JOFFRE AND H 
 ARMY 
 
 CHARLES DAWBA
 
 /4
 
 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY
 
 BY CHARLES DAWBARN 
 
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 JOFFRE AND HIS 
 
 ARMY 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES DAWBARN 
 
 AUTHOR OF "FRANCE AT BAY," ETC. 
 
 MILLS & BOON, LIMITED 
 
 49 RUPERT STREET 
 
 LONDON, W.
 
 Published 1916
 
 IN MEMORY OF 
 
 GENERAL GALLIIENI 
 
 TO WHOM THIS BOOK 
 
 WAS DEDICATED 
 (by permission)
 
 u
 
 FOREWORD 
 
 This book is intended as a presentation card to the 
 French army. It is a plain story for plain people, 
 and there has been a deliberate avoidance of any 
 technicalities. In it you will find references to the 
 leading figures in the fighting organisation of France — 
 Joffre and his most brilliant collaborators ; and I have 
 tried to render just homage to the " poilu," who is the 
 French common soldier. Perhaps the most touching 
 thought about that man, whose deeds of glory and 
 pure heroism will inspire the poets for many a long 
 year, is that he represents not the soldier of profes- 
 sion, but the soldier drawn from the most peaceful 
 occupations. Practically the first great encounter 
 of the French with the Germans in the battle of 
 Charleroi, and the subsequent retreat, accounted for 
 a large part of the regular army, and more or less 
 placed hors de combat the greater number of its 
 officers. That professional force was replaced by 
 the Reserve and later supplemented by the youngest 
 classes — men culled from the very heart of pacific 
 France. They came to the trenches with all their 
 civilian instincts — it was a peasant and bourgeois 
 army — but in an amazingly short space of time they 
 were vying with the old soldier in the brilliance of 
 their exploits, in their ability to endure supreme 
 hardship with the greatest gallantry, and without 
 
 vii
 
 viii FOREWORD 
 
 complaint : an extraordinary story of adaptability. 
 And it came to pass in the process of time that there 
 was the army at the front and the army in the rear : 
 the army of the field and the army of the munition 
 factory, recruited from different elements, for the 
 men in the trenches were the peasants, the sons of 
 agricultural France ; and the army of the factories — 
 the munition workers — was composed of the artisan 
 and typical toAvn dweller. And it is as well to re- 
 member, when the question of the future of France, 
 after the war, arises, that the peasant supported to 
 a great extent the physical sufferings of the war, the 
 danger of death and mutilation, the exposure in 
 the trenches, the cold and damp, whilst the townsman 
 was harnessed to the intensive labour of producing 
 shot and shell for infantry and guns. I do not in- 
 sinuate that the townsman shirked the more bitter 
 task. Each time a demand was made upon him, 
 involving sacrifice of life, he also was ready to rise 
 to any height of abnegation. And in the more 
 mechanical branches of the war, such, for instance, 
 as artillery and aviation, it was often a townsman 
 who was the hero, and who gained, by some glowing 
 deed, the precious symbol of the war cross and even, 
 perhaps, the Legion of Honour. A pure Parisian 
 was Guynemer, the sergeant pilot, who, on a mono- 
 plane where he was pilot and combatant, bore down 
 six German machines in as many months, and won 
 thus his stripes as sergeant, the military medal — 
 the highest military award in France — the Legion of 
 Honour and the War Cross with seven palms; and 
 all this at the age of twenty-one. Indeed, in every 
 enterprise that demanded skill and daring the towns- 
 man was to the fore. But it is not possible to
 
 FOREWORD ix 
 
 differentiate in the heroism displayed by the French. 
 The historian will never point to the bravery of one 
 class and the timidity of another, for there has been 
 bravery everywhere — bravery and heroism of the 
 most sublime sort poured out with lavish hand to 
 the eternal glory of France. 
 
 In these pages I have sought to give a glimpse of 
 the " poilu " at work in the trenches, that one may 
 peep a little through the shutters of his soul. For 
 the mind of the " poilu " is strangely barred and cur- 
 tained, more strictly than the windows in any English 
 east-coast town. The outsider is not permitted to 
 see the light within. Question him and he will 
 proudly boast his vices; concerning his virtues he is 
 silent, and quaintly ashamed ; and to understand the 
 mentality of the " poilu," to discover what manner 
 of man he is, one must rub shoulders with him in 
 everyday life. Upon some of these familiar visits I 
 hope my readers will accompany me, at least in 
 imagination, and will gather some insight into the 
 character of the Soldier of France. I shall, indeed, 
 have ill performed my task if I have failed to show 
 how valiant he is in facing mortal danger, how un- 
 complaining in the midst of monotonous peril, and 
 in the worst discomforts — waiting the order to attack 
 without the least murmuring, with soldier-like ac- 
 quiescence in the bitter cold of a winter's night or 
 in the chill of early spring. He has forged in a 
 surprisingly short time the ame militaire ; he has 
 exhibited an amazing adaptability. Some had sup- 
 posed him ill-disciplined, incapable of the highest 
 military virtues. "Is this a school treat?" ex- 
 claimed an outraged Britisher as a detachment of 
 French soldiers slouched, singing and whistling down
 
 X FOREWORD 
 
 the road. Yes, a sloppy and disorderly lot they 
 looked, their clothes dirty and ill-fitting, and hung 
 around with their kit like travelling caravans. Surely 
 such men were no soldiers ! There was a large section 
 of English opinion convinced that the Frenchmen 
 would not fight; that, probably, was the German 
 idea also. What, then, has effected the transforma- 
 tion? How has the " poilu " become inspired by 
 the highest military courage, and for weeks and 
 weeks, as at Verdun, sustained the most devastating 
 bombardment ? Ah ! that is the secret of this war, 
 that is the secret of the French temperament, that 
 secluded soul, which is not always what it seems to 
 be. It ever carries in it the seeds and possibilities 
 of greatness : seeds that lay dormant until this war 
 germinated them and they developed into the glorious 
 flower of achievement. In an instant this quick and 
 imaginative people awoke to the necessities of the 
 war; they had every reason to realise its meaning; 
 it was only too plain. There it was, written in blood 
 and carnage in the invaded departments. England, 
 of course, lacked that object-lesson. Merely the 
 Zeppelins reminded her of the " reality " of the war, 
 with their pitiable toll of innocent lives ; and more- 
 over, the attitude of the authorities, far from in- 
 sisting upon the realisation of the war and its horror, 
 tended to starve the imaginative side of the cam- 
 paign. There were, of course, the scenes at the 
 recruiting meetings, the posters and the rest : but 
 that, after all, was undignified, a little pathetic, and 
 sometimes even rang false ; the great diapason of the 
 Country's Call was but rarely sounded. " Your 
 country needs you," said a theatrical-looking poster; 
 but did it really need one ? One had to be sure of
 
 FOREWORD xi 
 
 that. And yet, in spite of these disadvantages, in 
 spite of a despairing and exasperating silence about 
 the achievements and daily heroisms of the army in 
 the field — until one began to think that the only 
 records other than the meagre communique, were 
 the casualties — in spite, I say, of these drawbacks, 
 in spite of the paucity of the appeal, the response of 
 the young men to this voluntary call was stupefying 
 in its splendour and spontaneity, so that the French 
 were able to say — though they did not always say 
 it with satisfying eloquence — again the fault of those 
 who did not trouble to let them know precisely what 
 the splendid English army and English organisation 
 were doing — that never had the world given such a 
 picture of sacrifice, of absolute, undiluted courage. 
 The men of England were splendid, and only the 
 Government, so ill-adapted to the exceptional, 
 limped painfully, slowly and awkwardly, behind 
 public opinion, instead of springing in front to 
 direct it. 
 
 I have said that people at home were not always 
 sure that the French would be equal to the enormous 
 strain put upon them by the tragic events of the 
 invasion, by the systematised savagery of a relentless 
 foe. Perhaps they had dipped into history and 
 become inspired by that wonderful picture that 
 Alfred de Musset draws in La Confession d\in Enfant 
 du Siecle. A generation pale, nervous and feverish 
 was born during the wars of the Empire. " Con- 
 ceived between two battles, raised in the colleges to 
 the roll of drums, thousands of children looked about 
 them with sombre eyes and shrinking, quivering 
 muscles. From time to time their fathers, stained 
 with blood, appeared, raised them on their chests
 
 xii FOREWORD 
 
 shining with decorations, and then, placing them on 
 the ground, remounted their horses. 
 
 " There was only one man living then in Europe : 
 the rest filled their lungs with the air that he had 
 breathed. Each year France gave three hundred 
 thousand young men to this man; it was the tax 
 paid to Caesar, and if he had not had that mob behind 
 him, he would not have been able to carry out his 
 plans. Never were there so many nights without 
 sleep as in the time of this man ; never has one seen 
 so many desolated mothers, never such silence, the 
 hush around the shadow of death. And yet there 
 was never so much joy, so much life, so much war- 
 like music in hearts. Never was there such pure 
 sunlight as that which dried up all this blood. It 
 was the air of this sky without a cloud, where shone 
 so much glory, where so much steel glittered, that 
 the children were then breathing. They knew well 
 that they were destined to the hecatombs, but they 
 believed Murat to be invulnerable, and one had seen 
 the Emperor pass immune through such a hail of 
 bullets that one doubted whether he could die. 
 Death was so fine then, so great, so magnificent in 
 its smoky purple. . . . The cradles of France were 
 shields and coffins also. There were no longer any 
 old men, but corpses and demi-gods. Nevertheless, 
 France, widow of Caesar, felt suddenly her wound. 
 She began to fail and slept with so heavy a sleep that 
 her old kings, believing her dead, wrapped her in a 
 white shroud. The old, grey-haired army returned, 
 worn out with fatigue, and the fires on the hearths of 
 deserted chateaux sadly rekindled." 
 
 The war is over ; the children no longer see sabres 
 and cuirasses ; Caesar is dead, the portraits of Welling-
 
 FOREWORD xiii 
 
 ton and Bliicher hang in the Consulates. Anxious 
 children sit on the ruins of the world, the children 
 that were born at the breast of war, for the war. 
 They had dreamed during fifteen years of the snows 
 of Moscow and of the sun of the Pyramids. Every 
 one was tired, used up, exhausted. The light of life 
 had gone out. The children, when they spoke of 
 glory, were urged to become priests, priests when 
 one spoke of ambition, love and hope ; and, whilst 
 life outside was so pale and shabby, the internal life 
 of society took on an aspect silent and sombre. The 
 habits of students and artists were affected; they 
 became addicted to wine and women. And then 
 De Musset speaks of the influence that Goethe 
 and Byron — the two finest geniuses of the century 
 according to Napoleon — exercised over Europe. 
 " Can't 5^ou put a little honey in the fine vases you 
 make ? " he asks of Goethe ; and of Byron he ques- 
 tions, " Have you no well-beloved near your dear 
 Adriatic?" and adds that though perhaps he, 
 personall}^ has suffered more than the English poet, 
 he believes yet in hope and blesses God. It is the 
 reign of despair. " The ills of the century come from 
 two causes," he says : " the people who have experi- 
 enced the Revolution and Waterloo carry two wounds 
 in their hearts. All that was, is no more ; all that 
 will be, is not yet. Do not look elsewhere for the 
 secret of our ills." 
 
 Could he have foreseen the terrific experience 
 through which France was to pass a hundred years 
 from Waterloo, how his tone would have altered into 
 deep commiseration. And yet it is interesting to 
 compare this picture of the years following the 
 Napoleonic wars and the exhaustion which then
 
 xiv FOREWORD 
 
 revealed itself — the utter hopelessness of every one — 
 with the condition to-day when, with the first pale 
 beams of the sun of peace, France is thinking of the 
 future, already discounting the profit that will be 
 obtained by her victorious and long-suffering arms. 
 What great repose has she not merited ? What great 
 reward of peace and plenty? This generation has 
 fought, has given its life with unheard-of prodigality 
 that the new generation may not have to fight. It 
 has purchased freedom at the terrible price of blood — 
 freedom from the slavery of Germany. No. De 
 Musset's picture is no longer true, but it is doubtless 
 this portrait of a puny, bloodless, spiritless France 
 which impressed itself, all the more vividly because 
 of the splendour of the word-painting, upon the 
 foreign observer, and it was perhaps these students 
 of French history who moulded English opinion. De 
 Musset's powerful description was photographed upon 
 the brain, and few realised that the conditions of 
 which he spoke were transitory, and that France had 
 emerged triumphant from her darkest hour when the 
 pulse of her being was but a thread. The France of 
 to-day is not bowed down with despair, but is buoyed 
 with invincible hope. Hope in the morrow, hope in 
 the recreative genius of her people — of their mar- 
 vellous powers of recuperation. It is pleasant, it is 
 comforting, to note the contrast, to observe the 
 salutary change the century has brought ; the France 
 of De Musset shuddered, demoralised, over the cold 
 embers of conflict — a conflict gigantic as it then 
 seemed, but small in face of the sacrifices of the 
 Great War. Even the agonies of Napoleon's invasion 
 of Russia cannot compare with the hecatomb, the 
 awful onslaught that Joffre had to meet and defeat.
 
 FOREWORD XV 
 
 Glory to the " poilu," to his courage and constancy. 
 He has saved France; he has gained for her the 
 sweet and fruitful repose of a century wherein her 
 inventive industry and creative genius may be 
 revived ; wherein she may excel in the arts, in the 
 most splendid works of peace; wherein she may 
 prove to be the torch-bearer of advanced civilisation, 
 the pioneer — only a prudent and alert pioneer — no 
 longer the dupe to illusions, of that beatific time 
 when there shall be no more war. 
 
 Nor in this picture of fighting France must one 
 forget the wife and daughter of the " poilu " ; their 
 work has been splendid. In no direction has the 
 national spirit been more finely emphasised. I recall 
 a visit to a typical factory in the east of France, 
 some twenty miles behind the lines, where the 
 workers were women. I was struck by their positive 
 fanaticism. Upon the walls hung mottoes, just as in 
 pious English homes one sees texts of Scripture. One 
 in particular caught the eye by its terse and vivid 
 eloquence : " Bad work may kill your brother ! " 
 And I can well believe that there was no bad work 
 in that factory. There was no question of wages; 
 they were never discussed ; no one thought of them ; 
 they were of no importance. Wages, disputes, 
 strikes ! when the men were fighting a life and death 
 struggle a few miles away, and when you could hear 
 plainly the hoarse rattle of the guns when the wind 
 lay in the right direction ? Impossible ! Instead of 
 striking, women worked themselves to death and 
 often were carried fainting from their tasks after a 
 twelve and fifteen hours' day. And what an example 
 the masters set of untiring devotion. Addressing 
 the Creusot workers in the twenty-first month of the
 
 xvi FOREWORD 
 
 war, M. Albert Thomas, head of the Ministry of 
 Munitions, spoke of chiefs who had kept to their duties 
 for eighteen hours at a stretch. For them, at least, 
 there were no restorative week-ends and pleasant 
 breaks in public fetes — nothing but a continuous, 
 back-aching and brain-wearying round. First to 
 realise the shortage of the shells, some six months 
 before the English, the French displayed astounding 
 energy in remedying the defect. Their ant-like 
 industry and powers of organisation, rivalling even 
 the vast enterprises of America, attracted a world- 
 wide admiration as great as for their heroism in the 
 field. And if it awakened an equal homage, its 
 presence was even less suspected than those martial 
 qualities for which, after all, history gives credit and 
 the brilliant proof though we had forgotten it in 
 this talk of perpetual peace, in an atmosphere of 
 material prosperity and a super-civilisation bordering 
 on decadence. 
 
 These things are faintly reflected in my pages 
 together with some appreciation of the English. 
 Sometimes it is a little pale, that praise for the 
 gallant ally : the cause of it I have shown already 
 in a rudderless Governmental policy and a Press 
 starved into undue reticence by the Censor. The 
 harm of it was seen in querulous articles from Boule- 
 vard pens. " France has borne the brunt, France 
 has bled, let others now do their share." That was 
 during Verdun, when the trumpets had blown the 
 fame of France over the wide earth and there was 
 no note resonating for England — in spite of her 
 casualty list. Had the chroniclers, then, forgotten 
 the glorious stand of the English in the Great Retreat, 
 how they had saved the French army from being
 
 FOREWORD xvii 
 
 crumpled up by Von Kluck's furious attacks on the 
 left wing, and how they had shown unparalleled 
 resistance against overwhelming ' odds ? No ; the 
 French have not forgotten, it is engraved eternally 
 in their hearts. Those who seem to forget adopt a 
 political pose; yet it is necessary to reassert the 
 facts, not to diminish the " poilu," but rather that 
 we may " realise " him the more, that we may 
 regard him as a brother for whom we have laboured 
 and fought, for whom we have shed our blood. 
 England, by her early heroism in the war, contributed 
 to the full development and glory of the French 
 soldier. It is not the least of our satisfactions that 
 we have helped to build the proud monument whereon 
 is emblazoned the imperishable record of his victories. 
 Thus may we cry with greater fervour, " Vive la 
 France ! vive son armee ! " If we know that army 
 and know its chiefs, we shall be the readier to protest 
 our faith.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 FOREWORD ..... 
 
 I THE AWAKENING .... 
 
 II THE THREE-YEARS LAW . 
 
 Ill DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY 
 
 IV JOFFRE — HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD . 
 
 V PREPARATION ..... 
 
 VI JOFFRE IN ACTION .... 
 
 VII THE SECOND IN COMMAND 
 
 VIII THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS . 
 
 IX FRENCH DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 
 
 X GALLIENI AND HIS POPULARITY 
 
 XI GALLliiNI AND HIS COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 XII THE HERO OF THE OURCQ 
 
 XIII THE MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND. 
 
 XIV SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS . 
 XV CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING. 
 
 XVI MILITARY COMMAND AND THE REVOLUTION 
 
 XVII THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES . 
 
 XVIII TRENCH JOURNALS AND THEIR READERS 
 
 XIX THE AIRMAN IN WAR . . . 
 
 XX THE " POILU'S " HOSPITAL 
 
 vn 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 24 
 
 83 
 
 44 
 
 55 
 
 69 
 
 80 
 
 93 
 
 105 
 
 117 
 
 127 
 
 137 
 
 149 
 
 161 
 
 173 
 
 182 
 
 194 
 
 208 
 
 221 
 
 XIX
 
 i 
 
 t^'
 
 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE AWAKENING 
 
 " Rather than submit to the slavery of the 
 Germans, the whole French nation would perish." 
 These words of General de Castelnau are no idle boast 
 — the coloured eloquence of a General who wishes to 
 hearten his troops : they are a simple statement of 
 fact. France has left behind eloquence and em- 
 broidered phrases : her commerce, her agriculture, 
 her arts are gone. She has only one business, that 
 of fighting : her men are all mobilised. And behind 
 them stand the old, the young, the women and 
 children, waiting their turn, should that turn come. 
 And if France ever lies under the German heel, at 
 least of the French people there will be none left 
 to weep. That is the spirit animating the army of 
 Joffre, that army whose exploits must have impressed 
 even the most unimpressionable by their continued 
 splendour. Never was finer heroism displayed than 
 theirs. And they recognised from the very first 
 the desperate character of the enterprise. It was 
 not a war of chivalry. There has been no incident as 
 at Fontenoy when Lord Hay, addressing the French 
 guards, invited them to fire first. The Germans
 
 2 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 carried no sentiment of any kind into the battle- 
 field, where their sole endeavour was to overcome the 
 adversary, and any means were considered legitimate. 
 To them the doubtful honour of the most diabolical 
 inventions for destroying life. This is not the 
 atmosphere — ^the atmosphere of asphyxiating gas — 
 where chivalry thrives, and the French character, 
 legends, and traditions of fighting, are utterly opposed 
 to such scientific barbarities. " These civilised 
 savages inspire me with more horror than cannibals," 
 said Flaubert. But far from being overcome and 
 dismayed by German barbarism, the French showed 
 an instant spirit of adaptation; the hideous con- 
 ceptions of the Hun brain were hurled back to them 
 across the trenches. And horror begets horror. 
 Officers, from the most accomplished generals down 
 to the subalterns, learned with astounding speed 
 the new art of war — this terrible, unscrupulous, 
 brutal combat which, after fearful carnage in the 
 open, as at Verdun, constantly ran itself to earth, 
 settling down into trench war of the most monstrous 
 description. 
 
 Protracted trench warfare, it has been said a 
 thousand times, is quite contrary to the French 
 disposition, which is all dash and go and impulse. 
 But to-day we shall have to revise our views, no 
 doubt, and find that the French have mixed with 
 their audacity, with their natural quickness of 
 thought and action and their high receptivity, some 
 of that resistance and tenacity which are character- 
 istically British. Confirmed Anglophiles in France 
 attribute this phenomenon to the moral influence 
 of ourselves — a flattering and satisfying doctrine to 
 our own self-esteem. But the appearance of this
 
 THE AWAKENING 3 
 
 " new " virtue extended to all parts of the population, 
 and was so universal that we cannot credit this grand 
 attribute of the French in the hour of their great 
 adversity to anything but their own innate qualities. 
 It was exhibited by mayors of communes, even the 
 most remote, who have been exposed to the brutalities 
 of the invaders; by the clergy to a conspicuous 
 degree — nothing was more touching and remarkable 
 than their absolute devotion in the most nerve-racking 
 conditions. It was shown, indeed, by the whole of 
 the civil population, young and old, and especially by 
 women. How splendid they were ! They did their 
 work with extreme quietude, with a positive genius 
 for adaptability, and no illustrated paper published 
 photographs of their uniforms — for they had none. 
 On the first day of the mobilisation the French women 
 turned into the fields to gather the harvest the men 
 had left on the ground. They had no time to choose 
 a suitable costume ; no need of exhortations from the 
 Board of Agriculture. They were left to do the work, 
 and they did it without fuss and without parade. 
 Such examples of determination, tenacity, sheer self- 
 sacrifice, courage and abnegation existed in all 
 directions, diffusing a golden light over the country, 
 just as the coloured windows at the Invalides bathe 
 the tomb of Napoleon in a splendid effulgence. 
 
 In the army itself the adaptability of its leaders is 
 a thousand times exemplified by the manner in which 
 erudite soldiers who have taught tactics and strategy 
 in the War School, along certain lines, suddenly 
 confronted with the problems of actual war, have seen 
 that they were quite other than those laid down in 
 the text-books, and thereafter have speedil}?" adapted 
 themselves to the new conditions. Some failed, and
 
 4 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 there arose the rumour of many enforced retirements 
 from aetive command. But the inference to be drawn 
 froni this was not always correctly stated. The 
 generals in most cases were not incompetent; they 
 correctly applied the old war rules to the situations 
 as they arose ; but they were not sufficiently supple ; 
 they did not adapt themselves to the new conditions. 
 The officers who proved the most successful were, 
 for the most part, the colonels and majors, who in 
 a few months obtained important commands. 
 
 The classic instance of this is General Petain, who, 
 when the war broke out, was a colonel, and rose with 
 breathless rapidity to take supreme command of the 
 armies at Verdun during that terrific fight which 
 occupied many weeks of the Spring of 1916. Romantic 
 as such a rise may seem to be, it is as well to remember 
 that the new commander was eminently qualified 
 by reason of his long preparation to occupy such a 
 position. He possesses one of the finest brains in the 
 army — which in France for long has been an in- 
 tellectual profession — and had so trained it that he 
 was able at once to take advantage of the new con- 
 ditions of warfare which have so materially changed 
 since the area of war was charted for the guidance 
 of commanders. 
 
 When the war broke out, France was not ready. 
 We in England have been often accused of our 
 lack of foresight; but the fact that France, living 
 under the shadow of war, at least since the Agadir 
 incident, was unprepared seems to have been in- 
 credible folly. How is it to be explained? The 
 explanation is politics, and the pleasant, but alas ! 
 entirely false, atmosphere created by the dreams of 
 pacifists. Whilst Germany planned war and pre-
 
 THE AWAKENING 5 
 
 pared for it in the most cold-blooded manner, France 
 was dreaming of peace and behaving as if war were 
 a thing of the past. All her preoccupations were 
 pacific; to her purblind politicians, the real danger 
 was either a struggle between Capital and Labour — 
 and there were not wanting signs that this was 
 probable — or else a largely imaginary conflict between 
 the dispossessed Church and the State. And, again, 
 there was a large party in the nation led by the per- 
 suasive eloquence of Jaures which urged that universal 
 peace was a practical reality. France herself did not 
 want to fight, England showed no bellicosity; 
 Germany, it was true, through her governing classes, 
 displayed a disquieting tendency to bully, but the 
 heart of the people — was not that pacific ? Had not 
 Socialism, and the doctrine of the brotherhood of 
 man, taken firm root ? The French Socialists were 
 convinced that it had. And so they argued war was 
 a practical impossibility ; for, certainly, this great mass 
 of German opinion, penetrated with Socialism and 
 with the ultra-pacific doctrines which go with it, 
 would never permit the nation to be drawn into war 
 for the benefit of the fire-eaters and directors of the 
 great war machine. The wish was father to the 
 thought, and these misguided but well-meaning people 
 were always seeing across the Vosges evidence of 
 the same beneficent principles that manifested them- 
 selves at home. The French Socialists were, indeed, 
 to a great extent anti-militarist : did it not take two 
 to make a quarrel ? Was it likely that they would be 
 wantonly attacked when they had not the least 
 intention of attacking anybody? Very naturally, 
 I think, they argued in that strain — and the great 
 fault was that the directors of opinion in France, as
 
 6 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 in England, made no effort to explore the dark waters 
 of political probability. It was pleasant to walk 
 ruminatingly along the banks and to dream that the 
 good time would always continue. The bomb-shell 
 of the invasion brought the awakening. In a certain 
 sense English politicians were more to blame than 
 the French, chiefly because no one of them with their 
 hard practical Anglo-Saxon sense really believed in 
 universal brotherhood — there was no Jaures to cap- 
 ture the public imagination by the witchery of words. 
 England realised clearly enough that war between 
 France and Germany was, sooner or later, inevitable, 
 and the high failure of these self-same politicians was 
 that they did not bring home to the public conscience 
 the no less inevitable intervention by England. 
 " But we are not scaremongers ! There was too 
 much talk already about the sword and keeping one's 
 powder dry," say the apologists. But it is precisely 
 in a pacific interest that the so-called leaders of the 
 nation ought to have spoken. Mathematics is the 
 base of war — and of its prevention ; and in this case 
 the sum was easy : merely two and two make four. 
 If England had displayed the precaution that she 
 adopts in other affairs — the caution of the typical 
 citizen safe-guarding his own personal interests — 
 then Germany would have thought a long while 
 before crossing the frontier and would still have been 
 thinking about it. Knowing what we do of the 
 Teuton temperament, revealed more particularly 
 in the report of the camp at Wittenberg, we are 
 convinced that Germany would have hesitated long 
 had she not had the quasi conviction of an easy 
 victory. Everything points to that : the rapid 
 defeat of France, and then a swift turning upon
 
 THE AWAKENING 7 
 
 Russia, whose mobilisation is proverbially slow and 
 whose armament was known to be ludicrously in- 
 adequate. Undoubtedly a little plain speaking as 
 well as definite and resolute preparations for eventual- 
 ities would have done much to prevent war. Forces 
 are blind and superior to man, but war was made by 
 man, and man sets the current that renders it in- 
 evitable ; then, the same human energy directed at 
 the right time and right place could have prevented it. 
 
 Nor was there in England the same anti-militarism 
 which prevailed in France amongst a large section 
 hypnotised by the engaging doctrine of high-minded 
 theorists. There was no anti-militarism, for the 
 reason that there was no militarism; England was 
 not a military power. And thoughtful Frenchmen 
 have been immensely impressed by the speed with 
 which she became one. The unchanging England 
 had become changed out of all recognition. I 
 remember that when Rodin went first to England, he 
 was struck by the eighteenth-century aspect of the 
 people and their institutions. In the houses and in 
 the streets he met types such as Gainsborough and 
 Lawrence painted. Their clothes even had not 
 changed, for though English women nominally wear 
 French fashions, they individualise them and adapt 
 them to their own tastes. And this friendly observer 
 was constantly meeting in the unchanging women 
 evidences of the eternal England in their classic 
 features and fresh complexions, their dignified 
 carriage, splendid shoulders and fine open counten- 
 ances. Even the clothes — the broad hat and the 
 use of scarfs and trinkets for the adornment of the 
 person — signified the same thing. 
 
 And in military matters this faithfulness to the past
 
 8 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 was every whit as pronounced. The Enghsh Army- 
 was unchanging in its traditions, habits and customs, 
 in its equipment and even in its names. As M. 
 Germain Bapst, the French battle historian, has 
 pointed out, the names of commanders remained 
 unaltered from the Peninsular War and Waterloo 
 to the Crimea. Men purchased commissions in the 
 British Army until after the Franco-German War, 
 and only a quarter of a century has elapsed since 
 soldiers were whipped. In 1894 there were forty-six 
 sentences of this sort carried out. There was little 
 or no change in the army from the Crimea to the Boer 
 War. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were the 
 two magicians who awakened England from her 
 lethargy. 
 
 And then consider the continuity of tradition in 
 the English regiments : they bear on their standards 
 the names of the old victories, and their history and 
 achievements can be traced for hundreds of years. 
 Not so with the French regiments. Their identity 
 has been lost in the shifting sands of the Revolution. 
 To quote one instance : the Regiment of Piedmont, 
 which existed in the time of Henry VIII, became a 
 departmental regiment, then the Third of the Line, 
 and then the Seventh — it is impossible to keep pace 
 with its changes. Practically the history of regi- 
 ments in France stops at the Revolution. That was 
 the moment of great changes when everything was 
 swept away and new principles established. England 
 the immutable, France the fluid, enthusiastic, pas- 
 sionate, artistic, wildly given over to new ideas — 
 what singular destiny has brought the two together 
 as comrades and allies on the field of battle in a 
 union much closer than in the Crimea, where, however.
 
 THE AWAKENING 9 
 
 Canrobert came to the same conclusion as Foch, who 
 repeated the eulogium, at an interval of sixty years, 
 to General Delannes, a former chief of staff : " Once 
 the British Army has agreed to do something, the 
 thing is done." The michanging spirit, then, the 
 bull-dog tenacity, that tremendous grip that never 
 lets go — these British qualities blend and render 
 powerful the Latin temperament, with its quickness 
 of comprehension and adaptability. Slow to see a 
 new fact, still slower to excite himself, John Bull is 
 the ideal character to play the waiting game, that 
 game of exhaustion of the war. The more wonderful, 
 then, in the eyes of the French that he should have 
 made so prodigious a military effort. 
 
 Eminent French military critics have dealt with 
 all the phases of the movement for raising men, first 
 by the old traditional system of voluntaryism, then 
 by graduated processes of compulsion. The result 
 was an army whose peer the world had never seen, 
 either for the high training of the men or the quality 
 of the equipment. Already in the Spring of 1916 
 the English artillery was more numerous than the 
 French, especially in heavy guns. It is true that the 
 shooting of those pieces was not as good as that of our 
 Allies, and that the French sent instructors to coach 
 the English in their own methods ; but one need not 
 be surprised that w^e had not immediately acquired 
 the full science of artillery usage upon which the 
 French have specialised for many years. In the strict 
 co-operation of two armies of differing nationalities 
 working together in the field there must be neces- 
 sarily certain difTiculties and differences, and it is 
 certain that the French did not always comprehend 
 our methods of fighting. The English " stick it out "
 
 10 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 is often opposed to their own notion of a judicious 
 retreat. For instance, the " marmites " are falhng 
 fast upon the front-Hne trench; there is a danger 
 of the trench caving in and burying its occupants. 
 Reahsing the situation, the French 'withdraw their 
 men to the second hnc — perhaps three hundred yards 
 behind the other. The British, however, will not 
 countenance this strategic move ; they remain ; 
 their own flank is exposed. Two rival principles are 
 here in play. Say the British : " Better remain in 
 the trench, because, on the morrow, you must win it 
 back again by a counter-attack which is a wasteful 
 process." " No," say the French, " retreat in time 
 and save your men ; you can get it back at a less cost 
 than if you stayed and ran the risk of being decimated 
 by the big shells." 
 
 You may see, no doubt, much of the same spirit 
 in the question of guarding or abandoning sections 
 of the line which are difficult to keep. For instance, 
 the French probably would have given up long ago the 
 salient at Ypres, which the English maintained at a 
 considerable cost, mainly for sentimental, at least, for 
 moral reasons, whereas the French would have urged 
 that there was a line behind that would have given a 
 better and easier frontier to defend. None, however, 
 can estimate the moral value to the French of the 
 mere presence at their side of their old rivals and 
 antagonists ; and the effect of contingents arriving in 
 France from far-off Canada and Australia, New Zealand 
 and the Cape, has been quite extraordinary. Almost 
 inconceivable, also, has been the material help that 
 Britain has extended to her Allies. To France alone 
 we have advanced £500,000,000, a wonderful achieve- 
 ment in itself, and we have also supplied unending
 
 THE AWAKENING 11 
 
 stores of coals, steel, boots, clothing — material of 
 all sorts. 
 
 Of the " poilu," too, I shall often speak, but you 
 will never realise how big he is — this sometimes 
 unlikely-looking man, hung about with pots and 
 pans and cumbered with all sorts of strange impedi- 
 menta. And he is often a poet as well as a hero. 
 I wish you could read the letters from him I have been 
 privileged to see, written under the hail of bullets and 
 in the thunder of the big guns. His courage and 
 undying spirit shine through these tender com- 
 munications which lose so much in the translation, 
 which are untranslatable, in fact — for one cannot 
 translate a perfume or a colour, nor can you put upon 
 cold paper the complexion of a kiss. The " poilu " 
 is peculiarly French in the mood and manner of his 
 life, in his apparent slackness, in the speed with which 
 he braces up at the proper moment, his disgust and 
 objection to mere unintelligent parade, his amused dis- 
 dain of the " panache," his admiration for and whole- 
 hearted devotion to a man capable of understanding 
 and drawing him out, able to appeal to the particular 
 form of his patriotism, and to fire him with a holy 
 zeal for a holy cause — to a man, in fact, who com- 
 bines a species of apostolic fervour, a winsomeness 
 and appeal, with the sterling qualities of a real 
 leader of men. Of such men I shall presently speak — 
 men who inspire devotion like Mahomet over his 
 followers, men who bring out the spirituality of war — • 
 if so be that one is allowed to speak of its spiritual 
 side. For amidst the awful wreck of war — the suffer- 
 ings it entails, its thousand miseries, the break-up of 
 the home, the desolation of hearths, and the abomina- 
 tions practised upon civilians by the drunken or
 
 12 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 cynical soldiers of the Kaiser — there are incidents, as 
 great and as sublime as ever immortalised the saints 
 and martyrs dying for their religion, suffering name- 
 less tortures that, in their quivering flesh, they might 
 represent, for ever, the sustaining power of God. Of 
 such heroism, of such priceless sacrifice this war is 
 full — so full, that one knows not where to begin, and 
 certainly would not know where to end, in a recital 
 of deeds of valour and of splendour, irradiating poor 
 human nature with a glow of glory whose beams will 
 reach Eternity. Yet this war, despite its horror, 
 despite the fact that it has filled the streets of every 
 big town in France with a melancholy line of cripples, 
 of men hopelessly maimed, who must go through the 
 remainder of their existence on this earth with 
 diminished vigour, has taught lessons and inculcated 
 warnings which must continue through the years to 
 bear their fruit and point the way to the right road 
 as well as constituting a danger-signal to national 
 shortcomings. 
 
 " Quit yourselves like men." The war will not 
 have been in vain if this lesson is laid to heart. Let 
 us have no more cant ; no more false sentiment ; no 
 more idle dreams and castles built upon the founda- 
 tions of a civilisation that does not exist. If, after 
 nearly 2000 years of Christianity, we have not learnt 
 to love one another, let us not, at least, pretend we 
 do — until we are awakened by a Hymn of Hate. The 
 Peace of the future is to the strong, to the country 
 that is alive to the menace of war, to the nation 
 constantly vigilant, to a people standing to arms. 
 France, with her woman's soul, clung to a belief in 
 civilisation that should make war unthinkable. But 
 the nations that emerge from this war will have lost
 
 THE AWAKENINCx 13 
 
 their illusions ; they will have grown old and wise, 
 and perhaps a little hard. Yet, at least, they will 
 have learnt to faee facts ; they will not cry Peace 
 when there is no peace. No, the policy of the nations 
 will be directed by hard facts ; the horrors of the camp 
 of Wittenberg are seared into our souls. Dreams and 
 idealism must have no place in our national affairs; 
 such pleasant pastimes bring too rude an awakening.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE THREE-YEARS LAW 
 
 During the Summer of 1913, it became evident 
 that France had to change her mihtary law to enable 
 her to cope with the new forces Germany had arrayed 
 against her. The growth of the Imperial effectives 
 was quite remarkable. They had been increased by 
 new legislation to 876,000 ; the cover troops, that is, 
 those placed along the frontier in readiness for 
 immediate service, were reinforced by 60,000 men and 
 500 pieces of artillery. To these numbers must be 
 added the enormous total of the reserve : 4,370,000. 
 Such masses were quite unknown to Europe and 
 inspired legitimate alarm, not only in France, but 
 amongst the other nations. The French Army 
 numbered 567,000 of the active, and 3,980,000 of 
 the reserve, namely, 700,000 fewer than the Germans. 
 Again, of this number, 50,000 were employed in 
 Northern Africa, and the infantry mass was further 
 depleted by the creation of artillery regiments, 
 machine-gun sections and aerial squadrons. It was 
 time, therefore, to act. 
 
 When the German Emperor went to Tangiers in 
 1905, few French people ignored the significance of 
 the step. And when, in 1911, the Panther anchored 
 off Agadir, each one realised that it was a new menace, 
 a new challenge to the right of France to Morocco, 
 
 U
 
 THE THREE-YEARS LAW 15 
 
 notwithstanding that " scrap of paper," the Algeciras 
 Conference. The presence of the cruiser was a protest 
 against the settlement by France of the Moroccan 
 Railway question and against the march of French 
 columns on Fez, which was the symbol of French pos- 
 session. On both occasions, Parliament went hurriedly 
 to work to vote extra credits, realising the state of 
 unpreparedness, and then sank into its habitual 
 indifference to these matters. But now it was no 
 longer possible to postpone the question of effectives. 
 The German advance was so real that France was 
 forced to take note of it on pain of being relegated, 
 definitely, to an inferior position. It was soon 
 apparent that if the discussion revealed some of the 
 vices of the French Parliamentary system, it also 
 demonstrated that Parliament could rise, on occasion, 
 above party and give an example of enlightened 
 patriotism. The Government of the Republic, indeed, 
 was more alive to its duty than the Imperial Govern- 
 ment, which, forty-five years before, had not had the 
 courage to support Marshal Niel's motion for universal 
 service. It was on the eve of the elections and it had 
 its own policy to pursue. It was again the eve of 
 the elections in 1913, but the spirit of the country 
 had changed; temporisation was no longer possible. 
 " Let the Chamber tell me the sum it will place at 
 my disposal and I will say in w^hat measure I can 
 organise the National Mobile Guard," cried Marshal 
 Leboeuf, in the discussion under the Second Empire. 
 It was a preposterous attitude to adopt, quite in 
 consonance, however, with the lack of seriousness of 
 the period. On the very brink of the war, the 
 Government actually proposed to reduce the annual 
 contingent !
 
 16 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 The discussion in 1913 was remarkable for several 
 things. One was its great length : it lasted three 
 months; another was the prolixity and poverty of 
 the speeches ; hardly one contained the germ of a 
 great idea. The striking contributions in this mad 
 welter of talk could be counted on the fingers of one 
 hand. The majority of deputies, until convinced of 
 the error of their ways, persisted in treating the ques- 
 tion as if it were political rather than patriotic. Day 
 by day they mounted to the tribune and delivered 
 orations as empty as air. An exception was the great 
 speech of M. Andre Lefevre, who had been Under 
 Secretary of State for Finance, some years before, 
 and had resigned " because he had not enough to do." 
 This novel reason proved his originality; nor was it 
 belied by his inethods in the rostrum. He was not 
 eloquent in an ordinary sense ; there was no attempt 
 at phrase-making; his facts spoke for themselves. 
 His rather homely appearance gave instinctive force to 
 his unadorned style, but his manifestly deep concern 
 for his subject obviated all need of rhetoric. Thus 
 his sentences were sharp and telling, and free from 
 all pose or attempts at persuasion ; and, perhaps, 
 because of that, they carried a double conviction. 
 Facts and figures were so downright in their character 
 that none could dispute them. 
 
 He showed that Germany had spent a colossal sum 
 upon her military preparations, and had been in- 
 defatigable in their continuance. He showed that, 
 during the preceding thirty years, France had spent 
 £110,000,000 as against £188,000,000 on the part of 
 Germany. Who was responsible for this disparity 
 of such danger to the country ? M. Lefevre showed 
 that no party in the State could escape from censure.
 
 THE THREE- YEARS LAW 17 
 
 In 1868, each section of the body poHtic was united — 
 to do nothing : the RepubHcans, because they would 
 not " turn France into a barracks " ; the Bonapartists, 
 because they feared the effect of any action upon 
 their popularity at the elections ; and the Government, 
 because it had not the energy to stand against a cry 
 of " reaction." 
 
 But if M. Lefevre's speech represented the sound 
 view of the situation, the contribution of M. Jean 
 Jaures presented features of brilliant generalisation, 
 expressed in lofty language, which always appeals to 
 Frenchmen. His counter proposition had but one 
 defect : it would not have worked. None the less, 
 it was attractive in the abstract and had much to 
 recommend it. Its weaknesses were in the details, 
 which were too fantastic and shadowy for a people who 
 knew what war was and had drunk deep of the bitter 
 cup of defeat. The Socialist leader based his argu- 
 mentation on the principle of : "la nation armee." 
 The only way to meet the situation was to utilise, fully, 
 the reserve, he insisted. And in this he was right, 
 as the Great War has shown. Germany's initial 
 advantage, apart from heavy cannon, machine-guns 
 and a more intensive training of her troops, was due 
 to her rapid mobilisation of reserves. 
 
 But the Socialist leader failed, notwithstanding his 
 talents, when it came to working out his scheme. 
 And yet the House, fascinated and half-convinced, 
 cheered him repeatedly — but it voted the other way. 
 This is a common attitude in assemblies which dis- 
 tinguish between personal success and political 
 expediency. The deputies, indeed, could not with- 
 hold their support from General Pau, who, with 
 
 General Joffre, was the special commissioner of the 
 c
 
 18 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Government. Yet so much was admirable in the 
 scheme of M. Jaures that, had he not been known for 
 his anti-mihtarism — and therefore suspect — he would 
 have fared much better. 
 
 What was the matter with France in a military 
 sense ? It was a question, was it not, of effectives ? 
 But the birth-rate must be arraigned for that. What- 
 ever was done, declared Jaures, that primary fact 
 could not be disavowed. The Germans were more 
 prolific than the French and, consequently, had 
 more soldiers. " The Three- Years Law is mere 
 plagiarism of the Germans," he said, with an im- 
 passioned gesture such as Jean Weber has so happily 
 caricatured. " You are beaten in advance ! " he 
 shouted. " Notwithstanding the Three-Years Law 
 you will have an inferiority, at the outset, of 200,000. 
 Thus the sacrifice demanded will aggravate the 
 malaise. The equilibrium, already disturbed, will 
 be further accentuated to the extent of 20,000 a 
 year." The population of France was only 43,000,000 
 and that of Germany 70,000,000. In face of this 
 inequality it was essential that every citizen should 
 be trained to arms. But when he came to this part 
 of the subject, the Socialist orator fell short of his 
 first flights. He was pathetically inadequate. He 
 proposed a military service of eighteen months, then 
 of a year, and finally, from 1918, onwards, of six 
 months. Before their embodiment, the young men 
 were to train for one day a month, and, after their 
 •liberation as reservists, one day every quarter. 
 
 The war has shown the possibility of training the 
 young soldier in less than six months; but when 
 M. Jaures presented his scheme none foresaw the 
 fantastic character that the fighting would assume.
 
 THE THREE- YEARS LAW 19 
 
 If it had presented its habitual physiognomy of massed 
 movements in the open, soldiers of six months' 
 training would have been inadequate to the first shock 
 of battle. Though, as we have shown, there were 
 points in the speech that revealed acute observation 
 and an accurate reading of the times, the treatment of 
 details was deplorable. Here and there his inspiration 
 failed him, as if his mentor, who was known to be 
 Captain Girard, a writer on military topics, had ceased 
 to jog his elbow. One of the least happy of his 
 inventions was his proposal in regard to the " cover." 
 He considered that it was quite adequate with the 
 protection of the Eastern Forts. Again, the frontier 
 departments, being rich and highly industrialised, 
 could organise their own defence. " If you have 
 confidence in the people, if you organise them in 
 unities constituted locally and ready to march at the 
 first sound of the war tocsin, if you launch all these 
 living forces towards the frontier, this, indeed, is 
 the real cover." From this passage you may judge 
 the character of his pleading : the appeal to national 
 sentiment and spontaneous enthusiasm, as opposed 
 to the laboured and essentially mechanical prepara- 
 tion of the Germans. He went to military history to 
 prove that, in 1813, Germany was saved not by her 
 generals formed in the school of Frederick the Great, 
 but by her landwehr, which constituted 60 per cent, 
 of the army — peasants hastily armed to defend the 
 soil. Evidently he thought that the old revolu- 
 tionary spirit would flame forth again in France and 
 suffice against any wanton attack. 
 
 He was admirable in his description of the German 
 plan to invade France abruptly and to bring her to 
 her knees by forced marches, by a rapid succession of
 
 20 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 blows, and the occupation of her capital, and then 
 to turn swiftly towards Russia. Jaures found con- 
 solation — alas ! unwarranted — in the thought that 
 Germany under Prussian domination would never 
 make full use of her reserves. She was afraid, he said, 
 of a democratic army, afraid of that spirit which had 
 enabled France, amidst all her difficulties and lack 
 of preparation, to resist for seven months, in '70, and 
 had given Bismarck and Von Moltke a certain anxiety 
 even after Sedan. Better build strategic railways 
 than barracks, he said, so that an avalanche of men 
 might be poured on the frontier to meet the German 
 mass — a conclusion which was wise enough. 
 
 Then there was M. Clementel, a former Minister of 
 Colonies, with some experience of army affairs, who 
 had likewise his little plan to propose. He wished 
 to divide the reserve into eleven classes which would 
 train alternately, for a month at a time, during the 
 year. Parliament rejected it, not because it was 
 fanciful, but because the transportation of 200,000 
 men a month to their training camps would dis- 
 arrange the railway systems. M. Mcssimy — who was 
 Minister of War, during the early days of the Great 
 Invasion, and, like Mr. Winston Churchill, resigned 
 his Cabinet functions to join the army — devised a 
 method whereby the youth of the country would be 
 trained for twenty-six months. How he proposed to 
 bridge the gap between the departure of the time- 
 expired men and the arrival of the new recruits was 
 never made clear. In the light of his subsequent 
 experience as a Colonel of troops, and wounded in 
 action, he probably thought better of his own plan. 
 
 General Pau clinched the matter by a series of 
 irrefutable figures. His style differed utterly from
 
 THE THREE-YEARS LAW 21 
 
 that of any other speaker. He showed the quick 
 temperament of a leader of the old school, who 
 believed in a brisk offensive. Taking umbrage, one 
 day, at the remarks of a deputy, he gathered up his 
 papers and walked out of the House, to the con- 
 sternation of the Government. Wounded in the 1870 
 conflict and bearing the token of it in an amputated 
 arm, he looked and spoke with the abruptness of the 
 traditional soldier. As a leader of men he was 
 impetuous and brusque in his methods, rather than 
 a cool calculator like the Generalissimo. He told the 
 House, with a certain impetuousness, that the troops 
 available for national defence were scarcely more 
 than half the German effectives. For, abstraction 
 made of the number serving overseas, France had 
 only 480,000 in her active army, whilst Germany had 
 830,000. First-class reserve, territorials, and the 
 reserve of the territorials amounted to 3,978,000, of 
 which a part had performed only twelve months' 
 service in accordance with the terms of the 1889 law. 
 In Germany, the reserve amounted to 4,370,000, 
 giving an advantage to that country of 400,000 men. 
 The effectives were constantly growing in the one 
 country, with the advance in population, but remained 
 stationary in the other. Whilst France called up 
 every available man for service, Germany was in the 
 happier position of being able to dispense with a 
 certain portion of her resources. Thus, automatic- 
 ally, an increase in her peace establishment meant 
 an increase in the reserve. 
 
 The German law of 1913 gave 63,000 more men 
 to the active army and increased the effectives to 
 5,400,000. The speaker was even more impressive 
 when, looking forward to 1937 — in twenty-four years
 
 22 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 from that date — he anticipated that the adverse 
 balance in the reserve would amount to one million 
 and a half. " Since our numerical weakness is un- 
 deniable, we must increase the value of our troops," 
 declared the veteran in the thunder of the House. 
 And he added, that military value was dependent 
 upon cohesion and training. Those two advantages 
 could be obtained by increasing the effectives and 
 prolonging the period under arms. What had the 
 law of 1913 given to Germany? It had given to her 
 a better quality of troops and permitted greater 
 rapidity of mobilisation. The cover troops repre- 
 sented, henceforth, about half the total effective of 
 the German Army. In a few hours, then, half the 
 German Army could enter the field. Out of twenty- 
 three German army corps, eleven were up to war 
 strength and ready for instant service. Finally, this 
 unconsciously eloquent advocate of the momentous 
 change in French armament said that by incorporat- 
 ing a class and a half of their youngest reserve, the 
 German troops of the interior would reach their full 
 strength whilst the French had to receive four or 
 five classes of reserves — a fact which retarded, 
 notabh^ the mobilisation. 
 
 I have given the discussion at length because it 
 supplies the underlying causes of Germany's military 
 superiority. It explains why the " attaque brusquee " 
 succeeded up to a certain point; it explains, also, 
 why the Chamber, after listening to the most authori- 
 tative champion of Three-Years, gave M. Barthou, 
 whose courage throughout the tremendous debate 
 was proof against all assaults, an overwhelming 
 majority, and France an additional 180,000 men, 
 whose presence with the colours was of immense
 
 THE THREE-YEARS LAW 28 
 
 value in the Great Retreat a year later. It is acknow- 
 ledged by military experts that, had not thoroughly 
 trained troops formed the base of the army, the 
 Generalissimo would not have found to his hand 
 the instrument needed to make the stand on theMarne. 
 The fact is undisputed, and to M. Barthou is due the 
 honour of having refused to disregard the logic of 
 events, for which, alas ! he had every precedent.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY 
 
 The national army arose suddenly out of the blood 
 and turmoil of the Revolution. The country was 
 aflame with enthusiasm and informed with the spirit 
 of sacrifice. The urgency of the times was well 
 represented by the law of March 4, 1791, which 
 declared in all the ardour of the First Republic : 
 " The service of the country is a civic and general 
 duty." That fine definition was born of the need 
 of the nation to defend itself against overwhelming 
 odds ; and thus, every citizen was called to a place 
 in the army. The King's forces, which existed before 
 the nation in arms, was composed, on the other hand, 
 of French and foreign mercenaries and a militia 
 raised by royal authority. Though, sometimes, these 
 professionals espoused the popular cause and fought 
 for patriotic purposes, they were primarily engaged 
 to defend the King's interest, and the two were not 
 necessarily identical. Not infrequently it happened 
 that the army Avas on one side of the barricade and 
 the people on the other. The recruiting sergeant 
 had much to do with the presence of men under the 
 King's banner, and certain vigorous methods rein- 
 forced his arts of persuasion. To the regular pay of 
 the soldier was added the prospect of unlimited pillage 
 in foreign war. Generally he fought because he was 
 
 24
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ARMY 25 
 
 paid for it, and his royal master had no particular need 
 to enlist his sentimental interest in the enterprise. 
 
 But another change came when the Republic 
 emerged from the glowing brazier of Revolutionary 
 France. The country was beset with numerous 
 enemies anxious to champion the lost cause of 
 monarchy, though the people of these nations, as 
 the official text-books in France tell us, had no 
 quarrel with the people of France. And then, just 
 as one hundred and twenty years later, the German 
 princes led the hosts against France and the response 
 was the uprising of the nation. Since the Revolution, 
 the nations of Europe have adopted national service 
 in acceptance of the principle laid down on March 4, 
 1791, that it was a " civic and general duty." The 
 Convention ordered levies en masse, and this principle 
 was embodied definitely in the enactment of March 23, 
 1793, which said that from this moment until the 
 territories of the Republic were free from enemies, 
 all Frenchmen were liable to serve; the 2nd Article 
 decreed that young men should fight, that the 
 married men should forge arms and transport material, 
 the women to make tents and clothing and serve in 
 the hospitals, the children to convert old linen into 
 surgeons' lint, and the old men to be carried to the 
 public squares to encourage the warriors, to excite 
 their hatred against the Kings, and promote unity 
 in the Republic. The annual drafts were fixed by the 
 law of Fructidor 19 An VI, and they were recruited 
 by drawing lots and by enrolment. A later law of 
 the Year VII allowed those drawn to purchase 
 substitutes, and it was under this law that Napoleon 
 raised his armies. The system lasted until 1814, 
 when the fortunes of France were at a low ebb. The
 
 26 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 country had become tired of a military Imperialism, 
 which had devitalised it and left it with monstrous 
 debts. There was no further taste for arms ; Volun- 
 tary engagements had practically ceased. Thus the 
 abrogation of conscription was tantamount to abolish- 
 ing the army. The wars of the First Empire had 
 worked out the vein of militarism. 
 
 Compulsion, however, had to be re-established, in 
 principle at least, on March 18, 1818, by the Gouvion 
 St. Cyr law. A certain number of men was called 
 up annually and the system existed side by side with 
 voluntary engagements. The annual contingent was 
 fixed at 40,000. There was further legislation on 
 March 21, 1832, due to Marshal Soult. This estab- 
 lished that conscription was the normal method and 
 engagements the subsidiary one, but the principle of 
 paying substitutes was admitted. The service was 
 for seven years. The army was divided into two 
 classes : the one performed the full term ; the other 
 was en conge, and constituted the reserve. The 
 business of finding substitutes rose to such a pitch 
 that agencies were founded to deal with it. It became 
 a crying scandal. Reform was necessary, and it was 
 embodied in a law dated April 26, 1855. By its 
 provisions a fund was formed. Those who wished 
 to buy themselves out were obliged to contribute a 
 certain sum fixed each year by the Minister of War. 
 This money was allocated to bonuses paid to time- 
 expired men to re-engage. The system was not as 
 brilliant as it looked and in practice it worked badly. 
 It lowered the status of the soldier in his own eyes 
 and in those of public opinion, for it gave to national 
 service the character of a punishment or a commercial 
 transaction. Only those remained in the ranks who
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ARMY 27 
 
 could not find a substitute or because of a monetary 
 inducement. Again, it was bad because it created a 
 permanent class of under-officer who regarded the 
 army as his perquisite and shut the door of promotion 
 to the common soldier. The plan, none the less, 
 prevailed until 1868, when, like a trumpet blast, 
 startling Europe out of her sleep, came Prussia's 
 victories over Southern Germany. 
 
 The meaning was clear. It meant that, since 
 Napoleon's amazing successes, Prussia had adopted 
 a military regime which gave her superiority over 
 her neighbours. It was based on universal service. 
 If France realised how great were her own military 
 shortcomings, she had not the strength of mind neces- 
 sary to institute a system involving serious sacrifice. 
 Even Marshal Niel, who presented a project to the 
 Imperial Legislature, did not prevail against a con- 
 spiracy of optimism based on a total disregard of the 
 facts. The Marshal, indeed, played the ungrateful 
 part of a Lord Roberts in warning his nation against 
 an illusory peace. His was the vox clamantis in 
 deserto calling in vain for a real national service. 
 His prophetic eyes had seen the storm, which others 
 preferred not to see. However, the law was altered 
 in a half-hearted effort to obtain reform, but the old 
 facilities for substitution remained. It was then 
 decided to create a national Garde Mobile composed 
 of men excused from active service. Unfortunately, 
 there was no time to organise it before war with 
 Germany broke out. Though it lacked training and 
 experience and was comparatively ill-disciplined, it 
 was not wanting in courage, and proved of utility 
 in the campaign. Lord Kitchener joined it as a 
 young volunteer.
 
 28 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 When the dib&cle came, the whole of Europe was 
 able to read the lesson in the lurid light it flung to 
 heaven. German dominance had been built up on 
 a conscripted army, against which a volunteer and 
 partially conscripted army struggled in vain. It was 
 overborne by sheer weight of numbers. England 
 felt herself guarded by the inviolate sea, but the 
 other Powers of the Continent adopted the principle 
 of national service. In France itself, the law of 
 1872 was the logical outcome of the dread experience 
 of the annee terrible. The subsequent legislation, which 
 is dated 1889, 1905, and 1913 aimed at rendering 
 military service more complete and more in accord 
 with Republican equality. The last law, just before 
 the war, imposed the same burden upon each citizen. 
 But an immense amount of discussion was necessary 
 before reaching this simple result, for alas ! political 
 interests in various specious guises had interfered 
 with the pure working out of national defence. As 
 a consequence, exemptions were always considerable. 
 The broadest interpretation was given to " higher 
 education," and examinations, useless from a national 
 point of view or as a test of learning, existed for the 
 sole purpose of allowing the son of the bourgeois to 
 curtail his military service. It was obvious that a 
 knowledge of some out-of-the-way tongue could not 
 be held to compensate, in a national sense, for the 
 loss of a man's service in the army. 
 
 A large number of exemptions arose through the 
 laudable desire to lighten the burden for widows and 
 families dependent upon an only son. But, as a 
 result of it, two different categories of reservists were 
 created, those whom the haccalauriat had excused 
 after a year's service, and that much larger class of
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ARMY 29 
 
 comparatively unlettered lads who escaped with the 
 minimum term because of being only sons. In their 
 case the year's service was not as efficacious as in 
 the other, where education had made possible a more 
 intensive process of training. And two theories, 
 affecting the use of reserves, see-sawed through the 
 Parliamentary debates for many years. One school 
 held that it was sufficient to season the mass of 
 reservists with long-service soldiers, whose influence 
 and training would be strong enough to lead them 
 to victory on the day of battle ; the other side 
 maintained that salvation lay in giving training to 
 as large a proportion as possible, so that units 
 could act independently, and this theory eventually 
 prevailed. The Three- Years Law was the outcome 
 of it. 
 
 The law of July 27, 1872, had reaffirmed the old 
 Revolutionary principle that every Frenchman was 
 liable to serve. The military period was fixed at 
 twenty years — from twenty to forty. Thus consider- 
 able advance had been made over the earlier legis- 
 lation. There was no longer any question of a 
 limited contingent or of substitution by money pay- 
 ment, yet, as is clear from my earlier paragraphs, 
 the law did not establish equality. The yearly 
 contingent was divided into two parts ; the one served 
 for five years, the other for one year or six months 
 only. The drawing of lots decided to which category 
 a man belonged. Only sons, who supported widowed 
 mothers, the clergy, and members of the teaching 
 profession were excused ; also, there existed a one- 
 year service for young men who volunteered before 
 the yearly drawings, who had passed their matricula- 
 tion and had paid sixty pounds. I have touched
 
 30 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 already upon the defects of this system and its 
 doubtful advantage to education. 
 
 Then came the law of July 15, 1889, which estab- 
 lished a Three- Years service on a basis of absolute 
 equality. It represented the principle of training 
 for everybody, whereas the earlier enactments had 
 created a nucleus of professionals to act as motor 
 to the military machine. No one served for five 
 years under this new system, but then no one served 
 only for six months. The weakness of the measure 
 resided in the wide facilities given for " dispenses." 
 After a year's effective service, exemption could be 
 obtained either for bread-winners or for the theolo- 
 gical and general student. Thus the real advantage 
 of the Act was whittled down to a partial instead of 
 a total exemption. The old voluntariat (Tun an was 
 superseded by a special dispensation for students, 
 but there was no money payment. Yet the law of 
 1889 caused heartburnings because of its invidious 
 character. Examinations designed to fulfil the letter 
 but not the spirit of the enactment sprang up with the 
 express object of shortening military service. Even 
 art workers and students in commercial colleges were 
 included in the dispensation. 
 
 And now comes the statute of March 21, 1905, 
 which purported to promote homogeneity of the 
 reserves and to suppress exemptions so favourable to 
 thefils a papa. But its primary object was to reduce 
 the period of service to two years. It was a Revolu- 
 tionary measure, daring and insensate in its contempt 
 for the danger involved by an obvious reduction in 
 the effectives. This danger was to be conjured in 
 various ways : by employing " auxiliaries " (or the 
 medically unfit) in clerical work; by suppressing
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ARMY 31 
 
 exemptions, and limiting furloughs, and by giving 
 special advantages to re-engaged men. 
 
 One of the main objections to the change was that 
 it prejudicially affected the staff of army instructors, 
 who were exposed to a dangerous fluctuation. Just 
 when greater intensity in the training was needed, 
 the quality and quantity of the instructors declined. 
 It was the exact opposite of the condition created 
 by earlier legislation, which rendered the corps of 
 drill sergeants practically inaccessible to new blood. 
 The Bill offered special inducements to sous-officiers 
 to remain with the colours, and gave to likely young 
 men in the ranks an opportunity to rise — the class, 
 who, under the earlier laws, would have benefited 
 by the voluntariat. These previous efforts at army- 
 making had created masses of imperfectly trained 
 reserves. The soutiens defamille (supports of widows 
 and poor families) represented, for instance, 60,000, 
 which made 600,000 in a decade. Each man in this 
 vast army had had only a year's training, which, 
 though adequate in some cases, was inadequate in 
 the mass. The two-years law sought to remedy this 
 by requiring a minimum of two years from every 
 one. Another important provision allowed grants 
 to be paid to poor families deprived of their sons, 
 which shows that Parliament was solicitous for the 
 weakest in the community, even in such a matter 
 as the national defence. 
 
 Finally, there was the law of 1913, passed by 
 M. Barthou, the then Premier, in the teeth of great 
 opposition, and as a reply to the formidable prepara- 
 tions of Germany. This we must leave to the next 
 chapter. Suffice it to say here that the Act provided 
 for a three-years service in the Active Army, eleven
 
 32 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 years in the First Class Reserve, seven years in the 
 Territorial Army, and seven in the Reserve of the 
 Territorial. Thus the citizen could be mobilised up 
 to the age of forty-eight. After that, he was no 
 longer liable to be called up.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD 
 
 There is this satisfactory about a Frenchman — 
 that rarely he disdains his origin. He is not the 
 sort of man who spurns the ladder by which he 
 mounted ; rather does he contemplate with pleasure 
 every rung of the way. Joffre, in that sense, is 
 typically French. He rejoices in the modest origin 
 which has given him the privilege of building his 
 own fortune. But his pride and his independence 
 come, I think, from his racial attributes. They are 
 indigenous to the soil, to that fruitful soil of the 
 Roussillon, the old province of France which came 
 under the French crown in the reign of Louis XIV, 
 in the middle of the seventeenth century, and as a 
 result of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. Known to-day 
 as the Eastern Pyrenees, and become one of the 
 regular departments of France, it has preserved much 
 of its old Spanish ciiaracter. It has maintained a 
 particular flavour, like the wine which grows in its 
 smiling vineyards and the peaches that stretch for 
 twenty kilometres, a vast and fertile garden, round 
 Perpignan. The local capital is peculiarly Southern : 
 sunny, wide-spaced, prosperous, embowered in hand- 
 some planes. The inhabitants wear the easy grace 
 and captivating manner of people who, under a blue 
 sky, do not find life too hard. Joffre's town of 
 
 D 33
 
 34 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Rivesaltes is close by, connected by tram and rail. 
 It is less agreeable of aspect than Perpignan, there is 
 less pride in appearances ; indeed, it is thoroughly 
 Spanish in style, even if French in the temper of its 
 politics. The inhabitants speak Catalan like their 
 brethren on the further side of the Pyrenees, where 
 newspapers are produced in the tongue, but their 
 sympathies are as w^holly French as those of their 
 famous townsman. And what a cult of him there 
 is ! Every cafe and most of the shops have a por- 
 trait of him on the large scale, as if a small repro- 
 duction would not suffice for his reputation. The 
 album of a local tobacconist is a gallery of the great 
 man in various stages of his development. Old in- 
 habitants contribute anecdotes more or less authentic 
 of his studious yet sturdy youth, of his kindness and 
 modesty, of his astonishing simplicity. 
 
 " Yes, he came here years ago and played manille 
 with his father and his father's friends, and he would 
 not allow his old acquaintances to change their 
 manner of speaking to him ; they were to say ' thee ' 
 and ' thou ' as in the old days. His father's bit of 
 land had become flooded. ' You must cut trenches 
 to drain off the water,' he said to Joffre pere, ' I 
 know something about that; it is my metier.' ..." 
 When war broke out, the inhabitants had no doubt 
 about anything. The country was safe. What was 
 an invasion when Joffre was in command ? 
 
 The future Generalissimo was a flaxen-haired boy, 
 with a light complexion and a firm, straightforward 
 and kindly expression. There was certainly little of 
 the Southerner either in his face or in the square-cut 
 vigorous figure, but he had the independence of the 
 Catalan in his character. Though an excellent com-
 
 JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD 35 
 
 rade and full of fun, he did not like to be interfered 
 with in his work, and was ready to fight his tormentors 
 to secure quiet. Later, the kind blue eyes, wide set 
 beneath the bushy eyebrows, grew steel-like in their 
 expression when an acquaintance tried to take 
 advantage of his amiability to advance a protege. 
 Joffre has a horror of the recommendation. " Let the 
 young man make his own way as I have made mine," 
 he would say; " that is the only sound method." All 
 his life he has been opposed to patronage ; it annoys 
 him, he feels it to be unfair — a mean advantage. 
 When he was appointed Chief-of-Staff, and eventu- 
 ally Commander-in-Chief, in 1911, he received visitors 
 only once a fortnight at his office in the Invalides, 
 because he wished to avoid, as much as possible, 
 bores and protectors of interesting young men. Merit 
 is the only channel which he recognises for advance- 
 ment. The knowledge of his utter impartiality has 
 robbed his decisions, often sternly disciplinary, of all 
 personal sting. The army felt that in him they had 
 a final court of appeal, pure and fearless. 
 
 Boyhood's days at Rivesaltes were unaccompanied 
 by a luxury, which might have dulled the edge of 
 fine ambitions. The little house in the narrow Rue 
 des Grangers where he was born, remains the symbol 
 of his simplicity. The humble bedroom, flanked by 
 dining-room and kitchen, where he first saw the 
 light, the store-room above served by an outside 
 pulley for the raising of winter's stores — all this speaks 
 of a laborious and thrifty life such as the peasantry 
 live hereabouts. The future General was one of 
 eleven children of a working cooper. According to 
 Joffre' s sister, the family, of Spanish origin and called 
 Gouffre, is of noble descent; but its fortune had
 
 36 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 dwindled when Grandfather Joffre, leaving his native 
 country for political reasons, started as a tradesman 
 at Rivesaltes. He left no particular heritage to his 
 son Joseph, the offspring of middle age, whom he 
 seems utterly to have neglected. Joseph was little 
 more than a working man with a patch of vineyard 
 close to the town. But for a friendly uncle, struck 
 by his intelligence, Joseph Jacques Cesar Joffre — our 
 Joffre — would not have enjoyed the education which 
 was his at the lycee at Perpignan and at the Poly- 
 technique in Paris. 
 
 It was to his stay in that admirable school for 
 civil and military engineers that he owes the ground- 
 work upon which he has so successfully built. It 
 gave him an immense advantage at the start. 
 Though he passed into the school with the high 
 number of fourteen and became, because of it, a 
 sergeant in his dormitory, charged with keeping order 
 amongst older lads — rather trying to his silent and 
 unassertive character — he did not consistently show 
 the brilliancy that was expected of him. On leaving, 
 his number had fallen to thirty-five, which did not 
 entitle him to high civil employment under Govern- 
 ment. Whether as a consequence of it, or because of 
 a pronounced vocation, he joined the Corps of Engi- 
 neers as lieutenant. Already he had had a taste of the 
 life, sufficiently discouraging, one would think, in the 
 War of 1870, which broke in upon his school career. 
 He served for some months as a junior subaltern in 
 a fort round Paris. Even at that age, he was known 
 for his silent seriousness, and the memory of the 
 national defeat seemed to have sunk deeply into his 
 soul. It made him a patriot, eager to w^ork for 
 France and for her re-establishment. That, more
 
 JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD 87 
 
 than anything else, fired his ambition, for he was not 
 one to crouch at the feet of chance, waiting, as an 
 arriviste waits, for his own advancement. Not until 
 the moment of his Soudan expedition, in early middle 
 life, did he expand to the full limit of his capacity, 
 and then the call of country and the consciousness 
 of duty done for France were responsible. Before 
 that, he had not shown, I think, any great desire to 
 progress beyond the common mark. But when he 
 saw that he could be useful to his time and generation, 
 a holy zeal possessed him to press on to the great 
 achievement. And his tranquil courage and perse- 
 verance were rewarded to an extent that seemed 
 incredible in his early years. But, even so, he would 
 not regard his position as head of the army with 
 complacency or self-satisfaction. " The war found 
 me," he said to a lifelong friend ; " I did not seek it." 
 That is the note of the man. 
 
 His Soudan campaign, which came when he was 
 a Commandant at the age of forty-three, gave him 
 deserved renown, for it was a masterpiece of organisa- 
 tion. Before that, he had done more or less humdrum 
 work on defences, gaining his captaincy that way, 
 when working on the forts round Paris ; he continued 
 in the provinces and in Upper Tonking, where his con- 
 structions were aimed at the predatory Chinese. He 
 fought them from Formosa, whither he had gone as 
 a change from spade and trowel work, but partly, I 
 suspect, to forget in change of scene the loss of a 
 beloved young wife. Admiral Courbet, most famous 
 of pioneers in the French Colonial domain, was then 
 concluding the Tonking campaign, and employed him 
 to the general satisfaction. The future Generalis- 
 simo was in fighting and fort building showing an
 
 38 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 equal talent. Finally, he exhibited a new side to his 
 character by organising an artistic and industrial 
 exhibition at Hanoi. Though wrapped up in his 
 profession and seeming, daily, to take a greater 
 pleasure in it, he showed adaptability and could turn 
 his hand to anything. 
 
 His celebrated march to Timbuctoo again showed 
 him as the all-round man, for there he had to think 
 of everything. He had gone out into the wilds for a 
 pacific object, for the building of the Soudan railway, 
 destined to link the Senegal to the Niger river. His 
 new post did not, strictly speaking, appeal to him. 
 It interrupted his course of lectures on fortifications 
 at the School at Fontainebleau, which succeeded to his 
 command of the Railway Battalion of Engineers. It 
 seemed to him like his own first-class interment. 
 Surely there was no glory in building a railway in the 
 desert ; yet he was to find it there. At that moment 
 France had become conscious of her colonial posses- 
 sions, and with it had become the desire for develop- 
 ment. A haphazard policy had been amended into 
 a settled plan of pacific penetration by means of the 
 Niger. The railway was to be the great instrument 
 of civilisation, linking the two great waterways and 
 making the desert blossom as a rose. It had begun 
 at Kayes, the capital, under Colonel Gallieni, then 
 commanding in Upper Senegal, and had been pushed 
 to the hundred and sixteenth kilometre. Then yellow 
 fever and a lack of credits from home brought it 
 to an abrupt stop. Commandant Joffre, with his 
 habitual vigour, added kilometre to kilometre until 
 the hundred and fifty-ninth mark was reached. 
 
 Thereafter came orders to undertake an expedition 
 to Timbuctoo. The mysterious city had been entered,
 
 JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD 39 
 
 just before, by Commandant Boiteaux, who had gone 
 up the river Niger in a flotilla of boats as far as 
 Cabara and there gained the city on foot. It was 
 resolved to extend the French dominion over it and 
 over the loop of the river as it sweeps downward to 
 its ocean outlet. Joffre's duty was to support his 
 superior, Colonel Bonnier, who had given him a 
 rendezvous outside the city's walls. The Colonel 
 was to go by river ; Joffre followed the left bank with 
 a force of one thousand, three parts of which were 
 bearers and servants. He started from Segou, two 
 days after Christmas 1893. The rendezvous never 
 took place. The Colonel having made quicker pro- 
 gress, turned back to meet the Commandant, but 
 failed to arrive; the column was assassinated. Only 
 one white officer, Captain Nigotte, escaped to tell the 
 tale in Timbuctoo, where fears were expressed for 
 Joffre's safety. But the latter had acted with great 
 vigour and yet caution in his dealings with the 
 natives. He went quickly to the rescue of the few 
 survivors of the column, chastised the murderers, and 
 then, on February 12, entered the city without further 
 fighting, carrying with him the bodies of the white 
 officers. At the moment when the news reached him, 
 he was engaged in crossing the river, in face of a 
 hostile band of Tuaregs, who had burned his boats 
 at the habitual crossing-place. 
 
 More than 500 miles separated Segou from Tim- 
 buctoo, and the journey had been beset with peril 
 and difficulty, how difficult and how perilous is 
 admirably told in Joffre's own report of the expedi- 
 tion. He showed good generalship by keeping his 
 men in close order and by throwing out scouts to 
 protect his flanks and rear. At night a careful
 
 40 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 watch was set over the camp, and the young Com- 
 mander went the rounds to see that his black sentinels 
 did not sleep at their posts. Water was a great 
 difficulty, for there was cither too much of it or not 
 enough. Great flooded areas, where the river had 
 overflowed, left swamps which could only be passed 
 by circuitous marches in an unknown country. By 
 contrast there was a stark and staring need of wells 
 in a burning desert, where bearers dropped by the 
 way for want of the precious liquid, and communica- 
 tions were endangered because posts left in the rear 
 could not obtain the necessary water. In conse- 
 quence, the young Commander had to scatter his 
 column through the villages, where existed a species 
 of boycott, for the natives had fled before the advance 
 and had carried off all foodstuffs. Joffre kept a 
 stout heart and a cool head in these trying circum- 
 stances. There was a good deal of fighting, especially 
 in the later stages, but Joffre took the offensive, as 
 the safer way, and did not allow himself to be 
 attacked by the enemy. He fought to clear a path 
 for his column. 
 
 His initiative and sense of responsibility shone in 
 this crisis. When he entered the city the engineer 
 in him reappeared, and he planned and plotted for 
 the safety of the citizens. Strategic positions were 
 seized and upon them were placed forts and block- 
 houses. Then, in his turn, he acted as political 
 officer and received the submission of the tribesmen. 
 In the midst of these high occupations he received 
 orders from the Governor of the region to rejoin his 
 railway at Kayes. For once in his life he disobeyed 
 and sent his reasons, which, of course, were accepted. 
 When, finally, he left Timbuctoo, he had made
 
 JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD 41 
 
 an excellent job of it. He had established his 
 reputation as an organiser and soldier-colonist, and 
 his reward was the red rosette which decorated his 
 tunic of Lieutenant-Colonel. His first grade in the 
 Order had been gained in Formosa. Timbuctoo 
 closed the second colonial phase in Joffre's career. 
 
 The third was to open two years later when, as 
 full Colonel, he was given fortification work to do 
 in Madagascar. It was at the moment of British 
 reverses in the Boer War. Certain memories, con- 
 nected with Fashoda and Dreyfus, rankled in French 
 breasts. The Paris Government felt it was as well 
 to be prepared against possible enterprise on the 
 part of the British fleet in the Indian Ocean; and 
 so the defences of the big island were set hastily on 
 foot. Diego Suarez, the naval base to the north, 
 was fortified by Joffre under the eye of the Governor, 
 General Gallieni, who was then gaining renown 
 for his administration of the island. It was there 
 that the two met and fraternised, as expatriated 
 Frenchmen will, and learned to respect each other's 
 qualities. 
 
 Therewith closed the final chapter in Joffre's 
 colonial life. Henceforth he was to work in France, 
 in the immediate path of the great office to which 
 destiny was hastening him. Successively he com- 
 manded the 19th brigade of Artillery at Vincennes, 
 and the 6th division of Infantry at Lille, of which 
 town he was the military governor; at Amiens, he 
 was head of the Second Army Corps. Between the 
 stages of Brigadier and General of Division, he was 
 director of Artillery at the Ministry of War. And so 
 he performed the whole cycle of the military art, 
 before arriving at the Superior Council of War
 
 42 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 where he was to receive the crown of the chief com- 
 mand. He had served in just the capacities, colonial 
 and metropolitan, which equipped him for his great 
 responsibility. No point in his experience could be 
 considered useless from the building of forts to the 
 construction of railways ; from the organisation of a 
 self-contained force on the Niger, to the command 
 of troops in France ; from his lectures to military 
 students, to his direction of the artillery. 
 
 The supreme honour came to him on July 29, 1911. 
 The Panther had dropped a noisy and menacing 
 anchor in the quiet waters of Agadir. In spite of 
 assurances of peace from Germany and the fixity of 
 the pacifist idea in France, clear-sighted people saw 
 the cloud of danger in the sky. Joffre had no mis- 
 givings on the subject. One of the earliest questions 
 to occupy him was that of effectives. None but he 
 and his charming wife, whom he had married on 
 returning to France, will ever realise how hard he 
 worked during the three years that intervened before 
 the outbreak of the war. Sundays and weekdays — it 
 was an incessant round. He was deeply convinced 
 that the hour was approaching for the trial of the 
 French military institutions, to which he was called to 
 supply not merely the finishing touch, but, alas ! a great 
 deal of the foundation work. That was the tragedy 
 of it, the tragedy of an optimism, which had ignored 
 all German preparations. It had ignored the vast 
 accumulations of engines of war on the frontiers of 
 Lorraine and Belgium, it had ignored the meaning 
 of the caves and subterranean passages prepared in 
 advance in the Champagne and the Soissons district, 
 just as it ignored the other phases of German activity, 
 the systematic corruption, the spying, and the rest.
 
 JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD 43 
 
 Thus Joffre came to the post which his persistent 
 work had made a just, if onerous, reward. He was 
 GeneraHssimo in new conditions. The old duahty, 
 which allowed one man to lead in war and another to 
 prepare for it, was swept away. Parliament at last 
 had awakened to its dangers, and MM. Caillaux and 
 Messimy, Premier and Minister of War, had sub- 
 mitted to President Fallieres a new decree desig- 
 nating Joffre the Supreme Commander in time of 
 war and the Chief-of-Staff in peace. 
 
 It was an admirable choice. If it meant little to 
 the public which had forgotten all about the march 
 on the Niger, it meant a great deal to the army 
 which felt comforted and relieved at the appointment 
 of a sound and thorough administrator. For Joffre, 
 by long contact, knew every cog in the military 
 machine, which he was now called upon to direct. As 
 divisionnaires went, he was the youngest of his rank 
 in the army and had still some years before him which 
 he could count his own. Thus he joined experience 
 to a comparative youth, which was all in his favour. 
 Probably the defects rather than the qualities of the 
 organisation engaged his attention and stimulated 
 his amazing energy to even greater efforts. At the 
 age of fifty-nine he was faced with a task to try the 
 strongest head, the steadiest nerves, the most robust 
 health. Happily he possessed all three and placed 
 them unreservedly at the service of the State. France 
 was fortunate in her General-in-Chief. How he 
 succeeded in the colossal burden of the Great War 
 may be left for consideration to a future chapter.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PREPARATION 
 
 We have seen Joffre in the various stages of his 
 career acquiring that many-sided experience, which 
 was to serve him in excellent stead when, finally, 
 he came to supreme power. Sometimes the engineer 
 officer was uppermost, sometimes the combatant. 
 Though in the latter years, when qualifying for the 
 Council of War, he commanded troops over the very 
 ground where French and English were to oppose the 
 invaders in incredible battles, it is yet true that his 
 experience, with the exception of operations against 
 the Chinese and the Tuaregs on the Niger in his 
 march to Timbuctoo, consisted in the main of engi- 
 neering exploits with a military aim. Thus he coaxed 
 the desert into a railway track, and thus he cast up 
 mounds of earth and built defensive masonry around 
 Paris and in the provinces and at various strategic 
 points in France overseas. This contact with a larger 
 patrie and with the wider aspects of his profession 
 proved of immense service when, in the process of 
 time, he came to his great estate. It was in reviewing 
 the work of his early years, the period of his maturity 
 and then of his later life that he fully comprehended the 
 character of his task. He realised all the elements 
 that make up France, all the elements that must be 
 flung into the crucible of a national army. " Vive la 
 
 44
 
 PREPARATION 45 
 
 France " had a new meaning for him, for it meant the 
 France of Asia and Africa as well as the France of 
 metropolitan frontiers. 
 
 None the less, for all the pleasure of the prospect, 
 he was sensible of the weaknesses that lay underneath. 
 None better. Had he not himself said in his now 
 famous speech to the Polytechnicians, that you could 
 improvise nothing in war ? As a soldier, tried in the 
 service of his country, he was penetrated with that 
 truth. There must be preparation in war — that was 
 the implacable verity. He was emphatic on the 
 point in a speech which must be regarded as one of 
 the documents of the war. For he was speaking to 
 officers, past members of the famous school of which 
 he is a distinguished alumnus, and declared with that 
 sense of reality joined to idealism, which is as pleas- 
 ing to the plain man as to those in search of lofty 
 generalisation, that preparation implied many things. 
 His auditors, at this Old Boys' gathering, strained 
 their ears in the expectation of hearing something 
 removed from the banalities of the usual chairman's 
 utterance. And they were not disappointed. The 
 speech fitted the occasion like a glove; it was no 
 common one, for the Balkan War had broken out. 
 The eventual Commander-in-Chief could not ignore 
 a subject fraught with such consequence to him- 
 self and to his hearers (for the most part officers) 
 and quietly aware, no doubt, of the curiosity he 
 had excited, dealt broadly, yet sufficiently, with the 
 situation. 
 
 He began by arraying the forces one against the 
 other in the theatre of war. On the one side he said 
 were numbers and on the other preparation. You 
 could tell by the way in which he insisted on the
 
 46 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 latter word how much it meant to him. And yet 
 the subject must have been painful, for none realised 
 better than this impressive-looking man, with brow 
 rimmed with white hair and the white of massive 
 eyebrows, that France was not prepared. In elaborat- 
 ing his theme, he told what preparation meant. The 
 whole of national life must co-operate in it. And what 
 were the factors of success ? They were of three 
 kinds : material, intellectual, and moral. Under the 
 first came the number and equipment of the troops, 
 under the second and third the capacity of leaders 
 and the patriotism of the people. It was clear that 
 he felt the deep significance of the last quality. 
 Numbers and equipment were certainly important, 
 but patriotism was the soul of the army. " To be 
 ready in our epoch," he insisted, " implies a signi- 
 ficance of which those who prepared and conducted 
 war in the past can realise only with difficulty. It 
 would be illusory to count upon the popular elan 
 though it exceeded that of the volunteers of the 
 Revolution, if it were not supported by a previous 
 organisation. ' To be ready ' to-day, one must have 
 directed, in advance, all the resources of the country 
 and all its moral energy towards the unique end, 
 ' Victory.' " And then he proceeded to utter the 
 phrases which have become classical. They are a 
 synthesis of Joffre's system, the exposition of his 
 inward faith. " One must have organised every- 
 thing, foreseen everything. Once hostilities are com- 
 menced, no improvisation will be valid. What lacks 
 then, will be definitely lacking. The least omission 
 may cause a disaster." 
 
 And he proceeds to particularise. The call to 
 arms must reach those for whom it is intended.
 
 PREPARATION 47 
 
 Each man must know where to go and how to get 
 there and he must meet there his officers, his arms, 
 and his effects. And over this army which has been 
 organised, equipped, and assembled must be chiefs, 
 mihtary and administrative, imbued with the national 
 theory of the war. " But neither the material organ- 
 isation of this army nor its training would suffice to 
 assure victory if to this intelligent and strong body 
 a soul were lacking. This soul is Patriotism." That 
 he should lay stress upon the word showed how deeply 
 he had realised how even elaborate schemes of mobilis- 
 ation could come to naught without this saving grace, 
 without the faith which moves mountains. He 
 seemed to say : " We can save France, even if there 
 are flaws in our preparations, provided we possess 
 Patriotism — the sacred flame." By this alone could 
 soldier and civilian summon the courage to resist 
 reverses. 
 
 That Joffre himself accepted the heavy burden of 
 office, showed that he, too, was inspired by a strong 
 love of country and faith in the unlimited powers of 
 French adaptability. He knew that his countrymen 
 were capable of heroic resistance and a persistent 
 and yet strenuous effort, which would astonish the 
 world, because he had read in the heart of the piou- 
 piou undying love for country, and because he had 
 watched silently the growth of that national spirit 
 evoked by the brutal provocation of Germany. He 
 knew, also, the delicacy of fitting discipline to de- 
 mocracy and a fierce national spirit of independence 
 and justice to the exigencies of a European War. 
 Intuition and experience told him that only by the 
 finer emotions could the mass be moved, that it 
 would rebel against mechanical methods and harsh
 
 48 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 domination and yield only to the influence of enlight- 
 ened chiefs. Thus he was the man destined to lead 
 and to become the interpreter of the racial spirit of 
 France. 
 
 Joffre had established between himself and the 
 soldier in the trenches an irresistible current of 
 sympathy. How, nobody knows, but, at the very 
 commencement, his benevolent activity for the 
 common welfare was a common saying endearing 
 him to the legions under his control, and many were 
 the incidents quoted of his tenderness of heart He 
 had found a swift way to the understanding and 
 implicit obedience of his troops. By his acts of kind- 
 ness and consideration he had accumulated a stock of 
 allegiance from which to draw in the supreme hour, 
 when he should say, as on the eve of the battle of the 
 Marne : " Now is the time to conquer or to die." 
 Had he learned these secret arts of sympathy in the 
 wilds of Africa or in the cloistered life he led, like the 
 Pope in the Vatican, when harnessed to his work of 
 preparation at the Ministry of War ? I do not know, 
 but I suspect that this trait, like the others, was in- 
 born and developed by urgent circumstance. How- 
 ever we explain it, he became the most popular man in 
 France, a god and a hero, a name to conjure with. 
 " Notre Joffre " was a symbol of success, and of popular 
 confidence. The " magnificent rumour " which had 
 preceded him on the day of mobilisation was crystal- 
 lised into a solid renown when the public saw with 
 what calm and celerity he assembled troops and with 
 what mastery he played upon the railway keyboard. 
 Napoleon had won his battles with the legs of 
 his soldiers, Joffre was going to win them with his 
 railways.
 
 PREPARATION 49 
 
 It is not possible, of course, to repair defects of 
 forty years in two or three years even of unremitting 
 labour ; but knowing, as he did, the tone and temper 
 of the men he had to command and the miraculous 
 capacities of their nervous energy he did not doubt 
 for a moment the final triumph, and a species of 
 sublime confidence radiated from him whether at the 
 Ministry or in the field. It was with his friend and 
 companion-in-arms. General Pau, that he began to 
 work at the problems belonging to his position, and 
 the first of them was the effectives. When the in- 
 tentions of Germany could be no longer disguised, 
 Joffre resolved upon the only course compatible with 
 his responsibilities. He urged the Government to 
 augment the army pari passu with the increased 
 numbers on the other side of the Vosges, and, happily, 
 he found in M. Barthou, the Premier, a political leader 
 as strongly impressed as he with the high necessity 
 of action. This admirable statesman became, there- 
 fore, one of his collaborators in the national defence. 
 A Deputy at twenty-seven and a Minister at thirty- 
 three, this lawyer and journalist found full scope for 
 his activities only in the wide region of national 
 politics. His quickness of comprehension astonished 
 the experts, and perhaps confirmed their uneasy 
 suspicions that a lawyer knows everything; but 
 M. Barthou' s enthusiasm and deep conviction were 
 beyond all question. Some reproached him for being 
 a man of letters, guilty of writing an excellent history 
 of Mirabeau, but he sacrificed ruthlessly his intellec- 
 tual leisure and his love of reading on the altar of 
 duty. It would seem as if the figure of the Revolution- 
 ary aristocrat, which glows from the pages of his book, 
 had communicated his fire to his accomplished and
 
 50 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 versatile biographer. So M. Barthou rose grandly to 
 the situation and became, with Generals Joffre and 
 Pan, organiser of the new military plan to save France 
 from her disparity with the German Army. 
 
 Joffre occupied himself with his accustomed method 
 to the work of preparing the Government victory. 
 Some one has recalled a conversation which he had 
 with Joffre at this time. The General sits in an arm- 
 chair looking steadily into space. His visitor insists 
 on the impossibility of increasing the annual contin- 
 gents to the French Army. But, he says persuasively, 
 you can supplement the number by enrolling the 
 black man. " The black man," repeats Joffre, and 
 his mind goes back, no doubt, to his colonial days. 
 He is again building the railway from Kayes to 
 Bafoulabe, he is again on the Niger at Goundam, where 
 they brought him news of Bonnier' s massacre with 
 his eleven officers and sixty-four tirailleurs. And 
 he asks suddenly : " But what sacred fire wall animate 
 them ? Will they ever equal our own soldiers defend- 
 ing, field by field, their own soil ? " Joffre, indeed, had 
 realised the impotency of numbers unless animated 
 by the spirit of a great cause. He would not hear 
 of reinforcing the French regiments by those newly 
 acquired citizens of France in Central Africa. " No, 
 no," he said ; "the Three- Years Law is a vital question ; 
 do not give the enemies of the measure the pretext 
 they seek." 
 
 The Generalissimo went to the Chamber, to act, 
 with General Pau, as Government Commissioner 
 during the progress of the great debate. I imagine 
 that the experience was more painful to him than 
 first facing fire in a Paris fort in 1870. For the Social- 
 ist opponents of the Bill heckled the Commissioners,
 
 PREPARATION 51 
 
 challenging not merely their arguments but also their 
 figures. The temptation was strong upon Joffre at 
 times to retort angrily upon the obstructionists, but 
 he kept his temper and a cold, even tone of courtesy. 
 In his rare interventions he spoke briefly and directly 
 to the point, figures in hand. He maintained through- 
 out an impassive attitude, and looked a formidable 
 figure as he stood resolutely to his guns dominating 
 the wilderness of talk. Even in the lobbies of the 
 Chamber, in the entr'actes of the debate, he did not 
 unbend from his attitude of reserve, which, though 
 it angered the obstructionists, impressed them in spite 
 of themselves. Here was the man who could keep 
 his head — the tete froide demanded by Napoleon as 
 the first essential of a battle-chief. Pau, on the other 
 hand, was much less calm and was visibly vexed at the 
 shameless opposition. The fingers of his whole arm 
 (for he had lost the other in the War of '70) clinched 
 and unclinched as if anxious to meet the foe at close 
 quarters. 
 
 Heartily glad to be allowed to return to his labours, 
 Joffre gave himself more thoroughly than ever to 
 the task of preparation. He occupied himself more 
 particularly with the question of transports, and the 
 perfection of the system that he worked out was 
 revealed at the outbreak of the war, when the Com- 
 missariat proved an instant success. The trenches 
 were well furnished with food. But alas ! the medical 
 service, which depended not upon the General Staff 
 but upon the Ministry of War, proved in those early 
 days a lamentable failure, for the war had caught it 
 in a state of transition. The mobilisation, itself, 
 impressed every observer by its order and regularity ; 
 Joffre revealed himself a master organiser. He was
 
 52 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 as prepared as man could be with the time and 
 " material " to his hand. He had trained his body 
 as well as his mind by a just balance between work 
 and rest and physical exercise. He had the true 
 soldier's horror of growing soft. As a captain he was 
 out riding one day when he fell, owing to his horse 
 stumbling, and was carried to bed with injuries to his 
 head. He spent a few weeks of his convalescence at 
 Rivesaltes. Fearing that his mental powers were 
 affected by his accident, he set himself a hard prob- 
 lem in mathematics to test his brain. At the end of 
 three days' silent work, he cried suddenly in broad 
 Catalan from his bed to his brother, who was sharing 
 the room with him, Soun geuri (" I am cured "). 
 The anecdote shows his strenuous character and 
 detestation of self-indulgence, and also that he is 
 not quite as reserved by nature as his proud title of 
 Le Taciturne would imply. Joffre's taciturnity, in 
 fact, is self-imposed — part of his vigorous system of 
 preparation. It comes, also, from the fact that he is 
 not, naturally, an orator and knows it. Serious and 
 meditative, his temper is not as severe as some sup- 
 pose; his sternness in all questions of discipline has 
 been forced upon him by duty. On the contrary, it 
 pains him considerably to punish any one, and he 
 suffers as much as his victims when he has to pass 
 judgment upon serious faults and incapacity. 
 
 His daily habits made him physically hard, just 
 as his studies equipped him for continuous intellectual 
 labour. The morning gallop in the Bois on a strong 
 horse, such as would have carried Du Guesclin in 
 his wars against the English in the moving Middle 
 Ages, and his walk to the Invalides or the Ministry of 
 War from his distant home in Auteuil gave him the
 
 PREPARATION 38 
 
 training he needed. On campaign, the motor-car 
 replaced the healthier exercise, but even then he 
 managed to take long solitary walks which reposed 
 his mind and recreated his body. Even the most 
 pressing matters are not allowed to interfere with his 
 regular rest. To bed at nine and up at six is a rule 
 maintained even in the heat of battle. He feels it to 
 be necessary for the equipoise of his constitution. 
 Joffre has the great Corsican's faculty of suspending 
 his intellectual powers by a mere effort of the will and 
 thus obtains complete repose of the cerebral system. 
 His slumbers were childlike even after Charleroi; 
 on his motor journeys, to points along the Front, he 
 slept profoundly. This recuperative power is inesti- 
 mable in a commander upon whom is cast a vast 
 responsibility. He was often to be seen in his car 
 behind the lines sunk in restorative sleep, his head 
 inclined to an angle like some tired Atlas, worn with 
 supporting the world upon his broad shoulders. 
 
 This man, eminently French in heart and mind, 
 has consistently trained for his great position. Nothing 
 has been too great a sacrifice to secure the victory. 
 To railwaymen, w^ho came to thank him for his praise 
 of them in the mobilisation, he said : " I work for the 
 salvation of France and then I shall disappear." 
 Just as he knows the character of the men under him, 
 he knows the value of his own services to France and 
 throws both into the balance at moments when every 
 gramme of weight is of consequence. He seems able 
 to communicate his own confidence and calm to 
 others — he, so uncommunicative with his low voice, 
 his gentle and pensive manner. Evidently, in this 
 preparation of the soul for combat he must shut out 
 the distressing sights and sounds of battle. He must
 
 54 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 not think of devastated homesteads and ruined vil- 
 lages, he must not think of widowed women and 
 weeping children, nor, as he goes along the line of 
 yesterday's battle, must he think of what lies there, 
 of the ghostly army that is still presenting arms to 
 him. All these things he must banish from his mind, 
 in the hardening processes of a great decision — this 
 man who has never given a contrary order. And 
 yet Jojfre Vhumain is as just a title as any which 
 honour him, for it expresses his natural kindness 
 and desire to save life. And a Socialist professor 
 wrote, in an organ of his political faith, that if, 
 after the war, a monument was erected to the great 
 General, no mother need turn her head away from it. 
 Joffre was touched when he read the phrase, for he is 
 as proud of his humanity as of those purely military 
 virtues, which have gone to his preparation.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 
 
 Flechier's panegyric of Turenne might have been 
 written for Joffre, for it expresses his traits with 
 a curious exactitude. Said the eloquent Bishop of 
 Nimes of the Marshal : "He was accustomed to 
 fight without anger, to conquer without ambition, 
 to triumph without vanity. . . . Bolder to act than 
 speak, resolute and determined within when appar- 
 ently embarrassed, there was never a man wiser or 
 more prudent, who conducted war with greater order 
 and judgment, who had more precautions and more 
 resources, who was more active and more reserved, who 
 better managed things for his ends and who showed 
 more patience in allowing his enterprises to mature. 
 He took measures that were almost infallible, divining 
 not only what the enemy had done, but what he 
 planned to do; he could be unsuccessful but he was 
 never surprised. And, finally, this system was the 
 source of many successful gains. It kept alive that 
 union of the soldiers with their chief which renders 
 an army invincible ; and it spread amongst the troops 
 a spirit of energy, of courage and confidence, which 
 enables them to suffer everything." 
 
 There is no feature of this admirable portrait 
 which does not fit the man. Joffre belongs to the 
 same noble line and recommences, it has been said, 
 
 55
 
 56 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 the same victory on the same theatre with new forms. 
 The history of Alsace will enshrine the two names, for 
 both captains fought there with skill and courage. 
 Turenne's defence of the province occurred almost 
 two hundred years before its cession to Germany 
 as part of the spoils of the victors. If, like other men, 
 Joffre has faults he has also the qualities of greatness. 
 He possesses strength of soul and knowledge formed 
 by study and reflection, and is yet without pedantry. 
 He does not allow himself to be guided by sudden 
 flashes of inspiration, nor does he invent new methods ; 
 he prefers a solid system, founded on poise of mind 
 and body and reinforced by calm and consistent 
 attention. Thus he brings to his task a clear and 
 even temperament and a profound and searching 
 judgment. Possessing, perhaps, more character than 
 personality, he has less imagination than clairvoyance 
 and mental vigour, and the fact is an assurance to 
 those he commands. He has the temper to succeed, 
 and is a constant traveller by that road. Slowly his 
 career has unfolded itself, and, at each stage, his 
 nature has deepened and his love of country assumed 
 a warmer tone. 
 
 Not a gay and debonair officer, born with title 
 and fortune, he is the son of a working man, who has 
 planned his own career and risen by merit to the top. 
 I do not propose to catalogue Joffre' s virtues, or to 
 offer an estimate of his strategy — that must be left 
 to other pens, equipped with the knowledge that 
 staff histories bring, but his career possesses contours 
 that, in their flowing curves, express the beauty and 
 harmony of his life. A " masterpiece of will power 
 and equilibrium," he has known how to inspire the 
 devotion of his soldiers, and this is not the least of his
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 57 
 
 claims. His ability to extract to the utmost the 
 allegiance of those who serve and to make appeal to 
 their secret sympathies is one of his most precious 
 talents. His character, laborious and unobtrusive, 
 free from ambition, solicitous for the common wel- 
 fare, has given him an irresistible hold upon hearts, 
 so that men's hands stretch out at the moment of 
 action and he is surrounded and enveloped by an 
 atmosphere of good- will incalculably precious for con- 
 certed action. And the women, who Joffre says, are 
 sublime, give him stoically their husbands and sons, 
 rivalling in courage those who lay down their lives. 
 And Joffre, by a mysterious predestination, became 
 the instrument of that sacrifice, limitless during the 
 war. And he never called in vain, for, at his first 
 demand, up rose valiant youth ready and joyous 
 to die for the sweet sake of France. He seems to 
 have the art of communicating that secret vibration 
 of the soul, which moves crowds, without so much as 
 opening his lips. It is a southern gift, belonging to the 
 sunny lands where life runs richly and deeply. And 
 for this reason, perhaps, the south has become the 
 region of great generals. By their inventions and 
 manoeuvres they express that species of brimming 
 talent which turns some into poets and plastic workers, 
 others into men of action, statesmen, or charmers of 
 the public ear upon stage and platform. His even 
 temper that takes no umbrage at rival reputations, 
 that seeks in everything only the good of the cause 
 and its strict utility, is the right armour for the 
 martial figure. His silence, like his calm, has its 
 positive and its negative side. It does not spring 
 from lack of thought, but from seriousness and 
 contemplation, just as the other is a proof not of
 
 58 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 insensibility, but of a considered system of control. 
 Nor is his unshakable determination the sign of 
 obstinacy or a purblind view, but a bright weapon 
 forged in the recesses of the heart as a defence against 
 adversity and as the ready instrument of achieve- 
 ment. Rarely has a man by such simple means, with 
 no eloquence or artifice, with no advertisement, pose, 
 or pretension, reached such a pinnacle of authority 
 at once subtle and conceded and giving confidence 
 to every one. 
 
 When President Poincar^ presented the Generalis- 
 simo with the highest military reward — the Military 
 Medal — he drew a living portrait of the man : " You 
 have shown in the conduct of your armies qualities 
 which were not for an instant belied, a spirit of 
 organisation and order and method, of which the 
 beneficent effects were extended from strategy to 
 tactics ; a cold and prudent wisdom, which knows 
 how to guard against the unexpected; strength of 
 mind that nothing can shake; a serenity of which 
 the salutary example spreads abroad confidence and 
 hope." 
 
 His popularity is as great a factor in his success as 
 his science and military skill. It is born of acts of 
 consideration which, in the opening phases of the war, 
 came to the common knowledge and gave him an 
 immense hold over his men. This or that journal 
 recorded incidents which showed his kindness and 
 humanity. He stayed awhile on his way to the 
 Front to talk to a wounded " poilu," to ask him about 
 his services, his health, and his family; and a poor 
 woman, who had written to him begging that her 
 son might be placed in a less exposed position, 
 for she had lost three since the war began and this
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 59 
 
 one was her sole support, received from Joffre the 
 reply that she had done enough for the country and 
 could have back the lad. A dozen instances of the 
 sort, repeated here and there, created such an atmo- 
 sphere of good-will that allegiance was created in 
 advance, and Joffre swayed his army by sheer 
 affection. 
 
 The soldier, in the light of Joffre's humanity, under- 
 stood delay; he became reconciled to the monotony 
 of trench life, for a forward move, he knew, would 
 cost limitless lives. No, it was better for the war to 
 drag on at this slow game of "nibbling" the enemy 
 than to allow a generation of young lives to be offered 
 to the insatiable god. France could not afford to be 
 lavish with the blood of her children, since the future 
 of the race was as paramount as the fortune of the war. 
 
 There were some who said that Joffre's cautious- 
 ness was overdone; that the war would have been 
 quickened had he shown greater initiative and greater 
 energy in seizing more sharply the occasions for an 
 offensive. The elements for such a judgment are 
 wanting to us all, but at least this parsimony of life 
 earned him the sublime confidence and esteem of his 
 troops, as completely as his fearlessness in disciplin- 
 ing those who failed in the higher command. The 
 fact that he was impartial, that he was ready, if need 
 be, to chastise his friends, produced a feeling of security 
 invaluable in such a case. The whole country felt 
 that here was a man for whom France had been look- 
 ing, imbued with a sense of justice, who stood fast 
 to principles, and feared not to apply them. And 
 in valour, as Emerson has said, is always safety. 
 When the army heard that a hundred and fifty 
 Generals had been placed en disponibilite, because
 
 60 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 of failure in the field, then it realised that Joffre would 
 brook no obstacle to his success. 
 
 In a famous interview which he gave to the editor 
 of a provincial newspaper — a lifelong friend — Joffre 
 declared that Charleroi was lost largely owing to 
 the failure of the Generals engaged in it. It was not 
 so much a question of effectives, he insisted, as in- 
 feriority in the higher command. " Long before the 
 war, I saw that a great number of our Generals were 
 fatigued ; certain seemed unfitted for their duty and 
 below its requirements. I had the intention to re- 
 juvenate the higher command, but the war came too 
 soon. And there were others in whom I had confi- 
 dence who justified it, but imperfectly." Energy must 
 go with knowledge and experience, he insisted. 
 " Some were my best friends; but if I am fond of 
 my friends, I am still fonder of France." The words 
 have become linked with Joffre, and so closely re- 
 present him that they deserve to be graven on the 
 monument that must one day be his when he has 
 laid aside his sword. 
 
 It was this implacable search for efficiency that 
 gave Joffre such pre-eminence in the army. Yet he 
 is scarcely the type to appeal to the romantic side of 
 popularity. He is rarely represented on horseback, 
 he waves no sword, in figure he looks like a comfort- 
 able farmer rather than the traditional soldier; he 
 spends long hours at an office table, and is suspected 
 of moving armies through a telephone. But his 
 appearance — sound, robust, suggestive of common 
 sense — accords with his manner and his methods on 
 campaign. His life in the midst of the terror and 
 tumult of war is as simple as his routine at the Ministry 
 in times of peace. There was no fuss or parade about
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 61 
 
 Headquarters, even in the most acute phases of the 
 conflict. Everything passed as calmly as if a simple 
 game were being played with counters engaged, in- 
 stead of thousands of human lives. Joff re directed the 
 huge machine from a bare room furnished with a 
 common deal table, a map or two, a black board, 
 and three cane-bottomed chairs. The privileged 
 visitor who saw him for a few moments found himself 
 faced by a man with the dark undress uniform of the 
 Engineers, with no decorations upon the jacket save 
 the three stars on the sleeve which marked his rank. 
 His conversation, unless the moment warranted ex- 
 pansion, was scarcely more than monosyllabic. A 
 simple " yes," or '* no," sufficed ; why waste time, when 
 moments were precious ? And you went from the 
 room conscious of having met a great personage, 
 impressive by silence, masterful by the flash of keen but 
 kindly blue eyes, from beneath protruding eyebrows. 
 In a neighbouring room was a low murmur of voices 
 on the telephone — officers talking to the Front or 
 receiving news therefrom — and above their heads 
 a mast carrying wires stretched into space tingling 
 perpetually with live whispers of battles, and armies 
 in movement. 
 
 This was the nerve centre of the army : a plain 
 building, commodious, simple, effective, strictly utili- 
 tarian. Here a large force of officers and assistants 
 did the bidding of the chief; here every morning, 
 and again in the late afternoon, conferences were 
 held between the Generalissimo and his staff. The 
 inner council consisted of three brilliant specialists 
 in strategy, gunnery, and transport. With these he 
 concerted the common measures of the day, the pre- 
 paration to deliver or parry attacks. When large
 
 62 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 and general problems were afoot others of the Etat- 
 Major were called in ; or, it may be that a meeting of 
 representatives of the Allies, over which he presided 
 with great authority, called for his wisdom and per- 
 spicacity. But each day passed with great regularity. 
 Joffre lived in an unpretentious villa near his Head- 
 quarters, which changed according to the exigencies 
 of his work. After his breakfast, over which he wasted 
 no time, he went afoot to his office, saluted on the 
 way by soldiers and civilians. To the former he 
 would say : " Bon jour, mon brave ! " to the latter, 
 he would vary the address to : " Bon jour, mon 
 ami ! " Children are attracted by him, and raise 
 their caps or curtsey to gain a smile. Sometimes a 
 little boy preceded him shouting, to Joffre's infinite 
 amusement : " Vive notre General ! " Thus greeted 
 as a symbol of united France, as the redeemer of the 
 country, Joffre passed into his Headquarters and was 
 soon plunged in the problem that absorbed him every 
 hour. Whilst he slept that calm sleep of his, wires 
 had flashed with news of victory or defeat or with the 
 common incidents of the Front. " If it is good news, 
 it will keep until the morning," said Joffre when 
 recommending his officers to respect his rest; "if 
 the news is bad, you know what to do ; everything has 
 been prepared." In this way he gained a full night's 
 repose, whatever the happenings between the parallel 
 lines of combatants, or in the savage thrust of mid- 
 night raids and assaults. And he slept on calmly 
 keeping fresh his energies for the morrow. 
 
 And now, when he enters his office, his first duty 
 is to call for the reports of the night. These he 
 studies closely, and they are then classified according 
 to the armies to which they belong, in cardboard
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 63 
 
 covers of different colours. Thereupon takes place 
 the conference to which I have alluded ; and then 
 Joffre, having finished his morning's work at a time 
 when most men are beginning it, goes out upon a long 
 and solitary tramp through the countryside. He gives 
 himself freely to his meditations, knowing that none 
 of the inhabitants, whom he crosses on his path, will 
 dare to disturb him. Either he thinks of a knotty 
 question presented by some new move of the enemy, 
 or his mind fashions one of those electrifying Orders 
 of the Day which have become world-famous. " The 
 time for looking back has ceased . . . die rather 
 than yield ground." That order, given on the eve of 
 the battle of the Marne, has become as celebrated 
 as Nelson's signal. Like most men who keep their 
 thoughts rigidly to themselves, his occasional ut- 
 terances are full of a strange force. And Joffre's 
 Orders of the Day have reached a high order of elo- 
 quence and exalted passion. 
 
 The events of the day may call Joffre to the Front, 
 whither he goes in a fast motor-car. On the way he 
 will lunch at a village auberge and scandalises the 
 proprietor, who has prepared, perhaps, a royal feast 
 — if he knew in advance the honour to be done him — 
 by the plainness of his fare. A simple omelette, a 
 little fruit and cheese for a Generalissimo ! Boniface 
 is bouleverse ! It is incredible ! With pious in- 
 dustry a journalist compiled Joffre's menus during 
 the battle of the Marne. They were the simple meals 
 of any bourgeois ; a plate of roast meat, preceded 
 by soup or hors d'osuvre and followed by vegetables 
 and fruit, constituted the repast. Notwithstanding 
 this sobriety, the General does not disdain the plea- 
 sures of the table ; like every good Southerner, he is
 
 64 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 something of a gourmet, but on campaign he exercises 
 a rigid self-restraint. 
 
 The same disregard for personal discomfort per- 
 vades all his arrangements. When the battle of the 
 Marne raged, the proprietor of a chateau at Bar- 
 le-Duc, whence Joffre directed operations, placed his 
 house at the Commander-in-Chief's disposal. Joffre 
 gave the finest rooms of the house, overlooking a calm 
 and beautiful garden, to the officers of his suite; he 
 himself, took a front room facing the Boulevard, 
 and subject, of course, to the street noises ; he thinks 
 nothing of these things. His dinner at eight o'clock, 
 after the day's work — for he resumes touch with the 
 details of Headquarters towards the end of the after- 
 noon — is just as simple as the lunch, and Joffre never 
 varies from this strict regime. Thanks to its regu- 
 larity, he is able to sustain, without physical change 
 or faltering, the heavy burden of his role. 
 
 Joffre belongs to the African school of soldier, 
 against whom is reproached an impetuous bravery 
 without science or system, and only possible against 
 an enemy untrained, ill-equipped, and ignorant of 
 tactics. It was thought that men were unfitted to 
 fight against a civilised enemy after their contact 
 with the rude warriors of the desert and jungle ; but 
 by a curious coincidence, Joffre, Gallieni, Marchand, 
 Gouraud, and Bailloud (Sarrail's lieutenant in his 
 retreat through Macedonia), all learned their business 
 of soldiering in the waste places of the earth, in over- 
 coming the obstacles of rebellious Nature or the 
 treachery of tribes. But Joffre has shown, as others 
 have shown, that this contact with difficulties brings 
 out the man and educates, strengthens, and vitalises 
 him. Often the faults of others have been placed on the
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 65 
 
 broad back of the Generalissimo. He has been accused 
 of ignoring the German intentions to invade France 
 through Belgium. What was his Intelligence Depart- 
 ment doing that they did not know ? But Joffre and 
 his staff were well aware of the plan, and they knew 
 also the different stages of the march. But what 
 they had not reckoned upon was the rapid fall of the 
 forts of Li^ge and Namur before the heavy guns of the 
 invaders. That the Germans possessed siege artillery 
 was a matter of common knowledge in France ; but 
 alas 1 to meet it was involved a large expenditure which 
 Parliament would not sanction. That is the reason of 
 it. " Cherchez la politique " is the answer to the short- 
 age in heavy ordnance and in armoured aeroplanes. 
 
 It would take too long to tabulate the various 
 attempts to extort money from Deputies for the 
 national defence. But though the attenuated credits 
 cannot be laid to the charge of the General Staff, it is 
 true that experts were divided on the use that could 
 be made of the heavy siege-pieces which the Germans 
 thrust into battle. Such cumbersome weapons would 
 prove white elephants said some in authority, and 
 protested that they could not "hold" the infantry. 
 However that may be, Joffre was faced with the diffi- 
 culty that the Germans, instead of entering France 
 by the eastern gate, where forts and " cover " com- 
 bined to make the task supremely difficult, chose 
 the easier road by Belgium and through the Luxem- 
 bourg. Yet it was obviously impossible to tell by 
 which route the enemy would enter. Joffre was 
 forced to watch them all, to secure contact at each 
 point, to feel the enemy, and then retreat towards 
 his reserves. This, indeed, was the plan more or 
 less successfully carried out. But the fact that
 
 G6 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Belgium was the main path of the invasion caused 
 a rapid transposition of forces at the last moment, 
 for the bulk of the army had to swing from the east 
 to the north, and the process took time. Here, again, 
 the Germans were at an advantage, for they had 
 systematically built railways to the edge of the 
 Luxembourg and in Alsace-Lorraine, so that their 
 mobilisation was startlingly rapid. 
 
 Joffre was certainly unprepared for the speed with 
 which the enemy brought into play his reserves. 
 This was due to the cunning use which he made of his 
 strategic railways, but also to a perfidious advance in 
 the date of mobilisation. The army was already on a 
 war footing when France had begun her work of 
 assembling troops. And so Joffre was handicapped 
 by many things, by lack of rapid railway transit, of 
 heavy cannon and of the minute preparation and 
 prevision which extended to the years preceding 
 his appointment. Germany had prepared for war 
 whilst France was thinking of peace and dreaming of 
 progress in art and letters and general culture, anti- 
 cipating a universal brotherhood, pathetically chimer- 
 ical in the face of the armaments across the Rhine. 
 Politics were greatly responsible for the inferiority 
 of France in the opening weeks of the war. The 
 troops assembled on the Franco-Belgian frontier had 
 not at once the value of the invading force. They 
 were wanting in numbers, in the perfection of their 
 equipment and in the intensity of their training. 
 Though Joffre had justly condemned incompetence 
 in high places, it is also true that France was over- 
 weighted by the masses of a highly trained enemy 
 which placed all its reliance upon the strength and 
 rapidity of the first blow.
 
 JOFFRE IN ACTION 67 
 
 The Socialist doctrine would have substituted 
 popular elan and the fierce revolutionary spirit for 
 what it held to be the sterile stupidity of a long 
 and intensive military preparation. And again, the 
 Socialist movement in Germany proved a snare and 
 delusion to many of the faith in France. Was it 
 possible that war could come when millions of the 
 masses in each nation were vowed to peace ? The 
 nation was deceived — perhaps it wanted to be de- 
 ceived. In any case, it was much more interesting to 
 concentrate upon human progress, to let the mind dwell 
 upon the delightful prospect of the millennium, when 
 there will be no more war, and when an era of peace 
 and tranquillity and of mutual co-operation will have 
 been ushered in, than to linger upon a picture of 
 militarism bound up with cannon and its human food . 
 
 The French General Staff apparently thought that 
 the German attack would come from the two frontiers 
 and would seek to envelop the French Army in its 
 tentacles, and thus conclude with one swift, tremen- 
 dous blow a campaign more disastrous than that of 
 1870. It seems clear, also, that M. Barthou's success 
 in carrying the Three-Years Law was an important 
 factor in the resolution of Germany to invade France 
 by Belgium rather than by the East. The new 
 legislation had given great strength to the " cover," 
 and thus there was little chance of passing that way. 
 Probably had Germany attacked France by the East, 
 England would never have been brought in and her 
 role would have been confined to protecting the 
 . French coasts by her fleet. Thus, M. Barthou might 
 properly contend that the mere fact that the Three- 
 Years Law was voted determined the action of 
 Germany and enlisted the support of England.
 
 68 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 We have shown that Joffre by his system of making 
 war and his qualities of heart and head is the ideal 
 democratic chief. Obviously, there is little of the 
 Napoleonic temper in his strategy, which is made up 
 of prudent vigour and discernment rather than of bril- 
 liancy or spontaneity. Some urge that Joffre should 
 have made his stand upon the Aisne rather than upon 
 the Marne, since the latter line was better defended 
 by Nature, but his reserves were not sufRciently ac- 
 cessible. In any case, conditions have altered since 
 Napoleon's day, and even the Corsican's great faculty 
 of improvisation scarcely would have found scope in 
 twentieth-century conditions. None the less, Joffre's 
 dispositions at the battle of the Marne, when he 
 drew the enemy to his own battle-ground and sup- 
 ported his line at each end with the forts of Paris and 
 of the East were strictly in the style of the Master. 
 And by his very victory he proved the martial qualities 
 of the French, since with the aid of the English they 
 administered a sharp repulse to an enemy flushed with 
 success and organised and equipped in a manner 
 superior to the Home forces. Until the story is 
 disproved, I shall continue to think that the battle 
 of the Marne would have been definitive and the enemy 
 driven from the soil of France had Joffre possessed 
 an adequate supply of munitions. 
 
 We have taken the Generalissimo to the edge of the 
 great battle : let us now give a few particulars of his 
 chief collaborator.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE SECOND IN COMMAND 
 
 If ever Nancy is minded to raise a statue in its 
 beautiful Place Stanislas to a battle-hero it will be 
 surely to Noel-Marie Edouard Curieres de Castelnau, 
 for to him is due the existence of the city. During 
 three tremendous weeks its fate hung in the balance — 
 weeks in which Joffre was developing the final phases 
 of his retreat and then delivering battle on the Marne. 
 With flank and rear defended from the immense 
 army that de Castelnau and Dubail prevented from 
 passing the gap of Nancy, the master strategist was 
 enabled to win. Nancy lies in the plain; it can be 
 never defended, people said, and, therefore, it was 
 to be left an open town. Did not the Treaty of 
 Frankfort forbid the placing of cannon which would 
 command German soil ? Be that as it may, the 
 doubters had forgotten le Grand Couronne, a series of 
 wooded heights and steep plateaux, which marked the 
 junction of Meurthe with Moselle and interposed a 
 rugged barrier between the old Lorraine capital and 
 the frontier. Here, with a forethought unusual in 
 a country where so little had been prepared, trenches 
 had been dug ; and when de Castelnau was forced to 
 retreat from the annexed province before an impassable 
 barrier of artillery, he raised earthworks, installed 
 barbed wire entanglements and brought heavy guns 
 
 69
 
 70 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 from Toul. It was the turn of the Germans to be 
 surprised. With three attenuated army corps and 
 four or five divisions of reserve, de Castelnau kept 
 at bay an immense force of the enemy which battered 
 savagely at the gates. 
 
 How gaily the army marched out to the reconquest 
 of annexed Lorraine and to occupy the Germans 
 whilst the English landed in Belgium. It was a 
 force thoroughly representative of France, for it was 
 recruited from all parts. There were reservists from 
 Bordeaux, from Marseilles, from Montpellier and 
 from the West, but the heart of the crusade was the 
 famous 20th Army Corps from Nancy — Lorrainers 
 to a man — who had inherited the memory of the 
 annee terrible. With a gesture that expressed 
 eloquently their spirit, they knocked over the 
 frontier posts as they sang the Marseillaise with the 
 strenuous accent of the soldier engaging in a holy 
 war. Great was their first enthusiasm, but great, 
 also, their disappointment, for none met them in the 
 streets ; no hand flung flowers to them ; no voice cried 
 in gladness : " Vive I'Armee ! Vive la France ! " 
 The silence was sinister, scarcely broken by the dull 
 reverberation of distant cannon bombarding Pont-a- 
 Mousson. It took them a little time to realise that 
 the masters of the soil, fearing a demonstration, had 
 threatened the inhabitants with its consequences. 
 The silence and the gloom were fully explained. 
 
 For two days the army marched into the old land 
 of France without meeting serious opposition. Then 
 the presence of strong outposts betokened the enemy. 
 Dubail's army operating to the south strove to enter 
 more deeply into German territory through Sarreburg ; 
 de Castelnau took the northern route through Delme
 
 THE SECOND IN COMMAND 71 
 
 and Morhange. Both were met by a tremendous 
 opposition. The battle hne stretched in rough 
 crescent form through the three places I have named, 
 Dubail's left wing being in contact with de Castelnau's 
 right. The Germans had secretly organised a vast 
 system of defence in which gun positions were estab- 
 lished and distances marked. The trenches existed 
 for miles and had been furnished with innumerable 
 machine-guns and heavy mortars, the possession of 
 which was now revealed for the first time. The battle 
 was joined, therefore, in disadvantageous conditions 
 for the French. Every ruse known in warfare was 
 employed by the foe. It decked the trenches with 
 dummies and led on the assailants to their doom, for 
 mitrailleuses were posted behind the lay figures. 
 Regiments lost more than half their effectives. An 
 early victim was Lieutenant Xavier de Castelnau, 
 one of the General's sons, who fell whilst leading his 
 men of the 4th Battalion of Chasseurs to a counter- 
 attack. He was mentioned for gallantry in the 
 Orders of the Day. 
 
 The French soon discovered that the forces opposing 
 them were no mere " cover " troops, but the Bavarian 
 Army under its Crown Prince, an army under Von 
 Heeringen and a strong detachment from Von 
 Deimling's command. Forced to retreat, de Castelnau 
 fell back ten miles to the Grand Couronne, which he 
 fortified in the way I have described. Dubail, who 
 had begun well with successes in the Vosges, was 
 unable to maintain his position on the Sarre and fell 
 back, also. His troops, especially the 21st Corps, 
 behaved with great gallantry and only left Sarreburg 
 under express orders, and then with colours flying 
 and the band playing the Marche Lorraine. Though
 
 72 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 he delivered many attacks upon the enemy, he was 
 forced to reform behind the Meurthc, and finally took 
 up a position at Luneville and in the fork between 
 the stream just mentioned and the Mortaigne. 
 
 The attack on the Grand Couronne was particularly 
 severe. Wave after wave of the enemy threw itself 
 against the works held by de Castelnau's troops, who, 
 though exhausted by a week's continuous marching 
 and fighting, showed an unbreakable spirit. And 
 there were brought to the attack, besides the armies 
 I have mentioned, four new Corps composed of 
 seventeen brigades of Ersatz, so that the hostile 
 forces numbered nearly half-a-million men. The 
 assailants were encouraged not merely by their 
 numerical superiority — Dubail's army was about 
 150,000 — but by their success in Lorraine, which had 
 been hailed by their countrymen as a great victory. 
 Furthermore, they were under the eye of the Emperor 
 and a brilliant staff, who were watching them from 
 the hill of Eply, to the north of the Couronn^. The 
 Kaiser's dramatic sense had been awakened by the 
 thought of a triumphal entry into Nancy, the ancient 
 capital of Lorraine. He realised what it would mean 
 in the Fatherland, and that, from a military point, 
 it would signify that a breach had been made in the 
 defences of France. Alas, for human hopes ! The 
 walls of Jericho refused to fall to the trumpet's 
 brazen call ; and the Kaiser, after waiting in vain for 
 a victory, departed sombre and silent for other 
 fields. 
 
 The Germans tried every imaginable means to break 
 through, and bloody were the struggles on hill-tops 
 and in the woods of the region. A regiment, suddenly 
 debouching from a forest, was mown down within a
 
 THE SECOND IN COMMAND 73 
 
 few yards of the French trenches, and a division, 
 marching to the attack with drums and fifes playing, 
 met with a similar fate. The Forest of Vitremont, 
 near Luneville, was filled with the bodies of Germans, 
 computed to number 4500. Vigorous counter- 
 attacks by de Castelnau from north to south, and by 
 Dubail from west to east, finally held the enemy in 
 check, and this uneasy equilibrium lasted for a 
 fortnight — the tremendous fortnight in which Joffre 
 saved Paris and sent the Germans flying to the north. 
 At that moment, the eastern frontier from Nancy to 
 the Vosges was free of the enemy; but at what a 
 cost 1 Thousands had been lost on either side and 
 villages had been burned and civilians assassinated 
 by the Germans in pursuance of their studied policy 
 of terrorisation. 
 
 De Castelnau' s brilliant tactics brought him renown 
 and the direction of the 2nd Army on the Compiegne- 
 Arras line. Along this Front rising rectangularly 
 from the Aisne to the north, occurred those terrific 
 battles, which marked the historic " race to the sea." 
 Smarting from their defeat on the Marne, the Germans 
 sought to turn the Allies' left; Joffre had a similar 
 idea in wishing to envelop the enemy's right. The 
 resultant contest was the course d la vier. But the 
 forces given to de Castelnau were inadequate for 
 the purpose, and de Maud'huy's army was added to 
 the line now creeping forward like a gigantic snake 
 to the sea. But before the Germans tried to pierce at 
 Lens and Arras, they assailed the lower line held by 
 de Castelnau, and the angle formed by Aisne and Oise 
 proved a particularly warm corner. In that late 
 September and early October, de Castelnau lost as 
 many men as in Lorraine, and the battles, if less
 
 74 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 renowned, were as fiercely fought as those to the 
 north of Arras on the Yser and at Ypres. 
 
 The Germans in extending their hnes reahsed that 
 if they could reach Dunkirk and Calais they would 
 not only cut England's communications, but point a 
 pistol at her heart. And so they brought up army 
 after army until the line stretched in a solid trunk of 
 trenches with branches towards the sea, and 800,000 
 Germans (eighteen Army Corps and four Cavalry 
 Corps) made persistent efforts to break through the 
 Allies or envelop them. To defeat this plan, Joffrc 
 formed three new armies, of which de Castelnau's was 
 one, and brought up the English from the Aisne, and 
 the Belgians from Antwerp. The situation was often 
 critical, for de Castelnau, like the other commanders, 
 lacked ammunition. But his gift of prevision and 
 his infinite resource saved the day. Eventually, the 
 chief fighting was transferred to the northern part 
 of the line, but de Castelnau's early resistance had 
 rendered the greatest service. And so Joffre thought, 
 for de Castelnau was given dominion over four armies 
 from Soissons to Verdun, the longest front in the 
 possession of a single commander, though Foch and 
 Dubail were also given groups of armies. His tenure 
 of the line was distinguished for the great offensive 
 in Champagne, whereby 23,000 prisoners and 120 
 guns were captured by the French, and 3,000 prisoners 
 and 25 guns by the English in Artois. That latter 
 feat will be ever remembered for the house-to-house 
 fighting in Loos and for the brilliant capture of Hill 70. 
 
 The General's vigour of body is as remarkable as 
 his vigour of mind. He seems never to tire. In the 
 Great War he took no particular care of his health, 
 going to bed late and rising early with apparent
 
 THE SECOND IN COMMAND 75 
 
 impunity. Nor did he follow any system of diet, 
 eating heartily with a Southerner's appreciation of a 
 good table. An excellent horseman, the Great War 
 left him little time for equestrian exercise. When 
 commanding on the Somme he had horses at head- 
 quarters at Amiens, but he rode only once in seven or 
 eight months. Like his chief he walked a good deal, 
 not merely for exercise, but to get into direct touch 
 with the troops. He believes in the closest relations 
 between the leader and the led. He likes to recall 
 the names and records of his officers and to ascertain 
 the thoughts and sentiments of the men. His inspec- 
 tions behind the lines were no perfunctory affairs, 
 but real examinations into moral and materiel. 
 No detail of the kits escaped him, and he questioned 
 soldiers as if searching consciences. Officers in his 
 command have told me that his parades lasted a 
 couple of hours or more. He never lost an oppor- 
 tunity of becoming acquainted with the elements of his 
 armies. As he journeyed to the Front he would spring 
 from his car to compliment a colonel on the appear- 
 ance of his regiment, or turn aside to visit a hospital 
 and comfort the inmates with cheery words. He is 
 a believer in moral suasion and the uplift of words. 
 Men going into battle look to him for encouragement, 
 and never in vain. Officers in charge of them inter- 
 rogate his personal staff : " What does the General 
 say? Does he think we can win? " And upon the 
 answer, which is certain to be positive and stimulating, 
 depends their demeanour in the fight. There is some- 
 thing in the look of this soldier of the old school, 
 courteous and chivalrous, with character, resolution, 
 and intelligence, written in the high-coloured features, 
 framed by the white hair that bespeak courage,
 
 76 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 health and confidence, and instil in others the bravery 
 and sacrifice that are dominant in himself. This 
 influence is heightened by the knowledge that he has 
 himself suffered in his intimate affections. When the 
 death of Gerald, his second son, occurred on the Marne 
 — he was buried at Vitry-le-Francois — de Castelnau 
 was engaged in a Council of War on the Eastern Front. 
 The news was brought to him as he deliberated with 
 his commanders on the plan of battle. After a painful 
 moment he said with stoic calm, " Gentlemen, let 
 us continue." And he bore with equal fortitude the 
 news that another son had been wounded and taken 
 prisoner at Arras. 
 
 Such calmness and composure spring from the 
 deep conviction that all is for the best. Doubtless, 
 there was something of predestination in the fact 
 that he was baptized Noel-Marie, in allusion to the 
 date of his birth, Christmas Eve. To his Catholic 
 parents it was a sign and a symbol. His early 
 training at a Jesuit College, before he entered St. Cyr, 
 confirmed him in his principles, and he is of those 
 who have practised always their faith. He attends 
 Mass every day, and when going to the Front at night 
 he arouses a priest to take the Sacrament. He was 
 the first to insist upon the attendance of chaplains 
 with the forces. To his credit he has never concealed 
 his faith, though there were times in the history of 
 the Third Republic when it might have been politic 
 to do so. Perhaps this sturdiness in his profession 
 accounts for the slowness of his promotion. It began, 
 however, with a rush — Captain at nineteen, in charge 
 of a company in the Loire Army under General Davout, 
 a grandson of Napoleon's famous Marshal; but he 
 stayed long years working steadily but inconspicu-
 
 THE SECOND IN COMMAND 77 
 
 ously on the staff. The tide turned rapidly when he 
 again commanded troops, and his quahty was seen at 
 once. For six years he was Colonel of the 37th Regiment 
 of Infantry at Nancy (Turenne's old command), and 
 here he obtained that deep knowledge of the country 
 which stood him in such stead ten years later. He 
 did not get his General's stars until 1906, and then 
 commanded troops at Soissons, Sedan, and Chambrun. 
 He distinguished himself in grand manoeuvres in the 
 Bourbonnais, under the eye of General Tremeau, 
 president of the War Council and the designated 
 Commander-in-Chief under the old system. The new 
 system, inaugurated by Joffre, brought him into 
 close contact with the Generalissimo, whose Chief-of- 
 Staff he became and collaborator in framing the 
 Three-Years Law, then being passed by the Legis- 
 lature. The same year he went to England to attend 
 the Manoeuvres and afterwards conferred with the 
 military chiefs; and a mission took him to Russia, 
 where he discussed the lines of eventual co-operation. 
 Of an old Southern family, the General was born 
 (in 1851) at St. Affrique in the Aveyron, the old 
 Rouergue which came to the French Crown under 
 Henri IV. He likes to speak the patois with soldiers 
 from the district, but he is not democratic in the 
 French sense of the word, though familiar in his deal- 
 ings with the ranks and solicitous for their welfare. 
 But he is exacting where discipline is concerned, and 
 not only gives orders but sees that they are executed. 
 His staff as well as his regimental officers respect his 
 strenuous temper. His family is noted for intellectual 
 distinction. Some of his brothers, as well as his sons, 
 were at the Polytechnique, the famous mathematical 
 school. He, himself, is both classical and mathe-
 
 78 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 matical. If he has httle EngHsh and less German, 
 and his pronunciation of Enghsh place-names amuses 
 his Anglo-Saxon friends, he is a brilliant classic, and 
 jokes in Latin, when the mood takes, with his staff. 
 Nevertheless he is thoroughly modern in his appre- 
 ciation of science and gives a chance to any likely 
 inventor. INIanufacturers are numbered amongst his 
 family, and the largest coal-mine in the south belongs 
 to it. His father, however, was a jurist and a friend 
 of the economist, Le Play. 
 
 The General's vigour comes from the natural 
 energy of his mind. In his boyhood there were few 
 sports in France, but he likes to tell his intimates that 
 he played a sort of football, with an inflated ball, in 
 his lyc6e in the mountains. His youngest son is a 
 well-known champion of the Rugby game. Of his 
 six sons, each went to the war. Three were already 
 in the Army, one was at school, another in the Navy, 
 and a third an engineer. The record is a tribute to 
 the patriotism — no uncommon trait — of provincial 
 France. And there are those who, ignorant of the 
 austerity of her Catholic families, declared that France 
 was decadent ! Of the General's six daughters — for 
 Providence has blessed him with a full quiver — one 
 has had her arm amputated, having been infected with 
 gangrene whilst nursing in a hospital. Such cour- 
 age and devotion are well exemplified in the mother, 
 who heard of her son's death whilst attending the 
 Uttle church where it is her habit to go daily. " Which 
 one?" she asked, almost inaudibly of the curi, as 
 she saw by his look of tenderness, that he had bad 
 news to communicate. She thought of her husband, 
 and of her sons at the Front, and when the name was 
 pronounced, with a soft sigh of resignation she bowed
 
 THE SECOND IN COMMAND 79 
 
 her silvery head a Httle lower over the breviary, and 
 proceeded with outward tranquillity, though with a 
 torn heart, to receive the consolation of her religion. 
 The man whom I have summarily sketched was 
 invested by Joffre with the dignity of his Chief-of-Staff 
 and the title of Major-General. The life-long friend 
 became the chief aid in his deliberations, and the 
 virtual leader on the Western Front, leaving to the 
 highest in command the larger issues of a world-w^ide 
 campaign. Even in Republican France there is 
 thus place for the croyant and the aristocrat, as the 
 names of Delangle de Cary, de Maud'huy, and D'Urbal 
 show.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 
 
 One of the many surprises of the war was the vast 
 place given to munitions. Not even the most care- 
 ful calculator had foreseen the enormous consump- 
 tion of war materiel that would result from a long 
 continuance of trench warfare. The Germans had 
 reckoned on an expenditure of 35,000 shells a day, 
 and the French on about half that ; the actual con- 
 sumption was often 100,000 shells on each side. 
 
 Both French and German had based their figures 
 on a rapid war, and, had the invaders' plans been 
 realised, Paris would have been occupied and the 
 French opposition paralysed in a fortnight. But 
 this was reckoning without Joffre, without England, 
 and without " General Chance," one of the most im- 
 portant factors in any war. Ammunition, by reason 
 of its vast role, became as engrossing and as vitally 
 important as the actual fighting. For it soon became 
 apparent that in this war of maUriel he would win 
 who could most quickly assemble the largest quantity 
 of guns and shot and shell. The Germans began with 
 an immense advantage, for they had accumulated 
 secretly a mass of machine-guns estimated at 50,000, 
 leaving the Allies hopelessly in the rear in this respect. 
 But even their perverse intelligence did not fully 
 grasp the logical outcome of their own preparations, 
 
 80
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 81 
 
 or foresee that, their first plan having failed, they 
 would be caught inevitably in their own toils. 
 
 To the eternal credit of the French, they realised 
 with great rapidity the character of the war, and set 
 themselves with methodical speed to adapt themselves 
 to its unexpected features. Factories sprang up all 
 over the country, some created out of boards and 
 bricks; others existing, but "controlled" in the 
 English sense, with Army officers assisting the civilian 
 directors; and a vast business of production was 
 ordered and marshalled as if the French had never 
 done anything else in their lives. At one bound, 
 they developed into a manufacturing nation, though 
 the term would have been refused them, in the long 
 yesterday of the war, by England, the United States, 
 and Germany. Their faculty for seeing clearly and 
 acting quickly, so apparent in their history, again 
 came to their aid. It was their distinguishing mark 
 during the Great Revolution. Having seized the 
 essentials of the problem, they acted upon their 
 insight with startling rapidity and resolution. Of 
 course they committed excesses of a dreadful kind, 
 but their excuse was the gigantic character of the evil 
 which they sought to remedy. Much the same spirit 
 of swift determination, happily without its fearful 
 manifestations, came upon the French people, and 
 with all the old Republican ardour they set them- 
 selves, with a sort of grim alacrity, to face the crisis. 
 The old stern common sense, which has always lain 
 at the bottom of apparent volatility, again came to 
 their rescue; and in no way did the French show a 
 greater grasp of the situation than in their handling 
 of munitions. 
 It had been supposed that they were wanting in 
 
 G
 
 82 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 order and method, and that their dramatic achieve- 
 ments were due to the impulse of the moment. But, 
 even if this were ever wholly true, it was certainly 
 not true of the second great struggle with Germany. 
 The magnificent effort of France was the outcome, not 
 of improvisation, but of the will to conquer and to 
 adopt the proper means to secure that end. Nor was 
 a Press campaign necessary, as in England, to bring 
 home to the people the peculiar importance of war- 
 work in the factories. It is true that M. Albert 
 Thomas, who took charge of Munitions in the circum- 
 stances which I shall describe, made speeches to 
 factory workers in his visits of inspection, but it was 
 never necessary to wrestle with labour and cause it 
 to abrogate its proud pretensions, months after the 
 war had broken out. Conscription would have settled 
 that question even if a vivid sense of realities had not 
 rendered unnecessary any exhortation from Ministerial 
 lips. The vital character of the war had penetrated 
 to every intelligence; it had not stopped half-way 
 through the social strata, as appeared to be the case 
 in England. And the disposition of the working 
 man in England towards conscription was only 
 intelligible on the assumption that he did not under- 
 stand. In France, the war was too deadly real, too 
 close at hand for any to affect an attitude of light- 
 hearted detachment. 
 
 The fact that men in the factories, like those on 
 the railways, were mobilised, simplified matters a 
 great deal. A man could not desist from his labour 
 on the pretext of claiming higher pay without running 
 the risk of being treated as a deserter — a thing un- 
 thinkable in time of war. His duty, then, was the 
 soldier's — to remain where he was until relieved by
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 83 
 
 order. " We have had no strike since the war 
 began." How well I recall the pride with which 
 those words were uttered by a functionary at the 
 Ministry of Munitions. If it spoke well for the 
 patriotism of the working-class, it spoke equally well 
 for conscription as a scientific basis for waging war. 
 For it had cast its net over the whole nation, and 
 by its means the munitions worker took his place 
 in the factory as did the combatant in the trench. 
 But there were certain complications which arose, 
 none the less, in practice. If there was no disturbance 
 of the labour market to exercise the conciliatory 
 powers of the Minister, production did not yet reach 
 its maximum until long after the war had broken out. 
 This was due to the unexampled demand made on 
 munitions and to the logical completeness of con- 
 scription. It required many months to adjust a plan 
 whereby the skilled worker was placed in his rightful 
 position in the factory, whilst those who had wrongly 
 usurped his name and functions were sent to the 
 trenches. The most unlikely people had described 
 themselves as mechanics ; and one found lawyers, 
 sculptors, school-teachers, painters, writers and a 
 host of semi-professional people masquerading as 
 munition-workers. On the other hand, numbers of 
 highly trained specialists, some distinguished chemists 
 and engineers, had to be extricated from the trenches 
 to take up their natural positions in the factories, 
 in the interests of national defence. This chasse- 
 croisse, inevitable in such a country as France, where 
 Government must be based upon equality, took some 
 time to effect. Indeed, the chief duty of the pubHcist 
 during the second year of the war seemed to be to 
 urge an equitable and intelligent application of the
 
 84 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Dalbiez law, which was aimed expressly at the 
 shirker. 
 
 Nor did private patronage and political " pull *' 
 wholly disappear, even in the stringent atmosphere 
 of a national crisis. This was, perhaps, to expect too 
 much of human nature. And so the Minister of 
 Munitions constantly received recommendations for 
 factory employment from persons whose intervention 
 it was hard to resist. On the one hand, the Minister 
 was asked by important deputies to bring back this 
 or that worker from the Front ; on the other, he was 
 warned by groups of Republican zealots of the danger 
 to democracy of showing partiality and conniving at 
 the existence of the shirker. In a laudable effort to 
 strike the happy medium, M. Thomas decided to 
 receive no more nominations to the factory, and 
 decreed that only the indispensable man was to be 
 kept in the rear. Even the good workman, if of 
 military age, must become a combatant; his place 
 in the factory would be taken by an older man. 
 But there remained, naturally, a certain rivalry be- 
 tween the trench and the workshop, not unconnected 
 with the fact that assiduous munition-workers also 
 received their Croix de Guerre — a decoration that, 
 assuredly, should have been reserved for deeds of 
 gallantry on the battle-field. But these various 
 difficulties, which M. Thomas settled with habitual 
 celerity and savoir jaire, were, after all, only questions 
 of detail, and in no way affected the broad principle 
 of conscription or the working of the new Act against 
 the embusques. There was no quarrel with compulsion, 
 for each worker recognised the right of the nation to 
 ask him to suspend his individual rights at such a 
 moment. "We are at war; the vital interests of
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 85 
 
 the country are at stake." This was a sufficient 
 argument. And so all energies were directed to 
 increasing the output. In connection with the 
 establishment of factories, the " white coal " or 
 water-falls of the mountains were harnessed to the 
 work, and engineer shops were set up under the falls 
 themselves to employ the power directly. Inventors 
 were given carte blanche to work out their ideas and 
 valuable improvements resulted in the opportunity 
 given to scientific brains to simplify processes, and thus 
 effect economies in manufacture. For the first time 
 France had begun to explore and develop her own 
 scientific estate, which she had left, hitherto, largely to 
 the Germans. For, if the latter were foremost in chem- 
 istry, they had learned not a little from the researches 
 of Berthelot and Pasteur. The great bacteriologist's 
 study of ferments contributed sensibly to the growth 
 of the German brewing industry. Under the direc- 
 tion of scientific soldiers and officials, production 
 rose to immense heights, and it soon reached more 
 than 100,000 shells a daj^ at a time when, according 
 to Mr. Lloyd George, the English output was scarcely 
 more than 15,000 a day. M. Charles Humbert, 
 Senator for the Meuse and editor of the Journal, 
 preached in his columns the need of more guns and 
 shells, and his gospel was enforced by other writers; 
 but the root argument laid in the comprehension of 
 the people themselves and in their instinctive realisa- 
 tion of what there was to be done and how to do it. 
 Latin brains and Latin culture triumphed in an 
 absolutely new field. 
 
 The genius of Munitions was M. Albert Thomas, 
 who sprang into prominence from the unlikely begin- 
 nings of a schoolmaster and parliamentarian with
 
 86 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Socialistic leanings. His assets were youth and 
 vigour and a large stock of learning. He had gradu- 
 ated from the " Higher Normal School," the training 
 ground for secondary teachers, with an agregation 
 in history — equivalent to a Fellowship Examination 
 in England — and then became tutor to a grandson of 
 Victor Hugo. In the family were steelworks situated 
 in the Loire, and the tutor's active mind became 
 interested in the fascinating processes which turned the 
 unwrought metal into shining implements of labour. 
 This knowledge, strengthened by many visits, stood 
 him in good stead when he became a deputy, and there- 
 after Reporter to the State Railways Committee. His 
 constituency was Sceaux, on the outskirts of the 
 capital, and therein was his native commune, Cham- 
 pigny, where he was born of humble shopkeepers and 
 continued to reside. In the Chamber his connection 
 with the railways brought him into contact with 
 M. Claveille, then coming into fame as administrator 
 of the Ouest-Etat line. M. Thomas must be impressed 
 by the catenation of events, for, on arriving at the 
 Ministry of Munitions, he bethought him of the 
 railway manager and installed him first as his master 
 of contracts and, then, at the head of manufacture. 
 So that the guns began to arrive at their appointed 
 place with the same punctuality with which the trains 
 on the State Railway, under the reforming zeal of 
 M. Claveille, began to steam into the Gare St. Lazare. 
 At the outbreak of the war, M. Thomas, torn from 
 peaceful Socialistic propaganda in Ullumanite, where 
 he supported M. Jean Jaures in his opposition to 
 Three- Years, went to the Front as a lieutenant of 
 reserve. After a few weeks in the trenches, he
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 87 
 
 joined his General's Staff and then was summoned 
 to Bordeaux, whither the Government had retired 
 from threatened Paris. " Will you organise Muni- 
 tions ? " he was asked. The battle of the Marne had 
 revealed not only their primordial necessity, but the 
 grievous shortage of France, and it was said that had 
 she been better provided, the Germans would have 
 had no chance of re-establishing themselves on the 
 line of the Aisne. So M. Thomas, faced with the crude 
 need of the hour, undertook the post and flung him- 
 self into it with his accustomed energy. His acquaint- 
 ance with steel, both in the works he had studied and 
 the railway he had controlled, fortified his resolution 
 to undertake the responsibility. Day and night he 
 passed rapidly, from point to point, in his motor-car, 
 organising munition work and exhorting and advising 
 the engineers of the country engaged in it, until, 
 gradually, the production was screwed up to a point 
 where, with the shells made in England, it equalled the 
 output of the German factories. Here was a strange 
 destiny for a man whose reading and reflection had 
 induced him to believe that the tide of humanity 
 was set towards universal brotherhood. Looking as 
 little like a professor of war as could be possibly 
 imagined — a little plethoric, a little heavy in face 
 and figure, and glancing out upon the world through 
 kindly spectacles — this new embodiment of Mars 
 accepted his position with a frank and systematised 
 zeal that led directly to success. In a short time, 
 the tree brought forth prodigious fruit. He worked 
 ceaselessly, turning Sundays into days of labour; 
 his only relaxation from exhausting office was to 
 undertake further journeys of inspection.
 
 88 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 There was advantage in the fact that he was a 
 man of wide general views and not an expert. Had 
 he been a gunner, he would have thought exclusively 
 of the pointing of his piece ; as an engineer he would 
 have reflected on the life-history of the gun from its 
 early inception to its appearance as a finished article 
 of destruction. But being the intelligent amateur, 
 he was able, like an airman, to soar over intercepted 
 space, and think of the problem in its wider aspects : 
 how to obtain the ore and transport it from the other 
 ends of the earth ; how to procure the quickest output 
 from the arsenals ; how to adjust factory labour to the 
 new law against the shirker ; how to provide a suffici- 
 ency of food for the monsters he was evolving; how 
 to cultivate the scientific terrain of the \var; and 
 finally, how he could deliver his deadly wares into the 
 hands of those who would use them against the enemy. 
 There were a hundred different problems arising out 
 of the great military post which the war had given 
 him, and he managed them all with the ease and 
 optimism that belong to rapid assimilation combined 
 with poise, with sang-Jroid, and decision of character. 
 All these virtues contributed to the success of M. 
 Thomas. He was rewarded by official appointment 
 to the post of Under Secretary of State for Muni- 
 tions, specially created for him by M. Millerand, the 
 then Minister of War. The honour was unique in 
 the history of the Third Republic, which does not 
 always advantage those who serve it best. 
 
 All the departments connected with guns had to 
 be concentrated at the Ministry of Munitions in the 
 Champs Ely sees. At the outbreak of war the building 
 was a cosmopolitan hotel on the verge of opening;
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 89 
 
 the Government, needing quarters for its new depart- 
 ment of State, acquired it, and there amidst Louis XVI 
 chairs and Empire cabinets were installed M. Thomas 
 and his coadjutors. The Socialist pacifist had become 
 the Grand Armourer of France, the licensed provider 
 of artillery, in a house of luxury built for the wealthy 
 classes. ... In his chain of duties, however, was 
 a broken link. He was not given charge of the 
 powder, though it was essential to his full usefulness ; 
 and officials in that department corresponded directly 
 with the Minister of War. But Gallieni, when he 
 came to the Rue St. Dominique, saw the faults of 
 the system and immediately invested his titular 
 subordinate with the necessary powers. It was at this 
 moment, when work was piling high upon his willing 
 shoulders, that M. Thomas gave M. Claveille authority 
 over the construction of the guns. And the railway 
 manager's experience proved invaluable in his new 
 post. 
 
 France had every reason to be proud of her organisa- 
 tion of Munitions, and for the spirit which the crisis 
 prompted amongst her functionaries and workers. 
 As a University man of distinction, M. Thomas placed 
 his faith in higher education and was surrounded by 
 men who had achieved distinction in science and 
 letters. A Sorbonne professor of Romance languages, 
 M. Roques, acted as his chief secretary ; and a scholar 
 of European reputation occupied unremunerated leisure 
 in conducting the correspondence of the Department. 
 Thus the Ministry provided another example of public 
 spirit in France and of Gallic accessibility to new 
 ideas. 
 
 Quite apart from the attitude of labour, admirably
 
 90 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 attuned to the circumstances, there arose the material 
 difficulty of finding men. The Loi Dalbiez was 
 rigorous in its application, and there was a dearth of 
 young and vigorous men, both skilled and unskilled, 
 in the factories. I have spoken of some of the 
 methods adopted by M. Thomas to meet the case : 
 now he went to the colonies and employed Arabs and 
 Kabyles, Annamites, and other friendly nationals 
 from France overseas. This exotic labour worked 
 harmoniously with the dominant race. Wages were 
 on a far less generous scale than in England, and no 
 worker, however skilled, obtained £8 a week or even 
 half that amount. Such prices were unthought of. 
 The common wage for unskilled labour was five francs 
 for a ten-hour day for men and women. Where the 
 operations were perfectly simple and required only 
 adroitness, the wages for female labour were some- 
 times only 3 frs. a day. Even the trained mechanic 
 earned no more than 15 frs., the highest price being 
 generally 13 frs. 50. Thus, you see, there was a vast 
 difference between the English and the French 
 positions, and it is clear that the cost to the country 
 of shell production was infinitely less in France, even 
 at a moment when the output was infinitely greater. 
 There were no lady workers in the factories — " heu- 
 reusement non " — said the official, with an expressive 
 shrug, when I asked the question, and the whole 
 scheme of production was worked on carefully con- 
 sidered, economical, and patriotic lines. Certainly, 
 the worker made very little profit out of his labour, 
 and the intensity of it in France, as in England, put 
 a considerable strain upon his health. 
 
 A veritable scientific mobilisation was necessary
 
 THE ORGANISATION OF MUNITIONS 91 
 
 in the Champs Elysees. Highly trained brains were 
 needed for the deHcate calculations essential to the 
 manufacture of explosives and to the creation of new 
 types of guns. It meant the installation of eminent 
 specialists at the Ministry and the carrying out of 
 elaborate experiments in laboratories and open-air 
 trial grounds. The syndicates, I repeat, made no 
 difficulty for the Minister by adherence to rules 
 framed for peace ; but, of course, the power of these 
 bodies in France over their fellow- workers is less 
 pronounced than across the Straits. But, though it 
 has its stringent rules, it raised no finger of protest 
 against the speeding-up of production, the continuous 
 shifts, the employment of women and children and 
 of coloured labour. The difficulty that existed was 
 entirely due to the fear of creating any suspicion of 
 favouritism amongst those who were fighting the 
 country's battles by any arbitrary selection of men 
 for employment in the factories. None the less, the 
 munitions worker had to be recruited on a large scale, 
 for the consumption of shot and shell exceeded all 
 belief and emphasised the fantastic character of the 
 conflict. 
 
 No doubt the physical existence of the Channel was 
 answerable for the difference in attitude of French and 
 English labour. It was difficult for our workers to 
 visualise the situation in France with its invaded 
 departments, its devastated villages, its ruined 
 industries, its strangulated commerce and those 
 other disabilities which weigh upon a nation that has 
 suffered defilement from the foe. But the French 
 soon came to see that the loyalty of the British 
 working man was not in question because of his
 
 92 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 reluctance to accept a system which, however, both 
 Abraham Lincohi and Cromwell found necessary in the 
 raising of armed forces for the carrying out of national 
 purposes. And yet neither could be accused of being 
 indifferent to the claims of democracy.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 FRENCH DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 
 
 A CERTAIN number of political students had come 
 to the discouraging conclusion that discipline could 
 not exist side by side with a pure democracy. The 
 two things, they said, were incompatible. Trade 
 Union leaders in England were for a long time 
 apparently under the same illusion. Joffre, whom 
 I have tried to show as the perfect democrat, will 
 not accept any such view. In a frank and engaging 
 mood of communicability, he explained to an 
 American writer, Mr. Owen Johnson, who visited 
 him at Headquarters, that democracy was by no 
 means the uneasy bedfellow of discipline; the two 
 could exist in the most perfect harmony. " Where 
 a nation is truly Republican, I do not think there is 
 any danger to the spirit of democracy in military 
 preparation," said Joffre, in reply to the suggestions 
 that the existence of a large army was a constant 
 incitement to war, and opposed, therefore, to those 
 pacific principles upon which a modern republic 
 must be founded. Military discipline does not 
 undermine democracy : that is his argument. " In 
 a republic where the need of individual liberty is 
 always strong, military service gives the citizen a 
 quality of self-discipline which he needs, perhaps, to 
 respect the rights of others, as well as to act in 
 
 93
 
 94 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 organised bodies." And then he added that if 
 America — and the remark appHes, of course, to 
 England — dreaded miUtary service, it was because 
 the citizen had his ej^es fixed on the German ideal 
 rather than on the French. The distinction between 
 the French Army and the German was a difference 
 in the conception of the role of the soldier. The 
 German system made a man into a machine. It was 
 based on fear, and robbed him of his initiative. It 
 explained the attack in close formation, the stupen- 
 dous throwing away of life, and an officer class, a 
 veritable Brahmin caste, that did not transmit 
 orders directly, but through sergeants and corporals. 
 The French spirit, on the other hand, implied frater- 
 nity. The officer was interested in the welfare of 
 his men and regarded them as his children. Nothing 
 was indifferent to him which affected them morally 
 or materially. The German system was the revolver 
 at the head, the French the word of encouragement, 
 the smile, the bonne camaraderie. 
 
 General Joffre's distinction happily expresses the 
 fundamental character of the two systems; it goes 
 to the root of army psychology. The French method 
 requires a knowledge of the temperament of the men ; 
 for, though you may drive the dull and high-spirited 
 in much the same way, provided you are brutal 
 enough, to lead successfully requires knowledge of 
 mental characteristics and a certain power of appeal 
 which elicits the best efforts in your men. French 
 officers, therefore, have to be psychologists, under- 
 standing the character of those they lead and the 
 subtle differences that divide the townsman from the 
 peasant. They must vary indefinably the address 
 when they talk to one or the other. These two
 
 DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 95 
 
 broad classes are moved by different springs of action, 
 and the commander has to find out the best way of 
 firing the lethargic and attracting the fiery nature. 
 
 A French friend, who commanded a battalion of 
 engineers, gave me some explanation of the methods 
 he employed in dealing with a difficult class, the 
 town-bred mechanic. His battalion was composed 
 of men from provincial centres, with a sprinkling of 
 skilled workmen from Paris. He played off one 
 against the other. When the Parisian was inclined 
 to show slackness or insubordination he remonstrated 
 with him in a tone of raillery and mock commisera- 
 tion. It was certainly regrettable that he could not 
 attain to the same level of conduct or efficiency as 
 those excellent fellows from the provinces, who, 
 after all, had not enjoyed the same advantages. 
 Rarely had he to speak twice to the same delinquent ; 
 the man's amour propre was aroused; from that 
 moment, he commenced to mend his ways. To the 
 provincial he said that he was surprised that a man 
 of his energy and parts should allow himself to take 
 second place to the Parisian. Then it was true that 
 the countrvman could not hold his own with workers 
 from the capital? This, again, proved admirably 
 adapted to the particular mentality of his hearer; 
 his pride was piqued; he gave no more trouble. 
 Thus, to command under the French system requires 
 considerable adroitness and intelligence. 
 
 The secret, my friend said, of keeping order and 
 discipline in a regiment without getting oneself dis- 
 hked was to refrain from exerting more authority 
 than was strictly necessary. One must not be 
 always on the look-out for faults. Officers made a 
 mistake in seeing everything at all times; there are 
 
 »
 
 96 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 moments when, as Nelson found, the bHnd eye was 
 convenient. A Frenchman is not naturally inclined 
 towards discipline; the quicker his intelligence, the 
 more likely he is to feel resentment at clumsy 
 authority. The peasant, slower to think and to 
 take offence, is more amenable. He gives up his will 
 and individuality with greater readiness to the leader, 
 and even courts direction. But in the veins of every 
 Frenchman is some trace of the frondeur and revolu- 
 tionary. His mind is impatient of restraint and leaps 
 readily to conclusions and, sometimes, to tragic 
 resolutions. Mere authority, as authority, chafes 
 him; he dislikes it in the abstract. To render it 
 acceptable, there must be an idea behind it. If 
 you want to lead him, you must be prepared to 
 undertake gladly the same risks as he, to go out 
 and meet them with a gay insouciance. You must 
 show him that you do not count your life more 
 valuable than his, or shelter yourself behind your 
 position. You must lead him by going in front, 
 not by driving him from behind. It is an age of 
 miracles; astounding things may happen; notwith- 
 standing his nonchalance and objection to play the 
 hero, at the moment of action he becomes trans- 
 formed. You have only to know how to draw him 
 out, to find the formula which unlocks his heart, to 
 discover the hidden springs of his emotion. For an 
 idea, it has been said, he is ever ready to shoulder 
 a rifle behind a barricade. And when that idea 
 is the country, with patriotism leaping high, his 
 frondeur spirit is capable of all. Centuries have 
 not dimmed its ardent inflammability, and each suc- 
 cessive phase in history renews his high susceptibility, 
 until one feels that the Great War, instead of ex-
 
 DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 97 
 
 hausting the fruitful soil of France, has enriched it 
 with new virtues and a new potentiality. Rifles 
 have spoken again from the barricades, but this 
 time the nation is ranged on one side of it and the 
 invader on the other. Patriotism and ideality flow 
 perennially from the mountains of Latin youth, 
 ready to be diverted to any holy cause. 
 
 The spirit is manifest even in the midst of the 
 battle. At the critical moment, when officers have 
 fallen in the hurricane of iron, a man emerges from 
 the ranks to lead on his comrades to the attack. 
 From his knapsack, the legendary baton has slipped 
 into his strong, tenacious hand. He has shown 
 qualities of leadership in the supreme hour. General 
 Sir Robert Baden-Powell recognised this genius of 
 the race for instant adaptation when he visited the 
 French Front and heard stories of improvisation ; the 
 native initiative of the soldier comes ever to his aid 
 in the tightest corners, where German mechanism 
 inevitably faOs. Years ago, De Vigny, in a cele- 
 brated phrase, proclaimed the inherent power of a 
 Frenchman to become a man of war. Time and 
 again he has proved his martial qualities — a sheer 
 instance of atavism. A sergeant leads a battalion 
 into the jaws of death with such fire and courage 
 that each man is electrified, loses his constitutional 
 timidity and becomes a lion in the fight. Under 
 this magic influence he is irresistible, like Cromwell's 
 Ironsides, whom, strange to say, he physically 
 resembles. The low steel bonnet crowns the same 
 sort of ruddy visage and brown beard which marked 
 the East Anglian in the seventeenth century. There 
 is something of the Englishman in him, something 
 of the Berserker employing his " irresistible fury "
 
 98 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 in a national cause. His spirit of adventure has 
 been translated into terms of patriotic achievement. 
 
 And the officers themselves know how to acquire 
 rapidly the science of the trench. Many in the regu- 
 lar army fell in the early days of the war ; the profes- 
 sional leader trained and set apart for the career 
 scarcely existed any more. Then up sprang the 
 officer of reserve, until then engaged in civilian 
 pursuits; nine-tenths were in that condition. But, 
 taught in the hard school of war, they developed 
 into the most accomplished chiefs. 
 
 Though the French pioupiou is readily accessible 
 to daring, and glories in a passionate achievement, 
 he is not hypnotised by names, but demands a real 
 aristocracy. It is an error to suppose that he resents 
 superiority. On the contrary, he is constantly look- 
 ing for it and is eager to recognise it when found. 
 He is equally impressed by it, whether he finds it 
 in the plain, plebeian features of Dupont or in the 
 aristocratic mien of a De Rochefoucauld. The name 
 matters nothing ; the qualities are everything. But if 
 he disregards family, he is insistent on a real dis- 
 tinction. Dupont must not shelter his mediocrity 
 under democracy, or can the patrician hope to 
 win devotion by a mere show of elegance. The 
 accent is not of much account in the trenches; 
 there, as elsewhere, must be a real superiority. If it 
 is wanting, if the officer is mediocre and vulgar in his 
 taste and habits, shows the same deficiencies and the 
 same lack of control as the lower ranks, then his supre- 
 macy will be short-lived, whatever his grade. And it 
 does happen that old soldiers, promoted from the ranks, 
 sometimes fail to inspire the respect that should be 
 theirs, because they cling to the old habits, the old
 
 DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 99 
 
 laisser-aller, and know not how to assume the new 
 virtues that should go with the new position. For 
 commissioned rank in the French as in the other 
 armies of the world must mark a real ascendancy, 
 moral, mental, and even physical, to be effective in 
 the best sense. It is part of the panoply of power. 
 
 None the less, the adaptability of the nation is 
 never better shown than in the speed with which 
 the officer, newly risen from the ranks, for bravery 
 and coolness on the field, puts on the whole armour 
 of leadership. Yet his speech, probably, will remain 
 homely, and he will adopt no airs which jar with his 
 humble origin and native simplicity. Perhaps the 
 least successful of these leaders are those who have 
 longest served in some capacity, such as adjudant 
 (a rank above sergeant), because they are rooted fast 
 in their old associations and have not those natural 
 qualities of authority which should be inseparable 
 from commissioned rank. The essential is that a 
 man shall show the temper of a chief, and for this 
 reason the sportsman often proves more successful 
 in handling his men than the more intellectual type 
 of soldier, who is better able, no doubt, to perceive 
 the purpose of a movement. Yet the rank and file 
 will certainly expect high attainments from their 
 ultimate leaders, and are intelligent enough to know 
 that no amount of practical experience is a real 
 substitute for sound military culture. Obviously, a 
 knowledge of military history and of the principles 
 of strategy are not required of the subaltern who 
 leads an attack on a village; but it is equally true 
 that only to the student are accessible those solu- 
 tions of the past which are of such importance in 
 understanding the present. The sportsman, then,
 
 100 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 rather than the office soldier, inspires the affection 
 of his men. The type is more often found, no doubt, 
 amongst the aristocracy and the higher bourgeoisie 
 than amongst the artisan class, for in France at 
 least the last-named has rarely the chance of playing 
 games and of acquiring dexterity in manly sports. 
 Again, the men know that those who have risen 
 from the ranks are harder to serve than the " gentle- 
 man " class, just as the works' foreman is a severer 
 taskmaster than the employer ; thus of all the officers 
 the type that best succeeds in drawing out the 
 qualities of his men is he who has had the broadest 
 education and is the best example of finished man- 
 hood. The birth and social advantage are merely 
 the make-weight, not the ground-work, for his com- 
 mand ; the contrary is alien to the Republican instinct 
 and would be resented. But if the men are touched 
 with the feeling that Jack is as good as his master, 
 they like that master to be a fine, upstanding fellow, 
 recommending himself as much by his handsome 
 physical appearance as by his urbanity and savoir- 
 Jaire. If to this can be added a lively temperament, 
 disdain of danger and an evident liking for bodily 
 exercise, his dominion will be complete. But these 
 things do not come from books, or are they handed 
 down from generation to generation like a Roman 
 nose or a Bourbon chin. And thus is exposed, no 
 doubt, the weakness of the hereditary principle. 
 Alas ! man cannot transmit, like a letter in the 
 post, his courage and adroitness to his descendants. 
 Meeting cross currents by the way, the atavic message 
 becomes hopelessly confused. 
 
 Yet the French system in its elasticity is admirably 
 adapted to the genius of the race, for it gives free
 
 DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 101 
 
 play to improvisation. No account is taken of social 
 status, but I have shown that social rank, coupled 
 with mental and moral attributes, do aid a man even 
 in Republican France. Valour is no respecter of 
 persons — the poor man may be as brave as the most 
 favoured of the gods. Thus there is ever in the 
 breast of the soldier the splendid hope that to- 
 morrow he may begin his ascent to the temple of 
 Fame. Cases of promotion are so numerous that they 
 have ceased to be exceptional, and represented, at 
 least during the Great War, half the number of 
 commissioned officers. The garqon de bureau, earn- 
 ing his five francs a day at the Hotel de Ville, is a 
 lieutenant of reserve. In time of war he rejoins his 
 regiment and becomes a captain. He is mentioned 
 for bravery and is rewarded by the red ribbon of 
 the Legion. No one finds it strange that this young 
 man, son of a roadmaker in municipal employ, 
 should be on the high road to honours whilst his 
 father works on the low road of obscurity. 
 
 And the man — an amiable functionary of the 
 Ville de Paris — from whom I had this instance of 
 Republican grandeur and simplicity recalled his own 
 military service and the adjudant studying to be 
 an officer, who on wet days instructed young con- 
 scripts in the elementary lessons of the great battles. 
 He remembers particularly his description of Fontenoy 
 and his vivid presentation of the forces in contact 
 and the different dispositions of the generals, which 
 ended in our undoing and the victory of the French. 
 The lecturer had kept the rugged speech of his class, 
 but his obvious enthusiasm and knowledge of his 
 subject found a quick road to the hearts and com- 
 prehension of his young hearers. That simple, rough
 
 102 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 fellow with a taste for study is a Brigadier-General 
 to-day. The Great War gave him his chance to show 
 his mettle. It is a common enough story in the 
 French Army, particularly in the first eighteen months 
 of the war, when the Great Retreat and several sharp 
 offensives had inflicted immense loss on the corps of 
 officers. 
 
 The material of the French Army, then, is pretty 
 fine stuff, but it has to be treated with a delicate 
 discrimination and with that peculiar French quality 
 known as doigte. We have seen that town and 
 country, side by side in the same unit, must be 
 dealt with perspicaciously by the officer. Anything 
 that looks like mere routine and a mere waste of 
 time and energy is particularly obnoxious to the 
 sharp fellow from the large centres of population. 
 " A quoi bon tout 9a ? " he asks, with a scarcely con- 
 cealed irritation. He is difficult to lead unless he 
 comprehends the military utility of the order. Once 
 his sympathetic intelligence has been gained, he puts 
 his soul into the work. The peasant farmer, on the 
 other hand, accepts everything with the stolid pas- 
 sivity of those who work upon the land. He does 
 not suffer moral torture from the feeling that he is 
 wasting his time. Is he not out in the open ? And 
 the food is good. His intelligence does not rebel 
 against red tape, which is so distasteful to his lively 
 contemporary from the town workshops. And so the 
 commander has to show discretion in his manner 
 of utilising the human material to his hand. The 
 mechanic probably will prove an excellent scout and 
 give a vivid account of the country through which 
 he passes and the enemy whom he has sighted. His 
 interest has been excited, and all his qualities of
 
 DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP 108 
 
 resourcefulness and ready adaptability come to the 
 surface. He feels that he is being worthily employed, 
 and is happy in the knowledge that he has been of 
 service to his superior. But put him to guard a hay- 
 stack and he is much less happy. That is a peasant's 
 job, he feels. And the peasant, indeed, is perfectly 
 at home in front of the hay ; his nostrils dilate with 
 pleasure at the sweet scent of it; it makes him 
 think of his own bit of grass growing there in Brittany 
 on one of those shining slopes where the gorse flames. 
 As a general rule, mechanical drill is irksome to 
 the Latin mind; it fetters his individuality. The 
 idea of turning perpetually in a barrack square to 
 attain perfection in movements in mass is by no means 
 to his liking. He has never been attracted to it, 
 nor to the cult of buttons and straps and military 
 tailoring. He cares little for such things. On the 
 march, he considers only the question of covering 
 the ground in the quickest manner with the least 
 expenditure of force. He is largely indifferent to 
 his appearance. Perhaps his artistic instinct tells 
 him that sweat-covered, with the dust of the road 
 upon him, he is vastly more picturesque, more like 
 the real, traditional "poilu," than immaculate in a 
 new uniform of celestial blue. He is proud of the 
 general's praise of his fitness and stamina after his 
 march of fifty kilometres with a heavy pack on his 
 back; he would consider it intolerable if he were 
 reproached for some slackness in his dress, for buttons 
 that had been displaced, for a belt that had slipped. 
 These things are of no consequence, he says, im- 
 patiently. He does not understand that attention 
 to minutiee which is the bee in the bonnet of the 
 old-style disciplinarian. And yet tradition counts in
 
 10 i JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 this nation of soldiers in a manner surprising to those 
 who associate indifference with an outward air of 
 insouciance. It is as if each man were a FregoH 
 capable of a dozen roles. Certainly, at the end of 
 a long march he will pull himself together with a 
 brave air if he has to pass before the eyes of foreign 
 officers or through a village street with the inhabitants 
 lined up to receive him. There is pride at the bottom 
 of his character as readily aroused as those instinctive 
 martial qualities which he inherits from the great- 
 grandfather of the Napoleonic Wars.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 GALLIENI AND HIS POPULARITY 
 
 General Gallieni ^ came to his task of defending 
 Paris with a reputation gained in Madagascar. Nine 
 years of successful government had transformed the 
 island, torn with conflict, into a peaceful possession. 
 Already credited with great organising powers, he 
 was suspected of being a good strategist, and he 
 was soon to prove it. His very appearance, ener- 
 getic, thin, with large, osseous face looking like an 
 eagle in spite of the pince-nez, gave Paris a wonderful 
 impression of youth and energy. He was a man 
 who would make things happen, conjectured the 
 citizens — and, certainly, he looked like it. His stride 
 was masterly, and his orderly officers grew thin in 
 his service; there was a story of a plump private 
 secretary who visibly dwindled in an effort to keep 
 pace with the " patron's " energetic gait. 
 
 Paris had never faltered in its attitude of pure 
 valour even when news lacked and rumour stalked, 
 gaunt-eyed, and unfettered by the least fact, along 
 the Boulevards. Galheni's appointment to the 
 governorship of the city put fire into hesitating 
 pulses and new courage into hearts. To see him 
 crossing the street in his uniform of cerulean blue, 
 
 1 General Galli6ni died May 28, 1916, while this book was in 
 the press. 
 
 105
 
 106 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 that attractive colour of the French Army, was to 
 receive a lesson in youth and virility. He had the 
 look of the fighter grateful to Parisians, who, recalling 
 their past, did not like the notion of being handed 
 over tamely to the enemy as an " open " city. An 
 open city, forsooth ! What ignominy for the capital 
 of all the talents ! When the Governor was formally 
 invested on August 26, 1914, the muscles of his 
 administres grew tense with resolution. Then there 
 would be resistance, resistance to the point of street 
 fighting. Inch by inch the town would be disputed. 
 The Eiffel Tower would be blown up, so that the 
 enemy could not use its apparatus and antennae to 
 transmit or receive messages ; bridges would be 
 destroyed and the Underground would be rendered 
 useless. The two million inhabitants who remained 
 faithful to the city would be evacuated to the com- 
 munes south and west of the metropolitan area. 
 This was the plan as revealed later, and was appar- 
 ently authentic. That the Governor thought the 
 measures would be necessary I do not believe; but 
 it was well to be prepared. 
 
 In his military eye the enemy could not enter the 
 city until the home army had been destroyed; that 
 was an elementary principle of warfare. But how 
 much did the Germans know, definitely, of the con- 
 dition of the Allies ? One had to be quite sure of 
 that before one could forecast with accuracy their 
 line of action. Did they consider the Allies were 
 definitely crushed ? It seems almost certain that 
 they did. Such a state of mind is revealed in the 
 despatches they sent from the front, each more 
 affirmative than the other. They told of the utter 
 rout of the French, of their inability to withstand
 
 GALLI^NI AND HIS POPULARITY 107 
 
 the advance. Thus, as Colonel Feyler points out, 
 the Germans were in much the frame of mind of 
 Napoleon at Waterloo. History was repeating itself 
 in new conditions. Napoleon disdained Wellington, 
 whom he considered a mediocre general, and Biiicher, 
 a brave but blundering hussar, and so, without 
 sufficient preparation, sent his legions against the 
 British lines. If the German commanders had not 
 the sublime arithmetic of Napoleon : " One hundred 
 and twenty thousand men and I make two hundred 
 thousand," that was the spirit of their calcula- 
 tions. They were impressed with their own invinci- 
 bility. And there was some excuse for their belief 
 that the English had been annihilated and the French 
 demoralised. The British Army was only saved 
 by bull-dog tenacity and a constitutional inability 
 to accept defeat; the French showed a new quality 
 of resistance because of the presence of their Three- 
 Year soldiers — the three "Regular" classes with the 
 colours — wherewith the reserves were stiffened into 
 homogeneity. In any case, the Germans exaggerated 
 the effect of their successes. The wish was father to 
 the thought. The apparent direction of the retreat 
 induced them to believe that the fruit was ripe and 
 ready to fall into their expectant mouths. Surely, 
 they argued, Joffre is going to repeat the mistake of 
 Bazaine in 1870 and shut himself up in Paris as his 
 predecessor did in Metz. He is anxious, certainly, 
 they said, to seek the protection of the Paris forts, 
 and yet he must know their shortcomings, for, forty 
 years before, he had helped to build them. 
 
 But the cold fact remained that Joffre did not 
 enter Paris, but flung down the gage of battle on the 
 Marne, leaving Paris on his left as a protection to
 
 108 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 that flank and the eastern forts on his right to prevent 
 his hne from being turned in that direction. GalUeni 
 was quick to reahse the situation, to see its possi- 
 bihties and its dangers and the necessity for swift 
 decision. If Paris had to be fought, the best defence 
 was a forward move outside the city, an offensive- 
 defensive. But a bare week remained before the 
 Germans approached within striking distance. In 
 those feverish days, the Governor of the city mobiHsed 
 thousands of labourers and set them to work digging 
 trenches. It was obviously impossible to do more 
 than erect a temporary barrier against the tide, but 
 the Parisians were caught and fascinated by the 
 energy of their chief, who instilled into them his 
 own confidence and his own combativeness. Gallieni 
 knew his public with the divination of a psychologist, 
 and he built barriers at the narrow city entrances 
 with felled trees and stones torn from the roads. 
 Obviously such fortifications could not stand a 
 moment against artillery, but their purpose was as 
 much moral as military. If they prevented Uhlans 
 from capturing the gates by a forward rush, they 
 were equally operative in inspiring Parisians with 
 the reality of war, which some were in danger of 
 forgetting, and at the same time gave them the 
 assurance that they were being protected. The 
 temperament of la ville lumiere has something of the 
 child in it : a curiosity and interest in everything, 
 a thoughtless courage, and the need of constant 
 assurance that it is being cared for. 
 
 And when the hosts advanced, sweeping from the 
 north of Paris to the east, it was Gallieni who saw 
 the fault and determined to profit by it. Von Kluck 
 had disregarded the Paris army either through ignor-
 
 GALLI^NI AND HIS POPULARITY 109 
 
 ance or temerity, and he was to pay the price. The 
 Governor collected an army from here, there and 
 everywhere, placed it under a superb tactician, 
 General Maunoury, and at the critical moment carried 
 it to the field of battle. Our " intellectual general," 
 as Gabriele d'Annunzio calls him, combined activity 
 with perception. There was something Napoleonic 
 and something Parisian, too, in his notion of utilising 
 taximeters to carry soldiers to the German right wing, 
 which, threatened, had reinforced itself with a corps 
 (Tarmee and now seemed likely to envelop the French 
 left. Up aloft Von Kluck's airmen decided that 
 the Parisians were leaving their city by the thousand 
 in taxicabs. It was Gallieni's army of Zouaves and 
 Territorials hurrying out to strike a rapid and decisive 
 blow at the invaders. 
 
 When Von Kluck marched straight upon Paris 
 as if to devour it and turned aside to the south-east, 
 he gave Gallieni, as we have said, the opportunity 
 he sought. It is, of course, wrong to assume that 
 the Germans suddenly changed their plan; this was 
 not so, unless they wished to fly in the face of all 
 accepted rules of war. It is highly dangerous to 
 neglect one's main objective, the crushing of an 
 enemy, for a subsidiary one. And if the Germans 
 had entered Paris without defeating the Allies, they 
 would have committed a heavy blunder. Heaven- 
 born commanders like Napoleon could afford to take 
 the risks and by their genius escape; lesser men 
 have to abide by the rules of the game. Yet the 
 Germans, proud in their superiority of numbers and 
 equipment, might have supposed that they could 
 detach part of their forces to finish off the Allies 
 and with the remainder occupy the city. After all.
 
 no JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 strategy is a matter of common sense, and the plain 
 man can see the danger to a general of entering a 
 city whilst his enemy is at large, powerful enough 
 to imprison him within the walls and to cut his com- 
 munications. To a strategist of Gallieni's calibre 
 the problem was perfectly clear. 
 
 What he could not know, however, was the exact 
 intentions of the Germans : whether they were going 
 to attack the Home Army and simultaneously enter 
 the city, or whether they would relinquish occupa- 
 tion until they had made certain of the destruction 
 of the Allies. To meet the alternative he employed 
 his habitual energy and resource; he was prepared 
 for the two events. Even after the battle he took 
 unlimited precautions, accumulating vast stocks of 
 fodder and cattle in the Bois de Boulogne, until the 
 famous playing-ground looked like a western cattle- 
 ranch; he took, also, a careful census of the city, 
 so that food might be apportioned to the population. 
 As a military precaution he continued to construct 
 trenches and defences of all sorts. Why did he pursue 
 this mole-like activity of throwing up earth, since the 
 danger was past ? Gallieni had a double purpose : 
 to reassure Parisians against the return of the Ger- 
 mans and to train the young soldier in the art of 
 modern war. And so he built endless lines of trenches, 
 until the country round Paris from Beauvais in the 
 north to Fontainebleau in the south was scored and 
 ribbed with excavations. In their depths he hid 
 monstrous black cannon, ready to belch flame and 
 disappear again into their pits. He left nothing to 
 chance. 
 
 A year after his appointment to the Governorship, 
 he rose to the higher plane of Minister of War. The
 
 GALLIENI AND HIS POPULARITY 111 
 
 Viviani Cabinet had quietly given way to the Briand 
 Administration, and, with that thoroughness of 
 which the French are capable in great crises, they 
 began to reconstruct their military organisation. 
 His new post gave Gallieni a vast role, in which his 
 lively temper and insatiable capacity for work found 
 full employment. His part in the battle of the 
 Maine had become known, and enhanced his reputa- 
 tion. It was realised that he had acted with immense 
 decision. Thus he became newly popular with the 
 Parisians, and his singular features — the eyes gleam- 
 ing behind the glasses as if they weve unsleeping in 
 vigilance — were reproduced everywhere. His popu- 
 larity threatened to rival that of Joffre, except that 
 Joffre appealed more subtly and invariably to the army. 
 The new Minister, however, was more Parisian than 
 the Generalissimo, more distinctly Latin — Parisian, 
 also, in a certain truculence more affected than real, 
 for Gallieni is a tender-hearted man, a little diffident 
 outside the strict orbit of his duty. He was par- 
 ticularly strenuous in his dealings with the embusqu^. 
 That furtive creature, who shelters behind the flag, 
 was brought forth from his snug post in the rear. 
 Several hundreds found employment at the Ministry 
 of War; thousands more were scattered up and 
 down the country in depots, in stores and factories, 
 in headquarters of commanders. Gallieni routed 
 them out mercilessly, and sent one hundred and 
 fifty thousand of them to their regiments. From 
 his own ministry in the Rue St. Dominique, one 
 chilly November morning, there emerged a melan- 
 choly column of five hundred military clerks, who 
 wended their way to the grey lines of the trenches, 
 abominably wet and dismal, in contrast with those
 
 112 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 comfortable Ministerial quarters. The Minister's 
 implacability pleased both Paris and the country. 
 Both were ready to do their duty, but needed to be 
 told that there was perfect equality in everything 
 and no preferential treatment. Gallieni struck piti- 
 lessly at abuses. A Territorial officer who drove his 
 superior's car was punished as firmly as a midecin 
 major who showed undue favour to certain of his 
 patients and retarded their return to the Front. At 
 times, no doubt, the Minister was guilty of exag- 
 geration; but even this was typically French and 
 was better than inactivity. In calling up auxiliaries 
 (men exempted from military service because of 
 physical defects) he overlooked the economic needs 
 of the country; but these matters were soon put 
 right. 
 
 He proved the foe of red tape and routine. He 
 opened windows in his Ministry, which had been 
 closed for years, and let in fresh air. He broke down 
 the methods of the Circumlocution Office, doing away 
 with useless labour, installing typewriters and femi- 
 nine secretaries, the wives and daughters of those 
 who had fallen in the field, and thus relieving many 
 men for purely military duties. " Simpler methods," 
 he cried to all who would hear; "I want results"; 
 and, of course, he obtained them. Then he sup- 
 pressed recommendations. To Parliament, a little 
 dubious and jealous of its privileges, he explained 
 that, whilst open to proper representations from 
 every soldier, he could not listen to interested recom- 
 mendations. He re-established the sovereign power 
 of discipline, but at the same time constituted him- 
 self a court for the correction of abuse of authority. 
 In the Chamber he conquered sympathies, though
 
 GALLIENI AND HIS POPULARITY 113 
 
 obviously uncomfortable in the atmosphere. I saw 
 him the day after his maiden speech as Minister and 
 congratulated him on his success. " Ah, if you only 
 knew how much this sort of thing costs me," he 
 said, " you would not talk of my success," and he 
 shrugged his shoulders with a gesture half-humorous, 
 half -ironical. The soldier pleased in the tribune 
 because of his directness and vibrant patriotism; 
 but when Socialists interrupted him it was plain 
 that he chafed at the restrictions of time and place 
 which prevented him from making suitable reply ! 
 On one occasion he was about to leave the House 
 because of the behaviour of the Socialists, and was 
 induced with difficulty by M. Viviani to return to 
 his place on the Front Bench. Unconsciously he had 
 repeated the protest of General Pau a few years before. 
 It was unfortunate that it was not more effective, for 
 the opposition of the Socialists arose over a question 
 of regulating the hours of cafes in Marseilles — pal- 
 pitating subject in time of a national war ! The 
 Minister was happiest when dealing with the in- 
 corporation of the 1917 class — lads of eighteen 
 who were going to the Front. The Senate before 
 whom he spoke appreciated his patriotic quality, 
 and the fact that, though a disciplinarian and an 
 energetic commander, he yet kept in his heart 
 the sense of sacrifice of young lives given to the 
 country. 
 
 In every department Gallieni laboured to promote 
 efficiency and to perfect the great machine in his 
 hands. By some he was reproached for living 
 voluntarily in the great white light of publicity, but 
 Gallieni knew that unless he had the public em- 
 phatically on his side his reforms could be crushed
 
 114 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 by politics. When once he had estabHshed his 
 right to freedom of action, then no poHtical cabal, 
 thinking of its influence at the polls, could pull him 
 down. It was for this reason that he took the 
 public into his confidence, so that it might know 
 that the best was being done that could be done. 
 If Galli^ni showed no mercy to the shirker, it was 
 because he wished to encourage the peasant in the 
 trenches and the mechanic in the factory by the 
 thought that there was justice for all and favouritism 
 for none. Much of his work was accomplished 
 without the least blare of trumpets or the smallest 
 paragraph in the Press. He reorganised the medical 
 service of the army in the sense of bringing hospitals 
 into line with authority, and suppressed the laisser- 
 aller of the amateur and philanthropic institution. 
 
 Though not in the ordinary sense a social figure — 
 indeed, he is the despair of hostesses — Gallieni has 
 social graces and an artistic side to his character 
 wanting from the more burly figure of General 
 Joffre. Though he keeps his counsel in all pro- 
 fessional matters, he is not naturally silent; he has 
 a dozen interests, not exclusively military, and 
 touches life at all points. As a young man, follow- 
 ing his studies in the military school, he consorted 
 with a literary set in the Latin Quarter, and the 
 friends of his youth were Ernest Daudet and Jean 
 Richepin. He reads and speaks several languages, 
 believing that one should go direct to one's authorities, 
 and his conversation is informed with study, reflec- 
 tion and travel. He is the type of the modern soldier : 
 savant, philosopher and metaphysician. A wide 
 experience and intellectual tastes have given him
 
 GALLI^NI AND HIS POPULARITY 115 
 
 toleration, but he has none for incapacity and dere- 
 Hction of duty. Though accused of overweening 
 ambition, he is ambitious only to serve the country. 
 " For an old man like myself, death on the battle- 
 field would be a recompense," he said on a recent 
 occasion. " I should die in defending Paris with 
 the enthusiasm of a young lieutenant." This is the 
 spirit which flamed from the historic poster on the 
 walls of Paris at the moment when the Government 
 departed to Bordeaux : "I have received a man- 
 date to defend Paris, and I intend to fulfil it to the 
 end. . . ." 
 
 It was patriotism which induced him to accept 
 the heavy succession of the Ministry of War from 
 M. Millerand. Years before he had been offered the 
 post, but declined it " because it meant presence in 
 the Chamber." But the war changed everything; 
 it was impossible to urge personal reasons when the 
 country was at stake. But he knows so little of 
 political labels that he makes his friends laugh in 
 confusing one kind of Republican with another. To 
 him they are all the same, provided they have the 
 national interests at heart. For this reason he 
 was equally friendly with men of such divergent 
 tendencies as Gambetta, Jules Simon, Waldeck- 
 Rousseau and Albert de Mun. It is because of his 
 many-sided appeal that he inspires collaborators 
 with peculiar devotion. Two qualities outstand : 
 his perennial youth, represented by a figure which 
 might be that of a young cavalry officer, though he 
 has passed the age hmit, and a scientific precision 
 of thought which means that in everything he is 
 clear, precise, and piercing, like a sword-blade.
 
 IIG JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Illness caused him, unfortunately, to relinquish 
 his post at the Ministry of War in the spring of 1916, 
 after a few months of strenuous work, but his in- 
 fluence remains as that of a good patriot inexorable 
 in his country's service.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 GALLIENI AND HIS COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 If General Gallieni allowed his mind to take a 
 retrospective turn in the intervals of his intensive 
 work at the Ministry of War, there must have opened 
 to him a dazzling prospect of colonial enterprise and 
 adventure. And in the picture would appear a 
 gallery of celebrities, brown, black and yellow, as 
 w^ell as white. The man who made the profoundest 
 impression on his character was certainly Faidherbe, 
 type of the serious Frenchman, whose spectacles 
 added to the natural gravity of his face. His work 
 as pioneer had ceased before Gallieni 's had com- 
 menced, but his influence remained, powerful for 
 good, and vitahsing in its effect on the young mind. 
 He realised that when you beat back barbarism you 
 must attach the native to the flag and give him new 
 objects for devotion. Before the War of 1870, he was 
 engaged in conquering the Niger Basin. Gallieni w^as 
 destined to complete that work. Like his master, 
 as he called Faidherbe, he was inspired by the great 
 English explorers, Mungo Park and Livingstone. The 
 latter was discovering Lake Ngami when Gallieni 
 was born. 
 
 Faidherbe fought in the War of 1870 as commander 
 of the Northern Army, and won two rare successes 
 against the Germans at Bapaume and Pont Noyelles. 
 
 117
 
 118 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Then he retired to senatorial and academic honours, 
 and Briere de L'Isle reigned in his stead as Governor 
 of Senegal. Gallieni joined him from his peaceful 
 garrison of the lie Reunion. There he could have 
 lazed and luxuriated to his heart's content, for there 
 was nothing to do, but that was not his nature. He 
 preferred to give himself to professional studies and 
 to fit himself for the colonial career, for which he 
 felt already a vocation, if not a positive predestina- 
 tion. In Senegal the opportunity came early to 
 display his talents both as soldier and organiser. 
 Ahmadou, son of El Hadj Oumar, founder of a 
 Mussulman empire in Central Africa, was endea- 
 vouring to maintain his position by terrorism. An 
 English expedition from Gambia looked like barring 
 the way to French expansion in the Hinterland, and 
 the Senegal Government felt there was no time to 
 be lost. Gallieni, now a captain, fitted out his expedi- 
 tion, which started from Bakel in 1880. He took 
 with him presents to placate Ahmadou, for the object 
 of the mission was more political than military. We 
 have a picturesque account of it, with geographical 
 and ethnological details and amusing sketches of 
 negro chieftains from the pen of Gallieni himself. He 
 showed as much erudition as enthusiasm for his work, 
 and did credit to La Fleche, the military school 
 where he passed his boyhood, and St. Cyr, whence 
 he graduated, as sub-lieutenant, on the very day — 
 July 15, 1870 — when war broke out with Germany. 
 He was a real " son of a cartridge pouch," as the 
 phrase is, for his father, of an old Italian family, was 
 the last commandant of a French garrison on the 
 Spanish side of the Pyrenees. 
 
 The Captain underwent many perils in his search for
 
 GALLI^NI'S COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 119 
 
 Ahmadou. His column was ambushed and half its 
 effectives killed. The remainder took refuge in a 
 valley, and the exultant enemy crowned the heights. 
 Captain Gallieni, with the decision that always has 
 distinguished him, advanced with a single interpreter 
 to parley with the foe. The latter was so impressed 
 with his valour that it let him continue his journey. 
 But Ahmadou was coy, and hid himself in his capital 
 of Segou, which he did not allow the mission to 
 approach. For seven or eight months Galli6ni and 
 his companions were practically prisoners of the 
 irascible Sultan, who sent each morning to tell them 
 that they would be executed that day — news that 
 affected them less than the deprivation of salt, to 
 which they were subjected. Finally, by much 
 patience, Gallieni wrung a treaty from his captor, 
 giving France access to and commercial rights over 
 the river from its source to Timbuctoo. It was a 
 great stroke, and bore witness to the soldier-diplomat's 
 courage and persistence. 
 
 Whilst waiting for the good pleasure of the negro 
 Sultan, Gallieni was not wasting time. He was taking 
 stock of the country, of its resources and its inhabit- 
 ants, particularly in view of the extension of the 
 railway from Kayes (the capital of Senegal), which 
 was at the basis of French policy in the Soudan. The 
 young officer's account of his travels brought him 
 fame in France, the Gold Medal of the Geographical 
 Society, the red ribbon of the Legion, and the rank 
 of Major in the army. Though Ahmadou's trickery 
 had somewhat compromised the success of the mission, 
 important results had been attained, notably in 
 knowledge of the country, and in providing facilities 
 for the line. He was to see Ahmadou again.
 
 120 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 He had returned to Paris for a few months' repose, 
 and then had gone to the Antilles. Yet the Soudan 
 called him irresistibly. His work there was not 
 complete. He was now Lieutenant-Colonel and 
 Governor of French Soudan. Ahmadou was at his 
 old tricks; he menaced the colony from the north, 
 whilst new adversaries arose in Mahmadou-Lamine, 
 who had excited the fanaticism of his followers, and 
 had put a small community in Senegal to fire and 
 sword ; in his son Soybou, who operated on the right 
 bank of the Senegal ; and Samory, a rather famous 
 chief, who was suspiciously active in the south. It 
 took Colonel Gallieni two campaigns to settle the 
 agitation. The first campaign was both military 
 and diplomatic. In its former character it had 
 Mahmadou and his depredations as its punitive 
 purpose ; in its latter capacity it carried proposals to 
 Samory to grant access to the Niger over his territory. 
 Against Mahmadou, Gallieni proceeded with great 
 vigour. On Christmas Day, 1880, two columns con- 
 verged under the walls of his stronghold Diamou, about 
 125 miles from Bakel. The town was taken, but the 
 chief had flown. However, the expedition was a 
 fine piece of organisation, and no French column had 
 ventured hitherto as far from its base; Gallieni had 
 sown his rear with a succession of posts. 
 
 He parleyed more than he fought. It was his 
 principle to conciliate rather than arouse opposition 
 by strong measures. He founded a school for hostages, 
 and sent the sons of the chiefs there as an excellent 
 way of extending French influence, and established 
 "villages of liberty," where freed slaves could live 
 in peace and till the soil, thus promoting economic 
 development and the repopulation of devastated areas.
 
 GALLI^NI'S COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 121 
 
 The second campaign, undertaken in 1887-8, was 
 just as active as the first and just as fruitful in results. 
 In the interval, numerous missions of a politico- 
 geographical character were organised. Swamps were 
 drained, bridges thrown over streams, roads traced, 
 and posts founded. Negotiations were resumed with 
 Ahmadou. Soybou, who had continued his violence, 
 was captured and given a soldier's death, out of 
 respect for his youth and personal courage, and thus, 
 like a good Mussulman, he entered into the Paradise of 
 Mahomet, with the indispensable tuft of hair. It was 
 a chivalrous concession that gained for the Governor 
 new suffrages amongst the tribesmen. Nor did the 
 young chieftain long precede his father to the bourne 
 of defeated rebels, for Mahmadou-Lamine, was pre- 
 sently trapped to his last hiding-place and killed. 
 Gallieni completed his military measures by building 
 a large fort to dominate the district, and then pushed 
 the railway up to Bafoulabe, a considerable perform- 
 ance in a bare, desert country. Remarkable changes 
 took place in the character of the people in a very 
 few years. The Colonel gained more territory by 
 persuasion and negotiation than with the sword. 
 He added 900,000 square kilometres to the French 
 colonial domain, and 2,600,000 to its inhabitants. 
 He was the real creator of the French Soudanese 
 Empire, and laid the foundations of its political and 
 administrative organisation. The results of his ex- 
 perience were embodied in a brilliant book : Two 
 Campaigns in the French Soudan. 
 
 Now he was again in France, a full Colonel, com- 
 manding a regiment in the colonial army which 
 he joined on leaving St. Cyr in the War of 1870. 
 With that gallant force, popularly known as the
 
 122 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 " Porpoises," he was present at the heroic defence of 
 Bazeilles, a hamlet near Sedan, by the famous Blue 
 Division. The Division burnt its last cartridges 
 before yielding to the overwhelming numbers of the 
 Germans, who made prisoners of the survivors. 
 Amongst them was Gallieni. He was interned in 
 Germany, just long enough to enable him to learn 
 the language of the conquerors. It was an early proof 
 of his intellectual alertness. 
 
 The black faces of the Senegalese must now give 
 way, in his colonial recollections, to the Mongolian 
 type of Indo-China. The Black Flags over-ran 
 Tonking. They were evidently encouraged by Chinese 
 gold. Every day the list of their crimes lengthened : 
 posts attacked, villages laid waste. No part of the 
 colony, even the most settled, was free from them. 
 Gallieni received orders from the Home Government 
 to restore order and tranquillity. The officer, now 
 with an established colonial reputation, began a 
 systematic study of the problem. He found that his 
 predecessor. Colonel Pennequin, had written a work, 
 from which it appeared that the French were putting 
 their money on the wrong horse in giving dominance 
 to a race which was merely one of the three principal 
 ethnical elements of the country. Injustice was 
 created by this illogical preference, and tyranny had 
 grown up. Colonel Gallieni re-established the balance 
 by placing the races on a footing of equality. Then 
 he attacked the question of the pirates. He dis- 
 covered that economic conditions were partly respon- 
 sible, and that brigandage flourished in particular 
 soils. He set to work to change the temper of the 
 people, to reorganise resources and to group and 
 satisfy local demands for labour and self-development.
 
 GALLIENI'S COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 123 
 
 To his policy was given the name of " Spots of Oil." 
 It happily expressed the system, which consisted in 
 planting small posts in a region and advancing them 
 gradually towards the interior, so that the radius 
 was continually extended. He made instructors, 
 agriculturists and mechanics of his white non-com- 
 missioned officers in these military posts. Both 
 teachers and taught delighted in the arrangement, 
 and the work proceeded rapidly. He was repeating 
 in Asia the methods he had carried out so success- 
 fully in the Soudan. Against the pirates he acted 
 with great energy, rounding them up with mobile 
 columns until they were forced to yield. Upon the 
 northern frontier leading into China he planted a 
 triple line of block-houses linked by telephone, helio- 
 graph and pigeon post. To this day the installation 
 remains, attesting the soundness of the defence 
 against Chinese bands. And his friendship and 
 understanding with Marshal Sou, the mandarin who 
 represented the Son of Heaven as governor of Kang 
 Tsei, was largely instrumental in stamping out 
 piracy. The wily Oriental learned to esteem the 
 high intelligence and energy of his white neighbour. 
 With the capture of De Tham, the most formidable 
 pirate, the activity of these hordes ceased, and in 
 four years Gallieni had established peace. His 
 doctrine had again prevailed : Draw the sword as 
 little as possible; fight energetically when you have 
 to fight, but whenever the occasion offers, discuss, 
 negotiate, inspire sympathy; and, above all, civilise. 
 
 But Gallieni's chief work was done in Madagascar ; 
 it was the coping-stone of his colonial edifice. Civil 
 administration had broken down in the island. Not- 
 withstanding a costly expedition, French influence
 
 124 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 was practically confined to the capital, Antanana- 
 rivo, and revolt had broken out behind the advancing 
 columns. The island, indeed, was seething with in- 
 surrection, and the new Resident, or Governor as 
 he was soon to be, discovered that the Hovas were 
 partially responsible for this state of things. Though 
 they were given special privileges by the French — 
 again in defiance of ethnology — they were unworthy 
 of them. Gallieni, acting as he had done in Tonking, 
 treated them as he did the other sections of the 
 population. Fearing to alarm local sentiment, he 
 called a halt in some reforms inaugurated by his 
 predecessor and retarded the liberation of slaves, for 
 which both masters and servants were unprepared. 
 He began gradually to institute reforms, and to carry 
 out the pacification of the island. He colonised with 
 brains, in fact. Occasionally, he had to use force and 
 show that he intended that French suzerainty should 
 be a reality and not a mere shadow, such as Queen 
 Ranavalona apparently regarded it. Two Ministers 
 paid the penalty of their conspiracy before the Queen 
 was invited to depart and take up her residence in 
 Algeria as the permanent guest of the Republic. 
 These measures received the belated approval of 
 Parliament, though it had hesitated to take the 
 initiative. 
 
 Having got the government of the island into his 
 hands, Gallieni proceeded to apply his system in 
 all its completeness. His most successful experiment 
 was the division of the island into districts, each in 
 charge of a commandant. To these commandants he 
 sent recommendations worthy to rank with the best 
 efforts of Roman Proconsuls. They were penetrated 
 with good sense, enlightenment and precision. " When
 
 GALLI^NI'S COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 125 
 
 you root out a nest of pirates, think of the market 
 you must plant on the morrow," was one of his 
 instructions. Another was : " Every advance made 
 must be with a view to the permanent occupation 
 of the country." Both admirably expressed his 
 policy. He believed in markets and schools, in roads 
 and bridges, as instruments of domination. 
 
 His fashion of securing collaboration was also 
 crowned with success. With great care he selected 
 his lieutenants, and then allowed them a free hand. 
 He refused to burden his mind with details, and left 
 himself free to reflect upon and discuss the larger 
 issues. Thus, he summoned an authority on horse- 
 breeding, and gave him carte blanche, within certain 
 financial limits, to establish a stud-farm and provide 
 the island with cavalry. " Give me your report in 
 two years' time," he said; "meantime, do the best 
 you can." At the appointed hour the report was 
 forthcoming, and the Governor proceeded to act 
 upon it. It was typical of his modus operandi. This 
 faith in his entourage, after having tested capacity 
 and fidelity, was justified by its results. 
 
 His governorship of the island lasted nine years, 
 and its effects were so satisfactory that it seemed 
 as if a miracle had happened. Then, at his own request, 
 he was nominated inspector of troops in Western and 
 Eastern Africa, in the Antilles and Pacific. Thus 
 his colonial career was rounded out, and his title con- 
 firmed of " the great French coloniser." In each of 
 his posts, whether in the Soudan, in Tonking, or 
 Madagascar, he had shown capacity and resource- 
 fulness, an earnest and intelligent enthusiasm which 
 had triumphed over obstacles, because science was 
 joined to energy and knowledge to practical prin-
 
 126 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 ciples. Thus the empire he founded was not built 
 upon sand, but upon the bed-rock of native welfare and 
 material advancement. His success in dealing with 
 natives arose as much from his sympathy as from his 
 determination to study the character and antecedents 
 of his administres with the care with which the 
 physician studies the details of the case upon which 
 he is engaged. Thus success came not as something 
 due to fortune or caprice, but as a definite and cal- 
 culated result. 
 
 Home again after more than thirty years of dis- 
 tinguished colonial service, Gallieni, now a General 
 of Division, was given the 13th Army Corps at 
 Clermont Ferrand, and later the 14th Army Corps 
 at Lyons, carrying with it the eventual command 
 of the army in the Alps. In 1908 he was called to the 
 Superior Council of War. A year or two before the 
 Great War, which was to give him his crowning posi- 
 tion of responsibility at the Ministry in the Rue St. 
 Dominique, he took part in the grand manoeuvres 
 in Touraine, and succeeded not only in out-manoeu- 
 vring " the enemy," but positively in capturing the 
 General-in-Chief and his staff. Paris laughed long 
 over the episode ; the victorious General was antici- 
 pating his laurels in actual war.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE HERO OF THE OURCQ 
 
 FouR-AND-FORTY years he had waited for that tragic 
 moment : the crossing of the frontier by the Germans 
 for the second time. Through long years of monoton- 
 ous preparation he had been buoyed up by the thought 
 of serving his country in his country's greatest need. 
 And now the opportunity had come — almost too late, 
 for his normal career had finished two years before. 
 But the old soldier in him arose and refused to be 
 comforted by a country gentleman's occupations, 
 which had filled his retirement. There was great work 
 afoot; he must offer his sword to France. To his 
 friends it did not seem that Michel Joseph Maunoury 
 had greatly changed since the time when he was a 
 spruce artillery captain, and student of the Staff College. 
 Hair, moustache, and goatee beard had changed to 
 white, of course, but the figure remained as slim and 
 alert as in the old days when he galloped each morn- 
 ing in the Bois. Whatever the weather, he appeared 
 in the allees, sitting his horse like a Centaur, and 
 getting himself fit for the great day which he saw 
 by his prophetic vision could not be very far off. 
 He was haunted by the idea of la revanche, and 
 was too honest to conceal it. The word was not 
 popular with politicians. No public man dared 
 utter it, save Deroul^de and his League of Patriots 
 
 127
 
 128 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 thundering against national apathy and supineness 
 in their orations of July 14. General Bailloud, who 
 afterwards distinguished himself in Sarrail's retreat 
 through Macedonia, was punished for saying to his 
 Army Corps at Nancy that the time would come 
 when they would win back the Lost Provinces. 
 
 That Maunoury continually thought of these things 
 is clear from the General Order that he issued to 
 the Sixth Army on September 10 after the battle 
 of the Marne. It is dated from his Headquarters 
 at Claye, near Meaux : " The Sixth Army has just 
 sustained, during five entire days, without any inter- 
 mission or slackening, a struggle against a numerous 
 adversary whose moral has been exalted by success. 
 The struggle has been severe; the losses under fire, 
 the fatigue due to want of sleep and, sometimes, 
 want of food, have surpassed imagination. You have 
 supported all with a valour, a firmness and endurance 
 that words are powerless to glorify as they deserve. 
 Comrades, the General-in-Chief asked you in the name 
 of the patrie to do more than your duty ; you have 
 responded beyond what seemed to be possible. 
 Thanks to you, victory has crowned our standards. 
 Now that you know its glorious satisfaction, you will 
 allow it no longer to escape you. As for myself, if 
 I have done anything worthy, I have been recom- 
 pensed by the greatest honour which could have 
 befallen me in my long career, that of commanding 
 men like you. It is with a lively emotion that I 
 thank you for what you have done, for the revenge 
 for 1870, towards which all my energies and all my 
 efforts have been directed for forty-four years, is due 
 to your efforts." 
 
 The document is a real profession of faith. It
 
 THE HERO OF THE OURCQ 129 
 
 bespeaks the man and his mission, his courage, his 
 modesty, his patriotism, his long-suffering in the 
 Cause. The Order was wrongly attributed to Joffre, 
 because he had added some phrases at the end to 
 express appreciation of the part played by the Sixth 
 Army in keeping engaged a notable portion of the 
 German forces on the Ourcq Front; but none who 
 knew Maunoury and his intimate opinions could 
 question its authenticity. When he signed the 
 Order he wore for the first time (though he had 
 possessed it since 1911) the modest little bronze medal, 
 with its green and black ribbon, which commemo- 
 rates 1870. Thus were linked in his mind the two 
 dates — 1870 and 1914 — the one disaster and the other 
 its vindication. Maunoury had every reason to 
 remember 1870. He was an officer-cadet at the time, 
 studying at the engineering and artillery school at 
 Metz, the forerunner of Fontainebleau. When war 
 broke out he was appointed to a battery, and arrived 
 in Paris with it on the very day, September 14, when 
 the Republic was proclaimed. He had no idea, as he 
 marched through the streets with his men, that the 
 EiTipire had fallen to a new form of government. 
 But he was to see the popular temper even more 
 sharpiy represented than that. At the gates of Paris 
 was fought the battle of Champigny, and there 
 Maunoury lost his fellow-officers and remained alone 
 with f. remnant of his battery. Then the rising tide 
 of the Commune caught him in Paris, unwarned of 
 the retirement of the Regular Army to Versailles. 
 He and his men only escaped from the mob by 
 disguising themselves in mufti and walking singly 
 through the gates. 
 
 Happily, he was spared the horrors of a second 
 
 K
 
 130 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 siege — that of Paris in the hands of the Commune. 
 The first had left poignant memories never to be 
 effaced. Yet his vocation was so firmly fixed that 
 he was not to be turned from it even by this dis- 
 couraging commencement. The possibility of aveng- 
 ing national humiliation braced his energies and kept 
 him continually at work preparing for the inevit- 
 able day through more than two score years. He 
 became one of the most authoritative teachers 
 of the army. At St. Cyr, which he had attended as 
 student, he became professor, and when Fontaine- 
 bleau started its artillery course, it was he who 
 directed it for the benefit of subalterns. Whilst he 
 was professing artillery at St. Cyr, a great controversy 
 raged on the subject. It was clear that France had 
 been out-classed by Germany in field-guns; it was 
 one of the causes of her defeat. The guns were more 
 powerful, more accurately aimed, and more quickly 
 served. The Germans had learnt the art of shooting, 
 which the French had neglected. Though the De 
 Reffye cannon was much better than its predecessor 
 — a muzzle-loader, firing an eight-pound shell, which 
 broke only at two distances — it was still far behind 
 the German arm. The young war professor pro- 
 nounced strongly in favour of power. The field- 
 gun, above all, must be all-powerful, he said ; mobility 
 could come afterwards. The rival camp protested that 
 mobility should come first ; you could mass your light 
 and handy guns and obtain the power required. But 
 Maunoury unveiled what he considered to be the 
 sophistry of this argument. The result of all this 
 heat was the 75 mm., a model field-gun, which wrought 
 wonders for France in the Great War. But its effici- 
 ency was not unconnected with an excellent shell.
 
 THE HERO OF THE OURCQ 131 
 
 Though he had studied deeply the lessons of 1870, 
 Maunoury was not cast down by them, but rather 
 stimulated to greater effort. Immediately after the 
 war he wrote to his family a letter which shows 
 his faith in his country's renaissance. " The fright- 
 ful catastrophe leaves France mutilated, but she is 
 not stricken to death. All can be repaired if she 
 really wishes it." That was the language of a soldier 
 and optimist, but it interpreted exactly the spirit 
 of his countrymen and, above all, the capacity of 
 their eventual leaders. He was well placed to form 
 such an opinion, for, as General of Division, he 
 became Director of the War School, and upon its 
 benches sat the future commanders of French armies. 
 Napoleon in his time made use of the material to his 
 hand, often untrained scientifically — the soldier of 
 fortune, of practical experience — but he held always 
 that the best officer came from the Schools. And 
 this generalisation is true to-day, truer than ever, 
 because of the new character of war. Maunoury set 
 himself against mere specialisation, and, though he 
 became an expert, as we have seen, he enlarged his 
 scope by studying tactics and then applied them in 
 the field, by commanding first the Fourteenth Army 
 Corps at Marseilles, and secondly the famous Twen- 
 tieth Corps at Nancy, which looked directly in the 
 face of the foe. As colonel he had commanded 
 artillery at Vincennes. 
 
 He seemed to have written " finis " to the more 
 active part of his career when he became Governor 
 of Paris, but even in this post of pure routine in peace 
 time, he invented methods of reform. He objected 
 to the slackness that prevailed, and circularised 
 against the slovenliness of soldiers' dress in the
 
 132 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 streets, and even on the parade-ground. He tried 
 to revive officers' interest in the morning ride in the 
 Bois. Paris was amused and at the same time 
 satisfied with a circular issued during the winter of 
 1911-12, which expressed surprise that the Governor 
 met so few officers on wet and cold mornings in the 
 Bois. Between the lines you could read his con- 
 tempt for softness. Even in his most strenuous 
 student days be had always kept himself fit by con- 
 stant physical exercise. At the Cavalry School at 
 Saumur, he was noted for his good riding; in the 
 Bois his elegant, upright figure was a reproach against 
 the carelessness of some officers. 
 
 He objected to laissez-aller in any branch of the 
 army. Discipline was as important as guns and 
 ammunition, he thought. Nor did he mean mere 
 respect for established things or strict obedience to 
 superiors. He meant that discipline of the mind 
 which accepted principles and policies — the unity of 
 military doctrine; he meant a constant training of 
 officers in grand manoeuvres, that each might be 
 accustomed to responsibility in the common scheme. 
 Only by incessant practice could one attain perfec- 
 tion. And behind the discipline there must be 
 patriotism. His example and enthusiasm infected 
 the Paris garrison; in two years he had achieved 
 marvels. And then the night parades, inaugurated 
 by M. Millerand in concert with the Governor, aroused 
 civilian enthusiasm for the army. Once more the 
 streets of Paris resounded with the cry : " Vive 
 I'armee." Under the old regime it had become 
 almost seditious as a sentiment, but now the whole 
 street hummed and sang the Sambre et Meuse, and 
 marched in rhythm with the beating drums and
 
 THE HERO OF THE OURCQ 133 
 
 shrieking fifes. Even hlasis Parisians in tlie cafes 
 and restaurants stood on their feet as the tattoo 
 passed and the red-coated orchestras broke into a 
 rapturous Marseillaise, with accompanying cheers. 
 The fond of Paris is always patriotic whatever the 
 surface currents. 
 
 When war fell out of a blue sky, Maunoury was 
 tending his roses in his garden in the quiet village 
 of Mer, near Blois. A few months before, his neigh- 
 bours had asked him to stand for Parliament in the 
 interest of the Three- Years Law; but he declined. 
 Perhaps his near view of politics, as Commandant of 
 the Guard of the Senate, had not conduced to a 
 respect for them. In any case, he preferred his open- 
 air life and his country pursuits to the feverish atmo- 
 sphere of political Paris. When he went to the 
 Luxembourg, where is situated the Senate, it was to 
 attend a course on arboriculture — not to pay court to 
 politicians. These he has kept always at a distance. 
 It needed a war to wrest him from his gardening and 
 agriculture, tastes the stronger for being hereditary. 
 His family was long settled in the Loir-et-Cher, and 
 one of his uncles had allowed Pasteur to experiment 
 upon his flocks when investigating cattle-diseases. 
 
 The old ardour returned at the call of duty. First 
 came depot work, important even if lacking glory, 
 and then the command of an army at Verdun for the 
 eastern offensive. Alas ! it was unsuccessful, and 
 Maunoury's, with the other French Armies, was soon 
 in retreat towards the south. But the watchful eye 
 of Joffre remarked an attempt on the part of Von 
 Kluck, commanding the First German Army, to 
 envelop the left wing (the English Army) of the Allies. 
 He sent Maunoury to support the wing. The troops
 
 184 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 detrained at Montdidier, to the south of Amiens. 
 They arrived by divisions, and were flung, one after 
 the other, into the battle-Hne — a diffieult and danger- 
 ous process under fire. Von Kluck disregarded the 
 army forming in front of his right, as if it did not 
 exist, and concentrated his attention on the Enghsh 
 force, which he wished to crush. Maunoury's orders 
 were to fall back on Paris to form the siege garrison. 
 When the order reached him, he ejaculated, " Heaven 
 forbid ! Anything but that." His memory went 
 back to 1870, and there was revived the old anguish 
 at the misfortunes of his country. None the less, he 
 refused to lose heart, and kept a bold front to the 
 enemy, retiring in splendid order after holding each 
 line as long as possible. 
 
 Gallieni had seen the enemy's move from north to 
 east and noted its strategic consequences. He com- 
 municated his impressions to the Commander-in- 
 Chief, and Maunoury's army, hastily reconstituted 
 and now composed of 100,000 men, was thrust again 
 into an offensive against the flank-guard of Reservists 
 which was protecting Von Kluck's columns as they 
 glided past Paris. The assemblage of that army and 
 its rapid transport to the strategic points constitutes 
 one of the romances of the war. 
 
 The Sixth Army was composed of divers elements, 
 most of which had suffered greatly from the fighting 
 in the east and north. The cavalry, too, was fatigued 
 by its long march from Charleroi. One of its impor- 
 tant bodies was General Lamaize's corps, formed of 
 two divisions of reserves, which had lost heavily in 
 Lorraine. They had fought also at Amiens, whither 
 they had been transported by train, and then they 
 marched on foot to Dammartin, to the north of
 
 THE HERO OF THE QURCQ 185 
 
 Meaux, which was one of the points of concentration. 
 To these divisions was added a brigade of Moroccan 
 infantry. The second considerable element was the 
 Seventh Army Corps, which had battled, also, in the 
 east before reaching the Amiens district. One of its 
 divisions was commanded by General de Villaret, 
 who later was to be wounded with Maunoury at 
 Soissons. Two divisions, which had fought at 
 Cambrai in French Flanders, and had been much 
 cut up; a division from Algeria which had just 
 arrived in Paris; the Fourth Army Corps from Lor- 
 raine, where it had lost many men ; a cavalry brigade 
 and the First Corps of Cavalry, consisting of three 
 divisions ; a brigade of Marine Fusiliers, two-and-a- 
 half battalions of Zouaves and a brigade of Spahis 
 (native cavalry from Algeria) were also joined to the 
 force under Maunoury. The fixed garrison of Paris 
 consisted of four divisions of Territorials, who were 
 also employed in outpost work along the line of 
 contact. 
 
 The army was ordered to act in co-operation with 
 the English, who had assembled in the Coulommiers 
 district ; but, unfortunately, there seems not to have 
 been quite the co-operation needed between the two 
 forces, though Maunoury detached a division to the 
 help of the ally. The Sixth Army began the attack 
 on the afternoon of September 5. In moving to 
 their positions, the troops found the enemy's reserves 
 strongly occupying villages to the left of Meaux. 
 The General-in-Chief's dispositions were not entirely 
 realised, and some critics blame what they call the 
 hesitancy of the English in assuming a vigorous 
 offensive. In any case the operations, after severe 
 fighting, were generally crowned with success, and a
 
 136 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 great part of the credit of the battle of the Marne 
 is due to the resourcefulness and skill of Maunoury. 
 An incident in the battle was the arrival of reinforce- 
 ments in 1,100 taxicabs, mobilised by General Gallieni, 
 in order to transport the Seventh Infantry Division 
 to the left wing of the Sixth Army. The infantry 
 arrived with great promptitude by this means, and 
 was able at dawn on the morrow to enter into action. 
 Having distinguished himself in the defence of 
 Paris, Maunoury was given the command of an army 
 at Soissons. There he was wounded during the 
 Spring of 1915, whilst making an inspection of the 
 trenches with General de Villaret, who was also 
 injured by the same bullet. General Maunoury's 
 right eye was lost and the left affected. It meant 
 that he could no longer hold his command at the 
 Front, and this fine old soldier, who had done so 
 much for the French Army, again became Governor 
 of Paris, after an interval of three years. Some have 
 blamed him for exposing himself in the first-line 
 trenches only thirty metres from the enemy, but his 
 principle always had been that the Commander-in- 
 Chief should share danger with his troops. It is 
 characteristic of him that he did not shrink from all 
 the consequences of such a theory. There was some- 
 thing a little touching in the circumstances that in 
 the twilight of his own life, after a brilliant day, he 
 came to watch over Paris — la ville lumiere — plunged 
 into the deep shadows of a precautionary darkness. 
 And then when his own light faded into a perpetual 
 obscurity, he retired once again into the peace — alas ! 
 the disabled peace — of private life, a sad but glorious 
 end for an old soldier.
 
 CHAPTER Xm 
 
 THE MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND 
 
 To convert an army of a few hundred thousands 
 into a mighty machine of milHons — what achieve- 
 ment ! And this, in a few months. To clothe, equip, 
 and supply these men with munitions — an even 
 greater task ! Yet this England did ; and French 
 military critics were amazed at an exploit unequalled 
 in the world's history. The little band of men who 
 fought so gallantly at Mons, and whose opportune 
 arrival helped to turn the first tide of invasion, have 
 grown and increased to the gigantic British Army of 
 to-day. Nothing delighted the French as much as 
 the establishment of Conscription in England. It 
 seemed to them like the gauge of England's serious- 
 ness. With their clear minds they had long realised 
 that the voluntary system was inadequate to furnish 
 the necessary resources to the army in time of war. 
 True, the French, in their impatience to see England 
 scientifically increase her army, forgot how slowly 
 was evolved their own system of national service. 
 Although, as we have seen, the Convention, in a 
 moment of revolutionary fervour, decreed that it 
 was the duty of every one to serve the State, a 
 national system of compulsion, applicable to every- 
 body, was not resorted to until more than fifty years 
 
 after the Napoleonic Wars, and France had suffered 
 
 137
 
 188 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 defeat from conscripted armies. Then, in its final 
 form, compulsion became a drastic measure from 
 which none escaped; but, even here, nearly another 
 fifty years was necessary to implant and make good 
 the system of absolute equality. Thus the French 
 opinion which carped at England for her slowness in 
 taking up an equal burden in the field was not quite 
 mindful of French military history. These critics had 
 not realised that the completeness of the French 
 national military service had been the growth of many 
 years, and that a vast national army could not spring 
 into being at the mere waving of a wand ; and hence 
 it was impossible for England, even with the resources 
 of her vast Empire, to have taken, from the start, an 
 equal share in the war. Even had England adopted 
 compulsion at the beginning of the war, there were 
 corps of instructors to form, barracks to build, train- 
 ing-grounds to be found. These difficulties were quite 
 apart from equipment, which hinged largely upon the 
 supply of labour for the making of rifles. Lastly, 
 there was the supreme difficulty of the higher com- 
 mand. Generals and staff-officers cannot be turned 
 out with the speed of drill-sergeants. Happily the 
 Press, instead of inflaming the spirit of criticism, set 
 to work to explain the difficulties under which England 
 laboured by reason, even, of the character of her 
 institutions slowly evolved by the centuries. Both 
 M.Cruppi and M. Henry Davray emphasised England's 
 marvellous achievement in raising and equipping so 
 vast an army, even before she adopted the principle 
 of Conscription, and appreciated the difficulty of 
 accommodating compulsory service to the notion 
 of that individual liberty which is the corner-stone 
 of English national life. It was clear that a certain
 
 MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND 189 
 
 section of the British public confounded a national 
 army, formed for a definite national purpose, with 
 militarism of the Prussian type, and, therefore, had 
 created a bogey which it was necessary to knock down 
 before the principle of obligation could be accepted 
 by a free and enlightened people. And it is typical 
 of the conduct of the present war in England that it 
 was the voice of the people themselves, the clamour 
 of the man-in-the-street, which forced the Govern- 
 ment to a decision. When the war broke out many 
 thousands of Englishmen voluntarily sacrificed their 
 careers to join the army. But in so doing they in- 
 sisted that the manhood remaining in the country 
 should be forced to do likewise. And the man who 
 stayed at home ? Was he averse from Conscription ? 
 Almost without exception the men who stayed turned 
 to Westminster and said, " Fetch me if you really 
 want me. Fetch me if the need is honestly great." 
 No, the great British public — the men in the trenches, 
 the men at home, and the women (above all, the 
 women) insisted upon Conscription. It was West- 
 minster that slept; Westminster that hesitated, 
 Westminster (slow as ever in learning to " trust the 
 people") that mumbled about votes when, even in 
 those first days of the war, they could have insured 
 probably speedy victory ! Only when forced by the 
 man-in-the-street did the Government act. Through- 
 out the first stages of the war, the British Government, 
 instead of leading public opinion, was driven by it. 
 But in the eyes of a foreign nation, a country, un- 
 fortunately, has only the prestige of its Government, 
 and the French, chafing against our slowness to adopt 
 compulsion, little knew that John Bull himself was 
 fighting, through a maze of lawyers' arguments, for
 
 140 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 that very principle. The farm labourer who, at the 
 beginning of things, asked, " Why can't they treat us 
 all alike ? " had his finger upon the pulse of the nation 
 while the politicians hesitated and gambled with 
 time. Their fatal lethargy contrasted ill with the 
 patriotism of France, who, twelve months before, im- 
 posed upon herself a system of national service of the 
 most complete character. No partial exemptions were 
 allowed either in the interests of education or any 
 of the liberal careers or even of poor widows' sons. 
 The terms of service, too, were equally long for 
 infantry as for cavalry. In Germany a larger and 
 superabundant population allowed a fairly wide 
 system of exemptions. Until before the Great War, 
 certain categories of men were not called up; the 
 infantry served only two years, and students benefited 
 by a one-year system. French people do not always 
 realise, I think, the immense price they have paid to 
 escape from a repetition of the events of 1870. They 
 have not realised how seriously has been impeded 
 their own progress, thanks to the heavy strain placed 
 upon their resources in men. It has meant the with- 
 drawal of practically all the valid young men of the 
 country from industry and commerce for the prepara- 
 tion of war. It has meant the retardation of marriages 
 and a limited birth-rate, because young people could 
 not marry until comparatively late; it has meant, 
 also, that the smallest proportion of the country was 
 in a condition to emigrate, for emigration takes place 
 in the years of one's youth. Thus the French social 
 and industrial system was under the domination of 
 military exigencies, and France has made heavy 
 sacrifices to escape from what she most dreads : the 
 Prussian yoke.
 
 MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND 141 
 
 The enthusiasm in France was, then, immense, when 
 England finally decided to become an ally in the only 
 true sense of the word : to impose upon herself a 
 burden equal to that borne by her friends. But 
 France breathed a sigh of bitter disappointment 
 (disappointment which, it is fair to say, was shared 
 by the majority of Englishmen), at the large number 
 of exemptions at first granted ; and the excuses offered 
 by English statesmen by no means assuaged the 
 irritation felt both at home and abroad. For instance, 
 "the maintenance of essential trade" had a sort of 
 ironic ring to the French whose trade, either essential 
 or inessential, was hardly maintained at all. They 
 listened with a little smile of mockery whilst the 
 British Minister spoke rather glibly, as it seemed to 
 them, concerning the necessity of England being in 
 a position to lend money to the Allies. There was 
 a feeling, perhaps, that if they had suffered more, 
 they would have been more anxious to end the war, 
 and would have talked with less assurance of the 
 necessity of possessing money whereby they could 
 lend it to other combatants. The large proportion 
 of conscientious objectors, also, presented a strange 
 and sinister spectacle to the French, and assuredly so 
 curious an attitude would not have been tolerated in 
 France in the stress of a national war. It seemed a 
 monstrous proposition that a class of society should 
 have been allowed to accumulate wealth and a vast 
 prosperity under the protection of the flag, and yet 
 decline in the hour of need to bear arms from religious 
 scruples. To the alert intelligence of the French, this 
 was a grotesque and illogic situation, though they 
 themselves remembered that they had had in the 
 past their strict religious sects, including the Calvinists
 
 142 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 and the Camarists. The good-will of the English 
 people as a whole, however, was shown by the zeal 
 with which this question of national service was 
 taken up and adopted by a country naturally hostile 
 to any interference with the old principle of voluntary 
 enlistment ; and the position would have been clearer 
 to the French had they realised that the driving power 
 in England was being supplied by the individual and 
 not by the Government. The principle of Conscrip- 
 tion was not advocated by Ministers; it was forced 
 upon them. In small matters, as in great, the in- 
 dividual] took upon himself responsibility. Frail, 
 delicate women went without butter on their bread 
 and little children denied themselves sweets. In 
 France there was no evidence of any such personal 
 sacrifice. People lived as well as they could afford. 
 Why ? Because they relied upon their Government 
 to enforce any necessary sacrifices, and the individual, 
 having confidence in its Government, felt no personal 
 responsibility. 
 
 It is refreshing to turn from the question of Con- 
 scription, befogged as it was by the stifling atmosphere 
 of Westminster, to our army, working under the stars, 
 rubbing shoulders with our Allies in the trenches, and, 
 amid the bursting shells, establishing friendships and 
 understandings that are not couched in lawyers' 
 language. There in Northern France a brotherhood 
 has sprung into being which laughs at the arm-chair 
 critics and takes no count of the blunders of 
 politicians. But the arm-chair critic exists in France 
 (as in England), and his garrulity in clubs and public 
 places is by no means restrained by his lack of a 
 real understanding of military affairs. Let us admit 
 at once that the British Army has suffered from over
 
 MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND 143 
 
 prestige in the popular imagination of France; the 
 French people thought that England's help would 
 be sumptuous, colossal, spontaneous and irresistible; 
 and disappointment inevitably followed this exagger- 
 ated idea of the military assistance we should be able 
 to give at the beginning of the war. One heard much 
 criticism in France — indeed, one heard much the 
 same in England : " Why did the English, for so 
 long a time, take so small a share of the battle-line ? " 
 '' Where were Kitchener's great armies that were to 
 join with the French to drive the Germans back to 
 Berlin ? " " W^hy did not the English create a diver- 
 sion while the French were fighting at Verdun ? " 
 Such murmurings and complaints followed the relief 
 and joy which welcomed the arrival of the British 
 armies in France, and, among the uninformed portion 
 of the population, resulted in a certain cooling off 
 in the sentiment of friendliness. It was useless to 
 urge that the British Expeditionary Force could not 
 achieve the impossible; that an army cannot be 
 built in a night ; that General Joffre was responsible 
 for the general direction of operations, and that the 
 British could make no offensive that he did not 
 decree. French popular opinion persisted in believing 
 in the god their imagination had created, and bitterly 
 proclaimed its feet to be of clay. But such is the 
 work of the arm-chair critic all the world over. It 
 is his business to destroy confidence, to find fault, 
 to shake friendships ; and of far more real value is the 
 opinion of the French military command of our army 
 in the field. Here, again, we must be prepared to 
 hear some criticism — but considered criticism that 
 weighs difficulties and estimates conditions. The 
 French military observer notes an absence of good
 
 144 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 staff work on the English side, and he begins to 
 account for it by saying that, to form a staff is a long 
 and expensive process involving extensive scientific 
 studies. Now it is apparent that, up to the time of 
 the Great War, the profession of arms attracted rather 
 the high-spirited and sporting type of man than the 
 scientific student. In consequence, these excellent 
 sportsmen were at a disadvantage, perfectly easy to 
 comprehend, with the continental soldier. They had 
 not had the same training. It was impossible for 
 them to enter at once into the conception of men 
 who had been making war scientifically — at least on 
 paper — for many years. Excellent spade-work was 
 done at Aldershot, but the General Manoeuvres could 
 not be compared in military utility with those con- 
 ducted in Germany and France. Moreover, a long 
 course is necessary in military history, for without 
 this one glances at the map and finds nothing; there 
 is no spirit of comparison available, such as history 
 brings forth. On the other hand, if one has the sense 
 of comparison developed by long and varied reading, 
 the result is of the utmost value. One is able to say, 
 " Napoleon did so and so in certain circumstances; 
 what is there to prevent the modern commander from 
 imitating him ? " But without the knowledge such 
 comparison is impossible. 
 
 It is alleged against our leaders that they were not 
 sufficiently elastic and did not always allow them- 
 selves to be guided by circumstances. They formed 
 a rigid rule and would not depart from it. They did 
 not change their plans with the required promptitude 
 when the necessity arose for such a change. They 
 were not supple enough, not adaptable in their minds. 
 Of the immense and epic bravery of the English there
 
 MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND 145 
 
 was no question. " They know how to die," said a 
 General to me, and the commendation expresses a 
 universal opinion. There is something particularly- 
 Anglo-Saxon in the quality of this bravery. They 
 stood resolutely to the guns, when perhaps it would 
 have been better to temper valour with a little 
 prudence. It seems to be part of our steadfastness 
 never to draw back that we may leap the better; it 
 is part of our magnificent quality to hold fast that we 
 may be faithful to the end. Sometimes there is a 
 pathetic side to this characteristic, as when a sentry 
 posted outside British Headquarters was left standing 
 in the road after the retreat of the officers, because 
 he had not received his marching orders. That is 
 typical of the British temperament with all its sublime 
 self-abnegation; it is characteristic of the British 
 leader, and it is certain that, in the eyes of the French 
 observer, some element of suppleness might with ad- 
 vantage replace a little of our British stubbornness. 
 
 Of the new armies sent out by England I have heard 
 nothing but praise. General Bonnal, the former 
 director of the War School, writes : " Our dear Allies 
 are as brave, if not braver, than we ; and the athletic 
 sports which they cultivate enable them to surmount 
 material obstacles. Their moral has never ceased to 
 be splendid and is always accompanied by un- 
 changing good humour and gaiety." He, too, 
 finds fault with some of the staff work, but universal 
 is the commendation of the smartness and efficiency 
 of English company officers, and particularly of the 
 new class of officer, the student type — young men 
 from the Universities who exhibit great facility with 
 maps and show an immediate comprehension of the 
 exigencies of modern scientific warfare. 
 
 L
 
 146 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 But when we have left behind the arm-chair critic 
 and the mihtary critic we shall find that the British 
 Army, small or great, has made a vast impression 
 upon our neighbours, and the lilt of our pipes and 
 the echo of Tipperary will linger in the lanes when the 
 boom of the cannon has died away. Long wdll the 
 *' poilu " recall such exploits as those of the teams of 
 grenade-throwers in the British trenches, who were 
 much praised by Foch for their amazing work and 
 the speed they showed in it, reminiscent of the dash 
 and energy of a crack football team; and long will 
 the French Army covet the equipment and smartness 
 of the British soldier. It has been the grand chic to 
 imitate the English officer as much as possible by the 
 arrangement of straps and buttons and the rest; 
 and some French Generals, particularly Gouraud (who 
 was Commander-in-Chief in the Dardanelles and saw 
 much of the British Army at work), have expressed 
 to me their admiration for British smartness. "The 
 British soldier looks smart even in his shirt-sleeves ! " 
 observed Gouraud. 
 
 In the matter of uniform, the war has provided a 
 remarkable instance of the French ability to adapt 
 oneself to new circumstances. When hostilities 
 began, the French were still wearing their red and 
 blue uniforms, and some of the dashing young officers 
 went into battle at Charleroi with white gloves and 
 plumes. Against them the Germans sent wave after 
 wave of men in the invisible grey-green uniform. 
 From the point of view of equipment the French were 
 much behind us, and their red and blue uniforms 
 were ludicrously inadequate for modern warfare, and 
 contrasted unfavourably with the German grey-green 
 and our own khaki. But this the French quickly
 
 MILITARY POWER OF ENGLAND 147 
 
 realised, and in the middle of the battle adopted 
 horizon blue, which, though it soiled quickly, was, at 
 least, an excellent uniform from the point of view of 
 not being too conspicuous. 
 
 As to the services rendered by the Navy, the 
 French, like the English, have not been permitted 
 to lift the veil of secrecy which has cloaked the 
 operations. The newspapers, particularly the Te7nps, 
 have extolled its efficiency and have assured the 
 French public that the seas were being swept. But 
 they did not see the sweeper, and, therefore, were not 
 always aware how excellently the job was done. 
 Nor is the question of imports of such urgency in 
 France as in England, as the amount of wheat brought 
 into the country is infinitely less, and, without 
 difficulty, could be supplied at home. 
 
 To sum up one's impression of French sentiment 
 towards England during the first eighteen months 
 of war one is bound to admit a certain element of 
 disappointment, due, undoubtedly, to ignorance and 
 misconception. The French public expected — as did 
 we — a dramatic naval action to begin with. This 
 Germany's cautious tactics denied. Furthermore, 
 our Allies did us the compliment of imagining we 
 could achieve the impossible ; and when it was found 
 that our small Expeditionary Force could take but 
 a slight share in the operations, attention in France 
 was concentrated upon our National Service system, 
 and exasperation grew as our politicians played with 
 the issues of life and death. But this irritation is 
 merely superficial, and is evidence of the strain felt 
 by a highly strung, nervous people, forced to stand 
 still, for long months, while part of their beloved 
 country lay under the heel of the invader. Nothing
 
 148 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 can ever change the deep and lasting friendship 
 between two peoples who have borne the same burden, 
 shared the same horror, nursed the same hopes and 
 fears. The understanding between England and 
 France is no longer simply an entente ; it is a 
 brotherhood of tears.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS 
 
 The Generalissimo was, in a certain sense, less 
 known than any of his Generals, for though much had 
 been written of him, but little was really apprehended 
 of his silent and uncommunicative nature. As the 
 head of a powerful and almost anonymous organisa- 
 tion, he lived in a semi-seclusion. No politician 
 could boast that he had his ear, for he kept himself 
 rigidly from such influences. His popularity with 
 the masses was remarkable, and his name became a 
 symbol for economy in lives. None the less he dwelt 
 apart in an atmosphere removed from all clamour 
 and excitation, apparently unconscious of the intrigues 
 about him. This segregation carried with it the 
 disability of its advantage, for it involved a certain 
 inaccessibility to political necessities, which even the 
 strongest commander has to consult at times. " Moral 
 effect " had infinitely less weight with him than 
 military utility ; indeed, it seemed hardly to exist in 
 his vocabulary, and probably he bracketed this species 
 of popularity and concession to the crowd with that 
 private and subterranean influence of which he was 
 perpetually afraid. Rigid in his solitariness he 
 watched the conflagration from a lonely hill, silhou- 
 etted against the glowing sky, and none could say 
 that he had pierced to his inmost thoughts. Nor 
 
 149
 
 150 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 in the greater part of his career had he been in close 
 touch with army hfe, for his occupations took him to 
 distant climes where he engaged in road and railway, 
 bridge and even town construction, thus removing 
 him from military routine and strengthening those 
 powers of reflection and cold, dispassionate survey 
 which are his chief claims to a grateful consideration. 
 And, doubtless, the desert and the jungle taught him 
 nervelessness and that calmness which no vibration 
 of calamitous events could shake. 
 
 De Castelnau, the second in command, presented a 
 complete contrast with his chief. His character is 
 open, his oratory at once humorous and compelling. 
 Though a strict Catholic and attending Mass every 
 day, his tolerance enabled him to employ as aides-de- 
 camp two officers of the Alsatian Lutheran Church. 
 His military science is so sure that he seems to divine 
 in advance the plans of the enemy, and his experience 
 of camps and courts, following on his missions to 
 foreign countries, has given him the widest grasp of 
 political affairs which in reality lie in the region of 
 strategy. Probably the most accomplished General 
 in the French Army, to him is attributed the plan of 
 the great offensive designed for the Autumn of 1916. 
 
 The events of Verdun gave prominence to the 
 personality of Petain. Before the great attack by 
 the Germans on the fortress, he was unknown except 
 to those in close touch with the army. In a few weeks, 
 he had become world-famous. His rapid promotion 
 was due to the perspicacity of de Castelnau, who had 
 the general direction of the line from Soissons to 
 Verdun. The second in command observed the 
 vast German preparations, the accumulation of guns 
 and the massing of infantry, and with the assent of
 
 SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS 151 
 
 the Generalissimo, set Petain to work to stem the tide 
 of the enemy advance. With characteristic energy 
 the new-comer flung himself into the task. Urgency 
 was necessary, for it was a question of days. Divi- 
 sions were hurried up to reinforce the thin line of 
 12,000 men, garrisoning the twenty miles chiefly 
 threatened by the Germans ; heavy artillery was got 
 together, sometimes improvised from forts and war- 
 ships, and an immense accumulation was made of 
 machine and field guns. Fortunately, the German 
 attack was delayed by bad weather, giving the French 
 greater time to increase their fortifications, and when 
 the battle opened, a week later, the defenders were 
 in a good position to resist the first awful thrust of 
 the German battalions. None the less, the big guns 
 of the enemy were superior in range and were more 
 mobile than the French. This defect was partially 
 compensated by moving back the French line, by 
 employing the 75's as if they were machine-guns, 
 and yet, in other directions, so cunningly concealing 
 them that their fire could not be silenced. 
 
 The new commander of armies has the gift of 
 inspiring the enthusiasm of his men. They are ready 
 to die for him; to go anywhere at his bidding. His 
 magnetism was as strongly exercised upon the students 
 of the Ecole de Guerre, where, in a memorable series, 
 he lectured on infantry action. There is something 
 in his manner, in his appearance, which excites the 
 respectful attention of his listeners, who soon learn 
 to regard him as a master. And the frank, clear, 
 piercing eyes, the serene forehead, the handsome face 
 barred by the moustache, wheat-coloured like the 
 hair, until two score years and the Great War turned 
 it to grey, seem the outward expression of the
 
 152 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 character. He has the personaHty of great leaders, and 
 those tense and tragic weeks at Verdun served to 
 emphasise it. Personal influence counted for more, 
 perhaps, than actual matter in his discourse. Clarity 
 was its strong point, and an unerring touch which 
 dissipated difficulties and revealed as by inspiration, 
 in the classic battles of the world, the causes of victory 
 and of defeat. Petain sought the personal factor 
 in all these great contests. He gave no mere record 
 of facts, but studied the psychology of commanders, 
 his conclusions representing original research and an 
 untiring quest for truth. Character meant achieve- 
 ment, and the absence of it disaster. There could be 
 no more pointed lesson to give to students of the art 
 of war. 
 
 He was known as a man of exceptional talent by 
 those with whom he came into close personal contact. 
 His criticism of manoeuvres in which he engaged with 
 his regiment was suggestive and stimulating, and 
 pointed to rare gifts of discernment. But if his 
 reputation became strong in technical quarters, it 
 did not involve promotion. He was still Colonel, 
 mature and a little disappointed and even con- 
 templating retirement, when war broke out. But 
 contact with realities revealed his worth, and his 
 ascension from the Great Retreat to the prodigious 
 battle of Verdun was a record in rapidity. Placed in 
 charge of the Fourth Brigade of Infantry, he received 
 three days later the command of the Fifth Division. 
 On October 25, 1914, he was given the 33rd Army 
 Corps, which covered itself with glory at Carency, 
 Notre Dame de Lorette, and Ablain. Officially a 
 divisionnaire, on April 30, 1915, Petain became Chief
 
 SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS 153 
 
 of the Second Army, with which he led the great 
 offensive in Champagne. He pierced the German 
 Hnes with such speed and thoroughness that the plan 
 of attack was somewhat compromised, for the General 
 Staff had counted on a slower development. Thus 
 the movement was stopped, though attended with 
 great success. 
 
 Courteous in speech, he has yet a soldier's dislike 
 for subtle and tortuous phraseology, and his whole 
 tendency is to speak his mind. The result, however 
 justly phrased, was not always palatable to authority, 
 and, indeed, a plain statement of the truth is rarely a 
 passport to official favour. His energy is legendary, 
 and the effect of this is heightened by the appearance 
 of youth conveyed by the pink-and- white complexion 
 and the slim figure. As a young man, he is said to 
 have danced all night at a military ball at Marseilles, 
 until tired stewards came to him in the morning to ask 
 him to desist out of pity for the musicians ! Again 
 at Arras, when in command of the 33rd Regiment 
 of Infantry, he is said to have been requested by 
 his landlord to depart, because his skipping in the 
 morning annoyed the occupant of a flat below him ! 
 Thereupon, says the chronicler, he removed to a 
 house set in a garden, where, presumably, there were 
 no neighbours to annoy. The story is probably 
 apocryphal, but it represents the energy of the man. 
 Though he does not skip, he keeps himself fit by 
 physical exercises. He considers that a General's 
 vigour and power of resistance are as important as 
 his mental equipment. To assure this nice balance of 
 mind and body, a system must be resorted to. If one 
 weighs food for the war charger, why not for the
 
 154 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY ^ 
 
 warrior ? That is his argument, and he acts upon it. 
 No leader in the French Army has more persistently 
 trained himself to support the rigour of a campaign, 
 and none shows a greater activity. In the Champagne 
 offensive, he ran three miles over rough ground at 
 the head of his troops. 
 
 His principle is to leave nothing to chance, but to 
 oversee and control everything. Thus, at the height 
 of the bombardment of Verdun, he surprised his 
 officers by visiting them in the most exposed positions. 
 During the battle, he used an armoured machine-gun 
 car as his moving Headquarters, sleeping there and 
 conducting his business from it. At another stage 
 in the gigantic battle he sat for five days and nights 
 at his desk regulating details — proof of his powers 
 of endurance. He drives like the wind over any road, 
 leaving even racing motorists aghast at his speed. 
 He is reputed to have used up a dozen chauffeurs in 
 as many weeks. One said, pathetically, that he did 
 not mind taking his chance of being killed in the 
 trenches, but to drive for the General was like courting 
 death. Petain believes in sharing danger as he shares 
 discomfort with his troops. As a Colonel he was often 
 to be seen on the parade ground in bad weather 
 without an overcoat — as an example to his men. 
 If he has a deep and clear sense of his responsibilities, 
 he is neither sad nor taciturn in private life. He 
 enjoys social intercourse and is a charming con- 
 versationalist. Though unmarried, he adores children, 
 and a friend tells me that he saw him when Colonel 
 of a regiment romping joyously with children on his 
 back. 
 
 His superiority as a soldier comes from his instant
 
 SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS 155 
 
 vision. He sees a problem with such sureness, that 
 his words bear the look of prophecy. Long before 
 the war, he told a young lieutenant of cavalry 
 that he would regret his arm, for upon the in- 
 fantry, he said, would fall the brunt as well as 
 the glory of the next war. His prevision showed 
 that his thoughts were directed towards war when 
 others probably were thinking only of their own 
 affairs. 
 
 Calmness and equality of temper are the character- 
 istics of General Roques, who succeeded General 
 Gallieni as Minister of War. Possessing as great 
 will power as his predecessor, he has a quiet and 
 attractive way of gaining his ends without com- 
 promising their essential character. He finds the 
 formula suitable to the occasion, and possesses the 
 ideal temperament for a Minister of the Republic. 
 Like Joffre, he has passed the greater part of his 
 career in the colonies, where he learned the same 
 lessons of self-reliance and of organisation. Like 
 Joffre, too, he worked as an engineer in Madagascar, 
 helping the future Generalissimo to build Diego 
 Suarez, and afterwards linking by railway Antanan- 
 arivo with the sea. Seven fruitful years in Mada- 
 gascar were prefaced by similar periods in Algeria 
 and Tonking and an expedition with General Dodds 
 to Dahomey, which he undertook soon after leaving 
 the Polytechnique. 
 
 Succeeding Joffre as Director of Engineers at the 
 Ministry of War, he became Director of Aeronautics 
 at the moment when France began to realise the 
 military possibilities of the aeroplane. General 
 Roques's spirit of organisation was as potent at the
 
 156 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Rue Saint-Dominique as in command of troops. 
 Mounting by the usual stages of Division, Army 
 Corps, and Army, he distinguished himself in the two 
 latter situations on active service, and in the former 
 at manoeuvres one year before the Great War. For 
 his personal bravery and skill in the field he received 
 the War Cross and the Grand Cross of the Legion. 
 With the dust of Verdun still upon him he took 
 charge of Galli^ni's portfolio and soon showed a vivid 
 sense of the realities of modern war. His conciliation 
 and tact and his quiet mastery of details earned for 
 him the good-will and confidence of the army and 
 of his subordinates. To that perfect mastery over 
 himself which is necessary to mastery over others, he 
 added a decision of character invaluable in high 
 responsibility. He is of the school of Generals formed 
 overseas. Of such are Joffre and Gallieni, Gouraud 
 and Marchand. 
 
 Gouraud resembles Retain in his judgment and 
 charm as well as in his power over men. He 
 inspires devotion, and carries the secret of command 
 in a splendid face and figure. The empty right sleeve 
 is a touching testimony to his valour, and for months 
 he walked limping with a stick, for his right thigh and 
 left leg had been injured also at the Dardanelles — the 
 place of his dismemberment. It was after a day's 
 bombardment and the Commander-in-Chief was 
 watching the embarkation of wounded on a hospital 
 ship, for there was no place to put them on that rocky 
 shore, searched minutely by the enemy shells. One 
 breaking from a Turkish naval gun threw the 
 General over a wall and inflicted the injuries I have 
 described. On the way home by ship to Marseilles,
 
 SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS 157 
 
 gangrene supervened in the arm, demanding its 
 amputation. 
 
 I saw him just after his recovery when, with a glad 
 note in his voice, he announced his approaching return 
 to the Front. In conversation with him one reahsed 
 why he was called the " lion of the Argonne." There 
 is something king-like in his looks — the brown beard, 
 and the manly, well-formed features — and you are 
 certain that the khaki tunic covers a lion's heart. 
 His whole career has been of the noble sort : whether 
 tracking Samory, the negro chieftain, into the recesses 
 of his virgin forest, where he captured him after he 
 had waged fitful war with France for seventeen years ; 
 or whether he was leading a sortie from Fez and clear- 
 ing a savage horde from its walls. For this latter 
 feat he gained the three stars at a time of life when 
 most French officers have not reached a colonelcy. 
 When the Great War broke out Gouraud hastened 
 from Morocco to the east of France, where he led 
 Colonial troops in unexampled feats of bravery. 
 He was shot in the shoulder, but bullets cannot stop 
 such a man; he seems to bear a charmed life as he 
 passes heedlessly amidst a storm of flying, shrieking 
 metal. His heroic soul is unmoved by the Inferno of 
 the battle. Even the worst inventions of the devil 
 are powerless against this perfect knight, dressed in 
 the invincible and shining armour of his faith and 
 patriotism. 
 
 It was good to hear him speak of his career as simply 
 as if he were relating the banal life of some village 
 attorney. Perhaps an ancestor who served in 
 Napoleon's artillery, or a great-uncle who helped the 
 Due d'Aumale to conquer Algeria, were in measure
 
 158 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 responsible for his military tastes. Certainly he did 
 not get them from his father following the pacific 
 profession of a doctor in a Paris hospital. At sixteen 
 or seventeen years of age the Tonking campaign 
 attracted him with its promise of adventure, but 
 his youthful imagination was mainly fired by read- 
 ing the travels and explorations of Livingstone, of 
 Cameron, Stanley, Brazza and Gallieni. And the 
 Colonies, whatever their bad old reputation in France 
 for forming soldiers who were theatrical and had no 
 notion of modern warfare, since they fought against 
 savages, has proved in this war the nursery of manly 
 virtues. Therein a man learns courage and endur- 
 ance, self-reliance and a faculty for improvising 
 everything. It has produced men of the type of 
 Marchand, one of the most romantic figures that ever 
 donned the uniform of the Republic. His hold over 
 his men is quite extraordinary; they are ready to 
 follow him into the jaws of death. His exploits in 
 the Soudan recall a time when there was no smile on 
 the face of John Bull as he looked across to France. 
 A poet in his ideality and lyric quality, he has the 
 sublime courage of the Early Christian, the personal 
 sway of the born leader, the heart and tenderness of 
 a woman. 
 
 No French general has come into closer contact 
 with the English than Foch, for his army neighboured 
 theirs for long months together, and none has a higher 
 opinion of their qualities or was more sensible of the 
 vast improvement effected in their fighting methods 
 during the progress of the war. Foch is one of the 
 most learned of the chiefs of the army ; he directed 
 the War School during a period of his career, and his
 
 SOME TYPES OF COMMANDERS 159 
 
 lectures on the art of leading troops in battle are 
 models of their kind. When war broke out, he was 
 commanding at Nancy the 20th Army Corps, which 
 includes the famous Iron Division. As disciplin- 
 arian he offers no excuses for himself or for others 
 for any failure in duty; and there is no soldier, if 
 it is not Petain, who has adapted his science more 
 successfully to the problems of a twentieth-century 
 war. Looking forty-five, though twenty years older, 
 he is of those who prepared assiduously for the great 
 day of the battle. Alas ! his own family were early 
 victims of it, for at Charleroi fell his son and his 
 son-in-law. Amongst his officers at Nancy was 
 General Balfourier in charge of a brigade. Tall and 
 slim and dark until active service had whitened his 
 hair, Balfourier has the perfect manners of a man of 
 the world. You would take him for a courtier if 
 you did not know that he was a soldier and a par- 
 ticularly brave one. The Tsar's congratulations 
 reached him in the midst of the gigantic battle of 
 Verdun, where he had handled the 20th Corps with 
 such skill and daring as to attract universal attention. 
 There was always a perfect union between his 
 infantry and artillery. He and his wife kept open 
 house at Nancy to the officers under his command, 
 and their handsome fortune enabled them to enter- 
 tain lavishly both here and at their residence at 
 Chantilly. The General's father was as far removed 
 from Gouraud's from the trade of arms, for he fol- 
 lowed the unlikely profession of a notary; but both 
 obeyed the call to a soldier's life and achieved an 
 equal distinction. 
 
 These, then, are the men who have led France to
 
 160 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 victory. To-morrow others will spring from her 
 fruitful soil and represent her courage, her hope, and 
 her resourcefulness. The Great War has demon- 
 strated the adaptability of the race. It is perennial 
 in its freshness and inspiration.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING 
 
 When the German horde surged upon Verdun, 
 and was hurled back; when, again and again, they 
 swept to the attack and left their dead piled high 
 before the might and heroism of France — then was 
 it most clearly demonstrated that the days of old- 
 fashioned forts were no more. The fortress of stone 
 crumbles before the mighty guns of to-day, and the 
 hideous machines of war, belching forth tons of 
 metal, grind steel and concrete into dust. Before 
 Verdun it was proved that the fortress of France 
 was the soul of her soldiers : a fortress that the 
 mightiest guns could not shake nor all the horrors 
 of modern warfare humble. To the armed bar- 
 barity of science the French soldier opposed his 
 chest, and barbarism was swept back. That is the 
 first lesson of the war of millions. In spite of all 
 the fearful war machines — the huge guns, the gas, 
 the liquid fire, engines of destruction before which 
 man is as puny as a fly — in spite, too, of the im- 
 personal strategy that moves regiments as pieces in 
 a game of chess and seems to take no stock of the 
 little soul of a man, yet, after all, it is the man 
 that counts. Both combatants can pour out money, 
 
 M 161
 
 162 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 both can heap up materiel, but the side that can 
 expend the richest store of heroism is the side that 
 will win. This personal element in the battle of 
 to-day was the only factor overlooked by the war 
 expert. Bloch, the great Russian writer on military 
 science, foresaw only one end to fighting, and that 
 was immobilisation, for each side would sit down in 
 trenches and wait for the other; but the strange 
 thing was that this new game of sap and mine, by a 
 curious detour, conducted to the old hand-to-hand 
 encounters, in which the right arm played the deter- 
 mining part and even the bowie-knife was resusci- 
 tated as a deadly weapon, so that we seemed to 
 live again in the days of Fenimore Cooper and the 
 Indian fights ; and though the Germans sent at our 
 trenches liquid fire, asphyxiating gases, flying tor- 
 pedoes and all manner of explosives, all this science 
 was accompanied by ambuscades, by acts of treachery 
 and ruses de guerre not unworthy of the Redskin in 
 the most romantic pages of the novelist. Thus 
 modern civilisation and savagery met and shook 
 hands as men of the same family, unconscious of any 
 difference in their mental equipment, unembarrassed 
 certainly by any divergence in Kultur. And perhaps 
 because of this personal factor in the fighting, which 
 it was thought would be blotted out and suppressed 
 in modern warfare, there was developed an individual 
 courage so remarkable and romantic as to be un- 
 believable in its splendour, its intensity, and its 
 quality of rich lavishness. Never since the world 
 began has there been such an etalage of personal valour, 
 such outpouring of splendid deeds of indomitable 
 and deathless daring. Seemingly in the sombre
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING 163 
 
 monotony of modern warfare there could arise no 
 glorious exploit, and yet the trenches were frequently 
 the unlikely frame of the most palpitating and stu- 
 pendous defiance of man's nervous system. For the 
 weak envelope triumphed by the grace of the soul; 
 and man, though his teeth chattered by the mere 
 brutal concussion of monstrous weapons, yet showed 
 in his moral resistance a wealth and splendour of 
 achievement unknown to the old and picturesque 
 days. Thus, though the nations warred in such 
 incredible masses that there seemed no room for 
 personal bravery, yet never before had it been so 
 richly poured out, so that even the spies were brave 
 and went to their doom with hands untied and eyes 
 unbandaged in utter calmness. Never in the history 
 of warfare has there been a more splendid show of 
 every human quality, whether fighting this desperate 
 affair of the trenches or out in the open, under the 
 pitiless rain of unheard-of bombardments, as at 
 Verdun, where, in one single day, were fired 3,000,000 
 shells. And if there had never been a greater 
 squandering of metal than in this Titanic conflict 
 of the arsenals, there had never been a greater ex- 
 penditure of those splendid treasures of sacrifice, or 
 such a vast extravagance of youth and manhood, gold 
 and precious stones from the treasury of all the 
 manly virtues. 
 
 But if Bloch had discounted the personal element 
 of modern warfare, his theories otherwise were 
 justified by events. The Germans knew their Bloch 
 and heartily believed his doctrine, but in the opening 
 stages of the battle they made a desperate effort to 
 escape from his conclusions. They began in what
 
 164 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 Mr. Wells in a famous chapter called the " 1900 
 spirit," that is to say, they were convinced that 
 neither England nor France was alive to the latest 
 trench warfare. Their first methods, the precipitate 
 attack, massed movements and enveloping tactics, 
 were dictated by the thought that their adversaries 
 were old-fashioned fighters who had not learned this 
 doctrine of the squatting war, who had not, in fact, 
 read their Bloch or drawn from him the lessons the 
 Germans had. And so they fought in the open in 
 these first phases of the campaign, trusting by their 
 force and speed, superior leadership and brutal shock 
 tactics to bear down the Allies before they were 
 prepared to meet them. And, of course, they were 
 greatly aided in this traditional method of fighting 
 by the fact that they had been allowed to build 
 unchallenged strategic railways to their frontiers, 
 which enabled them to pour a million men into the 
 country, instead of the 300,000 that the French 
 General Staff expected by the northern route. 
 
 The ready adaptation of the Allies to the new 
 exigencies of war forced the Germans to rush to 
 earth. There came a change so sudden that it seemed 
 as if one had jumped literally from one century to 
 another. " We have driven them underground," 
 said M. Paul Deschanel, the eloquent President of the 
 Chamber. But after they sank into the earth the 
 Germans still made desperate efforts to escape Bloch's 
 conclusion : that immobility which he predicted as 
 being the inevitable result of the conflict of armed 
 nations. They endeavoured by their inventive genius 
 to break that immobility. By asphyxiating gas, by 
 liquid fire, by aerial warfare (especially against
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING 165 
 
 England), did they seek, as Mr. Wells points out, to 
 create such diversion as would avoid so barren a 
 conclusion to armed effort. 
 
 With the second phase of the battle the pulsing, 
 stirring features of the old warfare largely dis- 
 appeared. There was no longer the crowded rustle 
 of the ranks, except when men crept in the semi- 
 darkness from their trenches and attacked in the 
 open against barbed wire and murderous missiles. 
 The long, sinuous line of red, with its sheen and 
 shimmer of weapons glancing back the sun, gay 
 plumes to give a nodding note of youth, almost of 
 feminine finery, had passed to the limbo of military 
 museums and the pages of the historians of past 
 battles. None of these things; instead, men in 
 musty garments, covered with dust in summer or 
 the mud of winter rains, and, in place of the cavalry 
 charge in the open, the terrible twilight war began. 
 Those who waged it shirked the daylight, dwelt in 
 pits and crouched in dark ramparts as if the sight 
 of God's good sun shamed them. Gone was the 
 brave display riotous in colour and glory, glitter- 
 ing from ten thousand points. In its place was a 
 lone and dismal landscape, a drab expanse of trenches 
 interminably long ; of furrows deeply drawn through 
 the earth hiding living grain in their depths. Singular 
 country, like some vast cemetery, stretching indefi- 
 nitely towards a dull horizon, dead in its outer 
 aspects, and yet hiding in its bowels the quick and 
 the dead, the living happily outnumbering those 
 who live no more. Of course, the great novelty of 
 the war was its vast length of front. In France it 
 stretched from the North Sea to the rocky ramparts
 
 166 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 of Switzerland, 700 kilometres across the fair land of 
 France; and if one counted all the ramifications 
 and convolutions, then 10,000 kilometres represented 
 the sum of this amazing and ceaseless industry which 
 turned soldiers into navvies; moreover, this trench 
 warfare was universal where fighting occurred, and 
 was not special merely to Belgium and France, for 
 it existed in Russia, in Mesopotamia, and the Balkans. 
 A French Army Corps numbers 35,000 men, and, 
 taking the general character of the ground, the parts 
 that can be naturally defended with those that 
 require barricades of barbed wire and other obstacles 
 to reinforce their strength, this Army Corps can hold 
 a line of ten kilometres. Thus 2,000,000 men is 
 about the normal garrison of a line of 500 kilometres. 
 But it must not be supposed that the lines are 
 uniform; they vary considerably. For instance, 
 where the ground is steep and rocky, the defence is 
 rendered easier and the guards of the first trench 
 may be less numerous than in cases where the con- 
 ditions are more favourable to attack. But such 
 matters are settled by the local commandant, who 
 takes into consideration all the conditions and makes 
 his dispositions accordingly. There are parts of the 
 line where it is not necessary to place men because 
 the parts are enfiladed by cannon, and other places 
 where every mechanical means has been resorted to 
 for strengthening the trenches. The telephone is 
 largely used, and is linked with advanced posts, 
 called pastes d'ecoute, where the observer can note 
 the least activity in the enemy's trenches. Thus the 
 men guarding the first-line trenches can be sensibly 
 reduced, leaving a greater proportion to remain in the
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING 167 
 
 second-line trenches and in rest chambers dug out 
 of the earth at the ends of the Hues. Of course, the 
 trenches vary considerably, and the commander 
 takes note of the character of the soil. He makes 
 use of a hill-side, even of the ditches with embank- 
 ments on the side of the road, of every natural 
 conformation of the soil, and the number of men 
 necessary to defend the line varies according to 
 these circumstances. 
 
 It is true, certainly, that trench warfare has 
 inflicted a great loss of the picturesque, of glittering 
 movements, of kaleidoscopic effects which turned 
 and twisted into wonderful pictures; the picture 
 to-day is replaced by a melancholy waste of earth 
 scored and humped into mounds. 
 
 Wii^hin was life, and no end to labour, for there 
 were trenches, always more trenches to be dug as 
 the line swayed or curved in new forms, yielding to 
 pressure or being broken by it. And in the trenches 
 themselves there was a perpetual search for improve- 
 ment, and the longer the troops stayed there, the 
 more highly organised became their abodes. If 
 there was not an abundance of hot water there was 
 generally enough of cold, and gas on every floor ; alas ! 
 too much of it. There were wooden floors and wooden 
 walls and pictures, and even sculpture adorned them. 
 In these subterranean passages dwelt our men in a 
 kind of heroic enjoyment of a battle without issue, 
 of a sort of deadly ding-dong, only varied by the 
 blackening of the sky with the monstrous smoke of 
 projectiles that count a man a mere atom in their 
 whirlwind path— fearful engines that lay waste the 
 country, that reduce villages to a hopeless jumble
 
 168 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 of stones and bent iron and splintered wood, with 
 derisive-looking chimneys floating in a troubled sea, 
 like derelicts in the track of a tornado. 
 
 It was clear that in this squatting war all tradi- 
 tions had crumbled hopelessly and wilted away. 
 The monstrous engines belched fire and destruction. 
 From the caverns themselves, deeply cut in the once 
 fertile fields, issued a storm of shot and shell from 
 machine-guns, from mortars of an old-fashioned 
 type, from cannon of the newest type — every imagin- 
 able engine of destruction, down to the old hand- 
 grenade, again in usage from a distant past — a past 
 so ancient that Scott reminds us in Roh Roy that 
 " in those days this description of soldiers " {i. e. the 
 Grenadiers) " actually carried that destructive species 
 of firework from which they derive their name." 
 Thus every device known to man's inventive and 
 destructive brain was directed into a new and 
 diabolical channel, and from time to time the vast 
 engines employed emitted a rending noise as if the 
 earth were spitting flame and its rocky ribs had shat- 
 tered into quivering fragments — a volcano in its 
 most fearful mood, sending forth a mad jumble of 
 rocks and a living stream of lava devastating and 
 devouring. 
 
 A gaunt and desolate country haunted by the 
 melancholy crows, resounding with clacking detona- 
 tions of fusillades and a hoarse bass of heavy cannon, 
 is the place of invisible war. One rubs shoulders 
 with it without being aware of it. One comes sud- 
 denly upon it in all innocence. A journalistic friend, 
 at the beginning of the war, dashed into its area all 
 unknowing that he had come on top of it. To his
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING 169 
 
 unpractised eye the lines were no more clearly marked 
 than the Equator or the North Pole. And, of course, 
 every effort is made to conceal the battle-field. Beet- 
 root grows riotously on battlements, guns hide behind 
 trees and are covered with branches, so that the 
 airman, peering from his height, sees nothing but 
 the flicker of leaves. The line hides itself as soon 
 as it fights, and without loss of time prepares against 
 a possible retreat. That is the method of it. Should 
 it be driven back, there are strong positions in the 
 rear for the rallying, for the defence a outrance, and 
 for the counter-attack. Fronts have two or three 
 lines of shelter trenches, deep enough to cover a man 
 and generally a yard in width. These trenches are 
 proportioned to the effectives employed. They con- 
 tain redoubts and blockhouses where guns are placed ; 
 they are linked by zigzag paths, and, as a last resort, 
 with a trench of cement, a veritable fortress where 
 are cannon as well as machine-guns. These covered 
 over and fortified trenches nearly always contain rest 
 chambers and magazines for rifles and the different 
 sorts of ammunition required. 
 
 The lesson of this trench warfare, therefore, is 
 that if a combatant retires before it is too late 
 he has every chance to survive to fight another 
 day; and he has all the more chance of a new 
 offensive, or at least of maintaining a strong defen- 
 sive, if he retires in the direction of his resources, 
 or what is called his line of operation, whence he 
 receives his munitions, food and material of war. 
 He retires from the battle, therefore, at the psycho- 
 logical moment when he sees he is likely to be over- 
 whelmed, and reconstitutes himself in the rear.
 
 170 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 The opening phases of 1914 gave us two parallel 
 retreats : from the Belgian frontier to the Seine by 
 the Allies, and from the Marne to the Aisne by the 
 Germans. The campaign in Poland also showed a 
 similar disposition, and the Russians reformed their 
 line and beat the Germans after they retreated before 
 them. Therefore a mere retreat may be, literally, 
 little more than a strategic movement in the rear. 
 It does not mean, certainly, that all is lost or that 
 the position of the retreating force is one of utter 
 hopelessness. 
 
 After the opening phases of the war, the subterranean 
 character of the fighting was maintained, until such 
 big offensives as Verdun re-evoked the old-time 
 battle, when the Kaiser watched the operations from 
 an eminence, and on a front of twenty miles scenes 
 of the old onslaught were re-enacted. But in this 
 case the initiative was left to the Germans. To 
 them also the greater part of the losses, for whilst 
 they manoeuvred in the open and hurled masses of 
 their grey-green warriors upon the French trenches, 
 the defenders enfiladed the masses and mowed them 
 down with the gigantic scythes that their science 
 had forged since the war began. 
 
 A curious feature of the fighting in the Great War 
 was the element of fatigue. We have met with it 
 everywhere. It follows closely the course of the war ; 
 it is seen in every phase. At Charleroi and Mons 
 and those terrific fights that marked the beginning of 
 the war, the retreating armies of England and France 
 escaped because of the exhaustion of the Germans. 
 If cavalry had harried their rearguards and mobile 
 cannon had cannonaded their flanks the retreat
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTING 171 
 
 might have been turned into a rout. For the French, 
 largely composed of reservists, were within an ace 
 of demoralisation. And again the Allies, as con- 
 querors, showed extreme fatigue in the battle of the 
 Marne, when the victory might have been more 
 decisive had it been followed up by unwearied troops, 
 or, again, by masses of cavalry. 
 
 The cavalry, indeed, of both combatants proved 
 singularly ineffectual, and, as I have just pointed 
 out, failed as a means of attack or to pursue retreating 
 armies ; and an interesting feature was the dismount- 
 ing of the cavalry and its employment as infantry in 
 the trenches. Cavalrymen were divorced from their 
 horses and given infantry guns; and their equip- 
 ment and appearance approached very nearly that 
 of the foot-soldier. The Cuirassiers, for instance, 
 took off their picturesque manes and removed the 
 top pieces of their helmets, and thus very nearly 
 imitated the bourguinet, or low, mediaeval-looking 
 helmet of the French infantry. Even reconnais- 
 sance, the old duty of the cavalry, has been under- 
 taken by the aeroplane ; and the horse-soldier, indeed, 
 has little place in modern warfare. Some experts, 
 however, hold that a new role has emerged from 
 the war which the cavalry is qualified to fill. It 
 consists in their employment in large forces flanked 
 by mobile cannon and cyclists, whereby their offen- 
 sive radius is greatly extended. 
 
 In these few pages I have endeavoured to sketch 
 the varied phases of a war that opened with the 
 glittering pageant of the time of Napoleon and 
 merged into the dreary and sombre monotony of
 
 172 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 trench warfare. The " heroic " days of battle were 
 over, but a new heroism arose. Men fought no 
 longer to triumph as men among men; they were 
 content to go forward, nameless and unrecognised : 
 " to march heroically " (in the words of the French 
 writer), to become, not men among men, but — 
 
 " des morts parmi les morts."
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 MILITARY COMMAND AND THE REVOLUTION 
 
 " On nous fait une guerre ennuyeuse ! " How 
 often was the plaint heard in France, where this 
 war of " wait and see," this terrible game of patience, 
 racked the nerves not only of the soldiers in the 
 trenches, but of the multitudes who scanned the morn- 
 ing news in the hope of some startling manoeuvre and 
 stunning victory which should end the hideous night- 
 mare of trench warfare. Had Napoleon and his like 
 passed, then, for ever ? Could France never produce 
 his peer ? A man who would rise above all difficulties ; 
 who would drag guns over the snows in hollowed-out 
 tree-trunks; who would arrive where no man had 
 arrived ; who would achieve the impossible ? Times, 
 it is true, had changed, but sound opinion urged 
 the recognised fact that there is only one kind of 
 strategy, just as there is only one geometry. The 
 geometric truth of to-day is the geometric truth of 
 a thousand years ago; it never changes. Thus, 
 strategy is always strategy, though the circum- 
 stances may change, and the cafe critic was a little 
 inclined to blame the military command for the 
 dreary monotony of the conduct of the war. 
 
 Historians such as Dupuis and Aulard, the eminent 
 professor at the Sorbonne, recalled Convention days, 
 when youthful Generals were selected through the 
 
 173
 
 174 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 intervention of commissioners from the Government, 
 who visited the armies, interrogated everybody and 
 discovered talent. Sometimes they did not discover 
 it, but only thought they did. The unhappy man, 
 perhaps only just promoted from non-commissioned 
 ranks, was dragged from his obscurity and placed, 
 often against his own will, in command of an army 
 and told to get victories or take the consequences. 
 Good patriots were not allowed to refuse such signal 
 honour as serving the country in a position of re- 
 sponsibility ; and, placed between the devil of their 
 own incompetence and the deep sea of the guillotine 
 (for if they failed they would be hailed, certainly, 
 before the tribunal and treated as traitors), they 
 occasionally managed in sheer desperation to win; 
 but more often they miserably failed, and joined the 
 number of the suspected in the Conventional prisons. 
 Not only were these unfortunate people appointed, 
 willy-nilly, to the command of armies whenever they 
 attracted the eye of the representatives, but, once 
 arrived at the perilous summit of their power, they 
 were watched and their conduct noted as if they were 
 the most disreputable of mortals. And their judges 
 were not only the Convention, but the secret com- 
 mittees and clubs which flourished at that moment. 
 Nevertheless, the results of this terrible system were 
 astonishing. The most celebrated of the representa- 
 tives was Carnot, who was in every way an excep- 
 tional man. On the eve of the battle of Wattignies, 
 in October 1793, he obliged Jourdan, the General-in- 
 Chief, to effect a frontal attack, which failed. There- 
 upon a council was held, and the two men were 
 seen to differ materially in their views. Carnot, 
 with characteristic impetuosity, offered to assume
 
 COMMAND AND THE REVOLUTION 175 
 
 responsibility for his opinion and even to see to the 
 execution of his plan. On the morrow, Carnot, who 
 kept Jourdan under close observation, noted a column 
 falling back before the pressure of the enemy. In- 
 stantly he seized a rifle, placed himself at the head 
 of the retreating force and led them back into 
 action. Thanks largely to his energy, the battle was 
 won. 
 
 Saint Just was a man of similar type. In the 
 operations on the Sambre, which were unfortunate, 
 for a time, for the Revolutionaries, Saint Just and 
 Le Bas pushed the armies to combat, it has been 
 said, like a pack of dogs, without observing any rule 
 of war. There is a memorable scene related by 
 Dupuis. Saint Just convoked the Generals to a 
 midnight council. " You are convoked," he said, 
 "to do something great — worthy of the Republic. 
 To-morrow there must be a siege or a battle; 
 decide ! " On Kleber smiling satirically, Saint Just 
 rushed out into the darkness of the garden and 
 remained there, hatless, for two hours, though the 
 rain was falling in torrents. However, from all this 
 confusion and tyrannous intervention and diversity 
 of counsel emerged the victory of Fleurus, in the 
 neighbourhood of Mons and Charleroi, which speaks 
 so closely nowadays to our hearts. The Revolu- 
 tionaries crossed and recrossed the river many times 
 before they succeeded finally in overcoming the 
 Austrians. And this victory marked the end of the 
 peril of invasion, which was the excuse of the pre- 
 sence of the representatives with the armies. Wash- 
 ington said that an army must be led with absolute 
 despotism to ensure victory; the armies of the 
 Revolution certainly merited success from that point
 
 176 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 of view rather than by the talent of terrorised chiefs — 
 men whose previous career was often that of a sous 
 officier, and totally unfitted them for positions of 
 authority. Balland, who commanded a division at 
 Wattignies, was a drummer in a company of grena- 
 diers, and, according to a contemporary historian, 
 " cleaned our boots and ran our errands." 
 
 Yet some of outstanding character and talents 
 profited by this system, which advanced a man like 
 Napoleon to dazzling heights. The terror and con- 
 fusion of the time gave him the chance he needed to 
 soar. Whilst weaker men drowned in the storm, he 
 rose triumphantly above it. And his first chance 
 came through his connection with Saliceti, one of 
 the representatives, who was a fellow Corsican and 
 had taken part with Napoleon in struggles in the 
 island against the dictatorship of Paoli. They met 
 on the Riviera, where Napoleon, a simple captain, 
 was transporting war stores. Toulon was being 
 besieged; Napoleon, in the ardour of his tempera- 
 ment, proposed a plan to Saliceti and his colleague, 
 Augustin Robespierre, the brother of the dictator, 
 who happened to be there, insisted on conferring on 
 him the rank of Brigadier-General, with command 
 over the artillery in the army of Italy. Without 
 these influences. Napoleon would have had to wait 
 long for his preferment. Robespierre was particu- 
 larly struck by Napoleon, whom he regarded as of 
 transcending merit and, moreover, a sound and 
 perfervid Republican ! 
 
 Though Napoleon was accompanied, as the others 
 had been, by the commissioners of the Convention 
 in his campaign in Italy, they were men of an ordinary 
 type, and he knew how to get the better of them.
 
 COMMAND AND THE REVOLUTION 177 
 
 Moreover, he was extremely astute in his dealings 
 with his possible accusers, and played a definite 
 political role. He became, then, the favourite of 
 Barras, the most influential of the Directorate, and 
 finally, thanks to Barras and Carnot, obtained com- 
 mand of the Italian Army, which was the height of 
 his ambition. Here he was able to give the measure 
 of his military genius. His ardour and audacity 
 were equal to every situation, and his popularity 
 rose to such heights with the masses dazzled by his 
 victories, and he inspired such confidence amongst 
 the Convention itself, that he conquered his inde- 
 pendence of action. Under the former tyrannous rule 
 of the Convention the strategist was a mere puppet 
 in the hands of the Government ; Napoleon was not 
 long in restoring all the old power to the General 
 and giving to strategy its full amplitude, for he was 
 able, as he rose to be Consul, Life Consul, and finally 
 Emperor — all in four years — to control the political 
 destinies of France, and thus add to the military 
 arm the civil power, and make the former serve the 
 ends of his foreign and internal policy. 
 
 It is well to remember that Napoleon owed much 
 of his advancement — his promotion at the age of 
 twenty-seven to the rank of Commander-in-Chief — 
 to his clever utilisation of the social disorder which 
 followed the Revolution, and he obtained that liberty 
 of which he had need to beat the enemy, as Colonel 
 Dupuis points out, by his adroit relations with the 
 Government. His personal prestige soon placed him 
 above those who had given him the power. Finally, 
 strong in his immense successes, he threw off the 
 remaining shackles and conquered the right to act 
 as he thought best. He himself became the Executive. 
 
 N
 
 178 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 He was in the enviable situation of a man who gives 
 orders to himself. 
 
 This page of the past is sufficient answer to the 
 clamour for the heroic methods of the Revolution. 
 French people have only, to look back to recognise 
 the danger of allowing ambition to realise itself either 
 in the army or in politics — still worse when the two are 
 united. A later instance, and one even more terrify- 
 ing than that of Napoleon I, was that of Napoleon IH ; 
 for, though his Empire similarly ended in disaster, 
 brought about by foreign intervention, in the one case 
 it represented the paling of a star of surpassing 
 effulgence, whereas in the other it was the mere 
 pricking of a bubble, if " historic," reputation. 
 But in each event it brought humiliation and the 
 foot of the invader on the soil. Joffre, therefore, a 
 democratic and constitutional commander — the anti- 
 thesis of Napoleon — is the only type of general 
 really acceptable to the French Republic ; and though 
 the thoughtless individual may sigh for the breath- 
 less succession of events of Napoleonic days, there 
 is hardly a Frenchman who would be prepared to 
 accept the consequences of a return of the Napoleonic 
 system; and Joffre, working for war that he may 
 accomplish peace, eschewing inspiration and " strokes 
 of genius," steadily developing in quietude and re- 
 flection the details of a preconceived plan, is an ideal 
 figure in a country as profoundly democratic as 
 France, where a chief modelled on the Prussian type 
 or given to vain display and the "panache" would 
 inevitably cause a reaction unfortunate in the 
 interests of national defence. Never again will the 
 French, having learned in the bitter school of experi- 
 ence, place power in the hands of a man who, by
 
 COMMAND AND THE REVOLUTION 179 
 
 his masterly temperament, raises in their minds the 
 fears of a dictator. Non his in idem. 
 
 But not until the second year of the war was 
 Joffre given that supreme command and that inde- 
 pendence of action so essential to success. Only 
 in 1916 was it recognised that there must be a 
 co-ordination of effort in the different fields ; that 
 the Allies could not act separately without relation 
 to each other and hope thereby to advance the 
 common cause; they must carry out a certain pre- 
 conceived plan and carry it out with a common 
 energy, subserving all questions of persons and 
 national prestige to the unique end of winning the 
 war. The English Army, after the retirement of 
 Marshal French, was placed directly under the 
 orders of Joffre; thereafter it had its exact place 
 in the common movement and represented a certain 
 intimate part of the general machine. England 
 thereby showed her loyalty and her conception of 
 the necessities of the hour in bending to the prin- 
 ciple of French dominance. It was inevitable, for 
 the French were the chief combatants on the Western 
 Front ; their army was necessarily the more numerous 
 and they were defending their own hearths and 
 homes; the war to them was in reality a war of 
 liberation. After, then, the general objects of the 
 Allies were defined, it was seen that there must be 
 unity of command. I remember how urgently a 
 celebrated French General spoke to me on this subject 
 after the war had lasted a year. " For the sake of 
 our common action," he said, " do insist in England 
 on the necessity of oneness in the command. Other- 
 wise, the problem is impossible." And when that 
 principle was at last acknowledged, and England
 
 180 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 merged her military fortunes more deeply with those 
 of France, sacrificing also some of her independence 
 in the field, the Allies were approaching the German 
 homogeneity, where the Kaiser conducted the mixed 
 orchestra and called the tune. Whatever the music 
 was like, the general effect was certainly better than 
 if there had been two or more chiefs and as many tunes. 
 But although Revolutionary times were no more, 
 when generals of twenty-three gained such triumphs 
 as when Rocroi was won by Conde, yet the fierce 
 spirit of the Revolution remained. In that sombre 
 hour France triumphed because she had the fierce 
 determination to win ; because she was ruthless with 
 old-established reputations unless they responded to 
 the exigencies of the hour ; and also because, having 
 her back against the wall, she realised that it was 
 literally a case of " conquer or die." So in the war 
 of to-day, the military command was aided by the 
 popular clamour which speeded up the machine- 
 When Charles Humbert, Senator of the Meuse, and 
 certainly one of the organisers of victory, claimed 
 almost daily in Le Journal, which he directs with 
 such vigour, " more cannon and more munitions," 
 he was but repeating, at a distance of one hundred 
 and twenty years, the cry of Carnot and Lindet, who 
 were rather disdainfully called " the Workers " by 
 their colleagues of the Convention. But the harvest 
 of the Revolution that the Generalissimo reaps most 
 richly is that extraordinary and unsuspected virtue 
 which our Allies have shown, that bull-dog tenacity 
 and resistance which, blending with the natural 
 alUgresse of the French, made them irresistible in 
 battle where the conditions were at all equal. In 
 the last resort, the quality of the fighter prevails;
 
 COMMAND AND THE REVOLUTION 181 
 
 every observer has recognised that fact. The guns 
 may thunder and deal out death and destruction, 
 but the machine which finally counts is the white 
 arm, " Rosalie," as the bayonet is named in the 
 familiar speech of the " poilu." This fact accounts for 
 the superiority of the French on the field of battle; 
 for the final word is to the common soldier, to that 
 astonishing peasant and tiller of the land, who con- 
 stitutes the greater part of the armies of the Republic. 
 He fights, as I have said earlier in this book, not 
 because he must, but because he feels he is privileged 
 to defend his fields against the invader. Ever present 
 to his mind, as he meets the Hun, are the depredations 
 and deeds of horror of this civilised savage, and his 
 arm is nerved by the determination to save his own 
 village and his own kith and kin, if possible, from 
 his devastations. The personal feeling enforces the 
 personal element in battle; and, after all, a Holy 
 Cause is the best sort of armour in which to engage 
 in battle and the deadliest weapon to wield against 
 those who have sinned against all the laws of 
 humanity.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 
 
 The spirit of the trenches is the spirit of France. 
 Never did mirror more faithfully reflect the personal 
 traits than those endless trenches across France the 
 splendid valour of the race. In no preceding war 
 in history has courage been so abounding. Trench 
 warfare created a spirit of intimacy as well as a spirit 
 of adventure. Men of differing stations, of utterly 
 opposed traditions, of antagonistic education, were 
 thrown together in a narrow, self-contained comrade- 
 ship, and the result was a firm and singular fusion. 
 They partook of the same risks, they experienced the 
 same emotions, whether standing shoulder to shoulder 
 in the trenches, or racing, side by side, in some rush 
 attack, storming villages, or retiring, it might be, 
 beneath the pressure of an overwhelming cannonade. 
 And out of this comradeship grew a conventual feel- 
 ing. Though isolated from the ordinary world, they 
 were yet of it, for family ties triumphed over even so 
 radical a difference in experience and mode of life. 
 The rigours and segregation of the camp-life could 
 not separate from kith and kin. 
 
 Some have compared their existence with the 
 cloistered life. True, they took no vows of celibacy, 
 
 182
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 183 
 
 nor was continence the necessary attribute of their 
 association, but they had sworn to serve in a deathless 
 constancy. They slept and lived hard, exposed to 
 inclemency; passed days in a narrow semi-darkness, 
 and at night slept in the roughest shelters or in grot- 
 toes deep in the ground. Yet there was an essential 
 difference in their state and that of those bound to 
 the Church, for their thoughts were of earth rather 
 than of Heaven — of some distant spot whereon stood 
 a little white house surrounded with trees, with green 
 fields beyond, where cattle grazed, children played, 
 and geese cackled. Tender memories accompanied 
 their vigils, and such human sentiments removed 
 them from the category of the saints, who are not 
 supposed to listen to the heart, and from the old 
 professional class of soldier, the grognards of Napo- 
 leon's day. For between waiting France and fighting 
 France there passed hourly a warm current of 
 correspondence, ascending and descending, informed 
 with honest passion, homely and kindly virtues, 
 which softened and humanised the soldier's solitude 
 and heartened the civilian. It was the " poilu " who, 
 going to the war, comforted those who remained 
 behind, and the strange thing was that pessimism 
 more readily took root in security, far from the lines, 
 than at the Front itself. And the soldier's courage 
 was as much seen in his letters as in his conduct in 
 the field — wonderful tribute to its depth and sincerity. 
 For there were moments in the interminable war to 
 try the nerves of the hardened campaigner, much 
 more those of the young man but lately broken to 
 its severities. 
 
 Yet there was never a tremor in the living wall
 
 184 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 encircling la patrie, no touch of despair in the letters 
 that Dupont pencilled home in the intervals of bom- 
 bardment. His natural gaiety found an expression 
 there, as well as his courage and his calm. Letters 
 from only sons, out of reach for the first time of 
 maternal solicitude, manifested an almost discon- 
 certing enjoyment of danger and the independent 
 life. And those women who had feared hitherto for 
 the health of their darlings now seemed to rejoice 
 in new proofs of their courage and contempt of death. 
 Lads, apparently the most deeply wedded to the 
 soft and unheroic existence of towns, found an un- 
 expected satisfaction in the strenuous routine of 
 camps. The influence of the milieu, the daily contact 
 with the hard practices and risks of the metier, 
 riveted armour about the soul and bound the brows 
 with brass. Men, whose habit in civil life led none 
 to suspect the martial temperament, proved lions in 
 the fight. And I knew a timid soul, a little delicate, 
 much given to study and reflection who, after a few 
 months' actual experience of the trenches, became 
 utterly changed. No longer apologising for exist- 
 ence as in the old days, he bore himself proudly in 
 the field, and performed acts of exceptional bravery. 
 Of his civilian friends he asked with strange calm : 
 " Do you know how many Boches I've killed since 
 the war began ? " And in the surprised silence which 
 followed, he gave a tally, which was staggeringly 
 significant. 
 
 Apart from the professional pride which dictated 
 an air of gaiety, when a visitor arrived, the occupant 
 of the trench did not in his off moments assume the 
 mien of the troubadour. On the contrary, he looked
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 185 
 
 grave and serious, and often austere. It was remark- 
 able that when he went to Paris for a few days' rehef 
 from the monotony of danger, he found httle enjoy- 
 ment in the old-time pleasures. And those who had 
 been distinguished for a high thoughtlessness, for an 
 abandonment to the Red Gods, proved hardy and 
 virile warriors in the new life, with a speed that 
 astonished all who had not realised the French 
 adaptability. Frivolous in the days before the war, 
 they now adopted an attitude of disapproval and even 
 of positive disgust towards some outward symptoms 
 of the " light heart." 
 
 There was not necessarily opposition between 
 " poilu " and " pekin " (as the civilian is amusingly 
 called by the army), but there was, nevertheless, a gulf 
 fixed between the two : the one had seen visions and 
 experienced realities which were denied the other in 
 his peaceful civilian path. It made all the difference 
 in the world. Whatever his sympathy, the civilian 
 brother had not suffered as had the " poilu " ; he had 
 been immune from the hourly risk, he had not endured 
 cold and hunger; he had not lain out in the frosty 
 moonlight, in the No Man's Land of the trenches, 
 terribly wounded by one of the murderous engines 
 of war; he had not known the anguish of mind in 
 hospital, the doubt whether the limb could be saved 
 or not, or whether he must go through life halt and 
 maimed. No, for all his sympathy and moral suffer- 
 ing, the civilian had not reached the experiences of 
 the other. 
 
 Reflections of this sort no doubt obtruded on the 
 mind of the soldier in his hours of lonely watch. 
 Sometimes, when echoes of the old life were wafted
 
 186 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 back to him in the trenches, or when he saw the report 
 in newspapers of some futile discussion in the Chamber, 
 a smile of disdain crossed his lips. Frankly, he was 
 a little tired of this sort of thing. " If the Deputies 
 were here, they would not talk quite so loudly," he 
 reflected with bitterness. And then the headings of 
 another column caught his eye : " Great scandal, a 
 contractor charged with fraud ! Huge and hidden 
 profits." " Ah ! " he exclaims, and his lips purse 
 again. This time his comments are far severer than 
 against the Parliamentarians. " After all," he says, 
 " those Deputies are paid to talk; it is their business ; 
 but the blackguards who make money out of us, out 
 
 of our lives and limbs " The phrase is never 
 
 finished, but the intonation leaves you in no doubt 
 as to the fate of the offenders if they had fallen 
 into his hands. On the following day, perhaps, he 
 sees another scandal of the sort, and now his anger 
 knows no bounds. " What — again ? Then they are 
 all at it !" he exclaims. In his excited imagination 
 a considerable part of civilian France is engaged in 
 plundering military France. Happily, there was 
 great exaggeration in his sweeping assumptions. Cer- 
 tainly there were scandals in France during the Great 
 War, as there were scandals elsewhere; but they 
 were few and far between — so few that their rarity 
 magnified their importance. 
 
 The soldier's sufferings in the trenches had warped 
 a little his judgment. He was rather hard on others, 
 disregarding their sacrifices and their griefs, none the 
 less real because they had not been exposed to sudden 
 death. The hard work of munition workers turning 
 out shot and shell with ceaseless activity often
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 187 
 
 escaped him, and if, as might happen, he was de- 
 ceived in his most intimate affections, and a moral 
 catastrophe awaited him at home, then his cup 
 of bitterness was filled, and in his wrath he de- 
 clared that all women were faithless and all men 
 perjurers and conspirators against his honour or 
 security. And these were the people for whom he 
 was risking his life and sacrificing his professional 
 prospects ! 
 
 The close union of every day with men engaged in 
 the strong-hearted and ruthless profession of war 
 was bound to have a reaction upon thoughts and ways 
 of life. In the rude existence of camps, something 
 of the veneer of drawing-rooms disappeared and 
 man returned to primitive directness and simplicity 
 of thought and speech. He became impatient of 
 subtlety and complicated ways, which seemed to him 
 duplicity and the enemy of plain-dealing. A thing 
 must be frank and clear to appeal to him. He had 
 the soldier's disgust of those who whispered in secret 
 in the warmth and shelter whilst he was exposed to 
 the blast. A new temperament was forged in the 
 out-of-doors born of the sun and wind and rain. And 
 the thoughts of those who struggle with the ele- 
 ments and the incredible difficulties of a man-made 
 warfare often take on the rugged character of their 
 surroundings. 
 
 Directness of manner and speech are hardly looked 
 for in the traditional French, but war as it is to-day, 
 is no school of politeness, but of vigour and energy. 
 A new naivete accompanied the new strength of soul, 
 and one of its manifestations was an art, which at 
 other moments would have astonished by its crudity
 
 188 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 and garishness. It was visible in the shop-windows, 
 where cards showed the soldier in the trench. Above 
 him, in a luminous break in filmy clouds, appeared 
 the vision of the wife and children gathered about the 
 evening lamp. They were thinking obviously of 
 the absent " papa." Maudlin and mawkish though 
 it was, it appealed to the simple soul. Exile from 
 the social round, from the life of affairs, from the 
 frequentation of cafes and theatres in the small 
 country towns, had affected the mentality of the 
 countryman. This incredible existence of the 
 trenches, with its hairbreadth escapes and daily 
 incidents in which life and death played a tragic 
 game of hide-and-seek, developed such essential 
 manliness and such rough and hearty heroism that 
 the mechanism of the mind reverted to the simplest 
 expression. Before the great and serious question of 
 to be or not to be, the minor aspects of life ceased to 
 have importance. A man dying of hunger does not 
 discuss ortolans or peacocks' tongues, nor do the subtle- 
 ties of sauce appeal to the meatless. And the soldier 
 of France, divorced from his usual pleasures, and 
 being in no mind to complicate existence, turns to 
 the readiest and simplest forms of literary or pictorial 
 expression to satisfy his emotions : it might be the 
 cinematograph behind the lines, it might be the 
 feuilleton in the halfpenny paper. 
 
 No doubt the mass became infected with the peasant 
 spirit, for peasants formed the bulk of the army, 
 especially when the townsman became the munition- 
 worker. The peasant's mind is both childlike and 
 suspicious, slow to anger, secretive, inclined to deep 
 reflection. He attaches himself slowly, and only
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 189 
 
 after long proof, to those who win his reluctant con- 
 fidence, and deeply tenacious are his purposes. He 
 will defend his land to the death; he loves it as he 
 loves liberty. He insists on his independence as he 
 insists upon equality, and only upon that principle 
 will he submit to discipline. Injustice arouses his 
 intense resentment, and General Gallieni's crusade 
 against the shirker found its deepest roots and efficacy 
 in his tacit recognition. 
 
 The fact that it was a war to resist invasion 
 made it a holy war, differing intrinsically from a 
 war of aggression, which would never have gained 
 his whole-hearted support. The Great War awakened 
 the old vehemence of the race, which first revealed 
 its astounding power at the battle of Valmy, where 
 the shoeless hosts of the Revolution shook the 
 proudest might of Prussia. That was the birth 
 of the National Army, which, a century and a 
 quarter later, was to come to such extraordinary 
 development. The nation coalesced in 1792 against 
 the foreign tyrant, but that union lacked the com- 
 plete union of 1914, though it made up in intensity 
 of spirit what it needed in numbers. The Revo- 
 lution fought for liberty against a caste system; 
 then, as now, the peasant recognised that he was 
 defending his own ground — not the privileges of 
 feudal Europe — and the knowledge made him strong. 
 A man is always formidable in defending his own. 
 In the same way, the French patriot realised that 
 militarism had forced the German to make war upon 
 his peaceful neighbour. In the hospitals I have 
 seen the soldier share with the sick German prisoner 
 dainties that had been brought to him. " Poor devil.
 
 190 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 he was forced to fight against us," he would say, 
 showing his reahsation of the intimate differences 
 of the two. In his case it was a privilege to fight ; 
 he was defending his own fields against the hordes ; in 
 the other, a blind obedience to the State compelled him 
 to take arm. One was a virtual volunteer in a sacred 
 cause, the other the victim of German Imperialism. 
 It was well to know what one was fighting for, and 
 when one had realised the grandeur of the cause, then 
 heat and cold, mud and rats, and even occasional 
 shortness of rations became of small account. The 
 issue was paramount. 
 
 The French soldier was actuated by a deep love of 
 country. In his mortal breast beat the immortal 
 heart of France. When the bugle sounded, as M. 
 Charles Humbert, the Senator Editor has told us, 
 there was a magnificent hastening to the frontier. 
 The fighting souls of the people reappeared, the old 
 memory of struggles was reawakened. " We dreamed 
 of heroic encounters, of brilliant actions, of sublime 
 gestures, of flags conquered in the sun. The reality, 
 alas, was quite otherwise ! Rapidly the war became 
 a sad and protracted affair." It became an invisible, 
 scientific, subterranean war of tenacity and endur- 
 ance, though sometimes blazing into manoeuvre 
 battles as at Verdun. 
 
 Life, none the less, was not altogether disagreeable 
 behind the lines. There were compensations during 
 the rest moments. Concerts and theatrical representa- 
 tions in which all the stars of the army appeared, 
 men who had been renowned artists " in the civil," 
 made the audience forget the dangers and discomforts 
 of their actual life. And in these entr^actes in the
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 191 
 
 villages, the subject of the war was taboo by a sort 
 of coquetry; one talked of anything else, and occu- 
 pied one's leisure in acquiring relics from the ruined 
 houses in the devastated villages, or sought, in other 
 ways, to import some variety into the monotony of 
 danger. The concerts revealed the singular talent of 
 the French for improvisation and gave occasion to a 
 latent gaiety, which flickered and flamed into pure 
 joyousness. From the mind in those moments was 
 banished dull care, and badinage became the current 
 coin. Whilst the younger and more vigorous played 
 games, the studious and literary engaged in intel- 
 lectual exercises. Impressive in their reality are 
 some of the books that have been written at the 
 Front. There is a suggestion of actual experience 
 about them, of choses vecues, which one does not feel 
 in second-hand impressions. 
 
 Poems, too, flowed from the trenches — not poems, 
 in general, concerned with war, but love and the 
 softer passions. Where war was treated, it was as 
 a mistress, stern and hard to woo. The Great War 
 inspired something of the lyricism that succeeded the 
 Napoleonic era, when de Musset, Hugo, Lamartine, 
 and a pleiades of poets existed. Talent certainly 
 flourished in the trenches. An opera was a proof of 
 it — words and music of such startling excellence that 
 the critics, before whom the work was played, ex- 
 pressed a deep enthusiasm for it. It was reserved 
 for production at the Paris Opera House until the 
 music of the trenches should have given place to 
 the music of peace. Like many a hero in the 
 fight, the author will remain anonymous until 
 the war has ceased to be anything but an ugly
 
 192 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 remembrance, and then we shall taste the quality 
 of the composition. 
 
 Heroism belongs to no class; it is present in the 
 simple as in the learned, in the rude as in the polished. 
 One of the comforting reflections of the war is that 
 civilisation, in whose name it was waged, is often 
 justified by her children. Civilised man proved his 
 superiority over the savage, and the untutored child 
 of desert and jungle was less master of himself in 
 the dread hour than the finished product of the study 
 and laboratory. That, at least, contains a certain 
 solace more satisfying to human pride than the diabo- 
 lical inventions of the Germans. Brains triumphed 
 in the direction of battles, and they triumphed in the 
 trenches, where the most cultivated showed the 
 ascendancy of mind over matter. Though the savant 
 and the peasant might be on equal terms of courage, 
 yet it is true that character is the basis of it. And 
 where there were defections from the common bravery, 
 the explanation was in moral failure. A division 
 which broke in the early days of the campaign and 
 retreated some kilometres from the fight, was com- 
 posed of southern regiments containing, it was said, 
 a large percentage of the flotsam and jetsam of 
 society. And this, it seems, proved that only those 
 can wear the crown of heroism who have borne them- 
 selves uprightly. 
 
 The schoolmaster has contributed to the spirit of 
 the trenches by his glorious example on the battle- 
 field, if not by his teaching, which was often in a 
 sense opposed to what we term Patriotism. Was 
 he not the arch-antimilitarist ? But his intelligence 
 was awakened; he realised what was at stake,
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE TRENCHES 193 
 
 and so he strove to make good that civiHsation 
 in the name of which he had taught his beautiful 
 but impracticable theories. All honour to his 
 rapid realisation; all honour to his pupils in the 
 trenches.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS AND THEIR READERS 
 
 There is no better indication of the gaiety and 
 good humour prevaiHng at the Front than the 
 journals that are circulating in the trenches. I 
 know one charming periodical which was printed 
 within a hundred yards of the German lines, deep 
 down in the earth, in one of those subterranean forts 
 that one imagined impregnable until it was discovered 
 that the Germans, by employing their great guns, 
 could force their way through the soil and attain these 
 defences. The best of the journals that the war has 
 produced on the French side is probably Rigolboche, 
 an extremely clever little paper, and yet unpretentious 
 withal, being hand-written and reproduced by a 
 duplicating machine. The letterpress and sketches 
 are really charming, and convey in the most eloquent 
 manner the good temper and high spirits maintained 
 during this protracted war. Even the deadly mono- 
 tony of the fighting did not damp the artistic ardour 
 of its contributors. Indeed, the pages of many of 
 these jovial little publications prove how indigenous 
 to the soil of France are wit and talent. The wide 
 mobilisation gathers every one into the fold — artist 
 andlitterateur, artisan and peasant ; but the last named, 
 notwithstanding his lack of letters, has qualities of 
 
 194
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 195 
 
 his own, qualities of soul, and even if he is unable to 
 contribute directly to the trench journal, the little 
 newspaper sparkles with wit which he inspires. 
 
 Rigolboche has a characteristic sketch. The Kaiser 
 and Fran9ois Joseph are discovered talking. " My 
 dear Frangois Joseph," remarks the Kaiser, " I think 
 the moment has come to kill the Gallic cock ; it is fat 
 and in good condition." He draws his knife, but the 
 cock flies full at his face ; at the same time, the British 
 bull-dog gets his teeth into his leg, and the Russian 
 bull, charging up, bears him away on his back. 
 
 The "poilu" has given his name to many publications. 
 There is, for instance, the " Poilu et Marie-Louise," a 
 title a little obscure, no doubt, to the British reader ; 
 but the adjunction of " Marie-Louise " signifies that 
 it is associated with officers who left the famous school 
 of St. Cyr in a year when the anniversary of Marie- 
 Louise, Napoleon's Imperial wife, gave its name to the 
 academic year. This organ appears in all the glory 
 of print; but the majority cannot afford this luxury. 
 The Argonaut explains its origin, of course, distinctly 
 enough. It is produced in the Argonne. It contains 
 illustrations and letter-press copied by the duplicator. 
 Another has the suggestive name of La Saucisse — 
 the popular name of the observation balloon, which 
 directs the fire of the guns. The Souvenir, especially 
 to French ears, has a serious sound. Before the war 
 it had a definite military meaning. To-day, as 
 applied to this particular journal, it means an effort 
 to keep green the memory of those who have fallen 
 in the field. Whereas the majority of trench publica- 
 tions give an amusing view of life at the Front, the 
 Souvenir strikes the grave note. Its articles are
 
 196 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 devoted to cherishing the memory of brave deeds, 
 and of the heroes who performed them — lest we 
 forget. The editor, in an article of considerable 
 charm, quotes the remark of a mutilated soldier to a 
 sympathetic civilian. " Yes, I am the hero to-day," 
 says the victim of the war, " but a hopeless cripple 
 to-morrow." A glorious deed may be the work of 
 a moment, but crutches have no apparent glory and 
 endure for a lifetime. There is no halo round the 
 head with sightless eyes ; no monument over the 
 little green grave, and society, on the morrow of 
 victory, forgets. And so the poetic and heroic pages 
 of the Souvenir are full of the recital of deeds of valour 
 either actual in their happenings or symbolical. 
 
 Le Ver luisant (" The Glow-worm ") represents quite 
 a different conception of the duty of a trench journal, 
 as does La Voix du 75 {'' The Voice of the 75 "). The 
 Bellica, the Bourn Voila, the Boyau, the Canard Poilu, 
 the Clarion Territorial, the Cri de Guerre, the Diable 
 au Cor (the organ of the 3rd Brigade of the Chasseurs 
 Alpins), the Echo des Marmites, the Echo du grand 
 Couronne, and the Echo du 75 are other titles. Cheery 
 productions they are, full of light touches — humour 
 that is not always very refined perhaps, but still 
 humour, among the bursting shells and the agony of 
 death. " Bocheries " is the title of an amusing column 
 in the picturesquely named Marmite (the name given 
 to heavy shells), and there is sometimes a light fan- 
 tastic column of fashions — such, for instance, as the 
 correct way of wearing the respirator, or the chic 
 angle to tilt the steel helmet. 
 
 The British trench newspapers have also their 
 particular charm — intermingling Tommy's robust
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 197 
 
 cheerfulness with the shy pathos of homesick islanders, 
 but printed on fine paper, in good type, they lack a 
 httle the winsome appeal of those tiny hand-written 
 sheets, sometimes no bigger than a sheet of foolscap, 
 that are produced in the very atmosphere of war, and 
 which are nearly always dainty, and represent in 
 some subtle way the aroma of France : the wit and 
 tenderness, the heroism, the grand virtues of the 
 fighting man, and yet his simplicity of soul. Obvi- 
 ously, they have been born in war, and yet unaffected 
 by the crash of metal, the horrid jar and thud of 
 falling earth, the ruin of defences, the crashing, crazy 
 effects of heavy fire. 
 
 Here is another paper bearing the title of La Felix 
 Potiniere. Every one who has kept house in Paris 
 knows that " Felix Potin " is the name of a large 
 provision stores ; but the word 'potin is the slang term 
 for a piece of gossip, and gossipy indeed are the con- 
 tents of this amusing little sheet. What tranquil- 
 lity of mind is revealed by these jokes and jeux 
 d' esprit; one would imagine the Boches were many 
 miles off instead of just round the corner ! and, more- 
 over, these stimulators to gaiety have the profes- 
 sional touch : the cuisine is perfect ; the man of the 
 metier has been at work, and " news," with its accom- 
 panying comment, is served up with sauce piquante. 
 La Guerre Joviale does not belie its excellent title; 
 it shows us war under its most agreeable aspect; at 
 least it is heartening if not strictly true. And Uln- 
 discret des Poilus, the Lapin a plume (" The Feathered 
 Rabbit ") and Notre Rire (the organ of the artillery) 
 are brimful of laughter and the joy of living, even 
 though sometimes, in their surroundings, there is
 
 198 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 little laughter, a festival of Death rather than of 
 Life. 
 
 Another " poilu," a very curious sort of fellow, comes 
 from the Champagne district, and yet another from 
 Verdun, smoking hot with battle. One can imagine 
 the editor inditing his poems and dishing up his 
 article — one can almost see him doing it — with an 
 aerial torpedo sailing overhead and all sorts of 
 death-dealing engines threatening his plant down in 
 the deep-sunk chamber where the joyous little herald 
 blows his blast of good hope and perseverance to the 
 soldiers of its circulation. These are real examples 
 of the indomitable will of France in the most tremen- 
 dous episode of her existence, hardly excepting the 
 Revolution — for the War of '70 sinks into utter in- 
 significance before this vast and world-wide upheaval. 
 There is no mistaking the gay insouciant character, 
 though sometimes the effort to cheer may go a little 
 beyond the strict requirements. Nevertheless, these 
 little papers are barometers of the fighting spirit of 
 France. It is not strange to find this fighting spirit 
 so keenly developed in the first-line trenches, for here 
 it was tuned to the highest pitch by reason of the stress 
 of circumstances, by reason of the close proximity of 
 danger, by the very intoxication of that danger, and by 
 the common spirit of heroism that comes from close 
 comradeship; but it is significant that the same 
 spirit existed at the rear where men were awaiting 
 their turn for battle — the sort of waiting that is the 
 severest test for nerves ; and it is as symbols of this 
 splendid and invincible spirit that these charming 
 little documents have their greatest psychological 
 importance.
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 199 
 
 In glancing through the collection of M. de la Ron- 
 ci^re, Keeper of the Printed Books at the Bibliotheque 
 Nationale of Paris, one is particularly impressed by 
 the spirit of fraternity that pervades the trench news- 
 paper, evidence of the thoroughly democratic army 
 of France. No journal prides itself as being the 
 organ of a " crack " regiment. There are, in fact, no 
 corps d'elite — corps that are specially recruited. In 
 the Republican model army each regiment is placed 
 on a footing of equality, and the tendency in all 
 records of achievements is to keep a strict balance 
 and to give no more glory to one unit than another. 
 None the less, certain regiments have perforce dis- 
 tinguished themselves in spite of this arrangement. 
 They have distinguished themselves because they 
 have been in the forefront of the fighting, because 
 they have borne the brunt of dangerous enterprises, 
 because they have persisted in keeping alive the old 
 traditions of the corps, traditions which arose from 
 the fact that the men forming it came from a certain 
 district renowned for its hardy types, and capable 
 of an endless energy of resistance. Such a regiment 
 is the " Chasseurs k Pied," the most famous corps 
 of the Home Army, and popularly known as the 
 " Chasseurs Alpins." For although the Chasseurs 
 were used all along the eastern frontier from Belfort 
 to Luneville, the popular mind constantly associates 
 them with the mountains — the little thick-set men in 
 dark blue tunics and blue Tam-o'-Shanters, skimming 
 over the snow upon skis. These are men of the Alps 
 and the Vosges, sturdy of limb and sound of wind, real 
 mountaineers, courageous, resourceful and capable 
 of endless fatigue. No unit of the French Army has
 
 200 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 suffered as much as they in proportion to their num- 
 bers. They have been everywhere where the fighting 
 was most severe, and at Verdun they took a foremost 
 part in resisting the colossal attack of the Germans. 
 Although there was a Chasseur regiment under the 
 Empire, dressed very much as were the Grenadiers, 
 with a high fur bonnet, in their present form the 
 corps is of comparatively recent date, and has existed 
 only three-quarters of a century; the regimental 
 records, however, hold some well-known names. 
 President Poincare performed his military service in 
 this famous corps, Bar-le-Duc being his recruiting 
 centre, and among its officers were both Canrobert 
 and MacMahon, the one commanding the fifth and 
 the other the eighth battalion. 
 
 The Great War effected changes in the traditional 
 uniform of the Chasseurs. Though they kept their 
 dark clothes out of pride of family whilst the rest 
 of the army — except the Moroccans, who were in 
 khaki — adopted the horizon blue, the famous blue 
 heret (Tam-o'-Shanter) embroidered with a golden 
 bugle was sacrificed for the steel helmet, at least 
 for service in the trenches — that valuable head-gear 
 which has saved probably fifty per cent, of head 
 wounds. 
 
 One of the most picturesque elements of the French 
 army are the Zouaves, with their blue embroidered 
 tunic and vest and the baggy red trousers reaching 
 to the knee, the whole surmounted by the fez. Of 
 this gorgeous uniform the only survival of the war, 
 alas, was the fez ! The blue tunic was changed to 
 a khaki coat, the voluminous trousers copied from 
 the old Turkish garb became merely baggy khaki
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 201 
 
 breeches. Sic transit gloria mundi ! But if the Zouaves 
 were deprived of their brilhant plumage, they made 
 up for it in glory of achievement. Largely employed 
 in storming-parties, the Germans learnt to fear the 
 Zouaves more than any other troops, so reckless were 
 they in their bravery and their utter disregard of 
 desperate odds. The corps dates from the early days 
 of Algeria, and was created in 1831, when two bat- 
 talions were formed, receiving the name of " Zouaves" 
 from the Arab Zouaoua, a fierce and intractable tribe 
 of Kabyle, the best fighters of Northern Africa. The 
 Zouaves were recruited originally from the Kabyles 
 and Arabs of Algeria and also, a curious feature, 
 from the hot bloods of the Paris population — an 
 element that was introduced, because it was thought 
 advisable to dilute the number of natives by Euro- 
 peans. The blend was admirable, and the new troops 
 performed marvels of dash and daring in those days, 
 just after the July Revolution of 1830, when France 
 was not sure whether she wanted her new colonies 
 or not, and left to the Algerian administration the 
 onus of consolidating the nominal conquest and 
 pacifying and developing the country. One of the 
 early commanders of the corps was de Lamorciere, 
 a bold and dashing officer, with more than a touch of 
 eccentricity in his composition. He spoke all the 
 Arabian dialects perfectly, and indeed was an ideal 
 leader for such a corps of dare-devils. 
 
 The Zouaves hold many distinguished records in 
 French history. Under Marshal MacMahon they 
 fought at Malakoff and Sebastopol, and the Third 
 Zouaves went into action under the eyes of Victor 
 Emmanuel, taking a prominent part in the capture of
 
 202 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 the bridge at Palestro, marking the victory of the 
 French and Piedmontese over the Austrians. 
 
 The formation of the Zouaves led to the estabhsh- 
 ment of other native or semi-native corps, notably 
 the Tirailleurs Algeriens. Since that day the con- 
 quest of Morocco has added other elements to the 
 native army ; and, particularly in the early days of the 
 war, the French populations in the region of the Front 
 were interested to see the picturesque figures of the 
 Spahis, or native Moroccan cavalry, in their robes 
 and turbans, sitting superbly their swift and strong 
 little horses. 
 
 Later, however, the native element (which could 
 not overcome its fear and repugnance to cannon) 
 was largely eliminated, and the Zouaves, greatly 
 increased from their original numbers, were mainly 
 composed of colonials of French parentage. 
 
 But perhaps the most interesting regiment from 
 the psychological point of view — the regiment that 
 teems with romance and holds thousands of secrets 
 in its ranks — is the famous Foreign Legion. Under 
 Napoleon I the Foreign Legion existed side by side 
 with distinctly national regiments, such as the Portu- 
 guese, the Dutch, and even the German regiments. 
 But under Louis Philippe the two regiments that were 
 the original force became definitely formed into a 
 Foreign Legion. The sphere of the Foreign Legion 
 was mainly Africa, for owing to its mixed nationality, 
 resulting in a large diversity of sympathy, it was 
 deemed unsuitable for European warfare. True, 
 it was actively employed in the Crimea, and also 
 earlier against the Carlists in Spain ; but during the 
 Crimean War there was a certain amount of desertion
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 203 
 
 by elements of the corps that had Slav sympathies. 
 Hence the Foreign Legion was mainly employed in 
 tribal warfare, and Africa was its recognised home. 
 Strangely diverse were its ranks — the Paris hooligan, 
 the swindling banker, unfrocked bishops, aristocrats 
 who had dragged their names into the dust, the 
 discredited politician. Of the Legionaries no ques- 
 tions are asked, and the pseudonyms they adopt often 
 cover the once famous names of men who have 
 " disappeared." Rumour credits the corps with 
 many strange tales, but it is undoubtedly true that 
 an authentic German princeling fought with the 
 Legion until the opening of the war, when he crossed 
 over to Germany and used his local knowledge to 
 great effect against his quondam friends. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the ranks of the Foreign 
 Legion were swelled to a vast extent by the stream 
 of volunteers of all nationalities who loved France 
 and rushed to her succour. There were Italians, 
 Belgians, Greeks, English, Americans, who were 
 anxious to take up arms for the invaded country. 
 Poles, Russians, Croates, Slovanes, Serbs, Finns, 
 Montenegrins, and Tcheques joined. Some came to 
 France from the uttermost ends of the earth to offer 
 their services : Peruvians, Swiss, Argentines, Nor- 
 wegians. There were German Poles and Danes from 
 Sleswig-Holstein, Spaniards, Galicians, and Italians 
 from the Trentino, and ten thousand Alsatians, Ger- 
 man subjects, who had escaped. There were thus 
 available 35,000 men, a veritable army corps. This 
 was the figure, in spite of the rejection of a great 
 number by the recruiting board at the Invalides. 
 They all left for their depots four days later. These
 
 204 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 volunteers were of all ages and of all nationalities — 
 boys of eighteen, and mature men of fifty and even 
 more; Polish miners from the north of France; 
 Kabyle workmen from factories in the Seine et Oise ; 
 Russian artists, international boxers (including a 
 negro champion), famous trick cyclists, and jockeys, 
 who had often worn winning colours at Longchamp 
 and Auteuil. Alec Carter the well-known jockey was 
 killed. There were also young artists from various 
 nations at the Ecole des Beaux Arts. Prominent 
 writers and artists, a son of Maxime Gorki, and several 
 quite well-known poets from Central America; the 
 son of the Russian ambassador, M. Iswolsky, and a 
 famous pclota player, Pablo Irraguerro. 
 
 The regiment has fought splendidly at the Front, 
 partaking all the sufferings of the soldiers, all their 
 danger and their glory too. The force has been em- 
 ployed in all the grand coups de chien. There was the 
 spirited address of a Captain who read out the order 
 of the General, and then said, " Mes Enfants, we have 
 the honour of attacking the first. Pay no heed to 
 those who fall. If I go down, leave me; push on 
 without thinking of anything else." Some sang the 
 Marseillaise and others their national hymns. Their 
 conduct on that great day was sublime. They 
 rushed fearlessly forward under the storm of shell, 
 bayonets glittering in the sunshine of an early May 
 morning. Nothing stops the formidable advance. 
 They swarm over the parapet ; the course commences. 
 Their orders were to carry Hill 140, and they fulfilled 
 their instructions. The Polish Legion was extra- 
 ordinarily brave, and it saw fall at its head, brandish- 
 ing the colours, Ladislas de Szuynski, son of the
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 205 
 
 celebrated Polish historian. Concerning the Polish 
 Legion there is the pretty story of a Pole who, wishing 
 to discover whether there were Poles among the 
 enemy, crawled on his stomach in the night to the 
 German trenches. Once arrived there, he sang, very 
 quietly, an old Polish song. Surprised, the German 
 Poles lifted their heads, observed the bold singer, 
 and allowed themselves to forget the horrors of war. 
 When he had finished the listeners began to talk about 
 Poland, that the Prussian kept underfoot. A Pole 
 surely should not fight against France, who fights 
 for Poland, insinuated the emissary. There was 
 another song, and then, under the enchantment of the 
 old memories, the Poles allowed themselves to be 
 persuaded and carried over to the French trenches. 
 
 One of the principal elements of the new Foreign 
 Legion were the Garibaldians, who showed immense 
 fervour. They formed a part of the 10th Division 
 under General Gouraud in the Argonne, and with 
 them were the six grandsons of Garibaldi. Their 
 tactics were extraordinarily impetuous, and in a three- 
 days' fight they lost 800 men. The special corps into 
 which they were formed was disbanded on Italy's 
 declaration against Austria, but their valour had been 
 such that Joffre expressed his sense of honour in 
 commanding them. 
 
 Wherever it has fought, whether to-day or yester- 
 day, the Foreign Legion has always left a record of 
 valour, daring and devilry. An amusing story is 
 recalled from Crimean days, when Canrobert stopped 
 in front of a Legionary and asked him what sort of 
 shoes he was wearing ? Strange shoes indeed ! for 
 he had blackened his feet, having sold his boots for
 
 206 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 eau de vie. But episodes such as this are ever 
 typical of a corps that sells its shoes for a little brandy, 
 and its life for a spice of glory. 
 
 The colonial troops of the French Army were called, 
 until a few years ago, Marine Infantry, and were 
 attached directly to the Navy. Nowadays the system 
 adopted is that of some regiments in the British 
 Army ; that is to say, one battalion remains at home 
 whilst the other battalions serve in the colonies. 
 They wear a dark blue uniform with yellow epaulettes. 
 During the course of the war their composition be- 
 came very mixed, and negroes and tribesmen from 
 the Soudan were embodied with them. In this case 
 also the colonial troops are perhaps less adapted to 
 European warfare than they are to their own special 
 field of action in the colonies against insurrectionary 
 tribes. 
 
 A very fine corps, which covered itself with glory 
 at Dixmude, is the Marine Fusiliers. The force 
 retreated to Dixmude when their original mission, 
 which was to defend Antwerp, failed, owing to the 
 collapse of the Belgian defence. Here they held their 
 ground with the greatest heroism for over a month, 
 though the original plan was that they should be 
 relieved in a few hours, and at this spot a peculiarly 
 tragic incident took place. A second in command, 
 a naval captain, Janiaud, went up to take the sur- 
 render of two German companies of infantry, which 
 were surrounded by the Marines. The Germans 
 seized the captain and kept him prisoner. The 
 Fusiliers then opened fire, which was briskly returned 
 by the Germans, but during the short engagement 
 which ended in the capitulation of the enemy force,
 
 TRENCH JOURNALS 207 
 
 the captain was shot dead by two German officers 
 with their revolvers. After this act of treachery, 
 which took place in November 1914, the Marine 
 Fusiliers swore to take no further prisoners, a resolu- 
 tion to which they have rigorously held in their 
 various engagements ever since.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 
 
 " Ah, monsieur, you fly like a bird ! " said an 
 admirer one day to Pegoud. 
 
 " A bird ! " was the famous reply, " Les oiseaux ne 
 savent pas voler ! " ("The birds don't know how to 
 fly ! ") And indeed the bird-man, soaring at immense 
 height and incredible speed, has left the little denizen 
 of the air far behind. The wings of the machine 
 are rigid, it is true, but also they are tireless ; and 
 the skill of the inventor and science of the mathe- 
 matician have excelled the pulsing wings of flesh and 
 feather. A few years back — ten years ago to be 
 exact — the birds must have tittered as they watched 
 at Bagatefle the fearsome efforts of the ugly ducklings 
 of the early days of aviation. On November 13, 
 1906, a famous date in the history of flying, Santos 
 Dumont flew 220 metres in twenty-one seconds, 
 that is, at the rate of nearly thirty-eight kilometers 
 an hour. He had won the prize of the Aero Club 
 for a hundred meters in a straight line. The experi- 
 ments began at ten in the morning, but the test was 
 not accomplished until late in the afternoon. Two 
 enormous birds spreading their white wings of 
 canvas — the one belonging to Santos Dumont and 
 the other to Blcriot — lay upon the green carpet of 
 
 208
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 209 
 
 the ground. A crowd of enthusiasts, amongst whom 
 were some of the great names in aeronautics, such as 
 M. Archdeacon, the Marquis de Dion, Surcouf, Louis 
 Renault and M. Besan9on, were upon the ground 
 surrounding the two pioneers and eagerly discussing 
 the theories of lighter than air and heavier than air — 
 that is, the bag filled with hydrogen that floated in 
 air, or the aeroplane which flew by its own means of 
 engine and wings. The machine of Santos Dumont 
 was a weird-looking thing. Some compared it with 
 an ibis or heron as it rose into the air with its long 
 neck outstretched and its wings spread — a strange 
 thing like an antediluvian bird. Its planes were 
 formed of canvas frames divided into cubes, so that 
 at one angle it looked like a flying cupboard. The 
 square box-like head in front was the steering ap- 
 paratus. The tail of the beast was represented by 
 the screw continually lashing its way through the 
 air. The pioneer sat in a little cage arrangement 
 between the planes, so that his head and body 
 emerged and he had the appearance of riding astride. 
 The first starts were a little unpromising. The 
 machine rose a few inches, and then a few yards, 
 and came to earth abruptly in each case. In three 
 separate attempts it flew one hundred and fifty 
 yards in all, achieving, in the third attempt, eighty 
 yards in seven seconds. But it was not until the 
 light was failing that the machine really rose to any 
 height. It then flew at six metres from the ground at 
 a tremendous rate. The airman, however, was forced 
 to descend for fear of an accident to the crowd, which 
 was following his movements with impassioned 
 interest. He had won the prize of the Aero Club 
 
 for sustained flight, an advance, at any rate, upon 
 p
 
 210 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 the series of leaps in the air which had passed for 
 flight before that. It was said that the Wright 
 brothers had flown twenty-five miles ; but that was 
 in Ameriea, and, besides, the Parisians were not very- 
 sure about it; but here in Franee it was the first 
 time that mortal man had flown over the heads of 
 humanity by meehanieal means. The Bleriot-Voisin 
 machine, though very ingenious in its construction, 
 did not succeed that day; Santos Dumont, the little 
 plucky Brazilian, was the real conqueror : future 
 laurels were being reserved for M. Bleriot. The 
 French, indeed, have pioneered in the air. The 
 brothers Montgolfier were the first to make ascents 
 in their balloon ; and the balloon originally appeared 
 as a military engine for observation above the 
 battle-field of Fleurus, where the Revolutionary 
 General Jourdan vanquished the Austrians in 1794. 
 The dirigible is also largely the product of French 
 invention. 
 
 One of the amazing features of the war was the 
 rapid development of aviation after the outbreak of 
 hostilities. In a few months only the aeroplane 
 emerged from its experimental stage and appeared 
 as a highly finished and accurate instrument of 
 war. An immense stride was attained when the 
 machine was first adapted by the French to carry 
 cannon, which enabled the attack upon another 
 aeroplane to be made in the horizontal plane instead 
 of vertically, as was necessary when one machine 
 had to mount above another in order to drop bombs 
 or flechettes — one of those refinements of cruelty 
 which the present war has produced. Incidently, 
 there are some who say that the German flechettes, 
 launched from the skies, were of such inferior steel
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 211 
 
 that they buckled up when they touched a hard 
 object. However that may be (and we have no 
 reason to complain of such an arrangement), weight, 
 whether in the form of cannon or other armaments, 
 was constantly added to the aeroplane, and the 
 problem then arose as to the maintenance of speed. 
 In the aerial machine, speed is the first requisite, 
 especially nowadays when it is necessary to mount 
 and mount, perhaps, to six thousand yards to over- 
 fly the enemy craft, be he Zeppelin or fellow airman. 
 And a few minutes make all the difference — the 
 difference of kilometers — in the pursuit; thus speed 
 must always be combined with those offensive pro- 
 perties that are being gradually added to the battle- 
 plane. 
 
 And a third difficulty was that of starting the 
 machine quickly in pursuit of an enemy travelling 
 at the great heights that are now customary — and 
 indeed obligatory — with the development of anti- 
 aircraft artillery. Naturally the machine even of 
 the speedier sort loses time as it mounts spirally or 
 in a series of inclined planes to give battles to the 
 Zeppelin or Fokker. Would it be possible to turn 
 the observation balloon into a sort of perch for the 
 airman, so that he would be suspended always mid- 
 way between earth and sky ready instantly (if one 
 may suppose him able to detach himself) to fly 
 away in pursuit of the stranger ? Yet in the present 
 stage of development such a desideratum is difficult 
 of realisation. The airman must start from the 
 ground or return to it every time he wants to over- 
 haul his engine or replenish his reservoirs. That is 
 his touch with solid realities : otherwise one might 
 suppose him flying for days, never setting foot to
 
 212 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 earth, the modern Guardian Angel, hovering eternally 
 in the heavens. 
 
 The aeroplane has completely revolutionised war- 
 fare, inasmuch as it has deprived strategy of its 
 chief weapon — surprise. As the eyes of the army 
 the aeroplane played its most important role. A 
 light and very speedy machine is the scout, and it 
 is his duty to make reconnaissances, report upon gun 
 emplacements, the numbers of the opposing troops, 
 the movements of the enemy, and the disposition 
 of his trenches. But the aeroplanes used in warfare 
 are not all alike. The tendency is towards differentia- 
 tion, and while the scout is swift and light, the 
 battle-plane is extremely powerful and heavily armed 
 with cannon or machine-guns, sometimes also carry- 
 ing a spur for ramming enemy craft ; and again there 
 is a third type of machine armed also for defence, 
 but adapted principally to range-finding, and fitted 
 with signalling and photographic apparatus ; it 
 hovers continually over the enemy lines directing 
 artillery fire. None of the offices of the aeroplane 
 proved more valuable than that of giving the range 
 of enemy positions to one's own artillery, and then 
 registering the shots, marking where they fell too 
 short, or overpassed the mark. This is one of the 
 most dangerous as well as the most useful of the 
 services rendered by the man-bird. It requires great 
 nerve, judgment, and coolness on the part of the 
 aviator, for he must hang over the enemy trenches 
 and expose himself to the fire of their anti-aircraft 
 guns, the efficacity of which made rapid strides as 
 the war progressed. The German method of signal- 
 ling to the opposing batteries by means of smoke 
 bombs with different-coloured fuses was soon im-
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 213 
 
 proved upon by the French, who used wireless tele- 
 graphy and the heliograph by day. But the role of 
 the aeroplane is not confined even to these important 
 services. It becomes at times the instrument of 
 aerial bombardment for the destruction of fortified 
 places, military stores, railway junctions, dirigible 
 sheds, encampments, bridges, and roads used by the 
 military. When war broke out, the French airmen 
 received explicit instructions not to bombard any 
 town for fear of inflicting harm upon civilians, but 
 the Germans were not so scrupulous, and their defiance 
 of the dictates of humanity forced a change in the 
 policy of their Allies, if only in self-defence. 
 
 The aeroplane could be used also as a link for com- 
 municating with armies and their staffs, particularly 
 in the case of a besieged army or town. And, finally, 
 the man-bird is admirable in the capacity of aerial 
 policeman; he can watch the clouds and he can 
 prevent the passage of the enemy pilots. Not that 
 it is possible to suppose that one force of aeroplanes, 
 however numerous, can completely occupy the 
 heavens, for the skies are broad; but bold aviators 
 ever on the watch, patrolling the sky in constant 
 relays (as was the case in the aerial defence of Paris 
 against the Zeppelins), will generally succeed, what- 
 ever measures are taken against them, in overtopping 
 the adversary ; and the French aviator is remarkably 
 good in that sort of warfare where native audacity 
 and resource are in demand — that is why the French- 
 man is so superb a performer in the air. None the less 
 it is impossible quite to bar out the enemy. The 
 clouds may always hide a foe; the fog is ever the 
 possible lurking ground of the hostile airship. But 
 although the barrage system (so successfully applied
 
 214 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 on solid earth in the tir de barrage) cannot absolutely 
 prevent a Zeppelin attack upon a wide-spreading 
 town, yet the aerial dam has given good results in 
 the war of the air. The procedure is to institute a 
 barrage of aeroplanes over against a certain locality — 
 a certain restricted space. The enemy is marked 
 down and prevented from passing. Undesirable 
 visitors are invited to " move on," and they do not 
 wait for a repetition of the request ! I have heard 
 of one hardy airman who, charged to watch the 
 heavens against the passage of the adversary, so 
 manoeuvred that the thick heavy clouds which hung 
 in the sky were positively useful to him as a screen. 
 Noting that at one point there was a clear space in 
 the dense curtain of fog, he placed himself there and 
 watched as a look-out might in the embrasure of a 
 fort. None came to challenge his vigilance. 
 
 Again the barrage tactics are extremely useful in 
 the prevention of secrets being divulged to the 
 enemy. Certain important movements, such as the 
 moving up of reinforcements, are taking place in a 
 certain part of the line, and to keep the enemy from 
 knowledge of the fact squadrillas of battle-planes are 
 sent up to bar the way to the enemy scouts, and 
 nothing can penetrate the screen of the avians. 
 Thus it has so happened that, thanks to the barrage 
 system, the enemy has been without definite news 
 of the Allies' movements during twenty-four hours. 
 But let it be remembered that the aerial dam implies 
 the mastery of the air, as important to the Allies 
 as the mastery of the seas : indeed, one could establish 
 a very close analogy between the two. The mastery 
 of the air — ^the complete mastery — would have meant 
 the finish of the war, the absolute victory for that
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 215 
 
 side which possessed it. And the aerial fleet must 
 consist of aeroplanes, not Zeppelins. For after all 
 the Zeppelins failed miserably either in their bom- 
 bardment of England or their assault upon French 
 towns. True they have taken toll of a certain 
 number of innocent lives in England, but an infini- 
 tesimal number in comparison with the holocaust 
 caused by a terrestrial bombardment. Cumbersome, 
 unwieldy, unable to operate except in a fog, the 
 Zeppelin was comparatively ineffectual as an engine 
 of war, and w^ould not have been employed by the 
 Germans except to prevent the public exposure of a 
 mistaken policy. Six aeroplanes could effect more 
 damage than one Zeppelin, whose radius of action is 
 circumscribed by the fact that it has to carry vast 
 weight for a long journey, that it is expensive to 
 build, and consumes immense quantities of fuel en 
 route ; that it is almost as dangerous to itself as to 
 the enemy on account of its vulnerability from 
 cannon and from high winds, and moreover it is 
 constantly exposed to attack from the upper strata 
 of air by the aeroplane which swoops down upon it 
 with the speed of the eagle, and against wliich the 
 Zeppelin has no defence. No, it is the aeroplane 
 that has come to stay, and a very prominent air- 
 man — a man who bears a household name in aero- 
 nautics — declared to me that the side which could 
 furnish ten thousand aeroplanes with the airmen to 
 mount them would win the war. For if aerial 
 bombardment had, up to that moment, taken very 
 little place in the hostilities it was because it was on 
 so small a scale. Very little effect was to be obtained 
 by sending half a dozen apparati over a town — it is 
 true that in some of the French raids over German
 
 216 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 towns there were as many as thirty machines em- 
 ployed, but this was the great exception. It is easy 
 to conjure up the effect of a gigantic bombardment — 
 a shower of metal from the sky — rained everjavhere 
 upon the enemy troops on the march, upon the 
 enemy convoys in the rear, upon his stores and maga- 
 zines, upon his bridges and railways. Such a bom- 
 bardment, if it could be continued systematically 
 for long enough, would mean his forced surrender, for 
 retreat would not save him. His aerial foes would be 
 always quicker than he, even his quickest motor 
 transport, and would bombard him from the skies. 
 So that the mastery of the sky would ensure the 
 victory for any army. 
 
 The development of the aeroplane is full of the 
 most startling possibilities. Already it has far out- 
 flown the vision of its inventors, for, a very short 
 time ago it seems, one of the Voisin freres declared 
 to me that the aeroplane would never be other than 
 a rich man's hobby, of little use in w^ar-time other 
 than the dropping of a few explosives. My in- 
 formant has since trodden the path of so many brave 
 pilots, but had he lived he would have admitted 
 to-day that the possibilities of the aeroplane seem 
 limitless. The appearance of the Sikorski machine 
 in Russia carrying five or six men in its cabin en- 
 courages the belief that the aerobus will soon be a 
 practical reality, and the imagination is fired by the 
 prospect of the air humming with giant aeroplanes, 
 which, by the way, the Germans also attempted to 
 use during the war. There is more than a possi- 
 bility — so many surprising things have happened — 
 that, in the future, commanders will have aerial 
 motor lorries at their disposal for the rapid trans-
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 217 
 
 port of their troops. Thus strategy and the physi- 
 ognomy of the fight would be completely changed. 
 It would effect a complete metamorphosis. The 
 commander who possessed this aerial fleet would be 
 able to carry the whole of his army with the speed 
 and ease of the magic carpet of the Arabian Nights 
 to some distant point and descend even into the 
 enemy country. Nevertheless, as M. Blanchon in the 
 Revue des Deux Mondes suggests, the General who 
 resorted to these aerial methods could not carry out 
 normal military operations for the reason that his 
 materiel must go by road. But when the science of 
 air-transport is sufficiently advanced to allow armies 
 to pass in the sky, presumedly that army will know 
 how to take care of its lines of communication. 
 
 These are dreams of the future, however, and their 
 realisation is problematical. But the vision which 
 is in no wise uncertain — the vision which will be 
 realised in the near future, is that of vast armies of 
 wings gathered in the sky. Nations will no longer 
 possess fleets of hundreds of aeroplanes, but tens of 
 thousands will lie in readiness to skim into enemy 
 country and scatter terror and death over vast 
 areas. The nations that plunge into war will no 
 longer pledge only their fighting men ; they will enter 
 into battle knowing that their women and children 
 must also endure the worst agony of horror, for 
 modern science has destroyed civilised warfare, and 
 modern man has joined hands with primitive man 
 and wars upon the innocent and helpless. 
 
 But it must be conceded that superiority in the 
 machines should be accompanied by superiority in 
 pilots. In a conversation which I had at the time 
 of writing this chapter with M. Louis Bleriot (who
 
 218 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 knows as much as any man living of the practical 
 side of aviation and even its scientific side), the 
 famous winner of the cross-Channel prize confessed 
 that France had not sufficiently developed her rich 
 treasure in expert and adventurous men — the very 
 pick of the pilots of the world — though the English, 
 too, were extraordinary for their sang-froid and 
 were remarkable airmen. For in the air as on 
 the land, in the last resort, it is the personal 
 element which tells. A school, urged Bleriot, was 
 necessary to form such super-pilots as Garros and 
 Pegoud, men renowned for ever for their prowess in 
 the air. 
 
 For the conquest of the air is to the swift and 
 strong and fearless. Prudence and sagacity, and the 
 slow measured wisdom that comes with the years, 
 play no part in so breathless a pursuit. It is a 
 game for young gods, not for the pale savant ; a 
 sport for young eagles, for a man must be sharp of 
 eye, strong of claw and sinews to cleave his way 
 through the clouds, right into the face of day. These 
 super -men who ride fearlessly amongst the stars 
 must be the very pick of humanity, revelling in the 
 sensations of supreme danger, glorying in the know- 
 ledge that in a few seconds an assailant may emerge 
 from yonder cloud with whom he must come into 
 death grapples, and well aware that the vanquished 
 will crash down thousands of feet to earth. Youth : 
 youth has been poured out with a lavish hand on 
 the smoking, bloody altar of the war. Youth : there 
 is no incense more precious to the gods. Alas ! a 
 monstrous sort of selection is exercised. The young 
 are mowed down by Death with the scythe, leaving 
 the least adventurous, the timid and calculating —
 
 THE AIRMAN IN WAR 219 
 
 those who are sure eventually to die of a cold in the 
 head — to live on. 
 
 Very curious is the psychology of the airman. He 
 is billeted so often in the midst of the world in some 
 pleasant little town away behind the lines — it may 
 be even Paris; sometimes also Fate sends him to a 
 chateau where he lives like a prince amid ancestral 
 halls and a sweeping park — until the day when duty 
 calls him to mount the perilous stairway of the skies 
 to give mortal combat to the enemy. In the trenches 
 men welcome an attack as a relief from the deadly 
 monotony of life in pits, but the airman leaves an 
 easeful, agreeable, social life for the cold, austere 
 atmosphere of the skies under the pure radiant dome 
 of heaven. It requires a man of special tempera- 
 ment to withstand so lively a contrast — not to be 
 softened or unnerved by it. Think of the solitude 
 of the upper air, careering absolutely alone, perhaps. 
 And there is no turning back. There is no such word 
 as " funk " in the bright lexicon of the airman. He 
 is up there because he is fearless, because he does 
 not dread being solus in the wide heavens, because 
 he is a man and no craven, because he has nerves 
 of steel and whipcord. And he must be ready to 
 fight with any weapons. Garros was equally expert 
 in attacking and bringing down his man with machine- 
 gun, carbine, rifle, or even revolver, and in ten days 
 before he was captured he had "grassed" three 
 German aeroplanes. One of the men who fell into 
 his hands having asked him to announce his capture 
 to the German lines, Garros started off in that spirit 
 of chivalry common amongst airmen. There is this 
 delightful about the new arm, it has given a touch of 
 romance to the drab horror of the war. Whenever
 
 220 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 a man was captured or killed, airmen from the 
 opposite camp dropped a letter informing the com- 
 rades of the victim, often with an added word of 
 praise. " Even the Germans are gentlemen in the 
 air," remarked a young pilot the other day. There 
 is chivalry in the air. The man with his head near 
 the stars, flying in immeasurable space, has no room 
 for littlenesses. His heart is large and splendid like 
 the splendour of his deeds — deeds that make the 
 exploits of the old heroes pale into insignificance. 
 They are the phenomenal fruit of a limitless audacity, 
 of a glorious and spring-like youth, of the heyday of 
 existence, when danger is the mad intoxicant, the 
 heady draught that puts brightness into the eye, 
 that gives a riotous pleasure to life, that is like 
 song and wine to the hero clad in the shining and 
 invincible armour of his own superlative freshness 
 and illusions. 
 
 The bodies that crash down from the heavens and 
 the souls that soar into the white radiance of Eternity 
 have known no petty thought, have perpetrated no 
 mean deed. Yes, there is chivalry in the Air.
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 THE " POILU'S " HOSPITAL 
 
 There is this wonderful and alluring in France, 
 that, recognising the faults in an administration or 
 department of the public service, she sets to work 
 immediately to effect reform. And it was clear 
 enough that the service de sante, or hospital service, 
 was grievously defective at the outbreak of the war. 
 It was a question that had never been properly 
 worked out. Those who had thought about the 
 subject at all, never supposed that the demands upon 
 the department would be so terrific. Probably they 
 thought, as did most Frenchmen, that the war would 
 be of quick duration and that — well — the inconveni- 
 ences of the system would be but temporary, and 
 one would do the best one could in so short a time. 
 But the actual facts were to give the lie to this 
 prevision as to many others. The war lasted long, 
 the demands upon the hospital were not only terrific 
 but protracted. But with the spirit of adaptability, 
 of which the French have given so many proofs 
 during the war, they set to work with the resolution 
 to do the best possible. Little by little the gross 
 defects of the earlier days were remedied ; the number 
 of doctors, which at the beginning had been hope- 
 lessly inadequate, was augmented, and immense 
 improvements were made in the organisation of the 
 
 221
 
 222 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 hospital trains. Thereupon the evacuation of the 
 wounded developed on scientifically humane lines, 
 in spite of the difficulties of an unexpected kind, 
 mainly brought about by the colossal character of 
 the war. Thus the wounded rapidly received atten- 
 tion in the ambulances and were quickly sent away 
 in trains and motor-cars, and reached the most 
 distant parts of France not later than the morrow 
 of the combat. I was at Biarritz when the Cham- 
 pagne offensive was taking place, and saw arrive at 
 the station wounded men, still powdered with the 
 dust of the trenches, who had been in the fight 
 twenty-four hours before. 
 
 The hospitals, however, even the most modern in 
 their equipment, did not equal the English, still less 
 the American, but the reason was not far to seek : 
 a lack of money. A great many " sanitary forma- 
 tions " (as they are called in France) suffered also 
 from a want of motors ; in fact the French, by the very 
 nature of the circumstances, had not the immense 
 resources that the English possess. English news- 
 papers raised immense sums for the care of the sick. 
 But if the French had not the money to devote to 
 the niceties of hospital installation they did the best 
 they could with the time and means at their disposal. 
 And although, perhaps, the hospitals were not as 
 clean as would satisfy English tastes, they served 
 their purpose, which was to restore as many men as 
 possible to the firing-line and alleviate suffering. 
 
 Eternally to their credit is the manner in which 
 the French resolutely set their house in order after 
 the failure of the system was revealed on the field of 
 battle. It must be remembered that the long dura- 
 tion of battles nowadays prevents the wounded from
 
 THE 'POILU'S' HOSPITAL 223 
 
 being removed at once, and often they have to 
 remain the whole of the day where they have fallen 
 until the night comes and they can be transported. 
 Naturally it is of high importance in the saving of 
 life that the wounded should be got away as quickly 
 as possible to avoid the setting in of gangrene. 
 
 The Committee, which was formed by M. Millerand 
 at the Ministry of War in the early days of hostilities, 
 to effect reforms in the army medical service, fixed 
 the number of sixty motor-cars per army corps. 
 This number was in direct relation with the accommo- 
 dation of the hospital trains. But when the war 
 took on the character of a war of manoeuvres it 
 became necessary to employ trains used for ammuni- 
 tion and even for food supply — returning empty to 
 their base — for the evacuation of the wounded. In 
 a general fashion it may be said that the great pre- 
 occupation of the military command is to transport 
 the wounded away from the scene of action as rapidly 
 as possible in order to remain unhampered. One 
 could draw a melancholy picture of the first victims 
 of the war and its shambles being sent right across 
 France in crawling trains — the word is applicable in 
 a double sense, a long-drawn-out agony — before the 
 arrival at the base hospital. Never shall I forget 
 the first trainful of British wounded I encountered 
 coming from Mons. The goods train, without seats, 
 benches or beds, crawled and jolted by, passing my 
 train going in the opposite direction. We shouted 
 words of cheer, to which many of the Tommies 
 replied, gaily enough. Some even jumped off the 
 creeping train to pick up the fruit we threw (one 
 fellow, I remember, with a bandaged leg, hopped 
 on one foot in the permanent way, determined not
 
 224 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 to lose a pear that had fallen there). But others, 
 again, made no reply, and we hushed our voices and 
 bowed our heads as we saw recumbent figures, 
 stretched in cattle trucks on bundles of straw, figures 
 that gave no sign. Would they ever speak again, 
 these men lying alone, untended, in the creaking, 
 jarring train ? But these terrible conditions were 
 quickly changed. At the beginning of the war there 
 were only five regular hospital trains provided with 
 beds for the wounded, and a hundred improvised 
 trains, formed to a large extent of the rolling stock 
 of goods trains. The wounded could not be properly 
 attended in such trains, because there was a lack of 
 communication between the different parts, but after- 
 wards, corridor trains were adopted almost exclusively. 
 Nevertheless the number of the wounded was so 
 great, after some of the battles, that every sort of 
 train possible and imaginable had to be pressed into 
 the service. But the Committee, by its wise and 
 careful dispositions, rendered a great service in pro- 
 viding train accommodation for sixty thousand 
 wounded to which the Minister of War added twenty 
 thousand; and which again, I believe, was consider- 
 ably increased by General Gallieni during his brief 
 but strenuous period at the Ministry of War. 
 
 As originally conceived the ambulance of the Front 
 was equipped for major operations as well as the 
 hospital in the rear, but afterwards it was found 
 inadvisable to perform operations in these conditions 
 where the surgeon had not the time or the tranquillity 
 of mind necessary for the purpose ; and so by a later 
 arrangement the hospitals for the major operations 
 were placed fifteen or twenty miles to the rear. 
 And so it happened that the first mistakes were
 
 THE 'POILU'S' HOSPITAL 225 
 
 rectified. Instead of great and important operations 
 being conducted on the field of battle, subject to the 
 dangers and interruptions from such a propinquity, 
 the more gravely wounded, whose state required 
 amputation, were rapidly transported to these hospitals 
 in the rear after their wounds had been attended to 
 in the first place, and an examination made in the 
 field hospital, or ambulances as they are called in 
 France. This system gave much better results than 
 that adopted in the beginning, whereby the ambu- 
 lances de Vavant (or advanced ambulances) and the 
 reserve ambulances, the divisional ambulances, and 
 the army ambulances, were interchangeable. They 
 were intended to serve for all the purposes of attend- 
 ing to the wounded. They were used either as a 
 place of temporary relief for the wounded or took 
 on a quasi permanent character according to the 
 necessities of the case. When the advanced ambu- 
 lances in certain circumstances became stationary, 
 the reserve ambulances followed the army on the 
 march. It seemed in many respects an excellent 
 system, and certainly was very supple and ingenious, 
 for these ambulances became interchangeable; but 
 they possessed the inconvenience, to which I have 
 already alluded — that is to say, the proper sort 
 of attention could not be given to the important 
 cases. Hence the change that the Committee brought 
 about, whereby the grands blesses were transported 
 to the hospital at the rear, where the necessary skill 
 and the instruments required were at their dis- 
 posal. The present system works in this manner. 
 The battle takes place. The chief medical officer 
 fixes the spot in the rear where the formation ought 
 to be established. The formation establishes itself 
 Q
 
 226 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 there in a couple of hours with its motor-cars. An 
 hour after, it has pitched its first tent and is ready 
 to shelter the first wounded which come to it from 
 the ambulances, perhaps in the space of three or 
 four hours. Instruments sterilised in advance permit 
 the surgeons to commence to operate three hours 
 after having received their orders to establish the 
 hospital tent. Other tents can be established to the 
 number of five. A hundred wounded persons can 
 thus be taken care of and treated in the open country. 
 Reserve ambulances can be called upon in case of 
 need. As soon as operated upon, and out of immediate 
 danger, the wounded, in the majority of cases, can 
 be evacuated to permanent hospitals further back in 
 the rear. 
 
 In case of retreat, the formation, if warned in 
 time, falls back carrying with it if possible all the 
 wounded and follows the troops. These tent hospitals 
 carry with them the wherewithal to instal an operat- 
 ing theatre and a section d' hospitalisation, composed 
 of a hundred beds, five double-walled tents, and the 
 necessary doctors and male attendants. Of course 
 the problem of removing the wounded from these 
 tent hospitals at the Front is always a grave one. 
 When the war took on the character of a siege war, 
 a train acted as a sort of shuttle from the field ambu- 
 lances to the station where the " army zone " finished 
 and the " interior zone " began. The two were 
 generally seventy or eighty miles apart. Here the 
 wounded were carried to the other train, where the 
 cases were sorted out and sent to the distant base 
 hospitals. But, as I have said, the tendency was to 
 keep the slight cases as near as possible to the lines, 
 and send only to distant parts either medical cases —
 
 THE 'POILU'S' HOSPITAL 227 
 
 infectious diseases, and convalescents — or the more 
 serious surgical cases, which were entering upon a 
 secondary phase. 
 
 One of the most interesting aspects of the question 
 of the treatment and recovery of the wounded was 
 the utilisation of the mineral waters which exist 
 in such abundance in France, particularly in the 
 Pyrenees ; and all the well-known stations of this 
 delightful region were filled with soldiers recovering 
 from their wounds or illnesses incurred in the service 
 of the country. Magnificent results were obtained 
 also by the same means in '70. Strongly impreg- 
 nated sulphur waters gave then, as they have given 
 during this second war, most admirable results, 
 particularly in combating the infection of wounds 
 caused by fire-arms. It is not necessary to insist upon 
 the dreadful error of the theory that bullet wounds 
 were clean wounds. Before it was discovered that 
 the bullet infected the surrounding tissue much 
 harm had been done. The mineral waters were also 
 invaluable in the treatment of nervous affections 
 arising from wounds and rheumatism contracted in 
 the trenches. Some really remarkable recoveries 
 have been made in this glorious region irradiated 
 by the sun and full of pure air charged with the 
 balsamic odours of a pine-clad district. 
 
 Whilst, as I have said, there was rapid improve- 
 ment made in the various services, the defect inherent 
 in all administrations, English as well as French, but 
 perhaps more particularly French, subsisted. For 
 instance, M. Joseph Reinach, the well-known Deputy, 
 has inveighed especially against the abuse of red 
 tape in the hospitals. All sorts of dreadful formalities 
 were necessary to be fulfilled to obtain a lemon or
 
 228 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 a bottle of the simplest medicine. There had to be 
 a proper requisition made with several signatures 
 attached, and this entailed visits to different offices 
 situated in different parts of the building — a formid- 
 able waste of time. Some string and nails, value 
 1 fr. 25, appeared in somebody's report. Immediately 
 there was an imperious demand for details, which 
 were supplied, of course — though purely imaginary. 
 The precious document travelled during several weeks 
 from the bottom to the top of the administrative 
 ladder. Papers even pursue the unhappy doctor or 
 stretcher-bearer right into the trenches — though, of 
 course, every reasonable person would admit that 
 records must be kept. M. Reinach, who, furnished 
 with special powers of investigation, has carried his 
 inquiries into every part, points out that even if 
 the high administration decrees simplicity and the 
 different sub-departments apparently incline, they 
 continue their complicated practices just the same. 
 Says M. Reinach, and his words will serve to depict 
 the unhappy state of the public in this country as 
 well as in any other : " We believe we are governed 
 at one time by this party, at another by that. In 
 reality, we are governed by the departments in the 
 interests of a mysterious syndicate of paper merchants. 
 It will require a revolution more profound than that 
 of '89 to rid us of administrative routine." And it 
 must be remembered also — one feels authorised to 
 mention it since it is admitted by M. Reinach, as well 
 as by other thoughtful Frenchmen — that favouritism 
 and nepotism have made terrible ravages in this 
 direction as in so many others; but these abuses 
 have been corrected, we must hope, by the touchstone 
 of war.
 
 THE 'POILU'S' HOSPITAL 229 
 
 One of the most pleasing, and at the same time 
 touching, sides of the war is the heroism in the hospitals. 
 The majority of the patients belong to the class of 
 manual labourer, but they were as dignified, as calmly 
 Stoical, in their way as those who had larger oppor- 
 tunities for education. Though they had never read 
 Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, and were often just 
 simple labourers, they showed invariably a greatness 
 of soul. Women working in the hospitals have given 
 me pathetic instances of soldiers' gentleness and 
 resignation. They calmly watch the surgeon going 
 about his work probing in their own flesh. They look 
 on apparently unmoved, idly smoking a cigarette. 
 Heroic simple souls of France. They are always 
 joking, even before a most serious operation; one 
 cannot overcome their invincible courage and good 
 humour. Often it is touching enough. In the 
 Metropolitain of Paris I travelled with a man who 
 had lost his leg — one of the numerous army of the 
 mutilated. In conversation he had forgotten to alight 
 at a certain station. The train had already begun 
 to move from the platform, and, to the alarm of 
 those next to him, the poor fellow tried to jump out. 
 He was pulled back just in time. " J'ai oublie," he 
 said simply, looking reflectively at the empty trouser 
 leg. In the hospital it is easier, perhaps, to be 
 uncomplaining, to support with appearance of equa- 
 nimity the pain and suffering of the wounds ; it is 
 more difficult in the evacuation stations, where some- 
 times the wounded have to stay a night exposed to 
 all the discomfort of a provisional arrangement. 
 
 There are, too, pathetic instances of self-sacrifice. 
 The " poilu " (as I have said elsewhere in this book) is 
 a generous -hearted soul, very forgiving to his enemies,
 
 230 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 even when they have done him unspeakable hurt; 
 he will share food with the wounded Boche in the 
 next bed. He will send him his comforts. "Here," 
 he says to the nurse, "take this woollen waistcoat 
 and give it to that chap over there ; I have clothes 
 enough." The humanity of the French and their 
 intrinsic civilisation are revealed in the intimacy of 
 the hospitals which are tended by those admirable 
 women whose quiet and unadvertised devotion have 
 inspired the admiration of every beholder. 
 
 Another very charming feature is the care taken 
 of the permanently crippled. At Lyons, M. Herriot, 
 the mayor, worked hard in this direction, and es- 
 tablished schools where the mutilated could be 
 taught useful trades. M. Maurice Barres in Paris, 
 chiefly by making use of columns in the Echo de 
 Paris, worked for the same holy cause. One of the 
 prettiest things is to go into a French hospital and 
 see the semi-convalescents at work upon ingenious 
 and charming little objects wherein they show 
 their taste and inexhaustible ingenuity. They are 
 never at a loss, these sons of France : a cunningly 
 carved flower, an amusing caricature, a doll wath 
 articulated limbs, dainty little baskets — all these bear 
 witness to the inherent culture and good taste that 
 are theirs by right of birth, in virtue of having been 
 born on the fruitful soil of France. 
 
 I have spoken of the bravery of the soldier as he 
 lies under the surgeon's knife; but let us not forget 
 the signal heroism of the surgeons themselves, and 
 their staffs. They have given proof of a super- 
 human courage and self-forgetfulness, and surgeons 
 and doctors, stretcher-bearers and nurses, have 
 frequently figured in the Army Orders for their abso-
 
 THE 'POILU'S' HOSPITAL 231 
 
 lute devotion to duty. In many cases the enemy 
 granted no truce for the recovery of the wounded, 
 and it was necessary to seek them under a hail of 
 bullets and shell fire. Wounds were dressed on the 
 field of battle during the fight or in ambulances, 
 which the Red Cross flag did not always protect from 
 the bombardment of the Huns. In many cases it 
 was perfectly evident that the building was the 
 positive target of the enemy. The trained nurse, as 
 we understand her in England, hardly existed at the 
 outbreak of the war, but the women of the Red Cross 
 worked in the hospitals and made up for a lack of 
 professional training by a devotion without limits, 
 and a whole-hearted willingness to learn and adapt 
 themselves to the new conditions. It is true that 
 no amount of good-will can supply the want of pro- 
 fessional knowledge, but I have the testimony of 
 many doctors that the better-educated Frenchwoman 
 speedily acquired the essential part of hospital prac- 
 tice. The ladies who belonged to the various societies 
 under the Red Cross were unpaid, and had gained 
 their certificates after six-months' service in a hos- 
 pital. Three societies form the Red Cross organisation 
 in France : the Societe de la Croix Rouge, the Societe 
 de Secours aux Blesses, and Union des Femmes de 
 France. There is a religious basis to the French Red 
 Cross, and before the war, before every woman who 
 had leisure, rushed to offer her services to her be- 
 loved country, nursing in France was almost entirely 
 in the hands of the Sisters of Mercy. True, in late 
 years, in the course of the terrible struggle between 
 Church and State, many of these splendid women 
 had been driven from France, banished to carry their 
 beneficence and charity to foreign climes. But when
 
 232 JOFFRE AND HIS ARMY 
 
 the German hordes swept over the frontier, France 
 was invaded by another silent army, an army of 
 white-capped, calm-browed women, who with ex- 
 quisite serenity moved to the beds of sickness and 
 suffering. The nursing sisters returned to their 
 kingdom, and the Head of the State bowed to 
 receive them, for their heroism is matchless; they 
 blench at no risks, they falter at no fear of infection ; 
 with placid brow they look, undismayed, at the most 
 fearful sights, and the agonised patient, gazing into 
 their steadfast eyes, gains strength and courage from 
 the light of hope and faith that shines there. Never 
 again will the Orders be banished from France. 
 
 And the priests on the battle-field showed equal de- 
 votion. Those who were of military age fought in the 
 trenches side by side with the " poilu," and prejudice 
 rolled away with the smoke of gunfire. Some again 
 were stretcher-bearers, while those above fifty became 
 chaplains and celebrated Mass in little improvised 
 churches behind the lines. The soldier-priest gave a 
 singular example of Christian courage, an absolute 
 fearlessness which electrified the soldiers who were 
 fighting by his side. I was at Perpignan a few weeks 
 after a priest, who had lost an eye in the trenches, 
 was decorated with the Legion of Honour by the 
 General commanding the district. Truly the blood 
 of these servants of Christ, spilt on the battle-field 
 (and many have been killed), is the seed of the 
 Church, and from their self-sacrifice and heroism 
 will spring a harvest of love and charity, if not 
 actually a revival of religion in France. It is, per- 
 haps, too much to expect a general return to the 
 paths of practising Catholicism, but at least France, 
 having passed through the agony of blood and tears.
 
 THE 'POILU'S' HOSPITAL 233 
 
 will have forged a spirit of splendid tolerance; for, 
 as the greatest Healer and Physician came not to 
 bring peace but a sword, the lasting peace that 
 dwells in the heart of a nation is learnt from that 
 supreme teacher, that incomparable healer, the 
 sword.
 
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