. 
 
 SECOND PARTITION OF 
 
 POLAND 
 
 LORD
 
 HARVARD HISTORICAL STUDIES 
 
 PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF 
 THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
 
 FROM THE INCOME OF 
 
 THE HENRY WARREN TORREY FUND 
 VOLUME XXIII
 
 HARVARD HISTORICAL STUDIES 
 
 I. The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade 
 to the United States of America, 1638-1870. 
 By W. E. B. DuBois, Ph.D., Editor of 
 "The Crisis." 8vo. $1.50 net. 
 
 II. The Contest over the Ratification of the 
 Federal Constitution in Massachusetts. 
 By S. B. Harding, Ph.D., Professor of Euro- 
 pean History in Indiana University. 8vo. 
 
 $1.25 net. 
 
 III. A Critical Study of Nullification in South 
 Carolina. By D. F. Houston, A.M., LL.D., 
 Secretary of Agriculture. 8vo. $1.25 net. 
 
 IV. Nominations for Elective Office in the 
 United States. By Frederick W. Dallinger, 
 A.M., late Member of the Massachusetts 
 Senate. 8vo. $1.50 net. 
 
 V. A Bibliography of British Municipal His- 
 tory. Including Gilds and Parliamentary 
 Representation. By Charles Gross, Ph.D., 
 late Gurney Professor of History and Politi- 
 cal Science in Harvard University. 8vo. 
 
 $2.50 net. 
 
 VI. The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the 
 Northwest. By Theodore Clarke Smith, 
 Ph.D., Professor of History in Williams 
 College. 8vo. $1.75 net. 
 
 VII. The Provincial Governor in the English 
 Colonies of North America. By Evarts 
 Boutell Greene, Ph.D., Professor of History 
 in the University of Illinois. 8vo. 
 
 $1.50 net. 
 
 VIII. The County Palatine of Durham. A 
 Study in Constitutional History. By 
 G. T. Lapsley, Ph.D., Fellow of Trinity Col- 
 lege, Cambridge. 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 IX. The Anglican Episcopate and the Amer- 
 ican Colonies. By Arthur Lyon Cross, 
 Ph.D., Professor of European History in the 
 University of Michigan. 8vo. $2.50 net. 
 
 X. The Administration of the American Rev- 
 olutionary Army. By Louis Clinton Hatch, 
 Th.D. 8vo. $i.So net. 
 
 XL The Civil Service and the Patronage. 
 By Carl Russell Fish, Ph.D., Professor of 
 American History in the University of Wis- 
 consin. 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XII. The Development of Freedom of the 
 Press in Massachusetts. By C. A. Duni- 
 way, Ph.D., President of the University of 
 Wyoming. 8vo. $1.50 net. 
 
 XIII. The Seigniorial System in Canada. 
 By W. B. Munro, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor 
 of Municipal Government in Harvard Uni- 
 versity. 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XIV. The Frankpledge System. By William 
 Alfred Morris, Ph.D., Assistant Professor 
 of English History in the University of Cal- 
 ifornia. 8vo. $1.50 net. 
 
 XV. The Public Life of Joseph Dudley. By 
 Everett Kimball, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
 of History in Smith College. 8vo. 
 
 $2.00 net. 
 
 XVI. Memoire de Marie Caroline, Reine de 
 Naples. Edited by Robert Matteson 
 Johnston, A.M., Assistant Professor of 
 Modern History in Harvard University. 
 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XVII. The Barrington-Bernard Correspon- 
 dence. Edited by Edward Channing, 
 Ph.D., McLean Professor of Ancient and 
 Modern History in Harvard University. 
 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XVIII. The Government of the Ottoman 
 Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Mag- 
 nificent. By Albert Howe Lybyer, Ph.D., 
 Associate Professor of History in the Uni- 
 versity of Illinois. 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XLX. The Granger Movement. By S. J. 
 Buck, Assistant Professor of History in the 
 University of Minnesota. 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XX. Burgage Tenure in Mediaeval England. 
 By Morley de Wolf Hemmeon, Ph.D., some- 
 time Austin Teaching Fellow in Harvard 
 University. 8vo. $1.50 net. 
 
 XXI. An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs 
 contained in four folio volumes, transacted 
 in the colony of New York, from the year 
 1678 to the year 1751, by Peter Wraxall. 
 Edited with an introduction by Charles 
 Howard Mcllwain, Ph.D., Assistant Pro- 
 fessor of History in Harvard University. 
 8vo. $2.00 net. 
 
 XXII. English Field Systems. By Howard 
 Levi Gray, Ph.D., Professor of History in 
 Bryn Mawr College. 8vo. $2.75 net. 
 
 XXIII. The Second Partition of Poland. By 
 Robert Howard Lord, Ph.D., Instructor 
 in History in Harvard University. 8vo. 
 
 $2.25 net. 
 
 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION 
 OF POLAND 
 
 A STUDY IN 
 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
 
 BY 
 
 ROBERT HOWARD LORD, Ph.D. 
 
 INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 Oxford University Press 
 
 1915
 
 COPYRIGHT, ig IS 
 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
 
 Z^_3 4" UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 . ' , SANTA BARBARA COLLEGE LIBRARY 
 
 L Co 
 
 TO 
 
 MY FATHER
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The diplomatic history of the Second Partition of Poland has 
 never hitherto been made the subject of a monograph. It has by 
 no means escaped attention, but it has always been treated as a 
 matter of secondary or collateral interest: it has been adduced 
 to explain the policy of the great Powers during the Eastern and 
 Northern wars of 1787-92, or in connection with the formation 
 and collapse of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France, 
 or again as a chapter in the long struggle between Poland and 
 Russia; it has not been studied as a whole, by and for itself. 
 
 The serious investigation of the diplomatic questions con- 
 nected with the Second Partition began in the sixth decade of 
 the last century with Hausser's Deutsche Geschichte (1854-57), 
 Herrmann's Geschichte des russischen Staates (vol. vi, i860), Zin- 
 keisen's Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (vol. vi, 1859), and 
 Sybel's Geschichte der Revolutionszeit (1853 fL). The first three 
 of these works were based chiefly on the records of the Prussian 
 and Saxon archives and on private papers (particularly Diez's), 
 and, owing to the scantiness of their sources, they went very far 
 astray both in general conceptions and in matters of detail. 
 Greatly superior to all of them was Sybel's masterly work, espe- 
 cially in view of the corrections and additions made in the 
 successive editions through which it passed. In it most of the 
 questions that have since been debated were raised, and many 
 of them were practically settled. The '60s were rilled by a rather 
 acrimonious controversy between Herrmann and Sybel with re- 
 gard to the policy of Leopold II ; and a little later Sybel engaged 
 in lively polemics with Vivenot and Huffer about the falling-out 
 of Austria and Prussia over the Polish Question, and especially 
 about the character and policy of Thugut. Researches on all 
 these problems entered upon a new stage when towards 1870 the 
 Viennese archives were finally thrown open freely to scholars. In 
 the next twenty years investigations and publications of the
 
 Vlll PREFACE 
 
 Austrian sources followed thick and fast. The predominant 
 interest, however, was usually in the Revolutionary War; and 
 the Polish Question, which had previously been brought forward 
 chiefly in order to cover either Austria or Prussia with ignominy, 
 ceased to attract much attention from German historians when 
 the political rivalry between Berlin and Vienna came to an end. 
 Of late years controversy in this field has centered chiefly about 
 the period of the Oriental crisis, and especially about the policy 
 of Hertzberg, although a few recent monographs (Schrepfer's and 
 Heidrich's, for instance), would seem to indicate a revival of 
 interest in the early Revolutionary period. 
 
 In Russia, the first important work on subjects connected with 
 the Second Partition was Blum's biography of Sievers (1853). 
 Some years later Smitt's Suworow (1858) and Solov'ev's History 
 of the Downfall of Poland (the Russian edition in 1863, the Ger- 
 man in 1865) gave the first accounts based on the documents of 
 the Russian archives, and brought to light a multitude of in- 
 valuable facts. Since the appearance of Kostomarov's Last Years 
 of the Polish Republic and Ilova'iski's Diet of Grodno (both in 
 Russian) in 1870, Russian historical writing on this subject has 
 virtually come to a standstill, although the publication of sources 
 in Russia has continued uninterruptedly — and on a scale seldom 
 paralleled. 
 
 For Polish historians the period of the downfall of the Republic 
 has always had an intense, if painful, fascination. If the older 
 writers (Lelewel, Schmitt, Bobrzynski, e. g.) intent chiefly upon 
 explaining the catastrophe according to the a priori ideas of the 
 ' monarchist ' or the ' republican ' school, had contented them- 
 selves with a very inadequate knowledge of facts, Korzon's 
 elaborately documented and admirably scientific Internal History 
 of Poland in the Reign of Stanislas Augustus (1887) gave for the 
 first time a secure basis for judging the moral, economic, and 
 political forces of the nation in that crucial period. While Polish 
 scholars have busied themselves preeminently with the study of 
 domestic conditions, Kalinka, Dembinski, and Askenazy have 
 also made important contributions to the diplomatic history of 
 that age by extensive investigations in foreign archives.
 
 PREFACE IX 
 
 At present the literature relating to the Polish crisis of 1788-93 
 and to the Second Partition is immense. 
 
 Of the various collections of printed sources, one of the most 
 important is Vivenot's Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiser- 
 politik Oesterreichs, which, for the period from January, 1790 
 to April, 1793, contains many letters of the Austrian sovereigns; 
 practically all the extant protocols of the Staatsconjerenz; and 
 the more important ministerial reports (Vortrdge), dispatches to 
 the Austrian envoys, and reports of diplomats on special missions 
 (notably Spielmann's from Reichenbach and Luxemburg). Vive- 
 not's work has two considerable defects: he refused to print the 
 reports of the Austrian envoys, except in very rare cases; and he 
 gave to the affairs of the Holy Empire a quite disproportionate 
 amount of space — to the detriment of our knowledge of Austrian 
 policy in the Polish Question. Zeissberg, who continued Vivenot's 
 enterprise, has avoided both these faults, and his publication 
 leaves little to be desired in the matter of completeness. 
 
 Only second in importance to the Vivenot-Zeissberg compila- 
 tion are the numerous collections of letters of the Austrian mon- 
 archy and ministers of this period, published by Arneth, Beer, 
 Vivenot, B runner, and Schlitter. Austrian history can boast of 
 nothing in the way of memoirs, except for the somewhat dry 
 reminiscences of Philip Cobenzl and the very amusing ones of 
 the Prince de Ligne. 
 
 A publication of much importance for the policy of the North- 
 ern Courts is the supplementary volume of Herrmann's Geschichte 
 des russischen Staates, which contains a mass of excerpts from the 
 Prussian, Saxon, and English state papers bearing particularly 
 upon the Polish Question. It is a contribution for which one 
 must be grateful; but it is far from affording sufficient evidence 
 on most questions, and the choice of documents in many cases 
 seems arbitrary or even misleading. Fragments from the Prussian 
 archives are also found scattered in Ranke's and Sybel's works, 
 and in Dembinski's first volume to which reference will be made 
 below. The list of Prussian memoirs of interest for this period 
 is also very short: Massenbach's and SchliefTen's are the chief 
 ones that come into account, and, apart from a few valuable
 
 X PREFACE 
 
 letters, neither offers much that is important, and neither is 
 thoroughly reliable. 
 
 The first volume of Professor Dembinski's Documents relatifs 
 a Vhistoire du deuxieme et troisieme partage de la Pologne deals 
 with the period from 1788 to May 3, 1791, and contains chiefly: 
 (1) the correspondence of the Vice-Chancellor Ostermann with 
 the Russian ministers at Berlin and Vienna; (2) the correspon- 
 dence of the Prussian government with its envoys at St. Peters- 
 burg; (3) the private correspondence between Hertzberg and 
 Lucchesini. This is a contribution of the first importance, and 
 the continuation of this work will be awaited with eagerness. 
 
 Among the mass of sources printed in Russia the most notable 
 are: the correspondence and other papers of Catherine II pub- 
 lished in the C6ophhki> HimepaTopcKaro PyccKaro HcTopn^ecKaro C^mecTBa, 
 the PyccKaa Orapiraa and the Pyccirift ApxHBv, various papers and 
 letters of Potemkin in the periodical last mentioned; the invalu- 
 able correspondence of the brothers Vorontsov with Bezborodko, 
 Markov, Zavadovski, and others in the ApxHBt Kna3a BopomjoBa; 
 the papers of the Razumovski family published by Wassiltchikow; 
 and the protocols of the Council of the Empire in the ApsHBt 
 rocyjjapcTBeHHaro CoBiia. Martens' collection, the Traites de la Rus- 
 sie, adduces here and there a document, and meagre as it was, 
 being in French, it long remained one of the standard source-books 
 for the Russian policy of this time. The memoirs of Engelhardt, 
 Derzavin, and Langeron contain some interesting information, 
 especially with regard to the career of Potemkin; and one cannot 
 pass over in silence Khrapovitski's diary, which furnishes a 
 detailed chronicle of Catherine's doings and sayings in the years 
 1787 to 1789, but becomes somewhat scanty after the latter 
 date. It contains one story that has been conscientiously retold 
 by everyone who has written on the Empress' policy towards 
 Poland. 
 
 Of sources relating exclusively to Polish affairs, the most im- 
 portant are: the Domestic Correspondence of Stanislas Augustus, 
 published by Zaleski (i. e., correspondence with Poles pertaining 
 to the domestic affairs of the country); the documents printed 
 by Kalinka in the second volume of his Last Years of the Reign
 
 PREFACE XI 
 
 of Stanislas Augustus (the correspondence of the King with 
 Catherine, with Bukaty and Kicinski; the diary of Bulgakov, 
 the Russian envoy at Warsaw 1791-92); the curious and not 
 altogether trustworthy book called The Establishment and Over- 
 throw of the Polish Constitution of the Third of May, which con- 
 tains the apologia of the reforming party; and the memoirs of 
 Czartoryski, Oginski, Kozmian and others. 
 
 Of the secondary works that come into account here, Hausser's 
 and Herrmann's are for the most part antiquated, in so far as 
 the Polish Question is concerned. Sybel has the great merit of 
 having first shown the close connection and mutual interaction 
 between the French and the Polish crises, and of having first 
 defined the essential scope and character of the revolutionary 
 policy of Catherine II and the pacific and conservative policy of 
 Leopold. As was to be expected, however, in the case of one who 
 was breaking so much new ground, he fell into numerous errors in 
 matters of detail; he left many questions unexplored; he held 
 obstinately to various untenable views, even after it had been 
 clearly proved that he was in the wrong; and his pronounced 
 Prussian bias too frequently led him to pervert and distort facts 
 in a truly exasperating fashion. Of recent general works, Heigel's 
 Deutsche Geschichte is, perhaps, the most notable. It shows a sort 
 of reversion to Herrmann's point of view in its appreciation of 
 Leopold's attitude towards Poland. Heigel has, I think, placed 
 too much faith in the agreeable things that the Austrians saw 
 fit to tell the Prussian envoys. 
 
 Among works relating specially to Austria, Beer's study of 
 Leopold's Polish policy (in the volume Leopold II, Franz II und 
 Catherina. Ihr Briefwechsel) is the best account of this subject, 
 but, confined as it was to the narrow dimensions of an introduc- 
 tory essay, it was not by any means exhaustive nor altogether 
 accurate. There are no monographs on the era of Spielmann 
 and Cobenzl; and Thugut's storm-encircled figure still awaits a 
 proper biography. 
 
 Prussian policy has received much more attention. The period 
 from 1787 to 1790 has been minutely studied by Duncker, 
 Bailleu, Luckwaldt, Andreae, and the brothers Paul and F. C.
 
 Xii PREFACE 
 
 Wittichen. The events that led up to the Convention of Reichen- 
 bach have been exhaustively investigated — as far as Prussian 
 policy is concerned — by Sybel, Ranke, and Ritter. The Prus- 
 sian-Polish alliance of 1790 has lately found a brilliant historian 
 in Professor Askenazy of Cracow. The policy of Prussia towards 
 Austria, Poland, and France in 1792 is a subject on which the 
 conventional account (Sybel's) has long needed revision. This 
 want has been admirably met by Heidrich's recent book, Preussen 
 im Kampfe gegen die franzosische Revolution. By a more thorough 
 exploration of the Prussian archives than had yet been made, and 
 especially by the use of the rich collection of Lucchesini's papers 
 (secured by the Berlin Archive some years after Sybel's last 
 edition appeared), he has reached many new conclusions, and 
 above all has brought out clearly the essentially aggressive char- 
 acter of Frederick William's policy in that momentous year. I 
 had already reached views quite similar to his when Heidrich's 
 book appeared; and, apart from a number of questions of detail, 
 I have few objections to raise with him. 
 
 For Poland Kalinka's great work on the Four Years' Diet 
 (down to the Third of May) retains a considerable importance, 
 although his too pessimistic view of internal conditions has been 
 largely refuted by Korzon, and his fundamental ideas about 
 foreign policy have been sharply contested by Askenazy. Kal- 
 inka's magnum opus has found a not unworthy continuation in 
 Smolensky's Last Year of the Great Diet, which is written, how- 
 ever, from a very different point of view. Smolenski's Con- 
 federation of Targowica is distinctly inferior to his earlier work; 
 for instance, it leaves the origins of that unhappy movement 
 almost untouched. 
 
 Solov'ev's chapters on the events that led up to the Second 
 Partition are rich in documentary materials, but for several 
 reasons they leave very much to be desired. The author wrote 
 with too strong a nationalist bias (intelligible, perhaps, in a book 
 published in 1863); he was not always critically minded; he 
 knew little about the Austrian and Prussian side of the case; and 
 he often passed over things of the greatest importance with a 
 few vague sentences. Kostomarov concentrated his attention on
 
 PREFACE xill 
 
 the internal affairs of Poland, and — through a sublime faith in 
 the veracity of Stackelberg's and Bulgakov's dispatches — pre- 
 sented a picture of unrelieved blackness. He dismissed the Parti- 
 tion Treaty with a sentence, and hurried with quite exasperating 
 haste through all the negotiations of Russia with the German 
 Powers. It is interesting to find him asserting that Catherine 
 aimed at a partition from the beginning of her action in Poland 
 in 1792; but he was as little able to offer proof of this as was 
 Solov'ev to establish the contrary. 
 
 In general, the mass of secondary works dealing with the 
 Polish crisis of 1 788-93 and the Second Partition seemed to have 
 the following defects. 
 
 There remained not a few gaps in our knowledge, especially in 
 regard to the policy of Russia and the origin and development of 
 the Austro-Prussian 'indemnity' plan. The period bristled with 
 controverted questions: one has only to recall the widely-diver- 
 gent or downright contradictory views of Sybel and Vivenot re- 
 garding the merits of the dispute between the two German 
 Powers; of Kalinka and Askenazy regarding the Prusso-Polish 
 alliance; of Solov'ev and Kostomarov regarding the aims of 
 Catherine II. It was also to be noted that, with very rare excep- 
 tions, the German historians who had dealt with this period, had 
 been unable to use works in the Slavic languages, and Solov'ev, 
 Vasil'cikov (Wassiltchikow), and Kalinka were the only im- 
 portant writers in Russian and Polish whose books had been 
 translated into Western tongues. The greatest part of the rich 
 publications in Russian and Polish had thus remained inacces- 
 sible to most Western scholars. On the other hand, Solov'ev and 
 Kostomarov were little acquainted with the German investiga- 
 tions in this field. It seemed necessary, therefore, to collate the 
 materials and the results that were to be obtained from both 
 sides. Furthermore, it appeared that while the Prussian official 
 documents had been very thoroughly studied, the Austrian and 
 still more the Russian archives deserved further exploration. 
 
 Above all, there was need of a synthetic presentation of the 
 whole course of events that led up to the Second Partition. 
 Although the Polish crisis of 1788-93 has the same sort of unity
 
 XIV PREFACE 
 
 as that of 1763-75, no one had attempted to treat the former as 
 a whole, in the way that Beer and Sorel have treated the latter. 
 And yet the Second Partition cannot be properly understood 
 when treated as a mere casual episode in the history of the 
 Revolutionary War, or simply as the result of a political ' deal ' 
 arranged between the great Powers in 1792. In order to under- 
 stand it, one must follow the whole course of that brave venture 
 to regain national independence which was undertaken by the 
 Four Years' Diet in 1788; one must also study the fundamental 
 aims and ambitions, to which, in spite of many apparent changes 
 of ' system,' each of the neighboring Powers adhered tenaciously 
 throughout this crisis; and finally, one must trace the interaction 
 of these discordant ambitions through the astonishing vicissitudes 
 of five years of very complicated European politics. Hence it 
 appeared that what the existing literature dealing with the 
 Second Partition especially lacked was a comprehensive survey 
 of the development of the Polish Question from the time when 
 that question was re-opened in 1788 by the bold initiative of the 
 Great Diet down to the drastic resettlement of 1793, by which 
 the Poles were punished for their attempt to recover their inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 To present such a comprehensive survey is the primary aim 
 of the present volume. I have attempted to follow with equal 
 attention the policy of each of the three great neighbors of the 
 Republic, as well as the course of affairs in Poland and such 
 events in the broader theatre of European politics as worked 
 back upon the Polish Question. I have attempted to utilize more 
 fully than has often been done in the past the results gained not 
 only by German and Austrian, but also by Russian and Polish 
 scholarship. For the most part, however, the present work is 
 based on the results of two years of researches in the Austrian, 
 Prussian, and Russian archives, researches which, if not exhaus- 
 tive, may, perhaps, fairly be termed more extensive than had 
 hitherto been made. 
 
 In the K. u. K. Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv at Vienna I had 
 the opportunity to use:
 
 PREFACE XV 
 
 (i ) the correspondence (Expeditionen and Berichte) of the Austrian govern- 
 ment with its envoys at St. Petersburg (1788-93), Warsaw (1790-93), 
 Berlin (1790-93), London (1792-93), Dresden (1791-92), and Munich 
 (1792-93); 
 
 (2) the Vortrdge (reports of the State Chancellery to the monarch and 
 protocols of the Staatsconferenz) for the years 1790-93; 
 
 (3) Spielmann's reports from his missions to Reichenbach and to the 
 Prussian army headquarters in 1792; 
 
 (4) the correspondence relating to Landriani's mission to Dresden, 1791- 
 92; 
 
 (5) the private correspondence between Philip and Louis Cobenzl; be- 
 tween Kaunitz, Philip Cobenzl, and Spielmann; between Thugut 
 and Colloredo-Wallsee; 
 
 (6) the (unprinted) diary of Count Karl Zinzendorf. 
 
 In the Kgl. Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv at Berlin I made 
 use of: 
 
 (1) the correspondence of the Prussian government with its envoys at 
 St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Warsaw for the years 1792-93, and, in 
 the case of the Warsaw legation, also the acts for the period July, 
 1788-October, 1789; 
 
 (2) the correspondence of the King and Hertzberg with various Polish 
 magnates, 1788-89; 
 
 (3) the acts relating to Bischoffwerder's three missions to Vienna in 
 1791-92; 
 
 (4) the reports of the cabinet ministry to the King, 1792-93; 
 
 (5) the correspondence of Lucchesini with the cabinet ministry, Bischoff- 
 werder, Schulenburg, Alvensleben, Haugwitz, Manstein, Jacobi, and 
 Caesar; 
 
 (6) the correspondence of Schulenburg with Haugwitz and the Duke of 
 Brunswick. 
 
 In the Petrograd Archives of the Empire and of the Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs (rocy^apcTBeHHHH h neTporpa^cKiii ApxiiBH MannciepcTBa 
 nnocTpaiiHHXT. ^ixb) , I had the privilege of using : 
 
 (1) a mass of papers of the Empress Catherine II — notes, fragments 
 and comments — , her letters to Potemkin, P. A. Zubov, Bezborodko, 
 Ostermann, and Stackelberg (Rep. V and X) ; 
 
 (2) the papers of Potemkin, preserved in Rep. XI, 950; 
 
 (3) the correspondence of A. K. Razumovski with Markov; and various 
 minor series of documents. 
 
 In the Imperial Public Library at St. Petersburg, I had the 
 opportunity to go through the papers of the " Archives of V. S. 
 Popov", which contain a large number of letters and notes from
 
 XVI PREFACE 
 
 Bezborodko to Potemkin and Popov, and also the reports sent 
 by Potemkin's and Popov's correspondents at Warsaw from 1790 
 to July, 1792. 
 
 In the Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 (MocKOBciriii ApxHBi, MnHHCTepcTBa HHocTpaHHHX'b Jfix-b) I made use of : 
 
 (1) the correspondence of the Russian government with its envoys at 
 Vienna and Berlin, 1791-93, and Warsaw, 1791-92 (as also the 
 rescripts to Sievers for 1793); 
 
 (2) the mass of correspondence relating to the Confederation of Targowica 
 (Ceoraema cb IIojrLDieK), 1791-93, IX, 1-4), which contains especially 
 the correspondence of Buhler with the Empress, Zubov, and Oster- 
 mann, and that of F. Potocki, Rzewuski, and Branicki with the 
 Empress, Potemkin, and Zubov; 
 
 (3) Bezborodko's reports from Jassy, 1791-92 (CHomema ci TypnieK), 1792, 
 IX, 60) ; and some less important collections of papers. 
 
 Finally, I had the opportunity of using the correspondence of 
 Piattoli with Mostowski at Dresden, 1791-92, preserved in the 
 Archives of Count Zamojski-Ordynat at Warsaw; and the corre- 
 spondence of Ankwicz, the Polish envoy at Copenhagen, with his 
 government and with other Polish envoys abroad, 1791-92, from 
 the Ossoliriski Museum at Lemberg (MSS. 516). 
 
 From these studies in the archives, I have reached a number 
 of conclusions with regard not only to questions of detail but to 
 more fundamental problems, which differ from the views hitherto 
 generally accepted. The effort is made in the following pages 
 to show that the Second Partition was not a measure forced upon 
 Catherine II against her will by the importunities of Prussia, but 
 rather the consummation of the Empress' secret plans and am- 
 bitions. I have endeavored to bring out more clearly than has 
 yet been done by any writer except Heidrich the aggressive and 
 acquisitive character of Prussian policy, especially with regard 
 to the intervention in France. I have tried to correct Sybel's 
 exaggerated account of Leopold II's efforts on behalf of Poland, 
 while showing, on the other hand, that the Emperor's advocacy 
 of the new constitution was far more earnest and active than 
 Herrmann, Heigel, or Beer admit. In reviewing the long litiga- 
 tion between Austria and Prussia over the indemnity question, 
 I have advanced the view that Austria was in the right far more
 
 PREFACE Xvii 
 
 frequently than German historiography, dominated by the 
 writers of the ' Prussian school,' has generally been willing to 
 concede. Finally, the previous accounts of the origin and devel- 
 opment of the Polish-Bavarian indemnity plan and of the evo- 
 lution of Russian policy in the Polish Question are considerably 
 supplemented by new materials in the present volume. 
 
 This book was originally prepared in partial fulfilment of 
 the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
 Harvard University. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness 
 to the officials of the several archives in which it has been my 
 privilege to work; and to the numerous friends at home and 
 abroad from whom I have received advice and assistance, 
 especially to M. Serge Goria'inov, Director of the Imperial 
 Archives in Petrograd, Herr Geheimer Archivrat Dr. Paul 
 Bailleu in Berlin, M. Tadeusz Korzon in Warsaw, and Professor 
 Dembinski of Lemberg. I am under many obligations to Mr. 
 G. W. Robinson of Harvard University for assistance in the 
 preparation of the manuscript. Above all, I am indebted to 
 Professor A. C. Coolidge, at whose suggestion this study was 
 first undertaken, and to whose continued encouragement, advice, 
 and criticism I owe more than I can say. 
 
 R. H. L. 
 
 Cambridge, Mass. 
 September, 1915.
 
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 B. A Kgl. Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin. 
 
 M. A Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 P. A Petrograd Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 V. A K. u. K. Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. 
 
 F. B. P. G Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Ge- 
 
 schichte. 
 
 F. R. A Fontes rerum austriacarum. 
 
 F. z. D. G Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte. 
 
 H. Vjschr Historische Vierteljahrschrif t. 
 
 H. Z Historische Zeitschrif t. 
 
 R. H Revue Historique. 
 
 R. I. A Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et ministres 
 
 de France. (See Bibliography.) 
 Vivenot Vivenot, Alfred von, Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen 
 
 Kaiser politik Oesterreicks wdhrend der franzosischen Revo- 
 
 lutionskriege. (See Bibliography.) 
 
 Apx. Bop ApxHBt KHfl3a BopoHnosa. (See Bibliography.) 
 
 Apx. Toe. Cob. . . ApxHBi Tocy^apcTBeHHaro CoBiTa. (See Bibliography.) 
 
 Pyc. Apx Pyccidii ApxHBt. 
 
 Pyc. dap PyccKaa Grappa. 
 
 C6opHHK/i. C6opHHKt HMnepaTopcKaro PyccKaro HcropmecKaro 06mecTBa.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 I. The Polish Question. — General character and phases through 
 which it has passed. Its historical importance. 
 
 II. Causes of the Decline of Poland. — Decline primarily due to 
 political causes — to the unfortunate historic evolution of the Polish 
 constitution. The Stdndestaat. Analogies to, and differences from, the 
 constitutional development of other countries. The conquest of the 
 supreme power by the szlachta: their triumph over the Crown and over 
 the other classes of society. Their failure to organize their power properly. 
 Strength of the decentralizing tendencies. Impotence of the Diet as 
 against the Dietines. Imperative mandates. The Liberum Veto. Con- 
 federations. Unparalleled freedom and privileges of the szlachta. Ide- 
 ology of the szlachta-state. Arrested development and a century of 
 stagnation. 
 
 III. Poland in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century. — Area 
 and population. Lack of national and religious unity. Condition of the 
 peasantry, the towns, the magnates, and the poorer szlachta. Dis- 
 organization and paralysis of the government. Military impotence. 
 Summary of the results of ' golden liberty.' 
 
 IV. The Development of the Polish Question as an Interna- 
 tional Problem. — History of Poland's international relations from 
 the First Great Northern War to the accession of Catherine II. Policy 
 of France towards Poland; of Austria; of Prussia; of Russia. 
 
 V. The First Partition. — Catherine II, character and aims. Stanis- 
 las Poniatowski raised to the throne. His character. Troubles pre- 
 cipitated by Catherine's aggressive policy. An international crisis 
 terminated by a partition. This transaction not a triumph of Prussia 
 over Russia. Results of the First Partition. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 The State of Poland after the First Partition. The 
 
 Beginning of National Revival 56 
 
 I. Political Conditions. — General character of the period. The 
 Russian rule. The Permanent Council. Financial reforms. The Edu- 
 cation Commission. Inadequacy of the political reforms of this period. 
 
 II. Signs of National Revival. — Marked economic progress. In- 
 tellectual awakening. 
 
 III. The Reform Movement. — Growth of reforming ideas. Moral 
 condition of Polish society. Confused and perplexing character of a 
 period of transition.
 
 XX CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 The Austro-Russian Alliance and the Outbreak of the 
 
 Russo-Turkish War 64 
 
 I. The Policy of the Neighboring Powers towards Poland after 
 the FrRST Partition. — Catherine provisionally committed to the 
 status quo. Unsatisfied ambitions of Prussia. Austria averse to further 
 partitions. Precarious situation of the Republic. 
 
 II. Relations of the Three Eastern Powers with One Another. — 
 War of the Bavarian Succession. Potemkin's hints to Prussia about a 
 new partition. Formation of the Austro-Russian alliance. Projects of 
 the Imperial Courts with respect to Turkey, Prussia, Poland. Idea of 
 an Austro-Prussian rapprochement. 
 
 III. Outbreak of the Oriental War. — Trip of the Empress to the 
 Crimea. The Turks declare war. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 The Designs of Prussia 75 
 
 I. The Hertzberg Plan. — The problem before Prussia. Hertzberg's 
 ' universal panacea.' His diplomatic campaign, and the formation of 
 the Triple Alliance. 
 
 II. Counter Measures of the Imperial Courts. — Alarm at 
 Vienna. The Russian declaration to Austria guaranteeing the integrity 
 of Poland. Further projects for thwarting the ambitions of Prussia. 
 
 CHAPTER TV 
 
 The Plan for a Russo-Polish Alliance 82 
 
 I. Stanislas' Plan for an Alliance with Russia. — Aims and 
 policy of the King of Poland. His proposals to Catherine in 1787. 
 Offers of the magnates to her. 
 
 II. The Secret Designs of Potemkxn. — Position and aims of the 
 Tauric Prince. The ' Kingdom of Dacia.' Intrigues with the Polish 
 magnates. Scheme for a Cossack and peasant uprising in the Ukraine. 
 ni. Catherine's Plans for the Alliance. — The Empress' atti- 
 tude towards the King and Potemkin. Her draft for the treaty of 
 alliance. Disillusionment and humble submission of the King. 
 
 IV. The Collapse of the Plan before the Opposition of Prus- 
 sia. — Explosion of indignation at Berlin. Revolution in Prussian 
 policy. The Empress withdraws the project, but Prussia is not ap- 
 peased.
 
 CONTENTS XXI 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The Overthrow of Russian Rule in Poland 92 
 
 I. Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great Diet. — The impres- 
 sion produced by the Oriental war in Poland. The King's program, 
 and that of the ' Patriots.' 
 
 II. The Diet Effects a Revolution. — The meeting of the Four 
 Years' Diet. Parties. The Prussian declaration. Triumph of the 
 Patriotic and anti-Russian party. Overthrow of every external sign of 
 Russian control. 
 
 III. Attitude of Prussia towards the Revolution at Warsaw. — 
 Tortuous and uncertain character of Prussian policy. Original aim of 
 the Prussian intervention in Poland. Desire to provoke a Counter- 
 confederation. Attempts to get the Diet dissolved. Embarrassment 
 produced at Berlin by the victory of the ' Prussian party ' at Warsaw. 
 
 IV. Attitude of the Imperial Courts. — Austria counsels prudence 
 and moderation at St. Petersburg. Catherine's wrath against Prussia. 
 Decision to postpone her revenge. Potemkin's visit to the capital. 
 Talk of a new partition of Poland. The danger averted. 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Prusso-Polish Alliance 112 
 
 I. General Reflections on this Alliance. 
 
 II. Origin of the Project. — Desire of the Polish ' Patriots ' for an 
 alliance with England and Prussia. Proposals sent to Berlin in July, 
 1789. Crisis in the general policy of Prussia. Hertzberg counsels im- 
 mediate action. The King decides for a great offensive enterprise in 
 the following year. The Prusso-Turkish alliance. 
 
 III. Realization of the Project. — The alliance agreed upon. 
 Stanislas' efforts to prevent it. Hertzberg's demand for Dantzic and 
 Thorn. Consternation at Warsaw. The demand withdrawn. Conclu- 
 sion of the alliance. Its aim and significance. 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 Reichenbach 128 
 
 I. Leopold II. — His accession; character and aims. Overtures to 
 Prussia. Pitt's proposal of the status quo mite as the basis for a general 
 pacification. Frederick William persuaded to enter into negotiations. 
 
 II. The Austro-Prussian Negotiation. — Exchange of letters and 
 memorials. Dilatory tactics of both sides.
 
 XXli CONTENTS 
 
 III. Austrian Appeals to Russia. — Kaunitz's demands at St. 
 Petersburg. The Empress and Potemkin absorbed in other affairs. 
 Potemkin's plan for the seizure of the Ukraine. Austria abandons 
 hope of aid from Russia. Decision to treat with Prussia. 
 
 TV. The Convention of Reichenbach. — The respective situations 
 of Austria and Prussia on the eve of the congress. The negotiation 
 between Hertzberg and Spielmann. Frederick William's abrupt change 
 of front. Leopold accepts the strict status quo principle. Signature of 
 the Convention. 
 
 V. Results. — Significance of the denouement at Reichenbach for 
 Austria; for Prussia; for Poland. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Catherina Constans Invicta 153 
 
 I. The Problem of Imposing the Status Quo upon Russia. — 
 Catherine's terms for her peace with the Turks. Her animosity against 
 " the new dictators of Europe." Rude repulse administered to the 
 dictators. Diplomacy exhausted. 
 
 II. Deliberations at Berlin and London. — Double and triple- 
 faced policy of Prussia. Frederick William's overtures to Austria for 
 a reconciliation and joint action against the French Revolution. His 
 overtures to Russia. Reluctance of the Prussians to go to war over 
 the question of Oczakow. Pitt's ' Federative System.' His plans with 
 regard to Poland. Under Ewart's influence, he decides to coerce Russia. 
 Preliminary reconnoissance. 
 
 III. Diplomatic Battles. — Efforts of both sides to win allies. Atti- 
 tude of the Bourbon Courts, Denmark, Sweden. Zeal of the Poles for 
 a war with Russia; dampened by the equivocal attitude of Prussia. 
 Pitt's intervention at Warsaw. The Dantzic question. Attitude of 
 Austria. Bischoffwerder's first mission to Vienna. 
 
 IV. The Crisis. — England and Prussia decide upon the most vigor- 
 ous measures. Catherine's firmness put to the supreme test. Potem- 
 kin at St. Petersburg: leads the Empress into one false step towards 
 Prussia; again advocates a partition of Poland. Catherine's prepara- 
 tions to resist all her enemies. 
 
 V. The Backdown of the Triple Alliance. — Attitude of the 
 British public towards Russia and the Eastern Question. Storm of 
 opposition to Pitt's policy in Parliament and in the country. Pitt's 
 decision to abandon the principle of the strict status quo. Prussia joins 
 in the retreat. Fawkener's mission to St. Petersburg. Complete 
 triumph of the Empress. This outcome unfortunate for Poland.
 
 CONTENTS XXlll 
 
 CHAPTER EX 
 
 The Revolution of the Third of May and the Formation 
 of the Austro-Prussian Alliance 192 
 
 I. The Third of May. — Delays and difficulties in the way of consti- 
 tutional reform in Poland. Question of the hereditary succession. 
 The ' conspiracy ' of the King and the ' Patriot ' leaders. The events 
 of May 3, 1 791 at Warsaw. Analysis of the new constitution. Its 
 significance. 
 
 II. Attitude of the Neighboring Powers. — Frederick William, 
 against the advice of his ministers, expresses warm approval of the new 
 constitution. Leopold and Kaunitz not informed in advance of the 
 plans of the Polish reformers. They welcome the revolution at Warsaw; 
 and endeavor to persuade Russia to acquiesce in it. 
 
 III. The Vienna Convention of July 25, 1791. — Leopold II and 
 Lord Elgin. Bischoffwerder's second mission to the Emperor. The 
 crisis in French affairs induces Leopold to accept the Prussian alliance. 
 The conclusion of the preliminary Convention. Indignation of the 
 Prussian ministers. The end of the Oriental crisis. Its results. 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 The Development of the French and Polish Questions 
 to the Death of Leopold II 217 
 
 I. Austria's First Proposals for a General Concert on French 
 Affairs. — The Circular of Padua. Responses of the Powers. The 
 interview at Pillnitz. Temporary lull in French affairs. 
 
 II. Leopold's Effort in Behalf of Poland. — Critical state of the 
 Polish Question. The Austrian program of November. Proposals to 
 Prussia. Supreme effort to induce Russia to agree to the new Polish 
 constitution. Landriani's mission to Dresden. 
 
 III. Discussions between Austria and Prussia. — Renewal of the 
 French crisis. Austria driven to resume the plan for a concert and to 
 seek a thorough understanding with Prussia. Frederick William's ag- 
 gressive policy towards France. Territorial aggrandizement its essen- 
 tial aim. The question of ' indemnities.' His altered attitude towards 
 Poland; and rapprochement with Russia. Austria forced to concessions 
 in the Polish Question. Conclusion of the Austro-Prussian alliance 
 treaty. 
 
 IV. Further Aggravation of the Crisis. — Goltz discovers a great 
 secret at St. Petersburg. First signs of Prussia's desire to take the in- 
 demnities for an intervention in France at the expense of Poland. Bis- 
 choffwerder's third mission to Vienna. Death of Leopold II. His politi- 
 cal system already crumbling. His popularity in Poland.
 
 XXIV CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 The Outbreak of War in East and West 243 
 
 I. Russian Designs against Poland. — Catherine's attitude towards 
 Poland since 1788. Potemkin's schemes. Two rescripts to him. His 
 death. 
 
 II. Development of the Empress' Plans. — Catherine's anger 
 against Austria. The Polish malcontents at Jassy. Bezborodko recom- 
 mends an understanding with Prussia. First overtures of Russia to the 
 German Powers regarding the overthrow of the new Polish constitution. 
 
 III. " The Death-Sentence of Poland." — Francis II and his 
 advisers. Austria's last effort to save the Polish constitution. Fred- 
 erick William decides in favor of a new partition. He waits for Russia 
 to make the first proposal. 
 
 IV. The Origins of the Polish-Bavarian Project. — Spielmann 
 despairs of saving Poland; and is tempted to revive the project for the 
 Bavarian Exchange. Significant ' conversations ' between the diplo- 
 mats at Vienna. Spielmann's first overtures to Prussia regarding a new 
 partition. Kaunitz still clings to the policy of Leopold II. 
 
 V. The German Powers and the Intervention in France. — 
 Austria's rights to the support of Prussia. Frederick William's concep- 
 tion of the nature of his participation in the war. Lack of a definite and 
 binding agreement on this subject; or with respect to the indemnities. 
 
 VI. The Russian Intervention in Poland. — The Polish mal- 
 contents at St. Petersburg. Formation of the Confederation of Tar- 
 gowica. Catherine's final military and diplomatic preparations. Her 
 attitude towards the question of a new partition. The two ' counter- 
 revolutions ' in France and Poland. Their interaction upon one another. 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 The Russian Reconquest of Poland 283 
 
 I. Polish Preparations for Resistance. — State of Poland on the 
 eve of the Russian attack. Energetic but belated measures for national 
 defence. The end of the Four Years' Diet. 
 
 II. The Campaign of 1792. Prussia summoned to recognize the casus 
 foederis. Potocki's mission to Berlin. Frederick William refuses aid. 
 Military resources of Poland. The campaign in Lithuania and the 
 Ukraine. Situation at the moment of the cessation of hostilities. 
 
 III. The Collapse of the National Resistance. — Stanislas in 
 terror. He insists on negotiations. His overtures to the Empress, and 
 her reply. The extraordinary council of July 23. The King goes over 
 to the Confederation of Targowica. Flight of the Patriots. Submission 
 of the army. Poland prostrate.
 
 CONTENTS XXV 
 
 IV. Attitude of the German Powers. — Irritation and embarrass- 
 ment at Berlin and Vienna. Kaunitz's plan to checkmate the Empress. 
 The Austro-Prussian declaration to Russia. Failure of the joint action. 
 
 V. The Empress Renews Her Alliances with Both the Ger- 
 man Powers. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 Austria and Prussia Agree upon a Partition 310 
 
 I. Prussia Takes the Initiative in Proposing a Partition. — 
 The conference at Potsdam. Pointed hints to Russia. The secret corre- 
 spondence between Schulenburg and Spielmann. The Polish-Bavarian 
 plan agreed upon in principle. 
 
 II. Kaunitz's Fruitless Opposition and Retirement. 
 
 III. Austrian Overtures to Russia. — Razumovski's conversations 
 with Cobenzl and Spielmann. The Polish-Bavarian project formally 
 proposed by Austria at St. Petersburg. 
 
 IV. Reciprocal Advances between Russia and Prussia. — Cath- 
 erine's significant overtures on the indemnity question. Prussia replies 
 by revealing her ambitions in Poland. 
 
 CHAPTER XW 
 
 Austria and Prussia Disagree about the Partition . . .326 
 
 I. The Demand for Ansbach and Baireuth. — The Austrian minis- 
 terial conference at Frankfort. The Austro-Prussian conferences at 
 Mainz. First rift in the alliance. 
 
 II. Austria Insists upon her Demand. — Reflections and illusions 
 of Austrian ministers. Encouraging news from St. Petersburg. A new 
 onset upon Prussia. 
 
 III. The Prussian Resistance Stiffens. — Exasperation, suspici- 
 ons, and anxieties of the Prussian ministers. Their decision to seek an 
 understanding first of all with Russia. The demand for the Margra- 
 viates definitively rejected. Danger of a Russo-Prussian agreement 
 without the participation of Austria. 
 
 TV. Perplexity and Vacillation at Vienna. — Dissensions in the 
 Austrian ministry. The Emperor decides to take his ' supplement ' in 
 Poland. He decides to take it in Alsace instead. Spielmann dispatched 
 to the King of Prussia to negotiate a final settlement of the indemnity 
 question.
 
 XXvi CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 The Note of Merle 348 
 
 I. The Beginning of Speelmann's Negotiation. — Military dis- 
 asters. Spielmann's plan for meeting the new situation. 
 
 II. A Momentous Turn in Prussian Policy. — Austria's necessity, 
 Prussia's opportunity. The Note of Merle. 
 
 III. A Provisional Agreement. — Spielmann's fight against the new 
 Prussian principles. Reassuring declarations of the King and Haug- 
 witz. Plan for the forcible sequestration of Bavaria. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 Haugwitz's Final Negotiation at Vienna 362 
 
 I. Dismal Situation of Austria at the Close of 1792. 
 
 II. New Policy of the Imperial Cabinet. — The resolutions of the 
 ministerial Conference of November 29-30. Unsatisfactory reply to 
 the Note of Merle. Haugwitz assumes his most " peremptory " manner. 
 
 III. A Chaos of Misunderstandings. — Conflicting testimony. The 
 dispatches to London. The ostensible and the secret instructions to 
 L. Cobenzl. Haugwitz ' vanquishes every obstacle.' The question as 
 to what concessions he really obtained. Results of the negotiation. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 The Russo-Prtjssian Partition Treaty 377 
 
 I. Catherine Appears to Favor a Partition. — The evidence at 
 hand as to the Empress' attitude during the early stages of the project. 
 Prussia presses for an immediate agreement. Significant note of Bez- 
 borodko. 
 
 II. Catherine Appears to be Opposed to a Partition. — The 
 Empress' anger at the fiasco of the allies in France. Her " rules " for 
 the negotiation with Prussia. Other motives for delay. The negotia- 
 tion at a standstill. 
 
 III. The Denouement. — The reasons for Catherine's decision to 
 settle the affair at once; and with Prussia alone. Her territorial claims. 
 A hurried negotiation. The treaty concluded. 
 
 rv. The Secret Convention of January 23, 1793. — The pretext 
 invoked for the Partition. The respective acquisitions. Illusory pro- 
 visions in favor of Austria. An unsurpassed triumph of Russian di- 
 plomacy. Mingled emotions at Berlin. 
 
 V. Preliminary Measures for Executing the Partition. — The 
 Prussian declaration at Warsaw. Entry of the Prussian troops into 
 Poland. Pitiful spectacle presented by the Confederates of Targowica. 
 Manifestoes of the partitioning Powers.
 
 CONTENTS XXV11 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 The Attitude of Austria towards the Partition . . . .398 
 
 I. The Communication of the Convention at Vienna. — Delibera- 
 tions of the Imperial ministry in January. Growing uneasiness in Feb- 
 ruary. Attacks on the leading ministers. " Indescribable sensation " 
 produced by the Partition Treaty. Fall of Spielmann and Philip 
 Cobenzl. 
 
 II. Thtjgut's Debut. — Character of Thugut. Manifold objections 
 of Austria to the Partition Treaty: their justification. Thugut's pro- 
 visional program. His overtures to the partitioning Powers, and to 
 England. Reflections on his policy. 
 
 III. Results of Thugut's First Action. — Temper and projects of 
 the Prussian ministry. Lucchesini's note verbale of May 15. Russian 
 reply to Austria. Prussia and the question of the Austrian indemnities. 
 England's reply to Austria. 
 
 IV. Further Development of Thugut's Campaign. — The search 
 for acquisitions. Thugut's suspicions and miscalculations with regard to 
 Prussia. He relies chiefly upon Russia. Attempts to secure a share in 
 Poland; and to postpone the execution of the Partition. 
 
 V. The Lehrbach Mission. — Thugut's plan to "amuse " the Prus- 
 sians with a dilatory negotiation. Prussian plans to give the negotiation 
 a striking finale. Lehrbach and Lucchesini. The crisis at Grodno. 
 The Prussian note of September 22. Virtual rupture of the Alliance. 
 
 VI. Final Negotiations of Austria with Russia regarding the 
 
 Second Partition. 
 
 CHAPTER XLX 
 
 The Attitude of England and France toward the Parti- 
 tion 440 
 
 I. England. — Change in Pitt's foreign policy since 1701. British 
 sympathy for Poland in 1792. England's entry into the war with 
 France, and rapprochement with the Eastern Powers. Pitt expresses 
 his moral reprobation of the Partition, but refuses to go further. De- 
 bates in Parliament. 
 
 II. France. — Traditional friendship of France for Poland. Con- 
 tradictory desire to conciliate Prussia. Foreign policy of the Girondists. 
 Lebrun's scheme for a coalition in Eastern Europe. The First and 
 Second Committees of Public Safety. Collapse of French effort in the 
 East.
 
 XXVlll CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 The Diet of Grodno and the Consummation of the Parti- 
 tion 454 
 
 I. Preparations for the Diet. — The state of Poland in 1793. 
 Sievers. The King induced to go to Grodno. The elections. Plans of 
 the Empress. 
 
 II. The Russian Treaty. — Character of the Grodno Diet. Venality 
 and hypocrisy of the majority. The ' Zealots.' Turbulent scenes and 
 measures of coercion. Polish attempt to separate Russia from Prussia. 
 The treaty with Russia passed under constraint. 
 
 III. The Prussian Treaty. — Animosity of the Poles and duplicity of 
 the Empress towards Prussia. A dilatory negotiation. Tortures of a 
 Prussian envoy. The journee of September 2nd. Vigorous resolutions at 
 Berlin and change in Sievers' conduct. The ' Dumb Session ' of Sep- 
 tember 23. Conclusion of the treaty. 
 
 TV. Final Labors of the Diet. — The alliance with Russia. The 
 new constitution. Virtual incorporation of the remains of Poland with 
 Russia. A new storm gathering. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 Conclusion 484 
 
 I. With Regard to Poland. — Decisive importance of the Second 
 Partition. Judgments as to the expediency of the attempt for national 
 independence made by the Four Years' Diet. The problem of 1788. 
 The effort made in the next three years on the whole creditable. The 
 reverse side of the picture. Judgments on the Polish effort of 1792. 
 Adverse extraneous conditions. Material success or failure not the 
 sole standard: the moral value of the work done at that time. 
 
 II. With Regard to Prussia. — Prussian policy constantly one of 
 territorial aggrandizement. Its motives. Apologies for Prussia's con- 
 duct towards Poland. Sybel's theses. " Eine That gerechter Notwehr." 
 Disastrous results of the Partition for Prussia. 
 
 III. With Regard to Russia. — Catherine not averse to the policy 
 of partition, as is generally assumed. The political unification of the 
 Russian race not the determining motive of her policy. Material and 
 moral gains and losses resulting to Russia from the Partition. 
 
 IV. Broader Aspects of the Partition. — Inefficacy of the efforts 
 made by England, France, and Austria on behalf of Poland. General 
 character of international politics in the eighteenth century. What was 
 new in the dismemberments of Poland. The Second Partition the 
 classic example of the moral bankruptcy of the Old Regime.
 
 CONTENTS XXIX 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I. The Russian Declaration to Austria of May 10/21, 
 1788, Guaranteeing the Integrity of Poland . . 509 
 
 II. On Catherine's Attitude towards the Project of 
 a Russo-Polish Alliance 510 
 
 III. On Potemkin's Secret Plans 512 
 
 D7. On the Change in Prussian Policy in the Summer 
 
 of 1789 5 X 6 
 
 V. OSTERMANN TO ALOPEUS, MARCH 14/25, 179I .... 519 
 
 VI. Notes on Chapter DC 521 
 
 I. On the Origin of Bischoffwerder's Second Mission to 
 Leopold. 
 
 II. On the Vienna Convention of July 25, 1791. 
 
 III. On Bischoffwerder's Attitude towards an Intervention 
 in France. 
 
 VII. On the Austrian Attitude towards the Plan for 
 
 the Permanent Union of Saxony and Poland . . 524 
 
 VIII. On the Note from Catherine to Zubov Reported 
 
 by Goltz, February 3, 1792 525 
 
 LX. Felix Potocki to Potemkin, May 14, 1 791 .... 527 
 
 X. Bezborodko to the Empress, January 25/February 
 
 5> i79 2 528 
 
 XI. On Frederick William's Attitude towards the 
 
 Proposals of Austria and Russia in March, 1792 . 530 
 
 XII. Documents Illustrating the Origins of the Polish- 
 Bavarian Project 531 
 
 XIII. Documents Illustrating the Earliest Discussions 
 between Russia and Prussia regarding a New 
 Partition 534 
 
 XD7. On Razumovski's Conversations with Cobenzl of 
 June 30 and July i, 1792, regarding the Polish- 
 Bavarian Plan 537 
 
 XV. On the Date of Spielmann's Plan Discussed on 
 
 Pages 351-352 540
 
 XXX CONTENTS 
 
 XVI. Documents Illustrating Haugwitz's Final Negoti- 
 ation at Vienna 546 
 
 XVII. Notes of the Empress Belonging to the Papers of 
 the Secret Conferences of October 29/NovEMBER 
 9 and November 4/15, 1792 551 
 
 XVIII. Rescripts of Catherine II to Sievers with Regard 
 
 to the Negotiations at the Diet of Grodno . . . 552 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 557 
 
 INDEX 573
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF 
 
 POLAND 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the second half of the seventeenth century Eastern 
 Europe has presented two great international problems of equal 
 interest and equal importance, the Turkish and the Polish Ques- 
 tions. The character and history of the former are familiar to 
 scholars and, indeed, to the general public; but the latter is still, 
 in large part, an unexplored field. 
 
 The Polish Question has passed through two very different 
 phases. In the earlier one it resembled the Turkish (or Eastern) 
 Question in not a few respects. In both cases the problem was 
 that of maintaining the existence and integrity of a vast but 
 decrepit state, paralyzed by chronic misgovernment, military 
 inefficiency, racial and religious antagonisms, intellectual stagna- 
 tion, and economic decline. In both cases the neighboring Powers 
 were constantly tempted to interfere and aggrandize themselves, 
 while religious oppression, the duty of restoring ' order,' and the 
 need of preserving the ' balance of power ' served as ever ready 
 pretexts for aggression. In both cases the chief safeguard of the 
 menaced state was the mutual jealousy of the great Powers. 
 For various reasons the catastrophe which threatened both 
 Turkey and Poland overtook the latter country first. By the 
 Partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795 the Polish state was anni- 
 hilated. That drastic attempt at a solution did not end the 
 Polish Question, but it altered its character completely. Thence- 
 forth the problem was that of a conquered and dismembered 
 people attempting to regain its liberty and unity in the face of the 
 three strongest monarchies of Eastern Europe. In this form 
 the Polish Question has been the most difficult and perplexing
 
 4 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of the ' national ' problems with which the past century has had 
 to deal. 
 
 Of the historical importance of the Polish Question numerous 
 illustrations may be given. 
 
 No other event in modern times has produced such extensive 
 lasting changes in the map of Europe as did the dismemberment 
 of the Polish Republic, a state which had been the third in size on 
 the Continent, and whose area very considerably surpassed that 
 of France or Germany today. As a result of the Partitions, 
 Russia, previously so remote, and, as long as a strong Poland 
 existed, so largely cut off from communications with the West, 
 extended her frontiers deep into Central Europe, to within two 
 hundred miles of Berlin and Vienna. The territories which she 
 acquired from Poland now support a population almost as large 
 as that of France. 1 They form, indeed, about one-eighth of the 
 area, and they contain nearly one-third of the total population, of 
 European Russia. Through the appropriation of Polish lands the 
 Hohenzollerns were first enabled to unite and round out their 
 scattered possessions into a compact and defensible realm ; and if 
 these acquisitions were, as is often maintained, indispensable to 
 the consolidation of Prussia, then the dismemberment of Poland 
 and the unification of Germany appear to stand in very close 
 connection. 
 
 The Polish Question has played a large role in modern diplo- 
 matic history. It is well known that the quarrels over the dis- 
 tribution of spoils in Poland lamed and then disrupted the First 
 Coalition against revolutionary France; that the spectre of a 
 revived Poland chilled the friendship of Tilsit and hastened the 
 great breach of 1812; that the Polish-Saxon question came near 
 to breaking up the Congress of Vienna, and plunging Europe into 
 a new general war; and that the Polish insurrection of 1830 
 facilitated the triumph of the revolutions of that year in the West, 
 just as the final struggles of the old Republic contributed to the 
 
 1 I am referring here to the lands acquired by all four of the partitions of Poland 
 (1772, 1793, 1795, 1815). The present Kingdom of Poland and the ten governments 
 of Western Russia which formerly belonged to the old Polish Republic contained on 
 January 1, 191 2, according to the estimates of the Russian Central Statistical Com- 
 mittee, a population of 38,963,000.
 
 INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 victory of France in her first revolution. For a century the 
 Polish Question had an important effect in determining the 
 grouping of the Powers, estranging France and Russia, and bind- 
 ing together Berlin and St. Petersburg through a common interest 
 and a common anxiety. It was by his ineffectual intervention in 
 favor of the Poles in 1863 that Napoleon III completely alienated 
 Russian sympathies, while by his clever complacency towards 
 Russia on that occasion Bismarck secured the benevolent neu- 
 trality and moral support of Alexander II during the critical 
 decade when German unity was made. Even down to very recent 
 years, in spite of the new alignment of the Powers, Poland served 
 to ' keep the wire open ' between Berlin and St. Petersburg, while 
 Austria's occasional flirtations with the Poles have furnished one 
 more cause of antagonism between the Dual Monarchy and Russia. 
 
 Each of the two states which profited most by the Partitions 
 has acquired an internal problem of the most embarrassing kind. 
 First came the period of insurrections (1830, 1848, 1863), when 
 Poland, like Italy and the Balkan Peninsula, formed one of the 
 permanent danger-zones of Europe. In more recent years the 
 Poles have indeed renounced the method of armed uprisings; but 
 they have maintained and powerfully developed the conscious- 
 ness of their national unity, their traditions, their strength; they 
 have tenaciously resisted every effort to destroy their national 
 individuality; and they have been struggling hard to gain some 
 recognition of their national rights in each of the empires among 
 which they are divided. 
 
 That policy of colonization, expropriation, and persecution, 
 which the Prussian government has been conducting against the 
 Poles for thirty years, has hitherto failed not only to Germanize 
 the Polish districts, but even to prevent the Poles from peacefully 
 conquering new territory, for instance, in East Prussia and Silesia. 
 Prussia is faced by the danger of seeing her eastern provinces 
 slowly but surely Polonized and lost to German nationality. 
 Prince von Biilow has declared that the Polish problem is one of 
 the gravest of those confronting Prussia, and one upon which the 
 future of the Empire and the whole German nation depends. 1 
 
 1 Cf. Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 325 f.
 
 6 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 The Russians have also met with such difficulties in their 
 ' Kingdom of Poland ' that they have several times considered 
 abandoning it to Prussia. 1 The forty years of quiet after 1864 
 did indeed raise hopes that the spirit of the obstinate nation was 
 broken, but that was only because the nation had no normal and 
 effective means of manifesting its feelings. Since the Revolution 
 of 1905-06 has partially removed the obstacles to political dis- 
 cussion and the expression of popular opinion, it has become clear 
 that the policy of Russification has broken down completely and 
 that the Poles are more united and determined than ever in the 
 demand for national autonomy. 
 
 At the present moment, a war which has turned Poland into a 
 second Belgium has once more drawn the horrified attention of 
 the world to this unhappy country. The belligerents on both 
 sides have attempted to win Polish support by far-reaching 
 promises for the future. Whatever the outcome of the struggle 
 may be, is it too much to hope that this time Poland will not have 
 suffered in vain; that this time the rights of a nation, which is 
 after all the sixth or seventh largest in Europe and which has so 
 many claims upon the respect, the sympathy, and the justice of 
 the world, will not go unrecognized; that this time the Polish 
 Question, which has tortured the conscience of Europe for over a 
 century, will finally be set at rest ? 
 
 II 
 
 The Polish Question owes its origin to the desperate and well- 
 nigh irremediable decadence which overtook the Polish Republic 
 about the middle of the seventeenth century, and, continuing 
 unchecked for a hundred years, brought the country to the verge 
 of ruin. The causes of this decline and of the ensuing catas- 
 trophe have been discussed by numerous historians and publicists 
 with intense interest, although generally with too little knowl- 
 edge and too great national or party bias. 2 A final explanation 
 
 1 Poschinger, Also sprach Bismarck, i, pp. 74 f.; Dmowski, La Question polonaise, 
 
 PP- 55 f- 
 
 2 A very useful survey of the literature on the downfall of Poland is to be found 
 in Professor Kareev's book, Ha^eme IIojBinH bt, HCTopniecKofi JlHTepaTypt.
 
 INTRODUCTION J 
 
 has not been given, nor can it be given in the present state of 
 investigation. 
 
 It seems clear, however, that the decline of Poland is to be 
 traced primarily to political causes, to the defects of a wretched 
 system of government. Whatever other cause of weakness one 
 may discover, for instance, the lack of a strong middle class, the 
 oppression of the peasantry, religious intolerance, racial antip- 
 athies, intellectual or moral retrogression — these are all of but 
 secondary importance. These evils, or equally grave ones, could 
 be met with in other European states of the old regime, and yet 
 no other great state atoned for them by the loss of its existence. 
 For everywhere else there was a government strong enough to 
 curb or diminish the destructive tendencies and to produce or 
 assist invigorating ones. Poland alone had no such correcting or 
 ameliorating force. Poland had no effective government what- 
 ever. The nation lived in an anarchy thinly concealed under the 
 forms of an elaborate republican constitution. It is in the un- 
 fortunate historic evolution of that constitution that the explana- 
 tion of the decline of Poland is to be sought. 1 
 
 The constitution of the Republic in its later years was so nearly 
 unique in Europe that there was — and still is — a widespread 
 tendency to regard it as something quite sui generis, as an entirely 
 original creation of a misguided and fantastic people. In reality 
 it was only an exaggerated and one-sided development of a type 
 of political organization once almost universal on the Continent, 
 of what the Germans call the monarchisch-standische Staat or the 
 Standestaat. Nearly all the supposed peculiarities of the Polish 
 constitution can be traced to principles and tendencies inherent 
 in the Standestaat: almost all of them find analogies in other 
 countries in the same stage of development. Even the Liberum 
 Veto, which is often held up as the most unique and most mon- 
 strous institution of Old Poland, to be explained only from a 
 national lack of political common sense, or else from a survival of 
 primitive Slavic anarchism — even the Liberum Veto was merely 
 a logical extension of the idea pervading mediaeval parliament- 
 arism, that the vote of a majority cannot bind a minority. In 
 
 1 Cf. Bobrzynski, Dzieje Polski, ii, pp. 353 ff.
 
 8 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Aragonese Cortes, for example, a valid decision required the 
 assent of all four brazos (orders) and of every member of every 
 brazo. 1 In Catalonia a single nobleman by uttering the words 
 ' Yo dissent ' could stop the proceedings of the Cortes, 2 much as 
 the Polish deputies did with their famous ' Nie Pozwalam.' 3 
 But when all the parallels have been drawn — and they are very 
 numerous — the fact remains that the Standestaat produced in 
 Poland very different results from those that it brought forth in 
 most other countries. 
 
 The main difference is briefly this: that in Poland the struggles 
 of the Standestaat period resulted in the victory, not of the 
 Crown over the Estates (as in most other lands), nor of the 
 Estates collectively over the Crown, but of a single class over 
 the Crown and the other classes alike; this triumphant class then 
 failed to organize its power in such a manner as to give the 
 country an effective government; and finally the ruling class — - 
 the szlachta 4 — maintained its monopoly of power far too long. 
 A one-sided constitutional development, the failure to create a 
 new political mechanism adapted to the new distribution of 
 power in the state, and then prolonged anarchy and stagnation — 
 these seem to be the essential causes of the decline of Poland. 
 
 The szlachta, the military land-owning class, began to play a 
 political role only in the latter part of the fourteenth century, but 
 thereafter its progress was surprisingly rapid, its triumph only 
 too sudden and complete. Three circumstances especially con- 
 tributed to its victory over the Crown: these were, the extinction 
 of the ancient dynasty of the Piasts (1370), and the uncertainty 
 as to the succession under the next few kings, which led (by 1434 
 at the latest) to the recognition of the principle that the Crown 
 was elective; the weakness of character shown by most of the 
 Polish monarchs after the time of Casimir the Great; and finally, 
 the extraordinary military and financial needs of the Crown, 
 resulting from the Hundred Years' War with the Teutonic Order, 
 
 1 Marichalar and Manrique, Hlstoria de la Legislation y Recitationes del Derecho 
 civil de Espaiia, vi, p. 217. 
 
 2 Pella y Forgas, Llibertats y antich Govern de Catalunya, p. 146. 
 
 3 The words mean ' I forbid.' 
 i The gentry.
 
 INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 the struggles against the Muscovites and Tartars, and the 
 efforts of the Polish kings to establish their dynasty on the 
 thrones of Bohemia and Hungary. ' The attempt to play the part 
 of a great power of the modern type with only the resources of 
 a mediaeval feudal state ' l inevitably brought to the front the 
 class on which the maintenance of the new position and the suc- 
 cess of the new policy of expansion primarily depended. The 
 szlachta knew how to improve the opportunity to the utmost. 
 The cornerstone of their power was laid by the Privilege of 
 Kaschau (1374), by which King Louis of Anjou, in order to 
 assure his daughter's succession to the throne, granted the 
 szlachta exemption from all taxes (with one rather insignificant 
 exception) and from all duties to the state except unpaid military 
 service. After that, one privilege followed fast upon another. 
 In 1454 Casimir IV was obliged to grant the Statutes of Nieszawa, 
 the Magna Charta of the Polish nobility, by which he promised 
 not to make new laws or to order the pospolite ruszenie (the 
 general rising of the nation in arms) without the consent of the 
 szlachta. The gentry were thus for the first time legally admitted 
 to a share in legislation, and as they were also free from any mili- 
 tary or financial burdens, save those they might voluntarily lay 
 upon themselves, their position in the state was commanding. 
 
 These far-reaching concessions required the creation of an 
 organ through which the szlachta might regularly exercise their 
 new functions. That need was met by the Diet, which, slowly 
 taking form in the latter half of the fifteenth century, received its 
 definitive organization and legal sanction through the Statute 
 Nihil Novi in 1505. 
 
 Set over against this vigorous new institution, the Crown 
 steadily lost both prerogatives and prestige, although it retained 
 a considerable measure of independence as long as the Jagellonian 
 dynasty survived. But with the extinction of that family in 1572, 
 the foundations of Polish royalty crumbled. The nine months' 
 interregnum that followed saw a change of really revolutionary 
 
 1 The phrase belongs to Dr. Hotzsch, who has a very suggestive article, " Staat- 
 enbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung in der Geschichte des germanisch-slavischen 
 Ostens," in the Zcitschrift jiir osteuropaische Geschichte, i (ion), pp. 363-412.
 
 IO THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 character. The theory at once spread that, now that the old 
 dynasty had disappeared, the szlachta no longer had any master 
 over them and the supreme power had lapsed into their hands. 
 Hence they hastened to take possession of the state, acting by 
 means of armed provincial associations or ' Confederations,' 
 which, replacing the royal courts and officials, undertook to pro- 
 vide for the unity and security of the country and for the estab- 
 lishment of a new government. It was true that the szlachta did 
 proceed to the election of another king; but the theory of election 
 had now changed utterly. While the Jagellonian dynasty lasted, 
 the practice of election meant hardly more than the designation 
 of the natural successor by birth and an act of submission to him; 
 the nation had little real freedom of choice, and the Jagellonian 
 princes retained most of the prestige of hereditary monarchs. 
 But from 1572-73 onward, it was understood that the szlachta 
 were quite free to choose whom they would, and that the prince 
 whom they chose was only their delegate, entrusted by them with 
 a rigidly limited portion of authority, which might be revoked in 
 case he overstepped his mandate. The szlachta had thus anointed 
 themselves with the majesty that had once pertained to the 
 Crown, and henceforth it became their chief concern to see that 
 the sovereignty did not slip away from them. The state had 
 become in fact, as well as in name, a republic. 1 
 
 After this revolution, save for rare instances, the king of 
 Poland was merely the ' painted monarch,' the crowned figure- 
 head, whose impotence could be compared only with that of the 
 conventional doge of Venice. Surrounded by pomp and circum- 
 stance, he was yet without any of those effective powers which 
 even in modern constitutional states remain to the monarch. 
 The chief prerogative left to him was the right of appointing to 
 innumerable offices, civil and ecclesiastical; but as appointments 
 were made for life, and the king possessed no means of control 
 over officials once appointed, this prerogative was of little avail. 
 Indeed, it is probable that the jealousies, disappointments, and 
 resentments provoked by the use of the royal patronage quite 
 
 1 On the capital importance and the results of the interregnum of 1572-73, 
 cf. Pawinski, Rzqdy sejmikowe, i, pp. 28 ff.; KapteBi, IIojn.CK.ifi Ceuiii, pp. 45 ff.
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 1 
 
 outweighed any profit that the Crown may have drawn from it. 
 Certainly nothing contributed more to the suspicion that haunted 
 the szlachta in the last centuries of Old Poland, than the fear that 
 the kings were corrupting the nation and endangering liberty 
 by their insidious and unscrupulous use of the appointing power; 
 nothing did more to keep alive that sleepless and ineradicable 
 distrust of the Crown, which proved so formidable an obstacle 
 to every attempt to restore some strength to the executive. 
 
 A long series of Polish historians, from Naruszewicz down to 
 Bobrzynski, have deplored the abasement of the royal power as 
 the primary cause of the decline of Poland. It has often been said 
 that so vast, so exposed, and so heterogeneous a realm as this 
 could survive only under a strong monarchy; that Poland needed 
 to go through the wholesome discipline of enlightened despotism 
 like the western nations; that Poland fell because she tried to 
 omit a stage in her evolution. But the more recent historiography 
 tends toward a quite different view. It is urged that Poland 
 might have attained the results that western nations secured 
 through absolutism, by other methods, through the admission 
 of all classes of society to a fair share in the government of 
 the Republic. More serious, more decisive than the victory of the 
 szlachta over the Crown, was the victory of the szlachta over the 
 non-noble classes. These elements, unfortunately, showed them- 
 selves incapable of furnishing support to the falling kingship, or 
 of forcing the szlachta to share with them the power wrested from 
 the Crown, or even of defending their own political and economic 
 existence against the attacks of the nobility. If the Polish state 
 fell completely under the control of a single class, with the most 
 disastrous results, it was not so much because in Poland the kings 
 were weaker and the nobility more aggressive than elsewhere, as 
 because the lower classes, and especially the bourgeoisie, ex- 
 hibited a weakness unparalleled in any- western country. 1 
 
 In the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries an admirable 
 equilibrium existed between the various classes in Poland. Each 
 class enjoyed a fair measure of rights and privileges, and no class 
 was able to encroach seriously upon the others. This equilibrium 
 
 1 Cf. Kutrzeba, Historya ustroju Polski, pp. 87 f., 1O2 ff.
 
 12 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 was broken down, however, in the later fifteenth and sixteenth 
 centuries, when the szlachta established their complete political 
 and economic preponderance over townsmen and peasantry alike. 
 
 As against the peasantry, the szlachta were impelled by the 
 same imperious economic needs that were about the same period 
 converting the Grundherr into the Gutsherr and the free peasant 
 into the serf in Eastern Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and 
 Russia. Into the causes and history of this vast transformation 
 in the agrarian life of Eastern Europe, it is impossible to enter 
 here. This economic change coincided in time with the rise of the 
 szlachta to political power and their conquest of the right of legis- 
 lation through the Diet. The result was a series of ' constitu- 
 tions ' (the most important of them between 1496 and 1573), 
 which bound the peasant to the soil, increased his obligations in 
 rent and labor, deprived him of the protection of the law, and even 
 subjected his religion to the dictates of his master. Whether or 
 not the lord was legally vested with the jus vitae et necis, it was 
 assumed that he possessed it, and there are not lacking examples 
 of its being exercised. The peasant thus sank into the most abject 
 kind of bondage; the landowner was lord of his land, his property, 
 his life, and his conscience. 1 
 
 The degradation of the Polish peasantry is not surprising in 
 view of what was occurring elsewhere in Eastern Europe; but the 
 abasement of the towns before the szlachta is less easy to under- 
 stand, and in fact an entirely adequate explanation has not yet 
 been offered. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the 
 Polish cities were at the height of their prosperity. Politically, 
 they were by no means negligible factors. Even earlier than the 
 szlachta, they had learned to assert their rights by means of Con- 
 federations; their approval was frequently sought by the Crown 
 for important political acts; and all through the fifteenth century 
 their representatives often appeared at those loosely organized 
 and little known national assemblies out of which the Diet 
 developed. 2 But when that body was finally organized through 
 
 1 Cf . Lehtonen, Die polnischen Provinzen Russlands unter Kalharina II, pp. 38 ff. 
 
 2 The history of the Polish Diet in the fifteenth century is still in very urgent 
 need of further investigation. Much interesting information as to the participation 
 of the cities is to be found in Prochaska, " Geneza i rozwoj parlamentaryzmu za
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 3 
 
 the Statute Nihil Novi, the cities found themselves virtually 
 excluded. Cracow alone, by special privilege, enjoyed a clear 
 legal right to representation in the Diet; but the exercise of that 
 right encountered such opposition from the szlachta, the deputies 
 of the capital were subjected to such humiliations when they 
 ventured to show themselves, that by the end of the sixteenth 
 century they had ceased to appear. It is true that the cities never 
 quite lost their rank as one of the constitutional estates of the 
 realm. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries four 
 or five towns continued to participate in elections to the throne, 
 in extraordinary Diets, and in Confederations. The right of the 
 towns to be represented at ordinary Diets was never formally 
 abolished or renounced ; but for practical purposes, from the be- 
 ginning of the sixteenth century on, the cities had lost their place 
 in the national assembly and in the political life of the nation. 1 
 
 This elimination of the bourgeois element from the Diet was 
 a phenomenon not entirely peculiar to Poland. In Hungary, 
 Bohemia, and Moravia — lands whose constitutional develop- 
 ment closely resembled that of Poland, and might, perhaps, have 
 paralleled it completely, but for the fortunate advent of the House 
 of Hapsburg — the role of the city deputies at the Diets was 
 gradually reduced to little more than the right to be present; in 
 Bohemia that right was restricted to Prague alone, and in 
 Hungary and Moravia in the later years of the old regime all the 
 cities together had only a single vote. But nowhere else did the 
 city estate fall so completely as in Poland, so suddenly, or, what 
 is strangest, with so little apparent effort at self-defence. 2 
 
 The explanation most commonly advanced for this surrender 
 by the cities is the fact that the Polish towns in the Middle Ages 
 
 pierwszych Jagiellon6w," Rozpr. Akad. Umiej. w Krakoivie, Wyd. Hist.-Fil., Serya, 
 ii, T. xiii; also Piekosinski, " Wiece, sejmiki, sejmy, przywileje ziemskic w Polsce 
 wiek6w Srednich, ibid., T. xiv. 
 
 1 Cf. Rembowski, Koiifederacya i rokosz, pp. 2745.; also his articles in the 
 Biblioteka Warszawska, 1892, iv, and 1893, iii. On the significance of the Statute 
 of 1505 as virtually excluding the townsmen from the Diet, see the article by 
 Balzer, in the Kwartalnik Historyczny, xx. 
 
 2 The comparison of the role of the cities in the Diets of these four states is 
 made by Kadlec, " Ustavnf dejiny Polska podle novych badani," Casopis Musea 
 Krdl. Ces. 1908.
 
 14 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 were peopled chiefly by Germans, living according to German 
 law, separated from the rest of the nation by language, customs, 
 and interests, and neither willing nor able to take an effective and 
 continuous part in the political life of the kingdom. It is true 
 that in the sixteenth century the towns were rapidly being Polo- 
 nized, but this transformation came too late; the cities then 
 found that their cooperation was not wanted, and that the doors 
 of the Diet were closed against them. They were the less able to 
 defend their political interests, because, despite the external 
 appearance of prosperity, economic decline was setting in. The 
 primary cause was the shifting of the world's trade-centers at the 
 close of the fifteenth century and the ruin of the Black Sea traffic 
 at the hands of the Turks. The Polish towns thus lost that 
 transit-trade on which their prosperity in the Middle Ages had 
 chiefly rested, and henceforth they went steadily down hill. This 
 decline was accelerated by the encroachments of the szlachta, who, 
 as soon as they had come into power, rained blow after blow upon 
 the sinking bourgeoisie!) The latter were excluded from offices in 
 the state and from the higher places in the Church; they were 
 forbidden to own land outside their walls; their municipal liber- 
 ties were virtually destroyed in the seigniorial towns, and in the 
 royal cities greatly restricted. [Above all, their trade was nearly 
 ruined by the selfish and short-sighted legislation passed by 
 assemblies of country squires, bent only on assuring their own 
 fortunes and ignorant of the first principles of a sound national 
 economy? As typical of this legislation one may cite the law of 
 1565, which forbade native merchants to export or import any 
 goods whatsoever, or the enactment of 1643 that native mer- 
 chants were to sell at a profit of no more than seven per cent; 
 foreigners, of five per cent; Jews, of three per cent. 1 The pros- 
 perity of the cities might possibly have survived the activity of 
 the Polish Solons; but the terrible devastations suffered during 
 the wars against Swedes, Turks, and Muscovites dealt it the final 
 blow. By the eighteenth century the once brilliant and busy 
 towns presented a perfect picture of desolation: the houses de- 
 serted or falling in ruins, the streets grown up to grass, and 
 
 1 Kutrzeba, op. cit., pp. 171 f.
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 5 
 
 business confined to the wretched operations of Jewish money- 
 lenders and petty traders. Poland was thus left destitute of the 
 element most important for a sound political life — a strong, 
 prosperous, and progressive middle class. 
 
 Though supported by great wealth and by the prestige nat- 
 urally attaching to the Church among an ardently Catholic 
 people, the Polish clergy also failed to oppose an effective barrier 
 to the omnipotence of the szlachta. It is true that the bishops 
 acquired and maintained a place in the Senate, and that in the 
 fifteenth century the lower clergy were occasionally represented 
 at the Diets. 1 But in Poland, as in England, the clergy preferred 
 to tax themselves and to regulate their relations with the Crown 
 in their separate assemblies; as an estate they soon dropped out 
 of the Diet; and then they too became the object of the attacks 
 of the szlachta. Failing in their direct onslaughts, especially in 
 their attempt to oust the bishops from the Senate, the gentry 
 nevertheless succeeded in their essential aim. By securing a 
 monopoly of the higher positions in the Church for members of 
 their own class, they removed the main cause of antagonism, and 
 turned the hierarchy into an aristocratic body, one with them- 
 selves in birth, manners, ideas, and interests. With that the 
 victory of the szlachta over all opposing elements was complete. 
 They were the State. The struggles of the Standestaat period had 
 led in Poland to a result radically different from that attained in 
 most other states, and to one for which there is nowhere else an 
 exact analogy. The result was the omnipotence of a single caste 
 carried to a point unparalleled in any other European country. 
 
 Even this development need not have proved so disastrous, if 
 the szlachta, after gaining the supreme power, had only properly 
 organized it. An efficient aristocratic government, awake to 
 national needs and able to concentrate the power and resources 
 of the country for great national tasks, might have provided 
 a tolerable substitute for absolute monarchy. But it was the 
 
 1 This representation of the clerical estate in the fifteenth century is one of the 
 most obscure points in Polish constitutional history. Some data may be found in 
 Pawinski, Sejmiki ziemskie, pp. 94 f., and in Prochaska, Geneza i rozwoj parla- 
 mentaryzmu, etc., pp. 39 f.
 
 1 6 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 supreme misfortune of Poland that the szlachta, after appropriating 
 the sovereignty, seemed bent, not on using it for great national 
 aims, but rather on dividing it equally among all the members of 
 their class, taken as individuals. The authority lost by the Crown 
 passed, not to the Diet, but to the local assemblies (Dietines), and, 
 in the last analysis, to each country gentleman. The supreme 
 power was atomized until it simply vanished, leaving anarchy. 
 
 The explanation of this unhappy phenomenon is chiefly to be 
 sought in the geographic and historical conditions under which 
 the szlachta had worked their way to power. The Republic 
 embraced an enormous area; it was larger than any of the other 
 states which at that time experimented in popular government. 
 In the German territories, Bohemia, Sweden, or Aragon, for 
 example, all nobles might, without too much difficulty, attend the 
 central parliament; but in Poland, as in Hungary, this proved 
 impossible, and hence the need for the election of representatives, 
 for local assemblies, for local self-government. The mere size of 
 Poland rendered decentralization indispensable. 
 
 The particularist spirit had also been fostered by the historic 
 evolution of Poland. After a short period of unity under the 
 Piasts, in the twelfth century the realm had been divided into 
 numerous principalities, which soon possessed no connecting 
 links whatsoever. This period of disintegration, which lasted 
 nearly two hundred years, left very deep and abiding traces. 
 It was then that the various Polish ' lands ' — the principalities 
 of that age, the palatinates of the next — took permanent shape 
 and acquired their marked individuality, their separatist in- 
 stincts, traditions and prejudices. The reunion of the country 
 effected by Wladyslaw Lokietek at the beginning of the four- 
 teenth century, was only a hasty and mechanical process, each 
 ' land ' retaining its own hierarchy of officials, its own assemblies 
 of dignitaries and magnates, its own law, its own separate life and 
 self-consciousness. Though some progress towards real unity was 
 made under Lokietek and his successor, the speedy extinction of 
 the dynasty and the subsequent weakening of the royal power, 
 which had always been the chief bond of union in Poland, largely 
 arrested this salutary process.
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 7 
 
 It was at this moment, when the integration of the country was 
 still so incomplete, that the szlachta made their entry into political 
 life. Naturally they acted through the agencies with which they 
 were most familiar, namely, the local organizations, and in accord- 
 ance with those ideas of local independence to which they were 
 accustomed. So it happened that they entrenched themselves 
 first of all, not in a central parliament, but in the local assemblies 
 
 — the Dietines. About the beginning of the fifteenth century the 
 old provincial councils of dignitaries and magnates were trans- 
 formed (except for judicial purposes) into assemblies of the whole 
 community of the szlachta of each ' land.' These Sejmiki or 
 Dietines originally concerned themselves only with modest local 
 affairs; but as the szlachta extorted one privilege after another 
 from the Crown, it was through the Dietines as their chief organs 
 that they exercised their new functions. For purposes of taxation, 
 and, after the Statutes of Nieszawa, for calling the pospolite 
 ruszenie and for legislation (at least legislation affecting the rights 
 and privileges of the szlachta) , the King was obliged to consult all 
 the Dietines separately. That procedure was slow and awkward ; 
 what was needed was a concentration of the local machinery in a 
 general parliament. 
 
 The nucleus of such a body existed in the Wiec, the assembly of 
 the chief magnates and dignitaries of the entire kingdom, which, 
 as a royal council, under the first Jagellonians already exerted 
 great influence over the decisions of the Crown in matters of 
 general policy. Throughout the fifteenth century szlachta and 
 townsmen and, to some extent, the lower clergy not infrequently 
 attended the meetings of the Wiec; but it is still uncertain what 
 form their representation took, and what part they had in the 
 deliberations of the assembly. At any rate, an organic connection 
 between the Dietines and the Wiec (or Diet, as it came to be 
 called), was definitely established only at the close of the century. 
 The Dietines slowly formed the habit of sending deputies to the 
 central body; and in 1493, f° r the first time — as far as we know 
 
 — deputies from all the Dietines in the kingdom assembled in the 
 general Diet at Piotrkow. That was the Polish Model Parlia- 
 ment. The Diet took shape as a bicameral body: the deputies
 
 1 8 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 from the Dietines formed the Chamber of Nuncios, from which 
 the city representatives soon disappeared; and the upper house 
 was formed by the Senate, (i. e., the old royal council or Wiec, 
 made up of the archbishops, bishops, palatines, castellans, and 
 the great officers of the Crown), which through the Statute 
 Nihil Novi was placed on a footing of equality with the Chamber 
 of Nuncios with respect to legislative rights. 
 
 The success of Polish parliamentarism now depended on the 
 question of what the relation would be between the newly formed 
 Diet and the older provincial assemblies. The predominance of 
 the former would mean the continuation of the unification of the 
 realm and perhaps the development of a strong central govern- 
 ment; the predominance of the Dietines, on the other hand, 
 would involve decentralization, disunion, impotence. At the 
 outset, the decentralizing tendency prevailed. The deputies of 
 the Dietines represented only their respective ' lands ' ; they were 
 bound by instructions, usually precise and imperative, from their 
 electors; the Diet resembled a congress of ambassadors. Under 
 Sigismund II a determined effort was made by the Protestant 
 szlachta to end this state of things and to give the Diet the 
 character of a real parliament by eliminating imperative man- 
 dates, establishing the majority rule in voting, and subordinating 
 the Dietines to the Diet. But this effort failed, chiefly owing to 
 the opposition, and later the weakness, of the King himself. 1 
 
 In the next generation the tide set strongly in the opposite 
 direction. The doctrinaire theories of the age about the ' free- 
 dom ' and ' equality ' of the szlachta, the heightened sense of their 
 own importance produced by the events of 1572 in the minds of 
 the gentry, their natural preference for deciding all matters 
 directly in their local assemblies, rather than through deputies to 
 the Diet, who might be insidiously influenced by the King or the 
 magnates — all these things combined to assure to the Dietines a 
 preponderance such as they had never before enjoyed. Re- 
 stricted under the later Jagellonians to a very narrow sphere of 
 
 1 See Bobrzynski, Dzieje Polski, ii, pp. 75 ff., who regarded the proposals of the 
 Protestant party as the most promising reform program ever brought forward in 
 Poland.
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 9 
 
 activity, these assemblies now extended their encroachments so 
 far and assumed such a plenitude of power and independence, 
 that in the seventeenth century the Republic came to resemble a 
 loose federation of fifty or sixty sovereign states. Not only did 
 the various palatinates develop to the utmost their judicial and 
 administrative autonomy, but decentralization was also carried 
 to dangerous lengths in the financial and military system, on 
 which the strength and security of the Republic primarily de- 
 pended. The Dietines granted or refused taxes, either through 
 their deputies to the Diet or directly, when the question was 
 referred to them, as frequently happened; they themselves 
 assessed and collected the taxes, turning over to the treasurers of 
 the Crown only so much as they saw fit; and they raised and 
 maintained military forces, which they tended to regard as their 
 own provincial armies. 
 
 This excessive decentralization was, indeed, partially overcome 
 during the eighteenth century. The unity of the army was 
 restored; and the Diet of 1717, by establishing permanent taxes 
 levied according to a fixed scale by officials of the central govern- 
 ment, put an end to the financial powers of the Dietines, except 
 for the raising of local rates. But by this time it was hard to 
 undo the effects of one hundred years of disorganization and 
 chaos, to curb the deeply rooted particularist spirit, to bring the 
 state back to the path towards unity, on which it had started in 
 the sixteenth century. And above all, even in the mid eighteenth 
 century nothing had been done to remedy the worst evil produced 
 by the long preponderance of the Dietines, namely, the impotence 
 of the Diet. 
 
 That impotence was due chiefly to the system of the imperative 
 mandate. Since 1572 the instructions given by the Dietines to 
 their deputies had grown more and more lengthy, detailed, and 
 strict. The deputies might be ordered to put through a project 
 at all costs, or not to allow one to pass under any consideration. 
 Then the custom had grown up of holding so-called ' Dietines of 
 relation ' (Sejmiki relacyjne) at the close of each Diet, for the pur- 
 pose of hearing the reports of the returned deputies. These 
 Dietines of relation not only kept the nuncios in wholesome awe
 
 20 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of disobeying their instructions, but also, while they could not 
 de jure alter or nullify what the Diet had done, de facto they not 
 infrequently did so. 
 
 The result of this system was to hamper the action of the Diet 
 to the utmost. Whatever was to come up in the central parlia- 
 ment was discussed and virtually decided in advance by the 
 Dietines, and the latter decided these matters, — questions, it 
 might be, of the most general nature, affecting the whole Republic 
 — on the basis of local interests, local knowledge, local prejudices; 
 decided them prematurely, categorically, in final instance, without 
 regard for what the assembly of the whole nation, after a more 
 comprehensive survey of the situation and more mature delibera- 
 tion, might be inclined to favor. 1 The fate of every question thus 
 depended not so much upon the debates in the Diet, as upon the 
 referendum taken in fifty or sixty tumultuous gatherings of — for 
 the most part — ignorant and narrow-minded country squires. 
 
 The logical development of the system of imperative mandates 
 and the crowning anomaly of the Polish constitution was the 
 famous Liberum Veto: the right of any member of the Diet to 
 interpose a veto, which had the threefold effect of defeating the 
 particular proposition that had aroused opposition, dissolving 
 the Diet, and nullifying all the decisions previously taken by the 
 assembly. 
 
 The Liberum Veto was a late constitutional development. In 
 the sixteenth century Diets a determined minority was generally 
 able to check the action of the majority, but if the dissenters were 
 very few, little attention was paid to them. In the seventeenth 
 century, however, with the strong tendency of that age to 
 ' liberty,' and its antipathy to ' tyranny ' of any sort, the con- 
 ception of the rights of the minority developed, until in 1652 for 
 the first time a single deputy, Sicinski, by his veto ' exploded ' the 
 Diet. After that the use of the Liberum Veto, although it rested 
 on no written law and was in itself a defiance of common sense, 
 became an established constitutional practice, and a chronic evil. 
 The Dietines often expressly ordered its application, taking 
 pleasure in this means of showing their importance. The mass of 
 
 1 Cf. the vigorous passage on this subject in Pawinski, Rzqdy sejmikowe, i, p. 409.
 
 INTRODUCTION 2 1 
 
 the szlachta regarded it as a useful safeguard against injustice or 
 tyranny — in fact as the ' palladium of liberty/ the ' jewel of the 
 constitution.' Of the fifty-five Diets held between 1652 and 1764, 
 forty-eight were ' exploded,' almost one-third of them by the veto 
 of a single deputy. During the thirty years' reign of Augustus III 
 not a single Diet lived out its normal time. As the Diet met only 
 once in two years, and then for six weeks only (provided it 
 escaped being ' exploded '), and as each Diet was generally brought 
 to a violent and premature end with nothing accomplished, the 
 result was that the national parliament had virtually ceased to 
 function. And yet, after the collapse of the royal power, the Diet 
 was the one institution that might have given the country a 
 government ! 
 
 One means of getting around the Liberum Veto existed, but, as 
 has frequently been pointed out, it was a remedy worse than the 
 disease. This was the ' Confederation,' i. e., a voluntary armed 
 association of individuals formed for the purpose of putting 
 through its specified projects in the face of any opposition whatso- 
 ever. Confederations — a characteristic mediaeval constitutional 
 device — were much in vogue in Poland in the late fourteenth and 
 fifteenth centuries; they then disappeared for a time, but re- 
 curred frequently in the period after 1572, — one symptom more 
 of the reversion in type that marked Polish constitutionalism in 
 that age. Confederations were of three kinds: (1) those formed 
 during interregna, in order to prevent disorders and hold the realm 
 together; (2) those formed during the life- time of a king for the 
 purpose of assisting him in some great emergency; and (3) those 
 formed in opposition to the kings — of which there are only too 
 many examples. Associations of the first two kinds were useful; 
 indeed, a Confederation formed ' at the King's side,' might be 
 merely a technical device for putting through a project in spite of 
 the opposition of a minority, since in a Diet held ' under the seal 
 of a Confederation ' the majority ruled. But a Confederation was 
 under any circumstances a hazardous expedient, for it always 
 brought with it the danger of civil war. Nothing reveals in a 
 more glaring light the defects of Polish constitutionalism. Noth- 
 ing could be more detrimental to stability, legality, and order
 
 22 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 than a system under which the ordinary authorities might at any 
 moment be violently replaced by a set of ambitious private 
 persons, who usurped control of the administration, the courts, 
 the treasury, and the army, called a Diet, put through what 
 legislation they pleased, and dispersed only when their aims were 
 attained. The right of confederation, as Moltke declared, was 
 revolution legally organized. 1 It gave rise to the epigram that 
 the government of Poland was anarchy tempered by civil war. 
 
 Were there any truth in the old Liberal maxim that those 
 states were happiest that were governed least, the Polish Republic 
 must have approached the acme of perfection. The activity of 
 its government had been reduced to the vanishing-point. " No 
 people," said Burke, " have ever taken greater precautions to 
 secure the possession of a sober and well-regulated freedom, than 
 the Poles have to preserve themselves in their present anarchy." 2 
 In order that the King might not make himself a' tyrant,' he had 
 been stripped of wellnigh every prerogative. In order that the 
 Diet might not endanger ' liberty,' it had been reduced to com- 
 plete impotence. The Dietines, in which the Liberum Veto also 
 prevailed, were, as organs of government, scarcely more respect- 
 able. In Poland, Raynal declared, " everyone has the power to 
 prevent action, and no one the power to act. There the will of any 
 individual may thwart the general will; and there alone a foolish, a 
 wicked, or an insane man is sure to prevail over a whole nation." 3 
 Montesquieu rightly affirmed that ' the object of the laws of 
 Poland was the independence of every individual,' 4 that is of 
 every nobleman. 
 
 The szlachta had, in fact, attained the most complete freedom, 
 not only from every kind of oppression, but from any sort of 
 obligation or constraint. From the latter part of the seventeenth 
 century on, they ceased to render military service, since the de- 
 velopment of warfare had made the old feudal levies an an- 
 achronism; nevertheless they continued to consider themselves 
 
 1 Cited in Lehtonen, Die polnischen Provinzen Russlands, p. 15. 
 
 2 Annual Register, 1763, p. 46. 
 
 3 Histoire philosophique el politique des Etablissemens des Europeens dans les 
 deux Indes, x, p. 52. 
 
 4 U Esprit des Lois, Bk. 11, ch. 5.
 
 INTRODUCTION 23 
 
 the sword and buckler of Poland and to claim all the privileges for 
 which their former service had been the sole justification. They 
 enjoyed a monopoly of land-owning. They exercised sovereign 
 and unlimited power over the serfs on their estates. They could 
 not be taxed without their consent, and in practice they paid 
 none of the usual taxes, not even customs-duties. They could not 
 be arrested or imprisoned or deprived of their property without 
 trial, nor punished for their speeches and opinions. They held a 
 monopoly of the higher positions in the Church, and of political 
 rights and offices. Through their control of the Diet, the Dietines, 
 and the courts of justice, they had in their hands whatever 
 machinery of government existed. Finally, every nobleman, 
 however indigent or insignificant he might be, had the right to 
 attend and to participate in the elections to the throne, as a 
 supreme demonstration of the fact that in Poland the sovereignty 
 belonged to every szlachcic individually, as well as to all the 
 szlachta collectively. It may be doubted whether any other class 
 has ever obtained such unrestricted independence and such a 
 fullness of power and privilege. The szlachta themselves were 
 wont to boast that it was impossible to imagine a happier lot than 
 that of a Polish nobleman, and they looked down upon all the 
 other peoples of Europe as the ' slaves of despots.' 
 
 Naturally there grew up in the minds of the ruling class an 
 idealization of this ' golden liberty,' purchased by ' the blood and 
 toil ' of their 'virtuous ancestors,' which became a sort of relig- 
 ion, and a veritable obsession. One hardly knows whether to 
 wonder more at the glorification of the szlachta as a caste, or at 
 the panegyrics lavished upon the constitution which the nobility 
 had created. The szlachta, it was said, were exalted above all the 
 other classes as the cedars of Lebanon above the common trees. 
 They were the heart and hands of the body politic, as the king 
 was the head and the commoners the feet. As they gave their 
 lives to the defence of the Republic, it was meet that the lower 
 orders should serve them. It was necessary to have in the state 
 one class of people who, disdainful of all gain, sought only the 
 dignity, honor, and advantage of the fatherland. Traders and 
 artisans, absorbed in money-making, were incapable of lofty
 
 24 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 thought or deeds, just as the szlachta, living only for virtue, truth, 
 and right, were incapable of any low action. 1 
 
 As for the constitution, it was defended with a great store of 
 classical erudition, which testifies to the profound influence of 
 Humanism upon Polish thought. With their minds full of politi- 
 cal and legal ideas borrowed from antiquity, with the old phrases 
 about ' tyranny,' ' freedom,' and ' equality ' ever upon their lips, 
 the szlachta finally came to conceive of themselves as the rein- 
 carnation of the Roman Republic. The analogy was useful in a 
 dozen ways. Did not History show that in the ancient republics 
 political rights had also been confined to one class of well-born, 
 wealthy, and leisured citizens, below which stood a servile pro- 
 letariat ? Was not a deputy exercising the Liberum Veto merely 
 a tribune of the people ? Was not a Confederation simply a new 
 form of the Roman dictatorship ? Nowhere else, perhaps, was 
 the ideal of a democratic republic of the ancient type so popular, 
 or so potent in shaping political theory and practice. 2 
 
 Religion also added its sanction to the apotheosis of the 
 szlachta-state. In order to assure the victory of the Counter- 
 Reformation, the Jesuits had not hesitated to make themselves 
 ardent champions of ' golden liberty,' and to proclaim that the 
 free constitution of the Republic was peculiarly adapted to Catho- 
 lic principles and teaching. Under the influence of the clergy, the 
 Poles came to regard themselves as under the special protection 
 of Providence, as a chosen people; and confirmation for this belief 
 was found in the many signs and wonders of the seventeenth 
 century, especially in the miraculous deliverance of the country 
 from the Swedes in the time of John Casimir. 3 
 
 Extravagant as such theories were, they took deep root in the 
 minds of the nobility. Combined with material interests, class- 
 egotism, and the instinct of self-preservation, they produced in 
 the szlachta a blind conservatism, a horror of all innovations, a 
 fierce determination to maintain the existing state of things, 
 which long rendered reforms almost impossible. 
 
 1 Cf. the interesting essay of Wl. Smolenski, " Szlachta w swietle wlasnych 
 opinii," in his Pisma historyczne, i. 
 
 2 KapieBt, nojibCKift CeiiMT., pp. 42 ff. 
 
 3 Cf. Smolenski, Przewrot umyslowy w Polsce wieku XVIII, p. 9.
 
 INTRODUCTION 2$ 
 
 The constitutional development of Poland from the end of the 
 fourteenth down to the middle of the seventeenth century had 
 been continuous, consistent, and logical. Unfortunate as that 
 evolution had been, there had at least been life and movement. 
 But in the seventeenth century growth ceased. The constitution 
 had taken on fixed forms, and now entered upon a period of petri- 
 faction during which all the disastrous effects of the preceding 
 evolution made themselves increasingly and appallingly felt. 
 The seventeenth century was marked by intellectual and moral 
 retrogression, economic decline, growing political anarchy, and 
 continual, exhausting, and on the whole disastrous conflicts with 
 the neighboring Powers. Then followed the dullest and dreariest 
 period of Polish history, the reigns of the two Saxon Kings (1697- 
 1763), an age in which patriotism, public spirit, energy, and 
 initiative seemed to have deserted Poland. After the incessant 
 wars of the preceding period, amid which the nation could still 
 produce heroes like Czarniecki or Sobieski, the szlaehta laid aside 
 their swords and abandoned themselves thenceforth to the joys of 
 life on their estates, enhanced by constant and exuberant festivi- 
 ties, and varied by the excitements connected with the Diets, the 
 Dietines, the law-courts, and a sordid and senseless party strife. 
 This age of materialism, selfishness, apathy, and stagnation 
 brought Poland to the depths of degradation. Her impotence 
 was now well known to all the world, her anarchy proverbial, and 
 her complete downfall a matter of common discussion. 
 
 Ill 
 
 ^In the middle of the eighteenth century, just before the period 
 of the great disasters began, Poland was suffering from innumer- 
 able maladies. Outwardly, indeed, the Republic might still make 
 a somewhat impressive appearance. With an area of approxi- 
 mately 282,000 square miles, it ranked as the third largest state 
 on the Continent, 1 while in population it stood fourth, with over 
 
 1 Korzon {Wewnqtrzne dzieje Polski za Stanisiawa Augusta, i, p. 44) estimates 
 the area in 1772 (after the loss of the Zips, and without counting in Courland) at 
 ^jS 00 geographical square miles, which would equal 282,382.94 square miles, 
 English. Among European states, only Russia and Sweden were larger.
 
 26 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 eleven million souls. 1 But this population was far from homo- 
 geneous. The Poles can scarcely have formed more than fifty 
 per cent of it at the most; more than one- third of it was made up 
 of Little and White Russians; while the remainder consisted of 
 Germans, Lithuanians, Jews, Armenians, and Tartars. 2 This lack 
 of national unity was aggravated by the lack of religious unity. 
 The Poles and Lithuanians were, with few exceptions, Roman 
 Catholics; the Germans were mostly Protestants; and the Rus- 
 sians had for many centuries belonged to the Orthodox Eastern 
 Church. It was true that owing to the unceasing efforts of the 
 Polish clergy and the pressure of the landowners, the great ma- 
 jority of the Russian peasantry within the Republic had been 
 brought over to union with Rome; but their conversion had been 
 effected so recently and in part by such unedifying means that 
 their loyalty to the Roman Church was open to grave suspicion. 
 These religious diversities were the more dangerous because, 
 while the Poles had formerly shown themselves the most tolerant 
 nation in Europe, they were now coming to display quite the 
 contrary spirit. During the later seventeenth and early eigh- 
 teenth centuries the Dissidents (i. e., the non- Catholics) were 
 gradually deprived of political and even civil rights, subjected to 
 many forms of petty persecution, and occasionally exposed to 
 outbursts of violence, such as the so-called Massacre of Thorn in 
 1724. This unhappy state of affairs contributed not a little to 
 alienating the sympathies of the European public from Poland; 
 it furnished foreign Powers with a welcome pretext for interven- 
 tion; and it produced among the Russian population a chronic, 
 sullen, and ominous discontent. In the rich palatinates of the 
 southeast, where a small Polish minority of landowners and 
 priests ruled over millions of Russian serfs, the gentry lived in 
 constant fear of a jacquerie, of which the Orthodox popes would 
 be the natural leaders. 
 
 1 After elaborate computations Korzon (op. cit., i, p. 63) concludes that in 1764 
 the total population was probably about 11-11 1/2 millions. Only France, Russia, 
 and Austria had larger populations at that time. 
 
 2 So much can be gathered from Korzon's statistics with regard to the religious 
 divisions, op. cit., i, pp. 163 ff. Unfortunately he does not attempt to supply any 
 ethnic statistics directly.
 
 INTRODUCTION 2J 
 
 If racial and religious divisions sapped the strength of the 
 Republic, the social system of Old Poland was even more ruinous. 
 It has often been pointed out that this state was a paradise for the 
 nobility, but quite the reverse for all the other classes. Now the 
 szlachta, although more numerous perhaps than the nobility of 
 any other European country, formed only about eight per cent of 
 the population; the townsmen, Jewish and Christian, about 
 fifteen per cent; and the peasants seventy-two per cent. 1 The 
 interests of all the other classes had been systematically sacrificed 
 in favor of a caste which numbered less than a million. 
 
 Five-sixths of the Polish peasantry were serfs on the estates of 
 the Crown, the Church, or the szlachta. It seems to be generally 
 admitted that the lot of the serfs in Poland was more cruel than 
 anywhere else, chiefly because the state was here unable to offer 
 any protection to the serf. The many appalling descriptions that 
 have come down to us portray the mass of the peasantry as sunk 
 to a state of misery, apathy, and brutishness that almost defies 
 comparison. One contemporary declares: " These people differ 
 little from cattle, have no property, live from hand to mouth, and 
 rot in filth and poverty; half their offspring die from lack of 
 sunlight and proper nourishment, . . . and they themselves 
 finally perish from hunger, if a year of bad harvest comes. It 
 must be confessed that whatever fate should befall Poland, their 
 condition could not become any worse." 2 
 
 The sad fortunes of the Polish towns have already been de- 
 scribed. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Republic 
 did not contain a single city of 50,000 inhabitants, and only seven 
 with over 10,000; 3 and most of the so-called cities were only 
 " agricultural settlements and collections of straw-covered huts," 
 where a few Jews, artisans, and tinkers dragged out a wretched 
 existence. With their trade and industry ruined, largely by the 
 selfish class-legislation of the Diet, robbed of their municipal 
 
 1 Cf. the table in Korzon, op. cit., i, p. 320. These figures relate to the year 
 1 791; but it may be assumed, I think, that substantially the same ratio between 
 the various classes existed forty years earlier. 
 
 2 Cited in Von der Briiggen, Polens Aujiosung, p. 54. For general descriptions of 
 the condition of the serfs, see Lehtonen, Die polnischen Provinzen Russlands, pp. 
 32-72, and Korzon, op. cit., i, pp. 350-366. 3 Korzon, op. cit., i, pp. 274 ff.
 
 28 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 autonomy, exposed to the continual and tyrannous interference 
 of the szlachta in their domestic affairs, and excluded from all 
 political rights and offices, the townsmen, like the peasantry, 
 could scarcely be expected to feel any genuine devotion to the 
 Republic. 
 
 As the state existed solely for the benefit of the szlachta, as 
 everything else had been sacrificed to the interests of the szlachta, 
 one might have supposed that this class at least would be in 
 sound and prosperous condition, and able to furnish a great 
 reservoir of strength to the Republic. But even within this 
 exalted caste, poverty and wretchedness were the lot of the great 
 majority. Although in theory all members of this class were 
 equal, and the richest magnate was bound to address the poorest 
 szlachcic as ' brother,' in fact this much-vaunted equality was 
 very much a farce. The szlachta were divided into several strata 
 sharply differentiated by wealth, education, and social position. 
 
 At the top were sixteen or seventeen great families, like the 
 Potockis, the Czartoryskis, or the Radziwills; families who 
 possessed immense wealth and estates which in some cases sur- 
 passed in extent many a principality of Germany or Italy. Some 
 of these magnates maintained courts which outshone that of the 
 king in splendor and rigid etiquette; kept up standing armies of 
 their own (their ' house-militia '), a correspondence with foreign 
 monarchs, and a sort of foreign policy; aped the manners of 
 royalty to the best of their ability, and were accustomed to sign 
 themselves, 'We, Palatine (or Castellan), by the grace of God.' 
 In short, they conducted themselves like sovereign princes, and 
 in fact they often had more real power than the king of 
 Poland. Considering themselves born to rule the country and to 
 hold all the most lucrative positions, these families engaged in 
 incessant struggles with one another for power, influence, and 
 plunder. Their rivalry kept the Republic in constant turmoil, 
 and was demoralizing and dangerous, not only because it was so 
 entirely divorced from questions of principle or considerations of 
 patriotism, but also because in order to vanquish its domestic 
 opponents, each faction was generally ready to call in the aid of 
 foreign Powers.
 
 INTRODUCTION 29 
 
 Below the magnates stood the large number of fairly well-to-do 
 szlachta, who took but little part in politics, busied themselves 
 chiefly with their estates, and led simple, industrious, God-fearing 
 lives like their ancestors. In spite of their ignorance and preju- 
 dices, these middle-class gentry were probably the best element 
 in the nation. 
 
 The majority of the szlachta belonged to that aristocratic pro- 
 letariat which was made up of those who had either no land at all 
 or only enough to make a bare living. Poverty-stricken, ragged, 
 and dirty, living like peasants or worse, but still rilled with all the 
 pride of their caste, and eager to vent it on all occasions, these 
 people excited the derision of every foreigner, and were, indeed, 
 one of the most unique spectacles to be seen in Poland. Hundreds 
 and thousands of them lived at the courts of the magnates, serving 
 the latter in their militia, in the administration of their estates, or 
 even in menial capacities. It was a point of honor and almost a 
 matter of necessity for every great ' lord ' in Poland to have hosts 
 of such ' clients ' at his disposal, and their services were extremely 
 useful. For it was from this class that the magnates recruited 
 those hordes of tattered and drunken ' citizens,' who swarmed in 
 to every Dietine, ready to acclaim ' whatever the Lord Hetman, 
 (or the Lord Palatine) wishes,' and quick to use their swords in 
 case of opposition. As almost everybody in old Poland, from the 
 Diet down to the humblest law-court, was subject to mob-rule, it 
 was indispensable to have the mob on one's side. It was the mag- 
 nates who ruined Poland, and the ' barefoot szlachta,' who formed 
 their constant and efficacious instrument. And it was a sad 
 commentary upon ' golden liberty ' that more than half of the 
 class which boasted of its republican freedom and equality, had 
 been reduced to pauperism and to lives of groveling servility. 
 
 The results of ' golden liberty ' in the political sphere have 
 already in part been described. The administrative system was 
 completely disorganized. The great officials of the central govern- 
 ment, the marshals, chancellors, treasurers and hetmans, 1 were 
 irremovable and irresponsible, and each of them did what was 
 
 1 These great officials were always in pairs: one for ' the Crown ' (i. e., Poland), 
 and one for Lithuania. The hetmans were the highest military officials.
 
 30 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 right in his own eyes. The officials who represented the Crown 
 in the provinces had virtually ceased to discharge their functions. 
 Whatever local administration existed was mainly carried on by 
 the Dietines. It need hardly be remarked that a state in which 
 the executive power was thus atrophied, could undertake none 
 of those tasks of economic and social improvement which were 
 coming to attract the attention of so many governments of that 
 day. At a time when almost every other nation was doing its 
 utmost to foster commerce and industry, Poland did nothing 
 whatever towards that end. And — what was most serious in its 
 immediate consequences — the Poles were blind even to the 
 necessity of having those primary elements of strength, well- 
 ordered finances and a respectable standing army. It has been 
 estimated that about 1750 the annual revenues of the Republic 
 amounted to only one-thirteenth of those of Russia, and one 
 seventy-fifth of those of France. 1 Although the nation was mis- 
 erably poor, and had neither trade nor industry to be taxed, it 
 could undoubtedly have raised far larger sums with ease, had the 
 szlachta been willing to bear their proper share of the burden, had 
 the finances been decently administered, and had the govern- 
 ment done anything to develop the great natural wealth of the 
 country. Partly because of the perpetual stringency in the 
 treasury, and partly because the szlachta distrusted a large 
 standing army as a potential instrument of ' despotism,' the 
 military forces of the Republic had been reduced to the barest 
 minimum. The Diet of 17 17 had fixed the size of the standing 
 army at 24,000 men; but as a matter of fact, hardly half of that 
 number were actually kept on foot. This Lilliputian army was 
 the laughing-stock of the neighbors. There were generally about 
 as many officers as privates in a regiment; the officers' positions 
 were sold, often to mere boys of good family; the troops were 
 chiefly cavalry, since it was beneath the dignity of a Polish gentle- 
 man to serve on foot; there was almost no artillery; and there 
 was no discipline at all. 2 The Republic possessed only one fortress, 
 Kamieniec. It had no natural frontier except the Carpathians. 
 
 1 Korzon, op. cit., iii, pp. 109 ff. 
 
 2 Bobrzynski, Dzieje Polski, ii, p. 274; Von der Briiggen, op. cit., pp. 80 f.
 
 INTRODUCTION 3 1 
 
 On every other side its vast territories lay open and defenceless, 
 almost seeming to invite the invasion of the three great military 
 monarchies that encircled it. 
 
 The szlachta, however, refused to recognize the danger. With 
 incredible blindness they even tried to persuade themselves that 
 the very impotence of Poland was the best guarantee of its 
 security. For, as they reasoned, since the Republic had renounced 
 all aggressive enterprises and had voluntarily rendered itself 
 incapable of harming its neighbors, the latter would never think 
 of disturbing a state of things so ideally adapted to their own 
 interests. Each of the neighboring Powers must see the advan- 
 tage of having a weak state like Poland on its frontiers, rather 
 than another strong military state like itself. And hence there 
 arose among the szlachta the insane maxim, ' Poland subsists 
 through its anarchy.' 
 
 Without a government worthy of the name, without an army, 
 without trade or manufactures, with misery universal in all 
 classes save a small minority, rotting away under a system of 
 ' liberty ' which a sagacious Englishman described as " merely a 
 system of aristocratic licentiousness, where a few members of the 
 community are above the control of the law, while the majority 
 are excluded from its protection," l Poland had become, in the 
 opinion of foreign observers, the weakest and unhappiest of 
 nations. 2 A few among the Poles also recognized it. " Whatever 
 happens," one of them declared, " we cannot be any poorer or 
 weaker or more miserable than we now are, nor less free, nor more 
 oppressed, nor more despised by foreigners." 3 
 
 IV 
 
 It was the cataclysm that so suddenly overwhelmed Poland in 
 the reign of John Casimir (1 648-1 668), the simultaneous and 
 amazingly successful attacks of Swedes, Muscovites, Cossacks, 
 and Tartars, that first revealed to the world the utter weakness of 
 the Republic. Then for the first time Europe saw foreign armies 
 
 1 William Coxe, Travels in Poland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark, i, p. 15. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 143; cf. Burke in the Annual Register, 1772, p. 6. 
 8 Konarski, cited in Zaleski, Zywoi Czarloryskiego, i, pp. 23 f.
 
 32 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 marching from one end of the country to the other, the szlachta 
 deserting their own sovereign en masse and welcoming an invader 
 as a deliverer, a king of Poland driven a fugitive from his do- 
 minions. Then for the first time the idea of a partition of Poland 
 began to be seriously and universally discussed. Charles Gus- 
 tavus, planning to unite Poland to Sweden, or else to divide up 
 the huge realm with his allies; the Great Elector, stipulating for 
 himself in his numerous negotiations and treaties with the Swedes 
 the acquisition of West Prussia, Samogitia, or Great Poland; 
 Tsar Alexis, seizing Lithuania and looking forward to the day 
 when he should take Poland as well; Austrian diplomats debating 
 the relative advantages for the Hapsburgs of getting the Polish 
 crown or partitioning the Republic — all these actors in that 
 crowded scene were anticipating by a hundred years the things 
 that Catherine and Frederick and Joseph accomplished. So 
 thoroughly had the idea of the imminent disruption of the Re- 
 public taken root in men's minds that French diplomats sus- 
 pected that a partition treaty had already been signed; * and 
 the King of Poland, addressing the Diet, solemnly prophesied 
 to the nation its impending fate: Moscow would take Lithuania; 
 the Brandenburger, Great Poland; Austria, Cracow and the 
 neighboring palatinates. In short, the First Great Northern 
 War not only raised the Polish Question, but also marked out 
 the future solution. 
 
 It was true that through a belated national uprising and the 
 intervention of the enemies of Sweden, Poland escaped from this 
 first crisis with slighter losses than might have been expected. 
 John Sobieski succeeded in restoring to some degree the prestige 
 of the Polish arms, and in asserting, virtually for the last time, 
 Poland's position as an independent and considerable member of 
 the European political system. But Sobieski's victories brought 
 his country hardly more than an ephemeral glory; the anarchy at 
 home grew constantly worse; while, as a result of that anarchy, 
 the Republic became a prey to foreign intrigues, and in particular 
 a battleground between Hapsburg and Bourbon. It was in this 
 
 1 Cf. R. I. A., Pologne, i, p. 81. The best account of the diplomatic history of 
 the First Great Northern War is Haumant, La Guerre du Nord et la Paix d'Oliva.
 
 INTRODUCTION 33 
 
 second half of the seventeenth century that there arose among the 
 szlachta organized French and Austrian parties, even Brandenburg 
 and Muscovite ones; that the magnates began to treat with 
 foreign sovereigns like independent princes, and to accept bribes 
 and pensions from abroad as a matter of course; that elections to 
 the Polish throne came to be great international events periodi- 
 cally shaking the European political world, inviting and almost 
 compelling the rival Powers to interfere in Polish affairs. As yet, 
 however, this foreign interference was confined to the use of the 
 black arts of diplomacy; except during the Great Northern War, 
 the foreigners had not yet come to dictating to the Republic by 
 force. 
 
 With the advent of the Saxon Kings, the Polish Question 
 entered upon a second and more acute phase. Augustus II 
 owed his crown to a more shameful use of bribes and violence 
 and to more undisguised attempts at intimidation on the part of 
 foreign Powers — Russia and Austria — than had been known 
 at any previous election. Once seated on the throne, he found 
 it impossible to maintain himself there without the aid of the 
 foreigners. Having plunged recklessly into the Second Great 
 Northern War, he brought down on the Republic the invasion of 
 Charles XII. The scenes of the time of John Casimir were 
 repeated ; a great part of the szlachta again deserted their sover- 
 eign; the invaders roamed through the country, victorious at all 
 points; Charles set up a rival king; and Augustus saw safety 
 only in throwing himself into the arms of Russia. That was a 
 fateful step. For after Poltava the Swedes disappeared, but the 
 Muscovites remained, nominally as allies and protectors, really as 
 masters. It is a fact not sufficiently recognized that one of the 
 most important results of the Second Great Northern War was to 
 establish the predominant influence of Russia in Poland. 
 
 Peter the Great deserves the credit of having inaugurated the 
 policy which aimed at placing the Republic under a Russian 
 protectorate and ended with the three Partitions. He fixed the 
 traditions of Russia's Polish policy for nearly a century. Here, as 
 in so many other cases, Catherine II continued and completed 
 what Peter began. In Peter's time Russian armies first learned to
 
 34 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 scour Poland from end to end, to make themselves thoroughly at 
 home in the country, and to despise the military power of the 
 Poles. Russian diplomats became familiar with the mysterious, 
 but — to them — highly convenient, devices of the Polish con- 
 stitution, and with the tangled web of Polish party politics. They 
 learned how to buy up magnates, ministers, and even the court 
 itself; how to manage the Die tines; run a Confederation; cajole, 
 coerce, or 'explode' a Diet. Above all, the Russian government 
 acquired the art of playing off the Polish nation against the king 
 and the king against the nation, and thus holding both in de- 
 pendence upon itself. Catherine II never displayed greater 
 cleverness in handling the Poles than did Peter when, in 17 16-17, 
 he imposed his mediation upon Augustus II and the rebellious 
 szlachta alike. And then the world saw for the first time a Rus- 
 sian ambassador dictating a peace between the Polish nation and 
 its king, backing up his terms with a display of bayonets, and 
 placing an important series of political and constitutional arrange- 
 ments under the guarantee of the Russian sovereign. Prince 
 Dolgoruki, the peace-maker on this occasion, was the worthy 
 forerunner of the Repnins, the Stackelbergs, the Sievers of 
 Catherine's time; and the 'Dumb Diet' of Warsaw in 1717 
 foreshadowed the terrorized Polish parliaments of 1773 and 1793. 
 The Republic had now lost its complete independence. It had 
 allowed and invited its most dangerous neighbor to exercise a 
 decisive voice in its internal affairs. It had accepted from the 
 hands of Russia a number of constitutional arrangements, the 
 aim of which was obviously to prevent the King from acquiring 
 effective power in the state, and to prevent the Republic from 
 strengthening or reforming itself. 
 
 Significant, also, of the new situation was the fact that by the 
 alliance treaty of 1720 and a long series of subsequent agree- 
 ments Russia and Prussia bound themselves to watch over the 
 maintenance of the ' liberties ' of Poland. Already two of the 
 neighboring Powers were in formal accord on the principle of 
 perpetuating the anarchy and impotence of the Republic. The 
 protracted negotiations between the cabinets of St. Petersburg, 
 Vienna, and Berlin about the future succession in Poland showed
 
 INTRODUCTION 3 5 
 
 that henceforth the glorified ' freedom of election ' was to be 
 purely illusory. Moreover, the continual disturbances in Poland 
 during the first two decades of the century and the restless ambi- 
 tion of Augustus II brought about a great revival of the talk of a 
 dismemberment. The King of Poland himself repeatedly pro- 
 posed to Russia and Prussia a partition of the realm whose 
 integrity he had sworn to defend, in order that the fragments of 
 the state left after the avidity of the neighbors had been satisfied, 
 might be handed over to him as an hereditary kingdom. Fred- 
 erick I of Prussia suggested a partition at least four times to 
 Charles XII, and later tried to press his ' grand dessein ' upon 
 Augustus and Peter. The Tsar himself seems to have played for 
 a time with the idea of a dismemberment; but after firmly estab- 
 lishing himself in Poland, he set his face against it, and sternly 
 rebuffed the proposals coming from Berlin and Dresden as 
 impracticable, impolitic, and wicked. Possibly he had arrived 
 at the conclusion that it was useless to divide the realm with 
 others when by influence he could rule it all. 1 
 
 The death of Peter the Great brought some alleviation to 
 Poland, at least in that his immediate successors showed less 
 firmness and consistency in dealing with Polish affairs, while they 
 scarcely attempted to develop to its logical conclusion the policy 
 he had inaugurated toward the Republic. Nevertheless, they 
 adhered in the main to the cardinal principles of keeping Poland 
 weak, maintaining ' golden liberty,' and asserting for Russia a 
 special influence in the distracted state. 
 
 On the death of Augustus II in 1733 the question of the Polish 
 succession provoked a general European war. For the first and 
 last time one of the Western Powers drew the sword in order to 
 rescue Poland from the clutches of her neighbors. But neither 
 the capricious and half-hearted efforts of France nor the wishes of 
 the vast majority of the szlachta prevented Russia and Austria 
 from establishing by force of arms their protege, Augustus III of 
 Saxony, upon the Polish throne. Never before had there been 
 
 1 On the plans of partition discussed at this time see especially Droysen, 
 Geschichteder preussischen Politik, iv', pp. 177 f., 188 ff., 197, 217 ff.; iv H , pp. 147 f., 
 3i7-
 
 36 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 such a travesty of a free election, so striking an exhibition of the 
 impotence of the Poles to defend their independence, so clear a 
 demonstration of the fact that the neighboring Powers would 
 tolerate no king in Poland save a creature of their own. 
 
 It can hardly be denied that the Court of St. Petersburg failed 
 to exploit properly its triumphs in this war. The Russian states- 
 men were too much occupied with the ensuing contests with 
 Turkey and Sweden, and then with the great European questions 
 that were being fought out in Germany, to pay much attention to 
 Polish affairs. Under Elizabeth, the close friendship uniting the 
 two Imperial Courts 1 to the Saxon House led the Russian govern- 
 ment into acts of complaisance towards the King of Poland which 
 Peter or Catherine II would doubtless have avoided. 2 As Russia 
 had ceased to use other than diplomatic methods in Poland, as she 
 no longer entered actively into the party struggles that rent the 
 Republic, as her whole attention seemed to be concentrated else- 
 where, the result was that in Elizabeth's last years the Polish 
 Court paid less and less attention to demands from St. Peters- 
 burg; the Diet ventured to assume an independent, and often an 
 unfriendly, attitude; while the ' Russian party ' found itself 
 diminished, discouraged, and almost discredited. Russian policy 
 
 \ inPoland seemed to be losing its bearings. 
 
 /f\At the moment of the accession of Catherine II (1762), the 
 \Polish Question was in a curiously uncertain state, in which, 
 however, several facts stand out clearly. In the first place, 
 Poland was no longer considered an independent member of the 
 European group of states, 3 but rather as what we should call 
 today a Russian ' sphere of influence.' The Russian influence, it 
 is true, had varied greatly in intensity, and it had not yet attained 
 that all-embracing and absolute character which it was to have 
 under Catherine II. The government at St. Petersburg did not 
 yet pretend to control all the actions of the King and Diet; it 
 
 1 Austria and Russia. 
 
 2 Such as, for instance, promising the succession in Poland to the Saxon Electoral 
 Prince, or allowing Prince Charles of Saxony to become Duke of Courland. Com- 
 pare Catherine's remarks on this latter affair, CSopHHKt, vii, pp. 91 f. 
 
 3 Cf. Choiseul's instructions to Paulmy, April 7, 1760, R.I. A., Pologne, ii, 
 p. 217.
 
 INTRODUCTION 3 7 
 
 still paid some regard to the wishes of the court and nation; while 
 aiming to maintain the anarchy in Poland, it did not try to ex- 
 ploit that anarchy in order to gain material advantages for Russia. 
 Finally, while the development of the Polish Question concerned 
 Russia preeminently, it also touched Prussia and Austria very 
 closely, and to a lesser degree France. The ultimate solution 
 must depend on the interaction of the ambitions and interests of 
 three or four great Powers. Hence, before proceeding further, it 
 seems necessary to examine the special interests that guided each 
 of these Powers in its policy toward the Republic. 
 
 France was the oldest friend and the most natural ally of 
 Poland. In the classic system of French diplomacy, the Republic 
 occupied a place along with Sweden and Turkey as one of the 
 pivots of French policy in Eastern Europe, as a confederate that 
 might be used either to take the Hapsburgs in the rear or to 
 checkmate Brandenburg-Prussia and Russia. Hence France long 
 endeavored to establish a predominant influence in Poland. The 
 sixteenth century saw two Franco-Polish alliances (1500, 1524) 
 directed against the Hapsburgs, and — for a moment — a Valois 
 installed as King at Cracow. In the seventeenth century Riche- 
 lieu and Mazarin vainly tried to draw Poland into the Thirty 
 Years' War, and Louis XIV made a supreme effort to turn the 
 Republic into a useful ally. He proposed nothing less than an 
 " eternal league . . . and an indissoluble alliance," by which 
 France and Poland " would hem in the Empire, just as France 
 had formerly been hemmed in between the Empire and Spain," 
 and by which they could raise themselves "to a greater height 
 than ever Austria had attained." l But all Louis' efforts to draw 
 Poland into active cooperation proved fruitless, owing to the 
 failure of the szlachta to appreciate the advantages of the French 
 alliance, and to the ever-increasing anarchy in the Republic. In 
 the eighteenth century, chiefly, it would seem, out of deference to 
 the classic tradition, French statesmen continued to take a con- 
 siderable interest in Polish affairs and to lavish money in attempts 
 to build up a party or to place a protege on the throne. If Poland 
 could no longer be seriously thought of as an ally, France was at 
 
 1 Instructions for de Lumbres, December 20, 1660, R. I. A., Pologne, i, pp. 31 f.
 
 38 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 least anxious to protect it as a buffer state shutting off the 
 detested Muscovite ' barbarians ' from Europe; and she feared, 
 not without reason, the designs the neighboring Powers might 
 form upon the territories of the Republic. But the Polish policy 
 of France was neither well-considered nor well-conducted. With 
 strange blindness, the advisers of Louis XV refused to see that the 
 best means of saving Poland was to assist the nation to reform its 
 government; they rather persuaded themselves that the interests 
 of France demanded the maintenance of anarchy in Poland, in 
 order that Russia might gain no advantage from her influence 
 there; and they contributed not a little to that end. Further- 
 more, since the keynote of French policy in Poland was opposition 
 to Russia and Austria, the alliance between Louis XV and the 
 Imperial Courts during the Seven Years' War upset that policy 
 completely. The old French party in the Republic was ruined. 
 And then with the advent of Choiseul to power there came a 
 period in which France virtually renounced active participation 
 in Polish affairs and pretended to attach no importance to them. 
 In the critical years that followed the accession of Catherine II, 
 French policy towards the Republic was to vacillate between 
 misdirected and noxious activity and equally disastrous passivity 
 and indifference. 
 
 Down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, Austria was 
 the chief rival of France in Poland. Her interest in the Republic 
 was largely of a defensive nature. As long as Poland retained the 
 power to harm, the Hapsburgs had to be on their guard to prevent 
 their neighbor from attaching itself to France or from assisting 
 the frequent rebellions in Hungary and Bohemia. The Polish 
 alliance was frequently sought by Austria against Turkey or 
 Sweden; and at least on one occasion, in the great crisis of 1683, 
 it proved to be of inestimable value. On the whole, Austro-Polish 
 relations were friendly. The two states had no necessarily con- 
 flicting interests; they did have many interests in common; and 
 religious affinities and frequent royal marriages cemented a 
 friendship that seemed to He in the nature of things. Of all the 
 neighboring Powers, Austria had the strongest motives for desir- 
 ing the preservation of Poland. If the sad condition into which
 
 INTRODUCTION 39 
 
 the Republic had fallen in the eighteenth century precluded both 
 the fear of its hostility and the hope of its assistance, the rise of 
 Russia and Prussia supplied new reasons why Austria should 
 support and defend the sinking state; for neither the advance of 
 the Russian colossus into Central Europe nor the further aggran- 
 dizement of Prussia could be to the advantage of the Hapsburgs. 
 Austria had nothing to gain and much to lose by the disruption 
 of Poland. 
 
 Unfortunately, Austrian statesmen, while realizing this truth 
 in a general way, did not sufficiently act upon it. If the Vienna 
 Alliance of 17 19 marked one momentary effort to rescue the 
 Republic from Russian domination, the rivalry with the Bourbons 
 and with Prussia soon led the Hapsburgs to make the Russian 
 alliance the cornerstone of their political system; and the interests 
 of Poland were sacrificed on the altar of the new friendship. 
 Austria allowed and assisted Russia to fasten her grip upon the 
 Republic, while renouncing for herself any active influence in 
 Polish affairs. As long as the Court of St. Petersburg prevented 
 the French party from gaining the upper hand in the Republic and 
 protected the integrity of Poland against Prussia, Austria was 
 willing to tolerate its predominance at Warsaw. For the rest, it 
 had come to be the accepted doctrine at Vienna that the existing 
 anarchy in Poland suited Austrian interests, since it relieved the 
 Hapsburg Monarchy from any danger on its northeastern 
 frontier. 
 
 -A«r contrast to^Austria, Prussia was of necessity the persistent 
 enemy of Poland. Succeeding to the inheritance of the Teutonic 
 Order, the Hohenzollerns had fallen heirs to the ancient rivalry 
 between that Order and Poland for the possession of the coast- 
 land around the mouth of the Vistula, the control of which was 
 of vital importance to both contestants. There was not room 
 enough here for the coexistence of a strong Poland and a strong 
 Prussia: one could rise only at the expense of the other. More 
 than any other neighboring Power, Prussia was interested in 
 promoting the disruption of the Republic, for the scattered terri- 
 tories of the Hohenzollerns could be bound together only by the 
 annexation of Polish lands. Polish Prussia was needed in order
 
 4-0 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to unite East Prussia with Pomerania; a part of Great Poland, in 
 order to connect Silesia with East Prussia. 
 
 The Great Elector had already fixed the traditions of the policy 
 towards Poland which his successors followed with remarkable 
 fidelity, perseverance, and consistency. From generation to 
 generation one traces the same persistent effort to safeguard the 
 ' liberties ' of the Republic, to prevent the king of Poland from 
 establishing the hereditary succession or 'den absoluten Dominat,' 
 to keep the unruly Sarmatians in a state innocuous to their 
 neighbors. 1 The idea of a dismemberment of Poland, hereditary 
 in the House of Hohenzollern from the time of the Great Elector, 
 was brought forward and furbished up anew at each recurring 
 crisis in the North, in the half desperate belief that it was ' aut 
 nunc aut nunquam' 2 Frederick II, while only Crown Prince, 
 declared the acquisition of West Prussia indispensable; he seems 
 to have hoped to get that province during the Seven Years' War; 
 and in his Political Testaments of 1752 and 1768 he designated its 
 acquisition as one of the imperative tasks of the Prussian Mon- 
 archy. 3 A third phase of the traditional policy of Prussia was the 
 desire to prevent any hostile Power from gaining control of the 
 Republic. For that reason the Hohenzollerns repeatedly opposed 
 the attempts of France and Austria to establish their proteges on 
 the throne at Warsaw. They viewed with grave misgivings the 
 connection between Poland and Saxony. As long as relations 
 between Berlin and St. Petersburg were intimate, Prussia ac- 
 cepted not unwillingly the Russian influence in the Republic; but 
 during the period of antagonism under the Empress Elizabeth 
 Prussian diplomacy frequently worked hand in hand with the 
 French against the Russian party in Poland, and during the 
 Seven Years' War Frederick learned to his cost the dangers in- 
 volved in the subservience of the Republic to Russia. That lesson 
 was, later on, not wholly forgotten at Berlin. 
 
 1 Cf. Droysen, op. cit., in"', pp. 120 ff.; iv ! , pp. in, 177, 260. 
 
 2 Haumant, La Guerre du Nord, pp. 46 f., 53, 100 ff., 180 f.; Droysen, iv', 
 pp. 177 f., 182, 185 f., 197, 211 ff.; iv !i , p. 317. 
 
 3 Letter to Natzmer of 1731, Oeuvres, xvi, pp. 3 f.; Politische Correspondenz, 
 xii, p. 456; xviii, pp. 592, 611 ff.; Lehmann, Friedrich der Grosse und der Ursprung 
 des siebenjdhrigen Krieges, pp. 62, 94.
 
 INTRODUCTION 4 1 
 
 Finally, to come to the Power most directly concerned in the 
 Polish Question, Russian historians are accustomed to explain 
 their country's encroachments upon Poland by three reasons, 
 which may be called the inheritance, the nationalist, and the 
 religious motives. Poland-Lithuania having once appropriated 
 the western half of Russia, the Muscovite rulers, as heirs of the 
 old Kievan princes and ' gatherers of the Russian lands,' were 
 bound to recover the ancient home of their race, to free their 
 compatriots from a foreign yoke, and to deliver their Orthodox 
 brethren from Roman Catholic oppression. Undoubtedly these 
 motives did actuate the Tsars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
 centuries in their incessant struggles with Poland. Ivan III, by 
 assuming the title of ' Lord of all Russia,' announced the Mus- 
 covite program and hurled a challenge at his western neighbor. 
 He and his successors never tired of complaining of the Polish 
 attempts to force ' Rus ' to the ' Roman law ' ; or of asserting 
 that all the lands where the blood of Rurik had once ruled, were 
 their rightful ' patrimony ' ; or of striving to make good their 
 claims by force of arms. This policy, pursued by the Muscovite 
 rulers for two centuries with rare perseverance, was temporarily 
 shelved, however, after the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667; and then, 
 as other interests pressed to the front, it was, to all appearances, 
 abandoned. 
 
 There is no denying that in the eighteenth century the old 
 traditions about recovering the lost inheritance were very much 
 obscured, if not entirely forgotten. The westernized Russian 
 statesmen of that age were no more likely to take seriously claims 
 that went back to Rurik and Vladimir than French statesmen 
 were to hark back to rights derived from Clovis and Charlemagne. 
 Catherine II might occasionally declare herself determined not to 
 rest until she had recovered the graves of all the old Russian 
 princes, but it would be hard to show that such considerations 
 really affected her policy. The historic rights of Russia to the 
 western lands might be adduced to justify encroachments upon 
 Poland, but they were certainly not the motive that led to those 
 aggressions. Nor were considerations of nationality a serious 
 factor in determining Russian policy towards Poland in the
 
 42 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 eighteenth century. The western and southern branches of the 
 Russian race had so long lived a separate life under a foreign 
 state, they had developed into types so different from the Mus- 
 covites, that the latter hardly considered them Russians at all. 
 In the language of seventeenth century Moscow, the Little Rus- 
 sians (of the south) were the ' Cherkassian nation ' (^epKaccKift 
 Hapoai.) and the White Russians (of the west) the ' Lithuanian 
 people' (iHTOBCKie jqoah). 1 In the eighteenth century both the 
 government and the society of Russia proper hardly betrayed a 
 suspicion that the population of the eastern provinces of Poland 
 was not Polish. As for the population in question, it seemed as 
 far removed as possible from any consciousness of its Russian 
 nationality. And even had more exact ethnographic notions 
 prevailed, it would have made little difference. The governments 
 of the eighteenth century were not accustomed to be guided by 
 the wishes of the people; and the l rights of nationalities ' were 
 not yet recognized. The fact that in the partitions of Poland 
 Russia took only lands in which the bulk of the population was 
 Russian, leaving the purely Polish provinces to the German 
 Powers, is to be explained as a geographic accident. The uni- 
 fication of the Russian race was not, and could not be, the con- 
 scious aim of Russian statesmen in that age in their dealings with 
 Poland. 
 \J ^T he one part of the old tradition that was no t forgotten in the 
 /\ eig hteenth century was the religious motiv e. Their common 
 Orthodoxy was the sole bond that still united the estranged 
 branches of the Russian race. The defence of the faith in Poland 
 was one sure means by which the government at St. Petersburg 
 could always acquire merit in the eyes of society at home. By 
 several treaties, especially by the Eternal Peace of 1686, the 
 Russian rulers had stipulated freedom of worship for their 
 coreligionists in Poland; and on the basis of those treaties they 
 held themselves entitled to interfere in case the rights of the 
 Orthodox were violated. Unfortunately, the religious intoler- 
 ance which marked the Poles in that decadent age subjected the 
 Dissidents to ever-increasing vexations and even persecutions. 
 
 1 nHirain>, Hdopia PyccKoft 3THorpa<JHH, iv, pp. 1 2 ff .
 
 INTRODUCTION 43 
 
 The Orthodox clergy in Poland, feeling that they were fighting 
 in the last ditch, assailed St. Petersburg with constant appeals for 
 aid and deliverance. Here was a perpetual, plausible, and indeed 
 quite justifiable pretext for Russian interference in Polish affairs, 
 the first legal basis for intervention that Russia acquired. Down 
 to the time of Catherine II, however, the government at Peters- 
 burg did not exert itself sufficiently to procure any permanent 
 relief for the Dissidents; and, when it did interfere on their 
 behalf, its motives were generally political quite as much as 
 religious. 
 
 The mainspring of Russian policy towards Poland in the 
 eighteenth century was, in fact, the purely political aim of obtain- 
 ing a predominant influence over the Republic. That ambition 
 was perfectly natural and not unjustifiable. It was based, in the 
 first place, on the needs of self-defence. Poland had been a 
 dangerous neighbor in the past; it was essential that she should 
 not again become one in the future; hence the need of keeping her 
 in weakness. And, feeble as they were, the Poles might still be 
 capable of making trouble, if they fell under the influence of 
 Russia's enemies. In 1719-20 it was an important part of the 
 plans of George I of England, then in active opposition to Peter 
 the Great, to draw Poland into the proposed coalition against the 
 Tsar. During the wars of 1735-39 and 1741-43 one party in the 
 Republic dreamed of forming an alliance with France, Prussia, 
 Sweden, and Turkey against Russia. It was only through Poland 
 that the Western Powers could strike at Russia by land; and the 
 Russo-Polish frontier was terribly long and unprotected. Thus 
 Russia's own security seemed to demand her control over Poland. 
 Her land communications with the West, and her ability to assert 
 herself in general European affairs, to participate in the wars of 
 Germany, even to strike effectively at the Turks, these also 
 depended on her power to dispose of the vast realm which sepa- 
 rated her from the rest of the civilized world. 1 Whether as a 
 
 1 Cf. the view of the French government in 1726 that " if one could make sure 
 of the Poles, all gates would be closed to the Muscovites, and they could no longer 
 safely undertake any outside enterprise," R. I. A., Pologne, i, p. 314. Augustus II 
 thought that if he could make himself absolute master in Poland, he could exclude 
 Russia from all European affairs, CojiOBbeBi, Ilcropifl PocciH, iv, p. 542.
 
 44 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 gateway to the West or as a barrier against the West, Poland was 
 equally important to Russia. 
 
 In order to assure their control over the country, Peter the 
 Great and his successors endeavored to keep Poland in a state of 
 weakness, to uphold the existing vicious constitution, to prevent 
 the increase of the army, to preserve the elective kingship, to 
 exclude from the throne any ruler who could not be relied upon to 
 serve Russian interests, to shut out the influence of other foreign 
 Powers, and to maintain a strong Russophile party. 
 
 How far territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the 
 Republic entered into the calculations of Russian statesmen from 
 the time of Peter down to the accession of Catherine II is a ques- 
 tion not sufficiently cleared up. As was remarked above, Peter 
 seems for a time to have considered seriously plans of partition. 1 
 During the Seven Years' War it was Russia's declared intention 
 to acquire Courland from Poland, in exchange for the conquered 
 province of East Prussia. 2 Frederick II also claimed to know that 
 the Court of St. Petersburg had designs on the Ukraine. 3 On the 
 whole, however, Russia seems to have shown little desire for 
 Polish territory in that age, and it was chiefly owing to her opposi- 
 tion that the numerous plans for a dismemberment of the Re- 
 public collapsed. 
 
 At the accession of Catherine II, the Polish Question had been 
 before the Powers for a century. European statesmen had famil- 
 iarized themselves with all its aspects, and with its possible 
 solutions. The policies of the other states towards the Republic 
 were fixed by long tradition. All the Powers chiefly interested, 
 even France and Austria, were agreed upon upholding the 
 ' liberties ' of Poland. All were accustomed to maintain parties 
 of their own in the country, to distribute bribes and pensions, to 
 ' explode ' Diets when necessary, to interfere at elections to the 
 
 1 Herrmann, Russische Gesckichte, iv, pp. 258 f., especially the note on p. 259, 
 with reference to a plan of partition supposed to have been brought forward by 
 Peter in 17 10; see also Forster, Friedrich Wilhelm I, Konig von Freussen, ii, pp. 
 114-117. In 1705 Patkul came to Berlin as Russian envoy to purchase an alliance 
 against Sweden with the province of Courland and whatever else the King of 
 Prussia might want in Poland, Droysen, op. cil., iv', pp. 183 f. 
 
 2 CojiOBbeBt, op. cil., v, p. 1072. 
 
 3 Politische Correspondenz, xviii, p. 613.
 
 INTRODUCTION 45 
 
 throne. The idea of a dismemberment of the moribund state had 
 been common property for a hundred years. At each new crisis 
 in the North that idea was brought forward by someone as the 
 best means of effecting a general pacification by satisfying the 
 appetite of everybody. It is difficult to enumerate all the occa- 
 sions on which a partition of Poland had been seriously discussed. 
 The remarkable thing is, not that plans of partition had been so 
 frequently brought forward, but that hitherto they had always 
 failed to be realized. This latter fact may have been due in part 
 to some surviving scruples about the morality of robbing a peace- 
 ful and harmless neighbor; but chiefly it was occasioned by the 
 practical difficulties in the way of a dismemberment, in view of 
 the mutual jealousy of the great Powers, and by the general con- 
 cern of that age for the maintenance of the existing equilibrium. 
 After all, a partition of the Republic was possible only under 
 exceptional circumstances. 
 
 V 
 
 • In 1762 an extraordinary revolution placed the crown of the 
 Tsars upon the head of an Empress whom the Rusians revere as 
 the greatest of all their rulers save Peter, and whose name, it has 
 been said, is written in blood in the heart of every Pole. 1 Catherine 
 II is a figure whom it is difficult to approach without admiration 
 or else without a shudder, according as one remembers that she 
 unified Russia or that she dismembered Poland. Of her great 
 ability there can be little question. She undoubtedly possessed 
 masculine will-power and energy, a clear, penetrating intellect, 
 marvelous cleverness and cunning, boundless courage and self- 
 reliance, and an extraordinary talent for managing men. Forced 
 to play the game of high politics against such masters as Fred- 
 erick II, Joseph II, Kaunitz, Choiseul, and the younger Pitt, 
 invariably she at least held her own, and generally she got the 
 better of her adversaries. She played the game as did most of her 
 contemporaries, with perfect indifference to moral standards. 
 While ' justice,' ' magnanimity,' ' generosity,' and ' disinterested- 
 
 1 Kalinka, Ostatnie lata panowania Stanislawa Augusta, i, p. 96.
 
 \6 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 ness ' were always on her lips, her policy was one of unscrupulous 
 and relentless selfishness and aggression. The interests of Russia 
 (conceived in the materialistic fashion of that age) and her own 
 ' glory ' were the sole standards of that policy, and these two 
 objects were to her one and inseparable. There was much of Louis 
 XIV about her, especially in her exalted conception of the place 
 her country ought to hold in the world, and in her exaggerated 
 notions of what her own dignity and grandeur required. Like 
 Louis, she was inclined to regard the slightest opposition to her 
 will as a mortal insult; and vanity, pride, and vindictiveness 
 were capable of leading her into acts which a calmer and less self- 
 centered judgment would have avoided. Still, in the main, a 
 remarkably sure instinct kept her in the traditional and natural 
 paths of Russian policy; and she has the glory of having carried 
 through to a successful termination not a few of the tasks pursued 
 by her predecessors for centuries. 
 
 Throughout her reign Catherine was largely occupied with 
 Polish affairs, and she, more than any other individual, stands 
 responsible for the violent and, in many ways, unfortunate 
 solution which the Polish Question then received. That denoue- 
 ment can scarcely have lain within her original -intentions. It is 
 highly improbable that in the beginning she desired to annihilate 
 the Polish state or even (as is commonly asserted) to pave the way 
 for the gradual absorption of the whole of Poland into her Empire. 
 At the outset she seems to have had in mind two alternative 
 policies. The one was the policy of governing the Republic by 
 ' influence,' while preserving its integrity; the other the policy of 
 annexing convenient Polish territories from time to time as 
 occasion offered, this latter course involving the necessity of 
 making corresponding concessions to the two German Powers. 
 The former policy was generally safer and easier: the latter was 
 very tempting, and not at all so repugnant to Catherine as it has 
 )ften been represented. It is, I think, a n error to regard^ the 
 f partition s of Pola nd a s measur e s forced upon the Empress aga inst 
 he r' will by ha rd, necessit}/ - and by the victoriou s imp r>rfi ini'ti e g of 
 Prussi a. Catherine seems to have kept both courses constantly 
 before her eyes, ready to adopt either as circumstances permitted
 
 INTRODUCTION 47 
 
 or suggested. In general, hard and fast programs were not to her 
 taste. 
 
 In contrast to her immediate predecessors, Catherine attached 
 extreme importance to Polish affairs. Panin, her mouth-piece in 
 the early years of the reign, declared that without control over the 
 Republic, Russia would lose one-third of her strength, and would 
 be unable either to provide adequately for her own security, or to 
 participate effectively in the affairs of Europe. 1 Catherine felt 
 that Russia had not yet secured a sufficient hold upon Poland, 
 and unless the policy of recent years was altered, was in danger of 
 losing whatever influence she possessed. The Empress therefore 
 began to take steps to gain such an absolute and exclusive control 
 over the Republic that she could not only thwart whatever dis- 
 pleased her, but also positively govern the country in all matters 
 and dispose of it at pleasure. The Poles had never before suffered 
 such a systematic and merciless assault upon their independence. 
 Hitherto Russia had generally posed as their disinterested friend 
 and as the generous protector of their ' liberties.' In such a role 
 she could usually count upon the sympathy and support of a great 
 part of the szlachta, and she had been able to guard her essential 
 interest — the maintenance of the Republic in a state of weak- 
 ness — without resorting to much violence or deeply wounding 
 Polish susceptibilities. But Catherine II, by pushing her inter- 
 ference to excess, presently turned almost the entire nation 
 against her. She created an intolerable situation. She precipi- 
 tated a life and death struggle, which ended in the annihilation of 
 the Polish state. Thus her policy towards the Republic was not a 
 mere continuation of the traditional one : it was in some sense new 
 and revolutionary. 
 
 Her first great stroke was to place her candidate and former 
 lover, Stanislas Poniatowski, upon the Polish throne (1764). 
 That enterprise, conducted with masterly prudence and skill, 
 proved unexpectedly easy. The Poles displayed an apathy 
 unparalleled at any previous election, even in 1733; and foreign 
 interference was prevented by Catherine's timely alliance with 
 Frederick II, the complete passivity of Choiseul, and Austria's 
 
 1 'lenyjiHHi., BniraHflH HojiHTHKa Poccin, 1762-1774, pp. 208, 226 ff., 231 f.
 
 48 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 inability to attempt active opposition. The Empress thus suc- 
 ceeded in setting up a king of Poland selected both because of the 
 known weakness of his character and because, as she herself said, 
 he, being of all the candidates the one who had the least chance of 
 gaining the crown unaided, would owe Russia the greatest debt of 
 gratitude. 1 As the price of his election, Catherine imposed upon 
 him truly terrible conditions. He had to promise always to 
 regard the interests of Russia as his own, to maintain a constant, 
 unfeigned ' devotion ' to the Empress, and never to refuse to sup- 
 port her ' just intentions.' 2 Throughout his reign he was never to 
 escape from the consequences of that Faust-like bargain. 
 
 This was the last king of Poland, and the most unfortunate. 
 Stanislas Augustus was a man of keen intellect, broad culture, 
 charming personality, excellent intentions, and enlightened, 
 reforming ideas; but he was also weak of will, morally perverted, 
 incapable of daring, of inspiring others, of making personal 
 sacrifices. He was the last man in the world fitted to lead a nation 
 in its supreme struggle or to save a falling cause. There was not 
 an ounce of heroism about him. He cut a poor figure on horse- 
 back : he was not at home in a camp. Throughout the earlier half 
 of his reign, he was detested as no other Polish king had been, both 
 because of his unpopular family connection with the arrogant 
 Czartoryskis, and because of the means by which he had obtained 
 his crown. Unable to count upon his own nation, he was thrown 
 upon the support of Russia, knowing that if the Empress aban- 
 doned him, he was lost. Unable to lead his people in opposition to 
 Russia, yet too patriotic to be the docile instrument of Catherine's 
 designs, he remained distrusted, despised, insulted, and buffeted 
 by both sides. Never did a king find himself in a more humiliat- 
 ing position. It was true that Stanislas later succeeded, through 
 tireless efforts and consummate tact, in acquiring a certain meas- 
 ure of popularity which rendered him less dependent on Russian 
 support. But he still remained bound by another shameful 
 chain — his debts. Although the Republic granted him a gen- 
 erous income, and not infrequently extraordinary aid, his extrava- 
 gance plunged him hopelessly into debt and finally brought him to 
 
 1 PyccKifi ApxHBi., 1878'', p. 290. 2 ^eiyjEHHt, op. cit., pp. 228 f.
 
 INTRODUCTION 49 
 
 virtual bankruptcy. One means of financial salvation was ready 
 at hand — the subsidies of Russia — and these Stanislas did not 
 hesitate to accept, even in the greatest crises in Russo-Polish re- 
 lations. At the time of the First Partition and at the time of the 
 Second, the King was living on money furnished by the Russian 
 ambassadors. How far these shameful transactions influenced 
 his official acts, cannot be definitely ascertained; but probably 
 they did so to no slight degree. It was these wretched debts that 
 kept him on the throne when he could no longer reign without dis- 
 honor to himself and disaster to the nation. If he abdicated, who 
 was to save him from his creditors ? It was not the least of the 
 misfortunes of Poland that in the final crisis the nation had at its 
 head a king who was not only a weakling, but the pensioner of his 
 country's worst enemy, and, therefore, a traitor. 1 
 
 The establishment of her protege on the Polish throne was only 
 the first step in Catherine's aggressive policy. The second was to 
 raise the old question of the Dissidents. Not, of course, merely for 
 love of the abstract principle of religious toleration, however 
 much she desired the western public to think so; but rather in 
 order to please Orthodox opinion at home, and also in the hope 
 that by securing for the Dissidents access to political rights and 
 offices, she could build up a strong party on which Russia could 
 always rely. 2 Another aim of the Empress was to induce the Poles 
 to place their constitution under her formal guarantee. That 
 would assure her a perpetual right of interference in Polish 
 affairs, make a reform of the iniquitous constitution impossible 
 without her consent, and in general place the Russian ascendancy 
 in Poland on a permanent legal basis. Pursuing these demands 
 in her most vigorous and imperious manner, Catherine soon 
 threw Poland into a wild turmoil. She alarmed the King and his 
 uncles, the Czar tory skis, who saw through her plans; she exas- 
 perated the mass of the szlachta by what seemed an attack upon 
 
 1 The best account of Stanislas' financial affairs is in Korzon, Wewnqlrzne dzieje 
 Polski za Stanislawa Augusta, iii, pp. 4 ff. A brilliant character sketch in Kalinka, 
 Ostatnie lata, i, pp. 72 ff. 
 
 2 That this political aim was Russia's chief motive in raising the Dissident 
 question is confessed with perfect frankness by Panin to Repnin in the instruction 
 of August 14/25, 1767, CSopHHKi, lxvii, pp. 409 ff.
 
 5o 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Catholic religion. Finding diplomacy useless, she resorted to 
 force. In 1767 Poland was again flooded with Russian troops, 
 and the luckless Confederation of Radom, formed by the szlachta 
 chiefly for the purpose of overthrowing the King, served as a 
 pretext for the Russian ambassador to take over the whole 
 government of the country. Then the confederated Diet of 
 1767-68 was seduced, coerced, and terrorized, by those carefully 
 graded methods of which the Russians were already past masters, 
 into accepting all Catherine's demands : complete religious tolera- 
 tion and full civil and political rights for the Dissidents, and a 
 treaty between the Empress and the Republic, by which the 
 Polish constitution was placed under the guarantee of Russia. 
 
 With that Catherine and Panin fancied themselves at the end 
 of their labors. Poland seemed completely crushed, tied, and 
 bound. But one must admit that here the Empress had blun- 
 dered. She had tried to reach the goal too quickly. She had 
 wounded the Poles too deeply in their strongest feelings, their 
 patriotism and their religious convictions. The shameful Diet of 
 1767-68 had scarcely dissolved when a Confederation was formed 
 at Bar in the Ukraine for the defence of ' liberty and the faith.' 
 The uprising soon spread over the greater part of the country. 
 Anti-Russian and anti-royalist alike, the Confederation of Bar 
 was a last desperate attempt to save the ideals of the szlachta- 
 republic, very typical of Old Poland in its loyalties and its prej- 
 udices, its heroism and its follies, its audacity and its ineptitude. 
 It never succeeded in putting an organized army into the field or 
 in conducting a regular campaign; but it subjected Poland to 
 four years of terrible guerilla warfare, during which the country 
 was devastated from end to end, and Russians and Confederates 
 vied with each other in deeds of savagery. 
 
 Meanwhile the Porte, stirred up by France, declared war on 
 Russia, taking Catherine's aggressions in Poland as a pretext. 
 The war was marked by brilliant Russian victories on land and 
 sea; but these in turn alarmed the Court of Vienna. Austria 
 armed, concluded an alliance with the Turks, and assumed a very 
 menacing attitude towards Russia, although the will to act was 
 sadly lacking behind these warlike demonstrations. By 1771 the
 
 INTRODUCTION 5 1 
 
 situation appeared to be extremely critical. With her Turkish 
 and Polish wars still on her hands, Catherine was threatened with 
 the armed intervention of Austria, which then might lead to a 
 ge^of&l European conflagration. 
 
 /Itls well known that out of that crisis grew the First Partition 
 of Poland. That arrangement seemed to have the advantage of 
 reconciling the conflicting interests and satisfying the cupidity of 
 the three great Eastern Powers, while allowing the Turks to 
 escape without too great losses, and ending the long troubles in 
 Poland with a drastic and supposedly salutary lesson to the Poles. 
 Austria unwittingly supplied the pretext for the Partition by 
 occupying the Zips and some neighboring Polish districts; 
 Prussia first openly adopted the plan of a partition and pressed it 
 most vigorously; Russia spoke the decisive word and determined 
 the respective shares.)^ 
 
 Into the history 01 the negotiations it is impossible and unneces- 
 sary to enter here; but one point should be noticed, both because 
 it is so generally misunderstood, and because it is important for 
 the comprehension of later events. I refer to the attitude of 
 Russia towards the Partition. In spite of the common opinion 
 that Catherine accepted that arrangement only as a pis alter, in 
 order to satisfy her Prussian ally and avoid a war with Austria, I 
 think it may be asserted with confidence that both the Empress 
 and her advisers had long desired a partition, and were well 
 pleased when the opportunity for one at last presented itself. 
 Naturally they did not announce their ambitions prematurely; 
 they found it politic to feign a certain reluctance; they preferred 
 to be begged to take something rather than to beg for it. But all 
 this need not have proved misleading, were it not, unfortunately, 
 the custom of western historians — the Germans particularly — 
 to base their accounts of Russian policy so exclusively on what the 
 Russians saw fit to tell the Prussian or Austrian ministers, while 
 ignoring the documents in which the Russians confidentially 
 expressed their real opinions among themselves. 
 
 If one turns to the Russian documents, one finds that very soon 
 after her accession Catherine accepted, sealed up, and kept in the 
 greatest secrecy a memoir (presented by Count Z. G. Cernysev),
 
 52 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 proposing that at the first convenient moment Russia should 
 annex Polish Livonia, — that is, one of the chief territories which 
 she took at the First Partition. In October, 1763, the Russian 
 Council approved this plan on principle, and, while reserving its 
 execution to a more propitious moment, resolved that it should 
 steadily be kept in view. 1 That it was not lost sight of in the next 
 few years, appears from numerous documents. Thus in the main 
 instructions to Kayserlingk and Repnin before the election of 
 1764, there is a threat, which has been little noted by historians, 
 that if Russia were drawn into war over Polish affairs, she would 
 not lay down the sword until she had annexed Polish Livonia. 2 
 At the beginning of the Turkish war in 1768, the Imperial Council, 
 considering what aims were to be kept in view during the war, 
 resolved that there were two great advantages to be sought, one of 
 which was to gain a new frontier on the side of Poland that would 
 assure the permanent security of the Empire. 3 In 1763, 1766, and 
 1767 Panin hinted significantly to the Prussian envoy that if 
 Poland involved the two allies in great difficulties, they ought to 
 indemnify themselves at the expense of the Republic. 4 Then, 
 when the proper moment had come, at the beginning of 1771, 
 Catherine herself, talking one night at court with Frederick's 
 brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, with smiling lips and jesting 
 tone threw out the idea of a partition of Poland. 5 It is now well 
 established that Frederick took up the plan only after his brother 
 had returned and convinced him that sentiment in St. Petersburg 
 was quite in favor of such an arrangement. 6 It is true that Panin, 
 the leading Russian minister, made a brave parade of being 
 insuperably opposed to so iniquitous a transaction. But his pro- 
 fessed scruples — which were exhibited only before the Prussian 
 envoy, and of which there is no trace in his correspondence with 
 Russians — need impress no one who reads how this same Panin, 
 proposing the plan of partition in the Council of the Empire, 
 
 1 CGopHHRt, li, pp. 8-1 1. 2 Ibid., pp. 92 ff. 
 
 3 ApxHBt Toe. CoBiTa, November 6/17, 1768, 1, p. 7. 
 
 4 CSopHHKt, xxii, pp. 188 f., 500; xxxvii, pp. 49 f. 
 
 5 Henry to Frederick, January 8, 1771, Politische Correspondenz, xxx, pp. 406 f. 
 
 6 Koser, Friedrich der Grosse, ii, pp. 465 f.; Volz' studies in the Forschnngen 
 zur brandenburgischen und prenssischen Geschichte, xviii and xxiii.
 
 INTRODUCTION 53 
 
 declared that it offered " just such a chance as we have always 
 thought of, for realizing what we all desire — namely, to make our 
 frontier towards Poland coincide with the rivers." 1 In view of 
 all this, we may well believe in Catherine's sincerity when she 
 declared on ratifying the Partition Treaty that she had never 
 given her sanction to any act with greater satisfaction. 2 The First 
 Partition was not, then, a triumph of the brilliant, all-compelling 
 Frederick over his reluctant and sorely-pressed ally. It was 
 brought about in the first place by the common and equal cupidity 
 of Russia and Prussia; and, in the second place, it was singularly 
 facilitated by the extraordinary situation of Europe at that time, 
 which made a partition a plausible means for averting a general 
 war, forced Austria to become a partner in the nefarious business, 
 and prevented the Western Powers from intervening. 
 
 When the three Eastern Powers were once agreed, through the 
 Partition Treaties signed at St. Petersburg on August 5, 1772, it 
 was no great task, though a long and unpleasant one, to compel 
 the victim to assent to his own spoliation. After occupying their 
 respective acquisitions with their troops, the three Courts issued 
 manifestoes announcing their annexations. The Russian and 
 Austrian proclamations were wisely laconic. They simply 
 pointed out that these measures were necessitated by the con- 
 tinual anarchy in Poland and by the obstinacy of the Poles in 
 resisting the well-meant efforts of their neighbors to restore order. 
 Frederick, however, published a ponderous manifesto, establishing 
 his just rights to what he was taking on the basis of all manner of 
 musty documents raked together from the Prussian archives. 
 Frederick- fr.r nnrp made_ himself ridiculo us. 
 
 The next step was to force the King of Poland to convoke a Diet, 
 in order to get the dismemberment ratified in all form. Stanislas 
 indulged in eloquent tirades of protest — " as good as the best 
 pages in Plutarch," the Russian ambassador attested — and then 
 issued the letters of convocation. The elections were managed 
 
 1 Apx. Toe. Cob., May 16/27, 1771, i, PP- 82 ff. Compare also the protocol of 
 1 the Council of February 7/18, 1771, ibid., p. 74; Panin to Saldern, April 29/May 10, 
 
 June n/22, August 28/September 8, 1771, in the C6opHHKi>, xcvii, pp. 265,335 ff., 
 411 ff. 
 
 2 Beer, Die erste Theilung Polens, ii, p. 198.
 
 54 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 with all the arts known to the Russians; the three allied ministers 
 at Warsaw disposed of a joint fnnds de seduction; and the presence 
 of their troops sufficed to do what bribes could not effect. The 
 Diet which met at Warsaw in April, 1773, is one of the most 
 melancholy spectacles in Polish history. The deputies, who were 
 for the most part the creatures of the three Powers, were ready 
 enough to strike heroic attitudes in public; but that was merely 
 for the sake of appearances. Behind the scenes they joined in a 
 wild scramble to make their fortunes at the expense of the falling 
 state. It was characteristic of that society that never before had 
 Poland seen such a frenzy for pleasure. At that awful moment, 
 life at Warsaw seemed a long saturnalia. 
 
 Effective resistance to the will of the three Powers was virtually 
 out of the question. The nation lay prostrate and exhausted after 
 the late four years' struggle. England and France, absorbed in 
 their mutual rivalry, were perfectly passive in Eastern affairs. 
 There remained no means of opposition except delay, which 
 accomplished nothing except the prolongation of the nation's 
 agony. Finally, on September 18, 1773, King and Diet gave their 
 formal assent to the dismemberment. 
 
 By the First Partition Poland lost nearly one-third of her terri- 
 tory and slightly more than a third of her population. 1 The 
 Republic retained an area approximately equal to that of France 
 at that time, while in population it still ranked as the sixth state 
 in Europe, with over seven million people. 2 There was no need to 
 deplore greatly the lands yielded to Russia — the remote, poor, 
 and thinly settled palatinates of Polotsk, Vitebsk, andMohilev; 
 but the cession of rich and fertile Galicia was a painful sacrifice; 
 and hardest of all was the loss of Warmia and West Prussia, for 
 Poland was thereby cut off from the sea, and her trade down the 
 Vistula placed at the mercy of the enemy at Berlin. As regards 
 the partitioning Powers, Russia, while taking the largest but also 
 the poorest share, had greatly improved her frontier; Austria had 
 gained most in population; Prussia's lot was, from the financial, 
 military, and political standpoints, the most valuable. 
 
 However sympathetic the world has since become to the mis- 
 fortunes of Poland, at the time of the First Partition the con- 
 1 Cf. Korzon, op. cit., i, pp. 42 ff., 160 f. 2 Ibid., i, pp. 161 f.
 
 INTRODUCTION 55 
 
 science of Europe does not seem to have been deeply stirred. 
 Voltaire set the tone by sending his praise to Catherine and his con- 
 gratulations to Frederick. The mass of the public conformed to 
 his opinion. A few there were, however, who sympathized with 
 Poland: Rousseau, Condorcet, Turgot, for instance; and some 
 who condemned the Partition as an international crime. Raynal 
 exposed the moral aspect of the transaction when he wrote: " It 
 is in the security of peace, without rights, without pretexts, with- 
 out grievances, without a shadow of justice, that this revolution 
 has been effected by the terrible principle of force, which is, 
 unhappily, the best argument of kings." l Burke pointed out in 
 the Annual Register that the Partition was to be " considered as 
 the first very great breach in the modern political system of 
 Europe," which was thereby threatened with total subversion. 2 
 
 All writers agreed in the gloomiest auguries as to the future of 
 Poland. The Republic had become the reproach and the play- 
 thing of nations, said Raynal; 3 it was virtually a province of 
 Russia, added Mably, and ruined beyond recall. 4 " It is hardly 
 possible to suppose," Coxe wrote, " that Poland . . . will ever 
 emerge from her present situation: her misfortunes . . . will 
 gradually increase . . . until by slow progress or some violent 
 revolution, Poland either subsides into an hereditary monarchy, 
 or a well-ordered Republic; or, which is more probable, is totally 
 swallowed up by the neighboring powers." 5 People wondered at 
 the moderation of the three Powers in not appropriating the whole 
 country in 1772, and agreed that, in the natural order of events, a 
 total partition must follow sooner or later. 6 
 
 Thus after a century of waiting, the partition so often proph- 
 esied, so often planned, so constantly discussed, had taken place. 
 Now that this precedent had been set, the final solution of the 
 Polish Question seemed to be clearly marked out, and the total 
 ruin of the Republic only a question of time and circumstance. 
 
 1 Ilistoire philosophique et politique des Utablissemens des Europeens dans les 
 deux Indes, x, pp. 54 f. (1780). 
 
 2 Annual Register, 1772, p. 2. 
 
 3 Op. cit., x, p. 54. 
 
 4 De la Situation de la Pologne en 1776 (Oeuvres, Paris, L'an III, xiii), pp. 7 ff. 
 
 5 Travels in Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, 1784, i, pp. 18 f. 
 
 6 Burke, Annual Register, 1772, p. 6; Mably, op. cit., passim, esp. p. 59.
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 The State of Poland After The First Partition 
 The Beginning of National Revival 
 
 Between the completion of the First Partition and the series of 
 events that led to the Second, lies a period of a dozen years (1775- 
 87), which, while outwardly quiet, was still so full of changes 
 underneath the surface of society that it possesses a deep. historical 
 interest. It was then that the Polish people received whatever 
 preparation they were to have for the final struggle, for the great 
 national effort associated with the Four Years' Diet and Kos- 
 ciuszko's rising. On the scope and value of the work done at that 
 time, the judgments of historians vary greatly. Those German 
 and Russian writers who are inclined to deny to the later national 
 movement any genuine vitality or any real possibility of success, 
 commonly see in this period only superficial improvements, half- 
 hearted velleities of reform, continued and ever-increasing demor- 
 alization, and opportunities frivolously frittered away. 1 On 
 the other hand, many Polish historians have found in this period 
 the beginnings of a real national regeneration, of a political, 
 economic, and intellectual transformation which, had it not been 
 so soon violently interrupted, would have restored Poland to her 
 proper place among living states. 2 These diversities of opinion 
 are not due simply to partisanship. They reflect the contradic- 
 tions of a society in a confused state of transition, a society in 
 which the old lawlessness, selfishness, corruption, and prejudices 
 were still terribly deeply inrooted, but which was also, slowly but 
 unmistakably, being leavened by a new reforming and patriotic 
 spirit. In such a situation the amount of progress effected is 
 peculiarly difficult to estimate. 
 
 1 So, for instance, Herrmann, Solov'ev, Kostomarov, and also in much the same 
 sense Bobrzynski among the Poles. 
 
 2 So Lelewel, Szujski, and Korzon; and Bruckner among the Germans. 
 
 56
 
 POLAND AFTER THE FIRST PARTITION S7 
 
 The quiet which Poland enjoyed during this period was due in 
 part to the exhaustion of the nation after the storms of the pre- 
 ceding decade, but also to the constraint imposed by Russia. For 
 after the Partition the Russian yoke was fastened upon the country 
 more firmly than ever. The King and many of the szlachta, taught 
 by hard experience, saw safety only in absolute deference to the 
 will of the Empress, in a dependence which, however humiliating 
 and irksome it might be, at least guaranteed the continued exist- 
 ence of the state. During the next years, down to 1788, the Rus- 
 sian ambassador Stackelberg enjoyed a power greater than that 
 of the King himself, so that people jested about his ' coregency ' 
 and spoke of him as the Empress' 'Viceroy' at Warsaw. 
 
 At all events, the Russian rule in Poland was now very different 
 from what it had been, and in many ways much more tolerable. 
 Having attained her immediate aims in Poland and being absorbed 
 in other matters, Catherine desired to keep the Republic quiet 
 and to maintain the status quo. For this purpose, it seemed best 
 to abandon the old policy of playing off the King and the opposi- 
 tion against each other and so holding the balance between 
 equally matched parties. That system was expensive and dan- 
 gerous; it led to disturbances; it was no longer necessary, now 
 that the King had become the most docile of dependents. Hence 
 Stackelberg adopted the policy of ruling through the King and 
 government of Poland by diplomatic means, avoiding coercion 
 and threats as far as possible, descending into the arena of party 
 politics only when it seemed absolutely necessary. The Russian 
 troops were withdrawn from the country by 1780. Diets and 
 Dietines enjoyed the long-forgotten experience of deliberating 
 without the ' protection ' of foreign bayonets. Even the ambas- 
 sador's funds for bribery were reduced to a minimum. The new 
 course thus brought a considerable alleviation to the Poles, a 
 diminution at least of the external signs of subjection. The nation 
 began to breathe more freely again, and bolder spirits might 
 dream of ultimate independence. 
 
 Another great advantage of the new system from the Polish 
 standpoint was that it allowed — and even brought with it — 
 certain political reforms. The Russians had come to see that
 
 58 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 complete anarchy in the Republic was not to their interest; and 
 now that they had decided to use the Polish government as their 
 instrument for ruling the country, they were bound to give that 
 government a certain measure of strength and efficiency. Hence 
 among the changes extorted from the Partition Diet of 1773 was 
 the establishment of a new governing body called the Permanent 
 Council. This board of thirty-six members, elected by the Diet 
 every two years, was to advise the Crown in all important matters. 
 As the King was obliged to accept the opinion of the majority, the 
 royal power was virtually put in commission. The Council also 
 served as a supreme administrative board, for which purpose itwas 
 divided into the five departments of Foreign Interests, Police, the 
 Army, Justice, and Finance. The new institution was extremely 
 unpopular. It was denounced by conservatives as a menace to 
 ' liberty,' and an engine of ' despotism.' It was detested by patriots 
 as an invention of the Russian ambassador, foisted by him upon 
 the nation as a means of governing the country for Russian in- 
 terests. This latter charge was quite true, for Stackelberg was the 
 creator of the Council, regularly filled it with his friends, and 
 succeeded in making it the stronghold and organ of Russian 
 influence. But at any rate the Council was a great improvement 
 on anything that had gone before. It gave Poland an executive 
 that could dominate the hitherto independent and lawless great 
 officers of the Crown — the chancellors, treasurers, marshals, 
 and hetmans; it brought all the branches of the public service 
 under a common direction; it gave to the administration for the 
 first time something of unity and vigor. 
 
 This was not the only improvement allowed by Russia. The 
 Partition Diet, facing a truly desperate situation, adopted a series 
 of important financial reforms which, under the better fiscal 
 administration of the Permanent Council, assured to the Republic 
 a regular and an annually increasing income. By 1788 the rev- 
 enues were nearly four times as great as under the last Saxon 
 king, and more than twice what they had been in the early years 
 of Stanislas Augustus. 1 The army, which at the time of the Par- 
 tition had scarcely existed save on paper, was slowly brought up 
 
 1 Korzon, op. cit., iii, pp. 145 ff., 179.
 
 POLAND AFTER THE FIRST PARTITION 59 
 
 to 18,000 men (in 1786). It was at last regularly paid; it was 
 trained and disciplined according to the Prussian model; it was 
 provided with capable officers from abroad and from the new 
 cadet school. Quite the most important reform undertaken by the 
 government, however, was the effort to found a national system of 
 education. After the suppression of the Jesuit Order in 1773, its 
 property was taken over by the state and entrusted to the new 
 Education Commission. Made up for the most part of men filled 
 with a high appreciation of their task and guided by enlightened 
 and practical ideas, this Commission established a national school 
 system which ranked among the best in Europe at that time and 
 may claim, indeed, an honorable place in the history of pedagogics. 
 This reform in education was of inestimable importance for the 
 transformation of Polish society which was then going on. It 
 created a new liberal and progressive spirit in the younger gen- 
 eration, which then communicated itself to the older one. From 
 the new schools came a great part of the reformers of the Four 
 Years' Diet and the patriots of 1794. 
 
 It must be confessed, however, that apart from the work of the 
 Education Commission, the reforms undertaken by the govern- 
 ment during this period fell far short of what ought to have been 
 attained. Something was accomplished, but much more could 
 have been done. It was true that no essential changes in the 
 constitution were possible, owing to the Russian guarantee; but 
 neither the revenues nor the army were brought up to the stand- 
 ard which Catherine was willing to allow, and which the country 
 was amply able to support. This failure was due not only to 
 wretched political dissensions and to negligence and lack of 
 energy on the part of those in power, but also in large measure to 
 the general ignorance that then prevailed as to the real resources 
 of the nation. As a result, Poland entered the great crisis that 
 followed ill-prepared from both the military and the financial 
 standpoints. 
 
 II 
 
 In marked contrast to the unsatisfactory results attained in the 
 political sphere stands the undeniable and striking progress 
 made in matters economic and intellectual. M. Korzon, whose
 
 60 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 thorough researches have shown us that the Poland of those years 
 has another history besides the conventional chronique scan- 
 daleuse of the Court, the Diets, and the high society of Warsaw, 
 declares that after the Partition a great and admirable change 
 came over the country. The nation went to work and worked 
 hard. Agriculture, which had reached its lowest level in the Saxon 
 period, experienced a remarkable revival, especially in the 
 Ukraine, whose wealth was again unlocked by the reopening of 
 the Black Sea to European trade. In spite of the merciless transit 
 duties imposed by Prussia and the high protective tariffs of 
 Joseph II, Polish trade developed rapidly. Manufactures, rural 
 and urban, sprang up; there was scarcely a magnate family that 
 did not found a factory of one kind or another; and ephemeral as 
 many of these enterprises were, still the native industries were 
 presently able to supply a great part of the articles needed at 
 home, and even to place Polish manufactured goods — for the 
 first time — in foreign markets. The long decadent and half- 
 deserted towns awoke to new life and animation. Warsaw, which 
 had but 30,000 inhabitants at the accession of Stanislas Augustus, 
 could boast of 100,000 by the time of the Four Years' Diet. 1 
 It had become a great city, according to the standards of that age, 
 and the center of a commercial, financial, and intellectual activity 
 such as Poland had rarely witnessed. Finally, as a result of these 
 developments, a social class which had long been grievously 
 needed, at last appeared on the scene: a well-to-do, enterprising, 
 and educated middle class, fitted for political life and eager to 
 take its share of duties and privileges in the state; a class which 
 in the final struggle for independence was to equal and perhaps 
 surpass the szlachta in patriotism and civic devotion. 2 
 
 When one considers that at the time of the First Partition 
 Poland had been threatened with economic, no less than with 
 political, ruin, the progress made since 1775 appears highly credit- 
 able. It shows that the nation was shaking off its lethargy and 
 putting forth new life and energy. It suggests that at bottom the 
 country was far more sound and healthy than the actions of its 
 ruling class would indicate. 
 
 1 Korzon, op. c'U., i, pp. 274 f. 2 Cf. Korzon, ii, p. 411.
 
 POLAND AFTER THE FIRST PARTITION 6 1 
 
 Not less important than the economic revival was the intellect- 
 ual s movement that marked this period. After two centuries in 
 which Poland had dwelt apart in intellectual isolation and almost 
 in intellectual stagnation, nourishing herself on the dry bones of 
 scholasticism and an outworn humanism, modern science and the 
 ' philosophy ' of the Enlightenment made their triumphal entry 
 into the country. The new culture found an ardent champion in 
 the King, a ready acceptance with the aristocracy and the bour- 
 geoisie, an entrance — disputed but soon forced — into the 
 schools. The familiar phenomena of that age in other countries 
 were repeated in Poland: the general adoption of the French 
 language, French fashions, in fact everything that came out of 
 France; the immense popularity of Voltaire, Rousseau, Condillac, 
 Locke, and the other prophets of the Enlightenment; the rage for 
 physics and the other experimental sciences; the spread of free- 
 masonry, which numbered the King and the leading members of 
 the aristocracy among its adepts. 
 
 In Poland, as elsewhere, the new culture brought with it a 
 certain deterioration of morals and a wide-spread weakening of 
 positive religious beliefs; but, on the other hand, it helped to 
 break down obscurantism, superstition, and prejudice, it aroused 
 a new critical spirit, it introduced better political, economic, 
 and social ideas, it promoted the serious discussion of the most 
 fundamental questions, and it vastly stimulated the demand for 
 reforms. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The demand for reforms was by no means new in Poland. 
 Ever since the sixteenth century a long line of publicists had 
 pointed out the evils in the Republic and suggested remedies. 
 Under the Saxon kings the warning voices grew louder and more 
 frequent; the question of the increase of the army came to be 
 discussed at every Diet; and Stanislas Konarski in a masterly 
 book subjected that ' palladium of liberty,' the Liberum Veto, to 
 a scathing criticism, which no one in the conservative camp was 
 able to refute. 1 At the death of Augustus III there appeared a 
 
 1 The book skutecznym rod sposobie (" On the Proper Organization of Assem- 
 blies "), 1760-63.
 
 62 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 reform party, led by the Princes Czartoryski, who hoped, with the 
 aid of Russia and after putting their nephew on the throne,, to 
 carry through a comprehensive program of reforms. Unfortu- 
 nately, the plan which was to have saved the Republic, resulted 
 only in subjecting it entirely to foreign domination. At all events, 
 the tragic experiences of the first decade of the new reign sobered 
 the more intelligent part of the nation. The demand for reforms, 
 raised at the beginning of the century by only a few isolated 
 individuals, and then in 1764 by a small party, now became 
 general. The humiliating dependence upon Russia, the constant 
 danger of a new dismemberment, the unconcealed contempt with 
 which the rest of the world regarded the Poles, the influence of the 
 new ' philosophy ' and of foreign travel, the example of the neigh- 
 boring states, the general current of reforming ideas in the age of 
 the Enlightenment — all these factors combined to open the eyes 
 of thinking men to the glaring evils in the existing regime and to 
 the fact that without reforms the Republic was hastening to ruin. 
 
 The political literature of that age was almost entirely on the 
 side of the reformers. Its greatest representative was Stanislas 
 Staszic, from whose pen appeared in 1785 a remarkable book 
 entitled Considerations on the Life of Jan Zamoyski. Staszic 
 demanded the abolition of the Liberum Veto, the establishment of 
 hereditary monarchy, a permanent Diet, an army of 100,000 men, 
 the increase of the taxes, a reform of justice, the systematic 
 development of the national industries, and the emancipation of 
 the serfs. His book had an extraordinary, an unexampled suc- 
 cess. Its principles became the fashion in the salons, and pene- 
 trated widely in far humbler circles; it furnished an arsenal of 
 arguments to the reforming party; it laid down in outline the 
 program of the Four Years' Diet. 1 
 
 Undoubtedly the nation was coming to a clearer realization of 
 what must be done if ruin were to be avoided, but it remained to 
 be proved that the nation was capable of doing it. The reforms 
 in question demanded the abjuration of the most revered tradi- 
 tions, and almost a complete breach with the past; they de- 
 
 1 Cf. Niewenglowski, Les Idles politiques en Pologne a la fin du xviii e siecle, 
 pp. 75 ff.; Korzon, " Pocz^tki sejmu wielkiego," in Ateneum, 1881, i, pp. 330 f.
 
 POLAND AFTER THE FIRST PARTITION 63 
 
 manded a sure political instinct, consummate statesmanship, 
 energy, and will-power on the part of the leaders; they demanded 
 unity, discipline, perseverance, and the willingness to make any 
 sacrifice on the part of the nation. Had Poland the moral 
 strength required for so great an effort ? To that question it is 
 peculiarly difficult to give an answer. Diplomats, travellers, and 
 writers of memoirs have left us the blackest pictures of Polish 
 society in that age : of the f rivolity and instability of the national 
 character, the corruption of private morals, the general inclina- 
 tion to riotous festivities, drunkenness, gambling, and other 
 forms of dissipation; of the degradation and brutishness of the 
 lower classes, the ignorance, narrow-mindedness, and selfishness 
 of the lesser gentry, the sordid ambitions, the anarchical spirit, 
 the venality, the lack of patriotism of the magnates. Undoubt- 
 edly these pictures are often overcharged through personal bias, 
 and often based too exclusively on observation of the small group 
 of people at the top. But in any case enough remains to prove a 
 very deep and dangerous demoralization. The political history 
 of this period shows that too many of the Poles had learned 
 nothing from the Partition, but were still ready to plunge their 
 country into disorder, raise scandals that disgraced the nation in 
 the eyes of Europe, and call in foreigners against their own 
 government, whether for wretched, selfish aims or on account of 
 misguided political ideas or through sheer force of habit. Al- 
 though the new reforming tendencies were constantly gaining 
 ground, a large part of the szlachta still clung blindly to the old 
 prejudices, the old false maxims, the old horror of innovations. 
 In short, while the period from 1775 to 1787 shows a very con- 
 siderable progress in comparison with what went before, while the 
 worst was over and the nation was undoubtedly on the right 
 course again, still not nearly enough had been accomplished, not 
 as much as could and should have been done. The newer, better 
 tendencies had not yet gained a complete predominance. The 
 nation was not yet ready either materially or morally, when the 
 final crisis came.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 The Austro-Russian Alliance and the Outbreak 
 of the russo-turkish war 
 
 Of the three Powers who had joined in the First Partition, Russia 
 had perhaps the most reason to rest content with the arrange- 
 ments then made. After rectifying her hitherto inconvenient 
 western frontier, she had no urgent motives for seeking further 
 Polish territories; x and owing to the mutual jealousy of the Ger- 
 man Powers, what remained of the Republic had been turned 
 over unrestrictedly to the guardianship of the great Catherine. 
 At Warsaw the King reigned, the Russian ambassador ruled, and 
 the envoys of Austria and Prussia looked on. Under such cir- 
 cumstances it might well appear to be Russia's interest to main- 
 tain the status quo, rather than to aggrandize her neighbors by 
 new dismemberments. That seems to have been Catherine's 
 view — with certain reservations. Her policy after the First 
 Partition was to protect the Poles in their remaining possessions, 
 as long as they made no effort to escape from her control, and as 
 long as no conjuncture in general European affairs rendered it 
 desirable or necessary to purchase the support of the German 
 Powers with drafts on the usual treasury — Poland. Within 
 these limits, the Empress was committed to maintaining the 
 existing arrangements. 
 
 Very different was the position of her chief confederate in 
 depredation, Prussia. If that aspiring young state was to main- 
 
 1 The one further improvement of the Russian frontier on the side of Poland 
 that naturally suggested itself after the Partition, related to that southeastern 
 corner of the Polish Ukraine which projected into Russian territory, and which 
 was of great importance in case of war with the Turks. This acquisition seems to 
 have been discussed at St. Petersburg. Cf. the instructions to the Marquis de 
 Verac in 1780: " On parle d'un echange qu'elle [Catherine] veut faire des provinces 
 qui lui ont ete cedees contre la partie de l'Ukraine que les Polonois ont conservee," 
 R. I. A., Russie, ii, p. 368. 
 
 64
 
 THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 
 
 tain the rank Frederick had won for it among the great Powers, it 
 needed above all things to acquire a solid territorial foundation, to 
 unite its scattered members, to secure a defensible frontier. It 
 could not possibly accept as final an arrangement that left a great 
 wedge of Polish territory projecting deep into its side, completely 
 separating East and West Prussia from Silesia, while two highly 
 important towns, Dantzic and Thorn, remained Polish, although 
 surrounded by Prussian territory. For the half-built monarchy of 
 the Hohenzollerns, it was a vital matter that the First Partition of 
 Poland should not be the last. It was true that in his last years 
 Frederick II, grown cautious with age and haunted by the fear of 
 Austria, showed little taste for further adventures in territorial 
 aggrandizement. But the task was only deferred. With the 
 advent of a new king, Prussia's unalterable ambition to obtain 
 Dantzic, Thorn, and part of Great Poland became one of the 
 most constant and important factors in European politics. 
 
 Austria's policy towards Poland in these years was determined 
 by opposition to that of Prussia. The fact that Prussia coveted 
 new acquisitions in that quarter sufficed to lead Austrian states- 
 men to attach the greatest importance to upholding the integrity 
 of the Republic. That any further aggrandizement of the 
 ' natural enemy ' must be prevented at all costs, was one of the 
 cardinal tenets of the faith once for all delivered to Prince 
 Kaunitz. It was held at Vienna that the ' artificial state,' raised 
 to perilous grandeur by Frederick, would, if confined to its exist- 
 ing meagre territories, ultimately collapse of itself. Austria 
 might hope to end successfully the contest for supremacy in Ger- 
 many, if she could prevent the further dismemberment of Poland. 
 For the rest, she wanted no more Polish territories for herself, and 
 would not have been greatly averse to parting with those she 
 already possessed, if a good exchange could be effected. 
 
 Although the policy of the two Imperial Courts thus seemed to 
 afford some security to the Republic, the situation of Poland 
 remained highly precarious. If Russia and Prussia were allied, 
 the latter might at the first emergency extort from the Empress 
 new concessions in Poland as the price of her support. If the 
 Imperial Courts were allied, Prussia might seize the moment
 
 66 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 when they were engaged in some great enterprise to demand 
 Polish territory as a condition of not opposing them. If all three 
 Powers were united, the combination was almost sure to produce 
 a new partition. In short, any grouping of the three neighbors 
 contained elements of danger to Poland. Similarly, almost any 
 crisis might engender another dismemberment of the Republic. 
 As the system of the balance of power was then practised, any 
 aggrandizement of one of the Eastern Powers was likely to lead the 
 other two to demand equivalent acquisitions; and where were 
 equivalents to be found so conveniently as in the vast, defence- 
 less intermediate realm, in which, as it was said, ' one had only to 
 stoop in order to take ' ? Whenever the equilibrium was threat- 
 ened, Poland might be employed to redress the balance. And, 
 unfortunately, the equilibrium was at that time in perpetual 
 danger, owing to the aggressive, the downright revolutionary 
 policy of Catherine, of Joseph II, and, after Frederick's death, 
 of Prussia. 
 
 II 
 
 The union of the three Eastern Powers at the time of the Parti- 
 tion proved only temporary. The Imperial Courts soon resumed 
 their dissensions over Turkish affairs, while the alliance between 
 Russia and Prussia remained in full force, outwardly at least, 
 down to 1780. The only grave conflict in those years, the War of 
 the Bavarian Succession, did not last long enough to involve 
 Poland seriously; but it did give rise to several projects that were 
 to be of decided importance in the later development of the Polish 
 Question. At the moment when Frederick II was about to draw 
 the sword, his minister Hertzberg came forward with a plan for 
 avoiding war by a bargain, by which part of Bavaria should go to 
 Austria, part of Galicia should be restored to Poland, and the 
 grateful Republic should in its turn cede Dantzic, Thorn, and 
 some districts in Great Poland to Prussia. 1 This was, in embryo, 
 the famous ' Hertzberg plan,' which figured so prominently in 
 the Oriental crisis a decade later. It was also akin to that Austro- 
 Prussian plan of 1792 out of which grew the Second Partition of 
 
 1 Unzer, Hertzbergs Anteil an den preussisch-ostcrreichischen Verhandlungen, 
 1778-1779, pp. 4f., 122 f.
 
 THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 67 
 
 Poland. Frederick is said to have repudiated the project in 1778 
 with scant ceremony; x nevertheless, after hostilities had begun, 
 Hertzberg returned to the charge with the proposal of conquering 
 Galicia and then trading it off to Poland for the acquisitions 
 desired by Prussia. The King rebuffed him once more, but hence- 
 forth the idea of ousting the Austrians from Galicia and acquiring 
 Dantzic, Thorn, and part of Great Poland for Prussia, by ex- 
 change if possible, became the favorite project, the ' grand design ' 
 of the persistent, patriotic, and rather pedantic minister. 2 Hertz- 
 berg seems to have sounded some of the Poles on the subject of the 
 exchange at the time of the Bavarian war; 3 and his plan may 
 stand in some kind of connection with the project of Stanislas 
 Augustus for recovering Galicia by joining in hostilities against 
 Austria. The King's design, which foreshadows the Polish plans 
 of 1790, was well known at Vienna. It led Austria to take a more 
 active interest in Polish affairs after the war, and it strengthened 
 her desire to keep Poland in a state of impotence. 4 
 
 After the Peace of Teschen, Catherine began to consider a 
 change in. her political connections. The alliance with Prussia 
 seemed to have furnished most of the advantages of which it was 
 capable; and for the vast Oriental plans which now filled the 
 Empress' mind, the friendship of Austria was necessary. For a 
 time Catherine may have thought of combining liaisons with both 
 the German Powers by forming that triple alliance which had 
 often been a favorite project at St. Petersburg. What the triple 
 alliance would have led to, is sufficiently indicated in a remark- 
 able conversation that took place between the Empress' favorite 
 Potemkin and the Prussian envoy Gortz in the autumn of 1779. 
 At the order of his master, who was eager to make sure of the 
 favorite, Gortz intimated Frederick's willingness to further 
 Potemkin's supposed plans upon the crown of Poland. There- 
 
 1 His reply to Hertzberg was: " Allez vous promener avec vos indignes plans. 
 Vous etes fait pour etre le ministre de gens coujons comme l'electeur de Baviere, 
 mais non pour moi," Bailleu, " Graf Hertzberg," II . Z., xlii, p. 446, and note 1. 
 
 2 Unzer, op. cit., p. 143; Ranke, Die deutschen Machte, i, pp. 22 f.; Krauel, 
 Graf Hertzberg als Minister Friedrich Wilhelms II, p. 36. 
 
 3 Cf. his report to the King, September 4, 1778, Unzer, p. 143. 
 
 4 Kalinka, Ostatnie lata panowania Stanislawa Augusta, i, pp. 300 f.; Herrmann, 
 Geschichle des russischen Staales, vi, pp. 481, 483 f., 502, 520 f.
 
 68 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 upon the Russian, while roundly denying the ambition ascribed to 
 him, seized the occasion to propose a complete partition of the 
 Republic, as the only means of ending the difficulties to which 
 Poland in its present state must constantly give rise; and he 
 expressly charged the envoy to procure Frederick's views on the 
 subject. For once Frederick professed total lack of appetite. He 
 replied that he thought of nothing except keeping what he had 
 and checking the insatiable ambition of Austria. With that 
 response this highly enigmatic episode ended. Of one thing one 
 may be fairly sure: Potemkin could hardly have been throwing 
 out merely his own ideas, for in that case he could not have in- 
 sisted upon a reply from Frederick. He must have been acting 
 with a commission from the Empress. But, on the other hand, 
 one cannot be certain whether Catherine was simply trying to 
 probe the secret ambitions of Prussia, or whether she seriously 
 thought of a total partition of Poland as a preliminary to the 
 partition of Turkey, and as a means of bringing the Eastern 
 Powers into complete and durable accord. 1 At any rate, Fred- 
 erick's answer must have confirmed the idea that the triple 
 alliance was out of the question, and that the Prussian alliance 
 had exhausted its usefulness. With so unambitious and super- 
 annuated a partner as Frederick had now become, there was 
 really nothing great to be done. 
 
 While the King of Prussia was thus playing the recalcitrant, the 
 Court of Vienna was straining every nerve to supplant his in- 
 fluence at St. Petersburg. And as a result of the indefatigable 
 activity of Prince Kaunitz, the adroit diplomacy of Count Louis 
 Cobenzl, who was sent in 1779 as envoy to Russia, the visit of 
 Joseph II to the Empress in 1780, the influence of Potemkin, and 
 above all Catherine's own clever calculations, Austria in 1781 
 could boast of a brilliant diplomatic victory. By the letters 
 exchanged between the two sovereigns under the dates of May 2 1 
 and 13/24 of that year, 2 the Austro-Russian alliance was consum- 
 
 1 For this interesting incident, which deserves a more thorough investigation 
 than it has yet received, cf. Gortz, Denkwiirdigkeiten, i, pp. 123 ff.; Dohm, Denk- 
 wiirdigkeiten, ii, pp. xlv-xlviii; Reimann, Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates, 
 ii, pp. 282 ff.; Koser, Friedrich der Grosse, ii, p. 606. 
 
 2 Printed in Arneth, Joseph II und Katharina, pp. 72-87.
 
 THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 69 
 
 mated : an alliance which in the next few years seemed to domi- 
 nate Europe, and which was to be portentous both for Turkey and 
 for Poland. 
 
 It was the fatal defect of this alliance that the two contracting 
 Powers entered into it with very different aims. For the Aus- 
 trians the great object was security from Prussia and, if the 
 opportunity occurred, offensive action against that state. For 
 Catherine, however — and circumstances inevitably rendered 
 her the dominant partner — the goal was always the realization 
 of her plans against the Ottoman Empire. For some years after 
 the conclusion of the alliance, the two cabinets were intermit- 
 tently engaged in the discussion of the grandiose scheme called 
 the ' Greek project,' which aimed at nothing less than the ex- 
 pulsion of the Turks from Europe, suitable aggrandizement for 
 the allies, the restoration of the Byzantine Empire under Cath- 
 erine's grandson Constantine, and the creation of a ' Kingdom of 
 Dacia,' presumably intended for Potemkin. 1 The Austrians 
 accepted the grand plan in principle, but without enthusiasm and 
 with lively misgivings as to the possibility of its execution. 
 
 In Europe at large, enough of the ' Greek project' was known to 
 arouse enthusiasm in the public and consternation in the cabinets. 
 When in 1783 Catherine proceeded to the annexation of the 
 Crimea, the other Powers regarded the step as a preliminary to 
 the final onslaught of both the Imperial Courts upon the Turks; 
 and France and Prussia prepared for the worst emergencies. Both 
 Vergennes, the director of French foreign policy, and Frederick 
 were ready to go to war, rather than to allow the allies to partition 
 the Turkish Empire at pleasure. Vergennes thought of bringing 
 
 1 I know of no direct evidence from Russian official documents to prove that 
 Dacia was intended for Potemkin; but such was the general opinion of contem- 
 poraries, and that belief has been almost universally accepted by historians. One 
 reservation must be made, however. In case it proved possible to free the Danubian 
 Principalities, but not to restore the Greek Empire, then Catherine would probably 
 have preferred to bestow the crown of Dacia upon Constantine, although doubtless 
 with Potemkin at his side as adviser and mentor. Cf. [Helbig], " Potemkin der 
 Taurier," in Minerva, xxiii (1797), pp. 228f.,xxvi, pp. 305ff., xxxii, pp. 4271?.; Gortz, 
 op. cit., i, pp. 126 f.; Dohm, op. cit., ii, p. 50; Zinkeisen, Geschichle des osmanischen 
 Retches, vi, p. 351; Jorga, Geschichle des osmanischen Retches, v, p. 91; BpHKHepi., 
 UoTeMEHHi, pp. 64!!., 212; Askenazy, Przymierze polsko-pruskie, p. 36.
 
 7o 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 into the field against the Imperial Courts a great coalition con- 
 sisting of France, Spain, Sardinia, Prussia, Sweden, and perhaps 
 even Poland. 1 In case Catherine and Joseph were satisfied, how- 
 ever, with wresting a few provinces from the Turks, Vergennes 
 preferred to avoid a general war by a bargain which would give 
 France the Austrian Netherlands, and Prussia some Polish terri- 
 tories. 2 Frederick and Hertzberg, discussing the same problems 
 in 1783, differed in that the King inclined more to war, and the 
 minister to diplomacy; but the conclusions of both were identical: 
 that in case Austria made any considerable conquests from the 
 Turks, Prussia must extort equivalent acquisitions in Poland. 3 
 The storm blew over on this occasion, as Catherine contented 
 herself with the Crimea, the Emperor reserved his claims to a 
 later time, and the Turks were persuaded not to risk a rupture. 
 But the execution of the ' Greek project ' was only postponed, not 
 abandoned; and it was certain that whenever the allies resumed 
 the plan, they would have to reckon with Prussia, and possibly 
 even with a great coalition, such as Vergennes had outlined. 
 
 The Imperial Courts were by no means ignorant of the opposi- 
 tion to be expected. For a time the Austrians were not unwilling 
 to bribe Prussia to remain quiet by offering her a bit of Polish 
 territory, for which the Republic might be compensated out of the 
 spoils taken from Turkey. 4 Later, however, they talked rather of 
 coercing the Court of Berlin into passivity by military demon- 
 strations or even active hostilities; and they frequently suggested 
 that, in general, the indispensable preliminary to the execution of 
 the ' grand plan ' was ' to remove the horns of the King of Prussia.' 
 
 1 Flassan, Histoire de la diplomatic franqaise, vii, pp. 383 ff.; Zinkeisen, op. tit., 
 vi, pp. 423 ff.; Tratchevsky, "La France et l'Allemagne sous Louis XVI," in R. H., 
 xiv; Lucchesini to Frederick William, November 19, 1788: " J'ai vu des lettres 
 de ce Ministre au Comte de Rzewuski, demeurant alors a Paris, par lesquelles on 
 voit que le Comte de Vergennes, prevoyant la Guerre actuelle entre la Porte et les 
 deux Cours Imperiales, auroit voulu pouvoir former une Confederation en Pologne, 
 soutenue par l'argent de la France et de l'Espagne, et y joindre la Puissance de 
 V. M., avec une diversion que le Roi de Suede auroit du tenter en Finlande," B. A., 
 Pologne, Fasc, 1097. 
 
 2 Flassan, ibid., pp. 391 ff. 
 
 3 Bailleu, "Der Ursprung des deutschen Fiirstenbundes," H. Z. xli, pp. 424 ff. 
 
 4 F. R. A., II, liii, p. ix; Beer, Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs , p. 48.
 
 THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE Jl 
 
 After the formation of the Fiirstenbund — a crushing blow to 
 Catherine's German policy — that view seemed to gain ground 
 on the Neva. 1 The Empress was, in fact, coming to regard the 
 Court of Berlin as her most dangerous enemy. The state of 
 Russo-Prussian relations from 1785 onward ominously recalled 
 the tension on the eve of the Seven Years' War. 2 
 
 With Poland the Imperial Courts were even less disposed to 
 share their prospective conquests. They intended that the 
 Republic should remain as it was — weak and helpless. 3 By the 
 treaty of 1781 they had pledged themselves to maintain tran- 
 quillity in Poland, and had guaranteed the constitution as fixed 
 by the Diet of 1773; and they were thus committed to upholding 
 the status quo. Practically, the alliance produced a certain im- 
 provement in the position of Poland, inasmuch as it set a check 
 upon the territorial ambition of Prussia, while, by diverting 
 Catherine's attention to the Eastern Question, it led to a con- 
 siderable relaxation of the pressure she had hitherto exerted upon 
 the Republic. On the other hand, the alliance did not in any way 
 impair Russia's exclusive position in Poland. Austria gained no 
 additional influence there as a result of her new connection, and the 
 fear of arousing the suspicions or resentment of Russia deterred 
 her from any systematic or continued attempt to form a party of 
 her own. Joseph interfered vigorously in Poland only when the 
 interests of his Galician subjects were concerned; and if these 
 interventions occasionally led the Polish opposition (the so-called 
 ' Patriots ') to fix their hopes on the Court of Vienna, it was 
 invariably shown that no permanent support could be expected 
 from that quarter. At the opening of the Four Years' Diet an 
 Austrian party in Poland did not exist. 
 
 One question frequently discussed between St. Petersburg and 
 Vienna was that of the future successor to Stanislas Augustus. 
 Russia consistently declared in favor of a ' Piast ' (i. e., a native 
 Pole); while Austria, from 1782 onward, urged the desirability of 
 
 1 F. R. A., II, liii, pp. xiv ff., 349, 368; liv, pp. 13-21, 78 f., 108, note 1. 
 
 2 Cf. TpaieBCKiii, Coi03i Kiuraeii, pp. 384 ff. 
 
 3 Catherine's notes on the " Greek project," written probably about 1782, in 
 the PyccKaa Orapima, lxxvi, pp. 1 ff.
 
 J 2 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 holding out hopes to the Elector of Saxony. 1 Behind this latter 
 plan lay the wish of the Vienna cabinet not only to lure the 
 Elector away from the side of Prussia, but also to place upon the 
 Polish throne a king less dependent on Russia and more amenable 
 to Austrian influence. Such details were not overlooked at St. 
 Petersburg. The Polish succession remained an open question 
 between the two Courts, a germ of future disagreements. 
 
 It was not the only rift in the alliance. Indeed the role of 
 ' most intimate ally ' to Catherine would have proved a bit trying 
 to the most patient, the least self-willed of monarchs. Self- 
 abnegation was not Joseph's forte. Neither he nor Kaunitz had 
 ever felt any real ardor for the ' Greek project ' : both occasion- 
 ally vented their ill-humor at the frivolity, the megalomania, the 
 slight regard for her ally, with which the Empress pursued the 
 scheme. Besides, the advantages of the partnership seemed to 
 fall out most unequally. The alliance had brought to Catherine 
 the Crimea — to Joseph, only failure upon failure. The Emperor 
 began to think about a change of policy. 
 
 At the beginning of 1785, after the collapse of his plan for the 
 Bavarian Exchange, Joseph was reflecting seriously on the desira- 
 bility of a frank reconciliation with Prussia. United, the two 
 German Powers could hold all Europe in check, and procure 
 themselves whatever ' advantages ' they chose. 2 The ' advan- 
 tage ' the Emperor had in mind for himself was, of course, 
 Bavaria: what Prussia would have demanded in return, he could 
 easily have imagined. The point of the alliance, it appears, 
 would have been directed chiefly against France, while Russia was 
 to be taken into the partnership. In short, this was the system of 
 1792, of the First Coalition, of the Second Partition of Poland. 
 Dropped for a time, the same ideas returned to the Emperor's 
 mind after the death of Frederick II. Kaunitz dissented vigor- 
 ously, and Joseph appeared to yield; but behind the Chancellor's 
 back he continued the discussion with the Vice-Chancellor, Philip 
 
 1 Cobenzl to Joseph, January 18, 1783, and June 3, 1785, Kaunitz to Cobenzl, 
 February 13, 1787, F. R. A., II, liii, p. 366; liv, pp. 41 f., 108. Also Joseph to 
 Catherine, November 13, 1782, and her reply of January 4/15, 1783, Arneth, 
 Joseph II und Katharina, pp. 169-175, 182-188. 
 
 2 Joseph to Louis Cobenzl, January 22, 1785, F. R. A., II, liv, pp. 5-8.
 
 TEE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 73 
 
 Cobenzl, and Spielmann, the rising man in the Haus-Hof-und 
 Staatskanzlei. These two ministers, who were later to reign and 
 fall together, were already very much of one mind, particularly 
 with regard to the policies of their chief, the Chancellor. They 
 agreed that the Emperor's idea of a reconciliation with Prussia 
 pointed to the only course that could lead to great results. Both 
 before and after Joseph's trip to the Crimea, they submitted to 
 him in writing plans for the realization of that project. The exact 
 nature of their program is not quite certain; but there can be 
 little doubt that one feature of it was the exchange of Belgium for 
 Bavaria in the interests of Austria, while it probably included 
 acquisitions in Poland for the Court of Berlin. The combination 
 of those two favorite plans was the natural, the obvious condition 
 of any bargain between the two states for 'reciprocal advantages.' 
 Indeed, towards the end of 1786 an insinuation looking to an 
 understanding on just that basis reached Berlin as coming from 
 Vienna. The whole incident is very obscure, but it is possible 
 that the insinuation had some connection with the projects then 
 under discussion in the Emperor's cabinet. At any rate, those 
 projects came to nothing, at least for the time being. Joseph 
 found the means proposed too adventurous, and the conse- 
 quences too dangerous. 1 
 
 While these discussions were going on at Vienna, similar desires 
 for a rapprochement were felt in some circles in Berlin. Prince 
 Henry, Frederick's brother, had long advocated an understanding 
 with Austria for reciprocal advantages, and was not averse even 
 to allowing the Bavarian Exchange. The Duke of Brunswick held 
 somewhat similar opinions. Bischoffwerder and Wollner, the 
 favorites of the new King, Frederick William II, cultivated inti- 
 mate relations with Prince Reuss, the Austrian envoy, and 
 desired to bring about a meeting between the two monarchs. 2 
 
 1 For the above: Ranke, Die deutscken Machle, ii, pp. 298-308; Ph. Cobenzl 
 to L. Cobenzl, December 21, 1786, F. R. A., II, liv, pp. 93 f.; Brunner, Corre- 
 spondances intimes de VEmpcrcur Joseph II, pp. 60 f., 66 (Ph. Cobenzl to the 
 Emperor, February 23, 1787; Joseph's reply; also his note to Cobenzl of Sep- 
 tember 25, 1787); F. K. Wittichen, Preussen und England in der europaischen 
 Politik, 1785-88, pp. 1 18-123, 186 f. 
 
 2 Krauel, Prinz Heinrich von Preussen als Politiker, pp. 24, 30, 34 ff., 40 f.; 
 Volz, " Prinz Heinrich von Preussen und die preussische Politik vor der ersten
 
 74 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 On both sides there was, then, some desire for better relations, 
 some dawning consciousness that it would be wise to end the long 
 rivalry by a friendly understanding, through which each state 
 would be enabled to make the acquisitions it most needed, But 
 significant as these ideas were for the future, the time for realizing 
 them had not yet come. In the great European crisis of 1787-91, 
 the two German Powers were destined to appear once more as 
 bitter enemies. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The prelude to that crisis was the famous voyage of the Em- 
 press Catherine down the Dnieper to visit her new Tauric prov- 
 inces. The King of Poland waited seven weeks at Kanev for a 
 few hours' audience with the Tsarina; the Emperor of the Ro- 
 mans arrived soon afterwards to pay his homage to her. Europe 
 looked on with wonder and uneasiness, and the Turks prepared 
 for war. Joseph had gone to the Crimea much against his will, 
 loaded down with a set of Kaunitz's most masterly and vol- 
 uminous instructions and determined to do his utmost to dissuade 
 his ally from attempting the execution of the ' grand plan ' just 
 then. The meeting passed off brilliantly and satisfactorily; the 
 Emperor returned to Vienna reassured. Some weeks later 
 (August 16, 1787) the Porte declared war on Russia. Joseph at 
 once acknowledged the casus foederis, though his public declara- 
 tion of war against Turkey was issued only in the following 
 February. After so many years of planning, the allies were now 
 called upon to carry out their projects, and they were caught only 
 half prepared. It remained to be seen whether the despised Turks 
 would prove such easy victims as had been imagined, whether the 
 other Powers would quietly look on, and especially whether the 
 two states that had suffered most from the pressure of the Im- 
 perial Courts would not seize the opportunity to make trouble. 
 Those states were Prussia and Poland. 
 
 Teilung Polens," F. B. P. G., xviii, pp. 165 s.; F. K. Wittichen, Preussen und 
 England, pp. 18 f.; Koser, " Aus dem ersten Regierungsjahre Friedrich Wil- 
 helms II," F. B. P. G., iv, p. 600; Welschinger, Mirabeau d Berlin, pp. 303, 402.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 The Designs of Prussia 
 
 Great was the satisfaction felt at Berlin over the outbreak of the 
 Oriental war. Prussia at once found herself in an extraordinarily- 
 favorable situation. With the forces of the Imperial Courts tied 
 up in an arduous and costly enterprise, with the other Powers 
 suing for the friendship of Berlin, with the supposedly invincible 
 army and the well-filled treasury left by the late King, under an 
 ambitious new sovereign and a veteran minister who aspired to 
 surpass all that the great Frederick had done, Prussia seemed to 
 be in a position to make herself the arbiter of the Continent and 
 the foremost Power in Europe. Everyone at Berlin agreed that a 
 unique moment for great enterprises had come; but the question 
 as to just what was to be done was not so simple. One party was 
 for forming an alliance with England, Sweden, and Poland, com- 
 ing actively to the aid of the Turks, and fighting out the contest 
 with Austria to a finish. If Russia stood by her ally, the Turks, 
 Poles, and Swedes could keep her busy. By fighting two or three 
 campaigns now, it was said, Prussia could realize all her most 
 cherished ambitions, place her position as a great Power upon an 
 indestructible basis, and win peace for the next century. 1 Such 
 plans were bold and alluring, but they were open to grave objec- 
 tions. What reliance could be placed on the Turks, after the 
 figure they had made in their last war, or on such a mad knight- 
 errant as the King of Sweden, or on the feeble and inconstant 
 Poles ? The new Prussian entente with England was still in a 
 very uncertain stage, and Pitt had hitherto manifested no great 
 interest in Eastern affairs. Besides, it ran contrary to Frederician 
 traditions to provoke or even risk a war with Russia. The alliance 
 
 1 Cf. the ideas of Diez in Zinkeisen, op. cil., vi, p. 687; of Goltz, Herrmann, 
 op. cit., vi, pp. 200 ff.; also the plans described by Askenazy, Przymierze polsko- 
 pruskie, pp. 19-24.
 
 j6 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 with the Empress had not yet expired, 1 and there was no wish 
 dearer to most Prussian statesmen than to restore the onetime 
 intimacy of that connection. The indications from St. Petersburg 
 were not unfavorable; for the Russian ministers talked most 
 obligingly, and the Vice-Chancellor Ostermann even spoke of 
 the acquisitions which Prussia might make in the course of this 
 war. 2 Would it not be wiser, therefore, to play the part of the 
 zealous friend, try to draw the Empress away from the Court of 
 Vienna, and in the end be paid for one's services by a handsome 
 acquisition in Poland ? That was, at least, the policy that pre- 
 vailed at Berlin at the outbreak of the Oriental war; and if it led 
 to a fiasco, one cannot deny that it seemed at the start well 
 adapted to circumstances. Later events were to prove that it was 
 easier to make acquisitions in Poland in alliance with Russia than 
 in opposition to her. 
 
 But the particular plan through which Prussia attempted to 
 carry out this policy was in truth the unluckiest that could be 
 imagined. We have seen that Count Hertzberg, now the leading 
 minister of Frederick William II, had, years before, evolved a 
 scheme by which, as he thought, the mistakes of Frederick II at 
 the time of the First Partition could be rectified, the Polish Ques- 
 tion settled to perfection, and the whole equilibrium of Europe 
 assured in saecula saeculorum. Towards the end of 1787 and at 
 the beginning of 1788, the long- treasured revelation, with some 
 adaptation to present circumstances, was submitted for royal 
 approval, and confided in the greatest secrecy to most of the Prus- 
 sian representatives abroad, and to a great part of the foreign 
 ministers at Berlin. The plan, now as in 1778, had two chief 
 aims: to secure for Prussia the desired acquisitions in Poland, and 
 to oust the Austrians from Galicia. This was to be effected by 
 purely diplomatic means, and of the most extraordinary sort. 
 Prussia was to induce the belligerent Powers to accept her media- 
 tion, and the following terms of peace: (1) the Porte should cede 
 Wallachia and Moldavia to Austria, and Bessarabia and Oczakow 
 to Russia, while renouncing all claims to the Crimea: in return for 
 
 1 The alliance lapsed only in April, 1788. 
 
 2 Bailleu, " Graf Hertzberg," H. Z., xlii, p. 468.
 
 THE DESIGNS OF PRUSSIA J J 
 
 this, Prussia and her allies would undertake an eternal guarantee 
 of the Turkish possessions south of the Danube; (2) Austria 
 should restore Galicia to Poland; (3) the Poles, fired with grati- 
 tude, should cede Dantzic, Thorn and the palatinates of Posen 
 and Kalisz to Prussia. The monstrous impracticability of this 
 plan has been so often exposed that further criticism seems almost 
 superfluous. Though Hertzberg compared his scheme to the 
 " egg of Columbus " and found that " no reasonable man could 
 resist it," 1 still he was probably the only person at that time 
 who believed in the project, and no plan has ever been more 
 unanimously condemned by historians. 2 The idea that, of five 
 Powers concerned, three would voluntarily submit to be robbed, 
 and the fourth, from sheer gaiety of heart, to accept foreign dicta- 
 tion, for the benefit of the fifth, which had done nothing whatever 
 except to invent this marvelous panacea — this was a thought 
 that could arise only in the mind of an elderly pedant who 
 imagined that his memoires were perfectly irresistible, and who, 
 as Mirabeau said, " saw nothing in this sublunary sphere but 
 Hertzberg and Prussia." 3 
 
 All through the winter of 1787-88 Hertzberg dwelt in a fool's 
 paradise. The King, who in October had indicated his perfect 
 willingness to take the whole left bank of the Vistula, if an oppor- 
 tunity presented itself, 4 was slowly won over to give at least a 
 provisional assent to the ' grand plan.' Diez at Constantinople 
 received copious instructions to prepare the infidels to receive the 
 great light. The Russians were overwhelmed with kindness. 
 After offering the Empress Prussian mediation, subsidies for the 
 war, and a renewal of the alliance treaty, Hertzberg waited only 
 for the expected favorable answer, before laying his plan formally 
 before her. March 12, 1788, the answer was delivered in Berlin: 
 the Prussian proposals were one and all declined or evaded. At 
 
 1 Luckwaldt, in F. B. P. G., xv, p. 97; Zinkciscn, op. cit., vi, p. 676. 
 
 2 From the long list of writers who have condemned it, one might cite Bailleu, 
 Duncker, Treitschke, Koser, Luckwaldt, Krauel, Andreae, Kalinka, and Askenazy. 
 Almost the only defenders have been the brothers Paul and F. K. Wittichen, whose 
 recent attempts at a vindication of Hertzberg are far from convincing. 
 
 3 Welschinger, Mirabeau a Berlin, p. 206. 
 
 4 Luckwaldt, in F. B. P. G., xv, p. 97.
 
 78 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the moment when Joseph II was beginning hostilities against the 
 Turks, Catherine was not inclined to compromise herself by a 
 suspicious intimacy with Prussia. 
 
 The first onslaught had failed, but Hertzberg was not the man 
 to give up the battle. He concluded only that patience and the 
 support of some other Power were needed. Hence he next 
 started negotiations with England for converting the existing 
 entente into an alliance, while he continued to lavish professions 
 of friendship at St. Petersburg; he refused the proposals of 
 Sweden, which was just then preparing to attack the Empress; 
 and he waited with longing to hear of the expected Russian 
 victories over the Turks. The presence in Berlin during the 
 summer of a Russian secret agent of pronounced Prussian sym- 
 pathies, Alopeus, was encouraging; and, with the conclusion of 
 the Triple Alliance with England and Holland in August, Hertz- 
 berg thought himself on the highroad to success. If his new allies 
 would only properly back him up, if the Turks were once so 
 soundly thrashed that they could seek safety only under the 
 protection of Prussia, if Catherine would only accept the hand 
 of friendship held out to her from Berlin, if the Austrians and 
 Poles could be cajoled or coerced into accepting arrangements so 
 suitable for them and so profitable for Prussia, then the success 
 of the ' grand plan ' was assured. 
 
 As a matter of fact, however, not one of these conditions was 
 likely to be fulfilled. Pitt, while glad to cooperate with Prussia in 
 restoring peace in the Orient, was by no means disposed to back 
 up Prussian schemes of aggrandizement. 1 The perverse Turks 
 exasperated their friends at Berlin by not getting beaten. In the 
 summer of 1788 they were holding their own against the Russians, 
 and winning victory after victory over the Austrians. Above all, 
 unknown to Hertzberg, the Imperial Courts had been making new 
 agreements, especially designed to prevent the realization of the 
 ' grand plan.' 
 
 1 Cf. Salomon, William Pitt, i' li , pp. 339 ff., 4442.; Rose, William Pitt and 
 National Revival, pp. 386, 508 ff.
 
 THE DESIGNS OF PRUSSIA 79 
 
 II 
 
 From a very early date (December, 1787), intercepted dis- 
 patches had kept the Austrian government constantly informed 
 of the development of Hertzberg's projects. Joseph found the 
 grand plan ' as inadmissible as it was ridiculous ' ; Kaunitz 
 called it a ' chimera ' ; l nevertheless they hastened to raise the 
 alarm at St. Petersburg. It was above all things necessary to 
 make sure that Russia would not succumb to Hertzberg's seduc- 
 tions. The ambassador Cobenzl was ordered to propose that the 
 two Courts should pledge themselves to resist with all their forces 
 any Prussian attempt to make acquisitions in Poland, and that 
 they should at once set to work to conclude an alliance with the 
 Republic. 2 In case of an attack on the part of Prussia, they might 
 even promise the Poles the restoration of the provinces ceded to 
 that Court at the time of the Partition. 
 
 On the receipt of these instructions, Cobenzl exerted himself to 
 the utmost to ruin the Hertzberg plan, once and for all. There 
 was no possible case, he declared incessantly, in which his Court 
 could consent to an aggrandizement of Prussia ; a gain for them- 
 selves, if coupled with advantages for their natural enemy, would 
 be only a loss; the acquisitions contemplated by Prussia in Poland 
 were contrary to the fundamental interests of both the Imperial 
 Courts; and, if necessary, Austria would abandon the Turkish 
 war and sacrifice every other consideration, in order to oppose the 
 Prussian designs with all her might. 3 
 
 This language and these demands did not cause unmixed 
 pleasure at St. Petersburg. Though they were far from capti- 
 vated by the Hertzberg plan, and were, in general, opposed to 
 Prussian acquisitions in Poland at that time, the Russians dis- 
 liked binding themselves by too precise engagements, and were 
 even less inclined to take Austria into the alliance then under 
 
 1 Joseph to L. Cobenzl, December 11, 1787, F. R. A., II, liv, pp. 229 f.; 
 Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, December 7, 1787 and February 7, 1788, V. A., Riissland, 
 Fxpeditionen. 
 
 2 The project of alliance had been included in the instructions given Cobenzl 
 on his return to Russia in 1 786. The orders mentioned in the text are dated Decem- 
 ber 7, 1787. 
 
 3 Cobenzl's reports of February 3 and March 1, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1788.
 
 8o 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 discussion between themselves and Poland. They could not, 
 however, rebuff their ally in so serious a matter during the first 
 months of the joint war on the Turks. Hence, after long delays, 
 CobenzPs importunities were crowned with success. On May 21, 
 1788, he received from the Russians a formal ministerial declara- 
 tion, to the effect that if the King of Prussia, under the present 
 circumstances, undertook to acquire any of the possessions of the 
 Republic of Poland, the Empress of Russia bound herself to unite 
 with the Emperor of the Romans in making the most urgent 
 representations to deter the King from such an intention. If 
 these representations proved fruitless, she promised to make com- 
 mon cause with the Emperor in opposing the execution of such a 
 plan with all the forces and means that she could employ com- 
 patibly with the security of her Empire and the need of defending 
 herself against the Porte. The Russian ministers announced that 
 this declaration had the force of a formal treaty, and that they 
 held it superfluous to require a similar pledge from Austria. 1 
 
 The Austrians professed themselves completely satisfied. So 
 far as Russia could be considered bound by a solemn engagement, 
 they could rest assured that she would not consent to the Hertz- 
 berg plan or to any other Prussian designs upon Poland. But if 
 paper guarantees availed, Poland would never have been parti- 
 tioned. The declaration remained a secret of the two Imperial 
 cabinets, unknown at Berlin or at Warsaw. In the following 
 years it did not prevent either Austrians or Russians from con- 
 sidering seriously the sacrifice of Polish territory to Prussia, when- 
 
 1 The Russian attitude in this matter can be explained from the memoir pre- 
 sented by Bezborodko to the Empress, printed in the Pycdrifi ApxHBi, 1875, "» 
 p. 35; and the protocols of the Council of the Empire for December 23, 1787/Janu- 
 ary 3, 1788; and April 20/May 1, 1788, in the Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 518 ff., 
 556 f. Kalinka, the first historian to discover this convention, gave a satis- 
 factory account of its origin, except that he erroneously states that Russia demanded 
 a similar declaration from Austria; he also gives the essence of the text of the 
 agreement, Der polnische Reichstag, i, pp. 52-55. The translator of the German 
 edition of Kalinka's work adds in a note that the text of this Austro-Russian treaty 
 is not to be found among the acts of either the Warsaw or the St. Petersburg mission 
 in the Vienna Haus-Hof-und Staalsarchiv. This is an error. The original of the 
 Russian ' declaration ' is to be found appended to Louis Cobenzl's report of 
 May 24 among the Berichte, Russland, 1788. Since this document has never 
 hitherto been published, I give the text in Appendix I.
 
 THE DESIGNS OF PRUSSIA 8 1 
 
 ever interest or necessity suggested such a course. Yet if its 
 practical results were small, the declaration still has a certain 
 historical significance as the most explicit expression of the deter- 
 mination of Austria and Russia at that time to maintain the 
 integrity of Poland. 
 
 In the same dispatches with which he transmitted the Russian 
 declaration, Cobenzl reported that the alliance of Russia with the 
 Republic was well under way. Not, indeed, that alliance in 
 which Austria also would have participated, as Kaunitz desired, 
 for it did not accord with Russian policy to admit any other Power 
 to so close a connection with Poland. Yet the proposed alliance 
 between the Empress and the Republic had no other object 
 (Ostermann asserted) than that which the Austrians had sug- 
 gested: namely, to assure the Imperial Courts, of Polish aid in 
 case of a war with Prussia. This was, indeed, the plan Catherine 
 had chosen for thwarting the designs of Hertzberg and for keep- 
 ing the Republic in order while the Oriental crisis lasted. The 
 plan bore great results. It precipitated precisely the troubles it 
 was intended to avert.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Plan for a Russo-Polish Alliance 
 
 Stanislas Augustus, with all his weakness of will in emergencies, 
 displayed a remarkable tenacity and perseverance in the pursuit 
 of his fundamental aims. From the beginning of his reign down 
 to its tragic close, he was haunted by the desire to increase his 
 monarchical power, to augment the army and the revenues of the 
 state, and to restore Poland to its place among the active mem- 
 bers of the European political system. " Born with a vast and 
 ardent ambition," he said of himself, " the ideas of reform, of 
 glory, of usefulness to my country have become the background 
 of all my plans and of my whole life." x Defeated again and again, 
 he invariably returned to his projects, by new detours, timidly, 
 cautiously, but obstinately. The experiences of the first decade 
 of his reign had convinced him that nothing was to be accom- 
 plished in opposition to Russia ; but he still hoped that much good 
 might be effected with the consent and under the protection of the 
 Empress. The great thing was to persuade her that it was to her 
 interest to make Poland strong enough to render active services, 
 rather than to leave the country a prey to impotence, anarchy, 
 and constant troubles. Especially in case of war between Russia 
 and her neighbors, the King hoped that Catherine would be will- 
 ing to purchase Polish aid by permitting those military, financial, 
 and political reforms, without which the Republic could not 
 cooperate effectively. It has already been noted that during the 
 War of the Bavarian Succession Stanislas thought of an alliance 
 with Russia; and during the ensuing crisis over the Crimean 
 affair, he offered his alliance at St. Petersburg. 2 Decorously 
 
 1 Kalinka, Ostalnie lata, i, p. 80. 
 
 2 The date of this offer is given as 1782 by Askenazy, Przymierze polsko-pruskie, 
 p. 28; and 1783, by Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, i, p. 56. 
 
 82
 
 THE RUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE PROJECT 83 
 
 repulsed on this occasion, he returned to the idea some years 
 later. 
 
 During his stay at Kanev (March-May, 1787), the King laid 
 before Catherine and her advisers the outlines of a plan for a 
 defensive alliance against the Turks; and this time he received 
 the Empress' assent, at least in principle. 1 In September, after 
 the Porte had begun hostilities, he hastened to send the draft of a 
 formal treaty to St. Petersburg. He proposed that the Republic 
 should join actively in the war, and that he himself should take 
 command of one of the allied armies. In return he begged for 
 some extension of his royal prerogatives, the increase of the army, 
 a large subsidy for the expenses of the war, and, at the peace, the 
 acquisition for Poland of Bessarabia, part of Moldavia, and a port 
 on the Black Sea. The alliance was to be brought about by means 
 of a Confederation, which would also serve to prevent internal 
 disorders in Poland during the crisis. 2 Seldom had this unfortu- 
 nate King allowed his imagination so bold a flight. Whether the 
 plan in itself was salutary and statesmanlike or quite the reverse, 
 is a disputed question that need not be argued here. 3 The essential 
 fact is that the better parts of the King's project had not the 
 slightest chance of being accepted at St. Petersburg. 
 
 Catherine was not in the least disposed either to gratify the 
 personal ambitions which she detected in Stanislas' proposals, or 
 to allow the Republic a greater measure of strength and inde- 
 pendence. She attached little importance to the military aid that 
 Poland might render; and while she did desire an alliance, it must 
 be one on her own terms. The primary object of it would be to 
 keep the Poles busy with a harmless enterprise, nattering to their 
 vanity and capable of diverting their attention from more dan- 
 gerous projects. A Confederation under her auspices would 
 enable her to put down possible outbreaks with firmer hand, while 
 
 1 Cf. the note presented by the King to the Empress May 6, 1787, Memoires 
 de Stanislas Auguste, pp. 95-99; also the very interesting correspondence of the 
 King from Kanev, printed by Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, pp. 5-64. 
 
 2 The text of this proposed treaty has not yet been found. The essential features 
 of it can be ascertained, however, from the diplomatic correspondence of the time. 
 Cf. Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, i, pp. 58 f. 
 
 3 Cf. the qualified approval given the plan by Kalinka, op. oil., i, pp. 56 fif.; 
 and the unmitigated condemnation expressed by Askenazy, op. tit., pp. 30 ff.
 
 84 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 various articles might be inserted into the alliance treaty that 
 would extend her legal rights of guardianship over the Republic. 
 As for the means, she would not hear of a Confederation without 
 a Diet, or of the calling of an extraordinary Diet, as the King 
 proposed, for that would arouse the suspicion of the neighbors; 
 she would wait until the next ordinary Diet met, in the autumn of 
 1788, then put through the alliance as quickly and as quietly as 
 possible, and present the other Powers with a. fait accompli. 1 
 
 While Catherine was thus deliberately delaying the project, 
 she was being attacked from other quarters on the same subject. 
 Simultaneously with Stanislas' propositions, she received the 
 offers of the most active leader of the anti-royalist opposition in 
 Poland, the Grand Hetman Branicki. He, too, wished a Russian 
 alliance, but one to be put through by a Confederation directed by 
 himself. For that purpose he and his friend Felix Potocki, 
 Palatine of (Little) Russia, offered to put at the Empress' disposal 
 both the troops of the Republic and their own private militia. 
 Catherine, fortunately, rejected this treasonable offer and read 
 the two magnates a lecture on patriotism; 2 but she was soon to 
 hear very similar proposals from a much more exalted personage. 
 
 II 
 
 Of all the men whose activity was dangerous and baneful to 
 Poland in these years, Prince Potemkin the Taurian stands fore- 
 most. Field-Marshal, President of the War College, Commander- 
 in-Chief of the principal army against the Turks, virtual Viceroy 
 of all Southern Russia, the Empress' most intimate friend, her 
 favorite pupil, her " right hand," as she herself said, Potemkin 
 wielded enormous power and influence; and these facilities he 
 employed, not only to render very considerable services to his 
 benefactress, but also to advance his own personal ambitions. 
 His plans, though different in kind, were no less grandiose, 
 revolutionary, and complicated than Hertzberg's; and, like 
 
 1 For some discussion as to Catherine's attitude towards the Russo-Polish 
 alliance project, see Appendix II. 
 
 2 Branicki to the Empress, September 9, 1787, her reply of September 30/ 
 October n, M. A., HojiBina, II, 6.
 
 THE RUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE PROJECT 85 
 
 Hertzberg's, they related especially to Poland. It is important 
 to bear in mind that during the prolonged Oriental crisis the 
 Republic was equally threatened by the Prussian thirst for ag- 
 grandizement on the one side, and by the ambitions of Potemkin 
 on the other. 
 
 The Prince's secret designs, 1 once centered upon the Polish 
 crown, were now directed rather upon those rich palatinates of 
 the south that would form so capital an addition to his prospec- 
 tive ' Kingdom of Dacia.' To further his plans, he had long 
 maintained a party of his own in the Republic, a party whose 
 activity conflicted incessantly with the official policy of Russia as 
 represented by the ambassador Stackelberg. To strengthen his 
 position in the south, the Prince was continually making immense 
 purchases of land in the Polish Ukraine. His possessions became 
 so large that he thought for a time of having them erected into a 
 vassal principality, something like Courland. But the outbreak 
 of the Turkish war and Stanislas Augustus' proposals for a 
 Russo-Polish alliance opened the way to even more ambitious 
 projects. What could be more tempting to Potemkin than to 
 draw the Republic into the struggle, get its military forces under 
 his control, occupy the coveted southern provinces with his 
 troops, and then by means of a Confederation under his own 
 direction make himself dictator of Poland and put through what 
 changes he saw fit ? 
 
 The Prince was versatile. He knew several routes to the goal. 
 Although at Kanev he had championed Stanislas' alliance proj- 
 ect and later continued to negotiate with the King, at the same 
 time he was framing with the leaders of the Opposition very 
 different plans, vast in scope and revolutionary in character. A 
 coup d'etat, the overthrow of the royal power, the establishment 
 of an oligarchy, even the transformation of the Republic into a 
 federation of provinces or principalities — such appear to have 
 been some of the objects of these mysterious pourparlers. Early 
 in 1788 Potemkin sent to St. Petersburg the plan of action which 
 he had agreed upon with Branicki and Felix Potocki. He pro- 
 posed to raise quickly and secretly an armed force (' national 
 
 1 On Potemkin's schemes with regard to Poland, see Appendix III.
 
 86 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 militia ') in the southern palatinates, with the aid of those mag- 
 nates and szlachta who were most devoted to Russia ; this ' militia ' 
 would then form a Confederation in the provinces, under the pro- 
 tection of the Russian troops and remote from the malign in- 
 fluence of the King and the agents of foreign Powers; it would 
 take over the government of the country, overawe or beat down 
 any opposition that might be attempted, conclude a close alliance 
 between the Republic and the Empress, and, in general, put 
 through anything that Russia might desire. Had this plan been 
 carried out, the result would have been the overthrow of the King 
 and the lawful government of Poland, a repetition of the dis- 
 graceful Confederation of Radom, or a premature mise-en-scene 
 of the dismal tragedy of 1792. 
 
 These projects were the more dangerous because the Polish 
 malcontents who swarmed in Potemkin's camp, were also in rela- 
 tions with Hertzberg, to whom nothing would have given greater 
 pleasure than an outbreak of anarchy in the Republic. The 
 Prussian troops would at once have crossed the frontier ' to 
 restore order.' And Potemkin himself now inclined towards the 
 Prussian alliance. He continually urged the Empress to show 
 more cordiality to Frederick William, and even to win him over 
 by the gift of Dantzic; and he seems, through his Polish friends, to 
 have sounded Berlin with reference to his own plans. Obviously 
 he had more to expect from that quarter than from Vienna. 
 
 Even these measures did not exhaust the schemes of the 
 Tauric Prince. There was still one more plan in reserve — and 
 this the most audacious of all. Potemkin had an extraordinary 
 passion for Cossacks. Although it was he who had induced the 
 Empress to destroy the Zaporozhian Sec 1 in 1775, he had later 
 made great efforts to create new Cossack armies; and especially 
 in the winter of 1787-88 he was indefatigable in his exertions to 
 enlist Cossacks from every quarter. His recruiting officers were 
 particularly busy in Poland. Doubtless the new Cossack forces, 
 which were the object of such extraordinary care, were of much 
 use for the Turkish war; but there is reason to think that they 
 
 1 The famous fortified camp of the free Cossacks of the Dnieper, situated on an 
 island just below the cataracts of the river.
 
 THE RUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE PROJECT 87 
 
 were also raised with a view to one other emergency. If all his 
 other Polish plans failed, if the alliance fell through, if the hostile 
 party gained the upper hand in the Republic, then Potemkin 
 might enter the country at the head of a Cossack army, rouse the 
 Orthodox population of the Ukraine, and repeat the exploits of 
 Bogdan Chmielnicki. 
 
 We have dwelt at length on these astonishing projects for 
 several reasons. In the first place, Potemkin's intrigues with 
 Branicki, Potocki, and their associates at the beginning of the new 
 crisis in Polish affairs form the first link in a chain that ends at 
 Targowica. Then it has been so often asserted that the Republic 
 ought to have taken its position firmly and unconditionally on 
 the Russian side in this crisis, that it is of importance to indicate 
 to some extent what advantages Poland might have expected from 
 an alliance which would have handed over her army, her military 
 and financial resources, her strongholds, her southern provinces 
 to so inveterate an enemy, so dangerous a schemer as Potemkin. 
 Finally, the Prince's secret plans form an essential part of the 
 background of Russia's Polish policy in the next few years. 
 Catherine did not, indeed, blindly accept his advice; but, on the 
 other hand, she did not entirely disregard it. She generally tried 
 to satisfy him to some extent; she made many compromises and 
 many concessions. Down to his death in 1791 his opinions and 
 ambitions weighed heavily on the fate of Poland; and then, 
 unfortunately, his plans lived after him. 
 
 Ill 
 
 When Catherine was finally ready to declare her precise inten- 
 tions about the alliance, the plan she adopted differed materially 
 from the proposals both of Stanislas and of Potemkin. While she 
 distrusted the personal ambitions of the King, she also divined 
 to some extent the secret schemes of the favorite, and she was 
 beginning to find them in conflict with her own policies. As early 
 as December Potemkin's growing preference for the Prussian 
 alliance had provoked from her an unusually sharp letter. 1 She 
 
 1 November 23/December 4, 1787, Pyc. OrapHHa, xvi, pp. 441 ff.
 
 88 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 allowed him to take Polish magnates into her service, approved 
 his plans for organizing and employing the Polish armies, and 
 accepted his amendments to the King's plan for the alliance 
 treaty; but, on the other hand, she firmly rejected his plan for an 
 anti-royalist Confederation in the provinces. She was no more 
 inclined to sacrifice the King to the Opposition, than to surrender 
 the opposition to the King; and she could not lend her approval to 
 projects that would almost infallibly provoke a civil war in Poland. 
 
 In June, 1788, nine months after Stanislas had sent his prop- 
 ositions to St. Petersburg, the Empress' definite reply at last 
 reached Warsaw. The alliance was to be effected through a 
 confederated Diet under the direction of the King and the 
 ambassador — so much was satisfactory; but the other desires of 
 Stanislas were evaded or refused. The expenses incurred by the 
 Republic through the war were to be repaid only after the con- 
 clusion of peace, and then in instalments spread out over six 
 years. The military contingent of the Poles, cut down from 
 20,000 to 1 2 ,000, was to serve under the supreme command of the 
 Russian generals, and immediately under that of Branicki, Felix 
 Potocki, and Stanislas Poniatowski (this was one of the conces- 
 sions to Potemkin) . No territorial acquisitions for Poland were to 
 be thought of. None of the modest constitutional reforms for 
 which the King had hoped, were granted. Finally, an insidious 
 article, the aim of which was to enable Russia to take over the 
 diplomatic representation of Poland abroad, contained a new 
 encroachment upon the independence of the Republic. 1 In short, 
 Stanislas Augustus' original project had been transformed almost 
 beyond recognition. From this alliance, Russia alone could have 
 profited: Poland could have gained nothing whatever except a 
 very dubious protection against the designs of Prussia. Never- 
 theless, though bitterly disappointed, the King accepted the 
 Russian counter-project; perhaps because it was now too late to 
 draw back without offending the Empress. 
 
 It was characteristic of Catherine's policy toward her chief ally 
 that the draft of this treaty was communicated at Vienna only 
 
 1 For detailed analysis of this Russian counter-project, see Kalinka, Der polnische 
 Reichstag, i, pp. 87 ff.
 
 THE RUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE PROJECT 89 
 
 when the Polish Diet was on the point of assembling. Kaunitz 
 fumed and fretted; nevertheless he ordered the Austrian charge 
 d'affaires at Warsaw (de Cache) to support all the measures of 
 Russia, while he himself administered sage advice to those Polish 
 magnates whom he could influence. Yet just before the Diet 
 assembled, the growing ferment in Poland and the ominous 
 attitude of Prussia so alarmed the Austrian Chancellor that he 
 hastened to urge at Petersburg the danger of even proposing an 
 alliance of this sort at such a time. But this warning came too 
 late. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 Towards the end of August Catherine saw fit, as a matter of 
 courtesy, to communicate the alliance project to Prussia. She 
 apparently anticipated no serious opposition; 2 and she was cer- 
 tainly not prepared for the storm that followed. 
 
 The communication produced a livery sensation at Berlin; and 
 not unnaturally, for it seemed to mean the shipwreck of the 
 whole policy pursued so patiently for the past year. Hitherto the 
 Prussians had been trying to win back Russia by amicable means, 
 in the fond hope of persuading the Empress to sanction their 
 designs on Poland. Now, as a reward for all their complais- 
 ance, they were presented with this treaty, which contained 
 Catherine's guarantee of the integrity of Poland, which was, 
 therefore, designed to close the door in their faces, and to thwart 
 all their plans for aggrandizement. The proposed alliance seemed 
 to be directed entirely against Prussia, and it was the more dan- 
 gerous because Austria would probably hasten to accede to it. 
 This alliance must be prevented at all costs. 3 
 
 1 For the above: Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, June 28 and September 20, V. A., Russ- 
 land, Exped., 1788; Kaunitz to Czartoryski, August 26 and 29, V. A., Polcn, Fasc. 
 66; Kaunitz to Rzewuski, September 15 (printed in Beer, Leopold II, Franz II imd 
 Cathar ina, pp. 246 f.); Cobenzl's report of October 10, V.A., Russland,Berichle, 1788. 
 
 2 See her remarks on Potemkin's plan for the alliance, PycCKiii ApxiiBt, 1874, 
 ii, pp. 274 ff. 
 
 3 Hertzberg to the King, September 2, joint report of Hertzberg and Fincken- 
 stein, September 3, rescript to Buchholtz, September 3, B.A., Fol. 323 ("Acta 
 betreffend die Allianz welche die Kayserin von Russland der Republick Pohlen ant- 
 ragen lassen ... hat "). H. to F. W., September 2: "II ne peut pas etre douteux
 
 9° 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Moreover, it seemed clear that the time had come for a com- 
 plete change of policy. Now at last Hertzberg urged acting in 
 open opposition to Russia. 1 At Copenhagen, at Constantinople, 
 at Warsaw, Prussian policy took on a new aggressiveness. At 
 that moment, Gustavus III having attacked Catherine, the 
 Danes, in accordance with the terms of their alliance with Russia, 
 were preparing a counter-attack on Sweden. Berlin immediately 
 served notice that if Denmark did not cease hostilities, 16,000 
 Prussian troops would invade Holstein. Before this threat and 
 the equally vigorous action of England, the Danes backed down. 
 Hertzberg could hardly have dealt the Empress a severer blow, 
 for at a time when the Turkish war left her but small resources 
 against Sweden, the aid of Denmark would have been of great 
 importance. It was a clear sign of the revolution that had taken 
 place in Prussian policy. The first step had been taken in that 
 uncertain, wavering, ill-starred course which in the next few 
 years led Prussian statesmen further and further into open hos- 
 tility to the Power whose friendship they most desired, and into 
 unnatural alliances with states whose friendship they despised or 
 whose territories they coveted. 2 
 
 As regards the alliance project, the official Prussian reply 
 delivered at St. Petersburg left no doubt of the King's senti- 
 ments. 3 Buchholtz, the Prussian envoy at Warsaw, was ordered 
 to do his utmost to thwart the project by working up public 
 opinion against it and by organizing a strong Prussian party. If 
 possible, he was to prevent the approaching Diet from being con- 
 federated ; if necessary, he was to form a Counter-confederation, 
 which would then demand the aid of Prussian troops. 4 The 
 cabinet of Berlin was ready, in fact, to proceed to any extremity. 
 If the Empress persisted in her " presumption," Hertzberg 
 
 que cette alliance est uniquement dirigee contre V. M., pour lui carrer tout agran- 
 dissement, et que l'interet de V. M. exige par consequent de faire tout ce qui sera 
 possible pour la contrecarrer. . . , Je crois qu'en general V. M. sera obligee 
 bientot de montrer les dents a. la cour de Russie." 
 
 1 Report to the King, September 2, and Frederick William's reply, September 
 3, B. A., Fol. 323. 
 
 2 On this abrupt change, see Bailleu, in H. Z., xlii, pp. 484 ff. 
 
 3 Rescript to Keller, September 12, B. A., Fol. 323. 
 
 4 Rescripts to Buchholtz, September 3 and 16, ibid.
 
 THE RUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE PROJECT 9 1 
 
 wrote, she would force the King to take sides with Sweden and 
 the Porte. 1 
 
 The Empress, however, was not so rash. Although deeply- 
 incensed at the conduct of Prussia, she recognized that the 
 Polish alliance was not worth the risk of a third war in addition 
 to the two she already had on her hands, and so she ordered 
 Stackelberg to suspend negotiations on the subject. But she 
 could not bring herself to renounce entirely a plan she had once 
 taken up: she therefore added that if a more favorable oppor- 
 tunity presented itself in the course of the Diet, the alliance proj- 
 ect might be brought forward again. 2 
 
 By this reservation Catherine largely destroyed the value of 
 her concession. The Prussians were not conciliated, but only 
 filled with new suspicions. The Empress, they fancied, was trying 
 to lull them to slumber in order later on to surprise them with a 
 fait accompli. Hence they determined to persevere in their policy 
 of stubborn opposition. 3 When the Diet assembled, it was under 
 the shadow of a great impending struggle between Russia and 
 Prussia for control in Poland. 
 
 1 Hertzberg to Buchholtz, September 16. In equally warlike vein Hertzberg 
 to the King, October 2, Fol. 323. 
 
 2 Buchholtz's report of September 28, B. A., ibid. 
 
 3 Hertzberg and Finckenstein to the King, October 3, rescript to Buchholtz, 
 October 4, ibid.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 The Overthrow of Russian Rule est Poland 
 
 ' Jam venit hora! Now is the time to provide for the needs of 
 the Fatherland.' l Such was the general cry in Poland at the 
 outbreak of the Eastern war. The distractions of its neighbors 
 seemed to furnish the country the long-desired opportunity to 
 effect indispensable reforms, and such a chance as might never 
 occur again. " Our sons and grandsons," the Dietine of Samo- 
 gitia declared, " will not live to see a better occasion than we now 
 have for setting our house in order, increasing the forces of the 
 Republic, assuring our liberties, . . . and reviving the once 
 famous name of Poles." 2 To neglect this opportunity might 
 mean certain ruin. Staszic's words rang in men's ears: "All 
 these reforms must be realized as soon as possible. This matter 
 will brook no delay. The sickness is violent: it demands violent 
 remedies." 3 It appeared, then, that the supreme moment had 
 come. 
 
 Almost the whole nation demanded a confederated Diet, the 
 main task of which should be to put through a very substantial 
 increase of the army. The need of other reforms was generally 
 admitted. But precisely what these other reforms should be, how 
 far they should go, whether the nation should keep within the 
 limits imposed by the Russian guarantee of the existing constitu- 
 tion, what attitude the Republic should adopt towards the 
 neighboring Powers — on those questions public opinion was 
 divided. Broadly speaking, there were two programs before 
 the country: that of the King, and that of the loose array of the 
 opposition, which already called itself ' the Patriots.' 
 
 1 Quoted from a letter of M. U. Niemcewicz to the King, in Zaleski, Korespon- 
 dencya krajowa Stanislawa Augusta, p. 214. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 246. 
 
 3 Uwagi nod zyciem J ana Zamojskiego, p. 144. 
 
 92
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 93 
 
 The King's hopes and plans have already been described. 
 They were, in substance, that Poland should in this crisis attach 
 herself to Russia more firmly than ever, taking advantage of the 
 opportunity, indeed, to effect certain military and financial 
 reforms, but only such as Catherine in her present conciliatory 
 mood might be found willing to permit. This was the policy of 
 extreme prudence, if not of faint-heartedness and self-distrust. It 
 promised hardly more than a slight increase of the army — per- 
 haps to 30,000 men, the number indicated by Catherine in the 
 guarantee treaty; the honor of sending Polish troops to fight in 
 the Russian ranks in a purely Russian war; and the precarious 
 protection of the Empress against the designs of Prussia. This 
 was very little to offer to a nation which expected so much. Such 
 a program was not fitted to inspire or to arouse to supreme 
 efforts, but rather to disgust and to repel; for it ran counter to 
 the nation's instincts, its sense of dignity, its conviction of what 
 the occasion demanded. 
 
 Very different were the ideas that were fermenting in the minds 
 of the Patriots. Vague and inchoate as their program was, it 
 still pointed unmistakably to two goals: the realization of very 
 thoroughgoing reforms, — of the kind sketched by Staszic; and 
 the vindication of Poland's independence. These two ideals were 
 really inseparable. No far-reaching, solid, and decisive political 
 reforms were possible as long as Russia maintained her grip upon 
 the country. The elimination of the Russian ' guarantee ' and the 
 overthrow of the Russian ' influence ' were necessary before the 
 army could be brought up to a really respectable standard or the 
 vicious constitution replaced by something better. 
 
 The program of the Patriots was bold and alluring, but 
 was it wise or prudent or practicable ? It appeared that there 
 was a reasonable chance of success only in case Poland could 
 count on the friendship or, if need be, the support of one of the 
 neighboring Powers; and as matters then stood, such support 
 could come only from Prussia. Of the dangers lurking in such a 
 connection, of the natural ambitions and the ill-concealed cupid- 
 ity of Prussia, the Patriots were by no means ignorant. Their 
 leaders cannot fairly be accused of having thrown themselves
 
 94 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 blindly into the arms of their worst enemy. From the outset they 
 recognized that Prussia had been, and under certain conditions 
 might again become, the most dangerous foe of Poland. But the 
 existing circumstances gave ground for hope. As long as the 
 close connection between the Imperial Courts lasted — and it 
 seemed very firm at that moment — Prussia must remain in 
 opposition to Russia, and might therefore see in a revived Poland 
 a desirable ally. Moreover, it was supposed that England, Prussia, 
 and Holland were building up a great league of states (the ' Fed- 
 erative System'), into which Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, and the 
 Fiirstenbund were to be admitted, the object of which was to 
 maintain the balance of power and the existence of the small 
 states against the Imperial Courts. If Poland could gain admis- 
 sion to this league, her future might seem secure. Finally, the 
 character of the new King of Prussia, and especially the generosity 
 and moderation which were supposed to distinguish him so 
 signally from his predecessor, inspired hope and confidence. 
 Might it not be expected that Frederick William, who had so 
 recently intervened to rescue Holland from French influence and 
 had then taken that Republic into his alliance on terms of equal- 
 ity, would be found ready to render equally disinterested services 
 to Poland ? 
 
 Long before Prussia made any marked advances to the Poles, 
 the Patriots began to turn their eyes toward Berlin. At the 
 council of war held by their leaders in Paris at the beginning of 
 1788, plans were discussed for securing the Prussian alliance and 
 even for bringing Poland into the ' Federative System.' 1 In the 
 following summer many of the Patriots openly declared that they 
 meant to stand with Prussia at the approaching Diet, 2 and some 
 of the magnates were already writing Berlin to solicit support 
 against Russia. 3 The situation remained decidedly uncertain, 
 
 1 Dembinski, " Piattoli et son role pendant la Grande Diete," in Bulletin de 
 VAcademie de Cracovie, Classe de Philologie, etc., Juin-Juillet, 1905, pp. 54 f.; 
 Zaleski, Zycie Czartoryskiego , pp. 225 ff.; Debicki, Pulawy, i, pp. 253 ff. 
 
 2 Zaleski, Korespondencya krajowa, p. 242; Griesheim to Bischoffwerder, August 
 23, 1788, rejoices that the Poles are " grosstentheils so gut preussisch gesinnt," 
 B. A., Fol. 323. 
 
 3 Letters of Radziwill (July 20), Sulkowski (August 6), and Ogihski (September 
 10) to Hertzberg, B. A., R. 9, 27 and Fol. 323.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 95 
 
 however, down to the opening of the Diet, because the policy of 
 Prussia was still far from clear. A vigorous declaration from 
 Berlin was needed before the Patriots could enter boldly on plans 
 for reform or venture to throw down the gauntlet to Russia. 
 
 II 
 
 On the 6th of October, 1788, there met at Warsaw the assembly 
 destined to become famous as the Four Years' Diet, or, as patri- 
 otic historians prefer to call it, the Great Diet. It opened amid a 
 feverish excitement and a whirl of political and social activity 
 such as Poland had rarely, if ever, witnessed. Warsaw was 
 packed to overflowing. The whole ' political nation ' seemed to 
 have pressed up to the capital: senators and deputies with their 
 families, crowds of simple country gentlemen, the armies of 
 clients and retainers who followed the magnates, and adven- 
 turers, sight-seers, and fortune-hunters from every corner of 
 Poland, and indeed from every part of Europe. The lavish and 
 wellnigh fabulous hospitality displayed by the richer noblemen 
 and the constant round of balls, fetes, dinners, and theatrical 
 performances might suggest a society bent only on holding per- 
 petual saturnalia; and yet amid these carnival scenes the all- 
 pervading interest, the universal topic was politics. People 
 awaited the result of a vote in the Diet with intense anxiety; the 
 galleries of the assembly were constantly filled, especially by the 
 ladies of the high aristocracy, whose interest and influence in 
 polities excited the astonishment of foreigners; in the numerous 
 salons, in clubs like that of the Radziwill Palace, in the workshops 
 and in the market-places political discussion ran high; and even 
 coachmen and lackeys divided into ' Patriots ' and ' Parasites,' 
 the latter being the adherents of Russia. 1 This passionate 
 interest in politics is also shown by the immense publicistic 
 activity of the time, by the flood of treatises, open letters, poems, 
 dialogues, ' fables,' and ' catechisms ' evoked by wellnigh every 
 question. In short, never, perhaps, had there been a Diet which 
 had so aroused the country. 
 
 1 Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiorow, ii, p. 126.
 
 9 6 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 In the beginning there appeared only one organized and dis- 
 ciplined party, the Royalists. This was a phalanx largely com- 
 posed of office-hunters, but containing also some few men of 
 talent who from conviction adhered to the King's policy of friend- 
 ship with Russia and moderate reforms within the limits that 
 Catherine prescribed. 
 
 The opposition consisted of a loosely-united host of hetero- 
 geneous elements, which, after fighting side by side in the early 
 battles of the Diet, divided into two parties with radically differ- 
 ent tendencies, the ' Republicans ' and the ' Patriots.' 
 
 The former represented the conservative and reactionary 
 forces, the partisans of the old institutions, the fanatics of ' golden 
 liberty,' the bigoted, misguided, or selfish opponents of all change 
 whatsoever except, perhaps, a change backward — a return to 
 the undiluted anarchy of the Saxon period. The Republicans 
 were agreed in opposing the King — the traditional and popular 
 course in Poland ; and as for Russia, the magnates who led the 
 party were ready to rally to the Empress whenever she showed 
 herself disposed to throw over the King for their sake; while the 
 honest, ignorant squires, who made up the rank and file of the 
 party, detested Russia but still unintentionally served her interests 
 through their inability to understand the needs of their country 
 and through their blind hostility to reforms. The Patriots, the 
 champions of independence and of thoroughgoing reforms, were 
 undoubtedly the party which appealed most strongly to the heart 
 and to the enlightened opinion of the nation. To them rallied 
 spontaneously those who had freed themselves from the ancient 
 prejudices and desired to reconstruct the state on a new basis in 
 accordance with the liberal ideas of the age; those who resented 
 the yoke of Russia as an intolerable degradation ; those who had 
 sufficient faith in the nation to believe that independence, dignity, 
 and power could be won back by a determined effort. The 
 strength of the party lay especially in the younger generation, the 
 men fresh from the new schools, full of the energy, the broader 
 knowledge, the optimism which the older generation, broken and 
 disillusioned by the Partition, conspicuously lacked. These 
 younger men were to play so prominent a role in the Four Years'
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 97 
 
 Diet that critics jested of an assembly of ' Lycurguses and Solons 
 of twenty-five.' The Patriots possessed leaders of high charac- 
 ter and reputation: Ignacy Potocki, a man of ardent and noble 
 soul, disinterested, energetic, indefatigable, admired and almost 
 worshipped by his younger compatriots; his brother Stanislas, 
 the most eloquent orator of the party; the Marshal of the Diet, 1 
 Stanislas Malachowski, ' the Polish Aris tides,' a man whose name 
 was synonymous with pure and lofty patriotism; Koll^taj, the 
 organizer of the party's propaganda, the leader of the more ad- 
 vanced democratic wing, and perhaps the clearest thinker and the 
 best head in Poland; finally, Prince Adam Casimir Czartoryski, 
 the richest and most popular, the most charming and cultivated 
 man of his nation. Unfortunately, not one of these leaders was 
 really a statesman of the first calibre. The party was rich in men 
 of integrity and intellect and fervent patriotism, but it did not 
 contain a single great man of action. Nevertheless, whatever 
 talent Poland at that time possessed was, with few exceptions, 
 gathered within the Patriotic camp. 
 
 It was at the outset quite uncertain which of these parties 
 would gain the ascendancy in the Diet. Both Royalists and 
 Opposition could count upon a certain number of reliable support- 
 ers, but the majority of the assembly was at first unattached, 
 undecided, and ready to go with the tide. 
 
 On October 7th the Diet was, by general agreement, confed- 
 erated for the specified purpose of increasing the army and the 
 taxes. After the provisional withdrawal of the alliance project, 
 the King and the Russian ambassador had decided that military 
 and financial questions should furnish the chief business of the 
 session; for they hoped that by gratifying the nation's wishes in 
 this respect they could avert a discussion of more fundamental 
 problems and prevent an explosion of popular feeling against 
 Russia. And possibly their hopes might have been realized, 
 possibly Stanislas and Stackelberg might have remained masters 
 of the situation, had it not been for the vigorous intervention of 
 Prussia. 
 
 1 Or more strictly Marshal of the Confederation for the ' Crown ' (Poland), 
 Prince Sapieha being Marshal for Lithuania.
 
 9 8 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 At the first general session of the Confederation (October 13), a 
 note was read from the Prussian envoy Buchholtz, in which, in 
 language very courteous towards the Republic but unfriendly 
 and even menacing towards the Empress, the Prussian govern- 
 ment protested against the Russo-Polish alliance project, and 
 announced that if the Poles felt the need of an alliance, Frederick 
 William would offer them his own. This note decided the course 
 of the Four Years' Diet. For the impression produced by it was, 
 as Stackelberg himself reported, indescribable. 1 While the party 
 of the King and the ambassador was seized with consternation, 
 the exultation of the Patriots knew no bounds. For the first 
 time in many years, one of the neighboring Powers had come for- 
 ward in open opposition to the Russian policy in Poland, had in- 
 vited the nation to throw off the yoke, and had held out promises 
 of support. For the first time in many years, one of the neighbors 
 had addressed the Republic as if it were an independent and equal 
 Power, and had seemed to seek its friendship. The Poles had the 
 new and delightful experience of being wooed, and above all, they 
 felt the sense of deliverance. It was as if, after a hundred years of 
 servitude, the nation had been in a moment freed from its chains 
 and left master of its own actions. An illustrious Pole, describing 
 many years later that springtime of joy and hope, declared that it 
 was a moment of inexpressible happiness, such as no one could 
 appreciate who had never lived through it, and such as no one who 
 had lived through it could ever again experience in like degree. 2 
 
 The first impulse of the ' liberated ' nation was to give free rein 
 to its strongest passion, hatred towards Russia; a hatred born 
 of the insults and indignities endured for the past thirty years : the 
 brutalities of Repnin and Saldern, the arrogance of Stackelberg, 
 the arrest of the three Polish Senators dragged away from the 
 midst of the Diet of 1767 to imprisonment in Russia, the excesses 
 committed by the Russian troops during the War of the Con- 
 federation of Bar, the shame of the servitude that had degraded 
 Poland in the eyes of all Europe. That hatred extended to every 
 person and institution associated with the Russian rule: to the 
 
 1 Report of October 15 cited by Smitt, Suworow, ii, p. 185. 
 
 2 Ad. J. Czartoryski, Zywot Niemcewicza, p. 35.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 99 
 
 King, to the Royalist party, to the Permanent Council. The 
 ambassador presently found himself boycotted by Warsaw so- 
 ciety. The Royalists were hooted down in the Diet and insulted in 
 the streets. To denounce Russia became the road to popularity, 
 and to attack the Empress personally was held a patriotic deed. 1 
 
 The rising flood of anti-Russian and pro-Prussian feeling swept 
 everything before it. The Patriots acquired a constantly 
 increasing ascendancy in the Diet, while the King's party melted 
 away. It was in vain that Stanislas Augustus in eloquent and 
 prophetic language warned the assembly that their one chance 
 of safety lay in holding fast to Russia, or at least to the letter of 
 the existing engagements with the Empress, and that Prussians 
 offering friendship were Greeks bearing gifts. The King's not 
 altogether tactful speeches only added to the odium of his past 
 record. Nor was Stackelberg more successful in stemming the 
 tide. The ambassador's one serious effort was the note pre- 
 sented to the Diet on November 5, in which he warned the Poles 
 that the Empress would regard any change in the constitution 
 guaranteed by her as a breach of treaty, which would force her to 
 abandon her friendly attitude towards the Republic. If anything 
 had been needed to complete the ruin of the Russian influence, it 
 would have been supplied by that unlucky note. 
 
 Prussia at once seized the opportunity for an effective counter- 
 stroke. On November 20 Buchholtz presented to the Diet a new 
 declaration, containing his master's interpretation of the famous 
 guarantee of the constitution by the neighboring Powers. Fred- 
 erick William, it was said, regarded the guarantee as involving 
 the obligation to defend the independence of the Republic, but 
 not at all as implying a right to limit the freedom of the Poles to 
 change their institutions as they saw fit. This note was couched 
 in even more flattering terms than the last Prussian declaration, 
 and it created scarcely less of a sensation. Its effect was in- 
 creased by the activity of the Marquis Lucchesini, who had come 
 to Warsaw to assist Buchholtz, and was presently to replace him. 
 This supple Italian displayed an amazing virtuosity in captivat- 
 ing the Poles, maligning Russia, and spreading golden opinions as 
 
 1 Cf. especially, Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, i, pp. 242 ff.
 
 IOO 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to the beneficent designs of the generous Frederick William. He 
 fairly carried Warsaw by storm. His successes, together with the 
 two declarations from his Court, sufficed to assure the triumph of 
 Prussian influence in Poland, and to drive the Patriots irresistibly 
 forward upon the exhilarating course of revolution. 
 
 The first work of the victorious party was one of demolition. 
 Before their onslaughts there went down in rapid succession the 
 War Department, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Per- 
 manent Council — in short the whole edifice of government 
 erected and guaranteed by Russia. There were many reasons to 
 justify so destructive a course: the necessity of clearing the 
 ground before undertaking comprehensive and thorough reforms, 
 the undeniable abuses of which the Council had been guilty, the 
 need of removing control over the government from a king 
 devoted to Russia, whom the nation could not trust; but un- 
 doubtedly the primary motive of the Patriots was the desire to 
 assert the nation's independence and to prove that the detested 
 guarantee had become a dead letter. All understood that such 
 changes, made in the face of Stackelberg's solemn warning, con- 
 stituted a downright challenge to the Empress; and the constant 
 denunciations of Russia in the Diet, the collisions between Rus- 
 sian and Polish troops in the Ukraine, the propaganda of the 
 Patriots in favor of an alliance with Prussia, added to the danger 
 of a rupture. The crowning audacity of the Poles was the formal 
 demand, which, with the encouragement and diplomatic support 
 of Prussia, was repeatedly addressed to Catherine, that all Rus- 
 sian troops should be withdrawn from the territories of the Re- 
 public. In view of the exigencies of the Turkish war, which made 
 a free passage through the Polish Ukraine an inestimable and 
 almost indispensable convenience, such a demand was bound to 
 strain Catherine's patience wellnigh to the breaking-point. Great 
 was the surprise, therefore, when at the end of May (1789), for 
 reasons to be explained later, the Empress courteously announced 
 that she would immediately evacuate Polish territory. With 
 that, the emancipation of the Republic seemed complete. Little 
 more than six months had been required to throw off that Russian 
 yoke which had galled the nation for a quarter of a century. The
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE IOI 
 
 result surpassed all that could have been hoped for at the begin- 
 ning of the Diet. 
 
 But if the Poles had freed themselves, it had been only with the 
 aid of quite exceptional circumstances, which had led Prussia to 
 support, Austria to facilitate, and Russia to tolerate the revolu- 
 tion at Warsaw. It remains to examine the motives underlying 
 the attitude of the three neighboring Powers, in order to under- 
 stand the reasons which made the liberation of Poland possible 
 and to estimate its prospects of permanence. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Prussia had been the chief agent and sponsor of this revolu- 
 tion. Prussia had given the signal for the upheaval, suggested 
 and encouraged each successive move of the Patriots against 
 Russia, and vaguely promised the support of her battalions for the 
 work which the Diet had accomplished. All this was assuredly 
 not done from pure generosity, or from disinterested neighborly 
 friendship. Seldom even in the tortuous diplomacy of the eigh- 
 teenth century does one find so glaring a contrast as that between 
 the secret aspirations of the cabinet of Berlin and the seductive 
 professions wliich it lavished at Warsaw. Yet it would be a mis- 
 take to regard the Polish policy of Prussia at this time as entirely 
 a tissue of deceptions, as based throughout upon a deep-laid and 
 steadily pursued plan of treachery. To a certain degree the in- 
 terests of Prussia did coincide with the aims of the Patriots; and 
 a single, definite plan was what the Polish policy of Prussia most 
 signally lacked. That policy was by no means consistent; it 
 varied and shifted; it frequently lost its bearings and miscarried 
 in its reckonings. Prussia might seem to guide events at Warsaw, 
 but she was often hardly less surprised than her neighbors at the 
 results of her work. 
 
 The original aim of the Prussian intervention was simply to 
 thwart that Russian alliance project which by its guarantee of 
 the integrity of the Republic l had aroused such indignation at 
 
 1 This is the aspect of the alliance plan most emphasized by Hertzberg in his 
 report to the King of September 2, 1788, and in the instructions to Buchholtz of the 
 following day. 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF GALIFOR; 
 SANTA BARBARA COLLEGE LIBRARY
 
 102 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Berlin. But even before the Diet assembled, Prussian policy had 
 entered upon a new phase. The Court of Berlin was now afraid, 
 not that Catherine would put through her plan, but that she 
 would abandon it. For the antipathy of the Poles to the pro- 
 posed alliance had become so manifest that in case the Empress 
 had not the good sense to renounce the project, Prussia would 
 have a fine chance for a great stroke. In opposition to the con- 
 federated Diet about to be opened by Stanislas and Stackelberg, 
 Frederick William would organize a Counter-confederation, 
 which would then appeal to him for ' protection ' ; Prussian 
 troops would enter Poland and occupy the long-coveted terri- 
 tories; and the Hertzberg plan, in its most essential part, 
 might be realized immediately. Thus those professions of dis- 
 interested friendship, those assurances of armed support, those 
 declarations which so delighted the early sessions of the Diet had 
 for their ultimate aim — civil war, to be followed by the dismem- 
 berment of the Republic. 1 
 
 Catherine's withdrawal of the alliance project disconcerted but 
 did not ruin these pious hopes. If one pretext for armed inter- 
 vention disappeared, others might still be manufactured. Hence 
 Buchholtz and Lucchesini were presently instructed- to incite the 
 Patriots to attack the Permanent Council and to protest against 
 the Russian troops taking winter quarters in Poland. 2 One 
 question or the other might, perhaps, produce the desired rupture 
 between the two contending parties at Warsaw. For a moment 
 these hopes seemed near to being realized. The attack on the War 
 
 1 Hertzberg to the King, September 21 (B. A., R. 9, 27), and October 2, 
 Hertzberg to Buchholtz, September 30, rescript to Buchholtz, October 1 (B. A., 
 Fol. 323). 
 
 September 21, Hertzberg to the King : 
 
 " Si la Cour de Russie insiste sur son projet d'alliance avec la Pologne, V. M. 
 aura le plus beau jeu de lui opposer son alliance et une Reconfederation . . . ; mais 
 si la Cour de Russie a le bon esprit de renoncer a cette alliance, comme le C. de 
 Stackelberg le lui a conseille, notre role deviendra plus difficile." 
 September 30, Hertzberg to Buchholtz: 
 
 " Je ne me soucie pas que ces gens-la fassent leur confederation et leur alliance, 
 pourvu que nous puissions parvenir a former un parti a peu pres egal, qui nous 
 fournisse le titre de faire une autre confederation au nom de laquelle nous puissions 
 agir." 
 
 2 Rescripts of October 17, 18, 21, B. A., Fol. 323.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 1 03 
 
 Department — the prelude to the onslaught on the Permanent 
 Council — led to a decisive trial of strength between the Royal- 
 ists and the Opposition; party feeling ran high, and Lucchesini, 
 after several nocturnal conclaves with various magnates, reported 
 exultantly that if the royal party triumphed, a large section of the 
 Opposition was ready to resort to a Counter-confederation and 
 to appeal for Prussian aid. The news threw Berlin into excited 
 activity. Lucchesini was at once authorized to promise aid to a 
 Counter-confederation, no matter what the pretext under which 
 it was formed, although he was to avoid committing his Court to 
 too precise engagements. General Usedom was ordered to hold 
 his troops ready to cross the frontier the moment he should receive 
 word from Lucchesini. A manifesto was to be drawn up forth- 
 with to justify the entry of the Prussian army into Poland. 1 
 But Prussia's plans were crossed by the victory of her own 
 party at Warsaw. The overthrow of the War Department 
 (November 3) ended this crisis. 
 
 Whether it was from disappointment at so tame a result, or 
 because the season was growing late for military operations, or 
 because the wind now blew from a more pacific quarter at Berlin, 
 at any rate the Prussians now gave up serious hopes of a Counter- 
 confederation. Instead it became their chief aim to end the Diet 
 as soon as possible. For the great dilemma which had faced the 
 Court of Berlin ever since the beginning of the assembly, was 
 becoming increasingly embarrassing : the dilemma as to how far 
 
 1 Lucchesini's reports of October 29 and November 1, Hertzberg and Fincken- 
 stein to Frederick William, November 5, instructions to Lucchesini, November 
 6, B. A., Fol. 323. 
 
 This episode furnished Kalinka with material for one of his indictments of the 
 Patriotic party; and indeed, if the leaders of that party were conducting such 
 treasonable negotiations and were ready to call in Prussian troops for so slight a 
 pretext, they might justly be compared with the men of Targowica. It would seem, 
 however, from Lucchesini's very vague reports that the men implicated in this 
 disgraceful and dangerous plan for a Counter-confederation were not the leaders 
 of the party, but men like Sulkowski, Oginski, and Sapieha — adventurers and 
 broilers of little influence or consideration. The one leader of the Patriotic party 
 who undoubtedly had something to do with these secret conventicles with Lucches- 
 ini was Prince Adam Czartoryski, but it is quite uncertain how far he committed 
 himself. I know of no evidence to justify Kalinka's conjecture (Dcr polnische Reich- 
 stag, i, p. 218) that Ignacy Potocki took part in these meetings.
 
 io4 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Prussia could afford to support a party which, useful as it might 
 be in opposing Russia, was still highly obnoxious in that it aimed 
 at increasing the army, restoring the finances, and reforming the 
 government of Poland. But how break up the Diet with nothing 
 accomplished towards these latter ends, without ruining the popu- 
 larity and influence which Prussia had just gained at Warsaw ? 
 The plan adopted by the cabinet of Berlin was sufficiently subtle. 
 It was to spur the Patriots on to renewed attacks on Russia, in 
 the hope that Stanislas Augustus would be exasperated or alarmed 
 to the point of dissolving the Diet and taking all the odium of the 
 step upon himself. Such was the real aim of the second Prussian 
 declaration to the Diet — the invitation to repudiate the Russian 
 guarantee. 1 Once more, however, the result fell short of the 
 intention. The Permanent Council was overthrown, but the Diet 
 was not dissolved. The action of Prussia had only sealed the 
 supremacy of the party which now prepared to take up those 
 reforms that Prussia most detested. 
 
 In the early months of 1789, when the crisis of the struggle at 
 Warsaw was over, when the Diet had settled down to a quasi- 
 permanent existence under the domination of the Patriotic party, 
 when the Court of Berlin seemed to have definitely replaced 
 Russia as the preponderant Power in Poland, Prussian statesmen 
 surveying the situation hardly knew what to make of their 
 triumph. They might indeed congratulate themselves on a 
 striking diplomatic victory over Russia. It was something to 
 have demonstrated to the Empress how much she had lost when 
 she gave up the Prussian alliance, and how little she could afford to 
 ignore or to slight the Court of Berlin. But what material profit 
 could Prussia expect from her new position in the Republic ? 
 What was mere ' influence ' to a Power that wanted territory ? 
 What reliance could be placed upon the friendship or the grati- 
 tude of the weak and fickle Poles ? Lucchesini, with natural 
 pride in the work of his hands, discreetly urged the maintenance 
 of the new position won by such labors, pointing to the positive 
 advantages to be expected from a Polish alliance in case of war 
 
 1 Hertzberg to Finckenstein and to the King, November 12, rescripts to Buch- 
 holtz, November 12, 18, 22, and to Lucchesini, November 21, B. A., Fol. 323.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 105 
 
 with the Imperial Courts, and the negative advantages of having 
 deprived Catherine of a great kingdom that had been virtually a 
 Russian province. 1 But Hertzberg was much more skeptical 
 about the value of a Polish alliance, and much more impressed 
 with the dangers involved in the obnoxious schemes of the 
 Patriots. 2 
 
 In the final analysis, the future attitude of the Court of Berlin 
 towards Poland depended on whether Prussia was to draw the 
 sword against the Imperial Courts or to satisfy her ambitions by 
 a peaceful bargain with them. This in turn depended on the news 
 expected from Constantinople, from London, and above all from 
 St. Petersburg. The visit of Potemkin to the Russian capital 
 early in 1789 raised hopes of a change of system on the Neva. For 
 months Frederick William and Hertzberg waited with anxiety to 
 see whether the favorite would have the will or the power to effect 
 such a miracle. 3 If he succeeded, then a bargain between Russia 
 and Prussia at the expense of the Republic would be the natural 
 outcome. If he failed, then Prussia might ' break loose ' in the 
 summer, and a Prusso-Polish alliance might yet have its raison 
 d'etre. 1 
 
 rv 
 
 At Vienna the Polish revolution aroused only alarm and evil 
 forebodings. Kaunitz was far from appreciating the strength of 
 the patriotic movement in Poland, or from foreseeing the energy 
 and capacity of which the Four Years' Diet, with all its faults, 
 was to give evidence; but he did judge rightly of the illusion that 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the King, November 5, 1788, B. A., Fol. 323; memoir of Decem- 
 ber 25 and letters to Hertzberg, January 26 and February 18, 1789, B. A., R. 9, 27. 
 
 2 Hertzberg to Finckenstein, November 18, to the King, December 7, 1788, 
 H. and F. to the King, March 16, 1789, B. A. ( Fol. 323 and R. 9, 27. 
 
 3 See the Prussian correspondence of January-June, 1789 in Dembihski, Docu- 
 ments relatifs d Vhistoire du deuxieme et troisieme partage de la Pologne, i. 
 
 4 Hertzberg to Buchholtz, March 3, 1789, B.A., R. 9, 27; Hertzberg to Lucchesini, 
 May 30 (Dembiriski, op. cit., i, pp. 398 f.). 
 
 Hertzberg to Buchholtz, March 3: 
 
 Fears that Potemkin will not be able to make the Empress change her policy 
 completely. " Si cela ne peut pas avoir lieu, je crois qu'il vaut mieux que nous 
 entamions les deux Cours Imperiales et que nous tachions d'ex6cuter notre Plan 
 avec la Porte et la Suede et memo les Polonois, que nous devons habiliter alors."
 
 io6 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Diet could by mere high-sounding decrees at once restore the 
 decayed state to life and free it from all foreign influence; and he 
 saw clearly the danger the Poles would run if they threw them- 
 selves into the arms of the one Power that coveted their territory. 
 Any attempt to reform the constitution, he held, would lead only 
 to internal disturbances, which would afford Prussia a chance to 
 carry out her nefarious plans. Hence, as long as it seemed possi- 
 ble to hold back the torrent, he did not spare warnings and exhor- 
 tations at Warsaw. 1 But by the end of November, after the 
 second Prussian declaration, the battle was obviously lost. De 
 Cache, the Austrian charge d'affaires at Warsaw, was ordered to 
 suspend further representations and to relapse into the most 
 cautious reserve. 
 
 In his dispatches to Cobenzl at St. Petersburg, Kaunitz now out- 
 lined a new policy. The Russian influence in Poland, he declared, 
 could be restored only by violent means, and that would bring on 
 a war with Prussia. Austria could not possibly undertake such a 
 contest while the Turkish war lasted. It was therefore the most 
 pressing interest of the Imperial Courts to make peace with the 
 Porte as soon as possible, even on the uti possidetis basis, in order 
 to turn all their attention to Prussia and Poland. In the mean- 
 time, as one means of checking the insidious designs of their 
 enemies, he once more recommended the alliance with the Bour- 
 bon Courts, which had already been agitated since 1787, and one 
 chief point in which would be a guarantee of the integrity of 
 Poland by France and Spain. 2 
 
 Unfortunately, this plan for a quadruple alliance fell through, 
 largely owing to the reluctance of the Bourbon states to under- 
 take the defence of Poland ; the hope of an immediate peace with 
 the Turks soon vanished; and almost every dispatch from Berlin 
 
 1 Ostensible dispatch to de Cache, November 1, 1788, summarized in Kalinka, 
 Der polnische Reichstag, i, pp. 376 f.; Kaunitz to Czartoryski, October 29, V. A., 
 Polen, Fasc. 66. 
 
 2 Instructions of November 28, V. A., Russland, Exped., 1788. On the pro- 
 tracted negotiations for a quadruple alliance see: Segur, Oeuvres, iii, pp. 266 ff., 
 419 ff.; R. I. A., Russie, ii, pp. 441 ff.; Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs, 
 pp. 112, 120 f.; Aragon, Nassau-Siegen, pp. 1761!., 274 ff.; Dembinski, Rosya a 
 rewolucya francuska, pp. 33-40 ; Barral-Montferrat, Dix ans de paix artnee, i, 
 pp. 310 ff.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 1 07 
 
 and St. Petersburg announced the growing disposition of those 
 Courts to bring matters to a rupture. Hence it became one chief 
 aim of Austrian diplomacy to remove every pretext for an out- 
 break on the part of Prussia by preaching at St. Petersburg 
 moderation, patience, and long-suffering, especially with regard 
 to Polish affairs. If the catastrophe that might have been ex- 
 pected did not at once befall the audacious Poles, this was due in 
 large part to the mollifying influence which Austria now brought 
 to bear upon Russian policy. 
 
 Count Cobenzl at Petersburg found himself between Scylla and 
 Charybdis. On one side was a party which advocated meeting 
 the high-handed actions of England and Prussia with equally 
 vigorous measures, so that a new war might easily have followed. 
 On the other side there were many who would have gone so far as 
 to sacrifice a part of Poland, in order to conciliate the Court of 
 Berlin. The views of the former party, which was dominant in 
 the Council of the Empire, undoubtedly accorded best with 
 Catherine's own inclinations. Long weaned from any fondness 
 for Prussia, despising Frederick William II almost as much as she 
 did George III, the Empress had felt ever since the beginning of 
 the war a growing and passionate indignation against the two 
 monarchs who had dared to cross her plans and to set themselves 
 up as ' dictators ' in Europe. She approved the bellicose resolu- 
 tions adopted by the Council in September, 1788, in reply to the 
 first hostile demonstrations of Prussia; and when one of her 
 ministers presented a dissenting opinion, she shed tears of rage. 1 
 The events in Poland added fuel to the flames. " I swear to 
 Almighty God," she wrote to Potemkin, " that I am doing every- 
 thing possible to endure all that these Courts, and especially the 
 almighty Prussian one, are doing; but it [the latter] is so puffed 
 up that, if its head does n't burst, I see no possibility of agreeing 
 to its shameful demands. ... I am not revengeful, but what is 
 opposed to the honor of my Empire and its essential interests is 
 harmful. ... I will not give province for province, nor have 
 laws prescribed to me. . . . They will come to grief, for nobody 
 
 1 See the protocol of the Council of September 18/29, l 7&&> Apx. Toe. Cob., 
 i, pp. 606-611, and XpariOBim,Kiii, ^hobuhki., September 29/October 10, p. 95.
 
 io8 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 ever yet succeeded in such a course. They have forgotten who 
 they are, and with whom they have to deal; and that is why the 
 fools hope we shall yield." * " The Empress is entirely ready to 
 strike against the King of Prussia," wrote Cobenzl at the end of 
 November; " the ministers, with the exception of Count Oster- 
 mann, are of the opinion that perhaps this is the most favorable 
 moment for the two Imperial Courts, if we can secure, if not the 
 alliance, at least the neutrality of the Bourbon Courts; for it is 
 hard to believe that England will engage to furnish more than 
 indirect aid [to its ally]." 2 
 
 Joseph, however, was furious at the idea. The roles had 
 changed completely. The Austrians, who for years had been 
 preaching the necessity of ' reducing the Margrave of Branden- 
 burg to his proper place in the world,' were now as disinclined to 
 act against him as the Russians were eager to do so. 3 From 
 December on, Cobenzl counselled nothing but prudence and self- 
 restraint. When at the beginning of 1789 the Russians were 
 much alarmed at the talk of a Prusso-Polish alliance, he urged 
 that such a treaty would be made only to be torn up again, and 
 that protesting about it would be quite useless under the circum- 
 stances. In case of war, it might even be better to have Poland 
 on the side of Prussia than neutral; and at any rate, the two 
 Imperial Courts ought to take no open measures to prevent such 
 an alliance. 4 While the Russians refrained from presenting a 
 protest on the subject at Warsaw, while they met even the over- 
 throw of the Permanent Council with studied indifference, there 
 was grave danger that their patience would be strained to the 
 breaking-point by the demand formally made by the Republic, 
 with the diplomatic support of Prussia, for the immediate evacua- 
 
 1 Letter of November 27/December 8, 1788, Pyc. Clap., xvii, p. 22. 
 
 2 Report of November 28, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1788. 
 
 3 Cf. Joseph's letter to L. Cobenzl of November 24, 1788 as to the Empress' 
 desire to go to war with Prussia, F. R. A., II, liv, pp. 303 f. The view is advanced 
 by P. Wittichen {Polnische Politik Preussens, pp. 17 f.), and Beer (Orientalische 
 Politik Oesterreichs, p. 112) that if the Russians occasionally talked of war, it was 
 only in order to soothe their allies. A slight study of the Russian documents would 
 show how utterly mistaken is this point of view. Moreover, to talk of going to war 
 with Prussia at that moment was to do anything but to soothe the Austrians. 
 
 4 Cobenzl's reports of January 7 and April 15, 1789, V. A., Rtissland, Berichte.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE 109 
 
 tion of Polish territory by the Russian troops. But armed with 
 an intercepted letter of Hertzberg, in which that minister de- 
 clared that his Court hoped to find a pretext for a rupture in the 
 affairs of Poland and expected to be ready to strike in July, 
 Cobenzl was able to argue forcibly that the best way to foil the 
 Prussians was to remove their last remaining excuse for inter- 
 vention. 1 The Empress was highly exasperated by the constant 
 denunciations to which she was subjected by the Polish Diet, and 
 by the frequent collisions in the Ukraine; she wished nothing so 
 much as to avenge herself in Prussia; but finally prudent coun- 
 sels prevailed. In May orders were given to withdraw all Russian 
 troops and magazines from the territory of the Republic. Hence- 
 forth the Court of Petersburg adopted an attitude of complete 
 indifference to the doings of the Diet of Warsaw. The first period 
 of the Polish crisis thus came to an unexpectedly peaceful close. 
 While they strove successfully to prevent a rupture with the 
 Court of Berlin over Polish affairs, the Austrians had also to 
 guard against the contrary danger of an agreement between 
 Russia and Prussia at their expense and Poland's. A more con- 
 ciliatory policy towards Prussia was advocated by the favorite 
 Mamonov ; by Ostermann and Suvalov among the ministers; 
 by the Grand Duke Paul, who had long conducted a secret corre- 
 spondence with Frederick William; and above all by Potemkin. 
 It seemed only too obvious that Russia could free herself in a 
 moment from all her growing embarrassments by sacrificing the 
 Austrian for the Prussian connection. But there was " the 
 Empress' pretended dignity " (as the heir to the throne expressed 
 it). If any human power could prevail over that, it must be 
 Potemkin's, and after the capture of Oczakow the Prince was 
 coming to Petersburg. The court and the town looked forward to 
 his coming " as to a second Advent," the Prussian and English 
 ministers and their partisans with keen impatience, Cobenzl with 
 natural misgivings. The Prince was coming, people whispered 
 ' to overthrow everything.' 2 
 
 1 Report of April 15, V. A., Russland, Berickle, 1789. 
 
 2 For the above, the letters of Gamovski in the Pyc. Crap., xvi; the letters of 
 the Grand Duke Paul and his wife to Nesselrode in the Leltres et papiers du chart-
 
 IIO THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 For a time there was, indeed, talk of great changes. Potemkin 
 told the Prussian envoy that the neighboring Powers would have 
 done much better at the time of the Partition to divide up the 
 whole of Poland, and he added that it might still be done if 
 the Prussians would indicate what they wanted. 1 In a slightly 
 different strain he remarked to Cobenzl that he wished the 
 King of Prussia would seize a bit of the Republic ; the two 
 Imperial Courts would do the same, the Poles would get their 
 just deserts, and the Court of Berlin would lose all credit in 
 Poland. With equal chagrin the ambassador heard Ostermann 
 declare that a partition of Poland between the three Courts 
 would perhaps be the best way out of the present embarrassing 
 situation. 2 
 
 All this was not merely diplomatic gossip. About this time 
 Bezborodko, the most trusted of the Empress' ministers, laid 
 before her two memorials, in which he advocated using the good 
 offices of Prussia in making peace with Sweden and Turkey, and 
 declared that if in this way Russia could secure the desired terms, 
 there would be no disadvantage in renewing the alliance with the 
 Court of Berlin, or even in allowing the latter some acquisition in 
 Poland. This was to be effected through a secret negotiation with 
 Prussia, into which the Emperor was to be initiated only when it 
 was approaching completion. Had the plan been carried out, 
 Austria might have been confronted by the same situation as in 
 1793: by a bargain made behind her back between Russia and 
 
 celier comte de Nesselrode, i, pp. 126, 130, 133, etc.; the correspondence of the 
 Prussian envoy Keller for January-February, 1789 in Dembinski, op. cit. 
 
 1 Keller's report of February 26, 1789, Dembinski, op. cit., i, p. 180. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's report of April 15, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1789. The am- 
 bassador wrote: "... sagte mir Graf Ostermann, dass es ihm lieb seye, dass die 
 Preussen zu ihrem alten Projekt, ein Stuck von Pohlen zu erhalten zuruckkehrten; 
 dieses wiirde vielleicht das beste Mittel seyn, sich aus der damaligen verworrenen 
 Lage zu ziehen. Es verstiinde sich von selbst dass man dem Konig in Preussen 
 nicht zulassen wiirde sich in Pohlen zu vergrossern, ohne dass die beyden Kays. 
 Hofe wenigstens ein gleiches Aequivalent erhielten; der Konig miisste uns bey 
 solcher Verhaltniss der Sachen freye Hande lassen, die Pohlen wiirden fiir ihr 
 ausschweifendes Benehmen den verdienten Lohn empfangen, und die beyden 
 Kays. Hofe bald wieder die Oberhand in diesem Konigreich gewinnen und den 
 Preussischen Credit vertilgen." Such a transaction would have been a very exact 
 repetition of the Partition of 1772.
 
 THE OVERTHROW OF RUSSIAN RULE III 
 
 Prussia for the partition of Poland. 1 Fortunately, however, the 
 Empress stood firm. The talk of a new partition quickly died out, 
 and the Austrian alliance not only remained unshaken, but was 
 about this time renewed for another eight years. 2 
 
 Potemkin's stay in St. Petersburg (February-May), while it 
 may have improved his own position, seems to have had no politi- 
 cal results, except to confirm the Empress in the resolution to 
 adopt a somewhat more friendly attitude towards Prussia. As an 
 outward sign of a more conciliatory disposition, in the early 
 summer of 1789 Alopeus again appeared in Berlin with a secret 
 commission. Its real object seems to have been merely to lull the 
 Prussian Court with specious hopes, to gain time, and to postpone 
 the outbreak of open hostility in that quarter. It led to a tor- 
 tuous and futile negotiation, carried on chiefly through the royal 
 favorite Bischoffwerder, which was dragged out for two years and 
 resulted in practically nothing. 3 
 
 1 These memorials are printed in the Pyc. Apx., 1875, ii, pp. 36 ff. Cf. also 
 Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, October, 1789, Apx. Bop., xiii, pp. 167 ff. 
 
 2 This time also by the exchange of autograph letters between the two sovereigns 
 under the dates of May 21 and May 24/ June 4, 1789. 
 
 3 The character of Alopeus' mission and the credibility of his reports have 
 formed the subject of a lively controversy between Professors Dembinski and 
 Askenazy. See the Kwartalnik Historyczny, xvii and xviii. After a study of these 
 reports for the years 1789-93, I find myself quite in agreement with Professor 
 Dembinski. Alopeus was undoubtedly strongly pro-Prussian in his sympathies and 
 extremely eager to effect a reconcilation between the two Courts; but that he was 
 in these years in the pay of Prussia and that his reports were concocted between 
 him and the Prussian ministers, seems to me utterly improbable, M. Askenazy 
 notwithstanding. 
 
 Alopeus' mission may probably be regarded as a result of Potemkin's exertions 
 at St. Petersburg. His instructions were drawn up April 28/May 9, i. e., about a 
 week before the Prince set out to return to the army. The mission must also stand 
 in some kind of connection with the proposals of Bezborodko outlined in the two 
 memorials mentioned in the text. In Bezborodko's mind, it was to be some- 
 thing more than a mere 'dilatory negotiation': it was to lead, if possible, to 
 a satisfactory peace with Sweden and the Porte, reconciliation and alliance with 
 Prussia, an agreement with the latter Power for equal ' advantages ' to both 
 Courts at the expense of Poland and Turkey (cf. his letter to S. R. Vorontsov of 
 October, 1789, cited above). The mission fell very far short, however, of effecting 
 such important results, owing both to the Empress' " insuperable antipathy to a 
 rapprochement with Prussia " (the phrase is Bezborodko's), and to Hertzberg's 
 obstinate insistence upon his utterly inacceptable ' grand plan.'
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Prusso-PolIsh Alliance 
 
 The favoring circumstances of the moment had restored to 
 Poland a precarious independence; but it remained to consoli- 
 date the new position, to provide against the dangers of all kinds, 
 external and internal, with which the audacious venture of the 
 Patriots was menaced. On July i, 1789, at a secret meeting of 
 four leaders of the party, 1 it was decided to direct the future 
 labors of the Diet solely upon three great tasks: the establish- 
 ment of a new and stronger form of government, the introduction 
 of the hereditary succession to the throne, and the conclusion of 
 an alliance with Prussia. These three projects were inseparable 
 and mutually supplementary. A reformed constitution would 
 be of little avail if at the death of the present elderly and ailing 
 King the state was to be exposed to the anarchy and the foreign 
 intervention that regularly accompanied an interregnum. The 
 Prussian alliance seemed an indispensable guarantee of security 
 at a moment when Poland was engaged in the difficult task of 
 reorganization, and was constantly forced to fear an attack from 
 her powerful and vindictive eastern neighbor. 
 
 As we look back upon it now, this Prussian alliance appears 
 to be the supreme and tragic mistake of the Four Years' Diet. 
 Those who in that last hour undertook to save the Republic, 
 pinned their hopes to one Power, and that Power betrayed them. 
 Prussia encouraged the Poles mortally to offend Catherine; she 
 filled them with false hopes, and bound herself to them by the 
 most solemn engagements; she led them on and on from one 
 perilous adventure to another; and then in the end she deserted 
 them and sold them to Russia. That is the history of the Prusso- 
 Polish alliance as viewed from the Polish standpoint. The 
 
 1 The two Marshals of the Confederation, Malachowski and Sapieha, Ignacy 
 Potocki and Bishop Rybinski. (Lucchesini's report of July 4, B. A., R. 9, 27.) 

 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 1 13 
 
 Patriots have been overwhelmed with blame for staking their 
 country's fortunes upon so dangerous, so artificial, so unnatural 
 a connection. Unnatural it undoubtedly was, in view of the 
 fundamental contradiction between the aims of the Patriotic 
 party and Prussia's unalterable determination to keep Poland 
 weak and to continue the dismemberment of the Republic. It 
 was an alliance in which there could be little sincerity or confi- 
 dence on either side, and which could have slight chances of 
 permanence. And, judged by its result, the whole policy of the 
 alliance seems imprudent, false, and wellnigh suicidal. 
 
 But if we do not judge merely by the outcome, but attempt to 
 place ourselves in the position of the Polish leaders at that time, 
 we may well ask what else they could have done. 
 
 A great and unlooked-for opportunity had presented itself; 
 the nation insisted that that opportunity should not be thrown 
 away; as far as human foresight could predict, it might well be 
 the last chance. National independence and national revival 
 were not to be hoped for, if Poland remained on the side of 
 Russia. Had the Patriotic leaders recommended this latter 
 course, the nation would have repudiated them: they had no 
 choice but to attempt to rid the state of the Muscovite control. 
 But when that had been accomplished, Poland could not relapse 
 into a nerveless neutrality. Forced as she was to guard against 
 the future vengeance of the Empress, too weak, as yet, to defend 
 herself single-handed, obliged also to reckon with the danger 
 that Lhe neighbors would settle their differences, as usual, by a 
 bargain at her expense, Poland was compelled to make sure of 
 the support of one of the great Powers, and as matters then 
 stood, support could be expected only from Prussia. 
 
 The Patriots were tolerably well aware of the dangers of the 
 Prussian alliance, although they did not foresee the supreme 
 treachery of 1792, — and how could they, since that desertion 
 is almost without parallel in history ? They realized from the 
 outset that the alliance would have to be bought with a heavy 
 price — Dantzic, Thorn, perhaps a part of Great Poland - 
 
 1 See the program discussed by the leaders of the party in Paris in January, 
 1788, Dembinski, "Piattoli et son role," loc. cit., pp. 54 ff.; also Lucchesini's report
 
 114 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 although later, unfortunately, the leaders were unable to bring 
 the nation to make the sacrifice. They also seem to have recog- 
 nized that even if this price were paid, no great confidence could 
 under ordinary circumstances be placed in Prussian friendship. 
 But the present situation was of a decidedly extraordinary sort. 
 Prussia had allowed herself to be driven into an antagonism to 
 the Imperial Courts that seemed bound to end in open war. By 
 joining in that struggle, Poland might win solid claims to Prussian 
 gratitude, and also provide handsomely for her own immediate 
 interests. Such a war was likely to spell disaster for the already 
 hard-pressed Imperial Courts; it might put an end to Catherine's 
 power of aggression for good and all; at any rate, it would create 
 such a gulf between Poland's two most dangerous neighbors that 
 a new partition would be out of the question for a long time to 
 come. Under such circumstances the ordinarily ' unnatural ' 
 Prussian-Polish alliance might become the most natural thing 
 in the world. 
 
 Moreover, there was another contingency in which the Prus- 
 sian connection might prove useful and salutary. Prussia was a 
 member of the Triple Alliance, which seemed to be more and 
 more the dominant factor in European politics. It was true that 
 that alliance contained divergent tendencies. Prussia was eager 
 to make it the instrument of her own plans of aggrandizement, 
 while Pitt's great aim was to restore peace to Europe, to maintain 
 the balance of power, and to protect the weaker states against 
 such aggressive monarchs as Catherine and Joseph. But which- 
 ever tendency prevailed, Poland stood to gain something, pro- 
 viding the Triple Alliance held together and continued its policy 
 of opposition to the Imperial Courts. And if Poland, by means 
 of an alliance with Prussia, could gain admission to this wider 
 union, the advantage would be inestimable. The Republic would 
 not only free itself from too close dependence upon Berlin, but 
 would also gain the security resulting from membership in an 
 imposing league of states — England, Holland, Prussia, Sweden, 
 perhaps also Denmark, Turkey and the German Furstenbund — 
 
 of July 4, 1789, as to his first conferences with the Poles on the subject of the 
 alliance.
 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 115 
 
 a' league of states banded together for peace and mutual protec- 
 tion. Perhaps it was not too much to hope that the Triple 
 Alliance, which had rescued Holland from France, which had 
 delivered Gustavus III from the direst necessity, which was 
 ready to come to the aid of the struggling Turks, might also 
 undertake to defend Poland against the vengeance of Catherine. 
 These hopes proved to be fallacious and illusory, but under 
 the circumstances one cannot unreservedly condemn the Polish 
 statesmen for cherishing them. Certainly the Poles were not 
 alone in miscalculating the outcome of the general European 
 crisis: Prussians and Belgians, Swedes and Turks were equally 
 deceived. The difference was only that Poland had infinitely 
 more at stake on the issue. The general situation in 1789 was 
 indeed such as to warrant high hopes, and to make an alliance 
 with Prussia, incongruous as it might be at other times, appear 
 under the given circumstances a matter of sane and practical 
 politics. It seems probable that the alliance would have justified 
 itself, if Prussia had drawn the sword against the Imperial Courts 
 in 1790, or if the Triple Alliance had not executed so inglorious 
 a retreat before Catherine in 1791. Undoubtedly the Poles did 
 not perform all that might have been expected of them to make 
 their alliance with Prussia a success; but the great reasons for 
 the failure of that alliance are to be found, not in anything that 
 they did or left undone, but in the vacillations, contradictions, 
 and fiascos of Prussian policy and in the collapse of Pitt's 'Federa- 
 tive System.' 
 
 II 
 
 The proposal for a Prusso-Polish alliance came originally from 
 the Poles themselves. The idea, as we have seen, formed part 
 of the program of the Patriots as early as the beginning of 1788. 
 It was strengthened by Frederick William's first declaration to 
 the Diet (October, 1788), in which the King suggested that if 
 the Republic really needed an alliance, he would offer his own. 
 That offer was hardly intended to be taken seriously, for the King 
 was merely trying to checkmate the proposed Russian alliance; 
 but it raised hopes. As soon as the Patriots had gained control
 
 Il6 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of the Diet, they turned their attention to the realization of this 
 favorite project, combining it with the plan of securing admission 
 to the Triple Alliance, and with the establishment of an heredi- 
 tary monarchy in favor of the Elector of Saxony, who was also to 
 be drawn into the Federative System. 
 
 It is significant of the desire of the Polish leaders not to be de- 
 pendent upon Prussia alone that they at once attempted to open a 
 separate negotiation with England. In January, 1789, and again 
 in June we find them making overtures at London, looking 
 towards closer political and commercial relations between Great 
 Britain and Poland. But Pitt was not yet interested in the 
 Republic. Not long before he had confessed to the Prussian 
 envoy, who wanted to discuss the Polish crisis, that he had not the 
 ghost of an idea about the constitution or the affairs of Poland. 1 
 His foreign policy had not yet taken on the comprehensive 
 scope and the marked anti-Russian bias that it was soon to 
 have; and moreover, he felt that, as far as Poland was con- 
 cerned, it behooved Prussia, as the Power chiefly interested, to 
 prescribe the attitude to be adopted by the Triple Alliance. He 
 therefore intimated to the Poles that England could enter into 
 no negotiations, political or commercial, with them apart from 
 Prussia. 2 
 
 The leaders of the Diet had been sounding the ground at Berlin 
 ever since the close of the preceding year; but now, in July, 1789, 
 they came out more openly with their proposals. At a series of 
 secret meetings with Lucchesini and Hailes, the British envoy, 
 they set forth at length their desire for an alliance with Prussia, 
 admission to the Triple Alliance, a new constitution, and the 
 hereditary succession in the House of Saxony. 3 
 
 Hertzberg was fairly aghast at such ' precipitate projects.' 
 The Poles must be bereft of common sense, he wrote, if they 
 imagined that Prussia would aid them to turn their Republic 
 
 1 Luckwaldt, F. B. P. G., xv, p. 35. 
 
 2 Salomon, Das politische System des jiingeren Pitt und die zweite Teilung Polens, 
 pp. 24 &.; Lucchesini's reports of June 13 and 17, 1789, B. A., R. 9, 27; Kalinka, 
 Der polnische Reichstag, ii, pp. 242 ff. 
 
 3 Lucchesini's reports of November 5, 1788, January 26, May 9, 23, 30, July 4, 
 11, 19, 22, 25, 1789, B. A., Fol. 323 and R. 9, 27. 
 

 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 11 J 
 
 into a strong hereditary monarchy in permanent union with 
 Saxony. It might, indeed, be desirable to designate the Elector 
 as the future King, if that prince could thus be won over definitely 
 to ' the Prussian system ' ; but Prussia could never permit the 
 Polish crown to become hereditary — at least not without obtain- 
 ing an enormous compensation. It may be that on this point the 
 minister was not in agreement with his master, for in March, 
 through his confidant, BischofTwerder, Frederick William had 
 assured the Elector of his willingness to allow and support the 
 hereditary succession in the Saxon House ; l but the King 
 had probably not seen fit to inform either Hertzberg or the 
 Poles of this. As for the project of alliance, Lucchesini was 
 ordered to restrain the ardor of his Polish friends, since only 
 the events of the Eastern war could allow Prussia to make a 
 final decision. 2 
 
 The time for a final decision seemed, indeed, to be close at 
 hand. The general situation in the summer of 1789 was such 
 as to challenge Prussia to action. To all the older sources of 
 embarrassment from which the Imperial Courts had been suffer- 
 ing, there was now added the Revolution at Paris, which robbed 
 them of their one possible new ally, and entirely freed the hands 
 of their enemies; while the growing internal troubles of Austria — 
 the danger of rebellions in Belgium, Galicia, and Hungary — 
 together with the mortal illness of Joseph II, threatened com- 
 pletely to paralyze the energies of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 
 Under such circumstances, what glittering prospects opened up 
 before the King of Prussia, with his untouched resources, his well- 
 filled treasury, his numerous allies, his army of 200,000 of the 
 best troops in Europe ! " The events of ten centuries," Lucchesini 
 
 1 Flathe, Die V erhandhingen iiber die dcm Kurfiirsten Friedrich August III von 
 Sachsen angebotene Thronfolge in Polen, p. 7. 
 
 2 Hertzberg's reflections on the Polish proposals are set forth in his report to 
 the King of July 9, and the rescripts to Lucchesini of July 10 and 20, B. A., R. 9, 27. 
 H. to F. W., July 9: "V. M. nc peut jamais permettre selon ses veritables interets 
 que le throne devienne h£r6ditaire en Pologne, a. moins que l'Autriche ne sorte 
 entierement de ce royaume, et que V. M. ne recoive un tel aggrandissement 
 et accroissement de puissance qui La mette entierement en surety du cot6 de la 
 Pologne, puisque ce Royaume gouvern£ par un Roi hereditaire deviendroit trop 
 dangereux pour la Prusse."
 
 n8 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 declared, " could not bring about a situation more favorable to 
 Prussia for putting the last touch upon her aggrandizement." 1 
 
 Even Hertzberg, whose learned combinations had so long held 
 the Prussian sword in the scabbard, was now — rather suddenly 
 — seized with a fever for action. He proposed that the King, 
 on going to Silesia for the annual reviews, should gather two army 
 corps and then present to the belligerent Powers in the form of 
 an ultimatum a scheme for the general pacification based upon 
 the sacrosanct ' grand plan.' Hertzberg may, not improbably, 
 have thought that a mere military demonstration would suffice 
 to secure the general acceptance of his terms; but if the Imperial 
 Courts refused, then Prussia should strike, at least at Austria; 
 with the aid of the Turks and Poles the business would be finished 
 by winter, and Prussia raised to the pinnacle of earthly grandeur. 
 Seldom had the old minister aroused himself to such a pitch of 
 impetuous energy, and never had he seen success so nearly within 
 his grasp. 
 
 But now, for the first time, the King eluded him. At the 
 royal headquarters in Silesia other counsels prevailed. The de- 
 cision was doubtless due in large part to the influence and in- 
 trigues of England, which had never relished Hertzberg's schemes 
 of aggrandizement, and which was now moving heaven and earth 
 to prevent the outbreak of a general European conflagration. 
 Moreover, the Prussian generals declared with one accord that 
 the season was too far, and the military preparations not far 
 enough, advanced to permit of striking a blow that year. Freder- 
 ick William personally was ready enough to go to war in his own 
 good time, but he did not propose to do so merely in order to 
 obtain an exchange of provinces rather advantageous to Austria. 
 ' He could not bring himself,' he said, 'to do so little harm to his 
 natural enemy.' 2 Never very enthusiastic about the Hertzberg 
 plan, he now seemed to have made up his mind to abandon it for 
 something more practicable. > 
 
 The plan that the King adopted in its stead was: to await the 
 expected rebellions in Belgium, Hungary, and Galicia; to con- 
 
 1 Lucchesini to Hertzberg, August 27, 1789, Dembinski, op. cit., i, p. 405. 
 
 2 Lucchesini to Hertzberg, August 30, 1789, Dembinski, op. cit., i, p. 407.
 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 119 
 
 elude an alliance with the Porte; to keep the Poles ready to act 
 and the Swedes from making peace; to complete Prussia's own 
 hitherto inadequate military preparations, and then in the spring, 
 with the aid of all these allies, to deliver a crushing attack upon 
 the Emperor. Whatever may be thought of the morality of it, 
 this program, compared with the Hertzberg system of ' parti- 
 tions and exchanges,' ' equivalents ' and ' compensations,' seems 
 like a return* to sane and practical politics. It had something of 
 the spirit of Frederick the Great. If only the King had the energy 
 and the will-power to conduct the grand venture in Frederick's 
 manner, the " opportunity of ten centuries" would not have come 
 in vain. Hertzberg, however, was inconsolable at the overthrow 
 of his idolized scheme and the loss of the "unique moment" of the 
 summer. Henceforth there appears an ever-growing divergence 
 between the views of the minister, still clinging to his 'grand plan' 
 and perpetually devising new combinations for realizing at least 
 a part of it, and the projects of the King, who was bent not so 
 much on making acquisitions as on settling once for all with 
 Prussia's ' natural enemy.' Henceforth Prussia was to have on 
 more than one occasion two policies, the King's and Hertzberg's, 
 and sometimes even a third, an awkward combination of these 
 two. 1 
 
 At first, however, Prussia started off bravely enough on the 
 new course. Immediately after the King's return from Silesia, 
 orders were sent to Diez at Constantinople to conclude an offen- 
 sive and defensive alliance with the Porte, and to promise that 
 Prussia would take up arms the following year. 2 Gustavus III 
 was encouraged to persevere in his lonely struggle by a substantial 
 loan, coupled with assurances that Prussia would induce England 
 to send a fleet to the Baltic and might even consent in good time 
 to a Swedish alliance. 3 Negotiations were started for an alliance 
 with Poland; and by underground channels the malcontents of 
 
 1 In Appendix IV there will be found an enumeration of the authorities for this 
 episode of the summer of 1789, and some discussion of controversial points. 
 
 2 Zinkeisen, op. cit., vi, p. 740. 
 
 3 Wahrenberg, " Bidrag till historien om K. Gustaf Ill's sednaste regeringsar," 
 in Tidskrift for Litteratur, 185 1, pp. 336 ff.
 
 120 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Belgium, Hungary, and Galicia were invited to prepare for 
 Armageddon. 1 
 
 Frederick William's warlike resolutions were only strengthened 
 by the events of the autumn. In October the revolt began in the 
 Austrian Netherlands; by the end of the year the Imperialists 
 had been virtually driven from the country; in January, 1790, 
 the Congress at Brussels proclaimed the independence of ' The 
 United States of Belgium.' On the other hand, the Turks, who 
 had come through the previous campaign tolerably well, now met 
 with a series of crushing reverses: the great defeats of Focsani 
 (August 1) and Rimnic (September 22), the fall of Bender, Aker- 
 man, and Belgrade, and the total loss of the Danubian Principali- 
 ties. After such disasters it was only too probable that the 
 discouraged Ottomans would make peace at once, unless the 
 King of Prussia speedily came to the rescue. 
 
 Driven on by the most imperative and pressing orders from 
 Berlin, Diez at last brought his negotiation to a successful con- 
 clusion. On January 31, 1790, the Prusso-Turkish alliance was 
 signed. Prussia pledged herself to declare war on both the Im- 
 perial Courts in the coming spring, and not to lay down arms 
 until the Turks had recovered, not only all they had lost during 
 the present war, but also the Crimea. In return the Porte 
 promised to exert itself, at the time when peace should be con- 
 cluded, to procure the restitution of Galicia to Poland and to 
 obtain substantial advantages for Prussia. 2 This treaty produced 
 a tremendous sensation throughout Europe, and not a little 
 mortification even at Berlin, where it was found that Diez had 
 wildly overstepped his instructions, especially with regard to the 
 Crimea. Nevertheless, the King was well content, for at last he 
 was sure of the Turks, and the cornerstone of his great offen- 
 sive coalition was laid. Not long afterwards the Prusso-Polish 
 alliance also came into existence. 
 
 1 Herrmann, op. cit., vi, p. 282; Van de Spiegel, Resume des negotiations, etc., 
 pp. 16 ff. and 61 ff.; Blok, Geschiedenis van het N ederlandsche Volk, vi, pp. 513 ff.; 
 Bailleu, " Herzog Karl August, Goethe, und die ungarische Konigskrone," in 
 Goethe- J ahrbuch, xx (1899), pp. 144-152; Krones, Ungarn unter Maria Theresa und 
 Joseph II, pp. 51 f. 
 
 2 This treaty is printed in Martens, Recueil de Traites des Puissances de V Europe,
 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 121 
 
 III 
 
 For some months during the autumn Hertzberg had delayed 
 a formal negotiation with the Republic by every device his in- 
 genuity could suggest. If the minister had had his way, the 
 alliance would probably never have been made. But the Poles 
 grew continually more impatient, Lucchesini more insistent, and 
 Frederick William more ardent for " the alliance and war." x 
 At last, on December 10, 1789, a letter was communicated to the 
 Diet, in which the King of Prussia formally promised to conclude 
 an alliance as soon as the terms could be agreed upon. The sole 
 condition that he attached to it was that the Poles should put 
 through certain reforms in their constitution, since he saw "more 
 advantage in a well-ordered government in Poland which would 
 assure the political existence of the nation, than in an army of 
 300,000 men under a state of things that exposed the country to 
 constant revolutions and changes." The Diet, roused to en- 
 thusiasm, made haste to act upon this suggestion. A new con- 
 stitution, avowedly imperfect but designed to meet the emergency 
 and to strengthen the hand of the government, was rushed 
 through in remarkably quick time and with still more remarkable 
 unanimity (December 23). Meanwhile the Deputation of For- 
 eign Interests was authorized to negotiate an alliance, not only 
 with Prussia but also if possible with England. 2 
 
 It was an historic moment, the apogee of the Prusso-Polish 
 honeymoon. Never before nor later were the two sides so nearly 
 at one in purposes, desires, and aspirations. The King of Prussia 
 
 iv, pp. 466 ff.; Hertzberg, Recueil, iii, pp. 36-43; Angeberg, Recueil des Traites et 
 Conventions concernant la Pologne, pp. 216-220. 
 
 1 Hertzberg to Lucchesini, December 1, 1789: " Le roi, qui veut a present a 
 tout priz alliance et guerre . . . ," Dembinski, op. cit., i, p. 419. Very instructive 
 for Hertzberg's attitude is his " Denkschrift iiber das zwischen Preussen und Polen 
 im Jahre 1790 geschlossene Bundniss," in Schmidt's Allgemeine Zcitschrift fiir 
 Geschichte, vii, pp. 261-271. 
 
 2 Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, i, pp. 641 ff.; Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 57 f. 
 The proposal for an alliance subsequently made at London received only an evasive 
 answer, as Pitt was too much occupied with other things and also fearful of Conti- 
 nental connections that involved a danger of war. See Bukaty to Ankwicz, 
 December 18, 1789 and February 16, 1790, Dembinski, op. cit., i, pp. 426 f. (notes).
 
 122 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 believed that he had a real need of the Polish alliance in order 
 to complete his offensive coalition. He was probably sincere in 
 his professed wish to see a strong government in Poland, in order 
 that the Republic might prove an efficient confederate. The 
 mass of the Poles were eager for a treaty that promised security 
 against Russia, while the leaders of the Patriots, initiated into 
 the aggressive plans of Prussia, rejoiced in the prospect of a 
 glorious war, the recovery of Galicia, the restoration of Poland 
 to an honorable place in the political system of Europe. With 
 such dispositions on both sides, it might have seemed that the 
 conclusion of the alliance would be a short and easy matter. 
 
 The formal negotiation was begun at Warsaw in the last days 
 of December; and early in January, the draft of a treaty having 
 been put on paper, Lucchesini went off to Berlin to procure his 
 master's final instructions. Then, however, there came a painful 
 halt, and dangers loomed up that threatened to wreck the project. 
 The difficulty came, in the first place, from the King of Poland. 
 Stanislas Augustus was still profoundly convinced that salvation 
 lay only on the side of Russia, and he was haunted by Stackel- 
 berg's frequent warnings that the Empress would pardon any- 
 thing except an alliance with Prussia. How far he had bound 
 himself to the Russian ambassador, who had promised him the 
 payment of his enormous debts if he would thwart the obnox- 
 ious project, 1 it is difficult to say; at any rate, it is certain that 
 the King viewed the alliance with repugnance, and worked 
 against it as much as he dared. 
 
 As one means of checking the project, Stanislas secretly advised 
 the Imperial Courts to present declarations to the Diet that they 
 bore no ill will for all that had recently taken place in Poland, 
 and were themselves willing to conclude treaties of alliance with 
 the Republic, guaranteeing its independence and integrity. 
 Possibly such declarations might have had the desired effect; 
 but nothing could induce the proud lady in Petersburg to such 
 
 1 De Cache's report of February 6, 1790, as to Stackelberg's offer, V. A., 
 Polen, Berichte. That the King gave the ambassador some kind of a promise to 
 place obstacles in the way of the alliance appears from the protocol of the Russian 
 Council of the Empire of January 7/18, 1790, Apx. Toe. Cob., i, p. 758.
 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 1 23 
 
 an act of condescension. Austria, indeed, took up the King's 
 suggestion. At least, Kaunitz, keenly alarmed at the danger 
 threatening Galicia, approached the Polish minister at Vienna 
 with the rather abrupt offer of an Austro-Polish alliance on the 
 same terms as that which was to be concluded with Prussia. 
 But as this overture was not made public, the leaders at Warsaw, 
 rightly regarding it as a mere snare, returned an evasive answer 
 and avoided bringing the matter before the Diet at all. 1 
 
 While thus disappointed in the hopes he had based upon the 
 Imperial Courts, Stanislas Augustus had been more successful 
 with another device for thwarting the Prussian alliance. From 
 the beginning he had insisted that the alliance must be accom- 
 panied by a commercial treaty that would, at least to some extent, 
 free Polish trade from the enormous transit duties and other 
 restrictions imposed by Prussia. This was, indeed, a matter of 
 the utmost importance, in view of the fact that the vast bulk of 
 the foreign trade of the Republic had to pass through Prussian 
 territory, by the Vistula and the Oder or through Silesia; but 
 it involved delicate and complex questions which it would have 
 been wiser not to raise at such a time. The Patriotic leaders fully 
 realized how inopportune the demand for a commercial treaty 
 was; but the demand, which was certain to be popular, became 
 noised abroad, and they did not dare resist. Hence, when the 
 Polish proposals for the alliance went to Berlin, the commercial 
 question had been coupled with the political one. 2 
 
 All this was grist to Hertzberg's mill. He, too, wished to 
 combine the two sets of questions, because, in his pettifogging 
 way, he saw a chance to drive a sharp bargain and to prove once 
 more that for the aggrandizement of Prussia the pen was mightier 
 than the sword. He would sell the Poles the alliance and the 
 commercial treaty in return for the cession of Dantzic and 
 Thorn. Both Hertzberg and his master seem to have believed 
 that the Diet would make the sacrifice without too much 
 
 1 Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, February 10 and 17, V. A., Russland, Exped., 1790; 
 the Deputation of Foreign Interests to Ankwicz, February 24, Museum XX. 
 Ossolinskich, MS. 516; Wegner, Dzieje dnia trzeciego i piqtego maja, pp. 320 f. 
 
 2 KaHnka, Der polniscke Reichstag, ii, pp. 20 ff. ; Askenazy, op. cit., p. 205.
 
 124 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 murmuring : an error for which Lucchesini and the Polish envoys 
 at Berlin were probably responsible. 1 
 
 When at the end of February the Prussian minister returned 
 to Warsaw and presented his two treaties, including the demand 
 for Dantzic and Thorn, the impression was staggering. The 
 leaders of the Patriots were, indeed, ready to agree even to these 
 terms, realizing that the natural and inevitable desire of Prussia 
 for two cities enclosed in her own territory could not in the long 
 run be denied; but this mattered little, for no one dared come 
 out openly in defence of so violently unpopular a project. To 
 the rank and file of the so-called ' Prussian party,' it was a terrible 
 disillusionment to find the ' virtuous ' and ' disinterested ' 
 Frederick William a veritable Shylock in disguise. If this was 
 the first sample of his ' generosity,' what might not be expected 
 of him in the future ? To the mass of the nation the idea of the 
 proposed cession was intolerable, because it would have seemed 
 like a new partition, and this time the more shameful because 
 voluntarily accepted. 2 In short, the partisans of the alliance were 
 thrown into consternation, while the ' Russians ' and ' Parasites ' 
 triumphed, declaring that this was what they had always pre- 
 dicted. The Deputation of Foreign Interests did not venture 
 even to lay the Prussian terms before the Diet. Lucchesini did 
 not dare show himself. Sick with fever or chagrin, the envoy 
 shut himself up in his house and wrote home desperately, begging 
 for permission to drop the commercial treaty and the odious 
 conditions attached to it, assuring his Court that the Diet would 
 even rather give up the alliance than consent to sacrifice the 
 two cities. 3 
 
 Hertzberg, much ruffled at the inconceivable blindness of the 
 Poles to their ' true interests,' would probably have renounced 
 
 1 Lucchesini to Hertzberg, November 4 and 29, 1789, Dembinski, op. tit., i, 
 pp. 415 and 417; Hertzberg's Memoir in Schmidt's Zeitschrift, vii, p. 267. 
 
 2 Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiordw, ii, p. 287. 
 
 3 For the effect produced by the Prussian demands: Lucchesini to Hertzberg, 
 February 27, in Dembinski, pp. 423, f.; Lucchesini to Jacobi, March 20, B. A., 
 R - 93, 33> de Cache's reports of March 2 and 6, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1790; Aubert 
 (the French charge" d'affaires) to Montmorin, February 27 and March 3, Dembinski, 
 op. tit., 1, pp. 495-498; Engestrom, Minnen och Anteckningar , i, pp. 157 f.
 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 125 
 
 the alliance rather than desist from his territorial claims, but the 
 King was not so minded. Through the latter's intervention, 
 Lucchesini was straightway given the orders he had asked for: 
 the commercial question was to be postponed, and the alliance 
 to be concluded at once. 1 
 
 By the time. these instructions reached Warsaw, the atmos- 
 phere there had already cleared. The evil effects of the Prussian 
 demands had by no means been obliterated; they remained to 
 taint this alliance from its birth; but the news of the Prusso- 
 Turkish treaty, the death of the Emperor Joseph, the exhortations 
 of the English, Dutch, and Swedish ministers, who held out the 
 prospect of admission to the Triple Alliance, and above all the 
 energetic exertions of the Patriotic leaders had combined to pro- 
 duce a marked revulsion of public opinion in favor of the great 
 project. 2 
 
 The demand for Dantzic and Thorn being now laid on the 
 shelf, the final arrangements were quickly pushed through. On 
 March 27 the Diet in secret session approved the proposed draft 
 of the alliance with little opposition. The 29th the instrument 
 was signed. 
 
 The treaty contained the usual guarantees of the respective 
 possessions of the contracting parties, although it was stated that 
 this should not exclude a future voluntary agreement about cer- 
 tain territorial questions now unsettled. This referred, of course, 
 to Dantzic and Thorn. In case either side should be attacked, 
 the other was bound to render military assistance: Poland with 
 8,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry; Prussia with 14,000 infantry 
 and 4,000 cavalry. In case of extreme necessity either party was 
 bound to aid its ally with all its forces. Article VI, which later 
 acquired a mournful celebrity, ran: " If any foreign Power, by 
 virtue of any previous acts or stipulations or the interpretation 
 thereof, should seek to assert the right to interfere in the internal 
 
 1 For Hertzberg's attitude, cf. his above-cited "Denkschrift iiber das Biindniss," 
 in Schmidt's Zeitschrift, vii, p. 267; Kalinka, Der polniscke Reichstag, ii, pp. 51 ff. 
 
 2 Kalinka, op. cit., ii, pp. 58 f.; Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 59 ff.; de Cache, 
 March 13, 17, 31, V. A., loc. cit.; Engestrom, loc.cit.; Hailes' report of April 29 in 
 Herrmann, op. cit., vi, p. 546; Stanislas Augustus to Bukaty, March 31, in 
 Kalinka, Ostalnie lata, ii, pp. 150 f.
 
 126 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 affairs of the Republic of Poland, or of its dependencies [i. e. 
 Courland], at any time or in any manner whatsoever, His Maj- 
 esty the King of Prussia will first endeavor by his good offices 
 to prevent hostilities growing out of such a pretension; but if 
 these good offices should not prove effective and hostilities against 
 Poland result, His Majesty the King of Prussia, recognizing this 
 as a casus foederis , will then assist the Republic according to the 
 provisions of Article IV of the present treaty." So much for any 
 future attempt of Catherine II to revive the Russian guaran- 
 tee. Finally, both sides expressed their desire to conclude a 
 commercial treaty, but that matter was reserved for a future 
 time. 1 
 
 Thus that alliance with Prussia which the Patriot leaders had 
 hoped and worked for ever since the beginning of the Diet; the 
 alliance in which they saw the ' palladium of liberty,' the one 
 guarantee of their new-won independence, their one safeguard 
 against the reprisals and aggressions of Russia ; the alliance which 
 was to admit them to the great Federative System and restore 
 them to a secure and honorable place in Europe, had at last come 
 to be. That alliance had not been extorted from Prussia by mere 
 importunities, cajoleries, or ruses. Prussia had entered into it 
 voluntarily, in a spirit of comparative sincerity and amity. How- 
 ever much Hertzberg might writhe and rage, however much 
 Lucchesini might strive to give his reports from Warsaw a fine 
 Machiavellian flavor, the fact remained that at that time Fred- 
 erick William was really the friend of Poland. The King had 
 ardently desired the alliance; he wished to see the Poles reform 
 their government and strengthen their army; he favored their 
 plan of securing to the Elector of Saxony the succession to the 
 throne; he contemplated admitting the Republic to the Triple 
 Alliance. 2 All this, of course, was not because of any particular 
 
 1 The treaty of alliance of March 29, 1790, is printed in Martens, Recueil, iv, 
 pp. 471 ff.; Hertzberg, Recueil, iii, pp. 1-8; Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 222-226. 
 
 2 Before his return to Warsaw in February, 1 790, Lucchesini was sent to Dresden 
 to offer the Elector Prussia's assistance in the matter of the Polish succession 
 (de Cache, February, 13). As to the admission of Poland to the Triple Alliance, 
 see e. g., Hertzberg to Lucchesini, March 6 (Dembifiski, op. cit., i, pp. 426 f.) and 
 to Diez, March 9 (Herrmann, op. cit., vi, p. 290).
 
 THE PRUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE 127 
 
 affection for the Poles, but because the King believed that he 
 needed their alliance for his coalition against Austria. 
 
 The alliance was made, then, by both sides in good faith, for 
 precise, practical reasons. It was no mere formality, no hollow 
 form of words. Defensive according to the letter, it was in spirit 
 an offensive alliance, for it was formed with a view to a great joint 
 enterprise. It was an alliance for action, for meeting a great 
 opportunity with a great deed. 1 
 
 1 Cf. the remarks of Askenazy, op. ciL, pp. 60 ff.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 Reichenbach 
 
 Never, perhaps, in the course of its stormy history has the 
 Austrian Monarchy been placed in a more desperate situation 
 than at the moment when Joseph II sank into the grave. 1 With 
 the costly and bloody Turkish war still dragging on, the opulent 
 Netherlands lost, the other provinces apparently ready to revolt, 
 and slight hope of effective aid from an exhausted and unreliable 
 ally, the tottering edifice of the Hapsburg power must have 
 collapsed before a single vigorous blow from without. That the 
 threatening catastrophe was averted is the great merit of Joseph's 
 brother and successor, Leopold II. 
 
 The new monarch brought to his colossal task no very brilliant 
 talents ; but he possessed a deep understanding of men and affairs, 
 gained during twenty-five years' experience of rule in Tuscany; 
 a clear, dispassionate, and independent judgment; a keen instinct 
 for the practical, coupled with a complete indifference to the am- 
 bitious plans and love of glory that had haunted his brother; 
 finally, firmness, prudence, and tact. Having lived in Italy, 
 and not being accustomed to confide his inmost thoughts to all 
 comers, he could scarcely hope to escape the reproach so often 
 cast upon him of being a ' new Machiavelli ' — it comes with 
 such special grace from Lucchesini's lips — but in fact his policy, 
 whenever it was the expression of his own will and not that of 
 Kaunitz, appears straightforward, honest, and surprisingly simple. 
 It seems possible to reduce Leopold's whole political system to a 
 very few principles. He wished to secure and maintain peace at 
 home and abroad; to cultivate the Russian alliance, in so far as 
 it conduced to that end, and no farther; and to effect an under- 
 standing with Prussia, as the indispensable condition of per- 
 
 1 The Emperor died on February 20, 1790. 
 128
 
 REICHENBACH 1 29 
 
 manent quiet. Such a policy contains nothing particularly 
 Machiavellian. And it cannot be doubted that his was precisely 
 the kind of policy that Austria most needed at that time. 
 
 From the moment of his accession, Leopold's foremost aims 
 were to put an end to the Turkish war, to avert a breach with 
 Prussia and Poland, and to recover the Netherlands. Naturally 
 he wished to save as much as possible of the conquests made 
 during the war, but he was unwilling for their sake to risk the 
 most essential interests of the Monarchy. In general, he was 
 prepared to make any sacrifice compatible with honor, in order 
 to rescue the state from the desperate situation into which his 
 brother had brought it. This pacific policy conflicted from the 
 outset, however, with the ideas of the second power in the Em- 
 pire, the veteran Chancellor. Hating Prussia with all the accumu- 
 lated bitterness of a lifetime, viewing the glory of the Monarchy 
 as identical with his own, Kaunitz revolted at the thought of 
 anything resembling a surrender to the rival at Berlin. Rather 
 than endure such shame he would have risked as many wars as 
 might come. The result of these diverging tendencies was, at 
 first, a compromise. 
 
 It was decided to keep open both avenues of action. On the 
 one hand, while negotiating with England, whose disinclination 
 to the aggressive plans of Prussia was well known at Vienna, 
 Leopold meant to press operations vigorously against the Turks 
 in the hope of forcing a speedy peace, and to make sure of the 
 assistance of Russia in case of an emergency; on the other hand, 
 he hoped to avert an immediate outbreak of hostilities on the 
 part of Prussia and her satellites by making friendly overtures to 
 the Court of Berlin. Accordingly, immediately after his arrival 
 in Vienna, he wrote Frederick William an eminently amicable 
 letter, expressing his desire for peace and for better relations. 
 With it went a memorial announcing the Austrian terms for a 
 peace with the Turks: the frontier as formerly established by 
 the Peace of Passarowitz. 1 
 
 1 The letter and the memorial are printed in Van de Spiegel, op. cil., pp. 222- 
 230 ; the letter also in Hertzberg's Recueil, pp. 50 f . In both these texts the 
 date is given as March 25, as also by Duncker, H. Z., xxxvii, p. 14, and Beer,
 
 130 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Even so unexpected and friendly a communication, novelty 
 as it was in the relations between Berlin and Vienna, might of 
 itself have produced little effect upon Frederick William. Since 
 August his heart had been set on war, on fighting out the old 
 rivalry with Austria to a finish. His anti-Hapsburg coalition 
 was formed; his army was mobilizing; it was no time now for 
 turning back from the great enterprise. But just at this moment 
 England intervened and played into the hand of Austria. 
 
 It has already been noted that the two leading members of the 
 Triple Alliance pursued very different aims during this protracted 
 European crisis. While Prussia was eager to utilize the situation 
 for her own schemes of aggrandizement, Pitt desired only to 
 restore peace as soon as possible, and in such a manner as would 
 make the least possible change in the existing equilibrium and 
 would ensure the existence of the small states against the aggres- 
 sive and rapacious Powers. Under such circumstances it had 
 not been easy to maintain even a semblance of harmony between 
 the two allies. Both agreed that the Triple Alliance was called 
 upon to restore the peace of Europe; but when it came to a dis- 
 cussion of ways and means, there were endless bickerings and 
 recriminations. Early in 1 790, however, an agreement had appar- 
 ently been reached. At the close of February, Pitt had brought 
 forward his favorite formula of the status quo ante helium as the 
 basis upon which the allies should attempt to effect a general 
 pacification. Being at that time still ignorant of the real temper 
 of Austria's new ruler, the Prussians readily assented. They 
 reckoned that both the Imperial Courts would reject a principle 
 that involved the sacrifice of practically all their conquests; and 
 in that case, Prussia would have not only a pretext for war, but a 
 right to demand the armed cooperation of England and Holland. 1 
 Pitt, who was now determined to take up the great work of 
 pacification in earnest, had meanwhile been vastly encouraged 
 
 Leopold II, Franz II und Catharina, p. 16. Ranke (Die deutschen Mdchte, ii, 
 pp. 174 f., note), Sybel {Gesch. d. Revolutionszeit, i, p. 213), and Heigel {Deutsche 
 Geschichte, i, p. 250, note 2) give the 26th, which is also the date of the copy of 
 the letter among the Expeditionen, Preussen, 1790, in the Vienna Archives. 
 
 1 Salomon, William Pitt, i H , pp. 465 f.; Rose, Pitt and National Revival, pp. 
 
 5i9 ff-
 
 REICHENBACH 1 3 I 
 
 by an event in another quarter. Leopold's first act, on learning 
 of his brother's death, was to summon the British envoy at 
 Florence to a secret interview, at which he expressed in the 
 strongest terms his desire for peace, his willingness to make the 
 sacrifices that might be necessary, and his wish that England 
 should assume the role of mediator. It was true that he did not 
 commit himself definitely to the status quo ante principle, and 
 that after his arrival in Vienna, under the influence of Kaunitz, 
 his tone altered and stiffened considerably. But Pitt did not 
 wait for further particulars. Delighted by the request for media- 
 tion, and convinced that Austria was already converted to his 
 favorite principle, he hastened to send out invitations to all the 
 belligerents for a peace negotiation on the status quo ante basis. 
 At the same time he wrote to Berlin that the new King of Hungary 
 seemed sincerely 'anxious for peace on fair and moderate terms; 
 that he did not share his predecessor's ambition, or his predilec- 
 tion for Russia, or his jealousy of Prussia; and that it was to 
 be presumed that he would accept the status quo ante principle, 
 or something approximating it. If Prussia refused that basis, in 
 order to pursue offensive plans of her own, she was warned that 
 she could not count upon the cooperation of England. If she 
 accepted it, on the other hand, the principle need not be inter- 
 preted so strictly as to exclude certain reasonable modifications 
 of the old frontiers to the reciprocal advantage of the interested 
 parties; but great changes of territory would be out of the ques- 
 tion, and no changes ought to be insisted upon to the point of 
 producing a new war. 1 
 
 This communication from England, following close upon the 
 overture from Austria, placed the Prussians in a highly embar- 
 rassing situation. Should they go forward resolutely with their 
 offensive plans, paying no further attention to their inconsiderate 
 ally at London, or should they enter upon the path of negotiation, 
 as Leopold invited, and Pitt exhorted, them to do ? And if they 
 negotiated, could they afford to admit the status quo basis ? 
 Undoubtedly that principle now appeared in very different light 
 
 1 This dispatch, Leeds to Ewart, March 30, is analyzed in Salomon, Pitt, i H , 
 p. 470; Rose, Pitt, pp. 523 f.; Ranke, Die deutschen Mdchte, ii, pp. 182 f.
 
 I32 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 from that in which they had welcomed it only a month before. 
 Then it had meant a device by which they could draw England 
 after them into aggressive action against Austria. Now it meant 
 a formula by which, if they accepted it, Leopold could at any 
 moment strike the arms from their hands. Frederick William 
 was now furious against the English for declaring in favor of so 
 insidious a principle, and he was strongly tempted to ' emanci- 
 pate ' himself from them entirely. Hertzberg, however, was 
 rather pleased with the course events had taken. Always in- 
 clined to prefer diplomacy to arms and increasingly pessimistic 
 about a war with Austria, he now saw a new chance for his old 
 plan, the universal panacea — at least for the old plan in a some- 
 what reduced and more moderate form. In one report after 
 another he urged upon his master how dangerous it would be to 
 break with England entirely and to risk his fortunes in a war 
 undertaken with no more reliable allies than Turks, Poles, or 
 Hungarian rebels. On the other hand, if he negotiated, he would, 
 indeed, have to admit the status quo ante basis, but he could give 
 that principle so loose a meaning as to cover a bargain with 
 Austria for reciprocal advantages. England might be expected 
 to favor certain just and moderate acquisitions for Prussia, since 
 Pitt had himself declared that the status quo principle need not 
 be taken too strictly. In this way, perhaps, Dantzic and Thorn 
 might at last be won, without the necessity of striking a blow or 
 risking anything. It would, at least, do no harm to try, and 
 His Majesty could, of course, break off the negotiation whenever 
 he chose. At this point, if ever, it was time to dismiss a minister 
 obsessed by incongruous and impossible schemes. But although 
 Frederick William had long lost faith in the miraculous efficacy 
 of the ' grand plan,' and was still as eager for war as before, he 
 allowed Hertzberg to have his way. The chief reason was that 
 the army was not ready for action, nor likely to be for more than 
 a month. Unfortunately for Prussia, the date for the completion 
 of mobilization had been fixed at May 15. 1 Hence Hertzberg 
 was to have one more chance to exhibit his virtuosity as a diplo- 
 mat, although, as the King insisted, the military preparations 
 
 1 P. Wittichen, Die polnische Politik Preussens, p. 51.
 
 REICH EN BACH - 1 33 
 
 were to continue, and Prussia must be ready to strike within 
 two months. 1 
 
 This was, we think, a disastrous decision. The King com- 
 mitted himself to a formal negotiation in which the only alterna- 
 tives under discussion were to be: the strict status quo ante, which 
 was of all solutions the most repugnant to Prussia, or the status 
 quo modified according to Hertzberg's peculiar ideas, which was 
 likely to be repugnant to everybody else. The negotiation was 
 destined to consume many precious weeks, to wear out the 
 patience and arouse the suspicions of Prussia's allies, to involve 
 Prussian policy in a maze of uncertainty, irresolution, and con- 
 tradictions. Above all, the King was laboring under a delusion 
 as bad as his minister's in imagining that he could keep open at 
 one and the same time the possibility of executing his original 
 offensive plan and that of carrying through the Hertzberg ex- 
 change project. The two plans were fundamentally antagonistic 
 and incompatible. The one involved the cooperation of Poland 
 and Turkey and the annihilation of Austria; the other involved 
 the spoliation of Turkey and Poland and advantages for Austria. 
 When both plans became simultaneously known to the world, 
 the result could only be to rob Prussia of the confidence of all 
 parties concerned, and to make the realization of either project 
 almost impossible. Therein lies the cardinal reason for the total 
 fiasco that followed. 
 
 II 
 
 The Austro-Prussian negotiations were spun out for two months 
 through an interchange of letters between the two sovereigns, and 
 of memorials and ' verbal communications ' between the two 
 chancelleries. Hertzberg began by offering the Austrians the 
 choice between two bases for the pacification: either the strict 
 status quo ante or an arrangement for reciprocal advantages be- 
 tween the interested Powers. He indicated clearly enough that 
 
 1 On this important turning in Prussian policy, see, Duncker, in H. Z., xxxvii, 
 p. 15; Ranke, op. cit., ii, pp. 183 ff.; Ritter, Die Konvenlion von Reichenbach, pp. 
 3 ff.; Salomon, Pitt, i» pp. 470 f.; Reede to Van de Spiegel, April 15, Van de 
 Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 196 ff.
 
 134 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Prussia preferred the second alternative. The arrangement he 
 proposed was substantially as follows. The Porte, acting on the 
 benevolent advice of Prussia, should cede to Austria the ' frontiers 
 of Passarowitz ' ; Austria should restore to Poland the whole of 
 Galicia except the Zips, Pocutia, and Halicz (these last two dis- 
 tricts forming the southeast corner of the province, contiguous 
 to the Bukovina) ; and the Republic should cede Dantzic, Thorn, 
 and some small districts in Great Poland to Prussia. 1 In short, 
 it was the old ' grand plan ' warmed over, very little disguised, 
 abridged, or improved. 
 
 These propositions made anything but a favorable impression 
 at Vienna. It was true that the admission of the status quo basis 
 by Prussia placed in the hands of the Austrians at least the possi- 
 bility of avoiding a rupture; but they feared that the Court of 
 Berlin would give that principle a stricter interpretation than 
 England had done, while they found the plan of "exchange, com- 
 pensation, and depredation" still more inaccep table. At a great 
 ministerial Conference (April 26), it was decided that the 
 negotiation would have to be spun out for a time, because it 
 was impossible to risk a breach with Prussia while the Turkish 
 war lasted, and it was the opinion of the Conference that a double 
 war must be prevented at all costs. If it proved possible by 
 vigorous military operations to extort a speedy peace from the 
 Porte, or if Russia would back up her ally by an imposing parade 
 of force, then Austria might take a bold tone towards the would- 
 be dictator. If not, if it became necessary to accept the mediation 
 of the Triple Alliance, then Austria would prefer the basis of the 
 1 status quo non materiel ' (i. e., with certain slight alterations of 
 the old frontier in her favor), or even the status quo strict, by 
 which, at least, Prussia would get nothing, rather than to consent 
 to the thoroughly objectionable Hertzberg plan. 2 Steadfastness 
 
 1 The alternative was put to Austria in general terms in Frederick William's 
 letter to Leopold of April 15, 1790, Hertzberg's Recueil, iii, pp. 54-58; Van de 
 Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 230-233. The details of the ' arrangement for reciprocal 
 advantages ' were imparted by Hertzberg to Reuss, the Austrian envoy, in an 
 interview of the same date (Reuss' report of April 16, V. A., Preussen, Berichle, 
 1790). 
 
 2 Protocol of the Conference, V. A., Vortrdge, 1790.
 
 REICH EN BACH 1 3 5 
 
 and tenacity in misfortune are virtues that have rarely deserted 
 Austrian statesmen; and, desperate as was the situation in that 
 spring of 1790, these qualities were not lacking on that occasion. 
 However much Leopold might be inclined to concessions, his 
 ministers were resolved to put on a bold face as long as they 
 could, and even, under certain circumstances, to fight rather than 
 surrender their conquests of the past two years or submit tamely 
 to the dictatorship of Prussia. 
 
 In accordance with the resolutions of the Conference, Leopold 
 once more wrote Frederick William a friendly yet utterly non- 
 committal letter, announcing that he could give no definite reply 
 to the Prussian propositions until he had consulted his ally, the 
 Empress of Russia. 1 A month earlier such dilatory tactics would 
 scarcely have succeeded in Berlin, but in May the atmosphere at 
 that Court was much more pacific. The trouble once more was 
 with the army. The further the mobilization proceeded, the 
 more the inadequacy of the Prussian military preparations came 
 to light. The services of provisions and transportation were in 
 such woful disorder that the minister responsible for them com- 
 mitted suicide. While it had originally been intended that the 
 army should be ready by the middle of May, it now appeared 
 that at least another month would be required. Meanwhile the 
 Austrians had massed such large forces in Bohemia and Moravia 
 that they had for a time decidedly the superiority. There was a 
 moment when the Prussians feared an invasion of Silesia. Those 
 about the King urged or pleaded with him not to undertake a war. 
 Under the influence of all these deterrents Frederick William's 
 martial ardor was vanishing. His old faith in the absolute mili- 
 tary superiority of Prussia was shaken. For nearly a year he 
 had wanted war and nothing but war, but in May of 1790, when 
 the time for action had come, he scarcely knew what he wished. 2 
 
 The natural result of this was that Austria's wholly unsatis- 
 factory reply to the first propositions of Prussia evoked, not a 
 sharp ultimatum, but a mild offer of still a third basis for nego- 
 
 1 This letter of April 28 is printed in Hertzberg's Recueil, iii, pp. 58 ff., and 
 in Van de Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 235 ff. 
 
 2 For the above see especially Ritter, op. cit., pp. 7 f.; P. Wittichen, op. cit., 
 pp. 5° ff.
 
 136 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 tiation. Hertzberg suggested, namely, that Prussia might be 
 satisfied with a very small cession in Galicia, about one-sixth of 
 that province, though in that case the Austrian acquisitions from 
 Turkey would naturally have to be reduced. 1 
 
 Now at last the plans of the Prussian pacificators began to 
 find an echo at Vienna. Were they not already reducing their 
 demands ? And this new proposition, it appeared, might not be 
 their last. Only a little dexterous bargaining, using the status 
 quo to frighten them into concessions, and Austria might get off 
 with a handsome acquisition from the Turks and an insignificant 
 cession to Poland. This was, at least, the opinion of the majority 
 of the ministerial Conference, and especially, it seems, of Spiel- 
 mann. 2 Kaunitz was not so optimistic about the possibilities of 
 negotiation. He still pinned his hopes to imposing military 
 demonstrations to be made in concert with Russia, and would 
 even yet have trusted, if necessary, to the arbitrament of war. 
 Leopold was chiefly anxious for peace and the recovery of the 
 Netherlands. How far he entered into Spielmann's views, it is 
 difficult to say, but for whatever reason, he still postponed a final 
 decision. In accordance with the opinion of the Conference, one 
 more dilatory answer was sent to Berlin, to the effect that Austria 
 could not declare herself definitely until the arrival of the long- 
 awaited courier from Petersburg. Provisionally it was stated 
 that while preferring even the status quo strict to the other 
 propositions as formulated by Prussia, the Court of Vienna was 
 willing to treat on the basis of the exchange plan, providing it 
 could be made really fair and reciprocally advantageous. 3 
 
 Such procrastination could not continue much longer without 
 producing an explosion of wrath at Berlin, as the Austrians were 
 well aware. In reality, their final decision now depended on the 
 
 1 Frederick William to Leopold, May 11, and note verbale of the same date, 
 Hertzberg, op. cit., iii, pp. 60-64; Van de Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 237-243; Reuss' 
 report of May 12, V. A., loc. cit. 
 
 2 Conference protocols of May 21 and June 9, V. A., Vortrage, 1790. 
 
 3 Leopold to Frederick William, May 23, with the accompanying Memoir e 
 from the State Chancellery, V. A., Vortrage, 1790; printed in Hertzberg, op. cit., iii, 
 pp. 65-69, and Van de Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 243-248, and in both dated erroneously 
 May 25.
 
 REICH EN BACH 1 37 
 
 replies expected from Russia. Had Catherine not failed them, 
 they might, perhaps, have escaped the humiliation of Reichen- 
 bach. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Ever since the offensive plans of Prussia had come to light in 
 the previous autumn, the ambassador Cobenzl had been straining 
 every nerve to induce the Russians to come to the defence of their 
 sorely-menaced ally. Now, if ever, he incessantly declared, was 
 the time for the Empress to show her gratitude for all the loyal 
 services and sacrifices of Austria in the past ten years. He 
 demanded that Russia should at once send a corps to protect 
 Galicia; that the Empress should issue a declaration that she 
 had guaranteed that province to Austria, and would regard an 
 attack upon it as an attack upon herself; and that a supreme 
 effort should be made that spring to force the Turks to peace. 
 Above all, he wished Russia to make imposing military demon- 
 strations against Prussia and Poland, to indicate precisely what 
 forces she would bring into the field in case of a new war, and to 
 concert with Vienna a plan for joint operations. All these de- 
 mands and exhortations elicited, however, only unsatisfactory 
 replies. 
 
 At times the Russian ministers professed to see no way out of 
 the situation except a new partition of Poland, and they even 
 offered to propose that solution at London and Berlin. As usual, 
 Cobenzl combated this idea with all the arguments at his com- 
 mand, and the Russians did not insist. 1 On the other hand, in 
 May Austria for the first time requested her ally to consent to 
 certain Prussian acquisitions in Poland as a last resource, in case 
 the Court of Berlin insisted absolutely upon the Hertzberg plan. 
 The Russians consented to this without much opposition. 2 Re- 
 quest and assent are equally significant. The Imperial Courts 
 had long made the inadmissibility of further Prussian acquisitions 
 in Poland one of the chief principles of their alliance: now both 
 
 1 Cobenzl's report of April 9, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1700. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, May 1, the latter's report of the 18th, V. A., Russ- 
 land, Exped. and Berichte, 1790.
 
 I38 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of them were willing in pessimo casu to allow Prussia such 
 aggrandizement. 
 
 In general, the Russians protested warmly their determination 
 to do all that was humanly possible for their ally, but they con- 
 stantly avoided committing themselves to precise and definite 
 engagements. All the military arrangements, they told Cobenzl, 
 were in the hands of Potemkin, and it was impossible to know 
 what Potemkin would or would not do. These assertions corre- 
 sponded pretty closely to the facts of the situation. The Empress 
 was really disposed to do what she could for Austria; x she was 
 still as bitter against Prussia as ever; but her attention through- 
 out the spring was absorbed in the Swedish war, which was then 
 reaching its climax. At a moment when Gustavus' cannon were 
 thundering almost at the gates of St. Petersburg, or when the 
 Russian and Swedish fleets were breathlessly chasing each other 
 about the Gulf of Finland, the Empress could scarcely ven- 
 ture to commit herself to still a third war, or even give much 
 attention to the course of events in the West. Whatever was to 
 be done for the assistance of Austria depended primarily on 
 Potemkin; and Potemkin had plans of his own. 
 
 Throughout the whole first half of 1790 the Tauric Prince was 
 flaunting himself in regal state at Jassy, the capital of his pros- 
 pective ' Kingdom of Dacia,' already assuming the airs of an 
 Oriental despot, 2 and occupied far less with the Turkish war 
 than with his own schemes for personal aggrandizement. The 
 failure of his project for a Confederation in Poland at the out- 
 break of the Eastern war, and the new situation created since 
 the opening of the Diet, far from putting an end to his designs 
 upon the Republic, had only led him back to an old plan more 
 dangerous than all the others. He meant to raise a Cossack army, 
 get himself appointed Hetman — a title to conjure with in Little 
 Russia — enter the Republic at the head of his Cossacks, call the 
 whole Orthodox population of the Ukraine to arms against their 
 Polish masters, and then lead a war of national liberation. The 
 
 1 Rescript to Potemkin, March 19/30, 1790, M. A., Typiiia, IX, 15 (copy). 
 
 2 On Potemkin's court and his sovereign airs at Jassy, see IleTpyineBCKiH, 
 CyBopoBi, pp. 226 f.; BpHKHept, HoTeMKHirB, p. 178; Pyc. Crap., xiv, p. 226.
 
 REICH EN BACH 1 39 
 
 result, he believed, would be that the three or four palatinates of 
 the southeast would be wrenched away from the Republic, and 
 annexed either to Russia or, preferably, to the new Kingdom of 
 Dacia. 1 In view of the extreme tension of Russo-Polish relations 
 since 1788 and the probability of war between the two countries, 
 this audacious project, which under ordinary circumstances the 
 Prince would scarcely have dared to acknowledge, could now be 
 urged upon the Empress with some chance of success. 
 
 Potemkin seems to have broached the scheme — or part of it — 
 during his stay in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1789; 2 and he 
 then submitted it quite fully in writing the following November. 
 Catherine praised it in general terms, but found various pretexts 
 for not carrying it out immediately. At this time, she wrote, 
 it would be dangerous to stir up the Poles unnecessarily and pre- 
 maturely; it would be better to wait until after the peace with 
 Sweden and the Porte, and then execute the plan on the occasion 
 of the return of the army from Moldavia through Poland. It 
 was only after long delays that she grudgingly accorded him the 
 coveted title of Hetman of the Ekaterinoslav and Black Sea 
 Cossacks. 3 Undeterred, however, by the obvious coldness at 
 St. Petersburg, Potemkin seemed to center his attention more 
 and more upon his Polish plans. It was to further them, we 
 think, that he steadily increased his Cossack regiments, organized 
 a special corps called the ' Army of the Grand Hetman's Staff,' 
 recommended to the Empress not only peace but an alliance with 
 the Turks, and secured the replacement of Stackelberg at War- 
 saw by his own creature, Bulgakov. 4 At the same time the 
 
 1 Cf. Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 38 f., 199 ff. 
 
 2 Cf. the rescript to Potemkin of July 6/17, 1789, CfiopHHKS., xlii, p. 17. 
 
 8 Catherine to Potemkin, 'November 15/26 and December 2/13, 1789, and the 
 rescript of January 10/21, 1790, CoopHiiKt, xlii, pp. 47, 50 f., 57 f. ; see also 
 Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, December 20/31, 1789, Apx. Bop., xiii, p. 173; 
 Garnovski to Popov, March 21/April 1, 1790, Pyc. dap., xvi, p. 426. 
 
 4 Potemkin's correspondence of the early part of 1790 is full of references to the 
 recruiting and organization of the Cossacks: see CCopimin, BoeHHO-uCTopwiecKHXt 
 MaTepiaJiOBt, viii, passim. On the ' Army of the G. H.'s Staff,' sec EiirejH>rap,Tj"i>, 
 3aiiHCKH, p. 96, and Langeron's Memoirs, in Hurmuzaki, Documente privitore 
 la Istoria Romdnilor, Suplcmenl i Hi , pp. 105 f. As to the alliance with the 
 Turks and Bulgakov's appointment, see Catherine to Potemkin, March 19/30 and 
 April 8/19, C6opHHKi>, xlii, pp. 66 and 62 f.
 
 140 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 danger of an attack from Prussia and Poland gave him a very 
 favorable opportunity to press his main project in a somewhat 
 modified form. At the end of March he presented to the Empress 
 a plan, in accordance with which, at the first offensive movement 
 on the part of the Poles, the Russian armies were to occupy the 
 palatinates of Kiev, Podolia, and Braclaw, thus establishing com- 
 munications with the Austrians in Galicia and shortening and 
 improving their own line of defence. And it was not merely a 
 military occupation that the Prince proposed, but the outright 
 annexation of the three palatinates. Russia would thus acquire, 
 he wrote, the most fertile provinces of the Republic and a popu- 
 lation of more than a million of her coreligionists. Volhynia also 
 might, perhaps, be annexed; or at least the Russian frontier 
 should be drawn from Choczim to the government of Mohilev. 1 
 In short, the Prince proposed appropriating substantially the 
 same territories that Russia was to acquire at the time of the 
 Second Partition. 
 
 Catherine again both praised and raised objections; but the 
 danger was too pressing to admit of delay. The plan was ap- 
 proved — at least in its military aspects — by the Council April 
 11/22, and sanctioned by an Imperial rescript of the 19/30. 2 
 
 Soon after, Cobenzl at last received a fairly definite reply to 
 his oft-reiterated questions. By a ministerial note of May 6 he 
 was informed that if the Poles invaded Galicia, Russian forces 
 would then make a diversion by attacking the southeastern 
 provinces of the Republic. This was altogether unsatisfactory 
 to the Austrians, who had constantly demanded that a Russian 
 corps should be sent to Galicia at once, not to avenge but to 
 prevent an attack. But nothing more could be secured from the 
 Russian ministers, who confessed frankly that not even the 
 
 1 This plan is printed in the Historische Zeitschrift, xxxix, pp. 238 f., and in the 
 Pyc. Apx., 1865, pp. 401 ff. 
 
 2 Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 775 f. The rescript referred to has not yet been 
 brought to light, but we know of it through the rescript to Potemkin of July 18/29, 
 1 79 1, published by Liske in the H. Z., xxx, p. 295. Cf. also the letter of Catherine 
 to Potemkin of April 8/19, cited above, and also those of March 30/ April 10 and 
 May 13/24, 1790, C6opHHEi>, xlii, pp. 67, 78 f.; also Bezborodko to S. R. 
 Vorontsov, April 30/May 11, 1790, Apx. Bop., xiii, pp. 182 f.
 
 REICHENBACH 141 
 
 Empress' commands could make Potemkin do what he did not 
 wish to do; and nothing more could be effected with Potemkin, 
 who left letters from Kaunitz and even from Leopold himself 
 unanswered for months. 1 In this critical moment, when the hopes 
 of Austria so largely depended on him, he was thinking of nothing 
 but a Kozaczyzna in the Ukraine. The exasperation in Vienna 
 was increased by the fact that instead of pressing the campaign 
 against the Turks, as the Russian ministers had promised, Potem- 
 kin kept his troops idle all the spring, while he pursued a secret 
 and highly suspicious negotiation with the enemy. By the early 
 part of June, then, all hope of getting any effective aid from 
 Russia had practically disappeared. 
 
 There was likewise no prospect of driving the Turks to an 
 immediate peace by force of arms, for the bulk of the Austrian 
 troops had been sent off to Bohemia. Little help was to be 
 expected from England, for in view of the danger of war with 
 Spain over the Nootka Sound controversy, Pitt was now less 
 able to act energetically in Continental affairs, and also more 
 anxious than formerly to oblige his ally. Hence even English 
 ministers began to urge the Prussian terms upon the Court of 
 Vienna. 2 In short, the bases of Kaunitz's system were crumbling 
 one after the other. By this time the King of Prussia had gone 
 to his army in Silesia, and was impatiently awaiting Austria's 
 final answer. There was nothing to do but fight or take the best 
 terms one could get from him. 
 
 Leopold determined to send Spielmann to Silesia to negotiate 
 a final settlement. The active State Referendary was the man 
 whose views most nearly coincided with those of his sovereign; 
 he did not share the Chancellor's deep-seated hatred of Prussia; 
 and he was, as we have seen, inclined to enter upon the Hertzberg 
 plan. Exchanges, equivalents, compensations, all the beloved 
 political geometry of the time, were almost as much to his taste 
 as to Hertzberg's. His instructions were decided upon at a 
 ministerial Conference of June 15 th. As in May, the idea of the 
 
 1 L. Cobenzl's report of May 9, Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, June 19, V. A., 
 Russland, Berichte and Expeditionen, 1790. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, June 5, V. A., loc. oil.; ci. Leopold to Marie Christine, 
 June 23, in Wolf, Leopold und Marie Christine, Ihr Brief wechsel, p. 162.
 
 142 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Conference was to pretend to favor the basis of the status quo non 
 materiel, in order to drive a better bargain on the other basis — 
 the system of exchanges and equivalents — which they really 
 preferred. So ready, indeed, were the Austrians at this moment 
 to enter into Hertzberg's ideas that they would willingly have 
 accorded Prussia much larger acquisitions in Poland than she had 
 asked for, providing she only showed herself sufficiently generous 
 with the lands of her ally, the Porte. To secure Turkish Croatia, 
 Orsova, and Belgrade, or if possible the frontiers of Passarowitz 
 unmodified; to make the minimum of sacrifices in Galicia; to 
 present a bold front but never to let matters come to a rupture; 
 to bring back peace at any honorable price: such was the sub- 
 stance of the instructions, with which Spielmann set out on his 
 far from promising mission. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 At the end of June the eyes of all Europe were fixed upon 
 Silesia in expectation of stirring events. There on opposite sides 
 of the Riesengebirge the hosts of Austria and Prussia once more 
 stood face to face, ready, as soon as the diplomats had had ' their 
 little hour upon the stage,' to renew the ancient struggle. 
 
 In Bohemia and Moravia were gathered about 150,000 Aus- 
 trians 2 under the gallant old Field Marshal Laudon, 3 who had 
 
 1 Conference protocol of June 15, and Kaunitz to Leopold, June 16, V. A., 
 Vortrage, 1790. 
 
 The Conference protocol says: " Vor allem ist die Unterhandlung nach dem 
 Grundsatz des von England vorgeschlagenen nicht materielen Status quo zu eroffnen 
 und dem preussischen Ministerio glauben zu machen, dass wir diese Basis der 
 librigen vorziehen." 
 
 Kaunitz to Leopold, June 16: Spielmann had told him that it was the opinion 
 of the Conference: " dass wir absolute und durch alle mogliche Nachgiebigkeits- 
 Mittel den Frieden mit Preussen zu erhalten suchen miissen, weil wir einen Krieg 
 zu fiihren schlechterdings ausser Stande sind." Mildly protests. 
 
 Leopold's reply: " Ich bin Ihnen fur ihre Mittheilung ihrer Wohlmeinung sehr 
 verbunden. Unsere innerliche Umstande sind aber leider so beschaffen dass wir 
 alle nur einigermassen anstandige Mittel anwenden miissen, um einen Bruch mit 
 Preussen abzuhalten." 
 
 2 149,000 according to the Raisonnement drawn up by Col. Mack at headquarters, 
 June 8, V. A., F. A. a. 54. 
 
 3 Laudon fell suddenly ill and died just at the moment of greatest crisis in the 
 negotiations at Reichenbach.
 
 REICH EN BACH 1 43 
 
 but recently refreshed the laurels of Hochkirch and Kunersdorf 
 by the capture of Belgrade. His troops were posted in such 
 admirable defensive positions that an attack on them would 
 certainly have been far from easy. Austria's weakness in case of 
 war lay not in military unpreparedness, but in the terrible con- 
 fusion that still reigned in the interior of the Monarchy. The 
 Hungarian Diet was conducting itself in its worst manner and 
 threatening a formal revolt; the Galicians were conspiring with 
 Prussia and Poland; there was dangerous fermentation in the 
 other provinces; the peasantry were in revolt; and everywhere 
 diets, towns, merchants, nobles, and clergy were demanding, as 
 Leopold said, " the privileges of the time of Charlemagne," and 
 clamoring with threats for immediate satisfaction. 1 Under such 
 circumstances, a sustained military effort would have been well- 
 nigh impossible, and a single defeat ruinous. 
 
 Brilliant in comparison was the situation of Prussia. What- 
 ever difficulties might have been encountered in the course of the 
 mobilization, the King now stood at the head of 160,000 troops, 2 
 supposedly without their equals in Europe, the famous veterans 
 of Frederick the Great. Around him was a glittering train of 
 princes, generals, diplomats and visitors: the Duke of Brunswick, 
 reputed the foremost general of that age; M Ollendorff, Kalckreuth, 
 and other paladins of the great King; the coryphaei of the Fiirsten- 
 bund, like Charles Augustus of Saxe- Weimar; the ministers of the 
 allied Powers, England, Holland, and Poland; the agents of those 
 potential allies, the Belgians, Hungarians, and Galicians; and 
 illustrious sightseers like Goethe, who had come to witness the 
 expected triumphs of the Prussian arms. 
 
 Apart from the main army in Silesia, two corps were stationed 
 in East and West Prussia to observe the Russians. In case of 
 war, the Poles might also be brought into action; and the army 
 of the Republic, which was mainly concentrated on the Galician 
 frontier, had now been raised to about 56,000 men. 3 Poles, 
 
 1 Leopold to Marie Christine, June 31, Wolf, op. at., pp. 169 f. 
 
 2 163,000 according to the above cited Raisonnement of Mack. Wittichen de- 
 clares that the Prussian numbers reached 160,000 only after the arrival of Usedom's 
 corps on July 17, Die polnische Politik Preussens, p. 68. 
 
 s Korzon, Wewnetrzne dzieje, v, p. 62, correcting Lucchesini's estimate of 43,600.
 
 144 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Turks, and Swedes together might be counted upon to keep the 
 Russians fully employed. That the Sultan's armies were by no 
 means a negligible factor was shown by their valiant repulse of 
 the Austrians at Giurgevo (June 26); while Gustavus III was 
 just then conducting his most glorious campaign, which was soon 
 to be crowned by the splendid naval victory of Svensksund 
 (July 9). On the whole, the chances strongly favored Prussia, 
 if she had the courage to draw the sword. 
 
 In such a situation a man of the Bismarck type would probably 
 have forced on a war, regardless of what some timid generals, 
 some lukewarm allies, or some indignant publicists might say. 
 There were difficulties, of course — the defects in the commissa- 
 riat, the evil impression produced on Prussia's allies by the long 
 delays of the spring and by Hertzberg's diplomacy, the opposi- 
 tion to be expected at London, the ugly appearances inseparable 
 from such a deliberate act of aggression; but such things would 
 scarcely have deterred a statesman of real will-power and deter- 
 mination, possessed by the genuine Prussian Drang zur Macht. 
 But Prussian policy was guided at that moment only by a minis- 
 ter who was losing himself further and further in a blind alley, 
 and by a king who, although he was somewhat more self-confident 
 and bellicose, now that he was at the head of his troops, still 
 varied from day to day in accordance with the latest news from 
 abroad or the last conversation he had happened to have. 
 
 On June 27, at the village of Reichenbach near the Prussian 
 headquarters at Schonwalde, the negotiation was begun between 
 Hertzberg on the one side, and Spielmann and Reuss on the other. 
 At first things went tolerably well. The conferences were, in- 
 deed, not infrequently stormy, but at bottom both sides were 
 agreed in principle, and both dreaded the same things — namely, 
 war or the status quo ante. By the 29th a settlement had been 
 outlined, by which Austria should cede to Poland the northern 
 part of Galicia (the circles of Bochnia, Tarnow, Rzeszow and 
 Zamosc, and the town of Brody), and should receive from the 
 Porte not only the frontiers of Passarowitz, but also the much- 
 coveted Turkish Croatia (i. e., Bosnia as far as the river Verbas). 
 Although the cessions demanded were unpleasantly large, Spiel- 

 
 REICH EN BACH 1 45 
 
 mann thought them more than outweighed by the glittering 
 acquisitions placed in prospect. He did not feel able to decide 
 without consulting his Court, but his report shows how strongly 
 he was inclined to settle on this basis. 1 At Vienna, however, it 
 was found that the proposed cessions would render Galicia de- 
 fenceless and useless, and it had just been discovered that Turk- 
 ish Croatia was a mountainous, turbulent country, extremely 
 difficult to occupy, and not worth any great sacrifices. Hence 
 the envoys at Reichenbach were ordered to save as much of 
 Galicia as possible, to decline some of the Turkish lands so 
 liberally thrust upon them, and — if worst came to worst — in 
 Heaven's name to conclude as well as they could. 2 Probably, 
 after a due amount of haggling and huckstering, an agreement 
 would have been reached on these lines, had there not occurred 
 just then an abrupt revolution in Prussian policy. At the 
 moment when he seemed, so far as Austria was concerned, about 
 to realize his ' grand plan,' Hertzberg had been deserted by his 
 own sovereign. 
 
 Frederick William II, with all his faults, and in spite of many 
 sad pages in his history, had a strong sense of honor, a regard for 
 his engagements and his ' glory,' a certain chivalrousness and 
 magnanimity. Hertzberg had never seen anything dishonorable 
 in a scheme which consisted essentially in Prussia's robbing out- 
 rageously one or both of the two allies whom she had just pledged 
 herself to defend; but the King had for some time felt growing 
 scruples about it. At the very beginning of the Reichenbach 
 negotiation he informed his minister that unless the Austrians 
 were prepared to cede a large part of Galicia, so that he could 
 offer the Poles a handsome equivalent for Dantzic and Thorn, the 
 exchange plan had better be thrown overboard; for it would only 
 embroil him with the Turks and lose him the confidence of the 
 Poles, and the status quo strict would be " quasi plus Jwnorable." 3 
 
 1 Report of Reuss and Spielmann from Reichenbach, June 29, Vivenot, 
 Qiicllen, i, pp. 491-496. In all their joint reports one may regard Spielmann as the 
 man who set the tone. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to Reuss and Spielmann, July 7, Vivenot, op. cit., i, pp. 497 f.; Ph. 
 Cobenzl to Spielmann, July 3, ibid., p. 497. 
 
 3 Note to Hertzberg of June 26, Ranke, Die deutschen Machte, ii, p. 377.
 
 146 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Then a week or so later there happened a number of things in 
 rapid succession, which ended the King's indecision and led him 
 to pronounce definitively against the whole Hertzberg scheme. 
 
 In the first place, Jacobi, the Prussian envoy in Vienna, re- 
 ported that Kaunitz had hastened to inform the Porte of the 
 lavish offers of Turkish lands that Hertzberg was making at 
 Reichenbach. This revelation would probably reach Constanti- 
 nople at almost the same moment as the Prussian ratification of 
 the Turkish alliance treaty. The consequences were easily to be 
 imagined: at the least, the confidence of the Turks would be 
 alienated forever, and the King would stand convicted before 
 the world of the most flagrant breach of faith. 1 
 
 Almost simultaneously with Jacobi's report (July 6) came a 
 dispatch from Lucchesini repeating in emphatic terms a warning 
 often given before, that the Poles would never voluntarily cede 
 Dantzic, Thorn, and a part of Great Poland in return for a mere 
 fragment of Galicia. 2 Lucchesini's opinion was only too well 
 grounded. The news of Hertzberg's propositions to Austria had 
 created consternation at Warsaw. The Polish envoy to Prussia 
 had straightway been ordered to make earnest remonstrances, and 
 Stanislas Augustus wrote Frederick William a personal letter 
 conjuring him to allow nothing to be decided detrimental to the 
 interests of his ally, the Republic. 3 Soon after, Lucchesini 
 arrived at Schonwalde to enlighten his master still further about 
 the state of public opinion in Poland, and to direct a destructive 
 criticism against Hertzberg's whole political system. To com- 
 plete the minister's defeat, England, which a few weeks before 
 had seemed to approve the exchange plan, now came out de- 
 cidedly against it and in favor of the status quo ante basis. 4 
 
 Frederick William was now thoroughly convinced that the 
 Hertzberg plan was, as the English envoy declared, " as unsuit- 
 
 1 Ritter, op. cit., pp. 18 f. 
 
 2 This dispatch is given at some length in Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, ii, 
 pp. 157 ff. 
 
 3 Askenazy, op. cit., p. 77; the letter, dated July 3, is cited ibid., p. 210. Deputation 
 of Foreign Interests to Ankwicz, June 26 and July 10, Muzeum XX. Ossolinskich, 
 MS. si 6. 
 
 4 Ewart to Leeds, July 8, Herrmann, op. cit., vi, pp. 559 ff.; Rose, William Pitt, 
 p. 528.
 
 REICH EN BACH 1 47 
 
 able in itself, as its execution would be difficult and even im- 
 practicable." Even if the Austrians accepted it, it would be 
 impossible to induce the Poles and the Turks to do so, voluntarily 
 at least; and to coerce them would be contrary to all honor and 
 decency. Moreover, even to secure an agreement with Austria 
 on this basis would probably require many weeks more of 
 wretched bargaining over the map; and the King was sick of 
 that. He wanted a quick decision. Apart from the cost of keep- 
 ing his troops on a war footing, it was ridiculous for him to spend 
 his time negotiating, when he stood at the head of an army 
 ready to act. The only sure and honorable course, he now felt, 
 was to abandon the exchange plan entirely, and to fall back on 
 the other alternative, the status quo strict, which he had proposed 
 to Leopold at the beginning of the negotiation. If Austria 
 accepted this, he would have the glory of appearing as a dis- 
 interested and loyal peacemaker, and the advantage of forcing 
 his ' natural enemy ' to end a long and exhausting war without 
 having gained a single village. If Austria rejected it, he would 
 have a just pretext for beginning hostilities, and a right to count 
 on the assistance of England and his other allies. 1 It has often 
 been said that in going over to the status quo basis, the King was 
 trying to make a rupture inevitable; but it would seem that if 
 he had been determined to force on a war, he would have de- 
 manded something more than Leopold had already declared 
 himself willing to grant. 2 In general, it was not the way of 
 Frederick William to force or guide events: he waited on them, 
 and allowed them to take their own course. If war had come, 
 he would probably not have been displeased; but he deliberately 
 put the choice of war or peace in his adversary's hands. 
 
 It was only after three days of storms, protests, rage, and 
 gloom that Hertzberg consented to accept his defeat and to 
 
 1 See especially the King's note to Hertzberg of July n, Ranke, op. tit., ii, p. 379. 
 
 2 In the Memoire attached to Leopold's letter of May 23. Sybel takes as proof 
 that Frederick William wished to provoke a war the demand which he at first 
 proposed to make, that Leopold should admit a Prussian guarantee of the Hun- 
 garian constitution (Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, i, p. 232). But the fact that the 
 King let this demand fall when Hertzberg urged that it would infallibly lead to war, 
 seems to me to point to a conclusion quite the opposite of Sybel's.
 
 I48 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 execute the new orders given him. On July 15 he presented to 
 the Austrians a note declaring that the King found himself un- 
 able to discuss the new propositions of the Court of Vienna, both 
 because he foresaw with certitude that they would be accepted 
 neither by the Porte nor by Poland, and because they were too 
 far removed from the original basis upon which this negotiation 
 had started; that he could therefore only return to the other 
 basis, the status quo strict; and that he demanded a precise and 
 immediate answer whether the King of Hungary would consent 
 to that principle. 1 In vain Spielmann and Reuss protested hotly 
 against so abrupt a change of front, and at a demand so deroga- 
 tory to the honor, so incompatible with the dignity, of their 
 Court. There was nothing to do but to write to Vienna for new 
 instructions. Spielmann's indignation was unfeigned, for his 
 heart was too firmly set on the exchange project, and he revolted 
 at the thought of sacrificing every inch of conquered territory, 
 and at submitting to such arrogant dictatorship. 2 Leopold, how- 
 ever, did not hesitate over his decision. He wanted nothing so 
 much as peace, peace at once, peace on any even half-way 
 honorable terms. The plenipotentiaries might try to secure some 
 slight modifications of the strict status quo ante helium (such as 
 the cession of Orsova to Austria) ; but that was to him a matter 
 of merely secondary interest. He was quite ready to assent to 
 the main demands of the Prussian declaration. 
 
 When these instructions reached Reichenbach (the 24th), the 
 conferences were renewed for the purpose of drawing up a con- 
 vention; and after frequent violent scenes and more than one 
 moment when a breach seemed imminent over the article of the 
 Netherlands, on July 27 an agreement was finally reached. 
 Austria consented to the principle of the status quo strict; to an 
 immediate armistice with the Turks; and to the holding of a 
 Congress, where peace was to be concluded with the Porte under 
 the mediation and guarantee of England, Prussia, and Holland. 
 If at the final settlement the Court of Vienna secured any slight 
 
 1 The note in Hertzberg's Recueil, iii, pp. 83-87, and in Van de Spiegel, op. cit., 
 pp. 288 ff. 
 
 2 Reports of the two Austrian envoys of July 13, 16, 18, Vivenot, op. cit., i, 
 pp. 499-503. 506-515- 

 
 REICHENBACH 1 49 
 
 modifications of the status quo in its favor, Prussia reserved the 
 right to claim equivalent advantages. The Powers of the Triple 
 Alliance promised to use their good offices to assist the King of 
 Hungary to recover the Netherlands, whose former constitutions 
 were then to be placed under their guarantee. Finally, Austria 
 agreed not to aid Russia in any way, directly or indirectly, in 
 case the Empress continued the war with the Turks. Such 
 were the chief provisions of the written declarations which con- 
 stituted the famous Convention of Reichenbach. 1 
 
 V 
 
 " Your Grace will see the sad result of the Reichenbach nego- 
 tiation from the joint report," Spielmann wrote to Kaunitz. " It 
 is, unfortunately, an unavoidable consequence of our internal 
 circumstances and the deplorable aftermath of the late reign." 2 
 " In sane politics," was Kaunitz's verdict, " we ought never to 
 have consented to this congress. It was an humiliating step. 
 Decided to yield everything, we could have done it at Vienna, 
 and we should thus have avoided insolent and insulting lan- 
 guage. . . . The declaration is base, cringing, without a shadow of 
 dignity; besides, it leaves the most essential things undecided." 3 
 Leopold, however, found the final terms more favorable than 
 Hertzberg's, and believed that of all the bases for peace that were 
 possible at that moment, that of the status quo was the least 
 disadvantageous. 4 So diverse were the judgments then passed on 
 the Convention from the standpoint of Austrian interests. The 
 verdict of historians has been rather more unanimous. 
 
 To call Reichenbach an Austrian Olmiitz 5 is to overstate the 
 case. Doubtless the Convention involved great sacrifices; it 
 represented the total failure of that policy of resistance to Prussia 
 for which Kaunitz had stood; and even Leopold had probably 
 
 1 Printed in Neumann, Recueil des Traites de VAutriche, i, pp. 414-420; Hertz- 
 berg's Recueil, iii, pp. 88-101; Van de Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 297-302, etc. 
 
 2 Letter of July 28, Vivenot, op. cit., i, p. 530. 
 
 8 Note to Ph. Cobenzl, undated, cited by Vivenot, op. cit., preface, i, p. x. 
 
 4 Letters to Marie Christine of July 18 and August 9, in Wolf, op. cit., pp. 
 181 and 189. 
 
 5 Duncker, in H. Z., xxxvii, pp. 41 f.
 
 ISO 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 hoped for somewhat better conditions. 1 But the Austrian ruler 
 had, at any rate, gained the great and essential objects that he 
 had had in view since the beginning of the negotiation; and such 
 was emphatically not the case with Frederick William. In this 
 sense, the real victor at Reichenbach was not the monarch who 
 dictated the terms, but the one who submitted to the dictator. 
 
 To the King of Prussia the Convention brought a little idle 
 glamour, purchased at the cost of the hopes, plans, and efforts 
 of the past three years. In reality, it marked a dismal fiasco. 
 After fixing upon that summer for a great offensive action, after 
 elaborate military and diplomatic preparations, after taking the 
 field at the head of imposing forces and challenging the attention 
 of the world to the great deeds that were to follow, Frederick 
 William returned to his capital wreathed with no laurels, empty- 
 handed, bringing only the dubious honor of having saved a few 
 provinces to the Turks and of having paraded himself as the 
 disinterested peacemaker of Europe. The pose was awkward, 
 for all the world knew what chagrin lay behind it, and how in- 
 voluntary this disinterestedness had been. For these triumphs 
 the King had spent half the war- treasure so carefully collected 
 by his predecessor for an emergency. What was worse, he had 
 lost the chance to make those indispensable territorial acquisitions 
 to which he had looked forward so confidently at the beginning 
 of the Eastern war. Worst of all, Prussia had played away the 
 splendid opportunity to settle once for all with Austria, the finest 
 opportunity that had presented itself since 1740. " I cannot 
 contain myself for shame and grief," Hertzberg wrote to a 
 friend. 2 
 
 At Warsaw the news of Reichenbach was also a cruel dis- 
 appointment. Since the previous autumn the Poles had been 
 preparing a revolt in Galicia, planning an attack upon that 
 province, massing their force's on the Austrian frontier, and 
 
 1 Sorel's verdict: " Leopold recut du camp prussien sous forme d'ultimatum ses 
 propres conditions de paix. II lui convint de se les faire dieter " (L'Europe et la 
 Revolution franqaise, ii, p. 73) is, I think, not quite true. Leopold's ' own condi- 
 tions,' it seems, would have been the modified or approximate status quo. 
 
 2 Letter of August 1 to Schlieffen, in Nachrickt von einigen Hausern des 
 Geschlechts der von Schlieffen, ii, pp. 509 f. 

 
 REICH EN BACH 151 
 
 hardly stopping short of deliberately provoking a rupture. By 
 May relations had become so strained that the Austrian minister 
 was making ready to leave Warsaw. 1 At that moment the Poles 
 were honestly and even eagerly intent upon taking their full part 
 in the great enterprise planned by Prussia. They waited only 
 for the signal from Berlin. But weeks and weeks passed without 
 the signal being given, and meanwhile disquieting reports flowed 
 in about the secret negotiations going on between Leopold and 
 Frederick William. Irritated and uneasy over the delay, the 
 Poles became indignant and alarmed on learning how freely 
 Hertzberg was disposing of their lands and interests without 
 consulting them. The suspicions bred by the untimely demand 
 for Dantzic and Thorn some months before, flared up again. 
 The result was that, on the one hand, the idea of undertaking a 
 war in conjunction with such an ally began to grow unpopular, 2 
 while, on the other hand, the Polish government felt bound, as 
 we have seen, to register an energetic protest against the Hertz- 
 berg plan. Nevertheless, when the news of the denouement at 
 Reichenbach arrived, when it became certain that there was to 
 be no war after all, the first impression at Warsaw was one of 
 consternation and regret. 3 It was hard now to bid adieu to the 
 hope of recovering Galicia, and to abandon the dangerously 
 compromised people of that province to the punishment that 
 might be awaiting them. There was no denying that by its 
 warlike gestures and poses of the last few months the Republic 
 had gone very far in antagonizing the Imperial Courts. Above 
 all, the leaders of the Patriots could not fail to recognize that the 
 Prussian alliance itself — the alliance on which their whole political 
 system rested — was now endangered, both because after all that 
 had happened the Polish nation could no longer feel the old 
 confidence in their ally, and because Frederick William, on his 
 side, had also much ground for complaint. At the eleventh hour, 
 
 1 De Cache's report of May 16, 1790, V. A., Polen, Berichte. 
 
 2 De Cache reported, though probably with some exaggeration, that hardly a 
 dozen members of the Diet would now have voted for war (July 3, V. A., loc. cit.). 
 
 3 De Cache's report of July 31 (V. A., loc. cit.); Aubert to Montmorin, July 
 31, Dembinski, op. cit., i, p. 512; Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, ii, pp. 170 f.; 
 Askenazy, op. cit., p. 83.
 
 152 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 just before the Congress of Reichenbach assembled, the King had 
 learned from Prussian officers sent to inspect it that the Polish 
 army was not yet sufficiently advanced in its reorganization to 
 cooperate effectively. 1 If that discovery was damaging to the 
 credit of the Poles, Frederick William's feelings towards them 
 were not improved by finding his chances for making acquisitions 
 by negotiation thwarted largely by the obstinacy of these same 
 useless allies. After Reichenbach the Prussians made no secret 
 of their irritation. A Polish agent reported that at Berlin the 
 worst opinions prevailed regarding the King of Poland, the Polish 
 army, and the whole Polish nation. 2 Lucchesini, on his return 
 to Warsaw, talked blackly about a complete change of system on 
 the part of his Court. 3 The fact was that the collapse of the pro- 
 posed attack upon Austria had removed the one cogent motive 
 Frederick William had had for desiring the Polish alliance. 
 
 There was, then, dissatisfaction, disillusionment, growing es- 
 trangement on both sides. Only four months after its conclu- 
 sion the alliance seemed on the road to dissolution. One chance 
 remained, however, of saving it, of giving it renewed vitality and 
 real worth in Prussian eyes. If the joint enterprise against 
 Austria could no longer be carried out, the point of the alliance 
 might be turned against Russia. Such a possibility would pre- 
 sent itself if the Triple Alliance, having once undertaken to effect 
 a general pacification, attempted to enforce upon Catherine II 
 the same hard terms as had been imposed upon Leopold. 
 
 1 Askenazy, op. cit., p. 72; Kalinka, op. cit., ii, pp. 142 ff. 
 
 2 Kalinka, op. cit., ii, pp. 170, 238 ff. 
 
 3 Herrmann, op, cit., vi, pp. 331 f.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Catherina Constans Invicta 
 
 I 
 
 During the year after Reichenbach Catherine II was put to the 
 hardest test of her career. She who, like Louis XIV, had long 
 held her neighbors in fear by her continual aggressions, now found 
 a powerful coalition rising up against her; and for a time it 
 seemed probable that her reign would close in humiliation and 
 defeat, as Louis XTV's had ended. In that case, the future of the 
 Polish state would doubtless have been vastly different. For in 
 the duel between Catherine and Pitt, which we are now to follow, 
 it was far less the fate of Turkey than that of Poland that was at ,, 
 stake. 1 
 
 Immediately after Reichenbach the question presented itself, 
 whether Russia, like Austria, could be induced to renounce her 
 conquests, and to make peace on the strict status quo ante basis. 
 On that subject Catherine's mind was made up. Nearly two years 
 before, her Council had decided that when the negotiations for 
 peace came, Russia must insist on the cession of the fortress of 
 Oczakow and the territory between the Bug and the Dniester. 2 
 
 Oczakow, which French engineers had long been trying to turn 
 into a sort of Turkish Gibraltar, had a decided strategic impor- 
 tance. It commanded the mouths of the Dnieper and the Bug, 
 and as long as it remained in hostile hands, it formed a constant 
 menace to Russia's newly acquired possessions in the Crimea. 
 The adjacent territory as far as the Dniester was at that time 
 almost an uninhabited desert; but it was of considerable value as 
 affording a broader frontage on the Black Sea and controlling the 
 outlets of several important navigable rivers. On this cession as a 
 sine qua non Catherine remained unshakeably firm throughout all 
 the storms that followed. 
 
 1 Cf. Rose, William Pitt, p. 593. 
 
 2 Sessions of the Council of December 14-16/25-27, 1788, Apx. Toe. Cob., i, 
 pp. 638-655. 
 
 153
 
 154 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 As the war turned more and more in her favor, she advanced for 
 a time larger claims. At the close of 1 789 Potemkin was secretly 
 instructed to induce the Turks, if possible, to cede all their prov- 
 inces north of the Danube. The lands as far as the Dniester or 
 even the Pruth were to be annexed to Russia, and the rest was to 
 form the principality of Dacia, the crown of which Catherine at 
 that time destined to her younger grandson Constantine. 1 When 
 in January of 1790 she for the first time announced her terms of 
 peace to the Courts of London and Berlin, she had the courage to 
 include an article providing for the erection of Moldavia and 
 Bessarabia into an independent state under a prince of the 
 Orthodox faith, a demand which the Prussians found as ' arro- 
 gant ' and ' extravagant ' as it was ' inadmissible.' 2 It was one of 
 Catherine's better qualities that she generally recognized just 
 how far she could safely go. So on this occasion, after finding how 
 strong an opposition her tentative proposals had aroused, she 
 wisely decided to moderate her claims and then to stand by her 
 guns through thick and thin. In June she announced that her 
 irreducible and ultimate terms of peace were the cession of 
 Oczakow and of its territory as far as the Dniester. 3 
 
 Having chosen the position she meant to defend, Catherine 
 looked on at the proceedings at Reichenbach with indignation but 
 without fear. She could not view that convention without afflic- 
 tion, she wrote, since it was manifestly derogatory to the dignity 
 of her ally. Assuredly she would send no envoy to join the 
 Austrians in making peace under the tutelage of England and 
 Prussia. " No human power shall dictate laws to me. I am de- 
 lighted," she went on sarcastically, " that the King of Prussia is 
 again demanding Dantzic and Thorn from Poland. I suppose it 
 will be on condition that I cede to Poland White Russia and Kiev, 
 and that is just where His Prussian Majesty will fail." 4 
 
 1 Secret rescripts to Potemkin of November 30/December n, 1789, and 
 March 19/30, 1790, M. A., Typina, IX, 14, 15. 
 
 2 Ostermann to Nesselrode, December 28, 1789/January 8, 1790, Frederick 
 William to Goltz, January 22, 24, February 5, 22, Dembihski, op. cit., i, pp. 
 46-53, 277 5., 282, 285. 
 
 3 Goltz's report of June 18, 1790, Dembinski, op. cit., i, p. 308. 
 
 4 Undated note, perhaps to Bezborodko, P. A., X, 69.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 1 55 
 
 The Empress' courage was increased by the fact that she had 
 just patched up a hasty and very timely peace with Sweden. 
 Gustavus III would probably have preferred to continue the war; 
 but his meagre resources were exhausted, and he despaired of 
 obtaining adequate help from outside. For years he had been 
 storming the Courts of London and Berlin with pleas for military 
 and financial assistance; they had given him a long series of 
 rebuffs; and when at last, after discovering that he was negotiat- 
 ing for peace with the Empress, they came forward with the offer 
 of a subsidy, he found it wretchedly insufficient. Among the 
 mistakes made by Pitt and Frederick William in dealing with the 
 Russian problem, none cost them more, perhaps, than their 
 parsimony and comparative indifference on this occasion. At 
 the moment when they were about to begin their action against 
 Catherine, they found they had lost the most efficient ally they 
 could have secured. 1 On August 14, 1790, Russia and Sweden 
 concluded the Peace of Verela, by which the territorial status quo 
 ante helium was restored, although vague assurances were given 
 on the Russian side about a future ' rectification ' of the frontier. 
 Catherine's exultation over the peace was equalled only by the 
 discomfiture of the English and Prussians. " We have drawn one 
 foot out of the mire," she wrote to Potemkin; " as soon as we get 
 the other one out, we shall sing Alleluia." 2 
 
 Freed in this manner from her most pressing anxiety, the 
 Empress was ready to show herself perfectly uncompromising 
 on the subject of the peace with the Turks. If aught were lacking 
 to fill her with fiery determination, it would have been supplied 
 by her intense dislike and even contempt for her prospective 
 opponents. Her correspondence of that time is full of satirical 
 thrusts and passionate outbursts against " the new dictators of 
 Europe." Hertzberg is styled " the enrage" " the madman," 
 " the puffed-up pedant "; Frederick William is " the universal 
 Protector," " the universal Disposer of other people's property," 
 or "la Bete "; and the Kings of England and Prussia are rolled 
 
 1 On the relations between Sweden and the Triple Alliance down to this point, 
 see especially Wahrenberg, " Bidrag till historien om Kon. Gustaf III' sednaste 
 regeringsar," in Tidskrift for Litter alur, 1851, pp. 321-365. 
 
 2 Letter of August 9/20, C6opnnKt, xlii, p. 101.
 
 156 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 into one as " Gegu," l of whom it is written that 'not all the Gegus 
 possible or imaginable will make her conduct her affairs any 
 differently.' Never would she make her submission to such 
 people. "No human power," she wrote, " will ever make me do 
 that which does not conform to the interests of my Empire or the 
 dignity of the crown I wear." 2 When it appeared that no help 
 was to be expected from outside in case of war, she declared 
 unwaveringly: " Very well, alone, yes, perfectly alone, we shall 
 now conduct our affairs according to our own interests. N. B. I 
 shall not relax a jot from any of the propositions made to the 
 Turks." " Our role is to be unchangeable, unmoved by whatever 
 may happen." 3 Such was the attitude and the indomitable 
 temper of the sovereign whom it was now proposed to coerce 
 into surrendering her hard-won conquests. 
 
 The application of such rigorous terms to Russia had, as- 
 suredly, not lain within the original intentions of the Triple 
 Alliance. When Pitt first suggested a general pacification on the 
 status quo basis, in April, 1790, he had not meant, it seems, to 
 interpret that principle so strictly as td exclude moderate acquisi- 
 tions such as Catherine now demanded. Down to the summer of 
 1790 both England and Prussia frequently expressed themselves 
 in a sense not unfavorable to the retention of Oczakow and its 
 district by Russia. 4 But Reichenbach had altered the situation. 
 After England had there pronounced so strongly in favor of the 
 status quo basis in opposition to the Hertzberg exchange plan, 
 Prussia accepted the principle, but chose to give it the strictest 
 possible interpretation, in order to prevent her rival from gaining 
 even a single village. Having applied the principle to Austria, 
 the allies were then bound to apply it to Russia as well; for 
 without derogating from their professions of high impartiality 
 and disinterestedness, they could not allow the Empress advan- 
 tages denied to Leopold. Thus England and Prussia were led 
 
 1 See the correspondence in the Co'opHHK'B, xlii, passim, and especially that 
 with Grimm, xxiii of the same collection. " Gegu " is, of course, a fusion of 
 Georges and Guillaume. 
 
 2 To Zimmermann, January 26/February 6, 1791, C6opHZKi, xlii, p. 139. 
 
 3 Undated notes, P. A., X, 69. 
 
 4 Cf. Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century, v, p. 275.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 157 
 
 rather involuntarily to raise a demand that was likely to involve 
 them in a war which neither of them had clearly foreseen, and 
 which neither of them had any reason to desire. 
 
 Towards the end of August the envoys of the two Courts at 
 St. Petersburg officially communicated the results of the Reichen- 
 bach negotiations and invited the Empress to accept peace on the 
 same terms under the mediation of the Triple Alliance. The reply 
 was a courteous but flat refusal, During the autumn the two 
 ministers returned again and again to their demand, but always 
 with the same result. The Vice- Chancellor Ostermann informed 
 them that the Empress was indignant at " the unparalleled con- 
 duct " of the allies in attempting " to dictate in so arbitrary a 
 manner to a sovereign perfectly independent and in want of no 
 assistance to procure the conditions which seemed to her best 
 suited to satisfy her honor." x At the end of the year the allied 
 Courts made what they considered a great concession. They 
 would no longer insist that the Empress submit to their mediation, 
 if she would only accept their good offices and peace on their 
 terms. But this hardly improved matters, since the Empress 
 still held her to her own terms. Obviously there was no means of 
 dealing with her except by a show of force. The question was 
 how far England and Prussia would go with measures of coercion. 
 Would they risk a war ? That question held Europe in tense 
 anxiety throughout the winter and spring of 1791. The answer 
 to it depended upon many factors: upon the uncertain and 
 incalculable course of Frederick William, the deliberate resolu- 
 tions of Pitt, the attitude of Austria, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, 
 and various other states. 
 
 II 
 
 If it is difficult to distinguish with certainty the motives that 
 determined Frederick William's conduct at Reichenbach, the 
 policy of Prussia after that convention presents an almost hopeless 
 maze of perplexities and contradictions. That the King urged 
 England on to the most vigorous measures against Russia, while 
 at the same time he was making overtures to the Empress for an 
 
 1 Lecky, op. cit., v, p. 280.
 
 158 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 agreement for mutual advantages between themselves; that he 
 planned with the British cabinet a great Federative System 
 for the preservation of peace and the status quo in Europe, while 
 he was simultaneously looking for other connections and for 
 acquisitions wherever they might be found; that he negotiated 
 for an alliance with the Jacobins at Paris while at the same time 
 proposing to Austria a joint crusade against the Revolution — all 
 this, and much more besides, shows a versatility or an inco- 
 herence in his plans that almost defies analysis or comparison. 
 The best, though by no means a complete, explanation of his 
 course appears to be as follows. 
 
 After Reichenbach Frederick William felt it a point of honor 
 to bring Russia to accept the status quo; he soon convinced him- 
 self that earnest measures would be required; and he therefore 
 desired to make sure of vigorous support from England and of the 
 neutrality of Austria and France. It was primarily the exigencies 
 of the Russian crisis that determined his conduct, but he also 
 looked beyond. He wished, on the one hand, to gain a more 
 secure basis for his policy than that afforded by his present al- 
 liances, and, on the other hand, to effect in one way or another 
 the acquisitions which he considered so necessary to Prussia. 
 Hence he sought to keep all avenues open; to put himself in the 
 strongest position as against Russia, without entirely cutting off 
 the possibility of a friendly agreement with her; to preserve his 
 old connections, while preparing the way for new ones; to be able 
 in the future to choose between England, France, Austria, and 
 Russia, in accordance with the needs of his essentially aggressive 
 policy. 1 
 
 On the King's intrigues with the revolutionists at Paris it is 
 unnecessary to dwell, since they produced no result save to fur- 
 nish the Imperial Courts with new examples of ' Prussian du- 
 plicity.' 2 His advances to Austria, however, deserve attention, 
 
 1 Cf. especially, Sevin, Das System der preussischen Geheimpolitik vom Augicst 
 ijqo bis zum Mai 17 91. 
 
 2 For details on this subject, see Sevin, op. cit., pp. 37 ft\; Sybel, Geschichte der 
 Revolutionszeit, i, pp. 348 f.; Sorel, op. cit., ii, pp. 157 ff.; Heidrich, Preussen im 
 Kampfe gegen die franzosische Revolution, pp. 9 ff. That the negotiation was 
 known to the Austrians appears from Mercy's letter to Kaunitz of January 22,
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 1 59 
 
 since they mark the beginnings of a change in the grouping of the 
 great Powers, which was to be of great importance in the sequel. 
 Only a few weeks after the Convention of Reichenbach, while 
 Frederick William still remained in Silesia, there first began to be 
 talk of a rapprochement between Austria and Prussia. On in- 
 numerable occasions the Austrian envoy, Prince Reuss, was 
 assured by Bischoffwerder, the Duke of Brunswick, and others of 
 the King's desire for a sincere and permanent understanding, and 
 even for an alliance, with Austria. Everyone joined in condemn- 
 ing the old error that the two Powers were ' natural enemies.' 
 These ideas received an additional stimulus from the advent of 
 Baron Roll, an agent of the Count of Artois, come to urge the 
 latter's plans for effecting a counter-revolution in France through 
 a coalition of the neighboring states. Frederick William, who 
 had been sounded by Artois as early as February, 1 was not 
 disinclined to undertake the enterprise as soon as his hands were 
 free. He allowed Bischoffwerder and Prince Hohenlohe-Ingel- 
 fingen, the two chief enthusiasts for ' the cause of all sovereigns,' 
 to assail Reuss incessantly with hints on this topic; and these 
 hints were soon followed by the very definite proposals made by 
 Hohenlohe, September 13, looking towards a formal alliance and 
 joint intervention in the affairs of France. The immediate object 
 which Frederick William had in view appears from Hohenlohe's 
 intimation that the proposed alliance was designed ' to free both 
 sovereigns from the need of troubling themselves so much about . 
 the friendship of Russia,' and from his statement that the French 
 enterprise could be undertaken only after the final pacification in 
 the East. The King's ultimate aim was shown in the scheme of 
 ' compensations ' for the expenses of the intervention. Austria 
 was to take a part of French Hainault, and Prussia to receive 
 Juliers and Berg in exchange for an equivalent to be carved out in 
 Alsace for the Elector of Bavaria. This was the first communica- 
 
 1791, in Feuillet de Conches, Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette et Madame Elisabeth, 
 i, pp. 423 ff. 
 
 1 Bailleu, "Zur Vorgeschichte der Revolutionskriege," in H. Z., lxxiv, pp. 259- 
 262. It is not improbable that suggestions on this subject may have been made 
 to him even earlier. Cf. Daudet, Les Bourbons et la Russie pendant la Revolution 
 franqaise, p. 18.
 
 / 
 
 -, 
 
 l6o THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 tion between the two Courts regarding joint action against the 
 French Revolution; and from the very start the plan was bound 
 up on the Prussian side with projects of aggrandizement that 
 were to be the bane of the First Coalition and the ruin of Poland. 
 Simultaneously with Hohenlohe's overtures to Reuss, the Mar- 
 quis Lucchesini, passing through Vienna on his road to the peace 
 congress at Sistova, was ordered to sound Leopold about a coali- 
 tion for the restoration of order in France; and, as a matter of 
 course, the scheme for territorial ' indemnities ' was not to be left 
 out of the discussion. 
 
 The Austrians replied to these proposals in guarded style, point- 
 ing out the difficulties and dangers involved, evading the delicate 
 subject of ' compensations,' urging the need of delay until after 
 the peace with the Turks, but still by no means entirely rejecting 
 the idea of intervention in France. 1 
 
 The friendly exchange of opinions begun on this topic soon 
 extended to other subjects. Kaunitz and Hertzberg might do 
 their utmost to keep their Courts at swords' points in the good 
 old time-honored fashion; but in spite of them the two monarchs, 
 frequently communicating directly with one another, were draw- 
 ing closer together, and bringing a quite unwonted warmth into 
 Austro-Prussian relations. Both sovereigns had strong reasons 
 for desiring a rapprochement. Leopold had long been resolved 
 not to live in exclusive dependence upon Russia, in servitude to 
 the Tsarina, as he considered that his brother had done. Fred- 
 erick William, preparing for a possible war with Catherine, was 
 perforce anxious to lure her ally away from her; and this was, 
 indeed, the sole immediate aim of his advances to Leopold. But 
 the old distrust was still very deeply rooted at both Berlin and 
 Vienna. On the one question about which the Prussians were 
 most concerned at that time — namely, whether Austria would 
 remain neutral, in case they went to war with Russia — they 
 
 1 For the above: Reuss' reports of August 6 and 31, September 3, 7, io, 14, 
 17, 21, 28, Kaunitz to Reuss, September 13 and 19, Ph. Cobenzl to Reuss, 
 October 8, V. A., Preussen, Correspondenz, 1790; Brunswick to Schlieffen, June 
 17, 1792, in Schlieffen, op. cit., ii, p. 565; Sybel, op. cit., i, p. 350; Sorel, op. cit., 
 ii, p. 160; Beer, Leopold II, Franz II, und Catharina, pp. 36 f.; F. K. Wittichen, 
 " Zur Vorgeschichte der Revolutionskriege," in F. B. P. G., xvii, pp. 256 ff.
 
 CATHERINA CONST AN S INVICTA l6l 
 
 could get no satisfactory answer. Kaunitz replied only with 
 surly bravado, and Leopold with courteous evasions. As long as 
 this situation continued, the reconciliation between the two 
 Courts could be regarded only as a pious wish, rather than an 
 accomplished fact; and so long Frederick William found him- 
 self gravely impeded in undertaking to coerce the Empress. 
 
 While continually urging the British government to vigorous 
 measures, while talking loudly of war before the Austrians, and 
 massing very considerable forces on the eastern frontier, the 
 Prussians were also ready ' to build a golden bridge ' to Catherine. 
 Every sign of more conciliatory intentions on the Neva was 
 greeted with anxious eagerness at Berlin. 1 Hertzberg assured 
 Alopeus that he cared nothing for the status quo, and was con- 
 vinced that Oczakow was not worth a war. 1 He believed that all 
 might still be arranged satisfactorily to the Empress, if she would 
 offer to assist Prussia to obtain Dantzic and Thorn through a 
 voluntary cession by Poland. He declared that he had not been 
 authorized to make such a suggestion, and that the King had even 
 forbidden him to speak of Dantzic and Thorn. Possibly he was 
 telling the truth in these latter statements, in which case his pro- 
 posal must be regarded as an amazing bit of insubordination; 
 possibly they were only the white lies of diplomacy. At any rate, 
 a proposition that almost certainly had Frederick William's ap- 
 proval was that made to Alopeus early in February, 1791, by 
 Bischoffwerder, the especial confidant of the Prussian King. 
 Bischoffwerder intimated that the Empress could make sure of 
 her desired acquisitions, if she would by a secret convention 
 pledge herself to renew her old alliance with Prussia at the con- 
 clusion of the Turkish war. 2 Catherine doubtless judged the 
 situation at Berlin accurately when she wrote: " Le Statu quo, ce 
 trou seroit bouche avec Danzig et Thorn "; but she added, " Ce 
 n'est pas moi qui le proposera." 3 
 
 1 Alopeus' reports of December 6, Dembinski, op. cit., i, pp. 95-104; Reuss 
 report of January 25, 1791, V. A., Prcussen, Berichte. 
 
 2 Alopeus' report of February 8/19, Dembinski, i, pp. 116-119, which de- 
 serves to be supplemented by the unpublished one of June n/22, M. A., Ilpyccia, 
 III, 27. 
 
 3 Undated and unaddressed note, P. A., X, 75.
 
 1 62 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 In truth the Prussians had no stomach for this war. The 
 leading generals were almost unanimously opposed to it, as was 
 the King's uncle, Prince Henry; and Hertzberg mournfully 
 declared that it would be " the greatest disaster, perhaps the 
 grave of the Prussian Monarchy." To invade Russia it was said 
 in military circles, meant to risk a repetition of Poltava. 1 Fred- 
 erick William was, perhaps, the man in his kingdom who was least 
 averse to war, since he felt that his honor and his engagements 
 required him not to give way; but his moods and projects varied 
 incessantly. He would probably have been relieved, had the 
 Turks succumbed to panic and concluded a precipitate peace on 
 their own initiative; and he would doubtless have abandoned the 
 status quo principle entirely, had Austria or Russia proposed to 
 him a bargain for reciprocal advantages. At the end of the year, 
 shaken by the urgent remonstrances of those around him, dis- 
 gusted with the campaign the Turks were making, and wearied of 
 the endless delays of the British Cabinet in coming to a definite 
 statement of its intentions, the King seems almost to have made 
 up his mind to avoid war, if it could possibly be done. 2 It was 
 high time for Pitt to declare himself, if the Anglo-Prussian league 
 and the Federative System were to be saved from shipwreck. 
 
 It has already been noted that Pitt's ideas had been evolving 
 into a comprehensive program, the aim of which was to uphold 
 the existing political and territorial equilibrium, to protect the 
 weaker states against the lusts of the aggressive Powers, and in 
 general to put an end to that system of depredations, conquests, 
 and partitions which Frederick II and Catherine had brought 
 into vogue, and which was threatening to subvert the old political 
 order of Europe. As a means to this end Pitt thought to expand 
 the Triple Alliance through the admission of Sweden, Denmark, 
 
 1 Alopeus' reports of December 7/18, 14/25, December 24/January 4, Mous- 
 tier to Montmorin, March 28, 1791, Hertzberg to Goltz, December n, 1790, 
 and to Lucchesini, March 3, 26, April 24, 1791, Dembinski, op. cit., i, pp. 107 f., 
 349-352, 441 ff., 449, 538 (note); Schlieffen, op. cit., ii, pp. 365 f.; notes of Prince 
 Henry to Grimm, C6opHHKT>, xliv, pp. 436 ff. 
 
 2 I think Alopeus' reports on this subject, (December 14/25, December 24/ 
 January 4, January 25/February 5, Dembinski, op. cit., i, pp. 107 f., 112 ff.), 
 are sufficiently confirmed by Reuss' reports of December and by the overtures 
 made to Austria in January.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS IN VICT A 163 
 
 Poland, and Turkey, into a great defensive league, extending from 
 the British Isles to Constantinople, covering the North and East 
 of Europe, and strong enough to hold all the unruly Powers in 
 check. The states chiefly threatened at present were Turkey and 
 Poland. Pitt's interest in both countries was of very recent date, 
 but it was steadily growing. It has often been pointed out that 
 he was the first British statesman to view the Eastern Question 
 from that pro-Turkish standpoint which in the nineteenth century 
 became traditional in England. Poland had a special claim to his 
 attention. The Federative System being directed particularly 
 against the ambitions of Russia, it was necessary to provide 
 against the dangers that might result to the extensive trade of 
 Great Britain with that country. From a careful study of the 
 subject Pitt had convinced himself that the articles for which 
 England was chiefly dependent upon Russia — grain, timber, 
 hemp, flax, and hides — could be furnished equally well by Po- 
 land, and only by Poland. The preservation and strengthening of 
 the Republic and the establishment of close commercial relations 
 with it thus became indispensable conditions for the success of 
 Pitt's anti-Russian policy. But in order to attain these aims it 
 was, first of all, necessary to free Polish trade from the crushing 
 restrictions imposed by Prussia, and to end the latent antagonism 
 between that Kingdom and its eastern neighbor. Pitt thought 
 to solve both these problems in the following manner. England 
 should mediate a treaty between the two states, by which Poland 
 should cede Dantzic and Thorn to Prussia in return for commer- 
 cial concessions that would ensure virtual free trade with the out- 
 side world; England would guarantee this treaty, in order to 
 relieve the Poles from exclusive dependence on Prussian good 
 faith, and would then effect the admission of the Republic into 
 the Triple Alliance. Such an arrangement would satisfy Prussia's 
 legitimate desires for aggrandizement, and would enable her to 
 adopt permanently a policy of peace, conservatism, and good will 
 towards Poland. It would ensure to England the commercial facil- 
 ities she required. It would afford Poland the strongest guarantees 
 of security and prosperity that could well be offered to her. So 
 important a place did this Polish plan hold in Pitt's calculations
 
 164 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 that it has been called, perhaps without very much exaggeration, 
 the keystone of his whole conservative system. 1 Such were the 
 general ideas with which he approached the Russo-Turkish prob- 
 lem. 
 
 From April until November, 1790, Pitt's action on the Conti- 
 nent had been fettered by the Nootka Sound controversy and by 
 the resulting danger of war with Spain. When at last, after gain- 
 ing a signal victory in that affair, he found himself free to con- 
 centrate his attention on the Eastern question, he was for a time 
 doubtful whether the situation warranted a resort to extreme 
 measures. There was much to be said for the opinion, if not for 
 the chivalry, of Lord Auckland, who advised strongly against 
 running big risks merely for the sake of " taking a feather out of 
 the cap of an old vixen, or of preserving a desert tract of ground 
 between two rivers to the Turks, whose political existence and 
 safety will probably not be diminished if they are obliged to have 
 their barrier upon the Dniester, or even on the Danube." 2 But 
 about this time Ewart, the immensely active British envoy to the 
 Court of Berlin, came home on leave of absence. He had been 
 the first advocate of the Prussian alliance; he was perhaps the 
 originator, and certainly the most ardent apostle, of the Federa- 
 tive System; he was desperately anxious now to carry his work 
 through. With his usual energy he set himself to convince Pitt 
 and the other ministers that the hour had come for great deci- 
 sions and bold action. He urged that if the Empress were allowed 
 to keep Oczakow and its district, the security of the Turkish 
 Empire and of Constantinople itself would be perpetually men- 
 aced, while Poland, finding the natural outlet for the trade of its 
 richest provinces in Russian hands, would sink back under the 
 Tsarina's influence. But important as the territory in question 
 was, far larger issues were involved. England's whole position as a 
 great Power on the Continent, the alliances she had been building 
 up, the Federative System which she hoped to establish — all this 
 
 1 For the above see especially, Salomon, Das polilische System des jungeren Pitt 
 und die zweite Teilung Polens, particularly pp. 35 ff.; also the same author's William 
 Pitt der Jungere, i", pp. 348, 482 ff.; Rose, Pitt and National Revival, pp. 385-389, 
 593, 626 f., 631. 
 
 2 Rose, ibid., p. 602.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 165 
 
 was really at stake. If England yielded in this crisis, Prussia and 
 the other friendly states would lose all confidence in her; her 
 influence and her political connections would be ruined; she 
 would be left isolated and discredited, as she had been a few years 
 before, and exposed, perhaps, to far greater dangers than were 
 involved in the vigorous measures now proposed. That Ewart 
 badly underestimated Catherine appears from his opinion that 
 while she might, and probably would, make some difficulties at 
 first, there could be little doubt of her accepting the terms offered 
 her before spring, since she could never venture to risk the con- 
 sequences of a refusal. 1 The Prime Minister and the Foreign 
 Secretary, the Duke of Leeds, allowed themselves to be persuaded 
 by these clear-cut, logical, but too optimistic arguments. About 
 the end of the year Pitt set out on the hardest task he had ever 
 undertaken, that of driving Catherine II to her knees. 
 
 The campaign was planned with thoroughness. First of all, 
 there was to be a general diplomatic reconnoissance for the pur- 
 pose of securing the alliance of as many states as possible, and 
 the neutrality of the rest. Then, if the results were favorable and 
 if Catherine remained obstinate, in the spring the ultimatum 
 would be delivered at St. Petersburg, to be followed by the 
 appearance of British and Dutch fleets in the Baltic, while 
 Prussians, Poles, Swedes, and Turks threatened Russia by sea or 
 land. In January, 1791, the British program was presented at 
 Berlin, while English couriers sped to the four corners of the 
 Continent with orders to every envoy. There followed for some 
 months a diplomatic struggle waged at half the Courts of Europe 
 between the British ministers, more or less supported by their 
 Prussian colleagues, on the one side, and the representatives of 
 Russia on the other. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Neither side could expect much aid from the Bourbon Courts. 
 France, which under normal circumstances might have been relied 
 upon to hold England in check, now seemed to be a political zero. 
 The idea of the Quadruple Alliance of the Imperial Courts and 
 
 1 Rose, Pitt, pp. 598 f.; Salomon, Pitt, i i; , pp. 501 ff.
 
 1 66 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Bourbons still lived on, indeed, in the project of the ' Northern 
 League ' (Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and perhaps France), 
 for which the Spanish ministers professed a certain zeal, and 
 which Genet, the French charge at St. Petersburg, eagerly urged 
 upon his government. But all Catherine's exhortations that the 
 time had come for France and Spain to set bounds to British 
 arrogance, failed to break down Montmorin's and Florida- 
 blanca's invincible fear of England. The Court of Madrid con- 
 tented itself with promising England its neutrality and Russia its 
 good offices at Constantinople. And when Catherine, over- 
 coming for the moment her animosity against the National 
 Assembly, that " hydra with twelve hundred heads," attempted 
 to win over the Jacobins, Mirabeau took her money, promised his 
 services, and then, most unseasonably, died. 1 
 
 Count Bernstorff, the prudent and pacific leading minister of 
 Denmark, found himself in a terribly embarrassing position. The 
 Russian government, assuming the imperious tone it was accus- 
 tomed to take at Copenhagen, insisted that Denmark should arm 
 a fleet, close the Sound to the British, and in general fulfil the 
 obligations resulting from the ' eternal alliance ' of 1773. Eng- 
 land, on the other hand, demanded at first a free passage through 
 the straits, and then the use of the Danish ports, and for the rest, 
 strict neutrality. Bernstorff tried to wriggle through by making 
 vague promises to both sides, and begging each not to compromise 
 him with the other, while he also brought forward a plan of con- 
 ciliation, by which the Empress should be allowed to keep the 
 territories she demanded, on condition of razing the fortresses. 2 
 
 The art of adroit balancing was even better exemplified by 
 the King of Sweden. After fighting, denouncing, and generally 
 
 1 For these little-explored relations of Russia with France and Spain during 
 the crisis of 1790-91, see: Dembinski, Rosya a rewohicya francuska, pp. 76-81; 
 S. R. Vorontsov on the Mirabeau episode, Apx. Bop., viii, p. 22; Simolin's reports 
 from Paris of April 1 and 15, 1791, in Feuillet de Conches, op. cit., ii, pp. 24-27, 
 31 ff.; Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 849 f., 861 f.; the correspondence of Genet with 
 Montmorin, in R.I. A., Russie, ii, pp. 501-506; Baumgarten, Geschichte Span- 
 iens zur Zeit der franzosischen Revolution, pp. 295 f., 313; Muriel, " Historia de 
 Carlos IV," in the Memorial Historico Espanol, xxix, pp. 147 ff. 
 
 2 Cf. Holm, Danmark-Norges Udenrigske Historie . . . fra jygi till 1807, i, 
 pp. 2-6; Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 837, 846, 850.
 
 CATHERINA CONSTANS INVICTA 1 67 
 
 tormenting her for two long years, since the Peace of Verela Gus- 
 tavus III had set himself to woo the friendship of his good cousin 
 Catherine, who met his advances with the coquetry which she so 
 well knew how to combine with her many masculine qualities. 
 During the winter of 1790-91 Gustavus was negotiating at St. 
 Petersburg and Copenhagen with regard to the Triple Alliance of 
 the North, which the Russians were anxious to build up in order 
 to close the Baltic to hostile fleets. Nothing had been concluded, 
 however, when in February England and Prussia approached 
 him with flattering offers, intended to secure at least his neutra- 
 lity, and if possible his armed assistance. It was of extreme 
 importance for them to win him on account of his fleets, his ports, 
 his strategic position, and his proved efficiency. It was hardly an 
 exaggeration, when his ambassador at St. Petersburg assured 
 him: "All the world recognizes that Your Majesty holds the 
 balance of power in your hands." l Keenly conscious of the 
 advantages of his position, Gustavus proceeded with the frankness 
 of an Italian condottiere to inform each side of the offers the other 
 was making; he then stated his own price, raised his terms the 
 more the longer the auction continued, and waited to see which 
 competitor would offer him the most in territory and money. In 
 truth, he much preferred to attach himself to Catherine, who 
 treated him as her chosen cavalier, and flattered him in his darling 
 plan for a counter-revolution in France. Still, as Grimm said 
 of him, ' if for heroism he was of the family of the Knight of 
 La Mancha, when it came to the perquisites he agreed entirely 
 with the principles of the good Sancho, who looked out for hard 
 cash.' 2 
 
 Of all the states in question Poland was the one most strongly 
 interested in the success of the Allies. In the previous summer, as 
 soon as the first impression produced by Reichenbach had worn 
 
 1 Stedingk to Gustavus, April 15, 1701, Schinkel, Bihang, ii, p. in. 
 
 2 CfiopnnKi, xliv, p. 387. For details on Gustavus's policy, see, Odhner, Gustaf 
 III och Katarina II efler Freden i Wariila, pp. 157 ff., especially 168-171; Schinkel- 
 Bergman, Minnen, II, pp. 157 ff., and Bihang, i, pp. 107-115; Geffroy, Gustave 
 III et la Cour de France, ii, pp. 115 ff.; Rose, Pitt, pp. 592 f., 600, 609; Salomon, 
 Pitt, i u , p. 508; Hertzberg to Lucchesini, March 3, 12, 26, Dembinski, op. cit., i, 
 pp. 440-443-
 
 1 68 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 off, the Patriot leaders had taken up with ardor the project of a 
 grand concerted attack upon Russia by Prussians, Turks, Poles, 
 English, Dutch, and Swedes. If this coalition could be formed, 
 the Republic would have the best of all conceivable opportunities 
 to settle accounts with its eastern neighbor, to assure per- 
 manently its independence, and perhaps even to win back White 
 Russia and Kiev. In the first flush of enthusiasm, the Diet on 
 August 2, 1790 authorized its envoy at Constantinople to 
 negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance with the Porte, 
 although only on condition that the Sultan should grant Poland a 
 favorable treaty of commerce, and should not expect the Republic 
 to declare war on the Empress until after Prussia had done so. 
 Simultaneously the plan for a coalition against Russia was 
 unofficially communicated to Frederick William with an urgent 
 request for his cooperation. 1 
 
 The warlike zeal of the Poles abated considerably, however, in 
 the following months. In the first place, the Peace of Verela 
 made a sad breach in their calculations. Then the treaties with the 
 Porte, when just on the point of being concluded, were held up by 
 the difficulties unexpectedly raised by the Turks regarding the 
 commercial concessions, on which the Poles insisted as a sine qua 
 non. This setback was due to the insidious intervention of Prus- 
 sia. It was one of Hertzberg's sordid little calculations that if 
 Polish trade were diverted even slightly from the Vistula to the 
 Black Sea, his master would have the less chance to extort the 
 cession of Dantzic and Thorn. 2 The ambiguous attitude and 
 altered tone of Prussia were, indeed, the chief factor in dampening 
 the warlike spirit of the Poles. Lucchesini, who had known so 
 well how to captivate the confidence and play upon the feelings 
 of the nation, had now departed to the Austro-Turkish peace 
 congress at Sistova; and his locum tenens, the young Count 
 
 1 Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 83 ff., 212-215; Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, ii, 
 pp. 198 ff.; de Cache's reports of August 4 and 7, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1790. 
 
 2 Details in Kalinka, op. cit., ii, pp. 216-223. A rather ambiguous passage in 
 Smitt's Suworow una 1 Polens U titer gang, ii, pp. 227 f., has led some historians into 
 the erroneous statement that the Polish-Turkish alliance was actually concluded. 
 See, for example, Zinkeisen, op. cit., vi, pp. 812 f., and Kraszewski, Polska w czasie 
 trzech rozbiorow, ii, p. 317.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 1 69 
 
 Goltz, was but little fitted to replace him. In contrast to the 
 astonishing activity of Prussian diplomacy at Warsaw in the past 
 two years, the Court of Berlin now maintained an air of cool, 
 indifferent, and even sulky passivity. The honeymoon was 
 decidedly over. Frederick William had almost abandoned the 
 hope of gaining Dantzic and Thorn by a voluntary cession, since 
 in a moment of irritation against him the Diet had been stam- 
 peded into a hasty and ill-considered decree, proclaiming the 
 inalienability of every part of the Republic's territory (September 
 6, 1790). And the King of Prussia had now formed so low an 
 opinion of the Polish army that in case of war with Russia he 
 hardly cared whether Poland participated or not. 1 On their side, 
 the mass of the Poles regarded their ally with a growing distrust, 
 which was hardly unnatural, perhaps, in view of the now only too 
 well known desire of Prussia for their territories, her utter unwill- 
 ingness to relax her strangling grip upon their commerce, her 
 perfidious intrigues at Constantinople, and the reigning uncer- 
 tainty whether the Court of Berlin intended to go to war with 
 Russia or to enter into a bargain with that Power at Poland's 
 expense. Rumors of an impending partition were not infrequent. 
 In March, 1791, a report from Vienna that Prussia had formally 
 proposed such an arrangement to the Emperor created such a 
 panic at Warsaw that Frederick William felt obliged to present a 
 vigorous denial. 2 In general, the Polish public had lost all real 
 
 1 See his communications to Constantinople of early March, 1701, in Zinkeisen, 
 op. cit., vi, pp. 812 f., and his declaration to Jablonowski in April, in Askenazy, 
 op. cit., p. 224. 
 
 2 It is quite certain that this alarming report of a Prussian proposal to Austria 
 for a new partition of Poland was purely apocryphal. Kalinka {op. cit., ii, p. 282) 
 conjectures that Kaunitz started it in order to undermine Prussian influence at 
 Warsaw and thwart the then pending negotiations for the cession of Dantzic. 
 Jacobi, the Prussian envoy at Vienna, claimed to have found out that the story 
 emanated from Rzewuski, one of the Polish malcontents then stopping in the 
 Austrian capital (Sybel, op. cit., i, p. 366). Golitsyn, the Russian ambassador, 
 reported that he knew on the best of authority that the tale was invented by 
 " some people of the local political [diplomatic ?] corps," and that the Austrian 
 ministry saw fit not to contradict it (for quite intelligible reasons). Cf. Golitsyn 
 to Ostermann, March 12/23, an d to Bulgakov, probably of March 15/26, 179 1 , 
 M. A., ABCTpia, III, 50. Dembinski has printed these two documents {op. cit., 
 i, pp. 477 f.); but he has mistaken the letter of Golitsyn to Bulgakov for one from
 
 170 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 enthusiasm for the Court of Berlin, although the leaders of the 
 dominant party still clung to the alliance, and Stanislas Augustus 
 had at last renounced his Russian affiliations and come over to 
 what was called ' the Prussian system.' 
 
 Such was the rather unpromising situation when Pitt inter- 
 vened in the hope of patching up the differences between Berlin 
 and Warsaw and preparing the Republic to take its place in the 
 Anglo-Prussian league. The Poles themselves had taken the 
 initiative by sending Count Oginski to London towards the close 
 of 1790 to lay the whole state of their affairs before the English 
 minister. Pitt entered into the matter with much interest and 
 thoroughness. In several interviews with Oginski he dwelt at 
 length upon the important services that Great Britain and Poland 
 might render each other; upon the flourishing trade and many 
 common interests that had united them in the past and which 
 might now be renewed, if only the Republic would place its com- 
 mercial relations on a firm basis by treaties with Prussia and 
 England; and upon the necessity, to that end, of making a small, 
 and in the last analysis inevitable, sacrifice through the cession of 
 Dantzic. 1 In January, 1 791 , Hailes, the British envoy at Warsaw, 
 formally announced the desire of his government to negotiate for 
 closer political and trade relations. The cardinal point was to 
 persuade the Poles to part with Dantzic in return for an advan- 
 tageous treaty of commerce to be guaranteed by England. There 
 was to be no more question of Thorn, in view of the September 
 decree of the Diet; but it was held that Dantzic might still be 
 ceded, since it was only ' under the protection,' and not an integral 
 part, of the Republic. The Patriot leaders entered into Pitt's 
 plan with much good will, convinced that this sacrifice, hard as it 
 was, was indispensable for saving the Prussian alliance and 
 gaining the greater security and freedom of action that would 
 come from the connection with England. Hailes displayed for 
 some months an amazing, though often a misguided and tactless, 
 
 Ostermann to Golitsyn, and is thus led by the phrase " the local political corps " 
 to the conclusion that the story was of St. Petersburg manufacture — a quite 
 erroneous ' discovery.' See his preface, pp. lxix f. 
 1 Oginski, Memoires, i, pp. 92-100.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS IN VICT A 171 
 
 activity. He negotiated, conferred, promised, apostrophized, and 
 threatened; he resorted to pamphlets and broadsides; in short, 
 he left no stone unturned. But the obstacles were wellnigh 
 insuperable. On the one hand, the Court of Berlin refused to 
 lend any active assistance, holding that Dantzic alone was hardly 
 worth the concessions demanded in return for it; and on the 
 other hand, the majority of the Poles felt an almost invincible 
 repugnance to the abandonment of the last seaport they still 
 possessed. When the question was referred to the Diet at the end 
 of March, there were protracted debates, but the utmost that the 
 Patriot leaders could secure was that the proposed cession was not 
 refused outright. A final decision was postponed for some weeks 
 until the many absent deputies could be brought back to Warsaw, 
 and in the meantime the Deputation of Foreign Interests was 
 authorized to continue the negotiation with Hailes. The action 
 of the Diet on this occasion does more credit to its patriotism 
 than to its judgment; still, if the events of the next few months 
 on the broader stage of Europe had gone according to Pitt's 
 hopes, it is probable that his Dantzic plan would ultimately 
 have succeeded. 1 
 
 Towards Russia, the Poles were now in far less warlike mood 
 than in the preceding summer. Undoubtedly they were eager to 
 see England and Prussia engage the Empress; but as to the 
 advisability of Poland's participation in such a contest, opinion 
 was strongly divided. The King and many others favored strict 
 neutrality. 2 The British and Prussian envoys reported that the 
 nation would gladly take up arms, 3 but the Austrian minister at 
 Warsaw formed quite the contrary impression. 4 At any rate, 
 the warlike feeling flared up again during the exciting days in 
 April, when it was thought that the Allies had crossed the Rubi- 
 con. 5 Had there been a war, it is difficult to believe that the 
 
 1 Cf. Salomon, Das politische System des jungeren Pitt, pp. 50 f. A more pessi- 
 mistic view in Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, ii, pp. 283-297. 
 
 2 Kalinka, ibid., ii, pp. 694 f.; cf. Zaleski, Korespotidencya krajowa, p. 305. 
 
 3 Salomon, Pitt, i u , p. 510; Herrmann, op. cit., vi, pp. 342 f., 569. 
 
 4 De Cache's report of April 13, V. A., Polen, Berkhte, 1791. 
 
 5 Bulgakov's reports of April 2/13, and 5/16, M. A., Iiojitina, III, 63; Goltz's 
 of April 9 and 13, in Herrmann, op. cit., vi, pp. 343, 569.
 
 172 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Poles would not have been drawn into it, whether by their own 
 impulses or by a deliberate aggression of Russia. 
 
 The Power whose attitude was of most concern, both to the 
 Allies and to the Empress, was Austria. Since the preceding 
 summer Leopold had been reaping the fruits of his wise modera- 
 tion at Reichenbach by his election to the Imperial crown 
 (September 30, 1790), the recovery of the Netherlands (Novem- 
 ber-December), and the gradual pacification of the rest of his 
 dominions. Austria was once more in a position to command 
 respect and to act with vigor. Ever since Reichenbach Leopold 
 had been continuously assailed by demands from St. Petersburg 
 for a promise of aid in case England and Prussia proceeded to 
 extremities. Having sacrificed his own conquests for the sake of 
 peace, he was little inclined to go to war again merely in order to 
 enable his ally to save hers ; but it was not the part of prudence to 
 say so flatly. Hence for many months he put off Catherine with 
 vague or evasive replies, with exhortations to prudence, offers of 
 mediation, and promises to assist her as soon as, and so far as, his 
 circumstances permitted. 1 These responses were naturally 
 regarded as far from satisfactory at St. Petersburg. From them 
 one may trace the beginnings of that weakening of the alliance, 
 which later on became so marked. 
 
 Meanwhile Leopold was also receiving pressing solicitations 
 from England and Prussia. First, in November, 1790, Pitt dis- 
 patched Lord Elgin to Vienna to secure Austria's assistance in 
 persuading Russia to accept the status quo. The Emperor 
 amused this raw young envoy with edifying discourses on the 
 horrors of war, the uselessness of conquests, and the need that all 
 conservative Powers should stand together to combat the 
 ravages of the new ' French principles ' ; he promised to do what 
 he could to bring the Empress to reason; but he avoided binding 
 himself to anything definite. 2 Next arrived the director-general 
 
 1 Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, September 19, 1790, Ph. Cobenzl to L. Cobenzl, 
 October 10, Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, November 28, January 2, March 28, V. A., 
 Russland, Expeditionen, 1790 and 1791. 
 
 2 Herrmann, op. cit., vi, pp. 395-400, and Erganzungsband, pp. 43-48; Leopold 
 to Kaunitz, January 14, Beer, Joseph II, Leopold II und Kaunitz, pp. 383 ff.; 
 Kaunitz to Reuss, January 21, V. A., Preussen, Exped., 1791.
 
 CATHERINA CONST AN S INVICTA 1 73 
 
 of Frederick William's secret diplomacy, the invaluable Colonel 
 Bischoffwerder. His mission, as it was originally planned early in 
 January, 1791, marked an effort of Prussia to ' emancipate her- 
 self ' from England. The King was at that time still ignorant 
 of Pitt's resolution to proceed vigorously with the enforcement of 
 the status quo; he was decidedly out of humor with his ally, and 
 inclined to seek an understanding with Russia through the good 
 offices of Austria. 1 But during the long delays incidental to a 
 preliminary discussion with Vienna, Frederick William seems 
 considerably to have altered his plans. By the time Bischoff- 
 werder was ready to set out on his mission, the King's aim was no 
 longer to effect a bargain between the three Eastern Courts that 
 should leave England in the lurch, but rather to draw the Emperor 
 over to the camp of the Triple Alliance, so that the King might 
 then dictate his terms to the haughty lady in St. Petersburg. 
 The reasons for the change are probably to be found in the fact 
 that Pitt had meanwhile communicated his new plan of action; 
 that Catherine had made a most unsatisfactory reply to the last 
 Prussian propositions; and that the Turks were pressing for an 
 answer as to whether the King intended to fulfil his engagements 
 with them or not. 
 
 In the middle of February it was ostentatiously reported at 
 Berlin that Colonel Bischoffwerder had fallen into disgrace at 
 court, and had retired to his estate in the country. There were 
 not lacking rumors that he had gone instead on a secret mission 
 to London, or, as some indeed surmised, to Vienna; but the real 
 facts were known to very few persons, and least of all to Count 
 Hertzberg. The 18th the ' merchant Buschmann ' arrived in the 
 Austrian capital and took lodgings in an inconspicuous inn. Two 
 days later he was closeted with the Vice-Chancellor, Philip 
 Cobenzl, unfolding in a rambling and incoherent manner that 
 betrayed the novice in diplomacy, propositions as extraordinary 
 as was the secrecy with which his mission was enveloped. 
 
 Bischoffwerder proposed an Austro-Prussian alliance, to which 
 England and Holland should be invited to accede — and perhaps 
 
 1 Such seems to be the drift of Bischoflwerder's overtures to Reuss in January, 
 Reuss' reports of January 9 and 29, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, 1791.
 
 174 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 even the Porte — but from which Catherine was to be ex- 
 cluded. One aim of it should be to effect such a peace between 
 the Empress and the Turks that the latter " would not be ex- 
 posed to the danger of being expelled from Europe "; a second 
 aim was to exclude Russia from participation in the affairs of 
 Germany; a third to annul the Russian influence in Poland, " the 
 point from which most of the intrigues of the Court of St. Peters- 
 burg have emanated." In other words, the Emperor was invited 
 to desert Russia, join the Anglo-Prussian league, assist the latter 
 to force its plan of pacification upon Catherine, and in general to 
 oppose his late ally at every point. In its strong anti-Russian 
 tendency, its professed aim of freeing Poland from Russian pres- 
 sure and of setting bounds to the encroachments of a Power 
 " constantly aggressive and avid of universal domination," the 
 alliance proposed by Bischoffwerder might seem merely an ex- 
 tension of Pitt's Federative System; but it differed from that 
 system in so far as it was also intended to serve certain ambitious 
 plans of Prussia for the future. Bischoffwerder suggested, for 
 instance, an agreement with regard to the affairs of France — 
 i. e., a return to the counter-revolutionary projects of the pre- 
 vious summer; and he proposed that the two Courts should come 
 to an agreement respecting the ' peaceable ' territorial acquisi- 
 tions to which each of them might look forward. With all 
 protestations that his master was not ambitious for new territory, 
 he admitted that Dantzic would be much to Prussia's con- 
 venience, and that the King hoped to acquire Ansbach and 
 Baireuth on the death of the present Margrave, and Lusatia in 
 case of the extinction of the male line of Saxony. In return 
 Prussia might be willing to favor Austrian pretensions to some 
 parts of Bavaria on the death of the present Elector. The longer 
 the conferences continued, the more the subject of acquisitions 
 was thrust into the foreground. Presently Bischoffwerder was 
 pressing strongly for a promise that the Emperor would offer no 
 opposition in case Poland could be induced voluntarily to cede 
 Dantzic and Thorn to Prussia. In short, it was clear that the 
 proposed alliance had a double purpose: it was intended not only 
 to extricate the King from his present embarrassing situation, but
 
 CATHERINE CONST ANS IN VICT A 1 75 
 
 also — once the Russian crisis was over — to serve as an instru- 
 ment for his aggressive and acquisitive policy. 1 
 
 As was to be expected, Kaunitz found these proposals simply 
 " incroyables" Had it depended only on him, the alliance would 
 assuredly have been rejected entirely. Ever since the first tidings 
 of Bischoffwerder's mission reached him, the old Chancellor had 
 taken feverishly to writing memorials proving in a dozen different 
 ways that " between two Courts whose interests are diametrically 
 opposed, a sincere union ... is a sheer impossibility, a chimaera, 
 the falsest political project that could ever be adopted." 2 But, 
 as so often, Leopold was of another opinion. It was the Em- 
 peror's idea to accept the Prussian alliance, but in a form altered 
 to suit his own interests, stripped — for the most part, at least — 
 of its anti-Russian tendency, capable of being combined with his 
 existing alliance with Catherine. That was a resolution of grave 
 consequence for the future, since in it lay the seeds of the ulti- 
 mate reunion of all the three great Eastern Powers, a combination 
 fraught with misfortune for Poland. From the standpoint of 
 Polish interests, it would have been far better had the Emperor 
 either accepted the Prussian idea of a league for the protection of 
 Central Europe against the Muscovites, or else rejected the pro- 
 posed union entirely, thus throwing Frederick William back upon 
 the sole connection with England. 
 
 1 Cf. Cobenzl's report of his conversation with Bischoffwerder on February 20 
 (V. A., Vortrage, 1791). Cobenzl having remarked that in case the proposed 
 alliance were concluded, both Powers would have to renounce all schemes for 
 territorial acquisitions, Bischoffwerder replied: " Oui, sans doute, ou bien s'en- 
 tendre a l'amiable toutes les fois que les circonstances offriroient a l'une ou a l'autre 
 des deux Cours l'occasion de faire une acquisition, soit par droit de succession, ou 
 par convention volontaire, sans jamais employer des moyens violens." Cobenzl 
 replied that the second alternative was not likely to occur, and put the question 
 bluntly whether the King of Prussia was disposed in good faith to renounce all 
 acquisitions. Bischoffwerder answered, " Oui, tres decidement," but then, after 
 a moment, added: " Vous savez sans doute qu'on parle de Danzig, et en effet 
 cette acquisition seroit tres-fort de la convenance du Roi, s'il pouvoit la faire tout-a- 
 fait du gre de la Pologne, en faisant a la Republique d'autres avantages. . . . Le 
 Roi espere que l'Empereur n'y seroit pas contraire, si une fois l'amitie' et l'alliance 
 entre eux etoit formee. ... On s'entendroit facilement sur des acquisitions que 
 vous pourriez faire a votre tour." 
 
 2 This from his " Reflexions relatives a la Cour de Berlin," dated February 2. 
 He proposed rejecting the alliance in a memorial of February 23, immediately after 
 Bischoffwerder had first unfolded his ideas. V. A., Vortrage, 1791.
 
 176 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 At an audience granted to Bischoffwerder on February 25, 
 Leopold definitively announced his willingness to contract an 
 alliance with Prussia. It remained for the ministers to settle 
 the quomodo. In the ensuing conferences it became clear that the 
 affair could not be concluded immediately, chiefly because the 
 Austrians refused absolutely to give up their alliance with Russia, 
 while Bischoffwerder maintained stoutly that that connection 
 was incompatible with the one he was charged to propose. Nor 
 could he obtain the desired promise as to Dantzic and Thorn, 
 although the Austrians covertly hinted at their inclination to see 
 the Oriental crisis ended by a general agreement, by which the 
 Imperial Courts would secure certain acquisitions from the 
 Turks, while Prussia should get the long-coveted cities. Regard- 
 ing the all-important question of Austria's attitude in case of war 
 between the Triple Alliance and Russia, Bischoffwerder could not 
 extort a binding engagement of any kind from the Imperial 
 ministers; but it is not improbable that he received certain 
 reassuring oral declarations from Leopold himself. 1 
 
 After a last conference with Cobenzl on March 4, at which it 
 was agreed that the negotiations for the alliance should be con- 
 tinued through Prince Reuss at Berlin, and after prodigal assur- 
 ances on both sides that the grand plan should infallibly go 
 through, Bischoffwerder departed. His mission had been by no 
 means a total failure, but only a half success. He had failed to 
 lure Austria over with bag and baggage into the camp of the 
 Allies, and so to isolate Russia completely; but on the other 
 
 1 After his return to Berlin Bischoffwerder repeatedly told Reuss " que PEm- 
 pereur lui avoit repondu en propres termes, lorsqu'il avoit demande si Elle pre- 
 feroit que Ton s'arrangeat avec la Russie en se desistant du status quo, qu'Elle 
 preferoit que la Russie soit contrainte au status quo . . . et que l'Empereur avoit 
 dit qu'il verroit sans peine que la Russie aye du depit et Lui laisse les mains d'autant 
 plus libres pour s'unir bien etroitement a la Prusse." Reuss to Ph. Cobenzl, 
 April 22, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, 1791. It seems hardly probable that Bischoff- 
 werder would have ventured to misquote the Emperor on so weighty a matter in 
 conversations which he knew would be reported to Vienna. Compare also the 
 rescript which Frederick William sent off to his envoy in London immediately 
 after Bischoffwerder's return to Berlin: " Aiant de notions sures que l'Autriche 
 souhaite de se rapprocher de moi et de mes allies et de ce que l'Empereur a declare 
 a 1'Imperatrice de Russie de ne pouvoir l'assister dans une guerre qui pourrait 
 naitre de son refus d'accepter le Statusquo," etc., Salomon, Pitt, i", p. 514, note 3.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS IN VICT A IJJ 
 
 hand he brought back the conviction that Leopold strongly 
 desired a rapprochement with Prussia and was not likely to 
 interfere in case the Allies proceeded vigorously with the enforce- 
 ment of the status quo. 1 The envoy did not suspect, perhaps, that 
 Kaunitz would hasten to reveal all his propositions to the Court 
 of St. Petersburg, with the assurance that Austria had not al- 
 lowed herself to be seduced in any way; or that in the critical 
 months that followed, the Emperor would continue to promise 
 Catherine his aid in case of a rupture, in so far as the condition of 
 his Monarchy would at all permit. 2 
 
 rv 
 
 Bischoffwerder returned to Berlin on March 10, in buoyant 
 spirits. He dined alone with the King that afternoon. The 
 result was the ' immediate rescript ' sent off to the Prussian envoy 
 at London the following day. In this dispatch Frederick William 
 announced the favorable dispositions of the Court of Vienna ; he 
 declared that the moment for a final decision had come; he sug- 
 gested that the best course would be to impose the status quo 
 upon Russia by a show of superior forces by land and sea; and, 
 at any rate, he must have an immediate "categorical declaration" 
 of what the British government was willing to do. 3 
 
 This challenge produced the desired effect at London. Pitt 
 himself was now ready for action. By this time the preliminary 
 diplomatic campaign begun in January had advanced far enough 
 to enable him to judge the intentions of the various Powers, and 
 on the whole the results were not unsatisfactory. He could 
 count upon the neutrality of most of the states in question, and 
 perhaps upon active assistance from some; while on the other 
 hand, Catherine seemed to be entirely isolated and in a truly 
 desperate position. Misled, perhaps, by the exaggerated reports 
 
 1 Our information as to Bischoffwerder's first mission to Vienna is derived almost 
 entirely from the Austrian side. The chief documents relating to it are printed in 
 Vivenot, Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs, i, pp. 78- 
 101, and Beer, Leopold II, Franz II und Catharine, pp. 230-239. 
 
 2 Dispatches to L. Cobenzl, March 28 and April 27, V. A., Russland, Expedi- 
 tionen, 1791. 
 
 3 Salomon, Pitt, i n , pp. 514 f.; Rose, Pitt, p. 608.
 
 178 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of Whitworth at St. Petersburg, British statesmen were at that 
 moment inclined to believe that Russia was completely ex- 
 hausted and virtually bankrupt, as a result of four years of con- 
 tinuous warfare, that Catherine had neither generals nor armies 
 nor fleets that were capable of dealing with really formidable 
 opponents, and that her Empire was seething with discontent 
 and even on the verge of revolution. Under such circumstances 
 it seemed impossible that " pride and obstinacy, the only motives 
 which influence the Court of Petersburg," could long hold out. 
 A war would scarcely be necessary: mere military and naval 
 demonstrations would suffice. 1 Acting on these miscalculations, 
 spurred on by the appeal of the Prussian ally, convinced that the 
 time had come for consummating the great work of pacification 
 begun the year before, on March 21 and 22 the British cabinet 
 took its final resolutions, apparently with almost complete 
 unanimity. 2 
 
 On the 27th a courier was sent off to Berlin with momentous 
 dispatches. He bore, in the first place, an ultimatum to be pre- 
 sented by the Allies at St. Petersburg, giving the Empress ten 
 days in which to accept the strict status quo principle, and hinting 
 at unpleasant consequences in case of a refusal. This declaration 
 was to be backed up by the most vigorous measures. A British 
 fleet composed of thirty-five ships of the line and a corresponding 
 number of frigates was to be sent to the Baltic, and ten or twelve 
 ships of the line were to be held in readiness to sail for the Black 
 Sea. A Prussian army was to threaten Livonia; the Dutch were 
 to be stirred up to join in the naval demonstration; the King of 
 Sweden was to be brought into action by a subsidy of two or three 
 hundred thousand pounds. Finally, Pitt presented the drafts of 
 two conventions. One was to define more closely the aims of the 
 impending enterprise, which was designed only to force Russia to 
 accept the status quo, without thought of conquests or other 
 material advantages for the Allies. The other was a project for a 
 " preliminary commercial arrangement between Great Britain 
 
 1 See, for instance, Whitworth's report of January 8, cited by Rose, Pitt, 
 p. 598, and Auckland to Grenville, April 30, Dropmore Papers, ii, pp. 62 f. Cf. 
 Lecky, op. cit., v, p. 279. 
 
 2 Leeds, Memoranda, pp. 150 ff.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 1 79 
 
 and Prussia," by which in return for Dantzic Frederick William 
 was to pledge himself to extensive concessions to British and 
 Polish trade. It was a comprehensive and imposing program. 1 
 
 These communications threw Berlin into a fever of excitement. 
 Two days after their arrival, on April 7, the King held a council at 
 Potsdam, at which Field Marshal Mollendorff, Count Schulen- 
 burg, and Hertzberg were present. Of these three, Schulenburg 
 alone seems to have spoken in favor of risking a war; Mollen- 
 dorff, as always, opposed it from the military standpoint; and 
 Hertzberg, terribly disgruntled at the whole course of affairs, 
 brought forth a variety of objections. But the King's mind was 
 already made up; once more he was aflame for action. Hertz- 
 berg's remonstrances only drew down upon his head such a 
 tirade of reproaches for his " wretched political operations ' : 
 that the old man was stricken with a severe attack of illness on his 
 way back to Berlin. 2 It was decided to conform in everything to 
 the proposals of England. A Prussian army of 88,000 men was to 
 be ready for the invasion of Livonia and the siege of Riga. The 
 King intended to go to the front with his two sons and Mollen- 
 dorff beside him. The royal equipages were at once sent off to 
 Konigsberg. It appeared that the die was cast. 
 
 In those April days Europe rang with the news of the King of 
 England's warlike message to Parliament, of the great British 
 fleet fitting out at Portsmouth, of the vast military preparations 
 proceeding in Prussia and Sweden. It seemed as if nothing could 
 now prevent a general war unless the Empress of Russia gave 
 way. 
 
 This was the time when Catherine's courage and firmness were 
 put to the severest strain both by dangers from without and by 
 faint-hearted counsels from within. She herself was as deter- 
 mined as ever to brave all the enemies that might come rather 
 than make what she considered an inglorious surrender. The 
 very words status quo sufficed to throw her into a passion. " With- 
 out Oczakow and its territory as far as the Dniester, peace will 
 
 1 Salomon, Pitt, i H , pp. 515 f . ; Rose, Pitt, pp. 609 f.; Herrmann, op. cit., vi, 
 p. 591; Leeds, Memoranda, loc. cit. 
 
 2 Alopeus' reports of April 9 and 13, Dembinski, op. cit., i, pp. 129, 133; 
 Hertzberg to Lucchesini, April 9, 16, 19, 24, May 14, ibid., pp. 444-452.
 
 i8o 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 not be made," she wrote to Potemkin, " even if the Empress herself 
 consented to the restoration of the status quo." l " I am now busy 
 preparing to receive the strong English fleet, which has promised 
 to pay us a visit soon," she wrote to Zimmermann early in 
 February: " you will hear of me; but whether they attack me 
 by water or by land, you will never hear that I consented to any 
 of the unworthy conditions which they have the audacity to 
 prescribe to me." l But the Empress was wellnigh alone in her 
 obstinacy. Almost all her advisers were frightened and urged 
 concessions; 2 and their remonstrances were powerfully reen- 
 forced when on March n Potemkin arrived in St. Petersburg. 
 
 The Prince had come to the capital uncalled and even contrary 
 to Catherine's wishes, 3 partly in the intention of having a reckon- 
 ing with his enemy, the new favorite Zubov, and partly in order to 
 press his schemes against Poland. As usual, he had a project for 
 every contingency. If war came, he proposed to start a Counter- 
 confederation in the Republic, or else to carry out his secret plan 
 of the year before for the Cossack razzia, the revolt of the Ortho- 
 dox peasantry, and the seizure of the Ukraine. 4 But he much pre- 
 ferred that there should not be a new war; and his scheme for 
 avoiding it was to bring about a new partition of Poland. As so 
 often in the past, the partition he had in mind was to be on a far 
 larger scale than that of 1772 ; so ample a one that he might hope, 
 perhaps, to carve out a few territories for himself as well as for his 
 sovereign. 5 
 
 Immediately upon his arrival, Potemkin set himself to pave the 
 way for this plan by effecting a rapprochement with Prussia. It 
 
 1 IleTpoBT., Biopaa Typemcafl Bofma, ii, pp. 193 f. 
 
 2 See the concurrent testimony of Markov, Zavadovski, and S. R. Vorontsov, 
 Apx. Bop., xx, pp. 10 f.; xii, p. 67; viii, p. 22. 
 
 3 See her letters to him of January 22/February 2, and January 24/February 
 4, 1791, C60PHHKI., xlii, pp. 135 ff. 
 
 4 Before starting for St. Petersburg Potemkin had written to Felix Potocki, 
 who was expected to head a Counter-confederation, inviting him to leave Paris and 
 come to a more accessible place, in anticipation that the Empress would soon be 
 ready to act in Poland (this appears from Potocki's reply of May 14, M. A., IloJibina, 
 II, 7). As to the Cossack plan, see the rescript to Potemkin of May 16/27, Pyc. 
 Apx., 1874, ii, pp. 246 ff. 
 
 6 Cobenzl's report of April 19, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1791.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA l8l 
 
 will be remembered that just before his departure for Vienna the 
 versatile Bischoffwerder had approached Alopeus with the in- 
 sidious suggestion that his master might help the Empress to 
 secure Oczakow and its district, if she would at once sign a secret 
 convention pledging herself to renew the alliance with Prussia at 
 the conclusion of the Turkish war. Catherine had received that 
 proposal with indignation: ' she would not sign a pact of servi- 
 tude,' she wrote on the margin of the dispatch. 1 But Potemkin 
 insisted that she should accept the offer. There followed a severe 
 conflict and not a few lively scenes. From the laconic diary of her 
 secretary we hear of the Empress continually " weeping from 
 rage," — " spasms " — " colic " — " she won't degrade herself 
 and correspond with the King of Prussia " — - Potemkin irate and 
 " determined to fight it out with her; " 2 — but in the end, for 
 once, the Prince prevailed. On March 26 very secret instructions 
 were sent to Alopeus, ordering him to announce that the Empress 
 accepted the proposed convention, and would at once send a 
 draft for it and full powers to conclude, as soon as the King of 
 Prussia had confirmed Bischoffwerder 's informal overture. 3 But 
 this signal concession came just too late. The warlike proposals 
 of England reached Berlin a few days before; and Alopeus was 
 able to reveal the great secret to Bischoffwerder only on the very 
 afternoon of — perhaps a few hours after — the decisive council 
 held by the King at Potsdam on April 7. 4 The Empress' pride 
 had thus been sacrificed to no purpose. 
 
 Potemkin meanwhile continued his efforts for peace and a par- 
 tition. In a conversation with Goltz, the Prussian envoy, he 
 
 1 Martens, Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclus par la Russie, vi, p. 146. 
 
 2 XpanoBHu,Kiu JI,HeBH0Ki>, March 15/26, 17/28, March 22/April 2, March 
 23/April 3. 
 
 3 Ostermann's dispatches, dated March 14/25, but obviously sent the following 
 day. The fact that the Empress did consent to this " pact of servitude " is here, 
 I believe, brought to light for the first time. Dembihski, who has published Alo- 
 peus' reports on this subject, did not succeed in finding the secret orders of March 
 14/25, and conjectured that the concession contained in them was the offer to raze 
 the fortress of Oczakow, if Russia were allowed to retain that town and its district 
 {Documents, p. 126, note 1). In order to fill out this important lacuna in the corre- 
 spondence published by him, I have printed one of the dispatches from Ostermann 
 to Alopeus in Appendix V. 
 
 4 Alopeus' reports of April 6 and 8, Dembinski, op. cit., i, pp. 124-128.
 
 1 82 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 threw out a sufficiently broad hint on the latter topic. 1 With 
 Cobenzl he discussed his plan for a partition with much frank- 
 ness, saying that at present it was known only to the Empress, 
 Bezborodko, and himself, that he desired to learn the views of the 
 Court of Vienna on the subject, and that they ought to bring 
 Prussia to make the formal proposal. 2 But in this last point lay 
 precisely the difficulty. There are not a few indications to show 
 how seriously a new partition of Poland was then considered at 
 St. Petersburg; it seemed the easiest means of escape from a 
 perilous situation; the Empress herself was resigned to it as a 
 last resource; 3 if Prussia had actually proposed it, it seems almost 
 certain that both the Imperial Courts would have agreed; but the 
 trouble was that Frederick William was in no position — and 
 indeed in no mood — to make any such proposition. 
 
 The third week of April saw one courier after another dashing 
 into St. Petersburg with the most alarming news from all quarters 
 — from Berlin, London, Warsaw, Stockholm, and the Hague. 
 The worst feature of the situation was the apparent determination 
 of the British government to go to all extremities, a course which 
 the Russian envoy in London had down to the last moment repre- 
 
 1 Cobenzl's report of April 7, V. A., he. cit. Cobenzl claimed to have got the 
 story from a confidant of Goltz. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's report of April 19, V. A., loc. cit. 
 
 3 Cobenzl's reports of April (which are full of allusions to the topic) ; rescript to 
 Potemkin of May 16/27, already cited; instructions to Razumovski, April 30/ 
 May n, M. A., ABCTpifl, III, 49. 
 
 Potemkin told Cobenzl (according to the latter's report of April 19): " Si la 
 guerre avec la Prusse a lieu, il croit qu'Elles [les deux Cours Imperiales] devroient 
 s'attacher la Pologne, ou du moins un assez grand parti pour former une Confedera- 
 tion puissante, .... L'autre projet consiste, dans le cas ou on parviendroit a un 
 arrangement entre les trois Cours, de faire un nouveau Partage de la Pologne, mais 
 en grand et plus considerable que le premier." 
 
 He told Goltz (according to Cobenzl's report of April 7) : " Commencez d'abord 
 par finir la guerre actuelle, montrez un changement de conduite a notre egard, que 
 nous puissions voir avec evidence que vous etes nos amis . . . alors je ferai en 
 sorte que vous ayez Danzig d'une maniere tres facile que je vous dirai a mon retour 
 et lorsqu'une fois j'aurai termine avec les Turcs, mais qu'a present je ne puis pas 
 vous dire." 
 
 Rescript of the Empress to Razumovski: " We consider as a measure of extreme 
 necessity our agreement to any acquisitions of the Prussian Court, and in this case, 
 in common with the Court of Vienna, we intend to insist on a complete equality of 
 advantages . . . recognizing this principle as founded on strict justice." (Rus.)
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS IN VICT A 1 83 
 
 sented as utterly improbable. When this news arrived, Potemkin 
 and Bezborodko united in a supreme effort to break down their 
 sovereign's obstinacy and avert an otherwise inevitable war. 1 
 But it was all in vain. When the Council met on April 21, at the 
 worst moment of the crisis, the proposals presented to it in the 
 name of the Empress breathed not a word of concessions or sur- 
 render; they dealt only with the necessity of taking the most 
 vigorous measures for self-defence. 2 And this tone of uncom- 
 promising resolution and grim defiance Catherine maintained 
 unwaveringly through the anxious weeks that followed. Her 
 Baltic fleets were to unite and take up a position in front of 
 Kronstadt to face the English. The Finnish frontier was to be 
 well guarded, while at the same time a special envoy was hur- 
 riedly sent to Stockholm to make sure of the slippery Gustavus. 
 While the army on the Danube was to hold the Turks in check, 
 the main forces of Russia were to be kept in readiness to meet the 
 Prussians and Poles: one corps on the Dvina, one near Kiev, and 
 a third near Bender. The moment the Poles began hostilities, or 
 the moment the Prussians entered Polish territory in order to 
 reach Livonia, these three Russian armies were to advance along 
 concentric lines, carrying the war into the heart of the Republic, 
 scattering the Poles, and uniting eventually to fall upon the flank 
 or rear of the Prussians. 3 
 
 Such at least were the plans. How well they could have been 
 carried out, how successfully Catherine could have defended her- 
 self against such numerous and powerful enemies, may be a 
 matter for doubt, since there is some evidence that the actual 
 state of the military preparations was very far from correspond- 
 ing to the sonorous resolutions framed at Petersburg. 4 At any 
 rate, the question was never put to the test. 
 
 1 XpaiiOBHUKw, op. cit., April 7-9/18-20. 2 Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 843 f. 
 
 3 Apx. Toe. Cob., April 17/28, 19/30, April 24/May 5, April 28/May 9, May 1/12, 
 3/14, pp. 846-852; Potemkin's plan of operations against the Prussians and Poles, 
 IleTpoB'B, op. cit., ii, pp. 195 ff.; C6"opHHKi>, xlii, pp. 150 ff.; XpanoBHUKiii, op. 
 cit., p. 211. 
 
 4 See especially the very pessimistic letter of Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov 
 of March 7/18, 1791, in C6opHHKi>, xxvi, pp. 423-426, and Apx. Bop., xiii, pp. 
 177-181 (erroneously dated 1790 in this latter collection).
 
 1 84 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 About the end of April a ray of light appeared on the western 
 horizon; early in May there began to be strong hopes at St. 
 Petersburg ; and by the last days of the month hope had turned 
 to certitude. The Empress had won, for England had yielded. 
 
 V 
 
 Pitt can scarcely be acquitted of having gone into the Russian 
 enterprise in too sanguine and rash a spirit, without duly weighing 
 the opposition to be expected in Parliament and the probable 
 temper of the country. He had done little or nothing to prepare 
 public opinion, which was therefore startled and shocked when 
 the crisis arrived. A perhaps exaggerated reluctance to disclose 
 official secrets prevented him from stating his position fully and 
 frankly. This, together with his lack of adequate knowledge 
 about the territory on which the debate was bound to turn, com- 
 pelled him to rest his case chiefly on generalities about the balance 
 of power, which were hardly likely to satisfy a nation so much 
 more concerned about peace, trade, and taxes. 1 
 
 Anglo-Russian relations had been uncommonly close and 
 friendly throughout most of the eighteenth century. It was true 
 that in recent years there had been some ground for ill-feeling, 
 especially owing to the Armed .Neutrality, which was resented in 
 England as a signal display of ingratitude and hostility. But 
 over against this was the great fact that English merchants and 
 manufacturers found Russia one of their very best customers. 
 They furnished that country with the great bulk of its imports, 
 and drew from it large supplies of the most indispensable raw 
 materials. About a thousand English ships went annually to 
 Russian ports. 2 On the other hand, the English trade with the 
 Levant was quite insignificant; commercially as well as politically 
 
 1 It is a curious fact that it was apparently not until August, when everything 
 was over, that it was proposed (by Lord Auckland) to send a confidential agent to 
 examine Oczakow and the Dniester country and report on the real political, mili- 
 tary, and commercial value of the territory around which so hot a dispute had 
 raged. See Auckland to Grenville, August 19, i7gi,Dropmore Papers, ii, pp. 169 f. 
 
 2 Cf. Ewart's " Observations on the connection which has hitherto subsisted 
 between Great Britain and Russia," in Dropmore Papers, ii, pp. 44-49, and Rose, 
 Pitt, p. 590.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS IN VICT A 1 85 
 
 Turkey had long been reckoned a client of France; and the 
 conception of the Eastern Question as Pitt now viewed it, as 
 Englishmen generally viewed it in the nineteenth century, had 
 not yet begun to penetrate the consciousness of the British public. 
 Hence the Prime Minister was certain to encounter grave diffi- 
 culties when he attempted to persuade his countrymen to risk a 
 great war and to sacrifice the lucrative Russian trade for the sake 
 of a nebulous balance of power and for love of the Turks. 
 
 On March 28, the day after the ultimatum was dispatched to 
 Berlin, a royal message was sent to Parliament, announcing in 
 rather vague terms that the King felt obliged to augment his 
 naval forces as a means of adding weight to the representations 
 he and his allies were making to the Empress of Russia regarding 
 her peace with the 'Porte. 1 To the country this was almost like a 
 bolt from the blue; but it was not a total surprise to the Opposi- 
 tion. For some days before, S. R. Vorontsov, the active Russian 
 envoy, had secretly informed Fox and his friends of the plans of 
 the ministry, with details as to the diplomatic situation, the 
 moderate terms the Empress was defending, and, in general, a 
 whole arsenal of arguments to be used against the Government. 2 
 Hence when on March 29 there took place the first great debate 
 on the ' Russian armament,' the Opposition were armed for the 
 fray. 
 
 They protested, in the first place, against the reticence of 
 ministers, who seemed determined to rush the nation into war 
 without giving any explanations whatsoever. They demanded 
 that the country should be informed of the purpose of these arma- 
 ments. Was it not a case of attacking Russia merely on account 
 of a single town and a few adjacent deserts ? Fox, in an able 
 speech, challenged the Government to show that the balance of 
 power would be fatally upset or any British interest seriously 
 affected, if the Empress were allowed to keep Oczakow. Russia, 
 he said, was the natural ally of England, and the one naval 
 Power that was ever likely to be of assistance to her. To attack 
 such a state for so insignificant an object was as unjust as it was 
 
 1 Hansard, Parliamentary History, xxix, coll. 31 f. 
 
 2 S. R. Vorontsov to his brother, April 26, Apx. Bop., ix, pp. 193 ff.
 
 1 86 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 impolitic. Pitt replied in not very effective fashion, trying to prove 
 that the existence of Turkey, the independence of Poland and 
 Sweden, and the security of Prussia were British interests, all of 
 which would be imperiled if the Empress were permitted to keep 
 her conquests and continue her aggressive course. Burke followed 
 with a burning tirade against a foreign policy, the object of which 
 was to maintain in Europe " a horde of barbarous Asiatics," 
 " destructive savages " to whom " any Christian Power was to 
 be preferred." In the end Pitt was able to muster a majority in 
 both Houses; but the Opposition had undoubtedly carried off the 
 honors of the debate. 1 The galleries were with them, and it soon 
 appeared that the country was also. 
 
 The energetic minister of Russia at this moment began a furious 
 campaign to arouse the British public against its government. 
 Seldom, if ever, has a foreign envoy interfered so actively or so 
 successfully in English politics. Vorontsov relates in his auto- 
 biography that he bought up more than twenty newspapers and 
 a small army of hack-writers; that he scattered pamphlets 
 throughout the provinces; that he and the other members of the 
 embassy worked night and day for months dashing off articles 
 and tracts, carrying them around to the newspaper offices, and 
 rushing about here and there conferring with members of Parlia- 
 ment, merchants, and everyone else whose sympathies or services 
 might be of value. As a result of his exertions, he declares, alarm 
 seized the manufacturing towns; at Norwich, Wakefield, Leeds, 
 and Manchester meetings were held to protest against the policy 
 of the government; letters flowed in in great numbers to members 
 of Parliament begging them to vote against the ministry; and 
 popular feeling in London voiced itself in the inscription which 
 everywhere appeared upon the walls of the houses: " No war 
 with Russia." 2 
 
 Whatever exaggeration there may be in this, it is certain that 
 within a very few weeks the opinion of the country had mani- 
 fested itself as strongly opposed to the warlike plans of the 
 
 1 The speeches of Pitt, Fox, and Burke in Hansard's Parliamentary History, 
 xxix, coll. 52-79. 
 
 2 Apx. Bop., viii, pp. 19-23; cf. also ix, pp. 191 f., 491 ff., xxxiv, pp. 466-474.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS IN VICT A 1 87 
 
 cabinet. 1 The discontent of the merchant and manufacturing 
 classes worked back on Parliament. On successive divisions Pitt 
 did, indeed, manage to keep a majority, but it was much below 
 the normal size. He himself later confessed that from what he 
 knew of the sentiments of the greatest part of his followers and 
 even many of his warmest friends, he was sure that he could not 
 go further with his policy without risking a defeat. 2 On top of all 
 this came differences of opinion in the cabinet. Immediately 
 after the debates of March 29, Lord Grenville and the Duke of 
 Richmond declared that they could no longer approve of coercive 
 measures against Russia, while the Foreign Secretary, the Duke 
 of Leeds, held unswervingly to the line of policy already adopted. 3 
 All these things combined to break down Pitt's resolution. 
 The first sign of his weakening came on March 3 1 , when he asked 
 and obtained the cabinet's assent to dispatching a courier to 
 Berlin with the request that the Prussian government should 
 delay forwarding the joint ultimatum to Petersburg until it had 
 received certain new communications presently to be made from 
 London. Then in the next ten or eleven days Pitt slowly and 
 reluctantly made up his mind to yield. His judgment as to the 
 expediency and importance of restoring the strict status quo 
 remained unchanged. Many weeks later he wrote that he was 
 still convinced that that would have been the wisest policy, and 
 that " the risk and expense of the struggle with Russia, even if 
 Russia had not submitted without a struggle, would not have 
 been more than the object was worth," if only he could have 
 obtained the support of the nation. 4 But he saw clearly that to 
 persist in so extremely unpopular a course meant to risk the over- 
 throw of the ministry and the ruin of all his other plans. He 
 knew now that he had blundered into the worst predicament in 
 which he had ever yet found himself. With tears in his eyes, he 
 confessed to Ewart that ' this was the greatest mortification he 
 
 1 Salomon, Pitt, i", pp. 516-520; Stanhope, Life of Pitt, ii, p. 115; Auckland, 
 Correspondence, ii, pp. 387 f. 
 
 2 Pitt to Ewart, May 24, Stanhope, Pitt, ii, p. 116. 
 
 3 For the deliberations of the cabinet during this anxious period, see especially 
 the Leeds Memoranda, pp. 1526". 
 
 4 To Ewart, May 24, 1701, Stanhope, Pitt, ii, pp. n 5-1 18.
 
 i88 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 had ever experienced ' ; he had thought of resigning, but could 
 not bring himself to abandon the King and the country to a 
 factious Opposition; he still hoped, however, to find some means 
 of getting out of the scrape without " any serious bad conse- 
 quences." 1 
 
 On April 10, at Pitt's proposal, the cabinet decided to abandon 
 the demand for the strict status quo. There followed the resigna- 
 tion of the Foreign Secretary, the Duke of Leeds, who could not 
 be reconciled to this surrender, and who was succeeded by Gren- 
 ville, the most pronounced advocate of a pacific policy. Under 
 the new program, a special envoy, Fawkener, was to be sent to 
 St. Petersburg to negotiate an arrangement on a compromise 
 basis, or the so-called status quo modifie. Various gradations 
 might be proposed: the land between Bug and Dniester might 
 remain a neutral waste between the two Empires; or it might be 
 ceded to Russia on condition that it was left unfortified and un- 
 inhabited; or, at the worst, the Empress might have Oczakow 
 and some adjacent territory without any restrictions, if only both 
 banks of the Dniester remained in Turkish hands. 2 At the same 
 time the indispensable Ewart was to hasten back to Berlin to per- 
 suade Frederick William to support these propositions, while Lord 
 Elgin was sent to pursue Leopold, then travelling in Italy, in the 
 hope of winning him over definitively to the side of the Allies. 
 This profusion of diplomatic expeditions pointed to what was the 
 cardinal weakness of the new policy. The ministry soon decided 
 to suspend arming and to abandon all idea of backing up its new 
 propositions with a show of force. 3 Whether a due regard for 
 public sentiment at home rendered so extreme a resolution neces- 
 sary, may well be doubted. At any rate, this decision proved far 
 more disastrous than the mere abandonment of the strict status 
 quo principle. It led England inevitably to a complete diplomatic 
 defeat. It turned what began as a fairly dignified retreat into an 
 humiliating rout. 
 
 1 Ewart to Jackson, April 14, Rose, Pitt, p. 617. 
 
 2 Rose, ibid., p. 621; Salomon, Pitt, i", pp. 521 f. 
 
 3 Precisely when this resolution was taken it is difficult to say; at the very 
 latest it was by May 6. See the secret instructions to Fawkener of that date, 
 Herrmann, op. cit., vi, p. 410; also Rose, Pitt, pp. 617 f.
 
 CATHERINA CONST ANS INVICTA 1 89 
 
 At first, indeed, matters did not go badly. Frederick William 
 received Ewart and Fawkener with unexpected cordiality, readily 
 accepted the new English propositions, and agreed to support 
 them at St. Petersburg. Just at that time he had made a change 
 in his ministry, which also promised well. Hertzberg, latterly so 
 bitter against ' the British despotism,' had lost all influence and 
 was about to receive his dismissal. Foreign affairs had been 
 entrusted to Counts Schulenburg and Alvensleben, along with 
 the aged Finckenstein, all of whom seemed devoted to ' the Eng- 
 lish system.' It appeared then that the alliance was not only not 
 shaken but stronger than before. 1 The fact was that Frederick 
 William was not fully informed of the change that had come over 
 English policy. He was not displeased at the more moderate 
 terms now proposed from London, for they would diminish, or at 
 least postpone, the danger of a war which he had, at bottom, 
 always viewed with apprehension. But he expected as a matter 
 of course that the Allies would back up these new terms with a 
 show of force by land and sea, since that was the only means of 
 bringing the Empress to accept an honorable compromise. It 
 was only at the beginning of June, when he learned that England 
 absolutely refused to make any naval demonstrations whatever, 
 that the King at last fully grasped the situation. 2 Then he saw 
 that his ally had abandoned him, that there was nothing to do 
 but to beat a retreat with what grace he could, that all his exer- 
 tions and expenditures of the past four years had served only to 
 draw down upon him the wrath of the Empress and a series of 
 humiliations before the eyes of all Europe. Naturally he was 
 rilled with anger against such a worthless and craven ally. He 
 would still act with England until the wretched Oriental affair 
 was over; but after that he would go his own way and seek other 
 connections. 
 
 Under the circumstances Fawkener at St. Petersburg wore very 
 much the air of an ambassador of the vanquished. Catherine 
 treated him with a certain condescending indulgence, but could 
 not refrain occasionally from venting her exultation at his 
 
 1 Cf. Ewart to Pitt, and to Auckland, April 30, Dropmore Papers, ii, pp. 61, 68 f. 
 
 2 Cf. Salomon, Pitt, i i! , pp. 524 f.
 
 I90 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 expense. " How can I be afraid," she once wrote to him, " at the 
 head of a nation which has beaten all its enemies for nearly a hun- 
 dred years ? Je crains Dieu, cher Fawkener, et n'ai point d'autre 
 crainte." x One day in her garden, a propos of a vociferous 
 puppy, she remarked to him, " Dogs that bark do not always 
 bite." 2 Her triumph was increased by the appearance at her 
 court of an ambassador of the English Opposition, Robert Adair, 
 who had been sent by Fox with assurances of his devotion — a 
 pleasant parallel to the embassies which she was accustomed to 
 receive from the ' well-intentioned ' in Poland. 3 As for the 
 negotiation, the English and Prussian envoys simply surrendered 
 on every point. On July 26 they formally gave their consent to 
 the acquisition by Russia of Oczakow and the entire territory 
 between the Bug and the Dniester, subject only to the condition 
 that no restrictions should be placed on the navigation of the 
 latter river. Utterly insignificant as this concession was, the 
 English were vastly surprised to obtain even that, and they were 
 in no position to resent the tone of " impertinence and persiflage " 
 in which Catherine had couched her final declaration. 4 
 
 A few weeks later, the Turks, abandoned by their protectors 
 and beaten by land and sea, gave in and signed the Preliminaries 
 of Galatz (August 11, 1791), by which they too consented to the 
 cession of Oczakow and its district. On this basis peace was con- 
 cluded between Russia and the Porte at Jassy, January 9, 1792. 
 
 Catherine had thus won a complete victory, perhaps the most 
 brilliant of her reign, thanks to her own splendid courage and 
 constancy. In spite of her one false step in March, Grimm could 
 justly acclaim her " Die Mutter der unerschrockenen Stand- 
 haftigkeit." But for Poland the outcome of the crisis was un- 
 fortunate in the extreme. From the standpoint of Polish interests 
 
 1 Martens, Traites conclus par la Russie, ix, pp. 349 f. 
 
 2 Herrmann, op. cit., vi, p. 413. 
 
 3 The very ancient controversy as to whether Adair came to Russia on his own 
 responsibility or with a commission from Fox — a question which so recent a 
 writer as Rose attempts to answer with an exculpation of the great Whig leader — 
 would seem to be settled in a sense extremely damaging to Fox by Vorontsov's 
 letter to his brother of April 26, 1791, Apx. Bop., ix, pp. 196 f. 
 
 4 Whitworth to Grenville, July 21, Auckland to Grenville, August 9, Dropmore 
 Papers, ii, pp. 134, 160.
 
 CATHERINA CONSTANS IN VICT A 191 
 
 it is probably greatly to be regretted that the threatened general 
 war did not take place. Such a conflict might, indeed, have in- 
 volved terrible dangers to the Republic — a servile revolt, a 
 deluge of Cossacks, perhaps a repetition of the horrors of 1768. 
 But a struggle for independence against Russia was bound to 
 come sooner or later, and Poland's chances would have been far 
 better in 1791, with the numerous allies which she then had, than 
 they were in the following year, when she was left to fight her 
 battle alone. Moreover, if we may be allowed to speculate so far 
 on what might have been, a general war at that time, if it did not 
 once for all put an end to Catherine's power of aggression, might 
 at least have left such animosities between the three neighbors of 
 Poland that for many years to come they could not have united 
 amicably for a dismemberment of the Republic. As it was, Pitt's 
 defeat on the Eastern Question involved the ruin of all the other 
 plans which he had been pursuing in foreign policy. Deserted by 
 Prussia and discredited with the other states, England for a time 
 withdrew altogether from Continental affairs. Thus perished the 
 Federative System, the one combination of these years that 
 had seemed to promise most for the security of Poland. 
 
 The full extent of the loss, however, was not immediately felt at 
 Warsaw, for during the last months of the Oriental crisis two 
 great events had come to renew Polish hopes. The one was the 
 Revolution of the Third of May: the other, the conclusion of the 
 Austro-Prussian alliance.
 
 CHAPTER DC 
 
 The Revolution of the Third of May and the 
 Formation of the Austro-Prussian Alliance 
 
 It is not entirely creditable to the Poles that, granted the oppor- 
 tunity furnished by the Eastern war, they delayed for nearly 
 three years, and only at the eleventh hour nerved themselves to 
 put through — by revolutionary means, as if in desperation — 
 a great and sweeping act of reform. Of the many charges brought 
 against the Great Diet, that of wasting a vast amount of invalu- 
 able time is only too well founded. There were many reasons for 
 this procrastination. One must remember the fatal passion for 
 oratory so characteristic of the nation, the prevailing aversion to 
 limiting freedom of speech by any hard-and-fast rules of order, 
 the constant efforts of the reactionaries to hold back the majority 
 by obstructionist tactics, the inexperience of this " body of Solons 
 aged twenty-five," the natural tendency of such an assembly to 
 be swayed by gusts of passion or sentiment, to be easily led aside 
 into digressions or trivialities, to stumble about rather helplessly 
 amid the mass of questions clamoring for solution. One will be 
 inclined to judge such faults less rigorously, if one compares this 
 Diet with the contemporary assembly on the Seine, which was 
 also toiling to regenerate a nation. The Constituante suffered 
 from the same furor loquendi, the same variability , the same lack 
 of order, foresight, and economy of time; it also was accused 
 of wasting months over syllables, and then in a few hours up- 
 setting the whole ancient order of the kingdom. Such defects 
 are common to all green legislative bodies. Moreover, there was 
 in Poland one special reason for the slow progress of the reformers: 
 the fact that much time was required to educate, solidify, and 
 inflame public opinion as a preliminary to thoroughgoing changes. 
 At the beginning of the Diet the ideas of even the leaders were 
 
 192
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 1 93 
 
 but vague and half-formed. It was only after three years of 
 intense political discussion, after countless questions had been 
 threshed out by long debates in the Diet and by the flood of 
 books, pamphlets, and counter-pamphlets which poured from the 
 press, that the great and salutary reforms of 179 1 became possible. 
 One chief difficulty lay in the wide diversity of principles and 
 tendencies that had to be faced. At one extreme were the bigoted 
 champions of ' golden liberty,' and szlachta omnipotence, who 
 revolted at the thought of sacrificing a particle of the privileges 
 bequeathed to them by their ' virtuous ancestors ' ; who main- 
 tained, with incredible blindness, that the trouble with Poland 
 was an excess, not of anarchy, but of ' despotism ' ; and who were 
 inclined, many of them, to push their aristocratic republicanism 
 so far as to favor the suppression of the kingship altogether. 
 Then there were the admirers of the English system of govern- 
 ment, and those who advocated a constitution similar to the one 
 which was just then being elaborated in France. Finally, there 
 were the advanced reformers, who, attentively following events on 
 the Seine, tended more and more to appropriate the principles, 
 the language, and to some extent the methods of the Parisian 
 radicals. These people took up particularly the slogan of 
 ' equality,' denouncing the privileges and the exclusiveness of the 
 szlachta, exalting the Third Estate in the manner of Sieyes, and 
 demanding the political and economic emancipation of the towns- 
 men and peasantry. The growing political activity of the bour- 
 geoisie; the unprecedented episode of November, 1789, when 
 deputies from almost all the cities of Poland came together at 
 Warsaw to discuss their situation, and to petition the King and 
 Diet for the restoration of their ancient rights; the intense and 
 highly organized agitation in favor of democratic principles con- 
 ducted from the house of Hugo Kolla,taj, the ' smithy ' of the 
 new ideas; the proceedings at the ' Constitutional Club ' in the 
 Radziwill Palace — the Warsaw counterpart of the Jacobin Club 
 — whose orators nightly proclaimed ' the Rights of Man,' and 
 whose ringleader closed every speech with the words: " Whatever 
 is exalted shall be abased, and whatever is abased shall be exalted": 
 all this was calculated to make old-fashioned people stand aghast,
 
 / 
 
 194 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 and to lead even enlightened men to fear that the reform move- 
 ment was getting out of hand. 
 
 In the face of such divergent views and such a clash of opinions, 
 it is not strange that the leaders of the Patriotic party long hesi- 
 tated. The wonder is rather that they at last adopted a plan of 
 constitutional reform which contained so happy a blend of liberal- 
 ism and conservatism, which ran so contrary to many of their 
 instincts and prejudices, and which contained so many things of 
 a kind which it is not easy or popular for statesmen to propose. 
 Adherents as they were of ' the French principles,' they still 
 refused to apply them in blind doctrinaire fashion. Aristocrats, 
 they demanded heavy sacrifices from their own class, while 
 championing, as far as was prudent, the interests of the other 
 classes. Republicans by inheritance and education, they made 
 the central point in their program the establishment of a 
 strong royal power. In an age marked by its passion for ' free- 
 dom ' and hatred of ' despots,' they undertook a reform quite 
 opposite in character to the one then proceeding in France — a 
 monarchical revolution. To a nation extraordinarily attached to 
 its ' liberties,' they preached ' national existence first, and fiber- 
 ties afterwards.' x 
 
 It has already been noted that as soon as the struggle to cast 
 off Russian control was over, in July, 1789, the leaders of the 
 dominant party resolved to bring to the front the question of a 
 new form of government and the hereditary succession. On 
 September 7 the Diet appointed a commission to draw up a 
 constitution. The affair progressed slowly, however, since in 
 the following months military and financial questions and then 
 matters of foreign policy absorbed the attention of the reformers. 
 In December the Diet did, indeed, adopt a first instalment of 
 the new constitution, as a preliminary to the Prussian alliance; 
 but this was hardly more than an enunciation of the general 
 principles on which the future form of government was to be 
 based. Then public interest seized upon one particular consti- 
 
 1 The classic study of the evolution of ideas in Poland at this time is Roman 
 Pilat, literaturze politycznej sejmu czteroletniego. See also, Niewenglowski, Les 
 Idees politiques et Vesprit public en Pologne d la fin du XVIIP siecle; Smolensky
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 1 95 
 
 tutional question to the exclusion of all others: the question of 
 hereditary monarchy versus the elective kingship. The battle 
 over that issue filled the year 1790; it led both reformers and 
 reactionaries to bring their heaviest controversial artillery into 
 the field; it helped powerfully to spread sound political ideas 
 and to clear up the mind of the nation. 
 
 Soon after Reichenbach the leaders of the Diet determined to 
 force on a decision at once, at least with regard to the immediate 
 choice of a successor to the throne, and also, if possible, with 
 regard to the hereditary principle. A considerable number of 
 candidates for the crown came under discussion. Supporters were 
 found for the claims of the brother or the nephew of Stanislas 
 Augustus, for the Duke of York, the Duke of Brunswick, and 
 various minor German princes. Gustavus III, whose head 
 swarmed with fantastic schemes, was suddenly smitten with 
 the ambition to become king of Poland, and long persecuted 
 his reluctant envoy at Warsaw with orders to work for that 
 chimerical project. 1 The Marshal Ignacy Potocki for a time 
 seemed to favor the choice of a Hohenzollern, and at one moment 
 talked even of a personal union between Poland and Prussia. 
 In August, 1790, he sent his confidant, the Italian Piattoli, to 
 Berlin to offer the succession to a Prussian prince, preferably to 
 the King's second son, Prince Louis. Possibly this was done 
 chiefly with the aim of restoring the already shaken alliance by 
 flattering Frederick William, for it is certain that the King had 
 long caressed the idea of placing his son upon the Polish throne. 
 At any rate, the Prussian ministers, now for the first time con- 
 sulted about this project, protested strongly against it; and the 
 negotiation produced no result except to frighten the Courts of 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg, and to drive the ' Republican ' party in 
 Poland, from fear of the Hohenzollern candidacy, to rally to the 
 
 Kuznica Kollqlajowska, and his Przewrot umyslowy w Polsce XVIII w.; Kalinka, 
 Der polnische Reichstag, ii, pp. 410-51 1; Kraszewski, op. cit., ii, passim. 
 
 1 For details as to this Polish project, which haunted Gustavus from the autumn 
 of 1790 until the 3d of May (1791), see, Odhner, Gustaf III och Katarina, pp. 163 
 ff.; Gustavus' letters to Armfelt, in Historiska Handlingar, xii, pp. 172-177; 
 Engestrom, Minnen och Anteckningar , i, pp. 169 f., 290-304; Schinkel-Bergman, 
 Minnen, ii, pp. 175 ff., 309-312.
 
 I96 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 cause of the Elector of Saxony, whom the great majority of the 
 nation already favored. 1 
 
 At the end of September the Diet decided to refer to the country 
 (i. e., to the Dietines) the question whether a successor to the 
 throne should be designated in the lifetime of the present King, 
 and to recommend the choice of the Elector of Saxony. In 
 November the Dietines almost unanimously answered the ques- 
 tion in the affirmative, and also declared in favor of the Saxon 
 candidacy. Only a small number, however, pronounced decidedly 
 for the hereditary succession. At any rate, the Patriots might 
 well be satisfied with this result; and the more so because in the 
 partially renewed Diet (made up of the members of the old one 
 together with an equal number of new deputies chosen at the 
 same November Dietines), the reactionaries were now reduced 
 to a very small minority. In December the long-desired rap- 
 prochement between the King and the Patriot leaders was 
 effected. The reformers were now in a position to proceed boldly 
 with their projects. 
 
 Early in 1791 there began to be held regular secret meetings, 
 in which the King, Piattoli, Potocki, the Marshal Malachowski, 
 and a few others participated, at which the plan for a new con- 
 stitution was worked out. Stanislas himself seems to have drawn 
 up the project which served as the basis for discussion, taking 
 the English system as his model. So radical were the changes pro- 
 posed in this sketch, so far did they go beyond what past experi- 
 ence gave reason to hope for, that the King presented his draft to 
 his fellow-conspirators with the apology that ' these were only the 
 dreams of a good citizen '; but his friends replied unanimously 
 and enthusiastically that this was not a dream, but an excellent 
 constitution, which with energy and good will could easily be put 
 
 1 On this affair of the Hohenzollern candidacy, see Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 86-89, 
 216; Kalinka, Der polnische Reichstag, ii, p. 540; Dembihski, Documents, i, p. 415, 
 and his monograph on Piattoli, Bulletin de VAcadentie de Cracovie, Juin-Juillet, 
 1905; F. K. Wittichen, in F. B. P.G., xvii, pp. 253-262, and Preussen und die 
 Revolutionen in Belgien und Luttich, p. 119; Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, i, pp. 379 
 ff.; Catherine's " Remarques sur les candidats proposes pour la succession au 
 trone de Pologne," sent to Warsaw for use with the ' well-intentioned,' October 
 17/28, 1790, P. A., X, 71.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 1 97 
 
 through. 1 The great point was to lose no more time. The 
 Oriental crisis was obviously drawing near its close, and the 
 Patriots were resolved that the end of the war should not find 
 Poland still without a stable and well-organized government. 
 Realizing that at the rate at which the Diet worked it would 
 take years to pass the new constitution in the ordinary way, the 
 reformers undertook to introduce it and have it voted by a 
 coup de theatre in a single session. By the end of April the prepa- 
 rations for the great stroke were completed. About sixty persons 
 had now been initiated into the scheme; a majority in the Diet 
 seemed assured; and the temper of the public appeared to be 
 all that could be desired. In the last days of the month the 
 news arrived that Pitt was beginning to back down on the Eastern 
 Question, and then came the betrayal of the hitherto well-guarded 
 secret to Bulgakov, the Russian minister at Warsaw. That was 
 enough to convince the conspirators that they must strike at 
 once, and that it was now or never. 2 
 
 On the second of May the Diet reassembled after the Easter 
 recess. The Patriots had taken good care to call in their partisans, 
 
 1 Vom Entstehen und V titer gauge der polnisclien Konstitution vom 3. May, i, pp. 
 170 f. 
 
 2 Our knowledge of the origin and development of the plan which was crowned 
 with success on the Third of May, is extremely scanty. The chief source is still 
 the book, The Rise and Fall of the Polish Constitution of the Third of May, iygi 
 (in German translation, Leipsic, 1793), the apology of the reformers themselves. See 
 also Kalinka, op. cit., iii (a volume which, unfortunately, remained only a torso, 
 owing to the death of the author) ; the Memoirs of Oginski; Dembinski's monograph 
 on Piattoli, cited above; the account given by the King himself in a long letter to 
 Glayre of June 21, 1791, in Mottaz, Statiislas Poniatowski et Maurice Glayre, pp. 
 250-268; Bartoszewicz, Ksicga pamiqtkowa konstytucyi 3. Maja. 
 
 It is one of the most curious features of this affair that the secret was kept so 
 long. Since February Bulgakov had had a secret agent in the immediate entourage 
 of Ignacy Potocki (probably the latter's secretary, Parendier, as Kalinka and Smol- 
 enski suspect, although Askenazy has doubts of this). From this spy the Russian 
 minister continually received copies of Potocki's confidential papers, and especially 
 of the notes exchanged with Piattoli. Naturally the envoy was led to conclude 
 that some great scheme was under discussion, presumably one for the establish- 
 ment of a ' dictatorship ' in Poland in case of a general Furopean war; but he was 
 apparently not much alarmed until the last week of April. Then he began to fear 
 a revolution. On the 28th he learned the essence of the whole project through 
 the treachery of the Polish Chancellor, Jacek Malachowski, whom the King
 
 198 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 while the Opposition, despite the summons hastily sent out at 
 the last moment by Bulgakov and his friends, had returned only 
 in small numbers. By this time the plan of the conspirators had 
 become an open secret. The English, Dutch, and Prussian 
 ministers were apprised of it, and were already protesting against 
 it. On the evening of the 2nd, at a large gathering in the Radzi- 
 will Palace, the new constitution was read to all comers, and 
 greeted with shouts of approval. All Warsaw knew that some 
 great event was coming on the morrow. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 3rd the streets of the capital and 
 the approaches to the castle were crowded with expectant and 
 agitated throngs. The galleries of the hall of the Diet were 
 packed, and the session began amid tense excitement. First on 
 the order of the day came a report from the Deputation of Foreign 
 Interests. In its name the eloquent Matuszewicz read a number 
 of dispatches from the envoys at Vienna, Paris, Dresden, the 
 Hague, and St. Petersburg, showing various ominous develop- 
 ments in the general situation of Europe, the menacing designs 
 of Russia, and the danger of a new partition unless before the 
 end of the Eastern war Poland had given herself a strong govern- 
 ment. The effect was all that could have been hoped for. After 
 some moments of silence, the Marshal Potocki called upon the 
 King to suggest the means of saving the country. Stanislas pro- 
 duced the draft of the new constitution, which was read aloud. 
 Cries of ' zgodal zgoda! ' (agreed! agreed!) resounded from all 
 sides. But here the handful of reactionaries broke out into wild 
 obstruction. For hours there were storms of eloquence and also 
 tragi-comic scenes — as, for instance, when one republican fanatic 
 raised his young son in his arms and threatened to stab him 
 on the spot, in order that he might not live to see the despotism 
 which this constitution was preparing for Poland. At last a 
 happy interposition of the King saved the situation; the ques- 
 tion was put, and with hardly a dozen dissenting voices, amid 
 tumultuous enthusiasm, the great project was passed en bloc. 
 Rising on his throne Stanislas at once took the oath to the new 
 
 had unwisely acquainted with the plan (Bulgakov's reports of February-April, 
 M. A., HojiBHia, III, 62, 63).
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 1 99 
 
 constitution, and then King, senators, deputies, and people went 
 in joyful procession to the nearby Church of St. John, to sing the 
 Te Deum. That night all Warsaw illuminated and celebrated. 
 Thus ended the bloodless ' revolution ' of the Third of May, the 
 one altogether glorious and splendid day in the life of Stanislas 
 Augustus, the last great day of radiant joy and hope that Old 
 Poland was to know. 1 
 
 If there had been some anxiety as to how the country at large 
 would accept the new constitution, these fears were quickly dis- 
 pelled. In the weeks following the Third of May, letters, addresses, 
 and deputations with warm expressions of approval, praise, and 
 thanks flowed in from all the provinces. The other cities vied 
 with Warsaw in celebrations; the nation seemed intoxicated with 
 joy. From abroad came gratifying tributes. Burke compared 
 the French and the Polish revolutions, greatly to the advantage 
 of the latter, and passed a noble eulogy upon the new constitu- 
 tion. It was difficult, wrote Middleton, to describe the favorable 
 impression created at the Hague. Count Bernstorff declared that 
 no unprejudiced man could fail to view this happy transformation 
 with joy; and Hertzberg, who was not of the unprejudiced class, 
 affirmed gloomily that the Polish revolution was one of the great- 
 est events of the century, and would, in his opinion, have even 
 greater results than the revolution in France. 2 
 
 What then was this much-lauded constitution of the Third of 
 May ? It was essentially an attempt to transform a state of a 
 thoroughly mediaeval and antiquated pattern into a constitutional 
 and parliamentary monarchy of the modern type. It abolished 
 the worst abuses from which Poland had for centuries been sick 
 and dying: the Liberum Veto, the right of Confederation, elections 
 to the throne, the personal responsibility of the King to the Diet, 
 
 1 For the events of the Third of May, see the works mentioned in the preced- 
 ing note; also Wegner, Dzieje dnia trzeciego i piqtego maja; Herrmann, op. cit., 
 Vl > PP- 348-358; Solov'ev, Geschichte des Falles von Polen, pp. 246-251; KoCTOMa- 
 poBi, Eocii^Hie rom PiiH-IIocnojiHTOH, i, pp. 450-493; Smitt, Suworow, ii, pp. 
 234-265. The best appreciation of the constitution is that of Balzer, " Reformy 
 spoleczne i polityczne konstytucyi trzeciego maja," Przeglqd Polski, 1891, ii, 
 and separate. 
 
 2 Smolenski, Oslatni rok sejmu wielkiego, pp. 1-2 1; Hertzberg to Lucchesini, 
 May 28, 1791, in Dembinski, Documents, i, p. 453.
 
 200 . THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 and the lack of any effective executive power. The succession 
 was assured to the Elector of Saxony and to his male heirs, or 
 in case he should leave no sons, to his daughter (proclaimed ' the 
 Infanta of Poland ') and her heirs. The prerogatives of the 
 monarch were largely extended. The executive power was 
 lodged in his hands, to be exercised through a council of minis- 
 ters (the Straz), resembling a modern cabinet. If the principle 
 of ministerial responsibility was not clearly asserted, it was 
 approximated by the provisions that every act of the King must 
 be countersigned by a minister, and that ministers were not only 
 criminally but also politically responsible to the Diet, since they 
 might be removed at any time by a two-thirds vote of that body. 
 The administration was to be carried on through four Commis- 
 sions (Army, Finance, Police, and Education), acting under the 
 direction of the King and Council, but elected by and responsible 
 to the Diet (a rather unfortunate concession to the old fear of 
 despotism). As regards the legislative power, the chief inno- 
 vations were these: that the Chamber of Deputies, as the direct 
 representative of the nation, was given a decided preponderance 
 over the Senate, which was confined to the advisory and moder- 
 ating role proper to an appointive Upper House; and, secondly, 
 that the Lower Chamber, which had hitherto been essentially a 
 federal congress of ambassadors from the various provinces, re- 
 ceived an entirely new character through the declaration that 
 each deputy was the representative of the whole country and 
 was thus — by implication — not to be bound by imperative 
 mandates from his local constituents. While a thoroughgoing 
 social and economic reform would have been at that moment 
 quite impracticable, the constitution went as far in that direction 
 as was prudent; and it held up a program, an ideal for the 
 future. The economic barriers between nobles and bourgeoisie 
 were broken down; the townsmen recovered their judicial auton- 
 omy, and received a number of political rights, especially that 
 of admission to many of the higher offices and magistracies (such 
 as the four great administrative commissions). Above all, the 
 gates to the Diet were once more opened — after two centuries — 
 to the deputies of the Polish cities, although this representation,
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 201 
 
 unfortunately, was still confined within modest limits. 1 Finally, 
 the peasantry, so long left without any recourse against the arbi- 
 trary will of their masters, were now taken under the protection 
 of the law. 
 
 Through the abolition of the most crying political evils of the 
 old regime, the formation of a strong executive, and the granting 
 of increased freedom of action to the middle and lower classes, this 
 constitution marked a great advance upon all previous attempts 
 at reform in Poland. In its wise conservatism, its adaptation of 
 foreign norms so far as they were applicable, its refusal to follow 
 blindly the abstract political theories of the day, it compares 
 most favorably with the work of the contemporary constitution- 
 makers at Paris. It was not, indeed, free from serious defects; 
 the jurist will find in it much to criticize; but it must be remem- 
 bered that this was a popular work, framed in a crisis to meet 
 quite peculiar conditions and prejudices, and that on several 
 points its arrangements were never intended to be final. When 
 all is said, this constitution did afford the possibility of a new, 
 sound, and progressive national life. It may have been impolitic 
 to attempt such great changes at that moment, in view of the 
 probable attitude of the neighboring Powers; but at any rate, 
 this heroic breach with the past, this abjuration of the ancient 
 sins, this renunciation of the idolized ' golden liberty ' throws an 
 immortal gleam over the last dark years of the Republic. 
 
 II 
 
 The revolution of the Third of May essentially altered the 
 views of the outside world upon the Polish Question. Hitherto 
 foreign observers had followed the activity of the Four Years' 
 Diet with skepticism and a certain ironical indifference. The 
 Poles were regarded as noisy, troublesome, and childish people, 
 outlandish in their ideas, fickle in temper, and incapable of great 
 and decisive deeds. The main problem was whether they should 
 
 1 The (royal) cities obtained the right of sending 21 (later 24) representatives 
 to the Diet, as against 204 deputies elected by the szlachla in the Dietines. The 
 city-deputies might speak on all matters, but vote only on municipal and commercial 
 questions.
 
 202 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 live under the tutelage of Russia or Prussia, provided they did 
 not lose their political existence altogether. But after the Third 
 of May the world began to take the Poles more seriously. It was 
 now the general belief that the nation would after all effect its 
 regeneration, if only it were allowed to work out its destinies 
 undisturbed. The great question now was whether the neighbor- 
 ing states would permit a revival, which would in so many ways 
 alter the old balance of power, and which would cut short so 
 many long-cherished ambitions. Would they allow the new 
 constitution to stand ? Of the Powers most concerned Prussia 
 and Austria were the first to express themselves on this question; 
 and for quite diverse reasons both pronounced in a sense un- 
 expectedly favorable to Poland. 
 
 The first tidings of the new constitution reached Berlin through 
 a dispatch from Goltz of April 30. l The ministers at once drew 
 up a report to the King urging that if Poland were to become an 
 hereditary monarchy, it could not fail to prove extremely dan- 
 gerous, and perhaps even destructive to Prussia. Goltz must 
 therefore be ordered to do all in his power to dissuade the ' well- 
 intentioned ' party from their plan, if it had not already been 
 carried out. 2 The King approved, but before the appropriate 
 instructions could be sent off there arrived the news of the events 
 of the Third of May, along with a letter from Stanislas Augustus 
 formally announcing the promulgation of the new constitution. 
 It was then a case of making bonne mine a mauvais jeu. The 
 cardinal fact in the situation was that at this moment — and 
 until the end of May — Frederick William regarded a war with 
 Russia as quite within the range of possibilities, and hence he 
 desired not to antagonize the Poles and the Elector of Saxony. 
 Perhaps the influence of Ewart and Bischoflwerder, who were 
 
 1 In the early days of the conspiracy, it was the plan of the Polish leaders to 
 send the Marshal Potocki to Berlin to secure the secret approval of Prussia in 
 advance. This plan was not carried out, perhaps because Potocki disliked to 
 absent himself from Warsaw at so critical a moment. 
 
 2 The ministerial proposals of May 6 are given at some length in Hausser, 
 Deutsche Geschichte, i, pp. 304 f. It has again and again been stated that these 
 proposals were made after the news of the completed coup d'etat arrived, but in 
 fact that news reached Berlin only on the 7th.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 203 
 
 still preaching the Federative System, counted for something 
 here; r perhaps the King's mind was still susceptible to the 
 charms of posing as the patron of revolutions and the liberator of 
 nations; at any rate he now declared himself with a cordiality 
 and effusiveness that surpassed all expectations. In his reply to 
 Jablonowski, the Polish envoy, in rescripts to his ministers at 
 Warsaw and St. Petersburg, in letters to Stanislas Augustus and 
 the Elector of Saxony, Frederick William expressed his satisfac- 
 tion, approval, and admiration with regard to the new constitu- 
 tion, which he held to be " indispensable to the happiness of the 
 Polish nation." The conferring of the crown upon the Saxon 
 House would, he wrote, " confirm for ages the close friendship 
 and harmony existing ,: [between Prussia and Poland]. 2 These 
 declarations were within twelve months to receive a bitterly 
 ironical commentary. 
 
 Although the statement was made at that time 3 and has since 
 been championed by a great German historian, 4 there is no 
 evidence to prove that the Court of Vienna was informed in 
 advance of the plan which was carried out on the Third of May. 
 Doubtless Austro-Polish relations had improved considerably 
 since the preceding summer. Leopold's separation from Russia 
 by the Convention of Reichenbach, his pacific tendencies, the 
 assurances of his warm goodwill towards the Republic brought 
 back by all the Poles who visited Vienna, the still half-credited 
 tale that he had refused a Prussian proposition for a new partition, 
 
 1 Cf. Ewart's account of his intervention here, Dropmore Papers, ii, pp. 75 f. 
 
 2 Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 126 f., 224 ff. 
 
 3 Bulgakov's Vienna correspondent, May 16, 1791: "Si je ne juge pas mal 
 des choses, le ministere autrichien s'attendoit, a quelque chose de pareil, et je ne 
 peux meme en douter," M. A., IIojiMiia, III, 63. 
 
 4 Sybel. There can be no need to enter here into the controversy so warmly 
 conducted between Sybel and Herrmann fifty years ago regarding the Polish policy 
 of Leopold II. The dispute raged chiefly about Sybel's theses: (1) that Leopold 
 had a hand in preparing the coup d'etat of the third of May; (2) that he then exerted 
 himself actively to secure the general recognition of the new constitution by the 
 Powers; (3) that he originated the plan for the permanent union of Poland and 
 Saxony. It is now clear that Sybel was wrong on the first and third of these points, 
 but quite right regarding the second. Later researches, especially Beer's, have 
 deprived the controversy of practical interest.
 
 204 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 all this combined to inspire » more confidence in Austria than 
 had previously been felt at Warsaw. 1 Both Republicans and 
 Patriots had begun to form some hopes of gaining the Em- 
 peror's patronage. In February, 1791, Rzewuski, one of the 
 leading reactionaries, fruitlessly proposed at Vienna to form a 
 Counter-confederation under Austrian protection 2 very similar 
 to that which was later organized under Catherine's auspices. 
 About the same time one of the most active among the Polish 
 reformers advanced the idea that in view of the untrustworthi- 
 ness of Prussia the Republic would do well to seek support 
 rather in the friendship of the Court of Vienna. It was un- 
 doubtedly proposed to sound Leopold in advance regarding the 
 plan for a new constitution and a coup d'etat; but apparently 
 the proposal was not carried out. 3 Down to the Third of May 
 no real connection existed between the Warsaw reformers and 
 the Austrian cabinet; and there was still no Austrian party 
 in Poland. 
 
 The news of the coup d'etat was received at Vienna with almost 
 universal approbation. In the salons people lauded ' the Polish 
 revolution ' to the skies, by way of showing their horror for 
 the French one. 4 Kaunitz, too, was extremely well pleased. The 
 new constitution, he was sure, was directly opposed to all the 
 interests, plans, and desires of Prussia: hence he highly approved 
 of it. The old anarchy, the factions, the interregna had offered 
 a fine field to the intrigues of Berlin; and now, it was to be hoped, 
 all that was done away with. Under hereditary monarchs and a 
 
 1 Kraszewski, op. cit., ii, pp. 363 f.; Goltz's report of April 13, 1701, in Herr- 
 mann, op. cit., vi, pp. 568 {.; Zaleski, Zywot Czartoryskiego, pp. 258 f. 
 
 2 Rzewuski's plan is to be found among the Vortrdge of 1791 in the Vienna 
 Archives, accompanied by an undated note from Leopold to Kaunitz, asking his 
 opinion, and by the Chancellor's reply, dated February 8 — a scathing condem- 
 nation of so unholy a project. 
 
 3 The proposal was made by Piattoli in a Memoire of March 4, 1791 : see Smolka, 
 " Genezya konstytucyi 3. maja," in Bulletin International de VAcademie des 
 Sciences de Cracovie, Comptes rendus des seances de I'annee i8gi, pp. 350-354. 
 Smolka believed that Leopold was really sounded on the subject before the Third 
 of May, but Dembinski argues convincingly against this view in his above-cited 
 monograph on Piattoli. 
 
 4 Bulgakov's Vienna correspondent, May 14, 18, 28, M. A., Ilojitma, III, 63.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 205 
 
 stronger executive, Poland might recover sufficient force to main- 
 tain her integrity; that was all he required of her; he reflected 
 that there would always remain enough of the old republican 
 leaven to prevent this state from becoming dangerous to its 
 neighbors, and he believed that in the long run a revived Poland 
 would see that its true interest lay in cleaving to the Imperial 
 Courts. For the present, the revolution had come very much 
 a propos to increase the embarrassments of His Prussian Majesty 
 over the Eastern Question. If Austria and Russia, by taking 
 the new constitution under their protection, could win over Po- 
 land and Saxony immediately, that would add the crowning blow 
 to the discomfiture of Berlin. 1 This was, indeed, only a continua- 
 tion of the Chancellor's previous policy. Of any new departure, 
 of any independent and specifically Austrian system towards 
 Poland apart from or in opposition to Russia, there was at that 
 time no thought. 
 
 Leopold at first judged the events at Warsaw less accurately 
 than Kaunitz had done. He suspected that the King of Prussia 
 had had a hand in this affair, and that he was scheming to marry 
 a Hohenzollern to the ' Infanta,' or else to realize his ambitions 
 upon Dantzic; he also feared that the revolution might lead to 
 new disturbances in the Republic. 2 But Kaunitz's report of 
 May 12, together with a reassuring letter from Frederick William, 
 soon removed these suspicions; and henceforth the Emperor and 
 his Chancellor were agreed in approving the salutary change in 
 Poland. 3 
 
 1 These ideas in Kaunitz's dispatches to Cobenzl of May 25, and his report to 
 the Emperor of May 12, V. A., Exped., Russland, and Vortrdge, 1791. 
 
 2 Leopold to Kaunitz, May 20, the first expression of the Emperor's opinion 
 on the Polish revolution that has come to light (printed in Beer, Joseph II, Leopold 
 II, und Kaunitz, pp. 404 f.). This, together with his letters to Marie Christine of 
 June 2 and 9 (Wolf, Leopold II und Marie Christine, pp. 231 ff.) show how un- 
 expected and perplexing the news was to Leopold. 
 
 3 The Emperor's apostil to Kaunitz's report of May 12; Frederick William to 
 Leopold, May 21, Vivenot, op. tit., i, p. 133; cf. Elgin's reports of May 25 and 26, 
 F. z. D. G. v, pp. 255 ff. 
 
 Sybel's contention that Leopold's suggestion to Elgin on May 9 about a general 
 guarantee of the Polish constitution related to the new constitution, is quite un- 
 tenable. The news of the coup d'etat at Warsaw reached Vienna only on the ioth, 
 and Leopold was then in Florence.
 
 206 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Meanwhile, even before getting Leopold's orders, Kaunitz 
 had felt sure enough of his sovereign's views to act. Immediately 
 after the news of the revolution arrived, he hastened to order 
 de Cache at Warsaw and Hartig at Dresden to express the Em- 
 peror's complete approval of the new constitution and of the 
 succession in the Saxon House. 1 This friendly advance encour- 
 aged the Elector Frederick Augustus to turn to Leopold directly 
 for advice as to the acceptance of the proffered crown. He was 
 unable to form a decision, he declared, until the constitution of 
 the Republic and its relations with the neighboring Powers had 
 been arranged in such a way as would enable him to fulfil both 
 the obligations imposed by the crown of Poland and his duties 
 to his hereditary states. The Emperor replied with a very 
 friendly letter, approving the Elector's scruples and assuring 
 him of his own favorable attitude, which he believed he could 
 state was shared by the other Powers. Kaunitz began to make 
 a great show of zeal on behalf of the Court of Dresden, but he 
 did not press it for an immediate decision. It was enough for the 
 moment to bind Saxony to Austria; the final settlement of 
 Polish affairs would have to wait until he had arrived at a 
 thorough understanding with Russia. 2 
 
 In his dispatches to Louis Cobenzl of May 24 and 25, the 
 Austrian Chancellor made the first of what was destined to be a 
 long series of efforts to win Catherine's approval for the new con- 
 stitution of Poland. With great expenditure of cleverly chosen 
 arguments he labored to prove that the strengthening of the 
 Republic was now as much to the advantage of Russia as its 
 weakening might formerly have been; that the maintenance of 
 the old anarchy could serve only the insidious schemes of the 
 Court of Berlin; that even under the new regime Russia could 
 
 1 Instructions to de Cache of May 14, repeated the 25; instructions to Hartig, 
 May 11, V. A., Exped., Polen and Sachsen, 1791. 
 
 2 Frederick Augustus to Leopold, May 27, and the Emperor's reply, June 11, 
 Vivenot, op. cit., i, pp. 147, 166 f.; Kaunitz to Hartig, June 4. This seems to have 
 been the first correspondence between the two sovereigns with regard to the 
 Polish crown. The document printed in Vivenot, op. cit., i, p. 106 — ostensibly a 
 letter from Leopold to the Elector of March 24, 1791 — is the draft of a letter which 
 in all probability was never sent.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 207 
 
 always exercise as much influence in Poland as she needed ; while 
 if she found it necessary to make some small changes in the con- 
 stitution, means and opportunities would assuredly not be lacking 
 before the new order of things had had time to get thoroughly 
 established. The great thing at present was to outbid Prussia at 
 Warsaw and Dresden. It would be a capital stroke if the Imperial 
 Courts could confront the would-be dictators of Europe with a 
 quadruple alliance of Russia, Austria, Saxony, and Poland. 1 It 
 was a program in Kaunitz's best style, clear, logical, compre- 
 hensive, imposing. Nothing could be more adapted to the cardi- 
 nal principle of the Austrian policy of the past fifty years, for 
 what more formidable barrier could be reared against Prussian 
 ambition than a reinvigorated Poland backed by all the might of 
 Austria and Russia ? It was the last of Kaunitz's great combina- 
 tions against Prussia, and like so many of his choicest creations it 
 had one very serious defect. He was badly in error regarding the 
 real sentiments that reigned on the Neva. 
 
 When the news of the Third of May first reached St. Peters- 
 burg, Cobenzl found the Empress, Potemkin, and all the minis- 
 ters filled with anger and alarm. There was talk of a concert of 
 the three neighboring Powers to undo this work of revolution, of 
 a Counter-confederation, of a new partition. 2 After the first 
 
 1 The dispatches of May 24-25 are printed in Vivenot, op. cit., i, pp. 138-145. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's report of May 13, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1701. 
 
 Cobenzl wrote: " J'ai trouve l'lmperatrice, le Prince Potemkin et le Comte 
 Ostermann . . . fort affectes de l'ldee que la Pologne pourroit prendre une Con- 
 sistence reelle, tandis qu'on regarde ici comme l'lnteret de toutes les Puissances 
 voisines, qu'Elle reste dans son Etat de Nullite. S. M. me fit la grace de me dire, 
 qu'il est essentiel de se concerter avec Nous a cet egard. J'ai assure cette Princesse, 
 que Nous etions toujours prets sur tous les objets possibles. Mais, me dit l'lmpera- 
 trice, puis-je compter sur vous ? J'ai repondu a S. M. que des que Nous aurons le 
 moyen, l'Empereur ne connoissoit aucuns bornes a desirer de l'employer pour la 
 cause de la Russie; a quoi S. M. a repondu, il me faut dans ce moment-ci quelque 
 chose de plus positif. . . ." Vorontsov believed " que si la chose s'est faite contre 
 le gr6 du Cabinet de Potsdam, il en sera d'autant plus dispose a. un nouveau Traite 
 de Partage, qui mettroit fin a tout, bien entendu que les deux Cours Imp£riales 
 agissent en cela comme en tout d'un parfait concert. . . ." " On ne seroit pas 
 fach6 s'il resultoit de ce que le Roi de Pologne a entrepris, une scission dans la 
 Nation Polonoise et des Troubles. Le Prince Potemkin est assez port6 pour l'id6e 
 de former une Confederation dans les Provinces Polonoises, qui avoisinent la 
 Russie, et on m'assure que tout le Monde y est disposeV'
 
 208 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 flush of anger was over, however, Ostermann began to alter his 
 tone. After all, he declared, the revolution offered many advan- 
 tages to the Imperial Courts, especially the chance to form an 
 alliance with Poland and Saxony, which would be a stinging blow 
 to Prussia. He was very curious to know what the Court of 
 Vienna thought of this change, and prodigal of assurances that 
 Russia would take no action in the matter except in closest agree- 
 ment with Austria. 1 When Kaunitz's dispatches arrived, the 
 Vice- Chancellor affirmed that they accorded perfectly with what 
 he himself had already proposed to the Empress; but he could 
 not yet say what Her Majesty's final decision would be. Potem- 
 kin also declared that he agreed entirely with Kaunitz. 2 Other 
 questions at this time seemed to absorb the attention of the 
 Russian ministry, which was then in the throes of the final 
 negotiation with England and Prussia. It was only in the middle 
 of July that Cobenzl received a half-way definite answer on 
 Polish affairs, which was to the effect that the Empress would 
 postpone a decision regarding the new constitution until the 
 close of the Turkish war, and would then concert her future 
 course of action with Austria. 3 With that the matter rested. 
 Both Cobenzl and Kaunitz remained for some time in the com- 
 fortable conviction that on the Polish question the Russian point 
 of view was not far removed from the Austrian. What the 
 Empress' real intentions were, we shall have occasion to see 
 later. Meanwhile it is necessary to take up the long-dropped 
 thread of the negotiation for the Austro-Prussian alliance. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Since Bischoffwerder's return from the Austrian capital in 
 March, the plan which had formed the object of his journey had 
 been at a standstill. The pretence of negotiating about it had 
 been kept up through a fitful exchange of memorials and opinions 
 between Berlin and Vienna; but the great question of the admis- 
 sion of Russia to the proposed union seemed to offer an insur- 
 
 1 Cobenzl's reports of May 17 and June 4, V. A., loc. cit. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's report of June 27, ibid. 
 
 3 Cobenzl's report of July 19, ibid.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 209 
 
 mountable obstacle, and at least on the Austrian side there was 
 little eagerness to carry the matter further ac present. Kaunitz 
 was still eloquently opposed to the project; and the Emperor was 
 well content to delay the affair, as long as there was danger of a 
 war between his present and his prospective allies. What first 
 gave a new impetus to the plan was the mission of Lord Elgin to 
 Leopold, already mentioned in connection with England's back- 
 down on the Eastern Question. During May and June this 
 irrepressible young gentleman pursued the Emperor around Italy, 
 persecuting him with offers for an alliance with England and 
 Prussia, and with appeals for aid in bringing the Tsarina to 
 reason. Leopold was not inclined to exert himself overmuch 
 merely in order to save Pitt's imperiled bark from shipwreck; he 
 made no binding promises; but he did not mind giving pleasant 
 assurances of a general character, which kept Elgin in high hopes 
 and led him to send the most optimistic bulletins to London and 
 Berlin. From one of these reports, communicated by Ewart, the 
 Prussian government was informed of the Emperor's wish to have 
 a confidential agent sent to him by the King, and of his particular 
 desire to see " the excellent Colonel Bischoffwerder " again. 1 
 
 Frederick William at once determined to comply with so 
 flattering a suggestion. At this time — near the end of May — 
 the King still believed in the possibility of war with Russia; and 
 he was encouraged by Elgin's reports to hope that Leopold could 
 be drawn over to the side of the Triple Alliance, or at least in- 
 duced to promise his neutrality. Besides, he did not mean to let 
 England be the first to conclude an alliance with the Emperor; 
 the principal role belonged to himself, since he had originally 
 taken the initiative in this matter. In the lengthy instructions 
 drawn up by the Prussian ministers, Bischoffwerder was ordered 
 first of all to make sure that Leopold would actively support the 
 new terms of peace proposed by the Triple Alliance at St. Peters- 
 burg, and also that he would immediately put a stop to the 
 chicaneries by which Kaunitz was insidiously protracting the 
 Austro-Turkish peace congress at Sistova. Once assured on 
 these points, the envoy was authorized to conclude a treaty of 
 
 1 See Appendix VI, 1.
 
 2IO THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 alliance, preferably one between Austria and Prussia alone, to 
 which England might later be invited to accede. Under no cir- 
 cumstances was Russia to be admitted to the new union; Leopold 
 must promise to remain neutral in case of war between the King 
 and the Empress; and in fact the whole tenor of the instructions 
 shows clearly that opposition to Russia was intended to be the 
 cardinal principle of the Austro-Prussian alliance. It was quite in 
 accordance with that tendency that Bischoffwerder was ordered 
 to stop en route at Dresden and urge the Elector to accept the 
 Polish crown immediately, contenting himself with the approval 
 of Prussia, England, and Austria, and paying no attention to 
 Russia. 1 
 
 The envoy set out from Berlin May 30, tarried two days in the 
 Saxon capital, where his zealous exhortations failed to shake 
 Frederick Augustus out of his cautious reserve, and arrived on 
 June 9 at Milan, where the Emperor was then staying. Leopold 
 was somewhat glacial at the first meeting, apparently for the 
 purpose of showing that it was not he who was courting allies. 
 But immediately afterwards his tone changed, he became all 
 
 1 Instructions of May 28, 1791, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172. 
 
 Art. 8 of the instruction: " II est de la plus grande importance d'ecarter toute 
 participation de la Cour de Russie a la Negociation et au Traite a conclure, sur 
 laquelle le Prince Kaunitz et ses Adherens ne manqueront pas d'insister, mais qui 
 seroit entierement incompatible avec les interets du Roi et la Situation actuelle des 
 choses, et que l'Empereur lui-meme, selon les assurances du Lord Elgin, paroit 
 regarder comme telle. . . ." 
 
 Art. 7: " Comme la garantie de la Pologne dans ses frontieres actuelles et le 
 maintien de la constitution libre et independante de la Pologne paroit tenir fort a 
 cceur a ce Monarque [Leopold] et n'est pas moins conforme aux vues et aux interets 
 de Sa Majesty, rien n'empeche que le Colonel Bischoffwerder n'y accede tout de 
 suite. ..." 
 
 Art. 2: " Le Colonel de Bischoffwerder etant charge de prendre sa route par 
 Dresde afin de profiter du sejour qu'il y fera pour fixer les irresolutions de l'Electeur 
 de Saxe sur Pacceptation du throne de Pologne, il cherchera a se menager une 
 audience aupres de ce Prince pour rectifier ses idees et celles des personnes les 
 plus influentes de sa Cour sur cette matiere. ... II semble que la considera- 
 tion qui resultera pour la Saxe meme de l'acceptation du throne de Pologne par 
 l'Electeur; les suites facheuses qu'un refus ou meme la simple vacillation de ce 
 Prince pourroient avoir en Pologne . . . ; enfin la suret6 qui resulte pour l'Elec- 
 teur de l'Amitie et de l'Alliance, s'il en est besoin, de la Prusse et de l'Angleterre, 
 seront les principaux motifs qu'on pourra faire valoir pour inspirer de la fermete 
 a ce Prince. 
 
 1 • t
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 211 
 
 affability, and ' the worthy Colonel ' was soon completely under 
 the spell. The explanation of Leopold's altered attitude is to be 
 found in a startling piece of news which had reached him imme- 
 diately after Bischoffwerder's arrival. On June 12 came a letter 
 from Marie Antoinette, announcing that the French royal family 
 were about to attempt their escape from Paris; and the Emperor 
 saw before himself the prospect of having to undertake armed 
 intervention on their behalf. 1 In such a case, the assistance of 
 Prussia would be indispensable. The alliance at once became 
 an urgent and pressing matter. Hence he hastened to give 
 Bischoffwerder all the assurances required that peace should 
 promptly be concluded at Sistova; both were agreed in thrusting 
 Elgin aside and negotiating the alliance between themselves 
 alone; and the exact provisions of the treaty furnished no great 
 difficulties. After but slight resistance, Bischoffwerder gave way 
 on the question of inviting the adhesion of Russia, and he entered 
 with the greatest readiness into Leopold's proposals with regard 
 to French affairs. After a few conferences, the two found them- 
 selves agreed on the principal points, and it remained only to put 
 their arrangements on paper after the return to Vienna. 2 The 
 conclusion of the formal treaty of alliance was, indeed, to be post- 
 poned until after the final pacification in the East; but a pre- 
 liminary convention containing the essential articles was to be 
 signed at once. 
 
 On arriving at Vienna about the middle of July, Bischoffwerder 
 fell into the toils of the Austrians more hopelessly than ever. He 
 was flattered by the Emperor's show of confidence; he was over- 
 whelmed with attentions by Cobenzl and Spielmann, and even by 
 Kaunitz himself; for the old Chancellor, having once made up his 
 mind to what he could no longer prevent, had now developed an 
 astonishing zeal for ' the new system,' and delivered the most 
 edifying disquisitions on this alliance, which would startle the 
 
 1 Marie Antoinette to Leopold, June 1, and his reply of June 12, Arneth, 
 Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II, pp. 166 f., 177 ff.; Feuillet de Conches, 
 op. cit., ii, pp. 72, 78. 
 
 2 The above chiefly from Bischoffwerder's reports of June 14 and 18, B. A., R. 1, 
 Conv. 172, and from the "Journal iiber die Verhandlungen mit Bischoffwerder," 
 printed in Vivenot, op. cit., i, pp. 176-181.
 
 V 
 
 212 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 world and eclipse even the wondrous Treaty of Versailles. 1 
 Never did a negotiation pass off more smoothly; never was dip- 
 lomat more trustful, more compliant, more facile than ' the 
 excellent Colonel Bischoffwerder.' Two conferences sufficed for 
 everything. At the first, the Prussian envoy submitted his prop- 
 ositions, there was general discussion, and Spielmann promised 
 to draw up the articles of the convention. At the second, Kau- 
 nitz presented the completed draft; whereupon Bischoffwerder, 
 although he had heard it for the first time, and although it 
 differed greatly from the propositions he had made, signed it at 
 once, " seeing," as he wrote to his King, " that it was the ne plus 
 ultra of what I could obtain, that there was nothing in it disad- 
 vantageous to Your Majesty, and that I should spoil everything 
 by showing any lack of confidence." 2 In truth, it was a bargain 
 in which the Austrians had carried every point. Bischoffwerder 
 agreed to the future admission of Russia to the alliance, and to the 
 omission from the treaty of every phrase that might wound the 
 Empress' susceptibilities; he consented to an article providing 
 for mutual assistance in case of internal disturbances, and to 
 another which guaranteed the Austrian rights to Lusatia in case of 
 the extinction of the male line of Saxony; he accepted an article 
 providing for a concert on the affairs of France. 
 
 Particularly important were the stipulations of the convention 
 regarding Poland. The 'separate article' on that subject ran: 
 " As the interests and tranquillity of the Powers which are neigh- 
 bors of Poland render infinitely desirable the establishment of 
 such a concert between them as will remove all jealousy or appre- 
 hension of preponderance, the Courts of Vienna and Berlin will 
 agree, and will invite the Court of Russia to agree with them, not 
 to undertake anything contrary to the integrity and to the main- 
 tenance of the free constitution of Poland ; never to seek to place 
 a prince of their respective Houses upon the throne of Poland, 
 
 1 Bischoffwerder's journal of his negotiation (passim), B. A., R. i, Conv. 172; 
 Kaunitz to Leopold, July 26, V. A., Vorlrdge, 1791. The Chancellor wrote that this 
 alliance " fait a. peu pres le second Tome du Traite de Versailles, qui a etonne toute 
 l'Europe dans son temps, et a sauve alors la Monarchic Autrichienne." 
 
 2 Bischoffwerder's reports of July 22 and 25, B. A., loc. cit.; Spielmann to 
 the Emperor, July 23, V. A., Vorlrdge, 1791.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 21 3 
 
 either by a marriage with the Princess Infanta or in case of a new 
 election; and not to employ their influence in either of these latter 
 cases to determine the choice of the Republic in favor of another 
 prince, save by a common agreement among themselves." 
 
 The significance of this article has been much disputed. On the 
 one hand, it has been taken for a guarantee of the Constitution of 
 the Third of May, and a declaration that could only be regarded 
 as an insult at St. Petersburg; l and on the other hand, it has been 
 called a virtual surrender of Poland to Russia, the first sign of the 
 abandonment of the Republic by its Prussian ally. 2 Both these 
 interpretations are probably erroneous. This article was a 
 restatement of the one proposed by Bischoffwerder in February, 
 modified in accordance with the circumstances and with certain 
 considerations urged by the Austrians. The original Prussian 
 proposal had had for its chief aim to prevent Russia from recover- 
 ing her former predominance in Poland ; and it had also contained 
 a virtual guarantee of the existing constitution of the Republic. 
 In July the Austrian ministers insisted on toning down this article 
 in such a way as to render it ostensible and fit to be presented for 
 Catherine's acceptance. They fully agreed with Bischoffwerder 
 that the main object was to uphold the new constitution and to 
 prevent Poland from again falling under the control of Russia or 
 any other foreign Power; but Spielmann urged that it was both 
 imprudent and unnecessary to use terms that would lead the 
 Empress to think that ' they were trying to prescribe laws to her,' 
 or meant to extort her consent to the new regime in Poland by 
 force. Moderate language and courteous forms would be far 
 more likely to bring Catherine to accept the Austro-Prussian 
 standpoint. 3 Hence an article the terms of which had been soft- 
 ened down until they had wellnigh lost all clearness and vigor, but 
 the underlying spirit of which was undeniably favorable to Poland. 
 
 The provision as to " the free constitution " was indefinite, 
 indeed, but, coupled with that regarding the Infanta, it implied 
 
 1 Sybel, //. Z., xxiii, pp. 77 f. 
 
 2 Herrmann, Erganzungsband, p. 40, and F. z. D. G., v, pp. 239 f.; Askenazy, 
 op. cit., pp. 150 ff. 
 
 3 Spielmann's report to the Emperor, July 23, V. A., loc. cit.; Bischoffwerder's 
 journal of his negotiation, July 22, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 214 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 a recognition of the new constitution, and was so interpreted 
 both at Warsaw and St. Petersburg. There was no guarantee of 
 the new form of government, but the Poles had lately been de- 
 claiming a great deal about the irksomeness of such foreign 
 guarantees. The exclusion from the Polish throne of members 
 of the reigning houses of the three neighboring states was in 
 conformity with the interests of the Republic; and — it may be 
 added — it involved the sacrifice of certain plans that Frederick 
 William had long taken very seriously. The fact that Russia 
 was to be invited to join in the concert on Polish affairs did not 
 imply that the other two Courts were at that time ready to con- 
 cur with Russian plans hostile to Poland. The attitude which 
 the Empress would finally assume towards the new constitution 
 was quite unknown at Berlin and Vienna; indeed Cobenzl's 
 latest reports had led the Austrians to hope that she would adopt 
 their ideas on that subject. The one part of the article that could 
 hardly be reconciled with a strict regard for the independence of 
 Poland was that which suggested the possibility of a future con- 
 cert of the three Powers with respect to the succession to the 
 throne; for that implied that the contracting parties had not 
 altogether renounced interfering in the internal affairs of the 
 Republic. But taken as a whole these provisions were of a nature 
 to give satisfaction at Warsaw. Their essential significance lay 
 in this : that at a time when the fate of the new Polish constitu- 
 tion hung in the balance, Austria and Prussia had agreed to recog- 
 nize that constitution, to abstain from all enterprises against it 
 themselves, and to attempt to induce Russia to adopt the same 
 attitude. 1 
 
 The PreHminary Convention of Vienna was signed July 25, 
 and forwarded the next day to Berlin for ratification. The Prus- 
 sian ministry were filled with indignation when they received 
 this masterpiece of Bischoffwerder's diplomacy. They found 
 that he had been completely the dupe of the Austrians; that he 
 had agreed to articles on which he had never had any instructions 
 (especially that relating to the concert on French affairs); and 
 that he had acted in flat violation of his instructions in signing 
 
 1 Some further discussion of this article will be found in Appendix VI, 2.
 
 THE THIRD OF MAY 21 5 
 
 any convention without first submitting the draft of it to the 
 King. Frederick William, however, was apparently well pleased. 
 He was not averse to the French enterprise, and he was delighted 
 to have secured at last — on whatever terms — an alliance which 
 would free him from the English bondage and furnish the basis 
 for a new forward policy. With scarcely a word of explanation, 
 and without asking for their opinion, he ordered his ministers 
 to send back the act of ratification at once, though under the 
 condition that it should not be presented until peace had been 
 concluded at Sistova. 1 This provision, however, occasioned no 
 delay, for the treaty between Austria and Turkey was signed on 
 August 4. Austria restored her conquests of the late war, but 
 by virtue of certain ancient claims secured the cession of Old 
 Orsova, and thus a partial mitigation of the terms of Reichen- 
 bach. Bischoffwerder could then put the crown on his work by 
 proceeding to the exchange of ratifications (August 15). Thus 
 was virtually consummated an alliance which astonished the 
 world as much as did the famous diplomatic revolution of 1756, 
 or as much as would an alliance between France and Germany 
 today. 
 
 With the almost simultaneous conclusion of the Vienna Con- 
 vention, the Peace of Sistova, and the Preliminaries of Galatz, 
 the long Oriental crisis had reached its end. It was an unsatis- 
 factory, a dull and prosaic finale. For four years there had been 
 wars and rumors of wars, mobilizations, coalitions, congresses, 
 negotiations, diplomatic activity almost unparalleled; and the 
 result was that none of the great issues had been settled, none 
 of the great plans had been realized. Out of it all had come 
 only the slightest changes of territory, but a considerable shifting 
 in the positions of the various European Powers. The connection 
 between the Imperial Courts was loosened; the Triple Alliance 
 was practically dissolved ; and through the rapprochement sealed 
 by the Vienna Convention Austrian and Prussian policy had 
 received a new basis and struck out into new paths. But the 
 
 1 The King to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31, Schulenburg and 
 Alvensleben to the King on the same date, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172; Alvensle- 
 ben's Proces-verbal of August 11 (see Herrmann, Erganzungsband, pp. 40 ff., and 
 F. z. D. G., v, pp. 277 f.). Cf. Appendix VI, 3.
 
 2l6 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 greatest legacy of the Oriental crisis was the reopening of the 
 Polish Question. 
 
 It was during those four years of turmoil that the seeds of the 
 Second Partition were sown. The old system, which had seemed 
 to assure the existence of the Republic, had collapsed; the great 
 breach with Russia had taken place, and remained unforgotten 
 and unforgiven at St. Petersburg; and a new spirit had appeared 
 in Poland that made the permanent restoration of Russian domi- 
 nation in the old form impossible. But, on the other hand, the 
 Poles had seized too late the opportunity for internal reforms, 
 they had lost the chance to satisfy the ambitions of Prussia by a 
 peaceful bargain, and they had seen their best chances for securing 
 aid from without vanish one after the other. The three neighbor- 
 ing Powers had at the last moment failed to come to blows, and 
 were now about to unite, and their union had always been fatal 
 to Poland. But if the causes go back to the Oriental crisis, the 
 form which the catastrophe was to take was determined by the 
 struggle in which Austria and Prussia now became involved 
 against the French Revolution.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 The Development of the French and Polish 
 Questions to the Death of Leopold II 
 
 I 
 
 It is well known that immediately after learning of the flight and 
 recapture of the French royal family, the Emperor Leopold 
 issued the Circular of Padua (July 6, 1791), inviting the chief 
 European Powers to common action for the purpose of ensuring 
 the safety of the King and Queen of France and the maintenance 
 of monarchical government in that country. Of all the sover- 
 eigns invited into the concert, the Empress of Russia alone 
 showed an ardent zeal for the cause. Nothing could have suited 
 Catherine better than to see the other Powers embarked in the 
 French enterprise, partly because she detested the Revolution on \yS 
 principle, but even more because she wanted a free hand in her 
 own corner of Europe. As soon as the danger of the Oriental 
 crisis was over, she began the mise-en-scene of her next great act 
 on the European stage. Already in May and June she was doing 
 her utmost to persuade her quixotic cousin of Sweden to head a 
 counter-revolution in France, while she also commenced to sound 
 the Austrian cabinet on the same subject. 1 She received Leo- 
 pold's proposals of July with the warmest approval and regretted 
 only that the measures suggested were not more vigorous. Hence- 
 forth the Empress was aflame for ' the cause of all sovereigns.' 
 
 Frederick William's attitude was also distinctly favorable, but 
 his ministers succeeded in inserting into his reply certain condi- 
 
 1 Even in February, 1791, Catherine made vague hints about an intervention 
 in France to Austria and Sweden (Cobenzl's report of February 22, V. A., Russ- 
 land, Berichte; Schinkel-Bergman, Minnen, ii, pp. 151 ff.) For her later overtures 
 to those Powers: Cobenzl's report of June 11, V. A., loc. cit.; Ostermann to Golitsyn, 
 May 30/June 10, 1791, M. A., ABcrpifl, III, 51; Odhner, Gustaf III och Kata- 
 rina, pp. 173 ff.; Geffroy, Gitstave ITT el la Cour de France, ii, pp. no ff.; Catherine's 
 letters to Stackelberg, in the PyccKaa CTapHHa, iii; Dembinski, Rosya a reuiolucya 
 francuska, ch. iii. 
 
 217
 
 218 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 V 
 
 tions — especially about the cooperation of England — that 
 made it wellnigh declinatory. What was particularly char- 
 acteristic of the Prussian standpoint was the insistence that any 
 declarations to be addressed to the National Assembly must be 
 backed up by force, and that if military intervention was to be 
 attempted, the Powers must first come to an understanding on 
 the subject of ' conquests.' * With all his generous sympathy for 
 a fellow-sovereign in distress, Frederick William saw in the 
 French enterprise first and foremost a chance to make handsome 
 acquisitions. 
 
 At Vienna there was little thought of conquests and no real 
 eagerness for action of any kind. Neither a dismemberment of 
 France nor a complete restoration of the old monarchy seemed 
 desirable to the Austrian statesmen. Provided they could secure 
 a decent existence to the French royal family and suitable com- 
 pensation to the German princes dispossessed in Alsace, they 
 would have been well content to leave France in impotence and 
 anarchy. Universal principles have seldom exercised much in- 
 fluence over the policy of Vienna, and Leopold II, with his 
 constitutional ideas and strong common sense, was the last man 
 to feel any sentimental enthusiasm for ' the cause of all sover- 
 eigns.' When the answers received from the various Courts 
 sufficiently indicated that no effective concert of all the Powers 
 could be hoped for, the Austrian cabinet began to think chiefly of 
 retreating from an embarrassing position. This tendency was not 
 arrested by the meeting held by the Emperor and the King of 
 Prussia at Pillnitz as the guests of the Elector of Saxony towards 
 the close of August; for while French affairs were discussed at 
 length on this occasion, Leopold's prudence prevailed over Fred- 
 erick William's zeal for action and over the importunities of the 
 Count of Artois. The resulting declaration issued in the name of 
 the two monarchs aroused indignation in France, but it bound its 
 authors to nothing whatever. The negotiations for the concert of 
 the Powers continued for a time in a perfunctory way; but when 
 Louis XVI subscribed to the new constitution, Leopold hastened 
 to inform the other Courts that since the King had recovered his 
 
 1 Rescript to Jacobi of July 28, Herrmann, Erganzungsband, pp. 50-58.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 219 
 
 freedom and had voluntarily accepted his new position, there was 
 nothing to be done save to await the further course of events in 
 France. 1 The coalition against the Revolution seemed to be 
 definitely abandoned. 
 
 II 
 
 This lull in French affairs gave the Imperial cabinet the oppor- 
 tunity to take up the hardly less important Polish question. 
 The fate of the Constitution of the Third of May was still un- 
 decided; and the longer the suspense lasted, the more the political 
 constellation seemed to change to the detriment of the Poles. 
 Within the Republic, indeed, all was quiet; it was clear that the 
 malcontents were few in numbers and unable to stir without 
 foreign assistance; but the cloud on the eastern horizon grew 
 ever larger and darker. The Court of St. Petersburg maintained 
 an ominous silence, avoided any explanation with Austria on 
 Polish affairs, and hastened forward its peace with the Turks. 
 Kaunitz grew suspicious that the Empress' extraordinary zeal 
 for a crusade against France was based solely on a desire to divert 
 the attention of Austria and Prussia from Poland. 2 There were 
 also disquieting symptoms at Berlin. At Pillnitz Leopold and 
 Frederick William had again agreed to urge upon the Elector the 
 acceptance of the Polish crown; 3 but this was the last occasion 
 when the King showed any real inclination to favor the new order 
 of things in the Republic. Since then Kaunitz had had reason to 
 convince himself that the Prussians were at bottom opposed to 
 the new constitution, embarrassed by the approval which they 
 
 1 Austrian circular of November 12, 1791, Vivenot, i, pp. 270 f. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to the Emperor, November 5, V. A., Vortrage, 1791. The Austrians 
 still had no absolute certainty of this. I have been unable to find any authority 
 for the statement made by Sybel, op. cit., i, p. 389, and Heigel, op. cit., i, p. 454, that 
 about this time Golitsyn told Kaunitz that each of the Imperial Courts had its 
 counter-revolution to effect, the one at Paris, the other at Warsaw; and I am 
 strongly inclined to doubt the story. Golitsyn's reports show that he had not the 
 faintest knowledge of his sovereign's intentions about Poland, and he was hardly 
 the man to hazard such statements on his own responsibility. The story is probably 
 a bit of gossip retailed by Jacobi, the Prussian envoy at Vienna. 
 
 3 Spielmann to Kaunitz, August 31, Vivenot, op. cit., i, p. 238; Schlitter, Marie 
 Christine, p. lxvi.
 
 220 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 had been forced to give to it, and inclined to seize the first oppor- 
 tunity to repair the blunder. 
 
 To make the situation even more critical, the Elector was still 
 unable to decide either to accept or to reject the Polish throne. 
 Honorable and well-meaning, but cautious and irresolute in the 
 extreme, Frederick Augustus was torn between his desire for a 
 crown which two of his ancestors had worn and which his mother 
 had always planned to win for him, and his fear that this Polish 
 connection might again bring disaster upon his beloved Saxony. 
 His ambition was spurred on by his wife and by the not incon- 
 siderable ' Polish party ' at his court; but on the other hand his 
 ministers abhorred all political adventures and regarded a 
 system of pure passivity as the Alpha and Omega of Saxon state- 
 craft. Deterrent also were the reports from Warsaw of his 
 resident, the hypochondriac Essen, which contained nothing but 
 the most dismal jeremiads against the depraved Polish nation. 
 So for months the Elector vacillated. He could not bring himself 
 to refuse the honor, as some of his ministers advised him to do; 
 but he was also unwilling to accept without the fulfilment of 
 several conditions. Various changes must be made in the new 
 constitution, extending the royal prerogatives still further; and 
 he would have preferred to see the succession pass to his brother 
 rather than to his daughter, so that Saxony and Poland should be 
 permanently united. Above all, he was determined not to commit 
 himself until assured that there would be no opposition from any 
 one of the great neighboring Powers. 
 
 In spite of the warm expressions of friendship and support 
 received from the Emperor and the King of Prussia, Frederick 
 Augustus remained suspicious of both of them, and likewise of the 
 King of Poland. The repeated efforts of the government at 
 Warsaw, the mission of Bischoffwerder to Dresden at the end of 
 May, the interview at Pillnitz did not avail to draw the Elector 
 out of his irresolution. Every day that brought nearer the peace 
 between Russia and the Porte increased the danger to Poland, but 
 that consideration only made Frederick Augustus the more 
 cautious and reserved. By October the Poles had obtained from 
 him nothing more than the consent to open negotiations for the
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 221 
 
 purpose of clearing up the difficulties which he found in the new 
 constitution. At Warsaw this concession was taken for more 
 than it was worth, and it was hoped that a speedy negotiation 
 would end the Elector's scruples and secure an immediate accept- 
 ance. In November Prince Adam Czartoryski set out for 
 Dresden to undertake the mission, on which, as the Poles be- 
 lieved, the fate of their constitution depended. 
 
 The Austrian cabinet also attached great importance to this 
 negotiation, and they found themselves impelled by several other 
 incidents to undertake immediate action in Polish affairs. In 
 October the government at Warsaw, encouraged by Leopold's 
 friendly attitude to abandon the reserve which it had been accus- 
 tomed to maintain towards Austria, at last made a formal 
 communication of the new constitution at Vienna, and requested 
 the Emperor's good offices to secure for it the approval of the 
 Court of St. Petersburg. About the same time the Elector turned 
 to Leopold with a new appeal for advice. 1 The Austrians desired 
 nothing so much as to see Frederick Augustus accept without 
 further loss of time; but they hesitated to declare themselves 
 openly at Dresden and Warsaw out of regard for Russia. Co- 
 benzl's reports now left little hope that the Empress would ever 
 give her approval to the work of the Third of May, and they 
 pointed to the grave danger to the alliance, in case she adopted a 
 policy towards Poland which would be accepted by Prussia, but 
 rejected by Austria. And this was not the only peril ahead. The 
 Empress and her ministers were storming for action against 
 France, criticizing Leopold's conduct openly and bitterly, and 
 praising Frederick William's. The spectre of a rapprochement 
 between Prussia and Russia and the shipwreck of the alliance 
 between the Imperial Courts haunted the minds of the ambassa- 
 dor and his superiors. 2 
 
 In this delicate situation, in full realization of the danger of an 
 estrangement from Russia, the cabinet of Vienna still decided to 
 make anew attempt to save the Constitution of the Third of 
 May. To this end they determined to bind the hands of 
 
 1 Kaunitz to Leopold, November 25, V. A., Vortrage, 1791. 
 
 2 L. Cobenzl's reports of October 4, 7, and 13, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1701.
 
 222 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Prussia by turning the Convention of Vienna into a formal treaty 
 of alliance as soon as possible, 1 to make a last effort to convert 
 Russia to their views on Polish affairs, and to send a secret nego- 
 tiator to Dresden to persuade the Elector to accept the crown at 
 once. 
 
 As far as Prussia was concerned, the plan had somewhat the 
 nature of a stratagem. Kaunitz was quite convinced that the 
 internal consolidation of Poland was directly opposed to Prussian 
 interests and was so regarded at Berlin; but he reckoned that 
 Frederick William had so bound his own hands by his unlucky 
 Polish policy of the past three years, by the assurances given to 
 the Elector, and especially by the Convention of Vienna, that if 
 Frederick Augustus would only accept the crown at once, and if 
 the Convention were turned into a formal treaty, Prussia would 
 not only have to consent, bon gre mal gre, to the establishment of 
 the new order in Poland, but would even have to contribute to it. 2 
 Probably the Chancellor also reflected that it was important to 
 cement the union with the Court of Berlin at once in order to 
 prevent the latter from throwing itself into the arms of Russia 
 and possibly coming to an agreement with Catherine on Polish 
 affairs without the knowledge of Austria. Hence in their discus- 
 sions with the Prussian envoy the Imperial ministers emphasized 
 the necessity of settling the Polish question by a concert of the 
 three Courts, and avoided laying too much stress on the solution 
 which they themselves preferred. There was no need to alarm 
 
 1 That this decision to hasten the alliance with Prussia was not due to the 
 exigencies of the French question, as is generally assumed, appears from the fact 
 that the proposal was sent to Berlin along with the circular announcing the sus- 
 pension of the concert on French affairs. In view of the fact that the new repre- 
 sentations in favor of the Polish constitution were dispatched to St. Petersburg the 
 same day (November 12), and that in general throughout November Austrian 
 statesmen were preeminently occupied with this latter question, one may safely 
 assume that it was the Polish crisis that led to the resumption of the negotiation 
 for the alliance. Heidrich is, I think, the only writer who has remarked this (Preus- 
 sen im Kampfe gegen die franzosische Revolution, pp. 29 f.). 
 
 Landriani's mission to Dresden was first formally proposed, it appears, in a 
 report of Kaunitz to the Emperor of November 25, but one would judge from the 
 Chancellor's note to Spielmann of November 2 that it had been practically a settled 
 matter since the beginning of the month (V. A., Vorirage, 1791). 
 
 2 Kaunitz's Vortrag of November 25, V. A.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 223 
 
 the Prussians until the net was firmly fastened around them. 1 
 In accordance with the proposals made through Reuss, the pre- 
 liminary discussion of the treaty of alliance was at once begun 
 between Berlin and Vienna; 2 and although the delays inherent 
 in such a method of negotiating and the pressure of other business 
 prevented rapid progress, still Kaunitz could well be satisfied 
 with this part of his program. 
 
 The new attack at St. Petersburg was launched through the 
 voluminous instructions sent to Louis Cobenzl on November 12. 
 In these notable dispatches Kaunitz urged that it was imperative 
 for the Imperial Courts to define their attitude towards Poland at 
 once, since in the present critical condition of the Republic further 
 delay must result in the gravest dangers to the general tranquil- 
 lity. He pointed out with some asperity that the Court of Vienna 
 had communicated its views on Polish affairs as early as May, and 
 had waited vainly for six months for a similar confidence from 
 Russia. In the meantime it had been obliged to express itself in a 
 general way regarding the new constitution to Prussia and to the 
 Elector, and it could only assume that its declarations had not 
 been displeasing to the Court of Petersburg, since otherwise the 
 latter would have remonstrated. If the Empress, however, were 
 now to adopt a policy towards Poland contrary to that to which 
 she had allowed her ally to commit itself, the Court of Vienna 
 would be placed in the most embarrassing position, and the world 
 would draw the most unfortunate inferences as to the lack of 
 harmony between the two allies. But the more he considered the 
 
 1 In the face of such decisive documents as Kaunitz's Vortrag of November 25, 
 the orders to L. Cobenzl of November 12, and the instructions to Landriani, the 
 casual remarks of the Austrian ministers to Jacobi or the dubious surmises of the 
 Saxon and Polish envoys have no great significance for the interpretation of Austrian 
 policy on this question. Hence I cannot assent to Heigel's view {op. cit., i, p. 490, 
 note 2) that there was no great difference between the attitudes of Austria and 
 Prussia regarding Poland at this time. Both were indeed agreed that a concert of 
 the three neighboring Powers was necessary; but the concert that Prussia had in 
 mind was one in which Russia should speak the decisive word against the new con- 
 stitution, while that intended by the Austrians was to have no other business than 
 to approve a. fait accompli — the Elector's acceptance of the crown and the definitive 
 establishment of the new regime in Poland. 
 
 2 Orders to Reuss of November 12, his report of November 19, V. A., Preussen, 
 Exped. and Bcrichte, 1791.
 
 224 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 situation, Kaunitz continued, the more he was convinced that in 
 this question the interests of both Courts were identical. Both 
 were equally concerned, on the one hand, to shield the Republic 
 from the Prussian lust for aggrandizement, and, on the other, to 
 prevent it from becoming strong enough to endanger its neigh- 
 bors. Neither Court could desire further acquisitions of territory 
 in this quarter, since their frontiers were already so admirably 
 rounded out. From this it followed that a new partition of Po- 
 land would redound only to the advantage of Prussia, and to the 
 positive detriment of the Imperial Courts; that it was, indeed, 
 necessary that the royal power should remain limited, and that 
 the old republican spirit among the szlachta should not be allowed 
 to die out; but that it was quite as important that Poland should 
 cease to be the theatre of constant disturbances and a field 
 always open to Prussian schemes of aggrandizement, as it had 
 been under the old constitution. The new constitution was 
 admirable in that it promised to make the Republic just strong 
 enough, and not too strong. The change from an elective to a 
 limited hereditary monarchy was especially commendable, not 
 only because it would put an end to the periodical outbreaks of 
 anarchy inseparable from ' free elections/ but also because from 
 an hereditary sovereign the Imperial Courts could expect a more 
 constant and sincere attachment than from any elected king, who 
 was always sure to be blind to his own interests, or else powerless 
 to follow them. Moreover, if Poland were not allowed a stronger 
 monarchical government and a certain amount of reforms, it was 
 to be feared that the French democratic principles would take 
 root there, and Warsaw become a second Paris. All these con- 
 siderations led, of course, to the conclusion that the Imperial 
 Courts must at once declare themselves openly and clearly in 
 favor of the Constitution of the Third of May. 1 
 
 From the Austrian point of view, these dispatches were a mas- 
 terpiece. The appeal to the old principles so long agreed upon 
 between the Imperial Courts — the integrity of Poland, the dan- 
 ger of allowing Prussia further aggrandizement, the desirability 
 
 1 The dispatches to L. Cobenzl of November 12 are printed in part in Vivenot, 
 i, pp. 271-283.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 225 
 
 of an Austro-Russo-Polish league; the appeals to the Empress' 
 surviving resentment against Frederick William and to her new 
 hatred for ' the French ideas '; the not unsuccessful attempt to 
 demonstrate the innocuousness of the new constitution — these 
 were the arguments, if any, which might have persuaded Cath- 
 erine. But with all his belief in the power of his own dis- 
 patches, one must doubt whether Kaunitz cherished any great 
 hope that the Empress would allow herself to be persuaded; and 
 the fact that he took this decided step in spite of Louis Cobenzl's 
 warnings shows how strongly he and Leopold desired to uphold 
 the new order of things in Poland. 
 
 The third part of the November program, the mission to 
 Dresden, was entrusted to the Chevalier Landriani, a clever 
 Italian, half diplomat and half scientist, a confidant of the 
 Emperor and a man favorably known at both the Saxon and the 
 Polish courts. 1 Taking advantage of these connections, he was 
 ordered to negotiate directly with the Elector or with the favorite 
 Marcolini, avoiding the ill-disposed Saxon ministers as far as 
 possible, and surrounding his actions with the utmost secrecy, so 
 as not to compromise his Court with Russia or Prussia. The 
 confidential instruction made out for him is a document of much 
 interest; for here, freed from the precautions and reticences 
 necessary in communications to Berlin or St. Petersburg, Kaunitz 
 lays bare the fundamental ideas and inmost wishes that guided 
 the Polish policy of Austria at that time. 2 From it appears the 
 Chancellor's strong conviction that the firm establishment of the 
 new regime in Poland was peculiarly an Austrian interest, and an 
 Austrian interest of the first magnitude. He desired the consoli- 
 dation of the new constitution because it would enable the 
 Republic to free itself from all danger from, or dependence upon, 
 
 1 Landriani was an intimate friend of the Elector's favorite Marcolini. He en- 
 joyed the confidence of Stanislas Augustus to such a degree that the King several 
 times tried to get him appointed Austrian minister at Warsaw. 
 
 2 The voluminous Instruction pour M. le Chevalier de Landriani, V. A., F. A. 62, 
 dated December 12, and the other papers relating to his mission have hitherto 
 escaped the attention of the numerous investigators who have worked through this 
 period in the Austrian archives. Very interesting, too, is the Vortrag of Kaunitz 
 to the Emperor of November 25, analyzed in Beer, Leopold II, Franz II, und Catha- 
 rina, pp. 114-117.
 
 226 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 either Russia or Prussia. He approved of the Saxon succession, 
 because the Court of Dresden was always likely to be more de- 
 voted to Austria than to the other Powers. Best of all, he 
 thought, would be the establishment of a permanent personal 
 union between Saxony and Poland, as Frederick Augustus de- 
 sired; for there would thus be constituted a fairly strong state 
 which would naturally seek the alliance of Austria, as the one 
 neighbor with whom it had most in common, and from whom 
 it had least to fear. But Austrian interests also demanded that 
 the revival of Poland should not be carried beyond a certain 
 point; for if the Republic became strong enough to undertake 
 aggressive enterprises, it might cast its eyes on Galicia. Hence 
 Kaunitz desired that the royal prerogatives should not be ex- 
 tended beyond the limits fixed by the new constitution. 
 
 In accordance with these general ideas, the primary object of 
 Landriani's mission was to persuade the Elector to accept the 
 Polish crown immediately. That would place Russia and Prussia 
 before a fait accompli, which they could not with good grace 
 attempt to reverse. In order to overcome the Elector's irresolu- 
 tion, the envoy was equipped with all manner of arguments, some 
 of which did not bear the stamp of perfect sincerity. For in- 
 stance, he was to conceal, as far as possible, the fears entertained 
 at Vienna as to the attitude of Russia, and to insinuate rather 
 that the Empress was really not opposed to the new constitution; 
 if she remained silent, it was only because the Turkish war pre- 
 vented her from giving serious attention to the subject, or 
 because the conduct of the present Diet towards her must na- 
 turally lead her to adopt a certain reserve. Landriani was also 
 charged to persuade the Elector to abandon his demand for 
 further changes in the Polish constitution, on the ground that 
 such changes would involve an unfortunate delay and could 
 better be effected at some future time. As for Frederick Augus- 
 tus' desire to have the succession arranged in such a way as to 
 ensure the permanent union of Poland and Saxony, the envoy was 
 ordered to do what he could secretly to further the project, but 
 without showing his hand openly. There was a peculiar reason 
 for this caution regarding a plan so warmly approved of at
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 227 
 
 Vienna. Prince Anton, the Elector's brother and prospective 
 heir in Saxony, was Leopold's son-in-law. To have advocated 
 openly the extension of the Saxon law of succession to Poland 
 would have exposed the Emperor to the suspicion of working for 
 personal and dynastic ends. Hence Leopold felt bound to dis- 
 play a reserve which led many people at that time, and has led 
 many historians since, to conclude that he was averse to the 
 projected union of Saxony and Poland. 1 
 
 On his arrival at Dresden (December 18), Landriani found the 
 negotiations between the Saxon ministers and the Polish com- 
 missioners already begun but not progressing. The Elector 
 insisted on constitutional changes which the Poles professed 
 themselves utterly unable to grant; and he was still determined 
 not to accept the crown without the consent of all the neighboring 
 Powers. Under such circumstances Landriani soon convinced 
 himself that no amount of exhortations or arguments could 
 extort the immediate acceptance which he had been sent to 
 obtain. Nevertheless he threw himself with the greatest zeal 
 into the task of smoothing out the difficulties between Frederick 
 Augustus and the Poles over constitutional questions, and here 
 he attained a fair measure of success. Largely through his inter- 
 vention, it would seem, the Polish commissioners agreed to 
 recommend at Warsaw the alteration of the law of succession, so 
 as to ensure the permanent union of Poland and Saxony; and 
 they were also induced to promise various extensions of the royal 
 prerogatives in accordance with the Elector's wishes. 2 By the 
 end of January matters seemed to be going forward so satis- 
 factorily, the Elector appeared so eager to wear the crown and the 
 Poles so ready to make concessions, that Landriani was at a high 
 pitch of optimism. Given a fair amount of time, he was sure that 
 Frederick Augustus would in the end accept. 3 
 
 Meanwhile, the Austrian diplomat had been displaying a 
 talent scarcely inferior to Lucchesini's for gaining the confidence 
 of the Poles. The circles nearest to Stanislas Augustus came to 
 
 1 See Appendix VII. 
 
 2 Landriani's reports of December 30, January 9 and 14, February 22, V. A., 
 F.A. 62. 
 
 3 Reports of January 20 and February 4, V. A., F. A. 62.
 
 228 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 base their hopes of success at Dresden on ' our Landriani,' ' the 
 honest co-worker,' ' the Assisting Angel.' They were en- 
 couraged by him to dream of a quadruple alliance between 
 Austria, Prussia, Poland, and Saxony, a league that should 
 relegate Russia to the rank of an Asiatic Power. This glittering 
 project was to be brought to realization by a new mission of 
 Bischoffwerder to Dresden and Vienna and the coming of Lan- 
 driani to Warsaw. 1 But while the Poles were building these 
 air-castles and the Elector continued his interminable delays, the 
 face of affairs had once more been changed through the revival of 
 the danger from the west. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Since the end of November the war fever had been steadily 
 rising at Paris. The exchange of notes then begun with the Aus- 
 trian government, first on the subject of the emigres, and then 
 regarding Leopold's supposed counter-revolutionary plans, led 
 only to embitterment on both sides. Early in December Louis 
 XVI secretly addressed to the Powers an urgent plea for armed 
 intervention. The danger of a French attack, the spread of 
 ' Jacobin ideas ' in the Belgic provinces, the complaints made by 
 Marie Antoinette at other Courts about her brother's inaction — 
 all this combined to force Leopold and Kaunitz to resume in 
 January, 1792, the plan for a concert of the Powers against the 
 Revolution. They did not intend to venture forward a step 
 without a general concert, and even if the concert came into being, 
 
 1 The hold which Landriani soon won over the Poles is shown in the letters of 
 Stanislas' confidant Piattoli at Warsaw to Mostowski at Dresden, in which the 
 Austrian envoy is almost always referred to as L'Ange Subsidiaire. For a specimen 
 of the tone of this correspondence one may take the passage in Piattoli's letter of 
 February 3: " Depuis cette epoque la condition de l'Ange Subsidiaire devenant 
 celle d'un Esprit lumineux et brillant de toute sa clarte, il n'y a rien que nous ne 
 devions attendre de son heureuse influence." (These curious letters are in the 
 archive of Count Maurice Zamojski-Ordynat at Warsaw.) 
 
 As to the idea of the Quadruple Alliance, which aroused great hopes for a time 
 at Warsaw and which was regarded as Leopold's ' own system ': Bulgakov's diary, 
 January-March, passim, M. A., Iloabraa, III, 66; Cassini to Popov, February 
 25 and March 3 (Imperial Public Library, Petrograd, Papers of V. S. Popov); 
 Lucchesini's reports of January 7 and n, B. A., R. 9, 27.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 229 
 
 they were not inclined to undertake a complete restoration of the 
 old regime in France, such as was preached so vehemently at 
 Coblenz 1 and St. Petersburg. They hoped rather by mere de- 
 monstrations and threats to intimidate the National Assembly 
 and so to procure for Louis XVI the conditions of a tolerable 
 existence; in which event they would have been content to see 
 France remain in a state of " fluctuation, internal weakness, and 
 external nullity." 2 
 
 The whole calculation about the concert was sufficiently 
 erroneous; but it was a yet greater mistake that even before the 
 enterprise was launched Kaunitz saw fit to read biting rebukes to 
 the National Assembly and to admonish the French nation con- 
 cerning its internal affairs in a manner that could only be taken 
 as an insult at Paris. 3 Whether the great Revolutionary War 
 might have been avoided is a question one need not assume to 
 answer; but beyond a doubt the arrogant and challenging tone 
 adopted by the Austrian government in this crisis greatly facili- 
 tated its outbreak. By his failure to understand the character 
 and force of the Revolution, by his unhappy trust in the coercive 
 power of his " strong declarations," Kaunitz was largely respon- 
 sible for involving Austria in that disastrous struggle, which, 
 apart from its consequences in the west, threw the Court of 
 Vienna into dependence upon its rapacious allies, Russia and 
 Prussia, and forced it to sacrifice Poland. 4 
 
 The first result of the new crisis in Austro-French relations was 
 an effort on the part of the Imperial cabinet to come to a thor- 
 ough understanding with Prussia on all the pending questions. 
 At the beginning of January, Reuss was sent a draft of the treaty 
 of alliance, with full powers to conclude the matter and instruc- 
 
 1 The headquarters of the French emigr6s. 
 
 2 From the proposals of the State Chancellery to the ministerial Conference, 
 January 12, 1792, Vivenot, op. cit., i, pp. 330-341. 
 
 3 The Austrian notes of December 21, 1791, and February 17, 1792. 
 
 4 The best characterizations of Austrian policy in this connection are, I think, 
 those of Glagau (Die franzbsische Legislative und der Ursprung der Revolutions- 
 kriege, ch. vi), and Lenz (" Marie Antoinette im Kampfe mit der Revolution," in 
 Preussische Jahrbiicher, lxxviii). See also: Ranke, Ursprung und Beginn der Revolu- 
 tionskriege, pp. 128 ff.; Sybel, op. cit., ii, pp. 32 ff.; Sorel, op. cit., ii, pp. 342 ff.; 
 Heigel, op. cit., i, pp. 495 ff. 
 
 y
 
 230 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 tions to hasten. 1 Towards the end of the month the proposals 
 for the concert on French affairs were dispatched to Berlin, with 
 the categorical inquiry whether the King was ready to accept the 
 Emperor's views and to offer military cooperation in case the 
 concert came into existence. 2 Throughout the month constant 
 discussions also went on between the two Courts regarding the 
 Polish question. The more pressing grew the danger on the west, 
 the more necessary Kaunitz found it to settle Polish affairs at 
 once. The more he became convinced that Russia was invincibly 
 opposed to the new constitution, the more anxiously he strove 
 to win Prussia to his principles before the Empress had time to 
 declare herself. 
 
 Prussia, however, regarded both the French and the Polish 
 questions from a standpoint very different from the Austrian one. 
 While the Imperial cabinet had only been driven perforce to 
 resume the plan for a concert of the Powers, and would always 
 have preferred to get off with mere declarations and demonstra- 
 tions, Frederick William wanted to bring on a war. He con- 
 sented readily to the Austrian proposals, but constantly urged 
 the necessity of agreeing at once on the military measures to be 
 employed to back up the joint declarations. The Austrian plan 
 for the concert reached Berlin on January 31, and five days later 
 the Duke of Brunswick had already been summoned to discuss 
 plans for a campaign. The only additional diplomatic step that 
 was suggested by Prussia was one that seemed specially designed 
 to make war inevitable. It was the demand that the French 
 government repress by the most vigorous measures the machina- 
 tions of the society of the Amis de la Constitution, and of every 
 other association tending to propagate in other countries prin- 
 ciples subversive of order and tranquillity. 3 When it appeared 
 that the Austrian ministry inclined more and more to a peaceful 
 course, Frederick William made one effort after another to spur 
 them on to action. The extreme importance of not letting ' the 
 democrats ' think the two Courts feared a war, the urgent necessity 
 
 1 Kaunitz to Reuss, January 4, 1792, Vivenot, i, pp. 305 ff. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to Reuss, January 25, ibid., i, pp. 344-350. 
 
 3 The cabinet ministry to the King, February 3, B. A., R. 96, 147 G.; note 
 presented to Reuss, February 5, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, 1792.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 23 I 
 
 of putting an end to the troubles in France, the dangerous spread 
 of the infectious principles of ' insubordination and license,' the 
 sad plight of the emigres and the German princes dispossessed in 
 Alsace — one sees that there were arguments enough in the 
 repertory of Berlin. 1 But it was not these edifying reasons nor a 
 purely sentimental zeal for ' the cause of all sovereigns,' that led 
 the King of Prussia to labor so ardently to bring on a war. From 
 the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared 
 possible, Frederick William's dominant aim — the first and last 
 word of his policy — was territorial aggrandizement. 
 
 The idea appeared, as we have seen, in September, 1790, and in 
 July, 1 791; and from January, 1792 onward it formed the invari- 
 able refrain of every Prussian communication on French affairs. 2 
 The ill-sounding word ' conquests ' was, indeed, avoided as far as 
 possible; the Prussians preferred to speak of ' indemnities ' and 
 ' compensation for the expenses of an intervention,' with the 
 mental reservation that in view of the state of French finances 
 such indemnities could be taken only in land. In response to a 
 note from Berlin of January 13, the Austrian ministry had recog- 
 nized the justice of the principle that the Powers which took part 
 in an active intervention in France were entitled to compensa- 
 tion for their expenditures; and a confidential communication of 
 the King's views was requested. 3 The Court of Berlin replied 
 that the first step to be taken was to request a secret but formal 
 promise from Louis XVI to repay the costs of the intervention; 
 but that if such an engagement could not be obtained or fulfilled, 
 the conquests which the allied Courts would probably make, 
 
 1 Rescripts to Jacobi, February 6 and 9, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 169; instructions to 
 BischofTwerder of February 18, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172; reports of Reuss, February, 
 passim. 
 
 2 One could hardly attempt to point out all the occasions when the claim for 
 ' indemnities ' was brought forward on the Prussian side at this time. It will 
 suffice here to refer to Frederick William's letter to Louis XVI of January 13, 1792; 
 Schulenburg to Breteuil, January 13 and February 13; the notes presented to 
 Reuss, January 13 and February 5; the rescripts to Jacobi of January 14 and to 
 Goltz at St. Petersburg, February 10; Reuss' report of January 14, Alopeus' of 
 January 9/20 and 11/22; the dispatch of Carisien accompanying the letter of Gus- 
 tavus III to Fersen of February 6, in Klinckowstrom, Le Comic de Fersen et la 
 Cour de France, ii, pp. 164 f. 
 
 3 Kaunitz to Reuss, January 25, P. S. 3, Vivenot, i, p. 353. 
 
 y
 
 232 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 would furnish the most natural means of compensation. The 
 Prussians had, indeed, already entered into secret negotiations 
 with Louis' agent Breteuil, who had not hesitated to promise 
 reimbursement in money; but it is uncertain whether his master 
 ever formally consented to the agreement. 1 The Austrians fol- 
 lowed this example by making similar proposals to the King of 
 France through Count Mercy; but the matter was so long de- 
 layed through the reluctance of the French royal family to commit 
 themselves to a formal engagement, that before anything definite 
 had been arranged, the intervening Powers had agreed upon a 
 very different plan for their ' indemnities.' 2 
 
 With regard to Poland, Frederick William's sentiments had 
 changed greatly since the previous spring. In the early part of 
 May, 1 791, he had openly expressed warm approval of the new 
 constitution; at the end of the month he was still not against it; 
 but when, at the beginning of June, he learned that no effective 
 aid was to be expected from England in the Eastern crisis, his 
 attitude towards Poland began to alter immediately. Having 
 now renounced the policy of opposition to Russia, he no longer 
 saw any reason for seeking the friendship of the Republic. One 
 of the first signs of the change was a rescript to Goltz of June 10, 
 1 791, in which the King prophesied that the Empress would 
 never approve the Constitution of the Third of May, and ordered 
 the envoy to take care not to rebuff the Russian ministers if they 
 should make any friendly overtures on that topic. 3 As the Poles 
 saw the storm gathering in the east, they made repeated efforts 
 to induce Frederick William to promise his support in case of a 
 Russian attack. But henceforth the constant tenor of every 
 Prussian declaration at Warsaw was that the King, while remain- 
 ing loyal to the engagements contained in the alliance treaty, was 
 in no way bound to guarantee or defend a constitution estab- 
 lished without his knowledge and subsequent to the conclusion of 
 the alliance. The Poles — to their great misfortune — continued 
 
 1 Details in Flammermont, Negotiations secretes de Louis XVI el du Baron de 
 Breteuil avec la Cour de Berlin. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to Mercy, February 19, Mercy to Kaunitz, February 29, March 13, 
 April 17, and 23, V. A., Frankreich, F. 261. 
 
 3 Salomon, Das politische System des jiingeren Pitt, p. 64.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 233 
 
 to cherish some hopes of Prussian support, partly because they 
 imagined that the language of the Berlin ministry did not repre- 
 sent the King's true sentiments, partly because Lucchesini, now 
 returned to Warsaw, exhibited himself as such a Proteus among 
 diplomats that it was difficult to tell exactly what he was charged 
 to say; x but these hopes were built on sand. It was now the 
 fixed policy at Berlin to remain entirely passive in Polish affairs 
 until, as was confidently expected, Russia should come out in 
 opposition to the new constitution. The opportunity would then 
 be given to a form a concert of the three neighboring Powers, 
 which would overthrow the hereditary succession and the other 
 dangerous innovations of the Third of May, and would restore 
 the Republic to a becoming state of nullity. Exactly how this 
 beneficent work was to be accomplished was not yet certain; but 
 one may suspect that Schulenburg disclosed his master's arriere- 
 pensee, when in August (1791) he prophesied to the English envoy 
 a new partition of Poland. 2 
 
 It was favorable to the success of such plans that the relations 
 between Berlin and St. Petersburg were slowly improving. The 
 estrangement produced by the Eastern crisis lingered, indeed, 
 throughout the summer of 1791. Frederick William was deter- 
 mined not to take the first step towards a reconciliation with the 
 Empress; and as late as September she betrayed her surviving 
 resentment by revelling in sarcasms at his expense. 3 It was 
 French affairs that gave the first impetus to a rapprochement, the 
 earliest sign of which was the letter addressed by Catherine to 
 Frederick William about the middle of October. This encouraged 
 
 1 Lucchesini's dispatches are full of solemn assurances that his language con- 
 formed exactly to his instructions; but the reports of the Russian, Austrian, and 
 Saxon envoys combine to show that his utterances varied amazingly from day to 
 day. At one moment, he would be insinuating that all the neighbors of the Republic 
 were about to unite against it; at another, he would be firing the Poles with hopes 
 for the formation of a quadruple alliance in their defence. Bulgakov wrote in his 
 diary (December 6/17, 1791): " This Lucchesini in one and the same room tells 
 five people five different tales, and when he is caught contradicting what he has 
 just told someone else, he excuses himself with the plea: ' Qu'il faut parler a chacun 
 selon sa ported, mais le vrai est ce que je vous dis.' " M. A., Ilojitnia, III, 66. 
 
 s Ewart's report of August 4, Herrmann, Erganzungsband, p. 72. 
 
 3 Rescript to Goltz of August 27, in Salomon, op. cit., p. 66, note 1. Cobenzl's 
 reports of September 2, 6, 13, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1791.
 
 234 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Prussians to make counter-advances. At the end of the 
 month Bischoffwerder suggested to Alopeus that as it might be 
 repugnant to the Empress to accede to the future Austro-Prussian 
 alliance, it would depend only upon her to conclude a separate 
 alliance directly with the King. 1 In December the royal favorite 
 returned to the charge. He regretted, he said, that the alliance 
 with Russia could not precede that with Austria; but, at any rate, 
 it would be better to abandon all idea of a mere accession, and to 
 arrange a treaty directly between their two Courts. He would be 
 delighted to go to St. Petersburg and negotiate it himself, if 
 Alopeus would only propose that to the Prussian ministry as his 
 own idea. 2 These insinuations produced no direct response from 
 St. Petersburg; but still by the close of the year Goltz, the Prus- 
 sian envoy, began to find himself treated with more considera- 
 tion: the Empress spoke to him for the first time; the Grand 
 Duke knew him again. 3 As far as the delicate subject of Poland 
 was concerned, Schulenburg did his utmost by hints and sarcastic 
 comments to show Alopeus that the King was hostile to the new 
 constitution, and Bischoffwerder repeatedly asked that envoy 
 directly what his Court thought about Polish affairs. 4 Russia 
 remained absolutely silent on that question, but the Prussians 
 were not discouraged. When the Empress finally got ready to 
 speak, they were sure that an agreement between the two Powers 
 would come of itself. 
 
 Under such circumstances, Kaunitz's attempt to win over the 
 Court of Berlin to his Polish policy was doomed to failure. In 
 their note of January 13, the Prussian ministry urged that while 
 the King, like the Emperor, was far from wishing to oppose the 
 new constitution or the succession of the Elector, still it would be 
 a very delicate matter to take any steps in this affair until the 
 sentiments of Russia were known; and that while the Court of 
 Vienna seemed to regard the separate article of the July Conven- 
 
 1 Alopeus' report of October 19/30, M. A., Ilpyccia, III, 27. 
 
 2 Alopeus to Bezborodko, December 12/23, M. A., Hpyccia, III, 26. 
 
 3 Cf. Heidrich, Preussen im Kantpfe gegen die franzosische Revolution, p. 173. 
 
 4 Alopeus' reports of November 15/26, November 22/December 3, Decem- 
 ber 16/27, January 17/28, February 3/14, and 10/21, M. A., Ilpyccia, III, 27 
 and 29.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 235 
 
 tion as referring specifically to the Constitution of the Third of 
 May, they had always understood it to refer only to any free con- 
 stitution, i. e., one not imposed by any foreign Power. Hence 
 they desired to avoid ambiguities by omitting from the treaty of 
 alliance all mention of the constitution of Poland and promising to 
 maintain only " the liberty and independence of that Kingdom." 
 The ominous significance of the proposed change was quite 
 appreciated at Vienna. But immediately after the Prussian note 
 there arrived still more exasperating communications from St. 
 Petersburg. The Empress had seen fit to read Leopold a new and 
 impertinent lecture on his slackness in French affairs, and to pro- 
 pose a plan of action which only showed how little she understood 
 the situation or troubled herself about the interests of her ally. 
 The indignation of the Austrians was increased by the fact that 
 these dispatches did not contain the long and anxiously awaited 
 response on Polish affairs, but only a request that the Emperor 
 would take no step regarding them ' which might hinder the 
 freedom of the future joint deliberations.' ' The delay,' it was 
 added, ' was not only without inconvenience, but even necessary 
 in view of the confusion and irresolution still prevailing in the 
 minds of the Poles regarding the delicate and important innova- 
 tions which had been and were still being introduced.' l The 
 inference to be drawn from this was only too obvious. Putting it 
 alongside the answer received from Berlin, the Austrians found 
 themselves in danger of being isolated on the Polish question. 
 What the result of an agreement between Russia and Prussia on 
 that subject would be, seemed equally clear. It would be a new 
 partition. Doubtless under other circumstances the Court of 
 Vienna would have tried to avoid such a disaster by reverting to 
 its old policy of 1781, by giving Russia a free hand in Poland, 
 providing she agreed to keep the Prussians out. But now the 
 danger from France rendered the friendship of Prussia all- 
 important; and moreover, the Austrians were so indignant against 
 their old ally that they began to regard the restoration of Russia's 
 exclusive predominance in Poland as among the worst of evils. 
 Hence they fell back on the concert with Prussia, in the vain hope 
 
 1 Ostermann to Golitsyn, December 25/January 5, M. A., ABCtpifl, III, 51.
 
 236 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 that eloquent exhortations and small concessions might induce 
 Frederick William to oppose Catherine's projects and thereby to 
 deprive himself of the chance to gain a long-sought acquisition. 
 
 In the dispatches of January 25, Reuss was authorized to give 
 way on the article relating to Poland; but at the same time in an 
 ostensible postscript Kaunitz earnestly and forcibly pointed out 
 how dangerous it would be to the new friendship of the two 
 Courts, how inconsistent with the whole spirit of their alliance, if 
 Prussia were now to embark upon schemes for violent aggrandize- 
 ment at the expense of the Republic. 1 The Chancellor's warnings 
 were only too well grounded. Without throwing the entire 
 blame for what followed upon Prussia, one may still surmise that 
 many later disasters might have been avoided, and especially that 
 the great contest with revolutionary France might have taken a 
 very different turn, if the Court of Berlin could only have brought 
 itself to postpone the realization of its designs on Poland to a 
 more propitious time. But Kaunitz's admonitions fell on deaf 
 ears at Berlin. 
 
 At any rate, the difficulty about the treaty of alliance was now 
 removed. It was agreed that the article respecting Poland should 
 pledge the two Courts " to undertake nothing contrary to the 
 maintenance of a free constitution " in that country, in place of 
 the old phrase which referred to " the free constitution." It was a 
 change of but a single word, but it indicated the momentous 
 alteration that had come about in the Polish policy of Prussia 
 since the previous summer. In other respects the treaty con- 
 formed in substance to the Vienna Convention of July 25, while 
 in form it was modeled — significantly enough — after the 
 Treaty of Versailles of 1756. With its signature at Berlin on 
 February 7, 1792, the Austro-Prussian alliance was at last an 
 accomplished fact. 2 
 
 1 These dispatches are printed in Vivenot, i, pp. 353, 358 ff. 
 
 1 The treaty is printed in Neumann, Recueil, i, pp. 470-475; Martens, Recueil 
 de Traites des Puissances de I' Europe, v, pp. 301-305 ; the secret articles in Vivenot, 
 i, pp. 370 f.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 237 
 
 IV 
 
 In accordance with the wish expressed by the Emperor early in 
 January, it had already been agreed that Bischoffwerder should 
 undertake a new mission to Vienna to arrange the measures to be 
 adopted against France. On February 16 a conference was held 
 at Potsdam, at which the Kong, the Duke of Brunswick, Bischoff- 
 werder, Schulenburg, and Manstein were present, to decide upon 
 a plan of campaign. It appears, however, that other matters 
 were also discussed, and that a new project of the utmost impor- 
 tance was broached here, perhaps for the first time. The day 
 before, a courier had arrived from St. Petersburg with news that 
 must have seemed to the Prussians like the opening of the 
 heavens. 
 
 Goltz reported that through a secret channel he had learned the 
 contents of a note from the Empress to her favorite, Zubov, in 
 which she declared: " After all has been arranged with the Turks, 
 I wish Prince Repnin to go to the main army, collect as many 
 troops as he can — which, according to my calculation, will 
 amount to 130,000 men — and with them march by way of 
 the Ukraine into Poland. If Austria and Prussia oppose, as 
 is probable, I shall propose to them either compensation or 
 partition." 1 
 
 This was the first definite information about the Empress' 
 plans that had reached Berlin; and no news could have been 
 more welcome. Immediately the idea was brought forward at the 
 Potsdam conference of combining the settlement of Polish affairs 
 with the French enterprise, in the way that Prussia should take 
 her ' indemnities ' for the expense of the intervention in the west 
 by wrenching territory from her unfortunate eastern neighbor. 
 Nothing final was decided upon; nothing could be until the 
 intentions of Russia were more fully known; but one may safely 
 assert that from the middle of February on, from the moment 
 when the first favorable news arrived from St. Petersburg, the 
 
 1 Goltz's report of February 3, printed in Herrmann, Ergdnzungsband., pp. 
 231 f. See Appendix VIII.
 
 238 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Prussians were hoping and planning for a new partition of Poland, 
 for which the intervention in France might perhaps furnish the 
 pretext. 1 
 
 The first result of the Potsdam deliberations was that a few 
 days later Bischoffwerder visited Alopeus and, drawing the con- 
 versation upon Poland, assured him that the King was not in the 
 least inclined to support the new constitution, but that he re- 
 garded any ' explosion ' in the Republic as dangerous, as long as 
 French affairs were not terminated. 2 Although Bischoffwerder's 
 subtlety was lost on the Russian, the aim of this hint seems clear 
 enough. If the Empress was ready to propose a partition, in case 
 the other Powers offered opposition to the execution of her plan 
 — very well: the Prussians would offer such an appearance of 
 opposition as would not deter her from her essential aim, but 
 would lead her to take them into partnership. 
 
 The effect of the news from St. Petersburg is also seen in the 
 instructions drawn up for Bischoffwerder's mission to Vienna. 
 The article regarding Poland contained first of all the usual pro- 
 testations that the King's engagements with the Republic were 
 in no sense applicable to the new constitution, and that he in- 
 tended to act in the most perfect harmony with the Emperor on 
 Polish affairs. It was denied that there had been any discussions 
 
 1 We have very few documents through which to trace these developments of 
 February. My account is based chiefly on the Duke of Brunswick's letter to 
 Bischoffwerder of February 19: " Die Entschadigungs-Angelegenheit wird grosse 
 Verlegenheit herbeifuhren, wenn man den Kaiser nicht vermogen kann, seine Ein- 
 willigung zu den Veranderungen in Polen zu geben. Ich gebe den Erwerbungen, 
 die man in Polen zu machen hofft, den Vorzug vor den Eroberungen in Frankreich. 
 . . . Alles kommt darauf an, dass man sich mit dem Kaiser erklare." (Translation 
 from the French in Massenbach, Memoiren, i, p. 267.) Since Goltz's dispatch 
 came February 15, and the Potsdam conference took place the 16th, while the 
 Duke of Brunswick arrived from his capital that morning, departed homeward that 
 evening, and wrote the letter to Bischoffwerder almost immediately after his return, 
 it may safely be presumed that he learned of the " Erwerbungen die man in Polen 
 zu machen hofft " during the discussions at Potsdam. His championship of the 
 idea of a new partition of Poland is referred to in a letter from the King to 
 Bischoffwerder of March 14: " II paroit que les vues de l'lmperatrice touchant la 
 Pologne pourroit [sic] amener l'evenement que le Due de Bronsviq souhaite de voir 
 arriver et dont il parle dans la lettre que je Vous envoye [sic] a Dresde," B. A., R. i, 
 Conv. 172. 
 
 2 Alopeus' report of February 10/21, M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 239 
 
 on the subject between Russia and Prussia, and especially that 
 the Empress had made any overtures about projects of aggran- 
 dizement in Poland, " although," it was added, " one doubtless 
 cannot guarantee that this sovereign may not have plans of that 
 kind." If the King received any hints on that topic from Russia, 
 he would not fail to communicate them frankly to the Emperor, 
 in the conviction that in a similar case the Court of Vienna would 
 act in the same way towards him. "These cordial assurances," it 
 was said, " will furnish General Bischoffwerder the most natural 
 occasion to convince the Imperial Court that ... in order to 
 obtain in full the advantages which the union happily existing 
 [between the two Courts] ought to procure them, it is essential 
 that the most unlimited confidence in one another should animate 
 both in all that concerns their respective interests; and that they 
 should thus from the beginning remove by frank and amicable 
 explanations all that might later sow distrust between them and 
 alter their complete harmony." These words were not merely 
 conventional expressions of loyalty and confidence towards an 
 ally. They were a direct reply to Kaunitz's recent warning that 
 the friendship between the two Courts would be exposed to grave 
 peril, if Prussia entered upon plans for aggrandizement in Poland. 
 They were designed to pave the way for an understanding on the 
 basis of a partition, as soon as Russia had uttered the expected 
 word. 
 
 It may at first sight appear a contradiction to that which has 
 just been said, that in the article of the instruction which dealt 
 with the subject of ' indemnities,' the old plan — Alsace and Lor- 
 raine for Austria, Juliers and Berg for Prussia — was once more 
 recommended. Probably this was because it seemed necessary to 
 keep up the claim for an acquisition in the West as long as the 
 prospects for making one in the East were still uncertain. Fur- 
 thermore, the Prussian ministry could hardly have wished to dis- 
 close their hand to Austria too fully until Russia had spoken. 
 But, to all appearances, they no longer entertained serious plans 
 for a dismemberment of France. Bischoffwerder seems to have 
 displayed little zeal for that project while in Vienna; and at the 
 end of February Louis XVI's agent at Berlin was joyfully re-
 
 240 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 porting that there was no more talk of demanding a territorial 
 indemnity from his master. 1 
 
 Charged with these equivocal instructions respecting Poland, 
 which showed that Prussia was veering further and further away 
 from the Austrian standpoint on that question, Bischoffwerder 
 was also the bearer of proposals regarding the French problem 
 that were but little in harmony with the Emperor's wishes. The 
 main object of his mission was, indeed, to shake the Imperial 
 cabinet out of its too pacific temper, to inveigle Leopold into 
 armed intervention in France, and to arrange the plan of cam- 
 paign. 2 
 
 Bischoffwerder arrived in the Austrian capital on February 28; 
 but this time he was not to see that Imperial friend who had so 
 charmingly received him and smilingly outwitted him on his two 
 previous visits. At this crucial moment, when both the long- 
 gathering storms were about to burst in East and West, when an 
 experienced hand was needed more than ever at the helm, 
 Leopold II died suddenly, after an illness of only three days 
 (March 1, 1792). His death was an irremediable loss to Austria, 
 and perhaps to Europe. Whether he could have carried on with 
 success the struggle against revolutionary France must remain 
 uncertain; but he was assuredly the one sovereign of that time 
 least unfitted for that task. Quite certainly he could not have 
 averted the Russian attack on Poland, but he might, not improb- 
 ably, have prevented a new partition. 
 
 It is true that at the close of Leopold's reign his own Polish 
 policy was crumbling. His effort to hold Prussia firm in defence 
 of the new constitution had failed. Fruitless, too, had been his 
 
 1 Cf. Fersen to Gustavus III, February 29, and the directly contrary opinion 
 held at the beginning of that month, Gustavus to Fersen, February 6, Klinckow- 
 strom, op. cit., ii, pp. 182 and 165. 
 
 2 Stripped of its verbiage, the first article of his instruction certainly means this 
 and nothing else. Compare Carisien's report in Taube, Svenska Beskickningars 
 Berdttelser, pp. 95 f.; Fersen to Gustavus III, March 4, 1792, Klinckowstrom, 
 op. cit., ii, p. 193; Alopeus' report of February 10/21, M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29. 
 Bichoffwerder himself speaks of " le parti vigoureux que j'ai a proposer " (Report 
 of February 29, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172). 
 
 Bischoffwerder's instructions are printed in Ranke, Ursprung und Beginn der 
 Revolutionskriege, pp. 351-359.
 
 THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 24 1 
 
 attempt to extort a quick acceptance of the crown from the Elec- 
 tor. At the beginning of March the interminable negotiation at 
 Dresden still dragged on — or rather it was about to be trans- 
 ferred to Warsaw — with no prospects of an immediate decision. 
 War with France was now very nearly inevitable; and in that 
 case Austria would necessarily be quite unable to assert her voice 
 effectively in Polish affairs. Above all, Catherine had at last 
 spoken. At the time of the Emperor's death couriers were speed- 
 ing westward from St. Petersburg with news that confirmed well- 
 nigh all that was hoped at Berlin and all that was feared at 
 Vienna. That pronouncement from Russia was the ruin of Leo- 
 pold's Polish system. It may, indeed, be doubted whether his 
 policy in this connection did any good either to Austria or to the 
 Republic. On the one hand, it had deeply offended Catherine, 
 weakened the alliance of the Imperial Courts, and contributed to 
 the rapprochement between Berlin and St. Petersburg; and on the 
 other hand, it had lulled the Poles with false hopes of support 
 from without, which led them sadly to neglect their own prepara- 
 tions for self-defence. It won Leopold golden opinions only at 
 Warsaw. 
 
 At the end of his reign the Emperor enjoyed a popularity 
 among the Poles such as the Court of Vienna had not possessed 
 for many years. This was due in part to his mild treatment of his 
 Galician subjects; to the often very exaggerated reports spread 
 at Warsaw about the provisions in favor of Poland contained in 
 the July Convention and the February treaty of alliance; possibly 
 to certain assurances sent from Vienna through secret channels; l 
 but above all, to the general confidence felt in the Emperor's love 
 of peace, justice, and moderation, and to the indefatigable activity 
 of Landriani. Leopold had come to occupy much the same posi- 
 tion in the minds of the Poles as had once been held by Frederick 
 William. 2 They relied on his beneficent influence at Dresden and 
 
 1 Bulgakov, reporting to the Empress the causes of Leopold's popularity at 
 Warsaw, claimed to know on good authority that a secret correspondence went on 
 between the Emperor and the King of Poland through Corticelli, the former Polish 
 minister at Vienna, Spielmann, and Manfredini (another confidant of Leopold's). 
 Report of March 6/17, M. A., IloJbraa, III, 66. 
 
 2 Lucchesini's report of March n, 1792: "Leopold II et le Chevalier Lan-
 
 242 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Berlin; and on him many of them based their hopes of security 
 against Russia. It was reported that he intended to build up a 
 quadruple alliance of Austria, Prussia, Poland, and Saxony. 
 " His political system," it was said in the patriotic conventicles at 
 Warsaw " was to establish the general tranquillity on a perma- 
 nent basis, and to exclude Russia from the circle of European 
 states." Nowhere was his death more regretted than at Warsaw. 
 People declared that the nation had lost its friend, its powerful 
 protector, its support. 1 And in truth the nation had lost the one 
 foreign sovereign who had done his best to uphold the work of the 
 Third of May, and who was sincerely well-disposed towards 
 Poland. 
 
 driani avoient herite de la confiance qu'on avoit cidevant place en Votre Majeste et 
 moi," B. A., R. 9, 27. 
 
 1 For the above: Bulgakov's report to the Empress of March 6/17, M. A., 
 IloJibma, III, 66; Lucchesini's reports of January 7 and 11, February 22, March 
 7, B. A., R. 9, 27; de Cache's of March 10 and 14, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1792.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 The Outbreak of War in East and West 
 
 At the time of Catherine's first Turkish war, Sweden had seized 
 the opportunity to free itself from her grasp by the revolution of 
 1772, which had reformed a constitution almost as vicious as the 
 Polish one, concentrated the power of the state in the hands of 
 the monarch, and closed the door to further foreign interference. 
 Catherine had not seen fit to go to war about it. During her 
 second conflict with the Turks, Poland had tried to do precisely 
 the same thing as the Swedes had done, by means of a coup 
 d'etat consciously modeled upon that of Gustavus III. At the 
 close of the Oriental crisis, it was long believed at Warsaw that 
 the Empress would ultimately bow to the accomplished fact, as 
 she had done in the case of Sweden. She might sulk, she might 
 intrigue, she might even make demonstrations on the frontier, 
 but it was not thought probable that she would go further. An 
 attempt to reimpose the Russian yoke by force seemed scarcely 
 likely to be tolerated by the German Powers, one of whom was 
 now the warm friend of Poland, and the other its ally, pledged to 
 defend its independence. Moreover, how could the Empress 
 consistently attack the Poles for having established a monarchical 
 form of government, at a time when she was preaching to all 
 sovereigns the necessity of taking up the sacred cause of mon- 
 archy in France ? H«w could she face the odium of going to war 
 with her neighbors simply because they wished to reform their 
 institutions; of overthrowing by force of arms a constitution 
 which the whole nation, with few exceptions, had gladly accepted, 
 and which had received the applause of all Europe ? Neverthe- 
 less, as soon as her peace with the Turks was signed, Catherine 
 proceeded to undertake precisely this graceless task; and one 
 hardly knows whether to wonder the more at the unscrupulous- 
 ness or at the skill with which the enterprise was carried out. 
 
 »43
 
 244 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Although for nearly three years the Empress had maintained 
 an outwardly passive attitude and an ostentatious show of indif- 
 ference towards Poland, she seems never for a moment to have 
 wavered in the determination not to permit that country to 
 escape permanently from her control. Vindictiveness for the 
 slights and injuries inflicted upon her during the Turkish war may 
 have had some part in influencing her resolution; but she was, 
 undoubtedly, guided chiefly by the firm conviction that the vital 
 interests of her Empire and all the traditions of Russian policy 
 required that Poland should be kept under its old republican 
 constitution and in its old state of perfect impotence. The Poles 
 might fret and strut, they might inveigh against her and intrigue 
 with her enemies, they might make and mar their institutions to 
 suit their fancy for the present; but they should pay for it in the 
 end. Her time for action would come as soon as the Turks were 
 off her hands; and the program, marked out long in advance, 
 was a Confederation under Russian auspices. 1 
 
 All hopes that the nation would of its own accord return to the 
 side of its ancient protector were shattered by the events of the 
 Third of May. Catherine was furious at the news. ' The Poles 
 had outdone all the follies of the Parisian National Assembly/ 
 she wrote to Grimm; ' they must indeed be possessed of devils to 
 act in a manner so contrary to their own interests and to the very 
 conditions of their existence.' The morning after the tidings 
 arrived, she informed Bezborodko : " The question now is whether 
 Poland wishes to be ruled by the mob of Warsaw. If we see the 
 slightest inclination for a Counter-confederation, we must bring 
 one about without further delay. There you have my opinion." 2 
 The Council of the Empire, when asked for its advice, replied 
 that the new form of government, if once firmly established, 
 could only prove harmful to the neighboring Powers, and especi- 
 ally to Russia; but that as long as it was uncertain whether the 
 King of Prussia had had a hand in the revolution, and as long as 
 the Turkish war lasted, it was impossible to decide upon any 
 
 1 One of her earliest definite utterances on the subject is in the letter to Potem- 
 kin of September 30/October 11, 1790: "When God grants peace, then we shall 
 form a Counter-confederation," etc., C6opHHKi>, xlii, p. no. 
 
 2 To Grimm, C6opHHKi, xxiii, pp. 534 f.; to Bezborodko, ibid., xlii, p. 152.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 245 
 
 course of action. 1 After the first flush of anger was over, the 
 Empress too came around to this standpoint. Orders were ac- 
 cordingly sent to Bulgakov, her envoy at Warsaw, to continue 
 the same passive conduct as before, but in private to assure the 
 friends of freedom — if such there still were — that Russia would 
 always be ready to help them recover their liberty, as soon as 
 they showed a desire for it not only by words but by deeds. 2 
 Henceforth it was the Empress' first and foremost aim to over- 
 throw this thoroughly obnoxious constitution. Henceforth she 
 had a tolerable pretext for action, inasmuch as she had by the 
 treaties of 1768 and 1775 guaranteed to the Republic its old form 
 of government. Henceforth if her aid were invoked, she could 
 color her intervention before the world by the plea that she was 
 legally and morally bound to defend the ' liberty ' of Poland, and 
 that she could not refuse to succor the allied nation now groaning 
 under a ' despotism ' imposed by conspiracy, fraud, and violence. 
 Determined as the Empress was to act with vigor when the 
 proper time came, it was difficult for her to satisfy Potemkin. It 
 has already been noted that that restless schemer had come to the 
 capital in the spring of 1791 to press his own aggressive projects 
 against the Republic. As usual, he had several irons in the fire. 
 The favorite plan was still that of raising an Orthodox rebellion 
 in the Ukraine and robbing Poland of its richest provinces; but 
 he also talked at times of a new partition on a gigantic scale, and 
 again he urged the immediate formation of a Confederation 
 among the Poles themselves. For this last plan he hoped to find a 
 ready instrument in his friend Felix Potocki, and a pretext in the 
 revolution of the Third of May. These projects did not entirely 
 square with those of his sovereign. Catherine had always re- 
 garded the Ukraine scheme with misgivings; if she approved of 
 the idea of a Counter-confederation, she did not mean to be 
 rushed into the enterprise precipitately ; and she apparently felt 
 at this time a growing distrust regarding Potemkin's dreams of 
 personal aggrandizement. Moreover, she was vexed with him 
 because of his hostility to the reigning favorite Zubov, and be- 
 
 1 Protocol of May 12/23, Apx. Toe. Cob., i, p. 853. 
 
 2 Rescript to Bulgakov, May 25/June 5, M. A., IIojii>ma, III, 63.
 
 246 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 cause of his interminable delay about returning to the army. It 
 was probably mainly in order to get rid of him that at the end 
 of May she gave him a secret rescript once more approving in 
 general terms his plan of the preceding year for the seizure of the 
 Ukraine, but limiting its execution by so many conditions as to 
 render the concession quite illusory. On the other hand, the pro- 
 ject of forming a Confederation was sanctioned, and the Prince 
 was directed to work out the scheme in detail. 
 
 Shortly afterwards Potemkin received a letter from Felix 
 Potocki containing quite definite proposals for a Confederation 
 to be formed in the southeastern palatinates under Russian 
 protection for the overthrow of the new constitution. 1 Armed 
 with this, the Prince returned to the charge; and after long delays 
 he secured one more ' most secret rescript/ this time of a less 
 fictitious and more satisfactory character than the preceding one. 
 It was true that the execution of the Ukraine project was again 
 relegated to the dim future; but the plan for a Confederation was 
 approved in terms that showed the Empress resolved to proceed 
 with that in earnest. Potemkin was authorized to invite Potocki 
 and the other leading Polish malcontents to his headquarters; to 
 assure them of Russia's most efficacious aid and protection; and 
 to settle with them the details of the future undertaking, subject 
 to the Empress' approval. If they insisted on forming their 
 Confederation at once, Catherine was willing to begin action 
 immediately; but she preferred to postpone her intervention 
 until after the peace with the Turks, which at that time — the 
 end of July, after the complete backdown of the Triple Alliance 
 and Repnin's brilliant victory at Macin — seemed to be very 
 close at hand. The return of the Russian armies from Moldavia 
 through Poland would then afford the best opportunity to strike 
 the great blow. While outlining with remarkable foresight the 
 means and methods to be employed, Catherine also showed her- 
 self fully conscious of the momentous consequences of the enter- 
 prise on which =^° was embarking. "It is difficult now," she 
 
 .arliest d 
 1 Potockjnber 30/Cmkin, May 14, 1791, M. A., Ilojbraa, II, 7. Appendix 
 IX contains tr-confxt of this letter, of which only the existence has hitherto been 
 known, and to which may be traced the origins of the Confederation of Targowica.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 247 
 
 wrote, " to predict the end to which this policy will lead; but if 
 with the aid of the Almighty it is crowned with success, two 
 advantages may result for us. In the one case, we shall be able to 
 overthrow the present constitution and to restore the old Polish 
 liberty; and thereby we shall gain complete security for our 
 Empire for all time. Or in case the King of Prussia should dis- 
 play an invincible covetousness, we shall find ourselves obliged, 
 in order to put an end to these troubles and disturbances once for 
 all, to agree to a new partition of Poland in favor of the three 
 allied Powers. From this there will result the advantage that we 
 shall extend the boundaries of our Empire, augment by so much 
 its security, and win new subjects of the same faith and blood as 
 ourselves. Poland, on the other hand, will be reduced to such 
 limits that whatever be the strength of its government, it can 
 offer no dangers to the neighboring Powers, and will form only a 
 sort of barrier between them." 1 
 
 Potemkin, however, was not to reap the fruits of all these years 
 of planning and intriguing. He left St. Petersburg at the begin- 
 ning of August sullen and depressed, and died in Moldavia two 
 months later — the victim of a fever, due to the effects of an 
 ill-regulated life, and perhaps to the chagrins occasioned by his 
 last stay at court. Unfortunately, his death was not to be the 
 end of his oft-confirmed and much delayed plans. 
 
 II 
 
 Deprived of a helper who towards the last had become a trifle 
 burdensome, the Empress now took Polish affairs more directly 
 
 1 The two famous rescripts to Potemkin of May 16/27 an d July 18/29, I 79 I > 
 are printed in the Pyc. Apx., 1874, ii, pp. 246-258, 281-289; also by Kalinka in 
 Polish translation in his " Polityka dworu austryackiego," in Przeglqd Polski, 1873, 
 pp. 82-85, 88-92; and by Liske in German in //. Z., xxx, pp. 286-301. On Potem- 
 kin's shaken position at court at the time of his last visit to St. Petersburg, see: 
 Pyccofl CTapnua, xiv, pp. 241 ff.; ^epasaBnui, 3airacKH, pp. 304-308; BpHKnept, 
 IIoTeMKHHT., pp. 194 ff. In view of the rather strained relations then existing 
 between the Empress and the Prince, Askenazy seems inclined to deny to both 
 rescripts any importance as an expression of Catherine's real intentions (Przymierze 
 polsko-pruskie, pp. 162 f.). I should agree that the first rescript was very much of 
 a sham; but that the second was not appears — best of all — from the fact that 
 almost every plan there announced was duly carried out the next year.
 
 248 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 into her own hands, with her usual vigor and with a sureness in 
 the choice of persons, means, and occasions that has rarely been 
 surpassed. The fiery ardor with which she preached the counter- 
 revolution in France to Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, her well- 
 calculated and nicely measured rapprochement to the Court of 
 Berlin, her masterly silence towards Vienna on the Polish ques- 
 tion — all this was designed only to secure her a free hand in the 
 Republic. If she had originally planned to take the Emperor 
 into her confidence, 1 she soon abandoned the idea. Kaunitz's 
 efforts on behalf of the new Polish constitution threw her into 
 transports of rage, while the Emperor's slackness in French 
 affairs aroused her far from disinterested indignation. By the 
 end of the year she and all the Russians in chorus after her were 
 coming to declaim on every occasion that Leopold II was a 
 timid, nay a craven, prince, whose soul knew naught of honor or 
 dignity or magnanimity or any other of the virtues that were 
 supposed to characterize peculiarly the Court of Petersburg. 
 That meant that the Emperor had presumed to have an opinion 
 of his own on both the French and the Polish questions — an 
 unpardonable offence in an ally of the great Catherine. She was 
 coming to see in him the main obstacle to the realization of her 
 plans. But, far from being daunted, she insisted all the more 
 vigorously on going ahead with the Polish project, regardless of 
 the wishes of Austria and Prussia. " I inform the members of the 
 College of Foreign Affairs," she wrote in December, " that we can 
 do everything that we please in Poland, and the contradictory 
 demi-volontes of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin will oppose us 
 only with a stack of paper objections, and we shall settle our 
 affairs in Poland ourselves. I am hostile only to those who try to 
 intimidate me. Catherine II has often made her enemies tremble, 
 but I have not heard that Leopold's foes have ever feared him." 2 
 When one of her ministers objected that nothing should be done 
 until they had built up a party in Poland and made at least some 
 overtures to the German Powers, she wrote: " But I say that we 
 
 1 See the ahove-cited rescripts to Potemkin, especially that of July 18/29. 
 
 2 Notes written a propos of Kaunitz's dispatches to Cobenzl of November 12, 
 1791, P. A., X, 75. 

 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 249 
 
 do not have to utter a word to the other Courts; and a party will 
 always be found when it is needed. It is impossible that there 
 should not be people who prefer the old order. Volhynia and 
 Podolia offer many different pretexts; one has only to choose." l 
 The party, or the nucleus of one, had, indeed, already been 
 found. The two most prominent of the Polish malcontents, Felix 
 Potocki and Seweryn Rzewuski, had come to Jassy at Potemkin's 
 invitation in the middle of October, precisely at the moment of 
 the Prince's death; and they were followed shortly after by 
 another promising recruit, the Crown Hetman Branicki. These 
 three men, under Catherine, were to be the main authors of the 
 Confederation of Targowica. In them the worst vices of Old 
 Poland stand incorporated. Enormously rich, able to count his 
 villages by the score and his ' subjects ' by the thousand, accus- 
 tomed to live in truly royal magnificence, Potocki represents the 
 typical provincial kinglet, who could brook no superior, no re- 
 striction, no abridgment of golden liberty. Honest and well- 
 meaning, perhaps, and virtuous according to his lights, he was 
 also narrow-minded and obstinate, and consumed by pride and 
 vanity. Capable of seeing but one idea at a time, he was now 
 obsessed by the thought that the glorified Republic of his ances- 
 tors was doomed to perish, overthrown by ' despotism,' unless he, 
 the one blameless man, could save it — with the aid of foreign 
 bayonets. Rzewuski, Field-Hetman of the Crown, was the best 
 head in this group of reactionaries. He had always posed as the 
 argus-eyed guardian of liberty, the model of republican virtue, 
 the Cato of Poland ; and of a Cato he had at least all the unlovely 
 qualities. Branicki was simply the dashing adventurer, a rioter 
 and a brawler, gifted indeed with many of the arts that command 
 popularity, but guided solely by private interest, regardless of 
 loyalty, patriotism or duty — a man whose life was a succession 
 
 1 Catherine to Bezborodko, December 4/15, printed in the CSopnuKii, xxix, 
 pp. 176 f., and Solov'ev, Geschichte des Falles von Polen, p. 265. The German trans- 
 lator of Solov'ev has erroneously, I think, rendered the first part of the last sentence: 
 " Volhynien und Podolien zu nehmen, sind Vorwande genug vorhanden." If this 
 version were correct, it would indicate that the Empress had already decided upon 
 a partition. But the Russian text printed in the C6opHHKi gives little warrant for 
 such a translation.
 
 250 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of treasons. Doubtless these magnates had no conception of the 
 ruin they were bringing upon their country. Morally they were 
 no worse than those princes and gentlemen of France who at this 
 same time were inviting all Europe to arms against their father- 
 land. But never did traitors leave behind them so terrible a 
 monument as did the men of Targowica. In Polish history their 
 names are branded with infamy. 
 
 Count Bezborodko, sent down by Catherine after Potemkin's 
 death to conduct the peace negotiations with the Turks, was also 
 authorized to assure the Polish leaders of the Empress' favor and 
 protection, and to receive their plans and proposals. In the con- 
 ferences held at Jassy from November to February, the main 
 points of the enterprise were discussed at length, although the 
 final decisions were left to be made at St. Petersburg. After the 
 usual fashion of emigres, the Polish magnates were lavish with 
 assurances that the great mass of their countrymen were on their 
 side; it was only the terrorism of the dominant - faction ' at War- 
 saw that prevented the nation from manifesting its true senti- 
 ments. " A single spark would suffice to set the whole country 
 ablaze; thousands and thousands of adherents would rally to the 
 good cause at the first opportunity." Still, when they were called 
 upon to name men of prominence whose support might be relied 
 upon, the magnates could scarcely indicate a dozen; and they had 
 to confess that it would require at least 100,000 Russian troops to 
 enable the country to express its real opinions. They proposed, 
 however, to form a Confederation as soon as the Empress' forces 
 had crossed the frontier; the ' royalist ' army, they affirmed, 
 could be easily surrounded and captured, if it did not voluntarily 
 come over to the side of the republicans; the Confederates would 
 then take possession of the whole government of the country, and 
 effect a radical resettlement in accordance with principles to be 
 fixed in agreement with the Empress. The new constitution and 
 all the illegal works of the present Diet were to be summarily 
 annulled ; but what was to be put in their place was a question on 
 which the magnates could not agree even among themselves. 
 Rzewuski wished to restore the constitution of 1773, with certain 
 modifications designed especially to place the real control of the
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 25 1 
 
 state in the hands of the four hetmans, of whom he happened to 
 be one. Potocki, on the other hand, proposed a scheme no less 
 revolutionary in character than were the changes introduced on 
 the Third of May. The country should be reorganized as a federal 
 republic under the name of " The Independent and United Prov- 
 inces of Poland," on the Swiss or the Dutch model; each prov- 
 ince was to possess its own army, treasury, administration, and 
 judiciary; the King was to be deposed and replaced by a Presi- 
 dent elected for two years. All the Poles agreed that the first act 
 of the liberated Republic should be to conclude an ' eternal 
 alliance ' with Russia; and all of them insisted that the Empress 
 must guarantee in the most solemn manner the territorial integ- 
 rity of their country. 1 
 
 Bezborodko, while pleased with the eagerness of the Poles to 
 make themselves the tools of Russia, was not strongly enamored 
 of their projects. When early in February he submitted to the 
 Empress a final report on the Jassy conferences, he urged that the 
 first and most essential point in undertaking the settlement of 
 Polish affairs was to attain a confidential understanding with the 
 German Powers, or at least with the Court of Berlin. From 
 Austria no serious opposition was to be expected, since the 
 Emperor could not afford to throw away the friendship of Russia 
 for love of the Poles. But with Prussia the case was different. 
 Frederick William's engagements with the Republic were so clear 
 and unequivocal that unless he were won over in advance, he 
 might feel bound to come to the aid of his assailed ally. Besides, 
 the liberation of Poland had been so largely his work that he 
 might be inclined to defend it out of sheer amour-propre. Hence 
 it was advisable to enter into a concert with the King on Polish 
 affairs, and even into an alliance. Otherwise, an intervention in 
 Poland would probably lead to a war with Prussia, a danger 
 which Russia, exhausted by five years of constant fighting, could 
 not afford to risk. An alliance with Frederick William, on the 
 
 1 For the above: F. Potocki to Potemkin, May 14, 1791; Rzewuski to Bez- 
 borodko, December 7; plan general submitted by Potocki and Rzewuski early 
 in December; memorial of Branicki; Potocki to Bezborodko, December 17; 
 plan submitted by Potocki and Rzewuski early in 1792, M. A., ApxHBi. Bap- 
 maBCKoii Maccin.
 
 252 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 other hand, would really bind the Empress to nothing; it would 
 be of great assistance in the settlement of the Polish question; 
 later on it would make Russia the arbiter between Austria and 
 Prussia, so that after a period of rest and recuperation she could 
 safely take up any aggressive enterprises that seemed useful and 
 advantageous. A danger might, indeed, arise from the King of 
 Prussia's " thirst for Dantzic and Thorn"; but — Bezborodko 
 concluded — " His Majesty must realize that his ambitions could 
 not be satisfied save by an agreement of the three neighboring 
 Powers for a partition of Poland on the basis of the most complete 
 equality " (of advantages). 1 
 
 Had these counsels been accepted in toto, a bargain for a new 
 partition might probably have been the preliminary, rather than 
 the sequel, to the Empress' intervention in Poland. But during 
 Bezborodko's long absence from the capital the management of 
 the Polish enterprise had passed into the hands of a small clique, 
 who, acting of course under the Empress' supervision, conducted 
 it henceforth with few interruptions down to the very end. This 
 inner ' ring ' was made up of Zubov, a very young man, without 
 talent or experience, who was beginning to essay the role of 
 Potemkin; Markov, a member of the College of Foreign Affairs, 
 who aspired to rise on the wings of the favorite; and Popov, the 
 former head of Potemkin's chancellery, whose chief political 
 capital was his intimate knowledge of the ideas of the late 
 lamented. 2 With these advisers, the Empress had already decided 
 the most essential questions while Bezborodko was still in the 
 south. They meant to begin the enterprise as soon as possible; 
 they were not at all disposed to hold the troops idle while they 
 were negotiating with Berlin and Vienna; and it was still less to 
 their state to take the other Courts into partnership. Neverthe- 
 less, it was impossible to invade Poland without at least some kind 
 
 1 Bezborodko to the Empress, January 25/February 5, 1792, M. A., Typnia, 
 IX, 14. This voluminous report, which throws so much light upon the ideas with 
 which the Russians embarked upon their Polish enterprise, and especially upon their 
 attitude towards Austria and Prussia, has hitherto remained unknown to historians. 
 The text of it is printed in part in Appendix X. 
 
 2 As to this clique see the letters of Rostopcin, Bezborodko and Zavadovski to 
 S. R. Vorontsov, Apx. Bop., viii, pp. 52 f.; xiii, pp. 255 f.; xii, pp. 75 f.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 253 
 
 of explanation to the German Powers. Whatever Catherine may 
 have intended in December, towards the end of February — 
 perhaps as a result of Bezborodko's exhortations — she decided 
 to make certain preliminary communications to Berlin and 
 Vienna, which, without limiting her own freedom of action, might 
 still prevent opposition on the part of her neighbors. 
 
 On the 28th of February, 1792, the first official revelations as to 
 the Empress' momentous projects were made to Cobenzl and to 
 Goltz, the Prussian envoy. To Cobenzl Ostermann read a dis- 
 patch addressed to the ambassador Golitsyn in Vienna, which 
 contained the long awaited response on the Polish question. The 
 nine-months' delay was excused with the brazen plea that until 
 the recent peace with the Turks the Court of Petersburg had not 
 had leisure to form an opinion on Polish affairs. The various 
 arguments advanced on the Austrian side on behalf of the new 
 constitution were refuted or ignored in a manner that could 
 only be taken as open scorn at Vienna. The Empress, it was 
 said, was irrevocably determined no longer to allow the Poles to 
 violate arbitrarily their engagements with her; she intended to 
 overthrow the recent innovations in the Republic, so detrimental 
 to all the neighboring Powers; and she invited the Courts of 
 Vienna and Berlin to concur with her in that enterprise, especially 
 by means of vigorous declarations at Warsaw. It was to be ex- 
 pected that in the face of such a manifestation of solidarity the 
 Poles would give way without further difficulty; but should it 
 prove necessary to resort to force, the efforts required could not 
 in any case be considerable enough to prevent the three Courts 
 from pursuing at the same time the concert against France. In 
 the heated discussions that followed the reading of this dispatch, 
 every argument was exhausted on both sides, the Russians laying 
 most stress on the idea that if the new constitution were allowed 
 to subsist, it would infallibly lead either to the establishment of an 
 absolute monarchy or to the rise of a democracy even more 
 dangerous than the French. Cobenzl retorted with some force 
 that he failed to see how the growth of democracy could be 
 checked by destroying the monarchical power and restoring the 
 country to anarchy; but he was given to understand that what-
 
 254 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 ever the Austrians might think, they were bound by the treaty of 
 alliance to uphold the ancient constitution (which was true), and 
 that if they stood out for the new regime they would be alone in 
 their opinion, since Prussia would certainly adopt the Russian 
 standpoint. In vain the ambassador remonstrated that this 
 enterprise would surely end with a new partition. The Russians 
 replied with the most solemn assurances that the Empress would 
 never give her consent to such an arrangement. Nothing was 
 said about a Confederation. The Russian ministers refused to 
 state just what measures their sovereign intended to employ, if 
 it proved necessary to use force against the Poles; but Cobenzl 
 was informed that in such a case the Empress would willingly 
 take the disagreeable work of coercion upon herself, in order that 
 her two allies might be the more free to direct their attention to 
 the other great common enterprise, the counter-revolution in 
 France. 1 The irony of this suggestion lent the crowning touch to 
 a communication than which nothing more inconsiderate, harsh, 
 and dictatorial could well be imagined. 
 
 The insinuation verbale made the same day to Goltz was 
 friendly enough in tone, but even vaguer than the overtures to 
 Cobenzl. It merely called the attention of the Prussian govern- 
 ment to the dangers arising from the new Polish constitution, 
 and suggested a concert to regulate matters in accordance with 
 the common interests of the two Powers. Not a word was said as 
 to the nature or the final aim of the concert; and Goltz, who was 
 not on the same intimate footing with the Russians as Cobenzl, 
 did not dare ask questions. Still, combining his conjectures 
 with the note to Zubov which had so excited his imagination 
 some weeks before, he wrote to his Court that beyond a doubt the 
 Russians would presently come forward with proposals for a new 
 partition. 2 
 
 Thus the sphinx-like silence which the Empress had so long 
 maintained on Polish affairs was at last broken; the veil which 
 had enshrouded her projects was at least partially raised. Her 
 immediate object was clear, although her plan of action and her 
 
 1 Cobenzl's report of February 29, V. A., Russlattd, Berichte, 1792. 
 
 2 Goltz's report of February 29, B. A., R. XI, Russlattd, 133.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 255 
 
 ultimate goal were still an enigma to the other Courts. It re- 
 mained to be seen whether the German Powers would raise a 
 hand in defence of Polish independence, whether they would 
 allow the Republic to become once more a Russian province, or 
 whether they would insist on a division of the spoils. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The Empress' plans were not a little facilitated by the change 
 of ruler that had taken place at Vienna. The new King of Hun- 
 gary and Bohemia, soon to be known as the Emperor Francis II, 
 was a sickly young man of twenty-four, sadly lacking in experi- 
 ence, talents, independence, and initiative; fitfully inclined to a 
 bolder policy than that of the late reign; easily tempted by 
 prospects of aggrandizement, but without his uncle's energy, or 
 his father's prudence, or the firmness of will and definiteness of 
 purpose which alone could justify the ventures he undertook : in 
 short, a feeble and colorless personality, a ruler singularly ill- 
 fitted to guide the Monarchy through the stormy age of the 
 French Revolution. Nor was the complexion of the ministry 
 more promising. The octogenarian Kaunitz remained nominally 
 at the helm; but he was losing touch with affairs, and was more 
 and more thrust aside by pupils who fancied themselves cleverer 
 than " the old papa." These ambitious subordinates, Philip 
 Cobenzl and Spielmann, had enjoyed a large measure of the late 
 Emperor's confidence and had identified themselves thoroughly 
 with his policies, especially with the Prussian alliance. Under 
 the new monarch they aspired to play the leading roles, although 
 neither of them possessed talents rising above a finished medi- 
 ocrity. To make matters worse, these two ministers, and partic- 
 ularly the parvenu Spielmann, were the object of the special 
 aversion of the members of the State Conference, a body of old 
 grumblers who seemed to find their chief function in criticizing, 
 hampering, and thwarting all the operations of the State Chancel- 
 lery. The new reign began, therefore, with no happy auguries 
 for vigor and unity in the administration. 1 
 
 1 The Staatskonferenz was at this time made up of Marshal Lacy, Prince Star- 
 hemberg, Prince Rosenberg, Count Colloredo-Wallsee, Cobenzl, and Spielmann.
 
 256 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 If it had been anticipated that the young sovereign, as the 
 pupil of Joseph II, would lean more towards Russia than towards 
 the Court of Berlin, it soon appeared that the tendency was quite 
 the contrary. While the new King hastened to inform both the 
 Empress and Frederick William of his desire to maintain and 
 strengthen the existing alliances, the Court of Vienna remained 
 silent towards that of St. Petersburg on all important questions 
 for more than a month, while a lively discussion was carried on 
 with Prussia. The Austrian ministers overwhelmed Bischoff- 
 werder and Jacobi with assurances of confidence and friendship; 
 Kaunitz professed to see in the Prussian alliance the greatest 
 achievement of his career; Spielmann called it " the universal 
 panacea." x It seemed that the new government would follow 
 strictly in the paths of the late reign and attempt to settle both 
 the French and the Polish questions in closest concert with 
 Prussia. 
 
 Quite in accordance with the policy of Leopold, the first effort 
 was to dispose of the latter question before taking up the former. 
 In the early days of March, while still ignorant of the revelation 
 that was coming from St. Petersburg, Spielmann set to work to 
 devise a new scheme for harmonizing the interests of all three of 
 the neighboring Powers with respect to the Republic. The main- 
 tenance of the new constitution, though stripped of some of its 
 objectionable features; the establishment of a permanent per- 
 sonal union between Poland and Saxony; the limitation of the 
 Polish army to forty or fifty thousand men; the perpetual neutra- 
 lization of Polish territory; the incorporation of all these arrange- 
 ments in a treaty between the three great Powers, Saxony, and the 
 Republic: such were the chief provisions of the plan by which the 
 minister sought to save the essential parts of the late Emperor's 
 system, while making not inconsiderable concessions to Russia 
 
 Kaunitz never attended, although of course entitled to do so. Interesting light on 
 the characters of the Austrian ministers is afforded by Arneth's " Graf Philipp 
 Cobenzl und seine Memoiren," in Archiv fur osterr. Geschichte, lxvii, and by his 
 " Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs iiber Oesterreich im 18. Jht." F. R. A., II, 
 xxii, pp. 349 ff.; also, the anonymous memoire in Vivenot, ii, pp. 467-474, and 
 Zinzendorf's Diary, preserved in manuscript in the Vienna Archives. See also, 
 Schlitter, Kaunitz, Philipp Cobenzl und Spielmann. 
 
 1 Bischoffwerder's report of March 13, 1792, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 2$ J 
 
 and Prussia. The ever-complaisant Bischoffwerder having ex- 
 pressed his perfect approval, it was decided to send the project 
 to Berlin by courier; if Frederick William and the Elector of 
 Saxony agreed to it, the three German Courts would then present 
 it at St. Petersburg with " a very polite but firm declaration " 
 that they insisted on this plan and would accept no other. The 
 poor Empress! She would have to give in, Spielmann reckoned, 
 for she could not refuse without admitting that she had other 
 plans aiming at exclusive domination in the Republic, not to 
 speak of the terror into which she would be thrown by the polite 
 but firm declaration of the high allies. 1 
 
 Unfortunately, however, on the very day when the plan was 
 read to Jacobi and Bischoffwerder in final form, a courier arrived 
 with Ostermann's dispatch to Golitsyn of February 28 — the 
 formal announcement that Russia would never tolerate the 
 Constitution of the Third of May. The effect must have been as 
 painful as possible. After all the confidential communications 
 made by the Austrian cabinet at Dresden and Berlin, it was 
 bitterly humiliating to think of bowing before this imperious fiat. 
 But the strength of the Empress' will was sufficiently known at 
 Vienna. The Austrians can hardly have doubted that their 
 solution of the Polish question had now lost all chance of success. 
 From that moment they must have abandoned the hope of realiz- 
 ing the Polish plan of the late Emperor. 
 
 Henceforth the essential thing was to find a basis on which the 
 Courts of Vienna and Berlin could agree, in order to prevent 
 Russia from acquiring a too exclusive control in Poland. If, in 
 accordance with the previous agreement, Spielmann's plan was 
 still sent to Berlin, it was accompanied by the intimation that 
 Austria did not insist on this project, but was willing to accept any 
 other which, in the King of Prussia's opinion, might lead to the 
 desired goal. 2 Doubtless the main object of the ' expedition ' was 
 
 1 Bischoffwerder's reports of March 6, 10, 13, 17-18, the first printed in Ranke, 
 Ut sprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege, pp. 360-363; Jacobi's reports of March 
 3, 6, 14, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 169; Vivenot, i, p. 417. -The plan itself, in the form 
 of seventeen articles, as it was finally sent to Berlin, is printed in Vivenot, i, pp. 
 418 ff., and by Herrmann, F. z. D. G., iv, pp. 430 ff. 
 
 2 Kaunitz to Reuss, March 17, Vivenot, i, pp. 422 ff.
 
 258 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to induce Prussia to explain her views clearly and, perhaps, to 
 come forward with her own proposals. 1 And even the faintest 
 hope that the Court of Berlin would accept Spielmann's plan must 
 have been dispelled by the orders which reached Bischoffwerder 
 just before the courier left Vienna. Without waiting to get the 
 plan into his hands, Frederick William had decisively, irrevocably 
 rejected it. 
 
 On March 11 the King had received a report from Bischoff- 
 werder containing the news that Spielmann was working out a 
 project, the chief features of which were the advocacy of the 
 Saxon-Polish personal union and certain limitations on the mili- 
 tary forces of the Republic. That sufficed not only to make 
 Frederick William reject the scheme in advance, but even to 
 arouse in his mind suspicions as to the secret aims of Austria. A 
 rescript to Bischoffwerder was at once drawn up declaring that 
 the plan appeared infinitely dangerous, since nothing in the 
 world would be more contrary to the major interests of Prussia 
 than the proposed Saxon-Polish union; the King could never 
 acquiesce in it under any conditions whatsoever. 2 
 
 Immediately afterward came Goltz's report of February 29, 
 with the long awaited overtures from Russia. It did not require 
 the unpleasant plan brought forward by Austria to make the 
 King accede with joy to the Empress' proposals. In spite of 
 
 1 Jacobi's dispatch of March 18, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 169. 
 
 2 Rescript of March 13 : 
 
 " Rien au monde ne scauroit [sic] etre plus contraire aux interests [sic] majeurs 
 de mes Etats et de leurs Souverains futurs, que l'existence d'une Puissance telle 
 qu'on la formeroit par la reunion permanente de la Pologne a la Saxe, qui parta- 
 geant pour ainsi dire en deux le Corps de la Monarchie Prussienne, et s'elevant 
 peutetre de plus en plus par Pinfluence de sa position locale et de son nouveau 
 Gouvernement, seroit sans contredit le voisin le plus redoutable de mes etats. 
 Ajoutes a cela que la Pologne avec sept million [sic] d'habitants, reunie a la Saxe 
 qui en a deux, produiroient [sic] une masse de population de neuf millions, et 
 qu'une Puissance de cette force dans la position geographique ou elle se trouve, 
 exposeroit aux plus grands dangers, soit la Prusse . . . soit mes Etats de Silesie. 
 . . . En vain allegueroit-on les conditions et restrictions, auxquelles on preten- 
 droit assujettir les Polonois, pour leurs troupes et leur commerce. Quelles qu'elles 
 fussent, il me semble impossible que Ton puisse veiller avec asses de soin a leur 
 observation exacte. . . . En un mot, je ne puis, et ne pourrois dans aucun cas 
 acquiescer a un plan de cette nature. . . ." 
 
 B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 259 
 
 much that has been said, the documents at hand afford no traces 
 of any conflict at this moment in Frederick William's breast 
 between the desire for aggrandizement on the one hand, and a 
 sense of loyalty to his engagements with the Republic or regard 
 for Austria on the other. His decision was made in a moment; 
 and it was, as a great historian has declared, the death-sentence of 
 Poland. Immediately upon receiving Goltz's dispatch, without 
 waiting to consult his ministers, the King wrote to Schulenburg 
 that Russia was, apparently, not far removed from thinking of a 
 new partition, which would certainly be the surest means of 
 setting " just limits " to the power of a king of Poland, whether 
 elective or hereditary; it might be difficult to find a satisfactory 
 indemnity for the Court of Vienna, but if one could be found, the 
 " Russian project " would be the most advantageous and desir- 
 able for Prussia. The most suitable frontier for the acquisitions 
 which he himself might make, would be the left bank of the Vis- 
 tula. Schulenburg, it is needless to say, was full of admiration 
 for ' the luminous manner in which His Majesty judged the 
 affairs of Poland.' * 
 
 The Prussians were clear as to the goal they wished to attain, 
 but it was not so easy to lead up to it. They had absolutely no 
 certainty that the Empress was inclined to a partition, since that 
 conjecture rested only on Goltz's surmises and on the possibly 
 apocryphal note to Zubov reported by the envoy in February. 
 
 1 Frederick William's note of March 12, Schulenburg's reply of the same date. 
 
 The King wrote: " Par la derniere depeche du Ct. de Goltz de Russie il paroit 
 que les vues de l'lmperatrice concernant les afaires de Pologne sont fort diferente 
 de ce que le Ct. Rosomowski supose . . . et que la Cour de Russie ne seroit peut 
 etre pas eloignee de penser a un nouveau partage de la Pologne, ce qui seroit cer- 
 tainement le moien le plus sur pour mettre de juste borne au pouvoir dun Roi de 
 Pologne, fut il electif ou hereditaire; mais come un projet pareille renforceroit 
 singulierement la position des Russes de cotS d'Oczakow je doute que Ton put 
 trouver une indemnisation pour la Cour de Vienne dont celle-ci voudroit se con- 
 tenter. ... Si Ion pouvoit trouver une compensation pour l'Autriche dont elle 
 fut satisfaite le projet Russe seroit le plus favorable pour la Prusse et le plus a 
 desirer bien entendu quelle feroit alors lacquisition de la rive gauche de la Vistulc, 
 et que cette longue lisiere de frontiere actuellement aussi dificile a defendre se 
 trouveroit alors bien couverte. Tel est mon jugement sur les afaires de Pologne." 
 B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 (I have tried to reproduce the spelling and punctuation of the original.) 
 
 See also Appendix XI.
 
 260 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 They were not minded to propose a partition themselves, for they 
 recognized that there was a great difference between making and 
 accepting such propositions. They still had too much regard for 
 Austria and too little confidence in Russia to throw themselves 
 unreservedly into the arms of the Court of Petersburg. Hence 
 the reply delivered to Alopeus on March 13 was friendly but 
 cautious. It stated merely that the King would gladly enter into 
 the concert on Polish affairs proposed by the Empress, and, con- 
 fident of her approval, was inviting his ally, the King of Hungary, 
 to accede to it as well; that he was ready to come to an under- 
 standing with her at once as to the policy to be adopted towards 
 Poland, and the means to be employed; but that it was highly 
 important for him to know her views more in detail. 1 
 
 Having thus gone as far as they dared, the Prussians longingly 
 awaited further communications from the Empress, in the hope 
 that she would presently come forward and offer them Great 
 Poland. It was a bad miscalculation. St. Petersburg once more 
 relapsed into heavy silence. Goltz was put off with demonstra- 
 tions of friendship and the excuse that no further explanations 
 could be given until an answer had been received from Vienna. 2 
 On their side, the Prussians lost no opportunity to parade their 
 friendship for the Empress and to offer her occasions for new 
 overtures. Schulenburg declaimed to Alopeus of the common 
 interests of the two Powers in Poland, and the necessity of head- 
 ing off the strange predilection of Austria for the Saxon-Polish 
 union. If Russia and Prussia, he kept repeating, were once 
 agreed on a program, the Court of Vienna would have to 
 acquiesce. The seat of the concert on Polish affairs, he suggested, 
 might best be fixed at Berlin, as that city was midway between 
 the other two capitals. 3 But such bits of finesse proved quite 
 fruitless. Reports began to flow in that the Russian armies were 
 about to enter Poland. The Prussian ministry were keenly dis- 
 quieted. Still they continued obstinately to maintain — as if in 
 
 1 Alopeus' report of March 3/14, with the accompanying Prussian insinu- 
 ation verbale, M. A., Ilpyccia, III, 29. 
 
 2 Goltz's report of March 27, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 3 Alopeus to Ostermann, March 9/20 and 19/30, to Bezborodko, April 8/19, 
 M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 26 1 
 
 a desperate effort to convince themselves of it — that the Em- 
 press, after once proposing a concert, would not disavow her own 
 words by undertaking to settle Polish affairs single-handed. 
 And thus the Prussians remained, standing with folded hands 
 and eyes fixed on St. Petersburg, looking for a new dispensation 
 of Imperial grace, waiting for ' the concert,' down to the moment 
 when Catherine was ready to pour her troops into the Republic. 
 
 IV 
 
 Austrian policy meantime was taking a new direction. Within 
 four days after those first disturbing tidings from St. Petersburg 
 there came the news that Frederick William had vetoed Spiel- 
 mann's Polish plan and had given a favorable answer to the pro- 
 posals of Russia. 1 Among the chagrins occasioned by these 
 successive blows, not the least was the suspicion that there was 
 something behind this ready adhesion of the Court of Berlin to 
 the Empress' wishes, that perhaps Austria's two allies had already 
 come to a secret agreement between themselves. The conviction 
 had long existed at Vienna that if the King of Prussia acquiesced 
 in Catherine's designs on Poland, it would be only on condition 
 that he himself might realize his territorial ambitions in that 
 quarter. 2 But if such was his aim, was it possible to oppose it at a 
 moment when his cooperation was imperatively necessary in view 
 of the dangerous trend of French affairs ? Leopold's Polish 
 system had collapsed ; a return to Joseph's was wellnigh out of the 
 question, owing to the changed relations between Austria and the 
 other Powers ; and the idea was exceedingly obvious that the best 
 way out of the hopelessly confused situation would be to allow 
 Prussia the long-sought acquisitions in Poland, providing Austria 
 could secure a corresponding aggrandizement. That in such a 
 case Austria could not find it profitable to take her share of the 
 spoils in Poland, was recognized from the outset both at Vienna 
 
 1 March 14-18. 
 
 2 E. g., the dispatch to Reuss of January 25. This suspicion turns up again in 
 Kaunitz's dispatch to Landriani of March 25, in Jacobi's report of March 21, and 
 in Bischoffwerder's of March 24.
 
 262 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 and at Berlin. 1 It was natural that Spielmann turned his thoughts 
 to that favorite project which had haunted the minds of Austrian 
 statesmen for almost a century — the exchange of the Belgian 
 provinces for Bavaria. 
 
 As we have already noted, there is some reason to think that as 
 early as 1787 Cobenzl and Spielmann, discussing this plan with 
 Joseph II, hoped to realize it by combining it with a Prussian 
 acquisition in Poland. The next known occasion on which it 
 cropped out was at the meeting of the State Conference on 
 January 17, 1792, when the subject of ' indemnities ' for the 
 expenses of a possible intervention in France was brought under 
 deliberation. It was then proposed, probably by Spielmann, 
 that the Imperial Court should seek its compensation in the ex- 
 change of Belgium for Bavaria. 2 The Conference did not formally 
 accept or reject this idea, but held it advisable to let the other 
 Powers be the first to broach the question of indemnities. When 
 that topic was first discussed between Bischoffwerder and Spiel- 
 mann at the end of February, the Prussian gained the impression 
 that the Austrians intended to revive their old Exchange plan. 3 
 Then in March, almost simultaneously with the decisive news 
 from Berlin and St. Petersburg, there arrived dispatches from 
 Munich which must have encouraged Spielmann to take up the 
 project. Count Lehrbach, the Austrian envoy to Bavaria, 
 reported that the Elector was once more possessed with his 
 ancient hankering to become a king; that he thought to sell his 
 vote at the coming Imperial election for the price of a crown; and 
 that since Bavaria did not possess all the qualifications of a 
 kingdom, he was willing to consent to an exchange, in order to 
 obtain a " sovereign district." 4 The sovereign district in ques- 
 tion could be, of course, only the Austrian Netherlands, the 
 oft-projected ' Kingdom of Burgundy.' At that moment the 
 
 1 Spielmann's discussion with Jacobi of March 21, mentioned below; Frederick 
 William's note to Schulenburg of March 12. 
 
 2 See the Vorlage of the State Chancellery, dated January 12, and the protocol 
 of the Conference of January 17, Vivenot, i, pp. 327-341. 
 
 3 Bischoffwerder's report of February 29, 1792, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172. 
 
 4 Lehrbach's reports of March 10 and 16, printed in Schrepfer, Pfalzbayerns 
 Pulitik im Revolutionszeitalter , pp. 110-113.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 263 
 
 Austrian cabinet could give no definite promises, but it took 
 pains not to cut off the Elector's hopes. Lehrbach was ordered to 
 scatter assurances of his master's desire to oblige His Serene 
 Highness, but to add that the realization of these plans must 
 depend on time and circumstances. 1 
 
 In these eventful March days in Vienna, when all the great 
 questions were clamoring for solution, in innumerable con- 
 ferences Austrian, Prussian, and Russian diplomats were sounding 
 each other, tentatively throwing out pregnant hints, developing 
 new and far-reaching combinations. Scanty as are the sources 
 of our information, it seems clear that in these ' conversations ' 
 the ideas were broached, discussed, matured, out of which grew 
 the plan for the Second Partition of Poland. For example, 
 Bischoffwerder and Simolin, the former Russian envoy at Paris, 
 fell one day to discussing the Elector of Bavaria's desire to wear a 
 crown; the Russian hazarded the suggestion, " Why not make 
 him King of Burgundy, as it was once proposed to do ? " ; and the 
 Prussian replied that he believed his master would consent, if he 
 could obtain in return Dantzic, Thorn, and the adjacent districts. 2 
 Even more interesting are the discussions of Bischoffwerder with 
 Razumovski, the Russian envoy to the Court of Vienna. The 
 latter had frequently tried to sound the Prussian diplomat on the 
 Polish question, and on one occasion threw out the idea that 
 the best way to keep the Republic in bounds would be to partition 
 it once more. Bischoffwerder was at first cautious and reserved, 
 but soon after getting the orders of March 14 (in which Frederick 
 William indicated very clearly his desire for some such happy 
 consummation), he threw off the mask and told Razumovski 
 frankly that he believed a new dismemberment would be the 
 only means of attaining the common goal of the three Powers 
 with regard to both France and Poland. If the Empress, he 
 added, wished to come to an understanding with his master for 
 
 1 Kaunitz to Lehrbach, March 20, V. A., Bayern, Expcd., 1792. 
 
 2 L. Cobenzl to Ph. Cobenzl, May 19, 1792, V. A., Russland, Fasc. 139, a 
 private letter relating the story as Simolin told it on his return to St. Petersburg; 
 L. Cobenzl's official report of July 21, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1792; Alopeus' 
 report of May 8/19, 1792, giving Bischoffwerder's later allusion to the conversation, 
 M. A., Ilpyccia, III, 29.
 
 264 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 common aggrandizement in Poland, they could satisfy Austria by 
 reviving the Bavarian Exchange plan in her favor. He denied 
 having any instructions from the King on this subject, but 
 repeated frequently that the proposition would cause his sover- 
 eign great satisfaction. 1 Here was already outlined in all definite- 
 ness the plan which, it has hitherto been supposed, was conceived 
 only two months later : the plan for combining the French enter- 
 prise with the affairs of Poland in such a way that Austria should 
 secure her indemnity for the intervention in the West by means 
 of the Bavarian Exchange, while the other two Powers took theirs 
 at the expense of the unfortunate Republic. Finally, it appears 
 that Bischoffwerder, perhaps as a sequel to his conversation with 
 Razumovski, suggested this same project to Spielmann. 2 
 
 The Bavarian-Polish plan was, then, in the air, when on March 
 2 1 Spielmann broached to Jacobi — for the first time in the official 
 intercourse between the two German Powers — the idea of a new 
 partition of Poland. He declared that if the King of Prussia 
 decided that the plan submitted to him by Austria for the settle- 
 ment of the Polish question did not conform to his interests, it 
 rested with him to propose another plan in its stead, to which the 
 King of Hungary would reply with the same frankness and 
 loyalty as heretofore. If Frederick William desired to profit by 
 circumstances to obtain an acquisition in Poland, the Court of 
 Vienna would never oppose, for it recognized that Prussia could 
 secure a suitable arrondissement only in that quarter. What his 
 master would claim in return, Spielmann did not clearly say; 
 but he intimated that Austria could not wish to extend her fron- 
 tiers on the side of Poland, but could easily find a desirable 
 
 1 Razumovski to the Empress, March 11/22, 1792, M. A., ABcrpifl, III, 52. 
 This conversation took place the 21st. It is uncertain whether Razumovski was 
 authorized to make any such insinuation. There are no instructions on the subject 
 in Ostermann's dispatches of this period; but on the other hand, it is perhaps signifi- 
 cant that the envoy in his report to the Empress made no apologies for having 
 hazarded a suggestion of such far-reaching importance. It is not improbable that 
 he may have been authorized to make such insinuations through private letters 
 from Zubov or Markov, with whom he maintained a regular correspondence. 
 
 2 Razumovski to Bezborodko, July 4, 1792, from Spielmann's later confidential 
 disclosures, M. A., ABdpifl, III, 54. A number of documents illustrating these 
 ' conversations ' at Vienna will be found in Appendix XII.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 265 
 
 arrondissement elsewhere; and he suggestively declared that there 
 was hardly a plan in the world which the two Courts could not 
 realize, if they were only thoroughly agreed and sincerely resolved 
 upon it. Finally, he did not tire of repeating that the policy to be 
 adopted by the two allies towards Poland was left entirely to 
 Frederick William's decision. That was virtually inviting the 
 King of Prussia to come forward and propose Exchange and 
 Partition. 1 The Court of Berlin, however, was still too cautious 
 to show its hand so openly. It contented itself with expressing 
 its gratitude and pointing to the necessity of awaiting further 
 communications from Russia; 2 and thus the question of indem- 
 nities rested for the time being. At any rate, the ground had 
 been prepared for a revolutionary change in the Polish policy of 
 Austria. The seeds had been sown from which sprang the momen- 
 tous agreements of two months later. 
 
 While Spielmann was more or less independently evolving these 
 dangerous and alluring projects, his chief, the Chancellor, was 
 slower to adapt himself to the new situation. Although there 
 could no longer be any expectation of saving the Constitution of 
 the Third of May, Kaunitz did not cease to lavish confidences and 
 good advice upon the Court of Dresden, and he allowed Landriani 
 
 1 Jacobi's report of March 21, Bischoffwerder's of March 27, B. A., R. 1, 169, 
 and R. 1, 172. 
 
 Jacobi reported that Spielmann, speaking of Poland, had said: 
 "... que s'il s'agissoit de profiter des Circonstances pour s'arrondir, Votre 
 Majeste pourroit etre tres sure qu'Elle ne trouveroit jamais le Roi de Hongrie dans 
 son chemin, qu'on reconnoissoit ici que rien que la Pologne pourroit offrir a la 
 Prusse des arrondissements convenables et propres a donner encore plus de solidite 
 et de consistence a la Monarchic Prussienne, que dans le cas que Votre Majeste 
 trouvat ce parti preferable a. tout autre, il ne doutoit nullement que les Cours de 
 Vienne et de Berlin etant bien d'accord, et sincerement resolues de pousser leur 
 poinle, on ne parvient a s'arranger, . . . qu'il s'entendoit que les portions d'ag- 
 grandissement devoient etre egales pour les deux parties, qu'il ne vouloit pas me 
 cacher que la Cour de Vienne ne pourroit jamais trouver de sa convenance d'etendre 
 ses Etats vers la Pologne, que ce seroit plutot s'affoiblir, mais qu'il y auroit d'autres 
 moyens pour s'arrondir. ... II finit la Conversation sur cette matiere par me 
 t6moigncr son impatience extreme d'apprendre quel seroit le plan que Votre Majesty 
 trouveroit bon de substituer a celui parti dimanche dernier par le Courier du 
 General de Bischoffswerder." 
 
 2 Rescript to Jacobi of March 24, and in similar tone throughout April, B. A., 
 R. 1, Conv. 169.
 
 266 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to continue to fire the Poles with hopes that could never be 
 realized. In spite of the pressure from Berlin, in spite of Louis 
 Cobenzl's admonitions, a month went by before a reply was made 
 to Golitsyn's communications. And then what a reply! Cobenzl 
 was instructed, on the one hand, to give the strongest assurances of 
 the devotion of the new King of Hungary to the Russian alliance, 
 and to dispel any feelings of distrust or displeasure that might 
 have arisen at St. Petersburg; but on the other hand, he was 
 ordered to " make the Russian Court ashamed of its unseemly 
 and disloyal conduct," and to intimate that Austria still held — 
 in theory at least — to her former views on the Polish question. 
 Moreover, he was to demand that the Empress should do nothing 
 in Poland until the triple concert came into existence; that she 
 should content herself with such modifications of the new con- 
 stitution as were absolutely necessary; and that she should avoid 
 recourse to violent measures. 1 Stripped of its verbiage, this 
 answer amounted to a consent to the concert proposed by the 
 Empress, and to a surly admission that the Constitution of the 
 Third of May would have to be sacrificed in whole or in part. 
 Doubtless Kaunitz would have done well to swallow his pride and 
 approve with good grace what he was powerless to prevent. If he 
 flattered himself that by delays and recriminations he could hold 
 back the Empress from carrying out her plans, he was vastly 
 mistaken. That the Court of Vienna should do anything really 
 effective in defence of Poland was almost out of the question, 
 owing to the cardinal necessity of maintaining the Russian 
 alliance, and in view of the equivocal attitude of Prussia. And 
 whatever slight chances of such action there might have been 
 vanished entirely when — only a week after the sending of the 
 reply to St. Petersburg — on April 20 France declared war on 
 Austria. 
 
 V 
 
 With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War we have no con- 
 cern here except in so far as it influenced the development of the 
 Polish question. But since the fate of Poland was soon bound up 
 
 1 Instructions to L. Cobenzl of April 12, Vivenot, i, pp. 437-448.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 267 
 
 with the question of indemnities for this war, and as that ques- 
 tion in less than a year became confused by a bitter dispute about 
 the nature of the war, it is necessary to consider briefly the cir- 
 cumstances under which Austria and Prussia entered upon the 
 great struggle. 
 
 If it was later maintained that the Court of Vienna went into 
 the war only in order to vindicate ' the cause of all sovereigns,' 
 the statement was, to say the least, hardly a half-truth. Down 
 to the moment when it became convinced that an attack from 
 France was impending — that moment may be fixed about the 
 10th of April, — the Austrian government had done nothing but 
 temporize, in the hope that there would be no necessity for any 
 serious action. It was only on April 13 that the dispatch of 
 50,000 troops to the frontier was decided upon, and even this was 
 essentially a defensive measure. 1 It was only on April 21 that 
 the long delayed invitations to the general concert were sent out. 2 
 It was only on the 28th that, yielding to the pressure from Berlin 
 and to the necessities of self-defence, the State Conference 
 resolved upon aggressive action. And the reasons adduced in the 
 protocol for this last step are highly significant. Since Prussia, 
 it was said, would not send her troops to the front unless assured 
 that Austria agreed to take the offensive with her, since the 
 defence of the Netherlands essentially depended upon the dis- 
 patch of those troops, and since little or no aid was to be expected 
 from the other Courts, it seemed necessary that, without waiting 
 for a general concert of the Powers, Austria and Prussia should 
 present the proposed declaration at Paris, and in case of an 
 unsatisfactory answer, proceed immediately to armed interven- 
 tion. 3 The Court of Vienna thus agreed to aggressive action 
 against France, ostensibly for the common cause of all sovereigns; 
 but its resolution was taken only at the eleventh hour — two 
 days before the French declaration of war was known at the 
 Austrian capital — and it was taken chiefly in order to secure 
 Prussian aid against an attack expected almost with certainty. 
 
 1 Conference protocol of April 13, Vivenot, i, pp. 456 ff. 
 
 2 Vivenot, ii, pp. 1-4. 
 
 3 Conference protocol of April 28, Vivenot, ii, pp. 10 ff. 
 
 y
 
 268 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 On the other hand, it may be said that the immediate cause of 
 the war was the refusal of Austria to desist from the concert on 
 French affairs. In this sense, Austria was drawn into the conflict 
 by her adherence to the ' common cause,' and had a right to the 
 help of those Courts which had preached the anti-revolutionary 
 crusade with such ardor. 
 
 If there are moral rights in politics, seldom has an attacked 
 Power had stronger claims of that nature to the support of 
 another Power, than Austria had to the support of Prussia. 
 Frederick William had not only approved each of the fateful 
 replies of Kaunitz to the French government, but had con- 
 stantly urged stronger and more aggressive measures. One need 
 not be deceived by the occasional Prussian declarations that the 
 King was far from wishing to force Austria into a war; and that 
 he sought only to establish the principle that it was necessary 
 either to leave French affairs severely alone, or else to intervene 
 vigorously. Nothing would have grieved him more than to see 
 Austria adopt the former alternative. When at times she 
 seemed likely to do so — especially after Leopold's death — the 
 Court of Berlin took all imaginable pains to prevent the abandon- 
 ment of the enterprise. 1 From January on, the constant refrain 
 of Prussian communications was the necessity that the two Courts 
 agree at once upon vigorous measures against France. 2 The 
 Prussians attached very little importance to a general concert. 
 They doubted as much as did the Austrians that it would ever 
 come into being. They wanted to interfere in France whether the 
 concert was established or not. If they occasionally pressed for 
 the sending out of the invitations to the other Powers, the reason 
 was simply this: that if Austria and Prussia carried out the 
 French enterprise without any kind of agreement with the other 
 Courts, the latter — especially England and Russia — might 
 try to deprive them of " more or less of their just indem- 
 
 1 Cf. Bischoffwerder's instructions; the rescripts to him of March 6 and 13, 
 and to Jacobi of February 6 and 9 and March 3. 
 
 2 Rescript to Jacobi of January 5 ; notes to Reuss of January 13 and February 
 5; rescripts to Bischoffwerder of March 6, 13, 15, 19, 24, to mention only a part of 
 the evidence at hand.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 269 
 
 nities." 1 Of the active cooperation of the other Powers there is 
 hardly any serious suggestion in the Prussian dispatches. 
 
 How to drive Austria into action without waiting for a chimeri- 
 cal general concert, was for months the problem before Berlin. 
 In March Bischoffwerder reported dismally that nothing short of 
 a French attack would suffice; and he confided to Razumovski 
 his plan for provoking such an aggression on the part of c the 
 democrats.' 2 It was, therefore, with no little jubilation that the 
 Prussians received the news that the French were planning to 
 invade the Empire. 3 That would end the intolerable delays of the 
 Court of Vienna. Frederick William much preferred to have the 
 enemy assume the role of aggressor: ' they would thereby,' as his 
 ministers wrote, ' put the game into the hands of the other 
 Powers, and give the latter a clearer right than ever to demand 
 indemnities at the end of the war.' 4 So great was the King's 
 ardor that his advisers had difficulty in restraining him from going 
 ahead without waiting for the resolutions of Austria. 5 And if any 
 further proof were needed that Prussia did not draw the sword 
 merely in defence of her ally, it could be found in the fact that 
 towards the end of April, when it was thought at Berlin that 
 France was not going to attack after all, the King was still re- 
 solved to await only the final decision of Austria before sending 
 his troops to the front and beginning action. 6 He was firmly 
 determined upon a course that could lead only to war, before the V 
 news of the French declaration arrived in Berlin. 
 
 This declaration did not alter Frederick William's conception 
 of the nature of his participation in the enterprise. As early as the 
 middle of April, Reuss had raised the pregnant question of the 
 
 1 Rescripts to Bischoffwerder of April 5 and to Jacobi, April 6, B. A., R. i, 172 
 and 169. 
 
 2 Bischoffwcrder's reports of March 6, 9, 27, B. A., R. 1, 172; Razumovski's 
 report of February 28/March 10, M. A., ABCTpia, III, 53. 
 
 s Rescripts to Bischoffwerder, April 5, and Jacobi, April 6, B. A. 
 
 4 Rescripts to Jacobi, April 16 and 30, May 9, ibid. 
 
 6 Schulcnburg to Brunswick, April 20, 22, 24 (P. S.), B. A.,R. XI,Frankreich, Sgb. 
 
 6 Schulenburg to Brunswick, April 24 (P. S.); the cabinet ministry to the King, 
 April 25, B. A., R. 96, 147 C; rescript to Jacobi, April 28, B. A., R. 1, 169. 
 
 Schulenburg to Brunswick, April 24: the Duke's letter " ne pouvoit arriver 
 plus a propos pour affermir Sa Majeste dans les dispositions ou j'avois tadiS de la 
 
 ^
 
 270 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 form of the King's cooperation in case of a French attack upon 
 Austria, and had received the answer, ' that it was hardly to be 
 supposed that the Court of Vienna would wish to regard such an 
 attack as a mere casus foederis , on the same plane as an aggression 
 of other Powers.' The Prussian ministry ' believed rather that 
 Austria would much prefer to hold to the basis of the broader 
 engagements and stipulations of the concert.' l In a rescript to 
 Jacobi a few days later, the King was made to express himself in 
 the same sense. " I persist," he said, " in the most invariable 
 resolution to act in this case [in the event of a French attack] . . . 
 according to the engagements which I have undertaken, on a 
 footing of complete equality with the Court of Vienna." 2 The 
 engagements which the King chose to regard as involved, were 
 not those of the February alliance, but those of the concert agreed 
 upon between the two Courts for an intervention in France. The 
 reason is perfectly obvious. Not by sending the small auxiliary 
 corps stipulated in the alliance treaty, but only by taking part 
 in the war with forces equal to those of Austria, could Prussia 
 claim in the end an indemnity completely equivalent to that of 
 her ally. Furthermore, on receiving the news of the French 
 declaration of war, the King sent to Vienna the significant de- 
 claration: " I accept with real satisfaction the assurance that His 
 Apostolic Majesty will act against France in concert with me and 
 with the greatest vigor, even if, contrary to expectation, the other 
 Courts, and especially Russia, should refuse their cooperation." 3 
 If at the same time he recommended that the Court of Vienna 
 should base its counter-declaration against France on the injustice 
 of the French attack, while he would justify his own intervention 
 by the hostile measures of France against the Germanic Empire, 
 
 mettre, d'agir dans cette importante occasion avec la circonspection necessaire a 
 l'egard des intentions et des vues toujours fort protegees de la Cour de Vienne." 
 
 Rescript to Jacobi, April 28: " Je crois que par toutes les circonstances . . . 
 on peut regarder dans ce moment une invasion des Francois comme de la derniere 
 in vraisemblance. ' ' 
 
 The Cabinet Ministry to the King, April 25: " II nous paroit done, qu'il ne 
 s'agit plus que d'attendre l'indication du terme precis ou toute l'armee autrichienne 
 sera rendue au lieu de sa destination, et en etat de commencer les operations." 
 
 1 Rescript to Jacobi, April 12, ibid. 
 
 2 Rescript of April 16, B. A., R. 1, 169. 3 Rescript to Jacobi, May 9, ibid.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 27 1 
 
 this was only another illustration of the same point of view. It 
 was not in virtue of the treaty of alliance, and not as a member of 
 a nebulous general concert which still remained unformed, that 
 Prussia went into the Revolutionary War. It was rather in 
 accordance with engagements contracted with Austria before the 
 war for a joint intervention by the two German Powers, engage- 
 ments of which Frederick William himself had been the principal 
 author. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, these engagements had never been 
 drawn up in proper form. The communications between the two 
 Courts had been for the most part purely oral. At one moment, 
 indeed, Austria was not far from securing a formal written de- 
 claration which might later have served her in good stead. On 
 April 18 the Prussian ministry submitted to the King two 
 alternative drafts for a note to Reuss, in both of which was the 
 stipulation: " that whether the French attack took place or not, the 
 allied armies should take the offensive as soon as they were assembled, 
 and [the two Powers] should not lay down arms except by common 
 accord, when the aim of the concert had been attained, and the 
 expenses of the intervention had been repaid or at least their repay- 
 ment assured. " It was probably due to Schulenburg that a much 
 less definite and significant note was finally drawn up and pre- 
 sented to the Austrian envoy. 1 As matters stood at the outbreak 
 of the war, the chief agreements arrived at were that the two 
 Courts should employ equal forces and act on the offensive. As 
 for the aim of the war, no program existed save that laid down 
 for the general concert; and there was no obligation to adhere to 
 that. 2 The idea that one Power might abandon the struggle 
 without the consent of the other had not even been discussed. 
 Doubtless there was on both sides quite too much optimism about 
 the enterprise; but it was an unpardonable fault in the Austrian 
 ministers that they made no effort to secure any binding engage- 
 ments on this point from Prussia. 
 
 1 Schulenburg to the King, April 19, B. A., R. 96, 147 G.\ and to Brunswick, 
 April 20, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, Sgb. 
 
 2 Cf. the rescript to Jacobi of May 9: " l'aggression des Francois . . . nous 
 met dans le cas de n'avoir plus besoin de nous Her les mains en nous en tenant 
 strictement aux reclamations precedement proposees, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 
 272 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Scarcely less unfortunate was the fact that no very definite 
 agreement had been reached on the subject of indemnities. 
 The principle that compensation was to be demanded for the 
 costs of the enterprise had, indeed, been agreed upon; and it was 
 accepted on both sides that the indemnities of both Courts were 
 to be exactly equal. 1 This followed from the principle of parity 
 of efforts, which was the cornerstone of the concert, as well as 
 from that of strict equality in all ' advantages,' which, as Fred- 
 erick William said, was the basis, and would always be the firmest 
 support, of the alliance. 2 In general, however, the subject of 
 indemnities was little discussed during the critical month pre- 
 ceding the outbreak of the war. At the beginning of May, when 
 Austria found herself attacked and needed to show her ally the 
 utmost complaisance, Spielmann took up the topic again with 
 Jacobi, while Reuss was authorized to say that his Court left it 
 entirely to Prussia to decide whether they should generously 
 renounce all claim to indemnities, or demand reimbursement in 
 money, or seek compensation through conquests. 3 Disinterested- 
 ness was no longer Frederick William's role. He replied that he 
 could not conceive that the two Courts could afford to go without 
 indemnities; he did not believe that His Apostolic Majesty could 
 make such a sacrifice without detriment to his monarchy. 4 This 
 anxiety for the interests of the Austrian monarchy is almost 
 comic, when one remembers that a year later Prussian statesmen 
 were denying that the Court of Vienna had any rights to an 
 indemnity at all, or at least any rights that could be put on the 
 same plane with those of Prussia. As to what form of compensa- 
 tion he preferred, Frederick William promised to explain later on. 
 
 There was one Prussian minister, indeed, who had sought to 
 have the matter definitely settled before embarking upon the war. 
 
 1 Instructions to Bischoffwerder, February 18, Art. 4; Kaunitz's declara- 
 tions to Bischoffwerder reported by the latter March 13, and approved by the 
 King of Prussia March 19; Spielmann's remarks to Jacobi, reported by the latter 
 March 21, etc. (B. A., R. 1, 172 and 169). 
 
 2 Rescript to Jacobi, March 26, B. A., R. 1, 169. 
 
 3 Jacobi's report of May 3, B. A., loc. (At.; Kaunitz to Reuss, May 4, printed 
 in Vivenot, ii, pp. 23 ff. 
 
 4 Rescript to Jacobi, May 9, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 273 
 
 Alvensleben repeatedly proposed to Schulenburg that the King 
 should join in the struggle only in case the Imperial Courts 
 allowed him to occupy immediately the coveted territories in 
 Poland. 1 How such a demand could have been reconciled with 
 Prussia's engagements and declarations, it is difficult to see. 
 On the Austrian side, Spielmann later claimed that it was not his 
 fault that his Court had not reached a definite agreement with 
 Prussia regarding the indemnities before the outbreak of the war. 2 
 That this had not come about was probably due chiefly to 
 Kaunitz, who, disliking the idea of a Prussian acquisition, 
 avoided discussing indemnities as far as he could; and also to the 
 Nestors of the State Conference, who found it the height of wis- 
 dom to postpone the topic until Prussia had spoken first. 3 Doubt- 
 less in April, in view of Frederick William's burning impatience 
 to begin the enterprise, it would have been easy to secure from 
 him a formal declaration on the subject, or at least a guarantee of 
 the principle of strict parity in future acquisitions. As it was, the 
 two Powers entered upon the war with insufficient agreements, 
 insufficient conceptions of the magnitude of the task, insufficient 
 forces, and — as was soon to be shown — with insufficient con- 
 fidence in one another. 4 
 
 1 See Alvensleben's well-known Proces-verbal of October 1, 1793, in Herrmann, 
 Erganzungsband, pp. 404-409. 
 
 2 See the letter of Thugut to Colloredo-Wallsee of November i, 1792, in Vivenot, 
 Vertrauliche Briefe des Freiherrn von Thugut, i, pp. 4-8. 
 
 3 Cf. the rescript of Kaunitz to Stadion of April 18, 1792, Vivenot, i, pp. 464- 
 467; and the decision of the Conference on January 17, 1792, already mentioned. 
 
 4 On the roles played by Austria and Prussia in connection with the outbreak 
 of the Revolutionary War, see, Sybel, op. cit., ii, pp. 171 ff., especially pp. 184 f., 
 192-195; Heigel, op. cit., i, pp. 495 ff.; Hausser, op. cit., i, pp. 327-341; Sorel, 
 op. cit., ii, pp. 351 ff., especially pp. 366-369, 373-376, 424-427, 442-448; Ranke, 
 Ursprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege, pp. 125 ff.; Glagau, Die franzosische 
 Legislative und der Ursprung der Revolutionskriege, pp. 157 ff., especially pp. 174- 
 !77, 257-259; Heidrich, op. cit., pp. 31 ff., especially pp. 33-36, 158-162. 
 
 Heidrich's account seems to me the most satisfactory, and it is the only one 
 based on a complete study of the Prussian records. It brings out strongly the 
 aggressive character of Prussia's policy, which I have also emphasized in the 
 text. Glagau's attempt to prove a somewhat similar, though a less decidedly 
 aggressive, tendency in Austrian policy seems hardly successful. Doubtless, in his 
 conversations with Jacobi and Bischoffwerder and in some of his numerous memo- 
 rials Kaunitz occasionally used rather bold language; but from a thorough study
 
 V 
 
 274 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 VI 
 
 The outbreak of the struggle in the West came marvelously a, 
 propos to serve the designs of Catherine II. For many months 
 she had been — according to her well-known confession to her 
 secretary — ' racking her brains to push the Courts of Vienna 
 and Berlin into the French enterprise, so that she might have her 
 elbows free.' x Now, through no particular merit of her own but 
 simply through the good luck that so constantly attended her, 
 she saw her neighbors nicely embarked on that tremendous under- 
 taking, just at the moment when she most needed to have them 
 fully occupied. The French declaration of war greatly facilitated, 
 although it did not, as is often said, determine the Empress' 
 onslaught upon Poland. 2 
 
 The Polish malcontents had already presented themselves at 
 St. Petersburg, at Catherine's invitation, in the latter part of 
 March. 3 They numbered hardly more than a dozen. Apart 
 from the three leaders, almost all of them were men without 
 standing or repute at home, mere clients and dependents of 
 Potocki. For this handful of emigres to set themselves up as the 
 true representatives of the Polish nation, the sole and sufficient 
 embodiment of the Republic, was nothing short of ludicrous; but 
 it was enough for the Empress' purposes to have any sort of a 
 figurehead behind which she might act. Her guests were lodged 
 at her expense, feted, caressed, and overwhelmed with attentions. 
 Their leaders were honored with daily private audiences with 
 Catherine and Zubov, in which the details of the future Con- 
 federation were settled. 
 
 The Empress presented to the Poles a scheme for the reorgan- 
 ization of their country which she herself had worked out. Drawn 
 
 of the Austrian acts one cannot escape the conviction that he was at bottom 
 extremely anxious to avoid a war, and that when he or any of the other Austrian 
 ministers expressed themselves in more or less bellicose terms, it was due either to a 
 momentary outburst of wrath against the National Assembly or to the desire to 
 satisfy the Prussians. 
 
 1 XpanoBHirKifi, ^HeBHHKt, December 14/25, 1791. 
 
 2 The news of the French declaration reached St. Petersburg only May 9, long 
 after the final orders for the attack on Poland had been sent off. 
 
 3 Potocki and Rzewuski arrived the 15th, Branicki the 29th.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 275 
 
 up in the form of twenty-three articles, which were to be added to 
 the Pacta Conventa, it must have convinced her guests of her 
 sterling republican principles, for she had provided for the 
 annulment of every useful act of the Four Years' Diet and for the 
 restoration of every monstrosity of the old regime. 1 It appears, 
 however, that no definite arrangements were made at that time 
 for the future government of the Republic. The Poles could not 
 agree among themselves; and on one occasion, at the very close 
 of their stay in St. Petersburg, they almost came to blows with 
 one another in Zubov's chamber, when they fell to discussing the 
 delicate subject of the restoration of the power of the hetmans. 2 
 
 The immediate plan of action, however, was fixed with little 
 difficulty. The Act of Confederation was drawn up with Popov's 
 assistance, and apparently in accordance with an old scheme of 
 Potemkin. It was signed and sworn to by the Poles on April 27 
 at St. Petersburg, 3 but for the sake of appearances was lyingly 
 dated " May 14, Targowica." In other words, it was designed to 
 create the impression that the Confederation had arisen on Polish 
 soil, and on that date when it could first safely begin its activity 
 under cover of the invading Russian troops. The Act itself was 
 worthy of its signatories. It consisted mainly of a prolix, turgid, 
 and muddled indictment of " the usurpers " at Warsaw, who by 
 conspiracy and violence, and especially by " the audacious 
 crime " of the Third of May, had " overthrown all the cardinal 
 laws," abolished the liberty and equality of the nobility, spread 
 " the contagion of democratic ideas," following " the fatal ex- 
 amples set at Paris," imposed " the shackles of slavery " upon 
 the nation — in short, destroyed the Republic and established a 
 " despotism." Wherefore the undersigned " senators, ministers 
 of the Republic, officers of the Crown," etc., etc., united to form a 
 free Confederation in defence of the Roman Catholic religion, the 
 
 1 These articles are printed in the instruction for Baron Biihler in the C6opHHKi, 
 xlvii, pp. 303 ff. They are also to be found in various slightly divergent drafts 
 among Catherine's papers in the Petrograd Archives, X, 70. 
 
 2 Biihler to Zubov, November 19/30, 1792, M. A., HoJiBnia, IX, 3; Rze- 
 wuski to Catherine, August 19, 1792 and July 8, 1794, M. A., ITojibina, II, 7. 
 
 3 As to the place and date, see Smoleriski, Konfcderacya targowicka, pp. 30 f., 
 and the Rescript to Kakhovski of April 16/27, C6opnnKi>, xlvii, p. 275.
 
 276 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 liberty and equality of the szlachta, the territorial integrity of the 
 state, and the ancient republican form of government. They 
 annulled all that had been done at the present Diet contrary to 
 liberty and the laws; they declared that they would pursue all 
 those who in any way sought to defend the Constitution of the 
 Third of May; they ordered all ministers, senators, and deputies 
 to send in within two months a formal disavowal of all adhesion to 
 that illegal constitution; and they invited all ' their brothers in 
 the provinces ' to accede to the present Confederation. Since the 
 faction at Warsaw had usurped control of the armed forces of the 
 state, so that " the subjugated Republic " could not defend its 
 own cause, there remained, it was said, no other course than to 
 appeal for aid to " the great Catherine." " The justice of our 
 prayers," the Act concluded, " the sanctity of the treaties which 
 unite Russia to Poland, and above all the Empress' own grandeur 
 of character give us a well-grounded hope of her disinterestedness 
 and her magnanimity, in a word, of her worthy assistance to 
 our cause." 1 
 
 This masterpiece was supplemented by a formal reclamation for 
 aid, addressed by " the confederated Polish nation " to that 
 " immortal Sovereign," who although " ruling over half the 
 hemisphere " and ' filling the universe with her renown ' was 
 even more fitted by her heroic and godlike qualities to become 
 " the refuge of peoples and of kings " and " the tutelary divinity " 
 of Poland. 2 
 
 In preparation for the glorious role thus thrust upon her, the 
 Empress had already made the necessary military arrangements. 
 Early in April full instructions were sent to Generals Kakhovski 
 and Krecetnikov, the former commanding the army still quar- 
 tered in Moldavia and the other forces in the south, the latter the 
 troops massed on the frontiers of Lithuania. The date for begin- 
 ning action was fixed at the middle of May, the time set for the 
 evacuation of Turkish territory. According to the elaborate plan 
 of operations drawn up by General Pistor, four Russian corps 
 were to pour suddenly into the Ukraine from three sides; it was 
 
 1 The Act of the Confederation is printed in Angeberg, Recueil, pp. 262-274. 
 
 2 This document is printed in the C6opHHKT>, xlvii, pp. 310-316.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 277 
 
 expected that the small Polish army, most of which was scattered 
 about in that region, could easily be outflanked, surrounded, dis- 
 persed, or captured ; and thereupon Kakhovski was to go straight 
 for Warsaw, while Krecetnikov rapidly bore down upon the 
 capital from the northeast. Nearly 100,000 troops were assigned 
 to the enterprise, although the Russians looked forward to a 
 military promenade rather than a serious campaign. 1 
 
 While we are but imperfectly informed of what went on behind 
 the scenes at St. Petersburg during these months, it is clear that 
 there were not a few differences of opinion about the undertaking 
 in Poland. Zubov and Markov, into whose hands the manage- 
 ment of the affair had passed, made all their plans with the utmost 
 secrecy and intended to begin action without once consulting the 
 Council of the Empire and without further communications to 
 the other Courts. In this, however, they encountered the lively 
 opposition of Bezborodko, who after being summoned to return 
 to the capital in haste, on his arrival found himself completely 
 thrust aside. Naturally the veteran statesman was full of con- 
 tempt for the political operations of the twenty-six year old 
 favorite and his clique, and full of indignation that such a coterie 
 should be able to plunge the state into a new war without the 
 knowledge or advice of the Empress' responsible ministers. 2 He 
 insisted that the whole Polish enterprise should be laid before the 
 Council. He was also particularly determined that nothing 
 should be done until an understanding had been reached with the 
 German Powers, or at least with Prussia. 3 Bezborodko must have 
 recognized that such an understanding would probably lead up to 
 a new partition. His report from Jassy in February had already 
 hinted at such an arrangement; and on his return to St. Peters- 
 
 1 See the rescripts to the two commanding generals of March 14/25, April 
 1/12, etc., in the C6opHHKT>, xlvii, pp. 241 ff.; also the discussion of the Russian 
 military plans in Soplica, Wojna polsko-rosyjska, pp. 9-18. 
 
 2 Cf. Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, May 15/26, 1792, Apx. Bop., xiii, pp. 
 
 255 i- 
 
 3 That had been his opinion from the very outset; cf. his letter to Potemkin 
 of August 12/23, J79 1 ! CGopHHKt, xxix, p. 124; to A. R. Vorontsov, December 3/14, 
 ibid., p. 174; report of January 25/February 5 to the Empress, M. A., Typrrifl, IX, 
 14; Cobenzl's reports of March 23 and July 6, 1792, V. A., Rnsslatid, Berichte.
 
 278 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 burg he seems to have urged upon the Empress the necessity of 
 acquiring for Russia the Ukraine and other Polish territories x — 
 an acquisition that would inevitably involve equivalent advan- 
 tages for Austria and Prussia. 
 
 It is impossible to say with certainty what was Catherine's 
 attitude towards a new partition at the moment when she began 
 her enterprise in Poland. It is probable, however, that she was 
 by no means averse to the idea. From the rescript to Potemkin 
 of July 18/29, 1791, and from her conduct in the latter part of 
 1792, it appears that she was not inclined to stand out in opposi- 
 tion, in case the other Powers insisted upon a new dismember- 
 ment of the Republic. There is some reason to think that she 
 even tried to hasten such a denouement by subtle insinuations to 
 Austria and Prussia; although naturally she was not disposed to 
 take upon herself the onus of proposing it formally and openly. 2 
 That she was quite alive to the advantages to be expected from 
 the annexation of the Ukraine, appears from the oft-cited rescript 
 to Potemkin; and it is perhaps worthy of notice that in 1793 
 one of her ministers wrote that for " several years " her mind had 
 been filled with the thought of acquiring this territory and of the 
 glory and profit to be gained thereby. 3 Nevertheless, at the time 
 
 1 Cf. Bezborodko's memorial to the Empress, of June 30/ July 11, 1793 
 (C6opHHK'b, xxix, pp. 236-239), reviewing his past services, and reminding her that he 
 had given this advice about making acquisitions from Poland " at the first moment 
 when an opportunity for making them began to dawn." From the context it would 
 seem that the reference was to the time immediately after his return to St. Peters- 
 burg from Jassy. Such is also the opinion advanced by Smolehski, Ostatni rok 
 sejmu wielkiego, pp. 313 f. 
 
 2 I am not referring here to the famous note to Zubov reported by Goltz in 
 February, 1792. Although that has been almost universally taken as a hint, or 
 even an invitation, to Prussia to come forward with proposals for a partition, I 
 regard it as quite uncertain whether the note was genuine, and whether Goltz came 
 to be informed of it by Catherine's intention or otherwise. What I have in mind 
 in the statement in the text is: first, the very curious and subtle overtures to 
 Prussia on the subject of indemnities, contained in the instructions to Alopeus 
 of June 10/21, 1792 (to be analyzed later on); and secondly, the pregnant insinu- 
 ations made by Razumovski to Bischoffwerder, as already noticed, in March, 1792, 
 and repeated in much more definite form to Cobenzl and Spielmann at the end of 
 June. That Razumovski could have ventured so far without being in some manner 
 informed of his sovereign's wishes, seems scarcely conceivable. 
 
 3 Zavadovski to S. R. Vorontsov, July 27/August 7, 1793, Apx. Bop., xii, p. 90.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 279 
 
 now under consideration, she seems to have hesitated to disclose 
 her inmost thoughts even to her closest advisers. 1 Officially and 
 before the world she professed to have no object in view in Poland 
 except the overthrow of the new constitution and the vindication 
 of her treaties with the Republic. 
 
 Bezborodko's exertions had at least this result, that the 
 Empress was induced to lay the whole plan for the Polish enter- 
 prise before the Council of the Empire. While approving it in the 
 main, that body raised objections on some points; and especially 
 they urged the necessity of communicating their projects to 
 Austria and Prussia and securing the consent of those Courts. 
 They were, indeed, little disquieted by the known predilections of 
 Austria, but they feared that without a preliminary understand- 
 ing Frederick William would not remain a passive spectator. The 
 Empress was indignant at what she considered a criticism of her 
 own policy. 2 Nevertheless, on April 21 new dispatches were sent 
 to Vienna and Berlin, communicating in substantially identical 
 terms the plan for a Confederation and an armed intervention in 
 Poland, and requesting both Courts to support these measures, 
 when the time came, by appropriate and vigorous language at 
 Warsaw. It was a far cry, indeed, from the concert proposed in 
 February to the arbitrary and irrevocable resolutions thus 
 announced ; but the slight was glossed over with the excuse that 
 it was absolutely necessary for Russia to act at once, as her troops 
 were bound to return from Moldavia through Poland in May; 
 and it was also alleged that if the Empress had not confided her 
 
 1 Cf. the two undated notes to Bezborodko and Zubov, which may not im- 
 probably have been written about this period, CSopHHRt, xlii, pp. 245 f., 338. To 
 Bezborodko she wrote: " La proposition est incongrue; car par cette belle proposi- 
 tion nous attirerions non seulement tout l'odieux de la part des polonais, mais outre 
 cela nous agirions contre nos propres traites et notre garantie en £gard a Danzig 
 specialement. J'opine pour laisser tomber la proposition." To Zubov (in Russian): 
 " Your wish will never succeed with the present Courts of Vienna and Berlin. I 
 remember the partition of Poland with Maria Theresa and Frederick, how it went 
 off as smooth as butter. The comparison is not to the advantage of the former " 
 (the present Courts). 
 
 2 See the protocol of the Council, March 29/April 9, Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 906- 
 910; Catherine's note to Bezborodko, CfiopHHKi, xlii, p. 224; XpanoBHUKifi, op. cit., 
 April 3/14; Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, May 15/26, Apx. Bop., xiii, pp. 255 f.
 
 280 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 intentions earlier, it was because she was waiting for the long 
 delayed reply of Austria to her first communications. Some show 
 of regard for the other Courts was made at least; and Bezbo- 
 rodko's intervention may have averted rather embarrassing 
 complications. 
 
 Two weeks later the Russian declaration which was to be 
 presented at Warsaw, was also forwarded to Vienna and Berlin, 
 along with some additional explanations. At the same time a 
 pretence was made of replying to the Austrian dispatches of 
 April 12. It could scarcely soothe Kaunitz's irritation that, far 
 from being stricken with shame for its " unseemly and disloyal 
 conduct," the cabinet of Petersburg passed over all his arguments 
 and recriminations without the shadow of a response, and simply 
 reminded its ally of the long-standing engagement between the 
 Imperial Courts to maintain the Polish constitution of 1773. 
 In the dispatch to Berlin, it was emphatically declared that the 
 Empress had no other aim or project in Poland than to restore 
 the old form of government. That was not the declaration 
 the Prussians were hoping for, as the Russians were probably 
 aware. 1 
 
 Having thus set the stage, having organized the Confederation 
 which was to serve as her puppet, having formed her plans 
 without admitting her neighbors to consultation or deliberation 
 — in spite of the proposal for a concert — having then an- 
 nounced to those neighbors what she meant to do at the eleventh 
 hour when they no longer had time for counter-representations, 
 Catherine was ready for action. On May 18 Bulgakov presented 
 at Warsaw the declaration exposing the reasons which impelled 
 his sovereign to intervene on behalf of Polish liberties and in 
 defence of violated treaties against the usurping Diet and the 
 illegal Constitution of the Third of May. 2 On the night of the 
 18-19, the Russian troops crossed the frontier. 
 
 Thus at almost the same moment there burst forth in East and 
 West the two storms which the prudent diplomacy of Leopold II 
 
 1 Dispatches to Razumovski and Alopeus of April 23/May 4, M. A., ABdpifl, 
 III, 52 and Ilpyccifl, III, 28. 
 
 2 The declaration is printed in Angeberg, Recneil, pp. 274-281.
 
 WAR IN EAST AND WEST 28 1 
 
 had foreseen and vainly striven to avert. The ardor of the 
 Girondists to revolutionize Europe combined with the no less 
 aggressive and revolutionary designs of Catherine II and with the 
 insatiable Prussian thirst for aggrandizement to plunge wellnigh 
 the whole Continent into the vortex of war. France and Poland, 
 the two states which had simultaneously been attempting sweep- 
 ing reforms and national regeneration, found themselves exposed 
 — each isolated and without connection with the other — to the 
 onslaught of the great military monarchies of Eastern Europe. 
 These two conflicts could not fail to work back upon each other in 
 innumerable ways. Their influence upon each other can hardly 
 be overestimated. Broadly speaking, the results of this interplay 
 may be described as highly favorable to France, and ruinous to 
 Poland. If the struggle brought to the former glory and conquests 
 unparalleled in her history, and to the latter political annihila- 
 tion, the difference is not altogether due to the genius of the one 
 nation and the weakness of the other. 
 
 Without attempting to trace here all the ways in which the 
 conflict in the West affected the fate of Poland, it is incumbent to 
 point out the chief form which that interaction took. Vastly 
 different as were the pretexts for the two wars — since France 
 was being attacked for turning a monarchy into a republic, and 
 Poland for converting a republic into a monarchy — neverthe- \ 
 less, the diplomacy of the predatory Powers succeeded in finding 
 a common formula to justify the two utterly contradictory enter- 
 prises, and in establishing a subtle connection between them. 
 Both were ranged in the category of ' counter-revolutions,' 
 benevolently undertaken by the three allied Courts in the inter- 
 ests of order, stability and the general tranquillity of Europe. 
 Both were integral parts of a great common work; although for 
 the sake of an equitable division of labor, the intervention in the 
 West was entrusted to Austria and Prussia alone, while that in the 
 East was reserved for Catherine. Once this insidious theory was 
 established, the deduction was obvious. Pooling the stakes, the 
 three Powers would soon be pooling the profits. What was in- 
 vested in one quarter could be recouped in the other. Such a 
 combination had already been clearly foreshadowed in the dis-
 
 282 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 cussions between the diplomats at Vienna in March, at a time 
 when both the French and the Polish enterprises were still only- 
 uncertain contingencies of the future. By May both had become 
 realities. It remained only to see whether the two joint ventures 
 would yield results capable of leading up to a gigantic and mu- 
 tually satisfactory distribution of dividends.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 The Russian Reconquest of Poland 
 
 Catherine's abrupt attack caught the Poles in a state of terrible 
 unreadiness. Down to the eleventh hour they had refused to 
 believe that there was any serious danger. This disastrous 
 optimism was due in part to the Prussian alliance, which, in spite 
 of the unmistakable coldness of Berlin, still seemed to afford a 
 guarantee against a direct aggression from without; in part, it 
 was based upon the friendly attitude of Austria, upon the engage- 
 ments which the two German Powers were thought to have con- 
 tracted to defend the independence and the free constitution of 
 the Republic, and upon the hopes aroused by Landriani of a 
 quadruple alliance about to be erected as a barrier against Russia. 
 Hence, although Catherine's opposition to the new constitution 
 grew more and more evident, although since the autumn there 
 had been reports of suspicious movements of her troops along the 
 frontier, although the visit of the malcontents to Jassy was known 
 at Warsaw and its purpose could easily be divined, nevertheless 
 for many months the Poles continued to flatter themselves that 
 the Empress would not venture upon open hostilities. 
 
 Confidence was increased by the quiet, unity, and harmony 
 that reigned throughout the country. Patriotic ardor, the enthu- 
 siasm for reforms, the progress of enlightened political and social 
 ideas — in short, the hope and promise of a brighter future — had 
 never seemed so great as during the year that followed the 
 inauguration of the new constitution. When at the Dietines, 
 held in February, 1792, for the first time since the revolution the 
 szlachta had the opportunity to express their full opinion about 
 what had occurred, the result was a signal triumph for the reform- 
 ing party. All the provincial assemblies swore loyalty to the 
 constitution, and appointed delegates to thank the King and 
 
 283
 
 284 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Estates. The Diet meanwhile busied itself with completing the 
 reorganization of the government, with questions of finance, the 
 judiciary, a new law-code, the municipalities, religion, Courland 
 — in fact, with all sorts of questions except the most important 
 of all, the military one. 
 
 The awakening from this fancied security began towards the 
 close of March, when reports arrived from St. Petersburg and 
 Vienna revealing Catherine's aggressive plans and the communi- 
 cations she had made to Austria. In the next few weeks the news 
 grew steadily more and more alarming. It could no longer be 
 doubted that the Empress meant to attack. Warsaw trembled 
 with excitement, but not with consternation. In the streets, the 
 salons, the clubs there was but one voice: resistance to the last, 
 100,000 troops to the front, the rising of the whole nation in arms, 
 if need be. Better a new partition, said the Marshal Potocki, than 
 the abandonment of the constitution. 1 On April 16 and 21 the 
 Diet in secret session decided upon the measures necessary to put 
 the country in a state of defence. The army was to be raised at 
 once to 100,000 men. The King was authorized to engage ex- 
 perienced generals, artillery officers, and engineers from abroad, 
 to negotiate a loan for 30,000,000 florins, and to employ 9,000,000 
 florins then in the treasury for military preparations. These 
 measures were to be communicated to the friendly Powers, 
 especially to the Courts of Berlin, Vienna, and Dresden, along 
 with a declaration that the Republic was determined to defend 
 itself in case of foreign invasion. 2 Energetic and worthy of the 
 moment these decisions were; but they represented a desperate 
 and belated attempt to effect what ought to have been done three 
 years earlier. 
 
 In spite of the suddenly darkened horizon, on the 3rd of May 
 the anniversary of the revolution was celebrated with elaborate 
 and splendid fetes. " Warsaw was never more thronged or more 
 brilliant," wrote a contemporary: " that was the last day of 
 Pompeii, dancing over a volcano." 3 Two weeks later (the 18th), 
 
 1 Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiordw, iii, pp. 124 f. 
 
 2 Smolenski, Ostatni rok sejmu wielkiego, pp. 348-354. 
 
 3 Kraszewski, op. cit., iii, p. 127.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 285 
 
 Bulgakov presented his declaration, confirming the worst that had 
 been anticipated. 
 
 At the next session of the Diet (the 21st), before densely packed 
 galleries, the Russian note was read. Deep silence greeted it; but 
 at the passage which announced that the Empress was sending her 
 troops into the country in order to restore the liberties of the 
 Polish nation, there were groans and laughter. The King spoke 
 with his usual eloquence. He exhorted his people to manly 
 courage and determination, pledging his own best efforts and 
 enumerating the available means of defence. He referred to the 
 Empress in flattering terms, expressing the hope that when better 
 informed, she would decide not to proceed to extremities. He 
 spoke with confidence of the aid to be expected from the King of 
 Prussia, the ally with whose knowledge and approval all the most 
 important acts of the present Diet had been effected. He advised 
 soliciting the good offices of Austria and Saxony; and ' if any 
 other means could be found for settling the issue rather with the 
 pen than with the sword, assuredly none ought to be disdained, 
 none ought to be neglected.' And he ended with the brave 
 declaration: " Believe me, if there be need for sacrificing my own 
 life, assuredly I shall not spare it." x It was a moving, an in- 
 spiring speech; but behind the phrase " rather with the pen than 
 with the sword," lurked an intimation of where the King's 
 thoughts really lay. 
 
 In the following week the final resolutions of the Diet were 
 taken. Stanislas Augustus was appointed commander-in-chief of 
 all the armed forces of the Republic. Save for the right of con- 
 cluding peace, reserved to the Diet, he was virtually invested 
 with a military dictatorship — a thing unparalleled in Polish 
 history. War taxes were voted; arrangements were made for 
 enlisting regiments of volunteers; and the government was 
 authorized, in case of need, to decree a national levee en masse. 
 Finally the Assembly sanctioned a counter-declaration to Russia, 
 which was, unfortunately, too conciliatory and apologetic to be 
 quite effective; a bold and spirited proclamation to the army; 
 and an address of the King and the Estates to the nation. 2 These 
 
 1 Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 398 ff. 2 Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 408-413.
 
 286 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 were the last acts of the Four Years' Diet. Not wishing to 
 hamper the activity of the executive power by continuing its 
 deliberations, on May 29 the assembly adjourned. It had done 
 all that was possible for it to do at that late hour to provide for 
 the needs of the crisis. The rest depended on the King, to whom 
 the whole direction and the whole responsibility for the national 
 defence had been entrusted. 
 
 II 
 
 If the struggle were not to be utterly unequal, Poland impera- 
 tively needed to secure aid from outside. Naturally she turned 
 first of all to the allied Court of Berlin, to whose assistance she 
 had every right that solemn engagements could give. By the 
 treaty of 1790, the continued validity of which was unquestioned, 
 Frederick William had pledged himself to render military aid ' in 
 case any foreign Power, by virtue of any previous acts or stipula- 
 tions . . . should seek to assert the right to interfere in the inter- 
 nal affairs of the Republic.' No stipulation could more exactly 
 have fitted the situation of 1792. Nevertheless, for many months 
 past the Prussian government had maintained an attitude so cold 
 and forbidding as almost to preclude all hope of its assistance. 
 When the Diet's first resolution to resist a Russian invasion was 
 communicated to Berlin, Lucchesini replied with a stiff note to 
 the effect that his master could not take cognizance of these 
 decisions, since they related to matters utterly foreign to him. 
 Orally the envoy added that as the King of Prussia had had no 
 share in the revolution of the Third of May, he did not consider 
 himself bound to render assistance, in case the Patriotic party 
 wished to defend its work by force of arms. 1 
 
 Ominous as was this reply, it was long before the Poles could 
 convince themselves that the Court of Berlin would be as bad as 
 its word. Of the hostility of the Prussian ministry there could 
 be no doubt; but the world had often been taught that the policy 
 of that ministry did not always coincide with that of its master; 
 and it was reported from many sources that such was the case at 
 
 1 Note of May 4, Lucchesini's report of the 5th, B. A., R. 9, 27.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 287 
 
 present. 1 At any rate, faint as was the hope, no resource should 
 be left untried. Hence, immediately after the Russian declaration 
 the Polish government formally demanded that Prussia should 
 recognize the casus foederis, and furnish the aid provided for in 
 the treaty of alliance. And, as the value of ministerial notes was 
 sufficiently known, it was decided to send a special envoy to 
 Berlin to approach Frederick William personally, to make a 
 supreme appeal to his loyalty and sense of honor, and at least to 
 find out definitely whether he would do anything whatever on 
 behalf of Poland. The painful mission was entrusted to the 
 Marshal Potocki, who had been the author and the foremost 
 supporter of the Prussian alliance. 
 
 No visitor could have been more unwelcome at Berlin, and no 
 demands more embarrassing. Frederick William had no time or 
 inclination to consider his engagements with the Republic, for he 
 was already immersed in a negotiation for dismembering that 
 allied state. Potocki was, indeed, favored with two audiences 
 with the King and a conference with Schulenburg; but Frederick 
 William merely stammered out a few platitudes and hastened to 
 make his escape, while his minister took refuge behind such 
 flimsy pretexts as: that the Poles themselves had provoked hos- 
 tilities by their warlike resolutions of April; that the indepen- 
 dence and integrity of the Republic were not endangered by the 
 Russian invasion, and therefore there was no occasion for Prussia 
 to intervene; or that the alliance had been concluded with a 
 republic, Poland was now a monarchy, and therefore the treaty no 
 longer held. Potocki soon had to recognize that there was abso- 
 lutely no hope. Frederick William's last word was contained in 
 his reply to Stanislas Augustus, in which he flatly refused to 
 render aid, on the ground that the Constitution of the Third of 
 May, which was subsequent to the alliance treaty, had so altered 
 the situation that his engagements were in no way applicable to 
 the present circumstances. 2 That meant definitely that in the 
 moment of Poland's supreme need her ally had left her in the 
 
 1 Details as to these reports in Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 175, 233. 
 
 2 The text of this letter (of June 8) is printed in part in Askenazy, op. cit., p. 246. 
 Potocki's detailed account of his audiences with the King and his discussions with 
 Schulenburg, ibid., pp. 237-253.
 
 288 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 lurch. Such conduct can be characterized only as a flagrant 
 breach of faith, an act of treachery with few parallels in history. 
 
 At Dresden and Vienna the efforts of the Poles were equally 
 fruitless. The Elector would give only vague promises of his good 
 offices; and Austria, while secretly expressing her sympathy, 
 alleged that in the existing situation it was utterly impossible for 
 her to do anything effective in behalf of the Republic. The 
 mission of Prince Czartoryski to Vienna, which was the counter- 
 part of Potocki's to Berlin, proved no more successful. 1 By the 
 middle of June it was evident that no aid whatever was to be 
 expected from any neighboring Power. Poland was thrown 
 entirely upon her own resources. 
 
 Those resources were meagre enough. Although the size of the 
 army had been trebled since the beginning of the Four Years' 
 Diet, at the outbreak of the war it amounted to only 57,000 men; 
 and deducting the reserves and the garrisons of various fortresses, 
 there were barely 45,000 men available for field-service. 2 These 
 troops, moreover, were but recently organized, imperfectly 
 trained, and utterly inexperienced; they were inadequately 
 equipped with arms, ammunition, and uniforms; and the com- 
 missariat and the field-hospital service left much to be desired. 3 
 In short, the army lacked almost everything except courage and 
 patriotic enthusiasm. In spite of all deficiencies its spirit was 
 excellent. Granted a little experience and proper leadership, it 
 was capable of giving a good account of itself. 
 
 The leadership, however, was also not of the highest order. 
 The command of the forces in the Ukraine, on which the brunt of 
 
 1 Kaunitz to King Francis, June 1, V. A., Vortrdge, 1792, and to de Cache, 
 June 6, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1792; Haugwitz's report of June 2, B. A., R. 1, 
 Conv. 170. 
 
 2 Smolenski, Konfederacya targowicka, p. 45. 
 
 3 There is some difference of opinion on these points among Polish historians. 
 Korzon (Wewnetrzne dzieje, v, pp. 133-137) attempts to prove that in spite of 
 momentary disorders and deficiencies, and in spite of the complaints constantly 
 made by the commanders, the army was adequately supplied and equipped. In a 
 somewhat similar sense, G6rski, Historya piechoty polskiej, pp. 194 f. On the other 
 hand, the general view advanced in the text is maintained by the most recent his- 
 torian of the war, Soplica, Wojna polsko-rosyjska, pp. 50 f., and by Smolenski, 
 Konfederacya targowicka, pp. 46, 167.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 289 
 
 the fighting would fall, had been given to the King's nephew, 
 Prince Joseph Poniatowski, an inexperienced young man of 
 twenty-nine, who, with all his gallantry and devotion, had not yet 
 matured those talents that were to win him a great reputation as 
 a marshal of Napoleon. Accepting the command against his will, 
 weighed down by the sense of responsibility and the presentiment 
 of failure, he displayed throughout the campaign a deplorable lack 
 of initiative, an inability to seize what opportunities presented 
 themselves, and an exaggerated unwillingness to take risks. 
 Among the other officers, only one showed signs of real genius. 
 That was Kosciuszko; and he, unfortunately, was subordinated 
 to Prince Joseph, and constantly fettered by the latter's excessive 
 caution. 
 
 Between the 18th and the 22nd of May, four Russian corps 
 invaded the Ukraine from the east, the south, and the southwest, 
 while four others pressed into Lithuania. In the latter quarter 
 there was no really effective resistance. The Polish forces, 
 numbering 14,500 men, incapably led and faced by 32,000 Rus- 
 sians, 1 could only retreat steadily, fighting occasional unsuccessful 
 rear-guard actions. In the south Prince Joseph and Kosciuszko, 
 with about 17,000 men, were pitted against Kakhovski's 64,00c 2 
 In the face of such an enormous disparity of numbers, the best 
 chance for the Poles would seem to have lain in concentrating all 
 their available forces and hurling them upon one or another of the 
 widely separated Russian corps before the latter had time to 
 unite. That proposal was made by Kosciuszko at the very be- 
 ginning of the campaign, but rejected by Prince Joseph on the 
 ground that with such quite inexperienced troops the issue of a 
 pitched battle would be hazardous, and with no reserves at hand 
 a defeat would be ruinous. 3 The Prince was determined to hold 
 strictly to the defensive, keeping his irreplaceable army intact, 
 and maintaining his communications with the capital. The 
 Russians, on their side, were confident of their ability to cut his 
 line of retreat, surround him, and capture his whole army. As 
 they were constantly able to outflank him, he was obliged to fall 
 
 1 Smolensk.!, op. cit., pp. 45 f. 2 Ibid. 
 
 3 Korzon, Kosciuszko, p. 227.
 
 290 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 back continually before them, abandoning one strong position 
 after another. The campaign turned into a sort of chase, in the 
 course of which Kakhovski more than once allowed the enemy to 
 slip through his fingers, while the Poles displayed a certain 
 dexterity in eluding their pursuers, and occasionally turned and 
 struck back with good effect. Thus on June 18 at Zielence, 
 when a Russian corps under General Markov, advancing too 
 ardently and incautiously, suddenly found itself faced by the 
 bulk of Prince Joseph's army, the Russians were rudely repulsed 
 and forced to evacuate the battle-field, although the Polish com- 
 mander failed to follow up his victory, as he should have done, by 
 crushing Markov completely. 
 
 After more than a month of this game of hare and hounds, by 
 early July Prince Joseph had retired behind the line of the Bug, 
 which he hoped to be able to defend. On the 18th all the Polish 
 positions were attacked by the enemy. The hardest righting 
 came at Dubienka, where Kosciuszko with 6,000 Poles and 10 
 guns held at bay for three or four hours 19,000 Russians with 76 
 guns. 1 This was the fiercest and bloodiest battle of the war. 
 Under cover of darkness Kosciuszko did indeed withdraw, on 
 learning that the passage of the river had been forced at several 
 other points; but at any rate, his men had covered themselves 
 with glory, and he, whose name had hitherto been little known, 
 now became almost in a moment the national hero. 
 
 From the Bug the army fell back through Lublin to the Vistula. 
 On July 25 it stood at Kurow on the right bank of that river, 
 some distance to the south of the capital. The army of Lithuania 
 was posted on the lower Bug, almost due east of Warsaw. These 
 were the positions at the moment when hostilities ended. 
 
 The situation was not absolutely desperate. In some ways it 
 was even more favorable than in the earlier stages of the cam- 
 paign. The richest palatinates and the greater part of the territory 
 of the Republic had indeed been overrun by the enemy, and the 
 Russians had penetrated almost to the gates of Warsaw. But 
 the more the scene of operations moved to the west, the farther 
 the invaders were drawn away from their base, and the more 
 
 1 Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 177 f.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 29 1 
 
 difficult it became for them to protect a terribly long and exposed 
 line of communications. On the other hand, the various Polish 
 forces were constantly getting closer together and better able to 
 assist one another. The Vistula offered a relatively strong line of 
 defence; and behind it were the still undrained resources of the 
 western palatinates. There were 30,000 regular troops yet 
 available; and volunteers were flocking in daily. The army had 
 not been really defeated once. Only two considerable battles had 
 been fought, the one a Polish victory, the other not a genuine 
 defeat. The troops, green at the start, were getting hardened and 
 experienced and sure of themselves; and in spite of the constant 
 retreats, they were far from discouraged. Officers and men were 
 thirsting for more fighting, eager to repeat the exploits of Zielefke 
 and Dubienka. Kosciuszko later wrote bitterly: " The fighting 
 spirit, ardor, and patriotism were universal. . . . The means of 
 beating the Russian army were still in our hands. . . . But we 
 didn't make use of them." l That they were not made use of, 
 that the resistance collapsed at this moment, was not the fault of 
 the army; it was due to the tremors and terrors of the cowardly 
 King. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Stanislas Augustus had often sworn that he would never aban- 
 don the new constitution while life remained. He had solemnly 
 declared that he would lead his people to battle and, if necessary, 
 die with them. He had promised again and again to go to the 
 field with the army ; and indeed he made all the preparations, as if 
 he meant to go. It is doubtful, however, whether he ever had any 
 serious intentions of fighting. It is probable that no cause in the 
 world and no conceivable disgrace could ever have induced this 
 King to sacrifice his fife, his crown, or even his personal comfort. 
 When pressed to go to the camp, he • inquired anxiously whether 
 he would find there " a proper cuisine." 2 
 
 From the very outset his program was, " rather with the pen 
 than with the sword." The thought of settling everything by 
 
 1 Soplica, op. cit., p. 401. On the " comparatively favorable situation " at that 
 time, ibid., pp. 401 ff. 
 
 2 Soplica, op. cit., p. 222.
 
 292 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 negotiations was in his mind even before the Russian declaration 
 arrived l ; and after war had actually begun, he took pains to keep 
 the Russian envoy in Warsaw, and his own in St. Petersburg — 
 anomalous as such a situation was — in order to leave all chan- 
 nels open. The first shot had hardly been fired when through the 
 Chancellor Chreptowicz and the Danish minister Stanislas began 
 to sound Bulgakov about the possibility of entering into negotia- 
 tions. 2 
 
 The failure of the missions to Berlin and Vienna, the military 
 disasters in Lithuania, and the rapid advance of the Russians 
 everywhere only confirmed the King in the opinion that resist- 
 ance in arms was hopeless. His sister, his mistress, and others in 
 his entourage continually dinned into his ears that he was on the 
 verge of ruin, and that he must free himself from the perfidious 
 counsels of the Potockis, the hereditary enemies of his family. 
 Apparently he fell into a perfect panic. He saw nothing in the 
 world but his crown. He dreaded nothing so much as to lose 
 that. He was willing to do anything to save it. 3 It can readily 
 be imagined how the defence of the country fared at the hands of 
 a commander-in-chief who shut himself up in his palace in mortal 
 terror, thought of nothing except placating the enemy, and 
 seemed actually displeased at the news of a victory, from fear 
 that it would irritate the Empress. 4 
 
 By the middle of June nothing could hold back the King any 
 longer from starting negotiations. At a session of the Council of 
 War on the 18th, after the reading of various extremely black 
 reports from the front, he succeeded in putting through a decision 
 authorizing Prince Joseph to propose an armistice to Kakhovski, 
 which was to last until the Polish government should have had 
 
 1 See his letter to Bukaty of May 9, Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, pp. 217 f. 
 
 2 Bulgakov's report of May 22/June 2, M. A., Ilojibiiia, III, 66. Already 
 on May 12/23 the Russian envoy noted in his diary that the King wanted to 
 negotiate, and was only waiting for the Diet to go home and leave him a free hand. 
 The same opinion was current in the diplomatic corps at Warsaw (Lucchesini's 
 report of June 2, B. A., R. 9, 27). 
 
 3 Bulgakov's diary, June 10/21, M. A., loc. cit.; Cassini to Popov, June 27, July 
 4 and 7 (Papers of V. S. Popov, Imperial Public Library, Petrograd). 
 
 4 Vom Entstehen una 1 V 'titer gange der polnischen Konstitutionvom 3. May, 1791, ii, 
 p. 131; Smolefiski, Konfederacya targowicka, pp. 140 f.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 293 
 
 time to communicate with St. Petersburg. That same day the 
 indispensable Chreptowicz, who had always belonged to the 
 Russian party, hastened to his good friend Bulgakov to disclose 
 the King's propositions. His Majesty meant to beg the Empress 
 to take Poland back into her good graces, give the country her 
 younger grandson Constantine for its future king, and " improve 
 the constitution " according to her superior wisdom, adding or 
 rejecting what she pleased. Bulgakov, somewhat moved by these 
 signs of repentance, suggested the draft of a letter from the King 
 to his sovereign. 1 
 
 The next day all these matters were laid before the cabinet 
 (the Straz). Everyone present seems to have recognized the 
 desirability of proposing a truce and of appealing to the Empress 
 to end hostilities. Even the Marshal Potocki, just at that 
 moment returned from Berlin in downcast mood, approved of 
 this; but he strongly opposed the humiliating propositions out- 
 lined between Chreptowicz and Bulgakov. The result of the 
 discussion was that a courier was sent to Prince Joseph with 
 orders relating to the armistice (which Kakhovski, however, pro- 
 fessed himself unable to grant), while the King's letter to the 
 Empress was to be couched in the bolder and firmer tone recom- 
 mended by Potocki. 2 
 
 When Chreptowicz presented the document to Bulgakov, how- 
 ever, the Russian envoy declared flatly that this would never do; 
 it did not contain the propositions previously agreed upon be- 
 tween them; the tone was all wrong; the King must simply 
 throw himself on the mercy of the Empress. Thereupon, appar- 
 ently without consulting his cabinet, and contrary to the sense of 
 that body as manifested at its last session, Stanislas composed a 
 new letter, which Bulgakov was willing to accept. If Potocki had 
 recommended treating as one independent power with another, 
 the King's tone was that of a suppliant. He ' begged and 
 conjured ' the Empress to grant an armistice immediately. He 
 implored her not to carry out in their full rigor the intentions 
 announced in her declaration, while admitting that she had the 
 
 1 Bulgakov's report of June 11/22, M. A., IloJibina, III, 66. 
 
 2 Smolenski, op. cit., p. 134.
 
 294 "" THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 material power to do whatever she pleased. The essence of the 
 arrangement that he had to propose was that the succession 
 should be assured to the Grand Duke Constantine, and that 
 Poland should be attached to Russia by an "eternal alliance," 
 while being allowed to enjoy " a better organized government than 
 heretofore," and especially freedom from the perpetual danger of 
 interregna. It will be noticed that the King did not yet offer to 
 renounce the Constitution of the Third of May entirely. Not a 
 word was said about the Confederation of Targowica. Indeed, 
 the letter was essentially an attempt to bribe the Empress, by 
 various advantages to herself, into throwing overboard that Con- 
 federation, allowing at least a part of the new constitution to 
 stand, and permitting the King to retain at least a part of the 
 power he had gained by it. 1 
 
 For the next month Stanislas waited in morbid anxiety for a 
 reply from St. Petersburg. As his appeal to the Empress had 
 been kept rigorously secret, he continued to maintain a pre- 
 tense of zeal for the war. He went on with the old manoeuvre 
 of preparing to go to the army, and never going. He repeated 
 over and over his hypocritical vow to die for his country. On 
 July 4 he at last issued the long delayed summons for a national 
 uprising — an act which might have produced great results, had 
 it come at the beginning, instead of almost at the end, of the 
 war. 
 
 The Empress' reply arrived on July 22. It was cold, inflexi- 
 ble, imperious, as only Catherine knew how to write. Every one 
 of the King's proposals was rejected. He was simply advised — 
 or rather ordered — to accede to the Confederation of Targowica 
 without further delay, if he wished to avert the direst conse- 
 quences to his country, and — it was hinted — to himself. 2 
 Stanislas was, or pretended to be, overwhelmed with grief and 
 despair at these inexorable terms; nevertheless, before the end of 
 the day he had arranged with Bulgakov the form in which his 
 
 1 The King's letter of June 22 is printed in Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, pp. 74 ff.; 
 Solov'ev, Geschichte des Falles von Polen, pp. 284 f.; Smitt, Suworow, ii, pp. 461 ff., 
 and elsewhere. 
 
 2 This letter, dated July 2/13, is printed in Kalinka, op. cit., ii, pp. 76 f., and 
 elsewhere.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 295 
 
 accession was to be made. It remained only to save appearances, 
 as far as that could still be done. 
 
 For this purpose and no other, it would seem, on the 23rd the 
 King called together an extraordinary council. He had taken 
 pains to supplement the ordinary cabinet, in which he might not 
 have had a clear majority on his side, by the addition of various 
 high officials, on whose subservience he doubtless knew that he 
 could count. Before this carefully picked body he read the 
 Empress' letter, and then proceeded to set forth the situation of 
 the country — naturally in the blackest of terms. There could 
 be no doubt, he said, that the neighboring Powers were leagued 
 together against Poland. Further resistance would lead to the 
 immediate invasion of the Prussian armies already massed on the 
 frontier. Further resistance was impossible in any case, because 
 of the utter lack of money and the overwhelming superiority of 
 the hostile forces. No one could be more grieved than he at the 
 terms laid down by the Empress ; he would willingly give his life 
 for the maintenance of the constitution; but the sense of an obli- 
 gation higher than self-love, compelled him to consider whether 
 any desperate resolution could now bring the country any real 
 advantage. He therefore put the question whether it would not 
 be better to accede to the Confederation of Targowica in accord- 
 ance with the wishes of the Court of Petersburg. 
 
 The King's brother, the Primate, devoted to Russia from of old, 
 chimed in with the assertion that it was impossible to save the 
 constitution, but imperative to save the country. Others spoke 
 in the same sense, including even Kollataj, hitherto always the 
 boldest and most radical of the reformers. Only Malachowski, 
 the Marshal of the Great Diet, Ignacy Potocki, and two others 
 stood out unshakeably for resistance to the bitter end. Potocki 
 denied that the military situation was hopeless. He described 
 the enthusiasm and devotion of the troops. He conjured the King 
 to put himself at the head of the army and thereby set an example 
 that would surely inspire the nation to rise as one man; or if he 
 would not do that, let him at least lay down the crown and leave 
 the country, rather than stoop to associate himself with a band of 
 traitors. Ostrowski pointed to the overwhelming odds in the face
 
 296 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of which the Dutch had successfully carried through their 
 struggle for independence against Philip II; and he called upon 
 the King to emulate the bravery and constancy of John Casimir, 
 under whom Poland had been almost miraculously delivered 
 from extremities worse than the present. But all such manly 
 counsels were wasted. Stanislas Augustus leaving his palace, his 
 concerts, his mistresses, his ' proper cuisine,' for the rough life of 
 the camp — that was something inconceivable. 
 
 Eight of those present had spoken in favor of submitting to the 
 Empress' demands and four against. After Potocki had made his 
 last appeal, there was a moment's silence. Then the King an- 
 nounced that, having no more hope of saving a constitution dear 
 to him personally, and desiring to spare the country useless blood- 
 shed, complete devastation, and perhaps a new dismemberment, 
 he had decided to conform to the opinion of the majority and 
 accede to the Confederation. 1 The following day (the 24th) his 
 accession was sent to Bulgakov, while the army was ordered to 
 cease hostilities, recognize the Confederation, and leave the road 
 to Warsaw open to the Russians. 
 
 The King's shameful desertion produced an indescribable 
 feeling of rage, grief, and consternation in the capital, the army, 
 and the country at large. Nevertheless it immediately ended all 
 resistance to the invaders. For some few days it did indeed 
 appear likely that there would be a general uprising at Warsaw 
 and a repetition of the scenes then familiar at Paris. Crowds 
 gathered in the streets and squares, fiercely denouncing the King, 
 threatening to string up to the lamp-posts the advisers who had 
 misled him, and overwhelming with ovations those who had stood 
 up for the constitution. Inflammatory pamphlets and pasquils 
 were everywhere spread abroad. The police felt obliged to patrol 
 the city in heavy squads with loaded muskets, breaking up 
 gatherings in the streets and suppressing demonstrations. The 
 guard at the castle was doubled; and the King, trembling and 
 quaking, looked forward to the advent of the Russians as to a 
 deliverance. But, whether it was for fear of the oncoming enemy, 
 
 1 Bulgakov's report of July 16/27, M. A., ITojbma, III, 68; Cassini to Zubov, 
 July 25 (papers of V. S. Popov); Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 210-216.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 297 
 
 or because of the lack of leadership, or because the Warsaw mob 
 had not the courage or the violent instincts of the Parisians, at all 
 events no serious outbreak took place. 1 
 
 The Patriotic leaders, unwilling to start a civil war against 
 their King and feeling that for the present their cause was lost, 
 determined to leave the country. The Marshals of the late Diet 
 issued a formal protest against the Confederation of Targowica. 
 Those members of the party who held high offices, resigned. Soon 
 practically all those who were called ' the men of the Third of 
 May ' had departed for Leipsic, Venice, or other havens of refuge. 
 The roads from Warsaw to the frontier were choked with the 
 exodus. 
 
 In the army there was some talk of continuing the struggle in 
 spite of everything. Many of the officers, including Kosciuszko, 
 urged upon Prince Joseph the bold plan of abducting the King 
 and holding him a prisoner in the camp, while the fight for inde- 
 pendence was carried on in his name; but the Prince could not 
 bring himself to such an act of violence against his uncle. 2 There- 
 upon, rather than betray the cause they had sworn to defend, 
 Prince Joseph, Kosciuszko, and several dozen other officers 
 resigned, and many of them retired abroad. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian troops arrived at Warsaw and en- 
 camped just outside, to hold down ' the factious city.' Most of 
 the provinces were similarly garrisoned. The Polish army, after 
 being obliged to take the oath to the Confederation, was parcelled 
 out in small detachments about the country, wherever it could do 
 least harm to its new masters. The King, in spite of his submis- 
 sion, was kept almost a state prisoner. The Confederates would 
 have deposed him outright, had the Empress been willing to 
 allow it. Forbidden that satisfaction, they treated him like a 
 convicted criminal, subjecting him to all the humiliations in their 
 power, and denying him any influence whatever in public affairs. 
 
 The whole machinery of government was now, nominally at 
 least, in the hands of the men of Targowica. Their role had been 
 
 1 As to the scenes in the capital in these days, Cassini to Zubov, July 25, and 
 to Popov, July 26; Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 219 ff. 
 
 2 On this plan, see Soplica, op. cit., pp. 419 ff.; Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 226 f.
 
 298 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 insignificant enough while the war lasted. Returning to their 
 country under the protection of the invading army, and following 
 at a safe distance in the rear of the Russians, they had done their 
 utmost to produce a popular uprising in their favor, and they had 
 failed utterly. In vain they had attempted to debauch the army 
 that was fighting so valiantly for the nation's independence. In 
 vain they had tried to create an army of their own. Without a 
 strong guard of Cossacks they hardly dared show themselves. 
 Their proclamations, appeals, orders, and menaces produced little 
 or no response from their fellow-countrymen. If they succeeded 
 in forming local confederations here and there in the conquered 
 provinces, it was with the utmost difficulty, and often only by the 
 use of violence and constraint. It was true that after the King's 
 accession the situation was considerably changed in this respect. 
 As the Constitutionalist cause seemed hopelessly lost while the 
 men of Targowica appeared to have the game in their hands, their 
 ranks were soon swollen by the adhesion of all those who, regard- 
 less of honor or patriotism, were eager to be on the winning side. 
 The formation of confederations in each palatinate and the union 
 of all these local associations in a ' general Confederation ' then 
 went forward without much trouble. Still it cannot be said that 
 the men of Targowica ever acquired a really considerable popular 
 following. The mass of the nation held aloof, despising and exe- 
 crating them as a pack of traitors. Even the Russian officers 
 hardly concealed their contempt for their proteges. Without the 
 Empress' support the Confederation could not have held its posi- 
 tion a single day. Without her advice and approval its leaders 
 dared not raise a hand. In short, the Confederation remained 
 what it had been from the outset, a mere figurehead behind which 
 Russia could exercise sovereign rights over the Republic. 
 
 Thus Poland was once more prostrate before her old oppressors. 
 After enjoying a few brief years of glorious, exhilarating freedom, 
 after attempting to play once more the part of an independent and 
 active power in Europe, after striving so hard to purge itself of 
 the ancient errors and weaknesses and to lay the foundations for a 
 sound and progressive national life, the country suddenly found 
 itself plunged back under the old detested, anarchical regime and
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 299 
 
 into the old servitude to the foreigner. A more bitter history it 
 would be hard to imagine, were it not that the immediate future 
 had even worse disasters in store. 
 
 IV 
 
 The rapid and complete success of Catherine's Polish enter- 
 prise would hardly have been possible but for the strange passi- 
 vity of the two German Powers. Their inactivity was not due to 
 whole-hearted approval of her conduct. Both Courts had been 
 not a little ruffled when at the beginning of May, instead of form- 
 ing the proposed concert, she had simply called upon them to 
 acquiesce in her high-handed measures and to give her virtually 
 carte blanche in Poland. Although Prussia was anything but dis- 
 pleased at the prospect of seeing the work of the Third of May 
 overthrown, and Austria had at last made up her mind to accept 
 that as inevitable, 1 still neither Court wished to allow Russia to 
 regulate Polish affairs single-handed, or to attain a quite exclusive 
 predominance in the Republic. 
 
 In view of the French war, however, downright opposition to 
 the Empress was hardly possible, and in any case both Powers 
 attached too much importance to her good graces to be willing to 
 attempt it. Even to make polite remonstrances was a matter for 
 serious hesitation. It required much ingenuity to devise, and not 
 a little courage to propose, measures that would check the de- 
 signs, without too much wounding the susceptibilities, of the 
 great lady in St. Petersburg. Neither Court aspired to the honor 
 of being the one to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. For some 
 time each contented itself with begging the other to confide its 
 inmost thoughts about what was to be done. 
 
 The Prussians really preferred to do nothing at all for the pres- 
 ent. They hoped that if there should be a negotiation between 
 the Empress and the government at Warsaw, they would have a 
 chance to interpose their ' good offices ' ; and if, on the other 
 
 1 As late as May 9, Cobenzl was ordered to urge the Russians to delay resorting 
 to violent measures. It was only on June 9 that the ambassador was instructed that 
 his master agreed entirely with the Empress on the desirability of restoring the old 
 constitution in Poland. Vivenot, op. cit., ii, pp. 31 f., 88 f.
 
 300 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 hand, there was a protracted struggle, they might find a pretext 
 for armed intervention. For a time they played with the idea of 
 drawing a cordon across the Polish territory adjacent to their 
 frontier, without, however, finding the courage to take even so 
 half-way energetic a step. Painfully anxious to avoid all that 
 might possibly give umbrage at St. Petersburg, they preferred to 
 stand idle, consoling themselves with the thought that sooner or 
 later — perhaps in the course of the pending negotiation for a 
 Russo-Prussian alliance — the Empress would offer them a parti- 
 tion. Goltz was still strong in the faith that that was her inten- 
 tion. Doubtless there have been happier examples of political 
 sagacity. It is hard to see how the Prussian ministers could have 
 expected Catherine to make so huge a bid for their support, when 
 they were already conceding to her practically all she desired of 
 them. From what we know of the sentiments prevalent at St. 
 Petersburg at this time, it seems almost certain that had Prussia 
 taken a more vigorous tone and insisted on getting the price of 
 her complaisance, she could have secured easily then and there all 
 that she obtained with so much difficulty six or seven months 
 later. 
 
 It was from the Austrian side that the first proposals for action 
 were made. Kaunitz had determined to checkmate the Empress 
 by taking up the idea of the triple concert, which she herself had 
 suggested and then apparently abandoned, and making it a 
 reality. He meant to enforce the principle that Polish affairs 
 could not be regulated definitively save by the joint action of all 
 three of the neighboring Powers. In accordance with that prin- 
 ciple, the Confederation of Targowica must be induced to request 
 the protection of Austria and Prussia, as it had already invoked 
 that of Russia. The envoys of the three Courts at Warsaw must 
 act together. Above all, the Empress must be invited to sign a 
 convention by which each of the three Powers should bind itself 
 to undertake nothing in Poland without the consent of the other 
 two. By such arrangements Kaunitz hoped to prevent the 
 Republic from becoming once more a mere province of Russia; to 
 win for Austria an influence in Polish affairs such as she had sel- 
 dom possessed in the past; and also to guard against that danger
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 30 1 
 
 which had been feared at Vienna ever since the beginning of the 
 crisis — an agreement between Russia and Prussia for a new 
 partition without the knowledge of their common ally. 1 
 
 About the middle of May the Chancellor explained to Jacobi, 
 the Prussian envoy, his ideas about setting bounds, by the means 
 just indicated, to the Empress' activity in Poland. Having 
 reported to his Court, Jacobi received a reply which was, to say 
 the least, far from clear, but from which he concluded that his 
 master fully approved of Kaunitz's suggestions. He could only 
 have been confirmed in this impression by a previous rescript, in 
 which the Prussian ministry had declared that the most essential 
 thing at present was to prevent Russia from acquiring exclusive 
 control in Poland, and that this aim might be attained by insist- 
 ing continually on a triple concert. 2 It is not surprising, there- 
 fore, that the envoy took up Kaunitz's idea with some energy. 
 Just at this moment Jacobi was performing the last acts of his 
 ministry at Vienna and initiating his successor, Count Haug- 
 witz 3 into current affairs. The latter, inexperienced and zealous, 
 threw himself into the scheme under discussion with a vigor not 
 uncommon with beginners in diplomacy, but at that moment 
 quite inconvenient for his Court. 
 
 On getting the ambiguous orders of May 21, the two Prussian 
 envoys began to assail the Austrians with demands for a definite 
 declaration to be presented by the allied Courts at St. Peters- 
 burg. Spielmann, who had probably already received a secret 
 proposal from Berlin of a very different sort, met their suggestions 
 rather coolly. He professed himself convinced of the purity of 
 
 1 This idea of a quasi-permanent triple concert on Polish affairs was only a 
 development of the principle laid down in the Vienna Convention of July 25, 1791, 
 and in the February alliance treaty. It first appears in fairly definite form in a 
 note of Kaunitz to Ph. Cobenzl of May 4, 1792 (printed in Schlitter, Kaunitz, 
 Ph. Cobenzl und Spielmann, p. 59). Cf. the note of Kaunitz of May 18, printed in 
 Vivenot, ii, p. 47. 
 
 2 Jacobi's report of May 16, rescripts to him of May 18 and 21, B. A., R. 1, 
 Conv. 169. 
 
 3 Haugwitz, who here began his ill-fated public career, had been destined since 
 October to the post at Vienna, which he owed not only to his personal credit with 
 Frederick William (he was of the Rosicrucian Society), but also to his friendship 
 with the late Emperor, and to his supposed sympathy for the Austrian alliance, to 
 which Jacobi had never been able to adapt himself.
 
 302 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Empress' intentions, and too busy — on the eve of his 
 departure for the coronation at Buda — to undertake to draw up 
 the desired declarations. Haugwitz and Jacobi, not to be re- 
 buffed, thereupon announced that they would compose the draft 
 themselves, and presently they returned with one at which Spiel- 
 mann was fairly aghast. It contained, for example, the astonish- 
 ing demand that the Empress should arrest the advance of her 
 troops until the three Courts had agreed upon the measures to be 
 taken in common. Haugwitz was quite aware that such a demand 
 would have to be backed up by military demonstrations and 
 threats, but he did not shrink from that prospect. Spielmann, 
 however, protested emphatically and outlined a much more 
 moderate declaration, which the Prussians then accepted and at 
 once put upon paper. 1 
 
 Haugwitz next presented this draft to Kaunitz, who, finding in 
 it his own ideas, was highly pleased, declaring that if by this 
 means they could gain their great object, it would be a political 
 stroke of the rarest sort. The court having gone to Buda, it 
 required some time to obtain the royal assent to the project; but 
 this having been secured, the Chancellor proceeded to tone down 
 still more the terms of the declaration, and to add a draft for the 
 proposed convention, by which the three Powers were to bind 
 themselves to do nothing in Poland henceforth except conjointly 
 and by common accord. If the Empress entered upon this agree- 
 ment, recognized the principle of " a just community of in- 
 fluence," and took steps to induce the Confederation to request 
 the support of Austria and Prussia, the latter were in return to 
 present declarations at Warsaw analogous to Bulgakov's, and 
 also, in case of need, to render active military assistance to the 
 Russians. On June 20 the projects for the joint declaration and 
 the convention were sent to Berlin. 2 
 
 1 Jacobi's report of May 28, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 160. Haugwitz's readiness 
 to use measures of coercion against the Empress appears again in his report of 
 June 2, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 170. Spielmann's coldness towards the plan must have 
 been due in great part to the fact that he had probably just received Schulenburg's 
 secret overture regarding a new partition. That proposal was made through a 
 letter of May 22. The post between Berlin and Vienna ordinarily took five days, 
 and Spielmann's conferences with Jacobi and Haugwitz took place the 28th. 
 
 2 For the above: Haugwitz's reports of June 2, n, 15, B. A., R. 1, Conv.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 303 
 
 The Prussian ministry had been much irritated ever since learn- 
 ing of the independent step of their two envoys. They foresaw that 
 the declaration would not please the Empress, and that the Court 
 of Vienna, or rather its ambassador at St. Petersburg, would prob- 
 ably try to throw the blame upon them. They had been led into 
 sanctioning the plan, however, on the receipt of Jacobi's first 
 dispatches, which made it appear that the declaration proposed 
 by the two envoys awaited only the King of Hungary's approval 
 to be sent off at once to St. Petersburg. When more correctly 
 informed on that point, they did not spare hints to Reuss that 
 they would much prefer not to take this step at present, although 
 constantly repeating that they would abide by the decisions of 
 their ally. They probably breathed a sigh of relief when the draft 
 prepared by Kaunitz reached Berlin; for the Chancellor had 
 moderated the language and eliminated every suggestion of 
 coercion exactly as they would have desired. Frederick William 
 and his ministers approved it therefore, because it ■ contained 
 absolutely nothing contrary to their interests and intentions,' 
 without attaching any great hopes to it, as Kaunitz had done. In 
 transmitting it to Goltz, they took care to emphasize that this 
 was really the handiwork of the Viennese cabinet, and not theirs; 
 and the envoy was instructed not to thrust himself- unduly for- 
 ward in conducting this affair. 1 
 
 On receiving their dispatches, neither Cobenzl nor his colleague 
 quite knew what to do with the declaration. It provided for a 
 
 170; Kaunitz to the King, May 30, to Reuss and L. Cobenzl, June 21, the 
 Austrian draft of the declaration and convention, and the Jacobi-Haugwitz draft, 
 Vivcnot, ii, pp. 67 f., 99-103, 105 ff. In his letter to the King of May 30, 
 Kaunitz vehemently accused Spielmann of advising their sovereign against the 
 plan simply because it was not his own idea. On June 5 the Referendary 
 replied (V. A., Vortrage, 1792), calling the King to witness that he had never spoken 
 a word about it to him either pro or contra, and adding that he had himself dictated 
 the draft of the declaration word for word to Jacobi and Haugwitz, and that in its 
 present form he thoroughly approved of it. It follows from this that Spielmann, 
 although he had received the original propositions of the Prussians rather coldly 
 cannot be said to have opposed the project, as Sybel declares {op. cit., ii, p. 213). 
 
 1 Rescript to Jacobi of June 3, and to Haugwitz, June 7, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 
 170; Reuss to Kaunitz and to Spielmann, June 9, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, and 
 Vortrage, 1792; Schulenburg and Alvensleben to the King, June 27, and Frederick 
 William's reply of the 28th, rescript to Goltz, June 27, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 304 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 formal convention, and yet neither minister had received powers 
 to sign such an act. They agreed to present the declaration 
 jointly, made some half-hearted representations, and went no 
 further. Each regarded the other with dislike and suspicion; 
 neither wished to be the one to bell the cat. Under such circum- 
 stances their ' joint action ' could scarcely be very effective. 
 
 The Russians were not slow to size up the situation. Markov 
 told Goltz that his Court showed too much deference to that of 
 Vienna. Ostermann remarked to Cobenzl that Austria had just 
 given a very great proof of her intimacy with Prussia. 1 Playing 
 off the one German Power against the other had always been 
 Russia's forte, and nothing could have been more unwelcome at 
 St. Petersburg than to encounter their united and determined 
 opposition. Nothing could have been less to the Empress' taste 
 than a formal, permanent concert on Polish affairs, or the admis- 
 sion of the other Powers to an equal share in guiding and control- 
 ling the Republic. She delayed her answer, however, for many 
 weeks, until the complete triumph of her armies had removed the 
 chief pretext for Austro-Prussian intervention. Then in a note (of 
 August 25), which was not without a touch of irony, she thanked 
 the two Courts for their willingness to render assistance that was 
 no longer needed. She promised to employ her good offices to 
 induce the Confederation to invoke the support of Austria and 
 Prussia — as soon as that body had become more firmly estab- 
 lished. She politely refused the proposed convention as super- 
 fluous, in view of the engagements contained in the treaties of 
 alliance which she had just concluded with both the German 
 Powers. The Russo-Prussian treaty did, in fact, contain a pro- 
 vision for a concert of the three Courts to settle the affairs of 
 Poland; and although the corresponding stipulation in the 
 Austro-Russian one made no mention of Prussia, the cabinet of 
 St. Petersburg professed its willingness to amend that article. 2 
 
 This vague, evasive, and almost sarcastic reply would prob- 
 ably alone have sufficed to put a damper upon Kaunitz's project. 
 
 1 For the above: Goltz's report of July 27, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133; Cobenzl's 
 of the 2 1 st, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1792. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's and Goltz's reports of August 28, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1792 
 and B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 305 
 
 But by this time the German Powers themselves had lost all real 
 interest in the matter. Another plan of a very different kind 
 relating to Poland was already in full negotiation between them. 
 Hence the proposed convention was relegated to the archives. 
 Nothing more was heard of that triple Areopagus which was to 
 have presided over the destinies of the Republic. Thus ended the 
 one joint effort made by Austria and Prussia to check the Em- 
 press' victorious course, and to prevent her from recovering her 
 old exclusive control in Poland. The episode illustrates admira- 
 bly the difficulties in the way of any effective common action on 
 the part of these Powers in opposition to Catherine. Each Court 
 was far too eager to stand high in her favor to be willing to adopt 
 a really firm attitude. Each was reluctant to take the lead, for 
 fear that it would draw all the blame upon itself. Each hung 
 back, while trying to thrust the other forward. Each was mor- 
 tally afraid that its ally would outstrip it in Catherine's good 
 graces. Under such circumstances the Empress could go her way 
 unimpeded. 
 
 V 
 
 How little the two German Powers thought of serious opposi- 
 tion to Russia is shown by the fact that in this summer of 1792 
 both were engaged in concluding alliances with her. It has 
 already been noted that by the Vienna Convention and the 
 Treaty of Berlin Austria and Prussia had agreed to invite the 
 Court of St. Petersburg to accede to their new union. When in 
 April the two monarchs came to carry out this promise, the forms 
 adopted in both letters suggested not so much a simple accession 
 to the existing treaty, as the establishment of similar engagements 
 between the Empress and the King of Prussia. 1 This latter 
 
 1 Francis to Catherine, April 12, 1792 (Beer, Leopold II, Franz II, und 
 Catharina, pp. 170 f. In Vivenot, i, p. 409, dated erroneously as " ce (7-8?) 
 mars "): " Sa Majeste Prussienne se dispose ... a L'inviter incessamment a des 
 engagemens analogues a ceux dont Je Lui fais part par la presente " [the Treaty of 
 Berlin]. . . . He wishes to inform her of " les ouvertures que le Roi de Prusse est 
 a la veille de Lui faire," and adds: " je ne saurois me dispenser de Lui temoigner 
 en meme terns la satisfaction infinie que je ressentirois en Lui voyant adopter les 
 memes principes." This is vague enough, and probably designedly so, as the
 
 306 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 method was quite to Catherine's taste. She had never liked 
 triple alliances, for in such associations one might be outvoted. 
 In an alliance a deux, on the other hand, she was always sure to be 
 the dominant partner. Hence she replied to the Austrians that 
 certain clauses in the Treaty of Berlin (especially that mentioning 
 the Infanta of Poland, which implied a recognition of the Con- 
 stitution of the Third of May) prevented her from acceding to it; 
 but that she was confident that she would be conforming to the 
 intentions of His Apostolic Majesty in making a separate treaty 
 with Prussia, which would be based on the same principles as the 
 Austro-Prussian one, and which would be communicated at 
 Vienna immediately after its conclusion. 1 In the meantime, 
 although its term had not expired, she offered to renew her alli- 
 ance with Austria for another eight years. 2 To the Prussians, on 
 the other hand, the highly welcome reply was given that the 
 Empress was willing to contract directly with the King an alli- 
 ance based on the former treaties between the two Courts; and 
 that she preferred this procedure as characterizing more per- 
 fectly the return of both parties to the old ideas about the utility 
 of a liaison between them. Ostermann remarked significantly to 
 Goltz that it would be much better for them to unite " without 
 admitting certain people " (i. e., the Austrians). 3 Doubtless this 
 had been the wish of the Prussians from the outset. 4 
 
 It could hardly give unalloyed pleasure at Vienna to see that 
 Leopold's loyalty to Russia and his steadfast refusal to enter into 
 any connection into which his ancient ally could not be invited, 
 
 Austrians were far from eager to have the Empress accede to the alliance. Freder- 
 ick William to Catherine, April 15, 1792: " Je ne balance done pas de L'inviter a y 
 concourir en Lui proposant des engagemens defensifs analogues a ceux du susdit 
 Traite," B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 1 Catherine to Francis, May 2/13, 1792, Beer, op. cit., pp. 175 f. 
 
 2 Ostermann to Razumovski, May 4/15, M. A., ABCrpia, III, 52; Cobenzl's 
 report of May 19, V. A., Russland, Berkhte, 1792. Heidrich is wrong in declaring 
 {op. cit., p. 207) that the proposal for the renewal of the alliance was made from 
 the Austrian side, and that the Russians " wondered at the strange demand." 
 
 3 Catherine to Frederick William, May 3/14, Goltz's report of May 17, B. A., 
 R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 4 Cf. Bischoffwerder's overtures to Alopeus of the previous autumn. Goltz was 
 highly delighted at the "adroit manner " in which the Empress had avoided acced- 
 ing directly to the Austro-Prussian treaty.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 307 
 
 had resulted only in paving the way for a separate Russo-Prussian 
 alliance. There was a certain irony in the fact that Austria, who 
 for years had made it her business to prevent any connection 
 between St. Petersburg and Berlin, had now become the medium 
 for a reunion of those two Courts. The Viennese statesmen were 
 not a little chagrined at the role they had been obliged to play, 
 and not a little disquieted over the possible results of the rap- 
 prochement which they had sponsored. At any rate, there was 
 all the more reason to tighten their own connection with Russia. 
 Cobenzl was at once provided with full powers to renew the exist- 
 ing alliance; and he rushed through the treaty with a haste 
 which the jealous Goltz found positively "indecent." There was, 
 indeed, no occasion for delay, since it was merely a question of 
 renewing the engagements of 1781, with a very few slight modi- 
 fications. The separate article which concerned Poland con- 
 tained the mutual guarantee of the constitution of 1773, of the 
 ' fundamental laws,' and of the boundaries of the Republic as 
 fixed at the time of the Partition. Austria thereby abandoned 
 the Constitution of the Third of May formally and completely. 
 On July 14, 1792, the Austro-Russian treaty was signed. 1 
 
 The negotiation between Russia and Prussia was not quite so 
 simple a matter. The draft of a treaty, prepared at St. Peters- 
 burg on the basis of the treaty of alliance of 1769, encountered 
 some objections at Berlin, especially the clauses relating to 
 Poland. The Russians had proposed a concert of the two Courts 
 
 1 The Empress' decision to conclude this treaty was in no way influenced by 
 the Austrian proposal of the Bavarian-Polish plan, as one might judge from Sybel's 
 account {op. cit., iii, p. 163). Razumovski's courier, who brought this proposal, 
 reached St. Petersburg three days after the treaty was signed. 
 
 Heidrich says the treaty " kennzeichnet sich gerade durch die Geschwindigkeit 
 seines Abschlusses gelegentlich einer Landpartie von Cobenzl mit Bezborodko als 
 vollig bedeutungslos " {op. cit., p. 207). As to how far it was ' vollig bedeutungslos,' 
 a word will be said in the text; but it deserves to be pointed out here: (1) that 
 the chief reason for haste lay in the necessity of concluding before the Imperial 
 coronation at Frankfort, so as to avoid the usual controversy about precedence 
 between the two Imperial Majesties; (2) The Landpartie in question (which 
 took place on the nth) had nothing in the world to do with it, as the whole affair 
 was previously settled with the exception of a couple of utterly insignificant points 
 — the wording of one phrase and the question of naming France as one of the allies 
 of Austria (Cobenzl's report of July 21, V, A.),
 
 308 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to reestablish the ancient order of things in the Republic. The 
 Prussian ministry demanded the inclusion of Austria in the con- 
 cert, and they named as the common aims the reestablishment 
 and maintenance of the Polish government on approximately the 
 old bases. The Russians were far from eager to take Austria into 
 the partnership, as they were opposed on principle to threefold 
 ententes; but Goltz stood firm, and after a month of haggling, 
 on August 7, 1792, the treaty was signed at St. Petersburg, sub- 
 stantially in accordance with the modifications proposed at 
 Berlin. 1 
 
 While it has sometimes been asserted, it seems hardly accurate 
 to say that by this treaty Catherine went over from the Austrian 
 to the Prussian system. Undoubtedly the relations between the 
 Imperial Courts were no longer so intimate as in the days of 
 Joseph II; Leopold's independent and pacific policy had aroused 
 dislike and distrust on the Neva; and since his death the reti- 
 cence, the delays, the reluctant concessions, and "the petty 
 finasseries'''' of the Court of Vienna had often produced no little 
 irritation. But in spite of all, the conviction was deeply rooted in 
 Russian minds that the alliance with Austria was a ' natural ' and 
 a necessary system. Moments of discontent and coolness might 
 occur, but these would be only passing shadows. The renewal of 
 the alliance was by no means a mere hollow formality. Though 
 its immediate object was to allay suspicions at Vienna regarding 
 the Empress' rapprochement with Prussia, it also bore witness to 
 the abiding belief of the Russian statesmen in the permanent 
 utility of the older connection, and to their resolution to wait 
 patiently until the Austrians returned to a sounder appreciation 
 of their true interests. 2 
 
 The Prussian alliance, on the other hand, owed its conclusion 
 chiefly to the exigencies of the moment: the need of conciliating 
 the Court of Berlin until Polish affairs were settled, and the neces- 
 
 1 Printed in Martens, Traites conclus par la Russie, vi, pp. 148-158. 
 
 2 For the above: Bezborodko to the Empress, January 25/February 5, 1792, 
 M. A., Typiiia, IX, 14; Markov to Razumovski, March 9/20, April 10/21, 
 October 9/15, 1792, October, 1793, P. A., XV, 576. Numerous examples of the 
 same ideas might be cited from the Vorontsov correspondence.
 
 THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF POLAND 309 
 
 sity of preventing a revival of the Anglo-Prussian league. 1 The 
 conviction of permanent common interests which formed the 
 strength of the Austrian system was lacking here. 2 The best 
 proof of this is the fact that as soon as the Polish question seemed 
 to be settled, the Prussian alliance lost all reality, while the Aus- 
 trian one continued with growing intimacy down to the time of 
 the Empress' death. But for the present the new liaison with 
 the Court of Berlin was of the greatest value. For it gave Cather- 
 ine a comparatively free hand in Poland, offered her the chance to 
 mediate between Austria and Prussia in the indemnity ques- 
 tion, and afforded the desired security against too close a con- 
 nection between the German Powers. 
 
 At the close of the summer the Empress held a truly command- 
 ing position. She had brought to a successful conclusion the 
 Polish enterprise which most observers had believed she would 
 never dare risk. Whatever the moral aspects of that affair, she 
 had achieved a spectacular triumph of the rarest sort. With 
 Poland at her feet, with both the German Powers attached to her 
 by alliances and competing for her favor, with her own hands free 
 while her neighbors were just undertaking an enormous, an im- 
 possible task, she could well afford to sit back and watch events 
 confidently and serenely. " My part is sung," she wrote to 
 Rumiantsov. " It is an example of how it is not impossible to 
 attain an end and to succeed if one really wills it." 3 
 
 1 Cf. the protocols of the Council of the Empire of April 22/May 3 and May 31/ 
 June 11, 1792, Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 912 ff., 920 f. 
 
 2 Cf. Markov to S. R. Vorontsov, January 17/28, and July 27/August 7, 1793, 
 Apx. Bop., xx, pp. 34 ff., 52. Although he was writing to a man of strong pro- 
 Austrian views, Markov's declarations may probably be accepted at their face 
 value, as they were abundantly corroborated by the later course of Russian policy. 
 
 3 Letter of October 29/November 9, 1792, PyccKaa CrapiiHa, lxxxi 2 , p. 158.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 Austria and Prussia Agree upon a Partition 
 
 That the upheaval precipitated by Catherine's violent interven- 
 tion in Poland would end with a new partition was, in the opinion 
 of many observers, almost a foregone conclusion from the mo- 
 ment the Empress began her enterprise. 1 For such a denouement 
 the situation was altogether favorable. The close union of the 
 three Eastern Powers, the effacement of England, the assassina- 
 tion of the restless King of Sweden, and the exhaustion of Turkey 
 provided a political constellation of the most auspicious character. 
 Recent events suggested the necessity of taking drastic measures 
 to check the alarming recrudescence of Polish vitality; and no 
 measure could be quite so effective as a repetition of the political- 
 surgical operation performed with such success twenty years 
 before. The appetftes of the Eastern Powers, which throughout 
 the protracted Oriental crisis had been constantly whetted but 
 never satisfied, could not much longer be restrained; and the 
 principle that indemnities must be found somewhere for the ex- 
 penses of the French war supplied a convenient pretext. 
 
 It has already been noted that the idea of taking these indem- 
 nities in Poland was discussed at Potsdam as early as February of 
 1792, and that in March at Vienna there was talk of combining 
 this project with that of the Bavarian Exchange. It was not until 
 May, however, that these plans were made the subject of a nego- 
 tiation. The initiative was taken by Prussia. 
 
 From the 12th to the 15 th of May conferences were held at 
 Potsdam between the King, the Duke of Brunswick, Schulenburg, 
 Bischoffwerder, and Reuss. In the intimate discussions which 
 
 1 Cf. Cobenzl's prophecies to the Russians in January and March, 1792, already 
 cited; the warnings addressed by the British government to Berlin and Vienna in 
 March, Salomon, Pitt, i li , p. 540; the forecast of Gustavus III, Odhner, op. cit., 
 pp. 204 f. 
 
 310
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 311 
 
 then took place, the Prussian plan of action was probably decided 
 upon; * at any rate, immediately afterward the first fairly defi- 
 nite overtures looking to a partition were made both to Russia and 
 to Austria. It was, of course, an infinitely delicate subject to lead 
 up to; and, as will appear in the sequel, the Prussians went about 
 it with all conceivable caution. 
 
 A convenient pretext for sounding the Russians was furnished 
 by a dispatch from Goltz, which arrived in the midst of the dis- 
 cussions at Potsdam. The envoy wrote that he feared the Court 
 of St. Petersburg wished to combine the affairs of France too 
 much with those of Poland. The single word ' bon ' scrawled on 
 the dispatch opposite this passage, sufficiently shows that Goltz's 
 superiors were far from sharing his disquietude. 2 Soon after his 
 return to Berlin, Schulenburg hunted up Alopeus and confided to 
 him that he heard from all sides that the Empress wished to com- 
 bine French and Polish affairs; he personally could not at all 
 understand what this meant, and was curious to be informed. 
 The Russian envoy, unfortunately, could not enlighten him, and 
 Schulenburg did not see fit to speak plainly. 3 
 
 Bischoffwerder, however, was less reserved. Having written 
 from Potsdam to request an interview, he met Alopeus on the 
 1 8th at Charlottenburg, guided the conversation to the subject of 
 Poland, and presently threw out the suggestion that in order to 
 remove all occasions for controversy between the three Eastern 
 Powers, it would be best to reduce the Republic to so insignificant 
 a size that it could safely be left free to choose whatever form of 
 government it pleased. If this idea were once adopted, he added, 
 it would be easy enough to come to an understanding; and the 
 principal role in directing the affair would naturally be reserved 
 
 1 In a letter to the Duke of Brunswick of May 6, Schulenberg mentioned com- 
 bining French and Polish affairs, and promised to go into details in case he was 
 summoned to the conference at Potsdam. B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 b. 
 
 2 Goltz's report of May 1, received the 14th, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. Cf. 
 Appendix XIII (documents illustrating the earliest discussions between Russia 
 and Prussia regarding a new partition). 
 
 3 Alopeus' report of May 8/19, M. A., Ilpyccifl, III, 29. Goltz was also 
 ordered (May 17) to find out how the Russian Court thought to combine two 
 questions between which the Prussian ministry pretended to see no great connec- 
 tion. B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 312 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 for the Empress. Alopeus reported to his Court that he had 
 merely listened and said nothing. 1 It was apparently the first 
 time that a Prussian had broached the topic of a partition to him. 
 
 A week or so later Schulenburg favored the Russian envoy with 
 a long disquisition on the subject of indemnities for the French 
 enterprise, insisting strongly that his master must receive com- 
 pensation of some sort, and begging for a communication of the 
 Empress' views on that matter. 2 Putting together these various 
 overtures, the Court of Petersburg could hardly be badly at a loss 
 to divine the object of Prussia's aspirations. 
 
 While thus paving the way for a future understanding, Freder- 
 ick William and his advisers did not at that time mean to go 
 further than hints with Russia. Their purpose was, first of all, to 
 make sure of Austria, and then with the suport of their ally to 
 drive the best bargain they could with the Empress. 
 
 Schulenburg proceeded to initiate his action at Vienna with one 
 of those little tricks so beloved in eighteenth century diplomacy: 
 a negotiation behind the back of the Austrian Chancellor, quite 
 on a par with Leopold's and Kaunitz's intrigues with BischorT- 
 werder. As to which of the Viennese ministers to approach first, 
 there could hardly be a question. The one among them who was 
 known to be the most ardent champion of the Prussian connec- 
 tion, was Spielmann. Accordingly, on May 21 Schulenburg 
 confided to Reuss certain ideas on which he desired a very secret 
 and frank exchange of opinions with the State Referendary. In 
 view of the unexpected and high-handed action of Russia in 
 Poland, he declared, it behooved Austria and Prussia to consider 
 measures to safeguard their own interests and prestige. If the 
 Empress continued to conceal her real intentions, while her 
 armies went steadily forward, he would suggest that the two 
 Courts should send corps of observation across the frontier, with- 
 out declaring themselves for or against anyone, and thus, on the 
 pretext of providing for their own security, establish themselves 
 in Polish territory. Such a demonstration would probably force 
 Russia at last to reveal her true aims. From many indications he 
 
 1 Alopeus' report of May 8/19. M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29. 
 
 2 Alopeus' report of May 17/28.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 313 
 
 thought it likely that the Empress greatly desired to appropriate 
 the Ukraine. If that supposition proved correct, it might facili- 
 tate a settlement of the indemnity question: for in that case 
 Prussia, too, might take a part of Poland, while Austria found 
 compensation on the Rhine. In conclusion he begged that this 
 plan should be kept in the utmost secrecy until it had been agreed 
 upon by both Courts, and until the moment for its execution 
 arrived. 1 
 
 On receiving this momentous overture, Spielmann seems to 
 have had little hesitation about entering into the project, which 
 fitted in well, indeed, with ideas that he had had in mind since 
 March or even January. With the approval of King Francis, he 
 replied by a letter to Reuss, in which he declared himself agreed 
 with Schulenburg on the main principle. If Russia, he said, 
 coveted Polish territory, of which, however, he had as yet seen 
 no indication, she could doubtless make no more suitable acqui- 
 sition than Courland or the Ukraine. 2 He was convinced that 
 the Court of Berlin could nowhere else find more desirable ag- 
 grandizement than in Poland ; and Austria would assuredly con- 
 sent to such a Prussian acquisition not only without envy or 
 jealousy, but with a truly friendly readiness to assist in the 
 matter. But it could never suit the Court of Vienna, he protested, 
 to seek its indemnity on the Rhine; for of what value were 
 remote and precarious acquisitions, which could be retained only 
 by immense efforts, and which would expose their possessor to 
 the odium of having been the only Power to take part in a dis- 
 memberment of France ? Moreover, to seek compensation 
 through conquests in the west would involve prolonging the war 
 beyond the present year — and the allies hoped to finish the 
 struggle within that time — or else altering the whole plan of 
 campaign. He was therefore of the opinion that the only means 
 of realizing Schulenburg's ideas would be a plan based on the 
 
 1 Reuss to Spielmann, May 22, Vivenot, ii, pp. 55 f. This highly important 
 correspondence was first published by Adolf Beer in the Historische Zeilschrift, xxvii 
 (1872), and then more fully by Vivenot. 
 
 2 Schulenburg had not mentioned Courland. Probably Spielmann threw out 
 the suggestion in the hope of transferring the Russian acquisition from the south 
 to the north — away from the frontiers of Austria and towards those of Prussia.
 
 314 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria and the Upper 
 Palatinate. He knew very well, he said, what an anathema had 
 been laid on this project at Berlin during Hertzberg's ministry; 
 but he believed that the circumstances and the relations between 
 the two Courts had now changed so entirely that, with a minister 
 of Schulenburg's insight and high-mindedness, a few hours' con- 
 versation would suffice to bring about a perfect agreement. As 
 for the means proposed by Schulenburg for executing his plan, 
 Spielmann objected with much reason that anything which con- 
 veyed the least suggestion of coercion produced on the Empress 
 of Russia an effect exactly contrary to that which was desired. 
 Instead of an armed demonstration in Poland, he proposed that 
 after the two Courts had come to an agreement among them- 
 selves, they should at once lay their plan frankly before the Em- 
 press with the assurance that they were willing to consent to 
 whatever she might demand for herself. The fact that she seemed 
 inclined to cooperate in the French enterprise made it probable 
 that she would readily agree to this method of indemnifica- 
 tion. 1 
 
 Schulenburg professed to be, and doubtless was, delighted with 
 this reply. Never, he told Reuss, had ministers of two Courts 
 acted towards each other with such sincerity as he and Baron 
 Spielmann. He readily gave his assent to the modifications of his 
 original proposals which Spielmann had suggested. He agreed 
 as to the inadvisability of a military demonstration in Poland, 
 although he was thereby renouncing for his Court the prospect 
 of taking immediate possession of its proposed acquisition. He 
 not only accepted the Bavarian Exchange plan, but declared that 
 he had all along shared Spielmann's ideas on that subject 2 
 (although this involved the sacrifice of one of the most sacred 
 of the traditions handed down from Frederick the Great). In- 
 vited by Spielmann to indicate the precise acquisition that would 
 suit his Court, Schulenburg could only point to the Polish district 
 that separated Silesia from East Prussia, adding that its size must 
 
 1 Letter of May 29, Vivenot, ii, pp. 63-67. 
 
 2 This was doubtless true, for Schulenburg could hardly have remained ignorant 
 of Bischoffwerder's discussions at Vienna on that topic.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 315 
 
 depend on the lot claimed by Russia and could not be definitely- 
 fixed in advance. 1 
 
 A few days later, on the King's return from Pomerania, the 
 Prussian minister reported that his sovereign agreed to the Ba- 
 varian Exchange and offered to use his good offices with both the 
 Elector and his heir, the Duke of Zweibrucken; that he could not, 
 indeed, think of resorting to coercion in order to secure the assent 
 of those princes, in view of a promise he had once made; but 
 that he flattered himself that the King of Hungary would not 
 expect such extreme measures of him. As both monarchs had 
 now given their consent to the combined Bavarian-Polish plan, 
 Schulenburg requested that the affair should at once be brought 
 into the regular ministerial channel, in order to take advantage 
 of the pending negotiations with Russia. 2 
 
 Spielmann, who received Reuss' last two letters only on June 18 
 while at Buda, replied with assurances that nothing was more 
 justified than the King's aversion to coercive measures against 
 the Duke of Zweibrucken; he was convinced that there would 
 be no need of them. He was overflowing with joy at the happy 
 course the negotiation had taken, and at the confidence shown 
 by Schulenburg in him personally. He did not doubt, he added, 
 that all the details of the plan could be satisfactorily arranged at 
 the approaching meeting of the two sovereigns. 3 
 
 II 
 
 The first step in bringing the affair into the regular minis- 
 terial channel was to reveal the secret to Kaunitz. This Spiel- 
 mann and the King proceeded to do by letters written shortly 
 before their return from Buda. To the old Chancellor, already 
 jealous of his subordinate, 4 this negotiation, carried on with the 
 approval of the monarch behind his back, was a staggering blow. 
 In his reply of June 25 he poured out his wounded feelings in 
 
 1 Reuss to Spielmann, June 4, Vivenot, ii, pp. 80 ff. 
 
 2 Reuss to Spielmann, June 9, ibid., pp. 89 IT. 
 
 3 Spielmann to Reuss, June 22, Vivenot, ii, pp. no f. 
 
 4 Zinzendorf's Diary, June 6: " Le vieux [Kaunitz] s'est brouille' avec Spiel- 
 mann. ... II a pense a. faire sauter Spielmann." (V. A.)
 
 3i6 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 terms that few ministers would have dared address to their 
 sovereigns. He found the plan which the King had sanctioned, 
 " a chimera," an insult to the Austrian Court, utterly unjustifiable 
 — at least in so far as it concerned Poland, — and contrary to all 
 existing treaties and engagements. He doubted very strongly 
 whether the Bavarian House would ever give its consent; and he 
 was almost sure that the Maritime Powers would oppose; and 
 they would be right in doing so. At any rate, the Austrian 
 indemnity would be left dependent on a long and uncertain 
 negotiation, while Prussia could at any moment take possession 
 of her share. What security was there that the Imperial Court, 
 after being inveigled into assenting to the gains of its allies, would 
 not come forth empty-handed ? What reliance could be placed on 
 the proffered good offices of Prussia with the Elector and his 
 heir ? It was obvious that although the Court of Berlin had no 
 scruples about robbing the allied Republic of Poland, it still 
 objected to using sufficiently earnest language to secure the con- 
 sent of those princes. "I see then in this whole policy," the 
 Chancellor wrote, " nothing but covetousness, and principles 
 which can inspire little confidence in future times and which 
 therefore promise little good. Such a political morality is not 
 in accordance with my principles, and should . . . never be ac- 
 cepted by a great Power which respects itself, and recognizes the 
 value of its good name. . . . From evil no good can ever result; 
 it is therefore . . . my only wish and my only hope that nothing 
 can and will come of this." * 
 
 However much personal feelings may have influenced Kaunitz's 
 reply and whatever may be thought of his right to plume himself 
 on his exalted political morality, it must be admitted that his 
 objections and warnings were only too well grounded. On the 
 other hand, it is difficult to blame Spielmann unreservedly. An 
 indemnity had to be found for Prussia somewhere, and in that 
 case Austria could not afford to dispense with an equivalent 
 advantage. To seek compensation at the cost of France involved 
 prolonging the war indefinitely, covering the two Courts with 
 
 1 The King to Kaunitz, June 21, the Chancellor's reply of the 25th, and his 
 appended " Reflections," Vivenot, ii, pp. 107 f., 114 f.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 317 
 
 odium, and raising an insurmountable barrier to the restoration 
 of Louis XVI. To refuse Prussia the so ardently desired acquisi- 
 tion in Poland meant to loosen the alliance and to drive the Court 
 of Berlin into the arms of Russia. On the other hand, by consent- 
 ing, Austria could gain what seemed a unique chance to realize 
 that exchange project which had been pursued with such efforts 
 for almost a century; she might secure what was doubtless the 
 most valuable acquisition the Hapsburg Monarchy could make, 
 while at the same time getting rid of distant possessions which 
 exposed the state to ceaseless trouble and to a galling dependence 
 on foreign Powers. The success of the plan depended, indeed, on 
 the consent of a prince who had hitherto shown himself strongly 
 opposed to the Exchange — the Duke of Zweibriicken; but it 
 may well have seemed that he could no longer refuse when 
 Prussia, hitherto his chief support, urged his acceptance. On the 
 Elector's consent Spielmann might fairly count, both because of 
 his previous attitude and in view of his overtures to Lehrbach in 
 March. Undoubtedly the war introduced a great element of 
 uncertainty into the calculation; but one must remember the 
 exaggerated reports then universally current about the disorgani- 
 zation and impotence of France, and the general belief in the 
 speedy triumph of the allied arms. Spielmann's course is, then, 
 intelligible enough. And yet none of his hopes were to be realized ; 
 all of Kaunitz's prophecies were to be fulfilled. 
 
 The Chancellor's objections produced no change in the King's 
 resolutions. The only result was a severe tension in the relations 
 between monarch and minister. It was widely noted at Vienna 
 that at his departure for the Imperial coronation at Frankfort, 
 the young King failed to pay Kaunitz the customary visit. 
 Malicious tongues had it that the attention had been omitted for 
 prudential reasons : the old man had proposed to teach his sover- 
 eign a salutary lesson. 1 In his note of June 25 the Chancellor had 
 begged the King, if he adhered to the Schulenburg-Spielmann 
 plan, to excuse him from taking part in the affair, ' in order that 
 he might not be obliged, against his own conviction, to end his 
 ministry by such a step.' On this point he was gratified, for not 
 
 1 Zinzendorf's Diary, July 6 (V. A.).
 
 3 l8 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 only the negotiation over the indemnities, but all important busi- 
 ness henceforth passed through other hands. In August the old 
 man insisted on resigning his functions altogether. It was vir- 
 tually the end of Kaunitz's long and honorable career. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Almost immediately after the return of the King and Spielmann 
 from Buda an opportunity presented itself for entering into 
 negotiations with Russia concerning the new plan. Razumovski, 
 the Empress' ambassador, saw fit to force a confidential dis- 
 closure of the secret. In a familiar conversation with Cobenzl 
 (June 30), he took occasion to dwell at length on his sovereign's 
 invariable attachment to the alliance and on her great interest in 
 the prosperity of the House of Austria, and thus led up to the sug- 
 gestion that this might, perhaps, be the most favorable moment 
 to effect the Bavarian Exchange plan, to which the Empress had 
 formerly lent so willing a support. Cobenzl objected that even 
 now the Court of Berlin would not fail to oppose, unless it received 
 a corresponding advantage. Razumovski pointed to Dantzic and 
 Thorn. The Empress, he said, had formerly opposed Prussian 
 aggrandizement in that quarter solely out of regard for Austria. 
 " But do you think," said Cobenzl, " that to-day, if we found such 
 a plan to our advantage, the Empress would consent to it without 
 desiring any acquisition for herself?" "Oh no!" said the 
 Russian, " I think that in that case she, too, would wish to get 
 something." " But," replied the Austrian, " what is there that 
 would suit her ? She can make acquisitions of value to Russia 
 only in Poland." " Precisely in Poland," said Razumovski; " the 
 acquisition of the Ukraine would be very useful to us." " Yes, 
 the Ukraine or Courland," said Cobenzl, throwing out the same 
 idea that Spielmann had advanced to Schulenburg. The ambas- 
 sador considered, however, that the annexation of Courland 
 would be of no value to his Court, since that Duchy was already 
 totally dependent on Russia; an advantageous acquisition could 
 be found only in the Ukraine. As for the pretext, he was sure 
 there would be no difficulty; there were plenty of available titles
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 319 
 
 in the archives. Cobenzl then hazarded a suggestion that showed 
 the persistence of the ideas of Leopold. The Poles, he said, were 
 so infatuated with their new constitution that they might, per- 
 haps, consent to territorial sacrifices, in order to obtain its con- 
 firmation from the neighboring Powers. Razumovski replied, 
 however, that after restoring the old regime, the Powers could 
 easily obtain the desired cessions from the well-disposed party. 
 That day the conversation went no further. Both diplomats had 
 been profuse in compliments; Razumovski had amused his friend 
 by building air-castles; it was apparently only harmless specula- 
 tion. 
 
 Cobenzl hastened, however, to inform the King and Spielmann. 
 The next day, at the close of the Sunday audience of the ambas- 
 sadors, he drew Razumovski aside and confided to him that he 
 had penetrated their secret, or rather that there could be no 
 secrets between such allies. With the King's authorization he 
 then set forth the whole plan for the Bavarian Exchange and the 
 Prussian acquisition in Poland, though without mentioning the 
 fact that negotiations on this subject had already been opened 
 with Prussia. It is strange that with all his assurances that the 
 project would be left entirely to the good pleasure of the Em- 
 press, he failed to suggest that she, also, should share in the spoils. 
 Razumovski protested profusely about his sovereign's inclination 
 to anything that promised advantages to her allies; but he felt 
 bound to intimate that her interests must also be provided for. 
 Immediately afterward Spielmann confirmed to the ambassador 
 all that Cobenzl had said. It was thereupon agreed that Razu- 
 movski should send off a courier to St. Petersburg with a dis- 
 patch of his own, and one to Louis Cobenzl. 1 
 
 The instruction drawn up by the Vice-Chancellor for his" 
 cousin 2 is interesting, as showing how recent events, especially 
 those of the Oriental crisis, had convinced Austrian statesmen of 
 the impossibility in the long run of defending Poland's integrity 
 against Prussia. It also reveals a curious attitude towards 
 
 1 On the above see Appendix XIV, where the text of Razumovski's report of 
 his discussions with Cobenzl is printed. 
 
 2 Dispatch of July 2, Vivenot, ii, pp. i2off.
 
 320 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Russia. The Empress, Cobenzl wrote, could not justly demand 
 an acquisition, since the whole burden of the French war was 
 borne by Austria and Prussia, and since all the advantages 
 gained through the alliance of the Imperial Courts had hitherto 
 fallen to Russia. He thought that if the Court of Petersburg 
 consented to the indemnities demanded by the German Powers 
 for themselves, they might in return offer to excuse it from all 
 cooperation in the war with France, and to assist it in the com- 
 plete restoration of the old regime in Poland. But if, in spite of 
 all, the Russians manifested a very strong desire to make acquisi- 
 tions, the ambassador was ordered not to contest the claim 
 directly, nor to show any open signs of disinclination to such a 
 demand. The Vice-Chancellor added that the whole plan was 
 only a new idea, about which he desired to learn the Empress' 
 opinion. Much more precise instructions would be sent to St. 
 Petersburg after the meeting of the Emperor-elect and the King 
 of Prussia. Unsettled as the plan might be at that time, one can- 
 not repress a gasp of astonishment that an experienced Austrian 
 statesman could have imagined for a moment that the Empress 
 would renounce a share in the general distribution of indemni- 
 ties. One sees again that the Viennese ministers were by no 
 means eager to have the Russian eagles approach the frontiers of 
 Galicia. 
 
 IV 
 
 It is uncertain whether Razumovski, in making his far-reaching 
 suggestions to the Austrians, was acting in accordance with 
 directions from St. Petersburg. There are no instructions on this 
 subject among Ostermann's dispatches to him of this period; and 
 in his report to Bezborodko the ambassador expressed the hope 
 that his step would not be disapproved, since he had sought only 
 to verify a suspicion which he had long felt, that the Court of 
 Vienna desired to revive the Exchange project. The realization 
 of the plan depended solely on the Empress, he added; it could be 
 arrested by a single word from her, in case it did not conform to 
 her views. In spite of this apology, however, it is difficult to 
 suppose that he would have ventured to go so far without at
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 321 
 
 least a hint from some of the persons in power at St. Petersburg, 
 presumably from Zubov or Markov. The suspicion that Russian 
 diplomacy was at work at this moment pulling the most secret 
 wires in order to bring a partition upon the order of the day, is 
 strengthened by the fact that, almost simultaneously with 
 Razumovski's strange performance, his government took the 
 initiative in provoking very similar explanations from the Court 
 of Berlin. 
 
 Schulenburg's advances to Alopeus on the subject of indemni- 
 ties served as the point of departure. The Russians must have 
 been highly gratified by those overtures, both because they thus 
 obtained a chance to take a hand in a matter in which they were 
 keenly interested, and because they probably desired to give the 
 indemnity question a turn adapted to their own special views. 
 As a participant in the French enterprise (by paying subsidies), 
 and still more as being accustomed to take the leading role in all 
 great affairs, the Empress could not look on indifferently while 
 her neighbors collected war indemnities or annexed provinces. 
 Nothing could be more vexatious to her than to have Austria and 
 Prussia arranging everything between themselves, instead of 
 referring humbly to the grand court of arbitration at St. Peters- 
 burg. She would not have been Catherine II, had she not tried 
 to get the indemnity question into her own hands, so that in the 
 end she might appear on the stage to award the prizes, while 
 incidentally appropriating the largest for herself. Now it was 
 clearly not to her interest that the indemnities should take the 
 form of conquests from France, for in that quarter there were no '' 
 particularly desirable acquisitions to be found for Russia. It is 
 not improbable that the idea may very early have been adopted 
 at St. Petersburg, as at Berlin, of allowing Poland to pay the 
 costs. 1 That would be far more convenient for Russia and Prussia, 
 
 1 In Cobenzl's report of June n, 1791, relating Ostermann's first overtures 
 to him about an intervention in France, there is an enigmatic but suggestive pas- 
 sage. Ostermann said that the Empress desired an understanding with Austria on 
 the French question " d'autant plus qu'il ne seroit peutetre pas impossible de lier 
 ces affaires-la avec celles qui occupoient d'ailleurs les deux Cours Imp£riales." At 
 a time when the Oriental crisis was practically past, and the revolution of the 
 Third of May was very fresh in the minds of the Russians, the " affairs which
 
 d 
 
 \/li 
 
 322 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 and Austria could doubtless be provided for somewhere. By 
 June of 1792, the Empress must have been sufficiently well aware 
 that this idea corresponded to the wishes of the German Powers. 
 Since Razumovski's report of March and Alopeus' of May, she 
 could hardly have been in doubt as to the direction in which the 
 ambitions of Austria and Prussia would turn. 1 In view of all 
 this, Ostermann's reply to the above-mentioned overtures of 
 Schulenburg is highly significant. 
 
 In his dispatches to Alopeus of June 10/21, the Vice-Chancellor 
 eclared that the Empress entirely approved of Frederick Wil- 
 liam's claim for compensation, and would hasten to lend her 
 support, if it were needed, as soon as she was informed of the 
 nature and form of the projected indemnities. She expected that 
 a similar demand for compensation would probably be raised by 
 the other Courts cooperating in the French enterprise (i. e., 
 Austria, Sardinia, and Russia) . She felt obliged, however, to urge 
 upon the King's consideration that if France, weakened and ex- 
 hausted by anarchy, were now to be subjected to a dismember- 
 ment, as well as burdened with a form of government that would 
 never allow the country to recover its strength (i. e., a constitu- 
 tional government, instead of the absolute monarchy which she 
 had vainly advised the allies to restore), this state would dis- 
 appear completely from the political balance of Europe. She left 
 it to the King to decide whether that would be to the general 
 advantage. — The inference from this is obvious. If, as Oster- 
 mann plainly hinted, the indemnities were not to be taken in 
 France, there was practically only one other place in which to 
 seek them. There was only one quarter in which the Empress' 
 proffered aid in securing acquisitions for Prussia could be needed 
 or could be of value. Catherine was virtually inviting the King 
 to confide to her how much of Poland she could help him to 
 
 occupied the Imperial Courts elsewhere," and which were to be combined with the 
 French enterprise, could hardly have been other than those of Poland (V. A., 
 Russland, Berichte, 1791). 
 
 1 Cf. Schulenburg to Frederick William, June 30: " Apres les insinuations in- 
 directes qui lui ont 6te faites, elle [Russia] ne peut ignorer le fonds de Ses [the 
 King's] idees a cet egard " [a partition of Poland], B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 323 
 
 appropriate. Anything less than that these ' ostensible ' dis- 
 patches could scarcely have meant. This was also the sense in 
 which they were understood by the Prussian ministry, whose joy 
 can easily be imagined. 1 
 
 Only a few days before, in reply to a note in which the King 
 had impatiently inquired what was to be done to bring " the 
 principal aim" (the Polish acquisition) to the front, Schulenburg 
 had urged that it was still advisable to await further advances 
 from Russia, since if they (the Prussians) announced their desires 
 openly, the Court of St. Petersburg might betray everything to 
 the Poles in order to win the whole nation to its side. 2 The 
 furthest he had yet dared to go, was to tell the Prince of Nassau, 
 Catherine's agent in French affairs, who was then in Berlin, that 
 France had no money, and yet that an indemnity in money was 
 the only suitable compensation that Russia and Prussia could 
 find "in that quarter." As usual, the irresponsible Bischoffwerder 
 did not stop there, but proceeded to confide to Nassau the entire 
 plan for the Bavarian Exchange and the Prussian acquisition in 
 Poland — in the certain knowledge that it would be reported 
 straight to the Empress. 3 
 
 A few days later (July 1) Alopeus presented the thrice welcome 
 dispatches of June 21 regarding the indemnities. Soon after the 
 Russian envoy sought out Schulenburg with the direct intention 
 of provoking a confidence, precisely as Razumovski had done. 
 
 1 Ostermann to Alopeus, June 10/21, M. A., Upyccia, III, 28: Schulen- 
 burg to the King, July 1, Schulenburg and Alvensleben to the King, July 3, Fred- 
 erick William's reply of July 4, B. A., R. 96, 147 G. I am strongly tempted 
 to see a connection between these Russian advances to Prussia and Razumovski 's 
 simultaneous manoeuvres with the Austrians. Alopeus' reports of May 8/19 and 
 17/28 must have reached St. Petersburg not later than June 10 or 1 2. They brought 
 pretty full indications as to the designs of Prussia and provoked the decisive action 
 which Russia then undertook at Berlin. It seems not improbable that the courier 
 who left St. Petersburg for Vienna on June 16, may have carried secret and private 
 directions to Razumovski to draw out the Austrians on the same subject. 
 
 2 Frederick William to Schulenburg, June 28, the minister's reply of the 30th, 
 B. A., R. 96, 147 G. 
 
 3 Alopeus' report of June 19/30, Nassau to the Empress, July 11, both referring 
 to Nassau's conversation of the 29th of June with Schulenburg and Bischoffwerder, 
 M. A., Ilpyccifl, III, 29, and {ibid.) France, IX, Princes el Emigres, 1792.
 
 324 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Schulenburg resisted temptation no better than the Austrians. 
 Encouraged by Ostermann's so favorable response, he revealed 
 the whole Bavarian-Polish plan, including the acquisition of the 
 Ukraine for Russia, pretending, indeed, not to know his master's 
 views on the subject, but announcing that he meant to ascertain 
 them at once. 1 On July 5 he reported that, as a result of the 
 recent friendly overtures of the Empress, the King would now 
 enter into definite negotiations with the Court of Vienna on the 
 indemnity question, and would inform her of the results with all 
 loyalty and frankness. 2 In order to open the way to negotiations 
 at St. Petersburg, Goltz was next initiated into the secret, and 
 provided with a memorandum, in which the various possible 
 kinds of indemnity were discussed and it was urged that the 
 Bavarian-Polish plan was the only feasible one. 3 This document, 
 however, was represented to be only "first thoughts" on the sub- 
 ject; Goltz was directed not to show it but to advance the ideas 
 contained in it, in case Ostermann brought up the topic. Thus 
 within a surprisingly short time the ice had been broken in every 
 quarter. The Prussian initiative had met with the readiest of 
 responses from Austria; and although the Empress had not yet 
 committed herself, her attitude might seem distinctly encourag- 
 ing. Frederick William and his advisers, however, were not quite 
 free from fear that she might merely be lulling them with false 
 hopes until such time as she had ended her enterprise in Poland. 
 Decided caution towards Russia was still the watchword at 
 Berlin, and the first article in the Prussian program was to 
 secure a precise and definite agreement with Austria. 
 
 That agreement was to be effected, as was confidently reckoned 
 on both sides, at the meeting of the two sovereigns to be held 
 immediately after the Imperial coronation at Frankfort. In the 
 
 1 Alopeus' report of June 22/July 3, M. A., Ilpycciji, III, 29. From the 
 much more reserved tone of Schulenburg's and Alvensleben's report to the King 
 of July 3, one would judge that the former minister did not see fit to reveal to his 
 colleague how far he had gone with Alopeus. This conversation was on July 2. 
 B. A., R. 96, 147 G. 
 
 2 Alopeus' report of June 26/July 7, M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29. 
 
 3 Rescript to Goltz of July 10, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA AGREE 325 
 
 first week of July, from Vienna and Berlin there was a gen- 
 eral exodus towards the Rhine. The Emperor-elect, all the 
 Austrian Conference ministers save' Kaunitz, the King of 
 Prussia, BischofTwerder, Schulenburg, Haugwitz, Alopeus, Reuss, 
 Nassau — the whole diplomatic and military world was off to 
 attend either the great spectacle at Frankfort or ' the promenade 
 to Paris.'
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 Austria and Prussia Disagree about the 
 Partition 
 
 On July 14, 1792, at Frankfort, the world saw for the last time 
 the faded splendors of the coronation of a Holy Roman Emperor. 
 Five days later the successor of the Caesars and Frederick Wil- 
 liam, ' the modern Agamemnon,' held their meeting at Mainz. 
 Amid all the gorgeous festivities, while the public was celebrating 
 the anticipated triumph over the Jacobins, the ministers of the 
 allied Courts were already disputing over the prospective spoils. 
 Even before the departure from Vienna, clouds had begun to 
 appear on the horizon. When the Bavarian-Polish plan was con- 
 fided to the Austrian Conference ministers, there were murmurs 
 that this was no time to revive the Exchange project. 1 Probably 
 the cry had already been raised that although by the Exchange 
 Austria would, indeed, round out her territories, she would suffer 
 an actual loss in revenue, while Prussia was to gain in both ways. 
 Much as he clung to his original plan, Spielmann had been obliged 
 to urge upon Haugwitz the necessity of finding some ' supple- 
 ment,' some additional acquisition that would offset the financial 
 loss in question and establish a perfect equality between the 
 respective indemnities. As one means to that end, he had sug- 
 gested that in case the two Lusatias should revert to Austria, 
 they might be exchanged for the Franconian Margraviates, 
 Ansbach and Baireuth, which had recently fallen to Prussia. 2 
 
 1 Cf. Rosenberg's volum at the Frankfort conference: " Ueber den 2. Punkt des 
 Conferenzialgegenstandes, habe ich meine Meinung in Wien und hier dahin geaus- 
 sert, dass mir der nun gegenwartige Zeitpunkt keineswegs der gemessenste scheine, 
 die Negociation des Austausches zu entamiren," Vivenot, ii, p. 142. 
 
 2 Haugwitz to the King, July 26, referring to his conversations with Spiel- 
 mann before his departure from Vienna, B. A., R. 96, 155 E. Spielmann had left 
 the door open to such claims for a ' supplement,' when in his first reply to Schulen- 
 
 326
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 327 
 
 After the coronation, on July 17, the Emperor held a meeting 
 of the State Conference at Frankfort to decide upon the exact 
 propositions to be made to the Prussians at the approaching 
 interviews. Spielmann had presented a memorandum, which set 
 forth the history of the Exchange plan, summed up the advan- 
 tages of the project, and attempted to refute the objections that 
 were already being raised. Amid all the absurdities that were put 
 on paper by Austrian ministers in those days, it is refreshing to 
 find one statesman who realized that Prussia was sure to insist 
 upon an indemnity; that any attempt to oppose, or even the 
 failure to show real willingness to assist, would not only end all 
 support from that Power against France, but would ruin the 
 friendship built up with such exertions; that the Court of Berlin 
 was in a position to secure its indemnity anyway, through an 
 understanding with Russia or England; and that the only ques- 
 tion was whether Austria would seize the opportunity to extract 
 a counter-concession from Prussia, or would bargain and delay 
 until too late. Spielmann admitted that the Bavarian Exchange 
 would involve a temporary loss of from two to three millions in 
 revenue; but he argued that the Monarchy would gain so much 
 in territorial compactness and in freedom of movement, such great 
 improvements might be made in the financial administration of 
 Bavaria, so much could be saved by getting rid of the costly and 
 precarious Belgic possessions, that the loss would be more than 
 made up. The Exchange might possibly be combined with other 
 acquisitions, but he urged that insistence on additional advan- 
 tages and the resulting delays might involve the failure of the 
 whole plan. 1 
 
 burg he urged the financial loss involved in the Bavarian Exchange, and represented 
 the latter project as only ''the chief basis " of the prospective arrangement. Possibly 
 he had already had to face the opposition of some one of his sovereign's confidential 
 advisers, Colloredo, for instance. 
 
 1 This memorandum is printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 134-141, as of July 18, 1792, 
 i. e., the day after the meeting of the Conference. In the original, which is pre- 
 served among the Vortrdge for 1792 in the Vienna Archives, the date is written in 
 pencil and is not exactly clear; but it is almost certainly the 16th, rather than the 
 1 8th. Besides, the whole context of the memorandum corresponds to the supposi- 
 tion that it was written before the meeting of the Conference. Had it been written 
 afterwards, the historic resume with which it begins could not have failed to mention
 
 328 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Unfortunately these warnings made little impression on most of 
 the members of the Conference. Field Marshal Lacy declared 
 that if the Bavarian Exchange were to be undertaken at all, it 
 must be supplemented by the acquisition of Ansbach and Baireuth 
 from Prussia, the latter Power to be compensated, perhaps, with 
 Juliers and Berg or with additional territory in Poland. He 
 inclined to the opinion that the Exchange plan should not even 
 be discussed at the interview at Mainz, out of regard for the 
 foreign Courts (England) , and in view of the internal conditions in 
 the Netherlands. Prince Rosenberg, who was in general bitterly 
 opposed to Spielmann and Cobenzl, joined in the attack. He did 
 not believe the moment fitted for reviving the Bavarian project; 
 but since it had been revived, he opined at least that they should 
 not attempt to execute it without securing the consent of England. 
 He also found it as clear as day that the realization of the Ex- 
 change without a ' supplement ' would entail an incalculable loss 
 to Austria. Colloredo agreed entirely with Lacy and Rosenberg. 
 The discussion waxed hot. Overwhelmed with criticisms and 
 accusations, Spielmann was enraged to the point of demanding his 
 own dismissal. 1 Finally the battle ended with a compromise. 
 
 It was decided to go on with the plan for the Bavarian Ex- 
 change, which the Conference recognized as in itself " the summum 
 bonum " of the Austrian Monarchy, but also to make every 
 possible effort to secure such further advantages as would render 
 the Austrian gains absolutely equal to those of Prussia. A 
 graded series of propositions to the Court of Berlin was drawn up, 
 and first on the list stood the demand for the Franconian Mar- 
 graviates — in return for which Prussia might receive the Duchy of 
 Berg from Bavaria. If none of these supplementary advantages 
 could be obtained, the majority of the Conference agreed to adhere 
 to the Exchange pure and simple. If even that proved impracti- 
 cable, two contingencies were to be considered : if Prussia secured 
 
 the important decisions of the 17th. Beyond a doubt, this is the ' memoire ' which 
 was read at the beginning of the meeting, according to the Conference protocol, 
 and not, as is commonly assumed, an act drawn up by Spielmann after the meeting, 
 as a sort of protest against what had taken place. 
 
 1 Schulenburg to Finckenstein and Alvensleben, July 30, B. A., R. XI, Frank- 
 reich, 89 g.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 329 
 
 her acquisition in Poland, Austria must claim an arrondissement 
 in French Flanders and Hainault; in the contrary case, both 
 Powers should return to the original plan of demanding a money 
 indemnity from France. The Emperor approved these resolu- 
 tions, with the reservation that the consent of the other Courts, 
 and especially of England, must be obtained before attempting 
 the realization of the Exchange, and that in case of the slightest 
 opposition, the project was to be abandoned at once. 1 
 
 It has been the general opinion of historians that the confer- 
 ence at Frankfort marked a disastrous turn in Austrian policy. 
 It is true that Lacy and Rosenberg were not far wrong in holding 
 it an unfavorable moment for bringing up the Bavarian Exchange 
 plan, and in declaring the consent of England necessary; there 
 was also some justification for their view that it was not exactly 
 a, propos to divide the skin of the bear before he was caught; but 
 they failed utterly to reckon with the main factor in the situation, 
 Prussia. Since that Power insisted on obtaining securities for its 
 indemnity in advance, and since its aid was at that moment 
 indispensable, there was no other sound policy than to accede to 
 its demands and to avoid wounding its susceptibilities. The 
 decisions of Frankfort were so disastrous, not because they put 
 the Exchange plan in danger — for in view of the later turn of the 
 war, it is hardly probable that that project could ever have been 
 carried out — but because they produced the first rift in the 
 coalition and began the alienation of the ally, without whose 
 cordial cooperation a successful prosecution of the war and the 
 acquisition of an indemnity of any kind were wellnigh hopeless. 
 
 It was under no favorable auspices that the conferences be- 
 tween the Austrian and Prussian ministers were opened at Mainz. 
 On the one side, Spielmann and Cobenzl found themselves obliged 
 to champion demands of which both at bottom disapproved. 2 On 
 the other side, Schulenburg, who was to conduct the negotiation 
 
 1 Conference protocol and the separate vota of Lacy and of Rosenberg and 
 Colloredo, Vivenot, ii, pp. 132 ff., 141 f. 
 
 2 Of Spielmann's point of view, it is unnecessary to speak further. For Cobenzl's, 
 see his memorial printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 142-145 (here erroneously entitled 
 " Beilage zum Protokoll der Frankfurter Conferenz, Juli, 1792." It was in reality 
 presented with a Vortrag of August 3, V. A.).
 
 330 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 for Prussia, could hardly be in the mood for concessions. His 
 two colleagues, who remained in Berlin, had already fallen to 
 bemoaning the disadvantages of permitting the Bavarian Ex- 
 change: the sacrifice of the traditions of the great Frederick, the 
 loss of Prussia's proud position as the protector of the small states 
 of Germany, the immense increase of Austrian power and in- 
 fluence, the violation of the Peace of Teschen, etc., etc. If the 
 hated project must absolutely be allowed, they insisted that their 
 Court must receive a huge aggrandizement, which would enable 
 it henceforth to dispense with the support of the German princes, 
 and would justify its abandonment of a policy that had hitherto 
 formed the glory and the security of Prussia. 1 Furthermore, 
 Haugwitz, who enjoyed great credit with Frederick William, had 
 come to attend the King from Hochheim to Mainz, and had 
 seized the opportunity to combat the system recently adopted, 
 and Schulenburg's policies in particular. If we may believe 
 Haugwitz's later assertion, the King was already discontented 
 with his leading minister, and especially with the too modest 
 indemnity which the latter was disposed to claim. 2 On both sides, 
 then, the personal position of the negotiators rendered concessions 
 to the other party difficult, if not impossible. 
 
 The subject of the indemnities was brought up for discussion 
 at the conference of July 21. Schulenburg readily agreed to the 
 principle that the respective acquisitions were to be exactly equal, 
 both with regard to their utility as arrondissements, and in ' intrin- 
 sic value.' The Austrians then brought forward their claim for a 
 ' supplement ' to offset the losses involved in the Bavarian Ex- 
 change. Schulenburg seems to have admitted — after not a 
 little argument — that the claim was in itself just; but when 
 informed of the concrete demand based upon it — the cession 
 of the Margraviates, the sacrifice of Prussian territory to satisfy 
 the appetites of this ravenous Court of Vienna — there he 
 
 1 These considerations from a letter of Alvensleben and Finckenstein of July 27, 
 i. e., written after they had learned of the propositions made by Austria at Mainz. 
 That they had, however, advanced these same ideas even earlier, appears from then- 
 letters to Schulenburg of August 12, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 g. 
 
 2 Ranke, Hardenberg, ii, p. 277; " Fragment des mgmoires inSdits du Comte de 
 Haugwitz," in Minerva, clxxxiv (1837), p. 4.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 33 I 
 
 balked. His sovereign, he protested, placed a quite peculiar 
 value on these territories, which were the ancient home of his 
 dynasty. Repeatedly he begged the Austrians to devise some 
 other combination. Spielmann insisted that no other plan was 
 possible: if the King's aversion to the proposed cession was 
 insuperable, both Courts would have to renounce their intended 
 acquisitions. From the meagre words of the protocol it is im- 
 possible to reconstruct the course of what was undoubtedly a 
 very warm debate ; but it appears that at last Schulenburg 
 consented to take the demand for the Margraviates ad referen- 
 dum, and even to indicate the territories that his master would 
 claim in case he agreed to that proposition. They included 
 the palatinates of Posen, Gnesen, Cujavia, and Kalisz, with a 
 part of Sieradz, an allotment considerably smaller than that 
 which fell to Prussia some months later. These claims the 
 Austrians in their turn accepted only ad referendum. Finally, 
 Schulenburg agreed without difficulty that his Court should 
 undertake to secure the consent of England and of the Duke of 
 Zweibriicken to the Exchange. The conference ended amicably, 
 but with nothing definite accomplished. 1 The great opportunity 
 for a solid agreement on the original basis had been lost. The full 
 extent of the harm done in the way of disappointing, exasperat- 
 ing, and embittering the Prussians, appeared only a little later. 
 
 II 
 
 On the homeward journey from Mainz the Emperor stopped 
 several days at Munich, to visit the Elector. It had not been 
 intended, apparently, to broach the great plan of the day on this 
 occasion, but the Elector seems to have outrun the wishes of his 
 guests. In a moment of effusiveness, he assured the Emperor 
 that he entertained for him the same sentiments that he had 
 cherished for Joseph II, and that he did not exclude even his 
 willingness to consent to the Exchange. Encouraging as this was, 
 
 1 Protocol of the conference, Vivenot, ii. pp. 146-149; Ph. Cobenzl to Kaunitz, 
 July 31, and to the Emperor, August 3, ibid., pp. 155-158; Schulenburg to Finck- 
 enstein and Alvensleben, July 21, printed in Ranke, Ursprung und Beginn, pp. 364 f.
 
 332 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Austrians do not appear to have taken advantage of it. They 
 were not yet ready to begin a formal negotiation at Munich. 1 
 
 At the end of July the court arrived at Prague for the Bohemian 
 coronation. It was only then that the Austrian statesmen began 
 to cast up the situation produced by the conference at Mainz. 
 In the report presented by the Vice-Chancellor to the Emperor on 
 August 3, the tone was sufficiently hopeful. The main thing at 
 present, he declared, was to await the replies of the Courts of 
 Berlin and Petersburg. If the latter answered unfavorably, then 
 the Prussian acquisition in Poland would fall through, as well as 
 the Bavarian Exchange; and in such a case the Emperor could 
 easily console himself. One sees again that the Austrians, unlike 
 their allies, had by no means set their hearts upon aggrandize- 
 ment; 2 they had virtually been driven into the indemnity project 
 in order to preserve the balance of power. As for the counter- 
 proposals to be expected from Prussia, Cobenzl anticipated that 
 the King would offer not only the Exchange, to which he had 
 irrevocably committed himself, but also some additional advan- 
 tages — either the Margraviates or acquisitions elsewhere. 
 Evidently the Vice-Chancellor had been encouraged by Schulen- 
 berg's acceptance of the abstract principle of ' the supplement,' 
 and did not suspect the indignation and repugnance which the 
 demands made at Mainz had aroused in the Prussian ministry. 
 Still he obviously did not feel the ground quite secure under his 
 feet, for he thought it necessary to add a long memorial rehearsing 
 all the advantages of the Exchange project. The reason may have 
 been that he feared that the Emperor's inclination to the plan had 
 been shaken by the opposition at Frankfort; or possibly that he 
 
 1 For the incident at Munich, Razumovski to Bezborodko, September 2/13, 
 on the basis of what Spielmann had told him, M. A., ABCTpia, III, 54. Cf. Ph. 
 Cobenzl to Mercy, March 26, 1793: " Wie sehnlich der Herr Kurfiirst diesen 
 Tausch allezeit gewunscht hat (und die Fortdauer dieses Wunsches haben noch im 
 Juli v. J. positive Aeusserungen bestatigt) ist Jedermann bekannt " (Vivenot, ii, p. 
 532 — the italics are mine). Lehrbach, the Austrian envoy at Munich, was not 
 informed until the spring of 1793 that his Court had revived the Exchange project; 
 and no formal negotiation was ever undertaken on the subject with the Bavarian 
 government in these years. 
 
 2 Spielmann was probably an exception, but the statement applies, I believe, 
 to the other ministers.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 333 
 
 was trying to prepare the way for a return to Spielmann's original 
 project, in case the demand for a supplement occasioned too great 
 difficulties or delays. At any rate, the memorial labored to show 
 that the deficit caused by the Exchange would be only temporary, 
 and that the security and freedom of action to be gained by the 
 realization of the plan were far more precious than any acquisi- 
 tions or any mere increase of revenue. 1 
 
 A few days later a report arrived from Louis Cobenzl that 
 must have afforded considerable satisfaction. Immediately upon 
 receiving the orders of July 2nd, the ambassador had taken up 
 the new project (the Exchange) with his usual zeal, although he 
 had grave doubts about the success of the plan, and was not a 
 little pained at being obliged to champion those ambitions of 
 Prussia which for years he had made it his business to combat. 2 
 The Russian ministers received his propositions with all gracious- 
 ness. They could express only their private opinions, since all 
 must be referred to the Empress' decision, but each of them in 
 turn assured Cobenzl that she would surely do everything possible 
 to assist ' her most intimate ally,' just as she had done in 1784. 
 The ambassador was given to understand that the Exchange 
 project would meet with no difficulties whatsoever from Russia, 
 but as to the Prussian acquisition the situation was different. 
 Bezborodko, indeed, thought that in view of the present circum- 
 stances the claims of the Court of Berlin would have to be 
 admitted; but the other ministers raised profuse objections and 
 unanimously declared that this was a subject that required the 
 maturest deliberation. Markov asserted that the King of Prussia 
 had no right whatever to demand an indemnity for " the half- 
 campaign" he was making, and ought to be told so plainly. The 
 last-named minister was also the only one who broached the 
 topic of an acquisition for his own Court. If it were a question of 
 gains for Austria alone, he declared, the Empress would act as 
 disinterestedly as Joseph II had done at the time of the Crimean 
 affair; but if Prussia absolutely must get something too, that was 
 quite a different matter: then the balance of power must be pre- 
 
 1 Vortrag of August 3, V. A. The memorial, in Vivenot, ii, pp. 142-145. 
 
 2 L. Cobenzl to Ph. Cobenzl, July 21 (private letter), V. A., Russland, Fasc. 139.
 
 334 T HE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 served. Cobenzl's instructions did not allow him to discuss this 
 latter point, but he did not think fit to offer the petty concessions 
 suggested in the orders of July 2 to take the place of a Russian 
 acquisition. It is probable that his failure to propose that the 
 Empress should take her share along with the rest, had something 
 to do with the fact that on this occasion he secured nothing but 
 general assurances of good will. His sovereign would be unable 
 to reply definitely, Ostermann declared, until she learned of the 
 results of the interview between the Emperor and the King of 
 Prussia. 1 
 
 Unsubstantial as was his success, Cobenzl had still progressed 
 much further than his Prussian colleague. The excessively pru- 
 dent Goltz, bound by extremely cautious instructions, had failed 
 utterly to bring the Russians to speech. Not daring to make his 
 proposals openly, and not being on sufficiently intimate terms 
 with the Russian ministers to draw them out in familiar conversa- 
 tion, the envoy was no nearer to learning the intentions of the 
 Empress now than he had been five months earlier. He and 
 Cobenzl received their orders about the indemnity project at 
 almost the same time; yet so great was their mutual distrust 
 that instead of joining forces in a common effort, each assured 
 the other that he had no definite instructions on this subject. 2 
 
 The news from St. Petersburg — the advance gained by 
 Cobenzl over Goltz, the favorable reception accorded by the 
 Russians to the Exchange project, and their apparent repugnance 
 to the Prussian claims — all this furnished the Austrian ministry 
 with an excellent opportunity to return to the attack on the 
 subject of the Margraviates. Accordingly, on August 8 a dis- 
 patch was sent to Reuss ostensibly for the purpose of communi- 
 cating the results of Cobenzl's overtures. The Prussians were to 
 be given to understand that the obstacles that stood in the way of 
 their demands at St. Petersburg, could probably be removed only 
 
 1 L. Cobenzl to Ph. Cobenzl, July 21 (official report), V. A., Russland, Berichte, 
 1792. 
 
 2 Goltz's report of July 20, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133; Cobenzl's of August 24, 
 V. A., lot. cit. Cobenzl's ' duplicity ' towards Goltz furnished the Prussian ministry 
 with a theme for frequent jeremiads; but the duplicity was about equal on both 
 ■sides.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 335 
 
 through the earnest intervention of the Emperor; and that this 
 intervention could easily be had — at the price of Ansbach and 
 Baireuth. If the two Courts were once agreed on this latter 
 point, it was said, they could immediately begin a joint negotia- 
 tion with Russia with good hopes of success. 1 
 
 At the same time Spielmann took up a high tone in his discus- 
 sions with Haugwitz. Without the cession of the Margraviates, 
 he constantly declared, the whole Bavarian-Polish plan would 
 have to be given up; but, on the other hand, if the King consented 
 to. part with those possessions, Prussia might have whatever she 
 might desire in Poland. Haugwitz, however, knew a clever 
 counter-thrust. If the Bavarian-Polish plan were abandoned, he 
 said, the two Courts would have to return to the old idea of 
 seeking their indemnities from France; and in that case his 
 sovereign would claim Juliers and Berg. Spielmann protested 
 vigorously that if the Elector had to part with his possessions on 
 the Lower Rhine the Exchange would be rendered forever im- 
 possible; and he added gloomily that in the end the allies would 
 have to fall back on taking their indemnities in French assignats 
 — an idea which filled Haugwitz with horror. 2 
 
 The debate moved around in a vicious circle. Still it appears 
 that Haugwitz did not express himself on the subject of the 
 Margraviates with sufficient firmness to destroy the hopes of the 
 Austrians. It was rather the answer given to Reuss that first 
 enlightened the Imperial ministry on what was to be expected 
 from Prussia. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The Ansbach-Baireuth proposition had not appeared to Schu- 
 lenburg particularly exorbitant and offensive at the moment when 
 it was first brought forward. It was only the day after the 
 conference of July 21, after long rumination, that he convinced 
 himself that the demand was thoroughly unjustifiable and inadmis- 
 sible. Then the suspicion awoke in him that the Court of Vienna 
 was systematically trying to strew the negotiation with difficulties 
 
 1 Ph. Cobenzl to Reuss, August 8, Vivenot, ii, pp. 159 ff. 
 
 2 Haugwitz to Frederick William, August 16, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 170.
 
 I 
 
 336 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 in order to thwart the whole indemnity project; that it preferred 
 to dispense with compensation for the war altogether, out of a 
 Machiavellian calculation that fifty millions more of debts would 
 not ruin a state with the resources of Austria, while the same 
 loss would be fatal to Prussia. 1 Even the complaisance of the 
 Austrians in other matters filled him with distrust. This proud 
 Court of Vienna was not wont to be so courteous, so pliable: it 
 must certainly have, some vast, mysterious, and insidious design 
 on foot. 2 
 
 In this harrowing state of suspicion and uncertainty, Schulen- 
 burg clung all the more firmly to one principle and framed one 
 momentous resolution. Whatever might happen, Prussia must 
 obtain an indemnity for the cost of the war; and since Austria 
 had failed him, he decided that the vital point at present was to 
 reach an understanding with Russia. After the Prussian indem- 
 nity had thus been ensured, it would be time to consider the 
 demands of the Court of Vienna. Austria might then be allowed 
 to effect the Exchange, and, if it were clearly proved that a deficit 
 would result, she might be permitted to make up the loss by 
 certain acquisitions from France; but the claim for the Margra- 
 viates must be categorically, once and finally, rejected. This was 
 a turning-point in Prussian policy. Hitherto Schulenburg's cardi- 
 nal principle had been the concert with Austria. Now he looked 
 for salvation only to Russia. 3 
 
 If he had found the Ansbach-Baireuth proposition "inadmis- 
 sible," his colleagues at Berlin declared it " alarming, not to say 
 insolent," and even " revolting." Both of them had long been 
 discontented with the reigning policies; and they now found a 
 chance to give their anti-Austrian proclivities full vent. It was 
 bad enough, they held, to have to consent to the Bavarian 
 Exchange; but to undertake to urge it at London and Zwei- 
 briicken was out of the question. It could not be permitted at 
 
 1 Schulenburg to Finckenstein and Alvensleben, July 21, B. A., R. XI, Frank- 
 reich, 89 g. 
 
 2 Alopeus' report of July 13/24, based on Schulenburg's confidences to him, 
 M. A., Ilpyccia, III, 30. 
 
 3 Schulenburg to Finckenstein and Alvensleben, July 22, in Ranke, Ur sprung 
 und Beginn der Revolutionskriege, p. 365.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 337 
 
 all, unless Prussia obtained a very handsome acquisition in Po- 
 land. Though without great hopes with respect to the Empress' 
 attitude, they agreed entirely with Schulenburg's idea as to the 
 necessity of seeking first of all an understanding with Russia. If 
 that could be attained, the King ought to take possession of his 
 acquisition at once, and then tell the Court of Vienna that he 
 would do what he could for it. That was the only way to deal 
 with Austria, the two ministers declared. In 1771 and 1772 the 
 Court of Vienna had also affected an attitude of disinterestedness ; 
 but when it saw Russia and Prussia agreed and determined to 
 have their way, it had hastened to throw off the mask and beg 
 for a share of ' the cake.' 
 
 The idea, it must be said, was luminous enough, except that 
 there was this difference between 1772 and 1792: in the latter 
 year Prussia was bound to Austria by an alliance, the basis of 
 which was equality in all advantages; and she was engaged along 
 with that Power in a joint war, the success of which depended 
 upon complete mutual confidence. The alliance and the common 
 enterprise were doomed, the moment Prussia attempted to carry 
 out behind the back of her ally a coup like that proposed by the 
 Berlin ministry. Doubtless the Imperial Court had rendered 
 an agreement difficult by its exorbitant demands, but to seize 
 the coveted lands in Poland without a preliminary understanding 
 and then to present Austria with an insulting fait accompli was 
 to turn the alliance to scorn. The project did not, indeed, come 
 to execution at this time, as the sphinx at St. Petersburg could 
 not be brought to speak; but in the ideas here proposed by 
 Finckenstein and Alvensleben, and approved by Schulenburg, 
 one can see the germs of the Note of Merle, the Second Partition 
 Treaty, and the disruption of the First Coalition. 1 
 
 1 For the above: Alvensleben's and Finckenstein's notes to each other on 
 Schulenburg's letter of July 21/22, their joint reply to him of July 27, his letter 
 to them of August 2, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 g. 
 
 Finckenstein and Alvensleben wrote: "... Nous sommes tout a. fait du senti- 
 ment de V. Exc. que pour nous procurer du cote' de la Pologne le dedommagement 
 qui fait notre objet, le consentement de la Russie est un prealable absolument 
 n£cessaire avant de pouvoir faire aucune demarche de poids du c6te de l'Autriche. 
 . . . L'affaire une fois de regie avec la Russie, nous pensons qu'il faudra la terminer 
 sans perte de tems par nous mettre en possession le plut6t qu'il se pourroit sans
 
 338 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 ' Unanimous as was the opinion of the cabinet ministry, the 
 King did not at first display the same repugnance to the idea of 
 ceding the Margraviates; and Haugwitz was at bottom inclined 
 to it. In a report to his sovereign of July 26, the envoy urged 
 that the Court of Vienna might, indeed, be induced to content 
 itself with the Exchange alone, but in that case it would probably 
 raise great difficulties about the Polish affair; whereas if it were 
 promised Ansbach and Baireuth, all assistance and good will 
 might be expected from it. Before Schulenburg could intervene, 
 Frederick William replied with a letter in which he showed him- 
 self not entirely unwilling to make the proposed cession, if in 
 return he could get for himself the whole left bank of the Vistula. 1 
 Schulenburg was almost in despair over the royal indiscretion. 
 He did what he could to mend matters by a private letter to 
 Haugwitz, begging him in Heaven's name not to let the faintest 
 suspicion transpire that their master could ever conceive of the 
 possibility of such a cession. In public Haugwitz was to express 
 as his own opinion that the King's aversion to the sacrifice de- 
 manded of him was wellnigh invincible. For the envoy's private 
 instruction, Schulenburg added that it was only in the last 
 extremity and only in return for immense acquisitions in Poland, 
 that Prussia could consent to give up the Franconian principali- 
 ties; and he personally would never lend a hand to such a trans- 
 action save with infinite repugnance. 2 
 
 meme trop s'apesanter sur un arrangement exact des demarcations . . . et cela 
 fait, dire a la Cour de Vienne que telle est notre indemnity et que nous sommes 
 prets a lui en procurer une de la meme valeur, en autant que la chose dependroit 
 de nous. C'est la vraie maniere a notre avis de traiter en pareil cas avec l'Autriche. 
 Lors du demembrement de la Pologne en 1771 et 1772 elle suivit a peu pres la 
 meme marche qu'aujourd'hui, jouant la desinteressee . . . ; mais lorsqu'elle nous 
 vit d'accord avec la Russie et les deux Allies disposes a aller leur chemin, quelque 
 parti que Ton prit a Vienne, elle revint d'elle meme a nous pour avoir sa part au 
 gateau. . . . Nous . . . avons ete vraiment revokes en apprenant que les Min- 
 istres Autrichiens ont ose proposer la cession des Principautes de Franconie. . . . 
 V. Exc. a bien raison de nommer le projet d'une telle cession insoutenable et in- 
 admissible. . . . Nous sommes ainsi bien d'accord tous trois que dans tous les cas 
 il faut rejetter haut a la main une proposition aussi inacceptable sous tous les 
 rapports, et qui ne sauroit meme faire un objet de discussion entre les deux Cours." 
 
 1 Frederick William to Haugwitz, July 28, B. A., R. 96, 155 E. 
 
 1 Schulenburg to Haugwitz, July 30, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 339 
 
 With that, however, the evil was not quite undone. The 
 King's " indifference " to the " revolting proposition," did not 
 cease to alarm the cabinet ministry. They trembled at the 
 thought that if the Court of Vienna but suspected the weakness 
 of their position, it would, with its usual perseverance, return 
 again and again with offers of advantages and equivalents of all 
 sorts, until finally the King succumbed. 1 The secret of that 
 report of Haugwitz's and the replies made to it, Schulenburg 
 wrote, must be concealed like murder. What if Bischoffwerder 
 should learn of it, with his Austrian propensities ! 2 It was a try- 
 ing moment for the Prussian ministers. They feared the weak- 
 ness of their own sovereign; they had ceased to expect anything 
 good from Austria ; they found their hands bound with regard to 
 France by the declaration in which the Duke of Brunswick was 
 made to deny that the allied Powers had any designs upon the 
 territory of that kingdom. Not only the Prussian acquisition in 
 Poland, but a Prussian acquisition anywhere, seemed to be in 
 grave jeopardy. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that the Austrian cabinet 
 delivered its new attack through the dispatches to Reuss of 
 August 8. Nevertheless, the communication of Cobenzl's report 
 failed to work the wonders expected. This time Schulenburg was 
 the first to gain the King's ear, and he succeeded in putting 
 through an answer after his own heart. The reply given to Reuss 
 declared clearly and emphatically that Prussia could never think 
 of ceding the Margraviates, except in exchange for Lusatia, if 
 that should ever return to Austrian hands; that whereas Cobenzl 
 reported only the private opinions of the Russian ministers, it 
 was indispensable to learn as soon as possible the sentiments of 
 the Empress; that meantime the King desired to know whether 
 the Emperor would accept the Bavarian Exchange as equivalent 
 to the Prussian acquisition in Poland, and if not, and in case a 
 partition were found impossible, what were his ideas regarding 
 the indemnities that would then have to be sought at the expense 
 
 1 Schulenburg to his colleagues, July 30, their reply of August 4, B. A., R. XI, 
 Frankreich, 89 g. 
 
 2 To Finckenstein and Alvensleben, August n, ibid.
 
 34-0 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of France. To this formal response, Schulenburg added orally 
 that his sovereign fully accepted the principle of a ' supplement ' 
 for Austria, and would assuredly be willing to cooperate in pro- 
 curing one for his ally. His (Schulenburg's) personal opinion 
 was that such an acquisition could best be found in Alsace. The 
 honest Reuss was quite moved by such zeal for the interests of 
 the Imperial Court, and reported with touching simplicity that 
 it was plainly not Schulenburg's fault, if the King refused to 
 cede the Margraviates. The divergence between Schulenburg's 
 ' personal ' utterances and his formal, ministerial declarations, 
 BischofTwerder's profuse sympathy, and the probable ambiguity 
 of Haugwitz's interpretations of orders with which he did not 
 agree, may well have had something to do with the fact that the 
 Austrian ministry still refused for some time to consider the 
 King's decision about the Margraviates as final. 1 
 
 The Prussian ministers, too, were not yet thoroughly assured 
 that the Ansbach-Baireuth question was dead and buried. Haug- 
 witz continued even into September to recommend the cession, 
 in order to secure a very generous acquisition in Poland; and 
 this in spite of Schulenburg's efforts to " indoctrinate him," and 
 in spite of the fulminations of the Berlin ministry against the 
 very idea. 2 The King's mind, however, seemed henceforth fixed. 
 
 The Austrian communications through Reuss produced the 
 very reverse of the desired effect on the Prussian ministry. The 
 latter, instead of seeking the proposed concert with the Imperial 
 Court, now hastened their advances to Russia. Goltz, who had 
 hitherto been confined to generalities and hints, was at last 
 ordered to enter into full and frank explanations. 3 
 
 1 For the above: Reuss' report of August 17, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, 1792; 
 Schulenburg to Finckenstein and Alvensleben, August 14, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 
 89 g. It is to be noted that Schulenburg did not mention to his colleagues bis 
 declarations regarding a ' supplement,' and yet Reuss reports them so positively 
 that one can hardly doubt his word, especially in view of the fact that he was 
 admittedly one of the most truthful and honest of diplomats. 
 
 2 Haugwitz to the King, August 16, 20, September 4, B. A., R. 1, 170; Schulen- 
 burg to Haugwitz, August 15, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 g, and September 2, 
 B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K; Finckenstein and Alvensleben to Haugwitz, 
 passim, August 20 and September n especially, B. A., R. 1, 170. 
 
 3 Rescripts to Goltz of August 20 and 24, September 1 and 4, B. A., R. XI, 
 Russland, 133.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 34 1 
 
 Before these instructions reached St. Petersburg, matters had 
 already begun to progress in that quarter, largely, it would seem, 
 as a result of new communications from Vienna. On August 8 
 Philip Cobenzl had sent off to his cousin dispatches containing 
 a report of the interviews at Mainz. Until the question of the 
 Margraviates was settled, the Austrians were far from desiring to 
 start a formal negotiation at St. Petersburg; and hence the 
 object of the new communications was only to keep the Russians 
 informed and in good humor. But the dispatches contained one 
 novelty. By this time the Viennese ministers had convinced them- 
 selves that it would be impossible to avoid giving the Empress 
 a share of the spoils; and so in order not to be outdone in gener- 
 osity by the Prussians, and in order to accumulate merits for his 
 own Court, the Vice-Chancellor here mentioned for the first time 
 that, as a matter of course, Russia, too, should get something. 1 
 When Louis Cobenzl read these dispatches to Ostermann, the 
 latter's face lighted up with pleasure when it came to the passage 
 about an acquisition for Russia. " Well and good, in that case 
 the thing can go through," he declared; " it was impossible that 
 we alone should get nothing." 2 Without yet being in a position 
 to speak ministerially, he gave Cobenzl to understand that the 
 Empress agreed to the principle of the indemnity plan, and that 
 the only question was as to the quo modo. Goltz, who arrived for 
 his conference immediately afterward, found that day — for the 
 first time — a ready listener. Ostermann repeated to him the 
 assurance just given to Cobenzl, that his sovereign would cer- 
 tainly not oppose an arrangement for the advantage of all three 
 Courts and wished only to be informed of the plan in more 
 detail. 3 
 
 Now at last the Prussian ministry could, as they expressed it, 
 see a little couleur de rose in what had been so black a cloud. In 
 accordance with Goltz's suggestion, they at once begged the King 
 to fix the precise extent of the acquisition to be demanded in 
 
 1 Ph. Cobenzl to L. Cobenzl, August 8, Vivenot, ii, pp. 164-169. 
 
 2 " So recht, so kann die Sache gehen, denn es war nicht moglich dass wir die 
 einzigen leer ausgehen." 
 
 3 Cobenzl's and Goltz's reports of August 24, V. A., Russland, Berichle, 1792, 
 B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 342 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Poland, so that the envoy might be enabled to bring matters to 
 a definite agreement. 1 Hitherto the Prussians had been by no 
 means clear as to the exact boundaries that they meant to claim. 
 The King had several times spoken longingly of the whole left 
 bank of the Vistula, 2 and he had found Schulenburg's ideas too 
 modest. Haiigwitz, on leaving Frankfort, seems to have been 
 charged to go to Silesia and collect topographical information 
 bearing on the problem. In the middle of August, he reported 
 his conclusions. In case of the cession of the Margraviates, he 
 proposed to demand the whole left bank of the Vistula except 
 Mazovia; in the contrary case, a boundary might be drawn from 
 Cz^stochowa through Piotrkow and Rawa to the confluence of 
 the Bug and Vistula, and thence across to the East Prussian 
 frontier at Soldau. This latter proposal is worth noting: it is the 
 first appearance of the line of demarcation adopted in the Second 
 Partition Treaty (with very slight changes). 3 Haugwitz's ideas, 
 however, were apparently too bold to suit his superiors at Berlin, 
 and in the instructions now forwarded to Goltz the size of the 
 acquisition in Poland was cut down to much the same limits as 
 had been proposed by Schulenburg at Mainz. 4 In any case, the 
 road was thus paved for a formal negotiation at St. Petersburg, 
 and the will was not lacking in the Prussian ministry to close 
 V with Russia at once, without waiting a moment for Austria. 
 Unless the Court of Vienna hastened to present a really accept- 
 able proposition, it was likely to find itself isolated and ignored. 
 Meantime the Austrian ministers were casting around desper- 
 ately for their ' supplement,' hopelessly unable to meet the 
 impending danger. 
 
 1 Finckenstein and Alvensleben to Schulenburg, September 10, B. A., R. XI, 
 Frankreich, 89 g. 
 
 2 In his note to Schulenburg of March 12, and his letter to Haugwitz of July 28. 
 
 3 Haugwitz to the King, August 16, B. A., R. 1, 170. 
 
 4 Rescript to Goltz of September 28, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. The line 
 indicated ran from the frontier of East Prussia southward through Lip6w and 
 Bolkowa to Plock on the Vistula; thence via Gostyn, Sleszyn and Grzegorzow to 
 the Warta; then up that stream through Uniej6w and Sieradz, and across country 
 via Wielkie to the Silesian frontier near Gorz6w. It thus included the whole of 
 the palatinates of Gnesen, Posen, Kalisz, and Cujavia, about one-third of that of 
 Sieradz, and also the cities of Dantzic and Thorn.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 343 
 
 IV 
 
 Apart from its obstinate insistence on the impossible demand 
 for the Margraviates, the Court of Vienna had done nothing 
 throughout the whole month of August, the last month in which 
 by prudent concessions an agreement with Prussia on advanta- 
 geous terms might still have been reached. The Imperial cabinet 
 presented a sad spectacle of ever-growing feebleness, incoherency, 
 and internal dissensions. Now that Kaunitz had finally retired, 
 the direction of foreign affairs had passed nominally into the 
 hands of Cobenzl, an amiable, easy-going bureaucrat, who scribbled 
 and stuttered placidly through life without displaying an excess 
 of imagination, initiative, or energy. Spielmann was a more vig- 
 orous personality, but the ground was already shaking under his 
 feet. If at the beginning of the reign he had passed for the new 
 monarch's most confidential adviser, by this time the hatred of 
 the aristocrats for this parvenu, the discontent of all classes with 
 a war of which he was popularly supposed to be the author, the 
 rankling jealousy of Kaunitz towards his presumptuous pupil, 
 the violent opposition in the Conference — all this had combined 
 to place his position in grave danger. And with him the Bavarian- 
 Polish project stood or fell. In the Conference the parties were 
 equal: Spielmann, Cobenzl, and Starhemberg, the advocates of 
 the Exchange, against Lacy, Rosenberg, and Colloredo. But 
 even Cobenzl, whether from jealousy of his colleague or from a 
 natural inclination to steer with the wind, varied in his attitude 
 towards the project, sometimes apparently going so far as to 
 place the ' supplement ' above the Exchange itself. 1 As for the 
 opponents of the plan, they had nothing to put in its place. To 
 escape from the war as soon as possible; to free themselves from 
 an irritating dependence on Prussia; to avoid compromising the 
 Emperor's good name by complicity in a new dismemberment of 
 Poland: such seems to have been the height of their desires. 
 Without any perception of the real situation, without plan or 
 system, without moderation in their demands or prudence in the 
 
 1 Cf. his memorial written in the last days of August, Vivenot, Zur Genesis der 
 zweilen Theilimg Polens, pp. 43-47.
 
 344 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 choice of means, these gentlemen of the Conference found their 
 chief function in criticizing, obstructing, and tearing down; and 
 their activity resulted only in hampering and thwarting the 
 policy of the Emperor's responsible ministers. 
 
 The arrival of the reply given to Reuss threw the whole in- 
 demnity project into doubt. Spielmann told Haugwitz that ' he 
 was at the end of his Latin ' ; if the King absolutely refused to 
 cede the Margraviates, there could be no more talk of either 
 Bavaria or Poland. 1 Cobenzl felt bound to advise that the 
 matter should be brought before the Conference. 2 Accordingly, 
 on September 3 another great ministerial field day was held in 
 the Emperor's presence at Schonbrunn. 
 
 This time the victory rested with Spielmann. In spite of the 
 renewed efforts of the opposition and especially of Lacy, it was 
 decided to keep on with the Exchange plan, and to make a new 
 attempt to reach an understanding with Prussia about a ' supple- 
 ment.' In accordance with an idea brought forward by Spiel- 
 mann, the Conference resolved to propose once more the cession 
 of the Margraviates, this time in return for the promise of an 
 eventual cession of Lusatia whenever that territory should lapse 
 to Austria. But as a new refusal was to be expected here, the 
 State Chancellery had suggested that the ' supplement ' might 
 be found either in Alsace or in Poland. Rosenberg championed 
 the former alternative, but the Emperor decided in favor of the 
 latter; and Lacy was charged to draw up the boundaries of a 
 desirable acquisition in that quarter. It was the first occasion on 
 which the Austrians had seriously taken up the idea of demand- 
 ing a share in the new dismemberment of Poland. Here, too, 
 they discussed for the first time a possibility that was just begin- 
 ning to loom up on the horizon. The Bavarian Exchange could 
 hardly be effected until after the peace with France, and in the 
 meantime the definite settlement of Polish affairs could not well 
 be long delayed. What if Russia and Prussia should seize their 
 acquisitions before Austria had gained any securities for hers ? 
 The Conference decided that in such a case the Imperial Court 
 
 1 Haugwitz's report to the King of August 25, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 g. 
 
 2 Vortrag of August 27 (V. A.).
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 345 
 
 must occupy a district in Poland equivalent to that claimed by 
 Prussia, and retain it as a guarantee until the Bavarian Exchange 
 and the acquisition of the ' supplement ' had been effected. 
 Finally, the Emperor announced his intention of sending Spiel- 
 mann to the King of Prussia's headquarters to present these 
 propositions and to negotiate a definitive agreement. The news 
 from the front was favorable; it seemed probable that the allied 
 armies would soon be in Paris; it was urgently necessary to 
 settle the indemnity question at once. 1 
 
 Though much chagrined by the results of this Conference, 2 the 
 opposition were not yet ready to acknowledge themselves beaten. 
 In the next few days they sent in written vota repeating their 
 objections, especially to the idea of joining in the spoliation of 
 Poland, with such force that the Emperor was apparently shaken 
 in his previous resolution. Moreover, on the question of the 
 supplement, Cobenzl now went over to their side, thus giving 
 them the majority in the Conference. 3 One other incident also 
 occurred to render a reconsideration of the recent decisions desir- 
 able. Haugwitz, learning of Spielmann's mission, took the occa- 
 sion to declare that he should regret it, were the Referendary 
 sent in the supposition that the cession of the Margraviates 
 could ever be conceded, since he had recently had cause to doubt 
 more strongly than ever the feasibility of such a project. 4 Hence 
 on the 7th the Conference met again, this time in the absence of 
 the Emperor, who did not enjoy long discussions. 
 
 1 Conference protocol of September 3, and the ' separal-vota,' Vivenot, ii, 
 pp. 180-186. It seems highly probably that Spielmann's remarks on Reuss' 
 reports, which are printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 172-176, were prepared to serve as 
 the basis of discussion at this conference, and represent the Vorlage usually sub- 
 mitted on such occasions by the State Chancellery. 
 
 2 Zinzendorfs Diary, September 6 : " Rosenberg a honte d'etre de la conference " 
 (V. A.). 
 
 3 Cobenzl's desertion evidently took place after the Conference of September 3. 
 Otherwise the party in favor of taking the supplement in Alsace rather than in 
 Poland would have been in the majority that day, whereas it appears from the 
 protocol of September 7 that it was only the separat-vota submitted on the 5 th 
 and 6th which showed them to be in a majority. 
 
 4 This from the Conference protocol of September 7, V. A., Vortrage, 1792. 
 Haugwitz gives a somewhat more vigorous tone to his declaration in his report of 
 the same day, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 170.
 
 346 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Once more the question of Alsace or Poland was hotly fought 
 over. Rosenberg again advocated the former plan, on the ground 
 that it was more honorable to take a just indemnity from a con- 
 quered enemy than to join in dismembering a friendly state, 
 and also because of the superior value of this acquisition, which, 
 combined with Bavaria and the Austrian lands in Swabia, would 
 give the Imperial Court a decided preponderance in South Ger- 
 many. To the difficulties in the way of conquering and defending 
 such a province, Rosenberg seemed completely blind. With less 
 appeal to principle or sentiment, but with far more common 
 sense, Starhemberg argued that the Austrian indemnities must 
 be rendered, as far as possible, independent of the fortunes of 
 war, just as were the Russian and Prussian ones; that an acquisi- 
 tion in Poland would be easy and safe, while one in Alsace would 
 be quite the reverse ; and as for the odium of joining in a partition 
 of the Republic, the Imperial Court would only be following the 
 example of its two allies, and even if it did not take an open hand 
 in the affair, the world would never believe that it had not given 
 its consent in order to secure advantages elsewhere. The Con- 
 ference contented itself that day with elucidating the arguments 
 on both sides, which were to be submitted to the Emperor. 
 Regarding the other great point at issue, the ministers recom- 
 mended making a final effort to win the Margraviates by offering 
 a special arrangement by which the Bavarian House should cede 
 Juliers and Berg to Prussia. 1 
 
 Two days later the Emperor gave his decision. Characteristi- 
 cally enough, he tore up his own resolution adopted only six days 
 before, and pronounced in favor of just the opposite course: he 
 would take his supplement in Alsace, and not in Poland. One 
 may doubt whether this decision had quite the world-historic 
 importance that has sometimes been given to it; 2 but it would 
 seem to have been a fresh blunder for Austria to renounce the one 
 acquisition that she had any chance of making, in order to launch 
 forth on schemes for impossible conquests from France. It is 
 
 1 Protocol of September 7, in Vivenot, ii, pp. 186-190. 
 
 2 Sybel {op. cit., ii, pp. 355 f.) finds that it changed the whole character of the 
 war by turning the enterprise of the allies into a war for conquests on a grand scale.
 
 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA DISAGREE 347 
 
 more to the credit of the Emperor's judgment that he vetoed the 
 Juliers-Berg project, thus finally consigning the wretched ques- 
 tion of the Margraviates to oblivion. 1 
 
 Armed with these new and by no means modest propositions, 
 Spielmann set out on the morning of September 12, accompanied 
 by the high hopes of the Vice-Chancellor that the grand affair 
 would at last be settled to the great advantage of Austria. 2 The 
 wonder and the curiosity of the diplomatic world rose one pitch 
 higher, when on the same day Count Haugwitz also departed in 
 the same direction. 3 All eyes in Vienna were now turned toward 
 the Prussian headquarters. " Judging by what Prince Reuss 
 has just reported," Cobenzl wrote to Spielmann, " your letters 
 will probably soon be dated from Paris." It was the day of 
 Valmy. 4 
 
 1 Cobenzl's Vertrag of September 9, and the Imperial apostil, Vivenot, ii, pp. 
 191 f. 
 
 2 Cobenzl to Spielmann, September 9, V. A., Mission in das preussische Haupt- 
 quartier de 1792, A. 
 
 3 The reasons for Haugwitz's journey are not quite certain. He had received a 
 letter from the King appointing him cabinet minister and informing him of Schu- 
 lenburg's impending return to Berlin, but not, apparently, summoning him to the 
 army. He seems to have undertaken on his own initiative to go to Frankfort, in 
 the expectation that he would then be called to the royal headquarters to take 
 Schulenburg's place in conducting the negotiation with Spielmann. The letter to 
 the King (of September 5), in which he explained his reasons for taking this step, 
 is apparently lost. To Schulenburg he excused himself on the plea that he had 
 grounds for suspecting that Spielmann was charged to renew the proposition about 
 the Margraviates, and that hence he had determined to go to Frankfort, in order 
 to be near the King and strengthen the royal resistance to such a demand, suppos- 
 ing that Schulenburg would already have left the army. (Letter of September 30, 
 B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K.) Alopeus reported (doubtless on the basis of what 
 Lucchesini had told him) that Spielmann had asked Haugwitz to accompany him, 
 because he wished to negotiate with a minister in whom he had confidence and 
 with whom he was accustomed to deal. (Report of September 11/22, M. A., 
 Ilpyccia, III, 30.) This is quite probable, since if Haugwitz had not been present, 
 Spielmann would have had to negotiate with the much distrusted Lucchesini. At 
 any rate, it is clear that Haugwitz's trip was undertaken without orders from 
 anyone. 
 
 * Vivenot, ii, pp. 211 f.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 The Note of Merle 
 
 Spielmann reached Frankfort on September 18, closely followed 
 by Haugwitz. As the latter had just received the King's order to 
 come to the army, the two continued on the journey together as 
 far as Luxemburg. On the way Spielmann applied himself with 
 all his skill to win Haugwitz over to his propositions; and he 
 seems to have found a very ready hearer. Haugwitz, it must be 
 remembered, had always been in favor of allowing Austria a 
 ' supplement,' in order to obtain for his own Court a particularly 
 large slice of Poland. He now showed himself so complaisant 
 that Spielmann ventured to claim for his sovereign not only the 
 Bavarian Exchange, but Alsace and Lorraine as far as the Moselle 
 — an acquisition such as the Conference had never dared to 
 demand in even its wildest moments. Haugwitz accepted the 
 proposition, without objections apparently, and, leaving Spiel- 
 mann at Luxemburg, went on to Verdun (the 26th) to find the 
 King and receive his orders regarding the Austrian demands and 
 the counter-claims to be advanced for Prussia. 1 
 
 But just at this moment there began that rapid series of dis- 
 asters which ruined the hopes of the invaders of France and gave 
 an entirely new face to the situation. After Valmy (September 
 20) came Dumouriez's negotiation with Manstein; September 29 
 the retreat of the allied army was decided upon; October 8 the 
 
 1 Haugwitz to Schulenburg, September 30, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K; 
 Spielmann to Cobenzl, September 27, V. A., Mission in das preussische Haupt- 
 quartier, and October 15, Vivenot, ii, pp. 272-277. 
 
 Haugwitz wrote: " La Cour de Vienne demandera pour sa part l'echange de la 
 Baviere . . . et ils proposeront d'ajouter au lot de l'Autriche l'Alsace et une partie 
 de la Lorraine jusqu'a la Moselle, ce qui comprend les possessions francoises entre 
 le Rhin et la Moselle depuis les sources de cette derniere jusqu'a Remiez [Remich], 
 tout le long de la riviere en y comprenant les villes et forts situ6s sur la Moselle " 
 [i. e., Toul, Metz, Thionville, etc.]. 
 
 348
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 349 
 
 Prussians renewed the sham negotiation; on the 12th Verdun was 
 abandoned, on the 22nd Longwy; and in the next few days the 
 last German troops evacuated the soil of France. Meanwhile 
 Custine had made his bold raid down the Rhine, seizing Spires 
 September 30, Mainz October 21, and the next day Frankfort. 
 After the high hopes with which the allies began the ' promenade 
 to Paris,' these unthinkable catastrophes were doubly crushing. 
 Of 42,000 Prussians who had entered France, hardly 20,000 
 recrossed the frontier, and of these more than half were sick. 1 
 A soldier who lived through the horrors of 181 2, later declared 
 that the Prussians during the retreat from Champagne were per- 
 haps a more terrible sight than even the wrecks of the Grand 
 Army. 2 The effect upon Frederick William's impressionable and 
 glory-loving mind can easily be imagined. He who throughout 
 his reign had had to stand the comparison with his illustrious 
 predecessor, had played away in an expedition as ill-fated as 
 mismanaged the prestige and the nimbus of invincibility which 
 had hitherto clung to the army of the great Frederick. Little 
 wonder that the King was eager to wipe out the shame by a new 
 campaign in the following year, and that he was even more 
 anxious to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of his subjects by secur- 
 ing immediately an acquisition that would balance all his losses. 
 Under these circumstances, Haugwitz met his sovereign on 
 October 8 at Consenvoye, reported what he supposed to be the 
 aims of Spielmann's mission, and obtained definite instructions 
 as to the share which the King intended to demand in Poland. 
 On the map of the Republic Frederick William traced the line 
 Czgstochowa-Rawa-Soldau, which henceforth formed the basis of 
 the Prussian claims. Haugwitz was directed to go back to Ver- 
 dun, where Spielmann had now arrived, to receive the definite 
 propositions of the Court of Vienna. 3 On his return, however, he 
 found the Austrian minister on the point of retiring to Luxem- 
 
 1 Chuquet, La Catnpagne de VArgonne (1792), pp. 476 f. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 475. 
 
 3 Haugwitz to Schulenburg, October 15, B. A., R. XI, Frankrekh, 89 K. The 
 fact that the King at this time gave definite orders as to his claims in Poland, and 
 traced the line of demarcation on the map with his own hand, appears from Haug- 
 witz's great report of May 6, 1793, B. A., R. 96, 147 H.
 
 350 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 burg, as the evacuation of Verdun had just been decided upon. 
 During the brief conversation that then took place, Spielmann 
 learned only that the King expressed great willingness not only 
 to assist in the realization of the Exchange, but to secure for the 
 Imperial Court a rich ' supplement ' in lieu of the Margraviates. 1 
 On reaching Luxemburg on the 12th, the Referendary fell ill with 
 a fever, so that although Haugwitz arrived the following day, the 
 negotiation had to be still further delayed. 
 
 The situation had changed so greatly that Spielmann weighed 
 the question whether he could negotiate at all on the basis of 
 instructions drawn up on quite different presuppositions. Haug- 
 witz urged, indeed, that the King was resolved to make a second 
 campaign, if the Court of Vienna agreed, and was anxious to 
 settle the indemnity question at once. But the Prussian minister 
 also threw out an ominous hint of the kind of settlement his 
 master had in mind, when in a lively discussion (on the 14th) he 
 declared that the King must have his acquisition in Poland, no 
 matter how other affairs turned out, and that he could not leave 
 it dependent on the uncertain course of future events. In other 
 words, the King meant to make sure of his indemnity at once, 
 although, in view of the disastrous turn of the war, the realization 
 of the Exchange seemed still very far in the future. The prin- 
 ciple, hitherto accepted on both sides, that the respective indem- 
 nities must proceed pari passu, was in danger of being repudiated. 
 Spielmann did his best to combat so insidious an idea; but 
 Haugwitz maintained that his own personal standing depended 
 on the realization of his master's wishes. 2 It was the beginning of 
 a decisive turn in Prussian policy. 
 
 Nevertheless, after long cogitation, Spielmann determined to 
 go ahead even without instructions, and to make such arrange- 
 ments as were, on the one hand, required by the dangerous posi- 
 tion of affairs, and would, on the other hand, satisfy the desires of 
 Frederick William. He recognized clearly that the continuation 
 of the war was far more indispensable to Austrian than to Prus- 
 sian interests; the King was eager at present to make a second 
 
 1 Spielmann to Cobenzl, October 15, Vivenot, ii, pp. 272-277. 
 
 2 Spielmann to Cobenzl, October 15.
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 35 I 
 
 campaign; but if Austria showed any disinclination to it, or to 
 settling the indemnity affair at once, it was only too greatly to be 
 feared that his good dispositions would grow cold, and that he 
 would retire from the war altogether. No doubt the Jacobins 
 would build him 'bridges of gold'; and in the loss of the Austrian 
 Netherlands, Prussian statesmen might find a sufficient gain for 
 themselves, even if they got nothing in Poland. 1 With these 
 reflections in mind, Spielmann drew up a plan for an agreement 
 about the indemnities, in which he advanced for his own Court 
 those none too modest claims to which Haugwitz had already lent 
 so willing an ear, while he added certain stipulations adapted to 
 the altered circumstances and to the wishes of the King of Prussia. 
 Though it was destined to an early grave, this plan is too remark- 
 able to be passed over without some description. 
 
 Frederick William desired to make a second campaign; Spiel- 
 mann had no definite orders on that point, but he knew that the 
 interests of his Court imperatively demanded it: hence the first 
 article of the proposed agreement provided that the two Powers 
 should make a second campaign with forces as large as had been 
 employed in the present; that neither should consent to a truce 
 or a negotiation without the consent of the other; and that both 
 should endeavor to induce England, Russia, and the Germanic 
 Empire to join actively in the war. The struggle was to be con- 
 tinued in common until monarchical government had been 
 restored in France, or until the spread of revolutionary principles 
 had been sufficiently and permanently checked. The King of 
 Prussia would thus find his first wish gratified, and himself nicely 
 bound, too, if he consented to all this. Frederick William also 
 desired to occupy his Polish acquisition at once, without leaving 
 it to the uncertain chances of war. Spielmann was ready to grant 
 this also — on certain conditions. First of all, the Bavarian Ex- 
 change must be ensured immediately. If the King would at once 
 send Haugwitz to win the consent of the Duke of Zweibriicken, 
 while Austria simultaneously began negotiations at Munich; if 
 
 1 These reflections in Spielmann's letter to Cobenzl cited above. At the end of 
 this report he declared that he would later send in the plan by which he had deter- 
 mined to proceed. The plan followed in his next report of November 6.
 
 352 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 a formal treaty was concluded with the Bavarian House (the 
 execution to be deferred till the time of the peace with France) ; 
 if Prussia would guarantee the Exchange against all obstacles 
 from foreign Powers (England and Holland): then Frederick 
 William might proceed to the occupation of his lot in Poland, the 
 territory bounded by the line Cze^stochowa-Rawa-Soldau. But 
 the Austrian ' supplement ' must also be brought under cover. 
 Here Spielmann reverted to the idea approved by the Conference 
 on September 3 and discarded four days later. He proposed that 
 simultaneously with the Prussian occupation in Poland the 
 Emperor should also occupy a district there equivalent to the 
 respective acquisitions of his allies, and should retain this as a 
 guarantee until Bavaria and Alsace-Lorraine as far as the Moselle 
 were in his hands. Thus all contingencies would be provided for, 
 every interest of Austria would be ensured, the King of Prussia's 
 chief desires would be complied with : in short, a basis seemed to 
 have been found on which the two Powers could finally agree. 
 
 When Spielmann presented this plan to Haugwitz, the latter 
 readily acquiesced, as far as his personal opinion was concerned, 
 in all its points save one. He objected to the proposed Austrian 
 occupation in Poland. If the Court of Vienna must join in that 
 banquet, there would not be enough to go round. He agreed, 
 however, to report all to the King; and one would judge from the 
 tone of a letter of that moment that he was by no means dis- 
 inclined to the project. 1 
 
 But immediately afterward events began to play havoc with 
 Spielmann's plan. On leaving Verdun he seems to have thought 
 that the allies would retreat only beyond the River Chiers and 
 would still occupy winter quarters in France. But in fact the 
 retreat from Verdun turned into a rout, the combined forces 
 poured over the frontier in the most sorry plight, French soil was 
 
 1 Spielmann's plan is printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 348-354. The other sources 
 relating to it are the Referendary's report of November 6, and Haugwitz's letters 
 to Schulenburg of October 19 and 27, B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K. The 
 account given in the text differs greatly from those of previous writers, owing 
 to the fact that I have placed this plan in the middle of Spielmann's negotiation, 
 while Sybel put it at the very end, and Heidrich at the very beginning. The ques- 
 tions at issue are discussed in Appendix XV.
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 353 
 
 completely evacuated; and in the meantime the mysterious 
 negotiations of the Prussians with the enemy aroused in Spiel- 
 mann, as in all the Austrians present, the vehement suspicion 
 that there was treachery afoot. Under these circumstances, the 
 Referendary redoubled his efforts to bring Haugwitz to a cate- 
 gorical declaration as to the King's intentions, but he can scarcely 
 have concealed from himself the fact that the fateful turn of 
 events allowed little chance of success to the plan he had pre- 
 sented only a few days before. 1 
 
 II 
 
 Frederick William, for more than one reason, was angry with 
 the Austrians. The common disasters had not failed to bring 
 forth dissensions among the allies; and the refusal of the Im- 
 perial general Hohenlohe (Kirchberg) to defend Longwy, fol- 
 lowed by his precipitate retreat into Belgium, had capped the 
 climax. 2 The few supporters of the Austrian system had fallen 
 from favor. Schulenburg, who, patriot as he was, had meant to 
 deal loyally with the Court of Vienna, had returned to Berlin 
 discredited and disillusioned. Bischoffwerder was in semi-dis- 
 grace and entirely without influence on foreign policy. Of the 
 men who now enjoyed the most credit, the royal adjutant Man- 
 stein — the sometime friend and present rival of Bischoffwerder 
 — and Lucchesini, who had been called to the army to direct the 
 anticipated negotiations with France, were united in the desire 
 for peace and for the dissolution of the Austrian alliance. Haug- 
 witz, though unsteady and pliable, had formerly inclined to much 
 the same principles, and now under Lucchesini's influence re- 
 turned to them. It was Lucchesini who strove most effectually 
 to dampen the King's ardor for the war, persuaded him out of 
 proposing an ' offensive league ' to the Court of Vienna, and 
 continually urged upon him the necessity above all things of 
 
 1 Cf. his report of November 6, Vivenot, ii, p. 338. 
 
 2 Cf. Frederick William's outburst to Bischoffwerder after this incident: " Voila 
 
 les f alli6s que vous m'avez donneV, je suis pres de rompre avec eux," and 
 
 his complaints to Nassau, Feuillet de Conches, Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette el 
 Madame Elisabeth, vi, pp. 367 f., 372 ff., 392-396.
 
 354 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 attending to his indemnity. 1 It was Lucchesini, apparently, who 
 originated the plan embodied in the Note of Merle. 
 
 This plan was, substantially, to take advantage of the disas- 
 trous campaign, the danger threatening the Austrian Nether- 
 lands, the peril menacing the Empire itself, to demand an 
 immediate acquisition in Poland as the price of continuing the 
 war. Austria's necessity must be Prussia's opportunity. The 
 settlement of the indemnity question had been so long delayed 
 and had been so much obstructed by the pretensions of the 
 Imperial Court, that the chance was not to be lost to use the lever 
 thrust into Prussian hands. There could be no doubt that 
 Austria stood greatly in need of further assistance, and that, as 
 far as the French were concerned, Frederick William was free to 
 / withdraw from the contest whenever he pleased. It was, indeed, 
 true that according to the spirit of their original engagements, 
 neither of the allied Powers had the right to withdraw without the 
 other. As late as October 15 that principle was plaintively 
 reasserted by the Prussians themselves, when they feared for a 
 moment that Austria might be on the point of backing out of the 
 contest and leaving them in the lurch. On that date the ministers 
 at Berlin wrote to Lucchesini that since the two Powers had 
 undertaken this enterprise at their common expense, in the same 
 spirit and for the same aim, there could be no question of the one 
 abandoning the other; the struggle must necessarily be pursued 
 with united efforts until both Courts could simultaneously make 
 an honorable peace. Neither the ministers at Berlin nor Haug- 
 witz seem at first to have perceived the opportunity created by 
 the new situation. It may be doubted whether even Lucchesini 
 would have ventured to recommend taking so high a tone despite 
 all previous engagements, if he had expected to meet with the 
 united opposition of the Imperial Courts. But just at this 
 moment he felt fairly sure of encountering no obstacles from 
 Russia. 
 
 Goltz had recently reported, in a tone of assurance quite un- 
 common with him, that the Russian ministers showed the best of 
 
 1 Lucchesini to Finckenstein, Schulenburg, and Alvensleben, October 15, 23-26, 
 B. A., R. 92, Lucchesinis Nachlass, No. 14. The papers from this collection are 
 henceforth cited L. N.
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 355 
 
 intentions on the indemnity question, and that he was convinced 
 that the Empress desired a new partition of Poland, provided 
 only that Austria was not allowed to take anything from the 
 Republic. 1 Alopeus had also come to the camp at Consenvoye to 
 present a dispatch from Ostermann, which announced that the 
 Empress was disposed to oblige her allies as soon as she knew 
 their precise plans, and which pressed for a speedy communica- 
 tion of the King's views at St. Petersburg. 2 Such invitations 
 were not to be neglected. They also gave reason to think that 
 the effect of the reply would not be spoiled by a mild threat. 
 
 Frederick William made haste, then, to respond with a letter to 
 the Empress (written from Longuyon, October 17), in which he 
 referred to the definite and detailed communications which Goltz 
 was charged to make, and intimated politely but clearly that he 
 could not decide to undertake a second campaign until assured of 
 his indemnities not only for the expenses of the past, but for those 
 to be incurred in the future. 
 
 It remained to deal with Austria. From that Power little good 
 will was to be expected, but — thanks to Brunswick's generalship 
 — Prussia was in a position to dictate her terms. To prepare the 
 Austrians for the blow, the King invited the three ministers, 
 Spielmann, Mercy, and Thugut (the latter two had been sent to 
 conduct the expected negotiations with France) to his head- 
 quarters near the village of Merle (October 24), and after dinner 
 received them in audience in his tent. Though he treated them 
 graciously enough and spoke warmly of his desire to maintain the 
 alliance, he indicated sufficiently clearly the determination that 
 he had reached. At the close he announced that Haugwitz 
 would present his intentions in writing. Spielmann understood 
 what was coming, and already told his friends that he was a lost 
 man. 3 The following evening the Referendary received the 
 promised ' declaration ' from Haugwitz. 
 
 1 Report of September 25, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 2 Ostermann to Alopeus, September 3/14, Alopeus' report of October 8/19, 
 M. A., Ilpyccia, III, 28 and 30. 
 
 3 Lucchesini to the ministers at Berlin, October 26, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14; 
 Spielmann's report of November 6. All sources agree in placing this audience on 
 the 24th of October, and not the 25th as in Sybel, op. cit., ii, p. 360. 
 
 y
 
 356 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 The famous note, dated from Merle, October 25, is hardly a 
 model of clearness and precision, as neither the King nor Haug- 
 witz, who drew up the document, had at that moment a chan- 
 cellery at their disposal. Nevertheless, these few paragraphs, so 
 vague in part, were to be the Law and the Prophets for Prussian 
 ministers in the following year; they were to be held up as the 
 complete exposition of the nature of the King's participation in 
 the war, and as the sole basis and measure of his engagements. 
 
 The note may be divided into two parts. The first related to 
 the theory of Prussia's further participation in the war. The 
 King was ready, it was said, to continue his exertions either as a 
 member of a concert of all the European Powers, or in case the 
 Diet of Ratisbon declared war on France, as a member of the 
 Empire, i. e., with the small quota due from him as a Reichs- 
 stand. The first case was obviously unthinkable; and the aid 
 promised in the second would clearly be inacceptable to Austria. 
 These offers were, then, only phrases, intended to lead up to the 
 third case. If the Emperor, the note went on, saw fit to con- 
 tinue the war with all his forces, even if some or all of the other 
 Powers refused to join with him, the King agreed to assist him in 
 the next campaign with the same forces as had been employed 
 in the present one — under one condition. That is to say, all of 
 the previous engagements had been swept out of existence; and 
 if the King went on with the war, it would be only in order to aid 
 Austria, and at the price which he was about to name. It was the 
 beginning of the theory that Austria was partie principale et 
 attaquee, and Prussia partie accessoire et auxiliaire, a theory which 
 then became the favorite thesis of the statesmen at Berlin, 
 although it stood in glaring contradiction to the agreements with 
 which the two Courts began the war. 
 
 But now for the condition of Prussia's further cooperation, 
 which formed the principal part of the note. " Since the present 
 campaign," it was said, " has caused so considerable an expense 
 and so great a loss of life, and the continuation of the war must 
 involve a still greater expenditure, His Prussian Majesty feels 
 himself justified in expecting a complete and speedy compensa- 
 tion and indemnity for the expenses already incurred; and before
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 357 
 
 the King takes further part in the continuation of the war, he 
 considers himself bound by his duty to his realm to demand an 
 indemnity for the expenses of the next campaign. He therefore 
 expects that the arrondissement in Poland, with regard to which 
 he has already made overtures to the Emperor, will be assured to 
 him by the Courts of Austria and Russia, and actually taken into 
 his possession." 
 
 All this might have been said more precisely, but the drift was 
 clear. The King must have laid his hands upon his indemnities 
 both for the past and for the future, before he could begin a second 
 campaign. And with that, the whole previous plan for the joint 
 indemnification was thrown overboard. Hitherto both Powers 
 had always recognized the principle of complete parity: the 
 respective indemnities were to be equal ; they were to be gathered 
 in simultaneously; if the one proved impracticable, the other 
 must also be abandoned. Doubtless the King and some of his 
 advisers were still sincerely willing to help Austria to the acquisi- 
 tion of Bavaria; but the Exchange was obviously impossible at 
 that moment, and not to be realized for a long time to come; and 
 at all events Prussia meant to have her booty at once, whether 
 Austria ever got anything or not. That was the beginning of the 
 thesis that if the Court of Vienna had any titles to an indemnity 
 at all, they were not to be placed on the same line with those of 
 Prussia. The latter were absolutely independent of, and infinitely 
 more valid than, the Austrian claims. That was the crowning 
 blow to the theory of a common enterprise. It was also the ruin 
 of an alliance, the primary basis of which was complete equality 
 in all advantages. 
 
 But if the rights were mostly in favor of the Austrians, the facts 
 were all on the side of Prussia. Whatever the aims and nature of 
 the war had been originally, in view of the recent events the 
 allied Powers could no longer have any other object than to repel 
 the victorious Revolutionary armies and to exact such ven- 
 geance as they were able. In this the interests of Austria were 
 very much more at stake than were those of Prussia. And if the 
 altered nature of the war lent some color to the new Prussian 
 theory, the King's demand with regard to Poland was also not
 
 358 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 without justification in the circumstances of the moment. The 
 Empress could not long defer settling Polish affairs in one way or 
 another; she seemed strongly inclined to a partition at present; 
 but it was to be doubted whether her good dispositions would 
 last, if the King long delayed the matter. There was reason for 
 haste then, and an admirable opportunity, if seized in time. To 
 ask the Prussian statesmen to relinquish or to postpone a hand- 
 some acquisition that seemed within their reach at that moment, 
 simply out of regard for a jealous ally or out of respect for pre- 
 vious engagements, would be to expect a self-denial and a loyalty 
 not very common in history. 1 
 
 Ill 
 
 Spielmann was filled with indignation and dismay by the Prus- 
 sian declaration. Taken together with the slack conduct of the 
 recent campaign and the suspicious negotiations with the enemy, 
 it seemed to him to indicate a deep-laid design to " put the knife 
 to the throat of Austria." In two days of heated discussions with 
 Haugwitz, he endeavored to prove that the principles of the note 
 violated all those invariably agreed upon between the two Courts, 
 and ran contrary to all loyalty, fairness, and justice. But irrefut- 
 able arguments were powerless against Haugwitz, who had facts 
 on his side. After weighing the situation carefully with Mercy, 
 Spielmann decided to make the best of it, not insisting too 
 strenuously on the old principles, but rather trying to drive a new 
 bargain on the basis of the Prussian note. 
 
 The Referendary now directed his main efforts towards making 
 sure of the King's earnest cooperation in effecting the Exchange. 
 On that point Haugwitz was satisfactory enough. He gave the 
 most solemn assurances that his sovereign was, and would 
 remain, sincerely disposed to further the Exchange to the best of 
 his ability; he would gladly employ his good offices with the 
 Duke of Zweibriicken; he would even guarantee the realization 
 of the project against all hindrances whatsoever. But as it was 
 
 1 The Note of Merle is printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 292 f. On it cf. Sybel, 
 op. cit., ii, pp. 359 ff.; Sorel, op. cit., iii, pp. 128 f.; Hausser, op. ciL, i, pp. 398 ff., 
 435 ff.; Heidrich, op. cit., pp. 397-402.
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 359 
 
 clear that not only the Exchange itself, but even the negotiation 
 with the Bavarian House, must still be postponed for an indefinite 
 period, Spielmann again proposed the plan for an interimistic 
 Austrian occupation in Poland, the district in question to be 
 restored to the Republic in case the acquisition of Bavaria and 
 of a suitable ' supplement ' should later be effected. On this 
 point, too, Haugwitz seems to have shown himself complaisant; 
 at least Spielmann reported that on this occasion the Prus- 
 sian minister made no objection to the idea, but asked only to 
 know definitely what acquisitions Austria desired to make in that 
 quarter. 1 
 
 The matter seemed so important, however, that in order to get 
 the minister's utterances confirmed, Spielmann sought and 
 obtained through Bischoffwerder an audience with the King 
 (October 2 7) . Frederick William approved all that Haugwitz had 
 said. In a tone which must, as Spielmann reported, inspire 
 nothing but confidence, if such a thing as good faith existed in the 
 world, the King expressed his readiness to guarantee the Ex- 
 change and to negotiate at Zweibriicken, and even added the 
 suggestion that in view of the provoking conduct of the Elector 
 of Bavaria, they might in his case adopt a tone other than that of 
 mere persuasion. Spielmann encountered some opposition at 
 first on the subject of the Austrian occupation in Poland, but 
 believed that in the end he had succeeded in winning the King's 
 
 1 Spielmann's report of November 6, Vivenot, ii, p. 346. Heidrich holds {op. 
 cit., p. 405, note 2) that Spielmann's statement here is not accurate, and that 
 he was confusing his conversation with Haugwitz with the assurances given him 
 immediately afterward by the King. This view Heidrich bases on Haugwitz's 
 declaration (in a letter to Schulenburg of October 27) that he had rejected the 
 proposition about an Austrian acquisition in Poland. I think it deserves to be 
 pointed out, however, that in the letter to Schulenburg Haugwitz was referring to a 
 previous discussion of this question with Spielmann on the occasion of the ' mem- 
 oire ' presented to him by the Referendary about a week before the Note of Merle. 
 Spielmann readily admits that on that occasion Haugwitz had opposed the idea, 
 but states positively that he did not raise the slightest objection on the later occa- 
 sion. It is quite possible that Haugwitz, who was now doing his best to sweeten 
 the bitter taste of the Note of Merle, showed himself this time more compliant on 
 the subject. At any rate, since his statement does not refer to the later conversa- 
 tion, and Spielmann's does, I should prefer to trust the latter, quite apart from the 
 question of the comparative veracity of the two men.
 
 360 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 consent. It is not surprising, then, that on leaving Frederick 
 William he declared to Bischoffwerder that the audience had 
 revived all his hopes and cured all his sorrows. 1 The Note of 
 Merle would indeed lose its terrors, if Austria were assured of 
 the Prussian guarantee of the Exchange, the King's good offices at 
 Zweibriicken, and a real security besides in the shape of a Polish 
 province. 
 
 It remained to hear the verdict of Vienna. Haugwitz was 
 destined to return temporarily to his old post, in order to receive 
 the reply to the Note of Merle, and to make sure of the Austrian 
 consent to an immediate Prussian occupation in Poland. On 
 October 30 he left Luxemburg on the road to Cologne, and some 
 hours later Spielmann followed. 
 
 On arriving in that city the two had further discussions. 
 Spielmann's attention seems to have been called by Reuss to a 
 new plan of a bold and promising character. The King of Prussia 
 and the Duke of Brunswick had suggested that if the Elector of 
 Bavaria continued his more than equivocal relations with the 
 French, the Imperial Court should adopt violent measures against 
 him. The Lower Palatinate and the fortress of Mannheim were 
 too important to be left in danger of falling into hostile hands. 2 
 Spielmann was favorably impressed with the idea. The Elector's 
 sins and shortcomings might furnish the Emperor with an admir- 
 able excuse for putting himself in possession of Bavaria at once. 3 
 Haugwitz was straightway approached on the subject, and 
 hurried back to Coblenz, where the King had now arrived, to take 
 his orders. Apart from the military grounds, Frederick William 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the ministers at Berlin, December 14, B. A., R. 96, L. N. 14. 
 
 2 Reuss' report of November 6, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, 1792. On the Elector's 
 conduct in this connection, see Schrepfer, Pfalzbayerns Politik im Revolutions- 
 zeitalter, pp. 50 ff . 
 
 3 Reuss does not expressly say that he suggested the idea to Spielmann, but on 
 the one hand he was very ardent for the project and brings it up continually in his 
 reports of November; and on the other hand Haugwitz refers to it as a proposition 
 brought forward by Reuss (Report of December 1, B. A., R. 1, 170). The ministers 
 at Berlin replied (December 6) that they understood that Spielmann originated 
 this idea (and Heidrich, op. cit., p. 407, note 3 accepts their opinion); but it seems 
 that Haugwitz, who was on the spot, was likely to be better informed than they 
 were.
 
 THE NOTE OF MERLE 36 1 
 
 now had another motive for approving the idea. The latest news 
 from St. Petersburg was by no means so favorable as the Prussians 
 had hoped for. It began to appear that Austrian aid might be 
 required in order to induce the Empress to agree to the partition. 
 Hence the King decided to allow the Court of Vienna to occupy 
 Bavaria, but only after the united efforts of the Prussian and 
 Austrian envoys had extorted the Russian consent to the imme- 
 diate entry of the Prussian troops into Poland. 1 A new demand 
 was thus made upon Austria over and above those contained in 
 the Note of Merle; but this was little compared to the flattering 
 prospect offered to the Imperial Court of taking possession of its 
 indemnity at the same time that the Prussians occupied theirs, of 
 finally getting this long-sought and so elusive Bavaria into its 
 grasp. Spielmann might well congratulate himself upon the last 
 phase of his negotiation. He had almost wrung victory from 
 defeat. But his new plans and expedients had still to be sub- 
 mitted to the timorous, querulous, rancorous, quarrelsome 
 gentlemen of the State Conference. On November 25 he and 
 Haugwitz arrived in Vienna. 
 
 1 Lucchesini's report to the King, November 8, the cabinet ministry to Haug- 
 witz, November 20, and to Goltz, November 17, B. A., R. 92, L.N. 12; R. 1, 170; 
 and R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 Haugwitz's Final Negotiation at Vienna 
 
 The first effect produced at the Austrian capital by the disasters 
 of the campaign had been an outburst of exasperation and indig- 
 nation against the Prussians. The sober second thought was that 
 the war must be continued with all the strength the Monarchy 
 possessed, and that Frederick William's aid was indispensable. 
 Before the end of October preparations were begun for placing the 
 entire army on a war footing and for hurrying fresh troops to 
 the defence of the Netherlands. At the beginning of November, 
 the Prussian resident, Caesar, was able to give positive assur- 
 ance that his master was firmly resolved to pursue the common 
 enterprise in complete accord with the Emperor. 1 The battle of 
 Jemappes and the loss of all the Belgian provinces save Luxem- 
 burg did not diminish the determination of the Imperial govern- 
 ment to continue the war with redoubled vigor. 
 
 Another result of the recent calamities was to revive the attacks 
 upon the leading ministers, and especially upon Spielmann. 2 
 The opposition in the Conference would gladly have seen the 
 whole Bavarian-Polish project at last abandoned. When, in reply 
 to Spielmann's report of October 15, Cobenzl prepared new in- 
 structions authorizing the Referendary to continue the indemnity 
 negotiation in spite of the changed circumstances, Lacy, Rosen- 
 berg, and Colloredo persuaded the Emperor to have the instruc- 
 tions altered to the effect that for the present the two Powers 
 must occupy themselves with nothing save the vigorous prosecu- 
 tion of the war. One can easily imagine the effect on the Prussians 
 
 1 Caesar's report of November 3. This unconditional declaration was au- 
 thorized by the ministry at Berlin when they were still ignorant of the Note of 
 Merle and feared that Austria might desert the common cause (rescript of October 
 26, B. A., R. 1, 170). 
 
 2 Zinzendorf's Diary, October 13 and 27 (V. A.); Caesar's reports of October 
 17, November 7 and 10, B. A., R. 1, 170. 
 
 362
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 363 
 
 had Spielmann attempted to carry out these orders, had he 
 insisted that the indemnity question should be postponed 
 indefinitely. For once, however, the Emperor's vacillation served 
 to good purpose. When Cobenzl, after sending off the revised 
 instructions, took the liberty to remonstrate against their import, 
 his sovereign protested that neither he nor the Conference 
 ministers had meant that the indemnity negotiation must be 
 abandoned: the Vice-Chancellor was told that he had simply 
 misunderstood. Hence a second courier was sent flying after the 
 first, with dispatches authorizing Spielmann to go on with the 
 negotiation. It was a pitiful spectacle, this comedy between 
 the Emperor and the Vice-Chancellor; but nothing came of it 
 save perhaps a weakening of Cobenzl's personal credit. 1 
 
 The Note of Merle reached Vienna only on November 20, at a 
 moment when the news from Belgium was of the very worst. 
 Serious resistance to the Prussian demands was therefore hardly 
 to be thought of, and, after all, those demands were not so terrify- 
 
 1 Cobenzl's first draft of the instructions to Spielmann, October 26, Vivenot, 
 ii> PP- 3 00 ~3°9> the Emperor to Cobenzl and Lacy, October 29, Cobenzl to the 
 Emperor the same day, Vortrag of October 30, and the revised instructions, 
 ibid., pp. 313-321; Cobenzl to the Emperor, November 1, the Imperial reply of 
 November 3, Cobenzl's answer of the same day, the new instructions to Spiel- 
 mann of November 5, ibid., pp. 323, 337 f. There is in the Vienna Archive another 
 note of the Emperor to Cobenzl, of October 29, which is much sharper in tone than 
 those printed in Vivenot (Vortrage, 1792). Caesar reported, November 7, that 
 Cobenzl's influence had recently been impaired, and that he had been exposed for 
 a moment to his sovereign's displeasure, B. A., R. 1, 170. 
 
 I think there can be no question that the Vice-Chancellor had rightly understood 
 the vota of the Conference ministers; and the Emperor, in approving the instruc- 
 tions of October 30, had certainly sanctioned the alterations that Cobenzl had 
 accordingly made. The explanation vouchsafed the Vice-Chancellor four days later 
 was, therefore, only an awkward attempt to conceal the Emperor's hopeless vacil- 
 lation. Cf. Sybel's severe but very fitting judgment, op. cit., ii, pp. 357 f. 
 
 Sybel is wrong, however, in representing Lacy and associates as putting through 
 their opinion at a meeting of the Conference. Caesar does, indeed, report such a 
 meeting (November 3 and 7), but he was probably mistaken; for the Austrian 
 records speak only of the instructions to Spielmann being put into ' ministerial 
 circulation,' i. e., sent around to the various ministers to receive their written 
 comments. Quite in accordance with this, there is no mention of a protocol, but 
 only of the several ' vota.' Several weeks before, Colloredo had obtained an order 
 from the Emperor that all important correspondence with ministers abroad should 
 regularly be put in circulation in this way. (Colloredo to Cobenzl, October 15, 
 V. A., Frankreich, F. 261.)
 
 364 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 ing. The Note of Merle was not extremely precise. While the 
 King had demanded to be assured of his indemnity at once, he had 
 not specified the exact form of assurance required. One could 
 distinguish between a mere occupation and a formal annexation. 
 The latter operation could hardly follow immediately upon the 
 former, as it would take some time to prepare the stage in Poland 
 for the last great act. Meanwhile the details of the indemnity 
 arrangements would have to be discussed at length between all 
 three of the participating Powers, and embodied in a formal 
 treaty. It seemed probable, therefore, that the final settlement 
 of the affair would suffer not a little delay, and meanwhile Austria 
 might find means and opportunities to provide for her own inter- 
 ests. The essential thing was to satisfy the King of Prussia at the 
 lowest possible price, to be outwardly all good will, and to make 
 the most of his ardor for the war. 
 
 It is probable that Spielmann brought back with him the con- 
 viction that however much Frederick William desired his acqui- 
 sition in Poland, he was even more eager to make a second 
 campaign. 1 The King's conduct lent some color to that idea; 
 for without waiting for the reply to the Note of Merle, he ordered 
 fresh troops to the Rhine, and pressed Reuss for the sending of an 
 Austrian general with full powers to settle the plan for the next 
 campaign — to the lively chagrin of his ministers. 2 The Aus- 
 trians were tempted to surmise that Frederick William would not 
 stand firmly by the principles of the note, but would allow himself 
 to be put off with half-concessions. Hence the interminable de- 
 lays of the Imperial cabinet in December, the conditional and 
 ambiguous acquiescence in the Prussian designs on Poland, the 
 show of confidence and complaisance in other matters, and the 
 attempt to inveigle the King into committing himself at once to 
 the continuation of the war. 3 It is highly characteristic of the 
 
 1 Lucchesini wrote to the ministers at Berlin (December 14) that he knew Spiel- 
 mann had that belief when he left Luxemburg. B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 2 The ministers at Berlin to Lucchesini, November 14, the latter's reply, 
 December 14, the King to Haugwitz, December 13, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14 and R. 96, 
 155 E. Reuss' dispatches of November and December were full of assurances of 
 the King's lively desire to take the field again in the following year. 
 
 3 Cobenzl to Reuss, December 4, 10, 18, Francis II to Frederick William, 
 December 17, Vivenot, ii, pp. 387 f., 398 ff.
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 365 
 
 reign of Frederick William II that the Powers who had to deal 
 with him continually reckoned that his generosity, his enthu- 
 siasms, or his feebleness would prevail over the less altruistic 
 counsels of his ministers — a calculation that was sometimes 
 justified, but very often proved fallacious. 
 
 Another circumstance that essentially influenced Austrian 
 policy at this time was the fact that since the French conquest of 
 Belgium, England suddenly manifested a disposition to take a 
 hand in Continental affairs. Whether the British government 
 wished only to mediate peace or was seriously minded to join in 
 the war, was still uncertain; but in either case its intervention 
 could not be unwelcome to Austria. Towards the end of Novem- 
 ber, Pitt had addressed inquiries to the Courts of Vienna and 
 Berlin regarding the plans for indemnities which those Powers 
 were known to be pursuing. The question aroused only suspicion 
 and ill humor in the Prussian ministry, who could not doubt 
 Pitt's opposition to a new partition of Poland; but it was favor- 
 ably received by the Imperial cabinet, which hoped to win the 
 consent of the British government to the Exchange, and regarded 
 that consent as indispensable to the realization of that plan. 
 Possibly, too, they may have counted on England to delay the 
 Prussian occupation in Poland, although there is no clear proof 
 of this in the Austrian records. At any rate, the new activity of 
 England was, from the Austrian standpoint, the most hopeful 
 sign in a generally dismal situation. 
 
 II 
 
 The policy which the Imperial Court was to pursue for the 
 next few months, was marked out at the meetings of the State 
 Conference on November 29 and 30. It was the unanimous 
 opinion of that body that peace, although desirable, was almost 
 unattainable, and therefore that every effort must be made both 
 to conduct the next campaign with vigor and to gain the assist- 
 ance of Prussia, Russia, and England. With regard to the indem- 
 nity question, it was decided to give the King of Prussia all 
 assurances of the Emperor's willingness to cooperate both at St.
 
 366 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Petersburg and in Poland in order to secure him his acquisition, 
 but to intimate that its size could be fixed only by the concert to 
 be established with Russia. The principle that the respective 
 acquisitions were to be made at the same time could no longer be 
 upheld, for it was clear that not only the Exchange itself, but even 
 the negotiation with the Bavarian House, would have to be post- 
 poned for an indefinite period; but meanwhile every precaution 
 must be taken to ensure the ultimate acquisition of an indemnity 
 somewhere. To that end the Conference resolved to demand that 
 the other two Powers should either consent to a temporary Aus- 
 trian occupation in Poland, or else formally guarantee the 
 realization of the Exchange. In offering these alternatives, the 
 Imperial ministers were well aware of the aversion of their allies 
 to seeing the Austrian troops enter the Republic. If the Court of 
 Vienna occupied a district in Poland, even if only temporarily, 
 the shares of the other Powers would have to be cut down pro- 
 portionately. The Austrians themselves had no real desire to 
 take such a step, which would involve them in the odium of the 
 partition and would require a considerable military force. They 
 imagined, however, that the threat of such an occupation would 
 render their allies much more willing to accept the second alterna- 
 tive, the formal guarantee of the Exchange. Neither proposal, it 
 must be confessed, does great credit to the insight of the Viennese 
 statesmen. The demand to be allowed to occupy a district in 
 Poland could only irritate both Prussia and Russia. The idea of 
 a guarantee of the realization of the Exchange was not a little 
 difficult to fathom, for how could the other two Powers guarantee 
 an arrangement which admittedly depended on the voluntary 
 consent of the parties directly interested ? To find any sense in it 
 at all, one is driven to conjecture that the proposal meant a 
 guarantee of the acquisition either of Bavaria or of an equivalent. 
 One means there was by which the Imperial Court might have 
 entered into possession of its indemnity at the same time as its 
 allies : this was to adopt Spielmann's and Reuss' plan of seizing 
 Bavaria under pretext of punishing the Elector for his unpatriotic 
 and disloyal conduct. It is impossible to say whether this plan 
 was discussed at the conferences of November 29 and 30, but at
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 367 
 
 ^iny rate there is no mention of it in the protocol. Apparently the 
 Emperor and his advisers could not make up their minds to so 
 drastic and ruthless a measure. The Austrians did not lack 
 appetite, but they had not the bold unscrupulousness that was 
 necessary in order to keep pace with such Powers as Russia and 
 Prussia. 
 
 The second main point resolved upon in the Conference was to 
 answer England in a friendly but cautious manner, and especially 
 to confide the plan for the Exchange. It was decided to consult 
 Prussia about this reply and to suggest that she should make a 
 similar communication at London regarding her ambitions in 
 Poland; but even if the Court of Berlin refused to take such a 
 step, the majority of the Conference held that Austria should 
 take England into the secret with respect to her own hopes for an 
 indemnity. Finally, the Court of St. Petersburg was to be fully 
 informed of the negotiations with England and Prussia, and to 
 be begged to do its utmost for the interests of its hard-pressed 
 and ' most intimate ' ally. 1 
 
 After the conferences of November 29 and 30, almost two weeks 
 elapsed before the answer to the Note of Merle was ready. 
 Haugwitz urged and stormed; Razumovski added his exhorta- 
 tions; but the Austrians were not to be hurried. Nothing was 
 effected by this delay except that the Prussians were irritated, 
 and the Empress of Russia lost all patience waiting for the long 
 promised courier from Vienna. The answer, approved by the 
 Conference on December 6, was at last presented to Haugwitz 
 on the nth. In accordance with the decisions just described, 
 this note recognized the justice of the Prussian demand for an 
 acquisition in Poland, and promised Austrian support for it at 
 St. Petersburg; it referred to the principle invariably agreed upon 
 between the two Courts, of complete equality in the respective 
 indemnities, and expressed the confident hope that the King 
 would cooperate in the realization of the Exchange; finally, it 
 requested either consent to an Austrian occupation in Poland or a 
 guarantee of the Exchange by Prussia and Russia. The most 
 salient feature of the reply was the fact that while the Note of 
 
 1 Conference protocol and Separat-voten, Vivenot, ii, pp. 377-382.
 
 3 68 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Merle was answered article by article, its last clause, which con- 
 tained the demand that Austria should consent to the King's 
 immediate occupation of his prospective acquisition, was passed 
 over without a word. 1 
 
 The impression produced on the Prussians was unfortunate in 
 the extreme; the more so because Reuss had previously been 
 ordered to announce that the reply would be entirely satisfac- 
 tory. 2 Lucchesini and the ministers at Berlin vied with each 
 other in expressing their feelings of horror and revolt at such dis- 
 loyal conduct. Their indignation was especially aroused by 
 " the abominable snare " (cheville), that lurked behind the prop- 
 osition about an Austrian occupation in Poland. That insidious 
 demand, combined with the Court of Vienna's desire to take 
 England into the secret of the indemnity plan, seemed to an- 
 nounce the design of thwarting the partition entirely. Either 
 proposition might furnish the Empress with a sufficient excuse, if 
 she wanted one, for throwing over the whole project. There was 
 only one means of staving off such a disaster : the King must hold 
 inflexibly to the terms of the Note of Merle, and force both 
 Imperial Courts to recognize that not a single Prussian soldier 
 would take the field until the Prussian demands were granted. 3 
 These conditions and stipulations to safeguard the Austrian 
 indemnities were not to be thought of. The Prussian ministers 
 quite realized the embarrassment of their allies; they observed 
 with grim satisfaction that the recovery of Belgium was hardly 
 probable, and the consent of the Bavarian House to the Exchange 
 still less so; but the Austrians must recognize that their salvation 
 depended on the continuation of aid from Prussia, and must con- 
 tent themselves with such indemnities as " events would permit 
 them to obtain." 4 Doubtless these would not be very extensive, 
 if the Prussian ministers had their way. But whatever hap- 
 
 1 This note is printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 293 ff. The date should be December 9. 
 
 2 Cobenzl to Reuss, December 4? ibid., ii, pp. 387 f. 
 
 3 The ministers at Berlin to Lucchesini, December 17 and 19, to Haugwitz 
 the 17th, to the King the 19th, Lucchesini to the ministers, December 17, B. A., 
 R. 92, L. N. 14; R. 96, 147 G; R. 1, 170. 
 
 4 The cabinet ministry to Haugwitz, December 17, and to the King, December 
 19, B. A., R. 1, 170, and R. 96, 147 G.
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 369 
 
 pened, the Austrians must make no indiscreet pretensions that 
 would interfere with the plans of their allies. 
 
 Though apparently not so much incensed as his colleagues, 
 Haugwitz found the Austrian note quite insufficient. He could 
 not be "reassured," he told Cobenzl and Spielmann, until he had 
 seen absolutely satisfactory instructions sent off at once to the 
 Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg. The Imperial ministers 
 promised and procrastinated. The delay in this case was, indeed, 
 more intelligible, for the ' expeditions ' in preparation for London 
 and St. Petersburg were extremely voluminous, and had, besides, 
 to be sent the rounds of the Conference. Haugwitz, however, 
 grew impatient and suspicious. He later declared that at this 
 time he abandoned the ordinary tone of a diplomat for that of a 
 minister who announces the peremptory will of his master. 1 His 
 reports picture him relentlessly beating down the resistance of the 
 Austrians, ordering and disposing in sovereign fashion; and yet 
 later events were to prove this negotiation such a medley of 
 misunderstandings that one is driven to doubt whether Haug- 
 witz's language was quite so peremptory and unequivocal as he 
 himself made out. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The ' expedition ' to London is the first case in point. Cobenzl 
 had drawn up a long ostensible dispatch to Stadion (the Austrian 
 ambassador to the Court of St. James), explaining the aims of the 
 allied Powers in the war against France, and several postscripts 
 in which the Exchange plan was set forth at length with some 
 allusions to the Russian and Prussian designs on Poland. 2 Sta- 
 dion was expressly ordered, however, to omit all reference to the 
 last-named subject in case his Prussian colleague, Jacobi, was not 
 instructed to make similar communications. 3 Haugwitz's atti- 
 tude on this occasion is far from clear. In his own dispatches he 
 
 1 Report to the King, May 6, 1793, B. A., R. 96, 147 H. 
 
 2 The dispatches to Stadion of December 22 are printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 406- 
 425. 
 
 3 Vivenot, ii, p. 423. This fact deserves to be mentioned the more, because the 
 Austrian government has often been charged with insidiously betraying the plans 
 of its allies — a reproach that is hardly justified.
 
 370 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 claimed to have protested against making any confidences to 
 England at present with regard to the indemnity plans; but, on 
 the other hand, Cobenzl reported to the Emperor that the Prus- 
 sian envoy had not only failed to raise the slightest objection to 
 these dispatches, but had declared that his own Court could not 
 do better than to give Jacobi entirely analogous instructions, and 
 that he meant to send off a courier to Berlin to bring this about. 1 
 The contradiction is flat and glaring. 
 
 The same phenomenon appears in the case of the instructions 
 to Louis Cobenzl. The Vice-Chancellor had prepared several 
 ostensible dispatches to his cousin intended to satisfy Haugwitz. 
 In one of these it was said that the Emperor earnestly wished and 
 begged that the Empress of Russia would at once " enter into a 
 concert " for arranging and carrying out the proposed partition of 
 Poland and the " prise de possession eventuelle " so much desired 
 by the King of Prussia; and hence that she would specify the 
 acquisitions that might be found suitable for her Empire. For 
 the security of the Austrian indemnities the same demands were 
 advanced as in the reply to Prussia: namely, that the Emperor 
 must be allowed to occupy a district in Poland unless before the 
 effectuation of the Prussian acquisition his two allies had found 
 means to assure the realization of the Exchange. He would con- 
 sider such security as existing if the Empress and the King of 
 Prussia would undertake the guarantee of the Exchange; and 
 in this case he would claim nothing in Poland, even if he found 
 himself unable to obtain a ' supplement ' elsewhere. If the Ex- 
 change proved impossible, however, he would have no alternative 
 but to seek his indemnity at the expense of the Republic along 
 with his allies. 
 
 With all these conditions, the ostensible dispatches still com- 
 plied to some extent with the wishes of Prussia. But the Austrian 
 ministry could not resist the temptation to try to diminish the 
 evil by a subterfuge that was neither honorable nor dexterous nor 
 
 1 Haugwitz's reports of December 18 and 21, B. A., R. 1, 170; Cobenzl to the 
 Emperor, December 21, V. A., Vortrage, 1792, and a similar statement in the 
 2d P. S. to Stadion (Vivenot, ii, p. 423) and in the dispatch to Reuss of December 
 30 {ibid., ii, p. 448).
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 371 
 
 effective. It is probable that they did not need to have the idea 
 suggested to them, but they may well have been encouraged in it 
 -by one of Louis CobenzPs recent reports. In the latter part of 
 -November, when Frederick William's exploits in Champagne were 
 still exciting lively ill humor at St. Petersburg, the Russian min- 
 isters had spoken with irritation of the size of the Prussian de- 
 mands in Poland, paraded their own devotion to the interests of 
 Austria, and suggested that if the partition took place at all, its 
 execution at least ought to be delayed for some time. 1 This fitted 
 in admirably with the wishes of the Austrian ministry. Accord- 
 ingly, alongside the dispatches shown to Haugwitz, the Vice- 
 Chancellor prepared a secret instruction for Louis Cobenzl, in 
 which he declared that the Imperial Court had never consented 
 to the present exorbitant territorial demands of Prussia; that it 
 was not, however, in a position to contest them openly; but that 
 it relied upon Russia to cut down the Prussian lot in accordance 
 with the principle proclaimed by Zubov himself, 2 that Poland 
 must remain large enough to form a real buffer state. Doubtless 
 it would be the most desirable solution, the dispatch continued, 
 if the three Powers, while resolving upon the partition now, 
 should postpone its execution. But in view of the impatience 
 and importunities of Prussia, the Court of Vienna felt obliged to 
 propose that the two German Powers should simultaneously 
 occupy equivalent districts in Poland, under the pretext of 
 maintaining order or repressing Counter-confederations. The 
 Empress was begged, however, to assume the responsibility of 
 inducing the Prussians to defer a formal annexation until a more 
 convenient time, when, as it was hoped at Vienna, the Bavarian 
 Exchange might also be effected. Finally, the Vice-Chancellor 
 added the urgent entreaty that Russia should consent to the 
 Prussian aggrandizement only under the double condition that 
 the King should continue the war with all vigor, and that the Ex- 
 change should be assured at once and realized as soon as peace 
 was made. The Austrian government thus entrusted its cause 
 entirely to the merciful protection of the Empress. It appealed 
 
 1 Cobenzl's reports of November 13, 16, 20, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1792. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's report of November 20, V. A., loc. cit.
 
 372 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to her to tame the ally whom it dared not oppose openly. It 
 appointed her arbiter of the whole indemnity question. 1 
 
 When the ostensible dispatches to Louis Cobenzl were com- 
 municated to Haugwitz, the latter found them somewhat more 
 satisfactory than the note of December 9, but he objected to the 
 term prise de possession eventuelle, instead of actuelle, and still 
 more to the condition attached to that concession, the Austrian 
 occupation in Poland. In his reports to his government, he claims 
 that he then redoubled his efforts to remove these last difficulties, 
 and that within a few days he had vanquished every obstacle. 
 On December 24 he wrote that he had obtained a formal oral 
 declaration from the Emperor's ministers that their sovereign 
 1 would address the most urgent representations to the Empress 
 of Russia in order to secure her consent to the Prussian prise de 
 possession actuelle, without adding any condition relative to an 
 Austrian occupation in Poland, but contenting himself solely 
 with the demand that the Empress and the King should jointly 
 
 1 The dispatches to L. Cobenzl are printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 425-435. Sybel's 
 account of the origin of this ' expedition ' is far from accurate. He conjectured 
 (op. cit., iii, pp. 179 ff.) that the secret instructions were decided upon at the meet- 
 ing of the Conference on December 19, and that this unfortunate step was forced 
 upon Ph. Cobenzl by the Emperor himself, guided perhaps by Count Colloredo. 
 The basis of this assumption he found in the Emperor's note to the Vice-Chancellor 
 of December 21 (Vivenot, ii, p. 405) in which the Conference of the 19th is mentioned 
 and Cobenzl rebuked for his slowness in getting off the dispatches to London and 
 St. Petersburg. Sybel deplored the fact that Vivenot did not publish the protocol 
 of " this most important session " of the Conference. Vivenot is quite excusable. 
 No protocol of the 19th is to be found in the Vienna Archives. And apparently 
 that is no great loss. From certain other documents not printed in Vivenot, it 
 appears that except for the parts relating to the reply to England, the dispatches 
 to L. Cobenzl were already completed and had received the sanction of the Con- 
 ference ministers (having been ' circulated ' among them) by December 15. At 
 the session of the 19th only " slight changes and additions " were made, and one 
 further postscript to Stadion was agreed upon (doubtless the 4th, printed in Vive- 
 not, ii, p. 425), as Cobenzl himself relates in a note to the Emperor of December 21 
 (V. A., Vortrdge, 1792). If the conference of the 19th had resolved upon anything 
 so important as the secret instructions to L. Cobenzl, it is hardly possible that the 
 Vice-Chancellor would not have mentioned it in this note, in which he sums up the 
 reasons for his previous delays. It appears, then, that this meeting had little or 
 no importance. I do not think there is the slightest evidence to show where the 
 responsibility for the secret instructions rests. Sybel's view may be admitted as a 
 pure hypothesis; but the Vice-Chancellor's delays may equally well be ascribed to 
 his natural slowness, timidity, and indecision.
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 373 
 
 guarantee their consent to the Bavarian Exchange.' 1 With that 
 he considered his negotiation finished, and prepared to return to 
 Berlin to assume his new post as cabinet minister. At his final 
 audience (December 23), the Emperor assured him that his only 
 fear was that in spite of his own consent and the orders he had 
 sent to St. Petersburg, the Empress of Russia might still refuse 
 to agree to the Prussian demands. 2 Nothing apparently could be 
 more amicable or loyal. Haugwitz left Vienna affirming his 
 conviction that the Imperial Court was acting in good faith and 
 was sincerely disposed to further his master's acquisition. 3 
 
 If he really had secured the oral declaration he reported, he 
 might indeed congratulate himself on a complete diplomatic 
 victory. In that case, Austria had yielded to every Prussian 
 demand, in return for a single concession of the flimsiest and most 
 meaningless sort. For that phrase ' guarantee of consent ' was 
 vagueness itself: anyone could interpret that at his good pleas- 
 ure. The Berlin ministry hastened to inform Caesar (who had 
 been left as charge at Vienna) that they accepted the engagement, 
 if it meant ' promise of consent,' but that they would never allow 
 it a broader significance. 4 A promise of consent the King had 
 already given, and as long as its fulfilment was postponed, his 
 ministers were not greatly embarrassed by it. A guarantee of 
 the realization of the Exchange would be quite a different matter. 
 
 The question inevitably presents itself: did Haugwitz really 
 secure such complete and momentous concessions ? If so, why 
 did he not insist on the alteration of the dispatches to Louis 
 Cobenzl, which were based on quite different principles ? Why 
 did he content himself with a mere verbal assurance ? How 
 explain the fact that the Austrian records contain not the slightest 
 trace of the promise he claimed to have received, and that the 
 Austrian ministers continued to act as if such a promise had never 
 been given ? We find, for instance, that on January 3 the Con- 
 
 1 Haugwitz's reports of December 21 and 24, B. A., R. 1, 170. See Appendix 
 XI, 1. 
 
 2 Haugwitz's retrospective report of May 6, 1793, B. A., R. 96, 147 H. See 
 Appendix XVI, 3. 
 
 * Letter to Lucchesini, December 25, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 31. 
 4 Rescript of December 29, B. A., R. 1, 170.
 
 374 
 
 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 ference met to decide what Polish territories should be occupied 
 by the Imperial Court, in case the other Powers failed to furnish 
 a sufficient guarantee of the Exchange. 1 Cobenzl continually 
 spoke to the astonished Caesar of the alternative — occupation 
 or guarantee — as quite a matter of course. 2 Such positive 
 language is unintelligible — assuming Haugwitz's report to be 
 accurate — except on the hypothesis that Cobenzl and Spielmann 
 had been driven into concessions which they dared not reveal to 
 their colleagues, or on the supposition that they did not know the 
 meaning of the terms in question. Or did Haugwitz misunder- 
 stand them ? Or did he, in his haste to finish the affair, content 
 himself with assurances much less positive and satisfactory than 
 those which he reported ? 
 
 In favor of this last hypothesis, we have the testimony of one 
 witness who was fairly well acquainted with the course of the 
 negotiation and sufficiently intimate with all the negotiators. 
 Razumovski had frequently discussed the matters here in ques- 
 tion with Haugwitz, Cobenzl, and Spielmann, and he understood 
 from them that it was entirely settled that Austria should occupy 
 a district in Poland, unless Russia and Prussia furnished the 
 desired guarantee of the Exchange. Moreover, when Caesar, 
 much disturbed over the affair, read to him Haugwitz's final dis- 
 patch of December 24, Razumovski wrote to Ostermann that 
 Haugwitz, in order to facilitate his negotiation, had shown far 
 more condescendance in his conferences with the Austrians than 
 in his reports. 3 
 
 If the Russian ambassador's view was correct, it would point 
 to nothing exceptional in Haugwitz's first year of diplomatic 
 activity. It will be remembered how facile the latter had shown 
 himself towards the Austrians in May, in the affair of the joint 
 declaration at St. Petersburg; in July and August, in the affair 
 of the Margraviates; in October, in connection with SpielmannV 
 'plan.' If one compares his reports with the Austrian ones 
 
 1 Vivenot, ii, p. 457. 
 
 2 Caesar's reports of Jan. 30, Feb. 6 and 25, 1793, R. A., R. 1, 174. 
 
 3 Razumovski's report of January 21/February 1, 1793, Caesar's report of 
 January 30, M. A., ABCTpia, III, 54, and B. A., R. 1, 174. Razumovski's re- 
 port is printed in part in Appendix XVI, 2.
 
 THE FINAL NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA 375 
 
 relative to the negotiation at Luxemburg and to the dispatches 
 to Stadion in December, and still more if one studies his long re- 
 port of May 6, 1793, reviewing the whole course of the indemnity 
 affair, one sees that his conduct as represented to his Court was 
 very much more energetic, decided, ' peremptory,' than it ap- 
 peared to those with whom he negotiated. It must be remem- 
 bered that he was only a beginner in diplomacy. He later wrote 
 of this negotiation at Vienna: " These were the preliminaries that 
 were to serve as my schooling." l The suspicion lies very near at 
 hand that perhaps the novice did not pass the test so triumph- 
 antly as he reported. At any rate, mysterious as is the whole 
 affair, one may perhaps surmise that the Austrian ministers had 
 agreed to acquiesce in all that Prussia demanded for herself, and 
 to renounce their own project of an occupation in Poland, on 
 condition of receiving a guarantee of the Exchange (meaning the 
 realization of the Exchange) ; and that Haugwitz either misunder- 
 stood them, or deliberately misrepresented. 
 
 The consequences were momentous for the future course of the 
 affair. The Austrian cabinet continued to act on the principles 
 embodied in the dispatches to Louis Cobenzl; continued to re- 
 gard their assent to the Prussian demands as conditional upon 
 their securing safeguards for the Exchange either through an 
 occupation in Poland or through the guarantee of the other 
 Courts; continued to view the final settlement of the indemnity 
 question as dependent upon a concert of the three Powers, into 
 which England might also possibly be taken. 2 But the Imperial 
 ministry seems to have framed no clear idea as to the form which 
 this concert was to take. Although they knew that Goltz was 
 authorized to conclude a definite treaty with Russia, 3 they took 
 no steps to provide Louis Cobenzl with similar powers. They 
 thus condemned themselves to be excluded from a negotiation 
 
 1 Ranke, Hardenberg, ii, p. 306. 
 
 2 Cf . Caesar's report of January 23 : " Tout se reduit done a l'id6e qu'on parott 
 toujours avoir ici que l'etendue de l'arrondissement de V. M. en Pologne, ainsi que 
 les formes de l'echange de la Baviere et du nouvel etablissement de la maison Pala- 
 tine, seront d6finitivement arrangees du concours de toutes les Puissances contract- 
 antes par les negociations futures de la paix," B. A., R. 1, 174. It was a sort of 
 Congress of Vienna that the Austrians thus prematurely imagined. 
 
 3 L. Cobenzl's report of November 23, 1792, V. A., Russland, Berichle.
 
 376 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 that concerned their most vital interests, with a lack of foresight, 
 prudence, and consistency that is almost unintelligible. 
 
 The Prussians, on their side, viewed the agreements of Decem- 
 ber only in the light of Haugwitz's final dispatch, and so con- 
 cluded — quite justifiably — that Austria had given them a 
 perfectly free hand in Poland. The King was satisfied and 
 / grateful, but he was almost alone in his opinion. The long 
 delays, the bad grace with which the Imperial Court had yielded, 
 and the snares and subterfuges which they detected in all its 
 utterances, had convinced the Prussian ministers that no confi- 
 dence was to be placed in the good will of ' their faithful allies ' 
 and ' natural rivals.' " I see more and more clearly," Lucchesini 
 wrote to the ministers at Berlin, " that if we had had to expect 
 our indemnity from the Court of Vienna, we should never have 
 obtained it." x At that moment their indemnity no longer de- 
 pended on Austria. The Empress had spoken at last. 
 
 1 Letter of January 4, 1793, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 The Russo-Prussian Partition Treaty 
 
 It can hardly be doubted that when in July, 1792 Austria and 
 Prussia brought forward the Polish-Bavarian plan at St. Peters- 
 burg, they were but anticipating the inmost wishes of the Russians. 
 It was, indeed, in response to Russian hints at Berlin and Vienna 
 that these first overtures were made. Bezborodko confessed to 
 Cobenzl that his Court had expected something of this sort. 1 He 
 himself hastened to lay before the Empress a memorial emphasiz- 
 ing strongly the advantages that would accrue to Russia from a 
 new partition. A. R. Vorontsov likewise championed the project. 
 If Markov at first raised objections, pointing out the inconven- 
 ience of granting Prussia so considerable an aggrandizement, he 
 allowed himself to be won over without too much difficulty. 2 As 
 for the Empress, one of her closest advisers observed 3 that the 
 Austro-Prussian plan caused her a secret pleasure, but that she 
 hesitated to express clearly her opinion. At any rate, her senti- 
 ments may be inferred from her conduct. 
 
 She would not show her hand too early. She would manifest 
 no undue eagerness. Her ' moderation ' and ' magnanimity ' 
 required that she should make enormous annexations only with 
 an air of reluctance and ostensibly out of sheer deference for her 
 allies. The other Powers must take upon themselves the initia- 
 tive, and with it the odium, of the transaction. An attitude of 
 reticence was the more advisable because Austria long main- 
 tained an ungracious silence regarding any acquisitions for 
 
 1 L. Cobenzl's report to Ph. Cobenzl of July 21, V. A., Rus stand, Berichte, 1792. 
 
 2 Cf. his retrospective letter to S. R. Vorontsov of July 27/August 7, 1793, 
 Apx. Bop., xx, p. 48. Markov's statements as to his own attitude and that of his 
 two colleagues receive some confirmation from Cobenzl's reports, especially that 
 of July 21, 1792. 
 
 8 Markov in the letter just cited. 
 
 377
 
 378 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Russia, while Goltz was authorized to present the indemnity plan 
 only in the guise of ' speculations,' avoiding ' all that might give 
 his overtures the appearance or the form of a proposition made 
 officially or according to orders.' l 
 
 During the month following the initial advances from Berlin 
 and Vienna, the Russian ministers would say no more than that 
 the affair deserved mature deliberation, that the Empress was in 
 general disposed to oblige her allies, but that she could not 
 express herself definitely until the German Courts had composed 
 their differences and communicated their ideas in more detail. 
 But when towards the end of August it became clear that the 
 allies were willing to allow the Court of St. Petersburg an equal 
 share in the spoils, and when appearances had been provided 
 for by a due amount of procrastination, signs multiplied that 
 the Russians were warming to the project. Goltz and Cobenzl 
 were given to understand that the main question was practically 
 decided in their favor, and that it remained only to settle the 
 details and ' the quo modo.' Both envoys gained the conviction 
 that in spite of this air of pretended indifference, the Russians 
 eagerly desired the realization of the plan. 2 How correct this 
 
 1 Instructions to Goltz of July 9, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's reports of August 24, September n, 28, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 
 1792; Goltz's reports of August 28, September 25 and 28, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 
 
 133- 
 
 Cobenzl reported (September n): " Le Comte Woronzow . . . m'a temoigne 
 
 etre tout a fait porte pour ce que j'aiete charge de proposer en date du 8 Aout . . . : 
 
 il dit qu'il faut seulement observer dans les acquisitions que feroit la Russie d'eviter 
 
 tout voisinage immediat avec les Puissances copartageantes." 
 
 On September 28: " II me paroit qu'on ne le desire [the realization of the Bavar- 
 ian-Polish project] pas moins ici, et Marcow me dit a cette occasion, qu'outre 
 l'echange pour egaliser la chose nous devrions prendre un dedommagement du 
 meme cote ou nous la destinons aux deux autres cours." 
 
 Goltz wrote on August 28: "A en juger d'apres les vues de ses [Catherine's] 
 Ministres, il ne paroit pas douteux, qu'on entrera avec plaisir aux vues des autres 
 Puissances." 
 
 On September 25: " Quoique l'on continue toujours a affecter la plus grande 
 indifference, je suis cependant sur que ce n'est que cela et qu'on n'en desire pas 
 moins vivement de realiser le projet d'un nouveau partage de la Pologne." 
 
 On September 28: " II ne me reste rien a dire sur le plan de dedommagemens, 
 tous les Ministres ici m'assurant que l'lmperatrice consentira volontiers a la chose, 
 mais qu'on attend toujours le Courier de Vienne, pour pouvoir s'expliquer sur le 
 comment."
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 379 
 
 surmise was, is best shown by the fact that when the indemnity 
 project seemed in danger of being held up or even completely 
 frustrated by the dissensions between the German Powers, the 
 Empress intervened to remedy and to expedite matters. In the 
 middle of September, Razumovski and Alopeus were ordered to 
 urge upon the Austrian and Prussian cabinets the need of haste: 
 the final settlement of Polish affairs, it was said, could not be long 
 postponed, and delay was the more embarrassing because the 
 maintenance of the Russian armies in the Republic cost immense 
 sums; the Empress therefore desired that her allies should adjust 
 as soon as possible the questions at issue between them and then 
 provide their envoys at St. Petersburg with the instructions and 
 powers necessary for concluding a formal convention. 1 A three- 
 fold arrangement on the analogy of the treaties of 1772 was then 
 the Russian program. Of the exclusion of Austria there was, 
 and could at that time be, no thought. 2 That the negotiation 
 should be conducted at St. Petersburg, where the Empress could 
 most easily guide and control it, was assumed as a matter of 
 course. 
 
 A final explanation from Vienna was expected with the ratifica- 
 tion of the Austro-Russian treaty of alliance. Instead, however, 
 the courier brought only the news of Spielmann's mission to the 
 King of Prussia, and the promise that the agreements about to be 
 concluded would be promptly communicated. 3 Hitherto Austria 
 had taken the lead in the negotiations at St. Petersburg: here 
 began that three months' silence on the part of the Court of 
 Vienna, which was to prove so disastrous for it. 
 
 Meanwhile Goltz had at last received definite instructions, 
 which allowed him to quit the realm of pure ' speculations,' and 
 to state precisely the acquisitions desired by his Court. 4 From 
 mid-October on, he began to urge that Russia and Prussia should 
 come to an agreement at once without waiting further for the 
 
 1 Ostermann's dispatches to Razumovski and Alopeus, September 3/14, 1792, 
 M. A., ABCTpifl, III, 52, and Elpyccia, III, 28. 
 
 2 Cf. Markov to Razumovski, October 4/15, Wassiltchikow, Les Razoumowski, 
 ii, 4 e partie, p. 162. 
 
 3 Ph. Cobenzl to L. Cobenzl, September 13, Vivenot, ii, pp. 197-201. 
 * The instructions of September 28, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 3 8o 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 dilatory resolutions of Austria. The Court of Vienna, he declared, 
 was sufficiently informed of his master's views; its allies would 
 not neglect its interests; but they would be in far better position 
 to provide for them after they had duly attended to their own. 
 Towards the end of the month he had even advanced to the point 
 of pressing for consent to the immediate entry of the Prussian 
 troops into Poland. 1 
 
 Although still professing not to know their sovereign's inten- 
 tions, and protesting that nothing could be decided until the 
 results of Spielmann's negotiation were known, the Russian 
 ministers received these propositions with unmistakable favor. 
 In a highly significant note to a colleague, Bezborodko declared 
 that Ostermann and he were agreed that their Court ought not to 
 oppose the King of Prussia's desire to send his troops into Poland 
 at once, since that measure fitted exactly into their [the Russian] 
 plan, and would certainly lead to the quickest denouement of the 
 affair. 2 But just at the moment when matters seemed thus hap- 
 pily started, there came a turn of events which threatened to 
 blast the Prussian hopes. 
 
 II 
 
 On the 20th of October the news of the retreat of the allied 
 armies reached St. Petersburg. In the next few weeks every 
 courier brought tidings of disaster: the complete evacuation of 
 France, the loss of Belgium, the irruption of " the demons " into 
 the very heart of Germany. The Empress was highly incensed. 
 The " factious," in repelling the invaders, had committed the 
 crime of Use Catherine; the allies had sinned even more atro- 
 ciously by rejecting all her advice about the enterprise; and 
 worst of all were those mysterious, degrading negotiations of 
 the Prussians with " the rebels." " I confess," she wrote to 
 Grimm, " I feel such ill humor toward certain people that I 
 should like to box their ears." 3 Her letters and conversation 
 
 1 Goltz's reports of October 12, 23, 26, B. A., loc. cit. 
 
 2 Bezborodko to A. R. Vorontsov, Apx. Bop., xiii, p. 275. This note is un- 
 dated, but from a comparison with Goltz's dispatches it may be fixed with certainty 
 as of October 26. 
 
 3 Letter of December 7/18, C6opHHKt, xxiii, p. 579.
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 38 1 
 
 of that time are full of outbreaks and sarcasms against both 
 her high allies. 
 
 Under such circumstances, the Empress was for the time being 
 in no mood to listen favorably to the Prussian importunities about 
 a new partition. " After the brilliant campaign the two Courts 
 have made, they still dare to talk of conquests! " she wrote on 
 jthe margin of a dispatch; ! and in another place: " It seems to me 
 that in real and strict justice those who have failed in their duties, 
 ought to have no right to compensation." 2 This was no time for 
 starting a new set of troubles, when no one could foresee the end 
 of those already existing, and when she was left in perfect igno- 
 rance of the other plans of the high allies, who had hitherto done 
 diametrically the opposite of all that she had proposed to them. 3 
 After the miserable spectacle they had just made of themselves, 
 their primary concern ought to be to deliver the Germanic Em- 
 pire out of the hands of the French, and to prepare for a new and 
 more vigorous campaign. 4 In an interesting set of " rules " which 
 she dashed off a propos of the negotiation with Prussia, 5 we find 
 the following: 
 
 " To postpone the partition of Poland as long as possible. 
 
 " After a wretched campaign, no acquisitions. 
 
 " Not to take up this affair without the knowledge of the Court 
 of Vienna. 
 
 " [We have] no reason for aggrandizing the King of Prussia. 
 
 " To do nothing contrary to honor and promises." 
 
 Probably many reasons combined to produce this revulsion in 
 Catherine's attitude towards a project in which she had ap- 
 parently been keenly interested. The general situation and the 
 presuppositions with which she had entered into the affair had 
 been profoundly altered by the debacle in the West. It was still 
 uncertain how far the successes of the French would go ; how far 
 
 1 On Alopeus' report of October 8/19. 
 
 2 Letter to Rumiantsov, Pyc. Clap., lxxxi 2 , p. 161. 
 
 3 Note of the Empress belonging to the papers of the secret Conference of No- 
 vember 4/15, P. A., X, 69. 
 
 4 Note of the Empress belonging to the papers of the secret Conference of 
 October 29/Nov. 9, P. A., loc. cit. 
 
 5 Papers belonging to the secret Conference of October 29/November 9. These 
 notes are printed in Appendix XVII.
 
 382 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the Prussians had really been implicated in disloyal intrigues 
 with the enemy; whether Austria could now be provided for 
 except by a share in Poland — which would not at all fit in with 
 the Empress' wishes; or what would be the attitude of England. 
 The machinations of ' the Jacobins ' at Stockholm and Constanti- 
 nople were well known at St. Petersburg, and aroused at least a 
 certain disquietude, as was attested by the rushing of fresh troops 
 and of no less a commander than Suvorov to the southern fron- 
 tier. But it may perhaps be doubted whether these considera- 
 tions contributed as much to delaying the negotiation for the 
 partition as did the Empress' anger against those allies who had 
 tarnished her glory by bungling an enterprise to which she had 
 lent her patronage and her moral and financial support. 
 
 It was under no favorable auspices, then, that the Prussians 
 began their grand assault at St. Petersburg. In the last days of 
 October, Goltz suddenly found himself the object of a great 
 coldness. He ceased to be invited to the Hermitage. Ostermann 
 avoided conversing with him. 1 When the Vice-Chancellor could 
 be brought to speak at all, he proffered nothing but excuses for 
 delay: the uncertain state of French affairs; the danger of stirring 
 up new enemies at such a moment; the alarming attitude of the 
 Porte; the presence in St. Petersburg of a delegation from the 
 Confederation of Targowica, come to thank the Empress for 
 ' liberating ' the Republic; the impossibility of deciding on any 
 course of action until the arrival of news from Austria. 2 The 
 cabinet of Berlin pressed on the negotiation with restless haste. 
 Courier after courier was hurried off to Petersburg, bringing to 
 Goltz orders to present his demands in the most formal ministerial 
 manner, a royal letter to the Empress, the new and extended 
 territorial claims which Frederick William had formulated at 
 Consenvoye, the Note of Merle, full powers to conclude the 
 treaty, and fresh supplies of arguments with which to beat down 
 the Russian obduracy. Poland, it was alleged, was seething with 
 democratic agitation and with plots against Russia and Prussia; 
 it was superfluous to point out what dangers would threaten all 
 
 1 Goltz's report of the 30th, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 2 Goltz's reports of October 30, November 2, 6, 13, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 383 
 
 the North of Europe if this country were allowed to become " a 
 new theatre of revolution and fanaticism "; the evil must be cut 
 out at the roots, and the most efficacious way of extirpating it 
 was to restrict the tumultuous Republic within such limits as 
 would forever prevent it from menacing its neighbors. 1 If it were 
 merely regard for Austria that held back the Empress, that 
 difficulty, it was said, was now removed, since the King had given 
 his consent to the forcible seizure of Bavaria, which Spielmann 
 had proposed. 2 Even Cobenzl, when informed of the Note of 
 Merle, took it upon himself, without waiting for orders, to press 
 the Prussian claims. 3 But Ostermann remained immovable and 
 generally mute. He could accept Goltz's constantly reiterated 
 demands only ad referendum; he was chronically uninformed as 
 to the intentions of his sovereign; he was full of objections and 
 petty fears. So matters continued throughout November. The 
 Court of Berlin had exhausted every device and every attention 
 in order to win over the Russians ; its troops stood on the frontier 
 ready to enter Poland at a moment's notice from St. Petersburg; 
 but it seemed as if the word would never come. The Prussian 
 ministry grew quite out of patience. If Ostermann continued his 
 " tergiversations," they wrote, Goltz must declare that the King 
 would no longer think of a second campaign, but would retire 
 from the war altogether. 4 
 
 But just at the moment when Prussian hopes were most de- v 
 pressed, the tide began to turn at St. Petersburg. 
 
 Ill 
 
 It is probable that Catherine had never seriously intended to 
 abandon the plan for a partition: she had meant, it would seem, 
 only to postpone its execution. About the beginning of Decem- 
 ber, however, a number of reasons combined to make further 
 delay inadvisable. The Prussian importunities could not much 
 longer be denied without driving the King to fulfil his threat of 
 
 1 Instructions to Goltz of November 3, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 2 Rescripts to Goltz of November 17 and 22, B. A., loc. cit. 
 
 3 Cobenzl's reports of November 13, 16, 20, V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1792. 
 
 4 Rescript of December 1, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 3§4 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 withdrawing from an enterprise in which the Empress strongly 
 desired to keep him engaged. Moreover, the rumor of an impen- 
 ding partition was circulating so widely and attracting so much 
 attention that unless the great blow were struck at once, the 
 opposition to be expected from certain quarters would have time 
 to mature, and the difficulty of the task would be very materially 
 increased. England was already making cautious inquiries and 
 remonstrances on the subject at Berlin and Vienna. 1 The French 
 government was trying to stir up the Porte to interfere in Poland. 2 
 Above all, affairs within the Republic itself seemed to be ap- 
 proaching a new crisis. 
 
 The Confederates of Targowica had by this time proved their 
 complete inability either to agree among themselves or to win 
 over their fellow-countrymen to their cause. After a few months 
 of stupefied calm following the collapse of the national defence in 
 the summer, the Polish public had been electrified by the amaz- 
 ing victories of the French. Valmy and Jemappes supplied an 
 inspiring example of a free nation successfully defending itself 
 against a league of despots; they aroused hopes that Poland too 
 might yet be saved by French bayonets. It does not appear that 
 there was at this time any organized plan for a national uprising; 
 of any propaganda in favor of ' Jacobinism,' except in the case 
 of a few insignificant individuals, we find no trace; but there was 
 a wide-spread and enthusiastic sympathy for the French, which 
 could not be prevented from manifesting itself either by the 
 presence of the Russian troops or by the iron-clad censorship and 
 the unprecedented police measures introduced by the champions 
 of liberty who now presided over the government. Every act of 
 the Confederation was greeted with scorn and ridicule. There 
 were manifold demonstrations of devotion to the Constitution of 
 the Third of May. The Empress' officers were almost boycotted 
 by Warsaw society. The English resident reported that the 
 universal hatred of the Russians seemed to increase daily; it 
 
 1 The Prussian government hastened to inform the Empress of this step of 
 England and to urge that this made the need of haste all the greater (dispatch to 
 Goltz, November 23, sent by courier, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133). Cf. Salomon, 
 Pitt, i", p. 580; Lecky, op. cit., vi, pp. 83 f. 
 
 2 Cf. Zinkeisen, op. cit., vi, pp. 848 ff.
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 385 
 
 was shown on the streets, in the theatres, everywhere to such a 
 degree that he lived in constant fear of an explosion and a great 
 catastrophe. 1 There were rumors of an approaching Sicilian 
 Vespers. 2 Felix Potocki, blind as usual to the effects his words 
 would have, wrote desperately to St. Petersburg that the suc- 
 cesses of the French had ' turned the heads of his compatriots ' ; 
 ' Jacobin principles ' and those of the Third of May were making 
 terrible progress; unless something were done at once to stop the 
 evil, he feared the very worst. 3 The deputation which he had 
 sent to thank the Empress for ' liberating ' their country, had to 
 confess that the moment the Russian troops should be withdrawn, 
 the whole work of the Confederation of Targowica would be 
 overthrown by the nation. 4 In short, it appeared that matters 
 had come to such a pass that the only way out of endless embar- 
 rassments was a partition. This nation had shown itself so 
 hopelessly perverse that it must be reduced to a state of perpetual 
 impotence to harm its neighbors. And the sooner the operation 
 was performed, the better. 
 
 These considerations, reenforced by the long felt desire for 
 " the finest acquisition the Empire could ever make," 5 proved 
 decisive. It was true that the great excuse for delay which 
 Ostermann had always held up to Goltz, had not been removed, 
 for nothing had yet been heard from Vienna. But it was impos" 
 sible to defer forever to the incurable slowness of the Austrian 
 cabinet. Besides, it was distinctly to the advantage of Russia 
 to settle the affair with Prussia alone without the participation of 
 the Court of Vienna. From Prussia no opposition was to be 
 expected, no matter how enormous the Empress' claims might 
 be; but it was to be feared that Austria might resist the intended 
 extension of the Russian frontier to the borders of Galicia, and 
 
 1 Gardiner's report of November 14, 1792, printed by K. Sienkiewicz, Skarbiec 
 historyi polskiej, i, p. 198. Very interesting details as to the expressions of public 
 opinion at this time in Smolehski, Konfederacya targowicka, pp. 323 ff. 
 
 2 Cf. Kakhovski's reports to the Empress of October 17/28, November 1/12 
 and 8/19, CoopuHKi., xlvii, pp. 462-465. 
 
 3 Letters to Zubov of November 15 and 24, M. A., ApxiiBT. BapmaBCKoii Mnccin. 
 
 4 Instructions to Sievers, December 22/January 2, M. A., IIojBnia, III, 66. 
 
 5 Markov to S. R. Vorontsov, November 8/19, 1792, Apx. Bop., xx, p. 32.
 
 386 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 might also try to obtain some portion of Poland for herself in 
 default of the Bavarian Exchange. The Russians were not 
 unwilling to provide for Austrian interests in the course of the 
 negotiation, but in that negotiation they no longer intended 
 to have Austria take part. 1 This exclusion of the Court of 
 Vienna was, furthermore, quite in accordance with the ideas 
 of the Berlin cabinet, as repeatedly expressed at St. Petersburg 
 since October. 
 
 In the second week in December, by the 13th at the latest, the 
 Empress' final decision was taken. 2 On the 16th Ostermann 
 announced to Goltz that his sovereign consented to the immedi- 
 ate occupation by Prussia of the entire territory demanded by the 
 King, and that she claimed for herself an acquisition bounded on 
 the west by a line drawn from the easternmost point of Courland 
 due south via Pinsk to the Dniester opposite Choczim, a line 
 which ran for some distance directly along the Galician frontier. 
 The further details of the partition were to be regulated by a 
 secret convention between the two Courts as soon as the King 
 had given his consent to the acquisition demanded by the Em- 
 press. Ostermann excused the exclusion of Austria by pointing 
 to the slowness of that Power in communicating its intentions, 
 and the (supposed) fact that Frederick William had already satis- 
 fied its chief desire by agreeing to the forcible occupation of 
 Bavaria. 
 
 Goltz was naturally astounded at the enormous extent of the 
 Empress' claims, but he did not dare protest. It was agreed 
 that Cobenzl should be told only that the Empress had consented 
 to an immediate Prussian occupation in Poland, and nothing 
 
 1 According to Markov's letter to S. R, Vorontsov of July 27/August 7, 1793, the 
 proposal to exclude Austria from the negotiation was made by Bezborodko, who 
 of all the Russian ministers might pass for the most pro-Austrian (Apx. Bop., xx, 
 p. 49). 
 
 Sybel's statement that the Empress' decision was determined by Razumovski's 
 reports of the early stages of Haugwitz's negotiation at Vienna {op. cit., iii, p. 192) 
 is quite erroneous. The first report of the ambassador on that subject was sent 
 by post December 4, and so could not possibly have arrived in time to influence a 
 decision taken by the 13 th at the latest. 
 
 2 Cf. the memorandum of Bezborodko of December 2/13, printed in Solov'ev, 
 Geschichte des Falles von Polen, p. 305.
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 387 
 
 more. Goltz congratulated himself that he had avoided, as he 
 thought, all reference to the French war in the future convention. 1 
 The arrival of the courier caused intense jubilation at Berlin. 
 Although likewise amazed at the Empress' demands, the 
 ministry adjured the King to acquiesce in them rather than lose 
 the chance to secure an acquisition in some respects the most 
 important that the House of Hohenzollern had ever made, an 
 acquisition that would render Prussia for the first time " a co- 
 herent kingdom." They suggested, however, that since the 
 Empress seemed determined on a partition on a grand scale, it 
 might not be mal a propos to claim something more for themselves 
 — the district of Polangen, for instance, which separated East 
 Prussia from Courland, and which might some day acquire some 
 commercial importance. They also recommended begging the 
 Empress to renounce the strip of territory along the Galician 
 frontier; since that acquisition would irritate Austria — and 
 would deprive Prussia of precious facilities for importing horses 
 from Moldavia for the army ! It was not to be expected that the 
 idea of excluding Austria from the negotiation would cause great 
 grief at Berlin. The ministry recognized that the Court of Vienna 
 would probably show some ill humor when the convention was 
 presented to it; but after all it would only be paying the penalty 
 for all its "tergiversations" and " insidious negotiations." 2 They 
 were especially pleased by the prospect of not having to incur any 
 engagements for the continuation of the war. ' Undoubtedly,' 
 they wrote to Goltz, ' their continued cooperation would be a 
 tacit condition of their new acquisition, but there was a great 
 difference between a binding and formal agreement and a volun- 
 tary cooperation, which might depend more or less on circum- 
 stances and convenience.' 3 The connection between French and 
 Polish affairs had been very useful when it furnished a pretext for 
 acquisitions: when it entailed obligations, that was quite a 
 different matter. 
 
 1 Goltz's report of December 16, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133. 
 
 2 The cabinet ministry to the King, December 27, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 
 133- 
 
 3 Ministerial rescript to Goltz of December 26, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 388 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Frederick William's joy was, if possible, even greater than that 
 of his ministers. " Our great aim is, thank God, fulfilled," he 
 wrote to them: " it required efforts to attain it, but he who risks 
 nothing gains nothing. The anxieties that your patriotic appre- 
 hensions have given you, are now removed, and succeeded by 
 the satisfaction of seeing your labors crowned with the happiest 
 success." l With the King's complete approval of the ministerial 
 propositions, the courier was soon speeding back to St. Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 The situation on the Neva had meanwhile altered in several 
 respects. The Russian ministers were again showing themselves 
 ominously cold towards Goltz, in order to reduce him to a be- 
 coming state of anxiety and humility. This manoeuvre was 
 beautifully calculated to deprive him of the courage to make 
 either new demands or objections. With Goltz the effect was 
 unfailing. A further new element in the situation was the fact 
 that the Austrian dispatches of December 23 had arrived, and 
 the Empress' hand was strengthened in so far as the Court of 
 Vienna had turned over to her the congenial role of arbiter in the 
 indemnity question. From the first the Russians gave Cobenzl 
 to understand that it would be impossible to cut down or to post- 
 pone the Prussian acquisition. They were lavish in assurances, 
 however, that in the impending negotiation they would take pains 
 to bind the King to the continuation of the war, and would in 
 general provide for Austrian interests as carefully as for their own. 
 This appears to have been the sole effect of the secret instructions 
 sent to Cobenzl. For the rest, the Austrian communications to 
 England regarding the indemnities produced an extremely bad 
 effect at St. Petersburg: from the Empress down, everyone con- 
 sidered those confidences premature, indiscreet, and even insid- 
 ious. This was one more reason for hastening to settle with 
 Prussia. 
 
 The negotiation, which for greater secrecy was conducted 
 between Goltz and Ostermann alone, was rushed through in less 
 than six days. Terrified by reports that a large part of the 
 
 1 Frederick William to the cabinet ministry, December 31, B. A., R. XI, Russ- 
 land, 135.
 
 TEE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 389 
 
 Russian ministry was opposed to the partition altogether, Goltz 
 feared to ruin all by delaying matters in any way. His proposi- 
 tion about Polangen was curtly refused once for all, on the pretext 
 that the Empress could not acquiesce in Prussian claims more 
 extensive than those already communicated to the Court of 
 Vienna. Goltz dared not make the obvious retort that the size 
 of the Russian acquisition was wholly unknown to that Court. 
 Nor had he better luck with his objections regarding the territory 
 along the Galician frontier. He was obliged to accept an article 
 concerning the French war, which he and his Court would greatly 
 have preferred to see omitted. In short, the Russians simply 
 dictated their own terms. January 23 Ostermann, Bezborodko, 
 and Markov for Russia, and Goltz for Prussia signed the treaty of 
 partition. 1 
 
 IV 
 
 The act, which had been drafted by Markov, followed as far as 
 possible the form and phraseology of the treaties of 1772. This 
 time, indeed, there were no ' ancient and legitimate rights ' to 
 Polish territory that might be invoked; there was, in fact, no 
 decent pretext of any kind ; but the difficulty was met in the pre- 
 amble by sonorous allusions to " the imminent and universal 
 danger " that threatened Europe as a result of " the fatal revolu- 
 tion in France," and the need that the Powers interested in the 
 maintenance of " order " and " the general tranquillity " should 
 take " the most rigorous and efficacious measures " to arrest the 
 progress of the evil. It required something of a tour de force to 
 make Poland an accomplice in the guilt of France, but the 
 formula had long before been discovered. It was said that the 
 contracting parties had ' recognized by sure signs that the same 
 spirit of insurrection and dangerous innovations, which now 
 reigned in France, was ready to break out in the Kingdom of 
 Poland, in the immediate vicinity of their own possessions '; they 
 had therefore ' felt the necessity of redoubling their precautions 
 
 1 For the above: Goltz's reports of January 18, 22, and 24, 1793, B. A., R. XI, 
 Russland, 135. The text of the treaty is printed in Martens, Traites cone! us par 
 la Russie, ii, pp. 228-235; Vivenot, ii, p. 516-519.
 
 390 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 and efforts in order to guarantee their subjects against the effects 
 of a scandalous and often contagious example ' ; and they had 
 been obliged to combine those efforts in such a way as to obtain 
 for themselves l both present and future security and an indem- 
 nity for the exorbitant expenses which these exertions must 
 necessarily occasion them.' 
 
 The partition being thus represented as part of the wider 
 system of measures for combating the revolutionary plague ; and 
 also as an indemnification for such laudable services, it followed 
 that the two Powers could not well avoid committing themselves 
 to some kind of definite obligations regarding the French war. 
 Catherine was, indeed, delighted to seize the chance to bind the 
 hands of the King of Prussia as tightly as possible in this respect; 
 but as for her own cooperation, she preferred that it should remain 
 of the same purely moral and exhortatory sort as heretofore. 
 By Article I of the Convention she generously pledged herself to 
 maintain her military and naval forces " on the same formidable 
 footing as at present," so as to be able at all times to protect her 
 own states against any possible attack, to assist her allies in the 
 cases stipulated by the treaties, and to repress any outbreaks 
 that might occur in Poland. Prussia, on the other hand, was 
 obliged to promise to continue the war in common with the 
 Emperor, and to make no separate peace nor truce until the two 
 sovereigns ' had attained the aim announced by their common 
 declarations,' and forced " the French rebels ... to renounce 
 their hostile enterprises abroad and their criminal attentats in the 
 interior of the Kingdom of France" (Art. IV.). Taken in the 
 strict sense, this article would have bound Frederick William to 
 an interminable war. Here, it must be admitted, the Empress 
 had effectually provided for the interests of Austria — and inci- 
 dentally for her own. 
 
 As an indemnity for the expense of her armaments, and also for 
 the sake of " the general security and tranquillity," Russia was to 
 take possession of the Polish territories east of the line Druja- 
 Pinsk-Choczim : that is to say, of virtually the whole eastern half 
 of the Republic, including the rich palatinates of the Ukraine, the 
 granary of Poland, which had so long formed the object of Potem-
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 391 
 
 kin's ambition. Prussia's acquisition, bounded by the line 
 Cz^stochowa-Rawa-Soldau, embraced the whole of Great Poland, 
 including the cities of Dantzic, Thorn, Posen, Gnesen, Kalisz and 
 Sieradz. The yawning gap in the flanks of the Monarchy was 
 thus filled in more than generous fashion, and the Prussian fron- 
 tier advanced to within a few miles of Warsaw and Cracow. The 
 respective shares of the two partitioning Powers were glaringly 
 unequal. Russia gained over three million new subjects: Prussia 
 little more than one million. In area the Empress' share was 
 almost exactly four times as large as the King's. The loss to 
 Poland was relatively far greater than that in 1772. While the 
 First Partition had cost the Republic only twenty-nine per cent 
 of its area and thirty-six per cent of its population, the Second 
 Partition was to rob it of fifty-four per cent of its remaining 
 territory and approximately half of its remaining population. 
 There was left to the ruined state only a long, narrow quadri- 
 lateral extending from Courland to Cracow and Volhynia. 1 
 
 The formal annexation of the territories in question was fixed 
 for the period between the 5th and the 21st of April (New Style). 
 The two Powers agreed to act in the closest concert in effecting 
 the necessary " definitive arrangement with the Republic of 
 Poland." Finally, they made certain specious provisions for the 
 interests of Austria. By Article VII they bound themselves, 
 when the time should come, and when the request had been made 
 of them, ' to omit none of their good offices and other efficacious 
 means in their power to facilitate the Bavarian Exchange, while 
 
 1 It is impossible to offer any exact statistical data with regard to the area and 
 population affected by the Second Partition. According to the calculations pre- 
 sented to the Diet of Grodno on August 21, 1793, the Republic possessed before 
 the Partition an area of 9,630 (Polish) square miles ( = 206,795 square miles, Eng- 
 lish) ; the share taken by Russia included 4,157 square miles ( = 89,257 square miles, 
 English); that taken by Prussia 1,062 square miles ( = 22,805 square miles, English) . 
 
 Korzon estimates the area of Poland in 1792 as only 9,438 geographical square 
 miles = 200,661 square miles, English (i, pp. 160 f.). Sybel puts the Prussian lot as 
 1,016 square miles {op. cit., iii, pp. 222 f.); Priimers (Das Jahr 1793, p. 76) at 1,061. 
 According to the same statistics presented at the Grodno Diet, the population of 
 the Republic just before the Partition was 7,660,787 (but Korzon places it as high 
 as 8,790,000, ibid.); that of the lands annexed by Russia 3,055,900; that gained 
 by Prussia 1,136,389 (see this whole set of calculations in Kraszewski, op. cit., iii, 
 p. 336). These figures can be regarded as only approximate at the best.
 
 392 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 adding to it such other advantages as should be compatible with 
 the general convenience.' This article might mean much or 
 little, according as it was interpreted. The term ' efficacious 
 means ' suggested the idea of coercion to bring about the Ex- 
 change, but there followed the limitation to ' means in their 
 power.' The ' other advantages ' sounded well, but were bound 
 up with the elastic phrase about ' the general convenience.' 
 Each concession or promise contained a loophole for escape. 
 Austria was really offered nothing more solid than the eventual 
 good offices of the two Courts in behalf of the Exchange. Article 
 VIII stipulated that after ratification the Convention was to be 
 communicated to the Emperor with the request that he should 
 formally accede to it and guarantee its provisions, the Empress 
 and the King engaging for their part to guarantee the Exchange as 
 soon as it should be effected. Needless to say, this was not the 
 kind of guarantee for which the Austrians had asked. 
 
 In general, the treaty was an unsurpassed triumph of Russian 
 policy. The Empress, without having taken any active part in 
 the French enterprise, awarded to herself an enormous ' indem- 
 nity ' ; she accorded Prussia a lot one-fourth as large as her 
 own, under onerous conditions; and she provided chiefly by airy 
 promises for her ' ancient ally,' who bore the main burden of 
 the war. 
 
 The Prussian ministry found the terms of the Convention open 
 to more than one objection. They were chagrined at getting no 
 additions to their share and at the obligations imposed upon 
 them, but they were far too clever not to see the various means 
 provided for evading those obligations. The engagement to 
 continue the war was softened by the stipulation ' in common 
 with the Emperor,' for they were confident that they could rely on 
 him to abandon the enterprise at the first good opportunity. 
 The ' efficacious means ' to be employed to further the Exchange 
 could and must be interpreted as referring only to cooperation 
 in the recovery of the Netherlands. At any rate, all such captious 
 considerations were outweighed by the joy of having signed and 
 sealed the treaty which at last " raised the Prussian Monarchy 
 to that degree of material power to which it was destined by the
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 393 
 
 genius of its sovereigns and the vigor of its people." ' On Febru- 
 ary 28 the exchange of ratifications took place at St. Petersburg. 
 
 V 
 
 The execution of the Partition was already well under way. 
 On January 16, 1793, the Prussian envoy Buchholtz presented at 
 Warsaw a note announcing that his master was about to send a 
 corps of troops into Great Poland. As a pretext for this step, it 
 was alleged that " the self-styled Patriotic party " (formerly 
 known as ' the Prussian party,' it may be remarked) was ' con- 
 tinuing its secret machinations, which obviously tended to the 
 total subversion of order and tranquillity,' and which had exposed 
 the neighboring Prussian provinces to " repeated excesses and 
 violations of territory"; that ' the spirit of French democracy 
 was taking deep root in Poland, so that the manoeuvres of 
 Jacobin emissaries were gaining powerful support, and already 
 several revolutionary clubs had been formed, which made open 
 profession of their principles '; that the spread of this " dangerous 
 poison," and the connection of "the zealots" with theFrench clubs 
 placed the King under the absolute necessity of providing for the 
 safety of his own states, and averting the danger of being attacked 
 in the rear at the moment when he was engaged in war in the 
 west. As the aim of the intended occupation was only to repress 
 those who were fomenting troubles and insurrection, to restore 
 and maintain order, and to assure to honest citizens an efficacious 
 protection, ' the King flattered himself that he could count on the 
 good will of a nation whose well-being could not be a matter of 
 indifference to him, and to which he wished to give substantial 
 proofs of his affection and benevolence.' 2 The sublime irony or 
 the brazen hypocrisy of this declaration will rarely find a parallel. 
 Barring a few eccentric and utterly unimportant individuals, 
 there was at that time in Poland no ' democratic ' propaganda, 
 no ' Jacobin emissaries,' no ' revolutionary clubs.' 3 The King 
 
 1 The cabinet ministry to the King, February 3, Lucchesini to the Ministry, 
 February 7, B. A., R. 96, 147 H, and R. 92, L. N. 34. 
 
 2 The declaration is printed in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 297 ff., and elsewhere. 
 
 3 Cf. Smolenski, Konfederacya targowicka, pp. 366 ff. It is pathetic to find an
 
 394 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 of Prussia was threatened by no danger on the east — unless he 
 provoked one by undertaking a new partition and thus goading 
 the Polish nation into a supreme act of desperation. And yet the 
 formula, which was henceforth to serve the robber Powers in all 
 their unholy operations against Poland, had been furnished by the 
 Poles themselves; for the men of Targowica, in their blind hatred 
 of their opponents, had long been stigmatizing the adherents of 
 the monarchical constitution of 1791 as ' democrats ' and 
 ' Jacobins.' 
 
 On January 24 the Prussian troops under General Mollendorff 
 poured over the frontier. The districts to be annexed were oc- 
 cupied without difficulty, almost without resistance. Dantzic 
 alone closed its gates and held out until, threatened with famine 
 and deprived of all hope of succor, the Town Council surrendered 
 the city and begged for its incorporation with Prussia (April 4). 
 Even then on the day of the occupation the mob fired on the 
 incoming Prussian troops. 
 
 In the face of this attack, the government of Poland — the 
 ' Generality ' of the Confederation, sitting at Grodno — pre- 
 sented the most dismal spectacle of consternation, impotence, 
 and cowardice. That Prussia's action had been taken with the 
 Empress' consent was revealed in Buchholtz's declaration; and 
 that this action was only the preliminary to a new partition, 
 agreed upon between the two Powers, was only too obvious. 
 Deserted by Catherine, upon whose protection alone their power 
 had hitherto rested, the Confederation saw themselves exposed 
 to the execration of a nation, half of which regarded them as 
 dupes, and the other half as traitors. It is characteristic of these 
 men that in such a crisis they thought not so much of their 
 country as of themselves; for it is clear that in what few feeble 
 efforts they made to oppose the Prussians, their main aim was 
 only to save appearances and to vindicate, as far as might oe, 
 their own ruined reputations. 
 
 The Generality replied to Buchholtz's declaration with a meek 
 protest, denying any need for the entrance of the Prussian troops 
 
 historian like Sybel attempting a vindication of the Prussian declaration, and 
 asserting that " the facts " alleged in it were true {op. cit., iii, p. 194).
 
 TEE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 395 
 
 and requesting their withdrawal. When Felix Potocki, with 
 streaming eyes, announced the news that the invasion had 
 actually begun, the Confederation could think of nothing better 
 to do than to dispatch a pitiful appeal to St. Petersburg, throwing 
 themselves on the mercy of their great Protectress. While 
 awaiting her answer, they made some pretence of activity. They 
 issued a magniloquent proclamation, protesting " in the most 
 solemn manner in the face of the universe against any usurpation 
 of the least part of the Republic's territory," and swearing that 
 ' they were ready to shed the last drop of their blood in defence 
 of the liberty and integrity of the country.' 1 The Hetman 
 Rzewuski bustled about giving orders to the troops to oppose the 
 advance of the Prussians. On February n the Generality even 
 mustered up the courage to issue ' universals ' instructing the 
 nation to hold itself in readiness for a levee en masse (the so-called 
 pos polite ruszenie). How much sincerity there was behind these 
 demonstrations appears from the fact that Potocki and associates 
 hastened to assure the Russians that the universals had been sent 
 out simply because the Confederation had to do something to 
 appease the public, and this had seemed " the most innocent 
 means " that they could think of. 2 
 
 Any doubts as to Catherine's sentiments and intentions were 
 very soon removed. General Igelstrom, the new commander of 
 the Empress' forces in Poland, refused to allow a single Polish 
 regiment or a single cannon from the Warsaw arsenal to be sent 
 against the Prussians. Baron Sievers, who had just arrived to 
 replace Bulgakov as Russian ambassador, denied, indeed, any 
 knowledge as to the reasons for the Prussian invasion, but 
 announced that it was the Empress' will that the Generality 
 should attempt no resistance, and should in general avoid all 
 measures that might stir up the nation and disturb " the public 
 tranquillity." 3 Roundly rebuked for their universals of February 
 11 — so grave a step precipitately taken without consulting him, 
 " the minister of a friendly and allied state " — the Confederation 
 
 1 This document, dated February 3, is printed in Angeberg, Recueil, pp. 299-304. 
 
 2 Biihler to Zubov, February 1/12, M. A., IloJibiua, IX, 7. 
 
 3 Cf. Smolenski, op. cit., pp. 408 f.
 
 396 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 could only issue a new proclamation practically canceling the 
 preceding one and informing the nation that if there were any 
 hope left, it could be only in the magnanimity of the great Cath- 
 erine. 1 With that it was clear that every thought of national self- 
 defence had been abandoned. Poland lay helpless and passive 
 before her despoilers, while the leaders of the Confederation 
 thought only of making their escape from the scene. 
 
 In the middle of March, Potocki went off to St. Petersburg, 
 ostensibly in order to implore the Empress' protection for the 
 Republic. He was to return to the country only after the final 
 partition — ■ a Russian general. Branicki laid down his het- 
 man's staff, retired to the banks of the Neva, and became a 
 Russian subject. His worthy colleague Rzewuski remained for a 
 time nominally in office, busying himself chiefly with attempts to 
 whitewash himself before his fellow-countrymen and with desper- 
 ate and burning appeals to St. Petersburg. In words that well 
 sum up the tragedy of the Targowicians, he wrote: " Today I am 
 regarded as the opprobrium of my nation, as a man who bar- 
 gained to lead a people into error and to sacrifice the whole coun- 
 try to the interests of Russia. . . . Woe to the man who has to 
 deal with you Russians. I thought to establish the prosperity of 
 the Republic on eternal foundations: I was wrong. You have 
 wrought the ruin of my country and me." 2 
 
 The King, too, would gladly have joined in the general deban- 
 dade. Foreseeing what was coming, he wrote to the Empress 
 begging to be allowed to abdicate, if only his debts were paid. 3 
 His prayer was not granted : the Empress still had work for him 
 to do. 
 
 On April 7 the two partitioning Powers issued manifestoes 
 announcing the annexation of their respective acquisitions and 
 calling upon the inhabitants to take the oath of allegiance to 
 their new masters. Two days later Sievers and Buchholtz pre- 
 sented to the Generality at Grodno the long-expected formal 
 declarations of " the firm and irrevocable decision" of their Courts 
 
 1 Konfederacya targowicka, pp. 413 f. 
 
 2 Letter of March 11, 1793, probably to Zubov, M. A., IIo.TBma, IX, 1. 
 
 3 Letter of January 25, Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, pp. 80 f.
 
 THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN PARTITION TREATY 397 
 
 to execute a new partition. The Polish nation was invited to 
 convoke a Diet " in order to proceed amicably to the arrange- 
 ments and measures necessary to attain the salutary aim which 
 Their Majesties propose, that of securing to the Republic a firm, 
 durable, and unalterable peace." l It then remained only to 
 coerce the Poles into formally surrendering the half of their 
 country, and to provide against whatever opposition to the Parti- 
 tion might be forthcoming from foreign Powers. 
 
 1 See the Russian declaration, Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 306-309.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 The Attitude of Austria Towards the Partition 
 
 Although the St. Petersburg Convention seemed to assume that 
 Austria had acquiesced in advance in all the agreements that 
 might be concluded between her two allies, Russia and Prussia 
 saw fit to communicate the treaty at Vienna only after they had 
 virtually completed their arrangements for carrying it out. By 
 the express will of the Empress, 1 the negotiation had been kept 
 strictly secret from Louis Cobenzl, in spite of the latter's 
 reiterated and indignant protests. It was not until March 5 that 
 the ambassador could report that a convention had been signed; 
 and its contents remained unknown to him until after the act had 
 been sent to Vienna. 2 Meanwhile during the three months before 
 the blow fell, the Austrian cabinet presented the spectacle of a 
 ministry vaguely conscious of impending disaster, but helpless to 
 avert it, divided against itself, rejecting or postponing plan after 
 plan, perpetually waiting for a reply from one quarter and a 
 courier from another, incapable of making a vigorous decision of 
 any kind. 
 
 In January the main problem was how to gain some real secur- 
 ity for the effectuation of the Exchange, in case Russia and 
 Prussia refused to give the precise guarantees demanded. At the 
 ministerial Conference of January 3, the Vice-Chancellor Cobenzl 
 proposed that as the Empress had now given her consent to the 
 entry of Prussian troops into Poland, Austria also should tem- 
 porarily occupy certain territories in that Republic. As usual, 
 Lacy and his friends interposed a host of objections. It would be 
 imprudent, they urged, to divert any considerable body of troops 
 to the east, when all available forces were needed for the recovery 
 
 1 Goltz's report of January 18, 1793, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 135. 
 
 2 Cobenzl's reports of January-February, passim, and of March 5, V. A., Russ- 
 land, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 398
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 399 
 
 of the Netherlands. It would be impossible to decide upon the 
 territory to be occupied until the exact size of the lot claimed by 
 Prussia was known. The Conference finally resolved that if the 
 allied Powers refused to guarantee the realization of the Ex- 
 change, the Imperial Court should occupy only the fortresses of 
 Cracow and Kamieniec and the intervening strip of territory 
 along the frontier, although later on, after the precise area of the 
 Prussian acquisition was known, the occupation might be pro- 
 portionately extended. Owing to Lacy's meticulous anxiety not 
 to get a single village less than the King of Prussia, action was 
 thus indefinitely postponed. The net result of the Conference of 
 January 3 was that no effective measures whatever were taken to 
 obtain a security for the Exchange on the side of Poland. 1 
 
 There was one other means by which Austria might have safe- 
 guarded her interests and entered into possession of her indem- 
 nity at the same time as did Prussia. The highly suspicious 
 conduct of the Court of Munich still offered abundant excuse for 
 carrying out the plan discussed two months earlier between Spiel- 
 mann and the Prussians, the plan for the forcible sequestration of 
 Bavaria. If Cobenzl had had his way, it is probable that an 
 attempt would have been made to carry out this project; but 
 once more he encountered the opposition of Lacy and of Prince 
 Colloredo, the Chancellor of the Empire, who urged that such 
 violent measures would alienate all the German princes and 
 compromise the honor of the Imperial Court. If not definitely 
 abandoned, the plan was at least postponed until changes in the 
 military situation and the fall of Philip Cobenzl at last put an 
 end to it. 2 
 
 Hampered and thwarted in both his schemes for obtaining some 
 tangible security for the Exchange, the Vice-Chancellor could 
 only fall back on the uncertain resources of diplomacy; and here, 
 
 1 Cobenzl to Starhemberg, January 1, Lacy's volum of January 2 (erroneously 
 given as of January 3 and as written after the Conference, in Vivenot, ii, pp. 459 f.), 
 Conference protocol of January 3 and separat-vola, Vivenot, ii, pp. 456-461). 
 
 2 For the above: Cobenzl's correspondence with Lehrbach, January-March 
 1793, passim, V. A., Bayern, Expcd., and Berichte, 1793; Caesar's reports of 
 January 12, 26, February 13, B. A., R. 1, 174; vola of Lacy, Rosenberg, and Col- 
 loredo of January 12, Cobenzl to the Emperor the same day, V. A., Vortrdge, 1793.
 
 400 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 too, fortune was steadily adverse to him. On February 19 
 Razumovski communicated a dispatch from Ostermann contain- 
 ing a preliminary announcement as to the Partition Treaty. 
 After some explanation of the reasons that had led the Empress to 
 make a decision without a final consultation with Austria, the dis- 
 patch stated that she had provided for the Emperor's interests 
 in two equally effective ways, in such a manner that he could not 
 have done better himself, as he would be convinced as soon as the 
 completed act should be presented to him. She had, namely, 
 induced the King of Prussia to bind himself in the most formal 
 and positive manner to make common cause with the Court of 
 Vienna throughout the whole course of the war, and also to assist 
 powerfully and efficaciously both in the matter of the Bavarian 
 Exchange and in procuring "several otheradvantages" to Austria. 
 For the rest, it was said that it had been impossible to cut down 
 the size of the Prussian acquisition, in view of the consent pre- 
 viously given by the Emperor to all the King's demands; and no 
 direct reply was made to the Austrian request for a guarantee of 
 the Exchange. Immediately after Razumovski, Caesar made an 
 analogous communication in the name of his Court. 
 
 Cobenzl took these announcements with good grace. He 
 already knew that Russia and Prussia were negotiating a separate 
 convention, and he does not seem at this time to have felt much 
 uneasiness over the fact. In his reply to Caesar, however, he took 
 pains to indicate once more the provision in its favor to which 
 his Court attached the most importance, and which it confidently 
 expected to find in the treaty: namely, a clear and unequivocal 
 guarantee of the realization of the Exchange. 1 Reporting to the 
 Emperor, the Vice-Chancellor declared that a final judgment could 
 be formed only after the receipt of a detailed report of the Con- 
 vention from the ambassador in St. Petersburg; but meantime 
 he thought the prospects not unfavorable, although the refusal 
 to reduce the Prussian lot was as unexpected as the reason alleged 
 for not doing so was, according to the records, absolutely untrue. 2 
 
 1 Ostermann's dispatch of January 27/February 7, in Vivenot, ii, pp. 481- 
 484; Razumovski's report of February 9/20, M. A., ABCrpia, III, 54; Caesar's 
 report of February 25, B. A., R. 1, 174. 
 
 2 P. Cobenzl to the Emperor, February 21, Vivenot, ii, p. 481.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 40I 
 
 This somewhat optimistic mood must have been disturbed a 
 few days later by the arrival of an ominous report from Louis 
 Cobenzl as to the rigid secrecy with which the Russians concealed 
 from him their negotiation with Prussia. 1 The Austrians now 
 began to discover how completely they had played into the hands 
 of their allies; and in the following weeks their uneasiness and 
 their suspicions were increased by the inexplicable delay in the 
 communication of the Convention. 
 
 Almost at the same time with Razumovski's overtures, a 
 courier from London brought the reply of the British govern- 
 ment to the Austrian advances of December. The response was 
 favorable enough in so far as England, now committed to the war 
 with France, displayed a strong desire for a close understanding 
 with the Imperial Court; but as to the Bavarian Exchange, Lord 
 Grenville had raised so many objections that there could be little 
 doubt of the decided aversion felt at London towards that pro- 
 ject. On the other hand, he had held out hopes that if the Em- 
 peror would renounce that plan, England would gladly help him 
 to procure an indemnity at the expense of France. 2 
 
 The British answer made a deep impression at Vienna, the 
 more so in view of the bad news from St. Petersburg. The con- 
 viction was gaining ground that Cobenzl and Spielmann had 
 bungled sadly; that they had allowed themselves to be duped by 
 Russia and Prussia; and that by insisting further on their im- 
 practicable Exchange project, they would merely be alienating 
 England, the one ally from whom Austria might hope for loyal 
 assistance both in prosecuting the war and in securing a suitable 
 indemnity of some kind. Before the end of February the Emperor 
 was undoubtedly considering a change of ministry and a change 
 of system. A redoubtable competitor for Cobenzl's position was 
 already being brought to the front by the powerful Colloredo 
 family in the person of Baron von Thugut. 3 
 
 1 Report of February 13, which, being sent by courier, must have reached 
 Vienna about the 25th-2 7th, V. A.. Russland, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 2 Stadion's report of February 15, V. A., England, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 3 In January Thugut had been appointed political adviser to the commander- 
 in-chief, the Prince of Saxe-Coburg (Vivenot, ii, p. 466), but then the Emperor for 
 some unknown reason authorized him to delay his departure for the army (Thugut
 
 4-02 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 In a memorial which was probably presented to the Emperor 
 early in March, Thugut subjected the Vice-Chancellor's policy 
 to a searching criticism, and outlined a new program. He de- 
 clared that under the existing circumstances it was impossible 
 to ensure the ultimate realization of the Exchange sufficiently to 
 make that project the basis of a political system. On the most 
 favorable supposition, the Exchange could not be effected for two 
 or three years yet ; and during such a period no one could foresee 
 what events would occur to thwart a plan, the execution of which 
 depended on so many contingencies and on so many wills — on 
 the consent of the Elector and of all the members of his House, on 
 that of the Empire, Prussia, Russia, England, and so many 
 others. Austria could not afford to defer her indemnity to so 
 uncertain a future, or to rely on the promises of Prussia, when that 
 Power did not hesitate at present to violate openly the stipula- 
 tion which formed the cornerstone of the alliance — a perfect 
 equality in all ' advantages.' The Emperor's indemnification 
 must be based on another plan less complicated and better suited 
 to balance the dangerous aggrandizement of the Court of Berlin. 
 The precise nature of this plan Thugut did not attempt to fix at 
 that moment, but he suggested conquests from France. The 
 abandonment of that mirage, the Bavarian Exchange, an effort to 
 free the Imperial Court from too close dependence on a suspected 
 ally, close union with England, and vigorous prosecution of the 
 war with the aim of securing as soon as possible an indemnity 
 completely equal to that of Prussia — such were the chief points 
 in the new program. One can hardly deny that whatever were 
 the later results, it was better adapted to the existing situation 
 than Cobenzl's system. 1 
 
 to Colloredo, January 28, V. A., F. 446). In February the Baron began to fre- 
 quent the State Chancellery daily. On the 24th the Emperor ordered Cobenzl to 
 place all important documents without exception at Thugut's disposal, on the pre- 
 text of preparing him for his diplomatic mission (Vivenot, ii, pp. 485 f). In reality 
 Thugut was being prepared to take over Cobenzl's position, as appears from a 
 hitherto unpublished document in the Vienna Archives, written not later than 
 February 27 — a note in Thugut's hand, by which the Vice-Chancellor was to be 
 informed of his dismissal (V. A., Vortrage, 1793). Why the note was sent only 
 one month later is not entirely certain. 
 
 1 Thugut's memorial is printed in Vivenot, ii, pp. 498-501.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 403 
 
 Provided at last with a program and an able spokesman, the 
 party who had long been opposing the leading ministers re- 
 doubled their onslaughts. At the meeting of the Conference on 
 March 11, the Vice-Chancellor found his whole policy violently 
 assailed; and when pressed to explain precisely how matters 
 stood with Russia and Prussia, he was very nearly driven to the 
 wall. 1 His critics affirmed with much justice that he had practi- 
 cally given the other Powers carte blanche, without taking any 
 effective steps to prevent a separate negotiation between them or 
 to provide for Austrian interests. Kaunitz is said to have de- 
 clared to the Emperor that the mere possibility of a Russo-Prus- 
 sian convention on Polish affairs without the participation of 
 Austria was an unpardonable fault of the Imperial ministers. 2 
 Overwhelmed with reproaches, Cobenzl nightly poured out his 
 sorrows and anxieties to Razumovski, who could only offer his 
 personal opinion that the Empress would surely guarantee the 
 Exchange and might even admit an Austrian acquisition in 
 Poland, and who assured Caesar that he looked forward to the 
 coming of his courier as to the advent of the Messiah. 3 The town 
 was full of rumors of the impending ministerial revolution, which 
 was, indeed, virtually decided upon. If the Emperor delayed 
 announcing his intentions, it was apparently only because he 
 wished to await the communication of the Russo-Prussian Con- 
 vention. 
 
 On March 23 Razumovski and Caesar successively appeared at 
 the State Chancellery to present that long-expected treaty. The 
 sensation was indescribable. Cobenzl's consternation was such 
 that he could hardly speak. He flew to the map, stammering 
 incoherently: " This changes the whole system of Europe — the 
 French revolution is only child's play, compared with this event 
 — the Emperor must take a great decision — this will break my 
 
 1 Conference protocol and vota, Vivenot, ii, pp. 489-498. Caesar reported 
 (March 21) that Cobenzl was driven to declare — to the amazement of the Confer- 
 ence — that there was as yet no question of acquisitions on the part of the two 
 Northern Powers, but merely of the military occupation of Polish territory (!), 
 B. A., R. 1, 174. 
 
 2 Caesar's report of March 21, B. A., R. 1, 174. 
 
 3 Razumovski's reports of March 9/20 and 17/28, M. A., ABCTpia, III, 55.
 
 404 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 neck and my cousin's too." When Razumovski pressed for an 
 answer regarding the Emperor's accession to the treaty, Cobenzl 
 could reply only that he was too much agitated to speak of the 
 affair; he must have time to collect his ideas and to make his 
 report to his sovereign. 1 To Caesar the Vice-Chancellor de- 
 clared that the Convention was something so great, so decisive, so 
 different from all the preceding agreements that he simply could 
 not grasp it; he had been entirely ignorant of the extent of the 
 King's acquisition; nothing had been definitely arranged, con- 
 cluded, or signed with Austria, as had now been done between 
 Russia and Prussia; the previous negotiations had been mere 
 trifles compared to this. Spielmann was hardly less confused and 
 dismayed. Razumovski and Caesar could get no further reply 
 that day. 2 
 
 1 Razumovski's report of March 17/28, M. A., ABCTpia, III, 55. 
 
 Describing the scene when he presented the Convention to Cobenzl, Razumov- 
 ski wrote: " La sensation inexprimable qu'elle a faite sur lui, me persuade qu'effec- 
 tivement on ne s'etait pas doute le moins du monde de sa teneur. La consterna- 
 tion du comte de Cobenzl fut extreme; il se precipite a la carte geographique, 
 puis me balbutia maintes phrases qui peignaient l'agitation de son ame et la 
 confusion de ses idees ; comme par exemple, ' ceci change tout le systeme de 
 l'Europe ... la revolution de France n'est qu'un enfantillage en comparaison 
 de l'importance de cet evenement . . . il faut que l'Empereur prenne un grand 
 parti . . . voila qui me cassera le cou et a mon cousin aussi.' Je le laissais revenir 
 a. lui; je reclamais son attention sur ce que j'avais a dire touchant l'accession, a 
 laquelle S. M. Imperiale m'ordonnait d'inviter l'Empereur. II me repondit qu'il 
 n 'etait point en etat de me rien dire a cet egard, qu'il etait trop agite pour parler 
 de cette grande affaire, qu'il lui fallait du terns pour reprendre ses esprits et faire 
 son rapport a l'Empereur. . . . 
 
 Avant-hier je retournai chez le Comte de Cobenzl; je ne le trouvai ni plus rassure 
 ni mieux prepare a m'entendre. II me repeta encore qu'il ne pouvait revenir de 
 son etonnement; prenant ensuite le ton de la confiance et de l'amitie, il se plaignit 
 toujours du mystere qu'on leur avait fait, se lamenta sur l'etendue de notre acqui- 
 sition et surtout sur l'inconvenient de nous rendre limitrophes les uns des autres, 
 mais il se recria encore plus amerement sur la portion enorme du Roi de Prusse, 
 a laquelle il etait bien loin de s'attendre, ayant au contraire espere, d'apres leurs 
 sollicitations a notre Cour, qu'on chercherait a la restreindre plutot qu'a l'aug- 
 menter. . . ." Razumovski replied: "... Enfin Mr. le Comte, la chose est faite, 
 pouvez-vous Pempecher ? Des lors, je n'ai rien a dire. Mais comme j'en doute 
 fort, ne mettez done pas de la mauvaise grace a une mesure indispensable, et que 
 des retards inutiles n'augmentent pas le mecontentement que vous nous avez donn^ 
 plus d'une fois par des lenteurs. ..." 
 
 2 Caesar's report of March 24, B. A., R. 1, 174.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 40 5 
 
 The communication of the Convention sealed the fate of the 
 two leading ministers. On March 27, while the capital in gala 
 was celebrating the victory of Neerwinden, Cobenzl and Spiel- 
 mann received notes from the Emperor dismissing them from 
 their posts. 
 
 In his memoirs Cobenzl ascribed his fall to a cabal formed 
 against him by Colloredo, Rosenberg, Trautmansdorff, and 
 Thugut. 1 Doubtless personal rancors and intrigues played their 
 part in it, but from the political standpoint the Emperor's 
 decision seems fully justified. In judging the policy of the two 
 ministers one must bear in mind how constantly their better-laid 
 plans were thwarted by their opponents, and how much they had 
 to acquiesce in against their will; but in spite of this one can 
 hardly deny that they had adopted a disastrous political system, 
 and that it had had only too long a trial. Their first great mis- 
 take lay in taking up the Exchange project at such a time, and in 
 combining it with the nefarious Partition plan; their second lay 
 in holding to the scheme through thick and thin, after all the sad 
 experiences of the autumn and winter, to the neglect of every 
 other consideration. They had also confided overmuch in Prussia 
 and neglected Russia. Finally, not the least of their faults was 
 the mortal slowness of their conduct of affairs, their months of 
 silence and indecision, the timidity, the lack of energy, the dis- 
 organization that crept into the State Chancellery during their 
 year of control. It was time that their outworn system made way 
 for something less visionary, time that a strong and unfettered 
 hand took the helm. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Cobenzl's successor was Baron von Thugut, who here began the 
 stormy and tragic ministry which ended at Marengo. Thugut is 
 an enigmatic figure: the " Austrian Pitt " of some historians, the 
 " faunish Mephistopheles" or " the modern Borgia" of others. A 
 parvenu who had risen by immense industry, intelligence, and 
 some less creditable means, he far surpassed his immediate prede- 
 cessors in knowledge and experience, in the clearness and conse- 
 
 1 Arneth, Philipp Cobenzl und seine Memoir en, pp. 154 f.
 
 406 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 quence of his views, above all in the strength of his will, his ability 
 to dominate opposition, his justly celebrated courage. It was 
 said of him that he could not have been shaken by an earthquake. 
 But he missed greatness by a considerable margin. In his out- 
 look upon life, his aims and methods, his political morality, he 
 represented only too faithfully the sordid, cynical, unprincipled 
 eighteenth century at its worst. As a diplomat of the old school, 
 familiar with all the tricks of the trade, he believed that territorial 
 aggrandizement was the Alpha and Omega of statecraft, and that 
 all means were hallowed by that end. As a pupil of Kaunitz, he 
 had no stronger passion than hatred of Prussia. He was the last 
 man in the world to be repelled by the moral aspects of the parti- 
 tion of Poland, but no one could be more outraged than he by a 
 transaction which glutted the cupidity of the other Powers while 
 leaving his own Court empty-handed. 
 
 The first and the foremost task of the new ' General Director of 
 Foreign Affairs ' was to meet the situation created by the St. 
 Petersburg Convention, to repair — as far as might be — the 
 results of Cobenzl's bungling. And here, whatever might have 
 been his own ideas, he could hardly have ventured to propose an 
 unconditional acceptance of the treaty: the storm of indignation 
 at Vienna was far too strong. Throughout April and long after- 
 wards, the ' political circles ' in the capital alternately abused and 
 execrated the late ministers — Kaunitz referred to Spielmann as 
 " that scourge of Austria " — or raged at the perfidy of the parti- 
 tioning Powers, who had taken advantage of the confidence of the 
 Imperial Court to put through these vast plans, the full extent of 
 which could not even be conjectured. Poland had been anni- 
 hilated, it was said; a partition of Austria would be the next 
 project; Russia and Prussia had always been united when it 
 was a case of despoiling the Court of Vienna; the Emperor 
 would probably be reduced to the condition of a mere Elector 
 Palatine. 1 
 
 The causes of this ' indescribable sensation ' are easy to under- 
 stand. The partitioning Powers had themselves foreseen a 
 
 1 Zinzendorfs Diary, March 29, April 2, 19, 29, May 3, 19, June 5 (V. A.); 
 Casti, Lettere politiche, April 25, June 27, July 4, August 8.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 407 
 
 storm. 1 In the first place, the manner in which this affair had 
 been rushed through without the participation of Austria was 
 bad enough, and the mystery so long made of it was flatly in- 
 sulting. But apart from the form of the transaction, the sub- 
 stance of the treaty did not at all conform to the expectations and 
 desires of the Court of Vienna. The size of the Russian acquisi- 
 tion might well stagger the Austrian ministers: the Empress had 
 never uttered a word to them as to the extent of her claims. It 
 had always been a maxim of the Imperial Courts that Poland was 
 to be maintained as a fair-sized buffer state, but the Republic was 
 now to be reduced to a mere shadow. Another principle equally 
 accepted at all times between the neighboring Powers was vio- 
 lated by the new Russian frontier, which touched directly upon 
 Galicia; and almost as much by the Prussian acquisition of the 
 fortress of Czestochowa, which threatened the adjacent unpro- 
 tected Austrian province. These grievances were clear and un- 
 deniable, but they were not the only ones which the Emperor's 
 advisers felt themselves entitled to raise. 
 
 It was here that the fatal misunderstandings of December 
 began to appear in the most unpleasant light. If Haugwitz had 
 really received the declaration announced in his final report from 
 Vienna, the Austrian ministers were now guilty of a gross breach 
 of faith: in the contrary case, they were perfectly justified in 
 taking their stand on the text of the note of December 9 and the 
 instructions to Louis Cobenzl of the 23rd. From those documents 
 it could easily be proved that Austria had consented to an imme- 
 diate Prussian occupation in Poland only on the understanding 
 that the details of the convention were to be arranged by a con- 
 cert of the three Courts, and on condition either that the Em- 
 peror should be allowed to make a similar occupation temporarily, 
 or else that his allies should guarantee the realization of the Ex- 
 change. As has already been stated, it is uncertain whether 
 Haugwitz's assertions are accurate, but at any rate the language 
 of the Austrian cabinet in January accorded perfectly with the 
 view advanced at Vienna in April. If, on receiving the news of 
 
 1 The Prussian ministry to Caesar, March 15, 17, 24, B. A., R. 1, 174; Markov 
 to Razumovski, February 25/March 8, in Wassiltchikow, op. cit., pp. 167 f.
 
 408 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Catherine's consent to the immediate entry of the Prussians into 
 Poland, the Emperor wrote to congratulate the King on the ful- 
 filment of his wishes, the letter implied just the converse of the 
 meaning later ascribed to it on the Prussian side: it meant that 
 the Emperor considered the King's immediate desires satisfied by 
 an occupation de surete, although the partition had not been for- 
 mally effected. One would search in vain among the Austrian 
 utterances of December or January for an admission that the 
 Imperial Court had given Prussia carte blanche to go ahead, con- 
 clude a partition treaty, and execute it without a further word 
 from Vienna. Haugwitz later maintained, indeed, that he had in 
 December insisted daily on obtaining Austria's acquiescence in 
 the immediate formal prise de possession of the new Prussian 
 provinces, and in their immediate and complete incorporation in 
 the Prussian Monarchy; x but his reports of that month speak 
 only of a prise de possession effective or actuelle, which is by no 
 means the same thing and which would certainly not have been 
 taken as such by the Austrians. Had Haugwitz really employed 
 the language which he later claimed to have used, his master 
 would have been bound not to lift his hand towards the continua- 
 tion of the war until the formal annexation had actually taken 
 place. The fact that Frederick William announced his readiness 
 to continue his cooperation against France as soon as he was 
 assured of the entry of his troops into Poland, 2 certainly lent color 
 to the Austrian theory. 
 
 Another objection to the Convention raised at Vienna was that 
 the new Prussian acquisition went far beyond the limits pre- 
 viously announced to the Imperial Court. Here, also, one en- 
 counters an absolute contradiction between the statements 
 advanced by the two parties regarding their previous negotiations. 
 In May Haugwitz asserted that soon after the presentation of the 
 Note of Merle he had shown Spielmann the original map upon 
 which Frederick William at Consenvoye had traced the frontier of 
 
 1 Report to the King of May 6, 1793, B. A., R. 96, 147 H. (Printed in Appen- 
 dix XVI, 3). 
 
 2 Reuss' report of December 28, 1792, V. A., Preussen, Berichte; ministerial 
 rescript to Caesar, January 7, 1793, B. A., R. 1, 174. 

 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 409 
 
 his desired acquisition. 1 I know of only one previous allusion to 
 this: a somewhat similar but less definite statement in a letter of 
 Haugwitz to Lucchesini of January 21. 2 The Prussian envoy's 
 reports of December contain absolutely no reference to the exact 
 limits of his master's territorial claims. The Austrian records are 
 almost equally blank. Spielmann had, indeed, sent in from 
 Luxemburg a map showing the acquisition desired by Prussia in 
 case of the realization of the plan which he and Haugwitz had 
 agreed upon before the worst disasters of the campaign set in; and 
 from a letter of Haugwitz to Schulenburg 3 it appears that this 
 acquisition was identical with the one assured to Prussia by the 
 Partition Treaty. This plan, however, had been abandoned after 
 the presentation of the Note of Merle. After that note, Spiel- 
 mann seems to have believed that the King would claim only the 
 arrondissement proposed by Schulenburg at Mainz; 4 and that 
 idea is clearly conveyed in whatever allusions we have to the sub- 
 ject in the later Austrian acts — in the secret instructions to 
 Louis Cobenzl and in the Conference protocol of January 3? In 
 view of the meticulous attention with which the Austrians were 
 accustomed to scrutinize the territorial claims of Prussia, it is 
 inconceivable that they would not have noted — and protested 
 about — the difference between the acquisition proposed at 
 Mainz and that bounded by the line Czgstochowa-Rawa-Soldau, 
 if they had known of it. The difference was regarded by the 
 Prussians as a sufficient indemnity for a second campaign, and 
 was so great that the Berlin ministry hesitated for a time to pro- 
 pose the second line of demarcation at St. Petersburg. Once 
 
 1 The above-cited retrospective report of May 6. 
 
 2 B.A., R. 92, N. L. 31. 
 
 In this letter Haugwitz wrote: " Je prie V. Exc. instamment d'assurer a Sa 
 Majeste que le Consentement der Eigenthums-Besitznehmung des Arrondissements 
 Seiner Majestat in Pohlen, tel que je l'ai trace" au Baron de Spielmann a Luxem- 
 bourg a 6t6 formel et donne" de facon que la Cour de Vienne ne peut pas se r6tracter 
 sans deshonneur." 
 
 3 Letter of October 27, 1792, referring to the earlier negotiation, which, as 
 Haugwitz hastened to add, had had absolutely no consequences, B. A., R. IX, 
 Frankreich, 89 A". 
 
 4 See the passage in his report of November 6, Vivenot, ii, p. 342. 
 
 5 Vivenot, ii, pp. 429 and 457.
 
 410 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 more one is driven to the conclusion that either Haugwitz or 
 Spielmann had failed to inform their Courts correctly of what had 
 passed between them. But if the Emperor and — at least most 
 of — his advisers had supposed that Prussia's claims went no 
 further than the line proposed at Mainz, had found even those 
 demands excessive, and had begged Russia to reduce them, it is 
 easy to understand what must have been their astonishment and 
 indignation to find that the Empress had granted Prussia a vastly 
 larger lot, of which the cabinet of Vienna had hitherto not been 
 informed at all. 1 
 
 Finally, the Convention of St. Petersburg did not accord to 
 Austria either of the two securities which that Court had de- 
 manded as the price of its consent to the Prussian occupation in 
 Poland. The promise of good offices and ' other efficacious means ' 
 to facilitate the Exchange was very far from being the desired 
 guarantee. The promise of ' other advantages compatible with 
 the general convenience ' was as unsubstantial as thin air. The 
 sum of the matter was that the partitioning Powers had made sure 
 of their own acquisitions, assumed the acquiescence of Austria in 
 all that they chose to agree upon in secret, and offered her in 
 return castles in Spain. Little wonder that the Austrians felt 
 themselves in every way injured, deceived, and mocked. 
 
 Thugut presented his ideas about the reply to be made to 
 Russia and Prussia in a memorial submitted to his sovereign on 
 April 4. 2 In view of considerations substantially the same as 
 those discussed above, he found that the Emperor's interests and 
 dignity forbade him to accede unconditionally to the Convention, 
 although on the other hand circumstances rendered it inadvisable 
 to refuse accession entirely. He therefore advised demanding a 
 rectification of the proposed boundaries, to the end that neither 
 
 1 Sybel declares that in this matter, as in everything else concerning the Prussian 
 claims, the Austrians had been exactly informed in advance by Haugwitz (op. cit., 
 iii, p. 262). Heidrich is of the opinion that no communication of the final Prussian 
 line of demarcation had been made to the Austrians, since — as he, strangely 
 enough, asserts — this line did not differ essentially from that previously announced 
 {op. cit., pp. 445 f.). 
 
 2 This document is printed in Vivenot, Thugut und sein politisches System, pp. 
 378-383.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 411 
 
 acquisition should directly touch, or even approach too near, 
 Galicia ; and he laid it down as the conditio sine qua non of the 
 Emperor's accession that the indemnities of Austria must be 
 determined in advance in a manner that would ensure to the 
 Imperial Court a perfect equality with its allies with regard not 
 only to the intrinsic value of its acquisitions but also to security 
 in obtaining them. 
 
 In Thugut's opinion the Partition Treaty had changed the sit- 
 uation so entirely and had gone so far beyond the proportions of 
 the original indemnity project that it was necessary for Austria to 
 base her indemnification on quite a new plan. The Bavarian 
 Exchange, he held, could never be put into the balance against 
 the enormous acquisitions of Prussia and Russia. It would entail 
 a loss of a million in population and four million florins in revenue, 
 while affording no advantage save that of rounding out the 
 Austrian frontier. Prussia's acquisition, on the other hand, com- 
 bined absolute advantages of every kind. Were the original 
 indemnity plan to be realized, the balance of power between the 
 two German Courts would be shifted by almost three millions in 
 population and eight or nine millions in revenue to the advantage 
 of Prussia. Thugut therefore proposed to abandon the project 
 agreed upon the previous May between Schulenburg and Spiel- 
 mann, to return to the original principle of the concert — a per- 
 fect equality in the respective indemnities — and to build up a 
 new system on that basis. Precisely what the new plan would be, 
 he was not yet in a position to say. It was first of all necessary to 
 know the exact value of the acquisitions of the other Courts. 
 Besides, he hoped that those Courts might be induced to propose 
 acquisitions to Austria. His calculation — which does not do 
 him great credit — was, probably, that it was more advantageous 
 to accept than to make such propositions. He also seems to have 
 feared that if he announced his indemnity plans too early, Prussia 
 would not fail to abuse his confidence and to raise heaven and 
 earth to cut down the Austrian aggrandizement. In this his intu- 
 itions did not deceive him. The essential thing at present, he held, 
 was to sound the two allies, whose good intentions were open to 
 some doubts, and to secure, if possible, an agreement on principles.
 
 412 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 It had been one of the faults of Spielmann and Cobenzl that 
 they had left questions of principle in more or less obscurity. 
 Thugut meant to follow a more systematic course, and to advance 
 surely from step to step by clear and definite agreements. Such a 
 course involved delays, and he recognized it. But he believed 
 that the partitioning Powers would not be able to carry out their 
 plans so speedily ; the least sign of opposition from England would 
 probably encourage the Poles to a desperate resistance; in that 
 case the two Powers might find themselves in need of Austria's 
 support, and the Emperor would be in a position to sell his acces- 
 sion to the treaty at a good price. 
 
 His sovereign having readily approved this program, Thu- 
 gut began his campaign with the instructions sent on April 14 to 
 Reuss and Louis Cobenzl. 1 In these dispatches he set forth the 
 reasons which prevented the Emperor from acceding to the St. 
 Petersburg Convention except under conditions that would 
 properly safeguard the interests of Austria; he reviewed the 
 whole history of the negotiation on the indemnity question, and, 
 without stating precisely what acquisition his Court now con- 
 templated, labored to build up his principle of ' equality ' on the 
 basis of the agreements entered into between the allies at the 
 beginning of the war. This historical excursus was not of a nature 
 to please the Prussians: it was to be the beginning of a long liti- 
 gation fraught with the most unhappy results. In general, how- 
 ever, both replies were couched in moderate terms; there was 
 nothing to suggest threats or open opposition; on the contrary, 
 Austria expressed the willingness to acquiesce in all that had been 
 done, providing her allies showed her an equal regard. 2 
 
 1 Vivenot, iii, pp. 11-23. 
 
 2 I am at a loss to understand where Sybel got the idea that on April 4 Thugut 
 made a declaration to Caesar and Razumovski to the effect that the Emperor refused 
 to accede to the Convention, renounced the Exchange, demanded French territories 
 and a province in Poland, etc. (op. cit., iii, p. 266). As can be proved from the re- 
 ports of both envoys, no declaration at all was made at this time (it was only on 
 April 16 that Thugut announced to the two envoys the decision conveyed in the 
 dispatches to Reuss and Cobenzl of the 14th); and it is important to notice the 
 fact, since this apocryphal declaration cannot be used to justify certain proceedings 
 which took place on the Prussian side before the Emperor's reply was really first 
 announced by Reuss at the King of Prussia's headquarters on April 21.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 413 
 
 Thugut was, of course, well aware that mere arguments, how- 
 ever well grounded, were not particularly effective at Berlin and 
 St. Petersburg. It was necessary to supply the other Powers with 
 more cogent motives for obliging Austria. But here, if ever, 
 thrice-sealed secrecy was indispensable. It was useless to attempt 
 action at Grodno, where the Polish Diet was about to assemble, 
 for a secret negotiation with the Poles was of all things the most 
 impossible. Under the urgent pressure of Razumovski, de Cache 
 was, indeed, instructed to go to Grodno, but he was ordered to 
 maintain an entirely passive conduct — a role for which he was 
 eminently fitted, as his Court had never allowed him to play any 
 other. 1 It was England to whom the honor was to be reserved of 
 pulling the chestnuts out of the fire. On April 14 Thugut in- 
 structed Mercy to communicate to the British government as 
 much of the Convention as seemed advisable, and to urge that, as 
 the Emperor, although far from wishing a new partition, was 
 unable to oppose one openly, it behooved England to intervene at 
 Berlin and St. Petersburg with representations that might at 
 least lead those Courts to reduce their territorial claims and to 
 postpone the execution of their plans. He also suggested that 
 were England to give some slight signs of sympathy for the Poles, 
 the latter might be encouraged to resist the partition, and thus 
 much valuable time would be gained. 2 In conversation with Sir 
 Morton Eden, the British ambassador, Thugut expressed himself 
 vigorously about the dangers resulting from the enormous ag- 
 grandizement and the measureless ambitions of Russia and Prus- 
 sia; and as a bid for British support against those two Powers, he 
 even declared that the Emperor was ready to desist from the plan 
 for the exchange of the Netherlands out of deference for England. 3 
 
 1 Orders to de Cache" of April 3 and 20, V. A., Polen., Expeditionen, 1793. 
 Sybel's repeated assertions (op. cit., iii, p. 269; H. Z., xxiii, p. 93) that de Cache" 
 was ordered to stir up the Poles secretly to resistance are utterly unfounded. 
 
 Thugut to de Cache, April 3: " Uebrigens haben sich Ew. Exc. iiber die vorlie- 
 genden Pohlnischen Umstande aller Aeusserungen gegen wen immer zu enthalten, 
 und alle Anfragen mit ganzlichem Abgang von Instructionen zu beantworten." 
 
 Thugut to de Cach6, April 20: " Vor der Hand haben Sie sich daselbst [in 
 Grodno] in die Rolle eines aufmerksamen Beobachters und ruhigen Zuschauers 
 lediglich zu beschranken. ..." 2 Vivenot, ii, pp. 24 ff. 
 
 3 Eden to Grenville, April 15, Herrmann, Erganzungsband, pp. 386 ff.
 
 414 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 The new minister had thus begun his campaign by undertaking 
 two distinct and somewhat contradictory actions. On the one 
 hand, by protests, recriminations, and arguments he attempted to 
 induce Russia and Prussia to modify their agreements in such a 
 way as to provide effectively for the Emperor's interests: on the 
 other hand, by intrigues with England he hoped to raise up such 
 obstacles in the way of the partitioning Powers as would render 
 them more amenable to the demands of Austria. To frustrate 
 entirely the dismemberment of Poland was something which he 
 probably neither expected nor desired to do; but he did intend to 
 impede and delay the consummation of the partition until Russia 
 and Prussia could be brought to pay a sufficient price for Austria's 
 cooperation. 
 
 This policy, which was to have such unhappy consequences, has 
 often been severely condemned by historians. It was, indeed, 
 unfortunate that Thugut began at once with a double game. His 
 insinuations to England, although quite in the approved diplo- 
 matic style of the period, were to bring him no laurels. They 
 straightway came to the knowledge of Razumovski, and one can 
 imagine the indignation they produced at St. Petersburg. But 
 the refusal to accede unconditionally to the Partition Treaty was 
 not without much justification. It may well be doubted whether 
 any Power not in the last extremities would have submitted with- 
 out a word of protest to such treatment as Austria had met with 
 from her allies. At that moment, in view of the triumphant 
 recovery of the Netherlands, the Court of Vienna did not feel 
 itself in extremities. Thugut had no intention of breaking with 
 the partitioning Powers. It may well have seemed that with a 
 display of firmness Austria could secure an acceptable price for 
 her accession to the Convention. The conditions proposed by 
 Thugut were, in strict justice, sufficiently well founded. To con- 
 demn Austria for a shocking breach of faith in not submitting 
 unconditionally, to represent Prussia as the really aggrieved party 
 in this transaction, seems a singular perversion of the case. 1 
 
 1 I am referring, of course, to the view advanced by Sybel, op. cit., iii, pp. 266 ff., 
 and H. Z., xxiii, pp. 85 ff . For the contrary view, substantially the one I have taken, 
 see Hiiffer, Oestreich und Preussen, pp. 132 ff., and Erganzungsband, pp. 32-35. 

 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 415 
 
 Whether Thugut's policy was politically wise, is, of course, 
 another question. To understand its consequences, one must 
 glance at the temper, plans, and calculations of the cabinet of 
 Berlin. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Since the conclusion of the St. Petersburg Convention the 
 Prussian ministry had been largely occupied with devising means 
 for evading as far as possible the obligations imposed by that 
 treaty. How to avoid continuing the war after the close of the 
 present year, how to thwart the Bavarian Exchange — " that 
 fatal project " — while still keeping up the appearance of favoring 
 it, how to reduce to the minimum the ' additional advantages ' 
 stipulated for Austria in the Convention — those were subjects 
 for maturest deliberation. Long before the Court of Vienna had 
 announced its attitude towards the Partition Treaty, the Prussian 
 ministers were agreed that their master could not make a third 
 campaign without being assured of still a further ' indemnity ' in 
 territory or money; ' they were already sounding the alarm at St. 
 Petersburg with regard to Austria's " insidious designs " on Alsace 
 and Lorraine; 2 and they were secretly laboring to encourage the 
 Duke of Zweibriicken in his opposition to the Exchange, and to 
 bring him into close relations with England, which might be 
 expected to stand forth openly as his protector. 3 This attempt 
 to play off England against the Exchange was quite on a par with 
 
 1 This appears from Haugwitz's retrospective letter to Lucchesini of July 1, 
 1793, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 31. 
 
 2 Lucchesini's letter to the cabinet ministry of April 3, their reply of April 8, 
 B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14; rescript to Goltz of the 9th, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 135. 
 Cf. Lucchesini's memorial to the King of March 17, printed in [Schladen's] Mitihcil- 
 ungen ans den nachgelassenen Paplcrcn cities preussischen Diplomalen, pp. 155-170. 
 
 3 Lucchesini's letters to the cabinet ministers of April 9, 15, 16, 22; their letter 
 to him of the 21st, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 Lucchesini wrote (April 15): " Le Due de Deux-Ponts m'a paru dispose de faire 
 quelques demarches aupres de l'Angleterre pour la determiner a. prendre en conside- 
 ration les dangers qu'elle courroit ... si elle ne fesoit point tomber le projet du 
 troc. Comme Mylord Elgin va s'etablir au Quartier General, et que le Due de 
 Deux-Ponts est intentionne d'y venir remercier Sa Majeste de la visite qu'Elle lui 
 a faite a. Manheim, je n'ai pas cru devoir retenir ce Prince de s'ouvrir confidentielle- 
 ment a ce Ministre Anglais. . . . J'ai meme juge etre de l'interet du Roi d'appuyer
 
 416 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Thugut's nearly contemporaneous effort to induce the same 
 Power to oppose the Partition. It is hard to see that either of the 
 high allies yielded to the other in the matter of duplicity. At any 
 rate, there was plenty of material on hand for discussion between 
 the two Courts. To imagine that had the Emperor only acceded 
 unconditionally to the Convention of St. Petersburg, all trouble 
 would have been avoided and the coalition would have advanced 
 in perfect harmony, would be decidedly naive. 
 
 After the communication of that Convention at Vienna, the 
 Prussians awaited the Emperor's reply with a sort of malicious 
 curiosity, but with no trace of anxiety. The ministers at Berlin 
 expected that in spite of her jealousy Austria would end by acced- 
 ing, but the more far-sighted Lucchesini prophesied conditions and 
 long discussions. The situation was, however, quite to his taste. 
 " If the Emperor accedes," he wrote, " he will subscribe to very 
 considerable acquisitions in favor of other Powers, while obtaining 
 for himself nothing but hopes exposed to the inexhaustible chapter 
 of future accidents. If he refuses us his assent, the two partition- 
 ing Courts will keep their acquisitions none the less, and will find 
 themselves freed from all the obligations that they have con- 
 tracted in favor of the Court of Vienna." The Berlin ministry 
 professed themselves charmed by Lucchesini's exposition of this 
 "admirable dilemma"; they assured him that they meant to 
 improve to the utmost the "beautiful situation " resulting from 
 the expected embroilments between the Imperial Courts. 1 
 
 On April 21 Reuss presented the Emperor's answer at Frederick 
 William's headquarters. The effect was most unpleasant. The 
 
 en mon particulier cette idee, sans en laisser cependant aucun t£moignage de mon 
 approbation." 
 
 April 16, Lucchesini continued: " Je l'ai mis [the Duke] sur les voyes pour qu'il 
 parvienne ... a avoir un entretien sur cet objet avec Mylord Elgin. . . ." 
 
 April 21, the ministers at Berlin replied: " Nous applaudissons . . . aux en- 
 couragemens indirects que V. Exc. lui a donnes [the Duke] .... Malgre toute 
 notre aversion pour ce funeste projet [the Exchange], nous n'en persistons pas 
 moins a croire que le Roi doit avoir l'air de le favoriser, d'apres les engagemens 
 qu'il a contractus. ... II suffiroit selon nous de mettre le Due de Deux-Ponts en 
 relation avec Mylord Elgin, pour etre sur que sa proposition sera bien recue. . . ." 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, March 31, their replies of April 4 and 
 11, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 417 
 
 Prussians, although prepared for objections, had not expected the 
 Imperial Court to disavow the engagements which, according to 
 Haugwitz, it had contracted in December. From their stand- 
 point, they were quite justified in considering this a gross breach 
 of faith. The ministry at Berlin pronounced Thugut's reply " a 
 veritable labyrinth of false assertions, captious arguments, and 
 insidious propositions," which deserved to be solidly refuted. 1 
 Haugwitz, as the man whose honor was involved, was called upon 
 to enter the lists. He drew up a memorial 2 recounting his entire 
 negotiation at Vienna and Luxemburg, and proving to the satis- 
 faction of his colleagues that the Austrian ministry had in Decem- 
 ber consented unconditionally to the immediate occupation and 
 annexation of precisely those territories which had been assigned 
 to the King by the Partition Treaty. Lucchesini, thus thrice- 
 armed, then went forth to confound the Austrians. 
 
 His note verbale to Reuss of May 15 is a document which has 
 hitherto received little notice, but which deserves a prominent 
 place in the history of the disruption of the Austro-Prussian 
 alliance. Thugut had invited a discussion on principles ; he had 
 sought especially to reassert that original principle of perfect 
 equality in the respective indemnities, which, as even the Berlin 
 ministry in confidential moments admitted, 3 had been agreed 
 upon between the two Courts at the beginning of the war. The 
 Prussians took up the challenge and replied with the first clear 
 expression since the Note of Merle of their position on the in- 
 demnity question. There were two ways of defending that posi- 
 tion. The one hitherto employed consisted in maintaining that 
 the unexpected turn of the war had completely changed the 
 character of the enterprise, and that the Note of Merle must 
 therefore be regarded as superseding all previous engagements. 4 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, April 22, their reply of the 28th, B. A., loc.cit. 
 
 2 Report to the King, May 6, B. A., R. 96, 147 H (printed in part in Appendix 
 
 XVI, 3). 
 
 3 E. g., in the ministerial rescript to Caesar of March 8: 
 
 " Je suis bien loin de meconnoitre, que dans l'origine les indemnit6s des deux 
 Cours devoient aller de pair, les miennes devant se trouver en Pologne et celles de 
 la Cour Imp6riale par le troc de la Baviere ou par d'autres avantages equivalens." 
 
 4 This is the view advanced in the rescript to Caesar cited above. 
 
 " Mais depuis que des evenemens impreVus . . . nous ont oblig6s de songer a
 
 41 8 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Lucchesini chose, however, the other and bolder course of denying 
 the previous engagements altogether. In his note to Reuss he 
 declared that the principle of parity had never been explicitly 
 recognized by Prussia as applicable to the indemnity question; he 
 asserted — on the strength of Haugwitz's (quite untrue) state- 
 ment — that that envoy had always maintained, from the very 
 beginning of his ministry at Vienna, that if Austria had any rights 
 to an indemnity, they could not be placed in the same category 
 with those of Prussia. The King was merely partie accessoire et 
 auxiliaire in the war, and was sacrificing himself for a cause not his 
 own — for the defence of Austria; the Imperial Court ought to be 
 grateful that he did not claim an indemnity at its expense, but 
 was willing to seek one instead in Poland. If that Court had any 
 titles of its own to an indemnity, they could apply only to France, 
 and could never be admitted to be of the same nature or validity 
 as, or to stand in any connection with, the rights of Prussia. 1 
 
 This note was the counterpart of Thugut's recent pronounce- 
 ment. The Austrians denied the concessions relating to Poland 
 which Haugwitz claimed to have received; the Prussians denied 
 the agreements and principles on which the alliance and the con- 
 cert against France had been based. The issue was thus squarely 
 drawn. The two Powers proclaimed quite contradictory views 
 regarding their past and their present relations. While each held 
 to its own standpoint, a reconciliation was impossible. 
 
 There were two important omissions in the note of May 15. In 
 the first place, no further attempt was made to persuade Austria 
 to accede to the Partition Treaty. The explanation is obvious. 
 With the probable exception of the King, none of the Prussians 
 really desired the Emperor's accession. They had no fear that 
 Austria would be able to prevent the execution of the partition, 
 and they reflected, as Haugwitz wrote to Lucchesini: " If the 
 
 une continuation de la guerre de France, qui ne regarde directement et principale- 
 ment que la Cour de Vienne, j'ai du stipuler les conditions sous lesquelles seules 
 je pouvois me preter a y concourir ulterieurement, . . . et il ne depend plus de la 
 Cour de Vienne . . . de vouloir en revenir a celui [the principle] d'une reciprocity 
 rigoureuse, a laquelle depuis ce changement de circonstances, elle n'a certainement 
 plus les memes titres." 
 
 1 This note is printed in Vivenot, iii, pp. 63-67.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 419 
 
 Court of Vienna had hastened to accede unconditionally to the 
 Convention of St. Petersburg, the evil would be done, and we 
 could no longer set limits to our cooperation in the war. ..." 
 " This refusal, if we are fortunate enough to see it maintained, 
 delivers us from this very onerous obligation . . . and we shall 
 no longer be bound to Austria except by the provisional promise 
 of cooperation contained in the Note of Merle, which relates only 
 to the present campaign." 
 
 Secondly, Lucchesini's note contained only the vaguest assur- 
 ances with respect to the Austrian indemnities. Thugut's demand 
 had put the Prussians in a really embarrassing position, for it was 
 impossible for them to press very far the distinction which they 
 had set up between their own and the Emperor's rights to an 
 acquisition, without also invalidating the claims of Russia. 
 Hence Lucchesini had not dared to deny Austria an indemnity 
 altogether, but had announced that his master would consult 
 with the Empress on that " important subject," and that ' he 
 flattered himself that his past conduct and his known principles 
 would be a sufficient guarantee of his zeal to contribute to the 
 satisfaction and the advantages of his ally.' In reality, the 
 Prussian ministry hoped that ' the Court of Russia, driven out of 
 patience by the tergiversations of Austria, would end by excluding 
 that Power entirely from the advantages stipulated in its favor by 
 the St. Petersburg Convention, this consequence flowing naturally 
 from the [Emperor's] refusal to accede.' Still, as they wrote to 
 Goltz, ' it was not yet time to touch that chord.' They preferred 
 to let the Empress speak first on so delicate a matter. 2 
 
 At the first signs of opposition from Austria, the partitioning 
 Powers had exchanged assurances that they would not allow 
 themselves to be deterred thereby in the execution of their plans. 3 
 The Russians were irritated enough at the — to them — unex- 
 pected stand taken by the Court of Vienna, but they were by no 
 means alarmed. Having just cemented their relations with 
 England by the convention signed March 25 (regarding a com- 
 
 1 Letters of May 5 and 10, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 31. 
 
 2 Rescript to Goltz of May 6, B. A., R. XI, Russland, 135. 
 
 3 Rescript to Goltz of April 5, Goltz's report of April 16, B. A., he. cit.
 
 420 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 mon policy, if not a common action, against France), they found 
 Austria powerless to harm and themselves in position to wait 
 tranquilly until the Emperor ' returned to reason.' x Hence 
 Cobenzl's complaints and recriminations fell upon deaf ears. 
 The Russian ministers always replied that they had consented to 
 a negotiation with Prussia only at the request of Austria; that 
 Goltz had repeatedly assured them that the Court of Vienna had 
 acquiesced in all his master's demands; that once the affair had 
 been begun, it had been necessary to put it through without 
 delay; that it was impossible now to retrace their steps or to alter 
 the terms of the treaty; that Kamieniec and the territory adja- 
 cent to Galicia could not be restored to Poland, because the in- 
 habitants had already taken the oath of allegiance to the Empress. 
 Cobenzl soon convinced himself that it would be utterly impossi- 
 ble to secure any changes in the Convention. 
 
 On the other hand, the Russian ministers showed a real eager- 
 ness to obtain the Emperor's accession to the treaty, and were 
 lavish with assurances that their sovereign would do anything in 
 her power to provide an equal indemnity for Austria. " Flanders, 
 Lorraine, Alsace," said Markov, " offer you a vast field for ac- 
 quisitions, and you can exchange what is not to your convenience. 
 The King of Prussia offers to consent to the secularization of 
 some bishoprics in Germany; take advantage of that. England 
 will not be at all averse to the acquisitions that you may wish to 
 make at the expense of France; perhaps it will not think the same 
 of the Bavarian Exchange; but by acceding to the Convention 
 you will give us the right to speak firmly and to oblige Prussia 
 to do likewise." The Empress' generosity with other people's 
 property knew but one limit: when Cobenzl suggested that Aus- 
 tria might finally have to take her share in Poland, he was told 
 with some emotion that there would then be nothing left of that 
 unfortunate kingdom, and that it was the more uncalled for to 
 put it out of existence because if the King of Prussia were once 
 " bound," nothing could prevent Austria from finding her indem- 
 nity elsewhere. In general, the Russian ministers were over- 
 
 1 Markov to S. R. Vorontsov, April 29/May 10, Apx. Bop., xiv, pp. 253 f.; 
 Ostermann to Razumovski, May 16/27, M. A., ABdpia, III, 54.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 42 1 
 
 flowing with friendship, professed to love the Austrian alliance as 
 much as they hated the Prussian one, and dwelt with unction on 
 the approach of the day when the one ' natural system ' could be 
 established — a combination of the Imperial Courts and Eng- 
 land. 1 Their final answer was given, however, only after they had 
 learned what reply Prussia had made to Austria. Then through 
 the dispatches to Razumovski of May 16/27 the Empress an- 
 nounced her firm resolution to uphold the St. Petersburg Con- 
 vention, and pressed vigorously for the Emperor's accession — 
 for the quite disinterested reason that otherwise the Court of 
 Vienna could not obtain from that of Berlin the least favor or 
 even strict justice. In truth, the Empress desired Austria's 
 accession for the same reason for which the Prussians would have 
 preferred to avoid it: without it the Court of Berlin would have 
 an excuse for withdrawing from the war. In the same dispatches 
 the cabinet of St. Petersburg invited the Emperor to choose 
 whatever he found to his convenience in France, with assurances 
 that Russia would not oppose. If the Court of Vienna could be 
 induced to base its hopes on conquests in the West, the war would 
 last all the longer. 
 
 Through Alopeus the Prussians were informed of as much of 
 this reply as they were fitted to receive, with the reassuring ex- 
 planation that the Austrians were never likely to make conquests 
 extensive enough to cause alarm. 2 The Berlin ministry were 
 delighted that the Empress had not revived the Exchange pro- 
 ject; they resolved to follow her cue and to divert the Court of 
 Vienna to the path of conquest, with the mental reservation that 
 they would make it their affair to set just limits to the Emperor's 
 aspiring course. Hence they now delivered through Caesar their 
 promised reply on the subject of the indemnities of Austria. 3 
 This reply was couched in a much friendlier tone than the note of 
 May 15. It expressed the King's continued readiness to do what- 
 ever he could to procure for Austria a just indemnity, either by 
 
 1 For the above: Cobenzl's reports of April 30, May 10, and 31, V. A., Russ- 
 land, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 2 Ostermann to Alopeus, May 16/27, M. A., ITpyccifl, III, 3T. 
 
 3 The cabinet ministry to Lucchesini, June 11, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14; rescript 
 to Caesar, June 10, B. A., R. 1, 174.
 
 422 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 his good offices in the matter of the Bavarian Exchange, or, if the 
 Court of Vienna, considering the difficulties in the way of that 
 project, preferred to take its indemnities at the expense of France, 
 by cooperation to that end with all means that lay within his 
 power. His Majesty desired only to be informed of the precise 
 extent of the acquisitions that the Emperor desired to make in 
 that quarter, and he flattered himself that these acquisitions 
 could be secured by the end of the present campaign. This last 
 phrase was intended at Berlin, and understood at Vienna, as an 
 intimation that the King did not bind himself to continue the war 
 beyond the close of that year. This was, indeed, the crux of 
 Prussia's position. Chiefly out of regard for the Empress, 
 Frederick William's ministers had not dared refuse Austria an 
 indemnity altogether; they were mortally anxious to divert the 
 ambitions of that Power away from Bavaria; but they were no 
 less anxious that the satisfaction of those ambitions should not 
 involve a third campaign. How to wriggle out of this embarrass- 
 ing situation was the problem that occupied the cabinet of Berlin 
 for the next three months. 
 
 England had meanwhile replied to Thugut's overtures in a 
 manner at least half satisfactory. It was true that the British 
 ministers could offer little consolation with regard to Poland; for 
 while expressing freely their regret and disgust at the proceedings 
 of Russia and Prussia, they admitted that the French war ren- 
 dered it absolutely impossible for them to oppose the Partition. 
 On the other hand, however, they showed the utmost willingness 
 to assist Austria to secure a handsome acquisition at the expense 
 of France, and they left no doubt that they were eager for a close 
 alliance with the Imperial Court. 1 
 
 By the middle of June Thugut's first action might be regarded 
 as at an end. He had failed to secure any modification of the 
 Partition Treaty, or any postponement of its execution. There 
 was nothing left to be done except to accede on as favorable con- 
 ditions as could be obtained with regard to the Austrian indemni- 
 ties. As far as these indemnities were concerned, the replies from 
 
 1 Stadion's report of May 10, and those of his successor, Starhemberg, of May 24 
 and 31, V. A., England, Berichte, 1793.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 423 
 
 Russia and England were not unpromising; and Prussia, although 
 denying the principle of ' parity,' still professed her eagerness to 
 know and to concur in the Emperor's desires. On the basis of 
 these results, Thugut's policy entered upon a new phase. 
 
 IV 
 
 Since inaugurating his first action, the Director-General had 
 been busy planning a revision of the map of Europe. The more 
 clearly he saw the impossibility of impeding the execution of the 
 Partition Treaty, the more passionately he clung to the idea of 
 procuring for Austria acquisitions that would fully counterbalance 
 those of her allies. Aggrandizement in one quarter or another 
 became his first and last thought, and he turned his eyes in every 
 direction restlessly seeking whom or what he might devour. The 
 problem was not a little difficult. 
 
 The Bavarian Exchange being now definitely abandoned as 
 impracticable, the most obvious expedient was conquests from 
 France — a course which all the allied Powers combined to urge 
 upon Austria. Count Mercy had drawn up a plan for an acquisi- 
 tion which even he admitted was " gigantic " : it was to include all 
 the land as far as the Meuse and the Somme, i. e., Alsace, Lor- 
 raine, Artois, and half of Picardy. Thugut was not embarrassed 
 by the extent of this claim, but he was none too sanguine about 
 the ease of making conquests in this quarter; and he felt the need 
 of providing himself with an alternative, in case France made too 
 great difficulties about being partitioned. 1 The last resort of dis- 
 appointed conquest-hunters was Poland; and although Russia 
 and Prussia had shown a vexatious tendency to regard that realm 
 as their exclusive field of exploitation, Thugut had not entirely 
 lost hope of picking up something there. . At any rate, Poland was 
 not the only neighboring republic where Jacobins could be dis- 
 covered at pleasure: one might, perhaps, find a few in Venice. 
 The spoliation of that decayed state seemed both easy and 
 
 1 Mercy to Starhemberg, May 31, and to Thugut, June 15, Starhemberg, 
 to Thugut July 12, Thugut to Starhemberg, August 13, Thiirheim, Briefe des 
 Grafen Mercy, pp. 86 ff. and Vivenot, iii, pp. 112 f., 145-148, 184 f.
 
 424 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 profitable. 1 The new program was, then, to retain Belgium; to 
 carve out an enormous acquisition in France, if possible; and if 
 this failed, to fall back on Polish or Venetian territories. The 
 realization of this plan was, of course, far in the future, but Thu- 
 gut aimed to provide for all eventualities immediately by securing 
 guarantees from the allied Powers. In the case of Russia and 
 Prussia, the obvious procedure was to demand such guarantees in 
 return for Austria's accession to the Partition Treaty. 
 
 On the Court of Berlin the Director- General placed, indeed, no 
 great reliance. He had begun his ministry with a strong aversion 
 to Prussia, and everything that had happened since convinced 
 him that that Power was aiming at the ruin of the House of 
 Austria. 2 On receiving Lucchesini's declaration of May 15, he 
 wrote to the Emperor that if there could have been any doubts 
 before, this note would have sufficed to reveal the hateful purposes 
 of Prussia in the fullest light. 3 He found it a document " truly 
 remarkable in the history of diplomacy " for " the absurdity of its 
 principles " and " the alteration of facts in a manner not only 
 fabulous but incredible "; and its tone was as provoking as its 
 substance. As it was not a moment, however, for beginning a 
 guerre de plume, he decided to leave the Prussians to their own 
 guilty consciences; and he found that their overtures of June 
 were only the result of their uncomfortable reflections. Even 
 these overtures, although " less revolting " than the first declara- 
 tion, were far from satisfactory, since they upheld in passing " the 
 palpable incongruities " of the note of May 15, and because their 
 tone was anything but frank and loyal. 4 As long as Prussia 
 refused to admit the sacred principle of ' parity,' Austria would 
 arrange her indemnities with the other Powers alone. These 
 indemnities could, indeed, scarcely be secured without Frederick 
 William's cooperation, but Thugut held it dangerous to enlighten 
 the King in advance about his plans of conquest. Any project 
 
 1 Thugut to Colloredo, June 4, 1794: " Adieu au secret [as to " nos vues sur 
 Venise "], qui depuis un an a €te conserve avec tant de soins! " Vivenot, Vertrau- 
 liche Brief e, i, p. 107 (the italics are mine). 
 
 2 Cf. his letters to Colloredo of May 4 and 11, ibid., i, pp. 15 f. 
 
 3 Vortrag of May 23, V. A. 
 
 4 Thugut to L. Cobenzl, June 30, Vivenot, iii, p. 125.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 425 
 
 tending to a considerable aggrandizement of Austria would arouse 
 the Prussian jealousy to the highest pitch, and the Court of 
 Berlin would hasten to raise up difficulties of every sort. Hence 
 the Director-General desired to conceal his game, while binding 
 the King to the war through the intervention of England and 
 Russia, and so leading him on blindly to serve the interests of 
 Austria. It would be best of all, he thought, if the realization of 
 the Prussian acquisitions in Poland could in some way be post- 
 poned and made conditional on the vigorous prosecution of the 
 war; for once those acquisitions were finally secured, the King 
 would have no motive and no desire for continuing his exertions 
 in France. Among Thugut's various miscalculations none was 
 more persistent and disastrous than this idea that the true way to 
 render Frederick William active in the coalition was to raise up 
 obstacles in his path in Poland. 
 
 It was upon Russia that the Director-General chiefly relied for 
 bridling " the Prussian malevolence" and assuring the indemnities 
 of Austria. Since the middle of May — that is, since learning 
 that England would not oppose the Partition, and since receiving 
 Lucchesini's note — he had begun to show Razumovski all the old- 
 time confidence, to expatiate on his orthodox faith in the alliance 
 of the Imperial Courts, and to sigh for the coming of the Russian 
 courier. On June 10 the ambassador presented Ostermann's 
 dispatch; Thugut professed himself greatly pleased; and the 
 reconciliation was all the more effusive for the recent estrange- 
 ment. When Razumovski demanded, however, that the Emperor 
 should at once accede to the Convention of St. Petersburg, 
 Thugut replied that there would be no difficulty about that, but 
 that his sovereign must make his accession dependent on more 
 precise and reassuring stipulations regarding his indemnities. 
 The ambassador observed that the real way to captivate the 
 Empress would be to accede unconditionally; after that her 
 generosity and solicitude would know no bounds. 1 But Thugut 
 was not to be paid with such coin. He determined to test the 
 generosity of the Court of St. Petersburg by a few concrete prop- 
 ositions. 
 
 1 The above from Razumovski's report of June 6/17, M. A., ABCTpia, III, 55.
 
 426 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 By a dispatch of June 16 he ordered Cobenzl to demand that 
 the Empress should guarantee Austria the right to take her 
 indemnity in Poland, in case it should prove impossible to make 
 any considerable conquests from France. He would not contest 
 the objection already raised by the Russian ministers that in this 
 case the Polish state would be completely annihilated; but he 
 found that since the other Powers had appropriated such enor- 
 mous acquisitions, the total partition of the Republic would 
 involve no great inconveniences; besides, since the balance of 
 power absolutely required that Austria should gain aggrandize- 
 ment somewhere, all other considerations must give way before 
 this " peremptory reason." This was, of course, only a guarantee 
 for the future — for an extreme case; but in the meantime the 
 Emperor desired to profit by the present circumstances to im- 
 prove his Galician frontier by annexing a small strip of territory 
 along the boundary. If the Empress acquiesced, as was to be 
 expected, Thugut suggested that Sievers should receive instruc- 
 tions, so that the Republic might conclude the necessary treaty 
 with Austria at the same time as those with Russia and Prussia. 
 Finally, Cobenzl was informed that in eight or ten days full 
 powers would be sent to him to accede in the Emperor's name 
 to the St. Petersburg Convention. 1 
 
 Thugut's object in making this move was probably to gain a 
 foothold in Poland at once, before the conclusion of the impending 
 treaties at Grodno, which might contain guarantees of the in- 
 tegrity of the remaining possessions of the Republic. If Austria 
 could establish herself immediately on Polish soil, she could rely 
 on future events to furnish opportunities for extending her 
 acquisitions. 
 
 As might have been foreseen, however, the demand ran counter 
 to one of the Empress' firmest principles. Regarding Poland as 
 her peculiar property, she had felt her late concession to Prussia 
 as a personal loss, and she was not inclined to make a new sacrifice 
 of this sort in favor of the Court of Vienna. Cobenzl therefore 
 encountered objections and subterfuges of all kinds. He was told 
 that it was impossible to change the whole indemnity plan every 
 
 1 Dispatch of June 16, printed in Vivenot, iii, pp. 113-117.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 427 
 
 week; that if Austria had demanded a share in Poland in the 
 beginning, she might have obtained it, but that it was too late 
 now; that if the Empress had dreamed that it would be a question 
 of destroying the Republic entirely, she would never have con- 
 sented to a partition. Above all, the Russian ministers took 
 refuge behind Prussia, affirming that Frederick William would be 
 so enraged by this new demand of Austria that he would probably 
 withdraw at once from the coalition, if he did not proceed to 
 worse extremities. The most that Cobenzl could obtain was a 
 promise that the question should be left in suspense until the 
 arrival of the courier who was to bring the proposals of Austria in 
 full and instructions regarding the promised accession to the 
 Partition Treaty. 1 
 
 That courier was long in coming. The fact was that Thugut 
 was now absorbed in watching the proceedings at Grodno, where 
 the Polish Diet was making an unexpectedly vigorous resistance 
 to the demands of the partitioning Powers. That resistance 
 revived his hope that it might still be possible to delay the con- 
 summation of the Partition, and thus ' bind ' the King of Prussia 
 to the common cause. One means of doing so immediately pre- 
 sented itself, when the hard-pressed Diet dispatched a special 
 envoy, Wojna, to Vienna with an urgent appeal for the good 
 offices of the Imperial Court as a guarantor of the integrity of 
 Poland. Thugut refused, however, to allow himself to be seduced 
 into an open intervention. He did not conceal from Wojna his 
 aversion to the Partition, and his conviction that Austrian 
 interests were seriously menaced by it; but he always ended by 
 pointing to the French war, which rendered action against the 
 allied Powers impossible. Wojna's audience with the Emperor 
 was equally fruitless; he received plenty of sympathy, and 
 nothing more. 2 The Austrians were well advised in committing 
 themselves no further with the Poles, for Wojna's first dispatches 
 were read in the open Diet — to the lively chagrin of the Russian 
 and Prussian envoys. 3 But while it is true that Thugut did not 
 
 1 Cobenzl's reports of July 2 and 5, Vivenot, iii, pp. 128 ff., 133-137- 
 
 2 Wojna's reports of July 10, 17, August 7, 10, M. A., ApxHBi. U,apcTBa IIojlb- 
 cnaro. Cnomeuia ct> ABCTpieio, C6. 8. 
 
 3 De Cache's report of July 28, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1793.
 
 428 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 encourage the Diet in its resistance — as he has been accused of 
 doing by Prussian ministers at that time and by Prussian histori- 
 ans since — he did endeavor to delay the Partition by a new 
 action at St. Petersburg. 
 
 At the moment when the crisis at Grodno was at its height, the 
 Director- General sent off an appeal to Catherine to postpone 
 the settlement of Polish affairs until after the peace with France. 
 The Poles, he said, would not give in without coercion; and the 
 use of violent means would place the allied Powers in the most 
 unenviable light before the world, it might lead Turkey to declare 
 war, and it might, especially, so arouse public opinion in England 
 that the British government would be compelled to retire from 
 the coalition. And he hinted that this was, indeed, a spectacle to 
 shock all Europe, to see those Courts which were waging war on 
 France for the cause of sovereigns and the sanctity of treaties, 
 simultaneously overwhelming an unfortunate monarch with 
 indignities and tearing up their own solemn guarantees. Some 
 delay in so delicate a matter would involve no real inconveniences, 
 for the Russians would remain complete masters of Poland; it 
 could be cloaked with pretexts that would only lend added glory 
 to the Empress; and it would be the only means of ensuring 
 Prussia's active cooperation in the war. 1 
 
 By the time this dispatch reached St. Petersburg, the Diet had 
 given in to all the demands of Russia, but still remained obdurate 
 towards those of Frederick William. Cobenzl therefore applied 
 himself solely to the task of holding up the conclusion of the 
 Prussian treaty. Ostermann objected, warning him with great 
 good sense that the Court of Vienna deceived itself in imagining 
 that it could ensure the cooperation of the Prussians by keeping 
 them on tenterhooks regarding their acquisition; the King 
 would presently lose patience and proceed to violent measures, 
 which Russia could not prevent and which would furnish him with 
 an excuse for withdrawing from the French war altogether. 
 Markov, however, assumed quite the opposite tone, and assured 
 Cobenzl that the Empress wished nothing better than to delay 
 
 1 Thugut to L. Cobenzl, July 12, Vivenot, iii, pp. 141-145.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 429 
 
 the Prussian treaty. 1 And this time the deed followed the word. 
 Although it was not entirely a result of Austria's insinuations, 
 Thugut had the satisfaction of seeing the Prussian treaty held up 
 for more than a month, until there came the inevitable catas- 
 trophe which Ostermann had prophesied and which Thugut 
 ought to have foreseen. This catastrophe was closely connected 
 with another negotiation to which it is now necessary to turn. 
 
 V 
 
 Determined as he was to settle all the great questions first of all 
 with Russia, Thugut had long realized that it would be impossible 
 to maintain a total silence towards the Court of Berlin. He there- 
 fore resolved to send an experienced diplomat, Count Lehrbach, 
 to Frederick William's headquarters on a mission, the primary 
 aims of which were simply to gain time, to 'amuse' the Prussians, 
 and to sound them on the subject of conquests from France. 2 The 
 instructions which Lehrbach received — after long delays — on 
 the 3rd of August, were based on a rather complicated and peril- 
 ous plan. Thugut had, since April, repeatedly promised the 
 British government that the Emperor would abandon the Bava- 
 rian Exchange in return for guarantees from England of definite 
 acquisitions in France. This promise he had carefully kept secret 
 from the Prussians, for the very good reason that if they learned 
 of it, they would hold themselves absolved from the engagement 
 regarding the Exchange contained in the St. Petersburg Conven- 
 tion and, indeed, from every definite obligation to assist in 
 procuring indemnities for Austria. Furthermore, Thugut was con- 
 vinced of Prussia's mortal antipathy to the Exchange project, and 
 he knew more or less of Lucchesini's intrigues with the princes of 
 Zweibriicken. He believed that these intrigues had gone further 
 than. was really the case, and that the King had made definite 
 
 1 Cobenzl's reports of July 30 and August 2, Vivenot, iii, pp. 156 ff., 160 f. 
 
 2 The earliest mention I have found of Lehrbach's mission is in Thugut's letter 
 to Colloredo of June 4 (Vivenot, Vertrauliche Briefe, i, p. 20). As to Thugut's aims 
 in connection with this mission, see his dispatch to L. Cobenzl of June 30 (Vivenot, 
 iii, pp. 125 ff.) and his letter to Colloredo of July 30 (Vivenot, Vertrauliche Briefe, 
 i, pp. 25 £.).
 
 43Q 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 promises to those princes contrary to the engagements of the 
 Partition Treaty. 1 Hence he formed the plan of taking the Prus- 
 sians by their weak side and pressing to know in what manner 
 they intended to fulfil the obligations of the Convention; the 
 King, unable or unwilling to discharge those obligations or to 
 explain the reason why, would be caught in a trap, from which he 
 would be glad to escape by undertaking the desired new engage- 
 ments respecting Austrian acquisitions in France. The plan was 
 not altogether badly conceived. It was, indeed, indispensable to 
 begin on the basis of the previous negotiations and obligations; 
 and Thugut's suppositions about the Prussian attitude towards 
 the Exchange, although somewhat exaggerated, were in the main 
 correct. As for the principle involved here, one may recall 
 Huffer's remark that anyone who has pledges from several 
 parties for the same thing, may always release one party from the 
 obligation without absolving another until he has secured a 
 promise of equivalent advantages in return for his renunciation. 2 
 Thugut's great mistake, however, was that he did not sufficiently 
 reckon with England. 
 
 Lehrbach was charged, then, to bring up Bavaria first of all, 
 and thus to prepare the way for the Austrian project for conquests 
 from France, or for an acquisition in Poland in case of necessity. 
 If possible, he was to secure the King's promise to continue the 
 war until the Court of Vienna's indemnities had been assured ; but 
 he was not authorized to make definite propositions regarding the 
 extent of those acquisitions until he had received further orders. 
 On the result of his negotiation, it was stated, the Emperor's 
 accession to the Partition Treaty would depend. 3 
 
 A refinement of subtlety, an entire lack of confidence, and the 
 absence of any sincere intention of coming to a definite agreement 
 were the outstanding features of these instructions. Thugut was 
 only too fully persuaded that nothing good was to be expected 
 from Prussia, that concessions were useless, and that confidence 
 
 1 Thugut to L. Cobenzl, June 16, to Starhemberg, August 31 (P. S.), Vivenot, 
 iii, pp. 113-117, 234 f.; Razumovski's report of June 22/July 3, M. A., ABCTpia, 
 
 HI, 55- 
 
 2 Huffer, Oestreich und Preussen, p. 35. 
 
 3 These instructions are printed in Vivenot, iii, pp. 163-169.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 43 I 
 
 would only be abused. A negotiation begun with such presup- 
 positions had little prospect of success. 
 
 But even had Lehrbach come in the best of faith, it is scarcely 
 possible that he could have effected an agreement. What decided 
 the course of events more, perhaps, than all the dissensions 
 between the two allies, was the fact that the limited resources of 
 the Prussian state rendered it infinitely difficult for the King to 
 undertake a third campaign at his own expense. Since the spring 
 this thought had haunted the minds of the Prussian ministers, 
 and had formed the constant burden of their reports to their 
 sovereign. To retire from the war if possible, but if not, to avoid 
 continuing it without further ample indemnities, became their 
 first and last thought. After much discussion they had come to 
 the conclusion that since the territorial market was somewhat 
 depleted, the compensation to be demanded for a third campaign 
 must take the form of subsidies from England, Austria, and the 
 Empire. As usual, the great element of uncertainty lay in the 
 fitful moods of Frederick William himself, who, although de- 
 cidedly cooled in his zeal for the war since he had got Great 
 Poland into his possession, was still long subject to relapses of 
 military ardor. Before the end of July, however, he had practi- 
 cally succumbed to the importunities of his advisers. A cate- 
 gorical declaration that the King could not consent to make a 
 third campaign without further indemnities was henceforth re- 
 served as the Prussian piece de resistance for the negotiation with 
 Lehrbach. 1 
 
 This resolution about the continuation of the war decided the 
 Prussian attitude towards the two closely related questions, the 
 Austrian indemnities and the Emperor's accession to the Parti- 
 tion Treaty. In June the Court of Berlin would still have pre- 
 ferred to see Austria fasten her ambitions upon France. It was 
 important to ward off the Bavarian Exchange, and at this time it 
 seemed not impossible to make considerable conquests from 
 
 1 Alvensleben and Haugwitz to Lucchesini, July 25, 28, and August 8, B. A., 
 R. 92, L. N. 14. Frederick William's final assent to the program of his ministers 
 seems to have been contained in a cabinet order of August 12, which I have been 
 unable to find, but the sense of which appears from the report of Alvensleben and 
 Haugwitz of August 19, B. A., R. 96, 147 H.
 
 432 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 France in the course of this campaign. But the more the latter 
 hope diminished, the less the Prussians were inclined to commit 
 themselves to furthering the Emperor's ambitions in this direc- 
 tion. On the other hand, they did not yet see their way clear to 
 avoid assisting Austria to secure acquisitions somewhere. They 
 vacillated between repugnance to the Exchange and the dread of 
 a third campaign. They were also frightened by the rumor that 
 Austria and England were planning to transfer the Elector of 
 Bavaria to Alsace-Lorraine. The situation was the more harrow- 
 ing because the Court of Vienna maintained a profound silence 
 about its projects. Rescue from these embarrassments came 
 from an unexpected quarter. 
 
 On July 10 Lord Yarmouth arrived at the royal headquarters 
 to conclude a convention relating to the war. He soon became 
 confidential with Lucchesini, and began to make revelations 
 about the secret negotiations between London and Vienna. By 
 deftly drawing him out, Lucchesini learned that the Emperor had 
 already promised England to renounce the Bavarian Exchange. 1 
 This was, indeed, lux e tenebris. The chance to utilize this re- 
 nunciation could not be overlooked. The ministers at Berlin 
 adjured Lucchesini to hold fast to the Exchange project in the 
 approaching negotiation with Lehrbach. " It would be super- 
 fluous," they added, " to observe to Your Excellence why we 
 insist on the exchange of the Netherlands. We must hold to it 
 the more strictly because it is to be foreseen that England will 
 persist in thwarting it. If the question were then raised of sub- 
 stituting [for it] a plan for conquests, this would be a new order of 
 things, which would have nothing in common with the agreements 
 decided upon between Prussia and Russia; and in consequence it 
 would be necessary to begin the negotiation all over again, with- 
 out prejudice to the indemnities that we have already secured in 
 the past." 2 Thugut's previsions on this point were nothing if not 
 accurate. 
 
 Lucchesini determined to seal the fate of the Exchange project 
 once for all by still another stroke. As Lord Yarmouth had been 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, July 14, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 2 Letter of August 8. Much the same strain in a letter of July 28, B. A., R. 92, 
 L. N. 14.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 433 
 
 instructed to draw Bavaria into the coalition, the clever Italian 
 proposed to him that England should conclude with the Elector a 
 subsidy treaty, which should contain a mutual guarantee of the 
 present possessions of the contracting parties. 1 He also broached 
 the same scheme to the Duke of Zweibriicken, who then went off 
 to present it to his uncle, the Elector. Presently Lucchesini was 
 able to report to his colleagues glorious news from Munich. 
 " Everything has succeeded wonderfully in that quarter," he 
 wrote; " now I shall see whether Lord Yarmouth is already pro- 
 vided with full powers in order to profit by the Elector's good 
 dispositions. If he is, then all roads to the acquisition of Bavaria 
 are barred to the House of Austria, by England. It remains only 
 to ask the opinion of Your Excellencies about the utility of con- 
 cluding at present a formal alliance between the King [of Prussia] 
 and the Duke of Zweibriicken." 2 Neither this alliance nor the 
 Anglo-Bavarian treaty came into existence; but it must be con- 
 fessed that Thugut's much-condemned duplicity pales before 
 Lucchesini's sheer breach of faith. It was surely irony of the 
 choicest sort to insist that the Emperor should accede to the St. 
 Petersburg Convention and content himself with the promise of 
 Prussia's good offices in favor of the Bavarian Exchange, when at 
 the same time Prussia was secretly doing everything in her power 
 to make the realization of that Exchange absolutely impossible. 
 It is true, indeed, that Frederick William's ministers had never 
 really desired Austria's accession. They were seriously disquieted 
 by Razumovski's renewed importunities on that subject in June, 
 for they hardly ' dared flatter themselves that the Emperor would 
 persist in his refusal.' 3 But these fears presently showed them- 
 selves groundless. As the moment of Lehrbach's arrival ap- 
 proached, the Prussian ministers began to meditate a new 
 scheme. Lucchesini proposed that in case the Austrian diplomat 
 brought only a conditional accession to the Convention, as was to 
 be expected, they should at once declare that until the Court of 
 Vienna saw fit to keep its engagements (i. e., to acquiesce sans 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, July 17, B. A.. R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 2 Letter of September 6, B. A., loc. cil. 
 
 3 The cabinet ministry to Lucchesini, June 21 and 22, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14.
 
 434 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 phrase in the Partition Treaty), the King could enter into no dis- 
 cussion of the Emperor's indemnities. 1 The ministers at Berlin 
 thoroughly approved, and added the suggestion that if by the 
 time of Lehrbach's arrival the treaty was not concluded at 
 Grodno, the King might declare that in view of the resistance of 
 the Poles he felt obliged to cease his operations on the Rhine in 
 order to direct his attention towards securing his acquisitions in 
 Poland. Such a threat seemed the more a propos because it 
 might stop the (supposed) intrigues of the Court of Vienna at the 
 Diet. 2 These ideas rapidly matured until at the moment Lehr- 
 bach appeared the Prussians had agreed on the following plan. If 
 events went well at Grodno, the King was to declare that he no 
 longer demanded the Emperor's accession to the Convention, and 
 that he would take part in the next year's campaign only on con- 
 dition of being assured of a sufficient indemnity. In the contrary 
 case, they would add to the foregoing the declaration that the 
 King was obliged to suspend action against France in order to 
 attend to his interests in Poland arms in hand. This would be 
 killing a great many birds with one stone. It would frustrate for 
 good and all the danger of the Emperor's accession; it would 
 throw the blame for everything upon Austria, who had delayed 
 her adhesion until it could be of no further value; it would furnish 
 the pretext for retiring, or threatening to retire, from the French 
 war. One precaution, however, was still necessary. The minis- 
 ters at Berlin recommended some delay in presenting the pro- 
 posed declaration, in the hope of a favorable turn of affairs at the 
 Diet. To reject the Emperor's accession before their treaty had 
 been concluded at Grodno would be to expose themselves to the 
 redoubled intrigues of Austria; and then there was always the 
 danger of compromising themselves with the Empress. 3 Thus 
 everything was prepared in advance to give Lehrbach's negotia- 
 tion a striking finale. The Prussians had even less desire for a 
 reconciliation and an amicable agreement than had the Austrians: 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, July 19, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 2 Alvensleben and Haugwitz to Lucchesini, July 25, B. A., lot. cit. 
 
 3 The cabinet ministry to the King, August 20 and 28, to Lucchesini, August 
 23, B. A., R. 96. 147 H, and R. 92, L. N. 14.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 435 
 
 instead they were resolved to force on what was virtually the 
 rupture of the alliance. 
 
 Lehrbach arrived at the royal headquarters on August 18, and 
 three days later held his first conference with Lucchesini at the 
 village of Edenkoben. He began with the declaration that the 
 Emperor had always intended to accede to the Convention and 
 stood ready to do so now with pleasure, but on condition that the 
 King should agree to procure for him an indemnity fully equal to 
 the Prussian one. After reviewing the history of the previous 
 negotiations and establishing the principle of parity, he launched 
 into a discussion of the various means of indemnifying Austria. 
 He began with Bavaria, spoke of the antipathy of the members of 
 the House of Zweibriicken to the Exchange, alluded to several 
 indications that these princes supposed themselves to be backed 
 up in their opposition by Prussia, and ended by declaring that 
 unless the King could reassure the Emperor as to the efficacy of 
 the means that he was willing to employ in this connection, the 
 Exchange project must be abandoned. There would then remain 
 no other course than that of seeking conquests from France, as the 
 Court of Berlin had suggested by the dispatch to Caesar of June 
 10. Alsace and Lorraine seemed the most desirable acquisitions 
 in this quarter. Lehrbach then demanded formally that the King 
 should agree to continue the war until the Emperor was in actual 
 possession of his indemnity. 
 
 Lucchesini replied that he would report everything to his 
 sovereign, but that in the meantime he must observe how sur- 
 prised the King would be that the Emperor had not yet seen fit to 
 accede to the Convention of St. Petersburg, which formed the 
 basis of Prussia's cooperation in the present campaign. Wishing 
 to draw Lehrbach out, he then asked whether the Court of Vienna 
 really foresaw no other obstacles in the way of the Exchange than 
 those which had just been mentioned. Was there nothing to be 
 feared from England ? Caught unprepared by this thrust, Lehr- 
 bach hesitated, and finally admitted that some opposition had 
 been raised by the London cabinet, but said that he had not been 
 ordered to speak of it. Lucchesini triumphantly retorted that it 
 would have been unfair then to place at the King's charge the ill
 
 436 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 success of his good offices, and to compromise His Majesty un- 
 necessarily with the other Powers. With this the conference 
 ended. 1 
 
 All things having fallen out as he had foreseen, Lucchesini 
 found no reason for giving the Austrian a definite reply at once; 
 instead he set out to protract matters until the long hoped-for 
 news should arrive from Grodno. Meantime he amused Lehrbach 
 with long-winded discussions on the origin and nature of the war 
 — a subject which might be argued in saecula saeculorum without 
 the slightest results; and he excused his delays on the ground of 
 the necessity of communicating with Berlin and St. Petersburg. 
 During this period of waiting he made a discovery which gave 
 him a final assurance of victory. Lord Yarmouth, probably 
 alarmed by the news that Lehrbach had brought up the subject of 
 the Exchange, saw fit to inform the Prussian minister that in 
 June a secret convention had been signed in London, by which the 
 Emperor formally renounced alienating the Netherlands. It is 
 quite certain that this convention existed only in Yarmouth's 
 imagination, but this fact could hardly be known to Lucchesini. 
 The latter's jubilation knew no bounds. " This transaction," he 
 wrote to the ministers at Berlin, " destroys all the obligations 
 which the Convention of Petersburg imposed on the King with 
 regard to Austria's indemnities; and it serves as the key to Count 
 Lehrbach's negotiation. They [the Austrians] would like to sub- 
 stitute new engagements about conquests in France for those 
 which English policy has forced them to sacrifice. . . . Your 
 Excellencies will know better than I what use can be made of this 
 renunciation at St. Petersburg." 2 Lehrbach thus saw his chief 
 weapon struck from his hands, his whole game exposed, his plan 
 of campaign confounded and upset. One may doubtless believe 
 Lucchesini's statement that the Count was in despair. 3 For some 
 weeks the negotiation was completely at a standstill. Then 
 the turn of events at Grodno precipitated the denouement. 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, August 21, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14; Lehr- 
 bach's report of the same day, printed in Vivenot, iii, pp. 198 ff. 
 
 2 Letter of August 26, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 3 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, August 31, B. A., loc. cit.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 437 
 
 On September 2 the Diet had finally agreed to the Prussian 
 treaty, but only under conditions that strained the patience of 
 Frederick William's advisers to the breaking-point. On the 14th 
 the ministers at Berlin sent in a report urging the most prompt 
 and vigorous measures: they implored the King to suspend all 
 operations against France and return with 50,000 men (out of the 
 80,000 on the Rhine) to enforce his claims on Poland in person. 
 This step was to be accompanied by a fulminating declaration 
 that should show the Austrians that Prussia was through with 
 them, that she was free of all obligations to them, that for what- 
 ever might happen they had no one to blame but themselves. 
 On receiving these proposals, Lucchesini and Manstein set to 
 work energetically to win over the King. It was no easy task, for 
 Frederick William's sensibilities revolted at the thought of desert- 
 ing the good cause of all sovereigns to seek sorry laurels in chastis- 
 ing a few helpless Poles. He consented, then retracted, and 
 finally gave in under conditions: he would first of all fulfil his 
 promise to turn the fines of Weissenburg; he would then go to the 
 east, but he would leave almost his entire army on the Rhine, 
 under the command of the Duke of Brunswick; and he would 
 return later, if possible, to finish the campaign with a few brilliant 
 feats of arms. 1 Even this concession might not, perhaps, have 
 been wrung from him, had he not been incensed against the Court 
 of Vienna by disputes with General Wurmser, by Lehrbach's 
 ' insidious negotiation,' by the supposed complicity of Austria 
 in the resistance of the Poles, and by the suspicion that the Im- 
 perial Courts had secretly agreed to hold up his treaty at Grodno. 2 
 
 Lucchesini was now ready to unchain the lightning. On 
 September 22 he presented to Lehrbach and Reuss a written 
 declaration which announced: (1) that as the King was obliged 
 to go in person to assure his acquisition in Poland, he would leave 
 
 1 Lucchesini to the cabinet ministry, September 19, 22, and 26, B. A., R. 92, 
 L.N. 14. 
 
 2 Cf. Sybel, op. cit., iii, pp. 433 ft". There is not the slightest evidence that the 
 Austrians had done anything directly to stir up the Poles to resistance; though this 
 is not to deny that the known antipathy of the Imperial Court to the Partition 
 may have encouraged the opposition at Grodno. The Prussians were not far wrong, 
 however, in their suspicions regarding Thugut's intrigues at St. Petersburg. 
 
 /
 
 438 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to the Emperor the care of attending to his own indemnities in 
 France; (2) that, respecting the motives which had hitherto 
 prevented the Court of Vienna from acceding to the St. Peters- 
 burg Convention, the King would no longer insist on that formal- 
 ity; (3) that his duty to his subjects and the need of husbanding 
 the last resources of his Monarchy forbade His Majesty's con- 
 tinuing the war another year, unless the allied Powers provided 
 him with the means of doing so. 1 This declaration brought Lehr- 
 bach's mission to a close. It ended the long negotiation between 
 he German Powers on the indemnity question. It terminated 
 the discussion between them with regard to the Emperor's acces- 
 sion to the Partition Treaty. It dealt what was practically the 
 coup de grace to the Austro-Prussian alliance. 
 
 VI 
 
 In spite of the disastrous outcome of Lehrbach's negotiation, 
 Thugut continued to treat of the Emperor's adhesion to the St. 
 Petersburg Convention with Russia — though henceforth with 
 Russia alone. The wider grew the breach with Frederick William, 
 the more ardently the Austrian minister threw himself into the 
 pursuit of Catherine's wonder-working graces. Time did not 
 count with Thugut: though it took ages, he would end by pre- 
 senting his sovereign with an acquisition in some quarter that 
 would conform in every respect to the sacrosanct principle of 
 ' perfect parity.' Into the details of this long negotiation it is 
 impossible to enter here. 
 
 The failure of his attempt during the summer to secure the 
 Empress' consent to an Austrian acquisition in Poland had for a 
 time embarrassed Thugut. For some months St. Petersburg was 
 studiously silent. In the autumn, however, especially after 
 Frederick William's pronunciamiento, the reconcilation between 
 the Imperial Courts proceeded steadily. By December Thugut 
 was at last ready to declare himself with all precision at St. 
 Petersburg. The Court of Berlin having rejected Austria's acces- 
 sion — a fact over which he was not particularly grieved — he 
 announced that the Emperor desired to accede to the Partition 
 
 1 This declaration is printed in Vivenot, iii, pp. 290-295.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA 439 
 
 Treaty in such a manner that his adhesion would apply to Russia 
 alone. In return for this Thugut demanded the Empress' 
 guarantee for that acquisition in France which Mercy had sug- 
 gested — namely, the territory as far as the Meuse and the 
 Somme; and in case these conquests could not be effected, a 
 similar guarantee for an indemnity to be taken at the expense of 
 Venice. All claims for a share in Poland were, in deference to the 
 Empress, at last abandoned. 1 
 
 These propositions were sufficiently to Catherine's taste. 
 Markov repeatedly assured Cobenzl that, excluding Poland, the 
 remains of which she desired to keep intact, there was no plan of 
 aggrandizement that Austria might form of which the Empress 
 would not approve. Encouraged by this reply, Thugut proceeded 
 to draft the letters in which — as was usual in treaties be- 
 tween Austria and Russia — the two sovereigns were to embody 
 their agreement. 2 His proposals were about to be formally 
 accepted at St. Petersburg, the ministers were putting the final 
 touches upon the bargain, when the face of things was suddenly 
 changed by the outbreak of the revolution in Poland. The Rus- 
 sians again felt the need of Prussian cooperation; a new partition 
 was soon in prospect; both sides recognized that retroactive 
 arrangements about a now ancient treaty were inappropriate. 
 
 The course of the negotiation henceforth belongs to the history 
 of the Third Partition. This time Austria was the preferred 
 suitor. Behind the back of Prussia, the Imperial Courts con- 
 cluded the secret convention of January 3, 1795, which settled 
 the new partition. By the third article the Emperor acceded to 
 the Second Partition Treaty, but only in so far as it concerned the 
 Court of St. Petersburg. The acquisition secured for Austria, 
 though somewhat larger than that reserved for Prussia, was not 
 sufficient to make up for the defeat of 1793. Nevertheless, the 
 long litigation over the Second Partition Treaty had ended in 
 what may be considered a triumph, though hardly a justification, 
 of Thugut's policy. 
 
 1 Thugut to L. Cobenzl, December 18, 1793, Vivenot, Thugut und sein politisches 
 System, pp. 382-392. 
 
 2 Thugut to L. Cobenzl, February 27, 1794, ibid., pp. 399-403.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 The Attitude of England and France toward the 
 
 Partition 
 
 " This, at least, you cannot deny," wrote one of the Russian 
 ministers to a friend on the eve of the Second Partition, " that the 
 moment at which we are making this acquisition is the most 
 opportune that can be imagined, for no one is able to offer oppo- 
 sition; everyone has his hands full." 1 And in fact, Russia and 
 Prussia could never have found a situation more extraordinarily 
 favorable than that of 1793 for perpetrating a great act of inter- 
 national rapine without hindrance from the other Powers. If 
 Austria, bound by her past guilty bargains and by the exigencies 
 of war, was helpless to avert or delay the Partition, England and 
 France were even less in a position to do so. 
 
 Pitt had formerly displayed a lively concern for the defence of 
 the weaker states against the great predatory monarchies; he had 
 shown a particular interest in Poland; he had once been willing 
 to risk a war with Russia over so comparatively trifling a question 
 as that of Oczakow and its district. But his experiences in 1791 
 had taught him that the British public was not prepared to sup- 
 port so active, far-sighted, and altruistic a policy. Henceforth he 
 avoided every enterprise that might lead to war, unless the vital 
 interests of England were directly and palpably at stake. Hence- 
 forth he seems to have abandoned the hope of saving Poland. 
 For a year and a half after ' the Russian armament/ he pursued a 
 policy of strict non-intervention in Continental and especially in 
 Polish affairs. 
 
 It was true that during the early part of 1792 the London 
 cabinet discreetly warned Prussia of the danger of allowing the 
 
 1 Zavadovski to S. R. Vorontsov, January 27/February 7, 1793, Apx. Bop., xii, 
 pp. 77 f. (here erroneously dated 1792). 
 
 440
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 44 1 
 
 Empress to regain her old ' influence ' in Poland. But as these 
 counsels passed unheeded, when the crisis came in the summer of 
 that year, Pitt refused to take any action on behalf of Poland. 
 All appeals from Warsaw were met with the excuse that, in view 
 of the attitude adopted by Prussia, the Maritime Powers alone 
 could not intervene, " at least not without a much greater exer- 
 tion and expense than the importance to their separate interests 
 could possibly justify." l Nor was Pitt moved from his course by 
 the widespread sympathy which the Polish struggle for independ- 
 ence excited in England. The Lord Mayor of London started 
 what was intended to be a national subscription to assist Poland 
 against ' the infamous oppression of Russia.' 2 The Whig news- 
 papers were full of tirades against their former ally, the Empress, 
 and the whole ' nefarious association of monarchs ' to which 
 Poland was falling a victim. Fox and his friends now bitterly 
 confessed how mistaken had been their attitude the year before: 
 if Oczakow had not been abandoned, Catherine would have had 
 neither the power nor the inclination to attempt what she was 
 now doing. 3 In short, such was the storm of indignation that the 
 Russian ambassador reported that if Poland had been nearer to 
 England, the nation would have forced the government to 
 intervene. 4 
 
 In view of Pitt's complete passivity on this occasion, in the 
 face of this popular outcry and at a time when his hands were 
 free, it may well be doubted whether he would later on have done 
 anything effective to prevent the Partition, even had he not 
 become entangled in the conflict with France. At all events, it 
 was only towards the end of November that he learned through 
 indirect channels of the indemnity plans of the Eastern Powers; 
 and in that same month Dumouriez's conquest of Belgium sud- 
 denly produced that acute tension in Anglo-French relations 
 which led to the outbreak of the war three months later. Repug- 
 
 1 Lord Auckland to Sir Morton Eden, August 14, 1792, Auckland Journal, ii, 
 p. 432. Instructions to Col. Gardiner at Warsaw, August 4, cited by Rose, Pitt and 
 the Great War, p. 54. 
 
 2 Apx. Bop., ix, pp. 249, 253 f.; Parliamentary History, xxx, col. 171. 
 
 3 Burges to Auckland, July 31, 1792, Auckland Journal, ii, pp. 423 f. 
 
 4 Report of S. R. Vorontsov, June 10/21, Apx. Bop., ix, p. 241.
 
 442 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 nant as the schemes of the allies might be — and most English- 
 men would doubtless have concurred in Sir Morton Eden's 
 dictum that " such iniquitous projects, in so awful a moment, 
 seem to bid defiance to God and to man," x — nevertheless, when 
 it became a question either of saving Belgium and Holland from 
 the French or of attempting to rescue far-off Poland, the choice 
 of the British government could hardly be doubtful. Already in 
 November, Pitt began to seek a rapprochement with the Eastern 
 Powers, and to solicit from them a frank explanation of their 
 aims and ideas with regard to the struggle with France. 
 
 In response to this invitation, on January 12, 1793, the Austrian 
 and Prussian ministers at London for the first time officially 
 informed Lord Grenville of the Polish-Bavarian indemnity project. 
 Though not entirely unexpected, the announcement was vexa- 
 tious and unwelcome in the extreme. Grenville made a brave 
 show of virtuous indignation over the impending partition of 
 Poland. ' The King,' he said, ' would never be a party to any 
 concert or plan, one part of which was the gaining a compensa- 
 tion for the expenses of the war from a neutral and unoffending 
 nation.' 2 According to the Austrian ambassador, he even went 
 so far as to declare that the project was " screamingly unjust," 
 and that "England could never consent to it, much less contrib- 
 ute to its execution." 3 This protest was repeated soon after- 
 ward by Sir James Murray, who was then at the King of Prussia's 
 headquarters on a diplomatic mission, with the additional 
 warning that in case the Partition were actually carried out, the 
 British government would feel obliged to issue a public declara- 
 tion that it had had nothing to do with this measure and highly 
 disapproved of it. 4 At St. Petersburg the English envoy Whit- 
 worth, acting on his own initiative and without committing his 
 Court, endeavored for some weeks to avert or at least to postpone 
 the Partition. 5 But these few diplomatic steps practically make 
 up the sum of British effort on behalf of Poland. 
 
 1 Dropmore Papers, ii, p. 341. 2 Lecky, op. cit., vi, p. 91. 
 
 3 Stadion's report of January 25, V. A., England, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 4 Lucchesini to the King, January 28, 1793, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 12. 
 
 6 See his reports of January 25, 27, 29, and February 12, in Herrmann, Erganz- 
 ungsband, pp. 359-364.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 443 
 
 Pitt does not appear to have thought seriously at any time of 
 going further than harmless remonstrances^ And even these 
 remonstrances soon became singularly mild. As early as January 
 20, Murray was ordered to declare that England had no intention 
 of interfering by force in the Polish affair or of hindering the 
 execution of the Partition. 1 About the same time Grenville 
 assured the Prussian envoy that the British government would 
 maintain a complete silence and an entirely passive attitude with 
 regard to the dismemberment of Poland; and such a line of con- 
 duct, the Berlin ministry declared, was " all that we require from 
 England." 2 If Pitt had thus renounced the idea of intervention 
 in the East even before the French declaration of war reached 
 London (February 8), after that event there could be absolutely 
 no thought of such an action. Henceforth the British cabinet 
 insisted on ignoring everything that happened in Poland. How 
 little it allowed moral scruples to interfere with its political friend- 
 ships was shown by the fact that at the moment when the Parti- 
 tion was about to be proclaimed to the world, the treaty signed at 
 London on March 25 announced the restoration of the old close 
 liaison between England and Russia. 3 
 
 It has, indeed, been asserted by a distinguished historian that 
 
 1 Salomon, Das politische System des jungeren Pitt, p. 78. 
 
 2 Schulenburg and Alvensleben to Lucchesini, February 4, commenting on 
 Jacobi's report from London of January 22, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 3 No credence can be given to Sybel's statement that about the middle of Febru- 
 ary, 1793, Catherine wrote an autograph letter to S. R. Vorontsov, her ambassador 
 in London, authorizing him to declare that if England found means to hinder the 
 Partition of Poland, she would have no objections, since she had been forced into 
 this measure by Prussia (op. cit., iii, p. 202). This astonishing tale rests only upon 
 gossip retailed by Hogguer, the Dutch minister at St. Petersburg; it finds no corrob- 
 oration in Vorontsov's voluminous published correspondence (which includes many 
 letters written to him by the Empress) ; and it is in itself highly improbable. 
 
 Sybel's dictum, " Der Streich, welcher den Nacken Ludwigs XVI bedrohte, war 
 zugleich auch der todliche Schlag fur das nationale Dasein Polens " (op. cit., iii, 
 p. 196) seems to me misleading, like most historical epigrams. Apart from the 
 question whether the death of Louis XVI had any essential part in bringing on the 
 war between England and France, it may well be doubted whether even without 
 that war Pitt would have acted effectively to save Poland. In 1793, as in the 
 preceding summer, he would probably have found that an isolated intervention 
 would have involved more danger and expense than English interests in Poland 
 would justify.
 
 444 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 at one moment Pitt offered Austria his consent to the Exchange, 
 if she would make .peace with France under his mediation and 
 then unite with England in opposing the Partition of Poland. 1 In 
 reality, however, his policy seems to have tended in quite the 
 opposite direction. The Bavarian Exchange might be morally 
 less reprehensible than the Partition, but it was, from the stand- 
 point of British interests, by far the more objectionable of the 
 two projects. Hence, while the London cabinet refused from the 
 outset to do anything effective to hinder the Partition, it evinced 
 .an ever more and more pronounced opposition to the Belgian- 
 Bavarian plan. Unable to contest the latter project openly in 
 the beginning, at a time when the three Eastern Powers seemed 
 to be united in support of it, England soon found her opportunity 
 when the Emperor fell out with his two allies. Then the British 
 government, taking advantage of Austria's new dependence upon 
 its assistance, succeeded, as has already been seen, in frustrating 
 the Exchange project entirely. But on the other hand, all 
 Thugut's efforts to induce England to oppose the Partition were 
 fruitless. The Austrians were told that the British government 
 abhorred the conduct of Prussia and Russia, but saw no possi- 
 bility of opposing their plans at a time when it needed their 
 cooperation for the war with France. 2 The moment for protest- 
 ing against the Partition was past, Grenville declared, and the 
 only thing to be done was to take care that such abuses should 
 not be renewed in the future. 3 A little later, in the midst of the 
 crisis at Grodno, when the Polish Diet was sending out agonizing 
 appeals to the world for aid, a British diplomat was assuring the 
 Prussians that if his government had at one time shown some 
 inclination to protest against the Partition, that was due simply 
 to reasons of domestic politics; and that he was authorized to 
 declare that England no longer took any interest in Poland, and 
 had no intention of embroiling itself with Prussia and Russia on 
 
 1 Sybel, op. cit., iii, p. 195. Salomon denies that any traces of such an offer are 
 to be found in the English records (op. cit., p. 76), and I have met with none in the 
 Austrian diplomatic correspondence. 
 
 2 Stadion's report of May 10, V. A., England, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 3 Starhemberg (Stadion's successor) to Thugut, May 24, Vivenot, iii, pp. 77 ff.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 445 
 
 account of the port of Dantzic and a few Polish articles of mer- 
 chandise. 1 
 
 . Under such circumstances, it mattered little that the decimated 
 Whig opposition in Parliament indulged in virulent invectives 
 against the partitioning Powers — those " plunderers," " robbers," 
 " murderers," whose hands were " reeking with the blood of 
 Poland" — branded Frederick William's conduct towards the 
 Republic as " the most flagrant instance of profligate perfidy 
 that had ever disgraced the annals of mankind "; denounced the 
 Partition as " one of the foulest crimes and blackest treacheries of 
 despotism "; and accused the government of being an accomplice 
 in " spreading the gloom of tyranny over the Continent." 2 Pitt 
 in general replied that he had never hesitated to express his dis- 
 approval of the treatment Poland had suffered; but that • the 
 question was whether they should allow one act of injustice to 
 deprive them of the assistance of the Eastern Powers in resisting 
 a system of intolerable injustice, not merely existing in France, 
 but attempted to be introduced in every other country.' 3 Other 
 speakers for the government furbished up the well-worn argu- 
 ment that when your own house was on fire, you could not afford 
 to go to the assistance of your neighbor; " while we lament the 
 misfortunes of Poland," said Jenkinson, " let us look to our- 
 selves "; and Burke, the one-time eulogist of the Constitution of 
 the Third of May, had now discovered that, in respect to England, 
 " Poland might be, in fact, considered as a country in the moon" 4 
 Such was the pitiable ending of the Federative System. 
 
 1 Lord Beauchamp's declaration to Lucchesini on July 11, 1793: "Que si le 
 Ministere Anglois s'etoit cru oblige, au commencement de l'hyver passe de montrer 
 des dispositions a protester contre nos acquisitions en Pologne, c'avoit 6te une 
 mesure de politique interne qu'il a abandonne toute suite [sic] apres que notre 
 partage a ete definitivement arrets entre les cours interessees, et qu'il etoit autorise 
 a assurer qu'on ne songeoit plus a. la Pologne et qu'on se garderoit bien de se brouil- 
 ler avec la Prusse et la Russie pour le port de Danzig et quelques denrees de Po- 
 logne," Lucchesini to the ministers at Berlin, July 11, B. A., R. 92, L. N. 14. 
 
 2 Parliamentary History, xxx, coll. 1108, 1468, 1471, 1477 f., 1485. 
 
 3 This from his speech of March 6, 1794, ibid., xxx, col. 1485. 
 
 4 Ibid., xxx, coll. 1476 and 1009. The italics are mine.
 
 446 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 II 
 
 A classic tradition, going back at least to Richelieu and Maza- 
 rin, ranged Poland, along with Sweden and Turkey, in the group 
 of states, whose protection and preservation were an essential 
 interest of France. It was true that during the last decades of the 
 Bourbon Monarchy, after the Austrian alliance had dislocated 
 French policy in Eastern Europe, this tradition had been very 
 much neglected, if not entirely abandoned; but the memory of 
 the old system was still strong both in France and in Poland, 
 especially among those Revolutionary statesmen who had been 
 bred on the doctrines of Favier and in the hatred of the ' mon- 
 strous ' alliance of 1756. And nothing might seem more natural 
 than a return to the classic tradition at a time when France was 
 grappling with a coalition of which Russia and Prussia were 
 members: according to all time-honored precedents, it must then 
 be the aim of French diplomacy to create a diversion in the East 
 by bringing the Turks and Swedes into the field and by succoring 
 hard-pressed Poland. The idea of attempting such a diversion 
 was so obvious that it was taken up with more or less energy by 
 all those who came to the helm at Paris during the first year of 
 the Revolutionary War. Upon the success of these attempts 
 Poland's one real chance of deliverance from without depended. 
 France was, indeed, the one great Power which had neither the 
 need nor the wish to court the good graces of Catherine; the one 
 great Power whose situation not only allowed but seemed to 
 require active intervention on behalf of Poland. The old fixed 
 principles of French foreign policy, the new maxims about 
 championing the cause of oppressed peoples against usurping 
 despots, the exigencies of a war in which the enemies of Poland 
 were also the enemies of France, combined to suggest vigorous 
 opposition to the Second Partition. 
 
 Nevertheless, France did nothing effective to save Poland. For 
 this there were many reasons. The failure was not due merely to 
 the tremendous difficulties and dangers that beset the Revolu- 
 tionary government at home; nor to the instability, the inexpe- 
 rience, or the doctrinairism of those who successively held power
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 447 
 
 at Paris; nor to the remoteness of Poland; nor to the undeniable 
 lack of sympathy with which many Jacobins regarded the ' aris- 
 tocratic ' and too conservative reformers of the Third of May. 1 
 One of the most potent factors in the situation was the predilec- 
 tion of the disciples of Favier for Prussia. The idea of detaching 
 Frederick William from Austria and of securing a separate peace, 
 perhaps even an offensive alliance, with him, haunted the minds 
 of French statesmen, generals, and publicists. But reconciliation 
 with Prussia and action on behalf of Poland were two incompat- 
 ible policies. If Frederick William showed any signs of recipro- 
 cating the advances made to him, his would-be allies at Paris 
 were not likely to scrutinize too closely the ' crimes of despotism ' 
 in the East. Prussia was, indeed, the pivot around which the 
 European political system revolved. Just as the fear of losing 
 Frederick William's aid precluded Austria and England from 
 actively opposing the Partition, so the hope of inducing the King 
 to desert the coalition tempted France to acquiesce in that unholy 
 transaction. This inhibitory regard for Prussia crops out con- 
 tinually in the calculations of French diplomacy in 1792 and 
 1793, strangely intermingled with plans of a rather different 
 character, in which the deliverance of Poland occasionally figures. 
 At the beginning of the Revolutionary War, it was the favorite 
 project of the dominant Girondist party and of Dumouriez, then 
 Foreign Minister, to win the alliance of Prussia, and, if possible, 
 of England. Failing in this, they fell back on the classic idea of 
 forming a coalition which should include Sweden, Poland, and 
 Turkey. Before anything had been effected towards this end, 
 however, Poland succumbed before the Russian invasion, while 
 the proposed mission of Semonville to Constantinople came to 
 nothing, because the Porte, yielding to the vehement remon- 
 strances of the three Eastern Powers, refused to receive the am- 
 bassador. 2 The only part of Dumouriez's program that bore 
 fruit was the diplomatic campaign begun at Stockholm. 
 
 1 As to the indifference or downright contempt felt by a large part of the French 
 public for Poland, see Askenazy, " Upadek Polski a Francya," in Biblioteka War- 
 szawska, 1913, i, pp. 16 f. 
 
 2 August 20, 1792. Cf. Sorel, op. cil., ii, pp. 455 f.; Grosjean, " La Mission de 
 Semonville a Constantinople," in La Revolution Francaise, xii (1887).
 
 448 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 There the new French envoy, Verninac, enjoyed the experience, 
 unique in the annals of Revolutionary diplomacy at that time, of 
 finding a court which not only tolerated but welcomed his ad- 
 vances. The foreign policy of Sweden had, indeed, undergone a 
 sort of revolution within a few months after the death of Gusta- 
 vus III (March 29, 1792). The new Regent, the Duke of Soder- 
 manland, was determined to free himself from the alliance with 
 Russia formed by the late King, which he regarded as a galling 
 and dangerous pact of servitude. For this purpose he needed the 
 support of some foreign Power, both as a guarantee against future 
 Russian aggressions, and in order to obtain subsidies that would 
 enable him to dispense with those that Catherine had hitherto 
 paid. Hence during the summer of 1792, while Russo-Swedish 
 relations grew steadily worse, the secret discussions conducted 
 with Verninac progressed so rapidly that by September it was 
 agreed that a formal negotiation for a defensive alliance should be 
 opened at Paris. The French envoy then went home to pave the 
 way for this negotiation, while Baron de Stael-Holstein, the 
 Swedish plenipotentiary, was to follow in good season. 
 
 At this moment French foreign policy was very near to losing 
 its bearings altogether, as a result of the astonishing victories of 
 the republican arms during the autumn. Dazzled and blinded 
 by success, the Girondists were now talking of nothing less than a 
 general war on kings, the deliverance of all nations from their 
 * tyrants,' a universal revolution. Swept along by the reigning 
 enthusiasm, the Convention passed the famous decrees of Novem- 
 ber 19 and December 15, 1 by which it declared that it would 
 ( accord fraternity and aid to all peoples who should wish to 
 recover their freedom,' and laid down a set of rules for the estab- 
 lishment of liberty and equality in all the lands to which the 
 armies of France might penetrate. Such sonorous resolutions 
 were fitted to arouse the hopes of oppressed nations like the 
 Poles; but they were a reckless and extravagant challenge to all 
 monarchical Europe, widening the breach between France and 
 her enemies and rendering difficult an agreement even with the 
 well-disposed monarchies. At any rate, Lebrun, who had suc- 
 
 1 Moniteur (reimpression), xiv, pp. 517, 755 f.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 449 
 
 ceeded Dumouriez as Minister of Foreign Affairs and who was far 
 from sharing the Utopian illusions of the Girondists, quietly went 
 on with the old plan of seeking friends and building up a counter- 
 coalition in Eastern Europe. 
 
 From November to March, the liberation of Poland seems to 
 have been an integral part of Lebrun's political program. The 
 cardinal feature of his plans was an offensive and defensive al- 
 liance between France and Turkey, to which Sweden, Poland, 
 and perhaps Prussia, might be admitted. If the Turks could be 
 induced to declare war on the Imperial Courts and to invade the 
 Crimea, the Empress would be obliged to evacuate Poland; the 
 Poles would then fly to arms against their ancient oppressors, 
 while the Swedes were to deliver an attack in the Baltic and in 
 Finland. If the King of Prussia insisted on remaining in the 
 ' despotic ' coalition and carrying out his iniquitous designs on 
 Poland, he might be brought to reason and forced to surrender his 
 usurpations by a French invasion of Westphalia, combined with a 
 Swedish attack on Pomerania. To increase the Empress' em- 
 barrassments, Lebrun hoped to provoke a revolt of the Cossacks 
 and Tartars, and even to find a hardy soul " to repeat Puga- 
 chev's adventure." l And at times he talked of supplementing 
 all these measures by sending French fleets to the Black Sea and 
 the Baltic. 2 It was a comprehensive program, quite in the 
 style of the cabinets of the old regime, closely resembling Pitt's 
 plans of 1 79 1 or the projects of French diplomacy during the War 
 of the Polish Succession ; it could hardly have appeared chimeri- 
 cal at that time, in view of the amazing military successes of 
 the last few months; and it was infinitely more practical than 
 the contemporary schemes of the Gironde for revolutionizing the 
 universe. 
 
 Lebrun's activity reached its height about the end of Febru- 
 ary and the beginning of March. At that time a new envoy, 
 
 1 I. e., to set up as a pretender to the Russian throne and to start a servile 
 insurrection. 
 
 2 For the above, see Lebrun's instructions to S6monville, probably drawn up 
 in November, 1792, Grosjean, op. cit., p. 896; the instructions given to Descorches 
 in January, 1793, Sorcl, L' Europe el la Revolution franqaise, iii, pp. 302 ff.; Lebrun 
 to Parendier, February 28, and to Descorches, March 4, ibid., pp. 305 ff.
 
 45 O THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Descorches, was en route for Constantinople charged to persuade 
 the Turks to draw the sword immediately. Baron de Stael had at 
 last reached Paris (February 25), eager to put through the alliance 
 with Sweden, and fearful only that Dumouriez's victories would 
 render the French indifferent to such connections. 1 Through his 
 agent Parendier, Lebrun had for some time been in touch with the 
 leading Polish Patriots, the ' men of the Third of May,' who 
 gathered at Leipsic; he knew of their plans for a national up- 
 rising, encouraged them, and promised them money. 2 At the end 
 of January, Kosciuszko had come to Paris to negotiate for French 
 support in a new struggle for Polish independence. He was 
 authorized by the leaders of his party to give assurance that in 
 case the Patriots regained control in Poland, they would abolish 
 royalty, episcopacy, aristocracy, and serfdom, and establish 
 liberty and equality according to the most approved Parisian 
 standards. These promises are significant as showing, not indeed 
 that the conservative reformers of the Third of May were turning 
 into Jacobins, but that they had taken at their face value the 
 recent decrees of the Convention and that they were ready to 
 accept the principles laid down on the 15th of December in order 
 to secure the aid of the triumphant Republic. What Kosciuszko 
 chiefly desired was the landing of a French army in the Crimea, 
 which in conjunction with the Turks should assist in the liberation 
 of his country; after this had been accomplished he promised 
 that Poland would unite with France, Sweden, and the Porte in 
 the final struggle against the league of crowned despots. 3 Kos- 
 ciuszko had several conferences with Lebrun, and he also met 
 such prominent personages as Brissot, Vergniaud, Barere, 
 Herault, and Robespierre. 4 " The French Republic is actively 
 occupied," Lebrun wrote to Parendier on February 28, " with 
 the great measures that may release this interesting nation 
 [Poland] from the odious yoke that oppresses it. . . . Courage, 
 energy, and perseverance, and Poland will be saved." 5 
 
 1 Boethius, " Gustav IV Adolfs formyndareregering och den Franska Revolu- 
 tionen," in Historisk Tidskrift, xviii, pp. 182 ff. 2 Sorel, op. cit., iii, p. 305. 
 
 3 On the aims of Kosciuszko's mission, cf . Askenazy, " Upadek Polski a Francya," 
 in Biblioteka Warszawska, 1913, i, pp. 20 ff . 
 
 4 Ibid., p. 23. 6 Sorel, op. cit., iii, p. 305.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 45 I 
 
 All these hopes and plans, however, depended primarily upon 
 the continued success of the French arms, and in March a series 
 of terrible reverses began: the failure of the invasion of Holland, 
 the defeat at Neerwinden (March 18), the complete loss of Bel- 
 gium, the treason of Dumouriez (April 5), the invasion of France 
 from all sides, and the outbreak of civil war at home. This sud- 
 den and bewildering change in the situation necessarily produced 
 momentous changes in policy. In the first Committee of Public 
 Safety (appointed April 6), in which Danton was the leading 
 spirit, the tendency was to abandon that system of cosmopolitan 
 idealism, armed propaganda, and universal revolution, by which 
 the Girondists had so aroused the fears of sovereigns and the 
 hopes of peoples, and instead to fall back on a policy based 
 exclusively upon the practical needs and the material interests of 
 France. While determined to prosecute the war with all the vigor 
 necessary to defend the independence and integrity of the Re- 
 public, the new government desired to make peace if possible, 
 and at least to diminish the number of its enemies; and for that 
 purpose it was ready to adapt itself to the methods and usages of 
 the older Europe, without allowing Revolutionary principles to 
 stand too much in the way. 1 
 
 Danton and his associates no longer thought seriously of doing 
 anything to liberate Poland. To undertake the defence of that 
 country would mean prolonging the war indefinitely, while the 
 French people obviously wanted peace. Such an attempt might 
 ruin France without saving Poland. Besides, the impending 
 Partition would not be without its advantages for France, since 
 it would almost certainly arouse jealousies among the three 
 Eastern Powers and might greatly facilitate peace between 
 France and some of them. Under the new government the idea of 
 a separate peace and an alliance with Prussia had become the 
 cardinal aim of French policy, and there was no surer way to 
 conciliate Frederick William than to assent to his designs on 
 Poland. It is highly probable that in the secret conferences held 
 
 1 Cf . the admirable characterizations of the foreign policy of the first Committee 
 of Public Safety in Sorel, op. cit., iii, pp. 380 ff.; Aulard, " La Diplomatic du premier 
 Comite de Salut Public," in his £tiidcs et leqons sur la Revolution franqaise, j e serie.
 
 452 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 about this time with the Prussians, verbal assurances were given 
 that France would not oppose the Partition. 1 At any rate, it 
 seems clear that from the outset the Committee of Public Safety 
 was ready, in case of a formal negotiation with Prussia, to offer, 
 not indeed an open approval, but a tacit recognition of the 
 Partition, and to make capital out of its acquiescence in what it 
 was unable to prevent. 2 Thus France prepared to abandon Po- 
 land just at the moment when Russia and Prussia announced to 
 the world the new Partition. 
 
 The rest of Lebrun's plans did not long survive the disasters of 
 the spring. When Descorches, after protracted delays, reached 
 Constantinople (June 7), he found that the Turks had lost all 
 stomach for war, and that nothing could tempt them out of a 
 timorous neutrality. 3 With Sweden matters did for a time pro- 
 gress more favorably. On May 17 Lebrun signed the treaty of 
 defensive alliance which he had agreed upon with Baron de Stael, 
 and which the latter then sent home for the approval of his 
 government. Although the Regent was fearful of the conse- 
 quences of the adventure and by no means inclined to plunge 
 into the general war if he could avoid it, still he was so badly in 
 need of funds and his relations with the Empress had reached so 
 acute a state of tension that he would probably have consented 
 to ratify the treaty, providing a few slight alterations were made 
 in it. But meanwhile Danton and Lebrun had fallen, and the new 
 Committee of Public Safety, appointed July 10 (the second or 
 ' great ' one) , had no real desire for the Swedish alliance. Accord- 
 ing to the ideas of Robespierre, who was now the real head of the 
 government, the proposed treaty was dangerous because it might 
 involve France in wars in which she had no concern; whereas 
 once liberty had been consolidated and the Republic recognized, 
 
 1 Aulard, op. tit., p. 205. 
 
 2 The best expressions of the new French attitude towards Poland are to be 
 found in the instructions to Descorches of April 20 (in Sorel, op. tit., iii, pp. 396 
 ff.) and the ' plan de pacification,' drawn up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
 probably early in May (cf. Sorel, iii, pp. 394 ff., and Aulard, op. tit., pp. 205 f.). 
 
 3 Zinkeisen's very inaccurate account of Descorches' negotiation contains the 
 statement that the French envoy actually succeeded in concluding a secret treaty 
 of alliance with the Porte (Gesch. d. osmanischen Reiches, vi, pp. 872 ff.). The 
 true history of the affair is to be found in Aulard, op. tit., pp. 229-240.
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 453 
 
 the latter ought never again to draw the sword except to defend 
 itself and other peoples who wished to shake off the yoke of 
 ' tyrants.' Through the fault of France and not of Sweden — 
 and for such doctrinaire reasons — the project of alliance was pres- 
 ently dropped x (September). And with it disappeared, at least 
 for the time being, all hope of forming that 'League of the North,' 
 that ' anti-despotic coalition,' which was the one combination 
 that might have done something in 1793 to check the designs of 
 Catherine and Frederick William and to succor prostrate Poland. 
 Under the second Committee of Public Safety France virtually 
 renounced having a diplomacy or a foreign policy, save that pur- 
 sued with the sword. If Robespierre desired any foreign connec- 
 tion, it was only one with the Swiss Cantons. 2 Switzerland was 
 said to be a respectable Republic: Poland was not, at least accord- 
 ing to Jacobin standards. 
 
 1 By far the best account of this much-misunderstood subject, and especially 
 of the causes for the failure of the Swedish alliance project, is to be found in Boe- 
 thius, op. cit. (which alone is based upon both the French and the Swedish Archives). 
 Cf. also Rene Petiet, Guslave IV Adolphe et la Revolution francaise, pp. 51 f. 
 
 2 Sorel, op. cit., iii, p. 436.
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 The Diet of Grodno and the Consummation of 
 
 the Partition 
 
 If no resistance to the Partition was to be expected from foreign 
 Powers, Poland itself was quite without the means of self-defence. 
 No nation threatened with ruin was ever caught in a more helpless 
 and prostrate condition. One hundred thousand of the Empress' 
 troops occupied the entire country, save those western palatinates 
 where the Prussians had marched in and taken possession. War- 
 saw, the hotbed of ' Jacobinism ' (i. e., patriotic feeling), was 
 heavily garrisoned with Russians and encircled by armed camps. 
 The Confederation of Targowica had done whatever it could to 
 render the national army useless by splitting it up into small 
 detachments, and scattering them about the country in such a 
 way that each detachment was surrounded by superior Russian 
 forces; and the Polish troops had also been deliberately deprived 
 of cannon and ammunition. 1 The best men of the nation, the 
 leaders of the Constitutional party, were in exile. Whatever 
 government existed was in the hands of a rapacious, blind, and 
 cowardly crew, equally despised by the Power whose interests 
 they served, and by the nation upon which they had brought 
 such disasters. When the Partition was announced, the original 
 leaders of Targowica hastened to desert the sinking ship; and 
 those who remained behind at the head of the Confederation 
 were, with few exceptions, only those who had no scruples about 
 exploiting their country's ruin for their private gain, and who 
 were willing to render whatever services the Russian ambassador 
 might require. 
 
 In order that no kind of misfortune might be lacking, the politi- 
 cal crisis was accompanied by an economic one. The nation was 
 
 1 Korzon, Wewnqtrzne dzieje, v, p. 279. 
 
 454
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 455 
 
 suffering terribly from the exactions and depredations of the 
 Russian troops, and still more perhaps from the lawless operations 
 of the Targowician brigands, under whom no man's rights or 
 property were safe, and who practised what even a Russian 
 ambassador described as " a truly Asiatic despotism." l The 
 crowning blow came in February, 1793, with the failure of almost 
 all the leading banks, which ruined a host of capitalists, reduced 
 the richest families to penury, and completed the economic pros- 
 tration of the country. 2 
 
 With calamities of all sorts following thick and fast upon each 
 other, it is not strange that while the announcement of the 
 impending Partition aroused vehement indignation and protests, 
 it also produced general consternation and despair. Armed 
 resistance seemed out of the question; the Republic was ob- 
 viously doomed. Many people were chiefly anxious to end the 
 tragedy as soon as possible by quiet submission to the inevitable; 
 and some regretted that the Powers had not decided to partition 
 the country entirely, and thus spare the moribund state the 
 agonies of a lingering death. 3 It was true that the idea of a 
 national uprising and a final struggle for independence was al- 
 ready fermenting in the minds of the emigres in Saxony and in 
 certain military and other patriotic circles in Poland. 4 But these 
 projects had assumed no definite form, nothing was yet ready, 
 at the time when Catherine set out to finish her work by extorting 
 the consent of the Republic to its own dismemberment. 
 
 The management of this disagreeable business had been en- 
 trusted to Baron Sievers, the new Russian ambassador, who 
 arrived in Warsaw in February, 1 793 ; and perhaps the Empress 
 could not have made a happier selection. Sievers was a benevo- 
 lent, elderly, old-fashioned gentleman, with a dash of sentimen- 
 tality, pleasant and tactful manners, a perpetual smile, and a 
 
 1 Blum, Sievers Denkwiirdigkeiten, iii, p. 264. 
 
 2 Cf. Korzon, op. cit., ii, pp. 159 ff.; Oginski, Memoires, i, pp. 235 ff. 
 
 3 Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiordw, iii, 283; KocrosiapoBi, HocirijiHie 
 ro^H PiHH-IIocnoJiHTOH, ii, p. 276; Oginski, op. cit., pp. 233 ff.; Buchholtz's re- 
 ports of March 14, May 5 and 8, 1793, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1; de Cache's reports of 
 January 23 and February 9, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 4 Korzon, op. cit., ii, p. 176, v, p. 276; Korzon, KoSciuszko, pp. 266 ff.
 
 456 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 face that bespoke only candor and simplicity. Behind this 
 appearance of patriarchal bonhomie there lay a clear, cool head, 
 an inflexible will, an independent and self-reliant judgment, and 
 the readiness to use all means that would serve his purpose. At 
 bottom he seems to have felt not a little disgust at his sordid task, 
 pity for the King whose friend and companion he had been forty 
 years before, and sympathy for the nation which he had been sent 
 to coerce and terrorize. He would have liked to avoid violent 
 measures as much as possible; to ameliorate conditions in Poland, 
 as far as was compatible with Russian interests; to turn the 
 country into a well-ordered Russian satrapy. Throughout his 
 stormy embassy, in the midst of the brutalities which he was 
 obliged to perform " with bleeding heart," as he wrote to his 
 daughters, he consoled himself with the thought that he was doing 
 a service to humanity by transferring millions of men to the benefi- 
 cent sway of the Empress, and by restoring order, justice, and 
 tranquillity in what was left of Poland. 1 
 
 Sievers' first task was to induce the King to go to Grodno, 
 where by the Empress' orders the coming Diet was to be held — 
 far from the tumults and excitement of ' Jacobin ' Warsaw. 
 Although the ambassador at that time professed to know nothing 
 of an impending partition and declared that the chief aim of the 
 Diet was to settle definitively the constitution of the Republic, 
 still Stanislas could hardly be in doubt about what was in the 
 wind. As usual, he sighed, wept, expostulated, ran the gamut 
 of the tragic emotions. " Heavens," he cried out, " will they 
 force me to sign my shame, to subscribe to a new partition ? Let 
 them throw me into prison, let them send me to Siberia, but I 
 will never sign ! " 2 But in spite of these heroics, the King had 
 one — to him — irresistible motive for yielding, a motive that 
 was to make him the pliant tool of Russia throughout the sad 
 events that followed. His debts had now swollen to over thirty 
 million florins; 3 owing to the general failure of the banks he could 
 
 1 See, e.g., Blum, S^ers, iii, pp. 84, 94,189, 241, 274. 2 Blum,op.ciL,in,p.ii4. 
 
 3 Sievers reported in February that the royal debts amounted to 30 millions 
 (Blum, op. cit., iii, p. 60); but that figure is almost certainly too low, since the 
 detailed statement drawn up in September, 1793, and signed by the King, gave a 
 total of 33,515,236 fl 8 . See Korzon, Wewnqtrzne dzieje, iii, pp. 89-92.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 457 
 
 borrow no more; the state treasury was almost empty; and he 
 was absolutely at his wit's end to find money. In these straits he 
 was ready to descend once more to the depths of baseness by 
 becoming the pensioner of Russia — at such a moment. Hence 
 in his interviews with Sievers patriotic outbursts alternated with 
 pleas for the Empress' assistance in paying his debts, to which 
 the ambassador replied that the subject of the royal debts might 
 be taken up at the close of the Diet, i. e., after the King had done 
 all that should be required of him. Hence, after a month of 
 evasion and petty subterfuges, Stanislas consented to go to 
 Grodno, and accepted twenty thousand florins from Sievers for 
 the expenses of the journey. 1 And hence he told one of his con- 
 fidants at this time that he would assuredly sign the partition 
 treaty that was to be presented to him, although in public he 
 continued to declare on every occasion that he would never, 
 never sign. 2 
 
 Having thus entrapped the King, Sievers hastened on ahead to 
 Grodno, where on April 9 he and his Prussian colleague Buch- 
 holtz transmitted to the Generality of the Confederation the 
 manifestoes of the allied Courts, announcing the Partition and 
 demanding the convocation of a Diet to settle the affair ' amica- 
 bly.' The Generality, whose leading members had known very 
 well in advance what was coming, protested pro forma; but they 
 had no more desire than the King to court the martyr's crown by 
 indiscreet resistance to Russia. They hesitated, however, to 
 assume the odium of summoning a Diet, the outcome of which was 
 only too clearly to be foreseen. They assured Sievers that they 
 were precluded from sending out the ' universals ' (i. e., the 
 letters of convocation) by the oath of the Confederation, which 
 bound them to defend the integrity of the Republic. Still, as they 
 were men of resource, they found a way around this difficulty by 
 an ingenious device. They restored the Permanent Council (an 
 institution established by Russia in 1775, and abolished by the 
 Four Years' Diet), and entrusted that body with the ignominious 
 
 1 Blum, op. cit., iii, pp. 114, 130 f., 186. 
 
 2 Blum, iii, pp. 131 f.; Kraszewski, op. cit., iii, p. 309.
 
 458 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 duty in question. 1 The revived Council was packed with Sievers' 
 creatures, whom even the Russian general Igelstrom described as 
 " men of the worst character, gamblers, crooks, and brigands." 2 
 Its first act was to issue the universals for the Diet, which the 
 King was forced to sign — as a gratuitous humiliation — on the 
 3rd of May. 
 
 The elections were planned by the ambassador with great care, 
 and with all the savoir faire which a long experience in Poland had 
 taught the Russians. Sievers gathered around him at Grodno an 
 unofficial committee of his Polish ' friends,' with whom he settled 
 the details of the campaign, the list of the deputies to be elected, 
 and the instructions to be given them. Electioneering agents, 
 mostly Poles, were appointed to manage each Dietine; Russian 
 troops were to be everywhere on hand to overawe opposition; and 
 no means of persuasion, bribery, or coercion were to be neglected. 
 The ever-complaisant Generality assisted as much as it could by 
 issuing a couple of sancita (decrees), which excluded from voting 
 or from being elected all those who had not ' renounced ' the Four 
 Years' Diet; those who had participated in the establishment of 
 the Constitution of the Third of May; those who had not joined 
 the Confederation of Targowica; and those who, having joined 
 that Confederation, had presumed to protest against any of its 
 decisions. 3 
 
 After such comprehensive preparations and in view of the utter 
 depression of the nation, it is not surprising that the elections 
 passed off quietly and smoothly. In 1773, at the time of the 
 First Partition, patriots had tried to protest by preventing the 
 election of deputies, and at least half of the Dietines had been 
 ' exploded ' ; 4 but on this occasion most of the better citizens 
 simply stayed away from assemblies where their presence could 
 do no good, and where they were exposed to every kind of insult 
 and violence. In many cases those from whom opposition was 
 
 1 That this solution of the problem emanated from the Poles themselves (Bishop 
 Kossakowski and others) and not from Sievers, appears from Buchholtz's report of 
 April n, B. A., R. 19, 27, 1. 
 
 2 Blum, op. cit., iii, p. 206. 
 
 3 Blum, op. cit., iii, p. 236. 
 
 4 Over thirty Dietines (out of a total of about sixty), Kraszewski, op. cit., i, p. 92.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 459 
 
 feared, were driven away from the Dietines by the Russian troops 
 or forcibly confined in their homes. In the assemblies thus effect- 
 ually ' purified,' the crowds of poor szlachta, bought up at ten, 
 twenty, or thirty florins a head, acclaimed without debate the 
 deputies nominated by the Russian agents, and the instructions 
 approved by the Russian ambassador, and then adjourned to the 
 customary Gargantuan banquet, to drink the health of the Em- 
 press and the King amid the thunder of Russian cannon. 1 
 
 Sievers was delighted with the outcome. Writing to congratu- 
 late the Empress on " the complete success of the Dietines," he 
 assured her: " Never has a Diet cost so little as this one, and there 
 never was one that did so much in fourteen days as I shall do, 
 sick though I am. The one of 1772 lasted three years." 2 
 
 Soon afterward the ambassador received two highly signifi- 
 cant rescripts in which Catherine outlined her plans for the Diet. 
 In accordance with the procedure followed at the First Partition, 
 he was ordered to demand at the outset the appointment of a 
 committee or ' delegation,' with full powers both to negotiate 
 with the two allied Courts (with Russia first) on the basis of their 
 declarations of April 9, and to conclude the required treaties of 
 cession. In this negotiation the ambassador was directed to 
 make common cause with his Prussian colleague. 3 But the extor- 
 tion of the territories in question was only the first part of Cathe- 
 rine's program; the second half of it reveals the fact that her 
 ambition was still unsatisfied, and that she was firmly determined 
 to rivet her chains upon what was left of the unhappy Republic. 
 For, as the rescript proceeds to suggest, Poland, in the condition 
 to which it would be reduced by the Second Partition, could no 
 longer exist as an independent state; the Empress would have 
 
 1 For general accounts of the Dietines of 1793, see, HiOBaficKift, Ceihrtrpofl- 
 HencKw, pp. 59 ff.; KocroMapoBi, op. cit., ii, pp. 271 ff.; Blum, op. cit., iii, pp. 
 232 ff.; Morawski, Dzieje narodu polskiego, v, pp. 352 f.; Kraszewski, op. cit., 
 iii, pp. 299 f. 
 
 Ilovaiski gives an interesting description of the Dietine of Lublin and the 
 instructions drawn up for the deputies of the palatinate of Troki; but for the most 
 part we sadly lack detailed knowledge of the course of these last Dietines of the 
 Republic. 
 
 2 Letter to the Empress of May 21/June 1, 1793, Blum, op. cit., iii, pp. 255 f. 
 
 3 Rescript of May 24/June 4, M. A., Hojituia, III, 70.
 
 460 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 been glad to annex the whole country, but felt unable to do so at 
 that moment in view of the jealousy of the neighboring Powers; 
 and she had, therefore, resolved to attain her essential aim by 
 concluding with the Republic an alliance of so close and intimate a 
 nature as to render the two nations henceforth one and insepar- 
 able. Sievers was instructed to arrange matters so that the pro- 
 posal for this alliance should seem to come spontaneously from 
 the Poles. He was also to take pains to secure for himself a de- 
 cisive influence in the settlement of the Polish constitution, and in 
 general it was made clear that however powerless and innocuous 
 the Republic might have become, the Empress did not intend to 
 allow it a shadow of liberty. But in these ulterior arrangements, 
 the Court of Berlin was to have no voice whatever. Once the 
 treaties of cession had been disposed of, Sievers and Buchholtz 
 were to part company; the Prussians were to be given to under- 
 stand that their role was played out, and they were henceforth 
 to be excluded from all participation in Polish affairs. Lumi- 
 nously summing up her policy of that period in a single sentence, 
 Catherine declared: " We must profit by the preoccupations of 
 our neighbors in order to arrange all our affairs with the Republic 
 on a solid and stable basis." 1 
 
 Thus, according to the Empress' will, the coming Diet was 
 doomed not only to cede away more than half of the national 
 territory, but also to sign a bond of servitude, surrendering what 
 remained of the Republic to the guardianship and the scarcely- 
 disguised domination of Russia. 
 
 II 
 
 The Diet which met at Grodno on June 17, 1793, was the last 
 and stormiest one in the history of the Republic. The terrible 
 position in which this assembly was placed, the unparalleled acts 
 of violence to which it was subjected, the eloquent and pathetic 
 language in which it poured forth its sufferings to the world 
 almost suffice to invest it with the dignity of tragedy; but when 
 one considers the shameless venality shown by so many of its 
 
 1 Rescript of May 26/June 6, M. A., Hoabma, III, 70 (printed in Appendix 
 XVIII).
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 46 1 
 
 members, the contrast between their flaming speeches in public 
 and their private bargains with the Russian ambassador, the 
 frivolity and the passion for amusement that marked the social 
 life at Grodno even at such a moment, one is tempted to regard 
 the whole episode as only an unholy and disgraceful farce. 
 
 The great majority of the deputies had been chosen at the 
 dictation of Russian agents and under circumstances that made it 
 very difficult for honest men to be elected. The Austrian charge 
 d'affaires declared that most of them were " men without prop- 
 erty or influence or decent reputations, who could be expected 
 to render blind obedience and to look out only for their personal 
 interests." l The public from the first derided them as ' hired 
 land-ceders.' 2 The leaders of the assembly — the Hetman 
 Kossakowski; his brother, the Bishop of Livonia; Pulaski and 
 Zabiello, the two Marshals of the Confederation; Bielifiski, the 
 Marshal of the Diet; Ozarowski and the rest — were the men who 
 had managed the Dietines for Russia, and who throughout the 
 Diet continued to draw the largest sums from the caisse de seduc- 
 tion maintained by the Russian and Prussian ministers in com- 
 mon. At least seventeen other deputies enjoyed regular pensions 
 from the same source; while a still larger number of incon- 
 spicuous and impecunious members — how many it is difficult 
 to say — appear to have sold themselves for modest sums at the 
 time of their election, and to have received occasional gratuities 
 later on. The ambassador furnished many of them with board, 
 lodging, and carriages, and his own table was constantly thronged 
 by crowds of hungry hirelings. In short, it may safely be as- 
 serted that from one half to two thirds of the members of this 
 assembly were under financial obligations to the Powers whose 
 demands it was their bounden duty and their loudly professed 
 intention to resist. One will judge them less harshly, however, 
 if one remembers that the King himself was foremost in setting 
 an evil example; for it is certain that in the course of the Diet 
 Stanislas accepted not less than thirty-five thousand ducats from 
 the Russian ambassador. 3 
 
 1 De Cache's report of June 7, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1793. 
 
 2 De Cache's report of June 23 (" vermiethete Landabgeber "), V. A., loc. cit. 
 
 3 On the corruption practised at the Grodno Diet and the preceding Dietines:
 
 462 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 In view of these facts, it is all the more surprising that this 
 assembly should have offered so violent and protracted a resis- 
 tance to the demands of the partitioning Powers; a resistance 
 that astonished Europe, confounded all the prophets, and forced 
 Sievers to take, not two weeks, as he had originally expected, but 
 three months, to put through his treaties. A partial explanation is 
 doubtless to be found in the natural desire of the venal majority 
 to save their faces before their own fellow-countrymen. In order 
 to avoid the appearance of too gross collusion with the foreigners, 
 it was necessary to make a brave show of resistance. Besides, 
 even these men may not have been without some remnant of 
 patriotism; and at least they possessed the national talent for 
 oratory and the sense of what the dramatic proprieties demanded. 
 If they were to consummate the dismemberment of Poland, they 
 would do it in the grand manner: with floods of eloquence, with 
 passionate protests, with sighs and tears, with all the appear- 
 ances of yielding only to brute force, with appeals to the civilized 
 world and to posterity. 
 
 It is also clear that Sievers' plans were often crossed by intrigues 
 emanating, one might say, from those of his own household. 
 Among all the Polish satellites of Russia, none were warmer in 
 their professions of devotion than the Kossakowskis; and 
 doubtless that powerful family was loyal enough as long as Russia 
 allowed them to exercise the monstrous tyranny which they had 
 set up in Lithuania in the name of the Confederation. But when 
 Sievers, indignant at their proceedings, attempted to put a stop to 
 them and also threatened to dissolve the Confederation, the 
 Kossakowskis passed into secret but none the less active and 
 insidious opposition to him. The family was not an enemy to be 
 despised; for they controlled almost all the sixty deputies of 
 Lithuania, and they had powerful Russian backers, notably 
 General Igelstrom * at Warsaw and the favorite Zubov at St. 
 Petersburg. Their great aim, apparently, was to effect the dis- 
 
 Blum, op. cit., iii, pp. 102 f., 236 f., 252, 254 ff., iv, pp. 29-35; Buchholtz's reports 
 of February 15, March 6, May 12, 15, 20, July 10, 14, 18, August 3, September 17, 
 B. A., R. 9, 27, 1; KocroMapoBt, op. cit., ii, pp. 272 ff.; HjiOBaficiufi, op. cit., 
 pp. 59 ff. 
 
 1 Commander-in-chief of the Empress' forces in Poland.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 463 
 
 ruption of the Diet, in order that the Confederation of Targowica 
 might remain the sole authority in the Republic, and that they 
 themselves might continue to work their evil will in Lithuania. 
 Apart from that, they seem to have tried to create as many 
 difficulties as possible for Sievers, with the aid of their deputies 
 and their Russian friends; and it may be noted in passing that 
 at the close of the Diet, by a particularly subtle stratagem, they 
 succeeded in bringing about his recall in disgrace. 1 
 
 The most determined opposition, however, came from the small 
 group of patriots who were known at Grodno as the party of ' the 
 Zealots.' In spite of all the precautions and rigors employed at 
 the Dietines, a few bold and incorruptible citizens had managed 
 to get elected, chiefly in the palatinates of Mazovia and Plock, 
 and had come to the Diet with the sole purpose of putting up a 
 desperate resistance to the Partition. They numbered only about 
 twenty-five, out of a total of one hundred and forty deputies; but 
 they were to play a role quite disproportionate to their numbers. 
 They can hardly have expected to be able to thwart the Partition, 
 and they could offer no concrete plan for doing so; their one hope 
 lay in delaying matters until some lucky accident, some change 
 in the European situation, might intervene to save them. At any 
 rate, they insisted on fighting to the last ditch; they indignantly 
 repudiated the favorite argument of the majority that by con- 
 senting to the Partition the integrity and independence of what 
 was left of Poland might at least be assured; their watchword 
 was: ' If we must perish, let us perish with honor, not with 
 shame.' Constantly in the forefront of the battle, inexhaustible 
 in devices for delaying and obstructing, eloquent, indefatigable, 
 and irrepressible, they succeeded in making endless trouble for 
 Sievers and Buchholtz; they staved off the inevitable surrender 
 far longer than anyone had anticipated ; and they saved this Diet 
 from complete ignominy by proving that there were still brave 
 men and honest men in Poland. 
 
 The turbulent temper and the probable course of this assembly 
 were sufficiently revealed by the opening sessions. First of all, 
 
 1 On the relations between Sievers and the Kossakowski clique and Zubov, cf. 
 Blum, op. cit., iii, pp. 31 ff., 215 ff., 261 ff., 270, 290 ff., 358 ff., 444 ff.; iv, pp. 22, 
 24 ff., 28, 136.
 
 464 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 the ambassador put through, without difficulty, the election of 
 Stanislas Bielifiski, a ruined gambler and a notorious hireling of 
 Russia, as Marshal (i. e., president). Immediately afterward, 
 however, the deputies fell to quarreling over the oath to be taken 
 by the Marshal, and two days were spent in tumultuous and 
 fruitless wrangling. It would seem that the Kossakowski party, 
 the Zealots, and the King's friends united in provoking and pro- 
 longing this dispute in the hope of disrupting the assembly; for, 
 according to custom, if a Diet were not constituted within three 
 days after meeting, it was considered dissolved. Seeing through 
 this intrigue, Sievers promptly intervened and arrested five of 
 the disturbers. Thereupon the majority calmed down; the 
 Marshal was allowed to take the oath, and the assembly was 
 duly organized as a Confederated Diet (under the ' bond ' of the 
 Confederation of Targowica), with the Senate and Chamber of 
 Deputies sitting together and the operation of the Liberum Veto 
 suspended. 
 
 The next day (June 20) Sievers and Buchholtz presented 
 identical notes demanding the appointment of a delegation fully 
 empowered to negotiate and conclude treaties with them on the 
 basis of their declarations of April 9. After the reading of these 
 notes before the Diet, the King arose and made the brave-sound- 
 ing declaration: " I acceded to the General Confederation 
 guaranteed by the Empress only because its Act assured me of the 
 integrity and independence of the Republic. I cannot free myself 
 from the obligations incurred by my adhesion to the Confedera- 
 tion, and I have resolved under no conditions to sign any treaty 
 whatsoever which has for its aim to deprive the Republic of even 
 the smallest part of its possessions. I hope that the members of 
 the Diet, bound by the same oath, will follow my example." He 
 proposed that the Estates reply to these notes in moderate lan- 
 guage requesting that the two Courts should restore to the 
 Republic the lands they had taken, as the Polish nation had given 
 no excuse for their seizure. 1 Although probably no one imagined 
 that the King would stand by the firm resolution thus announced 
 — who could forget how often he had sworn to die for the Con- 
 
 1 KocTOMapoBt, op. cit., ii, p. 281.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 465 
 
 stitution of the Third of May ? — still his speech was received 
 with loud applause; the Diet appeared to be entirely a unit, and 
 responses in accordance with his suggestions were sent to the two 
 foreign ministers. 
 
 Sievers and Buchholtz at once reiterated their demand in more 
 emphatic form. They had anticipated some initial ebullitions of 
 Polish patriotism, but they were by no means prepared for the 
 storm of violent and impassioned oratory that marked the ses- 
 sions of the next three days (June 24-26). Unfortunately, it soon 
 became apparent how illusory had been the semblance of unanim- 
 ity at the outset. Although the Zealots demanded that the 
 Diet should resolve never to consent to a partition or even to 
 appoint a delegation to treat with the two Powers, although the 
 King exhorted the deputies to arm themselves with manly cour- 
 age, the out-and-out partisans of Russia were already beginning 
 to urge the necessity of giving way in order to save what remained 
 of the fatherland, and the Kossakowskis offered a compromise 
 proposal, which was to negotiate with Russia but not at all with 
 the Court of Berlin. This latter suggestion had much to com- 
 mend it to the majority. If there was any feeling common to all 
 Poles at that moment, it was bitter hatred towards the perfidious 
 and perjured Frederick William. On the other hand, their 
 sentiments towards Russia were moderated by the reflection that 
 after all Catherine had had some grounds for complaint against 
 them, and that her friendship and protection could best guarantee 
 the Republic a tranquil existence in the future. The Kossakow- 
 skis and their partisans talked of establishing some kind of organic 
 connection between Poland and Russia, like the union between 
 Poland and Lithuania, apparently with the idea that by nattering 
 the Empress with such projects they could induce her to renounce 
 the thought of a partition. Or, in case it was necessary to satisfy 
 her demands for territory, might it not be hoped that she would 
 then turn round and protect the Republic against the demands of 
 Prussia ? Acting upon such calculations, on June 26 the Diet 
 voted, on the one hand to appeal to the foreign Powers to use 
 their influence with the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin on 
 behalf of Poland — an appeal which proved perfectly fruitless —
 
 466 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 and on the other hand to appoint a deputation to negotiate with 
 Russia and with Russia alone. 
 
 This attempt to separate the interests of the partitioning Powers 
 and to play off one against the other placed Sievers in a rather 
 embarrassing position. Though alarmed at the unforeseen course 
 that the Diet was taking, convinced that the King was playing 
 him false, and suspicious that the recent decision was only a trick 
 intended to gain time and embroil the situation, still the ambassa- 
 dor could not fail to be gratified by the marked preference shown 
 to his Court, and somewhat tempted by the professed desire of the 
 Kossakowski party for a union with Russia. Reporting to the 
 Empress his conversations with the Bishop of Livonia, he inti- 
 mated that it would not be difficult to bring about the voluntary 
 submission of Lithuania, or indeed of all Poland. Should he not 
 at least attempt to buy from the Republic the overlordship over 
 Courland ? From many indications it appears that both then 
 and later he inclined to bolder and more ambitious projects than 
 had originally been contemplated, and that he would have pre- 
 ferred not to be satisfied with taking merely the half of Poland 
 when it would be so easy to take the whole of it. 1 Catherine, how- 
 ever, was not to be seduced into so radical and dangerous a 
 change of system. She ordered her ambassador to hold to the 
 plan of action originally prescribed; not to raise the question of 
 the suzerainty of Courland now; to let the Lithuanians alone, 
 and to prevent any premature and indiscreet movement in favor 
 of a union. 2 
 
 Meanwhile the Diet continued its dilatory tactics, amid fre- 
 quent scenes of uproarious disorder and constant demonstrations 
 of a wayward and refractory temper. The notes sent in by 
 Sievers and Buchholtz on June 28, protesting against the attempt 
 to separate the two Courts and demanding that the Deputation 
 be authorized to treat with Prussia, remained without effect. 
 
 1 Regarding Sievers' attitude towards the proposed union, cf . his letter to 
 Zubov of April 17, and his reports to the Empress of June 23, 26, July 4, August 13, 
 Blum, op. cit., Hi, pp. 186, 281 ft, 290, 337; as to Courland, his reports of May 14, 
 25, June 23, ibid., iii, pp. 239 f., 281. 
 
 2 Rescripts to Sievers of June 15/26 and June 23/July 4, M. A., noa&nia, III, 
 70. The latter rescript is printed in Appendix XVIII, 2.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 467 
 
 Even the preparations for a negotiation with Russia advanced at 
 only a snail's pace. The Diet could not be driven forward a step 
 without continual resorts to coercion. Sievers began by seques- 
 trating the King's revenues — a measure which promptly broke 
 down what slight powers of resistance Stanislas possessed, and 
 made him throughout the rest of the Diet the docile instrument of 
 Russia. Later the ambassador temporarily arrested seven 
 deputies of the opposition by way of making an example; 1 he 
 deported two others from Grodno, heavily reinforced the Russian 
 troops in and about the city, and sequestrated the estates of 
 Count Tyszkiewicz; finally, in one fulminating note after the 
 other he threatened the assembly and the country with the direst 
 disasters, unless his demands were immediately satisfied. Even 
 these severities generally resulted in extorting only half-conces- 
 sions. The ambassador was unable to procure for the Deputation 
 either the instructions or the full powers he desired, or to get it 
 chosen by the method he preferred, or to fill it entirely with his 
 creatures as he had planned. In fact, in appointing this com- 
 mittee (on July 11), the Poles still pretended that they were 
 consenting to a negotiation, not about cessions of territory, but 
 about a treaty of commerce and the ' perpetual alliance ' which 
 the Deputation was authorized to offer to the Empress. 2 At all 
 events, Sievers was satisfied to have secured any deputation at 
 all, and he intended to pay no attention to the limited powers or 
 the futile instructions it might have received. 
 
 The ' negotiation ' with this committee was a pure farce. At 
 the first meeting (July 13), the ambassador presented the ready- 
 
 1 It is characteristic of the diversity of statements in the historical works dealing 
 with the Grodno Diet that the number of deputies arrested on July 2 is given as 
 5, 7, 9, 12, or 16 by different writers. In fixing the number at 7, I am following 
 Buchholtz's report of July 4, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1. 
 
 2 The original draft of the instruction to the Deputation had spoken of proposing 
 to the Empress so close an alliance that " Poland and Russia should in future be 
 considered as one indissoluble body." This draft probably emanated from the 
 Kossakowskis. The Zealots had raised so strong an opposition to this ' incorpora- 
 tion ' of Poland with Russia that in the final draft all suggestion of an organic con- 
 nection between the two states had been abandoned. Possibly the Kossakowskis 
 had also learned from St. Petersburg that the Empress did not approve of their 
 projects for a union. Cf. KocroMapoBt, op. cit., ii, pp. 293 ff.
 
 468 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 made draft of a treaty by which the Republic was to cede to the 
 Empress the lands she demanded; he added that no changes or 
 additions would be allowed, and begged the Deputation to report 
 at once to the Diet. The Polish counter-proposals were scarcely 
 honored with a moment's consideration. 
 
 On July 15 the Deputation reported to the Diet; the draft 
 presented by Sievers was read, and also a note from the ambassa- 
 dor demanding that the Deputation be authorized to conclude 
 the treaty at once as the only means of saving the country. The 
 crisis had now arrived, and it was time for this assembly to show 
 its mettle. That day and the following no decision was reached, 
 but amid the general flood of patriotic declamation one deputy in 
 the pay of Russia, Lobarzewski, had the temerity to present a 
 motion in favor of yielding to the demands of the ambassador. 
 Sievers, growing impatient, sent in a new note (on the 16th), 
 threatening that if by the close of the next day the Diet had not 
 granted the Deputation full powers to sign the treaty, he would 
 regard it as a refusal to treat and as a hostile declaration; and the 
 Russian troops would then do military execution on the estates 
 of those members of the assembly who should be found opposing 
 " the general will of honest people and of the nation." l The 
 King, the Kossakowskis, and other dependents of Russia were 
 warned that they would be held responsible for everything that 
 might follow. 
 
 The 17th, then, was to be the decisive day. At the opening 
 of the session, the King delivered a moving but rather ambigu- 
 ous speech, 2 the general tendency of which was to counsel sub- 
 mission to the inevitable. But thereupon the Zealots broke 
 loose, and for hours this handful of strong-lunged patriots over- 
 awed a majority already determined to yield but still afraid to 
 say so. One deputy, Galezowski, proposed replying to Sievers 
 that the Polish nation calmly awaited the execution of his threats, 
 as the Roman Senate awaited the Gauls. 3 Karski declared that 
 if there were in the chamber anyone who would sign this treaty, 
 
 1 This note is printed in Angeberg, Reciml des Traites, pp. 314 ff. 
 
 2 The text in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 316 f. 
 
 3 KocTOMapoBt, op. cit., ii, p. 314.
 
 TEE DIET OF GRODNO 469 
 
 he would be the first to set an example of how to deal with 
 traitors. 1 Mikorski cried out, " Better for us to perish with honor 
 than to crown ourselves with eternal infamy in the lying hope of 
 saving the remainder of the country." 2 Kimbar reproached the 
 King for all his past mistakes and adjured him to efface their 
 memory by giving one immortal example of heroism now. " They 
 threaten us with Siberia," he added. " Let us go to Siberia then! 
 It will not be without charms for us; its deserts will be our 
 Elysian Fields, for everything . . . will remind us of our virtue, 
 our devotion to our country. . . . Yes, let them send us to 
 Siberia. Sire, lead us thither! " 3 The Diet, quick to catch fire, 
 joined in the cry, " Yes, to Siberia! To Siberia! " 
 
 As the assembly was reaching a dangerous pitch of exaltation 
 and he himself had been personally attacked, the King spoke 
 again, exerting all his undeniable eloquence to justify himself 
 and to moderate the chamber. He praised the patriotism of those 
 who feared neither prison nor desert nor death, but would such 
 personal self-sacrifice save the country ? Since they could do 
 nothing for those compatriots who had already passed under a 
 foreign domination, their duty was to their remaining country- 
 men whom they still might save. It would be folly to say to 
 Russia: ' Destroy, enslave three and a half million more of Poles, 
 whose representatives we are; we will it, because you have 
 already made yourself master of fcur millions of our brothers.' 
 He pictured the horrible state of the country in case the am- 
 bassador were driven to fulfil his threats: devastation, famine, 
 pestilence, and universal misery. The Diet had already done 
 all that was possible to save the brothers wrenched away from 
 them, and now it was necessary to renounce further resistance, 
 which would not only be perfectly fruitless but would plunge 
 what was left of the state into the most terrible disasters. 4 
 
 The King's speech made an obvious impression upon the assem- 
 bly. Taking advantage of this, the partisans of Russia came 
 forward more boldly in favor of the Lobarzewski motion of the 
 
 1 Ibid. 2 ILiOBafi cium, op. cit., p. no. 
 
 3 This speech is printed in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 317 fL; cf. ILiOBafiCKift, p. in. 
 
 4 This speech is printed in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 319-322.
 
 470 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 preceding day. Bishop Kossakowski assured the Diet that their 
 patriotic declarations alone would suffice to justify them in the 
 eyes of Europe and of posterity; he advised signing the treaty, 
 and added that by yielding to Russia, the Poles might hope that 
 the Empress would protect them against the Court of Berlin. 1 
 
 As midnight approached, the Marshal Bielinski declared that 
 it had been sufficiently shown how indispensable it was to resort 
 to the one means of saving the rest of the country. He directed 
 the secretary to read the Lobarzewski motion, in spite of the 
 desperate efforts of the Zealots to prevent it by cries and protests. 
 The vote was taken, and with only twenty dissenting voices 2 it 
 was resolved to authorize the Deputation to sign the treaty. By 
 way of justification for this surrender, the instruction to the 
 Deputation recited that since the members of the Diet found 
 themselves under threat of violence, left only to their own 
 resources, without any hope of outside aid, with but few troops 
 and the treasury quite empty; as humanity forbade undertaking 
 a war which Poland could not conduct, and the useless shedding 
 of blood: therefore, it remained for them only to call upon a just 
 God to witness their sufferings and their innocence, and to entrust 
 the fate of the country to the magnanimous Catherine. 3 
 
 Five days later, on July 22, the treaty was signed by Sievers 
 and the Deputation. In return for the cession of the lands 
 allotted to her by the St. Petersburg Convention of January 23, 
 1793, the Empress guaranteed the integrity of the remaining 
 possessions of the Republic (excluding, however, by implication 
 the lands claimed by Prussia) ; she bound herself not to oppose 
 any changes in the form of government which the King and the 
 present Diet should find it necessary to make, and — as a proof 
 of her friendship ! — offered to guarantee the revised constitution, 
 if she were invited to do so. Vague allusions were made to a 
 new commercial treaty and other new stipulations for mutual 
 advantage (i. e., the treaty of alliance), with which the Empress 
 in the near future might reward the Poles for their present sacri- 
 
 1 HjioBaftcKiii, op. cit., p. 114. 
 
 2 KocTOMapoBt, op. cit., ii, p. 316. 
 
 3 Blum, op. cit., iii, pp. 311 f.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 47 1 
 
 fices. 1 Sievers had thus brought the first part of his dismal task 
 to a successful conclusion, but the hardest work remained to be 
 done. 
 
 Ill 
 
 If the Russian treaty had encountered an unexpectedly pro- 
 tracted resistance, it was universally recognized that the passing 
 of the Prussian one would involve infinitely more trouble, in view 
 of what even Buchholtz described as " the hatred which a combi- 
 nation of events . . . has inspired in the whole Polish nation 
 against the cabinet of Berlin." 2 To the Poles at that time 
 Catherine's aggressions seemed almost innocent compared with 
 the unexampled treachery of Frederick William. Russia had 
 many partisans in the Diet, among them some who served from 
 conviction, not for hire; but Prussia had scarcely a friend in the 
 assembly. It was the Russian ambassador alone who had in his 
 hands the means of coercing the Diet. The success of Buchholtz's 
 negotiation depended therefore chiefly upon Sievers' willingness 
 to employ on behalf of the Court of Berlin the same unswerving 
 firmness and the same violent methods as he had employed in 
 the case of his own treaty; and here some unpleasant surprises 
 were in store for the Prussian minister. 
 
 Catherine had long before determined that when the time for 
 the Prussian negotiation came, it would be expedient to take the 
 cause of the Poles in hand. She may have felt a certain impulse 
 to atone for her own indignities to them by protecting them 
 against the ravenous Prussians; perhaps she relished the oppor- 
 tunity to show Frederick William how utterly dependent he was 
 upon her good graces; and possibly she was not unwilling to 
 oblige Austria, who had long been begging her to delay Prussia's 
 treaty at Grodno in order to stimulate that Power to greater 
 activity in the French war. But her chief motive, apparently, 
 was the desire to give the Poles a practical demonstration of the 
 value of her friendship, and to pave the way for that alliance 
 which was to deliver the Republic into her permanent tutelage. 
 
 1 The text of this treaty is printed in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 322-329. 
 
 2 Buchholtz's report of July 28, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1.
 
 472 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Hence Sievers was instructed that while the Prussian treaty must 
 indeed be put through, it would be as well to take one's time 
 about it, and to insist upon certain concessions to the unfortu- 
 nate Poles. In particular, since Prussia had always evaded her 
 commercial obligations to Poland (while Russia had religiously 
 observed hers), the ambassador was to insert into the treaty 
 substantial provisions in favor of Polish commerce, together with 
 the assurance that Prussia would grant the Republic a thoroughly 
 satisfactory commercial treaty in the near future. 1 As the Prus- 
 sian general M Ollendorff , under the pretence of * rectifying ' the 
 new frontier, had occupied a very considerable amount of terri- 
 tory not assigned to his Court by the St. Petersburg Convention, 
 Sievers was ordered to sustain the Poles in demanding the restitu- 
 tion of the land thus unjustly seized. With regard to the general 
 attitude which the ambassador was to assume during Buchholtz's 
 negotiation, the Empress wrote: " When the Prussian minister's 
 turn comes, you will naturally establish yourself as arbitrator 
 between him and the Poles. You will employ only the degree 
 of activity and energy analogous to the intention enunciated 
 above, 2 leaving the field open to Polish objections, and support- 
 ing them even in so far as reason and justice demand. There will 
 be not only no inconvenience but much advantage in gaining 
 time in this second negotiation." 3 It was a dangerous game 
 which Catherine was thus undertaking, for the Prussians were 
 not inclined to wait for their so ardently desired acquisition, and 
 they were in no mood to be trifled with. 
 
 As soon as the passing of the Russian treaty had been assured, 
 Buchholtz lost no time in sending in a note demanding that a 
 deputation should now be authorized to treat with him (July 20). 
 Sievers gave him his word of honor that he would act with the 
 same vigor in this affair as in his own negotiation; Bishop Kos- 
 sakowski promised his support; and the King also secretly 
 assured the Prussian envoy that he wished to finish the matter 
 
 1 Instructions to Sievers of June 15/26, M. A., IIoaBma, III, 70. 
 
 2 This seems to refer to the Empress' desire to put the Prussians into so chast- 
 ened a mood that they would accept the conditions she proposed to insert in their 
 treaty. 
 
 3 Rescript to Sievers, June 23/July 4. See Appendix XVIII, 2.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 473 
 
 speedily. 1 But when the note was read in the Diet (July 23), 
 there burst forth such a storm of opposition as even this assembly 
 had not yet witnessed. All parties joined in burning philippics 
 against Prussia, the Power which had been the cause of all the 
 misfortunes of Poland, which had originally suggested the First 
 Partition, which had perfidiously spurred on the nation against 
 Russia during the Four Years' Diet, the Power " whose business 
 it was to betray and to rob." 2 But as usual with this Diet, after 
 the first flush of patriotic indignation — real or feigned — timid 
 or venal souls began to talk of ineluctable necessity; the King 
 (by prearrangement) proposed an appeal to Sievers for counsel, 
 and the latter responded with a couple of notes urging the 
 assembly to proceed at once to the negotiation with Prussia. As 
 a result of this pressure, coupled with lavish promises of bribes, 
 on July 31 the Diet authorized the same Deputation which had 
 treated with Russia to open conferences with Buchholtz, although 
 with the injunction to take up only commercial questions and to 
 entertain no proposals for any cessions of territory. 3 
 
 On August 5 the Prussian minister began his discussions with 
 the Deputation; but for several weeks scarcely any progress was 
 
 1 Buchholtz's reports of July 17 and 24, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1. 
 
 2 Kraszewski, op. cit., hi, p. 327; Morawski, Dzieje narodu polskiego, v, p. 360. 
 
 3 Buchholtz's report of August 3. The Prussian envoy ascribed this concession 
 on the part of the Diet chiefly to " les soins tout a fait particuliers que nous avons 
 pris de monter les nonces et les chefs de parti." In the same dispatch he furnishes 
 an interesting but unpleasant picture of the operations that went on behind the 
 scenes at Grodno. He writes: 
 
 " Les Nonces de la diete engages pour quinze jours ou trois semaines sont au 
 desespoir. lis veulent tous partir, et comme la vie est tres chere ici, ils sont dans 
 la necessity de vendre leurs nipes [sic], . . . En consideration de ceci l'Ambassa- 
 deur et moi, nous avons fait un plan, qui leur a ete communique par Pulawski et 
 le Commandeur Mozelewski [sic], qui traitent avec eux. Nous leur promettons de 
 les recompenser et indemniser apres la signature du Traite avec Votre Majeste, 
 mais pas plustot [sic]. Ceci a produit deja un bon effet et nous nous sommes meme 
 assures d'un grand nombre de Nonces de l'opposition, de facon que ces gens dans 
 l'esp£rance de pouvoir gagner quelque chose poussent maintenant a. la roue. On 
 avoit trop bien recompense les grands par de belles charges, et trop peu donn6 aux 
 petits, qui pourtant font le plus de bruit a la Diete. ... La depense que ce plan 
 produit, pourra aller a dix-huit ou dix-neuf mille Ducats, pour chaque Cour. Elle 
 est tres necessaire pour nous conserver la plurality. ... La plus part [des Nonces] 
 sont arrives ici sans argent, et meme beaucoup sans habits, mais tous ont cru qu'ils 
 s'enrichiroient a cette occasion. Comme cela n'est pas arrive^ ils se sont mis de
 
 474 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 made, owing to disputes over small points. Meanwhile the Diet 
 enjoyed a period of rest and relaxation. It was at this time that 
 the gaiety and the mania for amusements, which characterized 
 the social life at Grodno even in the darkest moments, reached 
 their height. Although the town was almost in a state of siege, 
 the streets full of Russian soldiers and Cossacks, and camps, 
 pickets, and patrols everywhere in evidence, in the houses of the 
 citizens there was one continual round of entertainments and 
 celebrations. Throughout the Diet the leaders of the majority 
 dispensed the proverbial Polish hospitality, with Russian money. 
 The deputies flocked from the tragic scenes in the chamber to 
 balls and banquets: their mission was to be alternately dined 
 and imprisoned by the Russian ambassador. The adulation 
 lavished upon Sievers almost passes belief . At the close of July 
 Grodno society celebrated for eight days running the name-day 
 of the man who had just wrenched half its territory away from 
 the Republic. At one evening assembly on this occasion a trans- 
 parency was lighted with the device: " Vivat Jacob Sievers, who 
 brought peace and order and freedom to the Polish nation." l 
 Abject servility could go no further. " They consider here," 
 wrote one disgusted onlooker, " that no nation ever gave away 
 its lands and people so merrily as the Poles. . . ." 2 The Republic 
 was perishing amid fetes and illuminations. 3 
 
 While Sievers' negotiation with the Deputation had not lasted 
 three days, that of Buchholtz dragged on for three weeks, with 
 results most disheartening for the Prussian envoy. The Russian 
 ambassador, who at the invitation of the Poles had been admitted 
 
 mauvaise humeur, et ont voulu a toute force rompre la diete. . . ." B. A., R. g, 
 27, 1. 
 
 That Catherine had an equally low opinion of the assembly appears from a 
 rescript to Sievers (of July 13/24) in which she wrote: " II n'est pas necessaire 
 que Je vous observe que de tous ceux qui se sont determines a venir comme Nonces 
 a la Diete actuelle, il n'en est peut etre aucun qui y soit venu avec un autre but que 
 celui de soigner ses propres interets," M. A., IIojiLnia, III, 70. 
 
 1 Kraszewski, op. cit., hi, p. 329. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 337. 
 
 1 Interesting details about the social life at Grodno are to be found in Kraszewski, 
 op. cit., iii, ch. vii, passim; Blum, op. cit., hi, pp. 271 ff., 315, 328 ff., 343 ff.; Fr. 
 Schulz, Reise eines Lieflanders, i, pp. 39 ff.; HjiOBaHCKifi, op. cit., pp. 146 ff.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 475 
 
 to the conferences as mediator, did indeed persuade the Deputa- 
 tion to discuss the question of territorial cessions; but on the 
 other hand, he warmly supported the contentions of the Poles in 
 regard to commercial matters and the exact demarcation of the 
 new frontier, while the unusual mildness of his tone seemed to 
 encourage the Deputation to raise new demands and difficulties 
 of all sorts. Buchholtz was thrown into " the most cruel em- 
 barrassment " by the " feebleness," the " capriciousness," the 
 new-found tenderness of his Russian colleague for the Poles; he 
 suspected the Austrian and Swedish ministers of terrible intrigues 
 against him; and he was fairly bewildered by the "perfidy," the 
 " immorality," and the " horrible clamors " of the Deputation. 
 He was " alone in Lithuania," he wrote to his Court, face to face 
 with a nation which showed " an unbelievable hatred " for 
 Prussia, and " absolutely unable to effect anything without the 
 assistance of the Russian ambassador." His one resource would 
 have been to call in General M Ollendorff 's troops, as the ministry 
 at Berlin had authorized him to do; but to this Sievers strongly 
 objected, declaring that he could not approve of the use of force 
 when everything might be settled amicably in a few weeks, if 
 Prussia would only defer to the just and moderate demands of 
 the Poles. Thus driven from pillar to post, and fearing to see 
 his negotiation collapse altogether, the mortified envoy was 
 finally induced to accept sub spe rati the revised draft of the 
 treaty prepared by Sievers and the Deputation. This draft con- 
 ceded to Prussia the lands assigned to her by the St. Petersburg 
 Convention, but only half of the ' rectified ' frontier established 
 by Mollendorff. It also provided that a commercial treaty should 
 be concluded in the near future under the mediation of the Em- 
 press, which should reduce the crushing tariffs hitherto levied by 
 Prussia to the very moderate basis of a two per cent duty on 
 exports, imports, and goods in transit. The present treaty was 
 to be placed under the guarantee of Russia (by way of implying 
 that otherwise the Poles did not expect Frederick William to 
 keep his engagements). 1 
 
 1 For the above, Buchholtz reports of August 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, 25, B. A., R. 9, 
 27, 1.
 
 476 TEE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 Having thus imposed his will on the Prussian minister, Sievers 
 next prepared to force the treaty through the Diet. On August 
 26 the Deputation reported to the assembly. The debates of the 
 next four days surpassed all previous records for tumultuousness 
 and violence. When Podhorski, a deputy from Volhynia, who 
 later received eight hundred ducats for his shameful services, 1 
 proposed that the Deputation be authorized to sign the treaty r 
 he was hooted down, threatened with death, and driven from 
 the hall as often as he dared show himself. Szydlowski (of Plock), 
 the most active of the Zealots, demanded the breaking off of the 
 negotiation, on the ground that it was useless to negotiate with 
 a Power which had violated its last two treaties with the Republic 
 (of 1773 and 1790) for no cause whatever. There were wild cries 
 of execration against ' the Brandenburger,' and against that 
 1 Catiline ' Podhorski, and stinging accusations against the King 
 for his past errors and his present slackness. Again and again 
 the whole chamber was on its feet and swarming into the aisles, 
 and it seemed as if it would come to blows. Amid the general 
 uproar speeches could scarcely be heard. 2 
 
 Sievers determined to make an end of the matter. After several 
 vigorous notes had passed unheeded, on September 2 he sur- 
 rounded the castle where the Diet met with grenadiers and 
 cannon; all exits were closed; the Russian general Rautenfeld 
 and twelve officers took their seats in the chamber, and the 
 assembly was informed that no one would be allowed to leave 
 until the Prussian treaty was passed. As a pretext for such 
 unheard-of indignities, the ambassador alleged the necessity of 
 guarding the King, since a (purely fictitious) plot had been dis- 
 covered against His Majesty's person. The Diet sat until far 
 into the night, and then, after the usual scenes, decided to yield. 
 But while authorizing the Deputation to sign, they added five 
 new conditions, the most important of which was that the treaty 
 of cession should not be ratified until the promised commercial 
 treaty had been concluded. 3 
 
 1 Blum, op. cit., iv, p. 35. 
 
 2 On the scenes of August 26-30, cf. especially HjOBaficKifi, op. cit., pp. 157 ff., 
 and KocTOMapoBt, op. cit., ii, pp. 339 ff. 
 
 3 The other conditions were: (1) that the present Primate of Poland, although
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 477 
 
 Buchholtz, who had fancied himself at the end of his labors, 
 was fairly aghast at these new demands, which threatened to spin 
 out his negotiation for another weary month or two. There 
 followed angry scenes between him and Sievers. The latter re- 
 fused to employ further violence against the Poles, or to allow 
 the Prussians to do so on their own account. He even went so 
 far as to justify the new pretensions of the Poles and to declare 
 that he would never coerce the Diet into retracting. Quite in 
 despair over Russia's " insidious " policy, Sievers' absurd mania 
 for "making Poland happy," and his own helplessness and isola- 
 tion, Buchholtz could only beg his government for new instruc- 
 tions, while advising it to acquiesce in even these conditions. 1 
 
 It has already been noted that an explosion of wrath ensued at 
 Berlin. The Prussian ministry felt that they had carried com- 
 plaisance far enough by agreeing to the revised treaty proposed by 
 Sievers and the Deputation, and that their patience and' gener- 
 osity were being abused. Long indignant at the delays at Grodno, 
 suspicious that the Poles, the Imperial Courts, Sweden, and every- 
 one else were leagued together to rob the King of his indemnity 
 or at least to postpone its realization indefinitely, they concluded 
 that the time had come for bold and decisive action. 2 The great 
 result of this crisis was the memorable declaration already de- 
 scribed, by which the King informed Austria that he was obliged 
 to abandon the campaign against France in order to go to the 
 east and assure his acquisition in Poland. How unnecessary 
 this resolution was appears from the fact that the day after it 
 was announced the denouement took place at Grodno in a manner 
 altogether satisfactory to Prussia. 
 
 On September 13 Buchholtz had been ordered to present one 
 more vigorous note demanding the immediate conclusion of the 
 
 remaining Archbishop of Gnesen, should be permitted to reside inside the Republic; 
 (2) that in case of the extinction of the family of the Princes Radziwill, the House of 
 Brandenburg should raise no claims to its inheritance; (3) that both the treaty of 
 cession and the commercial treaty should receive the guarantee of Russia; (4) 
 that the much-revered statue of the Virgin of Czgstochowa should be restored to 
 the Republic. 
 
 1 Buchholtz's report of September 7, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1. 
 
 * Alvensleben to his colleagues in the ministry, September 12, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1; 
 the cabinet ministry to the King, September 14, B. A., R. 96, 147 H.
 
 478 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 treaty as presented to the Diet on August 26, i. e., without any 
 of the conditions or amendments made on September 2; if this 
 step failed he was to break off the negotiation and await further 
 instructions. Sievers could not afford to risk this latter con- 
 tingency, for he had always been ordered to see to it that the 
 treaty was passed. Moreover, recent dispatches from St. Peters- 
 burg indicated that the Empress was growing impatient to have 
 the affair terminated, in order to clear the path for the negotiation 
 of her alliance with the Republic. Hence Buchholtz was delighted 
 to observe a complete change of attitude on the part of his col- 
 league. Accurately divining his sovereign's wishes, although left 
 without very precise instructions, Sievers now announced that he 
 was ready to use the most efficacious means to put through the 
 Prussian treaty in the exact form desired at Berlin. 1 
 
 The ensuing journee of September 23 was very largely a repeti- 
 tion of the scenes of September 2. As a preliminary step, at dawn 
 of that day the Cossacks dragged from their beds and transported 
 out of Grodno the four leading members of the opposition. When 
 
 1 Buchholtz's reports of September 17 and 24, B. A., R. 9, 27, 1. Several writers 
 (e. g., Kostomarov, op. cit., ii, pp. 376 ff., and Sybel, op. cit., iii, p. 439) assume a 
 sudden and complete change of attitude on the part of the Empress with regard 
 to the Prussian negotiation, and urgent instructions to Sievers to finish at once. 
 Kostomarov explains this by the conjecture that Catherine foresaw the danger of 
 Frederick William's abandoning the French war. It is possible that she had such 
 a presentiment, but there is no proof of it in her rescripts to Sievers of this time; 
 in fact the only motive there given for hastening the affair is the desire to expedite 
 the alliance negotiation. 
 
 The rescript to Sievers of September 3 (N. S.) (practically the last instructions 
 he received before the denouement at Grodno) was not particularly urgent or 
 categorical: the ambassador was directed to " accelerate " the Prussian treaty 
 " par tous les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir, evitant toujours la violence et 
 conservant autant qu'il vous sera possible le role de conciliateur qui vous a si bien 
 reussi jusqu'a present." 
 
 But that Sievers rightly foresaw her intentions appears from the rescript of 
 September 7/18, which could scarcely have reached him before the decisive events 
 at Grodno: for here he was authorized to use " toutes sortes de moyens " (with- 
 out exception). " Quelque desir que J 'aye de faire empecher les voyes de violence 
 extreme," the Empress added in another passage, " Je n'en ai pas un moindre de 
 voir enfin terminer cette affaire." The general sense of this rescript is that as she 
 had now procured for the Poles all the concessions that they could reasonably 
 expect from Prussia, there was no longer any reason for delaying the conclusion 
 of the treaty. M. A., IIojiLina, III, 70.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 479 
 
 towards evening the deputies gathered at the castle, they found 
 it once more encircled by battalions of grenadiers, with cannon 
 trained on the doors, and the artillerymen standing by with 
 lighted matches. General Rautenfeld took his accustomed place 
 in the chamber near the throne, and once more the word was 
 given out that the Diet would be held captive until it had passed 
 the Prussian treaty without any of the conditions prescribed on 
 September 2. The Zealots at once set up the cry that it was use- 
 less and shameful to debate under such conditions. For hours 
 the assembly wrangled over the question whether the session 
 should or could not be opened. One deputation after another 
 was sent to Sievers to expostulate — to no purpose. Finally, 
 about midnight, the Diet relapsed into total silence, as the one 
 means left to it of protesting against violence. General Rauten- 
 feld, growing impatient, several times reminded the members of 
 their situation: the King would not be allowed to leave the 
 throne, the Senators might sleep on straw, if they chose, but no 
 one would be permitted to leave the hall until the ambassador's 
 demands had been satisfied. If the assembly remained incorri- 
 gibly obstinate, he was ordered to proceed to the most extreme 
 measures. The deputies continued to sit like statues. At last, 
 towards 4 a.m. the Russian general strode to the door, declaring 
 that it only remained for him to call in the grenadiers. The Mar- 
 shal Bielinski thereupon put the question: " Does the chamber 
 consent that the Deputation should sign the Prussian treaty sent 
 to the Diet by the Russian ambassador ? " No one answered. 
 Twice the question was repeated without response. Bielinski 
 then declared that since silence was a sign of consent, the motion 
 was unanimously carried. 1 Scarcely speaking a word, the King 
 closed the session, and the deputies trooped out in silence and 
 in tears. 2 
 
 Two days later the treaty was signed. 3 
 
 1 The majority had probably made up their minds in advance to end the affair 
 in this manner. There were precedents for such procedure. 
 
 2 Probably the best and fullest description of this famous ' Dumb Session ' is 
 that in KocroMapoBT>, op. cit., ii, pp. 385-400. 
 
 3 The text in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 342-347.
 
 480 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 IV 
 
 The final labors of the Grodno Diet were devoted to reorganiz- 
 ing the petty state that Poland now was, in accordance with 
 Catherine's plans for its future. Although the work done at this 
 time was to last but a few months, it is not without a certain 
 interest; for it illustrates the consequences which the Empress 
 meant to draw from the recent dismemberment, it completed 
 what may be called the Second Partition resettlement of the 
 Polish Question, and it indicates to some degree what the lot of 
 the Polish nation would have been, had that resettlement proved 
 permanent. 
 
 Five days after that ' Dumb Session,' at which the Russian 
 ambassador had subjected the Diet to brutalities unexampled in 
 the history of any other parliamentary body, the deputy Ankwicz 
 of Cracow proposed the conclusion of a perpetual alliance with 
 Russia, on the ground that Poland's only hope of salvation in the 
 future lay in the support of the great neighboring Empire. 1 By 
 an artful bit of comedy, the draft of a treaty of alliance sent down 
 from St. Petersburg was then formally presented to the ambassa- 
 dor by a deputation of the Diet as representing the summa 
 desideria of the Polish nation; Sievers was graciously pleased to 
 accept it; and on October 14 it went through the chamber 
 ' unanimously,' the Marshal pretending not to hear the opposing 
 voices. 2 The significance of the vote was well summed up by one 
 of the Zealots the following day with the words, " Poland has 
 now become a province of Russia." 3 It was not without justice 
 that Sievers boasted to his daughter that he had put through a 
 treaty without a parallel in modern history. 4 
 
 By the terms of this remarkable document, both sides promised 
 to aid each other with all their forces in case of war, and the chief 
 command was always to belong to the Power which furnished the 
 greater number of troops. Since the burden of the common 
 defence would fall chiefly on Russia, the King and government 
 of Poland recognized the justice of allowing the Empress that 
 
 1 KocroMapoBi., op. cit., ii, pp. 406 f. 3 Ibid. 
 
 2 KocroMapoBi., op. cit., ii, p. 407. 4 Blum, op. cit., iii, p. 395.
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 48 1 
 
 degree of "influence" in military and political matters that might 
 seem most conducive to the security and tranquillity of the 
 Republic. Under the same pretext, Russia obtained the right of 
 sendingtroops into Poland "in all cases of necessity," after having 
 amicably notified the Republic; and of keeping them there in- 
 definitely; and of maintaining military magazines on Polish soil. 
 The Republic agreed to enter into no foreign alliances and no 
 important dealings with foreign Powers without the consent of 
 Russia, while the Empress promised to accord her most efficacious 
 support to all diplomatic steps of the Polish government that 
 had been " concerted " with her in advance. The ministers of 
 the two states abroad were to act in harmony, and to keep each 
 other informed of all the important business that passed through 
 their hands. Russia received the right of representing Poland 
 at courts where the Republic did not maintain diplomatic agents. 
 Finally, the Empress guaranteed the constitutional and other 
 cardinal laws that the present Diet might enact; and the King 
 and the Republic bound themselves in turn to make no constitu- 
 tional changes in future without her consent. 1 
 
 The treaty thus gave Russia practically unrestricted control 
 of the army and the foreign relations of the Republic. It deprived 
 the Poles of the right of altering and reforming their fundamental 
 laws and institutions at their discretion. It gave legal sanction 
 and the widest opportunities for Russian interference in almost 
 every branch of Poland's domestic affairs. It was indeed a 
 pactum subjectionis el incorporationis, as the Zealots in the Diet 
 ventured to call it. 2 Catherine deserves the credit of having in- 
 vented, or at least of having first perfected, that system of 'veiled 
 protectorates ' which European Powers have applied so frequently 
 in Asia and Africa in recent times ; for the position of Poland as 
 fixed by this alliance treaty can be compared only to that of 
 Egypt, Tunis, or the vassal states of India today. 
 
 That the Empress did not intend to allow the Republic the 
 slightest vestige of real independence appears from a rescript 
 sent to Sievers immediately after the conclusion of the treaty. 
 
 1 The text of this treaty is printed in Angeberg, op. cil., pp. 347-353. 
 
 2 De Cache's report of October 16, V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1793.
 
 482 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 The alliance, she declared, was only a device for adding what 
 remained of Poland to her Empire without stirring up the oppo- 
 sition of Austria and Prussia. She meant to assert the right to 
 advise the Republic how to act and conduct itself; and it must 
 ask for her advice and follow it. She expected from Poland ' com- 
 plete submission to her counsels, plans, and views.' Her am- 
 bassador at Warsaw was to direct everything that went on in the 
 Republic, and to consider himself " the head of the country." l 
 And Sievers, accurately grasping her intentions, assured her: 
 " The future king of Poland will be chosen by Your Imperial 
 Majesty, and will receive a major-domo under the name of the 
 Russian ambassador, who will have infinitely greater power than 
 any Sicilian viceroy or than the governor-general of Your 
 Majesty's province of Tver." 2 
 
 From the standpoint of such principles, Sievers' practice dur- 
 ing the last months at Grodno left nothing to be desired. He 
 directed all the operations of the Diet with so high a hand that 
 one of the Zealots declared openly that it was a farce to go on 
 with this assembly: it would be far better for the Marshal simply 
 to invite the ambassador to make whatever arrangements about 
 Poland he chose, and to let the deputies go home. 3 Among the 
 characteristic enactments of that period were the law annulling 
 all the acts of the Four Years' Diet; the decree reducing the army 
 to approximately 18,000 men; and the revised constitution, pre- 
 pared by the ambassador, and rushed through with scandalous 
 haste during the last hours of the assembly. 4 This set of ' cardinal 
 laws ' sanctioned the traditional rights of the Diet and the tradi- 
 tional impotence of the Crown; the Liberum Veto and the elec- 
 tive kingship; the exclusive rights of the szlachta to civil and 
 ecclesiastical honors and dignities; serfdom — and in short all 
 the worst features of the old constitution. In order to perpetuate 
 these abuses, it was decreed that no future Diet could " change, 
 correct, modify ... or interpret " these cardinal laws, even by a 
 
 1 Many excerpts from this remarkable rescript are given in KoCTOMapoBt, op. cit., 
 ii, pp. 411 ff. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 415. 
 
 3 Wegner, Sejm grodzietiski, ostalni usl$p, pp. 169 f. 
 
 4 The text is printed in Angeberg, op. cit., pp. 354~357«
 
 THE DIET OF GRODNO 483 
 
 unanimous vote; and that they were to remain forever " sacred, 
 stable, and immutable." 
 
 After this worthy pronouncement, and after sending an envoy 
 to Catherine to thank her for her benefits to Poland, the assembly 
 dispersed (November 24) in gloom, shame, and humiliation. 
 
 " The name of Poland has virtually been erased from the list 
 of states," was the comment of the ' men of the Third of May ' 
 upon the work of the Grodno Diet. 1 The Second Partition had 
 terminated with the loss,' not only of more than half the territory 
 of Poland, but of the independence of what was left. It was 
 practically the end of the old Republic. 
 
 But the Polish people remained to be heard from. No nation 
 not utterly bereft of a sense of honor, patriotism, and self-respect, 
 could have submitted passively to such disasters, losses, and 
 humiliations. Caught helpless, unprepared, and almost dazed 
 by the action of the partitioning Powers in the spring of 1793, 
 and then goaded to desperation by the shameful scenes at Grodno, 
 the better part of Polish society had been gathering itself and 
 rousing itself for a great effort. Since July of 1793 plans were on 
 foot which were to lead in the following spring to the great 
 national uprising under Kosciuszko and to the final struggle for 
 Polish independence. But that story belongs to the history of 
 the Third Partition. 
 
 1 Vom Entstehen und Untergange der polnischen Konstitution vom 3 May, ii, p. 
 311. This book, the apologia of the exiled Polish reformers, appeared in Germany 
 about the close of 1793. 
 
 .
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The Second Partition was the death-sentence of the Polish state 
 — of that there can be no question. The First Partition had 
 foreshadowed the ultimate catastrophe, but did not render it 
 inevitable. That initial dismemberment was only an amputation 
 at the extremities; it left a body politic that still contained the 
 elements essential to continued national life; in some respects it 
 was even a salutary operation. The Third Partition, on the other 
 hand, was the necessary and immediate result of the Second: it 
 merely ended an intolerable situation in the only possible way. 
 It was the Russo-Prussian Treaty of 1793, therefore, that decided 
 the solution which the Polish Question was to receive. It was 
 the Second Partition that sealed the fate of the Republic. 
 
 While any attempt to analyze the causes of this historic tragedy 
 or to assess responsibilities must be attended by grave and obvious 
 difficulties, the reader may, perhaps, fairly expect the author to 
 state whatever conclusions he has reached, and to explain to what 
 extent the results of the present investigation accord with the 
 views advanced by previous historians. 
 
 The favorite thesis of German and Russian writers — that the 
 Poles themselves were primarily responsible for their own down- 
 fall — is, of course, true in this sense, that through individual and 
 class egoism, indifference to the common weal, and blindness to 
 the most elementary laws of sound political life, the Poles had 
 reduced their country to a state of weakness without which the 
 Partitions would scarcely have been possible. One can hardly 
 escape the feeling that the First Partition was the just retribution 
 for all the accumulated sins and errors of the two preceding cen- 
 turies. But with the Second Partition, the case is different. The 
 crime for which the Poles were then punished was that of an 
 
 484
 
 CONCLUSION 485 
 
 attempt at national regeneration. The Second Partition was the 
 reply of the neighboring Powers to the effort made by the Four 
 Years' Diet to reform the constitution, recover the nation's inde- 
 pendence, and restore Poland to its proper place among European 
 states. Hence Polish patriotism has been able to find some con- 
 solation — or additional motives for embitterment — in the 
 thesis set up by the men of the Third of May in their apologia, 
 that Poland fell " without any fault on her side, without having 
 given the neighbors the slightest cause for revenge or hostility — 
 just at the moment when she had prepared all things necessary 
 for her happiness." l 
 
 But the question presents itself : was it wise or prudent to make 
 the attempt for independence at that time and under the given 
 circumstances ? It is often said that the Poles made the mistake 
 of seeing the root of their troubles in the Russian domination, 
 whereas the real causes of the evil lay in their own perverted 
 political habits and prejudices, their own moral and intellectual 
 shortcomings, their own military and economic weakness; that a 
 long period of internal transformation was necessary before the 
 nation could safely try to recover its independence; and that in 
 the meantime it was the part of prudence to submit to the Russian 
 protectorate, which at least ensured the continued existence and 
 the territorial integrity of the state, and which was not, in the last 
 analysis, incompatible with gradual and moderate reforms. This 
 was, in essence, the policy of Stanislas Augustus after the First 
 Partition. But, we are told, " fantastic political ideas " and 
 " patriotic impatience " prevailed. Unwilling to content them- 
 selves with what might have been attained by protracted hard 
 work, the Poles threw themselves into the pursuit of external 
 political independence, which was at that time unattainable. 
 With no accurate appreciation of their own resources or of the 
 hard realities of the situation, they insisted on hazarding every- 
 thing upon a single throw, and thus the existence of the Republic 
 was played away. 2 
 
 1 Vom Entstehen und Untergange der polnischen Konstitulion vom 3. May, 1791, 
 11, pp. 323 f. 
 
 2 The above represents fairly, I think, the views of Bobrzyhski and Kalinka 
 among Polish historians, and Kostomarov and Kareev among the Russians.
 
 486 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 However convincing this indictment may seem in view of what 
 actually happened, it is nevertheless open to many objections. 
 If the decline of the Republic is to be ascribed chiefly to the 
 defects of the worst constitution then to be found in Europe, as 
 most historians agree, then the first and most indispensable step 
 in the regeneration of Poland must be to get rid of this constitu- 
 tion, and to establish a government capable of concentrating the 
 strength of the nation for great national tasks, of repressing the 
 evil tendencies, and of creating and fostering the ameliorating 
 forces. The material and moral resources of the country were not 
 altogether inadequate; the worst evil was the lack of a govern- 
 ment able to make use of them. In our opinion, the Polish 
 patriots of that time were right in raising the political reform to 
 the first plane. But no such reform was possible as long as Russia 
 retained her control over the country. Moreover, the indictment 
 in question rests upon the utterly unproved and unprovable 
 hypothesis that Poland's integrity was safe as long as the nation 
 submitted passively to the Russian protectorate. It assumes that 
 under the beneficent auspices of Russia the Republic could have 
 looked forward to a long unbroken period of peace, recuperation, 
 and steady progress; and that Poland could have afforded to re- 
 main for a generation or two unarmed and defenceless, trusting 
 solely to the protection of her great neighbor. The men of the 
 Four Years' Diet refused to make so naive an assumption. Since 
 1772 they had lived in constant fear of a new partition; they 
 knew that every crisis in the North put their political existence 
 in peril; they believed that they could never be safe as long as the 
 country remained in its helpless condition, dependent solely upon 
 the mercy of the foreign Powers. In this case, too, it is difficult 
 to blame them. We do not believe that the Empress was so 
 averse to a new partition as is commonly asserted. At any rate, 
 it is not at all certain that in case of a serious crisis in general 
 European politics she would not have decided to free herself 
 from embarrassments by a new partition, no matter how docile 
 the Poles might have shown themselves. It has already been 
 pointed out that the rest of Europe constantly expected a further 
 dismemberment of the Republic, and that this had become, one
 
 CONCLUSION 487 
 
 might almost say, the accepted formula for settling conflicts 
 between the great Eastern Powers. When one recalls, moreover, 
 how long and assiduously Potemkin pursued his designs against 
 the Republic; how seriously a partition was discussed at St. 
 Petersburg in almost every year of the Oriental crisis, in 1789, 
 1790, 1791 — and that not so much as a means of punishing 
 Poland as of disarming the hostility of Prussia; and how readily 
 the Empress succumbed to the temptation of a new partition 
 in 1792; one can hardly avoid the conclusion that submission to 
 Russia afforded no guarantee of security to Poland, and that the 
 policy advocated by Stanislas offered no more certainty of salva- 
 tion than the policy adopted by the Patriots. Indeed, it is 
 probable that had Poland remained submissive and passive, she 
 would have fallen a victim to a new partition and to the loss of her 
 political existence sooner or later — with the sole difference that 
 then she would have perished shamefully, and her ruin would have 
 been infinitely more deserved. 
 
 The general European crisis following the outbreak of the 
 Oriental war offered the Poles a great opportunity and forced 
 them to make a great decision. Three courses lay open to them: 
 alliance with Russia, alliance with Prussia, or timorous neutrality. 
 An alliance with Russia could have been purchased by bartering 
 away still more of the sovereignty of the Republic, and by hand- 
 ing over the nation's army, its fortresses, and its richest provinces 
 to Potemkin, whose ambitions to become King of Dacia, Duke of 
 the Ukraine, or liberator of the ' oppressed ' Orthodox people 
 were tolerably well known at Warsaw. It would almost certainly 
 have drawn down upon the country an attack from Prussia, and 
 one may imagine how much protection Poland would have re- 
 ceived from Catherine, absorbed, as she was, with the two severe 
 wars she already had on her hands. Neutrality would apparently 
 have been the worst of all courses, for it would have left the 
 Republic exposed unaided to aggressions from both sides. The 
 Four Years' Diet decided in favor of alliance with Prussia; 
 decided to seize what seemed to be a unique and, if lost, irre- 
 coverable opportunity; decided to attempt at once the great 
 venture of throwing off the foreign yoke and putting through the
 
 488 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 political reforms, without which no solid national revival was 
 possible. 
 
 The attempt itself was justifiable enough, but was it well 
 carried out ? On the whole, we think the effort was distinctly- 
 creditable. The Diet displayed an energy, a patriotic enthusiasm, 
 a liberal, enlightened spirit, and a high appreciation of its task, 
 such as no Polish parliament had shown for two centuries. It 
 succeeded within three years in doubling the revenues and 
 trebling the military forces of the state; it gave the country an 
 administrative system which, within the short period of its exis- 
 tence, performed an immense work; it made a brave and promis- 
 ing attempt to win for the Republic the sympathies and support 
 of the classes always hitherto neglected — the bourgeoisie, the 
 Dissidents, the Jews, the peasantry — by legislation in their 
 favor; and finally, by establishing the Constitution of the Third 
 of May, it proved that the nation had broken away from its old 
 errors and prejudices and was ready to enter upon a new period 
 of sound and well-ordered political life. 1 But, as against all this, 
 there is much to be put on the debit side. The Diet was guilty of 
 wounding Catherine unnecessarily by tactless oratory and some 
 gratuitous affronts. The refusal to cede Dantzic and Thorn and 
 even a small part of Great Poland to Prussia was probably a 
 mistake, although a very intelligible one, for the Poles thus lost 
 their last chance of satisfying the natural ambitions of Berlin 
 without a new partition, their last chance of giving their alliance 
 with Prussia some prospects of permanence. It would have been 
 wiser, perhaps, had the makers of the new constitution contented 
 themselves with designating the Elector of Saxony as the future 
 king, while postponing the establishment of the hereditary succes- 
 sion until a later period; for they would thus have gained their 
 essential object — to guard against the dangers of a new inter- 
 regnum — at least for a long time to come, and they would have 
 avoided stirring up that storm of alarm and exasperation which 
 
 1 Cf. the quite contrary opinion about the new constitution of KocTOMapoBt, 
 op. cit., ii, pp. 115 ft"., and Solov'ev, op. tit., pp. 251 f. Most of the Polish historians 
 pass eulogies upon the constitution itself, but some of them (Bobrzynski and 
 Kalinka) doubt the wisdom of introducing such fundamental changes at such a 
 moment.
 
 CONCLUSION 489 
 
 the idea of an hereditary monarchy in Poland aroused at Berlin 
 and St. Petersburg. 1 But the worst mistake of the Diet lay in not 
 pressing forward sufficiently the military preparations of the 
 Republic. The army of 100,000 men, which was voted at the 
 beginning of the Diet, could and should have been raised; but 
 three and a half years after that memorable vote, at the outbreak 
 of the war with Russia, hardly more than half of the appointed 
 number of troops were actually under arms, and in other respects 
 as well Poland was lamentably unready. This fatal negligence 
 was due in part to the fact that the Diet, which had such a multi- 
 tude of affairs on its hands, did not find time to attend properly 
 to military matters; in part, to an exaggerated reliance upon the 
 friendship and support of Prussia, and later, of the Emperor 
 Leopold; in part, and chiefly perhaps, to the lack of money and 
 credit. Both might have been procured, if the Polish leaders had 
 known how to set about the task. Hence a distinguished his- 
 torian has expressed the opinion that the fundamental cause of 
 the disasters of Poland was the amazing ignorance of the Polish 
 statesmen of that time, particularly with regard to economic and 
 financial matters. 2 At all events, the failure of the Poles to arm 
 themselves properly during the three years' respite that was 
 granted to them, avenged itself with ruinous results in the cam- 
 paign of 1792. 
 
 That campaign presents a painful spectacle. What is one to 
 think of a nation which, after boasting of its regeneration, when 
 called upon to fight for its liberty and very existence allows itself 
 to be conquered by a hostile army of only 100,000 men, after a 
 struggle lasting barely two months ? Many historians have 
 drawn the conclusion that the heart of the nation was not in this 
 contest; that the enthusiasm manifested over the work of the 
 Third of May was purely factitious outside the capital ; that the 
 mass of the szlachta preferred the old constitution and secretly 
 sympathized with the Targowicians ; and that the nation as a 
 whole was too far sunk in lethargy and demoralization to be able 
 
 1 Cf. Korzon, Wewnetrzne dzieje, Zamkniecie, pp. 40 f., Kalinka, Der polnische 
 Reichstag, ii, pp. 755~76o. 
 
 2 Korzon, op. cit., Zamknie.de, pp. 33 f.
 
 490 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to rouse itself to a manly effort even in such a crisis. 1 On the 
 other hand, the historian who has most thoroughly investigated 
 the question, has discovered so many signs of real enthusiasm and 
 self-devotion for the national cause that he arrives at the convic- 
 tion that "patriotic zeal was universal"; "the government 
 received from all sides encouragement and exhortations to per- 
 severance "; " the nation ardently desired to defend its inde- 
 pendence." 2 Why, then, this sudden and shameful collapse ? 
 The blame must fall largely upon the King, who, after volun- 
 tarily undertaking the direction of the national defence, mis- 
 managed everything, refused to issue the summons for a general 
 rising of the nation in arms until it was too late, and then, while 
 the military situation was still far from desperate, cravenly and 
 traitorously went over to the enemy. But it is unfair to make the 
 King the scapegoat for the whole disaster. What shall one say of 
 the Patriotic leaders who, with unpardonable shortsightedness, 
 entrusted the direction of the defence to a man whose whole past 
 record showed him tragically unfitted for such a responsibility ? 
 Or, when the King's intention to surrender had become apparent, 
 why did no one find the courage to thrust him aside and to force 
 on the continuation of the struggle till the bitter end ? Or why 
 did the mass of the szlachta wait for a summons from Warsaw, 
 instead of rushing spontaneously to their country's defence ? The 
 sum of the matter would seem to be that — in spite of warm and 
 widespread patriotic zeal — the nation did not find in itself or in its 
 leaders or, least of all, in its king that iron will; that indomitable 
 resolution; that readiness to risk everything; to sacrifice every- 
 thing; and to stop at nothing, which alone might still, perhaps, 
 have saved it. The lack of a great man of action at the head was 
 cruelly felt, but the morale of the nation was also at fault. 
 
 In reviewing the causes of this collapse, one should not over- 
 look how signally fortune had turned against the Poles in the 
 preceding two years, how many events on the broader stage of 
 Europe had combined to thwart their hopes and expectations and 
 to produce a situation infinitely unfavorable to them. As ex- 
 
 1 So, for instance, Bobrzynski, Dzieje Polski, ii, pp. 338 f., KapieBi., Ha^eme 
 IIojibfflH, pp. 25 ff., KocTOMapoBt, op. cit., ii, p. 119. 
 
 2 Korzon, op. cit., v, pp. 157 ff.
 
 CONCLUSION 49I 
 
 amples, one might cite the fiasco of Prussian policy in 1790, the 
 backdown of the Triple Alliance before Catherine in 1791, the 
 sudden and complete change in the European political constella- 
 tion that followed, the premature death of the Emperor Leopold, 
 the outbreak of the Revolutionary War at the very time when 
 Catherine most desired to have her hands free, and the un- 
 paralleled treachery of Prussia at the moment of the Russian 
 attack on Poland. Few nations, perhaps, have had to conduct 
 their struggle for liberty under such adverse conditions. 
 
 The effort made by the Four Years' Diet ended, apparently, in 
 total failure, with the dismemberment of the country and the 
 virtual annihilation of the Polish state. But mere material 
 success or failure is not the highest standard for judging such an 
 effort; there remains the ethical criterion. If the great Powers 
 had annexed the whole of Poland in 1772, the world would have 
 said that the Poles deserved their fate, and, in view of the deathly 
 languor displayed by the nation at that time, it seems probable 
 that the Polish name and Polish nationality would also have 
 perished. Twenty years later, however, a new era had dawned, 
 and Poland fell, not at the moment of her deepest degradation, 
 but just when she was beginning to put forth new life and to show 
 her greatest patriotism and energy. The work of the Four Years' 
 Diet, the lofty character of its leaders, the generous enthusiasms 
 and high hopes of the period, the Constitution of the Third of 
 May, the effort of the Polish army in 1792, and the new struggle 
 for liberty under Kosciuszko in 1794 — these things brought at 
 least this inestimable advantage that they furnished the nation 
 with a treasure of spiritual goods upon which it could live and 
 maintain its faith in itself and its future after the loss of its inde- 
 pendence. From these tragic but ennobling experiences later 
 generations could convince themselves and the unprejudiced 
 outside world that this nation had not deserved to perish. And 
 so, we think, the Patriots of 1788 deserved well of their country. 
 They did not succeed in saving the Polish state — perhaps no one 
 could have done that; but they did succeed in saving Polish 
 nationality and the spiritual life of their people, which was, after 
 all, more important.
 
 492 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 II 
 
 Those Polish historians who are wont to trace their country's 
 downfall to the facts of geography are at least right in this respect, 
 that Poland had the unique misfortune of being placed midway 
 between two states, which, having been the last to attain the 
 rank of great Powers and having their territorial foundations only 
 half-built, were throughout the eighteenth century reaching out 
 around them on all sides with a restless, youthful energy, an 
 insatiable voracity, and an indifference to moral scruples, which 
 the older Powers might emulate but could scarcely equal. Poland 
 was not only the weakest state of her size in that age, but she also 
 held the most exposed and dangerous position. While Prussian 
 writers are accustomed to throw the chief responsibility for the 
 Partitions upon Russia, and Russian writers return the compli- 
 ment in kind, it would seem fairer to divide the honors evenly, 
 for, in our opinion, the Second Partition, like the First, was the 
 result of the common and equal cupidity of both Powers, with 
 Austria playing the part of an interested, and in the end a duped 
 and disappointed, accomplice. 
 
 Prussian policy during the period surveyed in this book was 
 essentially one of territorial aggrandizement. The plans, the 
 methods, the immediate objective varied frequently; but, except, 
 perhaps, for Frederick William's projected attack on Austria in 
 1790, the primary purpose of which was, apparently, to settle the 
 old rivalry between the two German Powers, the great aim — the 
 aim underlying the Hertzberg plan, the alliance with Austria, the 
 crusade against the French Revolution, the Prussian machinations 
 against Poland — was the acquisition of new territories : acquisi- 
 tions in any quarter — Juliers and Berg, Lusatia, Swedish 
 Pomerania, Courland, Dantzic, Great Poland, or the whole left 
 bank of the Vistula; acquisitions by any means but usually with 
 the minimum of effort, whether by elaborate diplomatic combina- 
 tions, like Hertzberg's, or by a half-hearted campaign or two, as 
 in the case of the war with France. This aggressive policy was not 
 dictated, of course, by any ideas about ' Prussia's German mis- 
 sion,' or the duty of recovering lands of German nationality. Its
 
 conclusion 493 
 
 basis was simply the conviction that this Prussian Monarchy, 
 which, with its meagre, scattered, and exposed territories, still 
 seemed to be only the skeleton of a state, must take on flesh and 
 bulk, unite its disjecta membra, and acquire a defensible frontier. 
 
 Well-founded as that conviction might be, it is difficult to over- 
 look the sordidness and blindness of a policy, which saw in the 
 unparalleled upheavals which Europe was then going through, 
 only opportunities for selfish aggrandizement. It is not easy to 
 construct an apology for a king who, in the course of a very short 
 reign, allied himself with almost every state in Europe in turn, 
 and broke faith with almost every one of them. The worst part 
 of Frederick William's record, however, is his desertion of the 
 Poles in 1792 in violation of his solemn engagements, and the 
 initiative which he took in provoking a new partition of the 
 allied state, which had given him no cause of offence whatever. 
 
 Apologists have, at any rate, been found even for Prussia's 
 treatment of Poland. One need not, perhaps, pay much attention 
 to such extravagant views as that of Treitschke, who saw in the 
 Constitution of the Third of May only an outburst of the old 
 " mortal hatred against the Germans, the Protestants," which 
 " must be taken by Prussia as a declaration of war " l — unless, 
 indeed, Prussia was entitled to consider any attempt on the part 
 of her neighbors to live under decent and orderly conditions as a 
 casus belli. The most elaborate vindication of Frederick Wil- 
 liam's policy is that offered by Heinrich von Sybel, whose argu- 
 ment is substantially as follows. 
 
 The alliance treaty of 1790 had been torn up by the Poles 
 themselves, since they had conspired with the Emperor Leopold 
 to introduce their new constitution, without the knowledge and 
 contrary to the wishes of Prussia, and had then passed over more 
 and more openly into the clientele of Austria, while virtually 
 abandoning their connection with Prussia altogether. Hence 
 " we cannot . . . talk of the breach of an effective treaty in the 
 measures adopted by Prussian policy." Frederick William could, 
 in any case, have defended Poland only if he received the loyal 
 support of Austria. But the latter hastened to " tear asunder the 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichie, i, p. 113.
 
 494 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 new bond between the German Powers " through " Leopold's 
 plan of the Polish-Saxon union," which Sybel regards as " the 
 cornerstone " of the Emperor's whole political system, and as a 
 plot directed against the most vital interests of Prussia, which was 
 thereby " driven into the arms of Russia." Frederick William's 
 decision in favor of a new partition was then forced upon him by 
 the unparalleled crisis in which he found himself, with Russia, 
 France, and Austria simultaneously announcing offensive plans 
 which l threatened the whole Continent with the most violent 
 convulsions,' ' called all existing rights and titles of possession in 
 question,' and ' made self-preservation the leading principle of 
 every individual.' The King simply chose the least of evils, the 
 only course which did not lead to evident disaster. He could not 
 have remained neutral in the face of the universal onset of the 
 other Powers; nor could he have allied himself with " the Parisian 
 assassins " in favor of " the Polish slaveholders "; nor could he 
 have thrown himself with all his forces upon the French, while 
 allowing Russia to seize the whole of Poland. 1 
 
 This argument seems to us false in almost every particular, 
 false as a presentation of the course of events and as an inter- 
 pretation of the motives that determined the King's policy. No 
 evidence whatever has yet been discovered to show that Leopold 
 was consulted in advance as to the introduction of the new Polish 
 constitution. It seems the height of exaggeration to ascribe so 
 important a place in the Emperor's plans to the project for the 
 Saxon-Polish union, or to assert that Prussia was thereby driven 
 into the arms of Russia. Frederick William's decision in favor of 
 a new partition was made before the unparalleled crisis described 
 by Sybel existed — in February or March of 1792 at the latest; 
 and it would be difficult to prove that the various alternatives 
 mentioned above presented themselves to the King's mind at all. 2 
 
 1 The above is based upon ideas that run through the whole of the Geschichte der 
 Revolutionszeit, as well as through Sybel's articles in the Historische Zeitschrift, x, 
 xii, and xxiii; but especially upon the discussion of the broader aspects of the 
 Second Partition in the work first cited, iii, pp. 224-228. 
 
 2 Sybel's work, which passes as one of the classic histories of the Revolutionary 
 period, bristles with erroneous assertions and judgments regarding Polish affairs. 
 Askenazy, who has pointed out some of them, goes so far as to accuse the German 
 historian of perverting the facts deliberately (op. cit., pp. 130 f.).
 
 conclusion 495 
 
 The thesis most commonly advanced by German historians is 
 that Prussia's determination to appropriate a part of Poland was 
 a " justifiable act of self-defence " (eine That gerechter Notwehr), 
 since the King was placed in a position where he had to decide 
 either to tolerate Russia's exclusive and absolute domination in 
 Poland, or else by a new partition to set bounds to the swelling 
 flood of Muscovite power. " It was a MachtjrageP The whole of 
 Poland must not be allowed to fall into Russian hands. Prussia's 
 own safety forbade her to ' permit the Russian garrisons to fix 
 themselves as firmly in Posen and Gnesen, as in Grodno and 
 Warsaw.' l — But this view also rests upon an anachronism. It 
 ascribes to the Prussian statesmen of that time ideas which 
 modern historians think they ought to have had, but of which 
 there is no trace in the records. During the early months of 1792 
 — the time at which the decision in favor of a new partition was 
 taken at Berlin — the King and his ministers were aware that 
 Russia was preparing to recover her old influence in Poland. But 
 did they view the prospect with apprehension ? Not in the least. 
 They believed that Russia was only playing into their hands, for 
 they were at that time firmly convinced that the Empress in- 
 tended to settle the fate of Poland by a concert of the neighboring 
 Powers, which would restore her preponderant influence, but 
 would also assure to the German Courts a suitable voice, in Polish 
 affairs. The Prussians were not, indeed, disposed to allow Cath- 
 erine a sole and exclusive influence in Poland, but they did not 
 believe that such was her aim; and they were quite ready to 
 accord her a preponderant influence. In numerous Prussian 
 documents of this time one finds the statement that experience 
 had proved that it was natural and inevitable that Russia should 
 always exercise a far greater authority in Poland than either of the 
 German Powers ; and that such a state of things was not only not 
 detrimental to Prussian interests, but infinitely preferable to the 
 situation existing since 1788. 2 It may therefore be asserted that 
 in resolving to provoke a new partition Frederick William was 
 
 1 Cf., e. g., Treitschke, op. cit., i, p. 131; Heigel, op. cit., i, pp. 570-573; Sybel, 
 op. cit., iii, pp. 224-228, and 152, note. 
 
 2 In substantiation of the above, one may cite from among many documents the 
 rescripts to Jacobi of March 1, 17, April 6, 1792 (B.A., R. 1, 169); to Lucchesini,
 
 496 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 consciously choosing, not the lesser of two evils, but the greater of 
 two advantages. While regarding the restoration of the Russian 
 ascendancy in Poland, not as an imminent and pressing danger, 
 but rather as a positive gain for Prussia, he determined, without 
 any real necessity or compulsion whatever, to exploit the situation 
 still further in order to satisfy his long-repressed covetousness for 
 Polish territory. 
 
 It may readily be admitted that Prussia needed to acquire 
 Dantzic, Thorn, and that part of Great Poland which projected so 
 deeply into the side of the Hohenzollern Monarchy. But it was 
 also a Prussian interest of equal, and perhaps even greater, im- 
 portance that the Republic should be preserved as an effective 
 ' buffer-state,' as a real barrier against the great, aggressive 
 military Empire in the east. We venture to think that a revived 
 Poland — consolidated and reinvigorated under the Constitution 
 of the Third of May — could never have proved so serious a 
 danger to Prussia as the advance of Russia into the heart of 
 Central Europe to within striking distance of Berlin. At all 
 events, it behooved Prussia to weigh very carefully the advantage 
 of every acquisition in Poland against the perils involved in the 
 aggrandizement of Russia and the necessity of maintaining the 
 existence of the Republic. Frederick the Great appears to have 
 realized this, 1 and so did Hertzberg. Whatever charges may be 
 brought against the latter, it must be said in his favor that he 
 planned to make the needed acquisitions on the east with the 
 minimum of loss to the Republic, and then to assure the perma- 
 nent integrity of Poland's remaining possessions. 2 But those who 
 came after him were blind to such considerations. In their sense- 
 less lust for territory, they demanded far more than they had any 
 need of, thus opening the door to still more inordinate claims on 
 the part of Russia; and to these latter claims they assented 
 without a moment's hesitation, although it was obvious that a 
 
 January 25 and April 27 (ibid., R. 9, 27); to Goltz, March 22 (ibid., R. XI, Russland, 
 133); Schulenburg to Brunswick, May 6 (ibid., R. XI, Frankreich, 8gb.). 
 
 1 Cf. Sybel, loc. oil. 
 
 2 Cf. Hertzberg's Memoir in Schmidt's Zeitschrift, vii, p. 269; P. Wittichen, 
 Die polnische Politik Preussens, pp. 69 f.; Andreae, Preussische und russische 
 Politik, p. 27.
 
 conclusion 497 
 
 partition arranged on so gigantic a scale could mean only the 
 virtual annihilation of Poland. Even German historians admit 
 that Prussia's acquisitions were immeasurably dearly bought. 1 
 In our opinion, the gain was far outweighed by the disadvantages: 
 the odium inseparable from so signal a breach of treaty obliga- 
 tions; the quarrel with Austria over the indemnities, with its 
 fateful result upon the course of the struggle in the west; the 
 replacement of a weak, quiet, and altogether inoffensive neighbor 
 on the east by a powerful, restless, and aggressive one; and the 
 inclusion within Prussia of a large alien population, which could 
 not be assimilated, and which, had it been permanently retained, 
 would have tended to give Prussia the character of a hybrid, non- 
 national state like Austria. In short, while Prussia obtained by 
 the Second Partition the largest acquisition of territory that she 
 had made down to that time, we think this was nevertheless one of 
 the most short-sighted, disastrous, and morally reprehensible 
 transactions in her history. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The majority of the historians who have treated of this period 
 have advanced the thesis that Catherine II disliked partitions; 
 that she would have preferred to rule over the whole of Poland by 
 influence rather than to make territorial acquisitions at its ex- 
 pense, which must be purchased by corresponding concessions to 
 the German Powers; and that the dismemberment of the Re- 
 public was forced upon her by Prussia. The Second Partition, 
 like the First, it is said, was a triumph of Prussian policy over 
 Russian. It was, above all, Frederick William's threat to abandon 
 the French war and to turn his attention to the east, coupled 
 with the incorrigibly refractory temper displayed by the Poles and 
 the utter failure of the Confederates of Targowica to fulfil the 
 hopes she had placed in them, which compelled the Empress to 
 agree to a measure which was repugnant to her and contrary to 
 the fundamental aims of her Polish policy. 2 The evidence for this 
 
 1 Cf. Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, i, pp. 138, 507. 
 
 2 Among the historians who take this general view of Catherine's aims (and 
 apply it to the Second Partition, in case they treat of that subject at all), one may
 
 49 8 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 view, however, is very inadequate. As far as the Second Partition 
 is concerned, it rests chiefly upon the Empress' delay in the 
 autumn of 1792 in acceding to the demands of Prussia, and then 
 upon her exposition of the motives that had determined her to 
 yield, contained in the original instruction given to Sievers. In 
 our opinion, no such interpretation need be put upon that delay, 
 which can better be explained by Catherine's momentary irrita- 
 tion over the disasters in the west, and her natural desire to 
 affect a certain reluctance about so delicate a transaction; and 
 she was under no necessity, and not at all likely, to disclose her 
 real motives in an official document like the instruction to 
 Sievers, which was not of confidential character and which was 
 obviously intended chiefly to put the best face possible on a very 
 unsavory business. We have already expressed the belief that the 
 Empress' ' opposition ' and ' scruples ' at the time of the First 
 Partition were chiefly a sham, a bit of stage-play for the sake of 
 appearances; and we think it highly probable that her attitude 
 with regard to the Second Partition was very similar. 
 
 It is true that no entirely conclusive proof of this can be offered 
 from the documents available, but the indications point strongly 
 in that direction. Beneath the guarded phraseology of the famous 
 rescript to Potemkin of July 18/29, 1791, one can detect Cath- 
 erine's willingness to accept a new partition if the King of Prussia 
 displayed a covetousness which, in his case, could be assumed 
 with tolerable certainty. One does not find here any signs of a 
 real inclination to resist such a suggestion. We have already 
 noted the astonishing activity of the Russian envoys at Berlin 
 and Vienna in ' provoking ' confidential overtures from those 
 Courts with regard to a partition, and the Empress' discreet but 
 highly significant hints to Prussia on the subject of indemnities, 
 the aim of which was probably to divert the King's ambitions 
 from France to Poland. In April of 1792, at the moment of 
 beginning the intervention in Poland, the Empress' council laid 
 down the principle that in return for the great costs of the 
 
 name Sybel, Sorel, Raumer, Janssen, Bruckner, Bobrzyriski, Kalinka, Askenazy, 
 Smitt, Martens, Solov'ev, and Ilovalski. The contrary view is held by only a few 
 writers, among whom one may cite Herrmann, Heigel, Heidrich, Smolenski, and 
 Kostomarov.
 
 conclusion 499 
 
 enterprise Russia must strive to obtain at least perfect security 
 on the side of Poland for all future time, and that no merely- 
 palliative settlement of Polish affairs could be allowed. 1 Coming 
 from a body dominated by Bezborodko, one of the earliest 
 champions of a partition, this dry expression of the protocol gives 
 matter for thought. In the following October Bezborodko, 
 reporting the first definite discussions with Goltz about the 
 Prussian demands, declared joyfully that no opposition was to be 
 expected to " our intention to take the Ukraine," and that he was 
 in favor of allowing the King of Prussia to send his troops into 
 Poland, " since that fits into our plan exactly, and will certainly 
 lead to the quickest denouement of the affair." 2 When, in 
 addition to all this and to the considerations elsewhere adduced, 
 one recalls how easily Catherine might have averted a partition 
 had she made any genuine effort to do so, how brief and per- 
 functory her pretended opposition to the arrangement really was, 
 and how little necessity there was for her to give way had she 
 seriously wished to stand out, it is difficult to escape the con- 
 clusion that the generally accepted view about her attitude on 
 this question is wrong; that at heart she desired a partition, and 
 from an early date — perhaps from the beginning of her inter- 
 vention in Poland 3 — secretly intended to bring one about. We 
 cannot agree, therefore, that the Second Partition is to be con- 
 sidered as a triumph of Prussian policy over that of Russia. On 
 the contrary, it seems probable that Russia attained precisely 
 what she had long desired — and that on terms most advanta- 
 geous to herself — while thrusting the apparent moral responsi- 
 bility upon Prussia. 
 
 If such was the Empress' policy, what were her motives ? It 
 may be doubted whether her conduct was guided, as is sometimes 
 said, 4 by the desire to free the millions of Russian and Orthodox 
 people in Poland and to complete the political unification of the 
 
 1 Protocol of March 29 / April 9, Apx. Toe. Cob., i, pp. 906-910. 
 
 2 Note of Bezborodko, of October 26, 1792, Apx. Bop., xiii, p. 275 (here erron- 
 eously placed in 1793, and otherwise undated). 
 
 8 That such was her intention appears to be implied in two letters (of Zavadovski 
 and S. R. Vorontsov respectively) published in the Apx. Bop., ix, p. 302, and xii, 
 
 P- 75- 
 
 4 Cf., e. g., Solov'ev, op. cit., pp. 255 f., 304 f. 
 
 /
 
 5oo 
 
 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 / 
 
 Russian race. It is true that in a few official documents l Cath- 
 erine speaks of the liberation of " those of the same faith and 
 blood as ourselves " as one of the advantages incidental to a 
 partition; and she sometimes talked of the necessity of regaining 
 all the lands where the old Russian princes lay buried. 2 But these 
 sporadic utterances are probably merely phrases intended to 
 justify the Partition, not Catherine's motives. 3 When she had 
 ' liberated ' her oppressed compatriots from the rule of the Polish 
 state, she did nothing to free them from the far worse rule of the 
 Polish szlachta. Except for an attack on the Uniate Church, she 
 made no effort to assert the Russian character of the annexed 
 region. Indeed, down to the third quarter of the nineteenth 
 century, the Russian government and Russian society continued 
 to regard that region, not as a fundamentally Russian territory, 
 but as a Polish territory which happened to have a considerable 
 Russian servile population. 4 The modern conception of the 
 ' rights of nationality ' was so utterly alien to the eighteenth 
 century, Catherine's policy was shaped on such entirely different 
 lines, that it seems incongruous to imagine the Empress as 
 governed by the nationalist impulse, or fired with the ambition 
 to be the unifier of the Russian race. What she, like her con- 
 temporaries, was vastly more concerned about, was material 
 power, and the glory and profit of making territorial acquisitions. 
 In the various letters that have come down to us in which her 
 ministers and advisers present their ideas about the advantages 
 to be gained by the Partition, one finds a great deal about the 
 strategic improvement of the frontier, and the greater security 
 against Poland and Turkey; most of all, about the mere magni- 
 tude of the acquisition in area and population; but nothing at all 
 about the gain for the cause of Russian national unity. 5 And 
 doubtless Catherine's views were of the same sort. 
 
 1 E. g., in the rescript to Potemkin of July 18/29, 1791, and the instruction to 
 Sievers. 
 
 2 XpanoBimKift, ^HeBHHKt, June 4/15, 1793, p. 250. 
 
 3 Cf . KapieBt, Ha^eme IIo.ibmH, p. 1 79. 
 
 4 nmraHt, HcTopia PyccKoii SraorpacfnH, iv, pp. 13 ff ; KapieBt, op. cit., pp. 
 179 ff. 
 
 6 Zavadovski to S.R. Vorontsov, January 27/February 7, 1793, Markov to S.R. 
 Vorontsov, November 8/19, 1792, January 17/28, 1793, April 18/29, July 27/August
 
 CONCLUSION 501 
 
 One can therefore accept only with qualifications the plea most 
 commonly put forward by Russian historians in defence of Cath- 
 erine's policy in the matter of the dismemberments of Poland, and 
 especially of the Second Partition; the plea, namely, that she was 
 only reclaiming what Poland had stolen in the days of Russia's 
 weakness, and continuing the work of the old ' gatherers of the 
 Russian lands.' . Kostomarov, for instance, declares that the 
 recovery of the Russian provinces from Poland was the most 
 justifiable of all the territorial acquisitions made in Europe in the 
 eighteenth century, for Catherine was restoring to her Empire 
 what belonged to it in virtue, not of mere dynastic traditions or 
 documents from the archives, but of an age-long, living national 
 tie. 1 It may readily be admitted that the great historic result of 
 her work was the virtual completion of the political unification of 
 the Russian race; but it must be added that that achievement 
 appears to have been only an involuntary and accidental result of 
 her policy. 2 If the provinces in question had never belonged to 
 Russia, and had contained only a solidly Polish population, it can 
 scarcely be imagined that she would have acted any differently. 
 
 The material gain accruing to Russia from the Second Partition 
 was immense. Merely in point of size, this was one of the two or 
 three largest acquisitions of territory that any Power has made on 
 the continent of Europe in modern times. From the moral stand- 
 point, there is little to be said for Catherine's conduct. The 
 hypocrisy and the flagrant breach of promises which give so 
 odious an aspect to the affair were well set forth by a Russian 
 statesman of that time, who wrote: " The thing itself is too 
 notoriously unjust, but the perfidious manner in which it was 
 executed, renders it still more shocking. Since we were deter- 
 mined to commit this injustice, we ought to have said frankly that 
 we were robbing Poland to avenge ourselves, because she had 
 tried to make an offensive alliance with the Turks against us; but 
 instead we talked of friendship, we published manifestoes to say 
 that we were seeking only the happiness of Poland, that we wished 
 
 7, Apx. Bop., xii, pp. 77 f., xx, pp. 32, 34 ff., 42 ff., 48 ff.; Markov to Razumovski, 
 February 25/March 8, 1793, P.A., XV, 576. 
 
 1 Op. oil., ii, p. 667. 2 Cf. KapteBt, op. cit., pp. 219 L
 
 502 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to assure to her the integrity of her possessions and the enjoyment 
 of her old government, under which she had flourished with such 
 eclat through so many centuries ! " 1 It will always be a matter for 
 regret that the assertion of the rights of Russia was not effected 
 without inflicting an even greater wrong upon Poland. And from 
 the standpoint of purely Russian interests, it may perhaps be 
 doubted whether the gains made by the Second Partition out- 
 weighed the resulting disadvantages and dangers, to which the 
 events of the last century and especially of the present time afford 
 striking testimony. 
 
 IV 
 
 In considering the Polish Question in the late eighteenth cen- 
 tury in its broadest aspects, as one of the great international 
 problems of that age, one cannot fail to be impressed with the 
 inefflcacy here of certain factors that have served to maintain the 
 existence of other states too weak to defend themselves of their 
 own resources. Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, and 
 Turkey have, to a large extent, owed their survival to the fact 
 that one or more of the great Powers were interested in their 
 preservation, and that at times the force of European public 
 opinion has been strong enough to prevent the more unscrupulous 
 forms of international brigandage. 
 
 Austria, England, and France, in varying degrees, were in- 
 terested in the preservation of Poland. Each of them, within 
 the period we have been considering, made some attempt to save 
 the sinking Republic. Pitt's effort in 1791 was, perhaps, the 
 most promising, but it was wrecked, as we have seen, by the 
 blank indifference of the British public to the great questions at 
 issue, and by the firmness and courage of Catherine II. Austria 
 under Leopold II adopted an enlightened policy towards the 
 Polish Question, which, had it been accepted by the other Powers, 
 would, in our opinion, have worked out to the great advantage of 
 all parties concerned. While the Emperor has been accused of 
 conducting the affair with far less energy and determination than 
 its importance deserved, 2 while some historians 3 have even held 
 
 1 S. R. Vorontsov to his brother, May 7/18, 1793, Apx. Bop., ix, p. 302. 
 
 2 Cf. Huffer, Oeslreich und Preussen, pp. 38 f. 3 Herrmann and Heigel.
 
 CONCLUSION 503 
 
 that he was tolerably indifferent about the whole matter, it would 
 seem that he made every effort in behalf of Poland that was com- 
 patible with Austria's difficult international position. His policy 
 was condemned to failure by the outbreak of the trouble with 
 France, and by the desertion of Prussia to the side of the Empress. 
 In general, the international situation in the late eighteenth 
 century was extremely unfavorable to Poland. As long as Eng- 
 land and France were almost constantly at odds, while Austria 
 and Prussia, according to the mot of Joseph II, found their chief 
 business in seeing which should stand higher in the favor of 
 Russia, 1 any effective combined action of the great Powers in 
 defence of the Republic was almost impossible. 
 
 As for the deterrent force of public opinion, this was precisely 
 the time when that factor exercised least influence upon the policy 
 of the great Powers, when in most capitals policy was determined 
 by a handful of persons — princes, ministers, favorites, or back- 
 stairs intriguers — and when international morality had reached 
 its very lowest ebb. The unprincipled and unscrupulous char- 
 acter of eighteenth century politics is too well known to require 
 description. In one sense, the dismemberments of Poland were 
 nothing exceptional in that age. The history of the century is 
 filled with partitions or projects of partition; there was scarcely a 
 state on the Continent whose dismemberment was not plotted by 
 its neighbors at one time or another during those hundred years. 
 The mania of the monarchs of that day to get as much land as 
 possible — whenever and wherever possible — the conception 
 voiced by Louis XIV that " to aggrandize oneself was the 
 worthiest and most agreeable occupation of a sovereign" 2 afforded 
 an ever-ready motive for partitions. The growing indifference to 
 rights, treaties, promises, or obligations of any kind removed 
 restrictions upon such operations. The doctrine of the balance of 
 power supplied the pretext, for it had been happily discovered 
 that that doctrine, originally invented to assure the existence of 
 the weak states against the strong, might equally well be applied 
 
 1 Joseph told Nassau: " Mon mdtier et celui du roi de Prusse est de travailler a 
 qui sera le mieux avec la Russie." Aragon, Nassau-Siegen, p. 282. 
 
 2 Lemontey, Ulablissement monarchiquc de Louis XIV, p. 369, note.
 
 504 THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 to combinations of the strong states to destroy the weak, provid- 
 ing the robbers divided the booty evenly among themselves. 
 
 But while the dismemberments of Poland fitted in with the 
 whole spirit and tendencies of the politics of that age, there was 
 also something new in them. The First Partition was novel in 
 that this was the first occasion when foreign Powers had dismem- 
 bered a state without having first gone to war with it or without 
 bloodshed among themselves. If this was taking a long step 
 forward towards making the ' droit de convenance ' the sole law in 
 international relations, the Second Partition went even further. 
 In 1793 the partitioning Powers did not even trouble themselves, 
 as they had done in 1772, to invoke some kind of historic titles, 
 drawn from the archives, as at least a formal satisfaction to the 
 public law of Europe. The only excuses which they proffered for 
 their usurpations were: the necessity they were under of exer- 
 cising a sort of sanitary police over their corner of the Continent 
 to prevent the contagious spread of dangerous ideas — a plea the 
 like of which Europe had not heard, at least since the time of the 
 Wars of Religion ; and then their right to ' indemnify ' themselves 
 for their beneficent exertions. If the brazen falseness and 
 cynicism of this were fitted to shock even eighteenth century 
 Europe, the violation by both the partitioning Powers of very 
 recent promises and obligations to the Poles was also more open 
 and shameless than at the time of the First Partition. Hence 
 with right the Second Partition of Poland has always been held up 
 as the supreme manifestation of the tendencies of the ' cabinet 
 policy ' of the eighteenth century; the classic example of the 
 moral degeneracy and rottenness of the old monarchical Europe. 
 One cannot better sum up the moral aspects and not the least of 
 the political consequences of the Partition than in the words of an 
 old writer who declared: 
 
 " It was the kings themselves who, on the eve of the insurrec- 
 tion of peoples, taught them that no right existed for them except 
 that of the strongest, and that when they invoked liberty, it was 
 an ignoble sacrilege; they taught them that they were not to be 
 believed even when they spoke of the public tranquillity, and of
 
 CONCLUSION 505 
 
 the respect due to the hereditary power of princes; for these same 
 monarchs who constituted themselves the defenders of monarchy 
 in France, dismembered Poland while appealing to the mostv"' 
 anarchical liberty! In short, there was only one law for them, 
 only one principle, that of interest and the glory of their dynasties. 
 The peoples have profited by the lesson." 1 
 
 1 Laurent, Etudes sur Vhistoire de Vhumanite, xi, p. 333.
 
 APPENDICES
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 The Russian Declaration to Austria of May 10/21, 1788, 
 Guaranteeing the Integrity of Poland [V. A., Russland, 
 
 Berichte, 1788] 
 
 Les deux Cours Imperiales par l'article secret de leur Traite d'Alli- 
 ance ont suffisamment pourvu au cas possible d'une attaque hostile 
 de Tune d'Elles ou de toutes deux ensemble de la part du Roi de 
 Prusse pendant qu'Elles seroient occupees a une guerre avec la Porte 
 Ottomanne. Elles se trouvent egalement chargees, tant par des en- 
 gagements contractus entre Elles en particulier que par un Traite 
 solemnel et immediat avec la Republique de Pologne de la garantir 
 de ses possessions actuelles. La bonne foy est d'accord avec leur in- 
 teret respectif, pour leur faire respecter religieusement l'obligation 
 qu'Elles se sont imposee a Elles memes et pour ne pas souffrir qu'elle 
 soit enfreinte d'aucune autre part. L'lmperatrice a deja. manifeste 
 dans plus d'une occasion a Sa Majeste l'Empereur des Romains la 
 fermete de ses intentions a. cet egard. Cependant pour complaire a 
 la sollicitude qu'il a marque recemment a ce sujet, Sa Majeste Im- 
 periale ne balance pas a Lui dormer de nouveau l'assurance la plus 
 formelle, que si le Roi de Prusse entreprenoit dans les conjunctures 
 presentes de s'emparer de quelques unes des possessions actuelles de 
 la Republique de Pologne, Sa Majeste l'lmperatrice n'hesiteroit pas 
 un instant de se joindre a Sa Majeste l'Empereur pour faire con- 
 jointement a ce Prince les representations les plus energiques et les 
 plus capables de le detourner d'un dessein nullement compatible 
 avec la bonne intelligence et la tranquillite entre les voisins, ni avec 
 la religion des Traites; et qu'en cas que ces representations fussent 
 infructueuses, Sa Majeste l'lmperatrice, faisant cause commune 
 avec Sa Majeste l'Empereur, employeroit pour empecher l'effet d'un 
 tel dessein toutes les forces et tous les moyens que la surete de 
 son propre Empire et le besoin d'opposer une defence convenable a 
 son Ennemie actuelle, la Porte Ottomanne, pourroient laisser a sa 
 disposition. 
 Le Ministere de l'lmperatrice, authorise a etre l'interprete des
 
 5IO APPENDIX II 
 
 sentimens et des intentions de Sa Majeste par rapport a la circon- 
 stance envisagee ci-dessus, croit avoir parfaitement rempli l'objet 
 desire par la Cour Imperiale de Vienne, en lui faisant delivrer cet 
 ecrit mirni de sa signature. 
 
 Fait a, St. Petersbourg le 10. May (21), 1788. 
 Cte. Jean d'Osterman. 
 Alexandre, Cte. de Besborodko. 
 A. de Marcoff. 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 On Catherine's Attitude towards the Project of a 
 Russo-Polish Alliance 
 
 The views of the two chief Polish historians who have treated this 
 question differ fundamentally here, as on most other questions. 
 Kalinka declared: "Die Kaiserin . . . wiinschte entschieden ein Biind- 
 niss mit Polen zu schliessen"; 1 while Askenazy asserts that the 
 Empress entered into the alliance project "with deep reluctance, 
 against her own better judgment," apparently only in order to 
 satisfy Potemkin. 2 On this point, I incline to the view of Kalinka, 
 for the following reasons. 
 
 (1) The conclusion of a close alliance with Poland was quite in 
 the traditions of Catherine's policy. Early in her reign, she and Panin 
 had been very eager for such a connection, especially for the event 
 of war with the Turks. 3 The reasons which led her to decline 
 Stanislas' offer during the Crimean crisis have not yet been cleared 
 up; but they may well have been of purely temporary or accidental 
 character. From a hitherto unpublished draft of a letter to Potem- 
 kin, undated but certainly of 1782-83, it appears that, at the last 
 Turkish crisis before the one under discussion in the text, the Em- 
 press had intended to draw the Poles into active cooperation with 
 Russia against the Porte, probably by means of a Confederation. 4 
 And in discussing the execution of the ' Greek project ' with Joseph 
 in 1782, Catherine spoke of getting Poland to 'enter the lists.' 6 
 
 1 Der polnische Reichstag, i, p. 81. 
 
 2 Przymierze polsko-pruskie, p. 34. 
 
 3 ^e^yaHHt, BHinraaa nojraTHKa Poccin, 1762-17J4, pp. 263 f. 
 « P. A., X, 53. 
 
 6 September 10/21, 1782: Arneth, Joseph II und Katharina, p. 146.
 
 APPENDIX II 511 
 
 (2) At Kanev, where the plan of alliance was proposed, Catherine 
 allowed Stackelberg and Bezborodko to tell the King that this was 
 a project that particularly pleased her, and one that must certainly 
 be carried out — only carefully and at the right time. 1 Already she 
 indicated that the time she had fixed for realizing it was at the meet- 
 ing of the next ordinary Diet, then a year and a half in the future. 
 After the Kanev meeting, in all the Russian documents that he before 
 us, it is assumed as a matter of course that an alliance is to be con- 
 cluded; and the only question is as to the precise terms. 2 
 
 (3) It is true that Catherine did declare that it was not useful for 
 Poland to become "more active," but she was here condemning, not 
 every alliance with Poland whatsoever, but one that would make 
 the country stronger. It is true that she wrote Potemkin one day 
 that if the Poles showed themselves loyal this time, it would be the 
 first example in their history; but here she was obviously bent on 
 dampening Potemkin's too sanguine hopes about the utility of the 
 alliance, and especially on finding an excuse for preventing him from 
 flooding her army with his Polish friends and creatures. (See his 
 letter and her reply in Solov'ev (Ssolowjoff) Geschichte des Falles von 
 Polen, p. 186.) Solov'ev comments quite justly: "Katharina theilte 
 nicht die sanguinischen Hoffnungen Potomkins, der in alien Dingen 
 seiner feurigen Phantasie freien Lauf liess; dennoch wandte sie alle 
 Mittel an, Polen fiir das Biindniss zu gewinnen." 
 
 Finally, Catherine's long delays in attending to the alliance project 
 cannot be adduced as evidence that she disliked and distrusted the 
 plan; for, having from the outset fixed the autumn of 1788 as the 
 time for her action, there was no need to announce her precise 
 intentions much earlier; especially to announce them at Warsaw, 
 where state secrets were very badly kept. In short, in opposition 
 to Askenazy, I should say that Catherine was not dragged into this 
 unfortunate plan by Potemkin, but that she went into it of her own 
 accord, thinking to find in it the best means of keeping Poland in 
 order during the Oriental war. 
 
 1 The King to Kicinski: Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii. pp. 19 ff. 
 
 2 Cf., for instance, the commentary of Bezborodko — doubtless the Empress' 
 mouth-piece here — upon the draft-treaty sent from Warsaw (PycCKift ApxnBi, 
 1888, hi, pp. 184 ff.) This undated commentary was written not later than 
 October 6/17, 1787.
 
 512 APPENDIX III 
 
 APPENDIX III 
 
 On Potemkin's Secret Plans 
 
 It is well known that Potemkin exercised a stronger and more 
 durable influence over Catherine than any other of her favorites and 
 advisers; that he had a policy of his own, which often conflicted with 
 hers; that he cherished vast, far-reaching personal ambitions, part of 
 which he could not confide even to her. An investigation of those am- 
 bitions is of great importance for the study of Russian policy towards 
 Poland in this period; but it is also extremely difficult, for it must 
 be based, for the most part, on the conjectures or rumors as to Po- 
 temkin's secret plans of which contemporary writings and diplomatic 
 correspondence are full, on more or less enigmatic passages scattered 
 here and there in confidential letters, and then on what may be in- 
 ferred from the Prince's own actions. Professor Askenazy, in the 
 brilliant book so often cited here {Przymierze polsko-pruskie, pp. 35- 
 41, 199 ff.), has been the first to penetrate deeply into this labyrinth 
 of mysteries and to offer a consistent, acute, and convincing inter- 
 pretation of Potemkin's secret aims. The following excursus is in 
 substantial agreement with Askenazy 's views; but it is also based on 
 the first-hand study of the sources. 
 
 From the moment of his rise to power, Potemkin busied himself 
 with plans for acquiring a 'sovereignty' somewhere outside of Russia; 
 this, both because of personal ambition and because it behooved him 
 to provide for his own prospects in case of the Empress' death. If 
 he lived to see Paul or Alexander ascend the throne — both bitterly 
 hostile to him — he could expect no other fate than that of Men- 
 sikov or Biihren, unless he were out of reach. His first thought, 
 apparently, was to acquire the duchy of Courland. Catherine not 
 only approved this scheme, but drew up a plan for getting the reign- 
 ing Duke deposed and putting Potemkin in his place. 1 For some 
 reason, however, she suspended the execution of this plan. Potemkin 
 held to it at least until 1779, but after that abandoned it, whether 
 because he was bought off by the Duke, as rumor had it, or be- 
 
 1 See Bvuih6&cowb, UpHCoejiiHHeHie KypjurafliH k-b Poccin, in the Pyc. Clap, 
 lxxxiii, ', pp. 31 ff., especially the rescript to Stackelberg of May 2/13, 1776, in 
 which the Empress announces her intentions.
 
 APPENDIX III 513 
 
 cause he found Courland too poor an establishment and too near 
 St. Petersburg. 1 
 
 Next, perhaps, or, more probably, contemporaneously with the 
 Courland project, went the plan of gaining the crown of Poland. 
 His acquisition in 1775 of the Polish indygenat (a sort of naturaliza- 
 tion among the szlachta) may have been intended as the first step in 
 this direction. Then from 1776 on, Potemkin appeared as the pro- 
 tector and instigator of the opposition in Poland, the patron of that 
 unholy clique of adventurers, fanatics, and scoundrels who later 
 brought about the Confederation of Targowica and, indirectly, the 
 Second Partition of the Republic. By 1781 it had become the uni- 
 versal conviction at St. Petersburg that the Polish crown was the 
 goal of Potemkin's ambition. 2 
 
 But as the 'Greek project' came more and more to the front, the 
 favorite seems to have transferred his attention to the more glitter- 
 ing project of carving out for himself a new realm around the Black 
 Sea. The Danubian Provinces would serve as the nucleus of this 
 'Kingdom of Dacia,' but that was not sufficient. Potemkin was ac- 
 cused of wishing to set himself up as a feudal prince, or even as in- 
 dependent sovereign, in 'New Russia,' the Crimea and the adjacent 
 regions already annexed to the Russian Empire, of which he was 
 
 1 That Potemkin held to the Courland project as late as 1779 appears from an 
 unpublished letter from Stackelberg to him of January 21/February 1, 1779 (P. A., 
 X, 887). See also the memoirs of his emissary, Karl Heinrich von Heyking, edited 
 by Baron Alfons von Heyking, Aus Polens und Kurlands letzten Tagen, pp. 212 ff. 
 Heyking supposes that the Empress did not want the Courland plan to suc- 
 ceed, which would indicate that her distrust of his ambition, so marked later 
 on, began at a very early date. See also Gortz, Denkwiirdigkeiten i, pp. 123 ff.; 
 Dohm, Denkwiirdigkeiten ii, Zusatze, xxvi f.; [Helbig], "Potemkin der Taurier," 
 Minerva, xxiii, pp. 461 ff.; Seraphim, Geschichte des Herzogtums Rutland, 2nd ed., 
 pp. 308 f . 
 
 2 That is the statement of Dohm (ii, Zusatze, xlv ff.), who had it on the au- 
 thority of Gortz, the Prussian envoy at that time. Cf. also Segur, Memoires, ii, 
 p. 264; Herrmann, Russische Geschichte, Erganznngsba>id, p. 107 — where Potemkin's 
 ambitions on the Polish crown are suggested as early as 1775; Castera, Histoire de 
 Catherine II, iii, p. 358. Whether Potemkin ever wholly abandoned the hope of 
 getting the Polish crown may perhaps be doubted. At the very end of his life some 
 of those nearest him surmised that that was still the object of his ambition; see 
 EnreJitrapATi, 3anHCKH, pp. 124 f., and in the Memoirs of Stanislaw Nalecz 
 Malachowski (Polish), the very interesting but somewhat questionable tale re- 
 lated after his death by Potemkin's favorite niece, the Countess Branicki: "his 
 intention was to win over all the Cossacks, unite with the Polish army, and pro- 
 claim himself King of Poland."
 
 5H 
 
 APPENDIX III 
 
 governor-general and almost uncontrolled master. 1 However that 
 may be, it is probable that he was much more concerned with the 
 designs on Poland discussed in the text. 
 
 The exact extent of his purchases of land in Poland cannot be as- 
 certained at present; but it was undoubtedly enormous. The enter- 
 prise began on a large scale about 1781; 2 it was continued with the 
 aid of the Empress, who, for instance, helped him to effect a loan of 
 five million rubles for this purpose in 1787; it went so far that even 
 in 1788 Buchholtz, the Prussian minister at Warsaw, reported that 
 Potemkin had sold all his estates in Russia in order to buy land in 
 Poland, and that this indicated clearly his designs on the country. 3 
 The statement is substantially true. Askenazy cites a " fragmentary 
 inventory" of Potemkin's property, made out after his death, which 
 would show that he had only 6,000 male peasants in Russia, but 
 over 70,000 in Poland. 4 The latter figure is certainly far too small, 
 however, for from one reliable source it appears that the great estate 
 of Smila alone contained about 112,000 male 'souls.' 5 At the time 
 of his death the Prince still retained some not very considerable 
 estates in Russia, while his Polish possessions far exceeded in size 
 many a German or Italian state. 
 
 These purchases were made in the southeastern palatinates, espe- 
 cially in that of Kiev. That they had a political motive cannot be 
 doubted. Potemkin tried to convince Catherine that it was for the 
 good of the Empire that he should buy up all that corner of Poland 
 which projected into Russian territory and which it was so important 
 for Russia to control. This was to be a veiled form of annexation. 6 
 Catherine, however, seems presently to have suspected that his real 
 aim was very different and less disinterested; and henceforth she 
 was not so ready to help in these acquisitions. 7 One day the remark 
 escaped her in the presence of her secretary: "From his newly bought 
 
 1 See the biography of the Prince in the Pyc. OrapHHa, xii, p. 695, xiv, p. 246, 
 Helbig, in Minerva, xxiii, p. 228. 
 
 2 Cf. Cobenzl to Joseph, September 12, 1781, F. R. A., II, liii, p. 226. 
 
 3 Report of September 12, B. A., Fol. 323. 
 
 4 Op. cit., p. 36. 
 
 6 See the article by Rulikowski on Smila in the Shwtiik geograficzny krolestwa 
 polskiego. 
 
 6 See his letter to the Empress of March 27/April 7, 1788, C6opHHKT> Boeirao- 
 HCTopHHecKHxi jiaTepiajioBt. EyMara Khh3h Tpiiropifl AjieKcanipoBHia IIoTeM- 
 KHHa-TaBpniecKaro, vi, pp. 252 f. 
 
 7 Cf. her letter to him of January 11/22, 1788, PyccKaa OrapHHa, xvi, p. 446.
 
 APPENDIX III 515 
 
 lands in Poland Potemkin will, perhaps, make a tertium quid, inde- 
 pendent of both Russia and Poland." 1 Very similar opinions were 
 generally current at that time. It was supposed, and probably with 
 truth, that as a first step Potemkin wished to have a duchy created 
 for him in the Ukraine, which should be a fief of Poland in the same 
 loose, unreal way as Courland was. 2 At Kanev the Russian am- 
 bassador himself told Stanislas Augustus that he had heard that 
 Potemkin desired his great estate at Smila turned into some kind of 
 a feudal principality. 3 And de facto Smila was such a status in statu, 
 with its court, its elaborate military-feudal system, its army of horse 
 and foot. 4 
 
 As to Potemkin's attitude towards the King's plan for an alliance, 
 cf. Stanislas' letters to Kiciriski of March 21, March 29, May 8, 1787, 
 in Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii; Stanislas to Potemkin, May 7, July 16, 
 September 24, October 1, 1787 (P. A., V. 166) and July 14, 1787 
 (Petrograd Imperial Public Library, Papers of V. S. Popov — these 
 unpublished letters are mainly filled with thanks for Potemkin's 
 efforts to put through the alliance) ; EpHKHept, HoTeMKHHt, pp. 86 ff . ; 
 Aragpn, Nassau-Siegen, pp. 101 ff., 131 ff.; Potemkin's remarks on the 
 King's draft for the alliance treaty, in the Pyc. ApxHBi, 1888, iii, 
 pp. 184 ff. / 
 
 The Branicki-Potocki plan for a Confederation in the provinces, 
 the 'national militia,' etc., sent in with a recommendation by Potem- 
 kin, probably in January, 1788, is printed in the Pyc. Apxrai, 1874, 
 ii, pp. 269-280, and in Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, pp. 104-113. 
 
 For Potemkin's urgent pleas to conclude matters with the Poles 
 at once, to make use of the magnates, to enlist as many of the Poles 
 as possible in the Russian armies, etc., see his correspondence with 
 Catherine for the first half of 1788 in the Pyc. CiapHiia, xvi, and 
 the C6opHHKt H. P. H. 0., xxvii. Cf . also XpanoBmrKiii, ^neBiraKi, April 
 14/25, 1788, pp. 43 f.; Popov to Potemkin, April 14/25, 1788, in 
 the Pyc. Apx., 1865, pp. 751 f.; Potemkin to Suvorov, April 29/ 
 May 10, 1788, in the Pyc. OrapHna, xiii, pp. 32 f. 
 
 On Potemkin's intrigues with the Polish magnates, and the plans 
 for a Confederation which should "restore all the national liberties 
 
 1 XpanoBHudH, ^neBHHKi, March 16/27, 1787, p. 16. 
 
 2 Cf. the remarks of the Grand Duke Paul, in June, 1787, cited by Bilbasov in 
 the Pyc. Orap. lxxxiii, ', p. 32. Stanislas Augustus worried much over this 
 danger: see EpnKHepi, IIoTeMKHHi, p. 87. 
 
 3 The King to Kicirtski, March 21, 1787, Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, p. 12. 
 
 4 Cf. the above-cited article in the Slownik gcograficzny.
 
 516 APPENDIX IV 
 
 without restriction," and perhaps even establish some new kind of 
 oligarchical federalism: cf. the secret memoir of Rzewuski to the 
 Prussian government, November, 1788 (B. A., Pologne, Fasc. 1097); 
 Buchholtz's report of November 1 (B. A., Fol. 323), and Lucchesini's 
 of December 25, 1788 (B. A., R. 9, 27); Zaleski, Korespondencya 
 krajowa Stanistawa Augusta, pp. 2361!., 242; Kalinka, Der polnische 
 Reichstag, i, pp. 64 ff., 86 f., 105 ff., 113 ff.; Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 
 
 37 £ 
 
 On Pot em kin's efforts to recruit troops in Poland (apart from the 
 
 forces to be furnished by the magnates), and especially to enlist 
 Cossacks: cf. Apx. Toe. CoB*Ta, September 25/October 6, 1787; orders 
 to Nerancic, January 25/February 5, 1788, in the C6ophhki> BoeH.-HCTop. 
 MaTepiaaoBT,, vi, pp. 196 f.; Potemkin to Catherine, March 18/29, 
 1788, ibid., pp. 243 f. Dzieduszycki to Deboli, April 23, 1788 (M. A., 
 no.n>ma, IV, 8), encloses a passport given to a Russian recruiting 
 officer, in Potemkin's name, to enlist troops in the four southeastern 
 palatinates. 
 
 On Potemkin's extraordinary interest in Cossacks, his efforts 
 during the winter of 1787-88 to organize a new and very numerous 
 Cossack army, his plan for forming great Cossack settlements along 
 the Polish and Turkish frontiers, etc.: cf. HeTpoBi,, Biopaa Type^aa 
 BofiHa, i, pp. 125-129; Stein, Geschichte des russischen Heeres, pp. 
 172 ff.; documents in the C6opHHKt BoeH.-HC-rop. MaTepiajioBi, vi, passim; 
 Apx. BopoHn,oBa, xiii, p. 227. 
 
 That along with his other projects Potemkin also held in reserve 
 as early as 1788-89 the plan of heading an Orthodox and Cossack 
 rising in the Ukraine is only an hypothesis, but a very probable one. 
 It is quite certain that he later had such a plan (1790); it was uni- 
 versally ascribed to him in Poland during the troubles in the Ukraine 
 in 1789, reported by all the foreign ministers to their courts, and 
 only half denied at St. Petersburg. Cf . Kalinka, Der polnische Reichs- 
 tag, i, pp. 440-443, and Askenazy, op. cit., pp. 38 f. 
 
 APPENDIX IV 
 
 On the Change in Prussian Policy in the Summer of 1789 
 
 It is only within the last fifteen years that historians have realized 
 the importance of the summer of 1789 as marking a decided turning- 
 point in Prussian policy. For recent discussions of the subject, see:
 
 APPENDIX IV 517 
 
 P. Wittichen, Die polnische Politik Preussens, ch. v; F. C. Wittichen, 
 "Die Politik des Grafen Hertzberg," in Hist. Vjschr., ix, pp. 183 ff.; 
 Krauel, Graf Hertzberg als Minister, pp. 44 ff.; Luckwaldt, "Zur 
 Vorgeschichte der Konvention von Reichenbach," in Delbriick-Fest- 
 schrift, pp. 232-256; Salomon, William Pitt, i\, pp. 451 f.; Aske- 
 nazy, Przymierze polsko-pruskie, pp. 55 f. The chief printed sources 
 are the correspondence between Hertzberg and Lucchesini in Dembin- 
 ski, op. cit., and that of Schlieffen with Hertzberg and Ewart in Nach- 
 richt von einigen Hausern des Geschlechtes der von Schlieffen, ii, pp. 
 408 ff. 
 
 To Paul Wittichen and Krauel belongs the honor of having first 
 brought to light Hertzberg's proposals for immediate vigorous action 
 that summer. These proposals occupy the central place in Witti- 
 chen's defence of Hertzberg, as he finds here the occasion when the 
 minister's much-criticized plan might have been brilliantly executed. 
 Here was the unique opportunity, the neglect of which avenged itself 
 at Reichenbach. Salomon accepts this view, while Krauel argues 
 against it — as I think, with justice. For one may, perhaps, accept 
 the apparently unanimous opinion of the Prussian generals that the 
 army was not ready in September of 1789; and moreover, if one was 
 to go to war, there was no need to begin with such a declaration as 
 Hertzberg proposed, which, without conciliating the enemy, would 
 have alienated every friend. The belligerent Powers would probably 
 have made peace with each other on terms reciprocally much more 
 advantageous than Hertzberg's, and Prussia would have been left 
 isolated and discredited. 
 
 Wittichen is responsible for placing in circulation a story which I 
 regard as at best only an unproved hypothesis, and probably an error: 
 the story, namely, of Hertzberg's proposed "Anschlag auf Gross- 
 Polen." He declares that in case the Imperial Courts rejected the 
 Prussian plan of pacification, Hertzberg intended immediately and 
 without further preliminaries to seize a large part, perhaps all, of 
 Great Poland, so that Prussia would thus at once realize the part of 
 the 'plan' that most concerned her, whatever might happen in 
 other quarters. Wittichen thinks that Russia would have offered 
 no opposition to this — at the most, she might have appropri- 
 ated a few Polish territories herself ; Austria would have been 
 terrorized or coerced into submission; as for the Poles, Hertzberg 
 had isolated them so successfully that they must have accepted 
 whatever Prussia dictated. This would, indeed, have been a piece
 
 518 APPENDIX IV 
 
 of treachery and high-handedness seldom paralleled. F. C. Witti- 
 chen, Salomon, and Askenazy repeat the tale much as P. Wittichen 
 has given it. 
 
 It is to be noted, however, that none of the texts cited by Witti- 
 chen in support of his theory — a few very vague passages from 
 letters — contain the slightest proof that Great Poland was to be 
 won by such a violent procedure. There is nothing to show that the 
 minister did not hold to his old plan of acquiring (a part of) Great 
 Poland by voluntary cession from the Republic, in return for Galicia 
 wrested away from Austria. 
 
 To the best of my knowledge, we have from Hertzberg's pen only 
 one fairly concrete account of the military measures recommended 
 by him that summer. It is contained in his letter to Schlieffen of 
 October 22, 1789. 1 Here there is no reference to any 'Anschlag auf 
 Gross-Polen ' — an omission which Wittichen attempts to explain 
 away by all manner of conjectures. Instead there is mention only of 
 two preliminary military movements, the one on the frontiers of 
 Galicia, the other on the side of Livonia; and then, in case of a re- 
 fusal on the part of the Imperial Courts, the invasion of Austrian 
 territory is to begin. 
 
 In Hertzberg's statements regarding a possible war with the Im- 
 perial Courts one almost invariably finds him counting on the co- 
 operation of the Poles. The following passages seem to me signifi- 
 cant (August 1, 1789, Hertzberg to Lucchesini): "Je suis d'accord 
 avec vous sur la necessite de frapper le grand coup pour nous et pour 
 nos amis. . . . il me semble . . . qu'il vaudroit mieux, apres avoir 
 recu notre derniere reponse de Constantinople, que nous offrions 
 notre plan dilemmatique . . . comme en Hollande, et qu'apres le 
 refus qu'on peut prevoir, nous concertions et executions tout de suite 
 avec nos amis notre grand plan." 2 
 
 (August 22, Hertzberg to the King) . . . "II me semble que le 
 cas existeroit toujours de presenter aux deux Cours Imperiales sa 
 [His Majesty's] mediation armee et notre Plan avec le mouvement 
 de l'armee; ... en cas qu'il [the plan] ne fut pas accepte par les 
 deux Cours Imperiales, V. M. est sur de l'alliance de la Porte, de la 
 Suede et de la Pologne, meme avant d'en avoir les actions solemnels 
 [sic]." 3 It would seem hardly probable that even Hertzberg could 
 
 1 Schlieffen, op. citi, pp. 430 ft., reprinted by P. Wittichen, op. cil., pp. 93 ff. 
 
 2 Dembinski, Documents, i, p. 403. 
 * B. A, R. 9, 27.
 
 APPENDIX V 519 
 
 have fancied that the Poles would join in the war on Austria, if 
 Prussia began operations by seizing Great Poland. 
 
 Summing it up, I think Wittichen's view rests on a mere conjec- 
 ture, which finds very little support from the sources, and for which 
 anything like a solid proof has not yet been furnished. It is to be 
 noted that Luckwaldt, who has written the most detailed and the 
 most recent account of the events of that summer, makes no men- 
 tion of any proposed 'Anschlag auf Gross-Polen.' 
 
 APPENDIX V 
 
 OSTERMANN TO ALOPEUS, MARCH 14/25, 1791 [M. A., Hpyccifl, VI, 24] 
 
 J'ai mis, Monsieur, sous les yeux de l'lmperatrice Votre depeche 
 du 8/19 Fevr. 1 Son contenu a ete d'autant plus agr^able a S. M. I. 
 qu'il est parfaitement conforme aux intentions que Vous aves tou- 
 jours ete charge d'annoncer en Son nom, tant par les instructions que 
 Vous aves emportees en partant d'ici, que par celles qu'on Vous a 
 fait parvenir ulterieurement durant Votre mission a Berlin. Les 
 unes et les autres expriment constamment le desir et le voeu de 
 S. M. I. de conserver et de maintenir une bonne harmonie impertur- 
 bable avec S. M. Prussienne. En effet ce systeme etant analogue aux 
 interets des deux Monarchies et le Roi de Prusse paraissant partager 
 a cet egard la conviction de l'lmperatrice, il ne s'agit que de calmer 
 et d'ecarter les ombrages et les soupcons qui ont dirige jusqu'a pre- 
 sent la politique de la Cour de Berlin en sens contraire. Le moyen 
 qu'on Vous a suggere et dont Vous rendes compte dans la depeche 
 susmentionnee pour etablir et consolider la confiance entre les deux 
 Cours ne repugne en rien a la sincerite des vues de S. M. I. et de Ses 
 dispositions a, l'egard de S. M. Prussienne. Elle a asses developpees 
 [sic] ces dernieres dans toute Sa conduite pour ne laisser aucun doute 
 de la facilite avec laquelle Elle se pretera a tout ce qui pourra effec- 
 tuer un rapprochement aussi desirable pour les deux Souverains. 
 C'est dans ce sens que nous nous sommes expliques demierement 
 aussi vis-a-vis de la Cour de Dannemark en reponse aux ouvertures 
 qu'elle nous a faites au nom de celle de Berlin relativement aux con- 
 jonctures actuelles; et nous avons ordre de Vous autoriser, Monsieur, 
 en cas que cette derniere persiste dans les dispositions qu'on Vous a 
 
 1 For this dispatch, see Dembinski, Documents, i, pp. 116-119.
 
 520 
 
 APPENDIX V 
 
 temoignees en dernier lieu, a lui annoncer que Tlmperatrice ne fera 
 nulle dimculte de donner les mains a un arrangement provisionel 
 touchant le Traite d'alliance que S. M. Prussienne desire de conclure 
 avec Elle a. la suite de notre paix avec la Porte Ottomanne. Vous 
 nous instruires de la forme que la Cour de Berlin voudra donner a 
 l'acte ou a la convention secrette qu'on pourroit arreter entre les 
 deux Cours. Nous ne dirons qu'un mot de ce qui doit faire la sub- 
 stance de cette transaction. Elle doit d'abord porter l'engagement 
 mutuel de renouveller apres la presente guerre finie les anciennes 
 liaisons entre la Russie et la Prusse sur le meme pied ou elles ont 
 existees jusqu'a l'annee 1788. Ensuite on stipulera en termes pro- 
 pres la promesse positive de la part de S. M. Prussienne, non seule- 
 ment de ne point s'opposer a ce que Tlmperatrice amenat la Porte 
 Ottomanne par tous les moyens possibles a. faire la paix aux condi- 
 tions que S. M. a proposees, a savoir: le renouvellement pur et simple 
 des anciens Traites et transactions anterieures a cette guerre-ci et la 
 cession d'Oczakoff avec son territoire jusqu'au Dniester, de maniere 
 que cette riviere serve desormais de frontiere entre les deux Empires, 
 mais aussi a employer aupres de la dite Porte Ses representations et 
 Ses exhortations les plus efficaces et les plus energiques a fin de la 
 determiner a accepter ces conditions. ... Si ... S. M. Prussienne 
 se determine a realiser un accord ou un arrangement analogues au 
 plan que nous venons d'esquisser et qu'Elle Vous fasse connaitre 
 Ses intentions definitives la dessus, nous n'attendrons que le rap- 
 port que Vous nous en feres, pour Vous envoyer le projet d'acte 
 ou de convention secrette avec les pleins pouvoirs requis pour le 
 conclure et le signer et le convertir en instrument authentique et 
 revetu de toutes les formalites usitees dans les transactions entre 
 les Souverains. 
 
 Le courrier que nous Vous depechons, pour mieux cacher sa desti- 
 nation, a ordre de ne s'arreter aupres de Vous que le terns qu'il lui 
 faudra pour Vous remettre cette depeche et de passer d'abord a 
 Hambourg, ou Mr. de Gross le retiendra une huitaine de jours et 
 Vous le renverra pour chercher les rapports que Vous seres dans le 
 cas de nous transmettre et pour nous les apporter ici. Vous voyes 
 que de cette maniere le tems sera epargne autant qu'il est possible 
 et qu'il ne tiendra qu'a la Cour de Berlin d'ecarter les extremites 
 auxquelles les circonstances au grand regret de l'Imperatrice et au 
 grand detriment des interets respectifs paroissent avoir achemine 
 les choses.
 
 APPENDIX VI 521 
 
 APPENDIX VI 
 
 Notes on Chapter IX 
 
 1. On the Origin of Bischoffwerder's Second Mission 
 
 to Leopold 
 
 How far the Emperor was responsible for bringing about this 
 mission is a disputed question. It was asserted in the Prussian en- 
 voy's instructions that Leopold had asked to have Bischoffwerder 
 sent to him; and this statement has been very frequently repeated 
 by German historians. Leopold, on the other hand, denied having 
 expressed such a wish; 1 and although this has been declared to be 
 merely a dementi for use at St. Petersburg, I am inclined to think the 
 Emperor spoke the truth. If he had really expressed the wish for 
 such a mission, why was it that on Bischoffwerder's arrival his first 
 step was to attempt to persuade the Prussian envoy that he had not 
 done so? Besides, in his report to Grenville of May 15 Elgin said 
 merely: "I even venture to conceive it possible, that should His 
 Prussian Majesty send to the Emperor some confidential person with 
 powers similar to those His Majesty has been pleased to entrust with 
 me (I must add that the Emperor repeatedly mentioned Colonel 
 Bischoffwerder in high terms of approbation), such preliminary 
 stipulations might be immediately signed by us," 2 . . . The 
 same day Elgin wrote to Ewart at Berlin about the matter, and in 
 the translation of that letter communicated by Ewart to the Prus- 
 sian ministry the important passage runs: "il m'a paru qu'il Lui 
 [the Emperor] seroit fort agreable qu'une personne de confiance fut 
 envoyee aupres de Lui par Sa Majeste Prussienne avec des pouvoirs 
 semblables aux miens. Sa Majeste Imperiale m'a parle tres souvent 
 du Colonel de Bischoffwerder dans les termes de la plus haute Estime 
 et Confiance, qui prouvoient combien Elle desiroit de le revoir." 3 
 From this it appears that Elgin himself, encouraged by some words 
 of praise for Bischoffwerder on the part of the Emperor, conceived 
 the idea of bringing the 'worthy Colonel' upon the scene in order to 
 help along his own negotiation. 
 
 1 "Journal iiber die Verhandlungen mit Bischoffwerder," Vivenot, i, p. 178. 
 
 2 F. z. D. G., v, p. 251. * B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172.
 
 522 
 
 APPENDIX VI 
 
 The question has a certain importance, inasmuch as the Emperor's 
 supposed request has often been taken as a proof of his eagerness in 
 May for an immediate alliance with Prussia — an eagerness of which 
 I find no clear signs until about the middle of June, when French 
 affairs suddenly assumed a dangerous aspect. 
 
 2. On the Vienna Convention of July 25, 1791 
 
 The origin of the much-discussed ' separate article ' on Polish affairs 
 may be traced from the following excerpts. 
 
 (1) February 21, 1791, Bischoffwerder proposed as one of the 
 articles of the projected alliance: "D'eloigner par des moyens sages 
 et bien concertes l'influence de la Russie en Pologne (comme le foyer 
 d'ou la plus part [sic] des intrigues de la Cour de Petersbourg sont 
 parties) sans rechercher neanmoins aucune influence preponderante 
 en Pologne, ne desirant que le maintien de la constitution actuelle 
 de ce Royaume et un Roi librement elu de la nation polonoise selon 
 leurs Loix sans l'intervention de la Russie. 
 
 " (Pour rendre cet Article ostensible on propose de le changer ainsi.) 
 D'eloigner par des moyens sages et bien concertes tout influence 
 preponderante en Pologne de la part de ses trois voisins, de maniere 
 a y maintenir toutefois la constitution actuelle de ce Royaume et 
 un Roy librement elu par la nation polonoise selon leurs loix." 1 
 
 (2) The Austrian 'observation' on this was: "On est pret d'entrer 
 dans ces vues et l'on est meme si persuade qu'elles sont propres a 
 combiner les veritables interets des trois Puissances voisines de la 
 Pologne qu'on ne croit pas difficile de consolider ces vues par un 
 nouveau concert entre elles." 2 
 
 (3) J u ty 22 > I 79 I > Bischoffwerder again presented this article in 
 the 'ostensible' form just given, with the additional clauses: "Et 
 pour ecarter — apres la Revolution qui vient de se faire dans ce 
 Royaume — tout Sujet de jalousie et d'ombrage, les deux Cours 
 sont tombes d'accord: qu'il ne pourra jamais etre question d'un 
 mariage entre l'lnfante et un Prince des trois Puissances voisines, 
 ni de l'elevation d'un tel Prince dans le cas d'une nouvelle election 
 au Throne de Pologne." 3 
 
 (4) The final (Austrian) redaction: "Les interets et la tranquil- 
 lite des Puissances voisines de la Pologne rendant infiniment desira- 
 ble qu'il s'etablisse entre Elles un concert propre a eloigner toute 
 
 1 V. A., Vortrdge, 1791. 2 V. A., ibid. 8 V. A., ibid.
 
 APPENDIX VI S 2 3 
 
 jalousie ou apprehension de preponderance, les Cours de Vienne et 
 de Berlin conviendront et inviteront la Cour de Russie de convenir 
 avec Elles, qu'Elles n'entreprendront rien pour alterer l'integrite et 
 le maintien de la libre constitution de la Pologne; qu'Elles ne cher- 
 cheront jamais a placer un Prince de leurs Maisons sur le Trone de 
 Pologne, ni par un mariage avec la Princesse l'lnfante, ni dans le 
 cas d'une nouvelle election, et n'employeront point leur influence 
 pour determiner le choix de la Republique dans l'un ou l'autre cas 
 en faveur d'un autre Prince hors d'un concert mutuel entre Elles." l 
 
 Askenazy 2 finds a contradiction between the recognition of the 
 new constitution implied in the mention of the Infanta and the refer- 
 ence to a possible new election to the throne. He overlooks the fact 
 that the acceptance of the crown by Frederick Augustus was by no 
 means certain, and that in case he refused it, a new election would 
 be necessary even according to the new constitution. I think he is 
 equally in error in asserting that the apparent recognition accorded 
 to the new form of government was belied and reduced to a mere 
 sham by the setting up of a condition impossible of fulfilment, namely 
 the approval of Russia. In the first place, it is nowhere said in the 
 article that Austria and Prussia would submit to a Russian veto on 
 the new constitution; and secondly, they could not know at that 
 time in Vienna that the Empress would never give her consent to 
 the new regime in Poland — in fact, they had reason to think that 
 she would. 
 
 The article was certainly not considered at Warsaw as an open 
 sign of Prussia's desertion (as Askenazy regards it) : on the contrary, 
 Stanislas Augustus was deeply gratified and encouraged by it. See his 
 letters to Bukaty of August 20, and to the Crown Secretary Rzewuski 
 of August 24, Kalinka, Ostatnie lata, ii, pp. 199 ff., and Smolenski, 
 Ostatni rok sejmu wielkiego, pp. 240 f . ; also de Cache's reports of 
 August 24, 31, September 3, 10 (V. A., Polen, Berichte, 1791); Bul- 
 gakov's of August 13/24 (M. A., nojibma, III, 64). 
 
 3. On Bischoffwerder's Attitude towards an Intervention 
 
 in France 
 
 There is no doubt that in signing the Vienna Convention Bischoff- 
 werder went far beyond the instructions given him by the Prussian 
 ministry, but it is not improbable that he may have had further 
 
 1 V. A., Vortrage, 1791. 2 Przymierze polsko-pruskie, pp. 150 ff.
 
 524 
 
 APPENDIX VII 
 
 secret orders from the King. This suspicion arises particularly with 
 regard to French affairs. It has been noted in the text that the King 
 was busy in September, 1790, with plans for an intervention in France; 
 in November he promised one of the Count of Artois' agents his aid 
 under certain conditions; x in the spring of 1791 there appear to have 
 been further negotiations, in the course of which he stipulated the 
 repayment of his expenses as the condition of his cooperation. 2 
 These pourparlers came to the knowledge of the Prussian ministry 
 only in June, and then only imperfectly, but they were doubtless 
 known to Bischoffwerder. It is also worth notice that some months 
 later Prince Hohenlohe — who as early as September, 1790, was the 
 confidant of his master's views on French affairs — told Fersen 
 that Bischoffwerder on going to Italy had been charged to propose 
 to the Emperor an intervention in France and a scheme for territo- 
 rial 'indemnities' similar to that which had once been suggested to 
 Reuss. 3 According to Hohenlohe, Leopold rejected the latter idea. 
 Carisien, the Swedish envoy in Berlin, in general a very good ob- 
 server, also held that one of the chief objects of Bischoffwerder's 
 mission to Italy was to find out the Emperor's views on the state of 
 affairs in France. 4 Insufficient as the evidence is, it is difficult to 
 understand how Bischoffwerder could have entered from the outset 
 with such zeal upon Leopold's proposals for an intervention in France, 
 unless he knew that they corresponded closely to the views of his 
 own sovereign. 
 
 APPENDIX VII 
 
 On the Austrian Attitude towards the Plan for the 
 Permanent Union of Saxony and Poland 
 
 Sybel long maintained that the plan in question was originated by 
 Leopold soon after the revolution of the Third of May, and was pro- 
 posed by him at that time to Russia. 5 This position Sybel later had 
 to abandon. Herrmann was right in maintaining that the project 
 
 1 Schlitter, Marie Christine, p. xxii. 
 
 2 Fersen to Taube, April 11, in Klinckowstrom, Le Comte de Fersen el la Cour de 
 France, i, p. 99; instruction to Baron Roll, May 21, B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172. 
 
 3 Fersen from Prague, September 6, 1791, Klinckowstrom, op. oil., i, pp. 24 f. 
 
 4 Taube, Svenska beskickningars berdttelser, p. 85. Cf. also Taube to Fersen, 
 February 6, 1792, Klinckowstrom, op. cit., ii, p. 165. 
 
 5 See H. Z., x, pp. 418 ff., xii, pp. 280 ff.
 
 APPENDIX VIII 525 
 
 originated with the Elector, but wrong in asserting that Leopold 
 never supported it. 1 Beer's account 2 is much more accurate, but 
 fails to notice the real reason for the Emperor's cautious attitude in 
 this matter: the fact that his daughter was married to the prince to 
 whom it was proposed to assure the Polish succession. 
 
 Frederick Augustus conceived the plan of the Saxon-Polish per- 
 sonal union as early as June, 1791; 3 it was broached by his minister 
 Gutschmidt to Spielmann at Pillnitz; 4 it seems to have formed one 
 of the topics discussed in a letter from the Elector to the Emperor 
 not long afterwards. 5 At Vienna the plan was immediately approved. 6 
 While, for the reason mentioned in the text, the point was passed 
 over lightly in the ostensible instructions given to Landriani, Kaunitz 
 added in a secret postscript that this plan was of much importance 
 for Austrian interests, and continued: "Mr. de Landriani ne laissera 
 pas de seconder cet objet autant qu'il pourra sans risquer qu'on nous, 
 soupconne des vues secondaires. Comme au reste l'Electeur tient 
 lui-meme tres-fortement a la reussite de ce point, il sera plus facile 
 de combiner a cet egard le but essentiel avec les menagemens deli- 
 cats auxquels nous sommes astreints." 7 This fear of being suspected 
 of 'vues secondaires,' which has hitherto been overlooked by histo- 
 rians, is the dominant consideration in the Austrian utterances on 
 this subject. 
 
 APPENDIX VIII 
 
 On the Note from Catherine to Zubov Reported 
 by Goltz, February 3, 1792 8 
 
 This enigmatic episode has been related by all historians of the 
 period, and has given rise to a variety of conjectures. It has been 
 almost universally stated that Goltz actually saw the note in question, 
 but I think that can hardly have been the case, for the envoy nowhere 
 claims to have seen it, and he complains in his report of February 7 
 
 1 F. z. D. G., iv, pp. 397 ff. 2 H. Z., xxvii, pp. 11 ff. 
 
 3 Hartig's report of June 24, V. A., Sachsen, Berichte, 1791. 
 * Spielmann to Kaunitz, August 31, Vivenot, i, pp. 239 f. 
 
 5 Cf. the instructions to L. Cobenzl of November 12. 
 
 6 Cf. Schlitter, Kaunitz, Ph. Cobenzl utid Spielmann, pp. 89 f. 
 
 7 V. A., F. A. 62 A. 
 
 8 The several dispatches from Goltz cited in this appendix are all to be found in 
 the B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133.
 
 526 
 
 APPENDIX VIII 
 
 that he had been unable to learn more of the details of the Russian 
 project, since "le personnage peureux et borne qui avoit fait la lecture 
 en question 1 n'a rien su ajouter aux notions deja communiquees." 
 Cf. the phrase in his report of February 3: "Ce papier n'ayant ete lu 
 qu'a la hate, il a ete impossible d'en savoir davantage." The point 
 is not without interest, because it has been so often assumed that 
 the note was written only to be shown to Goltz, and that it was a 
 ballon d'essai intended to tempt Prussia out of her reserve. 2 
 
 I think it more probable that this was an ordinary case of a 'leak.' 
 Whitworth, the English envoy, to whom the Russians could have 
 no possible reason for letting out such secrets, had managed to get 
 even fuller information as to these same Russian plans earlier than 
 Goltz, without the latter's knowledge, and apparently through the 
 same channel. If the secret was betrayed in one case, why not in 
 the other? 3 
 
 Whitworth does not speak of a note, but the plan which he reports 
 agrees almost entirely with that described by Goltz. He refrained 
 at first from confiding in his colleague. The latter appears to have 
 broached the subject to him, and to have used his (Whitworth's) 
 knowledge to verify the sources of his own information. 
 
 The Russian archives have as yet failed to disclose any documents 
 bearing on this episode. Under such circumstances the incident 
 must remain obscure, but we are certainly not in a position to speak 
 of it, with Hausser, as "a Russian proposition to Prussia for a parti- 
 tion of Poland." All that we can say is that some underling, possi- 
 bly a servant, in Zubov's household or in the Russian Foreign Office, 
 came to the English and Prussian ministers with an extremely in- 
 teresting story about the Empress' plans against Poland and her 
 readiness to propose a partition; and that in his conversation with 
 Goltz he claimed that the source of his knowledge was a note from 
 Catherine to Zubov, which he had managed to read. Possibly he 
 was sent to make this revelation by his superiors. More probably 
 he was selling information, genuine or fictitious. The story he told 
 has, in itself, not a single improbable feature. We know, for in- 
 stance, that at one time there was talk at St. Petersburg of sending 
 Repnin to command the army against Poland. 4 Igelstrom went 
 
 1 The italics are mine. 
 
 2 Cf., e.g., Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, i, pp. 352 f., and Heidrich, Pretissen im 
 Kampfe gegen die franzosische Revolution, pp. 177 f. 
 
 3 Cf. Whitworth's report of January 31, 1792, Herrmann, Ergdnzungsband, 
 pp. 243 f. * Sea CoopHHKt, xxix, p. 175.
 
 APPENDIX IX 527 
 
 down to take the command in the government of Smolensk just about 
 this time, 1 thus corroborating another detail of the story. It is quite 
 possible, then, that Goltz's informant was truly reporting a genuine 
 note — and vastly important state secrets. 
 
 APPENDIX EX 
 
 Felix Potocki to Potemkin, May 14, 1791 (from Vienna). 
 [Original. M. A., Iio.ii>ina, II, j] 2 
 Monseigneur. 
 
 Je eu l'honneur de recevoire a Paris la lettre que Votre Altesse 
 a bien voulu m'ecrire avant son depart pour Petersbourg, je quitte 
 a l'insant ce pais la pour me rapprocher de vous en attendant ce 
 que S. M. PImperatrice voudra bien fair pour la conservation de 
 Notre Republique, mais en arrivant ici je trouve les nouvelles qu'elle 
 est aneantie ainsi que notre liberte, par le coup que le Roi vient de 
 lui porter, ce Roi que l'lmperatrice a donne a. une nation libre n'est 
 plus chef d'unne Republique, il est souverain d'unne Monarchie 
 nouvelle, nous avons perdue notre libertee, nos voisins perdiron 
 bientot la tranquility, il est done de lur interet, il est du notre, de 
 briser la fatal constitution que le Roi vient de nous imposer, de re- 
 tablir la Republique et de lui donner unne forme stable. Tout bon 
 Polonois qui n'est pas seduit par la Cabale Prussienne et Roiale est 
 persuade que le salut de la Patrie ne peut deja nous venir que de la 
 Russie, sans elle la nation autrefois libre est asservie, le Nombre des 
 Mecontents dans toutes les provinces de la Pologne est grande, mais 
 ils sont intimide, leur courage se relevera si on leur donne de l'appui. 
 Je prend la liberte de joindre ici un projet du Hetman Rzewuski, ce 
 n'est que pour vous fair voir notre bonne volonte, car pour les pro- 
 jets je croi qu'il ne faudra les former qu'apres etre convenu de la 
 volonte de briser les chaines qu'on vient d'imposer a, la Pologne. 
 Pour moi je suis persuade qu'il est impossible de maintenir la liberte 
 de la Pologne si on laisse la Royaute jointe a la Republique, un 
 guvernement federative seroit le plus convenable a un pais etendue 
 qui doit servire de bariere entre les plus grandes Monarchies du 
 Monde, les provinces independentes et unies ne pouroient jamais 
 etre asservie par un seul, car personne ne pourroit se servir de la 
 force integral de l'etat si les provinces ont leur guvernement, leurs 
 
 1 Goltz's report of February 17. 
 
 2 I have followed the writer's astonishing spelling and punctuation.
 
 528 
 
 APPENDIX X 
 
 armees, et leurs tresors separes, si leurs interet est necesserement 
 diverses, et si elles ne sont jointes que par l'interet de leur conserva- 
 tion. Je ne sai si je me trompe, mais je croi que ce seroit le moment 
 d'executer ce projet, et la chose se faire naturelement, si la Russie 
 donnee de l'appui au mecontents, il faudra commencer par unne 
 confederation dans les quatre Palatinats de Volhinie, Podolie, Kiovie 
 et Braclaw, qui forme la plus grande Moitie de la force, de la Popula- 
 tion, et des revenues de la Pologne, un autre confederation se for- 
 meroit en Lituanie et ce deux Confederation etabliroient dans chaque 
 de ces provinces un guvernement civile et militaire, les revenues de 
 l'etat serviroient pur solder les troupes de la Province et on formeroit 
 un tribunal pour que la joustice ne soit pas interrompue. Les pro- 
 vinces protesteroient contre le gouvernement et la constitution que 
 le Roi leurs a imposee on jureroient de maintenir la liberte on in- 
 viteroient les autres Palatinats a immiter leur exemple, et bientot 
 il seroit suivie, la revolution finiroit par un congres de Provinces 
 Confederes qui prenderoient le nom des Provinces independentes et 
 unies de la Republique de Pologne, on pourroit maime conserver au 
 Roi le titre et les emoluments de sa dignite presente il ne representera 
 pourtant que le president de congres et a sa mort le charge de presi- 
 dent ne seroit que pour deux ans. 
 
 Voila mes reves mon Prince si on veut les executer ou non il est 
 certain que nous desirons la libertee, et qu'il faut de la tranquilite 
 pour nos voisins. Si Votre Altesse trouvera necessaire que je viens 
 vous voire aies la bonte de me le dire. Votre Altesse connoit par- 
 faitement Finvariabilite de mes principes le respect et Padmiration 
 dont je suis penetre pour le Souverain qui fait l'ornement de ce 
 siecle, et l'amitie sincere pour votre personne. Mon Prince, votre 
 nom seroit deja immortel, soies encor le liberateur d'une Nation 
 oprime pour qu'il soit cherie a jamais. 
 
 J'ai l'honneur, etc. 
 
 APPENDIX X 
 
 Bezborodko to the Empress, January 25/February 5, 
 1792 (from Jassy). [M. A., Typijifl, LX, 14] 
 
 [Reports his discussions with Potocki and Rzewuski as to a Con- 
 federation to be formed in Poland under Russian protection] . . . 
 
 ITpeame HeacejiH ocm4jiiocb a CKa3aTt ito jth6o OTHOCHTejiBHo naMipemfl na- 
 TpioTOBt nojUxCKHxt, ;i;o3Bo.ii>Te, BceMHaocTHBMmaa rocyaapHHa, H3T>acHHTB
 
 APPENDIX X 529 
 
 HHcrocepneHHo hto rjiaBHEfimaa TpyjrnocrB bb tomt> npejuiejEHTt He otb caMnxt 
 HojiaKOBT., ... ho oti. jrpyrnxi. ^bopobi, IIojibni'B coci.iCTBeHHBix'B. ^to KacaeTca 
 ;jo BiHCKaro, xota Hacroamia ero HaMipeHia ne corjiacyiOTt cb HaraHMH, h6o 
 y Hero KpoeTca mhcjib Bocno.iB30BaTBca jriaTejiBHoc™ IIojiBinH kt. tomj t , , ito6 , b 
 bt. Heft npioSpf.CTB ce6i coio3HHKa ojiHoro 6oju.me, o6"y3;raTB Kopojia HpyccKaro^ 
 h bt> cjiy^ai noTpe6noM , B Ha Hero o6paTHTB tiro jjepjKaBy; ho Korjja oji,Ha2Kji.e 
 BiHCKift jibopt. yBHAHTi. ito Bame BejiniecxBo BCBMt HHHiia npejrnojioaceHia 
 HMieie, h hto oHHa TBep,iH h HenpeMT>HHBi, to ohb KOHe^Ho He CTanerB Ha nyTH. 
 HcnojmeHia hxt>, h6o othiojib He cbohctb6hho hto6t> HsmepaTopT. noatepTBOBajiT. 
 cok)3omi> tojib HaTypa.iBHHjn> h tojib BHro^HHM'B, KaKOBt ecTB Meamy AByiia HMne- 
 
 paTOpCKHMH JJBOpaMH OTflaJieilHBIMT. BHJiaM'B H yBaJKeniaMT., H 1T06'b OHT. yjJOBOJIBCT- 
 
 BOBa.ica 3aMiBHTB onua CBa3H bt. cymecTBi Hnnero He SHa^ymeft, KaKOBa y Hero 
 TenepB cociaBJieHa cb BepjrancKHMT. jtbopomt,. Bee tto hh CTaHeTi. ohb jrijiaTB 
 BonpeKH HaMi 6yjieT'B eflnHCTBeiiHo 3aKJiroiaTBca bt> noBTopeHiH cobt>tobt> h 
 npeACTaB.ieHift, na KOTopna tojibko oji;Ha 3af>OTa 6y,neT'B tto HnfiyjiB OTBiiaTB, 
 no npHMipy KaKT. h bt> boimt. nameft cb TypKaira ciy^iajiocB nocirB PeftxenSaxcKoft 
 KonBeHHin, hto o6opoHaacb nponiBy yrpo3T. h AO-MoraTeJiBCTBT. AHr.im h HpycciH 
 AOJiHHH mh 6bijih o6opoHaTBca n npoTHBy po6khxt> cobt.tobb HiinepaTopa, xoxa 
 nocjri BonpeKH chiii. coBT>TaMT> Bee aceaaeMoe oflepasaTB npejtycirEJiH. Ho ct 
 jrpyrofi CTopoHBi othkw> ce6a jiacuaTB He cjiiiyeTT., ito6t. b-b ciy^ai 6yie 6ep- 
 jHHCKift jjBopT. npHMen npoTHBy Haci. cnjieft CTopoHy Kopojia HojiBCKaro h ero 
 e^HHOMUCJieHHHX'B, irDnsHaJiT. BiHCKift jiBopt casus foederis, h HaMT. yiHHnjTB 
 nocofiie. CBepxi> Toro, nojiaraa ito tocjio chjit. Bamero HiunepaTopcKaro Bejra- 
 necTBa necpaBHeHHo npeBocxojtnTT. TaKOBHXT. Kopojia HpyccKaro, ito xpadpocrB 
 BofmcTBa Bainero HH^Befi bt. cbt>tt. He ycrynaerB, — ho no yTOMJiemro ^ByMa tojib 
 TarocTHHMH BoftnaMH, npH ncromemH .neHeaniBixT. cpe^CTBT., KOTopBia e^nno 
 npe3i HicKOJiLKo ji^tt. cnoKoftcTBia HanojiueHBi tojibko 6htb MoryrB, nepeMiua 
 HojiBCKaro HpaBjieHia He ctohtb 6yKeTT> hoboS TarocTHoft boFihh, ecjin6T> oniio 
 BMicTi cb HojiBmeft h Ilpyccieft 6e3i> ABCTpiftCKaro noco6ia npoH3BojiiHTB na- 
 jjoo'ho; a noTOMy h HyacHie Bcero caMHMT. acnusiT. o6pa30M , B npesBapnTeJiBHo 
 yiocTOBipnTBca bt. o6pa3 , E npanoMT. MHCJieft 6epjiHHCKaro Ka6nHeTa. . . . 
 
 A noTosiy cmt,k> H3T.acHHTB MHiHie Moe ^to npn HanepTaHin njiana no A^JiaMt 
 Hojibckhmb npea;j;e npncTynjiema kt. HcnojiHeHiio ero Heo6xoji;HMo Haji;o6Ho CHe- 
 
 CTHCB CB flBOpOMT. 6ep.IHHCKHMT, H BeCBJia HCKyCCTHHHT. H OCTOpOSKHHMT. O^paSOMTf 
 
 CTapaTBCa y3HaTB ero mhcjih, h npn ycMOTpiHin pacnojioatenia ero npeSuTB 
 paBiioj;yraHHMT., Torjjaace TBep^Bin aaTB OTBiTT. BincKOMy flBopy. . . . Ka3ajiocB 
 
 6BI ITO BepjIHHCKift J^BOpi. CB HBKOTOpHMT. yjj;OB0.1BCTBieMT> yCMOTpHTT. pa3HOCTB 
 
 MBic.ien MesKAy SByMa ABopaMH IIjinepaTopcKHMn, h no cyeraocTH CBoeft nanpaBHTt 
 CBon CTapania cb naMH cS.iHJKHTBca ; no iToaee He cxo^Haro h bt. ccmt. canoMt 
 c6jinateHiH ? 3Haio ^to oht. Miioria HanecB BaiiT. ocKop6jienia jiftcTBOBaBT. ^aiKe 
 h KOBapno npoTHBy no.iB3u h 6jiara Ihinepin Banieft ... ho Bame BejranecTBO 
 nojiyiH.in yse BceHapoj,noe y^oB-ieTBopeHie corjiamemeMT. h TafiHuxT. n aBiiuxT. 
 BparoBT. Bainnxi. na Bamn bh^h h HaMipenia, . . . (The Court of Vienna was 
 about to invite the Empress to accede to its alliance with Prussia.) SL no^HTaK) 
 TaKOBoe npiiCTyiiJienie k'b coM3y spyrnxT. ne yAo6HHMT>, ho oTBeprnyTB oHoe aBHO 
 Taitate He cxojtho, h6o Torji;a 6ep.iHHCKoft ;iBopi hobbih noBoj.'B kt. Bpe^HBiMT, ero 
 jrificTBiaMT. npnMeTB ; bmIjcto toto ito Bcero Jiyime no^aTBca Ha ero HCKanie 
 
 H Sjt.iaTB COK)3T. 6e3n0CpejCTBeHHBIMB, KOTOpUH HH KT. HeMJ r 6hl . . . \illegible\ 
 
 Kpoiit, noKoa h rapaHTin B3aftMHHxi B.iaj,tnift, pa3yMia ero HHuiuiHia BTastiiia, 
 a He KaKie jih6o hobbic 3axBaTH. Chmt. Bocno.iB30Ba.incB 6bi mbi na nojBCKia jrf>.ia,
 
 53° 
 
 APPENDIX XI 
 
 ocTajiHCfc bi> noKoi nocii apoHTpaMH Meatfly BiHCKHMt h 6epjraHCKHM-b ^Bopaivra, 
 H HaKoneirb no OTfloxHOBemeMt h nonpaBJieHieMi. pasHaxi ^aciefi 6ujih 6u 
 rocnoji;aMH pinmTbca Ha Bee hto naMi Hyamo h Bbiroji;Ho. OnacHOdb npefljieacaTb 
 Mor.ia 6h co ctopohh 6epjiHHCKaro ji,Bopa no ero ara,HH0CTH Ha npio6p , BTeHie 
 r^aHCKa h TopyHa co npo^HMH 3eMJiflMH ; ho h kt> ceaiy othhti. 6jA(iTb bcakm 
 noBo^i. Koi\na noMHHyrbift .a^opi. yBH^HTi. ito Bame HiinepaTopcKoe BejiniecTBO 
 e^HHCTBeHHO HaMtpeHH cnoco6cTBOBaTb BoscTaHOBjieHiK) npeatnefi cboSojth nojib- 
 ckoh h yHHTroatemio BpejtHeft h onacHoii fljra cocBjieft KoHCTHTyiriH 6e3i bcakhxt. 
 
 KOpHCTHHXl> BHflOBl,, O KOTOpHXl. He MOJKeTt KopOjIb IIpyCCKiH He HyBCTBOBaTb 
 
 ito Bb HacTOflmeM'b no-ioatemH jrBjrb, h npn pa3Ba3aHHHxi y Haw. pyuaxi Hejib3a 
 uwb yji,OBJieTBopHTb HnaKo KaKi o6w,iiwb Tpext cocbahhxi. ABopoBi corjiacieMt 
 h pasaijieMt Meamy hhmh ypaBHHTe.ibHUMi>. . . . 
 
 APPENDIX XI 
 
 On Frederick William's Attitude towards the Proposals 
 oe Austria and Russia in March, 1792 
 
 The rescript to Bischoffwerder rejecting Spielmann's Polish plan 
 is dated March 13, therefore a day after Goltz's dispatches of Feb- 
 ruary 29 arrived in Berlin; but it appears from the rescript to Bischoff- 
 werder of the 14th that that of the 13th was already drawn up before 
 the Russian overtures were known. 1 The King's decision to reject 
 the Austrian plan was, therefore, in no way influenced by the Em- 
 press' proposals. 
 
 Sybel's statement that Reuss presented Spielmann's memoir on 
 March 10, and was informed on the 13th that Prussia could under 
 no circumstances approve it, is utterly erroneous. 2 The memoir was 
 sent to Berlin only on the 17th and was presented by the Austrian 
 envoy the 22nd. 3 
 
 One cannot possibly agree with the eloquent passage in which 
 Sybel describes the great alternative before which Frederick William 
 was placed by the simultaneous proposals of Austria and Russia, 
 the former inviting him to commit political suicide, the latter offer- 
 ing him prospects of a handsome acquisition; the conflict in the King's 
 breast; the decision determined by the news from Paris of de Les- 
 sart's fall, which rendered war with France inevitable and opposition 
 to Catherine impossible. Nor can one subscribe to the conclusion: 
 "Es war . . . nicht das Ergebnis einer lange vorbereiteten Habgier, 
 
 1 B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172. 
 
 2 Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, ii, pp. 187, 191. 
 
 8 Reuss' report of the 25th, V. A., Preussen, Berichte, 1792.
 
 APPENDIX XII 531 
 
 -sondern inmitten eines beispiellosen europaischen Krisis der rasch 
 .ergriffene, das kleinste Uebel bezeichnende Ausweg." ! — Apart from 
 the fact that the Austrian proposals had already been rejected before 
 the Russian ones were known, there is no evidence that Frederick 
 William hesitated a moment about his decision. The news of de 
 Lessart's fall (March 10) could not possibly have reached Berlin by 
 the 13 th. Neither then nor for some weeks more did the King know 
 that war with France was inevitable, although he devoutly wished 
 that it were. The determination in favor of a new partition of Poland 
 was not forced upon him by "an unparalleled crisis" (he was doing 
 his best to bring one about), but had already long existed in Frederick 
 William's mind, at least in the form of a pious wish — probably, as 
 Heidrich suggests, 2 ever since the previous August. 
 
 APPENDIX XII 
 
 Documents Illustrating the Origins of the Polish- 
 Bavarian Project 
 
 1. Louis Cobenzl to Philip Cobenzl, May 19, 1792. [Private 
 
 letter. V. A., Russland, Fasc. 139] 
 
 (Describing Simolin's account of his sojourn in Vienna in March, 
 
 1792) 
 
 . . . Simolin a dit aussi qu'ayant parle a Bischofsverder de la 
 future Election de l'Empereur et des pretentions de l'Electeur Pala- 
 tin a devenir Roi, il lui avoit dit pourquoi ne le feriez Vous pas Roi 
 de Bourgogne, comme la chose avoit ete proposee autre fois, a quoi 
 Bischofsverder avoit repondu, si la chose etoit proposee a present je 
 crois qu'on y consentiroit chez nous. 
 
 2. Louis Cobenzl to Philip Cobenzl, July 21, 1792. [Official 
 
 report. V. A., Russland, Berichte, 1792] 
 
 ... La reprise de ce Projet [the Bavarian Exchange] a du etre ici 
 d'autant moins inattendue, que je me rapelle avoir entendu dire a 
 Monsieur de Simolin que Bischofsverder lui en avoit parle, et lui 
 
 1 Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, ii, pp. 188-191. 
 
 2 Preusscn im Kampfe gcgen die franzosische Revolution, pp. 181 f.
 
 532 APPENDIX XII 
 
 avoit dit que le Roi son Maitre ne seroit pas contraire a. l'echange de 
 la Baviere, s'il pouvoit en esperer autant de notre part pour l'Acqui- 
 sition de Danzic, Thorn et du pais adjacent. . . . 
 
 3. Alopeus to Ostermann, May 8/19, 1792. [M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29] 
 
 . . . M. de Bischoffwerder m'ayant ecrit de Potsdam de venir le 
 voir a Charlottenbourg ou il est arrive hier avec le Roi, je m'y suis 
 rendu immediatement apres etre sorti de la conference avec le C. de 
 Schoulenbourg. II s'est repandu en protestations, comme l'avoit 
 fait le Ministre, sur les sentiments d'amitie toute particuliere que le 
 Roi son Maitre portait a S. M. I. et sur les dispositions relatives 
 aux affaires de Pologne qui en etoient la suite. II lacha a cette occa- 
 sion un propos que je crois de mon devoir de ne pas derober a la con- 
 noissance de V. Exc. " Je crois, dit-il, que le vieux Prince Kaunitz a 
 tres fort raison, qui pretend que pour ecarter une bonne fois tout 
 sujet de discussion entre les voisins de la Pologne, il faudroit la re- 
 duire a un objet si insignifiant qu'on put lui laisser la liberte de pren- 
 dre telle forme que bon lui sembleroit. Ce principe adopte, il seroit 
 facile de s'entendre, et le role important de regler cette affaire seroit 
 encore reserve a lTmperatrice. J'en ai parle etant a Vienne et au 
 Comte Razoumovski et a Mr. de Simolin." 
 
 M'etant borne a l'ecouter tranquillement, je n'y ai rien repondu, 
 et j'ajoute que le Comte de Schoulenbourg n'a jamais articule le 
 moindre mot a ce sujet. 
 
 4. Razumovski to the Empress, March 11/22, 1792. [M. A., 
 
 ABdpia, III, 52] 
 
 Madame. 
 
 Les objets importans qui occupent presentement les cabinets des 
 cours les plus en relations avec Votre Majeste Imperiale, ont donne 
 lieu a des entretiens et a des developpemens d'idees que je crois 
 devoir porter directement a Sa connaissance. 
 
 Le General Bishoffswerder que je connaissais precedement a 
 neanmoins desire d'etre porteur d'une lettre de Mr. Alopeus pour 
 moi. Le concert relatif aux affaires de France a fourni matiere a la 
 conversation lorsque le hasard me l'a fait rencontrer, et toujours il 
 m'a fait sentir que les mesures a prendre a l'egard de la Pologne met- 
 traient obstacle a l'activite qu'on aurait a attendre de la Cour de 
 Vienne. Nos entretiens ont ete vagues parce que je ne m'y suis
 
 APPENDIX XII 533 
 
 livre qu'avec la circonspection que j'ai juge m'etre convenable sous 
 tous les rapports; attentif cependant a. ce qu'il me disait, j'ai cru 
 pouvoir hasarder entr'autres idees generates sur la Pologne, un ar- 
 rangement sortable pour les trois Cours, et propre a porter une at- 
 teinte decidee a l'accroissement des forces et de la puissance de cette 
 Republique. Hier nous etant trouves a portee de reprendre la meme 
 conversation, il me dit qu'il venait de recevoir des nouvelles de 
 Berlin, qui l'instruisaient de la communication qui y avait ete faite 
 par ordre de Votre Majeste Imperiale touchant les affaires de Pologne, 
 qu'elle etait de la meme teneur que les depeches qui nous sont par- 
 venues ici dernierement, et que le Roi son Maitre dispose a. concourir 
 aux intentions de Votre Majeste Imperiale, mais regrettant qu'elles 
 ne fussent pas asses clairement exprimees, avait deja fait solliciter 
 aupres du ministre de Votre Majeste Imperiale des explications plus 
 precises. Dans la suite du discours mettant toute finasserie de cote, 
 il revint a l'arrangement dont j'ai fait mention ci dessus, et parlant 
 sans reserve il me dit qu'il le considerait comme le seul moyen d'aller 
 au but commun des trois puissances, tant par rapport a la Pologne 
 que relativement a leurs projets a l'egard de la France. Que si Votre 
 Majeste Imperiale voulait s'entendre avec la Cour de Berlin sur un 
 accroissement respectif de possessions en Pologne, on pourrait, comme 
 equivalent, faire revivre en faveur de la Cour de Vienne l'echange 
 tant desire par feu S. M. l'Empereur Joseph de la Baviere contre 
 les Pays Bas, et en poursuivant le plan projette a l'egard de la re- 
 volution Francaise, on obtiendrait le double but d'y etouffer la con- 
 tagion et de ramener les Provinces Belgiques a l'obeissance avant de 
 leur faire changer de domination. 
 
 Telle est la substance de ma conversation avec Mr. le General de 
 Bishoffswerder. En me disant qu'il n'avait aucune instruction du 
 Roi son Maitre analogue a un pareil projet, il m'a cependant repete 
 a plusieurs reprises que cette proposition serait accueillie avec satis- 
 faction par Sa Majeste Prussienne et qu'au surplus si elle ne pouvait 
 avoir l'effet desire, elle resterait ensevelie dans le secret entre le tres 
 petit nombre de personnes qui en seraient instruites. 
 
 5. Frederick William to Bischoffwerder, March 14, 1792. 
 [B. A., R. 1, Conv. 172] 
 
 ... II paroit que les vues de lTmperatrice touchant la Pologne 
 pourroit amener l'evenement que le Due de Bronsviq souhaite de voir
 
 534 
 
 APPENDIX XIII 
 
 arriver l et dont il parle dans la lettre que je Vous envoie a Dresde, 
 ce qui seroit certainement tres favorable pour cet Etat ainsi que Vous 
 juges bien que je dois souhaiter que la Cour de Vienne entre dans la 
 meme idee, ce qui est peut etre possible puisque selon toute apparence 
 la Russie restera ferme, la chose etant trop de son propre interet. 
 
 APPENDIX XIII 
 
 Documents Illustrating the Earliest Discussions 
 
 between Russia and Prussia Regarding a 
 
 New Partition 
 
 i. Alopeus to Ostermann, May 8/19, 1792. [M. A., Hpyccia, III, 29] 
 . . . Schulenburg said to him: "qu'il alloit ecrire au Comte Goltz, 
 qu'il lui revenoit de tous cotes que l'lmperatrice avoit pour objet de 
 combiner les affaires de Pologne avec celles de France; qu'il ne com- 
 prenoit pas ce que cela voudroit dire, n'en ayant pas la moindre con- 
 noissance, et que le Comte de Goltz devoit demander a Votre Excel- 
 lence des eclaircissements a cet egard." 
 
 [The rest of this dispatch, relating to Bischoffwerder's pointed 
 hints about a new partition, is printed in Appendix XII.] 
 
 2. Ostermann to Alopeus, June 10/21, 1792. [MA., Hpyccia 
 III, 28] 
 
 ... La franchise avec laquelle Mr. le Comte de Schoulenbourg 
 s'est explique avec Vous, Monsieur, sur le dessein de S. M. Prussienne 
 de se faire indemniser par la France des fraix que son entreprise doit 
 lui couter, a ete envisagee par l'lmperatrice comme une nouvelle 
 marque de confiance que le Roy a bien voulu lui donner. S. M. I. 
 ne voit rien que de juste dans une vue aussi naturelle et si son con- 
 cours y est necessaire, Elle n'attendra pour s'y determiner que les 
 eclaircissemens ulterieurs sur la nature et le genre d'une indemnite 
 qui tres probablement sera aussi reclamee par les autres Puissances 
 qui ont concourru pareillement a l'entreprise. Mais dans cette oc- 
 casion Elle croit devoir presenter a la meditation et a la considera- 
 tion de S. M. Prussienne, que si la France, deja ruinee et epuisee par 
 l'anarchie et la desorganisation totale, auxquelles elle est en proye 
 
 1 A partition of Poland, cf. p. 238, note 1.
 
 APPENDIX XIII 535 
 
 depuis tant d'annees, et grevee par la charge des remboursemens 
 qu'elle aura a. faire, se voit encore garrotee par une forme de gou- 
 vernement et de constitution tellement combinee que les ressources 
 qui lui resteront ne puissent se developper avec l'energie et le ressort 
 indispensablement necessaires apres des secousses aussi violentes 
 et aussi destructives, il ne faudra plus compter ce Royaume pour 
 quelque chose dans la balance generate de l'Europe. Or il paroit 
 essentiel d'examiner des a present pour le bien et la tranquillite de 
 celle-ci, a. quel point peut influer sur l'un et l'autre l'aneantissement 
 complet d'existence politique d'un Etat aussi considerable que la 
 France. . . . 
 
 3. The Prince of Nassau to the Empress, June 30/JuLY 11, 
 
 1792. [M. A., France, IX, Princes et Emigres, 1792] 
 
 Dans une conversation que j'ai eu avec Bischoffwerder [on June 
 29, N. S.], et pour laquelle il m'a demande le secret, il m'a assure que 
 la cour de Vienne ne vouloit autre chose que l'arrangement de la 
 Baviere tel que Votre Majeste Imperiale l'avoit propose autrefois, 
 et que quant a la Prusse l'Empereur etoit convenu de proposer a 
 Votre Majeste Imperiale de luy faire ceder par la Pologne les en- 
 claves qui lui conviennent pour arrondir Ses etats; que ces arrange- 
 mens aiant lieu, il n'en couteroit a la France que quelques morceaux 
 de la Lorraine et de l'Alsace, que la Prusse sentoit bien que ... la 
 France ... est un pais si necessaire au maintien de l'Equilibre en 
 Europe. 
 
 4. Schulenburg to Frederick William, July i, 1792. [B. A., 
 
 R. XL, Russland, 133] 
 
 [Reporting a conversation with Alopeus] J'ai tache de le sonder 
 si sa Cour auroit des vues d'acquisition en Pologne, ou si elle se 
 borne simplement au renversement de la Constitution du 3 de Mai. 
 Quoique je ne lui aie pas fait cette question directement, il en a de- 
 vine le sens et m'a repondu que l'lmperatrice reconnoissoit la jus- 
 tice d'une indemnite parfaite des fraix qu'occasionnoient les affaires 
 de France, et qu'il avoit l'ordre expres de prier que Votre Majeste 
 voulut communiquer Ses idees comment Elle croyoit que cette in- 
 demnite pourroit se procurer. La reponse a cette question sera deli- 
 cate, mais toujours elle nous rapprochera du but.
 
 536 
 
 APPENDIX XIII 
 
 5. SCHULENBURG AND ALVENSLEBEN TO FREDERICK WlLLIAM, 
 
 July 3, 1792. [B. A., R. XI, Russland, 133] 
 
 [On the subject of ' indemnisation ' for the French war] Nous 
 avons la satisfaction d'annoncer a V. M. que non seulement l'lmpera- 
 trice de Russie la regarde comme juste et naturelle, mais qu'elle 
 promet aussi en cas de besoin d'y concourir en faveur de toutes les 
 Puissances cooperantes . . . Cette ouverture significative est ac- 
 compagnee de la reflexion que la France etant deja ruinee et epuisee 
 aujourd'hui, il lui restera difrkilement son veritable poids dans la 
 balance generale. L'observation est juste, . . . mais on diroit, 
 Sire, que la Cour de Russie, en plaidant la cause de la France, 
 cherche a. detourner l'idee d'un demembrement dont ce Royaume 
 pourroit etre menace, et qu'en offrant sa concurrence pour faciliter 
 les moyens de l'indemnite future, elle veut laisser entrevoir une possi- 
 bilite de la trouver du cote de la Pologne — le seul ou son influence 
 pourroit etre employe avec succes. — They mean to draw Alopeus 
 out further "afin de preparer imperceptiblement les esprits aux 
 ouvertures qui vont suivre." 
 
 6. Alopeus to Ostermann, June 22/JuLY 3, 1792. [M. A., Hpyccia, 
 III, 29] 
 
 Par le compte que j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre de la conversation 
 du Comte de Schoulenbourg avec le Prince de Nassau, j'ai prevenu 
 en partie les orders de Votre Excellence contenus dans l'Apostille de 
 sa depeche du 10 Juin, 1 mais pour me mettre en etat de les remplir 
 encore plus particulierement, j'ai saisi le pretexte du besoin de 
 quelque eclaircissement que j'avois demande au Ministre, et je me 
 suis rendu hier au soir ches lui. Alors j'ai amene insensiblement la 
 conversation a ce qu'il m'importoit d'eclairer. Elle m'a conduit a des 
 resultats, qui a ce que j'ose me flatter, repandront le jour necessaire 
 sur les vues des Cours de Vienne et de Berlin. II n'existe pas de con- 
 cert eventuel entre elles, mais il y a eu naturellement des pour- 
 parlers sur le genre des indemnites auxquels elles devroient aspirer. 
 Le remboursement des fraix en argent comptant paroissant impossi- 
 ble et ayant meme l'inconvenient de grever la France d'une nouvelle 
 masse de dettes, qui la tiendroit garotte et influeroit ainsi sur son 
 existence politique, il a paru au Comte Schoulenbourg que l'Autriche 
 
 1 I have been unable to find this apostil.
 
 APPENDIX XIV 537 
 
 pourroit faire des acquisitions territoriales sur la France sans que ce 
 Royaume en fut affoibli dans sa valeur politique. La Cour de Vienne 
 n'y trouve d'autre inconvenient que le sentiment de haine et l'odieux 
 dont elle se chargeroit de la part de la plus grande partie de l'Europe; 
 mais dans le fond ce n'est peutetre que le desir de realiser son projet 
 de l'echange de la Baviere auquel elle paroit toujours attachee. Ici 
 on n'y trouve plus les memes dangers qu'autrefois, pourvu que par 
 de nouvelles acquisitions la balance soit maintenue. L'impossi- 
 bilite d'en faire sur la France, tant a cause de l'eloignement que par 
 la necessite de ne pas echancrer ce Royaume comme la Pologne, a. 
 laquelle un role subalterne doit etre assigne, motive l'idee de cher- 
 cher les indemnites pour la Prusse en Pologne meme. Le Comte de 
 Schoulenbourg m'a assure de ne pas encore connoitre les vues du 
 Roi son Maitre a cet egard; mais il s'est propose de Lui en parler. 
 La lisiere de la Pologne, qui uniroit le Royaume de Prusse a la Silesie, 
 en fait l'objet, et il croit que la Russie pourroit egalement faire 
 l'acquisition de l'Ukraine Polonoise, a fin de former de ses nouvelles 
 acquisitions sur les Turcs une masse contigue avec ses anciennes pos- 
 sessions. C'est la en gros l'idee que ce Ministre a concu de la nature 
 et du genre des indemnites. . . . 
 
 APPENDIX XIV 
 
 On Razumovski's Conversations with Cobenzl of 
 
 June 30 and July i, 1792, Regarding 
 
 the Polish-Bavarian Plan 
 
 The chief source for the account given in the text is Razumovski's 
 letter to Bezborodko of July 4, which is supplemented by Ph. Cobenzl's 
 dispatch to L. Cobenzl of September 13 (this latter printed in Vivenot, 
 ii, pp. 202 f.). 
 
 With the aid of Razumovski's report I am able to present this in- 
 cident for the first time, I believe, in its true light. It has long been 
 partially known through the Vice-Chancellor's above-cited dispatch 
 of September, through a few vague references in the Prussian records, 
 and more recently through a brief and very unsatisfactory resume of 
 the ambassador's report published by Wassiltchikow, Les Razou- 
 tnowski, ii , pp. 139 f ., and erroneously dated July 23 (instead of 
 June 23/ July 4). None of these sources afforded a precise clue as to
 
 53§ APPENDIX XIV 
 
 the date of the incident, or sufficed to show in what relation it stood 
 to the development of the Polish-Bavarian plan. Sybel surmised 
 that these conversations took place in May, just about the time of 
 Schulenburg's first overture to Spielmann; and he conjectured that 
 it was Razumovski who first suggested to the Austrians the idea of 
 reviving the Bavarian Exchange project ("a pregnant hint which 
 was enough to inflame the Vice-Chancellor's mind"), thus leading 
 Spielmann to propose that plan to Schulenburg. 1 Very similar ac- 
 counts are given in Hausser 2 and Sorel. 3 Heidrich 4 and Heigel 5 are 
 much nearer the truth as to the time and the significance of Razu- 
 movski's insinuations to Cobenzl, though Heidrich is certainly wrong 
 in supposing that the ambassador made his suggestions at the im- 
 pulse of the Austrians. 
 
 The text of the Russian ambassador's report follows. 
 
 Razumovski to Bezborodko, June 23/JuLY 4, 1792. "Tres se- 
 cret." [M. A., ABdpia, III, 54] 
 
 Monsieur le Comte. 
 
 L'Echange de la Baviere projette sous le regne de feu l'Empereur 
 Joseph et dont les negotiations entamees sous les auspices de Sa 
 Majeste Imperiale Notre Souveraine, parvinrent malheureusement 
 a la connaissance du cabinet de Berlin et en furent traversers d'une 
 maniere si eclatante, cet echange n'a point cesse d'etre, dans le secret 
 du cabinet de Vienne, une maxime d'Etat. J'eus lieu de la soup- 
 conner de bonne source et je mis la plus grande attention a m'en 
 convaincre. La visite que le Roi doit rendre au retour de Francfort 
 a l'Electeur Palatin a Munick a redouble ma vigilance; enfin, apres 
 m'etre captive, j'ose le dire, quelque confiance de la part du minis tere 
 d'ici depuis que l'Imperatrice ma Souveraine a daigne m'honorer 
 de la sienne en me conferant le poste que j'ai l'honneur de remplir, 
 j'ai voulu m'assurer si le projet en question entrait dans les plans 
 actuels du cabinet autrichien. Dans une conversation familiere 
 avec Mr. le Vice-Chancelier Comte de Cobenzl j'ai hasarde de toucher 
 cette corde et ce que j'en ai dit a ete fonde sur ma profession de foi 
 a. l'egard de cette cour, sur les protestations sinceres auxquelles m'au- 
 
 1 Op. cit., ii, pp. 209 f. 
 
 2 Deutsche Geschichte, i, p. 358. 
 
 3 U Europe et la Revolution franqaise, ii, pp. 467 f. 
 
 4 Op. cit., p. 225, note 1. 
 
 6 Deutsche Geschichte, i, p. 537.
 
 APPENDIX XIV 539 
 
 torisent les dispositions loyales et bienveillantes de l'lmperatrice 
 envers la Maison d'Autriche, et Son invariable attachement aux 
 principes de notre alliance; que Sa Majeste Imperiale prenait par 
 consequent l'interet le plus vif au bien etre et a. la prosperite solide 
 de la Maison d'Autriche, etc. etc. Nous nous rimes des complimens 
 et cela en resta la. 
 
 Le lendemain, Dimanche 20 Juin/i Juillet, au sortir de l'audience 
 des ambassadeurs ches LL. MM. je trouvais Mr. de Cobenzl: il me 
 prit a part et me dit "Saves vous que notre conversation d'hier m'a 
 roule sans cesse dans l'esprit. La maniere franche et amicale dont 
 nous avons parle m'a engage a. en faire part au Roi; il vous sait bien 
 bon gre des bons sentimens que vous temoignes. Vous aves penetre 
 notre Secret; nous n'en avons point pour votre cour et vous alles en 
 juger. Nous envisageons la circonstance presante des affaires de 
 l'Europe comme la plus favorable a. effectuer l'echange de la Bavierre 
 contre les Pays Bas. Mais avant d'y songer, avant de faire la plus 
 petite demarche, le Roi veut consulter l'lmperatrice avec la franchise, 
 la confiance la plus illimitee, et l'intention de Se regler entierement 
 d'apres les conseils et les mesures qu'Elle lui suggerera. Le Roi 
 souhaiterait que vous en fissies l'ouverture; et m'autorise en meme 
 terns a, en ecrire a. l'Ambassadeur Comte de Cobenzl, le tout sous le 
 plus grand secret, car personne ne s'en doute ici; et le Roi, vous, 
 moi, et Mr. de Spielmann sont et seront les seuls qui en seront in- 
 struits. De sorte que si l'lmperatrice ne juge point a, propos que le 
 projet ait lieu, il sera comme non avenu et restera enseveli entre les 
 personnes qui en sont les depositaires. 
 
 L'opposition de la cour de Berlin, a t'il continue, est le plus grand 
 obstacle qui pourrait s'y rencontrer. Sans doute les termes amicals 
 ou nous sommes avec elle peuvent nous mettre a, l'abri du moins des 
 consequences funestes qui suivirent ce projet sous l'Empereur Joseph, 
 mais ils n'obtiendront [sic] surement pas son agrement sans que le 
 Roi de Prusse de son cote fasse une acquisition. Cette acquisition 
 serait comme de raison aux depens de la Pologne, et nomement de 
 Dantzig et Thorn convokes depuis si longtems et dont on ne saurait 
 l'empecher de s'emparer a, la premiere circonstance favorable; ce 
 qui meme eut ete fait deja sous un ministere plus habile. Nous 
 n'hesiterions done pas d'y souscrire, et quoique par notre echange 
 nous perdrions a peu pres 2 millions de revenus, nous ne croirions pas 
 acheter trop cher l'arrondissement et la stabilite de nos possessions. 
 
 Tel a ete le precis de ce que m'a dit le Comte de Cobenzl. En le
 
 54-0 APPENDIX XV 
 
 quittant j'eus une conversation avec le Baron de Spielmann a peu 
 pres de la meme teneur. II me dit au surplus que le General Bishoffs- 
 verder avec lequel il s'est lie dans les differens voyages qu'il a faits 
 ici, lui avait temoigne dans son dernier sejour tres confidement [sic] 
 des dispositions tres opposees au Systeme de non agrandissement 
 qu'il professait dans le public et dont on a fait la base du traite de 
 Berlin (ce dont j'ai eu moi meme dans le terns des notions positives) 
 et qu'il lui avait touche meme quelque chose de conforme a. l'objet 
 dont nous nous entretenions presentement. Enfin l'un et l'autre me 
 dirent au nom de leur maitre qu'il considerait la reussite de ce projet 
 comme tenant absolument a, la volonte et bonne disposition de l'lm- 
 peratrice et qu'on se conformerait entierement a. ce que Sa Majeste 
 Imperiale jugerait a. propos de decider. Je repondis par les memes 
 assurances que ci dessus, mais j'ajoutais que peutetre dans un ar- 
 rangement pareil faudrait-il avoir egard a des convenances relatives 
 aux interets de Sa Majeste Imperiale et que j'y comptais avec la 
 meme confiance a laquelle je venais d'inviter le ministere de S. M. 
 Apostolique envers nous. Cette clause ne parut nullement deplaire 
 et apres m'avoir fait les protestations les plus vives des obligations 
 qu'on nous aurait, nous convinmes que j'expedierais un courier et 
 hier au soir on m'envoya le paquet ci joint pour l'Ambassadeur 
 Comte de Cobenzl. 
 
 En suppliant V. Exc. de porter cette depeche a. la connaissance de 
 Sa Majeste Imperiale, j'ose esperer, Monsieur le Comte, de n'etre 
 point desapprouve dans la marche que j'ai suivie. J'avais de fortes 
 presomptions sur l'existence du projet d'echange, jamais moment 
 ne m'a paru plus favorable pour l'effectuer que la Situation actuelle 
 de l'Europe. C'est sous ce point de vue que j'ai cru devoir provo- 
 quer la confidence qui m'en a ete faite, et qui soumise entierement 
 au bon plaisir de Sa Majeste Imperiale ne saurait porter aucun preju- 
 dice ni a. nos interets, ni a. nos vues dans la supposition ou elles ne 
 seraient point analogues a, celles qu'on a ici. . . . 
 
 APPENDIX XV 
 
 On the Date of Spielmann's Plan Discussed on Pages 351 f. 
 
 This plan was brought to light through the document published 
 in Vivenot, ii, pp. 348-351, and there entitled "Protokoll aufge- 
 nommen zwischen Spielmann und Haugwitz." This document is in
 
 APPENDIX XV 541 
 
 -the form of an unsigned agreement or convention between the two 
 Courts. It is undated, but it was sent to Vienna along with Spiel- 
 mann's report of November 6. The question at issue is: when was 
 this plan drawn up and presented to the Prussians? 
 
 It should be remarked, in the first place, that the original document 
 does not bear the title 'Protokoll' or any other title. Spielmann 
 refers to it in his report only as a 'plan.' Secondly, while he did not 
 attach a date to it, some one has written on the back of it: "N. B. 
 Dieser hochst wichtige Vortrag muss zwischen dem letzten Bericht 
 des B. Spielmann d. d. x. 15. und der preussischen Verbale Note 
 vom 25. x. redigirt worden [sein]." While one cannot be certain, it 
 is probable that this note was added immediately upon the receipt 
 of the document, and that it indicates the idea then formed at Vienna 
 as to the date of composition of the plan. 
 
 The only direct evidence to be obtained from the report of No- 
 vember 6 is the following passage with which that dispatch begins: 
 "Ueber welchen beyderseitigen Entschiidigungsplan ich mit Graf en 
 Haugwitz unter Voraussetzung der Allerhochsten Genehmigung iiber- 
 eingekommen bin, bevor nach der Hand die ganze Reihe der spdtem 
 Ungliicksfalle eingetreten ist, 1 geruhen E. Exc. aus der gehorsamst 
 hier anverwahrten Beylage zu ersehen." Although by no means 
 clear, this passage is enough to refute the statement made by Sybel 2 
 and Sorel 3 that this 'protocol' represents an agreement reached be- 
 tween Haugwitz and Spielmann after the Note of Merle (October 
 25) and on the basis of that note. For on this theory, how explain 
 the reference to "the whole series of the later disasters"? How ex- 
 plain the fact that the Note of Merle is not mentioned, and that 
 the principles of the ' protocol ' are utterly different from those of the 
 Prussian declaration of October 25? One must do violence to the 
 whole history of the affair to represent a Prussian minister agreeing 
 after the Note of Merle to make his master's occupation in Poland 
 dependent on the conclusion of the Exchange treaty with the Bava- 
 rian House. Sybel has evidently given Spielmann's negotiation a 
 quite fictitious denouement. The "agreement of Merle," of which 
 he speaks, most certainly never took place. 
 
 Heidrich has already pointed this out, but I am equally unable to 
 agree with his theory. He declares that the 'protocol' represents an 
 
 1 The italics are mine. 
 
 2 Geschichte der Revolutionszcil, ii, pp. 362 f. 
 
 3 L' Europe ct la Revolution franqaise, iii, p. 168.
 
 542 
 
 APPENDIX XV 
 
 agreement effected between Spielmann and Haugwitz on the journey 
 westward from Frankfort, or at least before the latter minister's de- 
 parture from Luxemburg for Verdun (September 26). For this view 
 I can see only two possible grounds: (1) the passage cited above from 
 Spielmann's dispatch of November 6, to which I shall return later; 
 and (2) Haugwitz's letter to Schulenburg of September 30, in which 
 he reports what he has learned of the new Austrian propositions. 
 The sum of what he says is that the Court of Vienna now demands 
 a 'supplement' in Alsace and Lorraine as far as the Moselle; he men- 
 tions none of the other provisions of the 'protocol'; he does not hint 
 for a moment that he has already reached a provisional agreement 
 with Spielmann, that a written plan has been presented to him, that 
 he has made any definite proposals as to the Prussian acquisitions. 1 
 Spielmann, on his side, says in a letter to Cobenzl of September 27: 
 "Mit dem H. Graf en v. Haugwitz habe ich liber mein aufhabendes 
 Geschaft ausftihrlich und umstandlich conferiret"; 2 and October 15 3 
 that the King seemed inclined to grant Austria "die Zutheilung ander- 
 weitiger reichlicher Surrogate fur die Markgrafthtimer, woriiber ich 
 bereits seit Frankfurt den Grafen von Haugwitz vorlaufig bestens 
 zu sondiren und zu stimmen gesucht hatte." — I will readily admit 
 that much of the plan contained in the 'protocol' had been already 
 discussed on the journey from Frankfort; but I do not see any signs 
 whatever that the two ministers had advanced so far that Spielmann 
 could embody their agreement in a written plan, and especially in 
 one like this; and there are many reasons that render it highly im- 
 probable that such was the case. 
 
 In the first place, consider the initial article about the continua- 
 tion of the war. Heidrich says, indeed, that at the time of Spiel- 
 mann's departure from Vienna the Austrians had already grown 
 familiar with the idea that it would take a second campaign to get 
 the terms of peace that they wanted; that they already planned to 
 draw England, Russia, and other Powers into the contest; and that 
 they were inclined to go in for a war of conquest in the grand style. 
 As proof of this he offers only a by no means significant citation from 
 the Politisches Journal, pp. 1005 f. When one turns to the Austrian 
 records themselves, one gains quite a different impression: one finds 
 that the great desire at Vienna was to make peace as soon as possi- 
 
 1 B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K. 
 
 2 V. A., Mission in das preussische Hauplquartier de 1792. 
 
 3 Vivenot, ii, p. 273.
 
 APPENDIX XV 543 
 
 ble. As there is absolutely no reason to suppose that the temper of 
 his Court had changed in the week following Spielmann's departure, 
 one may take, for example, Cobenzl's instructions to the Referendary 
 of September 20, 1 which contain the clearest utterances on this sub- 
 ject. The Vice-Chancellor writes that since nothing lies nearer the 
 Emperor's heart than the speedy termination of the war, this must 
 be one of the objects of Spielmann's special care. He considers fur- 
 ther the possibility that the capture of Paris might not end the affair; 
 suggests an armistice and a negotiation for peace during the winter; 
 shows the greatest desire to avoid a ' long, ruinous war" at any hon- 
 orable price. I cannot find here any sign that the Imperial Court 
 had already resolved on a new campaign, on building up a great 
 coalition, or on a grand war of conquest. — Then one should notice 
 the development of Spielmann's ideas on the subject. On September 
 30 he writes that their main aim must be to get out of this " costly 
 game" (the war) as soon as possible; and hence they ought to offer 
 the French "a very cheap bargain," insisting chiefly that the King of 
 France should be restored to at least a "quasi-freedom." 2 How rec- 
 oncile this with the great war of conquest, for which, according to 
 Heidrich, Spielmann had just come to an agreement with Haugwitz? 
 Then, on October 4 3 the Referendary has learned of the retreat of 
 the allied armies, and begins to fear "die leider nur zu wahrschein- 
 liche Unvermeidlichkeit einer zweiten Campagne." Finally, on 
 October 15 he has become convinced of the necessity of continuing 
 the war, and exposes at length the reasons that have led him to con- 
 tinue his negotiations in spite of tJiat fact. In one place in this report 
 he writes: "Meiner Betrachtung, dass die bisherigen supposita durch 
 den unerwarteten Ausgang der Campagne nicht wenig geandert 
 wtirden, setzt derselbe [Haugwitz] die Ueberzeugung seines Herrn 
 von der absoluten Nothwendigkeit einer zweiten Campagne . . . ent- 
 gegen." 4 These words are absolute nonsense on the supposition 
 that the two ministers had long been agreed on a plan, the first 
 article of which provided for a second campaign. Unless Spielmann's 
 reports are to be considered a mass of duplicity, one cannot suppose 
 that he had consented to such an article in September — at a time 
 when the allied armies were supposed to be fast approaching Paris. 
 And as for Haugwitz, who in May and again in July had opposed 
 
 1 Vivenot, ii, pp. 211-221. 
 
 2 V. A., Mission in das prcussische Hauptquartier. 
 
 s Vivenot, ii, pp. 248 f. 4 Vivenot, ii, p. 274.
 
 544 APPENDIX XV 
 
 the war altogether, how can one believe that in September — with- 
 out any necessity or a shadow of authorization, as far as we can see 
 — he had agreed to a second campaign merely in order to conquer 
 Alsace and Lorraine for Austria? 
 
 There is another equally valid reason why this 'protocol' cannot 
 be referred to September. The Emperor had on September 9 ap- 
 proved the ideas of the Conference ministers, who opposed staining 
 the honor of their Court by any active participation in the dismem- 
 berment of Poland. Is one to suppose that immediately afterwards 
 Spielmann proposed to Haugwitz the plan for an Austrian occupa- 
 tion of Polish territory — an occupation which might be turned 
 into permanent possession, in case acquisitions failed to be secured 
 elsewhere? On this point, Spielmann speaks quite definitely in his 
 report of November 6. He relates telling Haugwitz (about October 
 27) that he had had, when he left Vienna, no instructions relative to 
 an Austrian acquisition in Poland; and that it was therefore only in 
 view of the changed circumstances and as his private idea that he had 
 suggested this expedient after his return from Verdun (i.e., after 
 October 12). This seems to me conclusive against Heidrich's theory. 
 
 From the dozen similar' considerations that might be advanced 
 here, I shall mention but two more. If in September Haugwitz had 
 reached an agreement with Spielmann that could be put into precise 
 written form, why did the King send him back from Consenvoye to 
 receive the Austrian's definite propositions? Or again, how could 
 Haugwitz in September have indicated to Spielmann the exact line 
 of demarcation that his Court desired in Poland? As far as we know, 
 he had received no instructions on that point; his proposals of August 
 had apparently been passed over without an answer; it was only at 
 Consenvoye that the King had drawn on the map the line he meant 
 to claim. 
 
 If these reasons seem decisive against placing the 'protocol' in 
 September, it is not hard to show that that document fits in very 
 well with the circumstances of mid-October. In the first place, the 
 passage at the beginning of Spielmann's report of November 6 can 
 be rightly understood, I think, only if one places the emphasis on the 
 word spatern: i.e., the plan was drawn up before the later disasters 
 set in. For Spielmann proceeds immediately to tell what disasters 
 he is referring to: the retreat from Verdun, which turned into a rout, 
 the total evacuation of French soil, the highly suspicious conduct of 
 the Prussians, the appearance that they were trying to get out of the
 
 APPENDIX XV 545 
 
 war and abandon Austria, etc., etc. Now these suspicions appear 
 only in the report of November 6; and they had much to do with 
 inducing Spielmann to change his tactics with the Prussians. In his 
 last preceding report (October 15) he still shows himself convinced 
 of the Prussian loyalty. The change evidently occurred after that. 
 At the end of this report of the 15th, he states that he has decided to 
 go on with the negotiation, and that the plan which he means to 
 proceed by — under reservation of the Emperor's approval — will 
 be sent in later. Then at the very beginning of the next dispatch 
 (November 6), he submits this plan (the 'protocol'), which he has 
 agreed upon with Haugwitz — under reservation of the Emperor's 
 approval — "before the later disasters set in." It is obvious, I 
 think, that October 15 must be taken as the terminus post quern. 
 
 The terminus ante quern can also be determined with fair precision. 
 On October 19 Haugwitz writes to Schulenburg that Spielmann has 
 presented him with a memoire analogous to the principles reported 
 in his letter of September 30. 1 Perhaps the term memoire does not fit 
 very well the document we have been considering; but the word 
 memoire is used rather loosely in the language of this period, and 
 Haugwitz may have chosen it as less suggestive of anything approach- 
 ing a definite agreement. For several reasons I am convinced that 
 this memoire was really the 'protocol' printed in Vivenot. In the 
 first place, it is not easy to suppose that if Spielmann had presented 
 another document to Haugwitz, he would not have sent it home, or 
 even have mentioned it in his report of November 6. Furthermore, 
 Haugwitz writing to Schulenburg on October 19, immediately after 
 speaking of the memoire, declared that the Court of Vienna seemed 
 more inclined to the continuation of the war (which would appear to 
 be a reference to Article I of Spielmann's plan); and on October 27 
 he added that the memoire contained the familiar proposition about 
 Alsace-Lorraine as far as the Moselle, the demand for the King's 
 mediation at Zweibriicken, the concession of the line Czestochowa- 
 Rawa-Soldau to Prussia, and a provision about an Austrian oc- 
 cupation, and possibly an Austrian acquisition, in Poland. 1 In 
 short, the memoire described by Haugwitz seems to have contained 
 all the important articles of the 'plan' sent in by Spielmann. More- 
 over, Haugwitz wrote that he had expressly rejected the proposition 
 about the Austrian occupation in Poland, and Spielmann also re- 
 ported that this was the only article of his 'plan' to which Haug- 
 
 1 B. A., R. XI, Frankrekh, 89 K.
 
 546 APPENDIX XVI 
 
 witz refused to agree. From all this, it seems evident that the memoire 
 and the 'plan' were one and the same document. The so-called 'pro- 
 tocol' printed in Vivenot represents, then, not an agreement reached 
 after the Note of Merle, nor one dating from late September, but 
 rather the draft of a convention submitted by Spielmann to Haug- 
 witz between the 15th and the 19th of October. 
 
 APPENDIX XVI 
 
 Documents Illustrating Haugwitz's Final Negotiation 
 
 at Vienna 1 
 
 1. Haugwitz's Report or December 24, 1792. [B. A., R. 1, 170] 
 
 En mettant le sceau sur les negotiations relativement aux justes 
 indemnites de Ses fraix de guerre dont V. M. a daigne me charger a 
 la Cour d'ici, je crois ne pas devoir tarder de mettre sous les yeux de 
 V. M. les derniers resultats. La reponse a la Note de Merle etant 
 peu satisfaisante, je provoquai la communication de tout ce qu'on 
 feroit passer a la Cour de Russie sur ce sujet. Les termes qu'on em- 
 ploye en s'expliquant vis a vis de l'lmperatrice de Russie sur la prise 
 de possession immediate de V. M. etoient a la verite plus precis, 
 mais la Cour d'ici revenant a une prise de possession interimistique 
 en Pologne de sa part, il sembloit que c'etoit eloigner de fait ce qu'on 
 parut d'ailleurs demander avec sollicitude. . . . Je n'ai cependant 
 pas pu etre tranquille, et beaucoup moins pouvois-je me resoudre a 
 quitter Vienne avant que de n'etre entierement rassure sur le parti 
 defrnitif auquel se determineroit la Cour de Vienne. En employant 
 done les moyens, auxquels Votre confiance m'a autorise, je suis enfin 
 parvenu a, vaincre tous les obstacles. Je viens de recevoir l'assurance 
 formelle du Ministere Imperial portant: que S. M. l'Empereur ad- 
 dressera les instances les plus pressantes pour engager l'lmperatrice 
 de Russie a. consentir a la prise de possession actuelle de V. M. sans 
 y ajouter aucune condition relativement a. une prise de possession en 
 Pologne de la part de l'Empereur, en se bornant uniquement a de- 
 mander que l'lmperatrice veuille conjointement avec V. M. garantir 
 
 1 The chief documents on the Austrian side relating to this negotiation have 
 been published by Vivenot (Quellen zur deutschen Kaiser politik Oesterreichs, vol. ii), 
 and Haugwitz's reports of December 12 and 19 are printed in Herrmann, Russische 
 Geschichte, Ergdnzungsband, pp. 308 ff., 314 f.
 
 APPENDIX XVI 547 
 
 son consentement a l'echange de la Baviere. Le Ministere de Vienne 
 s'est porte meme a, motiver le besoin d'une telle prise de possession 
 de la part de V. M. de la facon la plus prononcee, en y ajoutant que 
 l'Empereur etoit intimement persuade que V. M. etoit disposee a 
 prendre une part vigoureuse a. la continuation de la guerre actuelle, 
 mais qu'il etoit egalement convaincu que l'arrondissement en Pologne 
 et la prise de possession immediate etoit l'unique moyen de porter 
 V. M. a. suivre son inclination a lui porter son secours. 
 
 2. Razumovski's Report of January 2i/February i, 1793. 
 [M. A., ABCTpk, III, 54] 
 
 Le Sieur Cesar . . . ayant entendu parler des preparatifs dans 
 les trouppes de l'Empereur pour entrer en Pologne, a cru devoir s'en 
 expliquer avec Mr. le Comte de Cobenzl. Celui-ci lui a repondu que 
 l'entree n'aurait point lieu jusqu'a la reception de la reponse de notre 
 Cour au sujet de la garantie conjointe avec celle de Berlin, touchant 
 l'echange de la Baviere et que dans le cas seulement ou cette garantie 
 ne serait point accordee. Le Sieur Cesar allarme de cette reponse 
 est venu s'en ouvrir a. moi. II m'a temoigne avoir ignore parfaite- 
 ment la question de la garantie, m'a proteste que ce ne pouvait etre 
 l'intention de son Maitre, et qu'il ne s'en trouvait pas un mot dans 
 les ecrits que lui avait laisses a. son depart le Comte de Haugwitz. . . . 
 Enfin il m'a soutenu que ces deux points rentraient directement 
 dans le sens de la reponse faite a. la note de Merle, reponse qu'il dit 
 avoir ete rejette par le Roi son maitre. Cependant il est hors de 
 doute que le Comte de Haugwitz en a ete informe, car il m'en a 
 souvent parle. II n'en est pas moins certain que la susdite reponse 
 a la note de Merle n'a point ete rendue au Ministere d'ici, que par 
 consequent elle a ete de fait acceptee. II en resulte done que le Comte 
 de Haugwitz, pour faciliter les negociations, a mis dans les confe- 
 rences plus de condescendance que n'en portent ses rapports, et que 
 cette matiere qui paraissait entendue entre lui et le Ministere de 
 Vienne pourrait encore etre sujet a, de nouveaux embarras. Le 
 Sieur Cesar me disant tout cela sous le sceau de la confiance, l'a 
 portee jusqu'a me faire lecture du dernier rapport du Comte de 
 Haugwitz, ou . . . il dit que cette Cour ci espere s'assurer du con- 
 sentement du Roi de Prusse a l'echange de la Baviere; or, ce mot de 
 consentement differe bien de garantie.
 
 54 8 
 
 APPENDIX XVI 
 
 3. Haugwitz's Report to the King, May 6, 1793. [B. A., R. 
 96, 147 H] 
 
 . . . Un des principes que la Cour de Vienne a desire de poser 
 pour base des negotiations presentes des leur origine, c'est celui d'une 
 pretendue parite d' aggrandissement qu'elle s'avise de deduire de Ves- 
 prit de son Alliance avec la Prusse, sans que de son propre aveu il 
 en soit fait mention dans le Traite. . . . J'avoue que dans les pre- 
 miers terns de ma mission a la Cour Imperiale, j'ai entendu produire 
 et reproduire ce principe avec la plus grande assiduite, et que les 
 Ministres avoient le talent de faire valoir comme s'il avoit passe en 
 axiome; mais ils transgressent les loix de la verite en sou tenant "que 
 c'est moi qui l'ai reconnu aux conferences de Luxembourg et de 
 Vienne." Rien de plus faux. Le piege etoit heureusement trop 
 visible. . . . J'ai evite au contraire tout ce qui auroit pu impliquer 
 de ma part le moindre aveu de ce genre, et loin de souscrire aux pre- 
 tensions d'indemnites que les Ministres Autrichiens m'opposoient 
 pour essayer de contrebalancer celles de ma Cour, je n'ai jamais eu 
 qu'une seule et meme facon de repondre a leurs argumens. Je leur 
 objectai "que si l'Autriche croyoit avoir des droits pour etre dedom- 
 mages des fraix de la guerre, ces titres ne devroient cependant pas 
 etre confondus avec ceux de la Prusse. Que l'une etoit partie prin- 
 cipal et attaquee; l'autre, partie accessoire et auxiliaire, fesant des 
 sacrifices considerables en faveur d'une cause qui n'est pas la sienne, 
 et pour lesquels elle demande a, etre indemnisee. Que la Cour de 
 Vienne ayant reconnu l'equite de cette indemnite, la Prusse en se la 
 procurant par son arrondissement en Pologne, n'y retrouve que le 
 recouvrement de ses avances, le fruit d'une cooperation dont elle 
 s'est chargee a. la requisition de l'Autriche, et de laquelle cette Puis- 
 sance est obligee de lui tenir compte, tandis que si Ton accorde a 
 celle-ci le droit de reclamer un dedommagement de son cote, ce n'est 
 absolument qu'aux depends de la France son ennemie qu'elle peut la 
 realiser." 
 
 Tels etoient, Sire, daignez en grace Vous en souvenir, les principes 
 que j'osai Vous soumettre lorsque le 8 Mai de l'annee derniere j'eus 
 l'honneur d'entretenir V. M. sur cette matiere a Charlottenbourg, et 
 telle etoit ma profession de foi a Vienne, lors meme que je n'etois pas 
 encore appele a discuter rigoureusement cette matiere. Mais des 
 l'instant ou je fus autorise a l'eclaircir de plus pres, je l'ai fait sans 
 detour avec une franchise et une precision qui ne pouvoit plus laisser 
 le moindre doute.
 
 APPENDIX XVI 549 
 
 (The first occasion for a categorical explanation was at Luxem- 
 burg, when he had been charged to announce to Spielmann the terms 
 under which the King would consent to continue the war.) Le 
 Referendaire intime revenant alors a sa these favorite de la parite 
 des indemnisations, je saisis l'apropos pour dechirer le voile et pour 
 lui indiquer la difference de nos calculs. Je lui declarai en autant 
 de termes: "que si jamais il pouvoit avoir ete question d'etablir entre 
 les deux Puissances alliees un Sisteme d'egalite dans leur agrandisse- 
 ments futurs, ce Sisteme devoit s'entendre uniquement des acquisi- 
 tions qu'elles seroient a meme de faire par des convenances reci- 
 proques." (The present case entirely different, etc.). 
 
 Je n'en disconviens pas, cette explication acheva de troubler le 
 B. de Spielmann; il me repondit, "que mes principes diametralement 
 opposes aux siens etoient absolument neufs pour lui et que s'ils 
 devoient prevaloir, il y voyoit le tombeau de V Alliance entre les deux 
 Cours." 
 
 A l'appui de ce que j'avancois, et pour en tamer la negotiation prin- 
 cipale, je remis alors auB.de Spielmann la Note qui avoit ete pre- 
 pared dans le Quartier General de Merle la veille, 25. Octobre 1792, 
 sous les yeux de V. M. et qui renfermoit les conditions irrevocables 
 qu'Elle venoit de mettre a sa cooperation pour la campagne suivante 
 ... La dessus j'etalai sur la table du B. de Spielmann l'exemplaire 
 original de la carte de la Pologne sur laquelle, Sire, Vous aviez trace 
 de main propre dans le camp de Consanvoy la ligne de Vos acquisi- 
 tions de Czenstochow par Rawa a Soldau. Je lui montrai au doigt 
 cette ligne de demarcation, en lui disant "que telle seroit l'indem- 
 nite de V. M. et qu'apres en avoir ete mise en possession, elle con- 
 tinueroit a l'Empereur pendant la campagne prochaine la meme 
 assistance qu'Elle lui avoit accordee dans celle-ci." ... II me fallut 
 essuyer pendant trois heures une longue suite de declamations et de 
 plaintes, dont le retournant fut toujours l'insupportable principe de 
 la parite, et la necessite de l'adopter invariabiement pour base des 
 liaisons subsistantes entre les deux Cours. (He had finally ended 
 the discussion by saying) "Que sans pouvoir remonter au passe, 
 j'etois oblige de m'en tenir a. la situation des affaires telle qu'elle se 
 presentoit aujourd'hui. Que la resolution de V. M. et Ses conditions 
 etoient invariables, et que si la possession immediate de l'arrondisse- 
 ment propose pouvoit rencontrer les moindres obstacles, la retraite 
 de l'armee Prussienne restoit decidee sans retour." . . . 
 
 (At Vienna he had then daily pressed the Austrians for a satis-
 
 55° 
 
 APPENDIX XVI 
 
 factory answer, repeating constantly), "que j'entendois par la prise 
 de possession de l'acquisition de V. M. en Pologne non leur occupa- 
 tion eventuelle ou interimale, mais leur propriete permanente et leur in- 
 corporation complette a la Monarchic Prussienne." 
 
 A force de renouveller d'heure en heure mes representations, mes 
 instances, mes declarations energiques, et je dirois presque mes com- 
 minations, j'eus le bonheur enfin de ramener les deux Ministres du 
 Cabinet a des dispositions plus favorables. . . . Ce fut dans les 
 journees du 21 et 22 Decembre, que s'opera cet heureux changement; 
 j'obtins le consentement pur et simple a. la prise de possession effec- 
 tive et on laissa de cote les chevilles qui avoient herisse jusqu'ici 
 l'issue de ma negotiation. Les assurances formelles que je recus de 
 la bouche du Comte Cobenzl et du B. de Spielmann, furent en meme 
 terns accompagnees de la promesse positive: "Que S. M. l'Empereur 
 addressera les instances, les plus pressantes," etc. (word for word as 
 in the report of December 24 printed above). ... La seule restric- 
 tion qu'on se permit d'ajouter, ce fut: que l'lmperatrice de Russie 
 voulut, conjointement avec S. M. le Roi de Prusse, garantir son con- 
 sentement a Vechange de la Baviere, qui me presentoit a. la verite un 
 sens obscur et louche, mais sur laquelle je ne me crus pas oblige, par 
 cette meme raison, de faire le difficile, persuade qu'elle auroit grand 
 besoin d'etre determine avec plus de clarte dans la suite. 
 
 (The 23rd he had had his final audience with the Emperor.) L'Em- 
 pereur me repondit du ton le plus affectueux, "qu'il etoit bien loin 
 de se permettre le moindre doute sur l'amitie et les sentimens de V. 
 M.; mais qu'il ne pouvoit me cacher une chose qui l'embarrassoit. 
 Vous savez, continua-t-il, que j'ai donne mon consentement a. l'ag- 
 grandissement du Roi en Pologne; mais puisque S. M. a fait de cette 
 acquisition la condition sine qua non de sa cooperation a, la guerre, 
 je dois conserver quelques apprehensions que malgre les ordres les 
 plus positifs qui sont adresses auC.de Cobenzl a. Petersbourg, nous 
 ne rencontrions des difficultes pour emporter aussi l'acquiescement 
 de l'lmperatrice de Russie." . . . Ainsi finit cette audience memo- 
 rable dans laquelle l'Empereur me parla en termes si positifs de son 
 consentement donne et meme de son inquietude a voir realise le plan de 
 V. M., sans rappeller une seule de ces clauses restrictives que ses 
 Ministres avoient interjettees auparavant. ... II [Cobenzl] poussa 
 meme la resignation jusqu'a me dire "qu'il souscrivoit respectueuse- 
 ment aux volontes de son maitre convaincu d'ailleurs de la justice 
 de nos pretensions." . . . Dans ces derniers terns de mon sejour a,
 
 APPENDIX XV II 551 
 
 Vienne j'avois quitte le ton du negociateur pour prendre celui d'un 
 homme qui veut, et qui annonce les volontes peremptoires de son 
 Maitre. 
 
 APPENDIX XVII 
 
 Notes of the Empress Belonging to the Papers of the 
 Secret Conference of October 2q/November 9, 1792. 
 
 [P. A., X, 69] 
 
 1. Moauio 6u h to CKa3aTh em,e JIpyccaKaMt, ^to Hain> KaateTca Tenepi. ne 
 BpeMfl naiaTb hobbig xjoiiotbi Koraa Akjio H^eTS no BBipyneiria HiMeu.Kofl Iliinepin 
 h ea nt.tocTn n3i pyKt $paHii,y30BT>, koh He tokmo 3aBjia;i,'E.!iH Tpeiia Kypcjmper- 
 Bann ho h temt. ropo^oirb ate rjrfe KopoHyiOTca IbinepaTopbi. 
 
 2. ' IIpaBn.ia Bt tomt> jri-irE uasieTca 6htb .hojijkhh OT^ajraTb jrijiearb HojitmH 
 
 KOJHKO MOJKHO. 
 
 IIocji'b St^CTBeHHoft KaMnamH ht,ti npio6p , ETeHii1 yciOBHTtca, h mh ne Bf^a- 
 em> tto jrijiaTt xoTart ct naMH jse hh leMi. Tyrt He 6e3t Bi^ona BiHCKaro 
 jrBopa ne npncTynnTb Kt onojiy jrijiy. 
 
 Ychjihtb IIpyccKaro Kopo.ia hh fl.ia ^ero. 
 
 HpOTHBy leCTHOCTH H 06TjIIl,aHin OTHIOAB hh ieBO [sic] npHHHMaTt. 
 
 Note of the Empress Belonging to the Papers of the 
 
 Secret Conference of November 4/15, 1792. 
 
 [P. A, X, 69] 
 
 A la maniere pressante dont le Comte Goltz a parle hier, il n'y a 
 qu'a repondre que sans savoir ce que la Cour de Vienne mon Allie 
 repondra et me communiquera je ne saurois rien dire, qu'outre cela 
 il est indispensablement necessaire de savoir quelle sera la conduite 
 de l'Angleterre, que selon nos Avis de Constantinople les intrigues 
 y augmente pour porter le Divan a nous declarer la guerre, qu'on 
 l'a deja porte a faire travailler a un Armement maritime, qu'en con- 
 sequence je ne trouve pas que la Prudence permette de commencer 
 de nouveaux embarras tandis surtout que ceux qui existent ne sont 
 pas finis ni que nous puissions en prevoir la fin, etant dans une tres 
 parfaite ignorance sur le plan des hauts Allies, lequel jusqu'ici a ete 
 diametralement opose a. tout ce que nous avons propose, et meme 
 jusque la que les Princes freres du Roy de France, loin d'etre mis en 
 avant, sont chasses de lieu en lieu et prets a. perir de faim et de misere 
 
 1 This note follows immediately upon the preceding in the volume from which 
 it is taken, and in all probability belongs with it.
 
 552 APPENDIX XVIII 
 
 avec la Noblesse nombreuse qui est restee fidele a, la Cause du Roy 
 qui est reconnue pour celle de tous les Souverains. Que nous n'ajou- 
 tons pas foy au bruit general de l'Europe comme si S. M. etoit con- 
 venu avec les Rebelles de je ne sai quel arrangement, que nous n'y 
 ajoutons pas foy parce que ces bruits sont injurieux a sa gloire et sa 
 probite. 
 
 APPENDIX XVIII 
 
 Rescripts of Catherine II. to Sievers with Regard 
 
 to the Negotiations at the Diet of Grodno. 
 
 [M. A., EojiBnia, III, 70] 
 
 1. May 26/ June 6, 1793 
 
 Apres vous avoir annonce mes intentions en termes ostensibles 
 dans le Rescrit Russe, qui accompagne celui-ci, je ne veux point vous 
 laisser ignorer les motifs particuliers qui m'ont determinee a faire 
 traiter separement les objets de cession a faire aux deux Cours Co- 
 partageantes d'avec ceux de la nouvelle Constitution et des liaisons 
 politiques et commerciales de la Pologne. . . . Depuis j'ai scu de 
 differens cotes que les plus senses d'entre les Polonois sentoient que 
 dans la foiblesse et le neant.ou leur pays seroit plonge a la suite du 
 nouveau demembrement qu'il vient de subir, il lui seroit difficile ou 
 plutot impossible de subsister en Corps d'Etat libre et independant. 
 En partant de la, presque tous desireroient asses unanimement de 
 pouvoir suivre la destinee de ceux de leurs compatriotes, qui ont 
 passe sous ma domination. Je ne scaurois ecouter leurs voeux a cet 
 egard sans exciter la jalousie des Puissances voisines et sans leur 
 attirer une foule d'embarras qu'il importe d'eviter dans ce moment. 
 Mais il ne seroit pas impossible d'y suppleer au moyen d'un traite 
 d'alliance et d'union si etroite entre les deux Nations, que sans rendre 
 l'une sujette a l'autre, elles fussent liees inseparablement entre elles. 
 (A somewhat similar plan had been opposed in 1788 by the Court of 
 Berlin.) Quoique les choses soyent changees et par les rapports ou 
 je suis avec cette cour et par la position ou nous nous trouvons re- 
 spectivement, il n'en est pas moins certain que si cette question etoit 
 remise sur le tapis dans le terns que nous negocions en commun avec 
 Elle, il en resulteroit de deux choses l'une, ou qu'elle voudroit par- 
 ticiper de maniere ou d'autre a mes arrangemens avec les Polonois 
 ou qu'elle tacheroit de se procurer encore de nouveaux avantages a
 
 APPENDIX XVIII 553 
 
 leur depens. Ni l'un ni l'autre n'etant ni de ma convenance ni de 
 mes ihterets, j'ai cherche a. ecarter les Prussiens et a. les mettre hors 
 du jeu aussitot qu'ils auront arrange et termine l'article de leurs 
 acquisitions. C'est d'apres ces principes que j'ai fait rediger les 
 stipulations du Traite de cession et regie la marche de la Negocia- 
 tion que je leur ferai proposer et adopter; c'est aussi par cette con- 
 sideration que je n'ai pas voulu que dans votre projet d'acte on fit 
 mention d'aucune transaction eventuelle a l'exception d'un Traite 
 de Commerce pour que la Cour de Berlin ne fit rien de semblable a 
 notre imitation. J'ai laisse a votre choix de proroguer ou de dis- 
 soudre la Diette; mais lorsqu'elle se sera rassemblee pour la raison 
 de travailler a, l'organisation du gouvernement de la Republique, ce 
 sera votre affaire de disposer les esprits de maniere que la proposi- 
 tion d'un Traite, tel que je viens de le determiner cy-dessus, me 
 vient d'eux spontanement et comme un accessoire qui n'a ete nulle- 
 ment premedite. Je ne mets d'intervale entre la dissolution ou la 
 prorogation et le nouveau rassemblement de la diette que celui de 
 six a, huit semaines; car il faut profiter de l'occupation de nos voisins 
 pour arranger solidement et stablement toutes nos affaires avec 
 la Republique. Malgre la stipulation qui abandonne aux Polonois 
 le soin de l'arrangement futur de leur gouvernement, vous saures 
 vous menager les moyens d'y influer indirectement a. l'exclusion de 
 votre Collegue Prussien, et sans de bien grands efforts vous con- 
 tinueres a. diriger les esprits dans tous les sens qui conviendront les 
 plus a. mes mterets. 
 
 2. June 23/ July 4, 1793 
 
 . . . Cependant il me paroit qu'il ne sera pas tout a. fait superflu 
 de vous retracer aujourd'huy la marche et l'ordre que vous aves a. 
 suivre dans la negotiation qui vous est confiee et de vous faire part 
 en meme terns et dans la plus intime confidence des motifs qui m'ont 
 determinee a, les adopter. Je commencerai par ces derniers. 
 
 La Cour de Vienne depuis l'installation de son nouveau Ministere 
 commence a. manifester une inquietude bien plus vive qu'elle ne l'a 
 fait par le passe sur les acquisitions des deux Cours Voisines en Pologne. 
 Apres avoir fait d'inutiles tentatives pour en diminuer les portions, 
 elle vient d'avoir recours a. moi par des representations amicales pour 
 m'engager en cas de non-reussite des plans des compensations qui 
 lui etoient assignees dans notre convention avec le Roy de Prusse a. 
 lui reserver egalement en Pologne une part equivalente a. celle de
 
 554 
 
 APPENDIX XVIII 
 
 chacun de nous deux. Mais en attendant, et a tout evenement Elle 
 me demande a se mettre des a present en possession de la Ville de 
 Cracovie et dequelqu' arrondissement de limites du cote de la Gallicie; 
 . le tout sous pretexte que cette province sera trop exposee vis a vis 
 des Prussiens apres l'occupation qu'ils ont faite de Czenstochova. . . . 
 Cette raison sans doute n'est pas sans poids, mais comme en l'admet- 
 tant nous risquerions d'un cote d'appauvrir trop la portion restante 
 de la Pologne, et de manquer par la le but que nous proposions de la 
 conserver sur le pied d'un Etat intermediaire, et que de l'autre en 
 jettant ce nouvel incident au milieu de notre negociation nous ne 
 pourrions que l'embarrasser et la prolonger non sans des inconve- 
 niens majeurs, j'aurois desire de pouvoir y trouver quelque autre 
 expedient qui put concilier les interets des Autrichiens, sans en venir 
 a une concession de territoire Polonoise vis a vis d'eux, et sans avoir 
 l'air de manquer a. nos engagemens vis a vis des Prussiens. Cet ex- 
 pedient le plus naturel seroit celui de faire desister ces derniers de la 
 conservation de Czenstochowa dans la ligne de demarcation qu'ils 
 ont tracee jusqu'ici. Connoissant leur avidite toujours aussi prompte 
 a envahir qu'incapable de se dessaisir de ce qu'ils ont eu une fois en 
 main, il ne seroit pas permis de se flatter d'aucun accommodement a 
 ce sujet, si on venoit a le leur proposer avant que l'arrangement qui 
 nous concerne fut consomme. Mais lorsque celui-ci sera parvenu a 
 toute la maturite, il ne sera peut-etre pas impossible a l'aide de l'in- 
 tervention autrichienne et d'une opposition tant soit peu soutenue 
 de la part des Polonois d'obtenir quelque modification ou relachement 
 sur ce point. . . . En attendant, pour le bien de nos propres affaires, 
 voila la conduite que vous aves a tenir: 
 
 i°. Continues a insister sur la nomination de la delegation pour 
 traiter avec vous et votre Collegue Prussien, s'entend avec l'un 
 apres l'autre et par consequent avec vous le premier, sur l'objet de 
 vos declarations respectives. Si pour remporter cette determination, 
 il vous faudra employer tour a tour les promesses et les menaces, 
 tenes vous sur leur nature a ce qui vous en est prescrit dans vos in- 
 structions. Parmi les menaces, si vous les trouves plus necessaires 
 qu'autre chose, n'oublies pas de faire sentir aux nonces de la Diette, 
 que s'ils different la nomination de la delegation en question, vous 
 aves ordre de rompre la negociation, de vous retirer, et de faire traiter 
 la Pologne en pays ennemi en y levant les contributions et en le 
 livrant a la discretion des trouppes, . . . et engages le ministre de 
 Prusse a tenir le meme langage.
 
 APPENDIX XVIII 555 
 
 2°. Des que de cette maniere ou de toute autre vous parviendres 
 a, nouer votre negociation, ne perdes pas de terns pour conclurre 
 votre Traite et pour disposer les choses de maniere qu'aussitot que 
 nos ratifications vous seront arrivees, elles puissent etre echangees 
 contre celles du Roy et de la Diette de Pologne. 
 
 3°. Lorsque le tour du ministre Prussien viendra, vous vous 
 etablires naturellement en Conciliateur entre lui et les Polonois. 
 Vous n'y mettres que le degre d'activite et d'energie analogue a, 
 l'intention cy-dessus annoncee, laissant le champ libre aux objec- 
 tions Polonoises et les appuyant meme en tant que de raison et de 
 justice. II n'y aura non seulement aucun inconvenient, mais beau- 
 coup d'avantage a, gagner du terns dans cette seconde negociation. 
 
 4°. Laisses les Lithuaniens a, eux-memes. Accueilles-les, mais ni 
 les conseilles ni les deconseilles. Vous aves fort bien repondu a, 
 l'eveque Cossacovsky; mais restes en la, et empeches toute explosion 
 prematuree et par consequent indiscrette. 
 
 3. August 11/22, 1793 
 
 ... II etoit a, prevoir que les differentes mesures mal calculees 
 que les Prussiens ont adoptees au debut meme de leur negociation 
 entraveroient la marche de cette affaire par des nouvelles diffi- 
 cultes. . . . Vous etes tres bien entre dans ma facon de penser en 
 posant pour principe de vos explications avec les deux partis que je 
 ne refuserai surement pas mon appui efncace . . . au Roi de Prusse 
 dans tout ce qu'il pourra exiger legitimement de la Pologne en vertu 
 de la Convention conclue entre moi et la Cour de Berlin; mais qu'en 
 meme terns je n'employerai jamais la violence et les moyens coer- 
 citifs pour forcer les Polonois dans l'etat d'abandon et de desolation 
 ou ils se trouvent, a, recevoir des conditions injustes et onereuses. 
 (As to the two points which the Poles demanded from Prussia: strict 
 adherence to the line of demarcation indicated by the Convention 
 of St. Petersburg, and certain commercial stipulations in their favor) 
 Je me crois d'autant plus autorisee a. insister sur ces deux points 
 aupres du Roi de Prusse que mon exactitude a remplir le premier et 
 ma generosite a l'egard du second peuvent lui servir d'exemple; et 
 puisque les Prussiens et les Polonois s'en rapportent egalement a. ma 
 mediation dans ces differends, je ne pourrai jamais donner mon 
 suffrage que d'apres la stricte equite. ... II resulte de cet expose 
 que vous deves soutenir et pousser par tous les moyens qui sont 
 en votre pouvoir, sans cependant user de voyes de fait, la negocia-
 
 556 
 
 APPENDIX XVIII 
 
 tion Prussienne appuyee sur les principes developpes cy-dessus, et 
 soutenir en meme tems les Polonois dans leurs justes demandes re- 
 latives aux deux points en question. Vous deves cependant assurer 
 ces derniers que ma ferme volonte est que le Traite avec le Roi de 
 Prusse se fasse, et que je tiendrai religieusement ma parole a. ce der- 
 nier. La marche que les Polonois devraient a mon avis adopter dans 
 ce moment-ci, au lieu des clabauderies et des intrigues qui les agitent, 
 devroit etre de former en prenant pour base la Declaration Prussienne 
 du 9 Avril, un contreprojet de Traite dans lequel ils insereroient 
 toutes les stipulations commerciales qu'ils ont droit d'exiger et les 
 differentes specifications qui doivent determiner avec exactitude la 
 demarcation. 
 
 Dans ce nouveau Projet de Traite la garantie de la future constitu- 
 tion de la Republique ne devroit absolument pas avoir lieu, et de 
 quelque maniere que les choses aillent, vous aures soin qu'elle ne s'y 
 trouve pas, ce qui est consequent au but que je me suis propose . . . 
 d'ecarter desormais les Prussiens de toute influence dans les affaires 
 interieures de la Pologne. Ce contreprojet communique une fois 
 au S r . Bucholz, la Cour de Prusse, tranquille sur le fond de Paffaire, 
 auroit mauvaise grace de se refuser a des concessions de moindre im- 
 portance pour elle, et les deux partis se trouveront bientot d'accord. 
 
 4. August 23/September 3, 1793 
 
 . . . Dans tout ce que vous avez dit et fait en faveur des Polonois, 
 vous avez rempli parfaitement Mes intentions, et la Cour de Prusse, 
 quelque contraire que puissent paroitre a ses interets la marche que 
 vous avez tenue, ne pourra sans doute s'empecher de reconnoitre les 
 principes de justice et d'humanite qui en ont ete la base. Le nou- 
 veau Projet de Traite entre la Prusse et la Pologne redige a la suite 
 des dernieres Conferences, Me paroissant reunir en faveur de cette 
 derniere tous les avantages conciliables avec le sacrifice inevitable 
 qu'elle doit faire a la Prusse, Je ne vois plus ce qui pourroit en arreter 
 la conclusion, et Je vous enjoins expressement de l'accelerer par tous 
 les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir, evitant toujours la violence 
 et conservant autant qu'il vous sera possible le role de conciliateur 
 qui vous a si bien reussi jusqu'a. present. Le prompt achevement de 
 la Negotiation Prussien Me tient aujourd'hui d'autant plus a cceur, 
 que Je me suis decidee a n'entamer aucune autre sur les differens 
 objets a regler entre Moi et la Pologne avant que celle-ci ne soit finie.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 The following list is intended to enumerate the works cited in this 
 book and such other works as the author has found distinctly useful 
 in the preparation of the present volume. Limits of space render it 
 impossible to attempt here an entirely exhaustive bibliography of the 
 immense literature bearing upon the Second Partition and related 
 topics; and such an attempt is scarcely necessary, perhaps, in view 
 of the many admirable bibliographical tools already available for the 
 study of this period, such as Dr. Ludwik Finkel's Bibliografia his- 
 toryi polskiej and Dahlmann-Waitz's Quellenkunde zur deutschen 
 Geschichte. 
 
 I. Original Sources 
 
 Angeberg, pseud. See Chodzko. 
 
 Annual Register, The. 1758 — . London. 
 
 Arneth, Alfred, Ritter von, and Flammermont, Jules. Correspondance 
 
 seer He du Comte de Mercy- Argenteau avec VEmpereur Joseph II et le 
 
 Prince de Kaunitz. Paris, 1889, 1891. 2 vols. 
 Arneth, Alfred, Ritter von. " Graf Philipp Cobenzl und seine Memoiren." 
 
 In Archiv fiir osterreichische Geschichte, lxvii (1885), pp. 1-181. 
 " Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs liber Oesterreich im acht- 
 
 zehnten Jahrhundert." In Fontes rerum austriacarum, II, xxii (1863). 
 Joseph II und Katharina von Russland. Ihr Briefwechsel. Vienna, 
 
 1869. 
 Joseph II und Leopold von Toskana. Ihr Briefwechsel. Vienna, 1873. 
 
 2 vols. 
 Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II. Ihr Briefwechsel. Leip- 
 
 sic, etc., 1866. 
 Auckland, William Eden, Lord. Journal and Correspondence. London, 
 
 1861-62. 4 vols. 
 Aulard, A. Recueil des actes du Comite de Salut Public. Paris, 1889 — . 23 
 
 vols. (In the Collection de Documents inedits sur Vhistoire de France, 
 
 publics par les soins du Ministere de V Instruction Publique.) 
 Bartoszewicz, K. Ksie,ga pamiqtkowa setnej rocznicy ustanowienia konsty- 
 
 tucyi 3. maja. Cracow, 1891. 2 vols. 
 Beer, Adolf. " Analekten zur Geschichte der Revolutionszeit." In His- 
 
 torische Zeitschrift, xxvii (1872), pp. 1-35. 
 Joseph II, Leopold II und Kaunitz. Ihr Briefwechsel. Vienna, 1873.
 
 558 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Beer, Adolph, and Fiedler, Joseph von. " Joseph II und Graf Ludwig 
 Cobenzl. Ihr Briefwechsel." In Fontes rerum austriacarum, II, liii, 
 liv (1901). 
 
 ■ Leopold II, Franz II und Catharine. Ihre Correspondenz. Vienna, 
 
 1874. 
 
 Brunner, Sebastian. Correspondances intimes de VEmpereur Joseph II avec 
 le Comte de Cobenzl et le Prince de Kaunitz. Mainz, etc., 1871. 
 
 Castera, Jean. Histoire de Catherine II. Paris, [1800]. 4 vols. 
 
 Casti. See Greppi. 
 
 [Chodzko, L.] Recueil des Traites, Conventions, et Actes diplomatiques con- 
 cernant la Pologne, 1762-1862, par le Comte d'Angeberg. Paris, 1862. 
 
 [Cobbett, William.] The Parliamentary History of England from the Ear- 
 liest Period to the Year 1803. London, 1806-20. 36 vols. 
 
 [Colin, Frederic von.] • Vertraute Brief e iiber die Verhdltnisse am preussischen 
 Hofe seit dem Tode Friedrichs II. Amsterdam, etc., 1807-09. 6 vols. 
 
 Coxe, William. Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. Dub- 
 lin, 1784. 3 vols. 
 
 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, [Prince]. Zywot J. U. Niemcewicza. Posen, etc., 
 i860. 
 
 Czasy Stanislawa Augusta Poniatowskiego przez jednego z poslow wielkiego 
 sejmu napisane. Posen, 1867. 
 
 Dampmartin, A. H. Quelques traits de la vie privee de Frederic-Guillaume 
 II, Roi de Prusse. Paris, 181 1. 
 
 Dembifiski, Bronislaw. Documents relatifs a Vhistoire du deuxieme et troi- 
 sieme portage de la Pologne. Tom. i, 1788-91. Lemberg, 1902. 
 
 [Dmochowski, F., Kollataj, H., and others.] Vom Entstehen und Unter- 
 gange der polnischen Konstitution vom 3. May 1791. (Translated by 
 S. B. Linde.) Leipsic, 1793. 2 vols. 
 
 Dohm, Christian Wilhelm von. Denkwiirdigkeiten meiner Zeit. Lemgo and 
 Hanover, 1814-19. 5 vols. 
 
 Engestrom, Lars von. Minnen och anteckningar . Stockholm, 1876. 2 vols. 
 
 Feuillet de Conches, F. Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette et Madame Elisa- 
 beth. Lettres et documents inedits. Paris, 1864-73. 6 vols. 
 
 France. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Recueil des instructions don- 
 nees aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France. Pologne (edited by L. 
 Farges). Paris, 1888. 2 vols. Russie (edited by A. Rambaud). Paris, 
 1890. 2 vols. 
 
 Frederick II, King of Prussia. (Euvres. Berlin, 1846-57. 30 vols, and 
 index. 
 
 Politische Correspondenz. Berlin (vol. xxxv, Weimar), 1879 — . 35 
 
 vols, published to 191 2. 
 
 Gortz, Johann Eustach, Graf von. Historische und politische Denkwiir- 
 digkeiten. Stuttgart and Tubingen, 1827-28. 2 parts. 
 
 Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission. The Manuscripts of 
 J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore. London, 1892-99. 5 vols. 
 
 Greppi, E. " Lettere politiche dell' Abate Casti scritte da Vienna nelT 
 anno 1793." In the Miscellanea di Storia Italiana edita per cura della 
 regia diputazione di storia patria, xxi (1883). Turin.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 559 
 
 Gustavus III, King of Sweden. " Konung Gustafs bref till friherre G. M. 
 
 Armfelt." In Historiska Handlingar till trycket befordrade af Kongl. 
 
 Samfundet for utgifvande af handskrifter rorande Skandinaviens Historia, 
 
 xii, no. 3 (1883). Stockholm. 
 Hansard. See Cobbett. 
 [Haugwitz, Christian August Heinrich, Graf von.] " Fragment des me- 
 
 moires inedits du Comte de Haugwitz." In Minerva, -ein Journal his- 
 
 torischen und politischen Inhalts, hrsg. von J. W. von Archenholz, clxxxiv 
 
 (1837). Jena. 
 [Helbig, G. A. W. von.] " Potemkin der Taurier. Anecdoten zur Geschichte 
 
 seines Lebens und seiner Zeit." In Minerva, xxii (i797)-xxxvi (1880). 
 
 Hamburg. 
 Hertzberg, Ewald Friedrich, Graf von. " Denkschrift fiber das zwischen 
 
 Preussen und Polen im Jahre 1790 geschlossene Biindniss." In 
 
 Schmidt's Zeitschrift filr Geschichtswissenschafl, vii (1847), PP- 261-71. 
 " Precis de la carriere diplomatique du comte de Hertzberg." Ibid., 
 
 i (1844), pp. 16-36. 
 Recueil des deductions, manifestes, declarations, trails et autres actes et 
 
 fcrils publics, qui ont ete rediges et publics pour la cour de Prusse par le 
 
 tninistre d'etat Comte de Hertzberg depuis I'annee 1756 jusqu'd I'annie 
 
 1790. Berlin, 1790-95. 3 vols. 
 Heyking, Alfons, Baron von. Aus Polens und Kurlands letzten Tagen. 
 
 Memoir en des Baron Karl Heinrich Heyking {1752-1796) . Berlin, 1897. 
 Hurmuzaki, E. de. Documente privitore la istoria Romdnilor. Bucharest, 
 
 1887-1909. 13 vols, and supplement of 3 vols. 
 Keith, Sir Robert Murray. Memoirs and Correspondence. Edited by Mrs. 
 
 Gillespie Smyth. London, 1849. 2 vols. 
 Klinckowstrom, Rudolf, Baron. Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France. 
 
 Paris, 1877-78. 2 vols. 
 Koimian, Kajetan. Pamietniki obejmujqce wspomnienia od roku 1780 do 
 
 rokn 1815. Posen, 1858. 3 vols. 
 Leeds, Francis, fifth Duke of. Political Memoranda. Edited by Oscar 
 
 Browning. London, 1884. (Camden Society.) 
 Leouzon le Due, L. Correspondence diplomatique du Baron de Stael-Holstein, 
 
 ambassadeur de Suede en France. Paris, 1881. 
 Ligne, Charles Joseph, Prince de. Memoir es et Melanges historiques el lit- 
 
 teraires. Paris, 1827-29. 5 vols. 
 Liske, X. " Zur polnischen Politik Katharina II." In Historische Zeit- 
 schrift, xxx (1873), pp. 281-304. 
 Mably, l'Abbe de. CEuvres. Paris, Fan III. 15 vols. 
 Malachowski, Stanislaw Nal^cz, Hrabia. Pamietniki. Posen, 1885. 
 Malmesbury, James Harris, first Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence. 
 
 London, 1845. 4 vols. 
 Martens, Fedor. Recueil des Trails et Conventions conclus par la Russie 
 
 avec les Puissances etrangeres. St. Petersburg, 1874-1909. 15 vols. 
 Martens, Georg Friedrich von. Recueil de Traites des Puissances et Etats de 
 
 V Europe depuis 1761 jusqu'd, present. 2nd ed. Gottingen, 1817-35. 
 
 8 vols.
 
 560 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Massenbach, Christian, Freiherr von. Memoiren zur Geschichte des preus- 
 
 sischen Staates unter den Regierungen Friedrich Wilhelms II und Fried- 
 rich Wilhelms III. Amsterdam, 1809. 3 vols. 
 Masson, C. F. P. Memoires secrets sur la Russie et particulierement sur la 
 
 fin du regne de Catherine II et celui de Paul I. Paris, 1800. 2 vols. 
 Mayno, Edouard, Comte del. Lettres et depeches du Marquis de Parelle, 
 
 premier ministre du Roi de Sardaigne a la cour de Russie {1783-1784) 
 
 et du Baron de la Turbie {1792-17 93). Rome, 1901. 
 [Mirabeau, Honore Gabriel Riquetti, Comte de.] Histoire secrete de la cour 
 
 de Berlin, [n. p.], 1789. 
 Moniteur, Le (1789-99). Reimpression. Paris, 1840-45. 32 vols. 
 Mottaz, Eugene. Stanislas Poniatowski et Maurice Glayre. Correspondance 
 
 relative aux partages de la Pologne. Paris, 1897. 
 [Nesselrode, K., Comte de.] Lettres et papier s du Chancelier Comte de Nes- 
 
 selrode, 1760-1850. Paris, 1904-12. n vols. 
 Neumann, Leopold, and Plason, Adolphe de. Recueil des Traites et Con- 
 ventions conclus par VAutriche avec les Puissances etr anger es depuis 1763 
 
 jusqu'd nos jours. Leipsic, 1855-1902. 20 vols. 
 Oginski, Michel, Comte d'. Memoires sur la Pologne et les Polonais, depuis 
 
 1788 jusqu'd la fin de 181 5. Paris, 1826-27. 4 vols. 
 [Pistor, G. K.] Memoires sur la revolution de la Pologne trouves a Berlin. 
 
 Paris, 1806. 
 Politisches Journal. Herausgegeben von einer Gesellschaft von Gelehrten. 
 
 Hamburg. Jahrgange 1792, 1793. 
 Poschinger, Heinrich von. Also sprach Bismarck. Vienna, 1910-11. 
 
 3 vols. 
 Priimers, Rodgero. Das Jahr 1793. Urkunden und Aktenstucke zur Ge- 
 schichte der Organisation Siidpreussens. Posen, 1895. 
 Pulawski, Fr. " Listy SzczQsnego Potockiego do Katarzyny II a Zubowa." 
 
 In Kwartalnik Historyczny , xvii (1903), pp. 266-76. 
 Ranke, Leopold von. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fursten von Har- 
 
 denberg. 2nd ed. Leipsic, 1880. 5 vols. 
 Raynal, G. T. Histoire philosophique et politique des Etablissemens et 
 
 du Commerce des Europeens dans les deux Indes. Geneva, 1781. 
 
 10 vols. 
 [Schladen, K. F. G. von.] Mittheilungen aus den nachgelassenen Papieren 
 
 eines preussischen Diplomaten, herausgegeben von dessen Nejjen L. v. L. 
 
 Berlin, 1868. 
 Schlieffen, Martin Ernst von. Nachricht von einigen Hdusern des Geschlechtes 
 
 der von Schlieffen oder Schlieben. Berlin, 1830. 2 vols. 
 Schlitter, Harms. " Briefe der Erzherzogin Marie Christine, Staathalterin 
 
 der Niederlande an Leopold II, nebst einer Einleitung zur Geschichte 
 
 der franzosischen Politik Leopolds II." In Fontes rerum austriacarum, 
 
 II, xlviii (1896), pp. 1-360. 
 Kaunitz, Philipp Cobenzl und Spielmann. Ihr Briefwechsel {1779— 
 
 1792). Vienna, 1899. 
 [Schulz, J. C. F.] Reise eines Liefldnders von Riga nach Warschau. Berlin,, 
 
 1795-96. 3 Teil. 
 
 /
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 561 
 
 Segur, Louis Philippe, Comte de. Memoires. Vols, i-iii of his JEuvres, 
 Paris, 1824-27, 33 volumes. 
 
 Sienkiewicz, Karol. Skarbiec historyi polskiej. Paris, 1839-40. 2 vols. 
 
 Spiegel, L. P. J. van de. Resume des negotiations qui accompagnerent la 
 revolution des Pays-bas autrichiens, avec des pieces justificatives. Am- 
 sterdam, 1 84 1. 
 
 Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, King of Poland. Memoires de Stanislas 
 Auguste et sa Correspondence avec I'Imperatrice Catherine II. Posen, 
 1862. 
 
 Memoires du roi Stanislas-Auguste Poniatowski. (Edited by Serge Gori- 
 
 a'inov.) Tom. i. St. Petersburg, 1914. 
 
 Staszic, Stanistaw. Uwagi nod zyciem Jana Zamojskiego. Cracow, 
 1861. 
 
 Taube, C. E. B. Svenska beskickningars berdttelser om frdmmande makter 
 ar 1793. Stockholm, 1893. 
 
 Thurheim, A., Graf. Brief e des Graf en Mercy-Argenteau an den Graf en 
 Louis Starhemberg. Innsbruck, 1884. 
 
 Vivenot, Alfred, Ritter von. Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiser- 
 politik Oesterreichs wahrend der franzosischen Revolulionskriege, 1790- 
 1801. Vienna, 1873-93. 5 vols. (Vols, iii-v, which were edited by 
 H. Zeissberg after Vivenot's death, bear the altered title " Quellen zur 
 Geschichte der Politik Oesterreichs wahrend der franzosischen Revo- 
 lutionskriege, 1793-97.") 
 
 " Thugut und sein politisches System. Urkundliche Beitrage zur 
 
 Geschichte der deutschen Politik des osterreichischen Kaiserhauses 
 wahrend des Krieges gegen die franzosische Revolution." In Archiv 
 fiir osterreichische Geschichte, xlii (1870), pp. 363-489. 
 Vertrauliche Brief e des Freiherrn von Thugut. Vienna, 1872. 2 vols. 
 
 Vom Entstehen und Unter 'gauge der polnischen Konstitution des 3. May 17 91. 
 
 See Dmochowski. 
 Voss, Sophie Marie, Grafin von. Neunundsechzig Jahre am preussischen 
 
 Hofe. Aus den Erinnerungen der Oberhofmeisterin Sophie Marie, Grafin 
 
 von Voss. 6th ed. Leipsic, 1894. 
 Wassiltchikow, A. Les Razoumowski. Edition francaise par Alexandre 
 
 Bruckner. Halle, 1893-94. 3 torn, (in 6 vols.). 
 Wolf, A. Leopold II und Marie Christine. Ihr Briefwechsel, 1781-1792. 
 
 Vienna, 1867. 
 Wraxall, Sir Nathaniel William. Memoirs of the Courts of Berlin, Dresden, 
 
 Warsaw, and Vienna in the Years 1777, 1778, and 1779. 3rd ed. Lon- 
 don, 1806. 2 vols. 
 ApxHBt TocyjiapcTBeHHaro CoBiia. St. Petersburg, 1869. 2 vols. 
 ApxiiBi. Khji3h BopoHnoBa. Moscow, 1876-97. 40 vols. 
 rapHOBCKifi, MHxaiijrt. 3airacKH {1782-1796). PyccKaa Crapnaa, xv (1876), 
 
 pp. 9-38, 237-265, 471-499, 687-720; xvi (1876), pp. 1-32, 207-238, 
 
 399-440. 
 rojioBKHHt, 9. P, rpa(|)i.. 3anacKH. PyccKaa OrapHHa, cxxix (1907), pp. 347- 
 
 372, 669-686. 
 .HepacaBnni., T. 11. 3amiCKH, 17 43-1812. Moscow, i860.
 
 5^2 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 EuaTepHHa II, PyccKaa HMnepaTpnna. ByMarn HMnepaTpnnn EKaTepnHH II 
 xpaHHm,iflCfl bi> rocynapcTBeHHOMi. ApxHB'fe MnHHCTepcTBa IlHocTpaHHHxt 
 ^-bjit,. C6opHHKt HMn. Pyc. Hct. 06m.., vii, x, xiii, xxvii, xlii. 
 
 JI,HnjioMaTHiecKaa nepeiracKa HMnepaTpnnH EKaTepHHH II. Ibid., xlviii, 
 
 li, lvii, lxvii, lxxxvii, xcvii, cxviii, cxxxv. 
 
 HMnepaTpnnn EKaTepnHH II h KHa3a HoTeMKHHa nojiJiHHHaa nepenncRa 
 
 (031 c6opHHKa npo(}). II. C. JIe6e,a,eBa). PyccKaa dapHHa, xvi (1876), 
 PP- 33-58, 239-262, 441-478, 5!7-59°; xvii (1876), pp. 21-38, 206-216, 
 403-426, 635-652. 
 
 nepenncKa ct> gapoHOMt Me^bxiopoMt Iphmmomi.. CSopHHKi HMn. Pyc. 
 
 Her. 06m;., -xxiii, xxxiii, xliv. 
 
 HepenncKa ct KopojieMi. ^pnjrpnxoM'B H. Ibid., xx. 
 
 HiictMa h 6yMara HMnepaTpnnn EKaTepnHH H xpanainiecfl bt> HMn. 
 
 IIy6ji. Bn6jioTeK , E. (H3,n. A. 0. EH^KOBa.) St. Petersburg, 1873. 
 
 nncBMa EraTepniiH H rt, rpac{>y CTanejiBGepry, 1773-1793. PyccKaa 
 
 Crapnna, iii (1871), pp. 310-325, 474-484,605-627. 
 
 CoiiiHema HMnepaTpnnn EKaTepnHH II, Ha ocHOBanin nojpnHHHX'B pyRO- 
 
 nnceft n ci> 06'LflCHHTe.ibHHMH npHMiiamaMH aKa^eMHKa A. H. HnnnHa. 
 Uss,. HMnepaTopcKoii ARajieMra HayRt. St. Petersburg, 1901-07. 12 vols. 
 
 EHrejiBrapjrri, X H. 3aimcRH, 1766-1836. Moscow, 1867. 
 
 PyccKaa CTapnHa, iii, xv, xvi, xvii, lxxvi, lxxxi, cxxix. 
 
 PyccKifi ApxHBi,, 1865, 1874", 1876'- m , 18781-", 1888'". 
 
 C6opHnKt BoeHHo-ncTopH^ecKHxt MaTepiaaoBi. ByMarn muma Ipnropia AjeR- 
 caH^poBH^a noTeMKHHa-TaBpniecKaro, 7774-7795. (H3ji. BoeHHo-YHeHaro 
 KoMHTeTa r^aBHoro HlTa6a.) Vols, vi-viii. St. Petersburg, 1893-95. 
 
 CSopHHKb HMnepaTopcKaro PyccKaro HcTopniecKaro 06inecTBa. St. Petersburg, 
 1867 — . 144 volumes to 1914. Vols, vii, x, xii, xiii, xviii, xix, xx, xxii, 
 xxiii, xxvi, xxvii, xxix, xxxiii, xxxvii, xlii, xliv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, li, 
 lvii, lxvii, lxxii, lxxxvii, xcvii, cix, cxviii, cxxv, cxxxv, cxl, cxli, cxliii. 
 
 XpanoBnnRin, A. B. ^HeBHHRt ct 18 aHBapa 1782 no 17 ceHTa6pa 1793 rojry. 
 Moscow, 1901. 
 
 II. Secondary Works 
 (a) Works of a More General Character 
 
 Acton, John Edward Dalberg, Lord. The History of Freedom and Other 
 Essays. London, 1907. 
 
 Andreae, Friedrich. Preussische und russische Politik in Polen von der 
 taurischen Reise Katharinas II (Januar 1787) bis zur Abwendung 
 Friedrich Wilhelms II von den Hertzbergschen Pldnen {August 1789). 
 Berlin, 1905. 
 
 Bain, R. Nisbet. " The Second Partition of Poland." In English Histori- 
 cal Review, vi (1891), pp. 331-340. 
 
 Beer, Adolf. Die erste Theilung Polens. Vienna, 1873. 2 vols, and a 
 volume of documents. 
 
 Brougham, Henry, Lord. Historical and Political Dissertations. London 
 and Glasgow, 1857. (Vol. viii of his collected Works.) 
 
 Clapham, J. H. The Causes of the War of 1792. Cambridge (Eng.), 1899.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 5^3 
 
 Creux, H. J. Pitt et Frederic-Guillaume II. L'Angleterre et la Prusse devant 
 
 la question d'Orient en 1790. Paris, 1886. 
 F. v. S. [not Friedrich von Smitt, as often given]. Die Theilung Polens in 
 
 den Jahren 1773, 1793, 1796, und 1815, und der Wiener Kongress im 
 
 Jahre 181 3. Berlin, 1864. 
 Ferrand, F.-C. Histoire des trois demembrements de la Pologne pour faire 
 
 suite a I' histoire de Vanarchie de Pologne par Rulhiere. Paris, 1820. 
 
 3 vols. 
 Glagau, Hans. Die franzosische Legislative und der Ursprung der Revolu- 
 
 tionskriege, 1791-1792. Berlin, 1896. 
 Hausser, Ludwig. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis 
 
 zur Griindung des deutschen Bundes. 3rd ed. Berlin, 1861-63. 4 vols. 
 Haumant, Emile. La Guerre du Nord et la Paix d'Oliva, 16 3 5-1660. Paris, 
 
 1893. 
 Heigel, K. T. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur 
 
 Aujlbsung des alten Reiches. Stuttgart, 1899-1911. 2 vols. 
 Herrmann, Ernst. " Zur Geschichte der Wiener Convention vom 25. Juli 
 
 1791 und der ostreichisch-preussischen Allianz vom 7. Februar 1792." 
 
 In Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, v (1865), pp. 237-290. 
 Huffer, Hermann. Oestreich und Preussen gegeniiber der franzosischen Revo- 
 lution bis zum Abschluss des Friedens von Campo Formio. Bonn, 1868. 
 
 Ergdnzungsband. Die Politik der deutschen Mdchte im Revolutions kriege. 
 
 Munster, 1869. 
 Laurent, F. La politique royale. Paris, 1865. (Vol. xi of his Etudes sur 
 
 Vhistoire de Vhumanite.) 
 Lenz, Max. " Marie Antoinette im Kampf mit der Revolution." In 
 
 Preussische Jahrbiicher, lxxviii (1894), pp. 1-28, 255-311. 
 Luckwaldt, Friedrich. " Die englisch-preussische Allianz von 1788." In 
 
 Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, xv 
 
 (1902), pp. 33-116. 
 Oncken, Wilhelm. Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreiches und der 
 
 Befreiungskriege. Berlin, 1884-87. 2 vols. 
 Ranke, Leopold von. Die deutschen Mdchte und der Furstenbund. Leipsic, 
 
 1871-72. 2 vols. 
 Ursprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege, 1791 und 1792. Leipsic, 
 
 1875. 
 Raumer, Fr. L. von. " Polens Untergang." In Historisches Taschenbuch, 
 
 1832 11 , 1 , pp. 395-537- 
 Rulhiere, Claude de. Histoire de Vanarchie de Pologne et du demembrement 
 
 de cette republique. Paris, 1807. 4 vols. 
 Salisbury, A. T. G. Cecil, Marquess of. Essays, Foreign Politics. London, 
 
 1905. 
 Smitt, Frederic de. Frederic II, Catherine et le partage de Pologne. Paris, 
 
 1861. 
 Smolka, Stanislaw. " Stanowisko mocarstw wobec konstytucyi trzeciego 
 
 maja." In Przeglqd Polski, 1891", pp. 441-460. 
 Sorel, Albert. " L'Autriche et le Comite de Salut Public." In Revue His- 
 
 torique, xvii (1881), pp. 25-63.
 
 564 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Sorel, Albert. U Eur opeet la Revolution franqaise. Paris, 1885-1904. 8 vols. 
 
 La Question d 'Orient au xviii e siecle. 3rd ed. Paris, 1902. 
 
 Sybel, Heinrich von. Geschichte der Revolutionszeit von 1789 bis 1795. 4th 
 
 ed. Stuttgart, 1897-1900. 5 vols. 
 " Polens Untergang und der Revolutionskrieg." In Historische Zeit- 
 
 schrift, xxiii (1870), pp. 66-154. 
 Temperley, H. Frederic the Great and Kaiser Joseph. An Episode of War and 
 
 Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century. London, 1915. 
 Tratchevsky, Alexandre. " La France et l'Allemagne sous Louis XVI." 
 
 In Revue Historique, xiv (1880), pp. 241-285; xv, pp. 1-46. 
 Treitschke, Heinrich von. Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert. 
 
 Leipsic, 1879-94. 5 vols. 
 Uebersberger, Hans. Oesterreich und Russland seit dent Ende des fiinfzehn- 
 
 ten Jahrhunderts. Vol. i (1488-1605), Vienna and Leipsic, 1906. 
 Vivenot, Alfred, Ritter von. Zur Genesis der zweiten Theilung Polens. 
 
 Vienna, 1874. 
 Waliszewski, K. Polska i Europa w drugiej polowie xviii wieku. Wstqp 
 
 do historyi ruchu politycznego w tej epoce. Cracow, 1890. 
 Wolf, G. Oesterreich und Preussen, 17 80-17 90. Vienna, 1880. 
 TpaneBCKiH, AjieKcaHinTB. Cok>3t. KHA3efl h HiMeintaH nojiHTHKa EieaTepHHH 
 
 II, 3>pH,npHxa II h IocH(j)a II (1780-1790). St. Petersburg, 1877. 
 
 (b) Works Relating More Particularly to Poland 
 
 Askenazy, S. Die letzte polnische Konigswahl. Gottingen, 1894. 
 
 Dwa stulecia, xviii i xix. Badania i przyczynki. Warsaw, 1910. 
 
 2 vols. 
 
 Ksiqze Jdzef Poniatowski, 1763-1813. Warsaw, 1905. 
 
 " Materyaly i notatki, '1793'." In Biblioleka Warszawska, 1900', 
 
 pp. 155-165. 
 
 Przymierze polsko-pruskie. Lemberg, 1900. 
 
 Bain, R. Nisbet. The Last King of Poland. New York and London, 1909. 
 Balzer, O. " Panstwo polskie w pierwszem siedmdziesiQcioleciu xiv i 
 
 xvi wieku." In Kwartalnik Historyczny, xxi (1907), pp. 193-291. 
 " Reformy spoieczne i polityczne konstytucyi 3. maja." In Przeglqd 
 
 Polski, 1891", pp. 222-260, 461-496. 
 " Z powodu nowego zarysu historyi ustroju Polski." In Kwartalnik 
 
 Historyczny, xx (1906), pp. 1-57, 397-441. 
 Bobrzyhski, M. Dzieje Polski w zarysie. 3rd ed. Cracow, 1890. 2 vols. 
 Bruggen, Ernst, Freiherr von der. Polens Auflosung. Kulturgeschichtliche 
 
 Skizzen aus den letzten Jahrzehnten der polnischen Selbstandigkeit. 
 
 Leipsic, 1878. 
 Cleinow, George. Die Zukunft Polens. Leipsic, 1908-14. 2 vols. 
 D^bicki, Ludwik. Pulawy (1762-18 '30). Monografia z zycia towarzy- 
 
 stkiego, politycznego i literackiego na podstawie archiwum ks. Czar- 
 
 toryskich w Krakowie. Lemberg, 1887-88. 4 vols. 
 Dembinski, Bronislaw. "Mission diplomatique de Felix Oraczewski, resi- 
 dent polonais a Paris pendant la revolution (1 791-1792)." In Bulletin
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 565 
 
 International de VAcademie des Sciences de Cracovie. Comptes rendus 
 
 des seances de I'annee igoo, pp. 380-385. 
 Dembinski, Bronislaw. "Piattoli et son role pendant la Grande Diete 
 
 (1788-1792)." In Bulletin International de VAcademie des Sciences de 
 
 Cracovie, Classe de Philologie, etc., Annee 1905, pp. 53-64. 
 Dmowski, R. La Question polonaise. Traduction du polonais par V. Gasz- 
 
 towtt. Paris, 1909. 
 Gorski, K. Historya piechoty polskiej. Cracow, 1893. 
 Hotzsch, O. " Der Stand der polnischen Verfassungsgeschichte." In 
 
 Zeitschrift fiir osteuropdische Geschichte, i (191 1), pp. 67-83. 
 " Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung in der Geschichte des 
 
 germanisch-slavischen Ostens." Ibid., i, pp. 363-412. a 
 Hofman, K. B. Historya reform politycznych w dawnej Polsce. 2nd ed. 
 
 Leipsic, 1869. 
 Hiippe, Siegfried. Verfassung der Republik Polen. Berlin, 1867. 
 Kadlec, Karel. " tJstavni dejiny Polska podle novych badani." In Casopis 
 
 Musea Krdlovstvi Ceskeho, lxxxii (1908), pp. 40-66, 241-250, 436- 
 
 454- 
 Kalinka, W. Der vierjahrige polnische Reichstag, 1788 bis 1791. Aus dem 
 
 Polnischen iibersetzte deutsche Originalausgabe. Berlin, 1896-98. 2 
 
 vols. 
 Ostatnie lata panowania Stanislawa Augusta. 2nd ed. Cracow, 1891. 
 
 2 vols. (The second contains very valuable documents.) 
 Klotz, Justine. L'CEuvre legislative de la Diete de 4 Ans. Paris, 1913. 
 Konopczynski, Wladyslaw. Polska w dobie wojny siedmioletniej . Warsaw, 
 
 1908-n. (Forms vols, vii, viii, and xvi of Professor Askenazy's Mono- 
 
 grafii w zakresie dziejow nowozytnych.) 
 Korzon, T. Kosciuszko. 2nd ed. Cracow, 1906. 
 
 " Pocz^tki sejmu wielkiego." In Ateneum, 1881'. 
 
 W ewnetrzne dzieje Polski za Stanislawa Augusta, 1764-1794: badania 
 
 historyczne ze stanowiska ekonomicznego i administracyjnego. 2nd ed. 
 
 Cracow, 1897-98. 6 vols. Zamknie.cie. Lemberg, 1899. 
 Kraszewski, J. I. Polska w czasie trzech rozbiorow. Warsaw, 1902-03. 
 
 3 vols. 
 
 Kutrzeba, Stanislaw. Historya ustroju Polski w zarysie. Tom I. Korona. 
 
 3rd ed. Lemberg, 191 2. 
 Leblond, M. A. La Pologne vivante. Paris, 1910. 
 Lehtonen, U. L. Die polnischen Provinzen Russlands unter Katharina II in 
 
 den Jahren 177 2-1782. Aus dem finnischen Original iibersetzt von 
 
 Gustav Schmidt. Berlin, 1907. 
 Lelewel, Joachim. Histoire de Pologne. Paris, 1844. 2 vols. 
 Morawski, T. Dzieje narodu polskiego. Posen, 1875-77. 6 vols. 
 Niewenglowski, D. C. Les Idees politiques el Vesprit public en Pologne d la 
 
 Jin du xviii e siecle. Paris, 1901. 
 Olszewicz, V. " L'fivolution de la constitution polonaise." In Revue des 
 
 Sciences Politiques, 191 1, pp. 610-619. 
 Pamietnik drugiego zjazdu historykow polskich we Lwowie. Tom I. Referaty. 
 
 Lemberg, 1890.
 
 566 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Pamietnik trzeciego zjazdu historykow polskich w Krakowie. Tom I. Referaty. 
 
 Cracow, 1900. 
 Pawihski, Adolf. Rzqdy sejmikowe w epoce krolow elekcyjnych. Warsaw, 
 
 1888. (Forms vol. i of his five-volume work Dzieje ziemi kujawskiej.) 
 Sejmiki ziemskie. Poczatek ich i rozwoj az do ustalenia sie. udzialu 
 
 poslow ziemskich w ustawodawstwie sejmu walnego, 1374-1505. War- 
 saw, 1895. 
 Piekosifiski, F. " Wiece, sejmiki, sejmy i przywileje ziemskie w Polsce 
 
 wiekow srednich." In Rozprawy Akademii Vmiejetno'sci w Krakowie, 
 
 Wyd. hist.-fil., serya II., xiv (1900), pp. 177-251. 
 Pilat, Roman. O liter aturze politycznej sejmu czteroletniego. Cracow, 1872. 
 Popiel, Pawel. Powstanie i upadek konstytucyi 3. maja (wedlug dokumentow 
 
 oryginalnych). Cracow, 1901. 
 Prochaska, A. " Geneza i rozwoj parlamentaryzmu za pierwszych Jagiel- 
 
 lonow." In Rozpr. Akad. Umiej. w Krakowie, Wyd. hist.-fil., serya 
 
 II., xiii (1899), pp. 1-184. 
 Rembowski, A. Konfederacya i rokosz. Porownanie stanowych konsty- 
 tucyi patlstw europejskich z ustrojem Rzeczypospolitej polskiej. 2nd ed. 
 
 Warsaw, 1896. 
 " Reprezentacya stanowa w Polsce." In Biblioteka Warszawska, 1893 1 , 
 
 pp. 1-40. 
 " Stany Rzeczypospolitej polskiej w znaczeniu prawne-panstwowem." 
 
 Ibid., 1892^, pp. 417-441. 
 " Studya nad sejmem Rzeczypospolitej polskiej." Ibid., 1893™, pp. 
 
 288-311. 
 Roepell, R. Polen um die Mitte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Gotha, 
 
 1874. 
 " Zur Genesis der Verfassung Polens vom 3. Mai 1791." In His- 
 
 torische Zeitschrift, lxvi (1891), pp. 1-52. 
 Schmitt, Henryk. Dzieje Polski xviii i xix wieku. Cracow, 1866-68. 4 
 
 vols. 
 Seraphim, August. Die Geschichte des Herzogtums Kurland (i^di-i^gf). 
 
 2nd ed. Reval, 1904. 
 Smolenski, Wladyslaw. Konfederacya targowicka. Cracow, 1903. 
 
 Ostatni rok sejmu wielkiego. Cracow, 1897. 
 
 Pisma history >czne. Cracow, 1901. 3 vols. 
 
 Przewrot umystowy w Polsce wieku xviii. Studya historyczne. Cracow, 
 
 1891. 
 Smolka, S. " Geneza konstytucyi 3. maja." In Bulletin International de 
 
 VAcademie des Sciences de Cracovie. Comptes rendus des seances de 
 
 Vannee i8gi, pp. 35°-354- 
 Sokolowski, A. and Inlender, Adolf. Dzieje Polski illustrowane. Vienna, 
 
 1896-1901. 4 vols. 
 Solov'ev {German Ssolowjoff), S. Geschichte des Falles von Polen (nach 
 
 russischen Quellen). Uebersetzt von J. Sporer. Gotha, 1865. 
 Soplica, T. Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1JQ2 r. Tom I. Kampania koronna. 
 
 Cracow, 1906. 
 Studnicki, Wl. Sprawa polska. Posen, 1910.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 567 
 
 Sulimierski, F., and others. Slownik geogrqficzny krolewstwa polskiego i 
 innych krajow slowianskich. Warsaw, 1880-1902. 15 torn. 
 
 Szujski, Jozef. Dzieje Polski. Cracow, 1882-94. 4 vols. 
 
 Waliszewski, K. Potoccy i Czartoryscy. Walka stronnictw i programow 
 politycznych przed upadkiem Rzpltej, 17 35-1 763. Cracow, 1887. 
 
 Wegner, Leon. Dzieje dnia (rzeciego i piatego maja 1791. Posen, 1865. 
 
 Sejm grodzienski. Ostatni ust§p od 26. sierpnia do 23. wrzesnia 1793. 
 
 Posen, 1866. 
 
 Zaleski, Bronislaw. " Korespondencya krajowa Stanislawa Augusta." In 
 Rocznik Towarzystwa Historyczno-Literackiego w Pary&u, rok 1870-72, 
 pp. 147-402. 
 
 Zywot Ks. Adama Jerziego Czartoryskiego. Tom I. Posen, 1881. 
 
 HjoBaiicKifi, R. rpojrneHCKift cefiirL 1793 rojiy : nocjrEjrHiit cefiMX PjKeiH-nocno- 
 jihtoh. Moscow, 1870. 
 
 Kap4eBi>, H. Ea^eHie IIojiliuh bt> ncTopa^ecKofi jraTepaTypi. St. Petersburg, 
 1888. 
 
 ■ HojibCKia pei})opMU xviiiB-BKa. St. Petersburg, 1890. 
 
 IIcTopHHecKiii oiepKi noiBCKaro ceflsia. Moscow, 1888. 
 
 KocTOMapoBi., H. H. nodTEjiHie toah Piia-IlocnojiHTOH. 3rd ed. St. Peters- 
 burg, 1886. 2 vols. 
 
 (c) Works Relating More Particularly to Russia 
 
 Aragon, Louis, Marquis d'. Un Paladin au xviii e siecle. Le Prince 
 
 Charles de Nassau-Siegen. D'apres sa correspondance originate inedite 
 
 de 1784 a 1780. Paris, 1893. 
 Askenazy, S. " Przyczynek do krytyki depesz M. M. Alopeusza." In 
 
 Kwartalnik Eistoryczny , xvii (1903), pp. 530-543. 
 Bilbasov, V. A. Geschichte Katharina II. (Uebersetzung aus dem Russischen 
 
 von M. v. Pezold.) Berlin, 1891-93. 4 parts in 3 vols. 
 Katharina II Kaiserin von Russland im Urtheile der Welti iter atur. 
 
 (Autorisirte Uebersetzung aus dem Russichen, mit einem Vorwort von 
 
 Dr. Theodor Schiemann.) Berlin, 1897. 2 vols. 
 Blum, K. L. Ein russischer Staatsmann. Des Grafen Jakob Johann Sievers 
 
 Denkwilrdigkeiten zur Geschichte Russlands. Leipsic and Heidelberg, 
 
 1857-58. 4 vols. 
 Bruckner, Alexander and Mettig, C. Geschichte Russlands bis zum Ende 
 
 des 18. Jahrhunderts. Gotha, 1896-19 13. 2 vols. 
 Bruckner, Alexander. Katharina II. Berlin, 1883. 
 " Neue Beitrage zur Geschichte der Regierung Katharina II." In 
 
 Ilistorische Zeitschrift, lviii (1887), pp. 279-309. 
 Caro, Jakob. Katharina II von Russland. Berlin, 1876. 
 Daudet, Ernest. Les Bourbons et la Russie pendant la Revolution jrancaise. 
 
 Paris, 1886. 
 Dembinski, Bronislaw. Rosya a rewolucya francuska. Cracow, 1896. 
 " W sprawie krytyki korespondencyi dyplomatycznej." In Kwartal- 
 nik Historyczny, xviii (1904), pp. 32-46. 
 Herrmann, Ernst. Geschichte des russischen Staates. (Forms vols, iii-vi of
 
 568 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 the work begun by Philipp Strahl in the series Geschichte der europai- 
 
 schen Staaten.) Hamburg and Gotha, 1846-60. Erganzungsband. 
 
 Diplomatische Correspondenz aus der Revolutionszeit. Gotha, 1867. 
 Lariviere, Charles de. Catherine II et la Revolution franqaise, d'apres de 
 
 nouveanx documents. Paris, 1895. 
 Liske, X. " Beitrage zur Geschichte der Kaniower Zusammenkunft 1787 
 
 und ihrer Vorlaufer." In Russische Revue, iv (1874), pp. 481-508. 
 " Zur Charakteristik Katharina II." In Historische Zeitschrift, xxxix 
 
 (1878), pp. 230-240. 
 " Zur Geschichte der letzten Jahre der Republik Polen." Ibid., 
 
 xxi (1869), pp. 25-73. 
 Smitt, Friedrich von. Suworow und Polens Untergang. Leipsic, etc., 1858. 
 
 2 vols. 
 Stein, F. von. Geschichte des russischen Heeres. Hanover, 1885. 
 Sybel, Heinrich von. " Katharina II von Russland." In his Kleine his- 
 torische Schriften, i (1869), pp. 147-177. Munich. 
 Waliszewski, K. Autour d'un trone. Catherine II de Russie, ses collabora- 
 
 teurs. Paris, 1894. 
 
 Le Roman d'une imperatrice. Catherine II de Russie. Paris, 1893. 
 
 EHflLSacoBi., B. A. EaMflTH HMnepaipnaH EKaiepHHH H. PyccKaa OapHHa, 
 
 lxxxviii (1896), pp. 241-280. 
 
 npHcoejrHHeme KypaaHfliH. Ibid., lxxxiii (1895), pp. 3-55. 
 
 BpHKHept, AjieKcaH^pi. Boima Poccin cb HlBeaiefi Bt 1 788-1 790 r. St. 
 
 Petersburg, 1869. 
 
 EoTeMKHHt. St. Petersburg, 1891. 
 
 TpoTt, fl. K. EKaTepHHa II h TycTaBi III. St. Petersburg, 1877. 
 TpHropoBHit, H. H. KaHHjepi. khh3b Be36opo;rKO. Oiihti. o6pa6oTKH Maie- 
 
 piajioBt kjlh ero 6iorpa4>ia. PyccKiw ApxHBi, 1874-77, and CQ'opHHK'B 
 
 Hivin. Pyc. Hct. 06m,., xxvi and xxxix. 
 KHaab T. A. noTeMKHHt-TaBpH^ecKifi. Biorpa(J)H^ecKifi oTCput. PyccKa-a 
 
 CiapHHa, xii (1875), pp. 481-522, 681-700; xiii, pp. 20-40, 159-174; 
 
 xiv, pp. 217-267. 
 KHA3b njaTOHt AjieKcaH.npoBHi'B 3y6oBi>. HciopHKo-fiiorpatfra^ecKiH o^epKi. 
 
 Ibid., xvi (1876), pp. 591-606; xvii, pp. 39S 2 , 437~462, 690-726. 
 HeTpoB'B, A. H. BTopaa Typeintaa BofiHa Bt napciBOBaHie HjyinepaTpHn,H 
 
 EKaTepHHH II. St. Petersburg, 1880. 2 vols. 
 neTpymeBCKifi, A. renepajracHMyeb kh. CyBopoBt. St. Petersburg, 1900. 
 BHiraHt, A. H. BcTopia pyccKofi 9THorpa(JHH. St. Petersburg, 1890-92. 
 
 4 vols. 
 CojioBbeBT., C. M. HcTopia Poccin ci. apeBHittniHX'B BpeMeHt. H3,n. ToBapn- 
 
 m,ecTBa " OSmeciBeHHaa nojn>3a." St. Petersburg, 1893. 6 vols. 
 ^e^yjiHHi., H. J[. BfTEnraaa noiHTHKa Poccia bi> HanajrE HapciBOBama EKaie- 
 pHHH II, 1762-1774. St. Petersburg, 1896. 
 m,e6aai.cKia, n. PyccKaa noaHTHKa bi noabmi ao EKaiepHHH II. Moscow, 
 
 1864. 

 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 569 
 
 id) Works Relating More Particularly to Prussia 
 
 Bailleu, Paul. " Der Ursprung des deutschen Flirstenbundes." In His- 
 
 torische Zeitschrift, xli (1879), pp. 410-434. 
 " Graf Hertzberg." Ibid., xlii (1879), pp. 442-490. 
 
 " Herzog Karl August, Goethe, und die ungarische Konigskrone." 
 
 In Goethe- J ahrbuch, xx (1899), pp. 144-152. 
 
 " Konig Friedrich Wilhelm II und die Genesis des Friedens von Basel." 
 
 In Historische Zeitschrift, lxxv (1895), pp. 237-275. 
 " Zur Vorgeschichte der Revolutionskriege." Ibid., lxxiv (1895), pp. 
 
 259-262. 
 Biilow, Prince Bernhard von. Imperial Germany. London, etc., 1914. 
 Damus, R. " Die Stadt Danzig gegeniiber der Politik Friedrichs des Gros- 
 
 sen und Friedrich Wilhelms II." In Zeitschrift des westpreussischen 
 
 Geschichtsvereins, Heft xx (1887). 
 Droysen, J. G. Geschichte der preussischen Politik. Leipsic, 1868-86 
 
 (partly in 2nd ed.). 5 parts in 14 vols. 
 Duncker, M. Aus der Zeit Friedrich des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelms 
 
 III. Leipsic, 1876. 
 " Friedrich Wilhelm II und Graf Hertzberg." In Historische Zeitschrift 
 
 xxxvii (1877), pp. 1-43. 
 Flammermont, Jules. Negociations secretes de Louis XVI et du baron de 
 
 Breteuil avec la cour de Berlin, decembre, ijgi-juillet, 17Q2. Paris. 
 
 1885. 
 Forster, Friedrich. Friedrich Wilhelm I, Konig von Preussen. Potsdam 
 
 1834-35. 3 vols. 
 Heidrich, Kurt. Preussen im Kampfe gegen die franzosische Revolution bis 
 
 zur zweiten Teilung Polens. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1908. 
 Hiiffer, Hermann. Die Kabinetsregierung in Preussen und Johann Wil- 
 helm Lombard. Leipsic, 1891. 
 Koser, Reinhold. Konig Friedrich der Grosse. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1893- 
 
 1903. 2 vols. 
 " Aus dem ersten Regierungsjahre Friedrich Wilhelms II." In For- 
 
 schungen zur brandenburgischen und preussichen Geschichte, iv (1891), 
 
 pp. 593-605. 
 
 " Die preussische Politik von 1786 bis 1806." In DeutscJte Monal- 
 
 schrift fur das gesamte Leben der Gegenwart, xi (:907), pp. 453-480, 612- 
 
 637- 
 Krauel, R. Graf Hertzberg als Minister Friedrich Wilhelms II. Berlin, 
 
 1899. 
 Prinz Heinrich von Preussen als Politiker. Berlin, 1902. (Quellen und 
 
 Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Houses Hohenzollern, iv.) 
 Lehmann, Max. Friedrich der Grosse und der Ursprung des siebenjahrigen 
 
 Krieges. Leipsic, 1894. 
 Luckwaldt, Friedrich. " Zur Vorgeschichte der Konvention von Reichen- 
 
 bach: Englischer Einfluss am Hofe Friedrich Wilhelms II." In 
 
 Delbr tick-Festschrift (1908), pp. 232-256.
 
 570 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Naude, Albert. " Der preussische Staatsschatz unter Konig Friedrich 
 Wilhelm II und seine Erschopfung." In Forschungen zur brandenburg' 
 ischcn und preussischen Geschichte, v (1892), pp. 203-256. 
 
 "Die brandenburg-preussische Getreidehandelspolitik von 1713-1806." 
 
 In Schmoller's Jahrbuch fiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirt- 
 schaft im Deutschen Reiche, N. F., xxix* (1905), pp. 161-190. 
 
 Philippson, Martin. Geschichte des preussischen Staatswesens vom Tode 
 Friedrichs des Grossen bis zu den Freiheitskriegen. Leipsic, 1880-82. 
 2 vols. 
 
 Reimann, Eduard. Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates vom Eu- 
 bertusburger Frieden bis zum Wiener Kongress. Gotha, 1882-88. 2 vols. 
 
 Ritter, Paul. Die Konvention von Reichenbach {27. Juli 17 go). Berlin, 1898. 
 
 Sevin, Ludwig. Das System der preussischen Geheimpolitik vom August 17 go 
 bis zum Mai 17 gi. Berlin, 1903. 
 
 Sussheim, Karl. Preussens Politik in Ansbach-Bayreuth 17 gi bis 1806. 
 Berlin, 1902. 
 
 Unzer, Adolf. Eertzbergs Anteil an den preussisch-osterreichischen Ver- 
 handlungen, 177 8-7 g. Frankfort, 1890. 
 
 Volz, G. B. " Prinz Heinrich von Preussen und die preussische Politik 
 vor der ersten Teilung Polens." In Forschungen zur brandenburgischen 
 und preussischen Geschichte, xviii (1905), pp. 1 51-201. 
 
 " Friedrich der Grosse und die erste Teilung Polens." Ibid., xxiii 
 
 (1910), pp. 71-143, 225 f. 
 
 Welschinger, Henri. La Mission secrete de Mirabeau a Berlin {1786-1787). 
 Paris, 1900. 
 
 Wittichen, F. C. " Die Politik des Graf en Hertzberg, 1785-90." In 
 Eistorische Vierteljahrschrift, ix (1906), pp. 174-204. 
 
 Preussen und England in der europdischen Politik, 1785-1788. Heidel- 
 berg, 1902. 
 
 " Zur Vorgeschichte der Revolutionskriege." In Forschungen zur 
 
 brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, xvii (1904), pp. 253-262. 
 
 Wittichen, Paul. Die polnische Politik Preussens, 1788-go. Gottingen, 
 1899. 
 
 (e) Works Relating More Particularly to Austria 
 
 Beer, Adolf. Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774. Prague, etc., 
 
 1883. 
 Genelin, Placid. Leopolds II dussere Politik. Programm, Trieste, 1883. 
 Herrmann, Ernst. " Die polnische Politik Kaiser Leopolds H." In 
 
 Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, iv (1864), pp. 385-438. 
 [Hormayr, Joseph von.] Lebensbilder aus dem Befreiungskriege. Ernst 
 
 Friedrich Graf von Miinster. 2nd ed. Jena, 1845. 3 vols. 
 Kalinka, W. " Polityka dworu austryackiego w sprawie konstytucyi 3. 
 
 maja." In Przeglad Polski, 1873 1 . 
 Krones, Franz. Ungarn unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II, 1740-17QO. 
 
 Graz, 1871. 
 Langwerth von Simmern, Baron Heinrich. Oesterreich und das deutsche 
 
 Reich im Kampfe mit der franzosischen Revolution. Berlin, 1880. 
 
 2 vols.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 57* 
 
 Sybel, Heinrich von. " Kaiser Leopold II. Gegen Ernst Herrmann." 
 In Historische Zeitschrift, x (1863), pp. 387-432. 
 
 " Noch einmal liber Leopold II gegen E. Herrmann." Ibid., xii (1864), 
 
 pp. 260-283. 
 
 Wolf, A. Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia, Josef II und Leopold II. Ber- 
 lin, 1883. 
 
 Wolfsgruber, Colestin. Franz I, Kaiser von Oesterreich. Vienna and Leip- 
 sic, 1899. 2 vols. 
 
 Zeissberg, Heinrich von. Erzherzog Carl von Oesterreich. Vienna and Leip- 
 sic, 1895. 
 
 " Erzherzog Carl von Oesterreich und Prinz Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. 
 
 Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Feldzuges in die Champagne." In 
 Archiv filr bsterreichische Geschichte, lxxiii (1888), pp. 1—77. 
 
 (J) Works Relating More Particularly to Other States 
 
 Askenazy, S. " Upadek Polski a Francya." In Biblioteka Warszawska, 
 
 1913", pp. 1-35, 209-262. 
 Aulard, A. Etudes et lecons sur la Revolution franqaise. Paris, 1893 — . 
 
 7 vols, (to 1913). 
 
 Baehrendtz, F. J. " Om Sveriges forhallande till Ryssland under Konung 
 Gustaf IV Adolfs formyndarstyrelse." In Eistoriskt Bibliotek utgif- 
 vet af Carl Silfverstolpe, vii (1880), pp. 251-286, 507-530. 
 
 Barral Montferrat, Dominique, Marquis de. Dix Ans de paix armee entre 
 la France et V Angleterre, 1783-1793. I er tome. Paris, 1893. 
 (No more published.) 
 
 Baumgarten, Hermann. Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzbsischen 
 Revolution. Berlin, 1861. 
 
 Blok, P. J. Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk. Groningen, 1892-1908. 
 
 8 vols. 
 
 Boethius, S. J. " Gustaf IV Adolfs formyndareregering och Franska Revo- 
 
 lutionen." In Historisk Tidskrift, 1888, pp. 95-130, 177-230. 
 Chuquet, A. La Campagne de VArgonne (1792). Paris, 1886. 
 Flassan, G. R., Comte de. Histoire generate et raisonnee de la diplomatic 
 
 jranqaise. 2nd ed. Paris, 181 1. 7 vols. 
 Flathe, Theodor. Die Verhandlungen iiber die dent Kurfiirsten Friedrich 
 
 August III von Sachsen angebotene Thronfolge in Polen und der sdch- 
 
 sische Geheime Legationsrath von Essen. Meissen, 1870. 
 " Die Verhandlungen iiber Sachsens Neutralitat, 1790." In Archiv 
 
 fur sdchsische Geschichte, ix (1871), pp. 165-192. 
 Geffroy, Auguste. Gustave III et la Cour de France. Paris, 1867. 2 vols. 
 Goetz-Bernstein, Hans Alfred. La Diplomatic de la Gironde. Paris, 
 
 1912. 
 Grosjean, Georges. " La Mission de Semonville a Constantinople." In 
 
 La Revolution Franqaise, xii (1887), pp. 888-921. 
 Handelsman, M. "La Constitution polonaise du 3 mai 1791 et l'opinion 
 
 francaise." Ibid., lviii (19.10), pp. 411-434. 
 Holm, Edvard. Danmark-Norges udenrigske historie under den Franske
 
 572 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Revolution og Napoleons krige fra 1791 til 1807. Copenhagen, 1875. 
 
 2 vols. 
 Jorga, Neculai. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches. Gotha, 1908-13. 5 
 
 vols. 
 Lecky, W. E. H. A History of England in the Eighteenth Century. London, 
 
 1878-90. 8 vols. 
 Lemontey, Pierre-Edouard. Essai sur V etablissement monarchique de Louis 
 
 XIV. Paris, 1818. 
 Marichalar, Amalio, Marques de Montesa, and Manrique, Cayetano. 
 
 Historia de la legislacion y recitaciones del derecho civil de Espana. 
 
 Madrid, 1861-72. 9 vols. 
 Muriel, Andres. Historia de Carlos IV. Madrid, 1893-94. 6 vols. {Me- 
 morial Historico Espanol, vols, xxix-xxxiv.) 
 Odhner, C. T. " Gustaf III och Katarina efter freden i Warala." In 
 
 Svenska Akademiens Handlingar ifrdn dr 1886, ix (1894), pp. 145-208. 
 Pella y Forgas, Joseph. Llibertats y antich govern de Catalunya. Barcelona, 
 
 1 1905- 
 Petiet, Rene. Gustave IV Adolphe et la Revolution franqaise: Relations 
 
 diplomatiques de la France et de la Suede de 1792 d 1810, d'apres des docu- 
 ments d'archives inedits. Paris, 1914. 
 Pingaud, Leonce. Choiseul-Gouffier. La France en Orient sous Louis XVI. 
 
 Paris, 1887. 
 Politz, K. H. L. Die Regierung Friedrich Augusts, Konigs von Sachsen. 
 
 Leipsic, 1830. 2 vols. 
 Rose, J. Holland. William Pitt and National Revival. London, 191 1. 
 
 William Pitt and the Great War. London, 191 1. 
 
 Salomon, Felix. Das politische System des jiingeren Pitt und die zweite Tei- 
 
 lung Polens. Berlin, 1895. 
 
 William Pitt der Jiingere. Erster Band. Leipsic, etc., 1906. 
 
 [Schinkel, B. von.] Minnen ur Sveriges nyare historia. (Samlade af B. von 
 
 Schinkel, forfattade och utgifne af C. W. Bergman.) Stockholm, 1855- 
 
 81. 12 vols. Bihang. (Utgifvet af S. J. Boethius.) 1880-83. 3 v °l s - 
 Schrepfer, Rudolf. Pfalzbayerns Politik im Revolutionszeitalter von 1789- 
 
 1793. Nuremberg, 1903. 
 Stanhope, Philip Henry Stanhope, fifth Earl of. Life of William Pitt. 
 
 London, 1861-62. 4 vols. 
 Wahrenberg, C. F. I. " Bidrag till historien om Konung Gustaf IIP sed- 
 
 naste regeringsar." In Tidskrift for Litter atur, utgifven af C. F. Berg- 
 
 stedt, 1851, pp. 321-365. 
 Zinkeisen, J. W. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa. Gotha, 
 
 1840-63. 7 vols.
 
 INDEX
 
 INDEX 
 
 Adair, Robert, 190. 
 
 Africa, 481. 
 
 Agriculture, revival of, in Poland, 60. 
 
 Akerman, town in Bessarabia, 1 20. 
 
 Alexander I, emperor of Russia (1801- 
 
 25), 512. 
 Alexander II, emperor of Russia (1855- 
 
 81), 5- 
 
 Alexis, tsar of Russia (1645-76), 32. 
 
 Alopeus, Russian envoy at Berlin, 78, 
 in, 161, 181, 234, 238, 260, 311 f., 321, 
 322, 323, 325, 347, n. 3, 355, 379, 421, 
 
 532i 534 *; 53° f- 
 
 Alsace, 159, 218, 231, 239, 340, 344, 346, 
 
 348, 415, 420, 423, 432, 435, 535, 542, 
 
 544- 
 Alvensleben, Count, Prussian minister, 
 
 189, 272 f., 337. 
 Andrusovo, Truce of (1667), 41. 
 Ankwicz, Polish deputy, 480. 
 Ansbach, Franconian margraviate, 174, 
 
 326, 328, 335 f., 338-347- 
 Anton, Prince, brother of Frederick 
 
 Augustus I, 227. 
 Aragon, 16. 
 
 Aragonese Cortes, the, 8. 
 Armed Neutrality, the, 184. 
 Armenians, 26. 
 1 Army of the Grand Hetman's Staff,' 
 
 the, 139. 
 Artois, 423. 
 
 Artois, Count of, 159, 218, 524. 
 Asia, 481. 
 
 Auckland, Lord, English statesman, 164. 
 Augustus II, king of Poland (1697-1704, 
 
 1700-33), 33, 34, 35- 
 Augustus III, king of Poland (i733 _0 3)» 
 
 21, 35, 62. 
 Austria, 5, 26, n. 1, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 47, 
 
 53, 54; alliance with Russia (1781), 
 
 64-74; attitude towards the Polish 
 
 revolution, 105-108; the Convention 
 of Reichenbach, 128-152; formation 
 of the Austro-Prussian alliance, 201- 
 216; policy of Leopold II, 217-242; 
 Francis II and the French and Polish 
 problems, 255 ff., 263-273; agrees and 
 then disagrees with Prussia, 310-347; 
 the note of Merle, 348-361; Haug- 
 witz's final negotiation at Vienna, 362- 
 376; attitude towards the Russo- 
 Prussian alliance treaty, 398-439; re- 
 marks on the relation of Austria to the 
 Polish Question, 492, 502 f. 
 Austrian Netherlands, 70, 120, 128, 129, 
 136, 148, 149, 172, 262, 267, 314, 327, 
 328, 351, 354, 362, 392, 413, 414, 432, 
 436. 
 
 Baireuth, Franconian margraviate, 174, 
 
 326, 328, 335 f., 338-347- 
 Balkan Peninsula, the, 5. 
 Bar, Confederation of, 50, 98. 
 Barere, French politician, 450. 
 Bavaria, 66, 72, 73, 174, 262, 314, 328, 
 
 344, 346, 357, 361, 366, 383, 399, 43°, 
 
 433, 435, 535- 
 Bavaria, Elector of, see Charles Theodore. 
 Bavarian Exchange, the, 72, 73, 262- 
 
 273, 3io-347, 357-375, 39i f-, 398- 
 
 422, 423, 429-436, 53 I ~534- 
 Bavarian Succession, War of the (1778- 
 
 79), 66 f., 82. 
 Belgium, 6, 73, 117, n8, 120, 262, 353, 
 
 365, 368, 380, 424, 44i, 442, 45 1 , 502. 
 Belgrade, 120, 142, 143. 
 Bender, fortress in Bessarabia, 120, 183. 
 Berg, 159, 239, 328, 335, 346, 347, 49 2 - . 
 Berlin, Treaty of (Feb. 7, 1792), 236, 241, 
 
 270, 3°5, 3°6- 
 Bernstorff, Count, Danish minister, 166, 
 199. 
 
 575
 
 576 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Bessarabia, 76, 83, 154. 
 Bezborodko, Russian minister, no, 182, 
 183, 244, 250, 251 ff., 277 ff., 280, 320, 
 
 333, 377, 380, 389, 499, 5", 528 ff. 
 
 Bielinski, Stanislas, Polish politician, 
 461, 464, 470, 479, 480. 
 
 Bischoffwerder, favorite of Frederick 
 William II of Prussia, 73, in, 117, 
 159, 161, 173-177, 181, 202, 208-214, 
 220, 228, 234, 237, 238 ff., 256, 257, 
 258, 262, 263, 264, 269, 310 ff., 323, 
 325, 339, 34o, 359, 360, 521 I-, 524, 
 
 S30, 531-534, 535- 
 Bismarck, Prince, 5. 
 Bobrzynski, Polish historian, 11. 
 Bochnia, circle in Galicia, 144. 
 Bohemia, 9, 12, 13, 16, 38, 135, 141, 
 
 142. 
 Bosnia, 144. 
 
 Bourbon, House of, 32, 106. 
 Braclaw, palatinate of, 140, 528. 
 Branicki, Polish grand hetman, 84, 85, 
 
 87, 88, 249 f., 396. 
 Breteuil, agent of Louis XVI, 232. 
 Brissot, French politician, 450. 
 Brody, town in Galicia, 144. 
 Brunswick, Charles Frederick William, 
 
 Duke of (1780-1806), 73, 143, 159, 195, 
 
 2 3°, 237, 310, 339, 355, 360, 437, 533 f. 
 Brzesc Kujawski, palatinate of, 331, 342, 
 
 n. 4. 
 Buchholtz, Prussian envoy at Warsaw, 
 
 90, 98, 99, 102, 394, 396, 457, 460, 
 
 463-478, 514, 556. 
 Buda, 302, 315, 318. 
 Biihren, Russian adventurer, 512. 
 Biilow, Prince von, 5. 
 Bukovina, 134. 
 Bulgakov, Russian envoy at Warsaw, 
 
 139, 197, 198, 245, 280, 285, 292, 293, 
 
 294, 296, 302, 395. 
 1 Burgundy, Kingdom of,' 262 f. 
 Burke, Edmund, British statesman, 55, 
 
 186, 199, 445. 
 
 ' Cabinet policy,' 504. 
 CachS, de, Austrian diplomat, 89, 106, 
 206, 413. 
 
 Caesar, Prussian charge d'affaires at 
 Vienna, 362, 373, 374, 4°°, 403, 404, 
 412, n. 2,421, 435, 547. 
 
 Carisien, Swedish diplomat, 524. 
 
 Carpathians, the, 30. 
 
 Casimir III, the Great, king of Poland 
 (i333-7o), 8. 
 
 Casimir IV, king of Poland (1444-92), 9. 
 
 Catalonia, 8. 
 
 Catherine II, empress of Russia (1762- 
 
 96), 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 42, 43, 44, 66; 
 her Polish policy and the First Parti- 
 tion, 45-55; policy towards Poland 
 after the First Partition, 64-67, 509 f.; 
 relations with Prussia and Austria, 67- 
 74; journey to the Crimea, 74; proj- 
 ect of a Russo-Polish alliance, 82-91, 
 93, 102, 510 f.; denounced in the Pol- 
 ish diet, 99, 109; announces that she 
 will withdraw her troops from Poland, 
 100; letter to Potemkin, 107 f.; her 
 ' pretended dignity,' 109; absorbed in 
 the Swedish war, 138; grudgingly sup- 
 ports Potemkin's schemes, 139 f., 
 245 ff., 512-515; her diplomatic vic- 
 tory over the Triple Alliance, 153- 
 191; opposed to the Constitution of 
 the Third of May, 206 ff., 214, 243; 
 feigned zeal for the French enterprise, 
 217, 219, 235, 248; reconciled with 
 Prussia, 233 f.; note to Zubov, 237, 
 5255.; turns her attention to Poland, 
 244, 247-261, 274-309; agrees with 
 Prussia upon the Second Partition, 
 377-397; keeps Austria from sharing 
 in the Partition, 426 f., 438 f., 553 f.; 
 extorts the consent of the Republic to 
 its dismemberment, 454-483, 552-556; 
 general remarks upon her policy, 497- 
 502. 
 
 CernySev, Count, Russian statesman, 51. 
 
 Champagne, 349, 371. 
 
 Charlemagne, 41, 143. 
 
 Charles X Gustavus, king of Sweden 
 (1654-60), 32. 
 
 Charles XII, king of Sweden (1697- 
 1718), 33, 35. 
 
 Charles of Saxony, Prince, 36, n. 2.
 
 INDEX 
 
 S77 
 
 Charles Augustus.duke (later grand duke) 
 of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach (1775-1828), 
 
 143- 
 Charles Theodore, elector of Bavaria 
 (1777-99), iS9» I 74, 262 f., 315, 316, 
 3*7, 33i» 335, 359, 360, 366, 402, 432, 
 
 433- 
 Chmielnicki, Bogdan, Cossack hetman, 
 
 87. 
 Choczim, town in Bessarabia, 140, 386, 
 
 39°- 
 
 Choiseul, French statesman, 38, 45, 47. 
 
 Chreptowicz, Polish minister, 292, 293. 
 
 Cities, decline of, in Poland, 14 f. 
 
 Clergy, the, in Poland, 15. 
 
 Clovis, 41. 
 
 Coalition, the First, against France, 4, 
 72, 337, 425, 427,428. 
 
 Cobenzl, Count Louis, Austrian ambassa- 
 dor at St. Petersburg, 68, 79, 80, 81, 
 106, 107, 108, 109, no, 137, 138, 140, 
 182, 206 ff., 214, 223 ff., 253 f., 266, 
 303 f., 307, 319 (., 333 ff., 339, 341, 
 37i (-, 373, 375, 377, 378, 383, 388, 
 398, 401, 404, 407, 409, 412, 420, 426 f., 
 428, 439, 531 L, 539, 540, 550. 
 
 Cobenzl, Count Philip, Austrian vice- 
 chancellor, 7 2 f., 1 73, 176, 21 1, 255, 262, 
 318 ff., 322, 328, 329, 332, 341, 343- 
 347, 369 ff., 374, 398-406, 531 f., 538 f. 
 542, 543, 547, 550. 
 
 Coblenz, 229, 360. 
 
 Colloredo family, the, 401. 
 
 Colloredo, Prince, chancellor of the Em- 
 pire, 399. 
 
 Colloredo-Wallsee, Count, Austrian gen- 
 eral and conference minister, 255, n. 
 
 1, 328, 343- 
 Cologne, 360. 
 Committee of Public Safety, First, in 
 
 France, 451 f. 
 Committee of Public Safety, Second, in 
 
 France, 452 f. 
 Condillac, French philosopher, 61. 
 Condorcet, French philosopher, 55. 
 ' Confederations,' 10, 12, 13, 21 f., 24. 
 Consenvoye, 349, 355, 382, 408, 544, 
 
 549- 
 
 Constantine, grandson of Catherine II, 
 
 154, 293, 294. 
 Constitutional party, the, 454. 
 Convention, the, in France, 448, 450. 
 Cossacks, 31, 86 f., 138 f., 191, 298, 449, 
 
 474, 478, 516. 
 Council of the Empire, the, in Russia, 
 
 277, 279. 
 Counter-Reformation, the, 24. 
 Courland, 25, n. 1, 44, 85, 126, 313, 318, 
 
 386, 387, 391, 466, 492, 512 f., 515. 
 Cracow, 13, 32, 391, 399, 480, 554. 
 Crimea, the, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 120, 153, 
 
 449, 45°, 5*3- 
 
 Croatia, Turkish, 142, 144, 145. 
 
 Custine, French general, 349. 
 
 Czarniecki, Stefan, Polish general, 25. 
 
 Czartoryski, Prince Adam Casimir, Pol- 
 ish reformer, 97, 103, n. 1, 221, 288. 
 
 Czartoryskis, Polish noble family, 28, 
 48, 49, 62. 
 
 Czgstochowa, town, 349, 352, 391, 407, 
 
 409, 549, 554- 
 
 ' Dacia, Kingdom of,' 69, 85, 138, 139, 
 
 487, 5i3- 
 
 Dacia, proposed principality of, 154. 
 
 Danton, French revolutionist, 451 f. 
 
 Dantzic, Polish city, 65, 66, 67, 77, 86, 
 113, 123, 124, 125, 132, 134, 145, 146, 
 151, 154, 161, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, 
 174, 176, 179, 205, 252, 263, 318, 342, 
 n- 4, 39 1 , 394, 445, 488, 49 2 , 49 6 - 
 
 Danubian Principalities, the, 120. 
 
 Denmark, 90, 94, 114, 157, 162, 166. 
 
 Descorches, French diplomat, 449 f., 452. 
 
 Dietines, the, 17 ff. 
 
 Diez, Prussian envoy at Constantinople, 
 77, 119, 120. 
 
 Dissidents, the, in Poland, 42 f ., 49 f ., 488. 
 
 Dolgoruki, Prince, Russian diplomat, 34. 
 
 Druja, town, 390. 
 
 Drunkenness, 63. 
 
 Dubienka, battle of (1792), 290, 291. 
 
 ' Dumb Diet,' the (17 17), 34. 
 
 ' Dumb Session,' the, 479, 480. 
 
 Dumouriez, French minister and general, 
 348, 441, 447, 449, 45°, 45*-
 
 578 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Eastern Church, the, 26. 
 
 Eastern Question, the, 3, 163. 
 
 East Prussia, 5, 40, 44, 65, 143, 314, 387. 
 
 Eden, Sir Morton, British ambassador 
 at Vienna, 413, 442. 
 
 Edenkoben, village in the Lower Palati- 
 nate, 435. 
 
 Education Commission, the, 59. 
 
 Egypt, 481. 
 
 Elgin, Lord, British diplomat, 172, 188, 
 209, 521. 
 
 Elizabeth, empress of Russia (1741-62), 
 36, 40. 
 
 England, 15, 75, 78, 90, 94, 107, 108, 114, 
 116, 118, 119, 121, 130 ff., 134, 141, 
 146, 147, 148, 209, 210, 232, 268, 351, 
 365, 375, 42i, 425, S°2, 503; diplo- 
 matic defeat of, by Russia, 153-191, 
 310; relations to the Bavarian Ex- 
 change project, 327, 328, 329, 331, 336, 
 352, 367, 368, 369 f., 401, 402, 415 f., 
 420, 430, 432-436; relations to the 
 Second Partition, 384, 388, 412, 413 f., 
 419, 422 f., 428, 440-445; relations to 
 the First Coalition and the French 
 Revolution, 431, 432. 
 
 Enlightenment, the, 61, 62. 
 
 Ermeland, see Warmia. 
 
 Essen, Saxon diplomat, 220. 
 
 Eternal Alliance, the (1773), 166. 
 
 Eternal Peace, the (1686), 42. 
 
 Ewart, British envoy at Berlin, 164, 
 187 f., 189, 202, 209, 521. 
 
 Favier, French writer, 446, 447. 
 Fawkener, British diplomat, 188, 189 f. 
 February alliance, see Berlin, Treaty of. 
 Federative System, the, 94, 115, 116, 126, 
 
 203; downfall of, 158-191, 445. 
 Finckenstein, Prussian minister, 189, 337. 
 Finland, 449. 
 
 First Great Northern War, the, 32, 33. 
 Flanders, French, 329, 420. 
 Floridablanca, Spanish minister, 166. 
 Foc§ani, battle of (1789), 120. 
 Four Years' Diet, the (1788-92), 56, 59, 
 
 60, 62, 95-109, 192-216, 280, 283-286, 
 
 485, 486, 487 ff., 491. 
 
 Fox, Charles James, British statesman, 
 185, 190, 441. 
 
 France, 4, 5, 26, n. 1, 35, 37 f., 40, 43, 44, 
 50, 61, 70, 106, 115, 158, 159, 160, 165, 
 166, 167, 174, 185, 212, 217 ff., 228 f., 
 313, 348 f., 430; declares war on 
 Austria, 266; attitude towards the 
 Second Partition, 446-453, 502 f. 
 
 Francis II, Holy Roman emperor (1792- 
 1806), emperor of Austria (1804-35), 
 255 f-, 303, 3i3, 315-320, 326-347, 352, 
 356, 357, 360, 362-373, 392, 401 f., 
 404 ff., 408, 410-414, 416, 418-439, 
 546-550. 
 
 Frankfort, 348, 349; imperial coronation 
 
 at (1792), 3 J 7, 3 2 4-327, 329- 
 Frederick I, king of Prussia (1701-13), 
 
 35- 
 Frederick II, ' the Great,' king of Prussia 
 (1740-86), 32, 40, 45, 47, 52, 53, 55, 65, 
 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 76, 119, 143, 314, 
 
 33o, 349, 496. 
 
 Frederick Augustus I, ' the Just,' elector 
 (later king) of Saxony (1763-1827), 
 116, 126, 195, 199, 202, 203, 206, 210, 
 218, 219, 220-223, 225-228, 234, 241, 
 257, 288, 489, 523, 525. 
 
 Frederick William, elector of Branden- 
 burg (1640-88), 32, 40. 
 
 Frederick William II, king of Prussia 
 (1786-97), 73, 76, 86, 94, 98, 107, 109, 
 "7-I5I, 154, i55f-, 157-162, 169, 
 173 ff., 177-182, 188 f., 202 f., 205, 
 209 f., 212, 214 f., 217-225, 230-239, 
 251 f., 256-261, 263 ff., 268-273, 279, 
 286 ff., 303, 305 f., 310-345, 348-396, 
 399, 400, 404, 408 f., 416 ff., 420 ff., 
 424 f., 427-431, 433-438, 442, 445, 447, 
 449, 45 1 , 453, 47*, 475, 477, 49 2 -495, 
 497 ff., 519 ff., 530 f., 532-537, 54i I; 
 
 544-551- 
 Freemasonry, spread of, in Poland, 61. 
 
 French Revolution, the, 160, 216, 266, 
 348 f . ; relation of, to the Polish Ques- 
 tion, 217-242, 446-453, 502 f. 
 
 Furslenbund, the, 71, 94, 114, 143. 
 
 Galatz, Preliminaries of (1791), 190.
 
 INDEX 
 
 579 
 
 Galezowski, Polish deputy, 468. 
 
 Galicia, 54, 66, 67, 76, 77, "7, "8, 120, 
 122, 123, 134, i37, 140, 142, 144, i4S, 
 146, 150, 151, 226, 320, 385, 407, 4ii, 
 420, 554- 
 
 Gambling, 63. 
 
 < Gegu,' 156. 
 
 Generality, the, of the Confederation, 
 
 394-397, 457- 
 George I, king of England (1714-27), 43. 
 George III, king of England (1760-1820), 
 
 107. 
 Germanic Empire, the, 351, 356, 381, 
 
 402, 431. 
 Germanization, policy of, 5. 
 Germans, 14, 26. 
 Germany, 4, 28, 43, 65, 174, 33°, 380, 
 
 420. 
 Girondists, the, 281, 447, 448, 449, 45*- 
 Giurgevo, town in Wallachia, 144. 
 Gnesen, city in Poland, 391, 495- 
 Gnesen, palatinate of, 331, 342, n. 4. 
 Gortz, Prussian diplomat, 67. 
 Goethe, 143. 
 Golitsyn, Russian ambassador at Vienna, 
 
 253, 257, 266. 
 Goltz, Count, Prussian envoy at St. 
 
 Petersburg, 181 f., 232, 234, 237, 253, 
 
 254, 258, 259, 260, 300, 303 f., 306, 307, 
 308, 311, 324, 334, 340 ff-, 354 f-, 375, 
 378, 379 f-, 382 f., 385, 386-389, 4i9, 
 420, 499, 525 ff., 530, 534, 55i- 
 
 Goltz, Count, Prussian envoy at War- 
 saw, 168 f., 202. 
 
 Grand Duke, the, see Paul I. 
 
 Great Diet, the, see Four Years' Diet. 
 
 Great Elector, the, see Frederick Wil- 
 liam, elector of Brandenburg. 
 
 Great Poland, 32, 40, 65, 66, 67, 113, 134, 
 146, 260, 393, 431, 488, 492, 49 6 - 
 
 ' Greek project,' the, 69 f., 72, 5 10 , 5*3- 
 
 Grenville, Lord, British minister, 187, 
 188, 401, 442, 443, 444, 521. 
 
 Grimm, Friedrich Melchior, Baron, man 
 of letters, 168, 190, 244, 380. 
 
 Grodno, Diet of (1793), 394, 413, 426, 
 427, 428, 434, 436, 437, 444, 454"483, 
 552-556. 
 
 Gustavus III, king of Sweden (1771-92), 
 90, 119, 138, 144, 155, l6 6 f., 178, 183, 
 195, 217, 243, 310, 448. 
 
 Hailes, British envoy at Warsaw, 116, 
 170 f. 
 
 Hainault, 159, 329. 
 
 Halicz, district in Galicia, 134. 
 
 Hapsburg, House of, 13, 32, 37, 38. 
 
 Hartig, Austrian diplomat, 206. 
 
 Haugwitz, Count, Prussian minister, 
 301 ff., 325, 326, 330, 335, 338 ff., 342, 
 344, 345, 347, 348-356, 358-361, 367, 
 369-376, 407-410, 540-551. 
 
 Henry, prince of Prussia, brother of 
 Frederick the Great, 52, 73, 162. 
 
 Herault, French revolutionist, 450. 
 
 Hermitage, the, 382. 
 
 Hertzberg, Count, Prussian minister, 
 66 L, 70, 76-81, 84, 85, 90, 105, 109, 
 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124 f., 
 126, 132, 133, 141, 142, 144, i45, 146, 
 150, 151, 155, 160, 161, 162, 168, 173, 
 179, 189, 199, 314, 492, 496; his 
 'grand plan,' 66 f., 76-81, 132-148; 
 his hypothetical ' Anschlag auf Gross- 
 Polen,' 517 ff. 
 
 Hochheim, 330. 
 
 Hochkirch, battle of (1758), 143- 
 
 Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, 159, 160, 
 
 524- 
 
 Hohenlohe (Kirchberg), Imperial gener- 
 al, 353- 
 
 Hohenzollerns, the, 4, 39 f., 65. 
 
 Holland, 78, 94, 114, "5, 13°, 148, 173, 
 352, 442, 45i, 502. 
 
 Holstein, 90. 
 
 Holy Roman Empire, see Germanic Em- 
 pire. 
 
 Hiiffer, Hermann, German historian, 430. 
 
 Humanism, influence of, upon Polish 
 thought, 24. 
 
 Hundred Years' War, the, between Po- 
 land and the Teutonic Order, 8. 
 
 Hungary, 9, 12, 13, 38, 117, 118, 120. 
 
 Igelstrom, Russian general, 395, 45 8 , 
 
 462, 526 f. 
 Imperative mandate, the, 19 f.
 
 5 8o 
 
 INDEX 
 
 India, 481. 
 
 ' Infanta of Poland,' the, 200, 205, 213, 
 
 30 6 . 523- 
 Inowroclaw, palatinate of, 331, 342, n. 4. 
 International morality, at its lowest ebb 
 
 in the eighteenth century, 503. 
 Italy, 5, 28, 128, 209. 
 Ivan III, ' the Great,' grand duke of 
 
 Moscow (1462-1505), 41. 
 
 Jablonowski, Polish diplomat, 203. 
 Jacobi, Prussian envoy at Vienna, then 
 
 at London, 146, 256, 257, 264, 270, 
 
 272, 301 ff., 369 f. 
 Jacobins, 158, 166, 326, 351, 382, 423, 
 
 447, 45°- 
 
 Jagellonian dynasty, the, 9 f., 18. 
 
 Jassy, city in Moldavia. 138, 249, 250, 
 277, 283. 
 
 Jassy, Peace of (1792), 190. 
 
 Jemappes, battle of (1792), 3 02 , 3^4- 
 
 Jenkinson, English politician, 445. 
 
 Jesuits, the, 24, 59. 
 
 Jewish money-lenders, 15. 
 
 Jews, 14, 26, 488. 
 
 John II Casimir, king of Poland (1648- 
 68), 24, 31, 33, 296. 
 
 John III Sobieski, king of Poland (1674- 
 96), 25, 32. 
 
 Joseph II, Holy Roman emperor (1765- 
 90), 32, 45, 60, 66, 68. 71, 72, 73, 74, 
 79, 108, 114, 117, 125, 128, 256, 261, 
 262, 308, 331, 333, 503. 
 
 Juliers, 159, 239, 328, 335, 346, 347, 49 2 - 
 
 July Convention, see Vienna, Prelimi- 
 nary Convention of. 
 
 Kakhovski, Russian general, 276 f., 
 
 289 f., 292, 293. 
 Kalckreuth, Prussian general, 143. 
 Kalisz, city in Poland, 391. 
 Kalisz, palatinate of, 77, 331, 342, n. 4. 
 Kamieniec, Polish fortress, 30, 399, 420. 
 Kanev, town on the Dnieper, 74, 83, 85, 
 
 5", 5i5- 
 Karski, Polish deputy, 468 f. 
 
 Kaschau, Privilege of (1374), 9- 
 Kaunitz, Prince, Austrian statesman, 45, 
 65, 68, 72, 74, 79, 81, 89, 105, 106, 123, 
 
 128, 131, 136, 141, 149, 160, i6r, 175, 
 177, 204-209, 211 f., 219, 222-226, 
 228 ff., 234, 236, 239, 248, 255, 256, 
 265 f., 268, 280, 300-304, 312, 315- 
 318, 325, 343, 403, 406, 525, 532. 
 
 Kayserlingk, Russian diplomat, 54. 
 
 Kiev, city in Russia, 154, 168, 183. 
 
 Kiev, palatinate of, in Poland, 140, 514, 
 S28. 
 
 Kimbar, Polish deputy, 469. 
 
 Kollataj, Hugo, Polish reformer, 97, 193, 
 
 295- 
 Konarski, Stanislas, Polish liberal, 61. 
 Korzon Polish historian, 59 f. 
 Kosciuszko, Tadeusz, Polish patriot and 
 
 general, 56, 289 ff., 450, 483, 491. 
 Kossakowski, bishop of Livonia, 461, 
 
 466, 470, 472, 555. 
 Kossakowski, Polish hetman, 461. 
 Kossakowskis, Polish family, 462 f., 465, 
 
 468. 
 Kostomarov, Russian historian, 501. 
 Krecetnikov, Russian general, 276 f. 
 Kunersdorf, battle of (1759), 143. 
 Kurow, town on the Vistula, 290. 
 
 Lacy, Count Franz Moritz von, Austrian 
 field marshal, 255, n. 1, 328, 329, 343, 
 
 344, 398, 399- 
 
 Landriani, Chevalier, Austrian diplomat, 
 225-228, 241, 265 f., 283, 525. 
 
 Laudon, Baron von, Austrian field mar- 
 shal, 142 f. 
 
 ' League of the North,' the, 453. 
 
 Lebrun, French minister, 448 ff., 452. 
 
 Leeds, 186. 
 
 Leeds, Duke of, British minister, 165, 
 187, 188. 
 
 Lehrbach, Count, Austrian diplomat, 
 262 f., 317, 429-438- 
 
 Leipsic, 297, 450. 
 
 Leopold II, Holy Roman emperor (1790- 
 92), 128-152, 203-211, 217-242, 261, 
 306, 308, 312, 319, 489, 49i, 493- 494, 
 502 f., 524 f. 
 
 Lessart, de, French minister, 530. 
 
 Liberum Veto, the, 7, 20 f., 24, 61, 62, 
 199, 464, 482.
 
 INDEX 
 
 5 8l 
 
 Lithuania, 29, n. 1, 32, 276, 289, 290, 
 292, 462, 463, 465, 466, 475, 528. 
 
 Lithuanians, 26, 466, 555. 
 
 Little Russia, 138. 
 
 Little Russians, 26. 
 
 Livonia, 52, 178, 179, 183. 
 
 Lobarzewski, Polish deputy, 468, 469, 
 470. 
 
 Locke, John, English philosopher, 61. 
 
 Longuyon, town in France, 355. 
 
 Longwy, 349, 353. 
 
 Lorraine, 239, 348, 415, 420, 423, 432, 
 
 435. 535, 542, 544- 
 Louis XIV, king of France (1643-17 15), 
 
 37, 46, 153, 5°3- 
 Louis XV, king of France (1715-74), 38. 
 Louis XVI, king of France (1774-92), 
 
 218 f., 228, 229, 231, 232, 239 f., 317. 
 Louis of Anjou, king of Poland (1370- 
 
 82), 9. 
 Louis, Prince, son of Frederick William 
 
 II, 195- 
 
 Lower classes, degradation of the, in 
 Poland, 63. 
 
 Lower Palatinate, the, 360. 
 
 Lublin, 290. 
 
 Lucchesini, Marquis, Prussian diplomat, 
 envoy at Warsaw, 99 f., 102, 103, 105, 
 116, 117 f., 121, 122, 124, 126, 128, 
 146, 152, 160, 168, 227, 233, 286, 347, 
 n- 3, 353 i-, 368, 376, 409, 416, 417 ff-, 
 424, 425, 429, 432-437. 
 
 Lusatia, 174, 212, 326, 339, 344, 492. 
 
 Luxemburg, 348, 349 f., 360, 362, 375, 
 409,417, 542, 549- 
 
 Mably, French publicist, 55. 
 Matin, battle of (1791), 246. 
 Mainz, 326, 328, 329 ff., 332, 341, 342, 
 
 349, 409, 4io- 
 Malachowski, Stanislas, marshal of the 
 Confederation for the Crown, 97, 196, 
 
 295, 297- 
 Mamonov, Russian favorite, 109. 
 Manchester, 186. 
 Mannheim, fortress, 360. 
 Manstein, Prussian general, 237, 353, 
 
 437- 
 
 Manufactures, development of, in Po- 
 land, 60. 
 
 Marcolini, favorite of Frederick Augus- 
 tus I, 225. 
 
 Marengo, battle of (1800), 405. 
 
 Marie Antoinette, queen of France, 211, 
 228. 
 
 Maritime Powers, the, 316, 441. 
 
 Markov, Russian general, 290. 
 
 Markov, Russian minister, 252, 277, 304, 
 321, 333, 377, 389, 420, 429 f., 439. 
 
 Matuszewicz, Polish reformer, 198. 
 
 Mazarin, 37, 446. 
 
 Mazovia, district in Poland, 342, 463. 
 
 Mensikov, Russian statesman, 512. 
 
 Mercy, Count, Austrian minister and 
 diplomat, 232, 355, 358, 413, 423, 
 
 439- 
 Merle, Note of (Oct. 25, 1792), 337, 348- 
 
 361, 363 f., 367 f., 382, 383, 408, 409, 
 
 417,419. 
 Middle class, decline of the, in Poland, 
 
 14 f. 
 Mikorski, Polish deputy, 469. 
 Middleton, 199. 
 Milan, 210. 
 Mirabeau, 77, 166. 
 Model Parliament, the (1493), 17. 
 M Ollendorff, Prussian general, 143, 179, 
 
 394, 472, 475- 
 Mohilev, palatinate (later, government) 
 
 of, 54, 140. 
 Moldavia, 76, 83, 139, 154, 246, 247, 276, 
 
 279, 387- 
 Montmorin, French minister, 166. 
 Morals, deterioration of, in consequence 
 
 of the new culture, 61, 63. 
 Moravia, 13, 135, 142. 
 Murray, Sir James, British diplomat, 
 
 442, 443- 
 Muscovites, 9, 14, 31, 33. 
 
 Napoleon, 289. 
 
 Napoleon III, emperor of the French 
 
 (1852-70), 5. 
 Naruszewicz, Polish historian, n. 
 Nassau, Prince of, agent of Catherine II, 
 
 323, 325, 535, 530-
 
 582 
 
 INDEX 
 
 National Assembly, the, in France, 166, 
 
 218, 229, 244. 
 Neerwinden, battle of (1793), 405, 451. 
 Netherlands, see Austrian Netherlands, 
 
 Belgium, Holland. 
 New Russia, 513 f. 
 Nieszawa, Statutes of (1454), 9, 17. 
 Nihil Novi, Polish statute (1505), 9, 13, 
 
 18. 
 Nootka Sound controversy, the, 141, 164. 
 Norwich, 186. 
 Nuncios, Chamber of. 18. 
 
 Oczakow, fortress at the mouth of the 
 Dnieper, 76, 109; diplomatic contest 
 
 over, 153-19 1 . 44o, 44i- 
 
 Oginski, Count, Polish nobleman, 103, 
 n. 1, 170. 
 
 Oriental war, the, 74, 75, 78, 83, 100, 107, 
 no, 120, 129, 138, 153-190. 5"- 
 
 Orsova, town on the Danube, 142, 148. 
 
 Ostermann, Russian vice-chancellor, 76, 
 81, 109, no, 157, 208, 253, 257, 304, 
 306, 320, 322, 324, 334, 341, 355, 374, 
 380, 382, 383, 385, 386, 388, 389, 400, 
 425, 428, 429, 519 f., 534 f., 536 f. 
 
 Ostrowski, Polish patriot, 295 f. 
 
 Ozarowski, Polish politician, 451. 
 
 Padua, Circular of (July 6, 1791), 217. 
 Panin, Russian statesman, 47, 50, 52, 
 
 510. 
 Parandier, French agent, 450. 
 ' Parasites,' the, 95, 124. 
 ' Paris, the promenade to,' 325. 
 Particularist spirit, the, in Poland, 16. 
 Partition of 1772 (the First Partition), 
 
 3, 49, 51-55, 337, 379, 39*, 459, 484, 
 
 485, 492, 497, 498, 504. 
 Partition of 1793 (the Second Partition), 
 
 3, 140, 216, 263, 310-505, 534-556. 
 Partition of 1795 (the Third Partition), 
 
 3, 439, 483, 484- 
 
 Partition of 181 5 (the Fourth Partition), 
 
 4, n. 1. 
 
 Passarowitz, Peace of (1718), 129, 134, 
 
 142, 144. 
 Patkul, Russian envoy, 44, n. 1. 
 
 'Patriots,' the, 71, 92-100, 112 ff., 151, 
 
 170 f., 194, 196, 204, 297, 393, 450, 
 
 487, 490, 491. 
 Paul I, emperor of Russia (1 796-1801), 
 
 109, 234, 512. 
 Permanent Council, the, 58, 99, 102 f.; 
 
 abolished, 100, 104, 108; restored, 
 
 457 i- 
 
 Peter I, ' the Great,' tsar of Russia 
 (1682-1725), 33 f., 35, 36, 43, 44, 45. 
 
 Philip II, king of Spain (1556-98), 296. 
 
 Piasts, Polish dynasty, 8, 16. 
 
 Piattoli, Italian adventurer, 195, 196. 
 
 Picardy, 423. 
 
 Pillnitz, 218, 219, 220, 525. 
 
 Pinsk, town in Poland, 386. 390. 
 
 Piotrkow, town, 342; Diet at (1493), 17. 
 
 Pistor, Russian general, 276 f. 
 
 Pitt, William, the younger, English 
 statesman, 75, 78, 114, 116, 130, 131; 
 his unsuccessful diplomatic contest 
 with Catherine II, 153-191, 197, 209, 
 365, 449, 502; his attitude towards 
 the Second Partition, 440-445. 
 
 Plock, palatinate of, 463, 476. 
 
 Pocutia, district in Galicia, 134. 
 
 Podhorski, Polish deputy, 476. 
 
 Podolia, palatinate of, 140, 249, 528. 
 
 Poland, Kingdom of (Russian), 4, n. 1, 6. 
 
 Polangen, district in Poland, 387, 389. 
 
 Polish Question, the, general discussion 
 
 of, 3-7, 484-505- 
 Polish-Saxon Question, the, 4, 200, 203, 
 206, 207, 208, 210, 213, 214, 219 ff., 
 225-228, 234 f., 241, 257, 288, 489, 
 
 523, 525- 
 
 Polish Succession, War of the (1733-38), 
 449. 
 
 Polotsk, palatinate of, 54. 
 
 Poltava, battle of (1709), 33, 162. 
 
 Pomerania, 40, 315, 449, 492. 
 
 Poniatowski, Prince Joseph, Polish gen- 
 eral, 289 f., 292 f. 
 
 Poniatowski, Michael George, primate 
 of Poland, 295. 
 
 Poniatowski, Stanislas, see Stanislas II 
 Augustus. 
 
 Popov, Russian minister, 252, 275, 321.
 
 INDEX 
 
 583 
 
 Portugal, 502. 
 
 Posen, city in Poland, 391, 495. 
 
 Posen, palatinate of, 77, 331, 342, n. 4. 
 
 Potemkin, Russian statesman and gen- 
 eral, 67, 68, 69, 84-87, 105, 107, 109, 
 no f., 138-141, 154. 155, 180-183, 207, 
 245 ff., 249, 250, 252, 275, 278, 390 f., 
 487, 498, 510, 5". 512-516, 527 f. 
 
 Potocki, Felix, Polish magnate, 84, 85, 
 87, 88, 245, 246, 249, 274, 385, 395, 
 
 396, 527 i. 
 Potocki, Ignacy, Polish reformer, 97, 
 103, n. 1, 195, 196, 198, 284, 287, 288, 
 
 293> 2 95, 296. 
 
 Potocki, Stanislas, Polish orator, 97. 
 
 Potockis, Polish family, 28, 292. 
 
 Prague, 13; coronation at (1792), 332. 
 
 Protestant party, reform program of, 18. 
 
 Protestants, 26, 493. 
 
 Prussia, 4, 34, 37, 43, 46, 53, 54, 60; 
 designs of, in 1787-88, 75-81; atti- 
 tude towards the plan of a Russo- 
 Polish alliance, 89-91; woos Poland, 
 99-105; the Prusso-Polish alliance, 
 1 1 2-1 27; the Convention of Reichen- 
 bach, 128-152; as a member of the 
 Triple Alliance, 1 53-191 ; formation of 
 the Austro-Prussian alliance, 201-216; 
 hopes for a partition of Poland, 237- 
 240; negotiations with Austria and 
 Russia, 257-273; agrees and then dis- 
 agrees with Austria, 310-347; the 
 note of Merle, 348-361; Haugwitz's 
 final negotiation at Vienna, 362-376; 
 the Russo-Prussian partition treaty, 
 377-397; consummation of the parti- 
 tion, 454-483; remarks on the relation 
 of Prussia to the fall of Poland, 484, 
 487, 488, 489, 492-497; Prussian pol- 
 icy one of territorial aggrandizement, 
 492-496. 
 
 Pugacev, Russian pretender, 449. 
 
 Pulaski, Polish politician, 461. 
 
 Quadruple Alliance, the, 165 f. 
 
 Radom, Confederation of (1767), 50, 86. 
 Radziwill Palace, club of the, 95, 193. 
 
 Radziwills, Polish family, 28, 476, n. 3. 
 
 Ratisbon, Diet of, 356. 
 
 Rautenfeld, Russian general, 476, 479. 
 
 Rawa, town, 342, 349, 391, 409, 549. 
 
 Raynal, French philosopher, 55. 
 
 Razumovski, Russian ambassador at 
 Vienna, 263 f., 269, 318-323, 367, 374, 
 379, 4°o, 401, 403, 404, 412, n. 2, 413, 
 414, 421, 425, 433, 532, 537-540, 547- 
 
 Reichenbach, Convention of (1790), 137- 
 152. 
 
 Repnin, Prince, Russian general and 
 diplomat, 52, 98, 237, 246, 526. 
 
 ' Republicans,' the, 96, 204. 
 
 Reuss, Prince, Austrian envoy at Berlin, 
 73, 144, 148, 159, 160, 176, 223, 229, 
 236, 269 f., 271, 272, 303, 310, 312-315, 
 
 325, 334, 335, 339 f-, 344, 347, 360, 366, 
 
 368, 412, 416, 417, 418, 437, 530. 
 Richelieu, 37, 446. 
 Richmond, Duke of, British minister, 
 
 187. 
 Riga, town in Livonia, 179. 
 Rimnic, battle of (1789), 120. 
 Robespierre, French revolutionist, 450, 
 
 452 f. 
 Roll, Baron, agent of the Count of Artois, 
 
 159- 
 Roman Catholics, 26. 
 Rosenberg, Prince, Austrian conference 
 
 minister, 255, n. 1, 328, 329, 343, 344, 
 
 346- 
 
 Rosicrucian Society, the, 301, n. 3. 
 
 Rousseau, 55, 61. 
 
 Royalists, Polish party, 96, 97. 
 
 Rumiantsov, 309. 
 
 Rurik, legendary Russian prince, 41. 
 
 Russia, 4, 5, 12, 25, n. 1, 26, n. 1, 33, 
 62; relations with Poland after the 
 First Partition, 57-62; alliance with 
 Austria (1781), 64-74; pl an f° r a 
 Russo-Polish alliance, 82-91, 510 f.; 
 her rule in Poland overthrown, 92-1 n; 
 diplomatic contest with the Triple 
 Alliance, 153-191; prepares to attack 
 Poland, 243-282; reconquers Poland, 
 283-309; the Russo-Prussian parti- 
 tion treaty, 377-397; consummation
 
 5§4 
 
 INDEX 
 
 of the partition, 454-483; general re- 
 marks on the relation of Russia to the 
 fall of Poland, 484, 485, 486, 487, 489, 
 491, 492, 497-502, 504. 
 
 Russification, policy of, 6. 
 
 Rzeszow, circle in Galicia, 144. 
 
 Rzewuski, Seweryn, Polish malcontent, 
 249, 395, 390- 
 
 St. Petersburg, Convention of (Jan. 23, 
 
 1793), 377-453, 47o, 472. 
 
 Saldern, Russian diplomat, 98. 
 
 Samogitia, 32, 92. 
 
 Sapieha, Prince, marshal of the Confed- 
 eration for Lithuania, 9 7 , n. 1 , 103 , n. 1 . 
 
 Sardinia, 70, 322. 
 
 Saxon Kings, the, 25, 33, 61. 
 
 Saxony, 40, 117, 174, 205, 206, 207, 208, 
 220, 226, 227, 228, 242, 256, 285, 455. 
 
 Saxony, Elector of, see Frederick Augus- 
 tus I. 
 
 Schonbrunn, 344. 
 
 Schonwalde, town in Silesia, 144, 146. 
 
 Schulenburg, Count, Prussian minister, 
 179, 189, 233, 234, 237, 259, 260, 271, 
 273, 287, 310-315, 318, 321, 322-325, 
 329 ff., 335-342, 353, 409, 411, 532, 
 
 534, 535 ff-, 542, 545- 
 Second Great Northern War, the, 33. 
 Semonville, French diplomat, 447. 
 Senate, the, 18, 200, 464. 
 Seven Years' War, the, 38, 40, 44, 71. 
 Siberia, 456, 469. 
 Sicinski, Polish deputy, 20. 
 Sieradz, city in Poland, 391. 
 Sieradz, palatinate of, 331, 342, n. 4. 
 Sievers, Baron, Russian ambassador to 
 
 Poland, 395, 396, 426, 455-482, 498, 
 
 552-556- 
 Sieyes, French statesman, 193. 
 Sigismund II, king of Poland (1548-72), 
 
 18. 
 Silesia, 5, 40, 65, 118, 123, 135, 141, 142, 
 
 143, 159, 3*4, 342, 537- 
 Simolin, Russian diplomat, 263, 531, 532. 
 Sistova, Congress of (1790-91), 160, 168, 
 
 209, 215. 
 Smila, estate in Poland, 514, 515. 
 
 Sodermanland, Duke of, regent of Swe- 
 den, 448, 452. 
 
 Soldau, town, 342, 349, 391, 409, 549. 
 
 Spain, 70, 106, 141, 164, 166. 
 
 Spielmann, Austrian minister, 73, 136, 
 141, 142, 144 f., 148, 149, 211 ff., 
 255 ff., 258, 261 f., 264 f., 272, 273, 
 301 f., 312-319, 326-335, 343-353, 355, 
 358-361, 362-366, 369, 374, 379, 380, 
 383, 401, 404, 405, 406, 408, 409, 410, 
 411, 412, 525, 53°, 538, 539, 540-546, 
 
 549 i- 
 
 Spires, 349. 
 
 Stackelberg, Russian ambassador to Po- 
 land, 57, 85, 91, 97, 98, 99, 100, I 22 , 
 
 139, 5ii- 
 
 Stadion, Austrian diplomat, 369, 375. 
 
 Stael-Holstein, Baron de, Swedish diplo- 
 mat, 448, 450, 452. 
 
 Standestaat, 7. 
 
 Stanislas II Augustus (Poniatowski),king 
 of Poland (1764-95), 47~49, 53 i-, 58, 
 60, 61, 67, 71; strives for a Russo- 
 Polish alliance, 82-91, 92, 93; his 
 policy at the beginning of the Four 
 Years' Diet, 96, 97; opposes the Prus- 
 sian connection, 99, 122 f.; ill health 
 of, 112; his enormous debts, 122, 
 456 f.; drafts a new constitution, 196; 
 the Third of May, 198 f.; makes 
 brave speech in response to the Rus- 
 sian declaration, 285; talks of fight- 
 ing, 291; inquires concerning 'a 
 proper cuisine', 291, 296; appeals to 
 Catherine, 292 ff.; yields to Russia, 
 295 ff., 490; wishes to abdicate, 396; 
 talks of Siberia, 456 f.; accepts money 
 from Sievers, 461; his speeches in the 
 Diet of Grodno, 464 f., 468, 469, 473; 
 at the ' Dumb Session,' 479. 
 
 Starhemberg, Prince, Austrian confer- 
 ence minister, 343, 346. 
 
 Staszic, Stanislas, Polish liberal, 6 2, 9 2, 93, 
 
 State Chancellery, the, in Austria, 255. 
 
 403, 405- 
 State Conference, the, in Austria, 255, 
 
 262, 267, 273, 327-331, 343-347, 361, 
 362 f., 369, 373 f., 398 f., 409.
 
 INDEX 
 
 585 
 
 Straz, the, 200. 
 
 Sulkowski, Polish adventurer, 103, n. 1. 
 Suvalov, Russian minister, 109. 
 Suvorov, Russian general, 382. 
 Svensksund, naval battle of (1790), 
 
 144. 
 Swabia, 346. 
 Sweden, 16, 25, n. 1, 32, 36, 37, 38, 43, 
 
 44, n. 1, 70, 75, 78, 90 f., 94, no, 114, 
 
 139, 155, 157, 162, 166, 243, 248, 446, 
 
 447 i-, 449, 45°, 45 2 f -, 477- 
 Swedes, 14, 24, 31, 32, S3, 119, 446. 
 Switzerland, 453, 502. 
 Sybel, Heinrich von, German historian, 
 
 493 *• 
 Szlachta, the, 8-25. 
 
 Szydlowski, Polish deputy, 476. 
 
 Targowica, Confederation of (1792), 87, 
 249, 275-282, 294-298, 382-385, 394, 
 454 i-, 458, 462 ff., 497, 5i3- 
 
 Tarn6w, circle in Galicia, 144. 
 
 Tartars, 9, 26, 31, 449. 
 
 Teschen, Peace of (1779), 67, 330. 
 
 Third of May, Revolution of the, 191, 
 192-216, 488, 489, 491. 
 
 Thirty Years' War, the, 37. 
 
 Thorn, Polish city, 65, 66, 67, 77, 113, 
 123, 124, 125, 132, 134, 145, 146, 151, 
 154, 161, 163, 168, 169, 170, 174, 176, 
 252, 263, 318, 342, n. 4, 391, 4S8, 496; 
 massacre at (1724), 26. 
 
 Thugut, Baron von, Austrian minister, 
 355, 401 f., 405 i-, 410-415, 422-430, 
 432, 433, 438 f-, 444- 
 
 Tilsit, Treaty of (1807), 4. 
 
 Trade, decline of, in Poland, 14 f. 
 
 Treitschke, German historian, 493. 
 
 Triple Alliance, the, of England, Hol- 
 land, and Prussia, in 1788, 78, 114 f., 
 116, 125, 126, 130, 134, 152, 163, 173, 
 176, 209, 215, 246, 491. 
 
 Triple Alliance of the North, the, 167. 
 
 Tunis, 481. 
 
 Turgot, French statesman, 55. 
 
 Turkey, 3, 36, 37, 38, 43, 70, 74, 94, no, 
 "4, 133, 3io, 428, 446, 447, 449, 500, 
 
 502; concludes peace with Russia, 
 
 I53-I9 1 - 
 Turkish Question, the, 3. 
 Turkish war, see Oriental war. 
 Turks, the, 14, 43, 50, 51, 69, 70, 115, 
 
 118, 120, 129, 132, 137, 139, 145, 147, 
 
 148, 243, 244, 250, 253, 446, 450, 452, 
 
 501, 537- 
 Tuscany, 12. 
 
 Tver, Russian province, 482. 
 Tyszkiewicz, Count, Polish magnate, 
 
 467. 
 
 Ukraine, the, 44, 50, 60, 85, 87, 100, 109, 
 138, 141, 180, 237, 245, 246, 276, 278, 
 288 f., 313, 314, 318, 324, 390, 487, 
 499, 5i5, 5i6, 537. 
 
 Uniate Church, the, 500. 
 
 Upper Palatinate, the, 314. 
 
 Usedom, Prussian general, 103. 
 
 Valmy, battle of (Sept. 20, 1792), 347, 
 
 348, 384- 
 Veiled protectorates, system of, 481. 
 Venice, 297, 423 f., 439. 
 Venice, doge of, 10. 
 Verdun, 348, 349, 350, 542, 544. 
 Verela, Peace of (1790), 155, 167, 168. 
 Vergennes, Comte de, French statesman, 
 
 69 f. 
 Vergniaud, French statesman, 450. 
 Verninac, French diplomat, 448. 
 Versailles, Treaty of (1756), 212, 236. 
 Vienna, Congress of, 4. 
 Vienna, Preliminary Convention of 
 
 (July 25, 1791), 214 f., 234 f., 236, 241, 
 
 3°5- 
 
 Vitebsk, palatinate of, 54. 
 
 Vladimir, Saint, ' the Great,' grand 
 prince of Russia (980-1015), 41. 
 
 Volhynia, district in Poland, 140, 249, 
 391,476, 528. 
 
 Voltaire, 55, 61. 
 
 Vorontsov, A. R., Russian minister, 377. 
 
 Vorontsov, S. R., Russian envoy at Lon- 
 don, 185, 186, 501 f.
 
 5 86 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Wakefield, 186. 
 
 Wallachia, 76. 
 
 Warmia (Ermeland), ancient division of 
 Poland, 54. 
 
 Warsaw, 296 f., 391, 454. 
 
 Weissenburg, lines of, 437. 
 
 Westphalia, 449. 
 
 West Prussia, 32, 40, 54, 65, 143. 
 
 White Russia, 154, 168. 
 
 White Russians, 26. 
 
 Whitworth, British envoy at St. Peters- 
 burg, 178, 442, 526. 
 
 Wiec, 17 f. 
 
 Wladyslaw I Lokietek, king of Poland 
 (1319-33), 16. 
 
 Wollner, favorite of Frederick William II 
 of Prussia, 73. 
 
 Wojna, Polish diplomat, 427. 
 
 Wurmser, Austrian general, 437. 
 
 Yarmouth, Lord, British diplomat, 
 
 432 f., 436. 
 York, Duke of, 195. 
 
 Zabiello, Polish politician, 461. 
 Zamosc, circle in Galicia, 144. 
 Zaporozhian S&c, destruction of the, 86. 
 Zavadovski, Russian minister, 440. 
 'Zealots,' the, 463-470, 476, 479, 480, 
 
 481, 482. 
 Zielehce, battle of (1792), 290, 291. 
 Zimmermann, 180. 
 
 Zips, the, 25, n. 1, 51, 134. • 
 
 Zubov, favorite of Catherine II, 180, 237, 
 
 245, 252, 254, 259, 274, 275, 277, 371, 
 
 462, 526. 
 Zweibriicken, 336, 359, 360, 429. 
 Zweibrucken, Duke of, 315, 317, 331, 
 
 35i, 358, 415, 433-
 
 University of California 
 
 SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388 
 
 Return this material to the library 
 
 from which it was borrowed. 
 
 
 8(H9242s8)9482 
 
 1
 
 i 
 
 DK 
 
 U3h 
 16 
 
 UC SOUTHERM REGIONAL 
 
 LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 A A 000 234 792 
 
 ~*D 
 

 
 Ue