this time Colonel 
 Dennie was still in command of two native regiments of General Nott's 
 brigade, and thought it hard these troops should be left there, and the 
 camels given up for raw levies of the Shah- On this point he addressed a 
 letter to Colonel Macdonald for the information of the Commander-in- 
 Chief; and out of this has arisen an erroneous impression, as now ascer* 
 tained, that Colonel Dennie thereby incurred the displeasure of Sir John 
 Jieane. His Excellency was himself completely of the same opinion with 
 Colonel Dennie, but the Governor-Generars policy and his orders were, to 
 send on the Shah's contingent entire if possible. It seems Sir John Keane 
 at this period had a very high opinion of Colonel Dennie ; that he thought 
 equally well of him when he joined at Candahar; and up to the day after 
 Ghuznie was taken, when, by a visit Colonel Deflnie paid him in his tent, 
 he greatly offended the Commander-in-Chief. (16) The reports, therefore, 
 which have gained such extensive circulation, countenanced as they are by 
 his own letters since published, that Sir John Keane bore enmity to Colonel 
 Dennie before the capture of Ghuznie, are totally without foundation. 
 Sir John Keane felt himself bound to disapprove of some arrangements 
 made by Colonel Dennie, when he volunteered to take charge of a convoy 
 froni Dj^dur through the Bolan Pass, which included two troops of the 
 Shah's artillery, a great part of the material belonging to them having been 
 captured by bands of plunderers and robbers in the pass on that occasion 3 
 but this circumstance made no difference in the feelings of the Commander- 
 
 16. We give this view of the case on the highest authority : our own 
 impressions have, we confess, been hitherto different : \yq are happy to have 
 this opportunity of correcting them. 
 
86 
 
 in-Chief towards Colonel Dennie, who was a guest at Sir John Keane's 
 table, partaking of his hospitalities during the halt at Candahar. 
 
 A reserve forc6 of 3,000 men had been ordered up from Bombay to be 
 stationed at Kurrachee. They landed near the town on the 3d February, 
 about 50 miles from the Hujamry mouth of the Indus, where the troops 
 under Sir John Keane had disembarked on the 27th November. 
 
 The fishermen on the coast had informed them that the fort was one of 
 the strongest in Lower Scinde, and that it was defended by one of the 
 Ameers in person, with an army of 3,000 men. Her Majesty's ships 
 Wellesley and Algerine, under command of Admiral Sir F. Maitland, ac- 
 companied the transports. Her Majesty's 40th having landed under com- 
 mand of Colonel Valiant, with some artillery, the fort was levelled by the 
 first broadside of the men-of-war, and was within the hour in our posses- 
 sion, without the troops having occasion to fire a shot. The garrison 
 were captured in endeavouring to make their escape, and were found to 
 consist of no more than 20 men ! Cholera, which has since that period 
 proved so fatal to the troops stationed at Kurrachee, broke out soon after the 
 brigade was encamped, and carried off many men ; together with Colonel 
 Thomas Powell of the 40th regiment ; an old and experienced Peninsular 
 officer, much regretted. To return, however, to the armies now on 
 their march towards the mountains. It had been agreed that the Ben- 
 gal division, for the sake of conveniency of carrying on baggage and 
 supplies, should move at some distance ahead of the Bombay troops, 
 which had not yot overtaken them, and by a line considerably to the 
 right, and that the whole army should unite at Candahar. It was at one 
 time proposed that Sir John Keane^s force should ascend the Gundava Pass, 
 and take a line of route for a time forming an acute angle with that the 
 others pursued. This resolution wa?, however, departed from, from the 
 apprehension of obstructions which proved to be unreal. Ihe descent of 
 Sir T. "Willshire by this pass, after the fall of Kelat the following November, 
 shewed its perfect practicability. (17) The whole of the principal division, 
 which had been separated into three portions by the diversion on Hydrabad, 
 having, as already stated, been once more reunited on the 17th February, 
 proceeded towards Shikarpore, a large commercial town containing about 
 6,000 houses, and 30,000 inhabitants, on the edge of the desert, (18) 
 which interposes itself betwixt Scinde and the fertile plains of Cutchee, 
 skirting the foot of the mountains ; the Bengal 35th Native Infantry liad 
 been ordered to stand fast at Sukkur till relieved, part of the treasure 
 having been deposited in the adjoining fort of Bukkur. Sir "W'illoughby 
 Cotton arrived at Shikarpore on the 20th February ; the other portions of 
 
 17. Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 157- 
 
 18. Hough, p. 33— Sir Alexander Burnes^s Travels to Bokhara. 
 
iB7 
 
 the force liaving come in in the course of the five preceding days, orders 
 were given to commence the march towards the Bolan Pass without delay. 
 The force under his immediate command, including the Shah's contingent 
 amounted to about 15,000 fighting men, attended by about 80,000 camp- 
 followers ; so that there were nearly 100,000 people to feed from the com- 
 missariat. (19) This was altogether independent of the Bombay division, 
 amounting to 5,500 fighting men, with probably not fewer than 30,000 
 camp-followers ; so that the whole army betwixt Kurrachee — where the 
 reserve of 3,000 was stationed — and Dadur, just before we entered the 
 Bolan Pass, amounted to 27,000 soldiers, and probably 125,000 camp- 
 followers, — or nearly 150,000 in all. The Bombay camp followers provid- 
 ed their own food, and were not rationed by the commissariat. The 
 desert having been crossed in safety, Dadur, at the foot of the moun- 
 tains 150 miles beyond Shikarpore, was attained by the 6th March, the 
 Bombay troops being still nine marches, or nearly 100 miles, behind. 
 Here supplies began to run short, so that it was thought prudent to 
 put the non-combatants of the Bengal column on half rations before 
 entering the mountain country. Yet they had scarcely left the terri- 
 tories of professing allies, and overcome no more than one-half of the 
 road to Cabool ; they had hitherto lost little or nothing by pillagC) and 
 never encountered an enemy. Dadur is, as already stated, the nearest 
 town to the base of that enormous ridge which, buttress-like, sup- 
 ports the table land beyond. The latter is here attained by the defile 
 known by the name of the Bolan Pass — a terrible chasm which, in the 
 course of 70 miles, carries the traveller to a height of 5,637 feet above the 
 level of the plains below, which are here about 750 feet in height above the 
 sea. This portion of the country is inhabited by the poorest and wildest 
 tribes, who live entirely by plunder — supporting existence on the plainest 
 and scantiest fare. Fortunately, they offered no opposition to our troops 
 till just about to quit the defile, when some skirmishing took place, by 
 which a few of our people were wounded. The excessive barrenness and 
 steepness of the line of march had caused the destruction of a vast number 
 of horses and camels, and a considerable loss of private baggage. On the 
 26th March the troops arrived, in safety, at Quettah, where a very short 
 halt was permitted them^ This is the capital of the fertile valleys of Shawl 
 and Pesheen. It contains a population of about 6,000 souls. The territory 
 was, in the reign of Ahmed Shah, made over to Kelat on condition of con- 
 tributing a contingent of 12,000 men when the exigencies of the state 
 
 19. Hough, p. 34. We give the above on the authority of Major Hough. 
 We are assured, however, by a member of Lord Keane's staff, that the camp- 
 followers must be prodigiously over-rated— 28,000 only having been mustered 
 at Candahar. 
 
88 
 
 required it : it afterwards became, along with Kelat, wholly independent of 
 Candahar, whose chiefs desired to keep it in subjection. We have just 
 seen how the expectations of the array had been disappointed in obtaining 
 supplies from the Ameers of Hydrabad and Khyrpoor ; a more severe 
 source of mortification awaited them in the non-fulfilment of the promise* 
 of Mehrab Khan of Kelat, whose dominions had been traversed by us from 
 a little beyond Shikarpore to Quettah. The chief just named governed the 
 various rude tribes who inhabit the eastern portion of Beloochistan. He 
 could boast a descent from seven princes ; was a shrewd, brave, unscru- 
 pulous ruler, who had never sought our friendship, or received overtures of 
 amity, till the march of our armies had begun. ** While the Doorannee 
 empire preserved the semblance of authority [says Masson], there was, 
 agreeably to the original treaty concluded between Ahmed Shah and 
 Nasser Khan, a Belooch force of one thousand men stationed in Cashmere; 
 and the Khans of Kelat had ever been attentive to the observance of their 
 engagements. On the dislocation of the empire, and after Cashmere had 
 been lost (1809), there was, of course, an end to the treaty, and, virtually, 
 of dependence." '^ So long as there was a nominal Shah in the country, 
 as in the case of the Shah Ayub, they professed a certain allegiance ; but 
 when, by the final partition of the remnants of the Doorannee empire, it 
 became parcelled into small and separate chiefships, they no longer felt the 
 necessity of acknowledging the supremacy of either." (20) In 1834, when 
 the Shah Soojah was defeated at Candahar, Mehrab Khan gave him 
 shelter, and refused to deliver him up to his enemies. (21) In November, 
 1838, Sir Alexander Burnes (22) had beea dispatched to Shikarpore to 
 endeavour to obtain a treaty with him, binding himself to supply our army 
 with carriage and provisions so far as our march lay through his country. 
 For this, the Khan was to receive a subsidy of £15,000 a-year during the 
 war, besides payment for the supplies ; but was to be denuded of all his 
 independence, and a raoi«ty of his territory, so soon as the Shah was 
 restored! He held out as long as he could, but at length gave a hesi- 
 tating, reluctant, and apparently insincere assent, It was no wonder that 
 he should have been concussed into this: an army of 20,000 men was then 
 on its march, the whole of which was to pass through his territories — one- 
 fourth of it by the Gundava route, subsequently abandoned, close to his 
 
 20. Journies in Beloochistanj Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, by Charles 
 Masson. 3 vols: Bentlej, 1842, vol. ii., p. 101. 
 
 21. Ibid, p. 102. Mr. Masson was the chief, or rather the only, authority 
 referred to by Sir C. M. Wade, in support of the views afterwards adopted by 
 Lord Auckland in opposition to those of Sir Alex. Burnes. 
 
 22. Sir Alexander Burnes was appointed Envoy to Kelat and other states, 
 under Mr. Macnaghten's direction^General Notification by the Governor- 
 General, Simla, October 1. 
 
^9 
 
 capital. All the historians of the campaign agree that, had this last line of 
 march been pursued by the Bombay column, Kelat would have been dealt 
 with at once. Mehrab promised plentifully, as most oriental, and many 
 European prince?, under these circumstances, would have done ; trusting 
 that the chapter of accidents would enable him to evade, or release him 
 from, a treaty which was acceded to under fear or constraint, and which we 
 had no right whatever to impose upon him. Major Leech had been at 
 Kelat some months before (August 1838), urging the chief to supply us on 
 our march. The answer received at this time was such as to furnish but 
 little hope that our wi^^hes would be complied with. (23) It is important 
 to keep these things in view: the affairs of Kelat furnish two singularly 
 important episodes further on in our narrative ; and nearly all the writer^ 
 of the time, apparently without searching into the facts, or seriously con- 
 sidering the matter, concur in condemning the Khan as guilty of some 
 grievous piece of ingratitude, or a gross breach of treaty, — well deserving 
 the capital punishment afterwards inflicted on him ! Before leaving Shik- 
 arpore the Kelat chief had desired us to send people to take charge of the 
 stores he had provided for us, as he would not be responsible for their 
 safety. On applying at Dadur for what we considered we had reason to 
 expect from him, less than one-tenth of what we looked for was found to 
 have been provided. On the 24 th March, Sir Alex. Burnes, with Lieu- 
 tenants Simpson and Paterson, went from Sir-i-ab on a further embassy to 
 Kelat, to endeavour to reason the chief into terms. *'He appears [says 
 Atkinson] to have had a morbid dread of the Shah Soojah ; and could not 
 be brought to promise that he would see him, without the assurance that 
 the British would .stand his friends, and guarantee his safety." (24) He 
 was informed that he needed be under no apprehension on that head, — that 
 be should hold the territory dependent on Cabool, (25) on the same terms 
 as in the reign of Ahmed Shah, grandfather of the Shah Soojah, in the 
 middle of the preceding century. He was, as formerly intimated, proposed 
 to receive a subsidy of £15,000 a-year during the Continuance of our army 
 
 23. Hough, p. 45, note : — " I must say, [writes Hough, J he, i. e.. Major 
 Leech, was never very sanguine as to his keeping his promise." 
 
 24. Hough, p 73, note. The above are nearly the words said to have been 
 used by the Khan. 
 
 25. The Expedition into Affghanistan — by Dr. J. Atkinson, Superintending 
 Surgeon of the Bengal Division. The apprehensions here detailed were, in 
 all likelihood, a feint to get rid of a peculiarly disagreeable arrangement. 
 The whole of the Kelat episode has been excessively compressed. Our treat- 
 ment of Mehrab Khan was, perhaps, the most tyrannous proceeding during 
 the campaign. We send an army of 20,000 men into the country— ask one of 
 the rulers to supply us with the means of carrying on the war, wliich, if suc- 
 cessful, robs him of his power and independence — and then, when he en- 
 deavours to resist us, we attack and plunder his capital; and kill himself and 
 his Chiefs ! 
 
90 
 
 in the direction of Kliorassan, en condition of supplying provisions, car- 
 riage, and escorts, to the extent of his ability; all of which were to be 
 separately paid for. After a good deal of shuffling and evasion, he at length 
 subscribed the treaty. "When it is considered that, during the Barukzye 
 rule, Kelat and its acquisitions— Quettah and Shawl amongst the rest- 
 had been perfectly independent, his reluctance to accede to a measure 
 whose object was the restoration to the throne a man who had treated him 
 with gross ingratitude, and who he hated and despised , — and that frona 
 this must follow the loss of the fairest half of his country, and all Is inde- 
 pendence, — his aversion to our advance, and reluctance to assist vu, seems 
 neither so marvellous nor reprehensible as the writers of the tinie appear to 
 regard it. The provisions were at length promised, but were not forth- 
 coming, and the payment never was required. (26) Burnes gives a very 
 minute account of one of his discussions with this Chief, in a letter to 
 Government, dated March 30, 1839. He said that '' Dost Mahomed was 
 a man of resource and ability ; and though we could easily put him down 
 through the Shah Soojah, even in our present mode of procedure, we could 
 never win over the Affgltan nation by it." (27) '^ Wait," said he, ^' till 
 sickress overtakes your troops — till they are exhausted with fatigue from 
 long and harassing marches, and from the total want of supplies; wait till 
 they have drank of many waters ; and wait, too, till they feel the sharp- 
 ness of the AflPghan swords." (28) The Khan is said, on another occasion, 
 to have used these ominous words : — '^ You have brought an army into the 
 country, but how do you propose to take it out again ?" (29) — the very 
 expression which fell from the Duke of Wellington, on the same subject, on 
 
 2ti. These statements are given on the authority of Major Hough, who is 
 generally correct, though lie does not quote his inforrnaiit. He states that 
 Lieut. Simpson, one of tl:e party, informed him that a plot had been laid by 
 jNletirab KLau to murder them, which was only foiled by their sudden depar- 
 ture. This is not noticed in any of the letters, either public or private, of Sir 
 Alexander Burnes, — who speaks of the Khau with great respect : neitlier is it 
 so by Masson, to whom he was intimately knoAvn : and we hold it, therelore, 
 ground. ess, as it certainly is eminently improbable. 
 
 27. Tl»is letter was tirst published in the Bombay Times of the 24th and 27th 
 August, 1842 — Subsequently at greater len<:ih in the Caledonian Mtrcury, (an 
 Edinburgh paper) 22d Oct , 1842. Several other documents appear in tbis 
 paper not previously printed, to which we shall have occasion to refer. Burnes 
 concludts his letter to Government by siatmg, in reference to the counsel the 
 Kelat Chief had offered as to the conduct of the Shah Soojah — " I agreed his 
 advice was sound and jjood." 
 
 2^^ Atkinson, p- lol. Dr. Atkinson's book contains far the fullest informa- 
 tion of any of our printed auihoriiies on the Kelat treaty, tiis facts and 
 inferences, however, seem often singularly inconsequential. He gives ^ the 
 above as evidence of the connection of the Chief with Persia and Russia I 
 
 29. We take this Irom Hough : it is not meuiioned by Burnes The remark- 
 able sagacity of the observations of the whole of the Affghnn Chiefs, as j^iven 
 iu the otlicial papers, contrasts strikingly w ith the tlimsy sophistry of Lord 
 Auckland's politicals. 
 
91 
 
 the intimation of our advance into the country having been made in parlia- 
 ment. (30) We never took the army out of the country- — their bones rest 
 in Affghanistan ! Sir Alex. Surnes rejoined the force on the 7th April, 
 without any satisfactory arrangement having been eflFected. *To return 
 from this digression to the Bengal column, vyhich we left at Quettah — the 
 Bombay column not having as yet entered the Bolan Pa?s. On the 4th 
 April, Sir John Keane having established his head-quarters at Quettah, 
 issued an order in continuation of that promulgated at Larkhana, dated 10th 
 March, by which Sir W. Cotton was directed to resume charge of the first 
 division, and General Nott of the second brigade, from which they had 
 been temporarily transferred on the 4th December. Colonel Dennie, who 
 had been left in command of troops at Shikarpore, was ordered to join his 
 regiment, — Brigadier Gordon, commanding in Upper Scinde, succeeding to 
 his duties. The other details may be passed over for the present. So 
 scarce and dear had grain already become, that the camp-followers greedily 
 devoured the fried skins of sheep, coagulated blood, roots, or whatever elsa 
 they could procure, to save themselves from starvation. (31) With a 
 march of 150 miles before them to Candahar, they were obliged to push on 
 as far as Pesheen (25 miles) with only ten days' half rations for the men, 
 and none at all for the cattle. (32) All communication betwixt the front 
 and rear divisions, now 100 miles apart from each other, was completely 
 cut off by the tribes in the Pass. A very unlocked for spirit of discon- 
 tent had began to make its appearance amongst the Bengal troops just 
 before Sir John Keane took command at Quettah; They had been on 
 half rations for some time before his arrival, and had permitted themselves 
 to believe that their situation was desperate. A political officer (Major 
 Leech, we understand) tendered his advice, in writing, to Sir Willough- 
 by Cotton, among other alterations, that a retreat towards Shikarpore would 
 be prudent ; this baneful counsel got circulation through the camp, and 
 was in everybody's mouth, and many had made up their minds that it must 
 end in a retreat. The first act of Sir John Keane was, to desire that no 
 officer or soldier should permit themselves to indulge in such nonsensical 
 and mischievous talk, and he issued an order for a march forward the 
 next morning. This confidence on the part of the Commander-in-Chief 
 seemed to inspire spirit in all. The adoption of some prompt and stringent 
 measure for the subsistence of the troops now became indispensable ; and 
 as more than nine days' provisions for a fifteen days' march could not on 
 any terms be procured, the fighting men were put on half, and the non- 
 combatants, v.'o had been reduced to this ten days before, were brought 
 
 30. Hansard's Debates, February, 1839. 
 
 31. Hough, p. 74. 
 
 32. Outram, p. 62. 
 
9a 
 
 down to quarter rations (33)— -or, as Havelock calls it, famine allow- 
 ince. (84) On the first march towards Candahar, sixty of the artillery 
 horses were shot, to prevent thera from falliog into the hands of the enemy, 
 —no more food for thera being procurable. In the course of seven days, 
 116 cavalry horses died from the effects of starvation; and of eating 
 H poisonous weed often mixed with the grass which was gathered : and, be- 
 twixt the 6th April and middle of June? this arm of the service was nearly 
 disabled for want of food I Kine hundred camels had died in the course of 
 three months ! (33) It is needless to follow, in detail, the footsteps of the 
 troops on their march to Candahar — a distance of 130 miles, which occu- 
 pied them till the 6th April. They found some supplies of forage, as well 
 as live-stock, on the way— as welcome as unlooked-for, — which con- 
 siderably relieved the pressure of their necessities. They were incessantly 
 harassed by the predatory tribes, who, without venturing to attack them, 
 omitted no opportunity of committing the most audacious acts of robbery 
 en their baggage. These were, on most occasions, pursued, and on many 
 overtaken ; and, when captured, were hanged or shot — no quarter being 
 en any occasion given them. On the 26th April the head-quarters of the 
 army reached Candahar. (36) The Bengal column had traversed a distance 
 of 1,000 miles since quitting Ferozepore ; the non-combatants had been on 
 half or on quarter rations for the preceding 48 days ; the figliting men, 
 with the cattle of all arms, on half rations ; the cavalry and light artillery 
 horses had had no grain for 26 days, and were at length found unfit for 
 duty, — in which state they continued for gome weeks after their halt. (37) 
 
 TVe must now return, however, and trace the progress cf the Bombay 
 column; which, when the Bengal troops entered the Bolan Pass, was nine 
 marches in the rear, but had now so far gained on the advance as to be in 
 the Kojjiick Pass, 60 miles behind, when the head-quarters of the grand 
 array arrived under the walls of Candahar. 
 
 On the forward movement, just after the demonstration opposite Hydra- 
 bad, betwixt the 4th and 10th February, the Bombay column kept along 
 the western bank of the Indus, continuing to approach the range which 
 divides Lower from Upper Scinde at the Lukkee Pass. Here 1,000 men 
 were, for four days, employed in cutting a road along the face of the pre. 
 cipice which overhangs the river, and in dragging up the guns and heavy 
 baggage. Having experienced some inconvenience in consequence of an 
 order which, having been misunderstood, caused the baggage to separate 
 
 33. Atkinson. 
 
 34. Havelotk, vol. i., p. 255. 
 35 Ibid, p. 298. 
 
 36. Hough, p. 96. Havelock, p. 298. 
 
 37- Kennedy- vol. i., pp. 188 to 209, gives a very lively and graphic account 
 of the march of the Bombay column till it fell, at Dadur, into the route of 
 that which preceded it. 
 
93 
 
 into sereral portions, and sortie alarnEi in crossing tlie Arul, a large artlHcial 
 canal, where the pontoon bridge was threatened to be carried away by a 
 premature inundation ; — they, on the 3d March, reached Larkhana, the 
 pest already described as having been occupied by the Shah's troops on 
 their descent from Bukkur to assist in hastening the resolves of the Ameers. 
 In the plan of operations for the campaign, one brigade at least of the 
 Bombay troops was ordered to be left on the banks of the InJus, to be 
 distributed as might be found necessary, and such portions stationed at 
 Sukkur and Shikarpore, and along the line to Dadur, as might be deemed 
 proper to keep up the communication with the brigade of Bengal troops 
 above the Bolan Pas?, at Quettab, and the advance — ihree native regiments 
 under Brigadier Gordon, were, therefore, selected for the purpose. Indeed, 
 It would have been almost impossible to have taken them on for want of 
 carriage. The remainder of the Bombay column, tl.en reduced to 8600 
 men, two-thirds European and the other natives of India (1st Cavalry 
 and 19th Bombay Native Infantry) moved on. They crossed the desert 
 by a forced march of 30 miles on the 16th. A person sent to ex- 
 plore the Gundava Pass, returned and reported it impracticable. Had 
 it been threaded as was intended, it would have carried the force close 
 by Kelat, and out of the already impoverished track of the leading 
 division. It does not appear how the reporter came to the conclusion 
 just stated; that it was an erroneous one, appeared the following November, 
 by the facility with which it was traversed in the opposite direction by our 
 troops. On the 23d March, Sir John Keane, with his staflF, escorted by a 
 detachment of Bombay light cavalry, quitted the force, and after joining 
 Shah Soojah at Dadur on the 28th March, arrived, as already stated, at his 
 command at Queltah on the 4th April. He was succeeded in charge by 
 Sir T. Willshire. (38) Mehrab Khan, whose actual hostility towards us 
 had scarcely sought to conceal itself by so much of the senablance of friend- 
 ship as to mislead any one, even when in the act of treating with us, 
 appears to have urged the tribes along the line of our march to practise 
 every species of annoyance against us ; a system which needed little stimu- 
 lant amongst the predatory hordes, who have, from time immemorial, sub- 
 sisted almost entirely by plunder. In an intercepted letter addressed to a 
 hill chief, of a date subsequent to that of the treaty of the beginning of 
 April, he is reported to have written^." What is the use of your treaties 
 and your arrangements ? all child's play. There is no relief but in death : 
 no cure but in the destruction of the English. Their heads, goods, and 
 bodies must be sacrificed. Strengthen the Pass. Call on all the tribes toi 
 harass and destroy." (39) How nearly this system had proved successful, 
 
 38. Kennedy, ut supra. . 
 
 39. Atkinson, p. 132.>- Though both Major Hough and Dr Atkinson furnish 
 
94 
 
 uader the very impeifect shape it assumed, we have already seen : had it 
 been tarried out as just suggested, the campaign would probably have 
 closed short of Candahar. Orders had been given to withhold all grain 
 from us in Cutchee ; and the most annoying system was that of rifling the 
 letter-bags, so that, from the end of March till the troops reached Cabool 
 in August, the safe arrival of not a single packet could ever be depended 
 on. (40) Numberless executions occurred in consequence ot this very 
 vexatious species of molestation ; but it does not appear to have, in any 
 degree, decreased with the deaths of a few of the culprits. On the 8th 
 April, the now diminished column, having suffare I grievously from exces- 
 sive heat — the thermometer ofcen standing as high as 104° — reached Dadur, 
 and found Major Griffiths in charge of the depot of the Bengal commis- 
 sariat. Stores having been received from Shikarpore, the whole of the 
 troops had entered the Bolan Pass by the 12th. The thermometer was 
 110°; but could tl'ey have borne fire by thinking on the snowy Caucasus* 
 the accounts they received of a snow storm which had been experienced just 
 above the Pass a few weeks before would have relieved them. On the SOih 
 they reached Quettah, having, on their progress through the Pass, escaped 
 molestation from the'enemy till near the conclusion ; a rather sharp attack 
 •was made upon them in a very exposed position, but occasioned nothing 
 more than the loss of some baggage and three or four men : the loss of 
 forty-nire camel-loads of grain, with five horses killed, was the heaviest of 
 our casualties. (41) During the march from Dadur they had been con- 
 siderably annoyed by the stench of dead camels, and multitudes of unburied 
 bodies of the enemy left behind along the line of the advance of the first 
 division. General Nott, with the second brigade, and a considerable force 
 of foot artillery, had been left behind at Quettah to keep open the com- 
 munication with the rear. Here, a large amount of camel-men deserted. 
 
 facts sufficient to illustrate the character of the chief, as well as to prove the 
 sagacity, if not the honesty, of the system proposed to be put iu force, neither 
 of them seem to comprehend the drift of their own statements ! They speali of 
 Jlehrab Khan as a weak-minded traitor, well deservin<x the punishment intiict- 
 ed on him, because he promised but did not fulfil that wliich he dai'ed not 
 refuse, hut might well withhold ! Major IJavelock and Sir A. Burnes give him 
 due credit for talent and sajfacity. 
 
 40. Kennedy speaks of this as having been done in sheer wantonness of 
 mischief. This is improbable : it is easily accounted for by the wish ot in- 
 terrupting communication — by retarding dispatches— a motive which has been 
 held to legitimatise this species of annoyance in every war. Masson gives par- 
 ticulars of matters of this sort, when "he and Loveday were prisoners in the 
 hands of the Brahoes in August 1840— see Masson's letter dated Quettah, Dec. 
 24, 1840,— published in the jBomftay Times, March 13; and Summary^ A^riW. 
 Dr Kennedy mentions that the Khan had been sent monies as bribes, and re- 
 ceived all he got : we cannot discover any evidence whatever of this in any 
 quarter. All the other writers agree that he was promised a subsidy,— but 
 he never earned, nor, so far as we can perceive^ obtained any. 
 
 41. Outram, p. 68. 
 
95 
 
 The sudilen change of climate which, in the course of ten day?, had 
 elevated their position by nearly 5,000 feet, and lowered the temperature 
 from 96° or 104° to 80° and 58° produced a slight, but almost universal, 
 though transient, attack of dysentery. Nothing of any note, further than 
 what has just been mentioned, Occurred till they reached Caudahar, where 
 they arrived, by rapid marches, on the 4th May, and found the Bengal 
 troops, who had been there since the 26th Aj)ril. 
 
 Before proceeding to examine the state of affairs at Candahar, we must 
 record a notable adventure of an officer already well known to fame through 
 forty years of distinguished military service ; and whose name, from this 
 date to the close of his honourable career leading the van at Jellalabad on 
 the 7th April 1842, occupies a couFpicuous place in the narrative of the con- 
 flicts which from this time, on to the memorable close of our connection 
 with the country three years and a-half afterwards, continued almost 
 without intermission. The party just referred to was Lieutenant Colonel 
 Dennie, of H. M. 13th Light Infantry. He had been left in command of 
 the second brigade, consisting of the 31st and 42d Bengal Native Infantry, 
 ordered to remain at Shikarpore till means of conveyance should reach them 
 from Mooltan and the Punjaub : this was a temporary arrangement, which 
 ceased on the remodelling of the cummandg. The reserve stores and car- 
 riage were here put under his charge ; while he was, at the same time, en- 
 gaged in organizing a poriion of the raw levies directed to form the Shah's 
 coniingent. (42) No sooner had Head Quarters got above the pass, than 
 the whole of the camels, hordes, and means of conveyance were withdrawn 
 from Shikarpore. Colonel Dennie remonstrated ; but in Vdin : he complain- 
 ed that he had neither been left hands or feet (43) — neither the means of 
 defence or escape. Remonstrance, however, was useless, and in this help- 
 less state he remained at Shikarpore till the end of March. Captain Stock- 
 
 42. Colonel Dennie's letters, 9th March 1839, and 24th Nov. 1840. As we 
 shall have frequent occasion to refer to these papers, we may state that tiey 
 consist of a seiies of letters to friends in Bombay, not immediately meant tor 
 pubiica'-ion, but of which the writer stated that any use might be irrnde which 
 was desired, provided he was not in his military capacity committed with his 
 superior officers. A rmmber of these were published either in substance, or 
 iu the shape of anicles, during his life, wittiout the author being referred to, 
 and the proceeding wah, we have every reason to believe, highly approved of. 
 When his death removed all personal objections to their appearing' in the 
 form in which they were written, a selection made from them was published iu 
 the Bombay Times during the month of April. They form important historical 
 documents on many points Avhere our information was defective. A similar 
 series of letters, rather of an earlier date, was published in the Dublin Uni- 
 versity Magazine for September and October 1842. A number ot unpublished 
 letters from tne same quarter are in the preset. t writer's hands : they also have 
 occasionally been drawn upon, and are marked MSS. papers. 
 
 43. Letter dated Cabool, laih April 1841. We have given nearly the 
 whole ot the letter. 
 
96 
 
 l«y of the BoJTibay commissariat, had, in the mean time, while on his way 
 to Dadur with cattle, grain, and store?, been surrounded and shut up in 
 the fort of Janneedeera by the Beloochees ; 850 of his camels had been 
 captured, and numbers of his people had been cut up. (44) Securing a 
 few treasure camels, the only cattle left him, with 200 sepoys he raaiched 
 to the rescue ; and, after a rapid march of 150 miles, one-third of it across 
 the desert, he succeeded in saving the convoy, and delivering it safely 
 over to the commissariat depot at Dadur. All intercourse betwixt the 
 troops above and those below the pass had, as before explained, been cut 
 off by the Beloochees. It was here, in the middle of May, that he first 
 learned of the Quettah General Order of the 4th of April, already advert- 
 ed to, ordering him to join his regiment, now on its way to Candahar. At 
 Dadur, Captain Anderson, commanding two newly raised troops of the 
 Shah's Horse Artillery, with tumbrils, ammunition waggons, &c., amount- 
 ing to 50 carriages, clained Colonel Dennie's protection through the Bolan 
 Pass. Opposed in like manner by a numerous enemy the greater part of 
 the wa}', with horses that could not draw, and boys that could not ride — 
 compelled to halt every alternate day in this mountainous and rocky defile, 
 they were destitute for several days of all powf'er, and their casualties in 
 killed and wounded were necessarily increased by men dying of apoplexy or 
 going mad from heat. With all these obstacles to be overcome, the de- 
 tachment was brought in safety to Quettah with astonishingly little loss. 
 From Quettah, Colonel Dennie, with this insignificant force, augmented 
 at Dadur by the accession of five companies of the Bengal 87th N. I., took 
 charge of treasure to Candahar, a distance of 1 50 miles, the Kojjuck Pass 
 intervening. "With this he arrived in safety, (45) and joined the head- 
 quarters of his regiment on the very day appointed. 
 
 Having thus brought our narrative to the point where the whole of the 
 elements of the grand army were assembled at Candahar, we may be per- 
 mitted shortly to review the general aspect of the military arrangements of 
 Sir J. Kcane at the opening of a campaign which, up to this date, could 
 scarcely be considered as begun. The troops had marched to the battle- 
 ground, but had hitherto met with no opposition : they were now about to 
 engage in combat. The army which had assembled at Candahar, by the 
 6th of May amounted to 10,400 (45) fighting men, of which the Bengal 
 
 44. Letter to Major Henderson, Ofl&ciating Military Auditor General — Ca- 
 bool, 24th Nov. 1840. 
 
 45. Letter to Major Henderson, ut sup. He says in a published letter of 
 the I3th April 1841, <<■ I have always considered that duty the most arduous, 
 if not the most meritorious, which fell to my lot in Affghanistan." 
 
 46. In all numerical matters we have taken Major Hough for our guide. He 
 gives no account of the Contingent in his muster roll, dated Candahar, 1st 
 June. This author is one of those whom every body copies, and no one com- 
 mends. As a store-house of exact statistical facts, his work is invaluable ; but 
 
97 
 
 column supplied 6460, the Bombay division, last arrived, 3940 ; these were 
 exclusive of the Shah's Contingent, of whose exact strength, at this date, 
 we^ are not informed, but which probably brought the force up to 15,000. 
 The followers at Candahar amounted in all to 28,653, of which more than 
 half were on the muster roll, and aA depended on the commissariat. These 
 were attended by about 4000 horses and bullocks, and above 10,000 ca- 
 mels. It was co:nputed, that from Shikarpore about 500 Beloochees had 
 been slain by us ; our own loss amounting to about 40 or 50 men, with about 
 500 horses, besides 900 oamels, and a large quantity of baggage. 
 
 The Shah's Contingent constituted a description of force to which weshall 
 have such frequent occasion to refer, that we may here give a short notice 
 of its origin, expense, and uses. It consisted of six regiments of regular 
 infantry, two of cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, a corps of sappers 
 and miners, and a mountain train, besides five local corps of irregulars. 
 These amongst them mustered about 13,000 fighting men, paid and officered 
 by the Government of India, (47) at an outlay of about half a million an- 
 
 it is so dry, and so severely statistical, that it forms rather uninteresting 
 study by itself. In saying this much, we most readily acknowledge the ex.tent to 
 which, on the present and innumerable other occasions, we have been indebted 
 to him. Hough states in his journal? p. 105 — " The British force then present 
 at Candahar (8th May) was about 90'J0 men, and there were about 3000 of the 
 Shah's Contingent, besides some AfFghan cavalry." We are unable exactly to 
 reconcile the two statements, but have assumed 15,000 as the gross number. 
 
 47. The following abstract of the charges of the Shah's army was supplied 
 us by a Cabool correspondent of 27th September, 1841, whose name is un- 
 known to us, but who, we have retison to believe, held a high official appoint- 
 ment : — 
 
 Paid by the Indian Government, Rupees. 
 
 6 Regiments of Infantry of the liue, yearly 7,92,000 
 
 i Kohistanee Corps 78,000 
 
 1 Khyber Corps 78,000 
 
 1 Jezailchee Corps 90,000 
 
 1 Bolan or Kakar Corps 48,000 
 
 2 Regular Cavalry Corps (50,000 monthlyl 6,00,000 
 
 1 Atchukzie do 36,000 
 
 2 Troops Horse Artillery 1,44 000 
 
 I Company Mountain Train 54,000 
 
 1 Corps of Sappers and Miners, . 1,20,000 
 
 General Staff: — (I Brigadier, 1 Brigade Major, 1 Judge Advocate, 1 
 
 Superintendent of Cavalry, 3 Cavalry Officers, 1 Artillery Officer) — 
 
 95Q0 monthly..., 1,14,000 
 
 Medical Department— (I Surgeon, 5 Assistant Surgeons) 60,000 
 
 Paid by the Shah. 
 4 Regiments of Jan T3az, 1 Battalion of Artillery Guards. Not paid by 
 
 the Company, and therefore the real cost unknown, but estimated at 6,00,000 
 
 Total, 28 lahks— 28,14,000 
 
 Add id for pension, half mountings, and contingencies 9,38,000 
 
 Add Commissariat Department, at 60,000 monthly 7,20,000 
 
 Graiid Total 44,72,000 
 I need not mention that the amount for pensions, half mountings, and contingencies, is very 
 uncertain ; I take it at 9,38,000, which, if not now, it will be at no distant day. Total, .£447,200 
 sterling. 
 
 Major Hough gives their numerical strength as lii<,'h as 13,000 men, includ- 
 ing the Alfghau and Kohistan levies of 4000, raised subsequent to our arrival 
 at Cabool. 
 
 r 
 
98 
 
 nually, their pay alone amounting to £280,000 ; tlie regular portion of 
 them consisted entirely of men of Hindostan. (48) The reason why this 
 body of raw levies should at the first juncture have been added to a couple 
 of well appointed armies, already adequately itrong for the performance, of 
 the task prescribed to them, is not explained. Our ideas of the then prospec- 
 tive objects of the campaign are still so imperfect and obscure, that it would 
 be rash to pronounce an opinion on a piece of policy which seems eminent- 
 ly unwise and inexplicable, and in reference to the objects of which no one 
 has ventured to offer any information :— it was disapproved of by Sir J. 
 Keane, and censured by the highest military authorities. The only colour- 
 able pretext is that suggested by Colonel Dennie in his official letter to 
 Col. Macdonald, that " it was in the vain hope of giving plausibility to the 
 fiction that the Shah was entering his dominions surrounded by his own 
 troops, — when, in fact, it was too notorious to escape exposure? that he had 
 
 Hough in his preface, gives thefoUowing as a recapitulation of the numeri- 
 cal strength of the force at the commencement of the campaign: — 
 
 Ey way of Candahar, Bengal and Bombay ^columns, 13,030 ; Shah's contin- 
 gent, 6070 ; total, 19,100. At Bukkur, under Brigadier Gordon 2200 ; reserve 
 at Kurrachee, 30505 reserve at Ferozepore, 5000. The Shahzada Timour's 
 force and Seikh contingent, to act by way of the Khyber Pass, 10,886. The 
 whole force amounting to 40,186. The difference betwixt this statement' and 
 that already given from the same quarter, is not explained. The force left in 
 Affghanistan and Scinde amounted to 20,000 men, with from 70 to 80 guns . 
 This was gradually raised up to nearly 25,000 men before the insurrection 
 broke out. It is well to keep this in view, because it has been urged in- 
 numerable times, that we stripped the country of troops before it was quieted I 
 
 The subjoined from Major Hough's preface, gives us the details of the 
 
 Shahzada's force : — 
 
 Shahzada Timoor's force, under Lieut.- Colonel Wade. Lieut. J. D, Cunning- 
 ham, Bengal Engineers, Mily. Secy, and Political Assistant- 
 
 Artillery — Two 24-Prs. Howitzers and two 6-Prs. (and 20 Swivels) 
 under Lieut. Maule? Bengal Artillery, 4 
 
 Golundauze, , 40 
 
 British,-.2 Co.'s 20th (Capt. Ferris) and 2 Co.*s 21st N.I. (Capt. 
 
 Farmer), 320 
 
 Cavalry — Mahomedans armed with swords, shields and matchlocks 
 
 400— iregulars 600, 1,000 
 
 Juzzailchees (rifles), 320. Infantry (matchlocks). Regulars 3 Bns. 
 
 (683)— 2,040. Irregulars 820 (under native commandants,) . 3,180 
 
 Affghans, 100 
 
 Pioneers, 200 
 
 . Total, . 4,840 
 British officers with these troops and commanding parties, Lieut. F. Macke- 
 son, 14th I Lieut. Rattray, 20th, Political Assistant ; Lieut. J. G. Caulfield, 
 68th J Lieut* Hillersden, 63rd Bengal N. I., and Dr Lord, Political Assistant 
 to Lieut.-Colonel Wade, Bombay establishment: Dr Alexander Reid, Bengal 
 establishment, in medical charge. 
 
 48. See letter of Colonel Dennie to Colonel Macdonald, D. A. G., Shikarpore, 
 March 9, 1839, We have as usual given nearly the words of the letter. 
 
99 
 
 not a single subject or Affghan amongst them, — his army being com- 
 posed of camp-followers from the Company's military stations." (49) ^Te 
 can liardly suppose but that it was intended to leave the contingent behind 
 us as constituted — that is of Hindoo sepo}S, commanded by British officers 
 and paid by the Company ; and yet if such was proposed at the time of the 
 publication of the Simla proclamation, the writers who stated that so 
 soon as the Shah Soojah was established on his throne, the British army 
 would be withdrawn, were guilty of embodying as gross an equivocation 
 in a Government proclamation as ever state paper contained ! To return 
 from these digressions, which have been considered necessary for the full 
 elucidation of this portion of the narrative, the reader will recollect that 
 we have now arrived at that period when an army of 15,000 British soldiers 
 having encamped around Candahar, the Shah Soojah was prepared to 
 enter the western capital of the Doorannee empire — a city containing a po- 
 pulation of from 60,000 to 100,000 inhauitants. 
 
 On the approach of a fo'-ce so perfectly overwhelming, the three brother 
 Sirdars, who had for a period of 12 years maintained Candahar, fled with 
 their families and about 200 followers to Ghirisk, a small fortress on the 
 river Helmund, 80 miles distant, which formerly belonged to one of the 
 other brothers, latterly to themselves. They left their capital on the 24th 
 April. '* Antecedently to the occupation of Candahar," says Major Have- 
 lock} •' they might by timely submission have received at the hands of the 
 British government a comfortable provision and honourable asylum in 
 Hindustan ; they hav3 now no resource left but flight into Persia." Who 
 doubts but they made the nobler choice ? It would be humbling were it not 
 ridiculous now to listen to the tone in which the contemporary narratives of the 
 Affghan war are written. The most unjustifiable acts of the Indian govern- 
 ment figure as worthy of all admiratioii ; the bold freedom of thought and 
 
 49. Letter dated Shikarpore, 9th March, 1839, addressed to Lieut. Colonel 
 Macdonald, Military Secretary to Lord Keane. We have so far given the 
 words of the letter as they stand. The following are farther extracts :— " I 
 cannot but lament, la common with the whole force-, that two regular and 
 disciplined armies, brought from so great a distance with so much dithculty and 
 cost, should) at the very moment of united action, be thus maimed and dis- 
 membered merely for the sake of keeping together a mass of raw levies like 
 the Shah's contingent, whose carriage and supplies would suffice for the Ben- 
 gal and Bombay divisions, and who would again be much better employed in 
 being left here for formation and instruction, whereas in their present state 
 they must prove worse than worthless in advance. * * A necessary evil 
 which has arisen out of this has been the effort to establish the efficiency of 
 one part ot the army at the expense of the other," &c. These observations 
 were as sound as fairly put, and their justice was heartily concurred in by the 
 Cominander-iu-Chief. But the Government of India on this occasion desired 
 no advice on military matters from the officers in its service : Sir John Keane 
 knew this, and he troubled them with none, but executed what he was ordered. 
 
100 
 
 action manifested by the Affglians, whose analogies in our history are sources 
 of our hiofhest and purest national pride, are spoken of by English officers as 
 pieces of fatuity wholly unaccountable! The Shah was anxious to have made 
 his troops pursue the Sirdars, and bring them back to camp : the more conside- 
 rate Envoy having, without success, endeavoured to make terms with them 
 and secure their submission or friendship, and fearing that the treatment 
 they might reeeive from any one under the immediate authority of the so- 
 vereign might not be altogether consistent with English justice or genero- 
 sity, dispatched Brigadier Sale, on the 12th May, in pursuit of them ; who, 
 however^ on approaching the Helmund, found that they had continued their 
 flight without interruption to Meshid in Persia. (50 i The chiefs had been 
 driven to the alternative of seeking exile rather than attempting resistance, 
 by the treachery of one of their number — Hadjee Khan Kakur, who had de- 
 serted them, and shortly afterwards displayed similar treachery to us. They 
 proposed before this to have posted a body of cavalry to oppose us at the foot 
 of the Kojjuck pass, but had not carried their intention into effect. (5 1 ) This 
 arrangement, if conducted with the most ordinary skill, might have been 
 sufficiently inconvenient for u<, considering the strength of the position and 
 the crippled condition of the mounted portion of our troops. 
 
 On his approach to Candahar, the Shah appears to have been received in 
 a very friendly spirit by the populace. It was with the chiefs he was unpo- 
 pular ; and they had quitted their country when they found their inability 
 to defend it. Up to this period the King kept in the rear of the British 
 Troops. "As we drew near to Candahar," says Sir William Macnaghteii 
 in a letter to Government of the 24th April, "at every hundred yards of 
 our progress we were met by bands of well-mounted and well-armed men, 
 all tendering their allegiance to his majesty ; whilst the peaceable inhabitants 
 of the city assembled in crowds and manifested their joy at the Shah's re- 
 storation, in the most unbounded terms.'."(32) "On the morning of the 
 24th April the king approached Candahar, but without any intention of 
 entering the city. The scarcity of water compelled his majesty to proceed 
 within three miles of tiie walls. This, at all events, was the excuse for 
 passing to the front, and leaving the British army in the rear. The king 
 was in advance of his own troop?. The morning had scarcely dawned when 
 parties of horse were descried; they were soon ascertained to be friends 
 come to pay homage to their sovereign. They galloped up, dismounted, 
 drew up in line, prayed to the king, who welcomed them, and then fell 
 into the rear of the procession. One standard after another succeeded, 
 
 50. Atkinson, pp. 159, 160. 
 
 51 . Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 248. 
 
 52. r>r Kennedy. 
 
and ere his majesty enterel the city lie had been joined by 1500 well-mount- 
 ed, dressed, aud caparisoned horse. On his majesty's entering into the 
 city, there could not have been less than between 60,000 and 70,000 persons 
 present." (53) After they had visited the shrine containing the shirt of the 
 prophet, and prayed at his grandfather's tomb, the party returned through 
 the city amidst universal demonstrations of loyalty and respect. These 
 emotions must either have been shallow, insincere, or of very transient 
 duration. The Shah had not been six months seated on his throne, when 
 discontent and insurrection made their appearance, which, in this quarter 
 never was subdued while we remained in the country. On the 25th, the day 
 following that on which so favourable a reception had been given to a chance 
 visit, he took possession of his western capital in form. On the 8th of May 
 the whole of the British army was drawn out in review order, by desire of the 
 sovereign, to make a display of our strength in the eyes of his subjects, and 
 celebrate /lis restoration to his throne. *' The king was surrounded by his 
 loving subjects, (says Lieutenant Fane,) and ragamufSa soldiers, but by 
 very few men of rank or consequence."(54) Nothing could have appeared 
 better than the whole array of people, but from fear or dislike of the Shah, 
 ^ew, if any, men of influence in the country were present. It is needless to 
 give the details of the Shah's levee, with the other regal ceremonies, by 
 whose means it was hoped to give the phantom the authority of a king. The 
 modern city of Candahar is comprised within a fortification, three miles in 
 circumference, forming an irregular oblong square, surroun;le 1 by a ditch 
 24 feet wide and 10 deep. The wall just within this is 27 feet in height, and 
 from 14 to 20 feet thick. It has six gates, all at this time in bad repair. 
 The gateways are defended by six double bastions, and there are 54 lesser 
 bastions distributed lalong the face of the wall. There are four leading 
 streets running from north to south and from eist to west, and meeting in 
 the centre in a large circular space 50 feet in diameter, and covered in by a 
 dome. This forms the principal market place, where the chief merchants 
 reside. 
 
 When we arrived at Candahar in April, the crops were in process 
 of rapid vegetation. We still clung to the hope that Mehrab Khan 
 would supply us with cattle and provisions ; and as forage was becoming 
 more plentiful as the season advanced, though the means of transport were 
 rather falling off than improving, we hung on from week to week till the 
 
 i 63. Letter from an officer of the Bombay force, published in a Bombay pa- 
 per> quoted in Capt. Outram's rough notes. This visit to the city was made 
 at the suggestion of the Envoy, and gave the greatest offence to Sir J. Keane. 
 It certainly was a singularly rash and imprudent adventure : wholly ignorant 
 as we were of the temper of the populace, it might have been fatal. 
 
 54. Five years in India— by Lieut. Henry Fane? late aid-de-camp to H. E. 
 the Commander in- chief j now Captain in H. M. army, vol. ii., p. 131. 
 
102 
 
 approach of harvest: — that season being later at Ghuznee and Cabool than at 
 Candahar, in consequence of the great additional elevation and higher lati- 
 tude of the latter two than the former, gave us reason to hope that we should 
 find the produce of the soil ready for us as we advanced. It was a singular 
 feature in the design of the campaign, that we should have sent an expedition 
 of such magnitude to so great a distance, knowing that for its success we 
 must in some measure be dependent on the aid of chiefs whom we might 
 punish for broken promises, but could not coerce, and whose whole interests 
 lay in retarding and resisting us. " Had Mehrab Khan of Kela*"- obstructed 
 us in the Bolan Pass (says Dr. Kennedy) ; (55) had Caniahar been proper- 
 ly defended ; had the 28 guns we found at Urgundah been bestowed for the 
 defence of Candahar and Ghuznee ; and had the 1200 cavalry shut up in the 
 latter fort been merely employed in riding round u«, wasting all the forage, 
 and watching all foraging parties from the Bolan Pass to Cabool : finally, 
 had Russian agency been so far developed as it was supposed, and ought to 
 have been, to have justified such a campaign ; had any one of these contin- 
 gencies occurred, — and not only one but all were to be looked for, — the army 
 could not have advanced ; not because we should not have been able to de- 
 feat the enemy if he would have given us the opportunity ; but because it 
 was his wisdom to avoid a contest, and the distance to be travelled exceeded 
 the means of any Commissariat to convey supplies in the face of hostile 
 opposition. The wretchedness of the country denied pasture for our cattle* 
 and they must have perished on the road had the necessary delay occurred, 
 which must have resulted from a cool and calculating enemy, however feeble, 
 availing himself of the natural advantages his position gave him, and of the 
 length of way we had to travel." At Candahar there was every appear- 
 ance of a plentiful harvest. The Commander-in-Chief had a very heavy 
 responsibility on his shoulders, — that of the future provisioning of the army ; 
 and one of his first acts was to consult the king and the envoy in regard 
 to the crops on the ground. It was considered, that if the owners consent- 
 ed to receive a high price for their grain, and a certain number of the. 
 largest mills were placed under the control of the commissariat, such 
 an arrangement would be the best, and least annoying to all parties ; but 
 unless the king could satisfactorily establish that he had power to guarantee 
 this, and assurance of it was given by the principal men in the place, and 
 by the owners of the crops, there was still left the power of might in the 
 hands of Sir John Keane, to take possession of the crops on the ground, and 
 pay the owners a fair valuation — but such a measure as this last was not to be 
 resorted to except in an extreme case. The most satisfactory assurances were 
 given that there would be no occasion for coercion on the point of collect- 
 
 65. Campaign of the Army of the Indus, vol. i , p. 261 . 
 
103 
 
 ing. grain, and this free system was cairied out to the letter; but the 
 cost was tremendous, and the treasury was in consequence most severely 
 drawn upon. So extremely guarded was the Commander-in-Chief obliged 
 to be, and so parsimonious in the disbursements from the treasury at that 
 time, that not a rupee could be issued to any functionary, or establishment, 
 whether to the Envoy for the service of the Shah, the expenses of the 
 commissariat, or the pay of the troop?, without a written order from 
 Colonel Macdonald, his Excellency's military secretary. The grounds 
 and necessity of the requisitions for money were required to be made 
 manifest before the order was given. In this way it was managed to 
 keep the chest in such a state that there was always something 
 to go and come upon for exigencies. All attempts failed of raising 
 money at Candahar, by giving bills upon India. Whether this pro- 
 ceeded from poverty in the place, or a want of confidence in us, has 
 not been clearly ascertained, but in all probability from the former cause. 
 Daily reports were sent to Sir John Keane of the progress made, 
 and great exertions were used by the commissary-general to complete 
 the quantity oJ provisions required for an onward move, and for which 
 there was carriage. The four heavy guns of the battering train wero left 
 behind, for two reasons, first, because the carriage for their transport, 
 together with the ammunition and all belonging to them, could ill be 
 spared ; and, secondly, but the principal cause^ owing to the strong opin- 
 ion given by the chief engineer, Capt. Thomson, that they would be wholly 
 unnecessary, as Ghuznie was not a place of that strenyth to require their 
 being brought into use. This opinion was not formed by Captain Thomson 
 on light grounds. It was, strange to say, come to on the authority and 
 report of an engineer and an artillery oflScer in our own service, who had seen 
 the place, and who were actually then present with the force I How dif- 
 ficult then is the situation of a commander of an army in a country 
 so little known as this was. Who could Sir John. Keane look to for in- 
 formation with so much confidence as to the officers in our own service 
 who had seen Ghuznie, and those, officers too of the scientific branch ? 
 Captain Thomson states in his official reports, that he was misled by this 
 information. The Commander-in-Chief has been blamed in more than one 
 publication for leaving the heavy guns behind. He did so, however, on 
 the recommendation of those from whom he had the best right to expect good 
 counsel on such a point, the heads of the engineer and artillery departments ; 
 and although the lamented Brigadier Stevenson is not alive to verify the fact 
 of what is here stated. Colonel Pew and Majors Thomson and Peat are, and 
 will readily subscribe to its accuracy. (56) At length the order was given 
 
 oQ. The above explanation is given on the authority not named but already 
 
104 
 
 that we should advance on the 29th June, and by the 1st July the whole 
 army had quitted. They met with no obstruction in their progress, and 
 no event of any considerable note occurred to them till their approach to 
 Ghuznee, when they were much annoyed by alarms of night attacks 
 which never were made. The troops still continued on half, and the fol- 
 lowers on quarter rations. (57) On the 21st of July, they arrived under 
 the walls of Ghuznie; the distance from Candahar being 230 miles. 
 The British force consisted of 8000 fighiing men fit for duty, and the 
 Shah's contingent, about 4,000 : making 12,000 in all, with 40 pieces 
 of artillery. (58) Their baggage covered an area of 16 square miles. (59) 
 Ghuznie is situated on the northern extremity of a range of hills run- 
 ning due east and west. The west, south, and east sides of the town, are 
 protected by a broad and deep ditch supplied with water from the river 
 adjoining. (60) The citadel or Bala Hissar is an irregular square on an 
 eminence overlooking all the city. The fortress was considered by the 
 Affghans so strong that it was believed capable of being maintained against 
 us for twelve months. Its garrison consisted of betwixt 3000 and 4000 
 men, half of which were cavalry ; they were provisioned for three months. 
 The population of the city was about equal in amount to the garrison. Jt 
 was commanded by Goolara Hyder Khan, youngest son of Dost Mahomed. 
 "The accounts of the fortress received," says Captain Thomson, (61) 
 •* from these who had seen it, were such as to induce his Excellency the 
 Commander-in-Chief to leave at Candahar the very small battering train 
 then with the army, there being there a scarcity of transport cattle. The 
 place was described as being very weak, completely commanded by a range 
 of hills. When we came before it on the morning of the 21st July, we were 
 very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a 
 scarped mound about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and sur- 
 rounded by a fausse braye and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the 
 < enceinte' gave a good flanking fire, whilst the right of the citadel covered 
 the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering, 
 it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been 
 enlarged, screen-walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out 
 and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the 
 right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it. As we approached 
 Ghuznie the most conflicting accounts reached us of the intentions of the 
 
 repeatedly referred to. It has been made more minute because of the 
 misapprehension which has generally existed on the subject. 
 57. Major Hough, p. 150, note. 
 
 68. Ibid, p. 164. 
 
 69. Dr Kennedy. 
 
 60. Hough, p. 227. 
 
 61. Memoranda by Captains Thomson and Peat, engineers, July 1839. We 
 have employed the words of the writers. 
 
105 
 
 enemy : it was at first maintained that night attacks were intended ; thea 
 that battle was to be given us in form ; afterwards that the city and citadel 
 were to be abandoned without resistance; and, finally, which proved the 
 truth, that the garrison had been reinforced and received instructions to 
 hold out to the last. General Willshire's brigade having pressed on by 
 forced marches, the whole army were arranged by the Comrnander in- Chief 
 in three columns, ready to deploy into line, and give battle at a moment's 
 warning, and thus they moved across the extensive plain by which Ghuznie is 
 approached on the west, and after a march of twelve miles halted within a 
 mile of the walls of the fort. (62) On the arrival of the infantry a party 
 of skirmishers was thrown into a garden from which some matchlock fire 
 had appeared to proceed, and cleared it without difficulty. It was desired 
 by the Commander-in-Chief that it should be ascertained what amount of 
 fire the enemy could direct against us. With this object-, 18 horse artillery 
 guns, together with the camel battery of 9-pounders, making 30 in all, 
 were got into position 700 yards from the walls. (63) They opened a brisk 
 fire of shot and shrapnel), which lasted for three quarters of an hour, the 
 enemy appearing to suffer severely, especially from the explosion of the 
 shells. The practice of the Affghans was good, and their guns were well 
 supplied. Having ascertained all we wanted to know, our artillery were 
 withdrawn. (64) The fort was now reconnoitred in form : it was found 
 that all the gates, save that opening on the Cabool road on the opposite 
 side from whence we halted, had been built up. It was impossible to 
 breach the walls with guns of the calibre we had alone brought along with 
 us, or in any reasonable time with the small battering train brought from 
 Sukkur and left behind, even could this have been commanded. Mining 
 and escalading were equally out of the question, from the height of the 
 parapet and magnitude of the wet ditch; to sit down in formal siege was 
 an operation much too tardy to be thought of, considering the advanced 
 period of the year, and it was therefore determined, on the resommenda- 
 tion of the Engineers, that the Cabool gate should be blown in, and cap- 
 ture attempted by assault. On the evening of the day of their arrival, the 
 
 62. Outraai, p. 91. 
 
 63. Major Hough, p. 166, and note* 
 
 64. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to 
 expect, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. 
 We had no battering train, continues Captain Thomson : to besiege Ghuznie 
 in form, a much larger one would have been required than the army ever 
 possessed. The command of the parapets from 60 to 70 feet, with the wet 
 ditch, were unsurmountable obstacles to an attack either by mining or escalad- 
 ing « • ♦ The result of this reconnoissance was a report to His 
 Excellency the Commander in-chief that, if he decided upon an immediate at- 
 tack on Ghuznie, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one 
 which held out a prospect of success, was to make a dash at the Cabool gate- 
 way, blowing tho gate open by powder- bags. — Report^ ut supra. 
 
106 
 
 troops \rere directed to cliange their ground : they marched in two column?, 
 right and left of the fortress, to take up their new position on the Cabool 
 instead of the Candahar side: they were directed to make a considerable 
 circuit, so as to keep without the range of the fire of the fort : they reached 
 the new halting place in the course of the night. Besides being now in a posi- 
 tion for the operations about to be carried into effect previous to the assault, 
 the army was so placed as to prevent the escape of Hyder Khan and tlie 
 garrison should they think of abandoning the fort, as well as to preclude 
 the possibility of his receiving assistance or supplies from his father or 
 brother, whose troops were still further to the eastward. The Commander- 
 in-Chief having, at break of day, reconnoitred the new aspect the city 
 now presented, laid down his plans and issued his orders for the proceed- 
 ings of next night. (65) About noon the hills to the southward of our 
 camp were crowded by masses of horse and foot, displaying several stand- 
 ards. The whole of the Shah's horse, supported by the Lancers and 
 a Bengal regiment of cavalry, moved ,out with a couple of guns to 
 meet them. So soon as the cavalry approached, the enemy, who had 
 begun to descend into the plain, found it expedient to re-ascend the 
 heights, leaving behind one of their standards in our possession, four or 
 five of their horses having fallen. Captain Outram had at this time 
 galloped out to ascertain what was astir : he reached the scene of action 
 just before the occurrence of the incident already described, and finding na 
 European officer on the spot, persuaded a body of the Shah's horse to follow 
 him round the hills to the enemy's rear, where he stationed them so as to 
 cut off their retreat. Intimidated by this movement, and repulsed by the 
 gallant charge of Ensign Nicholson, the Affghans ascended the heights 
 beyond the reach of our horse. Captain Outram now suggested to an 
 English officer, whom, at this juncture, he met in charge of 150 infantry 
 and matchlock -men, that they should make an attempt to drive the enemy 
 from the heights in the direction in which the cavalry had been stationed. 
 They scrambled over the rocks with great gallantry. Captain Outram at their 
 head ; and after scaling the steep and rugged acclivity of the hill, sheltering 
 themselves from the fire, which was hot and well-directed, by every stone 
 and rocky promontory which came in their way, they at length step by step 
 attained the highest summit. They now reached the head- quarters of the 
 enemy, marked by a large green and white banner, which had been conse- 
 crated by the priests, and was supposed to confer invincibility. On arriving 
 within fifty paces of this, the whole of our party rushed in with a general 
 cheer — a fortunate shot brought down the standard-bearer, and the standard 
 itself fell into our hands. The enemy were panic- struck, their charm had 
 
 65, Outram, p. 95. 
 
107 
 
 failed them, and they fled on every side. The loss of the Affghans amounted 
 to 30 or 40 in killed and wounded, and 50 were made prisoners by the 
 cavalry — the greater part of which were afterwards executed, because one 
 of them in the king's presence stabbed an attendant ; his Majesty gave in- 
 stant orders to behead him and the otliers. As may be supposed, this was 
 done without the knowledge of the Commander-in-chief, who was astounded 
 when Sir Alex. Burnes came to him soon after from Mr Macnaghten to report 
 it. It was also perpetrated without the knowledge of either of them ; but the 
 deed was done, and it was too late to recall it. His Majesty was, however, dis- 
 tinctly informed by Sir John Keane's orders, that such butchering \^ ould never 
 again be permitted within the limits of a British camp, even on his Majesty's 
 own subjects. (66) By 3 o'clock of the morning of the 23d July, the va- 
 
 QQ. This version of the matter may be relied on, though very widely differ- 
 ent from that usually given. Sir W. Macnaghten, though disapproving of the 
 measure at the time, afterwards attempted to defend it. [We have retained 
 this note, as well as the text to which it refers, exactly as it stood in the 
 Bombay Montldy Times^ A letter subscribed *' Old Vkusion^" gives Sir VV. Mac- 
 naghteu's own account of the matter, which is very greatly at variance with 
 the above.] 
 
 On referring the matter to an Officer of rank now in Bombay, who held a 
 confidentiul Staff situation with Sir John Keane at the time, he writes as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 Sir, — As you have asked my impression as to the two versions regardino; what 
 immediately preceded the beheading of the Ghazee prisoners by order of Shah 
 Shoojah, I can have no objections to give it, in so far as I had any means of forming 
 an opinion, — it being a matter that did not in the most remote degree come within 
 the sphere of my office or duty. Tl)e point upon which I believe you wish an opi- 
 nion is, whether Sir John Keane was aware of the King's intention to behead the 
 prisoners, and gave his concurrence lo it, before thejact; or whether he was only 
 made aware of it after the fact. The impression on my mind is, that he only kn«nr 
 it after, and for this reason ^ having gone into Sir John Keane's tent that afternoon, 
 and finding Sir Alexander Burnes with him, Sir John Keane exclaimed *' what do 
 you think has happened ? — the King has beheaded the prisoners taken this after- 
 noon." Sir Alex. Burnes then related how, and why the King had done so — ihat 
 when they were brought into His Majesty's presence and questioned regarding 
 th'-iir rebellion and treason, they said they would glory in taking His Majesty's life ; 
 that he was an infidel^ and had brought an army of infidels into the country, and 
 that they would take his life whenever they could, ©r had an opporiunity; and one 
 of them, suiting the action to the word, plunged a dagger into the breast of one of 
 the Shah's attendants in His Majesty's presence j — upon which the King gave orders 
 that tliey should all be beheaded. 
 
 I cannot be mistaken in what Sir Alexander Burnes said, as I have above related 
 it', nor do I think lie cauld have come with a message from the Envoy asking con- 
 currence, previous to that afternoon, without my knowing it, as I was seldom out of 
 Sir John Keane's tent> it being a time of heavy work, as well as heavy responsibility 
 and much anxiety to him, as the arrangements for the storming of Gbuznie were 
 still ir> progress and not completed. My impression therefore, for the reason I 
 have stated, is, tlat the account in the text is the nearest to the true version. There 
 was no writing of any kind upon the subject that I was aware of, and I seldom or 
 e«er heard it afterwards talked of or condemned by the Officers in the Field ; at the 
 moment ail seemed to think the treason of the Ghazee prisoners of a double and 
 
108 
 
 rious detachments were at their posts, and all the guns in position at points 
 which commanded the eastern face of the fortress, as well as the Gabool 
 
 most aggravated kind ; and although at the time of Sir Alexander Burnes relating 
 the tragic story to me, as I have stated it, I heard Sir John Keane condemn the 
 Shah for his rash act, and that such a thing must not happen again, 1 at the same 
 time heard him say, that *' the murderers and treacherous rascals deserved it,'* or 
 words to that effect. I therefore think, that if Sir William Macnaghten wrote a 
 year afterwards, to the eff'ect stated in the note, he must have jumhled two things 
 togetlier, and confounded the account Sir Alexander Burnes gave him of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief's conversation with concurrence in the Shah's act. 
 
 I had for Sir William Macnagliten personally a very great regard,and so thorough- 
 ]y convinced am I of his good intentions, and his strict regard for truth, that if he 
 did write to the effect stated, he had convinced himself of its correctness, however 
 he may have mixed up two circumstances at a time of intense anxiety, and of no 
 small danger) when my lamented friend Sir Alexander Burnes went back to him 
 and related his conversation with the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 It was not an unusual thing for Sir John Keane to offer advice to the Shah (the 
 Envoy being of course cognizant of it). This he was not only authorized to do, but 
 also to enforce the advice in any case of necessity. In that way, he caused the Shah 
 to be informed on one occasion, when the ears of a man had been cut off by His 
 Majesty's orders for a heinous crime, that mutilation, which was abhorrent to Bri- 
 tish feelings, however it might accord with Affghan law and usage? would not be 
 permitted, so long as His Majesty and his followers formed part of a British Camp. 
 I am, Sir, your obedient servant. 
 An Officer of Rank now in Bombay, who held a 
 
 Confidential Staff Situation. 
 
 '* The following extract is from an autograph-letter from Sir William Macnaghten 
 to Sir Alexander BurneS) dated '' Cabool, Nov. 27, 1840,' now before me, and a 
 Copy of which I have supplied by last Mail to Sir William's friends in London, to 
 enable them to meet the new ' version of the matter' in your Summary with such 
 denial as they may think proper. 
 ** Extract from a letter from Sir William Macnaghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, on 
 
 the subject of the destruction of the 36 prisoners who were put to death at Ghizni 
 
 the presence of Major McSherry, on the evening of the 22d July 1839. 
 
 * The facts of the case, as contained in my official letter to Government, were 
 simply these : to the truth of my statement you and many^ther persons can testify, 
 
 t On the morning of the 22d July, whilst we were before the Fort of Ghizni, a 
 numerous body of armed people (I have recently heard their number estimated at 
 nearly four thousand) were seen ascending the hills immediately to the left of His 
 Majesty's camp. In the course of the day they several times threatened to come 
 down upon our camp; but they were repulsed and kept in check chiefly by the 
 Shah's own troops and Christie's horse, who were at different periods engaged 
 ■with these fanatics. Towards evening, a report was brought to me, that the King's 
 people had taken several prisoners, and that His Majesty had determined upon the 
 execution of them all. On the impulse of the moment, I suggested that a selec- 
 tion should be made of the offenders for execution j and I immediately consulted 
 Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, through Sir Alexander Burnes, who was in His 
 Excellency's camp; and his opinion was, that < the most summary example should 
 be made of all such dastardly ruffians.' In the meanwhile, I had received several 
 .messages from His Majesty, expressing his determination to put the prisoners to 
 death, as the only safe and proper course to be adopted in the exigency of our situ- 
 ation. 1 replied, that His Majesty was supreme, but that I would at least strongly 
 fecommeud him, if he thought a severe example necessary> to liberate some of the 
 
109 
 
 gate. The weather was peculiarly favourable for the concealment of our 
 movements. The wind blew strongly and in gusts from the east, and occa- 
 sionally with such violence over night and towards dawn, as to render in- 
 audible to the devoted garrison the tramp of columns or rattle of artillery 
 wheels.(67) Under these circumstances, so quietly and judiciously were 
 all our arrangements effected, that not a shot was fired from the garrison 
 until after the commencement of the false attack by Captain Hay, with three 
 companies of the 35th N.I. from the opposite quarter to that from which 
 real danger was preparing. As an attack for the relief of the garrison had 
 been threatended, Col. Stalker with the Bombay 19th N. I., was ordered to 
 guard the Cabool road, but no enemy appeared. At midnight, the first bat- 
 tery left camp, followed by four others at intervals of half an hour. Those 
 to the right of the road were conducted to the right of their positions, by 
 Lieutenant Sturt, those on the left by Lieutenant Anderson. The ground 
 for the guns was prepared by the sappers and pioneers, taking advantage of 
 the irregularities to the right, and some old garden walls on the left. (68) 
 The artillery being all in readiness shortly after 3 o'clock, Captain Peat of the 
 Bombay Engineers moved down to the gateway, acconcpanied by six men of 
 H. M/s 1 3th, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same 
 Regiment, consisting of 18 officers, 28 sergeants, 17 buglers, and 276 rank 
 and file, which entered to the right and left of the road, taking what cover 
 they could find as they arrived at the ditch, and endeavouring to keep down 
 the fire of the ramparts, which became very heavy on the approach of 
 the party, though it had been sufficiently slack throughout on previous 
 operations. Blue lights were shown by the besieged, which rendered 
 surrounding objects distinctly visible ; luckily they were burned on the top 
 of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below. (69) The ex- 
 plosion party consisted of Captain Peat, Li cuts. Durand (70) and M'Leod, 
 
 prisoners^ in order that the retribution which had overtaken their comrades might 
 be made known to the whole of these fanatic offenders My recommendation was 
 not concurred in by His Majesty to the extent that I could have wished: of 38 
 prisoners 2 only were released, — the one on the ground of his being a Syud, and 
 the other because he begged his life. The remainder, who obstinately persisted in 
 exasperating His Majesty, were executed.' * * * 
 
 * On such an occasion it was my duty to seek the advice of the chief military au- 
 thority on the spot, and I have shown that I did so.'' 
 
 Old Version." 
 
 67. Havelock, vol. ii. p. 71. 
 
 68. Captain Thomson's Report. 
 
 69. Report, ut supra. Copied verbatim. 
 
 70. This officer having been home on leave, returned to India with Lord 
 Ellenborough, and was appointed his Lordship's Private Secretary. Long 
 before the capture of Ghuznie, when very young in years, he had distinguish- 
 ed himself in scientific research : especially by his discoveries of some of the 
 most famous sub-Himalayan fossils. 
 
no 
 
 three Serjeants, and eighteen men of the Sappers, in working dresses, 
 carrying- 300 lbs. of powder in 12 sand-bags, with a hose 72 feet long. 
 These advanced steadily, silently, and rapidly, led by Lieut. Durand. The 
 enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to 
 have no idea of the nature of the operations in progress. If they had been 
 so, they might have rendered it impossible to place the powder^bags, by 
 throwing over blue- lights, of which they had abundance in store. The 
 powder pots, and other fire-works so much used by the natives of Hindos- 
 tan, would easily have rendered the cramped space leading to the gate much 
 too hot for such an operation, but the ignorance of the besieged was known 
 and calculated on ; the results show how justly. Lieutenant Durand, oa 
 first going up, saw, through the chinks of the gate, that there were lights, 
 and a guard immediately behind it. The men on duty were smoking quiet- 
 ly thinking of no danger : three minutes after, they must have been destroy- 
 ed by the explosion ! The powder was placed, the hose laid, the train 
 fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover, in less than two 
 minutes. No man was hurt ; Captain Peat was momentarily stunned by 
 the concussion, but speedily recovered. The success was complete. There 
 having been reason to apprehend that the enemy might have built up or 
 strengthened the gate from within, more than double the quantity of gun- 
 powder recommended by Colonel Pasley had been used. The charge was 
 so heavy that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considera- 
 ble portion of the square building in which it was placed, the ruins obstruct- 
 ing the advance of the assaulting column. (71) A few moments elapsed be- 
 fore a bugler could be found to sound the advance. (72) The instant the 
 trumpet blast was heard, the storming party, consisting of the grenadier 
 companies of H. M.'s 2d and 17th, with those of the Bengal European Re- 
 giment, and a company of H. M.'s 13th, led on by the heroic Colonel Den- 
 nie, rushed in and found themselves for a few moments in fierce hand-to- 
 hand conflict with the Affghans amidst the ruins of the demolished gateway. 
 *' Nothing could be distinctly seen in the narrow passage; but the clash of 
 sword-blade against bayonet was heard on every side." (73) The soldiers 
 had to grope their way between the yet standing walls ; there was neither 
 room nor leisure for regular firing. Each section loaded in turn, and deli- 
 vered its deadly volley at half pistol-shot distance on the enemy. The en- 
 trance-way just on passing the gate, took a sudden turn at right angles to 
 the line of its previous path. This led at first to the erroneous impression 
 that the passage was built up within, and that the explosion had not opene( 
 
 71. Capt. Peat's Report, verbatim. 
 
 72. Capt. Thomson's Report. 
 
 73. Havelock, vol. ii., p. 76. 
 
Ill 
 
 a thoroughfare. The illusion was only dispelled when the sky began to ap- 
 pear over head ; and the leading files immediately afterwards found them- 
 selves in the open square within the town. Meanwhile an erroneous report, 
 that Col. Dennle had been unable to make good an entrance, reached the 
 supporting column, consisting of H. M.'s2d and 13th, with the remainder of 
 the Europeans, under Brigadier Sale, (H. M.'s 17th being directed to follow 
 the storming party into the fort.) They halted for a moment, and the retreat 
 was sounded ; (74) fortunately it was imperfectly heard and unattended to 
 during the tempest of the night and the excitement of the events in pro- 
 gress. A few minutes more elapseJ, and the true version of the matter was 
 communicated; Brigadier Sale pressed on, but the loss of the few minutes 
 his halt had occasioned, gave rise to mischief. (75) A considerable interval 
 was left betwixt the forlorn hope, under Col. Dennie, and the column of Bri- 
 gadier Sale. As the latter pressed into the gateway, the Queen's regiment 
 taking the lead, a large body of Aflfghans, driven from the ramparts by the 
 fire of the forlorn hope, rushed down upon them in hopes of escaping be- 
 yond the walls. The attack was made on the rear company of the Queen's 
 and the leading files of the Bengal European regiment.(76) The fury of 
 their assault for a moment drove back the troops opposed to them. Briga- 
 dier Sale was cut down, and his adversary rolled over him. Capt. Kershaw 
 of H. M.'s 13th, during the struggle passed his sword through the body of 
 the AfFghan. This, however, was not enough ; and not till Sir Robert Sale 
 managed to get uppermost and cleave his skull to the eyebrows, would liis 
 desperate enemy let go his hold. The reserve under Colonel Croker now 
 speedily followed, and made its way into the city without resistance. On the 
 evening of the 22nd a council of war had been held in the garrison of Ghuznie : 
 it had been proposed by Hyder Khan the governor, that all the females should 
 be sent into the fort as a place of protection j this was opposed ; and j ust as the 
 assembly, whose debates had occupied the live long night, were being dissolv- 
 ed, the gates were burst open, and the batteries opened their fire. (77) No one 
 dreamt of what had happened, and the three leading companies under Col. 
 Dennie were within the fort before the chiefs suspected the approach of danger. 
 The Commdr.-in-ehief, perceiving that the city had been won, desired that the 
 •whole force of the artillery should be directed against the citadel, from which 
 a determined resistance was still expected. But the enemy were panic struck 
 with the suddenness and magnitude of the misfortune which had fallen upon 
 them, and though in their attempts to reach the gateway, the flying Affghans 
 laid about them in all directions, there was no farther resistance systematical- 
 
 74. Major Hough, p. 175. 
 76. Havelock, ut supra. 
 
 76. Major Havelock, vol. ii. p. 79. 
 
 77. Dr. Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 48. 
 
112 
 
 ly attempted. By five o'clock a. m. the colours of H. M.'s 13th C78) and 17th 
 waved from the battlements of the citadel of Ghuznie. There had been some 
 sharp fighting in the streets : one lofty building offered a desperate resistance, 
 and upwards of 50 Affghans perished in defending it. There were 514 dead 
 bodies picked up within the walls : we took 1600 prisoners, and the number of 
 the wounded was estimated about equal that of the captives. For weeks after- 
 wards, however, bodies were found in the recesses of private buildings or 
 narrow streets, mostly those of men who had died of their wounds, so that 
 the total loss of the Afi^ghans is estimated at about 1000 slain. (79) No 
 city taken by assault ever suffered so little as Ghuznie, and no men ever 
 conducted themselves under similar circumstances with temperateness and 
 moderation equal to that of its captors. On this point all writers are un- 
 animous. With the close of the fighting all violence ceased, and not one 
 female was exposed to insult or injury. It may not be superfluous to 
 add, that long before this the commissariat store of intoxicating liquor had 
 been exhausted, and Sir J. Keane commanded a temperance army. To 
 the want of liquor is ascribed by the medical men the unprecedented cel- 
 erity with whicli the injuries of the wounded were healed. Our casu- 
 alties in killed, wounded, and missing, officers and men together, amounted 
 to 191, of whom 17 only were killed. Hyder Khan, the governor, surren- 
 dered himself in the course of the morning, and was placed under the sur- 
 veillance of Sir Alexander Burnes ; he subsequently accompanied the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief with the part of the Bengal army which returned through 
 the Khyber Pa?s, and in progress through the Punjaub he requested that, 
 owing to the kind treatment he experienced, he might be allowed to accom- 
 pany Sir J. Keane all the way to Bombay, — a request which was assented to 
 by the Governor-General. He remained through the year 1840 a prisoner 
 of state at Bombay, where he was left almost entirely at liberty. The fall 
 of Ghuznie was known at Cabool, 80 miles off, at 5 o'clock the same day. 
 (80) Meer Ufzul Khan, the eldest, and commonly known as " i\\Q fighting 
 son" of Dost Mahomed, was afterwards found to have been close upon cur 
 camp early in the morning with 5000 cavalry. He heard the firing, and was 
 
 78. Major Hough, p. 6 — The colours of the 13th were placed on the 
 battlements by Ensign Frere, an able, amiable, and gallant young officer, 
 who, after having been present at all the remarkable actions which occur- 
 red in AfFghanistan betwixt 1838 and 1842, including the siege of Jella- 
 labad and return to Cabool, died on his way to India on the final abandon- 
 ment of the country. 
 
 79. Dr Atkinson's Affghanistan, p. 236—" On our arrival at Cabool, infor- 
 mation reached us, that in searching through every recess and corner, be- 
 tween 200 and 300 more dead bodies had been found and buried j so that, 
 together with those cut down in their flight, the total amount of killed has 
 been estimated at upwards of 1000," — li^id^ ut supra. Major Hough esti- 
 mates them at 1200. 
 
 80. Major Hough. 
 
Il3 
 
 only waiting for daylight to discover the state of Ghuznie. Dawn showed 
 him the British flag waving on the citadel, and indicated that it had already 
 met its fate. He immediately fled towards Cabool, leaving his elephants 
 and baggage behind him, within six miles of our camp. These were after- 
 wards captured by us. (81) 
 
 Lieut.-Col. (now Sir Claude Martin) Wade, political agent at Loodiana, 
 had, as mentioned at the commencement of our narrative, assembled near 
 Peshawur an army of 4800 men of the Shah's levies, besides a Seikh con- 
 tingent of 6000, (82) so early as the month of January. These were to 
 move upon Cabool by Jellalabad, nominally under Shahzada Timour, eldest 
 son of Shah Soojah ; while a further Seikh contingent of 10,000 was to re- 
 main as an army of observation at Peshawur. Col. Wade having been duly 
 informed of the progress and success of the grand army under Sir J. Keane, 
 proceeded into the Khyber Pass on the 22d of June. On the 27th he ob- 
 tained possession of Ali Musjid, a fort previously held by Dost Mahomed's 
 troops, and considered the key of the pass : the enemy abandoned it without 
 fighting on the approach of the advancing force. Mahomed Ukhbar Khan, 
 second son of Dost Mahomed, and afterwards too famous amongst the insur- 
 gent chiefs in 1842, was then stationed at Jellalabad, of which he was the 
 governor, with 2,500 men and 14 guns. On the fall of Ghuznie he was 
 recalled to defend Cabool. This at once opened the way for the Shahzada's 
 advance through the passes. He arrived at Cabool on the 2d Sept. Near 
 Gundamuck, Ukhbar Khan abandoned his artillery and camp equipage, so 
 that 12 guns, 7000 rounds of ball cartridges, with camp appointments, horses, 
 and draught bullocks, fell into the Shahzada's hands. Gen. Ventura, who 
 was to have taken command of the Seikh contingent, remained behind in 
 consequence of the death of Runjeet Singh, and the entire command of this 
 force, amounting to betwixt 10,000 and 11,000, devolved on Col. Wade, (83) 
 who, for this well'directed movement, received the special thanks of the 
 Governor- General: and appears well to have deserved them. A march 
 through the passes, at all times a difficult operation, was at this juncture a 
 very important one; and though little opposition was experienced, it seems 
 to have been got rid of by skilful and judicious management, — by a series 
 of ditlicult and intricate arrangements amongst a set of most untractable 
 subjects. 
 
 So soon as all was tolerably quiet, H. M. Shah Soojah and the Envoy 
 
 81. Major Hough, p. 183. 
 
 82. Major Hough. 
 
 83. Dr Atkinson's expedition into Affghanistan. This work supplies us with 
 a great many valuable facts, but it is impossible sufficiently to censure the 
 tone of childish adulation towards Lord Auckland's administration, which 
 characterizes it every where, or the perverted credulity with which all ' 
 sorts of silly and incredible anecdotes against the Barukzyes are raked up. 
 
 K 
 
114 
 
 and Minister were conducted round the citadel and a f^reat part of tlie for- 
 tress, by the Commander-in-Chief. The King was astonished at our havinp^ 
 made ourselves master of a place considered to be impregnable, in the space 
 of two hours of assault, and within 48 hours of our having presented our- 
 selves before it. (84) He was still more delighted than astonished at the 
 result. On the recommendation of the medical oflacers of the force, it 
 was determined that the sick and wounded should be left at Ghuznie under 
 charge of field-surgeon Pinhey of the Bombay service. The garrison to be 
 stationed there consisted of the I6th Bengal N. I., a detachment of 30 artil- 
 lerymen, and 200 of the Shah's horse: to these were afterwards added a 
 ressalah of the 4th Bengal local horse, with four of the Shah's guns. (8a) 
 On the 28th July, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, eldest brother of Dost Ma- 
 homed, arrived in camp on deputation from the Ameer. Sir Alex. Burnes 
 and an escort of Lancers went out to meet him. This chief had been cele- 
 brated by all the travellers whoever visited AfFghanistan, for his hospitality, 
 his kindness to Europeans, and general liberality and benevolence of dispo- 
 sition. (86) His strength of intellect and shrewdness of remark have 
 already been noticed by us in our introductory chapter, where the reasoning 
 of the state papers of the Government of India is shewn to have been 
 completely demolished by him and his brother. '* The conduct of Jubbar 
 Khan (says Major Hough) was on this occasion noble : he had at one time 
 been defrauded of his estates by his brother, but he said he wanted nothing 
 for himself.'' The drift of his present proposition was, that Hyder Khan 
 should be released, and that Dost Mahomed should cease to offer further 
 resistance, and should resign all power and authority into the hands of Shah 
 Soojah, provided we consented to his becoming Vizier or Prime Minister— 
 a position which he claimed by right of heritage. After the steps we had 
 already taken, this proposal was clearly inadmissible. He was informed 
 that the only terms which Dost Mahomed could look for, were a safe asylum 
 and liberal allowance within the British dominions. He declared that his 
 brother would never consent to reside in India on any terms. He was of- 
 fered for himself the continuance of his property, with honours from the 
 hands of the Shah. These were declined, and the chief seems to have re- 
 sorted to a boldness of speech not over grateful to royal ears. '' On being 
 
 84- Lord K^anes dispatch. 
 
 85- Major Hough, p. 221. 
 
 86. Dr Atkinson's work is on this, as on most other points affecting the 
 Barukzye character, at variance with all our books of travels. He does not 
 state whence his lights are drawn — that they are tinted by the medium of 
 the Shah Soojah court is sufficiently apparent. He speaks of Jubbar Khan 
 ■with much disparagement. 
 
115 
 
 introduced to the King," says Dr. Atkinson, " his deportment was not 
 uncourteous, but he said, ' if you are to be king, what is the use of the Bri- 
 tish arnay here ? If the English are to rule over the country, what use are 
 you here ?' " " The Shah," continues the courtly historian, ''with un- 
 ruffled temper, parried this observation by soothing his hurt mind, and, in a 
 bland manner, promised him a confidential station near his person." If, 
 instead of parrying, the Government of India had endeavoured to solve the 
 
 difficulty here set forth, as also that pressed by Mehrab Khan of Kelat 
 
 ** you have brought an army into the country, how do you propose to feed it 
 while here, or get it back again ?" — before entering on the war, Britain 
 might have been spared the loss of much life, treasure, and fame. The Na- 
 wab having failed in effecting any of his objects, left us, declaring his deter- 
 mination to follow his brother's fortunes to the close- 
 On the 30th of July our troops marched from Ghuznie towards Cabool. 
 Near the end of the first day's march they passed a defile of about 200 or 300 
 yards, behind which, a very inferior force with a few guns might have made 
 good. The elevation here was the greatest attained by them, being 9000 
 feet above the level of the sea Very rigid orders were issued for the pro- 
 tection cf the villagers, and to prevent injury to the growing crops, now 
 nearly ripe in the field. On the 1st of August a message from Peshawur 
 brought accounts of the death of Runjeet Singh : this event, by which the 
 triple alliance was so materially affected, had occurred on the 27th of June, 
 the day before the troops left Candahar. On the 3d, intelligence was re- 
 ceived of Dost Mahomed having been wholly deserted by his chiefs and army, 
 the latter said to have shortly before amounted to 13,000 men. (87) Quar- 
 rels and jealousies had arisen amongst them : old feuds and grudges were, 
 as usual, called up just at the time they should have been forgotten. The 
 severities of Dost Mahomed's vigorous government were recent and mi- 
 nutely recollected : distance had mellowed the errors of the Shah ISoojah, 
 and caused his half remembered seven years' reign of -30 years since to be 
 looked back upon as an era of happiness and prosperity. The force, 
 besides, which was accompanying him to the throne, appeared capable of 
 bearing down all opposition. The result was, that with perfidy, treachery, 
 dissension, and disaffection every where, with enemies on every side, and no 
 one to encounter them, Dost Mahomed, with 600 horsemen, fled to Bamee- 
 an with a view of seeking refuge amongst the chiefs in Traos-Oxania till 
 more auspicious days should come around. So soon as authentic accounts 
 of this reached camp, it was resolved to send a detachment in pursuit of the 
 Ameer, who, so long as he was left at liberty, must necessarily prove the 
 hope of the disaffected, and a source of substantial annoyance to the new 
 
 87. Letter of Sir J. Keane? dated 8th August, to the Envoy and Minister. 
 
116 
 
 ruler. Two thousand of the Shah's Affghans, under Hadjee Khan Kakur, 
 were ordered for this service, accompanied by a hundred of our Cavalry, 
 regular and irregular, for the purpose of stimulating their exertions, and 
 checking hostilities in case of the fugitive chief or his family falling into 
 their hands. (88) These were accompanied by the following British offi- 
 cers: —Captain Outram, Captain Wheeler, Captain Troup, Captain Law- 
 rence, Captain Backhouse, Captain Taylor, Captain Christie, Captain 
 Erskine, Lieut. Broadfoot, Lieut. Hogg, and Dr. Worral — Capt. Outram to 
 take command. The party assembled at 4 p.m., according to order, at the 
 tent of the Envoy, where the Affghans were also to have been in readiness ; 
 but not more than 300 effective men had made their appearance when it be- 
 came dark ; the remainder, consisting of from 400 to 500 of a ragged rabble, 
 mounted on yaboos or half starved ponies. It was promised that the rest 
 should follow, and the details were made up by 100 of Captain Christie's 
 horse. Hadjee Khan Kakur was extremely desirous that the high road 
 should be pursued as far as Meidan, in order, as he pretended, t(» take up 
 the track of their quarry ; and it was not till Capt. Outram had repeatedly 
 urged the impossibility of ever succeeding in this manner in the pursuit, 
 seeing that Dost Mahomed was already 24 miles a-head of them, that the 
 line of march was changed. It was with great difficulty that guides were 
 ultimately procured to enable them to make a short cut across the hills, so 
 as to intersect the path of the Ameer, about three miles from Meidan. The 
 first night the party marched thirty miles, leaving Gada, a small village 
 situated in a confined but fertile valley, about 7 a. m. Several halts had been 
 made to admit of the Affghans closing up, but not more than 100 of the 
 1600 awanting had made their appearance. Those who dropped in in the 
 course of the day gave evidence, from the plunder with which they had en- 
 cumbered themselves, of the cause of their delay. The March was renewed 
 in the evening ; the road v^as precipitous and bad ; at the end of ten miles 
 they bivouacked till one in the morning, when the moon having risen they 
 proceeded on afresh till 7 a. m. Barely 60 of the Affghans kept up with 
 them, the rest straggled in in the course of the day. Information was here 
 received that Dost Mahomed was at the village of Youit, one march a-head. 
 Hadjee Khan Kakur, who had hitherto proceeded with the greatest reluct- 
 ance, became urgent for a halt till reinforcements could be sent for. He 
 declared that the Ameer had 2000 followers, and was much too strong for 
 the present force to attack him with any hope of success. Capt. Outram 
 having insisted on proceeding, the followers of the Hadjee were raus- 
 
 88. We have taken the whole narrative of the pursuit of Dost Mahomed 
 from Major Outram's Kough Notes, which we have given a good deal 
 abridged. 
 
teredj and were found to amount to 700 in all, — less tlian one half 
 of them being suitably mounted. Before they had advanced four miles 
 «n the evening's march the guides were reported to have deserted : in a 
 dark night, amongst abrupt precipices and interminable ravines, it was in 
 vain to attempt to move without conductors, so a halt was made till day- 
 break, and Yourt was, in consequence, not attained till the morning of the 
 following day, the 6th. Few of the Affghans were now forthcoming, and 
 no inducement whatever could prevail on the Hadjee to advance sixteen 
 miles further to Huzar, where there was positive intelligence of Dost 
 Mahomed's presence ; he promised most solemnly, however, to proceed in 
 the evening, and this afforded some hope of their being able to beat up the 
 Ameer's quarters during the night. Next evening he fell back on his old 
 resolution : nothing would induce him to move that night, but he promised 
 to make a forced march of double the distance next morning. 
 
 It was most singular that in arranging this most important expedition, 
 the whole authority was intrusted to Hadjee Khan Kakur ; the European 
 officers were vested with no power save over their own men, and Capt. 
 Outram's only instructions were, that he should act along with the Aff- 
 ghans, and second them if necessary 1 All accounts agreed that the Dost 
 was accompanied by at least 2000 followers, but their progress was retarded 
 by the sickness of one of the young princes : this greatly increased the 
 chance of success in the pursuit, and Hadjee Khan was informed that, in 
 the event of his hanging back on the morrow, the party would proceed 
 without him or his assistance. It rained and hailed violently over night, 
 and our people had for the two preceding days had nothing to eat but a little 
 unripe parched corn. On the 7th they marched at daybreak, and, on 
 arriving at Huzar, found traces 'of the Ameer's camp of yesterday; they 
 learned that he had that morning encamped at Kalloo, without apparently 
 being in any hurry to depart. They reached the place at three p. m., but 
 found the Dost gone so many hours before that he must have surmounted 
 the Kalloo Pass? the highest in the Hindoo Koosh. Every one of the 
 Affghans had now fallen behind, and the little sepoy band had been nine 
 hours in the saddle; their horses were knocked up ; they were 12,000 feet 
 above the level of the sea, and saw snow 1300 feet below them. In the 
 evening they obtained a scanty meal of flour. On the morning of the 8th 
 they were joined by Captains Trevor and Taylor with 30 troopers. In the 
 course of the day they surmounted the Pass called the Camel's Back, 
 15,000 feet high, nearly the altitude of the summit of Mount Blanc. 
 Hadjee Khan they now found to be totally untrustworthy : a council of war 
 was held, when it was resolved that on the Ameer turning to oppose us in 
 the event of his being next day overtaken, of which no doubt was enter- 
 
118 
 
 tained, that the thirteen British officers should charge in the centre of the 
 band, every one directing his individual efforts against the person of Dost 
 Mahomed Khan, whose fall in this vray must be next to certain. It was 
 evident that all the Affghans on both sides would turn against them, unless 
 they were immediately successful, and this plan appeared to afford the only 
 chance of escape to those who might survive. It was an object of para- 
 mount importance to effect the destruction of the Ameer rather than permit 
 his escape. (89) 
 
 On reaching Bameean, on the morning of the 9th, the intelligence of the 
 Dost's escape, which had previously been received, was fully confirmed. 
 He had pushed ahead by long forced marches, and was, by this time, on 
 the extreme verge of the Shah's territory, and close upon the confines of 
 that of the Wullee of Khooloom, who had always been a friend of the 
 Barukzyes ; it would, under these circumstances, and in the utterly ex- 
 hausted state of their horses, have been madness to proceed, and it was 
 resolved to halt until they were so far refreshed as to be able to return to 
 Cabool. They arrived at the capital on the 19th. Hadjee Khan Kakur 
 was immediately arrested, — abundant evidence of his treasonable intentions 
 having now made their appearance. This wretch was originally a melon- 
 vendor. He deserted Dost Mahomed Khan to join the Candahar Sirdars, 
 and, having betrayed them and joined the Shah Soojab, forced them to 
 quit their country without a blow. For this he was ennobled with the 
 title of " Nusseer-ood-Dowlah," — or Sword of the State, — and received 
 territory valued at £30,000 a-year- It now appeared that he had leagued 
 himself to fight against the King in the event of any change of fortune 
 arriving. He has been since detained a state prisoner at Chunar, — as 
 deeply dyed a traitor as ever betrayed an empire. 
 
 Returning to the movements of Sir John Keane's army: simultaneously 
 with the despatch of the party towards Bameean, Major Cuerton, with 200 
 of H. M.'s 16th Lancers, was sent forward to take possession of the guns 
 left at Arghundee. They were all of brass, and amounted to 28 in number, 
 of various calibres, generally from 6 to 9 pounders. Many of them were 
 double-shotted, and would, in all likelihood, have been as injurious, if fired, 
 to the army to which they belonged, as to that against which they were 
 directed. They were badly mounted, difficult to work, and their car- 
 riages liable to damage or destruction from comparatively trivial accidents. 
 They were unskilfully placed, and an army situated where the guns had 
 been planted could very easily have been attacked in flank from (90) the 
 
 89. Captain Outram's Rough Notes? ut supra. 
 90- Dr. Kennedy. 
 
119 
 
 high grounds, witliin easy range of them. A deep ravine would have 
 carried our light companies safely into the midst of them before they sus- 
 pected danger. Yet there was much strong ground eminently favourable 
 for military dispositions in the neighbourhood, where, had they known 
 how to make use of it, a very formidable resistance, even with their troopsj 
 might have been maintained. (91) A large quantity of powder and shot, 
 with tumbrils, ammunition-waggons, and gun-bullocks, were also cap- 
 tured. He was directed to push forward his reconnoisance as far as the 
 walls of the city. The army continued its march without interruption, and 
 on the evening of the 6th encamped under the walls of Cabool. On the 
 evening of the 7th, His Majesty proposed to proceed in state from Nanu- 
 chee to the Bala Hissar. 
 
 At 4 in the afternoon, when the heat of the day had been succeeded by 
 one of those mild and beautiful evenings which characterise the autumnal 
 climate of the cooler latitudes or altitudes, the Shah Soojah, accompanied 
 by the Envoy and Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, and the general 
 officers of the army ; Sir Alex. Burnes and other officers of the mission ; 
 the staff, and a vast number of other officers ; left the camp to proceed? 
 with much pomp, into the city of Cabool. (92) They had about three 
 miles to march. The escort of His Majesty consisted of a squadron of the 
 4th Light Dragoons, and one of the 16th Lancers, with Captain Martin's 
 Troop of Bombay Horse Artillery. They were paraded in review order in 
 front of the lines, and on the road leading to the city. A royal salute was 
 fired as the Shah approached the escort ; and the cavalry having saluted 
 him as he passed, fell into the rear of the procession. 
 
 The royal reception was respectful but cold ; the people were orderly : 
 curiosity brought them in thousands to witness the spectacle, and a feeling 
 of decorum seems to have prompted them to pay distant respect to the 
 king. The chiefs were absent j there was no enthusiasm, and not even 
 that clamorous exultation which a crowded populace commonly display on 
 the first fall of one who has kept them in order, or in the manifestation of 
 any important change in the order of things. The king led the way into 
 the palace : he wept as he witnessed the dilapidation the neglect of thirty 
 years had occasioned. (93) The cavalcade returned at a late hour in the 
 evening to camp, finding some difficulty in making their way past the bag- 
 gage of the Shah, then passing through the narrow streets. For the next 
 three weeks no event of any moment occurred to the army. Capt. Outram 
 
 91. Major Havelock. 
 
 92. Major Hough. Copied verbatim. 
 
 93. Major Hough, ut sitp., p. 252. 
 
120 
 
 and his party returned on the 19th August from the fruitless pursuit of 
 Dost Mahomed, and on the 3d September the Shahzada Timour and 
 Colonel Wade, with betwixt ten and eleven thousand men under their com- 
 mand, arrived from Peshawur by the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad, and Khoord 
 Cabool. These things have been already mentioned. Of the events which 
 occurred on the march from Ghuznie we should have noticed the death 
 of Lieut.- Colonel Herring: he was following the grand army in charge of 
 treasure from Candahar, when he with two other officers had imprudently 
 gone out some way from camp unattended, and been murdered by the 
 robbers by whom the whole country seemed infested, who hung upon 
 the skirts of our army. He was a gallant and experienced officer, and his 
 death was deeply lamented. Lieutenant Inverarity had in like manner 
 fallen a victim to a similar imprudence during the halt at Candahar in 
 May. 
 
 On the I7th September a magnificent state durbar was held at the palace 
 for the purpose of conferring the badges of the Doorannee order on certain 
 of the most distinguished officers of the army. 
 
 '* In a court-yard of about a hundred yards square [says Dr. Kennedy 
 (94)J a ruinous and neglected garden, and surrounded by ruinous build- 
 ings of the old palace in which a dozen or two of bricklayers and plas- 
 terers were at work repairing the dilapidation and neglect of the past thirty 
 years, and who never stopped their work to look at us, sat the old King 
 alone in his glory; his throne being one of our old camp-chairs, value, 
 when new, some four or five rupees at the utmost : behind it stood two old 
 fat eunuchs, each holding a dish in his hand : and up to this extraordinary 
 dumb show we marched, and were all ranged behind and on the right of the 
 camp-chair with the King in it. 
 
 " When all was ready, — and it took less time than I could have sup- 
 posed, — Sir John Keane stepped before the said camp-chair with the King 
 in it, and gravely dropped on his knees before the Douranee Emperor. 
 One of the fat eunuchs waddled to the front, and uncovered his dish, in 
 which was the decoration and ribbon of * the order of the Douranee 
 empire.* The Emperor with great diffieulty stuck it on ; and, Sir John's 
 coat being rather too tight, it cost him some effort to wriggle into the 
 ribbon : but the acorn in time becomes an oak, and Sir John was at last 
 adorned, cap-a-pie, a Knight Grand Cross of the Douranee empire. 
 
 '^ The decoration required eloquence ; and Sir John, standing before the 
 Emperor, delivered himself of a speech, in which there was a great deal 
 about • hurling a usurper from the throne,' — at which my uncle Toby might 
 perhaps have whistled his lillibuUero. 
 
 94. Campaign of the Army of the Indus, vol. ii. p. 112, 
 
121 
 
 " But as the Emperor of the Douranee empire did not understand 
 English, the Chief's Pergian interpreter, Major Powell, stepped to th® 
 front to interpret. Poor man ! he was 'not accustomed to speak in public,' 
 and made but a bad job of it ; and the Emperor, who seemed to wish the 
 whole aflf'air over, broke into the midst of the interpretation with his own 
 observations complimentary to the British General, the British Army, and 
 the British Government- Burnes, for some reason best known to himself, 
 wished the whole interpretation to be fairly and fully driven into and 
 through the imperial ears, and whispered * Deegurust, ' ' There is more of 
 it; ' which silenced the Emperor, and Major Powell went on : but, making 
 a pause to take breath, his Imperial Majesty began again and was again 
 silenced : a third pause, and again his Imperial Majesty commenced ; and 
 by that time Burnes seemed tired too, and the Emperor had it all his own 
 way, and all the talk to himself for the rest of the ceremonial. Mr. 
 M'Naughten and Sir W. Cotton were next invested ; and Sir A. Burnes 
 and Sir Martin Wade were told that they were created Knights Grand 
 Crosses too, but that the goldsmith had not been able to make the decora-^ 
 tions in time for them, but they might rely on receiving them in as short a 
 time as he could compass it. Lord Auckland was declared a Knight Grand 
 Cross also ; how Colonel Pottinger escaped can be only explained by the 
 wonderful good fortune that has attended that gentleman through life* 
 
 ** The Grand Crosses being created, the Knights Commanders and Com- 
 panions were to be invested, but the decorations had not been made ; and 
 it was clear that if there was to be a kneeling and a tow-tow for each, 
 there would be no end of it: so an officer in a Bengal Cavalry uniform, 
 holding a paper in his hand^ shouted out the names of the ' men whom the 
 King delighted to honour ;' and we, the oi pollot\ being all drawn up on 
 the right of the King, the parties so named stepped forth in succession, 
 and, crossing in front, bowed to the King, and ranged upon the left. The 
 officer, who thus enacted the Grand Mareschal of the palace, read with a 
 clear good voice, and deserved to have been a Grand Cross himself, if his 
 taste lay that waj, for the fine feeling he showed when, in reading the 
 original list, he paused on the names of Brigadier Arnold and Colonel 
 Herring, and, reading them with a subdued tone, added ' deceased,' and 
 passed on to the next in order. This honourable tribute to the dead was 
 the only incident in the whole affair that seemed worth recording for any- 
 thing but its extreme absurdity. 
 
 *' The decoration of the order is a Maltese cross, a bad imitation of the 
 Guelphic order of Hanover ; and it was the more absurd to give a Chris- 
 tian's most sacred religious badge as an honour supposed to be conferred 
 by the most bigoted petty Mahomedan government in the world ; because 
 the arabesque star of six points, which forms the ornament of the historic 
 
 S 
 
122 
 
 gates of the tomb of Mahomed of Ghuznee, would have been so peculiar 
 and appropriate an emblem of a Douranee institution. The ribbon, ' party 
 per pale vert and gules,' is in good taste ; and when manufactured in 
 England, will no doubt be very ornamental. 
 
 " When the list was read out, and all was over, there rose the cry of the. 
 disappointed ; and I saw Sir John Keane much excited, and apparently in 
 a bewilderment and amaze at the storm that threatened. The rule for the 
 selection had been^ that the brigadiers and heads of departments were to 
 be Knights Commanders ; and all field officers, and sundry head-quarter 
 favourite?, Companions. The claimants who now started forth were the 
 field-officers by brevet ; there were only four or five ; and these of course 
 from the simple fact of their brevet, were the oldest officers of their class, 
 and much senior to many who were preferred before them. One of them 
 had served nearly forty years in India, and was old enough to have been 
 the father of half the new-made knights : be is said to be writing a history 
 of the campaign, and will no doubt make known his grievance. No satis* 
 factory reason was assigned for their being omitted ; had they been too 
 numerous, it would have been otherwise, but they were not so." — Kennedy ^ 
 vol. ii., pp. 113—118. 
 
 On the Hth of September, before the separation of the Forces of the two 
 Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, a General Order was issued, of which 
 the following is an extract :— 
 
 *>* Sir John Keane cannot omit this opportunity of assuring the Troops of both 
 Presidencies, that it will be a proud refiection to him throughout his after life, to 
 have had the honour of commanding Troops of such high character and bearing^ 
 and who have surmounted difficulties of all kinds without a murmur, but on the 
 contrary) a cheerfulness which does them honor, and which marks their high disci-> 
 pline and good feeling : these qualities, combined with gallantry^ they gave the ene- 
 my a signal proof of, on the memorable day when their stronghold Ghuznee fell. 
 
 *' The conduct of the Troops has been no less marked by their gallantry and high 
 bearing on that occasion, than it has all along by the cordial good feeling which has 
 subsisted between the combined forces of Bengal and Bombay throughout this ser* 
 vice, and to which it will be the pleasing duty of Sir John Keane to call the atten- 
 tion of the Right Honorable Lord Auckland, the Governor-General; and he is con- 
 vinced it will be equally gratifying to his Lordship to learn it, as it is to him to re- 
 port it. 
 
 « His Majesty Shah Shoojah-ooL Moolk has requested Sir John Keane to signify 
 to the Troops that His Majesty has, in token of his gratitude, determined on con- 
 ferring the decoration of the Order of the Doorannee Empire on certain Officers, and 
 to present every Officer and Soldier present at Ghuznee on the 23d July last, with 
 a medal. That his Majesty has further addressed a letter through the Right Ho- 
 norable the Governor-General of India, to our most gracious Sovereign Queen 
 
123 
 
 Victoria, requesting that Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to permit the Offi- 
 cers and Soldiers to wear these marks of distinct;on."(95) 
 
 By order, kc. 
 CSigned) R. Macdonald, Lieut. Colonel, 
 Mily. Secy, and Depy. Adjt. Genl. H. M.'s Forces, Bombay. 
 
 On the 18tli September the Bombay column quitted Cabool ; they retraced 
 their steps by the reute over which they had advanced as far as Ghuznie : 
 thence crossing the Toba mountains, they made a short cut on Quetta, 
 evading the detour by Candahar, and pursuing a line of march to Quettah 
 entirely new to them. From Quettah part of the force proceeded to Kelat, 
 which they captured. But this will form a part of our narrative to which 
 we must return after tracing the progress of the Bengal troops to Feroze- 
 pore- Towards the beginning of October, the affairs to the northward of 
 the Hindoo Koosh began to wear an aspect so alarming as to occasion 
 serious apprehensions to the authorities at Cabool. Dost Mahomed ap- 
 peared to have so firmly established himself in the favour of the Chief of 
 Koondooz, and to have obtained such entire command of the reseurcei 
 of the country, that the Envoy and Minister, at the suggestion of Dr 
 Lord, had at one time resolved to establish, even at that late season of the 
 year, a brigade near Syghan. From this ill-considered measure he was 
 dissuaded by Sir John Keane. The troops sent out could have had no time 
 to construct for themselves suflBcient cantonments before the setting in of 
 winter ; and would, even if they had, have been cut off from all communi- 
 cation with the army at Cabool, and exposed single-handed, and without 
 ammunition, provisions, line of operations, or means of resistance, to the 
 attacks of all the forces of independent Tartary, which, as subsequently 
 shown, could easily muster to the extent of 12,000 men. (96) This was 
 a bud of the fatal system which afterwards spread abroad, and proved fatal 
 to us. The Bengal troops remained for nearly a month after the departure 
 of the Bombay column — as late, in fact, as the season would permit. 
 Head-quarters, under Lord Keane, marched on the 15th October, and the 
 remainder followed with as little delay as possible,— and the whole of those 
 who proposed returning for the present to India had left before the 20th 
 The cold was severe in the pass — ice was found upon the roads, and the 
 bodies of dead camels and horses lay frozen all around, and the horsemen's 
 cloaks which chanced in the morning to be splashed with water in crossing 
 the stream, were immediately decorated with a border of ice. (97) Hyder 
 
 95. These Medals have since been presented to the Officers and Soldiers in 
 the name of the Government of India. 
 
 96. Major Havelock, vol. ii., p. 171. 
 
 97. Major Havelock, vol. ii. p. 176. 
 
124 
 
 Khan, governor of Ghuznie, and Hadjee Khan Kakur, accompanied lUe 
 force. We s^hall not at present attempt a description of this tremendous 
 chain of defiles, or the savage predatory tribes which inhabit them, which 
 occupy nearly the whole space betwixt Cabool and Peshawur, a stretch of 
 200 miles. We shall, in the last chapters of our narrative — those which 
 record the melancholy loss of 13,000 men in the pass in January 1842, 
 and in that which describes the victorious advance of General Pollock on his 
 mission of vengeance eight months afterwards, — require to go over every 
 part of the ground which Lord Keane with his retiring force traversed with- 
 out annoyance or impediment. It is enough at present to mention, that 
 the army which left the capital on the 18th October reached Peshawur on 
 the 8th November. They had not been attacked or molested in any way, 
 except the rear division on the last day's march in the Khyber pas?, when 
 two officers were wounded, several men killed and wounded, and many 
 camels with their loads taken by the tribes that afterwards gave so much 
 trouble ; nor experienced greater difficulty than might have been anticipated 
 in traversing such wild and sterile regions. From Peshawur the route lay 
 through the friendly territory of the Seikh ruler : the distance is 350 mile?, 
 which was traversed without inconvenience or obstruction, our troops 
 reaching the frontier station of Ferozepore on the Sutlej on New-year's 
 day 1840. 
 
 A deputation from the Maharajah Kurruck Sing met Sir John Keane 
 at Attock, on crossing by the bridge of boats over the Indus after its 
 junction with the Cabool River at that place, to invite His Excellency to 
 visit the Court of Lahore. At the head of the deputation was Lena Sing, 
 a young and handsome Sirdar of great wealth, with an escort of 2000 men 
 well mounted and appointed, who continued with the Commander-in-Chief 
 during his whole journey afterwards through the Punjaub until he reached 
 Ferozepore. Lena Sing is one of the very few men of high rank (or indeed of 
 any rank) in his country given to literary and scientific pursuits. He is 
 particularly fond of Astronomy, and not a day passed without his asking 
 questions, and taking instructions from Major Thomson and the other Engi- 
 neer officers. He was presented with a Sextant, which pleased him much, 
 and a set of instruments and telescopes were ordered out ff rhim from Eng- 
 land. 
 
 Sir John Keane with all his personal StaflPand the Stafi" of the Bengal 
 force, made the detour to Lahore, while the Army continued to move by 
 the direct route through the country, where he arrived on Christmas 
 day, taking with him as his Escort — Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, a Troop 
 of Bengal Horse Artillery, and his Infantry Escort of the Bombay 19th N. 
 I. His reception was most cordial, and attended with a degree of splendour 
 which cannot be rivalled by any other Eastern Court in the present day. 
 
125 
 
 All the usual ceremonies were gone through, and a display made of Jewel?, 
 Cashmeers, Cloth of Gold, &c. &c., that surprised all who had seen it for 
 the first time. Sir John Keane was unfortunately so unwell at times, as 
 not to be able to attend all the ceremonies, and by the approval of the Ma- 
 harajah he was on those occasions represented by Colonel Macdonald; The 
 most imposing of all the ceremonies was a review of 45,000 men, with 152 
 pieces of cannon, drawn up in one continued line, under the command of 
 the Heir apparent to the throne, Nao Nehal Sing, a high-spirited youth of 
 about 20 years of age, who afterwards lost his life by the falling of a beam, 
 at one of the gateways, on the day of his father's funeral, when he was to suc- 
 ceed as sovereign of the Punjaub. The courtiers. Generals and others, as 
 well as the whole of the Staff Officers of the British Force, were mounted on 
 Elephants, and mostly seated in gold and silver Howdahs, (98) to afford 
 them a better view of the troops from their elevated seats, than they could 
 command on their chargers. The fine appearance of the troops, and their 
 appointments, surprised the British Officers. The arras, cuirasses and 
 clothing were all of French manufacture. The late Runjeet Sing had given 
 a carte blanche to two of Napoleon's officers of distinction, Allard and 
 Ventura, Generals in the Maharajah's service, to procure in France all that 
 they considered requisite for the equipment and respectability of His High- 
 ness's Army. There were besides in his service, of the Napoleon school,^ 
 Generals Court and Avitabile (the latter a most intelligent energetic man,, 
 who has since proved himself so useful and such a stanch friend to the Bri- 
 tish as Governor of the Province of Peshawur,) together with many other 
 French, German and Italian officers of inferior grade ; and the drill and dis- 
 cipline was entirely French. The Cuirassiers and Artillery were particu- 
 larly well horsed and -appointed, and all had the appearance of soldiers ; it is 
 believed that if it came to blows, they would make but a poor stand against 
 a British Force. 
 
 On the 7th January Sir John Keane and his staff left them for Bombay, 
 and the various regiments were dispersed amongst their respective canton- 
 ments. Since the 8th November 18.38, the Bengal column had traversed 
 a space of 2070 miles, the longest continuous march ever accomplished 
 by an Indian army. (99) 
 
 We must now return to the movements of the Bombay column, and 
 follow them through this important episode, detailing the operations against 
 Kelat, out of which one of the most singular passages in the history of our 
 policy in the East so speedily arose. " It was a strange feeling in retracing 
 our steps," says Dr Kennedy (100), '-'- to compare the numerous recollec- 
 
 98. A Howdah resembles the body of a Gig, or very large arm chair. 
 
 99. Major Hough, p. 362. 
 
 100. Vol. ii. p. 121. History of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus. 
 
126 
 
 tions ©f our journey on the advance, with its doubts and uncertainties, 
 and the thousand wild rumours which were every day afloat, in contrast to 
 the solution of all difficulties and the termination of all danger, on the 
 homeward march of the army." 
 
 Capt. Outram appears on most occasions to have been the officer in all 
 the army sought out when any enterprize of especial hazard, or where 
 unusual dispatch or daring was required, whose services were put in requi- 
 sition. The Envoy having applied to have him placed in political employ- 
 ment, — on the 7th Sept., a week before the march of the Bombay column, 
 he was sent out to depose, and, if possible, to arrest the refractory Ghilzie 
 chiefs, Mehta Moossa Khan, Abdool Rehman Khan, Ghool Mahomed 
 Khan, and the Mama, a Chief so named from his being the uncle of the 
 Candahar Sirdars, (101) and to establish the newly appointed Ghilzie 
 Governors, Meer Allum Khan, Zeman Khan, and Khulleel Khan ; — to 
 punish the inhabitants of Maroof, who, in May last, wantonly destroyed a 
 caravan proceeding from Hindostan to Candahar ; — and lastly, to reduce 
 the forts of Hadjee Khan Kakur, should they still be held by his adherents. 
 The murder of Colonel Herring was reported just as he was about to 
 Start ; he was directed if possible to search out and punish the perpetrators 
 of that atrocity. The force placed under his charge consisted of a wing of 
 the Shah's 1st Cavalry and Goorkah Battalion, Capt. Abbot's Battery of 9 
 pounders from Cabool, a reinforcement from Capt. Macau's Regiment of 
 Shah's Infantry at Candahar, half of the Shah's 2d Regiment of Cavalry, 
 and a brigade of Horse Artillery. In consideration of the difficulty of 
 obtaining forage and preventing plunder with so large a number, the 
 regular force was, at the especial request of Capt. Outrana, reduced to 500 
 men. A thousand AflPghan cavalry, under Mahomed Oosman Khan, an 
 uncle of the King, led in parties by 20 Affghan Chiefs, were to be added. 
 After the experience of the trust to be reposed in the Affghans, which had 
 been supplied from the time we reached Quettah, and especially after the 
 conduct of Hadjee Khan Kakur and his people, it seems singular that the 
 system of pressing them into a service in which they seemed determined 
 only to impede or thwart our aims, should hare been persisted in, when we 
 had troops of our own in the country sufficient for the discharge of all the 
 duty desired to be performed. It is impossible to conceive what good end 
 could have been purposed to be served by it, unless to delude the people at 
 a distance into the belief that the Shah was subduing and quieting the 
 country by the help of his own subjects ; a more thorough delusion, or one 
 more zealously striven after, could not be imagined. The Affghan auxili- 
 
 101. Outram's Rough Ngtes, p. 123. We have copied the instructions rer- 
 batim. 
 
1^7 
 
 aries could not be got ready, and Capt- Outram marched without thertti 
 His Majesty, though unable to make his faithful subjects accompany the 
 expedition, promised to drive them after it, and, in three days after it was 
 gone, he succeeded in driving a part of them from CabooU they joined on 
 the 7th day of the march. On the evening of the I4th, Meer Allum Khan 
 succeeded in capturing some of the banditti connected with the murder of 
 Colonel Herring. On the 20th, Buxee Ithan was captured. The following 
 day, Capt. Outram's party were reinforced by a wing of the 16th N. I. 
 under Major M'Laren, and they arrived at daybreak at a deep dell occupied 
 by the gang of which they were in quest. Our people managed completely 
 to surround the marauders ; they fought desperately, and maintained their 
 position until their ammunition was exhausted, when they were induced to 
 throw down their arms, after 16 of the most desperate of their body had 
 been killed, and 71 wounded. We lost three sepoys, and had two European 
 and two Native oiBcers wounded. Not a soul escaped ; 112 prisoners, with 
 a similar number of camels, fell into our hands, The Company's mark on 
 the head of the animals showed that they had been acquired by plunder* 
 Forty-six of the most ferocious of the robbers were selected, and despatched 
 to Cabool for execution. Capt. Outram's party were now moving on a line 
 nearly parallel with that of the Bombay column, which had left Ghuznie 
 on the 29th Sept., (102) under a temperature which at night sunk to 34 
 deg., and were now only three marches to their right. They were in con- 
 stant intercourse with Sir T. Willshire, who supplied them with whatever 
 reinforcements were necessary. On the 1st Oct., the detachment of the 
 Shah's 1st Cavalry, under Lieut. M*Kenzle, was ordered to return to 
 Cabool — three weeks of such severe marching as that required amongst the 
 Ghilzie mountains, having knocked up all the horses. On the 3d the 
 Poonah Auxiliary Horse, under Captain Keith Erskine, arrived in camp ; 
 the aext night they made up with a couple of nine-pounders, escorted by a 
 wing of the Bombay 19lh N. I., sent out to meet them from Ghuznie by 
 previous agreement. On the 5th, Capt. Outram marched his little band 42 
 miles in the course of 24 hours. The following day he surprised in his fort 
 the principal Ghilzie chief Abdool Rehman Khan. The father of this man, 
 when disputing the empire with Shah Zeman, besieged Cabool with 50,000 
 horse and foot. Abdool Rehman seemed to have had no intention to fly. 
 He had, just before the arrival of our troops, sent off his women and pro- 
 perty : he himself, with eighty chosen horsemen, remained within his hold. 
 It was a well-constructed fort, with a wet ditch and lofty citadel, before 
 which in former days the Shah Soojah had twice been foiled and forced to 
 
 102. Dr, Kennedy, &c., vol. ii.,p. 122. 
 
i-eturn. Capt. Outram had resolved to defer the capture of the place till tha 
 fiollowing evening, that the cavalry might be sufficiently rested to be able 
 immediately thereafter to make a dash upon the other chiefs, whose strongs- 
 holds were only about a forced march oflP. Major M''Laren had the fort 
 surrounded by 500 cavalrj', besides two companies of the 16th Bengal N. I- 
 stationed under cover within 200 yards of the gate. Near midnight, how- 
 ever, Abdool and his party suddenly rushed out on horseback through our 
 piquets, and dispersing in all directions, managed to escape in the dark. 
 He had remained to the last in his fort under the expectation of being joined 
 by a neighbouring chief, who was to have attacked our rear with 1000 
 horse. This man had been brought over to our interests^ and had come into 
 our camp the previous evening before sunset, leaving no choice to Abdool 
 Rehman but to attempt the flight thus boldly and successfully effected. 
 The fort was completely destroyed, having been mined and blown up by us 
 after its evacuation. On the evening of the 8th, Captain Outram rode into 
 Gen. Willshire's camp, attended by no more than a couple of Ghilzie fol- 
 lowers, though the distance was 20 miles. These operations against the 
 Ghilzies were continued with the utmost enterprise and spirit, and with no 
 inconsiderable success, till the troops reached Quettah on the 31st October* 
 Captain Outram had latterly occasionally accompanied the Bombay columUj ' 
 sometimes moved parallel with it, and occasionally crossed its path in all 
 directions. The season of extreme cold was now approaching; the country 
 was to the last degree barren and inhospitable. On the 18th October, on 
 reaching the summit of the Toba mountains, the thermometer at daybreak 
 stood at 19 deg. — 13 degrees below freezing. The engineer officer in charge 
 (Captain Peat) stated that it only required the difficulties of the country 
 to be a fraction of a fraction greater than they were, when the roads would 
 have become impassable. On the 29th they regained the line of their 
 original advance at Hyderzye^ and found themselves plentifully supplied 
 with provisions, sent out on purpose by Captain Bean from Quettah ; the 
 fort was attained in safety the second day after. 
 
 Before the Bombay column quitted Cabool it had been determined that 
 Mehrab Khan should be deposed, and a remote relative, Newaz Khan, a 
 Cutchee chief, placed in authority at Kelat. The conduct of the Beloo- 
 chee chief has been pretty fully treated of in the preliminary chapter 
 and earlier portion of the present narrative. Finding that all the obstruc- 
 tions which he had endeavoured to throw in our way, and the numberless 
 annoyances he had occasioned us, had failed to retard us on the path of 
 victory, or to prevent the restoration of the Shah Shoojah : he no sooner 
 found the Suddozye power supreme, and the British army likely to maintain 
 itself in Affghanistan, than he sent in all sorts of professions of loyalty and 
 devotion towards the king, and friendship for his allies. On General Will- 
 
129 
 
 ahire's arrival at Queltah, he received a letter written in the same unblush- 
 ing style as those addressed to the envoy and minister, in which he 
 declared himself the faithful subject of the Shah Shoojah, and devoted ally 
 of the British government, (103) and entreating that he would interfere to 
 prevent the hostile measures which Captain Bean, the political agent for 
 Shawl, had meditated, from being put in execution against him ; conclud- 
 ing by stating, that if attacked he would defend himself to the last. The 
 nature of our information as to the state of affairs at Kelat appears to have 
 been almost inconceivably imperfect. The most fitting time for a move- 
 ment against it would probably have been the month of August, when 
 General Nott, left at Quettah to keep the Beloochees in check, had a force 
 under his charge abundantly powerful for the purpose, especially as the 
 intelligence of the fall of Ghuznie had at that time astonished and stunned 
 the whole of Affghanistan. It was afterwards said that Captain Bean had 
 requested General Nott to undertake the adventure with a single native 
 regiment and a company of artillery. He was believed to have been pre- 
 vented from this by a point of military etiquette on receiving a copy of 
 General Willshire's instructions. Matters being now fully arranged. Bri- 
 gadier Baumgardt was dispatched on the 3d Nov. with H. M.'s 2d and 17th 
 Foot, and the 31st Bengal N. I. The whole of the line regiments being 
 weak, these mustered less than 1000 bayonets. (104) To these were added six 
 light field pieces, two of the Bombay Horse and four of the Shah's Artillery ; 
 the sapper corps, and 150 irregulars, the whole in the best possible order. 
 General Willshire and staff" followed them the ensuing day. The remain- 
 ing portion of the Bombay column under Brigadier Scott, consisting of 
 the park, with the whole of the cavalry and greater part of the artillery, 
 and the 19th N- I., proceeded through the Bolan Pass, and so by Dadur on 
 to Sukkur, where they arrived without obstruction or adventure on the 
 29th November. Accounts of the fall of Kelat and of the advance of the 
 Russians on Khiva, had reached them on the way, and in consequence of 
 the latter event they were directed by the political agent to halt near 
 Bhaug ; but cholera had broken out amongst them in a part of the country 
 where comforts were not procurable, and acting on the recommendation of 
 the head of the medical department, Brigadier Scott moved on. Betwixt 
 the 20th and 30th of November, the force, mustering short of 700 men, 
 lost by this appalling visitation Surgeon Forbes of the 1st Bombay Cavalry, 
 and Captain Ogle of H. M.'s 4th Dragoons, together with 56 European 
 soldiers. The natives escaped. 
 
 To return to the operations against Kelat, whitherward, as above stated. 
 
 103. Dr Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 135, 
 
 104. Dr Kenned V, vol. ii. p- 143, verbat. 
 
 T 
 
130 
 
 General Willshire had marched on the 4th November. Until the 13th of 
 the month, "when they closely approached Kelat, the column met with little 
 opposition in their progress ; it was now that active operations commenced. 
 "VVe shall draw on Capt- Outram's rough notes for an account of the capture 
 of the town. (105). 
 
 ** I3th Nov. Marched at sunrise, the Local Horse being left in charge of the 
 baggage. About a mile from the encampment we had just left, we were met by a 
 body of about one hundred horse, who kept aloof until they observed that we had 
 no Cavalry to oppose to them, whereupon they became bolder> and galloping 
 close up to the head of the Column, discharged their matchlocks. A party of 
 Light Infantry having been thrown out to keep them at a distance, we continued 
 our march without further molestation about six miles, wlien, on our surmounting 
 a. small range of hiils, the town and fortress of Khelat suddenly burst upon our 
 view. It was truly an imposing sight. Some small hills in front were crowned 
 with masses of soldiers, and the towering citadel which frowned above thena 
 in their rear, was completely clustered over with human beings, — ladies of the 
 harenn ciiiefly, who had assembled to witness the discomfiture of the Feringees, 
 and the prowess of their Lords, all of whom, with the Khan at their head, had 
 previously marched out to the heights, where they awaited us in battle array ! 
 
 " No sooner had the head of the British Column shewed itself, than the enemy'g 
 guns, of which there were five in position on the heights, opened upon it ; but 
 being ill directed, they were unattended with effect. In order to assemble every 
 efficient man of his small araiy, General Willshire here halted the troops until 
 the baggage had closed up, assigning the charge of it, and of the sick, to the 
 Local Horse. It was very evident that the enemy, who greatly outstripped us 
 in point of numbers, were fully bent upon mischief; and our total strength amount- 
 ing to less than one thousand bayonets, we had nothing to spare in the contest 
 that awaited us. During this delay two companies were sent to clear some gardens 
 on our left ; and a body of horse threatening us from that direction, a few 
 shrapnel shells were thrown amongst them, which caused them to withdraw to the 
 fort. The cool and determined demeanour of our veteran General inspired every 
 one present with confidence of success, nor shall I ever forget the obvious feejing 
 of delight with which his deep toned word of command, ' Loosen cartridges,' was 
 received by the soldiers — evincing as it did, that an immediate attack was intended, 
 and tnat serious opposition might be expected. 
 
 *' The following plan of assault was then communicated by the General. Under 
 cover of the Artillery, the three redoubts on the heights are first to be carried by 
 four companies of each Regiment. Two companies are to advance through the 
 gardens, on our left, and the remaining ten companies are to form the reserve. 
 The heights, once in our possession, would serve in a great measure to cover our 
 camp from the Artillery of the fort, and would afford us a commanding position 
 from which to annoy the Garrison. 
 
 105. Captain Outram, pp. 141—147. 
 
131 
 
 CAPTUnB OF KHELAT. 
 
 '* All being in readiness, the three columns of attack moved steadily forward 
 jjreceded by the Artillery, which unlimbered at the foot of the hills, and opened 
 a cannonade of shells and shrapnel with such admirable precision, that the masses 
 bf the enemy^ crowning the heights, were compelled to abandon their position long 
 before the Infantry had gained the summit. Observing the enemy endeavouring 
 to draw off their guns, the General despatched tne with orders to the Column of 
 the Queen's Royals, which was the nearest to the gate, to pursue the fugitives, 
 and if possible, to enter the fort with them — but at any rate to prevent their 
 taking in the ordnance^ t overtook the head of the column before it had attained 
 to the redoubt ( C. ) and galloped on to the redoubt at the very moment that 
 the enemy were vacating it j when perceiving them to be engaged in the attempt 
 to carry off one of the pieces of Artillery, I called on Captain Raitt of the Queen's 
 Royals to push down quickly with his Grenadiers, and if unable to enter the gate 
 with the enemy, at all events to capture the gun. I accompanied this party, 
 which rushed down the hill, but arrived too late to enter the Fort with the enemy, 
 who however abandoned the gun outside, and hastily closed the gate after them. 
 
 '* Leaving the Grenadiers to take post under cover of a ruined building, ("marked 
 E. in the plan,) within sixty yards of the gate, so as to be in readiness to enter- 
 by it, in case the general might decide upon following up this advantage by 
 blowing open the gate before the Garrison should find lime to block it up, as they 
 doubtless would do, were the attack to be delayed, I rode back to report pro- 
 gress. The whole of our troops were already on the heights, and the guns 
 were also being dragged up. Four of the latter were directed to play upon the 
 towers commanding the gateway from the positions B. B., whilst the other two 
 were ordered down to D. for the purpose of battering the gate itself. The Ge- 
 neral at the same time despatched me to G., with instructions to bring up the 
 Light Companies under Major Pennycuick to H;, where a mud wall about four 
 feet in height, afforded shelter within thirty yards of the wall, on the opposite side 
 of the gate to that near which the Grenadiers of the Queen's Royals were posted. 
 Having brought them at double quick time across the plain to within two hundred 
 yards of the walls, and then directed them to scatter and rush under cover, t 
 returned to the General, taking the point E. in my way, in order to warn the 
 Grenadiers that the gate would be immediately blown open, when they were to 
 rush in simultaneously with the Light Companies from the opposite side. It was 
 whilst taking up the positions E. and H. that most of the casualties during this 
 day occurred, the troops so engaged being exposed to an exceedingly hot fire 
 from the walls. On these two occasions I was the only mounted officer present, 
 but although both the nature of my occupation, and the singularity of my rifle 
 uniform, differing as it did from all others, must have attracted a considerable share 
 of the enemy's observation, I escaped with my usual good fortune. 
 
 " From the point D., the two guns now opened upon the gate, and being ad- 
 mirably directed (by Lieut. Henry Creed of the Bombay Artillery,) a few rounds 
 w€re sufficient to throw down one half of it* The general's signals for the advance 
 
132 
 
 of the storming parties, not being immediately observed, 1 galloped donrn, and 
 accompanied the Grenadiers to the gate, after seeing them in secure occupation of 
 which, I returned to the General, whom I met close to the fort, bringing up the 
 main body of the troops. He immediately despatched me with Captain Darley's 
 Company of H. M.'s I7lh Foot, with instructions to take the 31st Regiment Ben- 
 gal Native Infantry along with me, and with these to storm the heights and 
 secure the gate on the opposite side of the fort. After passing quickly round 
 the western face, from which we were exposed to a considerable fire, I placed the 
 Company of the 17th under cover of a spur of the hill, and thence proceeded 
 back to seek for the 31st Regiment, which 1 found scouring the suburbs. Ha- 
 ving united the two detachments, we stormed the heights at K., where we ex- 
 perienced some trifling opposition from matchlockraen occupying the rocks above : 
 these being soon dispersed we rushed down to the gate L., driving in a party of the 
 enemy with such precipitation that they had not time to secure the gate, possession 
 of which was thus obtained, and the escape of the garrison entirely cut off. 
 
 ** We were here joined by a party under Major Deshon, which had been sent 
 round by the eastern face of the fort j when I directed the officers to leave a de- 
 tachment ia charge of the gate, and with the remaining portion to make their way 
 up to the citadel, which still maintained a fire upon our troops, whilst I ac- 
 companied Lieutenant Creed for the purpose of selecting a position from whence 
 to bombard it with the Shah's guns. Placed the guns in position at N., and 
 opened a fire on the citadel which was continued with destructive effect, until 
 our soldiers had obtained possession. Rejoining the General in the meantime, 
 to report progress, I found him at the gate first carried, giving orders for attaching 
 bags of gunpowder to the gates af the citadel, which had hitherto successfully 
 resisted all attempts to enter it from this side. Reported that the party from the 
 opposite quarter had already got well up, and with the aid of Lieutenant Creed's 
 guns, would shortly surmount every obstacle. Hereupon troops were again sent 
 up to co-operate, and a (ew minutes more sufficed to display the British standards 
 waving over the highest of the towers of Khelat. All hostilities immediately 
 «eased, and the soldiers displayed much greater forbearance than they usually do 
 on such occasions. Quarter was never rtfused by them when craved by cries of 
 * Aman' * Aman,* and before nightfall nearly two thousand prisoners had been 
 removed from the fort unharmed. 
 
 ** About four hundred of the Garrison are supposed to have fallen in this affair, 
 and amongst them are the chiefs Mehrab Khan, Wuilee Mahomed Khan, and 
 other principal Belocbe chieftains — every person of note having been either 
 slain or captured. Some anxiety was expressed by the General on the occasion 
 of my rejoining him at the first gate, in consequence of the rumoured escape of 
 Mehrab Khan ; but I assured him that as the fighting portion of the Garrison had 
 been driven back whilst in the act of attempting to decamp by the opposite 
 gate, I entertained no doubt that the Khan was still within the fort, since he 
 could not, in honor, have previously deserted his followers. This afterwards 
 proved to be the case. Foiled on that occasion in his attempt to escape, the 
 
133 
 
 Chief had returned to the citadel with WuUee Mahomed Khan of Wudd, and others 
 of his most trusty followers, where they had all died sword in hand ; the 
 Khan himself being slain by a shot through the neck, from whose hand it is 
 not known. Considering the small number of our troops, not one half of whom 
 were actually engaged, the loss on our side is severe. Thirty-two were killed, 
 and one hundred and seven wounded ; amongst the former is Lieutenant Gravatt 
 of the Queen's Royals, and there are nine officers amongst the latter. 
 
 ** 14th. Working parties have been employed the whole day in removing 
 and burying the dead, as well as in collecting prize property. Scattered as the 
 dead bodies are over every part of the town, among houseS) the numerous dark 
 chambers of which are not easily explored, it has not yet been practicable to as- 
 certain the number of the slain. The amount of booty is supposed to be very 
 considerable, but we unfortunately do not possess the means of carrying it away, 
 nor is there any market here in which to dispose of it. The arms especially are of 
 very superior manufacture, and the sword of the fallen chief Mehrab Khan in par- 
 ticular, which is of the most costly workmanship^ is estimated to be of great 
 value. The members of our little army have with one accord resolved upon 
 presenting this enviable trophy to their gallant leader, General Willshire, in token 
 of their admiration of his heroic bearing yesterday." — OntrairCs Rough Notes^ 
 pp. 141—147. 
 
 The joyous tidings of this event were carried by Capt. Outram to Bombay 
 through the very heart of the enemy's country, until he reached Son- 
 meeanee by the sea. (106) The adventure was as dangerous and daring as 
 any that could have been undertaken, and the bold adventurer only escaped 
 on reaching the shore by about five hours before his pursuers. 
 
 There is no doubt that the capture of Kelat was not only the most 
 creditable aflPair during the campaign, but that it was in itself exceedingly 
 brilliant and meritorious, — well able to bear comparison with any exploit 
 our troops ever performed in India. Kelat, with a garrison only one- 
 third less numerous than that of Ghuznie, and fortifications scarcely less 
 formidable, was captured by a force mustering little over 1000 bayonets, 
 without cavalry, and with only one light guns. At Ghuznie we had 40 
 pieces of artillery, and above 6000 men ; we speak comparatively ; we 
 have no wish to disparage the skill, bravery, or moderation of the last 
 named gallant exploit which sealed the fortunes of the war. The loss of 
 the enemy was computed at about 500 men ; amongst these were num- 
 bered eight of the most influential chiefs, including Mehrab Khan himself: 
 three others were taken prisoners. This brought up the loss of the Afighans 
 
 106. Capt. Outram had, after quitting Cabool, been, during his operations 
 against the Ghilzies, invested with extensive political powers. These ceased 
 on his approach to Quettah, when he was made aide-de-camp to Sir T. 
 Willshire, and permitted to do duty with the engineers. 
 
134 
 
 during the campaign to about 2500. Our casualties amounted to 31 
 killed, and 108 wounded. The value of the spoil taken at Kelat was at 
 first calculated as high as £60,000, it turned out considerably less than a 
 tenth of this. The principal item was the crown and Zenana jewels : these 
 had been built up and plastered over in the wall of the house of the chief 
 counsellor of the Khan. No hint had been given in regard to them until 
 our army was about to leave, and the teoement in which they were secreted 
 had been assigned as a habitation to our future resident. A native, fearing 
 probably that they must by and bye be discovered without his aid, or 
 "without advantage to any of those who were in the secret, disclosed the 
 place of concealment — which it required much labour to break open. The 
 history of this much of our spoil is so singular as to deserve a few lines of 
 notice ; they were valued at £60,000 ; we have seen how nearly they were 
 missed : on their way to India they were as nearly lost. The jewels were 
 entrusted to the care of H. M.'s 17th. About 300 of this Regiment having 
 embarked at Kurrachee on board the transport Hannah for Bombay, were 
 shipwrecked at the mouth of the Indus on the 17th of March. None of 
 the people were lost, and the jewels were saved by Colonel Pennycuick^ 
 who carried them on his back for a considerable way through the surf and 
 marsh. They were sold at Bombay the following July for betwixt £3000 
 and £6000 : but the premises of the salesman shortly after the sale were 
 broken into and robbed, and he himself afterwards became bankrupt ; the 
 amount realized to the army was a sufficiently insignificant fraction of that 
 originally looked for. 
 
 Mehrab Khan and his principal chiefs having thus been summarily dis- 
 posed of by the fate of war, the field was all but clear, and Newaz Khan 
 was at once established on the musnud. We had become so familiar with 
 the unseating and reseating of rulers on thrones, that it seemed to be 
 thought that it required no more than the announcement that the house of 
 Nusseer had ceased to reign, to ensure stability to the rule of his successor. 
 Newaz was accordingly left to maintain himself in authority as he best 
 could over the fierce and independent tribes whom he was designed to con- 
 troul and to re-subject to the new Doorannee sovereign. Although Mehrab 
 Khan had left a son — a spirited boy of fourteen years of age, to whom his 
 subjects seemed devoted^ — and a widow — a woman of infinite courage, talent, 
 and perseverance, no apprehension appears to have been entertained on his 
 account, or efi'ort made to get them into our hands. The new ruler, as if 
 established by the prescription of half a century, was left with Lieut. Love- 
 day as our Envoy at his court, and 30 sepoys as a guard of honour ! The 
 result was, that in six months' time he was expelled from Kelat ; Loveday 
 was taken and murdered ; and an insurrectionary movement of 18 months' 
 
135 
 
 duration brought about, ^hich cost us £300,000 in treasure, the lives of 12 
 British officers, and some 300 soldiers, and ended in our reversing all that 
 "we had donej — pensioning the widow, and replacing the son of Mehrab 
 upon his father's throne. This, however, comes to be treated in a sub- 
 sequent chapter. 
 
 Sir T. Willshire returned by the Gundava pass into Cutchee — a fertile 
 district in Upper Scinde ; and joined the force stationed at Sukkur, — his 
 gallant little army being shortly afterwards broken up. Sir John Keane 
 and his staff arrived there from Ferozepore, on the 4th February, 1840, 
 and gave the final orders for the breaking up of the army of the Indus, 
 under instructions from the Governor-General, after which the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief proceeded to Kurrachee, where he embarked for Bombay 
 and there landed with his staff, on the 27th February, amidst the roar of 
 cannon and other demonstrations of respect. 
 
 Thus closed the first Affghan campaign ; and as the people at home 
 appeared to have believed, concluded all arrangements exactly as had been 
 desiderated, bringing round a period of universal peace. The war expen- 
 diture of these fifteen months seems, as near as can be guessed, to have 
 amounted to nine millions sterling. Our loss of men, including camp- 
 followers, appears altogether to have been under 300, — the principal part of 
 the deaths having been occasioned by predatory attacks on our line of 
 march. About 33,000 Government camels had perished on the march, 
 occasioning a loss of £140,518 in this item alone, (107) — this includes 
 about 4000 private camels, the value of which amounted to nearly £30,000, 
 besides the loss to Government just stated. The total loss of property 
 incurred by individual members of the service, is estimated at nearly £70,000 
 in the course of fourteen months, and which fell to be paid for by the officers 
 of the force. Upper India was drained to supply this amount of carriage ; 
 (108) and we never, till the conclusion of the war, could command sufficient 
 means of transport for our stores. The enemy had, as already stated, lost 
 about 500 men before we reached Candahar, and 1000 at the storm of 
 Ghuznie. We find no return of their casualties either on our advance to Ca- 
 bool, or our retirement through theKhyber Pass, or during Major Outram's 
 operations against the Ghilzies, where their loss must have been severe. We 
 are satisfied that to set them down ai 500 will be under the mark : 500 
 more at Kelat, bringing up the casualties on their side during the campaign 
 to about 2500. 
 
 But though the fighting was closed, the most momentous and costly 
 portion of our connection with Affghanistan was only just begun. The 
 
 107. Major Hough — Appendix. 
 
 108. Ibid, p. 7. 
 
136 
 
 Shah's contingent was already about 10,000 strong; it wa?, within six 
 months, raised to 13,000 ; it was officered and paid by us, and was chiefly 
 composed of subjects of the British Government. The cost of this, falling 
 on our treasury, amounted in 1841 to very nearly half a million sterling. 
 
 Of the Seikh force of 5000 men which had ascended the Khyber Pass 
 with Colonel Wade, a single regiment alone returned with him. The 
 rest remained at Cabool. But the aid of 25,000 foreign soldiers, even 
 with the fear of British power, was found inadequate to assure the Shah of 
 the loyalty or submission of his subjects. We have traced to the confines 
 of India the Bengal and Bombay columns on their retirement; but these 
 were the mere skeletons of the forces which, under the same name, had 
 ascended the Bolan Pass. The whole of the Bengal division of infantry, 
 the 2nd Bengal light cavalry, and No. 6 light field battery, were ordered to 
 remain in Affghanistan ; (109) — the clouds which began to threaten on 
 the N. W. just as we were preparing to leave, induced the Commander- 
 in-chief to comply with the request of the Envoy and Minister, that another 
 brigade might be left behind beyond what had been originally contem- 
 plated. 
 
 In detail, the arrangements of the force stood thus; H. M. 13th, and the 
 35tk N. I., with three guns, were stationed in the Bala Hissar, Cabool ; 
 together with the Shah's Ist Cavalry, with some of his Artillery. This 
 force, amounting to about 2,000 men, were to be commanded by Lieut' 
 Colonel Dennie. The 48th N. 1., the 4th Brigade, a detachment of sappers 
 and miners, and 2d cavalry, with a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and three 
 guns, were to be cantoned at Jellalabad ; where the King and Envoy, 
 according to the former luxurious custom of the Doorannee Sovereigns, 
 proposed to spend the winter. If the Shah was slow in taking on himself 
 the toils of King-craft, he was resolved that he should postpone the enjoy- 
 ment of none of the luxuries of royalty for the sake of the tranquillization 
 of his kingdom. The Ghuznie garrison was to be placed under charge of 
 Major (now Colonel) McLaren, and to consist of the 16th N. I.^ a ressalah 
 of Skinner's horse, and such details of the Shah's contingent as could be 
 made available. The 42d and 43d N. L, with heavy artillery and local 
 horse, with details of the Shah's troops, were to be stationed at Candahar* 
 (110) The Shah's infantry mustered in all about 4000, his regular cavalry 
 about 2000. Subsequent to the arrival at Cabool, garrison- artillery had 
 been formed, with a mountain-train of 12 3-pfs. The Affghan and Kohistan 
 levies, raised on our arrival, amounted to about 4000, and the whole con- 
 tingent to about 13,000 men. Including the British force, which consisted 
 
 109. Major Hough, p. 268. 
 
 110. General Order copied from Major Hough. 
 
137 
 
 of H. M.'s 13tb, Ist Bengal European Regiment, 2d Light Cavalry, and 
 the 2d, 16th, 35th, 37th, 42d, 43d, and 48th N. I., with details of Artillery*' 
 there was, by the beginning of 1840, an organized force in Affghanistan of 
 20,000 men; with from 70 to 80 guns. But the most formidable-looking 
 and unlooked-for source of outlay was the salaries of thirty -two political 
 agents who were dispersed over the country to see after its interests : and who 
 received amongst them a revenue of £50,000 a-year. We shall speedily 
 see that liberal as was the scale of expenditure at starting, before six 
 months had elapsed it was found necessary to have it vastly encreased : and 
 the regular Indian army which, when left behind in October 1839, amounted 
 to about 8000, was within the next twelve months more than doubled in its 
 strength. At the outbreak of the insurrection in November 1841, we had 
 upwards of 14,000 men, besides the contingent, in the Shah's dominions ! 
 
 How long such a state of matters as this was proposed to be continued, 
 does not appear ; — if we might judge from the solidity and extent of the 
 political edifice we should infer that it was expected to be occupied by 
 British tenants for a considerable period of years. The expense of the 
 13,000 men added to the Indian army before the war began, necessary to 
 make up for the troops dispatched and detained beyond the Indus, 
 amounted to above £600,000 — the cost of the maintenance of the extra 
 field force alone exceeding a million and a quarter annually, besides all 
 commissariat, civil, and diplomatic charges. The services of the political 
 agencies and the army called the Shah's contingent, must, at all events, 
 have been expected to be required for a long lapse of time. Yet the net 
 cost of these, as we have seen, amounted to £550,000 a-year ^ whereas 
 the total revenues of the kingdom screwed up to their highest pitch, could 
 never be raised, during the three following years, to more than £250,000 ; 
 and were never estimated higher than £300,000. With a country so 
 situated, — without sea-coast or navigable rivers, — mineral produce or 
 manufacturing industry, or any single capability or means of purchase, — 
 it seems difficult to divine what couH possibly be contemplated by further 
 occupation. The fears of Russia and Persia had. proved a dream ; — the 
 siege of Herat was raised before our troops left their cantonments in Hin- 
 dostan ; — apprehensions of disaffection in India had been dispelled, and the 
 Rajah of Sattarah, and Nawaub of Kurnool, from whose Portuguese allies 
 and hidden cannon so much was apprehended, had been reduced to the 
 condition of state prisoners with as little trouble as a bankrupt is brought 
 to gaol ; — Runjeet Singh, one of the most important parties to the tri- 
 partite treaty, was on his death-bed when it was signed, and in ashes before 
 we left Candahar;— the Shah Soojah was in years above 60, in constitution 
 at least ten years older from the life he had led, — and his sons, from the 
 atrocious dissoluteness of their characters, were worthless or scandalous as 
 
 U 
 
138 
 
 allies to any nation : — yet with all the parties for or against, or with whona 
 the treaty had been contracted, thus vanishing from the scene,— ^prepara- 
 tions were being made on a scale of such magnituda as if the drama had 
 been destined for perpetuity ! 
 
 The intelligence of the fall of Ghuznie, and occupation of Cabool, 
 reached England in the middle of October ; and nothing could exceed the 
 triumph with which it was received. There was certainly much that was 
 peculiarly brilliant and captivating in the exploit itself, and something 
 extremely striking in the length, the difficulty, the boldness, and the suc- 
 cess of the march which had preceded it. At a quarterly meeting of the 
 Court of Proprietors held on the 18ih December, a series of resolutions 
 passed the week before by the Court of Directors was read : by these it 
 was agreed that the thanks of the court should be tendered to Lord 
 Auckland, '' for the sagacity and promptitude with which he had planned 
 the expedition, and the zeal and vigour he had displayed in preparing the 
 troops to take the field." Sir John Keane and the field officers were also 
 thanked for the intrepidity and spirit manifested by them in conducting 
 the campaign. (Ill) This was cordial enough so far as it went, and was 
 not unmerited : it was carried with dissent. Sir Charles Forbes spoke at 
 great length on the subject, — urging the strongest objections to the policy 
 of the Affghan War altogether, and especially adverting to the reported 
 slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners by the Shah Soojah at Ghuznie. He said 
 that the expense of the expedition had been estimated at three millions 
 sterling : it was now admitted that it would cost five : and for his part he 
 would not undertake to defray them for seven, up to the time of the retarn 
 of our troops to India — about the period when the Ilon'ble Baronet ad- 
 dressed the court. We have already seen that the war charges of 1839 
 have since been set down, by the best authorities, at about nine millions 
 sterling. It now appears that so many as nine-tenths of the Court of 
 Directors (112) were hostile to the policy of the war, however much dis- 
 posed to approve of the military skill and bravery by which it had been 
 carried into execution : and the chairman never ventured, on any one 
 occasion, to ask the court for an approval of the policy ! Mr. St. John 
 Tucker had, early in 1839, made a formal protest against the war ; and Sir 
 Henry Willock a short time afterwards addressed Lord Palmerston at 
 length upon the subject. The country were, however, so completely carriei 
 away by the clash of victorious arms, and the shout of triumph, that it 
 was regarded as the extremity of party rancour to speak despairingly or 
 disparagingly of a system whose commencement had been crowned with 
 
 111. Re^port— Asiatic Journal for January 1840, Vol. 39, N. S. p. 49, part ii. 
 
 112. Mr. Hogg's speech in the House of Commons, July 8, 1842. 
 
139 
 
 victory. They knew not then how much greater at one time had been the 
 probability of failure than of success ; and how much more terrible would 
 have been the consequences of the former than those of the latter were 
 auspicious. The general impression besides, appeared to be, that large 
 acquisitions of territory had been gained, and ample additions made to our 
 revenue. (113) They little expected that the laurels we had reaped had 
 cost us nin« millions sterling — that our new ally could only be maintained 
 upon his throne by 20,000 British bayonets, and an expenditure of three 
 millions a-year ! — the return for which was nothing ! ! So cowed were 
 the opposition into silence, or so ill-informed on the details of the policy, 
 that scarcely any reply was made to it when alluded to in the Queen's 
 speech of the 15th January, 1840. Sir R. Peel said he would wait and 
 watch for the results. The Duke of Wellington had before remarked, that 
 he never entertained any doubt but ihat the valour and discipline of our 
 troops would secure victory to our arms : but it was when we had com- 
 pleted our first conquests that our difficulties would begin. When a vote of 
 thanks was proposed to the Governor- General, the Commander-in-Chief, 
 and the Army, the same cautious reserve was maintained by the Conserva- 
 tives : no formal opposition was offered : and up till after the time of Lord 
 Keane's pension bill being passed in February 1841, no one save Lord 
 Ellenborough, — who declared the war to have been a folly, and said that it 
 remained to be seen whether or not it might not prove a crime, — ventured 
 to speak out in Parliament in terms of open and decided disapprobation ; 
 but in great praise of Lord Keane for the manner in which he conducted 
 the military part of it. 
 
 Lord Auckland — previously a Baron — was made an Earl : Sir John 
 Keane was raised to the Peerage by the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznie 
 and Cappoquiu ; — the followinj^ February a pension of £2000 a-year was 
 conferred upon himself, to be continued to his male representatives for two 
 generations: Mr Macnaghien and Colonel H. Pottinger — the great diplo- 
 matists on the occasion — received Baronetcies : Colonel Wade obtained the 
 honor of knighthood. (114) Sir Alexander Burnes had been Knighted, and 
 raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on the commencement of the 
 war ; — the official intimation thereof having reached him in Scicde in 
 January. (115) 
 
 Before concluding the present chapter, it may be as well to take leave of 
 
 1 13. The speeches of Sir Phillip Durham and Sir John Cam Hobhouse at 
 a meeting of the Directors, evidenced how extensively the delusion pre- 
 vailed. The error of the Minister must have arisen from something worse 
 than ignorance ! 
 
 114. These Patents are dated Whitehall, Dec. 11, 1339. 
 
 115. Gazetted September, 1«38. 
 
140 
 
 the principal actor,— the only one who retired from the stage no more to 
 appear before the public in person, — almost the only one who reaped the 
 honours and rewards of conquest, without suffering from the calamities 
 which fast followed at the heels of original sucees?. Lord Keane arrived at 
 Borabp.y on the 27th February. He remained for five weeks, during which 
 period he and his companions in arms received a splendid public entertain- 
 ment in the Town Hall : the whole period of his sojourn, in fact, was filled 
 up with feasts and festivities in honour of his successes in war. On his 
 return home he received a public entertainment from the Court of Directors 
 on the nth July. As to his character, Lord Keane is a man of talents 
 not entitled to be called eminent, yet considerably above mediocrity. He 
 has had much experience in his profession, having served in Egypt, in the 
 Peninsula, and in the American war of 1814. That he is a man of enter- 
 prize and resources— of vigour, spirit, and determination of purpose, is 
 disputed by no one. The cool equability of his courage has repeatedly 
 been called in question, (116) but without, as it appears to us, any suffi- 
 cient reason : and though there can be no doubt that, for the master-stroke 
 of the campaign— the capture of Ghuznie, the feat which won him all his 
 fame, he was in a great measure indebted to the science, skill, and conduct 
 of the Engineers, and the dauntless bravery of the troops ; there are 
 abundance of points remaining, of which he alone can claim the merit, to 
 entitle him to the gratitude of his country. He was not the planner of the 
 campaign ; nor is he understood to have concealed his disapprobation both 
 of the plan and the policy which led to it : though entrusted with its 
 execution, he was not called upon for more ; and this much he effected 
 well. He was a stout Conservative in politics ; and after the glowing 
 Ghuznie despatch had been penned, he is understood to have said that 
 "the fort was but a rotten hole after all !"— but that its capture would 
 give the Whigs another year in office. — We hare here given the bright side 
 of Lord Keane's character : we have omitted the darker portions for the 
 present, — many of which would ill bear public scrutiny. 
 
 116. See Colonel Dennie's Letters. 
 
141 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Extentof the Doorannee Empire under Ahmed Shah— under Shah Soojah— Political Agents- 
 Establishment and Expense of— Expedition to the northward, November 1839— The Shah 
 and Envoy winter at Jellalabad — Colonel Orchard's unsuccessfal expedition to Pushoot 
 — Aflfair with the Hazarah Tribes— Grand Convoy arrives at Jellalabad in April — ^Expedi- 
 tion against the Ghilzies betwixt Candahar and Ghuznie— Detachments under Captains 
 Walker and Tayler — under Captain Anderson — Colonel Wallace's Detachment— Successes 
 of— Returns— Surrender of Nawaub Jubbar Khan and two of the Sons of Dost Mahomed 
 —Reception of at Cabool -Dost Mahomed proceeds to Bokhara and is made prisoner— Ad- 
 ventures|of— Escapes and returns to Khooloom— Discontented state of the country — Alarm- 
 ing state of Kohistan — Captain Hay compelled to fall back on Syghan, which is reinforced — 
 Captain M'Gregor's mishap near Jellalabad— Alarm of the Envoy— Apprehensions that we 
 should require to quit all our outposts and concentrate on the Capital— Colonel Whee- 
 ler's success against the Kudjah Chief s—Affzul Khan repulsed near Bajgah— Detach- 
 ment abandons Syghan leaving much private property behind— Desertion of a part of the 
 Shah's Troops— Colonel Dennie dispatched fiom Cabool to reinforce Bameean— Extreme 
 apprehensions of Dr Lord— Colonel Dennie's brilliant manoeuvres on the Irak mountain, 
 — Reaches Bameean— Advance of Dost Mahomed— Battle of Bameean— Dennie's Advance 
 on Syghan— Flight of the Affghans— The Khooioom Confederacy broken up— Sir R. Sale at- 
 tacks Tootan Durrah— Death of Lieutenant Connolly— Destroys the whole of the Tootan 
 Durrah Forts— Attack on Juglah— At first unsuccessful— Movements of Dost Mahomed- 
 Destruction of the Village of Heibuk and adjoining forts— Battle of Purwan Durrah — 
 Disgraceful conduct of the 2d Cavalry — Death of Dr Lord, Lieutenants Broadfoot, and 
 Crispin— Surrender of Dost Mahomed to the Envoy— Sir Alexander Burnes's account of 
 the State of the Country. 
 
 We have as j-et been favoured with no suflSeiently trustworthy materials 
 to enable us to come to any distinct conclusion as to what might have been 
 Lord Auckland's intentions or expectations at the beginning of the war as 
 to the line of policy to be adopted after the Shah should have been replaced 
 on his throne. It is probable, however, that he might have some such 
 scheme as the following before him : as we cannot imagine any man mad 
 enough to enter on an expedition, forseeing that long before any thing 
 final or effective could be brought about, it must be abandoned because the 
 finances as well as the credit of India were exhausted. We have already 
 seen that the withdrawal of a much larger portion of the regular army than 
 it was found prudent to permit to return to India, had been contemplated, 
 and that the Commander-in-Chief, on the solicitation of the Envoy, left an 
 additional brigade behind him at Cabool in October. It is probable that, 
 by the second or third year of the new reign, it was hoped that the ser- 
 vices of the whole of our troops might be dispensed with, and that the 
 charge of the empire might be committed to the contingent for a few years 
 longer, when probably our more immediate connection with the country 
 might either have been expected to cease, or that by this time our faithful 
 
142 
 
 ally being gathered to his fathers, his kingdom might have become worthy 
 of annexation to our other territories. When, or by whom, the marvellous 
 scheme of political organization, immediately aftervsrards brought into ope- 
 ration, was devised, — how long it was meant to last, — or what useful purpose 
 it was expected to serve, does not appear. There is no doubt but that it 
 was implicitly believed that the Doorannee empire might speedily be 
 stretched very nearly to its original limits. At the death of Ahmed Shah 
 in 1773, it consisted of the provinces of— 
 
 Neshapoor, Ghuznie, Dheera Ishmael Khan, 
 
 Meshid, Candahar, Mooltan, 
 
 Herat, Jellalabad, Scinde, 
 
 Cabool, Peshawur, Beloochistan, 
 
 Balkh, Cashmere, The country as far as Sir- 
 
 Bameean, The Punjaub, hind. 
 
 Ghorebund, Dheera Ghazee Khan, 
 
 The revenues of the Doorannee sovereigns at this period amounted to 
 about three millions a- year. The total revenue of Cabool in Dost Maho- 
 med's time was about £250,000, and it fell considerably l?elow this after 
 his deposition. The Shah Soojah had, in addition to these, the revenues of 
 Candahar, his other acquisitions yielded hlra none — which brought up the 
 whole financial returns of the empire to something under £300,000 a*year. 
 The dominions of which we put him in possession were Cabool, Bameean, 
 Ghuznie, Jellalabad, and Candahar, the last of which alone did not belong 
 to Dost Mahomed. One of our earliest arrangements for reducing the 
 Doorannee states to order, was the appointment of an expensive set of 
 functionaries termed political agents ; so often adverted to, that it will be 
 convenient here to give a brief account of them. These were selected from the 
 civil or military services — mostly from the junior grades of the latter, 
 their chief recommendation being their familiarity with the Persian lan- 
 guage. They resided in the larger towns or troubled districts, and were 
 vested with the most extensive powers over the troops in their neigh- " 
 bourhood, without any relation to age or rank in the army ; — the 
 youngest lieutenant (and out of the thirty-two there were nine captains 
 and seventeen lieutenants) within the limits of the corps diplomatique being 
 competent to direct the oldest general in the service ! Sir Alexander 
 Burnes invariably denounced this variety of diplomatic organization as 
 productive of the most detrimental consequences to the country. In his 
 memorial to the Envoy of the 19fch April, 1841, he says—" It seems to 
 me that wherever our political officers are, collision forthwith follows ;" and 
 in his private letters he speaks of the frog-spawn and fry of politicals with 
 which the country was overspread- The Envoy, on the other hand, con- 
 ceived them indispensable as means of gaining information- We shall have 
 
143 
 
 8o much to do with this body of functionaries in the course of the following 
 narrative, that we here give a list of their names, and statement of their in- 
 comes, as contained in the Bengal Almanac for 1841. (1) 
 
 Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart., Envoy and Minister, £11,220 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, at Cabool 3,000 
 
 Major E. Pottinger, Resident, Toorkistan, 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant P. Lynch, do-, Ghilzie country, 1,200 
 
 Captain A. Conolly, Envoy to Khiva, 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant P. Nicholson, in charge of Dost Mahomed, 1,080 
 
 Lieutenant C. Rattray, Political Assistant, Kohistan, 840 
 
 Captain G. F. P. Lawrence, Military Secretary to the Envoy, 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant J. B. Conolly, Military Assistant to tne bnvoy, 840 
 
 Lieutenant Rawlinson, Political Agent, Candahar, 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant C. A, Jackson, Assistant to ditto, 1,080 
 
 Lieutenant G. H. Macgregor, Political Agent, Jellalabad, 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant C. Burnes, Political Agent, Ghuznie, 720 
 
 Captain F. Mackeson, Political Agent, Peshawur, 1,800 
 
 Captain Colin Mackenzie, Political Agent, 840 
 
 Captain J. D. Bean, Political Agent, Quetta 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant W. F. Hammersley, Assistant 840 
 
 Mr Ross Bell, Political Agent, Upper Scinde, 3,900 
 
 Lieutenant E. B. Eastwick, Assistant, 840 
 
 ^ Captain W. J. B. Knyvett, ditto, 840 
 
 Lieutenant E. J. Brown, ditto, , 840 
 
 Lieutenant Sinclair, ditto, 720 
 
 Lieutenant W. Brown, 840 
 
 Lieutenant W. Young, ditto, , 720 
 
 Lieutenant W. Broadfoot, Assistant, Toorkistan Frontier, 840 
 
 Captain J. Nash, in charge of State Prisoners, Cabool, 930 
 
 Captain E. Sanders, attached to the Herat Agency, 1,938 
 
 Captain J. Abbott, Political Agent, Herat, 840 
 
 Major D'Arcy Todd, Herat, 1,440 
 
 Lieutenant R. Leech, Political Assistant, ., 840 
 
 Lieutenant R. C. Shakespear, Political Agent, Herat, 840 
 
 Lieutenant E- K. Elliot, Political Assistant, Candahar, 720 
 
 Being just £49,248 annually — exclusive of Major Outram's establishment in 
 Lower Scinde, and without making any mention of the arraj' of native attend- 
 ants. Mr Bell used to employ 750 camels for the transport of his private bag- 
 gage ; which, at £1 10s. per month each, makes the very respectable item of 
 £13,500. 
 
 Before the winterliad set in, our people had had a brush with the refractory 
 
 1. The Bengal and Agra Annual Guide And Gazetteer for 1841. Rushton ; 
 Calcutta. 2 vols. 8vo. — a very valuable work. 
 
144 
 
 Kohistances. In the end of September the Ghoorka corps, a troop of horse 
 artillery, three mortars, 1,000 Affghan cavalry, and 600 infantry, marched 
 for Bameean ; these were afterwards ordered to wait the junction of additional 
 troops. Dr Lord, political agent in that district, reported that Dost Maho- 
 med (2) had allied himself by marriage to the chiefs of Khooloom and 
 Khoondooz, and wasrapidly gaining influence in Toorkistan.(3) His intrigues 
 were said to have been so far matured, that his son Ukhbar Khan was 
 reported to have reached the Ghorebund Pass, 60 miles north of Cabool, in 
 the end of September. The 4th brigade and the local horse, a company of 
 sappers and miners, and the 35th and 37th N. I., left in the beginning of 
 October for the northward, with supplies for six weeks. Having joined the 
 force previously dispatched for Bameean, they were directed to cross the 
 pass and make a dash into Tartary — a measure afterwards abandoned. 
 On the 31st October a small party of horse artillery acting as cavalry, with 
 some infantry and Affghan horse, having cotne up with from 600 to 700 
 Uzbegs, near Syghan, thirty miles beyond Bameean, defeated and dispersed 
 them. Syghan was thus re-annexed to the Shah's dominions ; a worthless 
 possession like the rest, imposing on us the necessity of maintaining it, 
 without the possibility of its conferring benefit in return. (4) The king of 
 Bokhara, it was said, had offered the Dost a strong force to enable him to 
 cut oflP the party at Bameean, now greatly reduced : — if his Majesty ever 
 made such a proposal he must very quickly have altered his intentions : as 
 in December he seized on the Dost, after having invited him to his court on 
 promise of assistance, or according to another account, when making his way 
 towards Persia, and in violation of all the rules of hospitality, so strictly 
 attended to in Central Asia, kept him in confinement till the following 
 August. The force maintained at Bameean throughout the winter consisted 
 of 600 infantry, with six guns and two mortars, the heavier detachment 
 above mentioned having returned to Cabool. The month of December passed 
 quietly over, though threats of insurrection in every quarter led us to 
 look for a turbulent spring and summer : an anticipation more than rea- 
 lized. The Shah and the Envoy continued at Jellalabad throughout the 
 winter. The first of the operations of any magnitude in which we 
 were engaged, was unsuccessful. Colonel Orchard, in the beginning of 
 January, was dispatched against the fort of Peshoot, in the mountain 
 country to the eastward of Jellalabad, in command of a force about 2,000 
 strong, consisting of three 9-prs., 1 troop 2d cavalry, 1 wing 37th N. I., 
 
 2. The Ameer is described by Wood as about 45 years of age (in 1838) : 
 according to Dr Atkinson, Prince Timor? the Shah Soojah's eldest son, who has 
 since retired to India, was at that time 40 : the Shah himself about 60. 
 
 3,. Englishman newspaper, October 25, 1839. 
 
 4. Atkinson's Expedition into Affghanistan, p. 327. 
 
145 
 
 80 of the 1st European Regt., 20 Sappers, 3d Regt. Shah's infantry, Ist 
 Shah's cavalry, 700 strong. Severe and continued rains had for some time 
 prevailed ; but on the 17th, the weather having cleared up, the guns virere 
 placed in battery, and after two hours firing, praeticable breaches were made 
 on both sides of the principal gate. Lieutenant Pigou (afterwards blown 
 up and killed when engaged in a similar operation about a year after), with 
 a party of 40 Europeans and sepoys, pushed down the outer gate, and pro- 
 ceeded to examine the inner one, which was found to be still entire. A bugler, 
 by mistake, on seeing this party enter the breach, sounded the advan'3e, and 
 the whole column began to move forwards. They were quickly made aware of 
 the blunder, and directed to shelter themselves from the enemy's fire in a ravine 
 close by. Two attempts were made to blow open the gates by means of gun- 
 powder bags ; but both of them, in consequence of the rain which had begun to 
 fall again, proved failures. It having been found impossible to scale the walls, 
 or storm the fort, in its present condition, and the troops having been for 
 five hours drenched with rain, and exposed to a severe fire from the fortress, 
 it was resolved to retire about noon. The enemy, perceiving that eventually 
 we should succeed, retreated shortly afterwards with the eclat oi victory, car- 
 rying with them all their valuables, and leaving us in possession of their 
 naked hold. Our loss was severe, consisting of about 69 killed and wounded ; 
 Lieutenant Collinson and Ensign Hicks were severely, the former, as it 
 proved, mortally wounded. We afterwards took possession of Khathke, 
 on the opposite side of the river, (5) and attempted to pursue the 
 chiefs, but found this last impossible at such a season. In January, a 
 fall of snow, said to have been nearly five feet deep, occurred at Cabool, 
 while the thermometer fell to 13 — at one time it was 5 ; at Bameean it sunk 
 to 10 below zero, or 42 under freezing, the first week of the year. Ghuznie 
 also was for some time snowed up, the cold being very severe, the snow 
 lying a foot thick for weeks on end. The spirit of resistance which every- 
 where made its appearance amongst the tribes on the return of spring, was 
 as obstinate as it was universal. About seven miles from Bameean stood a 
 number of mud forts, belonging to the tribe called Hazarahs, on the table- 
 land at the foot of the mountains which form a valley stretching away to the 
 south-west. Meer Moheb and Shah Nusseer Beg were the ruling chiefSj 
 of whom the former was supreme ; the valley was populous and well cul- 
 tivated, and the people had, up to the beginning of March, shown every dis- 
 position to supply our wants. On the 13th, the Hazarahs not only refused 
 to sell forage to the commissariat officers, but, having assembled in consider- 
 able numbers, insulted and stoned the troops sent in quest of it. To a 
 threat from one of our people, it was replied that we were Kaffirs, and 
 
 5. Colonel Orchard's Despatch, 19th January. 
 
146 
 
 might bring our guns against them if we pleased. All attempts at concilia- 
 tion having failed, a detachment was despatched under Captain Garbett, 
 consisting of two 6-pr. guns under Lieut. M'Kenzie, 25 Horse Artillery 
 Troopers as Cavalry, 50 AflPghan Horsemen, and 4 Companies of the 4th 
 Light Infantry under Captain Hay, to reduce them to order. The 
 first fort arrived at was a strong one; the occupants refused all terras, 
 and shut their gates against us. The heights in front, which had been 
 covered with Hazarahs, were quickly carried. The artillery played 
 briskly on the fort at a distance of 400 yards, and in less than an 
 hour it was in our possession. The garrison retired to an inner tower and re- 
 fused to yield. Hay and straw were piled up and set fire to in the lower part 
 of theirr etreat ; they still continued resolute; and, when the fire had burned 
 out, not a man of them was found alive. The women and children (18 
 in number), who had sought refuge with the men, had scrambled to the top 
 of the tower as the flames advanced, and from this, after all the garrison had 
 been destroyed, they were rescued with difficulty ; a trooper having contrived 
 to carry up a rope through the burning building, by which they were let 
 down.(G) Our casualties amounted to 16 killed and wounded ; the enemy 
 lost about 50 killed. (7) The value of the whole property found within the 
 fort was about £40 ; no satisfactory explanation is given of the cause of the 
 enemy's recusancy, or the fatal obstinacy of their resistance. A fine was 
 subsequently levied on the tribe. Considerable sickness had prevailed 
 amongst our troops, and great inconvenience been experienced by them, 
 in the course of the winter, from the eifects of a climate so entirely 
 new to them, and for which they had been so imperfectly prepared. The 
 King and Envoy, with their escort and suite, returned from their winter 
 quarters at Jellalabad, and reached Cabool the first week of April. The 
 arrival, on the 9th May, of the grand convoy, as it was called, from 
 India, helped, to remove, or to enable them to meet, those sources of 
 discomfort arising from climate, already described. The convoy referred to 
 consisted of the 2d N. I., six depot companies of native regiments, with drafts 
 of H. M.'s 13th and 1st European regiment, and the mountain train» 
 amounting in all to 2,000 fighting men, 200 remount horses, with 800 
 camels for the use of the troops, commanded by Brigadier AVallace, who 
 had in charge £210,000 in treasure, and a vast quantity of public and pri- 
 vate stores. About 4,000 camp followers, and 2,000 camels, attended 
 it.(8) It left Ferozepore in the beginning of February, and proceeded 
 in quiet, and without annoyance, through the Punjaub. The Khyberies 
 having threatened to attack them. General Sale, with the 37th and 48th 
 
 6. Bengal Hurkaru. 
 
 7. Bombay Times, May 6, — gives the same account as the Hurkaru. 
 
 8. HurkarU', March 5. Delhi Gazette^ March 4. 
 
147 
 
 N. I., moved down from Jellalabad to Jumrood to escort them through the 
 Passes. They reached the former place in safety on the 16th of April, and 
 thereafter proceeded without interruption to Cabool. As spring advanced it be- 
 came apparent that so far from our being able to withdraw any portion of the 
 large force we had left in the country, and to which 2,000 men had just been 
 added, that a very considerable increase of their numbers would speedily be 
 requisite. (9) It was said that, at this time, the Shah could not have taken 
 with him a hundred of his own subjects into the field unless bribed by British 
 treasure to attend him. Around Candahar the people were in the same con- 
 dition of discontent and disturbance as they were in Cabool and Kohistan. In 
 April, the whole Ghilzie country having for some time been in a state of 
 insurrection, cutting off the dakhs, and robbing every kafila betwixt Cauda* 
 har and Cabool, a small party of cavalry, under Captain Taylerof the Euro- 
 pean regiment, and Captain Walker of the 4th Local Horse, pushed into 
 the centre of the enemy's fastnesses, and endeavoured to seize Sultan Ma- 
 homed and the Gooroo — chiefs who had been removed by Captain Outram 
 the previous autumn, and who now headed the rebels. Having received 
 notice of our approach, they retired to the mountains, but speedily returned 
 in such force as to compel the cavalry to fall back on Khelat-i- Ghilzie. 
 Here they were reinforced by 200 infantry and 150 cavalry proceeding to 
 Cabool, under Captain Codrington. General Nott having received intelli- 
 gence that a still larger body of Ghilzies was about to attack them, prepared 
 a stranger force for their assistance. (10) On the 7th May, an expedition, 
 consisting of 46 of the 4th Local Horse, detachments of the Shah's 1st and 
 2d Cavalry, four 6-pr. guns of the Horse Artillery, the 5th regiment of the 
 Shah's Infantry, and another detachment — amounting to 1,200 in all, of 
 whom 336 were cavalry — commanded by Captain W. Anderson, was dis- 
 patched from Candahar to attack a body of insurgent Ghilzies, and form a 
 junction, if possible, with Captains Walker and Tayler ; this last was 
 effected on the 14th. At Tazee, near JChelat-i- Ghilzie, it was reported by the 
 spies that the enemy, about 2000 strong, had determined to give battle. On 
 the following day (e. e. the 16th) Captain Anderson advanced upon them in 
 column, the artillery leading, flanked by two companies of the 5th Infantry, 
 the main body of which immediately followed. Captain Codrington closed 
 the rear and covered the baggage. The Cavalry having been divided into 
 two wings, were directed to take a wide sweep to the right and left, and so 
 endeavour to cut off the retreat of the enemy, on whom they were to close in 
 so soon as the fire indicated that the action had begun. In this order the de- 
 tachment marched for about five miles, when the enemy were overtaken, and 
 
 9. Delhi Gazette^ June 13, 1840. 
 
 10. Delhi Gazette. The Gazette account is given by an ofl&cer with the force. 
 
148 
 
 after a sharp action were defeated and dispersed. Our casualties amounted 
 to 10 men killed and 30 wounded ; the enemy had about 100 killed. (1 1 ) The 
 fight lasted for about an hour, after which our men continued their march 
 till obliged to halt at Tazee, in consequence of want of carriage for the 
 wounded. Preparations were meanwhile made to despatch a force from Ca- 
 bool to co-operate with the troops under General Nott's command, the suc- 
 cess of a portion of which has just been related. Colonel Wallace marched from 
 the capital on tTie 22d of May with the 2d N. I., two troops of the 2nd Light 
 Cavalry under his command, three 9 prs. and 2 mortars. He reached Ghuznie 
 in safety, and having been reinforced by the addition of two companies of 
 the recruit depot, the 1st Light cavalry, and two 6-prs., he left on the 31st, 
 and proceeded westward. By a sudden move, Mhookah, the fort of the principal 
 rebel chief, was surprised, and taken without resistance, and afterwards blown 
 up. Our arrival had been wholly unexpected, and the women and families 
 of the chiefs were almost the only persons found in the stronghold. Mhoo- 
 kah is 7000 feet above the level of the sea, and in the beginning of June, 
 quilts and blankets were required over night. Colonel Wallace after 
 this returned to camp, directing Captain Anderson, now in his neighbour- 
 hood, to join him. (12) 
 
 The combined force, now nearly 3000 strong, proceeded to destroy the forts 
 of the malcontents in the neighbourhood. They experienced no f'^rther re- 
 sistance for the present. WhoUoo Khan and Marroo Khan, as well as a Vi- 
 zier of the latter, remained in our hands as prisoners : several of the others 
 were beheaded. ( 13) Colonel Wallace shortly afterwards returned to Ghuznie, 
 when the 2d N. I., a squadron of the 2d Cavalry, half Abbott's Battery, and 
 2 mortars, were directed to remain at the disposal of General Nott. Kelat- 
 i-Ghilzie, 80 miles eastward from Candahar, was occupied by Captain Wood- 
 burn's corps, the Shah's 5th Regiment, 4 guns, and 300 of Christie's 
 Horse? who were directed to remain till the beginning of winter. The con- 
 bideration of the aflFairs of Scinde and Belpochistan — where insurrection 
 showed a still more formidable front than to the eastward of Quettah — is 
 postponed till afterwards: it forms a perfectly independent episoJe, which 
 will be taken up when the present act of the Affghan drama is closed by 
 the surrender of Dost Mahomed. 
 
 On the 3d of July, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, with Mahommed Akram Khan, 
 
 11. Captain Anderson's despatch, Bombay Times, 17th May 1841 : also Agra 
 Ukhbar ; Hurkaru, 12th, and Englishman. 25th, June 1840. 
 
 12. Delhi Gazette. 
 
 13. An annoymous writer in the Agra Ukhhar, dated 23d June^ states, that 
 '' three of the chiefs who made themselves over to Lieutenant Nicholson and 
 Shahzada Timour,had their heads struck off ; and now," says he, "the country 
 is deserted and the crops standing : but worse than all, the British Word, which 
 was heretofore sacred everywhere, is defiled and rotted in the dust." 
 
149 
 
 and Sheik Ali Khan, sons of the Dost : together with the most of the other 
 members of the Ex-Ameer's family, arrived at Bameean, and placed them- 
 selves under our protection. The old Chief himself, and his sons Afzul and 
 Ukhbar, were still confined at Bokhara ; Azim Khan, a younger son, had 
 joined us some time before. The family, amounting at this time to 250, in- 
 cluding attendants, were directed to proceed to Ghuznie : it was understood 
 that Quettah was meant to have been their place of destination. On the sur- 
 render of the Dost three months afterwards, they accompanied him to India, 
 where they remained from Christmas 1840 till Christmas 1842, when they 
 were released from captivity. The WuUee of Khooloom sent an ambassa- 
 dor tendering friendship to the Shah Soojah. Jubbar Khan, on his arrival 
 at Cabool, was very kindly received by the envoy and minister, who offered 
 him the same terms as those originally proposed : that is, that he should 
 have his estates restored to him and dwell in Affghanistan, provided 
 he remained faithful to us. From this date, up to the present time, he 
 continued to reside at his fort of Killa Cazee, near the capital, — never 
 throughout all the troubles in which his country was involved, when scarcely 
 an Affghan failed to take advantage of our difficulties, forfeiting the charac- 
 ter by which he had been known from the period of our earliest acquaintance 
 with him, of" The Good Nawab — the Feringees' Friend." 
 
 We must now return to the personal adventures of Dost Mahomed, whose 
 flight fromUrgundah, and escape across the Hindoo Koosh, has been described 
 in a previous chapter. On his arrival at Khooloom, he was handsomely 
 received and hospitably entertained by the chief. Except the threatened 
 incursion on Bameean by the Uzbegs, and the discontented spirit manifested 
 by the Hazarahs, no demonstration was made for a period in his favour to 
 the northward. "Winter was too close at hand indeed ; and the consterna- 
 tion which our apparently irresistible success had occasioned, too general to 
 permit any military operation to be thought of by the Ex-Ameer before the 
 return of spring. He wrote, in the mean time, to the King of Bokhara, 
 inviting him, as one of the Lights of Islam, to assist in expelling the accursed 
 Kaffirs. They were to share the spoil betwixt them ; and it was urged that 
 the Shah Shoojah and the Feringees, unless routed, would not fail to over- 
 run the countries on the Oxus.(l4) The King replied in very cordial terms, 
 directing a vakeel or ambassador to be sent to him. Mirza Sami Khan 
 having been deputed in this capacity, was directed to write Dost Mahomed, 
 giving him the warmest assurances of sympathy and assistance. Troops and 
 
 14. These statements are given on the authority of Dr Atkinson : who, with- 
 out any appearance of dishonesty, is prejudiced against the Barukzyes — credu- 
 lous and careless in his statements to a degree, —Expedition) p. 329. Other 
 accounts, referred to abovcj state that the Dost was on his way to Persia when 
 arrested. Dr Atkinson, however, is in this likely to be correct. 
 
150 
 
 money were to be supplied him so soon as a personal interview, to conclude 
 arrangements, could be obtained. Dost Mahomed on receipt of this, set out for 
 Bokhara in the end of Nov. 1839, with his sons Ukhbar, Afzul, and Sum- 
 munder Khan. On their arrival at Bokhara the King was profuse in his 
 professions of friendship, — entreating that the Dost should send for his 
 family, that their alliance might be still more closely and firmly cemented : 
 he wrote at the same time to the Wullee of Khooloom, requesting him to 
 forward them by force or fraud, without respect to their wishes. It had by 
 this time become apparent that the professions of the Bokhara chief were 
 hollow and delusive : that he wished to get his old enemy into his hands, 
 partly with a view to revenge — chiefly from a desire to plunder him of his 
 last remaining property. The Dost wrote an open letter to Jubbar Khan, 
 directing arrangements to be made to have the wishes of the King complied 
 with : he sent a secret order at the same time, telling his brother to put 
 every member of the family to death rather than entrust them to the tender 
 mercies of the Bokhara chief! The Nawab, uncertain how to act, and dis' 
 trusting the Wullee, thought it better to enter into a correspondence with 
 the British Government than to remain for an indefinite period in the dan- 
 gerous position in which he now stood, Negociations were in progress in 
 March, and ended, as already mentioned, in the surrender of his brother's 
 family early in July. So soon as the King of Bokhara became aware that 
 the fraud intended to have been practised by him had been discovered, and 
 in some measure frustrated, he laid aside the mask of friendship, and 
 threw the Ex-Ameer and his sons into prison. The Dost, meanwhile, 
 applied for and received assistance in his extremity from the Khan of Kookan 
 on the Persian border ; who having first used remonstrances and entreaties, 
 afterwards resorted to arms,— captured some forts, and was in full march 
 towards Bokhara, when the King pretended to relent : — he promised to 
 release his prisoner on condition of hostilities being suspended, but at the 
 same time retained him in close confinement, threatening his life should he 
 attempt to get away. Early in July, he succeeded in making his escape under 
 circumstances of great difficulty and danger.(15) Directing his course 
 towards Khooloom, assisted by his son Afzul Khan, he proceeded to stir up 
 the country to undertake a holy war against us, promising that the Wullee 
 should be his vizier could he succeed in recovering Cabool. 
 
 Between Bameean and Cabool lie the districts of Koh-i-Damun and Ko- 
 histan. There were at this time no parts of the Doorannee empire more 
 hostile than those to the authority of the Shah Soojah. Yet, on our 
 arrival in the country in July 1839, it was here the King found his stoutest 
 
 15. Dr Atkinson's Expeditioa, (Sec, p. 337. The whole of the adventures 
 connected with the escape, which are too long for quotation, will be found in 
 Dr Atkinson's Work. 
 
151 
 
 friends. *' It was in those districts that Dost Mahomed ruled with 
 a rod of iron. He put to death most of the Chiefs ; he quadrupled 
 the revenues drawn from them. His policy was to sow dissension 
 amongst them, and he succeeded : it was the only district of the 
 country where the name of the ex-ruler was execrated when the Shah 
 Soojah ascended the throne. One would have supposed that here, at 
 least, his Majesty's Government would have found favour ; and the 
 more so, as the Kohistanees flocked in numbers to welcome him on his ori- 
 ginal entrance into Cabool — expressing the strongest feelings of loyalty and 
 devotion. By the month of May, 1840, a miserable change had been pro- 
 duced in their sentiments. The Governors appointed under the Suddoyze 
 rule demanded duties which were unusual and exorbitant, and exacted taxes 
 the king had just declared to have become obsolete. The population of 
 whole districts had fled to the hills to avoid oppression. When complaints 
 were preferred, the complainants were thrown into prison ; and when tem- 
 porary redress was forced by the direct interposition of our authority, all the 
 acts of petty tyranny which had for a time been interrupted were again re- 
 newed. At the time of the escape of Dost Mahomed, the feeling throughout 
 these extensive districts was feverish in the extreme ; and the Envoy was 
 warned, by Sir A. Burnes, that an insurrection might break out any day 
 in that part of the couutry where circumstances had originally given his Ma- 
 jesty the most trusty portion of his subjects."(16) It was here, then, that 
 Dost Mahomed looked for assistance ; and no sooner was it known that he 
 was mustering troops to the northward than the whole country prepared 
 itself to rise in his favour. The Chiefs of Khoondooz and Khooloora, who had 
 just before ^nt Ambassadors proffering friendship to us, altered their views, 
 and allied themselves to the fortunes of the Ameer. Besides our mishaps in 
 Scinde and Beloochistan, various misadventures at this time be.^el us, cal- 
 culated to excite or embolden sedition. A fort, commanding one of the 
 principal passes into Toorkistan, had been quietly given up to Captain 
 Garbeit, then on an exploring expedition, and was deemed of importance 
 enough by the politicals to be permanently retained. Captain Hay was 
 directed to occupy it with five companies of the Shah's infantry, one com- 
 pany of which was stationed at Bameean, the others at Syghan. He arrived 
 on the 4th of July, and took charge without the assistance of any other 
 European officer. Matters at first went on quietly, but shortly afterwards, 
 disaffection making its appearance, a reinforcement was sent for to Syghan, 
 where Lieut. Golding commanded. Captain Hay, meanwhile, fell sick ; and 
 
 16. The portion of the text marked by inverted commas is taken, with slight 
 abridgment, from a memorial by Sir A. Burnes, dated Aug. 7, 1840, addressed 
 to the Envoy. We shall have frequent occasion to quote this very remarkable 
 pap. r. 
 
152 
 
 Judging-, from his information, tint Lieut. Golding would be on his way 
 with assistance crossing the Dundan Shekan Pass on the 1st iast., despatched 
 two companies, about 100 in all, under a serjeant, to meet him. They 
 halted during the night opposite a fort, which they supposed to be friendly ; 
 at day. dawn the occupants of the hold, probably mistaking the unexpected 
 visitors for assailants, fired upon them. The serjeant and his little band re- 
 turned the fire and retired, but had, unfortunately, to pass through a narrow 
 defile where the enemy crowded the heights to the amount of about 300. 
 Our men kept steadily together and retired in perfect order, but this was all 
 they could effect. They had 13 killed, and 27 wounded ; when a detachment 
 being sent out by Capt. Hay to their assistance they returned without further 
 obstruction. A couple of mortars, and as many 6-pounders, left Bameean 
 on the 1st inst. to reinforce Syghan. But the quarrel just described was 
 settled by conference — the Chiefs agreeing to cede one of their forts to us,— 
 so no further hostilities took place. The whole of our outposts in this 
 quarter were shortly afterwards abandoned. About this time, Captain 
 McGregor having sent 1,300 of the Shah's Affghans against a place north 
 of Jellalabad, they were defeated, lost their guns and 100 of their men — 200 
 going over to the enemy. So insecure did the Shah himself feel, that 
 having prepared to start on a trip into Koh-i-Damun, thirty miles from his 
 capital, the Chiefs objected, and he wars obliged to abandon his purpose, and 
 return his tents into store. (17) The Seikhs who had been detected giving 
 harbourage to the Ghilzie refugees some months before, were now proved by 
 intercepted letters to have promised or forwarded supplies of money to Dost 
 Mahomed j while a conspiracy was discovered in Gabool by Sir A. Burnes, im- 
 plicating almost all the first men in the city and surrounding countries in a 
 plot to subvert the Suddoyze dynasty, and drive us from the country. (18) 
 Arms and ammunition were purchased up in great quantities in Cabool, and 
 forwarded to the Camp of the ex- Ameer, while large bodies of ,the citizens 
 and fighting men in the neighbourhood joined the insurgent standard. The 
 Envoy was so greatly alarmed that he retired with his family and suite' 
 into the Bala Hissar or citadel, where mortars and howitzers were placed in 
 a position to command the town in case of emergency. At one time it 
 was believed that we should require to abandon all our outposts and 
 concentrate on the capital till assistance should reach us. At Ghuznie, 
 the guns in the citadel were loaded, and kept pointed in the direction 
 whence approach of danger was apprehended. The European regiment 
 and 48th N. I., stationed at Jellalabad, were ordered up to Cabool. Cap- 
 
 17. Private note by Sir A. Burnes, dated 22d Aug., written on a copy of the 
 report sent up to the Envoys found amongst his posthumous papers. 
 
 18. Ibid, ut supra. 
 
153 
 
 tain McGregor's mishap was speedily retrieved. Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Wheeler, in conjunction with Captain McGregor, marched on the 19th 
 against the refractory Kudjah chiefs. His force consisted of 340 of 
 the 1st European regiment, and 90 of the 48th N. I., with one 
 6-pounder of the Shah's artillery. There was much difficulty and delay 
 in bringing the gun to the scene of action. A fort situated on 
 their flank greatly annoyed them by its fire. Another, which stood 
 right in the line of their operations, was carried in brilliant style by 
 the Grenauiers of the 48ih under Lieutenant Paterson. The gun was now 
 run up to the gate of the largest fort, which was instantly blown open ; 
 the enemy flying, panic struck, through every aperture by which they could 
 make their escape. The fort first mentioned as annoying the left flank in 
 its advance, next fell into our hands, and so on till five of these strong-holds 
 were in our possession. Our casualties amounted to 3 killed and 16 
 wounded. The enemy, finding resistance hopeless, sued for terms,— 
 which were conceded them on hostages being granted ; — they were 
 said to have lost 80 men in the defence, including two chiefs. On the 
 ?Oth of August, Afzul Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, came down 
 on Bajgah with about 500 horse. Captain Codrington had command of 
 this advanced post, which was occupied by 200 of the newly raised Janbaz 
 or AiFghan levies, with the Ghoorkas or sepoys from Nepaul already 
 referred to. The Janbaz horsemen being without European officers, were 
 headed by Lieutenant Rattray, political assistant to Dr Lord. The enemy 
 were twice charged and driven off the field. (19.) A hazardous advance in 
 pursuit of the Uzbegs had at first been determined on, but intelligence 
 having reached, in the course of the evening, that Heibuk, the stronghold 
 of a friendly chief in our front, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, it 
 was resolved to commence a retreat on Syghan during the nighf, and 
 unite with Captain Hopkins, commanding the Afi'ghan regiment, and 
 Captain Garbett's horse artillery ; the whole of Dost Mahomed's troops 
 being now at liberty to attack our outposts. From Syghan, having saved 
 the public baggage and treasure, but having sacrificed a large quantity of 
 private property on the way, they returned on Bameean and proceeded to 
 fortify themselves for immediate defence till assistance should reach 
 them from Cabool. The force amounted to 2000 men, with 12 guns ; but 
 of these one half were Atfghaus ready to join the Dost the moment he came 
 sufficiently near to permit desertion. (20) On the way from Syghan their con- 
 
 19. Delhi Gazette, September 23. 
 
 20. Letter of Sir Alexander Burnes, Caboo], September 7. — Fourth troop 
 3rd Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery, four of the Shah's guns, two mortars, 
 and 460 Aftghau horse, with the force fell back from the outposts mentioned 
 in the iQs.i.-'JJombat/ Times^ 14th October, 1840. 
 
 W 
 
154 
 
 duct \7as in the last degree mutinous and disorderly ; and on their arrival at 
 Bameean one company marched out with their arms and aceoutrenaents and 
 went over to the camp of the enemy ; the remainder, to the amount of 500 
 or 600, were disarmed and ordered to return to Cabool. On the 7th 
 September, Colonel Dennie, with the 35th N. I., the Shah's 4th regiment, 
 and 160 of Anderson's horse, left Gabool to reinforce Bameean. On the 
 11th, while on his march, he received an express from Dr Lord apprising 
 him of the desertion of Captain Hopkins's Affghans, and intimating that 
 Dost Mahomed, with his son Afzul Khan, the WuUee of Khooloom, and 
 some thousands of the tribes, had advanced to and captured Syghan im- 
 mediately on its abandonment by us, and that the enemy were within 30 
 miles of Bameean. Having pressed through the Gurdan Dewal defile, a 
 second despatch of still greater urgency was received, intimating that th.a 
 ex-Ameer had resolved to return to Bameean and occupy the passes, so as to 
 prevent the junction of our troops. In order to frustrate this, Colonel 
 Dennie resolved to occupy the Track pass, and the same day the crest of the 
 mountain, 13,000 feet above the sea, was gained, and both its sides care- 
 fully guarded. Bameean was now safe, and only twenty miles off, the troops 
 being on the same side with it of this vast unbroken chain of mountains. 
 Here they remained just lang enough to collect their supplies, left somewhat 
 behind them by the rapidity of their movements, and the difficulty of the ground 
 they required to traverse. Fresh entreaties for advance induced Col. Dennie 
 to press on by forced marches to Bameean, where he arrived on the 14th. 
 Having drawn out the Ghoorkas, he disarmed Captain Hopkins's regiment, 
 who, although loaaed, offered no resistance. This has been referred to above. 
 Finding no enemy in the neighbourhood, he proceeded to make arran je- 
 ments for an advance upon Syghan. This turned out unnecessary, the 
 Uzbegs being now close at hand. On the evening of the 17th, information 
 was received that Dost Mahomed and his Uzbeg allies, under the Wullee 
 of Khooloom, were entering the valley from the great defile seven miles in 
 front of Bameean. They were not discouraged in their approach, in order that 
 they might be drawn well up the valley, into a position favourable for our 
 operations. On the morning of the 18th, a fortified village which had claims on 
 our protection having been attacked by them, it became imperative on us to 
 drive them off. It was reported that the Dost's troops amounted only to a 
 few hundreds — it turned out that they numbered from six to ten thousand 
 fighting men. Relying on the correctness of the understatement, one- third 
 of the force, with a 6-pr. gun and howitzer, was all that were taken out. 
 These consisted of 230 of the 25th N. I., 270 Ghoorkas, 80 of Anderson's 
 Ilorse, aiid 200 Janbazes — 800 in all. The enemy had got possession of 
 the chain of forts in front, and Colonel Dennie was not a little surprised to 
 find them ten times as numerous as had been represented. To have retired, 
 
us 
 
 t^r waited for reinforcements, would have been fatal, so tliey were imme- 
 diately charged and driven from their position. The artillery practice was 
 beautiful, and our grape and shrapnell told fearfully on their crowded masses. 
 They rallied tour or five times, but seeing our steady aod rapid advance, 
 they lost heart, broke, and fled pell-mell towards the pass. 
 
 The cavalry, consisting of 80 of Anderson's Horse, 200 Janbazes, and 40 
 or 50 of Dr Lord's and Captain ConoUy's escort— about 330 in all — were now 
 let slip, and cut up vast numbers of the flying Uzbegs. The deserters from 
 Captain Hopkins's regiment were drawn up as light infantry— no mercy was 
 shewn them by their former comrades. The allied troops dispersed them- 
 selves in all directions over the hills — the pursuit continued for four miles, 
 and when Dost Mahomed was last seen, he was wounded in the thigh, and 
 had not more than 200 horsemen along with himi The ex- Ameer and his 
 son, with the Wullee of Khooloom, owed their escape, which was a narrow 
 one, entirely to the fleetness of their horses. Their only gun, kettle- 
 drums, tents, standards, and baggage fell into our hands. The casualties of 
 the enemy are said to have exceeded 300 killed and wounded. Our loss- 
 amounted to 50, of whom six only were killed. For more than a week no 
 tidings could be obtained of the Dost or Wullee, but apprehensions being 
 entertained that they might be endeavouring to re-assemble their scattered 
 forces at Syghan, 37 miles from Bameean, Colonel Dennie made prepara- 
 tions to move out and disperse them. On the morning of the 22d, he 
 marched with 3 6-pr. guns, and 1 12-pr. howitzer, six companies of the 
 35th N. I., six more of the Ghoorka battalion, 100 of Anderson's Horse, 
 200 Janbazes, and 100 Hazarah pioneers — 1500 in all. (21) On reaching 
 Akurabad at the end of the first day's march, he learned that the allies had 
 passed that place after their defeat, and pushed forward without halt to 
 Hyatoo, where a garrison was left, and continued their onward flight. The 
 following afternoon he reached Hyatoo, and fiading it abandoned, set fire to 
 it : — here he learned that the fugitives had pushed on past Syghan, and 
 that the garrison they had left behind them had fled. This fort was next 
 approached and occupied ; it was found most difficult of access, and capable 
 of maintainidg a determined and protracted defence. So precipitate had 
 been the retreat of the Uzbegs on hearing of our approach, that they had 
 left behind them the whole of the stores, tents, and arms, property, public 
 and private, which had been abandoned by our troops? on their retreat 
 
 21. The details of the above operations are taken from Colonel Dennie's 
 despatches. He dates from Syghan the 27th, mentioning that it had taken 
 him two days to reach this from Bameean. He states that he left on the 27th j 
 the two are irreooncileable, so the date of his despatch has been altered to the 
 25th. He was back at Bameean again on the 1st Oct. j private letters state 
 that he reached on the 24th, He says> ** Syghau was stronger than 
 Ghuznie." 
 
156 
 
 towards Banaeean, three weeks before. Oa the ^Stli, aa ambaf?sa.ior from 
 the Wullee waited on Dr Lord with overtures of peace, and Colonel 
 Dennie resolved to remain where he was till negociations were completed- 
 Dost Mahomed appeared to have been for the time cast off from the Uzbegs, 
 of whom there were 5500 in a valley 30 miles from Syghan. On the 29th 
 September our army returned to Bameein, the terms proposed to the Wulles 
 having been conceded him. The Dost having made his appearance at 
 Heibuk, was refused all farther assistance, and no course appeared to be 
 left to him but to surrender himself into our hands. The duty on which 
 Colonel Dennie and his gallant little band had been dispatched having been 
 thus gloriously executed, they returned to Cabool on the I8th October. 
 This series of operations betwixt the 1 1 th and 30th September, was one of the 
 most important, and by far the most brilliant, which had yet occupied our 
 troops in Affghanistan. From circumstances never satisfactorily ex- 
 plained, the whole of the despatches of Colonel Dennie relating to them, 
 excepting that giving an account of the battle of Bameean, were excluded 
 from the Gazette. It was the custom with Lord Keane and Sir Willoughby 
 Cotton to avenge themselves on officers out of favour with them, by passing 
 them over in the Gazette or suppressing their despatches — a system subse- 
 quently practised by General Nott, and permitted to pass uncensured. Col. 
 Dennie was offered the second class Doorannee Order for the most brilliant 
 exploit performed during the war : he declined it. (22) He had before de- 
 clined the offer of the third class Order, with which he had been insulted fo* 
 the storming of Ghuznie. Meanwhile, operations equally active, but in all 
 respects widely different in their results, had been in progress to the 
 westward. On the 29th September Sir R. Sale marched at daylight from 
 his camp at Robat to attack the fort of Tootundurra, at the entrance of the 
 Ghorebund Pass. His force consisted of Her Majesty's 13th, two com- 
 panies 27th, and flank companies 37th N. I., two squadrons of the 2d 
 Bengal Cavalry, and the Shah's 2d cavalry, which joined at Charekar, five 
 miles in advance, a couple of G-prs., and three 9-prs. The cavalry were in ad- 
 vance. On arriving at Tootundurrah the enemy were fouad very strongly 
 posted. A village, surrounded by garden walls, and defended by a small 
 fort, with several detached towers, commanded the uneven ground from 
 which the steeps ascend which wall in the pass. A chain of detached forts, 
 within musket shot of each other, and of the village respectively, extended 
 to the eastward. One of the forts was peculiarly strong. The rear or 
 northward of this position was protected by a deep canal along the high 
 ground, the valley beyond being covered with gardens. A party of the 
 
 22. Colonel Dennie's letter to Sir W. Cotton, dated Cabool, 23d October ; 
 also private letters.— Fraser's Magazine, and Bombay Times, 
 
157 
 
 enemy was drawn up in front, protected by a mound ; a second party oecu* 
 pied the face of the hill to the west. The forts were all garrisoned by 
 matchlock men, which maintained a hot fire upon us as we advanced. 
 Strong parties, with artillery, were detached to clear the hills, and take the 
 enemy in flank, and to get possession of two detached forts on the right- 
 These having been completely successful, the principal column moved down 
 upon the village. (23) The enemy were defeated, and compelled to retire 
 from all their position?, and by 1 1 o'clock the whole of their strongholds 
 were in our possession. The artillery, as usual, rained destruction on our 
 opponents, and left them without means of resistance or hope of success. 
 We had six privates killed, — the only officer who fell was Captain Edward 
 Conolly. Three brothers of this talented family lost their lives during the 
 Affghan war — Captain John died at Cabool in July 1842, and Captain 
 Arthur, the traveller, was shortly after murdered at Bokhara along with 
 Colonel Stoddart. The whole of the Tootundurrah forts were, at the sug- 
 gestion of Sir Alexander Burnes, who accompanied the force, destroyed. 
 Sir R. Sale having been informed by the Political Agent that a number of 
 the rebel chieftains had taken refage at the fort of Jugla, 16 miles from his 
 camp at Chareekar, Captain Anderson, with two squadrons of the Shah's 
 cavalry, the janbazes, and 500 Doorannee horse — about 1000 cavalry in all, 
 were despatched under Captain Sanders with a view to surround and pre- 
 vent the escape of the chiefs until the slower moving infantry and artillery 
 should be able to get up and attack the place. They marched soon after 
 midnight, and by sunrise of the 3d of October the fort was completely 
 invested. By ten a.m., the General with Her Majesty's 13th, two com- 
 panies of the 27th and 37th Native Infantry, two squadrons of the 2d 
 cavalry, arrived, and in two hours more one 24-pr. howitzer, three 9 and 
 two6-prs. had joined - the mortars, which had been detained by the badness 
 of the roads, did not get into position till late in the afternoon. A severe 
 cannonade was maintained betwixt one and tiiree p.m., when the breach 
 being considered practicable they proceeded to storm. Four officers of 
 H.M.'s 13th for some time maintaiiled themselves on the summit of the wall 
 with such determined gallantry as to call forth the cheers of all their com- 
 rades in the thickest of the fight. (24) The enemy crowned the crest of the 
 shattered wall, and poured in so hot a fire, and offered such stout re- 
 sistance, that the storming party was compelled to retire with loss, — the 
 breach being quite impracticable, as was afterwards ascertained fully. They 
 took refuge in the adjoining ravine until recalled to camp. The 
 
 23. Sir R. Sales's despatch of 29th September, 1840. 
 
 24. These were Brevet-Major Kershaw (killed on retreat from Cabool), 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenant Edward King (who afterwards 
 fell gloriously at Tezeen), and Lieutenant G. Wade. 
 
garrison, 'Notwithstanding all the precautions made use of to secure them^ 
 made good their retreat ; and the fort having thus been evacuated, was taken 
 possession of by our men a httle after dusk— 7 p. m. Our casualties amounted 
 to 50 in killed and wounded. On the morning of the 13th, information was 
 received that Dost Mahomed had come through the Ghorebund Pass at Too- 
 tundurrah, and taken up his quarters 15 miles from our camp : his cattle 
 were described as so entirely knocked up, that it was supposed a squadron 
 of cavalry might intercept and cut off his retreat. Lieutenant Dowson, with 
 500 Affghan horse, was immediately despatched on this duty, but found 
 he was too late, the ex- Ameer having^ a few hours before, left for Nijrow^ 
 20 miles east of Chareekar* Next morning a whole company of Lieut. Maule'a 
 Kohistanees went over to their old ruler, and fears were entertained that the 
 rest would follow. Our troops were encamped at Chareekar when information 
 was received that the Dost had crossed the valley, apparently intending to 
 move on Cabool, whose safety, considering the temper of the people in and 
 around it, began to occasion serious uneasiness. A position was accordingly 
 taken up by our troops on the J 6th at Karabagh, with a view of covering 
 and protecting the capital. On the 17th, they proceeded to attack the fort 
 of Derveesh Khan, one of the most respectable and consistent of the friends 
 of the late ruler. A long detour was made to avoid some difficult marching 
 ground, and when the fort was attained, it was found empty. The walls 
 and bastions were blown up and the stronghold destroyed. On the night 
 of the 18th, the enemy assembled after dark within 120 yards of our camp, 
 and continued for three hours to pour in upon us a close but ill-directed fire, 
 which could not be replied to, but from which little damage was sustained. (25) 
 On the 19th, the remainder of the 37th N. I. and three 9-pounders joined. 
 On the 20th, preparations were made to attack the strong village of Kan-.« 
 darrah, occupied as was understood by from 600 to 1000 of the insurgents. 
 It was situated close under the inferior range of the Lughman mountains 
 by which Koh-i^Damun is bounded on the west. Immediately to the south 
 is the village of Beydack^ and the groves, vineyards, and gardens of the two 
 places cover a portion of the hill side, measuring about two miles north and 
 south, and half as much from east to west. The gardens are, as usual, cul- 
 tivated in terraces like a flight of gigantic steps : each house was a distinct 
 little fort, loopholed and garrisoned ; while numerous towers of great strength 
 were scattered about : the place, in fact, was of very great strength, and if 
 ordinarily well defended, could only have been captured at a heavy sacrifice 
 of life. Fortunately, while we were encamped within sight of them, the 
 people took to quarrelling amongst themselves. The warrior portion of the 
 inhabitants refused to fight, and on the night of the 20th moved off ; the 
 
 2S. Englishman, 9th December. 
 
* 159 
 
 res-t felt so alarmed and dispirited that they all dispersed, and an the fore- 
 noon of the 21st we set fire to the houses, destroyed the gardens, and levelled 
 the villages ; and on the 22d moved to the north of Ak Serae to resume the 
 observation of the Cabool road. At this time a force of the 3d Shah's 
 Khelat-i-Ghilzie Corps, and two Shah's gun?, marched from Cabool and 
 surprised Istalif by a night march. The 3rd Shah's joined us from Pur- 
 wan shortly afterwards. In this position our troops remained for 
 about a week, when they advanced towards Nijrow on hearing that the 
 Dost had come out of the valley with a small force which was hourly in- 
 creasing. On the 1st November they reached the fort of Meer Musjedee, 
 where more exact intelligence than had hitherto been obtained of the move- 
 ments of the ex-Ameer was procured. He had advanced towards Purwan 
 Durrah, a small valley traversed by a clear rapid stream, and sprinkled over 
 with orchards and numerous forts. Hitherward the following morning 
 moved our troops. The advanced guard consisted of 2 6-pr guns under 
 Lieutenant Warburton, four companies ofH.M.'s 13th under Major Ker- 
 shaw, the two flank companies of the 37th, and one company of the 
 27th N. I., under Lieutenant Rhind of the former corps ; two squadrons 
 of the 2d Bengal Light Cavalry, and 200 of the Shah's 2d Horse, un- 
 der Captain Anderson, — the whole being under the command of Colonel 
 Salter. The troops moved at daybreak on the 2d Nov. : the morning was 
 serene and beautiful, the country in the highest degree picturesque ; but 
 the road was intersected with cuts, canals, and water courses, and was difficult 
 in the extreme. Between eight and nine, the Goraband river was crossed, 
 the guns having been got over with great difficulty. On ascending the 
 hills beyond, a fort opened fire on the advance, and compelled them to form 
 line. By this time the villagers were flocking in from every quarter, in- 
 treating protection from the army of Dost Mahomed, said to be plunder- 
 ing them in all directions and preparing to decamp. (26) The forts and 
 villages as we advanced were rapidly evacuated by the enemy, who were seen 
 retreating towards the hills. Their numbers were computed at 3500 foot and 
 500 horse. (27) Dr Lord, who accompanied Col. Salter, having intimated 
 that tho cavalry, by proceeding in advance, would be able to cut off a por- 
 tion of the fugitives, the 2d cavalry were ordered to skirt the hill on tho 
 right, while the left of the pass was occupied by Anderson's horse. The 
 infantry followed, but were greatly retarded in their movements by the guns, 
 which were impeded by the water courses. The cavalry, having got a mile or 
 so ahead of the main body, were attacked by a detachment of about 200 Aff- 
 ghan horse, believed to be headed by the ex- Ameer in person. Line having 
 been formed, Capt. Fraser, who commanded the right, ordered the troopers to 
 
 26. Correspondent in the Delhi Gazette, November 22. 
 
 27. General Sale's despatch? 2d November Government Gazette. 
 
160 
 
 draw and charge. The first troop hesitated, and the men began to fall back by- 
 eights or tens. The officers were so completely occupied by the enemy advanc- 
 ing at a slow but determined pace, and now close upon them, that they merely 
 called out to the men to come on, little anticipating that they were to have 
 all the battle to themselves. Observing, when too late, that they were about 
 to be left without support from their men, who had now begun to move off 
 by threes and fours, and scamper like a flock of sheep before a force not 
 superior to them in numbers, Captains Fraser and Ponsonby in vain used 
 every effort to bring them on to the charge ; in vain they exhorted, in- 
 treated, and implored them during the few moments permitted them. Cap« 
 tain Fraser at length exclaimed, " I never saw such cowards, we must go 
 alone.*' The Affghan horse were now amongst our wavering or retiring 
 ranks. Dost Mahomed led his men down the hill^ calling ^* In the name of 
 God and the prophet, fight and drive the Feringee Cafiirs from the land, or I 
 am gone." The European officers already named, together with Lieut. Crispin , 
 Cornet Moffat, Assist.^Surg. Eddy, Mr Boulton, the riding master, and Mr 
 M'Dermot, the veterinary surgeon, with some 15 or 20 men, were left fight- 
 ing desperately in the midst of the enemy. Dr Liord had been killed on the 
 advance by a shot from one of the posts. Lieutenant JBroadfoot of the En- 
 gineers had followed in the rear of the cavalry, and was ridden down by them 
 while endeavouring to prevail upon them to return to the field. His body 
 was afterwards found mutilated by the enemy. The infantry column had 
 observed with admiration the gallaut bearing and steady advance of the Aff- 
 ghans, conceiving that they would be as steadily met and still more gal- 
 lantly repelled ; the hot charge and flashing sabres conveying for a moment 
 the impression that all had gone well, when the enemy's high red banner 
 dispelled the illusion. To their dismay the next moment they perceived 
 the cavalry in full retreat flying at speed before the Affghans. Capt. Fraser 
 arrived shortly after in camp on horseback, severely wounded in the back, and 
 with his right hand nearly cut off. The advanced guard was now formed 
 in line to receive the enemy, and the guns placed in position; but the 
 horsemen were probably satisfied with their success, and were, at all events, 
 too weak to attempt more than they had accomplished. They passed on 
 beyond range of our artillery. Three companies of the 37th N. I., with 
 the 2d Bengal Light Cavalry which had been seat back, were ordered to 
 move round to the right in quest of the missing officers, while three com- 
 panies, under Lieutenant Rhiud, with two of Abbott's guns, proceeded 
 towards the left to attack the enemy now accumulating in masses on a rocky 
 eminence on the flank. Some delay occurred in these arrangements : as the 
 second- mentioned party advanced. Lieutenant Da wei, who was in charge of 
 the guns, opened firo with admirable precision on the Affghans. The red 
 standard of the enemy was now placed on the top of the hill, anj a detach- 
 
161 
 
 ment, under Lieutenant Rhind, after experiencing the greatest difficulty in 
 the ascent, obtained possession of the height just before occupied. This posi- 
 tion having been maintained for about half an hour, was abandoned, the ene- 
 my having been driven off. (28) The troops had now been nine hours 
 under arms ; it would have taken them three hours more to have reached the 
 principal portion of the enemy; who still remained in the field, so we returned 
 to the camp for the night. (29) A new attack was arranged for next day, 
 and the soldiers slept accoutred for the fight. When morning dawn- 
 ed, the Affghans were found to have fled towards Chareekar : not a shot 
 had been fired, nor was an enemy to be seen. The loss at Purwau Durrah fell 
 entirely on the officers. Dr Lord, the Political Agent in Kohistan, fell on the 
 advance; Lieut. Broadfoot was killed as the cavalry began to retire, and Cornet 
 Crispin was shot dead upon the field, and was afterwards cut to pieces. The 
 condition in which Captain Fraser returned to camp has already been refer- 
 red to ; (30) the escape of Captain Ponsonby was almost miraculous. He was 
 mounted on a magniticent Ghuznie charger, who, finding himself hemmed in 
 on all sides, lashed furiously out and dismounted three of the Affghans. 
 The gallant officer himself had a ball through his left arm ; the top of his left 
 thumb was cut off, with a severe sabre wound dividing his nose and laying open 
 his cheek to the bone. His reins were severed across ; his horse had lost his 
 ears, and had a shot through his neck. Such was the battle of Purwan 
 Durrah, which closed the caieer of Dost Mahomed Khan ,- and presented 
 the first example of misconduct on the part of the Sepoy soldier since the 
 commencement of the war. Of this no adequate explanation has ever been 
 obtained ; but so infamous was it regarded that the regiment was degraded 
 and disbanded, and its number erased from the army list. The heroic con- 
 duct of the British officers met with the applause that it deserved ; the Na- 
 tive officers and troops who had not been engaged, or were guiltless of mis- 
 conduct, were drafted into other corps. Bameean had, in reality, sealed 
 the fate of the insurgent party, who were now unable to bring into the field 
 half the force that Colonel Dennie had defeated. Having staked his all upon 
 this cast without further hope of success. Dost Mahomed found himself on 
 the eve of being abandoned to his fate. He disappeared from the field of 
 battle, no one knew how or where. On the evening of the 3d November, 
 as Sir W. Macnaghten was returning from his evening ride, and was within 
 
 28. Delhi Gazette, ut sup. 
 
 29. Colonel Dennie's letters, Cabool, 18th April> 1841, and India Gazette 
 therein referred to. 
 
 30. Tnis officer formed one of Sir R. Sale's garrisonat Jellalabad, when thej? 
 were blockaded betwixt November 1841 and April 1842. In March 1843, 
 he went home in charge of presents from the Maharajah Shere Singh to the 
 Queen of England. His hand had not been amputated, but was at this time 
 wholly useless. 
 
 X 
 
16'2 
 
 a fevr yards of his own residence in the citadel of Gabool, a single horsemait 
 galloped up to him, and having satisfied himself that he was the Envoy and 
 Minister, told him that Dost Mahomed had arrived, and sought his protection. 
 The ex-Ameer immediately appeared ; he alighted from his horse, and pre- 
 sented his sword. (31) His sword was returned him, and he himself requested 
 to remount. He had quitted tha field of battle late the preceding evening, 
 and rode straight into Gabool, a distance of 60 miles, having been 24 hours 
 on horseback. His finances were exhausted ; his allies were deserting 
 hill ; and the Seikhs, who had heretofore promised him all sorts of support, 
 had consented to open their country for the march of additional troops, to 
 reinforce the British army in Affghanistan. It had become obvious, that 
 however he might protract the struggle it could have but one issue. With 
 a pride peculiar to himself, he carefully eschewed our army close to(32) 
 him, whom he considered he had foiled, and rode in straight to give himself 
 up with flying colours. He shewed few symptoms of fatigue, and his self- 
 possession was remarkable. He wrote to his eldest son Mahomed Afzul, 
 the sharer of his captivity and toils, and to two of his other sons who had 
 escaped from Ghuznie, desiring them to come in immediately, as he had al- 
 ready surrendered himself and been honourably treated. He left Cabool for 
 India under escort on the 12th November, and waited at Peshawur till joined 
 by his family. They had resided at Ghuznie since their surrendcF in July ; 
 they consisted of nearly 700 persons, of whom one half werj females. Four- 
 teen sons surrendered themselves; Ukhbar Khan alone having declined our 
 hospitalities to the end- Hyder Khan, who became prisoner on the fall of 
 Ghuznie, at this time a prisoner at large at Bombay, afterwards joined theoa. 
 The ex- Ameer was permitted at his own request to visit Calcutta, where he 
 was received with the utmost respect by Lord Auckland, and became for a time 
 the great Lion of the City of Palaces. He was allowed an income of three 
 lakhs of Rupees, — £30,000 a-year. He was assigned a residence first at 
 Loodianah and afterwards at Mussooree on our north-west frontiers, where 
 the climate was more congenial to his constitution than that of lower BengaL 
 He appears to have created a strong and favourable impression on all with 
 whom he came in contact ; and though watching, of course with deep interest, 
 the struggles of his country, he was never on any occasion detected interfering 
 with its affairs, or even during the time of our troubles, which he appeared 
 to deplore, corresponding with the insurgents. He quitted India in January 
 ]843, and after a sojourn of some weeks at Lahore, returned to Cabool. 
 This, however, is greatly in anticipation of the regular course of our narra- 
 tive. The surrender of Dost Mahomed reduced the country around Cabool 
 
 31. Sir W. Macnaghten's Despatches, November 4. 
 
 32. Colonel Dennie's Letters, December 27. We hare borrowed in part 
 the words of both the papers referred to- 
 
163 
 
 to a state of temporary tranquillity. (33) There was no further head or defi- 
 nite object for combination, and though the elements of insurrection were 
 every where abundant, and instances of individual resistance to the tax- 
 gatherer not unfrequent, there w^as no hope to be indulged in, or object to 
 be advanced, by a combined or extensive outbreak. The embers of discon- 
 tent smouldered in Kohistan, but were not extinguished ; a communication is 
 said to have been intercepted, bearing the seal of the blinded Zemaun Shah, 
 brother of the Shah Soojah, addressed to the Sultan Mahmoud Khaa 
 Barukzye, Sirdar of Kohat, urging a combination with the Seikhs to restore 
 him to authority ; a proof of the conviction of this member of the royal 
 family, that the question was less betwixt the Suddozye and Barukzye races 
 than the anxiety to get rid of the present ruler and his allies. (34) Winter 
 was now at hand : — the AflFghans had not as yet discovered the weak points 
 in the position we had taken up; — and warlike operations were not thought 
 of with the ground covered with snow, and the thermometor considerably 
 below zero. Before directing attention to the affairs of Scinde and Beloo- 
 ehistan, where insurrection was rife, and rebellion had assumed a more for- 
 miJable front than in any of the tramontane parts of the Doorannee empire, 
 it will be expedient briefly to examine the causes of the unexpected continu- 
 ance of hostilities, and our extreme want of success in reducing the country 
 to obedience. The papers of Sir Alexander Burnes fortunately furnish 
 abundant materiel for an enquiry as important in its nature as unsatisfactory 
 in its results. The history of the operations in the countries south- 
 west of Candahar forming an episode of themselves, will be narrated in the 
 following chapters, 
 
 Dr Atkinson relates that, in December 1840, when accompanying Dost 
 Mahomed on his way to India, the ex-Ameer recommended strongly the 
 policy of taking the dominion of the country into our own hands. "The 
 Suddozyes," he said, " had never been accustomed to obey, and never would 
 obey ; and, by their intrigues, under the anomalous sovereignty of the 
 Shah Shoojah, we should be involved in perpetual embarrassment.*' The 
 only effectual mode of crushing them was to govern them in our own way. 
 ** You will also find," he observed, ** the very courtiers about the Shah 
 who have for years been fattening on your bounty, the most forward in 
 plotting against you." There is no doubt that the observation of the 
 Affghan ruler fully explained our difficulties, arising, as they did, from tho 
 anomalous nature of our position. It is true that the habits of the popula- 
 tion of Affghanistan bore scarcely any resemblance to those of the countries 
 
 33. " The surrender of Dost Mahomed has made the country as tranquil as 
 Vesuvius alter an irruption j how long it will continue it is impossible to say." 
 — Letter of Sir A. Burnes^ Cahoot, Nov. 13, 1840. 
 
 34. Atkinson's Expedition into Affghanistan, p. 368. 
 
1^4 
 
 with which, in India, we had hitherto been accustotned to deal i— countries 
 which lay on the borders of our dominioDs, and were accessible to our armies 
 along the whole line of their frontiers : which were familiar with the aspect, 
 as well as with the resistless power of our authority, before they felt its 
 influence. The Affghans had at no time for any lengthened period, sub- 
 mitted to a regular government of their own : they were divided into a 
 hundred petty clans, each professing allegiance to individual chiefs, who 
 made no ceremony in disputing the authority of the Sovereign when his 
 behests discorded with their views. Imbued with more than the usual 
 impatience of taxation, almost the only aid they could be induced to con- 
 tribute to the state was in the shape of a contingent of men in the case of 
 war. Difficult as it was, however, to fuse these hot, fiery, and refractory, 
 subjects into the form of a quiet, well-ordered, and submissive tribute- 
 paying-population ; the source of all our troubles lay in the anomaly of our 
 own position. Had we taken possession of the country for ourselves, it would 
 not only have been totally useless to us, but would have cost some millions 
 sterling a-year for the maintenance of from 12,000 to 15,000 regular troops 
 to keep up the show of sovereignty. But so long as we asked no tribute, 
 and left the tribes to themselves, it is probable they would have learned to 
 leave us alone when they discovered bow much more satisfactory was the 
 silver and gold we scattered than the steel and lead we might have required 
 to use amongst them. This, certainly, was the most we could ever at any 
 time have hoped, from the entire occupation of Affghanistan. 
 
 In maintaining the Shah Soojah by force of arms on the throne in the 
 shape of an independent sovereign, we enabled him to do as he thought fit, 
 while we relieved him from the fear of consequences. The capricious 
 tyranny he exercised over his subjects was carried into effect, and he pro- 
 tected from the results — by British bayonets ! Rights long dormant 
 or forgotten, and which in many cases had never been admitted, were 
 resuscitated ; claims were renewed on tribute for half a century fallen aside ; 
 and the whole country harrassed and annoyed by the political agent, the' 
 spy, and the tax-gatherer, — creatures equally new and unwelcome in the 
 recesses of the Doorannee empire. 
 
 No better explanation can be given of the sources of our difficulties than 
 that contained in the representation of Sir Alexander Burnes, laid before the 
 Envoy on the 7th of August 1840, on the anniversary of our entrance into 
 Cabool ; with a long extract from which able, but unfortunately unheeded, 
 document, the present chapter may be concluded : — 
 
 So much for the state of affairs in the kingdom of Cabool on this day, the anni- 
 versary of our entrance into its capital. At Court I fear we shall not find matters 
 in a better state ; much is said of the King's popularity : this is a subject I feel an- 
 xious to grapple with thoroughly. To me it would be very astonishing if any Af- 
 
165 
 
 ghan King who had allied himself to the Siklis, and the English, could be popular ^ 
 it is not in the nature of things. His Majesty's successor may hope for a better 
 share of the public favor, but Shah Shoojah must I fear get on without it. I would 
 not however dwell much on the abstract question of unpopularity, I would rather 
 enquire into the causes for it, if they exist, or are only imaginary. Bad ministers 
 are in every Government, solid grounds for unpopularity, and I doubt if ever a 
 King had a worse set than Shah Shooja- His principal adviser is an old servant 
 byname Moolah Sbikore, who has grown grey with Uis Majesty in exile, where he 
 distributed, in some hundred fractional parts, the Pension which the Shah receiv- 
 ed from the Company. He is not a man of family, but a Moolah ; his faculties are 
 impaired by age and disease ; he once incurred His Majesty's displeasure for 
 which he forfeited his ears, a subject fruitful in witticism to the discontented about 
 court, and little calculated to elevate the representative of Majesty. So com- 
 pletely is this poor man's memory gone that he never recognizes a man he has 
 once seen ; that the commonest business requires half a dozen of notes, — in fact, of 
 him it might be said that his whole business is to gather money, and to this one 
 end his remaining faculties are applied. Moolah Shikore passes by the name of 
 Yuzeer or minister, but His Majesty gets offended at his being so called) 
 so we may presume he thinks it possible to get on without any minister. By 
 facts that have come under my own knowledge, I shall depict the Vizier's character, 
 and all of them can be tested by yourself. In the last winter, his notions of Po- 
 litical economy led him to seize all the granaries around Cabool, on which he put 
 his seal, and from which he drew forth the grain, and had it exposed for sale in 
 the Bazaar by his own officers, and at a price 6xed by himself. When spring ar- 
 rived, he conceived it would please His Majesty to adorn the royal Gardens which 
 have been long neglected, a measure most laudable to a people so fond of gardens 
 as the Caboolies, highly popular, but this was to be done gratiSy and by conscrip- 
 tion on all around this district. The poor peasantry were dragged in hundreds 
 from their homes at seed time, when their lands required their care, and compelled 
 to labor without any reward. Discontent rose to such a height that I sent to the 
 minister and plainly told him that he was disgracing his King and himself; and 
 that I would no longer stand silent, as policy dictated I should on all occasions, un- 
 less he at least gave the poor wretches bread, and if he would not do it, I would 
 from next day open my own treasury and supply it. After this the workmen 
 got two pice worth of bread per diem, while our Engineer officers were paying 
 seven times that in the adjoining garden, where our Cantonments vrexQ erecting. 
 The next freak of this minister was to reduce the number of Butchers' shops in 
 this populous City, and to compel these to sell at his own price, thereby ensuring 
 a monopoly of meat to a few, and injuring many. For days the loudest complaints 
 were uttered, till free trade was at last established. As I write, the shops in which 
 flour is sold are now shut, the minister having turned his views from meat to 
 bread; and it is painful to pass through the Bazaar in consequence. With such an 
 adviser, can His Majesty be popular — do he, and his minister deserve it ? 
 
 You have frequently pointed out to the King, in which I have humbly seconded 
 
166 
 
 you^ the uttel* worthlessness of such a man as an adviser, and His Majesty has prd* 
 mised more than once a remedy to an evil so pressing. You are aware that he has 
 appointed within this past month a man of family and character to take a share in 
 public matters by the title of Nizam-oo-dowla, his own name being Oosman Khan 
 Suddoozzye- This.however, I regret to say is a pure fiction, the man exercises no au- 
 thority in the state. His Majesty has given to him the old revenue accounts to ex- 
 amine, and he is to find out such defalcations as he can, a task imperiously neces- 
 sary I admit, but one by no means furnishing a remedy to the grievances above 
 enumerated. These grievances relate to Gabool, but the surrounding country 
 equally suffers under others. Those in the Kohistan I have described, those else- 
 where are fully as common. Besides Oosman Khan, of whom I am bound to speak 
 with favor. His Majesty tells us there is no man fit for trust ; I will only say that be 
 deceives himself, but if unworthy of trust, we shall then suppose the Shah carries 
 on this Government himself: not at all! he has surrounded himself with four or five 
 advisers, who were with him at Loodiana, who are engaged entirely in filling their 
 purses, and who from long absence in Hindoostan, are quite unfit for the respon- 
 sible duty which they are called on to perform. To reward old servants is noble 
 and magnanimous, but other employments may be found for such, than those 
 which taint the ends of justice, and with them. His Majesty's reputation. 
 
 I have spoken of the duties assigned to Oosman Khan connected with the re- 
 venue, and this brings me to that very important subject, and the system on which 
 His Majesty conducts it, if system it can be called, and which calls loudly for re- 
 form. The Collectors of the revenue are the soldiers ; they receive assignments on 
 certain districts for their pay, and they proceed there, living at free quarters on the 
 community till the peasant pays the amount of the assignment, causing thus a 
 more fruitful harvest of dispute than any other human invention could have devi- 
 sed. Distant from the capital the subject refuses to submit to su'^h oppression, 
 and before the snow falls expeditions are sent forth to levy His Majesty's rights ; 
 if the snow does fall the people defy the oflScers of the Crown, and escape for the 
 year. By one of these expeditions the system will be explained. Khan Shereen 
 Khan, the head of the Persian faction, was dispatched in the fall of the year to the 
 countries of Koorum and Koost, south of Suffaid Koh : he levied His Ma- 
 jesty's dues, and lived for five months with 1800 men at free quarters in the coun-' 
 try. As he is a good man, he did his duty with more mildness than an Afighan, 
 but to continue such a system, must clearly alienate all the people of this country 
 from Shah Soojah and from us, for the force we give him ensures what^ if left to 
 himself he could not otherwise command. It is therefore incumbent on us by 
 sending religious men, or by demanding hostages to live at the capital, as security) 
 to see that some other revenue arrangements be adopted ; by the present we can nei- 
 ther govern on the AfFghan system, nor on our own, for the former implied that if a 
 subject paid his duties one year he was to be called out to plunder the Punjaub or 
 Hindoostan the next. 
 
 After adjusting revenue arrangements, the admitted end of Shah Shooja's Go- 
 vernment is to make his Troops fit for service, to raise in fact a national force. 
 
167 
 
 The Jan Baz corps are assuredly a step towards this, and a very important onef 
 and these with the AfFghan Infantry, now being raised, promise well) but it is the 
 object of many to destroy His Majesty's interest in them^ and as they are not con- 
 stantly under the King's eye, his attention is bestowed on other things, his own 
 Irregular Cavalry, his own guns, his own Orderly Regiment, his Nujeebs, and his 
 Sikh bodyguard. I would not advocate the dismissal of the AfFghan Horse, be- 
 cause, 1 believe, if paid, they will do good service, but it will be seen that all the 
 really serviceable portion of the army, the Jan Bazj and the AfFghan Infantry, are 
 paid by ua, or have our security, and that His Majesty ^Zays at soldiers with the 
 other branches) which would be well enough were they not a burden on the fi- 
 nances of the State, (or rather our State,) for this country more than others can- 
 not afford to support useless Troops, and it is not didicult to shew not only how 
 useless are these Troops but how dangerous they are in this country. Of the 
 Irregular Horse I shall not speak ; of the household Artillery, however) you are 
 aware that His Majesty left them in Cabool in the winter without pay ; they pledg- 
 ed their swords and clothes, then mutinied, collared their native officer, and 
 were ultimately paid by jour orders out of our money left in deposit here. The 
 King has a mountain train and two Troops of Horse Artillery in his service, be- 
 sides an Artillery Officer to look after his guns. Of what use are these men ? 
 Next 'come the Orderly Regiment, a bo4y of Hindoostanees some six or eight 
 hundred strong, who run before the King and keep his subjects at a distance with 
 the butt ends of their muskets, \rhh little or no discipline though good looking men, 
 and capable of it) and to which His Majesty has rejected all your entreaties to 
 appoint an Euro^eaii-eScer. Tiie result is to be expected. Six weeks ago they 
 mutinied. You were apprehensive that the regular army would be required, but the 
 orderly Regiment had only repaired to Moolah Shikore) His Majesty's minister ; 
 blockaded the entrance to his house, and told him, which I repeat on the Shah's 
 own authority, that if he did not pay them) they would have his nose, his ears be- 
 ing already gone. The men were paid. His Majesty sought to punish this serioua 
 breach of discipline and respect) and had the oflFenders confined ; the men laid down 
 their arms before the King, and only took them up from there on General Cotton's 
 approach, and from whom I heard it. With so many fine promising regiments, re- 
 gular and irregular) of what use cau this Orderly Regiment be, or what use the Nu- 
 jeebs ? One of H. M.'s regiments of the contingent would with pride discharge the 
 duties of the Palace, and mutiny and disrespect would disappear. But if these sen- 
 timents apply to such Troops, what is to be.said to a body of Sikhs in the costume of 
 their country as the King's guard in this Mahomedan capital ? A few evenings ago 
 I was saluted by several of them with the Wagerojee ka Fatteh,(the Sikh war cry,) 
 in the very streets of Cabool. I assert without fear of contradiction that no Sikh 
 (Khulsa^ ever durst in the time of the AfFghan monarchy appear thus in this city ; and 
 I further assert that their presence here is odious to the people, and to the last degree 
 injurious. These then are the Troops kept up by His Majesty from our coffers, for 
 his own treasure cannot defray the charge. Are there not two parties to a bargain, 
 <And is not Shah Shooja bound to attend to our wishes in discharging useless muti- 
 
168 
 
 nous men, some of whom are offensive to tl»e peoplej and all of whom add to the 
 enormous expense of our occupation of this country ? A few of those men were old 
 servants of the Shah when at Loodiana, but any one who has seen His Majesty's 
 establishment thure, knows how few these are. To use a homely simile, we by 
 keeping up such people, are burning the family candle at both ends, and I cannot 
 but doubt that a demonstration to His Majesty of our inability to support such 
 people would readily rid us of such a nuisance. We all know that panic and mu- 
 tiny are very infectious among soldiers. If Hindoostanees successfully demand 
 their pay with arms in their hands) what will prevent Affghan Horse and Foot 
 acting likewise : and where men are so irregularly paid, what so probable ; and if 
 it occurs, are we to bayonet, and slay His Majesty's subjects, because it pleased 
 His Majesty to live beyond his means ? Place these facts before any soldier, and 
 I shall retract all these opinions if he deems them, unsound or unprofessional. 
 
169 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SCINDE AND BeLOOCUISTAN. 
 
 Mr RoiS Bell, Political Xgent for Scinde— State of Khelat— Expedition under Major Billamore 
 to Kahun and Deyrah— Attacks the Bhoogties— Captures the chief Beebruck— Sacks the 
 village— Retires by Kahun and Nufoosk to the plains— Futility of the expedition— Detach- 
 ment dispatched under Captain Brown and Lieut. Clarke to occupy Kahun— March from 
 Poolajee— Difficulties of the way— Arrive at Kahun, and find it empty— Clarke's party, and 
 that of a Subedar, attacked aad cut to pieces on their return— Captain Brown shut up in 
 Kahun—Puts the men on half- rations on the 24th May— Patience and skill of the defence— 
 Oflfers of assistance from Quettah— Hear of Major Clibborn's convoy— Are informed of its 
 destruction— State of garrison in the end of August— Detachment under Major Clibborn 
 dispatched from Sukkur on 12th August— Reach Poolajee-*Enter the hills— Arrive at 
 Surtof— Examine the ground where Clarke's party were cut to pieces— Difficulties of the 
 way— Reach Nufoosk— -"Want of water— Dreadful heat— Attempt to storm the Pass unsuc- 
 cessful—Storming party driven back, four officers killed— Main body keep their ground till 
 10 P.M.— Parties sent out for water— Return unsuccessful— Part of them cut up— Clibborn 
 retires on Surtof— Attacked during the night— Lose all their baggage— Return to Poolajee— 
 Total loss of convoy generally overstated— Court of Inquiry upon— Extraordinary proceed- 
 ings of— Premature publication of their report— Observations on— General Brooks and Col. 
 Valiant recalled— Reflections. 
 
 The Political Agent to whom the charge of Scinde and Jteloochistaa 
 was, in the end of 1839, committed, was a man in every respect as unlike 
 the Envoy at Cabool as could well be imagined. Mr Ross Bell, by whose 
 individual management so many of the untoward events about to be described 
 were brought around, was, at the time of his appointment, scarce thirty 
 years of age; yet, before this, he had distinguished himself in the Secre- 
 tariat, as a Persian scholar, and had been employed with high credit at the 
 Courts of Nepaul and Lahore, and in an important political situation at 
 Delhi. He had charge of the districts from Dadur to Kurrachee, and from 
 the Indus to the westernmost borders of Beloochistan— the ruler of Kelat 
 being regarded as only a tributary of higher grade than the other chieftains of 
 the Doorannee Empire. Mr Bell was a man of great vigour, and activity 
 of understanding, and of the most determined and reckless daring of pur- 
 pose : but he was one of those who seemed to think the rules of general 
 morality inapplicable in government, and that the maxims of common 
 honesty essential to be observed in the intercourse of private life, might 
 wisely be disregarded by political authorities : a frailty with which too large 
 a portion of our statesmen in India of recent years appear to have been af- 
 fected. While the Envoy and Minister clung to the last to the fond dream 
 of the restoration^ under British auspices, of the Doorannee Empire in its 
 former extent and splendour, the Political Agent of Scinde had sagacity 
 enough early to become satisfied of the mischievousness and untenabi- 
 lity of our policy, and of the impossibility of long maintaining the sovereiga 
 
 Y 
 
170 
 
 on the throne, or ourselves in the country. H?s representations to Govern- 
 ment, like those of Sir Alexander Burnes to this effect, appear to have been 
 utterly unheeded. 
 
 At the close of a former chapter the arrangements which took place at 
 Kelat were adverted to. Mehrab Khan and his principal chiefs having 
 fallen on the capture of the town, his widow, with her step-son Nusseer 
 Khan, a boy about fourteen years of age, betook themselves to the hills. 
 
 Newaz Khan, a relative of the deceased chief, descended by a collateral 
 branch from Abdoolah Khan, the founder of the dynasty, was placed upon 
 the throne. It seems to have been most unaccountably assumed, that we 
 had no more to do than to set up a ruler amongst the democratic tribes of 
 Central Asia, to ensure the permanence of his authority. No means of 
 maintaining our protegee in the perilous position in which we had placed 
 him appear to have been thought of. He was to collect tribute, not for 
 himself only, but for his superior, the Doorannee sovereign, and procure 
 military service from fierce and lawless races, who ill brooked the exercise 
 ot hereditary authoritj', scarcely of that which they themselves had conferred 
 on an elected chief. Lieutenant Loveday was appointed Resident at his half 
 formed and unsupported court: and a guard of honour of thirty sepoys was 
 ail that was considered necessary to make our authority known and re- 
 spected throughout Beloochistan. 
 
 In the middle of December, a force, consisting of the head- quarters of the 
 1st Grenadiers, 150 strong, with 60 Irregular Horse, under Captain llaitt, 
 was despatched from Lheree to take possession of Kahun, the capital of 
 the Murrees, a fierce and warlike but chivalrous clan, occupying a portion 
 of the mountain country which sweeps to the eastward of the Bolan Pass. 
 Another party, acting in conjunction with this, and consisting of the light 
 company of the 5th N.I.,^0 men of the Grenadiers, aud 40 Horse, under 
 Lieutenant Clarke, with Lieutenant Jacob's Battery, proceeded to Deyrah, 
 the head-quarters of the neighbouring tribe of the Bhoogties. The whole 
 force was commanded by Major Billamore. These tribes were to be 
 compelled to pay tribute to Newaz Khan or his superior the Shah Soojah. 
 The chieftains had been persuaded to permit military posts to be established 
 within their country: on what express understanding does not quite appear. 
 (1) On Captain Raitt's arrival at Kahun, he found that, besides its inha- 
 bitants, there were about 400 warriors in the town : there were at 
 least 2000 fighting men collected around. On the chief enquiring whether he 
 came for peace or war, he was answered, that we expected to be received 
 
 1. Bombay Times, January 6 and March 6. Our authorities on Scinde 
 matters are chiefly to be foand in the Bombay Times. The writers are per- 
 fectly known to us, though we regret that we are not au thorised to refer to 
 th«ra by name. 
 
J 71 
 
 as friends, and he was accordingly permitted peaceably to encamp close to 
 the walls. It had been proposed to occupy the fort, when the old chief 
 Dodah learning this, came in person to Captain Raitt, and entreated that 
 this intention should not be persisted in, else bloodshed would ensue, as 
 the fury of the peoj)le was already nearly uncontrollable. The Murrees 
 were still wholly ignorant of the object of our people having beea sent 
 amongst them ; having never before seen regular troops within their hills 
 they considered that our presence boded any thing but good ; and observing 
 the weakness of the force, they began to pelt and insult the sepoys in a 
 way sufficiently indicative of the feelings of the tribo, though the chief 
 excused himself by the plea of want of control over his people. Captain 
 Raitt not thinking himself sufficiently strong to resent these insults, left a 
 detachment of one hundred men strongly posted within a mile of Kahun, 
 and himself returned to join Major Billamore. The part of the force under 
 this last named officer's command reached Deyrili without symptoms of 
 hostility (2) further than aa occasional shot from the high grounds adjoin- 
 ing. They were constantly watched by hundreds of eyes from the summit 
 of the hills, and every day when the rear-guard left the camp, large bodies of 
 men showed themselves in all directions, and signals were fired and repeated 
 at immense distances along the mountains to give notice of our movements. 
 On arriving within twenty miles of Deyrah, Major Billamore was met by 
 Islam Khan, the eldest son of the Bhoogtie chief, with a few followers ; he 
 vfas profuse in his professions of friendship, and conducted the detachment 
 with every demonstration of politeness to the town. Here the old chief re- 
 ceived them with the same cordiality and attention as had marked the de- 
 meanour of his son. He expressed his astonishment at the smailness of our 
 numbers : he had himself twice as many warriors in Deyrah, with two thou- 
 sand more at his command amongst the adjoining highlands. The other chiefs 
 had hardly left Major Billamore's tent when they showed their contempt for 
 the weakness of our force. The town was full of all sorts of supplies, but 
 the most exorbitant demands were made for every thing required by the 
 detachment : forage and firewood, then plentiful in the country, being at 
 first absolutely refused. The Bhoogtie warriors began now to remove from 
 Deyrah, so that in a few days there was scarcely an armed man to be found 
 within the walls. At last Islam Khan secretly departed, taking with him 
 his harem and household: he had, a few hours before, visited Major 
 Billamore, and made the most unbounded professions of eternal friendship. 
 Before this, private information had been received that the whole tribes were 
 
 2. We have adhered closely to jihe statements, and in many cases to the 
 words, of the letter of an officer belonging to Major Billamore's party, which 
 appears in the Bombay Times, March 6, under the signature '' Nufoosk.." 
 Afterwards acknowledged to be Captain Jacob. 
 
172 
 
 collecting in the neighbouring hills to atlack our troops : it was stated, that 
 Islam Khan would first quit Deyrah, and when all was prepared, his father, the 
 chief Beebruck, would follow, and that the circumstance of the latter joining 
 his tribe would be the signal for them to fall upon us and destroy us by night. 
 The camp was originally pitched a mile from the town, and a guard was 
 placed at the gate to prevent soldiers from entering, as complaints had been 
 made of their committing irregularities in the bazaar. On receipt of the intelli- 
 gence just referred to, the camp was moved up to the walls of the town on the 
 Sd January; and the guard was directed to prevent Beebruck's depar- 
 ture : this they effected first civilly as he proceeded through the gate^ 
 and afterwards by force as he attempted to make his way over the wall. 
 Captain Raitt at this time arrived from Kahun. From the time the expe- 
 dition approached the hill country, which they entered on the 25th Dec, 
 the men had slept fully clothed and accoutred, with their loaded arms in 
 their hands. On the night betwixt the 3d and 4th January none of the 
 officers laid thonselves down to rest. All was quiet till daybreak, when the 
 videttes gave information that from seven to eight hundred men were 
 within half a mile of our cantonments, flourishing their swords, and firing 
 their matchlocks, in the most approved style of defiance. The country 
 around was covered with brushwood and jungle, and intersected with 
 nullahs (water courses,) and while the officers and men were intently 
 observing the main body of the enemy, three horsemen penetrated a ravine 
 unnoticed, and made a rush to carry off Beebruck, who had just before been 
 allowed to proceed a short distance from the gateway of the town under 
 charge of a dozen of sepoys. So sudden was this movement that there was not 
 an instant left for preparation to resist it. Lieutenant Clarke saw the ad- 
 vancing party, he sprang upon his horse, dashed at them alone, and not only 
 secured the old chief and brought him back again, but captured one of the 
 adventurous horsemen, and dragged him off a prisoner, horse and all. The 
 main body of the Bhoogties took alarm at our artillery, and swerved off to 
 the right before coming within musket shot. A shell, dexterously thrown 
 in the midst of them, killed or wounded thirty men and horse, and struck 
 such terror into the remainder, that no man present that day ever after- 
 wards dared to join battle with the infidel. Major Billamore now quartered 
 his force within the walls of Deyrah. The place was about one hundred and 
 forty paces square, with strong corner bastions ; the walls, which were 
 thin at the top, but broad at the base, being about twenty-five feet high. (3) 
 A few days afterwards, they received information from their brethren within 
 the town, that a foraging party was about to be dispatched to bring in provi- 
 
 3. Letters from camp at Deyrah, 15th January — Bombay Times, 22d Feb. 
 1840. 
 
173 
 
 sions from a distance of ten or twelve miles : it was intimated that not 
 more than a single gun, with some 50 men, would be left behind ; so 
 that were the Bhoogties to divide their strength, keeping the foragers in 
 play on one hanJ, and attacking the little garrison on the other, they could 
 scarcely fail to rescue their chief and recover the fortress, which they might 
 maintain in defiance of us. Major Billamore having become aware of this, 
 left his guns, with about twenty or thirty men, within the walls, and sent out 
 a party, commanded by Capt. Raitt, consisting of abou t liO foot and 40 horse 
 under Clarke— rightly judging that this party would be the first object of as- 
 sault, and that, unless they were beaten, no attempt would be made upon the 
 other. The conclusion was correct : the foragers were permitted to load 
 their came's without molestation ; but so soon as they began to move on 
 their return, about 300 Beloochee footmen rushed down upon them sword 
 in hand, and notwithstanding the steadiness of the fire poured in upon them 
 by our infantry, approached within fifteen yards of our ranks, when the 
 cavalry charged them and dispersed them in an instant. Lieut. Clarke, at the 
 head of these, cut down four with his own hand : one -fourth of the enemy's 
 force must have been killed or wounded. Had the orders against pursuit 
 not been most imperative, few indeed would have escaped. The detachment 
 left by Captain llaitt, under Lieut. Peaeock, at Kahun, joined head-quarters 
 at Deyrah about the 10th or 12th, (4) the Murrees having quitted their 
 habitations, and retired to the hills with their families and property, leaving 
 the town empty, and the garrison, now of no farther use, in danger of star- 
 vation. On the 15th, the chief Beebruck was dispatched under a guard 
 to Scinde. Before he left, notice was sent to the people that he was about to 
 start; as it was impossible to detach many men as an escort, the tribe was 
 warned that, if any attempt at rescue was made, the first step would be to 
 shoot Beebruck, and then fight it out : this had the desired effect, and rather 
 than risk the life of their Chief, they allowed the party, consisting of only 
 about 60 horse, to pass unmolested. He was imprisoned for eight months in 
 the fortress at Bukkur, without reason or precedent being assigned : and was 
 liberated after the affair of Nufoosk, in the end of August, in order to enable us 
 to make terms with the hill men. He himself had not even been in arms against 
 us ! — his tribe had given us no worse reception than such intruders into their 
 country were entitled to expect ; their retirement to the hills is said to 
 have been occasioned by the apprehension of an attack from us : it is as- 
 serted that their subsequent demonstration on oar camp was made with a 
 view of rescuing their chief. A double treason by the guide in whom we 
 
 4. The dates are not given in any of the communications we have seen : they 
 require to be conjectured from the general tenor of tho narrative. They can- 
 not any where be more than two or three days wrong ; and these errors, i 
 they be any, are quite immaterial. 
 
174 
 
 trusted is affirmed to have been practised,-eaeh of the eontending parties hav- 
 ing been informed that his opponent meant to assail him. Beeja Khan and 
 Janee, two of the chiefs who surrendered on faith of honourable treatment, 
 were, in violation of all the practices of war, kept in irons and dealt v^ith as 
 felons. It was with utter amazement that the Beloojhees witnessed this on 
 the part of a nation famous all over the world for the stern unimpeachability of 
 its honour. Our officers were soon and frequently afterwards condenned to 
 witness the ridicule heaped upon our professions of integrity. The villao*e of 
 Deyrah was sacked — grain, cloth, arms, every thing, down to tha humblest 
 donkey, becoming prize property. (5> Major Billamore determined to leave 
 the Grenadiers in possession of Deyrah, and to retire to the plains via Kahun, 
 taking with him the artillery. This route had been represented as absolutely 
 impassable : but it was considered of so much importance to shew the 
 Murrees that we could penetrate their fastnesses at our pleasure, through 
 the most difficult of their defiles, that an attempt by Nufoosk, which saved 
 forty miles in distance to Poolgee, was thought well worthy of encountering 
 the danger and difficulty attending it. The route betwixt Deyrah and 
 Kahun was fearfully difficult, and to be overcome only by the most deter >- 
 rainel perseveranse and indefatigable exertions. (6) Two forced marches — 
 one of twenty, and another of twenty-seven miles — brought the detachment 
 to Kahun, which they found entirely abandoned. Messages were sent to 
 the old chief Dodah Murree, to which insolent answers alone were returned. 
 A foot path across the mountains indicated the line of march to Poolajee 
 desired to be pursuel. It was surveyed by Lieut, Jacob of the Artillery, 
 to whom was committed the Herculean task of cutting a path through 
 the Nufoosk hills fit for the transport of guns and baggage. It was a grim 
 looking place : the mountains were about 3000 feet in height, and four 
 miles across, and the narrow path, all which then existed, found its difficult 
 way through tremendous rocks, precipices, and ravines. The work was not 
 only attempted but completed, and a few days afterwards the astonished 
 mountaineers saw our troops, horse and foot, with their guns, on their way. 
 through the Nufoosk and Surtof passes,— a few months after rendered so 
 
 5. There is nothing more humbling in the study of the largo collection of 
 letters of officers with the force, published and unpublished, trora which the 
 above narrative is compiled, than the constant recurrence to this most morti- 
 fying topic. The taunts that thej could not believe us, were everywhere cast 
 in our teeth by the tribes with whom we desired to treat. Such was the result 
 of the political management of Scinde within six months of Mr Bell's 
 appointment ! . 
 
 6. The reader will do well to keep these facts in special recollection when 
 he comes to the report of the Nu'oosk commission, where great fault is found 
 with Major Clibborn that he did not select the Deyrah route instead of that 
 by Nufoosk— the former being forty miles longer, and only a few shades less 
 difficult than the latter: the garrison of Kahun being, meanwhile, in extremity 
 for want of provisions. 
 
175 
 
 unhappily memorable. They arrived safe at Poolajee on the plains, while 
 Captain Raitt and his detachment retired from Deyrah shortly afterwards. 
 
 The details of this gallantly conducted, but useless expedition, have been 
 more fully given than its ma-^nitu le might appear to warrant, because of its 
 bearing oq a series of most important, but unfortunate operations which 
 ensued. It has been so generally overlooked, that in that invaluable repository 
 of eastern intelligence, the Asiatic Journal^ no notice of it is to be found. 'Ihe 
 materials at the disposal of the present writer have been supplied by some 
 of the most talented officers of the force, and are of unquestionable authority. 
 Here was a body of 300 gallant men sent roving amongst fearful mountains 
 utterly unknown to us, to encounter tribes of whom we knew no more than 
 that they were poor and warlike — to collect tribute not acknowledged or 
 shewn to be due, and obtain professions of allegiance to a sovereign whose 
 ancestors appear never to have been recognised by them I The information 
 subsequently obtained from the minister at Kelat, after all the ra'schief had 
 been don?, proved that never had tribute been claimed by his master, or 
 paid by either Murree or Bhoogtie, and that nothing could be more indefi- 
 nite than their ideas of so much as an acknowledgment of sovereignty or 
 superiority being due. These circumstances were notorious to the whole po- 
 pulation of the countries around- But in 1839 we were too busy in over- 
 turning dynasties, and remodelling chiefships, to think of enquiring whether 
 ornot there were grounds of expediency or justice for what we were engaged 
 with. (7) The expedition proved worthless : it made us acquainted with roads 
 into a country where we bad no busines?, and whose ditficulties were shortly 
 afterwards taught us to our cost. The occupation of Deyrah and Kahun 
 ended in nothing, and in our subsequent attempts to treat with Dodah 
 Murree, a twelvemonth afterwards, we appeared rather as supplicants for 
 his friendship than as allies of his sovereign demanding his allegiance and 
 support. Enough has been stated to shew the skill and bravery with which 
 the military portion of the arrangement was carried out, and the wretchedness 
 of the policy which ever called this into operation. To consummate its ab- 
 surdit}', neither engineering officer nor political agent accompanied the de- 
 tachment : so that while it was rendered as useless as possible when in 
 the country for the time, it was left without the means of having the routes 
 surveyed, to ascertain their military capabilities in ease it was found requi- 
 site for us to return. The system of dispersing handsful of men up and down 
 through the country had, the previous autumn, been objected to by Brigadier 
 Gordon, who absolutely refused to send out detachments to be isolated in the 
 mountains, for no end but to gratify a political whim, and give colour to 
 
 7._ A very admirable series, under the title of " Cutchee Letters,'* on this 
 subject appears in the Bombay Times betwixt April and July 1841, from the 
 pen of an officer then in a very important position in Sciade. 
 
176 
 
 the fiction that the country was every where kept in subjection to us. (8) 
 Col. Gordon had resisted the dispatch of Major Billamore's expedition, but 
 was overruled by the civil authorities. A quarrel and correspondence so violent 
 had, in 1839, arisen betwixt the political and military chiefs, that the latter 
 felt himself constrained to resign his command, Mr Bell had at this time 
 quitted his post and retired to Simla, to pass the hot season in the bosom 
 of the Himalayas — a month's journey from the troubled region committed 
 to his charge. Lieut. Postans, his principal assistant, held supreme autho- 
 rity under the instructions and in the absence of the chief. Kahun was 
 ordered once more to be occupied : for what end cannot be divined. We 
 still maintained our claim to tribute and submission, and a Naib (a native 
 tax-gatherer), accompanied Captain Browa to collect money. The previous 
 enquiry as to whether any was due was considered entirely superfluous ; of 
 course none was ever paid us. The charge of the troops destined 
 for this service was entrusted to two of the officers who had accompanied 
 the expedition under Major Billamore — Captain Brown and Lieutenant 
 Clarke — both men of the utmost courage, coolness and judgment. Captain 
 Brown joined the detachment then assembled at Poolajee, on the 8th April. 
 It consisted of 300 bayonets of the 5th regiment, under Ensign Tay- 
 lor ; two l2-pr howitzers, under Lieutenant D. Erskine ; with 50 Poonah 
 horsemen and 50 of the Scinde Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, 
 already named. He was directed to occupy the petty fort of Kahun, and was 
 provided with supplies for four months. His convoy consisted of 600 camels 
 besides bullocks. The empty camels were to be returned under charge of 
 Lieutenant Clarke, with 80 infantry and 50 horse. About the 15th, the 
 weather was extremely hot, the thermometer rising to 112'=' in the shade; 
 fever became prevalent, and one native officer died from a stroke of the sun. 
 At the request of the political agent, Lieut. Clarke with his horsemen were, on 
 the 20th, dispatched in the direction of Shapoor, where they were to be 
 joined by 100 men of the Belooch levy, under Lieutenant Vardon. The 
 combined detachment was to proceed to the south-east, with a view of sur-' 
 prising a party of Culpore Bhoogties. In this they were unsuccessful, by 
 reason of the treachery of their guide : the sufferings of the party from heat 
 in crossing the desert were inconceivably severe : the Belooch levy alone 
 left 25 men behind them, of whom three died. The guns were ordered back 
 to Lheree on the 27th, in consequence of the sickness of Lieutenant Erskine 
 
 8. Statement of Colonel Gordon in the Bombay Times. The letters referred 
 to in this were published in the Bombay Times-) May 1841 : as extraordinary a 
 series as ever appeared in print- They extend from July to September 1839> 
 and might have served to convince Lord Auckland that Mr Bell had been 
 mistaken, and that he was unqualified for the important office to which he 
 had been appointed. He was at this time about to have resigned : it would 
 have been fortunate for his fame had he carried his resolution into effect. 
 
177 
 
 — ^oneonly being restored to the custody of Captain Brown, who knew, from 
 his experience with Major Billarnore, how ircpossible it was to proceed with- 
 out artillery. Lieutenant Erskine soon after so far recovered as to be able 
 to take charge ©f the gun, the howitzers being left. On the 3d May the de- 
 tachment entered the hills, leaving 50 horse behind who could not be re- 
 lied on. The road was so heavy and difficult that a mile an hour was all the 
 advance that could be made : water, luckily, was plentiful. Ensign Taylor 
 became so sick on the first march that he had to return, leaving two Euro- 
 pean officers in charge of three companies of Sepoys ! The heat was intole- 
 rable; the thermometer was 116°, and the wind came down the gorges like 
 the breath of a furnace.(9) Arriving on the 7th at the spot where the road 
 round by Deyrah, a detour of 74 miles, divides itself from the short cut 
 of 20 miles to Kahun through the mountains, by which Major BilUmore had 
 descended a few months before, Captain Brown selected the latter ; having 
 in this matter been left, as Major Clibborn was afterwards, to judge for him- 
 self. On the 10th they reached the celebrated Pass of Nufoosk, through 
 which Lieutenant Jacob had cut a track for artillery, ut supra. A hun- 
 dred men ascended the acclivity in the morning ; the breast works erected by 
 the enemy were destroyed, and the cuts, three of which had been made across 
 the road by them, were repaired. From 6 in the morning till 4 in the after- 
 noon was occupied in getting the gun up the steep, though the distance was 
 little more than a quarter of a mile ; and it was 3 next morning before the con- 
 voy was got to the summit of the gorge. The heat was dreadful, and water 
 extremely scarce ; the camels dropped down by dozens from fatigued A few 
 Beloochees followed in the rear, and some shots were exchanged, but no for- 
 midable annoyance wis experienced ; the troops required to be kept three 
 nights on end under arms. On the 11th they obtained a sight of Kahun from 
 the top of the Pass ; the descent from their lofty bivouack was, for a mile, 
 so extremely steep, that their progress was difficult and tardy : it was 2 p.m. 
 before the gun was got down. The heat continued as intense as ever, and 
 water was extremely scarce. By 5 p.m. they reached their destination ; the 
 whole march had been as arduous as it was skilfully conducted. The con- 
 voy often stretched a distance of 2 miles, so that to guard it properly was 
 impossible: through the exertions of the officers and men scarcely anything 
 was lost. Kahun is a small, irregular, hexangular town, 900 yards in cir- 
 cumference : it is surrounded by a rugged and imperfect wall 25 feet high, 
 with six bastions. It has no ditch, but a large tank opposite the gateway 
 serves as a reservoir for water. It was found abandoned, the gates having 
 been carried off and buried ; they were discovered hid in the ground ad- 
 
 9. This part of the Narrative is chiefly an abridgement of Captain Browu's 
 Journal) published by Government : a most interesting little brochure. 
 
 Z 
 
178 
 
 joining, and replaced a few days after our arrival. The fort is chiefly 
 used as a place of retreat, its only regular inhabitaats being the chief 
 and a few followers, — the Banians or Hindoo merchants, though nuraerou?, 
 themselves living in huts on the plains which extend for fifteen miles 
 around. So soon as the troops were housed, every effort was made 
 to put the works in a state of repair ; the wells were cleared, the 
 bastions strengthened, — the detachment having apparently been dispatched 
 to be placed in a state of siege when no succour could be sent them ! The 
 cavalry discovered some grain in the fields, and 50 camel loads of wheat, in 
 stalk, were sent in ; a second supply of similar amount was shortly after- 
 wards met in with ; the Murrees diacovering this set fire to the rest. 
 
 On the 16th, the return convoy under Lieutenant Clarke, started for 
 Poolajee at 2 in the morning. Capt. Brown, availing himself of the permis- 
 sion to increase the detachment originally destined to escort the returning ca- 
 mels, in consideration of the difficulty about to be encountered, accordingly 
 augnpented it by the addition of a subedar's party, consisting of 5 havildars 
 and 80 rank and file. Finding no opposition in crossing the first hill, Lieu- 
 tenant Clarke appears to have directed their return to Kahun. They were 
 attacked on their way by a body of about 2000 of the enemy, and cut off to 
 a man ; one dhoolie-bearer alone escaping to tell the tale. The escort party 
 having got so far, were enabled to proceed towards the bottom of the Sur- 
 tof mountain, 13 miles from Kahun, with apparently but little molestation. 
 The string of camels extended to a length of two miles ; these had yet forty 
 miles before them of grim passes, rugged rocks, and river beds. (10) Clarke 
 had got his convoy safe through the ghaut and assembled in the plain, when, 
 seeing a strong body of Beloochees following down the mountain, he left 
 the camels in charge of the Irregular horse, while he went back a mile with 
 the infantry, and took up a position on the crest of the hill overhanging and 
 completely commanding the road. He appears to have thought that, consider- 
 ing the distance he had yet to march, a timeous check would have saved him 
 from all further annoyance. The motive on which he acted appears not only 
 to have Keen a brave, but a wise one, and would most likely have proved suc- 
 cessful, but for one of those untoward accidents which no man ctuld have fore- 
 seen. From the post he had taken up he could easily have kept the enemy at 
 bay. Having sent for a supply of ammunition the messenger unhappily was 
 killed before reaching his destination. The Beloochees, seeing that our fire 
 had begun to slacken, crept up a shallow cut on the fl;ink of the sepoy 
 party and then darted on them with the utmost fury, when, after a two 
 hours' fight, every man of them was slain. The horsemen fled to Poolajee 
 
 10. The particulars of this melancholy catastrophe are derived in part from 
 Captain Brown's narrative, partly from a letter of an officer with Major Clib- 
 born's force. 
 
179 
 
 at speed : the whole of the baggage fell into the enemy's hands. One 
 havildar and ten privates alone escaped : thus, in a single day, did the 
 5th Bombay N- I. lose 148 men — Lie jtenant Clarke was the pride and 
 ornament of his profession. To this day the Murrees speak of his bravery, 
 calling him " Burra Bahadoor." 
 
 The departure and entire destruction of both portions of the escort party 
 had reduced the strength of the garrison at Kahun to 140 bayonets, with a 
 single gun — who amongst them had to watch 900 yards of wall against 
 the assaults of a brave and indefatigable enemy. One hundred and fifty 
 rupees (£.\5) was ofi^red to get a messenger to carry intelligence to the 
 plains of the state of affairs : but none would undertake the task. On the 
 2 1st, a despatch was sent, intimating to Brigadier Gordon, that there 
 were still four months* supplies in store, and that every exertion would 
 be made to hold the fort. The old chief Dodah had tried every means in 
 his power to prevent the attack on our relieving convoy, and when the 
 tribes would no longer be gainsaid, he exclaimed to those who 
 were leaving — •* there you go, selling our country for five hundred 
 camels." (11) The full fatuity of the expedition had at length be- 
 come apparent—the garrison had been only twelve days in the country, 
 from which they came to enforce tribute and allegiance, and they were 
 now beleaguered in the capital, and barely able to hold their own. A strict 
 account of stores was taken and the troops put on half rations on the 24th 
 May, while every tree and shrub within 200 yards was cut down. To have 
 moved one step beyond the walls would have involved certain destruction. 
 Lieutenant Loch having intimated his intention of endeavouring to join 
 them with 200 horse, was warned of the utter hopelessness of penetrating 
 Nufoosk with such a force. The idea of forwarding reinforcements from 
 Sukkur having for a time been abandoned, Captain Bean at Quettah was 
 written to, to see whether he could not get the Kakur tribe to attack the 
 Murrees, with whom they were at enmity, and so produce a diversion in our 
 favour. By the end of June, the wells had all been cleared, an^ the inner 
 fort, adequate to contain all their scanty provisions, strengthened as a last 
 place of retreat in case of emergency. Clubs from the adjoining bushes 
 were cut for the use of the camp-followers, who could not otherwise be 
 got armed ; and the empty grain bags were filled with sand to make up a 
 show to deceive the spies occasionally known to find their way into the fortress. 
 On the morning of the 29th June, a party of 150 Beloochees came sweep- 
 ing round the fort and managed to cut off the retreat of 20 bullock -drivers, 
 who contrary to express instructions had gone about a mile beyond the 
 walls. The work of slaughter had commenced, when a shell dexterously 
 
 11. Captain Brown's Journal? para. 3d. 
 
180 
 
 thrown amongst the assailants, of whom 6 were killed by if, cansed 
 them to give way ; while a party of 40 men thrown out in that direction, 
 and flanked by a couple of bastions, afforded a retiring post for the survi- 
 vois, of whom 10 were by this means saved. About the same time some 8 
 or 10 camel men were attacked while out foraging, by 20 Beloochees, who 
 rushed on them at speed, and would have inevitably cut them to pieces, 
 but for the courageous conduct of two sepoys, who coolly waited till the as- 
 sailants were close at hand, and then fired in their faces, wounding one of 
 them and compelling them to return. The only sheep remaining were gra- 
 zing hard by, when the attention of the enemy, luckily for the garrison, was 
 too intently directed to the destruction of the camel-men to observe the 
 plunder, otherwise the loss would have been serious. On the 3d July 
 Shere Beg^ a Bhoogtie, to whom Captain Brown had the previous year been 
 of service, and who from the time our troops entered the Murree hills, clung 
 to him like a shadow, brought in 45 sheep and goats in evidence of his 
 gratitude : a most welcome supply, the troops being reduced to their last goat. 
 This man often visited the garrison, bringing with him small supplies of ve- 
 getables and condiments — his approach was always hailed with tfelight. He 
 was the only source of intelligence or stranger who visited them, and his 
 name as he approached was passed from bastion to bastion as that of a friend. 
 He was believed to act the part of a spy in a small "way, while the prices he 
 obtained for his com.nodities, relieved our people of any alarm for excess 
 of obligation obtained at his hands. Offers of assistance were received from 
 Captain Bean on the 7th July, but the proffered aid never reached : while 
 the political agent at Shikai pore wrote that it was intended to act on the 
 defensive till the heats were over. Lieut. Erskine one day killed 3 out of 50 
 Beloochee horsemen who had been watching for some mischief in the dell 
 adjoining; after this the enemy kept at a respectful distance, and heaped 
 abuse on us beyond the range of the artillery. The same routine of dis- 
 heartening duties continued throughout the month of July: the camels 
 were getting into poor condition from the badness or scarcity of food, and 
 many of the gun bullocks had to be shot on the advance of disease. Intel- 
 ligence was received that the Kojjucks, instead of coming to our assistance, 
 had joined the Murrees against us : the Kakurs whom Captain Bean was 
 to send for our relief had turned to attack himself in Quettah. The men 
 suffered severely from ulcers, upwards of 90 of all ranks being laid up with 
 them by the middle of July : while by the 6th of August, 33 men were in 
 hospital from fever. The camp followers were subjected to drill, and had 
 become able to take a share of military duty. Dr. Glasse himself became 
 sick, and the medicine chest being exhausted, hot water was resorted to and 
 found effectual as a substitute for purgatives. A tremendous storm of wind 
 and rain filled all the tanks and inundated the country around : and the 
 
181 
 
 sight of the cultivators every where engaged in the labours of the field, ex- 
 hibited to the beleaguered soldiers a scene of as ranch cheerfulness as could 
 be witnessed from such a prison. By the beginning of August the Beloo- 
 chees had begun to approach closer and closer every day to the fort. Their 
 matchlocks could carry twice as far as our muskets ; while little parties 
 like picquets appeared seated round in every direction. A set of men who 
 were watching in a ravine close by, fired on the officers while walking near 
 the gate. A few sepoys were sent out to entice them on, when 50 Murrees 
 immediately sprung up, and the sepoys having got out of the way, a shell 
 was fired which killed 15 of the enemy. The following extract gives so 
 graphic an account of the incidents at this period of the siege, that it is 
 given without abridgment (12) : — 
 
 •' 10th Aug. — For the last 4 or 5 days the flocks had been coming closer and closer 
 toti e walls, eating up what little grass there was left. I had warned Hybutt IChan 
 of this 3 or 4 times, and had also offered to purchase 100 at his own price, but 
 he declared I should not have one. Erskine and myself had finished the last but 
 one, of those we procured fr@m old Sheer Bheg. We have both excellent appe- 
 tites, although shut up in a fort. To-day, 2 large flocks of sheep and goats came 
 most temptingly near, and the sepoys earnestly entreated for some fresh meat ; 
 watching our opportunity (no Beloochees being then in sight^ we slipped out 
 about 30 sepoys, flanking them with 2 bastions filled with men, and Erskine got 
 the gun round to bear in the direction. There were only 3 Beloochees just then 
 in charge; they immediately ran off for their lives, and the goats, by some in- 
 stinct, and to our great annoyance, followed them at speed, like dogs. Two 
 horsemen then came up looking very fierce, but soon rode off on getting a shot. 
 To describe the delight of all on getting this flock inside the fort is impossible; 
 there was a perfect uproar ; on counting our plunder we found we had secured 
 300 sheep* and 57 goats ; most of the latter were milk goats, so that the highest 
 castes shared the enjoyment ; we immediately made a division of the whole, charg- 
 ing ^ Rupee on the head of each, for the benefit of the widows of those who fell 
 on the 16th May. That evening the fort became one large cook-shop. 
 
 '* 11th. — Hybutt Khan came to-day to try and recover his sheep; told us Nusseer 
 Khan had driven all our detachments in to Sukkur ; also brought a note from 
 Dodah, the Chief, desiring us to leave his fort forthwith; and that he and his army 
 would escort us down to the plains ! When Hybutt found he could not get back 
 his sheep, being tuld that most of them were already killed, he flew into a great 
 rage, and declared he would come and attack the fort, for which threat I told 
 the sentry to give him a shot, when he quickly departed. 
 
 12. The whole of the narrative of the siege of Kahun is abridged from 
 Captain Brown's journal. The entries from the 10th to the 16th are given 
 entire. The capture of the sheep is too graphic an incident to admit of 
 abridgment. 
 
 * These sheep were a great addition to the half rations ; the latter alone 
 being but poor food for men working all day and on guard every night. 
 
182 
 
 •* 15th. — A cossid) to our great joy, came in this morning after a lapse of 20 
 days; could have hugged the old rascal, although I knew him to be the greatest 
 of spies. A letter arrived by him from the Political Agent saying, it was con- 
 templated to try and throw in supplies, througli the agency of Jeytt Sing, * and 
 Meer Hussain, to save moving the troops up with a convoy. 
 
 " 16ih. — Another cossid this morning. The system mentioned yesterday of 
 throwing in supplies discarded, being found impracticable ; and the welcome, most 
 welcome intelligence of the following detachment leaving Sukkur for our relief j 
 Detachment of H. M. 40th Regiment, 
 1st Grenadiers, 4 Guns, 
 2nd ditto, 200 Horse, 
 under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st grenadiers ; received intimation that it 
 was arranged between Hybutt Khan and the rest of the chiefs, that the former, 
 in making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging, and then cut us up." 
 
 Old Dodah Murree had first sent a message, stating that if the detachment 
 would retire, he and his chiefs would escort them to the plains ; and then 
 intimated, through his brother, that the whole tribe would assemble on the 
 31st of August, and put the garrison to the sword. Assemble they did — 
 for another, but not less fatal purpose. From the 10th of August, the stir 
 and activity in the direction of Nufoosk indicated that some evil was afoot. 
 A fortnight afterwards, .Captain Brown was informed by Hybutt Khan, the 
 friendly chief to whom the flocks around belonged? that the Murrees, mus- 
 tering 3,000 strong, had resolved to intercept the convoy if possible. 
 They had determined to have three fights should they at first prove unsuc- 
 cessful: one at Nufoosk — one somewhat nearer Kabun — and the third at a 
 fort still farther in the rear, where they had vowed to stand to the last. 
 We must once more borrow the, words of the gallant commander of the 
 fortress : — 
 
 *' 31st Aug — A day of great and almost overpowering excitement. It commenced 
 about 5 o'clock last evening, when the plains and hills became alive with Beloo- 
 chees, and at dark, large signpl fires on the tops of all the hills. At day-break, 
 large parties of horse and foot were seen hurrying across the plain to the NulToosk 
 pass, on the opposite side of which, we soon learnt of the arrival of our convoy, 
 from thereport of one of their guns, a signal agreed upon between us j about sun- rise, 
 we saw collected on the very top of the pass about 2000 Beloochees, and others 
 prowling about in all directions ; the distance, as the crow flies from the fort to the 
 
 * Jeytt Sing is a Shikarpore merchant, immensely rich, and has great 
 sway with all the Beloochees around 3 our loss is always his certain gain ; he 
 buys back our stolen camels for 15 or 20 rupees, and sells them again to our 
 commissariate for 50 or 60 Rs I a positive fact, Meer Hussain I am almost 
 positive, was the cause of poor Clarke being attacked, and it is fully proved 
 it was he who led Major Clibborn's watering party into the ambuscade. I 
 hope he will yet meet with the punishment he deserves. 
 
183 
 
 pa?s, is about 4 miles ; in fact, we were completely behind the scenes, and saw 
 all that the Beloochees were at^ and fully expecting to see our comrades crown the 
 top every hour^ we were highly amused and excited — 2 p^ m. no sight of convoy 
 coming over pass, they must be repairing the road up — 3 *p. m. saw the shrapnells 
 flying over the hill, and bursting in the midst of the enemy with the most beauti- 
 ful effect — 5 P. M. still no sight of convoy. Beloochees still crossing the plains 
 towards the seat of action. Erskine scattered a small body of them with a shell — 
 8 P. M. heavy firing of guns and musketry for 10 minutes, when all was silent for 
 the rest of the night. I should be very sorry to pass many days of my life like 
 ihis — I would ten thousand timies sooner have been in the thick of it ; the excite- 
 ment and suspense was beyond any thing lever felt before ; knowing the difficulty 
 of the pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I felt certain there must be 
 much bloodshed going on.f 
 
 '• Sept. 1st. — Not a single Beloochee to be seen on the top of the bill at day-light 
 but several passing across the plain in that direction. No sight or sound of convey 
 all day ! Sadly perplexed to know what has become of them ; conclude that finding 
 the pass too strongly defended yesterday, that they had fallen back to go round by 
 the Deyrah road, as I first recommended. 
 
 '* 2d Beloochees in all directions, and busy as bees — Another day of suspense and 
 
 excitement 5 after 11 o'clock they pitched ore of our sepoy's fents about halfway 
 up the hill, up and down which, batches of loaded and unloaded camels are going; 
 suppose the convoy must have dropped some of their baggage and stores in the 
 hurry of their departure. About 12 o'clock much firing commenced and continued 
 with intervals until 2 P. m. ; from the sound, it would appear the convoy had fallen 
 back in the direction of the Deyrah road, some 20 miles J cannot now expect to 
 see them for the next 6 or 7 days ; tantalizing, when they were so close : not a drop 
 of spirits, a cheroot or a cup of tea left, or have we indeed tasted any for some 
 time ; sepoys very weak from short rations, only 6 bags of flour left, a bad look- 
 out j cannot help thinking of our having got our convoy over »o snugly in May, 
 when we had only a third of the number of the present convoy. 
 
 " 3rd, — Still in suspense ; no communication from out-side ; all on the look-out, 
 particularly at night ; upwards of 100 loaded camels going across the plain, being 
 
 * Between 2 and 3 o'clock the fight of Nufi'oosk commenced. 
 
 f I have since heard some surprise has been expressed that we could see 
 and hear Clibborn's shells, and not rush out to his succour ! Had we done so 
 the labor and perseverance of 4 months would have been thrown away in an 
 hour, and the Beloochees would have gained the very object they had been 
 trying for without effect, since the day we entered the fort, namely to entice 
 us out : but the thing was out of the question. Between us and the pass were 
 4 miles of plain, i of a mile one of the most dangerous ravines I ever passed 
 thro' : a mountain a mile in extent, and last tho' not least, 2000 Beloochees ! 
 I might perhaps have mustered 100 bayonets, but must have left some 40 
 sick behind j but the best reason of all is, that it was not until the 7th Sep- 
 tember (8 days afterwards) when we first saw the guns in the enemy's hand, 
 that we had the slightest idea of the disaster that had taken place. Up to 
 that date we anxiously looked out to see tho convoy coming round the Dey- 
 rah road, thinking they had found the Nuffoosk pass too difficult. 
 
184 
 
 some distance off, whuther these are horses or camels cannot be clearly ascertained 
 without a glass, persuaded the people in the fort that they were the former, altho' 
 the sepoys made the shrewd remark, that they never saw horsemen look so large, 
 or go along one after the other so regularly. About 20 horsemen with 8 or 10 
 spare horses came down from the hill to water near the fort, looks as if the owners 
 of the latter had been killed — 2 bodies carried across the plain on charpoys, with 
 a kind of funeral party following them j suppose they are two chiefs. At 3 p.m. 
 saw a large body ofBeloochees pitching a sort of camp within 1| mile of the fort, 
 no mistaking our sepoy's tents, also one officer's tent, 5 of the former and 1 of the 
 latter, exactly the number they took from Clarke's party, trust they are those only, 
 but appearances are very suspicious. Just as it was getting dark, saw the whole 
 body assembled in one dense mass, in front of their tents; warned all hands to 
 keep a bright look-out when the moon goes down. 
 
 *' 4th. — To day some horsemen came and informed us * that they had cut up our 
 ' convoy, taken the guns and all the stores and supplies, and had killed all the 
 * sahib log except 3, who were prisoners in their camp" — in proof of which as- 
 sertion they offered to show the guns to any person I chose to send, who could 
 also bring a chit frona the prisoners — iThis offer however I refused, firmly believing 
 the report to be altogether untrue, and made with a view of getting hold of one of 
 ray people for information. They also said, that if I would leave the fort and go 
 to the plains, they would not molest me — we had a very heavy fall of rain about 
 4 p M. — More tents springing up in the Murree camp, about 300 Beloochees seated 
 on a rising ground on one flank — great amusement in watching their naovements ; 
 having a good glass, we could almost see into their very tents. 
 
 *'5th. — A person came under the fort calling out, wishing to give us the news j had 
 had already quite enough of these people's stories, so sent a bullet or two after 
 him, to hurry his departure — all in the fort sadly perplexed to know what to think 
 of affairs — Beloochees on the move in every direction — 100 passed this morning 
 in the Deyrah direction, the road from which we are expecting the convoy — the 
 Beloochees do not seem in good spirits, not like men who have destroyed a large 
 convoy — there has evidently been mischief some where — a storm occurred about 
 4 o'clock, which to our great delight blew down all the Beloochee tents 5 they 
 however soon had them up again. 
 
 " 6th. — No grain left for camels or bullocks, and little or no forage — they must 
 take their chance, poor creatures; nothing now left but a few hags of rice and 3 
 or 4 of flour — 10 bags of the latter, which were thrown aside as being half sand, 
 now came into use, and were greedily devoured by the sepoys — a camel-man shot 
 himself, being detected in a theft. 
 
 " 7th. — Half expected, on taking a look at the Beloochee camp this morning, to 
 find them all decamped; but a sad reverse met our sight — The three guns belong- 
 ing to the convoy staring us in the face! they are placed on a piece of rising 
 ground on one flank of their camp, their muzzles pointed towards the fort. What 
 can have become of Major Clibborn and his convoy ? Many officers and men 
 must have lost their lives before they gave up the guns! There is no doubt now 
 that something most disastrous must have occurred, and we must prepare for the 
 
185 
 
 worst. Sepoys keep up their spirits amazingly weil^ not the slightest sign of 
 flinching, altho' they seem to be aware that their situation is rather perilous : 
 luckily they cannot see the guns with the naked eye, on account of the jungle. 
 There are chances in our favor yet, and that the guns will not be of much use 
 to them. Ist, they may be spiked, 2ndly, they may have no ammunition, and 
 lastly, they know not how to load or fire them j luckily they are howitzers instead 
 of field pieces ; 10 A. M. all the Beloochees are assembled round the guns, pnd 
 peeping into their muzzles, quite playthings to them. 
 
 "Sth..^ — Small parties of horsemen prowling all round the fort, watching us I sup- 
 pose, knowing we must soon take to flight for want of provisions ; they need not 
 be in such a hurry, as we have still some rice and gun bullocks left- 
 
 " 9th. — Loaded camels still going across the plain, 2 Beloochees mounted on 
 artillery horses; no mistaking them from their size and their having blinkers on, 
 which they were determined should not escape our sight, as they galloped up and 
 down in front of the fort for an hour, 
 
 '•10th,' — Our old friend Sheer Bheg came in this morning, but in such a suspi- 
 cious manner, that I put him prisoner ; he tells us, the Beloochees' report of having 
 destroyed our convoy is all true; he mentions poor Kaitt and Moore as being two 
 of the killed. 
 
 " 11th. — Made some horsemen, who were grazing their horses rather too 
 close, scamper oflF, and received much abuse from them for ray pains. The 
 Murrees acknowledge to their having had 80 killed and 80 wounded in the fight. 
 Our old acquaintance Hybutt Khan and his son are, it is stated, both killed, also 
 Kurreem Khan, who superintended the slaughter on the 29th June." 
 
 We must now leave off for a little the narrative of the heroic defence of 
 KahuQ till some account be given of the unsuccessful attempts for its relief, 
 terminating in the bloody action at Nufoosk. 
 
 A force consisting of 1 ,000 bayonets, yrith artillery and irregular horse, had 
 early in August been warned, by Brigadier Stevenson, for service amongst 
 the hills. The lamented death of that able and amiable officer transferred 
 to the hands of Major Forbes the crude and incomplete arrangements so 
 imperiously required to be put into effect without a moment's delay. Major 
 Forbes, a man of prudence, spirit, and activity, reached Sukkur on the 6th 
 August, a complete stranger to the country ^ and on the 9th, by the casualty 
 just alluded to, found himself senior officer in Upper Scinde. (13) The 
 first step he took was to recommend that the garrison should not be relieved, 
 but withdrawn. Having been informed by Lieut. Postans, Assistant Poli- 
 tical Agent at Shikarpore, that Mr. Ross Bell had given the most positive 
 orders for the maintenance of the Murree fort, he had no alternative left him 
 but to use all dispatch in preparing a force for its succour. The detach- 
 ment, which was allowed no more than 36 hours for preparation, consisted 
 
 13. Letter of Mr. Secretary Willoughby, 2d June 1841, in reference to the 
 Minute of the Clibborn Commission. 
 
 A 1 
 
186 
 
 of the 1st Grenadiers and flank company of the 2d, mustering altogether 
 about 600 bayonets, with three 12-pounder howitzers, — this being the utmost 
 number 01 fighting men which could be equipped at Sukkur at the time; 
 with a convoy of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks under their charge. This 
 large train of animals, stretching over a space of four miles, where the Passes 
 compelled them to move in single file, was considered no more than neces- 
 sary for maintaining the garrison reinforced by the escorting party for the 
 space of two months which they had been commanded to remain. The de- 
 tachment and convoy left Sukkur on the 12th, and reached Poolajee on the 
 20th. Here they were joined by 200 of the Scinde and Poonah Horse, un- 
 der charge of Lieutenants Loch and Malcolm. This raised the force to a 
 strength of 850 fighting men. The heat across the desert was in the last 
 degree oppressive ; but as the marches were accomplished under night, the 
 encamping ground being taken up by sunrise, no accident of note occurred 
 on the first part of the way. On the 24th August they left Poolajee, and 
 for the next six marches traversed a wild and mountainous country, abound- 
 ing with water and furage, but wliere no human habitation was observa- 
 ble. (14) The march before reaching Surtof, 20 or 30 Beloochees who 
 followed them with a view to plunder, were surprised by Lieut. Loch, and 
 eight of them killed. On arriving at the scene of Lieut. Clarke's disaster* 
 they found the bleaching bodies of the dead Sepoys scattered everywhere 
 around ; the guide giving a very clear account of the manner in which the 
 sad mishap occurred. (15) A heap of stones was shown them under which 
 poor Clarke had been buried by Meer Hussein, the guide now in attendance. 
 Fragments of his dress were recognized scattered amongst the accoutre- 
 ments and bodies of the brave men who had fallen around him. The 30th 
 of August was occupied in getting the convoy and guns up the ghaut, — the 
 latter had to be dragged by the men, suffering from the excessive heat of an 
 Auo-ust sun reflected from the rocks around, — the laborious task was com- 
 pleted by 6 P.M. At night they slept on the table-land which stretches from 
 the top of the Surtof to the bottom of the Nufoosk Pass six miles beyond. ' 
 No water was to be found nearer than the bottom of the ghaut, which it had 
 taken them all day to ascend. The men were under arms a great part of 
 the night, the Beloochees keeping up a fire on the camp and picquets from 
 the opposite side of an impassable ravine. The march towards the Kahua 
 hills was commenced at two in the morning. As they approached Nufoosk 
 the heights were seen covered thickly with the enemy, who shouted and 
 
 14. The description of the march is tanen from a letter of a very accomplished 
 officer of the force- It appeared in the Bombay Times of September ; — of the 
 engagement, from this, and from Major Clibbora's despatch. 
 
 isf See above, where the guide's account is embodied in the narrative, along 
 with that of Captain Brown's Journal. 
 
187 
 
 flourished tlieir swords ia defiance as we came on, while a beacon fire, lighted 
 up on the highest summit, called the scattered Murrees to the slaughter. 
 The road lay along the base of the precipice, over ground intersected with 
 ravines and nullahs, in one of which a gun which overset caused considerable 
 delay. A heavy fire was meanwhile maintained from the hills, where the 
 enemy were screened by the shelter and within the crevices of the rocks. 
 On arriving at the bottom of the Pass, they found the zigzag road, formerly 
 made by Lieut. Jacob up the steep, and by which Gapt. Brown had ascended 
 with so much difficulty, cut across and blocked up — unfit for the advance of 
 camels, much more of guns, and only admitting men in single file. The 
 ascent, half a mile.in length, was abrupt in the extreme. Worst of all, their 
 apprehensions of want of water, which the late rains half led them to expect, 
 were realized. Captain Brown had written on the 27th, that owing to the 
 recent fall, water was likely to be plentiful : a single pool, which could only 
 be approached under the enemy's fire, was all that could be found — and this 
 was speedily exhausted ; and the puckals, or skins, they had brought along 
 with them had leaked or dried up, and were nowempty. It was ten o'clock a.m. 
 — the heat was becoming dreadful, and it was obvious that some immediate and 
 decisive step must be attempted, or the troops would speedily perish of thirst. 
 It was half-past one before the rear-guard, consisting of a company of the 2d 
 Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Poonah Horse, came up. The guns had 
 been placed in position to enfilade the summit of the Pass in front, and 
 immediately on the arrival of the rear-guard, the storming party, consisting of 
 the left and flank companies of the 1st and 2d grenadiers, were told ofi'. 
 These moved up the hill in beauiiful order, headed by Capt. Raitt, and sup- 
 ported by 100 dismounted irregular horsemen ; a heavy fire of shell and shrap- 
 nell being meanwhile maintained on the crest and gorge at the summit of the 
 pass. A strong flanking party of 317 was posted at the foot of the ghaut 
 on the right, who maintained a steady fire on the enemy, while the remain- 
 der of the regiment was drawn up on the plain facing the acclivity, and pro- 
 tecting the guns. The storming party gallantly overcame every difficulty, 
 having forced their way over three tiers of breast-works, topped with thorns 
 and bushes, built across their path. They had nearly reached the last turn in 
 the ascent, and were just entering the gorge at its summit, when they were 
 assailed on every side by a deadly fire from the enemy, and overwhelmed 
 with showers of stones hurled down from the precipices on all around. One 
 sepoy reached the gap and was seen to fire through it, when the Beloochees 
 gave a shout and rushed down sword in hand. Captain Raitt had been shot 
 through the thigh, halfway up the mountain, and asked Lieutenant Frank* 
 lin to lead the advance ; but seeing this officer supporting Lieut. Williams, 
 who had just been shot through the heart, he bound his limb with his hand- 
 kerchief, and nobly took his place at the head of his men. He and Lieut. 
 Williams were both killed fighting desperately when the furious rush was 
 
188 
 
 made on them. LieutJ More received two shot wounds in the body, and 
 was afterwards cut down. Lieut. Loch, who led the dismounted horsemen, 
 was severely wounded : he had received a bad sword cut, with numerous 
 bruises from stone?, and was ferced down the hill by his orderly, reaching' 
 the guns in a fainting state. Out of the 100 men he led, 47 were left dead 
 upon the hill- The Beloochees and sepoys were now mingled together 
 fighting hand to hand in wild confusion. All the officers, and nearly half 
 of the men had fallen, when the remainder were borne by main force down 
 the hill — hundreds of the enemy leaping from every nook and overpowering 
 them. Seeing the impossibility of making a«tand on the face of the hill, 
 the flanking party fell back upon the main body of the regiment, firing on 
 the enemy as they retired. An attempt was made to get into square, but 
 from the unsteadiness of the many recruits which formed the line, the move- 
 ment ended in a rally round the gun?, now sweeping the plains with grape 
 shot. The Beloochee?, about 800 strong, now came rushing down on all 
 sides, pouring on our ranks showers of heavy stones, with which the place 
 abounded, and charging sword in hand up to the muzzles of the cannon, 
 which carried destruction amongst them. The fire at length became too hot 
 for them, and they were repulsed with great slaughter, and fled in all direc- 
 tions, leaving about 200 dead on the plain. There had been in all upwards 
 of 150 killed and wounded, including the four officers who had fallen. The 
 scorching heat of the day continued unabated, the wind from the rocks was 
 like the breath of a furnace, and the excessive thirst experienced was intoler- 
 able. The piteous and incessant cries of the wounded for " water, water," 
 were heart rending. Water there was none, yet all were clamorous for drink, 
 and the small supply of beer belonging to the officers was served out to the 
 most necessitous of all castes, who grasped at it with frantic eagerness. 
 Parties with camels and waterskins were sent to seek for water in the ad- 
 joining nullahs, where the guides reported that it was to be found 
 within a mile of the pass. The artillery horses, which were in their present 
 exhausted state unfit to draw the guns, were dispatched on a similar duty, 
 under an escort of 50 of the Scinde irregular horse. The evening was spent 
 in collecting and bringing off^ the wounded ; shells were occasionally thrown 
 on the enemy, who still kept up a straggling fire from the hills. Party af- 
 ter party returned with the dismal intelligence that no water was any where 
 to be found ; and to complete their apprehensions, they quickly learned 
 that the Sowars, who had been sent with the gun horses, had been sur- 
 rounded in a nullah, attacked, and cut up; through the treachery, as was 
 believed, of Meer Hussein, a Bhoogtie chief, who acted as guide. The horses 
 had been carried off": and the camel men and dhoolie-bearers had by this 
 time nearly all absconded. To make a second attempt on the pass was, under 
 present circumstances, considered hopeless ; had the eneaay indeed at this 
 
189 
 
 time attacked thera, the men were so helpless from extreme exhaustion, that 
 they must have been cut up without resistance. They had now been under 
 arms and without food for 16 hours ; and it was resolved, that if no sup- 
 plies of water made their appearance before 10 at night, the troops should 
 retreat. Fifty pounds were offered to any one who would carry a letter to 
 Kahun, only 14 miles otT, advising Captain Brown to cut his way through 
 and join Clibborn's detachment in the course of the night, so that the whole 
 might retire to the plains together. No one would undertake the task,— 
 and the garrison now believed to be almost without provisions was neces- 
 sarily left to its fate : a fate which the providential supply of sheep already 
 alluded to luckily prevented from being disastrous. At 11 a. m. this brave 
 but exhausted band moved silently off the ground, carrying with them as 
 many of the wounded and as much baggage and convoy as could be collected 
 and transported. Fortunately no ob'^truction was experienced; on reach" 
 ing the top of the Surtof Pass, 7 miles in the rear of the scene of action, 
 all discipline was at an end. The sepoys were frantic with thirst, au( 
 rushed furiously down the hill, leaping like madmen into the pools at the 
 bottom. At this time the rear was attacked by a large body of Beloochees, 
 who appeared no one knew how or from whence. The flash of musketry 
 was seen along the whole face of the hill, and the slaughter amongst the 
 followers was severe. The men recovered themselves the moment their 
 thirst was slaked, and, having formed a hollow square, waited till day- 
 break should afford them a sight of the enemy. These, however, disappeared 
 before dawn, carrying with thera the whole of the remainder of the convoy 
 which had fallen into their hands in the confusion of the night. The sepoys, 
 before leaving Nufoosk, had been directed to put three or four days' supply 
 of flour into their haversacks, but most of them had been too tired to do so, 
 and they now found themselves absolutely in want of food. The tents, trea- 
 sure, guns, and ammunition, everj thing in short which constitutes the 
 materiel of an army, had been lost. The men only escaped. Fortunately 
 there were still a few camels remaining, and a number more joined on the 
 road, as did also 35 gun-horses believed to have been destroyed. With such 
 scanty means as these a forced march of 54 miles to Poolajee was before 
 them. They started at seven, and sheltered themselves under some ta- 
 marisk trees during the heat of the day. Still occasionally fired at by the 
 enemy, and seeking refuge behind rocks and banks from the fierce rays of 
 the sun, they arrived at their destination on the night of the 2d September, 
 having accomplished a march of betwixt 60 and 70 miles in the course of 
 48 hours. Four sepoys died of heat on the way, and Capt. Heighington was, 
 from the same cause, afterwards struck with apoplexy, which proved fatal. 
 The total loss in killed was 177—72 were wounded. The casualties amongst 
 the camp followers is not known, they must have been numerous. The loss 
 
190 
 
 of baggage was estimated at £15,000. (16) The enemy lost 350 of their 
 bravest warriors, and amongst them were several chiefs. After a short rest 
 the detachment returned to Shikarpore, 50 miles off, a week afterwards, 
 where they joined head-quarters at Sukkur without further accident. 
 
 Returning to Kahun, where we left Captain Brown and his gallant party, 
 grieved and disappointed, but not dismayed by the blight their hopes of 
 relief had sustained, we find them making the most of the live stock they 
 had obtained possession of so unexpectedly, and still on the alert — cheer- 
 fully waiting for what might befall. On the 12th the Murrees began to 
 move away the captured guns, which till then had renuained in position in 
 sight of the fort ; and the day after the warriors themselves dispersed. Qn 
 the 17th official intelligence of the full extent of Major Clibborn's disaster 
 was received from the Brigade Major (Forbes) at Sukkur, who intimated 
 to Captain Brown, that he might use his own discretion as to abandoning 
 
 16. The loss was estimated by the Agra Ukhbar at six lakhs (60,0001.) and 
 as a considerable show of details was then given, this has generally passed 
 current as correct. The following is from an omeial statement in the hands of 
 government : its accuracy may be relied upon j its amount, as given in the 
 text, being about one quarter that of the U/chbar's estimate. 
 
 BhoU 8,000 lbs. at 16 lbs. | oz. per Rupee Rs. 494 3 3 
 
 Rice 80,480 ... 29 do 2793 3 6 
 
 Flour 82,200 ... 33 ... i ... do 2,446 6 9 
 
 Ghee 5,76l ... 4| do 1^2U0 3 4 
 
 Salt 3,250 ... 200 do 16 110 
 
 Gram 40,600 .. 33^ do 1,208 5 
 
 Jowarree 77,840 .. 43 do 1,80113 
 
 Total 9,960 4 8 
 From this should be deducted six days' rations of troops, followers, and cat- 
 tle, paid daily into the commissariat treasure chest. 
 The camels taken into the hills were— 
 
 Commissariat 978 
 
 Sick from Lberee 150 
 
 Private camels 60 
 
 1178 
 Died on the road above 1 30 ) qoq 
 
 Brought off carrying wounded ... 200 ) 
 
 Estimated loss at Nufoosk — 848 
 
 Grain Rs. 10,000 
 
 Camels 848, at 75 Rs. a camel 63,600 
 
 Bullocks 600, at 8 Rs. each 4,800 
 
 Gun Horses 25, at Rs- 300 each 7,500 
 
 Irregular do 30, at 120 each 3,600 
 
 Routies old 40, at Rs. 50 each 2,000 
 
 Three Guns, at Rs. 1000 each 3,C00 
 
 Private baggage and miscellaneo.us items 34,000 
 
 Total Rs. 1,50,000 
 
191 
 
 the fort. It wars ascertained, that by reducing the men to quarter rations 
 and eating up the gun bullocks, they might contrive to subsist on this fa- 
 mine fare till the 15th October ; and so it was determined that the fort 
 should be maintained, unless honourable terms were offered. The old chief 
 Dodah sent a message through Shere Beg, intimating that he had twice 
 before, just after the fight, otfered to grant any terms we should desire, 
 provided we would quit the country ; but that we drove his emissaries 
 away, and that he was now ready to agree to the arrangement sug- 
 gested. This was no offer of our seeking: the opening was fair: 
 and our position not likely to improve by delay. Captain Brown therefore 
 wrote in reply, "Dodah Murree, I'll give you back } our fort, on con- 
 ditions, viz. — that you give me personal security for my safe arrival in 
 the plains: if not, I will remain here two months longer, having provisions 
 for that time." On receiving this, the whole of the chiefs assembled, 
 and, after consultation, took an oath on the Koran that, if he would leave 
 the fort in three days, they would protect him to the plains : they wrote to 
 this effect immediately, concluding that " whatever Captain Brown's wishes 
 were, should to them be law." Immediately after the arrival of this, a letter 
 was brought from Dodah himself, in answer to that which had been written 
 to him, containing an agreement on oath, and promising to send his nephew 
 to pay his respects, and see that the terms were observed by the people of 
 the tribe. From this to the conclusion of Captain Brown's adventures, we 
 must draw on his journal, which no longer adaaits of abridgment. 
 
 " 25th Sept Replied to Dodah's letter, to the effect, that I would give up 
 
 the fort 3 days hence, on the above terms. Surprized at their letting us off 
 so easily, viz. simply to return to the plains without let or hindrance from his 
 people, on condition of giving up the fort, which Dodah must well know we 
 cannot hold a month longer j plenty of room to suspect treachery, but we 
 must run the risk. This evening Guamaul Khan came near the fort, and sent 
 a message to say, that he feared to venture inside? but that if 1 would meet him 
 outside without my troops, he would ratify the agreement. Wishing at once 
 to see whether it was to be ' treachery, or no treachery,' I agreed, and with 
 Erskine and 4 native officers, met him about a mile from the fort. I never saw a 
 man in such a fright in my life. Altho' he had 30 horsemen, armed to the teeth, 
 and there were only 6 of us, he retreated twice before he would venture near 
 us ! He thought from our coming alone, there must be treachery ; that some 
 men were hidden somewhere : even after we had metj he had his horse all 
 ready close by for a start. Down we all sat in a circle. A wild scene ; his fol- 
 lowers appeared to be exceedingly well armed and all fine stout built men. 
 After compliments, &c. the nephew began to talk very reasonably. He ex- 
 pressed a hope that * there would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and 
 the British : that they had only fought at the Nuffoosk pass to save their 
 country, and their lives j that it was the least they could do, when they had 
 
192 
 
 the fate of Bejahkhan staring them in the face. That they had ' never killed 
 any of our people after the fight, and that all the prisoners had been fed, 
 clothed^ and set free.' He concluded by saying that ' he should remain near 
 the fort until we left, to prevent any disturbances between his people and 
 mine 3 and that he would furnish me with trustworthy guides down.' There 
 Avas not the slightest appearance of treachery. Thus ended this most interest- 
 ing conference. It will not, I think, be easily forgotten by either Erskine or 
 myself. So much depended on it, the fate of ourselves and the whole of the 
 detachment. We found these Beloochees the most civil and polite of men ! 
 The confidence we placed in their word, by meeting them in the way we did, 
 seemed to please them much, and from having been deadly enemies for 5 long 
 months, became in one hour the best of friends j no doubt their joy was just 
 as great in getting rid of us, as our's was in obtaining our freedom. 
 
 " 26th and 27th. — Most delightfully employed in preparing for a start -, only 
 10 public camels left, and those as thin as rats ; none here procurable —the 
 number of sick amounts to 40, and these require 20 ! Then there are the 
 rations, ammunition, both guns and musket, water and tents. In fact, I found I 
 could not move without sacrificing all private property and half the am- 
 munition and tents j obliged to call on officers and men to give up what 
 private camels they had — this was most willingly agreed to j and all kit, even 
 to our bedding, was left behind— the gun ammunition I was obliged to take, as 
 I rather expected opposition from the Bhoogties, through whose country we 
 had 40 miles to go. At first we were almost afraid we should not be able 
 to bring down the gun from the wretched state of the bullocks, and weak- 
 ness of the men— however we determined to try> and leaving the waggon and 
 forge-cart behind, picked out 30 of the best for the gun aloae — the sepoys 
 thinking we were going to leave it behind, came and begged me not, as they 
 themselves would drag it down and defend it with their lives I When Erskine 
 was burning the forge-cart and waggon, the Beloochees outside thought we 
 were setting fire to the fortj and sent to beg us to spare it. 
 
 *'28th. — Turned our backs on Kahun this morning at 2 o'clock. Much trou- 
 ble in getting off, in consequence of the number of sick ; obliged to tie some^ 
 of the poor fellows on the camels — commenced the ascent of the big hill at 
 6, and after immense fatigue and labour, got the gun to the top by 2 p. m. The 
 sepoys were regularly overpowered with fatigue half way up — the call for wa- 
 ter now was dreadful, all that I had brouglit with me in the mussucks being ex- 
 pended. About 9 o'clock about 300 Beloochees had assembled in our front, 
 rear and right flank, perched on the top of the hills ; they seemed highly amused 
 at our getting the gun up : but when they saw the sepoys completely done 
 up with thirst and fatigue, they called out 3 * ah ! you will never get the gun 
 down to the plains, you had better give it to old Dodah.' — I offered them 
 money to show us some water, they said they would for 1,000 Rupees ! After 
 some talk they agreed to show us some for 100 Rupees, which was immedi- 
 ately given them, — there was just enough to give each man a handful or so 
 
193 
 
 and then they set to, and got the gun up. I really thought at one time we 
 must have left it behind. At the very top of the pass were about 50 of 
 Hybutt Khan's followers j these men swore we should not go any further 
 until we had paid for the flock of sheep we captured on the 13th August ; 
 however, when it came to the point, and seeing the gun too close to be 
 pleasant, they thought better of it, and begged a few rupees for Hybutt Khan's 
 family, who they said, were very poor ; it was as much as I could do to 
 restrain m3^self from giving this party a round of grape. It's well I did not 
 perhaps, as it would most likely have embroiled me with the rest of the tribe, 
 and my detachment was not in much of a fighting condition I It was now 4 
 p. M. and we had still to descend the Nuffoosk pass to some water, which our 
 Murree guide reported was in abundance 3 miles from the bottom, in conse- 
 quence of much rain having fallen. (1 7) Commenced descending, when a spec- 
 tacle, the most horrible to be conceived, met our sight : the bodies of all 
 our poor fellows, both officers and men, who fell on the 31st August, lying * 
 unburied with all their clothes on ! having been merely dragged off the road 
 — Raitt's body was the first, being almost on the top of the pass ; through 
 this dreadful scene, we had to lower our gun down the hill, inch by inch — I 
 would have given worlds to have buried the poor fellows, but this was out 
 of the question ; we had then been 14 hours under arms, and had still to 
 seek for water, besides which, we had no intrenching tools. The bodies 
 were lying on heaps, which shows what a bitter fight it must have been. The 
 Murrees spoke highly of poor Raitt's bravery in being at the head of all ; they 
 had buried all their own dead at the bottom of the hill, but although I offer- 
 ed them any money they choose to ask, they refused to bury our's in conse- 
 quence of the state of decomposition they were then in. After much labour, 
 got the gun down, the hill and proceeded on along the table land until 7 
 o'clock, when we found water in abundance, in a deep water course, on the 
 bank of which, we bivouacked for the night. Altho' the men had had no food 
 all day, they all (save the pickets) immediately fell asleep, without tasting 
 a bit : they had been 19 hours under arms, the 1st bugle having been 
 sounded at 12 last night- Had this water been found when the fight of the 
 31st took place, what a different tale would have been told ! 
 
 17. This appears to have been the passage seized upon by the Court of 
 Enquiry for the famous deliverance which amounted to this — that Major 
 Clibborn was culpable for not keeping a sharper look out for water : the 
 men who were perishing with thirst might, according to the report, have 
 found water within 300 yards of them if they had looked for it I There is 
 no doubt of the fact, if they had just remained where they were 28 days long- 
 er, till after the rains had fallen 1 This entry of Captain Brown, together 
 with that of the 9th, 10th and 11th May, will give some idea of the difficulty 
 of forcing the pass of Nufoosk ! 
 
 * Since writing this, I am happy to say I have succeeded in getting all our 
 poor comrades buried — their remains now lie in one large grave in the ground 
 on which they fought so gallantly — Mundoo Khan, the nephew of Beejah 
 Khan, accomplished this desired object for me, in which he was assisted by 
 some of the Murrees engaged in the fight. 
 
 B 1 
 
ig4 
 
 *' 29th. — Marched this morning to the top of the Surtoff Mountain, 4 miles 
 descended hill, lowering gun down with drag ropes ; reached bottom at 10 
 o'clock ; on examining one of the gun wheels, found the iron work of the 
 axle-tree box split in several places ; to all appearance it seemed impossible 
 to repair it, or that the gun could travel any further j but Erskiae by great 
 exertions, got it bound up, and on we went again, startin* at 2 p. m., but 
 did not reach our ground until 10, having lost the road, got jammed in 
 between rjivines — I should have wished to have made only one march a day, 
 ia consequence of the weak state of the men, but there was no help for it^ 
 on we must go, night as well as day, having only 2 days provisions with us. 
 Here no water was procurable s luckily the sepoys were so done up? that 
 they soon fell asleep> and forgot all about their thirst. Received an express 
 from the Assistant Political Agent, warning us to expect opposition from the 
 Bhoogties, whose country we are now in ; not in much of a fighting train, 
 half the men being on camels, but with the gun I think we have not much 
 to fear from them. 
 
 *' 30th. — Started at 5 a. m. and arrived at 10 at a beautiful stream of water 
 — on this march I was obliged to throw away all the ammunition, save a few 
 rounds of grape, otherwise I must have left 8 or 10 sick behind — men and 
 camels regularly gave in during this march, and how we got all safe up, I 
 hardly know — Remaining with the rear-guard, I cheered them on as well as 
 I could — one poor fellow died on the camel's back. Our Murree guide, who 
 had behaved as yet very well, did an act of extraordinary kindness for a 
 Beloochee : hearing that one of our people was left behind for want of car- 
 riage to bring him on, he went back of his own accord, mounted him on his 
 horse, and brought him into camp, walking himself by his side. From this 
 ground, sent off an express by our Murree guide, (the only man who would 
 venture) to Poolajee, for some spare camels and gun bullocks, and we pro- 
 ceeded on another 8 miles at 4 a. m., getting to some water about 10 o'clock. 
 J,*' October 1st. — Started at 3 a. m. and marched on 8 miles— soon after our 
 arrival, to our great delight, up came our Murree guide, with some Scinde 
 horse, spare camels and gun bullocks — proceeded on to Poolajee at 4 p. m., 
 reaching that post at 12, distance 14 miles 5 on coming out of the hills into the 
 plain, fired off our howitzer to give notice to our friends at Lheree, the head 
 quarters of the 5th Regiment, of our safe arrival. 
 
 *' Thus after a detention of 5 months in the fort of Kahun, was our escape 
 from that position and the Murree hills, accomplished. The [hardships and 
 privations circumstances forced on us, were most cheerfully borne with by 
 all. After the attack on Major Ciibborn's party) it often appeared impossible 
 to expect a release, yet not a murmur was heard. On no one occasion had 
 I to find fault with the men, and the alacrity and cheerfulness .'with which 
 they performed the exceedingly onerous duties which I was forced to exact, 
 reflects, in my humble opinion, great credit on the Kalee (5th) Pultan and small 
 detachment of Artillery. Of the constant aid afforded me on every occasion 
 by Lieut. Erskiae and Dr. Glasse^ I note nothing j it can never cease to be 
 
19o 
 
 fresh in my memory' ; and their rank is too near my own to admit of my say- 
 ing all I could wish or they deserve> even in this ray private Journal." 
 
 The admirable conduct of Captain Brown earned for him the thanks of 
 Government and the cordial applause of India at large: and he was im- 
 mediately created Brigade Major, in Scinde, in room of Major Boscawen 
 just then promoted ; he was afterwards raised to the rank of Major by 
 Brevet, and appointed to the command of the Bheel corps in Guzerat. 
 Nor admidst the obloquy endeavoured to be heaped by a section of the ad- 
 mirers of Lord Auckland's policy on the Affghan tribes, who dared to 
 resist the invasion of their country, did the generosity and honour of the 
 MUrrees, and their aged chief, wholly pass unpraised. 
 
 Though Dodah the Murree chief, and Beebruck the leader of the Bhoogties, 
 had been induced to allow military posts to be established in their respec- 
 tive holds of Kahun andDeyrah, neither of them had ever made submission 
 or acknowledged supreraacj. (18) With our retirement from the country, 
 the objects for which our troops were sent there — if indeed these 
 had ever been understood — appear to have been entirely forgotten. We had 
 taught the hill tribes two lessons, which were new to them and fatal to us ; 
 — they had learned that representatives of the British government could 
 tamper with truth, and give justice to the winds ; that we could break our 
 pledges, and press demands, at the bayonet's point, of tribute which had 
 never been our due ; and that if they took advantage of the natural strength 
 of their fastnesses for the purposes of mountain warfare, they could compel 
 us on any occasion to capitulate, or turn us back upon our path of conquest. 
 The nation which, throughout the East, had hitherto been known as " im- 
 mutable in faith, invincible in arms," was found failing in both beyond the 
 Indus ! 
 
 The capture and imprisonment of the Deyrah chief Beebruck has already 
 been referred to : in the instructions furnished to Major Billamore, it was 
 stated that the Bhoogties and Murrees not only plundered in the plains, but 
 gave shelter to robbers, and received stolen property. They were believed 
 to have robbed us of as many as 5000 camels (! 1) and they had given refuge 
 to Beejah Khan, a notorious freebooter.(19) This man was a chief of the 
 Do9mkees, and in consequence of his power and activity he had been for 
 some time acknowledged head of the tribe. It was said he could muster 
 
 18. We once more draw for our facts on the admirable store supplied by 
 the Cutchee letters already repeatedly referred to. The writer subscribing 
 himself " Nufoosk," {Times', 19th June, 1841,) states that " the placing of military 
 posts within the hills was not thought of till after Major Billamore's return to 
 the plains.'' 
 
 19. Cutchee Letters, No. I. ; for the most part greatly abridged—in part? 
 however, copied verbatim. 
 
196 
 
 !>0D followers for a foray info the plains. Various attempts had in vain been 
 taade to capture him. At last he was induced to submit ; but fearing trea- 
 fchery, he stipulated that Uraeer Shaw, a renowned Syud (holy man) should 
 accompany him to an interview with the British authorities. Conceiving 
 that, with a companion the sacredness of whose person assured him of pro- 
 tection, he was safe, he proceeded to Shikarpore with his nephews and a 
 few followers. He was received as became the head of a warlike clan, and 
 for four days was treated with all honour by Lieut. Postans, the Assistant 
 Political Agent, whom he visited daily. On the fourth day, while paying 
 his respects to the resident as usual, he and his attendants were seized, 
 without reason or warning given, and thrown into the prison at Bukkur, 
 where they were detained for many months, — their horses, arms, and orna- 
 ments being sold by public auction 1 The order for this was given by Mr 
 Bell, then at Sukkur, 23 miles off. The whole of the tribes regarded it as 
 a direct breach of promise towards a man who defied us to capture him ; and 
 who, on stipulations being granted, volun'arily came into our camp. Tlie' 
 same view was taken by the officers of thd force ; and if we are to judge from 
 results, perhaps at last by the chief political liimself. The money arising 
 from the sale of the horses and other property was at Lheree paid orer to 
 the chiefs some time after their liberation I (20) This much of explanation 
 
 20. This is the version of the Cutchec letter-writer, whose narrative has 
 throughout been very closely adhered to. The subjoined passage is a correction 
 on this by one of the Assistant Political Agents formerly in Scinde ; — 
 
 *' In June 1839, Major Clibborn moved, intending to proceed to the Hills^ 
 but was unable froni climate to proceed fartlier than Shikarpoor from Sukkur, 
 losing on the way 1 officer, and 14 ntien. Beja Khan Doomkie was the ntiost noted 
 freebooter of the plains, and was the object of the movement, as he alone caused 
 us a loss of about 2 Lacs of rupees. He was offered by Government Us. 3000 a 
 month to leave his nefarious practices and engage to protect the road between Shi- 
 karpoor and Dadur. Beja refused to do so by letter, and accompanied his refusal 
 with insult! As soon as the cold season however stt in, Beja sent earnest peti- 
 tions to be allowed to come in, which was refused unless with conditions. The 
 1st Assistant then, with three or four of the Khjeeri tribe proceeded to the haunts 
 of the Doomkie, who fled. The Khyeeries afterwards fell into an ambuscade pre- 
 pared for them by Beja, and were defeated. The detachments under Major Bil- 
 lamore were then pushed across the desert, accoinpaniecl by the ] st Assistant ; and 
 the Jekranee chiefs, after Several encounters with our Horse, and being pushed to 
 desperation for want of food, surrendered themselves to the Political Authorities, 
 and Bejah Khan, the L'oomkie chief, after a pledge sent to him verbally tlirougli 
 Ameer Shan the Syud, to the effect that iiis life should be spared, but without 
 other conditions, also surrendered himself to the same authority, in his own coun- 
 try at Shapoor. At this time lie was in open hostility P'ith us, and had been 
 warned, that if he persisted in his freebooting practices, a price would beset on 
 fiis head — Beja Khan was sent in a Prisoner to Sukkur under a strong guard 
 commuided by Captain Erskine, and he was followed, as speedily as possible, by 
 the Assistant Political Agent. Previous to Beja's surrender, Major Billamore 
 marched into the Hills, and as the most important object was then considered to 
 be tlie negotiations with the Doomkie and Jekranee tribes, the Political Assistant 
 'did not consider iiiuiseif authorized to leave the plains until this duty waa per^- 
 
197 
 
 io reference to these chiefs is necessary, bec;Hise their case was repeafedly 
 referred to by the Murrees in their negociations with Captain Brown ; and 
 
 formed. Tlie want of ' Judgment' of M^jor B. at Deyrah in departing from 
 his orders, vvliich were specific to use the luo'i^ conciliatory measures only, was the 
 sole cause of the catastrophe which ensued.'' — Bombay Times, May 2S, 1841. 
 
 This letter elicited the following reply from Lieut, (now Major) Jacob : — 
 
 " Sir, — In your paper of the 26th May, which I have just received, I perceive an 
 assertion, given on the authority of a correspondent on whom you say you can 
 place Very implicit reliance, that ' The want of judgment of Major Billamore 
 at Deyrah, in departing from his orders, which were specific, to use the most 
 concihatory measures only, was llie sole cause of the catastrophe which ensued.' 
 
 *' Attacks on the dead are seldom creditable, and at least should be founded on 
 truth. In this instance your correspondent is altogether mistaken,' and I beg 
 leave to contradict his assertions mojvt emphatically. 1 was on very intimate terms 
 with Majer Billamore during the whole time he was employed on the service in 
 question, and well acquainted with the instructions received from the political 
 authorities ; I can positively assert that he neither ' departed from his orders' 
 or displayed * any want of judgment.' His instructions were * to use concilia- 
 tory measures, but to resist insult or aggression to the utmost.* The latter 
 words are not alluded to by your correspondent — for reasons best known to 
 himself; but I can distinctly declare, that tiie most conciliatory measures ivere 
 used by Major Billamore until the attack made on him at Deyrah by the wiiole 
 Bhoogtie tribe. An imperfect account of Major Bdlamore's proceedings in the 
 Hills was given some time since in your paper in a letter signed • Nafoosh :' 
 that account is correct at far as it goes, and was written by me ; the circumstances 
 described in it will shew, not only tliat Major Billamore did not act wiiii want 
 of judgment, bnt that any other line of conduct but the one he pursued would, 
 in all probability, have ensured the loss of his little detachment. 
 
 " Very many members of our little party in the hills alas ! are dead, but there 
 are enough left to bear witness to the truth of what I have said above, and I trust 
 they will do so. — I am. Sir, your most obedient servant, 
 
 »■* Quetta-, I8ih June, 1841.'' «* J. Jacob, Artillery Lieut." 
 
 *• Sir, — In continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, I beg It-ave to point 
 out other inaccuracies in the letter of your corresjonient therein alluded to. Your 
 Correspondent sajs 'The first assistant then, with three of the Kliyeeree tribe, 
 proceeded to the haunts of the Doomkee, who fled. The Khyeerees afterwards 
 fell into an ambuscade prepared for them by Beejali, and were defeated. The 
 detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert accom- 
 panied by the first assistant, &c. &c.' 
 
 *• On this I must remark, that the haunts of the Doomkees extended over the 
 whole plain of Upper Scinde, so that it is probable ' the first assistant' did visit 
 some of them. But the Head Quarters of the tribe, and Beejah Khan himself, 
 were at Poolajee, and did not fly until the very tay before Major Billamore 
 reached the place ; when they set fire to the town, went into the hills, and encamp- 
 ed in a ravine some twelve miles distant, which camp was visited some days after- 
 wards by Capt. Browii and myself. It was after this that the * first assistant' 
 first visited Poolajee. The Ktiyeerees were put to flight by Beejah Khan ma ly 
 days after the arrival of Major Billamore at Poolajee, and the Major was actually 
 present under arms in the field at the time with his wtiole force, yet your corres- 
 pondent gravely writes, after mentioning the def'iat, ' The detachments under 
 Major Bi lamore were then pashe<l across the desert.' There are other inac- 
 Mjuracies in your correspondent's letter, but 14iave mentioned onl) tliose of which 
 
198 
 
 will indirectly fall to be spoken of in another point of vie^v. The distrust 
 occasioned by these disingenuous proceedings was one great source of our 
 difficulties throughout the next twelvemonth of almost incessant fighting. 
 The secret of the almost instant pacification which ensued on the resignation 
 of Mr Bell, and continued to the close of our connection with the country, 
 arose from the thorough restoracion of confidence by the appointment of 
 Major Outrara. This officer was well known to them ; they placed the 
 most implicit reliance on his assurances — whether promises or threats, — and 
 they found that in this they had acted right. 
 
 In December, Captain Brown, who had been placed in political employ 
 by Mr Bell, was sent on a mission into the Murree hills to negociate terms 
 of friendship, on condition of their returning to us the guns captured at 
 Nufoosk. Mr Bell himself took up his quarters for a time at Lheree, and 
 expected that the Chiefs of the hill tribes would come in and render sub- 
 mission, as a considerable force was collecting in the neighbourhood for the 
 purpose of coercion, if necessary. Beebruck was not yet at liberty, though 
 now present with the Chief Political Agent, and so great was the distrust of 
 his neighbours and friends, that they, anxious to see him, could in nowise 
 be induced to come within four miles of the Residency, though Captain 
 Brown had gone out almost unattended on purpose to induce them. This 
 
 I was an eye witness, and in which 1 was a party concerned. Verily your cor- 
 respondent's facts appear to be of equal value with liis opinion of Major Billarnore's 
 judgment at Deyrah. But perhaps no one but a Political oflicer is, in Upper 
 Scinde, allowed to possess the faculty of judgment 1 
 
 ^' The cause of our reverses was at one time Walpole Clarke's rashness, now it is 
 Major Billarnore's want of judgment which caused llie ' catastrophe I' Why these 
 repeated accusations against dead men ? the answer is obvious, — they tell no 
 tales. Poor Clarke had been concerned in many a dangerous adventure before 
 he ever saw Upper Scinde: his daring was so different from rashness that I 
 doubt if many cooler or more far-seeing soldiers of his age ever existed. Major 
 Billamore judged wrong in not allowing himself to be destroyed without resistance 
 at Deyrah 1 But where was the judgment (setting aside the question of breach 
 of faiih) displayed in the imprisonment of Beejah Khan and Janee, or in writing 
 submissive letters, in the name of the British Government, to Dodah Murree 
 after the affair at Nufoosk, or in many other instances I could mention ? Had 
 these efforts of wisdom no influence in bringing about the 'catastrophe'? Your 
 correspondent is apparently a political officerj and perhaps not unacquainted with 
 ' the first assistant' of whom he writes. Let him make himself acquainted 
 with the opinion of the Home Government with regard to the * Judgment* of the 
 statesmen of Upper Scinde before he presumes lo lay the blame of their acts on 
 the memory of gallant soldiers uow deceased — Let your correspondent also appear 
 in his real name. 
 
 " Anonymous accusations are in general little attended to ^ and nothing but your 
 grave Editorial remark ' that your correspondent's communication is a valuable 
 fragment of history, — ' together with my own personal knowledge of its calum- 
 nious nature, would have induced me to come forward in this instance to defend the 
 character of deceased friends. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant, 
 
 ** J. Jacob, Artillery LieuL^* 
 
199 
 
 officer proceeded about 20 miles into the hills nearly alone, and then at 
 length a secondary Murree Chief was prevailed on to visit the British Resi* 
 dent. To urge the return of trophies taken in fair stand-up fight seemed 
 unreasonable — our guns could never be used against us; they had been 
 placed in a mosque as trophies, and were valued by them and worthless to 
 us. This point, therefore, was abandoned. Two Chiefs at length visited 
 Mr Beli in January 1841 ; they pledged themselves on the Koran that they 
 and their respective tribes would abstain from plundering on the plains, and 
 questions of tribute and allegiance were carefully avoided. This was called 
 submission ; and so the curtain drops on the affairs of the Murrees, with 
 which we found that we had no further occasion to interfere. 
 
 The Governor- General, it is said, was never officially informed of the in- 
 tention to demand tribute from the Murrees, and he is believed to have been 
 greatly offended with the whole proceedings. These events occurred simul- 
 taneously with those terminating with the surrender of Dost Mahomed, 
 narrated in the previous chapter, and with the occurrences about to be enu- 
 merated in connection with the affairs of Nusseer Khan of Khelat, which for a 
 twelvemonth kept Scinde and Shawl in a state of incessant conflict. The 
 Deyrah and Kahun episode stands by itself, and apart from the rest : it would 
 be incomplete without a short notice of the proceedings of the Court of En- 
 quiry appointed to investigate the causes of the loss of the convoy at Nufoosk. 
 Major Clibborn, in closmg his despatch, earnestly solicited that a rigid 
 enquiry should be instituted in regard to his conduct as the unfortunate com- 
 mander of the convoy : and the solicitation was immediately complied with 
 by the Supreme Government. Not that there was any charge or suspicion 
 of culpability or mismanagement, but with a view of silencing obloquy where 
 it was unmerited, and of bringing to light the sources of misarrangements 
 somewhere supposed to exist. Major- General Brooks, commanding the 
 field-force in Upper Scinde, was instructed to nominate the officers required 
 to constitute the court, over which he himself was appointed to preside, and 
 to proceed with the investigation without delay. (21) From the tenor of 
 what has already been stated, it will appear that the party whose character 
 was chiefly implicated throughout for the primary occupation of Kahun, 
 the determination to provision and reinforce the garrison when the military 
 authorities were of opinion that it ought to have been withdrawn, and others 
 of the unwise measures which led to the result of its final abandonment, was 
 none other than the chief political agent himself. It has been repeatedly 
 stated that Mr Bell was an able man : he had a singular facility of gaining 
 
 21, The Members of the Court were Lieut.-Colonel (now Major-General) 
 Valiant, H.M.'s 40th 5 Lieut -Colonel Wyraer, 30th Bengal N,I. ; Major Farrel, 
 6th Bombay N.I. ; and Major Lloyd, of the Artillery. 
 
200 
 
 the mastery over weaker minds with whom he came in contact, when he conf 
 ceivetl it to be his interest to bend them to his wishes. The use made by him 
 of the influence thus obtained was, on the present occasion, in the last degree 
 unjustifiable. The Chief Political, who was one of the most vindictive of men, 
 had special grounds of grudg-e against Major Clibborn, on whom he appears 
 to have determined now to ba avenged for the share taken by him in the most 
 indecent controversy betwixt the political and military chiefs the preceding 
 year. Captain Clibborn was, in 1839, Brigade-Major to Colonel Gordon, 
 and gave some of the most important evidence before the Court of Enquiry 
 in refutation of Mr Bell's charges against that officer. (22) General Brooks 
 was at this time understood to be entirely under the thumb of the political 
 agent; and three out of the five officers, who constituted the commission, 
 were at the date of the enquiry residing under his roof. The court 
 having adjusted preliminaries. Major Clibborn read over a statement 
 of the case, the correctness of the whole of which was deponed to by every 
 one of the surviving officers who had been present with him at Nufoosk. 
 These gentlemen were afterwards examined, but that apparently with the 
 view to inculpation rather than for the eliciting of truth. Major Forbes, 
 then commanding at the station, and Lieutenant Postans, the chief political 
 assistant at Shikarpore, also at hand, the conduct of both of whom became 
 the object of special observation, were called on for no explanations, al- 
 though it afterwards became apparent that they could fully exonerate them- 
 selves of the charges brought against them. Dr Kirk, (23) who had accom- 
 panied the detachment, had made numerous and valuable sketches of the sce- 
 nery, and these, when produced in court, were considered evidence of the exis- 
 tence of water, against the testimony of the living witnesses who deponed that 
 there was none. By a singular fatality the report of the Commission found 
 its way into the newspapers before it had reached the hands of Government. 
 This of itself immediately demanded investigation. The matter was involved 
 in mystery, and clouded with a grievous amount of mis-statements, (24) 
 and though the manner in which it obtained premature publicity was never 
 officially accounted for, it was perfectly well understood by the public. 
 
 22. The whole correspondence on this subject? together with the evidence 
 referred to, was published in the Bombay Times, May, 1841. 
 
 23. This very talented officer was sent on mission to the Court of Shoa in 
 Abyssinia along with Major Harris, &c. in May 1841. 
 
 24. The sensation this matter created for many months warrants us in en- 
 larging on it more than its importance demands, as connected with the Affghan 
 war. The report was dated 20th Nov. 1840, and it appeared in the Bombay 
 Courier newspaper of the 19th Dec. :— the post occupying 15 days from Sukkur 
 to Bombay. It appears as if the copy meant for Government had been kept 
 back on purpose until the public should have seen the newspaper account. It 
 was known to have been handed about for some days at Poonah before being 
 sent to Bombay. 
 
201 
 
 The Court having closed its enquiries, met after a few days' adjournment 
 to report proceedings, when the President, on taking his place, produced a 
 paper which he said embodied his opinion, and that if the members approved 
 it would be adopted as the report of the Commission ; or, if it was not so 
 adopted, each member should give his opinion in writing. The document 
 in question, the same as was afterwards published, having been read, and 
 the members having been called upon, beginning with the youngest, each 
 gave his assent without commentary. Colonel Valiant was the last called 
 upon to vote. He declined adopting the report, pointing out its irrelevancy, 
 and calling attention to the numerous points which appeared wholly unsup- 
 ported by evidence. The President replied that some of the matters ob- 
 jected to were notorious throughout India, and being irritated at the ob- 
 jections being pressed. Brigadier Valiant having remarked that were the 
 report forwarded to Government in its present form, it was sure to be re- 
 turned disapproved of — General Brooks replied that in this case he should 
 himself be answerable for it, — so the objections were no longer persisted 
 ia. (-25) 
 
 The commissioners were required to meet again and reconsider various 
 points in their original report, which appeared to be set forth, on some occa- 
 sions, without any evidence whatever, and on others, in the teeth of that 
 which had been laid before them. Their revised finding was much the same 
 as the first report, and on the parts on which they offered explanations or 
 attempted to adduce evidence, matters were made worse. The whole was ulti- 
 mately laid before the public in an admirably written Government Gazette o^ 
 the 8th of May, 1841. It were too tedious to go over the whole entire, and 
 the notice of a few isolated points will sufficiently indicate the character of 
 the paper. Lord Keane's conduct in supplying the commissariat the year 
 before, was declared to be the origin of the whole mischief. This assertion 
 was made, without an attempt at proof, in reference to the character of a 
 party already beyond the cognizance or jurisdiction of the court, and who 
 had quitted India five months before the Kahun expedition was undertaken. 
 Col. Stevenson, whose lamented death on the 9th August, before the array 
 started, might have saved his memory from aspersion, was blamed for send- 
 ing Captain Brown into the hills, although it subsequently appeared in 
 evidence that this was done by order of Mr Ross Bell. (26) Brigadier 
 Stevenson and Major Forbes were both blamed for not having made Captain 
 Brown aware of the difficulties of sending him supplies, so that he might 
 have put his men on half or quarter rations early in August. From Captain 
 
 25. Geaeral Valiant's report, dated 18th June 1841— Government Archives. 
 
 26. Mr. Secretary Willoughby's letter in reference to the report of Major 
 Forbes. C 1 
 
202 
 
 Brown's journal, so often quoted, and then at the command of the commis- 
 sion, had they desired it, it appeared that it had been intimated, so early as 
 the 4th June, that no assistance could be sent from Sukkur, and that he, of 
 his own accord, and in consideration of ihe extreme isolation of his position, 
 had put his people on half rations on the 24th of May ! The court, in its 
 original finding, declared that Major Clibborn, in his choice of theNufoosk 
 instead of the Deyrah route, placed too implicit reliance on the guide, Meer 
 Hussain, — it was subsequently shewn that Meer Hussain joined the party two 
 marches from Nufoosk : in their revised finding, they state that it wa? not this 
 man but another named Buchan Shaw : Government declared this wholly un- 
 supported by evidence ; other things were declared on equally or still more 
 questionable grounds, of which government afterwards stated, that " they 
 deeply regretted to find this court, composed of five field-officers of rank and 
 experience, could, on such grounds, have recorded as a fact that which was 
 not a fact, &c."(27) The court blamed Major Clibborn for not having been 
 guided by the drawings of Dr Kirk, by which the difficulties of the passes 
 were manifested, — the drawings having in fact been made on the ad- 
 vance ; Dr Kirk never having traversed this route until with Major Clib- 
 born's party. The court, in their first finding, observed that Major Clibborn, 
 before entering the Murree hills, had been warned by Captain Brown that 
 the Murrees were assembling : in their second, they admit that they came 
 to this conclusion from the circumstance that a rumour to that effect pre- 
 vailed at Hydrabsd, 250 miles off", in the end of August. Captain Brown 
 declared, that not only had no such warning as that referred to by the court 
 ever been given by him, but that, on the contrary, he had written to Major 
 Clibborn on the 27th August, that he had heard that the road had not been 
 destroyed, and that the Murrees were not assembling, and that water might 
 be expected, as heavy rain had recently fallen. Captain Brown was present 
 in court, and had been examined as a witness. Major Forbes was censured 
 for having sent out a force, under half the size of that ordered by Brigadier 
 Stevenson, and without consulting the political authorities ; as also, for the 
 cumbrous magnitude of the convoy, as 200 camels would have been sufficient 
 to provision the fort of Kahun for three months. Major Forbes proved 
 that instead of a force of 1200 bayonets, six guns, and some irregular horse, 
 having, as stated by the court of enquiry, been actually equipped by his 
 predecessor in command, that no arrangement up to the 10th of August had 
 been made for its equipment; that the number of bayonets warned yr 9,% 
 1033, and not 1200 : and that the amount of stores and camels was no more 
 than was essential to relieve and provision Kahun, and subsist the escorting 
 party. (28) Lieut. Postans had named a much smaller force, to which 
 
 27. Governor in Council's Minute, 7th May, 1841. 
 
 28. Mr Secretary Willouffhbv's letter. 
 
203 
 
 Major Forbes, of his own accord, had added one third. These explanations 
 on the part of Major Forbes, — who, till he received the commission's report, 
 never suspected that he could have been condemned unheard, when on the 
 spot to offer explanations, if required, — were not sent in till afterwards, 
 Gen. Brooks having declined to receive or forward them to government, (29) 
 These most extraordinary proceedings were clearly exposed, and most 
 severely and justly censured, by a very clear and able minute of the Bombay 
 Government, which, while passing high and merited encomiums on Major 
 Clibborn and the officers and men under his charge, directed the im- 
 mediate removal of General Brooks from his command, and the retara of 
 Colonel Valiant to the Presidency. The conduct of Government was greatly 
 approved of by the Governor- General in Council, the Court of" Directors, 
 and the Horse Guards, and was as decided as it was upright and energetic. 
 General Valiant had been on the point of protesting against the whole proceed - 
 iugs, when unhappily be permitted himself to be concussed into acquies- 
 cence by some inaccurate and confused ideas of the duties of the members of 
 a court of enquiry ; he conceiving it to be essential that an apparent unan- 
 imity should exist. The junior members of the court appear to have homo- 
 logated the report as drawn up without their assistance, and presented to them 
 by the President, who took on himself the responsibility of its accuracy, with- 
 out giving themselves the trouble of examining into its contents, or reflect- 
 ing on the monstrous nature of the proceedings to which they were making 
 themselves parties. This, at all events, was believed to be the only explanation 
 of the conduct of Colonel Wymer, Majors Farrel and Lloyd, officers of sound 
 judgment and unimpeachable integrity, and who, had they been unprinci- 
 pled enough to have made the judgment of a court of inquiry the means of in- 
 dulging personal animosity — misconduct of which no one suspected them — 
 it did not appear that in this case there existed any such feelings as those 
 towards the parties concerned, to gratify. Of course, what has just been 
 stated is no sort of excuse for the solemn duties of a court of inquiry having 
 been trifled with — the ends of truth and justice perverted, and the charac- 
 ter and prospects of officers, as honorable as themselves, destroyed by the 
 flat of a military commission. The report to whose accuracy they solemnly de- 
 poned was, from beginning to end, a tissue of malignant falsehoods, and 
 which, if uttered by the humblest subaltern, would, if enquired into, have 
 occasioned his dismissal from the service. Had the whole of the officers 
 who constituted the Nufoosk commission been removed from the service, 
 the punishment for so grave and mischievous an offence could not have 
 been considered too severe. That General Brooks was, at this lime, a 
 tool in the hands of Mr Bell, is sufficiently notorious ; but his conduct 
 
 29. Mr Secretary Willoughby's letter. 
 
204 
 
 notwithstanding this, is far more reprehensible than that of the other mem' 
 bers. As the President of the court, and the party who was entrusted 
 with the selection of its members, and the guidance of the forms of its pro- 
 cedure, he was peculiarly bound to be circumspect. He, at all events, must 
 have known that much of what was charged against the parties inculpated 
 was unsupported by, much more in the direct teeth of, the evidence adduced ; 
 and that, instead of searching for Information, or desiring to discover truth, 
 the parties who could have assisted them in attaining these were avoided to 
 be inquired after. Mr Bell was the only man connected with the affairs of 
 Scinde who escaped all notice — a circumstance in itself sufficient to have 
 awakened suspicion. Though afterwards brought, in the most irregular 
 manner, into the field as the voluntary accuser of Lord Keane and Sir T. 
 Willshire, it does not appear that he ever experienced a frown from his 
 superiors, and, at all events, he was maintained in high and confidential em- 
 ploy as if no suspicion had ever been entertained of his unfitness for service. 
 General Brooks returned to Bombay along with Colonel Valiant in Feb . 
 1842, and left for Europe on the 1st May, having completely lost the con- 
 fidence of Government. Colonel Valiant, as a Queen's officer, received a 
 reprimand from the Horse Guards. He was Commander of the garrison of 
 Bombay from February 1842 to March 1843. He had been raised to the 
 rank of Major- General on the brevet which occurred on the birth of the 
 Prince of Wales. This is, however, anticipating in point of time : in the 
 next chapter we shall have occasion to mention the names of both officers i» 
 connection with the affairs of Scinde. 
 
205 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Genealogy of the Khans of Kelat— Doubtful extent of Mehrab Khan's treachery in 1839— His 
 preparations for defence sudden and imperfect— His death -Escape of his Widow and Son— 
 Unsuitableness of Newaz Khan to rule over the Brahoes— Lieut. Loveday appointed Envoy 
 — Dismemberment of the Khanate — Sharawan and Cutchee made over to the Shah Shoojah 
 — Cutchee given to tlie Indian Government by the Shah— Rent exacted from the free Jagheers 
 — Resistance the consequence — Bad selection of ©ur Native agents— Mahomed Sherreef, 
 villany of— Revocation of jagheers — The Chiefs left in ignorance of the change in their con- 
 dition—Customs of the port of Las ceded by Newaz Khan to the British Government- 
 Claims are abandoned— Nusseer Khan pursued— Vengeance iuflictedon those who protected 
 him— Vnhappy proceedings of Lieut. Loveday— Kakurs threaten Quettah— Reintorcemeuts 
 arrive from Candahar— Insurgents retire from Quettah and invest Kelat— Pusillanimity of 
 the Envoy— Lieut. Hammersley defeats the insurgents at Moostung — Attempts at negotia- 
 tion with Captain Bean — Lieut. Loveday and Mr Masson put in close confinement— Insur- 
 gents proceed to Moostung — Misunderstandings in negotiating witli Captain Bean— Depute 
 Mr Masson as Ambassador— He is placed under arrest on suspicion of being a Russian spy — 
 Proceedings connected therewith— His release — Combination of mishaps— Large reinforce- 
 ments sent to Scinde— Brahoes attacked and defeated at Kundah— Lieut. Vardon attacks and 
 defeats them near Bhag and captures 1100 camels— Expertness of the Enemy in seizing 
 camels experienced by Major Boscawen— Sack of Gundava — Three days' fighting round Dadur 
 — The enemy on each occasion defeated — Loss estimated at from 300 to 400— Murder of Lieut. 
 Loveday — The insurgents disperse — Nusseer Khan left a wanderer— General Nott recap- 
 tures Kelat — General Brooks, Brigadier Valiant, and Major Holland, leave Bombay and join 
 the force— Views of the Politicals towards Herat— Colonel Marshall takes command of the 
 Kotra Brigade— Negotiates with the enemy — Nusseer Khan makes submission — Receives 
 pecuniary assistance — Ordered by General Brooks, who was ignorant of pending negotia- 
 tions, to,be attacked— Brilliant victory at Kotra— Entire dispersion of the insurgents — A 
 large reinforcement moves towards the Bolan Pass — Colonel Stacey improves the aspect of 
 affairs at Kelat— Cutchee affairs— Seebee tribute— Detachment advances on Kojjuck— Misun- 
 derstandings, and attack on the town unsuccessful— Inhabitants abandon it— Occupied by 
 our troops— Beiaforcements arrive — Kojjuck sacked and burnt — Submission of the Beebee 
 Gunjani— Herat affairs— Troops ascend the Bolan Pass— Expedition to N>'.osky— Acci- 
 dent in the Bolan to Captain Haldane's Irregulars— Similar accident in the Khyber Pass — 
 General Brooks -ud Colonel Valiant deprived of their command— Surrender ot Nusseer 
 Khan— Peath of Mr R. Bell— Major Outram takes political charge- Restoration of Nusseer 
 Khan— Coronation at Kelat— General state of Affairs— Memoir of Major Outram. 
 
 SiNCJE the earlier portion of the present narrative was issued, the va- 
 luable work of Mr Masson, entitled " A Journey to Kelat, &c.," has been 
 published. By this, many important facts have been disclosed, of which the 
 public were previously ignorant. These have been taken advaetage of at 
 the risk of some repetition ; and where present statements diifer from those 
 formerly given, — as, on one or two points, chiefly of ampliflcatlon, they may 
 chance to do, — the newer is to be regarded as the more correct version of the 
 matter. The Cutchee letters have been consulted with more care and 
 minuteness than formerly, and the iuformation supplied by them, which 
 may hitherto have been overlooked, has been embodied in the present 
 Chapter. The first few pages of the following chapter, in consequence of 
 these things, are in part retrospective, and ought perhaps to have taken 
 their place in that part of the narrative where the earlier portion of the 
 aflPairs of Kelat are discussed. (I) The following genealogical table of the 
 rulers of Kelat, copied from the work of Mr Masson, will save the trouble 
 of much explanation and reference : — 
 
 1. These letters have been referred to in a previous chapter, in connection 
 with the proceedings in the Murree country. They arc of unquestionable 
 authority, and their writer now holds a high appointment : the revelations 
 they make are most mournful and disheartening ; yet their accuracy will, wo 
 doubt not, be amply borne out by the papers in the archives of the Board of 
 Control, as we are sure the\' will be by every officer in the Scinde field force 
 who had the means of making himself acquainted, with the subjects of which 
 they treat. 
 
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 From this, U appears that Mehrab Khan was descended from the younger 
 branch of the family, and his successor on the throne from the elder, yet the 
 ancestor of the latter had been set aside by the progenitor of the former, 
 four generations back, and the legitimacy of the succession had never, since 
 the reign of Nusseer Khan, been called in question. 
 
 At the time the British army crossed the Indus (Dec. 1838) the Kelat 
 durbar was filled with councillors hostile to their own ruler, and anxious for 
 an opportunity to betray him into any difficulty which might redound to 
 their profit or advantage. The incessant misunderstandings which arose in 
 our attempts at negociation seem in a considerable measure to be accounted 
 for by this, without imputing to the Khan a greater amount of duplicity 
 and cunning than might have been expected and excused in an Asiatic chief 
 under the circumstances. (2) 
 
 When Mehrab Khan heard of the intention of our march upon Kelat, he 
 sent his son to collect troops. This step was opposed by his councillors, 
 but the chief replied, that though he had given no cause for enmity, as we 
 proposed attacking him he would defend his throne. Kelat had fallen 
 before the desired levies could be brought into the field, and on becoming 
 aware of this they departed without coming into action. (3) 
 
 The women of the harem had made their escape before the fall of the 
 fortress : — the Beebee Gunjani, one of the widows, shortly after claimed 
 the protection of the Scinde politicals, and for a time resided in 
 Cutchee on a pension allowed her by government. She joined the 
 followers of her stepson, Nusseer Khan, when the insurrection broke oit 
 in June, 1840. The young Khan, a spirited and intelligent boy of fourteen 
 years of age, sought refuge amongst the chiefs who had been his father's 
 friends, and who speedily became the objects of our vengeance in conse« 
 quence of the hospitality exercised by them towards the fallen prince. New az 
 Khan, the destined successor to the throne, quickly joined the army, and 
 was duly invested ruler of Kelat, and vassal to the Doorannee empire. 
 This man, who was one of the few of our protegees who did not re- 
 quite our kindness with ingratitude, was ill suited for sovereignty over a 
 people so fierce and unruly as the Brahoes, who, though aware of his being 
 of the royal line, could in no shape recognise his claim of right. The 
 bad odour attached to him of being our protegee, and the suspicion 
 of his having made over to Shah Soojah the more valuable portions of 
 the sovereignty : besides, he himself was unwarlike ; he had acquired no 
 name or position, and had no respect amongst the chiefs. The territory we 
 committed to him was not only poor and sterile, but eminently hostile. A 
 loan of £5000 was considered sufficient to enable him to set up a royal es- 
 
 2. Masson, p. 383. 
 
 3. Cutchee Letters, No. 3, — Bombay Times f May. 
 
208 
 
 tablishraent. The jewels which belonged to the women of his predecessor, 
 which were secured by us as prize property, had brought us more than this. 
 For repayment of the sum just named he was to make over to us the rights of 
 the customs along the sea-coast, which had been abandoned by the sover- 
 eign half a century before ; but of this more hereafter. It was a part of 
 our agreement with him that he was to expect no assistance from us 
 to maintain him on his throne. Lieutenant Loveday, a young Bengal 
 officer of some distinction as a Persian scholar, but beyond this eminently 
 ill qualified for the post assigned him, was appointed political agent to re- 
 side at the Kelat court ; he was supplied with 60 sepoys as a guard of 
 honour, and this, with the terror supposed to invest our name, was all that 
 was considered necessary for securing the stability of the new dynasty, and 
 to ensure the tranquillity of eastern Beloochistan under all the changes to 
 which we had subjected, or were about to subject it. 
 
 Lord Auckland is understood to have been from the beginning averse to 
 the deposition of Mehrab Khan : he left, however, an amount of power in 
 the hands of the politicals which was taken advantage of. Mr Bell pointed 
 out with fatal accuracy the mischief, which he himself afterwards hastened 
 and aggravated, sure to ensue from the dismemberment of the empire just 
 about to be noticed. (4) 
 
 The valuable provinces of Sharawan, Cutchee, Harand and Dajil had 
 been conferred by Ahmed Shah, on the first Nusseer Khan, for service per- 
 formed during his wars with Persia. These were to be held by him as 
 feudatory on the usual terras of furnishing a military contingent to the 
 Doorannee sovereign, when required. While the monarchy remained entire, 
 there was a force of 1000 Beiooch horse furnished for the protection of 
 Cashmeer ; and the Kelat princes had ever been remarkable for the fidelity 
 with which they fulfilled their obligations to the sovereign. When the Doo- 
 rannee empire fell to pieces all semblance of allegiance disappeared. (5) 
 Sharawan contains a population of about 150,000 souls : it was placed under 
 charge of Captain Bean, assistant to the envoy, and chief political in Shawl. 
 Quettah, its principal town, containing about 4,000 people, was maintained 
 as a strong military post from the commencement to the conclusion of our 
 connection with the country. Cutchee was taken charge of by Mr Bell; it 
 contains about 150,000 people, and is so rich and fertile that it has always 
 been considered the granary of Upper Scinde. Both were transferred to the 
 Doorannee empire in lieu of a tribute alleged but not admitted to be due. 
 They were nominally made over to us by Shah Soojah, and retained by 
 
 4. Letters in Bombay Times, February 13, 1841 : also Cutchee Letters, ditto 
 May. 
 
 5. Journeys in Beloochistan and Affghanistan, &c., by Chas. Masson, vol- ii. 
 page 101 — quoted, supra page 88, chap. ii. 
 
 #* 
 
209 
 
 us for the liquidation of a portion of his majesty's debts. (6) Like our other 
 legacies of the kind they proved unprofitable bequests, having cost us in the 
 course of the next twelvemonth, an outlay of some £300,000 to keep them in 
 order.(7) The dismemberment of states is not without example in Europe ; 
 but the precedents which history supply are not such as moralists refer to 
 with approbation, or as England would often desire to copy. The fact of 
 the transfer, bad as it was, was matter of small account in comparison to 
 the manner of its accomplishment. 
 
 In the large province of Shawl, Jagheers (feudal estates) had been held 
 for many generations by influential families on military tenure. The 
 principal chiefs so situated at the period of the fall of Kelat, were 
 Assur Khan, Rysannee ; Mahommed Khan, Shewannee ; Mahoramed 
 Shye, Rhodeynees ; Bungoolzyrees, &c. These men had made sub- 
 mission to Mr Bell at Bagh, and proceeded to their estates on the under- 
 standing, that they were to hold them on the same tenure as here- 
 tofore. Their surprise and indignation may ba imagined when they were 
 called upon by Captain Bean to pay rent for their hitherto rent-free jagheers. 
 This demand was said to have greatly incensed the Governor- General, who 
 reproved it as at variance both with the spirit and tenor of his instructions ; 
 but the mischief was done, the mandate had gone forth, and the appearance 
 of the revenue moonshee sent out to collect the tribute, called down on him- 
 self and his escort immediate and condign punishment : they were attacked 
 by Mahommed Khan Sheewannee, near Moostung, and slaughtered 
 to a man. (8) A less barbarous and martial race would have remonstrated 
 and petitioned against the violation of the pledge made at Bagh ; but 
 of orderly and deliberate proceedings such as these the fiery chiefs of 
 Shawl knew nothing : and with arms in their hands they sought, after the 
 
 6. Cutchee Letters. 
 
 7. Friend of India. 
 
 8. CuLchee Letters, No. 5, given verbatim. Masson speaks of a party of 25 
 Sepoys being cut off at Moostung, but says they were a portion of Lieut. Love- 
 day's guard going on business to Qaettah. We think the two narratives must 
 relate to the same thing, and though we have referred to the other, the Cutchee 
 writer is likely to be correct- The party accompanied Captain Bean's Moon- 
 shee to Moostung to collect revenue. Ou arrival at the place, the Moonshee 
 sent in and ordered the chiefs to come out and make salaam to him ; this they 
 refused to do, justly saying he was not their ruler. On this the Moonshee sent 
 the sepoys to bring the chiefs out : an engagement took place, and the sepoys 
 were driven back to the house where the Moonshee lived, which they gallantly 
 defended until destroyed : this was told by a native who was present. The con- 
 tinuance of Captain Bean in office, and the obtaining for him a badge of the 
 Doorannee empire,— the last that was conferred, — is, after the repeated disap- 
 proval of his acts, and proofs of his incompetenc}'', one of the numberless illus- 
 trations of Lord Auckland's character. He in general judged rightly, but 
 wanted the decision or nerve to put his purposes into effect. Captain Bean 
 had friends in the Secretariate, and Beloochistan was kept twelve months at 
 war on this account. 
 
 D 1 
 
210 
 
 fashion of their race, that redress which the justice of their cause deserved, 
 but of which under their new rulers, it did not, or could not, assure them. 
 They flew to arms? joined their banished chief Nusseer Khan : their cause and 
 his became identified ; and they quickly avenged their grievances, by be- 
 sieging their oppressor in his stronghold. The particulars of this fall after- 
 wards to be detailed. A process very similar to this was meanwhile being 
 pursued in Cutchee. No intimation whatever was in the first place given 
 to the chiefs that Cutchee had been di.>joined from Kelat and annexed to 
 the Doorannee empire, or that it bad been made over by the Shah Soojah to 
 the Government of India. Not only were the people never consulted ; they 
 were not so much as informed on these points. It was left to their own sa- 
 gacity to discover that it was a Briton and not a Brahoe who now ruled over 
 them. These omissions were trifling compared to the fatal mis takes which 
 followed. ** It was peculiarly unfortunate," observes Mr Masson, *• and 
 what might and ought to have been avoided, that both in Beloochistaa 
 and Affghanistaq the traitors to the old order of things became the 
 favoured and trusted adherents of the new: as might have been expected, 
 the confidence so unwisely reposed in them was uniformly betrayed." 
 Syud Mahomed himself had been appointed (by Mehrab Khan) Naib 
 of Dajil and Hurrand, two provinces beyond the Murree Hills, and east 
 of them. These provinces he sold to the Seikhs, and became a traitor to 
 his master. Had it not been for his being a Syud, Mehrab Khan would 
 have executed him. He was known to all as the greatest scoundrel in the 
 country. 
 
 The treason and perfidy of the Syud Mahomed Sherreef to his late mas- 
 ters, was, as usual, recommendation enough to ensure him especial marks of 
 our favour : and we met with the requital which those who patronize 
 scoundrels are entitled to look for from their protegees. This man was 
 appointed, by Mr Bell, Naib or collector of Cutchee, and in a country not 
 famed for honesty, he could scarcely have found a more dishonest o r thorough- 
 bred rascal. (9) The territory whose supervision was committed to his hands 
 occupied a space of from 5000 to 6000 square miles; and over this the Syud 
 held absolute charge without the controul of a single European assistant. 
 "Within a few months of the fall of Kelat, which occurred November 1839, a 
 letter was addressed to this man by Mr Bell, directing him to inform the chiefs 
 that all the jagheers were attached, but that they would be restored to the law- 
 ful claimants on their appearing personally or by vakeel at Sukkur, and prov- 
 ing the validity of their sunnuds or charters of gift from the Crown. (10) It 
 does not appear that Mr Bell was authorized by his superiors, without investi- 
 
 9. Cutchee Letters, No. 3, verbat. 
 10. Cutchee Letters, No- 3, abridged. 
 
211 
 
 gation, t® deprive the whole proprietors of a province of hereditary estates 
 even until their titles should be proved. When the measure was resolved 
 upon, the best thing that could have been done was to make it known by 
 proclamation, or in any other way which might render it most public and 
 notorious. It is more than doubtful whether the Naib ever communicated 
 to the parties most concerned the instructions he received from his superior, 
 A few of the smaller landholders did appear at Sukkur, and had the proper 
 seal attached to their title deeds; the rest, irritated by having rights ques- 
 tioned by intruders which had been held undoubted under their native so- 
 vereign, and maddened by the exactions and insolence of Mahomed Sherreef, 
 shared in the discontent, and joined in the insurrection beginning in June 
 to make its appearance everywhere throughout the country. The revenue 
 from this unjust source which reached the treasury, was insignificant even 
 at its best ; the frauds and extortions by the Naib were boundless ; and in 
 a country where Syuds are almost worshipped, he alone of his class was sub- 
 ject of universal execration. Charges preferred against him by Europeans 
 were not so much as listened to ; his knavery was in the mouth of every na- 
 tive ; his accounts, when called for at length, had to be drawn out afresh 
 before they could be presented 3 like all the others in Cutchee, they remained 
 for a twelvemonth, if they remain not still, unaudited. Yet no such thing 
 was ever broached as the threat of his removal from office. Six months af- 
 terwards, when the chiefs had been driven to rebellion, and 2000 of the 
 people slain in battle, an order was issued, though only partially carried in- 
 to effect, that all the rights which had been held valid during the late reign 
 should be so still ; the whole question in dispute being, like that of the 
 Murree tribute, abandoned after we had had our fill of fighting. But we 
 are not yet done with the schemes which would almost seem to have been 
 purposely contrived to drive the country to arras. The customs of Bella 
 have already just been referred to. This province is governed by the Jam 
 or chief, on a military tenure under Kelat. From the seaport of Son- 
 meanee the Khan, some generations back, had received as revenue half 
 the duties collected — amounting to about £700 annually ; these had, ia 
 consequence of an intermarriage with the Kelat family, been made 
 over to the Jam in perpetuity : his other iacome derived from his 
 jagheer amounted to about as much more. So soon as Newaz Khan 
 was placed in power, the grant of the port duties was declared to be 
 resumed ; and they were made over to us for the liquidation of the sura 
 of £5000 received in loan by the Khan. A British officer, who was direct- 
 ed not to acknowledge the local authority of the Jam, was appointed to make 
 the collection. The chief appealed to the Bombay government, and thus 
 managed to have his case brought to the notice of Lord Auckland, who cen- 
 sured and reversed every thing that had been done. Infinite alarm and irri- 
 tation had been at first occasioned ; but this act of the Government was 
 
212 
 
 luckily in time to save the Jam and his tribe from joining the other insur- 
 gents against us. 
 
 When Nusseer Khan escaped from Kelat, on the capture of that fort by 
 Sir T. Willshire, he sought refuge amongst the chiefs in Panjore : Newaz 
 Khan soon afterwards set out on an expedition to expel or capture hitn ; 
 but though this was well planned, the youth had friends who made hioi aware 
 of his danger, and so enabled him to escape : so that the first expedition in 
 the new reign was unsuccessfd. Enraged at his disappointment, the intru- 
 sive ruler avenged himself by plundering the tribes which had afforded his 
 enemy shelter. A large amount of spoil was obtained, and the cruelties 
 exercised were spoken of with horror long after.(ll) A second expedition 
 for a similar purpose, attended by the like results, and conducted in the same 
 unhappy manner, was shortly afterwards made to Noosky. The allegiance 
 of some disaffected chiefs was compelled before returning to the capital. On 
 these occasions Lieutenant Loveday most unwisely accompanied the Khan 
 —thus mixing himself and his government up with intestine broils in a 
 manner said to have been highly displeasing to the Envoy and Minister. 
 Directions to desist from these things for the future, alone prevented further 
 expeditions from being engaged in. It did not seem that the son of Meh- 
 rab Khan had any idea of appearing for the present in arms, or that the 
 chiefs intended to do any thing more in his favour than to afford him a 
 place of refuge. Such was the state of matters betwixt November 1839 and 
 June 1840. Lieut. Loveday appears to have occasionally suffered from an 
 unsettled condition of mind : he lived in a state of the utmost seclusion, enter- 
 taining constant apprehensions of intruders upon his premises. He seems to 
 have been a dog-fancier, and to have had with him a number of specimens 
 of the fierce bull and mastiff races. These he is said occasionally to have 
 hounded upon the populace, some of whom were worried to death. (12) To 
 have ferocious beasts set loose upon them, was sufficient to exasperate people 
 any where : it was amongst Mussulmans a heavy aggravation of the offence, 
 that these were dogs held specially unclean by the prophet. The conduct 
 of the Resident appears to have been such as to have occasioned excessive 
 discontent : and the evil deeds of himself and the chief, to whose court he had 
 been deputed, caused hatred and scorn to be mutually reflected on each of them. 
 The garrison of Quettah had in May consisted of the Shah's 1st or Royal Regi- 
 
 11. Masson, p. 112. 
 
 12. Masson, p. 119. Masson's authority on this point we understand to 
 be confirmed by at least one of the political asjents who had the best means 
 of being informed. We are bound to state, at the same time, that much of 
 what is alleged against Lieutenant Loveday is believed to have had its origin 
 amongst the Brahoes, who were glad to propagate every variety of calumny 
 against him, to excuse their own cruel treatment of him. A camel man wfto 
 had been in the employment of Lieutenant Loveday, stated at Lheree that the 
 dogs destroyed one man : this was afterwards confirmed by a native of Moostung. 
 
213 
 
 raent, commanded by Captain GrifBn, the 1st Troop of the Cabool H. A. 
 under Lieut. Cooper, and the Bolan Rangers. These were shortly reduced 
 by dispatch of troops to Candahar, so that by the middle of July, the force 
 was diminished to 250 infantry, 80 horse, and 3 guns. The young prince 
 Nusseer Khan was immediately summoned from his retreat to head the 
 malcontents, and form a rallying point for the tribes. The Moostung insur- 
 gents moved straight upon the capital. Newaz Khan was not slow or indo- 
 lent in endeavouring to collect troops from amongst the villages. Perso- 
 nally he was unpopular, doubly so as having been forced upon the country 
 by infidels and foreigners, the conduct of whose representative was enough to 
 cause general dissatisfaction. His treasury was empty, and his success in 
 procuring succour commensurate with what might have been looked for 
 under a combination of circumstances so eminently inauspicious. The in- 
 surgents meanwhile considering Kelat a secure prize at any time when they 
 might fiad it most convenient to seize upon it, resolved to direct their ef- 
 forts against Quettab, which had been nearly stripped of troops ; its entire 
 garrison mustering as already stated, under 400 men. Here a large quantity 
 of treasure was believed to be kept, and the weakness of the force tempt- 
 ed to assault. It has already been mentioned that when it was found 
 impossible to send Captain Brown relief from Sciode, that Captain Bean 
 had promised him the assistance of the Kakur tribes, which had been taken 
 into our pay ; but that this scheme had been frustrated by these very stipen- 
 diaries turning their arms against us. (1 3) The Kakurs had been at the same 
 time engaged in double treaty — they were in terms with Captain Bean to 
 assist in relieving the garrison at Kahun, and on treaty with the Murrees 
 to secure its destruction. True to the latter and more congenial alliance, 
 the first proof they appeared to have intended of their sincerity was the attack 
 on Quettah, where they hoped to monopolize the spoil. The earliest assault 
 occurred on the 22d of June, when the insurgents were repelled with consi» 
 derable loss. They had taken up their quarters in a deep and narrow gorge 
 nine or ten miles from the British camp, into which several of them had 
 introduced themselves, pretending to be friends. These were detained, and 
 in the course of the night the whole Kakur force, amounting to about 1000 
 men, advanced towards the town. They came on quickly, expecting to take 
 the garrison by surprise, but were received with a discharge of grape, followed 
 by a brisk fire of musquetry, which dispersed them at once. They fled to- 
 wards the hills, pursued by the irregular horse, who cut up a few of them. 
 The enemy had 20 killed, with 100 wounded and 3 prisoners : we had two se- 
 poys killed, with 1 gunner wounded. It was considered expedient, however, to 
 abandon the lines and place the troops within the walls until succour should 
 
 13. Vide ante; p. 180. 
 
214 
 
 reach from Caudaliar.(14) Shoitly after this, a reinforcement arrived from 
 the eastward, consisting of the left wing of the Shah's regiment, which had 
 been detached on duty, and a detachment from Killa Abdoola, under Lieut. 
 Bosanquet. Thus reinforced, a party was sent out to reconnoitre the enemy 
 at Moostung ; and the result was that they were considered too formidable 
 in point of strength to be attaclied by the garrison. In this state matters 
 continued for some time : the garrison at Quettah actually cooped up within 
 the walls of that town for several weeks together. The assistance of Salu 
 Khan, a Pesheen chief, is said to have been purchased for £2,000 : be forc- 
 ed his way through the insurgent host, and brought the effective aid of 600 
 horsemen to the relief of the garrison. The tribes still pressed the invest- 
 ment, and had actually prepared ladders for escalade, when disputes arose 
 amongst them as to the points which each individual tribe should assail. (15) 
 Captain Bean afterwards discovered the ladders in camp. Lieut. Cooper 
 was dispatched from Candahar with a troop of horse artillery to assist Cap- 
 tain Bean. The insurgents now perceived that all hope of a successful 
 attack on Quettah had vanished, and about the third week of July they 
 accordingly broke up and decamped. Lieut. Jackson, with 200 Affghan 
 horse sent to keep open the passes, had just before cut his way through their 
 camp ; he had arrived in 8 days from Candahar, 13 being in general allowed 
 for the march. (16) When the tidings reached Kelat that the tribes had 
 retired from Quettah, it was at first conjectured that having been foiled, 
 they would for the present return to their homes, and defer the execution of 
 any purposes against the ^capital which they might have formed. This 
 conjecture proved erroneous. About the 22d July the insurgent host 
 directed their steps to the southward. About the 2Dth, they appear to have 
 presented themselves before the walls of Kelat. The unwillingness to 
 assist Newaz Khan, was on the part of two important Chiefs aggravated 
 when their cordial aid was most to be desired. It now for the first time 
 transpired that the customs of Sonmeanee had been made over to the 
 English, and that the estates in Cutchee, had, without any reason assigned,' 
 been confiscated. These things have elsewhere been stated in detail. Lieut. 
 Loveday in this extremity undertook to interpose his authority, so as to 
 
 14. On reference to previous chapters, it will be found that this untoward 
 event was nearly simultaneous with the general risings betwixt Ghuziiie and 
 Candahar, and with the earlier hostilities of the Murrees against Captain 
 Brown : so that at Midsummer 1840, when at home Affghanistan was represented 
 as m a state of universal tranquillity, we had three little wars raging in differ- 
 ent portions of the Doorannee empire, on the results of two of which we had 
 no grounds of felicitation. 
 
 15. Masson, p. 126— Delhi Gazette, Bombay Times, Sept. 5. 
 
 16. We have found much dfficulty in making out the precise dates when 
 those events occurred. Masson never gives one. The circumstance just men- 
 tioned is taken from the Delhi Gazette of the 26th Aug. 
 
215 
 
 have matters settled according to the wishes of the malcontents, who wefe 
 in this way for the time pacified. 
 
 All diligence was used to place the garrison in a state of defence ; arms 
 and aramanition were plentiful, but provisions unfortunately scarce. The 
 assailants mustered from ten to twelve hundred strong, but had probably 
 not more than five hundred matchlockmeu at arms, while the garrison 
 mustered about a similar number. This is Mr Masson's estimate, other 
 writers uniformly guess them higher — at from six to eight thousand. The 
 artillery on the walls unhappily proved nearly unserviceable. For three 
 days irregular and desultory firing was kept up, when, on the fourth night, 
 an escalade, which had proved all but successful, fifty of the insurgents 
 having entered the town, was prevented by the bravery of the resistance of 
 Lieut. Loveday's sepoy escort. Fear and treachery had now made their 
 appearance amongst the garrison. Some days were spent in fruitless, and, as it 
 appears, pusillanimous and discreditable negociation by the British resident, 
 who by no persuasion could be induced to support Newaz Khan in his 
 more courageous determination to resist to the last. At length, money 
 and provisions having, bit by bit, been g'ven over to the enemy, the town 
 was taken possession of by permission of the rabble. Shah Newaz, indeed, 
 had acted with zeal, determination, and perfect fidelity to us throughout. (17) 
 The communication with Captain Bean had given them no reason to hope 
 that assistance could be spared them, otherwise the defence might have 
 been protracted till this arrived. Yet the town had hardly been surrendered 
 when information was received that Lieutenant Hammersley, with fifty of 
 Christie's Horse, and about four hundred horsemen under Salu Khan, had 
 sallied out from Quettah, in the direction of Moostung. (18) They came 
 up with a party of about four hundred of the insurgents, when nearly the 
 whole of his cavalry refused to charge. The Affghan chief, and British 
 officer, with a handful of the men, dashed in amongst the enemy, and killed 
 great numbers : the whole would have been cut up had the troops proved 
 stanch. Letters had been written by Lieutenant Loveday to Captain Bean, 
 at the entreaty of the chiefs, offering to make submission, and to continue 
 at peace -with the British Government, provided the removal of Shah 
 
 17. For the whole of this we are indebted to Mr Ma«son's work. His ac- 
 count of the matter is unusually obscure. Lieutenant Loveday's servant 
 stated that his master became a prisoner on the 20th August, and that the 
 Brahoes immediately marched to Moostung, which they reached in three days : 
 this man estimates the enemy at eight thousand strong — Bombay Gaz., Nov. 30. 
 
 18. Delhi Gazette, September 2d. There cannot have been two similar 
 sallies by Lieutenant Hammersley. The Delhi Gazette's intormation seems 
 derived from a Quettah correspondent, and appears to be correct. Yet Masson 
 speaks of Hammersley having 1500 or 1600 infantry and cavalry, with horse 
 artillery guns. This would have nearly exhausted the whole Quettah garrison, 
 which, at this time, contained only two weak regiments, with Cooper's guns 
 and some irregulars. 
 
216 
 
 Kewaz, and the restoration of the son of Mehrab, was conceded to them. 
 To this Captain Bean replied by expressing his willingness to receive an 
 Envoy from the insurgents, and his intention to recommend that the son of 
 Mehrab should be acknowledged, but insisting that a letter of submissive 
 allegiance should be written to Shah Soojah. This was the rock on 
 which we invariably split. The Affghan tribes would have submitted to 
 our direct and immediate rule with comparative willingness : their re- 
 pugnance to the Government, and their aversion to the person, of Shah 
 Soojah, nothing could overcome. The chiefs, on receiving this, ex- 
 pressed their willingness to make submission to the Lord Sahib, as they 
 denominated the Envoy : he was, they said, the real Sovereign of the Em- 
 pire, and to him they would pay homage in any form that miglit be desired 
 of them, however humble : but the Shah's conduct to their late ruler had 
 been so base and ungrateful that to him they would make no submission. (19) 
 Though Kelat had for some time been in the hands of the insurgents. 
 Lieutenant Loveday and Mr Masson were left at liberty, though closely 
 watched, and their departure prevented. The Resident at this juncture un- 
 fortunately wrote to Captain Bean, recommending him to send four hun- 
 dred horse to their relief, and instracting them in what manner their 
 services would be most effective. The messenger proved treacherous, 
 and the imprudent note was at once conveyed to the chiefs, who 
 next night required Lovecay to repair to the citadel to pay his res- 
 pects to the young ruler. No escort was sent to conduct him, and 
 it was impossible for him to have made his way through the infuriated mul- 
 titude without danger, so the request was not complied with. Next night a 
 sharp fire was opened on the residency, which was returned with interest 
 by the sepoy guard, three of whose number unhappily fell. The mus- 
 quetry speedily silenced the matchlocks of the enemy, aud probably did 
 considerable execution. The sepoys at length began to desert, and the 
 Brahoes making their way into the building, longer resistance became fu- 
 tile. Lieutenant Loveday and Mr Masson being conducted to the durbar, 
 were severely reproached by the Darogah, Ghool Mahommed ; by the 
 others they were received more civilly j but were speedily afier placed in close 
 confinement in a very loathsome apartment. The residency was completely 
 plundered, and the whole property it contained appropriated by the multi- 
 tude. From this till about the 20th cf August, (20) various unsatisfactory 
 interviews appear to have taken place betwixt the prisoners and insurgent 
 
 19. Masson, p 192. 
 
 20. Masson as usual leaves us entirely in the dark as to dates. From other 
 sources it appears that Kelat was taken possession of on the 29th July, and that 
 the insurgents reached Moostung, a distance of 90 miles, about the 22d August. 
 Lieut. Loveday's servant declared the 20th August was the day on which his 
 master became prisoner : he had been requested to recollect it. 
 
217 
 
 leaders, chiefly with a view of arranging negociations for peace with the po- 
 litical agent for Shawl. It was at length resolved that they should move 
 in a body to Moostung, 25 miles frona Qiiettah, with a view of endeavouring 
 to promote peaceful negotiations, by being in the neighbourhood of Captain 
 Bean. From this they were earnestly, but in vain, warned by Mr Masson j 
 fresh troops were known to be on their way from Candafaar ; the insurgent 
 followers were disorderly and intractable, and the villages sure to suffer at 
 their hands ; and the approach to the British camp seemed now the most 
 likely thing that could be devised to provoke collision. Towards the con- 
 clusion of the march, letters were received from Oapt. Bean, and the Brahoes 
 fearing that Lieut. Loveday might attempt, to make his escape, had him loaded 
 with fetters and chained to a tent pole. Arriving at Moostung, Mr Masson 
 and he were placed in close confinement, with a numerous guard set to watch 
 over them. Negociation was again renewed, and it is said that Captain 
 Bean promised to procure the restoration of the young chief to his father's 
 throne ; he was to hold under the Shah Soojah ; and though Sharawan and 
 Cutchee were not immediately to be restored, composition was spoken of. (21) 
 These were as conciliatory and reasonable terras as could have been desired 
 — more so than might have been expected. A private letter to Nusseer 
 Khan himself, accompanying this, is said to have occasioned great indigna- 
 tion amongst the insurgent leaders. By this it was insisted that the Khan 
 should immediately surrender Kelat — that he should proceed to Candahar to 
 make his obeisance to the Shah — and that after that he should do whatever 
 was required of him. On such conditions were his claims to acknowledgment 
 to meet with consideration. On these points Mr Masson is our sole authority ; 
 and incredible as his statements may appear, the most extraordinary nature of 
 the proceedings was in no shape out of keeping with most of our political 
 transactions beyond the Indus in the years 1840 and 1841. It was at length 
 determined that a messenger should be sent with powers to see what could be 
 effected in the way of personal treaty, and Mr Masson was selected as the 
 party best suited for this purpose. The negociations appear to have occu- 
 pied about three weeks in all ; and about the 21st of September the travel- 
 ler was dispatched, at the request of Lieutenant Loveday, as ambassador 
 to Quettah, to arrange the terms of peace, when he was immediately placed 
 under arrest by Captain Bean, on suspicion of being a Russian spy !(22) 
 
 It must here be remarked in passing, that the Russophobia which two 
 years before appeared to have blinded the understandings of the Teheran 
 and Cabool missions, had not wholly, though it had in a considerable mea- 
 
 21. Massou, p. 244. 
 
 22. In a letter from Mr Masson in the Bombay Times of 14th Nov- 1840, we 
 find copies of letters betwixt iiim and Captain Bean of the 25th and 26th Sep- 
 tember. These seem to have been written a few days after his arrival, whicft 
 probably was about the 21st, as mentioned in the text, 
 
 E 1 
 
218 
 
 sure, passed away. Even the better-informed and more able of the politicals, 
 who in 1837 and 1838 actually raved about Russia, and saw an emissary or 
 a spy in every ragamuffian who did not choose to give an account of him- 
 self, or who desired to play upon their fears, still wrote of the advance on 
 Khiva, and of the dangers of intrigue at Herat, as things for which the Bri- 
 tish empire had cause to tremble. The printed papers on these subjects 
 betray much futile fear and anxiety, totally unwarranted by any thing set 
 forth by those aflfected by it. 
 
 The disease which had nearly exhausted itself in the quarter where it 
 first broke out, now made its appearance and spread amongst the weaker 
 minded of the politicals scattered everywhere over the country. That which 
 in 1837 and 1838 affected the solid and clear understandings of such men as 
 Sir John McNeil and Sir Alexander Burnes, in 1840 totally upset the 
 addled brains of such weak-minded persons as Lieutenant Loveday and Cap- 
 tain Bean, who seemed to imagine that there was something in discovering, 
 or evenin suspecting, Russian intrigue, which allied them, if only in their 
 frailties, with the more eminent individuals with whom they were now as- 
 sociated. 
 
 The possession of the most unlimited amount of absolute and irresponsible 
 power in an enemj's country seems besides to have turned the heads of 
 many of the younger politicals, whose freaks and caprices in the tyran- 
 nous exercise of the authority so unwisely committed to them might readily 
 seem incredible, were our information on the subject one whit less copious or 
 authentic than it really is. These matters will develope themselves by and bye ; 
 what has been said may be enough to assist us at all events, in accounting 
 for the conduct of Captain Bean — a singularly weak-minded, confused, will- 
 ful, and capricious man, who appeared to the end incapable of comprehend- 
 ing the absurdity he had committed. 
 
 The grounds on which Mr Masson was put under restraint were some 
 mysterious and discreditable letters written by Lieutenant Loveday — but 
 afterwards explained away by the writer, — who stated that the conduct of 
 the imagined spy during the siege had been " noble," and that no suspicion 
 any longer attached to him ; — and a letter from Major Outram, intimating that 
 200 Brahoes had assembled in Kej in favour of Nusseer Khan, with whom Capt. 
 Bean had most unaccountably suspected Mr Masson of being connected. 
 Major Outram, the moment he discovered the use that had been made of his 
 letter, hastened to disclaim all suspicion — declaring that nothing was farther 
 from his thoughts than to dream of Russian emissaries. Notwithstanding this 
 the captive was detained for a period of four m onths in durance, until refloated 
 references had been made, first to the Envoy, and finally to the Governor- 
 General. 
 
 No more unpardonable sin could in those days be committed than for a 
 stranger— who might, perhaps, make disclosures of mismanagement— to in- 
 
219 
 
 trude himself into the region of the misrule of the young politicals. Sir W. 
 Maenaghten had too recently been a close correspondent with Mr Masson 
 (July 1838), and knew his character too well to sympathise with the suspi- 
 cions of Captain Bean, — while, at Calcutta, the whole affair must have 
 seemed absolutely ludicrous. His answer to Mr Masson (10th Oct. 1840) 
 is as absurd an one as could well be supposod. He stated that he did autho- 
 rize Captain Bean to detain him until the pleasure of the Governor- General 
 should be ascertained as to his being permitted to prosecute his travels in 
 countries subject to the crown of Cabool, seeing that he was without per- 
 mission to do so, either from the Shah Soojah or the British government ! 
 The Envoy had all along insisted, when any particular act of wrong was 
 perpetrated by the Shah on his subjects, that he was an independent prince 
 'with whom we had no right to interfere : — yet here it is assumed that no 
 traveller could enter the states subsidiary to the Doorannee empire without 
 permission of the British government 1 Ahmed Shah himself would never 
 have dreamt that he had power to exclude travellers from Cabool in the most 
 palmy days of his authority — much more from distant subsidiary state3,which 
 scarcely acknowledged allegiance to him. The arrogance, as well as the ab- 
 surdity, of the Envoy's claim, was characteristic of the politicals of the time. 
 The inSrmity of Lord Auckland— which was the bane of his foreign policy 
 throughout — was his want of decision of character and determination imme- 
 raediately to put down what was wrong in the conduct of a public servant. In- 
 stead of pursuing the dignified course of censuring the Shawl political, and 
 ordering the immediate liberation of the wrongfully suspected spy, the matter 
 was referred to Mr Ross Bell, — who, whatever might be his other frailties, 
 was neither chargeable with fear ofresponsibility, want of talent, nor deficiency 
 in decision : Mr Bell, on examining into the facts, saw at once the enormity 
 of the blunder that had been committed, and the ridicule to which it exposed 
 its authors and abettors. Mr Masson was so perfectly well known to the 
 leading politicals and literary men who had been in any way concerned 
 in the affairs of Affghanistan, his habits and pursuits so familiar to the 
 literary world, and his journey from Kurrachee to Kelat in April and May 
 so absolutely void of mystery or suspicion, that it required an amount of per- 
 verseness of perception to extort from it a charge, such as was scarcely cre- 
 dible even in the political agent of Shawl. The traveller was ordered to be 
 liberated without dela}', and to be permitted to proceed on his way wherever 
 he thought fit : a guard being furnished him should he desire to proceed to 
 Kelat or Scinde. He chose the latter route, and pursued his journey to 
 Bombay, where he resided for many months, and thence departed for Eng- 
 land. On the 15th September, the following reinforcements reached Quettah 
 from Candahar— the Shah's -Id infantry, the 43d Bengal N. I., 100 Sowars 
 of the 1 st cavalry, and two of the Shah's guns ; a few days afterwards General 
 
220 
 
 Nott joined with the light company of the Bengal 4'2d N. I., and 80 of the 
 4th local horse, raising the force to nearly 3000 men of all arms. The Be- 
 loochees having waited for a considerable time in expectation of the arrival 
 of their messenger, at length to their astonishment discovered the mishap 
 that had so unexpectedly befallen him. A letter received from Capt. Beaa 
 so incensed the chiefs that they resolved at first to kill Lieut. Loveday on 
 the spot ; but speedily changed their purpose, determining instead to ba 
 revenged on us by plundering Cutchee, and attacking our troops whenever 
 they could be taken at a disadvantage : they moved their camp from 
 Moostung, and proceeded through the Bolan Pass, determined to inflict as 
 much injary upon us as they were able. 
 
 These mishaps at Kelat and at Kahun occurring almost simultaneously, 
 convinced the authorities of the necessity of immediately dispatching large 
 reinforcements to Scinde. The 6th N. I. was ordered to start from Deesa 
 and march by Nugger Parkur, through the sands to Omercote. Captain 
 Del Hoste was directed to take charge of this regiment in its journey across 
 the desert. He was left without any directions, save that he should take 
 his own way and conduct the march with as much speed and as little risk 
 as possible : government felt the fullest confidence in his competence for 
 the task. The country was then almost entirely unknown ; for nearly 100 
 miles neither villages nor inhabitants were to be found. The heat was 
 most intense, the road difficult, and water there was none. With all these 
 obstacles to contend with, they reached Sukkur in safety under the able 
 pilotage of the gallant and distinguished officer who had undertaken to guide 
 them. The 8th, 21st, and 25th were dispatched from Bombay. Betwixt 
 the 27th January and 19th December 1840, in fact, a force of nearly 6,000 
 men left the Western Presidency for Kurrachee, in addition to those moved 
 from the upper provinces ; so that a larger regular army was found essen- 
 tial to keep the peace betwixt Quettah and Kurrachee, within a twelve- 
 month of Lord Keane's return through the Punjaub, than had been thought 
 necessary for the capture of Gandahar, Ghuznie, and Cabool.(23) At this, 
 
 23. The following abstract of the number of troops dispatched from Bombay 
 within the period referred to, is from the returns of the Commissary General's 
 Office:— 
 
 Date of Names of Vessels. Officers. Troops; 
 Departure. 
 
 1840 Eur. Nat. E. & N. 
 
 27th Jany. Ship Hannah 10 176 
 
 1st March Ditto • 4 1 273 
 
 24th ditto Ship Resolution 1 72 
 
 18th Augt. Steamer Berenice j 4 3 227 
 
 Ditto Cleopatra I 3 3 226 
 
 Ditto Barque Benares 2 2 38 
 
 22nd Augt. Brig Palinurus 2 68 
 
 29th ditto Steamer Berenice , 6 4 272 
 
 2ad Sept. „ Cleopatra 8 6 338 
 
 10th ditto Barque Benares 3 3 164 
 
 nth ditto Ship Charles Forbes 13 7 492 
 
 2lst ditto Steamer Hugh Lindsay 4 158 
 
221 
 
 time, 10,000 camels, at the cost of upwards of £80,000, were ordered to 
 be purchased for the use of the army in Scinde. 
 
 The insurgents had threatened Lheree, then very weakly garrisoned. 
 In the 2d week of October they had assembled in some force at Khunda. 
 
 On the 14th October a detachment, consisting of Captain Curtis's Irre- 
 gular Horse, with a wing of H. M.'s 40th, reached Kundah. Information 
 having been received immediately on their arrival, that the Brahoes were 
 approaching with the view of plundering the town, accompanied by a large 
 number of camels to carry away the spoil, the horse were instantly sent up- 
 on their track. But though on foot and carefully guarding their camels, 
 the insurgents for some time succeeded in keeping the sowars at bay, 
 amongst some close thick jowarree jungle, from which they fired their 
 matchlocks on scouts and reconnoiterers. The Irregular Horse were led 
 on by Captain Curtis and Lieut, Postans, assistant Political Agent 
 in Scinde, but the enemy retired too rapidly to permit the infantry 
 to overtake them in the tangled ground they had now reached. Our 
 horsemen behaved most gallantly, and the enemy defended themselves with 
 desperation as they retired. One hundred and forty are said to have been 
 killed, and 84 camels were captured from them. Our casualties amounted 
 to two killed and three wounded. (24) Around Bagh, where a detachment 
 of the 5th N.I. was stationed, the same system of universal plunder appeared 
 to have been practised. Early in October the Head-quarters of the 23d 
 N. I. were ordered to proceed as a reinforcement from Shikarpore. About 
 the 24th, Lieut. Vardon having been out with a party of Beloochee auxi- 
 liary horse, met a strong detachment of Brahoes about 20 miles from Bagh : 
 he immediately attacked, and, after a sharp encounter, defeated them, cap- 
 turing 1 100 head of cattle, and leaving 25 of their people dead upon the field. 
 Reinforcements in light detachments were now pressing upwards with all 
 dispatch from Sukkur to the disturbed regions along the base of the moun- 
 tains. Major Boscawen with a wing of H.M.'s 40th, the whole of the Ben- 
 
 27th Sept. Steamer Sesostris 3) ,„ ao-r 
 
 Ditto „ Cleopatra... 5) "^' 
 
 6th Oct. „ Zenobia 1 40 
 
 10th ditto „ Cleopatra 14 355 
 
 15th ditto „ Hugh Lindsay 12 1 90 
 
 23rd ditto „ Zenobia 7 47 
 
 25th Oct. „ Cleopatra 16 321 
 
 l8t Nov. ti Hugh Lindsay 4 250 
 
 4th Nov. ., Zenobia H 5 R50 
 
 24thditto „ Zenobia 4 125 
 
 19th Dee. „ Sesostris 10 2 307 
 
 Total 140 56 5568 
 
 24. Bombay Gazetie,^ov. 9 ; Bombay/ Times, Dec .2. The latter paper states 
 that this occurred at Kotrah, and the detachment was that of Major Boscawen, 
 i. e. wing of H.M.'s 40th, Bengal 38th, and Poonah Horse ; and that the action 
 occurred on the 18th. The two are agreed as to the general results, casualties, 
 &c. 
 
222 
 
 gal 33th, and some guns and irregular horse, left Shikarpore on the 15th 
 October, and directed his march towards Kotra ; while the Bombay 25th 
 N. I. were sent to watch the opening of the Moolah Pass to prevent the Bra- 
 hoes from plundering the country. The latter regiment was on its way 
 from Kurrachee, and wasjoined^by the right wing at Larkhanah, and thence 
 proceeded across the desert in the direction of Gundava, On its march 
 the 25th experienced proofs, which they were scarcely prepared for, of the 
 audacity and expertness in the art of thieving of the people into whose 
 country they were advancing. One night about 1 1 o'clock, a party of marau- 
 ders came quickly down on the advancing force, under cover of some jungle, 
 and mixing themselves up amongst the baggage-camels in the rear, succeed- 
 ed in carrying oif six of them with their loads before anything wrong was 
 suspected. A cry from the camel men made the officer aware of the acci- 
 dent, when the Grenadier company, under Lieuts. Jackson and Phayre, were 
 ordered back to search the jungle. Their efforts were in vain : they reco- 
 vered nothing, and only exposed themseiv s to further risk in the darkness and 
 confusion. (25) About 10 o'clock in the morning, shortly after this, a party of 
 30 horsemen galloped at speed upon a number of camels feeding about a mile 
 from camp, and, before any alarm could be given, or assistance afforded, they 
 hamstrung six and carried off two of them, and then made good their retreat. 
 They were pursued three or four miles but in vain ; a sepoy managed to 
 shoot one of the horses, but the rider escaped. The detachment joined Major 
 Boscawen on the 3 1st October. The enemy continued to ravage the country 
 and sack and burn the villages on the whole line of the advance. Conceal- 
 ing themselves from our troops during the day, they prowled abroad so soon 
 as darkness set in, and spread devastation everywhere. 
 
 The detachment already detailed had reached Gundava under the above officer 
 a week before (23d October,) but unfortunately too late to save it from total 
 sack, and the demolition of all the property contained in it. " The most de- 
 termined desire of destruction," says an officer of the force, writing from the 
 spot(26) " seems to have influenced the rebels in their attack ; they levelled , 
 and burnt that which they could not carry away ; the value of the property 
 destroyed is about 3J lakhs (£35,000 Sterling). The houses of the Hin- 
 doos had been fired, and the rich and thriving Gundava presented a general 
 scene of misery and desolation." The advance of our troops ^&s a signal 
 for the enemy to retire ; they fell back on Kotra, which they threatened 
 with a similar fate to that which they had inflicted on Gundava j but, 
 fortunately, it was saved. This was the natural but fierce vengeance the 
 Brahoes took on the estates of which they had just before been so iniqui- 
 
 25. Letter from an officer of the 25th NI- ; Bombay Times, Nov. 21, 
 
 26. Letter from upper Sciude ; Bo,nhay Times, Nov. 11. 
 
223 
 
 tously deprived by us. We had stripped them of their heritage without 
 cause, and they resolved our plunder should not profit us. 
 
 On the '28th October, the Brahoes, amounting to betwixt 4S0O and 5000 
 men, emerged from the Bolan Pass under Nusseer Khan, and took up a 
 position two miles to the south of the mouth of the defile, near the en- 
 trenched camp at Dadur. The force in camp numbered about 575 200 
 
 of the 5th, and 225 of the 23d N.T., commanded by Captain Watkins of the 
 latter corps, and 120 of the Bengal Local Horse. On the 29th, they ad- 
 vanced to the attack at first steadily and slowly, increasing their speed as 
 they drew near, and raising a shout as they prepared to charge. A fire of 
 round shot and shrapnell was opened upon them from the gUHs on the 
 entrenchments so soon as they got within range. Undaunted/ by the de- 
 struction this caused amongst their ranks, they divided their force into two 
 parties — one advancing along the front, the other moving to the right 
 and rear of the breast-work. The first of the attacking parties proceeded to 
 a position where the whole detachment of Local Horse was stationed : they 
 were gallantly charged and repulsed by the Sowars, leaving about 40 dead 
 upon the field. Lieut. M'Pherson, 43d Regt. B.N.L, who headed the charge, 
 was wounded, as also were 20 of his men — one only was killed. While this 
 was passing, Captain Heath of the 5th plied the enemy so hotly with 
 grape that they retired beyond range, ensconcing themselves in a mud village 
 about half a mile off. About sunset, however, they again formed and ad- 
 vanced, taking up a position on the left of the Sowar lines, from which they 
 could not be dislodged. From this they kept up a desultory fire of match- 
 locks, which was replied to during the earlier portion of the night from 
 the breast-works and fortified summit of the commissariat store room. 
 About 2 p. M , they once more advanced in line to attack the breast-work, 
 but were repulsed with heavy loss — one of their chiefs having fallen. 
 Nothing daunted by these successive checks, and once more reinforced 
 to a strength ot full 5^00, they, on the 31st October, advanced on the 
 breast-work, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They pressed on in two 
 divisions, the one headed by the young Khan with his standard dis- 
 played : and took up a position about 200 yards from the breast-work. 
 Having been compelled by the fire of grape and shrapnell to retire from 
 this, about 1000 of them made for the town of Dadur, where they were at 
 once admitted by the Belooehee inhabitants. The population of the town, 
 which is surrounded by a thick mud wall, and surmounted by a strong 
 citadel, amounts to about 2000. The Hindoo, that is the wealthier, portion 
 of them, were plundered and maltreated, and the part of the town which 
 they occupied sacked before our eyes. The fortified camp had been con- 
 structed two miles from the fort to prevent collision with the inhabitants, and 
 avoid the filth and annoyance from which, in the neighbourhood of Indian 
 
224 
 
 towns, our troops suffer. The remainder of the enemy having, about 6 p. m., 
 taken up a position in the compound where the Bengal Horse were posted, 
 were driven from this by our artillery, and as night drew on retired tov^ards 
 Dadur. Lieutenants M'Pherson and Cartwright were wounded, 3 men were 
 killed, and 30 wounded. (27) The fighting seems to have been very severe, 
 and 150 of the enemy are said to have fallen. Scarcely had the above 
 gallant series, of encounters closed, when a wing of H. M.'s 40th and the 
 Bengal 38th N. I. arrived at Dadur. It has been mentioned that Nusseer Khan, 
 with the force of the strength formerly noticed, was encamped neaij, the 
 mouth of the Bolan Pass, four miles off, determined, apparently, to make 
 another attack on the town or field works. Every preparation was made for 
 their reception— but as they did not seem disposed to attack us with so much 
 alacrity as was desired, on the 3d November Major Boscawen, with the 
 whole of the reinforcement just named, two guns, and the regular cavalry, 
 proceeded in quest of them. The Brahoes hearing of his approach, re- 
 tired rapidly up the Pass, leaving their camp standing. Owing to the 
 extreme difficulty of the road, pursuit was impossible, so that they escaped 
 for the present. Their camp, containing the jewels of the young chief, 
 with property of the value of £1000, was taken possession of. Lieutenant 
 Loveday was found murdered, as was supposed by some of the chiefs : the 
 crime appeared to have been perpetrated by a horse-keeper, who, when he 
 found that the poor prisoner who had for two months been dragged along 
 with them must be left behind and fall into the hands of friends, re- 
 turned and nearly severed his head from his body. He was found heavily 
 ironed, and nearly naked, chained to a kajawa or camel chair. His body 
 seemed much bruised ; and it is to be feared that, from the time the tribes 
 left Quettah, his sufferings must have been extreme. The loss of the enemy 
 in these various encounters is estimated at from 150 to 400 men — autho» 
 rities writing from the spot being in the last degree discrepant on this point 
 — 300 may perhaps be pretty near the mark : 70 are said to have fallen on 
 the 29th, 150 on the 31st Oct., and 80 on the 1st Nov. : the casualties on 
 the other days not being mentioned. 
 
 The Brahoes, immediately after this, appear, for a time, to have despaired ; 
 and Nusseer Khan, with his step- dame, and several of the chiefs, having 
 separated themselves from the rest, were left to wander in the Bolan Pass 
 almost without a follower. 
 
 Meanwhile General Nott started from Quettah with a strong detach- 
 ment to recover Kelat : he encountered no resistance, and, when he ar- 
 rived under the walls, found that the town had been vacated four 
 days before. He accordingly took possession on the 2d November, and left 
 Lieut.-Colonel Stacy, with the Bengal 43d, to maintain the now tenantless 
 
 27. Letter from an officer at Dadur ; Bombay Times, Dec. 5, 1840. 
 
225 
 
 garrison. Mr Bell was understood to have been dissatisfied with General 
 Nott's advance, wishing probably to let the affairs of Kelat settle down of 
 themselves, and desirous to observe the effect of a little quiescence and 
 non-interference. At this time a strong and general disposition began to be 
 expressed to make peace with the Brahoe chief. The various charges agahist 
 hia father began to be proved unfounded : and even had they been otherwise, 
 his life had paid the penalty of his errors. Neither Nusseer Khan, nor his 
 stepmother, the life and soul of the insurrection, were in any way implicated 
 in the more violent proceedings of the tribes. The facility with which Ne- 
 waz Khan, who had now passed through Scinde towards Hydrabad, had been 
 discarded, clearly proved that he had no hold on the affections of the people ; 
 while it was equally apparent that no advantage whatever was to be gained 
 by maintaining a detested ruler amongst a race at once needy, warlike, 
 and revengeful. The Vuzeer of Kelat, who had been detained since its 
 capture the preceding November, a prisoner at Bukkur, was set at liberty, 
 and it was understood to be the wish of Shah Soojah himself, as well as 
 the Envoy, and Governor- General, that submission should first be obtained, 
 when the Khanite would be restored to the rightful heir. These humane 
 and prudent wishes appear to have been marred by the mismanagement of 
 the political agents ; and the Brahoes had now no longer any faith in our 
 professions of friendship and forbearance. 
 
 On the death of Brigadier Stevenson on the 9th of August, Genl. Brooks 
 had been nominated to the command in Scinde ; and Colonel Valiant, K.H-, of 
 Her Majesty's 40th, tendered his services to Government, which were 
 accepted of, and he appointed to the command of a brigade. These 
 officers, together with Major Holland, deputy quarter-master-general, 
 left Bombay on the 15th of October, as soon as the state of the weather 
 would permit, and, having reached Kurrachee by sea, arrived at Suk- 
 kur on the 1st November. The force in the field between Kurrachee 
 and Quettah at this time amounted to nearly 10,000 men, and immediate 
 preparations were made for moving a very strong detachment towards 
 Quettah. It was said that the intelligence from Herat was such that the 
 Scinde politicals were determined to march a force towards the Persian fron- 
 tier. This, as it appears from the papers published by Parliament in 1843, 
 was without the cognizance of the Bengal government, whose severe dis- 
 pleasure was expressed as soon as they became aware of what was intended 
 to be attempted. The posts along the foot of the mountains had all been 
 strengthened, the villages were mostly destroyed, and the efforts of the 
 enemy to annoy us seemed to have slackened, partly from having suffered so 
 severely at our hands, and in part because they had already accomplished 
 nearly all the mischief they could inflict upon us. 
 
 F 1 
 
226 
 
 Lieutenant- Colonel Marshall having taken command orf the Brigad* 
 now assembled near Kotra, consisting of the 25th N. I., with detachments 
 of the 2nd Grenadiers and 21st N. I., with details of the 5th and 6tb 
 companies of light artillery and irregular horse, on the 26th Nov. pro- 
 ceeded without delay to take active measures against the insurgents. Hav- 
 ing learnt that Nusseer Khan was in strong force within six miles of his 
 camp, he went out with a reconnoiteriog party to satisfy himself on the 
 subject. He started at 3 in the morning with 250 men under Capt. 
 Teasdale, a company of the 2nd Grenadiers 100 strong, under Capt. Boyd, 
 1 gun, and 20 irregular horse. (2&) One of their objects was to occupy 
 the pass, and prevent the insurgents from escaping in that direction. Having 
 by 6 o'clock threaded the gerge and ascended the hill, with 1 gun and 250 
 irregulars, he at 9 discovered the enemy in great strength, occupying 
 a difficult position commanding the entrance into the body of the hills. 
 Our troops took up a station 300 yards from them, when Nusseer Khan 
 sent a message expressive of his anxiety for peace. *' I gave him,*' says 
 Colonel Marshall, from whose despatch our extract is taken, " one hour to 
 decide finally [the gallant officer does not state what he was to decide 
 upon ; he had before expressed his anxiety for peace without condition] 
 before I opened fire ; at the same time I immediately sent and ordered 
 Capt. Teasdale to join us with his horse as quickly as possible, as I saw I 
 was too weak to dislodge them should the Khan decide on fighting. The 
 rascals opened fire on us from the hills for more than three-quarters of an 
 hour, but did no harm. I would not allow a shot to be fired in return until 
 the hour had expired, as I thought it might defeat the object Mr. Bell had 
 in view of the Khan coming into camp to make terms of peace." At the 
 expiration of the hour the Khan sent by his Vizier a letter with his seal 
 affixed, stating that within a few days he would disband his followers, and 
 proceed to Mr. Bell to make submission, with an assurance that he would 
 not again be cut off from Col. Marshall's camp. On receipt of this Col. 
 Marshall withdrew his troops and returned to camp. Mahomed Husseiif, a 
 native in our employ as a spy, having next day (Nov. 27) stated that the 
 Khan was destitute of provisions and of the means of making his way to 
 Shikarpore, Col. Marshall advanced him rupees 2000 C^200) to overcome 
 the difficulty. This man had been the minister of Mehrab Khan, and was 
 taken prisoner by us and detained at Bukkur ; he was now deputed as 
 ambassador from Mr Bell, in negotiating a treaty not meant to be ful- 
 filled ! The letters detailing these things are dated the 27th and 28th, 
 and could not have reached General Brooks before the Slst November, 
 While arrangements for peace were thus being proceeded with between the 
 
 28. Colonel Marshall's letter to General Brooks, November 27th and 28tb, 
 and P. S. 
 
227 
 
 British commander and insurgent force, a peremptory order was forwarded 
 by General Brooks from Sukkur to attack the enemy without delay. The 
 letter is dated the 27tb, and must have been written without cognizance of 
 the requests of the Khan, Colonel Marshall being then 150 miles from Suk- 
 kur.C29) 
 
 29. The letter is from Major Holland, Deputy Quarter-Master General, and 
 is of sufficient importance to be subjoined entire : — 
 Deputy Quarter- Master GeneraVs Office-t Camp Sukkur^ 27th Novemberj 1840. 
 
 Sir, — I am directed by Major-General Brooks, commanding the Field Army, 
 to acquaint you that, by information received from Sehun Lai, the native agent 
 at Kotria, it appears that a body of insurgent Brahoes, amounting to about 1200 
 men, located at the entrance of liiis Pass not more than 8 miles from yourpostt 
 hive been lulled into fancied security by our apparent inactivity. 
 
 2. .This state of affairs leads the Major-General, in communication with the 
 Political Agent, to consider that an attack judiciously planned, and with the 
 utmost secresy and caution, will enable you, without fail, to cut up and destroy 
 this body j and with this view 1 am to give you the following information. 
 
 3. The enclosed Persian letter from Mr. Ross Bell to Sehun La], contains that 
 gentleman's instructions to him to place himself under your orders, for the purpose 
 above mentioned, to furnish you with guides, to accompany you in person, and to 
 procure and furnish you the moit specific information as to the position occupied 
 by the Brahoes, — whether on the height, in the hollow, or in the defile, and their 
 state and numbers ; in order to enable you to concoet your plans for surprising 
 them. 
 
 4. You will send for Sehun Lai, and deliver the enclosed letter to him— no 
 otner person being present, directing him, after he has read and made known its 
 contents to you, to deliver it into your keeping : you will then arrange your 
 plans with him — placing the most imt»licit reliance on his good faith. 
 
 5. Yt-uare not to communicate the subject of this letter to any one> as the 
 whole success of the plan depends on the most profound secresy being observed j 
 and you will endeavour, in preparing your troops, to do so in such manner as to 
 give rise to no suspicions of your objects. 
 
 6. You will leave 200 men, under the command of a steady intelligent officer, 
 in your camp ; and you will take with you the remainder of your infantry, and all 
 your cavalry ; and so arrange your march as to fall on the enemy at day-break. 
 
 7. You will take no tents or baggage of any kind : the men to carry one meal 
 in their havresacks, and to fill their canteens ; their pouches are to be well supplied 
 with cartridges. 
 
 8. You are on no account to advance more than one day's march from your 
 camp : you will pay particular attention to the guides ; they are to be well treated, but 
 closely watched, and in case of treachery put to death on the spot ; and y-ou will 
 take care that, if there is the least cause for suspicion, they shall not escape you. 
 
 9. In conclusion, I am directed to repeat, that nothing but the most complete 
 secresy, as to your plans and intentions, can give you success, — and the Major- 
 General enjoins this above all things : even your officers should not know your 
 intentions till you are close to the Pass, Yon will, of course, grant quarter to 
 those who surrender. (Signed) James Holland, Major^ 
 
 Dep. Qr.'Mr. GenL of the Army. 
 
 P. S — Nusseer Khan's position is stated by Sehun Lai to be on the Kotria ^ide 
 
 of Peer Chutta. The latter place is 12^ miles from Kotria, and the road to it is 
 
 good. The next march within the hills Js Kuttur Kahun, distant 8 miles, and the 
 
 road to it leads through a defile, and is very difficult the whole way; I would 
 
228 
 
 "When the order to attack the insurgents reached Col. Marshall, he was 
 no longer at war with the Brahoes, who had sued for peace on certain 
 terms, which, so far as was known to the contrary, they intended faithfully to 
 fulfil. The days granted to Nusseer Khan to disperse his followers, and pro- 
 ceed to surrender himself to Mr. Bell, had not yet expired ; and there is no- 
 thing anywhere set down which authorises the belief that the chief designed 
 to break his word. A new attack by Col. Marshall after he had drawn off 
 his troops on the 26th, and advanced money for friendly purposes to the 
 Khan on the 27th, without additional provocation or grounds for the 
 suspicion of bad faith, was as distinct a breach of truce, and as flagrant a 
 violation of the spirit of the treaty just entered on, as was the attack of the 
 Affghans on the retiring army of General Elphinstone in January 1842. 
 These were points, however, on which the Scinde politicals of 1840 felt no 
 hesitation ; in reference to which after they were over they appear neither 
 to have experienced compunction or drawn down censure from their supe- 
 riors. It was said that information had been received that strong reinforce- 
 ments were expected by the insurgents, — three parties of Brahoes, one of 
 3000, one of 5000, and one of 2000 men ! Had such a force as this been 
 in existence, the defeat of 3000 at Kotra was unlikely to have ensured us 
 peace from so determined a foe. The rumour was probably got up by a 
 native spy with a view of bringing on an action. . These gentry throve well 
 on their country's disorders. 
 
 Agreeably to the instructions contained in the despatch of General 
 Brooks, which had been forwarded express by his aide-de-camp, Capt. 
 Smith, (30) Col. Marshall with the main body of the force, consisting of 
 900 men, of the 2nd Grenadiers, the 21st and 25th N. L, with 60 irregular 
 horse and two guns, started shortly after midnight, and proceeded straight 
 for the enemy's camp, a distance of about six miles. The Brahoes, apparently 
 confiding in the truce entered on two days before, were taken completely by 
 
 therefore advise, that should Nusseer Khan's position have been changed since 
 last accounts, and he be on the Kahan or Kuttur side of Peer Chuttah, although 
 only a mile, the movement of the detachment should be suspended. 
 
 (Signed) G. Brooks. 
 J. Holland. 
 
 Mahomed Hussein, stated in the text as a spy, was no other than the ex- 
 prime minister of Kelat, who Uad just before been released from prison by Mr 
 Bell, and sent as an ambassador to Nusseer Khan, to treat with him for sur- 
 render I The order directing Colonel Marshall to attack the Brahoes was ap- 
 proved of by Mr Bell, and written in his house ! 
 
 30. Lieutenant Smith of the Bengal 16th N. I — This zealous and active 
 officer left Sukkur at 2 o'clock on the 28th of December, and although his 
 progress was greatly impeded by falling in with a large body of the enemy's 
 cavalry, who followed and fired on him for several miles, he reached Colonel 
 Marshall's camp on the morning of the 30th; completing a journey of 150 
 miles in 38 hours. The accounts of the whole ot this affair are taken almost 
 unaltered from the despatches. 
 
229 
 
 surprise. Capt. Teasdale of the 25th, made a detour of 21 miles by Peer 
 Chutta, "with 500 men, and so took the enemy in the rear and cut off his 
 retreat. Capt. Ennis with 200 men pushed over a portion of extremely 
 difficult ground, and so outflanked them and drove them back upon our 
 guns ; by which means many were slain, and 180 were taken prisoners. 
 
 The resistance of the insurgents was most determined : they numbered betwixt 
 3000 and 4000 men : their position was strong, and they disputed every inch 
 of ground. Nothing could have exceeded the courage and conduct of the se- 
 poys that day; excited by the constant fighting and marauding which had 
 occurred all around for six weeks anterior to this, when the enemy in general 
 contrived to elude them before any serious damage had been done, they de- 
 termined to pay off old scores. The death of Lieutenant Loveday had excited 
 them to a pitch of fury, and as some charge more destructive than the rest was 
 made, or deadly volley thrown in, the cry was ** remember Loveday Sahib — ■ 
 let us revenge him ;*' and fearfully were they avenged that day. After three 
 hours hard fighting the Brahoes were totally defeated, and made their way 
 through the unoccupied ravines, or up the mountains the best way they could. 
 Nusseer Khan, attended, as was believed, by Gool Mahomed, was seen 
 crossing the heights on horseback, almost alone. Betwixt 400 and 500 of 
 the enemy were left dead upon the field. Four of the principal chiefs were 
 taken. The kettle-drums, standards, and camp furniture fell into our hands, 
 together with carpets, wearing apparel, and a great number of beautifully 
 illuminated copies of the Koran. (31) Our loss amounted to 4 killed and 
 30 wounded. Amongst the former was Lieutenant and Quarter- Master 
 Lodge, 25th Regt. N.L,who was shot through the thigh, and almost imme- 
 diately bled to death. 
 
 The prisoners were dispatched for Sukkur under charge of Captain 
 Smith, aide-de-camp to General Brook?, who was directed to shoot them in 
 case their rescue ghould be attempted. (32) 
 
 This victory was so complete — the battle so unexpected and so disas- 
 trous to the enemy, that for the present they dispersed and left us without 
 annoyance. They had, since they deputed Mr Massou to treat with Captain 
 
 B\. Asiatic Journal, A-prillSil, -p. 303. . o • i. . ^i, 
 
 .32. Colonel Marshall's words are— " I have directed Captain Smith, m the 
 event of any attempt being made to rescue the prisoners in his charge, or any 
 attempt being made by them to escape, to shoot them on the spot."— Letter to 
 General Brooks, 3d December. We believe there is nothuig unusual lu this. 
 When a report got abroad that Ukhbar Khan had directed our prisoners to be 
 kille.l, should any attempt be made to rescue them, the cry was raised that he 
 had done the most atrocious and tiend-like thing on earth. Captain Johnston, 
 who had been the party to disseminate this rumour, found that it was untrue, 
 and that Saleh Khan had misled him. He took every means m his power to 
 obtain for it a contradiction, but not one in ten of the journals which propa- 
 gated the error had the honesty to correct it ! 
 
230 
 
 Bean, lost upwards of 2000 men out of a force which at no time seems to 
 have exceeded 7000 at the uttermost, if ever it was higher than five. The 
 only fruits of the victory were, that any little confidence the Brahoes might 
 before have entertained of British faith was dissipated : they fled to the 
 mountains to bide their time, having no longer any wish or heart to treat 
 with us. Singularly enough, the ordinary official reports of this action were 
 not forwarded to the Governor-General, who, so late as the 29th March, 
 remarks on this unexplained fact, and then for the first time publishes in the 
 Gazette^ extracts of the field orders of Colonel Marshall and General Brooks, 
 from which this part of the narrative is chiefly abridged. 
 
 The excellent conduct of the sepoys at Kotra has just been mentioned : the 
 whole of the correspondence from Scinde at this period bears unvarying and 
 enthusiastic testimony to the admirable patience, co'irage, and spirit with which 
 tfaey conducted themselves throughout this harrassing campaign. Though 
 fighting in a country which was new, and with an enemy not only strange to 
 them, but surpassing in strength, courage, and determination, as well as 
 arms and appointments, any they had before encountered, no Europeans 
 could have done better service to the state. To this there had not as yet 
 occurred a single case of exception. 
 
 Meanwhile, though the Murrees and Bhoogties had been pacified, and the 
 Brahoes disabled, there were rumours of formidable disturbances above the 
 pass, both to the east and west, around Candahar, and on the Persian fron- 
 tier, which caused a general movement to be hastened of the principal body 
 cf the troops in Scinde. 
 
 The 1st Light Cavalry, and Irregular Horse, left Shikarpore for Dadur 
 on the 5th January ; the 4th troop Horse Artillery, and right wing 
 of the Bombay 20th N.I. started on the 12th from the same place for 
 Quettahj and the Ist troop H. A. and left wing of the 20th N.I. marched 
 for Bhag on the Uth. Previously, the 2d Grenadiers, with some Irregular 
 Horse, marched from Sukkur with a convoy of 3000 camels and 200 carts. 
 The stores were left at Bhag ; the Regt. proceeded to Dadur in order to re- 
 lieve the Bengal 38th N.I., which left for Quettah on New-year's- day. The 
 head quarter wing of H.M. 40th, which had shortly before arrived from Kur- 
 rachee, the 21st N.I., with a body of Irregular Horse, left for Bhag on the 
 15th. The cavalry, the 4lst, and Capt. Pontardent's artillery, followed a few 
 days afterwards. (33) General Brooks with a stro-ng force reached Shi- 
 karpore on the 5th, and Mr Bell joined him on the 7th. (34) 
 
 The confidence of the people in our protection had been so far restored that 
 they returned to their villages and commenced the cultivation of their fields. 
 Nusseer Khan still kept the hills, his step- dame found shelter amongst 
 
 S3. Bombay Times, Jan. 30- 34. Ibidf Feb. 27. 
 
231 
 
 the Dodah Murrees. The country throughout the month of January kept 
 tranquil : it was gorged with troops, occasioning an expenditure amongst 
 the people of many times the amount of the revenue of the whole region wo 
 occupied. Mr Bell meanwhile directed the chiefs taken at Kotra to be li- 
 berated unconditionally and sent to their own country loaded with pre- 
 sents. (35) The ejected Shah Newaz was now at Larkhana, Government 
 having allowed him a pension of £1200 a year.(36) This was afterwards re- 
 duced a half, and finally altogether withdrawn by Sir C. Napier in 1843. 
 Colonel Stacy continued to conduct matters with much prudence at Kelat, 
 where the people returned to their homes, and the bazaar once more be- 
 came occupied by nearly 1000 residents. (37) So much confidence had 
 this inspired that it was expected Nusseer Khan would give hinoself up. 
 But though he must by this time have been repeatedly apprised of our 
 friendly intentions towards him, he would not trust us : he had seen other 
 chiefs who came into our power relying on friendly treatment, thrown into 
 the dungeons of Bukkur. The broken truce of Kotra was not to be forgot- 
 ten. At this time the sepoys in Scinde suffered from the cold of the 
 nights, where ice constantly made its appearance. 
 
 We come now to the most unsatisfactory portion of the history of the 
 management of the affairs of Scinde — to a portion which, whether in a poli- 
 tical or a military point of view, no Englishman can read without a blush. 
 The chief part of our knowledge on the first division of the subject is 
 derived from the often-quoted Cutchee letters, and a better authority could 
 not be desired ; fortunately, indeed, there is no conflicting information to 
 be dealt with — the intelligence from the spot was at the time copious, va- 
 ried, and perfectly harmonious, and not one particle of its truth was ever 
 called in question. 
 
 When the Army of the Indus passed through Cutchee in 1839, Major Leech 
 ■wrote and sent a moonshee (interpreter) to the people of Kujjuck, to beg 
 that they would break their bunds (weirs or dams) which retained for 
 the irrigation of their fields the water flowing from the hills, and 
 let it off for the use of our troops. The request was complied with, 
 but the money offered for a piece of such valuable service, attended 
 with much damage to the cultivators, was declined. The fields suf- 
 fered from deficient irrigation, but to this they submitted without 
 complaintj The following year Yoosiff Khan Rysannee was Naib of the 
 Seebee country, and the Kujjuks requested he would make the battai or 
 division of grain, on which the Government share or ty thing is allotted, 
 the crops being ready for it. The revenue is paid in kind ; and the corn 
 
 35. Letters from Shikarpore, 27th Jan., B. Times, Feb. 
 
 36. Cutchee Letters, No. 5. 
 
 37. TimeSf Feb. ; letter from Camp> near Kotra. 22d Jan. 
 
232 
 
 cannot be housed till the Government's quota has been determined on. 
 The Naib of Seebee stated that he could not act in this matter -without the 
 directions of Mahomed Sherreef. What piece of roguery this -worthy had in 
 view|in delaying the order, does not appear : but so it was, the time passed 
 away, the rainy season approached, and the Kujjucks housed their grain to 
 save it from destruction. When all this labour had been incurred, and the 
 cultivators were led, from the delay which had been occasioned, to believe 
 that the tax was for that season to be remitted, Mahomed Sherreef ordered 
 the battai or division to be made. The cultivators were now loath to part 
 with that which they had begun to regard and deal with as their own ; and 
 they urged as a plea for exemption, the service they had performed, and 
 sacrifice they had incurred at Major Leech's request ; stating what was' 
 admitted to be true, that they almost alone, of all the tribes, had abstained 
 from plundering our bag'gage or convoys. They expressed a hope that these 
 considerations would weigh with Mr Bell in obtaining for them exemption 
 from payment for the present. The district is very productive, the utmost 
 attention to irrigation being paid. It contains about thirty villages, each 
 under its particular hakim or chief. The adult male population amounts 
 to about 6000, of whom only one thousand are reckoned warriors : they 
 are mostly infantry, and have no guns. The town where all the principal 
 chiefs reside is Kujjuck. It contains a population of about 4000. The 
 annual revenue of the district amounts to about £3600 ; the arrears 
 now stated to be due, to £4400 — of this we demanded immediate payment 
 of the half. In this state matters were, when the chief political pro- 
 ceeded to Cutchee, and had, in the beginning of February 1841, an 
 interview at Lheree with some of the chiefs. They pleaded poverty in 
 addition to the other reasons already adduced, on which they claimed 
 exemption : this was known to have been a mere pretence, for they were 
 not poor: and the hardship of claiming afterwards that which was not 
 received at the time when it was offered, was, owing to the representations of 
 Mahomed Sherreef, not held entitled to consideration. At MunghulKeshehur, 
 4 miles from Bhag, eight of the chiefs had a second interview with Mr Bell, 
 when, on the 7th Feb., a paper was drawn up by them, in conjunction with 
 Lieut. Brown, Mr Bell's assistant, and others, guaranteeing that the reve- 
 nue claim should be satisfied in full on or before the 19th of the month. (38) 
 Not observing that any measures were taken to have this agreement ful- 
 filled, a demonstration was directed to be made before the time fixed for 
 payment had expired, and on the 18th February our troops arrived before 
 the town — the people having not the most remote idea that hostilities 
 
 38. Cutchee Letters, No. 3— Much of this letter has been taken verbatm 
 and incorporated with the text. 
 
233 
 
 were intended : the same having been the impression of General Brooks 
 when the dispatch of the force was arranged. They had not so much as 
 provided themselves with ammunition, nor had they cut the bunds, though 
 their unfailing practice in ease of attack was to lay the country under 
 water and render it impassable. They invariably maintained that they never 
 thought of being attacked, or of attacking us : nor have we any grounds for 
 believing that in this they misrepresented their apprehensions or inten- 
 tions. 
 
 The troops sent, consisted of the 3d cavalry, Leslie^s horse artillery, some 
 of Skinner's and of Curtis's irregular horse, and a wing of the 20th N. I. ; 
 these were afterwards joined by 200 of the 2d Grenadiers, with Lieutenants 
 Hogg, Falconer, and Morrison. Tho whole was commanded by Colonel 
 Wilson of the cavalry. The distance they had to march from quarters, was 
 about 40 miles; a detachment worse suited for the attack of a fortified town, 
 could not be imagined ; especially when the General had every variety of 
 troops in such abundance at com[nanil.(39) So late as the iVth, after 
 the troops were on their way certain of the Kojnck chiefs had an in- 
 terview with Mr. Bell : — some misunderstanding appears to have arisen ; 
 Mr. Bell stated that he was left under the impression that the chiefs 
 wished to evade payment altogether, though admitting it was due; and 
 some of the natives on whom he so often so unworthily relied, assured 
 him that the Kojjucks were arming and preparing for resistance. The 
 groundlessness of this last became obvious wliea our troops arrived near 
 the fort, and the populace appeared never to dream of hostilities. Lieu- 
 tenant Brown, A. P. A., was sent to join the force in consequence of Lieut. 
 Col. Wilson reporting that the people were hostile, and that our camel-men 
 had been detained in the town^ ^c, which he deenieJ it imperative to make 
 known ! He proceeds to say — ** but little forage had been promised, and 
 the people who went for it were treated with ill-concealed ill-will. lam 
 positively informed that an attack on our camp will be made should a favour- 
 able opportunity of doing so occur. I respectfully solicit the Major-general 
 granting further and more explicit instructivjns." It was at this time that 
 the Assistant-political Agent was ordered to proceed to Col. Wilson's camp 
 in case of difficulty, that the commanding officer might be fully aware 
 
 39. We hdve heard General Brooks declare that he never in the course 
 of 40 years service, experienced any thing so intensely mortifying as the 
 failure at Sebee. He sent out a light detachment on the assurance of Mr. 
 Bell that by no possibility could there be fighting,— that a mere demonstra- 
 tion was all that was desired. The neighbourhood of Kujjuck had been re- 
 commended as a station for part of the mounted force, and the cavalry and 
 horse artillery were ordered therein the first instance without any idea of war- 
 fare, but simply for the benefit of forage, which was hardly procurable at 
 Mungul-ke-Shuher." 
 
 G 1 
 
234 
 
 how matters were to be managed. On the day of the fight, 20th Febru- 
 ary, a deputation of the chief men had an interview with Lieutenant 
 Brown : they declared their readiness to pay the sura required, but re- 
 quested twelve hours to malie the collection. This was refused, and they 
 were informed that unless within two hours they should produce £2,200, 
 their town would be attacked by the troops. The attempt was made — the 
 collection was commenced on the instant; and rupees, gold and silver orna- 
 ments were gathered in the utmost haste, in amount equal to our demands. 
 A Moonshee with some attendants, who had been sent to the town when 
 the two hours* leave which had been given were expired, met the chiefs 
 bearing the treasure to our camp. Before they arrived there, however, they 
 observed the guns getting into position, and the troops being drawn out in 
 order of battle. Supposing some trick or delusion to be intended, that we 
 meant both to take the money and attack the town besides, they retired within 
 the walls, and charged the Moonshee with endeavouring to practise a fraud 
 upon them. The fight inioiediately began. The fort, which contained about 
 4,000 people, of whom 1,200 were women, was not a strong one. It was 
 situated in a level plain, which aflTorded no cover for ordnance, and sur- 
 rounded with a ditch and mud wall, varying from 12 to 20 feet in height, 
 with four open gateways respectively of 9, 10, 12, and 20 feet in width. 
 The ditch surrounding the fortress at 12 feet distance from the wall was 25 
 feet broad and 4 feet deep ; it was encircled on three sides by marshes and 
 water-courses. About two o'clock p. m. the guns opened with round-shot 
 and spherical case, at the distance of two hundred yards ; after a fire of 
 nearly half an hour's duration, they were removed to within one hundred 
 yards of the mud wall. The defences were so thick, and numerous, 
 that even at this distance our shot scarcely told upon the town. The enemy 
 had kept up a brisk and galling fire upon us from the moment our artillery 
 were in position. Colonel Wilson was wounded through the thigh, the fe- 
 moral bone being badly splintered by one of the first shots. The command, 
 in consequence, devolved on Major Rollings of the 2d Grenadiers. The storm- 
 ing party, consisting of two companies of the regiment just named, supported 
 by the left wing of the 20th N.I., proceeded to a place where the men were 
 able easily to cross, the ditch having been left unfinished, and advanced by the 
 pathway 12 feet wide, which intervened betwixt the edge of this and the base 
 of the wall. Captain Walter, with a troop of the 3d cavalry, proceeded round 
 to the other side of the town to cut off the enemy's retreat. The rest of the 
 troops remained to support Captain Leslie with his guns, and act as circum- 
 stances might require. The enemy were six or eight hundred strong just within 
 the gate, — there being about twelve hundred fighting men in the town altoge- 
 ther : the guns, which otherwise kept the gate clear, required to suspend their 
 
235 
 
 fire as the storming party advanced. So soon as the head of the column got 
 near the gate, the enemy rushed out and cut down the leading men, who were 
 unfortunately very indifferently supported, as no effort on the part of the officers 
 could induce the Grenadiers to move forward. Lieut. Falconer was killed, and 
 Lieut. Shaw, sub- assistant commissary general, who volunteered his services 
 on tie occasion, severely wounded in leading the assailants on. On seeing 
 the check of the storming party, the intrepid Lieut. Creed, H.A., requested 
 permission to take some dismounted artillerymen to head the column, and 
 endeavour to recover the fortunes of the day. This gallant band of about 
 20 horse artillerymen at once advanced and endeavoured to force their way 
 into the town. Lieut. Creed and some few got within the gateway : but 
 here the heroic officer and five of his men were immediately cut down, 
 and the remainder, most of whom were severely wounded, driven back by 
 force of numbers, were compelled to retire, being unsupported. At this 
 time some women came out with korans on their heads entreating for 
 peace. The enemy began to flag i and had the attack been persist- 
 ed in the fort must have fallen. Evening was now rapidly advancing : it 
 was obviously in vain to maintain the struggle, so our troops retired to a 
 distance of 1000 yards, and proceeded to encamp for the night with a view 
 of next morning renewing operations. 
 
 The casualties in this unfortunate affair amounted to 15 killed and 25 
 wounded ; Lieuts. Falconer and Creed were amongst the former, Col. Wilson 
 and Lieut. Shaw amongst the latter. Colonel Wilson died in a few days 
 afterwards from the effects of his wound. The enemy's loss is said to have 
 amounted to about 60 killed. 
 
 A report was spread that the Kojjucks intended to attack us at night, so 
 that the troops slept under arms. The rumour proved groundless : about 
 11 o'clock P.M. a Banyan arrived in camp from the fort, intimating that 
 the chiefs had fled, — the whole of the occupants of the town, save the aged 
 and bedridden, made their escape to the hills — so that, when morning dawn- 
 ed, it was tenantless. Kujjuck was taken possession of, and all the move- 
 ables contained in it declared prize property. This amounted to about 
 £2000 in value : this, as will by and bye be seen, had afterwards to be 
 restored by order of government. 
 
 The tidings of this mishap reached General Brooks at Mungel-ke-shuher 
 about noon on the 21st; and he immediately ordered out a detachment to join 
 Capt. Rollings with the utmost expedition. This consisted of the head- quar- 
 ters of the 4th troop horse brigade, H. M.'s 40th, and the 2 1st N. I., with the 
 sappers and miners j they marched about 5 p. m. the same afternoon. These 
 were to proceed by forced marches without a moment's delay, as the extent 
 of the mischance was believed to be much more serious than it turned out. 
 Bat on the march the Major-General receiving authentic intelligence that 
 
236 
 
 the Kojjucks had evacuated their fort, directed the infantry to remain that 
 night at Mitree, and proeeeded only with the head-quarters and 4th troop 
 Horse Artillery to Kujjuck, The infantir recommenced their march 
 the following afternoon . —before they had proceeded far rain began to fall in 
 torrents, and from the night being pitchy dark, the troops remained for 
 some time in a perfect slough of mud and water, aid did not reach the camp 
 till mid-day. The whole were detained before Kujjuclc till the middle of 
 March by the heavy rains^ which caused great destruction amongst the 
 camels of the force. 
 
 After the town had fallen into our hands, but before it was destroyed, 
 some of the people, who were starving on the hills, returned with a view of 
 recovering their lost property : they were driven back, some perishing in 
 the ditch, and orders were given to fire on any one who should approach 
 the town. Foiled in avenging our mischances on the Kojjuck warriors, Mr 
 Bell resolved that the property of the inhabitants should suffer. An order 
 was fulminated, directing the place to be destroyed and the country deso- 
 lated. On the 6th March, accordingly, the aged, sick, and bedridden having 
 been carried beyond the walls, the clothes on them being the only property 
 they were allowed to retain, the fort was set fire to, and laid in ruins. The 
 houses that could not easily be pulled down were mined and blown up, — the 
 timbers that could not be otherwise destroyed were burnt, — the devastation 
 was complete : the fire raged for several days— and the property accumu- 
 lated, and buildings erected, through the spice of seven generations, during 
 which the place had flourished in the hands of the Kojiucks, was appro- 
 priated or destroyed by us. The crops were eaten up or trampled under 
 foot by the horses, the camels, and the baggage-cattle of the army : the de- 
 sire appearing to be to dc as much wanton mischief a? possible. An edict 
 was i.sued when the work of ravage had been completed, that no part 
 of the town should be rebuilt or re-occupied. (40) Shortly after this, some 
 
 40. The account of the action is chiefly given from an unpublished copy of. 
 the ofiicial despatch, with some incidents from private letters. We have been 
 favoured with divers valuable notes from officers of the force, to whom the 
 proofs have been submitted, and the following is one:—** Mr Bell's first letter 
 to General Brooks was such as to lead the General to expect opposition ; the 
 second was merely saying the tx'oops should take up a position convenient for 
 water and forage — this was received late at night. The force was framed on 
 the firjjt letter, and nothins" could be more injudicious than its selection. 
 General B. knew nothing of Kujjuck, nor did Mr Bell— a fact fully proved, for 
 had they known what the place was, Europeans would have been sent. Well 
 might General Brooks feel unsatisfied, not only in this instance, but in having 
 remained from October until January at Sukkur, instead of being in the field 
 with his troops. Had he been stationed at Bhag, and Mr Bell with him, the 
 country would have had a better chance of becoming quiet and fettled. Uow 
 could General Brooks say he did not expect resistance, when his orders to 
 Lieut.Col. Wilson were—* Your detachment is to march to Kujjuck, in order 
 
237 
 
 Brahoes, who must have otherwise starved in the hills, came down, and 
 were quietly feeding their Hocks at Mitree, when our troops observing them 
 mistook them for Kojjncks, and actually attacked them, dispersing them ia 
 every direction, and seizing on the women's ornaments and property left 
 behind. The mistake was soon discovered, and every eflPort made to remedy 
 it ; but the mischief was done, and this untoward accident was added to iha 
 list of acts of supposed perfid) and wrong — for too few of which we could 
 plead any excuse < r extenuation. 
 
 The Cutchee letter-writer, who learned the facts on the spot, and was 
 most familiar with every feature of the case, and with all the parties con- 
 cerned, says, *' We all know that Asiatics invariably plead poverty and 
 procrastination to contribution of revenue to their despotic governments, in the 
 hope of obtaining some remission ; and that where they can, they resist with 
 force the payment altogether, as the Kojjucks have often done. That the 
 Kojjucks hoped, by aa excuse of poverty and procrastination, to get some 
 remission, is, I conceive, beyond doubt. It is the opinion of all the natives 
 of Cutchee that I have seen : of our habits they knew little, what they did 
 know was not likely to have produced the most favourable impressiori. A 
 forcible resistance of our demands they knew to be useless, and accordingly 
 
 to coerce some refractory tribes in that district, in case of their refusing com- 
 pliance with the demands of the political agent.' The detachment marched 
 on the 17th, and on the 18th General Brooks writes to Mr Bell — * I have no 
 information who are the parties to be acted against,' &o. Why not have 
 made due inquiry on the subject before sending the force ? The Kujjuck force 
 was as follows: — 
 2d Grenadier Ilegt. — 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 native officers, 12 havildarsj 
 
 200 rank and file ; killed — I lieut. (Falconer), 8 men j wounded 20, 
 Scinde Horse — 1 captain, 4 native officers, 2 dufltadara, 66 sowars ^ killed — 1 
 
 sowar. 
 1st Troop H. A. — 1 captain, 2 lieuts., 98 men; killed— 5, and 1 officer, (Lieut. 
 
 Creed) ; wounded— 6, and 1 otiicer (Capt. Blood). 
 Sd Lt. Cav.— 1 col., 1 capt., 6 lieuts. and cornets, 201 troopers; killed — 1 
 
 trooper. 
 Rt. Wing 20tn — 2 captains, 2 lieuts., 2 ensigns, 381 men j killed— 1 private> 10 
 
 ditto wounded. 
 Total force . . . Cavalry .... 266 
 Infantry . , . 681 
 
 847 
 Deduct sick and guards . . . . . . 182 
 
 Present in action 665 
 
 Killed — 1 lieut.- col., 2 lieutenants, and 12 men. 
 W ounded, 2 lieuts., and 45 men." — Note hy an Offfcer of the Force. 
 Another officer belonging to the Staff states that there were not above 
 300 warriors in the town : that so ill-defended and weak a place was un- 
 worthy of the name of fort ; and that the whole affair was one of the most 
 miserably mismanaged during the war. 
 
238 
 
 they not only avoided plundering the country, but even neglected providing 
 thenasveles with ammunition, trusting to procrastination as the safest diplo- 
 macy. From the fact of their having gathered in valuables in amount equal 
 to our demand, and with which they were about to present themselves in our 
 camp when they saw our troops advancing on the town, and from that of no 
 earthly provision having been made for defence, does it not appear that, 
 instead of opening our guns at two in the afternoon against the fort, if we 
 had thrown a cordon around it, that the people would at once have seen how 
 unlike we were to former rulers, even had they not gathered together ia 
 money and ornaments the amount we demanded." (41) 
 
 Well might Sir Alex. Burnes, in ^remonstrating with the Envoy shortly 
 after this on our deplorable and calamitous mismanagement of the country, 
 exclaim, *' It seems to me that wherever our political officers are, collision 
 forthwith follows. A native temporizes, a European officer fights ; we are 
 thus on the high road to denationalize Aflfghanistan instead of contributing 
 to its stability as a kingdom ; we shall subvert all its institutions, and not 
 succeed in fixing our own in their stead, for we are not labouring to do 
 so." * * « Xhat regular troops should be employed in enforcing 
 
 revenue, is at all times doubtful, unless refusal to pay ends in rebellion ; but 
 it is more than ever questionable, when there is injustice on the side of the 
 CjUector. A postponement to pay is at once in our notions converted into a 
 refusal, and that which a parley and explanation between Affghans would 
 terminate in a day or two amicably, ends with us in a battle and loss of life 
 on both sides. But the lives are not the greatest loss : respect for u?, and 
 influence with them, go with them. When once regular troops appear, hesi- 
 tation is deemed pusillanimity, they cannot stand still, they must act, and 
 thus every trifling outbreak endangers the character not only of the English 
 but of the whole frame of government." (42) The reader will excuse the in- 
 terruption of the narrative which the introduction of those passages occasions, 
 proving, as they do, how early and distinctly the more sagacious portion of 
 the political authorities saw and appreciated the mischiefs we were inflicting, 
 and the direction whitherward they were tending. Unhappily, those in 
 whose hands the amendment of this system lay, would not, or could not, see 
 its error. 
 
 The details of these proceedings appear to have given the greatest offence 
 to the Governor- General : it is doubtful whether the despatches afforded 
 him a sufficiency of particulars ; but the facts in which they w^ere defectire 
 
 41. Cutchee Letters, No. 4. 
 
 42. Notes on the consolidation of Affghauistan, by Sir Alexander Burnes, 
 dated April 19, 1841. A copy of tbese was found amongst his posthumous 
 papers, with notes by the Envoy. Frequent occasions of referring to them 
 will by and bye present themselves. 
 
239 
 
 were amply supplied by the letters to which we have had such frequent oc- 
 casion to refer, and which bore with them so much of the stamp of aulho- 
 rity that they could not be overlooked. Early in August an order was re- 
 ceived rescinding the edict against the re-construction of Kujjuck, and order- 
 ing the payment of the value of the property which had previously been 
 declared prize, — abandoning all claims of arrears, and explaining as the 
 reason, that though our troops had for a time required to occupy the 
 country, the Kojjucks were considered our friends ! We are, however, 
 breaking through the chronological order in which events ought to be re- 
 lated. 
 
 A few weeks before this, the Beebee Gunjani, widow of Mehrab Khan, 
 had made submission : she was kindly received, and seemed gratified with 
 the attention that was paid her ; she was a sprightly, pleasing, intelligent 
 looking lady, whose influence with the chiefs friendly to her husband, as 
 well as with her step-son, seemed to be very great. She received as a giff, 
 the Naibs hip of Kotra, worth about £1200 a year, and with this she 
 seemed contented. About 1000 of her followers shortly afterwards made 
 submission. 
 
 Alarming reports were meanwhile gaining currency as to the state of 
 afl'airs at Herat and along the Persian frontier. It may be recollected 
 that in July 1839, Major D'Arcy Tod, with a deputation of British officers, 
 had been dispatched from Caodahar to the court of the worthless prince who 
 was the legitimate representative of the Suddozye dynasty. After an ex- 
 penditure of £300,000 in endeavours to purchase a friendship, the free gift 
 of which was not worth our acceptance, the Governor- General resolved, ^ 
 that before more advances should be made, the expediency of moving a gar- \ 
 risen of British troops into Herat should be broached to Kamran Shah. \ 
 This became the source of immediate misunderstanding ; and Major Tod 
 discovered, that not only was this as unpalatable as might be, but that 
 Yar Mahomed the Vizier, known at all times to be in his heart unfriendly 
 to us, had usurped the actual power of the Shah, and was caballing amongst 
 the chiefs with a view to an advance on Candahar. It was said, indeed, that 
 it was the intention to proclaim Kamran Shah head of the Doorannee em- 
 pire, and to endeavour, through the assistance of the Affghan malcontents, 
 to place him on the throne. Major Tod had been guilty of the offence of 
 endeavouring to put a stop to the plunder of caravans and the sale of the 
 persons captured along with them as slaves. The English mission left on 
 the 10th, and arrived at Ghirisk on the 2l8t Feb., having encountered some 
 narrow risks but experienced no injury. This post is on the river Helmund, 
 about 80 miles north-west from Candahar; it had been weakly garrisoned 
 ince our original invasion, and was now about to be reinforced by the 
 
240 
 
 Shah's 5tli Native Infantry under Captain Woodburn, and 500 of Christie's 
 Horse. The country everywhere in fact shewei symptoms of that unquiet 
 and uneasy state of feeling which, six months afterwards, broke out into 
 such fearful and successful insurrection. 
 
 Preparations were on these grounds made once more to draw our troops 
 together near Dadur, and to move a heavy force up the Bolan Pass so early 
 as the season would permit, to await at Quettah the determination of the 
 Governor- General. Luckily this was peaceful ; though the Envoy was ur- 
 gent to stretch the limits of the Doorannee empire to their proper extent, 
 which he conceived to be Herat on the west, and Attock on the south-east. 
 
 From the scarcity which prevailed in Cutchee and Beloochistan, it was 
 necessary that the whole of the troops, followers, and cattle, attached to 
 the force, should be rationed by the Commissariat ; and to enable that de- 
 partment to do so, the following enormous amount of animals was required 
 during the campaign for the transport of the Commissariat supplies, bag- 
 gage, guns, ammunition, camp-equipage, &c. of the army :— - 
 
 12,000 Government Camels, valued at £8 each . . £96,000 
 
 4000 Hired Camels, from Sukkur to Q xettah, at £1, lOs. per month 6,000 
 2000 Hired Draught and Pack Bullocks, — 5J00 more were expected from 
 Ferozepore, but never joined. (43) 
 
 The 20th N.I. entered the pass about the lOth October, and botwixt 
 the 16t:h and 20th March a large portion of the army, under General Brooks, 
 had commenced moving through the Bo'an. The General arrived at Quet* 
 tab on the 3d April ; his command having been extended so as to include 
 Kelat, Moostung, and Qaettah, as well as Scinde : Mr Bell had preceded 
 him by a few days only. The first brigade suffered severely from storms 
 in the pass : their tents having been blown down and property destroyed. 
 It was believed that General Valiant's brigade would proceed to Canda- 
 har, — a determination which, if ever made, was speedily altered. Having 
 already done nearly all we could in the way of irritation and annoyance, 
 our policy now appeared to be to make every effort at conciliation. Colonel 
 Stacy had, in a brief space, produced a very important alteration in the 
 feelings of the people of Kelat. He sought communion with the chiefs, and 
 mingled freely with the people, and his sympathy with their sufferings, and 
 still more, his apparent confidence in them, and the fearless want of suspi- 
 cion with which he alone dared to move amongst them, won sympathy and 
 confidence in return. In the course of the month of April he set out to the 
 Brahoe camp almost unattended, though he had to travel nearly 60 miles 
 through a wild, turbulent, and disaffected country. He had an interview 
 
 43. Comraissariate Returns. 
 
241 
 
 with the young- Khan and his chiefs, and seemed to consider that everything 
 was settled, when some fresh source of misunderstanding broke out, and 
 Nusseer Klian again sought refuge in the remote hills. Colonel Stacy had 
 just before this advanced a considerable sura of money to the Khan. On 
 the present occasion something occurred during his residence in camp, which 
 80 offended the chiefs that his life was in peril. The Khan warned him of 
 his danger, and entreated that he would retire as speedily as possible, offer- 
 ing him a safe conduct to Kelat. Of this he accepted, and after a ride of 
 nearly 60 miles in length, returned in safety with the utmost speed to 
 the Brahoe capital. The Bombay 25th N. I. was aboui this time dis- 
 patched to Kelat. The Beebee Gunjani having occasional interviews with 
 Mr Bell, promised him that she would speedily prevail upon the young prince 
 to come in if made sure of being restored to his father's throne. The assur- 
 ance was given, but he would not trust us, nor could he be prevailed upon 
 to see any political save Colonel Stacy till Mr Bell was no more. Mean- 
 time an order was promulgated, that unless he surrendered himself before 
 the 4th May, he would be put to the ban, and chased wherever he might 
 seek refuge. 
 
 The force now at Quettah amounted to above 8000 men. No instructions 
 had been received, nor did any definite idea seem, in any quarter, to be en- 
 tertained as to their destination. The Herat panic was now well nigh over : 
 the idea of advancing thitherwards, broached, and so far acted on by the 
 Scinde politicals, was discountenanced by Government ; and the country 
 around Candahar was considerably less turbulent than it shortly before had 
 been. 
 
 A petty chief called Fazei Khan had been giving some annoyance in the 
 Noosky cjuntry, and as we had soldiers on the spot, it seemed to be 
 thought a pity we should not keep fighting. An expedition accordingly was 
 ordered for Noosky, consisting of the 4th Troop H.A., a squadron of the 3d 
 Light Cavalry, 2 companies of the4lst, and the 20th N.I. They were com- 
 manded by Colonel Soppitt, an officer of conduct and experience. They left 
 Quettah on the 3d of May, and having reached Noosky by a forced night - 
 march of 40 miles, found that the offending chief, with his principal people, 
 had fled. It was said they had taken the route of Kelat to render submis- 
 sion to Colonel Stacy. Two companies of Europeans, mounted on camels, 
 were dispatched with the cavalry in pursuit of him, but without effect. The 
 force returned to Quettah after incurring much hardship and fatigue, and 
 losing many camels, — having effected nothing. 
 
 An accident as singular in its nature as unfortunate in its consequences, 
 at this time befel a party of Skinner's horse in ascending the Bolan Pass. 
 Capt. Haldane had been left at Dadur with orders to escort the battering- 
 train to Quettah. When the plan was altered, and orders given that the heavy 
 
 H I 
 
242 
 
 guns should be allowed to remain at Sukkur, this officer, with the horse 
 under his command, was ordered to join his brigade, which had just reached 
 Shawl. Having experienced much difficulty in obtaining a sufficiency of 
 baggage-cattle, he was at length enabled to start on the 23rd of April. 
 Having got to withia ten miles of the end of the pass, a night was passed at 
 Sir-i-Bolan (44), and the cattle being still very much knocked up, they 
 were allowed to rest till the afternoon to recruit. It rained very much on 
 reaching the narrowest part of the pass, which was no more than from 30 to 
 40 yards wide, and Capt. Haldane having sent on the camel-men with all the 
 baggage and 100 troopers, ordering them to keep close together, was bringing 
 up the rear with about 80 men, when just as he entered the narrow gorge, 
 and came to a sharp turn in the way, he saw a body of water, about a foot 
 deep, rushing on with tremendous speed round a turn of the rock a little way 
 ahead of him; this was immediately followed by a second, more than three 
 feet in depth, thundering on with still greater fury than that which pre- 
 ceded it. On the right and left there were no means of escape, the rocks 
 being nearly perpendicular ; so they galloped back, reaching a place which 
 enabled them to retire on one side a little way out of the reach of the torrent 
 just as its waters were upon them. The cataract, now increased to ten 
 feet in depth, rushed past the rock with awful fury. Then came a scene 
 terrible to contemplate, — men, horses, and camels were swept past, and 
 dashed to pieces against projecting rocks, against which the water flew to 
 the height of twenty feet. No assistance could be rendered, for the stream 
 ran faster than any horse could gallop. '* I stood upon the bank," says 
 Capt. Haldane, ** quite horror-struck, for I believed that every one ahead of 
 us had perished. In a few moments the destruction was complete, and we 
 felt like men cast upon a desert plain, without a particle of food, wet to 
 the skin, a cold and cutting wind blowing on us, and no means, from the 
 nature of the country, of ascertaining the extent of our loss ; as, until the 
 water went down, all communication with any party who might have been 
 saved was completely cut off. About sunset the stream had nearly sub-* 
 sided, and I perceived how matters stood. The loss of life was 33 men and 
 101 animals. We passed a miserable night, and next day pushed on to 
 one of cur outposts, eight miles from Dusht-i-Bedowlut. We trusted to 
 recover some of oar property in the morning before starting, but found very 
 little : for such was the force of the stream, that the matchlocks belonging 
 
 44. Sir-i-Bolan, head of the Bolan;— a powerful spring here forms the 
 source of the Bolan river. The ascent betwixt A hi Goom and Sir-i-BoIan in 
 the course of 9i miles is 1954 feet, giving a rise of about 1 foot in 25 ; this is 
 the steepest acclivity in the pass. A mass of water pouring down this must 
 rush with the rapidity of a cataract. — Major Houghs pp. 53 and 427. 
 
243 
 
 '0 men drowned had their barrels broken in two, and some of the bodies were 
 found at Bebee Nanee, 20 miles below where the accident occurred. The 
 property lost was estimated at £1200." (45) 
 
 An accident of a precisely similar nature occurred to Sir Alex. Burnes and 
 his party in ascending the Khyber Pass in September 1838, when a thunder 
 shower overtook them, and the brooks swelled so rapidly, that it was with 
 much difficulty they saved their baggage: the party was for a shert while 
 divided in two, without the power of communicating with each other. (46) 
 So that, besides the incidents liable to occur in those defiles from the oppo- 
 sition of hostile tribes, which in its most formidable shape British troops have 
 overcome — there are storms of wind and snow, with the swelling of torrents 
 by the sudden burst of thunder storms, to be encountered, sufficient for the 
 destruction of any array. These appear to be of by no means unfrequent 
 occurrence, and the only wonder is that we suffered from them so little: that 
 just detailed, and the snow-storm which overtook Colonel Wallace's party in 
 February 1842, being the only serious accidents which really from these 
 causes befel our troops. 
 
 Affairs in Upper Scinde and around Quettah from this time forward to 
 the surrender of Nusseer Khan, continued in a state of tranquillity and 
 insipid inaction. About the beginning of June, the notification issued by 
 the Bombay Government, that General Brooks and Brigadier Valiant had 
 been recalled — the former to be temporarily succeeded by Colonel England 
 ofH. M. 41st, the latter by the senior Brigadier at the station, — reached 
 camp, and occasioned no small astonishment. The causes of this have al- 
 ready been minutely explained ; (47) but the authors of the Clibborn com- 
 mission never, up to the close, seem to have suspected the serious offence 
 of which alike in a military or in a moral point of view they had been guil- 
 ty. Mr. Bell was at this time suffering from a severe indisposition, which 
 caused him to tender his resignation — and Major Outram was already un- 
 derstood to be assured of succeeding him ; the charge devolved on the latter 
 earlier than was anticipated, by the demise of the former on the Ist of Aug. 
 Captain Bean also had solicited leave to retire, on the plea of ill health. 
 The great schemes to be accomplished by the army under General Brooks, 
 in which all of the gentlemen just named, more or less sharel, one by one 
 fell to the ground. The Candahar force proved adequate for the work as- 
 signed to it : strong bodies were posted at Ghirisk, Moostun^ and Keiat, 
 
 45. Letter of Capt. Haldane? given in Asiatic Journal, Sept. 1841 j part II. 
 p. 32. It appears as a quotation, but it is not stated where it was first pub- 
 lished. 
 
 46. Wood's Journey to the source of the River Oxus, p- 163. Burnes'a 
 Cabool, p. 129. 
 
 47. See conclusion of preceding chapter, p. 202. 
 
244 
 
 ready to act if required ; there appeared no source of alarm of serious mis- 
 chief from Herat, and no intention of proceeding- against ii for the present ; 
 and as the Brahoes no longer showed themselves in the field, there really 
 seemed nothing for our troops to effect beyond watching the current of 
 events. 
 
 Nusseer Khan had meanwhile fallen sick and become tired of remaining 
 a fugitive: he had received the fullest assurance that no more evil was in- 
 tended him than that of reinstating him on his father's throne— our pur- 
 pose being now to add Cutchee to Kelat, from which it had been so un- 
 wisely disjoined. About the 20th July, Colonel Stacy was written to, 
 intimating that the Khan and his chiefs were in the neighbourhood, and 
 expressive of a wish to see that officer in camp. This was immediately 
 complied with : the boy had been suffering severely from intermittent fever, 
 which the treatment of one of our medical officers speedily relieved. He 
 came into camp without conditions on the 25th July — and Colonel Stacy 
 immediately made preparations to procee 1 with him to Quettah. 
 
 A general order was published on the 9th August at Sukkur, intimating 
 that Nusseer Khan and hisjadherents were no longer enemies to the British ; 
 while the intimation from Lord Auckland already referred to was at the 
 same time circulated, to the effect that the property taken at Kujjack could 
 not be considered as prize, in consequence of its having been captured in a 
 town of a friendly power, though it was found necessary as a temporary 
 measure to occupy it with British troops. (48) 
 
 By the time the Khan and his party reached Moostung, intimation had 
 been received of the demise ot Mr Bell, which took place at Quettah on the 
 1st of August; and it was resolved to remain there until Major Outram'* 
 arrival, or until the purposes of government should be definitively made 
 known. 
 
 Major Outram, after hearing of the death of Mr Bell, having been de- 
 tained for a short time at Hydrabad, bringing some political arrangements 
 there in progress to a close, left with a view of taking charge of the affairs . 
 of his new appointment, on the 18th of August. The unostentatious celerity 
 of his progress contrasted as much with the pomp and circumstance with 
 which his predecessor moved as did the other portions of the career of the 
 two differ from each other. Mr Bell's escort consisted of 150 horsemen — 
 his rate of travelling was about 10 miles a day. The appointments of 
 Major Outram consisted of one palanquin, with 16 bearers for exchanging, 
 one attendant, four troopers of the irregular horse, and three riding camels. 
 
 48. Bombay Courier, August 31. No allusion in this order was made to the 
 total destruction of the town ; the occupation might have been necessary, but 
 to blow up the tvalls and burn the bazaars of our friends was a curious mode 
 of manifesting amity ! 
 
245 
 
 The distance from Hydrabad to Quettah is 400 miles, including 96 railes 
 of desert and 70 railes of the Bolan Pass: this was traversed in 16 days, 
 the new political agent having arrived at Quettah on the 3d of September. 
 
 Sir W. Macnaghten, for what reason does not appear, seemed anxious 
 to take into his own hands the task of closing an arrangement with Nusseer 
 Khan. About the 25th of August a draft of a treaty was forwarded to Moos- 
 tung, for his subscription, by the Envoy, just before Major Outra^a's arrival, 
 and when he was known to be on the way. This would have seemed alike 
 strange and inexplicable, but for the passion for diplomacy with which the 
 leading politicals were then afflicted : they seemed never so happy as when 
 endeavouring to over reach the rude and semi-barbarous tribes, who under- 
 stood the spirit of treaties, but were totally bewildered and misled by the 
 complex technicalities with which they were crammed ; and who, when any 
 of them were neglected, and^punishraent followed the oversight, always 
 conceived that we had misled them or dealt with them unfaithfully. 
 
 After a delay there of a month, the young Khan and his attendants left 
 Moostung immediately on hearing of Major Outram's arrival ; he reached 
 Quettah on the 6th Sept. He was received with that kind and frank cordiality 
 which distinguished the manners of the new resident, and he seemed delighted 
 with his reception. Affairs of state are easily arranged when one party 
 is disposed to concede whatever the other can desire: and so it was agreed 
 that they should set out all together as speedily as possible for Kelat, to invest 
 the young sovereign with regal power, ani place him with becoming pomp 
 upon the throne of his fathers. About the middle of tha month they started, 
 and on the 6th October the Khan was duly invested, the chief Sirdars 
 being previously invited to be present at the ceremony. The follow- 
 ing is a short notice by an officw who was present on the occasion ; — 
 
 *' At 2 p. M. the Khan, with his Sirdars and Officers of State, proceeded 
 to the Durbar Tent of the Agency, where the Treaty was ready for signature — it 
 was read by the young Khan himself, and by the Wuzz^er Moolla Mahomed 
 Hussein. The Khan, Sirdars and all were most grateful for the liberal terms on 
 which the British gave him back the country of his ancestors. The Treaty being 
 approved of, it was signed on the spot, and after some quarter of an hour's con- 
 versation, the Khan took leave. 
 
 »* At 4 p. M. Major Outram ascended to the citadel. A circular had been sent 
 round in the morning, notifying that the investiture would take place at 4 p. M. The 
 young Khan, who has ingratiated himself with every body, was reatiy at the hour 
 appointed — every Officer in Camp paid the Khan the compliment of attending. 
 
 '' After Major Outram, assisted by Brigadier England and C«l. Stacey, had 
 invested him with his complete Khanate Dress, he was seated between the two 
 former, and a Royal Salute announced the completion of the Treaty between the 
 Honorable Con^pany and the Khan of Kelat.'' 
 
 The country as usual was infested with robbers. Dr Owen and Lieut. Mac- 
 
246 
 
 kenzie, 3rd Cavalry, were, in the middle of September, waylaid and 
 robbed, and narrowly escaped mur ler in the Koochlak Pass, 7 miles north 
 of Quettah; while General Brooks and his party were fired upon in 
 descending the Bolan Pass ; but from the time of Nusseer Khan's surrender, 
 there was no hostile movement in Beloochistan of any considerable magni- 
 tude against us. 
 
 In taking a cursory review of the contents of this and the preceding chap- 
 ter, which refer exclusively to the affairs of Beloochistan, it will be found that, 
 from the time Sir T. Willshire returned to the plains, when everything was 
 considered to have been settled, our troops in numbers varying from 50 to 2000, 
 had been 15 times engaged with the enemy (49) and four times unsuccess- 
 fully.(50) The loss of the enemy on these various occasions must, so near 
 as can be estimated, amount to not much under 2500 ; our own casualties to 
 aboit 300 men slain. We lost no fewer than 12 European otfieers, viz. Col. 
 Wilson, Capts. Rait and Heighington, Lieuts Clarke, Franklin, Williams, 
 Mcore, Loveday, Lodge, Falconer, and Creel. All these, save two, had 
 fallen in action, or died of their wounds. Captiin Heigliingion had died from 
 the fatigue of the fight and retreat of Nufoosk ; and Lieut. Loveday was 
 murdered. The climate of the countries in which these unhappy operations 
 had been carried on, had among our officers been still more destructive of 
 life than the sword of the enemy. There had died, chiefly from climatic 
 causes within the period under review, Brigadier Stevenson, Major Billa- 
 more, Major Liddel, Captains Sutherland, Rebenack, Jones, Beddingfield, 
 and Lewis; Lieuts. Revelly, Hunt, Valiant, Cuerton, Shubrick, and 
 Oliphant, with Drs Carlow and Baines ; 16 in all. The death of Mr 
 Bell was not perhaps altogether attributable to the effects of climate. 
 
 The destruction of beasts of burthen had during this short but unhappy 
 campaign exceeded the worst apprehensions our most disastrous experience 
 could have led us to form. Of the twelve thousand camels which were col- 
 lected at Sukkur in August 1841, scarce 3000 could be produced in October 
 1842 : the loss occasioned by this sacrifice of animal life must alone have 
 exceeded £80,000. The total outlay occasioned by the campaign was 
 
 49. These '' affairs" took place at Deyrah 4th and 12th January (p. 172). Na- 
 tive officer's party of 80 men slaughtered to a man in returning to Kahun, 16th 
 May, (p. 17« ) Destruction of Lieut Clarke and convoy, 16th June, (p. 179). 
 Repulse at Nufoosk, (p. 189). Destruction of 25 sepoys, the escort of Captain 
 Bean's revenue moonshee. Attack of the Kakurs on Quettah. Attack on the 
 Brahoes by Lieut. Hammersley at Moostung. TJiree days' fighting round 
 Dadur. Destruction of llhaug and Gundava. Attack on the enemy at Kun- 
 dah. First fighting near Kotra. Aff'air of Lieut. Vardon in capturing 1100 
 bullocks. Battle of Kotra. Capture of Kujjuck. Attack on the Brahoes at 
 Mi tree. 
 
 60. The unsuccessful affairs were Surtof, Nufoosk, Quettah (where the troops, 
 though not beaten, had to retreat into the fort), and Kujjuck. 
 
247 
 
 estimated by the Friend of India at £300,000, and no one was less likely 
 to exaggerate in this. 
 
 The results were as extraordinary, and still more mortifying-, than the 
 expenditure of men and money by which they were achieved. Our rule 
 seems to have been to fight first, and when we became tired of this, to en- 
 quire into what we were fighting about. By a strange fatality, every 
 quarrel in which Mr. Bell engaged us, we were compelled to proclaim by our 
 abandonment, unwise, unjust, or oppressive. Tlie system was one of 
 continual doing and undoing, of which the only memorials that were left 
 were the heaps of slain who fell in battle, and the delapidation of a hereto- 
 fore flourishing treasury. 
 
 A slight reference to what has been already related at large and in detail, 
 will illustrate this statement. 
 
 In seeking tribute for Kelat, we attacked Deyrah, and slew some 60 of 
 its inhabitants, carrying away the chiefs as captives ; we subsequently 
 released the chiefs and solicited their friendship, abandoning all claims of 
 tribute, — it being admitted that none was due. On the same grounds 
 Kahun was taken possession of, and our troops shut up for six months in the 
 fort, one detachment having meanwhile been destroyed, and another defeated 
 by the Murrees. We then left the country, abandoning all our claims 
 against it, granting a free pardon to those who had handled us so roughly, 
 and entreating the friendship of the chiefs on their own terms. Cutchee 
 and Shawl were in 1839 detached from Kelat ; the one was re-annexed to 
 it in 1841, the other in 1842. We stripped the chiefs of the former pro- 
 TJnce of their hereditary estates, because they had not made up their title- 
 deeds according to our pleasure; and after six months' fighting with them, 
 we restored the disputed property without making any questions about 
 titles at all. We claimed the customs of Las, which had long before been 
 made over to the chief of Bella, and when an armed resistance was 
 threateneel we withdrew our claim. We attacked and destroyed Kujjuck 
 and then proclaimed that all the property which had been captured would 
 be restored ; their town being that of a friendly power whose dominions it 
 had become necessary for a time to occupy. Finally, we expelled Nusseer 
 Khan from the throne of his father in November 1839, and restored him in 
 October 1842; his claims on our gratitude being founded on the two years 
 of war he*had carried on against us ; Major Outram having afterwards re- 
 commended, that, in the event of our retiring from Candahar, we should 
 grant him a subsidy of £15,000 a year (51) instead of assisting him with 
 troops. 
 
 The casualties we have already detailed are far from light, but they are trivial 
 in comparison to the damage we sustained from loss of character for truth, 
 
 61. Blue Book of 1843, p. 266. 
 
248 
 
 consistency, justice, and integrity. Of unhappy violations of all tliese we 
 stood self-convicted by the repeated reversals of our policy, which we felt 
 ourselves compelled to resort to. 
 
 Just at the very time when the tranquillization of Beloochistan was con- 
 sidered to have been completed, an insurrection broke out at the other ex - 
 tremity of the Doorannee empire, more frightfully momentous and tragical in 
 its results than any recorded in modern history. On the 6th October, the 
 coronation of the young prince was celebrated at Kelat : three days after. 
 General Sale was attacked in the passes near Cabool, and after nearly a 
 month's incessant fighting, found shelter in the fort of Jellalabad, where he 
 was shut up for six months. The general rising which occasioned the de- 
 struction of the Cabool garrison, took place a few weeks afterwards. This, 
 however, opens a new chapter in history, on which it is not at present pro- 
 posed to enter. 
 
 This narrative would be incomplete without a short sketch of the history 
 of Major Oatram, whose management of Scinde betwixt August 1841, and 
 November 1843, merits the lasting gratitude of his country, and reflects the 
 highest honour on one who has well been termed the Bayard of the Indian 
 Army. (52) Major Outram, in requital for services the most meritorious 
 and successful, has experienced nothing but injury and insult from Lord 
 Ellenborough : he has been stripped of office without cause, and remanded 
 to his regiment, when his exertions as an envoy at the court of Hydrabad 
 might have spared us the most discreditable war in which we were ever en- 
 gaged. 
 
 Major Outram. 
 
 Mr Jambs Outram arrived at Bombay as a gentleman cadet in the Hon. 
 Company's Service on the 1 5th of August 1819, and very shortly after hav- 
 ing joined was appointed adjutant of a newly raised Sepoy regiment, now 
 the Bombay 23d L.I. In those days of military activity, when every month 
 had its conflict or scene of adventure to record, an appointment such as that 
 with which Lieut. Outram was entrusted, was one of the most honourable 
 and responsible so young an officer could have conferred upon him : and no 
 man could have filled it with more credit to himself, or benefit to the army, 
 than the subject of our narrative. 
 
 In 1824 the fort of Kittoor, in the Southern Mahratta country, was gar- 
 risoned by a party of troops much too weak to withstand severe assault, but 
 unsuspicious, at the same time, of the approach of hostilities. On the 23d 
 of October an insurrection broke out ; the resident, Mr Thackeray, with 
 Captains Black and De'ghton, were killed, and the whole of the troops were 
 surrounded and taken prisoners. A large force having been dispatched to 
 
 52. Speech of Sir C. Napier at a dinner given by the whole of the Officers of 
 the force, at Sukkur, subsequent to Major Outram 's loss of office, and prior 
 to his quilting Scinde. 
 
249 
 
 chastise the insurgents, and recover our captive soldiers, Kittoor was taken 
 on the 6tli December, with a loss on our side of six only : 1000 of the 
 enemy were believed to have fallen. It was at one time supposed that it 
 would have been necessary to storm the fort, and, at his own request, Lieut . 
 Oulram was appointed to lead the forlorn hope. This operation was after- 
 wards found unnecessary, the place having been surrendered without assault ; 
 but in the dispatch of Col. Deacon, Lieut. Outram is particularly mentioned, 
 as having, along with Captain Pouget and Lieut. Lawrie, been of the 
 greatest use in the dangerous service of reconnoitering. In 1825 a rebel- 
 lion having broken out in the western part of Candeish, headed, as was be- 
 lieved, by Appa Sahib, ex-Rajah of Nagpore, the standard of the Peish- 
 ■wa was raised, and the fort of Moolair taken possession of by the rebels. 
 Troops were ordered to advance with the utmost expedition from all the 
 posts around; and reinforcements were summoned from stations so remote 
 as Jaulna and Surat. Lieut. Outram was then at Malligaura. A detach- 
 ment of 200 men was entrusted to his charge to relieve Moolair, not then 
 known to have fallen. Purposely passing the fort, which he ascer- 
 tained to have been captured, he pushed on by a rapid and brilliantly- 
 executed night march till he overtook the rebels : completely taken by 
 surprise, and without the remotest idea that an enemy was near, they 
 were attacked, defeated, and dispersed in an inconceivably short space 
 of time. One of the leaders of the insurrection was killed : the fort was re- 
 taken, and the first overpowering success followed up with such celerity and 
 vigour, that the whole were reduced to submission before the other detach- 
 ments, which had been put in orders, were able to reach the scene of action. 
 About this time, Lieut. Outram was appointed to raise a Bheel corps in 
 Candeish, and the countries of the barbarous tribes adjoining. In these 
 remote and savage regions, he, for twelve years, laboured without inter- 
 mission, laying the foundations of peace and tranquillity in quarters long a 
 refuge for the robber, and converting the ferocious and untutored Bheel into 
 a defender of the peasant and a cultivator of the soil. These people have, till 
 of late, been considered the most barbarous and unteachable of any of the 
 natives of India. They in general go about almost entirely naked ; they make 
 no attempt at manufactures, even of the rudest sort, and have scarcely 
 any agriculture; they are all but ignorant of peaceful industry, and live 
 almost entirely by plundering neighbouring tribes. The ruder portions of 
 them are armed with bows and arrows,— in their hands not unformidabla 
 weapons. They pay no tax or tribute, and acknowledge no allegiance to 
 any one. They are said to be one of the original races of Central Hindustan. 
 Scarcely a trace of any species of religion is to be found amongst them ; 
 they are nominally of the Brahrainical faith, but pay no heed to the observ- 
 ances considered essential to this form of belief. Whole brigades had, 
 
 I 1 
 
250 
 
 year after year, been employed to no purpose to suppress or chastise 
 the outrages committed by these barbarians on the adjoining frontier. 
 -To deal with them from within : to convert the disturbers of the peace 
 into its preservers, appeared never to have been -thought of; and indeed 
 witli such materials the task seemed hopeless and chimerical enough. 
 Lieut. Outram, at the hourly peril of his life- proceeded at once and 
 'almost alone into the jungle, bent on the execution of his dangerous 
 and all but desperate mission. The nature of the difficulties encountered 
 may be gathered from the means taken to overcome them. It was at 
 first found impossible to make the Bheels comprehend what was desired 
 of them ; and when this had been got over, it was most difficult to find 
 any stimulant or motive adequate to induce them to comply with our 
 Irishes. The great seducer of civilised, as of savage men — intoxicating li- 
 jguor— was at length resorted to. And for months and months together he 
 managed to keep first some hundreds and then several thousands of those 
 speedily destined to become temperate and orderly soldiers, around him by 
 "the mere influence of arrack. The men and their future officer began at 
 length to understand each other. They had now been for a time at least 
 detached from their kin Ired, as well as from their habits of depredation and 
 pillage, and the next thing was to wean them from the excesses by the in- 
 dulgence in which these things had been efiPected. It is needless to go into 
 the details of the tedious and dangerous measures by which the drunken 
 savage was converted into the sober, orderly, and steady soldier : it is enough 
 to state, that in five years' time the Bheel corps, if not so temperate or man- 
 ageable as a sepoy regiment, was equal in sobriety to any English fcrce, and 
 80 thoroughly to be depended on, that they were employed with perfect 
 guccess in the escort of treasure through the very country which so short- 
 ly before had furnished the scenes of their own most lawless acts. Suc- 
 ceeding officers have ably and faithfully carried into execution the system 
 thus begun ; but for its plan, and for surmounting the fearful difficulties 
 presenting themselves at its conamencement, we are entirely indebted to 
 Major Outram. In 1830 this officer, still a subaltern, was entrusted with the 
 command of a very important expedition, undertaken expressly on his 
 own urgent recommendation, into the countries bordering on the scenes 
 of his recent operations. The force committed to his charge consisted of 
 detachments from regiments of the line, the Bheel corps, the Poonah horse, 
 and other native auxiliaries ; and its object was the invasion of Daung, a 
 strong, jungly, robber country, dividing Candeish from Surat. Sir John 
 Malcolm, then governor of the Western Presidency, doubted the practica- 
 bility, and feared the results, of such an undertaking, even if set about with 
 double the force which could then be spared : and he yielded only to the 
 urgent entreaties of the officer who recommended it, and who pledged him- 
 
251 
 
 • 
 
 Relf for its perfect success. Mr Outram'a character and thorough know- 
 ledge of the neighbouring' country and the people around, afforded assure- 
 ance that any pledge he made on such a subject was likely to be redeemed. 
 Within one month of our advance the entire tribes of a territory till now com- 
 pletely unknown to us, and whose jungles had never been penetrated till 
 entered by our troops, were completely subdued, and the whole of their chiefs 
 and rajahs, amounting to seven in number, were prisoners in Lieutenant 
 Outram's hands. This, considering its magnitude, was one of the most 
 brilliant and successful feats of arms from the time of the Mahratta war. 
 
 From Candeish Captain Oatram was, in 1833, transferred by the sa- 
 gacity of thelate Sir R. Grant, Gfovernorof Bombay, to the Mahee Caunta 
 in Guzerat. Inhabited by turbulent and warlike predatory tribes, this 
 country had been for years, almost for ages, a scene of desolation, pillage, 
 and slaughter. Might constituted right, security for life and property was 
 unknown, and year after year military operations, with their attendant evils 
 and transiettt or doubtful success, became necessary for the protection of 
 our subjects. Within the short space of three years, Captain Outram, by 
 the strength of his intellect, and fertility of his resources, try his unwearied 
 industry and conciliating spirit, brought peace and order where such bless- 
 ings had before been unknown. This was effected without his having ever, 
 with one single exception, had occasion to resort to arms. The ex- 
 periment tried with such admirable results in Candeish was here repeated 
 with renewed success : and so stable have these arrangements proved, that 
 for the past seven years tranquillity has scarcely ever been interrupted. 
 Here was organized the Coolie Police corps,— composed, as its name de- 
 notes, from the predatory races. 
 
 In December, 1838, he joined the army of the Indus, acting as extra A.D.C. 
 to Lord Keane. We had scarcely touched the shores of Scinde when the 
 zeal, promptitude, and indomitable activity of Capt. Outram were of the 
 utmost service to the army. It was not very wonderful that the Ameers of 
 Hydrabad should not be over-zealous in promoting the success of an expedi- 
 tion, one of the objects of which was to render them tributaries to a sove- 
 reign whose rule they had renounced, and mulct them at starting of 
 £300,000. The carriage-cattle they bad promised had not made their ap- 
 pearance on the arrival of our army at Vikkur, and nothing but the efforts 
 of Capt. Outram in procuring camels from Cutch enabled them to advance 
 at the time they did. His adventures on the expedition of Lord Keano are 
 80 fully given in the First Chapter of this narrative that they may here be safe- 
 ly omitted. Though he lost the favour of the Commander-in-Chief he was re- 
 peatedly thanked by the Supreme Government, as well as the Shah Soo- 
 jah, for his exertions. In 1840 he was appointed Resident at Hydra'^-d, 
 
252 
 
 d Political Agent for Lower Scinde, and as has just been seen, he, in 
 August 1841, was promoted to the charge of the whole country from 
 Quettah to Kurrachee. 
 
 We have had repeated occasion to refer to the sad disrepute into which 
 our hitherto unimpeachable character for good faith and veracity had fallen 
 under the administration of Mr Ross Bell. The bitter stigma which 
 the order of an advance on Cabool occasioned^ after the Sirdars had 
 agreed to every proposition we had made to them, was infinitely more 
 merited in western than in eastern Affghanistan — where we were said 
 *' to have taught every chief to lie and cheat by our example." (53) Major 
 Outram's two years' residence at Hydrabad had made the natives well 
 aware of his character as a soldier and politician. Intimately acquainted 
 with the principles, prejudices, manners, and feelings of the semi-bar- 
 barians with whom he had to deal ; he was by nature eminently fitted 
 to command their respect and esteem. Brave, determined, prompt and de- 
 cided in all his proceedings ; he was forbearing, frank, and forgiving. He 
 ■was as destitute as any man alive of those Jesuitical qualities which appear 
 occasionally to be considered essential to good statesmanship amongst the 
 class of diplomists who appear to think that no negociation can claim 
 the character of skill which is not marked by dissimulation, disingenuous- 
 ness, and concealment, or which would not readily avail itself of direct fraud 
 could its objects be forwarded thereby. In Mr Bell's time, the chiefs never 
 appear to have treated with us without a suspicion that, in some way or 
 other, they were meant to be overreached. In that of his successor they were 
 told at once what was desired of them ; their expostulations, if they had any to 
 offer, were duly considered and yielded to a.t/irst, if found reasonable; and 
 they knew that whatever Major Outram said, whether as threat or promise, 
 would be made good whatever might be the consequences. He permitted 
 his intercourse with them to be interrupted by no parade of ceremony — to 
 be perverted by the intervention of no third parties. On all occasions they 
 found access to him personally, and at once had their case listened to with^ 
 patience, and decided on with justice and moderation without a moment's 
 delay. Where any thing was suspected of being wrong. Major Outram was 
 on the spot to examine and inquire for himself, and that with a rapidity 
 of movement which cast the celerity of their own wild forays into the shade. 
 Before he had been three months in power, he found that distrust had 
 vanished : that he had done as much as mortal man could accomplish in 
 
 53. Dkhbar Khan's remark to Captain Troup on his having returned from 
 Jellalabad with the treaty unratified. (Jahappily, the charge of the Sirdar 
 against our Government is fully borne out by the evidence of the Blue Book 1 
 Surely impeachment is barely enough for those who have done so much to de- 
 file the fair and unsullied fame of England in the East. 
 
253 
 
 remedying the injury bis predecessor had inflicted on our character^ We 
 once more became trusted; the veracity of the political agent, instead of 
 being a subject of mockery and derision, was looked upon as inviolable — as it 
 was wont throughout the east to have been, till these unhappy wars began. 
 
 The result was even more auspicious than could have been anticipated ; 
 showing what deep cause we have for grief, that the system which led to it 
 was not earlier resorted to and practised over a far wider field. 
 
 From October 1841, when our misfortunes began, till November 1842, 
 when they had been fully and finally retrieved, and the policy which led to 
 them was for a time abandoned and repudiated, there occurred not betwixt 
 Quettah and the sea, either in Scinde or Beloochistan, a single exhibition 
 of hostility or distrust towards us : though at this time there was not one 
 solitary tribe from I'esheen to Peshawur, including the districts around Can- 
 dahar, Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelialabad, which had not attacked us. The 
 invaluable services of Major Outrara in collecting baggage-cattle, forward- 
 ing treasure, and hastening and facilitating the advance of troops, in a 
 great measure contributed to our ultimate success. His conduct in this 
 respect appears at the time to have been appreciated both by the late 
 and the present Governor-General. In the despatches published in the Blue 
 Book it is repeatedly mentioned in terras of the greatest approbatien ; 
 and Lord Auckland, since his return to England, has, in Parliament, 
 bestowed on it the highest commendations. There were few who could 
 be persuaded of the desperate position to which the Doorannee alliance 
 had reduced the finances of India by the end of 1841 ; a position which, if 
 no insurrectio.i had occurred, would, before the close of 1842, have com- 
 pelled us, under any circumstances, to have retired frona the country ; and 
 Major Outrara appeared for a time to believe, notwithstanding the assurances 
 of Government to the contrary, that so soon as the insurrection was sub- 
 dued we should resume the place we held before it began. No man more 
 deeply deplored the resolution for a time adopted by the Government, of 
 retiring from the country before any attempt to retrieve our reverses had 
 been made. He recommended that Candahar and Jelialabad should, at all 
 events, be held as outposts for the year 18i2,(54) and deprecating in the 
 strongest manner the withdrawal of the garrison of Sir R. Sale, he stated, 
 that he did not conceive that a measure more injurious to our interests 
 in Aflfghanistan, or one more likely to endanger our character there and 
 in India, could have been devised by our bitterest enemy. These views 
 were fully concurred ia by Mr Clerk and Major Rawlinson, who pro- 
 posed a formal invasion of the country for next year. Farther on, when 
 
 64- Blue Book, p. 197. Sir J. Nicolls' letter to the Governor in Council, 
 March 30, 1842 ; given verbatim. 
 
254 
 
 General Nott had been reinforced by the brigade of General England, and 
 fully supplied with carriage, Major Outratn recommeuded that a direct 
 movement should be made from Candahar on Cabool, without waiting for 
 General Pollock, whose force was unable to proceed for want of carriage, 
 and was, besides, not necessary, — the Candahar army being strong enough 
 to accomplish every object the government had in view, (55) Had this 
 advice been followed, the achievements undertaken at such enormous hazard 
 in September and October, might have been accomplished in June — the 
 troops retiring by Jellalabad, without General Pollock incurring the cost, 
 risk, and tremendous labour and loss of money, in penetrating the defiles 
 beyond Gundamuck. It is not exactly known from what cause Major Out- 
 ram incurred the displeasure, and drew down the manifestations of spite 
 80 meanly vented on him shortly afterwards by the Governor- General. 
 He remained in full favour up to the beginning of May, at which time it 
 was intimated to him that he was to be appointed Envoy at the court of 
 Hydrabad — hostilities against the Ameers not having at this period been 
 dreamt of. The source of offence is said to have been the friendly interest 
 taken by him in Lieutenant Hammersley, assistant political at Quettah. 
 General England, with a reinforcement of 1200 men, and convoy of J 500 
 camels, and £45,000 of treasure, while on his way to Candahar, where the 
 troops were suffering extremely for want of medicine, and were disabled for 
 field service from deficiency of cash and carriage, was met at Hykulzye by a 
 force of the enemy said to have been nearly 800 strong. An ill-advised attompt 
 to storm in line ! a hillock which might easily have been turned or commanded, 
 occasioned the repulse of the storming party of 180, when, to the astonishment 
 of every officer in the force, the whole brigade was ordered to retreat a dis- 
 tance of 25 miles, and immediately on arriving at Quettah, commenced en- 
 trenching themselves as if for a siege, leaving the troops of General Nott to 
 their fate. For a much more venial error Admiral Byng had been tried and 
 shot. A despatch, making a fearful parade of dangers and difficulties, in refe- 
 rence to which no information had been provided by the political ageat. was 
 forwarded to the Supreme Government, and Lieutenant Hammersley was dis- 
 missed. Major Outram wrote to Lord Ellenborough entreating him to sus- 
 pend judgment on this point, until enquiry had been made as to the nature of 
 the Hykulzye defences, and the time occupied in their construction, both of 
 ^hich were represented by General England in such a formidable light that 
 the political agent ought to have been informed of the matter. The officers 
 
 55. This was exactly the doctrine laid down by the Bombay Times so far 
 back as March, and insisted on so long as there appeared to be any intention 
 of advancing at all — that ?/ a demonstration on Cabool was to be made, General 
 Nott might advance with a brigade of 6000, leaving 50u0 at Candahar and 
 Kelatd-Ghilzie, and level every town in Affghanistan if deemed expedient. 
 
255 
 
 X)T General England's army were almost unanimously of opinion that the 
 Hykulzye despatch was a tissue of the most grievous mis-statements. To 
 the recommendation for inquiry the Governor-General did not think fit to 
 accede.(56) The perfect facility with which the same ground was gone 
 over by the same detachment exactly a month afterwards, shewed that it was 
 neither the existence of defences nor the want of information, but the gross 
 mismanagement of the commanding officer, which occasioned the retreat from 
 Hykulzye before an inferior force: the only disgraceful military measure 
 (those at Cabool excepted) which occurred during the war. Lieut. Hammers- 
 ley's health had suffered from the extent of his exertions and the insalu- 
 brity of the climate^ and this harsh, ungenerous, and unjust decision, proved 
 fatal to him. 
 
 Major Ontram had now committed an unpardonable offence in interposing 
 in behalf of his friend ; and he also must be victimized. From the 2d of 
 May, when the intention of appointing him envoy to the court of Hydrabad 
 was announced to him, on to the 19Lh of October, he heard no more on the 
 subject ; but had no reason to suppose the resolution of the Governor-General 
 in his favour altered. A notification in the Gazette of the latter date intimated 
 his summary removal from all political employ, placing his services at the dis- 
 posal of the Commander-in-Chief for regimental duty ; his salary and al- 
 lowances to cease from the 15th November, the duties of political aj^ent here- 
 after to be discharged by the extra Aides-de-Camp of General Napier. (57) 
 On the 4th of November he received a public dinner at Sukkur previously 
 to his departure for Bombay. General Napier presided, and except those 
 who were detained by indisposition, of the officers belonging to an army of 
 nearly 10,000 men scarcely one was absent. The gallant chairman wisely 
 avoided all allusion to public affairs, especially to the treatment their guest 
 had recently experienced. He proposed his health as the *' Bayard of the 
 Indian army — the Chevalier sans peur et sans re.proche.^^ On his arrival at 
 Bombay a similar testimony of public regard awaited liim ; he was entertained 
 on the 13ih December by a party of upwards of 100, including the Secretaries 
 and Aides-de-Camp of the Governor, the Secretaries of Governnient, heads 
 of all the departments, the Judges, senior Civil Servants and Staff Olficers, 
 and the whole elite of the Presidency. Had he gone the round of India he 
 would probably have met with compliments similarly arratifying at every mi- 
 
 56 Blue Book, p 2(37, Lord Ellen bo rough's leiter to ttie Secret Coujinittee, 
 8th June J the wording of this letter has, m the text, been pretty closely ad- 
 hered to. 
 
 67. It must be kept in view, that the order applied to all che Scinde politi- 
 cals; Major Outram was included amongst the common herd 5 not the slight- 
 est notice being now taken of his services. The conduct of the Governor- 
 General has been apoloj;ized for on the plea that a functionary such as Major 
 Outram was no longer required in Scinde. The appointment of Lieut. Brown 
 as commissioner, shews that this excuse is baseless. 
 
256 
 
 litary station in the Company's territories. He at this time proposed to proceed 
 to England on furlough. No sooner had Sir C. Napier taken in hand to un- 
 ravel the tangled skein of Scindian polities, than he found that a task had 
 been imposed on hlra which he was wholly unable to execute. He applied 
 to the Supreme Government for assistance, and was permitted to req'iest 
 the services of Major Outrara ; the Governor- General had not the courtesy 
 to make the nomiaation direct, — it was done by Sir C. Napier. After slights 
 and insults such as these, Major Outram might readily have excused him- 
 self from assuming a subordinate appointment where he had, three months 
 before, been supreme, on the plea that he had made arrangements for imme- 
 diate return to England ; he never thought of this ; he had for twenty years 
 devoted his life to the service of his Government without the most remote 
 idea of indulging in personal feeling ; and now, when required to resume the 
 duties of an office from which he had been so lately and summarily discarded, 
 he set private arrangements and personal considerations at naught, and started 
 at once for Kurrachee. His appearance on the 4th January in Sir C. Napier's 
 camp, and subsequent interview with the Ameers, made almost an instan- 
 taneous change in the aspect of affairs— it inspired confidence of our peace- 
 ful and honest intentions in the bosoms of the Chiefs, who were at once 
 willing to accept Major Outram as a referee, and to be guided by his de- 
 cisions on any question of misunderstanding betwixt them and the Supreme 
 Government. The Governor- General had by this time resolved to have terms 
 proposed to the Ameers so injurious and insulting, that compliance 
 with them could never have been expected. The object was to bring 
 them into such total subjection that their independence would hereafter 
 be virtually annihilated : or to force a quarrel on them which might 
 compel conflict and afford us a pretence for conquering the country. 
 Having succeeded in inducing them to subscribe the treaty : there were 
 certain secret and most exorbitant stipulations contained in separate in- 
 structions, which he was directed to insist upon, but which the Ameers 
 could not be prevailed on to comply with. While yet at court, and in hopes 
 that he might induce them to concede even these, General Napier continued 
 to advance steadily on Hydrabad with a force of 2,700 men. The Ameers 
 intimated to Major Outram, that unless the army halted until negociations 
 had finally been broken off or concluded, they would be compelled to move 
 out and protect their capital, from which our troops, whose object could no 
 longer be mistaken, were now only 30 miles off; and they fully warned the 
 Commissioner, that unless he retired, they could not further be answerable 
 for his safety. Anxious to avert a conflict which he clearly foresaw would be a 
 desperate and bloody one, and in expectation that he might still be enabled to 
 obtain by persuasion that which Sir C. Napier was prepared to extort by force ; 
 he remained after he had received a first, and then a second formal warning to 
 
257 
 
 depart, or until he and his escort of 100 men were attacked by 8000 of the 
 enraged Beloochees now on the eve of marching forth to the fatal field of 
 Meeanee. Above 90 of the enemy were killed in the defence, and Major 
 Outram expressed a fervent but not sanguine hope, " that their deaths might 
 not be charged on him as murders," He considered the attack on himself 
 as perfectly justifiable by the laws even of Christian war ; and conceived, 
 that so far were the Ameers from being chargeable with the treachery im- 
 puted to them by the Governor-General, that they had acted a thoroughly 
 candid, friendly, and generous part, till forced to betake themselves to arms. 
 Major Outram joined Sir C. Napier on the eve of the battle of Meeanee, at 
 which he was not, however, present, having been directed to take in hand 
 the dangerous and troublesome service of destroying by fire the Shikargurs 
 which protected the enemy. He returned to Bombay immediately after the 
 victory, having left Hydrabad on the 21st, and reached the presidency on 
 the 26th February. It was resolved that on this occasion a Sword, to the 
 value of 300 guineas, should be presented to him by his friends: the sub- 
 scription list was filled up with the utmost celerity ; and had it been extend- 
 ed to the services throughout India at large, £3000 would, in all likelihood, 
 have been got as readily as £300. The following inscription was desired to 
 be engraven on the blade:—" Presented to Major James Outram, 23d Regt. 
 Bombay Native Light Infantry, in token of the regard of his friends, and 
 the high estimation in which he is held for the intrepid gallantry which has 
 marked his career in India, but more especially his heroic defence of the 
 British residency at Hyderabad in Scinde, on the 15th February 1843» 
 against an army of 8000 Beloochees, with six guns ;" on the opposite side 
 were the words—" sans peur et sans reproche^ He sailed for England on 
 the 1st April. The stand made at the residency was considered so admirable, 
 that Sir C. Napier made it a subject of separate memorial for the Governor- 
 General, as an example of the defence of a military post. (58) No notice 
 was ever taken of this by government, and Major Outram now remains the 
 only ofiicer who did duty near Hydrabad whose services have not been pub- 
 licly noticed in any way by Government. His brethren in arms who could 
 appreciate his heroic virtues, were not slow in expressing their sentiments 
 on the subject : the rulers he served alone remained silent ! It may be 
 added, in conclusion, that when he temporarily resumed his political duties, 
 be declined to accept of any remuneration ; and that while acting as Com- 
 
 58. This is in part an assumption j Sir Charles, at the close of his despatch 
 of the 18th February, promises to send this, and there is no reason to doubt 
 that the promise was fulfilled : tho text gives nearly the words of the despatch 
 —proceeding thus far oa the hypothesis as to the paper having beon forwarded. 
 
 K 1 
 
258 
 
 mlsaioner in Scinde, betwixt the 19th December and 20th February, he was 
 only in the receipt of the pay and allowances>of a Captain of the 23d N.L.I. 
 He proposes to remain two years in Europe ; by the time of his return it 
 is to be hoped that the Government of India will be in the bauds of some 
 one capable of appreciating the worth of services such as his. 
 
259 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Events near Cabool in the beginning of 1841— Brlgadiag of tho Troops in Affghanis- 
 tan— Shelton's Brigade leaves Ferozepore— Alleged reduction of the Army— Expedi- 
 tion into the Nazian valley in February— Lieut. Pigou killed by an explosion— Captain 
 Douglas shot— Arrival of the 3d Convoy at Cabool— Return of the Shah and Envoy to the 
 Capital— Arrogance of the Shah— Seikh affairs— Death of Kurruck Sing— Of Nao Nehal Sing 
 — Shere Sing proclaimed King— Dissipated habits of— His coronation— Queen Dowager 
 declared pregnant— Shere Sing withdraws himself— A revolution in the Army— He is restored 
 to the throne— Tranquillity of the Punjaub— Captain Broadfoot's convoy— Death of one of 
 the Royal Ladies— Danger of the Convoy— Coolness and good conduct of Captain Broad- 
 foot— Arrives at Peshawur— Scene of Narrative changes— Suf tar Jung Governor of Canda- 
 bar— His misconduct and dissipation— Discontents in the Ghilzie country— Expedition to 
 Ghirisk— Detachments of the Shah's troops destroyed— Captain Farrington sets out— Pur- 
 sues Ukhtar Khan and defeats him on the Helmund— Ms^Jor Tod's arrival from Herat— Rein- 
 forcements sent to Ghirisk- Major Lynch's management of the Ghilzie country— Resolves 
 to fortify Kelat-i-Ghilzie— Unhappy aflfair at KuUa i- Ingoz— General rising of the country- 
 Colonel Wymer's reinforcement from Candahar— Defeats the enemy— Detachment from 
 Ghuznie quartered at Mookloor— Colonel Chambers's expedition— Success of Captain Walker 
 and Lieut. Bazzett— Captain Woodburu's Detachment sent to Ghirisk— Battle with Ukh- 
 tar BLhan on the Helmund— Misconduct of the Janbaz Horse— Brilliant victory Ex- 
 pedition under Captain Griffin— Battle with Ukhtar Khan's troops— Great slaughter 
 of the enemy— Expedition under Colonel "Wymer into tho Teeree country— Capture 
 of Akram Khan — His execution — Colonel Maclaren's Brigade leaves for India — Di- 
 rected to return and proceed to Cabool— Advance found impossible — Posts in Western 
 Affghanistan in October 1841— Affairs at Cabool— Expedition into the Zoormut Valley- 
 Strength of Army in Eastern Affghanistan— Ghilzie insurrection ocoasipned by stoppage of 
 tribute— Conclusion— Loss of life during the Affghan war— Loss of Treasure— Sir W. Mac- 
 naghten's letter on presenting Sir Alexander Barnes's memorial— Apathy of the people at 
 home— Lord Palmerston's Tiverton speech- Proposed continuation and subsequent aban- 
 donment of our Affghan policy— Reflections on the conduct of the Political Agents— Noble 
 conduct of the Army— Conclusion. 
 
 Thb history of the events in Beloochistan and Scinde arising out of our 
 connection "with the Doorannee sovereign has, in last chapter, been brought 
 down to the commencement of the Ghilzie insurrection, when our alliance 
 may be said to have terminated, the whole of its objects having been frustrated : 
 from this time we remained in the country, in the first place until we 
 could find the means of retiring from it ; and afterwards, on second thoughts, 
 till some signal mark of our vengeance had been inflicted on the AfFghans for 
 daring to dispute our right to make a causeless invasion into their territo- 
 ries,— and for having conducted that dispute with the falsehood, perfidy, and 
 vindictiveness characteristic of the quarter of the globe to which they be- 
 longed. 
 
 The thread of the narrative, in order of time running parallel with this, 
 requires now to be resumed at Cabool, where it was broken off at the close 
 of the third chapter, with the account of the surrender of Dost Mahomed in 
 
260 
 
 November 1840, and the temporary and partial tranquillity which imme- 
 diately thereafter ensued. This auspicious state of repose was of short 
 duration ; so soon as the season for active operations opened, one general 
 ferment of discontent and insurrection made its appearance from Ghirisk to 
 Jellalabad i a condition of matters which was never remedied or allayed dur- 
 ing the period of our continuance in the country. 
 
 The following order was issued on the 28th of January, for the brigading 
 of the troops in Affghanistan : (I) the first brigade of infantry, stationed at 
 Cabool, and consisting of H. M.'s 13th, the 16th, 35th, and 37th Bengal 
 N. l.t to be under the command of Sir Robert Sale ; Capt. Wade, of H. M.'s 
 13th, acting as major of brigade. The Candahar, or second brigade, 
 under the charge of General Nott, was to consist of the 2d, 42d, and 43d 
 N.I. The third brigade, consisting of H. M.'s 44th, the 27th and 54th 
 N.I., was to be commanded by Colonel Shelton: it was at this time at Jel- 
 lalabad. These three brigades comprised nine regiments of the line, of 
 which two were Queen's and seven Company's, and contained probably 
 about 7,500 men. This was exclusive of the Bombay troops at Quettah 
 in Beloochistan, and Scinde, — as well as of cavalry, artillery, the Shah's 
 contingent, and all irregulars, — which brought up the strength of the army 
 required to be paid by the East India Company for the maintenance of the 
 Poorannee alliance, to betwixt 25,000 and 30,000 men. Loose as tho statement 
 appears, it is difficult to make it more specific, from the fluctuating strength 
 of the irregulars, which constituted nearly one half of the contingent. 
 
 When these arrangements were made, Colonel Shelton was still on his 
 march. He left Ferozepore on the 8th December, 1840, reached 
 Peshawur in the beginning of January, and arrived at Jellalabad about 
 the 25th of that month. He crossed the convoy accompanying Dost 
 Mahomed to Hindostan, at Rawul Pindee, on the 6 th January. The 
 Kaffila escorted by Colonel Shelton's troops is commonly known as the second 
 convoy of the season ; the first having been that under Colonel Wallace, 
 mentioned in a previous chapter, and usually termed the grand convoy. 
 The third convoy left Ferozepore on the 31st January : it was escorted by a 
 wing of the 5th N. I., a detachment of H. M-'s troops (details of the 13th 
 and 44lh) under Captain Havelock, and a detachment of the Company's 
 under Captain Manning and Lieut. Pottiager, some artillery drafts under 
 Lieut. Brougham, and a Goorkah detachment under Lieut. Crawford ; the 
 whole was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Oliver. (2) General Elphinstone 
 and Brigadier Anquetil accompanied this force, together with Major Thane 
 and Lieut. Eyre— all names of men speedily destined to occupy a conspicu- 
 
 1. Calcutta Government Gazette, January 28. 
 
 2. Delhi Gazette^ February 3- 
 
261 
 
 ous place amongst the fearful events which followed ten months afterwards. 
 Sir Willoughby Cotton crossed them on his return three marches on their 
 way : he reached Ferozepore on the 6 th February. 
 
 The 1st Bengal European regiment, and two companies of the 27th N.I., 
 which had accompanied the grand convoy, under Colonel Wallace, were 
 sent back to India under command of Colonel Wheeler, as an escort to Sir 
 W. Cotton. These were replaced by Shelton's brigade, and the troops 
 attending the second and third convoys, about 4000 in all, as a substitute 
 for 1100 withdrawn. These changes were afterwards censured as prema- 
 ture withdrawals of the troops from Affghanistaa,— three men being sent 
 where one was intended to be taken away ! 
 
 The most continuous and uninterrupted series of disorders requiring to be 
 enumerated occurred in 1841 near Candahar ; and that the narrative of these 
 may be left unbroken, a slight departure from strict chronological order will 
 permit the expedition of Colonel Shelton into the Nazian valley to be notic- 
 ed without breaking in upon the history of the squabbles with the Western 
 Ghilzies : those to the east and south of Cabool having given little trouble 
 from the month of February till the great and disastrous outbreak of October. 
 
 Colonel Shelton, when on his way from Ferozepore, was directed by the 
 Envoy to proceed from Jellalabad to chastise a refractory tribe called the 
 Sungoo Kail, inhabiting the Nazian valley. For this purpose, a strong force 
 marched from Jellalabad on the 21st February, consisting of a detachment 
 of Sappers and Miners, and a troop of Horse Artillery with four guns, 
 H. M.'s 44th, and the 27th N. I. Troops of the Shah Soojah consisting 
 of a detachment of the mountain train, 1 squadron of the 2d Cavalry, 3d 
 Infantry Regiment, and 1st corps of Janbaz Cavalry. This force arrived at 
 Pesh Bolack, a distance of about twenty-three miles, on tho 23d, and was 
 joined by Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchies, and the 3d Regiment of 
 Janbaz, Quitting this post on the morning of the 24th,(3) the Nazian val- 
 ley was entered by the Sarobi Pass soon after daybreak. The force having 
 been divided, Colonel Shelton advanced up the centre of the valley with 
 six companies of H. M.'s 44th under Colonel Mackerell, a similar number 
 of the 27th N. I. under Col. Palmer, (4) and two guns under Capt. Nicholl.- 
 The 1st Shah's Janbaz regiment, the 2d cavalry, and two hundred JezaiU 
 chees, under Hyder Alii, a native commandant, proceeded from the left flank 
 along the high ground, closing the valley on the east side : the remainder 
 of this corps, moving from the extreme right of the detachment, under 
 Captain Ferris, were to attack the enemy on the left : two companies of 
 
 3. Brigadier Shelton's Despatch. 
 
 4. This officer with his regiment (27th N, I.) was shut up in Ghuznie in 
 the following November, and becamo a prisoner in March 1843, remaining iu 
 the hands of the enemy till September. 
 
262 
 
 II.M.'s 44th, and two of the 27th N.I., supported by detachments from the 
 same regiments, with two six-pounder guns, under Captains Scott and 
 Swayne, moved along the heights on the west of the valley. A strong hody 
 of regulars and irregulars made a considerable detour so as to enter by 
 the eastern pass the dell, which was thus hemmed in on all sides. Captain 
 Ferris came in almost immediate contact with the enemy : he attacked them 
 with great spirit, pursuing them with the most determined gallantry over 
 almost inaccessible heights, and driving them before him under a galling 
 fire. The Jezailchees suffered severely in the performance ot this service. The 
 insurgents were retiring with their women and children, and driving off their 
 flocks, inclining the line of their retreat so as to get out of reach of our fire 
 with all convenient speed, when Hyder Ali, with his two hundred Jezail- 
 chees, met them and captured most of their cattle : Lieutenant Golding, 
 with his Janbaz, made a successful charge upon the fugitives, and destroyed 
 a considerable number in their attempts to escape. Some skirmishing had, 
 meanwhile, occurred up and down the valley, where the conduct of the 
 troops was excellent, and their success complete. A few men still held out 
 in two of the forts, till the gates were blown open by powder-bags. The 
 explosion on the second occasion proved fatal to Lieutenant Pigou of the 
 Engineers, who, with the utmost coolness and gallantry, conducted the 
 operations. He was blown up and killed : his body falling at a distance of 
 about eighty yards from the place of explosion. The Naziaa valley is about 
 eight miles in length, studded from end to end, on both sides, with forts. 
 Nearly the whole were in our possession by a little after noon, the advance 
 of the troops having been one continued course of success. Oar casualties 
 amounted to eighteen killed, and thirty-four wounded : those of the enemy 
 were estimated at from forty to fifty killed and wounded. The following 
 day the same force proceeded into a secluded valley adjoining, similarly de- 
 fended, and sprinkled with forts, but of which scarcely any thing was known : 
 they continued as formerly to carry every thing before them. Tho ground 
 over which the march had to be performed was difficult : the defiles were deep, 
 narrow, and appalling ; the heights requiring to be crowned by the flanking 
 parties rugged and precipitous. The loss of Captain Douglas, who was 
 shot dead by the side of his commander, was the only casualty which oc- 
 curred, and by the evening of the 25th, eighty-twoforts had been captured. (5) 
 The force returned to camp, having fulfilled the objects of the expedition 
 in devastating a valley whose inhabitants had proved refractory on the 
 usual subject of tribute, it is presumed : though the occasion or manner 
 in which the insubordination for which they were chastised manifested itself, 
 13 not stated. The third convoy of the season, which, as already noticed, 
 
 r\ Colonel Shelton's Despatch, 25th February. 
 
263 
 
 commenced its march on the 1st February, was now well on its way towards 
 the Attock, and Captain Broadfoot, escorting a portion of the Shah's family, 
 had just entered, or was about to enter, the Seikh territory, where the dis- 
 pute for the succession betwixt the Dowager Princess and Shere Singh was 
 threatening disorder. 
 
 The third brigade, in consequence of the disturbances apprehended in the 
 Punjaub, was meanwhile ordered to stand fast at Jellalabad, to watch the 
 progress of events. The third convoy arrived in safety on the 4th April : 
 General Elphinstone hating preceded them by four days. The 54th N. I. 
 and a squadron of the Light Cavalry were ordered to proceed to Gunda- 
 muck on the 8th to keep open the way for the convoy itself, which, accom- 
 panied by its former escort, marched on the 9th. The Shah Soojah, at- 
 tended by the Envoy and court, who had, as in the first year of the new 
 reign, taken up his winter quarters at Jellalabad, was enabled by the guard 
 of the convoy to return to Cabool on the 30th of April, accompanied by 
 General Elphinstone, who, as already mentioned, took the place of Sir 
 Willoughby Cotton in the command of the forces in AfFghanistan — a brief, 
 troubled, and disastrous charge. The arrogance of the weak and unhappy 
 monarch had grown upon him, as might have been expected, by the 
 adulation which was paid to him, and the actual power which our friendship 
 had enabled him to exercise compared to the mere nominal authority he had 
 formerly possessed when on the throne- Punctilious at all times, he now 
 gave full rein to that small-minded and miserable selfishness which fur- 
 nished the most prominent feature in his character ; insisting on the 
 minutest observance of etiquette and ceremony. (6) 
 
 C. The following extract of a letter of Sir William Macaaghten's, accom- 
 panying the report of Sir A. Burnes on the Consolidation of Affghanistan, to 
 which we have already had occasion to refer, sufficiently indicates the excessively 
 exaggerated view taken of his majesty's excellences by the envoj'' in August 
 1840 ; — " His Majesty invariably evinces the greatest anxiety that justice should 
 bo done to all his subjects. His Majesty sits in durbar every morning, except 
 Thursday, for about two hours, and listens with the greatest patience to tho re- 
 presentations of his chiefs. One day is set apart for hearing the complaints of 
 all those who may allege that they have not received redress from the autho- 
 rities to whom their cases have been referred. — Though stern in the execution 
 of justice (as was exemplified only the other day in the case of the murderer 
 in whose pardon so much influence was exerted) yet His Majesty is merciful 
 and kind-hearted in the extreme ; and if the personal qualities of a monarch 
 could ensure popularity, Shah Soojah could not fail to obtain it. My longer 
 experience of His Majesty's character more thoroughly convinces me of tho 
 truth of what I have already asserted, that there is not an abler or a better 
 man than himself in all his dominions." — The subjoined extract from a private 
 journal kept by Sir Alexander Burnes up to the day before his murder, and 
 preserved by Mohun Lai, will show how completely the opinions of Sir W- 
 Macnaghten were shortly afterwards changed : — 
 
 *• Cabool; 1st Sopt^ittber) 1841. * * * Au expression from Mac- 
 
264 
 
 The Envoy, ^yho continued to profess the highest opinion of the ex- 
 cellences of the Shah's character and of his capacity for government, 
 indulged him in the silliest whims, and most absurd and troublesome 
 caprices. On his return to the capital an order was issued that no officer 
 should ride through, or even enter, the Bala Hissar, unless required so to 
 do as a matter of duty. A fort which Captain Main waring had purchased 
 at a large price, as a residence, as well as one of the commissariat stores, 
 were directed to be abandoned or removed as being too near the royal 
 gardens! 
 
 The history of Seikh affairs, from the death of Ruojeet Sing, in July 1839, 
 to the accession of Shere Sing, is well worthy of a separate chapter : it 
 may be sufficient here to remark, that the Lion of the Punjaub having 
 been quietly succeeded by his son, the weak and imbecile Kurruck Sing, 
 this prince was cut off on the 5th November after a lingering and painful 
 illnesss, aggravated by the prescriptions of native physicians, which alone 
 he could be persuaded to attend to. His body was burned, and one of his 
 wives with three or four of her hand-maidens, were immolated on the funeral 
 pyre. His only son and heir, Nao Nehal Sing, was killed the same day by 
 the falling of a beam in one of the city gates on returning from his father's 
 obsequies. 
 
 Two days after this Shere Sing, Governor of Cashmere, was proclaimed 
 Sovereign. This prince was the son of one of the wives of Runjeet Sing, but 
 born on an occasion when her husband had been so long absent from home, 
 as to leave little doubt as to his illegitimacy. He was, however, treated as a 
 prince of the blood, though not considered heir to the throne. He was made 
 governor of Cashmere : was a man of both energy and ability, but of habits 
 so extremely dissipated, that he was much estranged from the old Lion him- 
 self, whose own manner of life should have made him in the last degree 
 forbearing towards the frailties of his imputed son. Shere Sing hastened 
 to Lahore and was duly installed on the musnud. Meanwhile one of 
 the wives of Kurruck Sing was declared pregnant, and shut up in the 
 zenana ; — a large party, including the European officers taken into 
 pay by Runjeet Sing, being attached to her cause. This looked for- 
 midable, and though the people clung to the prince, the strength of his 
 party continued for a time to decline, when at length he professed to have 
 abdicated and retired from power. This was merely a ruse to enable him 
 to visit those districts where he was popular, and to raise and collect his 
 friends for a further effort. A revolution took place early in January, the 
 
 naghten to-day that ' the Shah Soojah was an old woman not fit to rule his 
 people, with divers other condemnations.'— Aye, see my Travels so far back as 
 1831." 
 
265 
 
 prince returned towards the city, the leading men joined him on the way, 
 and the army went over to his standard under the walls of Lahore. Gene- 
 rals Court, Ventura, and Avitabile had been brought over, and before the 
 end of the month, the new ruler was seated on the throne ; the princess 
 having been persuaded to abandon further claims for the present but not till 
 after oflPering a stout defence, in which ^^000 of her followers are said to have 
 fallen. These events occasioned much commotion through the country, the 
 troops becoming mutinous and disorderly, and acting as brigands on the 
 chief lines of route. No serious mischiefs, luckily, arose out of these dis- 
 orders, whose aspect at one time had been so alarming. By the commence- 
 ment of the hot season matters were so far tranquillized that the Seikh 
 troops were entrusted with the conveyance of treasure for our armies. 
 
 About the end of March, Captain Broadfoot left Ferozepore with a 
 weak detachment of sepoys, a small body of Ghoorkas, and a detachment of 
 Alexander's horse— in all about 1000 strong, one half only being regular 
 infantry, — in charge of a portion of the family of the Shah Soojah, including 
 about 100 ladies, who had not till now rejoined him. Soon after he 
 entered the Punjaub, the country became much disturbed , several regi - 
 ments had mutinied, and bands of robbers marauded all over the kingdom. 
 As the ladies' jewels were valuable, and the convoy had a considerable quan- 
 tity of property in charge, a strong inducement to attack was held out to 
 men ever ready to plunder under the slightest of temptations. Much sick- 
 ness prevailed, and nearly 150 sepoys are said to have deserted. An acci- 
 dent occurred early on the march, eminently illustrative of eastern manners, 
 in reference to the seclusion in which the females of the higher ranks are 
 maintained. A restive camel threw its load, consisting of one of the wives of 
 his majesty, concealed with as much privacy as a camel litter would permi t. 
 The beast fell heavily upon his burthen, which now entangled him. In a 
 moment an European officer was on the spot, anxious to release the suflPer- 
 ing captive; who amidst all the terror and torture which the struggles of 
 the restive animal must have occasioned, deprecated interference, and en- 
 treated that no man might approach to subject her to sufferings worse than 
 death, -—that of being seen ! She was so injured that she died a few hours 
 afterwards. Though repeatedly threatened, the prudent conduct and bold 
 front at all times manifested by Captain Broadfoot, overawed the rebels. His 
 chief danger was near Attock, where the occupants of a stockade first threat- 
 ened an immediate attack on him. Though outnumbering his force by 
 about six to one in strength, he sent a peremptory mandate to them, inti- 
 mating that unless they immediately gave him what assistance was required 
 to help him on his way, he would compel them; and that if they continued 
 
 to maintain the present unfriendly attitude, he would attack and destroy 
 
 L 1 
 
266 
 
 their fort. It was easier to make this threat than to carry it into execu- 
 tion; but the bold confidence it implied, served the purposes desired. En- 
 trenchments meanwhile were dug, and defences thrown up, and the most 
 active preparations made for hostilities. The Seikhs even proceeJed so far as 
 to plunder the women's travelling- litters, having- got it into their heads that 
 they carried treasure. They next secured several of our cattle, and some of 
 the chiefs came into camp and became insolent. Finding that Captain 
 Broadfoot was not to be bullied, they produced a letter from Genl. Avitabile, 
 assuring him of protection. This was thrown back in their faces — they 
 were told that fifty letters from the General would not make thieves honest 
 men ; and that they must restore every thing they had taken, or they would 
 be instantly attacked ; and that if this was not done in ten minutes, they 
 would be treated as criminals. They now became terrified, and did as 
 they were desired. Alarmed and humbled, they permitted the convoy to 
 cross the Attock and proceed towards Peshawur, where it arrived in safe- 
 ty on the 18th May. Such, however, had been the alarm for their safety, 
 that Col. Shelton proceeded by forced marches through the pass with H.M.'s 
 44th, 1st troop 1st brigade H. A., two squadrons of the 5th L. C, with the 
 27th and 54th N. I., to assist him in case of need — or at all events to show 
 the Seikhs that aid was at hand. Their duties were happily limiced to 
 those of an escort from Jumrood to Jelallabad. They reached Cabool on the 
 1 7th June ; a party of the Sappers having been left behind to look after the 
 magazine stores at Gundamuck. 
 
 To the northward and westward of Cabool though discontent was ge- 
 neral, and casual outbreaks of a trivial nature not unfrequent, no afi'air 
 of any couBiderable importance occurred betwixt the surrender of Dost Ma- 
 homed and the general rising which took place exactly that day twelve-month 
 — on the 2d November 1841. To the south the Ghilzies and Khyberrees 
 were liberally rewarded for the use of their passes ; and just so long only 
 as their stipend of £8000 a-year was paid in full, did they remain at peace. 
 
 The scene of the narrative which relates to the warlike proceedings of 
 summer 1841 must now be shifted to the westward. At Candahar popular 
 discontent appeared to be approaching a crisis just as matters around Cabool 
 were becoming tranquillized by the surrender of Dost Mahomed on the 
 3d November. (7) Sufter Jung, son of Shah Soojah, had been appointed 
 governor of the town and province, with a salary of £1700 a-year. The whole 
 of the offspring of the Doorannee sovereign — Prince Timour alone excepted 
 — appeared to have been men of the most worthless character, and depraved 
 and dissipated habits. The Candahar governor was a wretch too execrable 
 
 7. See Chapter III., p, 162. 
 
267 
 
 to live. He is said frequently to have increased an income of £140 a- 
 month to £10,000, by extortion alone : on one occasion, he put a merchant 
 to the torture on some frivolous pretence, and released him only when £300 
 had been paid by his relations for his liberation. The money thus vil- 
 lanously obtained was squandered in the grossest sensuality, and in shame- 
 less and excessive indulgence in a vice not uncommon in the east, which 
 in Europe is reckoned so infamous, above all others, as to be nameless. (8) 
 On one occasion he managed to entice some Europeans into his residence, 
 and, havmg drugged them with brandy, took advantage of their helpless 
 condition. One of them afterwards poisoned himself. The political agent 
 was not allowed to interfere with the pleasures of the Prince, whose mis- 
 conduct was thus bringing scandal on the British name. (9) The contrast 
 betwixt the family of the late and present ruler was most disadvantageous 
 to us : the sons of Dost Mahomed being so remarkable for their good 
 conduct, and manly, soldier-like, and intelligent bearing, as to make a 
 deep impression on every European who came in contact with them. (10) 
 By the middle of December the country was threatened with a general 
 insurrection— discontent was at its highest pitch everywhere, and the 
 detestation of the Shah Soojah, intense and universal as it had now be- 
 come, was too manifest to be disputed by the most devoted of his friends. 
 A detachment of 800 men— a sort of armed police— provided with a 
 couple of guns, having been sent to the westward to collect revenue on 
 the banks of the Helmund, were attacked by the enemy and defeated, 400 
 or 500 of them having been killed and their guns taken. Such a casualty 
 demanded instant attention from the authorities. About this time a detach- 
 ment, consisting of the 1st troop Shah's Artillery, '2nd N.I , and 1st Cavalry, 
 with 2 guns and some Irregular Horse, was dispatched from Cand^har by 
 General Nott, under charge of Captain Farrington, into the Zamin Dawu r 
 country, for the purpose of dispersing a body of rebels assembled under a 
 chief named Akhtar Khan. (11) They reached Koosh-kina-Khood on the 
 28th December, and halted on the following day to permit Lieut. Elliott, 
 the political agent, to complete his arrangements. On the morning of the 
 30th, they proceeded to Sungboor, 16 miles in the direction of Saerwan- 
 killah, where the detachment of the Shah's troops, under Mahomed Allum 
 Khan had the evening before bean completely worsted, his guns and 
 baggage having been captured by the insurgents. This success on the 
 
 8. Agra Ukhhar, Nov. 1 .—Bombay Times. 
 
 9. Letter of the medical attendant of the prince — Bombay Times, October 
 21,1840. . , . „ , 
 
 10. Letters from the late Dr. Grant, Bombay medical service.— 2?om6ay 
 
 11. Captain Farrington's despatch, 4th January, 1841. 
 
268 
 
 part of the enemy was likely to acquire for them many new adherents, and 
 as their force was now making formidable head, Capt. Farrington resolved 
 to hasten matters as much as possible, preserving the utmost secrecy as to 
 his intentions. On the morning of the 3 1st, the detachment marched 25 
 miles, crossing the river Helraund, here a broad and difficult stream, and 
 occupying the fort of Ghirisk on its western bank 80 miles from Candahar. 
 On the 1st Jan. the march was continued 22 miles farther to Kareegha. 
 By these rapid movements the rebels were outmanoeuvred and outwitted. 
 They became so completely misled as to the object of our movements, and 
 nature of our position, as to believe at one time that another force was in 
 their rear. On the 2d a halt to refresh the men was indispensible. It hav- 
 ing been reported that the insurgent force was in the neighbourhood, a re- 
 connoitring party, consisting of some irregular horse and a portion of the 1st 
 cavalry, under Lieutenants Patterson and Hawkins of the horse artillery, 
 proceeded in the direction of Lundie Nowah. The enemy were discovered to 
 have taken up a difficult position amang the sand hills in the neighbourhood. 
 They had a strong range of heights in their front, and a canal in their rear. 
 The irregular horse, with Lieutenant Patterson, having succeeded in driving 
 in their outposts, gave Lieutenant Hawkins time to bring his guns, which 
 were supported by the 2d N.I., into position. A well-directed fire of grape 
 and shrapnell having been opened upon the rebels, they were prevented 
 crossing the crest of the heights, behind which they ensconced themselves. 
 The 1st cavalry followed up the advantage thus gained by the 2d N.I. : they 
 charged under a heavy fire of matchlocks, and drove the enemy everywhere 
 from their position. The insurgent force consisted of from 1200 to 1500 
 horse and foot : they were drawn up in four divisions, two of which at- 
 tempted to turn our left. Their objects were frustrated by the cavalry, who 
 charged and defeated them. They were now completely routed : sixty were 
 left dead upon the field, amongst whom was one chief of distinction. A 
 standard was taken. Their wounded must have amounted to several hun* 
 dreds. After half an hour's halt at the conclusion of the action, the de- 
 tachment posted on to Shornek, the stronghold of a rebel chief: where the 
 guns, lost on the 29th, were recaptured. We had six killed, and fourteen 
 wounded. Lieutenant Young was severely, and Lieut. Patterson slightly, 
 injured. This seems to have been a very judiciously and gallantly con- 
 ducted expedition altogether, and reflected the utmost credit on Captain 
 Farrington, the military leader, and Lieutenant Elliot, the political autho- 
 rity. (12) 
 
 On the 9th Feb. the 38th N.I. under Colonel Wymer, arrived at Canda- 
 har, and were added to the strength of Gen. Nott's brigade. On the 20th, 
 
 12. The narrative is slightly abridged from the despatch. 
 
269 
 
 the 1st regiment of the Shah's infantry, 500 irregular horse commandeu 
 by Captain Leeson, together with the 5th Shah's infantry under the com- 
 mand of the gallant Captain Woodburo, (13) left Candahar to reinforce the 
 garrison at Ghirisk. Fears were entertained for Major Tod and his party, 
 now known to have left Herat, and believed to have Ukhtar Khan in front 
 and Yar Mahomed in their rear. They arrived at Ghirisk on the 21st with- 
 out sustaining harm : they had left on the 9th, and were aware that numerous 
 parties of marauders were on the way ready to attack them : but the escort 
 of the embassage was too strong, and the intended assailants kept their 
 distance. Matters having become comparatively quiet in Shawl, Captain 
 Anderson's troop of horse artillery, with the remainder of the 38th N. I., 
 were ordered to return to Candahar from Quettab, at which latter place 
 the army of General Brooks was immediately expected. 
 
 The troubles of the Ghilzie country affords a connected and almost unin- 
 terrupted series of disturbances from the surrender of Dost Mahomed 
 
 the date at which the scene was shifted from Cabool to Beloochistan, — down 
 to the termination of our connection with the Doorannee empire. 
 
 The characters of the political administrations of Mr, Bell and Capt. Bean, 
 — the authority of the former of whom was absolute in the countries below the 
 Bolan pass, that of the latter being supreme in the district immediately above 
 it, have already been detailed in a previous chapter. Major Rawlinson (14) 
 held the chief political authority at Candahar — M:ijor Lynch(l5) being im- 
 mediately under him in charge of the Ghilzie country. The latter officer 
 unfortunately seemed to have been deeply imbued with the creed at this 
 time unhappily of general prevalence amongst the politicians of India 
 whose votaries held it a maxim, that in state affairs the ordinary principles 
 of morality were by no means to be held binding, but that something which 
 they termed '^expediency," which seemed to warrant every variety of 
 roguery, trick, and deceit — which furnished every man, in short, with au- 
 thority to do without reproach in his public character, whatever he thought 
 fit, was the sole rule by which statesmen, big and small, should be guided. 
 The laws of war and of nations as recognised in Europe, were held to be 
 inapplicable in cases where such countries as Affghanistan had to be dealt 
 with. (16) These things, which are gathered from the published statements 
 
 13. This brave and excellent officer was, along with a party of one hundred 
 sick sepoys on their way to Hindostan, attacked at the outbreak of the insur- 
 rection on the 3d Nov. 1841, and cut to pieces near Ghuznie. 
 
 14, Lieut. Rawlinson has the local rank of Major iu Persia. At the time 
 referred to he was a Lieut, of 1835, of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, and is a 
 Knight of the Lion and Sun. 
 
 15, The same is the case with Major Lynch, a Lieut, of 1833. 
 
 16. These seem still favourite views amongst a considerable class of per- 
 sons, both at home and hero, in reference to Indian affairs. The statement of 
 
270 
 
 of Major Lynch, are necessary to be explained to account for some portions 
 of his proceedings, otherwise not easy to be accounted for. 
 
 On the restoration of the Shah Soojah in August 1839, Sunnud Khan had 
 been appointed chief of the Tokey (Ghilzie) tribe, more from the conside- 
 ration of his having been a well-wisher to his Majesty, than for any in- 
 trinsic qualities for government possessed by him. He seemed to have 
 been a weak-minded man, unfitted for the exercise of the authority which 
 had been placed in his hands ; and Major Lynch accordingly recommended 
 his removal — not says he " that this was a just act, for nothing could be 
 brought forward to impugn his loyalty or fidelity," but because he was ill qua- 
 lified to rule the tribes over whom he had been set.(17) The change was ac- 
 cordingly effected ; Sunnud Khan was removed, and a chief more vigorous, 
 one of his rivals of the race of Shaboodeen Killie was set up to rule in his 
 stead. The country for a time became comparatively tranquil. In the be- 
 ginning of July, Lieutenant Nicholson, who had hitherto been the active 
 manager of Ghilzie matters, left for Cabool, — the entire charge hereby de- 
 volving on Major Lynch, who had a force consisting of the Shah's 5th Hin- 
 dostanee Regiment, 4 guns, and betwixt 300 and 400 Irregular Horse placed 
 at his disposal.(18) These were directed to remain in the field till the beginning 
 of winter ; but they were not expected to be required in actual fighting, as 
 every effort was directed to be made to conciliate the tribes. Sultan Maho- 
 med Khan, one of the most obstinate and refractory of the chiefs, was at 
 lengthj and with much difficulty, induced to take the oath of allegiance to 
 the Shah Soojah. He was a shrewd, cunning, unscrupulous, and enterprizing 
 man, and much value was attached to his friendship. He, so early as the 
 month of August, recommended that the troops meant to be maintained in 
 that quarter of the country should occupy Kelat-i- Ghilzie, which place he 
 recommended as in itself a commanding station, and one where the govern- 
 ment of the country had generally been located. When Dost Mahomed 
 made his appearance on the Kohistan frontier previous to the battle of Ba- 
 meean on the 18th September, (19) emissaries had been sent into the Ghil- 
 zie country, but were unable to shake the loyalty of the chiefs- In this 
 auspicious condition matters remained till the approach of winter, when the 
 
 Lord Lansdowne, received by the House of Commons as axiomatic in 1818, 
 seems to have become exploded before 1838, His lordship said *' that he did 
 not believe their lordships would sanction any rules of war in India, differing 
 from those prescribed in Europe ; that it was their duty to convey over e very- 
 portion of the globe where their power extended, those principles of justice 
 and moderation which governed them in Europe." 
 
 17. Major Lynch's statement for the Envoy, June 22, 1841. Bombay Times, 
 April 20, 1842. 
 
 18. The narrative of the affairs of the Ghilzie country will be found to have 
 been brought down thus far in Chapter III,, pp. 147 and 148. 
 
 19. Vide ante, p. 156. 
 
271 
 
 severity of the cold compelled the -withdrawal of the troops. They retired 
 to Candahar on the 14th November attended by such an escort ot friendly 
 Ghilzies as had rarely been seen assembled together for any purpose save to 
 concert for war or plunder. 
 
 In the beginning of Deer. (20) it became known that about 70 of the mem- 
 bers of the Shaboodeen tribe, including a brother of a chief of note who had 
 found refuge in the Punjaub the previous year, (21) had been made over 
 to the British Government and sent prisoners to India. The Affghans ap- 
 pear all along to have held in special abhorrence the idea of being removed 
 from their native country, and detained as captives in Hindostan. " It is a 
 very common saying amongst them," observes Major Lynch, from whose 
 statement this much of the present narrative is chiefly taken, ** when they 
 talk of the Shah Soojah in connection with the British, and when they are 
 told that he is king of Affghanistan, and only supported by the Indian 
 Government, that they conceive it rather a curious fact that Shah Soo- 
 jah should be king of AflFghanistan, and have his state prisons in India or 
 London. I am firmly of opinion, that if there has been one measure more 
 than another calculated to make us unpopular with the Affghans, it has been 
 the untoward circumstance of sending into exile Hadjee Khan Kakur and 
 the other Affghan khans." 
 
 From this time Major Lynch considered that all chance of the system of 
 conciliation — which had previously been so promising — ultimately proving 
 successful was now at an end, and that coercion and severe measures could 
 alone produce or maintain tranquillity. The mode in which he proposed 
 to change from the one to the other was certainly summary and unscrupulous 
 enough. He writes to the Envoy under date 27th December — " It is just 
 as well the Tokies did not know you had seized their Pet-man [one of the 
 Ghilzies given up to us by the Seikhs, and for the possession of whose 
 person it appears the Envoy had for six or seven months been negociating] 
 or the chief of the Shaboodeen Killie, or they might, in all probability, 
 have boned me, and given you some trouble, when the Dost was at large. 
 However, we have laughed at their beards, and hope you will now approve 
 of ray adopting a new system, for the conciliatory one will not work in the 
 Tokey land for the future. Wb can easily get them to commit them- 
 selves, AND IN LIEU of their present pay, give them a few more rounds of 
 cannister from Anderson's guns, which they will now in all probability 
 
 20. It is called March in Major Lynch's MS. ; instead of 1st March it mast 
 be 1st December, — a note farther down discusses the matter. 
 
 21. '* The Seikhs who had been detected giving harbourage to the Ghilzie 
 refugees some months before? were now (Sept. 1840) proved to have promised 
 supplies of money to Dost Mahomed Khan," anU, Chap. III., p. 152, 
 
272 
 
 require before the winter is over."(22) A more indefensible system than 
 this, though it was afterwards practised on a larger scale against the Ameers 
 of Scinde, cannot be conceived:— premeditatedly to drive or to entrap men 
 into a quarrel, for the purpose of being able to slaughter and get rid of 
 them, is so closely allied to wholesale murder, that it gives a sad view of 
 the political morality of the time to see such a sentiment as is here express- 
 ed, in a formal official paper, should have been passed uncensured. In 
 the month of January 1841, so strong was the feeling of dissatisfaction 
 through the tribe, that Major Lynch proceeded at once into the country, 
 when a deeply laid plot to seize himself and his escort was discovered. He 
 was met by about 1000 horse, who pretended to have been assembled to 
 welcome him back, but were so in fact for the purpose of attacking him. 
 He managed to make Ibera aware that he was not ignorant of their designs, 
 and persuaded them to abandon them, and once more to seal the Koran in 
 the name of the king — the Affghan mode of swearing allegiance. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, intimation was sent to the chief by whom this very 
 measure had been originally advised, that Kelat-i-Ghilzie was to be fortified 
 and garrisoned. Sultan Mahomed Khan assembled the head men to con- 
 sult on the subject ; and though he pointed out the futility of resistance to 
 our wishes, they determined to set themselves in this matter against us. A 
 very civil but guardedly- written letter was sent back to the political agent, 
 intimating that the measure in contemplation would be most unpopular with 
 the tribe. They suspected our objects, and were in the last degree jealous 
 of permitting a foreign force to be permanently established amongst them. 
 The minor chiefs were written to in succession, but with no better success : 
 the determination to resist the construction of fortifications and establishment 
 of a garrison, seemed firm and universal. Failing to persuade them to per- 
 mit us to establish ourselves peaceably in the capital of the country, it was 
 resolved that a garrison should be placed there by force. 
 
 About the end of April, a detachment consisting of the 1st and 2d Shah's 
 Hindostanee infantry, commanded by Captains Griffin and Macan, about 300 
 of Christie's horse (Shah's 1st cavalry), and a couple of guns, were dispatch- 
 ed from Candahar to occupy the ground on which the fort was to be built. 
 The distance from Candahar is 80 miles, and the country here attains an 
 elevation of 5773 feet, intermediate betwixt that of the place they had 
 
 22. We are unable to reconcile Major Lynch's dates with each other. In 
 his statement, he says that it was on the 1st of March 1841 on which he 
 made the discovery about the Ghilzies having been carried to India — yet the 
 letter itself is dated 27th December 1840. Moreover, in a letter of 1st Dec. 
 same year, the matter is specially referred to ; and the Envoy, under date 15th 
 same month, makes some severe remarks thereon. 1st Dec. 1840, instead of 
 1st March 1841, must be the date intended, though even this produces confusion 
 with the rest of the narrative. 
 
273 
 
 ieft^ which was 3484, and.Ghuznie, still 140 miles farther to the north*west 
 of them, which rose to the altitude of 7726. 
 
 The troops appear to have experienced no molestation on their advance^ 
 but no sooner had they reached their destination than they planted the Bri- 
 tish standard with much ostentation and display, and saluted it with a salvo 
 of artillery and three volleys of musketry : a silly proceeding in itself under 
 any circumstances ; but, on the present occasion, calculated to irritate and 
 madden a people sufficiently discontented, and prepared to take umbrage at 
 what they must have viewed as insult added to aggression. They were 
 already boiling with rage and indignation at the seizure of their kinsfolks* 
 and chafing under the oppressionjof the new order of things ; and were ready 
 to rise in arms on the slightest additional provocation, and take vengeance 
 on any one who came within reach of their wrath. It does not appear that 
 this was even a part of the execrable system suggested " to get them to 
 commit themselves," but a simple act of spontaneous imprudence. Just 
 after this, Major Lynch, hearing of the discontents everywhere prevailing 
 around, resolved to satisfy himself as to the state of matters with his own 
 eyes, and so started with a feeble escort to take a general survey of the 
 country. In passing the fort of KuUa-i-Ingoz, about six miles off, the 
 people observing a body of 200 or 300 horse, as they supposed with hostile 
 intent in their neighbourhood, turned out and made demonstrations to the 
 extent of flourishing their swords, indicating that they would not tamely 
 submit without resistance. (23) An officer was immediately sent back, 
 ordering out a regiment, and a couple of guns to chastise this instance of 
 contumely. The detachment arrived about 10 o'clock at night, and an attack 
 was immediately commenced on the fort, which turned out to be garrisoned 
 only by 30 men. They defended themselves stoutly till half their numbers 
 were slain i and not till we had blown up the gate with powder-bags, by 
 which an officer was nearly destroyed, nor till Captains Saunders and Macaa 
 and Lieutenant Hoppe were wounded, and several sepoys slain, did we 
 manage to get possession of the stronghold, in which fioe prisoners were 
 taken ! It afterwards appeared that the Kulla«i-Ingoz chief was a firm 
 friend of the Shah Soojah ! 
 
 The country was immediately in arras, and the garrison at Kelat-i-Ghilzie 
 surrounded by from 3000 to 4000 men furious for the fray. A requisition for 
 troops was at once forwarded to Cabool and Gandahar. The Envoy disap- 
 proved of the whole proceedings, and declined to permit reinforcements to be 
 sent. He desired Capt. Macan to act strictly on the defensive, and he accord- 
 ingly remained in cantonments, merely driving off the enemy, who, mistaking 
 
 23. CalGvita JSn^Ushmm, June .8. Ml 
 
274 
 
 insction for timidity, attacked his pickets. So soon as the tidings of these 
 unhappy events reached Candahar, a reinforcement under Colonel Wymer 
 was ordered to be dispatched with the utmost speed to the Ghilzie country. 
 This consisted of 400 men of the 38th N.L, the remainder of Christie's horse, 
 commanded by Capt. Leeson, shortly before returned from Ghirisk, with four 
 horse artillery guns, and a large supply of stores for the fort. When the 
 enemy, about 4000 strong, heard of their approach they retired from the 
 neighbourhood of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and proceeded to interrupt the advance of 
 the reinforcement. They came upon our camp about 6 o'clock in the evening 
 of the 29th May, at a place called Assoa Hazzarah, and immediately attack- 
 ed it, rushing down upon the bayonets of our troops, who had formed in 
 front the moment the alarm was given. They were believed by this time 
 to have been betwixt 4000 and 5000 strong — their old enemies the Dooran- 
 nees having forgotten their quarrels, and joined them in common enmity to 
 us. They were steadily withstood and repulsed, but again and again they 
 rushed on with the most determined gallantry. Foiled in this, the Ghilzies 
 endeavoured to turn our flank with still worse success than that which at- 
 tended their attempt to force our front. The engagement lasted till 1 1 — the 
 five hours* fighting being chiefly in the dark. They were beaten in every 
 quarter, and when morning broke were found to have quitted the field, leav- 
 ing 70 dead behind them. Their wounded were as usual carried away. Our 
 casualties amounted to four killed and fifteen wounded. Col. Wymer's force 
 was too weak, and the country too formidable, to permit of a pursuit being 
 attempted. The conduct of officers and men is said on this occasion to 
 have been admirable : the coolness of the commander in making his arrange- 
 ments when taken by surprise, was above all praise. Next morning the de- 
 tachment and convoy proceeded on their march, and reached Kelat-i-Ghilzie 
 without further interruption. Strangely enough these events were after- 
 wards associated with the general rising in November, a matter with which, 
 as will appear in the narrative, they had no earthly concern. The London 
 Times newspaper first took up this view— misled, apparently, by an In- 
 dian correspondent, and the error was fallen into by the writer of the Annual 
 Register^ who supplies one of the most inaccurate accounts of oriental 
 affairs in existence. 
 
 The severe castigation inflicted by Colonel Wymer, and the strength to which 
 the post at Kelat-i-Gkilzie had now been raised, appears for a time to have 
 overawed the people ; the more impatient and fiery of the malcontents having 
 probably joined the standard of Ukhtar Khan, who was still in force on the 
 Helmund, giving great annoyance, and about to beleaguer or attack the gar- 
 rison at Ghirisk. The construction of the works of the intended fortress 
 was commenced and proceeded with apace \ the place was strong by 
 nature, a beautiful emiueace of about lao feet in height, with a splendid 
 
27^ 
 
 spring on its summit, surmounted by a cone of rock 60 feet higher still, was 
 to be walled in and defended by a couple of 18-prs and other guns ; and fur- 
 ther to ensure tranquillity while these were in progress, a detachment was 
 sent out from Ghuznie to the westward, and quartered in the Ghilzie 
 country. The post they occupied was at Mookloor, six marches from 
 Ghuznie, and nearly as much from Kelat-i- Ghilzie. The troops consisted 
 of the I6th and 43d N.I., now set down amongst the reliefs as about to return 
 to India by the Bolan Pass in October, (24) the 5th Light Cavalry, and a 
 ressalah of Local Horse, with three of the Shah's guns, the whole com- 
 manded by Colonel Chambers, of the 3th Cavalry. The insurgents having 
 made their appearance in considerable numbers in the neighbourhood, the 
 detachment already alluded to broke up its camp on the 1st of August. 
 About noon they arrived at Eck-au, 18 miles in advance. They here ex- 
 pected to have overtaken the enemy, who wore found, however, to have re- 
 tired to a pass adjoining, where they were reported to be in numbers, both 
 horse and foot. On the evening of the 2d, a part of the detachment arrived 
 in the valley of Karootoo, well knocked up with a march of 2a miles over 
 hilly and irregular ground. (25) For the next three days the enemy con- 
 tinued to increase— our troops apparently remaining in camp till such a body 
 should make their appearance as might be attacked and dispersed with effect. 
 About eight o'clock on the morning of the 5th shots were heard on the left 
 of the valley, where the grass-cutters were employed in procuring forage, 
 and a troop was immediately ordered to be got in readiness. Soon after 
 this, information was brought that the enemy were descending the Shea- 
 Kotel Pass, in the direction of a weak reconnoitring party of the 4th Irre- 
 gular horse under Capt. Walker. Lieut. Bazzett's troop being by this time 
 in readiness, was dispatched to his assistance, with as many of the 4th res- 
 salah as could be sent, with a view of keeping the enemy in check till the 
 infantry and remainder of the cavalry were able to make up with them. 
 
 There were supposed by this time to be not fewer than 3000 Ghilzies bear- 
 ing down upon the grass-cutters, when Capt. Walker, now strengthened by 
 the arrival of Lieut. Bazzett, made a brilliant charge with the liocal Horse, 
 cutting up about 200 of the enemy. Lieut. Bazzett meanwhile attacked 
 another party, of whom about 20 werp slain. The last-named officef was 
 
 24. Calcutta Englishman, 30th August. 
 
 25. The chief portioa ot the above is taken from the Delhi Gazette of the 
 23d June and 28th August, and gives an abstract of letters from camp. Col. 
 Chambers's dispatch is meagre and obscure. Mr Stocqueler in his '♦ Memorials 
 of AfFghanistan," the most incorrect and untrustworthy work on the subject 
 which wo have seen, states (p. 159) that Colonel Chambers's detachment 
 was sent out from Candahar iu consequence of Capt. Woodburu's applica- 
 tion for reiuforcemeuta at Ghirisk 1 
 
276 
 
 shot through the thigh, and Captain Walker's horse was killed under him ia 
 the charge. Colonel Chambers states, that as his column approached the scene 
 of action, he could distinctly see Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazzett with 
 their parties dashing boldly over the hill after the enemy, driving them off in 
 all directions, and, in short, leaving nothing for him to do,(26) A few Horse 
 and Foot having been observed in the Syeeghan Ghaut as the main column 
 passed, Captain Oldfield, with a troop of the 5th Cavalry, was directed to 
 halt at a distance and merely hold them in check until the troops returned. 
 As they speedily increased both in boldness and numbers, the cavalry charged 
 and dispersed them, killing from 28 to 30. Our loss in all amounted to I 
 man killed and S wounded,— that of the enemy by the statement just given, 
 appears to have exceeded 250, — this, we think, must be an exaggeration, 
 —it is difficult to suppose anything like 200 to have fallen by the hands of 
 the Irregular Horse on such ground. The detachment after this remained 
 for a time in the valley previous to proceeding to the westward ; the 16th 
 resumed its march about a week afterwards, and arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzie 
 on the 17th, and Candahar on the 25th August.(27) Half of the 5th Ca- 
 valry, and a similar proportion of the 43d N. !■, had been sent into theToree 
 passes when the detachment first moved. (28) 
 
 The strength now attained by the force at Ghirisk, and the magnitude of 
 the army assembling at Quettah, and mystery of its dest ination, tended to 
 impress on the recollections of the insurgents the lesson Captain Farrington 
 had read them in the first week of the year. Though the country continued 
 in a state of disorder, they seem not for some months to have mustered any 
 where in such numbers as to permit scope for a regular attack being made 
 on them. Sometime in June, Ukhtar Khan took the field, and fairly set 
 himself down before Ghirisk, with a body of 3,000 men, from which, by 
 this date, Captain Woodburn's troops appear to have been withdrawn. (29) 
 On the news of these disturbances reaching Candahar, General Nott or- 
 dered out a force, consisting of a detachment of the 1st troop horse artillery, 
 with detachments of the 1st and 2d Janbaz horse, and the 5th Shah's Hin- 
 dostanee infantry. These were placed under the command of Captain 
 Woodburn, with the following officeri under him .'—Captain Hart, Lieuts. 
 Cooper, Golding, Ross, and Clark, and Assistant- Surgeon Colquhoun. 
 
 26. Colonel Chambers's Despatch verbatim. The chief part of the narrative 
 continues to be taken from the Delhi Gazette. 
 
 27. Delhi Gazette, Stn Sept. 
 , 28. Delhi Gazette ut supra, 
 
 29. The information from this quarter is, from Jan. to Juno, very defective. 
 The inference of the withdrawal of Captain VVoodburu's troops is based on tlie 
 fact of that officer having advanced ia the end of June from the Candahar 
 side, as related in the text from his own despatch- 
 
277 
 
 It was thought likely that on hearing of the approach of the Candahar 
 troops the enemy might retire along the river's bank, and a short detour 
 was resolved upon with a view of meeting them. They continued, how- 
 ever, before the walls of the fort until Captain Woodburn approached the 
 Helmund, and found that they were in possession of all the fords. The 
 river, which at certain seasons of the year is 350 yards wide, and from 2 to 3 
 feet deep, is two miles from the fort. (30) The enemy appearing deter- 
 mined to prevent Captain Woodburn from crossing the stream, Capt. Hart 
 was directed to advance three miles up its banks about daybreak on the 4th, 
 to the ford of Sumboolee, and there cross, with the 2d Janbazes, and so 
 move down upon the enemy while Captain Woodburn himself attempted 
 to get over lower down, at a place where, according to the assistant political 
 agent, it was no more than knee deep; Capt. Hart executed his portion of 
 the movement with perfect success, when, on advancing towards the insur- 
 gent force, he luckily discovered the mishap that had befallen Capt. Wood- 
 burn : the so-called knee-deep ford, from the depth and rapidity of the water, 
 proved impracticable, and he was condemned to see, from the high banks, 
 the enemy's force drawn up in order on the] further side, while the Janbazes 
 were in danger of being attacked, and cut off in detail. Captain Hart 
 observing what had happened, was able to retire and recross in time. Capt. 
 Woodburn, with the remainder of the force, joined him at Sumboolee about 
 eight o'clock in the morning. The enemy having observed these movement?, 
 advanced up the farther bank of the Helmund, and posted themselves at the 
 entrance of the ford right opposite to our troops. It was now excessively 
 hot, and the men were fatigued with the march of the morning and previous 
 night, having been in motion for nearly twelve hours, so Captain Woodburn 
 contented himself with firing some round-shot, which compelled them to 
 retire to a respectful distance. Immediately on this he pitched his camp 
 close to the river, having resolved to wait till the excessive heat of the day 
 was over before commencing an attack. The hills in the British rear were, 
 for a mile up the river, crowned with horsemen, whose duty it was to watch 
 the enemy and give information of his move;nents. About half-past 4 the 
 insurgents, it was observed, began to get in motion. Lieut. Golding was de- 
 tached with the Janbaz cavalry to watch their progress and prevent them 
 from crossing the river. In the latter of these he failed in accomplishing 
 his object, the enemy having contrived to ford the Helmund considerably 
 further up. They were now advancing in large bodies on the position of 
 Captain Woodburn, from which they were less than three miles distant. 
 The British troops immediately changed their ground, taking up a strong 
 
 30. See Conolly's Travels, vol. ii., p, 384. This traveller visited Ghirisk 
 and crossed the Helmund in October. 
 
278 
 
 post on the left of the camp, the best which, under the circumstances, ap- 
 peared to be attainable. The guns were stationed betwixt the 4th and 5th 
 companies of the 5th Hindoostanee Infantry ; the Janbaz regiments were 
 formed on either flank, and 200 horsemen were placed in the rear to protect 
 the baggage. A large mass of the enemy's infantry were shortly after this 
 seen passing towards the left of Captain Woodburn's force, which required 
 him to make a considerable change in his order of battle,— an alteration vary 
 speedily accomplished,— all the troops, save the Janbaz, moving with the 
 steadiness and precision of a review. The attack was made with great bold- 
 ness by the insurgents, but was repelled by the well-directed fire of the guns 
 and infantry; the enemy on pushing towards the right, experienced a simi- 
 lar reception, with results similarly disastrous to them. Large bodies of 
 horse and foot were now seen crowding along the heights, and making for 
 Capt. Hart's Janbaz, posted on the extreme right of the infantry. These the 
 assailants speedily forced back, driving them to the rear, and following their 
 advantage close up to the baggage. Lieut. Clarke now faced round the 
 rear rank of the infantry, and poured a deadly fire on the enemy, compelling 
 them to retire. The rear was still threatened, the utmost exertions of the 
 officers failed in recovering the Janbazes from their confusion. It became ne- 
 cessary to move back one of the guns, with the Grenadiers of the 5th, 
 to disperse the masses of Infantry and Cavalry now threatening the baggage. 
 Nor was this efiected^ so determined were the assailants, until three rounds 
 of grape and a volley of musketry had been delivered within 50 paces of 
 them, when they were fairly driven back. Captain Hart and Lieutenant 
 Golding were now directed to pursue the fugitives, and scour the country 
 around — but they were hurrying back, crowding in upon the baggage, and 
 could not be induced to follow their, leaders to the field; The baggage was 
 now placed within some melon ground, so as to be easily guarded by the 
 Infantry in case of a night attack. The enemy again made their appear- 
 ance in heavy masses about 1 1 o'clock at night, and kept pouring in a 
 desultory and useless fire till morning, apparently with the view of distract-* 
 ing attention till they had carried off their dead. At sunrise on the 4th, 
 Lieutenant Golding was dispatched to observe the movements of the enemy : 
 he found them strongly posted, and in considerable strength, about two 
 miles higher up on the further side of the river. Soon after this they re- 
 sumed their retreat; and Captain Woodburn's force being too weak to 
 follow them proceeded to cross the river. This operation occupied some 
 hours, and not till 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th did the convoy reach 
 Ghirisk : the troops having for thirty hours scarcely rested. The Janbazes who 
 conducted themselves so indifferently, were a portion of the Affghan cavalry 
 of the Shah's contingent. They occasionally fought well, but their feelings were 
 all opposed to us— and they were never to be depended on. The rest of the 
 
279 
 
 troops conducted thoraselves admirably : the British officers as usual expos* 
 ing themselves to every danger, and submitting to every variety of fatigue. 
 The enemy were believed to be at least 6000 strong ; and though beaten, 
 seemed neither brolcen nor disheartened, though 300 of them were understood 
 to have fallen. They had lost three standards— and the villages all around 
 were said to be full of the wounded. Our casualties amounted to 12 killed 
 and 28 wounded. In forwarding an account of this gallant and decisive 
 action, Captain Woodburn took occasion strongly to recommend that rein- 
 forcements should be sent to follow up the present success, the Ghirisk de* 
 tachment being much too weak to take the field, with cavalry so little trust- 
 worthy as the Janbazes had just proved themselves, and the enemy still in 
 such strength in the neighbourhood. A force was accordingly sent out 
 under Captain Griffin, consisting of four 6-pounder guns under Captain 
 Cooper, a wing of the 2d Bengal N. I., a portion of the ist Shah's infantry 
 and 5th cavalry, under Captain Woodburn, with the Ist and 2d Janbaz 
 (cavalry) regulars, under CaptainHart and Lieutenant Golding— amounting 
 in all, besides artillery, to 800 sabres and 350 bayonets. On the afternoon 
 of the 16th August, information was received that the insurgents were in 
 force near Khawind about ten miles ofi". At 4 a. m. our troops broke ground, 
 and at 7 they came up with the enemy, strongly posted in a succession of 
 small forts with walled gardens in front. The combined Doorannee and 
 Teeree troops amounted to about 5000 in all. Immediately on our advance 
 they opened a heavy fire of jezails and matchlocks from the efficient cover 
 behind which they had placed themselves. After a few skilfully delivered 
 rounds of grape, parties were detached from the 2d Bengal N. I., and the 1st 
 Shah's infantry, to clear and take possession of the enclosures. The 5th 
 Shah's, (31) with a wing of the 1st cavalry, deployed into line, and advancing 
 at double quick time, drove in a body of the enemy's skirmishers concealed 
 behind a range of broken walls, and whose fire was becoming mischievous. 
 Simultaneously with these things, the enclosures in front of the column 
 were speedily and gallantly carried, under a heavy fire of matchlocks, by 
 two companies of the 2d Bengal N. I., led by Lieutenants Cooke and 
 Travers, supported by a party of the 1st Shah's infantry, under 
 Lieutenant Gardener. The enemy suS'ered severely in this charge- 
 many of them resisting until bayonetted. The whole of our troops 
 now advanced with a view of attacking the main body of the enemy, who 
 were seen en masse in the rear of the gardens— but before the assault could 
 take full effect, sotne confusion being observed amongst them. Captain 
 Hart's Janbazes and the Shah's 1st Cavalry charged and broke them, and 
 pursued them for several miles, taking fearful vengeance upon them. (32) 
 
 31. Captain Griffin's Despatch. 
 
 32. Captain Griffia's De3patch9S verbatim, Lieut. Golding, who we find 
 
280 
 
 t*riace Sufter Jung headed the pursuit in person. Lieutenant Golding'd 
 Janbazes, who had, till now, been on rear -guard duty with the baggage^ 
 were, by the request of their commanding officer, and at their own special 
 desire, permitted to share in the close of the fray — both these regi- 
 ments so conducted themselves on this occasion as completely to regain the 
 character they had lost on the Helmund a month before. The enemy's 
 resistance was stout and protracted-— their position eminently favourable 
 for defence j their casualties are said to have amounted to betwixt GOO and 
 700 killed, of whom 100 are said to have fallen by the bayonet. (33) Our 
 losses were somewhat severe, consisting of twelve killed, and 104 wounded, 
 for the most part slightly. 
 
 This affair seems to have been ably planned, and gallantly conducted. 
 Captain Woodburn, though up to this time requiring to be carried in a litter 
 in consequence of a wound shortly before received, quitted his couch and re« 
 mained throughout the action on horseback at the head of his regiment. 
 
 As usual on occasions such as this, the enemy, when they found that 
 they had been fairly beaten, and that there was no chance for them against 
 the strong! and well organized force now in their country, dispersed, and 
 left our troops without molestation. The country, however, was still as 
 far as ever from being tranquillized. — Akram Khan, a chief of the Teeree 
 tribe, had joined Ukhtar Khan just before the fight with Captain Griffin, 
 and it was against him we next prepared to direct our vengeance. 
 
 On the nth of September, a force under Colonel Wymer, consisting of 
 Sappers, Miners, and Bildars, under Captain Sanders, two 18-pounders 
 and four 6-pounders— the former with European artillerymen, Leeson's 
 horse, and the 2d and 38th Bengal N. I., were directed to proceed to the 
 Teeree country to collect tribute and chastise the refractory. Such was the 
 scarcity of camels, that 1200 jackasses had to do duty as draught and baggage 
 cattle. Lieutenants North and Conolly were the politicals in attendance. 
 The Teeree country is 100 miles north of Candahar : it had never till now 
 been travelled through or surveyed by any European, much less traversed 
 by our troops, and nearly all that was known of it amounted to this, that it 
 was rocky, wild, and difficult of access, inhabited by a fierce and lawless 
 population, eminently disinclined to pay homage, allegiance, or tribute to 
 
 fighting at Syghan in Oct. 1840; in the Naziau Valley in Feb. 1841 with Col. 
 Shelton j with Capt. Woodburn at Ghirisk in June ; and with Capt. Griffin 
 in the Ghilzie country in August,— was, in November, murdered by the men 
 of his own regiment, who rose in mutiny and went over to the enemy. 
 
 33. A correspondent of the Ddhi Gazette, subscribing himself " Rienzi," 
 states the number at 700— there is a tone of exas^geration about the letter 
 which leads us to doubt its statements. We should think 600 more near to 
 the mark than 700, though the latter is adhered to by several writers. 
 
281 
 
 the Shah Soqjah, or to conduct themselves towards their neighbours or their 
 Feringhee allies as peaceable and well-disposed citizens. (34) The detachment 
 left on the 16th September, and General Nott shortly afterwards followed in 
 person and took command. On the 2 1st they reached a tremendous moun- 
 tain gorge at the entrance to the Duramut valley : the utmost difficulty was 
 experienced in getting forward the artillery, and the transit of the batteritig 
 guns occupied three days. Lieutenant Conolly with a small party of Jan- 
 baz horse came by surprise on the Teeree chief, Akram Khan, and captured 
 him. He was sent as a prisoner to Cabool, and being sentenced to death, 
 was blown from a gun. From the Teeree and Duramut valleys the inhabi- 
 tants fled on otir approach, so that with the exception of the capture of the 
 chief nothing whatever was effected by it. It returned to Candahar on the 
 2d of October; and the 16th, 42d, and 43d N.L, which had, from the be- 
 ginning of August, been under orders for relief, started on the 7th Nov. 
 on their return to India by the Bolan Pass. But the insurrection which 
 proved so fatal to us had by this time broken out around Cabool ; and when 
 three marches on their way towards Quettah, Colonel M'Laren's brigade 
 as this was called, was directed to return and endeavour to make their 
 way to tho assistance of the garrison in the eastern capital ; — they started 
 on the 17th November. In this they failed, having been compelled 
 from want of baggage cattle, and the severity of the weather, to return after 
 they were well on their way towards Ghuznie. It is not to be supposed 
 that the politicals were mad enough to diminish the strength of the army, 
 notwithstanding the exigencies into which the state had now fallen in 
 this scene of tribulation. H. M.'s 40th had been marched to Canda- 
 har, and though Beloochistan was now at peace, and all thoughts of an 
 expedition towards Herat abandoned, a portion of the force which ascended 
 the Bolan pass in April, still remained unemployed at Quettah. The 25th 
 Bombay N. I. returned thither from Kelat, immediately after the corona- 
 tion of Nusseer Khan on the 3d October ; so that, had the Bengal brigade 
 returned to India, there still would have been a larger force above the Bolan 
 pass to the westward of Ghuznie, than had at any time been thought neces- 
 sary betwixt Nov. 1839 and Feb. 1841. (35) But we are now approaching 
 
 34. Bengal Hurkaru, 6th and 15th October. 
 
 35. The following return gives pretty exactly the strength of General 
 Nott's army, including Colonel M'Laren's Brigade, which, on the lOth Dec, 
 returned to Candahar from its unsuccessful attempt to succour Cabool. This 
 enumeration does not include officers j its force of all ranks amounted to 8724, 
 (Blue Book, p. 171.) 
 
 At Candahar. 
 2 Troops of Shah's Horse Artillery, 12 six pr. guns 200 
 
 1 Co. Foot Artillery with Capt. Blood, 4 nine prs 70 
 
 2 Eighteen pounders ••••• •• 
 
 H. M.'s 40th Regiment , 800 
 
 N 1 
 
282 
 
 that portion of the history of tho Doorannee alliance which spreads over 
 too large a field for being at present entered on — which is so recent and so big 
 with events of unprecedented moment, as still to be fresh in the recollection 
 of the public ; and with the comraeneement of which the present narrative 
 must be concluded. 
 
 The posts in Western AfFghanistan at this time occupied by our troops, 
 were Candahar, Quetta, Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Killa Abdoola, and Ghirisk, with 
 sundry lesser stations up and down the country ; the latter of these were 
 wisely called in as our troubles thickened around us : afterwards the 
 troops at Killa Abdoola fell back on Quettah, except those belonging to the 
 Shah's service who deserted us, and ultimately the three garrisons first 
 named alone remained in position. They maintained themselves right glo- 
 riously till it was resolved finally to abandon the country. 
 
 Turning shortly to Cabool, we find the same incessant disquietude pre- 
 vailing here to the end with which the whole country, from first to last, had 
 been afflicted. The garrison itself was so strong, and troops so easily available 
 to move in any direction, that from the time of the victories of Colonel 
 Shelton in the Nazian valley in February, no conflict of any moment had 
 occurred. 
 
 2nd Bengal Native Infantry • 8^0 
 
 lOih do. ..do 850 
 
 38th do. .do. (one wing) ♦ 450 
 
 42nd do. .do . 850 
 
 43rd do.. .do 850 
 
 1st Shah's Infantry 600 
 
 2ad dc......do , 500 
 
 5th do do 600 
 
 1st do Cavalry 500 
 
 One Squadron Skinner's Horse... 300 
 
 At Kelat-i-Ghilzie. 7220 
 
 2 1 ighteen pounders. 
 
 2 six do., with ^ Co. European Artillerymen * 70' 
 
 3rd Shah's Infantry 500 
 
 Wing of 38ih Bengal N. 1 450 
 
 1020 
 
 Total rank and file, 8240 
 
 The force at Quettah, according to the Blue Book, at this time, consisted of 
 two strong native regiments (say 1700 men), two 9-prs. with European artillery, 
 two 9-prs. of the Bolan Rangers, with Major Southeby's company of European 
 artillerymen, in all about 2200 regular troops j so that, above the Passes, 
 there were nearly 11,000 men to the westward of Ghuznie when the insurrec- 
 tion began, and about as many more to the eastward, including Sir R. Sale's 
 brigade of 2273, the Charekar Goorkahg of 800, and the Ghuznie garrison, the 
 27th N.I. 
 
283 
 
 In the beginning of September an expedition had been arranged for the 
 usual purposes of punishing the refractory, and collecting tribute. A de- 
 tachment was ordered to proceed to the Zoormut valley, consisting of two 
 hundred men of H.M.'s 44th, the 5th Bengal N.I., one Shah's regiment, a 
 detachment of sappers and miners, with two iron and four brass guns. (3G) 
 The mountain train, under Captain Abbott, with two ten-inch mortars, ac- 
 companied the force, and which was, for its magnitude, unusually well sup- 
 plied with artillery, the kiag's regards for his subjects being manifested 
 by knocking down the strongholds when he could not manage to secure or 
 slaughter the inhabitants. On the •27th of the month the whole moved for- 
 ■wa.-d, under command of Colonel Oliver, towards the mouth of the Zoormut 
 valley, resolved that not one stone should be left standing on another in tlie 
 country of the rebels. Captain Hay, when in the same neighbourhood 
 collecting tribute shortly before, had endeavoured to persuade the Zoormut 
 chief to disjoin himself from his friend, a much more notorious malcontent 
 and enemy of the Shah than even himself. His counsels had been responded 
 toby a shower of stones and torrents of abuse: and after replying to this by 
 our usual retort, a few rounds from his six-pounder guns, he found himself 
 too weak to proceed further, and so withdrew. This was the immediate 
 cause of the dispatch of an expedition of sucl^ ma^rfHrude as the present at 
 this late period of the year. The valley was, as In the case of the expedi- 
 tion to Xeeree by General Nott, abandoned by its inhabitants, and the force 
 returned to Cabool on the 17th October without having fired a shot. (37) 
 
 It has already been stated that in the course of the spring and summer of 
 1841, about 1100 men were permitted to retire from Affghanistan, — nearly 
 4000 of a reinforcement having been sent to the eastern capital. 
 
 It had been resolved on the arrival of the brigade of Colonel Shelton at Ca- 
 bool in July, that that of Sir R. Sale, whose term of service had now expired, 
 should return to India. By this exchange of 2000 men about to be with- 
 drawn for upwards of 3000 which had been sent, the Army in Affghanistan 
 would still have been permanently increased. (33) Should the force at Cabool 
 appear to have been too much weakened, H.M.'s 9th, with two native reo-i- 
 raents, were ordered to be in readiness to take the place of Sale's brigade. (39) 
 
 36. Delhi Gazette, October. 
 
 37. Delhi Gazette, 17th November. 
 
 38. Bombay Times Ooerland Summary, Dec. 1, 1841, The Brigade of Colonel 
 Shelton, it will be recollected, consisted of H.M.'s 44th and the 27th and 54th 
 N.I., \nth. Horse Artillery, &c. j that of Sir R. Sale, of H.M.'s ISfch, and the 
 16th, 35th, and 37th N.I. The 16th, as will be remembered, had, in July, been 
 sent to Mukloor, 60 miles from Ghuznie in the western Ghilzie country, and had 
 arrived at Candahar on 25th of August, being destined to form part of Colo- 
 nel Maclaren's Brigade about to return to India by the Bolan Pass. 
 
 39. Blue Book of 1813-^No. 1. 
 
284 
 
 The Doorannee alliance had now so completely drained the treasury that 
 the Government of India were compelled to enjoin economy in every quar- 
 ter. An accumulated surplus of ten millions sterling(40) in the hands of Go- 
 vernment sometime after the war began, had been entirely expended : an an- 
 nual surplus revenue of a million and a half, which had existed in 1836, had, 
 in 1840, been exchanged for a deficit of above two millions and a quarter ;(41) 
 and so severely were the finances at Calcutta pressed, that a stoppage of 
 payment at Fort William in September was at one time contemplated by the 
 Supreme Council. (42) 
 
 The authorities in Affghanistan had, like those throughout India, been 
 naturally urged to husband their means with the utmost care. The revenues 
 of the country were in the last degree narrow, and while we seemed to con- 
 template bearing the burthen of the army of tranquillization for an indefinite 
 period, the instructions given the envoy that beyond this he was not in future 
 to rely on assistance from the British treasury, left no alternative but to at- 
 tempt retrenchment in the only quarter where this seemed practicable, (43) 
 The department in which reduction was commenced was in the pension of 
 £8000 a-year allowed to the Ghilzies of the eastern passes for the free tran- 
 sit of troops, stores, and merchandize. It was resolved to curtail this by a 
 half, and the country was in consequence in a blaze in a moment. The re- 
 monstrances of the chiefs were in a great measure disregarded, and they at 
 once proceeded to take matters into their own hands. A kaffila with property of 
 £2000 in value, was seized at Tezeen on its way to Cabool. The roads were 
 stopped, and all communication with Hindostan entirely cut off. The Envoy 
 appeared to despise the danger of the insurrection. He induced Gen. Elphin- 
 stone to dispatch the 33th N.I., with a couple of gun?, to clear the way to Jel- 
 lalabad. They were stopped at Bhoodhak as they entered the passes ; and, 
 after a severe struggle, found themselves unable to proceed till joined by H. M. 
 13th. The fighting continued almost without interruption till they reached 
 Gundamuck, and afterwards Jellalabad, where they were shut up for six 
 months. Such was the commencement of the general Ghilzie insurrection,— 
 a movement in many of its chacterisartics unprecedented amongst the fickle 
 and incoherent hordes of Asia, unparalleled in the amount of calamity it occa- 
 sioned us, and in the nature of the retribution exacted after our misfortunes 
 had come to an end. 
 
 40. Parliameutary paper j also Major Hough on the Finances of India. 
 
 41. Sir II. Peel's speech, House of Comraoiis' Debates, 11th March, lo42. 
 
 42. Statement of the Hon'ble Mr Bird, Senior Member of Council, given in 
 tl^e letter of Sir H. Willock to Lord Aberdeen, Sept. 1«41 — Colonial Maga- 
 zine. 
 
 43. Sir W. Macnaghtea's despatch, Oct. 23. BJue Book of 1843, page 8. 
 
285 
 
 Having thus drawn our narrative to a close,— for, with the occurrences 
 just mentioned the system of policy which we had for three years attempted 
 to carry out may he said to have been brought to an end, — the war of ag- 
 gression having been changed first into a struggle in our own defence, and 
 finally into a war of vengeance,— a few general observations may be per- 
 mitted as to the concomitants and consequences of what must be regarded 
 one of the wildest adventures in which any Government ever was engaged. 
 
 It will have been seen from the preceding pages that betwixt November 
 1839, when the armies of Sir J. Keaue and Sir T. Willshire quitted Affgha- 
 nistan, till November 1841, when the Ghilzie insurrection made its appear- 
 ance, our troops, varying in numbers from fifty to two thousand, had been 
 on thirty-four several occasions engaged with the enemy ; that we had had 
 1500 killed and wounded, and had slaughtered about 5030 of the insurgents. 
 This was in addition to the 2500 already enumerated as having fallen in the 
 first campaign, so that from February 1839 till October 1841, we had slain 
 about 7500 Afi'ghans, yet we marvelled at their ingratitude in not requiting 
 with attachment the blood relationship we had established. The connexion 
 was cemented by the sacrifice of above 5000 more in the course of the suc- 
 ceeding year ! — 12,500 in all. About 18,000 of our own army, and camp 
 followers had been destroyed before December, 1842. "We had in the course 
 of this period, lost about fifty British officers, of whom nearly one- half 
 had fallen by the sword. The names of twelve killed in Beloochistan 
 have already been given : those who fell in Kohislan or near Jellalabad 
 are as follows : — Captain Douglas, Dr Lord, Lieutenants Collinson, Gonolly, 
 Broadfoot, Crispin, and Pigou. We have not been able to make up a 
 complete list of those who died from climatic causes. During Lord Keane's 
 campaign we had lost 32 officers, of whom one was killed in action, three 
 wounded by the enemy, three were burnt, and one drowned j about half the 
 rest died from natural causes, the other half fell victims to the climate,— 
 nearly one hundred officers having perished in the country before the insur- 
 rection. We had on thirteen several occasions been unsuccessful : by these 
 not only dispiriting our troops, but injuring the character for irresistibility 
 we had hitherto maintained, and which is so often more than half the battle. 
 
 No official returns of the precise cost of the Affghan war have yet been 
 published, but we have sufficient data to enable us to make a very close ap- 
 proximation to this. The earliest estimate in point of date which has been 
 
286 
 
 attempted, tliat of tlio Bombay Times of July 1811, comes singularly near 
 the truth. The cost of the first year's campaign is set down at nine railliona 
 sterling, that of each succeeding year at three : these were deductions from 
 the known charges of the troops, the salaries of political agents, and the pay 
 allowed to the tribe?. By the Parliamentary papers since publisleJ, it ap- 
 pears that there was ten millions of accumulated surplus in the various trea- 
 suries of India when the war began. Not only was this entirely expended 
 by the end of the year 1841, but Governsisnt required a loan at an un- 
 usually high rate of interest, by which about five millions more were raised. 
 Sir R. Peel stated in Parliament on the 1 1th March 1843j that there had been 
 for some years just before the coraraenceraent of the war a surplus revenue 
 of somewhat above a million sterling annually. The domestic government 
 of Lord Auckland was, if not parsimonious, far from extravagant or wasteful : 
 and as the revenues of India have for some years been growing in productive- 
 ness, we must suppose this surplus, amounting betwixt 1838 and 1841 to 
 four millions, to have been absorbed in the one vast drain that was carrying 
 off all our wealth. On these facts, and this assumption, the cost of the Doo* 
 rannee alliance up to the time of the siege of Cabool will be found to have 
 amounted to betwixt seventeen and twenty millions at the lowest estimate, 
 •without taking interest into account at all. 
 
 But the enormous loss of treasure thrown away without any hope of pe- 
 cuniary return, was only a portion of the financial evil. The whole of the 
 money sent from India to Affghanistan was so in the shape of coined silver- 
 it was expended there on baggage-cattle, forage, provisions, commissariat 
 stores, and other matters which the country itself supplied. Nearly a mil- 
 lion sterling v^^ent for camels alone, of whom upwards of 70,000 were sacri- 
 ficed within the period referred to. The Affghans are not a commercial people, 
 and their trade with the countries below the mountains never in all ap- 
 pears to have amounted to a million annually in gross value, if it ever came 
 up to anything like this. It was just beginning to set in the direction of 
 Hindostan when it was fairly turned by us ; the imports from Russia by 
 the Herat frontier, having, according to Sir Alexander Burnes, more 
 than doubled from 1838 to 18il. Such was one of the most natural 
 and foreseeable results of our interference. Without any exact means 
 of estimating, the conjecture that from four to five millions sterling was 
 withdrawn in specie from the currency of India to which it has not yet, 
 nor will for many years, return, may probably be found within the truth. 
 
 The more the matter is examined, the more difficult it is to discover by 
 what process of self-delus'on it was that the projectors or advocates of the 
 Doorannee alliance could for a moment persuade themselves that the 
 restoration and maintenance of the Shah Soojah on the throne, could 
 conduce to any one of the ends we professed ourselves anxious to attain. 
 
287 
 
 Assuming, for argument's sake, that which we know to be either unproven, 
 improbable, or utterly untrue — that Herat was meant to become a Rus- 
 sian outpost — that Dost Mahomed was determined to recover Peshawur 
 and attach himself to the Czar, without regard to our interests, wishes, 
 or friendship, yet it seems impossible to discover by what process we 
 supposed that matters, in any one of those respects, save that of Peshawur, 
 which concerned us not, was to be one whit improved. 
 
 It was apparent from the beginning, to all who chose to open their eyes, 
 that in the person of the Shah Soojah was no inherent potency or virtue 
 to repel Russia or draw the tribes around him ;— that by our arras and re- 
 sources, expended directly in Affghanistan, and encumbered and deadened 
 by the very parties the thorough efficiency of whose assistance was the only 
 thing which, under any circumstances, could have rendered the Doorannee 
 alliance in the most remote degree desirable, must the Northern Autocrat 
 be repelled should he dream of advancing. 
 
 Copious extracts have already been given from a report laid before the 
 Envoy by Sir Alexander Burnes, on the 7th August, 1810.(44) The follow- 
 ing from a letter to Mr Secretary Torrens, by the Envoy in handing this 
 up to Government, will throw light on the difficulties experienced at the 
 commencement of the new reign :— 
 
 To H. Torrens, Esq.^ Officiating Secretary to the Government of India. 
 
 SiRj — I was about to submit my sentiments to Government on the present con- 
 dition and future prospects of this count! y, when I received a paper, of which the 
 accompanying is a copy, from Lieutenant Colonel Sir A. Burnes, to each Para, of 
 which I have annexed my comments as being the most convenient form of showing 
 wherein I agree, and wherein I differ, with that officer. 
 
 2nd, It will be seen that this paper reached me originally in a private form, 
 but with the permission of Sir A. Burnes I have placed it on record, as was done 
 with his former paper written in February last on similar subjects. 
 
 3d. In this paper Sir A. Burnes has enumerated all the defects of the present 
 Government, and the dangers to which our position is exposed. Of the defects, no- 
 thing certainly has been extenuated, but when they are weighed it would be but 
 fair to take into consideration the difficulties by which we have bsen surrounded 
 from the time of the assumption of authority by His Majesty up to the present pe- 
 riod. Of the dangers to which we are exposed from the perpetual intrigues of secret 
 foes in our front and in our rear, I have already, I fear, written too much, 
 
 4th. No sooner was His Majesty seated on his throne than his attention was at- 
 tracted to the necessity of sending an Expedition against the rebellious Ghiljee 
 Chiefs, and against the treacherous Khan of Kelat. Whilst these operations were 
 going on, His Majesty was anxiously considering the best means of frustrating the 
 
 ■ I i- ..11.. . . ju I ... ... . L- , . « .i I' M l " 
 
 44. \ide ante, pp. 164-1 G3. 
 
288 
 
 machinations of Dost Mahomed Khan, and before they were brought to a concla. 
 sionhe was compelled to proceed to Jellalabad. 
 
 5th. Whilst on his way to that place, His Majesty was informed of the insur- 
 rection of the Khyber tribes ; and hardly had this been suppressed by negotiation, 
 when the rebellion broke out in Koonner. Next followed our own negotiation 
 with a view of conci'iating Saadut Khan, Azeez Khan, and other disaffected chiefs. 
 And just before His Majesty quitted Jellalabad to return to Cabool the disturbances 
 broke out in Bajore which have not yet been quieted. 
 
 6th. Immediately after His Majesty's return to Cabool it became necessary to 
 take measures for coercing the Ghiljees a second time ; and scarcely had this object 
 been effected when the disturbances in the neighbourhood of Quetta and Kelat de- 
 manded bis attention. 
 
 7th. When it is considered that all these occurrences, and many others of minor 
 importance, were crowded into the brief space of one twelve raonth^ it must be ad- 
 mitted that His Majesty has quite enough to occupy his attention without the set- 
 tlement of the internal affairs of his kingdom. In his efforts for the improvement 
 of these, I know that His Majesty lias been indefatigable. Governors, with their su- 
 bordinate officers, have been appointed to the different districts ; His Majesty himself 
 examines his treasure accounts, and superintends, in conjunction with Capt. Trevor, 
 the muster of his Troops. All objectionable taxes have been abolished, and His 
 Majesty invariably evinces the greatest anxiety that justice should be done to all 
 his subjects. His Majesty sits in Durbar every morning, except Thursday, for about 
 two hours, and listens with the greatest patience to the representations of his chiefs. 
 One day is set apart for hearing the complaints of all those who may allege 
 that they have not received redress from the authorities to whom their cases have 
 been referred. 
 
 8th. Though stern in the execution of justice, (as was exemplified only the 
 other day in the case of the murderer in whose pardon so much influence was ex- 
 erted,) yet His Majesty is merciful and kind-hearted in the extreme ; and if the per- 
 sonal qualities of a monarch could ensure popularity. Shah Shooja could not fail to 
 obtain it. My longer experience of His Majesty's character more thoroughly con- 
 vinces me of the truth of what I have already asserted, that there is not an abler, 
 or better man, than himself in all his dominions. 
 
 9th. But His Majesty labours under peculiar and complicated difficulties, the 
 foremost of which is his connexion with us. We have placed him on his throne, 
 but it will be some time before our motives in doing so are thoroughly understood. 
 There are many who wilfully misunderstand them. The difference of our religi- 
 on is, of course, the chief cause of antipathy on the part of the people. The Aff- 
 ghans are a nation of bigots. Besides an intolerance of our creed there is an in- 
 tolerance of our customs, and it behoves us therefore to be very wary in our at- 
 tempts at innovation : nor ought it ever to be forgotten that a system, though excel- 
 lent in itself, may not be good as applied to this country, nor though good, may it 
 be such as to admit the due appreciation of its advantages. It requires the most 
 cautious steering to refrain, on the one side from alarming popular prejudices, and 
 on the other from leaving the Government in the same imbecile state in which we 
 
289 
 
 found it : a safe foundation has been laid for improving the natural strength of the 
 country, but on this subject I shall shortly do myself the honor of submitting a se- 
 parate report. 
 
 10th. It would be impossible to enumerate the various difficulties with which 
 the British Representative has daily to contend in this country. Our enemies try 
 to impress the people with a belief that we are the rulers of the country. We 
 must necessarily interfere on some occasions, and the risk of exceeding or falling 
 short of the exact medium is of daily (I may almost say of hourly) occurrence. 
 Tliere are other minor causes which operate against us : we have raised the price 
 of provisions by increasing the number of consumers, and the quantity of the cir- 
 culating medium, and the inconvenience from this unfortunately tells chiefly on the 
 two classes of the greatest influence — the priesthood, and the military,— who have 
 fixed s'ipends. 
 
 llih. His Majesty has found an Augean stable of iniquity to cleanse. He has 
 to defeat the accumulated impurities of thirty years. During the whole of that 
 period, all has been anarchy, and what little of government there was, has been 
 chiefly supported by a system of perBdy and assassination. It is notorious by 
 these means alone that Dost Mahomed Khan was able to prop up the little power 
 he possessed beyond the gates of Cabool. The most virtuous Aflfghan would deem 
 it no sin to break faith with a rebel j and assassination, as a means of conquest, 
 was of daily occurrence. His Majesty has not been exempt from those inconve- 
 niences which ordinarily beset restored monarchs. His old retainers were in- 
 satiable in their wants, and his new adherents entertained the most sanguine ex- 
 pectations of reward for their desertion ; whilst all looked forward to the appear- 
 ance of some miraculous change in their favour. The splendour of the ancient 
 monarchy was revived in the recollection of all; whilst the king, succeeding to a 
 dismembered monarchy impoverished by the struggle which placed him on the 
 throne, as well as by the long-continued system of grinding oppression which pre- 
 ceded the restoration, found himself without the means either of rewarding his 
 friends or conciliating his enemies. 
 
 12th. It appears that even at the time of Mr. Elphinstone's mission, (p. 49) the 
 Doorannee Lords were averse to an alliance with the British Government, which 
 might strengthen the king to the detriment of the aristocracy. How much more 
 averse must they now be to such an alliance after having participated with Dost 
 Mahomed, almost on equal terms, in the spoils of the country ? They are now 
 powerless, and they feel that every additional security we grant to His Majesty, 
 lessens their own consequence. 
 
 13th. I have on more than one occasion stated the great facilitiei which exist 
 for disturbing the peace of this country. The people I have described as being 
 rapacious, bigotted, and credulous. Sikh Agents with Sikh gold can easily set the 
 whole country into a flame by taking advantage of their position, by power and 
 offers of money, and by artful appeals to the religious prejudices of the people ; 
 whilst the mountainous nature of the country, and the prevalent notions of hospi- 
 tality which prevent the people from giving up a refugee however criminal, ren- 
 der it a work of infinite difficulty to root out the disturbers of the public tran- 
 quillity. O I 
 
290 
 
 14tb. There is one, and only one> remedy for all these evils, namely, to deprive 
 those of the power who have the will to injure us. The Sikh Feudatories on one 
 side, and the Herat authorities on the other^ should be for ever deprived of 
 the means of molesting us, — If such a vigorous policy as this should suit our con- 
 venience} it would further be recommended by proving to the world that there 
 was no original miscalculation taken of the risks to be run in the bold and saga- 
 cious measures of the Governor General, but that all the evils which have hap- 
 pened were as unespected as they are undeserved, — that they are attributable to 
 the perfidy of pretended friends, which could not of course be either foreseen or 
 provided against. 
 
 I5tb. I have now enumerated the principal events which have occurred in this 
 country since His Majesty's accession to the Government ; — I have recapitulated, 
 as succinctly as was in ray power, the chief obstacles which have arisen to the suc- 
 cessful administration of affairs j — and 1 have endeavoured to show that the 
 existing state of things is as prosperous as, under all circumstances, could reason- 
 ably have been expected. 
 
 16th, I would now respectfully solicit the expression of His Lordship in Coun- 
 cil's opinion as to the course of policy which I have pursued. I am of opinion that 
 it would be impolitic to alienate His Majesty's affections by suddenly and harshly 
 calling upon him to dismiss the comparatively small number of armed attendants 
 whom he is desirous of retaining about his own person ; especially when it is clear 
 that we should have to supply their place by troops of the contingent, who have 
 already more duties than they can perform, and whose discipline would be ruined 
 by such employment. 
 
 17th. I am of opinion that it is the duty of the British representative here ra- 
 ther to watch carefully for opportunities of suggesting reform, and to treat His 
 Majesty with all possible consideration, than to urge sweeping innovation, or to 
 assume towards His Majesty anything like a tone of dictation. Such proceedings 
 would reduce His Majesty to the condition of a cypher, and would afford to our 
 enemies the means of successfully propagating reports to our prejudice, and to the 
 effect that our design is to seize the Government of the country. I am of opinion 
 (and if wrong I hope to be corrected) that it is preferable to work at minor abuses, 
 which are inherent in every Eastern Monarchy, than to exercise frequent and 
 authoritative interference, the good effects of which would be at least proble- 
 matical. 
 
 18th. It has been my principle therefore to turn a deaf ear to all trifling com- 
 plaints that are brought to me, and to refer the complainants for redress to their 
 lawful sovereign, — deeming it of paramount importance to our interests that His 
 Majesty's authority should be felt and respected. 
 
 19tb. Where complaints appeared to me to be of such a nature as seriously to 
 involve the interests or reputation of His Majesty's Government, I have never 
 failed to bring them privately to His Majesty's notice, and I bave not unfrequent- 
 ]y found those eomplaints utterly destitute of foundation. 
 
291 
 
 20th. Though fully aware of the difliculty of making a proper solution) I have 
 never ceased to urge upon His Majesty the great importance of selecting a competent 
 minister, of reforming his army, and of reducing his expenditure within the limits 
 of his income. These and other objects will bo gradually attained by kind and 
 persevering counsel. This is not a country in which our objects are to be attain* 
 ed per saltum : His Majesty's wishes must meet with some little attention. The 
 prejudices of the people must be respected, minor abuses must be overlooked, and 
 our proceedings at every step must be guarded by caution, temper, and forbear- 
 ance. 
 
 (Signed) W. H. Macnaghte». 
 
 August 10th, 1840. 
 
 The first portionrof this is a justification or extenuation of the errors into 
 which Government had fallen, as enumerated by Sir Alexander Burnes: in 
 point of fact it afibrds precisely the picture that was at the time drawn by the 
 opponents of the Doorannee alliance, and which was repudiated and de- 
 nounced by its supporters as gloomy and exaggerated— just a representa- 
 tion of that state of affairs, for which, at the commencement of the expedi- 
 tion, the Government ought to have been prepared to look. Yet at this 
 time, with these documents in their possession, the Ministry at home de- 
 picted everything as bright and sunshiny : the halcyon days of Affghan 
 tranquillity were hastening on ; the golden age of the Doorannee civiliza- 
 tion was at hand j and it but required a few years continuance of that 
 blessed peace and prosperity which was ruining the armies, draining the 
 treasury of India, and filling Central Asia with tumult and slaughter, to 
 prove that the Suddozye alliance was one of the miracles of modern 
 statesmanship ! A miracle it was most assuredly, but in the opposite sense 
 to that in which it was intended to be understood as such by those who so 
 characterised it. 
 
 It has already been stated, that the vast majority of the newspapers of 
 India were, from tho beginning, most hostile to the Affghan war ; and now 
 that we can look back on the occurrences which have happened within the 
 last four years, and compare them with the anticipations formed of them by 
 the press, the extraordinary accuracy with which their prophecies have been 
 realized occasions less admiration of the sagacity of the writers than astonish- 
 ment that what was so obvious to the guides or representatives of public 
 opinion should have been so utterly lost sight of by Government. 
 
 Not only is this most marvellous, but still more so in the apathy mani- 
 fested by the ministry and people of England at the fearful warnings the 
 events of each succeeding month supplied. In May 1841 the Bombay Times 
 published a corrected list of thirty-three actions in which our troops had 
 been engaged during the preceding twelve months, in thirteen of which they 
 had been unsuccessful ; and two months afterwards an account current drawn. 
 
29^ 
 
 np on the facts supplied by the Government Gazette^ the Almanack^ &iid 
 the Armi/ List^ from which it appeared, that up to that date twelve mil- 
 lions gterling had been expended, and three millions annually hardly covered 
 the current charges of the Doorannee alliance. The paper referred to was at 
 this time extensively circulated in England, yet not one of these fearfully 
 alarming facts, or the inferences deduced from them, that the hour of our 
 compulsory retirement or expulsion from Affghanistan was then drav»ing 
 rapidly near, occasioned the slightest attention. Within ten months, the 
 gloomy, but unheeded auguries, were all realized. (45) 
 
 This was the period of the general election of June and July 1841, 
 when the merits of the measures, foreign and domestic, of both parties are in 
 general pretty keenly canvassed. About this time Lord Palmerston, in ad- 
 dressing the electors of Tiverton (46), took infinite credit to himself and his 
 colleagues for the excellency and thorough success of their policy towards 
 AflFghanistan, which country he described as so perfectly tranquillized, and 
 so entirely satisfied with our management, that Englishmen might travel 
 from the one end of it to the other without fear of danger or annoyance. 
 At this very time the papers in the archives of the Board of Control, to 
 which the foreign secretary had access, showed that, from the hour we had 
 entered the country, it had been one scene of incessant bloodshed and 
 turmoil, that the chiefs whom we subsidized were the only ones who main- 
 tained even the semblance of submission ; and that our soldiers dared not 
 venture beyond sight of the sentries without perilling their lives. Yet 
 these observations of Lord Palmerston's, — which, in India, were received 
 
 45. The London Times and the Spectator are at this time the only papers which 
 seemed to; be fully alive to the momentous warnings then so universally 
 neglected, and which, if attended to, might have saved the expenditure of so 
 much blood and treasure. 
 
 46. The following extract is from the newspaper report of the famous Ti- 
 verton Speech of June 1841. At the time it was delivered Lord Palmerston 
 must have been aware of the documents in the bands of the Board of Controul, 
 giving accounts of Shelton's operations in the Nazian valley— of the general, 
 discontents in Kohistan — the three separate expeditions then on foot betwixt 
 Candahar and Ghuznie— the victories of Farrington and Woodburn on the Hel- 
 mund, with the preparations for Captain Griffin's expedition — the Noosky 
 expedition — the atfair of Kojjuckand general movement of the troops in Scinde 
 and Shawl — the universal marching and countermarching of detachments 
 throughout the country, occupied as they were in fi.ve simultaneous or imme- 
 diately consecutive campaigns around Jellalabad, Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Ghirisk, 
 Noosky, and the Seebee country. The Foreign Secretary must either have 
 spoken ironically, or desired to ascertain how far the credulity of the people 
 might be taxed. It must have been gratifying to him to discover, that there 
 was no statement whatever, however enormously at variance with fact, which 
 would not be received in England in reference to the affairs of India, if made 
 by a minister of the Crown, The same system is at present being adopted by 
 the conservative journals in defending the policy of Lord Ellenborough, 
 and apparently with similar success j the statements of the Morning Post and 
 
293 
 
 as a bitter mockery of the suflFerings our troops were then enduring in 
 Aflghanistan,'— were at home passed over without question, reprehension, or 
 observation. So late did public apathy continue, that when the abstracts 
 above referred to were reprinted after the destruction of the Cabool force, 
 they were still regarded, and in many cases stigmatised, as exaggerated or 
 fictitious. They are wrought into the preceding narrative, with the authorities 
 on which they have been made given in detail ; and now that abundance of 
 corroborative official information has been supplied by Government, defy 
 impeachment. 
 
 It appears, as already stated, from the official papers published in the 
 Blue Book of 1843, that had the Ghilzie insurrection not occurred, Lord 
 Auckland was anxious to have his policy carried out as long as it would 
 hold : H. M/s 9th, with two native regiments, were under orders to sup» 
 
 Standard on this subject may, in point of accuracy, be fairly placed beside those 
 of the ex-Foreign Secretary : it is to be hoped that their illusions will be some- 
 what less rudely dispelled. 
 
 t' Now let me travel a little further to the east ; for there is no quarter of the 
 globe in which we have not had occasion to uphold the dignity of the country, and to 
 vindicate its honour, and to maintain its dearest interests. Transactions had taken 
 place in countries which many of you have, perhaps, never heard of till they came 
 to be introduced to your notice in consequence of events to which I allude— trans- 
 actions, I say, had taken place in Persia and Aflghanistan, in the centre of Asia, 
 which threatened destruction to the vast emp're which we possess in the East Indies; 
 but, aciiog with promptitude and decision, we carried our armies into the centre of 
 Affghanistan, and the noble Lord, whose name my honourable friend mentioned 
 just now, there rendered the most important services to his country, by achieving 
 military successes which have rendered secure to us that vast empire which we 
 possess in India, and the importance of which it is hardly possible to over-rate, though, • 
 perhaps those who have not turned their attention to these matters may not at once 
 sufficiently perceive their value. We brought within British influence, in one cam- 
 paign, a vast extent of country, larger than France, almost as big as half Europe ; 
 and the way in which this was done, and the results which have followed, are well 
 deserving of the attention of the people of England. There is a contrast, of which 
 we may have reason to be proud, between the progress of our arms in the East and 
 the operations which a neighbouring power — France — is now carrying on in Africa. « 
 The progress of the British arnrs in Asia has been marked by a scrupulous refer- I 
 ence to justice, an inviolable respect for property, an abstinence from anything ? 
 which could tend to wound the feelings and prejudices of the people ; and the result ,f 
 is this, that I saw not many weeks ago a distinguished military officer who had just 
 returned from the centre of Affghanistan, from a place called Candahar, which 
 many of you, perhaps, never heard of, and he told me that he, accompanied by half 
 a dozen attendants, but without any military escort, had ridden on horseback many 
 hundreds of miles through a country inhabited by Avild and semi-baibarous tribes, 
 who but two years ago were arrayed in fierce hostility against the approach of the 
 British arms — but that he had ridden through them all with as mueh safety as he 
 could have ridden from Tiverton to John o' Groat's house, his name as a British officer 
 being a passport through them all, because the English had rtspected iheir rights, 
 had afforded them protection, and treated ihem with justice ; thence it is that an 
 unarmed Englishman was safe in the midst of their wilds." 
 
294 
 
 ply the place of Sir R. Sale's Brigade, should this be found necessary at 
 the time our misfortunes began. H. M. 41st, with 2000 Bombay troops, 
 wore ready to ascend the Bolan Pass, if needed, in room of McLaren's bri- 
 gade. It is equally clear, that though this was the Governor- General's 
 determination, it was merely contingent upon the continuance of affairs in 
 a state not more unfavourable than that in which they had been for the 
 preceding two years, — and probably with a view of getting rid of the matter 
 in the best way he could, leaving the difficulties of the winding-up in the 
 hands of his successor : the moment the intelligence of the insurrection 
 reached Government, they declared that, in the event of military possession 
 of Cabool and the surrounding country being lost, it was not their intention 
 to direct new and extensive operations with a view of re-establishing our 
 supremacy ;(47) and they were prepared for the contingency of our political 
 influence in that quarter being for a time entirely subverted. (48) Mr 
 Bird's apprehensions of immediate bankruptcy have been already noticed : 
 the Commander-in-Chief shortly afterwards declared his belief that the state 
 neither of the army nor treasury of India were such as to permit them to 
 think of renewing the war. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it is clear that early in the year 1842, the 
 Doorannee alliance must have been broken off, and Affghanistan aban- 
 doned at all events, without reservation or delay, whatever its condition. 
 The originators of the policy, had they remained in power, would have 
 been compelled to undo their own measures with their own hands, — to 
 abandon a system, which, from its own inherent defects, was incapable 
 of being maintained. The Cabool disaster was for them and their already 
 bankrupt credit as statesmen, far the best thing that could have happened : 
 making it appear as if the policy of 1838 had been brought to an end by a 
 great and unlooked-for catastrophe, which no one could have foreseen or 
 guarded against, and withdrawing public attention from the fact that, in 
 the tirst place, the Ghilzle insurrection, and its results, was a natural 
 and long-expected emanation from the system itself; and, in the second' 
 place, that if, by some rare piece of unimagined good fortune, we had con- 
 trived to escape any thing like this, the whole fabric of our policy, which 
 the disasters of Cabool so suddenly dissolved, was ready to crumble to 
 pieces from its own intrinsic rottenness. (49) 
 
 Such frequent mention has been made of the mismanagement of the 
 political agents, in contrast with the excellent conduct of the military, 
 
 47. Letter of Governor-General in Council, Dec 3. News from Cabool at 
 this time extended to the 9th Nov., and gave details of only one week of the 
 insurrection, which began on the 2d. Blue Book, p. 37. 
 
 48. Letter, &c. &c., Dec. 5. Blue Book, p. 38. 
 
 49. See extract from memorial of Sir Alex. Burnes, page 151. 
 
295 
 
 tliat a misapprehension has got abroad that these gentlemen did not belong 
 to the army at all. This is a mistake which ought to be rectified. On 
 referring to the list given at the commencement of the third chapter (p. 143) 
 it will be seen that at the first the Envoy and Mr Bell were the only 
 political agents who did not belong to the military service ; and that after 
 the demise of the latter of these gentlemen, the envoy alone was a civil- 
 lian. Of the thirty- two political agents employed in Affghanistan between 
 1839 and 1842, not one had attained the rank of major in the army, (50) ten 
 were captains, and 21 lieutenants. Had these gentlemen continued to act 
 in their military capacity there is no reason to doubt but that they would 
 have done no discredit to the service from which they had been tem- 
 porarily in some measure withdrawn. They were selected chiefly for their 
 proficiency in languages and knowledge of the country : and as these 
 accomplishments did not necessarily imply the possession of a high order 
 of intellectual endowment, the men whose power was supreme over the 
 various districts of the Doorannee empire were too often found awanting 
 for the adequate discharge of the onerous and important duties imposed 
 upon them. The amount of irresponsible authority with which they were 
 invested was enough to have turned stronger and stabler heads than theirs 
 — and the idea had unhappily got amongst them that subtlety and dissimu- 
 lation were essential, and the most tortuous policy and Machivellian 
 morals permissible in the position of statesmen which they naw occupied 
 — that in fact they must fling aside the military frankness and straight- 
 forward candour which became them as officers, and assume a character 
 from which, in their private capacity of English gentlemen, they would 
 have shrunk. There are many, very many, to whom these observations are 
 inapplicable, and the examples of the eminent success of Major Outram, and 
 Captains M'Gregor, Mackeson, and Lawrence, in pursuing the straight- 
 forward system becoming high-minded soldiers and honourable men, may 
 shew how sadly some of their brethren erred in supposing wisdom in- 
 compatible with perfect candour, frankness ana simplicity. The evils 
 which arose from the general system of political agencies might have been 
 greatly diminished had the sphere of the labours of the agents been re- 
 stricted to that of interpreters and collectors of information — leaving the 
 political power in the hands of the military chiefs. Yet the mischiefs 
 complained of were, in a considerable measure, inherent in the system, 
 and it is difficult to conceive any organization which could have worked 
 
 50. Sir Alex. Burnes had merely the army rank of Captain— Major Outram 
 was so by Brevet — Majors D'A. Tod, Rawlinson, Pottinger, Leach, and Lynch, 
 were Lieutenants in the army, and held the rank of Major in Persia or Affghan- 
 istan only. 
 
296 
 
 Teally well in carrying out the objects we had in view, considering the 
 nature and magnitude of these, and the circumstances under which they 
 were desired to be elaborated. 
 
 A single subject remains yet to be noticed— the conduct of the army 
 —which we have reserved to the last, because it is the only one which can 
 be discussed not only without a preponderance of censure, but with un- 
 mixed approbation, and unalloyed pride and pleasure. 
 
 Highly as the sepoy soldier had been appreciated by every one acquaint- 
 ed with the history of oriental wars, half the merit of the Company's 
 native army may be said to have remained unknown till brought to light 
 by the Affghan campaigns. There are no people on earth more averse to * 
 quit their homes for foreign lands than the natives of Hindostan, and no 
 country could have been more abhorrent to them than that where the cli- 
 mates of the frigid and torrid zone alternated, and from which had de- 
 scended those torrents of gigantic and resistless warriors by whom, from 
 time to time, the fairest provinces of India were overrun. 
 
 From November 1838 till November 1841, the native army sustained a 
 series of incessant and most perilous encounters, over an expanse of 800 
 miles of rugged, difficult, and inhospitable country, without one solitary 
 instance of alleged misconduct, save that on the part of a single squadron 
 of cavalry at Purwan Durrah. Patient of fatigue, tormented by extremes 
 of heat and cold, in a country where the thermometer ranged from 120 
 deg. to 40 deg. below freezing — often suffering from scarcity of food and 
 want of camp accommodation, we have not so much as an example of a 
 threat of mutiny, or manifestation of discontent. Frequently disappointed in 
 the expectation of returning to India, they received their orders to remain 
 in the country and resume campaigning with the most perfect cheerful- 
 ness. With no single instance of timidity or backwardness, save that 
 just named, and a trifling case at Kojjuck, only worth adverting to be- 
 cause we are anxious to extenuate nothing which the censurers of the ser- 
 vice would desire to dwell upon — —there were numberless examples of 
 endurance, coolness under fire, and intrepidity, which would have been the 
 boast of any service. It must be kept in view that we were on almost 
 every occasion of conflict enormously outnumbered,— that the enemy indi- 
 vidually were stronger and more powerful men, far better armed, and 
 equally as brave as those they encountered : and that the advantage of 
 choosing their battle-ground was always on their side. These observations 
 refer exclusively to the Hindostanee troops, — the character of the British- 
 born soldier is sufficiently known to require no commendation — it was 
 never more gloriously sustained than in the campaigns in Affghanistan, 
 to which this narrative relates. A portion of H. M.'s 4th dragoons, H.M.'s 
 13tb, 17th, 40tb, and 44tb, and the 1st Bengal Europeans, with various 
 
297 
 
 corps of artillery, all more or less shared in our Doorannee wars before 
 the Ghilzie outbreak. The 13th alone were engaged throughout, and 
 fought gloriously, and auflPered patiently from the beginning to the end. 
 The perfect harmony betwixt the various races, and the brotherly feeling 
 with which they fought, side by side, is above all commendation. The fel- 
 lowship which afterwards sprung up betwixt H.M.'s 13th and Bengal 35th 
 N.I.,and the admiration of H.M/s 22d for the Bombay 25th N.I-, indicate 
 that the sympathies of the brave with each other are impeded by no dif- 
 ference of country, colour, or creed. 
 
 Of the British officers nothing need be said : the history of their 
 achievements and sufferings, brief and meagre as it is, is enough. With 
 the service of more gallant, upright, able, or efficient men, no Govern- 
 ment need desire to be blessed or honoured. Where there was so much 
 to irritate and excite, it is not to be forgotten that with the daring and 
 promptitude, the mercy and humanity of Englishmen was duly mingled. 
 More instances of individual heroism and personal gallantry, under circum- 
 stances of extreme trial, might be quoted in this campaign than in any 
 one in which our armies ever were for a similar time engaged. To the 
 army the Affghan war was in many ways a curse: its hardships they 
 cheerfully surmounted — its dangers they defied. But it was a war as void 
 of apology or justice as of honour, its objects awakened no sympathy in 
 its favour, their attainment was unworthy of British ambition. The laurels 
 it yielded, however ably won, were grudgingly given, and scarcely coveted, 
 their exhibition hardly furnished food for gratification — they gained no 
 glory in so worthless a cause. The terrors of the sword were nothing, 
 those of sickness and poverty were less easily defied. Instead of the cam- 
 paigns from 1838 to 1842 requiting the soldier for his sufterings and toils, 
 they were, in all cases, sources of loss, in many, of absolute ruin. The 
 extra allowances were utterly inadequate to meet the extravagant charges 
 on the march, and expenses attending on the detention in cantonments ; 
 and unless to those to whom lucrative political or staff appointments fell, 
 the officers, not only in health but in emolument, were grievous sufferers.^ 
 
 Ov3rleaping the interval occupied by the active operations of the insur- 
 rection, it may be as well shortly to notice the fate of the leading characters 
 which have occupied so prominent a place in the preceding pages. 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Macnaghten were murdered at 
 Cabool — the one on the 2d November, the other on the 23d December, 1841. 
 General Elphinstone died a prisoner in the enemy's hands. 
 
 General Nott, with his army, remained at Candahar till August 1842, 
 when he himself, with the larger portion of them, advanced on Ghuznie, 
 
 PI 
 
298 
 
 which they destroyed, and returned by Cabool and the Khyber Pass to Itidia, 
 gaining two victories, and attended by the most brilliant success on the way. 
 The other portion returned by Quettah and the Bolan Pass. 
 
 The Shah Soojah is suspected to have been connected with the Ghilzie 
 insurrection. At his own desire he was left behind when our armies quitted 
 Cabool on the 6th January 1842, and for a time appeared likely to maintain 
 himself in power. He was murdered a few months afterwards by the chiefs. 
 
 Of his sons, Prince Timour, the only one whose character was without 
 reproach, remained faithful to us to the end, and retired with our armies to 
 India, where he now lives a pensioner on government. Prince Futteh Jung 
 succeeded the Shah in nominal authority at Cabool, but afterwards fled from 
 the capital for fear of his life. Prince Shahpoor it was at one time believed 
 would be able to maintain himself in power, and he was left behind after 
 our 6nal retirement : he quickly followed his brother, and the two are now 
 elemosynaries of the Seikh ruler. 
 
 The miscreant Sufter Jung of Candahar went over to the enemy shortly 
 after the commencement of the insurrection, and having continued for six 
 months to fight against us, ultimately surrendered himself into our hands. 
 He was left behind on General Nott's advance, but having been shortly 
 afterwards expelled from his country, is said to have found refuge at Kelat. 
 According to another rumour he is now in chains at Candahar, where every 
 one who befriended us is made subject of persecution by the ruling powers. 
 
 On the 1st of October 1842, a proclamation dated Simla, announced that 
 our connection with AfFghanistan had ceased, and that the government of 
 India would meddle no more with its affairs ; our own prisoners had 
 been recovered, and the Affghan chiefs and their families were all to be set 
 free. 
 
 After devastating the country — cutting down the trees, and uprooting the 
 orchards and vineyards, after having blown up or burned with fire the cities 
 and forts of Ghuznie, Cabool, IstaliflP, Jellalabad, and AH Musjid, by which 
 about 70,000 human beings were, on the eve of winter, left houseless — our' 
 armies were, in November, entirely withdrawn from the country. 
 
 In April 1843, Dost Mahomed, after a long sojourn in the Punjaub — 
 where he was entertained by the Seikh ruler in a manner becoming both 
 their stations — returned with his family, without obstruction and in safety, 
 to Cabool, and resumed sovereignty without opposition or resistance. His 
 indomitable son, Ukhbar Khan, for a time laying aside the sword, set him- 
 self about the reconstruction of the fort of Jellalabad, and the ruined cities. 
 
 The king of Bokhara sent an ambassador to congratulate the Ameer on 
 his return : he was received with favour, and returned with presents. 
 
299 
 
 Sara wan was once more re-anaexed to Kelat, and Quettah left uninjured 
 — Cutchee had been before made over to Nusseer Khan. 
 
 The Candahar Sirdars do not appear so easily to have regained their 
 authority : by the latest intelligence their government was said to be in the 
 hands of Persia— the Shah coining money — the surest stamp of oriental 
 sovereignty — in his own name. 
 
 Kamran Shah is understood to have died about May 1843, and the 
 sovereignty of Herat was immediately assumed by the king of Persia. 
 
 The Ameers of Scinde appear on the whole to have conducted themselves 
 inoflfensively enough from the date of the hostile demonstration near Hy- 
 drabad in January 1839 — fresh treaties were urged upon them from time to 
 time, and successively agreed to. In February 1843, terms were proposed 
 to them by Lord EUenborough, to which they considered it impossible to 
 assent — they resolved to oppose the advance of Sir Charles Napier, then 
 pressing forward on Hydrabad, with an army of nearly 30,000 men. They 
 were beaten with a loss of 5000 killed and wounded, and having surrender- 
 ed themselves prisoners, were sent to be confined in India for life. A second 
 battle with a similar loss occurred near Hydrabad some weeks afterwards. 
 Scinde was declared ours by right of conquest^ and was added to the British 
 territories in India. At present 16,000 men, at an annual cost of above a 
 million sterling, are required to maintain it in peace — the share of its revenue 
 claimed by us being less than the fourth part of this ! 
 
INDEX. 
 
 A 
 
 Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, 14. 
 
 Abbot, Captain, his batter}' of 10-pounders reinforces Major Outram, 126— 
 accompanies force into the Zoormut valley, 283. 
 
 Abdool Rehman Khan> an insurgent Ghilzie Chief, 126— taken by surprise, 127 
 — escapes, 128. 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord,— Sir H. Willock's letter to, 284. 
 
 A«kbar, Mahomed Akbar Khan (sometimes spelt Ukhbar), commands the 
 troops against the Seikhs in 1834, and is successful ; defeats the Seikh troops 
 in May> 1836, when Hurry Sing is slain, 11— sent out from Cabool to receive 
 Captain Burnes ; his appearance, as described by Lieut. Wood, 33, — Gover- 
 nor of Jellalabad in 1839 ; recalled to defend Cabool j abandons his artillery 
 and baggage, 113 — accompanies his father, and is confined at Bokhara, 149} 
 150 — declines our hospitalities j and continues captive at Bokhara, 162. 
 
 AcKRAM Khan, son of Dost Mahomed, surrenders himself at Bameean, 149. 
 
 AcKTER (commonly spelt Ukhter) Khan, an insurgent Chief on the Helmund j 
 troops of defeated by Captain Farrington, 269,— beseiges Ghirisk, 276— 
 defeated by Captain "Woodburn, 278, — his army joined by that of Ackrara 
 Khan, defeated by Captain Griffin, 279- 
 
 Affghanistan — Boundaries of, area, population, i., iv— climate of, v reve- 
 nue, V. — character of the population, from Asiatic Journal, vi. — Wood's 
 account of slave trade to the westward, viii, — toleration of people, Masson's 
 account of, viii.— invasion of, a favourite threat of Persia, 4— anxiety of 
 Affghan chiefs for an alliance with England, 5— troubles in, watched by 
 Runjeet Singh, 6— Forces of withdrawn from Peshawur in 1834, 6— A.ffghans 
 of Peshawur discontented with Seikh dominion, fight against Seikhs, look 
 to Dost Mahomed for assistance, 64. 
 
 Affghans, character of by travellers— .4s/afic Journal's account of, v— Mr. 
 Masson's account, viii. 
 
 Afzul (sometimes spelt Ufzul) Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed -, gains a 
 victory over the Seikhs at Peshawur, 10,~near our camp at Ghuznie with 
 5000 cavalry, 112,— sets out for Bokhara with Dost Mahomed, 150,— es- 
 
302 
 
 capes and assists in stirring up the country, ibid, —comes down on Bajgah 
 with 600 horse, 153 — ^joins his father and the Wullee of Khooloom, 154— 
 desired by the Dosi to surrender, 162. 
 
 AuMED Shah, Founder of the Doorannee empire, i. — Kelat chief, his ter- 
 
 *' ritory held in reign of — his reliance on the Kuzzilbashes, 35 — terms per- 
 mitted by to the Khan of Kelat — adds Sharawan, Cutchee, Harund, and 
 Dajil to Kelat, 208 — extent of the Doorannee empire at the death of, 142. 
 
 AicRAM Khan, an insurgent Teree Chief, joins Ackter Khan on the Helmund y 
 joint forces defeated by Captain Griffin, 279, — Chief himself captured by 
 Lieut. Connolly, 281, — ordered for execution at Candahar, ibid. 
 
 Algerine, H. M.'s ship, dispatched to Kurrachee, 86. 
 
 Allard, General, a Corsican in the Seikh army j introduced to Lord Keanc at 
 Lahore, 125. 
 
 Ameers, The, of Scinde.— Feudatories of Dooranee empire, 81 — profess friend- 
 ship ; their duplicity, 82 — Beloochees plunder with sanction of 3 compelled 
 to pay £100,000, part of arrears due to the Shah Soojah 5 threatened by 
 Bombay and Bengal troops ; give in to all our requests, 83 — deposition of by 
 Lord E llenborough, 299. 
 
 Anderson, Lieut., leads attacking party at Ghuzaie,109. 
 
 Anderson, Capt. "W., marches against the Ghiljies from Candahar, 147 — joins 
 Col. "Wallace, 148 — present at Purwan Durrah, 159- 
 
 Appa Sahib, ex-Rajah of Nagpore ; rebellion said to be headed by, 249- 
 
 Arnold, Brigadier, death of, 121. 
 
 Asseer Khan, a Chief of Sarawan, stripped of his estate, 209. 
 
 Assoo Hazara, Colonel Wymer's victory at, 274. 
 
 AsTRABAD ; Report of Russian forces assembling near, 47. 
 
 Atkinson, Dr J.'s account of the conduct of Mehrab Khan, 89, 9d — estimates 
 the slain at Ghuznie above 1000 ; prejudices against the Barukzyes ; anecdote 
 by of Dost Mahomed, 163. 
 
 Attock, boundary of Affghanistan, i. 
 
 Attock; Fort of, seized on by Runjeot Singh, 6 — ibid, 12 note^ p. 49, — Cap- 
 tain Broadfoot's convoy threatened at, 265-66. 
 
 Auckland, Lord, Governor-General of India ; papers in regard to his policy, as 
 quoted by his supporters, incomplete, 2— respectability of his private cha- 
 racter, goodness of his intentions, considered the time was come for resis- 
 tance, 26— -letter to Dost Mahomed in August 1830, 31 and 39— believes in 
 possibility of Russia and Persia endangering India, 4 1— his minute, 12th May, 
 1838, 42— absence from his council in April, 1838, 63— farewell letter to the 
 Ameer 5 difficulties of keeping him in warlike mood ; amusing scene ; de- 
 spatch to the secret committee J declared a grand cross of the Doorannee 
 order, 121 — domestic government of, not extravagant, 286. 
 
 Avitabile, General, Governor of Peshawur, 9— protection to Captain Broad- 
 foot, 266. 
 
303 
 
 AZKEM Khan, a Barukzye leader, defeated by the Seikhs at Peshawur in 
 
 1823, 6. 
 AziM Khan, youngest son of Dost Mahomed^ gives himself up to us, 149. 
 
 15 
 
 Bean, Capt. J. D., Political Agent at Quettah, 128— seizes Mr Masson as a 
 Russian spy, 219— character of, 220. 
 
 Bkntinck, Lord William, his desire for the extension of trade beyond the 
 Indus, S3. 
 
 Bhagh — System of plunder prevailing around, 221. 
 
 Bhoogties, tribe of, 170. 
 
 Bjobnstjerna, Count, his speculations on the safety of the Indian empire, 18 ; 
 his estimate of the amount of the Indian army, 79. 
 
 Bligh, Ambassador at St. Petersburg j his letter to Lord Palmerston on the 
 death of the King of Persia, 20. 
 
 Bokhaba, the western] boundary of| Affghanistan, i — Hussein Ali accompanies 
 Captain Vicovitch from, 47— king of offers to assist Dost Mahomed, 144— 
 invites him to his court, 149 — suddenly seizes and iaiprisons him, and his 
 sons 5 threatened by the Khan of Koochan ; they escape from, 150 — Colonel 
 Stoddart and Captain Connolly murdered by, 157. 
 
 BoLAN Pass, a tremendous defile betwixt Dadur and Quettah (see Dadur and 
 Quettah). 
 
 Bbydges, Sir Hartford Jones, late ambassador at the court of Persia ; his esti- 
 mate of the expense of the various Persian missions, 45. 
 
 Brooks, General, appointed to the command of the Scinde field force, 225— 
 letter to Colonel Marshall, 227— mortification at the Kojjuck reverse, 233— 
 conduct in reference to the Clibborn commission, 210 — recall of, 204. > 
 
 Bkown, Captain, takes charge of expedition to Kahun. (See Kahun.) 
 
 Brown, Lieutenant, political agent at Kojjuck, 233. 
 
 Bboadfoot, Lieut., killed at Purwan Durrah, 161. 
 
 Broadfoot, Captain Geo., takes charge of convoy from Ferozepore to Attock, 
 264.5. 
 
 BuBNEs, Captain (afterwards Lieut.-Col. Sir Alex.), opinion of Affghan cha- 
 racter, V. — visit to Cabool in 1832, 4— considers payment to Persian cabinet 
 derogatory to the dignity of England, note, 15 — pronounces selection from 
 Cabool papers "sheer trickery," 23 note, 29— affected by Russophobia, 21 
 — his Hegociations at Cabool, 31 — directed to proceed on a commercial mis- 
 sion through Scinde in 1836, 33 — proceeds by Peshawur, and is received by 
 Ukhbar Khan and splendid escort, 34— opinions of Affghan affairs expressed to 
 Sir J. M'Neil, 35— his instructions as to the mercantile portion of his mis- 
 sion ; his views as to the reasonableaess of Dost Mahomed's wishes, 40— in- 
 definite nature of instructions, 42 — offers to conduct an expedition in person 
 against the Persians, should they move on Candahar; would pay their 
 troops ; suggests an advance of £30,000 j these proceedings repudiated by 
 
304 
 
 government, approved of by Court of Directors, 44— inability to give a. 
 specific answer to Affghan chiefs ; unable to guess intentions of government, 
 46— receives instructions from Mr Macnaghten in January, 48 — important 
 letter from of 26th January 1838 j ditto of 5th March 5 Ameer waits upon, 
 62— proposes to leave Cabool ; account of interview with Ameer, difficulties 
 apparently all overcome ,* returns from Cabool, 63— opinions as to the re- 
 storation of the Shah Soojah ; further reports to Mr Macnaghten j Masson's 
 account of his reception at Simla ; employed to provide camels for grand 
 army, 86 — receives intimation while at Shikarpore that knighthood has been 
 conferred upon him, and he been raised to the rank of lieut.-col.» 139— ap- 
 pointed envoy to Kelat, 88, note j dispatched in November 1838 to endeavour 
 to procure a treaty with the Khan of, 88 — proceeds to Kelat in March, 89 — 
 result of negociations j rejoins the force, 91 — his interview with Sir J. Keane 
 on the beheading of the Ghazee prisoners at Ghuznie, 107-9 — Hyder Khan, 
 governor of Ghuznie, placed in charge of, 113— proceeds to meet the Na- 
 waub Jubbar Khan j present at ceremonies at Cabool, 119— receives grand 
 cross of the Doorannee order, 121 — his opinion of the system of political 
 agencies, 142, 238 — appointed assistant to the envoy, 143 — warns the envoy 
 of the alarming state of the country, 151, 164— unsatisfactory condition of 
 Affghan portion of the contingent, 153, note — conspiracy discovered in Cabool 
 by 5 accompanies the force to Tootan Durrah, and suggests that the forts b© 
 destroyed, 157— letter of on the unhappy state of the country j states that 
 our trade with Affghanistan had not increased since 1839 ; that of Russia had 
 more than doubled, 286 — letter of Sir \V. Macnaghten on handing up his 
 report of 7th Aug. 1840 to government, 287 — is murdered at Cabool, 297. 
 
 BuBNEs (Dr James, K. H., brother of Sir Alexander) ; account of Ameers of 
 Scinde, 81—" Visit to Court of." 
 
 C 
 
 CABOoii, Kingdom of, origin of, i — Timor Shah transferred the seat of Govern- 
 ment to, 1— Dost Mahommed makes himself master of, iii— population of 
 city, iv. — Bevenues of, iv. 137-142 — Dost Mahomed supreme in ', makes over 
 Peshawur to his brother, 6 — Captain Burnes's mission to, 33 —had been pre- 
 viously visited by him-, reception at; protracted negotiations at, 35-65 — force 
 under Colonel Wade moves on from Peshawur, 113-120— intelligence of fall 
 of Ghuznie received at, 112 — Colonel Wade arrives at, 2d September, 1 13— 
 grand Army moves on, 115— arrives at, 119— Shah Soojah's reception at ; in- 
 vestiture of knights of the Doorannee Order at, 122— Bombay column quits 
 for the westward, 123— Bengal troops retire from by Khyber Pass, ib. 
 
 Candahar ; Timor Shah transferred the seat of government from, i— falls un- 
 der the rule of three of Dost Mahomed's brothers, iii— population of city, iv— 
 revenue, iv— Candahar sirdars at feud with Dost Mahomed, 3— the Dost'a re- 
 solution to join them to keep Persia at bay, 4— right over claimed by the 
 King of Persia, 13— stipulation to place the Sirdars of on the throne of Herat 5 
 
303 
 
 llurnes receives a letter from, announcing the arrival of a Persian elchee at, 
 in June 1837, 36— negotiations at in October; Sirdars of, correspond with 
 Persia, 41 — cut the Persian alliance, 42— promised assistance and money by 
 Burnes against Herat, 43— charged by Quarterly Review yfith. double dealing; 
 Persian ambassador compelled to quit the country after reaching Candahar, 
 55— grand Army resolved to march upon, 78 — grand Army arrives at, 92 — loss 
 on joining ; the Bombay column arrives at, 4th May ; Colonel Dennie's ad- 
 ventures betwixt Shikarpore and Candahar ; muster of troops and followers 
 at, 97— reception of Shah Soojah ; flight of Barukzye Sirdars, 99— Shah 
 entertains him, 100— review at ; delay of two months at, 104— Runjeet Sing 
 died day before on march from, 115. 
 Clark, Lieut., proceeds with a detachment to Deyrah, 170— heads a party 
 sent out by Major Billamore from Deyrah, 173— his prowess, 172 — accom- 
 panies Captain Brown to Kahun, 176— returns with empty camels, 178— his 
 detachment attacked and cut to pieces, 179-184— remains of seen by Major 
 Clibborn's party, 186. 
 Clibborn, Major, dispatched in charge of troops to relieve Kahun, 185, 203— 
 
 decision of commission on, 199 , 230 . 
 Collin SON, Lieut., death of, 145. 
 
 CoNOLLY, Arthur, Traveller, murdered at Bokhara, 167. 
 CoNOLLY, Lieut. Edward, killed in Kohistan j melaneholy fate of three bro- 
 thers, 157. 
 Cossack. Officer, vide Vicovitch. 
 
 Cotton, Sir Willoughby, takes command of the Bengal column, 80, 81 — de- 
 tachment dispatched under towards Hydrabad, 84 — recommended to fall 
 back on Shikarpore from above the Bolan Pass, 121 — Commander-in-chief 
 left in Affghanistan. His conduct towards Col. Dennie, 153 — ^relieved from 
 command, and succeeded by General Elphiustone, 261. 
 Creed, Lieut. Henry, Bombay Artillery, practice of at Kelat, 130— is killed 
 
 in endeavouring to storm Kojjuck, 235. 
 CuTCHEE separated from Khelat, 210— Mahomed Sherriflf appointed Naib 
 of, 210, 
 
 D 
 Dadur— A town in Upper Scinde, near the mouth of the Bolan Pass, 87 — 
 Sir J. Keane's interview with the Shah Soojah at, 84 — troops betwixt and 
 Kurrachee, 87? 93— troops to keep up^the line of communication between 
 and Sukkur, 93— troubles in Mr Bell's political charge ; three days' fighting 
 near, 223, 234. 
 Deeba. Ishmael KaAN obtained by the Seikhs by stratagem, 10. 
 Dennie, Lieutenant Colonel ; appointed brigadier, 80— prevents Bengal com- 
 missariat officers from misappropriating camels ; complains of baggage cattle 
 required for Shah's levies, 85— misunderstandings with Lord Keane — takes 
 charge of troops through the Bolan Pass, 86-.arrives at Candahar> 95, 
 
 Ql 
 
306 
 
 96— ordered to join head-quarters, 91 — his opinion of the Shah's contingent, 
 95— concurred in by Lord Keane, 85— letters of, 93, note, and 98— conduct 
 of coming through Bolan Pass disapproved of by commander-in-chief, 96— leads 
 the storming party at Ghuznioj heroic conduct of; reported failure ; com. 
 plete success of. Ill — appointed to command troops in Balla Hissar, 130 — leaves 
 Cabool with a force to protect Bameean, 154— brilliant manoeuvring near 
 Syghaun j splendid victory of near Bameean, 155— further operations ; de- 
 spatches mutilated : offered second class Doorannee order, but refuses it » 
 seals the fate of the campaign, 161— his account of the surrender of Dost 
 Mahomed, 162. 
 
 Dejebat obtained by stratagem by the Seikhs, 10. 
 
 Deyrah, capital of Bhoogties (see Bhoogties and Billamore.) 
 
 Del'Hoste, Captain, takes charge of 6th N. I., across the desert, 220. 
 
 PoDAH, a Murree chief, 179— Captain Brown's treaty with, 191, 195. 
 
 Dost Mahomed, makes himself ruler of Cabool, iii — recovers half of Pesha- 
 wur from Runjeet Singh, 6— makes this over to his eldest brother, 7 — 
 his principal Chiefs required to meet the advance of the Shah Soojah 
 in 1834, 7 — Peshawur seized in his absence ; resolved to recover it 
 at all hazards; prepares to descend by Jellalabad ; repulsed by the Seikhs ^ 
 and returns through the Khyber Pass; pledges himself to renew the 
 attack; Runjeet Singh also acts in the spirit of unscrupulous aggression 
 against, 12— forwards letters to the Emperor of Russia, King of Persia, and 
 Governor- General, 16— Burnes's opinion of his character, 34— Wood's des- 
 cription of, «62c?— conduct towards the Kuzzilbashes, 36— his letter to Lord 
 Auckland in 1836, 37— answer to, 38— falls into the views of Sir A. Burnes, 
 {vide Burnes)— ^\g\it of from Arghundee, 115— escapes into Kohistan, US- 
 proceeds to Bokhara and is made prisoner, 147 — escape from, 150— threatens 
 Kohistan, 154— defeated by Colonel Dennie at Bameean, 155— appearance 
 of at Purwan Durrah, 160— flight of, 161— surrenders to .Sir W, Macnagh- 
 ten, and is sent to India, 162— his views of Affghan policy, 163— restoration 
 of, 297. 
 
 DuHAMEL, General, ambassador at the Court of Persia ; recalls Captain, 
 Vicovitch, 23, 24, 27. 
 
 DiTBAND, Lieut., on€ of the explosion party at Ghuzuie, 109— afterwards pri- 
 vate secretary to Lord Ellenborough, note. 
 
 E 
 
 Ellenborough, Lord, character of his Government, 2— opens the trade of the 
 
 Indus, 32. 
 Eluck, Mr, our ambassador at the Court of Persia, 19— his alarms for Russia; 
 
 21— obvious misconstruction of views of Russia ; despatches of, 20 to 28. 
 
 F 
 Farbel, Major, Member of Nufoosk Commission, 203. 
 Falconbb, Lieut-, killed in attempting to st^rm Kojjuck, 235. 
 
307 
 
 Fane, Sir Henry, Commander-ia- Chief for all India j 79— about to proceed' ta 
 Europe in bad ^health ; succeeded by Sir Jasper Nicolls ; his opinions of the 
 Doorannee alliance> 79— resigns the command of the array, f and proceeds 
 down the Indus on his way to Bombay, SO—Meets Sir J, Keane at Sehwan, 
 84. 
 
 Fane, Lieu tenant- Colonel; letter in the London Times giving an account of his 
 father's opinions, 79. 
 
 Fane, Captain, A.D. C. to the Commander-in-Chief; his account of the Shah's 
 reception at Candahar, 101. 
 
 Farrington, Captain; his expedition to Ghirisk, 263— skilful movements of; 
 brilliant victory over the enemy, 269. 
 
 Fbrozepore — Reserve left at, 80. 
 
 Forbes, Assistant Surgeon, death of, 130. 
 
 Forbes, Major, succeeds Brigadier Stevenson in'command at Sukkur, 185» 
 
 G 
 
 Ghirisk, a fortress on the Helmund ; Candahar Sirdars retire to, 99 — detach- 
 ment of troops proposed to be sent to, 239, 243 — Shah's troops sent to, to col- 
 lect tribute, defeated and dispersed, 267 — Captain Farrington's expedition 
 to, 268 — brilliant success of; reinforcements sent out to, 269 — Major Tod 
 and the Herat mission arrive at ; fears for safety of, 239, 269 — Ukhtar Khan 
 besieges, 276— Captain Woodburn's troops arrive at, 278 — one of the posts 
 occupied at the time of the general insurrection. 
 
 Ghilzies; Outram's operations against, 127 — Major Lynch, political amongst 
 (see Lynch) — various expeditions against, 145, 148. 
 
 Ghorian ; refusal of Kamran Shah to restore to Persia ; anxiety of British 
 embassy to have it annexed to Herat ; restoration of to Persia, 19. 
 
 Ghqznie^ advance on, 103— capture of, 109— slaughter of Ghazeesnear, X07. 
 
 Gordon, Brigadier, succeeds Colonel Dennie in command in Upper Scinde, 91 . 
 
 Griffiths, Major; in charge of the Bengal commissariat at Dadur, 94. 
 
 GuNDAVA ; the pass of reported impracticable, 93— Sir T. Willshire retires by, 
 86, 185. 
 
 GuNDAVA, town of, destroyed by the Brahoe insurgents ; value of property in, 
 222. 
 
 H 
 
 Hadjee Khan Kakur, an Affghan chief, 100 — treachery of, 117 — is sent to 
 India a prisoner, 118. 
 
 Hazarah country j expedition into, 145— extermination of the occupants of a 
 fort in the, 146. 
 
 Havelock, Major ; describes the practicability of the Khoord Cabool and 
 Tezeen defiles, 81, nofe— describes the troops as on famine allowance on 
 their advance, 92— opinion of Candahar Sirdars, 99— takes charge of a de- 
 tachment from Ferozepore, 260. 
 
 Hebat; people of deal in. slaves, vii. —affairs of, l^contiaual quarrels with 
 
308 
 
 Persia and Candahar, 3— no foars of an attack from Russia, 6— Simla pro- 
 clamation in relation to, 12— its revenue and population ; Shah Mahomed 
 finds refucje at; succeeded by Kamran Shah ; character of the latter, 13 — 
 King of Persia claims sovereignty over ; threatens an expedition against, 
 14— threatened with a joint attack from Persia, Candahar, and Cabool, 15 — 
 Persian army prepares to advance on, 16— arrives before, 17 — unsuccessful 
 operations against ; seige of raised ; defended by Lieutenant Pottinger ; 
 Major Tod and Pottinger ordered to quit, 19— fear of Mr EUice that it 
 might be made a Russian outpost ; Count Nesselrode dissuades the Shah 
 from advancing on, 21 — intention to annex, to Candahar, 22— harmony of the 
 views of Great Britain and Russia on, 24— Sir J. C. Hobhouse's statement in 
 reference to, 25 — exchange from Suddozye to Barukzye rule ; Lord Auckland 
 aAvare of the King of Persia's preparations against, 36— Candahar Sirdars 
 agree to attack, 42— King of Persia declines their assistance, "iSSpectator 
 newspaper on, 74. 
 
 Herring, Colonel ; murder of, 120— .Captain Outram desired to seek out his 
 murderers, 126. 
 
 Hicks, Lieutenant ; severely wounded at Pushoot, 145. 
 
 HoBHOusE, Sir J. C, President of Board of .Control, extract from speech of, 
 27 — mutilation of the Cabool Despatches by, 39. 
 
 Hyder Khan, son of Dost Mahomed ; Governor of Ghuznie, 111 — surrender 
 of, 112 — accompanies Bengal army, 124. 
 
 Jacob, Lieut., cuts a path through the Murree Hills, J 76-77— his defence of the 
 
 conduct of Major Billamore, 198. 
 JuBBAR Khan, Nawaub, brother of Dost Mahomed, deprived of his government, 
 
 iii — interview with Captain Burnes, 65— attempts to make terms for his 
 
 brother at Ghuznie, 114 — his surrender, 149. 
 
 K 
 
 Kandahar. — See Candahar. 
 
 Karrack, an island in the Persian Gulf j Bombay troops take possession of, 17, 
 19. 
 
 Karootoo 5 expedition near, 275. 
 
 Keane, Sir John, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army ; appointed to 
 command the army of the Indus, 80— character of, 80, also 140— lands at 
 Vikkur, 81— gives letters to Captain Outram requesting supply of camels 
 from Cutch ; advances up the lino of the Indus ; halts at Tatta, 83— for- 
 bearing conduct towards the Ameers of Scinde— halt at Jerruck ; obtains 
 subscription of a treaty at Hydrabad, 84— meets Sir H. Fane at Sehwan ; 
 issues general order at Larkhana intimating the arrangements of the troops 
 for both presidencies j quits tho Bombay column and joins the Shah and 
 Envoy at Dadur, 85, also 93— distributes the camels collected ; alleged mis- 
 \mderstandiDg with Colonel Dennie, 85— finds feeling of despondency in the 
 
309 
 
 array at Quettah, 91— gives peremptory orders to advance ; disapproves of 
 Shah's contingent, 85, 98— difficulty of obtaining forage at Candahar, 102— 
 misled as to the strength of Ghuzaie, 103 — reconnoitres the Fork, 106— his 
 opinion of the slaughter of the Ghazeesat Ghuznie, 108— Ghuzaie despatch, 
 114— accompanies the Shah Soojah round the fortress; advances on Cabool; 
 receives grand cross of Doorannee order, 120 — general order on separation of 
 troops -, quits Cabool for India, 123 — visits Lahore, 124— quits Feroaepore 
 for Bombay, 125 — thanked by India House, 138 — by Parliament; pension 
 bill passed, 139— general character of; his politics ; the dark portions of his 
 history, 140. 
 
 Kelat, line of traffic with, 32 — the Khan of refuses supplies, 88— Sir A. Burnes 
 negociates, ibid — his anticipations of our mishaps, 90 — Bombay troops proceed 
 against, 128— capture of in 1839, 133— affairs of, in 1840, 170— dismember- 
 ment of Khanate. 
 
 Kennedy, Dr., his account of progress of the march, 102— of the proceedings 
 at Cabool, 137-39. 
 
 KiLLA Abdoola, Detachment from, 214. 
 
 Khiva ; people of deal in slaves, vii., — reported advance of Russians on, 129. 
 
 Khyberies, Plunderers, vi. 
 
 KnyBER PASs,'The ; Burnes proceeds by, 32 — Colonel Wade penetrates, 113. 
 
 Kirk, Dr, drawings of passes in the Murree hills, 202. 
 
 KojjucK Pass, The. 
 
 KoocHAN, Captain Burnes meets Abbas Meerza at Siege of, 14 — Khan of 
 threatens Bokhara, 150. 
 
 KoTuii Pass ; the Fighting in, 275. 
 
 KooNDooz, one of the Boundaries of Affghanistan, i.— Chief of sends Am- 
 bassador to Cabool, 131. 
 
 KooLOOM, The WuUee of, friend to Dost Mahomed ; escapes from Bamean, 
 118 — allies himself to the Ameer, 151. 
 
 Kahun, a Murree fort; first expedition to, 172— troops quit, 173— return to, 
 174— Captain Brown takes possession of, 180— is besieged in, 181, 185— ad- 
 mirable defence of, capitulation, 195. 
 
 KuNDAH, fightiHg near, 221. . 
 
 KuDJAH chief. Colonel Wheeler proceeds against, 153. 
 
 KojjucK, town of, 232— expedition against, 233— destruction of town of, 238. 
 
 KoTRAH, fighting near, 226— brilliant victory at, 229. 
 
 Kullah-i-Ingoz, capture of, 273. 
 
 KuHRucK Singh, deputation from to Lord Keane, 124 — succession of to the 
 throne of Lahore ; his death and character, 264.] 
 
 KuRRACHEE, Bombay troops land near, 81— fort captured, 86— reserve force 
 at, ibid — Sir J. Keane retires by, 135. 
 
 Khokassan, the limits of Ahmed Shah's dominions, i. 
 
 Kamkan Shah of Herat; succeeds his father in 1829, ii., 4— character of, 13— 
 conduct towards India, 18. 
 
310 
 
 LovEDAY, Lieutenant, Envoy at Kelat, 212. See Kelat. 
 
 Leech, Lieutenant, Major in AflPghanistan — negociations at Candahar, 43. 
 
 LoODiANAH, place of the Snah Soojah's retirement, 49— removal from supposed 
 by Burnes never to have been contemplated, 55. 
 
 Lynch, Major, political agent in the Ghilzie country, 269— character of his 
 political views? 269-70— recommends removal of a Tooky chief ; force under 
 his control ; account of the ideas of the Ghilzies as to the power of the Shah 
 Soojah J considers all hope of conciliation at an end ; proposes that the 
 chiefs should be '' made to commit themselves ;" applies for permission to 
 erect a fort at Kelat-i-Ghilzie ; force sent out from Candahar j Major Lynch 
 proceeds to inspect the country j affair of KuUai-Ingoz j conduct disap- 
 proved of by the Envoy, 270-273. 
 
 M 
 
 Macnaghten, Mr, (Secretary to Government of India, afterwards Sir WiUiam) 
 Envoy at Cabool ; letter to^Sir A. Burnes, 49 (see Burnes) — change of opinion 
 as to Candahar Sirdars, 71— mission to Lahore, 68-73. 
 
 McNeil, Sir John, Ambassador at the Court of Persia, 41.— (See Persia^ Ellice, 
 Palmerston, &c.) 
 
 Mabshall, Colonel Thomas, gains a brilliant victory at Kotra, 229 — negotiates 
 ■with Nusseer Khan, 226— attacks during truce, ib.>— instructions to shoot pri- 
 soners, 230. 
 
 Masson, Mr C, Traveller, account of Affghan revolution, viii. — writings of in 
 reference to the affairs of Cabool, 39— account of the views of Lord Auck- 
 land, 71— his account of the affairs of Kelat, 205-218— seized and imprisoned 
 as a spy, 219. 
 
 Mehkab Khan of Kelat, negotiates with Sir A. Burnes, 89-90. — See Kelat. 
 
 MooKLOOK, troops stationed at, 275. 
 
 MoosTUNG, a village near Quettah, fighting near, 214 — insurgents beat at, 217— 
 mission sent from, 219. 
 
 N 
 
 Nazian Valley, Col. Shelton's expedition into, 261. 
 
 Nesselrode, Count, correspondence with Lord Palmerston, desires full pub- 
 lication of all communications with Lord Palmerston, 30— terrors for move- 
 ments of, 48. 
 
 Newaz, intrusive.Khan of Kelat. — See Kelat. 
 
 NijRow, troops advance on, 159. 
 
 NoosKY, ravages of Newaz Khan near, 212— expedition under Colonel Sop- 
 pitt to, 241— Loss of Camels at, ib. 
 
 NoTT, General, starts for Kelat, 224— captures, ib. — joios expedition into the 
 northward, 291— returns in triumph to India, 298. 
 
 Nusseeb, son of Mehrab Khan of Kelat 3 escapes after the capture of, 130— 
 geeks refuge amongst the tribes, 212— See Kekt, Kotra? QuQttah; and Outram. 
 
311 
 
 NuFOOSK Pass, Lieut. Jacob cuts a road through, 176-77— defeat of Major 
 Clibborn's force at, 186-88— spectacle witnessed in by Captain Brown, 192- 
 193. 
 
 O 
 
 OnvEB, Colonel, commands an expedition into the Zooramut valley, 283. 
 Orohard, Lieut. Col., expedition to Pushoot, 145, 
 
 OuTRAM, Captain James (afterwards Major, and political agent for all Scinde), 
 extra A. D. C. to Sir J. Keane $ dispatched to Cutch in quest of camels, 82— ^ 
 disperses a large body of the enemy near Ghuzaie, 103 — takes charge of 
 the detachment sent in pursuit of Dost Mahomed, 116— returns to Cabool, 
 118 — placed in political charge, 123— undertakes an expedition against the 
 Ghilzies, 127— remarkable forced march; returns to camp; attached to 
 General Willshire's division on leaving Quettah, 129— his account of the cap- 
 ture of Kelat and causes of, 130-33— carries tidings of to Bombay ; supposed 
 loss during these operations, 135 — appointed political agent at Hydrabad ; 
 
 expense of establishment, 143— disclaims all suspicion of Mr Masson, 219 
 
 appointed to succeed Mr Bells proceeds to Quettah to take charge, 244 — 
 assists at the investiture of Nusseer Khan at Kelat, 245— Memoir of, 248— 
 captures Moolair ; raises the Bheel corps in Candeish, 249— entrusted by Sir 
 J. Malcolm with an important expedition, which proves completel}> successful, 
 251 — raise? Coolie police corps, 252 — connection with the army of the Indus? 
 &c. ; distinguished success as political agent ; promised the appointment of 
 resident at Hydrabad ; incurs the displeasure of Lord Ellenborough ; receives 
 a public dinner from the oflScersof the army at Sukkur j receives a public 
 dinner at Bombay? 256 — returns to Scinde ; his negociations with the Ameers ; 
 retires from Scinde ; his opinion of the conquest of the country ; receives a 
 sword from the army ; returns to England, 257— success of in managing 
 Scinde by honest means proves that chicanery was no where necessary, 295. 
 
 P 
 
 Palmebston, Lord, letter to Mr EUicCj Nov. 1835 ; correspondence with Count 
 Nesselrode, 19— considers Count Nesselrode's explanation entirely satisfac • 
 tory, 27. 
 
 Persia, affairs of, see Herat, 12, 
 
 Peshawub, affairs of, 5 — views of Dost Mahomed regarding, 60, 62. 
 
 Pesheen, valley of, — See Quettah. 
 
 PoxxiNGER, Lieut. Col. (afterwards Sir Henry), resident at Hydrabad j hostile 
 to the idea of attack on, 83 — made a baronet? 139. 
 
 PuBwAN Ddrbah, fight at, 160 — Dr Lord, Lieut. Broadfoot, and Cornet Cris- 
 pin killed at, 161. 
 
 PusHOOx, Colonel Orchard's expedition to, 145. 
 
 Q 
 
 Quarxebly Review, opinion of favourable to Lord Auckland, ^lB-^ Spectator's 
 reply to, 73. 
 
312 
 
 QuETTAH, the capital of Shawl, independence of j Bengal column reaches, 87 
 —arrival of Sir J. Keane at, 91— Bombay column arrives at ; Col. Dennie's 
 adventures near 5 Bombay troops return to, 128— Sir T. Willshire starts from 
 for Kelatj troops proposed to be sent from to relieve Kahun, 179— General 
 Brooks arrives at, 240— large force at, 241. 
 
 R 
 
 RoREE, a town in Scinde, troops cross from, 84. 
 
 Russia, relations with, 19. 
 
 Raitt, Captain Queen's Royals, present at Kelat, 131. 
 
 Rait, Captain 1st Bombay Grenadiers, killed in endeavouring to storm the 
 Nufoosk Pass, 187. 
 
 RuNjEET Singh, Ruler of the Punjaub j termed " our ancient ally " in Simla 
 proclamation, 6— seizes in 1818 on Attock ; on Mooltan ; on Cashmere ; defeats 
 the j&ffghans under Azeem Khan in 1823 ; seizes on, but finds himself unable 
 to keep, Peshawur j divides.it betwixt Kamran Shah and Dost Mahomed, 7 
 ~ advances to meet Affghans, and defeats them, in 1835 3 resolves to seize on 
 Shikarpore ; his feelings on the death of Hurry Singh and defeat of his 
 troops at Jumrood, 11— had maintained the line of the Indus a scene of in- 
 cessant strife, 12— Peshawur constant source of expenditure and annoyance 
 to, 39 — would have been willingly parted with j had never sought to attack 
 Caboolj 67— enters on treaty with British government and the Shah Soojah, 
 ^ 68— declines to permit our army to pass through the Punjaub, 78— death of 
 occurs on 27th June; intelligence of reaches the troops 1st August; is suc- 
 ceeded by Kurruck Singh j his treatment of Shere Singh his repudiated son? 
 now ruler of the Punjaub, 262. 
 
 S 
 
 Sale, General Sir Robert, pursues Candahar Sirdars, 99 ; commands the leading 
 column at Ghuznie, 111 — Operations in Kohistan, 156— service expires, 283 
 — his brigade forces the Khoord Cabool Pass and retires on Jellalabad, 
 293. 
 
 Salter, Lieut. Col., commands 2d Cavalry at Purwan Durrah, 159. 
 
 SiMONicH, Count, Russian Ambassador at the court of Persia, 20— desires th6 
 King of Persia to attack Herat, 20. 
 
 Shikarpore, a town in Scinde, amount of force at, in Feb. 1839, 86. 
 
 Shah Soojah, The, — first appearance of as a public character, ii — defeated and 
 driven from his kingdom by Futteh Khan j pensioned at Loodianah, iii— Sir 
 Alex. Burnes's opinion of, 35, 263, note— on terms with the brother of Dost 
 Mahomed, 49 — mode of restoration recommended by Burnes, 68, 70 — charac- 
 ter of his ministers, 165— spends the winter at Jellalabad, 144. 
 
 Shelton, Colonel, appointed to command 3d brigade at Cabool, 260— leaves 
 Ferozepore and reaches Jellalabad, 261— success of in Nazian valley, 262 — 
 proceeds to escort Capt. Broadfoot, 266. 
 
 Spectator Newspaper,— sagacity of views, 73— refutal of Quarterly Review^ 74. 
 
313 
 
 Stqhan, troops stationed at, 151— compelled to retire from, 163--re-oecupied 
 by Col. Dennie, 165. 
 
 T 
 Tazeb, victory near, 148. 
 Tebee Valley, expedition to, 280 — found abandoned, 281 — troops connected 
 
 with Doorannees, 279. 
 Tezeen, cafila seized at, opens the Ghilzle insurrection, 284. 
 TiMouR Shah, character of, i. 
 Tiverton, Lord Palmerston's speech at, describing the tranquillity of Affghan- 
 
 istan, 291-92. 
 ToBBENS, Mr, Secretary to Government, 71. 
 Tod, Major, Ambassador at Herat, 19 
 TooTAN DuRRAH, Licut. CoHolIy killed at ; forts destroyed at, 169. 
 
 V 
 
 Valiant, Colonel T., (now General) captures Kurraehee, 86 — left in charge 
 of the mouth of the Indus j member of Nuflfoosk commission, but opposed 
 the report of; votes in favour of, 199. 
 
 Ventura, General, a Corsican officer in the Seikh array, remains behind on 
 advance of Timour Shah for Pcshawur, 113. 
 
 VicoviTCH— a Cossack Lieutenant, 23— objects of his mission, 26, 27, 47 — 
 treatment of at Cabool, 48 — Burnes's account of, 55 — Had no political au- 
 thority, 66. 
 
 ViKKXjR, post at the mouth of the Indus ; Bombay troops disembark at, 81 . 
 
 W 
 
 Wade, Capt. (afterwards Sir Claude Martin^ ; statement in reference to Dost 
 Mahomed's attack on Peshawur, 8-11 — said by Masson to have denounced 
 the peaceable arrangement for the surrender of Peshawur, 9 (note) — views 
 as to the popularity of the Shah Soojah, 39— takes charge of detachment of 
 contingent from Peshawur to Cabool, 80-81, also p. 113. 
 
 Walker, Captain, accompanies Captain Anderson against the Ghilzies, 148. 
 
 Wallace, Colonel, takes charge of grand convoy from Ferozepore, 146— arrives 
 at Caboo], 146— proceeds towards Ghuznee with troops, 148 — joined by 
 Captain Anderson, captures a fort and returns to Ghuznie. 
 
 Wheeler, Lieut.- Col., successes against the chiefs, 153. 
 
 Willshire, Sir Thomas, commands the Bombay column of the Army of the 
 Indus ; descent of from Khelat by the Bolan Pass. 86-135 — returns from Ca- 
 bool to Quettah over the Tobah mountains, 127— proceeds against Mehrab 
 Khan, 128— Capture of Khelat, 130-135. 
 
 Wilson, Colonel, mortally Wounded at Kojjuck, 235. 
 
 WooDBUBN, Captain, about to be sent to reinforce Ghirisk, 139— accompanies 
 reinforcements lor Ghirisk, 269— sent out at head of detachment to Ghir- 
 isk to attack Ukhtar Khan, 176 — skilful movements of, 277 — brilliant 
 
 R 1 
 
314 
 
 victory on the flelmund, 278— aQQpmpj^n^ie^ Cs^ptain GriffijQ^s force j gallant 
 conduct of J leaves his couch to lead his regiment, 279~hisde^^ii, note to 
 p. 269. 
 
 WiMEB, Lieut. Colonel, member of the Nufoosk commission, note 199— arrives 
 at Candahar and his detachment added to General Nott's army ; detachment 
 under, sent out to the Ghilzie country, 274 — brilliant success of, *6td— fore© 
 dispatched under, into the Teree country, 280. 
 
 Y 
 
 Yak Mahomed, vizier to Kamran Shah— S^e jierat and Kamran Sh^h. 
 
 Z 
 
 Zbman Shah, elevation of to the throne, ii. 
 
 ZooBAMUT, Valley, expedition into, 283. 
 
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