PRIZE ESSAYS
OF THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
1914
To this Essay was awarded the
Justin Winsor Prize
IN American History
for 1914
ANGLO-AMERICAN
ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
1815-1915
BY
MARY WILHELMINE WILLIAMS, Ph. D.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN GOUCHER COLLEGE
WASHINGTON: AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1916
^■K'tri^
GIFT
Copyright, 1916
By The American Historical Association
Washington. D. C.
the lord BALTIMORE rRBIt
BALTIMORE, MD.. U. I. A.
A
TO MY FATHER AND MY MOTHER
CHARLES WILLIAMS
AND
CAROLINE K. WILLIAMS
ivr?3883'7
PREFACE.
Though the diplomatic relations of England and the
United States over the Central American isthmus have
received frequent consideration of a general character
by writers on American diplomacy, no exhaustive study
of the subject appears to have been before attempted.
It is the aim of the following essay to present the result
of a detailed investigation into Anglo-American isth-
mian diplomacy, from the first emergence of Central
America as a subject of diplomatic interest between
the two countries down to the immediate present.
The work here presented is to a large extent based
upon new material. Part of this is in the form of
printed sources, drawn upon to some degree by pre-
vious writers but by no means exhausted. The most
important writings of this class are the British Parlia-
mentary Papers and the United States Documents.
But a much larger and more valuable contribution was
made by the manuscript archives for the period 1815
to 1 86 1, found in the Public Record Office in London
and in the Department of State at Washington. Only
a comparatively small portion of the archives bearing
upon the subject of this study have been printed, and
the unprinted material has hitherto been entirely un-
touched by research students.
Chapter I, which is merely introductory, makes no
pretense at being an original contribution. The author-
ities upon which it is founded, however, have largely
(vii)
viii PREFACE
the character of sources, and these have been used
critically with a view to ascertaining the facts behind
the conflicting statements of various contemporary
writers. Chapters II to VIII, inclusive, which are
based to a considerable but varying degree upon pre-
viously unused material, are the most original part of
the essay. Access to manuscript archives made possible
not only a presentation of many hitherto unknown
facts, but also led to a new, and, it is beheved, more
accurate, interpretation of numerous phases of the
subject considered by previous writers. Chapter IX,
which covers a period subsequent to that for which
the archives are open, presents some fresh viewpoints
resulting from the new light thrown upon preceding
events. The period covered by chapter X is too recent
for a satisfactory treatment ; hence, this chapter aims
primarily to present in broad outline the latest phases
of the general subject, in their proper relations. The
concluding chapter, XI, summarizes the result of the
whole study.
Certain irregularities appearing in connection with
the bibliographical citations may need an explanation.
In some instances more than one authority has been
cited for a given statement. This has been done with
two purposes in view: (i) to strengthen by a multi-
plication of witnesses statements based upon non-
documentary writings — generally in the nature of
travel sketches, largely made up of personal observa-
tions and reports from hearsay evidence; (2) to aid
the reader who may wish to make a further study of
the point in question. The authority believed to be the
most reliable has been placed first on the list. Through-
out the study, writings of a generally untrustworthy
PREFACE ix
character have been used only in a supplementary man-
ner. References to manuscript sources are in every
case as definite as possible. Wherever despatch or page
numbers exist they have been given. Letters in the
archives from important diplomatic or consular agents
are as a rule numbered, but those from less important
agents — particularly those written from Central Amer-
ica — are frequently unnumbered. Drafts of corre-
spondence are generally unnumbered, as are also pri-
vate letters from officials, while letters from private
individuals are always without numbers.
This study was originally written as a thesis under
the direction of Professor Ephraim D. Adams, in con-
nection with my candidacy for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at Leland Stanford Junior University.
For his painstaking supervision of my work and for
his stimulating interest in it, I am especially indebted
to Professor Adams. My gratitude is also due to
Professor Henry L. Cannon of Stanford University
for many suggestions which were of value in the later
revision of the manuscript. Through the friendly in-
terest of Mr. Hubert Hall, Assistant Keeper of the
Public Records, in London, I secured access to the
British manuscript archives, the most valuable part of
my source material. My sister. Miss Edle Carolyn
WiUiams, gave much assistance in the preparation of
the accompanying map.
Mary Wilhelmine Williams.
Wellesley, Massachusetts,
May 20, 1915.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
Preface vii
CHAPTER I.
The British in Central America before 1815 . i
CHAPTER H.
British Aggressions ; American Interest Awak-
ened, 1815-1850 26
CHAPTER HI.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, April 19, 1850 . 67
CHAPTER IV.
Attempts at Readjustment under the Xew Treaty,
1850-1852 no
CHAPTER V.
The Bay Islands Colony and the Xew Interpreta-
tion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1852-1854 . 139
CHAPTER VI.
American Defiance of British Claims, 1853- 1855 . 168
(xi)
xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER VII.
The Crisis, 1855- 1856 ; Signs of British Retreat . 196
CHAPTER VIII.
Adjustment in accordance with American View,
1856-1860 224
CHAPTER IX.
Development of American Opposition to the Clay-
ton-Bulwer Treaty, 1860-1895; End of Mos-
quito Reserve, 1894 270
CHAPTER X.
The New Canal Treaties, and New Conditions in
Central America 300
CHAPTER XI.
General Resume 321
Bibliography 331
MAP.
Central America, 1850- 1860, showing disputed
territory. Facing page . . . .198
CHAPTER I.
The British in Central America Before 1815.
For more than a century before the government of
the United States came into existence, the subjects of
Great Britain had been actively interested in that part
of the North American continent which, geographic-
ally, is included under the term " Central America "/
By various and fluctuating degrees of political control
their government protected them, and, in consequence,
there gradually developed a close relationship between
Great Britain and certain parts of Central America.
It was the existence of this British connection with the
isthmus and the fact that the connection was time-
honored when the attention of the United States was
first seriously attracted to the region that rendered
subsequent British-American isthmian relations so
complicated and difficult of adjustment. Shortly after
the United States had become a rival of the British in
Central America, so delicate had the situation grown
that the American government, despairing of any other
peaceful settlement, for the first and only time in its
history compromised with the Monroe doctrine and
made an agreement with Great Britain which later
came to be known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This
instrument, instead of removing the difficulty, as had
^ This account assumes a general knowledge of Central American his-
tory on the part of the reader. Bancroft's three-volume work is the best
and most comprehensive history of Central America; Fortier and Fick-
len's Central America and Mexico gives a good brief account.
2 I
2 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
been hoped, only magnified it to an alarming degree
and brought into being the long-lived and vexatious
" Central American question ".
These early British interests were divided between
three different portions of Central America : Belize
Settlement, the Bay Islands, and the Mosquito Shore.
For the purpose of making clear the subsequent chap-
ters, a brief account of the early English connections
with the places named is here given.
Belize Settlement.
The British settlement of Belize was a direct out-
growth of the buccaneering era in the Western World.
At an early date the exclusive commercial policy of
Spain tempted the subjects of other nations to acquire
a share in her prosperity by irregular and violent
methods. During the long and frequent wars they
operated as privateers ; in times of peace they were
undisguised freebooters, or buccaneers. As time
passed, the West Indies became the chief centre of
operations for these " brethren of the coast " ; and
from here they made daring and profitable attacks
upon Spanish vessels homeward bound from the colo-
nies.* With the conquest of Jamaica by Cromwell, in
1655, the strength of the English buccaneers increased ;
for the early governors of the island as a rule not only
connived at the marauding expeditions, but at times
even shared in the plunder.' Indeed, Captain Morgan,
notorious for sacking and burning many cities on the
' For a detailed account of the buccaneers see Ilaring, Buccaneers in
the H'cst Indies; Burney, Buccaneers of America; Johnson, General
History of the Pyrates; Esqueineling, Buccaneers of America.
•Johnson, Pyrates, I, 25; Long, History of Jamaica, I, 300; Squier,
A'otcs on Central .Uncrica, 369.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 3
coasts of Spanish America, as well as for preying upon
Spanish vessels, was knighted by the British govern-
ment and made lieutenant-governor of Jamaica/
At first, when attacking Spanish ships, the free-
booters aimed primarily to rob them of the wealth
carried from the mines ; this accomplished, the vessels,
which frequently carried mahogany or logwood, were
set afire and abandoned. Almost by accident a ship-
load of logwood was spared and taken to London,
where the ready market which it commanded quickly
revealed its value to the buccaneers. After this, log-
wood-laden vessels were eagerly captured for the sake
of their cargoes."
When Spanish prizes became scarcer the freebooters
gradually took to cutting their own logwood on the
thinly-settled portions of the Spanish coast.* This
change began a few years after the English took pos-
session of Jamaica.' The new enterprise was favored
by Modyford, the governor of the island, as plundering
Spanish bottoms had come to be frowned upon by the
home government.^ Spain was now too weak to do
more than partially police her coasts and to seize the
vessels containing plunder from her forests ; conse-
quently, for a time the British Council for the Planta-
tions approved of the connivance of Modyford's suc-
cessor.*
* Cal. St. P., Col., Am. and W. I., 1675-1676, 343; Long, Jamaica, I,
301; Haring, Buccaneers, 205.
' Dampier, Voyages, II, pt. 2, p. 47; Gibbs, British Honduras, 24.
' Dampier, Voyages, II, pt. 2, pp. 47-48; Cal. St. P., Col., Am. and
W. I., 1669-1674, 121, 311, 426, 427, 428; Gibbs, British Honduras, 24.
' Ilaring, Buccaneers, 208-209; Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV,
" Spanish-American Republics ", 3.
* Haring, Buccaneers, 209.
^ Ibid., 210; Cal. St. P., Col., Am. and W. I., 1677-1680, 343, 406;
1681-1685, 284.
4 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Naturally, log-cutting settlements grew up with the
development of this new British industry. One of the
earliest establishments of this sort was made in Yuca-
tan, on the Belize River, in 1662." As logwood was
plentiful on this part of the coast, the settlement pros-
pered and was soon on a firm basis.
The reprisals of the Spanish upon the English log-
wood cargoes continued, however, in spite of precau-
tions ; " therefore in 1670 the British government
attempted to secure by treaty a sanction or defense of
the actions of its subjects. The seventh article of an
agreement made with Spain in this year reads :
It is agreed that the most serene King of Great Britain, his
heirs and successors, shall have, hold, keep and enjoy forever
with plenary right of sovereignty, dominion, possession and
propriety, all those lands, regions, islands, colonies, and places,
whatsoever, being or situated in the West Indies, or any part
of America, which the said King of Great Britain or his sub-
jects do at present hold or possess."
Though the clause appears to have been inserted in
the treaty ostensibly and primarily for the purpose of
settling a dispute over the possession of Jamaica," the
British negotiators evidently aimed to secure a word-
ing which might include the British log-cutting settle-
ments on the Belize and on other parts of the Spanish
'" L. L., " Balize ", in NouvcUes Annates, C, 53; Pari. Papers, 1847,
Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics", 13; Gibbs, British
Honduras, 26. This was probably not the first Hritish settlement in the
region, for it seems that as early as 1638 a number of shipwrecked
British sailors established themselves there. Ibid., a6; Lucas, Historical
Geography of the British Colonics. II, 297; Trendell, Her Majesty's Col-
onics, 347.
" I taring, Buccaneers, 211.
"Ilertslct, Treaties between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, II,
196197.
'• U. S. Dues., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 80.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 5
coast." This interpretation was attempted by the
governors of Jamaica and by the Board of Trade,"
but the Spaniards had no intention of acknowledging
that such concessions had been made ; therefore they
continued to capture the logwood vessels of the British,
and repeatedly destroyed their log-cutting settle-
ments ; " Belize suffered like the rest, and in about the
year 1732 the settlers were driven away and their
homes demolished. They promptly returned, however,
and defeated all further expeditions sent against them."
Belize was occupied by the British under the equivo-
cal title of 1670 until the formation of the peace of
1763, which concluded the Seven Years' War. Whether
or not the negotiators of this treaty were ignorant of
the terms of that made in 1670 and of its possible
application to Belize is not apparent."* In any case, by
the later treaty England agreed to demolish all forti-
fications erected by British subjects in the Bay of
Honduras ; but the Spanish government permitted the
log-cutters to remain, and guaranteed them protection,
though, obviously, Spain still held full sovereignty over
the settlement."
Again, in 1779, when Spain had allied herself with
the revolting English colonies, the Spaniards returned
to Belize. This time the settlement was pillaged and
many of its inhabitants taken as prisoners to Havana.
^* Long, Jamaica, 1, 341; Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, " Spanish-
American Republics", 13; Gibbs, British Honduras, 27.
^^ Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
14; Burney, Buccaneers, 99-100.
"Wafer, New Voyage to America, 34; Long, Jamaica, I, 341; Pari.
Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics", 13-14.
" Bancroft, Central America, II, 625-628.
" Long, Jamaica, I, 342.
^° MacDonald, Select Charters, 265.
6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
But in the following year Omoa, in Honduras, was
captured by British officers, who, by convention with
the Spanish authorities, arranged for the redemption
of the " Baymen ", as the settlers were called."
By the treaty of 1783, which concluded the American
Revolution, Belize still remained under Spanish sover-
eignty, and by this treaty definite boundaries were for
the first time agreed upon for the settlement. The
boundary line was given in great detail, but, generally
speaking, the northern limit of settlement was to be
Rio Hondo, and the southern, Belize River."
Notwithstanding the stipulations of 1783, the British
continued to spread ; therefore a treaty made three
years later extended the southern boundary as far as
the Sibun River. Besides this extension of territory,
the new agreement gave the settlers additional privi-
leges within the district. Not only were they permitted
to cut and carry away logwood, but they were also
allowed to take mahogany and all other woods, as well
as to gather and sell all other uncultivated products ;
but it was definitely agreed that no plantations were to
be made or factories of any sort to be established, since
the undisputed possession of the territory by Spain pre-
cluded the right of the English to form settlements of
that kind." A Spanish commissioner, in company with
one representing the iMiglish government, was to be
admitted to the settlement twice a year to examine into
the condition of afTairs."^
'^ An». Reg., 1780, "History", 212-214; Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns.,
LXIV, " Spanish- American Republics", 15; Henderson, British Set-
tletncnt of Honduras, 5-7.
^^ Ann. Reg., 1783. "State I'apers ", 3.14-335-
'^^ Ibid., 1786, pp. 362-264.
''Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., I-XI\', " Spanisli .Xiiu-rican Ucpiiblics ",
1718.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 7
For many years the Spanish government held the
settlers rigidly to the terms specified. Commissioners
made regular visits for this purpose, and saw that the
boundary limits were not exceeded, as well as that the
other agreements were complied with. Repeatedly they
uprooted and destroyed young plantations started by
the residents."*
The jealous vigilance of the Spanish authorities was
shared by the rival Spanish wood-cutters. This jeal-
ousy, and the fact that the British settlers tried con-
stantly to exceed the terms of the treaty, led to repeated
threats of hostilities on the part of the Spaniards. The
Baymen, who were not permitted to erect fortifications,
were alarmed at these demonstrations, and appealed to
their government for protection. In response, Colonel
Barrow was sent to the place with both military and
civil commissions, and took charge of affairs as super-
intendent, January i, 1797."
In 1798, when England and Spain were again at war,
a determined attempt Avas made to drive out the set-
tlers. A combined expedition was sent from Cam-
peachy and Bacalar, under Governor O'Niel of Yuca-
tan. The Baymen, however, prepared for a desperate
resistance. They burned the houses on Saint George's
Cay, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the
enemy, and met the invaders at sea."° With the aid of
a small naval force under Captain Moss in the Merlin,
'* Crowe, Gospel in Central America, 196; Gibbs, British Honduras, 50.
^ Trendell, Her Majesty's Colonies, 348.
^Henderson, British Settlement of Honduras, 8; Crowe, Gospel in
Central America, 196; Lucas, Historical Geography, II, 307. The popula-
tion at this time, white and colored, was probably not more than six or
seven hundred. Henderson, British Settlement of Honduras, 85.
8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
they drove off the Spaniards after two days' fighting.''
This appears to have been the last attempt of the
Spanish actively to interfere with the Belize settlement.
During the remainder of the period previous to 1815
the same relations prevailed between the British gov-
ernment and Belize as formerly.* By at least three
treaties in this period England virtually acknowledged
that the settlement was upon the basis established in
1786. The third article of the peace of Amiens of 1802
reads :
His Britannic majesty restores to the French republic and
its allies, viz. his Catholic majesty and the Batavian republic,
all the possessions and colonies which respectively belonged to
them, and which have been either occupied or conquered by the
British forces during the course of the present war."
The only exceptions mentioned are the island of
Trinidad and the Dutch possessions in Ceylon." Again,
in 1809, Great Britain and Spain formed an alliance in
which the two powers agreed upon " an entire and
lasting oblivion of all acts of hostility done on their
side in the course of the late wars " in which they had
been engaged against each other." The last and most
important of these treaties was that of 1814; it con-
firmed the first article of the treaty of 1786."
In view of what has just been said, there seems to be
absolutely no basis for the statement made by more
" Bird, " Sketch of the East Coast of Central America ", in Jr. Roy.
Geog. Soc, XI, 8i; Bancroft, Central America, II, 635; Henderson.
British Settlement of Honduras, 8; Crowe, Gosfel in Central America,
196-197.
** L. L., " Balize ", in Nouvelles Annales, C, 54.
"'Ann. Reg., 1802, p. 609.
» Ibid.
" Ibid., 1809, p. 737.
" Ilertslet, Treaties, II, 2451 271.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 9
recent writers, that the victory won by the Daymen in
1789 was a conquest of the Belize territory, and the
event which led directly to the extension of full British
sovereignty over the region/' The victory seems really
to have attracted but little attention from the home
government, and it was not until after a lapse of more
than fifty years that enlarged claims were made in con-
sequence of it. In 181 5, and for many years subsequent
to that date, as will be shown later, the British govern-
ment merely regarded Belize as a settlement of British
subjects upon soil the sovereignty of which rested in
Spain.
The Bay Islands.
In the Bay of Honduras, close to the shores of the
Honduran repubhc, lie the Bay Islands, a group of
some half dozen islands, of which Ruatan " is by far
the largest and most important. This island is about
thirty miles long and eight or nine broad, and is pos-
sessed of excellent harbors, easily defended.^"*
While on his fourth voyage, in 1502, Columbus dis-
covered and took possession of Ruatan and another
island of the group, now generally known as Bonacca,
in the names of the Spanish sovereigns.'^ The owner-
ship of Spain was not disputed until towards the
middle of the seventeenth century, when the bucca-
neers swarmed in the western seas." The advantages
^ See Gibbs, British Honduras; Egerton, British Colonial Policy,
Keane, Central and South America; Woodward, Expansion of the British
Empire.
** Also written Roatan or Rattan.
"Long, Jamaica, I, 333; Roberts, Central America, 276; Alcedo, Dic-
tionary of America and the West Indies, IV, 334.
'° Roberts, Central America, 275; Squier, Notes on Central America,
369. The name of Bonacca is sometimes rendered " Guanacca ".
"Squier, Notes on Central America, 369; Travis, Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, 3; Edgington, Monroe Doctrine, 65.
10 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
offered by the islands as a rendezvous early appealed
to the freebooters, who landed on them in 1642.** The
Indians, who were apparently the only inhabitants at
the time, made no resistance and the intruders estab-
lished themselves on the islands. From this retreat,
and particularly from the sheltered harbors of Ruatan,
attacks were made upon the Spanish.*"
The bishop of Comayagua, however, soon became
much concerned over the injurious effect of the hereti-
cal British upon the religion of the natives, and helped
incite the Spanish authorities to action against the
usurpers. A strong force was organized under the
leadership of various colonial officials, and in August,
1650, the buccaneers were dislodged.*" But no attempt
was made to guard Ruatan or the other islands against
future seizure by the British. The few natives, whom
the pirates had spared and enslaved, were too fright-
ened to remain, and were therefore removed to the
adjoining coast and allotted lands by the government."
From this time until 1742, when war existed between
Spain and England, the Bay Islands appear to have had
no permanent inhabitants.** During this struggle, how-
ever, the English planned to gain control of the whole
Atlantic coast of Guatemala. They captured and forti-
ned several important places on the mainland, and later
"* Strangeways, Mosquito Shore, 42; Juarros, Guatemala, 318; Crowe,
Cosf'el in Central America, 184.
"Juarros, Guatemala, 319; Crowe, Gosfel in Central America, 184;
Squicr, Notes on Central America, 370.
*" Juarros, Guatemala. 319-321; Crowe, Gosf^el in Central America,
184-185; Gibbs, British Honduras, 25.
■" Scjuicr, Xotes on Central America, 370; De Bow's Re-t-iew, XXVII,
555-556.
** Long, Jamaica, I, 335; Juarros, Guatemala, 3^1; Squier, i\'otes on
Central America, 370.
BRITISH I.Y CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1813 11
took possession of Ruatan/' Following this, they made
a strong efifort to colonize the island, but after the
treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle the settlements were broken
up and the inhabitants removed/' Spain then tried to
encourage colonization, but her efforts failed ; and for
some time the islands, though recognized as Spanish
territory, seem to have been practically deserted/"
Later, however, a few British appear to have settled
upon the islands, but when war again broke out, in
1780, they were driven away by the Guatemalans,*" and
the treaty of 1783 definitely stipulated that all English
settlers should, without exception, retire from the
Spanish continent and its dependent islands.*^ These
terms appear to have been evaded, but a supplementary
convention, formed three years later, containing more
definite stipulations to the same effect," resulted in
British evacuation of the coveted territory."
Yet when war again existed in 1796, they once more
returned. British officers transported Caribs from
*^Juarros, Guatemala, 321; Squier, Notes on Central America, 370-371.
** Long, Jamaica, I, 335.
^ Ibid., 335-336. Long, in his history, published in 1774, repeatedly
urged (I, 334, and passim), the acquisition and settlement of Ruatan by
England. He stated (p. 333), that two Jamaica traders had patents for
grazing mules on the island.
Squier, Notes on Central America, 371, and Trendell, Her Majesty's
Colonies, 348, give the impression that during this whole period the
islands were definitely held by the British; the latter stales (p. 348),
that the government of Ruatan and Bonacca was connected with that of
Belize, and that the administrative officers had their residence on
Ruatan. With regard to this point, however, Long seems to be the best
authority.
■•* Long, Jamaica, I, 333; Squier, Notes on Central America, 371.
*'' Ann. Reg., 1783. " State Papers", 334-335-
"^Ibid., 1786, p. 263.
*'^ Squier seems uncertain upon this point, Notes on Central America,
371; but Juarros gives a clear impression that the English abandoned the
islands, Guatemala, 321.
12 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Saint Vincent and the Leeward Islands to Ruatan and
made that place a penal settlement. A guard of 2,000
negroes was stationed there for the defense of the
islands. As soon, however, as these encroachments
became known to the Spanish colonial officials, steps
were taken towards the reconquest of the place ; and
in May, 1797, the Indians and negroes surrendered to
a Spanish naval commander, after which the Spanish
flag was hoisted and the territory formally declared a
possession of Spain.**"
After this, as long as Spain retained her dominion
over Guatemalan territory, she remained in undisputed
possession of the Bay Islands. About the year 1804
Captain Henderson, the superintendent of Belize,
landed upon Ruatan, and, in writing of the incident,
stated definitely that the island belonged to Spain."
Moreover, as has already been stated," a treaty made
between Spain and England in 181 4 confirmed the first
article of the treaty of 1786, which referred to British
settlers on Central American territory. Therefore, if
at any time previous Spanish control of the islands had
lapsed, it was revived at this time and distinctly recog-
nized by the British government.
The Mosquito Shore.
During the period considered in this chapter the
term " Mosquito Shore " was applied in a vague way
to the east coast of the captain-generalcy of Guate- i
•"Juarros, Guatemala, 321; Squier, Notes on Central America, 371;
Gibbs, British Honduras, 53; Galindo, " Notice of the Caribs in Central
America ", in Jr. Roy. Geog. Soc, III, 290.
" Henderson, British Settlement of Honduras, 168; Squier, Notes on
Central America, 372.
" .See above, p. 8.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 13
mala, but particularly to that part lying between Cape
Honduras and the mouth of the San Juan River."
The name was derived from the Moscos, or Mos-
quitos, the semi-nomadic population which inhabited
the district." These people were a mixture of at least
three races. Those to whom the term Mosquito was
originally applied were American aborigines, partly
composed of Caribs who invaded the coast from the
West Indies." To these was added, probably in the
early part of the seventeenth century, an Ethiopian
element through the wreck of an African slaver some-
where upon the coast.°* Because of this infusion of
negro blood, the name " Sambos " was at times applied
to the population of the region, or at least to the more
negroid portion of it."^ As time passed, traders and buc-
caneers who frequented the shore contributed a Cau-
casian strain to the earlier mixture ; °^ and more Afri-
can blood was occasionally added by fugitive slaves
from the adjoining settlements."'
The aboriginal inhabitants of the shore were never
completely subjugated by the conquerors of Guate-
mala ; *" but the cruel treatment which they suffered
''Long, Jamaica, I, 314; Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-
American Republics", 27; Kemble Papers, II, 419, in N. Y. Hist. Soc,
Colls., 1884.
** Squier, Notes on Central America, 48; Keane, Central and South
America, II, 237; Churchill, Voyages, VI, 287; Kemble Papers, II, 419.
" Keane, Central and South America, II, 235.
** Churchill, Voyages, VI, 293; Henderson, British Settlement of
Honduras, 216; Strangeways, Mosquito Shore, 328; Bonnycastle, Spanish-
America, I, 172.
"Kemble Papers, II, 419; Roberts, Central America, 152-153; Strange-
ways, Mosquito Shore, 239; Bonnycastle, Central America, I, 172.
"Bard, Waikna, 337-338.
" Scherzer, Travels in Central America, II, 30-31; Squier, Notes on
Central America, 208; Keane, Central and South America, II, 236.
'" Cal. St. P., Col., Am. and IV. I., 1669-1674, 303; Alcedo, Dictionary,
III, 347; Long, Jamaica, I, 315, 317; Roberts, Central America, 54.
14 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
from the would-be conquerors bred in them a deep
hatred for the Spanish people and their government."
This feeling was shared by the English buccaneers w'ho
infested the coast and worked harm to the Spaniards ; "
and they found it to their interest to foster it in the
natives. But while encouraging opposition to the
Spaniards, the freebooters themselves cultivated
friendly relations with the Indians. They taught them
the use of firearms and won their favor in various
ways ; and the Mosquitos in return helped the English
in their attacks on the Spanish settlements." Other
adventurers came to the shore, especially from Jamaica,
and traded with the ]\Iosquitos for the natural products
of the region." With the aid of the Mosquitos as
middlemen, they also exchanged British goods for the
gold of the Spaniards, within the Spanish settlements."
The ]\Iosquito coast was thus made a sort of " under-
ground railroad " connecting the Spanish colonies,
commercially, with the outside world.
As time passed, the freebooters and other British
subjects made permanent settlements on the shore at
Cape Gracias a Dios, Bluefields, and other points ; "
and thus the British influence grew. Shortly after the
" Dampier, Voyages, I, 8; Hist. MSS. Conim., Report on MSS. of
Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, II, 289; Henderson, British Settlement of Hon-
duras, 212, 225; Roberts, Central America, 153.
"Churchill, Voyages, VI, 286, 289, 291; Bard, IVaikna, 337; Keane,
Centra! and South America, II, 237.
"Long, Jamaica, I, 315, 317; Churchill, Voyages, \'I, 287; Dampier,
Voyages, I, 8, 10.
"Churchill, Voyages, VI, 286; Long, Jamaica, I, 319-320; Pari.
Papers, 1847, Coms., LXIV, " Spanish-.\nieric.iii Republics", 29.
"■■'Long. Jamaica, I, 317; Kemble Papers, II, 428; Pari. Papers, 1847,
Corns., LXIV, " Spanish-American Republics ", 29.
** Pari. Papers, 1847, " Coms.", LXI\', " .Spanish-American Republics ",
36; Bonnycastle, Spanish-America, 1, 172; llard, ll'aikiia. 337.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 15
English conquest of Jamaica this influence was much
increased, for Oldman, the chief of the Mosquitos, was
taken to England, where he formed some sort of alli-
ance with the English government,*" in consequence of
which the Mosquitos regarded themselves as subjects
of the King of England.^^ After some years, however,
the alliance seems to have been forgotten by the Eng-
lish government, for when Jeremy, the heir of Oldman,
came into power he was sent to Jamaica, evidently at
the instigation of British residents of the shore, to ask
for British protection for his people."'' Whether the
request was granted at this time is not certain ; '" but
at some subsequent date the governors of Jamaica
adopted the plan of appointing justices of the peace
for the shore, who in addition to their regular duties
were empowered to decide commercial questions of
contracts and debts. '^
This policy was continued until the war of 1739-
1748 with Spain. During this struggle the British
government came quickly to realize the importance of
the Mosquitos as military allies and as agents for carry-
ing on illicit trade with the Spanish colonies." Gov-
" Oldman received from the English king a " crown " and a " com-
mission ", which were but a " lacd hat " and a " ridiculous piece of
writing " purporting that he should kindly use and relieve such straggling
Englishmen as came to the shore. Churchill, Voyages, VI, 288.
** Dampier, Voyages, I, pt. 2, p. 11; Edwards, British West Indies, V,
203.
*' Sloane, History of Jamaica, I, 76; Cal. St. P., Col., Am. and IV. I.,
1669-1674, 493; Long, Jamaica, I, 316.
" Sloane says that Albemarle, the governor of Jamaica, did nothing
in the matter, as he feared that it was a trick to set up a government
of buccaneers. History of Jamaica, I, 76; cf. Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal,
82-84.
" Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXI\", " Spanish- American Republics ",
20.
^ Ibid., 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United States
respecting Central America ", 202.
i6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ernor Trelawney of Jamaica, in 1740, wrote to the
home government describing a plan for producing
revolt in the Spanish colonies by aid from the Mos-
quitos." For the purpose of executing the scheme,
Captain Robert Hodgson was promptly sent to the
shore to take possession of it in the name of the British
government.'^ Hodgson called a meeting of the lead-
ing Mosquitos and made known his purpose to them.
Then, probably through a liberal use of promises and
rum, he secured their assent to a series of articles
which he drew up." These articles formally trans-
ferred the sovereignty of the shore to the British gov-
ernment, and made a Sambo chief, to whom the others
were required to swear allegiance, the local ruler."
Hodgson's attempt to produce a revolt of the back-
country Indians failed, as did also Anson's and Ver-
non's expeditions, so there were no British conquests
in Central America in consequence of Trelawney 's
scheme." The British government, however, was now
determined to secure a firm hold upon the Mosquito
Shore. Therefore Hodgson was appointed superin-
tendent of the region, and in 1749 he erected a fort at
Black River, hoisted a British flag, and established a
garrison of 100 men sent from Jamaica." His action
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 37, p. 8j.
^* Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
29; Bard, Waikna, 340.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, pp. 85-86; Bard, Waikna. 340-343-
''* Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, " Spanish-.Xnierican Republics",
29; U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 84; Bard, Waikna, 340-342;
Scherzer, Travels in Central America, II, 31.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 86; Travis, Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, 24; Bancroft, Central America, II, 601.
''* Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
29; Bard, Waikna, 343; Lucas, Historical Geography, II, 299.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 17
really amounted to a formal assumption of possession
on the part of the British government. His function
was to look after British interests generally, and par-
ticularly those of a commercial nature. This latter
duty included the cultivation and preservation of
friendship with the Mosquitos."
In the autumn of 1739, before the arrival of
Hodgson, the Spanish ambassador to England had
complained that the English of Jamaica incited the
Mosquitos to attacks on the adjacent Spanish settle-
ments.^" After the arrival of the superintendent and
the formal occupation of the region, protests were
uttered again and again. In 1750 the Spanish threat-
ened to expel the intruders by force." By way of reply
to this, Hodgson, at Trelawney's instructions, repre-
sented that the object in stationing a superintendent on
the shore was to prevent British hostilities against the
Spanish.^ For a time the Spaniards were, or pre-
tended to be, deceived, and complimented Hodgson
with the title of colonel for his professed services.''
But the aggressions of the British continued, and the
Spanish finally prepared for hostile action.**
The British settlers, who numbered about a thousand
at the time,'° were alarmed at this, as was also Governor
Knowles, Trelawney's successor.'" Knowles lacked
''* Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
29.
*" Bard, Waikna, 343.
^'^ Ibid.; Bancroft, Central America, II, 601-602; Keane, Central and
South America, II, 237.
'^ Bard, Waikna, 343; Bancroft, Central America, II, 602.
''Bard, Waikna, 343-344; Bancroft, Central America, II, 602.
** Bard, Waikna, 344; Bancroft, Central America, II, 602.
''Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, " Spanish- American Republics",
36.
'" Bard, Waikna, 344.
i8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the enthusiasm for British territorial expansion which
had moved his predecessor ; accordingly he wrote to
the home government that the whole Mosquito affair
was " a job ", and that if Hodgson were not checked
or recalled he would involve the nation in difficulties."
While waiting for a reply from home, Knowles wrote
to the captain-general of Guatemala in an effort to pre-
serve peace/' In consequence of these endeavors, a
more pacific spirit was displayed by the Spaniards."
But with the accession of a new governor the old diffi-
culties returned, and helped produce a conflict with
Spain."
By the treaty of 1763 which concluded this conflict,
Great Britain agreed not only to demolish all fortifica-
tions erected by British subjects in the Bay of Hondu-
ras, but also in " other places of the territory of Spain
in that part of the world ". " In the following year,
orders were given for the destruction of the fort at
Black River, and the withdrawal of the garrison ; **
and the orders were executed." But the settlers were
reluctant to leave the shore, and the British govern-
ment, probably influenced by Otway, the existing super-
intendent,"* soon changed its policy.
In view of their bitter opposition to British interfer-
ence in Mosquito territory, it is certain that the Spanish
" Rard, H'aikna, 344; Travis, Clayton-Duhvcr Treaty, 26.
*' I5ar(l, W'aikna, 344.
*» Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 26.
""Ibid.; Bard, ll'aikna, 344; Bancroft, Central America, II, 602.
*^ Ann. Reg.. 1762, "State Papers", 239.
"Pari. Papers, 1847, Coins., LXIV, ".Spanish-American Republics",
30.
■• Travis, Clayton-Buluer Treaty, 26.
** Pari. Papers. 1847, Corns., LX1\'. " Spanish-.Nmerican Republics",
30.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 19
authorities intended the terms of the treaty to apply to
this whole territory as well as to the settlements strictly
upon the shores of the Bay of Honduras ; but in the
wording of the agreement the British saw a chance for
evasion. Could the whole of the Mosquito Shore be
regarded as lying in the Bay-of-Honduras " part of
the world " ? Black River might be so considered, but
not the settlement at Cape Gracias a Dios, and surely
not Bluefields, which was far to the south and near the
mouth of the San Juan River.
Apparently certain of good ground for defense of
their action, the British soon resumed occupation of the
shore, under pretense that they had been imposed upon
by the Spanish court w^hen they gave orders for evacu-
ation of the region.°° The system of appointing super-
intendents was restored. Robert Hodgson, son of the
first superintendent, held office from 1767 to 1775,
when, as a new plan of government was decided upon,
he was recalled."*' This plan provided for a superin-
tendent and an elective council of twelve members.
With the approval of the Jamaican authorities these
officers could make police regulations for the country."
While the British were establishing themselves more
firmly upon the Mosquito Shore, the Spanish were by
no means passive. They protested emphatically, and at
times resorted to retaliatory measures ; °^ but the well-
known weakness of Spain and the evident value of the
'5 Ibid.
*' Travis, Clayton-Buhver Treaty, 2y.
" Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, " Spanish-American Republics ",
32; Travis, Clayton-Buhver Treaty, 27.
^^ Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
32-34; Bancroft, Central America, II, 602-604.
20 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
coast led the British to take a more bold and open atti-
tude than formerly. In reply to Spanish protests, the
British government declared that the Mosquito terri-
tory had never been conquered by the Spaniards ;
consequently, its king was an independent sovereign
and quite capable of acting politically as such."
The indignation of the Spanish government at these
claims influenced it to aid the revolting American colo-
nies in 1779."° England, in retaliation for this un-
friendly act, formed a daring plan for indemnifying
herself through conquests from Spain for the probable
loss of her Atlantic colonies."* By means of aid from
the Mosquitos, the Spanish colonial dominions were to
be cut into two parts, along the line of the San Juan
River and Lake Nicarauga, after which each section
was to be conquered separately."^ Governor Dalling
of Jamaica, with whom the plan originated, was put
in control of the bold undertaking.^"* The Mosquitos
did not give so much aid as had been counted upon,
however, and in some cases even went over to the
enemy.'*** The rainy season set in, and with it came
disease. Adequate food and clothing and medical
supplies were lacking, and the whole enterprise ended
'•'Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
30; Travis, Mosquito History, 8; De Botv's Rei^eiv, XXVII, 553.
""Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 27.
'" Tortier and Ficklcn, Central America and Mexico, 115.
^"^ Ibid. Cf. Edwards, British West Indies, V, 2:2, 214.
^0* Kctnble Papers, II, " Preface," 7.
^••* Kembte Papers. II, 7, 406; Hist. MS.S. Comni., Report on MSS. of
Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, II, 287-388; Crowe, Gospel in Central America,
187.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 21
in great disaster/"* Of the more than 2,000 men sent
out only 380 returned to Jamaica."'
At first the Spanish were also successful on the
Mosquito coast itself, for the British garrison had been
reduced."" The fort at Black River was captured in
March, 1782, and the settlers were forced to take
refuge at Cape Gracias a Dios."' But reinforcements
were sent, and in five months the whole region was in
control of the British, in whose hands it was when the
war ended.""
When the treaty of 1783 was being negotiated, the
question of British settlements in Central America
gave considerable anxiety to the British cabinet. After
the ambitious plans for conquest of Spanish soil had
failed, the British government had no intention of
relaxing the hold maintained on Mosquito territory
previous to the war. The Spanish, however, were
determined to drive the enemy from all of their terri-
tory except Belize ; therefore the definitive treaty of
peace stipulated by its sixth article that all English
settlers except those at Belize should retire from the
" Spanish continent "."° The British cabinet objected
to the article on the ground that it gave greater con-
cessions than were warranted by the preliminaries, and
wished to defer for six months the agreement regard-
^"^ Kemble Papers, II, 3-65, passim; Crowe, Gospel in Central America,
187; Fortier and Ficklen, Central America and Mexico, 117; Mahan,
Interest of America in Sea Power, 80; Bancroft, Central America, II,
6ii.
i"" Crowe, Gospel in Central America, 187; Fortier and Ficklen, Central
America and Mexico, 117.
^0'' Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, " Spanish- American Republics",
34-
i»8 Ibid., 34-35-
^"^ Ibid., 35; Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 28.
^'' Ann. Reg., 1783, "State Papers", 334-335.
22 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ing the question covered by the article.'" But as it
seemed desirable to sign the treaties as soon as possible,
Fox pointed out to the King that the British govern-
ment could put its own interpretation upon the words
" Spanish continent ", and could determine whether
the Mosquito Shore came under that description or
not.'" The King gave his consent, and Fox instructed
the Duke of Manchester to accede to the objectionable
article unless he could prevail upon the other negotia-
tors to defer the consideration of it."' Further delay
seemed undesirable, and the treaty was signed with
this article unchanged.
After the agreement was ratified the British made no
move towards the evacuation of the Mosquito Shore,
and, in reply to the protests of Spain, declared that the
shore was not a part of the " Spanish continent ", but
of the " American continent "."* Nevertheless the
Spanish government was determined, and as England
was crippled by a long and unsuccessful war, and by
discontent at home, she was forced to yield. After a
long and bitter discussion, the treaty of 1786, which
left no loophole for British evasion, was signed."* This
stipulated that " His Britannic Majesty's subjects, and
the other colonists who have hitherto enjoyed the pro-
tection of England, shall evacuate the country of the
Mosquitos, as well as the continent in general, and the
islands adjacent, without exception, situated beyond the
"* I'ox, Memoirs and Correspondence, II, 122, 124.
^* Ibid., 123-123.
^^ Ibid., 124.
^^* Pari. Papers, 1847, Cams., LXIV, " Spanisli-.\niericaii Republics",
.■?5-36; Bard, JCaiA-iia, 344; Keanc, Central and South .America. II, 2i^.
^^^ Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, " Spanish Anieiiiaii HepiiMi.s ".
36; lUirney, Buccaneers of .America, 102.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 23
line hereinafter described "."" The line referred to
was the new and more comprehensive boundary for
Belize settlement.
The Indians were much opposed to the arrange-
ment/" and in their opposition were probably sup-
ported by the settlers, some of whom remained in defi-
ance of the treaty,"* and by the traders."' Several
attempts were made by the Spaniards to subjugate the
Indians and to establish permanent settlements upon
the coast, but all in vain. In 1796 the Mosquitos re-
captured the last settlement — that on Black River —
and drove out the Spaniards."^" This seems to have
been the last effort of Spain to secure control of the
Mosquito Shore.
After the treaty of 1786 the British gave up all open
political relations with the Mosquitos."" Yet the influ-
ence of the contraband traders, to whom the Indians
were still invaluable, did much towards preserving a
friendly feeling for Great Britain. This friendliness
was also fostered by a continuance, by the Belize
authorities, of an old custom of feasting the leading
Mosquitos and of distributing presents among them."^
Because of this attention the Mosquitos seem to have
''■^'^ Ann. Reg., 1786, " State Papers ", p. 263. This treaty was very un-
popular and led to a vote of censure by the House of Lords against the
government. After a long, sharp debate the motion was defeated. Ann.
Reg., 1787, "History", 1 11- 114.
"' Stout, Nicaragua, 168.
'^^^ Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
36; Roberts, Central America, 283; Bancroft, Central America, II, 606.
^^ Kemble Papers, II, 428; Bonnycastle, Spanish America, I, 174.
^*'* Bancroft, Central America, II, 607; Travis, Clayton-Biilwer Treaty,
30.
^^ Bard, Waikna, 345; Bancroft, Central America, II, 606-607.
^^ Henderson, British Settlement of Honduras, 165-182; Edwards,
British West Indies, V, 206.
24 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
considered themselves as still under British protection,
and the Spanish tacitly permitted them to do so/""
As long as Spain retained dominion over Central
America, the British government refrained from all
further attempts at interference with the Mosquitos,
and showed no special interest in the shore. In 1814,
by a treaty already described, she confirmed Spain in
her sovereignty over it. Shortly after this a captain in
the corps of royal British engineers, who had made a
voyage in the region, wrote : " The Mosquito shore
. . . has been claimed by the British. The English
held this country for eighty years, and abandoned it in
1787 and 1788. The Spaniards call it a part of Hon-
duras,'"" which it really is, and claim it as such." ""
This statement seems to reflect the view of the British
government at the time. The British protectorate no
longer existed, and British control on the shore was a
thing of the past.
Such was the character of British influence in Cen-
tral America, extending over a period of more than a
century and a half. At one time Great Britain had
some basis for asserting a legal claim to all of the terri-
tory towards which her interests were directed ; "* and
at times she exercised full control, now over one portion
and now over another, in disregard of Spanish sover-
eign rights, and frequently in defiance of treaty stipu-
lations. After a long struggle, largely devoid of
success, Spain was finally able to strike an effective
blow by the treaty of 1786. By means of this she
'^ .Stout, Nicaragua, 168.
"* The northern, or Ilonduran, part of the shore had been described
by the writer.
'-' liuniiycastle, Spanish Atnerica, I, 171.
*''* The treaty of 1670.
BRITISH IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1815 25
drove the British from the Bay Islands and from the
Mosquito Shore, but permitted the retention of the
BeHze concession, while carefully keeping in the Span-
ish Crown the sovereignty over Belize territory. The
years which followed were largely occupied by the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. During
this period, Great Britain, from lack of inclination or
lack of opportunity, failed to recover the hold which
she had lost. Therefore, at the date with which the
next chapter opens her Central American relations
were on the same basis as immediately after the treaty
of 1786.
CHAPTER II.
British Aggressions; American Interest
Awakened, i8i 5-1850.
With the year 181 5 there opened a new era for the
United States. Though in the War of 181 2 the vision-
ary Republican party had utterly failed in its schemes
for conquest, yet the nation had fought its battles alone,
and, while frequently defeated and discouraged, had
finally won an inspiring victory at New Orleans. The
conflict roused the American people as a whole to
national consciousness and filled them with a confi-
dence in their own possibilities, hitherto lacking. With
the close of the struggle the country assumed a more
secure and dignified position among the nations.
After this second war for independence, the attitude
of England, especially, was altered towards the United
States. She not only showed a sincere desire to refrain
from any unseemly meddling with American aflfairs,
but even displayed a real anxiety to avoid all chances
for future trouble. Actual concessions were as a rule
reluctantly granted, but the discussion of subjects out
of which serious differences might arise was avoided
if possible, or postponed. It was this determination on
the part of the British to maintain a pacific policy that
prevented embarrassing complications as a result of
Jackson's violent proceedings in Florida ; ' and it was
undoubtedly also influential in effecting the temporary
^ Reddaway, Monro* Doctrine, 14, 33. Cf. Rush, Rtsidenct at the
Court of London, 399-413.
26
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 27
arrangements regarding Oregon, made by the conven-
tion of 1818/
Up to 1823 nothing had arisen seriously to disturb
the good f eeHng between the two governments. When,
therefore, the " Monroe doctrine " was first given ex-
pression in December of that year, popular enthusiasm
was roused in America for the British government
because of the well-known position of Canning towards
the designs of the Holy Alliance. Few outside of the
American cabinet suspected that the attitude displayed
by the President's message was not welcome to Eng-
land, and might prove an embarrassing obstruction in
the execution of plans which she herself cherished for
the extension of power in the western world.^
Nevertheless, Canning was decidedly taken aback by
this independent stand of the American government.
However, without revealing his own views, and care-
fully refraining from all open acts which might rouse
antagonism, he proceeded to adopt and carry out a
policy calculated to render ineffective the Monroe doc- 1
trine in so far as it conflicted with British designs.Mil
Canning's general policy was to prevent Latin America
from looking towards the United States for help and
from seeking alliances with her.° For this purpose the
- Beauinarchais, La doctrine de Monroe, 2, 6-7.
^ Reddaway, Monroe Doctrine, 88.
■• J. Q. Adams early discerned the unfriendly character of Canning's
attitude (Adams, Memoirs, III, 437), and upon learning of Canning's
death in 1827, wrote in his diary: " May this event, in the order of
Providence, avert all the evils which he would, if permitted, have drawn
down upon us, and all evil counsels formed against our peace and
prosperity be baffled and defeated!" Ibid., VII, 328.
° Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 28, 1835, F. C, Cen. Am., vol. 16, no.
26; Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning", in Am.
Hist. Rev., XI, 783, 787-788. For instance, on February 8, 1826, Canning
wrote to Vaughan: "The avowed pretension of the United States to put
28 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
British government was to secure a preponderating
influence, politically and economically, in the new
states."
Great Britain was especially interested in Central
America because of early relations there, and, in con-
sequence of Monroe's proclamation, suspected the
American government of watching with particular
attention British movements in that quarter. However,
at this period the American government did not merit
the suspicion directed towards it. As yet the United
States as a nation had hardly secured her bearings;
she was a second rate power with an uncertain future.
Her population numbered but little more than ten mil-
lion, and was confined to the eastern fourth of the
present settled area. In proportion as her national
strength was less than it is now, so also were her inter-
ests less comprehensive. The Monroe doctrine, though
boldly uttered, was merely defensive in aim ; and for
many years it was applied only to territory actually
contiguous to American borders. The great triangle
of Mexican domain shut ofif the attention of the United
States government from Central America.
Though Central America as well as the other
Spanish-American republics received Monroe's declar-
ation with enthusiasm and looked towards the north
themselves at tlie head of the confederacy of all the Americas, and to
sway that confederacy against Europe, ((Ireat Britain included), is not
a pretension identified with our interests, or one that we can countenance
as tolerable.
" It is however a pretension which there is no use in contesting in
the abstract; but we must not say anything that seems to admit the
principle." Mass. Hist. Soc, Proc, XL\'I, jj4; cj. Rush, Th* Court
of London from 1S19 to i8JS, PP- 43«-433. 47 ••
"Turner, Rise of the Neto iVest, 222; Paxson, Indcfendencr of th*
South American Republics, i-S-js-J, passim.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 29
for protection from European enemies, there is nothing
in either the EngHsh or the American archives to show
that, for the first two decades following the proclama-
tion, the United States government took any special,
interest in British encroachments on the American
isthmus, or made any active attempts to check them.^
°*jRri825 the government was invited to send delegates
to a great pan-American congress at which was to be
discussed, among other questions, the manner in which
all colonization of European powers on the American
continent should be resisted.' It is true that on this
occasion much interest was shown by the United States, °
but in the instructions given the American representa-
tives no special mention was made of Central America,
or of British aggressions in that region." Moreover, it
should be borne in mind that Great Britain also was
invited to the congress. However, as is well known,
party opposition to President Adams prevented the
American delegates from reaching Panama in time,
and the congress itself came to nothing.
In fact, for a long period the United States govern-
ment not only ignored Central America so far as the
'In 1824 the United States government decided to send an informal
agent, Mann, to Guatemala. J. Q. Adams, the secretary of state, in-
structed Mann that the first object of his mission would be to gather
information about the new republic. Guatemala, Adams wrote in his
diary, was important because of its location on the isthmus, and because
of the " commercial connections, and lodgments on the soil by the British,
with the neighboring bay of Honduras and Mosquito shore ". Memoirs,
VI, 325. No note of resentment towards British interests in Central
America is evident in the words just quoted. If such resentment had
been felt by the American government, it seems probable that Adams's
jealous patriotism would have caused him promptly to reflect it. See
above, note 4.
' Brit, and For. State Papers, XIII, 307.
^ Am. State Papers, For. Relats., V, 916-919; VI, 356-366.
"Sr«Y. and For. State Papers, XV, 832-862.
30 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
principles of the Monroe doctrine were concerned, but
also quite neglected that country itself. Only occa-
sionally were agents of the United States sent there,
and those who were sent appear to have lacked both
interest and efficiency." In their instructions, the
American agents were often directed to emphasize to
the restless states the importance of union to the main-
tenance of republican government," but though the
history of British encroachments in Central America
must have been pretty well known to the Washington
authorities, nothing appears in the instructions regard-
ing the matter; furthermore, the despatches of the
^age nts contain no allusion to it.
Meanwhile the British improved their opportunity.
During the last years of Spanish control and in th^
period of the Central American confederation they
advanced but slowly, largely content to keep ofT all
intruders and to hold the ground previously gained."
At this time a desire to be on good terms with the
United States, as well as the lack of special interest,
prevented the British government itself from adopting
a very strong policy in Central America, though its
agents in the region displayed much aggressiveness.
But almost simultaneously with the dissolution of the
confederation in 1839, and the consequent loss of power
of united resistance, appeared a greater jealousy of
" Dept. of State, Inst., Am. States, vol. 15, p. 15; Squier to Clayton,
Aug. 20, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol. 2.
" Dept. of Slate, Inst., Am. States, vol. 14, p. aia, and passim.
" Schenley to I'lanta, May 21, 1826, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 5; Memor-
andum from the British Tremier, 1829, C. O., Hond., vol. 40; Palmerston
to Granville, Oct. 4, 1831, ibid., vol. 42; Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 34,
1831, ibid.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 31
American designs, which overcame the earHer hesita-
tion, and the policy of the government became as
aggressive as its agents could desire. With the ap-
proval of their superiors, the British representatives
intrigued to prevent further union," and set one v^eak
state or warring faction against the other to the advan-
tage of their country, and at the same time extended
their hold upon Central American territory. The Brit-
ish interference to prevent a closer union of states will
be shown later, but attention is now directed to the
British plan of acquiring more territory.
In the early part of the period under consideration
the center of British influence was Belize. During the
last years of Spanish sovereignty, when commissioners
no longer visited the region, the settlers gradually
spread south of the Sibun River into Guatemalan terri-
tory, and at the time of Central American independence
had reached the Sarstoon." After the overthrow of
Spanish power, the British government was anxious
to preserve to the settlers the rights granted by Spain.
Consequently, suspicious over the wording of a treaty
of alliance made between Guatemala and Colombia in
1825," it required a distinct declaration from each state
that neither designed to arrogate pretensions to a terri-
torial authority which might possibly clash with British
possessory rights in Belize." In a treaty made with
Mexico in 1826, Great Britain also secured the intro-
duction of a clause guaranteeing to the British at Belize
" Froebel, Seven Years in Central America, 193-194; Scherzer, Travels
in Central America, II, 31.
" Codd to Goderich, Nov. 24, 1827, C. O., Hond., vol. 38.
^* Brit, and For. State Papers, XII, 802-811.
" Chatfield to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 1834, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 14.
32 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the same terms as were given by Spain forty years
before."
Bad feeling arose between the Central American
confederation and the British settlers almost immedi-
ately." As a result of complaints from the latter the
British colonial secretary consulted the legal adviser
of the Crown regarding the status of Belize. That
official, basing his judgment upon the treaties of 1802,
1809, and 1814, referred to in the preceding chapter,
gave the opinion that the treaties of 1783 and 1786
were still in force.'" This decision prevented the estab-
lishment of full British sovereignty over the territory,
for which the settlers had hoped ; °' consequently the
inimical relations continued. Soon complaints against
the Central Americans were again made to the home
government, accompanied by the statement that the
unfriendly Central American attitude was caused by
the presence of people from the United States.*^ A
little later the superintendent announced that North
Americans were planning to settle in the region be-
tween the Sibun and the Sarstoon rivers.^ This report
seemed to rouse the British premier to consider the
situation seriously. He admitted as undeniable the
right of Spain to the Belize territory, but felt it desir-
able to determine whether she would not relinquish her
*' BWt. ar,d For. State Patters, XIV, 6^5. A little later an attempt to
secure the same agreement with Central .\merica failed because the
Central .Xmerican agent in I_x)ndon lacked the necessary powers. Edging-
ton, Monroe Doctrine, 64.
'» Codd to Rathurst, Feb. 6, 1825, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 4.
^^ Robinson to Rathurst, July 8, 1825, C. O., Hond., vol. 36.
^ Codd to Goderich, Nov. 24, 1827, ibid., vol. 38.
"Schenley to Planta, May 31, 1826, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 5.
•^ Memorandum of Rritish rrcmier, 1829, C. O., Hond., vol. 40. Tli<
report was evidently false, for nothing further was said regarding the
matter.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1850 33
claims. Should she be unwilling to do this, he thought
it might be well to regard the territory as a part of the
state of Guatemala, and to offer the Central American
government an earlier recognition in return for the
cession of it.^
Nothing resulted from the suggestion at the time,
how^ever, but w^hen the Liberals under lead of jMorazan
gained control of the Central American government
they demanded that the British settlers retreat to the
territory beyond the Sibun, the southern boundary
established by the treaty of 1786." This led the British
agents to support the Serviles, who were more indiffer-
ent to British encroachments, and to work for the
overthrow of Morazan."* The demand of the Liberals
also caused Palmerston to oppose a suggestion "" to
settle the strife by means of a treaty with Guatemala,"
and to instruct Chatfield, the British consul, to refrain
from all discussion of the question of boundaries with
the Central American government, warning him not to
give them any reason to think that the British govern-
ment considered the question one with which they had
any concern."'
Insistent upon maintaining w'hat it regarded as its
rights, the Central American government confirmed a
cession of tracts of territory between the Sibun and the
Sarstoon, made by the state of Guatemala, to a land
*« Ibid.
** Cockburn to Goderich, Jan. 26, 1833, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 13, no. 52.
^Chatfield to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 1834, F. O., Am., vol. 14; Squier,
Nicaragua, II, 412-414; Stephens, Central America, II, 47-49.
" Backhouse to Cockburn, Feb. 19, 1834, C. O., Hond., vol. 45.
** Cockburn to Goderich, Jan. 30, 1833, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 13.
*• Palmerston to Chatfield, Mar. 19, 1834, ibid., vol. 14, no. s; Pal-
merston to Chatfield, Sept. 22, 1834, ibid., vol. 15.
34 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
company and to one Colonel Galindo,'* an Irishman by
birth, but a Central American by adoption." This
roused Cockburn, the Belize superintendent, to declare
that the British government would resist to the utmost
all encroachments upon this territory.'^ As Chatfield,
true to his instructions, had refused to discuss the
question of boundaries, the Guatemalan government
decided to send Galindo to London to secure terms."
He was to go by way of Washington and endeavor to
secure American aid against the British. But Chatfield,
anticipating this move,^* notified Vaughan, the English
minister to the United States." Vaughan took the hint
and later wrote to Palmerston that he " had no difficulty
in convincing ]\Ir. Forsyth that the United States could
not possibly listen to any such proposal from Colonel
Galindo ". ^^ Therefore, when Galindo made known
his errand, he was informed that the United States
government deemed it inexpedient to interfere in the
matter. He then proceeded to London, but the British
government refused to receive him as a diplomatic
agent on the ground that he was a British subject, and
his mission ended in failure."
Meanwhile the quarrel between the British settlers
and the Central American government had increased in
bitterness, partly because of discriminatory duties
'■'Chatfield to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 1834, C. O., Hond., vol. 47, no. 23.
*' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, pp. 12-13.
" Chatfield to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 1834, C. C, Hond., vol. 47, no. 23;
Palmerston to Chatfield, May 13, 1836, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 18, no. 7.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 12.
** Chatfield to Palmerston, Dec. 29, 1834, V. C, Cen. Am., vol. 14, no.
29.
"Chatfield to Vaughan, Dec. 29, 1834, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 14;
Chatfield to Vaughan, Jan. 10, 1835, F. O., Cen. Am. vol. 16.
"• Vaughan to Palmerston, July 4, 1835, C. O., Hond., vol. 47.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, pp. 3-13.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 35
charged by the latter upon all goods coming into the
republic from Belize.** Coiisequently the residents
took matters into their own hands ; they held a conven-
tion, changed the name of the place to British Hon-
duras, adopted a colonial form of government,** and,
in November, 1834, sent a petition to London asking
that the settlement be declared a regular British
colony/'
As a result, the British government decided to settle
the whole question. Its plan involved a definite recog-
nition of sovereignty over the Belize territory as still
existing in the Spanish Crown, for the purpose of
securing the relinquishment of this sovereignty to
Great Britain. Accordingly, in March, 1835, Villiers,
the British representative at Aladrid, was instructed to
try to obtain from the Spanish government a conces-
sion to the whole tract of land occupied by the Belize
settlers, as far south as the Sarstoon.** Villiers
broached the matter to the Spanish foreign secretary,*^
hinting that if the cession was not made the settlement
would be declared a British colony anyway.** He
received an encouraging reply from the secretary,** but
the question seems never to have been considered by
the Spanish government, and the English ambassador
thought it inexpedient to press the matter." Palmer-
^ Chatfield to Palmerston, Dec. 30, 1834, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 14, no.
28.
'* Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal, 171; Walker, Ocean to Ocean, so.
■*" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 4; Crowe, Gospel in Central
America, 206.
*i Wellington to Villiers, Mar. 12, 1835, F. O., Spain, vol. 439. no. iP;
■"Villiers to Wellington, April 8, 1835, ibid., vol. 441, no. 61.
« Miller to Glenelg, May 18, 1835, C. O., Hond., vol. 47.
** Ibid.
*' Palmerston to Glenelg, Sept. 13, 1838, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 21.
36 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ston thereupon determined that it was best to " let the
Spaniards quietly forget it "/" and to permit whatever
interests and claims the latter possessed to lapse.
The continued lack of interest in Belize on the part
of the United States made this policy a safe one for
the British government ; and though the settlers were
dissatisfied with the equivocal situation, their govern-
ment consistently maintained its former stand, unwill-
ing needlessly to attract the attention of the American
or the Spanish governments to the region. In Novem-
ber, 1840, a new superintendent, Macdonald, pro-
claimed the law of England to be the law of the
" settlement or colony of British Honduras ", and sent
a new petition to the home government ; " But as
Aberdeen thought it unwise again to open the question,
and feared that a declaration of British sovereignty
over Belize would be offensive to Spanish dignity,"
nothing was done. Again, in 1846, Belize, was heard
from. A petition presented to the British government
in behalf of Belize merchants asked that goods from
Belize be admitted at British ports free from the dis-
criminating duty charged upon foreign goods." But
the Colonial Office replied that the sovereignty of Belize
territory rested not in Great Britain, but in Spain,
under the treaties of 1783 and 1786.°" Therefore the
petition could not be granted. This seems to have been
the last attempt of the Belize settlers for a long period
to put themselves on a complete colonial basis.
" ralmerston to Glenelg, Sept. 15, 1838, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 21;
Strangeways to Stephen, Mar. 20, 1839, C. O., Ilond., vol. 56.
*' Crowe, Gospel in Central America, 305-206; Gibbs, British Honduras,
50.
"Canning to Hope, Dec. 13, 1841, C. 0., Hond., vol. 61.
•" Il.iwes to Parker, Oct. 12, 1846, ibid., vol. 71.
" Ibid.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, iS 15-1850 37
For many years the British agents in Central America
tried to rouse their government to the importance of
securing the island of Ruatan," and in 1830 the Belize
superintendent, hoping to be sustained in his act, seized
the island, on the excuse that the Central Americans
had refused to return fugitive slaves." But remon-
strance being made by the Central American authori-
ties, the seizure was disavowed by the British govern-
ment, and the island abandoned."^' The English authori-
ties were nevertheless alive to the value of Ruatan,
and, while from policy they could not countenance an
occupation of it by their subjects, they kept close watch
lest other nations seize it.°* When Villiers was in-
structed regarding Belize, he was also directed to try
to secure from the Spanish government the cession of
Ruatan and Bonacca,^' but his efforts in this regard were
equally fruitless.
As the right of Great Britain to the islands was, in
the opinion of the British government, " to say the
least, exceedingly questionable ",°^ it was felt that the
revival of a dominant claim might by objected to by
other European powers, and by the United States ; "
therefore the same policy was pursued as with Belize.
^^ Schenley to Planta, May 31, 1826, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 5; Cockburn
to Goderich, Jan. 30, 1833, ibid., vol. 13, no. 52; Cooke to Howickl, Aug.
i3i 1831, ibid., vol. 11; Prowett to Glenelg, April 15, 1837, C. O., Hond.,
vol. 51: Grey to Backhouse, Nov. 30, 1837, ibid.
'* Squier, Notes oti Central America, 372-373.
" Ibid.
** Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 4, 1831, C. O., Hond., vol. 42; Gran-
ville to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 183 1, ibid.; Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 8,
1838, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 20, no. 58; Palmerston to Chatfield, Sept. 21,
1839, ibid., vol. 22, no. 7.
"Wellington to Villiers, Mar. 12, 1835, F. O., Spain, vol. 4, no. 21.
" Colonial Office Memorandum of Correspondence respecting Ruatan
or Rattan, Dec. 31, 1838, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 38.
•■ Ibid.
38 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
The British cabinet shrewdly kept open the question of
ownership of the islands, and watched developments."
When the Central American confederation had fallen
to pieces, partly as a result of British influence," the
time seemed ripe for a bolder stand. In 1838 a party
of Hberated slaves from the Grand Cayman Islands
came to Ruatan to settle. The Honduran commandant
stationed on the island informed them that before they
could establish themselves there they must obtain per-
mission from the republic of Honduras. Some of the
immigrants asked for permission, but others refused
to do so and appealed to the Belize superintendent.
Macdonald, noted for his aggressive policy, held the
ofifice at the time. He soon landed on Ruatan, hauled
down the Central American flag, and hoisted that of
Great Britain. Scarcely had he departed, however,
before the commandant again ran up the Central
American colors. Macdonald returned, seized the
commandant and his soldiers and carried them to
the mainland, threatening them with death if they
attempted to return." The government of Honduras
protested and once more unfurled the flag of Central
America on the island,*" but it was hauled down by
orders of the British government, and Chatfield was
instructed to inform the Central Americans that the
British government did not deem it necessary to discuss
with them the right of British sovereignty over Rua-
'" Chatfield to Palinerston, Jan. 30, 1836, F. 0.. Cen. .\ni., vol. iS, no.
2; Chatfield to I'alinerston, Oct. 8, 1838, ibid., vol. 20, no. 58.
'» Squier to Clayton, Aug. 20, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Gnat., vol. 2.
"• Squier, Notes on Central .-Imeiica, 373.
•» I'alnierston to Chatfield, Sept. 21, 1839. F. ()., Cen. -Sni., vol. aa,
no. 7; Squier, Notes on Central .-iDierica. 374.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1850 39
tan.'" At this time Honduras was acting alone and
was too weak to do more than protest; therefore the
British remained in control.'^
In 1 841 the British government went a step further.
It informed the governor of Jamaica that should any
foreign power take possession of Ruatan he was to
order the departure of the intruders, and he was author-
ized to use forcible measures for their ejectment, with-
out further instructions, if the order was not obeyed."
Meanwhile to the Cayman Island population had been
added some English settlers,°° and Macdonald, seeing
his opportunity, offered to appoint magistrates for them
if they so desired.** Some time later the offer was
accepted, and subsequently magistrates were regularly
appointed by the Belize superintendent.*^
On the Mosquito Shore, as in Belize and the Bay
Islands, the same slow but decided advance was made
towards British control. In 1816 the heir of the Mos-
quitos was at his own request crowned at Belize,*' and
the custom was followed with his successors.'^ In spite
of this, however, British interest in the Mosquitos
seems temporarily to have declined, for the practice of
giving them presents was discontinued, and was only
"^ Palmerston to Chatfield, Sept. 21, 1839, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 22,
no. 7; Chatfield to Palmerston, Jan. 25, 1840, ibid., vol. 23, no. 2.
*' Squier, Notes on Central America, 375.
•" Palmerston to Bulwer, Mar. 14, 1850, F. O., Am., vol. 509, no. 25.
"' Fancourt to Elgin, Jan. 15, 1845, C. O., Hond., vol. 69, no. i.
^' Squier, Notes on Central America, 375.
^■^ Fancourt to Elgin, Jan. 15, 1845, C. O., Hond., vol. 69, no. I.
°' Bard, Waikna, 345-346; Stout, Nicaragua, 168.
'° Codd to Manchester, April 3, 1824, C. O., Hond., vol. 35.
40 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
revived in 1830, after the Indians had protested against
English neglect."
In the early thirties, when the Central American
government was trying to secure a settlement with
England regarding the Belize boundaries, an attempt
was also made to induce the British to relinquish all
claims to the Mosquito Shore, but Chatfield diplo-
matically evaded a discussion of the subject/' How-
ever, the claims of the Central Americans to the shore
succeeded in reviving the interest of the British govern-
ment ; and as the Central American confederation weak-
ened the British interest increased. In 1837 the Colo-
nial Office ordered that the custom of giving presents
be continued and that the Indians be protected from
Central American encroachments." In the following
year Palmerston directed that the old connection with
the Mosquitos be maintained, and, if anything, be
drawn closer, because circumstances might arise to
make the dependence of the Mosquito country politi-
cally and commercially useful to England.*'
"Arthur to Bathurst, Jan. 15, 1821, ibid., vol. 30; Cockburn to the
Colonial Secretary [n. d.], ibid., vol. 41. In view of later events, it is
of interest to note the opinion held at this time by the Belize super-
intendent with regard to the southern boundary of the Mosquito territory.
In 1830 the Mosquito king granted a tract of land, apparently lying
between Bluefields and the San Juan River, to one McLeLachein who
evidently intended to make a British settlement there. In referring to
this circumstance, Cockburn wrote that he was not aware of any
recognized right by which the king could make such a grant. Moreover,
the settlement contemplated would be regarded with increased jealousy
by the Central .Americans because of its proximity to the San Juan River,
by means of which it was proposed to open up a canal. Cockburn to
Twiss, Feb. 7, 1830, ibid.
'> Chatfield to Palmerston, July 5, 1834, F. C, Cen. .\m., vol. 14, no. j.
"Stephen to Backhouse, June 15, 1837, ibid., vol. 19.
" Strangeways to Stephen, Mar. 28, 1838, ibid., vol. ai; Dept. of State,
Inst., .\m. States, vol. 15, p. 52.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1S30 41
But no very active measures were taken to increase
British influence over that region until the appoint-
ment of the enterprising Macdonald to the superin-
tendency of Belize. Macdonald quickly savir the use
which might be made of the Mosquito protectorate, and
in 1840 wrote to Russell urging the importance of
keeping the Central Americans from possessing the
mouth of the San Juan for transit purposes. To retain
the river mouth for the Mosquito king, he declared,
would promote British commercial prosperity, and
strengthen national and political power.''*
In August, 1 84 1, Macdonald, accompanied by the
Mosquito king, went in a British vessel to San Juan,
the little town at the mouth of the river. Here he
raised the Mosquito flag, laid claim to the port in the
name of the Mosquito king, and announced the pro-
tectorate of England over the Indians." The Central
Americans were ordered to leave the place by the first
of the following March.'^ The Nicaraguan com-
mandant of the port" refused to recognize the sover-
eign of the Mosquitos, and was thereupon taken aboard
the vessel and carried to Cape Gracias a Dios, where
he was put ashore and left to get back as best he could."
Macdonald's expedition was evidently made without
instructions from his government, but, judging from
Chatfield's reply to a protest from Nicaragua," it was
" C. O., Hond., vol. 57, no. 45.
""^Miles' Register, LXI, 98; Latane, Diplomatic Relations, 191.
" Ntles' Register, LXI, 98.
" In 1832 the Nicaraguans had moved to the north bank of the San
Juan River, Pari. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LXV, " Correspondence
respecting the Mosquito Territory ", 84.
■" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 24.
" Ibid., pp. 24-26.
42 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
entirely approved."' In this letter Chatfield outlined
the history of the British protectorate over the Mos-
quitos, stated that the Alosquio territory extended to
the south bank of the port, and declared that as the
British government recognized the sovereignty of the
Mosquitos it would not regard with indiflPerence the
usurpation of their territory." Chatfield's letter not
only had the full approval of the Foreign Office, but
was clearly written in compliance with instructions
from the foreign secretary."* In reply, the secretary-
general of Nicaragua entered into further protests,
accompanied by a long argument to prove that the
Mosquitos had never been recognized as an indepen-
dent nation by any sovereign power in Central Amer-
ica.** This seems to have ended the quarrel for the
time, and, in spite of British plans and acts, the Nica-
raguan authorities remained at the port of San Juan
unmolested for many years.
Before laying claim to San Juan in behalf of the
Mosquito king, Macdonald had attempted to establish
practical British sovereignty on the shore by placing
the government in charge of a commission to which he
intended to delegate his authority. This body was to
be composed chiefly of British subjects and was to sit
** Soon after his appointment Macdonald found among the Belize
archives documents showing the close alliance which had formerly existed
between the Mosquitos and the British government. Perceiving the use
to which these documents could be put, he sent them to his government.
The result was a distinct increase of interest in the Mosquitos on the
part of the British cabinet. Murphy to the Secretary of State, Jan. 20,
1842, Dept. of State, Des., Cen. Am., vol. 2.
"■ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 24.
"Memorandum on Mosquito Shore, written Ueo. 15, 184J, upon a
Colonial Office letter of November 27, 1840, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 36.
" if. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 30-34.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 43
at Belize." The superintendent evidently appointed
the commissioners without instructions, after which he
outlined his plans for the Mosquito government, ex-
pecting that they would meet with favor from the
British cabinet. Palmerston was strongly inclined to
the scheme and wished it executed, but Russell, who at
that time was colonial secretary, opposed it on the
ground that it would make the shore in fact a British
colony." As Russell stood firm, the superintendent was
informed that there was no objection to a commission
composed of EngHshmen, provided that they were con-
sidered solely as Mosquito, and not as British, agents.'*"
Nothing further appears to have been done towards
changing the government before 1842, when the death
of the Mosquito king created an unsettled state of
afifairs.*' As a result of this disorganized condition,
frequent complaints of lack of protection, and of the
encroachments of the Central American states on Mos-
quito territory, were made by British subjects on the
shore.^
Finding that his earlier plans were unacceptable,
Macdonald wrote in 1842, apparently shortly after the
Mosquito king's death, urging that a British resident
be appointed for the shore.'" In the following year
the Foreign Office took the matter seriously into con-
sideration. A memorandum written at that time states
that the question now was how to show interest in the
Mosquito coast with determination as to foreign
powers, but without adopting measures which might
** Memorandum on Mosquito Shore, written Dec. 15, 1843, upon a
Colonial Office letter of Nov. 27, 1840, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 36.
^^ Ibid. "'Ibid. "Ibid. ^^ Ibid.
*" Macdonald to Metcalf, April 30, 1842, C. 0., Hond., vol. 63.
44 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
lead to unnecessary quarrels with them." It was finally
decided to adopt Macdonald's suggestion and station
a British resident on the shore.** The selection of the
official seems to have been left to Macdonald, who, in
1844, appointed Patrick Walker, his private secretary,"
to the position, and established him at Bluefields." The
territory was renamed Mosquitia, and a new flag,
closely modelled after the Union Jack, was given to
the Indians."
\i» While the British were thus establishing themselves
more securely in Central America, events in the United
States had produced a renewal of the earlier British
policy of blocking American advance to the southwest
by supporting Mexico °° — a policy which had not been
vigorously pursued after Canning's death. At an early
date when citizens of the United States began moving
into Texas, the migration was not overlooked by the
British agent in Mexico. He saw the danger and called
Canning's attention to the probable outcome of the
movement ; but whether, in consequence, warning was
oflfered to Mexico by the British government is not
evident."" When Texas declared her independence and
"Memorandum on Mosquito Shore, written Dec. 15, 1843, upon a
Colonial Office letter of November 27, 1840, F. O., Cen. .'\m., vol. 36.
'^ Ibid.; Chatfield to Aberdeen, July i, 1844, F. 0., Cen. Am., vol. 3?,
no. 24.
" Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal, 169.
"^Chatfield to Aberdeen, July i, 1844, F. C, Cen. Am., vol. 37, no. 24.
"* Crowe, Gospel in Central America, 213.
" Temperley, "Later .American Policy of George Canning", in .Un.
Hist. Rev., XI, 781; .\dams, British Interests and .-ictifities in Texas,
15. 239.
•* After reporting the movement to his government. Ward, the Uritish
agent, remarked: " Not knowing in how far His Majesty's Ciovernment
may conceive the possession of Te.xas by the .\mericans, to be likely to
affect the interesls of (^reat IMitain, I have not thought it right to go
beyond such general observatinns upon the subject, in my communication
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 45
expressed a desire to enter the American Union, the
uneasiness and jealousy naturally increased, and Great
Britain promptly took measures to preserve the inde-
pendence of this new republic, and to maintain it as a
strong buffer state against the extension of American
power/' This reinforced jealousy of the British un-
doubtedly was influential in increasing their activities
in Central America, as w^ell as in determining their
attitude on the Oregon question.
The United States appears, however, to have taken
but little notice for some time of this revived policy of
general aggressiveness against American interests,"*
and it was not until 1843 that the Washington authori-
ties were really aroused regarding the situation in
Texas. They then realized that British influence
there was very strong, and believed that it aimed,
with this Government, as appeared to me calculated to make it perceive
the danger, to which it is wilfully exposing itself." Paxson, " England
and Mexico, 1824-1825 ", in Colo. Univ. Studies, III, 118.
"Adams, British Interests and Acti-ities in Texas, 1S38-1846; Smith,
Annexation of Texas, passim.
"In 1841, Murphy, a special and confidential agent of the United
States, was sent to Central America with directions to learn the cause
for the failure of Galindo's mission, and also to determine the existing
state of the Belize boundary controversy. To his instructions Webster
added: "This information you will endeavor to supply by proper
inquiries, which, however, should be cautiously made and so as not to
let it be supposed that this government takes any more interest in the
matter now than it did at the time of the visit of Colonel Galindo to
Washington, or that it is inclined to deviate from the course which was
pursued upon that occasion." Dept. of State, Inst., Am. States, vol. 15,
pp. 48-49. These words suggest an intention to adopt a more vigorous
Central American policy. However, though Murphy secured the desired
information, gave details regarding other British encroachments in
Central America, and urged that a commercial treaty be made with
Nicaragua to prevent the British from gaining control of the San Juan,
no further steps were taken by the American government at this time.
Murphy to the Secretary of State, Jan. 20, and Feb. 4, 1842, Dept. of
State, Des., Cen. Am., vol. 2. The failure to act may have been due to
the transfer of American attention to British interests in Texas.
46 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
among other things, at the aboHtion of slavery." There-
upon, the American government began immediately to
prepare for Texan annexation/"* Simultaneously with
this movement came the proclamation of the expansion-
ist policy of the Democrats/"* The election of Polk
followed, and in the next year the admission of Texas
to the Union.
These events were clearly disconcerting to British
plans ; but the policy of hindering American advance
towards the southwest was stubbornly maintained, and
was even given greater impetus when war between the
United States and Mexico became imminent, and with
it the American acquisition of Cahfornia. Aberdeen,
then British foreign secretary, even thought of active
interference to prevent the latter event. He gave up
his idea of doing so only in consideration that the
Oregon question was still capable of peaceful settle-
ment. Should the Oregon boundary negotiations end
in war, aid was to be given ]\Iexico."" As the Oregon
boundary dispute was settled peaceably, Mexico fought
her battles alone — and lost California.
This triumph of American expansionist schemes was
certain to have a profound effect upon British policy in
Central America. For centuries the importance of
Central America for a transisthmian route had been
recognized, and recently the line via Nicaragua had
been considered the most feasible.'" The significance
of such a route at that time becomes evident only when
"■•'Garrison, Westward Extension, 110-114; Reeves, American Dif'lomacy
under Tyler and Polk, 132-134.
""Garrison, K'estward Extension, 114-115.
*"* Rives, "Mexican Diplomacy", in Am. Hist. Rev., XVIII, 275.
"■■•/fcirf., 286-291.
><" Travis, Mosquito History, 11; Snow, Awerican Diplomacy, 3jo.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1850 47
it is remembered that before the Civil War little faith
was entertained that a railroad could be successfully
built to the Pacific, or operated even if it should be
built/'^ Therefore, upon gaining territory on the
Pacific coast, the interest of the United States in Cen-
tral America must increase tremendously.
As England clearly saw the outcome of the Mexican
War before it began, she lost little time in preparing
for it. Early in 1847 Palmerston, who had succeeded
Aberdeen in the preceding July, wrote to Chatfield,
and Walker, the Mosquito superintendent, and to
O'Leary, the British representative at Bogota,^" asking,
first, for the most authentic information procurable as
to the boundary claimed by the king of the IMosquitos ;
and, secondly, for their opinions as to the boundary
which the British government should insist upon as
" absolutely essential for the security and well-being
of the Mosquito state." ^'^ The replies varied to some
extent regarding the limits claimed by the Mosquito
king, though in general all indicated that he had pre-
tended to dominion pretty well south to Chiriqui
Lagoon, near the Isthmus of Panama ; but all agreed
that the boundary which the British should insist upon l
to the south was the San Juan River."'
A detailed report on the Mosquito Shore, which had
been called for by the Committee of the Privy Council
for Trade and Plantations, was made by John Mc-
i<^ Travis, Mosquito History. 12-13.
105 New Granada as well as Nicaragua claimed the Mosquito Shore.
'^oe Pari. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LXV, "Correspondence respecting
the Mosquito Territory ", i.
"' Ibid., 2-52. Had the Mosquitos been recognized as sovereign and
independent, the claims, when compared with the evidence submitted
by Chatfield and Walker, would have been quite reasonable.
48 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Gregor on February i .'"' The foreign secretary appar-
ently availed himself of the information contained in
this report, for on June 30, before receiving replies to
his inquiries, he wrote to Chatfield stating that the
encroachments committed by the states of Honduras
and Nicaragua upon the territory of the Mosquitos
had given rise to the question of boundaries. There-
fore, after carefully examining various documents
relative to the subject, the British government was of
the opinion that the Mosquito king's right should be
maintained as extending from Cape Honduras to the
mouth of the San Juan River /*** Chatfield was accord-
ingly instructed to notify the Central American states
concerned, and to inform them that the British govern-
ment would not view with indifference any attempt to
encroach upon the rights or territory of the Mosquito
king, who was under the protection of the British
/— 110
Crown.
The instruction was followed by Chatfield, who, in
speaking of the southern boundary, took the precaution
to add the words, " without prejudice to the right of the
Mosquito king to any territory south of the River San
Juan ". "^ The two weak Central American states,
roused to a fear for their independence, protested vigor-
ously that they did not recognize the Mosquito king-
dom, and declared their intention to resist the attempts
>•>» For/. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXIV, "Spanish-American Republics",
26-61. The report of McGregor also gave detailed information regard-
ing Belize, the I?ay Islands, and Central America in general.
'*' These boundaries coincide with those given by McGregor as exist-
ing in 1777. Pari. Papers, 1847, Corns., LXI\', " Spanish-.American
Republics ", 27.
^"' Pari. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LX\', "Correspondence respecting
the Mosquito Territory ", i.
"'76irf., 56.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, iS 15-1850 49
of the British to commit aggressions upon Central
American territory in the name of the Mosquitos."'
But unfortunately they were too helpless and distracted
to unite against the aggressor.
In October, notice came from the " Council of State "
of the Mosquito king"' to the government of Nica-
ragua, that the Nicaraguans would be given until Janu-
ary I, 1848, to withdraw from the San Juan. After
that time, forcible means would be employed to main-
tain the king's authority."* On the same date. Walker,
in company with the king, went to San Juan, hauled
down the Nicaraguan flag, hoisted that of the Mos-
quitos, and fired a royal salute to the latter.""
The Nicaraguan government was, obviously, too
weak to do more than protest, which it did, emphatic-
ally denying the existence of the Mosquito kingdom,
and declaring that the Mosquito Shore, by the treaties
of 1783 and 1786, had been Spanish territory, and that
with independence from Spain the shore had become a
part of the Central American states."^" Twice, also,
was appeal made to Washington by the Nicaraguans
for aid against the British,"^ but no reply was returned
at the time by the United States government."'
Before the opening of the new year the small Nica-
raguan garrison evacuated the mouth of the San Juan
"2 Ibid.. 66-69.
'" This was apparently Walker's development of Macdonald's idea
for government by commission, and was made possible by the increasingly
aggressive policy of the British government, as well as by the fact that
Grey, and not Russell, was now colonial secretary.
^^* Pari. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LXV, "Correspondence respecting
the Mosquito Territory ", 58.
^^Ibid., 57.
^^^ Ibid., 75-76, 93-94.
"' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp- ii-i4t 79-8o.
"" Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 34.
s
50 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
and retired up the river to Serapaqui. On January i.
Walker, again accompanied by the Mosquito king, went
to San Juan and hauled down the Nicaraguan flag
which he found flying, and hoisted that of the Mos-
quitos, saluting it as before. He left a small party at
the place and gave the Nicaraguan officials a short time
in which to clear out the customs house. Again the
Nicaraguans issued their protest, and a few days later
the force at Serapaqui descended upon San Juan,
hoisted the flag of the repubhc, seized the British offi-
cials stationed at the port, and carried them as prisoners
to Serapaqui. On February 12 the fort at the latter
place was destroyed by two British war vessels, the
Alarm and the Vixen, sent to punish the defiant act of
the Nicaraguans."'
Following the battle at Serapaqui Captain Loch of
the Alarm made a treaty with the Nicaraguans. This
provided for the surrender of the British prisoners,
with apologies for all violent acts committed at San
Juan, and also contained an agreement by the Nica-
raguans not to disturb the Mosquito authorities at that
place. But by the last article of the treaty the Nica-
raguans tried to secure a loophole for escape. This
article stipulated that nothing in the treaty should pre-
vent Nicaragua from soliciting, by means of a com-
missioner, a final settlement of the difficulties with
England.''"' Walker had been drowned at Serapa-
qui ; ''' therefore Loch appointed an officer to fill his
"'PoW. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LXV, "Correspondence respecting
the Mosquito Territory", 94-104; Squier, Nicaragua, I, loi; Crowe,
Gospel in Central America, 215.
^'^ Pari. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LXV, "Correspondence respecting
the Mosquito Teritory ", 121.
"^Ibid.. 104.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15- 1850 51
place, and also named a collector of customs for San
Juan,"* which was shortly afterwards renamed Grey-
town, in honor of the governor of Jamaica."'
In February, 1848, Palmerston, basing his action
upon the reports of Chatfield and Walker, extended the
southern boundary of the Mosquito territory to the
Colorado branch of the San Juan, which was many
miles south of the port.^* The purpose of this exten-
sion was obviously to shut Nicaragua from both banks
of the river and thus leave her no share in any inter-
oceanic canal arrangements. In the following month,
upon learning of the retaliatory measures taken by the
Nicaraguans against the British at San Juan, the for-
eign secretary showed his determination by directing
that the Nicaraguan authorities be notified that a Brit-
ish war vessel would be ordered to visit San Juan from
time to time to maintain the officials stationed there.
Furthermore, if the Nicaraguans persisted in intruding
themselves in San Juan, measures of an unfriendly
character would be resorted to upon parts of their own
coast."'
These acts of Palmerston gave Nicaragua little rea-
son to expect favorable results from negotiation ; but
since protest and appeal as well as attempt at physical
resistance had proved vain, negotiation seemed the only
hope left. Accordingly, Francisco Castellon was ap-
pointed Nicaraguan charge d'affaires at London in the
^^^ Ibid., 123.
123 Bancroft to Buchanan, Jan. 26, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Eng.,
vol. 59, no. 114; Addington to Hawes, Jan. 12, 1849, C. O., Hond., vol. 78.
^■* Part. Papers, 1847-1848, Corns., LXV, "Correspondence respecting
the Mosquito Territory ", 94.
^""^ Ibid., 102.
52 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
autumn of 1848,"° with instructions to try to secure
terms from the British government. For many months
Castellon remained in London, hoping to arrive at an
agreement regarding Greytown, but Palmerston refused
to do anything that would intimate that San Juan did
not belong exclusively to the Mosquitos, and warned
the Nicaraguan agent against counting on aid from
the United States, as it was " a matter of total indiffer-
ence to her Majesty's government " what the American
government might say or do. Finally, in July, 1849,
after all hopes of making a direct settlement with the
British government had disappeared, Castellon returned
to Central America.^
vX While the British were thus incited by American
expansion to renew their encroachments in Central
America, the people of the United States and their
government were anything but indifferent to the situa-
tion. Once roused by the cry of British interference
in Texas, American jealousy and suspicion of England
long survived. Moreover, through the successful an-
nexation of Texas and the settlement of the vexed
boundary questions, the nation had become intoxicated
wnth the " manifest destiny " idea.'" The knowledge of
European interference in an attempt to preserve a
" balance of power " in the New World only served
further to increase American aggressiveness, which
was reflected in Polk's version of the Monroe doctrine
set forth in the annual message of December, 1845.*"
In accordance with the policy then declared, the govern-
'"• Castellon went by way of Washington and made a third appeal for
aid, but no reply appears to have been given to his communication during
Polk's administration. U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 91, 92.
'" Ibid., pp. 173-180.
'•'" Dtfm. Rev., XVII, s-io, 193-204.
"» Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, 398-399.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 53
ment, as far as circumstances permitted, systematically
worked to frustrate what was believed to be the design
of the British.
An interoceanic canal was part of Polk's general
expansionist policy/^ The British had a grip on the
isthmus of Nicaragua and were suspected of having
designs on Panama also."^ In order to insure a route
for the United States, a prompt arrangement seemed
necessary in 1846. Because of the war just opened
with ]\Iexico, it was probably deemed unwise to nego-
tiate for the Nicaragua route, and thus risk entangle-
ment with the question of Mosquito claims. Therefore,
a treaty was negotiated with New Granada giving to
the United States and its citizens the right of way
across the Isthmus of Panama by any available method
of transit. In return for the concession the United
States guaranteed the complete neutrality of the isth-
mus and the right of sovereignty possessed by New v
Granada over it."^
For some years the American government had sus-
pected Great Britain of designs upon CaHfornia.^" This
territory had attracted the Americans also, and Presi-
dent Polk especially coveted San Francisco harbor."*
Therefore American attention was attracted towards
the region, and the Mexican War had scarcely begun
before it was in control of the United States authori-
ties.
*^ Garrison, Westward Extension, 287.
'" Grahame, " The Canal Diplomacy ", in N. Am. Rev., CXCVII, 33.
"' Brit, and For. State Papers, XL, 968-969.
**^ Professor Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas. 234-264,
has shown that these designs were entirely limited to British agents who
received no encouragement from their government. The British interest
in California just before the Mexican War was due simply to a desire
to save it from falling into American hands.
"»Polk, Diary, I, 71.
54 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
This much accomphshed, Polk's administration" un-
doubtedly would have pursued a more vigorous policy
towards the British encroachments in Central America,
had it not been for the Mexican War. But while handi-
capped by the struggle with Mexico the government
had no desire to venture into a more serious one with
Great Britain."' However, before the war was over
the United States government had determined to act.
A hint of coming developments appeared in the presi-
dential message of 1847, through Polk's assertion that
no European power should, with the consent of the
American government, secure any foothold upon the
continent.™ Early in the next year Elijah Hise was
appointed charge d'affaires in Guatemala. As the fate
of the treaty of peace with Mexico had not yet been
learned when Hise received his instructions, it was
determined to proceed cautiously. The general plan
was first to reunite the Central American states and
thus aid them to resist British encroachments.*" The
purpose of the mission was to determine the extent of
British aggressions, and to urge upon the states the
necessity for union ; and Hise was instructed accord-
ingly.*^ When his report should be received the gov-
ernment meant to settle upon a more definite policy,
calculated to put an end to British interference on the
isthmus."'
135 '• Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan ", in Ant. Hist. Rev.. \', 98, 99;
Buchanan, Works, VIII, 379.
**^ Richardson, Messages and Papers. IV, 539-540.
"' " Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan ", in Atn. Hist. Rev., V, 98-99;
Buchanan, Works, VIII, 379, 380.
'«• Ibid., 78-84.
130 " Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan ", in .-Int. Hist. Rez\, V, 99.
.•\t this time, an American agent. Savage, was in Guatemala. He had
announced the British seizure of San Juan, and in reporting the inten-
tions of the British, had stated " all eyes arc turneii towards the United
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 13-1850 55
The British government realized that as soon as the
Mexican War was over the United States could be
expected to interfere in Central American affairs.
Therefore, Palmerston was on the alert. When, as
a result of speeches of Senator Dix, delivered early in
1848, the American nation was being more actively
roused against the British movements in Central Amer-
ica,"" the foreign secretary furnished Crampton, the
British representative at Washington, with a history of
the ]\Iosquito protectorate,'" and instructed him to say
in reply to inquiries that his government would be ready
to vindicate its proceedings at San Juan whenever
called upon to do so by any party having the right to
question it.'^
When the proposed mission became known to
Palmerston, he wrote to Chatfield, stating that he
understood that the principal object of Hise would be
to urge a union of the Central American states in order
better to resist any interference of the British govern-
ment in the affairs of Mosquito. In consequence of
this, Chatfield was instructed to take such steps as
might be necessary or useful to defeat the poHcy of the
United States so far as its object was hostile to the
interests of Great Britain.'" But Chatfield was in some
way misled regarding the object of Hise's visit, and
thought that he was merely to arrange a commercial
treaty.'** Therefore he was but little suspicious of the
States of America for the solution of this problem ", but he gave no
details regarding the general situation. Savage to Buchanan, Jan. 14,
1S48, and Dec. 25, 1847, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol. i.
'*" Crampton to Palmerston, Feb. 9, 1848, F. O., Am., vol. 484, no. 19,
and April 2, 1848, ibid., vol. 485, no. 35.
'^^^ Ibid., vol. 483, no. 13.
^*'' Ibid., no. 20; vol. 497, no. 38.
"^ F. O., Guat., vol. 50, no. 24.
>« Chatfield to Palmerston, Jan. 12, 1849, ibid., vol. 57, no. 6.
56 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
American charge d'affaires. Nevertheless he reported
to Palmerston his intention to anticipate any possible
designs of the Americans by private correspondence
calculated to show the Central American states the use-
lessness of looking to North America for real sympathy
at any time/*'
Unfortunately for the plans of the Polk government,
Hise was delayed by sickness and other causes '" and
did not reach Central America until late in October,
1848/" At the time of his arrival the Central Ameri-
can states were in the utmost confusion and on the
verge of anarchy, a condition partially produced by the
intrigues of the British agents. Honduras and Nica-
ragua, because of the Mosquito claims, hated and
feared England, as did also Salvador, and looked
towards the United States for aid."' The Servile
party, to which the British gave preference, was in
power in Costa Rica and in Guatemala ; consequently
the British government was in favor with those
states.'" The existence of a boundary dispute between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica "" also inclined the latter to
look to Great Britain for protection against her
stronger neighbor; and the suspicion of American
designs roused by the Mexican War naturally caused
Guatemala to hold aloof from the United States."'
After two months spent in investigation, Hise wrote
his government that he was convinced that the British
"* Chatfield to Palmerston, Jan. 12, 1849, F. O., Guat., vol. 57, no. 6.
"" Buchanan, Works, YIII, 380.
"^Dept. of State, Des., .\m. States, vol. 15, p. 52.
^■" Chatfield to ralnierston, Jan. 11, i8|8, F. O., Guat., vol. 51, no. 2,
and Dec. 15, 1848, ibid., vol. 53, no. 115.
'"•' Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 53.
"" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75. P- '36.
1" Savage to Buchanan, T)tc. 2$, 1847, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol.
i; .Savage to Webster, .April 21, 1851, ibid., vol. 3, no. 6.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1850 57
designed to make themselves owners and occupants of
the points on the coasts of Nicaragua which would
become the termini of any interoceanic canal communi-
cation by way of the San Juan and Lake Nicaragua.
Therefore, in order to outwit British schemes, he asked
for power to negotiate transit treaties.'"' In May, 1849,"'^
he again wrote, explaining the urgency of the situation.
The British agents, he said, were working to produce
results the most inimical to American interests, by
planning to secure control of the whole interoceanic
line of transit."' Because of the slowness of means of
communication, no word was received from Hise before
the end of Polk's administration ; consequently no
reply or further instructions were sent to him.'"* In
view of this fact and of his belief that further delay
would be fatal to American interests, it is not to be
wondered at that Hise ventured, without instructions, '"_]
to negotiate a canal treaty with Nicaragua.
The treaty, signed by Hise June 21, 1849, was in
keeping with the Polk policy, and was a definite appli-
cation of the Monroe doctrine to the situation in Cen-
tral America. Through it, Nicaragua granted to the
American government, or its citizens, in perpetuity, the
right of way for transit purposes across Nicaragua,
and permitted the fortification of such a route. In
return, the United States pledged herself to protect
Nicaragua in all territory rightfully hers."' By means
of this treaty, the Nicaraguan commissioner believed
^" Hise to Buchanan, Dec. 20, 1848, ibid., vol. i.
^" Hise to Buchanan, May 25, 1849, ibid.
^^* " Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan", in Am. Hist. Rev., V, 99;
Buchanan, Works, VIII, 380.
^^^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 105-106.
^^^ Ibid., pp. 1 10- 1 17.
58 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
that Nicaragua had gained a protector in the United
States, and that her case against Great Britain was
consequently secure.'"
While Hise had been thus cut off from his govern-
ment, important changes were taking place in the
United States. The Polk Democrats had given way to
a Whig administration under Taylor. The gold dis-
covery in California, becoming known throughout the
country, had created a popular demand for more satis-
factory means of transportation to the West than that
afforded by ox-team journey across the plains or by
the long voyage around Cape Horn. This demand
attracted general attention to Nicaragua, where the
British were in control of the eastern terminus of what
was considered the best transisthmian route. The suc-
cessful termination of the Mexican War had excited
enthusiasm and increased the self-confidence of the
nation ; the conviction of " manifest destiny " still influ-
enced a large portion of the population.'** England
must not be permitted to monopolize a route so valuable
to American prosperity. Public opinion demanded that
the government take measures to prevent such a pos-
sibility."'
At this juncture a group of American citizens formed
a transportation company with the object of construct-
ing a canal. In March, 1849, this association made a
contract with the Nicaraguan government for the use
of the San Juan route across the isthmus. When look-
ing more fully into the subject connected with their
*" Cliattield to ralinerston, May 17, 1849, 1". O., Gnat., vol. 58, no. 42.
^f* Dem. Rev., XXV, 3-1 1.
'"Travis, Mosquito History, 15; Henderson, .■Imerican Diplomatic
Questions, iii; Grahanie, "The Canal Diplomacy", in A'. Am. Rev.,
CXCVII, 3536.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1850 59
contract, the members of the company learned of the
extensive British claims in the name of the Mosquito
king,"" and were much concerned by the discovery.
Meanwhile their movements had not escaped the jealous
watchfulness of Chatfield, who, through the British
consuls in Nicaragua, promptly notified the Nicaraguan
government and the company that the whole of the San
Juan River from its mouth to Machuca Rapids be-
longed to Mosquito, and could not be disposed of or
used without the consent of the British government/"
Chatfield also reported the situation to his govern-
ment ; "^ and in response to instructions from the For-
eign Office,"^ Barclay, the British consul at New York,
published a warning notice to the grantees not to begin
work on the proposed canal, inasmuch as the British
government was the protector of the Mosquitos, whose
territory would be bisected by it.'°* Before this, how-
ever, the American company had reported conditions
in Central America to the United States government
and had asked protection for its undertaking/"
The new administration at Washington possessed a
definite Central American policy, and promptly upon
accession proceeded to execute it. Accordingly, letters
were addressed by President Taylor .and by Clayton,
his secretary of state, to the Nicaraguan government,
replying to the appeals for aid made to the Polk admin-
istration. These letters expressed the sympathy of the
^^ Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal, 193.
"1 Inclosures in Chatfield to Palmerston, May 5, 1849, F. O., Guat.,
vol. 58, no. 38.
^" ChaLfield to Palmerston, April 14, and 21, 1849, ibid., vol. 57, nos.
33. 35. and I\Iay 5, 1849, ibid., vol. 58, no. 38.
"'^ Inclosure in Palmerston to Crampton, June 28, 1849, F. 0., Am.,
vol. 497, no. 37.
"=' Dem. Rev.. XXV, 406.
i'>^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 119.
6o ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
American government and the promise of its friendly
interposition for the purpose of adjusting the Mosquito
controversy/**
At the same time Hise, who had not yet been heard
from,"' was recalled,'"* and Ephraim George Squier
was appointed as his successor."" Through his instruc-
tions Squier was made acquainted with the history of
British encroachments in Nicaragua, and was directed
to inform the Nicaraguan government that the United
States would employ any moral means in its power " for
the purpose of frustrating the apparent designs of Great
Britain in countenancing the claims of sovereignty over
the Mosquito coast, and the Port of San Juan, asserted
by her ally the alleged monarch of that region ". ''°
The new charge d'affaires was empowered to make
treaties of commerce with the Central American repub-
lics, and particularly one with Nicaragua in the interest
of the transportation company,"^ which had become
absorbed into the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship-
Canal Company of New York/" This treaty was to
secure to American citizens a right of way across the
isthmus "' for a transit line open to all nations, with
exclusive benefits to none."* No objection would be
made by the United States to the employment of foreign
capital, which might be necessary to the success of the
undertaking."* In anticipation of the price which Nica-
ragua might ask for such a concession, Clayton directed
^"^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 7s. P- '.?2.
^"^ Ibid., pp. 120-121. ^»» Ibid., p. 117. "» 2fr»d.
'" Dept. of State, Inst., Am. States, vol. 15, p. 69.
'" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 120-121.
"" Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal, 197.
"' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 7.S. p. 121.
"^ 76irf., p 130. "»/6irf., p. 129.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, 1815-1850 61
that no guarantee of territorial independence should be
given in compensation for the grant of right of way."'
When Squier reached Central America, he found the
usual confusion in most of the states.'" The three
republics which favored the American government re-
garded his coming as an occasion for great rejoicing."""
Their satisfaction was increased when Squier held out
high hopes of American interference to drive out Brit-
ish power.'"' In consequence of Squier's promises,
Nicaragua took a defiant stand against the British,
strongly denouncing the Mosquito protectorate and
expressing a determination to uphold the Monroe
doctrine.'*"
The terms of the Hise treaty, still unknown to the
United States, had been revealed to Chatfield, and had
evidently thoroughly aroused his suspicions."' Con-
sequently, he was on the alert when Squier arrived. At
once there began between the two a struggle for the
supremacy of their governments in Central America,
which did not terminate until the recall of Squier a
year later. Each important move of Squier was met
by an act from Chatfield calculated to checkmate it.
Squier's promises of American aid brought forth arti-
cles of a counteracting nature by Chatfield, published
in the press of Costa Rica and Guatemala."' When
"' Ibid., p. 121.
"' Inclosure in Squier to Clayton, July 20, 1849, Dept. of State, Des.,
Guat., vol. 2.
"' Chatfield to Palmerston, July 27, 1849, F. O., Guat., vol. 59, no. 64.
^" Squier to Clayton, June 3, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol. 2;
Chatfield to Palmerston, July 27, 1849, F. O., Guat., vol. 59, no. 64, and
Dec. 15, 1849, ibid., vol. 60, no. 119; Squier, Travels in Central America,
I, 251-256.
^*" Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 25, 1849, F. O., Guat., vol. 60, no. 98;
Inclosures in Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1849, ibid., no. 100.
^^^ Chatfield to Palmerston, May 17, 1849, ibid., vol. 58, no. 42.
"'Chatfield to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1849, ibid., vol. 60, no. 119.
62 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Squier tried to induce the three states friendly to the
American government to form a union, the better to
resist British encroachments/*' Chatfield, perceiving his
purpose, proceeded to frustrate it by inducing Hon-
duras to form a treaty permanently detaching her from
the contemplated league.'" When a commission came
to ask Costa Rica to become a member of the union ,^'°
the British consul again stepped forward to prevent her
consent,'"" and in order the better to dominate Costa
Rica, formed a new treaty with her,"^ after which he
intimated to Nicaragua that Costa Rica was under
British protection, and therefore her boundary rights
must be respected/**
Notwithstanding the opposition of British agents
and the existence of a rival British canal company,""
Squier succeeded in inducing Nicaragua to grant the
American company a favorable concession for the con-
struction of a canal along the line of the San Juan/"*
Following this, the Nicaraguan government granted the
company a charter of incorporation/''
These arrangements being made, Squier experienced
little difficulty in forming a treaty for interoceanic
communication based upon the general terms outlined
'*' Squier to Clayton, Aug. 20, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol. 2;
Chatfield to I'almerston, Nov. 7, i8.i9, F. O., Guat., vol. 60, no. 107.
'*"' ChattidA *iO- talmkcraUui^ Dec. 31, 1849, ibid., no. 126; Squier,
Travels in Central America, II, 180-181.
^*^" Chatfield to Palmerston, Dec. 24, 1849, I'- O., Guat., vol. 60, no.
'^'^ Ibid.; Chatfield to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1849, ibid., no. 116.
'"Chatfield to Palmerston, Nov. 28, 1849, ibid., no. 114.
"■' Chatfield to tlie Principal Secretary of the Government of Nicaragua,
Dec. I, 1849, ibid., no. 21.
i*» Travis, Clayton-Bulwcr Treaty, 65.
'•• Pari. Pat'ers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 19-24.
'"' Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal, 198.
AMERICAN INTEREST AWAKENED, i8 15-1850 63
in Clayton's instructions. The treaty engaged the two
contracting parties to defend the canal company in its
enterprise, secured from the American government a
recognition of the rights of sovereignty and property
possessed by Nicaragua in the canal route, and guaran-
teed its neutrality as long as it should be controlled by
American citizens. The rights and privileges given by
the treaty were open to any other nation willing to enter
into an agreement with Nicaragua for the protection of
the contemplated canal."^
As Squier discovered soon after his arrival, Rise's
suspicions regarding the designs of British agents upon
the termini of the proposed canal line were well
founded. Not content with the British claims to San
Juan on the Atlantic, Chatfield, as early as January,
1847, had written to Palmerston suggesting that Great
Britain, in anticipation of the Americans, obtain a hold
on the " Port of the Union " and on Realejo on the
Pacific. The Central American states had long been in
debt to the British ; therefore he thought that an island
in the bay might be accepted in part payment.^'^ Palmer-
ston displayed but little interest in the scheme,"^ but
in the following March the British consul wrote again,
this time asking for authority to obtain the cession to
Great Britain of the port of San Carlos on Lake Nica-
ragua and three islands in the Bay of Fonseca, in return
for which the British government should assume the
payment of all claims against the states concerned."'
Palmerston promptly replied that the government did
^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 18-19.
^'' F. 0., Cen. Am., vol. 45, no. 4.
"* Palmerston to Ward, April 16, 1847, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 49.
"'Palmerston to Chatfield, June 17, 1848, F. 0., Guat., vol. 50, no. 15.
64 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
not consider such a measure expedient ; "* Chatfield,
nevertheless, urged the subject repeatedly,"' and finally
decided to secure Tigre Island, which commanded the
Bay of Fonseca, as guarantee for the payment of
British claims against Honduras, to which state the
island belonged. He therefore wrote to the Honduran
government pressing the payment of debts, and stating
that if Honduras did not respond promptly a Hen might
be put upon Tigre until the claims should be paid.'™ In
May, 1849, Palmerston again wrote in opposition to
Chatfield's plans, stating that the government much
preferred that the claims be met by proper payments,
as Parliament would be very little disposed to take upon
the public the payment of the claims in return for the
islands in question.'"* Chatfield, however, still cher-
ished the hope of securing at least the island of Tigre
for his government, which, he felt, did not fully appre-
ciate the situation.
The hearty welcome extended to Squier caused the
British consul to believe, or at least to pretend to be-
lieve, that the three states unfriendly to England were
seeking the protection of the American government in
order to escape a direct payment of British claims."*
Therefore, he pressed for settlement more vigorously
*" Palmerston to Chatfield, June 17, 1848, F. O., Guat., vol. 50, no. 15.
"'Chatfield to Talmerston, Nov. 24, 1848, F. 0., Guat., vol. 53, no. 8;
Jan. 5, 1849, ibid., vol. 57, no. 4; April 14, 1849, ibid., no. 33; July 24,
1849, ibid., vol. 59, no. 63; July 27, 1849, ibid., no. 67.
"' Chatfield to the Principal Secretary of the Honduran Government,
Jan. 26, 1849, ibid., vol. 57, no. 2. In writing of the proposed lien on
Tigre, Chatfield said: " I have p.nrtly hecn made to make it from a desire
to anticipate an attempt in any other quarter, to get possession of a
spot so valuable in a naval point of view on this side of the Continent."
Chatfield to Pundonald, Feb. 24, 1849, ibid., no. i.
'"•Palmerston to Chatfield, May 1, 1849, ibid., vol. 56, no. 7.
^"^ Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 17, and Nov. 14, 1849, ibid., vol. 60,
nos. 95, 112.
AMERICAN INTEREST A IF A KEN ED, iS 15- 1850 65
than ever.*" Upon learning of Chatfield's designs on
Tigre, Squier became fearful that, if executed, they
would embarrass all efforts to form a canal treaty
and construct a canal, for he believed that the canal
must terminate on the Bay of Fonseca/"^ Therefore,
although unauthorized to do so, he determined to form
a treaty with Honduras for the purchase of the island
by the United States, or for its temporary cession until
the canal arrangements should be completed.'"* Accord-
ingly, at his request a Honduran commissioner came
to Guatemala and formed a treaty ceding Tigre to the
American government for a period of eighteen
months."^ Squier then promptly notified the British
agents of the transaction.""'
Chatfield thereupon hastened the execution of his
plans, and, on October 16, a week after its cession to
the United States, at his orders '"^ Captain Paynter of
the British navy seized the island and hoisted the Brit-
ish flag.^ Squier protested and demanded its evacua-
tion,^"* Chatfield refused and called attention to the hen
which he had placed upon the Tigre in the preceding
January. The proprietary rights thus established, he
declared, no subsequent arrangement without cogniz-
ance of England could undo.^*""
^^ Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 17, 1849, ibid., no. 95.
**' Squier to Clayton, Oct. 10, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol. 2.
^^ Squier to Clayton, .\ug. 20, 1849, Dept. of State, Des., Guat., vol. 2.
^^ Pari. Papers. 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .\merica ", 31-32.
^Ibid., 33.
^''' Inclosures in Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 17, 1849, F. O., Guat.,
vol. 60, no. 93.
^^ Paynter to Hornby, Oct. 2i, 1849, ibid., vol. 68, no. 41.
^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .America ", 33.
^ Ibid.
6
66 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Admiral Hornby, commander of the British fleet in
the West Indies, was famihar with Palmerston's view
of Chatfield's plans,"" and, therefore, upon hearing of
the seizure, he promptly ordered the restoration of the
island to Honduras.'" Later, both Chatfield'" and
Squier"' were rebuked by their governments for the
parts which they had played in the affair.
But the seizure of Tigre Island produced much
excitement in the United States ; and suspicion against
the British government, which had been somewhat
allayed by negotiations then pending, was again
aroused, and a peaceful settlement of the canal ques-
tion endangered. Clayton, through Lawrence, the
American minister at London, demanded a disavowal
of the act,^* which, after some delay, was given,**"
though not in an altogether satisfactory manner.
^'Hornby to Chatfield, Dec. 12, 1849, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 64.
^'^7b«d.; Hornby to Parker, Dec. 12, 1849, ibid., vol. 68, no 100.
-^' Palmerston to Chatfield, Jan. 17, 1850, ihid., vol. 63, no. i.
-" Dept. of State, Inst., Am. States, vol. 15, pp. loo-ioi.
"* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 313-315.
^^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 34-35.
CHAPTER III.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, April 19, 1850.
While the British and American agents were manipu-
lating the weak Central American states in the interest
of the country each represented, a movement, initiated
at Washington, had begun towards effecting, through
negotiation, a peaceful settlement of the matter in dis-
pute. But the problem was an unusually hard one
because of the peculiar nature of the situation itself ;
and the difficulty was made greater by the suspicion
and jealousy with which each government had long
viewed the other ; moreover, this mutual distrust was
further stimulated by the rash acts of the agents in
Central America, and the negotiations were embar-
rassed accordingly.
George Bancroft was American minister at London
when San Juan was seized by the British, but for many
months he received no instructions upon the subject,
because his government had decided to investigate the
situation before determining upon a course of action.
The investigation was to be made by Hise, whose
report, as has already been stated, was not received
before Polk's administration ended. But Bancroft in-
formed the American government of whatever came to
his notice with reference to the dispute between Eng-
land and Nicaragua. When Castellon, accompanied by
Marcoleta, the Nicaraguan charge d'affaires in Bel-
gium, arrived in England for the purpose of trying
67
68 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
to settle the Greytown dispute, Bancroft apprised
Buchanan of the fact and expressed the belief that
Palmerston would not recede/ Later he reported the
unsatisfactory reply which had been given Castellon,
remarking that Aberdeen agreed with Palmerston in
the stand which the latter had taken.'
Bancroft's last-mentioned report reached Washing-
ton very shortly before the inauguration of President
Taylor and probably hastened the action of the new
administration, which, while it had no schemes for terri-
torial aggrandizement, was interested in dislodging the
British from their position in Central America, and
very desirous of securing a neutral transisthmian route.
On April 30, 1849, Clayton, the new secretary of state,
directed Bancroft to notify Castellon that the Presi-
dent had determined to grant Nicaragua's request by
trying to induce the British government to abandon its
pretensions to Nicaraguan territory. Bancroft was
also directed to advise the Nicaraguan minister to
" continue firm in asserting the rights of his govern-
ment and not to do any act which might either weaken
or alienate these rights ".'
Two days later Clayton again wrote to Bancroft
stating that for some time the President had anxiously
viewed the acts of the British in Central America, but
had not asked for an explanation, in the hope that the
measures of the British government might still prove
consistent with the treaties made between that govern-
ment and Spain; or, if otherwise, that the differences
between Great Britain and the Central American
authorities might be settled in a manner satisfactory
• U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 222.
* llnd., p. 224.
' Dcpt. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. 15, pp. 385-386.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 69
to all parties. That hope, however, had apparently
been vain. Therefore, since Nicaragua had requested
the interposition of the United States with reference
to the seizure of San Juan, the American government
had investigated the Mosquito claims asserted by the
British and had decided these claims to be without rea-
sonable foundation, consequently the President had
decided to present the American views upon the ques-
tion to the friendly consideration of Great Britain,*
But before entering into any written correspondence
upon the subject, it seemed best that Bancroft sound
Palmerston in conversation as to the views and inten-
tions of the British government regarding the Mos-
quito coast, and ascertain whether that government
intended to set aside for its own use any portion of the
territory ; if so, for what reason, and on what prin-
ciple. Clayton also suggested that Bancroft find out if
the British government claimed a right as ally and pro-
tector of the Mosquito king to " control or obstruct the
commerce of the river San Juan de Nicaragua, or to
keep forts or establishments of any kind on its banks ".
Further, Bancroft was instructed to intimate to Palmer-
ston the inexpediency of any great commercial power 1
claiming a right to the river, in case it should become;
a world highway. He was to inform Palmerston in
the most friendly manner that while the United States
would look upon the exclusive possession or command
of such a river by themselves as a great evil, which
would draw upon the nation the jealousy and ultimately
the hostility of the rest of the commercial world, yet
they ought not to consent to its obstruction by any other
power. If, after the subject had been thus presented,
"^ L'. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 230-231.
70 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Palmerston was still unwilling to abandon the British
and Mosquito claim, or retire from the river and the
command of its harbor, Bancroft was to express to him
the views of the President regarding the Mosquito
claim, assuring him that the United States was not actu-
ated by ambitious motives or by any feeling in the least
unfriendly to Great Britain. If this failed to move
Palmerston, then Bancroft was to present a formal
written protest to the British government. Bancroft
was also directed to obtain from the Costa Rican minis-
ter an assurance that he would not commit the rights
of his state by any convention with Great Britain. A
cession to Great Britain of the territory south of the
San Juan River, which was claimed by Costa Rica as
well as by Nicaragua, might be a serious embarrass-
ment to the United States. No British forts or pos-
sessions of any kind should exist on either bank of the
river. Therefore, Clayton stated, it was desirable to
warn Costa Rica against ceding her territory to Great
Britain, for the safety of every American state would
require that it yield to no further foreign aggression."
Bancroft had no opportunity to present the subject
to Palmerston for some time, but he had an interview
with Molina, the Costa Rican minister, who assured
him that the relation existing between his country and
Great Britain was one of friendship, and nothing more.
However, Bancroft suspected from Molina's manner
that, in case war occurred with Nicaragua over the
boundary question, Costa Rica meant to ask protection
of England." Therefore, in reporting the interview to
Clayton, Bancroft suggested that the American agent
in Central America try to get the two states to reach an
* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 232.
" Ibid., p. 233.
CLAYTON -BULWER TREATY 71
agreement over their boundaries ; meanwhile, he him-
self would endeavor to induce the Costa Rican minister
to await the outcome of such an effort, before appealing
to England/
But Bancroft was decidedly slow in grasping the
intentions of Costa Rica. This was evidently due to his
inclination to credit Molina with more frankness and
friendliness towards the United States than the latter
really felt.' A note in the Public Record Office in
London shows that in December, 1848, five months pre-
vious to Bancroft's interview with him, Molina had
distinctly asked that the British government take Costa
Rica under its protection, as that state feared trouble
with New Granada and Nicaragua over boundary ques-
tions.' The terms offered by the Costa Ricans, in return
for the protecting power of the British, practically
amounted to a surrender of their country to the latter."
Thus it is evident that Clayton's fears of Costa Rican
plans for British protection were far from groundless.
Palmerston, however, refused the offer, though just
at what time is not clear." Buchanan, writing in April,
1850, expressed the beHef that but for the determination
to resist European colonization on the North American
continent, shown by Polk's administration, the offer
would have been accepted." Yet this is by no means
certain. To be sure. Great Britain, even at this early
date, did not think it wise to run counter to the Monroe'
doctrine, but there were stronger reasons for not con
' Ibid., p. 233. * Ibid., p. 223.
* Moliua to Palmerston, Dec. 23, 1848, F. O., Costa Rica, vol. i.
" Ibid.
"■ Molina to Palmerston, Mar. 2^, 1850, ibid., vol. 3. This letter of
Molina simply refers to the refusal as having been made " on considera-
tions of too great a weight to be controverted."
" Biichanan, Works, VIII, 379.
72 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
sidering Molina's proposal. At this time the British
government had come to feel strongly that the country
was overburdened with colonies, and it was even be-
lieved that Canada must soon become independent."
By the seizure of San Juan and the extension of the
I Mosquito boundary to the Colorado, England had
'gained all that she desired at the time, in the vicinity
vof the proposed canal ; therefore, all regard for Ameri-
jcan wishes aside, there could be no object in burdening
iierself with a Costa Rican protectorate.
Meanwhile the outlook for Nicaragua had grown
more discouraging. The British government was
plainly determined not to restore San Juan." Palmer-
ston's plan to settle all of the questions in dispute by
an agreement between IMosquito, Costa Rica, and Nica-
ragua would not be considered by the Nicaraguans,
who did not recognize the Mosquito kingdom." There-
fore, in despair, Nicaragua again turned to the United
States. On July 12, Castellon addressed a note to Ban-
croft asking whether Honduras, Salvador, and Nica-
ragua, or the last-named only, would be admitted to the
American Union. In case the American government
were willing, upon what terms could the admission take
place, and what steps were necessary to effect it? If
the United States were opposed to annexation, could
the Nicaraguans count, at least, on American aid in
defending the integrity of their territory? If so, upon
what terms would the aid be given ? '*
Bancroft, who was entirely without instructions upon
this subject, cautiously replied that the United States
had no selfish purpose in its policy towards Central
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 223.
^* Ibid., p. 235. ''* Ibitl.. p. 2j6. "Ibid., pp. 301-302.
CLAYTON-BUUVER TREATY 7Z
America ; it desired only the welfare of the Central
American states. The American government, he said,
had hoped to see San Juan returned to Nicaragua, but
intervention for that purpose had been delayed by the
dissensions within Central America itself. In order
that a more sympathetic regard from the outside might
be secured, he advised that the boundary dispute be
settled peaceably with Costa Rica, and that the latter
be permitted to carry on commerce through the port of
San Juan, duty free."
After the receipt of this reply, Castellon once more
turned to Palmerston and proposed arbitration.'''
" Should this be refused ", Bancroft wrote Clayton,
" Nicaragua must submit, unless she can rely on the
prompt exertion of the influence of the United
States." ^* But Palmerston would not arbitrate ; " and,
indeed, acquiescence in a plan to refer her claims to
Mosquito to an international court was hardly to be
expected of Great Britain.
Clayton's instructions on Central American . afifairs
had reached Bancroft in May, but it was not until July
that he succeeded in securing an interview on them with
Palmerston, and even then the latter was called away
before the interview was concluded." Bancroft be-
lieved, and reported to Clayton, that Palmerston was
purposely delaying in order to shut the United States
out of the Central American discussion and thereby
bring the Central American states to an acquiescence in
British arrangeme 'ts." The British correspondence
" Ibid., pp. 303-304. •*' Ibid., 236. ^' Ibid.
" Inclosure in Lawrence to Clayton, April 19, 1850, Dept. of State,
Des., Eng., vol. 60, no. 45.
^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, dec. 75, p. 235.
^ Ibid.
74 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
indicates the correctness of Bancroft's surmise ; the
plan was to frighten Nicaragua into yielding, and thus
avoid any cause for American interference.
At the interview Bancroft asked whether the British
government intended to appropriate to itself the town
of San Juan or any part of the " so called Mosquito
territory ", to which Palmerston replied, " No ; you
know very well we have already colonies enough."
When asked in whose hands San Juan then was, the
Foreign Secretary replied, " For the present, in those of
English commissioners." He acknowledged that this
was an occupation by England, but stated that the
occupation was only temporary. Thereupon Bancroft
expressed the opinion of his government that there was
no such body politic as the kingdom of the IMosquitos ;
that if there were any, its jurisdiction did not reach to
San Juan ; and that, even if it did, no right of exercis-
ing a protectorate belonged to Great Britain. In his
response to this, Bancroft reported to his government,
Palmerston " did not in the least disguise his strong
disinclination to restore the port, insisting, however,
that any purposes the United States might have in
reference to connecting the two oceans by a commercial
highway, would be better promoted by the policy which
he is pursuing than in any other way. And in refer-
ence to the whole subject, his words were, ' You and we
can have but one interest '." "
Bancroft was not reassured by Palmerston's conclud-
ing remarks, because of the attitude towards the restor-
ation of San Juan, displayed in this interview, as well
as by the reports of Castellon and Marcoleta. More-
over, Palmerston did not invite a renewal of the inter-
*' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, p. 235.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 75
rupted discussion, and when Bancroft learned that the
Foreign Secretary had given a long interview to Cas-
tellon and Marcoleta, he decided that it was time to
present the protest, as directed by Clayton." But he
had not quite finished writing the paper when notice of
his recall came, and in view of this he thought it best
not to present the protest to the British government."
Before Bancroft's report of his interview reached
Washington the American government had learned that
a contract had been secured from Nicaragua by the
Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Company. As he knew
that the completion of this contract w^as to be followed
by a canal treat}% drawn up between Squier and the
Nicaragua government, Clayton became uneasy over
Bancroft's delay. Therefore, on August 16, he wrote
to Rives, the newly-appointed minister to France, re-
garding the situation, and pointed out how important
it was that Great Britain become acquainted with the
views of the United States government upon the Mos-
quito question. " We are deeply anxious ", he wrote,
" to avoid any collision with the British government in
relation to this matter; but that collision will become
inevitable if great prudence be not exercised on both
sides." With reference to the arrangement between
Nicaragua and the canal company, he said : " We view
the title of the state of Nicaragua, which entered into
this contract, as irrefragable, and are about to make a
treaty with her on the subject. WJien, Great Britain
shall ascertain the real objects that we have in view,
sTie cannot, I think, fail to see the propriety of aiding
instead of obstructing us in securing, for all commer-
cial nations on the same terms, the right of passage by
" Ibid., pp. 235-236. ^ Ibid., p. 234.
76 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the Nicaragua route from ocean to ocean, if that route
should prove to be practicable." Consequently, Rives
was instructed to pass through London on his way to
Paris and perform the duty enjoined upon Bancroft, if,
upon his arrival in London, it had not yet been per-
formed. If Palmerston showed himself determined
to maintain the Mosquito title, Rives was not to pre-
sent the protest, but to leave that to Lawrence, Ban-
croft's successor.^*
Palmerston was absent from London when Rives
arrived,^' but he soon returned, and on September 24,
Rives had an interview with him. Palmerston received
the American minister cordially, saying that he had
returned to London solely for the purpose of seeing and
conversing with him.^ Rives stated the object of his
errand as instructed, explaining the views of the Ameri-
can government and its intention to support the canal
company in the rights granted it by Nicaragua. He
then pointed out to Palmerston the peculiar interest
which the United States must have in the canal route
because of her possessions on the Pacific coast, assuring
him, however, that the United States " sought no
exclusive privilege or preferential right of any kind in
regard to the proposed communication " but wished to
see it " dedicated to the common use of all nations, on
a footing of perfect equality for all." Yet, while pos-
sessing no selfish designs on the transisthmian route,
the American nation " could never consent to see so
important a communication fall under the exclusive
control of any other great commercial power." Mos-
quito possession at the mouth of the San Juan could be
-° U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 13.
"/£)/</.. p. 15. ^^ Ibid., p. 18.
CLAYTON-BUUVER TREATY 77
considered in no other light than British possession, and
must necessarily cause dissatisfaction and distrust on
the part of other commercial powers. In view of these
facts, Rives suggested to Palmerston that the govern-
ments which they represented come to a " frank and
manly understanding with each other, and unite their
influence for the accomplishment of an object of the
highest importance to both of them as well as the rest
of the world, instead of hazarding the final loss of so
great an object by jarring and divided councils." "
Palmerston replied that he was very glad to have full
and free conversation upon the subject. He had con-
versed to some extent with Bancroft regarding it, he
said, but as Bancroft was soon to leave, it had not
seemed necessary to enter into much detail. He then
reviewed the controversy W'ith Nicaragua, stating that
from a very early time the Mosquito Indians had been
treated by the British as forming a sovereign state.
For more than a century, the British government had
given them tokens of recognition and protection. The
Nicaraguans, according to the Foreign Secretary, had
taken forcible possession of the port of San Juan to
which they had no right. The British, as protectors of
the Mosquitos, had driven them out, but the Nicara-
guans, while not in possession, had fraudulently granted
a right of way to American citizens in order to draw
the United States into their quarrel. In this connection
Palmerston assured Rives, however, that there was not
the slightest foundation for the suspicion, which existed
in the United States, that the British government
wished to plant a new colony on the San Juan, for they
already had more colonies than they could manage ;
^ Ibid., pp. 18-19.
78 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
" that, as to any idea of their holditig exclusive posses-
sion of the mouth of the San Juan as the Key of the con-
templated communication between the Atlantic and the
Pacific, nothing could be further from their minds'' *"
Later Palmerston spoke of the dissension and strife
which distracted the Central American states and pre-
vented the development of their natural resources. In
the interest of humanity and of the general commerce
of the world, he declared, it was desirable to promote
the civilization and improvement of those countries.**
When the conversation again reverted to the Mos-
quitos. Rives called attention to the fact that " the
ultimate property or high domain of Indian territory
was always considered as vested in the nations coloniz-
ing the country by the mere fact of discovery or settle-
ment anywhere within the limits declared to be assumed
by them ", and pointed out that this principle had been
acted upon by Great Britain herself in various inter-
national pacts. The Foreign Secretary fully admitted
the general doctrine stated by Rives, and said that this
was the principle on which the British relations with
the Indian tribes in Canada were conducted. But he
insisted that the case of the Mosquitos was " sui generis
and stood upon its own peculiar circumstances ". How-
ever, he declared that the question of Mosquito title
need not prevent the consummation of the plan for
interoceanic communication.*^
Throughout the interview Palmerston's conversation
was marked by " a tone of perfect frankness and the
most conciliatory and friendly spirit towards the United
States ", which led Rives to feel that the way had been
**■ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 20. The italics appear in
Rives's report to Clayton.
»' Ibid. " Ibid., p. 23.
CLAYTON-BU LIVER TREATY 79
opened for a better understanding and final co-opera-
tion." In conclusion, Rives suggested, that " if Great
Britain would do what she had the unquestionable
power to effect with the Mosquitos, and exert her influ-
ence with Costa Rica, while the United States em-
ployed their good offices with Nicaragua, every politi-
cal impediment to the execution of the great work they
both desired to see accomplished would be speedily
removed." This done, the benefits of the highway j
could be secured to all by an international guaranteed
Palmerston received the suggestion very favorably and |
left the American minister with the impression that he \
was desirous of co-operating with the United States in j
promoting the accomplishment of the object in which /
both nations were interested, the construction of an/
interoceanic highway."*
When Lawrence arrived two or three weeks later he
had interviews with Palmerston '" and Russell,^' both of
whom repeated substantially what had been said to
Rives. In consequence, Lawrence, like Rives, was led
to believe that the British government would join with
the United States in the guarantee of a transisthmian
highway."^
A comparison of the attitude displayed by Palmer-
ston towards Bancroft, with his manner of meeting and
answering Rives and Lawrence, plainly reveals a shift-
ing of British policy. The fact of such a change makes
desirable at this point a more definite consideration of
British motives as well as an investigation into the
causes which made the English government show j
greater willingness at this time to discuss the Central I
^^ Ibid., p. 21. ^* Ibid., p. 23. ^^ Ibid., p. 23-24.
=« Ibid., p. 24. « Ibid.
8o ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
American question, and particularly the strictly canal \
phase of it, with the American government.
^-- In the first place, it should be said that the aggressive
f movement of the United States towards the southwest,
1 accompanied by the talk of " manifest destiny ", had
I given the British good reason to suspect the Americans
of designs upon the territory of the isthmus, and to fear
that they might attempt to monopolize the Nicaragua
route.^ Should this fear be realized, the control of
commerce in the Pacific would pass from English to
American hands. To prevent such a monopoly of the
interoceanic highway and to secure a share in any
arrangement with regard to it, Palmerston directed the
seizure of San Juan. That this was the Foreign Secre-
tary's main and perhaps only motive is evident from a
\ study of his conduct previous and subsequent to the
seizure. Moreover, Rives after his interview expressed
the belief that Palmerston's aim had been to prevent
exclusive control of the interoceanic route by the Amer-
icans, and not to monopolize it for the British." A
Times editorial of a later date took the same view.*"
Indeed, the British government must have clearly real-
ized that the American people would not peacefully
permit the establishment of such a foreign monopoly.
After San Juan had come under Anglo-Mosquito
control, there was a double British reason for avoiding
all discussion with the United States government.
Complicated with the old fear of American designs on
the route, was the knowledge that since American
'" Chatfield to Palmerston, Mar. 8, 1848, F. O., Guat., vol. 51, no. 30;
Sept. 15, 1849, ibid., vol. 59, no. 87; Manning to Green, Oct. 4. 1849,
C. O., Hond. vol. 77.
'» U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 21.
*" London Times, June 13, 1850.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 8i
interests had focussed attention upon the region the
Monroe doctrine might be applied to the situation in an
attempt to drive out the intruders. This explains the
attitude towards Bancroft as well as the attempt to
force Nicaragua to acquiesce in British-made bound-
aries for the Mosquitos.
But despatches containing the purport of the Hise
treaty *^ and outlining the terms of the canal contract
of the New York company," as well as reports of
Squier's reception in Central America and the policy
followed by him,*' must have reached Palmerston a little
before Rives's arrival. These would all be strongly
influential towards convincing the British government
that the United States must be reckoned with eventu-
ally in connection with Central America, and that fur-
ther evasion would be useless, if not distinctly unwise.
To lend emphasis to this view there was the fact that
Castellon had departed without an agreement regard-
ing Mosquito boundaries, and, in consequence, the
Nicaraguans would undoubtedly again turn to the
Americans, whose feelings had been strongly enlisted
on their side. In the opinion of the Times, Nicaragua
had gained a position that it was " most unwise to treat
with violence and contumely ". " Therefore, that news-
paper advised a pacific and conciliatory policy." How-
ever, this policy was not to be directed towards the
weak state of Nicaragua, but towards the power be-
lieved to be behind that state — the American govern-
** Chatfield to Palmerston, May 17, 1849, F. O., Guat., vol. 58, no. 42.
*^ Chatfield to Palmerston, April 21, 1849, ibid., vol. 57, no. 35; May 5,
1849, ibid., vol. 58, no. 38; Crampton to Palmerston, June 25, 1849,
F. O., Am. vol. 409, no. 61.
^ Chatfield to Palmerston, July 27, 1849, F. O., Guat., vol. 59, no. 64.
** London Times, Nov. i, 1849.
« Ibid.
7
82 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ment and the American people. These various con-
siderations which have been mentioned seem to furnish
ample explanation of the British change in attitude.
After Rives's frank and friendly statement of the
American canal policy, practically all remaining sus-
picion of American intentions concerning Central
America seems to have vanished. With its disappear-
ance came a change of attitude towards Central Amer-
ica itself. Since the aim of the United States was
really the establishment of a great commercial highway
for the benefit of all nations, weakness and disorganiza-
tion in Central America was no longer an advantage
but a handicap to British interests ; hence Palmerston's
expression of a desire for the quieting of dissension in
those countries, and the promotion of civilization.
One further matter requires attention in this con-
nection. By the seizure of San Juan the British gov-
ernment had, for the time, insured the Nicaragua route
against foreign monopoly ; but in order to give some
shadow of legality to the act, it had committed itself
to an assertion of the Mosquito title to the port, as well
as revived the British protectorate over the Indians and
renewed the claim of full sovereignty and independence
for them. This unfortunate proclamation of Mosquito
sovereignty placed Great Britain in a position from
which she could not easily withdraw. This attitude, in
reality outworn, but forced on England as consistent
with her past stand, consequently became the source of
virtually all future trouble between the British and
Americans over Central America,^ ~ft>f''rf"pro\'^ an
obstacle in all negotiations and made difficult a free
discussion of the matters taken up, with the result that
misunderstandings arose which complicated the Cen-
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 83
tral American question and delayed its final settlement
for more than half a century.
Lawrence's full instructions did not reach him until
some time following his arrival in London.'" After a
long discussion showing the fallacy of the Mosquito
claim/^ they directed Lawrence to suggest to Palmer-
ston that the two governments form a treaty guarantee-
ing the independence of Nicaragua, Honduras, and
Costa Rica, with provisions for extinguishing the title
of the Mosquitos to any lands assigned to them in
carrying out the terrns of the treaty, should the pro-
posed interoceanic canal pass through those lands." A
copy of the part of the Squier treaty pertaining to the
canal was inclosed by Clayton with instructions to
Lawrence to call Palmerston's attention to the terms of
this and express to him the desire of the United States
that the British government enter into a similar treaty
with Nicaragua.*' The whole negotiation with Great
Britain should be placed on the " broad basis of a great
highway for the benefit of mankind, to be dedicated
especially by Great Britain and the United States, to
the equal benefit and advantage of all the nations of
the world that would join them in entering into the
proper treaty stipulations with Nicaragua." "" Should
Great Britain desire any further guarantees of Ameri-
can good faith than those already given, Clayton added,
the American government would gladly enter into a
treaty with her binding both nations " never to colo-
nize, annex, settle, or fortify any part of the ancient
** The instructions were dated October 20, and were written after the
receipt of Bancroft's and Rives's reports of their interviews. U. S. Docs.,
ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 24.
*'' Ibid., pp. 24-29. ■*' Jbid., pp. 29-30. ^' Ihid., p. 30. ™ Ihid.
84 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
territory of Guatemala, embracing Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Honduras, and, indeed, the whole Mosquito
coast." "
In case the British rejected these overtures and
refused to cooperate, Lawrence should present the
terms of Hise's treaty which had recently been received,
informing Palmerston that the treaty was made with-
out authority from the United States, and assuring him
that no step would be taken towards ratifying it, if, by
an arrangement with England, American interests could
be placed upon a " just and satisfactory foundation ".
Should the efforts to this end fail, however, the Presi-
dent would not hesitate to present it, or some other
treaty which might be concluded by Squier, to the Sen-
ate for ratification, in which action he would be sup-
ported by the American people.""
Should the British government refuse all proposi-
tions made by Lawrence, the latter was directed to
enter the protest which Bancroft was to have presented,
and immediately notify his government of the fact."
If, on the other hand, Palmerston showed a willingness
to co-operate, but should be still tenacious about the pro-
tection of the Indians, Lawrence was to suggest that
the Nicaraguan government pay them an annuity in
order to extinguish their title. Lawrence should strive
to produce a withdrawal from all pretensions to the
whole Mosquito coast." " I shall await the result of
your negotiation with no little anxiety ", Clayton con-
cluded. " Bring it to a speedy close one way or the
other. We are ready for either alternative. If we
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 31.
M Ihid. »» Ihid., p. 33- »• Ibid., p. 34-
CLAYTON-BULIVER TREATY 85
must have a collision with Great Britain about this
matter, the sooner we understand it the better for us.
The President is firm in his purpose and will never
consent that Great Britain shall, under any pretext,
enjoy any exclusive possession within the territory of
Nicaragua. If we adopt the treaty negotiated by Mr.
Hise and Great Britain should persevere in her asser-
tion of the Mosquito title, I know not how we can avoid
a collision consistently with our national honor." "
After the receipt of his instructions, Lawrence
promptly secured an interview with Palmerston, and
opened the subject in a general way, but avoided a
discussion of the rights of the Mosquitos, explaining
to the Foreign Secretary that he hoped it would not
become necessary to do so.""" After his interview he
addressed a note to Palmerston, asking whether Great
Britain intended to occupy or colonize Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central Amer-
ica, and also whether the British government would
join with the United States in guaranteeing the
neutrality of a " ship-canal, railway or other com-
munication to be open to the world and common to all
nations." "
Lawrence's object in avoiding agitation of the Mos-
quito title and in narrowing the discussion to the two
questions was to make more possible a prompt reply,
and thus relieve the popular mind in America. More-
over, he believed that if the points covered by his
inquiries could be settled, an amicable arrangement of
the Mosquito question would follow.^*
Palmerston's reply, written on November 13, stated
that the British government did not intend to " occupy
■' Ibid. ^ Ibid., pp. 4.3-44. ^'' Ibid., p. 45. ^ Ibid., p. 44.
86 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast,
or any part of Central America." In regard to Law-
rence's second inquiry, the Foreign Secretary wrote
that the British government would feel great pleasure
in combining with the United States to effect the estab-
lishment of such an interoceanic highway as was sug-
gested and would fully undertake to obtain the consent
of Mosquito to such arrangements as would render the
port of Grey town applicable for the purpose/^
In a private letter to Lawrence of the same date
Palmerston protested against the terms of the Squier
treaty. He had as yet received no copy of that docu-
ment, he said, but if he had been correctly informed
with reference to it, one object of the treaty was to
engage the United States to endeavor to compel the
British government to return Greytown to Nicaragua.
Such an engagement would involve the United States
in an unprovoked aggression towards Great Britain."
Lawrence replied by pointing out that no maritime
nation ought to desire or to be permitted to have exclu-
sive foothold on the isthmus. On the contrary, the
aims of such a nation should be confined to guaran-
tees of neutrality. He hoped, therefore, that the Mos-
quitos might be properly provided for, that other
causes of difference might be satisfactorily arranged,
and the two governments thus be spared a discussion
which could only defer matters, and perhaps lead to
serious results. The Squier treaty, while it rested upon
the validity of Nicaragua's claim of sovereignty from
ocean to ocean, sought to secure nothing exclusively to
'• U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 46.
*^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 8.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 87
the United States, and contemplated an invitation to
the world to join in its provisions. " I have reason to
believe ", Lawrence concluded, " that the United States
are as firm as they are sincere on this point." °*
It was now clear that the negotiations would not
proceed as smoothly as was at first hoped. Clayton saw
an obstacle in the Foreign Secretary's promise to obtain
the consent of Mosquito to arrangements regarding
Greytown ; consequently he declared that British with-
drawal from the port was essential to the success of
the enterprise.*^ Lawrence was accordingly instructed
to press the matter so as to leave no doubt in Palmer-
ston's mind of the American convictions regarding it."
Lawrence also quickly saw the difficulty and soon
became convinced that discussion of the Mosquito ques-
tion could not be avoided. On December 14 he wrote
to Palmerston that unless the views of the two govern-
ments upon the subject could be harmonized the desired
cooperation would be prevented; and he asked defi-
nitely whether the British government was willing to
transfer the Mosquito protectorate to other hands
under provisions for the humane treatment of the
Indians, and to let such parts of the territory, said to
be occupied by them, as might be necessary, be dedi-
cated to the transit route.** On the same date Lawrence
wrote to Clayton expressing a determination to insist
upon the abandonment of the Mosquito protectorate,
even if Lord Palmerston gave up everything else.°°
No reply was made to Lawrence's last-mentioned
note to Palmerston, and with this note negotiations on
" Ihid., 24-2$.
^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, pp. 51-52.
^^Tbid. "/bid., pp. 54-58. "/bid., pp. 53-54.
88 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the British side of the Atlantic terminated. The reason
for this cessation was perhaps Lawrence's insistence
upon discussing the Mosquito question with the pur-
pose of forcing the British to retreat from the stand
they had taken.
Some time in the autumn of 1849, probably when
Lawrence began to direct his attention to the Mosquito
title, the British government seems to have carefully
investigated the history of the question. As a result
it evidently concluded that the rights previously con-
tended for were not easily reconcilable with the terms
of the treaties with Spain."* Moreover, it discovered
that the mouth of the San Juan was fortified by the
Spaniards long before the establishment of the Mos-
j quito protectorate.*" The results of this investigation,
and the fact that Nicaragua had won the sympathy of
the United States, evidently caused the cabinet to
abandon any intention it might have had to assume a
defiant stand on the question,** which, with the existing
temper of the American people, would have made war
very probable.
On the other hand, the English government did not
intend to give up the claims hitherto maintained for the
Mosquitos if it could possibly avoid doing so. Besides,
the British protectorate was not easily disposed of.
Yet, from the present evidence it seems pretty certain
that had Great Britain been squarely confronted with
an American war as the only other alternative, a
method of relinquishing Mosquito claims without too
great damage to British pride would have been found.
"•London Times, June 13, 1850.
" Ibid. M Ibid.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 89
As it was, the British government determined to
proceed cautiously and, if possible, to remove all cause
of jealousy regarding the canal route, while still main-
taining the protectorate. Evidently with this in view
the cabinet concluded to attempt negotiations in Wash-
ington. There were reasons for believing that better
terms might be made with Clayton than with Law-
rence. The former had shown nervousness when speak-
ing to Crampton just after the receipt of the Hise treaty
and had expressed great anxiety that the British gov-
ernment should not think that the treaty was in accord-
ance with the wishes of the American government."
Besides, both Whig and Democratic press in America
were violently attacking the British claims and calling
upon the administration for action on the matter.'*
This situation also might have been expected to incline
Clayton, embarrassed by a refractory Democratic Sen-
ate, to an early compromise settlement. Be these
speculations as they may, the fact remains that some
time previous to November 14 " Sir Henry Bulwer was
appointed British agent to Washington, presumably
for the purpose of determining what chance there was
of making a favorable arrangement with Clayton."
But hope of reaching terms with Lawrence was not
entirely given up ; " the aim was to satisfy the United
States without forsaking the protectorate, and if Law-
^' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 1991, doc. 194, pp. 55-56.
'"Crampton to Palmerston, Nov. 4, 1849, F. O., Am., vol. 501, no. 95.
'^ Bulwer sailed for America on November 14, the day after Palmerston
wrote to Lawrence complaining of the terms of the Squier treaty.
U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 27, p. 45.
" The British Public Record Office is singularly lacking in any corre-
spondence giving reasons for taking up the discussion of the question
at Washington.
'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 35.
90 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
rence showed any sign of yielding, there was no reason
why negotiations with him should not be resumed.''
Bulwer received no detailed instructions before his
departure, but in his last conversation with the Foreign
Secretary, Palmerston pointed out that an unforeseen
difificulty had arisen about an unimportant matter, and
that while the question itself would have to be solved
in a manner that comported with British honor, the
matter out of which the difificulty had grown would
admit of adjustment.'" This view of the situation indi-
cates that the British government was prepared to
arrange its relations with Central America to suit
whatever were the ultimate demands of the United
States, should these demands be in any way reasonable.
Bulwer reached Washington some time in Decem-
ber, but for some weeks no attempt at negotiation was
made. Indeed, for a short time it appeared that there
would be no further effort to settle the question with
England. This was when the British seizure of Tigre
Island became known at Washington, and excitement
ran high as a result.'' Just at this crisis Carcache, a
representative of the Nicaraguan government, arrived
to solicit ratification of the Squier treaty." Clayton,
partaking of the general increase in suspicion of British
aims in Central America, promptly stated, on January
5, in response to a note from Carcache, that the Presi-
" Lawrence did not receive word until April, 1850, that the negotia-
tions had been entirely transferred to Washingrton. Appleton, " Memoir
of Hon. Abbott Lawrence ", in Mass. Hist. See, Proc, III (1855-
1858), 76.
'•'• Bulwer to Palmerston, .\pril 28, 1850, " Private ", 1". C, Am.,
vol. 512.
'" Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 28-29.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 3i2-3'3-
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 91
dent would submit the Squier treaty to the Senate and
would cheerfully ratify it if it received the approval
of that body." Bulwer, however, seems to have come
to the rescue, and succeeded in allaying the suspicions
of the American government to such a degree as to
alter its intentions regarding the Squier treaty. Con-
sequently, when, a little later, a call came from the
Senate for the Squier correspondence and treaties,"
it was met with a refusal from President Taylor.'"
After his arrival in Washington, Bulwer carefully
studied the situation and saw that the chief interest of
the American people regarding Central America lay
in the need for an interoceanic route, and that the
broader question of Mosquito claims had for the time a
secondary place. He therefore concluded that, in
trying to reach an agreement, it would be best to avoid
all consideration of the latter question and to concen-
trate upon the former." This he seemed to believe
would make possible a disposal of the difficulty with-
out serious sacrifice of British pride. The situation of
the American government at the time favored the idea.
When Clayton, his nervousness increased by the dis-
content of the country and the demand of both houses
of Congress for the Squier correspondence,*^ went to
him and declared that he " must either deliver up the
whole subject to popular discussion and determination,
or come to some immediate settlement upon it ",*' Bul-
" Ibid., p. 313.
''^ Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., i sess., pt. i, p. 159.
^ Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 31-32.
^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 29-30.
^ Ibid., 35.
*' U. S. Docs., ser. no 1991, doc. 194, p. 61.
92 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
wer saw his chance. He determined to enter into a
negotiation for the purpose of forming a treaty,
although he was without treaty-making power and even
without definite instructions from his government.
Clayton's semi-appeal to him gave him an advantage
which he was quick to seize. By playing upon the
nervousness of the Secretary of State he induced him
to avoid the subject of Mosquito claims in the discus-
sion which followed, and to put practically the whole
emphasis on securing guarantees of neutrality for the
isthmian canal."*
(^^"xqX, while driven from the bolder stand of a few
months before, Clayton by no means gave up hopes of
making the British relinquish the Indian protectorate.
As a frank promise to withdraw seemed out of the
' question, he determined to gain his end by a less direct
route ; this was by securing such a wording of the
treaty as would amount to a British agreement to aban-
don all control in Central America. Bulwer, on the
other hand, strove to preserve the protectorate, while
giving up all special advantage which might interfere
with the security of the interoceanic highway. Even a
casual study of the Clay ton-Bul wer treaty makes it
evident that a severe struggle took place between the
negotiators, a struggle as the Times put it, " for gen-
eralship in the use of terms " ; " and such a study also
shows that both contestants were forced to recede from
some of the ground which they had hoped to hold.
In short, it makes it clear that the treaty was not a
victory, but a compromise.
** Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 35-38.
" London Times, Jan. 19, 1856.
CLAYTON-BU LIVER TREATY 93
The project of a convention was quickly completed
and on February 3 this was sent to Palmerston for his
approval, together with a letter explaining the circum-
stances producing it/* But as negotiations had pro-
gressed, discontent in the United States had increased.
A disavowal of the seizure of Tigre had not yet reached
Washington, and just a week after the project was
sent off, reports again came from Central America " of
other violent acts committed by Chatfield and the Brit-
ish naval officers, in their efforts to collect claims
against the republics.** Probably roused by the fresh
suspicions resulting from these reports,'" certain mem-
bers of the American cabinet who knew the character
of the recent agreement went to Clayton and desired
that alterations be made in the project in order to pre-
vent further disputes. Some arrangement, they stated,
should be made for the relinquishment of Mosquito
claims to territory along the San Juan. As it was, they
felt that many would contend that the British meant
to do under another name that which they agreed not to
do under their own.*"
Clayton, thereupon, explained the situation to Bul-
wer, and on February 18 the latter wrote to Palmerston
explaining the change of feeling which had taken place.
It was his belief, he stated, that if Clayton had not
already signed the project he would not do so now.
However, having done so, he was bound inevitably to
a conciliatory line of policy, if the project should be
^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 35-40.
" Bulwer to Palmerston, Feb. 18, 1850, F. O., Am., vol. 511, no. 31.
** Crowe, Gospel in Central America, 217-220.
" Bulwer to Palmerston, Feb. 18, 1850, F. O., Am., vol. 511, no. 31.
»» Ibid.
94 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
approved by the British government, and would omit
nothing to make that policy succeed. Though Clayton's
colleagues were not so interested, Bulwer believed they
would be loath to reject the treaty. But he added, " I
ought not to disguise from your Lordship that this
question is becoming, the longer it remains in abeyance
the more intricate and perplexing, and that it contains
within it if not the seeds of actual war, the seeds of
such hostile and angry excitement as render war
always possible, and very often produce many of the
evils of war even when war itself is not produced."
He therefore suggested that Palmerston add to the
project, if approved by him, an explanation or clause
that would quiet to some extent the suspicions of
British intentions. In conclusion, he wrote : " I am
bound to add my opinion that if nothing is done, and
even that if nothing is done speedily, to set this busi-
ness at rest, and bring it to an amicable conclusion, the
tone of opinion on this side of the Atlantic will raise it
ere long into very serious importance." **
While negotiations remained in this uncertain state
the situation grew more tense. Rumors again reached
the American government that British protection was
to be extended to Costa Rica ; " and before fear of this
could be allayed by word from Palmerston," there
arrived from Lawrence the announcement regarding
the evacuation of Tigre Island and a disavowal of its
seizure, qualified by the declaration : " Her Majesty's
"Bulwer to Palmerston, Feb. 18, 1850, F. O. Am., vol. 511, no. 31.
Part of this despatch is given in Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Corre-
spondence w^ith the United States respecting Central .\merica ", 40-43.
"Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 46.
" Ibid., 46-47-
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 95
Government must not on that account be considered as
giving up in any degree the claims which it has made
on the Government of Honduras, and must hold itself
free to use whatever means the Law of Nations may
allow for obtaining the redress which it demands if that
redress should continue to be withheld." ^
Such a statement, closely following reports of
blockades and seizures in Central America, seemed to
the American government utterly inconsistent with
Palmerston's declaration that the British government
had no intention of occupying or colonizing the re-
gion ; " consequently it roused all the old suspicion of
British good faith,*^ and caused the American govern-
ment almost to despair of reaching an agreement." As
a result, the administration decided to pursue its own
course, with the intention of continuing it should Great
Britain prove herself determined not to act honorably.
Accordingly, the American government seems to have
worked in anticipation of a later struggle, diplomatic
or military, with the British. In 1847 Christopher
Hempstead had been appointed United States consul at
Belize,"* securing his exequatur from Great Britain.''
On March i, 1850, Clayton sent him a letter of recall,
explaining that as the appointment might have been
made " without full consideration of the territorial
rights of Great Britain in that quarter ", it was deemed
advisable under existing circumstances to discontinue
the consulate.^"* Although, before negotiations had
begun, Bulwer, at least, had understood that the Squier
treaty would not be presented to the Senate before the
" Ibid., 34-35. »» 7b»i., 48-49- ^Ibid. "^ Ibid., $3.
" V. S. Docs., ser. no. 579, doc. 75, pp. 310-311.
"' Ibid., p. 311.
^'^ Ibid., ser. no. 660, doc. 12, p. 2.
96 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
treaty which it was hoped would result from the nego-
tiations, or except in connection with it/*" on March 19
it was nevertheless transmitted " for the advice of the
Senate in regard to its ratification "/"
A few days after this, Bulwer received his govern-
ment's approval of the treaty project, and was em-
powered to sign it. In order to remove the suspicions
of the Americans, Palmerston directed that at the time
of signing Bulwer give to Clayton a note stating that
the British government had no intention of making use
of the protection which it afforded to the Mosquitos,
for the purpose of doing under cover of that protection
any of the things the intention to do which was dis-
claimed in the letter to Lawrence"' of November 13,
1849/"* This greatly eased the situation. Aloreover,
a little later a letter was received from Palmerston dis-
avowing any intention on the part of the British gov-
ernment of establishing a protectorate over Costa
Rica.'"" Consequently, the negotiations proceeded, and
after a few minor changes in the body of the treaty
Clayton agreed to sign it. He added, however, that
upon receiving the statement which the Foreign Secre-
tary had directed Bulwer to make, he should be obliged
to present a counter-declaration on the part of the
United States government to the effect that it in no
wise recognized the Mosquito title or sovereignty.^"*
Thereupon, Bulwer, desiring to omit such an allusion
^'^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Coins.. LX, " CorresponJence with the United
States respecting Central .\nierica ", 52-53.
"" Richartlson, Messages and Papers, V, 33-34.
'"3 See above, pp. 85-86.
^'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .\merica ", 45-46.
^"^ Ibid.. 46-47.
^*' lUilwer to ralmerston, April 28, 1850, F. O., Am., vol. 512, no. 67.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 97
to a difference between the two governments and feel-
ing it desirable to bind the United States also as to
American protection over any part of Central America,
decided to omit the statement suggested by Palmer-
ston, and instead to embody in the treaty the substance
of the statement, but without direct mention of the
Mosquito protectorate."' This being arranged, the
convention was signed by the two negotiators on April
19, 1850/"'
Since the fame and notoriety of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty resulted almost entirely from the peculiar word-
ing of the first article, that article is here quoted in full :
The Governments of Great Britain and the United States
hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever
obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the
said Ship-Canal ; agreeing that neither will ever erect or
maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the
vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or
exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mos-
quito Coast, or any part of Central America ; nor will either
make use of any protection which either affords or any may
afford, or any alliance which either has or may have, to or
with any State or people, for the purpose of erecting or main-
taining any such fortifications or of occupying, fortifying or
colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any
part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising domin-
ion over the same. Nor will Great Britain or the United States
take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance, connec-
tion, or influence that either may possess with any State or
Government through whose territory the said canal may pass,
for the purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly,
for the subjects or citizens of the one, any rights or advantages
in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal,
"' Ibid. Part of this despatch is given in Pari, Papers, 1856, Corns.
LX, " Correspondence with the United States respecting Central Amer-
ica ", 55-56.
">* Ibid., 52.
8
98 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
which shall not be offered, on the same terms, to the subjects
or citizens of the other.^"**
By the fourth article the two governments engaged to
use their good offices to " procure the estabhshment of
two free ports, one at each end of the said canal ", and
the eighth stated that the two contracting parties desir-
ing not only " to accomplish a particular object, but also
to establish a general principle ", agreed to extend their
protection, by treaty, to any other practicable communi-
cations, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus
connecting North and South America. The remainder
of the treaty referred to the more obvious provisions
necessary for securing the construction and neutraliza-
tion of the canal/"
Before signing the agreement, Clayton, fearing oppo-
sition from the Democratic majority of the Senate,
with the aid of King, the chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, obtained the approval of the leading
members to the measure/" Therefore, he submitted
it with a fair hope of securing ratification. Neverthe-
less, the treaty had a stormy time in the Senate, the
members of which were distinctly divided on the ques-
tion of what should be accomplished by the arrange-
ment. Some were primarily interested in securing the
guarantee for the proposed canal ; others were bent
upon driving the British completely out of Central
America."* Stephen A. Douglas was leader of the
latter faction, and was bitterly opposed to the treaty."*
^"^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 50.
"0 Ibid., so-52.
»" Buchanan, JVoiks. VIII, 382; Cong. Record. XXII, 2981.
'■'^ Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 237-238; 34 Cong., i sess., pt. 2, p.
1072.
^^^ Ibid., 34 Cong., i sess., pt. 2, p. 1072; Cong. Record, XXII, 2971.
CLAYTON -BULWER TREATY 99
It took the best efforts of Clayton and King to persuade
the opposition that the agreement was a practical appli-
cation of the Monroe doctrine, and required the aban-
donment of the Mosquito protectorate."*
In the discussion of the treaty the uncertain wording
of the first article was criticised, but King explained
that the obscurity was due to a wish on the part of
Bulwer to protect his nation's pride, and the desire of
Clayton to indulge him in this. England, it was ex-
plained, felt that she was being forced into a sort of
backward step, and it was expected that the Americans
would not insist upon any expression that might wound
her sensibilities."" These explanations, evidently given
with perfect sincerity by King"' — though up to this
time neither Bulwer nor Palmerston had acknowledged
a retreat on the part of their government — so con-
vinced some of the senators that they wished to retain
in the Squier treaty the clause recognizing the right of
Nicaragua over the proposed canal route. They argued
that this recognition was now of no real importance,
"< Buchanan, Works, VIII, 381-382.
"' Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 253. In a letter to Squier describing
the new treaty, Clayton added, " But let there be no exultation on our
side at the expense of British pride or sensibility ", and cautioned Squier
to deal kindly with both British subjects and British agents. Dept. of
State, Inst., Am. States, vol. is, P- 108.
"* On May 8, 1850, King wrote to Buchanan in reference to the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty: " I saw no objection to entering into a Treaty
stipulation not to occupy or colonise any portion of Central America,
when by so doing we are practically enforcing the Monroe doctrine, by
requiring of England the abandonment of her claim to the protectorate
of the King of the Mosquitos . . . The Treaty as I conceive accomplishes
all that we ought to desire, while it strengthens the position we have
heretofore taken, and avowed before the world. I may be mistaken in
the views I have expressed; but if so, four-fifths of the Democratic
Senators whom I consulted before the signature of the Treaty, were
equally in error." Buchanan, Works, VIII, 382.
loo ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
and that it would be satisfactory to Nicaragua and, in
view of the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, could
not be obnoxious to Great Britain/" Bulwer, however,
pointed out to Clayton that this policy would destroy
the harmony so necessary to the construction of the
canal."' Clayton agreed with him ; and the Senate as
a whole showed the same desire for friendly action.*^"
As a result of the efforts of Clayton and King, aided
by Bulwer,'"^ considerable temporary favor was created
for the treaty in the Senate, and it was ratified without
modification by a vote of forty-two to eleven.'^ In view
of the temper of the Senate a few weeks before, the
fact that the treaty passed by such a large majority,
or even that it passed at all, seems ample proof that the
Senate as a whole believed the arrangement to be in
harmony with the Monroe doctrine and felt that it
would force the British out of Central America.
Shortly before the treaty was sent to the Senate, an
instruction of far-reaching significance was received
by Bulwer from his government. It had been reported,
Palmerston wrote, that some Americans were about to
establish themselves in the island of Ruatan. The
islands of Ruatan and Bonacca were not only English
de jure but were actually occupied by British settlers
'"Bulwer to Palmerston, May 6, 1850, "Private and confidential",
F. O., Am., vol. 512-
^'^ When the treaty was signed on .'Xpril 19, Clayton had assured
Bulwer that should the Senate ratify it, care would be taken that any
other treaty also confirmed by the Senate should conform with it.
Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United States
respecting Central America ", 52-54.
'" Bulwer to Palmerston, May, 6, 1850, " Private and confidential ",
F. O., Am., vol. 512.
1^' Bulwer to Palmerston, .'\ug. 6, 1850, " Secret and confidential ",
vol. 514, no. 157.
*" ConfiT. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 and 3 sess., .\ppendix, 267.
CLAYTON-BULIVER TREATY loi
who were governed by a British magistrate appointed
by the BeHze superintendent. Moreover, in 1841 the
governor of Jamaica had been instructed that if any
other power should take possession of Ruatan he was
to demand the removal of the intruder, and, should the
demand be disregarded, he was authorized to resort to
forcible means for compelling withdrawal without fur-
ther instructions."^
In a note to Clayton, dated April 15, Bulwer made
known this view of his government, adding, " should
any persons attempt to locate themselves therein and
resist his [the governor of Jamaica's] request for their
withdrawal, I deem it advisable to report to you at
once the intelligence which H. M. Govt, has received
knowing that you will take all the steps in your power
to prevent the aggression of wh. H. M.'s Govt, has
been informed." ^^
Clayton was much disconcerted by this communica-
tion which seemed to threaten disaster to the treaty
just negotiated with Bulwer. For several days he
delayed action, during which time the treaty was signed
and sent to the Senate, but when it was under discus-
sion by that body he called upon the British minister
and asked that he cancel his note. An official message
like the note, he explained, if permitted to stand, must
be sent to Congress, and should this be done, some of
the members would very possibly imagine that Great
Britain was at that moment laying claim to new terri-
tories in America — a belief which, however erroneous,
would affect the passing of the treaty now under their
1-' Palmerston to Bulv.er, Mar. 14, 1850, F. O., Am., vol. 509, no. 25.
See above, p. 39.
"^ Inclosure in Bulwer to Palmerston, April 16, 1850, F. O., Am.,
vol. 512, no. 63.
I02 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
consideration. The reports of American designs upon
Ruatan, Clayton stated, he believed were entirely
incorrect."^
In consequence of Clayton's representations, Bulwer
agreed to cancel his note of April 15,"* and to accept
from Clayton as satisfactory a private note to the effect
that the American government had never desired to
occupy, fortify, or settle any of the Bay Islands, that
he, Clayton, had no knowledge, information, or belief
that Americans desired to establish themselves there
and that no attempt of American citizens to do so would
receive countenance from their government.'^
This indirection on the part of the American secre-
tary of state, though it probably saved the treaty,
played an important part in complicating English-
American isthmian relations, as will appear later.
The treaty as altered by Bulwer met the approval of
Palmerston, who stated that the government would
ratify it."^' But a suspicion that it was intended by the
Americans to apply to Belize and the Bay Islands seems
to have risen in Palmerston's mind — evidently in con-
sequence of Clayton's attitude towards Bulwer's note
of April 15 — and made him anxious to guard against
such a contingency. The sole object of the British in
wishing to retain the Mosquito protectorate was to
save the dignity of the government and perhaps to do
their duty by the Indians ; but with Belize it was differ-
ent ; the population there was almost wholly composed
>-•' Bulwer to Palmerston, .'\pril 27, 1850, " I'rivate and confidential ",
F. 0., Am., vol. 5I2.
"s Ibid.
^Clayton to Bulwer, April 24, 1850, "Private", ibid.
>" Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns.. LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .\merica ", 58.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 103
of British subjects, the territory was desirable, and the
full title to it was almost their own. The attempts
to place it entirely under British sovereignty have been
described. The Bay Islands also were prized by the
British because of the fine harbors of Ruatan. Conse-
quently, Palmerston was roused to precautionary meas-
ures. He instructed Bulwer to deliver to Clayton, at
the time of exchanging ratifications, a declaration that
" Her Majesty's Government do not understand the
engagements of that Convention as applying to Her
Majesty's settlement at Honduras, or to its dependen-
cies."*'^ Should the United States government object
to receiving and assenting to this declaration, Bulwer
was not to proceed to the exchange of ratifications
without further instructions."^
Palmerston's declaration was regarded with much
dissatisfaction by Clayton, to whom the treaty was
already much less than he had hoped for and desired.""
Consequently, for a time it was resolved to abandon the
arrangement entirely."* Besides, the doubt regarding
the efficacy of the treaty, for a time overcome in the
Senate, had returned very strongly immediately after
the vote was taken,"" and King declared that if the
document should be resubmitted for reconsideration in
connection with Palmerston's statement, it would not
receive a single vote.""* But King seems to have con-
vinced Clayton that the Senate did not regard the treaty
as applying to Belize."^*
^^ Ibid., 59-60. ^ Ibid., 60.
''* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 694, doc. 13, p. 16.
la Ibid.
^^^ Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 6, 1850, " Secret and confidential ",
F. C, Am., vol. S14, no. 157.
'^^ Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 2^7.
i-'^ Ibid., 230.
104 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
King suspected, however, that the object of the
declaration was to obtain from the American govern-
ment an acknowledgment of British title to the Belize
territory,'" and he was determined that no such admis-
sion should be made. Clayton also suspected the British
of this design ; but, in view of his evasive arrangement
with Bulwer to prevent British pretensions to the Bay
Islands from defeating ratification of the treaty by the
Senate, he was especially concerned over the elastic
possibilities of the term " dependencies ", and believed
that by this wording the British government aimed to
insure its claims to the Bay Islands.""
After considerable discussion the American govern-
ment decided to proceed with the ratification, but to
present a counter-declaration, calculated to annul any
effect intended to be produced by the statement of the
British government.'" This counter-declaration was
carefully drawn up by Clayton, who consulted John-
son, the United States attorney-general, with regard to
its phraseology.''
''^ Cong. Globe, 33 Cong., i sess., Appendix, 96.
is« Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 6, 1850, " Secret and confidential ",
F. O., Am., vol. 514. According to Bulwer, in a conversation during
the period of negotiation Clayton had acknowledged Belize " with its
dependencies, including two islands called Ruatan and Bonaca ", to be
excluded from the terms of the treaty. Extract of memorandum inclosed
by Bulwer in a private note to Webster, Aug. 17, 1850, Dept. of State,
Notes to Dept., Gt. Brit., vol. 27. This statement appears inconsistent
with some of Clayton's other statements and actions, but a knowledge of
his equivocal conduct regarding the islands when the treaty was before
the Senate makes it seem not unlikely that Bulwer reported the conver-
sation correctly. Clayton possessed a wavering and contradictory dis-
position, qualities which were fully recognized by Bulwer. Bulwer to
Palmerston, Mar. 2, 1850, " Private and confidential ", F. C, Am., vol.
512, no. 43; "Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan", in Am. Hist. Rev.,
V, 98. Cf. Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 31, 1856, F. O., Am., vol.
642, no. 77; May 19, 1856, ibid., vol. 643, no. 128; May 27, 1856, ibid.
"' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 694, doc. 13, pp. 16-17.
'''Ibid., p. 16.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 105
On July 4, the day upon which the ratifications were
exchanged, Clayton wrote to King with reference to
the proposed counter-statement and asked for his per-
mission to state that the true meaning of the treaty
had been explained by him, King, to the Senate before
the vote was taken."' To this King replied that the
Senate " perfectly understood that the treaty did not
include British Honduras "/*"
Consequently, before the ratifications were ex-
changed that night Clayton handed to Bulwer a docu-
ment which declared that the treaty was not understood
by the British or American governments or by the
negotiators —
to include the British settlement in Honduras (commonly
called British Honduras, as distinct from the State of Hon-
duras) nor the small islands in the neighborhood which may be
known as its dependencies. To this settlement, and these
islands, the treaty we negotiated was not intended by either
of us to apply. The title to them it is now and has been my
intention, throughout the negotiation, to leave, as the treaty
leaves it, without denying, affirming, or in any way meddling
with the same, just as it stood previously. The chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Hon.
William R. King, informs me that " the Senate perfectly under-
stood that the treaty did not include British Honduras". It
was understood to apply to, and does include all the Central
American States of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica with their just limits and proper
dependencies.*'"
To this Bulwer replied in substance, that he under-
stood Clayton's answer to the declaration of the British
government as meaning that he, Clayton, fully recog-
"* Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 250.
^*' Ibid.
"* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 12, pp. 2-3.
io6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
nized that it was not the intention of the treaty to
include the British settlement at Honduras, whatever
might be included under the term, nor its dependencies,
whatever they might be ; and that British title to the
settlement would not in any way be altered in conse-
quence of the treaty/*^ Exchange of ratifications fol-
lowed."'
Thus the treaty was concluded without the consent
of the Senate to the declaration, and, in consequence,
that declaration was obviously not an alteration of the
treaty but was merely understood by the two negotia-
tors as a " just specification of its meaning and inten-
tions ".'" However, the President and his cabinet,**"
as well as individual senators who were consulted, knew
of the existence of the declaration before the treaty
was ratified. Furthermore, the interpretation of the
treaty held by the government must have become pretty
well known to the Senate as a whole within a few days
after it was concluded, for, on July 8, the National
Intelligencer stated that the treaty neither recognized
nor altered in any way the British title to Belize ; '" and
the message of the President, of the fourteenth of the
same month, transferring the treaty to the House of
Representatives, contained more detailed expressions
to the same efifect."'
Although no discussion appears to have arisen at
the time, in consequence of these post-ratification
announcements, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty from the
"^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " CorresponJeiK-e with the United
States respecting Central America ", 63-64.
"' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 660, doc. 12, p. 4.
"* Rulwer to ralnierston, Aug. 6, 1850, F. C, Am., vol. 514, no. 157.
'•" Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 248.
I'*' Ibid.. 249. "' Ibid.
CLAYTON-BUUVER TREATY 107
first was unpopular in America. Its phraseology was
vague and it did not directly abolish the Mosquito
protectorate ; hence it failed to convey the full assur-
ance desired by the nation that British influence in
Central America was absolutely obliterated. However,
the American government beheved that the pecuHar
wording of the first article had rendered the protector-
ate null ; it felt that the agreement not to occupy,
colonize, fortify, or exercise dominion was equivalent
to an agreement to withdraw, for without the ability to
do these things protection was impossible. To be sure,
a nominal protectorate could exist under the treaty, but
it was hoped that as the protectorate was utterly shorn
of its power, the British government would entirely
abandon it. This general view of the treaty was re-
flected in a letter written by Clayton to Squier Avhen the
treaty was before the Senate. He wrote :
I trust that means will speedily be adopted by Great Britain
to extinguish the Indian title with the help of the Nicaraguans
or the Company "* within what we consider to be the limits of
Nicaragua . . . Having always regarded an Indian title as
a mere right of occupancy, we can never agree that such a title
should be treated otherwise than as a thing to be extinguished
at the will of the discoverer of the country. Upon the ratify-
ing of the treaty, Great Britain will no longer have any interest
to deny this principle which she had recognized in every other
case in common with us. Her protectorate will be reduced to
a shadow, " Stat nominis umbra,' for she can neither occupy,
fortify, colonize or exercise dominion or control in any part of
the Alosquito coast or Central America. To attempt to do
either of those things after the exchange of ratifications, would
inevitably produce a rupture with the United States."'
^■•^ The canal company.
"9 Dept. of State, Inst., Am. States, vol. 15, pp. io;-io6.
io8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Reverdy Johnson, the attorney-general, interpreted
the agreement in the same manner. On December 30,
1853, he wrote in a letter to Clayton :
As one of the advisers of the President, I unhesitatingly gave
him my opinion, that the treaty did effectually, to all intents
and purposes, disarm the British protectorate in Central Amer-
ica and the Mosquito coast, although it did not abolish the
protectorate in terms, nor was it thought advisable to do so
"in ipsissimis verbis". All that was desired by us was to ex-
tinguish British dominion over that country, whether held
directly or indirectly — whether claimed by Great Britain in her
own right, or in the right of the Indians.^"
The correspondence upon the subject makes it clear
that at the time of negotiation the British government
agreed pretty closely with the United States as to the
influence of the treaty upon the Mosquito protector-
aie "^ — an influence, however, which, strange to say,
Bulwer, the British negotiator of the treaty, did not
recognize as existing."'' Though there was no feeling
*"> U. S. Docs., ser. no. 694, doc. 13, p. 15. Though Johnson's letter
was written more than three years after the ratification of the treaty, and
during a controversy between the British and American governments over
its interpretation, there is no reason to believe that the opinion of the
Attorney-General here expressed differed in any degree from that held
by him when the treaty was concluded.
^^^ This will be brought out in the following chapters.
'" On April 28, 1850, after the treaty was signed, Bulwer wrote to
Palmerston: "I need not say that should your Lordship wish to make
any further statement as to the views of Her Majesty's Government
with regard to the protectorate of Mosquito, that statement can still be
made; nothing in the present Convention is affirmed thereupon, but
nothing is abandoned." Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence
with the United States respecting Central America ", 56.
In a memorandum of the negotiations kept for his own use Bulwer
wrote: "The treaty, indeed, was intended to apply to future and not
to present possessions in Central America; so that without any question
as to what Central .America is, IT. M.'s settlement in Honduras and its
dependencies are not included in the said treaty." Extract of Mem-
orandum inclosed by Bulwer in a private note to Webster, .Aug. 17, 1850,
Dept. of State, Notes to Dept., Gt. Brit., vol. 27.
CLAYTON-BULJVER TREATY log
that the protectorate over the Mosquitos had been aban-
doned, it was fully realized that the relations with the
Indians had been decidedly weakened/" Through the
persistence of Clayton the substance of the protectorate
had been taken away, though the form, with the pride
of the British, had been preserved by Bulwer's shrewd
diplomacy.
Just what either government thought would be the
effect of the treaty upon British occupation of Belize
and the Bay Islands, it is impossible to say, for no
expression of opinion upon this point seems to have
been recorded at this time. It seems fair to presume,
however, that, after the British declaration regarding
Belize had been exchanged for the American counter-
declaration, both governments were uncertain as to
what had actually been lost or won by the transaction ;
but that both were determined to get the most possible
out of the arrangement in the execution of their
respective policies. The effect of this procedure will
appear later.
"' Ehiring the negotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Chatfield en-
deavored to form a treaty with Honduras regarding the Mosquito
boundary at the north. The first draft of the agreement bore the
Queen's name as one of the parties to the agreement. Inclosure in
Palmerston to Chatfield, Mar. 30, 1S50, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 63, no. 11.
Later, in June, this was changed by order of the British government, and
the name of the Mosquito king was substituted, on the ground that the
other form was not consistent with the language of the treaty with the
United States, which engaged both parties not to " assume or exercise
any dominion over Mosquito coast ", etc. Palmerston to Chatfield, June
20, 1850, and inclosure, ibid., no. 21, and Foreign Office notes of June
6 and 7, 1850, ibid., vol. 63.
CHAPTER IV.
Attempts at Readjustment Under the New
Treaty, 1850-1852.
The negotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
brought to a successful conclusion by careful concen-
tration upon the points of agreement between the two
contracting parties, and studied avoidance of the larger
Central American question, regarding which differ-
ences were well known to exist. To carry out the spirit
of the treaty in its application to the Mosquitos was far
more difficult, but it was a task which the British gov-
ernment honestly planned to attempt, even before rati-
fications were exchanged.
When the treaty was under consideration of the
Senate, Bulwer wrote to Palmerston :
You will best judge if anything, and if anything what, is to
be done as to the remaining difference between Nicaragua and
Mosquito, on which the Government of Her Majesty and
that of the United States still entertain opposite opinions,
although these opinions are, by our Treaty, restrained or with-
drawn from the necessity of being carried out into any act
of hostility.*
Though the British government, he added, no longer
had any interest in maintaining the Mosquitos where
they were or in protecting them in that particular local-
ity, still they could not give up the protectorate or
' I'arl. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
•States respecting Central America ", 56.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1830-1852 in
change the condition of things on which it existed if
pressed to do so in a disagreeable way ; yet the question
might be finally settled with a friendly power on general
and friendly grounds. If the pending treaty with the
United States, and that between the latter and Nica-
ragua could be completed without any assertion of the
right of Nicaragua over the Mosquito territory, a
friendly arrangement might be made with the United
States for the withdrawal of the Mosquitos from the
vicinity of the canal. The Mosquito title might be
purchased and the Indians reorganized in a particular
district.'
In reply to these suggestions, Palmerston wrote :
Her Majesty's government feel that the present state of
things in regard to the Mosquito Territory, and especially with
regard to the Port of Grey Town, is in many respects incon-
venient, and not entirely in conformity with the true spirit and
meaning of the Convention just concluded between Great
Britain and the United States. The British government is
bound in honor to protect the Mosquitos, but her Majesty's
government are of the opinion that the protection of Great
Britain might be afforded to that nation as effectually in a
different way, and without any direct interference of any agent
of the British Government in the internal affairs of that
country.
In accordance with this idea, he explained, the boun-
daries of the Mosquito territor)^ might be adjusted by
Great Britain in co-operation with the United States.
In order to meet the terms of the treaty, and yet to
secure for Greytown a well-organized government, the
boundary dispute between Mosquito and Costa Rica
might be so arranged as to give the port, with a suffi-
^ibid., 56-57.
112 AXGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
cient district to the north of it, to the latter.' In return
for the cession, Palmerston wrote, the Mosquitos
should be given some suitable and adequate compensa-
tion/ In combination with these arrangements, he
thought that the general differences between Costa Rica
and Nicaragua might be settled by the good offices of
the British and American governments.' The basis of
such arrangement might be the decision in favor of
Nicaragua of some of the disputed questions of boun-
dary on the western side of the isthmus.'
Bulwer knew that the American government was
interested in securing a favorable canal treaty from
Nicaragua, and therefore would not be likely to make
any disagreeable suggestions to her while the Squier
treaty was in abeyance. Consequently, he approached
Clayton cautiously, remarking that if the American
government would agree to the transfer of Greytown to
Costa Rica in return for some cession of other disputed
territory he would suggest such an arrangement to
Palmerston.' However, as he suspected would be the
case, Clayton was opposed to such a disposal of the
question.' Bulwer therefore became convinced that
the most urgent need at that time was to prevent the
United States from recognizing by treaty the rights of
' F. O., Am., vol. 509, no. 58. Though Costa Rica did possess a more
stable government than Nicaragua, the fact that Great Britain was a
friend of the former, while bad feeling existed between herself and the
latter, which looked towards the United States for protection, undoubtedly
also influenced Palmerston in considering the disposal of Greytown.
• Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., I.X, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .America ", 58-59.
• F. 0., Am., vol. 509, no. 59.
« Ibid.
' lUilwer to Palmerston, July i, 1850, " Private and confidential ",
F. O., .Xm., vol. 513.
• Ibid.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 113
Nicaragua over the San Juan, and worked with that
end in view.'
With the accession of President Fillmore, Daniel
Webster became secretary of state, and as the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty was by this time ratified, discussions
more to the point regarding the disposal of affairs in
Central America seemed possible. Shortly after the
ratification, Molina, the Costa Rican representative,
informed Palmerston that his government was willing
to submit the boundary dispute with Nicaragua to the
joint mediation or arbitration of the United States and
Great Britain," and would be bound by the decision of
those governments." Thereupon Palmerston communi-
cated Molina's message to Bulwer with instructions to
submit the proposal to the United States government."
The matter was made known to Webster by Bulwer,"
who at the same time suggested the desirability of
speedily settling by joint mediation all of the territorial
differences between Mosquito, Costa Rica, and Nica-
ragua."
Webster replied that it would be necessary to know
what the Nicaraguans would consent to before the
United States government, which was in some degree
compromised with respect to their claims by the ex-
pression of its opinions, could decide what would be
the best course. He added, however, that he entirely
agreed in the spirit of the plan suggested by Palmer-
ston, and stated that he would recommend the Senate
to do nothing for the time being with regard to the
» Ibid.
■** This was in reply to an offer made by Palmerston. Pari. Papers,
1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United States respecting
Central America ", 65.
" Ibid., 65-66. ^ Ibid.. 67. " Ibid., 68. ^* Ibid., 67.
9
114 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Squier treaty," to which Bulwer had called attention
because it contained certain points objectionable to the
British government."
But the situation in Central America was such as to
make a prompt settlement very difficult, if not impos-
sible. Political conditions in Nicaragua had grown
worse and the government had been brought very much
under the influence of the canal company," an agent
of which was reported as trying to induce the Nica-
raguans to recapture San Juan." This town " was at
the time nominally under Mosquito sovereignty, but
really governed by the British consul, who was virtually
dictator "^ and, as representative of the arch-enemy, was
cordially hated by the Nicaraguans. To avert danger
of an attack, British war ships were ordered to visit the
port," and after a time one or two vessels were kept
constantly in the harbor." The boundary dispute be-
tween Costa Rica and Nicaragua had also grown more
bitter, and war between the two threatened to increase
the confusion."
More serious still was the fact that communication
with the British and American agents in Central Amer-
^'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 68-69.
" Ibid., 70-72.
"Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 29, 1850, "Private and confidential",
F. C, Am., vol. S'S, no. 189.
^^ Pari. Papers, 1856 Corns. LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 90.
" In the autumn of 1850 the place contained fifty or sixty houses
with a population of about three hundred. Squier, Nicaragua, I, 73-73.
*• Froebel, Seven Years' Travel in Central America, 14; Squier,
Nicaragua, I, 79.
^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 90-91.
" Squier, Nicaragua, I, 79.
** Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 95.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-18 52 115
ica was so difficult that it was almost impossible for
their governments to keep in touch with or control
them. The actions of Chatfield and Squier in particu-
lar, both of whom were lacking in tact and judgment
and were exceedingly jealous of each other's intentions,
often threatened to cause trouble for the countries
which they represented. Apparently unaware of the
opinion held at Washington regarding his treaty for
the cession of Tigre, Squier seized the island shortly
after its evacuation by the British,''* and for many
months the American flag floated over it, regardless of
the fact that the Honduras legislature had disavowed
the treaty of cession.^ Chatfield, on the other hand,
seemed finally to lose all interest in making Tigre Brit-
ish territory, but busied himself with various other
violent acts calculated to force the Central American
states to pay their long-standing debts. His efforts
with Nicaragua and Costa Rica availed little, however,
for both states united in refusing payment until the
British acknowledged their rights to Mosquito Shore.^
Furthermore, scarcely had the terms of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty become known before the two agents
began to rouse irritation by their extreme and contra-
dictory interpretations of that instrument, as to the
peculiar advantages conferred by it upon their respect-
ive governments." As a result of his unsatisfactory
" Ihid., 61. 23 iiid,^ 94-95.
2«Hall to Macdonald, Dec. 8, 1841, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 25; Chatfield
to Palmerston, Nov. 6, 1850, ibid., vol. 66, no. 104. Spain, by a treaty
with Nicaragua, made July 25, 1850, acknowledged the exclusive claims
of the latter to the sovereignty of Mosquito coast. Chatfield to
Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1850, ibid., vol. 65, no. 87.
" Inclosure in Chatfield to Palmerston, July i, 1850, ibid., vol. 64;
Chatfield to Palmerston, Aug. 20, 1850, ibid., vol. 65, no. 58; Bulwer to
Palmerston, Mar. 10, 1851, F. O., Am., vol. 528, no. 49.
ii6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
conduct, Squier was recalled in the autumn of 1850*
and was succeeded by Kerr," who was of a less pugna-
cious disposition.'" This change relieved matters but
little, however, for Chatfield remained and kept up the
condition of semi-warfare in Central America," and
consequently created ill-feeling in the United States
against England. But he too was removed, in January,
1852,"^ presumably in consequence of repeated com-
plaints by the American government," and after his
departure more pacific relations prevailed between
British and American representatives on the isthmus.
Notwithstanding these various obstacles, Bulwer
tried to keep the question of a Central American settle-
ment to the front, for he felt that better and fairer
terms, from a British viewpoint, could be obtained from
Webster than from any other secretary of state.** But
in consequence of Webster's determination to consider
Nicaragua's wishes in the matter, no progress was
made for several months. The Nicaraguan govern-
ment had promised to send a representative to Wash-
ington, but none had arrived.** Should none be sent,
Webster assured Bulwer, it was the intention of the
American government to establish diplomatic relations
^Bulwer to Palmerston, Oct. 7, 1850, ibid., vol. 515, no. 208.
-° U. S. Docs., ser. no. 819, doc. 25, pp. 47-48.
*• Chatfield to Palmerston, Oct. 25, 1851, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 72,
no. 126.
*^ Bulwer to Palmerston, Jan. 28, 1851, F. C, Am., vol. 527, no. 20;
Bulwer to Palmerston, Mar. 10, 1851, ibid., vol. 528, no. 49.
"Granville to Chatfield, Jan. 15, 1852, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 76, no. 2;
Bulwer to Palmerston, June 22, 1851, F. O., Am., vol. 529, no. iia.
^ Bulwer to Palmerston, Jan. 28, 1851, ibid., vol. 527, no. ao; Mar.
10, 1851, ibid., vol. 528, no. 49.
"White to Palmerston, Nov. 12, 1851, ibid., vol. 537; Bulwer to
Palmerston, May 19, 185 1, ibid., vol. 528, no. 98.
^ Pari. Papers, i8.i;6, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 95.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 117
with Nicaragua by appointing an agent to that govern-
ment at once.'*
While the American government waited to hear from
Nicaragua, Bulwer resumed the discussion of terms of
settlement, and finally persuaded Webster to agree not
to recognize the exclusive right of Nicaragua over the
San Juan River or to make more than a commercial
treaty with that government ; but Webster would not
consent to the cession of Greytown to Costa Rica."
Bulwer therefore suggested to Palmerston that the
town be given to Nicaragua, in return for compensation
to the Mosquitos and to Costa Rica ; '^ and Palmerston
agreed to this plan, provided insurmountable difficulties
prevented the transfer of the port to Costa Rica.'"
Finally Marcoleta arrived as representative of the
Nicaraguan government and expressed a desire to form
commercial treaties with Great Britain and with the
United States."" Shortly afterwards he began negotia-
tions for the latter purpose with Webster." Mean-
while the discussion of the disputed points in connec-
tion with Mosquito was vigorously pursued by Webster
and Bulwer, and the latter began to hope for a speedy
termination of the whole question.*^ However, when
the two negotiators had almost reached an agreement
regarding Greytown,*^ Marcoleta displayed a sudden
change of mind," and declared himself unwilling to
sign any commercial treaty with England, or even with
»• Ihid. " m^^ 96-97. 3s ji,i^ 39 /j,j-(i^ gg
« Ibid. ■" Ibid. *' Ibid. '=" Ibid., 98-99-
** The change in Marcoleta was evidently due to criticism from his
government because of a willingness to make concessions, which he had
at first shown, and to a correspondence which he had recently carried
on with Senator Douglas, who was an enemy of any compromise with
England. Bulwer to Palmerston, July 28, 185 1, F. O., Am., vol. 329,
no. 132.
ii8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the United States unless something respecting Grey-
town and the Mosquito territory was at the same time
settled."
This stand of the Nicaraguan agent produced a
change in Webster, who, while still expressing adher-
ence to his former opinions, seemed reluctant to act
upon them/* Bulwer, desirous of securing some defi-
nite result, drew up a statement of the opinions ex-
pressed by himself and Webster, which the latter after
some reflection finally refused to sign." Then Bulwer
proposed a meeting of Marcoleta, Molina (the Costa
Rican minister), Webster, and himself for the purpose
of trying to reach satisfactory terms. The meeting
was held July 1 1, but it resulted in nothing, as the Nica-
raguan minister refused to accept any arrangement
suggested by Bulwer, and offered instead proposals
from his own government,^ which Bulwer in turn
refused to consider.'" This change in affairs again
brought negotiations to a standstill, for Marcoleta had
no powers to go beyond the proposals he had made.""
Some time before, Crampton had arrived at Washing-
ton for the purpose of relieving Bulwer, but at Web-
ster's request the latter had consented to remain longer
*' Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 99.
« Ibid.
*'' Ibid. Webster's reluctance was certainly produced to some extent
by the change in Marcoleta; but public criticism of his foreign policy
may also have caused him to hesitate. Bulwer to Palmerston, April 7,
185 1, F. O., Am., vol. 528, no. 69.
** Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., "Correspondence with the United States
respecting Central America ", 99. Marcoleta's proposals diflfered from
those of Bulwer in that they provided for no compensation to the
Mosquitos in return for Greytown, which, by both projects was to go
to Nicaragua; and the boundary dispute between the latter and Costa
Rica was to be settled by arbitration. Ibid., 100.
** Ibid., 98. '"Ibid.. 100.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-18 52 119
in order to try to settle the Mosquito difficulty." Now,
as no progress could be made until the Nicaraguan
government was again heard from, Bulwer returned
home in August, 1851."
During the period of delay an event occurred which
created considerable feeling against England in the
United States, and seriously threatened the friendly
relations which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty had tempo-
rarily established. On November 21, 1851, the Pro-
metheus, a vessel belonging to the Atlantic and Pacific
Ship-Canal Company, was in Greytown harbor, about
to leave for New York." For some time harbor dues "
had been levied by the municipal- authorities upon all
vessels entering the port except the English steamers
which carried the mail. All had fulfilled the require-
ment except the Prometheus, which had made several
trips, each time steadily refusing to meet the demands
of the port officials, on the ground that the company
did not recognize the Mosquito authorities ."^ On the
occasion in question, after the usual bill of charges, plus
*i Bulwer to Palmerston, May 25, 185 1, F. O., Am., vol. 528, no. 100.
'^Dic. Nat. Biog., XIII, 6.
^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", iii.
" This was a port charge levied solely by the local officials in order
to meet expenses connected with the harbor. U. S. Docs., ser. no. 618,
doc. 30, p. 5. In accordance with the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, Palmerston, in the autumn of 1850, had instructed the Mosquito
authorities to make Greytown a free port. Palmerston to Buhver,
Nov. 15, 1850, F. O., Am., vol. 510, no. 150. These instructions had been
obeyed, and since January 1, 1851, no duties had been levied by the
representatives of the Mosquito government upon vessels or goods.
U. S. Docs., ser. no. 618, doc. 30, p. 5.
" It should be remembered that the canal company had obtained its
charter and contract from the Nicaraguan government. The contract had
granted the company the use of the river and harbor " free of all duties
or charges of any kind whatsoever ". Par!. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX,
" Correspondence with the United States respecting Central America ",
120 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
arrears, had been presented and payment refused, a
warrant was issued for the arrest of Churchill, the cap-
tain of the vessel, for the debt. Local officials went
aboard and served the warrant, but Churchill still
resisted. The officials, after giving notice that the
vessel would not be permitted to leave until the debt
was paid, went ashore. The captain, however, ignored
the threat and in a few minutes his vessel was dropping
down the harbor. "* The British brig-of-war Express
happened to be in the port at the time and its captain,
Fead, had been requested by Green, the British consul,
to detain the Proiuetheus in case the dues were not
paid." Accordingly the Express immediately followed
the departing vessel and at Green's orders two shots
were fired across her bows. The Prometheus then
returned to her place of anchorage, and the president
of the canal company, Cornelius Vanderbilt, who hap-
pened to be aboard, went ashore and paid the debt.
The vessel was then permitted to proceed on her
voyage."'
On December i, the board of directors of the canal
company met and drew up resolutions regarding the
affair, in which they claimed the interference and pro-
tection of the United States government.*' White, the
counsel for the company, sent resolutions, accompanied
by a letter calling attention to Green's share in detain-
ing the vessel, to the United States government."
Promptly upon receiving intelligence of the matter,
the Navy Department ordered Commodore Parker,
"Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .-Xmerica ", iii.
" Ihid., 113.
'^ Ibid., hi; U. S. Docs., ser. no. 614. doc. 6. pp. 2-1.
" Ibid., p. 3. *• Ibid., p. 2.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1S50-1852 121
commander of the home squadron, to leave as soon as
possible for San Juan in order to protect American
interests there." Parker was instructed to assure the
authorities of the port, however, that the American
government would not justify the non-payment of any
lawful and proper port dues on the part of merchant
vessels."'^ On the same date Webster sent a despatch
to Lawrence calling his attention to the action of the
British officials at San Juan and directing him to inquire
of Palmer ston whether the captain of the Express had
acted under orders from his government, and whether
his course was approved. Should Palmerston's reply
be in the affirmative, Lawrence was to state that the
President would consider the proceeding a violation of
the treaty of April 19, 1850."
The resignation of Palmerston just when Lawrence
presented his communication prevented a prompt reply
from the British government,'^* but on December 30,
immediately after his installation in the Foreign Office,
Granville wrote to Lawrence stating that Fead's act
was not in consequence of any orders from his govern-
ment, and that as soon as word should be received from
Greytown a further statement would be made. In the
meanwhile Lawrence might rest assured that it was
" far from the intention of her Majesty's government
to authorize any proceeding at variance with the stipu-
lations of the treaty of Washington of the 19th of
April, 1850." °° Upon receipt of this note Lawrence
expressed his regret that the British government had
not yet received the official intelligence which would
enable it to disavow the act of the Express.^ To this
^^ Ibid., p. 4. '^^ Ibid. '^ Ibid., ser. no. 6i8, doc. 30, pp. 1-2.
M Ibid., p. 4. « Ibid., pp. 5-6. "« Ibid., p. 6.
122 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Granville replied that should the circumstances of the
affair be shown to be such as were described by the
American minister, the British government would at
once disavow it."
During this period of suspense the affair was taken
up in an angry manner in the United States by the Dem-
ocratic party and the press, and matters were becoming
serious "* when Crampton received a letter from Vice-
Admiral Seymour of the British navy, which reheved
the situation. Seymour stated that his instructions to
the commander of the Jamaica division of the navy did
not sanction such an act as Fead had committed, and
that therefore he had sent word to Fead to desist from
enforcing the payment of dues at Grey town until fur-
ther orders. Seymour also stated that Green, too, had
apparently acted without instructions.'" Crampton
greatly relieved Webster's anxiety by reading portions
of this timely letter to him, and he, Webster, asked
Crampton to inform Seymour that the United States
government highly appreciated the friendly and con-
siderate spirit in which he had acted."
On December 20, Seymour had written to the Admir-
alty of the affair and explained the instructions which
he had given regarding Greytown."^ Through this
letter Granville received his first official information
regarding the matter." On January 10, 1852, immedi-
ately upon the receipt of it, he wrote to Lawrence
making known the attitude taken by the Vice-Admiral,
and stating that the British government entirely ap-
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 6i8, doc. 30, pp. 6-7.
** Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central .\merica ", 122.
**lbxd., 121. ■"> Ibid., \22. ^Ibid., 121.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 618, doc. 30, pp. 7-8.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 123
proved of the latter 's conduct, and disavowed the acts
of Green and Fead."
Lawrence expressed his gratification at the prompt-
ness with which the disavowal had followed the receipt
of Seymour's report and stated that he had no doubt
but that the apology would be received by his govern-
ment in the same spirit which had dictated it on the part
of Great Britain." Lawrence's earlier report of the
attitude taken by Granville had been received by Web-
ster with much satisfaction/" and after notice of the
disavowal and apology had reached him he expressed
his belief that the British government had " behaved
with great honor and justice in the affair of the Prome-
theus".'^ Thus the matter ended peaceably, and with
friendly feelings between the two governments.
But the excitement growing out of the affair showed
the constant danger in delaying a settlement regarding
the Mosquito question and created greater anxiety on
both sides for a resumption of negotiations.'' Webster
now, apparently for the first time, showed a real inter-
est in effecting an adjustment. While writing to Law-
rence shortly before the news of the disavowal was
received, he expressed his fears for the future should
the arrangement of matters in dispute with England
much longer be postponed.'* Moreover, Palmerston's
withdrawal from the government was considered as
particularly favorable to American interests, and hence
to an adjustment." It was now believed that England
"/&td. ■'*Ibid., pp. 8-9.
" Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVI, 635.
'• Curtis, Daniel Webster, II, 596.
" Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., " Correspondence with the United States
respecting Central America", 117, 123-124.
78 Webster, Writings and Speeches, XVI, 634-635.
■"Ibid.. XVIII, 504, Sio.
124 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
had a strong desire to settle all pending questions '" and
that she would never be in a better humor for the
purpose.** A strong effort was made to have Bulwer
return to the country for the purpose of resuming the
negotiations/' but circumstances prevented," so that
duty fell to Crampton.
Matters, however, were in such confusion in Nica-
ragua that it seemed impossible to make the diplomatic
connections necessary for consulting her with reference
to terms. It was just at this time that the three states
of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador were making an
effort to federate, but affairs were so unstable as to
force Marcoleta to acknowledge that there was no
government which he could properly represent, or which
could properly give him instructions ; " and Kerr, the
American minister, who had been in Nicaragua for
several months, reported that he had not yet been able
to find any authority to which he could present his
credentials."*
But upon reflection the American government had
decided that until the boundary dispute between Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica was settled, and until it was
determined just where the proposed canal should run,
no guarantee of sovereignty over the canal line could
be given to Nicaragua; for such a guarantee, should
the route run on the south side of the river — which was
claimed by Costa Rica — would only complicate diffi-
*" Curtis, Daniel Webster, II, 59 j.
"Webster, Writings and Speeches. Will, 525.
'^ Curtis, Daniel Webster, II, 593.
" Ibid., 593-596.
■"Webster, Writings and Speeches, X\'I, 636; U. S. Docs., ser. no.
819, doc. 25, p. 55.
« Ibid.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-18 52 125
culties.'* Hence, as a canal treaty with Nicaragua must
be an arrangement of the indefinite future, the friend-
ship of that nation was not now so eagerly sought.
This fact, as well as the urgency for the settlement of
the Mosquito question and the hopelessness of early
restoration of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua,
made Webster willing to consider terms, independently
of that state. The idea now was to reach an agreement
satisfactory to the British and American governments,
which could become the basis for a quadripartite
treaty."
After Webster had expressed a desire to come to an
understanding over the question,** Granville, on January
23, 1852, instructed Crampton to enter into a discussion
with him, and outlined various plans of settlement to
be proposed to the American secretary of state. It
was the desire of the British government, Granville
wrote, that the whole Mosquito question should be set-
tled, and especially that it should be settled in such a
manner as to secure the cordial assent and good will of
the United States. The only stipulation upon which the
government insisted was that the settlement be con-
sistent with British honor.**
But the change which almost immediately again took
place in the Foreign Office, as well as the preoccupation
of Webster with other matters,*" prevented any definite
progress from being made before events at Greytown
once more attracted attention to that place.
*" U. S. Docs., sen no. 819, doc. 25, pp. 47-48.
" Webster, Writings and Speeches, XIV, 480.
^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 117.
^^ Ibid., 124-126.
^ Ibid., 131, 143, 144, 146.
126 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
The difficulty this time rose from the instructions
given Commodore Parker before his departure for
Greytown. These had stated that the United States
acknowledged no right in the government or vessels of
Great Britain to exercise any police or supervision over
American merchant vessels in Nicaragua or elsewhere,
out of British dominions ; on the contrary, the first
article of the convention between the United States and
Great Britain relative to Nicaragua, signed April 19,
1850, excluded each of the contracting parties from
assuming or exercising any dominion over Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central
America.**
This view of the matter was presented by Parker to
Captain Fead, who in turn reported it to his govern-
ment. Upon receipt of Fead's letter, Granville wrote
in an injured tone to Crampton with regard to Parker's
language :
Her Majesty's Government cannot admit such an interpreta-
tion of the Convention of the 19th of April, by which, as under-
stood by Her Majesty's Government, Great Britain is not
precluded from protecting the Mosquitos but is only restricted
from occupying, fortifying, or colonizing, or of assuming or
exercising any dominion over the Mosquito Coast or any part
of Central America; and Her Majesty's Government will there-
fore resist any attempt on the part of Nicaragua or any other
Power to take possession of Greytown, or of any portion of the
Mosquito territory, until some arrangement is concluded
between Great Britain and the United States."
With his letter Granville inclosed a report from Sey-
mour, showing matters to be in a critical condition at
Greytown. The language of some of Parker's officers
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 614, doc. 6, p. 4.
"' Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 127.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 127
was of so unfriendly a nature as to cause the British
officers at the place to fear that they would further a
threatened attack on the port by the Nicaraguans. In
consequence of these demonstrations, Seymour had
ordered an additional vessel to Greytown.''
With reference to this situation, Granville stated that
in order to maintain a good understanding between the
two countries it was desirable that, until a final settle-
ment could be reached, a provisional agreement be
made, by which, without entering into any question of
right of possession, both parties should recognize the
existing government of Greytown as a merely de facto
body, existing there for the benefit of commerce and
the maintenance of order ; and that in accordance with
this agreement British subjects and American citizens
at Greytown be enjoined to respect the local laws and
pay the local port dues, and the commanders of British
and American vessels stationed or arriving at the port
be instructed to enforce respect to these laws and regu-
lations."
The view given by Granville as to the bearing of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty upon the Mosquito protectorate
is of interest because it is the first expression of opinion
upon the subject exchanged between the two govern-
ments and is a slight hint of the long and bitter discus-
sions over the interpretation of the treaty which were
to come with more aggressive administrations in Eng-
land and the United States. But at this time no discus-
sion resulted, for when Crampton called Webster's
attention to the matter, the Secretary of State replied
that he by no means held the doctrine, which, from the
terms of the Foreign Secretary's letter, the British
o^Ibid., 128. ^Ibid., 127-128.
128 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
government seemed to infer was that held by the Amer-
ican government. On the contrary, he said, he was
" well aware that each Government still held its own
opinion as to the rights of Nicaragua and Mosquito to
Grey town " and that it was for the purpose of remov-,
ing and reconciling these recognized differences ofi
opinion that he was engaged in negotiations upon the
subject with the British minister.*" Furthermore, Web-
ster received with favor Granville's proposal to recog-
nize the de facto government at Greytown.*" Therefore,
in accordance with a suggestion from Webster, identi-
cal instructions, with full power to come to an agree-
ment and execute the details of the arrangement, were
sent to Parker and Seymour by their respective govern-
ments.*'
But before the instructions for this mutual arrange-
ment were given, another event took place at the storm-
center, which threatened further to embarrass the
situation. On February 28 there met in San Juan a
body of men largely composed of Americans — resident
merchants *' and adventurers, pausing on their way to
California.** This assemblage passed resolutions ex-
pressing a desire for a more satisfactory government
than that existing under the Anglo-Mosquito authori-
ties, and indicating the determination to establish a new
government based upon power to be obtained from
Nicaragua, which was declared to be the rightful owner
of the territory. In accordance with the resolutions, a
committee of fifteen was appointed with instructions to
"'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 134. ]
"^ Ibid. '^ Ibid., 134-137. '^ Ibid., 110-112, 139.
•° Ibid., 137, 151.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 129
proceed to Nicaragua and secure a charter of incor-
poration/""
Crampton, upon learning of these proceedings, imme-
diately realized that the plans of the Americans could
not be carried into effect without the violent expulsion
of the existing authorities at Greytown — an event
likely to cause misunderstandings or collisions between
the British and American naval officers at the port, and.
consequently, bad feeling between their governments/"
Therefore, he promptly communicated with Webster,
and the two agreed upon a set of instructions which
was sent to the British and American naval officers sta-
tioned at Greytown."^ These instructions were similar
to those recently furnished to Parker and Seymour,^"'
who were at the time so far apart that it would be long
before they could meet and come to an agreement.""
This prompt action and the good judgment of the act-
ing British consul at Greytown "" apparently convinced
the disaffected Americans that they could not count on
any support from their government, and caused their
plans to come to nothing.*"*
But the increase of immigration to the California
gold fields and the popularity of the Nicaragua route
had in four years' time quite changed the character of
the population of Greytown, as well as greatly added
to its numbers.*"' The American residents, who were
the most numerous,"' complained of British influence
and attributed the difficulties which constantly rose in
the town, not to Mosquito, but to British interference."'
Therefore, Green, who acted as British consul and agent
for the Mosquito king, and was in the latter capacity
^0^ Ibid., 138-139. ^'"■Ihid.. 137. ^"^ Ibid. ^^Ibid., 140-142.
i«*/6trf., 137. i»5/W(i., 150-152. i»«7fc«d., 151-152. >»'/6td., 169.
^'>'Ibid., 168. '"» Ibid., 168-169.
10
130 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
chairman of the town council/" decided to remove the
cause of friction by withdrawing from all direct inter-
ference with the management of the local govern-
ment/" He was very probably also moved to this
resolve by fear of another attempt such as that made
in February to overthrow Mosquito sovereignty at
Greytown and establish that of Nicaragua. Conse-
quently, on April i, he called a meeting of the inhabi-
tants and transferred to them the power of self-govern-
ment."^ The result was the establishment of a free
town corresponding in a small way to the German cities
of Hamburg or Bremen."' A new constitution was
formed, and under it new officers were elected."* The
inhabitants, who preferred a government of their own
to being under the dominion of Nicaragua, now unani-
mously expressed a dislike for that state and declared
their intention of forcibly resisting any attempt of the
Nicaraguans to occupy the place."° However, they had
no objection to the nominal supremacy of the Mosquito
king, and permitted his flag to fly over the town."'
While the accidental discovery of gold in the Cali-
fornia Sierras was thus causing the cessation of active
British interference at Greytown, negotiations for the
final disposal of the Mosquito question had made some
headway. At Webster's request, Crampton had out-
lined a plan for the settlement of the dispute, to which
the British government would agree. This provided
for the cession of Greytown and a district to the north
of it to Nicaragua, in return for a sum of money to be
paid to the Mosquitos ; for the establishment of a
^'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 168-169.
"*/6»rf. ^ Tbid.. 169. "* Ibid.. 168, 169.
^*Ibid., 169-173. ^"Ibid.. 169-170. "''Ibid., 168, 188.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 131
definite boundary for the remainder of the Mosquito
territory wherein the rights of the Indians were to be
respected ; and for the settlement of the boundary dis-
pute by giving to Costa Rica the district of Guanacaste
and all territory south of the San Juan, together with a
limited right of navigation of the river."' After a con-
ference upon the matter, Webster failed to approve
of the arrangement, and seemed inclined to the cession
of Greytown to Nicaragua without an equivalent, as
Nicaragua was without funds ; and he proposed the
recommendation of union between the Nicaraguans and
Mosquitos, the latter becoming Nicaraguan citizens.
Crampton on his part objected to this plan as inadvis-
able and inconsistent with the position which the British
had always held in regard to Mosquito, a position from
which, he said, Webster must feel they could not honor-
ably recede."* Finally Webster again told him to draw
up the articles in a manner acceptable to the British
government, and to add such improvements and condi-
tions as should occur to him."' Crampton did this,^
modifying his project in the hope of meeting the most
serious objections of the United States.*^ This project
he sent to his government, which, after making some
slight modifications, returned the articles with its ap-
proval.^ The document then became the basis of a
plan of settlement.
There is no evidence that in the negotiations which
followed Webster made any attempt to force the Brit-
ish out of Central America. The Fillmore administra-
tion restricted its interest in that region almost wholly
^■^ Ibid., 142-143. ^^Ibid., 143. ^^ Ibid., 144.
"»7fc»d., 144-146. ^ Ibid., 144. ^"^ Ibid., 147-150.
132 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
to gaining protection for the transisthmian canal,*^
though it had no intention of recognizing the Mosquito
kingdom."* The British, on the other hand, took the
same attitude as during the negotiation of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty. The aim was to effect a settlement
entirely satisfactory to the United States, and at the
same time to save what the British government called
its " honour ", in connection with the Mosquito pro-
tectorate and the Mosquito claims. Great Britain no
longer harbored selfish designs in connection with her
former allies ; but it was necessary that the Indians be
secured from the possible tyranny of Nicaragua. The
object of the supplementary project was to effect this,
and there is no reason to doubt that the British intended
to withdraw all of their officials from the IMosquito
territory, should the treaty, of which the project was
meant to become a basis, be ratified.^ However, out of
regard for British pride no concession could be made
to the Nicaraguan government which could possibly be
interpreted as an acknowledgment that the seizure of
San Juan had been unjustifiable, or that the claims of
Mosquito sovereignty and independence on which it
had been based were a mere convenient pretense. With
these objects in view, the articles were worked over,
and, after various changes had been made, they were
signed by the negotiators, on April 30. 1852."' The
substance of the arrangement was as follows :
( I ) Definite boundaries should be established for the
Mosquitos, who were to relinquish Greytown and a
"^Webster, Writings and Speeches, XI\', 6j6.
^Ibid.. 471.
^'■'^ See above, p. io8.
^'''' Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence witli the United
States respecting Central America ", 158.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 133
tract of territory to the north of San Juan River to
Nicaragua. In return for this cession, the Mosquitos
were to have for three years the net receipts of all
duties levied and collected at Greytown, at the rate of
ten per cent, ad valorem on all goods imported into
the state. The protection of the Indians was to be
secured by an agreement on the part of Nicaragua not
to molest them within their territorial reserve.
(2) Nothing in the preceding article should prevent
the Mosquitos from voluntarily incorporating them-
selves with the Nicaraguans, in which case they were
to be on the same basis as other citizens of Nicaragua.
Greytown was to be established as a free port.
(3) Boundaries were to be defined between Nicara-
gua and Costa Rica, giving to the latter all of the
territory south of the San Juan, and limited privileges
of navigation in this river.
Articles four to seven contained provisions intended
to facilitate the construction of the canal or to govern
•, 127
its use.
As neither Molina nor Marcoleta had been consulted
regarding this last plan of arrangement,^ the negotia-
tors attached to it a statement that the propositions, so
far as they pertained to the governments of Costa Rica
and Nicaragua, were merely advisory and recommen-
datory ; but their immediate consideration by those
governments was earnestly invoked. Furthermore,
unless these states promptly agreed to the general basis
^' Ibid., 155-158.
^' Molina had been ignored because the terms he demanded for land
on the Costa Rican side of the San Juan, to be used by the canal com-
pany, were considered unreasonable by Webster. Marcoleta had re-
mained without powers or instructions until the project was practically
complete. U. S. Docs. ,^ser. no. 819, doc. 25, pp. 64, 66.
134 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
of the arrangement and adopted proper measures for
carrying it into effect, the British and American gov-
ernments would immediately agree between themselves
upon such measures as they should deem advisable to
carry into full execution the terms of the treaty of
April 19, 1850."'
Since it was very desirable that the whole affair be
terminated before the American Congress adjourned,
Webster suggested that the proposals be sent directly
to Central America for submission to the governments
concerned. Crampton agreed to this, although the
revised draft had not yet been approved by his govern-
ment. Accordingly, it was decided that Kerr, who was
at Nicaragua, should present the project to that govern-
ment, and that a special agent, Robert Walsh, should
be sent to Costa Rica to obtain her consent. In behalf
of the British government, the proposals should be pre-
sented to both Costa Rica and Nicaragua by Wyke, the
successor of Chatfield, who had some time before
arrived in Washington on his way to his post. At the
suggestion of President Fillmore, he had awaited the
completion of the project in order that he might pro-
ceed to Central America in company with the American
special agent, and thus make apparent to the Nica-
raguans that the British and American governments
were in harmony regarding the matter."" The plan was
carried out, and Walsh and Wyke sailed from New
York on May 10, intending to proceed first to Costa
Rica."'
Some time before this Webster had sent Kerr careful
instructions for the presentation of the subject to the
"^^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Coins., vol. LX, "Correspondence with United
States respecting Central America ", 157-158.
"'> Ibid., 146. ^'^ Ibid., 159-
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1850-1852 135
Nicaraguan government. In anticipation of probable
objection to payment for the return of Greytown, Kerr
was directed to point out that the port had not been in
Nicaraguan possession since January, 1848, when Nica-
raguan authority was forcibly expelled. The hopeless-
ness of inducing the British government to agree to
the cession without equivalent was also to be hinted at ;
but Kerr was to assure Nicaragua that by agreeing to
pay the compensation the Nicaraguan government
would by no means be chargeable with inconsistency
or dishonor, but would only be yielding to the stronger
party, a frequent occurrence in the world's history.^
Such arguments were not likely to appeal to the proud
Nicaraguans, but they were the strongest that Webster
had to offer.""
Kerr used his best efforts, but the Nicaraguans
looked upon the project with anything but favor. Vari-
ous reasons prompted their attitude. Naturally, they
objected to giving any sort of compensation for the
return of the port which they had repeatedly and
emphatically declared to be their own. To make this
objection more decided was the fact that Castellon,
who had won prominence by his stand on the claims
regarding Greytown, was now secretary of foreign
affairs.*" Moreover, the Nicaraguans had begun to
feel that they had been betrayed by the American
government,"' which seemed to have gone over to the
enemy. The hopes held out by the Monroe doctrine,
reflected in the speeches of Hise and Squier, had not
been fulfilled. Instead, the American government had
united with the British in recommending settlement on
1^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 819, doc. 25, pp. 77-79.
'^^ Ibid., 97-99. ^^ Ibid., p. 93. ^^ Ibid., pp. loo-ioi.
136 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
terms humiliating to Nicaraguan pride ; and the recom-
mendation had been reinforced by a threat/" Further-
more, American citizens had been guilty of high-handed
conduct in Nicaragua. The canal company had usurped
powers not granted by the contract ; *" San Juan had
been converted into a free city, through the influence of
North Americans ; and the United States, in co-opera-
tion with Great Britain, continued to protect the place/"
As an indication of its feelings, the Nicaraguan govern-
ment on July 20, a few days after the proposals were
presented, issued a decree which contained a refusal to
consider such an arrangement as that recommended, an
expression of a desire for settlement by impartial arbi-
tration, and a declaration that the state of Nicaragua
solemnly protested against all foreign interference in
matters of her administration and against the use of
force to restrain her will and her rights."'
Wyke, having promptly secured the consent of the
Costa Rican government to the project,*** proceeded to
Managua, the Nicaraguan capital, which he reached on
July 26,"' but a few days after the decree had been
issued. Kerr informed him of his lack of success ; '**
Wyke nevertheless presented the proposed arrange-
ment in the name of his government, but was met with
the answer that " the sacrifices demanded of Nicaragua
were too great for that Government ever to make, and
that they were ready to take the consequences, what-
ever they might be, of refusing to come to the proposed
arrangement." "'
i3« U. S. Docs., ser. no. 819, doc. 25, p. 123.
^^'' Ibid., pp. loo-ioi. '"^ Ibid., pp. loo-ioi, 104-106.
^^* Ibid., pp. 103-104. ^*'' Ibid., pp. 91-92.
^*^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the I'nited
States respecting Central .America ", 191.
1" Ibid. '" Ibid.
ATTEMPTS AT READJUSTMENT, 1S50-1852 i37
Thus, after negotiations extending over a period of
two years, all attempts to carry out the terms of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty had proved failures. Yet it is
by no means certain that at this time any arrangement
based upon that ambiguous document could have been
made w^hich v^^ould have been acceptable to all of the
parties concerned. Though the British were anxious
for a definite settlement, in view of the concessions
which they had gained from the United States by
means of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, it seems hkely
that even a much more aggressive administration than
that in power would have found it difficult to induce
them at this time to give up Greytown without com-
pensation to the Mosquitos. England most probably
would have met any American attempt to secure such
terms by a studied policy of evasion.
Yet it seems clear that the American negotiator did
not do his best to effect a speedy and satisfactory settle-
ment, which would secure for Nicaragua such an
arrangement as that state had at an earlier date been
led to expect. Though Webster for a time firmly in-
sisted upon being guided in the negotiations by the
wishes of Nicaragua, he later, as has been seen,
retreated from this stand, though probably from justi-
fiable reasons, and negotiated a project of arrangement
which was a virtual disavowal of the earlier attitude
of the American government. The project went fur-
ther than the much-criticised treaty, the spirit of which
it was intended to carry out; for while the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty tacitly recognized the existence of a pro-
tectorate in Central America, the Webster- Crampton
arrangement was, by its terms, practically an acknowl-
138 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
edgment of Mosquito sovereignty/" This project
marks the low tide of American interest in Central
America during the period between 1850 and i860,
and the Webster-Fillmore administration which made
it possible covers the period when British influence
most nearly dominated the policy of the United States
in that region.""
i« After the departure of Walsh and Wyke for Central America, word
came from Malmesbury directing various changes in the project. Upon
learning that these modifications could not be introduced before the
proposals should be submitted to Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the Foreign
Secretary wrote: " If I were not conscious of the great difficulties which
you must have encountered in inducing the United States Government
to enter into any agreement at all by which they should admit the
independence of the Mosquitos, whose very existence as a nation the
United States, as well as the Central American States, have hitherto
constantly denied, I should be unable to conceal the regret I feel that
so wide a departure had been admitted from the original Project." Pari
Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United States re-
specting Central America ", 165.
"" An effort was made to keep secret the terms of this project, but
Marcoleta, to whom a copy was loaned, angry at being left out of the
discussion, permitted them to be published in a newspaper. U S Docs
ser. no. 819, doc. 25, p. 79; Dept. of State, Inst, Am. States, vol 15'
p. 59- They appeared in the North American and United States Gazette
of June 28, 1852, by which they were severely criticised. The Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, said the article, was made for the express purpose of
driving the British out of Central America, and of compelling the
relinquishment of the Mosquito protectorate. The present scheme of
settlement was a surrender of the American policy on this continent;
It admitted England as protector of the Mosquito Indians. Let the
Senate look to it.
CHAPTER V.
The Bay Islands Colony and the New Interpre-
tation OF THE ClAYTON-BuLWER TrEATY,
1852-1854.
While the English and American negotiators, in a
spirit of friendly understanding, had been vainly trying
to settle the Mosquito question, trouble was brewing in
another quarter. On March 20, 1852, by royal procla-
mation, Ruatan, Bonacca, and four neighboring islands
were erected into the British " Colony of the Bay
Islands " ; and thus Clayton's fears regarding the evil
possibilities of the word " dependencies " in the Belize
declaration were realized. This act eventually led both
the British and American governments to assume ex-
treme and decided attitudes towards the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty and caused the Mosquito question to
develop into the more complicated and dangerous Cen-
tral American question. In view of this fact, it is
desirable to determine, if possible, the motives of the
British government in its relations with the Bay
Islands.
The later interest of the British government in the
islands, like its interest in the port and river of San
Juan, rose chiefly from a fear that they might be mon-
opolized by some other government in connection with
a transisthmian highway, and, in consequence, British
commercial and political power be crippled. The most
dangerous rival, obviously, was the United States ; and
139
140 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the bold and rapid advance of that nation towards the
southwest gave very vaHd grounds for suspicion. The
aggressions of the British upon the Bay Islands pre-
vious to 1850, it will be remembered, kept pace with
American territorial expansion.
There were two important differences, however,
between the attitude of the British government towards
the San Juan route and towards Ruatan, with its desir-
able harbors. The former could be made neutral and
of equal benefit to all nations ; but this could scarcely
be done in the case of the latter. After the dissolution
of the Central American confederation, it seemed
hardly likely that, should the canal be built, the island
would remain under the sovereignty of the weak Hon-
duran republic. Instead, it was almost certain to be
seized by some strong commercial power. Moreover,
though the British government realized that the United
States would never permit any foreign monopoly of the
canal route, there was no particular reason to believe
that a similar stand would be taken with regard to the
Bay Islands, especially as they had been kept pretty
well out of the early discussion preceding the formation
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Some such thoughts
probably determined the British government quietly to
maintain its hold upon the islands ; and the statement
which Bulwer handed to Clayton at the time of ratifi-
cation, containing as it did the reference to " depend-
encies ",* was undoubtedly meant to save the islands
from the terms of the treaty.
But in view of the unwillingness of the nation to
undergo further expense for the protection of new
^ It will be remembered that tlie Hay Islands were governed to some
extent from Relize.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 141
colonies/ the British government had discouraged the
settlement of British subjects on the islands.' The aim
of the cabinet seems to have been to hold the islands,
more especially Ruatan, against all intruders until the
canal should be built, when they should be declared a
British possession, and become an important commer-
cial station on the way to the Pacific. But in spite of
discouragement from their government, many British
subjects took up their residence on the islands, and,
evidently at the instigation of British agents in Central
America,* sent repeated petitions to London, asking for
protection." This situation, as well as the compromis-
ing attitude of Clayton towards the Bay Islands while
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was before the Senate, and
the fact that the Webster-Fillmore administration had
been primarily interested in guaranteeing the canal
route and had seemed indifferent to British aggressions
in other parts of Central i\merica, led directly to the
proclamation of the Bay Islands colony.
What would have been the American attitude
towards this act had the Whigs won in the election of
1852 may well be left to conjecture; but it was very
evident from the first that the Democrats, whose ambi-
tious plans had been interrupted by a Whig adminis-
tration, would not passively acquiesce in such an
arrangement. Harbingers of coming difficulty ap-
peared before the old administration went out. A
newspaper announcement regarding the new British
^ Colonial Office to Greaves, Jan. 18, 1849, C. O., Hond., vol. 78.
'Lord Grey to Sir Charles Grey, April 14, 185 1, ibid., vol. 80, no. iii.
* Squier, Notes on Central America, 375-376; Michell, " Island of
Ruatan ", in United Service Magazine, 1850, II, S44-S4S.
'Colonial Office to Greaves, Jan. 18, 1849, C. C, Hond., vol. 78; Sir
Charles Grey to Lord Grey, Dec. 11, 1850, ibid., vol. 80, no. 33; Lord
Grey to Sir Charles Grey, April 14, 185 1, ibid., no. iii.
142 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
colony had attracted attention in the United States ; °
consequently, shortly after Congress met in December,
the Senate carried a resolution, offered by Cass of
Michigan, requesting the President to communicate
any information which he might possess respecting the
establishment of a new British colony in Central Amer-
ica, together with a statement of what measures, if any,
had been taken by the Executive to prevent the viola-
tion of the treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, which provided that neither party should
" occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume dominion
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or
any part of Central America ".'
The President stated in his reply of a few days later
that no information of the character requested had been
received by the State Department/ But with the mes-
sage were inclosed Palmerston's declaration regarding
Belize and the notes exchanged by Clayton and Bulwer
with regard to it.' Thus, for the first time, the declara-
tion became known to the Senate as a whole.
This at once produced an attack on Taylor's adminis-
tration in general, and particularly on his secretary of
state, who was charged with willfully concealing the
correspondence. Cass and other Democrats now de-
clared emphatically that had they understood that the
treaty was not meant to apply to Belize they would
never have voted for it. His object in voting for the
treaty, Cass stated, had been to free Central America
'Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 141. A very caustic article upon
the subject, written by Squier, appeared in the Democratic Review for
November-December, 1852.
''Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 201-202, 205.
* Ibid., 205. ' Ibid., 206-207.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 143
from all British influence. In view of the declaration,
the British government had far better grounds for its
supposed actions than he had at first believed/"
The defense of the administration was assumed by
Seward, among others, and he defended Clayton from
the charges brought against him, showing that the
opposition could hardly have been so ignorant of the
intentions of the treaty, immediately after ratification,
as they pretended. The main object of the treaty, the
defense declared, had been the building of the canal,
and the aim had been merely to limit the encroachments
of the British within the five republics of Central Amer-
ica, of which Belize was not a part."
This debate, and those following Clayton's election
to Congress as senator from Delaware, were of a very
bitter nature; and from an attack upon the Whig
administration they soon changed to a denunciation
of Great Britain. They pointed out that though more
ithan two years had elapsed since the ratification of the
itreaty, British relations in Central America had under-
gone practically no change, and charged the British
government with violating the terms of compact."
Throughout the debates, the extreme Democrats
maintained that the intention of the treaty had been to
remove all British influence from Central America,
Belize included. These claims, though not without
foundation in the words of the treaty itself, were evi-
dently more extravagant than those held by the same
members at the time when the treaty was completed.
The change was probably due partly to the fact that
'" Cotij/. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 237-238; 33 Cong., i sess.. Appendix,
61-72.
'^^ Ihid., 32 Cong., 2 sess., 247, 266-272, 414-416.
^^ Ibid., 2 and 3 sess.. Appendix, 245, 247-256, 257-279, 284-290.
144 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the canal company had failed to fulfill its contract;"
and thus the building of the canal, which it had been
hoped would be begun immediately, was indefinitely
postponed. Naturally, therefore, interest was shifted
from the theoretical canal to the actual British en-
croachments. The bitterness of feeling in the Senate,
caused by the reported British colonization of the Bay
Islands, was undoubtedly also increased by the recent
revelation of British efforts to thwart American de-
signs in Cuba. While extending her own territory by
direct violation of treaty engagements, Great Britain,
in co-operation with France, had tried to induce the
United States to enter into a tripartite treaty, guaran-
teeing Cuba to Spain. The proposal had been em-
phatically refused by the Fillmore administration, but
resentment at British interference lingered."
The President's message in reply to the Senate reso-
lution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, which was also instructed to determine what
measures, if any, should be taken regarding the Belize'
declaration." In its report the committee stated that it
had obtained unofficial information, which appeared tO'
be true, regarding the supposed new British colony in:
Central America, and had proceeded with its investiga-
tion as if the information were official. The committee
accordingly reported that the Bay Islands formed a part
of the republic of Honduras, and hence were a part
of Central America ; consequently, any occupation or
^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 214-216.
^■' Schouler, History of the United States, V, 251-232.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 671, doc. 407, p. i.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 145
colonization of them would be a violation of the treaty
of April 19, 1850."
As regarded Belize, the committee offered the
decided opinion that the settlement, as defined by the
treaties with Spain, lay within the territory of the
Guatemalan republic, and therefore also formed a part
of Central America. And it further stated that, should
this opinion be correct, while it was not prepared to
say that the treaty of 1850 would require the abandon-
ment of those settlements by Great Britain, yet the
United States government would have just cause of
complaint against any extension of the boundaries
beyond those prescribed by Spain, or as further allowed
by the republic where they might be found ; and that
in any manner to enlarge or change the character of the
settlements by any mode of jurisdiction would be a
violation of the treaty." Furthermore, even should the
settlements be found later to be outside of Central
America, and thus not come within the strict engage-
ments of the treaty, yet any colonies or other perma-
nent establishments erected there by Great Britain or
any other European power must necessarily excite the
most anxious concern of the American government,
and would, if persisted in, " lead to consequences of
most unpleasant character "."
As to the resolution of the Senate with reference to
Belize, the committee reported that the declaration of
the British government and the reply made to it by the
American secretary of state imported nothing more
than an admission on the part of the two governments,
or their functionaries, at the time of the exchange of
ratifications, that nothing contained in the treaty was
"7i>td., p. 17. ^' Ibid. ^Ibid.
II
146 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
to be considered as affecting the title or existing rights
of Great Britain to the English settlements in Honduras
Bay, and, consequently, that no measures were neces-
sary on the part of the Senate because of such declara-
tion and reply."
This report was plainly a sharp return to Monroe-
doctrine principles with reference to Central America,
and it was a strong indication of the poHcy to be pur-
sued by the incoming administration.
The stir created in Congress by the rumors of a new
colony in Central America and by the presentation of
the Belize correspondence quickly became known to the
British government, but that government seemed un-
moved by the attack upon it, and determined to pursue
a conciliatory policy. In fact, it rather appears as if
the policy became more conciliatory in consequence of
American criticism, for two days after the receipt of a
despatch from Crampton, reporting the Cass resolu-
tion,*" Russell, now foreign secretary, wrote to Cramp-
ton offering terms for the settlement of the Mosquito
question. Conditions had so changed, he explained,
since the assumption of the Mosquito protectorate that
the British now no longer had any interest in the
Indians other than that derived from an honorable
regard for their old connection with them. In conse-
quence of this change, the British government had for
several years vainly tried to suit its engagements to the
altered circumstances. Now he suggested that an
agreement be made by the British and American gov-
ernments with the authorities at Greytown, making that
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 671, doc. 407, p. 17.
^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 200-201, 204-214, 217, 222-235.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 H7
place a free and independent port, after the payment
of proper indemnity to the Indians. Plans for the pro-
tection of the Mosquitos were also offered. In conclu-
sion, the Foreign Secretary added that though it was
the intention of the British government to do all that
honor and humanity demanded in behalf of the Mos-
quitos, it intended to adhere strictly to the treaty of
1850, and not to assume any sovereignty, directly or
indirectly, in Central America.^
In a letter written later on the same day Russell
referred to the plans already outlined and expressed
the desire of the British government to make Mosquito
a reality instead of a fiction. He acknowledged that
while Greytown was virtually a possession and Mos-
quito a dependency of Great Britain, it was not un-
natural that the United States should have looked upon
that state of things with jealousy and aversion, and
should have sided with Nicaragua ; this, however, had
all been changed by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and the
great question now was how to turn the Mosquito
country to the best account for the whole world.
Therefore Crampton was instructed to present the
matter in this light to the American secretary of state,
explaining that honor required the British government
to provide liberally and permanently for the Indians,
but that, this point being secured, it had no objection
to arranging with the United States for insuring the
more rapid settlement and colonization of the Mosquito
territory, and for establishing its future administration.
Once established, the new state would soon become
independent of both Great Britain and the United
States, and probably soon be able to protect itself.'"
^ Ibid., 202-203. ^^ Ibid., 203-204.
148 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
These proposals, it will be noted, utterly disregarded
the rights of Nicaragua and were in conformity with
the threat contained in the Webster-Crampton project,
to ignore the Central American states concerned,
should they refuse to accept the project as a basis of
settlement.
But the suggestions of Russell met with no favor
from Everett, who upon Webster's death had become
secretary of state. In a communication to the Presi-
dent, Everett declared it more advisable to attempt to
secure Nicaragua's acceptance of the Webster-Fillmore
arrangement, than to resort to terms less favorable to
her.^' However, as the Fillmore administration was
almost ended, no measures were taken, in consequence
of Russell's proposals, to settle the dispute at that time.
The character of the claims made in the Senate for
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty soon convinced the British
government that in order to avoid serious misapprehen-
sion it was very desirable that the American govern-
ment be given clearly to understand the British view
of the treaty, and the conduct which the British govern-
ment intended to pursue in regard to it. Consequently,
on May 27, Clarendon, who as Russell's successor was
again in the Foreign Office, wrote to Crampton with
reference to the matter. Great Britain, he declared,
intended to observe religiously all of the engagements
of the treaty, but she had nowhere in that agreement
renounced, and never had intended to renounce, "the
full and absolute right which she possessed over her
own lawful territories in Central America. Neither
had she renounced the protection which she had for
^'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America", 218-222.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1S54 149
centuries afforded, and still afforded, to the Mosquito
territory. The Foreign Secretary then reverted to the
efforts which had been made by the British government
to adjust matters in Central America, asserting that it
was still ready and desirous to effect a settlement. He
added, however, that until such arrangement was made
his government could not abandon its present position,
nor permit either Nicaragua or Honduras to assert or
attempt to establish by force a right of possession
which the British government had always denied, and
still denied."
Crampton made known this attitude to Marcy,
Pierce's secretary of state, who replied that he was not
yet able to say what would be the opinion of the Ameri-
can government in regard to the interpretation of the
treaty, but that the matter was then being considered
by the cabinet. He added that Buchanan, who had
recently been appointed United States minister to Eng-
land, would probably be instructed upon the subject
and empowered to discuss it with the British foreign
secretary.^
Buchanan, who as Polk's secretary of state had taken
much interest in the Mosquito question, now shrewdly
planned for the settlement of the larger Central Ameri-
can question into which it had grown. On May 29 he
wrote to Marcy and revealed his plan. It provided that
the treaty with Great Britain regarding the Canadian
fisheries and reciprocity be perfected at Washington,
where it had been begun, with the exception of its
final execution, which should be made to await the
result of the negotiation to be carried on by Buchanan
in London.'* Buchanan believed that if the reciprocity
'* Ibid., 247-249. ^ Ibid., 252.
^ Buchanan, Works, IX, i.
150 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
treaty, which England was anxious to conclude, were
held in suspense, she might be induced to abandon her
pretensions in Central America.*' Should such a plan
as he mentioned not prove feasible, he suggested that
the Central American question be settled in connection
with the others at Washington.^
Pierce, however, opposed the first plan, because he
believed that the delay necessary to the completion of
a Central American treaty might lead to actual collision
between the two countries upon the fishing grounds ; "
the second plan he found equally objectionable, for he
felt that to attempt to settle all of the questions at
Washington would simply be to complicate difficulties.^
In consequence of the President's disapproval of his
suggestions, Buchanan declined the mission, for he
believed that without some such arrangement as he had
proposed the settlement of the Central American ques-
tion would be delayed for years.^ He was finally
induced to accept the post, however, and agreed to do
his best towards effecting a settlement ; ^ but it was
only with great reluctance that he gave up his idea of
making the reciprocity treaty wait upon a settlement
with reference to Central America."
Marcy's instructions to Buchanan were written July
2, 1853. Since the acquisition of CaHfornia, he stated, \
Great Britain had manifested a more deliberate design
to change the Belize settlement into a British dominion.
Such a design would not be disregarded by the Ameri-
can government. Acts passed by Great Britain in 181 7
and 1819, as well as the treaty made with Mexico in
"Buchanan, Works, VIII, 511; IX, 19.
^ Ibid., IX, 2-3, 23-24. ^''Ibid., VIII, sii; IX, I, 10, 19.
*»/fcid., IX, 23-24. a/fciJ., IX, 1-2. "Ibid., 2, 24. "Ibid., 3.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, i8 52-1854 151
1826, clearly showed that Belize was not within British
dominion ; therefore, while the American government
conceded that Great Britain had rights in Belize, it
positively denied that Belize was a British province, and
it was bound to resist any attempt to convert the settle-
ment into a colony."
Though the direct object of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, Marcy continued, was ostensibly to guarantee
the transisthmian canal route, the stipulation in the
treaty most regarded by the United States was that for
the discontinuation of Great Britain's assumed protec-
tion over the Mosquito Indians, and with it the removal
of all pretext for interfering with the territorial
arrangements which the Central American states might
wish to make among themselves. It was the intention,
as it was obviously the import, of the treaty of April
19, 1850, to place Great Britain under an obligation to
cease her interposition in the affairs of Central Amer-
ica, and to confine herself to the enjoyment of her
limited rights in Belize. In spite of her agreement not
to occupy, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part
of Central America, Great Britain still asserted the
right to hold possession of and to exercise control over
large districts of that country and important islands in
the Bay of Honduras, the unquestionable appanages of
the Central American states. The object which it was
hoped that Buchanan would be able to accomplish,
Marcy pointed out, was to induce Great Britain to with-
draw from all control over the territories and islands
of Central America, and, if possible, to abstain from
'^Dept. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. 16, no. 2.
152 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
intermeddling with the poHtical aflfairs of the govern-
ments and people of that region.**
The policy of the new administration with
reference to Central America was quite in harmony
with Buchanan's own ideas ; it was, in fact, a reversion
to the old Monroe-doctrine principles of the Polk
administration, which, according to Buchanan, aimed
to sweep geographic Central America clear of all
British influence which had developed since 1786;'°
and the basis of the demands to be made for British
evacuation was to be the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The wording of this document is so ambiguous that
any discussion, at the present time, for the purpose of
getting at its full meaning would be of little profit.
However, an impartial examination of the first article
in connection with the statements in Marcy's letter
leads to the conclusion that, on the whole, such an inter-
pretation of the article as he made was not so unreason-
able as might at first appear, though it was in strong
contrast to that which the Fillmore administration
seemed willing to accept.
It is true that the Belize settlement was originally in
Mexico, but the encroachments of the settlers had been
to the south, into what was plainly Guatemalan terri-
tory; therefore the district between the Sibun and
Sarstoon rivers would evidently come under a strict
application of the treaty terms. Moreover, though
Marcy's intimation that the treaty required the discon-
tinuation of British protection over the Mosquitos was
rather sweeping, it is nevertheless true that a strict
'' Dept. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. i6, no. 2. Most of this instruction
is printed in U. S. Docs., ser. no. 840, doc. i, pp. 42-49.
*° " Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan " in .tm. Hist. Rev., V, 99.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 153
observance of the other terms would have made such
protection a virtual impossibility.
On September 2, some time after Buchanan's arrival
in London, Marcy sent him full powers to negotiate a
treaty with regard to Central America. In his letter
of that date Marcy stated that though the United States
could not claim as a matter of right that Great Britain
should altogether withdraw from Belize, still it was a
very important object to prevail on her to do so. As
to the Bay Islands, he believed that Great Britain had
never defined the character of her claim to possess the
so-called colony; but whatever rights she may have
had to the islands were all relinquished by the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty. However, it seemed wisest to give the
British government a chance to explain its views upon
the matter before presenting a formal protest against
her further occupancy of the colony.^' The President,
he added, expected Buchanan so to treat the subject
as to leave no doubt in the minds of the British minis-
ters that the United States would insist upon the aban-
donment of the islands.'*
As the Crimean War was impending when Buchanan
reached London, it was some time before he was able
to secure an interview with Clarendon, and he thought
it indiscreet under the circumstances to press the mat-
ter,''* but in the last part of October he met Clarendon
by appointment at the Foreign Office and had an inter-
view which he considered highly satisfactory. The
Foreign Secretary on his own account introduced the
^ Such a protest had been previously suggested by Buchanan and was
apparently a favorite idea of his. Buchanan, Works, IX, 29, 65.
*' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 840, doc. i, pp. 49-50.
"" Buchanan, H'orks, IX, 70, 77.
154 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
subject of the Bay Islands and of the general Central
American question, which led Buchanan to express the
wish of his government that the questions be settled
without unnecessary delay. After touching on the best
method of procedure in regard to the negotiations, the
conversation returned to the Bay Islands, and Claren-
don remarked that he believed Ruatan to be a " miser-
able little Island " which had been occupied for many
years by British subjects whose request for some kind
of government had been granted. This, he declared,
was an entirely different case from what it would have
been had the British but recently first occupied the
island.'^
Buchanan replied that he believed it would appear
that the British, far from having occupied Ruatan for
many years, had taken the island by force from Hon-
duras as recently as 1841 ; but, in any event, the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty had disposed of the question, for the
island was unquestionably a part of Central America.
He concluded by averring that the United States had
no idea of acquiring any territory in Central America ;
it desired only that the Central American states be per-
mitted to enjoy in peace what belonged to them, and
that the British and American governments interpose
their good offices to settle the boundary disputes be-
tween them. Neither Great Britain nor the United
States, he believed, had any real interest to pursue
a different course ; moreover, in America all had ex-
pected that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty would produce
that happy result. To Buchanan's wish for the welfare
of Central America Clarendon heartily agreed, and
with that the conversation on the subject ended."
« Buchanan, Works, IX, 77, 80-81. " Ibid., 81-82.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 155
On November 12, a second interview took place. In
the early part of it the Foreign Secretary asked if the
Webster-Crampton project would do for a basis of
settlement; and Buchanan promptly replied that that
agreement was now at an end and could not be con-
sidered. That project, he stated, " both recognized and
constituted the Mosquito Indians as an Independent
Power ; which could never be assented to by the United
States. That these Indians were incapable of govern-
ing themselves ; and the consequence would be that
they must continue to be under the dominion of the
British government." However much the American
government liked Great Britain, it desired her with-
drawal from Central America as quickly as possible.
It was to effect this withdrawal that the United States
had concluded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ; but un-
fortunately the object had not yet been accomplished.
Besides, the United States could never recognize the
right of Great Britain to a protectorate over the Mos-
quito Indians. Clarendon replied that the British gov-
ernment earnestly desired to get rid of its protectorate,
but British honor required that this be done with a
proper regard for the interest and well-being of the
Mosquitos.*'
The plan suggested by Russell in the preceding Jan-
uary was also mentioned by Clarendon, but Buchanan
objected to such an arrangement on the ground that
it would deprive the Central American states of terri-
tory to which they were justly entitled ; furthermore,
this arrangement would perpetuate strife in Central
America, because the states would never cease trying
« Ibid.. 88-90.
156 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
to have the injustice redressed; in short, it would
make confusion worse confounded."
At this second interview Clarendon showed a desire
to avoid mention of the Bay Islands, and the subject
was finally introduced by Buchanan, whereupon Claren-
don, as before, tried to minimize the importance of the
colonization of the islands, and intimated that the
Americans were making " a Mountain out of a Mole
Hill "." To this Buchanan answered — to quote from
his despatch to Marcy :
Whatever you may suppose, I can assure you that this is
the dangerous question ; because we firmly believe that the
establishment of this Colony is a direct violation of the Clayton
and Bulwer Treaty . . . Even if it were a fact that you had
always been in possession of Ruatan, still your obligation to
withdraw from it would, in my opinion, be imperative, under
the Clayton and Bulwer Treaty . . . Let me assure you that
this will be considered a most important question by the Con-
gress and people of the United States ; and I have no doubt
they will arrive at the same conclusion with the Committee
of Foreign Relations of the Senate."
At the conclusion of this interview, Buchanan asked
Clarendon for an official document regarding the colo-
nization of the Bay Islands which Clarendon had pre-
viously promised him, and the Foreign Secretary gave
him a copy of the proclamation, by the lieutenant-
governor of the islands, erecting them into a colony in
the name of the Queen. Buchanan sent this paper —
which contained the first official information regarding
the new colony in Central America to be received by
the American government — to Marcy with his report
of the interview.""
** Buchanan, Works, IX, 91. ** Iliid.. 94. *^ Ibid., 94-95.
■" Ibid., 96, 97. Cf. Pari. Papers, 1836, Coins., XLI\', " Hay Islands ",
1-5-
i
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 157
Clarendon was so preoccupied with the Russo-
Turkish question that Buchanan did not secure a
chance to resume the discussion until the first part of
January. During the interview which then took place
the Foreign Secretary astonished Buchanan by pre-
senting a new interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. That arrangement, he declared, was entirely
prospective in its operations and did not require an
abandonment of any British possessions in Central
America." Bulwer, it will be remembered, took this
view of the treaty from the first,** but a study of the
previous correspondence upon the subject leaves no
doubt that the British government itself had but
recently adopted this interpretation.*' Though it had
hoped that possible American indifference and the
declaration of Palmerston regarding Belize and its
dependencies might limit attention to the Mosquito
Shore, still the British government clearly understood
the treaty to apply to existing as well as to future
relations.
The change of attitude seems to have been due to
several causes. Among these might be mentioned the '
temper which the Pierce administration had shown in
reference to the Belize declaration and the colonization
of the Bay Islands ; congressional criticism of the
British failure to withdraw from Mosquito Shore ;
and the actual difficulty of an honorable withdrawal
which England had experienced in her attempts of the
last two years. The fact that the canal company had
*' Buchanan, Works, IX, 117, 134-135.
"See above, p. 108; also below, p. 163, note 59.
"See above, pp. 108-109, m. 146-147; also below, p. 161. Cf.
Buchanan, Works, IX, 341-342.
158 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
not carried out its contract very probably was also
influential in producing this new stand ; for now no
early commercial gain, as a result of a transisthmian
world highway, seemed likely to appear as compensa-
tion for relinquishing special interests in Central
America.
Thus, after this interview of January, 1854, the
general position of each of the parties on the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty was clear to the other : in the opinion of
the American government, the treaty was meant to be
retrospective as well as prospective, and demanded
British withdrawal from Central America ; to the Brit-
ish government it was only prospective and merely
prohibited further territorial and political extension in
the region.
At this meeting in January Buchanan gave Claren-
don a memorandum containing the views of the Ameri-
can government on the whole Central American
question. The paper was temperately and logically
worded and was a shrewd defense of the American
attitude. The object of the Clayton-Bulwer treat>% it
declared, had been to place the two nations on exact
equality with regard to the interoceanic highway ; con-
sequently, both had agreed never to occupy, fortify,
or exercise dominion over any portion of Central
America. As the United States held no land in the
region, she was simply restrained from making future
acquisitions ; but in the case of Great Britain the lan-
guage applied to the present as well as to the future,
because when the treaty was made she was exercising
dominion over a large portion of the eastern coast of
Central America. Notwithstanding the agreement, the
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 IS9
British government had not taken the first step towards
withdrawing from Central America. The failure to do
so could not result from any obscurity in the treaty
itself, for the first article clearly meant that the con-
tracting parties should not exercise dominion over
Central America, either directly or indirectly. Great
Britain's disregard of treaty obligations was even more
palpable in the case of Ruatan ; not only had she failed
to retire from there, but since the completion of the
treaty she had formed Ruatan and five adjoining
islands into a British colony. In vain had the self-
denying stipulations been made, if Great Britain was to
continue to exercise dominion over the Bay Islands. '"'
Some months elapsed after the interview in January
before further opportunity was given Buchanan regard-
ing the matter, and before a reply was made to his
paper. The reason for this lapse of time is partly to be
found in the pressure of the war question with Russia ;
but a study of the correspondence leads to the suspicion
that it was also due to intentional evasion of the sub-
ject on the part of the British government. This post-
ponement of discussion may have resulted entirely from
a desire to see the outcome of the quarrel between
Russia and Turkey before a more determined stand
should be taken upon the question in dispute with
America ; but Clarendon's words as well as his actions
give cause for the belief that, as Buchanan sus-
pected," he did not find it as easy as he had at first
supposed it would be to defend the British claims in
Central America, or to justify the view that the Clay-
50 Buchanan, Works, IX, 1 18-128.
^^ Ibid., 148, 154, 180-181.
i6o ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ton-Bulwer treaty was intended to be only prospective
in its operations.
At the next interview, which was held April ii,
Clarendon again announced distinctly that the British
government considered the treaty to be entirely pros-
pective, and not as interfering with existing possessions
in Central America. This led Buchanan to point out
that, in view of such interpretation, Palmerston had
put himself to much unnecessary trouble in insisting
upon an acknowledgment, before the exchange of rati-
fications, that the provisions of the treaty did not
embrace Belize. To this Clarendon made no satisfac-
tory answer, and he never did supply Buchanan with
an explanation which reconciled Palmerston's action
with the new interpretation of the treaty. As the
Foreign Secretary promised a written statement of
British views within a few days," but little more was
said regarding the Central American question during
this interview.
Yet the paper was not received until the first week
in May. The statement was, as Buchanan character-
ized it, " rambling and inconclusive in its arguments "."
Clarendon summarily disposed of the Mosquito ques-
tion by stating that the United States would scarcely
expect Great Britain to enter into an explanation of
acts committed by her nearly forty years before, in a
matter in which no right or possession of the United
States was involved. He added, however, that since
the peace of 1815 Spain had never raised a question
with respect to the protectorate ; and that the Central
American republics — if it were to be admitted that the
»' Buchanan, Works. IX, i8o.
-Ibid., 189.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1S52-1854 161
rights and obligations of Spain were vested in them —
had made no remonstrance against the protectorate for
many years, though they well knew that it existed.
Furthermore, though in 1842 the United States govern-
ment was informed of the existence of the protector-
ate," no objection was made up to the end of the year
1849. The protectorate had not been abolished by the
terms of the first article of the treaty ; the American
minister had confounded the conditions of a sovereignty
and a protectorate and had treated the agreement " not
to colonize, nor occupy, nor fortify, nor assume, nor
exercise dominion over ", as including an agreement
not to protect. The British government never claimed,
and did not then claim, any sovereignty over Mosquito ;
but the treaty of 1850 did not, and was not meant to,
annihilate the protectorate which had long been exer-
cised over it.'°
The aim in forming the treaty, Clarendon proceeded,
had been to neutralize the proposed canal ; and in
deciding upon the terms the object of both negotiators
had been presumably to draw up such a convention as,
without conceding any specific point on which one
party could not in honor yield, would make such con-
cessions on all other points as the other party desired.
An examination of the treaty would show that it was
drawn up in such a manner as to make it a matter of
indifference, so far as the canal was concerned, whether
the port and town of San Juan were under the modified
" Macdonald informed Murphy, the American agent in Central Amer-
ica, that the protectorate had been reestablished, and Murphy reported
the fact to his government. Murphy to the Secretary of State, January
20, 1842, Dept. of State, Des., Cen. Am., vol. 2.
'^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 840, doc. i, pp. 81-84.
12
i62 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
protectorate of Great Britain, or under the government
of Nicaragua."
Though, the paper continued, the British government
did not pretend that the treaty by implication recog-
nized the protectorate, still it clearly acknowledged the
possibility of Great Britain or the United States afford-
ing protection to Mosquito, or any other Central Ameri-
can state, and admitted that the intention of the parties
was not to prohibit or abolish, but to limit and restrict,
such a protectorate. Defending and protecting was a
temporary act of friendship ; occupying, colonizing,
fortifying, or acquiring sovereignty were acts having
a permanent result. No one would maintain that the
bar to colonization was a bar to all protection."
As to Belize and its dependencies, neither govern-
ment had ever intended that the treat}'' should interfere
in any way with them ; this was shown by the fact that
the term " Central America " could only be applied to
the territory once included under the term " Central
American republic ", and also by the declarations ex-
changed by Clayton and Bulwer. Moreover, the fact
that, in 1847, the United States sent to Belize a consul
who received his exequatur from the British govern-
ment, gave reason to believe that the term " Belize " in
the declaration meant the Belize with the limits of 1850,
for this act constituted a recognition by the United
States government of the settlement of British Hon-
duras, as it then existed. Furthermore, the limits of
the settlement established in 1786 were abolished by a
subsequent state of war between Spain and England."
•• U. S. Docs., ser. no. 840, doc. i, p. 86.
" Ibid., p. 87. M Ibid., pp. 8990.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852- 1854 163
With reference to Ruatan and the adjoining islands,
Clarendon stated, the only thing debatable was whether
they were dependencies of Belize, or of some Central
American state. An attempt followed to show that the
pretensions of Great Britain to consider Ruatan and
Bonacca dependencies of Belize were of long standing
and existed when the treaty of 1850 was formed, at
which time it was not questioned by the American
government. In consequence of these facts, the British
government could not admit that an alteration in the
internal form of government of these islands was a
violation of the treaty, or afforded to the United States
a just cause of remonstrance.^'
In reply to the views presented by Clarendon,
Buchanan, on July 22, 1854, wrote a long and able
paper, emphasizing his former arguments and present-
ing new ones to meet those of the Foreign Secretary.
An agreement on the part of Great Britain not to
" occupy " any territory then actually occupied by her,
he maintained, clearly was an agreement to withdraw
therefrom. If, as the British government held, the
treaty was only prospective in its nature it amounted
to an American recognition of the British right to ter-
ritory already held in Central America. Such an inter-
pretation entirely destroyed the mutuality of the con-
vention, for it bound the United States, which held no
territory there, not to acquire any. But the British
government, at the time of ratification, must have
regarded the treaty as applying to the present as well
as the future ; otherwise, why the Belize declaration ?
^' Ibid., pp. 90-93. Clarendon's paper was based partially upon argu-
ments furnished by Bulwer. Inclosures in Bulwer to Hammond, Sept.
30, 1854, F- 0-. Cen. Am., vol. 83. See above, p. 108.
i64 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
The fact that no attempt was made to except any other
Central American territory amounted to an admission
that the British were bound to withdraw from all of
their other possessions there*
As for the Bay Islands, even admitting for the sake
of argument that the Belize declaration was binding,
these islands were not excluded by it, for the word
" dependencies " applied only to the small islands in
the neighborhood of the settlement, as stated by Clay-
ton in his note to Bulwer, and not to the large island
of Ruatan which was hundreds of miles from Belize.
The British statement attached much importance to
the fact that Ruatan was occupied by the British in
1850; it was for the reason that not only Ruatan but
the whole eastern coast of Central America was occu-
pied by them that the United States was so anxious
for a convention requiring British withdrawal. But
for this agreement, the United States, in self-defense,
would have been compelled to accept cessions of terri-
tory in Central America." Then followed an investi-
gation into the British title to Ruatan, which Buchanan
showed to rest on very flimsy foundations."
When the treaty was formed, the paper proceeded,
Great Britain had merely taken the first step towards
possessing the island. Consequently, no mention was
made of the matter by the United States government
at the time, for, in view of the terms of the treaty, it
was not doubted that Great Britain would promptly
withdraw. Instead of so doing the British government
had erected Ruatan and five adjoining islands into a
British colony. Clarendon had failed to assert any-
'• Buchanan, Works, IX, 216-217.
'^ Ibid., 317-220. *' Ibid., 320-225.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-18 54 165
where in his paper that any of these five islands had
ever been occupied by the British government previous
to their formation into a colony."
The protection of the San Juan route, far from being
the only feature of the convention, as the statement of
Clarendon seemed to intimate, was only one feature of
a policy far more liberal and extended. This policy
embraced all routes, whether for railroads or canals,
throughout Central America ; and the prohibition of
occupation was co-extensive with the whole territory
over which such canals or railroads might pass. The
American government could not become a party to any
arrangement whereby Great Britain should merely
withdraw from the port and harbor of Greytown and
the northern bank of the San Juan, thus leaving the
remainder of the Mosquito coast in its present condi-
tion ; the American government stood upon the treaty,
and firmly believed that Great Britain should have
abandoned the whole Mosquito territory more than four
years before."
The British statement asserted, Buchanan continued,
that though, in 1842, the American government knew
that the protectorate existed, it did not complain until
1850. The American government had no right under
any treaty with Great Britain until 1850. Had it inter-
fered previous to this time it could have done so only
under the Monroe doctrine, which the British govern-
ment did not recognize. But it should not be concluded
that without this convention the United States would
not have interfered eventually to prevent, if possible,
any portion of Central America from being permanently
occupied or colonized by Great Britain.^'
^ Ibid., 225-226. " Ibid., 230-232. ^^ Ibid., 232-238.
i66 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Finally, the American statement declared, whether
the term " Central America " appearing in the first
article of the treaty was considered in a political or a
geographical sense, it applied to the territor}' between
the Sibun and the Sarstoon, for this was a part of the
province of Vera Paz in Guatemala. Moreover, Clay-
ton's letter to Bulwer upon exchanging ratifications
referred to the convention of 1850 as applying to all of
the Central American states, " with their just limits
and proper dependencies ". Hence, the territory in
question, being within the just limits of the state of
Guatemala, was expressly embraced by the conventionj
The United States emphatically denied that the appoint-
ment of a consul to Belize was even the slightest recog-
nition of British title to the port. Consuls were mere
commercial, and not political, agents. The contention
that the territory between the Sibun and the Sarstoon
was British by right of conquest, Buchanan proved to
be unsound by citing the treaties of 1809 and 1814 with
Spain and the treaty of 1826 with ]\Iexico, as well as
acts of Parliament pased in 1817 and 1819.°*
But regardless of the nature of the British claim to
this territory, the question, as in the case of the Bay
Islands and the Mosquito coast, did not turn upon the
validity of the claim, but upon the fact that Great
Britain had bound herself not to occupy any portion of
Central America, or to exercise dominion over it. As
to Belize proper, limited by the treaties of 1783 and
1786, the United States would not for the present insist
upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from it, provided
all the other questions between the two governments
were settled amicably. But it must be distinctly under-
•" Buchanan, Works. IX, 238-240.
BAY ISLANDS COLONY, 1852-1854 167
stood that the United States government acknowledged
no British claim there except the right to the usufruct
specified in the Spanish treaties, and it recognized the
former Spanish sovereignty as now belonging either
to Guatemala or to Mexico."
Thus, through Buchanan's second formal statement
the attitude of the United States was more clearly
revealed, and such arguments were presented against
the British view as it seemed hardly likely that the
British government would be able to refute. This was
the last word between the two governments for some
time, directly upon the controversy over the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty. Meanwhile events of importance to
British-American relations were taking place in Central
America, and to these attention is now directed.
*' Ibid., 241.
CHAPTER VI.
American Defiance of British Claims, 1853-1855.
At the time when Great Britain and the United States
were approaching what appeared to be irreconcilable
differences over the meaning of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, affairs in Central America were assuming a
correspondingly serious aspect. Borland, Kerr's suc-
cessor as United States minister, was one of the earlier
causes of discord. He was a man of the school of
Squier and worked as assiduously as did the latter to
build up American influence and counteract that of
Great Britain. Upon arriving in Central America, Bor-
land found the British in the ascendancy in Costa Rica
and Salvador, and especially in Guatemala,* where the
American government was particularly hated and
feared because of its recent interference in Mexico.'
Even Nicaragua was suspicious of the United States,
partly because she had come to regard the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty as an abandonment of the Monroe doc-
trine.* In fact, Honduras was the only state which was
at this time distinctly friendly towards the American
1 Wyke to Clarendon, Nov. 27, 1853. T. O., Cen. Am., vol. 79. no. ^t.
Borland to Secretary of State, Dec. 10, 1853, Dept. of State, Pes., Nic.
vol. I, no. II.
» Wyke to Clarendon, Mar. 13, 1854, F. O.. Cen. Am., vol. 8a, no. 9-
So fearful of American designs were the Guatemalans that they even
talked of a Spanish protectorate. Wyke to Clarendon, Oct. 30, iSs.'.
ibid., vol. 79, no. 33-
' Borland to Marcy, Sept. 20, 1853, Pept. of State, Des., Nic., vol. i.
no. 5.
168
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 169
government ; * and this loyalty was obviously due to
the attitude of the United States regarding the British
colonization of the Bay Islands.
Borland, however, while complaining vigorously
against the actions of the British in Central America,"
immediately set about improving conditions in that
region for his own country. By liberal promises he
soon regained Nicaragua's confidence,' and, in accord-
ance with his Monroe-doctrine principles, negotiated a
commercial treaty with her, by which her territorial
claims were again guaranteed on the part of the United
States.' He went further than this ; he criticised the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty and urged its abrogation on the
ground that Great Britain had violated its terms ; * and
then he proceeded to act as if the treaty had been
already set aside. His plan, strongly hinted at in his
speeches and letters, was evidently to bring the whole
of Central America under the control of the United
States for the purpose of annexing the region to the
American Union.'
While Borland was working, in a manner entirely
unauthorized by his government, to strengthen Ameri-
* Ibid., Borland to Marcy, Dec. 10, 1853, ihid., no. 11; Wyke to Claren-
don, Feb. 27, 1854, F. O., Can. Am., vol. 82, no. 6.
' Borland to Marcy, Dec. 10, 1853, Dept. of State, Des., Nic, vol. i,
no. II.
* Wyke to Clarendon, Oct. 30, 1853, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 79, no. 33.
' Crampton to Clarendon, May i, 1854, F. O., Am., vol. 595, no. 115;
July 3, 1854, ibid., vol. 597, no. 172. This treaty met with no favor
from the American government. Ibid.
* Borland to the Secretary of State, Aug. 28, 1853, Dept. of State,
Des., Nic, vol. i, no. 3.
" Inclosure in Borland to Marcy, Aug. 29, 1853, ibid., Borland to
Marcy, Nov. 10, 1853, ibid., vol. i: Dec. i5[?], 1853, ibid., no. 15.
In one of his public speeches in Nicaragua Borland stated that his
greatest desire was to see Nicaragua forming a bright star in the flag
of the United States. Wyke to Clarendon, Nov. 27, 1853, F. C,
Cen. Am., vol. 79, no. 37.
170 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
can interests in Nicaragua, Squier, as a private citizen,
was similarly engaged in Honduras. During his resi-
dence in Central America as an agent of the United
States government, Squier had contracted an intense
hatred of British influence on the isthmus. This feel-
ing was kept alive after his recall, and at about the
time of Borland's arrival in Nicaragua Squier also
returned to Central America and made his headquarters
in Honduras. The ostensible purpose of his visit was
to obtain a grant from that republic for the construction
of an interoceanic railway," but he was suspected by the
British of being primarily interested in " the further-
ance of his well-known political views regarding Cen-
tral America "."
Indeed, Squier's actions appear to have given good
reason for British suspicion. According to reports, he
lost no opportunity of declaring that he staked all of
his hopes of success in life on the prospect of annihilat-
ing every vestige of British influence in Central Amer-
ica." At this time Honduras and Guatemala were at
war, and, as the latter was a British stronghold, Squier
was much interested in the contest. He became the
chief instigator and adviser of Honduras, and it was
said that under his influence a Honduran agent was
sent to Washington to secure aid in the war, and pos-
sibly also with the idea of bringing about annexation
to the United States." Moreover, rumors were afloat
*" Crampton to Clarendon, July 24, 1854, " Confidential ", F. C
Am., vol. 597, no. 195.
" Ibid.
"Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 6, 1854, "Confidential", ibid., vol.
594, no. 58.
1' Crampton to Clarendon, June 5, 1854, ibid., vol. 596, no. 147;
.Seymour to the Secretary of the .\dmiralty, Mar. 24, 1854, Ad. Sec.
In-I-ctters, 5629, no. 32.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 171
that Squier had secured, or was about to secure, from
the United States, men and arms for the purpose of
drivmg the British out of Mosquito territory and
Ruatan."
Though Great Britain felt at this time that the
American government intended honestly to observe the
terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, there was yet a
fear that public opinion in the United States might
force support of Squier;" consequently, Crampton
was directed by the foreign secretary to inform Marcy
that the British government was convinced that he
would give no countenance to the schemes of Squier."
As an additional precaution, it was decided to reinforce
the British naval station in the West Indies."
While affairs were in this condition, an event
occurred which on first appearance seemed likely to
produce a rupture between the British and American
governments ; the famous British protectorate over
Mosquito was put to test by the United States. The
occurrence originated in a quarrel, begun early in 1853,
between the Accessory Transit Company " and the
" Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 6, 1854, F. 0., Am., vol. 594, no. 58;
Seymour to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mar. 24, 1854, Ad. Sec.
In-Letters, 5629, no. 32.
" Wyke to Clarendon, Nov. 27, 1853, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 79, no. 37.
" Clarendon to Crampton, Mar. 24, 1854, F. 0., Am., vol. 590, no. 64.
"Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 6, 1854, ibid., vol. 594, no. 58;
Seymour to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mar. 24, 1854, Ad. Sec.
In-Letters, 5629, no. 32; Hammond to Merivale, April 26, 1854, C. O.,
Hond., vol. 89.
^' In order to take advantage of the increase of traffic across the
isthmus, in consequence of the discovery of gold in California, the
Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Company had secured a modified charter
giving it the monopoly of a line of transit across the isthmus. Under
this charter it styled itself the Accessory Transit Company. Scroggs,
" William Walker and the Steamship Corporation in Nicaragua ", in
Am. Hist. Rev., X, 793-
172 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
authorities at Greytown. Thoui^h securing its charter
from Nicaragua, the company had obtained from Grey-
town a concession to build a coal depot on Point Arenas,
on the opposite side of the river from the town." The
terms of the concession were quickly exceeded by the
erection of warehouses, stores, and hotels."" This
angered the town authorities, and the anger was in-
creased by the company's refusal to deliver its passen-
gers on the town side of the harbor, thus cutting off
the inhabitants from all share in the profits from trans-
isthmian traffic.""
According to the agreement, the land was to be given
up upon requisition from the town ; " the requisition
was made, but the company ignored it. The town then
ordered the removal of the establishments from Point
Arenas within thirty days,"^ but no attention was paid to
the notice, and when the time limit had expired the
town officials destroyed some of the buildings.^*
Meanwhile, as a result of appeal from the Transit
Company,"" Captain HoUins of the American navy had
been ordered to Greytown with the sloop-of-war Cyane,
for the protection of American interests." He arrived
a day or two before the time set for a second attack on
the buildings, and upon learning of the situation noti-
fied the town authorities that he would resist by force
any attempt to execute the design," However, a body
of armed men was sent from Greytown to complete the
^^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 236.
M Ibid.
"■ Harper's Magasine, X, 56.
^ Part. Papers, 1856, Covts., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 236.
=» Ibid. " Ibid., 237- '^ Ibid., 243-245. » Ibid., 245.
" Ibid., 240.
DEFIANCE or BRITISH CLAIMS, 1833-1855 1/3
work of destruction ; but upon landing they were con-
fronted by marines from the Cyane, sent by HoHins. In
the face of this resistance the party from the town
retired and for a time efforts against the company
were abandoned.^
This event became the subject of correspondence
between Great Britain and the United States ; but as
this was just when the British government was being
sharply attacked by the American Senate, Clarendon
very wisely preserved a conciliatory tone, only showing
sufficient resentment at Hollins's act to preserve the
dignity of his government." Alarcy's reply to the com-
plaint of Clarendon contained a hostile note,*" however,
which further roused the Foreign Secretary ; '^ but the
American government soon learned that the Transit
Company had received its concession from Greytown —
a fact of which it had previously been ignorant ^ — and
therefore assumed a milder tone.'* The British govern-
ment quickly responded, and the irritation produced by
the affair disappeared.'*
But the Transit Company's buildings remained on
Point Arenas and, in consequence, bad feeling con-
tinued between the company and Greytown. At first
the feeling was largely on the side of the latter, which
bitterly resented the commercial monopoly maintained
by the company, but soon the enmity of the Transit
Company was increased by the loss of large amounts
of goods stolen from their stores, apparently in retalia-
tion, by their neighbors in the community across the
river. When the company demanded the return of the
goods and the pimishment of the offenders, the town
^ Ibid. ^ Ibid., 246-247. ^^ Ibid., 2$2-2SS- ^^ Ibid., 255-257.
" Ibid., 257-258. ^^ Ibid.. 25S. ^ Ibid., 257-258.
174 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
officials refused to take any action." This was the
situation in the summer of 1854 just before the second
clash came.
The initial act of the second difficulty was the shoot-
ing of a negro citizen of Greytown by Captain Smith of
the Routh, one of the Transit Company's steamers.
Smith's vessel ran into a bungo of merchandise belong-
ing to the negro, and in the quarrel that followed the
negro met his death." This took place some miles up
the San Juan River. Borland, the United States minis-
ter to Central America, happened to be aboard the
Routh at the time, but apparently he made no attempt
to interfere."
After the vessel returned to Greytown, the municipal
authorities attempted to arrest Smith on the charge of
murder. The latter resisted and Borland went to his
aid, informing the marshal of the place that the United
States government recognized no authority as existing
at Greytown to arrest an American citizen. When, a
few minutes later, a body of men who had accompanied
the marshal in a boat to the steamer's side threatened
to board the Routh and attack the captain, Borland
ordered them off with a gun. This produced quiet, and
the marshal withdrew.^
But in the evening of the same day an attempt was
made to arrest Borland while he was at the home of
Fabens, the United States consul at the port. A num-
ber of people gathered about Fabens's house, and.
during a conversation between Borland and the mayor
of the town, some one in the crowd threw a broken
** U. S. Docs., ser. no. 734, doc. 126, pp. 19, 20, 32-25.
"Ibid., ser. no. 918, doc. 9, p. 8.
'"Ibid., p. 9.
^ Ibid., ser. no. 734, doc. 126, p. i6.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 175
bottle at Borland, slightly wounding- him. The mayor
stated that the second attempt at arrest was made with-
out his authority, so the gathering soon dispersed, but
an armed force was stationed between the consulate and
the harbor, thus keeping the American minister a pris-
oner throughout the night.''
At a meeting held in the morning aboard the North-
ern Light, one of the company's steamers about to sail
for New York, it was decided that the persons and
property of American citizens were not safe from
aggression." Consequently, Borland made arrange-
ments with fifty of the passengers, who agreed to
remain over and afford the necessary protection ; and
he himself returned to the United States aboard the
Northern Light for the purpose of laying the whole
subject before his government.*^ Fabens also reported
the matter to Washington, by letter, expressing the
opinion that frequent visits of a United States man-of-
war would have a beneficial effect upon all concerned."
In consequence of the reports of Borland and Fabens,
and of previous complaints on the part of the Transit
Company,^' the American government determined to
send the Cyane to the scene of difficulties. In his
instructions Hollins was told to consult with Fabens
and learn the truth regarding the actions of the Grey-
town citizens. " It is very desirable ", wrote the secre-
tary of the navy, " that these people should be taught
that the United States will not tolerate these outrages,
and that they have the power and the determination to
check them. It is, however, very much to be hoped
that you can effect the purposes of your visit without
^ Ibid., -p. 17. ** Ibid. *^Ibid.. pp. 17, 18.
''-Ibid., ser. no. 702, doc. 85, pp. lo-ii.
*' von Hoist, History of the United States, V, 12.
176 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
a resort to violence and destruction of property and loss
of life. The presence of your vessel will, no doubt,
work much good. The department reposes much in
your prudence and good sense." "
On June 9, Marcy wrote to Fabens instructing him
to co-operate with Hollins. Goods belonging to the
Transit Company, he stated, had been stolen and with-
held by the people or authorities of Grey town. It was
hoped that the town would have adjusted that matter
to the entire satisfaction of the company, and thus
would have relieved Hollins from the " disagreeable
necessity of taking any action with regard to the sub-
ject ". The American minister to Central America had
been insulted by the authorities or people of Greytown,
Marcy continued, and nothing short of an apology
would save the place from the infliction which such an
act justly merited. It was expected that this apology
would be promptly made, and satisfactory assurances
given of future good conduct towards the United States
and its agents who might in future be sent to the place.*
The peculiar character of the above instructions
immediately attracts attention. They implicitly
directed that in case of necessity violence should be
used against Greytown, but left entirely to Hollins and
Fabens the determination of the necessity, as well as
of the degree of violence to be employed. Such instruc-
tions seem to indicate a desire actually to test the British
protectorate over Greytown, as well as a resolve to
ignore the agreement, made with Great Britain two
years before, to protect the de facto government of the
place. This defiant attitude of the American govern-
" U. S. Docs., ser., no. 734, doc. 126, p. 2.
** Ibid., pp. 19-20.
J
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 177
inent seems to have been produced by the unsatisfactory
condition of the general Central American question.
But two or three weeks before the instructions were
sent to Fabens and Hollins, Marcy had received from
Buchanan Clarendon's statement of May 2, presenting
formally and officially the view that the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty was prospective in its operation, and did not
apply to existing British possessions in Central Amer-
ica. This unreasonable stand apparently led the Amer-
ican government to use the opportunity offered by the
situation at Greytown with the aim of convincing Great
Britain that such an interpretation of the treaty would
not be tolerated, and that complete abandonment of
former claims in Central America was essential to the
preservation of friendly relations with the United
States.
The instructions to Hollins and Fabens had been
made known to the Transit Company and were quite
in harmony with its wishes and plans. In fact, judg-
ing from a letter written June 16, 1854, by White,
counsel for the company, to Fabens, a quiet understand-
ing existed between the American government, Hollins,
Fabens, and the company. Much discretion had been
given Fabens, White wrote, and he hoped that it would
" not be exercised to show any mercy to the town or
people. ... If the scoundrels are severely punished ",
he continued, " we can take possession and build it up
as a business place, put in our own officers, transfer the
jurisdiction, and you know the rest. It is of the last
importance that the people of the town should be taught
to fear us. Punishment will teach them, after which
you must agree with them as to the organization of a
new Government and the officers of it. Everything now
13
178 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
depends on you and Hollins. The latter is all right.
He fully understands the outrage, and will not hesitate
in enforcing reparation." **
The instructions were executed by Fabens and Hol-
lins, aided by Scott, agent of the company at Grey town.
Before the arrival of the Cyane, Fabens. as directed,
notified the inhabitants of the town that the United
States government required reparation for the wrongs
committed by them, but had received no reply." He
learned from private sources, however, that the town
neither intended to pay damages nor to apologize for
the insult to Borland." As soon as he arrived, Hollins
communicated with Fabens and the two decided to
renew the demands already made. After consultation
with Scott, it was determined to call for $24,000 dam-
ages for the loss of goods belonging to the Transit
Company,'' and an apology for the insult to Borland,
with an assurance of future good behavior.""
Accordingly, on July 1 1 such a demand was made by
Fabens." This demand was likewise unheeded, and
HoUins, after consultation with the others, decided to
give the town twenty- four hours in which to render
satisfaction. Hence, on the following day at Hollins's
order a proclamation was posted in public places about
** Inclosvire in Crampton to Clarendon, Sept. lo, 1855, F. O., Am.,
vol. 623, no. 188. There seems to be no reason for doubting the authen-
ticity of this letter. It was printed in the newspapers and appears no'
to have been questioned. Moreover, the proposed scheme was quite ir
harmony with the company's well-known character.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 734, doc. 126, p. 29.
« Ibid.
*" In the opinion of Clarendon, this was an unreasonable sum (Claren-
don to Crampton, Aug. 31, 1854, F. O., Am., vol. 591, no. 191), and,
though there are no means of verifying this opinion, a knowledge of
the circumstances leads to the belief that it was correct.
"' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 734, doc. 126, p. 9.
" Ibid.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS. 1853-1S55 I79
the town, declaring that if the demands were not met
by nine o'clock the next morning the place would be
bombarded." A body of marines sent by Hollins
secured the arms and ammunition which were at the
station house/^ At the same time Scott invited the
women and children and the aged and infirm as well as
all who would declare themselves well-disposed towards
the United States to take refuge in the river steamers
of the company.'" But only about twelve availed them-
selves of the oflfer.*"
While these things were taking place, the British
schooner Bermuda with Lieutenant Jolly in charge lay
in the harbor. Hollins notified Jolly of his intentions,""
and the latter entered a solemn protest against the pro-
posed action. The town, he pointed out, was entirely
defenseless and the force under his command was
totally inadequate to protect the place against the
Cyane" Hollins expressed regret that Jolly considered
a protest necessary, but declared that he, Hollins, must
enforce the reparation demanded by his government.'^'
As no attention had been paid to any of the demands
made in behalf of the United States government, on the
morning of July 13 Hollins opened bombardment.
When the bombardment was over, the buildings spared
by the guns of the Cyane were set afire by Hollins's
orders, and the town was thus totally destroyed."'
Hollins's action met with strong condemnation from
the American press and people.^" The New York
Times was particularly bitter, and, assuming that the
^^ Ibid., pp. 6-7, 9-10. ^ Ibid., p. 10. ^* Ibid., p. 10, 30.
^^Ibid., p. 31. ^ Ibid., p. 7. « 7bi(J. ^^ Ibid., pp. 7-8.
^' Ibid., ser. no. 702, doc. 85, p. 29.
'"New York Times, July 26, 31, Aug. i, 2, 1854; New York Tribune,
Aug. 2, 3, s, 16, 1854; Boston Transcript, July 28, 29, Aug. 3, 1854;
Boston Post, July 31, 1854; von Hoist, History, V, 12.
i8o ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
action was directed or approved by the government,
intimated that the terms of the Clayton-Biilwer treaty
had been broken, and denounced President Pierce for
a violation o,f the Constitution of the United States, on
the ground that Congress alone could declare war."
The Times was an opposition paper, but the best ele-
ments of the Democrats themselves felt that they could
not honestly defend the deed/'" The fact that resolu-
tions from both houses of Congress, asking for the
correspondence upon the subject, with a copy of Hol-
lins's instructions, were carried by a large majority
and in spite of administrative opposition was indicative
of the general disapprobation of the country."*
The attitude of the British government towards the
destruction of Greytown is of decided interest in view
of the declaration, which the government had repeatedly
made, that the place was under British protection and
would remain so until terms could be agreed upon for
its disposal. The town had been utterly destroyed by
a United States war vessel. The protectorate was thus
finally put to a test.
Throughout England the affair was, of course, dis-
approved, regretfully by those friendly to the United
States, and savagely by newspapers like the London
Times.^* As usual, this paper reflected the views of the
government. Clarendon, writing to Crampton on
August 31, 1854, declared the outrage to be " without
a parallel in the annals of modern times ",'"' but added
that it was a consolation to learn, as he had from
•" New York Times, Aug. 1, 1854.
"' von Hoist, History, V, 9-10.
""'Crampton to Clarendon, July 31, 1854, F. O., Am., vol. 598, no. 204;
Griffith to Hammond, Aug. 20, 1854, " Private ", ibid., vol. 598.
" Buchanan, Works, IX, 248.
*^ F. 0., Am., vol. 598, no. 191.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 181
Cranipton, that the deed had been indignantly repro-
bated by public opinion in the United States, and he had
no doubt that these feelings would be shared by the
American government."'
Upon first learning of the matter, Buchanan had
promptly assured the British government of his convic-
tion that Hollins's act was without authority and would
be disavowed by the United States." Marcy, however,
seems to have been placed in a quandary by the situation.
It is possible that Hollins's measures were more ex-
treme than had been desired by the American govern-
ment,'' but in view of the instructions furnished him,
they could hardly be disavowed. On the other hand,
American public opinion, which was probably much
more adverse than had been expected, had to be con-
sidered ; and the British government had to be reck-
oned with. In this dilemma it was evidently thought
best to avoid discussion as long as possible. Accord-
ingly, when approached by Cranipton regarding the
subject, Afarcy replied that for the present he must
decline expressing any opinion, as the matter was under
consideration of the American government."' A little
later when Cranipton broached the subject, Marcy
declared that he could not yet speak officially regarding
it, as he had not heard from the President. But during
this conversation, he tried to make much of the fact
«" Ibid.
« Buchanan, Works, IX, 248.
^ On August 8, Marcy wrote in a private letter to Buchanan: "The
occurrence at Greytown is an embarrassing affair. The place merited
chastisement, but the severity of the one inflicted exceeded our expecta-
tions. The Government will, however, I think, stand by Capt. Hollins."
Ibid., 242. Marcy may have been perfectly sincere in this statement, but
in view of Buchanan's expectation of a disavowal, in a letter to Buchanan
Marcy would scarcely have commended the act.
*' Crampton to Clarendon, July 31, 1854, F- O., Am., vol. 598, no. 204.
i82 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
that the principal ringleaders of Greytown had been
received aboard Jolly's vessel, and, as Crampton ex-
pressed it, showed an attempt to shift the blame for an
unpopular act to the shoulders of a British officer/"
On September 21, when more than two months had
passed without a disavowal or an explanation from the
American government, Clarendon again addressed the
British minister at Washington. The British govern-
ment, he wrote, had confidently expected the outrages
and wrongs committed at Greytown to be indignantly
disavowed by the United States government as they had
been by the American people, but had seen with sur-
prise and regret that the sentiments of the people had
not been re-echoed by the cabinet at Washington, and
that so long a time had been allowed to elapse without
Hollins's conduct being disavowed. Crampton was
instructed to read this letter to Marcy."
Finally, in the President's message of December 4,
1854, a definite stand was taken by the American
government. The message gave a detailed account of
the bombardment and the events connected with it,
but with such omissions " and misrepresentations " as
'"Crampton to Clarendon, Sept. i8, 1854, ibid., no. 229. The charges
made against Jolly were promptly investigated by order of the British
government, and Jolly was completely exonerated. Fanshawe to the
Secretary of the Admiralty, Nov. 25, 1854, .-Vd. Sec. In-Letters, 5629,
no. 204.
" F. O., Am., vol. 591, no. 198.
" For instance, the message failed to state that before the bombard-
ment began arms and ammunition had been removed from Greytown and
put aboard the Cyane.
" The message declared Greytown to be a " marauding establishment
too dangerous to be disregarded and too guilty to pass unpunished, and
yet incapable of being treated in any other way than as a piratical resort
of outlaws or a camp of savages depredating on emigrant trains or
caravans and the frontier settlements of civilized states ", which was
only partly true. Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 282. Further-
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 183
to leave an erroneous impression of the incident. In
concluding his consideration of the matter, the Presi-
dent wrote : " It certainly would have been most satis-
factory to me if the object of the Cyane's mission could
have been consummated without any act of public force,
but the arrogant contumacy of the offenders rendered
it impossible to avoid the alternative either to break up
their establishment or to leave them impressed with the
idea that they might persevere with impunity in a career
of insolence and plunder." "
Thus the American government tried to justify the
act of its official, and, in view of the instructions sent
to Hollins and Fabens, it is rather difficult to see what
other course was possible. But the whole affair was
unjustifiable. It is true that the insult to Borland and
the depredations upon the property of the Transit Com-
pany demanded some action on the part of the United
States government, but to bombard and then burn a
town deserted by its inhabitants, and thus to destroy
the property of the innocent with that of the guilty, was
an act unworthy of a civilized nation. Furthermore,
in considering the guilt of the Greytown people it
should be remembered that there were mitigating cir-
cumstances. Because of Hollins's interference, their
grievance of the preceding year against the Transit
more, the message stated that Hollins had appealed to Jolly " to interpose
and persuade them (the people of Greytown) to take some course
calculated to save the necessity of resorting to the extreme measures
indicated in his proclamation." Ibid., 283. Neither the report of Fabens
nor that of Hollins justify such a statement. Moreover, nearly a month
before the President's message appeared, Jolly distinctly stated in reply
to a question from the Admiralty that Hollins " did at no time entreat
or request him to exert his influence with the authorities at Greytown
to act differently ". Inclosure in Fanshawe to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, Nov. 25, 1854, Ad. Sec. In-Letters, 5629, no. 204.
'■* Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 280-284.
i84 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Company still existed ; and Borland had protected the
murderer of one of their number, who had apparently
been innocent of any offense.
The President's message was practically the last
word between the two countries upon the general sub-
ject of the bombardment. The British government had
asked for a disavowal of the act, and the President had
replied by defending it. The British government did
not press the matter further." The protectorate over
Mosquito, like the kingdom which it pretended to pro-
tect, was but a shadow when a strong nation was the
aggressor.
It may be suggested that had not the British govern-
ment been embarrassed by the Crimean War at the
time, HoUins's proceedings might have had more seri-
ous results. It is possible that in such case the call for
disavowal might have been worded less mildly, and the
correspondence might have taken on a more belligerent
tone, but it is unlikely that the affair would have gone
beyond this. The protest and call for disavowal by the
British government were merely made for the purpose
of saving — or trying to save — British dignity. If a
disavowal could be obtained, so much the better; if
not, the matter would be dropped. The British govern-
ment fully realized that a war over such a flimsy pretext
as the Mosquito kingdom would not only receive the
condemnation of the world at large, but, what was
'■* In conversation with lUichanan, Clarendon severely criticised the
presidential message relative to the destruction of Grcytown, which
Buchanan in turn defended. Buchanan, H'orks. IX, 337.
The Nicaruguan government had also protested against Ilollins's act,
hut it had not ventured to demand a disavowal of the act. Grifluh to
Hammond, .Aug. :<7, 1854, " Private", F. O., .\ni., vol. 598.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 185
more to the point, would also fail to receive either the
approval or the support of the British people."
In addition to a disavowal of the outrage, the British
government had attempted to secure indemnity for
property of British subjects which had been destroyed
by Hollins. In accordance with instructions, Cramp-
ton informed Marcy that his government considered
compensation due for these losses ; '" but the Secretary
of State gave little reason to believe that such damages
would be paid, and took the ground that as the inhabi-
tants of the town formed a sort of de facto government,
they had no claim to protection on countries of which
they were natives.'* However, Wheeler, a new minis-
ter to Central America, with Fabens, was instructed to
investigate the claims for damages presented by various
nations," and for a time Marcy held out some hope that
" innocent sojourners " at the place might be compen-
sated ; '" but later he stated that so far as he had been
able to examine the reports sent in no such persons
existed.*' He informed Crampton, however, that Amer-
ican citizens who claimed damages were treated just
as the people of other countries.*' Finally, after Cramp-
'* The attitude of the British public regarding the subject was reflected
in the press in the spring of 1853. The London Globe for March 3
remarked that if cause for war with the United States were wanted, the
very positive grounds necessary for a quarrel with kinfolk " should not
be mixed up with the assertion of anything quite so aboriginal as the
ill-defined rights, titles, and dominions of the tawny, — and to confess the
truth, — somewhat trumpery majesty of Mosquito." And the News for
April 2 expressed the opinion that the sooner the British government gave
up its interference in the paltry squabbles of the savages of Mosquitia,
and the semi-savages of Honduras and Nicaragua, the better it would
be for its reputation.
"Clarendon to Crampton, Aug. 31, 1854, F. O., Am., vol. 591, no. 191.
'^ Crampton to Clarendon, Sept. 18, 1854, ibid., vol. 598, no. 229.
'° Clarendon to Crampton, Feb. 16, 1855, ibid., vol. 616, no. 32.
*" Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 12, 1855, ibid., vol. 620, no. 60;
Crampton to Clarendon, July 16, 1855, ibid., vol. 622, no. 136.
*« Ibid. " Ibid.
i86 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ton had repeatedly called the attention of the American
government to the subject of claims,*" the Foreign Sec-
retary consulted the law officers of the Crown with
regard to it and was informed by them that as the
United States government had adopted the acts of its
naval officer, it could not, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of international law, be called upon to make
compensation to British subjects for the losses occa-
sioned to them by those acts. In a confidential note
Clarendon made known this opinion to Crampton, and
added that it was of great importance that a maritime
power like England should uphold the doctrines of
international law thus laid down, since her fleets were
likely often to be engaged in hostilities against seaport
towns. Consequently, he wrote, the British govern-
ment did not think it advisable that Crampton should
officially press the Greytown claims." With this the
matter was dropped and no claims were ever paid by
the United States for damages caused by the bombard-
ment of Greytown.
Long before the correspondence arising from the
bombardment ended, there had grown from the rumors
of armed expeditions to be sent from the United States
to Central America a reality which in time roused the
old British suspicion of American designs on the isth-
mus, and struck terror to the hearts of the Central
American republics. This was the filibustering move-
ment. Early in 1854 reports were abroad that an
American colonization society had secured certain lands
"^Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 12, 1855, F. O., Am., vol. Oio, no. 60;
Clarendon to Crampton, May 21, 1855, ibid., vol. 616, no. 100; Crampton
to Clarendon, July 16, 1855, F. O., .\m., vol. 622, no. ij6; Jan. a8, 1856,
ihid., vol. 640, no. 1 1.
" Ibid., vol. 638, no. 45.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 187
in the Mosquito territory."' These reports evidently
had reference to an organization called the Central
American Agricultural and Mining Association, formed
by Colonel Kinney of Philadelphia.'" The land in which
the association was interested lay to the south of the
San Juan, in territory claimed by Nicaragua, and was
part of a grant made in 1839 to Peter and Samuel
Shepherd of Georgia by the Mosquito king." The
organization professed that its object was the coloniza-
tion of this territory and the development of its re-
sources.^
When this report, somewhat exaggerated, was added
to the rumors regarding aid to be sent Squier," the
British government took a further precautionary step.
Though it felt that such expeditions would not be coun-
tenanced by the United States government, there still
remained the danger that they might escape the vigi-
lance of the American authorities. Consequently, on
March 9, 1854, Clarendon instructed Wyke to give
warning, confidentially, to the Central American repub-
lics to which his commission extended.""
But the recent American policy in Mexico had
already roused these states to keen watchfulness of
their northern neighbor. All except Honduras were
now thoroughly frightened, and turned towards Eng-
land for protection. The situation offers an interesting
contrast to that which existed upon Squier's arrival in
** Bowen to Wyke, Feb. 25, 1854, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 82, no. 3.
^ Crarapton to Clarendon, Dec. 11, 1854, F. O., .\m., vol. 600, no. 89.
" Stout, Nicaragua, 171-172.
^ Ibid.. 1-3.
*° It seems likely that the rumors that Squier intended to drive the
British from Mosquito and Ruatan had their origin in the preparations
of the Kinney expedition. There is no evidence to prove that Squier
ever contemplated such action.
^ F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 82, no. 5.
i88 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
1849, when three of the states turned eagerly towards
the United States for protection against British en-
croachments. Though Guatemala had not forgotten]
her old claims on Belize territory, in the last part of
1853 the prime minister of the republic approached
Wyke expressing a desire to settle the Belize bounda-
ries by secret treaty with Great Britain, in order to
protect his state from American designs," his idea
apparently being that the American government might
use the boundary dispute as an excuse for intervention.
But the British government prudently replied that this
would not be conducive to the interest of Guatemala, as
such a treaty would be more Hkely to produce than
avert the dangers anticipated from American encroach-
ments.°" A little later Nicaragua revealed her fears by
soliciting a treaty which would bring her into closer
relations with the British government. She even prom-
ised to let her Mosquito claims lie dormant, in the hope
that the Indians would later voluntarily unite them-
selves with her, and offered to acknowledge Greylown
a free port imder the protection of all nations.'" The
matter was presented by Wyke to his government, but
Clarendon replied that if a treaty should be formed with
Nicaragua it was expedient that some mention be made
of the Mosquito territory."* Wyke believed that Span-
ish pride would prevent the Nicaraguans from acknowl-
edging the independence of the Mosquitos, so it was
thought best to let the matter rest for a while.*'
"Savage to Webster, April 21, 1851, Dept. of State, Ues., Guat., vol.
3, no. 6; Wyke to Clarendon, Nov. 27, 1853, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. rp.
no. 37; Clarendon to Wyke, Jan. 19, 1854, F. O., Cen. .\ni.. vol. 82, no. .1.
"■■' Ibid.
11:1 Wyke to Clarendon, Mar. 13, i8r,4, il'id., no. 9.
"* Ibid., no. 7.
iti Wyke to Clarendon, July 29, 1854, ibid., no. 22.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1835 189
Meanwhile, however, the British government, though
on the verge of the Crimean War, had not been indif-
ferent on its own account to the reports of contemplated
attacks on Central America by American citizens. The
interference of the American government in Mexico
and the filibustering expeditions of William Walker
into that state doubtless quickened British attention.
As early as February 2, 1854, Clarendon wrote to
Crampton about the matter, stating that such projects,
if carried out without the knowledge of the United
States government, would amount to buccaneering
acts ; and that Great Britain could not believe that the
United States would fail, on learning of such inten-
tions, to put an immediate stop to them. Crampton
was instructed to notify Marcy immediately of these
views, and to inquire whether anything was known of
the contemplated plans, and also whether means would
be employed to prevent their execution.**
About a week later the Foreign Secretary again
wrote, sending further information with reference to
the proposed expeditions, and directed Crampton to
communicate with Marcy regarding it. Should he fail
to receive a satisfactory reply from the Secretary of
State, he was to express the feelings of surprise and
deep concern with which the knowledge of these
manoeuvres had been received by the British govern-
ment, which hoped that they would not only be dis-
countenanced, but prevented, by the United States ;
for it must be obvious that if attempts should be made
to execute such schemes other governments might be
forced to take measures for defeating them — a course
which might lead to misunderstandings between Great
" F. O., Am., vol. 590, no. 20.
I90 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Britain and the United States." The instructions were
executed by Crampton, to whom Marcy declared him-
self ignorant of any such designs as were reported, but
expressed the desire of the American government to
keep on good terms with Great Britain."
But Crampton had been preceded, in his representa-
tions to the American government, by Marcoleta, who
persistently labored to prevent the departure of the
Kinney expedition. Later in the year the Nicaraguan
minister increased his efforts, for then the rumors took
more definite shape and it was stated that the coloniza-
tion association intended, if necessary, to use force in
taking the land,*^ and that the expedition also planned
to seize Greytown.'" As many members of the coloniza-
tion association were also affiliated with the Transit
Company,"" there seemed good foundation for the re-
port. Consequently, Marcoleta again communicated
with Marcy, declaring that the Mosquito king could
not legally make land grants.'" Marcy replied that the
American government had no power to prevent its
citizens from leaving the country when " engaged in
business purposes ", and added that the question of the
validity of the grant would have to be settled between
the company and the Nicaraguan government.'"*
Though it was more difficult to enforce the neutrality
laws of the United States against the filibusters than
most foreign powers realized, yet it is quite evident that
the American government did not use its best efforts
to do so, and that local officials were at times guilty of
"' F. C, Am., vol. 590, no. 31.
" Crampton to Clarendon, l^Iar. 6, 1854, ibid., vol. 594, no. 53.
""Crampton to Clarendon, Dec. 11, 1854, ibid., vol. 600, no. 89.
»<» Ibid. "« Ibid. •»> Harper's Magasine, X. m^.
>•" Crampton to Clarendon, De.-. 11, 1854, V. 0., .Am., vol. 600, no. 89.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS. 1853-1855 191
'gross neglect of duty in the execution of orders. Part
of this neglect was undoubtedly due to the desire of the
South for the extension of slave territory, but there
seems good reason to believe that the failure of the
British government to withdraw from Central America,
as required by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, also strongly
contributed to this indifference to international obli-
gations.
Marcoleta's persistence, however, was not in vain.
Evidently as a direct consequence of his protests, a
correspondence took place between Marcy and Kinney
with reference to the proposed expedition. The latter
declared that his object was to improve and occupy the
land within the limits of his grant; everything was to
be done peacefully, without invading the rights of
either communities or states.^"^ Marcy replied that if
the expedition was merely a peaceful emigration, and
if those connected with it chose to abandon all claim
to protection from the United States and to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of some other country,
the American government would not interfere with
it.'°° He expressed the determination of the United
States government, however, to preserve the neutrality
laws of the nation,^*^ which required that it prevent the
departure of any expedition intended to disturb the
peace of a friendly state.
This correspondence was published in the Union of
February 7, 1855,^" ^^'^ gave much satisfaction to those
concerned over the subject. A letter written by Cramp-
ton to Clarendon a few days later stated that Marcy's
^'^ Harper's Magasine, X, 542.
^'^Ibid.; Crampton to Clarendon, Feb. 10, 1855, F. O., Am., vol. 619,
no. 33. ^^Ibid. ^^■' Ibid.
192 ANGLO-AMERICAS ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
determination to enforce the neutrality laws was gener-
ally considered fatal to the expedition, for it did not
seem likely that Kinney would persist in his enterprise '
in face of the risk which must now attach to it.'""
But all hope that the undertaking had been aban-
doned soon vanished, for in a few weeks a letter de-
scribing the proposed undertaking was published in
the newspapers. It promised six hundred and forty
acres of land to all colonists engaging to serve in a i
military capacity for twelve months.'™ This seemed
to prove that, as had been reported, the land was to be
taken by force, if necessary. A letter written by
Kinney in January, 1855, to a prospective colonist
reflects the same idea. After describing the country
to be settled and stating that the colonists should be
armed, Kinney wrote : " We do not suppose there will
be much necessity for fighting, but we believe that the
establishment of such a colony in that part of the world
will result in a few years in the entire control of all
Central America by the American people." '" The aim
was obviously to conquer Central America by colo- 1
nization.
When the first-mentioned letter appeared in the ■
newspapers, Marcoleta again addressed Marcy, asking j
that the United States government prevent the " per- ;
fidious schemes " from being carried out."' This effort '
led to investigation by the American government, and,
"" Crampton to Clarendon, I"eb. lo, 1855, F. O., .\ni., vol. 619, no. a.
*"" Marcoleta to Marcy, Mar. 14, 1855, Dept. of State, Notes to Dept., ,
Cen. .Am. I.egat., Nic, vol. 2.
*'" Inclosure in Ross to Clarendon, Nov. 30, 1855, F. O., Cen. Am.,
vol. 87.
'" Marcoleta to Marcy, Mar. 1855, Dept. of State, Notes to Pepf.,
Cen. -Am. I.egat., Nic, vol. 2.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 I93
as a result, on April 27, Kinney, and Fabens, who was
apparently his most important colleague, were indicted
on the charge of preparing a military expedition
against Nicaragua."' However, when the case came
up for trial the two were acquitted for want of suffi-
cient evidence."^ But the latter was deprived of his
consular office, because of the part which he had taken
in the affair/" Nevertheless, Marcoleta continued his
complaints,"' and consequently the American govern-
ment gave orders for the detention of any vessel which
Kinney might attempt to use for the purpose of his
expedition."" But in spite of these precautions, Kinney
and several of his associates escaped to Jamaica, where
they waited a favorable opportunity for the execution
of their designs."'
But before Kinney made his escape the attention of
foreign diplomats at Washington had been attracted to
a more formidable foe to Central American inde-
pendence. This was William Walker.'"' On July 10,
1855, Crampton informed Clarendon of the aid given
"^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 822, doc. 68, pp. 8-9.
"' Stout, Nicaragua, 176.
'i* Lutnley to Clarendon, May 14, 1855, F. O., Am., vol. 621, no. 10.
"' Marcy to Marcoleta, May 15, 1855, Dept. of State, Notes from Dept.,
Can. Am. Legat., vol. i.
"' Jbid., pp. 80-81.
"' Crampton to Clarendon, June 18, 1855, F. O., Am., vol. 621, no. 124.
Kinney soon reached Greytown where he remained for a time. But he
seemed to give up his plans for a colony and later wandered in different
parts of Central America, where he occasionally aroused some uneasiness
on the part of the British or Central Americans, but after June, 1855, his
movements were no longer a subject of diplomatic correspondence.
Sfeymour to Bell, June 17, 1857, and Seymour to Darling, Aug. 17, 1857,
F. 0., Hond., vol. 3-
"' For an account of Walker's career in Central America, see general
histories of Central America, and also the following: Walker, War in
Nicaragua; Lucas, Nicaragua: War of the Filibutters; Wells, Walker's
Expedition to Nicaragua.
14
194 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
by Walker to the Central American Liberals, and ex-
pressed the belief that should a government be estab-
lished in Nicaragua by either of the contending parties
through the aid of American auxiliaries, the inde-
pendent existence of Nicaragua might be regarded as
in a very precarious condition/" When news of the
fall of Granada reached the United States shortly
afterwards, the concern of Crampton and of the Cen-
tral American agents at the capital was much increased,
for they felt that Walker could not have succeeded
without aid from the Transit Company."" This state of
affairs, in the opinion of Crampton, showed flagrant
violation of international duty on the part of the Ameri-
can government, as well as an aim on the part of
American citizens to bring about the annexation of
Nicaragua to the United States.^
But though Crampton faithfully sent in his reports
of the filibustering movement,'" after the first half of
the year 1854 he seems to have received but few instruc-
tions from his government regarding the matter. This
neglect, however, was probably not due to indifference,
but to a realization that the expeditions had a definite
diplomatic significance which was at first not suspected.
The determined stand of the United States government
with reference to the interpretation of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, as well as the bombardment of Greytown
and the defense of the act by President Pierce, had
"° F. O., .Am., vol. 621, no. 134.
*'* For a good account of the part played by the Transit Company,
see Scroggs, " William Walker and the Steamship Corporation in
Nicaragua ", in Am. Hist. Rev.. X, 793-813.
'"Crampton to Clarendon, Nov. 13, 1855, F. O., .\m., vol. 634, no.
24.^.
*** Crampton to Clarendon, July 10, 1855, ibid., vol. 631, no. 134;
July 30, 1855, ibid., vol. 632, no. 154; Nov. 13, 1855, ibid., vol. 634,
no. 243.
DEFIANCE OF BRITISH CLAIMS, 1853-1855 195
evidently convinced the British government that indif-
ference to filibustering was part of American policy in
dealing with the Central American question. In view
of this, British protests might be even worse than
useless.
Marcoleta, and Molina, however, and Irisarri, the
newly-arrived representative of Salvador "' and Guate-
mala, continued and increased the protests on behalf of
Central America."* Perhaps partly in consequence of
their efforts, the American government, near the close
of 1855, displayed a stronger sense of international
duty. Wheeler, Borland's successor, in spite of instruc-
tions, had recognized Walker's government, but his
act was promptly disavowed by the United States and
the assurance given that the American government
had no intention of recognizing Walker."" The favor-
able impression made by this announcement was
increased by the fact that almost simultaneously came
the refusal of the Washington authorities to receive a
representative sent by Walker."" But more effective
still in allaying the suspicion that the American govern-
ment was willing to connive at the proceedings of its
citizens in Central America was the proclamation of
President Pierce warning all Americans not to take
part in any hostile operations in Nicaragua, carried on
by Walker."'
^" At about this time Salvador tried to form a treaty with England
for protection against the filibusters. Wyke to Clarendon, Nov. 29,
1835, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 85, no. 57.
^^* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 822, doc. 68, pp. 21, 42-43, 46-47, 48-49.
"' Dept. of State, Notes from Dept., Cen. Am. Legat., vol. i, pp. 99-
lOI.
"^^ Crampton to Clarendon, Dec. 17, 1855, F. O., Am., vol. 624. no. 266;
Wells, Walker's Expedition to Nicaragua, 100.
"" Ibid.
CHAPTER VII.
The Crisis, 1855-1856; Signs of British Retreat.
More than a year passed after Buchanan presented
his second statement of American views on the Central
American question before any serious attempt was
again made to reconcile the differences between the two
governments. Various reasons produced this seeming
unconcern. The Foreign Secretary was deeply en-
grossed in the Crimean War ; besides, he probably felt
after receiving Buchanan's second paper, that the posi-
tion which the British government had assumed could
better be maintained by evasion than by discussion.'
Marcy, too, had other demands on his attention ; the
Kansas-Nebraska struggle was on. Moreover, since
the North believed that the Democratic interest in
Central America originated largely in the desire for
extending slave territory, it would have been most
unwise to insist upon settlement of the Central Ameri-
can question, and thus risk complications with England,
when the nation was facing a domestic crisis produced
by an effort to introduce slavery into Kansas.
During this period, therefore, Buchanan was left
practically to his own resources regarding Central
American negotiations. But the completion of the
reciprocity treaty," and later the resignation from the
' Clarendon promised Buchanan an answer to his second paper, and
later said that he had prepared one, but it was never presented.
Buchanan, Works, IX, 278; U. S. Docs., ser. no. 840, doc. i, p. 76.
' London Morning Post, Dec. s, 1854.
196
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 197
premiership of Aberdeen, who was friendly to the
United States, and the accession of Palmerston,^ under
whose direction Greytown had been seized in the name
of the Mosquitos, caused Buchanan to lose all hope of
an early settlement of the Central American dispute.
Furthermore, such casual and desultory conversations
as he obtained with Clarendon ' were not conducive to
a revival of the hope.
But in August, 1855, the discussion was reopened by
the United States. The approaching session of Con-
gress made it desirable that the question be placed on
a more satisfactory basis ; and the fact that both of the
parties concerned were less occupied with other matters
than in the preceding year made the prospect of settle-
ment better than it had been. Moreover, the deter-
mined policy displayed by the United States govern-
ment was evidently now expected to produce favorable
results. Consequently, Marcy directed Buchanan to
secure a definite and final statement from the British
government as to the position it proposed to maintain
on the subject, especially regarding the Bay Islands.
If the British government meant to avoid the operation
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in reference to the Bay
Islands, there was little use in asking it to respect any
other of the obligations imposed by that act. Marcy's
letter showed the same attitude as the year before, and
declared that a fulfillment of treaty stipulations re-
quired that Great Britain withdraw from the Mosquito
coast, the Bay Islands, and the Belize territory lying
between the Sibun and the Sarstoon.'
" Buchanan, Works, IX, 297, 299. 3oo, 320, 339-342-
* Ibid., 298, 337-343-
^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 840, doc. i, pp. 69-72.
198 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Buchanan accordingly reopened the question,' but
with small hopes of a satisfactory result.' Clarendon's
response showed a determination consistently to main-
tain the former extreme position. The British govern-
ment, he stated, adhered to the opinion which it had
" uniformly held, that the convention of April 19, 1850,
was merely prospective in its operation, and did not in
any way interfere with the state of things existing at
the time of its conclusion. If it had been intended to
do so, . . . it would have contained, in specific terms,
a renunciation, on the part of Great Britain, of the
possessions and rights which, up to the conclusion of
the convention, she had claimed to maintain, and such
renunciation would not have been left as a mere matter
of inference." *
In an unofficial reply to Buchanan's report of the
result of his efforts, Marcy gave what may be consid-
ered the frank views of the United States government
regarding the conduct of Great Britain. He wrote :
Notwithstanding the intimation before given by the British
Govt., I was not prepared to beheve that when pressed to a
definite decision, it would dare to take the ground that the
provisions of the Clayton and Buhver treaty were only pros-
pective in their operation . . . Her position in that respect
raises a very serious question. The United States will never
acquiesce in that interpretation of the Convention and Great
Britain cannot, it seems to me, believe that this government
will do so. That she is wrong, no reasonable, calm- judging
man can doubt, and the judgment of this country, and, I should
think, the reflecting portion of the English people, will look
upon it as something more and worse than an error. . . . From
the present course of the British government on the Central
American controversy, ... 1 am inclined to conclude that it
• Buchanan, Works, IX, 403-405.
^ Ibid., 394-39S-
• U. S. Docs., scr. no. 840. tloc. i, pp. 76-77.
Port of Real.
CENTRAL AMERUCA
ISnO - 18G0
Sliowiiiii,- P)iilisli E]l(•^();l(•hl^t'llt^
o
o
^>
^
ISLANDS
C3P®
^
^.
^
^^
iCape Gracias a' Dios y^3^
a
e^
Greytown (San Juan del Norte)
" ] Pt. Arenas
[R.Colorado
THE CRISIS, 1853-1856 199
cares very little about maintaining cordial relations with the
United States. I can discover nothing in the present condition
of Great Britain or her future prospects to justify her in
holding her head so high. . . . With her, as with all others,
this country desires to maintain the relations of friendship, but
from her and them it claims a respect for our sovereign rights,
and good faith in international compacts ; and neither will be
sacrificed for the sake of peace. The prospect, to my pre-
vision, looks a little cloudy; but, as our old friend Mr. Ritchie
was wont to say " nous vcrrons"^
The determination of Great Britain to maintain her
unreasonable interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty caused a change in the United States towards
that agreement. The members of the government took
the attitude that the treaty obHgations were in a way
suspended ; " and a portion of the press declared that
Clarendon's reply to Buchanan amounted to an abroga-
tion of the arrangement." Had not the North con-
demned filibustering as a slavery extension measure, it
is probable that, in consequence of the British stand,
the American government would have at this time
come out more strongly in favor of Walker. As it
was, and especially in view of the feeling roused by the
Kansas-Nebraska question, such a result was impos-
sible. Indeed, as has already been noted, in the autumn
of 1855 " the American government displayed more
vigor in its efforts to prevent aid from being sent to
Walker. The reason for this, however, was most prob-
ably a desire to place the United States in a more
advantageous position in the discussion rising from the
discovery of Crampton's share in the British attempt
® Dept. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. 16, pp. 396-397.
'* Napier to Clarendon, Oct. 22, 1857, F. 0., Am., vol. 674, no. 220.
"^ Daily Alta California, Dec. 5, 1855; Wells, Walker's Expedition to
Nicaragua, 135.
" See above, p. 195.
200 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY ,
to recruit soldiers in the United States for the Crimean
War."
The appearance of the recruitment difficulty coinci-
dent with the more menacing attitude of the Central
American question placed British-American relations
in a much more serious light. Though it is evident that
the irritation caused by the unreasonable British inter-
pretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty produced much
of the American indignation over the subject of British
enlistment and determined the attitude of the govern-
ment regarding the latter subject," yet considerable ill-
feeling was caused by the recruiting question itself ;
and the one difficulty so reacted upon the other as soon
to put the relations of the two countries in a critical
state.
Naturally, most of the sensitiveness and suspicion
was found on the American side ; and it was quickened
by the belief that France and England meant to make
use of the alliance which they had formed during the
Crimean War for the purpose of interfering in Ameri-
can affairs." This belief appeared well founded when,
in the last part of October, the Times and other leading
British newspapers announced that the government had
sent several war vessels to reinforce its West Indian
squadron.'" This had been done, the Times stated, for
the purpose of repressing the movements then in pro-
gress in various American cities for the invasion of
countries with which the United States was at peace.
Great Britain was determined to supply the ability
" Cramptoii to C'larciulon, Dec. 31, 185s, V. O., .\in., vol. bJ^, no. aSi.
'* Ilansaril, Pari. Debates. 3d ser., CXI. II, 1511-1513: Blackwood's
Magazine, LXXX, 12a; Daily Alia California, Dec. 16, 1855.
" Buchanan, H'orks, IX, 434, 4(.2-463.
" //>!(/., 43.1436; Harper's Magazine, XII, a.sj.
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 201
which the American government lacked, to enforce its
own laws."
Such representations by journals believed to enjoy
the confidence and reflect the views of the British min-
istry were certain to create excitement in America.
Therefore, Buchanan, who described the outlook as
" squally "/' changed his plans for returning home and
determined to await the arrival of his successor. As
soon as possible " after reading the Times article, he
secured an interview with Clarendon and asked the
purpose of increasing the British naval armament so
near to American coasts, giving as his reason the desire
to prevent, if possible, the irritation in the United
States which the appearance of such a fleet would natur-
ally produce.'** The Foreign Secretary emphatically
condemned the statement of the press " and declared
that the fleet had not been sent with the least unfriendly
intention towards the United States. Its despatch,
he said, had resulted from information secured by
the British government that several privateers for
Russian service were being built at New York."
Buchanan was not convinced by this explanation,^
but his anxiety was somewhat relieved by the attitude
taken by the British people. Recent events had
attracted the attention of the British public to the dis-
pute, and had created a desire to learn the real facts of
the controversy. Buchanan felt that this new alertness
of the British public mind was a strong indication that
Palmerston would not be sustained in raising difficulties
with the United States.'*
" Harper's Magazine, XII, 253.
" Buchanan, Works, IX, 436.
» Ibid.. 433-434. " Ibid.. 438. *» Ibid.. 439-440.
" Ibid.. 438- " Jbid.. 438-439- '* Ibid., 446.
202 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Later, after it had been proved that the report
regarding the building of privateers in New York was
false " Buchanan called Clarendon's attention to the
mistaken nature of the report and desired the with-
drawal of the fleet.'' The President's message, he
stated, would undoubtedly present the unsatisfactory
condition of the Central American question and as the
news of the sending of the fleet would reach the United
States but a short time before the message was issued,
the two would be connected in public opinion, thus ren-
dering the question more complicated.*^ Clarendon
again declared that the despatch of the fleet was not
intended as a menace to the United States, and prom-
ised to consider recalling the vessels.™ Buchanan tried
to emphasize the expediency of doing so. He showed
how a withdrawal could allay public indignation in the
United States, and pointed out the disastrous character
of a possible war between the two nations.**
As time passed, Buchanan counted more and more on
British public opinion to keep the peace ; but he realized
that an unfriendly press might bring the people to a
willingness to fight America, especially if they could
be induced to believe that national honor required war.*'
Therefore he was anxious that the whole Central
American question be brought before them clearly and
in a firm but temperate manner, for he believed that this
would force Palmerston to adopt a more friendly
policy, or to retire." He counted on the President's
message to effect this, and consequently looked forward
" I'>tu haiian, IVorks, IX, 450.
*•/&.</. "/W</., 451- "//..■./.
"yfci'd., 452-453. " /W</., (56, 461. " /fci'rf., 4M, 479.480.
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 203
eagerly to the early appearance of that document."
However, the political confusion of the period delayed
for some time the organization of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and thus deferred the message, until, on
December 31 — probably in consequence of the urgings
of Buchanan," as well as of the general unsatisfactory
relations with England " — it was finally sent to Con-
gress even though the speaker of the House still
remained unchosen."
The message contained a detailed consideration of
British relations. On the whole the language was tem-
perate, but a hostile note was discernible and a deter-
mination not to yield on either the recruiting difficulty
or the dispute over Central America.^^
The President's stand was supported by the Senate.
The speeches which followed the receipt of the message
offer an interesting contrast to those produced three
years before by Palmerston's declaration regarding
Belize. Then there was distinct division on party lines ;
now there was a complete acceptance of the view repre-
sented in the President's message, and a practically
unanimous denunciation of Great Britain. Though a
few advocated abrogation of the treaty, as a whole the
Senate favored requiring Great Britain to fulfill her
treaty obligations, even though such insistence result
in war. Still, there was a strong feeling that there
would be no war ; but that England, when she saw that
the United States was firm, would yield, for war over
such questions as those in dispute would find little favor
" Ibid., 479-480.
=*' Ibid.
** Rhodes, History of the United States, II, 120-121.
*° Schouler, History of the United States, V, 339.
^'Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 328-331.
204 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
with the British nation." The Senate in its attitude
upon the question evidently reflected the feeUngs of the
nation as a whole.^ 1
The President's message had been accompanied by |
the Central American correspondence, and had been '
quickly followed by a definite stand on the part of the
American Senate. iVll of this expression of opinion, as
well as the exposition of the matter in controversy, had,
as was expected, a marked influence in England.
Expressions friendly to the United States appeared in
the London Times and the Nezvs, which, Buchanan
reported, seemed to indicate the general public opinion
that the United States was right. He felt that now the
Central American question might easily be settled with
any other premier than Palmerston.**
Parliament met on January 31 and it soon became
evident that British public opinion had wrought a
change in British governmental attitude. In the
speeches in answer to the Queen's address Lord Derby
criticised the British policy regarding America. There
was no other nation on earth, he declared, with which
war would be so mutually suicidal as with the United
States. Clarendon, in reply to the attack, stated that as
regarded the Central American question the only dif-
ference of opinion which could take place was as to the
legal interpretation of the treaty ; therefore, believing
that when differences of this kind arose between two
governments correspondence was generally useless as
a means of settlement, he had lost no time in making
"Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., i ses3., pt. i, pp. 107-111, 283-286, 323, 468-
471, passim; ibid., Appendix, 70-84, 87, passim.
'^Harper's Magaeinc, XII, 255; New York Times. Jan. .1, 19, 1856, Feb.
I, 33, 1856.
"•Buchanan, Works, X, 21, 27.
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 205
the offer to the United States government to refer the
whole question in dispute to any third power that might
be willing to undertake the reference, both parties
agreeing to be bound by the decision. This offer, he
regretted to say, had not been accepted by that govern-
ment ; but he had since renewed it, and he thought it
was so plain that this was the fairest and most rational
mode of settling the difference that he earnestly hoped
that the offer would be in the end accepted.*"
The intention of Clarendon's remarks was obviously
to disarm public criticism and parliamentary opposi-
tion by making it appear that the non-settlement of the
long-standing and dangerous Central American ques-
tion was due solely to the unreasonableness of the
American government. But, notwithstanding the
efforts of the ministry, Cobden in the House of Com-
mons called almost immediately for the correspondence
respecting American relations." This call was made
just at the time when it was expected that any mail
would bring word that the refusal of the British minis-
try to recall Crampton had been answered by his
prompt dismissal by the United States ; ^ and it was
evidently the aim of Cobden and his associates to fore-
stall any retaliatory measures on the part of their
government, should the dismissal take place.
Palmerston tried to avoid producing the correspond-
ence by stating that it was not complete ; but Cobden
was insistent. He wished the correspondence laid
before the House in order that it might discuss the
Central American dispute : the causes of the quarrel
should be made known and the question met fearlessly
** Hansard, Pari. Debates, 3d ser., CXL, 39-40.
" lUd.. 462.
" Buchanan, Works, X, 30.
2o6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
and honestly." The subject of American relations, he
declared, would be safer in the hands of the House
than in the hands of the government or of the press.
A hostile collision with the United States would be a
most horrible calamity, and would find no favor with
the British people. Yet the policy of the government
was producing a deadlock which would make it impos-
sible to escape war.*^
Palmerston responded by emphasizing the view of
the British government that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
was intended to be prospective in its operation," and
stated, as Clarendon had done, that the government had
offered to submit the question to arbitration, but had
received no reply from the United States.^ He then
admitted that, though the correspondence on the enlist-
ment question was not yet complete, that regarding
Central America, though perhaps not technically closed,
was ready to be presented and would be laid on the tabic
at once."' In conclusion he agreed with Cobden that a
war with the United States would be most lamentable,
and expressed his determination to do all possible to
end the dispute peacefully."
A week later the same subject was introduced in the
House by Roebuck, who asked for Crampton's instruc-
tions. He denounced the action of the government on
the recruiting question, declaring that the facts of the
case had been so misrepresented as to make it appear
that the British were in the right and had done all that
honor demanded, while the Americans were in the
wrong." Roebuck's desire, like Cobden's, was to pro-
*"lFansard, Pari. Debati-s. 3d ser., C".\L, .J67.
** Ibid.. 466-467. " Ibid.. 467-468. *• Ibid., 460.
*^ Ibid. *" Ibid.. 471-472. *' Ibid.. S37-844.
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 207
mote a discussion which would show the friendly feel-
ings of the British nation towards America. Palmer-
ston's reply to Roebuck was similar to that made to
Cobden ; while defending the action of the government
and declaring that the recruiting correspondence was
not yet closed, he expressed the strong desire of the
British nation to remain at peace with their American
kindred.""
The announcement that an offer of arbitration on the
Central American dispute had been made by Great
Britain came as a complete surprise to Buchanan. In
various conversations the Foreign Secretary had sug-
gested referring the matter to a third power, but
Buchanan had regarded such suggestions merely as
informal and as originating entirely with Clarendon.
Consequently, though he had carefully reported the
conversations to Marcy, he had not taken them seri-
ously and had simply expressed the opinion that there
was nothing in the question to arbitrate, and that,
besides, it would be difficult to find an impartial arbi-
trator."'
Upon learning of Clarendon's remarks in the House,
however, Buchanan promptly called upon Clarendon
and inquired whether the suggestions made to him had
constituted the offers referred to. Clarendon replied
in the affirmative, stating that the offer had been made
in a most formal manner by direction of the Cabinet.
The offer had been made thus orally as a preliminary to
more formal consideration of it. On November 10,
1855, Clarendon added, he had reported the last offer
=•' Ihid.. 844-850.
'^ Par]. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 297-298; Buchanan, Works, IX, 456.
2o8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
of arbitration made to Buchanan in a letter to Cramp-
ton, instructing him to communicate the contents of
the letter to the American secretary of state."
Immediately after this interview Buchanan wrote to
Marcy reporting the matter," and Clarendon also com-
municated it to Crampton," and it soon appeared that
there had been a general misapprehension of the
Foreign Secretary's meaning. Not only had Buchanan,
and, consequently, Marcy, gained a wrong impression
of Clarendon's intention, but Crampton, believing that
Buchanan was to have full charge of the Central Amer-
ican question, had simply considered what Clarendon
had told him with reference to the offer of arbitration
as for his own private information ; consequently he
had not read the letter carefully, and had entirely over-
looked the instruction to communicate the offer to
Marcy.'" As soon, however, as the misunderstanding
was cleared up, Crampton acquainted various members
of the American government with the fact that arbi-
tration had been offered by Great Britain."* Though
some criticism followed because of what was called
Crampton's negligence," the information undoubtedly
had a beneficial effect on American public feeling, espe-
cially as it was preceded by a conciliatory tone in the
parliamentary debates and in the British press.
Still, an offer of arbitration was not a settlement of
the question ; and it appealed to the nation as a whole
as little as it had appealed to Buchanan. Moreover,
" Pari. Paf'ers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 297.
"Ibid.; Buchanan, IVorks, X, 35.
" Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 297-298.
" Ibid., 298299. " Ibid., 299. " Ibid.
THE CRISIS, 1855- 1856 2og
the horizon was again darkened by the persistently
unsatisfactory attitude of the British government
towards the enhstment dispute. On February 25 the
Senate called for the correspondence on the subject,''
and President Pierce promptly transmitted it.'" The
following day the President sent a message to both
houses of Congress recommending to their favorable
consideration a request from the secretary of war for
a special appropriation of three million dollars for mili-
tary equipment.'" In the debates which followed, the
question of war with Great Britain was freely dis-
cussed, and at this time, as earlier in the year, a deter-
mination was shown to insist upon the fulfillment of
treaty terms even at the price of war ; but there was
also the conviction that if the American government
stood firm Great Britain would avoid war by retreating
from her position."
For some weeks after this, the two matters in dispute
remained in practically a state of deadlock. With
regard to the Central American question, it was no easy
matter to determine upon a course of action. Though
throughout the country there were some who favored
arbitration and others who advocated annulling the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, still there were strong objec-
tions to both. The other alternative was to force the
British to fulfill treaty obligations, even at the risk of
war, a course for which the majority of the nation
seemed ready, but one which was not to be chosen
lightly.** The enlistment question was in a graver state ;
^» U. S. Docs., ser. no. 819, doc. 35, p. i.
6» Ibid.
*" Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 362.
*^ Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., i sess., pt. i, pp. 618-627, Appendix, 175-177.
234-242, 300-306, 435-442.
«'Dept. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. 16, pp. 468-469.
IS
210 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the published correspondence had made it evident that
the demand for Crampton's recall was justifiable, yet
the order of recall had not been given, and no other
adequate amends had been oflfered by Great Britain."
During the month of May the situation became more
tense. The dismissal of Crampton seemed certain and
imminent, and it was felt by many that this step on the
part of the American government would be the signal
for an outbreak of hostilities between the two nations.
Different causes had also increased feeling on the Cen-
tral American question. Though Crampton had con-
tinued to call attention to the evil which the filibusters
wrought in Central America, and though Marcy had
denounced Walker and his methods,** still, by one
means or another large numbers of American citizens
with filibustering aims were able to leave the United
States ; and recently Marcy had tried to avoid discus-
sion of the subject with foreign diplomats, and had
displayed impatience and ill-humor when approached
regarding it.*^ Moreover, Walker, by his high-handed
proceedings, not only constantly endangered the lives
and property of British subjects in Nicaragua," but
"^Harper's Magazine, XII, 689.
"Clarendon to Crampton, Jan. 17, and Feb. 19, i8.s6, F. O., .'\ni.,
vol. 638, nos. 21, 46; Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 31, 1856, ibid., vol.
64J, no. 75-
"Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 4, 1856, ibid., vol. 641, no. 53; .\pril
29, 1856, ibid., vol. 643, no. ii. Marcy's ill-humor was probably in-
creased by the fact that he had consistently been opposed to Walker's
schemes from the first, but had not been supported by the President.
Marcy to Dallas, June 16, 1856, " Unofficial ", Dept. of State, Inst., Cit.
Brit., vol. 16, Walker, War in Nicaragua, 267.
"•Clarendon to Crampton, Jan. 10, and Feb. 19, 1856, F. C, \m., vol.
638, nos. 14, 46; Wyke to Clarendon, June 24, 1856, F. O., Cen. .\m.,
vol. 89, no. 37.
THE CRISIS, 1S55-1856 211
even levied exactions upon the British as well as upon
other foreigners in the region."
The seeming connivance on the part of the American
government at a violation of the spirit of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, while assuming an air of righteous
indignation towards Great Britain for an alleged
infraction of its letter, naturally produced a feeling
of distrust and resentment in England. Moreover, the
similarity between Crampton's offense, for which the
American government indignantly demanded amends,
and the shortcomings of local American officials — evi-
dently winked at by the Washington authorities —
which made possible the establishment and maintenance
of Walker's government, did not escape British notice."
Consequently, when Costa Rica determined to open war
upon Walker, the British government, while refusing
all of her appeals for direct protection,*" consented to
sell Costa Rica two thousand muskets to aid her in the
war against the filibuster.'" Knowledge of this soon
reached the United States through the Nicaraguan
seizure, on the San Juan, of the mail for Costa Rica
which contained the correspondence upon the subject
which had passed between the Costa Rican minister and
the British foreign secretary." The usual charges of
treaty violation were made against Great Britain, and
" Crampton to Clarendon, Mar. 3, 1856, F. O., Am., vol. 641, no. 52.
** Lumley to Clarendon, June 19, 1856, F. O., Am., vol. 643, no. 4;
San Francisco Evening Bulletin, Aug. i, 1856.
''Hansard, Pari. Debates, 3d ser., CXLII, 310-311.
''"Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with Wallerstein ",
11-12, 15-17. The Costa Rican agent decided not to accept the terms of
the British government, so the arms were never delivered. Hansard,
Pay'. Debates. 3d ser., CXLII, 311.
"^ Wells, Wc.'ker's Expedition to Nicaragua, 149.
212 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
much excitement was created." Largely as a result of
this act of Great Britain the President determined to
receive Padre Vijil, a new representative from Walker's
government." American resentment was further in-
creased by the news that Captain Tarleton of the Brit-
ish vessel Eurydice had boarded the American packet
Orizaba for the purpose of examining the ship's papers
in an effort to prevent recruits from reaching Walker.'*
So serious did the situation become that both nations
found it desirable to increase their naval forces in the
Gulf of Mexico."
These hostile acts reported against Great Britain led
Dallas, who had recently succeeded Buchanan, to take
a very gloomy view of the future as well as of the situ-
ation in general. Recent British action in connection
with Central America, he believed, showed the intention
to dispose of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and to bring
the isthmus under British control, thus disjointing the
American Union.'" He felt that British disregard for
American friendship would also appear in connection
with the recruitment dispute, and expected that news of
" Crampton to Clarendon, May 5, 1856, F. C, :\m., vol. 643, no. 113;
Cong. Globe. 34 Cong., 1 sess., pt. 2, pp. 1069-1072.
" Dept. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. 16, p. 529. The presidential
message announcing the reception of Vijil, stated that the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua was imperative because of the
interruption of interoceanic communication across both Nicaragua and
Panama. Richardson, Messages and Papers. V, 373-3"4.
'♦Crampton to Clarendon, May 12, 1856, F. ()., .\m.. vol. 643. no. 118.
Captain Tarleton's act was taken up by Dallas with the British govern-
ment, but it soon became evident that no insult had been intended against
the American flag; consequently the matter was dropped. Dallas to
Marcy, July 11, 1856, Dept. of State, Des., Eng.. vol. 69, no. 19; cf.
Wells, Walker's ilxpedition to Nicaragua, 203-224.
" Keasbcy, S'icaragua Canal, 236; Han.sard, Pari. Debates, 3d sir..
CXLII, i;o8.
'■■ Dept. of State, Des.. Eng., vol. 69, no. 11. Most of the despatch is
printed in U. S. Docs., scr. no. 3853, doc. 161, p. 38.
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 213
Crampton's dismissal would be followed by the notice
that his own passports were at his disposal."
A letter of June 16, 1856, from Marcy to Dallas
shows that Dallas's belief in British bad faith was
shared by his government. The President, Marcy
wrote, had recognized Walker's government because
of the aid furnished Costa Rica by Great Britain. The
intercepted documents, he stated, had satisfied the
American people that Great Britain was aiding Costa
Rica and other Central American governments to
" crush out " the only existing authority in Nicaragua ;
and the object of her policy was not considered ques-
tionable. " This government could not remain entirely
inactive and see Great Britain obtain complete ascend-
ancy in all the states of Central America." " The un-
reasonable interpretation which the British government
had placed upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, as well as
its colonization of the Bay Islands, certainly gave
strong support to the conviction of British perfidy.
On May 28, 1856, the American government discon-
tinued diplomatic relations with Crampton in conse-
quence of his having aided in violating American
neutrality laws by recruiting soldiers for the Crimean
War within the territory of the United States." But
before the fact of Crampton's dismissal was known in
England, it became very evident that Dallas and his
government were mistaken in their analysis of the situ-
ation, and in their predictions regarding the future.
The news that Walker's agent had been received at
" Dept. of State, Des., Eng., vol. 69, no. 13.
"Dept. of State, Inst., Gt. Brit., vol. 16, p. 529. Cf. Wells, IValker's
Expedition to Nicaragua, 226-236.
'» Die. Nat. Biog., XII, 6-7.
214 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Washington '" reached London a few days before the
report of Cranipton's dismissal." It was this American
recognition of the fihbuster government which caused
the British nation to reveal its real feelings and inten-
tions. The Times, which, earlier in the year, had
blustered and threatened, in the face of the real crisis
quickly assumed a conciliatory tone. After remarking
about the low state of political morality in America
which made Vijil's reception possible, it added:
But it is no case of war, it is not even necessarily a ground
of diplomatic complaint. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty has not
been in terms violated, and it may probably be expedient in
the present critical state of the relations between the two
countries, rather to pass this matter by in silence than to incur
the risk of introducing fresh difficulties into a discussion
already sufficiently perilous, or give an excuse to those who are
even now only too ready to seek an occasion of quarrel. If
war does come we must meet it as we may. Let us, at any rate,
have the satisfaction of reflecting that this greatest of human
calamities has not been precipitated by any undue sensitive-
ness or any avoidable interference on our part."
The Times now also advocated a policy of peace in
reference to the recruiting question. Though the dis-
missal of Dallas must immediately succeed the receipt
of notice that Crampton had been dismissed, such an
act, the Times declared, by no means implied a state of
war. " We may be at peace with America ", it added,
" though without any diplomatic representative ; and,
•* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 161, p. 30. Disgusted at the studied
coldness of tlie diplomatic body at Washington, Vijil soon returned to
Nicaragua. I.uniley to Clarendon, June 30, 1856, F. O., .Am., vol. 644,
no. 26; Dublin Review, XI^, 376-377. His successor was not received by
the .Xnicriian government. Marcy to Wheeler, Sept. 18, 1856, Dept. of
State, Inst., -Am. States, vol. 15, p. 279.
"Crampton to Clarendon, May 28, 1856, I'. O., Am., vol. 643, no. 134.
" I^ondon Times, June 2, 1856, quoted in Littell's Lit-ing Age, anil ser.,
-XIV, 113-114.
THE CRISIS, i8 55-1856 215
perhaps, at the point at which matters have arrived, the
absence of an Ambassador may in some degree dimin-
ish the apprehension of danger." ^'
The other leading newspapers took a similar attitude.
The Examiner^ and the Press"^ were even more
strongly for peace than the Times. The News ex-
pressed the hope that the British cabinet might think
twice before sending away Dallas ; *° while the Tele-
graph, less friendly to the government, seized the
occasion to denounce its policy while pointing out the
folly of war with America. A war with the United
States, because of the American navy, would be a
much more serious contest than the Crimean War.
" Surely ", it said, " the war just terminated by a dis-
graceful peace, which we were obliged to accept, ought
to be a lesson to curb the overweening pride of our
countrymen." "
That the attitude of the country thus reflected in the
press was quite in harmony with the views of the Brit-
ish government Dallas learned in an interview with the
foreign secretary early in June. At this time he read
to Clarendon two letters from Marcy upon the subjects
in dispute. In the letter on recruiting, which was writ-
ten in a conciliatory tone, Marcy stated that the Ameri-
can government gladly accepted the assurance of Great
Britain that no violation of the law had been authorized
*' London Times, June 3, 1856, quoted in Littell's Living Age, 2nd ser,,
XIV, 114-
** London Examiner, June 7, 1856, quoted in Littell's Living Age,
2nd ser., XIV, 242.
^ London Press, June 2, 1856, quoted in Littell's Living Age, 2nd
ser., XIV, 122.
*' London News, June 4, 1856, quoted in Littell's Living Age, 2nd
ser., XIV, 118.
'" London Telegraph, June 2, 1856, quoted in Littell's Living Age,
2nd ser., XIV, 118-119.
2i6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
or countenanced, and explained that the withdrawal of
Crampton had been requested because of his personal
acts ; however, the United States was anxious to con-
tinue diplomatic relations with Great Britain."
The second letter, written May 24, reviewed in a
temperate manner the history of the Central American
question, and added that, while the United States
government could not consent to arbitration on the
meaning of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which seemed
to it beyond doubt, yet it would not object to the sub-
mission of some of the questions of fact connected
with it to arbitration, such as the question of the sover-
eignty over the Bay Islands, and of the boundaries of
Belize and Mosquito territory. But Dallas was in-
structed first to communicate with the foreign secretary
in order to determine whether the differences could not
be promptly terminated by direct negotiation ; and if
they could not, to discuss the conditions to govern the
arbitration of the points of difTerence.^'
Dallas reported to IMarcy that Clarendon had shown
himself much gratified at the tone and import of the
communication regarding Central America, and had
remarked that " it would be disreputable to both gov-
ernments, if, upon a platform written with so much
clearness, and in a spirit so candid and conciliatory,
they failed to reach an adjustment of the whole diffi-
culty." The United States, Clarendon declared em-
phatically, did not seem to realize the immense change
which had taken ])lace in British jniblic opinion and
pohcy regardng colonial establislunents ; " while Great
Britain could not submit to be i)usheil out i)f a place
"'Brit, and For. Slate Papers, XLVIII, 256-27U-
"•I/. S. Docs., srr. no. ,l8.s.l, doc. 161, pp. a-io.
THE CRISIS, i8 55-1856 217
she actually occupied, he would not give three coppers
to retain any post on the Central American territory or
coast from which she could honorably retire ".^
Dallas was much encouraged by the interview, and
informed Marcy that he felt that there now existed in
Great Britain a real disposition to close all difficulty
over the Central American question. " Indeed, I was
agreeably surprised," he wrote, " though I forebore to
manifest it, at the apparent warmth of welcome given
to your paper, and augur beneficial results." ''
The same conciliatory attitude was displayed three
days later in the House of Commons when Lord Russell
tried to forestall any governmental retaliation upon
Dallas in consequence of Crampton's dismissal.'" It
seemed particularly desirable, he said, that Dallas be
retained, since a discussion of the Central American
question had been reopened by him in such a manner
as to give hopes of a settlement.'" Russell also called
attention to the danger of a collision between the Brit-
ish and American naval forces on the coast of America
in consequence of Crampton's dismissal, and inquired
whether suitable precautions had been taken to prevent
it, dwelling strongly upon the misfortunes which would
result from war between the two countries.'" In reply
Palmerston gave the assurance that Dallas would not be
dismissed, and expressed a readiness on the part of the
government to enter into communication with him for
a settlement of the Central American question."' " It
would be lamentable in the extreme", he stated, "if
^ Dallas to Marcy, June 13, 1856, Dept. of State, Des., Eng., vol. 69,
no. 15. Extracts from the despatch are given in U. S. Docs., ser. no.
3853, no. 161, pp. 33-35-
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, no. 161, p. 35.
"-Hansard, Pail. Debates, 3d ser., CXLII, 1502-1503.
^^Ibid.. 1503. '^Ibid.. 1504-1505. ^'' Ibid.. 1508.
2i8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
two countries which have so many interests in common
should, through the perverseness of any man, be
brought into a state of hostihty with each other." **
The attitude here displayed by Palmerston put an
end to the recruiting dispute " and really opened a new
and more friendly era in the relations between the two
countries. It gave Dallas high hopes of an agreement
on the Central American question." In the opinion of
Dallas and of the English public, the favorable turn in
the relations between the two governments was due
exclusively to the " equally able, firm, and conciliatory
despatches last sent to be laid before Lord Clarendon ".**
That the increased friendliness of the American gov-
ernment, probably produced in part by the unexpected
close of the Crimean War, gave the British govern-
ment an opportunity to adopt a more moderate attitude
without loss of dignity, and that it also made possible a
reopening of the Central American negotiations under
more favorable conditions, is quite obvious ; but this
increased friendliness did not avert any real danger of
war, for in the questions in dispute no such danger had
existed. During this whole period war could have been
produced only by some rash act on the part of the
Americans which would have forced the British to fight
in order to vindicate their honor ; and in such a case it
would have been necessary that the grievance against
the United States be a very real one.
•* Hansard, Pari. Debates, 3d ser., CXLII, 1509.
"' The only display of resentment on the part of the British government
in consequence of Crampton's dismissal was several months' delay in
appointing his successor.
•• Dept. of State, Des., F.ng., vol. (19, no. 16. Tart of the despatch is
given in U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. i6i, pp. 35-37-
•' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 161, p. 36.
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 219
Reasons various and of varying importance deter-
mined the British attitude. The enlistment question
needs scarcely to be considered here, since the feeling
produced in connection with it was largely due to
irritation over British conduct regarding the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty and Central America."*" Besides, sooni
after the facts came to light, the conviction seems to
have become general in England that the fault lay
largely with the British. The two matters which
caused practically all of the feeling in the Central
American dispute were the retention of the Mosquito
protectorate and the colonization of the Bay Islands.
Though consistency led the American government to
demand the withdrawal of British settlers from the
territory between the Sibun and the Sarstoon, that
government realized that a compliance with the demand
was not likely to result, and that it was, under the cir-
cumstances, rather too much to expect."^
Of the other two matters, the simpler was that of the
protectorate. It has been shown that the British gov-
ernment was sincere in its desire to rid itself of this,
and had only been prevented from so doing by a false
sense of honor, and by the political confusion in Central
America. Aloreover, war between Great Britain and
the United States could not have been produced by
the j\Iosquito question in itself. Since the British gov-
ernment considered the j\Iosquito kingdom a farce and
a joke, it had no intention of making the nation ridicu-
lous in the eyes of the world by going to war to defend
such a make-believe. Besides, no support could have
^'^ See above, pp. 199-200.
^"^ Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 99.
220 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
been secured from the British people for the pursuit
of such a war.
With the Bay Islands the case was somewhat differ-
ent ; the British government had seized these to pre-
vent their occupation by any other power, and had
organized them into a colony to protect British subjects
settled there. Like the assertion of the British pro-
tectorate, the colonization of the Bay Islands had not
met with popular favor ; furthermore, it was a clear
violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The British
government had realized this for some time, and the
British public had also come to question the action of
the government.'"
In June, 1854, while searching for data with which
to refute the statements of the American government,*"
the foreign secretary had learned, through evidence
from the Colonial Office, that in the period between
1830 and 1840 the British government had more than
once acknowledged the sovereignty of Central America
over Ruatan.'"' This fact might have been kept con-
cealed from the United States ; but there was evi-
dence still more damaging to the position taken by the
British government. This was in the form of a letter
written in 1836 by the Colonial Office itself to one S.
Coxe, who had inquired in behalf of a colonization com-
pany regarding the boundaries claimed by the British
government for Belize. The reply from the Colonial
Office, after naming the boundaries on the north, south,
and west, added, " The British Crown claims also the
'"■' l-ondon Daily News, Jan. 31, 1853; London Economist, XI\', 560;
Wodehouse to Labouchere, Mar. 28, 1857, V. O., Ilond., vol. 3.
'"" Hammond to Merivale, May 30, 1854, C O., Hond., vol. 89.
'"* Merivale I0 naminoiul, June u, 1854, C O., Hond., vol. 80.
THE CRISIS, 1855- 1856 221
waters, islands, and cays lying between the coast defined
and the meridian of the easternmost point of Light-
house Reef." ^"^ Unfortunately for the claims of the
British government — that the Bay Islands were de-
pendencies of Belize — these islands were situated sixty
miles to the east of the meridian described."* More
unfortunately still, from the British point of view, a
copy of the letter had fallen into the hands of a member
of Kinney's colonization association who had recently
made a public statement as to its contents.*"'
In view of these facts, the British government had
no resort but to retreat as gracefully as possible. The
stubborn policy of the Pierce administration, shown as
clearly by the defense of Hollins's destruction of Grey-
town and the indifference to filibustering, as in the
correspondence over the meaning of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, undoubtedly emphasized the necessity
for a prompt and definite concession.*'*
But, all question of justice of British claims aside,
the British government and people, for commercial
reasons, were strongly averse to war with the United
^'^ Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., XLIV, "Belize", i. What appears to
be the original draft of this letter, found in the Public Record Office,
gives the boundaries as above, states that claim is made to the islands
along the coast, and then adds, " as well as any other islands and keys in
the Bay of Honduras which G. Britain may have heretofore occupied or
been entitled to occupy ", but the lines quoted were struck out. Glenelg
to Coxe, Nov. 23, 1836, C. O., Hond., vol. 49. The idea of making
known the British claim to the Bay Islands was, apparently, after more
careful consideration, abandoned.
"»Z)« Bow's Rei-iew, XXVII, 558.
"'Hansard, Pari. Debates. 3d sen, CXLIII, 645.
10s -pjjg bombardment of Greytown was declared by the British govern-
ment to be an obstacle in the way of settling the Central American dispute,
but the actions of the government indicate that this was merely an excuse
offered in the vain hope of delaying the retreat insisted upon by the
United States. Buchanan, Works, IX, 250, 298, 300.
222 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
States ; though willing to evade and, if possible, to
delay the issue to save their pride, they intended caii-
tiously to avoid having war thrust upon them. Durir.L^
the preceding few years, trade with America, especiall\'
in cotton and cotton products, had increased tremen-
dously. Consequently, when the Central American dis-
pute began to look serious the members of Parliamo:
from the manufacturing districts became concerned
and promptly after the meeting of Parliament began to
bring pressure to bear upon the government."* Later,
at the time of Crampton's dismissal, the British press
in general took alarm and emphatically called attention
to the disaster to British trade which would result from
war with America."' But the same consideration had
secured the attention of the British government ; "*
and, as is shown by a Foreign Office " departmental
"» Buchanan, Works. IX, 365.
"" Cobden represented Manchester, and Roebuck, Sheffield.
^" The London Examiner for June 7, 1856 called attention to the
tremendous amount of trade carried on between the two countries. In
1854, it stated, the total value of imports from the United States was
£29,795,590, and of this the value of the raw cotton alone amounted to
£17,274,677. In the same year the value of British exports to the United
States was £21,410,369. Such were the liritish commercial interests in
time of peace. Great would be the scandal to humanity if two coinitries
which so served to enrich each other should turn their powers to injur-
ing each other. Quoted in LitteU's Lhing Age, 2nd ser., XI\', 242.
The London Telegraph for June 2, 1856, pointed out that a war with
the United States would be a guerilla war on the ocean, which would
end in the destruction of British commerce. The mills in the north
would stop and hundreds of thousands of people would be thrown out
of work. Quoted in LitteU's Living Age, 2nd ser., XI\', 119.
*" The fact that great damage to .\merican commerce would result in
consequence of war with England was early realized in the United States,
but the .'\mericans, who had the grievance on their side, were willing to
risk war and face its consequences. Besides, there was the strong prob-
ability that if the American government put on a bold front the British
would concede the points in dispute. New York Times. Mar. 6, 1856;
Pliiladclphia Evening Journal, June 25, 1856, quoted in the London Times,
July IS, 1856; Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., i sess., 79-80, 84, 241.
¥
THE CRISIS, 1855-1856 223
minute " of 1856, that government decided that the
trade in cotton with the United States was of far more
value than any interests possessed in Central America ;
consequently, it could not afford to risk war by further
offending the United States. This decision shaped the
whole British policy towards America during the years
immediately preceding the Civil War."'
*" See below, p. 230, note 25.
CHAPTER VIII.
Adjustment in Accordance with American View,
1 856- 1 860.
The war cloud past, conditions were more favorable
than ever before to a final and satisfactory settlement
of the dispute. For the first time in the history of the
Central American question, the differences of opinion
which produced it had been thoroughly discussed by
the British and American governments and were so
well known that little chance remained for misunder-
standing or evasion. Moreover, England was willing
to meet any reasonable demands of the United States,
Consequently much might have been expected from the
last attempt at direct settlement between the two gov-
ernments, made in 1856 and 1857.
On June 26, 1856, Clarendon wrote Dallas a reply
to Marcy's instruction communicated to him on June
1 1 . The Foreign Secretary's letter was cordial in tone,
and, while still maintaining that the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty was prospective in intention, it declared the
British government to be as anxious as the President
to preserve the friendly relations between the two coun-
tries, and expressed a readiness to resume negotiations
with a sincere desire to bring them to a speedy and
satisfactory conclusion. Attention was again called to
the wish of the British government to retire from the
Mosquito protectorate. As to Belize, Clarendon added,
the only question to be settled regarding it, which con-
cerned Central America, was that of boundaries be-
224
ADJUSTMENT, 1S56-1S60 225
tween the two ; and no insurmountable difficulties need
be expected in this regard. Since the United States
government held that under any interpretation of the
treaty the Bay Islands were no part of British
dominions previous to 1852, this question might be
arbitrated, should it not respond to direct negotiation/
With the elements of the problem thus laid before
them, Dallas and Clarendon began discussion. An
interview held on June 30 made it clear that the Mos-
quito protectorate would give but little trouble ; BeHze
and the Bay Islands were the subjects over which diffi-
culties were likely to arise. But Dallas expressed the
hope that the British government would let the islands
return to Honduras ; and Clarendon, on the other hand,
was anxious that the United States would not even in
appearance " be ingenious to make difficulties " regard-
ing Belize." Thus was indicated the general basis on
which a settlement would be possible, and from the
first the negotiators seem to have tacitly adopted it.
During the preliminary discussion, however, little
was said about the Bay Islands, for Herran, an agent
from Honduras, had arrived in London to negotiate
for their restoration.' Since the British press, include
ing even the Times, regarded the return of the islands
as required by justice as well as consistent with British
honor,* Dallas had little doubt of Herran's success ;
but he anxiously watched the negotiations between
Clarendon and Herran and cautioned the latter not to
yield to the British desire to make Ruatan a free port
but to insist upon its unconditional surrender.^ After
* Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, " Further correspondence with the
United States respecting Central America ", 7-9.
^ U. S. Docs,, ser. no. 3853, doc. 161, pp. 40-43.
3 Ibid., p. 46. * Ibid. ' Ibid., p. 51.
16
226 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the Bay Islands treaty was complete, Dallas learned
that it made the islands a free state under the sover-
eignty of Honduras.* This arrangement was obviously
intended as a protection to the British subjects settled
on the islands. While feeling that the terms of Great
Britain were not very magnanimous, Dallas believed
that if Honduras was willing there was no cause for
oppposition from the United States ; ' consequently,
he raised no objection, and the treaty was transmitted
to the Honduran government for ratification.
When the arrangement between England and Hon-
duras seeemed on a fair way to satisfactory conclu-
sion, the negotiations between Dallas and Clarendon
progressed more rapidly. The draft of a treaty was
drawn up, and after certain changes in detail by the
United States government, it was signed by the nego-
tiators on October 17.' This document, like the
Webster-Crampton project, was a set of proposals for
adjustment to be offered Nicaragua and Costa Rica,
but it was first to be ratified by the British and Ameri-
can governments.' Like that project also, the new
arrangement established boundary limits for the Mos-
quito Indians, within which they were to be permitted
to govern themselves. By voluntary compact, however,
they might become incorporated with the republic of
Nicaragua. All of the Mosquito territory south of the
Wanx River, not included within the reservation,
should, without prejudice to the rights of the republic
of Honduras or to any question of boundary of the
• U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 161, p. 55.
' Ibid.
* Pari. Pat>crs, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 24-29.
» Ibid., 27.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1S60 227
latter and Nicaragua, be regarded as within the limits
and under the sovereignty of Nicaragua. Greytown
also came under this last stipulation, but as a free city
with a free port. In return for its privileges, the town
should pay an indemnity to the Mosquitos for a limited
period. The treaty gave Costa Rica free use of San
Juan harbor and certain rights of navigation on the
river. Her boundary dispute with Nicaragua was to
be arbitrated by the British and American govern-
ments.^"
The questions concerning Belize and the Bay Islands
were adjusted by separate articles. These called for
definition of the Belize boundary limits as they existed
April 19, 1850, by treaty between Great Britain and
Guatemala ; and stated that, in consideration of the
agreement negotiated by Herran and Clarendon, the
two contracting parties engaged to recognize the free
territory of the Bay Islands as part of the republic of
Honduras."
President Pierce approved the treaty and mentioned
it favorably in his annual message of December, 1856."^
That such a compromise arrangement should have been
satisfactory to the President is a matter of some sur-
prise, in view of his former demand that Great Britain
completely withdraw from Central America ; and it
leads to the conclusion that Pierce's early aggressive-
ness was assumed partially for political purposes.
After he had failed of renomination by the Demo-
cratic convention, his demands on the British became
much more modest. But the Dallas-Clarendon treaty
did not receive congressional attention until Pierce
'0 Ibid., 24-28. ^ Ibid., 28-29.
" Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 410-41 1.
228 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
went out of office ; and when it did come up for con-
sideration it met with Uttle favor from Buchanan, the
new President, or from the Senate. Particular objec-
tion was made to the article relating to the Bay Islands.
As the islands were considered Honduran territory,
there was strong feeling against any mention, in an
agreement made with England, of the treaty for their
restoration." Furthermore, though the Senate had not
yet seen a copy of the Herran-Clarendon treaty, it had
learned that that treaty contained a clause prohibiting
the introduction of slavery into the Bay Islands." Such
a stipulation was offensive to southern members."
Finally, after various changes the Dallas-Clarendon
arrangement was ratified on March 12, 1857," by a
majority of but one vote.^' The chief change in the
treaty was in connection with the article regarding the
Bay Islands. This was struck out and replaced by a
simple engagement on the part of the contracting
parties to recognize and respect those islands, as under
the sovereignty and as part of the republic of Hon-
duras."
The treaty thus modified was returned to Dallas by
Cass, Buchanan's secretary of state, accompanied by a
note explaining that the amendments had made the pact
more acceptable to the President than before, but not
entirely satisfactory. However, in order to remove the
^' Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respectinR
Central America ", 40-41.
" Ibid., 23.
^^ Ibid., 39-40, 41. London Morning Post, Dec. aa, 1857; Napier to
Clarendon, May 3, 1857, F. O., Am., vol. 671, no. 64.
^'^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America", 31-33.
" Ibid., 40.
^ Ibid., 31-33. Cf. above, p. 237.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 229
only remaining cause for misunderstanding, he had
thought it best to ratify the agreement."
As soon as the British cabinet had examined the
amended treaty, Clarendon reported that since the
treaty with Honduras was not yet ratified, the change
in the article relating to the Bay Islands had raised an
insurmountable difficulty. The adoption by the British
government of the Senate amendment would tempt
Honduras to reject the arrangement negotiated by
Herran, and thus the Bay Islands would be resigned
without satisfactory guarantees for protecting the
British settlers."^ But as he was very loath to see the
negotiations again fail,"^ Clarendon immediately revised
the treaty amended by the Senate, adding to the article
by which the contracting parties recognized the Bay
Islands as under the sovereignty of Honduras, the
clause: "whenever and so soon as the Republic of
Honduras shall have concluded and ratified a treaty
with Great Britain by which Great Britain shall have
ceded and the Republic of Honduras shall have ac-
cepted, the said islands, subject to the provisions and
conditions contained in such Treat3^" *"
Thus modified, the treaty was again returned to the
United States and presented to Cass by Napier, the
" Ibid., 32-33-
^ In a letter to Cass of April 16, 1857, Dallas stated that the Senate
amendment would not have constituted an impediment to ratification had
it not been for Palmerston's remarkable success in the recent elections.
Dept. of State, Des., Eng., vol. 70, no. 49.
^ The opposition earlier shown by Buchanan to the Sarstoon as the
southern boundary of Belize had caused the British government to fear
that, as president, he would refuse his consent to any such arrangement.
In appreciation of his concession on this point, the British government
was anxious to save the treaty. Foreign office memorandum, April 8,
1857, F. O., Cen. Am., vol. 94.
'^ Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 39.
230 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
recently-appointed British minister.^ After it had been
examined by the President, Napier was promptly noti-
fied that the proposition, though changed in form, was
the same in substance as that recently rejected by the
Senate ; therefore it could not be considered. Believ-
ing as he did that the Bay Islands belonged to Hon-
duras, the President could not possibly sanction any
arrangement by which their restoration should be made
dependent upon conditions either already prescribed
or left to be prescribed. Moreover, there was another
obstacle to American acceptance of the arrangement.
Napier had supplied Cass with a copy of the Herran-
Clarendon treaty, the conditions of which the American
government found highly unsatisfactory. Should Hon-
duras ratify this treaty, Cass declared, she would ratify
the establishment of an independent state within her
own limits — a state at all times liable to foreign influ-
ence and control. On the other hand, should this treaty
or a similar one be rejected by Honduras, Great Britain
would retain possession of the islands with the implied
concurrence of the United States, and these islands
might eventually become a permanent portion of the
British empire. The American government could not
become a party to such an arrangement.'* But before
Cass's letter was received by Napier, a despatch from
Wyke had reached Clarendon, reporting the failure of
the Honduran assembly to ratify the treaty negotiated
by Herran." Consequently, the many months of nego-
tiation had again brought no result.
" PuW. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence rcspcctiuK
Central .America ", 43-43.
" Ibid., 44-46.
" Ihid., 40. The oilier Central American states were influential in
securing the rejection of the treaty. They feared that under the terms
of svirrciuler liomhiras woulj be unable to protect the islands from
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 231
Following this last failure, the American government
revealed a strong inclination towards the abrogations
of the Clayton-Buhver treaty. In conversation with
Napier, Cass clearly intimated that this would be the
best solution of the difficulty,"* and Buchanan showed
the same attitude/' Senator Douglas, of Illinois, Cass
informed Napier, had contemplated nullifying the
treaty by a vote of the Senate declaring it not to be
binding; if the motion were made, he declared, it
would be based on the alleged violation or non-execu-
tion of the treaty by Great Britain. Upon inquiry from
Napier whether the American constitution contained
any provision for such action, Cass replied that such a
course had been taken before — about 1798 — and it
might be again."* This attitude on the part of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of State convinced Napier that
unless the discussion was closed before the next meet-
ing of Congress, an attempt would be made to set aside
the treaty.^ Therefore, on June 7, he wrote to Claren-
don reporting the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, he said, could not long be main-
tained on the British interpretation of it. If the British
government wished to stand upon the treaty, it would
be necessary to reconcile it to the views of the United
filibusters. Wyke to Clarendon, April 16, 1857, F. O., Guat., vol. 95.
no. 32. On July 28, 1857, Wyke wrote to Hammond with reference to
the fears of the Guatemala government, " they are now inclined to
believe that for the sake of our Cotton market we would sacrifice them on
the shrine of American A.mbition and allow these countries to be over-
run and conquered by American Adventurers sooner than risk a quarrel
with the Northern Union." F. C, Guat., vol. 95.
* Napier to Clarendon, May 3, 1857, F. 0., Am., vol. 671, no. 64;
June 7, 1857, ibid., vol. 672, no. 90; June 7, 1857, ibid., vol. 673, no. 96.
« Ibid.
^Napier to Clarendon, May 3, 1857, ibid., vol., 671, no. 64. The refer-
ence was evidently to the treaty of alliance with France, made in 1778.
» Ibid.
232 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
States by concessions to Central America. This per-
haps could not be accomplished before Congress met.
but if the intentions of the British government were of
a liberal and conciliatory character, and were frankly
made known to the American government, the danger
of a violent explosion in Congress might be averted.
Hence, in order to expedite matters, Napier suggested \
that an able commissioner be sent to Central America •
for the purpose of settling the Belize boundaries, and ,
the Mosquito question, and for arranging the surrender |
of the Bay Islands on fair terms. It would be well, he ''
believed, for the commissioner to make a preHminary
visit to Washington as a public mark of friendly feel-
ings as well as for invoking the unofficial aid of the
United States in the matter. Though the arrangement
would be a virtual execution of the American interpre-
tation of the treaty, it would be attained by an inde-
pendent and benevolent course of action on the part of
the British government. Moreover, this plan would
avoid direct negotiation at Washington, and the con-
sequent intervention of the Senate.*'
Two weeks later Napier again wrote, expressing
greater certainty that Congress would attempt to abro-
gate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Even if the President
did not recommend abrogation in his message, he would
be likely to use language such as would arouse bad
feeling between the two countries. Therefore, Napier
stated, he was convinced that the best way to secure
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty would be by promptly and
frankly conforming the British position to the Ameri-
can construction of it ; accordingly he once more urged
*• F. O., Am., vol. 672, no. 90.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 233
that a commissioner be sent to Central America to make
suitable arrangements."
Recent events connected with the Panama Railroad,
;an American line opened in 1855," increased British
/ fears for the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. In April, 1856,
^the train on this route was attacked by Panamanian
outlaws, who killed several of the passengers and stole
a large quantity of goods."" In consequence, American
newspapers reported that the United States intended to
obtain a strip of territory across Panama in order to
secure the safety of the route."* This immediately
aroused British suspicion," which was increased by the
fact that the President's message, appearing shortly
after these reports, had referred to the neutralization
features of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as applicable to
any transit line across the isthmus of Panama, " within
the limits of Central America "."' An article from the
Panama Herald, copied in the Union, seemed to put an
ominous interpretation upon this part of the message.
Panama was not in Central America, it declared, and,
as the eighth article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
merely provisional," it was a mistake to suppose that
Great Britain had promised or guaranteed any protec-
tion to the Panama Railroad."'
In consequence of these suspicions, and of reports of
proposals made by American commissioners to the
^ Ibid., no. 109.
^^ Edwards, Panama, 426.
^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 237, p. 26.
** Lumley to Clarendon, Nov. 19, 1856, "Confidential", F. O., Am.,
vol. 647, no. no.
** Foreign Office to Lumley, Nov. 19, 1856, ibid., vol. 639, no. 32.
^ Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 411.
^' See above, p. 98.
^ Lumley to Clarendon, Dec. 9, 1856, " Confidential ", F. O., Am.,
vol. 647, no. 122.
234 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
New Granada government,** Clarendon had instructed
Napier to observe to Cass that the British government
did not doubt that the United States would admit that
for either of the two powers to exercise exclusive con-
trol over the Panama route would be contrary to the
spirit and intention of the eighth article of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty.*"
In reply to Napier's representations, Cass denied any
intention on the part of the United States to occupy or
acquire any part of New Granada or to obtain posses-
sion of the railroad route." Cass's letter, however, was
not entirely reassuring, for the Secretary of State failed
to commit himself to any acknowledgment that the
eighth article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty contem-
plated a joint protection by the United States and Great
Britain over the Panama Railroad." This omission
attracted Napier's attention, and led him to fear that if
the pending claims for damages against New Granada
were not settled before Congress met, hostile measures
might be passed by the American government causing
New Granada to forfeit to the United States her right
to Panama, or, at least, her rights over the railway."
These views were also communicated by Napier to his
government," and they most probably had weight in
aiding it to reach a decision regarding his suggestions
for settling the Central American dispute.
"These commissioners were empowered to form a treaty with New
Granada for transferring the control of the Panama Railroad to the
United States and for seciirinj; to the United States in full sovereignty
five islands in the harbor of Panama. U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 337,
pp. 25-34. The treaty was not ratified.
■•"Clarendon to Napier, .\pril 10, 1857, F. C, \m., vol. 667, no. 50.
"■ The commissioners had been appointed by the Pierce administration.
** Napier to Clarendon, April 28, 1857, F. O., .\m., vol. 670, no. 55.
<* Napier to Clarendon, June 24, 1857, ibid., vol. 673, no. 114.
«* Ibid.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 235
The situation in Central America made Napier's plan
for settlement by a special mission seem particularly
feasible at this time. The experience of the Central
American states with the filibusters, as well as the
greater friendliness of the British government and its
agents towards Central America, had produced a con-
fidence which augured well for the success of direct
negotiation. Therefore, the British government de-
cided to carry out Napier's suggestions to the letter.
Sir William Gore Ouseley, who had filled various diplo-
matic offices " and was intimately known to Buchanan,**
was selected as special commissioner.
As the time for the opening of Congress approached,
however, the American government had grown more
impatient over the delay in the settlement of the Central
American question." Napier realized this, and on
October 19, as soon as he learned that his suggestions
had been adopted, he obtained an interview with
Buchanan and informed him of the intentions of his
government. The decision had been made some time
past, he explained, but delay had been occasioned by
the difficulty of selecting a competent person for the
mission and also by recent reports from India, which
had absorbed the attention of the British government.
Though he could not say what would be the exact
nature of Ouseley's instructions, Napier stated that he
believed the British government intended to execute
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty according to the general
tenor of the interpretation put upon it by the United
States, but to do so by separate negotiation with the
Central American republics.**
^ Die. Nat. Biog., XLII, 364.
** U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, p. 114.
*' Ibid., pp. 112-114. *^ Ibid., p. 115.
236 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
The British minister later referred to the contingency
which he aimed to prevent, remarking that if, in conse-
quence of the language in the President's message, a
resolution should be proposed in Congress for abrogat-
ing the Clayton-Bulwer treaty such a step would not
only frustrate the purposes of the special mission but
" would have a calamitous influence on the future rela-
tions of England and America ". It would therefore
be very gratifying to him, he stated, to be able to inform
his government that, pending Ouseley's negotiations,
no proposal to annul the treaty would be sanctioned or
encouraged by the President or the members of his
government/"
Buchanan replied that he intended to give an account
of the Dallas-Clarendon negotiations in his message,
and admitted that this part of the message was already
prepared; yet, notwithstanding this, he asserted, if the
British government really intended to execute the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty according to the American interpre-
tation and would, before Congress met, make some
communication to him in that sense, such as he could
use, he would cancel what he had written and insert
another passage referring to the special mission to be
sent by the British. Moreover, under the circum-
stances, no attempt in Congress against the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty would receive any support from him."
Subsequent conversations with Buchanan, however,
revealed the fact that he expected the unequivocal
restoration of the Bay Islands, the abandonment of the
Mosquito protectorate, and the restriction of Belize to
its boundaries of 1786." Napier felt that his govern-
** U . S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, p. 116.
°* Ibid., pp. 116-117.
^^ Pari. Pafeis, i860, Cotns., LWIII. " Correspoiulencc respecting
Central America ", 60-62.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 237
ment would not yield to the last demand ; hence he
seriously questioned whether such a statement as the
British government would be willing to make with
reference to Ouseley's mission would be sufficient to
restrain Buchanan from inserting in his message lan-
guage such as would cause difficulties between the two
governments." Consequently, he suggested to Claren-
don that the formal proposal to arbitrate the question
be renewed. Such a proposal, connected with the mis-
sion of Ouseley, would, he beheved, place the policy
of the British government in a very favorable light.'^
Though Clarendon instructed Napier to renew the
offer of arbitration," his suspicions as to Buchanan's
intentions were roused, and he doubted the efficacy of
the measures suggested to save the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty from a hostile attack. Therefore, after Ouse-
ley's departure for the United States, he wrote him that
in consequence of the probability that the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty would be abrogated by the American
Congress, it was necessary to proceed with great cau-
tion ; that he must not commit the British government
in any way as regarded the Bay Islands until the inten-
tions of the American Congress with reference to the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty were fully ascertained."^
Clarendon's distrust of the American government
had probably been increased not only by what Napier
had told him of Buchanan's expectations in connection
with the Ouseley mission, but also by further develop-
ments in reference to Panama. Though Napier's fears
of difficulty in connection with the American collection
of damages against New Granada had evidently been
averted by the appointment of a joint American and
" Ibid., 63. "= Ibid. " Ibid. =5 Ibid., 64.
238 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
New Granadian commission for the adjustment of the
claims,"" the British government was still uneasy over
the matter. Consequently it had proposed a tripartite
guarantee of the Panama route on the part of Great
Britain, France, and the United States. The United
States, however, had promptly refused, on the ground
that she had already made such an agreement with New
Granada in the treaty of 1846 ; moreover, it was against
the policy of the United States to enter into such
engagements as that suggested." Somewhat later still,
a report reached England of a movement in Panama to
separate that state from Xew Granada and secure
annexation to the United States." As a result, Claren-
don instructed Napier to inquire unofficially what
course the American government would pursue in case
such annexation should be offered."^ There seems to be
no record that such inquiry was made by Napier ; but
Clarendon's letter contains the last indication of sus-
picion against the United States during this period, in
connection with Panama.
On November 18, Ouseley arrived in Washington,
and two days later was presented to Cass, by Napier,
who stated that he would in a few days make a written
"Napier to Clarendon, Aug. 3, 1857, 1". O., Am., vol. 673, no. 155.
" Clarendon to Napier, Oct. 15, 1857, ibid., vol. 669, no. 278.
"'Clarendon to Napier, Nov. 27, 1857, ibid., no. 322. It was evidently
upon the suspicions of the Hritish government and the proposals of the
American commissioners (see above, pp. 2.25-2^6) that Harral-Montferrat,
De Monroe a Rooserelt. 81-82, based his statement that President
Buchanan, through Marcy, proposed to the British government that the
two nations divide their influence on the .\merican isthmus, England
carrying out her own plans in Nicaragua and Honduras, and the United
States doing the same in Panama. This statement is both confused and
erroneous. Cass, and not Marcy, was Buchanan's secretary of state.
Moreover, while neither the British nor -American archives contain any
evidence that such proposal was made by the .\mcrican government, the
data found and given above clearly disprove it.
••Clarendon to Napier, Nov. 27, 18571 f- O., Am., vol. 669, no. ^22.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 239
communication to the American government respecting
the special mission. This commmiication was made
on November 30. The specific objects of the mission,
Napier wrote, would be the cession of the Bay Islands
to Honduras, the localization of the Mosquito Indians
under Nicaraguan sovereignty, and the definition of the
boundaries of British Honduras. The transfer of the
islands would not be unconditional, but it would be
unambiguous ; the government of Honduras would
obtain not only a titular, but a virtual and useful pos-
session under provisions necessary for the security of
the settlers and favorable to the expansion of com-
merce. In arranging for the settlement of the Mosquito
question, Ouseley would be guided by the provisions of
the Dallas-Clarendon treaty. Modifications might be
made in the boundaries mentioned in that document,
but they would not be less favorable to Nicaragua and
Honduras ; nor would they trespass on the territory
appHcable to transit purposes. In arranging details
the aim would be to grant an indulgent consideration to
the wishes and necessities of the Central American gov-
ernments, when they were compatible with the safety
and welfare of the Indians. The boundary limits of
Belize would be arranged by negotiation with Guate-
mala. The British government trusted to obtain al
recognition of limits for Belize, which, judging from
previous communications on the subject, might be
accepted in a spirit of conciliation, if not with absolute
approval by the President. Though the proposed
arrangement, Ouseley concluded, might not strictly
coincide with the interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty adopted by the United States, it nevertheless
involved no slight relaxation of the sense in which the ,
I
240 ANGLO-AMERICAS ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
engagements of 1850 were contracted by Great Britain.
Consequently, it was hoped that the concessions of the
British government would be met in a similar temper
by the United States, and that, if successfully accom-
plished, its results would be regarded as an honorable
compromise of contending opinions, and as a definite
settlement of the Central American dispute."
No formal expression of opinion upon this com-
munication seems to have been made by the American
government before the appearance of the President's
message — which made mention of it — on December 8.
The message first called attention to the Dallas-Claren-
don negotiations and to the objectionable treaty made
by Great Britain with Honduras, and then continued :
The fact is that when two nations like Great Britain and the
United States, mutually desirous, as they are, and I trust
ever may be, of maintaining the most friendly relations with
each other, have unfortunately concluded a treaty which they
understand in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is to
abrogate such a treaty by mutual consent and to commence
anew. . . . Whilst entertaining these sentiments, I shall, never-
theless, not refuse to contribute to any reasonable adjustment
of the Central American questions which is not practically in-
consistent with the American interpretation of the treaty.
Overtures for this purpose have been recently made by the
British government in a friendly spirit, which I cordially
reciprocate, but whether this renewed effort will result in
success I am not yet prepared to express an opinion. A. brief
period will determine."
The message was hardly as conciliatory as might
have been expected from the assurances given Napier
by Buchanan, but in view of the President's deep dis-
like for the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the language is not
^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns.. L.W'III, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 70-72.
•' Richardson, Messages and Papers, \' , 44^-445.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 241
to be wondered at. Moreover, it was undoubtedly
influenced by a conviction, gained since Napier's first
communication regarding the special mission, that, in
negotiating wth Central Amerca, Great Britain did not
intend to follow the American interpretation of the
treaty as closely as was at first expected.
Though Napier felt that the language of the Presi-
dent might afford some cause for exception on the part
of the British government, he reported to Clarendon
on the day the message appeared, that in the United
States it would be considered conciliatory.*"
A few days later, Napier again wrote to Clarendon
in reference to the message, stating that it now
remained for the British government to decide whether
to arrange for the abrogation of the treaty by mutual
consent, which Buchanan had favored, or to pursue the
earlier plan to send a commissioner to Central America.
Should the cabinet decide on either course, he suggested
that its decision be made known to the United States
and be carried out immediately."'
The British government, however, had been dis-
appointed in the lack of American cordiality shown
towards its overtures for the settlement of the dispute,"
and by the equivocal character of the President's mes-
sage. It felt that it had gone far enough in the display
of a conciliatory spirit. Consequently, Clarendon
replied that the government was decidedly of opinion
that it would neither be consistent with British dignity
nor interest to make any proposal to the United States
government until it had received a formal answer to the
"^ F. O., Am., vol. 67s, no. 277.
^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 75.
'^'^ Ibid., 73; Clarendon to Napier, Nov. 20, 1857, F. O., Am., vol. 669,
no. 314.
17
242 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
offer of arbitration/'^ which had been made by Napier
on November 30/"
This decision of Great Britain produced a triple dead-
lock which lasted for several weeks. The American
government had agreed not to make any move towards
abrogating the treaty until it could be seen what inter-
pretation of its provisions would result from Ouseley's
mission. Moreover, as appeared later, Cass was wait-
ing for further details regarding Ouseley's instructions,
which Napier had intimated that he would receive ; "
Ouseley could not proceed until instructed to do so ;
and, finally, Napier was prohibited from taking any
action until the American government made reply to
the formal offer of arbitration.
The existing situation, however, seemed particularly
favorable to a settlement of the Central American dis-
pute. Presumably in consequence of Walker's an-
nouncement that he intended to maintain Nicaragua as
an independent sovereignty,"* as well as because of the
more reasonable attitude shown by Great Britain
towards the matter in dispute, the American govern-
ment had for some time displayed unusual energy
against the filibuster, and Nicaragua was at least tem-
porarily freed from Walker."" Furthermore, a good
'^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 78.
" Ibid., 74. " Ibid., 78, 79, 89, 90.
•"Walker, War in Nicaragua, 265-269; Blackwood's Magaciuc, LXXXl,
552; Napier to Clarendon, June i, 1857, F. O., Am., vol. 67a, no. 8r;
Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., i sess., pt. i, p. 295.
"'Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 78, 80. In the autumn of 1857 Napier reported to
Clarendon that he helieved both Huclianan and Cass now to be honestly
opposed to the filibustering attempts against Nicaragua; but that this
attitude was not shared by other members of the American cabinet.
Napier to Clarendon, Sept. 22, 1857, " Private and unofficial ", F. O.,
Am., vol. 673; Napier to Clarendon, Nov. 16, 1857, ibid., vol. 674, no. 248.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 243
understanding existed between the United States and
Great Britain regarding a transit treaty negotiated by
the former with Nicaragua, to take the place of the
Squier treaty, which had never been ratified by the
American Senate. This later arrangement, the Cass-
Yrissari treaty, provided for an open and neutral transit
through Nicaragua, and granted to the United States
the power to land troops, if necessary, to protect the
route." Such an arrangement was hardly in strict con-
formity with the letter of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ;
but the British government learned indirectly that
should it oppose this measure as a treaty violation, a
movement would be initiated for the purpose of annull-
ing the Clayton-Bulwer agreement by act of Congress."
Probably in consequence of this, the British government
had made no objection, and finally Napier had frankly
announced to Cass that none would be made.^
Napier was anxious that advantage be taken of these
favorable conditions for the adjustment of difficulties."
Consequently, on February 17, 1858, he addressed Cass,
informing him that the British government wished to
know the decision of the United States upon the offer
of arbitration, and remarking that should the United
States be opposed to this mode of settlement his gov-
ernment would give a friendly consideration to any
observations which Cass might choose to make on the
objects of the special mission."
'* Ibid., 69-70. The obstruction of the route by the conflict in Nicaragua
made this stipulation seem necessary.
'^Napier to Clarendon, Nov. 30, 1857, ibid., vol. 675, no. 266.
" Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, " Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 78.
" Ibid., 78, 80.
"Ibid., 80-81.
244 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
But since the Kansas question was again absorbing
the attention of the American government, there was
further delay." Meanwhile, desultory conversations
upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty took place between
Napier and Cass. Napier, upon Clarendon's authoriza-
tion," unof^cially notified Cass that the British govern-
ment would not object to abrogation of the treaty by
mutual consent," and suggested that, should the United
States favor such action, a proposal to that effect be
inserted in the reply to the oflFer of arbiration. The
treaty of abrogation, Napier thought, should contain a
self-denying engagement with reference to the inter-
oceanic route, and he mentioned this to Cass, adding
that the abrogation of the treaty would throw Central
America open to territorial acquisition by the United
States. The British government, however, would
retain British Honduras and the Bay Islands." Later,
Napier was instructed by Malmesbury, who had suc-
ceeded Clarendon in February, 1858, to inform Cass
that the British government was willing to consent to
unconditional abrogation. Such stipulation as Napier
had suggested regarding the canal, the Foreign Secre-
tary feared, might perpetuate the entanglement with
the United States. Should the British government be
so fortunate as to extricate itself from the difficulties
resulting from the treaty, it wished to guard itself
against any similar difficulties in the future. Napier,
" PoW. Papers, i860, Corns.. I.W'III, " Correspondence respecting Cen-
tral America ", 86-87.
'" Ibid.. 83.
"On January 22, 1858, Clarendon wrote to Napier: "The more 1
consider the matter, the more I incline to the belief that throwing over
the C.-B. Treaty will be our best way out." V. O., .\m., vol. 695.
''* Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 83-84.
ADJUSTMENT, i8 56-1860 245
however, was to show no eagerness for settlement by
either abrogation or arbitration."
The statement of the British government regarding
the conditions under which it would consent to abroga-
tion undoubtedly influenced the United States to make
a definite choice of the three alternatives offered by
the British for settling the dispute. Its views were
expressed in a letter written by Cass to Napier on
April 6. After reviewing the recent history of the
question, Cass complained of not receiving the further
details promised regarding Ouseley's mission. Since
the President was asked to co-operate in the arrange-
ments, it was necessary that he know the nature of
these arrangements. This information was the more
important in consequence of the idea which seemed to
prevail that the American interpretation of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty was found in the provisions of the
Dallas-Clarendon treaty, for such an idea was entirely
erroneous. Yet the President trusted that the more
complete information which he hoped to receive con-
cerning the mission of Ouseley might justify him in
anticipating from it a substantial execution of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty according to the general tenor
of the American interpretation. In that event he would
be happy to give his cordial co-operation, and to direct
the ministers of the United States in Central America
to render any assistance in their power towards pro-
moting its success.^
''* Ibid., 85-86. In conversation with Dallas upon the subject, Malmes-
bury said, " we do not offer to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
but if such be the disposition of the President, we shall make no
difficulty whatever." Dallas to Cass, April 13, 1858, Dept. of State,
Des., Eng., vol. 71, no. 99.
'"' Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, " Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 87-90.
246 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
The prosecution of the plan to adjust the difficulty by
special mission, Cass continued, must naturally exclude
the adoption of any other alternative. Therefore he
had been much surprised upon receiving an offer of
arbitration, after the President had been notified of the
mission of Ouseley and had expressed his concurrence
in it; and he had regarded the oflfer as sufficiently
answered by the President's express agreement to the
mode of adjustment contemplated by the mission, even
if it had not been twice rejected before. But, Cass
added, in order to avoid misunderstanding, he was
instructed to state that the same reasons which caused
the rejection of the first oflfer of arbitration still existed,
and for these reasons it was still declined."
Should Ouseley 's mission prove successful, there
would, of course, be no need to consider the question
of abrogation ; but it appeared that, should the treaty
be abrogated, the British government would relinquish
none of its pretensions in Central America, and that the
Bay Islands in particular " would remain attached to
the British Crown ". Since it was well known that the
views of the United States were wholly inconsistent
with these pretensions and that it, therefore, could
never willingly acquiesce in their maintenance by
Great Britain, Napier must readily perceive what seri-
ous consequences might follow a dissolution of the
treaty, if no provisions should be made at the same time
for adjusting the questions which led to it. If, there-
fore, the President did not hasten to consider the alter-
native of repealing the treaty of 1850, it was because
he did not wish prematurely to anticipate the failure of
Ouseley's mission, and was disposed to give a new
*^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence rcspcclinK
Central America", 90-91.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 247
proof to the British government of his sincere wish to
preserve the amicable relations which now subsisted
between the two governments."
This decision of the United States in favor of
arranging the dispute through the proposed Ouseley
mission would seem on first appearance to have been a
diplomatic victory for Great Britain; but the victory
was more apparent than real, as soon became evident.
American dislike for the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
still as intense as ever. In May a joint resolution for
its abrogation was reported from the Committee on
Foreign Relations ; " and though neither Cass nor
Buchanan encouraged congressional action, abrogation
had evidently been the course which they favored for
disposing of the dispute," until it became clear that in
such case the British government would retain the Bay
Islands. The aim of both men was evidently to dispose
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which was opposed to
the expansionist policy of the administration, and also
to drive the British out of Central America. The latter
consummation was the most immediately desired ;
hence after it became clear that the British would
retain the Bay Islands if the treaty were set aside,
choice was made of the plan to settle the dispute by a
special commissioner.
Yet, after this decision had been imparted to the
British government, Cass, with surprising frankness,
expressed to Napier a desire for the dissolution of the
treaty after the arrangements contemplated by the
^Ubid.. 91.
^* Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., i sess., pt. 2, pp. 1944-1943.
^♦Napier to Clarendon, May 3, 1857, F. O., Am., vol. 671, no. 64;
June 7, 1857, ibid., vol. 672, no. 90; Ouseley to Malmesbury, July 6,
1858, F. O., Guat., vol. 98. no. 55.
248 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Ouseley mission should have been made. The treaty,
he said, was obnoxious to the American people, and an
impediment to cordial understanding between the two
countries." Napier, however, pointed out that the con-
cessions committed to the Ouseley mission " w^ere based
on the supposition that the stipulations of the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty were to remain, and be the future rule
of the relations of the two countries in Central Amer-
ica." If the British government gave up its posses-
sions, he said, it would keep the treaty ; it could not be
expected that both possessions and treaty would be
abandoned.*^
Since the American government had made known its
choice as to methods of settling the dispute, it was
decided by the British government that Ouseley should
proceed at once to Central America. On July 15
Malmesbury notified him of this decision, but stated that
his business would be confined to making treaties with
Nicaragua and Honduras with reference to the Mos-
quitos, and with Guatemala defining the Belize bound-
aries. He was to have no commission to negotiate
regarding the Bay Islands." This deviation from the
instructions of the previous administration was evi-
dently due to suspicion, roused by Cass's remarks to
Napier, that the United States still had secret designs
against the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The Bay Islands,
the possession which the government was most reluctant
to give up, were not to be relinquished until it was cer-
tain that the American government meant to abide by
the treaty. Before Ouseley's definite powers were sent,
the British plan was further changed and the com-
*^ Pari. Patters, i860, Corns., I, XVIII, " Corrcsponilence respecting
Central America", 99100.
»» Ibid. " Ibid.. 99.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 249
missioner was simply instructed to form commercial
treaties with Nicaragua and Costa Rica and an addi-
tional treaty with the former with reference to the
Mosquitos.^ No authority was given for the settle-
ment of the Belize boundaries.
On August 18 Malmesbury replied to Cass's letter
of April 6. A tone of resentment at the attitude of the
American government is discernible in the reply.
Napier was instructed to inform the American secre-
tary of state that the British government had nothing
further to add to the explanations already given with
reference to Ouseley's mission. Offers of arbitration
and abrogation had been refused by the United States ;
therefore Great Britain appeared completely to have
exhausted the means of arrangement at her disposal.
Consequently there was no alternative but to leave it to
the American government to originate any further
overtures for an adjustment of the controversies.^'
A little later Napier was instructed with reference to
his relations with the United States government. At a
convenient season he should inform that government
of the intentions and objects of the British cabinet
relating to Ouseley's errand, but in doing so he must
not ask either advice or assistance from the United
States ; such requests would be, under existing circum-
stances, derogatory to the dignity of the Crown. The
United States government had successively refused
every solution of the controversies which had been
offered ; hence Great Britain and Nicaragua were now
about to treat as independent states, and the United
States government was to be informed of this merely
as an act of friendship and courtesy .°°
^ Ibid., 100-120. *^ Ibid., 123-124. ^ Ibid., 124.
250 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
The perversity of the United States, however, had by
no means made Great Britain indifferent to American
friendship. The situation was a delicate one. Though
the British government was willing to abrogate the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty if the first move for the purpose
were made by the American government," British honor
could not endure its abolition by the American Con-
gress. Such action must require a reckoning between
the two governments, and this would be certain to pro-
duce strained relations, disastrous to commerce, if not
even war itself. Both results were to be avoided, if
possible, and the latter was not to be thought of at this
time, as there was possibility of war with France."
Hence, it was highly desirable to preserve the treaty
against congressional action ; and efforts were made to
keep in close touch with the American government and
to convince it of British good intentions.
Malmesbury now showed considerable anxiety lest
nothing be accomplished towards settlement of the
Central American dispute before the meeting of Con-
gress, and he urged Ouseley to execute his instructions
as quickly as possible and arrange to have the negotia-
tions terminated not later than the last of November.
Any delay in commencing the negotiations, he said,
would frustrate the objects which the government had
in view and render the continuance of his mission
unnecessary."'
For some weeks after Ouseley's departure, the
American government remained silent upon the general
"Clarendon to Napier, Jan. 22, 1858, F. C, Am., vol. 695.
'"Napier to Malmesbury, .April 12, 1858, ibid., vol. 691, no. 85; Napier
to Malmesbury, April 13, 1858, ibid., nos. 89 and 90.
"^ Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America", 125, 134.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 251
subject of his mission, but on November 8 Cass wrote
Napier a reply to Malmesbury's communication of
August 18. Though Cass's letter displayed a slight
tone of resentment at some of the statements made by
Malmesbury, it was, on the whole, frankly conciliator}'.
The American government had evidently come fully to
realize that in trying to grasp all it might lose all —
that if the British were to be driven from Central
America, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which also barred
the isthmus to the Americans, must be preserved.
Hence the change in tone. In his letter Cass considered .
the elements of the dispute and called attention to the *
fact that there was no apparent disagreement except as
to the conditions governing the surrender of the Bay
Islands, and as to the limits to be set for Belize. Was it
possible that these difi'erences, if approached in a spirit
of conciliation and good feeling, could not be adjusted
in a friendly manner? To believe this would be to
underestimate the importance of the adjustment and the
intelligent appreciation of this importance, which must
be entertained by both nations. What the United States
wanted in Central America, next to the happiness of
its people, was the security and neutrality of the inter-
oceanic routes leading through it. This -was equally the
desire of the whole commercial world. Such an object
would be accomplished if the principles and pohcy of
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were carried into effect. An
adjustment of the Central American question accord-
ing to the general tenor of the American interpretation
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was all that the President
had ever desired, and instead of having rejected the
proposal for such a settlement he had expressed his
cordial acceptance of it, so far as he understood it, and
252 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
had anticipated from it the most gratifying conse-
quences. Nothing now remained but to inquire
whether the good results expected in the beginning
from Ouseley's mission might not yet be happily accom-
plished.**
Malmesbury quickly responded to the cordial tone in
this letter, and in his reply to Napier expressed his
" lively satisfaction " with it. The friendly character
of the letter and the high appreciation it displayed of
the importance of ending the irritating discussion, he
believed, could not but tend to bring the dispute to a
speedy and permanent conclusion. The existing admin-
istration, Malmesbury informed Napier, considereii
itself morally obliged to carry out the political views of
its successors, as embodied in Napier's note to Cass of
November 30, 1857, in respect to the Bay Islands. Con-
sequently, it was the intention of the British govern-
ment, as soon as Ouseley should have settled the ques-
tion of the Mosquito territory, to instruct him to enter
immediately into negotiations with Honduras regard-
ing the Bay Islands. As soon as Ouseley's present task
should be accomplished, the details of this second mis-
sion would be made known to the American govern-
ment. The British government, Malmesbury con-
cluded, interpreted Cass's note of the 8th of November
as meaning that if the principles of the Mosquito terri-
tory were arranged, the Bay Islands ceded to Honduras,
and the boundaries of British Honduras established, the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty would remain as the acceptable
and practical rule for the relations of England and the
United States in Central America and would thereafter
^' Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 147-154.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 253
be recognized and respected as such by the United
States. It was the wish of the British government as it
was also the wish of the United States that the good
results expected in the beginning from the Ouseley
mission might yet be effected.''
A copy of this letter, furnished by Napier and read at
a meeting of the President's cabinet, gave much satis-
faction."' But before Malmesbury's letter was received
the American government had fully settled upon a con-
ciliatory course. Though no report of progress had
come from Ouseley, on December 6, the President's
message appeared containing a clause in reference to
British relations quite in harmony with the friendly tone
of Cass's letter written a month before. An earnest
desire was expressed in the message for the settlement
of every misunderstanding with Great Britain, as any
serious interruption of the commerce between the two
countries would be equally injurious to both. In fact,
no two nations had ever existed which could do each
other so much good or so much harm as these two.
Though gratified that he could announce that the con-
troversy over visitation and search had been settled,
the President was truly sorry not to be able to say the
same for the controversy over the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. As the purposed negotiations mentioned in the
last message were still pending, their present condi-
tions could not be reported. A final settlement of the
question was greatly to be desired, as it would wipe
out the last subject of dispute between the two coun-
tries."^
The increase in cordiality on the part of the United
States produced a greater briskness in the British gov-
»'7fctrf., 155-157. ^ Ibid., 165.
^' Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 507-508.
254 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ernment with reference to the Central American nego-
tiations. Ouseley had not made as much progress as
had been hoped for, hence, in order to avoid unneces-
sary delay, on December i6 IMalmesbury authorized
Wyke to resume and complete the negotiations, should
Ouseley be incapacitated by illness.** On the same date
Malmesbury notified Ouseley that he could not exert
himself too much to conclude the treaties for the nego-
tion of which he had been empowered.**
Yet in spite of the Foreign Secretary's efforts, the
Central American negotiations failed to make satis-
factory progress. This was partly caused by new diffi-
culties which had arisen in Central America, but more
through the inefficiency of Ouseley himself. The new
difficulties were largely due to the intrusion of Felix
Belly, the agent of a French company desirous of con-
structing an isthmian canal. The Cass-Yrissari treaty
had not been ratified by the Nicaraguan government
when Belly arrived, and he at once proceeded to work
against its ratification in order to secure for his own
company exclusive control of the route.^"" The Ameri-
can government, he declared, supported the filibusters,
and should the treaty go into effect the whole of Cen-
tral America would be dominated by the United States."'
Nicaragua, as a result of Belly's efforts, set aside the
Gass-Yri&&a*> tseat)i,^ and settled her boundary dispute
'^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", i6o-i6i.
"'Ibid., 161. British interest in the removal of all obstacles to the
formation of a neutral transisthmian highway had probably been stim-
ulated by the recent organization of British Columbia, a colony result-
ing from the discovery of gold on I'raser River. Dallas to Cass, Nov. 26.
1858, Dept. of State, Des., Eng., vol. 72, no. 138.
'"" Scroggs, " William Walker and the Steamship Corporation in
Nicaragua", in Am. Hist. Rev., X, 8io.
^"^ Ibid., Lamar to Cass, June 26, 1858, Dept. of State, Des., Nic. and
Costa Rica, vol. 3.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 - 255
with Costa Rica,"" after which the two states granted
Belly a joint canal concession."' It had been the aim of
the British government to introduce into the commer-
cial treaty with Nicaragua terms for the neutralization
of the transit similar to those contained in the Cass-
Yrissari treaty; Belly's manipulation made the Nica-
raguans unreasonable in their demands, and caused
delay.^"
Belly's representations regarding American support
of filibustering movements also proved a handicap to
Ouseley, for they increased Central American fears of
attack from Walker, who was at this time in the United
States preparing a new expedition. There was little
danger of trouble from the filibusters, however, for the
British government had ordered an extra war vessel to
the Central American coast to protect it pending nego-
tiations. The commander was instructed to prevent
any descent upon Greytown or Mosquito, but if the
filibusters attempted to go up the San Juan he was not
to act except in conjunction with the forces of Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica, and then only upon written
request from the commanders."' As France was plan-
1** In consideration of aid in case of the return of the filibusters,
Nicaragua made a large cession of territory to Costa Rica, Scroggs, of. cit.
In the summer of 1857 the American government had sent Carey
Jones as special agent to Central America to investigate the quarrel
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, with a view to effecting a settlement;
but Jones was inefficient and his efforts vain. Napier to Clarendon,
July 6, 1857, F. O., Am., vol. 672, no. 133; Oct. 31, 1857, ibid., vol. 674,
no. 228.
^^ Scroggs, op. cit.; Johnson, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal, 65.
The efforts of Belly came to nothing as far as forming an open route in
Nicaragua was concerned. American attempts in this direction also
resulted in failure, and interest was diverted to the Panama railway.
"« Lamar to Cass, April 28, 1859, Dept. of State, Des., Nic. and Costa
Rica, vol. 4, no. 50.
^** The American government objected to these instructions and de-
clared that the landing of troops to protect Ouseley's negotiations would
256 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ning to negotiate a commercial treaty with Nicaragua,
by friendly understanding the same instructions were
given the French naval commanders ."^
The most serious obstacle, however, to a prompt and
satisfactory settlement of the Central American diffi-
culty, was Ouseley's lack of ability for his task, which
was quickly shown. At the very outset he made a blun-
der by first negotiating the commercial treaty for which
Nicaragua was very anxious, and which was little likely
to cause difficulty, and neglecting the Mosquito arrange-
ment, the terms of which might have been expected to
give trouble."' He was rebuked by his government for
this lack of judgment and again told that the Mosquito
treaty was the important one. No general commercial
treaty with Nicaragua would be approved by the Brit-
ish government, Malmesbury informed him, until the
convention for the adjustment of the Mosquito question
be a direct violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The British govern-
ment replied that such an act would be the same in principle as the land-
ing of American troops to protect the transit route, as contemplated by
the Cass-Yrissari treaty, and insisted that it intended to protect the
negotiations. No occasion for landing British troops arose, however,
and with the accession of Russell to the Foreign Office the instructions
were changed and permission withdrawn from the British naval com-
manders for operations against the filibusters on Central .-Xmerican soil.
Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, " Correspondence respecting Central
America", 137-138, 139-141, 280.
^''^ Ibid., 159, 161, 231. The American government had refused to
co-operate with the British naval forces in protecting Central .-Smerica.
Napier to Clarendon, Oct. 22, 1857, F. C, Am., vol. 674, no. 220.
"" PoW. Papers, i860. Corns., I.XVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America", 170-171, 185. The British government attributed
Ouseley's inefficiency to his constant illness while in Central -Vmcrica.
Dallas to Cass, May 2, 1859, Dept. of State, Des., Eng., vol. 73, no. 181.
He was also handicapped by conflicting instructions. Before leaving
England he was told that the cession of Mosquito to Nicaragua should
be treated as a concession for which Central .Xmerica was to thank Eng-
land's moderation and good will. It was to be his duty to try to save
the dignity and honor of Great Britain even at the expense of material
interests, and he was not to show anxiety for a settlement. Ouscley to
Malmesbury, Mar. 31, 1859, F. O., Guat., vol. 103, no. 40.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 257
had been signed. The aim was to settle the latter point
and thus to obviate any further discussion with the
United States regarding it.""
But the difficulty of communicating with him pre-
vented the interruption of Ouseley's mistaken course/"'
and, consequently, the commercial treaty was signed
and awaiting the ratification of the Nicaragua assem-
bly "° before any headway could be made on the other
treaty. ]\Ioreover, when the draft of the former was
received by the British government it was disclosed that,
in violation of instructions,"' Ouseley had introduced
important alterations in the original which had been
furnished him."^
Ouseley's unsatisfactory progress decided the British
government to entrust to Wyke the settlement of the
Belize boundary. Accordingly, on February 16, 1859,
Malmesbury sent him instructions, enclosing a draft of
a convention. The proposed line of boundary at the
south was to be the Sarstoon River ; but in view of the
claim of the United States that the territory between the
Sibun and the Sarstoon belonged to Central America,
the instructions stated that it was necessary that the
line to be established by the proposed convention should
be described therein, " not as involving any cession or
new acquisition from the Republic of Guatemala, but
as it is in fact, simply as the definition of a boundary
long existing, but not hitherto ascertained." '" Conse-
quently, the first paragraph of the convention read :
It is agreed between Her Britannic Majesty and the Re-
public of Guatemala, that the boundary between the British
^"^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 170-171.
"* Ouseley to Malmesbury, Mar. 30, 1859, F. 0., Guat., vol. 103, no. 38,
^^^ Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 186.
^^Ibid., 120, 197. "-Ibid., 186-195. "^ Ibid., 172
18
258 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Settlement and Possessions in the Bay of Honduras, as they
existed previous to and on the ist day of January, 1850, and
have continued to exist up to the present time, was, and is as
follows."'
Two years before, a basis had been laid for the
contemplated treaty by the superintendent of Belize.'"
This, with the fact that Wyke was well acquainted with
the Central American character and also possessed con-
siderable diplomatic ability, prompted a quick and easy
accomplishment of the task assigned. As soon as he
received his full powers, Wyke set to work. At first he
found the Guatemalan government opposed to the terms
stipulated by the draft,"' but he devised a plan which,
while it made the arrangement satisfactory to the
Guatemalans, would tend to aid the British commer-
cially.'" Owing to better communications between
Guatemala and the Port of San Jose on the Pacific
and to the competition of the United States, for the
past few years the commerce of Guatemala with Belize,
as well as the British carrying trade with Guatemala,
had been on the decline. Hence a route of transport to
some point on the Atlantic was very desirable.'" By an
additional article to the treaty, Wyke pledged the Brit-
ish government to aid Guatemala in establishing stich
a line of transport,"" and thereby induced the republic
to accept the remainder of the draft just as it stood.'""
The convention was signed by the negotiators and rati-
fied by the Guatemalan assembly on April 30.'" The
arrangement received the approval of the British gov-
ernment, and ratifications were exchanged in the early
part of September.'"' Thus one element of contention
"* Pari. Patcis, i860, Corns., LXVIIl, " Correspondence respecting
Central America", 173, 174.
"'/fcid., 171. "•/fr»d., aso. '" Ibid.. 2Si. "'Ibid.
"' Ibid., 254- '"'/fcid., 251-355. "' Ibid.. 2Si. ^^ Ibid.. 300.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856- 1860 259
between the British and American governments ap-
peared to be removed.
Notwithstanding the slow progress of the Central
American negotiations, the cordial relations which had
been established between Great Britain and the United
States remained, on the whole, uninterrupted during
the remainder of the period considered in this chapter.
Though Cass did not fail to call Napier's attention to
the delay in the iMosquito negotiations and to the un-
satisfactory quality of the commercial treaty formed by
Ouseley with, Nicaragua,^" by a poHcy of perfect frank-
ness the British government retained the confidence of
the United States."^ However, as the year advanced
and it became known that the Belize boundary question,
regarding which Great Britain had had her wishes, was
settled, but that the other matters in dispute, which it
was expected would be arranged according to Ameri-
can views, were not,''' the American press began to show
some impatience and irritation.^ This state of aflfairs
roused Cass to remind Lyons, who had succeeded
Napier, that it would be necessary for the President to
treat the Central American question in his message.
If, at the opening of Congress, Great Britain should
still be in possession of Mosquito and the Bay Islands,
a strong effort would most probably be made by certain
"^^ Ibid., 214, 215-217, 224-225, 234. Ouseley had admitted into the
commercial treaty a clause regarding the landing of armed expeditions,
indirectly aimed at American filibusters. Ibid., 193-194, 224-225.
'^ Ibid., 213, 216-217, 224-225, 239-246, 247, 250. On May 31, 1859,
Ouseley himself wrote to Buchanan explaining and excusing his delay
in making the settlement regarding Mosquito. Buchanan, Works, X, 322-
323-
^^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, " Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 267.
^2« Ibid., 234.
26o ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
young and ardent politicians of the " manifest destiny "
school, to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. He had
no doubt, Cass assured Lyons, but that the British
government would execute with the most scrupulous
good faith the arrangements regarding which the two
governments had come to an understanding ; but the
essential point was to do this in time. It was impossible,
he declared, to overrate the importance of enabling the
President to announce the conclusion of the whole affair
in his message in December ; he therefore begged
Lyons to omit no effort to impress this fact upon the
British government.'"
About a month later, on August ii, the President
himself spoke in the same strain, but with more em-
phasis, and complained that the Belize boundary ques-
tion only, of the whole dispute, had been settled. Should
things be in the existing condition when Congress met,
he warned Lyons, there would be an outburst of feeling
in the country with which it might be impossible to con-
tend. " It would indeed be lamentable ", he added, " if
two countries whose interests were more deeply in-
volved in a mutual good understanding than those of
any other two nations in the world, should be kept asun-
der by questions which might be settled so easily." '^
But before the American government began to com-
plain, the fact that Ouseley had been in Central America
for several months without having accomplished any-
thing towards settling the dispute, as well as the con-
viction of his inefficiency, had determined the British
^'" Pari. Papers, 1860, Corns., LW'III, " Correspoiulcnce respecting
Central America ", 264-266.
'^"* Ibid., 287-288. To allay the existing irritation the government
published articles in the Washington Union, explaining the purpose of
Ouseley's mission. Napier to Malmcsbury, April 4, 1859, V. O., .\m.,
vol. 712, no. 108.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 261
government to place the negotiations for the transfer
of the Bay Islands in other hands. But, unfortunately,
Wyke, who had demonstrated his fitness for the task,
had been forced by ill health to return to England."'
However, he was soon able to resume his duties, and,
on August 15, Russell, who had succeeded Malmesbury
in June, instructed Ouseley to return home, as his mis-
sion had been conducted in an unsatisfactory manner,""
and commissioned Wyke to complete the negotiations,"'
as well as to treat for the disposal of the Bay Islands."'
Since the latter was the most pressing point in dispute,
this was to be settled first. In connection with it,
arrangement was to be made for the transfer to Hon-
duras of the part of Mosquito territory which lay within
the Honduras frontier.'^ These arrangements being
accomplished, Wyke should proceed to Nicaragua and
complete the commercial and Mosquito treaties, if
^^ Pari. Papers, i860, Corns., LX^'III, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 255-256.
^^ Ibid., 281-282. The Nicaraguans according to Ouseley, were afraid
that the filibusters might snatch Mosquito from them as soon as the
British protectorate was abandoned, so in their perplexity, they seemed
to wish to delay the transfer of the territory. Believing that this would
seriously affect the negotiations of the treaty regarding the Mosquitos,
Ouseley dropped the Mosquito negotiations and went to Costa Rica where
he negotiated a commercial treaty. After his return to Nicaragua no
further progress was made; hence, when Ouseley finally received notice
of his recall a year after his arrival in Central America, the Mosquito
question was as far from settlement as it had been when he came, though
much discussion had taken place. Ibid., 205, 206-207, 225-233, 238-239,
241-248, 256, 259-263, 283-286, 294, 297-298.
^^Ibid., 268.
^'^ On August 2, 1858, Russell had written: " I believe our occupation
of the Bay Islands to be a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the
sooner we settle that matter the better." Note on draft of treaty with
Nicaragua, F. O., Supplement, Guat., vol. 91.
'''^ Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 269-272.
262 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Ouseley had not already done so before he arrived.'"
Drafts for all of the treaties were enclosed.'"
Meanwhile Lyons, at the direction of Russell/"
expressed to Cass regret at the unfortunate delays
which had prevented the settlement of the dispute. The
British government, he said, could make no promise
that the matter would be settled before the President's
message was issued, but it would use its utmost eflForts
to accomplish that object, and if it failed it would be
made clear that such failure was not due to any fault
of the British government. A fresh mission was about
to be sent to Central America with a view to finishing
the negotiations."' Both the President and the Secre-
tary of State, Lyons reported to Russell, expressed
their pleasure and satisfaction at the announcement."*
This continued display of British frankness and good
faith now finally produced in the American government
a willingness to aid actively in facilitating the proposed
arrangements."" Accordingly, Dimitry, the newly-
appointed minister to Nicaragua and Costa Rica, was
instructed to use every effort to form the most frank
and friendly relations with the British negotiator, and
to co-operate with him in any manner which he might
"* Pari. Papers, i860, Corns.. LXN'III, " Corresponiience respectins
Central America ", 269, 272-275. Later, in order to insure the prompt
success of the negotiations, instructions were sent Wyke to permit certain
modifications calculated to make the treaties more satisfactory to the Cen-
tral American governments concerned. Russell to Wyke, .^ug. 16, 1859,
" Confidential ", F. O., Guat., vol. 102, no. 9; Nov. 29, 1859. ibiJ., no.
IS.
"^ Pari. Papers, i860. Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 270-272, 275-280.
"" Ibid., 266. "' Ibid.. 289. "» Ibid.
"* On Ouseley's departure for Central .\mcrica, the .Xnierican govern-
ment had, after reflection, refused even to notify its aKont in Central
America that the government had no desire to impede the negotiations.
Napier to Malmesbury. Oct. 25, 1858, F. O., .\m., vol. 694, no. 245; Nov.
8, 1858, ibid., no. 251; Nov. 9, 1858, ibid., no. 257.
ADJUSTMENT, i8 56-1860 263
desire. Dimitry was also to urge the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment to come to an agreement with Great Britain
regarding the Mosquito protectorate without further
delay/*" Clarke, the United States minister at Guate-
mala, was directed to go to Honduras for the purpose
of forwarding to the best of his ability the success of
Wyke's mission.'"
But the presence of the two American agents proved
a hindrance instead of a help to Wyke ; for Clarke
failed to learn of the altered policy of his government
in time,'*^ and Dimitry did not interpret his instruc-
tions with sufficient broadness ; "^ consequently, during
practically the remainder of the negotiations the two
followed the policy of their predecessors and tried to
hinder British action.'"
Notwithstanding the demonstrations of friendship
on the part of the United States, the British govern-
ment anxiously watched lest something rise to provoke
a note of hostility in the President's message on the
Central American question. But the good feeling re-
mained undisturbed, and before the message was issued
its substance on the matter in dispute was made known,
in a spirit of friendliness, to Lyons, who found it of an
entirely satis factor}'^ nature."' It merely stated that as
a result of unexpected obstacles the British govern-
'* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 237, pp. 164-166.
^■" Lyons to Russell, Sept. 19, 1859, F. O., Am., vol. 715, no. 196.
^— Wyke to Russell, Nov. 29, 1859, F. O., Guat., vol. 102, no. 8; Jan.
10, i860, ibid., vol. 108, no. i; Inclosure in Lyons to Russell, Feb. 28,
i860, F. O., Am., vol. 735, no. 75.
143 Wyke to Russell, Jan. 28, i860, F. O., Guat., vol. 108, no. 2.
^"Hall to Russell, Feb. 29, i860, ihid., vol. 109; Hall to Russell, April
30, i860, ibid., no. 25.
*^ Inclosure in Lyons to Russell, Nov. 30, 1859, F. O., Am., vol. 716,
no. 275; Lyons to Russell, Dec. i, 1859, ibid., no. 276; Jan. 17, i860, ibid.,
vol. 734, no. 23.
264 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
ment had not been able to complete treaty arrangements
with Honduras and Nicaragua ; consequently the Presi-
dent could not announce, as he had earlier believed that
he would be able to, that the Central American ques-
tion had been satisfactorily settled ; but it was confi-
dently expected that the final adjustment of the difficulty
would soon be effected.""
The confidence of the American government in
British good faith prevented support in Congress for
movements against the treaty. Both a joint resolution
for abrogation "' and a call for the correspondence upon
the subject '** failed to endanger the agreement.
Meanwhile, negotiations in Central America were
progressing rapidly and in an entirely satisfactory
manner. On November 28, Wyke signed a treaty with
the Honduras government regarding the Bay Islands
and the IMosquito Indians. The opening paragraph of
the first article of this treaty was so worded as to save
British pride while it satisfied Honduras.'" It read :
Taking into consideration the peculiar geographical position
of Honduras, and in order to secure the neutrality of the
islands adjacent thereto, with reference to any railway or other
line of interoceanic communication which may be constructed
across the territory of Honduras on the mainland, Her Bri-
tannic Majesty agrees to recognize the Islands of Ruatan,
Guanaca, Elena, Utile, Barbarete, and Morat, known as the
Bay Islands, and situated in the Bay of Honduras, as a part
of the Republic of Honduras.""
The terms governing the restoration were simple
and reasonable ; the Honduras government engagetl
'*■ Richardson, Messages and Pafcrs, \ , 561.
^^ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 si-ss., pt. i, pp. 9, 104-106.
'*" Ibid., pp. 45-47-
'" C/. Pari. Papers, i860. Coins.. I. Will, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 22.
'" Ibid., 308.
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 265
not to transfer the islands to any other state, and to
permit the British inhabitants freedom of rehgion and
the right to property previously held, as well as the
right to emigrate from the islands."* The treaty fur-
ther recognized the Mosquito territory lying within the
frontier of Honduras as part of the republic, and the
Indians residing thereon as under Honduran sover-
eignty.'" A new clause, added by Wyke "'' to the origi-
nal draft, pledged the government of Honduras to pay
to the Indians semi-annually for ten years the sum of
two thousand, five hundred dollars.'''
After six weeks of work, Wyke was equally success-
ful in his negotiations with Nicaragua, and signed a
treaty with that government on January 28, i860. By
this Great Britain agreed to recognize as under the
sovereignty of Nicaragua the part of Mosquito terri-
tory lying within Nicaraguan frontiers. The British
protectorate over the Indians should cease three months
after the ratification of the treaty. A definitely bounded
reservation was to be set aside for the Mosquitos, within
which they should be permitted to govern themselves
under any regulations which they might adopt not
inconsistent with the sovereign rights of Nicaragua ;
but nothing in the treaty should be construed to prevent
the Mosquitos from later incorporating themselves into
the Nicaraguan republic. All bona fide land grants
made by the Indians subsequent to January i, 1848,
lying within the territorial reserve, with certain excep-
tions, should be confirmed. Like Honduras, Nicaragua
agreed to pay to the Indians two thousand, five hundred
dollars semi-annually for ten years. Greytown, under
Nicaraguan sovereignty, was to be a free port.'"
>■■» Ibid. ^=2 ii,ij_^ 30P 153 7^;^^ 307^ 305
'»■' Ibid. "= Ibid., 315-318.
266 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Wyke's manner of executing his instructions received
the hearty approval of his government.'" After some
slight changes both treaties were ratified and in due
time carried into effect."' On August 4, Russell trans-
mitted copies of the treaties to Lyons, with instructions
to communicate them to Cass. " These Treaties ", Rus-
sell wrote, " as you will perceive, provide for the relin-
quishment of the Protectorate of the Mosquito Indians
by Great Britain, and for the cession of the Bay Islands
to Honduras ; and thus, it may be hoped, finally set at
rest the questions respecting the interpretation of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which have been the subject of
so much controversy between this country and the
United States." '"
The belief that this long-desired consummation had
been effected was voiced in President Buchanan's mes-
sage of December, i860. With reference to the Central
American controversy he wrote :
Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly
character . . . The discordant constructions of the Clayton
and Bulwer treaty between the two Governments, which at
different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect,
have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this
government.^"
•" C/. Pari. Pat'ers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, " Correspondence respecting
Central America", 311, 324.
'" Fear of Walker caused Honduras to request that the transfer of the
Bay Islands be postponed for a time. This request was granted by the
British government, and the delay was acquiesced in by the I'nited States.
Russell to Lyons, Sept. 22, i860, F. O., .Am., vol. 733, no. 213; Irwine to
Russell, Oct. 9, i860, ibid., vol. 739, no. 44.
''"Pari. Pat'ers, i860, Corns., LXVIII, "Correspondence respecting
Central America ", 329.
"' Richardson, Messages and Papers. V, 639-640. In a letter to Russell,
Lyons, the British minister at Washington, stated that this pass.ige prob-
ably contained the most cordial mention of (ireat Britain which had ap-
peared in any presidential message. F. O., .\m., vol. 740. no. 311.
Lyons had been fearful that the part played by a British man-of-war
in Walker's defeat and <leath might cause an outcry aguin<st fireat
ADJUSTMENT. 1856-1860 267
Through the negotiations of Wyke, the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty was restored to its original authority as
the rule governing future British and American rela-
tions in Central America ; and by the President's mes-
sage it was virtually recognized by the United States
government as being so restored. This rehabilitation
of the treaty was brought about not through a complete
victory of one government over the other, but through
a compromise, though an unequal one, for Great Britain
conceded the more. In 1853 Great Britain maintained
that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty applied only to the
future, and that her existing possessions in Central
America were untouched by it ; the United States, on
the contrar}', held that the treaty was retrospective as
well as prospective, and that, consequently, the British
were bound by it to withdraw from the whole of Cen-
tral America. By Wyke's treaties the British gave up
their occupation of ]\Iosquito and relinquished the Bay
Islands, but, contrary to the earlier demands of the
United States, retained the Belize territory south of
the Sibun. The arrangement corresponded almost
exactly with the Dallas-Clarendon treaty as amended
by the American Senate ; the concession which the
British government could not make directly to Ameri-
can demands in 1857, was accomplished indirectly two
years later by the negotiation of a new treat>' with
Honduras.
In the decade since the negotiation of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, however, the attitude of the contracting
Britain; but no such demonstration took place. Its non-appearance was
perhaps partly due to the fact that the news of Walker's end arrived
during the Prince of Wales' tour. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 6, i860, ibid.,
vol. 739, no. 278. However, Walker's selfishness and cruelty had before
this turned the majority of .Americans against him.
268 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
parties had changed very materially towards Central
America, and the shifting of viewpoints was not with-
out its influence in promoting a settlement of the dis-
pute. Though in 1850 Great Britain had not the inter-
est in territorial expansion on the isthmus of which
the United States suspected her, yet for commercial
reasons she was not indifferent to it, and was keenly
jealous of the United States ; on the other hand, the
American government, under a Whig administration,
was little inclined to territorial acquisition for itself, in
Central America, but was much opposed to British
control there. During the three or four years preceding
Wyke's negotiations British interests in the region had
decreased while American interests had increased ;
Great Britain, as it were, resigned in favor of the
United States. British interests in the region had
become almost wholly commercial, and were directed
not so much towards the establishment of an inter-
oceanic transit route as to the development of the
resources of Central America itself. The British gov-
ernment had become convinced that that region, ex-
ploited by American enterprise, protected by a stable
Anglo-Saxon government, would contribute much more
to British commercial wealth than would be possible in
a state of political independence attended by confusion
and unrest which paralyzed all industrial development.
With this new viewpoint died all British jealousy of the
United States in connection with Central America, and
England began to hope as well as to expect that the
Central American states would eventually become a|
part of the American Union.'""
'""Hansard, Pari. Debates. 3cl ser., CXLII, 1511-1512; London Times,
Dec. 4, 1856, Dec. 20, 1858; Blackwood's Magasine, LXXIX, 74^; l.ittell's
ADJUSTMENT, 1856-1860 269
In the United States, meanwhile, attention to Central
America for transit purposes was somewhat subordi-
nated to interest in the territory itself — partly with the
view to increasing slave soil, and a strong belief had
developed that in spite of opposition, even in spite of
treaties, sooner or later Central America would be
Americanized and absorbed into the Union/"^ Had
Democratic control of the government continued a few
years longer, and with it the demand for extension
of slavery, it seems more than likely that such expecta-
tions would have been realized ; but with a Republican
victory came the War for Secession, one great reason
for territorial expansion was swept aside, and Ameri-
can interests and energies were diverted into other
channels.
Living Age, 2nd ser., XIV, 312; San Francisco Evening Bulletin, July
18, 1856, Aug. 14, 1856; Buchanan, Works, X, 114-116.
On July 31, 1858, Napier wrote confidentially to Malmesbury suggest-
ing that it be made known to the United States government that the
mission of the United States in the regeneration of the Spanish colonies
was recognized by the British government, which would view with satis-
faction the extension of United States authority southward in a peaceful
and legitimate manner, in so far as the rights of others were not
intrenched upon. F. O., Am., vol. 693, no. 193.
A few weeks before, these sentiments had been expressed by Malmes-
bury to Dallas, with the request that the latter make them known to his
government. Malmesbury said, Dallas reported to Cass, " that he was
one of that class of statesmen who believed that all the Southern part of
North America must ultimately come under the government of the United
States: that he had no objection to what seemed the inevitable course
of things: that on the contrary, he thought it would be beneficial as well
to the population occupying the countries referred to as to the United
States, and the rest of the world." Dept. of State, Des., Eng., vol.
71, no. 99.
""•1 Lumley to Clarendon, Sept. 9, 1856, F. O., Am., vol. 646, no. 69;
U. S. Docs., ser. no. 964, doc. 74, p. 7 ; Schouler, History of the United
States, V, 416; Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., i sess., pt. i, p. 395, Appendix,
PP- 87, 306; Daily Alta California, Jan. 22, 1857.
CHAPTER IX.
Development of American Opposition to the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1860-1895; End of
Mosquito Reserve, 1894.
For many years subsequent to i860 the United States
paid little attention to Central America. This was
partly due to preoccupation with the Civil War and
the problems to which it gave rise, but other changes
had also taken place which had decreased American
interest in the isthmus : with the abolition of slavery
was removed the chief demand for territorial expan-
sion ; and the building of the Panama Railroad and the
completion of the transcontinental line to the Pacific
for a time diverted attention from Central America as
the solution for interoceanic transportation problems.
Consequently for some time nothing arose clearly to
reveal how the nation as a whole regarded the settle-
ments made by the Wyke treaties, or to show whether
it was satisfied to consider the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
the future rule of conduct for the British and American
governments in reference to Central America. Yet,
in the first two decades of the period now under con-
sideration, a few occasions arose which led first the
United States government, and later the American
people, to reveal their attitude towards the treaty and
gradually to disclose and emphasize a new interpreta-
tion of it.
In 1866 Seward wrote to Adams, the American
minister to London, regarding the need of the United
270
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 271
States for a coaling station between Panama and San
Francisco. Tigre Island, he said, would be very desir-
able for the purpose, but the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
stood in the way of its acquisition. Therefore Adams
was instructed to " sound " Clarendon upon the subject,
but to use only general terms and not let it be known
that the American government particularly coveted
Tigre. In this connection the Secretary of State
remarked that, should the canal never be begun it was
a question whether the renunciatory clauses of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty were to have perpetual opera-
tion. Technically speaking, he thought, the question
might be decided in the negative ; still, as long as it
remained a question it w'ould not be consistent with
good faith for either of the nations to do anything con-
trary to even the spirit of the treaty.* These reflections
of Seward contain the first definite hint of the view later
emphatically stated by the American government.
A month after this Adams took occasion to approach
the British foreign secretary on the subject, but avoided
stating definitely to what territory on the Central Amer-
ican coast he had reference, on the ground that the
terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were not clear in
his mind; and Clarendon also stated that his remem-
brance of the treaty was vague but suggested that both
look into its stipulations.' Whether or not this was
done, and the question again broached, is not evident,
but Tigre remained a Honduran possession.
A little later the American government gave further
evidence of its attitude towards the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. In 1862 Great Britain had taken advantage of
I
' U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853. doc. 194, pp. i55-iS7-
'Ibid., doc. 237, p. 20.
2^2 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
America's embarrassment by the Civil War to place the\
Belize settlement on full footing as a British colony.* 1
Though, technically, the colonization of the territory \
between the Sibun and the Sarstoon was a violation of
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the American government
paid no attention to the action. However, in 1872 the
minister from Guatemala complained to the Washing-
ton authorities that the British in Belize were encroach- ,'
ing upon the territory south of the Sarstoon. Conse- '
quently, in April of the following year Fish, the Ameri-
can secretary of state, communicated with Schenck, the
American minister to England, stating that if author-
ized or countenanced by the British government, such
encroachments would be tantamount to a breach of the
engagement not to occupy any part of Central America.
Schenck was instructed to ascertain the correctness of
the representations made to the American government,
and should they prove to be correct, he was to remon-
strate formally to the British foreign secretary against
any trespass by British subjects with the connivance
of their government, upon the territory of Guatemala,
as an infringement of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which
would be very unacceptable to the United States.* The
result of Schenck's execution of these instructions does
'Lucas, Historical Geography, II, 309; Gibbs, British Honduras. 134;
Trendell, Her Majesty's Colonics, 349. In 1856 when the relations
between the British and American governments were critical, there was
a renewed attempt on the part of the Belize settlers to have the settle-
ment declared a colony. Bell to Lahouchere, .Aug. 8, 1S56, C. O., Hond.,
vol. 9J. I'or a time Clarendon thought of securing the view of the
American government on the matter, in order to avoid misunderstanding,
but finally it was thought inexpedient to do anything at that time in
regard to it. Clarendon to Hammond, Oct. 28, 1856, F. C, Cen. .\\n.,
vol. 94; Merivale to Hammond. June 8, 1856, ibid., vol. 93; Clarendon
to the Admiralty Office, June 10, 185b, ibid.
* U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, PP. 162164.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 273
not appear, but Fish's letter shows the American view
that the first article of the treaty was still binding — at
least as regarded the British government.
The attitude of Fish was consistently maintained
seven years later by Evarts, when it was rumored that
Great Britain was about to acquire the Bay Islands.
Evarts wrote to Logan, American minister to Central
America, that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty seemed un-
questionably to preclude British acquisition of that ter-
ritory. Therefore, the report of British intentions
might well be discredited, though it should awaken the
attention and excite the vigilance of the American
government.^
• From the first, however, there was a tendency on the
I part of the United States, acquiesced in or unnoticed by
," Great Britain, to ignore the eighth article of the Clay-
[ ton-Bulwer treaty by which the contracting parties
; agreed " to extend their protection by treaty stipula-
tions to any other practicable communications, whether
by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects
North and South America ", and provided that such
i canals or railways be open on equal terms to the sub-
I jects and citizens of Great Britain and the United
\ States.' No such joint protection was extended to the
Panama Railway, completed before i860. Moreover,
the American government negotiated two new canal
treaties with Colombia which completely ignored the
eighth article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The first
of these, negotiated in 1869, stipulated by its sixth
article that : " As fast as the canal and its appendages
and appurtenances shall be constructed, the control,
' Wharton, Digest of International Law, II, 209.
"Pari. Papers, 1856, Corns., LX, "Correspondence with the United
States respecting Central America ", 52.
19
274 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
possession, direction, and government of the same shall
belong to, and be exercised by, the United States of
America." ' The other, made the following year, con-
tained the same stipulation.' Neither of the treaties
was ratified, but they show a distinct tendency on the
part of the American government away from the policy
of internationalism in the control of a transisthmian
canal, and towards an American canal controlled by
Americans.
The formal opening of the Suez Canal in 1869
undoubtedly had a very strong influence in causing the
[negotiation of the treaties just mentioned. The suc-
Icessful completion of this first interoceanic canal roused
great enthusiasm, and naturally inspired American
desire to undertake a similar labor in the New World.
This feeling was voiced in a report of the secretary of
the navy on December i, 1869, which emphasized the
importance of constructing a ship-canal across Darien.
Now that the Suez Canal had been opened, the report
said, the United States was undoubtedly stimulated to
such eflForts as would lead to the success of its own great
enterprise: " It would be a matter of lasting regret, if
the people and government of the United States were
anticipated in this great work." Investigations should
be at once commenced for determining the most feasible
route."
Various surveys of the isthmus followed," but
nothing definite was accomplished before de Lesseps,
in 1878, secured a concession from Colombia for build-
ing a canal across Panama. The news of such an
^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 1885, doc. 112, pp. 34-.i8.
* Ibid., pp. 38-46; cf. Arias, Panama Canal. 20.
■ U. S. Docs., 8cr. no. 141 1, doc. i, p. 24-
" Coolidgc, The United States as a World Power, 272-273.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 27s
undertaking, by the successful builder of the Suez
route, filled the American people with jealousy and
alarm. Resolutions were introduced into both houses
of Congress declaring that control over any trans-
isthmian canal must be in the hands of the United
States." This opinion was shared by President Hayes
and expressed by him in a special message to Congress,
March 8, 1880 :
The policy of this country is a canal under American control.
The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this
control to any European power or to any combination of
European powers. If existing treaties between the United
States and other nations or if the rights of sovereignty or
property of other nations stand in the way of this poHcy — a
contingency which is not apprehended — suitable steps should
be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and
establish the American policy on this subject consistently with
the rights of the nations to be afifected by it.
The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other
countries in such an enterprise must in a great degree look for
protection to one or more of the great powers of the world.
No European power can intervene for such protection with-
out adopting measures on this continent which the United
States would deem wholly inadmissable. If the protection of
the United States is relied upon, the United States must exer-
l cise such control as will enable this country to protect its
\ national interests and maintain the rights of those whose
j^ivate capital is embarked in the work."
The President's allusion to existing treaties which
might stand in the way of the American canal policy
evidently called attention to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
for a strong movement promptly set in against that
agreement. On March 22 a joint resolution was intro-
^'^Cong. Record, IX, 2312; X, 1392; XI, 107, 1568.
" Richardson, Messages and Papers, VII, 585-586.
276 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
duced into the House of Representatives requesting the
President to notify the British government of the abro-
gation of the treaty." This resolution was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations, which, on April
i6, returned a report" requesting that the President
take immediate steps towards abrogating the treaty."
In connection with the demonstrations against the
treaty " plans were discussed by Congress for defeat-
ing the aims of the French company."
On June 24, 1881, Blaine took definite action for the
execution of this newly-voiced policy. An excellent
opportunity for this was offered by the report that
Colombia desired to terminate the treaty made with
the United States in 1846 and to secure from the
powers of Europe a joint guarantee of the neutrality
of the proposed Panama Canal." Accordingly, the
Secretary of State sent identical letters to the American
diplomatic agents at the various European courts,"
instructing them, that should the rumors take tangible
shape, they were to call attention to the provisions of
the treaty of 1846, and to intimate to the governments
to which they were accredited that any attempt to sup-
plement the guarantee contained in that treaty would
necessarily be regarded by the American government as
" an uncalled-for intrusion into a field where the local
and general interests of the United States of America
must be considered before those of any other power
save those of the United States of Colombia alone."
This position, the American ministers were reminded,
was not the development of a new policy ; it was simply
^^ Cong. Record, X, 1775.
'■• U. S. Docs., ser. no. 1937, doc. 1121. " Ibid., p. 7.
'* Ibid., ser. no. 1982, doc. 224. " Ibid., pp. 1-40.
^* Ibid., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, p. 174. "Ibid., 177.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 277
the pronounced adherence to principles long since enun-
ciated and firmly established as a part of the national
policy, and should be so represented to the foreign
governments.'" It is noteworthy that Blaine's letter
contained no hint of the existence of the Clayton-Bul-
wer treaty ; that agreement was utterly unnoticed, and
the declarations were directly contrary to its terms.
In his reply to Blaine's letter, Granville, the British
foreign secretary, merely called attention to the fact
that the position of the two nations, as regarded the
canal, was determined by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The British government, he added, relied with confi-
dence upon the American observance of all of the
engagements of that treaty.'"
But before Granville's communication was received,
Blaine again wrote, this time with reference to the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty." That arrangement, he stated,
had been made more than thirty years before, under
temporary conditions which had long ago ceased to
exist and could never be reproduced. The President
believed that some changes in the treaty were necessary,
and as the British interests in the question were slight
as compared with those of the United States, it was
hoped that a readjustment of the treaty terms might be
reached in a spirit of amity and concord. Reasons for
the desired modifications followed. Great Britain had
a large navy and the United States had not ; the treaty
bound the United States not to use its military force
for the defense of the interoceanic route, while it left
the naval power of Great Britain unrestrained, ready at
" /bid., pp. 174-177. ^ Ibid., 178.
-- It would seem from this that Blaine's failure to mention the treaty
in his first letter was due to forgetfulness or ignorance of its terms, and
not to a determination, later abandoned, to ignore it.
278 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
any moment to seize both ends of the canal, thus render-
ing its military occupation entirely within the discretion
of Great Britain. Furthermore, the United States gov-
ernment would not consent to perpetuate any treaty
which impeached the right of the nation to priorit}' on
the American continent. Should the Pacific coast be
attacked, the United States would be handicapped in
an attempt to protect it, for no discrimination was made
by the treaty in favor of American vessels going
through the canal to defend United States territory, as
compared with vessels bent on a hostile errand. For
purposes of self-protection the United States claimed
the right to control the isthmian transit, and offered by
such control the absolute neutralization of the canal as
respected European powers, which could in no other
way be attained and perpetuated. The fact that since
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty had been completed, com-
mercial powers, other than the contracting parties, had
developed, required a modification of the treaty ; other-
wise these powers might interfere with the transit.
If the non-intervention enjoined upon the United States
by the treaty should be appHed to the canal projected
by the French, it would prevent the American govern-
ment from asserting the rights and privileges acquired
from Colombia before the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
formed. Consequently, the United States wished the
treaty so modified as to enable it to treat with all other
nations seeking a foothold on the isthmus on the basis
of impartial justice and independence. It was desired
khat the terms of the treaty be so changed as to give the
Rjnited States a right to protect and control the canal,
In conjunction with the couiUry in which it was located,
'witli tlie exception of the acquisition of sites necessary
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 279
for military and naval stations, no territory would he\
acquired in Central America by the United States. |
Finally, since the eighth article which was designed to '
extend the terms of the treaty to other practicable lines
of communication between the two oceans had never
beeen put into effect, the American government wished
to consider it obsolete/*
Ten days later Blaine again wrote, replying to Gran-
ville's letter received a few days before. He denounced
the Claylon-Bulwer treaty as a source of former mis-
understanding and controversy, and declared that the
eighth article did not stretch the guarantees of article
one over the Panama route. That article was simply
an agreement to extend, by treaty stipulations, the pro-
tection of both countries to that or any other practi-
cable transisthmian waterway or railway outside of
'^Central America. The obligations entered into by the
United States with Colombia in 1846 required that the
United States be freed from the unequal and unequi-
table obligations to Great Britain " under the vague
\and, as yet, unperfected compact of 1850 ".'*
On January 7, 1882, Granville replied to Blaine 's
letter of November 19, defending the Clayton-Bulw er
^^ty. The principles upon which the Secretary of .
State's arguments were fnrmed ^^^re. he thought, nove l
in international law. The British government could not
believe that the changes in the treaty suggested by the
American government would promote the object in-
tended, or be beneficial in themselves. The principles
I which guided the negotiators of the treaty were sound,
land still applicable to the present state of affairs. The
^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, pp. 178-184.
^* Ibid., pp. 184-190.
28o ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
wish of the British government was that these principles
be put into effect ; and that other states be invited by
the contracting parties to enter into similar stipulations
with them. Great Britain would be glad to see the
United States take the initiative in extending the invi-
tation to other powers, and was ready to join or support
and indorse it/'
A little later a reply came to Blaine's attack on the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The differences which had
formerly arisen between the two governments regard-
ing it, the Foreign Secretary pointed out, did not relate
to the general principles to be observed in reference to
interoceanic routes, but to the acquisition of territory.
During the controversy the United States had indicated
no desire to fortify the canal or to exercise political
control over it ; on the contrary, she had disclaimed any
wish for exclusive or preferential control. During the
dispute Great Britain had contemplated the abrogation
of the treaty, but only on condition of reversion to the
status quo, a solution which was then possible though
dangerous to the cordiality between the two nations,
but which subsequent events had rendered impossible.
However, a better and more conciliatory settlement had
been made by the independent and voluntary action of
the British government. The points in dispute were
practically conceded by Great Britain and the contro-
versy terminated in a manner declared to be " entirely
satisfactory " by the President of the United States.'"
Frelinghuysen, who became secretary of state on the
/accession of President Arthur, undertook to answer
Granville by a new line of argument. Blaine had repre-
'" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, pp. 191194.
" Ibid., pp. 194-203.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION. 1860-1895 281
sented that a wholly new situation had risen since the
conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and had urged
that Great Britain recognize the changes wrought by
thirty years and consent to alterations in the trj
Blaine's efforts proving vain, his successor turned to -^
technical argument, with the idea of justifying inde-
pendent American action. In 1859, he wrote, Great
Britain had formed a treaty with Guatemala, in which
what had been called the settlement at Honduras, in
the declaration made on the exchange of ratifications
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, was styled " Her Britan-
nic Majesty's settlement and possessions." The United
States had never given its consent to the conversion of
this settlement into a British possession with British
sovereignty. This step on the part of the British gov-
ernment, Frelinghuysen intimated, was a violation of
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Moreover, it was under-
stood that the British had spread beyond the boundaries
made with Guatemala. If Great Britain had violated
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and continued to violate it,
that agreement was, of course, voidable at the pleasure
of the United States. When President Buchanan spoke
of an amicable and honorable settlement of the dispute
as having been made, he had referred not to the colo-
nization of Belize, but to the adjustment of the Mos-
quito controversy."
As to the provision in article eight of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, no such " treaty stipulation " as was
therein proposed had been made or suggested by Great
Britain for the purpose of joining the United States in
the protection of the canal or railway by the Panama
route. After thirty years of independent protection of
-' Ibid., pp. 9-16.
282 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
the Panama railway, the American government was
convinced that such joint protection was not needed.
Moreover, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was subject to
the provisions of the treaty of 1846 with New Granada,
while the latter treaty bound the United States to the
sole protectorate of any transit by the Panama route.
Furthermore, as the persons who had the concession for
the canal — which the United States understood to be
accepted by the two governments, under the provisions
of the treaty — had not carried out the proposed enter-
prise, the United States felt justified in refusing to
afford its joint protection to any other persons or com-
pany ; and it felt free to protect any interoceanic com-
munication in which it or its citizens might become
interested, in such a way as treaties with the local
sovereign powers might warrant and their interests
might require. The American government could not
take part in extending an invitation to other powers to
participate in an agreement based on the convention
of 1850, and it would look with disfavor upon an
attempt at concerted political action by other powers in
that direction. There was no provision in the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty to invite, or obliging the United States to
accept, the aid of other nations to protect or guarantee
the neutrality of the Panama route."
This letter brought a reply from Granville, showing
that by the eighth article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
the contracting parties had intended to establish a
" general principle " applicable to " all interoceanic
communications, and not to any one particular scheme
or schemes ". The correctness of this view, he declared,
was proved by the character of the treaties made by
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 194, pp. 16-25.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1S95 283
Great Britain with Honduras in 1856, and with Nica-
ragua in i860, and by treaties made by the United
States with Honduras in 1864 and with Nicaragua in
1867. Moreover, in its treaty with Nicaragua the
American government had not only agreed to extend
its protection " to all such routes of communication
(between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans), and to guar-
antee the neutrality and innocent use of the same ", but
did further agree to employ its influence with other
nations to induce them to guarantee such neutrality and
protection. The government of the United States
having, therefore, since the conclusion of the treaty of
1846 with New Granada, entered into treaties of a more
recent date with Great Britain and other powers, carry-
ing out the " general principle " established by the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty, it could hardly now appeal, without
inconsistency, to its treaty with New Granada as giving
it exclusive rights of protection over the projected
canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Besides, there
was nothing in the treaty with New Granada which
conferred on the United States any exclusive right of
protection, or which was inconsistent with the joint
protection of Great Britain and the United States."'
Granville next turned to the American allegation thati
such acts had been committed by Great Britain in Brit- I
ish Honduras in violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty |
as would entitle the United States to denounce the-p
agreement. The United States was not justified in any f
claim to abrogate the treaty on such grounds, for thel
treaty was not intended to apply to British Honduras. I
That territory had become British by conquest, and was!
possessed by Great Britain long prior to the conclusion
'^ Ibid., doc. 237, pp. 411-413.
284 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ; and, furthermore, by a
postal convention made between Great Britain and the
United States in i860 the latter had recognized British j
Honduras as being a British " colony ". Consequently, 1
the contention of the American secretary of state was i
not sound.'" 1 1
Some further correspondence took place upon the
subject in the following year, 1883," which, however,
added little to the arguments already given, and the
discussion was brought to a close by Granville, who felt
that a prolongation of it would be useless.''
An examination of the arguments presented shows
clearly that Great Britain had decidedly the best of the
controversy, for by incontrovertible evidence she had
shown that the treaty by its eighth article established a
general principle applicable to all transisthmian routes,
and, therefore, to Panama. The defense offered by
Granville in regard to Belize was obviously defective
in part ; but the charges made by Frelinghuysen were
scarcely less so. Though Belize was not British by
conquest, a long, unchallenged occupation of the terri-
tory gave Great Britain a strong title to it. Moreover,
the United States by acquiescing in the Sarstoon
boundary made by Wyke had virtually agreed to a
British occupation of the territory between the Sibun
and the Sarstoon, and, consequently, was scarcely
entitled to object to its formal establishment as a colony.
Finally, though the colonization had taken place twenty
years before, until 1882 the American government had
not thought fit to criticise the step.
The determined effort made by the American govern-
ment from 1880 to 1883 to secure the right to protect
'" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3853, doc. 237, pp. 413-417.
''■Ibid., pp. 417-425. -^ Ibid., p. 423.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 285
all transisthmian lines of communication, and the attack
on the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which obstructed this
exclusive policy, raises a question as to the cause of
the American attitude. The question is practically
answered by the fact that since the completion of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty thirty years of growth and prog-
ress had taken place in the United States. Shortly
previous to 1850 the nation had annexed the Ore-
gon Country and the Southwest. During thirty years
this vast region had been settled and its resources
were being rapidly developed. The population of the
country as a whole had doubled, and there had been a
tremendous increase in wealth and prosperity. These
changes made inevitable a new feeling of dignity and a
greater degree of self-confidence in the nation. More-
over, the conduct of most of the European powers dur-
ing the Civil War inclined the United States more fully
to realize that these nations were not to be trusted in
matters involving American welfare.
These facts in themselves are sufficient to explain
' the American policy, but it seems desirable to consider
others in connection with them. In the first place, it
should be remembered that long-established British
influence in Central America was what produced the
treaty of 1850, which admitted Great Britain to a part-
nership with the American government in the regula-
tion of transisthmian communication. The settlement -
of the dispute-4)y-sueh-^ treaty wa* -encouraged by the
lack of sufficient American capita] to_huild-the canal"
But the treaty from the first was unpopular because it
compromised with the Monroe doctrine. Even as early
as 1856 the United States was averse to extending the
^ Ibid., pp. 229-230.
286 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
provisions of the eighth article to the Panama route/*
The stand of Blaine and Frelinghuysen was, conse-
quently, a definite voicing of an attitude long held in
•silence rather than the presentation of a new interpre-
tation of the treaty.
The great interest roused by the opening of the Suez
Canal has been mentioned, and the consequent desire
of the American nation to be the leader in a similar
undertaking in the New World. Closely following
this stimulation of interest, came news of de Lesseps's
contract with Colombia. Though hitherto various for-
eign nations had directed attention to projects for routes
across the Central American isthmus, never before,
since growth in prosperity had made possible the con-
struction of a canal by American capital, had a danger-
ous rival appeared. De Lesseps's success at Suez
seemed to guarantee success at Panama. Such a situa-
tion was bound to reveal a bold and exclusive policy
on the part of the United States.
Although worsted in argument, the United States
gave little sign of acquiescing in the British view ;
and in 1884 she proceeded again to ignore the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty by negotiating with Nicaragua a
treaty for a canal to be entirely under American
control, built by the United States and jointly owned
by herself and Nicarsgtta.^'^ This treaty was still before
the Senate for ratification upon the accession of Cleve-
land, who withdrew it and reverted to the policy of a
neutralized canal under international guarantee.*' But
Cleveland's action only caused a temporary check to an
'■• See above, pp. 233-234.
*" Sparks, National Development, 225-226.
" Richardson, Messages and Papers, VIII, 327.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1S95 287
irresistible national movement; with the Harrison
administration the former poHcy was resumed. The
growing likelihood that de Lesseps's undertaking would
prove a failure, however, somewhat abated American
enthusiasm, and also again turned attention to the Nica-
ragua route." The Maritime Canal Company, in 1887,
obtained a concession for the construction of a canal on
this line. Work was begun two years later,'' but as the
company's funds soon began to fail it appealed to the
United States government for help. The subject was
taken up by the Senate in 1890, and in the following
year a bill was reported, amending the company's char-
ter. The amendments provided for the guarantee of
the company's bonds by the American government,
secured the government against loss, and gave it a con-
trolling voice in the management of the canal.'' Accom-
panying the bill was a statement from the committee
that as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was obsolete it could
not be an obstacle to the passage of the measure.*"
The matter frequently came up for debate in the next
four years and the treaty was vigorously denounced,
but that the country was unwilling to assume responsi-
bility for its abrogation, independent of England, was
evident from the fact that several joint resolutions for
that purpose failed to pass. However, in January,
1895, the canal bill passed by a good majority, showing
the increasing determination of the country to have a
canal under American control."
The action of the Senate did not escape the notice of
Great Britain. In July, 1894," and again in February,
" Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, 274.
"Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 240-241.
'* Dewey, National Problems, 118-121.
*" Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 241-242. ■** Ibid., 242.
*'Parl. Debates, 4th ser., XXVII, 15.
/,
288 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
1895," attention was called to it in the House of Com-
mons, but the reply of Grey, the under secretary of
state for foreign affairs, was that there was no reason
to believe that the American government did not intend
to keep its treaty engagements." This confidence in
American integrity was justified by the stand taken in
1896 by Secretary of State Olney. In a memorandum
upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty he declared Freling-
huysen's contention — that the treaty referred to a par-
ticular canal — to be " ingenious rather than sound ",
and held that the treaty was still in force. "If ", he
wrote, " changed conditions now make stipulations,
which were once deemed advantageous, either inappli-
cable or injurious, the true remedy is not in ingenious
attempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to
explain away its provisions, but in a direct and straight-
forward application to Great Britain for a reconsidera-
I tion of the whole matter." " This stand of Olney was
substantially a return to the attitude of Blaine.
A second element of the old Central American dis-
pute attracting attention during the period now under
consideration was the relations between the English
and the Mosquitos. The treaty of Managua, negotiated
by Wyke in i860, failed to banish British influence as
completely as had been expected. Many foreigners,
particularly English, continued to reside in the old
Mosquito territory, and were the controlling power,
advancing their own interests with little regard to the
welfare of the Nicaraguans or Indians. This foreign
element produced discord between the Mosquitos and
"^ Pari. Debates, 4th ser., XXX, 745-746.
^'/frtd., XXVII, 16; XXX, 746.
■"Moore, Digest of International Law, III, 208-209.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 289
the Nicaragua!! government, and quarrels were fre-
quent. The dissensions led to appeals to England, and
the consequent interference of the British government.
A dispute soon developed regarding the meaning of
the treaty of IManagua.^
Nicaragua was finally persuaded by the British
government to submit the dispute to the arbitration of
the Emperor of Austria. His award, given in 1880,
favored the British interpretation of the treaty ; it
made Nicaraguan sovereignty over the reserve merely
nominal, and practically established the right of the
British to interfere in behalf of the Mosquitos." How-
ever, there is no reason to believe that either previous
or subsequent to the award the interference of the
British was such as to constitute a violation of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. If it had been, it is pretty
certain that this lack of good faith would have attracted
American attention.**
There is no available evidence that the American
government took any notice of British relations with
the Mosquitos from i860 until 1888; and the interest
finally then roused was largely due to the renewed
popularity of the Nicaragua route, and to the project
of the Maritime Canal Company." In October, 1888,
the Nicaraguan minister at Washington presented to
Secretary of State Bayard a letter from the British
^ Brit, and For. State Papers, LXXXI, 752.
"Ibid., LXXII, 1212-1213.
*' Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 208-210, gives the British interference
in Mosquito as one of the causes for the American attack on the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty in 1880; but this view scarcely seems sound, for had such
interference attracted the attention of the United States, a point would
undoubtedly have been made of it by Blaine or Frelinghuysen in their
correspondence of 1880- 1883.
*° U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20, pp. 69-70, 96.
20
290 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
minister in Central America to the Nicaraguan govern-
ment, complaining that the Nicaraguans had infringed
upon the boundaries of the Mosquito reserve and had
also established a post office at Bluefields,'" " thus inter-
fering with the domestic affairs of the Reserve ". The
establishment of forts, arsenals, post offices, etc., in the
reserve by the Nicaraguans, was, in the opinion of the
British government, inconsistent with the treaty of
Managua as interpreted by the award."
In consequence of this communication, Bayard wrote
to Phelps, the American minister to England. Had the
United States anticipated, he said, that under cover of
the treaty of Managua the British government would
continue to attempt any interference with the affairs of
the Indians, it would not have hailed that treaty as a
solution and termination of disputes concerning the
British protectorate over the Mosquitos, but Avould
have regarded the arrangement as a serious obstacle to
any such settlement. However, he declared, nothing in
the treaty of Managua or in the Austrian award was
incompatible with the right of Nicaragua to establish
post offices in the reserve or military posts for the
common defense. Such a right was an essential inci-
dent of paramount sovereignty, and could be properly
exercised only by Nicaragua. It was important to the
United States as to all other powers that Nicaraguan
sovereignty exist in fact over the Mosquito reserve,
for with the sovereign alone could diplomatic relations
be maintained, and to it alone could the powers look
for redress of possible wrongs to their citizens."
"> Bluefields was the residence of the Mosquito government.
'> Brit, and For. State Papers, LXXXI, 758-759.
"/fctd., 746-754-
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 291
But more important than the question of Nicaraguan
authority in the reserve, was the general question of
the right of the British government to interfere in dis-
putes between Nicaragua and the Mosquitos. The
President could not but regard the continued exercise
of the claim on the part of Great Britain to interfere
on behalf of these Indians as the assertion of a British
protectorate in another form ; more especially when
this effort was directed to preventing Nicaragua from
exercising military jurisdiction in the immediate neigh-
borhood of the Atlantic mouth of the projected canal.
The United States could never see with indifference the
reestablishment of such a protectorate. It would not
only be contrary to the Monroe doctrine, but also to the
terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the binding force
of which Great Britain had hitherto so emphatically
asserted. The history of the former controversy with
regard to the same subject should admonish the British
and American governments to spare no effort to avoid
misunderstandings and to promote cordial co-operation
and good intelligence between the two countries. With
this purpose in view the American government desired
that its attitude be made known to Great Britain.^'
Salisbury, the British foreign secretary, replied in a
reasonable and conciliatory manner. Because of com-
plaints from the Mosquito chief, he explained, the
British agent in Central America had been instructed
to make friendly remonstrance to the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment and to draw its attention to the wording of the
treaty of Managua and to the interpretation given it
by the Austrian award. If Mosquito rights were in-
fringed upon by Nicaragua, by whom could remon-
'-^ Ibid., 754-758.
292 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
strance be made if not by Great Britain, with whom
Nicaragua concluded the convention defining these
rights ? However, the British government did not
claim the right to intervene in every dispute between
the Mosquitos and their sovereign ; the extent of the
intervention was indicated in the report annexed to the
award. Moreover, the British government had no
desire to assert a protectorate, or anything in the nature
of a protectorate over the Mosquitos, and it would give
that government the greatest possible satisfaction if
Nicaragua and the Indians would come to an amicable
arrangement for the incorporation of the latter into the
Nicaraguan republic, thus relieving Great Britain from
any further responsibility/^ This explanation was evi-
dently satisfactory to the United States, for with it the
correspondence ended."
The Austrian award practically established Mosquito
independence of Nicaragua, and after it was given
foreign influence increased. Extensive banana planta-
tions were established by American immigrants, and a
thriving commerce developed, particularly with the
United States."" The peaceful prosperity of the terri-
tory roused the jealousy of the disorganized, poverty-
stricken remainder of Nicaragua, and led the Nica-
raguan government to determine to extend its influence
over the reserve." Consequently, in 1893, a Nicaraguan
" Brit, and Foreign State Papers, LXXXI, 754-758.
" Four years later Lincoln, the .American minister to London, ad-
dressed a letter to the British foreign secretary, reopening the discus-
sion, but no reply was given him. U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20,
p. 28.
" Keely, " Nicaragua and the Mosquito Coast ", in Pop. Set. Mo., XLV.
164-165. In 1894 it was reported that ninety-four per cent, of the wealth,
enterprise, and commerce of the reserve was American. Bluefields was
" American to the core ". U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20, pp. 70, 87.
" Ibid., p. 37.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 293
commissioner, General Lacayo, was appointed/'* with
instructions to assert the sovereignty of the republic
over the reserve and to use his influence to secure its
incorporation into Nicaragua."" Lacayo's efforts, how-
ever, were vain.'"
This was the situation in 1893 when war broke out
between Honduras and Nicaragua." As a result of
rumors of a Honduran invasion of the reserve, the
Nicaraguan government sent troops there who estab-
lished martial law."" Immediately great excitement pre-
vailed and the Americans in the reserve petitioned their
government for protection by a war vessel."^ The Nica-
raguan commissioner meanwhile had meddled with
Mosquito affairs in various ways, and had placed a duty
on bananas sent out of the reserve.'^ In February, 1894,
Bingham, the British consul, warned him that should
he persist in his course, the British war vessel in the
harbor would interfere."' Finally, however, because of
the danger to life and property in the reservation, the
commissioner himself and the foreign consuls requested
protection from the British vessel Cleopatra ; "" and, on
March 5, marines who were landed from the ship com-
pelled the Nicaraguans to raise the siege laid upon
^^ Ibid., pp. 37-38, 84. The appointment of a Nicaraguan commissioner
was permitted by the treaty of Managua. Brit, and For. State Papers,
LXXII, 1212.
'■'^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20, p. 84.
^'> Ibid., pp. 11-12, 84-85.
'^^ Ibid., pp. lo-ii. A clear and interesting account of the Mosquito
coast in 1893 may be found in Pop. Sci. Mo., XLV, 160-175.
^^ U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20, pp. 19, 20-23.
'^^ Ibid., pp. 12-13. The Kearsarge which was sent was lost on the way.
When the loss became known the San Francisco was ordered from
Brazil to Bluefields. Ibid., p. 68.
'■• Ibid., p. 38. This was a violation of the Austrian award. Brit, and
For. State Papers, LXXII, 1213.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20, p. 14.
«= Ibid., p. 36.
294 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Bluefields." Following this, a provisional government
was formed for the reservation by Captain Howe of
the Cleopatra, the British consul, Lacayo, and the com-
mander of the Nicaraguan troops. The American citi-
zens and Braida, the American consul, refused to have
any part in the arrangement.*^ The Americans were
strongly opposed to the provisional government for
they felt it to be a step towards Nicaraguan rule in
Mosquito, which they believed would be fatal to indus-
try and commerce.'" What they desired was local self-
government based on the lines laid down in the treaty
of Managua.^" Thus it appeared that the interests of
American citizens in Mosquito were at variance with
the contention of the American government as to the
rightful control of the territory.
An account of the occcurrence at Bluefields was
promptly telegraphed, and later written, to the Ameri-
can government by Baker, the American minister at
Managua ; " and immediately upon receiving the tele-
gram, Gresham, the American secretary of state,
telegraphed to Bayard, then minister to England,
instructing him to investigate and report the cause for
Captain Howe's action."
A telegram from Bayard, dated March 15, stated that
the British government had given no instructions for
the landing of the troops, and was waiting for further
information regarding the matter. As soon as addi-
tional intelligence should be received, it would be
promptly communicated to the United States. Kimber-
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275, doc. 20, pp. 15, 36. Thanks were formerly
extended by the Americans to the captain of the Cleopatra for his pro-
tection. Ibid., pp. 32, 45.
'^^ Ibid., pp. 32-34. «»7?)irf., pp. 32-33. '"Ibid., pp. 32-33, 43-
^^ Ibid., pp. 17-18. ''Ibid., p. 26.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 295
ley, the foreign secretary, had assured Bayard, however,
that the British government had no desire or intention
to estabhsh a protectorate in Central America. Bayard
himself believed that the troops had been landed merely
for protection to the residents." Some time later
Bayard sent further details regarding the incident
which went to show that his opinion had been correct.'*
A telegram from Gresham to Baker, sent on March
14, had brought no further details ; " but on April 19
Captain Watson, of the American vessel San Francisco,
which had been sent to Bluefields to protect American
interests, telegraphed a statement to the Navy Depart-
ment. The landing of the British troops, he said, was
justifiable, and permission of the Nicaraguan commis-
sioner had been first obtained. The troops had been
believed necessary to the protection of life and prop-
erty. Later, however, the British force had retired
and now the Nicaraguans were in full control.'"
By April 30 a fairly accurate account of the afifair
had reached Washington, and on that date Gresham
wrote to Bayard, objecting to the joint assumption of
authority in Mosquito by the British and Nicaraguan
agents, as incompatible with the terms of the treaty of
Managua. The stipulations of that treaty, Gresham
stated, left no room for foreign intervention, or for the
administration of affairs in the reserve by aliens. The
arrangement for a provisional government would tend
to strengthen the assumption that Mosquito was a
territorial entity with sovereign rights. Such govern-
ment could have no support from the United States.
While the American government was pleased to learn
that the British forces had been landed simply for the
'^ Ibid., pp. 26-27. " Ibid., pp. 34-40. " Ibid., p. 26.
•" Ibid., p. 50.
296 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
protection of life and property, the President hoped
that the anomalous situation in the Mosquito reserve
might speedily cease, and that no foreign agency would
be permitted to dictate or participate in the adminis-
tration of affairs there."
Bayard, on May 22, telegraphed a reply to this. In
an interview just concluded with Kimberley, the latter
had again assured him that Great Britain had no inten-
tion or desire of forming a protectorate over any part
of Nicaraguan territory ; instead it wished to act thor-
oughly in concert with the United States, and to con-
tinue the treaty of 1850 " in unbroken force and effect ".
The British consul, Kimberley had stated, had acted
without instructions in helping to form a provisional
government, but had done so because he believed the
lives and property of the residents to be in danger. It
was the wish of the British government to consult with
the United States in order to guard against Nicaraguan
violence to British and American interests. The British
minister at Washington had been instructed to this
effect.^
.^ Later, a letter from Bayard expressed the belief
that the British government had no desire for the
abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, or to do
anything inconsistent with its provisions, or to interfere
in any way with the plans or works of the United States
in relation to the proposed canal. They desired, he
believed, to have only the most friendly and mutually
\ Accommodating relations with the American govern-
I ,70
ment.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 327S. doc. 20, pp. 68-69.
" Ibid., p. 91. '» Ibid., pp. 96-97-
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 297
Gresham replied, on July 19, that to accept the
implied invitation to join with Great Britain for the
purpose of settling the questions originating in the
recent incident at Bluefields might indicate a willing-
ness on the part of the existing American administra-
tion to depart from the policy of its predecessors in
dealing with Central American questions. The gov-
ernment in the reserve was not Mosquito, but alien,
especially at Bluefields. No matter how conspicuous
the American or other alien interests which had grown
up under the fiction of Indian self-government, neither
the United States nor Great Britain could fairly sanc-
tion or uphold this abuse of Nicaraguan sovereignty.
American rights in the reservation must be treated by
the United States like similar rights in other parts of
Nicaragua, and, should these be invaded, the American
residents could look only to the Nicaraguan govern-
ment for redress.*"
Aleanwhile, the provisional government, supported
by the Nicaraguan authorities, had acted in a very arbi-
trary manner and had become unpopular. Encouraged
by the aliens — especially the Americans of poor repu-
tation " — the Indians and Jamaica negroes revolted,
drove out the Nicaraguans, and restored Clarence, the
Mosquito chief, to his ofifice." The two contending
parties at first displayed considerable violence, but the
presence of marines from the American vessel Marble-
head helped restore order.^'
The Nicaraguan authorities, however, soon regained
control of the reserve, and by tactful treatment of the
^ Ibid., pp. 126-128.
^^ Ibid., pp. 128, 158-161, 163, 164, 168, 169.
s» Ibid., p. 128.
^^ Ibid., pp. 128, 132, 137-142.
298 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
Indians won their confidence/' In a short time, at the
express desire of the Mosquitos, steps were taken
towards their incorporation into the Nicaraguan repub-
lic. Delegates from the leading tribes met in conven-
tion, voted for incorporation, and formally recognized
the constitution of Nicaragua. The Mosquitos were
given all of the rights of other Nicaraguan citizens and
also some special privileges. The former reserve
became the department of Zelaya in the republic."
The fact of Mosquito incorporation, made known to
the American government through a telegram from
Baker, was received with much satisfaction.*' The
arrangement was equally gratifying to Great Britain.
On December 22, 1894, Bayard sent the following
announcement :
Her Majesty's Government are well pleased with the pros-
pect of having " Clarence " and his fortunes eliminated from
their political responsibility.
There was the most open expression of satisfaction at the
foreign office upon the reported voluntary incorporation of the
*' The foreigners who were suspected of having incited the Mosquitos
to revolt escaped less fortunately. Two American citizens and twelve
British subjects, including Hatch, the British vice-consul at Bluefields,
were arrested and after rough treatment were sent to Managua. Ibid.,
p. 173. Upon protest being made from their government, the Americans
were soon released; but the release of the British, and particularly of
Hatch, was long delayed, as was also the redress demanded by the
British government. Ibid., pp. 190-195. Finally, by seizure of the harbor
of Corinto, Great Britain forced Nicaragua to restore Hatch and to
pay an indemnity of seventy-five thousand dollars. Travis, Mosquito
History, 31. This roused some Americans who believed that the British
were trying to gain control of the Nicaragua canal route; but the .Amer-
ican government itself took a more reasonable view, as did the majority
of the population. Colquhoun, The Nicaragua CanaJ, 293-395.
" U. S. Docs., ser. no. 3275. doc. 20, pp. 204-206. The firm stand of the
American government for the rights of Nicaragua in the reserve was .t
very important factor in producing this final settlement; and the friendl\
action of the United States was fully appreciated by Nicaragua. Ibid.,
p. 205.
'" Ibid., p. 201.
AMERICAN OPPOSITION, 1860-1895 299
Indians with the rest of Nicaragua, for it was a consummation
devoutly to be wished, and they were glad to be free from the
subject."
Thus, in a manner agreeable to all concerned, was
at last settled the famous Mosquito question, which had
been a source of disagreement between the United
States and Great Britain for nearly fifty years, and
between the latter and Central America for more than
two centuries.
'^ Ibid., pp. 203-204. By a treaty with Nicaragua, ratified in 1906,
Great Britain formally recognized the abrogation of the treaty of
Managua and the incorporation of the Mosquitos into the Nicaraguan
republic. Pari. Papers, 1906, CXXXVI, " Treaty between the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Nicaragua with regard to the Mosquito
Territory ", 1-6.
CHAPTER X.
The New Canal Treaties, and New Conditions in
Central America.
For many years a growing desire had existed in the
United States for a transisthmian canal owned and
controlled by Americans, but up to the close of the last
century there seemed little prospect of its prompt reali-
zation. Though the less responsible element in Con-
gress frequently urged abrogation, the members with
a clearer sense of international honor felt with Olney
that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty could not be set aside
except by joint action with England. Such action
seemed but a remote possibiHty, for the British govern-
ment had expressed its satisfaction with the treaty and
its firm determination to stand by it.
The last few years of the century, however, brought
a change in British and American affairs which pro-
foundly affected the relations of the two governments.
The Boer War and the events immediately preceding it
had given rise to a coldness between England and other
European powers. England felt herself isolated, and
therefore sought support beyond Europe.' This new
policy undoubtedly influenced the British attitude
towards the United States during the Spanish-Ameri-
can War. English sympathy probably would have been
* Coolidge, The United States as a It'orlJ Power, 275; Barral-Mont-
ferrat, De Monroe ii Roosevelt, 239.
300
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 301
on the American side in any case, but, as it was, an
unusual cordiality accompanied the sympathy.'
The friendliness of Great Britain was reciprocated
by the Americans, but the British government fully
realized that such unusual cordiality would not long
survive if the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were maintained
as an obstacle to an American transisthmian canal. The
long cruise of the Oregon around Cape Horn in 1898,
for the purpose of joining the Atlantic squadron, had
called attention to the need for a canal, while the
acquisition of the Philippines and Hawaii, in the Pacific,
and of Porto Rico, which strengthened the American
position in the Caribbean Sea, further increased the
arguments in favor of it.' The time was fully ripe for
the undertaking, and, in order to place on a secure basis
the new Anglo-American relations, Great Britain was
inclined to humor the United States in her long-
cherished desire.
Accordingly, after the presidential message of
December, 1898, had again called attention to the need
of the nation and urged action, Pauncefote, the British
ambassador at Washington, approached the secretary
of state in order to learn the exact attitude of the
American government. This was frankly given. The
President, Pauncefote was emphatically assured, had
no intention of ignoring the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and
would faithfully observe its stipulations ; but, in view
of the demand for a canal, the United States wished,
' Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, 275; Latane, America
as a World Power, 63-64.
'Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, 274; Pari. Papers,
1901, [Cd. 438], "Correspondence respecting the Convention Signed at
Washington relative to the Establishment of a Communication by Ship-
Canal ", 4; Keasbey, " Terms and Tenor of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ",
in Annals of the American Academy, Nov. 1899, pp. 1-26.
302 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
by friendly negotiation with England, to secure such
modification of the treaty as would, without affecting
the " general principle " therein declared, enable the
enterprise to be undertaken by the American govern-
ment.*
The British government expressed a willingness to
consider the matter, and, in consequence, a draft con-
vention was drawn up by Secretary of State Hay, and
handed to Pauncefote in January, 1899. However, just
at this time the Joint High Commission, to which had
been assigned the settlement of the Alaskan boundary
and other questions between the two governments, had
come seriously to question whether an adjustment of
these difficulties could be effected, because of the un-
willingness of the American government to yield
regarding the contested boundary. In consequence,
Great Britain hesitated to make concessions on the
question of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and for some
months nothing was accomplished with regard to it.
But early in 1900 the British government was again
stirred to activity. A bill was before Congress em-
powering the President to acquire from Nicaragua
and Costa Rica the control of territory for a canal
route, and directing the secretary of war to construct
the canal and make provision for its protection. It
seemed likely that the bill would pass, and thus cause
embarrassment between the two governments. To
obviate such a possibility the British government
decided to accept the convention as presented by Hay.*
This convention, signed February 5, 1900, gave the
American government full power to direct the construc-
* Pari. Papers, 1901, [Cd. 438], "Correspondence respecting the Con-
vention sig^ned at Washington . . . ", etc., 4.
» Ibid.. 4-5.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 303
tion of the canal and to provide for its regulation and
management. In order to preserve the " general prin-
ciple " of neutralization established by the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, the following rules for the free navi-
gation of the canal, substantially those agreed upon in
1888 for the Suez route, were adopted:
( 1 ) The canal was to be open in time of war as in
time of peace to vessels of commerce and war on terms
of entire equality.
(2) The canal was never to be blockaded, or any
right of war exercised, or any act of hostility com-
mitted within it.
(3) War vessels of a belligerent should not revictual
or take any stores in the canal, except so far as was
strictly necessary ; and the transit of such vessels
should be effected with the least possible delay. Prizes
were to come under the same rule as war vessels.
(4) No belligerent should embark or disembark
troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the
canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the
transit, in which case the transit should be resumed as
quickly as possible.
(5) War vessels of a belligerent should not remain
in the waters within three marine miles of either end
of the canal longer than twenty-four hours, except when
in distress, in which case they should depart as soon as
possible. But a war vessel of one belligerent should not
depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of
a war vessel of the other belligerent.
(6) The works, etc., necessary to the construction,
maintenance, and operation of the canal were to be
considered part of the canal and should enjoy complete
immunity from hostile attacks.
304 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
(7) No fortifications should be erected to command
the canal or the adjoining waters, but the United States
was free to maintain such miHtary pohce as would
protect it against lawlessness and disorder.
Immediately after the ratification of the treaty the
contracting parties were to bring the arrangement to
the notice of other powers and invite them to adhere
to it."
The treaty was promptly presented to the Senate, but
ratification of it was not accomplished before Congress
adjourned, though the bill for the American construc-
tion and defense of a canal was passed by a large
majority, on ]\Iay 2. When Congress resumed its ses-
sion in the autumn, the treaty formed by Hay and
Pauncefote was ratified, but only after three amend-
ments, seriously changing its meaning, had been added :
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was declared to be super-
seded by the new arrangement ; a new clause was added
to rule five stating that the first five rules should not
\^^ / apply to measures which the United States might find
^^ it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the
defense of the United States and the maintenance of
^~^0^> public order ; the provision for inviting the adherence
of other powers to the treaty was entirely omitted.'
t These changes were practically an elimination of the
J neutralization policy, and would place the canal in
I control of the United States with the protection of the
/ route for the use of other powers left entirely to Anieri-
j can discretion.
' * Pari. Papers, 1900, [Cd. -30], "Convention between Her Majesty ;iii«l
the United States Supplementary to the Convention of April 19, 1850 ",
1-2.
''Ibid., 1901, [Cd. 4j8], "Correspondence respecting the Convention
signed at Washington . . . ", etc., 2-5.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 305
From the first it seemed hardly possible that the,'
British government would favor the amended treaty.
Though the British press fully admitted that fifty years
of change justified the American demand for modifi-
cation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, it declared that the\
draft signed by Hay and Pauncefote accomplished this,\
and denounced the amended treaty.' The President I
also was criticised for permitting its ratification, after '
being so amended.*
A letter written on February 22, 1 901, by Lansdowne,
the British foreign secretary, to Pauncefote, after call-
ing attention to the conciliatory spirit which had led the
British government to resume negotiations, presented
the British view of the Senate amendments. The
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Lansdowne wrote, was an
international contract of unquestionable validity, and,
according to well-established usage, should not be
abrogated or modified except with the consent of both
parties to the contract. In spite of this, the Britishl!
government had been confronted by a proposal fromij
the American Senate — without any previous attempt to i
ascertain British views — for the abrogation of the i
treaty. But the second and third amendments were \
even more objectionable. The second, giving the '
United States control of the canal in time of war, was a
distinct departure from the principle hitherto acceptable
to both governments. The change proposed by the
United States would presumably permit warlike acts,
on the part of that government, in or near the canal —
acts clearly inconsistent with the neutral character
which it had always been sought to give the canal, and
* London Morning Post, Dec. 5, 14, 1900; London Daily News, Jan. 17,
1901; London Times, Jan. 16, 18, 1901.
* London Times, Dec. 24, 1900.
21
3o6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
which would deny its free use to the commerce and
navies of the world. Such an arrangement would
strike at the very root of the general principle of neu-
tralization upon which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
based. But the import of the second amendment was
peculiarly emphasized when considered in connection
with the third. If the adherence of the powers were
given, the neutrality of the canal would be secured ;
without that adherence, it would depend only upon the
guarantee of the two contracting parties. The last
amendment, however, not only removed all prospect of
the wider guarantee, but also placed the British govern-
ment in a position of marked disadvantage, compared
with the other powers, which would not be subject to
the self-denying ordinance which Great Britain was
desired to accept."
In view of these facts, the British government could
not accept the amended convention, and, under exist-
ing circumstances, preferred to retain the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty. The British government, Lansdowne
concluded, had shown an earnest desire to meet the
views of the United States, and would have been ready
to consider in a friendly spirit any amendments — not
inconsistent with the principles accepted by both gov-
ernments — which the United States might have desired
to propose ; and it would sincerely regret a failure to
come to a friendly understanding in regard to this
important subject."
The British refusal to accept the amended treaty
immeiiiately produced a Senate resolution for the abro-
'^'^ Pari. Paters, 1901, [Cd. 438], "Correspondence respecting the Con-
vention sigiieil at Washington . . . ", etc., 5-7.
" Ibid.. 7.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 307
gation of the Clayton-Bulwer convention." Hay. how-
ever, promptly proceeded to form a new draft, which,
on April 25, 1901, Pauncefote transmitted to Lans-
downe." This draft was similar to the former treaty
as amended by the Senate in that by separate article it
declared the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to be superseded
and made no provision for inviting other powers to
adhere to the stipulations agreed upon; but the rules
for the regulation of the canal were modified with the
aim of meeting British objections and yet preserving
the principle contended for by the United States. From
the first rule were omitted the words, " in time of war
as in time of peace " ; rule seven prohibiting the fortifi-
cation of the canal by the United States was omitted,
but to rule two was added the reservation : " The
United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain
such military police along the canal as may be necessary
to protect it against lawlessness and disorder " ; finally,
the clause added to rule five in the former draft was
entirely omitted."
The changes made by Hay rendered the arrangement
more acceptable to the British government, but certain
further modifications were proposed by Lansdowne. In
order to preserve the " general principle " stipulated
for in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, a new article was
added reaffirming this general principle and asserting
that the rules governing the use of the canal should as
far as applicable control all interoceanic communica-
tions across the isthmus connecting North and South
" Cong. Record, XXXV, 8, 13-22, 23-28.
'^^ Pari. Papers, 1902, [Cd. 905], "Correspondence respecting the
Treaty signed at Washington relative to the Establishment of a Communi-
cation by Ship- Canal ", i.
^^Ibid.. 1-2.
3o8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
America ; and that no change of territorial sovereignty
or other change of circumstances should affect such
general principle or the obligations of the contracting
parties under the treaty. The first rule for regulating
the use of the canal was so modified as to admit to it
only the vessels of those nations which should agree to
observe the rules above described ; and to the same
rule was appended the stipulation that the conditions
and charges in connection with the use of the canal
should be just and equitable."
The American government objected to the first
change mentioned. This, it claimed, repeated what was
already stated in the preamble, and seemed to give a
wider application to article eight of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty than was originally intended. Instead of the
article added by the British government, Hay suggested
a simple statement providing that no change of terri-
torial sovereignty or of the international relations of the
country or countries traversed by the canal should affect
the general principle of neutralization, or the obligation
of the contracting parties. The second change was also
objected to, because of the strong American aversion to
inviting other powers to become contracting parties to
the canal treaty ; in its place were proposed the words,
" the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of
commerce and of war of all nations observing these
Rules "."
These modifications were accepted by the British
government, which suggested a slight further alteration
in the wording of the preamble and of the first article,
'^ Pari. Papers, 1902 [Cd. 905], " Correspomlcnce respecting the Treaty
signed at Washington relative to the Establishment of a Communication
by Ship-Canal ", 2-7.
'« Ibid., 7-8.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 309
in order to make it perfectly clear that the treaty was
meant to apply to all other canals across the American
isthmus as well as that through Nicaragua." These
changes were in turn accepted by the American govern-
ment, and the treaty was signed on November 18,
1901," by Hay and Pauncefote. The next month it
passed the Senate by a vote of seventy -two to six," and
ratifications were exchanged between the two govern-
ments in the following February.^"
In view of the modifications which Great Britain had
permitted in the rules providing for the neutralization
of the canal, it is difficult to see how neutralization was
guaranteed in the case of war between the United
States and any other power." The new treaty, however,
met the approval of both nations. As Great Britain
seemed to think her interests secured by this treaty,
she had no objection to giving up some of the earlier
measures for which she had contended, or to setting
aside the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which both countries
acknowledged to be outgrown." Moreover, the British
felt that the right to protect and control the canal was
only a reasonable demand, considering that the whole
cost of construction was to be borne by the American
nation.^ In fact, the satisfactory completion of the
treaty was regarded as the conclusion of a long period
"Ibid., 8-9. ^^ Ibid., lo-ii. "Ibid., 11.
''Ibid., [Cd. 1007], "Treaty between the United Kingdom and the
Unite d States of America for the Establishment of a Ship-Canal ", i.
/"^ ^ For a discussion of the neutralization provisions of the treaty, see
I Latane, " Neutralization Features of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty ", in
I Am. Hist. Assn., Antiua! Report, 1902, I, 289-303; also Woolsey, "Suez
I and Paji agia — a Parallel ", pp. 305-312 of the same volume.
^London Daily News, Nov. 18, Dec. 17, 1901; London Times, Nov. 19,
19"'-
^ Pari. Papers, 1902, [Cd. 905], " Correspondence respecting the Treaty
signed at Washington . . . ", etc., 4.
310 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
of controversy and misunderstanding, and the opening
of a new era of more friendly feeling between the two
overnments.^
Even before the ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty the American government had taken steps
towards the construction of a canal. In 1899 it
appointed a commission which was instructed to exam-
ine into all practicable routes. The following year the
commission reported in favor of the Nicaragua route,
as the French company which had the franchise for the
Panama route seemed unwilling to sell all of its rights
to the American government.** This report, however,
led the French company to change its attitude, and in
1902 it offered to sell out to the United States for forty
million dollars. In consequence of the offer, the canal
commission altered its decision and advised the adop-
tion of the Panama route."* On June 28, 1902, the
President was authorized to purchase the French com-
pany's property, and to obtain from Colombia the con-
trol of the territory traversed by the canal route. If
reasonable terms could not be obtained from the com-
pany or from Colombia, the President was empowered
to form a canal treaty with Nicaragua and Costa Rica.""
Negotiations with Colombia followed, and the Hay-
Herran treaty of January, 1903, was the result ; but
the Colombian Senate refused to ratify the agreement,"
and for a time it seemed as though the United States
^* London Times, Dec. 18, 1901.
=" Lindsay, Panama and the Canal Today, 88; Johnson, Four Cen-
turies of the Panama Canal. 116, 120-121; Edw.nrds, Panama. 464.
*• Johnson, op. cit., 121-126; Kdwards, Panama. 464-465.
^ Lindsay, Panama and the Canal Today, 89-90; Johnson, op. cit.,
126-128.
'» Lindsay, Panama and the Canal Today, 90-9'; Johnson, op. cit.. 130-
149; Edwards, Panama, 465-467.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 311
would again turn to the Nicaraguan route. However,
a revolution which the United States was accused of
fomenting,^ soon took place in Panama, and that prov-
ince declared its independence of Colombia, in Novem-
ber, I903> and established itself as a separate republic.'"
A speedy recognition of the new government by the
United States followed, and within a month a new
canal treaty, which was promptly ratified, was formed
between the United States and Panama.") Further
investigation led to a decision in favor of a lock canal,"
and in 1907 the American government itself determined
to undertake the construction. The commission, with
Major G. W. Goethals at its head, was put in control of
the enterprise, and work was promptly begun."
By 19 1 2 it was evident that the canal would soon be
ready for use ; therefore it was necessary that Congress
pass measures for its regulation. The Panama Canal
bill, originating in the House, was framed for this pur-
pose. Among other provisions it fixed the tolls to be
paid by vessels passing through the canal, but exempted
all American vessels from such payment."' The bill
went to the Senate and while it was before that body,
" Lindsay, Panama and the Canal Today, 92-93. For the part played
by the United States in this connection, see the source collections. The
Panama Canal Question, and "I Took the Isthmus " , also U. S. Docs.,
ser. no. 4587, doc. 51; ser. no. 4588, doc. 95.
^Edwards, Panama, 467-476; Arias, Panama Canal, 64-68.
'* 5en. Doc. no. 456, 63 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 74-84. In consequence of
the attitude of the United States, much bitterness has been displayed by
Colombia towards that country. This seems likely to be wiped out by a
treaty, now ready for the ratification of the American Senate, by which
the American government agrees to pay Colombia twenty-five million
dollars for the loss of Panama and the transfer of the canal zone to the
United States. Cong. Record, LI, 12676, passim; LII, 403-405.
"Edwards, Panama, 488-490; Johnson, Four Centuries of the Panama
Canal, 316-325.
^Edwards, Panama, 505-510.
^^ New International Year Book, 1912, p. 495.
312 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
a protest was presented by the British government
against such exemption in favor of the United States,
on the ground that it was a violation of the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty/"
The canal bill was the subject of a long, sharp debate
in the Senate,'" and finally the exemption clause was so
modified as to include only American vessels engaged in
coastwise trade. In this form the bill was passed by
the Senate on August 9 and was promptly signed by
President Taft." On November 13 the President
issued a proclamation fixing the rates of tolls to be paid
by vessels using the Panama Canal.^ On the following
day the British foreign secretary instructed Bryce, the
British ambassador at Washington, to present to the
American government a protest against the canal legis-
lation. This protest, which was presented December 9,
was an amplification of that of the preceding July.
" The intention of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty ", the
protest stated, " was that the United States was to
recover the right to construct the transisthmian canal
upon the terms that when constructed the canal was to
be open to British and United States ships on equal
terms." If any American vessel were permitted to pass
through the canal toll free, British vessels would be
forced to bear more than an equal share of the cost and
current expenses of the canal. The British govern-
ment, the communication intimated, expected the
United States either to repeal the objectionable part
"Sen. Doc. no. ii, 63 Cong., 1 sess., pp. lo-ii.
''Cong. Record, XLVIII, 1818-1825, 9168-9189, 9221-9227, 9231-9239,
9278-9284, 9359-9365.
*'' New International Year Book. 1912, p. 495.
'"Sen. Doc. no. 11, 63 Cong., i scss., pp. lo-ii.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 313
of the canal act or to submit the matter to arbitra-
tion."
The reply of the American government was evasive
and its arguments unsound. The protest of the British
government^ it implied, was premature, as the canal was
not yet complete and no unfair tolls had yet been paid
by Great Britain ; consequently, there was nothing to
arbitrate. After all, the remission of tolls to American
ships was only a subsidy for which America had to pay,
and not Great Britain. The protest of the British, the
reply intimated, was really an attempt to read into the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty a surrender by the American
government of its right to regulate its own commerce.
The letter concluded, however, with an expression of
willingness to submit the matter to arbitration.*"
But it early became evident that the American
government by no means had the undivided support of
the nation. Expressions of disapproval came from all
over the country, on the ground that such discrimina-
tion in favor of the United States was inexpedient as
well as a violation of treaty obligations." In the face
^ Ibid., pp. 11-19. The protest also called attention to the fact that
vessels of Panama had been exempted from the payment of tolls by the
canal treaty with Panama in 1903, and intimated that discretion seemed
to be given the President to discriminate, in fixing the tolls, in favor of
American vessels in general as against foreign vessels. Ibid., pp. 16, 18.
^ Ibid., pp. 3-10. The toll controversy was probably influential in
rousing a fear in the United States that Great Britain or some other
foreign power, dissatisfied with American regulation of the Panama Canal,
might determine to construct a rival route. In an effort to guard against
this, a treaty, now ready for ratification by the Senate, was formed with
Nicaragua. This treaty secures to the United States a perpetual and
exclusive right of way across Nicaragua for an interoceanic canal, and
also establishes a virtual American protectorate over the Nicaraguan
republic. Nation, XCVII, 92-93; Outlook, CVI, 20-21.
■" The " Coastwise Exemption " : the Nation Against It; Cong, Record,
XLIX, 1818-1825; Root, " Panama Canal Tolls ", in World Peace Founda-
tion Pamphlet Series, III, no. 3; Nation, XCVI, 26; Outlook, CIII, 249-
253; Independent, LXXIV, 224-226; Century Magazine, LXXXV, 630-
631; Literary Digest, XLV, 1165-1166; LXVT, 220.
314 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
of opposition from home and protest and criticism from
abroad it seemed unlikely that the toll legislation could
long stand. A definite attitude of disapprobation on the
part of President Wilson shortly after his accession to
office hinted at an early reversal of government policy
regarding the question; and on March 5, 1914, in an
address delivered at a joint session of the houses of
Congress the President asked for the repeal of the
Panama Canal Act, on the ground that exemption of
American vessels from the payment of tolls constituted
a mistaken economic policy and was a " plain contra-
vention of the treaty with Great Britain "." On the day
following, a bill for repealing the exemption clause of
the canal act was introduced into the House, and it was
passed by the House a few weeks later. In the Senate
the measure was hotly debated, but it was finally passed
on June ii, with an amendment attached. The amend-
ment provided that the repeal of the exemption clause
should not be regarded as a relinquishment of any right
which the United States might have under the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty or the treaty with Panama, or other-
wise, to discriminate in favor of American vessels by
exempting them from the payment of tolls ; or as
impairing any right of the United States under those
treaties, or otherwise, with respect to the sovereignty
over or the control of the canal." The House promptly
concurred in the Senate amendment, and President
Wilson signed the repeal bill on June 15.** Thus was
removed the latest cause for friction between England
and the United States with relation to the Central
American isthmus.
"House Doc, no. 813, 63 Cong., 2 sess.
*' Cong. Record. LI, 5895-11214, t>assim.
** Nation. XCVIII, 711. 712.
t/0 ('■
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES .31S
The abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the
Hay-Pauncefote agreement removed the former re-
straint upon British and American relations in connec-
tion with Central America. Upon Great Britain this
change had merely a negative influence ; she reduced
her garrisons in the West I;idi£S.and withdrew her war
vessels, tjius practically recogniziiig'-American suprem-
acy in the Gulf region,"' But with the United States f^*^-*^
the case was quite different. The large investment of
American capital in Central America and the proximity
of the region to the Panama Canal Zone was bound
greatly to increase American interest in the Central
American states, and to cause the United States govern-
ment to assume a decided policy towards them.
In consequence, a system of interference in Central
American matters, resembling tutelage, developed.
Repeatedly the United States stepped forward to pre-
vent the states from meddling in one another's affairs,
and to prevent or end war between them.^ Nicaragua,
because of her disorganized condition, has received the
largest share of attention. In December, 1907, under
the auspices of the United States and Mexico, a con-
vention of Central American delegates met at Washing-
ton and formed a treaty providing for the arbitration
of all international differences." However, Zelaya,
the Nicaraguan dictator, refused to abide by the
arrangement, and while the convention was still sitting
he planned an invasion of Salvador.^ The American
government prevented the execution of the plan," but
•" CooHdge, The United States as a World Power, 276.
■" Palmer, Central America and its Problems, 291-292, 294-295; Calderon,
Latin America: its Rise and Progress, 292.
■*'' Palmer, Central America and its Problems, 292-293, 307-330.
•*' Ibid., 294-295. ** Ibid., 295.
<ee-
3i6 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
shortly afterwards a revolt, aided by American citi-
zens, was started against Zelaya's rule. Two American
captives from the revolutionary army were shot at the
order of the dictator. This act, and Nicaragua's failure
to observe the arbitration convention, caused the sus-
pension of diplomatic relations between her and the
United States. In consequence, Zelaya, realizing that
his position was hopeless, fled from the country."
Anarchy in Nicaragua followed, and the United States
again interfered, for the purpose of promoting a free
general presidential election and the establishment of a
stable government."
The Nicaraguans, however, failed to follow the plans
of the American government, and confusion and dis-
order increased to such an extent that Nicaragua finally
appealed to the United States for aid. In response, the
American government appointed Thomas C. Dawson,
who had had much diplomatic experience with the
Latin-American republics, for the purpose of aiding the
disorganized state to establish itself politically and
economically on a sounder basis. Under Dawson's
influence the political leaders pledged themselves to
agree upon a presidential candidate in 191 3." Dawson's
financial plans were similar to those which he had
recently put into execution in San Domingo ; " Nica-
ragua's debt was to be taken over by New York bankers
and her customs houses were to be put under American
protection."* This arrangement was approved by the
•' Palmer, Central America and its Problems. 296, 3,10-335.
'^ Hale, "With the Knox Mission to Central .'\merica ", in H'orld's
Work, XXIV, 184; Ilale, "Our Diniger in Central America", ibid.,
446.
^''American Rei'icu' of Reviews, XLVI, 573.
'•■'Ibid.; llale, "With the Knox Mission to Central America", in
World's Work, XXIV, 183-185.
M/Wd., 184.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 317
Nicaragua!! government, but the American Senate
refused to ratify the treaty."
The actions of the United States in San Domingo and
Panama, however, had roused general suspicion in
Latin America against American designs. In Central
America this suspicion was aggravated by constant
interference by the Washington authorities, and by the
Dawson mission. Annexation to the United States was
feared and a strong faction opposing all American
interference had developed." In order to allay these
fears, Secretary of State Knox went to Central America
in 1912, while the Dawson treaty was still before the
American Senate. The aim of the visit was to explain
that the United States wished merely to establish such
conditions of peace and security as would remove all
necessity for direct intervention." However, aside
from revealing the full extent of dislike and suspicion
felt by the Central Americans for their northern neigh-
bor, the Knox mission appears to have accomplished
but little.''
Following the Senate's refusal to ratify the Dawson
treaty,'" war broke out in Nicaragua between the par-
tisans of the United States and the foes of American
intervention. American naval forces took part in the
struggle and defended the capital against the anti-
^ Ibid.; Outhok, CI, 845-846.
" Hale, " With the Knox Mission to Central America ", in World's
Work, XXIV, 184, 190; Current Literature, LIII, 377.
" Conant, " Our Mission in Nicaragua ", in A^. Am. Rev., CXCVI, 63;
Hale, " With the Knox Mission to Central America ", in World's Work,
XXIV, 179-180.
'^ Ibid., 182, 186, 190-193; Literary Digest, XLV, 286.
" Though the treaty failed, Nicaragua voluntarily placed the administra-
tion of her customs in the hands of an American, to decided advantage,
and obtained a loan of New York bankers, so she was soon on a better
basis financially. Outlook, CVI, 21-22.
3i8 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
American party, which was led by ]\Iena, the former
secretary of war.™ During this disturbance, in
♦■'wV f September, 1912, a note of warning was issued from
^ ^ ^^Q Washington, setting forth the policy of the Taft admin-
y^O ^ istration towards Central America. Under the Wash-
^^ ""^ xington convention of 1907, the note declared, the United
\ *"/■ /t OStates had a " moral mandate " to exert its influence
K.'Vx^ for preserving peace in Central America. Its aim was
XK *^ ' to foster true constitutional government and free elec-
tions, and to this end it would support established
governments against revolutions based upon the selfish
designs of would-be despots. Force would be used, if
necessary, to maintain free communication with Ameri-
can legations, and to protect them.*^ The announcement
of the moral mandate was an exposition of what was
denounced as " dollar diplomacy " by opponents of the
Taft administration. These claimed that it was the
policy of the administration to support Central Ameri-
can leaders favorable to the United States government
or friendly to American business interests in Central
America.^ The situation formed an interesting con-
trast to that existing in Central America in 1848 andl
1849. -^t that time Great Britain was practicing " dol-
lar diplomacy ",°*
As the Panama Canal approached completion the
constant confusion in Central America gave rise to
serious questions regarding future relations between
the United States and the Central American Republics,
and in this connection the Monroe doctrine became the
"'^Current Literature. LIII, 376; Literary Digest, XLV, 286.
''^Outlook, CII, :so-i5i; Literary Digest, XLV, 505.
'* Palmer, Central America and its Problems, 304-305; N. Am. Rev.,
CXCVII, s8-6i; Current Literature, I-III, 376; Literary Digest. XLV,
505-506.
"^ See above, pp. 55 IT. Also see above, p. 313, note 40.
THE NEW CANAL TREATIES 319
subject of considerable discussion and criticism, in the
United States as well as in Europe and Latin America."
Many Americans felt that the doctrine had outlived its
usefulness, for while it no longer aided Latin America,
it caused the United States to be hated and feared by
her neighbors to the south.
Within the preceding few months, however, a decided
reaction has developed in favor of a " new Monroe
doctrine ". President Wilson is a strong exponent of
this doctrine, which carries with it a less selfish and
more helpful Latin-American policy than that which
has existed during the past decade." Coincident with
this change of attitude has developed the idea that the
rapid progress of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and the
degree of stability and culture displayed by these states,
entitle them to a voice in the management of the affairs
of the Western World. Consequently, the conviction
is growing that the United States should invite these
republics to become partners with her in supporting the
Monroe doctrine and in promoting peace and progress
in the weaker parts of Latin America. The American
acceptance of mediation offered by representatives of
the " A. B. C. republics " in the difficulty with Mexico
in the spring of 1914 was in conformity with the new
attitude of the United States towards her southern
neighbors. And this mediation not only relieved the
" Calderon, Latin America: its Rise and Progress, 298-312; Palmer,
Central America and its Problems, 284-2S7; Crichfield, Rise and Progress
of the South-American Republics, II, 632-644; Winter, Guatemala and
her People of Today, 226-227; Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine: an
Obsolete Shibboleth; Hale, " Our Danger in Central America ", in
World's Work, XXIV, 443-452; Literary Digest. XLIV, 583, 978-979,
1151-1152; XLV, 412, 1117-1118.
** Brown, "A New Era of Good Feeling", in Atlantic, CXV, 99-111;
Current Opinion, LIV, 3-5.
320 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
strained situation between the United States and Mex-
ico, but it also established a new precedent by recogniz-
ing these powers as equals of the United States ; and
it virtually admitted that " differences which gravely
menace the relations of individual American states are
matters of concern to all the American nations ",*" The
recent appointment, by the Pan-American Union, of a
commisssion to consider the problems of international
law which have risen in consequence of the great war
in Europe is another noteworthy step in the same direc-
tion." If this policy is continued, genuine Pan-Ameri-
can friendship and understanding are bound to result,
and solidarity upon questions of Western international
interest. The Central American states, with the remain-
der of Latin America, will participate in the benefits
resulting from the change.
*• Moore, " Is there a Latin America? ", in Independent, LXXXI, 91-93-
•' Nation, XCIX, 702.
CHAPTER XL
General Resume.
In the preceding chapters has been traced a century
of British-American diplomatic relations regarding the
Central American isthmus, with the purpose of showing
the changes in attitude which have taken place between
the two governments and also of determining the
causes producing these changes. This has necessitated
— in addition to a consideration of the main question —
a study of the relations of the Central American states
to each other, as well as notice of the attitude of the
British and American governments regarding other
matters whenever an influence upon the question under
consideration was evident or probable.
For more than a century and a half previous to the
formation of the American Union, Great Britain en-
croached upon Central America ; and for more than
four decades after the establishment of the United
States, the aggressions continued in a fluctuating man-
ner without rousing any feeling between the two
countries. But British suspicions of American opposi-
tion were roused by the publication of the Monroe
doctrine. Consequently, for the following twenty
years, through a desire to avoid trouble with the United
States, as well as because of a temporary waning of
governmental interest in Central America, Canning's
anti-American policy was neglected ; British encroach-
ments were slow and were initiated largely by British
agents in the region. With the rapid movement of the
22 321
322 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
United States to the southwest, however — insuring the
acquisition of CaHfornia as well as other Mexican terri-
tory — the British government became fearful that the
Americans meant to seize the isthmus, and, by monopo-
lizing the transisthmian routes, to strike a blow at
British commerce. As a result, under governmental
direction, British interest in Central America now
greatly increased. The weakness and subsequent dis-
solution of the Central American republic, produced
partly by the intrigues of the British agents, particu-
larly favored foreign interference.
When California became an American possession,
the interest of the United States in Central America
was for the first time thoroughly roused. This was
largely because the Nicaraguan isthmus was then be-
lieved to supply the most feasible route to the Pacific
coast. Attention thus being directed to Central Amer-
ica, the nation came to realize the predominance of
British influence there, and promptly showed resent-
ment at finding the eastern terminus of the San Juan
route across Nicaragua controlled by the British in the
name of the Mosquitos. Determination to eliminate
British control from Central America was influential
in producing a more aggressive version of the Monroe
doctrine by President Polk ; but plans to assert Amer-
ica's leading position on the isthmus, delayed by the
Mexican War, were as yet unrealized at the close of the
Polk administration. The discovery of gold in Cali-
fornia greatly increased American demand for a trans-
isthmian highway, as well as added to the resentment at
apparent British intention to monopolize the best route.
This situation faced the new Whig administration
and led it to take definite steps, primarily for securing
RESUME 323
a neutral transit route, but also with the aim of forcing
the British to withdraw from Central America. With
this in view, negotiations were begun early in 1849, but
under unusual difficulties. Though at the time neither
nation desired to monopolize the Nicaragua route, each
suspected the other of such a purpose. After such sus-
picions were partially removed, there remained the
serious difference of opinion concerning the British
protectorate over the Mosquitos ; but since feeling in
America was so strong as to threaten a hostile outbreak
between the two nations, it was decided to negotiate for
the guarantee of neutrality of the interoceanic transit
and to avoid discussion of the Mosquito question, on
which an agreement was little likely to be reached. The
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which violated the spirit of the
Monroe doctrine, was the result. This agreement con-
tained self-denying clauses with reference to Central
American territory, and stipulations intended to secure
the entire neutrality of the prospective Nicaragua
canal, as well as articles for extending the guarantee to
all other practicable routes across the American isth-
mus. But as Clayton had labored to secure such word-
ing as would force British withdrawal from Central
America and as Bulwer had endeavored to preserve
the IVIosquito protectorate, the language of the treaty
was vague, and augured future trouble.
Promptly after the ratification of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, the British government began negotiations for
adjusting its Central American relations in conformity
with the new treaty ; but the disorganized condition of
affairs in Central America, the unwillingness of the
British to make sufficient concessions, and the lack of
interest of the Fillmore administration in securing a
324 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
just and final settlement, all tended toward delay, and
no result was reached after two years of effort.
When Pierce became president a more aggressive
American policy was asserted, since the Democrats
were more favorable than the Whigs to a stiff tone in
foreign relations — especially as regarded England.
British action served to increase this attitude ; shortly
before the accession of Pierce, the Bay Islands, contrary
to treaty engagements, had been formed into a British
colony. A dispute over the interpretation of the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty followed. The American govern-
ment declared that the treaty required British with-
drawal from the Mosquito protectorate, the Bay
Islands, and the Belize territory between the Sibun
and the Sarstoon rivers. The British government in
reply assumed the untenable stand that the treaty was
merely prospective in its operation and did not affect
existing British possessions in Central America.
The emphatic presentation of these conflicting points
of view produced a deadlock in Central American rela-
tions lasting for more than a year. During this time
the American government displayed an active deter-
mination to stand upon its own view of the treaty, and
to force Great Britain to recede from her extreme inter-
pretation.
In the autumn of 1855 the question became compli-
cated with the recruiting dispute ; suspicion increased
on both sides, and the situation grew more serious.
The British government, however, somewhat relieved
the tension early in 1856 by a formal offer to submit
the Central American controversy to arbitration. But
the evident determination of the American government
to dismiss Crampton, and the growth of suspicion in
RESUME 325
both countries that each nation was interested to some
degree in the fihbustering movements in their relation
to the Central American dispute gave a bad turn to
affairs, so that by the last of May, 1856, the possibility
of war was freely discussed by both nations.
But the British government had no intention of pro-
voking war with the United States. It had come fully
to realize how unjustifiable was its position upon the
Central American question and was convinced by the
determined attitude of the United States that an attempt
to maintain this position would be likely to end in open
hostilities between the two nations. The British gov-
ernment knew, moreover, that it would lack the support
of the British people in a war over such a question.
Finally, Great Britain, government and people alike,
was anxious to avoid a conflict with the United States,
under any circumstances, because of the resulting dam-
age to commerce between the two countries — especially
commerce in raw cotton and cotton products. Con-
sequently, the British foreign secretary quickly re-
sponded to the firm but conciliatory tone assumed by
the American government during the height of the
crisis, and the relations of the two countries took on a
more friendly appearance.
In a spirit of good understanding negotiations were
resumed, and produced the Dallas-Clarendon treaty.
This was a compromise arrangement, providing for
British withdrawal from Mosquito Shore and the Bay
Islands ; but by it the United States acquiesced in the
Sarstoon as the southern boundary of Belize. The
treaty failed of ratification, however, largely because
an earlier treaty made between Great Britain and Hon-
326 ANGLO-AMERCIAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
duras for the transfer of the Bay Islands was rejected
by the Honduran Senate.
After the failure of the Dallas-Clarendon treaty, a
strong movement towards the abrogation of the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty by congressional action was mani-
fested in the United States. In order to avert this, and
consequent hostile relations between the two govern-
ments. Great Britain determined to settle the question
by direct negotiation with the Central American states.
The American government was notified of this plan,
and in order further to allay unfriendly feeling in the
United States, the offer of arbitration was renewed.
The aim of the mission to be sent to Central America,
the British government explained, was to carry out
the general tenor of the American interpretation of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty as reflected in the Dallas-Claren-
don arrangement. President Buchanan, however, was
not satisfied with such an adjustment; he showed httle
cordiality towards the plan, and in his message of 1857
evinced a strong inclination towards abrogation.
This attitude on the part of the American govern-
ment and the British determination not to take any
action until an answer had been received to the offer of
arbitration produced a deadlock which lasted for several
weeks.
]\Ieanwhile, the American government was officially
notified by Napier, the British minister, that Great
Britain would consent to an unconditional abrogation
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which would mean a
return to the status quo, Great Britain retaining her
former possessions, including the Bay Islands. This
communication was influential in bringing the Ameri-
can government to a decision, and it replied by reject-
RESUME 327
ing arbitration and expressing a preference for direct
settlement by a special British commissioner. There-
fore, the British government determined that Ouseley,
the British commissioner, who had lingered at Wash-
ington pending a decision on the part of the American
government, should proceed immediately to Central
America. But Ouseley's original instructions were
modified, because of the attitude of the United States,
and he was authorized only to arrange for the disposal
of the Mosquito protectorate, of which Great Britain
had for some time been anxious to free herself.
The American government, when it realized that
Great Britain would not consent to abrogation of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, in addition to abandonment of
her Central American claims and possessions, soon
assumed a more cordial manner and displayed a friendly
interest in the British plan of settlement. The inclina-
tion of Congress, however, was still strongly towards
the abrogation of the treaty, and there was danger that
if the dispute was not settled before December, 1859,
Congress, which would then meet, would attempt to set
aside the arrangement. Consequently, the British gov-
ernment, in order to expedite matters, appointed Wyke,
who had already formed a treaty with Guatemala,
defining the Belize boundaries, to take the place of
Ouseley. The latter, indeed, had conducted his mission
in an unsatisfactory manner and had accomplished
nothing towards the settlement of the Central American
question. Wyke, accordingly, made a treaty with Hon-
duras for the transfer of the Bay Islands and the
sovereignty over the Mosquitos within the limits of
Honduras to that republic ; and by treaty with Nica-
ragua he transferred to her Greytown as well as the
328 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
remainder of the Nicaraguan part of the Mosquito
Shore. The arrangements made by Wyke were de-
clared by President Buchanan, in his message of
December, i860, to be entirely satisfactory.
During the years 1856 to i860 a shifting of interests
had taken place in Great Britain and the United States ;
the former lost her territorial interest in Central Amer-
ica and, with it, her jealousy of the United States ; the
latter, on the other hand, had become convinced that
Central America must eventually be hers — a conviction
which probably would have become a fact had not the
Civil War swept aside slavery.
Shortly after the close of the war the United States
began to show a tendency — hinted at by her actions in
1856 and 1857 — to regard the terms of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty as not applying to the Panama route.
This tendency became an open declaration with the
granting of the Panama concession to de Lesseps, and
with it came the demand for an American canal con-
trolled by Americans. In order to obtain this, a strong
effort was made, from 1881 to 1883, by the United
States to secure the modification or abrogation of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This attempt was resisted by
the British government, which showed that the Ameri-
can arguments were unsound, that the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty by its eighth article had established a general
principle of neutralization for all routes on the Ameri-
can isthmus, and that this principle had been recogfnized
by the American government in subsequent treaties.
Following the vain attempt against the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, the United States still manifested a
determination to secure an American canal ; but with
the failure of de Lesseps's undertaking interest was
RESUME 329
shifted from the Panama to the Nicaragua route. This
called attention to the fact that Great Britain, in spite
of the treaty of Managua, was still interfering with the
Mosquito Indians. American jealousy was roused
because of the proximity of the Mosquito reserve to the
canal route ; and the opposition of the American goV'
ernment to the British policy was influential in pro-
ducing the incorporation of the Indians with Nicaragua
in 1894, which removed all further cause of dispute
over the Mosquitos.
In the closing years of the nineteenth century an
unusual feeling of friendliness developed between the
United States and Great Britain. The British govern-
ment, in particular, was anxious to preserve this cor-
diality. Therefore, in 1901 it consented to the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty, which superseded the Clayton-
Bulwer arrangement and made possible an American
transisthmian canal, controlled and protected by Amer-
icans. When the canal was nearing completion the
American government passed an act for regulating its
use which discriminated in favor of American coast-
wise vessels. The act was protested against by the
British government as a violation of treaty engage-
ments and was disapproved by a large proportion of
Americans. In consequence of this, the objectionable
clause was repealed, June, 1914.
The Hay-Pauncefote treaty produced a marked
change in British and American relations towards Cen-
tral America ; British interest lessened, while that of
the United States increased ; and there developed a
system of American interference in Central American
afifairs which has become objectionable to the Central
American states and has seemed little productive of
330 ANGLO-AMERICAN ISTHMIAN DIPLOMACY
good. The unsatisfactory nature of the situation, how-
ever, has come to be reahzed in the United States,
where a distinct revolution in Latin-American policy
has begun, which seems likely to terminate in more
satisfactory relations between the United States and
her southern neighbors, including Central America.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
The critical comments following the titles listed below are
based wholly upon an estimation of the value of the writings
to this present study.
GUIDES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Cannon, Henry Lewin, Reading References for English His-
tory, Boston, [c. 1910].
Channing, Edward, Albert Bushnell Hart, and Frederick Jack-
son Turner, Guide to the Study and Reading of American
History, revised and augmented edition, Boston, 1912.
Paullin, Charles O., and Frederic L. Paxson, Guide to the
Materials in Lotidon Archives for the History of the
United States since 1783, Carnegie Institution of Washing-
ton, Publication No. 90-B, Washington, 1914. A valuable
guide for the subject, but it appeared too late to be of aid
in the preparation of this work.
Phillips, P. Lee, A List of Books, Magazine Articles, and Maps
Relating to Central America, Including the Republics of
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Sal-
vador, 1800-igoo, Washington, 1902. Valuable; includes
many obscure works as well as those better known.
Van Tyne, Claude Halstead, and Waldo Gifford Leland, Guide
to the Archives of the Government of the United States
in Washington, second edition, Carnegie Institution of
Washington, Publication No. 92, Washington, 1907. Espe-
cially useful, as the arrangement of the Central American
correspondence in the State Department is unusually com-
plicated.
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.
Department of State, Washington, Bureau of Indexes and
Archives. Offers much material not printed in the Amer-
ican State Papers, the United States Documents, or the
writings of Buchanan and Webster. Especially valuable
331
332 BIBLIOGRAPHY
for instructions to and despatches from American diplo-
matic agents in Central America and England. The manu-
scripts in the Department of State for the period 1815-1860,
inclusive, were examined. For a classification of the
American diplomatic correspondence bearing on the pres-
ent study, see Van Tyne and Leland's Guide to the
Archives listed above.
Public Record Office, London. By far the most valuable source
was found in the British manuscript archives, which con-
tain a vast amount of material not printed in the British
and Foreign State Papers or in the Parliamentary Papers.
The following is a complete list of the records consulted
for the years 1815 to i860, inclusive :
Admiralty Office. — Admiralty Secretary's In-Letters, Ad-
miralty Secretary's Out-Letters. (Cited as "Ad. Sec. In-
Letters", etc.)
Colonial Office. — Honduras. (Cited as " C. O., Hond.")
Foreign Office. — America, Central America, Costa Rica,
France, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Sal-
vador, Spain. (Cited as " F. O., Am.", etc.)
Foreign Office, America was the most important series,
but many valuable letters were found in Foreign Office,
Central America, Foreign Office, Guatemala, and Colonial
Office, Honduras. The material in the other records was
meagre or of less importance. In every case throughout
the present work citations to Foreign Office material have
reference to the Foreign Office Records, which consist of
the papers, or in-letters, received by the office, with their
inclosures, and copies or drafts of letters originating there.
All Public Record Office citations in the foot-notes are to
the old classification, as the reclassification was not com-
plete when the records were examined.
PRINTED SOURCES.
Adams, John Quincy, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Com-
prising Portions of his Diary from IJQS to 1848, edited by
Charles Francis Adams, 12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874- 1877.
A little material.
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY Z2Z
American State Papers, Foreif^n Relations, 6 vols., Washing-
ton, 1833-1859. Useful for Panama Congress.
Annual Register, London, 1758. Contains texts of treaties.
British and Foreign State Papers, London, 1841. Valuable.
Buchanan, James, The IVorks of James Buchanan, Comprising
his Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence,
collected and edited by John Bassett Moore, 12 vols.,
Philadelphia, 1908-1911. Extremely important. Besides
the Buchanan correspondence found in the Department of
State, it includes copies of that in the collection of the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, as well as in some
private collections.
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West
Indies, 1675-1700, London, 1893-1910. Slightly useful.
" Canning and Cuba", in Publications of the Southern History
Association, vol. 11, no. i. Two illuminating letters from
George Canning.
" Canning to Vaughan," in Massachusetts Historical Society,
Proceedings, XLVI, 233-235. A pertinent letter from
George Canning, not found elsewhere in print.
The "Coastwise Exemption": the Nation against it. New
York, 1913. A compilation of expressions of opinion.
Congressional Globe, Washington, 1834-1873.
Congressional Record, Washington, 1873-.
Fox, Charles James, Memoirs and Correspondence of Charles
James Fox, edited by John Russell, 2 vols., Philadelphia,
1853. Contains a few letters of worth.
Hertslet, Lewis, [and others], A Complete Collection of the
Treaties between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, 22
vols., London, 1840-1901. Valuable for texts of treaties
difficult to find elsewhere.
Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manu-
scripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, vol. 2, London, 1910.
A few letters regarding the British expedition to Nica-
ragua, 1780-1781.
'/ Took the Isthmus": Ex-President Roosevelt's Confession,
Colombia's Protest, and Editorial Comment by American
Newspapers on "How the United States Acquired the
Right to Build the Panama Canal", New York, 191 1.
334 BIBLIOGRAPHY
" Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan, on the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, 1849, 1850", in American Historical Review, V,
95-102. Important; not found elsewhere in print. I
MacDonald, William, Select Charters and Other Documents
Illustrative of American History, 1606-1775, New York,
1906.
Moore, John Bassett, A Digest of International Law, 8 vols.,
Washington, 1906.
New York Historical Society, Collections, 1884, Kemhle Papers,
II, New York, 1885. Material on the British expedition
to Nicaragua, 1780- 1781.
Panama Canal Question: a Plea for Colombia, New York, 1904.
Diplomatic correspondence.
Parliamentary Debates, edited by T. C. Hansard [and others],
London, 1812-
Parliamentary Papers, London, 1801-. These papers, with the
United States Documents, are essential to any study of the
subject from printed sources alone.
Polk, James K., The Diary of James K. Polk, 1843-1849, edited
by Milo Milton Quaife, 4 vols., Chicago, 1910. Slightly
useful.
Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 8 vols., Washington,
1896- 1898.
Rush, Richard, A Residence at the Court of London, London,
1833. A small contribution.
Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London,
Philadelphia, 1845. A continuation of the preceding.
The Court of Loudon from 1819 to 1825, with Subse-
quent Occasional Productions, noiv First Published in
Europe, edited by Benjamin Rush, London, 1873. Sub-
ject matter largely similar to that of two preceding works.
United States Documents, Washington, 1817-. Under this
title are included all public documents of the American
government. They are an indispensable complement to
the Parliamentary Papers. The new classification by serial
numbers has been used in the foot-notes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 335
Webster, Daniel, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel
Webster, National Edition, i8 vols., Boston, 1903. Very
valuable ; contains copies of private correspondence as
v*^ell as of that existing in the Department of State.
Wells, William V., Walker's Expedition to Nicaragua; a His-
tory of the Central American War, New York, 1856. Con-
tains copies of useful letters, speeches, etc. See same title
below under " Contemporary Special Works and Articles."
Wharton, Francis, A Digest of International Law of the
United States, second edition, 3 vols., Washington, 1887.
Includes a few extracts from American diplomatic cor-
respondence, subsequent to i860, not printed in the United
States Documents or Moore's Digest.
CONTEMPORARY SPECIAL WORKS AND ARTICLES.
(Written before 1861.)
Alcedo, Antonio de. The Geographical and Historical Dic-
tionary of America and the West Indies, translated and
enlarged by G. A. Thompson, 5 vols., London, 1812-1815.
Useful.
Allen, Bird, " Sketch of the Eastern Coast of Central Amer-
ica ", in Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, XI,
76-89.
Appleton, Nathan, " Memoir of Hon. Abbott Lawrence ", in
Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, III, 68-82.
Baily, John, Central America; Describing each of the States
of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica, London, 1850. Almost valueless.
Bard, Samuel A. [Ephraim George Squier], Waikna; or
Adventures on the Mosquito Shore, London, 1855. Im-
portant. Squier was bitterly opposed to British encroach-
ments in Central America, but this does not appear to
have made his writings any the less authoritative.
Bonnycastle, R. H., Spanish America; or a Descriptive, Histor-
ical and Geographical Account of the Dominion of Spain
iti the Western Hemisphere, 2 vols., London, 1818. Largely
descriptive, but contains a little material.
336 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burney, James, History of the Buccaneers of America, re-
printed from the edition of 1816, London, 1891. Valuable,
though prejudiced in favor of the British.
Byam, George, Wild Life in the Interior of Central America,
London, 1849. Useless.
Churchill, Awnsham, and John, A Collection of Voyages and
Travels, Some Noiv First Printed from Original Manu-
scripts, Others Now First Published in English, 8 vols.,
London, 1752. Volume six contains an account of " The
Mosqueto Indian and his Golden River ; Being a familiar
Description of the Mosqueto Kingdom in America . . .
Written [in or about the Year 1699.] by M. W. ". An im-
portant source, written by one who had spent some time on
the Mosquito Shore.
Crowe, Frederick, The Gospel in Central America, Containing
a Sketch of the Country, London, 1850. Crowe was a
British missionary at Belize. Authorities generally cited.
Reliable and very important.
Dampier, William, Voyages, 3 vols., London, 1703-1705. A
valuable source.
Dunlop, Robert Glasgow, Travels in Central America, London,
1847. Contains a clear and fairly accurate account of
Central American history from 1821 to 1846.
Edwards, Bryan, The History, Civil and Commercial, of the
British West Indies, unth a Continuation to the Present
Time, fifth edition, 5 vols., London, 1818-1819. Important.
Esquemeling, John, The Buccaneers of America, a reprint
from an early translation, London, 191 1. Esquemeling
was a buccaneer. Of slight value.
Fancourt, Charles St. John, The History of Yucatan from its
Discovery to the Close of the Seventeenth Century,
London, 1854. This volume was meant by the author, who
was superintendent of Belize, as an introduction to a
history of Belize, which seems never to have been written.
The introductory volume covers a too early period to be
of much use.
Froebel, Julius, Seven Years' Travel in Central Ameriai.
Northern Mexico, and the Far West of the United States,
London, 1859. Somewhat helpful.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 337
Galindo, Juan, "Notice of the Caribs in Central America",
in Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, III, 290-91.
" On Central America ", in Journal of the Royal Geo-
graphical Society, VI, 119-136.
Henderson, George, An Account of the British Settlement of
Honduras, London, 181 1. Good. Henderson was superin-
tendent of Belize.
Johnson, Charles, A General History of the Pyrates, 2 vols.,
fourth edition, London, 1726. An account by a pirate.
Juarros, Domingo, A Statistical and Commercial History of
the Kingdom of Guatemala, translated by J. Baily, London,
1825. Some material ; used by later writers.
L. L., " Note sur la colonie anglaise de Balise, et ses rapports
sur le Yucatan mexicain ", in Nouvelles Annales des
Voyages et des Sciences Geographiques, C. 51-67.
Long, Edward, The History of Jamaica; or General Survey
of the Antient and Modern State of that Island, 3 vols.,
London, 1774. Valuable.
Michell, R. C, " A Statistical Account and Description of the
Island of Ruatan", in United Service Magazine and Naval
and Military Journal, 1850, pt. 2, pp. 541-546.
Scherzer, Carl, Travels in the Free States of Central America;
Nicaragua, Honduras, and San Salvador, 2 vols., London,
1857. Of slight use.
Sloane, Hans, A Voyage to the Islands Madera, Barbados,
Nieves, S. Christophers and Jamaica, unth the Natural
History of the Herbs and Trees, Four-footed Beasts,
Fishes, Birds, Insects, Reptiles, etc., of the Last of those
Islands, etc., 2 vols., London, 1707-1725. Useful.
Squier, E. G., Nicaragua, its People, Scenery, Monuments, and
the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, 2 vols.. New York, 1852.
Good account of British encroachments.
Notes on Central America; Particularly the States of
Honduras and San Salvador, New York, 1855. Good ;
supplements the author's Nicaragua.
Travels in Central America, 2 vols.. New York, 1853.
Valuable ; subject matter similar to that in two preceding
works.
23
338 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Stephens, John L., Incidents of Travel in Central America,
Chiapas, and Yucatan, 2 vols., New York, 1841. Slightly
useful.
Stout, Peter F., Nicaragua; Past, Present and Future, Phila-
delphia, 1859. Contains considerable material, fairly ac-
curate, but shows bias against England. Stout was Amer-
ican vice-consul in Central America.
Strangeways, Thomas, Sketch of the Mosquito Shore, Edin-
burgh, 1822. Good.
Roberts, Orlando W., Narrative of Voyages and Excursions
on the East Coast and in the Interior of Central America,
Edinburgh, 1827. Much useful material ; written by a
resident British trader.
Wafer, Lionel, A New Voyage and Description of the Isthmus
of America, reprinted from the original edition of 1699,
edited by George Parker Winship, Cleveland, 1903. Of
little worth.
Walker, William, The War in Nicaragua, Mobile, i860. An
account from Walker's point of view of his career in
Nicaragua previous to May, 1857.
Wells, William V., Explorations and Adventures in Honduras,
New York, 1857. Helpful.
Walker's Expedition to Nicaragua; a History of the
Central American War, New York, 1856. Considerable
material, but poorly organized. Wells was a strong sup-
porter of Walker. See same title above under "Printed
Documentary Sources."
CONTEMPORARY REVIEWS AND NEWSPAPERS.
Blackivood's Magazine, vols. 79, 80, 81.
Boston Post, July 31, 1854.
Boston Transcript, July 28, 29, Aug. 3, 1854.
Daily Alta California, Dec. 5, 16, 1855, Jan. 22. 1859.
De Bow's Review, vol. 27.
Dublin Review, vol. 40.
Harper's Magazine, vols. 10, 12.
Littell's Living /Ige, vol. 14.
London Daily News, Jan. 31, 1853, April 2, 1854.
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY 339
London Daily Times, Nov. i, 1849, June 13, 1850, Jan. 19, 1856.
Dec. 20, 1858.
London Economist, vol. 14.
London Globe, Mar. 3, 1853.
London Morning Post, Dec. 5, 1854, Dec. 22,, 1857.
New York Times, July 26, 31, Aug. i, 2, 1854, Jan. 3, 19, Feb. I,
23, Mar. 6, July 15, 1856.
New York Tribune, Aug. 2, 3, 5, 16, 1854.
Niles' Register, vol. 61.
San Francisco Evening Bulletin, July 18, Aug. i, 1856.
United States Magazine and Democratic Review, vols. 17, 21,
25-
GENERAL HISTORIES AND BIOGRAPHIES.
Babcock, Kendric Charles, The Rise of American Nationality,
1811-1819, New York, 1906.
Bancroft, Hubert Howe, History of Central America, 3 vols,
San Francisco, 1886-1887. Useful for study of early period.
Bourne, Edward Gaylord, Spain in America, 1 450-1 580, New
York, 1904.
Crichfield, George W., The Rise and Progress of the South
American Republics, 2 vols., London, 1909. Of little use.
Curtis, George Ticknor, Life of Daniel, Webster, 2 vols., New
York, 1889.
Life of James Buchanan, 2 vols., New York, 1883.
Dewey, Davis Rich, National Problems, 1885-1897, New York,
1907. Some material.
Fortier, Alcee, and John Rose Ficklen, Central America and
Mexico, Philadelphia, [c. 1907]. Good brief account of
Central American history.
Foster, John W., A Century of American Diplomacy, Boston,
1900.
Garcia Calderon, F., Latin America: its Rise and Progress,
translated by Bernard Maill, New York, 1913. Latin-
x\merican viewpoint.
Garrison, George Pierce, Westward Extension, 1841-1850, New
York, 1906. Helpful for background.
Hart, Albert Bushnell, The Foundations of American Foreign
Policy, New York, 1901.
340 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Helps, Arthur, The Spanish Conquest in America and its
Relation to the History of Slavery and to the Government
of Colonies, 3 vols., London, 1855-1857. Some material.
Henderson, John B., American Diplomatic Questions, New
York, 1901. General account.
Hoist, Hermann Edouard von, The Constitutional and Political
History of the United States, 8 vols., Chicago, 1881-1892.
Keane, A. H., Central and South America, 2 vols., edited by
Clements Markham, London, vol. i, revised 1909; vol. 2,
first edition, 1901.
Latane, John Halladay, America as a World Power, New
York, 1907. Useful.
Lucas, C. P., A Historical Geography of the British Colonies,
6 vols., Oxford, 1888-1907. Helpful for early period.
McMaster, John Bach, A History of the People of the United
States from the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 vols., New
York, 1907-1913.
Rhodes, James Ford, History of the United States from the
Compromise of 1850, 7 vols., New York, 1900-1906.
Schouler, James, History of the United States of America
under the Constitution, 7 vols.. New York, [c. 1894-1913].
Smith, Edward, England and America after Independence: a
Short Examination of their International Intercourse,
1783-1872, Westminster, 1900. Strongly prejudiced against
America.
Smith, Theodore Clark, Parties and Slavery, 1850-1859, New
York, 1906. Good.
Snow, Freeman, Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy,
Boston, 1894. Good perspective.
Sparks, Edwin Earle, National Development, 1877-1885, New
York, 1907.
Trendell, A. H. R., Her Majesty's Colonies, London, 1886. Of
little use.
Turner, Frederick Jackson, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829,
New York, 1906. Contribution to the background of
the study.
Winsor, Justin, editor. Narrative and Critical History of
America, 8 vols., Boston, 1884-1889.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 341
Woodward, William Harrison, A Short History of the Expan-
sion of the British Empire, 1500-1902, Cambridge, 1907.
Slightly useful.
Woolsey, Theodore Salisbury, American Foreign Policy, New
York, 1898.
RECENT SPECIAL WORKS.
(Written since i860.)
Adams, Ephraim Douglass, British Interests and Activities in
Texas, 1838-1846, Baltimore, 1910. Valuable for back-
ground. Based principally on documents in the Public
Record Office.
Anderson, C. L. G., Old Panama and Castilla del Oro, Wash-
ington, 191 1. Contains brief general account of the
filibusters.
Arias, Harmodio, The Panama Canal: a Study in International
Law and Diplomacy, London, 191 1. Good general account
of the American canal policy.
Barral-Montferrat, H. D. de, De Monroe a Roosevelt, 1823-
1905, Paris, 1905. Unreliable.
Beaumarchais, Maurice D. de. La doctrine de Monroe;
revolution de la politique des £tats-Unis au XIX' siecle,
deuxieme edition, Paris, 1898. Of slight value.
Bingham, Hiram, The Monroe Doctrine: an Obsolete Shib-
boleth, New Haven, 1913.
Bryce, James, South America: Observations and Impressions,
New York, 1912. Good for general background of study.
Butte, George G., Great Britain and the Panama Canal: a
Study of the Tolls Question, 1913. A defense of exemption
in favor of American vessels.
Colquhoun, Archibald Ross, The Key of the Pacific, the Nica-
ragua Canal, New York, 1898. An uncritical but fair
treatment.
Coolidge, Archibald Cary, The United States as a World
Power, New York, 1908. General view; good prospective.
Dunning, John C, Die Neuesten Anwendungen der Monroe
Doktrin, Borna-Leipzig, 1908.
Edgington, T. B., The Monroe Doctrine, Boston, 1905. A
mediocre work.
342 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Edwards, Albert, Panama: the Canal, the Country, and the
People, New York, 1912. A popular account.
Egerton, Hugh Edward, A Short History of the British
Colonial Policy, London, 1897.
Fiske, Amos Kidder, The West Indies, New York, 1906.
Froude, James Anthony, The English in the West Indies,
London, 1888. Slightly useful.
Gibbs, Archibald Robertson, British Honduras: an Historical
and Descriptive Account of the Colony from its Settle-
ment, 1670, London, 1883. The best history of British
Honduras.
Haring, C. H., The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the
XVI I th Century, London, [1910]. A careful, critical work.
Johnson, Willis Fletcher, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal,
New York, 1906. Contains considerable information on
the Panama question, but is biased in favor of the Amer-
ican government.
Keasbey, Lindley Miller, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe
Doctrine, New York, 1896. Sound as to simple facts ; but
conclusions colored by an anti-British feeling, and a
prejudice in favor of a Nicaragua as against a Panama
canal.
Latane, John Halladay, The Diplomatic Relations of the United
States and Spanish America, Baltimore, 1899. Good gen-
eral account.
Lawrence, T. J., Essays on Some Disputed Questions in
Modern International Law, second edition, Cambridge,
1885. Good general discussion by an Englishman, with
emphasis upon the American attack on the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, 1880-1883.
Lindsay, Forbes, Panama and the Canal Today, new revised
edition, Boston, 1912. Fair general account.
Lucas, Daniel B., Nicaragua: War of the Filibusters, Rich-
mond, 1896. A popular account based largely upon
Walker's War in Nicaragua.
Mahan, A. T., The Interest of America in Sea Pou'er, Present
and Future, Boston, 1898.
Martin, Percy F., Salvador of the Twentieth Century, New
York, 191 1.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 343
Moses, Bernard, The Establishment of Spanish Rule in Amer-
ica, New York, 1898. Slightly useful.
Nicaise, Auguste, Les flibustiers americains: Walker et I'Ame-
rique Centrale, Paris, 1861. Fair brief account.
Oppenheim, L., The Panama Canal Conflict between Great
Britain and the United States of America: a Study, Cam-
bridge, 1913. A British view.
Palmer, Frederick, Central America and its Problems, New
York, 1910. A clear, unbiased view of the present situation
in Central America.
Paxson, Frederic L., The Independence of the South American
Republics: a Study in Recognition and Foreign Policy,
Philadelphia, 1903.
Reddaway, W. F., The Monroe Doctrine, second edition. New
York, 1905. Good.
Reeves, Jesse S., American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk,
Baltimore, 1907.
Roche, James Jeffrey, By-ways of War; the Story of the
Filibusters, Boston, 1901. A popular account.
Rodway, James, The West Indies and the Spanish Main,
London, 1896. A popular history of the buccaneer period.
Siegfried, A., [and others], Les questions actuelles de politique
etrangere dans I'Amerique du Nord, Paris, 191 1. Of little
use.
Smith, Justin Harvey, The Annexation of Texas, New York,
191 1. Useful for background. Based chiefly upon manu-
script records.
Squier, E. G., Honduras; Descriptive, Historical and Statistical,
London, 1870. Ground covered very similar to the author's
Notes on Central America.
Travis, Ira D., British Rule in Central America: or a Sketch
of Mosquito History, Publication No. 5, Michigan Political
Science Association, July, 1895. Good.
The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Publica-
tion No. 8, vol. 3, Michigan Political Science Association,
Jan., 1900. Carefully prepared and reliable as to facts,
but conclusions at times unsound. The best work on the
subject.
Tucker, George F., The Monroe Doctrine: a Concise History
of its Origin and Growth, Boston, 1885.
i
344 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Walker, J. W. G., Ocean to Ocean: an Account, Personal and
Historical, of Nicaragua and its People, Chicago, 1902.
General account of the Central American question.
Perspective good, but some inaccuracies.
Winter, Nevin O., Guatemala and her People of Today,
Boston, 1909.
RECENT ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS AND
NEWSPAPERS.
(Signed Articles.)
Bell, Charles N., " Remarks on the Mosquito Territory, its
Climate, People, Productions, etc.", in Journal of the
Royal Geographical Society, XXXII, 242-268.
Bingham, Hiram, " The Monroe Doctrine : an Obsolete Shib-
boleth ", in Atlantic Monthly, CII, 721-734.
Brown, L. Ames, "A New Era of Good Feeling", in Atlantic
Monthly, CXV, 99-1 11.
Conant, Charles A., " Our Mission in Nicaragua ", in North
American Review, CXCVI, 63-72. Useful for recent
period.
Grahame, Leopold, " The Canal Diplomacy : a British View ",
in North American Review, CXCVII, 30-40.
Hale, William Bayard, " Our Danger in Central America ", in
World's Work, XXIV, 443-452. Valuable.
" With the Knox Mission to Central America ", in
World's Work, XXIV, 179-194, Z22-2,^7- Valuable.
Keasbey, Lindley M., " The National Canal Policy ", in Amer-
ican Historical Association, Annual Report, 1902, I, 275-
288.
" Terms and Tenor of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ", in
Annals of the American Academy, Nov., 1899.
Keely, Robert N., Jr., " Nicaragua and the Mosquito Coast ",
in Popular Science Monthly, XLV, 160-175. A good de-
scription.
Latane, John H., " Neutralization Features of the Hay-
Paimcefote Treaty ", in American Historical Association,
Annual Report, 1902, I, 289-303. A valuable discussion.
Moore, John Bassett, "Is there a Latin America?" in Inde-
pendent, LXXXI, 91-93. Good.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 345
Paxson. Frederic Logan, " Enj^land and Mexico, 1824-1825 ",
in Colorado University Studies, III, 11 5- 119. Contribution
towards the background of the study.
Rives, George L., " Mexican Diplomacy on the Eve of War
with the United States ", in American Historical Review,
XVIII, 275-295. Useful.
Root, Elihu, " The Obligations of the United States as to
Panama Canal Tolls ", in World Peace Foundation Pam-
phlet Series, III, no. 3. Speech delivered in the Senate
against exemption of American vessels, January 13, 1913.
Scroggs, William Oscar, " William Walker and the Steam-
ship Corporation in Nicaragua", in American Historical
Review, X, 792-812. Valuable.
Showalter, William Joseph, " The Countries of the Carib-
bean", in National Geographic Magaaine, XXIV, 227-249.
Describes present conditions.
Temperley, H. W. V., " The Later American Policy of George
Canning", in American Historical Review, XI, 779-798.
Valuable for understanding of early period.
Woolsejs Theodore S., " Suez and Panama — a Parallel ", in
American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1902, I,
307-312. A helpful comparison.
(Unsigned Articles.)
American Review of Reviews, vols. 46, 47.
Century Magazine, vol. 85.
Current Literature, vol. 53.
Current Opinion, vols. 54, 56.
Harper's Weekly, vol. 60.
Independent, vols. 74, 77.
Literary Digest, vols. 44, 45, 46.
London Daily Nezvs, Nov. 18, Dec. 17, 1901.
London Daily Times, Nov. 19, Dec. 18, 1901.
Nation, vols. 96, 97, 98, 99.
North American Revieiv, vol. 97.
Outlook, vols. 91, 92, 93, 96.
24
INDEX
"A. B. C. republics", 319-320.
Aberdeen, Earl of (George Gor-
don), Central American policy,
36, 68; attitude toward California
question, 46; resignation of, 196-
197-
Accessory Transit Company, and
Greytown dispute, 171-174, 177,
178, 183; and Kinney expedition,
190; and Walker expeditions,
194. See also American Atlantic
and Pacific Ship-Canal Company.
Adams, Charles Francis, and desire
of U. S. for Tigre Island, 270-
271.
Alarm, British war vessel, 50.
Alaskan boundary, settlement of,
302.
American Atlantic and Pacific Ship-
Canal Company, 60, 62, 144, 158
contract secured from Nicaragua
75, 81; difficulty concerning ves
sel of, 1 19-123; new charter for
171 n. See also Accessory Tran-
sit Company.
American Union, 212.
Amiens, peace of, 8.
Anson, expedition of, 16.
Argentina, relations with U. S.,
319-320.
Arthur, Pres. Chester A., canal
policy of, 28.
Austria, Emperor of, arbitration of,
289, 290, 291, 292.
Baker, Lewis, and Bluefields affair,
294, 295 ; and the Mosquito-Nic-
aragua dispute, 298-299.
Bancroft, George, mission at Lon-
don, 67-79, 81, 84.
Barclay, British consul at New
York, 59.
Barrow, Col., in Belize, 7.
Bay Islands, settlement of, 9-12;
British claim to, 102, 103, 104;
erection of British colony of,
139; negotiations concerning,
139-167, 197, 216, 219-221, 225-
230, 232, 236, 237, 239, 244, 246-
248, 251, 252, 259, 261, 264, 267,
324, 325, 327; protest against
British acquisition of, 273. See
also Bonacca; Ruatan.
Bayard, Thomas F., and the Nic-
aragua-Mosquito dispute, 289-
290; minister to England, and
Bluefields affair, 294, 295, 296;
letter from, 296.
Baymen, 6, 7, 9.
Belize, settlement of, 2-9; British
settlement at, 31-32, 35, 36;
duties upon goods from, 35, 36;
Mosquito chiefs crowned at, 39;
claim to, 102-103, 104, 142, 143,
145-146, 150-153. 157, 160, 162,
163, 164, 166, 284; boundary dis-
pute, 188, 216, 220, 224-225, 227,
232, 236, 239, 248, 249, 251, 257,
259, 260, 327; trade, 258; en-
croachments of British from, 272.
See also British Honduras.
Belly, Felix, mission for French
Company, 254, 255.
Bermuda, British schooner, 179.
Bingham, British consul, 293.
Black River, fort at, 16, 18, 21, 23.
Blaine, James G., canal policy, 276,
277, 278, 280-281, 286, 288.
Bluefields, British settlement at, 14,
19; post office established at, 290;
siege of, 293-294, 295, 297.
Boer War, 300.
Bonacca, claim to, 37, 100, 163; in
colony of Bay Islands, 139.
347
348
INDEX
Borland, Solon, in Central Amer-
ica, 168-170, 174, 175, 183, 184;
wounded at Greytown, 174-175,
178.
Braida, American consul, 294.
Brazil, relations with U. S., 319-
320.
British Honduras established, 35;
boundaries, 239, 252; negotia-
tions concerning, 283-284. See
also Belize ; Honduras.
Bryce, James, protest against canal
bill, 312.
Buccaneering, 2-3, 9-10, 14.
Buchanan, Tames, opinion concern-
ing Costa Rican offer, 71; ne-
gotiations concerning Central
America, 149-160, 163, 164, 165,
166, 167, 196-204, 207-208; and
Greytown difficulty, 181, 182-184;
and Dallas-Clarendon treaty, 227-
228; and Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
231, 233, 235-237, 245, 247, 251,
253, 260; messages concerning
Central America, 240-241, 263-
264, 266, 281.
Bulwer, Sir Henry, mission of, 89-
109, 112-114, 116, 117, 118; letter
to Palmerston, 110; return of,
119.
California, acquisition of, 46, 322;
discovery of gold in, 58, 322; im-
migration to, 129.
Canadian fisheries and reciprocity,
149-150.
Canal projects, 53, 57, 58-59, 60,
91, 165, 273-288, 300, 301-314,
322-323. See also Colombia;
Costa Rica; Nicaragua; Panama;
Suez Canal; Transit routes.
Canning, George, and the Holy Al-
liance, 27; and the Monroe
Doctrine, 27-28; Central Amer-
ican policy of, 321.
Carcache, Nicaraguan agent, mis-
sion of, 90-91.
Caribs, transportation of, 11-12; in-
tercourse with Mosquitos, 13.
Cass, Lewis, resolution offered con-
cerning Bay Islands colony, 142,
146; Central American negotia-
tions, 228-229, 230, 231, 234, 242,
244-249, 251-253, 259, 260, 262,
266.
Cass-Yrissari treaty, 243, 254, 355.
Castellon, Francisco, Nicaraguan
charge at London, 51-52; note
concerning American Union, 72;
and Central American dispute,
67-68, 73, 74, 75, 81; Nicaraguan
secretary of foreign affairs, 135.
Central America, British in, before
1815, 1-25; and the Monroe
Doctrine, 28-30; interest of U.
S. in, to 1850, 29-66; Great Bri-
tain in, to 1850, 28-66, 68-109;
further relations with Great Bri-
tain and U. S., passim. See also
names of particular countries ana
places.
Central American Agricultural and
Mining .Association, 187, 190. .
Ceylon, Dutch possessions in, 8.
Chatfield, Frederick, British consul
in Central America, 33, 34, 38,
40-42, 47, 48, 55-56, 59, 61-66,
93, 115, 116; relations with
Honduras, 109; removal of, 116.
Chile, relations with U. S., 319-
320.
Churchill, captain of the Prome-
theus, 120.
Civil War, U. S., 269, 270.
Clarence, Mosquito chief, 297.
Clarendon, Earl of (George V'il-
liers), and Central American
negotiations, 148-149, 153-161,
163-166, 197-199, 201, 202, 204-
205, 207-208, 215, 216, 224-229,
231, 234, 237, 238, 241, 244; and
Greytown dispute, 173, 180-182.
186; statement concerning Clay-
ton-BuKver treaty, 177; and fili-
bustering in Central .America,
187, 188, 189, 191, 19,5: and
desire of U. S. for Tigre Island.
271. See also Dallas-Clarendon
treaty; Herran-Clarendon treaty.
INDEX
349
ft
Clarke, Beverly, U. S. minister at
Guatemala, 263.
Clayton, John M., letters of, 59-60;
disavowal demanded by, 66;
negotiations of, 68-109; criticism
of, 143; elected U. S. senator,
143. See also Clayton-Bulwer
treaty.
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, discussed,
1-2, 67-109, 323, 324; re-adjust-
ment under, 1 10-138; reference
to Bay Islands, 197, 199; opera-
tion of, 206, 211, 212, 216, 220,
224; threatened abrogation of,
231-254, 260, 264, 326-327; inter-
pretation of, 239, 240, 243, 266,
267; development of American
opposition to, 270-288.
Cleopatra, British vessel, 293, 294.
Cleveland, Pres. Grover, canal
policy, 286-287.
Cobden, Richard, request for Cen-
tral American correspondence,
205-206.
Cockburn, British superintendent
at Belize, 34.
Colombia, alliance with Guatemala,
31; canal negotiations, 2-3-274,
276, 278, 279, 286, 310-311. See
also New Granada.
Comayagua, Bishop of, 10.
Congress, U. S., Bay Islands dis-
pute in Senate, 142-146; and
Central American question, 203,
204, 209; and Dallas-Clarendon
treaty, 227-228, 229; and Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, 231, 232, 247,
250, 264, 327; and canal projects,
275, 276, 287, 302, 304-307, 309,
3 1 1-3 1 2, 313; and Dawson treaty,
317.
Costa Rica, Serviles in power, 56;
boundary dispute with Nicara-
gua, 56, 71, 73, 112-114, 124, 133,
227, 254-255; relations with Great
Britain, 62, 70-72, 96, 97, 168,
211, 213, 249; relations with U.
S., 70-72; boundary dispute with
New Granada, 71; treaty negotia-
tions concerning, 83, 84, 226.
227; boundary dispvite with Mos-
quito Shore, 111-112, 113; op-
position to Walker, 211; canal
projects, 302.
Coxe, S., letter to, 220.
Crampton, John F. T., instructions
to, 55, 171; arrival in U. S., 118;
and the Prometheus affair, 122;
negotiations of, 125-127, 130-13 1,
i34i 136, 146-149, 206, 208, 210;
and Greytown difficulties, 180-
182, 185-186; and filibustering
movements in Central America,
189, 190, 191, 193, 194; demand
for recall of, 205, 210, 213, 214,
216, 217.
Crimean War, 196; attempt to
recruit in U. S. for, 199-200, 209,
213, 219; close of, 218.
Cuba, proposal concerning, 144.
Cyane, sloop-of-war, 172, 173, 175,
178, 179, 183.
Dallas, George M., Central Ameri-
can negotiations, 212, 213, 215-
218, 224-226, 228. See also Dal-
las-Clarendon treaty.
Dallas-Clarendon treaty, 227, 228,
239, 240, 245, 267, 325.
Balling, Gov. Sir John, undertaking
in Mosquito Shore country, 20.
Darien, canal project, 274.
Dawson. Thomas C, mission in
Nicaragua, 316-317.
Democratic Review, cited, 142.
Derby, Lord, speech on Central
American question, 204.
Dimitry, Alexander, American min-
ister to Nicaragua and Costa
Rica, mission of, 262-263.
Dix, John A., speech of, 55.
" Dollar diplomacy", 318.
Douglas, Stephen A., opposition to
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 98, 231.
England. See Great Britain.
Eurydice, British vessel, 212.
350
INDEX
Evarts, William M., protest against
British acquisition of Bay
Islands, 273.
Everett, Edward, negotiations of,
148.
Express, British brig-of-war, and
the Prometheus, 120-123.
Fabens, U. S. consul at Greytown,
174-178, 183, 193-
Fead, captain of the Express, 120,
121, 122, 123, 126.
Filibustering, in Central Amer-
ica, 186, 189, 190-191, 192-195,
210, 255.
Fillmore, Pres. Millard, Central
American policy of, 131-132, 134,
136, 152.
Fish, Hamilton, protest against
British encroachment, 272-273.
Florida, Jackson's proceedings in,
26.
Fonseca, Bay of, British design on
islands in, 63, 64.
Forsyth, John, and Guatemalan
boundary question, 34.
Fox, Charles, and Central Ameri-
can policy, 22.
France, negotiations with Nicara-
gua, 255-256.
Frelinghuysen, Frederick T., canal
negotiations, 280, 281, 284, 286,
288.
French Company, canal projects,
276, 310.
Galindo, Co!., Guatemalan agent,
34, 45 n.
Goethals, Maj. G. W., head of
Canal Commission, 311.
Gracias a Dios, British settlement
at, 14, 19, 21; Nicaraguan com-
mandant carried to, 41.
Grand Cayman Islands, slaves
from, 38.
Granville, Lord, and the Prome-
theus affair, 121-123; instructions
from, 125, 126-128; canal negotia-
tions, 277, 278, 279-280, 282-284.
Great Britain, in Central America
before 1815, 1-25; relations with
Spain in Central America, 2-25;
relations with Mosquitos, 14-18,
20, 23-24, 39-41. 77, 78, 81, 84, 85,
88, 92, 96, 102, 109, iio-iii, 151,
155, 288, 291, 292, 323; attitude
of cabinet toward Central Amer-
ican settlements, 21-22; relations
with U. S. after War of 1812, 26-
27; in Central America, to 1850,
28-66, 68-109; relations with
Mexico, 31-32, 44; relations with
Guatemala, 33-34. 248, 257-358;
relations with Nicaragua, 41-42,
49-52. 56, 61, 67-68, 72-77, 81-
86, 88, 107, 117-119, 188, 248,
249, 255-257, 264, 265, 283; atti-
tude toward Texas question, 45-
46, 52; and California question,
53; relations with Honduras, 56,
62, 64, 95, 109 n., 225-226, 229,
248, 252, 264-265, 283; relations
with Salvador, 56, 168; claim to
Mosquito Shore, 59, 69-70, 73-74.
75-78, 85-86, 87-88, 96-97, 102,
107, 108-109; relations with Costa
Rica, 62, 70-72, 96, 97, 211, 213,
249.
Green, British consul, and the
Prometheus aifia.\r, 120, 122, 123;
and Greytown situation, 130.
Gresham, Walter Q., and Bluefields
affair, 294, 295, 296.
Grey, Sir Edward, and U. S. canal
projects, 288.
Greytown, name changed to, 5';
dispute concerning, 67-68, 86, 87,
130-133, 135. 136; dispute with
transit company, 171-174; nego-
tiations concerning, 117, 118,
146, 147, 227; difficulties at, 119-
123, 125-129, 171-186; shooting
of negro citizen of, 174; bom-
bardment of, 179-186, 221; plan
to seize, 190; declared a free
port, 265; transfer of, 327. See
also San Juan.
INDEX
351
Guanacaste, negotiations concern-
ing, 131.
Guanacca. See Bonacca.
Guatemela, British in, 10-11, 31,
168, 272; alliance with Colombia,
31; cession bj', 33-34; relations
with Great Britain, 33-34, 248,
257-258; Serviles in power, 56;
treaty negotiations concerning,
83-84; Belize declared part of,
145; right to territory in, 166,
167; war with Honduras, 170;
negotiations concerning Belize,
188, 239; trade, 258.
Harrison, Pres. Benjamin, canal
policy, 287.
Hawaii, acquisition of, 301.
Hay, John, negotiations with
Pauncefote, 302-309. See also
Hay-Pauncefote treaty.
Hay- Pauncefote treaty, 312-314,
329-
Hayes, Pres. Rutherford B., canal
policy, 275.
Hempstead, Christopher, U. S.
consul at Belize, 95.
Henderson, Capt., in Ruatan, 12.
Herran, Pedro A., agent from Hon-
duras, mission of, 225, 227, 228,
229. See also Herran-Clarendon
treaty.
Herran-Clarendon treaty, 225, 227,
228, 230.
Hise, Elijah, charge in Guatemala,
54. 55, 56-57, 67, 81; recall of,
60. See also Hise treaty.
Hise treaty, 84, 89.
Hodgson, Capt. Robert, operations
on Mosquito Shore, 16-18.
Hodgson Robert (son), superinten-
dent, 19.
Hollins, Capt. George N., at Grey-
town, 172-173, 175-185, 221.
Holy Alliance, Canning's position
towards designs of, 27.
Honduras, and the British in
Ruatan, 38-39; claim to Mosquito
Shore, 48; relations with Great
Britain, 56, 62, 64, 95, 109 n..
225-226, 229, 248, 252, 264-265,
283; relations with U. S., 65, 168-
169, 283; Tigre restored to, 66;
and the American Union, 72;
negotiations concerning, S3, 105-
106; proposed federation with
Nicaragua and Salvador, 124;
and Bay Islands, 140, 144, 226,
228, 229, 230, 239, 252; war with
Guatemala, 170; transfer of Mos-
quito frontier to, 261, 265; war
with Nicaragua, 293. See also
Belize; British Honduras.
Honduras, Bay of, English settle-
ments on, 5, 18, 19.
Honduras, British. See British
Honduras.
Hornby, Adm. Sir Phipps, and the
Tigre incident, 66.
Howe, Capt., provisional govern-
ment formed by, 294.
Irisarri. See Yrisarri.
Jackson, Andrew, proceedings in
Florida, 26.
Jamaica, adventurers from, 14; at-
tack incited by English of, 17;
instructions to governor of, 39,
lOI.
Jeremy, chief of Mosquitos, 15.
Johnson, Reverdy, and the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, 104, 108.
Joint High Commission, 302.
Jolly, Lieut., at Greytown, 179,
182.
Kansas-Nebraska question, 196,
199, 244.
Kerr, John B., appointment of,
116; mission of, 124, 134, 135,
136.
Kimberley, Earl of (John Wode-
house), and Bluefields affair,
294-295, 296.
King, William R., and the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, 98, 99, 100, 103,
104, 105.
352
INDEX
Kinney, Col. H. L., colonization
plan of, 187, 190-193, 221; in-
dictment of, 193.
Knowles, Gov. Sir Charles, attitude
toward Mosquito Shore settle-
ment, 17-18.
Lacayo, Gen., Nicaraguan commis-
sioner, 293, 294.
Lansdowne, Marquis of, and canal
negotiations, 305-306, 307.
Lawrence, Abbott, and Central
American disputes, 66, 76, 79,
83-90 ; and the Prometheus affair,
121-123.
Leeward Islands, Caribs from, 11-
12.
Lesseps, Ferdinand de, canal con-
cession secured by, 274, 286, 287,
328.
Liberals, in Central America, 33.
Loch, Capt., treaty made by, 50.
Logan, Cornelius A., protest to,
regarding Bay Islands, 273.
Logwood, cutting of, 3-5, 6.
London Examiner, cited, 215.
London Globe, cited, 185 n.
London News, cited, 185 n., 204.
London Press, cited, 215.
London Telegraph, 215.
London Times, cited, 80, 81, 92,
180, 200, 201, 204, 214, 215, 225.
Lyons, Lord (Richard), negotia-
tions of, 259, 260, 262, 263, 266.
Macdonald, British superintendent
of Belize, 36, 38, 39; mission to
IMosquito Shore, 41-44.
McGregor, John, report on Mos-
quito Shore by, 47-4S.
McKinley, Pres. William, canal
policy of, 301.
McLeLachein, grant to, 40 n.
Mahogany, trade, 3, 6.
Malmesbury, Lord, and Central
American question, 244, 248, 249,
250, 251, 252, 254, 256, 257.
Managua, treaty of, 288, 289, 290,
291, 294, 295.
Manchester, Duke of, inslruction
to, 22.
Mann, U. S. agent in Guatemala,
29 n.
Marblehead, American vessel, 297.
Marcoleta, Jose de, Nicaraguan
charge, 67, 74, 75; Nicaraguan
minister, mission of, 117-119, 124,
133; and the Kinney expedition,
190, 191, 192, 193, 195.
Marcy, William L., Central Amer-
ican negotiations, 149-153, 156,
171, 197-199, 207, 210, 213, 216,
224; and Greytown disputes, 173,
176, 177, 181, 185; and filibuster-
ing in Central America, 189-192.
Maritime Canal Company, work of,
287, 289.
Mena, Nicaraguan leader, 318.
Merlin, ship, 7.
Mexico, relations with Great
Britain, 31-32, 44; relations with
U. S., 46, 189, 319-320; and Cen-
tral American question, 166, 167.
Modyford, Gov. Sir Thomas, 3.
Molina, Felipe, Costa Rican min-
ister, 70, 71, 72, 113, 118, 133,
195-
Monroe Doctrine, British attitude
toward, 27-28, 81, 321; and U. S.
Central American policy, 31S-319.
Morazan, Liberal leader in Central
America, 33.
Morgan, Capt., operations of, 2-3.
Moscos. See Mosquito Indians.
Mosquitia. See Mosquito.
Mosquito, settlement of, 12-25;
Great Britain in, 39-44, 47-48;
renamed Mosquitia, 44; British
claim to, 59, 69-70, 73-74, 75-78,
85-86, 87-88, 96-97, 102, 107, 108-
109; negotiations concerning,
110-113, 118, 123, 125, 130-132,
146-149, 157, 160-161, 165, 188,
219-220, 224-226, 236, 261, 365;
boundary dispute with Costa
Rica, 111-112, 113; rights of Nic-
aragua and Costa Rica to, 115;
protectorate, 184; American col-
onization society in, 186-187;
boundary question, 216.
INDEX
353
Mosquito Indians, 13; relations
with England, 14-18, 20, 23-24,
39-41. 77, 78, 81, 84, 85, 88, 92,
96, 102, 109-111, 151, 15s, 288,
291, 292, 323; grants by, 40 n.,
187, 190; boundary claims, 41-
42, 47, 49; negotiations concern-
ing, 132-133, 146, 226, 227, 248,
249, 252, 256-257, 259, 261, 263-
265; Nicaraguan sovereignty for,
239; dispute with Nicaragua, 288-
293, 295-298.
Moss, Capt., naval force under, 7.
Murphy, U. S. agent to Central
America, 45 n.
Napier, Lord (Francis), and Dallas-
Clarendon treaty, 229-230; and
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 231, 232,
234-238; and Central American
question, 239, 241-253, 259.
National Intelligencer, cited, 106.
Nebraska. See Kansas-Nebraska
question.
Negroes, in Ruatan, 12; inter-
course with Mosquitos, 13. See
also Slavery.
New Granada, claim to Mosquito
Shore, 47 n. ; treaty relations, 53,
282, 283 ; boundary dispute with
Costa Rica, 71; proposals to, 233-
234; American claims against,
237-238. See also Colombia.
New York, Russian privateers built
at, 20:, 202.
New York Times, cited, 179-180.
Nicaragua, relations with Great
Britain, 41-42, 49-52, 56, 61, 67-
68, 72-77, 81-86, 88, 107, 117-
119, 188, 248, 249, 255, 256, 257,
264, 265, 283; canal projects, 46-
47, 53, 60, 62-63, 75-83. 112, 124-
125, 133, 243, 255, 322, 323;
claim to Mosquito Shore, 48-50 ;
boundary dispute with Costa
Rica, 56, 71, 73, 112-114, 124,
133, 227, 254-255; relations with
U. S., 57-58, 62-63, 68-69, 72-81,
83-90, 116-119, 124, 135-136, 168-
170, 283, 286, 287, 289, 302, 310,
315-318; and the American Un-
ion, 72; treaty negotiations con-
cerning, 83, 84, 226-227; claim to
the San juan, 113, 117; political
conditions in, 114; proposed fed-
eration with Honduras and Sal-
vador, 124; and the Greytown
dispute, 130-133, 135, 136; and
Mosquito Indians, 239, 288-293,
295-298; Walker in, 242; and the
Cass-Yrissari treaty, 254; nego-
tiations with France, 255-256;
transfer of Mosquito frontier to,
265; war with Honduras, 293;
disturbance in, 317-318.
Northern Light, steamer, 175.
Oldman, chief of Mosquitos, 15.
O'Leary, British agent at Bogota,
47-
Olney, Richard, and U. S. canal
policy, 288.
Omoa, capture of, 6.
O'Niel, governor of Yucatan, ex-
pedition under, 7.
Oregon, cruise of, 301.
Oregon question, 26-27, 45, 46, 285.
Orizaba, American packet, 212.
Otway, British superintendent, 18.
Ouseley, Sir William G., mission
of, 235-239, 242, 245-250, 252-
257, 259-261, 327.
Palmerston, Viscount (Henry
Temple), Central American pol-
icy, 33-36, 40, 43, 47, SI, 55, 63-
64, 68-90, 94-96, 99, 102-103, 113,
197, 201, 202, 205-207, 217, 218;
letter from Bulwer, no; letter
concerning Mosquito territory,
111, 112; resignation of, 121,
123; declaration regarding Belize,
157, 160, 203.
Panama, transit projects, 53, 233,
234, 238, 274, 276, 281, 282, 284,
286, 310, 311; revolution in, 311.
Panama Canal Zone, 315.
Panama Congress, 29.
354
INDEX
Panama Herald, cited, 233.
Panama Railroad, attack on, 233;
control of, 234; building of, 270;
treaty stipulation concerning,
ignored, 273, 281-282.
Panama Union, cited, 233.
Pan-American Union, 320.
Parker, Commodore, at San Juan,
121, 126-127, 128.
Parliament, British, and Central
American question, 204, 217,
222; and U. S. canal projects,
288.
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, and U. S.
canal negotiations, 301-309.
Paynter, Capt. J A., Tigre seized
by, 65.
Phelps, Edward J., letter to, 290.
Philippines, acquisition of, 301.
Pierce, Pres. Franklin, and the
Central American question, 150,
152, 157, 19s, 209, 221, 227, 324.
Point Arenas, concession on, 172,
173.
Polk, Pres. James K., policy of,
52-54, 322.
Porto Rico, acquisition of, 301.
Prometheus, vessel, affair at Grey-
town, 1 19-123.
Rattan. See Ruatan.
Realejo, British design on, 63.
Rives, William C, minister to
France, negotiations, 75-79, 82.
Roatan. See Ruatan.
Roebuck, John A., in House of
Commons, 206-207.
Routh, steamer, 174.
Ruatan, discovery and possession
of, 9-12; seized by British agent,
37; British claim to, 37, 38-39,
140, 141, 154, 159, :63, 164;
settlement of slaves in, 38;
American settlement reported,
100, 102; in colony of Bay
Islands, 139; Central American
sovereignty over, 220; negotia-
tions concerning, 225.
Russell, Lord John, and Central
American negotiations, 43, 261,
262, 266; and the Mosquito ques-
tion, 146-147; in House of
Commons, 217.
Russia, quarrel with Turkey, 157,
159.
Saint George's Cay, burning of
houses on, 7.
Saint Vincent, Caribs from, 11-12.
Salisbury, Marquis of, and the Nic- J
aragua-Mosquito dispute, 291.
Salvador, relations with Great
Britain, 56, 168; and the Ameri-
can Union, 72: proposed federa-
tion with Honduras and Nic-
aragua, 124; threatened invasion
of, 315.
San Carlos, British design on port
of, 63.
San Francisco, American vessel,
293 n., 295.
San Jose, port of, communications
with Guatemala, 258.
San Juan, renamed Greytown, 51;
control of, 114; meeting of Amer-
icans at, 128-129. See also Grey-
town.
San Juan River, dispute concern-
ing, 41-42, 48, 49-51, 69, 72-74,
77, 80, 88, 113, 117, 161-162,
227; canal route, 58, 62, 165.
Savage, American agent in Guate-
mala, 54 n.
Schenck, Robert C, instructions
concerning British in Belize,
272-273.
Scott, agent of transit company,
178, 179-
Serviles, in Central America, 33,
56.
Seward, W. H., Taylor administra-
tion defended by, 143; letter con-
cerning need of coaling station,
270-271.
Seymour, Vice-Admiral, and the
Protnetheus affair, 122, 123; and
Greytown affairs, 126, 127, 138.
INDEX
355
Shepherd, Peter and Samuel, grant
to, 187.
Slavery, influence on Central Amer-
ican question, 269, 270.
Smith, Capt., shooting by, 174.
Southwest, annexation of, 285.
Spain, buccaneering against, 2-3,
9-10, 14; relations with Great
Britain in Central America, 2-25 ;
right to Belize, 32-33, 36; and
the Central American question,
160-161, 166, 167.
Spanish- American War, 300-301.
Squier, Ephraim G., charge in
Guatemala, 60-66; letter to, 107;
activities of, 115; recall of, 116;
in Honduras, 170-17 1; rumors
concerning, 187. See also Squier
treaty.
Squier treaty, 75, 83, 86-87, 90-91,
95-96, 99, 1 13-1 14, 243.
Suez Canal, opening of, 274, 286;
rules for navigation of, 303.
Taft, Pres. William H., canal bill
signed by, 312; Central American
policy of, 318.
Tarleton, captain of the Enrydice,
212.
Taylor, Pres. Zachary, Central
American policy of, 59-60, 68;
and Squier treaty, 91; policy
regarding Bay Islands colony,
142-143, 144.
Texas, independence of, 44-45;
admission of, 46; annexation of,
52.
Tigre Island, British design on, 64,
6s; seized by British, 65, 66, 90,
93; cession to U. S., 65; restored
to Honduras, 66; evacuation of,
94-95; seized by Squier, 115;
American desire for, 271.
Transit routes, 251, 254, 258, 269.
See also Canal projects.
Trelawney, Gov. Edward, plan of
revolt, 16.
Trinidad, possession of, 8.
Turkey, quarrel with Russia, 157,
159.
Union, cited, 191.
United States, relations with Great
Britain after War of 18 12, 26-
27; in Central -America, 1815-
1850, 26-66; war with Mexico,
46; and Texas question, 52;
treaty with New Granada, 53;
relations with Nicaragua, 57-58,
62-63, 68-69, 72-81, 83-90, 116-
119, 124, 135-136, 168-170, 283,
286, 287, 289, 302, 310, 31S-318;
treaty with Honduras, 65, 168-
169, 283; relations with Costa
Rica, 70-72; relations with Mex-
ico, 189, 319-320; relations with
"A. B. C. republics", 319-320.
\^anderbilt, Cornelius, and the
Prometheus affair, 120.
Vaughan, Sir Charles, and Guate-
malan boundary question, 34.
Vera Paz, territory of, 166.
Vernon, Adin. Edward, expedition
of, 16.
Vijil, Padre, representative of
Walker, 212, 213.
Villiers, British representative at
Madrid, instructions to, 35, 37.
Vixen, British war vessel, 50.
Walker, Patrick, Mosquito superin-
tendent, 44, 47; at San Juan, 49,
50; death of, 50.
Walker, William, filibustering ex-
peditions of, 189, 193-195, 210-
211, 213, 242, 255; U. S. attitude
toward, 199, 210, 213.
Walsh, Robert, agent to Costa Rica,
134-
Washington, D. C, convention of
Central American delegates at,
315.
Watson, Capt., report concerning
Bluefields affair, 295.
Webster, Daniel, negotiations of,
113, 116-118, 123, 125, 127-128,
130-131, 134, 136; and the
Prometheus affair, 121-123; death
of, 148.
356
INDEX
West Indies, British naval station
in, 171; British withdrawal from,
315-
Wheeler, minister to Central Amer-
ica, and Greytown claims, 185;
and Walker's expedition, 195.
White, counsel for transit company,
120, 177-178.
Wilson, Pres. Woodrow, and canal
bill, 314; Central American
policy, 319.
Wyke, Charles "L,, negotiations of,
134, 136, 254, 257-258, 261, 263-
267, 284, 288, 327; instructions
to, 187; and Belize boundary,
188; despatch concerning Herran-
Clarendon treaty, 230.
Vrissari, Antonio Jose de, 195.
See also Cass-Yrissari treaty.
Yucatan, log-cutting settlement in,
4-
Zelaya, Nicaraguan ruler, 315-316.
Zelaya, department of, 298.
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